The begs of Xinjiang: between two worlds[1]

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Introduction

The Xinjiang People's Publishing House recently produced a series of booklets on the historical characters of Xinjiang. Included among the accounts of the region's heroes and heroines are the stories of some five hakim-begs, the local chief administrators during the Qing. They have all won inclusion in this series for demonstrations of loyalty to their Manchu conquerors and assistance rendered in the suppression of revolt against the Chinese empire. Heavily edited as these accounts may be, historical evidence of the hakims' co-operation with their conquerors is irrefutable.

Yet were these heroes of the empire someone else's traitors? The Muslim-Turkic élite of this region had no nation to lose, no supreme ruling family to betray. The calls on their loyalty were those of religion, culture, family and locality, none of which was ever challenged by the Manchu. Their conquerors did not aspire to impart to them the customs or ritual practices of the Chinese, but on the contrary, to legitimize their own specifically Manchu rule through the preservation of local tradition and recognition of cultural differences. This, in turn, was to have strong implications for the development of an ethnic consciousness among the sedentary, non-tribal peoples of Xinjiang.

Since 1678, the areas north and south of the Tianshan range had been united under Zunghar (Mongol) rule. In the south, the so-called Altishahr region, where the population was predominantly Turkic-Muslim, the Khwājas[2] had periodically attempted to shake off the Zunghar yoke. Yet, it was only with the Manchu conquest of 1760 that the power of the Naqshbandiyya in the south was broken, albeit temporarily, and their leaders exiled.

The Qing dynasty was now the source of ultimate secular authority, but far from being undermined by the conquest, the local aristocracy were the mediators between pre-colonial and colonial, conquerors and conquered, religious and secular. Their relationship with the Qing was symbiotic; these neo-traditional administrators served their conquerors, but they were also empowered by them both directly and indirectly. The very dynamics of co-operation and conflict with the Qing increased their room to manoeuvre in their internal power struggles.

This paper assesses some 100 years (1760–1864) of administration by local officials in the Chinese dependency of Xinjiang. It seeks to show that the begs, and the chief officials, the hakims, were neither unequivocal collaborationists nor passive recipients of the experience of colonization.

[1] In the following article, the names of places have been rendered in a commonly recognized romanized form. Where non-Chinese personal names have been given according to their Chinese transliterations, *pinyin* is used, but syllables are separated by hyphens to distinguish them from Chinese names.

[2] Unless otherwise stipulated, the term refers to the Makhdūmzāda Khwājas, political and religious leaders of the Alitshahr region.

The old alliances[3]

After the Zunghar conquest of the Altishahr region in 1679, the Mongols had retained neither military presence nor civil administration in the region.[4] Although tolerant of Islam *per se*, the Buddhist Zunghars identified the one real threat to their rule in the Altishahr region as the Khwāja descendants of the sixteenth-century Islamic leader Makhdūm-i A'zam.[5] By the mid seventeenth century, this family had divided into two opposing branches of the Naqshbandī order, the Isḥāqiyya and the Āfāqiyya. Both assumed for themselves the rightful position of pre-eminence in the religious and political life of Altishahr, and so began their long and ultimately self-defeating struggle for supremacy.[6]

In the early seventeenth century the Isḥāqiyya, named after Isḥāq, the second (or possibly fourth) son of Makhdūm-i A'zam, had dominated the politics of Altishahr from Yarkand, the seat of the Chagatai Mughal khans. After the Zunghar conquest, however, Galdan Khan (r. 1671–97) gave his support to the Āfāqiyya, followers of Khwāja Āfāq whose father (son of the eldest son of Makhdūm-i A'zam) had initiated the challenge to Isḥāqī rule. The Āfāqiyya now moved the seat of power to Kashgar, but following Khwāja Āfāq's death in 1694, Āfāqī authority was undermined by internal divisions and in the early eighteenth century the Isḥāqiyya attempted to reassert itself at Yarkand.

In 1713, the Zunghars reimposed their rule in the Altishahr region by removing to Ili eminent members of both branches of the Makhdūmzāda Khwāja family and holding them hostage. A temporary peace was secured, but in 1720, for reasons that remain unclear, the Zunghars decided to reinstate the Isḥāqī Khwājas as vassals, dividing the Altishahr between the five sons of Khwāja Dāniyāl, grandson of Isḥāq. An uneasy stability endured until the middle of the century by which time the political fissures in the northern heartland of the Zunghar khanate had prompted the Isḥāqiyya to prepare to rid themselves of the Zunghar yoke.

Evidence of the extent to which members of the Altishahr nobility, commonly known by the honorific title of 'beg' were bound to one or the other of the Makhdūmzāda Khwāja factions is scant. What is clear, however, is that the begs had their own agenda, independent of Khwāja politics. Their first concern was their power *vis-à-vis* religious authority, and for many their allegiance to one or other order was not immutable.[7] Responsibility for day-to-day administration throughout the Altishahr lay in the hands of both the

[3] The following account is taken largely from Henry Schwarz, 'The Khwājas of Eastern Turkestan', *Central Asiatic Journal*, 20/4, 1976, 266–96; Joseph Fletcher, 'The Naqshbandiyya in northwest China', in Beatrice Forbes Manz (ed.), *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), ch. xi; Robert B. Shaw, 'The history of the Khōjas of Eastern-Turkistān', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, LXVI, 1897, supplement; Martin Hartmann, 'Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft der Chogas in Kasgarien', *Der Islamische Orient*, VI–X, 1905, 1–173.

[4] After the reassertion of Mongol power in 1713, Schwarz finds reference to a nominal force of 15 soldiers in each major city (Schwarz, 'The Khwājas', 281).

[5] A Naqshbandī religious leader (1461–1542) who was active in Central Asia and claimed descent from the Prophet in the twenty-second generation.

[6] In the early eighteenth century, the Āfāqiyya and Isḥāqiyya became known as the Aqtāghlïq (White Mountain faction) and Qarātāghlïq (Black Mountain faction) respectively, after the Kirghiz who were associated with them. One group of these Kirghiz is said to have originated from the Pamirs (Qarātāgh) and the other from a mountain north of Artish (Aqtāgh). In an attempt to simplify events I have omitted reference to the Kirghiz, both here and later.

[7] This point has been argued by Miao Pusheng. See Miao Pusheng, 'Guanyu Qingchao zhengfu dui Xinjiang Yisilanjiao zhengce zhong de jige wenti' ('Regarding several questions in Qing dynasty policy towards Islam in Xinjiang'), *Xinjiang lishi yanjiu* (*Studies in Xinjiang history*), 1, 1987.

local *ākhūnds* and hereditary begs, but it was the former who were held in greatest respect and appear to have had ultimate power in the communities. According to one Chinese source, the begs did not dare exert authority over them[8] and while the hakims may have had responsibility for law and order including imposition of the death penalty,[9] the power of life and death over the hakims lay with the *ākhūnds*. At the Muslim New Year, after the hakim had performed his act of worship in the mosque, the *ākhūnd* (presumably the *A'lim ākhūnd*) and his coterie would decide whether or not the hakim was worthy. If their verdict was positive the hakim would be allowed to continue in office, but if he was deemed to be remiss, the *ākhūnd* would hand him over to the crowds to be killed. For this reason, we are told, 'the hakims frequently possessed soldiers for their personal protection.'[10] This and other indications that the role of the *ākhūnds* far exceeded religious concerns,[11] suggests that there was ample room for rivalry between the religious and more secular élites.

Learning that the Isḥāqiyya were planning to revolt against their divided Mongol overlords, the hakim of Ush-Turfan, Khōjis (Khwāja-sī), not entirely surprisingly therefore, reported this to the Zunghars. His interest clearly lay in keeping the power of the Makhdūmzāda Khwājas in check, but the Zunghar empire, now under the faltering leadership of Davachi, was in no position to restore its authority. In 1754, Amursana, who had been thwarted in his bid for the Zunghar throne, declared himself and his tribe subjects of China. The Qing armies, which had been engaged in sporadic and increasingly costly attempts to subdue the Zunghars since the time of Galdan, joined forces with Amursana and advanced towards Ili. The last Zunghar Khan, Davachi, fled south to Ush-Turfan where in 1755 his erstwhile vassal, Hakim Khōjis, was sufficiently well apprised of developments in the north to make him drunk and hand him over to the Manchu forces and Amursana.

Meanwhile, with the agreement of the occupying Manchu general, Ban-di, Amursana released one of the hostage Āfāqiyya Khwājas, Burhān al-Dīn, to rout the revolting Isḥāqiyya and to establish his own rule as a Qing dependency. Burhān al-Din, accompanied by a small detachment of Manchu forces, headed south.

