

**Resistance, Peace and War:  
The *Central China Daily News*, the *South China Daily News*  
and the Wang Jingwei Clique  
during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945**

by

**CHIU, Ming Wah**

B.A., *H.K.*

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Philosophy  
at The University of Hong Kong.

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This thesis aims to analyze and compare the roles of the *Central China Daily News* (CCDN) in Shanghai and the *South China Daily News* (SCDN) in Hong Kong as the propaganda organs of the Wang Jingwei Clique during the Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945.

Four observations about the CCDN and the SCDN in the war years are made in this study. First, the CCDN and the SCDN constituted an indispensable part of the propaganda machinery of the Wang Clique. Their status in the propaganda machinery of the Wang Clique was little challenged by other pro-Wang newspapers throughout the War under the leadership of Lin Bosheng, the Clique's chief publicist.

Second, the CCDN and the SCDN adhered to Wang's changing political ideas and helped the Wang Clique to explain its policies and activities in different periods of the War: When Wang supported the resistance policy in the first year of the Sino-Japanese War, the two newspapers advocated uncompromising resistance



against the Japanese; when the Wang Clique defected from the Chongqing government and advocated peace with Japan in December 1938, the two newspapers were steadfast in defending the cause of the Clique and promoted peace to the Chinese population; when the Wang Clique succeeded in establishing a regime in the Japanese-occupied areas and joined Japan to fight against the Allies during the Pacific War, the two newspapers immediately helped the Wang government to explain the apparent inconsistency between peace and war.

Third, while the political orientation of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* were similar under the control of the Wang Clique, these two newspapers needed to adopt different editorial and operational policies in order to survive in different local situations in Shanghai and Hong Kong. This thesis explains how these two newspapers responded to the ruling authorities' changing policies, the rivalries between the pro-Wang and pro-Chongqing forces, and the diverse attitudes of the local populations towards the Wang Clique in the two cities during the war years.

Finally, while the *CCDN* had a large readership in the occupied areas in Central China, the *SCDN* did not achieve similar popularity in Hong Kong. This phenomenon might reflect that the Wang Clique's influence on the population of Hong Kong was much weaker than that on the population of Central China.

(377 words)



## Declaration

I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree, diploma, or other qualifications.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_  
CHIU, Ming Wah



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## **Note on Romanization**

### **Chinese Names**

#### ***Names of Persons and Places***

Chinese names of persons and places in China are transliterated according to the *pinyin* system except for names which have long been familiar in an older form such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Peking, Yangtze, and Canton.

Chinese names of persons and places in Hong Kong are indicated in their official spellings. Where the official spelling is not available, the *pinyin* system is used.

#### ***Names of Publications and Organizations***

Chinese publications and organizations are indicated in their official spellings; however, in cases that the official spellings are not available, the names are dealt with differently:

Chinese publications without official spellings are transliterated according to the *pinyin* system. An English translation is given after these publications when they are first mentioned in the thesis.

Chinese organizations without official spellings are expressed in the English translations of their names. A *pinyin* transliteration is given after these organizations when they are first mentioned in the thesis.



## **Japanese Names**

Japanese personal names are written with the family name first and the given name second.

In any case of exception, it will be noted with a footnote. A glossary of the Chinese and the Japanese names is given for readers' reference.



## Abbreviations

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| C\$     | Chinese Yuan ( <i>fabi</i> )  |
| CADN    | Chinese American Daily News   |
| CBNS    | Central Book and Newspaper Store                                      |
| CCDN    | Central China Daily News  |
| CCP     | Chinese Communist Party   |
| CNMB    | Central Newspaper Management Bureau                                   |
| CRB\$   | Chinese Yuan (Central Reserve Bank)                                   |
| GMD     | Guomindang  |
| HK\$    | Hong Kong dollar  |
| HKACLCA | Hong Kong Branch of the All-China Literary Circles Association        |
| HKPRO   | Hong Kong Public Record Office  |
| JACAR   | Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan |
| MY\$    | Military Yen (Hong Kong)  |
| SCDN    | South China Daily News  |
| SCWR    | Weekly Review / South China Weekly Review                             |
| SHAC    | Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing                          |
| SMA     | Shanghai Municipal Archives, Shanghai                                 |
| SMC     | Shanghai Municipal Council  |
| SMP     | Shanghai Municipal Police   |



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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

This study aims to analyze and compare the roles of the *Central China Daily News* (CCDN 中華日報) and the *South China Daily News* (SCDN 南華日報) in the political activities of Wang Jingwei (汪精衛), a leading Chinese politician who led his associates to collaborate with the Japanese, during the Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945. Although there is some research on the politics of Wang's wartime collaboration, little attention has been given to the roles of the newspapers in Wang's political activities during the War. This research attempts to provide new insights into Wang's political activities during the Sino-Japanese War, especially his collaboration with the Japanese.

### Wang Jingwei Clique and Wartime Collaboration

Wang Jingwei was a senior politician in Republican China. He had been a famous and loyal follower of Sun Yat-sen (孫中山) and an important revolutionary since the early twentieth century. His influence over the Guomindang (GMD 中國國民黨) as well as the Chinese politics was strong in the early decades of the twentieth century. Since the mid-1920s, Wang gradually developed his own political faction, or commonly known as the Wang Jingwei Clique, within the Guomindang, and tried to compete for leadership in the Party and the government.

The definition of the *Wang Clique* changed from time to time, and members of the Clique also varied in different periods. In the mid-1920s, the *Wang Clique*



referred to the cooperation between Wang and the leftist wing of the GMD, such as Liao Zhongkai (廖仲愷) and Song Qingling (宋慶齡). In the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the Wang Clique composed mainly of the GMD members who supported a reorganization of the Party and opposed the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石). They were commonly known as the “Reorganization Faction” (Gaizu pai 改組派). The Wang Clique also included Wang’s loyal personal associates who participated actively in politics, such as Chen Bijun (陳璧君) or Madame Wang, Zeng Zhongming (曾仲鳴), Wang’s personal assistant, and Lin Bosheng (林柏生), Wang’s faithful publicist.

The meaning and composition of the Wang Clique changed again during the Sino-Japanese War, especially when Wang started to be involved in secret contacts with Japan in 1938. In the early days of the War, Wang supported resistance against the Japanese as the majority of the Chinese population did. After a year of fighting, however, he was gradually convinced that the resistance policy could not save China, and hence became more eager to achieve peace with Japan. Secret contacts between Wang’s associates and Japanese envoys began in 1938, and finally led to Wang’s departure from Chongqing, the wartime capital of China, and his declaration for peace in December 1938.

At the time of Wang’s departure from Chongqing, the Clique was comprised of only eleven members.<sup>1</sup> They were Wang’s personal associates, politicians who had worked for Chiang but shared Wang’s pessimistic view on the future of resistance, such as Zhou Fohai (周佛海), Mei Siping (梅思平), and Gao Zongwu (高宗武), and

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<sup>1</sup> Hu Lancheng 胡蘭成, *Jinsheng jinshi* 今生今世, vol.1 (Taipei: Sansan shufang, 1990), p.185.



some writers working for the *SCDN*, the propaganda organ of the Wang Clique. As the peace movement (*heping yundong* 和平運動) developed into a regime in the occupied areas under Japanese sponsorship in 1940, the Wang Clique became much larger and the background of its members became more diversified. Core members of the Clique included those who had followed Wang since the early days of the peace movement, and those who had been loyal to Wang long before the Sino-Japanese War, such as Chen Gongbo (陳公博). There were also a number of political activists or opportunists who joined the peace movement because of their personal interests. Ding Mocun (丁默邨) and Li Shiqun (李士群), the leaders of pro-Wang underground agents in Shanghai, were two examples. The composition of the Wang government, which existed in the occupied areas from 1940 to 1945, was even more complicated. Apart from the Wang Clique, the leadership of the Wang government included Chinese collaborators of the previous Japanese-sponsored regimes in the occupied areas, military officers who deserted from the Chongqing government, and public servants who were compelled to join the Wang government because of livelihood or Japanese pressure.

It is necessary to define the word *collaboration* during the Sino-Japanese War before continuing the discussion of the political activities of the Wang Clique during the Sino-Japanese War. The word *collaboration* commonly refers to “traitorous cooperation with the enemy”.<sup>2</sup> However, this common explanation is insufficient to become a definition, especially when it is put into a Chinese context. The term *collaboration* is to a great extent a Western concept.<sup>3</sup> There is no equivalent Chinese

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<sup>2</sup> J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2d ed., vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.469.

<sup>3</sup> The word first appeared, as an immediate translation from French, during the Second World War to specify the cooperative behaviour of the occupied population in Europe with their occupying power, Nazi Germany. Nicholas Atkin, *The French at War, 1934-1944* (Harlow: Longman, 2001), pp.61-68.



translation of the word collaboration without losing much of its original meaning.<sup>4</sup> Instead, the term most commonly used by both the wartime and post-war Chinese to refer to the men cooperating with the enemy is *hanjian* (漢奸), which literally means “traitor to the Han”.<sup>5</sup> The term is generally accepted to “allude to someone who throws in his or her lot with a foreign people or with foreign invaders, willingly serves at their beck and call, and sells out the interests of the ancestral land and the people”.<sup>6</sup>

Since the term *hanjian* has been frequently adopted by the Chinese to describe those who cooperate with the enemy during the Sino-Japanese War, one may question why it is not *hanjian*, but *collaborator* used in this study. In fact, both terms refer to the same group of people who cooperate with the enemy, but their connotations are so different that they can lead to vastly different conclusions.

To understand the difference in connotation between *hanjian* and *collaboration*, it is necessary to review the history of the usage of the two terms. As mentioned before, *collaboration* appeared in Europe during the Second World War. It was first declared by Marshal Pétain, a French national hero who led France to form a pro-German Vichy government after the French defeat and appealed to the French to

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<sup>4</sup> The most approximate term *tongdi* (通敵), which, according to a Chinese dictionary, means “collaboration with the enemy” (*goujie diren* 勾結敵人). Luo Zhufeng 羅竹風, ed., *Hanyu da cidian* 漢語大詞典, vol. 10 (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1990), p.45. The term is, however, seldom used by the Chinese in their narratives of the Sino-Japanese War.

<sup>5</sup> Frederic Wakeman Jr, “*Hanjian* (Traitor)! Collaboration and Retribution in Wartime Shanghai,” in Wen-hsin Yeh, ed., *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.298. Linguistically, the words *collaboration* and *hanjian* possess two different semantic properties. While *collaboration* describes an *action*, *hanjian* describes an *agent* who performs an *action*. It is hence more appropriate to use *collaborator* (one who performs collaboration) to compare with *hanjian*. George Yule, *The Study of Language*, 2d. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.117.

<sup>6</sup> Luo, ed., *Hanyu da cidian*, vol. 6, p.49; An excellent explanation of the meaning of *hanjian* is given in Wakeman, “*Hanjian* (Traitor)!,” pp.298-299.



achieve an “entirely novel peace of collaboration” with Germany in a broadcast in early October 1940.<sup>7</sup> There was originally no “traitorous” implication when Pétain coined this word. On the contrary, according to his advocacy, collaboration is a justified action for the national cause. The word was soon accepted to describe similar behaviour in the rest of wartime Europe, and finally became a general expression of “traitorous” cooperation with the enemy.<sup>8</sup> The term *collaboration* has long been associated with a negative sense in postwar narratives of wartime European politics, but as historians have started to re-examine the history of collaboration in Europe during the Second World War in a less morally preoccupied way, the meaning of *collaboration* has become increasingly neutral.<sup>9</sup>

Unlike the neutral interpretation of *collaboration*, the term *hanjian* succeeded the long-established self-distinction from alien races in ancient China. For centuries, the Chinese have used *jian* (奸) to refer to “the malicious”.<sup>10</sup> In the early Qing dynasty, *hanjian* began to be used to revile the Han gentry and officials who served the Manchu rulers.<sup>11</sup> When Western countries and Japan became the sources of external threat to China in the nineteenth century, the meaning of *hanjian* became

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<sup>7</sup> Werner Rings, *Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe, 1939-1945*, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1982), p.110; H.R. Kedward, *Occupied France: Collaboration and Resistance, 1940-1944* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p.34.

<sup>8</sup> In fact, in the wartime British reports about the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, the terms such as *Quislings* and *collaborators* has been adopted to refer to the occupied population, including the Chinese, who cooperated with the Japanese army and administration. Philip Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p.196. However, this calling did not have a rigid meaning.

<sup>9</sup> See Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Rings, *Life with the Enemy*, p.110.

<sup>10</sup> For example, Shao Bowen 邵伯溫 (1057-1134 AD), using the name of a writer Su Xun 蘇洵 (1009-1066 AD), wrote an essay “Bian Jian Lun” (On Distinguishing the Malicious 辨姦論) to attack Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021-1086 AD) and his new policies. One should note that the Chinese character *jian* used in Shao's essay (姦) is not that we are discussing in *hanjian* (奸), but their meanings as “the malicious” are supposedly the same. Yang Jingding 楊金鼎 et al., eds., *Guwenguanzhi quanyi* 古文觀止全譯, vol. 2 (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 1984), pp.971-976.

<sup>11</sup> Wakeman, “*Hanjian* (Traitor)!” pp.299-300.



very complicated and diversified. Nonetheless, *hanjian* was still a highly derogatory and sentimental epithet used to describe alleged traitors of the Chinese nation.<sup>12</sup> During the Sino-Japanese War, *hanjian* carried yet another meaning besides moral definition. The Chinese government declared in September 1937 that those who worked for the enemy, referring to the Japanese, were *hanjian* and subject to capital punishment.<sup>13</sup> With these strong moral and legal implications, the term *hanjian* is more confusing, if not misleading, than *collaboration* for an objective historical discussion. For this reason, this thesis defines collaboration in a more neutral way: “working voluntarily with the enemy, usually the occupying power, for a variety of reasons”.

Similar to the case in wartime Europe, Chinese wartime collaboration was divided into two categories: ideological and non-ideological. Much of the Chinese collaboration with Japan occurred during the Sino-Japanese War belonged to the latter one. A historian suggests that there was no significant ideological allegiance to the Japanese cause among the Chinese people during the Sino-Japanese War, not even among most of the collaborators who worked with the enemy at local or national level. Most of them collaborated with the enemy “because of self-interest or for sheer survival”.<sup>14</sup>

However, the Wang Clique’s wartime collaboration with the Japanese should

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<sup>12</sup> Ma Qihua 馬起華, *Kangzhan shiqi de zhengzhi jianshe* 抗戰時期的政治建設 (Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1986), p.480.

<sup>13</sup> There is an excellent legal and social definition of *hanjian* during the Sino-Japanese War in Ma Qihua’s book. Ibid., pp.480-483.

<sup>14</sup> David P. Barrett, “Introduction: Occupied China and the Limits of Accommodation,” in David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu, eds., *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: the Limits of Accommodations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p.8.





not be regarded merely as non-ideological collaboration. On the one hand, it is undeniable that the main reason for the Wang Clique's collaboration with Japan was, as shown in the following chapters of this thesis, rather pragmatic. The Clique wanted to save the Chinese nation from complete annihilation and preserve the Chinese sovereignty and independence after a number of military defeats in the Sino-Japanese War.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, the Clique often sought various ideological explanations and revolutionary theories to justify its ideas of collaboration after it initiated the peace movement in 1939. It employed Pan-Asianism (*Da yazhou zhuyi* 大亞洲主義), one of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary legacies, to prove that China and Japan were brothers and should cooperate with each other. During the subsequent years of the Sino-Japanese War, the Clique continued the peace movement and became even less hesitant to adopt Japanese ideas of "New Order of the East Asia" (*Tōa shin'chitsujo* 東亞新秩序) and "East Asian Federation" (*Tōa Renmei* 東亞聯盟), which were often regarded as the Japanese pretexts for starting the war in East Asia. Although even the seemingly staunchest supporters of the Wang Clique might not believe in these ideological explanations whole-heartedly, one should not dismiss the fact that the Wang Clique attempted to show its support for Japanese ideology of expansionism. As a result, the wartime collaboration of the Wang Clique should be regarded as a combination of non-ideological collaboration with Japan and ideological commitment to Japanese wartime expansionism.

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<sup>15</sup> Many leaders in the Wang Clique also insisted this viewpoint after the Sino-Japanese War. See Chen Gongbo 陳公博, *Ku xiao lu: Chen Gongbo huiyi, 1925-1936* 苦笑錄：陳公博回憶，1925-1936, ed. Wang Ruijiong 汪瑞炯, Li E 李鐸 and Zhao Lingyang 趙令揚, vol.2 (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, the University of Hong Kong, 1979), p.409; Nanjing shi dang'anguan 南京市檔案館, ed., *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu* 汪偽漢奸審訊筆錄, vol.1 (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1992), p.98. It is important to note that as these accounts were finished during his postwar trial. They might want to efface the Wang Clique's pro-Japanese psychology in order to alleviate his accusation of treason.



## The CCDN and the SCDN: Propaganda and the Press

The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* played important roles in Wang's political activities during the Sino-Japanese War because Wang and his supporters needed these two newspapers to spread their political ideas and influence the Chinese population. In fact, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* had already served as the propaganda organs of the Wang Clique since their establishment in Shanghai and Hong Kong respectively in the early 1930s.

The term *propaganda*, like *collaboration*, is primarily a Western concept. For many people, *propaganda* is a very negative concept which usually implies brainwashing or “big lies” told by dictators and propagandists to deceive their subjects.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, propaganda tends to prevail in closed societies, where sources of information are more easily controlled by the rulers. Propagandists usually try to limit “the plurality of sources of information”, and discourage interpretation of information provided in propaganda.<sup>17</sup> The term *propaganda*, however, can be treated in a neutral and less morally preoccupied way. It can be defined as “the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that further the desired intent of the propagandists”.<sup>18</sup> It aims to “promote a partisan or competitive cause in the best interest of the propagandist but not necessarily in the best interest of the recipient” through accurate, biased, or false information provided by the propagandists.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Such impression may have come from the idea that the notorious Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels “used evil propaganda methods to secure evil ends”. Lindley Fraser, *Propaganda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p.12; Andrew Smith Serrano, *German Propaganda in Military Decline 1943-1945* (Edinburgh: Pentland Press, 1999), pp.1-3.

<sup>17</sup> Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p.422.

<sup>18</sup> Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1986), p.16.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17.



Propaganda does not necessarily mean to be a tool for dictators to work out their evil objectives. It can be seen as a method which people, especially politicians, adopt to exert influence on others and make them believe in what the propagandists advocate.

The neutral sense of *propaganda* stands out when it is put into the context of modern China. Stranahan elucidates the neutral interpretation of *propaganda* in modern China: “Chinese word for propaganda – *xuanchuan* [宣傳] – is a relatively neutral term. It means ‘to publicize or to make known’ and does not necessarily imply manipulation for a special purpose.”<sup>20</sup> In fact, in modern China, there is no clear distinction between *propaganda*, which refers to a deliberate attempt to shape and manipulate perceptions of the readers or the audience, and *publicity*, which only means an attempt to promote a particular set of ideas to the public.

Propaganda in modern China, especially those carried out for political purposes, was closely associated with the press in China. Soon after modern newspapers were introduced to China in the nineteenth century, they became an important channel for Chinese intellectuals and politicians to publicize their political ideas. Wang Tao (王韜), a scholar who founded *Tsun Wan Yat Pao* (循環日報) in Hong Kong in 1874, knew the power of newspapers to inspire the collective mind of the people to resist the common enemy.<sup>21</sup> During the last decade of the Qing dynasty, Chinese reformists and revolutionaries publicized their political ideas through newspapers published in China or overseas. Kang Youwei (康有為) and Liang Qichao (梁啟超),

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<sup>20</sup> Patricia Stranahan, *Molding the Medium: The Chinese Communist Party and the Liberation Daily* (Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1990), p.8.

<sup>21</sup> He Yangming 何揚明 and Zhang Jiankang 張健康, eds., *20 shiji Zhongguo xinwenxue yu chuanboxue: xuanchuanxue he yulunxue juan* 20 世紀中國新聞學與傳播學：宣傳學和輿論學卷 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2002), p.66.



who were renowned reformists and the leaders of the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898, published *Wanguo gongbao* (the *Universal Gazette* 萬國公報), later known as *Zhongwai jiwen* (the *Chinese and Overseas Journal* 中外紀聞), in Peking in August 1895. They aimed at publicizing their arguments for the preservation and reform of the Qing monarchical government.<sup>22</sup> Chinese revolutionaries also made use of newspapers to rally public support for overthrowing the Manchu government. Sun Yat-sen, who went into exile to avoid being arrested by the Qing government, was keen to publish pro-revolutionary Chinese newspapers in foreign countries. He sponsored famous *Minbao* (the *People's Tribunal* 民報) and *Fubao* (the *Restoration Post* 復報), both of which were published in Tokyo in 1905. Yu Youren (于右任), another revolutionary, started several short-lived newspapers, such as *Minhu ribao* (the *People's Wail Daily* 民呼日報), *Minxu ribao* (the *People's Sigh Daily* 民吁日報) and *Min li bao* (the *People's Post*) 民立報 to publicize revolutionary ideas.<sup>23</sup> Both the reformists and the revolutionaries employed propaganda techniques. For example, the reformists tried to expand their influence by distributing copies of *Wanguo gongbao* free of charge to the subscribers of the *Peking Gazette* (京報).<sup>24</sup> The pro-revolutionary paper *Min li bao* also tried to stir up people's discontent with the Qing government and their support for the revolutionaries by spreading false reports unfavourable to the Qing government almost every day before the Chinese

<sup>22</sup> During the last decade of Qing dynasty, Kang and Liang worked for a number of Chinese newspapers in China and overseas, such as *Shiwu bao* (the *Current Affairs Post* 時務報) in Shanghai in 1896, and also *Qingyi bao* (the *Critics' Post* 清議報) and *Xinmin congbao* (the *New Citizens' Post* 新民叢報) in Japan when they were in exile in the 1900s after the failure of the Hundred Days' Reform. In 1904, Liang returned to Shanghai at risk and founded *Shibao* (the *Times* 時報) in the foreign settlements. Joan Judge, *Print and Politics: 'Shibao' and the Culture of Reform in Late Qing China* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1906), pp.24-31.

<sup>23</sup> *Minhu bao* lasted ninety-three days from May to August 1905. *Minxu bao* lasted only forty-three days in October and November 1905. *Min li bao* could survive for the longest period. It continued publishing about three years, from October 1910 to September 1913. Yin-liang Ma, *A Brief History of the Chinese Press* (Shanghai: The Shun Pao Daily News, 1937), p.16.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p.13.



Revolution in 1911.<sup>25</sup>

Wang and his associates never underestimated the propaganda value of newspapers when they were actively involved in Chinese politics. In fact, Wang was one of the most skilful orators and writers among the revolutionaries. He was the most active publicist of *Minbao* after he started his revolutionary career in 1905, and became one of Sun's closest followers through this channel. When he gradually formed his own faction within the GMD during the early republican period, he needed to secure a propaganda base to articulate his own political ideas. Therefore, he started two newspapers, the *SCDN* in Hong Kong in 1930 and then the *CCDN* in Shanghai in 1932, and used them as propaganda bases of the Wang Clique.

The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* continued to be the most important propaganda organs of the Wang Clique during the Sino-Japanese War. The two newspapers helped the Wang Clique explain its different political ideas and policies in different periods: when Wang supported the resistance policy in the first year of the Sino-Japanese War, the two newspapers advocated uncompromising confrontation with the Japanese and supported the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek; when the Wang Clique defected from the Chongqing government and advocated peace with Japan in December 1938, the *SCDN* and then the *CCDN* were steadfast in defending the cause of the Clique and promoted peace to the Chinese population; when the Wang Clique succeeded in establishing a regime in the Japanese-occupied areas and joined Japan to fight against Britain and the United States during the Pacific War, the two newspapers continued their unquestioning support for the Wang government's

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<sup>25</sup> He and Zhang, eds., *20 shiji Zhongguo xinwenxue yu chuanboxue*, p.67.



participation in the Pacific War. Apart from some criticism of the Wang government in the final years of the Pacific War, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* adhered to the political ideas of the Wang Clique and tried to convince the population to support the Wang Clique.

## Literature Review

### *Studies of the Collaboration of the Wang Jingwei Clique*

For almost three decades after the defeat of Japan and the demise of the Wang regime, the Wang Clique's collaboration with the Japanese was seldom discussed by Western and Chinese scholars. What Western scholars were interested in about the Sino-Japanese War was how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP 中國共產黨) expanded their power in China during the years of resistance, and how the War contributed to the final victory of the CCP in 1949. As the Wang Clique's collaboration with the Japanese was not much related to the rise of the CCP, Western scholars often paid little attention to this subject.<sup>26</sup>

Studies of the Clique's collaboration with the Japanese were even more unfavourable in the postwar Chinese societies. Wartime collaboration created a trauma to the Chinese population in the postwar period. Those who had experienced the bitter resistance against the Japanese accused the Chinese collaborators of betrayal of the nation for their own personal interests during the wartime. The postwar Chinese population raged against these "traitors" (*hanjian*) and demanded

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<sup>26</sup> Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp.169-172; Wang Kewen 王克文, "Ou Mei xuezhe dui kangzhan shiqi zhongguo lunxianqu de yanjiu" 歐美學者對抗戰時期中國淪陷區的研究, in *Zhonghua Minguo shi zhuanli di si jie taolun hui mishu chu* 中華民國史專題第四屆討論會秘書處, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo shi zhuanli lunwen ji: di si jie taolun hui* 中華民國史專題論文集: 第四屆討論會(Xindian: Academia Historica, 1998), p.1810.



punishments to be meted to these wartime collaborators.<sup>27</sup> Most collaborators were therefore unwilling to reveal what they had done in the war years for fear of being condemned severely. Such a strong nationalistic reaction made the wartime collaboration of the Wang Clique with the Japanese a very sensitive topic in Chinese society.

Postwar perceptions of the Wang Clique's collaboration with the Japanese were further complicated by the victory of the CCP in the Civil War in 1949 and the existence of two Chinese governments in the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. In spite of their own postwar interpretations of the Sino-Japanese War, both the CCP and the GMD shared a common viewpoint that there was no point in discussing Wang's collaboration with the Japanese. Due to Wang's complex political relations with Chiang Kai-shek, the GMD evaded discussion of this subject. The CCP also dismissed this topic from historical research because of Wang's long anti-Communist history, which could be traced back to the 1920s. As historical scholarship and access to primary sources were still under strict control of the governments between the 1950s and the 1970s, there were very few significant researches on the topic in China and Taiwan during the period.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> See Nanjing shi dang'anguan, ed., *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu*.

<sup>28</sup> A handful of reminiscences written by wartime collaborators appeared soon after the War and revealed the collaborators' personal experiences of collaboration. One example was Jin Xiongbai's (金雄白) *Wang zhengquan de kaichang yu shouchang* (汪政權的開場與收場) published under the pseudonym of Zhu Zijia (朱子家). It was a collection of Jin's articles published in *Chunqiu* (Springs and Autumns 春秋), a Hong Kong-based literary magazine, since 1957. During the War, Jin was a pro-Wang journalist and operated a collaborator-sponsored newspaper *Pingbao* (the *Fair Post* 平報) in Japanese-controlled Shanghai. His close relationship with Zhou Fohai and other leaders of the Wang Clique made him one of the insiders of the Wang regime. In his six volumes of reminiscences, Jin discloses many personal experiences with the top collaborators and describes the social situation in wartime Shanghai. These writings are invaluable primary materials about the Wang Clique's collaboration with the Japanese. Zhu Zijia 朱子家, *Wang zhengquan de kaichang yu shouchang* 汪政權的開場與收場, 6 vols. (Hong Kong: Wu xing ji, 1974). However, as Jin's accounts mainly reflect an ex-collaborator's standpoint without objective analysis, it has been argued that Jin's account was not totally credible. Gong Bode 龔柏德, *Wang Jingwei xiangdi maiguo mishi* 汪精衛降敵賣國密史 (Sanchong: Da li shudian, 1970), p.19.





The first two scholarly studies on Chinese collaboration with the Japanese appeared in the West at almost the same time when John Hunter Boyle and Gerald E. Bunker published their respective studies in 1972, discussing the diplomacy of the collaboration between Wang Jingwei and the Japanese.<sup>29</sup> Boyle examines the roles of the Wang Clique and other leading Chinese collaborators in Sino-Japanese wartime politics and suggests “a need for ambivalence” when judging whether collaborators like Wang were traitors.<sup>30</sup> Bunker gives a survey of the dealings of the Wang Clique with the Japanese before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. He confirms Wang’s patriotism and ascribes Wang’s failure to the unwillingness of the Japanese to materialize their peace promises.<sup>31</sup>

There are other studies on wartime Chinese collaboration carried out by Western scholars. Susan H. Marsh’s article discusses the role of Zhou Fohai, one of Wang’s closest associates, in the collaboration. Marsh avoids repeating the conventional impression that Zhou is a traitor. Instead, she analyzes the incentives of Zhou’s defection from Chongqing through his personal ambition, factional rivalry within the GMD, and Chinese scholar-gentry’s traditional mentality under alien rule, and raises a number of questions like definitions of nationalism and treason during the wartime.<sup>32</sup>

Generally speaking, these Western scholars avoid conventional nationalistic

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<sup>29</sup> John H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: the Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); Gerald E. Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937-1941* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).

<sup>30</sup> Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp.362-363.

<sup>31</sup> Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy*, pp.285-286.

<sup>32</sup> Susan H. Marsh, “Chou Fo-hai: The Making of a Collaborator,” in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp.304-327.





points of view and re-evaluate the collaboration of the Wang Clique with the Japanese. They have made several similar observations. First, the Clique's collaboration with the Japanese was an extension of wartime politics. In fact, the leaders of both belligerent countries tried to seek alternatives to deal with the War. The split of the Wang Clique from Chongqing originated in the secret contacts between the Japanese and the Chongqing governments, which had existed with Chiang Kai-shek's consent after the outbreak of the War.<sup>33</sup> Second, they acknowledge that Wang was not a mere puppet but a politician with genuine patriotic will to help China achieve peace with Japan on equal terms. Third, it is not easy to determine whether Wang was a "traitor" because this is related to many complicated questions like personal loyalty to the leaders, factional politics within the Party, legitimacy of the government, and different interpretations of "patriotism".<sup>34</sup> It is too hasty to make a conclusion if these questions are unresolved.

Although these early Western studies on the collaboration of the Wang Clique with the Japanese are objective and well-structured, they are not without shortcomings. Most of these Western scholars rely on the primary sources available in the West like diplomatic papers of the United States and correspondences of the British Foreign Office. Japanese materials such as documents of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimushō 外務省) are sometimes referred to in their research. Nevertheless, the Western scholars have seldom used Chinese materials even though they are important sources.<sup>35</sup> This problem might be due to the fact that

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<sup>33</sup> Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp.134-166; Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy*, pp.47-67.

<sup>34</sup> Marsh, "Chou Fo-hai: The Making of a Collaborator," p.325.

<sup>35</sup> Both the studies of Boyle and Bunker rely heavily on their personal interviews with Gao Zongwu, an active participant in the Wang Clique's dealing with the Japanese before he left the Wang Clique in 1940, to reflect the Chinese perspective in collaboration.



it was difficult for them to have access to the crucial materials in the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.

Another problem is that the Western scholarship has not looked into some important topics of this subject. Many Western scholars focus mainly on the triangular relationship among the Wang Clique, the Chongqing government and the Japanese. Since the 1990s, they have paid much attention to how the Wang Clique realized its collaboration with the Japanese in large cities, but there are still many spheres, especially those concerned with the relationship between the Wang Clique and the Chinese population, which still need further research.

Compared with the small number of researches conducted by Western scholars, Chinese scholars have published many studies on this subject since the 1980s. During the past two decades, the political situations in the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have become much more relaxed. Both governments are more willing to allow access to primary sources for historical research in relation to the collaboration of the Wang Clique with the Japanese.<sup>36</sup> A number of Chinese scholars devote themselves to the investigation of the activities of the Wang Clique during the wartime period. One of the leading Chinese scholars is the late Cai Dejin (蔡德金).<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> One of the important steps to disclose these materials is to publish selected documentary collections about wartime activities of the Wang Clique. In the 1980s and the 1990s, volumes of such collections were published in the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, such as: Qin Xiaoyi 秦孝儀, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian: dui Ri kangzhan shiqi*, 中華民國重要史料初編：對日抗戰時期, 7 vols. (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, 1981-1988); Huang Meizhen 黃美真 and Zhang Yun 張雲, eds., *Wang Jingwei jituan toudi* 汪精衛集團投敵 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984); Huang Meizhen 黃美真 and Zhang Yun 張雲, eds., *Wang Jingwei Guomin zhengfu chengli* 汪精衛國民政府成立 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984); Nanjing shi dang'an guan, ed., *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu*.

<sup>37</sup> He published the first chronology of the Wang regime and biographies of Wang Jingwei and his associates Chen Gongbo and Zhou Fohai. See Cai Dejin 蔡德金 and Li Huixian 李惠賢, eds., *Wang Jingwei wei guomin zhengfu jishi* 汪精衛偽國民政府紀事 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1982); Cai Dejin 蔡德金 and Wang Sheng 王升, eds., *Wang Jingwei shengping jishi* 汪精衛生平紀事 (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1993).



In the early days of historical research on the role of the Wang Clique during the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese scholars still maintained very nationalistic viewpoints and they condemned their research targets as traitors. It is shown in the scholars' use of terms such as “wei” (bogus 偽) or “niliu” (countercurrent 逆流) to describe the collaborators.<sup>38</sup> However, these studies “were groundbreaking in character” and their significance should not be dismissed because they utilized an enormous amount of Chinese materials then newly available to the scholars to sort out facts about the Chinese collaboration.<sup>39</sup>

With the increase in research undertaken by Chinese scholars in the last twenty years, the nationalistic viewpoints towards Wang's collaboration, which have prevailed for nearly half a century, is now under challenge. A group of young Chinese scholars receiving Western historical training, such as Lo Jiu-jung (羅久蓉) and Wang Ke-wen (王克文), have suggested that a “grey zone” exists between “patriotism” and “treason” in the discussion of wartime behaviour of the Chinese population. They urge that Chinese scholars should break down their ideological barriers in order to look into the wartime collaboration of the Wang Clique with the Japanese more objectively.<sup>40</sup> Although such stances are strongly attacked by many Chinese historians, the young Chinese scholars' opinion represents an important step forward to an impartial discussion on the Wang Clique's wartime collaboration with the Japanese.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Cai and Li, eds., *Wang Jingwei wei guomin zhengfu jishi*; Ma, *Kangzhan shiqi de zhengzhi jianshe*.

<sup>39</sup> Barrett, “Introduction,” p.15.

<sup>40</sup> Lo Jiu-jung 羅久蓉, “Zhong jian zhibian yu hanjian de misi” 忠奸之辨與漢奸的迷思, *Ming Pao Monthly* 31, no.5 (May 1996), pp.25-28; Wang Ke-wen 王克文, “Bagu ‘hanjian’ lun jixu chongxin jiantao – shixue jie zhujian dapao guo gong zhengzhi jinji” 八股「漢奸」論亟須重新檢討 – 史學界逐漸打破國共政治禁忌, *Ming Pao Monthly* 31, no.5 (1996), pp.29-32.

<sup>41</sup> Zhong Kui 鐘夔, “Gainian touhuan, luoji hunluan – hanjian zhengyi de qiwang yu miwang” 概念偷換, 邏輯混亂 – 漢奸爭議的欺枉與迷惘, *Front-line Magazine* (August 1996), pp.76-79.



In general, in the last twenty years, both Western and Chinese scholars have made considerable progress in the research on the politics of the Wang Clique's collaboration with the Japanese. The Western scholars seem to have avoided nationalistic bias in their discussion but there are other problems in their research. One major problem is that their arguments are not supported with sufficient Chinese materials. The Chinese scholars, on the other hand, enjoyed much easier access to the invaluable Chinese materials, but they have been caught in a patriotic preoccupation for a long time and are unable to draw a more objective conclusion on the Wang Clique's collaboration with the Japanese. It is hence necessary to adopt the merits of each side in order to give a comprehensive and fair analysis of this subject.

The scope of research also needs to be readjusted. In the early days, scholars put most of their efforts into the diplomatic history of collaboration. Over the last few years, they developed an interest in other issues of collaboration, such as the administration of the Wang regime and their implementation of collaborationist policies, but a number of aspects still remain unexamined.<sup>42</sup> For instance, the role of the press, which constituted a crucial connection between the collaborators and the masses, has hardly been discussed by scholars. Therefore, there is still a large room for the discussion of the politics of the Wang Clique's collaboration.

### ***Studies of Wartime Shanghai***

Apart from looking into the high politics of collaboration, studies on local

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<sup>42</sup> For example, Liu Zhiying 劉志英, "Wangwei zhengfu liangzheng shuping" 汪偽政府糧政述評, *Kang Ri zhangzheng yanjiu* 抗日戰爭研究 1 (January 1999), pp.135-153; Shao Minghuang 邵銘煌, "Jixing zhong de jixing - Wang zhengquan zhong de Huabei zhengwu weiyuanhui" 畸形中的畸形 - 汪政權中的華北政務委員會, in *Zhonghua Minguo shi zhuanli di wu jie taolun hui mishu chu* 中華民國史專題第五屆討論會秘書處, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo shi zhuanli lunwen ji: di wu jie taolun hui*. 中華民國史專題論文集: 第五屆討論會 (Xindian: Academia Historica, 2000), pp.1913-1943. Li Yinghui 李盈慧, *Kangri yu furi - Huariao, Guomin zhengfu, Wang zhengquan* 抗日與附日 - 華僑、國民政府、汪政權 (Taipei: Shuiniu tushu, 2003).



situations in occupied China are an indispensable part of the research on the Wang Clique's collaboration with the Japanese because the local populations and the Wang Clique could not escape from facing each other under the Japanese occupation. Shanghai played an extraordinary role in the vast Japanese-occupied territories in China. The city possessed a special position of "Solitary Island" (*gudao* 孤島) from November 1937 to December 1941. During this period, the foreign concessions of Shanghai remained unoccupied, but they were surrounded by the Japanese-conquered territories. The division of jurisdictions and the concentration of foreigners, Chinese elites and the wealthy made Shanghai the most complicated society in wartime China. As a result, when scholars began to study the local situations in occupied China, Shanghai became their first target. Although most of these studies do not focus on the press development in Shanghai, they help to provide an overview of the political, economic and social situations of the city in the war years.

Since the 1990s, Western scholars have published a number of studies dealing with life and experiences in wartime Shanghai. Poshek Fu's book on Shanghai intellectuals' choices during the Sino-Japanese War is an excellent example. Through an analysis of the different behaviours of the intellectuals in Shanghai, Fu tries to explain that patriotism, hope for survival and personal interests were intertwined in the mind of most intellectuals in occupied China. It was not easy for the intellectuals to separate one factor from another.<sup>43</sup> Another of his publications looks into the development of the film industry in wartime Shanghai and Hong Kong, where film producers and directors adapted themselves to the ever-changing political and social

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<sup>43</sup> Poshek Fu, *Passivity, Resistance and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937-1945* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993).



situations in the 1930s and the 1940s.<sup>44</sup>

Western scholars are also interested in the activities of urban terrorists, capitalists and other social groups in Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese War. In his book *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941*, Frederic Wakeman Jr. describes the continuous struggle among the agents sent by the GMD, the Japanese administrations and the Wang Clique in Shanghai.<sup>45</sup> Parks M. Coble, a renowned specialist in the history of Shanghai capitalists, has recently published a book discussing the Shanghai capitalists' responses to the Japanese occupation and their collaboration with the new masters in the lower Yangtze area.<sup>46</sup> Timothy Brook also gives an excellent discussion of the collaboration of the local elites in Shanghai with the occupying power during the early days of the Japanese occupation in his new book.<sup>47</sup> In the seminars held in San Francisco and Lyon in 1994 and 1997 respectively, Brook and other Western scholars presented new research areas of wartime Shanghai.<sup>48</sup> All these papers confirm that collaboration was an important aspect of life in wartime Shanghai and that the subtle relationship between the occupying power and the occupied subjects is one of the main research

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<sup>44</sup> Poshek Fu, *Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: the Politics of Chinese Cinemas* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

<sup>45</sup> Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>46</sup> Parks M. Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangtze, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

<sup>47</sup> Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005), chap. 6.

<sup>48</sup> They include foreigners' resistance and collaboration in the city, labour movement in Wang Jingwei's labour unions, and status of women in wartime Shanghai. See Bernard Wasserstein, "Ambiguities of occupation: Foreign Resisters and Collaborators in Wartime Shanghai," in Wen-hsin Yeh, ed., *Wartime Shanghai* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.24-41; Alain Roux, "From Revenge to Treason: Political Ambivalence among Wang Jingwei's Labor Union Supporters," in Christian Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh, eds., *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.209-228; Susan Glosser, "'Women's Culture of Resistance': An Ordinary Response to Extraordinary Circumstance," in Henriot and Yeh, eds., *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun*, pp.302-324.



topics of Western scholars.

Whereas Western scholars prefer microanalysis when studying wartime Shanghai and confining their studies to specific social groups, their Chinese counterparts tend to study the socio-economic situation of wartime Shanghai by the survey approach. The Chinese scholars' studies on wartime Shanghai can be found in chapters of different series of Shanghai historical surveys.<sup>49</sup> A group of Chinese historians in Shanghai has finished a project which studies the military, political, economic and cultural aspects in wartime Shanghai.<sup>50</sup> Most of these Chinese scholars are again influenced by the conventional nationalistic viewpoint that the Japanese aggressors and a few Chinese traitors spared no effort to oppress the occupied population, and that the majority of the Chinese were patriotic and were determined to fight against their enemy by all means.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, many of these studies provide a detailed description of wartime Shanghai, and hence become indispensable references for the study of the wartime press of Shanghai.

In summary, studies of wartime Shanghai have made considerable progress since the 1990s. More scholars have engaged themselves in this field and the number of research topics has been increasing. Nevertheless, many aspects of wartime Shanghai, such as the relationship between collaboration and the press, have hardly

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<sup>49</sup> There are chapters accounting of wartime politics, economy, education and culture in Shanghai in books, such as: Xiong Yuezhi 熊月之, ed., *Shanghai tongshi* 上海通史, vols. 7-10 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1999); and Ma Guangren 馬光仁, ed., *Shanghai xinwen shi (yibawuling – yijiusijiu)* 上海新聞史 (一八四零 - 一九四九) (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1996).

<sup>50</sup> The seven-volume series is called "Shanghai kang Ri zhanzheng shi congshu" (History of Shanghai resistance against the Japanese series 上海抗日戰爭史叢書), including Wu Jingping 吳景平 et al., *Kangzhan shiqi de Shanghai jingji* 抗戰時期的上海經濟 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2001); and Qi Weiping 齊衛平, Zhu Minyan 朱敏彥 and He Jiliang 何繼良, *Kangzhan shiqi de Shanghai wenhua* 抗戰時期的上海文化 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2001).

<sup>51</sup> Ma, ed., *Shanghai xinwen shi*, pp.922-923.





been discussed by scholars. More in-depth studies on the roles of the press of wartime Shanghai in Chinese collaboration are therefore needed.

### *Studies of Wartime Hong Kong*

“Wartime Hong Kong” not only refers to Hong Kong under Japanese occupation in 1941-1945, but also to the city under the shadow of the Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1941. In contrast with the scholars’ enthusiasm for conducting research on wartime Shanghai, the studies of wartime Hong Kong has long been overlooked by scholars. For a long time, the list of publications about wartime Hong Kong has been predominated by British and Canadian narratives of their personal experiences in the days of fighting, internment and escape.<sup>52</sup> Research on other aspects in wartime Hong Kong, such as political, economic and social situations, not to mention collaboration with the Japanese, is now still in its early development.<sup>53</sup>

Surprisingly, academic studies on wartime Hong Kong began rather early, as shown by the fact that G.B. Endacott, one of the forerunners of local historical research in Hong Kong, published in 1978 the first work surveying the situation of Hong Kong from the pre-occupation period to the Japanese occupation in 1941-1945 and to the Colony’s postwar rehabilitation.<sup>54</sup> The book uses a wide range of

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<sup>52</sup> Military accounts still form an important part of the recent publications about wartime Hong Kong. For instance, Tony Banham, *Not the Slightest Chance: the Defence of Hong Kong, 1941* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003); George S. MacDonell, *One Soldier's Story 1939-1945: From the Fall of Hong Kong to the Defeat of the Japan* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2002).

<sup>53</sup> It is complicated to explain the reasons for such phenomenon, but it is certain that the loss of official and civil records in the prewar and wartime period makes studies on wartime Hong Kong difficult. The most relevant and complete set of government records is the original correspondence between the British Colonial Office and the Hong Kong colonial administration, known as CO129. However, as the British rule in the Colony was interrupted under Japanese occupation between December 1941 and August 1945, the usefulness of this set of records is considerably reduced.

<sup>54</sup> G. B. Endacott, *Hong Kong Eclipse* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978).





materials available at that time to describe the wartime military, administrative and social situations in Hong Kong. It remains a fundamental reading for researchers studying wartime Hong Kong. Before the mid-1990s, studies on wartime Hong Kong were limited. Hard life and Japanese atrocities during the occupation period became a popular topic for amateur historians.<sup>55</sup> Nonetheless, serious historical research on this subject, such as L.K.C. Chan's studies on the wartime disputes between China and Britain over the question of Hong Kong under the broad context of Sino-British diplomacy in the first half of the twentieth century, was still rare.<sup>56</sup>

It seems that studies of wartime Hong Kong began to draw scholars' greater attention in the mid-1990s. Unlike the predecessors who tended to see the questions from the colonial rulers' point of view, the new scholars prefer looking at the issue from a Chinese perspective. The Mainland scholars emphasize the close relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland during the Sino-Japanese War, such as the Communist guerrilla's activities in Hong Kong under Japanese occupation. Other scholars pay more attention to how Chinese patriotism shaped the local society during the Sino-Japanese War. Jung-fang Tsai (蔡榮芳), an expert in prewar Chinese patriotism in Hong Kong, throws light on the "complexity and manifoldness" of wartime patriotism in his book *The Hong Kong People's History of Hong Kong, 1841-1945*.<sup>57</sup> Tsai explains the different definitions of "patriotism" imposed by different local social groups, rival political groups, and even the Wang Clique in

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<sup>55</sup> Xie Yongguang is one of the local amateur historians interested in wartime Hong Kong history. Xie Yongguang 謝永光, *Zhanshi Ri jun zai Xianggang de baoxing* 戰時日軍在香港的暴行 (Hong Kong: Mingchuang chubanshe, 1991); Xie Yongguang 謝永光, *Sannian ling bageyue de ku'nan* 三年零八個月的苦難 (Hong Kong: Mingbao, 1994).

<sup>56</sup> Chan Lau Kit-ching, *China, Britain and Hong Kong, 1895-1945* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990).

<sup>57</sup> Jung-fang Tsai 蔡榮芳, *Xianggang ren zhi Xianggang shi, 1841-1945* (*The Hong Kong People's History of Hong Kong, 1841-1945*) 香港人之香港史, 1841-1945 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.225-227.



Hong Kong from a “Hong Kong local perspective”.<sup>58</sup> Ma Yiu-chung gives a solid and informative overview in his unpublished thesis on the patriotic activities of the local Chinese population before the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong.<sup>59</sup> In the recently published historical study of the Hong Kong University, a chapter is written by Fung Chi-ming, a local historian, to describe the university students’ financial and propagandistic supports for the Sino-Japanese War.<sup>60</sup>

Similar to wartime Shanghai, Chinese collaboration with the Japanese also existed in wartime Hong Kong. This phenomenon was especially apparent after the fall of Hong Kong in 1941. However, this topic was seldom touched until very recent years. In his new publication *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation*, Philip Snow deals with the local gentry’s collaboration in the years under Japanese occupation. Apart from his in-depth analysis of the military, political, and economic situations of Hong Kong in the war years, his major achievement in his book is that he discusses the “acquiescence” of the local gentry to the Japanese occupation.<sup>61</sup> The behaviour of the local gentry in Hong Kong was similar to those in wartime Shanghai as well as other parts of occupied China, where “peace maintenance committees” were organized by the local leaders under Japanese sponsorship. However, it seems that the local collaboration in Hong Kong with the Japanese and the Wang Clique’s collaboration with Japan had very few political or ideological similarities. Hong Kong was under direct control of the Japanese

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<sup>58</sup> Tsai, *Xianggang ren zhi Xianggang shi, 1841-1945*, pp.12, 189-227.

<sup>59</sup> Ma Yiu Chung, *Hong Kong’s Responses to the Sino-Japanese Conflicts from 1931 to 1941: Chinese Nationalism in a British Colony*. (MPhil. diss., University of Hong Kong, 2001), chaps. 6-8.

<sup>60</sup> Fung Chi-ming, “Campus Activism in Defence of China and Hong Kong, 1937-1941,” in Chan Lau Kit-ching and Peter Cunich, eds., *An Impossible Dream: Hong Kong University from Foundation to Re-establishment, 1910-1950* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.175-191.

<sup>61</sup> Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, pp.107-118.



authorities during the Pacific War. The Wang Clique and its regime never had substantial administrative power in occupied Hong Kong. The objectives of these two groups of collaborators were also different. The local gentry in Hong Kong, as Snow suggests, only intended to preserve their own interests and to do some good to the public under the New Order.<sup>62</sup> The Wang Clique believed, or at least claimed, that they had a far higher political objective to save China.

The activities of the Wang Clique in Hong Kong have seldom been discussed by scholars. Tsai is the first scholar who acknowledges that the Wang Clique had a unique position on the political rivalry in Hong Kong before the Japanese occupation. He places both “collaborationist nationalism” of the Wang Clique and conventional patriotism of resistance into a broad category of “Chinese patriotism” of wartime Hong Kong. As the *SCDN* was the base of the Wang Clique in Hong Kong, Tsai highlights the conflicts between the *SCDN* and the other Chinese newspapers in the colony after Wang’s defection from Chongqing in 1938.<sup>63</sup> Zheng Shusen (鄭樹森), a local literary critic, and his colleagues reprint a selection of “peace literature” (*heping wenyi* 和平文藝), which were published in the *SCDN* during the wartime period, and discuss the role of peace literature in the early development of Hong Kong literature.<sup>64</sup> However, these discussions tend to focus on the activities of the Wang Clique in Hong Kong in a short period, and do not provide in-depth analysis of the complicated relationship of the Wang Clique, especially the *SCDN*, with the colonial government, the Japanese authorities, and the local population throughout

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid., pp.224-229.

<sup>63</sup> Tsai, *Xianggang ren zhi Xianggang shi, 1841-1945*, pp.218-222.

<sup>64</sup> Zheng Shusen 鄭樹森, Huang Jichi 黃繼持 and Lu weiluan 盧瑋鑾, eds., *Zaoqi Xianggang xinwenxue ziliao xuan (yiji erqi- yiji siyi nian)* 早期香港新文學資料選 (一九二七—一九四一年) (Hong Kong: Cosmos Book Ltd, 1998), pp.225-264.



the wartime period.

In summary, as the studies of wartime Hong Kong have not made significant headway in the past few decades, it is not surprising that the issues of collaboration and the press development during the wartime period have not attracted much scholarly attention. However, as more wartime primary sources are now available in Hong Kong for researchers, it is believed that in-depth research on these topics is feasible.<sup>65</sup>

The above literature review shows that studies of the wartime collaboration of the Wang Clique with the Japanese and the experiences of the populations in Shanghai and Hong Kong during the Sino-Japanese War have drawn scholars' attention in these few decades. Nonetheless, the development of the wartime press, especially the relationship between the Wang Clique and the press during the War, has not been fully examined. This thesis aims to contribute some new insights into how the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, the two pro-Wang newspapers, worked with the political activities of the Wang Clique during the Sino-Japanese War.

## Research Questions

This study tries to answer several questions. First, what were the roles of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* in the endeavour of the Wang Clique, and, in what ways did they constitute an indispensable component of the propaganda machinery of the Wang Clique, during the Sino-Japanese War? The collaboration of the Wang Clique

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<sup>65</sup> The British government records of wartime correspondences about the local collaboration in Hong Kong under Japanese occupation have been extensively utilized by Snow's works. See Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, pp.440-441. Japanese materials, including correspondences between the Japanese governors of Hong Kong and Tokyo between 1941 and 1945, and Chinese documents of the Wang regime on the issue of Hong Kong, have nevertheless not been used by researchers.



with the Japanese did not only refer to diplomatic dealings between the Clique and Japan, but also the Clique's policies and activities vis-à-vis the Chinese population. The *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, which were the most reliable organs of the Wang Clique, played important roles in the political activities of the Wang Clique. This thesis attempts to show the relationship between these two newspapers and the Wang Clique, and how these two newspapers tried to persuade the population to support the Wang Clique during the War.

Second, how did the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* interpret the contemporary situations and the Wang Clique's political advocacy during the Sino-Japanese War? There were mainly three themes which the two newspapers promoted throughout the Sino-Japanese War: resistance, peace, and war. As mentioned above, the two papers tried to help the Wang Clique reconcile these seemingly contradictory ideas and convince the population that the advocacy of the Wang Clique was legitimate and correct in dealing with the contemporary situations. The thesis examines editorials and commentaries of these two newspapers to analyze how the Wang Clique used the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* to articulate its political ideas in the war years.

Third, how did the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* deal with the changing situations in China during the different phases of the War? The status of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* was directly determined by the power of the Wang Clique. In addition, the local situations in Shanghai and Hong Kong also affected the experiences of these two newspapers. This thesis tries to reveal the responses of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* to the policies of different ruling authorities, the influence of the Chongqing government, and the attitudes of the local populations towards the Wang Clique in these two cities throughout the Sino-Japanese War.



Finally, how far did the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* succeed in influencing the Chinese population? As the main function of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* was to persuade the Chinese people to support the political ideas advocated by the Wang Clique, it is important to look into the impact of these two newspapers on the population. Although it is difficult to observe public responses to these two papers because of lack of reliable sources, this thesis tries to use circulation figures of newspapers and other examples to reflect on the impact of these two newspapers in Shanghai and Hong Kong.

In order to answer the above questions, this thesis will be divided into seven chapters. The first and the final chapters are the introduction and the conclusion of the thesis, providing a general discussion of this study. Chapter two gives a brief account of the establishment and the development of the two papers before the Sino-Japanese War. Chapter three deals with how the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* promoted the resistance policy in difficult situations after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. Chapter four discusses how the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* promoted peace with Japan after the Wang Clique defected from Chongqing in December 1938, and how they survived under various threats in Hong Kong and Shanghai during the early days of the peace movement. Chapter five analyzes the changes in the relationship between the two papers and the Wang Clique under the new propaganda machinery of the Wang regime, which was established in March 1940 as an extension of the peace movement. The same chapter also discusses the attitudes of the two papers towards the new Wang regime and Sino-Japanese cooperation. Chapter six examines how the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* turned from being pro-peace to pro-war after the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, and discusses the rise and the fall of the two newspapers during the Pacific War.



## Primary Sources

This study relies mainly on three types of primary sources. Newspapers published in China and Hong Kong during the wartime period form the fundamental source of materials for this research. As the main research target is the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* during the Sino-Japanese War, each issue of these two newspapers published between July 1937 and August 1945, most of which is still available nowadays, has been carefully examined. News reports, commentaries, and particularly editorials published in the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* are scrutinized in order to discuss the roles of these two newspapers in relation to the Wang Clique's collaboration with the Japanese. The University of Hong Kong Libraries hold an almost complete collection of the *CCDN* during the wartime period in microform. They also hold two collections of the *SCDN* during the wartime period in microform, one from the genuine collection of the University Libraries, and the other from the libraries in the Chinese mainland. Unfortunately, both of them are not complete collections. I am not able to read issues of the *SCDN* published in some months during the wartime period.<sup>66</sup> This problem is remedied by consulting other available contemporary newspapers and publications.

