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The Twilight of the Beijing Gendarmerie, 1900–1924

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The early-twentieth-century police of Beijing sprang not only from Japanese and European institutional models but also from the large Eight Banner and Green Standard Gendarmerie of the Qing era. The career of the gendarmerie, which had Ming dynasty and earlier roots and continued after the fall of the Qing until 1924, overlapped with that of the modern police for more than two decades. A significant number of individuals, including some leaders, were active in both forces simultaneously. Although the Qing-era capital cannot be called a "policed society" in all current senses of that term, the gendarmerie exercised considerable control. After 1900, this background sped the emergence of modern police in Beijing, a turn of events that contrasts sharply with contemporaneous urban history in Chengdu as reported by Kristin Stapleton.

Keywords: *Beijing; gendarmerie; police; urban control*

Surveys of Beijing's history circa 1900–1925 often stress that during this era police progressively extended their control further into urban society, anticipating and facilitating later developments under Communist rule (Strand, 1989: 73, 91, 95; Campbell, 1997: 188; Belsky, 2002). They ascribe this change mainly to the influence of modern city police systems, especially those of Europe and Japan. So great an emphasis on foreign models, however, reflects the common but only partially correct assumption that the Qing-era gendarmerie of the capital faded away after 1900, when a new police force was founded in Beijing. In fact, the Qing gendarmerie not only survived the end of the dynasty but persisted until 1924 and contributed to the emergence of modern police in the city. The simultaneous existence of

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old and new police organizations, and the participation of some individuals in both, created an environment that favored their mutual influence. The familiar image of the older force as an outdated relic, which probably originated in early efforts of the modernized city police to blot out the past and its influence, has obscured an important source of institutional development.

The significance of the relation between the Qing-era gendarmerie and modern police in Beijing is not limited to the history of these particular bureaucracies. I also argue here that the contribution of the gendarmerie to the transition between the two reflects the considerable control over urban society that the gendarmerie and other police agencies already exercised in Qing times. These efforts drew on deeply rooted Chinese methods of managing populous cities, especially capitals. We often exaggerate differences between traditional and modern China, and the police of Beijing are a case in point.

Arguing for the relevance of the Qing gendarmerie to twentieth-century developments raises a major question: to what extent were the gendarmerie and the complex of capital police institutions as a whole ever comparable to a modern urban police system? According to a contemporary sociological definition, a "policed society" is one in which "central power exercises potentially violent supervision over the population by bureaucratic means widely diffused throughout civil society in small and discretionary operations that are capable of rapid concentration" (Silver, 1967: 8). The Qing gendarmerie and the related capital police—with uniforms and weapons, with hundreds of posts and beats systematically manned in regular patterns—certainly were readily mobilizable, both in their mid-eighteenth-century heyday and long afterward. In this sense, Qing-era Beijing did resemble a policed society. The gendarmerie alone was an unusually large and bureaucratized premodern police force. But it was also a military (rather than civilian and community) force whose personnel, especially at lower levels, functioned in a relatively unspecialized and unprofessionalized institutional context.[1] Police interests focused on political security and public order. The safety of individuals and their property did not necessarily always draw police attention, except to the extent that political security required that even crime having only private implications not exceed a certain low maximum. Thus, for many reasons, Qing Beijing was not a fully policed society in today's sense of that term. The most important point here, however, is that the rapidity with which such a society emerged between 1900 and 1925 is closely related to the long experience of the city's people with premodern bureaucratic policing.

The Qing Gendarmerie Before and During the Boxer Crisis

Western scholarship has often assumed that formal control of huge Qing-era cities was limited and unsystematic (Rowe, 1989: 313–15; Wakeman, 1995: 16–24). One historian, for example, suggests that in the early twentieth century the "deployment of Beijing policemen in the streets and neighborhoods of the city in proximity to the average resident represented a redrawing of the boundary line between state and society" (Strand, 1989: 66, 73). But to what extent did this line really need to be redrawn? During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), following practices developed over at least a millennium, China's rulers already had sought to manage the million or more inhabitants of the city by means of detailed regulation and neighborhood-level policing.

In Qing Beijing as in earlier capitals, both the disposition of space and organized human effort were pillars of urban control (Zhu, 2004: 67).[2] Police institutions not only were massive in size but were supported by an architectural layout that greatly restricted movement from place to place.[3] As Susan Naquin notes, "Walls within, walls without, enclosure nested inside enclosure, cities within cities—compartmentalization was fundamental to [Beijing's] history and identity before the twentieth century." The city plan "valued security over convenience" (Naquin, 2000: 6, 100). Jianfei Zhu similarly emphasizes the importance of architecture:

> At one level, city walls and city gates formed enclosures as "cities." At another level, intersection entries and boundaries of the sub-zones and smaller areas formed thousands of pieces of space. With the dissecting-enclosing function of the boundary, and the checking-locking function of the threshold, the whole military arrangement imposed a rigorous structure of suppression upon natural space and upon free human movement. (Zhu, 2004: 75)

In this strategic spatial context, several police forces simultaneously cooperated and competed with each other. Police organizations served under the Censorate (in the Five Districts, or Wucheng) and the Metropolitan Prefecture (Shuntian fu). By far the largest and most important such organization was the joint Eight Banner and Green Standard military force under the Bujun tongling, the head of the gendarmerie, who reported to the Board of War. The gendarmerie numbered about 33,000 men in the nineteenth century (roughly 23,000 from the Gendarmerie Division, or Bujun ying, of the Army of the Eight Banners and 10,000 from the Five Battalions, or

Wuying, of the Chinese Army of the Green Standard). Although this force was more comprehensive than the others, it was never the only police organization. The multiple-police structure was thoroughly ingrained, and rivalry among the various agencies was itself a tradition. The Qing rulers both employed many people to watch society and encouraged them to watch each other. Police officials and censors habitually communicated their mutual criticisms to the rulers.[4]

The huge gendarmerie was always headed by a powerful Manchu or Mongol. Its two parts were separate, although at times they interpenetrated. The Gendarmerie Division, composed mostly but not entirely of Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese bannermen, dealt mainly with the Inner City and with the sixteen gates; the Five Battalions, composed mostly but not entirely of non-banner Chinese, focused especially on the area just beyond the walls and on the Outer City (see Figure 1). (Bannermen were hereditary military servitors of the dynasty. After the Manchu conquest in the mid-seventeenth century, most bannermen and their families were quartered in the Inner City; non-banner Chinese generally lived in the Outer City.)