As expected, at Aqsu and Ush-Turfan the city gates were opened in welcome. Ishāqī troops then advanced from Yarkand and Khotan, besieged the Āfāqiyya at Aqsu and tried to negotiate an agreement by which the two orders would divide the region between themselves and unite to march on the Manchu infidel at Ili—an offer which the Āfāqiyya declined. As the Ishāqī forces retreated, Burhān al-Dīn advanced on Kashgar, which had remained an Āfāqī stronghold. Here it is reported he was also given a warm welcome by the local people but, initially at least, there was some hesitancy on the part of the Ishāqī hakim, Khush Kipak, and the local élite. Whether Khush Kipak, a Khotani and trusted supporter of the Isḥāqī Khwāja Yūsuf, was reassured by the presence of the Manchu forces, as Chinese accounts imply, or whether their presence convinced him of the hopelessness of resistance is unclear. However,

[8] *Huijiang zhi* [hereafter *HJZ*] (*Gazetteer of the Muslim regions*), compiled by Su-er-de *et al.*, 1772, 22b. There are several slightly different versions of this work, I am here following an undated manuscript version in the Bodleian Library (MS Chin.e.6).

[9] Qi-shi-yi (Chunyuan) 'Xiyu wenjian lu' (hereafter XYWJL) ('Record of the Western Region') *c.* 1764 (Preface 1760), *Qingzhao tang congshu*, (comp.) Li Yuanchun, 1835, 106a.

[10] XYWJL, 92a.

[11] For example in Aqsu in the absence of a hakim it was apparently *ākhūnd* 'Abdu Ghāfur who assumed authority. *Qinding pingding Zhunga'er fanglüe* [hereafter *PDZFL*] (*Imperially commissioned account of the pacification of the Zunghars*), (comp.) Fu-heng *et al.*, 1772, *zheng* 65:9ab.

he subsequently supported Burhān al-Dīn against the Ishāqiyya, before surrendering to the Qing.[12]

At Yarkand, however, where Isḥāqī allegiance and Khwāja Ya'qūb's rule had popular support, there was a fierce battle of resistance. Only after winning over prominent members of the nobility was Burhān al-Dīn able to enter the city. Assisted by the ever-fickle Khirgiz, the Āfāqiyya then captured and slaughtered those Isḥāqī leaders who had taken flight.

When later the same year (autumn 1755) Amursana, the Zunghar leader, revolted against the Qing, in the ensuing confusion Khwāja Jihān (Yaḥyā), Burhān al-Dīn's younger brother who had been retained as a hostage in Ili, escaped and headed south. The two Āfāqī Khwāja brothers, Burhān al-Dīn and Khwāja Jihān, based in Yarkand and Kashgar, held sway over Altishahr in the name of the Qing for two years from 1756–58, but the Āfāqiyya became increasingly reluctant to pay taxes to the Qing, and Khwāja Jihān, supported by a number of begs, incited his brother to revolt. Just as Khōjis had been unwilling to support an Isḥāqī revolt some years previously, so now other hakims of the eastern Altishahr cities, such as Hudawī and Sadī-baldī, were unwilling to join the Āfāqī Khwāja rebellion and escaped to Ili.[13]

Once again it would appear that the ambivalent relationship between the local nobility of the south and the Khwājas must be explained not only in terms of their allegiance to one or other faction, but also in terms of the perceived threat to their own more secular authority. Moreover, it is unlikely that the influence of the Makhdūmzāda Khwājas was great beyond the western oasis cities of southern Altishahr; in the Kucha region, for example, another brotherhood, the Qādiriyya was dominant. Thus geographical divisions also figured on the political landscape and the hakims of the eastern Altishahr were clearly less willing than those of the south to accept the unfettered dominance of either the Āfāqī or the Isḥāqī Khwājas.

With their forces finally crushed and routed by the Qing armies, in 1759 the Āfāqī brothers fled to Badakshan where they were captured and killed. One of Burhān al-Dīn's sons, however, Samsāq (Sarimsāq), was to grow up in exile in the Ferghana Valley region and it was his descendants who, with their Khoqandi and Kirghiz allies, were to pose the greatest threat to Manchu rule in Altishahr in the first half of the nineteenth century.[14] It was over this much troubled and fractured society that the Qing sought to impose its rule.

The new order

In 1758, with the conquest of Zungharia complete, the governor-general of Ili, Zhao-hui, turned his attention to developments south of the Tianshan. Having apprised himself of the full extent of the Khwājas' revolt, he ordered a force of some 10,000 Qing troops to march from Turfan towards the eastern oasis cities of Altishahr.[15] At Kucha, the gateway to the south, Khwāja Jihān and his troops were besieged for three months. Finally, as food and water

[12] Appointed as the temporary hakim of Kashgar, in 1760 Kush Kipak went to court where he was given a peerage of the sixth rank *fuguo gong* and detained permanently in Beijing—on account of his divided loyalty, no doubt. *Huijiang tongzhi* [hereafter *HJTZ*] (*Comprehensive gazetteer of the Muslim regions*), (comp.) He-ning, 1804, 6:8ab. Nor was he the only Isḥāqī beg to switch sides.

[13] See their biographies in *HJTZ*, *juan* 5.

[14] See Saguchi Tōru, 'The revival of the White Mountain Khwājas, 1760–1820', *Acta Asiatica*, 14, 1968, 7–20.

[15] Following conventional usage, Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Hisar and Khotan are referred to as the western cities of the Altishahr region, and Kucha, Ush-Turfan, Aqsu (and Bai) and Korla as the eastern cities.

gave out, the Khwāja took flight and the gates of Kucha were swung open. The Qing army continued its march westward.

Throughout the following months, as the cities of the Tarim Basin surrendered one by one to the advancing army, so, in well-practised manner, the Qing generals duly carried out investigations of population, grain, livestock, tax and the vestiges of the local administrative system. In the summer of 1759 the governor-general, Zhao-hui, memorialized that in the populous region of Kashgar there were some 15 different administrative titles in current usage including a hakim, the chief official, under whose leadership the incumbents carried out their various civic duties.[16]

The administrative picture was consistent throughout the south. In total, Manchu officials identified some 30 offices ranging in a loose hierarchy from the hakim and his assistant, the *ishikāghā*, to those responsible for roads, schools and orchards.[17] These officials wore no indication of rank, and only the seating order at public feasts and ceremonies would apprise the uninitiated observer of their relative power and wealth. They drew no salary and their income depended on what they levied in fines, duties and extortion from those under their jurisdiction.[18]

There appears to have been little debate as to how the Qing were to administer their newly conquered region; the advantage of retaining the local officialdom of conquered territories was already well established in imperial practice. However, many local officials had been killed in the recent wars, while others had fled. Early in 1759, the court sanctioned Councillor Shu-hede's request to retain a system of local officials, to fill vacant posts, creating new ones where necessary, and to institute a system of rank *pinji* loosely in line with the system used in the interior.[19] These originally temporary measures, became the basis of the system by which the Manchu ruled this region through local officials for some one hundred years.

A hakim was appointed in all the major cities, towns and villages of the Altishahr, as well as in the Zungharian region of Ili whither large numbers of southerners were now being sent to cultivate the lands of the vanquished and vanished Zunghars.[20] Below the hakim, the appointment of the various officials reflected local requirements and conditions. Thus while most of the officials were common to all the major cities,[21] Aqsu, for example, with its large Dolon community, was the only area to have a Dolon-beg.[22] In the early nineteenth century in Korla, a small city of some 670 households, there were ten appointments distributed across seven offices, while in the entire administrative area of Kashgar with over 2,500 households, including the city of Yangi Hisar and

[16] *PDZFL, zheng* 75:33b–34a.

[17] The etymology of the titles is varied: Persian, Arabic, Turkic and Mongol. Saguchi suggests that some had been used as the titles of Turkmen, Uzbek and Iranian officials as early as the sixteenth century. Saguchi Tōru, *Jūhachi-jūkyūseiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū* (*Study of the history of eighteenth- to nineteenth-century Eastern Turkestan society*) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1963), 123. Saguchi's chapter on the beg-system is still the best general account and I am much indebted to his pioneering work.

[18] *HJZ*, 49a.

[19] *PDZFL, zheng* 75:28b–29b.

[20] In the mid eighteenth century, Qing massacres compounded by internecine fighting, emigration and a small-pox epidemic served to wipe out hundreds of thousands of Zunghars, leaving a largely depopulated region north of Tianshan. The Zunghars had established a small Turkic-Muslim community in Ili Valley to which the Manchu now added, moving hundreds of Turkic-Muslim households from the south.