While the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* are the essential sources of this study, newspapers which were published in China and Hong Kong during the wartime period are also important for this thesis because they reflect the political and social situations in wartime China and Hong Kong. More importantly, these newspapers played an important role in the propaganda warfare between pro-resistance and pro-peace camps in the war years. This thesis used a number of newspapers other

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<sup>66</sup> Most of these unavailable copies are those published between November 1937 and July 1938, when the *SCDN* reduced its size into a mosquito paper, and those published in December 1941 and January 1942, when the *SCDN* resumed publication immediately after the fall of Hong Kong.



than the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, such as the *Chinese American Daily News* (*CADN* 中美日報) in Shanghai, *Wah Kiu Yat Po* (華僑日報) and the *Sing Tao Daily* (星島日報), which was renamed as *Xiangdao ribao* (the *Hong Kong Island Daily* 香島日報) during the Japanese occupation, in Hong Kong, and the *Central Daily News* (中央日報) in Chongqing.

Government archives constitute another important source because they provide first-hand information on the propaganda policies of the Wang Clique and the attitudes of the foreign authorities in Shanghai and Hong Kong towards the pro-Wang newspapers in the cities. The Second Historical Archives of China (SHAC 中國第二歷史檔案館) in Nanjing, and the Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA 上海市檔案館) house rich collections of records of the Chongqing government, the Wang Clique and the Wang regime. Other Chinese or foreign government records, such as the British Colonial Office Records, the British Foreign Office Records, and the Shanghai Municipal Police Files, also provide useful materials for this study.

Personal accounts and memoirs of collaborators and journalists in wartime China are also useful. Although these accounts are sometimes biased by the political orientation of the writers, they are still important for this research because they provide information on the mentality and the experiences of the people involved in the political activities of the Wang Clique, which does not necessarily appear in other primary sources.

### **Limitations of the Study**

This thesis is not without limitation. In the first place, the relationships between the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* and the Japanese authorities are little discussed in this





thesis. It is true that these two newspapers were firmly controlled by the Wang Clique. The Japanese did not seem to have been involved in the operations of these two papers. However, as the Wang Clique collaborated with the Japanese during the wartime period, it is logical to suggest that the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* maintained some clandestine relationships with the Japanese authorities in occupied China. Information about these relationships might be found in Japanese sources, which are, however, beyond the writer's language ability.

The second major limitation of this study is about the responses of the Chinese population to the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* during the wartime period. It is difficult for researchers to provide a definite conclusion on this subject because there is little concrete evidence to rely on. Newspapers, which are supposed to be an efficient tool to reflect public opinion, were often manipulated by different political powers during the Sino-Japanese War and hence were unable to reflect the reality of public opinion. This problem was particularly serious in the occupied areas during the Pacific War as almost all publications were under the control of the Wang government and the Japanese authorities. In addition, postwar accounts of these newspapers are often biased by the moral preoccupation against the "traitorous" newspapers. As a result, the study has to depend on some scattered evidence to tackle this problem.



## Chapter 2

### Background: The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* before the Sino-Japanese War

#### Introduction

By the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* had existed for over seven and five years respectively. Since their foundation in the early 1930s, the two papers had been under the firm control of Wang Jingwei and his associates, and served as the Wang Jingwei Clique's mouthpieces. In these prewar years, despite fluctuation of power of the Wang Clique in Chinese politics, the two newspapers provided a propaganda base for the clique: on the one hand, the newspapers provided a channel to publish the partisans' political causes; on the other hand, the editors and commentators elaborated these ideas, attacked the clique's political rivals, and defended attacks from other opponents for winning the public support. As the existence and the development of the two newspapers were closely related with those of the Wang Clique, the editorial lines and the editors' opinion often shifted rapidly as the stands of the their partisan sponsors changed. This chapter aims to give a brief introduction to the relationship of *CCDN* and the *SCDN* with the Wang Clique in the prewar years.

#### Early Career of Wang Jingwei

Before the establishments of these two newspapers, Wang Jingwei had long been a renowned GMD politician in China. His political career started in 1905 when he, a law student sent by the Qing government to Japan, joined the United League (Tongmenghui 同盟會), which was formed in Tokyo by Sun Yat-sen and other



anti-Manchu revolutionaries.<sup>1</sup> He soon became an activist through his editorial work of the League's organ *Minbao* in Tokyo. He publicized Sun's ideas of "revolutionary republicanism" and criticized "reformist constitutionalism" advocated by such intellectuals as Liang Qichao.<sup>2</sup> His position in the revolutionary camp was further enhanced by his attempt on the life of the Manchu Prince Regent in Peking in March 1910. Although Wang was caught by the Qing court before the assassination and was sentenced by the Qing court to death, and later, life imprisonment, his devotion to the revolution shown in such dangerous action won him a name of "hero" among his comrades.<sup>3</sup>

In spite of his accomplishment in his early revolutionary career, Wang did not hold substantial political power until the reorganization of the GMD in the First National Party Congress in January 1924.<sup>4</sup> Wang was elected in the Congress a member of the Central Political Committee, the top decision-making body of the GMD, and became the party leader second to Sun Yat-sen and Hu Hanmin (胡漢民).<sup>5</sup> As Wang devotedly worked for Sun at that time, he did not lead a significant faction within the Party. It was not until Sun's death in March 1925 that Wang became more active in power struggles and gradually developed his own influence

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<sup>1</sup> Chiang Yung-ching 蔣永敬, "Wang Chao-ming" 汪兆銘傳, *Academia Historica Journal* 26 (June 1999), p.241.

<sup>2</sup> T'ang Leang-li, *Wang Ching-wei: A Political Biography* (Peiping: China United Press, 1931), p.33.

<sup>3</sup> Akira Odani, *Wang Ching-wei and the Fall of the Chinese Republic, 1905-1935* (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 1975), p.27; Chiang, "Wang Chao-ming," pp.242-243.

<sup>4</sup> After the Chinese Revolution, Wang decided to stay away from partisan politics. Although Wang was still active in Chinese politics, he refused to assume any post in governments. It was not until the reorganization of the GMD, which included a change of the structure of the Party and adoption of a policy to ally with Soviet Russia and to cooperate with the CCP, made Wang participate in Sun Yat-sen's government in Canton. Chiang, "Wang Chao-ming," pp.244-246; T'ang, *Wang Ching-wei*, pp.56-67.

<sup>5</sup> Sun Yat-sen was designated as the "President" (*zongli* 總理) for life, which held final authority of the Party. Hu Hanmin ranked first among members of the Central Political Committee while Wang ranked second. Chiang, "Wang Chao-ming," p.247; T'ang, *Wang Ching-wei*, pp.94-97.



within the GMD. He successfully defeated Hu Hanmin in the contest for the first chairmanship of the GMD “National Government” (Guomin zhengfu 國民政府) in Canton in July 1925.<sup>6</sup> Being a leading figure of the left wing in the GMD, he successfully diminished the influence of the right wing led by Hu. By the conclusion of the Second Party Congress in January 1926, Wang and his ally in the GMD Left had secured the leadership in the Party and the Canton government.<sup>7</sup>

Wang’s dominance in the GMD, however, did not last long. Rivalry between Wang and other party leaders continued after the Right’s failure in the Canton government. In the next several years, Wang’s predominant rival was Chiang Kai-shek, then the principal of the Whompoa Military Academy, who distrusted the Communists and the GMD Left. The first conflict between Wang and Chiang broke out in March 1926, when Chiang suppressed some Communists in Canton for their alleged plot to overthrow the GMD rule.<sup>8</sup> Being a supporter of GMD-Communist cooperation, Wang was held responsible for the incident. He was compelled to resign from his office and left for Europe.

Wang-Chiang rivalry persisted after Wang’s failure in Canton. Wang seized an opportunity to challenge Chiang’s leadership during the Northern Expedition in 1926-1927. With the support of the Communists and the GMD Left, he returned to

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<sup>6</sup> For details, see Chen, *Ku xiao lu*, vol. 1, pp.28-30. Also see Lee Kuo-chi 李國祁, “Minguo shisi nian Wang Jingwei de zhengquan” 民國十四年汪精衛的爭權, *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica* 17 (June 1988), pp.122-142.

<sup>7</sup> T’ang, *Wang Ching-wei*, pp.120-123; Chen, *Ku xiao lu*, pp.46-49; Shi Yuanhua 石源華, *Chen Gongbo quan zhuan* 陳公博全傳 (Banqiao: Daoxiang chubanshe, 1999), p.102.

<sup>8</sup> On March 20, 1926, Chiang suddenly ordered the arrest of the Communist captain and crew of the Zhongshan Fleet and declared a curfew in Canton. He explained that the Communists plotted to seize the fleet and start a coup in Canton. In fact there was no evidence to show that the Communists were really plotting an overthrow of the GMD rule. Chen Gongbo asserted in his memoir that it was the GMD Right who carried out the whole incident. Chen, *Ku xiao lu*, vol. 1, pp.15, 75.



China in April 1927 and restored his control in the GMD government which had moved from Canton to Wuhan after the victories in the Expedition. Chiang, now the commander of the expedition army, responded by suppressing the Communists in Shanghai and forming a separate regime in Nanjing. Wang was unable to overwhelm Chiang in this contest and finally agreed to reconcile Wuhan with Nanjing.<sup>9</sup> This Wang-Chiang rivalry ended in Wang's another exile abroad caused by the allegation that Wang supported the Communist riot in Canton in December 1927.<sup>10</sup>

### Renewed Wang-Chiang Rivalry and the Foundation of the SCDN

Wang's exile in 1927, like his previous journeys abroad during the Qing and early Republican periods, did not mean his complete retreat from politics. In May 1928, Wang's associate Chen Gongbo published a political journal *Geming pinglun* (the *Revolution Review* 革命評論). The journal challenged Chiang's authority and advocated GMD reorganization with greater democracy within the Party.<sup>11</sup> Based on this line of thinking, the Guomindang Reorganization Comrade Association (Zhongguo Guomindang gaizu tongzhi hui, 中國國民黨改組同志會) was established in the winter of 1928 by Chen and some Cantonese pro-Wang party members, which was later referred as the "Reorganization Faction".<sup>12</sup> In the Third Party Congress

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<sup>9</sup> After the split of the GMD in Wuhan and Nanjing, Wang and his colleagues found that the growth of the Communists in the city was out of their control. They were hence forced in July 1927 to declare the expulsion of the Communist from the GMD, and agreed to negotiate with Nanjing for rapprochement. Shi, *Chen Gongbo quan zhuan*, pp.163-171.

<sup>10</sup> In late October 1927, Wang and his colleagues returned to Canton and worked for securing Guangdong as their power base. On December 11, the Communists started a riot in Canton. Although Wang, who had left Canton for Shanghai in November, did not in fact participate in this riot, he was accused by the Nanjing government of working for the Communists in this riot; he therefore had to go exile from Shanghai to Europe on December 16 to avoid further attack from the party members. Odani, *Wang Ching-wei and the Fall of the Chinese Republic*, p.69.

<sup>11</sup> Chen Gongbo 陳公博, "Gaizu pai de shishi" 改組派的史實, in *Han feng ji* 寒風集, jia pian 甲編 (Shanghai: Shanghai difang xingzhengshe, 1945; reprint, Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1989), p.272.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p.279. At this moment, there were three political groups which supported Wang's leadership within the party: Wang's close associates led by his wife Chen Bijun and his personal secretary Zeng Zhongming; the GMD Left which had allied with Wang since the 1924 reorganization; and the newly formed Reorganization



held in March 1929, Chiang monopolized the appointment of delegates and excluded the Left and other non-Chiang factions. The Reorganization Faction made this an excuse to rally the supports of military leaders like Tang Shengzhi (唐生智), Li Zongren (李宗仁), Feng Yuxiang (馮玉祥) and Yan Xishan (閻錫山) and started a new anti-Chiang campaign.

While the anti-Chiang campaign was in progress, Wang ended his disengagement from Chinese politics and returned from Europe in October 1929 to lead the anti-Chiang campaign under the name to “protect the Party and save the nation” (*hudang jiuguo* 護黨救國).<sup>13</sup> This time Wang chose Hong Kong as his base because he had to command the alliance, with Chen’s aid, with the southwestern military leaders who stayed in Hong Kong.<sup>14</sup> Besides seeking for military alliance with the warlords, Wang was also active in building a propaganda base in Hong Kong for his anti-Chiang movement. The man responsible for this task was neither a member of the GMD Left nor that of the Reorganization Faction, but Wang’s personal henchman Lin Bosheng.

Born in 1902, Lin was a young member among Wang’s associates. He first took part in political activities in 1923 when he joined a school strike in Lingnan University in Canton. After being expelled by the University due to his political activism, he taught in Zhixin College (Zhixin zhongxue 執信中學). Through the recommendation of the college principal Zeng Xing (曾醒), whose sister-in-law was

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Faction led by Chen Gongbo. Wang did not actually participate in the Reorganization Faction despite his moral support to the faction. Chen, *Ku xiao lu*, vol. 2, p.211.

<sup>13</sup> Chen, *Ku xiao lu*, vol. 2, p.215.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.211.



Fang Junying (方君瑛), a comrade of Wang in the assassination of the Prince Regent in 1910, Lin worked for Wang as personal secretary in 1924. He soon became one of Wang's the closest associates because of his devotion to Wang and his good relationships with Madame Wang and Wang's other personal associates such as Zeng Zhongming.<sup>15</sup> From the very beginning of his participation in Wang's circle, Lin was assigned to conduct political propaganda. When Lin followed Wang to go into exile in Europe in 1927, he started *La Correspondance Chinoise en Europe* (留歐通訊) in France.<sup>16</sup> He had also been in the United States to supervise the GMD organs *Meizhou minguo ribao* (the *American Republican Daily* 美洲民國日報) and *Min qi bao* (the *People's Spirit Post* 民氣報).<sup>17</sup>

In late 1929, Lin went to Hong Kong and started the South China News Agency (Nanhua tongxunshe 南華通訊社) there. This agency was soon substituted by the *SCDN*, which published from February 1, 1930.<sup>18</sup> Editors included Lin and his friends Zhu Pu (朱樸) and Chen Kewen (陳克文).<sup>19</sup> In May 1931 the newspaper

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<sup>15</sup> Huang Meizhen 黃美真 and Zhang Yun 張雲, "Lin Bosheng" 林柏生, in Zong Zhiwen 宗志文, Yan Ruping 嚴如平, eds., *Minguo Renwu zhuan* 民國人物傳, vol.6 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1987), p.188.

<sup>16</sup> The close relation between Wang and Lin was shown in correspondences in Europe in 1928 in which Wang appreciated Lin of his ability to clarify some theoretical questions of the development of the Party. Wang Jingwei, *Wang Jingwei ji* 汪精衛集, vol.4, (Shanghai: Guangming shuju, 1930; reprint, Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1992), p.51.

<sup>17</sup> Nanjing shi dang'an guan, ed., *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu*, vol.1, p.483.

<sup>18</sup> Details about the foundation and operation of this news agency are not known. According to an advertisement in October 1938 posted by the *SCDN*, it is known that the South China News Agency was established in 1929. After the *SCDN* was set up in 75 Wyndham Street, the news agency was absorbed into in the *SCDN*. *SCDN*, October 28, 1938. In another narrative it was said that Lin first published a mosquito paper *Hujiao* (the *Pepper* 胡椒) individually. The newspaper later successfully drew Wang's attention and Wang agreed to sponsor Lin for publishing the *SCDN*. Li Jiayuan 李家園, *Xianggang baoye zatan* 香港報業雜談 (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing (Hong Kong), 1989), pp.106-107.

<sup>19</sup> Lin was the editor-in-chief while Zhu and Chen were the deputy editors. Between the two deputy editors, Zhu played a more important role in the later development of the *SCDN* and the *CCDN*. Born in the same year as Lin, he became a friend of Lin in Paris when he was conducting a field trip for the Shanghai municipal government in 1926. Zhu was shortly afterwards introduced by Lin to Wang and became one of Wang's junior henchmen. Zhu Pu 朱樸, "Sishi zishu" 四十自述, *Gujin* 古今 1 (March 1942), p.22.





expanded its business by publishing the *Weekly Review* (*Nanhua pinglun*, *SCWR* 南華評論) as a political commentary supplement of the *SCDN*.<sup>20</sup> As Wang continued to participate actively in the anti-Chiang campaigns with other military leaders in the GMD in 1930 and 1931,<sup>21</sup> the *SCDN* and the *SCWR* provided a channel for Wang and his followers to publicize their ideas in South China.<sup>22</sup> In a short essay in 1932 reviewing the early development of the *SCWR*, Lin explicitly stated that the earliest issues of the *SCWR* in 1931 were “secretly imported to Canton”, aiming to “draw the Cantonese attention and solidify the determination of the Canton authorities [to set up a government independent from Nanjing].”<sup>23</sup> Wang’s anti-Chiang speeches were often made the headlines in these publications. For instance, the first issue of the *SCWR* in May 1931 reported an interview with Wang conducted by the *SCDN* in Shanghai. Wang expressed in this interview his criticism against the National Convention (*Guomin huiyi* 國民會議) convened in Nanjing, which, according to Wang, was a puppet only “for Chiang’s personal consumption” (*yuyong* 御用). He also depicted the prospect of the anti-Chiang movement as follows:

In past years, Chiang produced anti-Chiang elements every day. Today, with the exception of Chiang’s personal associates, all people who have joined the GMD and all soldiers who have participated in the National Revolutionary Army are anti-Chiang. Such force is produced by

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<sup>20</sup> Zhu was later designated the editor-in-chief of the *SCWR*. Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> On August 10, 1930, an “Enlarged Conference of the GMD” was convened in Peking which gathered Wang and other anti-Chiang partisans. They set up a new government there and denounced Chiang’s autocratic rule in Nanjing. The Enlarged Conference was soon dispersed by a Manchurian militarist Zhang Xueliang (張學良) in September. Wang fled from Peking to Taiyuan and to Hong Kong and announced in January 1931 the dissolution of the Reorganization Faction. In February 1931, however, Chiang’s detention of Hu Hanmin, the President of the Legislative Yuan in Nanjing who opposed Chiang’s proposal to make a constitution for the government under the GMD’s tutelage, resulted in another anti-Chiang campaign. On May 27, Wang established a separate government in Canton and again prepared to start fighting against Chiang. Odani, *Wang Ching-wei and the Fall of the Chinese Republic*, pp.77-83; Chiang, “Wang Chao-ming”, pp.248-249.

<sup>22</sup> The editorial line of the *SCDN* in the earliest publications in 1930-1934 was little known because of lack of issues available, but the pro-Wang and anti-Chiang attitude of the press was clearly shown in its publication of collection of Wang’s speeches and articles. See Wang Zhaoming 汪兆銘 [Wang Jingwei], *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin yanlun ji* 汪精衛先生最近言論集 (Hong Kong: South China Daily News, 1930).

<sup>23</sup> Bosheng 柏生 [Lin Bosheng], “Juanshouyu” 卷首語, *SCWR*, August 13, 1932.





Chiang himself. [This force] will continue to grow until the fall of Chiang.<sup>24</sup>

Lin promptly echoed Wang's assertion in a subsequent issue of the *SCWR*. He helped Wang to explain the aim of this anti-Chiang movement and appealed to the GMD partisans in Canton to follow Wang's cause. Lin tried to reduce the partisans' distrust of Wang, who had previously cooperated with the rival Communists, by praising that Wang was a statesman who "persists in doing what he thinks reasonable" and who "dares to admit his mistakes, and dares to correct them seriously". He then claimed that Wang was "transcendent of factional rivalry" and welcomed all forces which shared common revolutionary beliefs and determination to topple Chiang's autocratic rule.<sup>25</sup> Such explicit anti-Chiang tone continued appearing in the *SCWR* in the following months. Writers exploited every opportunity to criticize the corruption and maladministration of the Chiang's government.<sup>26</sup>

### **Wang-Chiang Cooperation and the Foundation of the CCDN**

While the *SCDN* was a product of the factional rivalry between Wang and Chiang in 1930 and 1931, the establishment of the *CCDN* was caused by the Wang-Chiang cooperation in 1932. After the Japanese army provoked the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931 and invaded Manchuria with a speedy offensive, leaders in Canton and Nanjing faced a public outcry for national unity to protect the

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<sup>24</sup> "Wang Jingwei xiansheng duiyu zuijin shiju zhi zhuzhang" 汪精衛先生對於最近時局之主張, *SCWR*, May 15, 1931, p.4.

<sup>25</sup> Lin Bosheng, "Wang Jingwei xiansheng zhi taidu" 汪精衛先生之態度, *SCWR*, May 23, 1931, pp.3-4.

<sup>26</sup> It can be shown a short commentary in the *SCWR* on Chiang's issue of government bond that cost C\$160 million. In this article, the writer described Chiang as "a hooligan in the Shanghai Bund" (上海灘一小流氓蔣介石) who imposed a heavy financial burden on the people by raising government bonds. Haimin 海民(pseud.), "Baqian wan you baqian wan" 八千萬又八千萬, *SCWR*, June 27, 1931, pp.2-3.



Chinese sovereignty.<sup>27</sup> On September 28, the first round of reunion talks between Canton and Nanjing was held in Hong Kong.<sup>28</sup> In the following weeks, their representatives had more discussions in Hong Kong and Canton to arrange a formal reunion conference. Finally, the peace conference was held in Shanghai from October 27 to November 7, 1931. It was difficult to achieve a significant peace settlement, especially on the issue of Chiang's resignation and the future status of the existing regimes in Canton and Nanjing. In fact, even on the Canton side there was no consensus on how to settle the future status of Chiang.<sup>29</sup> The reunion conference in Shanghai ended without solving the problem of Chiang's resignation.<sup>30</sup>

Wang's compromise with Nanjing in the Shanghai conference irritated the Canton leaders, who retaliated by rejecting on November 23 the agreements having reached between Wang and the Nanjing leaders in Shanghai and a ban of the publication of Wang's *SCWR* in Canton in November.<sup>31</sup> This led to a split between Wang and the Canton leaders, and compelled Wang to ally with Chiang. The contests

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<sup>27</sup> Donald A. Jordan, "Shifts in Wang Ching-wei's Japan Policy During the Kuomintang Factional Struggle of 1931-1932," *Asian Profile* 12, no.3 (1984), p.204. For further details, see Parks M. Coble, *Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), p.37; Hsu Yu-ming 許育銘, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu: 1931 zhi 1936 nian dui Ri wenti xia de zhengzhi biandong* 汪兆銘與國民政府：1931 至 1936 年對日問題下的政治變動 (Taipei: Academia Historica, 1999), pp.18-20.

<sup>28</sup> The Canton representatives were led by Wang Jingwei and Sun Fo (孫科), while the Nanjing representatives delegates included Chen Mingshu (陳銘樞), Zhang Ji (張繼) and Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培). Jordan, "Shifts in Wang Ching-wei's Japan Policy," p.205; Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, pp.25-27.

<sup>29</sup> Some Canton leaders, such as Chen Jitang (陳濟棠), insisted in Chiang's resignation from the party, the armed forces and the government, but Wang, hoping to achieve a compromise with the Nanjing government, only demanded Chiang's abandonment of military dictatorship and military submission to a civilian government. Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, pp.45-46, 51-53.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.50.

<sup>31</sup> Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, p.57; Bosheng, "Juanshouyu", *SCWR*, August 13, 1932. After the *Review* was banned by the Canton government in November 1931, the editors resumed its publication in Hong Kong in January 1932, but the publication was also terminated after two months because, as Lin claimed in this article, "our publication in Hong Kong under the British colonial rule did not enjoy the slightest freedom of speech; all important anti-Japanese articles were censored. The editors were frequently prosecuted because of minor mistakes". The publication of the *Review* was finally resumed under the *CCDN* in Shanghai in August 1932.



among Wang, the Canton leaders and Chiang continued until Chiang's resignation from the government on December 15, 1931.<sup>32</sup> However, Chiang's retirement did not last long, as his successor Lin Sen (林森) and Sun Fo did not have enough power to cope with the political and military challenges from the Japanese and from the party leaders.<sup>33</sup> Sun Fo soon resigned on January 25, 1932, and Wang was invited to head the Executive Yuan in Nanjing on January 29. Chiang also returned to the Nanjing government on the same day to join the Military Affairs Commission, and, about a month later, chair the Commission.<sup>34</sup> The "dual-leadership" system, which Wang supervised the civilian governance and Chiang the military affairs, was hence established.<sup>35</sup>

Wang's alliance with Chiang in Nanjing caused him to leave his original power base in South China.<sup>36</sup> Since the beginning of the reunion talks in October 1931, Wang and his Canton comrades had worried about their lack of power in the lower Yangtze area.<sup>37</sup> Being a civilian politician, Wang needed to rely on propaganda to spread his political ideas in order to consolidate his ideological leadership in the new government. However, but he lacked a suitable channel in Shanghai or Nanjing to achieve this aim. The *SCDN* in Hong Kong was not able to give a sufficient support

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<sup>32</sup> Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, pp.67-68.

<sup>33</sup> Lin Sen was a neutral GMD leader and designated as the Chairman of the National Government, the nominal head of the government. Sun Fo was supported by both Canton and Nanjing and appointed as the president of the Executive Yuan.

<sup>34</sup> Chiang chaired the Commission from March 6, 1932. Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, p.88, Coble, *Facing Japan*, p.38.

<sup>35</sup> Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, p.92.

<sup>36</sup> In fact Wang did not actually stay in Nanjing in the immediate period after the Wang-Chiang cooperation was accomplished in January 1932. His office in the Executive Yuan was moved to Luoyang in Henan province on January 30, 1932 in order to face possible attack from the Japanese, who had just provoked the fighting in Shanghai on January 29. Coble, *Facing Japan*, p.47.

<sup>37</sup> This problem was partly solved by stationing the pro-Canton Nineteenth Route Army in the Shanghai-Wusong Garrison in October 1931. Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, pp.29-30.



to Wang for the paper was published far away from the political theatre in Nanjing and Shanghai. In fact, when Wang stayed in Shanghai during the reunion talks, he had no channel but a few underground publications to spread his political ideas.<sup>38</sup> The need to have his own organ became even more apparent to Wang when Wang had to settle in Nanjing for his alliance with Chiang.

Compared with the capital Nanjing, Shanghai was a more suitable place for Wang to set up his organ. Since the late nineteenth century, the city had gradually become the press centre in China. Such a development was caused by two factors. First, Shanghai was blessed with good transportation, a prosperous economy, and close contact with the outside world. All these made the metropolis the intellectual centre in Republican China. As the Chinese intellectuals in Shanghai became increasingly politically active throughout the early Republican period, they constituted the best readership for Wang's newspaper.<sup>39</sup> Second, there was greater freedom of speech in the foreign settlements of Shanghai than in the Chinese areas.<sup>40</sup> The Nanjing government imposed strict censorship of the press and other publications in order to suppress views which were unfavourable towards the GMD and the government.<sup>41</sup> Although such censorship was nominally applicable to the

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<sup>38</sup> For instance, Wang had to use the *Shanghai minbao* (the *Shanghai Citizens' Post* 上海民報), an underground publication sponsored by Tang Youren (唐有壬), for publishing his speeches. Ibid., p.53.

<sup>39</sup> For instance, the intellectuals in Shanghai played an important role in the New Culture Movement in the 1910s and 1920s. Ma, ed., *Shanghai xinwen shi*, pp.498-502. The intellectuals, through the newspapers in Shanghai, were also active during this period in promoting nationalism of modern China. For details, see Barbara Mitter, *A Newspaper for China? Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai's News Media, 1872-1912* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).

<sup>40</sup> Hu Daojing 胡道靜, *Shanghai de ribao* 上海的日報 (Shanghai: Shanghai tongzhi guan, 1935), pp.1-2.

<sup>41</sup> The strict censorship was shown in the censorship regulations set by the GMD Publicity Bureau, which classified all publications which "promote communism and class struggle", "promote fascism, anarchism and attack the party's doctrines, policies and resolutions", and "oppose or disobey the party's doctrines, policies and resolutions" as "reactionary publications" and liable for punishment. "Wei Guomindang Zhongxuanbu de xuanchuanpin shencha tiaoli" 偽國民黨中宣部的宣傳品審查條例, in Zhang Jinglu 張靜廬, ed., *Zhongguo jin xiandai chuban shiliao* 中國近現代出版史料, vol.4 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1954-1959; reprint, Shanghai:



Chinese press in the foreign settlements, the Chinese government was never able to exercise this power effectively there.<sup>42</sup> Instead, the authorities in the International Settlement and the French Concession in Shanghai only required the Chinese press to register before publication, and they seldom interfered with the Chinese newspapers unless they were deemed to threaten public order.<sup>43</sup> As a result, the Chinese newspapers published in Shanghai, such as *Sin Wen Pao* (新聞報) and the *Shun Pao* (申報), enjoyed high prestige throughout the country. It was even said by a commentator that “no news can be regarded as attested unless the Shanghai press has reported it.”<sup>44</sup> It would be beneficial for Wang if he could win public support for his own political advocacy through his own organ in Shanghai.

The task to set up a press in Shanghai was again assigned to Wang’s publicist Lin Bosheng. Lin assumed the post of general director of the new paper.<sup>45</sup> After months of preparation, the *CCDN* began circulation on April 11, 1932 in the International Settlement. Many editors of the *CCDN*, such as Zhao Muru (趙慕儒), the editor-in chief of the new paper, Xu Liqiu (許力求), Wu Peizhi (伍培之) and Yan Jiabao (顏加保), came from the *SCDN* in Hong Kong. The press also employed other Cantonese, such as Ye Xuesong (葉雪松), Chen Shaoxiang (陳少翔) and Li Wu (李

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Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2003), pp.523-524.

<sup>42</sup> The Nanjing government had been trying to impose press censorship in the foreign concessions in Shanghai. Since 1931, the Shanghai Municipal Government tried to influence the public opinion shown in the Chinese press in the foreign settlements by consultation between the officials and the press editors. In March 1933, the Nanjing government established a press censorship bureau in the International Settlement to censor the Chinese press in Shanghai. “Shanghai xinwen jianchashuo gongzuo baogao” 上海新聞檢查所工作報告, SHAC, 2040/89, May 19, 1941. However, since the Chinese police was not authorized to take action in the foreign settlements, the power of such censorship was limited.

<sup>43</sup> See “Règlement concernant la publication des périodiques – journaux – revues,” SMP, D-3019, November 23, 1931.

<sup>44</sup> Yao Kung-ho 姚公鶴, *Shanghai shihua* 上海史話, ed. Yün Shu-chio 惲樹珏, 3d ed., vol.2 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926), pp.109-110.

<sup>45</sup> “Rapport : Revue mensuelle ‘Chung Hwa Yueh Pao’ (Central China Monthly),” SMA, U38-2-694, July 24, 1936. At the same time, Lin continued to supervise the publication of the *SCDN* in Hong Kong.



屋), in Shanghai to deal with operational affairs.<sup>46</sup> The newspaper began on a relatively small scale, working in a small building in the International Settlement and publishing four-page copies daily.<sup>47</sup> It was only after Wang secured the finance of the newspaper by diverting a capital of C\$200,000 from the fund of the Ministry of Railway to the *CCDN* that the newspaper developed into the scale comparable with other broadsheet newspapers in Shanghai.<sup>48</sup> By the end of the year 1932, the *CCDN* appeared to be a national newspaper: its size was extended from four pages to six in June 1932, and then eight in September; its office was moved to Honan Road (河南路), or commonly known as “Wangping Street” (望平街), where offices of major newspapers in Shanghai were located;<sup>49</sup> the paper published editorials, news reports, commentaries, and different supplements every day, providing a wide range of topics from politics to literature and entertainment, which most commercial newspapers in Shanghai offered.<sup>50</sup>

### **The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* in the Mid-1930s: Attitudes and Readership**

Unlike commercial newspapers which were run by civilians and independent from direct interference from politicians, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, financed and managed by the Wang Clique, continued with their primary function to provide a

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<sup>46</sup> Guo Xiufeng 郭秀峰, “Wangwei shiqi de ‘Zhonghua ribao’” 汪偽時期的‘中華日報’, in Wu Hanmin 吳漢民, ed. *20 shiji Shanghai wenshi ziliao wenku* 20世紀上海文史資料文庫, vol. 6 (Shanghai: Shanghai chudian chubanshe, 1999), p.150. Guo Xiufeng was an important member of the *CCDN*. He joined the *CCDN* between 1932 and 1937, and became the editor-in-chief of the *CCDN* when the paper resumed publication in Shanghai in 1939. He continued to serve the Wang regime until the end of the Sino-Japanese War.

<sup>47</sup> The first office of the *CCDN* was situated in 320 Shantung Road (山東路) in the International Settlement. *CCDN*, April 19, 1931.

<sup>48</sup> The railway minister at that time was Gu Mengyu (顧孟餘), a loyal follower of Wang. Wang even designated his personal secretary Zeng Zhongming as the commissioner in charge of financial affairs of the Ministry of Railway. Guo, “Wangwei shiqi de ‘Zhonghua ribao’,” p.149.

<sup>49</sup> “Benbao qianzhi qishi” 本報遷址啟事, *CCDN*, November 30, 1932.

<sup>50</sup> Zhao Muru 趙慕儒, “Jinhou de benbao” 今後的本報, Editorial, *CCDN*, April 11, 1933.



channel for Wang and his associates to spread their political ideas. Comparing these two newspapers, the *CCDN*, which was the flagship of the Wang Clique's propaganda machinery from 1932, showed a more explicit pro-Wang attitude than the *SCDN*. This paper showed a political tilt towards Wang throughout the Wang-Chiang coalition between 1931 and 1936. Wang's speeches and articles were often published extensively in the *CCDN*.<sup>51</sup> Such support was sometimes so unreserved that the paper had to change its tone abruptly to conform itself to the Clique's shifting policy. For example, when Wang was under attack for his mild Japan policy in mid-1935 and announced his resignation from the government in August under the pretext of his health problem, the *CCDN* supported Wang's decision promptly.<sup>52</sup> But when Wang agreed to remain in office after having been persuaded by Chiang and other high officials in the next two weeks, the paper immediately switched its attitude to supporting the Wang's resumption of office.<sup>53</sup> The paper's pro-Wang attitude was further shown in the attempted assassination of Wang outside the venue of a Party Congress on November 1, 1936. Wang was seriously wounded by two shots fired by a terrorist who was later known as a follower of an anti-Chiang Cantonese military clique.<sup>54</sup> The *CCDN* lamented the attempted assassination and highly praised Wang's noble personalities:

Wang carries with his sick body and bears a huge burden [of the nation]. If he is prepared to sacrifice his life [for the nation], is there still any point for him to be unhappy with his injury and bleeding?<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> For example, on March 17, 1933, the newspaper used two pages to report the return of Wang from Europe and Wang's speech on the current affairs. *CCDN*, March 17, 1933.

<sup>52</sup> Hua 華 (psued.), "Wang xiansheng cizhi" 汪先生辭職, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 12, 1935.

<sup>53</sup> Hua (psued.), "Wang xiansheng zhi furen" 汪先生之復任, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 25, 1935.

<sup>54</sup> Report of the Assistant Commissioner (Japanese), SMP D-7045, February 20, 1936.

<sup>55</sup> Hua (pseud.), "Wang yuanzhang beici shi" 汪院長被刺事, Editorial, *CCDN*, November 5, 1935.





While the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* regarded Wang as their manifest leader, how they treated Wang's ally-competitor Chiang was another interesting question. As the *CCDN* was a product of the Wang-Chiang cooperation in 1932, it was logical to see that the anti-Chiang tone, which permeated in the Wang Clique's early publications in Hong Kong, disappeared. Chiang, however, was regarded as just one of the high government officials and seldom became the focus of news reports of the paper. The editors seldom quoted Chiang's speeches or ideas in their commentaries. However, as Chiang's control in the Party and the central government was further strengthened after Wang's injury in the attempted assassination in 1935, the *CCDN* gradually showed its willingness to support Chiang's leadership in the government. In Lin Bosheng's article to celebrate the new year of 1936, he asked the public to support Chiang:

When Mr. Wang was in charge of the government, we trusted the administration; now when Mr. Chiang is in charge of the government, we also trust the administration with the concept of encountering the national crises with sincerity and solidarity.<sup>56</sup>

The paper's support for Chiang reached its climax in the Xi'an Incident in December 1936. The *CCDN* joined the other newspapers throughout the country to issue a declaration to support Chiang who was "the pillar of the nation, the leader of the country, the trustee of the four hundred million people, and the master of the five-thousand-year history".<sup>57</sup> Although such support was caused by the nationwide fury at that time, it showed to a certain extent that even the *CCDN* had to admit that it was Chiang, not Wang, who was in power and attracted public support.

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<sup>56</sup> Shiquan 石泉 [Lin Bosheng], "Jiuwang tucun zhiyou yitiao lu – Ershiwu nian yuandan xianci" 救亡圖存只有一條路 - 二十五年元旦獻辭, *CCDN*, January 1, 1936.

<sup>57</sup> "Quanguo xinwenjie dui shiju xuanyan: yonghu zhengfu yiqie duinei duiwai fangzhen yu zhengce" 全國新聞界對時局宣言: 擁護政府一切對內對外方針與政策, *CCDN*, December 16, 1936.





Besides the roles of Wang and Chiang in Chinese politics, the *CCDN* paid particular attention to the national crises, especially the Japanese aggression in China, throughout the 1930s. The *CCDN* was usually patriotic on the issue of Japanese aggression, but its tone and attitudes towards this problem changed from time to time. The paper was very unfriendly towards Japan in the early days of publication as the effects of the Sino-Japanese conflict in Shanghai in 1932 were still strong. In a short period after the conflict, the paper encouraged the boycott of Japanese goods as a part of the economic warfare against Japan.<sup>58</sup> Lin Bosheng also expressed his optimism in the nation's struggle against Japan as he claimed that the Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China proper was "the last struggle of the Japanese imperialists before their downfall".<sup>59</sup>

However, such a hostile attitude was soon replaced by a much more modest tone in the subsequent years. Under the policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" which regarded the Communists, not the Japanese, as the primary enemy of the country, the Wang-Chiang government avoided direct confrontation with the Japanese army and made several compromises with Japan over the North China question.<sup>60</sup> Wang emphasized the importance of enhancing the national strength by developing the national economy.<sup>61</sup> His view was well-illustrated in a political report

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<sup>58</sup> Huang Yankai 黃延凱, "Dakai yitiao you xiwang de qiantu" 打開一條有希望的前途, Editorial, *CCDN*, October 10, 1932.

<sup>59</sup> Lin Bosheng, "Yijiusaner nian de zong jiesuan yu yijiusansan nian de xin xingshi" 一九三二年的總結算與一九三三年的新形勢 in *Zhonghua ribao xinnian tekan* 中華日報新年特刊 (Shanghai: Central China Daily News, 1933), p.2.

<sup>60</sup> Several truces and agreements were made between China and Japan from 1932 to 1935, such as the Shanghai Truce in 1932, the Tanggu Truce in 1933, the He-Umezu Agreement and the Qin-Doihara Agreement in 1935. For further discussion of the "first internal pacification, then external resistance" policy and Chinese negotiations with Japan, see Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, chp. 4; So Wai-chor, "The Making of the Guomintang's Japan Policy, 1932-1937," *Modern China* 28, no.2 (2002), pp.221-231.

<sup>61</sup> Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, pp.248-249.



given by Wang in the fourth Plenum of the GMD fourth Party Congress in January 1934, which he emphasized that the most crucial tasks of the government was to eliminate the Communists and to secure the economic and military developments.<sup>62</sup> In other words, the government would not seek a hard Japan policy in order to reserve its power for those two crucial tasks. Such a policy was soon fully supported by the *CCDN*, which Lin restated in the *CCDN* in an article on the occasion of the newspapers' second anniversary:

The present sickness [of the country] is the country's disunity and its unconsolidated national defence, [we therefore have to] think about the development, [follow the policy of] first internal pacification, then external resistance... The government and the people must give first priority to national economic development.<sup>63</sup>

The “first internal pacification, then external resistance” policy was maintained by the government until the Xi'an Incident in December 1936 when Chiang was forced to agree to stop the suppression of the Communists and divert the power for external resistance. Wang, who returned to China in January 1937 but failed to take advantage of the power vacuum in the Xi'an Incident, did not share Chiang's new policy.<sup>64</sup> Although he did not directly criticize such a policy change, Wang insisted in a speech given in Nanjing on February 1, 1937 that it was necessary to guarantee national unity before the country was able to deal with the external threat.<sup>65</sup> In the

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<sup>62</sup> He mentioned that “there is nothing more pressing than eliminating the Communist bandits [for] curing symptoms; there is nothing more pressing than production and development [for] tackling the core of the problem.” Wang Jingwei, “Wang Zhaoming zai si jie sizhong quanhui zhengzhi baogao liangnian lai guanyu jiuwang tucun gongzuo” 汪兆銘在四屆四中全會政治報告兩年來關於救亡圖存工作, GMD Party Historical Archive, January 23, 1934, quoted in Hsu, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin zhengfu*, pp.247-248.

<sup>63</sup> Shiquan [Lin Bosheng], “Benbao liang zhounian jinianri gaiban xianci” 本報兩週年紀念日改版獻辭, *CCDN*, April 11, 1934.

<sup>64</sup> So, “The Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy, 1932-1937,” pp.242-244.

<sup>65</sup> Wang Jingwei, “Annei yu rangwai: Zai Guomin zhengfu jinianzhou yanjiang” 安內與攘外：在國民政府紀念週演講, February 1, 1937, in Lin Bosheng, ed., *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin zhi yanlun* 汪精衛先生最近之言論 (Shanghai: Central China Daily News, 1937), p.33.



*CCDN* on the following day, the editor further explained that one of the key factors to guarantee national unity was to eliminate the “Communist bandits”.<sup>66</sup> Its moderate tone towards Japan and anti-communist stand did not change until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937.

As compared with the *CCDN*, the importance of the *SCDN* in the propaganda machinery of the Wang Clique was greatly reduced after Wang joined the Nanjing government in 1932. Despite the fact that the *SCDN* still adhered to the standpoint of the Clique and gave a wide coverage of Wang’s activities, the paper did not dedicate itself much to political news. In 1935, news and commentaries about national politics only occupied about one out of twelve pages in each issue of the *SCDN*, as compared with two out of eight in that of the *CCDN*. Editorials and commentaries were often brief and occasional. There was even no commentary for such a major national event as the attempted assassination of Wang in November 1935. On the other hand, its political colour was much overshadowed by other features of the paper such as local news and literary supplements. The sport news often covered one or even two whole pages in the *SCDN* in 1935 and became the selling point of the paper.<sup>67</sup>

There is no definite statistics with regard to the circulation of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* among the population throughout the mid-1930s. It is certain that both newspapers were not among the most popular papers in their respective cities. Literature in the 1930s about the contemporary press also seldom mentioned these two papers in detail.<sup>68</sup> But as both papers were published in a format similar to the

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<sup>66</sup> Qiu 求 [Xu Liqiu], “Annei yu Rangwai” 安內與攘外, Editorial, *CCDN*, February 2, 1937.

<sup>67</sup> *SCDN*, December 29, 1935.

<sup>68</sup> See Hu, *Shanghai de ribao*, pp.98-106; Mai Siyuan 麥思源, “Qishi nian lai zhi Xianggang baoye” 七十年



broadsheet newspapers, they were still regarded as the mainstream newspapers. For example, the *SCDN* was listed under the “Principal Publications” in the official *Blue Book* in Hong Kong.<sup>69</sup> The estimated circulation figures of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* in the mid-1930s were around 10,000 and 6,000 respectively.<sup>70</sup> In comparison with other leading commercial newspapers in their cities with large daily circulation figures, such as the *Shun Pao* in Shanghai, which printed 150,000 copies a day, and *Wah Kiu Yat Po* in Hong Kong with a 55,000 daily circulation, it is fair to say that these two papers did not attract much public attention.<sup>71</sup>

## Conclusion

The prewar development of the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* clearly showed the partisan nature of these two newspapers clearly. The *SCDN* originated in Hong Kong in 1930 when Wang was involved in the power struggle with Chiang Kai-shek. The *CCDN* was established in Shanghai in 1932, when Wang decided to form an alliance with Chiang after the Manchurian Incident. Financed by Wang and managed by his young publicists, the two newspapers published extensively Wang’s essays and speeches as well as news reports about Wang’s activities. The major objective of these two newspapers was to publicize political ideas of Wang and his associates.

As a result, the opinions of the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* shifted quickly in order to

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來之香港報業, in *Huazi ribao bianjibu 華字日報編輯部*, ed., *Huazi ribao qishiyei zhounian jinian kan 華字日報七十一週年紀念刊* (Hong Kong, *Huazi ribao yingye bu*, 1934), pp.3-5.

<sup>69</sup> *Hong Kong Blue Book*, 1936, p.320.

<sup>70</sup> These figures are supported by Guo, “Wangwei shiqi de ‘Zhonghua ribao’,” p.150 ; *Newspaper Directory of China (Including Hong Kong)* (Shanghai: Carl Crow, Inc., 1935), pp.51, 100; Wolfgang Mohr, *Die Moderne Chinesische Tagespresse: ihre Entwicklung in Tafeln und Dokumenten*, vol.2 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1976), p.66.

<sup>71</sup> *Newspaper Directory of China (Including Hong Kong)*, p.52, 102.



follow the changing standpoints of Wang and his subordinates. One of the most dramatic changes in the attitude took place in 1932 when Wang and Chiang cooperated with each other and formed a central government. Before the cooperation, the *SCDN* launched fierce attacks on Chiang and called for an overthrow of Chiang's dictatorship in the Nanjing government. However, anti-Chiang hostilities no longer appeared in the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* after Wang and Chiang formed the political alliance in 1932.

As the Wang-Chiang cooperation was based on the consensus between the two sides that China should be united to resist the increasing threat of Japan after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* followed this policy and explained the importance of national salvation. Although the two newspapers were often not keen to stir up anti-Japanese feelings among the people, they never showed friendly attitude towards Japan. This unfriendly attitude towards the Japanese persisted in the prewar years, and was even sharpened after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937.

## Chapter 3

### Promoting Resistance: The CCDN and the SCDN before Wang Jingwei's Defection

#### Introduction

After years of bargaining and compromises between China and Japan in the early 1930s, the relations between the two countries finally came to their breaking point at the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937. This local armed conflict soon developed into a full-scale war between China and Japan in the following eight years. The quick and formidable Japanese attacks changed the political atmosphere in China drastically. Most Chinese politicians renounced their partisan rivalry, at least ostensibly, and cooperated with Chiang in the War of Resistance. Cooperation between the GMD and the CCP, which had been agreed on by both parties after the Xi'an Incident, was finally realized when the Communists declared their allegiance to the Three People's Principles and submission of their Red Army to the GMD government in September 1937.<sup>1</sup> Different political and military cliques within the GMD also showed their support for the resistance policy of the government.<sup>2</sup> Being an important politician in the GMD, Wang Jingwei was no exception. In the early days of the War, he showed his full support for Chiang's resistance policy publicly.

Facing humiliation and a threat to national survival, the Chinese population showed its strong patriotism and support for resistance soon after the outbreak of the

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<sup>1</sup> *Central Daily News*, September 23, 1937.

<sup>2</sup> T'ien-wei Wu, "Contending Political Forces during the War of Resistance," in James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory: the War with Japan, 1937-1945* (Armonk, New York: East Gate Books, 1992), p.51.



War. Wartime patriotism was particularly fervent in the urban areas, such as Shanghai and Hong Kong. The Chinese populace in both the cities became active in support of the resistance movement. Different organizations, with or without political background, appeared in various circles to mobilize the civilians to provide various sorts of supports for resistance. People donated cash and materials, participated in frontline aid services, and publicized the ideas of resistance. During the first year of fighting, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* worked under very difficult conditions to promote national mobilization for resistance. However, the fall of Canton and successful secret contacts between the Wang Clique and the Japanese envoys in October 1938 changed the situation. The *SCDN*, which became the main propaganda organ of the Wang Clique after the *CCDN* suspended publication in November 1937, began showing pessimism over the War. This chapter deals with the enthusiasm of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* for resistance during the early months of the War, and the change in the attitude of the *SCDN* in late 1938.

### **The *CCDN* and the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War**

The anti-Japanese sentiment of the Chinese population in Shanghai became extraordinarily vigorous when the Japanese invaded North China in July and Shanghai in August 1937. Similar to the majority of the population at that time, the *CCDN* raged against the Japanese invasion and supported the government's resistance policy. Despite the fact that the *CCDN* was unable to sustain normal publication soon after the political and military conditions in Shanghai became worse at the end of 1937, it is clear that the paper followed Wang and the mainstream public opinions to adopt a pro-resistance and anti-Japanese stand in the first four months of Sino-Japanese hostilities.



### ***Reponses of the Shanghai Public and the CCDN in the Early Days of the War***

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese troops started its undeclared offensive on the Marco Polo Bridge, or Lugouqiao (蘆溝橋), near Peking, claiming to search for a missing Japanese soldier after their military practice. The local armed conflict was at first received by the Chinese government with a cautious but self-restraining attitude, hoping that this would not escalate the existing conflict. In fact, there were signs of peaceful settlement of this conflict at local level in the first few days after the Incident, such as a preliminary agreement between Japanese and Chinese field commanders to retreat their troops back to their previous garrisons.<sup>3</sup> It was reported that in the first week after the Incident the truce negotiation between the belligerents was in progress and “there [was] still a hope of peace”.<sup>4</sup> A similarly calm attitude was also adopted by the press in Shanghai. The *Shun Pao*, for example, was confident of the government’s determination to avoid such escalation.<sup>5</sup> The *CCDN*, despite its consistent opposition to Japanese aggression, was confident that a truce would take place between both fighting parties.<sup>6</sup> The public also stayed fairly calm in the first week after news of the eruption of the conflict reached the city. National salvation activities appeared in different circles, but they were sporadic and on a limited scale.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> *CCDN*, July 10, 1937.

<sup>4</sup> *CCDN*, July 15, 1937.

<sup>5</sup> Yi 宜 (pseud.), “You yici qinlue xingdong” 又一次侵略行動, Editorial, *Shun Pao*, July 9, 1937.

<sup>6</sup> Lan 蘭 [Hu Lancheng], “Lugouqiao shijian” 蘆溝橋事件, Editorial, *CCDN*, July 10, 1937.

<sup>7</sup> For example, it was reported that about 140 persons from cultural circles gathered on July 9 to propose a “national salvation” society (jiuguo hui 救國會). They succeeded in collecting C\$100 on their first meeting to donate to the Chinese troops in the north. *CCDN*, July 11, 1937. Over 160 public organizations from different walks of life were reported on July 13 to send telegrams to cheer up the Chinese garrisons in North China. With a few exceptions, their appreciation remained mainly verbal without being backed by substantial donations. *CCDN*, July 13, 1937.





The early Chinese endeavours for a peaceful settlement of the Incident were soon proved a failure. The Japanese continued with such quick offensives that they succeeded in taking Tianjin and Peking by the end of July.<sup>8</sup> As there was no sign on the Japanese side to stop offensives, the Chinese government was compelled to prepare for national resistance. This policy was declared in a speech by Chiang Kai-shek on July 17, in which he claimed that although he did not dismiss any hope of peace, he firmly refused any proposals that would damage territorial integrity.<sup>9</sup> Wang Jingwei also made a similar declaration to appeal to the public for endurance and sacrifice for national resistance.<sup>10</sup> The response from the public in Shanghai became increasingly vigorous as the military conditions worsened in North China. The Federation of the Civic Associations of Shanghai (Shanghai shi gejie kangdi houyuanhui, FCAS 上海市各界抗敵後援會), was inaugurated on July 22.<sup>11</sup> The association enlisted most of the prominent Chinese local leaders and community representatives in the city as members. It was made, under the supervision of the GMD local branch, the centre of the civil resistance activities in Shanghai.<sup>12</sup> Donation campaigns, recruitment of wartime aid workers, and propaganda movements started to be organized extensively throughout the city.

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<sup>8</sup> CCDN, July 31, 1937.

<sup>9</sup> CCDN, July 20, 1937.

<sup>10</sup> Wang Jingwei, “Zuihou guantou” 最後關頭, July 31, 1937, in Lin Bosheng 林柏生, ed., *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin yanlun ji xubian (you ershiwu nian guiguo dao xianzai)* 汪精衛先生最近言論集續編 (由二十五年歸國到現在) (Hong Kong: South China Daily News, 1938), pp.33-40.

<sup>11</sup> The meaning of the English official name of the FCAS was quite different with that of the Chinese version. The Chinese version of the Society means the “Shanghai Various Circles Committee to Support Resistance against the Enemy”. Minutes of the FCAS, September 2, 1937, in “Shanghai shi gejie kangdi houyuanhui zhuxituan huiyi jilu xuankan (zhong)” 上海市各界抗敵後援會主席團會議紀錄選刊 (中), *Dangan yu lishi* 檔案與歷史 4 (February 1986), p.21; CCDN, July 22, 1937.

<sup>12</sup> The main office of the FCAS is situated in the local GMD branch office and the main responsible persons included Tao Baichuan (陶百川), a standing committee member of the GMD local branch, and Pan Gongzhan (潘公展), the chief of the Bureau of Social Affairs of the Shanghai Municipal Government. Police Report, SMP, D-8183, September 26, 1937. The FCAS required all resistance or national salvation organizations in the city to register under the Association and accept its supervision. Minutes of the FCAS, August 30, 1937, in “Shanghai shi gejie kangdi houyuanhui zhuxituan huiyi jilu xuankan (zhong)”, p.16.



The *CCDN* joined the mainstream Chinese public opinion and became active in promoting resistance against the Japanese. Lin Bosheng, being a member of the Legislative Yuan and the publisher of the *CCDN*, joined the executive committee of the FCAS, which was comprised of 121 social leaders in the city.<sup>13</sup> The newspaper, seeing no sign from the Japanese side to stop the offensives in North China in late July, asserted that “there [was] no hope to achieve peace anymore”, and emphasized that the opinion of the Chinese nation should at that time be united for resistance and national salvation.<sup>14</sup> It even criticized the local authorities in Shanghai for their inefficiency in mobilizing the enthusiastic public to support the national salvation movement.<sup>15</sup>

### ***The CCDN and the Battle of Shanghai***

Shanghai was finally under direct attack when the Japanese started a new front in the lower Yangtze area on August 13. The Japanese troops started its offensive in Shanghai on that day after the Chinese mayor of Shanghai refused the Japanese request to withdraw the Chinese garrison from the city. As the majority of the local population experienced the direct threat of the war, local anti-Japanese sentiments reached a climax. National salvation movements were carried out throughout the city, especially in the International Settlement. Protected by the foreign powers, the Settlement and the neighbouring French Concession declared neutrality during the Sino-Japanese conflicts and enjoyed isolation from the warfare around their territories.<sup>16</sup> Although the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) forbid any

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<sup>13</sup> *CCDN*, July 23, 1937.

<sup>14</sup> Xiao 曉 (pseud.), “Kangzhan xumu zhi jiekai” 抗戰序幕之揭開, Editorial, *CCDN*, July 28, 1937.

<sup>15</sup> Yong 永 (pseud.), “Jiaoji yu zhunbei” 焦急與準備, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 5, 1937.

<sup>16</sup> The Shanghai Municipal Council gave up its police power in districts north of the Suzhou Creek to the



demonstrations and mass gatherings without permission in advance in order to “preserve the peace, order and good government of the International Settlement” immediately after the war,<sup>17</sup> the isolation from the war and moderate attitudes of the SMC towards anti-Japanese activities still made the International Settlement “the safest place to indulge in multifarious activities”, even as compared with the French Concession.<sup>18</sup> The target of aid services was shifted to local garrisons and refugees. Resistance propaganda also became much more intensive. Despite the prohibition of the SMC, voluntary stage performers managed to play anti-Japanese street dramas to the lower class population in order to educate them to support resistance and not to be traitors.<sup>19</sup> Other forms of publicity, such as lectures, choir performance, and distribution of pamphlets and handbills, were found throughout the Settlement.