Because the two gendarmerie subforces differed in social composition, police functions could be modulated according to the ethnicity or location in the capital of the parties involved in them. Both forces wore distinctive costumes that were, in effect, uniforms; both typically carried weapons, especially swords and whips, that made them recognizable as policemen.[5] They patrolled day and night, making use of a vast network of branch offices, sentry boxes, and street gates. A street gate could be locked at night, with the key left at the nearest police post. In spatial terms, sentry boxes and street gates were the "checking-locking" or "threshold" micro level of the same system of urban control in which Beijing's massive walls and gates—also routinely guarded by police—were the macro level.[6]

Qing capital gendarmes took an expansive view of their responsibility to society. They mediated street disputes, controlled traffic, repaired roads, observed large gatherings, and fought fires. They ensured food security by regulating grain shops, operated soup kitchens each winter; conducted a semiannual census of the Inner City that informed them who belonged in a neighborhood and who did not, kept archives of population registers, and tracked foreigners and travelers. In these efforts, they probably used a highly detailed map that appears to show every house in the Inner and Outer Cities (*Qing neiwufu cang jingcheng quantu*, [1750] 1940). They regarded with suspicion *laili bu ming zhi ren* or "floating population" (beggars, temporary sojourners, and others not clearly tied to a known residence). They also arrested, jailed, and tried criminals, paying particular attention to crimes that were seditious or notorious (for details, see Dray-Novey, 1981, 1993).

Figure 1
Beijing in the Qing Era



Note: The main Gendarmerie Headquarters (Bujun tongling yamen) moved to the location shown here in the mid-eighteenth century. In 1921, Sidney Gamble placed Military Guard headquarters on the same site.

Sources: Qing: *JWSL*, 4.1–3; Bredon, 1922: attached map of 1829. Republic: *Zengding Zhongguo lüxing zhinan*, 1921: 9; *Zengding shiyong Beijing zhinan*, 1923: 1.22–29; Gamble, 1921: 67. See also Dray-Novey, 1993: 900.

Beginning about 1830, the gendarmerie along with other police and non-police governmental institutions began to suffer from corruption and underfunding. Official communications circa 1830–50 often criticized police failings such as lapses in night patrol and failure to repair street gates (Dray-Novey, 1981: 282–325). Nevertheless, the decline was slow. In the 1860s a visitor described an "army of ragged policemen ready to pounce on the evil-doer at every corner" (Edkins, [1870] 1898: 9). They may have been ragged, but they were there. In the anxious days of June 1900, a missionary wistfully recalled that in peaceful times the "Chinese watchmen perambulate the streets beating a large rattle. . . . To meet them on a dark night . . . [is to see] a lot of old ruffians clad in any sort of rough and grimy costume. . . . But the clang of their rattle, when once familiar, is a cheerful and homely sound" (Allen, 1901: 97). These reports show that while the old organization and routine were still intact, the inadequacy of police funds was obvious to all. In reaction to the resulting deterioration in the gendarmerie, public associations (*shuihui*, lit. "water societies") arose to take over some vital police functions, especially firefighting (*BJTL*, 47.2; Rennie, 1865: 2.120–21; Favier, 1897: 330; Imahori, 1947; Dray-Novey, 1981: 271, 302–4; 1993: 911–13).

Accounts of the Boxer uprising in Beijing in 1900 suggest that the city's most important police force played an ambiguous role in that crisis. On the one hand, regular police routine continued through the spring and summer of 1900. Citing patrols by the large, well-organized gendarmerie, foreign residents assured the outside world that whatever might happen in the rest of China, Beijing was safe (Martin, 1900: 71; Smith, [1901] 1972: 1.211; Putnam Weale, 1907: 15, 18). At other times, however, policemen seemed hostile, untrustworthy, or at best unwilling to oppose the Boxers (Smith, [1901] 1972: 1.240–41; Allen, 1901: 43–44, 53, 82, 91, 93–94, 100). A pivotal event, the murder of the German minister (Baron Clemens von Ketteler) on June 20, occurred in the Inner City near the Chongwen (Hata) Gate when the minister's sedan chair, en route to the Zongli yamen (Foreign Office), passed a group of soldiers at or near a police station on Hatamen Street. A soldier (at the time, some said a Manchu acting on orders from superiors) fired the fatal rifle shot (Smith, [1901] 1972: 1.255, 257; Fleming, 1959: 107; Esherick, 1987: 303; Cohen, 1997: 50). Pamela Crossley identifies the soldier as Encun, a Manchu of the Tiger Spirit Corps (Crossley, 1997: 176). One writer suggests that the minister was killed partly because the German Legation had "evidence of involvement of Peking gendarmerie in anti-foreign activities" (Fleming, 1959: 108). According to the observant missionary Arthur Smith, after the occupation of Beijing by international

forces in August, foreigners took over the house of the head of the gendarmerie, Chongli (Smith [1901] 1972: 2.535).

The ambiguous role of the gendarmerie in 1900, its nineteenth-century decline, and its close association with the discredited Manchu dynasty were probably the most important reasons why it could not itself provide the vehicle for police modernization. Nevertheless, it would affect the speed of that process as well as its destination.

The Rise of the Modern Police Force, 1901–1920s

The late Qing governmental reform movement followed soon after the Boxer uprising. Police and local administration were priorities for the "new policies" (*xinzheng*) (Thompson, 1995: 35, 44–45, 65, 72; Stapleton, 2000: 46–110; D. Wang, 2003: 131–60). In North China, Yuan Shikai as governor-general of Zhili experimented with modern forces in Baoding and Tianjin (MacKinnon, 1975; 1980: 137–38, 151–63, 178–79). Similar efforts were under way in Beijing as well; trained police had been introduced under Japanese occupation in the northern part of the Inner City, and they continued to function after foreign forces withdrew.[7] Inspired especially by this local example, the Qing government began to create a modern police force in the capital. A stream of students learned police administration in Japan, and they became familiar with Japanese and Western—especially French—models (Westney, 1982; Strand, 1989: 66–72; Reynolds, 1993: 161–67; Rhoads, 2000: 86–88).

The new Beijing police force took to the streets in the Inner City in 1901–02 and in the Outer City in 1905; under a series of different names,[8] it soon became well established (Strand, 1989: 66ff.). As a consequence, the status of the gendarmerie fell sharply (Wang Ji, 1987). Thus during the final Qing decade, a new and dynamic component joined the multiple-police structure of the capital. The Qing rulers found it easier to modernize military and police organizations by adding institutions than by transforming those that already existed. More than 14,000 metropolitan bannermen were retrained for the New Army or the new capital police. At the same time, the dynasty preserved the Eight Banner system, including the gendarmerie (Han Yanlong and Su Yigong, 1993: 110–19; Rhoads, 2000: 72, 81–90).

By the 1920s, despite the vicissitudes of the city and the empire since the Boxer uprising—including the fall of the dynasty and the end of the imperial system, the failure of the Republic, and the rise of militarism—the new police of Beijing were a distinct success. They had managed to maintain

institutional continuity in a period when political authority over the city was in flux. Like the Qing gendarmerie, the police were numerous relative to the population by world standards (Strand, 1989: 72; Dray-Novey, 1993: 905–9). Foreigners tended to use superlatives in describing them: in 1920, the guidebook author Juliet Bredon considered the new police force the "most reasonable and courteous in the world" (Bredon, 1922: 48); in 1921, the social researcher Sidney Gamble thought Beijing the "best policed city in the Orient" (Gamble, 1921: 75–76, 85); and in 1928, the *New York Times* (December 30, 1928) pronounced it "one of the best policed cities in the world." Other Beijing residents—aware of financial constraints and corruption—were less enthusiastic in their opinions, but when the Guomindang government took over the city in June 1928, the Beijing police still enjoyed a national reputation as China's first modern—and by far its best trained—force (Xu, 2005).

