

UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG  
FACULTY OF ARTS  
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Thesis


CHINESE REVOLUTIONARIES IN  
HONG KONG 1895-1911

Submitted by

Mary Chan Man-yue


In Partial Fulfilment of Requirements for  
the Degree of Master of Arts

1963



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
I. The Nature of Reform in China in the Nineteenth Century . . . . .	1
II. Early Revolutionary Activity in Hongkong, and the Formation of the Hsing Chung Hui . . . . .	33
III. The Canton Rising of 1895 and Its Aftermath . . . . .	54
IV. K'ang Yu-wei and the Constitutional Reform Movement in Hongkong . . . . .	88
V. The Waichow Rising of 1900 and the Canton Attempt of 1903 . . . . .	112
VI. Revolutionary Activity Before 1905, and the Establishment of the T'ung Meng Hui . . . . .	144
VII. Revolutionary Attempts During the T'ung Meng Hui Period . . . . .	180
VIII. The Events of 1911 and the Change of Government in Kwangtung . . . . .	209
IX. Conclusion . . . . .	238
APPENDICES . . . . .	244
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	248




## CHAPTER 1

### The Nature of Reform in China in the 19th Century

The Manchus conquered China in 1644 and established the Ch'ing Dynasty 清 which lasted till 1912. Apart from minor innovations, they maintained the traditional political structure of China.<sup>1</sup> Emperor K'ang Hsi 康熙 (1661-1722) had promoted learning and scientific knowledge through the tolerance of foreign missionaries. Yung Cheng 雍正 (1723-1736) had attempted to centralize the administration, and had laid the foundations of a splendid reign for his successor. But the Emperor Ch'ien Lung 乾隆 (1736-1796), on his death, had left the Empire reduced in territory and exhausted in finances because of the wars he waged against neighbouring countries.

By the time of the Chia Ching 嘉慶 era (1796-1820) signs of the breakdown of administrative control and efficiency were

1) For accounts of the Chinese government structure, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, Mass. 1950) pp.30-48; P. Auber, China, An Outline of Its Government, Laws and Policy (London, 1854) pp.41-70; J.K. Fairbank and S.Y. Teng, Ch'ing Administration (Cambridge, Mass. 1960) pp.107-206; and also Lin Tieh, Chinese Government (Shanghai, 1934); H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organisation of China (Shanghai, 1912).



evident.<sup>2</sup> Corruption existed in all layers of the bureaucracy; the military system was degenerate and ineffectual; population increased, and coupled with serious natural calamities, caused a general shortage of food; the relief system was insufficient, and lawlessness was rife in the countryside.<sup>3</sup>


Popular discontent grew, but it received little sympathy from the administration, whose apathy and fear of change had been a traditional feature of the Chinese monarchy. The people turned, therefore, to armed risings to give expression to their grievances. These tendencies became identified with secret society activities.

Such secret societies have had a long history in China. The first sworn brotherhood reputedly dated back to 184 A.D. in the Han Dynasty.<sup>4</sup> And from that time, secret society outbreaks played an integral part in the development of China's internal affairs. In the main, such risings sprang from economic and

2) For accounts of the reigns of the Emperors, see A.W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (Washington, 1944) I, pp. 327-331, 369-373, II, pp. 915-919, 965-969; E.O. Reischauer and J.K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston, 1960) pp. 370-373.

3) E.O. Reischauer and J.K. Fairbank, op.cit. pp. 389-393; W.L. Bales, Tso Tsung-t'ang (Shanghai, 1937) Introduction pp. 1-12.

4) For general accounts of secret society activities in Chinese history, see Ku Yen-shih, Chung-kuo pi-mi she-hui shih (Shanghai, 1927); G. Schlegel, Thian Ti Hwui (Batavia, 1866); J.S.M. Ward and W.G. Stirling, The Hung Society (London, 1925); W. Stanton, The Triad Society or Heaven and Earth Association (Hongkong, 1900); W.T. de Bary, Chan Wing-tsit and B. Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York, 1960) pp. 649-659; Yuji Muramatsu, "Some Themes in Chinese Rebel Ideologies" in A.F. Wright, (ed) The Confucian Persuasion (Stanford, 1960) pp. 241-267; Anonymous "Secret Societies in China" in Hankow Club Collected Papers, Vol. 18.




social discontent. Thus by the 19th century, with the decline of administrative control under Chia Ching, secret society activity once again spread over many parts of China. Generally, these societies operated under the aegis of certain dominant sects.

In the north, the dominant society was the White Lotus Sect 白蓮教. Reputedly formed at the end of the Sung Dynasty (960-1280) it maintained a steady expansion until the end of the 18th century, when in 1795-1804 it broke out in violent rebellion. After the suppression of this rebellion, its activities fragmented, and affiliated societies developed. The most important of these included the Big Knife Society 大刀會, the Small Knife Society 小刀會, and the Eight Trigrams Sect 八卦教. Each of these claimed some relationship with the parent body, the White Lotus. This connection could be seen in the Nien rebellion of 1851-1868 in the Huai River area of the north of China. Similarly, the Boxer rising of 1900-1901 was also connected with the White Lotus.<sup>5</sup>

In the south, there was the Triad Society 三合會, also known as the Heaven-Earth Society 天地會 or the Hung League 洪門大會. According to legend, its establishment was dated 1674. From the start, the Triads were identified by their anti-dynastic aspirations, their slogan being "Expel the Ch'ing, and revive

5) Hummel, op.cit. 1, 585-586; Hsiao Kung-chüan, Rural China (Seattle, 1960) pp.231-233; Chiang Siang-tseh, The Nien Rebellion (Seattle, 1954) pp.10-12; Fan Wen-lan, et.al. (ed) Nien Chun (Shanghai, 1953) 1, 111-126; Ku Yen-shih, op.cit. pp.1-7, 10; Jen Yu-wen, T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo ch'üan-shih (Hongkong, 1962) 1, 665-671.




the Ming" 反清復明. They therefore became the focal point of all movements directed against the Manchu rule in the south. From their base in Fukien, Triad influence spread to Kwangsi, Taiwan, Kiangsi and Kwangtung; and eventually, with the emigration of Chinese abroad, overseas to Malaya, Siam, India, Australia, Canada, North America and Hongkong.<sup>6</sup>

By the mid 19th century in China, there was thus a series of constant internal disorders caused by these popular movements. One of the most outstanding risings was the Taiping Rebellion, 1851-1864. It originated in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and soon proved to be the most well-organised and wide-spread revolt ever attempted against the Ch'ing dynasty. Among the many causes leading to the outbreak, there was also the factor of subversive secret society conspiracies brought on by the economic distress of the decade before 1851.

In fact, when the rebellion broke out, it was regarded by many as only another Triad rising, and the Cantonese rebel leader Hung Hsiu-ch'uan 洪秀全 was thought to be a Triad chief. Research however, has shown that Hung had invited the Triads to join his movement on his own conditions, and the basic ideological differ-

6) Ku Yen-shih, op.cit. pp.13-22, 27-35; Schlegel, op.cit. 1, pp.3-4, 7-19; Ward and Stirling, op.cit. 1, pp.1-12; Stanton, op.cit. pp.24-38; de Bary, et.al., op.cit. pp.649-652; see also L. Comber, Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya (New York, 1959) and W.P. Morgan, Triad Societies in Hongkong (Hongkong, 1960) pp.28-65.

Lists of Triad risings are given in Ku Yen-shih, op.cit. pp.22-24; Lo Erh-kang, T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo shih-kao (Peking, 1955) pp.23-24; H.B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London, 1918) I, 439-440.



ences between the Taiping creed and the Triad beliefs had been too wide for the two groups to coordinate activities.<sup>7</sup> Only a minority of secret society sects in Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Fukien had joined the Taiping army. But elsewhere, the local societies sought to carry out independent risings amidst the general disorder, and therefore diverted to some extent Imperial attention against the Taipings.<sup>8</sup>


Within three years the Taiping armies had swept up from the south, and had taken Nanking as the capital of their Great Heavenly Kingdom (T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo 太平天国). By 1860 they were able to direct activities in sixteen provinces, and had captured more than six hundred walled cities.<sup>9</sup>

While the Taipings ravaged south and central China, the

7) G. Schlegel, op.cit. p.6; Lo Erh-kang, T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo shih-shih k'ao (Peking, 1955) pp.34-35, 55-68; Ku Yen-shih, op.cit. p.26.

8) Ku Yen-shih, op.cit. pp.29-32; Lo Erh-kang, op.cit. pp.55-68; T.T. Meadows, The Chinese and Their Rebellions (London, 1856) pp.450-455; Morse, op.cit. 1, pp.449-450; Ward and Stirling, op.cit. 1, pp.7-8.

9) For general accounts of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, see Hummel, op.cit. 1, pp.361-366; J.M. Mackie, The Rebel Chief (New York, 1860); F. Anderson, The Rebel Emperor (London, 1958); Rev. T. Hamberg, The Chinese Rebel Chief (London, n.d.); Jen Yu-wen, op.cit. 1, pp.1-43. Accounts of the movement are given in E.P. Boardman, Christian Influence upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion (Wisconsin, 1952) pp.9-115; de Bary, et.al., op.cit. pp.680-704; Teng Ssu-yu, New Light on the History of the Taiping Movement (Cambridge, Mass. 1950) pp.35-92; Fan Wen-lan, T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo k'o-ming yün-tung (Hongkong, 1948) pp.1-74; A.E. Hake, Events in the Taiping Rebellion (London, 1891) pp.99-481; Jen Yu-wen, op.cit. 1, 91-663, 11, 111; Pao Tsun-p'eng, et.al. (ed) Chung-kuo chin-tai shih lun-ts'ung T'ai-ping Chün (Taiwan, 1956); Lo Erh-kang, T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo shih-kao (Peking, 1955) and T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo shih-shih k'ao; Wang Hui-an, et.al. (ed) T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo (Shanghai, 1952); Pan Che-i, T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo k'o-ming ssu-ch'ao (Shanghai, 1946); Tu Wen-lan, T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo chan-ch'i (Taipei, 1961); Wang Chung-chi, T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo k'o-ming shih (Shanghai, 1934).




Nien-fei 捏匪 rebellion broke out in Anhwei, Shantung, Honan, Kiangsu and Hupeh, in 1851-1868. It was given impetus by the Taiping successes, but the two movements remained distinct from each other. The Nien was a northern secret society, and traditional hostility existed between local sects from the north and south.<sup>10</sup> These geographical rivalries were probably the main reasons why, despite the enormous number of secret societies flourishing in Chinese history, they had never coordinated their activities to organise a rising too strong for the Imperial troops to suppress.

In the border provinces of the Empire, discrimination against the Moslem communities and administrative corruption led to a rebellion in Yünnan in 1855-1873. Then a large-scale Mohammedan revolt broke out in Shensi in 1862-1877, which influenced another outbreak in Sinkiang in 1864-1881.<sup>11</sup>

These risings, which dominated the internal affairs of

10) Lo Erh-kang, Nien-chün ti yün-tung chan (Changsha, 1939) pp.14-59; Chiang Siang-tseh, The Nien Rebellion (Seattle, 1954); Hsiang Chün chih (1869?) IV, p.14; Chao Lieh-wen, Huai-chün p'ing Nien chih (n.d.); W.L. Bales, op.cit. pp.196-207; Fan Wen-lan, et.al. (ed) Nien Chun (Shanghai, 1953) II, pp.1-156; III, IV; M. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stanford, 1957) pp.101-107; K'ang Shih-yung, (ed) Nien Chun shih-liao ts'ung-k'an (Shanghai, 1957-1958) I, pp.1-128.

11) For brief outlines of these risings, see M. Wright, op.cit. pp. 107-117; Bales, op.cit. pp.212-293, 300-390; Hummel, op.cit. II, pp.764-766. The Mohammedan risings have not yet been fully covered, but there is a forthcoming book by Chu Wen-Djang, The Moslem Rebellions in North-west China, 1862-1878. For material on the rebellions of the late Ming and early Ch'ing periods, see Cheng T'ien-t'ing, Sun Yueh, et.al. (ed) Ming-mo nung-min ch'i-i shih-liao (Peking, 1954) and Hsieh Kuo-chen (ed) Ch'ing-ch'u nung-min ch'i-i tzu-liao chi-lu (Shanghai, 1957).




China in mid 19th century, have been sometimes regarded as an early expression of Chinese national aspirations against Manchu domination. This view is somewhat tentatively put forward by Sun Yat-sen, who on occasion called them "the most original nationalist revolutionaries."<sup>12</sup>

However, it must be accepted that these secret society adherents envisaged no revolution. Their movements were activated by economic and social grievances, and they fought against the government only to hope for redress of their distress. They were reformers only in the widest sense of the word, for they offered no programme of reforms. Not many among the riff-raff of secret society membership really understood their aims and objectives. There was no enlightened leadership, no central coordinating authority, and no organised system of military activities.

These characteristic features of the insurrections accounted for their repeated suppression by the government. A possible exception was the somewhat radical programme of the Taipings, in which case foreign intervention was one of the important factors for the final collapse of the movement.<sup>13</sup> But continuous internal unrest, together with the general breakdown of administrative control, contributed to the overall confusion within the Chinese Empire by the middle of the 19th century.

12) Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (Taiwan, 1953) pp. 191-192; Fu Wei-p'ing, Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng ch'u-an-lueh (Shanghai, 1928) p.6.

13) See A. Wilson, Ever Victorious Army (London, 1868).



The period was also one of increased foreign pressure on China. From the 1830's, due to expanding trade demands and the introduction of the illegal opium traffic, foreign merchants, led by the English, sought to stabilise their privileges in China. Increasing difficulties with the reluctant Chinese government led to the first Anglo-Chinese War in 1839-1842, in which China was defeated and was forced to concede treaties to various foreign powers.<sup>14</sup>

With these treaties, China entered upon treaty relations, which brought about the opening of treaty ports, establishment of a treaty tariff, and the extension of foreign commercial activities in certain parts of China. Difficulties which arose over the working of the treaties after 1842 then led to the

14) J.K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast (Cambridge, Mass. 1953) pp.57-151; Ch'i Ssu-ho, et.al. (ed) Ya-p'ien chan-cheng (Shanghai, 1954) 1, pp.19-594, II, III, IV; A. Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes (London, 1958) pp.11-157; Lin Tse-hsü, "Ya-p'ien shih-lüeh" in Hsin Chi Lu (Shanghai, 1940) pp.181-271; W.C. Costin, Great Britain and China, 1833-1860 (London, 1937) pp.59-114; Tai En-sai, Treaty Ports in China (New York, 1918) pp.8-45; Pao Tsun-p'eng, et.al. (ed) Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung-pu ping-teng tiao-yueh yù ping-teng hsin-yüeh (Taiwan, 1958) pp.7-73. Also see Sir J.F. Davis, China During the War and Since the Peace (London, 1852); Teng Ssu-yü, Chang Hsi and the Treaty of Nanking (Chicago, 1944); J. Darroch, China, the Foreign Powers and the "Unequal Treaties" (Presbyterian Mission Press, 1927); and J. Ouchterlony, The Chinese War (London, 1844). Accounts of the treaties are given in Sir E. Hertslet, (comp) Treaties, Conventions etc. between China and Foreign States (London, 1908) 1, pp.7-12; Ch'i Ssu-ho, et.al. (ed) Ya-p'ien chan-cheng Vol. V; The Maritime Customs, Miscellaneous series No. 30, Treaties, Conventions etc. between China and Foreign States (Shanghai, 1917) 1, pp.351-399.




second Anglo-Chinese War in 1856-1860.<sup>15</sup> As a result, the foreign powers secured the right of establishing foreign legations in Peking. Thus from 1860, China entered into formal diplomatic relations with the western powers. The Bureau of Foreign Affairs (tsungli yamen 總理衙門) and the Translation Bureau (tung-wen kuan 同文館) were set up, and diplomatic missions began to be sent abroad.<sup>16</sup> The Court, however, tried to maintain its traditional outlook as far as possible, and these innovations were only reluctantly accepted.

But a more enlightened approach could perhaps be discerned from among a few of the educated official class, particularly from those who had come into direct contact with foreigners. An early example was Lin Tse-hsü 林則除 (1785-1850), an Imperial Commissioner sent in 1839 to deal with the opium question at Canton on the eve of the first Anglo-Chinese War. Lin's negotiations with foreigners in the peace settlements had convinced him of the superiority of western technology. Practically alone, he tried to take the first bold steps in modernising China's military defenses. He admired foreign warships,

15) Wei Chien-yu, Ti-erh-t'zu Ya-p'ien chan-cheng (Shanghai, 1957); B. Bonner-Smith, The Second China War, 1856-1860 (London, 1954); P.H. Clyde, The Far East (New York, 1953) pp.139-159; H.B. Morse, op.cit. I, pp.419-437, 479-616; Hsü Chung-yüeh, China's Entry into the Family of Nations; The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880 (Cambridge, Mass. 1960); Tai En-sai, op.cit. pp.46-54; Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit. I, pp.18-52.

16) For the establishment of these innovations, see The Editorial Board of the Bureau of Chinese Historical Research, (ed) Yang-wu Yün-tung (Shanghai, 1959) Vol. II; Clyde, op.cit. p.217 M. Wright, op.cit. pp.228-231; S.Y. Teng and J.K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West (Harvard, 1961) pp.47, 73-74.



firearms and methods of military training. During his stay in Canton, he had begun translating western books, attempting to build ships and make guns, and had reputedly purchased two hundred guns from foreigners for his private use.<sup>17</sup>

Yet Lin's pioneering efforts yielded no significant results other than as a source of inspiration for later reformers. He received no official encouragement for his schemes, and no support from the provinces (except Kwangtung, to a limited extent). Besides, Lin Tse-hsü and a few of the mandarins who shared his reform ideals, had indicated the immaturity of their attitude, by thinking that China could be suddenly modernised with the purchase of some western machines, and the invitation of some foreign instructors into China. This early reform effort had thus shown a lack of organisation and understanding of China's needs. But more positive steps in the same direction were soon to follow.

The occurrence of a second foreign war in 1856, and the spontaneous outbreak of internal rebellions, brought into political eminence outstanding scholar-officials such as Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩, Li Hung-chang 李鴻章, and Tso Tsung-t'ang 左宗棠.<sup>18</sup>

17) For a brief biography of Lin see Hummel, op.cit. I, pp.511-514; Wu Ching-heng, et.al. (ed) Ya-p'ien chan-cheng shih (Shanghai, 1933) pp.133-135. For his reform efforts, see G. Chen, Lin Tse-hsü (Peiping, 1934) pp.4-5, 11-18, 30-31; de Bary, et.al. op.cit. pp.666-672; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. pp.29-30.

18) For their biographies, see Hummel, op.cit. II, pp.751-755, 762-767, I, pp.464-471; Lo Erh-kang, Hsiang-chün Hsin-chih (Changsha, 1939) pp.46-53; G. Chen, Tseng Kuo-fan (Peiping, 1935) pp.13-14; J.O.P. Bland, Li Hung-chang (London, 1917) pp.37-75; L.C. Arlington, Through the Dragon's Eyes (London, 1931) pp.22-24; W.L. Bales, op.cit. pp.53-72.