Being an important instrument to report daily situations of the local war to the public, newspapers played their role in the wartime propaganda. Special journals were published, mostly on a small scale, dedicated to daily war reports and anti-Japanese literature, aiming to inspire people’s patriotic sentiments. A leading example was *Jiuwang ribao* (the *Salvation Daily* 救亡日報). It was published under the auspices of Shanghai Cultural Circles Race Salvation Association (Shanghai wenhua jie jiuwang xiehui 上海文化界救亡協會), which was sponsored by the GMD but controlled by pro-Communist intellectuals such as Xia Yan (夏衍) and

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Japanese, making it one of the battlefields between the Chinese and the Japanese troops. The districts south of the Creek remained unaffected.

<sup>17</sup> *Municipal Gazette*, September 3, 1937.

<sup>18</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8103, September 26, 1937.

<sup>19</sup> For example, an anti-Japanese street play “Lay down your whip” (fangxia nide bianzi 放下你的鞭子) was performed before 400 refugees in the Lyric Theatre Refugee Camp in the International Settlement on September 5. Police Report, SMP, D-8039A, September 8, 1937; Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration*, p.8.



Guo Moruo (郭沫若).<sup>20</sup> On the first day of issue, the daily clearly asked the public to fight against the Japanese under the leadership of the government.<sup>21</sup> The *Jiuwang ribao* was renowned for a number of articles contributed by famous writers, politicians and scholars, and received a certain degree of support of the local population.<sup>22</sup>

The *CCDN* did not lag behind the public fervour for resistance during the Battle of Shanghai. The *CCDN* continued to enjoy a certain degree of press freedom in the International Settlement. It repeatedly stressed the importance of social mobilization during the war, and the idea that every individual should participate in resistance activities in every aspect, such as producing foods and materials for the soldiers, and detecting fifth columns in the neighbourhood.<sup>23</sup> When the early Chinese dominance in the battlefield was soon superseded by reinforcements of well-equipped Japanese troops, which had landed from the harbour north of the city in August and September,<sup>24</sup> the paper still remained optimistic. It avoided disclosure of setbacks of the Chinese troops until it was not able to conceal such reports anymore. One could hence often see that the war situation depicted in the paper changed overnight, from ongoing victory to sudden retreat of the Chinese army. For example, when the

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<sup>20</sup> Peng Qiyi 彭啟一, “*Jiuwang ribao zai Shanghai*” 《救亡日報》在上海, in *Guangxi ribao xinwen yanjiushi* 廣西日報新聞研究室, ed., *Jiuwang ribao de fengyu suiyue* 救亡日報的風雨歲月 (Beijing, Xinhua chubanshe, 1987), p.49; Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration*, p.11.

<sup>21</sup> “Fakanci” 發刊辭, August 24, 1937, in “*Jiuwang ribao fakanci, fukan zhici, fukan zhici – yijiusanqi – yijiusiwu nian*” 救亡日報發刊辭、復刊致辭、復刊之辭 - 一九三七-一九四五年, in Zhang Jinglu, ed., *Zhongguo jin xiandai chuban shiliao*, vol. 5, p.4.

<sup>22</sup> The *Jiuwang ribao* circulated 3,500 copies daily, which was considered remarkable among resistance publications newly appeared during the battle. Ma, ed., *Shanghai xinwen shi*, p.818.

<sup>23</sup> Lan, “Zenyang zhankai quanmian kangzhan: Renren dikang chuchu dikang” 怎樣展開全面抗戰：人人抵抗處處抵抗, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 14, 1937.

<sup>24</sup> Hans J. Van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945* (London: Routledge, 2003), p.215.



Japanese launched a general offensive near Liuxing (劉行), about twenty-five kilometres northwest from the city centre, in late September, the *CCDN* reported on October 1 that the Chinese troops continued defeating all Japanese attacks and “our [the Chinese] fortification is adamant like a giant rock and impenetrable like a gold castle with a boiling moat”.<sup>25</sup> However, such reports were quickly superseded by another report in the *CCDN* two days later to the effect that the fortification was destroyed by the Japanese and the Chinese retreated, or “transferred” according to the news report, westwards and southwards to the Yunzaobin River (蘊藻濱).<sup>26</sup> Whilst the editor was compelled to admit the loss of the Chinese troops, he still expressed his optimism with regard to the future situation.<sup>27</sup> Objectivity and accuracy were not the primary concerns of the news reports in the newspaper. In fact, it was almost impossible for the *CCDN* to guarantee the reliability of their source of information in such a chaotic situation. More importantly, it was the paper’s policy to maintain the spirit of the public as long as possible through its news reports, which were not necessarily true and accurate.

### ***The CCDN and the Fall of Shanghai***

However, the optimism of the *CCDN* with regard to the war was gradually eroded by the fact that the defeat of the Chinese garrisons in the city became irreversible. In late October, the Chinese armed forces had to retreat back to the south bank of the Suzhou Creek, giving up Zhabei (閘北) and Jiangwan (江灣), where the Chinese municipal government was located. The Japanese landing on the Hangzhou Bay, sixty kilometres south of the city, on November 5 sped up the collapse of the

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<sup>25</sup> *CCDN*, October 1, 1937.

<sup>26</sup> *CCDN*, October 3, 1937.

<sup>27</sup> Li 力 [Xu Liqiu], “Shiju xianjieduan” 時局現階段, Editorial, *CCDN*, October 5, 1937.



Chinese defence. Finally, a general withdrawal order was issued to the Chinese garrisons on November 8, resulting in the Japanese occupation of all districts in Shanghai except the two foreign concessions.<sup>28</sup> Although the *CCDN* continued to ask the people to continue with their relief work and predicted that the Chinese troops would return “in near future”,<sup>29</sup> the editors began to lament the aftermath of the evacuation of the Chinese troops and criticize the irresponsibility of the community leaders during the battle. The living conditions in the two foreign concessions worsened as normal supplies of food were blocked by the Japanese, and refugees flooded into the foreign concessions from occupied areas. According to the editors’ accounts, the hardship and dim prospect of refugees who were not able to secure jobs and food was “inconceivable”.<sup>30</sup> The *CCDN* dismissed enthusiasm and support for the local resistance activities, which the paper showed before the fall of Shanghai, and criticized vigorously against the light-headed behaviour of these local elites who organized the civilian resistance activities:

What mass organizations have they formed? [They] formed some so-called neighbourhood organizations. It seems that once intellectuals had joined these organizations, these local exactors’ organizations would have become revolutionary ones. What activities have they achieved? [They] only did relief work among the refugees, promoted the subscription of the National Salvation Bond, looked after wounded soldiers, promoted donation of cotton sweaters, or posted bills and cried slogans in the same way as they did for a charity. These activities were of course necessary, but they were only just a part of resistance... What is more deplorable is that some of those who have clamoured for resistance since the earliest period and in the loudest voice escaped from the battlefield, causing damage to the military cause.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945*, p.216.

<sup>29</sup> Zhi, “Jinhou de Shanghai shimin” 今後的上海市民, Editorial, *CCDN*, November 14, 1937.

<sup>30</sup> Zhi, “Muqian Hushi de liangda wenti – nanmin yu minshi” 目前滬市的兩大問題 -難民與民食, Editorial, *CCDN*, November 17, 1937.

<sup>31</sup> Lan, “Qi ba yilai de jiaoxun” 七八以來的教訓, Editorial, *CCDN*, November 27, 1937.



At the same time, the *CCDN* and other Chinese newspapers in Shanghai faced a more difficult political situation in the International Settlement. Despite its declared neutrality in the Sino-Japanese conflict, the SMC realized the importance to “cooperate with the Japanese authorities”, which had become the *de facto* government in the surrounding areas, “in meeting the changed situation”.<sup>32</sup> Anti-Japanese activities in the International Settlement became less tolerated by the SMC. The first sign of the tightening of policy was a notification of the Council on October 21, requiring all associations and newspapers in the International Settlement to register with the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP).<sup>33</sup> This notification soon became the legal basis of the suppression of anti-Japanese societies and newspapers in the International Settlement.<sup>34</sup>

After the Chinese troops had completely evacuated from Shanghai and the surrounding areas in mid-November, the International Settlement faced even greater pressure from the Japanese authorities, which demanded the Council to further suppress the anti-Japanese activities and propaganda in the Settlement. On November 20, Major-General Kumakichi Harada, the Japanese military attaché in China, asked Stirling Fessenden, the SMC Chairman, to put an official curb on anti-Japanese activities and press propaganda in the International Settlement, or the Japanese authorities would “reserve the right to adopt measures which they regard as

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<sup>32</sup> Shanghai Municipal Council, *Annual Report for of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 1937* (Shanghai: F.&C. Walsh, 1938), p.17.

<sup>33</sup> *Municipal Gazette*, October 22, 1937.

<sup>34</sup> By November 24, at least forty-nine national salvation organizations were closed either voluntarily or by the order of the Police. Police Report, SMP, D-8103, November 24, 1937. For example, the Shanghai Cultural Circles Race Salvation Association was closed by the SMP on November 5 for its refusal with register to the SMC. Police Reports, SMP, D-8002, October 31, 1937, November 6, 1937. The FCAS was also closed by the Police on November 11. Police Report, SMP, D-8013, November 24, 1937. Minutes of the FCAS, November 15, 1937, in “Shanghai shi gejie kangdi houyuanhui zhuxituan huiyi jilu xuankan (xia)” 上海市各界抗敵後援主席團會議紀錄選刊 (下), *Dangan yu lishi* 檔案與歷史 6 (April 1986), p.22.





necessary”.<sup>35</sup> Suemasa Okamoto, the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai, also made similar demands to the SMC.<sup>36</sup> The SMP, in response to the Japanese demands, informally advised four Chinese newspapers which were closely related to the GMD, including the *CCDN*, on November 23 to cease publication as soon as possible.<sup>37</sup> Although the cessation of these publications was not compulsory, the Police explained to the editors of these four papers that “no anti-Japanese or false reports would be permitted” in their publications if they chose to continue publication.<sup>38</sup> The intervention of the Police was effective in some ways. All of them except the *CCDN* followed the advice to suspend publication in the following three days.<sup>39</sup> The *CCDN* and the Chinese newspapers which still continued their publication resolved to modify their editorial policy and avoid provocative opinions and certain expressions like “enemy” which had been used to refer to Japan by most newspapers.<sup>40</sup>

But this compromise did not guarantee that these newspapers could continue publication without interference. On November 28, the Japanese Consular Police and gendarmeries took over the Shanghai Newspaper Censorship Bureau in the

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<sup>35</sup> *North China Daily News*, November 21, 1937.

<sup>36</sup> Okamoto made five requests to the SMC, including the suppression of GMD official and semi-official organs in the Settlement, eviction of Chinese officials from the Settlement and prohibition any censorship conducted by the Chinese government on the Chinese press and news services in the International Settlement. *North China Daily News*, November 22, 1937.

<sup>37</sup> The other three newspapers were the *China Times* (時事新報), *Lih Pao* (立報), and *Min Pao* (民報). Police Report, SMP, D-8187, November 24, 1937.

<sup>38</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8187, November 24, 1937.

<sup>39</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8187, December 1, 1937.

<sup>40</sup> Such resolution was adopted in an urgent meeting held by the Chinese Daily Press Association which most leading newspapers in Shanghai were its members. Most of the members present in the meeting including the *Shun Pao* and the *Sin Wen Pao* agreed to this resolution, while the *Ta Kung Pao* (大公報) showed its opposition to such proposal. Police Report, SMP, D-8187, November 26, 1937.





International Settlement, which had been previously run by the Chinese authorities but was closed on November 23 as the result of the evacuation of Chinese officials from Shanghai. The new censorship bureau issued a circular to the Chinese newspapers on the same day, instructing them to submit their papers for censorship before publication. The *CCDN* responded to the Japanese censorship by suspending its publication immediately. In its farewell editorial, the *CCDN* unreservedly expressed its hatred of the Japanese and supported resistance:

Given the vast territory and huge population of our country, if we can pull together, sacrifice and resist till the end of the day, how can the Japanese, despite their strength, migrate all their seventy million reptilian people to our four-million-kilometre-square territory and eliminate our four hundred million people? The brutal enemy can seize our land but not our mind; can take our lives but not our belief.<sup>41</sup>

In fact, most of the remaining major Chinese papers, such as *Shun Pao*, *Ta Kung Pao*, and *Sin Wen Pao*, also suspended their publication by December 16, the deadline to submit their papers for Japanese censorship.<sup>42</sup> In a short period of time, Shanghai lost its predominance as the press centre of China. The role of the press centre was subsequently taken over by other cities, such as Wuhan and Hong Kong.

### **Low Ebb of the Wang Clique Propaganda: the *SCDN* in Hong Kong**

The fall of Shanghai and the subsequent closure of the *CCDN* represented the loss of an important propaganda base for the Wang Clique. As the speedy offensive of the Japanese troops in Central China continued, Wang and his associates followed the central government to retreat from Nanjing to Chongqing and Wuhan, where they

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<sup>41</sup> “Gaobie benbao duzhe” 告別本報讀者, *CCDN*, November 28, 1937.

<sup>42</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8187, December 14, 1937.



did not have much political influence.<sup>43</sup> At that moment the only propaganda base on which the Wang Clique could rely was the *SCDN* in Hong Kong. The *SCDN*, despite its difficult financial position, continued with its propaganda work for the Wang Clique and supported resistance until Wang defected from Chongqing in December 1937.

### ***Hong Kong as a Propaganda Base after the Outbreak of the War***

As the situation of Shanghai continued deteriorating, political activists in Shanghai needed to find other places to continue their national salvation activities and propaganda. Hong Kong had several advantages for them in this respect. First, Hong Kong at that time was not directly affected by warfare. Except occasional air raids by the Japanese at Canton, there was no major military confrontation near the Colony until the Japanese landing on Mirs Bay in October 1938. Furthermore, Hong Kong was protected by its status as a British colony and hence free from the Sino-Japanese conflict. On many occasions, the Japanese official representatives in Hong Kong were eager to avoid friction with the colonial authorities.<sup>44</sup> While the hinterland was under the direct threat of Japanese air raids or military attacks, Hong Kong became a shelter for many Chinese elites, including journalists, intellectuals and political activists.

Second, the local Chinese population showed its support for Chinese resistance. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the local Chinese elites promptly launched

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<sup>43</sup> The National Government announced to move the capital from Nanjing to Chongqing on November 20, 1937. The Supreme National Defence Council, which Chiang and Wang were the chairman and the vice-chairman respectively, was moved to Hankou (Wuhan). *Central Daily News*, November 21, 1937. Wang arrived at Wuhan on November 23. *Central Daily News*, November 23, 1937. Shortly after the evacuation of the central government, Nanjing was occupied by the Japanese on December 13.

<sup>44</sup> Shatoukok Frontier Incident, H.K.I.R. No. 1/38, CO129/563/11.



charity and relief campaigns for the refugees in North China. New or existing local associations initiated fundraising campaigns among their members. The Chinese Relief Society, for example, was established on August 6 which aimed at carrying out a fundraising donation campaign in different circles. The campaign was so successful that over HK\$37,800 was collected from the public during a few days between August 23 and 28, 1937.<sup>45</sup> The local subscription of the National Salvation Bond issued by the Chinese government was also so impressive that by April 1938 over C\$5.5 million was subscribed to the bond in Hong Kong.<sup>46</sup> These happenings showed that the local population of Hong Kong was eager to support resistance and hence provided a base of readership for pro-resistance publicity.

Third, while the authorities of the foreign concessions in Shanghai were compelled to tighten their control over the political activities and propaganda in their jurisdictions, the colonial administration in Hong Kong showed a moderate attitude towards the local Chinese population regarding their support for the War of Resistance. The Hong Kong government did not openly interfere with the pro-resistance activities of the local Chinese population in Hong Kong on condition that they did not affect the neutrality of the colonial government or endanger law and order.<sup>47</sup> Although the Hong Kong government exercised the registration system and censorship towards Chinese newspapers under the Printers and Publishers Ordinance

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<sup>45</sup> SCDN, August 29, 1937.

<sup>46</sup> Ma, *Hong Kong's Responses to the Sino-Japanese Conflicts from 1931 to 1941*, p.98.

<sup>47</sup> For example, the Tung Wah Hospital (東華醫院), which had a semi-official status because of the government's participation in the finance and management of the Hospital, was advised by the government not to take part in such pro-resistance activities. Minutes of the Executive Council, CO131/97, August 4, 1937. Four Chinese representatives, Robert Kotewall (羅旭蘇), C. N. Chau (周竣年), M.K. Lo (羅文錦) and Li Shu-fan (李樹芬), also declared the government's policy of neutrality and asked the local Chinese population to observe law and order when expressing their patriotism. SCDN, July 29, 1937. Generally, there was no open conflict between the government and the local population over the latter's support for Chinese resistance in the first months after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.



of 1927 and the Emergency Regulations Ordinance of 1922, such control was usually mild and aimed at suppression of anti-British opinion. The pro-resistance, and, on many occasions, anti-Japanese attitudes shown in Chinese newspapers were little suppressed by the censorship.<sup>48</sup> In the early days of the Sino-Japanese conflict, news reports about the Sino-Japanese conflict which carried a strong anti-Japanese colour were usually allowed to appear in Chinese newspapers.<sup>49</sup> Although on some occasions some anti-Japanese terms, such as “enemy” (*di* 敵), “bandit” (*qiu* 寇), were mechanically omitted by the censors, the readers had no difficulty in understanding the meaning of these anti-Japanese articles.

These favourable conditions attracted many famous intellectuals, such as Guo Moruo, Zhang Naiqi (章乃器) and Zou Taofen (鄒韜奮), to choose Hong Kong as their first destination after they left Shanghai in December 1937.<sup>50</sup> They even set up different organizations to establish links with the resistance activities in the hinterlands.<sup>51</sup> Several Chinese newspapers which were compelled to suspend their publication in Shanghai, such as *Shun Pao*, *Lih Pao*, and *Ta Kung Pao*, resumed

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<sup>48</sup> The Printers and Publishers Ordinance required all newspapers to register with the government with a deposit of HK\$3,000. *Hong Kong Government Gazette*, December 23, 1927; January 3, 1930. The Emergency Regulations Ordinance empowered the Governor in Council to perform “censorship, and the control of suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication”. The regulations of the Ordinance further stated that no person should publish any newspaper or other material which induce any persons “to interfere with the administration of the law or with the maintenance of law and order”. *Hong Kong Government Gazette*, February 28, 1922; October 2, 1931.

<sup>49</sup> For example, the *SCDN* quoted a news correspondence concerning with the battle in Shanghai that “our soldiers on the front are extremely angry with the enemy’s bombing of the non-combatants outside the battlefields, and swear not to share the same sky with the enemy.” *SCDN*, September 26, 1937. Despite its anti-Japanese tone, the whole article was not censored by the government and was published in its entirety.

<sup>50</sup> Two welcome seminars were organized in Hong Kong for these intellectuals from Shanghai. *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, December 2, 1937.

<sup>51</sup> For example, the All-China Literary Circles Resistance Against the Enemy Association (Zhonghua quanguo wenyijie kangdi xiehui 中國全國文藝界抗敵協會), which was established in Wuhan in March 1938, began to establish connections with the intellectuals staying in Hong Kong. The Association finally sent an official to Hong Kong to prepare the establishment of a branch in Hong Kong in early November 1938. Lo Wai-luen 盧瑋鑾, *Xianggang wenzong – neidi zuojia nanlai ji qi wenhua huadong* 香港文縱 – 內地作家南來及其文化活動 (Hong Kong: Wah Hon Publishing Co., 1987), p.54.



publication in Hong Kong.<sup>52</sup> The pro-resistance activities and propaganda in Hong Kong hence became much more active and diverse.

### *Hardship of the SCDN*

As there were many favourable conditions in Hong Kong for the continuation of the resistance propaganda, it was sensible for the Wang Clique, which had started the *SCDN* in Hong Kong long before the outbreak of the War, to expand its publicity in Hong Kong after the Clique could no longer publicize their ideas through the *CCDN* in Shanghai. In fact, there was a sign showing the Clique's intention to increase the strength of the *SCDN* when the Battle of Shanghai took place in August and September. Zhu Pu, one of the first editors of the *SCDN* in the early 1930s and an editor of the *CCDN* at the outbreak of the War, was instructed to return to the *SCDN* to resume publication of the editorials which had been interrupted since May 1935.<sup>53</sup>

However, contrary to expectation, the *SCDN* failed to continue its normal publication even before the closure of the *CCDN*. On November 1, 1937, the size of the newspaper was reduced by half and combined with its supplement *Hujiao* to form a mosquito paper.<sup>54</sup> The reason for this cutback is little known, but it is not unreasonable to conclude that this was caused by the financial problem of the newspaper.<sup>55</sup> The *SCDN* had long been financially supported by the Wang Clique.

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<sup>52</sup> *Shun Pao* started publication in Hong Kong on March 1, 1938, *Lih Pao* on April 1, and *Ta Kung Pao* on August 13. Song Jun 宋軍, *Shenbao de xingshuai* 申報的興衰 (Shanghai: Shanghai shehuikexueyuan chubanshe, 1996), pp.197-198.

<sup>53</sup> Zhu's first editorial in *SCDN* after his return to Hong Kong appeared on the issue of October 1, 1937. Pu 樸 [Zhu Pu], "Qiangquan yu gongli zhi zhan" 強權與公理之戰, Editorial, *SCDN*, October 1, 1937.

<sup>54</sup> "Benbao qishi" 本報啟事, *SCDN*, October 26, 1937.

<sup>55</sup> The *SCDN* explained in an announcement that it reduced its size to save the resources for the national salvation. Ibid.



As the existing financial resources of the Wang Clique were gradually damaged by the retreat of the Chinese central government to the hinterland, the *SCDN* could no longer secure financial assistance from its sponsor. The newspaper suffered even further when it had to accommodate the *CCDN* editorial staff, who had evacuated from Shanghai after the suspension of the publication in late November 1937. Its financial position was so bad that the monthly salary of the director (*shezhang* 社長) was only HK\$32, which was similar to that of a team conductor.<sup>56</sup> No matter how the newspaper asserted that its quality would not be affected, it is not difficult to conceive that the influence and the popularity of the *SCDN*, which was then published as a mosquito newspaper, were severely compromised.<sup>57</sup>

The *SCDN* remained as a mosquito paper for at most eight months, from November 1937 to July 1938 at the latest.<sup>58</sup> Yet, Wang's associates did not stop their activities in Hong Kong. The centre of their activities at that time was the World Translation Press (*Guoji bianyishe* 國際編譯社), alias the Weilan Bookstore (*Weilan shudian* 蔚藍書店), which was established in January 1938. Although Lin Bosheng was the head of the Press, the Press was not directly sponsored by Wang or his personal associates, but by the Institute of Art and Literature (*Yiwen yanjiuhui* 藝文研究會), which was headquartered in Chongqing and was controlled by Zhou Fohai, the chief of the GMD Central Publicity Bureau.<sup>59</sup> The Press published three journals:

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<sup>56</sup> "Benbao shilue" 本報史略, *SCDN*, February 1, 1943; *Hong Kong Blue Book*, 1937, p.381.

<sup>57</sup> The *SCDN* claimed that all existing features of the paper, such as national and local news and supplements, would remain after the size reduction. "Benbao qishi" 本報啟事, *SCDN*, October 26, 1937. But as there is at present no copy of the *SCDN* published during the period of size reduction, it is difficult to show the actual situation of the *SCDN* during that period.

<sup>58</sup> The actual date which the *SCDN* resumed normal publication is not known. The earliest copy available at present is July 2, 1938.

<sup>59</sup> Zhu Pu, "Ji Weilan shudian" 記蔚藍書店, *Gujin* 13 (December 1942), p.19. Zhou's relationship with the Wang Clique and his participation in Wang's peace movement started in the Institute of Art and Literature, where



*Guoji congshu* (the *World Series* 國際叢書) edited by Mei Siping, *Guoji zhoubao* (the *World Weekly* 國際週報) edited by Fan Zhongyun (樊仲雲), and *Guoji tongxun* (the *World Correspondence* 國際通訊) edited by Zhu Pu. Contributors included many writers of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, such as Hu Lancheng (胡蘭成), Long Dajun (龍大均), and Liu Shike (劉石克). These publications focused on the analysis of the international relations, and seldom discussed the Sino-Japanese conflicts. In fact, the chief aim of the Press was to collect intelligence on the international relations for Chongqing and serve as a communication point for Chinese intellectuals who resided in or transited through Hong Kong.<sup>60</sup>

### ***The Wang Clique: Party Politics, Peace Overture, and its Responses on the SCDN***

The retreat of the Chinese government to Wuhan and Chongqing not only dried up the financial sources of the Wang Clique, resulting in the cutback of the *SCDN*, but also forced Wang Jingwei and his associates to leave their political power base in Nanjing. While Chiang succeeded in gaining allegiance from regional cliques in Sichuan and the other southwestern provinces to support his resistance policy, Wang gradually lost his political power and became further subservient to Chiang's leadership.<sup>61</sup> Chiang's undisputed leadership in the Party and the government was further consolidated in the GMD Extraordinary Party Congress held from March 29 to April 1, 1938. Chiang was elected in that Congress the Director-General (*zongcai* 總裁), and assumed the supreme power in the Party.<sup>62</sup> Wang, who was the Chairman

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he established contacts with Wang through Tao Xisheng (陶希聖), a leading officer of the Institute, Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, p.168.

<sup>60</sup> The editors of the Press would submit weekly reviews of international affairs to Zhou, and even Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. Zhu, "Ji Weilan Shudian," pp.19-20.

<sup>61</sup> T'ien-wei Wu, "Contending Political Forces during the War of Resistance," pp.59-63.

<sup>62</sup> The Party Congress also declared that Chiang had already been delegated by the GMD Central Executive Committee vast powers to "unify the leadership in the party, the government, and the army" "Zhongguo





of the Central Executive Committee and the official head of the Party, had to give way to the new Director-General and received in return the post of Deputy Director-General. It was hence reasonably believed that the shrinkage of Wang's political power and his further submission to Chiang's leadership under the name of resistance created bitterness among Wang and his associates.

The Extraordinary Party Congress also officially declared resistance against the Japanese as the party line and the principal government policy. The Organic Law for the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction (*Kangzhan jianguo gangling* 抗戰建國綱領), which was passed in the Party Congress on April 1, proclaimed to unite the various circles and political groups under the leadership of the GMD for resistance. This Organic Law showed the determination of the Party and the Chinese government to continue the War of Resistance.<sup>63</sup>

Although the Party leaders and the government officials often proclaimed military resistance against the Japanese, they did not deny possibilities of a negotiated peace with the Japanese. There were many reasons for the belligerents to want to stop the war. Generally, both Japan and China could not afford a prolonged war as neither of them had enough strength to achieve a decisive military victory.<sup>64</sup> One of the earliest secret contacts was conducted through Oscar Trautmann and Herbert von Dirksen, the German Ambassadors in Nanjing and Tokyo, from October

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Guomindang linshi quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan” 中國國民黨臨時全國代表大會宣言, April 1, 1938, in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol.4, pt.1, p.53.

<sup>63</sup> “Zhongguo Guomindang linshi quanguo daibiao dahui jueyi tongguo zhi ‘Zhongguo Guomindang kangzhan jianguo gangling’” 中國國民黨臨時全國代表大會決議通過之「中國國民黨抗戰建國綱領」, April 1, 1938, in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol.4, pt.1, pp.48-51.

<sup>64</sup> Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp.140-142.





to December 1937.<sup>65</sup> Although it ended in failure, it showed the desire in the part of both the Chinese and the Japanese to settle the war by diplomatic means.

The Wang Clique's involvement in the peace proposals started in early 1938, when secret contacts were renewed between the Chinese and the Japanese governments. This time the main responsible person was Gao Zongwu. He was an official of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and was despatched by Chiang to Hong Kong to seek contacts with the Japanese who had connections with high officials of the Japanese government. Meanwhile, Gao was closely associated with an informal political group called the Low-Key Club (Didiao julebu 低調俱樂部), which was headed by Wang and included some GMD leaders and intellectuals such as Zhou Fohai, Tao Xisheng, and Hu Shi (胡適). The members of the Club shared the idea that China should make peace with Japan so as to preserve national strength. Gao succeeded in establishing contacts with Nishi Yoshiaki (西義顕), Itō Yoshio (伊藤芳男) and Matsumoto Shigeharu (松本重治), and they held a private meeting in Hong Kong on March 28, a day before the Extraordinary GMD Party Congress resolved to continue the War of Resistance, and decided to work to bring about peace between China and Japan.<sup>66</sup> In the following months, Gao worked with his Japanese counterparts to seek possible peace terms between the two belligerents and reported to Chiang. Wang's role in the peace negotiations remained limited until Gao visited Japan in July 1938 without any authorization. During Gao's visit, Kagesa Sadaaki (影佐貞昭) suggested that Wang substituted Chiang as the leader of the government

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., pp.68-70.

<sup>66</sup> Nishi was the chief of the Nanking branch office of the Southern Manchurian Railroad, Itō was the special employee of the Southern Manchurian Railroad, and Matsumoto was the director of the Shanghai office of Dōmei News Agency. Three of them were directly or indirectly associated with Prince Konoye Fumimaro (近衛文麿), the Japanese Prime Minister. For details, see Bunker, *Peace Conspiracy*, p.76.



to conduct a peace negotiation with Japan.<sup>67</sup> This proposal gave Wang, whose power was greatly reduced by Chiang in the name of resistance, an opportunity to regain political leadership within the Party and the government.

Nevertheless, there was no hint that Wang was attracted by this proposal and was going to abandon the existing policies of resistance under Chiang's leadership. Wang rejected the proposal of Kagesa and Gao in Tokyo immediately after he knew about it.<sup>68</sup> The *SCDN* also reflected the Clique's continued support for resistance. The newspaper did not moderate its support for resistance and opposition to cooperation with Japan. The editors believed that the Japanese troops were able to occupy only railway lines and communication points in coastal areas, but not the countryside and hinterlands where the national strength of China was still preserved. The Chinese could utilize these unoccupied areas to sustain a prolonged war and finally deplete the Japanese military and economic strength.<sup>69</sup> As China was in such a favourable military position, China should strengthen its military power and seek the support of friendly powers, but should never make any compromise with Japan.<sup>70</sup> Collaboration with the Japanese was described in the paper as deplorable behaviour which deserved condemnation. Columnists in the *SCDN* sometimes used the leading

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<sup>67</sup> Kagesa was the chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Japanese War Ministry. He preferred Wang as the new leader for the future peace talks because the Japanese government tried to avoid violation against its own *aite to sezu* (相手とせず) statement of January 1938, which stated that Japan would not recognize Chiang and his regime anymore as the legitimate national government of China. Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp.182-187; "Gao Zongwu zhanshi sifang riben tanhe midang – dongdu riji, huitan jilu, geren guangan" 高宗武戰時私訪日本探知秘檔 - 東渡日記、會談紀錄、個人觀感, *Jindai Zhongguo* 近代中國 129 (February 1999), pp.125-126.

<sup>68</sup> Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, p.187.

<sup>69</sup> Canglang 滄浪 (pseud.) "Dangqian zhanju de toushi" 當前戰局的透視, Editorial, *SCDN*, September 3, 1938.

<sup>70</sup> "Everybody should bear in mind that Mr. Chiang and Mr. Wang have repeatedly put forward the ideas that 'midway compromise only leads to extinction'. [China should] 'sacrifice to the end', and 'fight to the end' for the ultimate victory." Liusha 流沙 [Hu Lansheng], "Yuandong xingshi yu woguo waijiao" 遠東形勢與我國外交, Editorial, *SCDN*, August 24, 1938.



collaborators in occupied areas as their satirical targets. For instance, a columnist teased Liang Hongzhi (梁鴻志), the head of the Reformed Government in Nanjing, for his reported insults by the Japanese officers.<sup>71</sup> In another article, Fu Zongyao (傅宗耀), the mayor of Japanese-occupied Shanghai, was described as a man who was so traitorous that it was justifiable to destroy the tombs of his ancestors.<sup>72</sup> In fact, the *SCDN* did not challenge the resistance policy or express pessimistic ideas towards the war with the Japanese until the falls of Canton and Wuhan in October 1938.

### ***Doubts of the SCDN after the Fall of Canton***

The full support of the *SCDN* for the central government in Chongqing was finally shaken greatly by the battles in Canton and Wuhan in October 1938. The Japanese commenced its attack on South China on October 12 by landing troops on Mirs Bay, about seventy kilometres northeast of Hong Kong. The *SCDN* was at first confident about the ability of the provincial administration to fight against the Japanese. The paper supported the central government's decision to appoint General Zhang Fakui (張發奎) to take charge of military affairs and asserted that "only General Zhang can take such huge responsibility."<sup>73</sup> It even suggested that the Cantonese possessed revolutionary and tough spirits, or the so-called "Guangdong Spirit" (*Guangdong jingshen* 廣東精神), which made them physically and mentally strong enough to bolster local resistance.<sup>74</sup> The newspaper's early optimism towards

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<sup>71</sup> Yiming 一鳴 (pseud.), "Hanjian de jiaoxun" 漢奸的教訓, *SCDN*, July 14, 1938.

<sup>72</sup> Fu was portrayed as follows: "A traitor who sells the nation has already lost its heart and conscience. How can a traitorous person still observe filial piety?" Lishao 李韶 (pseud.), "Kuilei qiyong xingang?" 傀儡豈有心肝?, *SCDN*, October 19, 1938.

<sup>73</sup> Lengguan 冷觀 (pseud.), "Huanying Zhang Fakui Jiangjun" 歡迎張發奎將軍, *SCDN*, October 16, 1938.

<sup>74</sup> The *SCDN* interpreted the "Guangdong Spirit" as "no subdual, no pedantry, no rigidity, dare to resist, dare to act", Liusha, "Fayang Guangdong jingshen" 發揚廣東精神, Editorial, *SCDN*, October 18, 1938.



the battle and its confidence in the local government was, however, soon shattered by the fact that the provincial government did not have substantial strength and determination to fight against the Japanese. From the onset of the battle, the press was not able to get correct information. The provincial government understated the unfavourable military situation. It denied any unfavourable report so repeatedly that even a British military officer in Canton commented that “most of the denials issued [by the provincial government] after the landing were much patent nonsense that they can only have been issued to ‘mark time’ until the time came for the officials to leave”.<sup>75</sup> Canton was swiftly abandoned by the provincial government, and the city was finally captured by the Japanese, without any significant opposition, on October 22, only ten days after the Japanese landing on Mirs Bay.

The quick loss of Canton provoked huge dissatisfaction on the part of the *SCDN*. The newspaper withdrew most of its support for the provincial government and strongly condemned the authorities at Canton for their over-optimistic attitudes towards the war, lack of determination to protect the territory and refusal to announce the decision to abandon the city.<sup>76</sup> The *SCDN* was much more critical of the provincial government than many Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong.<sup>77</sup> In the following weeks, criticism of the existing resistance policy appeared in the *SCDN*

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<sup>75</sup> Report of Fall of Canton by Captain M.F.G. Chauvin, W.A. CO129/571/11 Enclosure., November 14, 1938.

<sup>76</sup> Lin Bosheng commented that “The base of the revolutions, which was renowned for its so-called Guangdong Spirit, has collapsed to this extent. This really causes the Cantonese as well as the Chinese to lose face.” Shiquan 石泉 [Lin Bosheng], “Zhengge junshi waijiao yu Yuesheng kangzhan” 整個軍事外交與粵省抗戰, Editorial, *SCDN*, October 22, 1938. An editor suggested ten accusations against the Canton authorities in an editorial on the next day. Kongzhao 孔昭 (pseud.), “Tianxia jingyou ruci manhan de dangjuzhe!” 天下竟有如此顛覆的當局者!, Editorial, *SCDN*, October 23, 1938.

<sup>77</sup> In fact, some Chinese newspapers tried to moderate the provincial government’s responsibility in the quick loss of Canton. For instance, the *Sing Tao Daily* suggested that the loss of Canton was mainly caused by the lack of mobilization of the general public, but the *SCDN* rebutted this idea by suggesting that mobilization was not meaningful as the Chinese troops had prepared to abandon the territory before the enemy arrived. Jin Zhonghua 金仲華, “Huanan zhanju tuzhuan de jiaoxun” 華南戰局突轉的教訓, Editorial, *Sing Tao Daily*, October 22, 1938; Lao Baixing 老百姓 (pseud.) “Zui zai minzhong?” 『罪在民眾?』, *SCDN*, October 23, 1938.



frequently, something which seldom happened before. The retreat of the Chinese troops from Wuhan on October 25, and a citywide fire of Changsha, which was set by the Chinese garrison in the name of the “scotched-earth policy” in mid-November 1938, further infuriated the *SCDN*.<sup>78</sup> More seriously, the scotched-earth policy, which ruined the lives of civilians but did little harm to the Japanese army, made the *SCDN* doubt whether it was correct to give unconditional support for the existing resistance policy. An editor observed that pro-resistance publicity which should have aimed at bolstering the spirit of the population had already become irresponsible and misleading:

“The War of Resistance is everything”, “All things should be discussed only after the War of Resistance”, they are all the slogans of the skittish people. They have not understood that the War of Resistance itself would not be the objective... [One] should understand that all struggles for a better life are for people to survive, not to perish.<sup>79</sup>

In fact, the change in the tone of the *SCDN* was not only determined by the editors, but also by the top leaders of the Wang Clique, who were at that time particularly pessimistic about the war. Wang and some of his associates were then extremely eager to end the war as soon as possible in order to avoid further human and territorial loss. His eagerness to make peace with the Japanese was clearly shown in an interview with the Reuters on October 21 when he stated that he did not oppose any peace proposal which would not damage the sovereignty of China.<sup>80</sup> Zhou Fohai lamented in his diary on October 29 that “almost all the people [in Chongqing] except the Communists were pro-peace”. He later asked Tao Xisheng and other

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<sup>78</sup> Zhao Yuying 趙毓英, “Jiaotu de yiyi” 焦土的意義, *SCDN*, December 5, 1938.

<sup>79</sup> Liusha, “Kangzhan de yiyi” 抗戰的意義, Editorial, *SCDN*, October 27, 1938.

<sup>80</sup> *SCDN*, October 23, 1938.



publicists in Chongqing not to express any overly optimistic opinions in the propaganda.<sup>81</sup> As Tao was one of the most important writers of the *SCDN*, it was hence very likely that the newspaper received Zhou's instruction through Tao and made the necessary mental and attitudinal readjustments.

### ***The SCDN and the Wang Clique: On the Road to Defection***

Apart from the reorientation of the bearing of the *SCDN*, the Wang Clique took even more substantial steps in response to the worsening situation after the fall of Canton and Wuhan. Wang's associates Mei Siping and Gao Zongwu continued to work towards bringing about an agreement between China and Japan throughout the fourth quarter of 1938, but this time these secret contacts were not authorized by Chiang.<sup>82</sup> After Wuhan was occupied by the Japanese in late October, Mei knew from the Japanese envoys that they were willing to formulate a more lenient policy towards China.<sup>83</sup> Their efforts for a peace settlement were finally materialized in the Jūkōdō (重光堂) Conference in Shanghai on November 13, 1938, followed by an unofficial agreement *Nikka kyōgo kiroku* (Memorandum of the Sino-Japanese Agreement 日華協議記錄) on November 20. The agreement listed some principles of postwar arrangements and provided the foundation for future official peace negotiations. One of the most important requirements of this agreement was that when the Japanese government announced its new policy to welcome peace negotiations with the Chinese government in the unoccupied areas, Wang had to

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<sup>81</sup> Zhou Fohai 周佛海, *Zhou Fohai riji quanbian* 周佛海日記全編, ed. Cai Dejin 蔡德金, vol.1 (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubanshe, 2003), pp.188, 193.

<sup>82</sup> As Gao visited to Japan without Chiang's authorization in July 1938, he was ordered by Chiang to terminate his contact with the Japanese. However, he did not follow Chiang's order and the contacts went on. It is little known whether Wang himself authorized these secret contacts in the period before November 1938. It is however certain that Wang was fully acquainted with the *Nikka kyōgo kiroku* by late November. Bunker, *Peace Conspiracy*, pp.81-86; Zhou, *Zhou Fohai riji quanbian*, vol.1, p.201.

<sup>83</sup> Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, p.191.



leave Chongqing, sever his relationship with Chiang, and led a peace movement.<sup>84</sup>

It was likely that the head of the *SCDN* knew at least a part of the Clique's secret contacts with the Japanese during this period. It is believed that despite his close relationship with Wang, Lin Bosheng did not know details about the Jūkōdō Conference and the *Kiroku*.<sup>85</sup> However, he knew that secret contacts took place between the Wang Clique and the Japanese.<sup>86</sup> He was even instructed to prepare propaganda campaigns in Hong Kong and Shanghai for the future peace movement. It was reported in early December that Lin returned to Shanghai to contact local pro-Japanese political agents and buy two news agencies at the price C\$4,000 for forthcoming propaganda activities of the peace movement.<sup>87</sup> It might hence be perceivable that the *SCDN* would have followed Wang's pro-peace attitude, even without a clear understanding of the secret contacts between the Wang Clique and the Japanese, and would have adopted a more critical position on resistance.

It was, however, not the case. Although the *SCDN* adopted a more critical viewpoint against the resistance policy after the fall of Canton, the newspaper showed no support for direct peace negotiation between China and Japan before

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<sup>84</sup> The *Kiroku* stipulated that China was to cooperate with the Japanese to fight against the Communists, recognize Manchukuo, and in return the Japanese would consider abolishing its extraterritorial rights in China, and start to withdraw its army from China when peace was restored. Ma Zhengdu 馬振犢 and Zhao Yueqin 趙月琴, *Wangwei zhengquan* 汪偽政權 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), pp.643-649. Although the *Kiroku* was regarded by the representatives as a peace agreement between China and Japan, this agreement was not officially recognized by the two governments. Chiang never authorized Gao's secret contacts after July 1938, while the Japanese government only resolved upon a new China policy based on *Nisshi shin kankei chōsei hōshin* (日支新關係調整方針), the terms of which were similar to but not the same as the *Kiroku*.

<sup>85</sup> Nanjing Dang'anguan, ed., *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu*, vol. 1, p.578.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p.510.

<sup>87</sup> The two news agencies were Huadong News Agency (Huadong tongxunshe 華東中華電影股份有限公司章程通訊社) and Xinsheng News Agency (Xinsheng tongxunshe 新聲通訊社). Police Report, SMP, D-8939, December 10, 1938.





Wang defected from Chongqing and made his peace statement in Hanoi in late December 1938. While the confidential contacts were taking place and making progress throughout this period, the *SCDN* avoided any reference to direct peace talks with Japan as a solution to the current difficulties of China. When Wang's pro-peace attitude shown in the interview by the Reuters in mid-October led to attacks from other newspapers with an allegation that Wang was willing to surrender to the enemy,<sup>88</sup> Lin Bosheng defended Wang's opinion by referring to it as reassertion of the existing government policy which tried to achieve the peace through mediation by foreign powers, but not through direct peace talks with Japan.<sup>89</sup> Lin did not dismiss the possibility to engage in peace negotiations with the Japanese, but he insisted that these had to be conducted in front of foreign powers, the public and the world, and opposed any clandestine agreement with foreign powers to settle the current problems.<sup>90</sup> Such an opinion was obviously contrary to what the secret envoys of the Clique were pursuing at the same time.

The attitudes of the *SCDN* did not change even when the terms of the *Kiroku* were gradually realized in December 1938. Wang secretly departed from Chongqing, as the *Kiroku* stipulated, with his several closest associates on December 17, and arrived in Hanoi two days later.<sup>91</sup> Prince Konoye, the Japanese Prime Minister, also made a statement on December 22 for the reorientation of Japan's China policy to a

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<sup>88</sup> Feng Lieshan 馮列山, "Cike shi tan heping de shihou?" 此刻是談和平的時候?, Editorial, *Sing Tao Daily*, October 23, 1938.

<sup>89</sup> Shiquan, "Zailun kangzhan jianguo de waijiao fangzhen" 再論抗戰建國的外交方針, Editorial, *SCDN*, October 24.

<sup>90</sup> Shiquan, "Sanlun kangzhan jianguo waijiao fangzhen" 三論抗戰建國外交方針, Editorial, *SCDN*, October 25, 1938.

<sup>91</sup> They included Madame Wang, Zeng Zhongming and his wife, Zhou Fohai, and Tao Xisheng.





more lenient one.<sup>92</sup> In the ten days between Wang's clandestine arrival in Hanoi and his declaration for peace, the *SCDN* still adhered to the resistance policy. The newspaper reported Konoye's statement with disdain and described its content as "utterly bumptious" (措詞狂妄絕倫). It also announced that it would publish Chiang's speech to counter-attack Konoye's statement in a few days.<sup>93</sup> While there was widespread speculation in the press of Hong Kong and Shanghai over Wang's actual whereabouts,<sup>94</sup> the *SCDN* remained silent, and acted contrary to the forthcoming Wang's peace announcement by publishing on December 26 a commentary which highlighted the importance of diplomacy with Britain and the United States in checking the Japanese invasion.<sup>95</sup>

There were two possible reasons for the inconsistency between the stances of the *SCDN* and that of the Wang Clique towards the secret diplomacy. First, the contacts and the agreement between the Wang Clique and the Japanese were highly secret and any leakage of information about this plot might lead to disastrous effects on the Wang Clique. On the one hand, the peace agreement in the Jūkōdō was never authorized nor recognized by Chiang. Chiang would have forestalled Wang's defection if he had known about such a plan in order to avoid a split within the Party. The apprehension of Wang and his henchmen about Chiang's possible suppression was shown in their decision to delay the scheduled departure on December 6 when

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<sup>92</sup> The new policies included *zenrin yūkō* (善隣友好), which required China to recognize Manchukuo and cooperate with the Japanese, *kyōdō bōkyō* (共同防共), which required China to form an anti-Communist pact with Japan, and *keizai teikei* (經濟提携), which required China to provide all necessary convenience to the Japanese economic activities in China. South China Daily News, ed., *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zhongyao jianyi* 汪精衛先生重要建議 (Hong Kong: South China Daily News, 1939), pp.83-85.

<sup>93</sup> *SCDN*, December 23, 1938, December 28, 1938.

<sup>94</sup> *North China Daily News*, December 24, 1938; *Sing Tao Daily*, December 24, 1938.

<sup>95</sup> Shen Juchen 沈巨塵, "Jiajin dui yingmei waijiao" 加緊對英美外交, *SCDN*, December 26, 1938.



Chiang returned to Chongqing suddenly in the first week of December.<sup>96</sup> On the other hand, the widespread repercussions shown in the press after Wang talked about the possibility of peace with Japan in the conversation with Reuters in mid-October showed that there was public disagreement to negotiating peace with Japan. If the public knew of Wang's peace proposal in advance, the Clique would face even greater public opposition which would abort the plan. It was hence not wise for the *SCDN* to give any premature hint about the plan.

Second, there were hesitation and uncertainties within the Wang Clique to act in accordance to the agreement, so the safest way for the *SCDN* was to continue with its existing stance so that it would not be in an embarrassing situation if there was any change in the situation which made the implementation of the agreement impossible. Wang showed hesitation after he was informed of the terms of the *Kiroku*, and on a few occasions was about to abandon the plan to leave Chongqing. Zhou, who was much keener to see the implementation of the peace agreements, criticized Wang privately as an indecisive man with ever-changing minds.<sup>97</sup> There was also disagreement among Wang's close associates over whether Wang should sever the Wang-Chiang relationship and lead an uncertain peace movement. Chen Gongbo, who finally joined the Clique to defect and later became one of the top officials of the Wang government in Nanjing, took strong exception to Wang's defection and the subsequent split of the Party when he knew about Wang's plan in late November.<sup>98</sup> Even when Zhou, Chen and Tao brought the manuscript of Wang's peace statement

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<sup>96</sup> The Wang Clique finally discovered that Chiang came to Chongqing only for other reasons, and hence continued its plan to leave Chongqing. *Gendaishi shiryō* 現代史資料, vol.9 (Tokyo: Misuzu, 1964), pp.624-625.

<sup>97</sup> Zhou, *Zhou Fohai riji quanbian*, vol.1., pp.201-202.

<sup>98</sup> Chen, "Banian lai zhi huiyi", in *Ku xiao lu*, vol.2, pp.412-413.



from Hanoi to Hong Kong and were ready to publish it in the *SCDN*, Gu Mengyu, another Wang's close associate, still expressed his strong dissent and asked Lin to halt the publication of the statement. The dissuasion within the Wang Clique also created so much uncertainty to the announcement of Wang's advocacy of peace that the *SCDN* was not in a position to express any premature advocacy of peace with Japan.

## Conclusion

The experiences of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* in the first year of the Sino-Japanese War were in many ways similar to the other newspapers in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The outbreak of a full-scale war with Japan created an extensive consensus in the Chinese press throughout the country to support the resistance policy. The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* joined the resistance camp and helped to promote the ideas of resistance to the public. The *CCDN*, like many mainstream newspapers in Shanghai, faced the Japanese intervention because of its anti-Japanese attitude and was forced to suspend publication soon after the fall of the Chinese territories in Shanghai. Hong Kong then quickly became an alternative place for the Wang Clique to continue their publications. In spite of its difficult financial position, the *SCDN* managed to substitute the *CCDN* in Shanghai and became the main organ of the Wang Clique.

However, the support of the *SCDN* for resistance was weakened as there was no sign of Chinese victory after a year of fighting. The incompetence of the local authorities was well demonstrated by the quick loss of Canton, and by the attempt of the Wang Clique to seek an alternative method to solve the Sino-Japanese War. The *SCDN* started to show its doubts about resistance and challenged the existing policies



of the Chinese government. However, it was not until Wang's defection from Chongqing and the announcement of his peace statement in late December 1938 that the newspaper utterly changed its attitude towards the Sino-Japanese War.

## Chapter 4

### **Promoting Peace: The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* in the Wang Jingwei Clique's Peace Movement**

#### **Introduction**

Wang's defection from Chongqing and the publication of his peace statement, commonly known as *Yandian*(艷電), to Chongqing in the *SCDN* on December 31, 1938 shocked both the Chongqing government and the Chinese population in the unoccupied areas. His proposal immediately led to widespread condemnation in Hong Kong, Shanghai and other unoccupied areas in China. The *SCDN*, the only organ of the Wang Clique, played an important role at that time in providing a channel for Wang to explain his peace proposal, elaborating Wang's views through its editorials and commentaries, and defending the Clique's standpoints in face of the huge verbal and physical attacks.

As the Clique soon found that Chongqing was not going to accept Wang's peace proposal, and that the Clique was not able to acquire significant support from politicians and commoners in the unoccupied areas, it proceeded with its peace movement in the occupied areas. The Wang Clique returned to Shanghai in May 1939 and started to develop its own strength under Japanese sponsorship. One of the most important tasks was to rebuild their propaganda base in Shanghai in order to articulate their concepts of Sino-Japanese peace and amity and convince the Chinese population in Shanghai and the occupied areas in Central China of the necessity of Wang's peace movement to save them from the war. The *CCDN* was soon resumed



to become the flagship of the propaganda machinery of the Wang Clique. While the Clique succeeded in exploiting the complex political environment in Shanghai to conduct their propaganda work more freely than in other parts in China, it had to face much fiercer rivalry and terrorist attacks from the pro-resistance press and the agents sent by the Chongqing government. This chapter will discuss how the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* struggled to survive in these two cities in the early period of the Clique's peace movement.

## **The *SCDN*: A Solitary Defender of the Early Peace Movement**

### ***Yandian and Public Responses***

Wang's intention for his secret departure from Chongqing became clearer to the Chongqing leaders when Chiang Kai-shek received reports from Long Yun (龍雲), a military leader who received Wang in Kunming when Wang was on his journey to Hanoi via Kunming.<sup>1</sup> But Wang did not formally reveal his pro-peace stance until he sent a telegram to Chiang on December 29, 1938, stating that Chiang should consider to "share sincerity [with Japan] for the restoration of peace" on the basis of Konoye's statement issued on December 22.<sup>2</sup> Wang asserted in the telegram that the Japanese government had officially declared no territorial or financial demand on China, and that it promised the respect for the full sovereignty of China. Faced with Japanese sincerity as shown in Konoye's statement on the one hand, and the prolonged wartime destruction in China on the other hand, Wang commented in the peace telegram:

The War of Resistance, which has lasted for more than one year, has already injured the

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<sup>1</sup> Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol.6, pt.3, p.47.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was also known as *Yandian*, which meant "the telegram of the twenty-ninth day".



country deeply. If [we] can still end the war by the righteous peace, [we] will be able to keep the survival and independence of the nation, and [we will] achieve our objectives of resistance.<sup>3</sup>

Wang did not provide substantial suggestions in the telegram on how to realize the “righteous peace”. He only laid down some broad principles that Japan should order a “general and fast” withdrawal of troops from Chinese territories other than the anti-Communist areas in Inner Mongolia, and that China and Japan should promote long-term Sino-Japanese amity.<sup>4</sup> Although Wang did not proclaim severance from Chiang in the telegram as stipulated in the *Kiroku*, this telegram represented his formal opposition to the resistance policy of the Chongqing government.

Wang’s defection embarrassed the Chongqing government, but what irritated the Chongqing government further was the publication of *Yandian* in the *SCDN* on December 31. At the same time, Lin Bosheng and Mei Siping sent the text of *Yandian* to Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong and the official Central News Agency (中央通訊社).<sup>5</sup> Newspapers in the unoccupied areas also received the text soon through the network of the Central News Agency. The release of *Yandian* shocked the populations in Hong Kong and the unoccupied areas, and led to heavy criticism against Wang from the newspapers. The *Sing Tao Daily* was among the first newspapers which attacked Wang’s peace proposal. Jin Zhonghua (金仲華), the editor-in-chief of that newspaper, criticized Wang’s peace statement as a “conspiracy with an evil intention”.<sup>6</sup> Jin was stunned by Wang’s acceptance of Konoye’s

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<sup>3</sup> “Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol.6, pt.3, p.53.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.54. In fact, this principle was in accordance with the *Kiroku*, including the term which Japan would withdraw its troops after the “Sino-Japanese peace is restored”. Ma and Zhao, eds., *Wang wei zhengquan*, p.643.

<sup>5</sup> *Sing Tao Daily*, December 31, 1938.

<sup>6</sup> Jin Zhonghua, “Wang Jingwei de zhen mianmu” 汪精衛的真面目, Editorial, *Sing Tao Daily*, December 31,



statement, which was, in Jin's view, never a sign of genuine sincerity of the Japanese:

It is the enemy's untrustworthy trick to say that it has "neither territorial nor economic demand". Even a small child understands this trick. It is very surprising that in Wang's eyes [this trick] becomes a conciliatory move of the aggressor.<sup>7</sup>

As Wang was a top official of the government and the GMD, his defection and his peace statement would most likely have a demoralizing effect on the population. The GMD responded promptly by denouncing Wang's peace proposal as a treacherous behaviour and expelling Wang from the Party.<sup>8</sup> This led to an eruption of anti-Wang antagonism in the unoccupied areas. Different associations sent telegrams to Chongqing to declare their allegiance to the central government, and organized gatherings to denounce Wang's defection.<sup>9</sup> Chinese newspapers in the unoccupied areas were also active in condemning Wang.<sup>10</sup>

In Hong Kong, the antipathy of the Chinese newspapers against Wang was also intensified by the decision of the GMD to expel Wang from the Party. Almost all the local newspapers except the *SCDN* supported the official declaration of the GMD and regarded Wang's peace proposal as surrender to the enemy. Even the commercial

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid. The character "X" should be understood as "敵" (an enemy). This character was usually censored by the colonial government in order to avoid embarrassing Japan.

<sup>8</sup> *Central Daily News*, January 2, 1939.