The new city police of the 1920s continued, developed, and specialized many old gendarmerie operations: for example, they now paid attention not only to street disputes but also to family and workplace ones. These changes reflected, in David Strand's formulation, both a modernizing urban police organization and a traditional social ethic (Strand, 1989: 8). Yamin Xu suggests another dynamic behind these developments: there was a "mediatorial vacuum to be filled, which was left by disintegrated local communities of imperial times" (Xu, 2005: 378). Significantly, residents of Beijing did not resist these extensions of police power (Strand, 1989: 83–89, 91). Although they repeatedly refused to be taxed for police pay and protested specific regulatory actions (e.g., rules governing rickshaws), they did not oppose the "police idea."[9] The populace was historically conditioned by long-established practice and political culture to accept an increasingly policed society in the capital.

Recent research enables us to compare reactions to the introduction of modern policing in Beijing and in Chengdu (Sichuan), where officials worked from 1902 to create police with broad powers to "civilize" the urban community. ("Civilization" or *wenming*—in Japanese, *bunmei*—referred to the goal of an orderly, hygienic, and productive modern city; see Stapleton, 2000.) These aspirations were similar to those of the new police in Beijing and reflected some of the same influences, especially that of Meiji-era Tokyo. A closer look, however, reveals important differences between the two Chinese cities in both background and outcome.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Chengdu was a garrisoned city of 300,000; the banner population, including families, consisted of only about 20,000 persons, less than a twentieth of the number in Beijing (Han Guanghui,

1996: 126). Premodern policing in Chengdu had been more sporadic and less broad in scope, carried out by fewer men in proportion to the general population than in the capital (Stapleton, 2000: 38–39). Both soldiers and "runners" for the two local magistrates had participated, but most police had come from the Chinese Army of the Green Standard. Ten Chinese military battalions, which together consisted of about 4,000 troops, had assigned an undetermined number of soldiers to patrol the city, especially during the winter months. The massive police presence of Beijing had never been duplicated in Chengdu, and police activities were of necessity more limited.

Although some Chengdu residents welcomed the new police after 1902, popular reaction was mixed. Reformers faced a difficult problem, as Kristin Stapleton explains: "On the one hand, they wished to build a force of professional constables they could use to enforce a new order in Chengdu's public life, but, on the other, they had to operate in an environment in which an influential sector of the public considered such men to be akin to the base and bullying yamen runners" (Stapleton, 2000: 94). Partly for this reason, reform of the Chengdu police encountered repeated setbacks and was achieved only in the mid-1930s. In 1911 the founder of the new police at Chengdu, having aroused intense hostility by trying to use the institution to change public behavior, escaped angry crowds only by hiding in an orphanage and then going over the city wall in female attire (Stapleton, 2000: 110). Yet by that year, as we have seen, the new police in Beijing had made substantial progress in local acceptance.

Thus, although both Beijing and Chengdu contained banner garrisons, their police forces diverged markedly in development from around 1900 to the mid-1930s (Stapleton, 2000: 34–180, 247–48). In Chengdu, many residents were relatively unaccustomed to the systematic regulation of aspects of daily life, associated city police with abusive yamen runners, and consequently opposed the "police idea" (see also D. Wang, 2003: 159–60; on Tianjin, see Kwan, 2000). The capital, in contrast, had known bureaucratized police for many centuries in the context of its political centrality, greater scale, more diverse society (especially the large and privileged banner population), and higher degree of spatial differentiation (Dray-Novey, 1993: 885–86, 912–15).[10]

Dusk, 1900–1911

The swift rise of Beijing's new police force to a pinnacle of achievement in only two decades resulted from not only shared urban memory but also the continuing role played by the Qing gendarmerie until 1924. The twilight

period of the Beijing gendarmerie had two distinct phases, from 1900 to 1911 and from 1912 to 1924. Especially in the first period, although the shock of the Boxer uprising and its aftermath caused some police leaders to adapt and intensify old practices, most gendarmerie operations were carried on uninterrupted. As before, the physical structure of walls, gates, street gates, and sentry boxes provided the physical context for patrols.

Restoration and Enhancement

Accounts of events just before and during the Boxer uprising often mention gendarmes and their street stations (Martin, 1900: 71, 104; Smith, [1901] 1972: 1.255; Allen, 1901: 44, 65–66, 68, 82, 97; Fleming, 1959: 107); this system clearly was reconstituted in the years immediately after the rebellion (*BJTL*, 12; 22.8, 34).[11] Gendarmerie authorities realized that a control vacuum could develop as foreign forces withdrew. As soon as the withdrawal was complete, the gendarmerie repeatedly surveyed the condition of the walls and the sixteen gates of the Inner and Outer Cities, including the gates themselves; their equipment and weapons; and the residence quarters of officers and soldiers. A persistent problem was private citizens' encroachment on decaying or partially destroyed gate quarters to set up homes or shops (*BJTL*, 2.5–10, 16; 44; 49). They also surveyed streets and small security-related structures: sentry boxes (numbering in the hundreds), street gates (more than a thousand), police branch offices (about a hundred in Inner City neighborhoods), landmarks, and many *hutong* (lanes) (*BJTL*, 32.2, 5–7; 33.8).

Beginning in 1901–02, the gendarmerie raised the average quality of their corps (even at the expense of overall numbers) by weeding out the old, illiterate, and incompetent (*BJTL*, 8, 9, 12, 41). In 1906 the gendarmerie reorganized its administration, cutting its size once more and attempting to improve the skills of the remaining men through instruction (*BJTL*, 34.10). Leaders placed special emphasis on gun training for a thousand men each in the Gendarmerie Division and the Five Battalions. The successive reductions in 1901–02 and 1906 resulted by 1908 in an Eight Banner Gendarmerie force of about 10,000 and a Green Standard one of about 5,000. Combined, they totaled about half of estimated gendarmerie numbers in the nineteenth century (*BJTL*, 34.13; Dray-Novey, 1981: 67–74, 111–24, 341–59; 1993: 903–9; Wang Ji, 1987).[12] Gendarmerie secretariat records show that regular Eight Banner and Green Standard processes of evaluation, promotion, and discipline for this reduced force continued through the end of the dynasty (*BJTL*, 10, 12–13, 26, 29, 34, 40–41).