When the Manchu military system, consisting of the Banner Army and the Army of the Green Standard, proved unable to preserve peace and stability in the country in face of foreign threats and secret society risings, Peking was forced to grant large authority to provincial administrators to organise militia armies (than-lien 團練) against the rebels.

Thus under the direction of local leaders such as Tseng, Li and Tso, a new type of provincial army came into being. They were larger and stronger than the Imperial forces, yet more cohesive and independent from central control. Recruits were personally selected by the commanders-in-chief, and were usually taken from men of their own native provinces. These units were mainly supported by local revenue, and the personal ties between officer and soldier enhanced their fighting spirit. They were in every way an improvement on the old Manchu forces.<sup>19</sup>

The first of these new military units to be established was the Hunan Army (Hsiang-chün 湘軍) of Tseng Kuo-fan. Tseng had been in Hunan in 1853 when he received the Imperial commission to form a local militia for the defence of the province against the Taiping rebels. The Hunan Army was duly formed in February 1853, and was exceptionally well organised, trained and disciplined. It has been held that this army was not to be regarded as merely the militia army of Hunan, but a

19) R.L. Powell, the Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (New Jersey, 1955) pp.7-19; Lo Erh-kang, op.cit. pp.2-20, 216-218; M. Wright, op.cit. p.198.



different kind of army altogether.<sup>20</sup>


But so wide-spread had the Taiping rebellion developed that one army could not have sufficiently checked its progress. By the time the Hunan Army moved against the rebels in Nanking, the latter had overrun the areas of the Upper Yangtze, and it became necessary to defend Kiangsu province. By then, the Hunan Army had begun to deteriorate both in morale and fighting strength, and Tseng Kuo-fan decided to call on Li Hung-chang, the only capable militarist he knew, to recruit a volunteer corps from Huai-nan. This was the origin of the second reformed army, the Anhwei Army (Huai-chün 淮軍).

Li Hung-chang had been familiar with the Huai area, having helped earlier in fighting against the Taiping rebels in Anhwei. So in February of 1862 Li arrived with his select force at Tseng's headquarters at Anking, and the Anhwei Army was organised, based primarily on the Hunan Army model. It proved to be more powerful and a better fighting force than the latter had been. Li was able to make advantageous use of the resources offered by Shanghai, where the Anhwei Army was stationed.<sup>21</sup>

In the Hupeh area, Tso Tsung-t'ang, who had served as an officer in Tseng's army, had organised the Hupeh Army (Chü-chün 楚軍) in June, 1860. He distinguished himself by the wide-

20) This view is presented by Lo Erh-kang, op.cit. pp.21-45. Accounts of the Hsiang-chün are given in G. Chen, Tseng Kuo-fan, pp.20-23; Powell, op.cit. pp.23-24; Lo Erh-kang, op.cit. pp.97-192; M. Wright, op.cit. p.202; Hsiang-chün Chih IV, p.15.

21) Wei P'ing-wu, "The Rise of the Anhwei Army" in Harvard University, Papers on China, Vol.XIV, pp.31-40; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Li Hung-chang (Shanghai, 1936) pp.15-17, 37-38; R.L. Powell, op.cit. p.2



spread use of western weapons. The army was later incorporated into the Hunan Army but Tso continued to render service to the dynasty in campaigns against the Taipings.<sup>22</sup>


The formation of these militia armies finally helped to crush the rebellions, and by then foreign war had also ended. China had entered into the Tung Chih 同治 period.<sup>23</sup> It was an optimistic era, and from enlightened members of the bureaucracy came demands for a "self-strengthening" (tzu-ch'iang 自強) programme. This was to include reforms in the military, administrative and educational fields. In a memorial to the throne of 24 January, 1861, Prince Kung 孚親王 and two other officials urged a complete overhauling of the military system to prevent further external invasions and internal uprisings. Another significant aspect of the reform effort was the determination to study (hsüeh 學) western civilization first, before adopting their technological products.<sup>24</sup>

The Court however, still remained conservative, particularly when the imminent danger of war and rebellion had been removed. The mandarin reformers had looked towards the Court

22) Lo Erh-kang, op.cit. pp.71-73; G. Chen, Tso Tsung-t'ang, pp.6-8; Bales, op.cit. pp.111-115; Powell, op.cit. p.25.

23) See M. Wright, op.cit. and Hummel, op.cit. I, pp.295-300, 380-384; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. p.47.

24) M. Wright, op.cit. pp.68-95, 210-214; de Bary, et.al. op.cit. pp.705-706; Pao Tsun-p'eng, et.al. (ed) Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung-tzu-ch'iang yüntung (Taiwan, 1956); the memorials urging reforms are given in Tsiang T'ing-fu, Chin-tai Chung-kuo wei-chiao shih tzu-liao chi-yao (Shanghai, 1931-1934) I, pp.323-330, 333-334, 335-338, 351-352; A. Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization (Cambridge, Mass. 1958) pp.36-3



for encouragement and leadership, but they were given scant support. As a result they were forced to work for reforms privately and by isolated attempts.

The building of new armies led these mandarins on to the promotion of ship-yards, arsenals, and education to train men in the scientific civilization of the west. Tseng Kuo-fan built the first ship-yards and arsenals in Hunan and Kiangsi, experimented in building China's own steamships, established the famous Kiangnan Arsenal which began working in 1868, and started a translation bureau, an engineering school and a project of sending students abroad,<sup>25</sup> Tso Tsung-t'ang had early advocated the creation of a navy, and a bureau for building ships and making guns was established in 1854, headed by Tso. His efforts culminated in the Foochow Arsenal, 1866, and though he was soon transferred, his work was carried on by his successor, Shen Pao-chen 沈葆楨 under Tso's direction.<sup>26</sup> Li Hung-chang achieved fame by founding the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company and creating the Peiyang navy, as well as various administrative reforms and public works in Chihli. In education he promoted the Tientsin University, naval and military colleges, and the first medical college and hospital.<sup>27</sup>

25) Wen Ching, The Chinese Crisis from Within (London, 1901) pp.19-28; G. Chen, Tseng Kuo-fan, pp.15-80; Feuerwerker, op.cit. p.1; Lo Erh-kang, op.cit. p.40; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. pp.61-65.

26) G. Chen, Tso Tsung-t'ang pp.7, 10-19, 35; Teng and Fairbank op.cit. pp.79-83.

27) Arlington, op.cit. pp.22-27; Bland, op.cit. pp.227-250; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, op.cit. pp.33-38; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. pp.68-72.




At the same time, industrial reforms, closely associated with military enterprise, were promoted during the Tung Chih period under the Official Supervision and Merchant Management System (kuan-tu shang-pan 官督商辦). Li Hung-chang and his subordinate Sheng Hsüan-huai 盛宣懷 were the foremost organizers.<sup>28</sup> Enterprises such as the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, telegraph lines, the opening of mines, iron works, a modern banking system, schools and chambers of commerce were all established under this system.<sup>29</sup>

These were the efforts of some of the scholar-officials in the latter part of the 19th century. They had been compelled by the pressing problem of opposing internal rebellions to form the militia armies. In doing so, they became more inclined to accept the introduction of technological reform, military innovations, and industrial developments. But the court, naturally conservative, was reluctant to support the changes. It was also dimly aware that the formation of provincial militias implied the possibility of a decentralization of military control, which

28) For accounts of Sheng Hsüan-huai, see The Editorial Board of the Bureau of Chinese Historical Research, (ed) Yang-wu Yün-tung, VIII, pp.41-82; Feuerwerker, op.cit. pp.59-78.

29) For a full account of all the innovations of the period, see Feuerwerker, op.cit. pp.10-29; Yang-wu Yün-tung, II, pp.153-202, III, pp.219-440, IV, pp.7-508, V, VI, pp.5-324, VII, pp.5-438; Pao Tsun-p'eng, et.al. (ed) Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-tsung-Wei-hsin yü pao-shou (Taiwan, 1956) pp.6-90. Also see Sun Yu-t'ang, Chung-jih chia-wu chan-cheng chien wai-kuo chih-pan tsai Chung-kuo ching-ying ti chin-tai kung-yeh (Shanghai, 1955); and Huang T'ien-tso, The Economic Development, in its Industrial Aspect, of Modern China, from 1842 Onwards (Hongkong, 1938); Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. pp.112-113.



would lead to provincial autonomy.<sup>30</sup> It therefore refused to provide the necessary lead which could have brought about modernisation in China in the latter part of the 19th century.

Deprived of central direction and official resources, the scholar-gentry were only able to accept western techniques at a superficial level. The Kuan-tu shang-pan system was still subject to chronic corruption, monopolistic restrictions, and official exactions inherent in the bureaucratic organisation.<sup>31</sup> For some officials like Li Hung-chang, the promotion of reforms was later used as a means of achieving their personal political and financial ends.<sup>32</sup> Many mandarins had no real understanding of western culture and technology. Li was only the "one-eyed man among the blind",<sup>33</sup> while the entrenchment of the conservatives in positions of influence afforded no opening for the few reformers who had acquired some knowledge of the west through education and direct contact. Consequently, by 1895, the results of the sporadic 19th century reforms had only been limited and insignificant. No real inroad had been made in a nationwide modernisation of China.


By then, China had been involved in two more unsuccessful foreign wars, the Sino-French war of 1884-1885 over Annam, and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 over Korea. The first defeat meant the loss of a dependent state dating back to Han times,

30) Powell, op.cit. pp.23,26; Lo Erh-kang, op.cit. p.1; Feuerwerker, p.41; M. Wright, op.cit. p.57.

31) Feuerwerker, op.cit. p.93-95; pp.37-40; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, op.cit. pp.33-41; Bland, op.cit. pp.219-221.

32) Feuerwerker, op.cit. pp.13-14, 63-72.

33) Bland, op.cit. p.220.




and the second included the cession of territories, the payment of a large indemnity, and the acknowledgement of the superiority of a former vassal state in Korea.<sup>34</sup>

Whereas the earlier military failures of 1839 and 1856 had not been felt in every quarter of the vast Chinese Empire, the humiliation of being subdued by the geographically smaller and, to the Chinese mind, culturally inferior Japanese nation, was now brought home to all. The first reaction was determination to stir themselves, and the thoughts of the government turned again to military reorganisation. This time, the lead was taken by the conservatives, whose complacency was finally shattered by the Sino-Japanese War. The result was a regrouping of the armies in northern China in 1895.<sup>35</sup>

Besides militarism, a more significant aspect of the post-1895 period was the emergence of a general movement among the intellectual class for reform. The outstanding personality was

34) For accounts of the wars and the peace settlements, see Shao Hsun-cheng, et.al. (ed) Chung-fa chan-cheng (Shanghai, 1955) and Chung-jih chan-cheng (Shanghai, 1956); Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit. 1, pp.293-300, 362-373; P. Joseph, Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894-1900 (London, 1928) pp.101-200; W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New York, 1951) pp.167-194; Shih-chiao-hsueh yueh-kan shih (ed) Chung-jih Chia-wu chan-cheng lun-chi (Peking, 1954); J.V.A. Mac Murray (ed) Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919 (New York, 1921) 1, pp.18-25; Wang Yen-wei, Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao (Peking, 1935) Vols.17, 18, 52, 53; Ch'ing Kuang-hsu ch'ao Chung-jih chiao-she shih-liao (Peiping, Palace Museum, 1932); Ch'ing Kuang-hsu ch'ao Chung-fa chiao-she shih-liao (Peiping, Palace Museum, 1933); The Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions etc. Between China and Foreign States, 11, pp.590-598.

35) See R.L. Powell, op.cit. pp.51-89 for an account of the military reforms.



the Cantonese scholar K'ang Yu-wei 康有為.

K'ang had received a classical education which eventually won for him the coveted degree of chin-shih 進士. His interests, however, extended to the reading of a wide range of European and Japanese missionary works, from which he was to derive inspiration for his later reform ideas. In 1887, at the age of twenty-nine, K'ang journeyed to south and central China, and at one point passed through Hongkong. He was much impressed by the orderliness and efficiency of the British-administered colony, and the experience also helped to shape his ideas for administrative reforms in China.<sup>36</sup>

The influence of the British government at Hongkong was immediately significant. In 1888 K'ang was in Peking for an examination. He was so distressed by the corruption and disorganisation of the central government system, as compared with that of the British colony, that he drafted and presented a petition to the throne. He urged the need for reforms in China, and attributed the growing strength of Japan to the Meiji re-organisation. His petition, however, was only ridiculed, and was not presented to the Emperor. Disillusioned, K'ang returned to Canton, where he began to operate a school to spread reform

36) M.E. Cameron, The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912 (Stanford, 1931) pp.23-24; O.M. Green, The Story of China's Revolution (London, 1945) p.45; M.E. Tsure, "K'ang Yu-wei" in Hankow Club Collected Papers Vol.39 (1915) p.2; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih (Changsha, 1939) 1, p.71; E.R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western World (L. Black, 1937) p.112; K'ang Yu-wei, Nan-hai K'ang hsien-sheng tzu-pien nien-p'u (Peking, 1958) 1, 7b-9b; also given in Chien Po-ts'an, et.al. (ed) Wu-hsü Pien-fa (hereafter quoted as WHPF) (Shanghai, 1953) 1V, pp.107-120.



ideas among the young.

By the time of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, K'ang, as well as many of the scholars of his time, felt that the effort to press for reforms should be seriously taken up. When news came of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, K'ang and a group of scholars were in Peking for the metropolitan examination, and there was some agitation at China's humiliating treatment by the Japanese. A number of memorials for reform were submitted by various scholars, but to no avail. Then K'ang, obviously the most conspicuous in the academic world among them, was chosen to draft a grand memorial, to protest against the Treaty, and to ask for immediate reform measures. This was the "Ten-thousand-word Letter" (Wan-yen shu 萬言書) and was signed by over one thousand scholars. But again it was a fruitless attempt, for the Imperial advisors disapproved of its radical tone, and the petition was consequently ignored.

After this, most of the scholars who signed the petition abandoned reform activities in view of the impossible obstacles presented by the conservative officials. But K'ang Yu-wei was still enthusiastic. He revised the 1895 petition and sent it in again in his own name. When this also failed to reach the Emperor, he re-edited it once more, giving more definite suggestions for reform, and presented it a fourth time. The result was another rejection.<sup>37</sup>

37) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Wu-hsü cheng-pien chi (Yokohama, 1899) pp. 2; Also given in WHPF I, p.249; Tseng Yu-hao, Modern Chinese Law and Political Philosophy (Shanghai, 1930) p.44; Wu Tse, K'ang Y




Disappointed by the obstacles in the way of working through official channels, K'ang turned then to a literary campaign to spread reform ideas. Already, in 1891, he had published his radical concepts of reform in the "Examination of the New Learning and False Classics" 新學偽經考 for which he had earned the title of "The Modern Sage". Now his ideas were further compiled in two controversial books, the "One-world Philosophy" 大同書 and the "Examination of Confucius as a Reformer" 孔子改制考, both published in 1897. In the first work, he pictured Confucius as a political reformer, and in the second presented an idealistic treatise on how to create a Chinese Utopia.<sup>38</sup>

With these works K'ang Yu-wei represented the nature of the late 19th century reform movement. It was to be an intellectual and scholarly attempt to press for political reforms, and the reformers appealed only to the enlightened educated classes for support of their activities. These activities included the formation of study societies (hsüeh-t'ang 學堂), which ostensibly aimed at the promotion of learning, but in reality became

wei yù Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Shanghai, 1948) pp.9-13; Wen Ching, The Chinese Crisis From Within (London, 1901) pp.51-54; S.Y. Teng and J.K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West (Cambridge, Mass. 1961) p.148; Hummel, op.cit. I, p.702; Cameron, op.cit. p.26; Wang Ch'i-chü (ed) "K'ang Yu-wei tsou-i erh-shih-chiu pien" in WHPF 11, pp.123-268, gives 29 of the memorials K'ang had submitted to the throne.

38) For discussions of K'ang's works, see Cameron, op.cit. p.24; H.B. Morse, op.cit. I, pp.131-132; Tseng Yu-hao, op.cit. pp.45-49; Hsiao Kung-ch'üan, Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih (Shanghai, 1946) p.690; Lin Mousheng, Men and Ideas (New York, 1942) pp.218-223; K'ang Yu-wei, op.cit. I, 10b-11, also given in WHPF 1V, pp.120-124; Tuan Ch'ang-t'ung (ed) "K'ang Yu-wei shu-tu san-pien" in WHPF 11, pp.517-531; "K'ang Yu-wei teng-jen ch'u-chi" in WHPF 1V, pp.5-38; also see K'ang Yu-wei, Kung Tzu kai-chi k'ao (Peking, 1920); Ta T'ung Shu, trans. L.G. Thompson, (London, 1958) and Wei-ching k'ao (rev. ed. Shanghai, 1936).



intellectual tools in the hands of the reformers.


In the establishment of study societies, K'ang was ably assisted by one of his foremost students at the Canton school, and his earliest disciple in the reform cause, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啟超. Liang was also a Cantonese, and his brilliant scholarship soon made him one of the greatest personalities in the history of Chinese journalism.<sup>39</sup>

At Peking, in 1894, the Hanlin academician Wen Ting-shih 文廷式 had already organised the Society for the Study of Strengthening (Ch'iang-hsüeh hui 強學會). K'ang and Liang then followed in 1895 with the Society for the Protection of the Country (Pao-kuo hui 保國會), and the Society for the Study of the Times (Shih-wu-hsüeh t'ang 時務學堂).<sup>40</sup>

An important development during the early stages of the reform movement was the support given to these study societies by high-ranking officials in Peking and in other provinces. The Society for the Study of Strengthening included such distinguished members as Chang Chih-tung, the viceroy of Hunan and Hupeh, Yuan Shih-k'ai, Commander of the Northern Army, and the governors Ch'en Pao-chen 陳寶箴 and Sun Chia-nai 孫家鼎. Their patronage of moral and financial contributions was readily given, because they too were shaken by China's weakened position

39) For accounts of Liang, see Yang Fu-li, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao nien-p'u" in WHPF 1V, pp.171-182; Tseng Yu-hao, op.cit. pp.113-114; Lin Yü-t'ang, Press and Public Opinion in China (Shanghai, 1937) pp.97-99; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. pp.153-157.


40) Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. p.154; Cheng Kuan-ying, op.cit. in WHPF 1, p.48; Yang Fu-li, op.cit. in WHPF 1V, pp.171-181; "Yen-fu teng-jen ch'u'an-chi" in WHPF 1V, pp.83-84; Wang Ch'i-chü (ed) "Ch'iang-hsüeh-hui chi ch'i-t'a hsüeh-hui" in WHPF 1V, pp.373-478.



in international relations by the close of the 19th century, and had themselves made earlier individual efforts in introducing innovations in military and industrial spheres. Besides, K'ang, Liang and the other scholar reformers seemed to approach the reform problem by what appeared to them the appropriate intellectual and constitutional media.