<sup>9</sup> For example, over fifty trade unions in Hong Kong sent a joint telegram to Chongqing to support the resistance policy. *Sing Tao Daily*, January 4, 1939. In Chongqing, the All-China Literary Circles Resistance Against the Enemy Association organized an extraordinary meeting to denounce Wang's defection. *Central Daily News*, January 5, 1939.

<sup>10</sup> For instance, the *Central Daily News* in Chongqing followed the official announcement to condemn Wang in its editorial. "Biaozhang zhongyi chengchu jiangui" 表彰忠義懲處奸宄, Editorial, *Central Daily News*, January 3, 1939. *Shun Pao*, which resumed publication in the International Settlement of Shanghai in October 1938, also described Wang as one who "takes a rascal as one's benefactor" and "loses all balance of judgment," "Tao Wang Jingwei" 討汪精衛, Editorial, *Shun Pao* (Shanghai), January 3, 1939.





newspapers which had less political colour, such as *Wah Kiu Yat Pao*, condemned Wang as an “unscrupulous traitor”:

[Wang Jingwei] is now willing to be a traitor. He not only opposes the Communists and Chiang, but also endangers the Party and the nation. While the nation is struggling for the War of Resistance, he works for his unscrupulous conspiracy and shows his eagerness to be a puppet of the enemy. His sin is only second to that of Qin Kuai [秦檜 an ancient Chinese traitor].<sup>11</sup>

The Chinese journalists in Hong Kong also showed an uncommon unity in their anti-Wang attitude. The Hong Kong Association of Chinese Journalists (Xianggang Zhongguo xinwen jizhe gonghui 香港中國新聞記者公會) declared on January 4 to support the resistance policy and denounce Wang for his surrender to the enemy.<sup>12</sup> Within a few days, Wang and his associates were under fierce condemnation throughout the country.

### ***The SCDN under Fierce Antagonism: Justification and Responses***

The Wang Clique had already foreseen that the public was not ready to accept its peace proposal and that there would be widespread criticism against Wang.<sup>13</sup> At this critical period, the strategic value of the *SCDN* became particularly important. The Wang Clique hoped to convince the leaders in Chongqing and the population in unoccupied areas to agree to Wang’s peace overture. Almost all the newspapers were, however, so anti-Wang that they were not willing to provide a channel for the Clique to explain its political ideas. The *SCDN*, which was directly controlled by the Clique, hence became the only reliable medium through which the Clique could defend its

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<sup>11</sup> “Ai Wang Zhaoming” 哀汪兆銘, Editorial, *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, January 4, 1939.

<sup>12</sup> *Sing Tao Daily*, January 4, 1939.

<sup>13</sup> Zhou Fohai, for example, commented in his diary that he was not surprised at the comments appeared on the newspapers after the release of *Yandian*. Zhou, *Zhou Fohai riji quanbian*, vol.1, p.217.



peace proposal. In the following months, Wang himself remained discreet in Hanoi and did not elaborate his peace idea much. Instead, this task was taken up by the editors of the *SCDN*, including Lin Bosheng, Tao Xisheng, Hu Lancheng, and Gu Yongjin (古泳今).<sup>14</sup> The newspaper abandoned its previous pro-resistance attitude and turned to support Wang's peace proposal. In the first editorial of the *SCDN* after the release of *Yandian*, Lin Bosheng described Wang's peace proposal as "what the Chinese hope to articulate but have not articulated."<sup>15</sup> The *SCDN* editors tried to elaborate and justify Wang's peace ideas, and turned the paper into the frontline of the debate about the choice between peace and resistance.

One of the editors' fundamental justifications of peace was that resistance was no longer a way to preserve the sovereignty and independence of the nation. The editors did not oppose resistance as a means to achieve victory, but they pointed out that China had no substantial means to win over Japan in this war. Faced with the deadlock of the Sino-Japanese conflicts at that time, Lin commented:

Of course we subjectively hope that the war can let us have greater bargaining power and better timing for peace, but we should never ignore the existing objective situation. The indecision between war and peace, and between offensive and defence, will definitely ruin the whole nation and make the population suffer enormously.<sup>16</sup>

The *SCDN* editors stated that both war and peace were means to achieve the national sovereignty and independence. It would be the best phenomenon if the nation could resist foreign invasion and protect its own population by military forces,

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<sup>14</sup> Telegram dated the 14.2.39 from Hon (侃) to Director Shing, CO129/579/11 Pt.2.

<sup>15</sup> Lin Bosheng, "Wang xiansheng de zhongyao jianyi" 汪先生的重要建議, Editorial, *SCDN*, December 31, 1938.

<sup>16</sup> Lin Bosheng, "Women de lichang" 我們的立場, Editorial, *SCDN*, January 5, 1939.



but the loss of the vast territories in China during the past months of fighting proved that China was never militarily strong enough to resist the Japanese advance.<sup>17</sup> Casualties and destruction brought by resistance at that time did little to improve the military condition but drained the national strength further.

While the *SCDN* editors asserted that China failed to defend its independence and sovereignty by resistance with its own military strength, they also opposed the idea, which was commonly held, that the foreign powers would help China to win over the Japanese. There was a widespread belief that China could easily win the sympathy of the international community on the Sino-Japanese question. The League of Nations, for example, declared its sympathy for China and asked its member-states to assist China to resist the Japanese invasion. Britain and other Western powers, which wanted to preserve their existing interests in China, were also likely to stand on the Chinese side in the Sino-Japanese War. In fact, even the *SCDN* shared this opinion with the Chinese population before Wang's defection.<sup>18</sup> The *SCDN* editors, however, came to an opposite conclusion with regard to international assistance to China after they turned to support Wang's peace statement. They became pessimistic and argued that the Western powers would allow neither China nor Japan to get decisive victory in the war in order to maintain the Westerners' predominance in the Pacific. The powers would therefore restrain themselves from providing substantial assistance to enable China to triumph over Japan. The expectation of external assistance to win the war was, as a result, not realistic.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Changuan 沉觀 (pesud.), "Jieshu Zhongri zhanzheng yu changshi" 結束中日戰爭與常識, in South China Daily News, ed., *Xu hanzhan wenti zhi taolun* 續和戰問題之討論 (Hong Kong: South China Daily News, 1939), p.41.

<sup>18</sup> Shen Juchen, "Jiajin dui Yingmei waijiao", Editorial, *SCDN*, December 26, 1938.

<sup>19</sup> Liusha, "He yu zhan" 和與戰, Editorial, *SCDN*, January 4, 1939.



More seriously, what the editors worried most about international assistance was that the Communists outside China would exploit the relationship with their counterparts in China to turn the nation into an arena of international conflicts. The editors asserted that the CCP was the extension of the Comintern in China. They believed that the Communists' cooperation with the GMD was not intended to save China from Japanese invasion, but to work for the Comintern to transform China into a battlefield of international conflicts between Communist and anti-Communist blocs. The Comintern conspired to utilize China's strength to exhaust Japan, which had signed the anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and then Italy since 1936, so that Japan would be unable to destroy the Communist influence in East Asia.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, while the Comintern benefited from the Sino-Japanese conflicts without using its own power, China drained all its resources for the war of attrition and made itself more vulnerable to a communist revolution. As one of the *SCDN* editors stated:

We should know that the Comintern consistently advocated wars and counteracted peace. In Spain, [they] advocated the so-called anti-Fascist Civil War, [but they] shirked their responsibility and stood aloof, and the result was the collapse of the Republican government. In China, [they] advocated uncompromising resistance against the Japanese in order to weaken the strength of the GMD and develop the Communists' power... The longer the war lasted, the weaker the GMD, and the stronger the Communists would become; the more miserable people would be, and the more opportunities the Communists would seize [to topple the government].<sup>21</sup>

On the other hand, the editors were quite satisfied with China's own achievement so far in resistance. They believed that resistance in the previous months had already demonstrated China's power to resist invasion, and it was time

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<sup>20</sup> Liusha, "Yige zongjiantao" 一個總檢討, Editorial, *SCDN*, January 14, 1939.

<sup>21</sup> Zhiyu 止愚 (pseud.), "Fangong yu heping" 反共與和平, Editorial, *SCDN*, March 2, 1939.



that China should divert this power to develop the country.<sup>22</sup> At the same time, the Sino-Japanese conflicts also altered the diplomatic relationship among the powers in the Pacific. The editors asserted that both the United States and Japan hoped to supersede British supremacy in the Pacific. Although China could not resist to the dominance of any power in the region, it was still able to exert certain influence on this competition. As Japan wanted to make peace with China in order to increase its own power to counter the American challenge, China should “be smarter” and consider carefully how to seize this opportunity to maximize its benefit.<sup>23</sup>

In order to alleviate the public perception that Wang’s peace proposal was an overt challenge to the party leadership, the *SCDN* was at first not hostile to Chiang or the Chongqing government. Lin emphasized in the first *SCDN* editorial after *Yandian* that Wang’s peace telegram was only a “suggestion”, and that the publication of the peace telegram only aimed to “let the population have a chance to discuss national policies”.<sup>24</sup> He also argued that the opinion made in *Yandian* was totally in compliance with the existing policy, declared in the Extraordinary Party Congress of April 1938, which the Chinese government would continue to seek “righteous peace” with Japan.<sup>25</sup>

Even after a firm rejection of the Chongqing government to Wang’s proposal, the *SCDN* still showed a gentle attitude towards the Chongqing government in the following weeks. The editors explained that Wang had no intention to seize the

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<sup>22</sup> Lin Bosheng, “Women de lichang”, Editorial, *SCDN*, January 5, 1939.

<sup>23</sup> Liusha, “Heyi de shiji yu heyi de yunyong” 和議的時機與和議的運用, Editorial, *SCDN*, March 3, 1939.

<sup>24</sup> Lin Bosheng, “Wang xiansheng zhi zhongyao jianyi”, Editorial, *SCDN*, December 31, 1938.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.; “Zhongguo Guomindang linshi quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan”, in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 4, pt. 1, p.54.



authority of the Chongqing government to initiate peace talks. They believed that both resistance and peace should be carried out by the central government, rather than by any individual.<sup>26</sup> The editors also avoided to put the blame for the continuance of resistance on the GMD. Instead, they maintained that the Communists were the prime enemy of the nation and urged the GMD to suppress the Communists before it could not control them.<sup>27</sup>

However, the mild attitude of the *SCDN* did not secure toleration of the Chongqing government. While the newspapers in the unoccupied areas continued to condemn the Wang Clique and the *SCDN*, the Chongqing government soon decided to suppress the defectors and their propaganda with more substantial actions. On January 17, 1939, Lin Bosheng was attacked in Hong Kong by a man called Chan Shek Lam (陳錫林) when he was walking back to his *SCDN* office in Central district. Lin's head, particularly his right eye, was seriously wounded.<sup>28</sup> He had to retire from political activities in the following three months. It was believed that this attack was organized by the Chongqing agents who were instructed to punish Lin's pro-Wang opinion in his *SCDN*.<sup>29</sup>

The turning point in the attitude of the Wang Clique and the *SCDN* towards the Chongqing government was the Hanoi Incident in late March 1939. On March 21,

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<sup>26</sup> Peixian 佩弦 (psued.), “‘Dawen’ de jidian jieshi” 「答問」的幾點解釋, Editorial, *SCDN*, January 31, 1939.

<sup>27</sup> Liusha, “Guomindang qiewu zibaoziqi” 國民黨切勿自暴自棄, Editorial, *SCDN*, February 23, 1939.

<sup>28</sup> Chief Justices' Notes heard in Criminal Jurisdiction Cases, HKPRO, HKRS107-1-9-15, pp.239-240.

<sup>29</sup> Xie Yongguang 謝永光, *Xianggang kangri fengyun lu* 香港抗日風雲錄 (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu, 1995), pp.147-148; Huang and Zhang, eds., *Wang Jingwei jituan toudi*, pp.434-436. It was also reported in a Chongqing intelligence report that Lin's attack was managed by Cai Jingjun (蔡勁軍), the ex-Commissioner of the Public Safety Bureau, Shanghai. Report of Sub. Inspector Ellis, CO129/579/11 Pt.2, October 20, 1939. Chan did not disclose the intention of his attack or information about the person who instructed him. He was sentenced to fifteen-year imprisonment, but he was killed in prison soon afterwards. *SCDN*, October 25, 1939.



agents under the command of Dai Li (戴笠), the head of the special service corps of the Chongqing government, broke in Wang's residence in Hanoi and tried to assassinate Wang.<sup>30</sup> The assailants, however, wrongly killed Zeng Zhongming, the personal secretary to Wang and the Director-General of the *SCDN*. The Clique was angered by Chongqing's attempt on Wang's life. The *SCDN* responded immediately by declaring that the Chongqing government should bear full responsibility for this assassination.<sup>31</sup> The editors even implied that the Clique would no longer wait for the Chongqing government to agree to its peace proposal. Instead, the Clique would take its own initiative to carry out the peace movement.<sup>32</sup>

The Hanoi Incident also intensified indirectly the disputes between the *SCDN* and the other pro-resistance Chinese newspapers. In order to retaliate against the Chongqing government, Wang abandoned discretion which he had held in the previous months and released another shocking article "Give an Example" ("Ju yige li" 舉一個例) on the *SCDN* exclusively on April 1.<sup>33</sup> He disclosed in this article the secret minutes of a meeting of the Supreme Defence Council in December 1937, which recorded that Chiang approved the continuance of German mediation between China and Japan. Wang hoped to use this document to illustrate that his peace proposal was not as unacceptable as what the party leaders in Chongqing claimed to be because Chiang himself had been willing to accept the harsher terms

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<sup>30</sup> Chen Gongshu 陳恭澍, *Henei Wang an shimo* 河內汪案始末 (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1983), p.193.

<sup>31</sup> Liusha, "Wei Henei zhengzhi ansha shijian zhaogao Zhongwai" 為河內政治暗殺事件昭告中外, Editorial, *SCDN*, March 26, 1939.

<sup>32</sup> Wenxi 溫犀 (pesud.), "Zailun Henei ansha shijian" 再論河內暗殺事件, Editorial, *SCDN*, March 28, 1939.

<sup>33</sup> The article dated March 27, and was released in the *SCDN* on April 1. Wang Jingwei, "Ju yige li" 舉一個例, *SCDN*, April 1, 1939. The Chongqing government succeeded in asking other Chinese newspapers not to publish this article. Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol.6, pt.3, p.78.



suggested by the German mediators a year earlier than those declared in Konoye's statement.<sup>34</sup>

Wang's article renewed the debate between the *SCDN* and other Chinese newspapers. One of the most satirical criticisms appeared in the newspapers came from Wu Zhihui (吳稚暉), a senior GMD politician in Chongqing. He wrote an essay "A Further Explanation to Wang Jingwei's 'Give an Example'" ("Dui Wang Jingwei 'Ju yige li' de jinyijie" 對汪精衛「舉一個例」的進一解). In this essay, which was distributed to major pro-resistance newspapers in Hong Kong and unoccupied China, Wu used ironic expressions to condemn Wang's disclosure of a secret document as criminal offence. He stated that Wang's aims to publish that document were "to publicize [Wang's] personal peace negotiation, to provoke internal instability, to conspire to sell-out the country, to provide benefit to the enemy, and to satisfy personal interests."<sup>35</sup> At this time, the *SCDN* again functioned as the defender of the Wang Clique and rebutted Wu's attack, but this time its counter-attack became more sentimental and personal. In response to Wu's satirical views, Hu Lancheng described Wu as a "joker" who aimed to dishonour Wang's advocacy of peace and distract the public from understanding the necessity of peace.<sup>36</sup> Wu, according to Hu's view, was an old man who prohibited others hysterically from discussing any peace suggestion.<sup>37</sup> This dispute showed that the conflicts between *SCDN* and the pro-resistance became increasingly acute and irreconcilable.

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<sup>34</sup> Wang Jingwei, "Ju yige li" 舉一個例, *SCDN*, April 1, 1939.

<sup>35</sup> Wu Jingheng 吳敬恒 [Wu Zhihui], "Dui Wang Jingwei 'Ju yige li' de jin yi jie" 對汪精衛「舉一個例」的進一解, *Central Daily News*, April 12, 1939.

<sup>36</sup> Liusha, "Chi Wu Zhihui" 斥吳稚暉, Editorial, *SCDN*, April 12, 1939.

<sup>37</sup> Liusha, "Zai chi Wu Zhihui" 再斥吳稚暉, Editorial, *SCDN*, April 13, 1939.





### ***The SCDN, Rivals' Sabotage and Attitudes of the Colonial Government***

Throughout the period between Wang's defection from Chongqing in late December 1938 and the establishment of the Wang government in March 1940, the tension between the pro-Wang and the pro-Chongqing circles in the press of Hong Kong remained serious. On the one hand, the Wang Clique tried to expand its influence on the press of Hong Kong by subsidizing several small-scale newspapers. By the end of the year 1939, three more newspapers in Hong Kong joined the Wang Clique and conducted pro-Wang propaganda. They were *Tianyan ribao* (the *Evolution Daily* 天演日報), which was established by Li Zhongyou (李仲猷) in 1936 and joined the Clique soon after the peace movement began in early 1939, *Ziyou ribao* (the *Liberty Daily* 自由日報), which was founded by Yang Xichuan (楊昔川) in June 1939 and received funding from the Wang Clique from the onset, and *Xin wan bao* (the *New Evening News* 新晚報), another newspaper run by Li Zhongyou from December 1939.<sup>38</sup> The Wang Clique provided monthly subsidies of HK\$13,300 to the four pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong.<sup>39</sup> Apart from the SCDN, which had been an organ of the Wang Clique from the onset and received the largest share of subsidy of HK\$8,000, *Tianyan ribao*, *Ziyou ribao*, and *Xin wan bao* collected HK\$2,500, HK\$800 and HK\$2,000 each month from the Wang Clique respectively.<sup>40</sup>

On the other hand, the agencies of the Chongqing government in Hong Kong

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<sup>38</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi 中央宣傳部秘書室, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* 中國國民黨中央執行委員會宣傳部工作報告, xiabian 下篇 (Nanjing: Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, 1940), p.130.

<sup>39</sup> Telegram from Lim Bosheng to Pan Sai Wing, SHAC, 2040/36, May 17, 1940.

<sup>40</sup> Letter from Li Zhongyou to Lin Bosheng, SHAC, 2040/36, May 7, 1940; Letter from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2040/2148, January 22, 1941. It was believed that the subsidies in this period came from the C\$3 million of monthly grant provided by the Kōain (興亞院) since April 1939. Bunker, *Peace Conspiracy*, p.136.



continued to use different methods to disrupt the influence of the *SCDN* and other pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong. The local branch of the Central News Agency was instructed in February 1939 to assist Yu Hongjun (俞鴻鈞), a director of the Hong Kong office of the Central Trust, to “get in touch with the newspaper circle” and “carry out extensive propaganda campaigns to reveal the secret plot of Wang”.<sup>41</sup> In fact, the *SCDN* did not publish any news report provided by the Central News Agency from April 30. It was very likely that the Central News Agency refused to provide news reports to the *SCDN* in order to minimize the availability of news reports to the pro-Wang newspapers.

Besides, the Chongqing government tried to weaken the influence of the *SCDN* in Hong Kong by underground activities. This work was mainly supervised by Wu Tiecheng (吳鐵城), the Chairman of Guangdong province and a representative of the Chongqing government in Hong Kong. One of Wu’s assignments in Hong Kong was “to frustrate the enemy’s sinister plot in buying the editors of newspapers and check their progress”.<sup>42</sup> As the Chongqing agents had already received some reports, though not necessarily verified by sufficient evidence, that some local newspapers like *Tsun Wan Yat Po* and *Wah Kiu Yat Po* were bribed by the Wang Clique not to publish anti-Wang articles, Wu tried to maintain their allegiance to Chongqing with subsidies.<sup>43</sup> It was reported that each pro-Chongqing newspaper could collect a huge monthly subsidy of HK\$15,000, which was much greater than what the Wang Clique was able to provide.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Telegram dated 12.2.39 from Hon 侃 (David Kung) to Director Shing 盛, CO129/579/11 Pt.2.

<sup>42</sup> “Activities of General Wu Te-chen in Hong Kong”, Letter from G.A.S. Northcote to Malcolm MacDonald, CO129/580/3, October 26, 1939, Enclosure 3.

<sup>43</sup> Report No.1860 by 756 dated 4.3.39. CO129/579/11 Pt.2.

<sup>44</sup> Report No.1896 by 756 dated 14.5.39. CO129/579/11 Pt.2.



Wu Tiecheng even succeeded in organizing sabotage within the *SCDN* to paralyze its publication. From April 1939, his special service team infiltrated into the printing crews of the *SCDN* as well as two other pro-Wang newspapers through a worker Ma Chaofan (馬超凡).<sup>45</sup> Ma persuaded eighty-two compositors and pressmen of these three papers to walk out suddenly on August 13, the second anniversary of the outbreak of the Battle of Shanghai. The strike was accompanied by a boycott of newspaper vendors against the sale of the *SCDN* on the same day.<sup>46</sup> While the strike was instigated by the Chongqing agents, this sabotage soon turned to possess a strong pro-Communist colour when the strikers formed the Service Group of the *SCDN*, *Tianyan* and *Ziyou* “August 13” Workers in Hong Kong (Qiao Gang Nanhua Tianyan Ziyou bao “Bayisan” gongyou fuwutuan 僑港南華天演自由報「八一三」工友服務團) in Hong Kong under the guidance of the Hong Kong Printing Industry Workers’ Union (香港印刷業工會) and received financial supports from pro-Communist circles in Chongqing.<sup>47</sup> On October 29, the group proclaimed a plan to return to the unoccupied areas to continue anti-Wang publicity activities, and attempted to carry out this plan in the following months.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Xie, *Xianggang kangri fengyun lu*, pp.145-146. Besides the crew of the *SCDN*, the compositors of *Tianyan ribao* and *Ziyou ribao* were also the targets of the Chongqing agents. But as these two newspapers operated on a small scale, it is believed that they did not maintain their own printing shops and hence did not have a large printing team. It was hence likely that most of the printing crews mentioned here belonged to the *SCDN*.

<sup>46</sup> Translation of Extract from File No. 67, August 17, 1939, CO129/579/11 Pt.2.

<sup>47</sup> Ye Yubing 葉裕彬, et al., *Xianggang yinshuaye de fazhan licheng he xianzhuang* 香港印刷業的發展歷程和現狀 (Beijing: Yinshua gongye chubanshe, 1997), p.92. *Xinhua ribao*, a pro-Communist newspaper in Chongqing, forwarded a donation of C\$3300 to the Service Group in Hong Kong on October 24, 1939. These included C\$350 of donations made by Mao Zedong and other six Communist leaders. *Xinhua ribao*, October 26, 1939.

<sup>48</sup> Twenty-one members of the Service Group began its journey from Hong Kong to Chongqing in late December 1939. They managed to carry out some publicity activities in South China on its way to Chongqing. “Fang Wang gongyou huiguo fuwutuan dongtai” 反汪工友回國服務團動態, in Cai Long 蔡龍 and Guo Liang 郭梁, eds., *Huaqiao kangri jiuguo shiliao xuanji* 華僑抗日救國史料選輯 (Fuzhou: Zhonggong fujian shengwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, 1987), pp.276-278. But when the Service Group arrived at Chongqing in April 1940, the Chongqing government was apathetic to the Service Group, probably because of its pro-Communist colour. Finally the government ordered dissolution of the group on May 3. The members of the group had to return to Guangdong province afterwards. Letter from the Service Group of the *SCDN*, *Tianyan* and *Ziyou* “August 13” Workers in Hong Kong to Overseas Chinese Commission, SHAC, 22(2)/69, May 4, 1940.



The immediate effect of this strike on the *SCDN* was disastrous. The paper had to reduce its number of pages per copy from eight to four in the period between August 14 and September 2. It had to offer higher salaries than other newspapers and provide various welfare services to the workers in order to attract them to stay with the newspaper.<sup>49</sup> The refusal of the newspaper vendors to sell the pro-Wang newspapers also dealt a heavy blow to the circulation of the *SCDN*.<sup>50</sup> Even the *SCDN* admitted that they suffered seriously from the incidents in August 1939.<sup>51</sup>

Faced with the increasing rivalry in the local Chinese press between the Chongqing agents and the Wang Clique, the colonial government in Hong Kong kept a close eye on both sides to prevent any behaviour which threatened tranquillity and order of the colony. Despite its neutrality in the Sino-Japanese conflict, the colonial government were generally sympathetic to the Resistance in China, and its policy towards the Chongqing government was “to give as much assistance to China as may be compatible with the safety of the Empire as a whole, including Hong Kong, and the avoidance of actual hostilities with the Japanese”.<sup>52</sup> The colonial government provided convenience to the representatives of the Chongqing government in Hong Kong on many occasions, and allowed the Chongqing government to set up at least twenty-nine official or semi-official agencies in Hong Kong by March 1939.<sup>53</sup> As the British government intended to maintain a good relationship with Chongqing, it showed an indifferent attitude towards the activities of the Wang Clique in Hong

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<sup>49</sup> Wei Xuanchuanbu 偽宣傳部, “Xuan chuanbu diyijie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian” 宣傳部第一屆全國宣傳會議報告彙編, June 1941, in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol.6, pt.3, p.870.

<sup>50</sup> Translation of Extract from File No. 67, August 17, 1939, CO129/579/11 Pt.2.

<sup>51</sup> Wei Xuanchuanbu, “Xuan chuanbu diyijie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian,” p.871.

<sup>52</sup> Letter from R.G. Howe to G.E.J. Gent, FO371/22160, July 13, 1938.

<sup>53</sup> Letter from Archibald Clark-Kerr to Viscount Halifax, FO371/23516, March 16, 1939, Enclosure.



Kong. When Wang asked for British permission in April 1939 to settle in Hong Kong to continue his activities, the colonial government opposed this proposal firmly for fear that Wang's presence would endanger the law and order in Hong Kong and embarrass the colonial government.<sup>54</sup> It showed that the colonial administration hoped to minimize the activities of the Wang Clique in Hong Kong.

The colonial government, however, became less tolerant of activities of the Chongqing agencies in Hong Kong when it found that the Chongqing government exploited such convenience to engage in underground activities in Hong Kong. The strike of the printing staff of the pro-Wang newspapers and the anti-Wang boycott of newspaper vendors had already proved the ability of the Chongqing agents to organize substantial sabotage to the activities of the Wang Clique in the Colony. The authorities were even much more exasperated when the Chongqing agents murdered Shen Song (沈崧), Wang's nephew working for the Clique in Hong Kong, in Central district on August 22. The police found during a raid on an illegal wireless transmitter station operated by David Kung (Kong Lingkan 孔令侃), H.H. Kung's son, in Kowloon on September 25 that the Chongqing government maintained a secret society "Nan jian she" (South Spear Society 南尖社) in the Colony and organized the murder of Shen Song and some terrorist activities in Shanghai.<sup>55</sup> Geoffrey Northcote, the Governor of Hong Kong, was angry at Chongqing's underground activities, which he branded as "a treacherous action against a nation which has so befriended to China" and "a gross breach of hospitality which we have

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<sup>54</sup> Telegram from the Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO129/581/14, April 19, 1939.

<sup>55</sup> Telegram from the Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO129/579/11 Pt.1, October 12, 1939; Letter from G.A.S. Northcote to Malcolm MacDonald, CO129/579/11 Pt.1, October 13, 1939.



given in Hong Kong to Chinese Government Department”.<sup>56</sup> He believed that Hong Kong should not be a base of the Chongqing government to perform anti-Japanese and anti-Wang activities.<sup>57</sup>

Meanwhile, the colonial government also faced Japanese pressure to suppress anti-Wang activities and propaganda in Hong Kong. On September 26, Tajiri Akiyoshi (田尻愛義), the Japanese Consul-General in Hong Kong, handed in a memorandum to the Acting Colonial Secretary asking for the suppression of the anti-Japanese activities organized by the Chongqing agents and to “treat amicably and friendly those Chinese people who advocate pro-Japanese and peace movements”.<sup>58</sup> The Japanese also helped the *SCDN* and other pro-Wang newspapers by demanding the administration specifically “to exclude pressure and hindrance brought about by Chinese upon such newspapers as publish news, editorials, and correspondences in respect of peace movement”.<sup>59</sup> The British government, hoping at that time to preserve not only Anglo-Chinese but also Anglo-Japanese relations, tended to support the idea of giving some concessions to the Japanese requests and adopting measures to control Chongqing’s anti-Japanese activities in Hong Kong.<sup>60</sup> The colonial government tried to assure the Japanese that it “would discourage the establishment in Hong Kong for any organization for conducting propaganda against any friendly nation” including Japan.<sup>61</sup> Wu was called by Northcote and was warned

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<sup>56</sup> Extract from Letter from Sir Geoffrey Northcote (Hong Kong) to Mr. Gent, Colonial Office, dated 14<sup>th</sup> October 1939. CO129/579/11 Pt.1.

<sup>57</sup> Letter from G.A.S. Northcote to Archibald Clark-Kerr, CO129/579/11 Pt.1, October 16, 1939.

<sup>58</sup> Letter from G.A.S. Northcote to Malcolm MacDonald, CO129/580/3, October 25, 1939, Enclosure 1.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Letter from R.G. Howe to G.E.J. Gent, CO129/580/3, October 4, 1939.

<sup>61</sup> Letter from G.A.S. Northcote to Malcolm MacDonald, CO129/580/3, October 25, 1939, Enclosure 2.



not to make Hong Kong a centre of anti-Wang activities.<sup>62</sup> It clearly showed that the colonial government was very cautious and avoided giving opportunities to the Chongqing government and the Wang Clique to escalate their rivalries in Hong Kong.

### ***Public Reception and Significance to the Peace Movement***

It is difficult to speak in certain terms with regard to the popularity of the *SCDN* in Hong Kong as there were no definite sales figures of the paper during the period, but it was very likely that the paper attracted a very small readership because of the deep-rooted public perception of the *SCDN* as a traitors' paper. The newspaper attracted hardly any commercial advertisement except those posted by other pro-Wang publications in Shanghai. Its copies were distributed either directly to readers free of charge, or to vendors at a price much lower than the production cost.<sup>63</sup> In fact, the *SCDN* always had to rely on the sizeable monthly subsidy of HK\$8,000, which amounted to the daily sales of at least 13,000 copies, to continue its publication.<sup>64</sup>

The Wang Clique also failed to expand its influence in the press of Hong Kong. The other three pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong had an even poorer circulation than the *SCDN*. All the three papers remained on a small scale, only four pages per copy a day. Even the Wang Clique admitted that these three newspapers remained

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<sup>62</sup> Letter from G.A.S. Northcote to Archibald Clark-Kerr, CO129/580/3, September 25, 1939.

<sup>63</sup> Wei Xuanchuanbu, "Xuan chuanbu diyijie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian," p.872.

<sup>64</sup> The nominal retail price of the *SCDN* was two cents per copy, so the newspaper had to sell at least about 13,000 copies a day directly to the readers in order to recover this subsidy. But one should bear in mind that in normal situation the newspaper had to sell more than the above figure for the same amount of income because the wholesale price provided to the vendors was always lower than the retail price.





indecent content and unable to provide proper publicity for the peace movement.<sup>65</sup> This illustrated that these three pro-Wang newspapers had little propagandistic significance.

Despite its poor circulation, the *SCDN* still played an important role in the peace movement during this period. In the days immediately after the Clique's defection from Chongqing, Wang and his associates were in a difficult position in Hanoi as the Chinese population showed an overwhelming opposition to his peace proposal. The *SCDN* became the only channel for the Wang Clique to express its own political ideas and counter-attack the strong tide of criticism. The role of the *SCDN* as the defender for the Wang Clique's peace movement, however, was greatly shared by the *CCDN* in Shanghai which resumed publication in July 1939. Many editorial staff moved to Shanghai and continued to work for its twin newspaper there. The editorial policies of the *SCDN* mainly followed those of the *CCDN* as most of its editorials and important commentaries shown in the *SCDN* were extracted directly from those of the twin paper in Shanghai.

### **The *CCDN*: A Refurnished Flagship of the Clique's Propaganda Machinery**

#### ***The Press of Shanghai at the time of Wang's Arrival***

Wang was enraged by the Hanoi Incident in April 1939. His attempt to reach an understanding with Chongqing on the question of peace with Japan was at that time mixed "with a desire to see Chiang's humiliation", which compelled him to spend the rest of his life "in a desperate final attempt to seize glory".<sup>66</sup> Wang decided to accept the Japanese proposal to lead a rival peace movement in the occupied areas. Under

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<sup>65</sup> Wei Xuanchuanbu, "Xuan chuanbu diyijie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian", p.904.

<sup>66</sup> Bunker, *Peace Conspiracy*, p.132.





the assistance from the Ume Kikan (梅機關), a newly established Japanese special service team led by Kagesa Sadaaki to deal with the Wang's work (*kōsaku* 工作), Wang and his associates left Hanoi and arrived at Shanghai on May 7, 1939.<sup>67</sup> Although Wang initially wanted to stay in the foreign concessions in order to show that he was not a Japanese puppet and his peace movement was independent from Japanese control, his request was not realized as the Clique had to work under Japanese protection. They first resided in the Jūkōdō, then in the western district (Huxi 滬西), both of which were situated in the Japanese-controlled districts in Shanghai.<sup>68</sup>

As Shanghai became the new centre of the Wang Clique's activities, it was necessary for the Clique to continue its propaganda there by rebuilding its influence in the press of Shanghai. The situation of the press of the city had changed considerably after the retreat of the *CCDN* from Shanghai in November 1937. The Shanghai Newspaper Censorship Bureau, jointly operated by the Japanese military and the Japanese-sponsored local government since March 1938, was still maintaining a strict censorship of Chinese newspapers published in both the Japanese-occupied districts and the foreign concessions.<sup>69</sup> The Bureau, however, failed to suppress the anti-Japanese Chinese newspapers in the city because these papers could legally escape from Japanese censorship by registering the newspapers under the names of foreigners, who enjoyed extraterritorial rights in China. Almost all the major Chinese-language newspapers in Shanghai, such as *Shun Pao*, *Sin Wen Pao*, and the *Standard* (*Wen Wei Po* 文匯報), were published under either American

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p.149.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p.150; Police Report, SMP, D-8939, July 6, 1939.

<sup>69</sup> Secret order by the Dadao Municipal Government, SMA, R-1-1-79, March 12, 1938.



or British registration and continued publishing anti-Japanese and pro-Chongqing articles.<sup>70</sup> By April 1939, there were at least seventeen Chinese-language newspapers registered under the foreign ownership, and their circulation reached 200,000 a day.<sup>71</sup>

The hostility between the Japanese authorities and the anti-Japanese Chinese newspapers in the city always put the administrations of the foreign concessions in a difficult position. The Japanese-controlled press censorship office had already been asking the SMP since early 1938 to suppress the foreign-registered Chinese-language newspapers which published anti-Japanese articles.<sup>72</sup> The SMP managed to dismiss most of these Japanese requests in the early days by claiming that such suppression could only be carried out by consuls of the nations concerned.<sup>73</sup> But as the Japanese control in Central China was gradually consolidated in 1939, the SMC could not ignore the Japanese requests anymore. On April 26, 1939, the Japanese Consul-General Miura Yoshiaki (三浦義秋) made representations to the SMC about the latter's tolerance of the anti-Japanese newspapers in its jurisdiction, and requested suppression of these newspapers.<sup>74</sup> Similar requests were also sent to the

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<sup>70</sup> *Shun Pao* resumed publication in Shanghai on October 10, 1938 in the name of Columbia Publishing Company under the nominal leadership of an American N.F. Allman. The registration of *Sin Wen Pao* was changed from Chinese to American in September 1938 by transferring the ownership to Pacific Publishing Company directed by V.C. Fergusson. The *Standard*, or in its Chinese name *Wen Wei Pao*, was established in January 1938 and nominally chaired by a Briton H.M. Cumine. Despite the foreign ownerships of these newspapers, the editorial staff was mainly Chinese, and in many cases related to Chongqing or Communist circles. Police Report, SMP, D-8149/C83. January 27, 1938; Documentation sur les principaux journaux et revues publiés à Shanghai, SMA, U38-2-1178, September 28, 1940.

<sup>71</sup> Ma, ed., *Shanghai xinwen shi*, p.847.

<sup>72</sup> Letter from the Shanghai Press Censorship Office to Commissioner of Police, SMP, D-3019, February 2, 1938.

<sup>73</sup> Letter from Commissioner of Police to the Director of the Shanghai Press Censorship Office, SMP, D-3019, February 4, 1938.

<sup>74</sup> Miura asked the SMC to publish a notification to the public announcing prohibition of publication which inserted anti-Japanese articles, to arrest anti-Japanese journalists, and to ban all publication and transportation of anti-Japanese materials. Letter from Hebert Phillips to His Majesty's Ambassador to China, FO371/23501, May 12, 1939, Enclosure 1.



American and British Consul-Generals in Shanghai. The British Consul-General complied with the Japanese demands by prohibiting British-registered Chinese-language newspapers to use particular Chinese characters in their articles.<sup>75</sup> The SMC also had to respond to the Japanese pressure by temporarily suspending the publication of *Hwa Mei Chen Pao* (華美晨報), an American-owned Chinese newspaper which advocated assassination of Wang's brother-in-law Chu Minyi (褚民誼), for one day on May 3.<sup>76</sup> The SMP further warned editors of all Chinese newspapers that police approval was required to publish any political speech or manifesto in the newspapers.<sup>77</sup> However, the Chinese newspapers ignored these warnings and continued to publish anti-Japanese articles and Chiang's speeches.<sup>78</sup> Four participating newspapers were hence punished on May 18 by compulsory suspension of publication for two weeks.<sup>79</sup> These cases showed the tension and conflicts among the Japanese authorities, the anti-Japanese Chinese newspapers, and the administrations of foreign concessions.

The complex situation of the press in the foreign concessions of Shanghai, however, facilitated the Wang Clique to place its flagship of the propaganda machinery there. First, if the Wang Clique set its main organ in a foreign concession

<sup>75</sup> The use of Chinese characters *jian* (traitors 奸), *zhuanghan* (braves 壯漢) and *di* (enemy 敵) were not allowed to appear in Chinese newspapers. The character *guizi* (devils 鬼子) and crosses (xx) were also banned to signify the Japanese. Letter from Hebert Phillips to His Majesty's Ambassador to China, FO371/23501, April 28, 1939, Enclosure.

<sup>76</sup> Letter from Hebert Phillips to His Majesty's Ambassador to China, FO371/23501, May 12, 1939.

<sup>77</sup> Letter from Hebert Phillips to His Majesty's Ambassador to China, FO371/23501, May 12, 1939, Enclosure 5.

<sup>78</sup> Ma, *Shanghai xinwen shi*, p.854; *CADN*, May 11, 1939.

<sup>79</sup> On May 18, two American-owned newspapers *Ta Mei Pao* (大美報) and the *Chinese American Daily News*, and two British-owned papers the *Standard* and the *News Digest* (每日譯報), published without police's approval the text of Chiang's speech delivered in Chongqing, which contained some anti-Japanese expressions. The former two papers were punished by the SMC by cancellation of their registrations in the Council for two weeks, while the latter two were punished by the British authorities by withdrawal of their licences in the Consulate for two weeks. Letter from Herbert Phillips to His Majesty's Ambassador to China, FO371/23501, May 25, 1939.



but not in a Japanese-occupied area, it would probably give an impression to the Chinese population that the Clique was not a Japanese puppet and it could express its own ideas autonomously in a neutral district. Second, as the pro-Chongqing press maintained a large influence in the city, the new organ could continue its propaganda battles directly with the pro-Chongqing newspapers in the foreign concessions of Shanghai. Third, Wang's organs enjoyed a great extent of freedom to conduct their work in the foreign concessions. Whilst the Chongqing government did not have legitimate authority to suppress its rival press in Shanghai, the administrations of the foreign settlements had to compromise with the Japanese authorities to restrict the anti-Japanese propaganda and acquiesce in the existence of pro-Japanese newspapers in their jurisdictions. The efficient communication and transportation system in the foreign settlements enabled the paper to receive news from the outside world more easily. These factors made the Wang Clique decide to locate its organ in the foreign settlements of Shanghai.

### ***Early Propaganda Activities of the Wang Clique in Shanghai***

Even before the arrival of Wang in early May 1939, Wang's followers had started some scattered activities in Shanghai to prepare to build a propaganda base of the Clique in the city. After having recovered from the attack made by the Chongqing agent in January, Lin became active again in Hong Kong and Shanghai in April 1939. He provided his nephew, Lin Xiaoxiong (林孝雄), with C\$50,000 as capital to run the People Strength Society (民力社) and publish the weekly *Le Peuple Fort* (民力週刊). He also obtained a printing press, Huadong Printing Company (Huadong yinshuasuo 華東印刷所), through his nephew at a cost of C\$5,000 in late April in the hope that these organizations would become the main institution for handling the



Clique's propaganda when the situation became suitable.<sup>80</sup> Ding Mocun and Li Shiqun, two leading Japanese-sponsored agents who later joined the Wang Clique and formed a special service corps at 76 Jessfield Road in the western district, also helped the Clique at that time to buy off some newspapers not to publish anti-Wang articles at a monthly expenditure of C\$5,000 a month.<sup>81</sup>

Preparation of the Clique's propaganda work in Shanghai was reorganized when Wang moved his residence to Shanghai in early May 1939. Wang instructed his subordinates to transfer all propaganda work which had been carried out in the city individually to an underground Publicity Committee (xuanchuan weiyuanhui 宣傳委員會), which was newly established in Shanghai with a rather small monthly subsidy of C\$7,000. Lin was appointed as the committee convenor and worked with other eight committee members, including Hu Lancheng and Li Shengwu (李聖五), who had left the *SCDN* in Hong Kong for their new tasks in Shanghai.<sup>82</sup> The committee continued to rally the Shanghai newspapers to join the peace movement, or at least not to publish anti-Wang articles. One of its major attempts was to buy over the British-owned Chinese newspaper the *Standard*, which had been ordered by the British Consulate-General to suspend its publication in May 1939, at a cost of C\$100,000.<sup>83</sup> Wang's followers succeeded in persuading the British owner to accept the offer, but finally they could not turn the *Standard* into a pro-Wang paper because

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<sup>80</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8939, April 21, 1939.

<sup>81</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), shangbian 上篇, pp.1-2.

<sup>82</sup> The other members were Zhao Housheng (趙厚生), Fu Shishuo (傅式說), Zhao Shuyong (趙叔雍), Tang Huimin (唐惠民), Tang Liangli (湯良禮), Zhang Zhengfan (章正範). These members had been in Shanghai before Wang's arrival. *Ibid.*, p.1.

<sup>83</sup> H.M. Cumine, the proprietor of the *Standard*, received C\$100,000 secretly from the Wang Clique. The Wang Clique asked Cumine to invest C\$50,000 in the paper and reorganize the paper under his control. The remaining C\$50,000 was given by the Wang Clique to Cumine as the remuneration. Police Report, SMP, D-8149/C83, May 31, 1939.



the Chinese editors refused to work after the newspaper was reorganized. The newspaper was unable to resume publication even the ban of the British Consulate-General on the publication expired in early June.<sup>84</sup> The Clique, nevertheless, succeeded in buying over several other British-registered minor newspapers and suspended their publication in order to weaken the anti-Japanese and anti-Wang feelings in the press of Shanghai.<sup>85</sup>

### ***The CCDN and the Peace Movement: Targets and Objectives***

However, the main task of the Publicity Committee was still the resumption of the *CCDN* in order to secure a reliable propaganda organ of the Wang Clique. It was not too difficult for them to rebuild the *CCDN* as the office of the newspaper was not completely closed and still functioned on a limited scale after the suspension of publication in November 1937.<sup>86</sup> In May 1939, Lin resumed his directorship of the *CCDN*, and Hu Lancheng was designated as the editorialist of the paper, Guo Xiufeng as the editor-in-chief, and Ye Xuesong as the general manager. After two months of preparation, the *CCDN* resumed publication on July 10, 1939.

Being the flagship newspaper of the Wang Clique, the *CCDN* performed as the official spokesman of the Clique aiming to carry out propaganda work to the whole

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<sup>84</sup> Twenty-six Chinese editorial staff published an advertisement in *Shun Pao* on June 1 to declare their refusal to comply with the Wang Clique. *Shun Pao*, June 1, 1939; Xu Zhucheng 徐鑄城, *Xu Zhucheng huiyilu* 徐鑄城回憶錄 (Taipei: Commercial Press (Taiwan), 1999), pp.76-77.

<sup>85</sup> The other Chinese-language newspapers bought over by the Clique were the *Morning Leader* (導報), the *News Digest*, the *International Daily News* (國際日報), and the *International Evening News* (國際夜報). All of them were registered under the names of British nationals, and their licences were either withdrawn voluntarily or by the order of the British Consulate-General for publishing inflammable pro-Wang articles. Letter from G.V. Kimson to G. Geoffrey Philips, SMP, D-8149/C83, July 13, 1939; Letter from Herbert Phillips to His Majesty's Ambassador to China, FO371/23501, September 2, 1939.

<sup>86</sup> Two staff members, Ye Xuesong and Guo Xiufeng, were instructed to maintain the office of the *CCDN* by receiving some printing jobs for some mosquito papers when the paper suspended the publication between November 1937 and July 1939. Guo, "Wang wei shiqi de 'Zhonghua ribao'", pp.150-151.



Chinese population in both the occupied and unoccupied areas.<sup>87</sup> The status of the *CCDN* as the organ newspaper of the peace movement was illustrated clearly by its publication of Wang's radio broadcast speech in Shanghai on the first day of the issue. This speech, titled "My basic concepts and objectives of Sino-Japanese relations" ("Wo duiyu Zhongri guanxi zhi genben guannian ji qianjin mubiao" 我對於中日關係之根本觀念及前進目標) represented a remarkable change in Wang's idea of peace with Japan. Wang's advocacy of Sino-Japanese peace at that time was no longer based on his pessimistic attitude towards the future of resistance and his intention to save China from annihilation by achieving peace with Japan, but on a more magnificent belief that China and Japan were "brothers" and should collaborate with each other for the stability of East Asia. He also declared formally to "walk the other road" from Chongqing and asked the people in all of China to work for his peace movement.<sup>88</sup> Such a change came from the fact that the Clique worked at that time to develop itself into a political force which it expected to be strong enough to challenge, or even supersede, the Chongqing government. In order to justify the *raison d'être* of the peace movement, it had to manifest a set of political concepts distinct from the idea of resistance. Advocacy of long-term Sino-Japanese peace, which was based on brotherhood and cultural similarities between the two nations, might provide a good rationale for the Wang Clique to justify its peace movement.

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<sup>87</sup> The contents and standpoints of editorials and important essays of the *CCDN* were set by the Publicity Committee of the Wang Clique. After Wang convened his own GMD Party Congress and established his own party headquarters in Shanghai in August 1939, this task was transferred to the "Editorial Committee" (shelun weiyuanhui 社論委員會), which was under the supervision of the Party Publicity Bureau (xuanchuanbu 宣傳部). The Editorial Committee was responsible for guiding the opinion of all pro-Wang publications. Hu Lancheng, the editorialist of the *CCDN*, was one of the standing members of the Editorial Committee. It was hence sensible to suggest that the opinion of the *CCDN* reflected the standpoints of the Wang Clique. Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), shangbian, p.13.

<sup>88</sup> Wang Jingwei, "Wo duiyu Zhongri guanxi de genben guannian ji qianjin mubiao" 我對於中日關係之根本觀念及前進目標, *CCDN*, July 10, 1939.





As Sino-Japanese peace was generally not accepted by the wartime population, the Wang Clique and its propaganda organs needed an authoritative and plausible explanation to convince the people that long-term Sino-Japanese peace was a correct and legitimate way to save China. Finally, the Wang Clique and the *CCDN* turned to adopt “Pan-Asianism” as their theoretical foundation of the peace movement. Pan-Asianism was introduced by Sun Yat-sen in two speeches addressed to Japanese organizations in Kobe in November 1924. Sun suggested in the speeches that Japan and China should bear the responsibility to revive the traditional Asian political order of righteousness and harmony, and to expel the imperialistic aggression of the Westerners in Asia.<sup>89</sup> According to Sun’s idea, Japan was the strong younger brother of China. The strong younger brother should help the weak elder brother, China, to abolish unequal treaties imposed by the Westerners so that the two brothers could cooperate with each other for a brighter future of Asia.<sup>90</sup> In fact, Pan-Asianism was a very abstract concept without concrete arguments. Sun himself never elaborated this concept further because these two speeches in Kobe were Sun’s last public talks before his death in March 1925. After Sun’s death, the idea of Pan-Asianism was seldom mentioned by politicians or intellectuals. Wang, however, used this vague theory during the Sino-Japanese War to justify his idea that China and Japan should not be enemies but friends. He even asserted that Pan-Asianism was Sun’s “greatest ambition” in his revolutionary career, and implied that he was the staunch follower of Sun’s ideology.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Da Yazhou zhuyi” 大亞洲主義, in *Guofu quanji* 國父全集, ed. Qin Xiaoyi 秦孝儀, vol.3 (Taipei: Jindai zhongguo, 1989), pp.541-542.

<sup>90</sup> Sun Yat-sen, “Ribei ying zhu Zhongguo feichu bupingdeng tiaoyue” 日本應助中國廢除不平等條約, in *Guofu quanji*, vol.3, p.545.

<sup>91</sup> Wang Jingwei, “Liangzhong huaiyi xinli zhi jieshi” 兩種懷疑心理之解釋, *CCDN*, July 22, 1939.





When Pan-Asianism became the guiding principle of the peace movement, the editors of the *CCDN* began to follow this line of thinking and explain that the peace movement was more than mere peace negotiation with Japan. The peace movement should be regarded as the beginning of reconciliation between the two nations, as well as reconstruction of the political order in China and East Asia:

People's impression of peace [with Japan] was mostly derived from the powerlessness [of China] to change the present situation. [People think that] they have to accept peace because they do not have the power to fight. They have to accept loss [during peace negotiations] because this is much better than the extinction of the nation... They have not understood the positive side of peace. This positive side refers to the fact that postwar China and Japan will follow the spirit of coexistence and coprosperity to revive East Asia... This is how Mr. Wang has inspired us.<sup>92</sup>

The *CCDN* editors further dignified the peace movement by asserting that what the Clique pursued at that time was as noble and revolutionary as the Chinese Revolution in 1911. They believed that both of them shared some common characteristics. For example, both movements originated from the revolutionaries' consciousness to revive the nation from crises. While the Chinese Revolution aimed to deliver the Han population from alien rule and foreign aggression, the peace movement was initiated by Wang to protect China from total defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. In addition, both movements showed great self-sacrificing spirits of the revolutionaries. The editors praised the noble personality of Wang and his followers, who sustained nationwide condemnation and worked for the peace movement without personal benefit.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Ruoye 若耶 [Hu Lancheng], "Duiyu dayazhou zhuyi de renshi" 對於大亞洲主義的認識, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 3, 1939.

<sup>93</sup> "Xinhai geming jingshen yu jinri de heping jiuguo yundong" 辛亥革命精神與今日的和平救國運動, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 28, 1939.



But it soon proved that the theory of Pan-Asianism led to, but not solved, the problem of credibility of the peace movement. While the *CCDN* depicted the peace movement as a process to achieve Pan-Asianism, it soon found that some Japanese politicians and intellectuals associated Pan-Asianism with their own concepts of New Order of East Asia or East Asian Cooperative Body (*Tōa kyodōtai* 東亜協同體), which were often understood by the Chinese as a Japanese excuse to invade other Asian nations. These Japanese elites even claimed that Wang was willing to work under the Japanese system of Sino-Japanese cooperation. This was a dangerous signal to the Clique. The Clique began to doubt that many Japanese perceived future Sino-Japanese relations as paternalistic supervision imposed by Japan onto China.<sup>94</sup> The Chinese population might also be further perceived that the Clique was a Japanese puppet and that the peace movement, in the name of Pan-Asianism, meant nothing but surrender to the Japanese.<sup>95</sup> In order to show that Wang's peace movement worked for the genuine interests of the Chinese nation and stood with the Japanese on an equal footing, the *CCDN* editors were increasingly concerned with keeping their distance from the Japanese notion of Sino-Japanese cooperation. They emphasized the importance of independence and equal status with Japan in the future political order in East Asia. Hu made this point clear:

There are many interpretations among the Japanese on the ideas of *Tōa shin'chitsujo* or *Tōa kyodōtai*. But the meaning of Pan-Asianism of Mr. Sun is very clear: The relationship between China and Japan should be one between friends, not one between a master and a slave.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Zeng Zhisheng 曾芝生, "Zhongri hezuo de jichu" 中日合作的基礎, *CCDN*, August 26, 1939.

<sup>95</sup> This time, the *SCDN* admitted that there was widespread misconception about Pan-Asianism. Pan-Asianism was often misunderstood as a synonym of *Tōa kyodōtai*, which was just a Japanese excuse to invade China. "Dayazhou zhuyi de neihan – jiuzheng sanzong wujie" 大亞洲主義的內涵 – 糾正三種誤解, Editorial, *SCDN*, November 21, 1939.

<sup>96</sup> Ruoye, "Zhongri hezuo de jidian" 中日合作的基點, Editorial, *CCDN*, September 10, 1939.



The *CCDN* editors even reduced the importance of the theoretical explanation of the peace movement and stated that Pan-Asianism was ideal but too ambitious for the Chinese populace. The Chinese population, according to the editors, did not expect a Sino-Japanese brotherhood but only restoration of the sovereignty of China.<sup>97</sup> This proved that the *CCDN* had to readjust its opinion to minimize the ideological collaboration with the Japanese.

As theoretical justification seemed to be unable to improve the credibility of the Wang Clique, the *CCDN* turned to make use of domestic politics to justify the peace movement. There were two main characteristics of the paper's arguments of domestic politics. First, the paper undertook continuously anti-Chiang propaganda in the *CCDN* hoping to shaken people's faith in Chiang and the Chongqing government. In contrast with the less anti-Chiang attitude of the *SCDN* before the Hanoi Incident, the *CCDN* was much more hostile towards Chiang and the Chongqing government. Such hostility became particularly strong after the Wang Clique arranged its supporters to hold its own "Sixth Party Congress" of the GMD in Shanghai in August 1939. The Congress resolved to replace Chiang by Wang to be the leader of the Party.<sup>98</sup> As the Clique proclaimed in the Congress that Wang and his followers officially took over the party leadership, it needed to further weaken the legitimacy of Chiang's leadership in the Party. The *CCDN* portrayed Chiang as a dictator who only regarded the country as his own personal property and ignored the interests of the population.<sup>99</sup> The unverified news reports about the grievance of the population of the unoccupied areas and instability within the Chongqing government became the

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<sup>97</sup> "Heping yundong zhi mudi yu shouduan" 和平運動之目的與手段, Editorial, *CCDN*, October 17, 1939.

<sup>98</sup> *CCDN*, August 31, 1939.

<sup>99</sup> Huiwen 慧聞 (pseud.), "Qiwang yu Jiang zhengquan yapo xia de renmen" 期望於蔣政權壓迫下的人們, *CCDN*, September 21, 1939.



headlines of the *CCDN* frequently.<sup>100</sup> The editors asserted that Chiang only wanted to be a warlord and rule the remaining Chinese territories without doing anything substantial to recover the Japanese-occupied areas.<sup>101</sup> They tried to depict the Chongqing government as only a local regime which was unable and unwilling to lead the population of the whole China.