Surveillance

In Beijing no control task was more critical than that of guarding the sixteen gates (thirteen external and three lying between the Inner and Outer Cities). The gates were crucial for control not just of persons (beggars, for example, were often kept outside them) but of *anything* entering or leaving the city. For example, gendarmerie documents of 1902–09 show how police monitored entry of money, generally silver ingots, from the provinces (*BJTL*, 43.1–10). When money entered the capital area, the nearest battalion (usually the South) of the Green Standard Gendarmerie sent soldiers to protect it. The three southern (or "front") gates of the Inner City (guarded, as were all city gates, mainly by banner gendarmes) were the most important checkpoints when money entered Beijing. Taxes were collected both at gates and at outstations in a cordon around the city. The head office of the government agency that taxed goods entering the capital (the Chongwen men shuiwu yamen, the Customs and Octroi) continued to be located at the Chongwen (Hata) gate until 1928 (Brunnert and Hagelstrom, 1912: §556; Arlington and Lewisohn, 1935: 225). The gendarmerie routinely confiscated and destroyed opium, morphine, and cocaine discovered in transit through the gates (Gamble, 1921: 71). Gate personnel tables of the gendarmerie for the first decade of the twentieth century show patterns of assignments similar to those of the nineteenth century, with comparable numbers (*BJTL*, 10.16–28; 11.1–33; 12.17, 38; 40.8–13; *JWSL*, 2.48–54, 7.43–45; Dray-Novey, 1981: 74–86, 122–24; 1993, 903–11).

When, at the opening of the twentieth century, Chinese authorities strongly resisted the piercing of Beijing's Outer City walls by railroads, they did so not merely for symbolic reasons but also for practical ones of urban control. Only foreign insistence just after the Boxer uprising made possible the breaching of Outer City walls and the building of train stations at the Zhengyang (Qian) Gate and near the so-called Water Gate,[13] which replaced more distant stations outside the Yongding Gate at the southern end of the Outer City and at Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) (*BJTL*, 32.3–4, 8; Smith, [1901] 1971: 2.523–25; Bredon, 1922: 34). New entrances to and exits from the city at the rail stations caused anxiety to the gendarmerie, which always had been charged with knowing who arrived at and who left the capital. In September 1905, a bomb carried by a revolutionary exploded at a Beijing station while a delegation of officials sent abroad to study constitutionalism was leaving. This episode intensified local authorities' attention to rail stations. Soon after the explosion, the *North China Herald* reported that there was "unusual energy manifested in the policing of the city and the

new uniforms [i.e., of the new police] are in evidence everywhere" (*North China Herald*, October 13, 1905; see also September 24 and 29, 1905; Rhoads 2000, 97). This energy appeared among the gendarmes as well; they adjusted to the presence of the railroad by developing routines of surveillance at the stations. The gendarmerie was adapting its traditional concern for security of the capital to new circumstances.

Systematic reports for 1907–10 from train stations recorded arrivals and departures of all daily trains; categories of passengers, especially officials, foreigners, and prominent businessmen; names of significant individuals; and, for students, native place, location of the Beijing residence that they had just left, or the place to which they were going after arriving in the capital (*BJTL*, 16, 17).[14] Gendarmes evidently interrogated selected travelers. The format of many reports shows that a group of at least four policemen carried out station observations over a long period. This surveillance was thorough; when there were no trains at a station on a given morning or afternoon, that too was recorded.

According to an account current in the 1930s, Wang Jingwei, later a leader of the Guomindang, once inadvertently gave himself away at a Beijing train station to police—whether to the gendarmerie or the new police force is not recorded. In 1910, Wang was saying goodbye to two women confederates after an unsuccessful plot on the life of the Prince Regent. He raised his hat, revealing a false queue attached to it, "in those days the mark of a true revolutionary." After the two women had departed by train, police followed Wang to his lodgings and arrested him (Arlington and Lewisohn, 1935: 200–201). Similarly, in 1902 a secret investigation (already a police tactic much earlier in the Qing period; see Dray-Novey, 1981: 23–40) observed comings and goings at the home of a family connected with Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary society (*BJTL*, 42.5).

Control at the gates extended even to the dead. Normally a corpse could not be brought into the city, and burial was not permitted inside the city gates. The gendarmerie carefully recorded the passage of the deceased through the gates and out of the city. In 1909–10 it prepared at least 165 periodic statistical reports on coffins exiting through fifteen of the sixteen gates (corpses could not be carried through the Qian Gate). Data collected from the gates and kept at the gendarmerie yamen over a given time period show each individual's name, age, residence, and cause of death. Police investigated when the person was unknown, when the cause of death was wounds, and when the cause was unclear. After the investigation, police buried those who had died unidentified (*BJTL*, 4, 5).

These reports, which have no counterparts in an extensive gendarmerie archive published in the mid-nineteenth century (*JWSL*; see Dray-Novey,

1981, 1993), suggest the influence of modern public health ideas, which took hold quickly in the capital in the early twentieth century. Tracking the causes of death might alert authorities to health problems in the city and direct their attention to certain neighborhoods (Campbell, 1993, 1997).[15] Here again, the gendarmerie was adapting traditional practices to modern times. Its habit of compiling helpful statistical information, shown earlier in the regular census-taking of the Qing period, would be passed on in turn to the new police (Gamble, 1921: 65).

Security

After the withdrawal of occupation troops, the gendarmerie coped, often at foreign request, with remaining Boxers and with criminals who were taking advantage of unstable conditions (*BJTL*, 19; 20; 21; 22.6, 12, 14–18, 22, 30; 24.1–2; 28.1; 33.2; 42.1, 4). Increased availability to criminals of guns, probably a result of the uprising and its suppression, complicated the task (*BJTL*, 6.22; 21.9, 13, 19, 21; 22.6).

The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century gendarmerie had provided overpowering protection for imperial processions as they passed through the streets of the capital. In the first decade of the twentieth century, imperial processions still prompted elaborate preparations similar to those earlier in the Qing period (Dray-Novey, 1981: 179–92; 1993: 902–3). For example, in 1902 an imperial procession through the Chaoyang Gate of the Inner City toward the imperial tombs at Dongling required 109 officers and 920 soldiers of the North and Left Green Standard Battalions. Strategic streets, households, shops, temples, and spaces between them along the route were carefully assessed. Soldiers guarded the way at close intervals and at all intersections, where side streets were cordoned off (*BJTL*, 23.3; see 33.3, 4, 7). Similarly, also in 1902, an imperial passage through the Outer City from the Qian Gate to the Temple of Heaven required 86 officers and 1,186 men, whose placement was, as usual, fully planned beforehand (*BJTL*, 27.20).

Public Works

Adding to the burden on the gendarmerie, roads in both the Inner and Outer Cities needed extensive repair after 1900. Even before the Boxer uprising, a proposal for improving the capital's roads had been part of the 1895–98 Reform Movement (Belsky, 2002; see also Spence, 1982: 43). In a memorial of early 1902 (*BJTL*, GX 28/1/30), the gendarmerie explicitly linked a plan for road repair to the general need for police modernization

guided by foreign models. Memorialists led by Natong noted that the "common people like to share [the government's] success but not its labor" and could not be expected to pay taxes to improve city streets until they were actually walking on them (*BJTL*, 40.22; 45.1). The need for better roads was especially urgent, the memorial continued, because foreign envoys were pressing for progress, having themselves repaired Dong jiaomin xiang (Legation Street), and their further activities along this line might interfere with China's autonomy if the government took no action.