Chang Chih-t'ung was particularly sought after as their champion by the reformers because of the early innovations he had initiated in the provinces he administered, Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Hupeh and Hunan. He donated five thousand taels for the establishment of the Shanghai branch of the Society for the Study of Strengthening, and also arranged for subscriptions to be taken from government sources for reform publications. In 1898 he culminated his reform tendencies in the publication of the "Extortions to Study" (Ch'ian-hsueh Pien 勸學篇) which was immediately used by the reformers as a sort of party platform. They helped to distribute it freely to students and officials. The fact that Chang's stand of "Chinese learning for fundamental principles, western learning for practical application" (Chung-hsueh wei-t'i, Hsi-hsueh wei-jung 中學為體，西學為用) was in direct conflict with K'ang's whole-hearted appreciation of all that western learning offered was temporarily ignored.<sup>41</sup>

41) See Hummel, op.cit. I, pp.28-29; "Sun Chia-nai teng-jen ch'u-an-chi" in WHPF, IV, p.104; Hu Ch'un, "Chang Chih-t'ung nie p'u" in WHPF IV, pp.213-214; Wu Tse, op.cit. p.21, 41; Lin Mousheng, op.cit. p.97; Wen Ching, op.cit. pp.22, 219; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. pp.164-166; Tseng Yu-hao, op.cit. p.67; Cameron, op.cit. pp.41-42.




Encouraged by this official support, the reformers had also embarked on a wide propaganda campaign by means of newspapers and journals. In this, they enjoyed the help of two foreign missionaries in Peking, the Rev. Timothy Richard, and Dr. Young J. Allen, who provided information on events in the western world.<sup>42</sup>

The Society for the Study of Strengthening published the Wan-kuo Kung-pao 萬國公報, edited by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. So favourable was official reaction to it that the daily paper was printed at the press of the Peking Gazette.<sup>43</sup> However, the increasingly radical tone of the articles brought about the denunciation of that Society by the Imperial Censor Yang Chung-i 楊崇伊, and the Society itself was banned by edict. The Shanghai branch of the Society subsequently put forward the Ch'iang-hsüeh pao 強學報 which was also forced to end in March 1896.

The reformers were undaunted, and in August began publication of a ten-day pamphlet, the Shih-wu pao 师務報, which because of its carefully toned down reform articles, enjoyed much encouragement from many of the governors and viceroys. By 1898 the Shih-wu pao had become an official organ of the reform movement, and in May, a daily paper was introduced, the

42) E. Soothill, Timothy Richard of China (London, 1924) pp.173-304; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. p.135; Hummel, op.cit. 11, p.703; Tse Tsan-tai, The Chinese Republic, Secret History of the Revolution (Hongkong, 1924) p.14.

43) R.S. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800-1912 (Shanghai, 1933) pp.90-91; Lin Yu-t'ang, op.cit. pp.95-96; Cameron, op.cit. p.27; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, op.cit. pp.126-127; Wang Ch'i-chü (ed) op.cit. in WHPF, IV, pp.389-395.



Shih-wu jih-pao 壬午日報 .44


Thus from 1888, and especially after 1895, the scholar reform movement gradually gathered momentum, and it seemed that it could count on the encouragement and support of many of the enlightened bureaucracy. By 1897, K'ang Yu-wei had been made a secretary in the Board of Works, and reform activities were intensified.

In the same year, Germany aggressively obtained the lease of Kiao-chow from China as reparation for the murder of two German missionaries.<sup>45</sup> This led to a wave of protests from the educated classes, and K'ang Yu-wei submitted his fifth and last petition to the throne. Once again, he urged the necessity of a national policy of reform, and begged the Emperor Kuang Hsü 慶緒 to take as models the Meiji Emperor of Japan and Peter the Great of Russia. He also offered his personal services should a reform programme be contemplated.<sup>46</sup> This time his petition came to the notice of the Emperor's tutor, Weng T'ung-ho 翁同龢. This was the first step in a chain of events leading to the climax of the reform movement.

44) Cameron, op.cit. p.28; Britton, op.cit. pp.91-94; Hummel, op.cit. 11, p.704; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. p.161; Morse, op.cit. I, p.133; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Wu-hsü cheng-pien chi-shih pen-mo" in WHPF, 1, p.318; "Yen-fu teng-jen ch'u-an-chi" in WHPF, 1, pp. 86-87; Wang Ch'i-chü (ed) "The Shih-wu pao chi chi-t'a pao-chih" in WHPF, 1V, pp.524-528; Lin Shu-hui (ed) "Shih-wu pao p'ing-lun wu-pien" in WHPF, 1II, pp.273-286.

45) For accounts of events leading to the "Scramble for Concessions" see Hsia Ching-lin, Studies in Chinese Diplomatic History (Shanghai, 1936) pp.47-162; P. Joseph, Foreign Diplomacy in China 1894-1900 pp.189-221; W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism pp.445-475.

46) Wu Tse, op.cit. p.14; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. p.148; K'ang Yu-wei, op.cit. I, 15b-16; also given in WHPF, 1V, pp.138-139.



Weng T'ung-ho had been tutor and advisor to the Emperor Kuang Hsü since 1875. A native of Kiangsu, Weng had been one of the greatest scholars of the age, with intelligent and liberal political views. He had already been sympathetic to the reform writings of K'ang Yu-wei, and so in 1897 brought K'ang's name to the notice of the Emperor.<sup>47</sup>

Emperor Kuang Hsü had had a comparatively liberal education and had even studied English under two graduates of the Tung-wen kuan. He was intelligent, conscientious and ambitious for the welfare of his country, though lacking in strength of will and political cunning in his dealings with his shrewd aunt, the Empress Dowager. Having been introduced to K'ang's reform writings by Weng T'ung-ho, the young Emperor was not only sympathetic, but also ready to place himself at the head of the reform movement.<sup>48</sup>

On 3 January, 1898, through the influence wielded on his behalf by Weng, K'ang was asked to confer with members of the Tsungli-yamen to put forward his ideas for reform. These were then transmitted to the Emperor by Weng, and K'ang was subsequently asked to present a memorial directly to the throne, embodying his ideas. It was only then that the Emperor learnt

47) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, op.cit. p.2; also given in WHPF I, p.250; Hummel, op.cit. II, pp.860-861; "Yen-fu teng-jen ch'u'an-chi" in WHPF, IV, pp.75-77; Johnston, op.cit. pp.22-23.

48) Information on the Emperor Kuang Hsü is given in Hummel, op.cit. II, p.732; Cameron, op.cit. pp.31-32; Johnston, op.cit. p.24; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, op.cit. pp.147-156; also given in WHPF I, pp.305-314; Princess Der Ling, Two Years in the Forbidden City (New York, 1914) pp.113-114.



about K'ang's earlier petitions, and so impressed was the Emperor by K'ang's earnestness, that he granted K'ang the rare privilege of submitting all future petitions directly to himself. By June, 1898, K'ang was granted another exceptional privilege, that of having a private, lengthy audience with the Emperor.<sup>49</sup> These beginnings culminated in the "Hundred Days Reform Movement" of 1898.


From 11 June to 21 September, 1898, K'ang had the Emperor Kuang Hsü issue some forty edicts, to carry out sweeping administrative reforms throughout the country.<sup>50</sup> For a time it appeared that, at the end of the 19th century, China was to be speedily transformed by constitutional means into what was in the view of K'ang and his colleagues, a modern state.

The rapid success of the "Hundred Days" could be attributed to the fact that circumstances favoured the rise of its leader, K'ang Yu-wei. His being an outstanding scholar had won him the admiration and respect in a society which valued the scholar above all classes. Besides, K'ang's programme of reform had placed its direction under an enlightened ruler, which had appealed most to the influential members of the bureaucracy.<sup>51</sup>

49) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, op.cit. p.2; also given in WHPF, I, p.250; K'ang Yu-wei, op.cit. I, 16b-17 also in WHPF, IV, pp.140-147; A.H. Smith, China in Convulsion (New York, 1901) p.134; Mei Ying, "Wu-hsü cheng-pien chen-wen" in Jen-wen Yüeh-k'an (Shanghai) Vol.VII, No.10 (Dec. 1936) pp.1-6.

50) For the edicts, see Lin Shu-hui (ed) "Shang-yü san-i-liu t'iao" in WHPF, II, pp.1-22; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Wu-hsü Cheng-pien chi-shih pen-mo" in WHPF, I, pp.315-324.

51) See Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih (Taiwan, 1957) I, pp.174-176, 180.



It was only when their personal interests were threatened by the new scheme of things that they readily deserted the reform cause.

The end of the reform movement came just as quickly as its climax. At the head of the reactionary forces was the powerful Empress Dowager. The Emperor was the first to realise that reaction was setting in. In an edict to K'ang Yu-wei of 16 September 1898, he stated that<sup>52</sup>


"....western method can only be adopted if the conservative, staunch old officers be dismissed. But in this the Empress Dowager does not agree with me. I have represented this to her many times, but she only becomes the more angry. At present my seat is not secure. I hope that you and the others of the same way of thinking will quickly and secretly contrive a means of assistance. I am very anxious and ill at ease."

On the 18th, another secret edict reached K'ang, and this time in a more desperate tone. The Emperor wrote,

".... I have causes of deep distress from which there is no escape, deeper than writing can express. You had better go quickly. I know your affection for me. Look out for your own safety. Use greater endeavours still in the cause of good government. Such is my hope."

Thus warned, K'ang realised the threat of the total collapse of the reform movement. The reformers decided to chance everything on a coup d'etat, and to enlist the help of Yuan

52) The two secret edicts are given in Su Ch'i-chu "Ch'ing-t'ing Wu-hsü chao-pien chi" in WHPF, 1, pp.343-344; Tso Shun-sheng (ed) Chung-kuo chin-p'ai-nien shih-chih-liao ch'u-pien (Shanghai, 1933) 11, pp.421-422; A. Smith, op.cit. p.148; also in the despatch from Acting Consul-General Brenan to the Foreign Office, No.28 of 26 Sept. 1898, enclosing Shanghai Consul-General Bourne's report of a conversation with K'ang Yu-wei on 25 Sept. 1898, in Foreign Office, General Correspondence (Public Record Office, London) Series F.O. 17/1718, "Chinese Revolutionaries in British Dominions, 1896-1905" (hereafter quoted as F.O. 17/1718) pp.183-1



Shih-k'ai, the only possible source of military power they could turn to. Yuan was to go to Tientsin and eliminate the chief obstacle in the way of innovations, Jung Lu, the Empress Dowager's faithful servant. If this had been accomplished, the Empress Dowager was then to be imprisoned in the Summer Palace, and a new era was to begin with a political order under the Emperor Kuang Hsü.

Yuan Shih-k'ai revealed the plot to Jung Lu. The next morning, 21 September, the Emperor was seized and made a prisoner in the Winter Palace. On 22 September, an edict announced that the Empress Dowager had resumed complete control of the administration. Yuan had earlier been summoned back to Peking, and a decree was posted on the same day for the arrest and decapitation of K'ang Yu-wei. Subsequent edicts called for the arrest, deprivation of rank, banishment and execution of nearly forty reformers. On 24 September, a reward of two thousand taels was offered for the capture of K'ang Yu-wei, and a smaller sum for Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.<sup>53</sup>

The forces of conservatism had thus proved far stronger than the proponents of the 19th century spirit of reform. The


53) For accounts of the coup d'etat, see Cameron, op.cit. pp.47-49; Morse, op.cit. I, pp.147-148; Hummel, op.cit. II, pp.702-705; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Wu-hsü cheng-pien chi, pp.106-112; Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, op.cit. p.716; Su Ch'i-chu, "Ch'ing-t'ing Wu-hsü chao-pien chi" in WHPF, I, pp.345-346; Yuan Shih-k'ai, "Wu-hsü jih-chi" in WHPF, I, pp.549-556; extract from "Chung-wai jih-pao" of 25 Sept. 1898 in WHPF, III, p.417. The Empress Dowager's edict of 22 Sept. is given in Lin Shu-hui (ed) "Shang-yü san-liu t'iao" in WHPF III, p.99; and FO 17/1718, p.182.



failure of the 1898 movement could not be attributed only to the helplessness of the Emperor Kuang Hsü in face of opposition from the Empress Dowager and the ultra-conservatives. K'ang Yu-wei had envisaged a new government for China more from a philosopher's view point than that of a practical statesman. His over-enthusiasm and hasty methods only roused the antagonism of the officials who had secured for themselves prestige and contentment in the traditional system of government. Yet K'ang had disdained the support of the masses for his movement, and directed his energies mainly towards the literate, intellectual classes, most of whom were Imperial administrators. The selfish ambitions and reactionary ideals of men such as Yuan Shih-k'ai and Ch'ang Chih-tung in refusing their ultimate support for the movement was the final cause of its failure.<sup>54</sup> In the view of an impartial observer, K'ang Yu-wei was a visionary, a man of great strength of character, but quite unfit to be the leader in the troublous times of the 1890's. He had been evidently carried away by enthusiasm for western methods, and "stuffed up with nonsense by Timothy Richard."<sup>55</sup>

54) Discussions of the causes of failure of the reform movement are given in H.B. Morse, op.cit. 1, pp.139-140; Wu Tse, op.cit. pp.32-36, 42-44, 186-196; Wen Ching, op.cit. pp.66-67; Hsiao Kung-ch'dan, op.cit. p.710; Lord C. Beresford, The Break-up of China (New York, 1899) p.199; Li Chien-nung, op.cit. 1, pp.183-192; G.H. Blakeslee, (ed) China and the Far East (New York, 1910) pp.335-338; T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution (London, 1930) p.28; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. pp.175-177.

55) Consul-General of Shanghai, Bourne's conversation with K'ang Yu-wei on 25 Sept. 1898 on board the liner "Balaarat" lying at Wusung, enclosed in Acting-Consul Brenan to the Foreign Office, No.28 of 26 Sept. 1898, in FO 17/1718 p.191.




Meanwhile, the conservatives who were entrenched in positions of power, turned to an extreme course to maintain their control. Western influences had ignited the reform activities of K'ang and his disciples; therefore, led by the Empress Dowager, they decided to rid China of all foreigners, and thus have no need for anything to do with reforms or hot-headed reformers.

At this time, there was active a secret society, the Boxer Society (I-ho Tuan 義和團), an off-shoot of the original White Lotus Sect, in the northern provinces. The conservative clique at Court sought to make use of their activities, by encouraging them to turn their superstitious beliefs into an hysterical anti-foreign furore. Outrageous acts against foreigners culminated in the siege of the Foreign Legation at Peking. This led to the invasion of China by a combined foreign army in 1900, and reparations exacted from China were settled in the Boxer Protocol of 1901.<sup>56</sup>

The effect of the Boxer Rebellion was to convince even the Empress Dowager and the extreme conservatives that some concessions had to be made to the general outcry for administrative and military reforms, before China was entirely over-


56) For a general outline of the Boxer movement, see Chien Po-ts'an, et.al. (ed) I-ho Tuan (Shanghai, 1953); C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York, 1955); G.N. Steiger, China and the Occident, the Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement (New Haven, 1927); Ch'en Chieh, I-ho Tuan yün-tung shih (Shanghai, 1931); Tso Shun-sheng, op.cit. II, pp.427-492; G.B. Smyth, The Crisis in China (New York and London, 1900) and H.C. Thomas, China and the Powers (London, 1902).



run by foreign aggressors. The result was the Manchu programme of constitutional reforms, to be achieved by a step-by-step process.<sup>57</sup> Yet from the very first it was apparent that the Manchu reforms were motivated mainly by fear of the Allied powers and the desire to preserve the dynasty for the Manchus. They only served as a gesture of conciliation to the growing demand of some progressive Chinese officials for a national programme of self-strengthening.

Even before then, there had existed a group of extremist reformers, whose activities had become more marked since 1895. At first, they had subscribed to K'ang Yu-wei's programme of moderate reforms, though without much conviction of the hope of success. But the coup d'etat of 1898 had convinced them of the futility of relying on legitimate, constitutional means of reform. They therefore advocated a different approach, and preached the creed of revolution as a necessary preliminary to a real, national programme of reform. In this, they soon attracted a larger following than K'ang Yu-wei and the constitutionalists


57) Accounts of the Manchu effort at reform are given in Ts'ang Fu, "Li-hsien yün-tung chih chin-hsing" in Chai Te-keng, et.al. (ed) Hsin-hai k'o-ming (Shanghai, 1957) (hereafter quoted as HHKM) IV, pp.3-9; Huang Hung-shou, "Chia-wa shih li-hsien chi tsu-shih kuei-ts'u nei-kao" in HHKM IV, pp.48-51; R.F. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City, pp.55-58; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Li-hsien cheng-ti yü cheng-chih tao-te" in HHKM, IV, pp.121-126; Tuan Fang, "Ch'ing-kai-ting kuan-i-wei li-hsien yü-pei che" in HHKM, IV, pp.33-38; W.A.P. Martin, The Awakening of China (London, 1907) pp.196-218; Chang Hsiao-jo, "Li-hsien yün-tung chi tzu-i-chü ch'eng-li" in HHKM, IV, pp.156-163. The official Manchu account is given in Ku-kung Tang-an-kuan, "Kuan-yü ch'ou-pei li-hsien ti yü-chih yü tsou-che" in HHKM, IV, pp.83-104; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit. pp.196-211.



had ever achieved.

Perhaps the best-known of the revolutionaries was Sun Yat-sen. After 1898, the conservatives had taken control of all influential positions in the Chinese government. Sun Yat-sen was therefore forced to carry out most of his activities abroad. The outstanding overseas revolutionary centres became Hawaii, Japan, Southeast Asia and Hongkong. Among these, Hongkong soon assumed a special significance, and "in the revolutionary movement, the importance of Hongkong occupied the first chapter of its history."<sup>58</sup>

58) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih (Chungking, 1945) lll, p.227.




## CHAPTER 11

### Early Revolutionary Activity in Hongkong, and the Formation of the Hsing Chung Hui

Hongkong had been established as a British Crown colony by the Treaties of Nanking, 1842.<sup>1</sup> Under efficient British administration, it soon became a flourishing colonial settlement which, by virtue of its geographical position, held a special place as a leading trading mart between the Far East and the western world.

The administration of the colony was carried out by a governor responsible to the British sovereign through the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The constitution of the colony also provided for an Executive Council, a Legislative

1) For accounts of the cession of Hongkong, see Sir C. Collins, Public Administration in Hongkong (London, 1952) pp.1, 13, 17-19, 23; W.C. Costin, Great Britain and China, pp.76-77, 105; E.J. Eitel, Europe in Asia, the History of Hongkong from the Beginning to the Year 1882 (London) (1895) p.121; H. Ingrams, Hongkong (London, 1952) p.272; G.B. Endacott, A History of Hongkong (London, 1958) pp.14-34; Sir E. Hertslet, (comp.) Treaties, Conventions etc. Between China and Foreign States, II, p.8; also see W.V. Pennell, History of the General Chamber of Commerce, 1861-1961 (Hongkong, 1961) pp.3-22 for accounts of trading activities; C.A.M. Smith, The British in China and Far Eastern Trade (London, 1920) and Sir C.W. Dilke, Greater Britain (London, 189




Council, and such other officers and ministers as were necessary for the government of the colony. At first all administrative posts were filled by Europeans. However, as the Chinese community grew in numbers and influence, the first Chinese representative to the Legislative Council, Mr. Ng Choy (also known as Wu T'ing-fang),<sup>2</sup> was nominated in 1880. The system worked well, and the colony gained in administrative efficiency and public order.<sup>3</sup>

The population of Hongkong was predominantly Chinese, more than 80% of which were Cantonese from the nearby province of Kwangtung. The census taken in May 1891 showed that the Chinese population stood at 210,995, while the total number of European, American and other foreigners was only 10,446. The standing population remained under two hundred thousand (176,379), which included a considerable amount of emigration overseas. The statistics also showed that some 848 (about 0.4%) of the Chinese were directly concerned with the shipping trade, while 5,387 (about 2.6%) took employment under European and other foreigners.<sup>4</sup> Thus in terms of social classification, a much bigger group of

2) In this thesis, Chinese names in general are given in the Wade-Giles romanisation, except in those instances where the Cantonese or Fukienese rendering allows easier identification.