[21] *HJTZ*, 7:19a–20a.

[22] *Huijiang zeli* [hereafter *HJZL*] (*Substatutes of the Muslim regions*), (comp.) Tuo-jin *et al.*, 1842, 1:13b. The Dolons were probably of Mongol origin, although they were Muslims. There were some 400-odd households at Aqsu at the time of the conquest, *PDZFL, xu* 8:17a.

17 towns and villages, there were approximately 52 office-holders with 12 different titles.[23]

The Manchu authorities retained the familiar traditional titles of the various offices, which for the most part indicated the function of the incumbent.[24] To the 30-odd offices which were officially recognized throughout the region were added three new posts: those denoting responsibility for jade, copper and gold mining—all of which now became government monopolies.

The Qing also added the term 'beg' to all titles of office. Beg had been used as an honorific title throughout Central Asia long before the Qing conquest. It was passed on from generation to generation in noble or influential families and implied social status rather than official position. Not surprisingly, nearly all those who held office under the Zunghars and the Khwājas happened to be begs, although this was not necessarily the case.[25] Now, however, all local holders of government office became known as begs, so that the hakim became a hakim-beg, the *qāḍī* (official responsible for Islamic Law) the *qāḍī*-beg, the *mīrāb* (controller of irrigation), the *mīrāb*-beg and so on.[26] As the term beg came to signify an official functionary in the service of the Qing, so the hereditary, honorific usage was gradually eroded.

Fundamental to the creation of the new administrative system was the introduction of a system of rank: five grades ranging from the third to the seventh rank. As the chief local official with responsibility for all the other begs, the hakim-beg of an area would hold the highest rank, but this would vary according to the size of the population over which he had responsibility. The hakim-begs of the cities of Kashgar, Khotan, Yarkand, Aqsu, Sairam, Kucha, Shayar, Korla, Bugur and Ili were all of the third rank, while the remaining 20-odd hakims ranged from third to sixth rank. In the cities the hakim's assistant, the *ishikāghā*-beg, was normally of fourth or fifth rank, and the *khazānachī*-beg and *shang*-beg of fourth rank.[27] The highest grade for the *qāḍī*, *mutuvallī*, *naqīb*, *pādishab*, *mīrāb*, *dīvān*, *altūn*, *ming* and *muḥtasib* begs was the fifth rank,[28] while the remaining begs would be of sixth and seventh rank. The ranked beg was an official of the Qing government and in the Altishahr region, the limits of the beg-system defined the limits of Chinese imperial power. Thus when in the 1830s, the Khanate of Khoqand tried to appropriate the Sarikol region, to the south-west of Yarkand, the court cited the existence of the ranked beg-system in the area as irrefutable evidence that this was Chinese territory.[29]

Below the ranked begs every locality had a number of non-ranked public

[23] Figures fluctuated and differ slightly from source to source. The figures given here are based on the *HJTZ*.

[24] There is only one indication of a possible change in function. According to the *HJZ* 64a, formerly, the *dīvān* (*du-guan*) had been responsible for official documents, but he now took charge of supplying foreign envoys with provisions. However, it is not clear when this 'formerly' refers to and already in 1759 Zhao-hui's report notes that the *dīvān* was responsible for courier stations (*PDZFL*, *zheng* 75:34a).

[25] See Shimada Jōhei 'Hōjiya jidai no bekutachi' ('The begs at the time of the Khwājas'), *Tōhōgaku* (*Eastern Studies*), 3, 1952, 71.

[26] There is some evidence, however, that the suffix beg was used with at least three of the posts prior to Qing rule, e.g. *shangbeg*, *mingbeg*, and *yüzbeg*. See for example, *PDZFL*, *zheng* 75:33b–34a and Shimada's reference to the Kashgarian *waqf* record of 1662. As Shimada points out, in the case of the *mīrāb*, to add the suffix beg was clearly tautological; '*mīr*' meaning 'amīr' and '*ab*', 'water'. Shimada, 'Hōjiya jidai no bekutachi', 71.

[27] The *khazānachī*-beg and the shang-beg were responsible for control of the treasury and tax collection, respectively.

[28] These officials were responsible for Islamic law, deeds, construction works, policing, courier stations, gold-mining, tax collection from 1,000 households and Islamic education, respectively.

[29] Number One Historical Archives, Beijing: *Junjichu lufu zoupi: minzu* (*Grand Council copies of palace memorials: minorities*), 8072.38 (Daoguang, 14.12).

servants, including messengers, translators and minor officials of the local militia. In some cases these posts afforded them the Qing insignia of the gold button, *jinding*, and in all cases the incumbents were accountable to the hakim-begs.[30]

The impact on religious authority

The significance of the grade-system was not merely to dictate emolument and privileges, it brought all local officials into one, clearly defined hierarchical administrative system. This included the three religious functionaries, the *qāḍī*-beg (responsible for interpreting the shariat), the *muḥtasib*-beg (responsible for public morality and religious education), and the *pādishab*-beg (responsible for policing), all of whom were now placed under the hakim and his assistant, as opposed to alongside them.

The impact of this on what had long been a fragile balance of power between the religious and secular authorities cannot be doubted. By subordinating the religious functionaries to the higher-ranking begs, the Qing dealt a significant blow to religious powers and enhanced the status of the begs. Thus although the *ākhūnds* remained influential and respected members of the community,[31] it was the begs, notably those who held office as hakims, who by virtue of their association with the Manchu, held the monopoly of power. Clearly, the religious leaders did not immediately grasp their new status. Soon after Hudawī of Kucha took up his post as hakim of Yarkand, several leading members of the community, including the *ishikāghā*-beg 'Abd al-Raḥīm, lodged a complaint about him: he drank excessively, was given to outbursts of temper and was, they claimed, unfit for office. The fact that the leading signatory of the petition was not the *ishikāghā*-beg but an *ākhūnd* (who apparently held no official post) did not escape the attention of the Qianlong emperor and he promptly ordered that a public announcement be made indicating that the *ākhūnds* should not interfere in administrative matters, responsibility for which lay entirely with the hakim-begs.[32] Nevertheless, the Manchu attempted to limit, not to strip the *ākhūnds* of their authority, and those who supported the Qing conquest were well rewarded.

In fact, any attempt to separate completely the secular and spiritual powers would have been impractical. In a society in which only the wealthy could read and even merchants were virtually illiterate,[33] the religious leaders and local nobility belonged to a small educated class and were frequently related; not surprisingly, the authority of the former did not vanish overnight. In 1760, many who had served as *pādishab*, *muḥtasib* and *qāḍī* under the Khwājas and the Zunghars were now given the title of beg and were thereby bureaucratized, taking their position in the hierarchy below the higher-ranking begs. Clerics continued to serve as begs and given that mullas frequently worked as translators, close relations between secular and temporal powers were ensured. As a respected and potentially powerful force whose appeal to the people was well appreciated, not surprisingly hakim-begs were wont to appoint their personal favourites as *ākhūnds*, or even begs. In 1828, concern at this tendency

[30] Appointments to *jinding* posts were made locally and ratified by the Councillor (*HJTZ*, 9:8a). For a full account of the local and Manchu administrations see *Qinding huangyu Xiyu tuzhi* (*Imperially commissioned illustrated gazetteer of the lands of the Western regions*), (comp.) Fu-heng *et al.*, 1782, *juan* 29 and 30.

[31] Ahmed Shāh Naqshbandī, 'Route from Kashmir, via Ladakh, to Yarkand, by Ahmed Shah Nakshahbandi' (tr. J. Dowson), *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 12, 1850, 383.

[32] *HJTZ*, 5:3b.

[33] *HJZ*, 23a; XYWJL, 105b.

prompted the Special Imperial Agent Na-yan-cheng to propose that *ākhūnds* and their sons no longer be allowed to serve as begs, and that no more than one or two sons of any *ākhūnd* be allowed to become religious leaders themselves.[34] On the other hand, cases of friction and animosity between begs and *ākhūnds* also persisted resulting, on one occasion, in *ākhūnds* being put in the cangue for opposing a new tax[35] and on another, in provoking open rebellion.[36]

The immediate effect of the Manchu conquest and subsequent policies was not only to check the religious activities of the Khwājas, but to shift the local balance of power from the Āfāqiyya to the Isḥāqiyya. However, the lack of any informed reference to these two Naqshbandī orders in communications between the court and the military authorities in the Altishahr would indicate that there was no conscious attempt to manipulate the schism. On the contrary, during the late eighteenth century at least, it would appear that even if the Manchu did fully comprehend the religious politics of the region, they did not regard it as relevant—having concluded that allegiance to one or other order was not a reliable reflection of loyalty to the Qing.