Second, the paper attempted to publicize an idea that the Wang Clique would be able to conduct peace negotiation with the Japanese as an equal and recover the Chinese territories and properties which had been lost in the War. Although the Wang Clique and the Japanese government maintained active contacts with each other throughout the second half of the year 1939 to seek a peace settlement, these discussions remained highly secret and outsiders were little acquainted with the progress of peace negotiations.<sup>102</sup> The *CCDN*, as a result, had to assure the public that the peace movement was on the right track to settle the current Sino-Japanese hostilities, and that the Wang Clique was an autonomous entity rather than a puppet during the negotiations with the Japanese. While the *CCDN* promoted the ideal of Sino-Japanese peace and cooperation, the editors showed on many occasions their disagreement with the Japanese with regard to the future Sino-Japanese relationship. The editors even implied that the Clique dared to abandon what they had achieved in the past months and refuse Sino-Japanese cooperation if it found that Japan

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<sup>100</sup> For example, the *CCDN* reported in its headline a correspondence from a man “who stayed in Chongqing for three months and has recently returned to Shanghai via Kunming”, saying that the Chongqing government “extorts the population of the five southwestern provinces, imposes numerous taxes, and leads to a rapid rise of prices of food and necessities”. *CCDN*, November 7, 1939. Other similar anti-Chongqing reports were frequently shown in the *CCDN* throughout the period.

<sup>101</sup> Ruoye, “Tuo yu pian’an” 拖與偏安, Editorial, *CCDN*, November 6, 1939.

<sup>102</sup> In June 1939, Wang and his eleven associates visited Japan for three weeks and met Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirou (平沼騏一郎) and other high officials of the Imperial Government. On November 1, the Wang Clique and the Ume Kikan opened a two-month negotiation on the future peace settlement. For the details about the contacts between the Wang Clique and the Japanese, see Bunker, *Peace Conspiracy*, pp.154-190.



continued to pursue its own war aims without considering Chinese interests:

Now we would like to tell Japan that Japan does not have enough power to lead East Asia to acquire foreign capital and exploit international relations [for its own benefit]. As a result, Japan can only intimidate China [to support Japan]. However, such intimidation does not help [to increase Japanese power], but only makes China turn to powers outside East Asia and increases the Japanese difficulty in acquiring foreign capital and exploiting international relations.<sup>103</sup>

The paper's discontent with the Japanese attempt to control China was accompanied by the paper's detached attitude towards the establishment of a new central government. It was clear that the Clique hoped to topple Chiang's leadership in the Chongqing government. The Clique's Sixth Party Congress and Wang's assumption of the party leadership were the first steps. It was supposed that the Clique's next move was the establishment of a new rival central government. However, the *CCDN* was very cautious not to articulate this intention publicly. The most important reason for such discretion was that the Clique did not receive substantial Japanese support to realize a new central government. It was not until the signing of a *Nisshi shin kankei chōsei yōkō* (Important points for adjusting Sino-Japanese relations 日支新關係調整要綱) between the Wang Clique and the Ume Kikan on December 30, 1939 that this support was guaranteed by the Japanese.<sup>104</sup> There was, however, another reason for such discretion. The paper hoped to create a public image that Wang and his followers carried out the peace movement not for personal power and benefits, but for the selfless objective to save China. The editors claimed that the Clique would continue its work no matter whether there was its own central government, and that the Clique would not

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<sup>103</sup> Ruoye, "Zhongri liangguo de gongtong lihui" 中日兩國的共同利害, Editorial, *CCDN*, October 16, 1939.

<sup>104</sup> Bunker, *Peace Conspiracy*, p.190.



sacrifice the ultimate goals of the peace movement to save the whole of China for its own central government:

Although peace can be carried out first in some parts [of China], but we have already pointed out repeatedly that the peace which we want is general peace. Our peace movement will never stop at partial restoration of peace, nor [will we be] satisfied by the political development [which we can now achieve] in the occupied areas... We must point out that: we will never agree to reorganizing the National Government and to the government returning to the capital if these moves cannot help the peace movement.<sup>105</sup>

The editors' firm attitude towards the Japanese and the ultimate goal might assure the population that the Clique would defend its own objective of the peace movement and work for the sovereignty and integrity of China during the negotiations with the Japanese.

Although the *CCDN* aimed to conduct nationwide propaganda, they did not ignore the special importance of propaganda to the local population in Shanghai. On the one hand, as the Clique placed its headquarters in Shanghai during that period, it had to rally the support of the people in the city to facilitate its local activities. On the other hand, as the *CCDN* was published in Shanghai, the residents of the city, especially those who lived in the foreign concessions, constituted its most immediate potential readership. The paper hence tended to focus on the interests of the local population in Shanghai when they tried to attract the people to support the peace movement.

The Chinese capitalists were one of the local communities which the *CCDN*

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<sup>105</sup> "Heping yundong zhi mudi yu shouduan" 和平運動之目的與手段, Editorial, *CCDN*, October 17, 1939.



wanted to win over because their capital and influence would be useful for consolidating the strength of the Clique in the lower Yangtze area. They suffered greatly during the wartime period because most of their businesses were destroyed or occupied by the Japanese.<sup>106</sup> For those who could preserve their factories and maintain operation also had to face various serious problems, such as shortage of raw materials and depreciation of the Chinese currency issued by the Chongqing government. The *CCDN* put the blame on the Chongqing government for all these problems. The editors stated that Chiang did not have any ability to win over the war and recover the factories and other properties which were occupied by the Japanese. The Chongqing government, according to the editors, had done nothing for the Shanghai capitalists but put pressure on them to provide financial support to the Chongqing government.<sup>107</sup> The editors claimed that while Chongqing could no longer protect the capitalists' interests, the Wang Clique was capable of solving this problem by conducting negotiations with the Japanese for the return of the occupied factories and properties.<sup>108</sup> They also stated that the Clique would work to remove the Chinese currency from Chongqing's control and ensure the stability of the currency in the future.<sup>109</sup>

Besides the rich, the *CCDN* also needed to rally the ordinary people in Shanghai because many of them potentially were useful for the peace movement. One of the gravest problems which the Shanghai commoners faced was food shortage. This problem had long existed in Shanghai because the transportation between the

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<sup>106</sup> Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order*, pp.13-15.

<sup>107</sup> Xiaofeng 曉峰 (pseud.), "Shanghai gongshangye ziji zhidao" 上海工商業自救之道, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 15, 1939.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> "Women duiyu fabi wenti de jianjie" 我們對於法幣問題的見解, Editorial, *CCDN*, December 15, 1939.



food-producing areas in the lower Yangtze region and the city was blocked by the War. The shortage led to an enormous increase of the price of food and even other necessities. The average price of rice was doubled from 1937 to 1939.<sup>110</sup> As most of the wage-earners did not enjoy a corresponding increase of their salaries, their real wages had decreased by 50% since the outbreak of the War.<sup>111</sup> The *CCDN* editors made use of the difficulties brought by the food shortage to convince the population to support the peace movement:

If there is a legal and independent regime in the occupied areas, and at the same time it conducts peace negotiations [with Japan] on an equal basis,... the rice problem will be solved... Nowadays, Mr. Wang has first advocated [the proposal of] an independent regime and peace negotiations on an equal basis, and people across the country follow his course. Now what we have to do is to implement [the proposal]. The earlier we implement [the proposal], the earlier the difficulties of the people can be relieved.<sup>112</sup>

Among different circles of ordinary people in Shanghai, the *CCDN* editors paid particular attention to the college and university students. As the youngsters might not support resistance as firmly as the adults, it might be easier for the *CCDN* to gain their support for, or sympathy with, the peace movement. From August 1939, the *CCDN* published a weekly supplement *Qingnian zhoukan* (the *Youth Weekly* 青年週刊) and conducted propaganda to the youngsters. The *Weekly* criticized the propaganda of the Communist or pro-Chongqing writers, who always used sensational expressions to incite the youngsters to join the Resistance. In an article, a

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<sup>110</sup> Zhujun 竹君 (pseud.), “Jiujiu laobaixing”救救老百姓, *CCDN*, August 13, 1939. Eleanor M. Hinder, *Social and Industrial Problems of Shanghai: With Special Reference to the Administrative and Regulatory Work of the Shanghai Municipal Council* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), p.50.

<sup>111</sup> Hinder, *Social and Industrial Problems of Shanghai*, p.26.

<sup>112</sup> Mengrong 孟容 (pseud.), “Shanghai minshi wenti de zhengjie” 上海民食問題的癥結, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 16, 1939.





writer commented on these practices of the pro-resistance propagandists:

The youngsters' hearts are vibrant, their blood is hot. None of them wants to fall behind to love their nation. Who else refuses to volunteer for "salvation" work? As a result, the slogan "Go to the hinterland for salvation work" emerges... Faced with this appeal, the youngsters tried hard to avoid accusation of "evading responsibilities". They have no choice but to leave for the hinterland, even without considering their "mental" and "physical" abilities, so as to show their "determination". But this results in falling into the trap set by the enemy [the Communists].<sup>113</sup>

Meanwhile, the writers tried to make use of the youngsters' confusion about the future of the nation and their patriotic sentiments to convince them that the peace movement would succeed in the end in leading China to prosperity and development. They argued that the peace movement was the only correct way to save China because the Wang Clique could achieve a reconstruction of the country through negotiation with Japan and restoration of China's sovereignty.<sup>114</sup> The writers did not provide any further insight into the peace movement, but they tried to excite the youngsters when they discussed the bright future of the peace movement, such as frequent uses of exclamation marks and sentimental expressions to ask the youngsters to devote themselves to the reconstruction of the nation.

The resumption of publication of the *CCDN* represented the beginning of open activities of the Wang Clique in Shanghai. As the paper aimed at general publicity of the peace movement to the population in Shanghai as well in as other parts of China, it alerted the Chongqing authorities, which worked to prevent the expansion of influence of the Wang Clique and to prevent the population from supporting or

<sup>113</sup> Feishi 斐石 (pseud.), "zaitan 'jiuwang gongzuo'" 再談「救亡工作」, *CCDN*, November 25, 1939.

<sup>114</sup> Huiming 晦鳴 (pseud.), "Yuandan gao quanguo qingnian zhiyi – mo fangguo shiji wei heping jiuguo fendou" 元旦告全國青年之一 – 莫放過時機為和平救國奮鬥, *CCDN*, January 1, 1940.



feeling sympathetic with the Wang Clique. Unlike the colonial government in Hong Kong, the administrations of the foreign concessions in Shanghai possessed less power and authority to check the agents sent by the Chongqing government or the Wang Clique. This caused the Chongqing government and the Wang Clique to be more prone towards resorting to violent means to destroy the influence of each other in the press of Shanghai.

### ***Terrorism and the Press in Shanghai***

Being the flagship organ of the Wang Clique, the *CCDN* stood at the centre of terrorism in the press of Shanghai since its resumption of publication. On the first two days of republication, Chongqing agents were sent to disrupt the circulation of the *CCDN* by threatening newspaper distributors in the International Settlement not to sell the *CCDN*. They seized and destroyed 2,000 copies of the *CCDN* publicly.<sup>115</sup> Faced with the strong threat of the Chongqing agents, even the staff of the *CCDN* admitted that they were not confident about maintaining the normal operation of the newspaper during the initial days of publication.<sup>116</sup>

The boycott of the *CCDN* instigated by the Chongqing agents just marked the beginning of terrorist war in the press of Shanghai between the Chongqing government and the Wang Clique. In contrast to the self-restrained attitude towards its rival newspapers in Hong Kong, the Clique was much more aggressive in devastating the pro-Chongqing influence in the press of Shanghai. The main target of the Wang Clique in this terrorist war in the press was the *CADN*. Established in

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<sup>115</sup> The total number of copies published by the *CCDN* was about 15,000. The number of copies destroyed was about 13% of the total copies. *SCDN*, July 24, 1939.

<sup>116</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), shangbian, p.45.



September 1938 under the name of an American company, the Roosevelt Publishing Corporation, the paper was supervised by Wu Rencang (吳任滄), a subordinate of top Chongqing leader Chen Guofu (陳果夫). The *CADN* was originally Chen's personal business, but it was transferred to the control of the GMD central in Chongqing and received subsidies from the Party soon after the Wang Clique launched terrorist activities in the press of Shanghai.<sup>117</sup> Although it was not the most popular newspaper in Shanghai, the paper posed the most serious threat to the propaganda machinery of the Wang Clique because it served as the mouthpiece of the Chongqing government in Shanghai and conducted "the most malicious propaganda against the peace movement".<sup>118</sup>

The retaliation against the pro-Chongqing newspapers began with the bombing of the offices of the *CADN* and nearby the *China Evening News* (大晚報) in the International Settlement on the evening of July 22. A group of armed gangsters shot at the offices and raided the printing houses. Two men were killed and twenty-one were injured in the gunfight.<sup>119</sup> The Police arrested these gangsters several days later and found that they received money from Ding Mocun, the head of the special service corps of the Wang Clique, in order to retaliate against the *CADN* for its recent publication of an anti-Wang article.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8966(C)/A5-II, August 5, 1939. It was estimated that the paper received monthly subsidies of C\$1,500 from Chongqing. Documentation sur les principaux journaux et revues publiés à Shanghai, SMA, U38-2-1178, September 28, 1940.

<sup>118</sup> It was known that the circulation figure of the *CADN* was around 10,000. It was not a large figure as compared with other mainstream newspapers like *Shun Pao* and *Sin Wen Pao*, both of which enjoyed over a daily circulation of over 80,000. SMA, U38-2-1178, September 28, 1940; Awaya Kentarō 粟屋憲太郎 and Chadani Seiichi 茶谷誠一, eds., *Nitchū Sensō: Tai Chūgoku jōhōsen shiryō* 日中戦争: 对中国情報戦資料 (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryō, 2000), vol.6, p.62.

<sup>119</sup> *CCDN*, July 23, 1939.

<sup>120</sup> *CADN*, July 25, 1939.



Ding's special service corps continued its battle against the *CADN*, hoping that it could "exhaust material and financial resources" and cause "the permanent closedown" of the paper.<sup>121</sup> Ding followed the examples of his Chongqing rivals to disrupt the circulation of the *CADN* in Shanghai. He sent his agents on September 4 to force newspaper wholesalers to sell them a large quantity of the *CADN* at a cost lower than the retail price.<sup>122</sup> Totally 10,000 copies were cornered and only 5,000 were distributed to the public. The *CADN* had to print an additional 10,000 copies immediately to meet the public demand.<sup>123</sup> Similar cornering actions were occasionally taken under Ding's order in the following months.<sup>124</sup> On the other hand, Ding's subordinates continuously warned newspaper vendors and advertisers not to do business with the *CADN*.<sup>125</sup> Sometimes these warnings were without follow-up action, but on some occasions they were accompanied with more violent actions. In December 1939, at least three newspaper vendors were arrested and jailed at 76 Jessfield Road because they were found to be selling the *CADN* in their stalls.<sup>126</sup>

Besides the *CADN*, Wang's followers also kept close eyes on journalists, printing workers and newspaper vendors working for other pro-Chongqing newspapers. Although these men were not the most active agitators against the peace movement, their pro-Chongqing and anti-Wang attitudes still posed considerable threat to the propaganda of the peace movement. It was hence necessary for the

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<sup>121</sup> Awaya and Chadani, eds., *Nitchū Sensō: Tai Chūgoku jōhōsen shiryō*, vol.6, p.60.

<sup>122</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8966(C)/A5-II, September 6, 1939.

<sup>123</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8966(C)/A5-II, September 5, 1939.

<sup>124</sup> For example, Ding's special service squads seized the *CADN* in the International Settlement at least once in November 1939 and five times in January 1940. Awaya and Chadani, eds., *Nitchū Sensō: Tai Chūgoku jōhōsen shiryō*, vol.6, pp.59, 219-220.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p.61.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.109-113.



Clique to check, or even suppress, these anti-Wang activities in the Shanghai press.

Journalists became the most immediate target of the Clique's terrorism because they usually had the power to influence the editorial line of a newspaper but were often vulnerable to terrorist attack or bribing. The agents of the Wang Clique resorted to violence against some anti-Wang journalists to warn others to stop articulating anti-Wang opinion. The first victim was Zhu Xinggong (朱惺公), a columnist of a pro-resistance paper *Ta Mei Wan Pao* (大美晚報). Zhu was not a prominent figure in the literary circle of Shanghai, but he was not reluctant to articulate satirical views on the Wang Clique in his column.<sup>127</sup> He was assassinated near his residence in the International Settlement on August 30, 1939.<sup>128</sup> Zhu's death led to tremendous anger among the pro-resistance newspapermen in Shanghai. *Ta Mei Wan Pao* responded to the assassination by publishing an open letter to Wang asking him to choose between admitting to assassination in silence and agreeing to an interview with the editor of the paper to "wipe out any suspicion".<sup>129</sup> The CCDN was instructed immediately to counter-attack the accusation. It spoke on behalf of the Clique to deny any relationship with Zhu's death. A CCDN editor pointed out that the open letter of *Ta Mei Wan Pao* was a "nasty blackmail", aiming to defame Wang. The comments of the CCDN was accompanied with a reply letter from Lin Bosheng to the editorialist of *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, in which Lin retorted that it was he who was the real victim of terrorism because he had been assaulted by the Chongqing agents in Hong Kong long

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<sup>127</sup> For example, he wrote a public reply to the Wang Clique after having received a threatening letter from the Clique's special service corps at 76 Jessfield Road, which warned him to stop publishing anti-Wang articles. In Zhu's reply, he publicly refused to surrender to the Wang Clique and continued to condemn the Clique. Xinggong 惺公 [Zhu Xinggong], "Jiangbei 'guofa' xuanpan 'sixing' zhe zhi zigong: fu suowei 'Zhongguo guomindang changong jiuguo tegong zong zhihuibu' shu" 將被「國法」宣判「死刑」者之自供：覆所謂「中國國民黨創共救國特工總指揮部」書, *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, June 20, 1939.

<sup>128</sup> *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, August 31, 1939.

<sup>129</sup> "Gei Wang Jingwei yifeng gongkaixin" 給汪精衛一封公開信, *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, September 2, 1939.



before this assassination.<sup>130</sup>

In addition, the pro-Wang agents tried to bribe individual journalists working for the pro-Chongqing newspapers to join the Wang Clique clandestinely. In October 1939 the agents formed working teams to systematically infiltrate into the pro-resistance newspapers.<sup>131</sup> By January 1940, they managed to recruit a handful of middle-rank reporters and editors in newspapers with less political colour such as *Shun Pao*, *Sin Wen Pao*, *Hwa Mei Wan Pao* (華美晚報) to the Wang Clique.<sup>132</sup> One of the characteristics of these recruits was that their financial condition was not good.<sup>133</sup> It was highly probable that they joined the Wang Clique because of the subsidies provided by the Clique.

The pro-Wang agents also tried to develop their own influence among printing workers and newspaper vendors. The low-rank workers sometimes played a crucial role in the terrorist activities of the Clique in the press because they were much easily bribed by the Clique for collecting intelligence and undertaking sabotage within the rival newspapers. The agents managed to absorb between November 1939 and January 1940 at least twelve printing workers of different pro-resistance newspapers to be informants of Ding Mocun's corps. One of these informants even succeeded in sabotaging the printing house of the *CADN* in January 1940 and causing the disruption of printing of that newspaper.<sup>134</sup> The pro-Wang agents also tried to put

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<sup>130</sup> "Da Mei Wan Bao de *Black mail*" 大美晚報的 Black mail, *CCDN*, September 5, 1939.

<sup>131</sup> Letter from Wu Hanbai 吳漢白 to Minister Ding [Mocun] 丁默村, SHAC, 2013/2648, October 4, 1939.

<sup>132</sup> Letter from Wu Hanbai to Minister Ding [Mocun], SHAC, 2013/2647, January 24, 1940, Enclosure.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Awaya and Chadani, eds., *Nitchū Sensō: Tai Chūgoku jōhōsen shiryō*, vol.6, pp.219.



newspaper vendors under their protection in the names of different trade unions.<sup>135</sup> By the end of January 1940, 868 out of about 5,000 newspaper vendors in Shanghai had registered as members of these trade unions.<sup>136</sup> It was likely that one of the responsibilities of these newspaper vendors were to sell the pro-Wang newspapers, especially the *CCDN*, at their stalls.

### ***Public Responses to the CCDN***

Although the propaganda campaign of the *CCDN*, accompanied with terrorist activities by the agents of the Wang Clique, succeeded in making the local people notice the activities of the Wang Clique in Shanghai, the *CCDN* seemed to remain unpopular in Shanghai. It is certain that the *CCDN* enjoyed a large circulation number at that time. The Wang Clique claimed that the number of daily copies of the *CCDN* increased from 15,000 in July 1939 to 45,000, and even reached 80,000 by March 1940.<sup>137</sup> Both Japanese and British intelligences sources also gave a prudent estimation that the *CCDN* printed over 25,000 copies daily in January 1940.<sup>138</sup> These were not small figures as compared with the daily circulation ranging from 15,000 to 30,000 of the Chongqing-controlled *CADN*.<sup>139</sup> Surrounded by other twenty small sized pro-Wang dailies and periodicals, the *CCDN* seemed to possess

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<sup>135</sup> Wang's followers formed in November 1939 two trade unions, namely the "Shanghai Municipal Newspaper Distributors' Union" (Shanghai shi xinwen peida ye gonghui 上海市新聞配達業工會), and the "Shanghai Municipal Newspaper Workers' Union" (Shanghai shi baogong zonghui 上海市報工總會). Ibid., pp.58-59.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., p.134.

<sup>137</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), shangbian, p.46.

<sup>138</sup> Memorandum on the press propaganda activities of the Chungking government and Wang Ching-wei Clique, in Letter from Herbert Phillips to His Majesty's Ambassador to China, FO371/24700, January 8, 1940, Enclosure No.2; Shōwa jugonen ichigatsu tsuitachi genzai Chushi ni o teru shimbunsha zasshisha tsushinsha ichiranbyō 昭和十五年一月一日現在中支ニ於テル新聞社雜誌社通信社一覽表, SMA, Q430-1-14, January 1, 1940.

<sup>139</sup> The Japanese intelligence estimated that the *CADN* printed 15,000 copies a day, while the British estimated 30,000 copies were printed each day by the paper. FO371/24700, January 8, 1940; SMA, Q450-1-14, January 1, 1940.



an important position in the press of Shanghai.<sup>140</sup>

However, the significance of the circulation figure of the *CCDN* should not be overstated because the *CCDN* was circulated in a much wider area in the occupied territories. The pro-resistance newspapers were only able to circulate in the foreign concessions of Shanghai because the Japanese administration suppressed all transports of these papers from the foreign concessions to other areas. They were strictly banned in all occupied areas, including the Japanese-controlled districts in Shanghai.<sup>141</sup> In February 1940, the Japanese gendarmeries even blocked the transports of these pro-resistance papers from the foreign concessions to the general post office in Shanghai and made it impossible to send them to the outside world.<sup>142</sup> On the contrary, the *CCDN* could circulate in the occupied areas in Central China, especially in Suzhou, Hangzhou and Nanjing, through the retailing network of the China United News Agency (中華聯合通訊社), the official news agency of the Japanese-sponsored Reformed Government.<sup>143</sup> The paper was well received by the people in this region because it provided much world news and financial information than the local newspapers, the news source of which was usually under strict control. As a result, it was reported that “practically” all the copies of the *CCDN* were sent to the occupied areas and only very few copies were sold in Shanghai.<sup>144</sup>

In fact, it was likely that the *CCDN* did not enjoy a good reputation among the

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<sup>140</sup> Besides the *CCDN*, the Wang Clique also maintained twenty publications in Shanghai, such as the *National Daily News* (民族日報), *Sze Tei Wan Pao* (時代晚報), the *Crystal* (晶報). All of these publications, however, were very small in their scales and did not have many readers. FO371/24700, January 8, 1940.

<sup>141</sup> Letter from Shen Yi 沈毅 to Mayor Su [Xiwen] 蘇錫文, SMA, R1-1-79, March 19, 1938.

<sup>142</sup> *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), February 26, 1940.

<sup>143</sup> *CCDN*, March 12, 1940.

<sup>144</sup> FO371/24700, January 8, 1940.





citizens of Shanghai. There were reports about forced sales of the *CCDN* to the residents living in Hongkou district. The situation seemed so serious that the *CCDN* had to issue a public announcement to disclaim any relationship with these forced sales.<sup>145</sup> Although there was no evidence to show whether these forced sales were done by the Wang Clique or its enemy, it was certain that they gave a bad impression to the local populace.

The credibility of the *CCDN* and other pro-Wang publications was on the verge of collapse when *Ta Kung Pao* in Hong Kong published a secret agreement between the Wang Clique and the Japanese government, *Nisshi shin kankei chōsei yōkō*, on January 22, 1940. The text was provided by Gao Zongwu and Tao Xisheng, who defected from the Wang Clique and escaped to Hong Kong in early January 1940.<sup>146</sup> In fact, this text was not the official version of the agreement which the Wang Clique signed with the Japanese on December 30, 1939. Instead, it was just a draft provided by the Ume Kikan during the course of the negotiation. This draft, however, did not have much significant difference with the final version of the agreement.<sup>147</sup> More importantly, the public was not much bothered by the authenticity and the accuracy of this document because it was provided by Wang's two closest associates. This document revealed that the Wang Clique was going to accept a basket of Japanese demands which were so harsh that the *Ta Kung Pao* described it as total sell-out of the nation.<sup>148</sup> The disclosure of the Wang-Japanese secret agreement was a

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<sup>145</sup> *CCDN*, October 29, 1939.

<sup>146</sup> Tao Xisheng 陶希聖, *Chaoliu yu diandi* 潮流與點滴 (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1974), pp.177-178.

<sup>147</sup> For the official version, see Huang and Zhang, eds., *Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu chengli*, pp.558-577.

<sup>148</sup> The terms included abandoning the sovereignty in Manchuria; allowing Japanese armies to station in Inner Mongolia permanently, and in other parts of China until "peace was restored"; and providing "special convenience" of Japanese companies in Chinese economy. *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), January 22, 1940.



propagandistic triumph of the Chongqing government. In Shanghai, the pro-Chongqing newspapers seized this opportunity to give a heavy blow to the Wang Clique and its propaganda and claimed that the peace movement never worked for the good of the population. The *CADN* commented as follows:

The facts now prove that what Wang can bring to the people is not an honourable and autonomous peace but a slave's chain. The evidence is so clear that he cannot defend himself anymore. From now on, the influence of Wang's appeals or propaganda means nothing.<sup>149</sup>

The *CCDN* tried its best to reduce the impact of the defection of Gao and Tao by different means. They counter-attacked that the published document was forged and the defectors received a bribe of C\$3 millions from Chiang.<sup>150</sup> The Wang Clique also mobilized hundreds of pro-Wang associations to advertise on the *CCDN* to support Wang and demand the punishment of the two traitors.<sup>151</sup> However, it was unlikely that these attempts were useful to reduce the dreadful public perception of the Wang Clique and its propaganda. This embarrassing event made the *CCDN* even harder to gain the support of the population for the peace movement.

## Conclusion

Since its defection from the Chongqing government and proposed peace with Japan in December 1938, the Wang Clique had been under widespread condemnation in the unoccupied areas. As the Clique had no substantial military power to realize its peace proposal on its own strength, it needed particularly the support, or at least understanding, of the population and politicians in China to increase its power to

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<sup>149</sup> "Shishi shengyu xiongbian – zhengju quezao herong dilai" 事實勝於雄辯 - 證據確鑿何容抵賴, Editorial, *CADN*, January 25, 1940.

<sup>150</sup> "Jiang Zhongzheng maile jiayao" 蔣中正買了假藥, *CCDN*, January 23, 1940.

<sup>151</sup> *CCDN*, January 28, 1940.



work out its peace overture. The *SCDN* in Hong Kong was first utilized by the Wang Clique to defend its peace ideas. This paper was very important for Wang and his associates because it provided the only channel at that time to express the idea that peace with Japan was urgent and most beneficial to China. With the help of some writers sponsored by the Clique, the *SCDN* became the solitary defender of Wang's peace movement in this early period.

When Wang and his associates took up residence in Shanghai in May 1939 and became active in working out their peace movement under Japanese protection, the propaganda centre of the Clique was also moved to Shanghai. The *CCDN*, which had been closed since the Japanese occupation of Shanghai in November 1937, was revived to be the flagship organ of the Clique. It tried to explain the rationale of the peace movement from various viewpoints, from the theoretical basis to the pragmatic necessity. These explanations aimed to persuade the population that Sino-Japanese reconciliation and collaboration would save China as well as East Asia, and that the Clique was more legitimate than the Chongqing government in leading the Chinese population to deal with the Sino-Japanese War.

As the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* openly challenged the rule of the Chongqing government, it became anathema to the pro-Chongqing circles in the two cities. Besides verbal disputes, the two papers also had to deal with violence. The secret service agents sent by the Chongqing government or the Wang Clique exploited the complex political environments in the two cities to intimidate journalists, buy over newspapermen and distributors, and sabotage printing facilities of the rival newspapers. These terrorist attacks did cause trouble to the *SCDN* and the *CCDN*, but they only led to short-term effects and did little to determine the winner of the



propaganda campaigns between the Wang Clique and the Chongqing government in Hong Kong and Shanghai.

After months of propaganda, however, neither the *SCDN* nor the *CCDN* was able to gain substantial support of the Chinese population in the unoccupied areas. Both newspapers had a small readership in Hong Kong and Shanghai respectively. The publication of the secret agreement provided by Gao Zongwu and Tao Xisheng in January 1940 even destroyed much of the validity of the arguments given by these two organs of the Wang Clique. The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* had to find ways to remedy the fall of credibility caused by this embarrassing event. The establishment of a new central government chaired by Wang in Nanjing in March 1940 might, to a certain extent, be helpful to improve the difficult position of the two newspapers.

## Chapter 5

### Promoting the Regime: The *CCDN*, the *SCDN* and the Wang Government

#### Introduction

The blow to the credibility of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, which was caused by the publication of the secret agreement between the Wang Clique and the Japanese by pro-Chongqing newspapers, did not affect the support of the Wang Clique to these two newspapers. On the contrary, these two papers benefited from the Clique's establishment of a nominally central government in Nanjing on March 30, 1940. In cooperation with Chinese collaborators who had run two Japanese-sponsored regimes, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China (中華民國臨時政府) in North China and the Reformed Government of the Republic of China (中華民國維新政府) in Central China, Wang proclaimed a "return of the National Government to its capital" (*Guomin Zhengfu huandu* 國民政府還都) and re-established a "legitimate" central government, which had once moved from Nanjing to Chongqing, and was designated as the head of the Executive Yuan. Despite the fact that the Wang government did not function independently because of the control of Japanese military officers and advisers within the government, the newly instituted government did provide the Clique with more resources and greater executive power to conduct propaganda activities. The financial and political strength of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* was thus enhanced by the new regime.

On the other hand, changes in the structure and the objectives of the propaganda machinery of the new Wang government altered the relationship of the *CCDN* and



the *SCDN* with their sponsors. Before the establishment of the regime, the two papers were practically the only propaganda devices of the Clique. The new government, however, operated much more newspapers and administrative bureaux within its propaganda machinery than before. Despite the fact that the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* continued to be the most authoritative newspapers within Nanjing's jurisdiction, they became just a part of the propaganda system of the Wang government. The role of these two newspapers under the Wang regime became different from before. Moreover, as the political situation in China, especially that in the occupied areas, became greatly different after the establishment of the Wang government, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* had to readjust their attitudes in order to make their pro-Wang propaganda plausible to the Chinese population. This chapter aims to examine the relationship of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* with the new regime, and what these two newspapers tried to publicize to the population in this new political situation.

### **Establishment of the Wang Government: Expansion of the Propaganda Machinery**

The establishment of the new central government in Nanjing in March 1940 resulted in a move of the centre of the Wang Clique's propaganda machinery from Shanghai to Nanjing. The existing Publicity Bureau of the Wang-controlled GMD, which supervised the propaganda activities of the Clique in Shanghai, was transformed into the Ministry of Publicity (Xuanchuanbu 宣傳部), a branch of the Executive Yuan.<sup>1</sup> Lin Bosheng, who had already become one of the highest officials in the Wang government, was designated Minister of Publicity.<sup>2</sup> Many editors and

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<sup>1</sup> The Publicity Bureau continued to exist nominally, but the majority of the personnel and duties of this Bureau were transferred to the new Ministry of Publicity. Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), xiabian, p.1.

<sup>2</sup> Besides the head of the Ministry of Publicity, Lin was also an ex-officio member of the Central Political Council (中央政治委員會), which was the highest decision-making organ of the Wang government, a member of



journalists who had worked for the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* were also introduced by Lin to take high positions in the Ministry.<sup>3</sup> Under Lin's leadership, the Ministry of Publicity became the headquarters of the propaganda machinery of the Wang government. The Ministry supported and controlled a wide propaganda network through an official news agency, a number of newspapers and administrative bureaux in Nanjing's jurisdiction, especially in the lower Yangtze region. The original role of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* as the sole spokesmen of the Wang Clique was much superseded by the new provisions in this propaganda machinery.

### ***Central Press Service and Newspapers in the Wang-controlled Territories***

One of the main achievements of the Ministry of Publicity in this period was the creation of an official and unified news agency within the Wang-controlled territories. This was essential to the propaganda machinery of the Wang government because a well-organized news agency could guarantee an efficient distribution of news which was favourable for the government. It could also help control contents and opinions of the press by monopolizing the source of news. On May 1, 1940, the Ministry merged two existing government-run news agencies, the China United News Agency of the Reformed Government and the China News Agency (中華通訊社) of the Wang Clique into the Central Press Service (中央電訊社). Headquartered in Nanjing, the new news agency inherited the foundation of the two predecessors and maintained a number of sub-bureaux in various cities in Central China, such as

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the Central Executive Committee (中央執行委員會) of the Wang-controlled GMD, and one of the seven Chinese representatives of the negotiation of the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty. Liu Guomin 劉國銘, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo Guomin zhengfu junzheng zhiguan renwuzhi* 中華民國國民政府軍政職官人物誌 (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1989), pp.926-929.

<sup>3</sup> For example, Hu Lancheng was appointed as Deputy Minister of Publicity, Zhao Muru as Deputy Director of the Central Press Service, Liang Xiuyu (梁秀予) as Secretary for General Affairs of the Ministry, Liu Shike, Guo Xiufeng (郭秀峰) as Secretary for Publicity Guidance, Gu Yongjin, Yan Jiabao also took other important posts in the Ministry. "Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian," in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, pp.539-540.



Shanghai, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Bangbu (蚌埠) and Wuhan. The agency soon extended its network to Canton, Hong Kong and Tokyo.<sup>4</sup> It was granted the exclusive right to distribute news issued by the Wang government at both central and local levels.<sup>5</sup> In addition to providing daily domestic and government news, the Central Press Service also dominated the distribution of international news within the Wang-controlled territories by making news exchange agreements with news agencies of the pro-Axis countries, such as Havas and the Trans-Oceans.<sup>6</sup> Even the Reuters, a British news agency, was interested in making a similar agreement with the Wang government.<sup>7</sup> The official status and various privileges accorded to it made the Central Press Service one of the most prominent institutions in the propaganda machinery of the Wang government.

While the Central Press Service contributed to the propaganda machinery of the Wang government through the control the news sources within the Wang-controlled territories, a number of pro-Wang newspapers were set up to help the Wang government conduct propaganda directly to the occupied populations. Before the establishment of the new central government in Nanjing, the Wang Clique only controlled two large-scale newspapers, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, together with a number of mosquito papers and magazines in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The strength of the Wang government in the press was much improved by the Ministry's takeover of thirty-eight newspapers in Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui.<sup>8</sup> All

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<sup>4</sup> The Central Press Service set up its sub-bureaux in Canton, Hong Kong were set up on August 1, 1940 and in Tokyo on November 30, 1940. *Ibid.*, p.683.

<sup>5</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), xiabian, p.75.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p.160.

<sup>7</sup> Letter from the General Manager for the Far East, Reuters Limited (Shanghai) to the Managing Director, Reuters Limited (London), FO371/24660, April 23, 1940.

<sup>8</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu*





these newspapers had been operated by the Reformed Government under the “guidance” of the Information Department (hōdōbu 報道部) of the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Force.<sup>9</sup> They became “subsidiary newspapers” (zhishu baoshe 直屬報社), which were financed and supervised by the Ministry of Publicity of the Wang government. Four of them, which were operated in Nanjing and the provincial capitals of Suzhou, Hangzhou and Bangbu (蚌埠) respectively, were “Class A newspapers” (jiaji baoshe 甲級報社).<sup>10</sup> These four papers were assigned a mission to represent the central government or the provincial governments to “elaborate the theories of the Three Principles of People and the policies of peace and national construction” and “speak for the local population”.<sup>11</sup> In cooperation with other thirty-four Class B or C subsidiary newspapers which published on a smaller scale throughout the lower Yangtze region, these four subsidiary newspapers formed a new backbone of the Ministry’s propaganda system.

In addition to the subsidiary newspapers controlled directly by the Ministry of Publicity, there were some non-official newspapers which supported the peace movement and formed a part of the propaganda machinery of the Wang government. Some of these papers were in fact financed and backed by top leaders of the Wang government. For example, Zhou Fohai, the Minister of Finance of the Wang government, financed two broadsheets *Zhongbao* (the *Central Post* 中報) in Nanjing

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*gongzuo baogao* (1940), xiabian, pp.127-130.

<sup>9</sup> Awaya and Chadani, eds., *Nitchū Sensō: Tai Chūgoku jōhōsen shiryō*, vol.3, p.253.

<sup>10</sup> These four Class A newspapers were *Nanjing Xinbao* (the *New Nanjing Post* 南京新報), *Suzhou Xinbao* (the *New Suzhou Post* 蘇州新報), *Hangzhou Xinbao* (the *New Hangzhou Post* 杭州新報), and *Bangbu Xinbao* (the *New Bangbu Post* 蚌埠新報). “Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian,” in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, pp.752-754.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.754.



and *Pingbao* in Shanghai.<sup>12</sup> Li Shiqun, the head of 76 Jessfield Road and the Deputy Minister of Police, also maintained his personal organ *Kuo Min Daily News* (國民新聞) in Shanghai.<sup>13</sup> All these newspapers served as additional channels for the Wang government to publicize pro-Wang political ideas.

### ***Bureaucracy and the Press in the Wang-controlled Territories: Support and Control***

The expansion of the propaganda network of the Ministry of Publicity also included the establishment of various administrative bureaux which aimed to support or control the publication and business of the newspapers. The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* were no longer always operated and administered directly by the top leaders of the Clique. Instead, they were supported and supervised by the propaganda bureaucracy of the Wang government.

The Ministry set up two offices, namely the Central Newspaper Management Bureau (Zhongyang baoye jinglichu, CNMB 中央報業經理處) and the Central Book and Newspaper Store (Zhongyang shubao faxingsuo, CBNS 中央書報發行所) to support printing and business affairs of the newspapers in the Wang-controlled territories. Established on November 7, 1940, the CNMB was made responsible for distributing printing materials to and soliciting advertisements for the pro-Wang newspapers.<sup>14</sup> The high price of newsprint was one of the most serious problems the newspapers faced during the wartime period. As China did not produce paper suitable for the printing of newspapers, newsprint had always to be imported from

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<sup>12</sup> Jin Xiongbai 金雄白, *Jizhe shengya wushi nian* 記者生涯五十年, vol.2 (Taipei: Yuesheng, 1988), pp.81-86.

<sup>13</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8149/C768, March 31, 1941.

<sup>14</sup> *CCDN*, November 7, 1940.



foreign countries, especially the Scandinavian countries. The European War blocked the newsprint trade between China and these countries. This led to huge fluctuations of price and quantity of newsprint available in the market.<sup>15</sup> In order to ensure that the pro-Wang newspapers had enough newsprint to continue their publication, the CNMB managed to acquire a rather reliable and low-priced newsprint supply through the Japanese Army and introduced a rationing system to the pro-Wang newspapers. By July 1941, the CNMB provided over 4,000 reams of newspapers gratis each month to all thirty-nine subsidiary newspapers and 5,800 reams each month to four non-official pro-Wang newspapers including the *CCDN*. These subsidies amounted to over C\$400,000 per month totally.<sup>16</sup> This greatly reduced the operation cost of the pro-Wang newspapers.

The CNMB also helped the pro-Wang newspapers by acting as their advertisement agency. In fact, the original aim of the CNMB to coordinate advertisement affairs for these newspapers was to provide the Japanese businesses with an efficient channel to advertise their products through Chinese newspapers in the occupied areas. Nevertheless, the work of the CNMB benefited the newspapers substantially because these advertisements provided a considerable amount of revenue to the pro-Wang newspapers. For example, the CNMB was able to provide at least C\$37,000 of advertisement revenue to the pro-Wang newspapers in the month of January 1941.<sup>17</sup> The *CCDN* benefited much from this arrangement because

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<sup>15</sup> Qian Chengxu 錢承緒, ed., *Zhanhou Shanghai de gongshang geye* 戰後上海的工商各業 (Shanghai: Zhongguo jingji yanjiuhui, 1940), pp.176-177. The price of the newsprint increased about eight times from C\$5.20 per ream in May 1937 to over C\$40 in May 1940. "Shanghai shi zhiye tongye gonghui jizhi shijia pingzhun weiyuanhui yangzhi shijia baogaobiao" 上海市紙業同業公會機紙市價評準委員會洋紙市價報告表, SMA, S286-1-15, May 12, 1937; *CCDN*, May 8, 1940.

<sup>16</sup> The non-subsidiary newspapers were nominally required to pay for the newsprint at the import price, but actually they did not need to do so because the Ministry underwrote these payments as indirect subsidies. Letter from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2152, October 30, 1941.

<sup>17</sup> "Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian," in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao*



many Japanese businesses preferred to publish advertisement in the *CCDN*.<sup>18</sup> It improved the financial situation of the *CCDN* and other pro-Wang newspapers.

Another Ministry-administered bureau, the CBNS, was established on August 20, 1940 on the original foundation of the sales network of the China United News Agency. The CBNS was responsible for the sales and the distribution of pro-Wang publications within Nanjing's jurisdiction. It claimed to operate a very wide domestic and international sales network. The CBNS operated twenty sub-bureaux in Central and South China and maintained over 110 points of sale, some of which even reached the United States and Mexico.<sup>19</sup> Most of the sales of the *CCDN*, the *SCDN* and other major pro-Wang newspapers outside their places of publication were dealt with by the CBNS. The CBNS was important for the circulation of all pro-Wang newspapers. On the one hand, the pro-Wang newspapers had to rely on the CBNS to sell their copies legally in these areas because the CBNS was the only institution which was authorized by the Japanese Army to distribute publications in occupied China. On the other hand, the wide sales network of the CBNS did help the newspapers to circulate its copies to much further areas which they could not reach on their own strength.

While the Wang government supported the operation and the sales of the pro-Wang newspapers through the CNMB and the CBNS, it also tried to strengthen its control over pro-Wang publications through an institutionalized system. The main provisions of such control were the issuance of different directives to the newspapers

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*shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, p.747.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp.747-748.

<sup>19</sup> It was highly likely that the overseas points of sale were maintained by underground agents and did not run as independent and public entities. Ibid., p.716.



from time to time and the imposition of press censorship across the Wang-controlled territories.

Apart from the subsidiary newspapers, the personnel and editorial policies of newspapers in the Wang-controlled areas were not controlled directly by the Ministry.<sup>20</sup> In order to ensure that the newspapers followed the propaganda policies of the Ministry or, at least, that they did not express opinions contrary to the peace movement and Sino-Japanese cooperation, the Ministry took initiative to “guide” (*zhidao* 指導) the editorial policies of the papers by sending different directives on an irregular basis to the newspapers. These directives forbid, postponed, or encouraged the publication of particular news in the pro-Wang newspapers.<sup>21</sup> The pro-Wang newspapers were liable to follow these directives or they would be punished by the Ministry.

The Ministry even attempted to unify the tone of the newspapers over important news by issuing circulars of “Publicity Points” (*xuanchuan yaodian* 宣傳要點) to the newspapers and other propaganda bureaux. These circulars aimed to “show the correctness of the peace movement, point out the right trend of the contemporary society, and serve as the reference to the propaganda work as well as the standard of the public opinion.”<sup>22</sup> When there were important domestic or international events, the Ministry formulated propaganda plans and outlines in the form of Publicity

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<sup>20</sup> “Xuanchuanbu zhishu baoshe guanli guize” 宣傳部直屬報社管理規則, SHAC, 2003/2073, May 29, 1941.

<sup>21</sup> In the period between April 1940 and October 1941, the Ministry issued about one hundred directives to the newspapers in Central China. “Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian,” in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, pp.551-557; Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi 中央宣傳部秘書室, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* 中國國民黨中央執行委員會宣傳部工作報告(Nanjing: Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, 1941), pp.15-19.

<sup>22</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), xiabian, p.3.



Points and sent them to the newspapers. In the whole period before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Ministry issued fifty-two circulars of Publicity Points to over a hundred pro-Wang newspapers and government bureaux which dealt with publicity affairs, and instructed them to follow these points to adjust their opinion and conduct suitable propaganda.<sup>23</sup>

The Ministry's control over the press was further strengthened by the development of a unified censorship system across its Wang-controlled territories. The Ministry tried to centralize the power of press censorship, which was at that time held by local governments and Japanese military administrations. The first target of the Ministry was Shanghai. On December 16, 1940, the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Force transferred the Shanghai Newspaper Censorship Office to the Ministry of Publicity of the Wang government.<sup>24</sup> By October 1941, the Censorship Office oversaw six large-scale pro-Wang newspapers and twenty mosquito papers, and made daily analysis of the contents of other pro-resistance newspapers in the city.<sup>25</sup> The Censorship Office helped to detect inappropriate opinion of the pro-Wang newspapers in Shanghai and collected intelligence about the pro-resistance propaganda in the foreign settlements of the city.<sup>26</sup>

### ***Diversification of Propaganda Devices***

Although the Ministry of Publicity relied mainly on newspapers to conduct their

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<sup>23</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1941), pp.12-14.

<sup>24</sup> "Shanghai xinwen jianchasuo gongzuo baogao" 上海新聞檢查所工作報告, SHAC, 2040/89, May 19, 1941.

<sup>25</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1941), pp.78-79.

<sup>26</sup> For example, the *Kuo Min Daily News* was found to fail to comply with the policies of the Wang government and was warned by the Ministry in August 1941. Ibid., p.46; CCDN, November 12, 1941.



propaganda activities, it did not overlook the importance to develop other propaganda channels in the Wang-controlled territories. For instance, the Ministry reformed the China Film Corporation (Zhonghua dianying gufen gongsi 中華電影股份有限公司), which had been jointly operated by the Reformed Government and the Japanese, in December 1940.<sup>27</sup> The Corporation produced documentaries and newsreels to publicize the recent progress of the Wang government and the Japanese Army in Central China. It also imported films and documentaries from Japan and rationed to about thirty cinemas in major cities in Central China.<sup>28</sup> Its mobile film-showing teams travelled around the countryside in the lower Yangtze region and showed newsreels to over 300,000 spectators in the two years ended March 1941.<sup>29</sup> The Corporation hence helped the Wang government to conduct propaganda through films and documentaries.

The radio was another new channel which the Wang government adopted in its propaganda machinery. The Wang government set up the China Broadcasting Development Association (Zhongguo guangbo shiye jianshe xiehui 中國廣播事業建設協會) under the supervision of the Ministry of Publicity in February 1941 and took over broadcasting stations in Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Suzhou and Hankou, which had been operated by the Japanese Expeditionary Force, in April 1941.<sup>30</sup> The Wang government was able to broadcast pro-Wang news reports and high officials' speeches across a broad area in Central China.

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<sup>27</sup> "Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian," in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, p.669.

<sup>28</sup> Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, p.536.

<sup>29</sup> "Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian," in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, pp.830-831.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.670.



Besides films and the radio, the Ministry maintained a number of minor organizations to conduct propaganda in a diversified way. The Ministry organized troupes to travel in Central China to give dramas, chorus and speech performances.<sup>31</sup> The provincial publicity bureaux were responsible for mobilizing the local population to participate in mass gatherings, lectures, seminars and other public activities to familiarize the populace with the Wang government and the peace movement.<sup>32</sup>

The extent of the expansion of propaganda machinery was reflected in the increase of delegates present in publicity conferences of the Wang government. In February 1940, a month before the establishment of the Wang government, the Publicity Bureau of the Wang-controlled GMD invited publicity bureaux and pro-Wang publications to send representatives to attend an “Extended Publicity Conference” (Kuoda xuanchuan huiyi 擴大宣傳會議) in Shanghai. There were 97 delegates present in this conference.<sup>33</sup> When the Ministry of Publicity held a similar conference “National Publicity Conference” (Quanguo xuanchuan huiyi 全國宣傳會議) in June 1941, the number of the delegates rose to 226.<sup>34</sup> This showed that the propaganda machinery of the Wang government grew much larger, at least in terms of the number of publicity bureaux, after the establishment of the regime.

The expansion of the propaganda activities of the Wang government changed the roles of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* in the peace movement. On the one hand, these

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp.773-775.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp.834-870.

<sup>33</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), shangbian, p.49.

<sup>34</sup> *CCDN*, June 2, 1941.





two newspapers were no longer the sole spokesmen of the Clique and became only a part of the whole propaganda machinery. On the other hand, however, their close relationship with the top officials of the government continued to make them the most authoritative organs of the Wang government, and played a crucial role in articulating the ideas of the peace movement.

### **The CCDN: A Non-official but Authoritative Organ of the Wang Government**

#### ***Special Status of the CCDN in the New Regime***

The new propaganda machinery of the Wang government changed the relationship between the *CCDN* and its sponsor. Before the establishment of the Wang government, the *CCDN* was practically the only reliable channel for the Wang Clique to articulate its political ideas in Central China. The paper was controlled and financed directly by the Wang Clique and its party system. Lin Bosheng and other top leaders of the Clique often participated in the actual editorial work and daily management of the paper.<sup>35</sup> The official news of the peace movement and important essays of the Clique leaders were also made public through the *CCDN* exclusively. Such a close relationship between the *CCDN* and the Clique made the paper the official spokesman of the Clique in Central China.

This official status of the *CCDN* was, however, much superseded in the new government by various bureaux and newspapers administered by the Ministry of Publicity. The *CCDN* was placed outside the direct control of the new bureaucracy and remained as a non-official newspaper.<sup>36</sup> Lin Bosheng and the leading personnel

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<sup>35</sup> Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), shangbian, p.1.

<sup>36</sup> “Zhao Junyue xunwen bilu” 趙尊嶽詢問筆錄, SMA, Q187-1-106, June 14, 1946,



withdrew from the daily operation of the *CCDN* for their new posts in Nanjing. Hu Lancheng was still responsible for writing editorials of the *CCDN* in the early days of the regime, but he soon resigned from the newspaper as his relationship with Lin Bosheng deteriorated in 1941.<sup>37</sup> Their work was taken over by minor associates Xu Liquiu, Liu Shike and Liang Shi (梁式).<sup>38</sup> Unlike the subsidiary newspapers administered by the Ministry of Publicity, the *CCDN* was nominally autonomous for managing its finance and personnel. Moreover, the *CCDN* lost most of the advantage of publishing first-hand information about the peace movement because this privilege was transferred to the Central Press Service. All these developments showed that the official status of the *CCDN* in the publicity of the peace movement was reduced considerably after the establishment of the Wang government.

It is, however, not correct to think that the importance of the *CCDN* to the Wang government diminished. Although the *CCDN* did not have an official status in the government, its long-established and close relationship with the high officials of the Ministry of Publicity meant that the paper still enjoyed an authoritative position in the pro-Wang press. Despite his withdrawal from daily operation of the paper, Lin Bosheng was still the proprietor and director of the *CCDN*. Many other high officials in the Ministry of Publicity were transferred on an irregular basis between the Ministry and the *CCDN*. Some of them even worked concurrently in the Ministry and the *CCDN*.<sup>39</sup> On the contrary, although the subsidiary newspapers were

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<sup>37</sup> Hu, *Jinsheng jinshi*, vol.1, p.208.

<sup>38</sup> Xu Liquiu was appointed first as Deputy Director (*fushezhang* 副社長), and later Acting Director (*daishezhang* 代社長), of the newspaper, Liu Shike as the editor-in-chief, Liang Shi as the editorialist. Guo, "Wang wei shiqi de 'Zhonghua ribao'," pp.151-152.

<sup>39</sup> For example, Gu Yongjin was concurrently the officer for special publicity in the Ministry of Publicity and the Deputy Director of the *CCDN*. Letter from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2150, September 13, 1941.



officially controlled by the Ministry, the majority of their personnel was appointed by the Reformed Government and had a different background from the publicists of the Wang Clique. The Ministry was also unable to exercise a full control over these papers because the local Japanese military administrations still maintained great influence on these newspapers.

Moreover, the *CCDN* was important for the Wang government because this was the largest newspaper in the Wang-controlled areas. Most of the subsidiary newspapers operated on a small scale. *Nanjing Xinbao*, the largest subsidiary newspaper of the Ministry, only published about 19,300 copies a day in June 1941.<sup>40</sup> Some of the subsidiary newspapers in the countryside even published fewer than 500 copies a day.<sup>41</sup> The *CCDN*, however, continued to grow after the establishment of the Wang government. The paper expanded its office in Shanghai in March 1940 by renting a four-storey building in North Honan Road, which was situated in the Japanese-controlled district of the International Settlement.<sup>42</sup> Throughout the period between March 1940 and December 1941, it managed to publish at least 60,000 copies a day.<sup>43</sup> As a result, the *CCDN* was the largest beneficiary of the newsprint rationing system of the Ministry.<sup>44</sup> Of the total 8,510 reams of newsprint provided free by the Ministry to the pro-Wang newspapers in August 1940, the *CCDN* was

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<sup>40</sup> “Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian,” in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, p.889.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p.914.

<sup>42</sup> Letter from Fu Zongyao to the Financial Bureau of the Shanghai Municipal Government, SMA, R32-1-130, March 12, 1940.

<sup>43</sup> “Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian,” in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, p.877.

<sup>44</sup> Before the establishment of the Wang government, the *CCDN* had to pay C\$45,000 monthly to import newsprint from Japan through the *Tariku Shimpō* (大陸新報), a Japanese newspaper in Shanghai. The new Ministry of Publicity soon took over the import of newsprint from Japan for the over forty pro-Wang newspapers in Central China. Letter from Zhao Shuyong to Lin Bosheng, SHAC, 2040/36 April 15, 1940; Letter from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2153, August 2, 1940.



estimated to have received about 2,500 reams, which amounted to C\$56,250. All these statistics showed that the Ministry still regarded the *CCDN* as the most reliable and authoritative newspaper of the Wang government and provided a considerable amount of resources to the *CCDN*.

***Struggling for National Autonomy: Scepticism of the CCDN in the Early Days of the Regime***

The establishment of the Wang government in Nanjing represented a new phase of the peace movement. The regime provided the Wang Clique with an arena to show the Chinese population that the Clique was capable of realizing what it had advocated for over a year: an honourable peace with Japan, suppression of the Communists, and national development (*heping fangong jianguo* 和平反共建國). Being the most reliable and authoritative organ of the Wang Clique, the *CCDN* was no doubt ready to support the new government wholeheartedly. The paper was entrusted with the task to convince the population that the new government would ultimately lead the nation to overcome the wartime difficulties and restore the full sovereignty of China.

Nevertheless, the *CCDN* editors did not fail to see that the new government had weaknesses and limitations. The gravest problem was how to guarantee the autonomy of the new government, which the Clique had promised to the Chinese population. In the first few months of the regime, Japan did not promise to withdraw its troops from the occupied areas. It even did not give any substantial assistance to the new government. The contradiction between the determination of the Wang government to restore the autonomy of China and the unfavourable reality made it difficult for the *CCDN* to adopt a clear and consistent attitude towards the current



situation. During the few months after the establishment of the new government, the *CCDN* editors were sometimes dubious about the future of the regime, and doubted whether the new government had enough prestige and power to exert the authority it claimed to possess.