3) Collins, op.cit. pp.131-132; "The Colony's Administration" in J. Braga (ed), Hongkong Business Symposium (Hongkong, 1957) p.57; Endacott, op.cit. pp.176-177; A. Ireland, The Far Eastern Tropics (London, 1905) pp.15-36.

4) Hongkong Government Gazette of 22 August, 1891; Hongkong Government, Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hongkong, 1841-1930 (Hongkong, 1932) chart 7; see A. Wright, 20th Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai and Other Treaty Ports of China. Their History, Commerce, Industries and Resources (London, 1908) pp.224-234 on the oriental mercantile community.



Chinese belonged to the manual classes than the mercantile.

This was not surprising because Hongkong, owing to its proximity to the Chinese mainland, had historically been a centre of refuge for Chinese fleeing their homeland. A ready example was the influx during the Taiping rebellion.<sup>5</sup> Many of the refugees had been criminals or political offenders escaping from Manchu justice or persecution, and in Hongkong they were quick to align with the local secret societies and other malcontents. The British criminal law, too, was mild when compared with that of China.<sup>6</sup>

Consequently, the Chinese population of Hongkong was heterogeneous, consisting of representatives from all the different social classes. Generally, it remained stable and law-abiding, though the Chinese people still maintained a close consciousness of events in China. By the late 19th century, when the state of the political situation deteriorated in China, there were thus significant repercussions among the Chinese in Hongkong.

This activity was largely brought about by a new class of intellectual Chinese in Hongkong, many of whom had been born in the colony, educated under the British system, and who had eventually made their living in Hongkong. However, their political interests still centred keenly on events in China. As a century

5) During the twelve years of the rebellion, the Chinese population of Hongkong had soared from 35,517 in 1852 to 117,868 in 1864. See charts 2 and 3 of the Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hongkong.

6) Collins, op.cit. pp.85-86; O.M. Green, The Story of China's Revolution (London, 1945) p.45; R.F. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City (London, 1934) p.83; Ireland, op.cit. pp.27-28; O.A.M. Smith, op.cit. pp.121-122.




of reform attempts had made no significant headway in the modernisation of the Chinese Empire, the condition of China by 1890 had seemed all the more deplorable to them when compared with the well-ordered society then existing in Hongkong.

The outcome was the practice of holding meetings for the purpose of political discussions. These however, had to be clandestinely arranged to avoid interference from the authorities, both the British and the agents of the Chinese government in Hongkong. This led to the formation of "literary societies," (wen-she 文社). On the surface, literary societies were meant for the perpetration of education and cultural activities. But in the case of those in Hongkong, as well as in other areas of Southeast Asia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, they became in reality convenient covers for the political activities of members of the Chinese communities.<sup>7</sup>

One such society in Hongkong was the Fu Jen Wen-she 輔仁文社 formed in March, 1892. The headquarters was located on the first floor at No. 1, Pak Tze Lane. But there were other meeting places, including the offices of the Ping Kee Shipping Company at Prayer Central, the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, and the Gon Kee Shipping Company. These were in fact the places where some of the society members were employed, and meetings were held secretly after work. The meetings had of necessity to be irregular, to avoid detection, and therefore little inform-

7) Pao Tsun-p'eng, et.al. (ed) Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'hu-hua-chiao (Taiwan, 1961) pp.120-121; Wang Gung-wu, "Sun Yat-se and Singapore", in Journal of the South Seas Society, Vol.XV (Dec. 1959) p.58.



ation was known as to the form of activity the Society engaged in.


The Chairman of the Fu Jen Literary Society was Yang Ch'u-yün 楊衢雲, who was born and educated in Hongkong. He came from a well-to-do family, and was employed in one of the largest shipping concerns in the colony, the David Sassoon and Sons' Company. A comfortable life, however, did not prevent him from harbouring strong feelings of indignation at the political weakness of China, and her humiliating treatment at the hands of foreign nations. Continued dissatisfaction led to positive action, and with the cooperation of his close friend, Tse Tsan-tai he initiated the literary society.<sup>8</sup>

Tse Tsan-tai 謝贊泰, the honorary secretary of the society, was born in Australia, but received his early education in Hongkong at the Government Central School.<sup>9</sup> There he came into the

8) Biographies of Yang are given in Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui K'o-ming-shih pieh-lu", appended in Ch'en Te-yün (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu (Canton, 1934?) p.114; Hsüeh Chün-tu, "Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yün, and the Early Revolutionary Movement in China" in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XIX, No.3 (May, 1960) p.307; Wang Hsing-jui, "Ch'ing-chi Fu-jen Wen-she yù k'o-ming yün-tung ti kuan-hsi" in Shih-hsüeh Tsa-chih (Chungking) Vol.1, No.1. (Dec. 1945) p.36; T'an Yung-nien, Hsin-hai k'o-ming hui-i lu (Hongkong, 1958) I, p.42; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao (Shanghai, 1938) IV, p.1226; Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu chih ta-hsüeh shih-tai (Taiwan, 1954) p.29.

J. Braga (ed) Hongkong Business Symposium (Hongkong, 1957) p.493 gives an account of the David Sassoon and Sons' Company.

9) The Government Central School was established in 1862. In 1889 it moved to a new site and was then known as the Victoria College, till 1894 when it was known as the Queen's College, a name which is still being used today. See G.B. Endacott, op.cit. pp.139-140, 237-239; G.H.B. Wright, "Education", in Arnold Wri. (ed) op.cit. pp.123-126; G. Stokes, Queen's College, 1862-1962 (Hongkong, 1962).



company of many "promising and patriotic young men", and gradually evolved the concept of reform in China and of driving out the Manchus from the Chinese throne. Tse later took clerical work with the Hongkong Government.<sup>10</sup>


Other members of the literary society included Liu Yen-pin 劉燕賓, chief clerk of the Ping Kee Shipping Company, Wu Kan-chih 胡幹芝, owner of the Gon Kee Shipping Company and compradore of David Sassoon and Company, and Wen Tsung-yao 溫宗堯, a teacher at the Government Central School. There were sixteen original members altogether, of which seven formed the organising committee, and there was no indication that further members were enlisted after 1892. It remained a small, closely-knitted group of young Chinese patriots throughout its period.

The motto chosen by the Fu Jen Literary Society was "Ducit Amor Patriae" 爱心愛國 (Be whole-heartedly patriotic) which indicated its political tendencies from the start. The aims of the Society were thus the promotion of education among the Chinese people, and the recognition of China's need for political reforms.<sup>11</sup>

In its own right, the Fu Jen Society was therefore import-

10) Biographies of Tse are given in C. Duncan, Tse Tsan-tai (London, 1917); Tse Tsan-tai, The Chinese Republic - Secret History of the Revolution (Hongkong, 1924) p.7; Hsueh, op.cit. p.308; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih (Chungking, 1943) 11, pp. 23-25; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.114&c.

11) Wang Hsing-jui, op.cit. pp.35-36; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih (Chungking, 1946) p.3; Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.8; Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution (Stanford, 1961) p.27.




ant as the first formal reform movement founded in the colony of Hongkong, and which directed its activities towards China and the Chinese people. But a greater significance of this organisation was its collaboration with the revolutionary society soon to be established by Sun Yat-sen in Hongkong.

Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 was born on 22 November, 1866, at Choyhung, Kwangtung. It was a picturesque countryside, the favourite holiday resort of people from Macao and Canton. The village inhabitants had therefore early made contact with the outside world, and were comparatively more progressive in outlook than villagers in other parts of China. It was here that Sun began to develop youthful radical ideas against the unfair social organisation, tyrannical local administration, and the outdated educational system.

These ideas were further nurtured when Sun was sent in 1879 to Hawaii, where his brother Sun Mei 孫眉 was making a living. In Hawaii he was educated at British and American missionary schools. By 1883 Sun Mei was forced to send him back to China, fearing that Sun was becoming too "westernised".

On the way to Kwangtung, the ship Sun was on stopped at Hongkong. Even as a youth of eighteen, Sun was appalled at the subjection of the ship's passengers to the illicit exactions of the Chinese customs officials at Hongkong. Spurred by a righteous indignation, Sun Yat-sen made his first public speech, addressed to his fellow travellers, and expounded his views on China's urgent need of political reforms.

When he arrived home, his stay in his native village was



a short one, during which he brought disgrace upon himself and his family by his outspoken dissatisfaction with the traditional social and political beliefs of the village dwellers. Sun had to be sent away again.

This time he came to Hongkong, where he joined the Government Central School in March, 1884. By then, Sun had decided to do reform work for his country.<sup>12</sup> He needed, however, a convenient cover for his activities. Knowing that physicians were much revered in Chinese society, he determined to make it his profession, and began to regard "medical science as the kindly aunt who would bring me out on to the high road of politics."<sup>13</sup>

Just at this time, the Sino-French War broke out as a result of difficulties in Annam. The young reformer was disheartened with the obvious weakness of the Chinese military strength as compared with that of the British which he saw in Hongkong. He was particularly affected by the superstitious belief of the conservative Chinese in "gods of luck" instead of confidence in military reforms.<sup>14</sup> This was the first of two foreign wars which were to become landmarks in Sun Yat-

- 12) Accounts of Sun's early life are given in P. Linebarger, Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic (New York, 1925) pp.6-173; Wu Shou-i, Kuo-fu ti ch'ing-nien shih-tai (Taipei, 1960) pp.14-48; H.B. Restarick, Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China (Yale, 1931) pp.1, 26; Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, II, p.702; S. Chen and R. Payne, Sun Yat-sen, a Portrait (New York, 1946) pp.5-25; Hu Ch'u-fei, Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng ch'u-uan, (Shanghai, 1933) Taung-li shih-lueh (Changsha, 1940) pp.1-13; Lo Chia-lun, (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao (Taipei, 1958) I, pp.1-30.
- 13) Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (Taiwan, 1953) p.185.
- 14) Fu Wei-p'ing, Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng ch'u-uan-lueh (Shanghai, 1928) p.4.




sen's revolutionary career. When a French cruiser came into Hongkong for repairs in September, 1884, the Chinese coolies refused to work on it. Sun Yat-sen was suitably impressed with the latent patriotism of the Chinese in Hongkong, and later held that "from the time of our defeat in the war with France, I set before myself the object of the over-throw of the Tai-tsing dynasty and the establishment of a Chinese Republic on its ruins."<sup>15</sup>

In 1886 Sun joined the Canton Pok Tsai Hospital as a medical student. There he made the first of a number of acquaintances who were to play important roles in his later revolutionary movement. Cheng Shih-liang 鄭士良 was the son of a Shanghai merchant, and a fellow student at the Canton Hospital. Sun soon found that Cheng was a sympathetic listener to his political views, and their discussions readily took on serious implications. Cheng Shih-liang disapproved of Sun's arguments for reform of the army and navy, and suggested that a revolution would achieve the same end quicker. Sun lamented that no revolution would be possible without organisation, and then Cheng revealed that he was an official of the Triad Society.<sup>16</sup> This was a significant development, for, having implanted the idea of a revolution in Sun Yat-sen's mind, Cheng now also suggested

15) N. Gangulee, (ed) The Teachings of Sun Yat-sen (London, 1945) p.1; also see, Linebarger, op.cit. pp.177-180; Sir C. Collins, op.cit. p.120; G.B. Endacott, op.cit. pp.208-209.

16) For accounts of Cheng, see M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge, Mass. 1954) p.61; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih (Changsha, 1939) 1, pp.38-39; T'ien Yung-nien, op.cit. 1, p.40; Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. p.29; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.58; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1211.



the means by which an organised anti-dynastic society could be made use of towards this end. From this developed the recourse to secret society cooperation throughout China's revolutionary history.


Yu Shao-wan 尤少純 or Yu Lieh 尤烈 was another important friend whom Sun met in Canton. Yu was visiting a relative at the Pok Tsai Hospital when he came upon Sun Yat-sen and Cheng Shih-liang, and a friendship was quickly started. Yu also proved sympathetic towards the radical political ideas of the two medical students, and disclosed that he had been a Triad member since 1882. Yu was subsequently employed in clerical work with the Hongkong Government, and he was responsible for bringing Singapore into the limelight of China's revolutionary history in its later stages.<sup>17</sup>

In 1887 Sun transferred to the Hongkong Medical College (Alice Memorial Hospital).<sup>18</sup> From then on, Chinese revolutionary activity was pursued in earnest in Hongkong. Sun knew that Hongkong offered prospects of a wider field for propaganda, because of the predominantly numerous Chinese population, and of its propinquity to China. He therefore devoted all his leisure hours in promoting reform and revolutionary ideas. However, he still managed to graduate as a medical doctor in 1892 with exceptional results.<sup>19</sup>

17) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, pp.40-48; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p. 1214; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.115b-116.

18) An account of the Hospital is given in G.B. Endacott, op.cit. pp.249-250.

19) Sun Yat-sen, op.cit. p.186; Linebarger, op.cit. p.198; T' Yung-nien, op.cit. I, p.34; Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. p.65; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. pp.62-66.




Like Yang and Tse, then active in the literary society, Sun Yat-sen was also influenced by the efficient administration of the British government, and the stability and order of the colony during his impressionable years as a university student. In Hongkong, he was able to make searching contrasts between the backwardness of his native Chinese homeland and the progress in the British colony. His political thinking was further encouraged when he formed close associations with members of the young local intellectuals, men who were enthusiastic about the cause of reform in China.

One such enthusiast was Yang Ho-lin 楊鴻齡 born of a rich family in Macao, and a school-mate of Yu Lieh. He kept a shop in Hongkong, the Yeung Yiu Kee 楊耀記 at Gough Street, the first floor of which was soon used as a club-house for his friends to hold their political discussions.<sup>20</sup> Another member of this group was Ch'en Shao-pai 決少白, a Cantonese from a good family, and a colleague of Sun Yat-sen for some time at the College of Medicine. Ch'en was so enthusiastic about revolutionary activities that he soon gave up his studies and left his family to become a full-time revolutionary in Hongkong during the period before 1906.<sup>21</sup>

Lu Hao-tung 陸皓東 had also studied at the College of

20) T'an Yung-nien, op.cit. 1, p.39; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.115-115b; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.59; Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. p.29; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'uo-ming kai-kuo shih p.2.

21) Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.2-10; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.59; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. p.2; Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. p.92; Hsueh Chun-tu, "Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yün, and the Early Revolutionary Movement in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XIX. No.3, p.310.




Medicine in Hongkong, and had known Sun Yat-sen from childhood in the same native village in Kwangtung. Sun had called him his "doctrinal friend", for they often talked of religion and education as a means of saving China, and lamented the failure of the Taiping rebellion. In their discussions, Lu once suggested to Sun: "Who knows but that you were born to be the new Napoleon for China?"<sup>22</sup> In 1895 Lu Hao-tung became the first revolutionary martyr, but not before he had made an original design for the Chinese Nationalist flag.<sup>23</sup>

These then were the Chinese intellectuals in Hongkong, who, at the end of the 19th century, took upon themselves the task of instigating a movement to work for the overthrow of the conservative Manchu government in order that China could be modernised and strengthened. Their activities at this stage, limited only to political discussions and spreading reform ideas, were similar to that of the Fu Jen Literary Society. Though Sun Yat-sen's group had not been formally organised into a society, they soon found a name to call themselves, the "Four Brigands." This included Sun, Yang Ho-lin, Yu Lieh and Ch'en Shao-pai.

The influence of the Taiping rebellion had caused them to choose the name "Four Brigands". They argued that if Hung Hsiu-ch'uan had succeeded in his movement, he would have become a king (huang 帝); but the failure of the rebellion saw him condemned as a brigand (k'ou 盜). The Chinese revolutionaries

22) Restarick, op.cit. p.24.

23) Jansen, op.cit. p.61; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. p.4, K'o-ming i shih, 11, pp.10-17; Restarick, op.cit. pp.23-24; Chou Lu, op.cit. p.1223.



thus sought to continue the unfinished work of the Taipings in overthrowing the Manchu dynasty, and felt it appropriate that they should call themselves the "Brigands of the Ch'ing Dynasty."<sup>24</sup>

The "Four Brigands" now held regular meetings to discuss Chinese political affairs. In the New Territories, an area on the Chinese mainland to be ceded to Britain in April 1899,<sup>25</sup> they managed to secure a house which they converted into their headquarters. In the isolated district of the New Territories, they were able to plot their activities without fear of interference.<sup>26</sup>


Their activities were not limited to Hongkong, however, but were also carried out in the near-by Portugese colony of Macao. After his graduation in Hongkong, Sun Yat-sen had set up his medical practice in Macao for a time, before being compelled to transfer to Canton owing to the professional jealousy of the Macao doctors against his philanthropic tendencies.<sup>27</sup>

24) Sun Yat-sen, op.cit. p.186-187; "T'an-hsiang-shan Hsing Chung Hui ch'eng-li hsuan-yen" in HKHM, 1, p.83; Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. p.59; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, p.401; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.117.

25) See Sir C. Collins, op.cit. pp.134-136; Endacott, op.cit. pp.260-269; Hsia Ching-lin, Studies in Chinese Diplomatic History (Shanghai, 1926) p.97; Sir E. Hertslet, Treaties, Conventions etc. Between China and Foreign States 11, p.728; Sir C. Lac Donald to Salisbury Tel. No. 113 of 3 Apr. 1898, F.O. China 1340, in G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley (ed) British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London, 1927) 1, pp.29-30; The Hongkong Hansard, 4 Oct. 1899; Lo Feng-luh to Salisbury of 6 Dec. 1899, in FO 17/1718 pp.199-201; for further papers relating to military operations in connection with the taking over of the New Territories, see the Hongkong Sessional Papers, 1899, pp.58-588.

26) Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.60.

27) Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.67; T'an Yung-nien, op.cit. 1, p.33; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.10.




The other members of the "Four Brigands" thus had cause to make frequent journeys to Macao, where they hoped to bring their political ideals to the Chinese community there.

When Sun Yat-sen moved to Canton to set up practice, Yu Lieh, Cheng Shih-liang, Lu Hao-tung and a few other sympathisers also travelled to that Chinese city to continue their political meetings. Once, in a Buddhist temple, they met Cheng An 鄭安, a former tutor of Lin Tse-hsü, who seemed impressed by their talk of reform and revolution. Cheng consequently advised them on the need of good organisation, the dangers of haste and the importance of secret societies. This gave the revolutionaries much encouragement.<sup>28</sup>

After 1892, it was therefore possible to distinguish two groups of active reformers, the self-styled "brigands" of Sun Yat-sen, and the formally-organised Fu Jen Literary Society. The influences of the Taiping movement had helped the "brigands" to determine on a programme which involved direct action of a rebellious nature. The character of Sun Yat-sen, unofficially acknowledged leader of the group, was also well-suited to guide its members towards such a policy. On the other hand, the Fu Jen Literary Society operated on a less pushing level of constitutional reforms. Its members, including the chairman Yang Ch'u-yün, were mainly responsible citizens of Hongkong society with their careers to attend to, and they were thus inclined to be more cautious in their reform activities. For these reasons.