For this reason, there was no purge of the Āfāqiyya following the conquest, and several Āfāqī begs who had served Khwāja Jihān were afforded office under the Qing and even selected to go on tribute missions.[37] Moreover, there was no persecution of the Āfāqiyya. Āfāqī shrines remained open; adherents were allowed to venerate the tombs of their saints and to seek spiritual inspiration there—notably at the Āfāqī tomb just outside Kashgar.[38] All who surrendered were treated with lenience. Prominent members of the Āfāqiyya, descendants of Makhdūm-i A'zam such as 'Abd al-Khāliq, fourth son of Burhān al-Dīn, and his relatives were removed to Beijing where they were ennobled and given grand residences in the Muslim camp, *Huizi ying*, not far from the imperial city. Several other relatives of this Khwāja family, including Husein Erke Khwāja and Pārsā Khwāja, the grandsons of Āfāq Khwāja's younger brother, surrendered to the Qing and were moved with their families and followers to Beijing.

Meanwhile a number of southern Isḥāqī begs were indeed appointed to high office as a reward for their loyalty and not surprisingly they would have outnumbered the Āfāqī nobles, many of whom had fled or been killed. Yet it would be erroneous to assume that the Qing and the Isḥāqiyya were thereafter allied against the Āfāqiyya. Just five years earlier the Isḥāqiyya had been as unreceptive to Qing rule as the Āfāqiyya subsequently proved to be. Thus when the Āfāqī Khwājas revolted, Isḥāqiyya co-operation with the Qing was born of the failure to reconcile their mutual differences with the Āfāqiyya and a clear sense of *Realpolitik*. Nor did the Isḥāqī attitude change after the conquest. The *History of the Khwājas* (*Tazkira-i-Khwājagān*) written in 1768 demonstrates a strong Isḥāqi sympathy and a vehement hatred of the Manchu infidel—a work which, according to its author Muḥammad Ṣādiq, was undertaken at the request no less of the wife of 'Othmān, the hakim-beg of Kashgar.[39]

[34] *Nawenyi gong zouyi* [hereafter *NWYGZY*]. (*Collection of the memorials of Na-yan-cheng*), (comp.) Rong-an, 1834, 78:23ab.

[35] For an account of this incident see James Millward, 'Beyond the Pass: commerce, ethnicity and the Qing in Xinjiang, 1759–1864' (Ph.D. thesis: Stanford University, 1993), 322–3.

[36] I refer to the revolt of 1815 led by the Isḥāqī *ākhūnd* Ziyā al-Dīn. Although the reasons for this revolt were never satisfactorily revealed, there can be no doubt that Ziyā al-Dīn was an influential character whose authority challenged that of the local begs—including the hakim of Kashgar. See *Song-yun Xinjiang zougao* (*Song-yun's Xinjiang memorials*), (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan tushuguan, 1980).

[37] Miao, 'Guanyu Qingchao zhengfu', 43–4.

[38] *PDFZL*, *xu* 1:11b.

[39] There is a problem here. Shaw notes that 'Othmān was the son of a religious man named Mīr Zāhidī (see Shaw, 'History of the Khōjas', preface by N. Elias, iii). I have not been able to trace any further reference to this hakim of Kashgar. Clearly it is not 'Othmān, son of Hudawī, who did not take office as hakim of Kashgar until 1778.

Continuity of power among the local élite

Not without reason then, for the Manchu the overriding concern in the appointment of higher-ranking begs was necessarily loyalty, and only hopefully ability. In the early years after the conquest, the Manchu authorities turned in the first instance to the nobles of Turfan and Hami. These two eastern regions, the Uighuristan of the ninth to fifteenth centuries, had had a close if troubled relationship with China since the Ming dynasty. Positioned at the head of the Gansu corridor, they formed a transit zone through which all the Manchu forces and their supplies had to pass on entering the newly-conquered western territories. Thus in the late Qing the strategic importance of the Turfan and Hami areas was enhanced, an importance which was retained until the late Republican Period.

In 1696, as the internecine wars of the Mongols became more virulent and the power of the Zungharian ruler Galdan Khan waned, Tarhan Beg 'Abdu-llāh, who ruled Hami under Zunghar tutelage, took the opportunity to dispatch to Beijing 1 dromedary, 24 horses, 8 camels, 1 knife, and an envoy charged with reaffirming Hami's loyalty to the celestial empire. Encouraged by the warm response—clothes, a hat of sable and a golden belt—the following year, 'Abdu-llāh attested to his loyalty by capturing one of Galdan's son, along with several of his followers and sending them bound hand and foot to Beijing. Shortly afterwards, a second son of the now deceased Galdan, who had sought refuge in Hami, was escorted under arms to Jiayuguan. The Kangxi emperor showed his appreciation by endorsing 'Abdu-llāh's rule and bringing Hami firmly into the empire. 'Abdu-llāh was appointed *jasak* of the first rank *qinwang* and in the course of 1698, Hami was fully incorporated into the banner system complete with an officialdom organized according to the Mongolian hereditary system of *jasaks*, *taijis*, and the various banner officials.[40] 'Abdu-llāh's descendants were subsequently awarded hereditary title and continued to rule over Hami until the death of Khan Maqsud Shah in March 1930, when the Chinese governor-general of Xinjiang, Jin Shuren, abolished the khanate.[41]

After the first Kangxi pacification campaign of 1720, there had followed several failed attempts to incorporate the Turfan Basin into the Qing empire. Finally, in 1756, success was attained, with the assistance of Emīn-khwāja. Emīn, the son of an influential religious family of the Turfan region rose to pre-eminence among the local nobility on the crest of the Manchu-Zunghar wars. In the early 1720s, he led the people of Lukchun, a town to the south-east of Turfan, in resisting Zunghar attacks. In 1725, the Qing garrison at Turfan withdrew and in its wake went the Turfan leader Toqtā Mahmud and several hundred of his people to seek refuge within the Pass. Emīn-khwāja took charge of those who remained, but the Zunghar fighting intensified and in 1732, on the instruction of the Yongzheng emperor, he organized the migration of over 10,000 Turfanis to safety in Guazhou, Gansu. For these clear demonstrations of antipathy towards the Zunghars, for his contribution to land reclamation and further services rendered to the Qing army, Emīn-khwāja was appointed *jasak* of the sixth rank *fuguo gong*, and on returning to Turfan in 1754 ruled first half and then, from 1756, the entire Turfan Basin. Rising swiftly through the imperial ranks of honour, in 1758 he was appointed councillor and assisted in the suppression of the Khwājas. He was conferred

[40] Liu Ziyang (ed.), *Qingdai difang guanzhi kao* (*Study of local officialdom in the Qing dynasty*) (Beijing: Zijincheng, 1988), 355.

[41] For 'Abdu-llāh's biography, see *HJTZ*, 2:6b–12b, 11:10a. This long succession was not achieved without some editing of the family's genealogy, see 'An heir to Prince Mahomet of Hami', *China Review*, XI, 1883, 334.

with the insignia of the three-eyed peacock feather and raised to the second rank of imperial nobility *junwang*, a title which in the course of the next 150-odd years was passed down through six generations to nine of his descendants.[42]

So, not only had the Qing court been instrumental in the establishment of the pre-eminent ruling families of Turfan and Hami, by the 1750s it had been cultivating their loyalty for several decades. With their authority in Hami and Turfan consolidated, these two Muslim families voluntarily gave their support to the Qing army as it marched south to suppress the Khwājas and take possession of the Tarim Basin. If it was the lure of reward that inspired them to take up arms against their Turkic-Muslim brethren, they were not to be disappointed. With the flight of the Khwājas and the suppression of the south complete, silver and silk were bestowed with imperial munificence, members of both families were duly awarded various ranks and appointed to high office in the administration of the Altishahr region. Emīn-khwāja, already elevated to the Manchu rank of councillor, now assumed office in Yarkand, while Yūsuf of Hami, the great grandson of 'Abdu-llāh, served briefly as hakim-beg in Kashgar. He, too, was appointed councillor and succeeded Emīn-khwāja at Yarkand. Yūsuf was replaced as hakim-beg of Kashgar by Emīn-khwāja's eldest son, Mūsā, who was assisted by his younger brother, Iskandar (Emīn-khwāja's sixth son) in the office of *ishikāghā*-beg. Subsequently, both Iskandar and his son Yūnus served as hakim-beg of Kashgar, while Afridūn, son of Yūnus was hakim of Yarkand.[43] Meanwhile in Ush-Turfan, Yūsuf's younger brother, 'Abdu-llāh, became the hakim-beg, an appointment which was to prove the error of assuming loyalty and integrity by association. In the early years after the conquest over a dozen members of these two families held office as third- and fourth-ranking begs throughout the Altishahr region and Ili. Meanwhile, there was no attempt to institute the beg-system in the area of Hami, and in Turfan the hereditary *jasak*-system also continued to predominate, with a mere ten begs appointed to fifth and sixth ranks.