A fundamental focus of the gendarmerie always had been the food security of Beijing. Confucian doctrine held that people could not be expected to behave morally if they were always hungry, and that the state had an obligation to ensure their basic subsistence. Moreover, any food supply crisis in the capital could have serious political implications. Undated gendarmerie reports, apparently from the first decade of the twentieth century, record deliveries to capital granaries via the canal that ran along the Inner City walls. Detailed lists show types of tribute grain, amounts, and the specific granaries to which the deliveries were headed. These reports originated with the Left Battalion, one of the Five Battalions of the Green Standard Gendarmerie, whose responsibilities included the area near and beyond the city wall on the east side of the Inner City, where many granaries were located. They show the continuation at least to the end of the dynasty of a traditional gendarmerie concern (*BJTL*, 31.1–29).

Similarly, like their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century predecessors, the gendarmerie of the first decade of the twentieth century regularly opened soup kitchens during the coldest months of the year. In these places, often set up in temples just outside the city gates, the poor received one daily meal of a hot porridge containing millet and rice. Such charitable efforts were closely related to police control of the capital, because locating many food distribution centers outside the city gates helped to prevent famine refugees and other hungry recipients from entering the city (Li and Dray-Novey, 1999: 1015–19). In addition, tribute grain figured in gendarmerie operations as part of the policeman's regular stipend and as food for prisoners at headquarters.

It also traditionally had fallen to the gendarmerie to watch the streets and to perform basic maintenance tasks. Police and their underlings filled holes, removed refuse, cleaned drains, and settled dust with water. They resolutely resisted private encroachment on streets by shops or residences. In 1902 (*BJTL*, GX 28/2), for example, a shop selling foreign medicine in the Inner City enlarged itself, intruding into the public road; police instructed the owner to dismantle the addition. In the same month, officers told owners of Inner City timber yards that they must not pile timber outside their gates,

unlawfully causing a fire hazard as well as taking up public space (*BJTL*, 40.3, 5, 21; 45.1). Historically, the Qing gendarmerie had kept an eye on sizable gatherings, such as those at markets or temple fairs. In the early twentieth century, in response to a censor's suggestion, police concerned themselves with guarding morals and catching criminals in mixed male-female crowds at temples. Officers monitored temples whenever they were open to the public (*BJTL*, 7.4).

Mutual Influence

Although the new police force tended not to mention the gendarmerie in its records,[16] gendarmerie archives and other sources show that the two organizations were continuously in contact (*BJTL* 8, 10, 46). Two heads of the new police in its earliest days (the Manchu nobleman Shanqi, better known as Prince Su, and Natong) held the post of Bujun tongling (head of the gendarmerie) concurrently (Han Yankong and Su Yigong, 1993: 112–13). Gendarmerie personnel high and low were recruited into the new force or studied at the capital's police academy, the Jingwu yamen (later Jingwu xue tang), founded in April 1901 by the Japanese adviser Kawashima Naniwa and supported by Prince Su (Strand, 1989: 67; Han Yankong and Su Yigong, 1993: 112; Reynolds, 1993: 164, 166–67). David Strand notes that such direct ties were one way of blunting the gendarmerie's initial opposition to the new police. Gendarmerie authorities on Qing law taught at the academy and were well paid (Strand, 1989: 68; see *BJTL*, 8). In 1901 alone, the left wing of the Gendarmerie Division sent 30 officers and 273 others to study at the academy (*BJTL*, 8.1).

In addition to noting frequent correspondence with the new police, the gendarmerie secretariat recorded many legal cases that the gendarmerie handled alone (*BJTL*, 38–39). In 1912, a description of the imperial Chinese government in its final years showed the gendarmerie active "*with* the new Police of the Ministry of the Interior" in maintaining public order in the city and its suburbs, guarding the city gates, patrolling the streets day and night, and arresting malefactors (Brunnert and Hagelstrom, 1912: §797; emphasis added).[17]

Nightfall, 1912–1924

In 1912, the new Republican authorities retained Beijing as their capital. The welfare of about 200,000 banner people in the Inner City, supported

by grain and money stipends promised in the 1912 abdication edict, thus became a direct concern of the national government.[18] Allowing the Eight Banner organization to remain in existence helped the Republic because it facilitated the regular distribution of those payments (Crossley, 1990: 294, 198; 1997: 195; Rhoads, 2000: 257). President Yuan Shikai's decision to preserve the Gendarmerie Division and the Bujun tongling yamen (Gendarmerie Headquarters) also may have been motivated by the wish to maintain multiple forces in Beijing as a way of enhancing his own control over all of them (Han Yanlong and Su Yigong, 1993: 347). It was characteristic of Yuan to assert authority by old and new means simultaneously (MacKinnon, 1975: 94–95; 1980: 213–24; Young, 1977: 138). Moreover, the national government may have feared the sudden disbanding of thousands of gendarmes recently selected for youth and competence, some of whom had been trained to use guns.[19] In this way, the results of the Qing habit of adding new governmental agencies without taking old ones away outlived the dynasty itself.

Both Sidney Gamble's pioneering 1921 social survey and contemporary guidebooks and newspapers document the second phase in the twilight of the gendarmerie, 1912–24. The police status quo of 1921, the date of Gamble's report, probably to some extent resembled that of 1912–21. Gamble used the term "Military Guard" for the gendarmerie and treated it as one of several important institutions jointly responsible for administering the city.[20] He observed that the "National Government, the Provincial Government, the Military Guard, the Municipal Council, and the Police Board are all exercising various governmental functions in the city" (Gamble, 1921: 66). He understood the Military Guard to have complete responsibility for the sixteen gates and for the territory immediately surrounding the city, but to be sometimes in contention with the new police over jurisdiction in the Inner City and especially in the Outer City, where the Five Battalions of the Green Standard had formerly been the principal police force (Gamble, 1921: 70–71).

Thus Gamble's description of Military Guard operations included areas (the immediate environs of the city beyond the walls and the Outer City) that had been dominated under the Qing by the Five Battalions. But it also included areas (the gates and walls of both cities, the main avenues of the Inner City) dominated under the Qing by the Gendarmerie Division. His account strongly suggests that significant remnants of both the Five Battalions and the Gendarmerie Division were active in 1921, but that the new police had to a large extent supplanted the Gendarmerie Division in the Inner City and firmly intended to supplant the Five Battalions in the Outer City as well. Gamble emphasizes the sharp competition between the Police Board

and the gendarmerie (Military Guard) in the early 1920s, particularly in the Outer City:

> The principal duties of the Military Guard in [Beijing] are putting its seal on all proclamations for the city, guarding all the city gates and posting extra guards on the main highways. These guards are allowed to make arrests without first notifying the police, if they find the offender in the North City, but they cannot do so in the South City. The police are jealous of the power that the Military Guard used to have in the South City, and so insist that no arrests be made without their having been notified. They want to make sure that the Military Guard is not using the organization that it still maintains for the South City.[21] (Gamble, 1921: 70–71)