28) Wu Shou-i, op.cit. pp.60,68-69.




there had yet been no contact between the two groups.

But by 1895, as internal conditions deteriorated in China, and external pressure intensified in the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, even the Fu Jen members were convinced that revolutionary means appeared more feasible than intellectual and educational methods in promoting urgently needed reforms in China. This led to their joining forces with the revolutionary group. So in Hongkong, the foundations of a movement which finally overthrew the Manchu dynasty of China were laid.

Already in 1894, Sun Yat-sen had read the ominous signs of the times, and had tried to gain the support of Li Hung-chang, then governor of Chihli, by a petition asking for reforms under his direction. Sun had gone to Shanghai with Lu Hao-tung in 1894, and had met Wang T'ao 王滔, from whom he had received a letter of introduction to meet Li in Tientsin. Li Hung-chang showed approval of Sun's suggestions in his petition, but was unwilling to put them to the test, let alone take the direction himself. In the end, Li Hung-chang only granted Sun permission to organise an "Agricultural Association" in Canton.<sup>29</sup>

After this unsuccessful venture, Sun abandoned all hopes of the possibility of peaceful reform from above. He returned to Hongkong a determined revolutionary.

29) Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. pp.67-68; Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih-yao" in Ch'en Te-yün, (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu, pp.94b-95; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.74; Hsiung Nan-yueh, Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng hsüan-chi (Hongkong n.d.) pp.167-180.



By August, 1894 when the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Sun Yat-sen decided that the time had come for positive action. Thinking of the influence his brother Sun Mei enjoyed among the Chinese community of Hawaii, Sun prepared to make a trip to the islands to rally support for his activities.

Sun Mei had earlier disapproved of the rebellious activities of his brother. But the 1893 revolt of the Hawaiians against their native rulers, and the conversion of the islands to republican rule, had greatly moved the conservative merchant. He had even grown accustomed to hearing reports of the anti-Manchu tendencies of his brother.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, in Hawaii, Sun Yat-sen was introduced to leading members of the Chinese community, and found them generally sympathetic towards the proposal of the organisation of a movement to overthrow the despotic Manchu rule in China, and to establish a new form of republican government. The material well-being of the Chinese in Hawaii also made it possible to obtain financial support from them. Sun Yat-sen therefore decided that a formal revolutionary society should be organised.

The Revived China Society (Hsing Chung Hui 奉中會) came into being on 24 November, 1894. On that day, a meeting of a number of Chinese residents in Hawaii was held at the residence of Ho K'uan 何寬, manager of a local bank. The members paid dues, and the aims of the newly-established society were formulated, as being the enlistment of members, the collection of

30) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 11, pp.1-3.



finances, and the preparation of a revolution at home in China. On this occasion, a considerable sum of H.K.\$13,000 was raised. This included a number of "shares" purchased by some enthusiasts and a donation from Sun Mei. Sun Yat-sen was subsequently elected chairman of the Hsing Chung Hui, and other office-bearers were mostly Cantonese from the Chinese community.<sup>31</sup>


One of the foremost enthusiasts of the Hsing Chung Hui in Hawaii was Teng Yin-nan 鄧陰南, a friend of Sun Mei. He had been one of the first to join the Society, and then had donated a large sum by selling a farm. He had also proved to be skilled in the manufacture of fire-arms and explosives, and so later became an essential member of the revolutionary society.<sup>32</sup>

By the spring of 1895 China's defeat by Japan was apparent. Sun Yat-sen decided to extend the Hsing Chung Hui activities to Hongkong, which was more suitably situated than Hawaii for the spread of revolutionary influences into the Chinese mainland. Taking part of the Hsing Chung Hui funds, and accompanied by Teng Yin-nan and a few others, Sun returned to Hongkong.

Once in Hongkong, Sun began to rally his own followers, and to initiate contacts with the Fu Jen Literary Society in prep-

31) Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.95; also given in HHKM, 1, p.29; Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. p.78; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. pp.76-77; Lo Chia-Lun, op.cit. 1, pp.51-53; Hsueh Chun-tu, "Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yün and the Early Revolutionary Movement" in Journal of Asian Studies Vol.XIX, No.3. p.309; Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen) "T'anshiang-shan Hsing Chung-Hui ch'eng-li hsüan-yan" in HHKM 1, pp. 85-85; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih (Chungking, 1946) IV, pp.2-8.

32) Accounts of Teng are given in Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.77; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.65-66; T'an Yung-nien, op.cit. 1, p.58; Ch'en Shao-ai, op.cit. p.115.



aration for the formation of a Hsing Chung Hui branch in Hongkong. Here evidence shows that, though the two reform groups had not exchanged mutual references before 1895, each must have known the existence of the other. The Chinese community of Hongkong had been close enough for news to travel easily, and the comparatively open discussions of the "Four Brigands" about revolutionary activities must have caused a stir among the student population.<sup>33</sup> The pressure of external events on the decrepit Chinese government had also convinced the leading members of the Fu Jen Society of the urgency of reform.

Accordingly, upon receipt of Sun's invitation to coordinate their two movements into a formal revolutionary society, Yang Ch'u-yün, Tse Tsan-tai and Chou Chao-chün 周兆君 readily agreed. With their support, the Hongkong Hsing Chung Hui was established on 21 February, 1895. However, these three remained the only Fu Jen members who joined the Hsing Chung Hui, the others having apparently renounced their support of the revolutionary movement.<sup>34</sup>

The headquarters of the Hongkong Hsing Chung Hui was located at 13, Staunton Street, and as a cover for their rebellious activities, it was known as the Kuen Hang Club, 勸善堂, which was meant to be only a social club. Enlistment was welcomed from all social classes, and the entrance fee was H.K.\$5.00, together with the recommendations of two members. Shares at

33) Wang Hsing-jui, op.cit. pp.37-38; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, p.9, records that Yang Ch'u-yün had known Sun Yat-sen during his days as a medical student in Hongkong. It is probable.

34) Wang Hsing-jui, op.cit. p.37.



\$10.00 each were sold, and members could also form branch clubs of their own, with the minimum requirement of fifteen initial members. The officers of the Society, including a chairman, vice-chairman, Chinese secretary, English secretary, treasurer, and ten directors of the board, were to be elected annually.

The programme of activities consisted of the establishment of newspaper concerns, building of schools, development of industry, and the founding of club houses for the use of members.<sup>35</sup>

Right from the beginning, however, the Hongkong Hsing Chung Hui suffered an internal split because of the rivalry between Sun Yat-sen and Yang Ch'u-yün for the post of chairman. Yang's strong position lay in the fact that he was seven years senior to Sun Yat-sen in age, and even more so, because he had established the Fu Jen Literary Society and begun the student reform movement in Hongkong, at a date when Sun Yat-sen was still studying in the Hongkong Medical College. Yang and his Fu Jen Society following had also probably a greater influence on the Chinese community of Hongkong than men like the "Four Brigands" and

35) Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.77; Hao Yen-ping, "The Abortive Cooperation Between Reformers and Revolutionaries" in Harvard University, Papers on China, Vol.15 (1961) p.92; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.62; Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih, pp.5-8; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, pp.16-26; T'ang Yung-nien, ou.cit. 1, p.34; Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.8; Hsüeh Chün-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution (Stanford, 1961) pp.28-30; Ku Yen-shih, Chung-kuo pi-mi she-hui shih pp.138-141; Sun Wen, "Hongkong Hsing Chung Hui Hsuan-yan" in HHKM, 1, pp.86-89; Hu Ch'u-fei, Taung-li shih-lüeh, pp.22-25. Feng Tzu-yu, in K'o-ming i-shih IV, pp.25-65 gives a list with brief biographies of all the Hsing Chung Hui members from 1894-1904. The total stood at 286, but Feng reckoned that including those whose names could not be located, the membership during the whole Hsing Chung Hui period must have been near 500.



Sun's supporters from Hawaii. After serious dissensions, during which Cheng Shih-liang was even prepared to resort to physical combat with Yang in his ardent support of Sun's candidature, Sun Yat-sen found it expedient to end the quarrel and withdrew his nomination. Yang Ch'u-yün therefore became chairman of the Hongkong Hsing Chung Hui.<sup>36</sup>


To Tse Tsan-tai, who later was to find many causes for disagreement with Sun Yat-sen over the conduct of revolutionary activities, there had seemed to be no difficulties over the chairmanship of the Hsing Chung Hui. Yang Ch'u-yün, to him, had seemed the only natural candidate. "In the spring of 1895" he noted later, "Yeung Ku-wan (Yang Ch'u-yün) conferred with me, and we joined hands with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his friends and established the Hing Chung Whui (Hsing Chung Hui) revolutionary party."<sup>37</sup> To a later proponent of Tse's eminent role in the Chinese revolutionary history, it was even suggested that Sun was only Yang's secretary.<sup>38</sup>

Nevertheless, Sun Yat-sen still remained the most active member of the Hsing Chung Hui. In Canton, by virtue of the permit granted to him by Li Hung-chang in 1894, Sun established the Agricultural Association (Nung Hsüeh Hui 農學會) on 6 October, 1895. It was in fact the cover for a branch of the

36) For accounts of the conflict, see Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. p.27; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.95b; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.7; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, 1226; T'an Yung-nien, op.cit. 1, p.63; Feng, Hua-chiao K'o-ming kai-kuo shih p.4.

37) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.8.

38) V.Y. Chow, "Sun Yat-sen's 'Fatherhood' of New China", in United China Magazine, (Shanghai) Oct. 1933. p.424.




Hsing Chung Hui in Canton. Other club houses and headquarters were formed in the city, and under the pretext of promoting agriculture, revolutionary propaganda was spread among the educated and student classes. The Ch'i-li Company 赤利 was set up, for the convenience of making fire-arms.<sup>39</sup> An important supporter in Canton was the Rev. Ou Feng-ch'ih 欧凤岐, a famed educationalist who had been Sun's Chinese tutor during his school days in Hongkong. The Rev. Ou helped to preach revolutionary ideas among the Christian population in Canton.<sup>40</sup>

By the middle of 1895 the revolutionary movement had thus been firmly established in Hongkong and Canton. The next step would be the actual perpetration of revolutionary action against the Chinese government. In this aspect, the Hsing Chung Hui was able to enjoy the support of some of the prominent Chinese residents in Hongkong, as well as that of the local secret societies. In fact, it was only through the ready assistance of men from these two social classes that the first revolutionary attempt of 1895 was made possible.

39) Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. p.79; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. p.4; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. pp.78-79.

40) Lo, op.cit. p.30; Feng Tzu-yu, K'uo-ming i-shih l, p.19; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.49.




## CHAPTER III

### The Canton Rising of 1895 and Its Aftermath

When news of the result of the Sino-Japanese War reached Hongkong, the Chinese community, in the main, was not unduly affected. There had only been a fair amount of economic disturbance caused by the dislocation of trade during the war.<sup>1</sup> But to the Hongkong Hsing Chung Hui and its revolutionary sympathisers the event acted as a stimulus to immediate action.

This stimulus was further augmented by reports from Canton of the disorder and lawlessness prevailing as a result of China's defeat in the war. Large numbers of disbanded Chinese soldiers, frustrated and angry against the government for its lack of resources, roamed the countryside as brigands. The Manchu guards in the provinces took advantage of the general disorganisation to plunder and rob the citizens, while the corrupt yamen refused to redress the grievances of the victims. At the same time, a new law was passed in Kwangtung which demanded extra taxation from government officials, who in turn squeezed the

1) G.B. Endacott, A History of Hongkong, p.253.




public. Popular agitation in Kwangtung province, and especially in the city of Canton, was therefore increasingly hostile.<sup>2</sup>

In such circumstances of social and economic distress, the Hsing Chung Hui agents in Canton were able to make suitable contacts and enlist large numbers into the revolutionary society. Reports of their activities were sent to Hongkong, where the Hsing Chung Hui leaders decided that the moment was ripe for the perpetration of an armed rising against the Manchu government in the south.

Such a decision could be made at this juncture because the Hsing Chung Hui in Hongkong, within a few months of its founding, had already gained the sympathy of a number of prominent residents in the colony, both Chinese and European. Their financial and moral encouragement became an essential feature of the early revolutionary movement. These leaders of society in Hongkong had not contemplated joining the Hsing Chung Hui during its whole period. Nevertheless, the earnestness of its revolutionary ideals, and the growing confusion of the Chinese government, had spurred them on to support a movement which promised a vigorous revival of the Chinese nation.

One of the most distinguished revolutionary supporters was Dr. Ho Kai 何啓 (later Sir Kai Ho-kai). Born in Hongkong, the son of a minister of the London Missionary Society, he was educated first at the Government Central School in Hongkong, and then later in England, where he qualified as both medical doctor and barrister-at-law. In 1881 he returned to the colony, and


2) Chou Lu, "I-wei Kuang-chou ch'i-i" in HHKM, 1, pp.225-226; Ch Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao (Shanghai, 1938)III, p.656.



began a free medical service to introduce the benefits of western medicine to the Chinese community. This led to the establishment in 1887 of the Alice Memorial Hospital in honour of his wife. Attached to the hospital was the Hongkong College of Medicine for Chinese, which he placed under the charge of the London Missionary Society and a number of European doctors in the colony.

Throughout his life Ho Kai was enthusiastic in promoting public welfare, and served on the committees of numerous public institutions. In March, 1890, he was appointed Chinese representative on the Legislative Council, which post he held for three successive terms (18 years). He was created C.M.G. in 1892, and knighthood came in 1900. During the constitutional reform activities in China, Ho Kai had helped to introduce the movement to the Chinese in Hongkong by submitting reform articles in the local Chinese and English press, and finally published a collection of reform works in conjunction with another local resident, Hu Li-yüan 胡禮垣, "The True Interpretation of the New Political System" (Hsin-cheng Chen-ch'üan 新政真詮).<sup>3</sup> The inadequacy of the constitutional reform

3) For accounts of Ho Kai and his role in Hongkong society, see Endacott, op.cit. pp.249-250; Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu chih ta-hsueh shih-tai (Taiwan, 1954) pp.5-10, 90; Dr. J.M. Atkinson, "Health and Hospitals" in A. Wright, (ed) 20th Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai and Other Treaty Ports of China (London, 1908) p.264, 109; Woo Sing-slim, The Prominent Chinese in Hongkong (Hongkong, 1937) 11, p.2; Hsiao Kung-ch'üan, Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih (Shanghai, 1946) p.795; Tse Tsan-tai, The Chinese Republic - Secret History of the Revolution (Hongkong, 1924) p. T'an Yung-nien, Hsin-hai k'o-ming hui-i-lu (Hongkong, 1958) 1, pp.44-45. The "Hsin-cheng chen-ch'üan" is in Hu Li-yüan, Hu i-nan hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi (Shanghai, 1920) Vols.1-VIII. See China Mail of 12 Mar. 1895 p.2 col.6-7 for a reform article by Ho Kai.



movement, however, had turned his sympathies towards revolutionary activities, and in 1895, Ho Kai was one of the leading organisers of the insurrection.

The influence of Ho Kai then brought another sympathiser to the revolutionary cause. Huang Yung-shang 黃詠商 was the son of the Hon. Wong Shing 黃勝 (Huang Sheng) the second Chinese representative to serve on the Legislative Council (1884-1890), and who was another prominent Chinese resident in his own right.<sup>4</sup>

Tse Tsan-tai had made a number of European acquaintances in the colony because of the clerical post he held in the Hong-kong government. Through his friendships he now brought the Hsing Chung Hui its first foreign supporters. They were Chesney Duncan and Thomas Reid.

Duncan was the editor of the "Hongkong Telegraph", an English newspaper which was established in June, 1881, and which was specially concerned with promoting Chinese interests in the colony. Because of this tendency, Duncan had once been called before the Colonial Secretary and warned about his publications, which allegedly "amounted to incitement of the Chinese to revolt against a government with which Great Britain was on friendly terms."<sup>5</sup> Despite the personal risks, Duncan continued to be an enthusiastic supporter of the Hsing Chung Hui, and wielded

4) Accounts of Huang Yung-shang are given in Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.9; Endacott, op.cit. pp.204-205; Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming pieh-lu" in Ch'en Te-yün (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu, p.114b, also given in HHKM I, p.27.

5) Taken from Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.8.



much influence on their behalf in the local English press.

Thomas Reid was editor of the "China Mail", one of the earliest English newspapers, which began as a weekly in February, 1845. Reid had never regretted his support of the Chinese revolutionary movement in Hongkong. In a letter from London dated 9 October, 1912, he wrote to Tse Tsan-tai:<sup>6</sup>

"....and I personally am proud to think that I was the first to support the movement publicly in the 'China Mail' when other English newspapers in China and the Far East scoffed at the movement."


Thus, with outside help secured from their Chinese and European supporters, the Hsing Chung Hui leaders in Hongkong began in earnest to make plans for an armed attempt.

The first preparatory meeting was held on 13 March, 1895, attended by Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yün, Tse Tsan-tai and Huang Yung-shang. The decision was made that advantage should be taken of the agitations in Canton, to aim at the capture of the Canton yamen, so that it could be used as a base for future operations. When the question of finances came up, Huang Yung-shang volunteered to sell his house at So Hong Street, and subsequently donated H.K.\$8,000 from the sale.<sup>7</sup>

At a second meeting at the Kuen Hang Club on 16 March, the plotters decided to utilise the occasion of the Chung-yang festi-

6) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.33. Accounts of the foreign supporters are given in Chou Lu, "I-wei Kuang-chou ch'i-i" in HHKM 1, p.225; Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. pp.85-90, 79; Kuo-fu yü Ou-Mei chih-yu-hao (Taipei, 1951) pp.78-79; Feng Tzu-yu, K'ō-ming i-shih, 1 p.18; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao, II, p.655; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-k 1, p.58.

7) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.10; Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.9; P. Linebarger, Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic, pp.211-213.



val. At this annual event, the 9th day of the 9th lunar month (which fell on 26 October in 1895) it was the Chinese custom to visit ancestral graves. There was bound to be a lot of activity and a flow of Cantonese from all the provinces into Canton. This could thus serve as a convenient cloak for their revolutionary conspiracies. The date having been fixed, the Hsing Chung Hui decided to ask Ho Kai to draft the proclamations, and Lu Hao-tung to design a revolutionary flag.<sup>8</sup>


At a subsequent meeting on 31 March, at the Hsing Chung Hui headquarters, Duncan was also present, and he promised his personal support to the movement, as well as that of the "Hongkong Telegraph."<sup>9</sup>

By 27 August, plans for the rising were finalised, and orders were given for the closing of the Kuen Hang Club. On the 29th, a last meeting was held at the Hang Fa Lau Hotel, at which Reid was present, besides Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yün, Tse-Tsan-tai, Huang Yung-shang, Ch'en Shao-pai and Ho Kai. Ho was chairman and spokesman of this meeting, and helped to draw up the outlines of a "Provisional Government" to be established in the south of China if the rising were successful. This time, Reid also promised to work for the support of the British government and the English people.