Having legitimized the rule of these two families and bestowed on them generous rewards for their loyalty, the Qing court also afforded family members tax exemption, annual grants according to their title,[44] clemency for criminal offences and preferential treatment during their tribute-bearing missions to court.[45] In the early years of Manchu rule, the populace of Turfan and Hami similarly benefited from the emperor's bounty in the form of long periods of tax exemption, subsidies for purchasing farming equipment, housing, seeds and clothing. By affording these areas privileged treatment, the Manchu reaffirmed their special status *vis-à-vis* the Altishahr region, while simultaneously extending the authority of the Uighuristan ruling élite into the south, and subsequently also into the Ili region.

In addition to the élite of Hami and Turfan, other Turkic-Muslim nobles, notably from the eastern Altishahr cities of Kucha, Ush-Turfan, Bai and Aqsu had also demonstrated loyalty to the Qing army in the war against the Khwājas.

[42] *HJTZ*, 4:1a–11a.

[43] H. W. Bellew, 'History of Kashgar', in T. D. Forsyth, *Report of a Mission to Yarkund 1873* (Calcutta: Foreign Department Press, 1875), 201–2.

[44] Nobility of the second rank *junwang* from Hami and Turfan were given 1,200 *liang* of silver and 15 *pi* of silk per annum, the same as the Mongol nobility of equivalent rank. Others, *taiji*, etc., were also afforded silver and silk on a par with that received by their counterparts among the Mongolian nobility (*HJZL*, 3:3a).

[45] For example, in Beijing the ennobled begs from Hami and Turfan were lodged in the *Hami guan*, as opposed to the *Siyi guan* where the Altishahr begs stayed. They also shared the superior seating positions enjoyed by the Mongol nobility at the imperial ceremonies and banquets (*HJZL*, 3:16b–21a).

Although these cities did not have the same historical ties as Hami and Turfan with the Chinese empire, nevertheless they were geographically closer to Ili than to Kashgar and thus more sensitive to the shifting balances of power in the north. Soon after the Khwājas rose in rebellion, three hakims, Hudawī of Kucha, Sadī-baldī of Ush-Turfan, and Ga-dai-mo-te of Bai, fled to Ili and declared themselves for the Qing. In the following months, they served the Manchu military as guides and informers and accompanied the imperial army in the conquest of the southern oasis cities. The court was cautious, however, repeatedly warning the Manchu military authorities that, however loyal the Muslims of these eastern Altishahr cities appeared, they should not be deemed as dependable as the ruling nobles of Hami and Turfan.[46]

Nevertheless, they were duly rewarded; Hudawī, who was granted the title of *junwang*, served briefly as hakim-beg of Aqsu before being moved to the post of hakim in Yarkand. Sadī-baldī took office as hakim-beg, first in Yangi Hisar and later in Aqsu, while Ga-dai-mo-te of Bai served as hakim in Kashgar, and then Yarkand. In the early 1760s, some 20 begs of sixth rank and above came from the eastern Altishahr cities. Many had received office as a reward for assisting the Manchu army during the conquest[47] and were granted imperial titles, either hereditary or decreasing with each successive generation. Although they never enjoyed the same degree of imperial confidence as did the nobles from Uighuristan, in several cases their families remained prosperous and powerful until well into the nineteenth century.

Religious partisanship clearly shaped alliances, but primarily what we see during this period and the ensuing 100 years of Qing rule is a highly complex network of temporary political ties motivated by personal and family gain. Khōjis of Ush-Turfan is a case in point. After the Qing conquest Khōjis was rewarded for his efforts against Davachi and the Khwājas, but because his family had been patronized by Buhrān al-Dīn and enjoyed extensive authority under the Khwāja's rule, the court suspected that he had aspirations to unite the south. It was these suspicions, rather than complaints from the people of Ush-Turfan that Khōjis and his son were guilty of oppression and exploitation, that preyed on the Manchu mind.[48] Khōjis left for Beijing in 1759 at the head of the first tribute mission. Awarded the noble title of second rank *junwang*, he remained in Beijing with his family, living in enforced if comfortable exile until his death in 1781. However, even in this case the continuity of family power was not lost. His youngest son was allowed to return to tend the family tomb at Aqsu, and having sold the family's estate at Ush-Turfan, to settle in Aqsu. Subsequently, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, the son of Kadir, Khōjis's fourth son, accompanied the Qing army in its campaign against Khwāja Jihāngīr.[49] As a reward for his endeavours he was appointed hakim of Yarkand[50] and his son Muḥammad 'Azīz became hakim-beg of Khotan. 'Azīz is known to have traced his ancestry to Jamāl al-Dīn, a saint associated with the Kucha Khwājas and the Qādiriyya.[51] This is not, of course, sufficient evidence to prove that

[46] See for example, *PDZFL*, *zheng* 75:29a.

[47] Thirty four Muslims received office as a reward, but this presumably included those from Hami and Turfan (*PDZFL*, *zheng* 75:38a).

[48] *PDZFL*, *zheng* 85:13b–14a. See Khōjis's biography, *HJTZ*, 6:1a–7b.

[49] Jihāngīr, the grandson of the Āfāqī leader, Burhān al-Dīn, led the first major Khwāja incursion into the Altishahr in 1826. He was captured in late 1827 and taken to Beijing for quartering.

[50] Khōjis's title of nobility was also passed down through Kadir. *HJTZ*, 6:7b–8a; *Report on the trade and resources of the countries on the north-western boundary of British India*, (comp.) R. H. Davies (Lahore: Government Press, 1862), Appendix XXIX B, cccxliv, ccxlviii.

[51] Hamada Masami, 'Supplement: Islamic saints and their mausoleums', *Acta Asiatica*, 34, 1978, 91–2.

Khōjis was connected with the Kucha Khwājas, but if as would seem likely, such were the case, it would explain further the ambivalent relationship that Khōjis, and others like him from the eastern Altishahr region, had with both the Khwājas of the south and the Manchu.

Cultivating integrity and loyalty

In the short term, at least, Manchu attempts to cultivate loyalty among the local élites served to accentuate the local rivalries that were rife within this deeply divided society. Evidence of petty jealousies and feuding among the begs in the 1760s is extensive and was a problem that the Qing authorities invariably solved by relocation. The begs accused one another of nepotism, forming cliques, spreading rumours, inciting revolt, drunken and disorderly conduct, corruption, and expropriation of land and cattle. While the Qianlong emperor was inclined to be magnanimous, noting that the new officials were not yet fully conversant with Chinese ways,[52] his patience was often sorely tried. On receipt of a report that local begs had petitioned against Emīn-khwāja and his son, as well as their coterie of translators, he railed against the Muslims. Appointments, he insisted, were made on the basis of ability not favouritism, while acknowledging almost in the same breath that the court could not do without the eyes and ears of the translators from Hami and Turfan. In these early years the court was in no doubt that it was only the authority of men such as Emīn and Yūsuf from Uighuristan that kept the Altishahr begs in order.[53]

By the early 1760s, there were some 270 beg-officials in the south and 15 in the Ili region of Zungharia.[54] The resident Manchu administration was free to reassign begs, and to increase or reduce posts as necessary. For the higher ranks, nominations and recommendations were forwarded to the court for a final decision, while lower ranks were approved by the local Manchu administration and only reported to the court at the year's end. Notwithstanding promotion or removal from their post for violations of duty, begs could remain in office until they either retired through ill-health or died. From the outset, however, it was stipulated that these offices were not hereditary.

In a further attempt to guarantee the integrity of officials, the principle of applying the law of avoidance to those of higher rank was also early established—but where to draw the dividing line proved problematic. In 1762, it was decreed that hakims from the third to fifth rank were not to serve in their native town. Only those of sixth rank and below were to be appointed from amongst the local community. However, the difficulty of finding non-local replacements and the heavy cost of moving officials and their families soon became all too apparent. The rule was therefore relaxed and the following year it was decreed that 'avoidance' would apply only to those hakims and *ishi-kāghā*-begs of third and fourth ranks; all other appointments could, if necessary, be made from the local area, although the selection process still required the submission of nominations through the councillor to the court.[55]

During the Qianlong period, despite the constant need to relocate begs, the established law of avoidance appears to have been upheld with proven effect.