It was not surprising that there was widespread enthusiasm and expectation among the pro-Wang supporters towards the peace movement during the early days of the new regime. The *CCDN* was also much cheered up by the establishment of the Wang government. The paper regarded the restoration of the National Government in Nanjing as a concrete example to illustrate Japanese sincerity and willingness to make peace with China. An editor of the *CCDN* commented on the new central government as follows:

Everybody knows that the capital [Nanjing] was occupied. Now the National Government returns to the capital which was occupied. It means that we have already recovered the occupied area... Based on this fact, we can understand that China and Japan are now on the road to peace.<sup>45</sup>

The *CCDN* were also keen to express their expectations towards the Wang government. A writer, for example, listed four expectations of the new government, including restoration of normal life, economic stabilization, suppression of the Communists, and a peace settlement with Japan. He urged the government “to realize these expectations with concrete achievements”.<sup>46</sup> Other writers and editors tried to give more substantial suggestions to the government to rebuild the nation, such as a

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<sup>45</sup> “Guofu huandu de yiyi” 國府還都的意義, Editorial, *CCDN*, March 22, 1940.

<sup>46</sup> Zhengzhi 政之(pesud.), “Wo duiyu guofu huandu hou de qiwang” 我對於國府還都後的期望, *CCDN*, March 27, 1940.



campaign to repatriate peasants from urban areas to the countryside.<sup>47</sup> These showed that the *CCDN* was eager to depict the new government as fully functional.

However, behind the general facade of enthusiasm towards the new government, the *CCDN* soon exhibited some worries as to about whether the Wang government was autonomous and strong enough to fulfil these expectations. In fact, the political situation in the occupied areas was not changed significantly in the first few months after the establishment of the central government. Although the new government was a product of the secret agreement between the Wang Clique and Japan in December 1939, it was not received by Japan with enthusiasm at the time of the establishment. The Japanese government did not officially recognize the Wang government immediately after its inauguration, nor did it take any substantial action to help to strengthen the new government. Faced with lack of any significant action, the *CCDN* did not refrain itself from urging the Japanese administrations, albeit politely, to take concrete steps to show its amiability to the new government:

The peace proposal has already been put forward, but we have to continue our struggle to implement this peace proposal. For instance, the headquarters of the Japanese expeditionary force in China declared the return of assets to the Chinese on the eve of the reorganization of the National Government [in Nanjing]. All these actions should be carried out universally and quickly, so that the Chinese population can have greater confidence in the National Government [in Nanjing] and can abandon its suspicion of peace suggested by Japan.<sup>48</sup>

However, the impasse of the status of Wang government in the first few months after the establishment of the Wang government made the *CCDN* quite pessimistic

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<sup>47</sup> “Women xuyao yige nongmin huanxiang yundong” 我們需要一個農民還鄉運動, Editorial, *CCDN*, April 13, 1940.

<sup>48</sup> “Chedi jie jue zhongri shibian” 澈底解決中日事變, Editorial, *CCDN*, April 25, 1940.



towards the future of the Wang government. The editors started to worry that the momentum would soon wane, and that the peace movement would end in failure:

If the National Government [in Nanjing] cannot unify China within a year, the future of the peace movement would be very dim... At that time, Japan will do many things [in the occupied China] for us. This is not what we want, nor is what Japan wants. In cases this really happens, we will be ashamed to face the population and Mr. Wang.<sup>49</sup>

Even when Japan took a further step to support the Wang government, the *CCDN* was still very cautious about the Japanese willingness to give a free hand to the new government. In July 1940, Japan delegated Abe Nobuyuki (阿部信行), the former Japanese Prime Minister and at that time the Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the Wang government, to conduct formal negotiation with the Wang government. As the Ministry of Publicity instructed all newspapers to publicize the negotiation in a positive manner in order dispel people's doubt about the possibility of success of peace with Japan, the *CCDN* tried to explain to its readers that Japan would certainly treat China on an equal basis during the negotiation.<sup>50</sup> However, the *CCDN* discreetly avoided being too optimistic. It often suggested implicitly that Japan did not respect the "free will" of China and was not willing to make fair peace terms with China.<sup>51</sup> It complained on an occasion that Japan tended to dominate diplomatic and military affairs in China, which were supposed to be controlled by the Wang government:

China and Japan are in agreement with each other militarily and diplomatically. However,

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<sup>49</sup> "Shi 'zuiji jingshen'" 釋「罪己精神」, Editorial, *CCDN*, May 11, 1940.

<sup>50</sup> "Xuanchuan yaodian huibian dier ji" 宣傳要點彙編第二輯, in *Zhongyang xuanchuanbu mishushi, Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao* (1940), xiabian, p.28; "Heping lilun zhengwu" 和平理論正誤, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 24, 1940.

<sup>51</sup> "Shijie zhanzheng yu zhongri heping zhouxin" 世界戰爭與中日和平軸心, Editorial, *CCDN*, July 8, 1940.



Japan should in principle recognize that China has its own autonomous space in the international politics. Technically speaking, Japan should assist China and not take it upon itself to represent China.<sup>52</sup>

In order to remedy the uncertainty about Japanese willingness to support the Wang government, the *CCDN* tried to demonstrate the strength of the Wang government to Chinese population in another way. This time the paper turned to condemn the Westerners for their privileges in Shanghai. The *CCDN* asserted that some Western powers, particularly Britain and the United States, regarded themselves as the masters of China and enslaved the Chinese population through the foreign concessions. The paper became very hostile against these Western powers and depicted the Wang government as the “combat headquarters” for liberation of the Chinese nation from Westerners.<sup>53</sup> An editor insisted that the first thing which the government should do was to recover foreign concessions:

The first task [of the central government] should be to recover foreign concessions. It is only when the foreign concessions are recovered that [we] can cut the link between imperialism and the Chongqing regime, can eliminate the power base of the comprador class, can unite the nation, and can achieve nationwide peace.<sup>54</sup>

The editor even claimed that China, under the leadership of the Wang government, had the power to recover the foreign concessions.<sup>55</sup> The hostility of the *CCDN* towards the authorities of the foreign concessions reached the highest point when Mu Shiyong, the director of the pro-Wang *Kuo Min Daily News*, was

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<sup>52</sup> “Zhongri junshi waijiao yizhi de yuanze yu jishu” 中日軍事外交一致的原則與技術, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 19, 1940.

<sup>53</sup> “Guomin zhengfu huandu xianci” 國民政府還都獻辭, Editorial, *CCDN*, March 30, 1940.

<sup>54</sup> “Shouhui zujie yundong” 收回租界運動, Editorial, *CCDN*, April 9, 1940.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.





assassinated by Chongqing agents on June 28, 1940. The *CCDN* alleged that the SMC had insulted Mu before his death and connived at the assassination. It asked the SMC to apologize and guarantee that no similar incident would happen again, otherwise the Wang government would take action against the foreign concessions.<sup>56</sup> The *CCDN* clearly hoped to use its firm stance towards the Westerners in China to convince people of the intention and the power of the Wang government to build up an administration free from foreign control.

However, the *CCDN* failed to sustain such an anti-foreign attitude for a long time. The paper's intimidatory attitude against the foreign authorities was never supported by corresponding actions of the Wang government. Recovering the foreign concessions in Shanghai, not to mention those in other Chinese cities, was far beyond the ability of the Wang government. Inability of the Wang government to recover foreign concessions put the Wang government and the *CCDN* in an embarrassing position because the population might have an impression that the new government could not realize what it advocated. On the other hand, this unfriendly attitude also endangered the survival of the *CCDN* in the International Settlement. Although the SMC was not powerful enough to prevent terrorist activities in Shanghai, it could still punish or even suppress the paper if it found that the paper seriously threatened the effective administration of the SMC. In fact, the SMC demonstrated this power clearly by temporarily suspending the publication of the pro-Wang *Kuo Min Daily News*, which published an inflammatory editorial, in May 1940.<sup>57</sup> From the second half of the year 1940, the *CCDN* editors avoided emphasizing the urgency of

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<sup>56</sup> "Ansha, Jiang Jinagshi zhengquan yu zhujie zhidu" 暗殺，蔣介石政權，與租界制度, Editorial, *CCDN*, June 29, 1940.

<sup>57</sup> Letter from K.M. Bourne to Secretary & Commissioner General, SMC, SMP, D-8149/C768, May 7, 1940.



recovering the foreign concessions. They no longer challenged the authority of the SMC when they discussed the issues about the International Settlement. The recovery of the foreign concessions was only mentioned briefly in most cases. For example, the paper adopted a milder attitude when it criticized the attempt of the SMC to increase land rates:

As the existence of foreign concessions was unreasonable in itself, most of the practices derived from them were also unreasonable... The best solution is to abolish the foreign concessions. But with regard to the present circumstance, we should at least firmly and righteously stop the financial extravagance of the authorities of foreign concessions.<sup>58</sup>

In the first half year of the Wang regime, the *CCDN* was not successful in depicting the new government as an autonomous entity which could lead the Chinese nation. The editors were cautious about the future of the new regime, and they failed to sustain a hard-line attitude towards the foreigners to exhibit the autonomy of the new government. The attitude of the *CCDN* was hence mixed with expectation and disappointment. It was not until the Wang government and Japan signed the Basic Treaty for the Readjustment of Sino-Japanese Relations (*Zhongri tiaozheng guojiao jiben tiaoyue* 中日調整國交基本條約) on November 30, 1940 that the *CCDN* came to have a clearer vision of the role of the Wang government in Sino-Japanese relations.

### ***China in the New Order of East Asia: Attitudes of the CCDN towards Peace and Sino-Japanese Cooperation***

The signing of the Basic Treaty had two major effects on the Wang government. These effects eventually shaped the attitudes of the *CCDN* during the pre-Pacific War

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<sup>58</sup> “Zailun Gongbuju jiajuan wenti” 再論工部局加捐問題, Editorial, *CCDN*, January 22, 1941.



period. First, the Basic Treaty provided Wang's followers with a seemingly sound answer to the future of the peace movement. It was true that the provisions of the Treaty were very unfavourable for the Wang government. They allowed Japan to station troops and enjoy special economic privileges in practically all important regions in occupied China.<sup>59</sup> The Wang government also had to recognize Manchukuo, which meant an official abandonment of the Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.<sup>60</sup> However, this treaty was in fact the greatest achievement of the peace movement, and represented the most substantial promise of Japan to the Wang government so far. Japan finally recognized the Wang government. More significantly, it officially promised to finish the withdrawal of its troops from Chinese territories other than the strategic areas in two years after "peace is restored". It also agreed to abandon its extritorial rights in China.<sup>61</sup> These promises reinforced an idea of pro-Wang supporters that the Wang government was able to regain what China had lost in the War.<sup>62</sup>

Second, the Basic Treaty helped to shift the focus of the peace movement gradually from national survival to Sino-Japanese cooperation. Before the establishment of the new central government and signing of the Basic Treaty, the Wang Clique avoided focusing on the notion of the New Order of East Asia or other theoretical justification for Sino-Japanese cooperation for fear that the Chinese might mistake the peace movement for surrender to Japan. The Clique preferred to use

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<sup>59</sup> Gaimushō 外務省, ed., *Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabi shuyō bunsho, 1840-1945* 日本外交年表並主要文書, 1840-1945, vol.2, (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966) pp.467-471.

<sup>60</sup> Zhonghua minguo waijiaobu [Nanjing] 中華民國外交部, ed., *Zhonggriman gongtong xuanyan* 中日滿共同宣言 (Nanjing: Zhonghua minguo waijiaobu, 1940).

<sup>61</sup> Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabi shuyō bunsho*, vol.2, p.468.

<sup>62</sup> Lin Bosheng, "Dao fuxing zhilu" 到復興之路, *CCDN*, December 8, 1940.



other reasons, such as fighting for national survival, as its rationale for the peace movement. However, as the Basic treaty was supposed to solve some sensitive issues about the Sino-Japanese War, the Wang government justified that there was a solid foundation for China and Japan to develop closer cooperation. The willingness of the Wang government to assist in building up the New Order of East Asia was explained by Wang at the signing ceremony of the Basic Treaty:

From now on, the two great nations [China and Japan] respect and help each other on an equal basis. Politically [we] respect the independence and freedom of each other; economically [we] benefit each other; [we] work hard together to build the New Order of East Asia, and to establish the foundation of co-existence and co-prosperity. These are what make this treaty so important.<sup>63</sup>

The new relations between the Wang regime and Japan under the Basic Treaty changed the attitude and emphasis of the *CCDN*. The paper showed less uncertainty about the future of the Wang government and expressed less pessimistic opinions in their commentaries. During the period between the signing of the Basic Treaty and the outbreak of the Pacific War, the *CCDN* particularly focused on two main themes: general peace in China, and Sino-Japanese cooperation under the name of the New Order of East Asia.

When the *CCDN* editors discussed the prospect of general peace in China, they always put the blame on the Chongqing government and the Communists. Although the *CCDN* had been attacking the Chongqing government and the Communists since it resumed publication in July 1939, the focus of these anti-Chongqing and anti-Communist propaganda changed after the establishment of the Wang regime and

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<sup>63</sup> *CCDN*, December 1, 1940.



the signing of the Basic Treaty with Japan. The *CCDN* no longer aimed to legitimize the peace movement by discrediting the Chongqing government and the Communists because the Wang government had already declared itself as the legitimate ruler of China. Instead, the paper aimed to indoctrinate its readers in the occupied areas with the idea that the Chongqing government and the Communists hindered general peace in China and hence were the enemies of the nation. The anti-Chongqing and anti-Communist standpoint of the paper during this period was clearly explained in one of the editorials of the *CCDN*:

Propaganda is a weapon in ideological warfare. We should adopt a combative attitude to reveal Chongqing's dishonesty to the population, to crush the Communists' plots, and to expose the evil of the Communist Party. [We should let] the whole nation understand thoroughly that Chongqing and the Communists have ruined the nation, and that the peace movement is a revolutionary movement which aims to save the nation.<sup>64</sup>

The editors tried to depict the Chongqing regime and the Communists as a British-American puppet and a Soviet puppet respectively.<sup>65</sup> In contrast with the endeavour of the Wang government to recover the territories and properties which China had lost in the War, the Chongqing government continued to exhaust the national strength to exchange for limited loans and military assistance from the Western powers.<sup>66</sup> Chiang and his followers were described as “gamblers” who believed vainly in final victory and poured all the limited resources of the nation on an unrealistic goal:

Unfortunately, there are now many “statesmen”, such as those in Chongqing, who adhered

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<sup>64</sup> “Fahui sixiangzhan de liliang” 發揮思想戰的力量, Editorial, *CCDN*, June 6, 1941.

<sup>65</sup> “Jiang Jieshi yu Gongchandang” 蔣介石與共產黨, Editorial, *CCDN*, March 10, 1941.

<sup>66</sup> “Yufang de yingmei luxian” 渝方的英美路線, Editorial, *CCDN*, May 16, 1941.



obstinately to error and dreamed about final victory. They surrender the magnificent territories to outsiders [to sustain their resistance], but they do not seem to know that they have only limited territories [to lose], and the final victory will never come.<sup>67</sup>

However, while the *CCDN* editors publicized the idea that the Chongqing government and the Communists hindered general peace of China, they did little to define the role of the Wang government in achieving general peace. The editors often made gave an ambiguous statement that the Wang government would achieve general peace by first achieving “partial peace” first within its jurisdiction, but they did not provide any substantial suggestion as to how the Wang government could deal with the Chongqing government. As a result, criticism of the *CCDN* against the Chongqing government and the Communists often remained empty words, without much significant effect on the development of general peace.

Another theme of the *CCDN* during this period was promotion of closer Sino-Japanese cooperation. As Japan officially assured the Wang government that it would respect the autonomy of the Wang regime, the paper abandoned most of its scepticism towards the future of the new regime and expressed its willingness to cooperate with Japan under the New Order in East Asia:

This spirit [of the Basic Treaty] exhibits that China and Japan respect the national existence of each other, exert their own authority according to their needs, so that China and Japan can get what they should have respectively. Based on this equal status, [the two nations] work to enable East Asia to get what it should have... The races in East Asia unite together to recast the circumstances of East Asia and to build a new order [in East Asia]... China will share a common responsibility for a common destiny [with East Asia].<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> “Pi ‘Zuihou shengli’” 闢「最後勝利」, Editorial, *CCDN*, April 30, 1941.

<sup>68</sup> “Xin shidai de kaishi” 新時代的開始, Editorial, *CCDN*, December 1, 1940.



Unlike the previous reluctance to support the Japanese notion of the New Order of East Asia, the *CCDN* now emphasized that Sino-Japanese cooperation meant not only peace and friendship between the two nations, but also the belief that China should contribute its own power to assist Japan to build up the new order.

However, the *CCDN* editors seemed to have no clear understanding of the concept of the New Order of East Asia and tended to explain this concept vaguely. In most cases, the *CCDN* regarded the New Order of East Asia as an equivalent for the East Asian Federation Movement (*Dongya lianmeng yundong* 東亞聯盟運動).<sup>69</sup> The movement was formally introduced from Japan to China in February 1941, aiming to enhance cooperation among East Asian countries under four principles: political autonomy, economic cooperation, military alliance and cultural exchange. In order to justify Sino-Japanese cooperation under the notion of the New Order of East Asia or the East Asian Federation Movement, the *CCDN* editors once again related them to the revolutionary legacy of Sun Yat-sen.:

Since the [Marco Polo Bridge] Incident... when people come across the terms such as the New Order of East Asia and the East Asian Federation, most of them do not study them carefully and make a hasty conclusion that these terms are synonymous with Japanese aggression in China. In fact, the New Order of East Asia represents the spirit of Pan-Asianism of the Founding Father [Sun Yat-sen]. The East Asian Federation is the implementation of this spirit. [As] the first among four principles [of the East Asian Federation] clearly states political autonomy [among the East Asian nations], what is the basis for people to insist that these concepts are synonymous with Japanese aggression in China?<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> On February 1, *Dongya lianmeng Zhongguo zonghui* (The China Society of the East Asian Federation 東亞聯盟中國總會) was set up in Nanjing. It was a semi-official organization chaired by Wang Jingwei. Most of the high officials of the Wang government were core members of the Society. Wang proclaimed in the inauguration speech that the construction of the New Order of East Asia and the East Asian Federation had the same meaning. *CCDN*, February 2, 1941.

<sup>70</sup> “Weida de xuntiao” 偉大的訓條, Editorial, *CCDN*, June 3, 1941.



One of the main goals of the New Order of East Asia or the East Asian Federation Movement was to destroy Westerners' domination in East Asia. This often implied that military confrontation between the Western powers and the Asian nations was necessary in order to achieve this goal. In fact, one of the four principles of the East Asian Federation was to form a military alliance among the member-nations. However, the Wang government always regarded itself as a promoter of peace and hoped to exclude itself from any war. While the *CCDN* supported closer Sino-Japanese cooperation, it tried to isolate China from possible wars caused by the New Order of East Asia. Hu Lancheng explained such contradiction in the *CCDN*:

Look at the strength of China. What can the National Government [in Nanjing] rely on to participate in an external war? It is extremely foolish to think that we need to participate in wars for maintaining unity of action [with Japan]. What China can help Japan with is something political. China can unite the liberation movements of the East Asian people based on its experience and its current struggle against the Western aggressions. It can also maintain the ports in East Asia accessible freely by Japan. [If we can achieve them,] Japan will benefit much and we can achieve unity of action [with Japan].<sup>71</sup>

Even when a war between Japan and the United States became increasingly unavoidable in late 1941, the *CCDN* still showed its hope to avoid direct participation in any war:

We hope that Japan and the United States can avoid conflicts, but we do not have such power to realize our hope. The only thing which we can do is to keep the negative impacts on China to a minimum. Now some parts of China [under Chongqing's control] still fight against Japan and lean on the United States. If we can stop these relationships immediately, we can restore normal relationship with these two countries – that means we can hope that they can

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<sup>71</sup> Hu Lancheng, “Wo duiyu heping yundong de xinnian” 我對於和平運動的信念, *CCDN*, December 13, 1940.





coexist peacefully.<sup>72</sup>

In general, during the period between the signing of the Basic Treaty and the outbreak of the Pacific War, the *CCDN* became more confident of the Wang regime and helped the government attack the Chongqing government and the Communists. The paper also became more confident of the Japanese and propagated Sino-Japanese cooperation in the notion of the New Order of East Asia. As the *CCDN* was essentially the authoritative newspaper of the Wang regime, its opinions were little challenged in the Wang-controlled territories. However, the pro-Wang and pro-Japanese colours of the *CCDN* continued to face serious attacks from the pro-Chongqing influence in Shanghai.

### ***Terrorist War in the Press of Shanghai and the Readership of the CCDN***

The establishment of the Wang government and the expansion of the pro-Wang propaganda network in Central China made the situation of the press of Shanghai even more complicated. The two rival governments in Chongqing and Nanjing increased their efforts to diminish the influence of each other in the press of Shanghai. During the period from July 1940 to the eve of the Pacific War in December 1941, the terrorist war in the press of Shanghai between the Chongqing and Wang agents reached its climax. A number of journalists working for pro-Chongqing or pro-Wang newspapers were kidnapped, attacked or assassinated. Newspaper offices were frequently bombed or raided by agents. Being the largest pro-Wang newspaper, the *CCDN* continued to be one of the major targets in this terrorist war. The staff of the paper worked in an extreme difficulty during this period.

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<sup>72</sup> “Women duiyu Rimei guanxi de taidu” 我們對於日美關係的態度, Editorial, *CCDN*, October 28, 1941.



The new tide of the terrorist war in the press of Shanghai started with the murder of Mu Shiying, the director of the pro-Wang *Kuo Min Daily News* and the editor of the literary supplement of the *CCDN*, by two Chongqing agents in the International Settlement on June 28, 1940.<sup>73</sup> The Wang government retaliated by promulgating an order for the arrest of forty-four pro-Chongqing journalists in Shanghai on July 1. Many leading pro-Chongqing journalists in Shanghai, such as Pan Gongbi (潘公弼), Jin Huating (金華亭) and Zhao Junhao (趙君豪) of *Shun Pao*, Gu Zhizhong (顧執中) of *Sin Wen Pao*, and Zhang Sixu (張似旭) of *Ta Mei Wan Pao* were on the list of this order for arrest.<sup>74</sup> This order was followed by Wang's instruction to Fu Zongyao, the Nanjing-appointed mayor of Shanghai, to deport seven foreign newspapermen in Shanghai.<sup>75</sup>

The Wang government had no authority to carry out these orders in the foreign settlements in Shanghai. However, this did not mean at all that these journalists were safe. In fact, the agents controlled by the Wang government or the Japanese authorities succeeded in executing these orders against at least six Chinese journalists in the foreign concessions of Shanghai. During the period between July 1940 and December 1941, three of them were killed, one was injured, and two were arrested.<sup>76</sup> Many pro-Chongqing newspapermen who were not listed on the order for arrest also

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<sup>73</sup> *CCDN*, June 29, 1940.

<sup>74</sup> There were totally eighty-three persons listed in this order for arrest. They were accused of being "lackeys" of Chiang and the Communists under the protection of the foreign settlements in Shanghai, starting anti-Wang rumours through foreign-registered newspapers, or assassinating pro-Wang followers. *CCDN*, July 2, 1940.

<sup>75</sup> They were Randall Gould and C.V. Starr of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, N.F. Allman of *Shun Pao*, T.B. Powell of the *China Weekly Review*, Hal. P. Millis of *Hwa Mei Wan Pao*, Sanderr Pates of the *British Evening News* (大英夜報), and a radio transmitter called Car. Roll. Alcott. *CCDN*, July 15, 1940.

<sup>76</sup> Among these six victims, Zhang Sixu, Cheng Zhenzhang (程振章) and Jin Huating were killed, Gu Zhizhong was injured, Ni Lanshen (倪瀾深) and Zhang Ruogu (張若谷) were arrested. Cheng Qiheng 程其恆, *Zhanshi zhongguo baoye* 戰時中國報業 (Guilin: Mingzhen chubanshe, 1944), pp.43-46; Gu Zhizhong 顧執中, *Baoren shengya* 報人生涯 (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1987), pp.658-662.



became victims of the Wang agents. At least four employees working for pro-Chongqing newspapers or news agencies in Shanghai were killed by the Wang agents.<sup>77</sup> Besides assaults on journalists, the Wang agents also launched attacks on the offices of major pro-Chongqing newspapers. *Ta Mei Wan Pao*, for example, found unexploded bombs in its office three times in the three months between July and September 1940.<sup>78</sup> The office of *Shun Pao* in the International Settlement was bombed three times in July 1940, November 1940 and January 1941 respectively.<sup>79</sup>

While the Wang agents launched fierce offensive against the pro-resistance newspapers, the Chongqing agents were also much involved in terrorist attacks on the pro-Wang newspapers and their staffs in Shanghai. After Mu Shiying was killed in June 1940, his successor in *Kuo Min Daily News*, Liu Na'ou (劉訥鷗), met the same fate on September 3, 1940.<sup>80</sup> Li Xiaoti (李孝悌), who worked in *Shun Pao* as an undercover agent of 76 Jessfield Road, was seriously wounded by a hammer attack on January 7, 1941.<sup>81</sup>

Being the largest pro-Wang newspaper, the *CCDN* became one of the main targets of the terrorist attacks at that time. The staff members of the paper were very careful about their personal security. For instance, Ye Xuesong, the general manager of the *CCDN*, often wore a pistol when he was on the streets.<sup>82</sup> The premises of the

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<sup>77</sup> They were Shao Xubai (邵虛白) of the Daguang News Agency (Daguang tongxunshe 大光通訊社), Wen Tiansheng (聞天聲) of the *CADN*, Zhu Zuotong (朱作同) of *Hwa Mei Wan Pao*, and Li Junying (李駿英) of *Ta Mei Wan Pao*. *CCDN*, July 2, 1940, April 29, 1941, May 1, 1941, June 24, 1941.

<sup>78</sup> Cheng, *Zhanshi zhongguo baoye*, pp.36-37.

<sup>79</sup> Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands*, pp.116-117.

<sup>80</sup> *CCDN*, September 4, 1940.

<sup>81</sup> *CCDN*, January 8, 1941.

<sup>82</sup> Police Report, SMP, D-8155(1), September 5, 1940.



*CCDN* were protected by seven Wang-controlled municipal policemen and a team of security guards sent by 76 Jessfield Road.<sup>83</sup> But these measures were still unable to stop sabotage and bomb attacks by Chongqing agents. The most successful sabotage within the *CCDN* occurred on December 4, 1940. The paper's compositors who worked clandestinely for the Chongqing agents inserted a small text "Down with Wang Jingwei the traitor" (*dadao Wang Jingwei maiguozei* 打倒汪精衛賣國賊) in an advertisement of the paper on that day.<sup>84</sup> This was a great embarrassment to the paper and it incurred a severe warning by the Ministry of Publicity.<sup>85</sup> There were also some minor bomb attacks on the office of the *CCDN*. In the first two weeks of October 1940, for example, there were two attempted bomb attacks on the offices of the *CCDN* by the Chongqing agents. The first attack took place on October 3. A grenade was thrown into the back door of the office in North Honan Road, but it remained unexploded.<sup>86</sup> This was followed by the second attack on October 10, when a Chongqing agent called Shi Ting (施艇) threw two grenades into the sales office of the paper in Honan Road. One grenade exploded but nobody was hurt.<sup>87</sup>

The most disastrous terrorist attack on the *CCDN* happened in the evening of August 9, 1941. A bomb was thrown into a machinery room in the *CCDN* office building in North Honan Road. The bomb explosion led to a great fire which burnt the whole four-storey building. The capture of the raider by the Japanese Gendarmeries on August 22 confirmed that this attack was plotted by the Chongqing

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<sup>83</sup> Letter from the *CCDN* to Shanghai Municipal Government, SMA, R1-4-1283, August 13, 1941; Qu Jun 瞿鈞, ed., *Jingan qu zhi* 靜安區志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1996), p.1142.

<sup>84</sup> This anti-Wang text appeared in an advertisement of an amusement house called "Dasheng" (大生). The original text should be "Big sum to invite the Queen of Ningbo opera" (重金聘請甬劇皇后). *CCDN*, December 4, 1940.

<sup>85</sup> *CCDN*, December 5, 1940.

<sup>86</sup> *CCDN*, October 12, 1940.

<sup>87</sup> *CCDN*, October 11, 1940.



agents in Shanghai.<sup>88</sup> The number of casualties was not very great as the attack did not occur during office hours. Only five printing workers were injured in this explosion.<sup>89</sup> But this attack caused serious disruption to the operation of the newspaper. Printing machines, newsprint, stationery and other facilities in the building were totally destroyed. The material loss of the *CCDN* amounted to about CRB\$575,000.<sup>90</sup> Although the paper managed to continue publication using facilities of other pro-Wang printing press, it could only publish two pages per copy on the first ten days after the explosion. The paper was never able to return to its full capacity of publication and it had to permanently reduce its size from originally eight pages each copy to six.

The growth of the readership of the *CCDN*, however, seemed not to have been affected by these terrorist attacks on the paper during this period. It was not surprising that the *CCDN* enjoyed a high circulation in the Wang-controlled territories outside Shanghai. The figures of the CBNS, the body which monopolized the distribution of the major publications within Nanjing's jurisdiction, showed that the *CCDN* made up 68% of its total sales, which amounted to over 100,000 copies per month, in September 1940.<sup>91</sup> However, it was more noteworthy that the *CCDN* began to get a larger readership even in the foreign concessions of Shanghai. Although there was no circulation figure of the *CCDN* in Shanghai during that period, the expansion of the readership in Shanghai could be shown in the increase of advertisements in the paper during the period. One of the major sources of these new

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<sup>88</sup> Letter from Zhou Fohai to Lin Bosheng, SHAC, 2013/468, September 23, 1941.

<sup>89</sup> *CCDN*, August 10, 1941.

<sup>90</sup> Letter from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2150, September 13, 1941.

<sup>91</sup> "Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian" in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, pp.721, 765.



advertisements was the legal notices posted by individuals living in the foreign settlements. As the Chinese courts in the French Concession were taken over by the Wang government on November 8, 1940, the *CCDN* became the authorized publisher of legal notices under the jurisdiction of that court.<sup>92</sup> This privilege increased the functional value of the *CCDN* and attracted more local citizens to read this paper. Although this did not necessarily mean that the public accepted the collaborationist ideas of the *CCDN*, the increase of readership of the *CCDN* in the foreign concessions still meant an increase of exposure of the political ideas of the Wang government to the local citizens in Shanghai.

### **The *SCDN*: A Remote Frontline of Anti-Chongqing Propaganda**

#### ***Difficulties of the SCDN***

In comparison with the *CCDN* in Shanghai, the *SCDN* in Hong Kong operated on a much smaller scale. As Hong Kong was a British colony and distant from the power base of the Wang regime in the lower Yangtze region, the influence of the Wang regime in Hong Kong remained small and underground. Unlike the *CCDN* and other pro-Wang newspapers published in Central China, the *SCDN* did not enjoy a wide readership in the occupied areas. However, the Wang government still supported the *SCDN* because of the strategic value of the paper in conducting anti-Chongqing propaganda. The Ministry of Publicity described the function of the *SCDN* as follows:

Published in Hong Kong, the *South China Daily News* is closest to Chongqing's frontline; there are also many Chongqing notables living in Hong Kong. So the paper has worked extremely hard to conduct propaganda to Chongqing from the onset.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Letter from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2536, January 8, 1941.

<sup>93</sup> "Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian" in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao*



The *SCDN* faced shortage of money and personnel throughout the whole period. The improvement of the resources of the propaganda machinery of the Wang government did not benefit the *SCDN* much. The new government took the place of the Wang Clique to pay monthly subsidies of HK\$8,000 to the paper.<sup>94</sup> The newsprint rationing system implemented by the Wang government in Central China was, however, inapplicable to the *SCDN*. The paper bore a huge financial burden because of the high cost of newsprint, which soared by 50% from June 1940 to June 1941. Although extra monthly subsidies of C\$9,901 were granted by the Ministry of Publicity to the paper from July 1940, their purchasing power shrank quickly because of the depreciation of the Chinese currency.<sup>95</sup> This caused the financial condition of the *SCDN* to deteriorate throughout the period.

The *SCDN* also faced a serious shortage of personnel. As many editorial staff of the paper had left for Shanghai and Nanjing to continue their propaganda work since the Wang Clique started its peace movement in Shanghai in May 1939, only a few capable and reliable editors and writers stayed with the *SCDN*. The paper encountered extreme difficulty in recruiting new editorial staff because of its pro-Wang colour. The workload of the *SCDN* was further aggravated by its duty to receive and distribute news telegrams sent from the Central Press Service in Shanghai to other pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong.<sup>96</sup> Although the Central Press Service created a local branch in Hong Kong in August 1940 to take up the

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*shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, p.721.

<sup>94</sup> Letter from Li Zhongyou to Lin Bosheng, SHAC, 2040/36, May 7, 1940.

<sup>95</sup> Letter from Lin Bisheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2153, August 2, 1940; “Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian,” in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, p.871.

<sup>96</sup> “Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian,” in in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, p.703



duty, this did not help to relieve the staff shortage because it still relied on the *SCDN* to provide the staff and a workplace.<sup>97</sup> The paper was operated by minor publicists Wu Peizhi and Zhu Zhuosheng (朱濯生), but most of its editorials were still written by Xu Liquiu, the Deputy Director of the *CCDN* in Shanghai and later the Director of the Hong Kong branch of the Central Press Service.<sup>98</sup>

As the *SCDN* was operated with such scarce resources, its objective was made less complicated. The paper tended to avoid being too involved in local affairs or propaganda which promoted theories of Sino-Japanese cooperation. The paper aimed to criticize the Chongqing government and create scepticism in the population in Hong Kong and the unoccupied areas, especially those with strong connection with the Chongqing government, about the resistance policy. The *SCDN* seemed to have hoped that if these people no longer fully trusted the Chongqing government, they would probably turn to sympathize and even support the Wang government.

### ***Moderate Criticism and Persuasion: Editorials of the SCDN***

The target of the *SCDN* was quite different from that of the *CCDN*. The people in Shanghai and the lower Yangtze region, which constituted the main readership of the *CCDN*, could hardly deny the fact that the Wang government was their *de facto* ruler and was hence more likely to endorse passively the collaborationist ideas of the Wang government. The populations in Hong Kong and the unoccupied areas, however, were not faced with this situation and were much less inclined to recognize the Wang government and the ideas which it advocated. Moreover, the strict press censorship in Hong Kong prohibited vigorous expressions which might embarrass

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid., pp.706-707.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p.873.





the colonial government and its neutrality in the Sino-Japanese War. The *SCDN*, therefore, had to adapt itself to this situation and moderated its tone in its criticism of the resistance policy.

The *SCDN* editors tended to criticize Chongqing's resistance policy in a mild way. They seldom condemned vigorously Chiang and the Chongqing government or explicitly advocated overthrowing Chiang's rule. Instead, most of the viewpoints in the *SCDN* followed the arguments which had already been made by the Wang Clique in the earliest days of the peace movement. They often asked the readers to have a calm and objective mind to examine the contemporary situation in order to realize the deficiencies of the resistance policy. Such modest propaganda was well illustrated in a series of editorials specifically addressed to the Chongqing government in early July 1940. The editorialist tried to point out that the politicians in Chongqing had already led to an extremely poor living conditions in the unoccupied areas:

Sirs [the Chongqing leaders], you all live safely in the city of Chongqing. During air raids you can protect yourselves in bomb shelters which are specially built for you, and afterwards you are again able to display the power of your official status. Perhaps you have no time to think about the difficulties of the commoners, but the fact that the whole population has already been exhausted for the war can no longer be concealed. With such weak national strength, how can we endure the hardship of competing with the Japanese... how can we make Japan perish with us?<sup>99</sup>

He also tried to refute again the possibility of foreign assistance against the Japanese:

Sirs, you might still think that China can rely on foreign assistance to achieve "final

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<sup>99</sup> "Gao Chongqing dangju (er)" 告重慶當局 (二), Editorial, *SCDN*, July 8, 1940.



victory”... [But the foreign powers always] consider their own interests first, and their relations with other countries will not be hastily changed by impulse or personal preference. They will be particularly cautious not to make enemies with other countries when they need to deal with serious [domestic or external] problems.<sup>100</sup>

Although these editorials were addressed to the Chongqing government, they also aimed to convince the civilians who had a difficult life in Hong Kong and unoccupied China. The paper hoped to exploit the contradictions between the goal of the resistance policy and the actual hardship at that moment to shake off the belief in resistance. In another editorial, the *SCDN* suggested a number of points to illustrate the inconsistency between the accounts given by the Chongqing government and the reality at that time:

“Our soldiers fighting progresses”, this is what people always like to hear... [But] if that is in the case, why has no single piece of lost territory been recovered? Why is the price of rice still so high in the interior while [it is said] that “we are self-sufficient” and that “we have a good transport system”? [We heard] that “our industries in the hinterland are prosperous”, but why does the price level in the interior soar continuously once the Burma Road is blockaded? Why does the value of the Chinese currency drop every day?<sup>101</sup>

While the *SCDN* tried to criticize Chongqing’s refusal to abandon the resistance policy, it also worked to publicize the merits of the peace movement and the Wang government. The editors praised the new central government for having succeeded in recovering what the Chongqing government could not achieve:

After the National Government has returned to the capital [Nanjing], local police teams, civilian administrations and economies of the major cities which were “occupied” by the Japanese have been recovered by the National Government [in Nanjing]. The Japanese return

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<sup>100</sup> “Gao Chongqing dangju (san)” 告重慶當局 (三), Editorial, *SCDN*, July 9, 1940.

<sup>101</sup> “Kangzhan zhiyi” 抗戰質疑, Editorial, *SCDN*, September 7, 1940.



to the Chinese of the factories which have been under Japanese military control is another example. [We] lost them in the War of Resistance, and we could not recover them by war. [But] the above examples prove that [we] can recover them progressively by peace instead of resistance.<sup>102</sup>

However, the *SCDN* editors did not overly publicize Sino-Japanese cooperation or the allegiance of the Wang government to the Japanese idea of the New Order of East Asia. For example, when the *SCDN* editors commented on the creation of the China branch of the East Asian Federation, they tended to mention liberation of East Asia from Western oppression, which was supposed to be the main task of the League, in a brief manner. Instead, they emphasized that the ultimate objective of the League was to achieve “worldwide peace” and “intercontinental cooperation”.<sup>103</sup> This shows that the *SCDN* mainly aimed to convince the people to abandon their support to the Chongqing government and, if possible, encourage them to support the Wang government. The paper had little intention at that time to persuade the people to accept the idea of Sino-Japanese cooperation.

### ***Peace-Resistance Confrontation in the Literary Circle: Peace Literature in the SCDN***

As the *SCDN* was unable to publish political commentaries that were too antagonistic towards the Chongqing government, it turned to open up another frontline in its literary supplements to attack the pro-resistance influence in Hong Kong from a semi-political perspective. During the period, the pro-Wang writers in Hong Kong started a “peace literature movement” in the *SCDN* and criticized the mainstream Chinese literature which promoted the idea of resistance. As there were

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<sup>102</sup> “Heping de shijixing” 和平的實際性, Editorial, *SCDN*, December 15, 1940.

<sup>103</sup> “Dongya lianmeng yu shijie heping” 東亞聯盟與世界和平, Editorial, *SCDN*, February 5, 1941; “Dongya lianmeng yu Oumei geguo” 東亞聯盟與歐美各國, Editorial, *SCDN*, February, 6, 1941.



many pro-resistance Chinese writers living in Hong Kong at that time, they responded to this attack vigorously and led to a series of wars of words between writers belonging to the pro-peace and pro-resistance camps.

The notion of peace literature began to appear in the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* at almost the same time in early February 1940.<sup>104</sup> While the theoretical discussion about peace literature lasted quite briefly in the *CCDN*, this discussion was sustained in the *SCDN* until the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941. In February 1940, the paper created a one-page literary weekly supplement called “Yizhou wenyi” (the Literary Weekly 一週文藝) and made it a base of peace literature in Hong Kong.<sup>105</sup> In the early few months, a few pro-Wang literary writers wrote a number of essays in the supplement, trying to provide a theoretical framework for peace literature. The most active contributor to these theoretical discussions was a writer with a pen name Nama (娜馬). According to Nama’s explanation, the literary circles in China was at that time dominated by resistance literature, which was full of “clichéd, superficial and hypocritical” contents.<sup>106</sup> The writer explained the reason for the inappropriateness of resistance literature:

“Resistance literature” is clichéd essentially because it is void of content and superficial... The theme and topics of “resistance literature” are false and unrealistic. They are not only over-idealistic but also without any basis... “Resistance literature” not only adopts war as its

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<sup>104</sup> The idea of peace literature suggested earlier in the literary supplement of the *CCDN* by a writer with a pen name Linpeng (林蓬). Linpeng suggested that it was necessary for Chinese writers develop “peace literature” in order to eliminate the propagandistic “resistance literature”. But the theoretical discussion about peace literature disappeared quickly in the *CCDN*. Linpeng 林蓬 (pseud.), “Jianli heping wenyi” 建立和平文藝, *CCDN*, February 4, 1940.

<sup>105</sup> In October 1940, the *SCDN* changed to publish this literary supplement twice a week, with half a page for every issue. The supplement was also renamed “Banzhou wenyi” (the Literary Bi-weekly 半週文藝) Nama 娜馬 (pseud.), “Women de taidu – wei benkan gexin gao quanguo heping zuojia” 我們的態度 – 為本刊革新告全國和平作家, Literary Bi-weekly No.38, *SCDN*, October 21, 1940.

<sup>106</sup> Nama 娜馬(pseud.), “Jianli women de heping jiuguo wenyi yundong” 建立我們的和平救國文藝運動, Literary Weekly No.5, *SCDN*, March 2, 1940.



theme, but also describes those brutal and terrible wars as innocent and beautiful. This is never an easy trick, so the outcome [of resistance literature] is necessarily so superficial.<sup>107</sup>

Peace literature, on the other hand, aimed to oppose resistance literature, attempting to reflect that the population hoped to stop war and enjoy peace:

What we praise is the happiness of peace and tranquillity, which are in agreement with the kind-hearted mentality and dignified compassion of the human-being. So our contents [of peace literature] are realistic, meaningful but never superficial.<sup>108</sup>

Nama urged the pro-Wang writers to consolidate the peace literature movement by developing a unified literary theory and clear objectives for the peace literature. The writer also suggested setting up an organization to bring pro-peace literature writers together and guarantee their livelihood in order to attract more writers to abandon resistance literature and join the camp of peace literature.<sup>109</sup>

The hostile attitudes of the *SCDN* literary writers towards resistance literature promptly led to a series of counter-offensive from pro-resistance writers in Hong Kong. The antagonism concentrated in the bulletins of the Hong Kong Branch of the All-China Literary Circles Association (*Zhonghua quanguo wenyijie xiehui Xianggang fenhui*, HKACLCA 中國全國文藝界協會香港分會), which was published weekly in a pro-Chongqing newspaper in Hong Kong.<sup>110</sup> The attacks from

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<sup>107</sup> Nama (pseud.), “Heping jiuguo wenyi shi meiyou bagu de” 和平救國文藝是沒有八股的, *Literary Weekly* No.9, *SCDN*, March 30, 1940.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Nama (pseud.), “Zenyang kaizhan women de heping jiuguo wenyi yundong” 怎樣開展我們的和平救國文藝運動, *Literary Weekly* No.13, *SCDN*, April 27, 1940.

<sup>110</sup> The HKACLCA was established in March 1939 by Chinese writers who moved from the Chinese mainland to Hong Kong since 1937 and was supervised by the headquarters in Chongqing. Lo, *Xianggang wenzong*, p.62. The bulletins were published weekly in one of the four local newspapers, including the *Pearl River Daily News* (珠江日報), *Sing Tao Daily*, *Lih Pao* and *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), by turns.



the pro-resistance writers became particularly intense from April 1940 when the Wang Clique set up its central government in Central China. One of the fiercest attackers was Ye Lingfeng (葉靈鳳), the editor of the literary supplement of *Sing Tao Daily* and an active member of the HKACLCA. He denounced the pro-peace literature writers as “shameless intellectuals” who “have already defected from the nation” and “take an enemy as their benefactor”. Ye predicted on the destiny of peace literature as follows:

This type of “cultural conspiracy” cannot shake the will of contemporary Chinese writers, who are always at the forefront of the cultural warfare. It can only strengthen our determination to destroy the traitors’ viewpoints and to eliminate their literature.<sup>111</sup>

It was not surprising that the attacks and counter-attacks between the writers of both camps soon led to a series of wars of words, which lasted over a year and half until the fall of Hong Kong in December 1941. The war of words had little connection with purely literary criticism or theoretical discussion. The writers of the two camps attacked the political orientation and moral standards of each other. The pro-resistance writers described pro-peace writers as traitorous and utterly shameless.<sup>112</sup> The writers of the *SCDN*, in return, attacked the pro-resistance authors as villains who always “start rumours, malign others, betray friends, attack legitimate writers, and gain fame by deceiving the public”<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Ye Lingfeng 葉靈鳳, “Zai chi suowei ‘heping jiuguo wenyi yundong’” 再斥所謂「和平救國文藝運動」, HKACLCA Bulletin No.50, *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), April 30, 1940.

<sup>112</sup> Ranxi 燃犀(pseud.), “Wenyi? Yundong?” 文藝? 運動?, HKACLCA Bulletin No.55, *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), May 28, 1940.

<sup>113</sup> Yingling 嬰玲(pseud.), “Kangzhan zuojia qunxiang (yi)” 抗戰作家群象(一), Literary Bi-weekly No.46, *SCDN*, November 18, 1940.



Although the literary writers of the *SCDN* ignited the wars of words between the pro-resistance and pro-peace writers in Hong Kong, they did not succeed in exerting significant influence on the literary circles in Hong Kong, not to mention the unoccupied areas. The pro-peace writers failed to formulate a clear literary theoretical foundation for the peace literature. They did suggest several concepts, such as “realism of Three Principles of the People” (*sanmin zhuyi de xianshi zhuyi* 三民主義的現實主義) and “realism of peace and national construction” (*heping jianguo de xianshi zhuyi* 和平建國的現實主義). However, apart from the advocacy of peace and national construction under leadership of the Wang government, all these literary concepts carried no substantial meaning.<sup>114</sup> The quantity of actual literary works belonging to the category of peace literature was even smaller than the shallow theoretical essays.<sup>115</sup> The pro-Wang writers also failed to lure the pro-resistance writers to join the camp of peace literature.<sup>116</sup> The proposal to establish an organization to unite pro-peace writers in Hong Kong was never realized. Ye Lingfeng claimed that there were only six pro-peace writers in Hong Kong.<sup>117</sup> All these showed that peace literature in the *SCDN* did not achieve much success throughout the period.

### ***Tension between the SCDN and the Colonial Government***

Despite the war of words between the literary writers of the *SCDN* and the

<sup>114</sup> Nama (pseud.), “Lutai wentan” 露臺文談, *Literary Weekly* No.21, *SCDN*, June 22, 1940; Nama, “Lun heping wenyi de chuangzuo fangfa – jianli heping jianguo de xianshi zhuyi” 論和平文藝的創作方法 - 建立和平建國的現實主義, *Literary Weekly* No.26, *SCDN*, July 29, 1940.

<sup>115</sup> Yifan 逸凡 (pseud.), “Heping wenyi de jianli yu xinjin zuojia” 和平文藝的建立與新進作家, *Literary Bi-weekly* No. 90, *SCDN*, May 12, 1941.

<sup>116</sup> Nama (pseud.), “Women xuyao heping wenyi de xin ganbu” 我們需要和平文藝的新幹部, *Literary Bi-weekly* No.68, *SCDN*, February 10, 1941.

<sup>117</sup> The pro-peace writers naturally denied this allegation, but they refused to give further explanation about the strength of the pro-peace writers. Nama (pseud.), “Guanyu heping wenyi zhi xin ganbu de hua” 關於和平文藝之新幹部的話, *Literary Bi-weekly* No.102, *SCDN*, June 23, 1941.



pro-Chongqing newspapers, both pro-Chongqing and pro-Wang camps did not take any extreme action against each other during the pre-Pacific War period. The Chongqing government did try to impede the circulation of the *SCDN*. For instance, the New Asia News Agency (Xinya she 新亞社), one of the major local news agencies, was intimidated in March 1941 by pro-Chongqing newspapers to stop supplying local news articles to pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong.<sup>118</sup> The pro-Chongqing *Pearl River Daily News* competed with the sports supplement of the *SCDN*, which was actually the most popular part of the paper, by distributing 5,000 free copies to spectators outside a football field and trying to entice sportswriters of the *SCDN* to leave the paper.<sup>119</sup> However, most of these subversive activities against the *SCDN* were indirect, causing little harm to the paper. On the other hand, the *SCDN* also tried not to be in trouble with the pro-Chongqing newspapers on operational matters. For instance, when the pro-resistance members of the Chinese Newspaper Owners' Association in Hong Kong (香港報界公社) threatened to boycott the association unless the *SCDN* withdrew from the association, the *SCDN* was willing to give in and to be absent from meetings of the association in return for keeping its membership.<sup>120</sup> In short, the conflicts between the *SCDN* and other pro-resistance newspapers remained relatively latent between the establishment of the Wang government and the outbreak of the Pacific War.

In fact, the greatest obstacle to the normal operation of the *SCDN* came from the colonial government. As Britain continued to recognize the Chongqing government,

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<sup>118</sup> The pro-Wang newspaper solved this problem by asking the Hong Kong branch of the Central Press Service to supply local news. "Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian," in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, p.709.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., pp.871-872.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p.874.





the amiable policy towards official or semi-official agencies of the Chongqing government in Hong Kong, including the pro-resistance newspapers, was basically unchanged on condition that these agencies would not endanger the tranquillity of the Colony. The contacts between the colonial administration and the pro-Wang agencies in Hong Kong, including the *SCDN*, were therefore kept at a minimum.

The uncooperative attitude of the colonial government towards the pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong was shown in its attitude towards the newly-created Hong Kong branch of the Central Press Service, which was actually an affiliate of the *SCDN*. This branch was set up in August 1940 and was designated as the main supplier of news of the Wang government to the pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong. However, the colonial government did not allow the name “Central Press Service” to be used because its short form in Chinese “Zhongyang she” (中央社) was the same as that used by the Central News Agency, the official news agency of the Chongqing government. The Central Press Service had to use its previous name “China News Agency” with a short form “Zhonghua she” (中華社) in all news published by the agency.<sup>121</sup> The government also succeeded in blocking effective communication between the Hong Kong branch and the headquarters of the Central Press Service by refusing the news agency to receive wireless transmission from Nanjing through public or private receivers.<sup>122</sup> The branch had to receive the news from the headquarters through cable transmission or by post, which were both time-consuming and expensive.

Furthermore, the *SCDN* editors had to express their opinions in the paper with

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p.704.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p.707.



caution under strict press censorship. The *SCDN* reported to Nanjing that its editors had to “be circumlocutory in the content [of the newspaper] showing an objective and moderate tone, and give commentaries on certain things indirectly” in order to avoid being censored by the government.<sup>123</sup> In fact, the *SCDN* was ostensibly supportive of the government and rarely criticized the colonial government in any aspect. For example, the paper commented that an air-raid drill organized by the government showed earnestness of the British authorities to protect the territory. It urged the local population to cooperate with the local authorities to carry out the drill.<sup>124</sup> In another case, the *SCDN* appreciated the colonial government’s refusal to release Chinese soldiers interned in Hong Kong in order to maintain neutrality of the Colony.<sup>125</sup>

The friendly attitude openly shown by the *SCDN*, however, helped little to improve the relationship between the *SCDN* and the colonial government. On the contrary, the position of the *SCDN* and other pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong became even more precarious when Anglo-Japanese relations deteriorated in the year 1941. Japan became an increasingly substantial threat to the British territories in Far East after it signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940. It became more likely in the eyes of the British government that the Japanese would attack Hong Kong.<sup>126</sup> As Britain regarded the Wang government as a puppet regime under Japanese control, the pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong were seen by the British government as an extension of the Japanese influence in Hong Kong. When

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p.875.

<sup>124</sup> “Jinwan kaishi de fangkong yanxi” 今晚開始的防空演習, Editorial, *SCDN*, October 29, 1940.

<sup>125</sup> “Guanyu liugang huajun de shifang wenti” 關於留港華軍的釋放問題, Editorial, *SCDN*, October 3, 1941.

<sup>126</sup> For example, the British government discussed in March 1941 the possibility to evacuate or destroy machine tools and plants in Hong Kong once the Japanese invaded the Colony, FO371/27889, March 11, 1941.



Britain decided to retaliate against Japan for the Japanese attempt to launch anti-British propaganda campaigns in its home territory, Northcote suggested suppression of some or all pro-Wang newspapers in the Colony.<sup>127</sup> This idea was further reinforced by an observation that the existence of pro-Wang newspapers might damage the morale of the Chinese people in the Colony, which would have a detrimental effect to the defence of Hong Kong.<sup>128</sup> This proposal was approved by the Colonial Office in late November 1941.<sup>129</sup> Being the largest pro-Wang newspaper in Hong Kong, the *SCDN* immediately became the greatest target of suppression. However, before this proposal was ready to be implemented, the Pacific War broke out and the situation changed drastically.

## Conclusion

The establishment of the Wang government in March 1940 represented a starting point for the Wang Clique to realize its peace movement which it had advocated since the defection from Chongqing. Although the Wang government never enjoyed full independence from the Japanese, it did possess greater power and much more resources to carry out its policies. The propaganda machinery of the Wang Clique, which had been centred in Shanghai, was expanded to the lower Yangtze region in Central China. Headquartered in Nanjing, the Wang government controlled a unified official news agency, newspapers, radio stations, and other forms of publicity in Central China. The role of the *CCDN* as the only substantial organ of the Wang Clique in Central China was much shared by this expanded propaganda machinery. However, the authoritative status of the *CCDN* was still little challenged

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<sup>127</sup> Telegram from G. Northcote to Secretary of State for the Colonies, FO371/27960, August 1, 1941.

<sup>128</sup> Letter from W.B.L. Donson to T.E. Bromley, FO371/27960, November 8, 1941.

<sup>129</sup> Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to M. Young and S. Thomas, FO371/27960, November 18, 1941.



because of its close relationship with the high officials of the Wang government. The paper continued to represent considerably the official view of the government towards current affairs.

It is reasonable to assume that the *CCDN*, being the authoritative paper of the Wang regime, always promoted the merits of the new central government. However, as the status of the new central government was still unstable in the early days of the regime, the *CCDN* did not hide its worries about the future of the regime and showed scepticism. Such scepticism persisted until the signing of the Basic Treaty, whereby Japan guaranteed its support for the Wang government. Since then, the *CCDN* played a more active role in promoting general peace and Sino-Japanese cooperation.

In comparison with the *CCDN*, the *SCDN* was operated on a much smaller scale and carried a simpler mission in Hong Kong. The paper became the frontline of anti-Chongqing propaganda because of its proximity to Chongqing. The paper aimed at shaking the belief of the population in Hong Kong and unoccupied areas in the idea of resistance and Chiang's leadership. As the Wang government did not have strong influence in Hong Kong, it had to adopt a mild tone and attitude in order to survive in the Colony. It also tried to make use of its literary supplement to undermine the pro-Chongqing influence from a semi-political perspective.

The outcomes of the efforts made by the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* were quite different. As the influence of the Wang government in Shanghai and the surrounding areas increased during the period, the circulation of the *CCDN* in the Wang-controlled territories and the foreign concessions in Shanghai improved gradually throughout the period. The *SCDN*, however, did not achieve the similar



progress in Hong Kong. The paper did not enjoy a large circulation in the Colony. The most attractive part of the paper was neither the anti-Chongqing political commentaries nor peace literature in the literary supplement, but its daily sports supplement. Moreover, the colonial authorities became progressively less tolerant of the *SCDN*, which supported Japan and its Axis allies. By December 1941, the colonial government was ready to suppress the *SCDN* and other pro-Wang newspapers. However, the sudden outbreak of the Pacific War altered the whole situation and brought both the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* into a totally different environment.