Finally, Sun, Cheng Shih-liang and Lu Hao-tung were to go

8) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.57; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.26-37; Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih-yao" in Ch'er Te-yan (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu, pp.95-95b, also in HHKM 1, p.30.

9) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.9.




to Canton and take charge of events there, while Yang, Ch'en Shao-pai, Huang Yung-shang, and Teng Yin-nan were to remain in the colony and raise funds, prepare arms and enlist men.<sup>10</sup>

In this respect, the Hsing Chung Hui found it necessary to align its activities with that of the local secret societies. The nature of the Hsing Chung Hui membership, its insignificant numbers, and the lack of military knowledge of its intellectual leaders, made it imperative that when it came to an armed rebellion, it should turn to other sources for its fighting force. The local secret societies of Hongkong and Canton thus became an integral part of the revolutionary movement. This was possible because a number of Hsing Chung Hui members such as Cheng Shih-liang, Yu Lieh and Chu Kuei-ch'üan 朱貴全, had been secret society officials of long standing. The close-knitted fraternity bonds of the societies made it easy for them to rally their followers, and with the payment of some form of remuneration, to ask them to act in the interests of the revolutionary society.<sup>11</sup>

When all the plans had been completed, and before the leading revolutionaries separated to attend to their respective tasks, an election meeting was held on 10 October, to select a "President of the Provisional Government" which would be established following the success of their attempt. For a second time, there was danger of serious friction within the ranks of the Hsing Chung Hui. Yang Ch'u-yün laid claim to the presidency, not

10) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.9; Hsüeh Chün-tu, "Sun Yat-sen, Yan Ch'u-yün, and the Early Revolutionary Movement" in Journal of Asian Studies Vol.XIX, No.3 p.311; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.58  
 11) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.58-60.



forgetting his existing role as chairman of the revolutionary Society. On the other hand, Cheng Shih-liang and Ch'en Shao-pai were adamant in their nomination of Sun Yat-sen. Sun's followers in the Society had probably been more numerous, since the election result gave him the victory. But Yang and his faction must have continued to press their claim and threaten the stability of the whole Society, for Sun immediately resigned from his elected position in favour of Yang.<sup>12</sup> It was a magnanimous gesture of Sun's towards the preservation of unity within the Hsing Chung Hui, but Tse Tsan-tai still contended that it had greatly displeased Sun, and that it had "always rankled in his breast."<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, after this brief rivalry with Yang, Sun left for Canton the next day, leaving Yang in charge of activities in Hongkong. The revolt, originally scheduled for 26 October, had to be postponed for two days because arms and men from Hongkong were not ready. But on the 27th, the plot was discovered by the Canton authorities. It was believed to have been revealed by the brother of Chu Ch'i 朱淇, who had joined the revolutionary society, but who at the last moment had feared to be involved. Suspicion for revealing the plot fell also on Ch'en T'ing-wei 陳定威, whom Sun had met in Shanghai in 1894, and who later came to join the revolutionary preparations in Hongkong. He was said to have been bribed by the Ch'ing authorities to spy

12) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, p.59; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.95b; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.7; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1226; Hsueh Chün-tu, op.cit. p.312.

13) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.9.



on Sun Yat-sen.<sup>14</sup>

The result of treachery led to a sudden raid upon the Canton headquarters of the Hsing Chung Hui. Lu Hao-tung attempted to hide the membership list and was caught by the Canton police. He became the first martyr of the Chinese revolution. Sun fled, and desperately telegraphed to Yang to hold all troop movements. But it was too late, and forty-five members fell into the hands of the Canton authorities when they arrived on the 28th. The rising was suppressed even before it began.

From Canton, Sun, Cheng Shih-liang and Ch'en Shao-pai returned secretly to Hongkong, and then for greater safety fled farther away to Japan. Yang also left Hongkong in November for Saigon, Singapore, Madras, Colombo and South Africa. Meanwhile, the Chinese government posted awards of one thousand yuan for the capture of Sun and Yang, while three other participants, including Chu Kuei-ch'üan, were executed.<sup>15</sup>

After the failure of their first attempt, disillusion over-took the Hongkong revolutionaries. One of the adverse consequences was the loss of the support of Tse Tsan-tai and Huang Yung-shang. Tse tended to hold Sun Yat-sen personally responsible

14) Wu Shou-i, op.cit. pp.81-87; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.60-61; Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih pieh-lu" in Ch'en Te-yün (ed), Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-su lu, pp.114-114b.

15) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.10; Hsueh Chun-tu, op.cit. pp.312-313; T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution (London, 1930) p.23; Sun Yat-sen, Kidnapped in London (Bristol, 1897) p.28; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 11, pp.26-27; Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih-yao" in Ch'en Te-yün, (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-su lu, pp.96-96b; also given in HKM 1, pp.56-57; Hu Ch'u-fei, Tsung-li shih-lüeh pp.27-32; Chou Lu, "I-wei Kuang-chou ch'i-i" in HKM 1, pp.225-234; The China Mail of 28 Oct. 1898 p.3. col.2.



for the movement, and now decided to retire from the revolutionary scene, "knowing Sun's character and disposition." However, he continued a private campaign to work for the spread of reform ideas among the Chinese of Hongkong through the vernacular and English press.<sup>16</sup> Huang Yung-shang was also said to have remarked, "I will have nothing to do with Sun in the future."<sup>17</sup>


From another source came a further set-back for the revolutionaries. The events of 1895 had proved disturbing to the British government of Hongkong. Clearly some steps had to be taken to prevent similar outbreaks in the future, particularly when the viceroy of Canton had applied to the governor of Hongkong for the surrender of Sun Yat-sen and some of the other conspirators. Sir William Robinson, governor from 1891 to 1898, had refused to grant extradition of these persons, considering that their alleged offence had been a political one. However, the revolutionaries had been a source of public disorder in the colony, and to safeguard the peace and stability of Hongkong, as well as appeasing the Canton authorities at the same time, the Hongkong government decided to banish Sun Yat-sen from the colony.<sup>18</sup>

Making use of an 1882 Ordinance, the "Banishment and Conditional Pardons Ordinance," an order for the exile of Sun Yat-sen from Hongkong for five years, the maximum penalty under that

16) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. pp.4-5.

17) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.9.

18) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.61-62 records that Yang Ch'u-yün and Ch'en Shao-pai were also banished for a similar period. Yet Ch'en returned to the colony in 1899, and Yang in 1900, without meeting any opposition from the British authorities.



ordinance, was therefore issued on 4 March, 1896.<sup>19</sup> The Governor had further received instructions from the Colonial Office that "if any of the men had rendered themselves liable to prosecution under the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, proceedings should at once be initiated against them."<sup>20</sup> Thus the revolutionary leaders would have lost their base of activities in the colony. But the decision to bring action against their rebellious movements rested mainly with the local administrators of Hongkong, and this aspect was to play an important part in the later revolutionary movement.

From Japan, Sun had left for Hawaii in November 1895, where he remained till June 1896. So it was probably in Hawaii that Sun received news of his exile from Hongkong.

On receipt of the banishment order, Sun wrote a dignified letter to the Colonial Secretary of Hongkong, which was received in Hongkong on 20 June, 1896. In it, Sun claimed that "... the Hongkong Government have outlawed me on account of my attempt to emancipate my miserable countrymen from the cruelty of the Tartar yoke," and further stated that he would appeal to the English public and the civilised world.<sup>21</sup>

19) The ordinance is given in Sir John Carrington (ed) The Ordinances of Hongkong (Hongkong, 1904) 1, pp.370-371. Accounts of the exile are given in Endacott, op.cit. p.227; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.83; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.61-62.

20) See Memorandum by F.A. Campbell of 26 Oct. 1896, in FO 17/1718 pp.107-108; also F.O. draft to MacDonald of 16 Dec. 1896 ibid p.147.

21) Sun's letter is given in Colonial Office, General Correspondence, (Public Record Office, London) Series CO 129/283, "Governor's Dispatches and Replies from the Secretary of State for the Colonies" Black to Chamberlain, No. 144, of 18 May, 1898. I am indebted to Mr. G.B. Endacott who brought my attention to the document. Also see Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.83.




To this, the Colonial Secretary, J.H. Stewart Lockhart, replied on 4 October, 1897, making clear the stand of the Hongkong government in relation to rebellious activities directed against the Chinese government:<sup>22</sup>

"In reply to your letter, undated, I am directed to inform you that the Government has no intention of allowing the British Colony of Hongkong to be used as an asylum for persons engaged in plots and dangerous conspiracies against a friendly neighbouring Empire, and that in view of the part taken by you in such transactions, which you euphemistically term in your letter 'Emancipating your miserable countrymen from the cruel Tartar yoke,' you will be arrested if you land in this Colony, under an order of banishment issued against you in 1896."

This determination of the British government to preserve peace in the colony, however, did not completely stifle the revolutionary movement. In fact, a beneficial result of the foolhardy attempt of 1895 was to draw to the support of the movement more sympathisers from among the upper circles of the Chinese population of Hongkong. They helped to keep the movement alive after the enforced departure of its two leaders, Sun Yat-sen and Yang Ch'u-yün. It was a period of pressing financial needs, which involved the payment of the secret society members who took part in the rising, and the settlement of other Hsing Chung Hui participants who had fled to Hongkong. This responsibility was readily taken on by a handful of well-to-do merchants in the colony.

22) The letter is given in Colonial Office ibid Black to Chamberlain of 18 May, 1898, (courtesy of Mr. G.B. Endacott); also in W.P. Morgan, Triad Societies in Hongkong (Hongkong, 1960) p.64; and in Chinese translation in Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.84.



One of them was Li Chi-t'ang 李紀堂, a man of wealth and position. He was friendly with Ch'en Shao-pai and Tse Tsan-tai, and had always shown sympathy towards their revolutionary aspirations. Now, realising the difficulties of the Hsing Chung Hui, Li offered to donate large sums, and with the cooperation of Teng Yin-nan, also began operating a farm at Castle Peak in the New Territories. It was ostensibly for the purpose of breeding animals and cultivation of crops, but it really served as a spacious, out-of-the-way headquarters for the revolutionaries to hide either from British or Chinese authorities. It was also convenient for the storage of weapons and explosives.

At the same time, Li also established a grocery store, the Tsing San Chan 青山舖 at the Central Market in Hongkong, for the sale of his farm products, which were taken out every day by a special ferry between Hongkong and Castle Peak. It was a flourishing store, particularly popular among the European population, and Li contributed all the profits towards revolutionary uses.<sup>23</sup>

Another supporter was the wealthy merchant Yü Yu-chih 余育之, who became a Hsing Chung Hui member in 1895. Owner of the Yat Cheong 嘉慶 Banking House, Yü secretly spent money for the activities of the Hsing Chung Hui, which contributed to the collapse of his business in 1904.<sup>24</sup>

23) For accounts of Li, see Feng Tzu-yu, "Hsing Chung Hui shih-ch'i chih k'o-ming tung-chih" in HHKM 1, p.156; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, p.138, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih, pp.13-14; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Jen-yin Hung Ch'u-an-fu Kuang-chou chü-i chi" in HHKM 1, p.315.

24) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih, 1, p.68.




Li Yü-t'ang 李煜堂 was also a generous supporter of the revolutionaries. A native of Kwangtung, Li had gone to America at an early age, and gained experience in commercial practice. On returning to Hongkong, he established the two profitable medicine stores, the Kum Lee Yuen 金利源 and Wing Lee Yuen 永利源. After China's defeat in the war with Japan, Li realised the need of modern industrial and commercial enterprises for the Chinese. Taking the initiative, he invested in a number of successful undertakings, earning for himself the title of "Insurance king" in Hongkong society. He was a "man of broad sympathy, and every cause of good will finds him a willing supporter." His sympathy towards the cause of the Hsing Chung Hui was rendered in the form of financial assistance throughout the period before 1911.

Meanwhile after the failure of the rising, Sun Yat-sen, Ch'en Shao-pai and Cheng Shih-liang had arrived at Yokohama in November, 1895. Among the Chinese community, there was the Cantonese Feng Chin-ju 馮鏡如, an enthusiastic revolutionary sympathiser. A British subject born in Hongkong, Feng operated a flourishing stationery shop in Japan, and enjoyed much influence among the overseas Chinese. Using his influence, he enlisted a group of friends to meet Sun Yat-sen, and this led to the formation of a Hsing Chung Hui branch in Yokohama, of which Feng was made chairman.<sup>26</sup>

25) Woo Sing-lim, op.cit. 11, p.8; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.1-179.

26) Sun's activities in Japan are given in M.B. Johnson, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge, Mass. 1954) p.162; Feng Tzu-yu Hua-chiao K'o-ming kai-kuo shih, p.42; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1,



Leaving Ch'en and Cheng in Japan to maintain contact with activities in Hongkong, Sun Yat-sen then left Japan in the spring of 1896, and travelled to Hawaii. There he was disappointed to find that the 1895 failure had destroyed the morale of many Hsing Chung Hui members, and resignations from the Society were frequent.<sup>27</sup>


From Hawaii Sun departed for America in June, 1896. Making a tour of the United States, he preached revolution among the Chinese community, and especially among the local secret societies. Triad influence had followed the emigration of Chinese to America, where by 1896 it had become an integral feature of the Chinese population. Known as the I-hsing Kung-ssu 爭興公司, the Triads in America, however, had lost much of their original political tendencies, and had lapsed into a form of benevolent society for Chinese travellers abroad. Nevertheless, they were still an important source of influence among the overseas Chinese. While in Hawaii, Sun had become a member of the local Triad society, the "Kwok On Hui", which accounted for his welcome in America by their fellow society officers.<sup>28</sup>

Sun's stay in America had been viewed with interest by the

pp.63-64; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.96b-97; Wu Shou-i, op.cit. p.88; Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (Taipei, 1953) p.28; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. pp.23-24.

27) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.65; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. p.24.

28) Ku Yen-shih, Chung-kuo pi-mi she-hui shih pp.13-22; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.65-66; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih, 1, pp.38-39, 197-199; Lo Hsiang-lin, op.cit. p.29; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. pp.23-24, 7-9; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao, IV, p.1210; Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (Taiwan, 1953) pp.191-192; W.P. Morgan, op.cit. pp.50-51.




agents of the Chinese government, who were still determined to bring him to justice for his role in the Canton rising of 1895. Accordingly when he left America for England in September, 1896, this information was telegraphed from Washington to Kung Chao-yüan 蔣兆遠, the Chinese Minister in London.<sup>29</sup>

From the date of Sun's arrival in London, 1 October, 1896, his movements were therefore vigilantly spied on by detectives in the employ of the Chinese Legation. Finally, in a reckless move, the Legation attempted to kidnap him and smuggle him back to China for execution. The dramatic event lasted from 11 to 23 October, and had it not been for the interference of the British Foreign Office and two of Sun's English friends from Hongkong, the venture would have been successfully completed.

On the morning of 11 October, Sun was unknowingly walking near the Legation quarters, when he was accosted by a Chinese from his native district of Canton. Sun was engaged in conversation in the course of which he was half-persuaded and half-forced to enter the Legation. Once inside, the door was locked, and Sun was led upstairs and confined in a room.<sup>30</sup> Later he was visited by Sir Halliday Macartney, the English councillor at the Legation, and Teng Ch'in-ch'i 鄧琴齊 the official interpreter,

29) Macartney to Sanderson, in Sanderson's Memo to F. O. of 22 Oct. 1896. in FO 17/1718 pp.54-60; also see Wu Shou-i, op.cit. pp.92-100; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.66-67.

30) According to Sun's statement of 23 Oct. 1896, in FO 17/1718 pp.80-83; while Macartney gives a different version of Sun's entry into the Legation, ibid pp.69-75. Also see Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.67-68; Sun Yat-sen, op.cit. pp.33-36; Kidnapped in London pp.40-61; T'ang Chen-chü, Kuo-fu shu-hsin hsüan-chi (Taipei, 195 pp.17-18; Restarick, op.cit. p.54.




and told of the fate awaiting him.

From his prisoner's room, Sun desperately tried throwing weighted messages through the window, bribing the servants, and finally resorted to prayers. In the end he succeeded in winning the sympathy of the English housekeeper at the Legation, Mrs. George Cole. Through her, the attempt to rescue Sun Yat-sen was initiated.

In this, Dr. James Cantlie played a leading role. Dr. Cantlie had been Sun's teacher at the Hongkong College of Medicine, and had early shown an interest in Sun's medical as well as political activities. In Honolulu in November, 1895, he had accidentally met Sun, and given him his London address, to which Sun had accordingly reported upon arrival in London. After this, they were in constant contact, and Cantlie had already noticed Sun's absence from his lodgings since the 11th.

On the night of 17 October, Mrs. Cole dropped an unsigned note in the letter-box of Dr. Cantlie, informing him of Sun's plight. Alarmed, Cantlie then secured the cooperation of Dr. Patrick Manson, formerly also a practitioner and teacher at the Hongkong College of Medicine. The next day, Cantlie went to see Sir H. Macartney, but was told he was out of town. At the same time, Dr. Manson inquired at the Legation, and was denied the presence of Sun Yat-sen.

By the 19th, the British Foreign Office was supplied with all the facts of the case, which Dr. Cantlie presented in a letter, together with three communications he had received from Sun Yat-



sen, through Mrs. Cole.<sup>31</sup>

The Foreign Office was now faced with an unprecedented crisis. Before coming to an ultimate decision of policy, it had to take into consideration a number of significant factors. First of all, Sun's earlier banishment from Hongkong had suggested that the British government, though mindful of its responsibility to prevent Hongkong being made a base for Chinese revolutionary activities, was adamant in its refusal to grant extradition of Chinese political offenders. This determination had already been made clear to the Chinese government. Before the arrival of Sun in England, the Tsungli Yamen had enquired of the Foreign Office, through Sir H. Macartney, if a Chinese subject who escaped to England could be surrendered for trial in China under the Extradition Clause, article 15, of the Convention of 1 March, 1894 with Burmah. Macartney had then been told by Sir Thomas Sanderson, permanent under-secretary of state for foreign affairs (1894-1906) that it was not possible.<sup>32</sup> The kidnapping of Sun was therefore all the more to be deplored, since Macartney had certainly known that it was illegal.

Furthermore, the Foreign Office had to consider Sun's claim to British nationality. In a note to Cantlie of 19 October, Sun stated, "... I was born in Hongkong and went back to the interior of China about four or five years of age, as legally a British

31) Cantlie to Sanderson of 19 Oct. 1896 in FO 17/1718 pp.8-12, 23, 30; also see J. Cantlie and C.S. Jones, Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of China (London, 1912) pp.60-63; Sun Yat-sen, op.cit. pp.62-106; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, 67-72.

32) Sanderson Memorandum of 22 Oct. 1896 in FO 17/1718 pp.54-60.



subject. Can you get me out by that?"<sup>33</sup> This was soon proved to be fraudulent, and the British government decided to ignore Sun's contention.<sup>34</sup> It was significant that Sun seemed to have no scruples about arbitrary claims of a foreign nationality, as it could be seen again in a later phase of his revolutionary career. However, though Sun was undoubtedly a Chinese subject, there was no reason to justify his being handed over to the mercy of the Chinese government as long as he was on British soil. This would lead to an undesirable public scandal and the loss of prestige, if the matter got out and it was found that the British government had done nothing.