[52] *PDZFL, zheng* 76:5b–6b.
[53] *HJTZ*, 4:6b–7a.
[54] There was a relatively swift rise in the number of begs in the Ili region as a result of the huge emigration programmes to that area. Conversely, at Ush-Turfan the revolt of 1765 caused a marked reduction in the total number of begs. There were 34 before the revolt, but after the suppression the population was so reduced that four sufficed.
[55] *HJZL* 2:3ab, 7:1a; *HJTZ* 7:18b.

It was the emperor's refusal to allow Hudawī's son to succeed to his father's post as hakim of Yarkand that led, in 1778, to the exposure of a major corruption scandal involving senior begs, the Manchu Imperial Agent, Gao-pu, and Chinese traders from the interior.[56] However, by the end of the eighteenth century the avoidance-law was no longer implemented so diligently and there are incidents of father-son succession even to such an important post as that of hakim-beg in Kashgar.[57] Yet, ironically, while succession was considered imprudent there was no provision to prevent several members of one family serving as begs of various rank in one place, either simultaneously, or consecutively. Manchu rule did not break family power, it simply became less localized, spreading horizontally rather than vertically across the region.

Hand in hand with the appointment of the new officials went the introduction of a system of emolument, *yanglian*. Most begs received grants of land which varied in size according to their rank, along with bondsmen, known as *inchü*, to cultivate it. In those south-western areas where there was a cash economy, such as Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan, begs also received small stipends (in *tangas*) apparently in lieu of part of the land and/or *inchü* entitlement. According to the official maximum allowances, at the top end of the scale third-ranking begs could receive 200 *bātmān* of land and 100 *inchü*, while at the other end, those of the seventh rank received 30 *bātmān* and eight *inchü*,[58] In practice, however, the emolument differed considerably depending on the locality and even the individual's circumstances prior to the conquest.[59] While many lower-ranking begs received no land or *inchü*, others received *inchü* and no land, or *tangas* and no land or *inchü*. Moreover, in the case of *mīrābs*, *qāḍī*-, *naqīb*- and *bājgīr*-begs the fines and duties that they collected constituted part of their official *yanglian*,[60] while in some instances *ākhūnds* or mullas who served as begs appear to have received no *yanglian* and depended for their livelihoods on gifts from the local populace and religious endowments.[61] When begs died, were removed from office, or retired, the *yanglian* passed to the new incumbent. In addition to the *inchü*, many begs were also assigned exiled criminals from the interior as servants. Information on how these criminals were allocated is lacking, but an estimate from the late eighteenth century puts the number of convicts enslaved to begs in the Altishahr alone at a substantial 600.[62] Following the nineteenth-century campaigns against the Khwājas and Khoqand, the begs won for themselves more slaves in the persons of Turkic-Muslim prisoners.[63]

Although the positions of higher-ranking begs were clearly legitimized by and dependent on the Qing, the Manchu officials stationed in the Altishahr were acutely conscious of the need to reinforce loyalty. The trappings and perks of power for high-ranking begs included insignia, seals of office, hereditary title, emolument, rewards for outstanding service, compensation for those

[56] For an account of this case see Preston Torbert, *The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 136–71.

[57] See Na-yan-cheng's attempt to tighten the system in 1828, *NWYZY*, 78:8b–9a. Most notably, in 1811 Yūnus succeeded his father, Iskandar, as hakim-beg of Kashgar.

[58] 1 *bātmān* = approx 5.3 *dan* of grain. Land area was calculated according to the grain harvest it could support. According to Lin Enxian, 1 *mu* supports 1 *dou*, therefore 1 *bātmān* = 5 *dan* 3 *dou* = 53 *mu*. Lin Enxian, *Qingchao zai Xinjiang de Han-Hui geli zhengce* (*The Qing dynasty policy of Han-Muslim segregation in Xinjiang*) (Taibei: Guoli zhengzhi daxue, 1988), 78.

[59] See for example, *HJZ*, 71b–72a.

[60] *HJTZ*, 7:22b–23a.

[61] *HJZ*, 75ab.

[62] J. Waley-Cohen, *Exile in mid-Qing China* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), 31; *HJTZ*, 7:18a.

[63] See for example, *NWYGZY*, 78:11ab.

who died in battle, tax relief, substantial relocation expenses[64] and, not least, participation in the tribute missions to the capital.

The rewards of the tribute missions

In 1759, almost before the conquest of Altishahr was complete, the governor-general, Zhao-hui, requested that all the begs be allowed to embark on tribute missions to court *rujin* on a triennial rotation *nianban*.[65] As in the case of the Mongol nobles, for the begs of Xinjiang the rituals of pilgrimage *qing'an* and tribute *jingong* were merged.[66] The first mission to Beijing comprising 46 begs departed in 1759. Led by Yūsuf of Hami and Khōjis of Ush-Turfan, the mission included those who had won high office and reward through support of the Qing campaigns, Ga-dai-mo-te, Kush Kipak and Hudawī, as well as others who had held office under the Khwājas before surrendering to the Qing. All were received with great pomp and presented with silver and silk.[67] The following year the court instructed that only those begs of sixth rank and above need present themselves at court—some after all had to stay behind to perform administrative duties, and the expenses which were borne by the court were also a matter of concern. By 1763, there were four rotations and now only those of the fourth rank and above (and newly appointed fifth rankers) were permitted to make the journey; the total number per mission was reduced from 40 to a maximum of 20. In 1774, a six-year rotation was introduced with numbers reduced to about ten. The next major change was not until 1811 when the rotations were increased to nine, each to be led by a third-ranking hakim and comprising nine fourth- and fifth-rankers. In 1839, professing concern for the welfare of the begs who had to transport their tribute such long distances, the Daoguang emperor instructed the rotations should no longer be dispatched annually, but once every three years.[68] The effect of these changes was significant; while many of those begs who served during the Qianlong reign period made the trip to Beijing two or even three times, by the time of the Daoguang emperor even a high-ranking beg in office for 30 years would probably make the trip only once, if that.

If the ritual pilgrimage to Beijing and exchange of gifts won for the emperor a degree of loyalty, for the begs the rewards were more tangible. First, tribute missions were used by ambitious fathers to give their sons a head start in their official careers. Begs who went to court were allowed to take their sons with them, a maximum of two or three. According to the substatutes, these young men were to be temporarily awarded the sixth rank for the duration of their stay in the capital. On their return home they could be employed as non-ranking officials and if they served well, after five years they could then be employed as a seventh-rank beg, but not a sixth.[69] The existence of such a substatute is clear indication that many regarded the pilgrimage and the prestige associated with it as the fast-track to high office.[70] But even more important than career advancement were the trading opportunities.

According to the *Lifanyuan*, the amount and nature of local tributary goods

[64] Payments ranged from 200 *liang* of silver for a third-ranking beg moving between Ili and Yarkand, Khoten, Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Bugur or Korla, to 30 *liang* for a beg of fifth rank or below moving between the above six cities and Aqsu, Ush, Sairam, or Bai (*HJTZ*, 7:23a–24a).

[65] *PDZFL, zheng* 80:29b–30a.

[66] See Ning Chia, 'The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian rituals in the early Qing (1644–1795)', *Late Imperial China*, 14/1, 1993, 81.

[67] Miao Pusheng, 'Guanyu Qingchao zhengfu', 43–4; *HJTZ*, 2:9b–10a.

[68] See Saguchi, *Higashi Torukisutan*, 156–9.

[69] *HJZL*, 4:1a, 4:2ab.