A comprehensive 1923 Beijing guidebook records the posts of the new police (known after 1914 as the Jingshi jingcha ting, the Capital Police Board). The guidebook also tells us much about the placement of men of the Gendarmerie Division (called in 1923 by its Qing name, the Bujun ying) in all sections of the city and its environs.[22] The posts of the Five Battalions of Green Standard Gendarmerie (again identified by Qing terms) also are shown in many places, especially in the northwestern suburbs. Intended for practical use by visitors, the book provides addresses and telephone numbers of local police offices. In all, the 1923 guidebook lists the information for more than 140 distinct gendarmerie posts in the Inner and Outer Cities, the major gates, and the suburbs. Their placement accords with traditional gendarmerie organization and street beats. A separate listing of sixteen special Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese banner gendarmerie branch offices (*guanting*) reveals that these local Inner City police agencies remained open twelve years after the fall of the dynasty (*Zengding shiyong Beijing zhinan*, 1923).[23]

The activities attributed by Gamble to the Military Guard certainly required a force of considerable size. He reported that the guard not only bore primary responsibility for the city gates and the area just outside the city walls, but also maintained a prison and two schools with a combined enrollment of 874 (Gamble, 1921: 135, 318). Whenever there was any disturbance, according to Gamble, the Military Guard quickly grew much larger by adding soldiers from around the city. (The 1923 guidebook confirms this observation by showing gendarmerie men stationed at many locations in the city and its extramural suburbs.) With its large, expandable, and mobilizable force, the Military Guard often took control in difficult times, as it did during the May Fourth demonstrations of May-June 1919 (Gamble, 1921: 70–72).

Significantly, it was the Military Guard, with its long gendarmerie tradition of suppressing the slightest move toward sedition, which reportedly forced the arrest of hundreds of the May Fourth demonstrators (*North China Herald*, June 14, 1919; *Dongfang zazhi*, June 15, 1919; Gamble, 1921: 71).[24] The same tradition led to secret investigations of Beijing University students' political activities in the years following the May Fourth incident (Han Yanlong and Su Yigong, 1993: 351–52), just as ten to twenty years earlier the gendarmerie had carried on clandestine surveillance of revolutionaries and watched students coming and going at railroad stations. Gamble also noted the joint effort of the Military Guard, along with the Metropolitan District and the Police Board, in providing soup kitchens and clothing for the poor on a relatively large scale (Gamble, 1921: 278, 282, 487).[25] Such relief had become an even more pressing need after the fall of the dynasty and the loss of the food security protection that it had been careful to provide for its capital (Li and Dray-Novey, 1999: 1018–19; see figure 1).

The gendarmerie carried on its work from a well-established central office. Military Guard headquarters, the Bujun tongling yamen, was located on the same street (Mao'er hutong) in the north-central Inner City where it had been since 1756. This location, not far north of the Di'an Gate of the Imperial City, is confirmed by numerous sources (*Zengding Zhongguo lüxing zhinan*, 1921: 9; *Zengding shiyong Beijing zhinan*, 1923: 1.22–29; Gamble, 1921: 67; see also Dray-Novey, 1993: 900).[26] Drum beats to signal the number of the watch throughout the night at the nearby Drum Tower, which in earlier times had helped to synchronize police patrols (Dray-Novey, 1993: 896), continued until 1928 and even into the 1930s. The Bell Tower yet further to the north also remained in use during the early Republic (Arlington and Lewisohn, 1935: 173, 175; Kates, [1952] 1996: 71; see figure 1).

In the post-1912 multiple-police context, a historic transformation was occurring. The roots of the gendarmerie as an institution went back well into the Ming period (1368–1644) and thus had successfully crossed over a previous dynastic divide (A. Chan, 1962: 123, 134, 142; H. Chan, 1988: 246ff.). At that earlier time, the Manchus had reshaped for their own use the police agencies both high (the Imperial Bodyguard, or Jinyiwei)[27] and low (the city constabulary) that remained from Ming rule (Beijing daxue lishi xi, 1999: 175–76).[28] Characteristically, they had accomplished this primarily by means of the banner military system, which was fundamental to their rule (Elliott, 2001). Under the early Republic, specialized and professionalized foreign models, on the one hand, and age-old Chinese urban police practices, on the other, began to flow together in a common stream.

Now defined partly by Western and Japanese models, the status of police work in general rose. The two principal forces, old and new, clearly influenced each other. As Strand observes, the policemen of the new force seemed to have "absorbed [the gendarmerie's] taste for a broad-gauged approach to the maintenance of order" (Strand, 1989: 71). They launched many operations that, although entirely new, directly reflected the gendarmerie tradition of taking responsibility for society: reform schools, workhouses, hospitals, shelters for former prostitutes, and a nursery for abandoned infants. They systematically collected socioeconomic data, much of which they shared with Sidney Gamble. For its part, as we have seen, the gendarmerie tried to adapt to modern times by reducing and improving its personnel, training them with guns, watching rail stations, keeping new kinds of statistics, and increasing relief efforts.

Because legal segregation of Manchu and Han populations had ended with the Qing dynasty, ethnic differences no longer could be the basis of urban governance. Leaders of the Republic envisioned that a common mass of citizens—overwhelmingly Han but including Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans—would emerge over time (Rhoads, 2000: 262). Accordingly, the gendarmerie's former tendency to view the city in terms of ethnic, territorial, and gender divisions (Manchu Inner City, Chinese Outer City, areas inside and outside the walls, the traditionally male street crowd, etc.) began to break down in favor of the new police preference for seeing Beijing and its populace as a unified whole.

This change in perspective gradually undermined one rationale for the long-established multiple-police structure. Heads of the gendarmerie, always Manchu or Mongol under the Qing, all appear to have been nonbanner Chinese after 1912 (Han Yanlong and Su Yigong, 1993: 347–48). Increased social responsibility by both old and new police created models for public charitable activity, just as police firefighting had given rise to public "water societies" *(shuihui)* in the nineteenth century. Despite strong efforts by the police, their resources could not begin to meet the social service needs of a population numbering about 800,000 in the two walled cities alone, and more than a million in those cities plus the extramural suburbs (Gamble, 1921: 412–13; Han Guanghui, 1996: 128). Nongovernmental philanthropic institutions, both indigenous and foreign, worked on a smaller scale to augment official operations (Gamble, 1921: 38, 276–85).