Therefore, upon receipt of Dr. Cantlie's letter on the morning of 19 October, the Foreign Office immediately sent an urgent dispatch to the Home Office, soliciting their views of the case.<sup>35</sup> The reply was that they considered the matter important if it was genuine.<sup>36</sup> But a decision had to be reached quickly, for Cantlie in his letter had suggested that he would reveal the facts to the press if the Chinese Legation continued to deny the presence of Sun Yat-sen.<sup>37</sup> Cantlie and Manson had also applied for a writ of Habeas Corpus and given affidavits, which had been found to be genuine as far as the facts of the case were concerned.<sup>38</sup>

33) Enclosed in Cantlie to Sanderson of 19 Oct. 1896, ibid, p.23.


34) Sanderson Memorandum to Lord Salisbury, of 22 Oct. 1896, ibid pp.33-34.

35) Bertie to Home Office (pressing) of 19 Oct. 1896, ibid pp.1

36) F.A. Campbell to Bertie of 19 Oct. ibid pp.3-5.

37) Cantlie to F.O. of 19 Oct. ibid pp.13-14.

38) Judge V.E. Digby (confidential and pressing) to Sanderson on 22 Oct. ibid pp.51-53.



With these considerations, Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister from 1895-1902, was thus urged from all sides to take immediate action. Mr. F. Bertie, assistant under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, (1894-1903), sought permission to take steps at once to watch the Legation and prevent the forceful deportation of Sun,<sup>39</sup> to which Lord Salisbury agreed.<sup>40</sup> From Sir T. Sanderson came a memorandum, "We ought not to lose time as the two doctors have sent a letter to the Inner Office which is withheld from publication, pending action by us... "<sup>41</sup> The Home Office also urged action.<sup>42</sup> At the same time, the Chief Inspector of the Metropolitan Police, F. Jarvis, reported that in an interview on 21 October with Mr. McGregor of the firm owning the "Glen" line of steamers, McGregor had stated that they had been approached by the Chinese Legation respecting the transport of a "lunatic" to China. It had only been the delay of the steamer in sailing out which prevented the negotiations from being carried through.<sup>43</sup>

Despite the indecision of the British Government, some form of action had clearly to be taken, before it should find itself involved in a public scandal and the illegal deportation of a Chinese subject who had been enjoying British protection. Therefore, by the evening of 22 October, a formal note demanding the immediate release of Sun Yat-sen was delivered to the Chinese


39) Bertie Minute of Campbell to Bertie, 19 Oct. ibid pp.3-5.

40) ibid p.5.

41) Sanderson memorandum to Salisbury of 22 Oct. ibid pp.33-34.

42) Judge Digby (confidential and pressing) to Sanderson of 22 Oct. ibid p.53.

43) Enclosed in despatch of C.S. Murdoch to Sanderson, of 24 Oct. ibid pp.93-94.



Minister, Kung Chao-yüan. The British government protested that the kidnap of Sun was "... an infraction of English law which is not covered by, and is an abuse of, the diplomatic privilege accorded to a foreign representative."<sup>44</sup>


Matters had come to a head, but the Chinese Legation hoped to stall for time. Sir Halliday Macartney was told to explain to the Foreign Office that the Legation must wait for instructions from the Tsungli-yamen before taking any steps even after receiving Lord Salisbury's note.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, it was discovered that the Legation had applied to the British High Court for an order requiring the Chinese Minister in England to bring up a Chinese subject alleged to be illegally detained at the Chinese Legation. It was thus clear that the Chinese government had no intention of surrendering Sun Yat-sen yet, without recourse to all possible means of evasion. The application, however, was denied.<sup>46</sup>

By then, the story of the kidnap was in all the English newspapers. The British government knew that it was expected to take more positive action other than diplomatic notes of protest. On 23 October, the Foreign Office let it be known to the Chinese Legation that it was prepared to take "drastic measures" in demanding the immediate release of Sun; or else the British government would be justified in securing the immediate recall of the Chinese Minister, and withdrawing diplomatic privilege from any British subject on the staff of the Legation who was

44) Salisbury to Kung Ta-jen of 22 Oct. ibid pp.24-25.

45) Sanderson memorandum of 22 Oct. ibid pp.54-60.

46) Judge Wright (confidential) to Salisbury of 23 Oct. ibid pp.64-67.



concerned in the matter.<sup>47</sup> The tone adopted by the British Government was effective. By four o'clock on the same afternoon Macartney promised that the Chinese Minister would liberate Sun on his own responsibility.<sup>48</sup> Thus, after twelve days of imprisonment, and four days of negotiations on his behalf by the British Foreign Office, Sun Yat-sen regained his freedom.

Meanwhile, in climbing down because of the strong line taken by the Foreign Office, the Chinese Legation had still hoped for British assurances that Sun would be prevented from further using Hongkong to plot conspiracies against the Chinese government. Despite Macartney's persistence, Sir Thomas Sanderson could only promise unofficially that "... it certainly was not the wish of the Government that Hongkong should be used for such a purpose ... and that ... persons suspected of such proceedings should be watched and that such measures as our law and constitutional practice permitted should be taken to prevent the accomplishment of such designs ..." <sup>49</sup> It was understandable that the British government could not allow this diplomatic victory over the Chinese Legation to be a conditional one. The demand for Sun's release had been based on a constitutional and legal stand, and any assurances of future discrimination against the treatment of Sun Yat-sen in British territory would have been tantamount to securing his freedom by bribery.

With this view in mind, it was later felt expedient that a

47) Sanderson memorandum of 23 Oct. ibid pp.69-75.

48) ibid p.75. Also see the China Mail of 26 Oct. 1896 p.2. col 6-7 for an account of Sun's kidnap and release.

49) Sanderson memorandum of 23 Oct. ibid pp.69-75.




strong remonstrance should be made to the Chinese government to prevent the repetition of such a breach of international law and usage. At this juncture, the banishment of Sun from Hongkong earlier in 1896 was brought up again. It was remembered that the banishment had followed the refusal to grant the extradition of Sun for his being a political offender. Accordingly, Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at Peking, was instructed by the Foreign Office to draft a communication to the Tsungli-yamen. MacDonald was to state that, in the absence of any treaty stipulation giving Chinese representatives in England extraterritorial jurisdiction over Chinese subjects, the detention of one, even though undoubtedly a subject of China, was a serious abuse of the privileges and immunities granted to foreign representatives. Again, the British government suggested that if such acts were persisted in or repeated, it would justify the use of "whatever measures" necessary for the release of the captive, and demand the immediate departure of the persons responsible.<sup>50</sup>

This remonstrance was duly communicated. MacDonald had also renewed the promise that the British government was prepared to prevent Hongkong being used as a base for plots against the Chinese government. He reported that Li Hung-chang had seemed satisfied.<sup>51</sup> Thus on such a note of mutual friendly guarantees for the future, the crisis over the kidnapping of Sun Yat-sen in England was passed.

50) F.O. to Macdonald of 16 Dec. 1896 ibid pp.147-150.

51) MacDonald to Salisbury of 9 Mar. 1897 ibid pp.156-157.



The British government had admittedly been taken unawares by the sudden and dramatic circumstances of the case, and indecision as to policy had been the general reaction of the Foreign Office. They had to maintain principles, yet give no cause for strained relations with the Chinese government, which was, after all, on friendly terms with Great Britain. Therefore, on the official level, the British government appeared recalcitrant in its annoyance at the Chinese violation of municipal and international law. But unofficially, it was prepared to promise that in future the Hongkong Government would carry out its share of responsibility in preserving the peace and order of the colony as well as that of the surrounding Chinese territory.

It was surely not British policy to offer unlimited protection for all Chinese political refugees on British territory. Lord Salisbury himself admitted that if the coup of Sun Yat-sen in 1895 had succeeded, "the question would have been very serious."<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, British prestige and the responsible observance of international laws had to be upheld. And for these considerations, Sun Yat-sen found himself official and personal champions in England during his short but eventful stay.

As a result, Sun gained fame and popularity among most of the English-speaking countries. The publicity made him a professional revolutionary, important both among his followers and his enemies. His banishment from Hongkong was little noticed in March, 1896. But now, with renewed attention focused on his

52) Salisbury to MacDonald of 26 Oct. 1896 ibid pp.95-97.




person, the subject was brought up again, in the British Parliament.

In the debates in the House of Commons early in 1898, questions were raised concerning the circumstances of Sun's exile from Hongkong and the attitude of the Hongkong government towards Chinese revolutionaries. It appeared that after the episode of his rescue by the Foreign Office from the Chinese Legation, public opinion in England and elsewhere was left wondering why Sun Yat-sen had earlier been banished from British colonial territory, and then five months later protected from his Chinese captors in England. The press took up the issue, and on 11 January, 1898, an article appeared in the "Evening News" in England which attacked the Hongkong government for having acted "unconstitutionally" in 1896, and contrary to "the spirit in which political offenders seek refuge in England."<sup>53</sup>

Consequently, on 5 April, 1898, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Right Hon. J. Chamberlain (1895-1903) was asked in the House of Commons upon what specific grounds had Sun been banished from Hongkong, what had been his offence against the British authority in that colony, whether he had been tried or convicted for any overt act against the laws of the colony, whether any record of such conviction had been communicated to the Colonial Office, and whether the decree of banishment issued against him in the absence of any such recorded guilt or sentence would be evoked.

53) The newspaper extract is given at the end of official correspondence concerning the kidnap case, ibid, p.163.



In his reply, Chamberlain explained that Sun had already left Hongkong in 1895. But the government of Hongkong had received information that he had been complicated in certain proceedings against the Chinese authorities in Canton, and hearing that he was likely to return to the colony, the Governor in Council had issued the order of banishment against him. Sun had not been charged with any offence against the laws of the colony. As for the possibility of a revocation of his banishment order, Chamberlain promised to make appropriate enquiries.<sup>54</sup>

Meanwhile, the Chinese government was also interested in the issue. On 21 April, the Chinese Minister in London, Lo Feng-luh 羅豐祿, approached the Foreign Office and desired to know if the banishment order against Sun was still in force.<sup>55</sup> Chamberlain had begun communications with the Officer Administering the Government of Hongkong, Major-General Black (February - November, 1898).<sup>56</sup> Soon the confirmation came from Hongkong that the decree was still active, and there was no likelihood of its being revoked.<sup>57</sup> After this, the Chinese Legation seemed satisfied at this "renewed proof of the friendly disposition of Her Majesty's Government towards China."<sup>58</sup>

Subsequently, on 18 July, 1898, in the House of Commons, Chamberlain supplemented his previous answer concerning the circumstances of Sun's banishment. This time, Chamberlain was


54) Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LVI, p.219.

55) Bertie to C.O. of 26 April, 1898 in FO 17/1718 p.166.

56) Chamberlain to Black of 12 April 1898 ibid p.169.

57) C.O. To F.O. of 21 July 1898 ibid p.171

58) Lo to Bertie of 10 August 1898 ibid p.174.




able to make a definite statement of British policy towards Chinese rebels in Hongkong. Sun, not being a natural born or naturalised British subject, had been exiled from Hongkong based on the provisions of the 1882 Ordinance,<sup>59</sup> and on the grounds that he was, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, dangerous to the peace and good order of the colony. There was no doubt that he had been implicated in the 1895 conspiracy against the Chinese government, which had therefore made his presence in Hongkong undesirable. Chamberlain thus saw no reason to interfere with the temporary prohibition of his residence in Hongkong.<sup>60</sup>

Thus British policy in Hongkong was mainly formulated with a view to preserving the stability of the colony, and at the same time remaining on friendly terms with the neighbouring Chinese government. This was inevitable, considering the fact that Hongkong's primary function as a trading mart between east and west depended on the peaceful coexistence of its heterogeneous population. This aspect of British colonial policy was to be consistently practised in the following period, as the Chinese revolutionaries gathered supporters and intensified their activities.

Sun Yat-sen meanwhile, had left England on 2 July, 1897. Passing quickly through Canada, he arrived back in Japan by

59) supra p.8

60) Parliamentary Debates Vol. LXII, p.76; also given in Chines translation in Wu Shou-i, Kuo-fu ti ch'ing-nien shih-tai pp.84-86.




late August.<sup>61</sup> Before then, Ch'en Shao-pai, who had been left in Japan to take charge of liaison with the revolutionaries in Hongkong, had been busy making contacts with the growing Chinese community in Yokohama. With the influence of Feng Chin-ju, he had similarly secured a number of important Japanese friends. Among them, three became zealous supporters of the Chinese revolutionary cause. Miyazaki Torazō was a young intellectual who imposed upon himself the task of promoting reform in all the Asian countries. His colleague in the field of research for the promotion of reforms in China was Hirayama Shū who also became impressed with the revolutionary programme of his Chinese friends. There was also Inukai Ki, a member of the Progressive Party in Japan. Through the influence of these Japanese supporters, Sun Yat-sen, after his arrival in Japan, was later taken to Tokyo and introduced to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Okuma, as well as others of the leading officials in the Japanese government.<sup>62</sup>

From these foundations, the role of Japan in the Chinese revolutionary history was gradually built. The interest of the Japanese government in the movement arose less out of purely revolutionary sympathies, than as one aspect of their foreign

61) Lo Chia-lun, Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 1, pp.75-76; T'ang Leang-li in The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution pp.25-27 gives an account of Sun's travels in Europe during this period; and H.B. Restarick, in Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China pp.55-57, an incredible account of his travelling in the Straits Settlements, and later in disguise in China.

62) M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge, Mass. 1954) pp.29, 54-58, 64-68; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.76-78.




policy of the period. Nevertheless, Japan was to become, for a time, one of the leading headquarters of the Chinese revolution.

Other areas containing overseas Chinese communities were also brought into the revolutionary movement. Yang Ch'u-yün, during his two and a half years travelling abroad, from November 1895 to March 1898, had established Hsing Chung Hui branches among the Chinese in South Africa, Singapore and the Straits Settlements. He managed also to gain the support and cooperation of the local anti-Manchu secret societies. In March, 1898, he arrived back in Hongkong, and after a meeting with Tse Tsan-tai, left for Japan to see Sun Yat-sen.<sup>63</sup>

The period after the Canton rising of 1895, despite the momentary disillusion of the unsuccessful attempt, was thus notable for the effective spread of revolutionary ideas among a wide range of Chinese communities. Much of this was achieved during their journeys abroad by the personal efforts of the two Hsing Chung Hui leaders, Sun Yat-sen and Yang Ch'u-yün. By 1898, with the heartening progress of the revolutionary movement, their differences over the chairmanship of the Society and the "presidency of the provisional government" in 1895 had been forgotten. After Yang's meeting with Sun in Yokohama in March 1898,

63) Tse Tsan-tai, The Chinese Republic, Secret History of the Revolution pp.10-13. An account of the Hsing Chung Hui branches overseas is given in Feng Tzu-yu, "Hsing Chung Hui tsu-chih shih" in Lo Chia-lun (ed), K'o-ming wen-hsien (Taiwan, 1953-1956) III, pp.322-326, 329-330.



the two men appeared to be reconciled.<sup>64</sup>


Yet it was at this time that in Hongkong a movement was being organised which in the end was to oust Yang Ch'u-yün from his chairmanship of the Hsing Chung Hui. In the autumn of 1897, Miyazaki Torazō and Mirayama Shū had been commissioned by Inukai Ki to travel and do research in China. During the course of their travels, the two Japanese had met leaders of the secret society in the Yangtze area, the Ko Lao Hui 哥老會.<sup>65</sup> In particular, they had made the friendship of one of the chiefs, the Hunanese P'i Yung-nien 普永年. P'i had earlier shown interest in the constitutional reform movement, and now had been easily converted by the Japanese to the revolutionary programme of the Hsing Chung Hui. Subsequently, he had followed the Japanese back to Yokohama, where he had been introduced to Sun Yat-sen and had joined the Hsing Chung Hui.<sup>66</sup>

Sun Yat-sen was quick to realise the importance of P'i Yung-nien's influence among the secret societies. He therefore despatched P'i and Cheng Shih-liang to Hongkong in 1898, for the

64) Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 1, p.82; Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih-yao" in Ch'en Te-yün (ed), Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu pp.105-105b.

65) An account of this society is given in Ku Yen-shih, Chung-kuo pi-mi she-hui shih pp.75-77.


66) See M.B. Jansen, op.cit. p.65; Ku Yen-shih, op.cit. pp.76-78; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, p.109; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao 1, p.20; "T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang teng-jen ch'uan-chi" in WHPF IV, p.92; Chih Kuei, "Ch'ing-tai K'ang Liang wei-hsin yün-tung yü k'o-ming-t'ang chih kuan-hsi chi ying-hsiang" in Chien-kuo Yüeh-k'an Vol.IX, No.2 (August, 1933) pp.4-5; Ch'en Shao-pai op.cit. pp.107-108, also given in HHKM 1, pp.60-61; Miyazaki Torazō, San-shih-sān nien lo-hua meng (trans. Chung-kuo yen-chih she) (Tokyo, 1943) pp.73-75.



purpose of coordinating support from all the secret societies of the Yangtze and south China areas. This meant contacts within the Ko Lao Hui and the Triad society. Ch'en Shao-pai also came to Hongkong, where he was initiated into the local Triad Society as an official.

It was at this juncture that Cheng Shih-liang and Ch'en Shao-pai must have conceived of the coup to force Yang Ch'u-yün from his position in the Hsing Chung Hui. It must be remembered that Ch'en and Cheng had been the most persistent supporters of Sun Yat-sen's candidature to the chairmanship in 1895. By using their secret society influence, and with the help of P'i Yung-nien, a meeting was arranged in November, 1899, at the Hsing Chung Hui headquarters. Representatives of the Ko Lao Hui from Hunan and Hupeh, the Triad society officials from Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and their various branch societies, were in attendance. Ch'en Shao-pai and Miyazaki Torazō presided over the convention, and in consequence, a new society was formed, the Hsing Han Hui 漢興會 (Revive Han Society).

This new society, with its strong secret society following, and under the guidance, no doubt, of Ch'en Shao-pai and Cheng Shih-liang, then elected Sun Yat-sen as president, and a chairman's seal was made for him. All this was conducted in the absence and without the knowledge of both Sun and Yang Ch'u-yün. It was then hinted to Yang that it was not possible to have two "presidents" in the revolutionary movement, and that Yang must work independently if he would not recognise Sun's



new position.<sup>67</sup>

Left with no choice, and with his revolutionary zeal much dampened after the failure of 1895, which was organised under his direction, Yang Ch'u-yün thus stated that he was willing "to sacrifice my life, let alone my position, for the good of the cause."<sup>68</sup> He therefore resigned his leadership in the Hsing Chung Hui in favour of Sun Yat-sen, and hereafter took no leading part in the revolutionary movement. His resignation was tendered while he was still in Yokohama. Significantly, shortly after Yang returned to Hongkong in January, 1900, the Hsing Han Hui was dissolved. It had outlived its usefulness. Tse Tsan-tai observing this development, therefore contended that Sun was guilty of "usurpation of Yang's position."<sup>69</sup>


Nevertheless it showed that only after 1899 was Sun Yat-sen given undisputed leadership of the revolutionary movement in Hongkong. His banishment order still prevented him from returning to the colony to direct activities, but in Japan he was kept in constant contact with events in Hongkong through Ch'en Shao-pai and his other followers.