[70] See for example, *NWYGZY*, 78:4b.

would be fixed annually by the governor-general. Yet practice fell far short of the regulations and in the mid nineteenth century, local Manchu officials were regularly reporting that Kucha and Shayar, for example, had never been required to send specific local products. Begs between the third and sixth rank took part in the tribute missions according to the rotation, but there was no set tribute quota. The begs made their own arrangements and sent their lists to Kashgar where everything was checked and weighed, with presumably a percentage retained by the local authorities.[71]

Travel expenses for the eight to ten month return journey were borne by the *Lifanyuan*, which also covered the begs expenses for the permitted sojourn in the capital of 40 days maximum. In practice, the begs rarely returned to their posts within less than 12 months. Despite the checks carried out at Hami, where all the begs congregated before departing for Beijing, as well as subsequent checks in every administrative area through which they passed, the tribute missions continued to exceed their baggage allowance. Moreover, much to the annoyance of the officials of the *Lifanyuan*, they regularly arrived in Beijing after the stipulated deadline of the 20th day of the twelfth month.[72]

In 1797, restrictions on baggage were set at 3,500 *jin* for a beg of the third rank, ranging to 1,500 *jin* for a fifth ranker; those with peerage were granted higher quotas ranging from 6,000 *jin* for a *wang* to 3,000 *jin* for a *gong*, and sons of begs had an allowance of 600 *jin*.[73] Given that a typical list of tribute requirements from Kashgar was 2 *pi* of gold satin and 200 *jin* of raisins, and from Yarkand 200 *jin* of raisins and 9 bottles of fruit syrup,[74] it is quite obvious these missions offered good trading opportunities, and that the court accepted this practice and was prepared to bear the cost—within limits. The reduction in missions was a cost-saving measure for the *Lifanyuan*, but as the opportunity to go on the missions decreased, presumably the temptation to violate the regulations and exploit the opportunity increased. For the ordinary people of Altishahr the burgeoning size of tribute missions also posed a problem. In 1828, in a series of reports on beg corruption, the Special Imperial Agent, Na-yan-cheng, noted that the begs used the tribute mission as an excuse to extort goods from the local people and then purchased furs, gold and jade, which were traded in the interior for silks and tea.[75]

Initially, the Manchu reliance on the carrot rather than the stick was effective in this volatile region. The social tensions and fissures that characterized the pre-Qing society go some way to explain not only why the Manchu were successful in winning over a sufficient number of begs who saw their fortunes tied to the Qing but also why instances of rebellion in the Qianlong period remained few and localized. The new, highly mobile begs were immersed in regional politics, the stakes were high, and for the time being the Manchu were their best bet. The law of avoidance almost ensured a division of interests and loyalties among the élite of any one area, cutting as it did across major regional and politico-religious power bases. Even the 1765 rebellion at Ush-Turfan, which was sparked by the oppressive administration of hakim-beg 'Abdu-llāh of Hami and his cohorts, coupled with the licentious conduct of

[71] 'Tax registers for Kucha and Shayar', MS Bodleian Library (MS Chin d. 69). I am grateful to Liu Zhiwei and David Faure for bringing these manuscripts to my attention.

[72] *HJZL*, 4:6ab.

[73] *HJZL*, 4:7ab. In 1814, these figures were raised by 500 *jin* for begs of the third rank and by 2,000 *jin* for the highest-ranking nobility *wang*. The quotas for others remained the same (Chia, 'The Lifanyuan', 75).

[74] Number One Historical Archives, Beijing: *Junjichu lufu zoupi: minzu*, 8098.36 (Daoguang, 15.8), 8098.38 (Daoguang, 17.9).

[75] For details of beg corruption and proposals for reform, see *NWYGZY*, 77:19a–43b.

the Imperial Agent Su-cheng, failed to elicit significant Muslim support. In almost all cases—Aqsu, Kucha, and Karashahr—support for the rebellion among the élite of other areas was nipped in the bud, not by the Manchu authorities, but by hakims and other begs. Meanwhile, the begs and *ākhūnds* of Yarkand had their plans scuppered by the wife of Hudāwi. Fearing that her weak-willed husband, the then hakim-beg of Yarkand, would not be able to prevent his begs taking up arms, Ri-yi-mu set out on the 3,000-odd *li* journey south from Kucha where she was living with her son. Arriving in Yarkand within less than a week, she gathered the ruling begs and *ākhūnds* together and lectured them on loyalty to the emperor. Having elicited promises of good conduct on pain of death, she then provided them with female entertainment and plied them with wine before dispossessing them of their weapons and driving their horses into the mountains.[76] Consequently, the inhabitants of Ush-Turfan were to be besieged for more than six months by the Qing forces without any hope of relief from their kinsmen.

While in the short term Qing policy may have aggravated and even exploited pre-existing divisions, as the begs became less reliant financially and otherwise on the Qing, there was a marked decline in instances of begs bickering among themselves. The influential families struck up power bases throughout the region from Ili to Khotan and from Kashgar to Hami. As their own power grew and that of the Manchu declined, so they increasingly took advantage of the fragile political situation. Ironically, as they did so, they undermined their own position.

Pawns, partners or pivots?

Alienated by language and culture, the Manchu officials had little or no communication with their subjects in the far north-west of the empire. It was the hakim-begs who stood between them and the use of force. Directly accountable for the begs to the Imperial Agents and Councillors, the hakims had ultimate responsibility for all civic administration, from the supervision of bazaars to tax collection, from law and order, in all but the most serious of cases, to responsibility for foreign envoys and traders. The scope for corruption and graft was wide, and as is revealed by Na-yan-cheng's reports and subsequent amendments to the substatutes, by the mid-1820s the begs were availing themselves fully of all the opportunities. While benefiting from the privileges of Qing employ, many had reverted to, if they had ever abandoned, the traditional practices of the old hereditary nobility, monopolizing water control, sending strong-men to the bazaars to demand illegal payments from the traders, and so on. The difference was, now that the traditional checks and balances had been removed, that the reformulated Manchu-sanctioned élite had much greater potential and scope for abuse. Any rising against the oppressive rule of the local élite would constitute rebellion against the Qing. The massacre executed by the Manchu in the wake of the Ush-Turfan rebellion of 1765 was a strong deterrent, and one still within living memory.

Even as early as the 1770s when, in the aftermath of the Gao-pu case, the Qianlong emperor offered rewards for begs and Imperial Agents who reported on one another,[77] the lack of significant response was probably more indicative of the degree of collaboration and fear than a testimony to clean government. In addition to the inevitable giving and soliciting of 'gifts', by the early nineteenth century the begs and Manchu authorities were mutually engaged

[76] *HJTZ*, 12:5b–6a.
[77] Torbert, *Ch'ing Imperial Household*, 164.

in extensive financial dealings, often involving Chinese merchants from the interior whose numbers in the region increased dramatically after 1830. Investigation into the Gao-pu case had revealed that the hakim-beg Hudawī had been in debt to one of the Chinese traders for almost 8,000 taels,[78] but by the 1850s not merely individuals, but entire local administrations had fallen foul of usurers. Between 1851 and 1854, the begs of Kucha and its dependent city of Shayar borrowed tens of thousands of taels from Chinese merchant money lenders, ostensibly for a range of civic projects which included irrigation works and restoration of the Kucha Khwājas' *mazār*. With little to show for the money, the begs and *ākhūnds* then secured the complicity of the Manchu officials in introducing new taxes in order to honour the loan. Despite local opposition and petitions to the governor-general at Ili, the Manchu Imperial Agent in Kucha took no firm steps to stop the new tax, the imposition of which was to spark the Kucha rebellion of 1857.[79]

The interests of the Manchu officials, Muslim begs and Chinese traders were increasingly interdependent. As James Millward has shown, by the 1830s, in the wake of the costly campaign against Jihāngīr, the Manchu authorities began to rely on loans both from the Chinese merchants and Turkic-Muslim élite in order to provide for the increased Manchu military presence in the region.[80] The begs for their part had long been involved in lending and borrowing money from Khoqandi traders, so by the 1850s, money borrowed by the begs from the Khoqandis was being used to supplement that raised by capitation tax and used to pay Chinese troops, whose duties involved defence against Khoqandi-sponsored incursions![81]

But above all it was the Manchu dependence on hakims in matters of foreign relations that afforded the latter the potential for power far beyond their own authority. Notwithstanding the large number of foreign traders in the south, Badakshanis, Kashmiris, Afghans and Jews, foreign affairs in the Altishahr region meant primarily relations with Khoqand. More importantly, Khoqand also provided sanctuary for the descendants of the Āfāqī Khwājas, and sometimes support for their attempts, in 1826, 1830, 1847 and 1857, to reconquer the Altishahr.

None of these revolts instigated by the Khwāja incursions spread far beyond the western cities of Altishahr and all centred on Kashgar. The first allowed the Āfāqi Khwāja Jihāngīr to take control of the western cities for some eight months, but after the second in 1830, when Jihāngīr's elder brother, Yūsuf, was seen to be little more than a figurehead for the Khoqandis, there was a decline in Āfāqī popularity throughout the region. This was further accentuated by the reigns of terror instituted by the Khwājas in their subsequent attempts to regain control of the Altishahr region.

Relying on the begs, as the Manchu authorities did, in all matters of communication with the Turkic-Muslims of Central Asia, to write letters, act as envoys, provide intelligence, issue travel permits, etc., it was hardly surprising that local Manchu officials should show occasional signs of paranoia and attempt to forbid unauthorized external communication.[82] The reality, how-

[78] ibid., 149.

[79] Number One First Historical Archives, Beijing: *Gongzhong zhupi: minzu* (Palace memorials—nationalities), 639:1–11 (Xianfeng, 7.5–8.4).

[80] See Millward, 'Beyond the Pass'.