## Chapter 6

### Promoting the War: The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* during the Pacific War

#### Introduction

The sudden outbreak of the Pacific War, or the “Greater East Asian War” (*Dai Tōa sensō* 大東亜戦争) as was called by the Japanese, on December 8, 1941 changed the political situations in Shanghai and Hong Kong fundamentally. These two cities, which had long been controlled by the Allied powers were among the first targets of the Japanese army. The Japanese garrison in Shanghai occupied the International Settlement that morning without any resistance. As the French Concession of Shanghai was administered by the pro-Axis Vichy government and had long been cooperative with the Japanese, the whole Shanghai was effectively under full Japanese control. At the same time, the Japanese 23<sup>rd</sup> Army in South China crossed the border in Shenzhen and invaded Hong Kong. After eighteen days of fighting, the British garrison was overrun and finally surrendered on December 25. The British colony then became an Occupied Territory of the Japanese empire.

The Japanese occupation of Shanghai and Hong Kong represented an immediate victory of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* in the propaganda war against the Chongqing government. The pro-resistance newspapers were either closed or compelled to submit themselves to the conqueror. The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* unsurprisingly enjoyed a high status under the new political order. Being the largest newspaper in occupied China, the *CCDN* bolstered the Wang government’s support of Japan in the War and promoted hostility against Britain and the United States. More importantly,



it helped justify the contradiction between the previous advocacy of peace and the present support for war. On the other hand, the *SCDN* was active in assisting the local Japanese administration to promote the rehabilitation of Hong Kong.

However, the heyday of the two papers did not last long. Japan began to face serious military setbacks in the Pacific from 1943. The living conditions in occupied China as well as in Hong Kong were deteriorating throughout the period. In the later period of the War, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* had increasing difficulty in convincing the populations of a bright prospect of the War. The papers' major concerns also became more down to earth, such as food problems, corruption and press censorship. The two papers finally declined and fell with the Wang regime in the final days of the War. This chapter aims to study the experiences of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* from their peak to their demise during the Pacific War.

### **High Tide of the *CCDN* during the Early Years of the Pacific War**

#### ***Japanese Occupation and the End of the Wang-Chongqing Rivalry in the Press of Shanghai***

The Japanese occupation of the International Settlement meant that pro-Chongqing newspapers lost their last foothold in Shanghai. In the morning of December 8, 1941, the Japanese troops occupied offices of all pro-Chongqing or pro-Allied newspapers in the International Settlement. The Chinese newspapers which were directly subsidized by the Chongqing government and refused to cooperate with the Japanese, such as the *CADN* and *Zhengyan bao* (the *Truth Post* 正言報), were closed and dissolved by the Japanese armed force. Other newspapers which were less politically tainted, such as *Shun Pao*, *Sin Wan Pao*, the *Shanghai Times* and the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, were allowed to resume



publication in the next few days after they discarded their anti-Japanese inclination and accepted the direct supervision of the Information Department of the Japanese Army.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, the Japanese troops imposed strict control over the publication of pro-Wang and non-political newspapers in Shanghai. On the first day of the Japanese occupation of the International Settlement, the Information Department of the Japanese Army instructed the Shanghai Newspaper Censorship Bureau, which was administered by the Wang government, to ensure that pro-Wang newspapers or other papers under the censorship system supported the Japanese occupation and helped the Japanese maintain the stability of the city.<sup>2</sup> The press of Shanghai was hence controlled by the Japanese Army effectively soon after the Japanese occupation of the International Settlement.

The immediate result of the Japanese suppression of anti-Japanese publications in the International Settlement was a victory of the *CCDN* and other pro-Wang newspapers over the pro-Chongqing press. After the suspension of publication of major Chinese newspapers, the *CCDN* became the largest Chinese newspaper available in Shanghai. The paper reacted immediately by expanding its circulation through publishing an evening edition since December 11.<sup>3</sup> Even after *Shun Pao* and *Sin Wen Pao* resumed circulation in December 1941, they could not retain most of their readers because they were not allowed to publish political news in the following

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<sup>1</sup> Ma, ed., *Shanghai xinwen shi*, p.923; Shenbao shi bianxiezu 申報史編寫組, “Diwei jieduo shiqi de shenbao” 敵偽劫奪時期的申報, *Xinwen yanjiu ziliao* 新聞研究資料 22 (November 1983), pp.182-183.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Mei Songnan 梅嵩南 to Lin Bosheng, SHAC, 2040/90, December 10, 1941.

<sup>3</sup> *CCDN*, December 11, 1941.





few months.<sup>4</sup> In comparison, the *CCDN* faced less Japanese interference in its editorial policies and was able to publish a wider range of news reports. This enabled the *CCDN* to maintain a large circulation in the city and became the leading newspaper in Shanghai.

The success of the *CCDN* was also reflected in the rise of status of the paper. The *CCDN* and its staff became much less vulnerable to terrorist attacks because most of the Chongqing agents who had stayed in the International Settlement were then unable to continue their activities in Shanghai. The pro-Wang newspapermen could be much more active in Shanghai than before. Moreover, the influence of the Wang government on the press of Shanghai was further consolidated. For instance, the Ministry of Publicity set up the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Publicity in Shanghai (Xuanchuanbu zhu Hu banshichu 宣傳部駐滬辦事處) in the International Settlement in February 1942 and delegated a commissioner to “develop communication between the Ministry and cultural workers” and to “carry out publicity and cultural affairs for the Ministry”.<sup>5</sup> As the *CCDN* had long been the most authoritative pro-Wang newspaper, it often became the centre of the Chinese press in Shanghai during that period. One of the illustrations of this point was the grand celebration of the paper’s tenth anniversary in April 1942. The paper did not have the tradition of extravagant anniversary celebrations before the outbreak of the Pacific War. However, things were different after the outbreak of the Pacific War. On April 11, 1942, more than 1,000 guests were invited to participate in the paper’s tenth anniversary celebration party in Hotel Pacific (金門飯店), one of the most famous hotels in the International Settlement. Many top government officials such as Chen

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<sup>4</sup> Shenbao shi bianxiezuzhuan, “Diwei jieduo shiqi de shenbao,” p.185.

<sup>5</sup> Letter from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2141, February 2, 1942.



Gongbo, Wen Zongyao (溫宗堯), Jiang Kanghu (江亢虎), Chu Minyi, Ding Mocun and Lin Bosheng attended the party.<sup>6</sup> The celebration of the paper was continued by a one-week art exhibition of Madame Zeng Zhongming in a department store on Nanking Road.<sup>7</sup> The extraordinarily large scale of the celebration underlined the high position of the *CCDN* in the press of the Shanghai under Japanese occupation.

While the *CCDN* became a prestigious newspaper in Shanghai, its pressmen also participated very actively in press-related activities at local and national levels. Xu Liqui, the Deputy Director of the *CCDN*, was designated as a standing committee member and the head of the cultural section of the Shanghai branch of the China Society of the East Asian Federation in June 1942.<sup>8</sup> He was often the host of gatherings for journalists in Shanghai. For example, he represented Chinese newspapers to give a keynote speech in the inauguration ceremony of the Shanghai Newspaper Association (Shanghai xinwen lianhehui 上海新聞聯合會), which was formed by Chinese and Japanese newspapers in Shanghai, on January 27, 1943.<sup>9</sup> Other writers of the *CCDN* were also active in cultural circles. Liu Yusheng (柳雨生) and Pan Yuqie (潘予且), literary writers working for the *CCDN*, were nominated as Chinese representatives of the first Greater East Asian Literary Conference (Dadongya wenxuezhe dahui 大東亞文學者大會) held in Tokyo in November 1942.<sup>10</sup> All these showed the high standing of the *CCDN* journalists after the outbreak of the Pacific War.

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<sup>6</sup> *CCDN*, April 12, 1942.

<sup>7</sup> *CCDN*, April 13, 1942.

<sup>8</sup> *CCDN*, June 2, 1942.

<sup>9</sup> *CCDN*, January 28, 1943.

<sup>10</sup> *CCDN*, October 28, 1942.



### ***Peace Movement and Participation in the War: the Justification of the CCDN***

As the Wang government was under Japanese sponsorship, it was not surprising that the Wang government supported Japan during the Pacific War. Wang announced immediately after Japan declared war on the Allies on December 8, 1941 that his government was going to “share prosperity and adversity” (*tonggan gongku* 同甘共苦) with its friendly nation, Japan, in order to achieve final victory.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, the official position of the Wang government on the Pacific War was still ambiguous in the next several months. It was certain that Japan needed the Wang government to provide materials to sustain its war machinery, but the Japanese leaders seemed not much interested in letting the Wang government stand side by side with the Japanese in its Greater East Asian War. Zhou Fohai observed that the officials in Tokyo did not conclude on the wartime status of the Wang government. The Japanese officials seemed to be worried that the participation of the Wang government in the War might create greater obstacles to a final solution to the split between the Nanjing and Chongqing governments.<sup>12</sup> It was not until Japan adopted a “New Policy for China” in the Imperial Conference on December 21, 1942 that Japan relaxed its control over occupied China and further enhanced the status of the Wang government.<sup>13</sup> The Wang government finally declared war on Britain and the United States on January 9, 1943. The declaration of war was accompanied by a joint declaration stating that Japan agreed to return all its extraterritorial rights and concessions, including the International Settlement of Shanghai, to China.<sup>14</sup> The relationship between the Wang

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<sup>11</sup> For example, Zhou Fohai seemed to be surprised by the sudden outbreak of the Pacific War. Although he had already thought that the war between Japan and the United States was inevitable, he was not given any concrete information about the war plan. Zhou, *Zhou Fohai riji quanbian*, vol.2, p.548; CCDN, December 9, 1941.

<sup>12</sup> Zhou, *Zhou Fohai riji quanbian*, vol.2, p.627.

<sup>13</sup> Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp.308-309.

<sup>14</sup> CCDN, January 10, 1943.



government and Japan became even closer when they replaced the Basic Treaty with a new Alliance Treaty on October 30, 1943, whereby Japan declared to abandon most of its privileges in China.<sup>15</sup>

The *CCDN* was ready to follow the Wang government to support the Greater East Asian War. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, a *CCDN* editorialist promptly tried to stir up anti-British and anti-American feelings among the readers in order to explain the necessity of supporting Japan in the War:

Britain and the United States have long been entertained the ambition of aggression in China. For a hundred years, they have conspired to drive China to become a semi-colony through economic aggression... The result of this war between Japan and the United States will affect China heavily. China and Japan have a very close relationship with each other. The two nations are interdependent and face the same circumstances. If Japan does not destroy the British and American conspiracy, this will be a disaster not only for East Asia, but also for China... Although our country is pursuing national construction and hence has not decided to participate in the war hastily, our nationals must cooperate with Japan for the sake of East Asia and China in order to liberate the races in East Asia. This is what our fellow countrymen must understand.<sup>16</sup>

The *CCDN* became increasingly excited when the Japanese troops swept through Southeast Asia and occupied British and American territories one by one in the region in the next few months. The *CCDN* editors became extremely hostile against the Allies and were eager to overturn their supremacy in East Asia. For example, when the Japanese troops captured Kowloon peninsula in Hong Kong, a *CCDN* editorialist was elated at the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong and expressed the hope to destroy the old political order in East Asia:

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<sup>15</sup> *CCDN*, October 31, 1943.

<sup>16</sup> “Taipingyang zhanzheng baofa le” 太平洋戰爭爆發了, Editorial, *CCDN*, December 9, 1941.



For the whole century, Hong Kong has created so many minions who have no sense of loyalty to the nation. It is the origin of men servile to foreigners and compradors; it is an asylum of failed politicians; it is a dark corner of China; it is a foothold of the vicious British and American in China... The flames of the Greater East Asian War have already been spread far and wide, now it is time to reevaluate all the things. The East Asians have been oppressed by the British and the American for so many years. Now we are going to expose and criticize all such oppression, and Hong Kong will be our first target.<sup>17</sup>

The optimism of the *CCDN* that Japan would win the War was at its peak when the Japanese captured Singapore, the British last stronghold in East Asia, on February 15, 1942. A *CCDN* editor commented that the fall of Singapore destroyed the morale of the British army and made the Allied Powers unable to launch significant counter-offensives anymore. The editor also predicted that the British Empire would decline and disintegrate because its subjects would no longer believe in the superiority and the prestige of the Empire.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, the paper believed that Japan would succeed in expelling the Allied Powers completely from Southeast Asia and India, and could even join forces with Germany and Italy in the Near East and form a new world order.<sup>19</sup>

No matter whether the Wang government officially declared war on the Allied Powers, its support for participation in a war seemed to be contrary to its idea of peace which the Wang government advocated before the outbreak of the Pacific War. The *CCDN*, therefore, needed to reconcile the two concepts of peace and war in order to convince the occupied population to work for Japan in this War.

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<sup>17</sup> “Qingsuan Xianggang” 清算香港, Editorial, *CCDN*, December 14, 1941.

<sup>18</sup> “Yingguo de moluo” 英國的沒落, Editorial, *CCDN*, February 20, 1942.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.; “Yeyi dading de jushi” 業已大定的局勢, Editorial, *CCDN*, March 11, 1942.



The *CCDN* explained that the Pacific War would help the Wang government to achieve the two goals of the peace movement: general peace in China and liberation of East Asia. Before the Pacific War, the *CCDN* often criticized that the Chongqing government refused to cooperate with the Wang government for general peace in China. The paper suggested that one of the reasons why Chongqing continued its resistance policy was high expectations of the Chongqing leaders for British and American assistance. After the outbreak of the War, the *CCDN* revised this argument and asserted that Britain and the United States, rather than the Chongqing government, were the greatest obstacle to general peace in China.<sup>20</sup> These Western powers conspired to instigate hostility and rivalry among the Chinese people in order to maintain the Westerners' dominance in the region. The paper claimed with hindsight that the Wang government advocated peace and cooperated with Japan because it had long understood the British and American ambition in China and hoped to stall such a conspiracy.<sup>21</sup> The war against the Allies should therefore be regarded as a strategy "to remove the ultimate cause of trouble" (*fudi chouxin* 釜底抽薪) which hindered general peace in China.<sup>22</sup>

The *CCDN* also tried to interpret the Greater East Asian War as a further step of the peace movement. Even before the Pacific War, the paper had already claimed that the peace movement aimed not only at saving China from wartime destruction, but also cooperating with the liberation movements in other East Asian nations to establish a New Order of East Asia. The war against the Allied Powers was then

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<sup>20</sup> "Qing yi tongyi de Zhongguo yu Riben xielì" 請以統一的中國與日本協力, Editorial, *CCDN*, April 21, 1943.

<sup>21</sup> "He yu zhan de yiguanxing" 和與戰的一貫性, Editorial, *CCDN*, March 16, 1942.

<sup>22</sup> "Heping yundong de kuozhan" 和平運動的擴展, Editorial, *CCDN*, April 25, 1942.



interpreted by the *CCDN* as a substantial action to achieve this aim. Being a part of the whole liberation movement, China should therefore fulfil its responsibility and contribute its own resources to support this war of liberation.<sup>23</sup> Only if the Allies were defeated could China liberate itself and achieve the ultimate goal of the peace movement.<sup>24</sup>

As the Wang government was determined to stand on the Japanese side to fight against Britain and the United States in the Greater East Asian War, the *CCDN* became even more eager to reconstruct people's mind to support Sino-Japanese cooperation and the New Order of East Asia wholeheartedly. The paper emphasized that Sino-Japanese cooperation should be carried out not only in the diplomatic or political aspects, but also among the populations in the two nations. An editor of the *CCDN* pointed out the importance of Sino-Japanese cooperation at an ideological level:

Peace terms are never enough to ensure lasting peace between China and Japan. We must enable the populations of the two nations to foster mutual understanding and trust with each other. [We should] promote cultural interchange between the two great races with enthusiasm in order to achieve real friendship and cooperation.<sup>25</sup>

In order to achieve such whole-hearted cooperation between the two nations, the paper claimed that the Chinese population should no longer count every advantage and disadvantage of Sino-Japanese cooperation. Instead, the paper suggested that the Chinese population cooperate with Japan on the bases of "moral principles" and

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> "Wei le shui?" 為了誰?, Editorial, *CCDN*, December 26, 1942.

<sup>25</sup> "Xinli de gaishan" 心理的改善, Editorial, *CCDN*, October 29, 1942.



“conscience” which existed in Asian traditions.<sup>26</sup> The *CCDN* did not define clearly these Asian traditions, but it was clear that the paper tried to inspire the support for the Great East Asian War in the population.

In general, the *CCDN* enjoyed the greatest success after the outbreak of the Pacific War. As Shanghai was effectively occupied by the Japanese, the paper won the rivalry with the pro-Chongqing newspapers and secured its leadership in the press of Shanghai. As the Wang government became increasingly closer to Japan during the Pacific War, the *CCDN* was also active in promoting Sino-Japanese political and cultural cooperation.

### **A Pro-Wang Voice in New Hong Kong: the *SCDN* during the Early Days of the Pacific War**

#### ***The SCDN before and after the Battle of Hong Kong***

The position of the *SCDN* fluctuated dramatically during the earliest days of the Pacific War. When the Japanese troops started the offensive in Hong Kong on December 8, 1941, the Hong Kong police immediately raided the office of the *SCDN* and the Hong Kong branch of the Central Press Service in Central district. The publication of the paper was suppressed. Chen Shaoxiang, the manager of the *SCDN*, was alleged to be pro-Japanese and detained in Stanley Prison.<sup>27</sup>

But the suppression and the detention did not last long. As the military situation of the British troops deteriorated quickly, the remaining newspapers ceased to

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<sup>26</sup> “Lihai guannian yu daoyi jingshen” 利害觀念與道義精神, Editorial, *CCDN*, April 16, 1943.

<sup>27</sup> Kong Kai-tung (鄭啟東), the registered proprietor of the *SCDN*, had already left for Macau before the outbreak of the War. Other leading editors of the *SCDN* staying in Hong Kong, like Wu Peizhi and Huang Zhechong (黃折衝), managed to escape from the arrest. Chen Shaoxiang 陳少翔, “Yuzhong zaji (san)” 獄中雜記 (三), *SCDN*, May 26, 1942.





function one by one during eighteen days of battle. The press of Hong Kong finally came to a halt when the British garrison surrendered on December 25. The Japanese victory altered the position of the pro-Wang influence in Hong Kong radically. Similar to the situation in Shanghai, the pro-resistance newspapers either vanished or were forced to change its attitude to support the new ruler. On the other hand, the new conqueror promptly released Chen Shaoxiang and helped the restoration of the pro-Wang newspapers. The *SCDN* was the earliest Chinese newspaper which resumed publication in Hong Kong. The paper appeared in Hong Kong again on December 28, the day when Lieutenant-General Sakai Takashi (酒井隆) led his Japanese 23<sup>rd</sup> Army to march through Central district and declared the official occupation of Hong Kong.<sup>28</sup> The office of the Central Press Service in Hong Kong was also restored on the same day under the assistance of the Domei News Agency.<sup>29</sup> By the end of January 1942, all five pro-Wang newspapers which existed before the battle had resumed publication.<sup>30</sup>

The Wang government was eager to use the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong to expand its influence among the overseas Chinese. The Central Political Committee in Nanjing resolved on December 25 to despatch leading members to “comfort and pacify” the local population of Hong Kong.<sup>31</sup> On January 19, a delegation, which was led by Lin Bosheng, Madame Wang, Chen Junhui (陳君慧), the Chairman of the

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<sup>28</sup> *CCDN*, January 10, 1942.

<sup>29</sup> Zhongyang dianxunshe diaochachu 中央電訊社調查處, ed., *Zhongyang dianxunshe di'ernian* 中央電訊社第二年 (Nanjing: Zhongyang dianxunshe, 1942), p.64.

<sup>30</sup> By the end of January 1942, there were totally ten Chinese newspapers being printed. Five of them were pro-Wang papers. They were the *SCDN*, *Tianyan ribao* (天演日報), *Ziyou ribao* (自由日報), and *Da guang bao* (the *Great Light News* 大光報) and *Xin wanbao*. *Hong Kong News*, January 23, 1942.

<sup>31</sup> Letter from Zhou Fohai to the Secretariat of the National Government, SHAC, 2002/63, December 26, 1941.



Overseas Affairs Committee, and Chen Yaozu (陳耀祖), the Chairman of the Guangdong provincial government, visited Hong Kong for ten days on behalf of the central government in Nanjing.<sup>32</sup> In comparison with the local elites' indifference to pro-Wang activists before the Pacific War, the Nanjing-appointed delegation was well received by the Japanese military administration, or Gunseicho (軍政府), as well as the local Chinese leaders who had just submitted themselves to the conqueror. On January 26, over 250 local elites, including Robert Kotewall, Shouson Chow, M.K. Lo, and Tung Chung-wei, were reported to attend a party under the arrangement of Gunseicho to welcome the commission from Nanjing and paid their allegiance to the Wang government.<sup>33</sup> Although it was highly doubtful whether such loyalty to the Wang government was genuine, the ostensible support of these elites for the Wang government showed that the status of the Wang government could no longer be neglected in the new Hong Kong.

On the other hand, during the early days of the occupation, the Japanese administration tried to enhance the status of the Wang government in Hong Kong in order to reduce the prestige of the Chongqing government among the local people. As there was no official representative of the Wang government in Hong Kong, the *SCDN*, which was the largest pro-Wang establishment in Hong Kong, became virtually the centre of the local pro-Wang interests in Hong Kong. Kong Kai-tung, the director of the *SCDN* and a member of the Overseas Affairs Committee (Qiaowu weiyuanhui 僑務委員會) of the Wang government, was appointed by the new Japanese governor Isogai Rensuke (磯谷廉介) on March 31, 1942 as member of the

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<sup>32</sup> *CCDN*, January 30, 1942.

<sup>33</sup> *Hong Kong News*, January 28, 1942; *CCDN*, January 30, 1942.



Chinese Cooperative Council (香港華民各界協議會).<sup>34</sup> The Chinese Cooperative Council, together with the Chinese Representative Council (香港華民代表會), aimed at strengthening the communication between the local Chinese leaders and the Japanese governor.<sup>35</sup> Kong's participation in these advisory institutions showed that the pro-Wang interests were taken into consideration of the Japanese rulers in Hong Kong.

As the *SCDN* was an important device to maintain the pro-Wang influence in Hong Kong, the Wang government was determined to bolster the paper during the early days of the Japanese occupation. This was illustrated particularly in the financial support provided by the Wang government to the *SCDN*. Before the Pacific War, the four pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong continuously received monthly subsidies of HK\$14,300 from Nanjing. On December 28, 1941, the military yen was introduced in Hong Kong at an exchange rate of MY\$2 to HK\$1.<sup>36</sup> This indirectly raised the price level by 100% because most merchants changed to selling goods in the military yen but did not reduce the prices correspondingly. When the Ministry of Finance in Nanjing was going to follow the official exchange rate to convert its monthly subsidies to pro-Wang newspapers in Hong Kong from HK\$14,300 to MY\$7,150 in April 1942, Lin Bosheng opposed and proposed to pay the subsidies at MY\$14,300 per month. Lin stated that in case the Ministry of Finance refused his

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<sup>34</sup> *Hong Kong News*, March 31, 1942.

<sup>35</sup> After the new Japanese governor Isogai Rensuke arrived at Hong Kong and established a civil administration in February 1942, he reformed the advisory system and set up two new institutions. The Chinese Representative Council was the highest advisory institution in the new government. It consisted of four top Chinese leaders, such as Kotewall and Lau Tit-shing (劉鐵城). The Chinese Cooperative Council, which was composed of twenty-two social elites including Tung Chung-wei (董仲偉) and M.K. Lo, can be seen as an extension of the Chinese Representative Council. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p.108.

<sup>36</sup> Financial measures taken by the army of Hong Kong, Rikuamitsu Dainikki 陸軍密大日記, vol. 17, JACAR, C01000058000, February 4, 1942.



proposal, he would prefer to divert all the subsidies to the *SCDN* and stop the subsidies to the other three pro-Wang newspapers.<sup>37</sup> The Ministry of Finance finally agreed to changing the subsidies to the *SCDN* from HK\$9,000 to MY\$9,000 and change the subsidies to other newspapers from HK\$5,300 to MY\$2,650.<sup>38</sup>

The Wang government's preference to the *SCDN* was also illustrated in the reorganization of the Chinese press of Hong Kong by the Japanese administration in June 1942. After the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, local newspapers faced shortages of printing materials. For example, the price of newsprint in Hong Kong rose about three times from HK\$24 before the Pacific War to about MY\$40 (HK\$80) in April 1942.<sup>39</sup> The Japanese administration hoped to reduce the number of the newspapers in order to save resources. Besides, the administration hoped to strengthen its control over the press by limiting the number of newspapers in circulation.<sup>40</sup> As a result, the *SCDN* was designated as one of the five Chinese newspapers which were allowed to continue publication after May 1942. *Tianyan ribao*, *Ziyou ribao* and *Xin wan bao* had to follow the Japanese instructions to stop publication and be incorporated into the *SCDN* on June 1, 1942.<sup>41</sup> It was not clear whether the Japanese administration had consulted with the Wang government before this reorganization, but the Wang government seemed to have no objection because it

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<sup>37</sup> Letter from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2181, April 9, 1942.

<sup>38</sup> Letter from Chen Chunpu to Zhou Fohai, SHAC, 2003/2154, May 6, 1942. After the currency conversion, *Tianyan ribao*, *Ziyou ribao* and *Xin wan bao* were entitled to receive MY\$1,250, MY\$400 and MY\$1,000 from the Wang government each month respectively.

<sup>39</sup> Status Report of the Governor-General of Occupied Hong Kong, Rikuamitsu Dainikki 陸垂密大日記, vol. 15, 3 of 3, JACAR, C01000250100, April 2, 1942.

<sup>40</sup> Monthly Wartime Report of the Governor-General Department, Hong Kong Occupied Territory, Rikuamitsu Dainikki 陸垂密大日記, vol. 17, JACAR, C01000412800, April 1942.

<sup>41</sup> *SCDN*, May 31, 1942. The five Chinese newspapers which were allowed to publish after May 1942 were the *SCDN*, *Xiangdao ribao*, *Wah Kiu Yat Po*, and *Dongya wanbao* (東亞晚報), and the Chinese version of *Hong Kong Nippo* (香港日報).



immediately diverted all the subsidies which had been given to the three minor pro-Wang newspapers to the *SCDN*.<sup>42</sup> The Ministry of Publicity in Nanjing was also so indifferent to the arrangement of these three minor pro-Wang papers after the merging that Li Zongyao, the former director of *Tianyan ribao* and *Xin wan bao*, complained to Wang Jingwei for the loss incurred by the cut of the subsidies and the closure of his business.<sup>43</sup> These cases showed that the Wang government made much effort to preserve the *SCDN* during the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong.

Because of its strong political background, the *SCDN* became influential in the Chinese press of Hong Kong during the first few months of the occupation. As other Chinese newspapers remained unenthusiastic to deal with the new ruler, the *SCDN* often became the representative of the Chinese press and cooperated with the administration actively. For example, when over fifty Chinese newspapermen dined with Colonel Nishikawa (西川), the chief of the Information Bureau of the new civil administration, on March 22, Kong Kai-tung was designated as the chairman of the party and gave a welcome speech at the party.<sup>44</sup> The Hong Kong Reporters' Club (香港記者俱樂部), a new organization established in July 1942, was also chaired by a *SCDN* reporter named Yuan Kai-cheong (源啟昌).<sup>45</sup> These examples showed that the *SCDN*, under the support of the new ruler, rose from a notorious newspaper to the leader of the Chinese press of Hong Kong during the early period of Japanese occupation.

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<sup>42</sup> Letter from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2178, July 7, 1942.

<sup>43</sup> Letter from Li Zongyao to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2178, December 7, 1942.

<sup>44</sup> *SCDN*, March 23, 1942.

<sup>45</sup> *SCDN*, July 29, 1942.



### *The Editorial Policies of the SCDN under the New Japanese Rule*

Since the situation in Hong Kong changed quickly after the Japanese captured the city, the *SCDN* needed to readjust its editorial policies in order to fit its new position in Hong Kong. In the first place, the *SCDN* became more concerned with local affairs. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the *SCDN* was not much interested in local affairs because the primary function of the paper was to conduct propaganda warfare against the Chongqing government. There were few editorials or commentaries discussing local affairs. Local news only occupied a small portion of the *SCDN* because no news agency except the pro-Wang Central Press Service was willing to provide local news materials to the pro-Wang papers.<sup>46</sup> The indifference of the paper to local news, however, changed during the Japanese occupation. Since the very beginning of its occupation of Hong Kong, the Japanese administration was aware of the value of newspapers in stabilizing the society and in rallying the support of the population for the new Japanese rule. By January 1942, the Gunseicho had already assigned Lieutenant-Colonel Tada (多田) of the General Affairs Department to supervise editorial policies of the newspapers.<sup>47</sup> When Nishikawa, the head of the Information Department of the new Japanese civil administration, first met the heads of the Chinese newspapers on March 8, 1942, he clearly stated that the primary editorial policy of the newspapers should be “to obey the instruction of the Japanese governor” in order to educate the citizens to build a new Hong Kong.<sup>48</sup> Nishikawa also decided to meet the pressmen at least once a week to explain government

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<sup>46</sup> “Xuanchuanbu diyi jie quanguo xuanchuan huiyi baogao huibian,” in Qin, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian*, vol. 6, pt. 3, pp.709-710.

<sup>47</sup> Submitting (sending) weekly work report, Rikuamitsu Dainikki, vol.17, JACAR, C01000056300, January 25, 1942.

<sup>48</sup> *SCDN*, March 10, 1942.



policies to the pressmen.<sup>49</sup> As the *SCDN* was a leading newspaper during the Japanese occupation, it cooperated with the Japanese administration and was active in publicizing the local government policies. For example, the *SCDN* asked the population to follow the lead of the government in hygiene campaigns, explained new criminal laws, and asked the citizens to join the repatriation programme to leave Hong Kong.<sup>50</sup>

Although the *SCDN* was concerned with local affairs and became active in helping to educate the populace to support the Japanese administration, it did not overlook its primary role as a mouthpiece of the Wang government in Hong Kong. While other major newspapers were not much interested in publishing news and commentaries about the Wang government, the *SCDN* continued to devote extensive coverage to report news of the Wang government.<sup>51</sup>

There were three characteristics of the paper's pro-Wang advocacy during the Japanese occupation. First, the *SCDN* no longer conducted intensive anti-Chongqing propaganda during the Japanese occupation. It was because the function of the *SCDN* as a "propaganda front" against the Chongqing government became much less important after the fall of Hong Kong. Similar to the situation in Shanghai, all pro-Chongqing newspapers in Hong Kong were either closed or forced to change

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<sup>49</sup> *SCDN*, March 9, 1942.

<sup>50</sup> "Qingjie yundong yu shimin jiankang" 清潔運動與市民健康, Editorial, *SCDN*, March 16, 1942; "Shishi jingling de yiyi" 實施警令的意義, Editorial, *SCDN*, May 31, 1942; "Xiang Qiaobao jin yiyan" 向僑胞進一言, Editorial, *SCDN*, July 27, 1942.

<sup>51</sup> The Central Press Service was the main source of news of the Wang government for newspapers in Hong Kong. In March 1942, the *SCDN* adopted about 780 news reports from the Central Press Service, but no other non-pro-Wang newspapers adopted more than 300 news reports from the Central Press Service. It showed that these major newspapers were not interested in reporting news of the Wang government. Zhongyang dianxunshe diaochaichu, ed., *Zhongyang dianxunshe di'ernian*, p.64.



their attitudes under Japanese occupation. Moreover, as Hong Kong was not the contact point between the unoccupied and occupied areas in China anymore, the *SCDN* was not able to spread the ideas about the peace movement to the unoccupied areas. As a result, the paper published much fewer articles and commentaries which criticized the resistance policy or denounced the Chongqing government.

Second, the *SCDN* attempted to consolidate the allegiance of the local population to the Wang government. Although the Wang government was officially recognized by the Japanese administration in Hong Kong as the central government of China, and the local gentry repeatedly pledged allegiance to Wang, the population of Hong Kong was far from being supportive of the Wang government. According to the *SCDN*, the people in Hong Kong had long been deceived by the Chongqing government and the Allied Powers and hence misunderstood the Wang government.<sup>52</sup> The paper, therefore, was eager to change and correct the mind of the people in Hong Kong. While there was little news of the Chongqing government available in Hong Kong after the Japanese occupation, the *SCDN* tried to continue publishing extensive news reports and commentaries of the Wang government so as to convince the readers that the Wang government was the only central government in China both *de jure* and *de facto*. Moreover, the *SCDN* tried to extend the influence of the Wang government by launching the New Citizens' Movement (*Xinguomin yundong* 新國民運動) in Hong Kong. This movement was introduced by the Wang government in January 1942, aiming at strengthening the cohesion of the population in its jurisdiction to support the Wang government and the Greater East Asian War.<sup>53</sup> The *SCDN* quickly made use of this movement to ask the population of Hong Kong to

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<sup>52</sup> “Haiwai qiaobao zhi yingyou renshi” 海外僑胞之應有認識, Editorial, *SCDN*, February 24, 1942.

<sup>53</sup> *CCDN*, January 1, 1942.





follow the movement:

Under the leadership of Chairman Wang, all 450 million fellow countrymen in China have participated actively in the New Citizens' Movement... The overseas Chinese should follow the compatriots in China, and launch the New Citizens' Movement first individually and then in the whole society.<sup>54</sup>

The objectives of the New Citizens' Movement in Hong Kong were similar to those carried out in occupied China. The paper hoped that the movement could make the local population of Hong Kong understand the aims of the Greater East Asian War and voluntarily contribute to the War.<sup>55</sup> More importantly, as the movement was closely associated with the Wang government, the paper tried to use this opportunity to indoctrinate the local population of Hong Kong to support the Wang government.

Third, the *SCDN* tried to convince the population that assisting the local Japanese administration to sustain the Greater East Asian War was a way to render service to the nation. The *SCDN* often stated that if the Chinese residents in Hong Kong, who lived under Japanese rule, could cooperate with the local administration, they actually helped their motherland by sharing the responsibility of building up the New Order of East Asia with China and Japan. For example, when a *SCDN* editorialist discussed how the overseas Chinese living in Hong Kong and other parts in Southeast Asia could utilize their financial resources, he put forward the following view:

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<sup>54</sup> "Haiwai huaqiao zhi xinguomin yundong" 海外華僑之新國民運動, Editorial, *SCDN*, February 11, 1942.

<sup>55</sup> "Jiji tuixing xinguomin yundong" 積極推行新國民運動, Editorial, *SCDN*, July 14, 1942; Wu Jianchen 吳劍塵 (pseud.), "Xinguomin yundong yu xin Xianggang jianshe" 新國民運動與新香港建設, *SCDN*, September 9, 1942.



Many [patriotic overseas Chinese] think that investing in the motherland for the rehabilitation of the peace areas was the only way to deploy their capital... But it is also a good way for our compatriots living abroad to use their capital to develop their individual careers and investment in the places where they live, and to provide what the friendly nation [Japan] needs according to their abilities as well as the principle of collective and individual endeavour [for the War] [*gezi nuli gongtong xieli* 各自努力共同協力]... If our compatriots living abroad can stick to these principles and work for a better future, their significance will be the same as the compatriots living in China.<sup>56</sup>

In general, being a newspaper with a high political status under Japanese rule, the *SCDN* became an instrument of both the Wang government and the Japanese local administration to publicize their wartime policies and educate the citizens to support the War.

### **Breakdown of the Propaganda Machinery: Decline of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, 1943-1944**

The success of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* after the outbreak of the Pacific War did not last long. The Japanese wartime empire reached its height in late 1942 when it occupied almost all of Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and the outlying islands in the West Pacific. Afterwards, the Japanese advance in Asia slowed down in 1943 and the United States started to launch counter-offensives in Papua New Guinea and the surrounding areas. In the years 1943 and 1944, Japan began to lose strategic islands in the Pacific and became increasingly vulnerable to the attacks of the Allies.

The unfavourable military situation had a twofold negative impact on the press in Shanghai and Hong Kong. First, the publication of the newspapers was

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<sup>56</sup> “Gezi nuli yu gongtong xieli” 各自努力與共同協力, Editorial, *SCDN*, December 9, 1942.



increasingly affected by operational problems. The control of the Wang government over the press in its jurisdiction became so strict that even the most pro-Wang newspapers were not satisfied with the government repression. Shortages of printing materials caused the newspapers in Shanghai and Hong Kong to reduce the number of pages and copies, and hence weakened the effectiveness of the newspapers as mass media. Second, the newspapers were faced with increasing difficulty in convincing the Chinese population that Japan could lead China and East Asia a bright future and that the Wang government had chosen the right way to save China. The papers began to steer away somewhat from political propaganda and be more concerned with the hardship of the population brought by the prolonged war. These pro-Wang newspapers were sometimes so dissatisfied with the current hardship of the people that they turned to criticize the Wang government for its inability to improve the living conditions in occupied China.

### ***The CCDN during Difficult Times***

The *CCDN* and other newspapers in Shanghai faced growing operational problems from 1943. The first practical problem was the press control in the Wang-controlled territories. Soon after the Wang government declared war on Britain and the United States in January 1943, the Ministry of Publicity began to tighten up its control over the press in its jurisdiction. The Shanghai Municipal Government was instructed on January 19 not to permit the publication of new newspapers in order to save resources and tighten control.<sup>57</sup> The Ministry of Publicity also stepped up the suppression of news reports which were unfavourable for the Wang government. For example, the Ministry issued an order to all the newspapers in

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<sup>57</sup> Letter from Lin Bosheng to Shanghai Municipal Government, SMA, R1-18-661, January 19, 1943.



January 1943 to the effect that no news of air raids in the Wang-controlled territories was allowed to be released unless authorized by the government.<sup>58</sup> Starting from March 30, 1943, all newspapers were not allowed to publish domestic or international news reports which were not provided by the Central Press Service or approved by the Ministry in advance. All anti-Axis articles or any unfavourable news reports about the Axis Powers were also banned without exception.<sup>59</sup> This measure aimed at blocking almost all alternative news sources and unifying contents and standpoints of news reports in the newspapers.

The most important step of the Ministry of Publicity in its attempt to tighten up the press was the announcement of the “Basic Outline of the Wartime Cultural Propaganda Policy” (*Zhanshi wenhua xuanchuan zhengce jiben gangyao* 戰時文化宣傳政策基本綱要) on June 10, 1943. The Outline declared the “general mobilization of the cultural propaganda in order to participate in the cultural and ideological warfare in the Greater East Asian War”.<sup>60</sup> It required all the cultural activities in the Wang-controlled territories to adhere to several principles set by the government. The cultural workers were obliged to support Sino-Japanese cooperation and the New Order of East Asia, eliminate political and cultural influence of Britain and the United States in China and East Asia, prevent the expansion of communism, and develop Chinese and East Asian culture.<sup>61</sup> In order to realize these principles, the Outline declared the strengthening of government control over all mass media,

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<sup>58</sup> Xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao 宣傳部工作報告, SHAC, 2003/2034, January 1943.

<sup>59</sup> Letter from Chen Gongbo to Huxiqu gongshu 滬西區公署, SMA, R18-1-381, March 25, 1943.

<sup>60</sup> Xuanchuanbu 宣傳部, ed., *Xuanchuanbu di'erjie quanguo xuanchuan gaikuang* 宣傳部第二屆全國宣傳概況 (Nanjing: Xuanchuanbu, 1943), p.171.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp.171-173.



such as the press, radio, films, dramas and songs.<sup>62</sup> The Outline became the legal foundation of the Wang government to maintain its control over the press in the following years until the end of the War.

In the following several months, the *CCDN* continued with its long-standing pro-government attitude and supported the new press policy. It criticized some newspapers which were not satisfied with the harsh press control:

We certainly need “public opinion” which speaks for the populace, but it is not propaganda, especially wartime propaganda, to which we refer at present. Wartime propaganda has already become a weapon directed at the populace and aimed at conquering the people’s mind. It never aims to reflect public opinion.<sup>63</sup>

However, it was soon proved that the Outline and the harsh press control failed to mobilize all journalists and writers to publicize the wartime policies of the Wang government. Many writers who were still active in the cultural circles in the occupied areas expressed discontent discreetly, or chose not to comment on political affairs in order to avoid violation of the strict control. Even the pro-government *CCDN* was eventually aware of this problem and began to be sympathetic with the writers’ dissent:

It is true that nowadays there are some writers who endeavour to escape from reality [in their writings]... Perhaps these writings stick to traditionalism or were indulged in romance, but they might have the same abilities to show the situation of the times as other writings do. It is not the fault of the writers to escape from reality. We should try our best to clear

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p.174.

<sup>63</sup> “Women duiyu xuanchuan yingyou de xinnian” 我們對於宣傳應有的信念, Editorial, *CCDN*, November 22, 1943.



obstacles and find a solution for the writers, but not blame them.<sup>64</sup>

The increasing grievance of the newspapermen and writers finally forced the Ministry of Publicity to relax its control over the press in August 1944. The Ministry announced on August 30 that it would no longer interfere with news reports and the opinions of the newspapers which were not related to military or diplomatic secrets.<sup>65</sup> However, the relaxation of control did not lead to a significant improvement of the situation in the press because the newspapers were faced with other more serious operational problems, such as shortage of printing materials.

Shortages of printing materials were another problem which worsened the difficulties of the *CCDN* and other newspapers in Shanghai. Among the inadequacy of various printing materials, the shortage of newsprint caused the most serious problem to the press. The import of newsprint was completely blocked after the outbreak of the Pacific War. Newsprint available in the market came from the limited stock of foreign newsprint imported before the Pacific War and a small amount of newsprint produced domestically.<sup>66</sup> The limited supply triggered a huge price increase of newsprint throughout the Pacific War. By July 1943, the price of foreign newsprint had risen to CRB\$1,100 per ream, which was about fifty-five times of the price in May 1940.<sup>67</sup> The price continued to climb to a stunning level of CRB\$9,000 per ream in August 1944.<sup>68</sup> Foreign newsprint was so valuable that it was hoarded

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<sup>64</sup> “Chubanjie yingyou de jingjue” 出版界應有的警覺, Editorial, *CCDN*, June 19, 1944.

<sup>65</sup> *CCDN*, September 1, 1944.

<sup>66</sup> Letter from Shanghai tebieshi zhiye tongye gonghui choubeihui zhuren 上海特別市紙業同業公會籌備會主任 to the Japanese Embassy in China, SMA, S286-1-71, February 29, 1944.

<sup>67</sup> Dangju hezhun jizhi zuigao shoujiabiao 當局核准機紙最高售價表, SMA, S286-1-97, July 19, 1943.

<sup>68</sup> Shanghai tebieshi zhiye tongye gonghui jizhi zuijin shoujiabiao 上海特別市同業公會機紙最近售價表, SMA, S286-1-97, August 21, 1944.



and unavailable for sale in the market from September 1944.<sup>69</sup> The rise of the price of newsprint also led to a continuous increase of the value of the used newsprint because the scrap newsprint could be recycled and resold at a high price. As the *CCDN* and other government-subsidized newspapers could receive cheap newsprint from the Ministry of Publicity at CRB\$100 (18 Japanese yen) per ream, they were not directly affected by the rise of price of newsprint during the early period. However, as the production cost of these subsidized newspapers was much reduced by the cheap newsprint, the wholesale price of these newspapers was often lower than the market value of the papers as scarp newsprint. Many newspaper vendors exploited this price difference for their own profit. When the vendors received the newspapers from the printing houses, they did not sell them to readers. Instead, they hoarded a large quantity of newspapers and resold them to the recycling factories as scrap newsprint at a high price.<sup>70</sup> This problem greatly reduced the circulation of the newspapers, and hence weakened their influence on the people.

The low-priced supply of newsprint provided by the Ministry of Publicity to the *CCDN* and other important newspapers became eventually unstable from 1944. The *CCDN* had to reduce its size from six to four pages per copy in January 1944. In July 1944, the Ministry further reduced 30% of its newsprint supply to all the subsidized newspapers.<sup>71</sup> The *CCDN* had to cut its production further by printing only two pages each copy every other day.<sup>72</sup> The reduction of pages printed in each copy weakened the contents of the *CCDN* and hence its influence to the public.

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<sup>69</sup> Zhiye tongye gonghui jizhi jiamubiao 紙業同業公會機紙價目表, SMA, S286-1-97, September 16, 1944.

<sup>70</sup> Xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao 宣傳部工作報告, SHAC, 2003/2034, March 1944.

<sup>71</sup> Xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao 宣傳部工作報告, SHAC, 2003/2033, May 1944.

<sup>72</sup> *CCDN*, July 1, 1944.



All these operational problems were in fact caused by the deteriorating military situation of the Japanese armed forces in the Pacific during that period. As the *CCDN* was a loyal follower of the Wang government, it had the duty to help the government maintain the morale of the population in the occupied areas when Japan was losing in the War. However, it was impossible for the *CCDN* to continue with its steadfast support for the government because of the worsening economic and social conditions in the occupied areas. The mission of the *CCDN* to propagate the Greater East Asian War and the worsening situations in the occupied areas became more irreconcilable when the Japanese failure was more apparent. Under such adverse circumstances, the pro-government *CCDN* began to complain about the poor administration of the Wang government.

News about the defeat of Japanese troops or its Axis allies began to appear in the *CCDN* from 1943. In January 1943, Germany lost the Battle of Stalingrad, causing catastrophic casualties and a halt of the Axis offensive on the eastern front in Europe.<sup>73</sup> The Allies invaded the Italian peninsula from Sicily, leading to the surrender of the Italian government in September 1943.<sup>74</sup> The *CCDN* also did not conceal news about the Japanese defeat in the Pacific, although it was reported in a more discreet way. For example, the paper reported in late December 1943 the annihilation of all 1,500 Japanese soldiers in Makin and Tarawa, two distant islands in the Southwest Pacific.<sup>75</sup> The paper also reported that the Allies recaptured the Pacific islands of Saipan in July 1944, Guam and Tinian in September 1944, and that

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<sup>73</sup> *CCDN*, February 4, 1943.

<sup>74</sup> *CCDN*, September 10, 1943.

<sup>75</sup> *CCDN*, December 21, 1943.





all the Japanese troops and civilians in these islands died in the battles.<sup>76</sup> The populations in the occupied areas were hence not totally ignorant of the defeat of Japanese armed forces in the Pacific.

Faced with the adverse military situation in the Pacific War, the pro-government *CCDN* had to continue to boost the morale of the population, or, at least, express its support for the continuation of the War. The *CCDN* repeatedly stressed that the loss of these islands did not affect the predominance of the Japanese troops in the Pacific. It described the death of the Japanese troops and civilians on the Pacific islands as brave patriots who died with honour (*yusui* 玉碎). For example, a *CCDN* editorialist praised the Japanese soldiers who died in the battles in Makin and Tarawa in the following way:

After reading the announcement [about the fall of the two islands], we deeply understand that the combat spirit of the Japanese soldiers is unparalleled in the universe and hence strengthened our faith in invincibility of Greater East Asia. Although the Japanese garrisons in these two islands faced a numerically superior enemy, they could hit the enemy seriously again and again. They even continued fighting night and day, without having food or water, for seven days. No nation except those with a long tradition of loyalty to the ruler and the nation, like Japan, can show such uncompromising and brave morale.<sup>77</sup>

However, the admiration of the *CCDN* for these brave Japanese soldiers did not imply that the paper overlooked the unfavourable political situation which Japan and the Wang government faced in this period. The paper no longer showed the optimism about the success of Japan which it had shown in the beginning of the Pacific War. It began to admit that there was no substantial evidence of Japanese victory. A *CCDN*

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<sup>76</sup> *CCDN*, July 19, 1944; October 1, 1944.

<sup>77</sup> “Beizhuang de yiye” 悲壯的一頁, Editorial, *CCDN*, December 21, 1943.



editor revealed the uneasy position of pro-Wang publicists, who needed to reconcile the assertion of Japanese victory with the lack of substantial evidence for this assertion:

... It is apparent that the focus of the core question [of the peace movement] is whether we can achieve general peace and victory in the Greater East Asian War. Before we can achieve these two goals, it is not possible to provide concrete evidence to support many of our ideals and commitments. So the publicists should now bear in mind that although it is important to give concrete evidence to support [our assertions], it is more crucial to [explain to the public] how to achieve general peace and victory in the Greater East Asian War as soon as possible.<sup>78</sup>

The *CCDN* was in an even more difficult position when it had to explain the hardship of the populace during the prolonged war. The population of Shanghai suffered seriously the shortage of necessities and soaring prices. The general price level in Shanghai rose by almost three times in the year 1943, and by eight times in the year 1944.<sup>79</sup> Rice, which was the most essential necessity for the population, fluctuated even more seriously. Most of the foreign supply of rice was blocked after the outbreak of the Pacific War. The government monopoly of the purchase and sale of rice in the lower Yangtze region failed to secure a sufficient supply of rice in Shanghai.<sup>80</sup> The rice supply therefore became highly unstable. There were many reports in localities throughout Shanghai that there was insufficient or even no rice available in the open markets.<sup>81</sup> Although there was a black market in rice in

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<sup>78</sup> “Zailun duiyu xuanchuan de xinnian” 再論對於宣傳的信念, Editorial, *CCDN*, November 23, 1943.

<sup>79</sup> The general price index in Shanghai rose from 4,235.82 in January 1943 to 16,537.57 in December 1943, and from 24,363.76 in January 1944 to 219,656.71 in December 1944. The base of price index was 100, and the base year was 1936. Shanghai shi dang’anguan 上海市檔案館, ed., *Riwei Shanghai shi zhengfu* 日偽上海市政府 (Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1986), p.620.

<sup>80</sup> Liu, “Wang wei zhengfu liangzheng shuping,” pp.150-151.

<sup>81</sup> Letter from Zhu Yuzhen 朱玉軫 to Chen Gongbo, January 27, 1943, in Shanghai shi dang’anguan, ed., *Riwei Shanghai shi zhengfu*, p.627.



Shanghai, the price was extraordinarily high and often unaffordable for the lower classes.<sup>82</sup>

The *CCDN* was not insensitive to the difficulties of the population from the very beginning of the Pacific War. The editors of the paper often expressed their concern about the worsening social situation. In April 1943, an editorialist lamented the ineffectiveness of the government policies to curb the rise of prices:

The high price level is the greatest reason for the present-day hardship of people...The press reported how the government “would” control the prices or would “formulate” different policies [to tackle the problems]. But what is the reality? Certainly, many effective policies have been in force during this period, but these measures are utterly inadequate to solve the problem.<sup>83</sup>

The paper, however, avoided putting all the blame on the authorities at this time. The editorialist continued to point out that the rise of price level was mainly caused by speculators and hoarders:

The fundamental solution to the present price problem, or even to the livelihood of the population, must be the strict and effective suppression of speculation and hoarding. The behaviour [of these speculators and hoarders] is a criminal offence which destabilizes the rear during war. It is never unreasonable to punish them with the military law.<sup>84</sup>

Despite its pro-government stance, the *CCDN* became less tolerant of the incompetence of the government in improving the living conditions when the

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<sup>82</sup> For further description of the difficult living conditions in Shanghai, see Fu, *Passivity, Resistance and Collaboration*, pp.123-126.

<sup>83</sup> “Yiping wujia de genben yaozhuo” 抑平物價的根本要著, Editorial, *CCDN*, April 10, 1943.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.



appalling living conditions continued throughout the years 1943 and 1944. On May 24, 1944, the government announced that it would abandon its monopoly of rice transport into Shanghai and allowed people to sell the rice in Shanghai at market price.<sup>85</sup> The new policy was regarded as the prelude to an abolition of the whole rice rationing system. It led to another wave of price increase of rice. The *CCDN* became impatient with the government and asked the administration to improve the situation.<sup>86</sup> In the following months, the *CCDN* editors frequently criticized that government officers were corrupt and unable to relieve the hardship of the population:

Shortages of materials, which we cannot overcome immediately at present, do render price control ineffective and the rationing system imperfect. Nevertheless, corruption and fraudulence of officials, as well as collusion between officials and merchants to exploit the population, further obstruct any administrative reform. If these corrupt officials are not eradicated, then all administrative reforms, transfers of personnel and introduction of new policies will have no effect but harm the population and provide more loopholes for corrupt officials.<sup>87</sup>

In general, the operational problems of the press, the unfavourable military situation and the worsening social condition made it increasingly difficult for even the most pro-government newspapers like the *CCDN* to put in a good word for the government. The propaganda machinery of the Wang government was, therefore, in danger of breaking down.

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<sup>85</sup> *CCDN*, May 25, 1944.

<sup>86</sup> “Minshi wenti jidai jie jue” 民食問題亟待解決, Editorial, *CCDN*, June 8, 1944.

<sup>87</sup> “Wujia kuangzhang lun peigei” 物價狂漲論配給, Editorial, *CCDN*, September 27, 1944.



### *Failure of the SCDN in Japanese-occupied Hong Kong*

While the *CCDN* had increasing difficulty in defending government policies as the situation in the occupied areas worsened in 1943 and 1944, the *SCDN* faced an even more embarrassing situation in Hong Kong during this period. Its privileged political status in the press did not guarantee popularity with the local population. On the contrary, people tended to choose newspapers which were less politically tainted.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, they seemed to be still reluctant to regard the Wang government as the central government of China. It was therefore not surprising that the pro-Wang *SCDN* failed to have a large readership in Hong Kong.

The poor circulation of the *SCDN* can be shown in the vastly different financial positions of the *SCDN* and *Wah Kiu Yat Pao*, a commercial paper which had little connection to the Wang government. Without any external subsidies, *Wah Kiu Yat Po* managed to have newspaper sales of MY\$244,997.67 and a profit of MY\$38,413 in the year 1943.<sup>89</sup> The *SCDN*, however, suffered loss and had to rely on the subsidies of MY\$139,800 from the Wang government in the same year to maintain its operation.<sup>90</sup> As the retailing prices of the two papers were the same, the poor financial situation of the *SCDN* showed that it had a much smaller circulation than *Wah Kiu Yat Po*.

The failure of the *SCDN* to enhance the support of the population for the Wang government was also illustrated in the disputes between the *SCDN* and *Xiangdao*

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<sup>88</sup> Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha 東洋經濟新報社, ed., *Gunseika no Honkon: shinseisita Dai Tōa no chūkaku* 軍政下の香港: 新生した大東亞の中核 (Hong Kong: Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha, 1944), p.289.

<sup>89</sup> Profit and loss account and balance sheet of the Overseas Chinese Daily News Ltd for the year 1943, HKPRO, HKRS122-5-53.

<sup>90</sup> Letters from Lin Bosheng to Wang Jingwei, SHAC, 2003/2178, 1943-1944.



*ribao* in May and June 1944 over rice import from Guangdong province. Similar to Shanghai and many parts of occupied China, Hong Kong suffered a shortage of rice in 1943 and 1944. The supply of rice was so unstable that the Japanese administration had to suspend the rice rationing system from April 14, 1944.<sup>91</sup> Aiming at seeking new sources of rice, Aw Boon Haw (胡文虎), a wealthy Chinese herbal oil manufacturer and the proprietor of *Xiangdao ribao*, took the lead to form the Hong Kong People's Food Cooperative Association (香港民食協助會) and a rice import agency Chung Kiu Company (中僑公司) in November 1943.<sup>92</sup> The Association was soon promised by Chen Yaozu, the Nanjing-appointed head of Guangdong province who was later murdered in Canton on April 4, 1944, to supply rice to Hong Kong.<sup>93</sup> However, Chen Yaozu's promise was not honoured. Only some 600 packs of rice had sold to Chung Kiu Company by May 1944. When Chen Chunpu (陳春圃), the successor of Chen's after the murder, announced a new food policy in Canton in May 1944, the discontented Chung Kiu Company finally started to express its grievance. On May 25, Aw's *Xiangdao ribao* published an interview with Chung Kiu Company, in which the Company criticized the provincial government for failing to keep the promise to sell sufficient rice to the Association.<sup>94</sup>

The *SCDN* was much irritated because *Xiangdao ribao* criticized and challenged the authority of a Nanjing-appointed administration. The paper counter-attacked Chung Kiu Company and *Xiangdao ribao* sternly:

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<sup>91</sup> *SCDN*, April 14, 1944.