Funding for the gendarmerie after 1912, as for the new police, appears to have come primarily from the national government's Ministry of Finance, with the new police placed under the Ministry of the Interior and the gendarmerie under that of War. Some (though not all) of the Eight Banner units

survived the end of the dynasty and also were supported by the national government. Payment of banner stipends, though gradually reduced in amount, continued in Beijing until 1924 (Elliott, 2001: 390, 638–39; Rhoads, 2000: 257).[29] In 1924, Emil Fischer's guidebook noted the importance at that time in governing the city of "Military Forces and the forces of the Eight Bannermen which are stationed in and around the Capital District" (Fischer, 1924: 175).[30]

Funds for policing the capital necessarily came from the national government rather than from the city itself, because traditionally Beijing residents had paid no taxes on their houses or land, and this Qing-era exemption continued under the Republic. A few taxes were levied on real estate transactions, shops, and vehicles. In addition, households helped to pay for the cleaning of their own streets. But the revenue collected in these ways was never sufficient to pay for local administration, much of which was carried out by police. In the 1920s, the national government became insolvent and did in fact transfer much of the expense of administering Beijing to the city. In these straitened circumstances, pay for the new police was frequently late. Attempts to establish more substantial urban taxation failed in 1915, 1921, and 1924, but at last succeeded in 1927 in the form of a house tax (*North China Herald*, April 12, 1907; Gamble, 1921: 29, 65, 67, 69, 71, 74, 83; Strand, 1989: 95).[31]

Loss of financial support from the national government probably was the main reason why the gendarmerie finally disappeared in the mid-1920s. In October 1924, General Feng Yuxiang captured Beijing, overthrowing the rule of its Beiyang warlords and their "facade of parliamentary government" (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 1965: 656; see also Crossley, 1997: 198). In November of the same year, Feng's troops ousted the last emperor and his entourage from the Forbidden City. Banner stipends came to an end. In connection with these events, the Beiyang government extinguished the historic Bujun tongling yamen on November 5, 1924 (*North China Herald*, November 6, 1924; Johnston, [1934] 1985; Wang Ji, 1987; Shuai, 1997).[32] According to the correspondent of the *North China Herald*, the Beijing gendarmerie thereon became the Third Brigade of the National Army, commanded by General Sun Yue.[33]

The Debris of the Old Regime

The gendarmerie's survival until 1924 is not in itself surprising. Police patterns in any populous city are tenacious and often outlast even major

social and political upheavals (Bayley, 1975: 370, 372). The gendarmerie in its twilight period was not a particularly strong organization, however. Even given late Qing reform, the institution's nineteenth-century decline made any long-term recovery unlikely. The important point is that during these years the gendarmerie *existed*, that it operated from its old Inner City headquarters, and that it worked together with the new police force in major ways, even on occasion taking the lead in controlling the city. Among history's final demonstrations of the strength of the Eight Banner organization was the tenacity of the gendarmerie, which transmitted old perspectives and practices to the newer force for almost a quarter of a century.

The seemingly instant emergence of the modern Beijing police—a force that became a national model—becomes more understandable when we perceive the framework in which its advent occurred. That context was a traditional multiple-police structure in which the Qing gendarmerie was not a vague memory but an active daily presence, though by 1912 reduced to between one-half and one-third of its former scale. As the case of Chengdu suggests, modern Western and Japanese organizational models would not have taken so swiftly had they not been grafted, via both the gendarmerie and the new police force, onto a living root of indigenous big-city police—one of the oldest such roots in the world. Foreign models catalyzed the potential for greater urban control that already existed in Beijing police institutions; they did not create that potential.

For twelve years after the fall of the Qing dynasty, old and new police operated side by side. When the gendarmerie became part of the National Army in 1924, it is likely that some of its remaining men were absorbed instead by the new police. In 1928, ninety percent of that force was Manchu, showing the strong presence of bannermen, who had been the mainstay of the Gendarmerie Division (*New York Times*, December 30, 1928). The presence of many former banner gendarmes in the new police after 1924 was probably yet another avenue for transferring characteristic attitudes and activities of the older force to the new.[34]

Thus a key organization of modern urban China was built up from a quarter-century-long synthesis of new ideas with traditional institutional material that lay at hand, available for recycling. In the 1850s, Alexis de Tocqueville had written of the makers of the French Revolution: "Unintentionally, they used the debris of the old régime to construct the framework of their new society. Thus, to properly understand the Revolution and its work, one must forget for a moment the France of today and ask questions of a France that no longer exists" (Tocqueville, 1998: 83). Similarly, we cannot understand the modern Beijing police that emerged in the first quarter of the twentieth

century, the influential model that they created for other cities of China, and the increasing control of urban society that they effected without asking questions of the city's long-lived Qing gendarmerie.

Notes

1. Bayley (1985: 23, 37, 47), in a comparative international analysis of police past and present, argues that modern city police are distinguished by being public (i.e., "paid by communities acting collectively"), specialized, and professional. In the Qing gendarmerie of Beijing, in contrast, most privates were unspecialized in function and were of humble social backgrounds; many had failed at previous military assignments. Even criminals degraded to slave status could be patrolmen. Salaries were low, less than that of common workmen or clerks, and they were paid by a dynasty, not a community. The huge number of privates suggests that some men worked only part-time, although a breakdown of part-time versus full-time status is not documented. A regular five-year examination and review was required for promotion of officers; it is not clear whether comparable formal procedures applied to lower-level evaluation (Dray-Novey, 1981: 59–137).

2. Zhu argues that spatial fragmentation allowed Chinese society in general and Beijing and other cities in particular to be "supervised and managed closely. It certainly invites comparison with practices in early modern Europe . . . and subsequent development of the so-called 'disciplinary society.' Perhaps, in China, such a disciplinary society, so characteristic of a problematic modernity in the works of Michel Foucault, was more systematic and thorough, more culturally internalized, and developed much earlier than in Europe" (Zhu, 2004: 67). Zhu finds some Chinese roots of control by means of disposition of space in the ancient Legalist philosophical school. See also Foucault, 1979: 213–28.

3. Information in this section is based on *JWSL*; Dray-Novey, 1981, 1993; and Li and Dray-Novey, 1999.

4. Many documents in *JWSL* report criticism of the gendarmerie to the throne by the police censors of the Five Districts, followed by the arguments of the gendarmerie in reply.

5. *Wanshou shengdian* (1718) illustrates the city route of an imperial birthday procession. Hundreds of figures of gendarmes appear in many separate scenes, a few of which are reproduced in Dray-Novey (1993) and Li and Dray-Novey (1999). In addition, *JWSL* (9.64–65; 12.25) documents Five Battalion uniforms.

6. Dray-Novey (1993: 893, 898) contains illustrations of street gates and sentry boxes from *Wanshou shengdian* (1718).

7. In October 1900, for example, B. L. Putnam Weale (1907: 435) noted in his diary that the Japanese-occupied area was the "best policed" and "most tranquil."

8. These names were the Gongxunju (Bureau of Public Works and Patrol), 1901–02; the Nei/Wai cheng xunjing zongting (Inner/Outer City Central Police Bureau), 1902–05; and in 1905 the Xunjing bu (Ministry of Police), which became the Minzheng bu (Ministry of Civil Administration) from 1906 to 1911 and after. The name Jingshi jingcha ting (Capital Police Board) was used from 1914 onward.

9. The title of Charles Reith's *The Police Idea* (1938) refers precisely to the intense resistance to bureaucratized city police in London in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

10. Whether Beijing was unique among Chinese cities in the extent of its Qing-era bureaucratic policing remains to be determined. The data from Chengdu suggest that cases comparable to Beijing should be sought among garrisoned cities with populations closer to that of the capital.

11. On Beijing and the Beijing area under foreign occupation during 1900–1901, see Hunt, 1979; Hevia, 2003.

12. Wang's estimate of 10,000 appears to omit the Green Standard gendarmes.

13. The "Water Gate" (*shuiguan* or *shuimen*) was the location between the Qian and Chongwen Gates where a canal used for transport of grain tribute entered the Inner City wall.