[81] For begs and *ākhūnds* lending money to Khoqandis see *NWYGZY*, 19:17a. Davies, *Report on the trade*, Appendix XXIV, cxci.

[82] *HJZL*, 6:17a. On occasions these fears may have been well-founded, as seems probable in the case of 'Abd al-Raḥīm, *ishikāghā*-beg of Yarkand. In the early 1760s, having been thwarted in his attempt to become hakim-beg, he was discovered to have entered into communication with the ruler of Khoqand with a view to instigating rebellion; he was consequently executed by the Manchu authorities (*HJTZ*, 5:3b).

ever, was that while some begs undoubtedly played a role in instigating rebellion, most would have been well aware that as administrators serving a colonial power, in times of rebellion they were highly vulnerable. One well-known case will suffice to illustrate their predicament. When in 1811 Yūnus, hakim-beg of Kashgar, sent an envoy to Khoqand to demand that the Āfāqī Khwāja leader, Samsāq, be handed over, the governor-general, Song-yun, was either unconvinced, or unimpressed, by the explanation that Yūnus had been attempting to foil a rising and recommended that he be condemned to death. However, Yūnus was the grandson of Emīn-khwāja and a hitherto loyal servant of the Qing, so the Jiaqing emperor was inclined to spare his life and have him removed to Ili. Some years later, having rebuilt his reputation, Yūnus was reappointed hakim-beg of Kashgar where, during the Jihāngīr rebellion, he was summarily put to death by his co-religionists on account of his pro-Qing sympathies.[83]

The local Ishāqī begs, those from the eastern Altishahr cities, and from Uighuristan had little to gain from a return of the Altishahr Khwājas and even less from a Khoqandi-dominated regime. Yet, not fully trusted by the Manchu administration, nor the Khwājas and their allies, nor indeed the local people, once rebellion had broken out, the begs' prime concern was to save their own skins. While the region remained under Qing rule, however powerful individual begs became, their legitimacy was tied irrevocably to the infidel—the infidel who seemingly sanctioned their increasing abuse of power. Not surprisingly, therefore, when in the late 1850s, popular discontent became widespread and the Qing administration showed signs of weakening, it was not to the hakim-begs that the people looked for leadership, but once again to the religious orders.[84] Faced with the imminent collapse of Manchu authority, many of the begs threw in their lot with the religious leaders; for them there could have been no worse scenario than that Manchu rule would be replaced by a strongly Islamic and 'foreign' regime with no need to rely on the local officialdom. This is exactly what happened in 1864.

Conclusion

All the early Manchu efforts to cultivate loyalty among the élite of Xinjiang must be seen in the context of the lack of any attempt to assimilate the begs into Chinese culture. For the first 60 years of Manchu rule, the region was an enclave into which the Han Chinese and their culture were only allowed limited access. The Manchu insistence on maintaining the cultural divide was as much a reflection of the need to maintain their own integrity in this remote region as respect for the culture of others.

But by the late 1820s, this policy was clearly jeopardizing the security of the 'new frontier'. At the height of the campaign against Jihāngīr, the Daoguang emperor is said to have sent a secret instruction to the Manchu authorities in the Xinjiang, requiring them to consider whether the begs should be replaced by local headmen, *tusi*.[85] Exactly what he had in mind is not clear,

[83] On this occasion all the other begs of Kashgar kept their heads and their posts. B. A. Akhmedov (ed.), *Materialy po istorii Srednei i Tsentral'noi Azii x–xix vv.* (Tashkent: Fan, 1988), 327. M. Kumlukov, 'Vzaimnootnosheniya tsinskogo Kitaya s Kokandskim Khanstvom', in *Kitai i sosedy* (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 206. Yūnus's full name was Sa'īd Muḥammad Yūnus.

[84] In 1861, for example, the rebellion at Artush was led by 'Abd al-Raḥīm, keeper of Satuq Boghra Khan's mausoleum, while in Kucha, Khwāja Rāsh al-Dīn, keeper of the shrine of Arshad al-Dīn, was appointed leader of the rebellion. See Kim Ho-Dong, 'The Muslim rebellion and the Kashgar emirate in Chinese Central Asia, 1864–1877' (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1986), 30, 55.

[85] See Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji* (*Chronicle of military campaigns*) 1842 (repr. Taibei: Wenhai, 1967), 188.

but it would suggest an influx of Han, or Chinese Muslim administrators coupled with the 'sinification' of the more compliant begs, akin to the policies implemented in the south-west of the empire.[86] The issue was not pursued, but after the Jihāngīr campaign, the same security concerns prompted the Qing both to increase their forces south of Tianshan and to initiate the permanent settlement of troops and their families in the region. By the 1830s, Han and Chinese Muslim civilian emigration to Xinjiang was being officially promoted and with the exception of the continued prohibition against intermarriage, there was little attempt to keep the various communities apart.

Nevertheless, the increased Han and Chinese Muslim presence in the region was not accompanied by an attempt to sinicize the Turkic Muslims or fundamentally change their way of life. Reports by travellers of the almost decadent life-style of the local Muslims, the prevalence of prostitution, the drinking of alcohol and smoking of hashish, should not be interpreted as a sign of 'sinification', but rather as a reflection of the lack of a strong Islamic authority. Even for the begs, who had long had closer relations than many with the Manchu conquerors, neither acquiring a smattering of Manchu,[87] nor sporting a queue,[88] nor occasionally prostrating themselves before an image of the emperor could serve to undermine their identity.[89] The bottom line was that, even had they so wished, they were not allowed to become Manchu, nor indeed Han or Muslim Chinese.

Yet while the court continued to cling limply to its preference for maintaining the cultural distinctions in this part of the empire, clearly some Manchu administrators began to see advantages in adopting a more positive approach to bridging the cultural divide. Writing some time after the Khwāja Yūsuf incursion of 1830, Bi-chang, the Manchu councillor responsible for withstanding the siege of Yarkand, argued the case for Confucian education. Starting from the premise that the Muslims cannot be unteachable because they, too, have human emotions, he goes on to suggest that they should be taught Zhuxi's Confucianism and that the *Xiaoxue* should be translated for their benefit. Schools, he advocated, should be established in every town and on the 1st and 15th of every month the Muslim leaders should take their people to hear interpreters explain the Confucian teachings; those who proved able should then be required to spread the message.[90]

Bi-chang was ahead of his time, but only by a matter of some 40-odd years. After the defeat of Ya'qūb Beg in 1878, when the region passed into the hands of a Han dominated administration, headed initially by Zuo Zongtang and then Liu Jintang, the notion of a cultural solution to region's problems was officially adopted—this was a solution which, together with that of incorporating Xinjiang as a province, Chinese intellectuals had long been advocating. By this time, however, it was far too late for significant cultural assimilation. In the course of the preceding century, as a result, at least in part, of Manchu colonization, the ethnic consciousness of the sedentary, non-tribal peoples of Xinjiang had begun to coalesce.

The Manchu administration had served to break down the boundaries of

[86] Pei Huang, *Autocracy at work* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 285–301.
[87] *NWYGZY*, 78:4b.
[88] Na-yan-cheng's claim that after Ishāq, hakim-beg of Kashgar, was rewarded with the privilege of being permitted to grow a queue for his part in the Jihāngīr rebellion, all the begs were clamouring to enjoy the same honour (*NWYGZY*, 78:3ab), should probably not be taken at face value. Nevertheless, the substatute that this memorial prompted decreed that the sons and grandsons of loyal begs with titles and those begs of fourth rank and above would henceforth be allowed to wear the queue as a mark of distinction. See *HJZL*, 8:2a.
[89] Ahmed Shāh, 'Route from Kashmir', 384.
[90] Bi-chang, *Shoubian jiyao* (*An outline on border control*), 1849, postscript 4ab.

local culture while simultaneously erecting regional borders. Under the bell-jar of Manchu protection, there had developed a discrete power structure and an élite whose sense of region was coterminus with those boundaries loosely demarcated by the Qing. Moreover, this had occurred without loss of the traditions that symbolized continuity and cultural identity.

The begs, for all their corrupt practices and abuses of power, had offered an alternative to local Islamic regimes and great power dominance. It may even be fair to say that the period of Manchu rule, from 1760–1864, had gone some way towards planting the seed of modern nationalism—a quasi-secular ruling élite whose political horizons extended over an area two and a half times the size of France. If, as Leroy Vail argues, ethnic consciousness is an ideology created over time,[91] then we have to ask why and how that ideology is created. In the case of Xinjiang an understanding of the role of the begs is one step towards answering these questions.

[91] Leroy Vail (ed.), *The creation of tribalism in Southern Africa* (London: James Currey, 1989), 10.