<sup>92</sup> *SCDN*, November 26, 1943.

<sup>93</sup> "Dao Chen Yaozu shi" 悼陳耀祖氏, Editorial, *Xiangdao ribao*, April 7, 1944.

<sup>94</sup> *Xiangdao ribao*, May 24, 1944.



Even if the Guangdong provincial authorities have committed some mistakes, we, overseas Chinese merchants, can suggest to the central government of China to review [these mistakes]. Unfortunately, Chung Kiu Company does not act in this way. Instead, it publicizes [the mistakes] in Hong Kong, a place where international attention focused. It seems that people who still have a sense of national identity should not have made such a move.<sup>95</sup>

Faced with the attack from the *SCDN*, *Xiangdao ribao* refused to give in. It responded to the *SCDN* by publishing another interview with Chung Kiu Company, in which the interviewee strongly criticized that the *SCDN* wanted to “block the voice of the overseas Chinese and forbid them to have [the mistakes] made public”.<sup>96</sup> *Xiangdao ribao* even threatened to close the newspaper if “the national policy and the editorial policy of the newspaper conflict with each other”.<sup>97</sup> The skirmishes between the two papers continued until mid-June 1944. In brief, the *SCDN* condemned the *Xiangdao ribao* for using the problem of rice trade between Hong Kong and Guangdong province to criticize the Wang government. *Xiangdao ribao* criticized that the *SCDN* tried to help the Wang government to conceal the mistakes and forbid any discussion of the matter.

The Japanese administration was aware of the disputes between the two newspapers. In a regular press conference for Chinese journalists held on June 7, Governor Isogai advised that while newspapers helped to publicize the government policies, they should also point out the mistakes of the government and make suggestions for improvement. He also stated that a newspaper should be impartial

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<sup>95</sup> Baiyi 白衣 (pesud.), “Zhenggao Zhongqiao gongsi” 正告中僑公司, *SCDN*, May 27, 1944.

<sup>96</sup> “‘Zhenggao Zhongqiao gongsi’ zhe tingzhi – Zhongqiao gongsi dangshiren da jizhe wen” 「正告中僑公司」者聽之 – 中僑公司當事人答記者問, *Xiangdao ribao*, May 30, 1944.

<sup>97</sup> “Yanlunjia de taidu” 言論家的態度, Editorial, *Xiangdao ribao*, June 2, 1944.



towards government policies and public opinion.<sup>98</sup> Although Isogai did not openly interfere with the dispute, it was apparent that he was sympathetic towards *Xiangdao ribao*, which pointed out the mistakes of the Wang government. The dispute finally faded away in mid-June 1944 when the Guangdong provincial government agreed to increase its rice export to Hong Kong.<sup>99</sup> This dispute showed that the *SCDN* failed to build up its influence and prestige in Hong Kong, and that the local population did not necessarily support the Wang government even after a long period of pro-Wang publicity of the *SCDN*.

### **Final Days: the *CCDN*, the *SCDN* and the Collapse of the Wang Government**

Wang's death in Nagoya, Japan in November 1944 further worsened the chaotic situation of the press during the final days of the Pacific War. Rivalry among the top officials of the Wang government shook the fragile foundation of the Wang government. The future of the Wang government became even dimmer when the Germany surrendered and Japan was no longer able to protect itself from the Allied attacks. In this situation, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* lost most of their functions to publicize the peace movement of the Greater East Asian War. Their collapse was just a matter of time.

### ***Wang's Death, Lin Bosheng's Failure and Closure of the SCDN***

Wang's health had been deteriorating since 1943. He suffered from serious backache caused by a bullet which had stayed in his back since the assassination in 1935. In December 1943, Wang had a surgery in Nanjing to remove the bullet.<sup>100</sup> As

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<sup>98</sup> *Xiangdao ribao*, June 8, 1944.

<sup>99</sup> *SCDN*, June 15, 1944.

<sup>100</sup> *CCDN*, December 23, 1943.





the surgery did not help much to improve his health condition, Wang flew to Nagoya in March 1944 to receive further treatment.<sup>101</sup> However, Wang's health condition continued to decline, and he finally died in Nagoya on November 10, 1944.<sup>102</sup>

Wang's death represented the fall of the key figure of the Wang government and the whole peace movement. While high officials in Nanjing unanimously mourned Wang's death, they became mutually antagonistic and started keen factional rivalry. Wang was succeeded by the second highest officials Chen Gongbo and Zhou Fohai. Chen, the head of the Legislative Yuan and the mayor of Shanghai, assumed the offices of Acting Chairman of the National Government as well as the head of the Executive Yuan and the Military Commission. Zhou, the Minister of Finance, was willing to cooperate with Chen Gongbo and assume the mayorship of Shanghai.<sup>103</sup> This arrangement, however, led to antagonism towards Chen and Zhou on the part of the top officials who belonged to the "Mansion Faction" (Gongguan pai 公館派). This faction included Lin Bosheng, Chu Minyi and Chen Chunpu, who obtained power in the Wang government because of their family or personal connections with Wang.<sup>104</sup> Wang's death implied that the Mansion Faction lost their only patron in the Wang government. They predicted, and were not content with, their own dim future in the Wang government under the new leadership. However, as the members of the Mansion Faction did not have substantial political power to change the situation, they could only threaten to leave the government. Zhou was annoyed and commented that

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<sup>101</sup> CCDN, March 28, 1944.

<sup>102</sup> CCDN, November 13, 1944.

<sup>103</sup> CCDN, November 13, 1944.

<sup>104</sup> Lin Bosheng was originally Wang's personal assistant in the 1920s. Chu was Madame Wang's brother-in-law, and Chen was Madame Wang's nephew. They were called the "Mansion Faction" because they often went to Wang's mansion to visit Wang as Wang's relatives and personal assistants. They also often had meals with Wang at Wang's mansion. Hu, *Jinsheng jinshi*, vol.1, p.202.



the behaviour of Lin and Chu in those days was “disgusting and absurd”.<sup>105</sup>

The opposition of the Mansion Faction soon proved to be futile. Lin Bosheng finally did not leave the government, but it seemed that Chen and Zhou were determined to eradicate Lin’s power in the central government. Lin was appointed the head of Anhui province in the Supreme Defence Council meeting on December 27. His post of the Minister of Publicity was taken over by Zhao Shuyong, who was Zhou Fohai’s friend and associate. Even Lin’s position in the GMD Publicity Bureau, which existed in name only, was later removed and given to Chu Minyi on January 31, 1945.<sup>106</sup> In fact, Chu’s situation was not much better than Lin’s. Chu was sent to Guangdong province to replace Chen Chunpu, who had just resigned from the chairmanship of Guangdong province, on April 27, 1945.<sup>107</sup>

Lin Bosheng’s failure to preserve his power in the Ministry of Publicity meant that the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, which were still controlled by Lin or his representatives, were no longer seriously supported by the Wang government. The *SCDN*, which was at that time the only overseas newspaper sponsored by the Wang government, was the first victim under the new leadership. The *SCDN* suspended its publication in around mid-January 1945.<sup>108</sup> The reason for the suspension is little known. The office of the *SCDN* might be damaged by an American air raid in Central

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<sup>105</sup> *CCDN*, December 28, 1944.

<sup>106</sup> *CCDN*, February 1, 1945.

<sup>107</sup> *CCDN*, April 27, 1945.

<sup>108</sup> The exact date of the suspension of the *SCDN* was not known. The last issue of the *SCDN* available at present is January 15, 1945, but there was no notice about the suspension of the paper in that issue. It is, however, certain that the *SCDN* had already ceased to publish by February 13, 1945 because the name of the *SCDN* did not appear in a notice jointly issued by the Chinese newspapers on that day. *Xianggang ribao*, February 13, 1945.



district in Hong Kong on January 15, 1945.<sup>109</sup> However, it was more likely that the *SCDN* could not continue its publication because the Ministry of Publicity in Nanjing did not continue its subsidies to the paper after Lin left office.<sup>110</sup> It is believed that a part of the editorial staff of the *SCDN* moved to Canton or other occupied territories.<sup>111</sup> The *SCDN* was eventually closed when it returned its premises to the landlord on July 31, 1945.<sup>112</sup>

### ***The CCDN before the End of the War***

The position of the *CCDN* was not much better than the *SCDN*. As the *CCDN* had long been the leading newspaper in the Wang-controlled area, the Ministry of Publicity supported the paper even in the final days the regime. However, as supply of newsprint and other printing materials in occupied China began to dry up, the *CCDN* had to reduce its publication to a minimum. The Ministry of Publicity further cut the supply of newsprint to the newspapers in March 1945.<sup>113</sup> From April 1945, the *CCDN* could only print two pages each copy. The paper had to discard all supplementary contents and published only editorials, the most important news, and advertisements in the newspaper.

The attitude of the *CCDN* towards the administration became increasingly

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<sup>109</sup> *Xiangdao ribao*, January 16, 1945.

<sup>110</sup> The archival record shows that the Ministry of Publicity continued remitting monthly subsidies to the *SCDN* until December 1944. There is no record showing similar remittances to the *SCDN* from January 1945. Letter from Lin Bosheng to Chen Gongbo, SHAC 2003/2178, December 20, 1944.

<sup>111</sup> A writer with the name Li Zhiwen (李志文), who had written articles for the *SCDN* since the pre-Pacific War period, became a correspondent of the *Xianggang ribao* in Canton from March 1945. He wrote about his post-*SCDN* life experience in Canton. *Xianggang ribao*, March 20, 1945.

<sup>112</sup> *South China Morning Post* and the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, February 14, 1946.

<sup>113</sup> Xuanchuanbu gongzuo baogao 宣傳部工作報告, SHAC, 2003/2032, February 1945.



critical when the Wang government was on the verge of collapse and Lin Bosheng lost most of his power after Wang's death. The *CCDN* often criticized the government for its failure to improve the miserable living conditions of the people and to the rampant corruption of the officials:

Try to think about whether the present-day government is built on the foundation of people, or outside of them? Government leaders know the answer, so do the people. Nowadays people suffer so many pains. If the government is really determined to quell the corruption of the officials, eliminate public scourges, and improve the livelihood of the population,... then not only will the people be loyal to the government, bandits will also become law-abiding people.<sup>114</sup>

As the Ministry of Publicity was no longer Lin Bosheng's private domain, the *CCDN* now dared to openly challenge the press policies of the Ministry and its subordinates. The editors of the paper wrote several editorials asking for protecting press freedom or relaxing the control of the Ministry over the press. For example, the *CCDN* appealed for a greater degree of press freedom based on four principles, including freedom of gathering materials and freedom of speech.<sup>115</sup> On another occasion, the paper even challenged openly the policy of the Ministry to tighten the control of the publication of magazines. While the Ministry faced a shortage of paper and minimized the number of magazines in circulation, an *CCDN* editorialist opposed this policy and criticized that "we should be far-sighted with regard to the cultural affairs, and should not only consider short-term objectives".<sup>116</sup>

While the *CCDN* became less cooperative with the government in the final days

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<sup>114</sup> "Wei minzhong jiechu tongku" 為民眾解除痛苦, Editorial, *CCDN*, November 25, 1944.

<sup>115</sup> "Baozhang xinwen ziyou" 保障新聞自由, Editorial, *CCDN*, January 29, 1945.

<sup>116</sup> "Du xuanchuan shice tanhua" 讀宣傳施策談話, Editorial, *CCDN*, February 28, 1945.



of the War, it shared a similar sense of helplessness and uncertainty about the future with the top officials of the Wang government. In fact, even the new leadership of the Wang government was not confident about the future of the regime. The Wang-controlled GMD issued a declaration on November 25, 1944 appealing openly to the comrades in Chongqing for reconciliation and reunification of the Party.<sup>117</sup> Zhou Fohai also tried to establish clandestine connections with Chongqing through secret agents and wireless transmission in order to acquire Chongqing's acquiescence and understanding in his work in the Wang government.<sup>118</sup> This showed that even the top leaders did not believe that the Wang government could exist in the long term and tried to reconcile with Chongqing as soon as possible for their own sake.

Meanwhile, the *CCDN* also showed a strong sense of uncertainty and pessimism towards the future of the regime. As victory of Japan and the Wang government in the War became almost impossible, the paper no longer publicized such collaborationist ideas as Pan-Asianism or the New Order of East Asia. Instead, the paper began to defend its support for the peace movement, which was regarded by supporters of resistance as treacherous behaviour. The editors tried to explain that the original aim of the peace movement was only to save China from annihilation and to establish peace with Japan. According to their explanation, it was only the British and American conspiracy to dominate East Asia that the peace movement had to change its objective and save China by war instead of peace. The *CCDN* editor lamented that this outcome was never what the leaders of the peace movement had

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<sup>117</sup> *CCDN*, November 27, 1944.

<sup>118</sup> In fact, Zhou was quite happy when he heard that Chongqing had no objection to his assumption of the mayoralty in Shanghai. Zhou, *Zhou Fohai riji quanbian*, vol.2, p.971.



expected.<sup>119</sup>

The pessimism of the *CCDN* grew when it was more apparent that Japan and the Axis Power were going to lose the Second World War. The European war ended in the German unconditional surrender on May 7, 1945. Meanwhile, Japan was also going to be defeated in Okinawa, the last stronghold outside its homeland. The *CCDN* could no longer conceal its worries about the fate of the collaborators after the War. In an editorial, the paper tried to comfort the collaborators:

We should be more far-sighted and bury ourselves at work. Even though in various areas at various moments, different political factions have different political beliefs and they lead to success or failure, their efforts to reconstruct the nation are similar with each other and lead to the same goal. The rights or wrongs will be judged by historians objectively, but it is always true that the nation will be free, revived and prosperous [as a result of these efforts].<sup>120</sup>

In fact, the worries of the *CCDN* for the postwar assessment of the role of collaborators were soon proved to be reasonable. It was because the defeat of Japan and the collapse of the Wang government were finally realized three months later.

### ***Collapse of the Wang Government and the End of the CCDN***

The Pacific War finally came to an end when Japan surrendered unconditionally after American planes dropped two atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945. The defeat of Japan implied that the Wang government would not be able to survive anymore. On August 16, one day after Emperor Hirohito made the well-known surrender broadcast, the Wang government declared dissolution and

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<sup>119</sup> “Yandian liu zhounian” 豔電六週年, Editorial, *CCDN*, December 29, 1944.

<sup>120</sup> “Muguang xu fangyuan” 目光須放遠, Editorial, *CCDN*, May 19, 1945.



transformed itself into a peace-maintaining administration.

Although the *CCDN* was discontented with the political and social conditions in the Wang-controlled areas in the final months of the War, it was still loyal to the Wang government until its final collapse. In the editorial on the day of the dissolution of the Wang government, the editorialist commented on the role of the Wang government with sympathy:

During the last six years, the persons in-charge tried their best to save the nation, preserve the national strength, and comfort the population in exile. However, the situation was so adverse that they were finally faced with an outcome which they did not want to see.<sup>121</sup>

The *CCDN* managed to publish for a few more days after the fall of the Wang government. During this short period, the journalists and writers of the paper clearly understood that it was no use continuing to support the collaborators who lost this war utterly. Instead, they showed two different attitudes. On the one hand, they tried their best to create a cheerful atmosphere in harmony with China's victory. News of the Chongqing government and Chiang's speech were again published in the *CCDN* extensively.<sup>122</sup> Some columnists also followed this cheerful atmosphere and wrote in an optimistic mood, anticipating the improvement of the living conditions in the future.<sup>123</sup> On the other hand, some writers were disillusioned by the defeat of the war and expressed depression and confusion. A literary writer, for example, describes himself as a man who is "beyond redemption" (*wuke jiuji* 無可救濟) when he looks

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<sup>121</sup> "Tuanjie tongyi" 團結統一, Editorial, *CCDN*, August 17, 1945.

<sup>122</sup> *CCDN*, August 18, 1945.

<sup>123</sup> Luo Tingwei 羅挺威, "Shuguang" 曙光, *CCDN*, August 18, 1945.



back on his literary life in the war years.<sup>124</sup>

Being the major pro-Wang newspaper in the occupied areas, the fate of the *CCDN* could be anticipated. Soon after the surrender of Japan, the Chongqing government despatched representatives to take over the properties of the enemies and the Wang government. On August 21, 1945, Feng Youzhen (馮有真), the new director of the Shanghai branch of the Central News Agency headquartered in Chongqing, took over the office of the Central Press Service in Shanghai and set up the first postwar organ of the Chongqing government in Shanghai.<sup>125</sup> The *CCDN*, which enjoyed similar standing with the Central Press Service in the propaganda machinery of the Wang regime, was also one of the first cultural institutions which the Chongqing government confiscated in Shanghai. It is believed that Wu Shaoshu (吳紹澍), the Chongqing-appointed head of the local branch of the GMD and the Three People Principles Youth Corps in Shanghai, took over the office of the *CCDN* on August 21 and ordered it to stop publication on August 21, 1945.<sup>126</sup>

## Conclusion

The development of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* fluctuated greatly during the Pacific War. The Japanese occupation of Shanghai and Hong Kong in December 1941 eliminated the pro-Chongqing influence in these two cities and caused the two pro-Wang newspapers to win the Wang-Chongqing rivalry in the press of Shanghai

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<sup>124</sup> Tao Jingsun 陶晶孫, “Xiaoyu” 小語, *CCDN*, August 18, 1945.

<sup>125</sup> Ma, ed., *Shanghai xinwen shi*, p.994.

<sup>126</sup> Wu soon gave the office and machinery of the *CCDN* for the use of the *Qingnian ribao* (the *Youth's Daily* 青年日報). Shanghai shi dangzheng jieshou weiyuanhui jieshou diwei jiguan ji shiye mingcheng tongjibiao 上海市黨政接收委員會接收敵偽機關及事業名稱統計表, SHAC, 2/7851; Zhongyang xuanchuanbu zhu hu tepaiyuan bangongchu 中央宣傳部駐滬特派員辦公處, SMA, Q430-1-266.





and Hong Kong. During the Pacific War, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* were major newspapers in Shanghai and Hong Kong respectively. They enjoyed high political status under the sponsorship of the Wang government and the support of the Japanese administrations.

As the Wang government stood on the Japanese side from the outset of the Pacific War, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* tried their best to convince their respective target the necessity of the Wang government to join the War. They asserted that Britain and the United States conspired to enslave the population of East Asia, and that Japan started the War with the aim of liberating China as well as other East Asian nations from British and American oppression. As the ultimate goal of the peace movement was also to liberate the East Asian nations, the paper asserted that China should assist Japan to fight the War.

However, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* were not able to sustain their success for a long time. Many people remained indifferent to the Wang government and its idea of Sino-Japanese cooperation. More importantly, the worsening military situation of Japan, deterioration of the living conditions in the occupied areas, and the operational problems occurred in the press of Shanghai and Hong Kong since 1943 made the pro-Wang newspapers increasingly difficult to justify the political ideas of the Wang government. As the situation was not improved, even the pro-government *CCDN* complained about the unsatisfactory administration of the Wang government.

The two papers finally had to face up to their likely demise when the defeat of Japan and the Wang government became increasingly apparent from late 1944. Lin Bosheng's failure in the factional rivalry after Wang Jingwei's death in November



1944 meant that the two newspapers lose their vital supporter in the government, and caused the quick closure of the *SCDN*. The *CCDN* continued to survive in extreme difficulty in the final days of the Wang regime, and understandingly, it was no longer enthusiastic in promoting the political ideas which justified the Wang government. Finally, the *CCDN* followed the fate of the Wang government when the Pacific War ended in Japan's unconditional surrender.

## Chapter 7

### Conclusion

Chinese collaboration with the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War became a highly sensitive topic immediately after the end of the Sino-Japanese War. The collaborators have often been stereotyped by the postwar Chinese population as traitors. The *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, the most important spokesmen of the Wang Clique and its regime during the wartime period, represented the shameful past of the collaborators in occupied China. A number of persons-in-charge of these two newspapers were arrested and accused of treason by the postwar Chinese administration. Some others disappeared from the public or concealed their embarrassing wartime experiences. The journalists who worked for the *CCDN* or the *SCDN* during the wartime period have long been labelled as “cultural traitors” (*wenhua hanjian* 文化漢奸). The wartime roles and experiences of these two papers have, therefore, often been distorted and little discussed objectively. After having discussed the roles of these two newspapers in different periods during the War, this chapter aims to give a general and objective conclusion on the roles of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* in the political endeavour of the Wang Clique during the Sino-Japanese War.

#### Pro-Wang Journalists’ Postwar Reflection on their Wartime Experiences

The assessment of the roles of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* during the wartime period will not be comprehensive if we do not review how the pro-Wang journalists perceive their own wartime experiences in the Clique, the regime, and the two newspapers, after the War.



There are three different attitudes when the pro-Wang journalists look back on their wartime experiences. Some pro-Wang journalists insist that what they did for the pro-Wang newspapers was not wrong at all. Lin Bosheng, the chief publicist of the Wang Clique and the director of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, is a typical example. After the collapse of the Wang government, he fled to Japan with Chen Gongbo hoping to delay their surrender to the Chongqing government. However, they were soon extradited back to China and were tried for treason in special courts in Nanjing in 1946. In his confession statements, Lin admitted that during the peace movement he had written articles and given speeches which defamed Chiang and the Chongqing government, but he insisted that he was always “persistent with the struggle for national independence”, and “work[ed] to inspire the sense of nationalism of the population”.<sup>1</sup> He defended that the pro-Japanese propaganda he was responsible for in the war years was only a “smoke screen” which aimed at preserving the integrity of the peace movement.<sup>2</sup> He asserted that what he had done in the peace movement was to “take urgent steps to save the population and the nation” and was of neither pro-Japanese nor traitorous nature.<sup>3</sup> Lin’s uncompromising attitude certainly did not win the sympathy of the judge or the population. He was finally sentenced to death and executed on October 8, 1946.

The second attitude of the pro-Wang journalists is denial. Such an attitude is apparent among young literary writers and editors who served the *CCDN* after the outbreak of the Pacific War. Liu Yusheng, a senior writer of the *CCDN*, and Luyishi (路易士), an editor of the paper who changed his penname to Jixian (紀弦) after the

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<sup>1</sup> Nanjing shi dang’an guan, ed., *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu*, vol. 1, p.523.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.524.

<sup>3</sup> Nanjing shi dang’an guan, ed., *Shenxun Wang wei hanjian bilu*, vol.1, p.526



War, are good examples. Many of these writers worked for the *CCDN* only to earn a living. Liu and Luyishi, for example, left Hong Kong for Shanghai in 1942 because they could not survive in Hong Kong under Japanese occupation and hoped to find better jobs in Shanghai.<sup>4</sup> These writers were therefore never genuine followers of the peace movement. When they were faced with accusations after the War, they tried to deny their involvement in the pro-Wang and pro-Japanese propaganda of the *CCDN*. They regarded the *CCDN* only as their employer, and were little interested in its pro-Wang standpoints. When Liu was tried after the War for spreading traitorous ideas and participation in the Wang government, he defended that he participated actively in the pro-Wang cultural circles just because he needed to feed his family, and his post in the Wang government was imposed by the supervisors involuntarily.<sup>5</sup> Despite his argument, Liu was still sentenced to three years in prison.<sup>6</sup> In comparison, Luyishi's postwar experience was less miserable. He managed to avoid being accused of treason by the court. However, he still tried his best to defend himself by declaring that all his literary work in the Japanese-occupied Shanghai was non-political and "purely literary", and that he had not taken up any post in the Wang government. He stated that he "[felt] no qualms" about what he did in Shanghai during the Pacific War.<sup>7</sup>

Between these two extreme postwar reflections, many pro-Wang journalists seem to feel ambivalence towards the roles of the pro-Wang newspapers in which

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<sup>4</sup> Confession of Liu Yusheng, SMA, Q187-2-100, 1946; Jixian 紀弦, *Jixian huiyilu* 紀弦回憶錄 (Tapie: Lianhe wenxue chubanshe, 2001), vol.1, pp.118-119.

<sup>5</sup> Confession of Liu Yusheng, SMA, Q187-2-100, 1946.

<sup>6</sup> Shanghai gaodeng fayuan xingshi panjue – Liu Yusheng 上海高等法院刑事判決 – 柳雨生, SMA, Q187-2-100, May 31, 1946.

<sup>7</sup> Jixian, *Jixian huiyilu*, vol.1, pp.152-153.



they were involved during the wartime period. Hu Lancheng, who was one of the core members of the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* until he left Lin Bosheng in 1941, is a typical example. He escaped postwar persecution after a period of hiding in his home province Zhejiang and finally fled to Japan in 1950. He looks back his experience in the Wang government and its propaganda machinery in a pensive way. He does not intend to deny his relations with the peace movement. In fact, his postwar accounts sometimes reveal that he is still sympathetic to the peace movement, and that he does not regret joining the Wang Clique and conducting pro-Wang propaganda.<sup>8</sup> However, he considers the peace movement and the Wang government as a tragedy and an illusion.<sup>9</sup> His postwar account of his participation in the peace movement, including the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, is therefore pervaded by a mood of melancholy.

In fact, there are many more pro-Wang journalists who were arrested, disappeared or stay silent after the collapse of the Wang regime. It is highly likely that many of them regard their participation in the *SCDN* and the *CCDN* as a stain on their reputation and face widespread condemnation from the postwar population. Many of them have hidden their past with these two newspapers. This aggravates our difficulties in observing how they judge the roles of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* in their own perspectives.

In short, the postwar reflection of the pro-Wang journalists on their wartime experiences in the peace movement, as well as in the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, provide important information for a more comprehensive assessment of these two

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<sup>8</sup> For example, Hu Lancheng described that he felt open and upright when he worked in the *SCDN* and joined the peace movement. Hu, *Jinsheng jinshi*, p.185.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.



newspapers during the wartime period. However, their accounts are almost inescapably affected by the postwar disputes over the morality of Chinese wartime collaboration with the Japanese, and are hence unlikely to provide unbiased observation on the roles of these two newspapers. It is the purpose of this study to redress the situation.

### **The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* during the Sino-Japanese War: An Assessment**

#### ***The CCDN, the SCDN and the Wang Jingwei Clique***

This thesis shows that the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* maintained a very close relationship with the Wang Clique throughout the Sino-Japanese War. Since their establishment in the early 1930s, the two newspapers had already been financed and controlled by Wang and his associates. Under the management of Lin Bosheng, a faithful publicist of the Wang Clique and one of Wang's closest associates, the two newspapers were utilized by the Wang Clique as the main channel to publicize its political ideas. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the influence of the Wang Clique in the Chinese government diminished because Chiang gained widespread popularity and became the supreme leader of China. As the *CCDN* was suspended after the fall of Shanghai, the *SCDN*, which was operated with very limited resources, provided the Wang Clique with a reliable channel to continue to articulate its political ideas.

After Wang defected from Chongqing and declared his peace proposal in Hanoi in December 1938, the relationship of the *SCDN* and the resumed *CCDN* with the Wang Clique became more indispensable. The widespread condemnation of Wang and his peace proposal by the Chinese population in the unoccupied areas made the Clique lose nearly all influence in the unoccupied China. The only institution which



the Clique controlled at that time was the *SCDN*. In the following months, the *SCDN* became the solitary fortress on which the Wang Clique could rely to conduct the debate with the pro-resistance press. Wang and his associates published articles in the *SCDN*, hoping to convince the population of the necessity of peace. At the same time, Lin Bosheng led a handful of fellow writers to elaborate the political ideas of the Wang Clique in the *SCDN*. The paper became the centre of the peace movement during the first few months of the peace movement. Most of the functions of the *SCDN* were later taken over by the *CCDN*, which resumed publication in July 1939 after the Clique continued its peace movement in Shanghai. Under the Wang Clique's direct supervision, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* continued to act as the spokesmen of the peace movement before the establishment of the Wang government.

The relationship of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* with the Wang Clique remained close after the Clique set up a central government in Nanjing in March 1940. Although these two newspapers were nominally civilian newspapers and hence were not directly administered by the Wang government, they were directed by Lin Bosheng, the Minister of Publicity of the Wang government. The editorial staff of these papers also maintained close connections with officials of the Wang government. As a result, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* continued to be the most authoritative newspapers in the Wang regime in the following war years.

As Lin Bosheng played a key role in the relationship between the two newspapers and the Wang Clique, the rise and fall of these two newspapers were determined by Lin's influence on the Wang Clique and the regime. When Lin was in power and became influential in the Wang government, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* enjoyed more resources and higher prestige in the regime. However, when Lin's





power diminished after Wang died in late 1944, the *SCDN* had to be closed because of the withdrawal of support of the Wang government. Although the *CCDN* managed to survive in the final days of the War, it had to close finally when Lin fell together with the Wang regime in August 1945.

### ***Resistance, Peace and War: Interpretation of the CCDN and the SCDN***

This thesis also explores how the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* helped the Wang Clique to elaborate its political ideas during the Sino-Japanese War. As both the newspapers were financed by the Wang Clique and managed by Lin Bosheng, the attitudes and standpoints of the two newspapers were basically the same. When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937, Wang and his associates raged against the Japanese invasion in China. Similar to the majority of Chinese politicians and the population, the Wang Clique supported resistance against the Japanese. The *CCDN* actively participated in the national salvation movement in Shanghai before the suspension of publication in late November 1937. The *SCDN* also adopted a similar attitude and promoted the resistance policy during the first year of the Sino-Japanese War. The editors of the two newspapers explained passionately that the whole Chinese nation should be mobilized to fight until the last man. Their attitudes were basically similar to the mainstream opinion appeared in the Chinese press at that time.

However, when the Wang Clique defected from the Chongqing government and proposed peace negotiation with Japan in December 1938, the *SCDN* promptly followed the Wang Clique and abandoned its anti-Japanese attitude. The *SCDN* writers tried to justify that the policies of resistance and peace followed the same objective to save China from annihilation. They observed that as resistance not only failed to save the nation but also destroyed the livelihood of the population, the



government should seek another feasible way to achieve national survival. The *SCDN* asserted that Wang's proposal could preserve national autonomy and solve the wartime hardship of the population, and that it should be therefore regarded as an alternative to achieve the goal.

Based on this belief, the *SCDN*, and later the *CCDN*, tried to convince the Chinese population of the necessity of Wang's peace movement. Their interpretation of the peace movement varied from time to time. The peace movement was depicted in the early days as diplomatic activities aiming at seeking peace with Japan. The two papers, however, soon bolstered the peace movement with more theoretical explanations. They explained that the peace movement was an extension of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Pan-Asianism, and therefore it was rational to develop Sino-Japanese friendship and cooperation. Besides, the newspapers asserted that the Communists were the prime enemy of China and that the Clique hoped to seek reconciliation with Chongqing. But their attitude changed later when the Clique decided to form a new central government to lead its own peace movement. The newspapers unreservedly supported the Wang regime and regarded the Chongqing government as the main obstacle of peace in China.

When the Pacific War broke out in December 1941, the standpoint of the Wang Clique and its regime changed again. The Wang government abandoned its concept of peace to which it adhered since the beginning of the peace movement and declared war on Britain and the United States in 1943. The *CCDN* and the *SCDN* had to help to rationalize the discrepancies between the Wang government's support for peace and war during different periods. The papers justified that the war against the Allies was a further step to realize the ultimate goal of the peace movement to liberate the



East Asian nations. The hardship which the populace suffered in the war against the Allies was, according to their explanation, not the same with what people suffered in resistance because the former one would bring a bright prospect to China under Japanese leadership in East Asia and Sino-Japanese cooperation.

In general, being reliable organs of the Wang Clique, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* had to change their attitudes swiftly in order to fit the needs of the Wang Clique and its regime during different periods of the War.

### ***The CCDN and the SCDN in the Local Context: Similarities and Differences***

While both the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* aimed primarily at helping the Wang Clique publicize its political ideas, they adopted different policies to cope with different political situations in Shanghai and Hong Kong. This thesis discusses how these two newspapers survived in these two cities and continued to work to fulfil their missions in different local circumstances.

There were some similarities between the local circumstances of the two cities. First, both newspapers were published under foreign jurisdictions in China before the Pacific War. Second, they had to face fierce attacks verbally and physically from the Chongqing government. The Chongqing government maintained strong influence in Shanghai and Hong Kong even though they did not administer these two cities. It worked to destroy the influence of the *CCDN*, the *SCDN* and other pro-Wang propaganda agencies in these two cities through criticism launched by pro-Chongqing newspapers and physical attacks by its underground agents.

Despite these similarities, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* dealt with the local



situations in different ways. First, the attitudes of the two pro-Wang papers towards the foreign authorities were different. In Shanghai, the Wang Clique was very active under Japanese protection. Although the *CCDN* was subject to the supervision of the SMC before the Pacific War, it was sometimes unfriendly to the foreign administrations of the city. As the *CCDN* was backed by the Wang Clique and the Japanese authorities, the SMC could not take any significant action against the *CCDN*. In Hong Kong, however, the influence of the Wang Clique was never strong. The *SCDN* was therefore usually much more cooperative with the local administration and conducted their pro-Wang propaganda without challenging the authority of the colonial government.

Second, the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* responded to violence of the Chongqing agents in diverse ways. Violence between the pro-Wang and the pro-Chongqing agents in Shanghai before the Pacific War was very vicious. Both sides spared no effort to diminish the influence of each other in the city. As the *CCDN* was the chief spokesman of the Wang Clique, it became the main target of the war of terrorism in Shanghai. Backed by the power of the underground pro-Wang agents, the *CCDN* showed an antagonistic attitude towards the terrorist attacks instigated by the Chongqing government. In comparison, although the *SCDN* suffered sabotages and terrorist attacks conducted by the Chongqing agents in Hong Kong several times, it usually refrained from taking revenge on its political enemies because of lack of power and the strong repression of the colonial government.

Third, the different target readerships of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* also affected the editorial policies and attitudes of the two papers. Although the *CCDN* claimed to publicize the political ideas of the Wang Clique to people all over the country, the



main target of the *CCDN* was still the people living in occupied China because pro-Wang newspapers were not allowed to circulate in the unoccupied areas. As a result, the *CCDN* attacked Chiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government vigorously so as to indoctrinate the occupied population that the Wang government was the legitimate government of China. The *SCDN*, nevertheless, was a different case. As Hong Kong was close to the unoccupied areas in the hinterland, the *SCDN* became the front of anti-Chongqing propaganda of the Wang Clique before the Pacific War. The paper was aimed at people in Hong Kong, especially those who had strong connections with the Chongqing government. As most of these people did not have a good impression of the Wang Clique, the *SCDN* had to adopt a milder tone in its criticism of the Chongqing government in order to avoid further irritating its target readers and to win their support for, or at least their sympathy to, the peace movement.

### ***Influence of the CCDN and the SCDN on the Chinese Population***

The primary mission of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* throughout the Sino-Japanese War was to convince the Chinese population to support the political ideas of the Wang Clique. This thesis, therefore, tries to find out how popular the newspapers were, and whether they could exert effective influence on the wartime population. It is difficult to be definitive on this issue because there are no statistics or other clear evidence available to accurately identify the readership of the papers. Postwar accounts of the influence of these two newspapers are also not necessarily reliable because of the postwar political biases. However, it is still possible to get some hints from scattered pieces of evidence.

The *CCDN* was apparently the leading newspaper in the occupied areas since



the paper had resumed publication in July 1939. It consumed the largest amount of newsprint among newspapers published in the occupied areas. It enjoyed the largest circulation, and, reasonably, the largest readership in occupied China. The paper was distributed widely across the Wang-controlled areas in the lower Yangtze region, and it was also available in North China and South China. It was therefore not appropriate to regard the *CCDN* as a totally unpopular publication in the occupied areas.

Nevertheless, the popularity of the *CCDN* should not be overstated. In fact, the circulation figures did not always reflect a complete picture of the readership of the paper. Many copies of the paper were given to people without charge. There were even some reports that people were forced to buy the *CCDN*. The people who got the *CCDN* in these ways did not necessarily support the viewpoints of the paper. In addition, the high popularity of the *CCDN* might be caused by the suppression of pro-resistance newspapers in the occupied areas. As all pro-resistance newspapers were banned in the occupied areas, the occupied population might choose the *CCDN* for its relatively richer contents of news and supplements. This observation was supported by the fact that the *CCDN* had a much poorer circulation in the foreign concessions of Shanghai, where the citizens were free to choose between pro-resistance newspapers and pro-Wang ones.

Due to the fact that the *CCDN* enjoyed a large readership in the occupied areas, it is hard to believe that the paper did not produce any significant influence on the occupied population. In fact, the occupied population seemed to be accustomed to these pro-Wang newspapers and publications after years of Japanese occupation. Pro-Wang and pro-Japanese publications still appeared throughout the city of



Shanghai even after the defeat of Japan and the collapse of the Wang government in August 1945. This situation annoyed the victorious Chongqing government so much that it ordered the local government to confiscate these publications.<sup>10</sup> This phenomenon seemed to indicate that many people who had lived under Japanese occupation did not consider pro-Wang or pro-Japanese publications questionable. Although there is no concrete evidence to account for this phenomenon, the *CCDN*, which was once the leading publication in the occupied areas, was likely to have contributed to such acquiescence of the occupied population in the pro-Wang ideas.

In comparison, the *SCDN* faced a more difficult situation in Hong Kong. The paper only attracted a small readership from the very beginning of the peace movement. Its most popular content was extensive local football news rather than pro-Wang political commentaries. There were very few commercial advertisements in the *SCDN* before the Pacific War because merchants shied away from putting their advertisements on a pro-Wang newspaper. The paper had to survive on heavy subsidies given by the Wang Clique throughout the wartime period.

The impact of the *SCDN* on the Chinese population in Hong Kong seemed to be much less significant than what the *CCDN* could achieve in Shanghai. As Hong Kong was outside the sphere of influence of the Wang Clique, the local people had little incentive to support the Wang Clique. Even when the Japanese occupied Hong Kong and allowed the *SCDN* to conduct pro-Wang propaganda more freely, the local populace seemed not to be affected by the *SCDN* and paid little attention to the Wang government.

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<sup>10</sup> Letter from Zhan Wenhu 詹文滸 to Shanghai Municipal Government, SMA, Q1-6-740, October 22, 1945.



## Final Remarks

This study explores and examines the roles of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN*, the two organs of the Wang Jingwei Clique, in the activities of the Wang Clique during the Sino-Japanese War. These two newspapers were important for the peace movement because the Wang Clique and its regime needed to articulate their political ideas through these two newspapers. This thesis explains how the two newspapers helped the Wang Clique explain its changing attitudes from resistance to peace, and then from peace to war, and how they rallied public support for the political causes of the Wang Clique. In addition, this thesis also discusses how the two newspapers faced different challenges and survived in Shanghai and Hong Kong, and evaluates the impact of these newspapers on the Chinese population.

While this thesis sheds some light on the roles of the *CCDN* and the *SCDN* during the Sino-Japanese War, further research is still necessary to discover how the press of Shanghai, Hong Kong, or other parts of China interacted with the wartime politics in China, especially those related to Chinese collaboration with the Japanese. There are a number of topics which have yet to be investigated deeply, such as the relationship between newspapers and the occupying power, political rivalry among different newspapers within occupied or unoccupied areas, techniques which newspapers adopted to persuade their readers, and how newspapers influenced the mentality of the wartime population. It is hoped that this thesis will stimulate further research on these topics.





## Glossary

*Names of well-known places and people, as well as commonly used terms, have been omitted.*

*Bangbu Xinbao* (New Bangbu Post) 蚌埠新報  
*Banzhou wenyi* (Literary Bi-weekly) 半週文藝  
*British Evening News* 大英夜報  
Cai Jingjun 蔡勁軍  
*Central China Daily News* (CCDN) 中華日報  
*Central Daily News* 中央日報  
Central Executive Committee 中央執行委員會  
Central News Agency 中央通訊社  
Central Political Council 中央政治委員會  
Central Press Service 中央電訊社  
Chan Shek Lam 陳錫林  
Chau, C. N. 周竣年  
Chen Bijun (Madame Wang) 陳璧君  
Chen Chunpu 陳春圃  
Chen Gongbo 陳公博  
Chen Guofu 陳果夫  
Chen Junhui 陳君慧  
Chen Kewen 陳克文  
Chen Shaoxiang 陳少翔  
Chen Yaozu 陳耀祖  
Cheng Zhenzhang 程振章  
*China Evening News* 大晚報  
China News Agency 中華通訊社  
*China Times* 時事新報  
China United News Agency 中華聯合通訊社  
*Chinese American Daily News* (CADN) 中美日報  
Chinese Cooperative Council 香港華民各界協議會  
Chinese Newspaper Owners' Association in Hong Kong 香港報界公社  
Chinese Representative Council 香港華民代表會  
Chu Minyi 褚民誼  
Chung Kiu Company 中僑公司  
*Crystal* 晶報  
*Da guang bao* (Great Light Post) 大光報  
*Da yazhou zhuyi* (Pan-Asianism) 大亞洲主義  
*dadao Wang Jingwei maiguozei* 打倒汪精衛賣國賊  
Dadongya wenxuezhedahui (Greater East Asian Literary Conference) 大東亞文學者大會  
Dai Li 戴笠  
*Dai Tōa sensō* (Greater East Asian War) 大東亞戰爭  
Didiao julebu (Low-Key Club) 低調俱樂部  
Ding Mocun 丁默邨  
*Dongya lianmeng yundong* (East Asian Federation Movement) 東亞聯盟運動  
*Dongya wanbao* 東亞晚報  
Fang Junying 方君瑛  
Feng Youzhen 馮有真  
Fu Shishuo 傅式說  
Fu Zongyao 傅宗耀



*Fubao* (Restoration Post) 復報  
*fudi chouxin* 釜底抽薪  
 Gaizu pai (Reorganization Faction) 改組派  
 Gao Zongwu 高宗武  
*Geming pinglun* (Revolution Review) 革命評論  
 Gongguan pai (Mansion Faction) 公館派  
*goujie diren* 勾結敵人  
 Gu Mengyu 顧孟餘  
 Gu Yongjin 古泳今  
 Gu Zhizhong 顧執中  
*Guangdong jingshen* (Guangdong Spirit) 廣東精神  
*gudao* (solitary island) 孤島  
 Gunseicho 軍政府  
 Guo Moruo 郭沫若  
 Guo Xiufeng 郭秀峰  
 Guoji bianyishe (World Translation Press) 國際編譯社  
*Guoji congshu* (World Series) 國際叢書  
*Guoji tongxun* (World Correspondence) 國際通訊  
*Guoji zhoubao* (World Weekly) 國際週報  
 Guomin huiyi (National Convention) 國民會議  
*Guomin zhengfu huandu* (return of the National Government to its capital) 國民政府還都  
*Hangzhou Xinbao* (New Hangzhou Post) 杭州新報  
*hanjian* 漢奸  
*heping fangong jianguo* 和平反共建國  
*heping jianguo de xianshi zhuyi* 和平建國的現實主義  
*heping wenyi* (peace literature) 和平文藝  
*heping yundong* (peace movement) 和平運動  
 Hiranuma Kiichirou 平沼騏一郎  
 Hōdōbu (Information Department) 報道部  
 Honan Road 河南路  
*Hong Kong Nippo* 香港日報  
 Hong Kong People's Food Cooperative Association 香港民食協助會  
 Hong Kong Printing Industry Workers' Union 香港印刷業工會  
 Hong Kong Reporters' Club 香港記者俱樂部  
 Hotel Pacific 金門飯店  
 Hu Lancheng 胡蘭成  
 Huadong tongxunshe (Huadong News Agency) 華東通訊社  
 Huadong yinshuasuo (Huadong Printing Company) 華東印刷所  
 Huang Zhechong 黃折衝  
*hudang jiuguo* 護黨救國  
*Hujiao* (Pepper) 胡椒  
 Huxi 滬西  
*Hwa Mei Chen Pao* 華美晨報  
*Hwa Mei Wan Pao* 華美晚報  
*International Daily News* 國際日報  
*International Evening News* 國際夜報  
 Isogai Rensuke 磯谷廉介  
 Itō Yoshio 伊藤芳男  
 Jiaji baoshe (Class A newspapers) 甲級報社  
 Jiang Kanghu 江亢虎  
 Jin Huating 金華亭  
 Jin Zhonghua 金仲華  
*Jiutwang ribao* (Salvation Daily) 救亡日報



Jixian 紀弦  
 Jūkōdō 梅華堂 / 重光堂  
 Kagesa Sadaaki 影佐貞昭  
 Kangzhan jianguo gangling (Organic Law for the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction) 抗  
 戰建國綱領  
 keizai teikei 經濟提携  
 Kōain 興亜院  
 Kong Kai-tung 鄺啟東  
 Konoye Fumimaro 近衛文磨  
 kōsaku 工作  
 Kotewall, Robert 羅旭龢  
 Kung, David (Kong Lingkan) 孔令侃  
 Kuo Min Daily News 國民新聞  
 Kuoda xuanchuan huiyi (Extended Publicity Conference) 擴大宣傳會議  
 kyōdō bōkyō 共同防共  
 La Correspondance Chinoise en Europe 留歐通訊  
 Lan (Hu Lancheng) 蘭 (胡蘭成)  
 Lau Tit-shing 劉鐵城  
 Le Peuple Fort 民力週刊  
 Li (Xu Liqiu) 力 (許力求)  
 Li Junying 李駿英  
 Li Shengwu 李聖五  
 Li Shiqun 李士群  
 Li Shu-fan 李樹芬  
 Li Wu 李屋  
 Li Xiaoti 李孝悌  
 Li Zhiwen 李志文  
 Li Zhongyou 李仲猷  
 Liang Hongzhi 梁鴻志  
 Liang Shi 梁式  
 Liang Xiuyu 梁秀予  
 Lih Pao 立報  
 Lin Bosheng 林柏生  
 Lin Xiaoxiong 林孝雄  
 Linpeng 林蓬  
 Liu Na'ou 劉訥鷗  
 Liu Shike 劉石克  
 Liu Yusheng 柳雨生  
 Liusha (Hu Lancheng) 流沙 (胡蘭成)  
 Liuxing 劉行  
 Lo, M.K. 羅文錦  
 Long Dajun 龍大均  
 Long Yun 龍雲  
 Luyishi 路易士  
 Ma Chaofan 馬超凡  
 Matsumoto Shigeharu 松本重治  
 Mei Siping 梅思平  
 Meizhou minguo ribao (American Republican Daily) 美洲民國日報  
 Min li bao (People's Post) 民立報  
 Min Pao 民報  
 Min qi bao (People's Spirit Post) 民氣報  
 Minbao (People's Tribunal) 民報  
 Minhu ribao (People's Wail Daily) 民呼日報



*Minxu ribao* (People's Sigh Daily) 民吁日報  
 Miura Yoshiaki 三浦義秋  
*Morning Leader* 導報  
 Nama 娜馬  
 Nan jian she (South Spear Society) 南尖社  
*Nanhua pinglun* (Weekly Review / South China Weekly Review, SCWR) 南華評論  
 Nanhua tongxunshe (South China News Agency) 南華通訊社  
*Nanjing Xinbao* (New Nanjing Post) 南京新報  
*National Daily News* 民族日報  
*News Digest* 每日譯報  
 Ni Lanshen 倪瀾深  
*Nikka kyōgo kiroku* 日華協議記錄  
 Nishi Yoshiaki 西義顯  
 Nishikawa 西川  
*Nisshi shin kankei chōsei hōshin* 日支新關係調整方針  
*Nisshi shin kankei chōsei yōkō* 日支新關係調整要綱  
 Pan Gongbi 潘公弼  
 Pan Gongzhan 潘公展  
 Pan Yuqie 潘予且  
*Pearl River Daily News* 珠江日報  
*Peking Gazette* 京報  
*Pingbao* (Fair Post) 平報  
 Qiao Gang Nanhua Tianyan Ziyou bao "Bayisan" gongyou fuwutuan (Service Group of the SCDN, Tianyan and Ziyou "August 13" Workers in Hong Kong) 僑港南華天演自由報「八一三」工友服務團)  
 Qiaowu weiyuanhui (Overseas Affairs Committee) 僑務委員會  
*Qingnian ribao* (Youth's Daily) 青年日報  
*Qingnian zhoukan* (Youth Weekly) 青年週刊  
*Qingyi bao* (Critics' Post) 清議報  
 Quanguo xuanchuan huiyi (National Publicity Conference) 全國宣傳會議  
 Ruoye(Hu Lancheng) 若耶 (胡蘭成)  
 Sakai Takashi 酒井隆  
*sanmin zhuyi de xianshi zhuyi* 三民主義的現實主義  
*Shanghai minbao* (Shanghai Citizens' Post) 上海民報  
 Shanghai shi baogong zonghui (Shanghai Municipal Newspaper Workers' Union) 上海市報工總會  
 Shanghai shi gejie kangdi houyuanhui (The Federation of the Civic Associations of Shanghai, FCAS) 上海市各界抗敵後援會  
 Shanghai shi xinwen peida ye gonghui (Shanghai Municipal Newspaper Distributors' Union) 上海市新聞配達業工會  
 Shanghai wenhua jie jiuwang xiehui (Shanghai Cultural Circles Race Salvation Association) 上海文化界救亡協會  
 Shanghai xinwen lianhehui (Shanghai Newspaper Association) 上海新聞聯合會  
 Shantung Road 山東路  
 Shao Xubai 邵虛白  
 Shelun weiyuanhui (Editorial Committee) 社論委員會  
 Shen Song 沈崧  
 Shi Ting 施艇  
*Shibao* (Times) 時報  
 Shiquan (Lin Bosheng) 石泉 (林柏生)  
*Shiwu bao* (Current Affairs Post) 時務報  
*Shun Pao* 申報  
*Sin Wen Pao* 新聞報  
*Sing Tao Daily* 星島日報  
*South China Daily News* (SCDN) 南華日報



*Standard (Wen Wei Po)* 文匯報  
*Suzhou Xinbao* (New Suzhou Post) 蘇州新報  
*Sze Tei Wan Pao* 時代晚報  
*Ta Kung Pao* 大公報  
*Ta Mei Pao* 大美報  
*Ta Mei Wan Pao* 大美晚報  
Tada 多田  
Tajiri Akiyoshi 田尻愛義  
Tang Huimin 唐惠民  
Tang Liangli 湯良禮  
Tang Youren 唐有壬  
Tao Baichuan 陶百川  
*Tariku Shimpo* 大陸新報  
*Tianyan ribao* (Evolution Daily) 天演日報  
*Tōa kyodōtai* (East Asian Cooperative Body) 東亞協同體  
*Tōa Renmei* (East Asian Federation) 東亞聯盟  
*Tōa shin'chitsujo* (New Order of the East Asia) 東亞新秩序  
tongdi 通敵  
*tonggan gongku* 同甘共苦  
*Tsun Wan Yat Pao* 循環日報  
Tung Chung-wei 董仲偉  
Tung Wah Hospital 東華醫院  
Ume Kikan 梅機關  
*Wah Kiu Yat Po* 華僑日報  
Wangping Street 望平街  
*Wanguo gongbao* (Universal Gazette) 萬國公報  
Weilan shudian (Weilan Bookstore) 蔚藍書店  
Wen Tiansheng 聞天聲  
Wen Zongyao 溫宗堯  
*wenhua hanjian* 文化漢奸  
Wu Peizhi 伍培之  
Wu Rencang 吳任滄  
Wu Shaoshu 吳紹澍  
Wu Tiecheng 吳鐵城  
Wu Zhihui 吳稚暉  
Xia Yan 夏衍  
*Xiangdao ribao* (Hong Kong Island Daily) 香島日報  
*Xianggang ribao* 香港日報  
Xianggang Zhongguo xinwen jizhe gonghui (Hong Kong Association of Chinese Journalists) 香港中國新聞記者公會  
*Xin wan bao* (New Evening News) 新晚報  
*Xinguomin yundong* (New Citizens' Movement) 新國民運動  
*Xinmin congbao* (New Citizens' Post) 新民叢報  
Xinsheng tongxunshe (Xinsheng News Agency) 新聲通訊社  
Xinya she (New Asia News Agency) 新亞社  
Xu Liqiu 許力求  
Xuanchuan weiyuanhui (Publicity Committee) 宣傳委員會  
Xuanchuan yaodian (Publicity Points) 宣傳要點  
Xuanchuanbu (Party Publicity Bureau / Ministry of Publicity) 宣傳部  
Xuanchuanbu zhu Hu banshichu (Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Publicity in Shanghai) 宣傳部駐滬辦事處  
Yan Jiabao 顏加保  
Yandian 艷電



Yang Xichuan 楊昔川  
 Ye Lingfeng 葉靈鳳  
 Ye Xuesong 葉雪松  
 Yiwen yanjiuhui (Institute of Art and Literature) 藝文研究會  
 Yizhou wenyi (Literary Weekly) 一週文藝  
 Yu Hongjun 俞鴻鈞  
 Yuan Kai-cheong 源啟昌  
 Yunzaobin River 蘊藻濱  
 yusui 玉碎  
 Zeng Xing 曾醒  
 Zeng Zhongming 曾仲鳴  
 zenrin yūkō 善隣友好  
 Zhang Fakui 張發奎  
 Zhang Naiqi 章乃器  
 Zhang Ruogu 張若谷  
 Zhang Sixu 張似旭  
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 Zhanshi wenhua xuanchuan zhengce jiben gangyao (Basic Outline of the Wartime Cultural Propaganda Policy) 戰時文化宣傳政策基本綱要  
 Zhao Housheng 趙厚生  
 Zhao Junhao 趙君豪  
 Zhao Muru 趙慕儒  
 Zhao Shuyong 趙叔雍  
 Zhengyan bao (Truth Post) 正言報  
 zhidao 指導  
 Zhishu baoshe (subsidiary newspapers) 直屬報社  
 Zhixin zhongxue 執信中學  
 Zhongbao (Central Post) 中報  
 Zhongguo guangbo shiye jianshe xiehui (China Broadcasting Development Association) 中國廣播事業建設協會  
 Zhongguo Guomindang gaizu tongzhi hui (Guomindang Reorganization Comrade Association) 中國國民黨改組同志會  
 Zhonghua dianying gufen gongsi (China Film Corporation) 中華電影股份有限公司  
 Zhonghua quanguo wenyijie kangdi xiehui (All-China Literary Circles Resistance Against the Enemy Association) 中國全國文藝界抗敵協會  
 Zhonghua quanguo wenyijie xiehui Xianggang fenhui (Hong Kong Branch of the All-China Literary Circles Association, HKACLCA) 中國全國文藝界協會香港分會  
 Zhonghua she 中華社  
 Zhongri tiaozheng guojiao jiben tiaoyue 中日調整國交基本條約  
 Zhongwai jiwen (Chinese and Overseas Journal) 中外紀聞  
 Zhongyang baoye jinglichu (Central Newspaper Management Bureau, CNMB) 中央報業經理處  
 Zhongyang she 中央社  
 Zhongyang shubao faxingsuo (Central Book and Newspaper Store, CBNS) 中央書報發行所  
 Zhou Fohai 周佛海  
 Zhu Pu 朱樸  
 Zhu Xinggong 朱惺公  
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| 2040 | Ministry of Publicity (Wang government)  |

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|      |   |
|------|---|
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| Q187 | Shanghai High Court   |
| Q430 | Shun Pao, Sin Wen Pao   |
| R1   | Japanese and puppet-controlled Shanghai Municipal Government                              |
| R18  | Western District Commission, Japanese and puppet-controlled Shanghai Municipal Government |
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