14. As a general rule, police reports noted street/gate areas where criminals or suspects lived. A sense of the social use of city space and its implications for order was a reflex of the gendarmerie. The conviction that many criminals came from outside the city (*BJTL*, 39.1, 4–6) reflects awareness of the tight control inside the walls, especially in the Inner City.

15. Campbell (1993, 1997) analyzes death certificates in the First Historical Archives, Beijing, for 1,377 women and 1,335 men who died in the capital during the Xuantong reign (1909–1911). One item of information on each death certificate was the gate through which the coffin was taken for burial (Campbell, 1997: 191). In the preceding Ming period, magistrates received monthly reports from physicians to learn of sickness in Beijing neighborhoods (A. Chan, 1962, citing *Xinguan hui fan* of 1584).

16. My thanks to Luca Gabbiani for this observation.

17. The new police had come under the Ministry of the Interior beginning in 1906 and 1907.

18. In 1908, banner people were 54 percent of the Inner City population of 414,528 (Rhoads, 2000: 39). Han Guanghui (1996: 126) calculates the Inner City banner figure for 1909 at 196,617.

19. Susan Naquin suggested this point, which also applies to other banner units surviving after 1912 (see Crossley, 1990: 198; Rhoads, 2000: 264).

20. It is characteristic of the competition between the gendarmerie and the new force as it was in the early 1920s that Gamble reported: "We have not been able to secure any information concerning the powers and organization of the police force under the Empire; but we have been fortunate in procuring from the Chief of Police a very complete report of the present-day organization and work of the [Police] Board [Jingshi jingcha ting]" (Gamble, 1921: 76). His Police Board informants apparently did not stress that the "Military Guard" was the direct continuation of the Qing gendarmerie, although Gamble was aware of the historical tie between the two. He concluded that the city's police system was a "copy of those used in the large cities of Japan, which in turn are based on the German police system" (Gamble, 1921: 70–71, 85).

21. The implication seems to be that the new police were relatively confident of their dominance in the Inner City, but not yet in the Outer City. It may be relevant that the new police had been established a few years earlier in the Inner City than in the Outer City (1901 vs. 1905).

22. In addition, stations of the Hujun ying (the Flank Division of the Banners) are reported in and near the Forbidden City, a top-level protective assignment that the same division had held under the Qing (Wade, 1851: 266).

23. One of the gendarmerie local offices listed in the 1923 guide appears to be the Military Guard suboffice near Dengshikou (in the Inner City) that happened to be mentioned by Gamble because he studied that neighborhood in detail (Gamble, 1921: 324).

24. The *North China Herald* reported on June 15, 1919 the details of demonstrations on June 4th and 5th:

> The new Commandant of Gendarmerie appears to be adopting the measures advocated by the militarists in dealing with the students. Upwards of 1000 students are now in custody in various parts of the city, and it is freely reported that they may not have been

> supplied with food for over forty hours. There is every indication that the students intend to continue the demonstrations until all are in custody. The Government declares that no definite policy toward the students has been adopted. Meanwhile the gendarmerie are in the saddle and are riding in the direction of a great upheaval, unable to see or unwilling to admit that the student body represents the great middle classes of China from all the provinces of the north and some of the south.

25. Han Yanlong and Su Yigong (1993: 351) mention ten soup kitchens at temples outside city gates as well as training in craft skills for poor youngsters. According to Gamble, seven soup kitchens of the Police Board together provided 350,000 to 400,000 meals a month; three centers of the Military Guard, from 120,000 to 150,000; and two centers of the Ching Chao Ying (Jingzhao ying, the Metropolitan District), 80,000 to 90,000 (Gamble, 1921: 278).

26. In 1997, the lane that once led to gendarmerie headquarters, as detailed on the map of 1750, was still clearly recognizable. The headquarters complex itself was partly gone and partly changed. A map of Dadu (later Beijing) in the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) shows a city surveillance bureau in the same neighborhood, in similar relation to the Drum Tower (Rossabi, 1994: 456).

27. Li Baochen suggested this particular Ming-Qing police connection (conversation with the author, 1997). On the Ming Imperial Bodyguard (*Jinyiwei*), "answerable to the throne and spaciously housed near the palace," see Naquin, 2000: 126.

28. Joanne Wakeland (1982) establishes that Ming police numbers were surprisingly high for a premodern city. Military officers with police jurisdictions "proliferated remarkably" in the late fifteenth to early sixteenth centuries, with about 10,000 officers and soldiers by the early Wanli reign (1573–1620). She further remarks: "A police force of this size would not be surprising in a city the size of [Beijing], but it contrasts sharply with the understaffing of local government throughout the rest of the empire" (Wakeland, 1982: 116–17).

29. According to Rhoads (2000: 257), at first bannermen received both grain and money in the same amounts as in the late Qing. By 1913–14, the grain stopped. Only money was paid, at first in silver dollars (rather than in bulk silver as before), and later in copper. Stipends were reduced after the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916. As late as 1918, tens of thousands of banner people in Beijing were still being paid by the government. Soon thereafter, however, payments became erratic; by the early 1920s they were limited to festivals and small monthly amounts. In most places in China, banner stipends ended soon after the 1911 Revolution; in Beijing they continued until 1924.

30. Fischer's statement reads in full: "Peking is supervised by the Inspector General of the Metropolitan District, by the Commander of the Metropolitan Gendarmerie Corps, [and] by the Chief of the Metropolitan Police, in addition to the Military Forces and the forces of the Eight Bannermen which are stationed in and around the Capital District" (Fischer, 1924: 175). He probably refers here to the head of the Metropolitan District (Jingzhao, formerly Shuntian fu), the head of the gendarmerie (Gamble's Military Guard), and the head of the new police (Gamble's Police Board). It is possible, however, that by "Metropolitan Gendarmerie Corps" he means a special, elite unit of about a thousand men controlled by the Police Board, the Bao'an dui (Gamble, 1921:78).

31. Not long after this period, in the early 1930s, the city populace actually would seek *more* policing as urban society became increasingly disturbed and crime-ridden (Xu, 2005).

32. Han and Su (1993: 352) give October 5, 1924 as the termination date of the Bujun tongling yamen.

33. *North China Herald*, November 8, 1924, "Dispatch of November fifth from Beijing: 'A special meeting of representatives took place this afternoon to deal with President Tsao Kun's resignation. Mandates issued place wine and tobacco under the Ministry of Finance, also convert the Peking gendarmerie into the 3rd Brigaed [*sic*] of the National Army commanded by General Sun Yueh, and make a number of other changes of local importance.'" Mingzheng Shi suggests that the gendarmerie was engaged for some time after 1924 in using 20 percent of the admissions revenue from the new public park at the Summer Palace for road maintenance. He describes the gendarmerie as the "local administrative authority responsible for Beijing's suburbs" (Shi, 1998: 238; citing Second Historical Archives of China, 1912–1928: 1001/1905).

34. After the Guomindang assumed authority in the city in 1928–30, many of the military police (*xianbing*) of the (then) former capital also may have had connections to the Qing gendarmerie.

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