By this time it was felt that the revolutionary movement needed an organised form of propaganda. The idea had occurred to Sun Yat-sen during his travels abroad, and on returning to

67) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.109-110; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.87-88; Ku Yen-shih, op.cit. p.78; Jansen, op.cit. p.85; Hsueh Chun-tu, "Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yün and the Early Revolutionary Movement" in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XIX, No.3, pp.313-314; T'an Yung-nien, Hsin-hai k'o-ming hui-i lu pp.85-86; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.107b-108.

68) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.16.


69) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.17.



Japan in 1897 he had begun serious discussions with Ch'en Shao-pai on the possibility of establishing a newspaper in Hongkong. It had probably been financial considerations which had prevented the plan from being immediately realised. Then, fortunately in December, 1899, Sun Yat-sen received a large donation from the Philippines' Independent Party, whom he and his Japanese friends had helped during their independence movement in the winter of 1899.<sup>70</sup> This sum was now handed to Ch'en Shao-pai, who proceeded to Hongkong to make preparations for the publication of a newspaper.

The first issue of the revolutionary journal, the Chung-kuo Jih-pao 中 國 儀 报 appeared on 1 January, 1900. Ch'en Shao-pai was appointed editor as well as director of the newspaper, while Dr. Ho Kai rendered constant indirect assistance and official advice. The offices were located at 24, Stanley Street. At first, the tone of the editorials and the contributed articles was cautious, because the revolutionaries were not certain as to the attitude of the British government in Hongkong, despite the freedom of press enjoyed by the colony. After six months, however, the newspaper became a real propaganda organ, and radical political views became one of its features. As its popularity increased among the Chinese community, it also issued a ten-day pamphlet, the Chung-kuo Hsün-pao 中 國 訓 报 which main-


<sup>70</sup>) Accounts of the Philippines' movement are given in M.B. Jansen, op.cit. pp.68-74; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.83-84; Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih pieh-lu" in Ch'en Te-yün (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu p.116; also in HKM 1, p.81



ly featured satirical treatises on existing Chinese political institutions. It soon became another propaganda tool.<sup>71</sup>

Revolutionary activity in Hongkong thus seemed well-organised by 1900. But before contemplating the perpetration of another attempt against the Chinese government, Sun Yat-sen was at this time trying to align the cooperation of K'ang Yu-wei, who had fled to Hongkong after the failure of the 1898 reform movement in China.

71) Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.117-117b; Chou Lu, op.cit. 11, p.403; R.S. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press p.113; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.98, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih p.8; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.83-84; Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu chih ta hsüeh shih-tai p.92; T'an Yung-nien, op.cit. pp.133-134.



## CHAPTER IV

### K'ang Yu-wei and the Constitutional Reform Movement in Hongkong

The "Hundred Days" reform movement had occurred in 1898.<sup>1</sup> After its failure, and the coup d'etat of September had restored the conservative clique to the government in Peking, the reformers had to flee for their lives. They looked to the south for their refuge, and Hongkong was the natural choice, particularly when K'ang Yu-wei's flight was to be facilitated by British assistance.<sup>2</sup>

By this time, the revolutionary movement had been firmly established in Hongkong. The unfortunate results of the 1898 events thus brought the Chinese reformers on to the revolutionary scene in the colony. But even before then, the leading revolutionaries had initiated attempts to align their activities with those of the constitutional reformers.

As early as 1895, Sun Yat-sen had hoped to gain the friendship and cooperation of K'ang Yu-wei. K'ang had been teaching

1) See Chapter 1, pp.17-29.  
2) See below, pp.92-94.



in Canton, while Sun had been practising medicine nearby. Sun had already known of K'ang's reform ideas, and subsequently had sent word to the scholar that he wanted to meet him. K'ang's reply had indicated that Sun could do so by formally sending in a written application as one of his potential pupils. This haughty attitude had annoyed Sun, and the two reformers had therefore not exchanged references on that occasion.<sup>3</sup>


In October, 1895, when Sun had established the Agricultural Association (Nung Hsüeh Hui) in Canton as a branch of the Hsing Chung Hui,<sup>4</sup> he had again invited K'ang Yu-wei and all his disciples to join. Ch'en Chien-chiu 陳千秋, one of K'ang's leading pupils, had seemed enthusiastic, but K'ang Yu-wei had prevented him from enlisting in Sun's movement.<sup>5</sup> Sun Yat-sen's two attempts at friendship with the reformers had thus been unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, in Hongkong, Tse Tsan-tai had also been trying to form an alliance with the reformers through K'ang Kuang-jen 康廣仁, K'ang Yu-wei's brother. Tse had met K'ang Kuang-jen and a number of other constitutional reformers at a dinner party on 21 February, 1896 at the Bun Fong Restaurant in Hongkong. A general discussion of "reform and the importance of union and cooperation" had ensued, and in the end, both Tse and K'ang had promised to consult their respective parties.

3) Feng Tzu-yu, K'uo-ming i-shih 1, p.71; Hao Yen-ping, "The Abortive Cooperation Between Reformers and Revolutionaries (1895-1900)" in Harvard University, Papers on China Vol.XV (1961) p.9.

4) See Chapter II, p.52.

5) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.71; Hao Yen-ping, op.cit. p.94.




Subsequently, on 4 October, 1896, when K'ang Yu-wei had arrived in Hongkong during the course of a journey in south China, Tse had met him at the Wai Shing Tea Shop, and they had discussed the existing political situation in China. Tse had stressed the importance of cooperation and union of all reform forces, and K'ang appeared to have been impressed.<sup>6</sup>

The friendship between Tse Tsan-tai and K'ang Kuang-jen had thus progressed, and by September, 1897, K'ang had decidedly agreed to cooperate with members of the Hsing Chung Hui. He had promised to broach the subject to his brother, and had felt that "we should get the superior men of both parties together and hold a conference. We desire to see a peaceful revolution for the good of the Empire and its millions..."<sup>7</sup> It was significant that K'ang had thought in terms of a revolution instead of merely effecting constitutional reforms, though what he meant by a peaceful revolution was not made clear.

At this juncture, however, both K'ang and Tse had contemplated amalgamation of their movements without making provisions for the role of Sun Yat-sen. It must be remembered that Yang Ch'u-yün was still chairman of the Hsing Chung Hui at that time, while K'ang Yu-wei had persistently refused to allow revolutionary influences to infiltrate into his peaceful movement for reform from above. Therefore it was not surprising that K'ang Kuang-jen had stated from the beginning, that "men like Sun

6) Hao Yen-ping, op.cit. p.94; Tse Tsan-tai, The Chinese Republic Secret History of the Revolution p.10.

7) Hao Yen-ping, op.cit. p.94; Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. pp.11-12.



Yat-sen frighten me - we cannot combine with such reckless men. Yeung Ku-wan (Yang Ch'u-yün) is a good man and I hope to meet him yet ..."<sup>8</sup>

K'ang Kuang-jen had then left for Shanghai, and on 8 November, 1897, had informed Tse by letter that he had spoken to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who had appeared to favour the idea of co-operation.<sup>9</sup> It had thus seemed possible that the representatives of the Chinese reform and revolutionary movements had arrived at some form of a rapprochement in Hongkong.

At the same time, however, events in Japan had begun to widen the breach between the two groups again. By 1897, the Chinese community in Japan had increased considerably. Therefore, in the winter of that year, Feng Chin-ju, chairman of the Hsing Chung Hui in Japan, had decided to establish a Chinese college at Yokohama. Feng had thus approached the Hsing Chung Hui headquarters in Hongkong for assistance in securing Chinese teachers for the college. Sun, however, had known that the classical scholars among the reform party were better-qualified to take up the responsibility of running a college than the revolutionaries. He had therefore written to K'ang Yu-wei, informing him of the establishment of the school, its name of "Sino-foreign College" (Chung Hsi Hsüeh-hsiao 中西學校), and its need of competent Chinese teachers.

K'ang Yu-wei had then sent Hsü Chin 徐勤 to administer the college. At the same time, he had insisted that its name

8) ibid.

9) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.12.




of Chung Hsi had not been "refined" enough, and had changed it to "Universal Harmony" (Ta-T'ung 大同). This had clearly some significance in relation to his "One-world Philosophy" (Ta-t'ung Shu 大同書) published in that same year. The college soon flourished, and though the Hsing Chung Hui had probably entertained hopes of its being a means of revolutionary propaganda among the overseas Chinese, by 1898, it had become in reality an organ of the reform party. This had contributed to ill-feelings between the two groups. The climax had come when, after K'ang's arrival in Japan in October, 1898, notices of "Not to admit Sun Wen" were posted in the school premises.<sup>10</sup>

Thus by 1898, no significant results had really been achieved in the attempts to correlate the activities of the reformers and the revolutionaries. The issue was taken up again when K'ang Yu-wei and some of his disciples sought refuge in Hongkong after the failure of the "Hundred Days" reform movement.

K'ang's flight from China into Hongkong was facilitated by the help of British authorities. As soon as he had received

10) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.71; Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih-yao" in Ch'en Te-yün (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu pp.101-101b, 104b-105; also given in HHKM 1, pp. 53-54; Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih 1, p.209; Hao Yen-ping, op.cit. p.95; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 1, pp.78-79; Wang Ch'i-chu (ed) "Ching-shih ta-hsüeh-t'ang chi ch'i-t'a hsüeh-t'ang" in WHPF 1V, pp.517-520; Chih Kuei, "Ch'ing-tai K'ang-Liang wei-hsin yün-tung yü k'o-ming-t'ang chih kuan-hsi chi ying-hsiang" in Chien-kuo Yueh-k'an Vol.IX, No.2 (August 1933) p.5.



the two warning edicts from the emperor,<sup>11</sup> K'ang prepared to flee. He first approached the Rev. T. Richard to seek the assistance of the British Minister at Peking on behalf of the reformers, and he had seemed incredibly optimistic that British interference would easily reinstate the Chinese Emperor and restore his reform edicts.<sup>12</sup> But before Richard could see the Minister, events in Peking were gathering momentum, and K'ang feared for his life. He immediately boarded a train from Peking to Tientsin, travelling in disguise, and then transferred to the Taikoo steamer "Chungking", which was bound for Shanghai.


Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities had got wind of his flight. At Wusung on 23 September, they instigated a search of in-coming vessels, including the British steamer "El Dorado". The British reaction to this was none too friendly.<sup>13</sup> This was especially aggravated when it was learnt that the man the Chinese were looking for was the leader of the reform party involved in the famed coup d'etat of September, 1898. Once again it became a question of British championship of political offenders fleeing Chinese persecution.

Bourne, the British Consul-general at Shanghai, then took upon himself the responsibility of protecting K'ang Yu-wei from his Chinese captors. He urged the Admiralty for cooperation,

11) See Chapter 1, p.27.

12) Translation of a letter from K'ang to Richard, enclosed in Brenan to F.O. No.28 of 26 Sept. 1898 in FO 17/1718 pp.180-182.

13) K'ang Yu-wei, Nan-hai K'ang hsien-sheng tzu-pien nien-p'u p.26b; W.E. Soothill, Timothy Richard of China (London, 1924) p.240; E. MacGregor (Commander-in-chief, H.M. Ships, China) to F.O. of 30 Nov. 1898 in FO 17/1718 p.194.



prepared to resort to strong action if the Chinese continued to interfere, and in his enthusiasm, even informed the Admiralty that "the man was under the protection of our flag when the coup took place."<sup>14</sup> This was obviously not true.


When the "Chungking" came into Shanghai, Bourne went aboard and located K'ang by the guidance offered by a photograph of the Chinese reformer. K'ang was then secretly transferred to the P.O. liner "Balaarat," which, under the convoy of a British man-of-war, the "Bonadventure," set sail for Hongkong.<sup>15</sup> During an interview with Bourne on the liner of 25 September, K'ang again stressed his belief that British help seemed the only source of redemption for China. He even went so far as to suggest that two hundred British troops would be enough to restore the Emperor Kuang Hsü. The effect of the discussion was to convince the Consul-general that though K'ang was a "visionary," he had committed no crime, and that the installation of the Empress Dowager in the government of China was "a retrograde step."<sup>16</sup>

Bourne had accordingly pressed his views home to the British government, and from then on, K'ang Yu-wei was assured of British protection during the period of his stay in Hongkong.

14) MacGregor to F.O. of 30 Nov. 1898 *ibid* pp.196-197.

15) See extract from the "Chung-wai Jih-pao" of 25 Sept. 1898, in WHPF 111, pp.417-419; M.E. Cameron, The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912 p.51; M.E. Tsur, "K'ang Yu-wei" in Hankow Club Collected Papers Vol.39, p.4; H.B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire 1, p.145.

16) Consul Bourne's conversation with K'ang, enclosed in Brenan to F.O. No.28 of 26 Sept. 1898 in FO 17/1718 pp.183-191.



He arrived on the evening of 30 September, 1898, and was met by representatives of the Hongkong government at Quarry Bay. He was then given lodgings within the central government offices compound, and was provided with a constant police guard. He appeared to be "in a state of nervous prostration" on his arrival, as a local newspaper reported.<sup>17</sup> K'ang was thus careful to refuse all visitors, except for two interviews with Lord Charles Beresford and a "China Mail" reporter. From his statements, it was evident that K'ang still seemed hopeful of the future of reform for China.<sup>18</sup>

As for the revolutionary group in Hongkong, the arrival of K'ang Yu-wei in 1898 was viewed with renewed interest. It was true that earlier attempts to gain his support for a united movement had been fruitless. But the failure of the "Hundred Days" reform effort, and K'ang's present status of a political refugee in the colony, suggested that he would be more susceptible to the idea of a revolution first before reforms could be effected. They calculated that K'ang too, would have lost hope in the wisdom of reform by constitutional means.

Ch'en Shao-pai was the first to try and approach K'ang in Hongkong. Ch'en had earlier known K'ang when they had both

17) K'ang Yu-wei, op.cit. 1, p.27; extracts from the "Shen Pao" of 5 Oct. 1898 in WHPF 111, p.435; the China Mail of 30 Sept. 1898 p.3 col.2-4.

18) See Lord C. Beresford, The Break-up of China (London, 1899) pp.196-199; P. Landon, "An Interview with Hong Yau-wei" in the China Mail of 7 Oct. 1898 p.3 col.1-6; H.B. Morse, op.cit. 1, p.145; Mei Ying, "Wu-hsü cheng-pien chen-wen" in Jen-wen Yüeh-k'ian Vol.VII, No.10 (Dec, 1936) pp.1-6.




been in Shanghai in 1895.<sup>19</sup> Recently returned from Japan, Ch'en Shao-pai had also brought with him a letter from Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, with whom he had been discussing the favourable effects of cooperation. K'ang Yu-wei, however, refused to see Ch'en. Instead, he sent three of his disciples, with the instructions that they were to transmit to him whatever business Ch'en had desired to discuss with himself. When asked if the three have been authorised to make any decisions, however, they confessed that they were only to act as messengers. Ch'en therefore knew that it was really futile to persist in courting K'ang's cooperation. He concluded that K'ang had never really wanted to work with the revolutionaries.<sup>20</sup>

Miyazaki Torazō, the Japanese revolutionary supporter, appeared to have better results, in that he managed to have several interviews with K'ang Yu-wei during his stay in Hong-kong. K'ang's followers also frequently came to see Miyazaki, and he impressed on them the impossibility of trying to reform China by peaceful means. The Japanese was particularly eager to make K'ang join the revolutionary camp, now that the constitutional movement had collapsed. But K'ang had mistrusted Miyazaki from the start, because of his liaison with the Hsing Chung Hui, and therefore refused to listen to his advice. Miyazaki did not despair, and on learning that K'ang intended going to Japan, where Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had fled, he even helped

19) Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.101-101b.

20) Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.108b-109; also given in HHKM 1, p.63.




to secure for him the necessary papers from the Japanese consul. Finally, on 19 October, 1898, he sailed with K'ang Yu-wei to Japan, where he hoped to bring K'ang into contact with Sun Yat-sen.<sup>21</sup>

As soon as K'ang Yu-wei arrived in Japan, therefore, Sun Yat-sen wished to call on him, thinking also that the failure of the reform movement would have made K'ang more willing to join forces with the revolutionaries. K'ang however, still refused to see Sun.<sup>22</sup> The Japanese were disappointed to find the Chinese patriots thus divided, Miyazaki Torazō and Hirayama Shū subsequently arranged a meeting for Sun, K'ang, Ch'en Shao-pai (who had also arrived in Japan) and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. On the appointed day, all of them came to the meeting, except K'ang Yu-wei, with an unconvincing excuse. No decisions could therefore be made. The next day, another Japanese revolutionary supporter, Inukai Tsuyoshi, accompanied Ch'en Shao-pai to call on K'ang Yu-wei. They too, failed to convince K'ang of the feasibility of cooperating with the Hsing Chung Hui. K'ang remained stubbornly loyal to the Emperor Kuang Hsü, and explained that personal gratitude to the Emperor prevented him joining any movement harmful to his person.<sup>23</sup>

21) K'ang Yu-wei, op.cit. I, p.29; Miyazaki Torazō (trans. Chung-kuo yen-chiu-she) San-shih-san-nien lo-hua meng (Tokyo)(1943) pp.58-63; M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen pp.76-77; the China Mail of 20 Oct. 1898 p.3 col.1.

22) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, pp.73-75; Jansen, op.cit. p.80; Li Chien-nung, op.cit. I, p.209; Miyazaki Torazō, op.cit. pp.64-65.

23) Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.106-107; also in HKKM, I, pp.57-59; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, p.82; Chih Kuei op.cit. pp.7-8.




After this, there was no more the revolutionaries could do. Cooperation with the reformers seemed impossible as long as K'ang Yu-wei remained their leader. Perhaps Yang Ch'u-yün, in a letter from Yokohama dated 6 June, 1899, summed up the situation correctly:<sup>24</sup>

"Hong's (K'ang's) party are too proud and jealous of our Chinese-English scholars. They don't like to have the same rank as us; they always aspire to governing us or want us all to submit to them .... It has all been a game of selfish political chess and scheming to become top dog!"

But soon K'ang Yu-wei left Japan for Canada, Hongkong and Singapore, to rally overseas support for the Society for the Protection of the Emperor (Pao Huang T'ang 保皇黨) which he had established in 1898 after the coup d'etat.<sup>25</sup> With his departure the cooperation movement took on new hope. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had already shown strong tendencies towards the programme of the revolutionary party, and now he was freed from the dominating influence of his tutor, K'ang Yu-wei. He began to be seen constantly in the company of Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries, and preparations were actually made for the amalgamation of the two groups. Sun was to be president of the federation, and Liang vice-president. Ch'en Shao-pai and Hsü Chin were to draft the regulations. K'ang Yu-wei was then informed of these activities by a letter from thirteen of his students, who also explained that if the Emperor were popular

24) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. pp.14-15.

25) For accounts of the society see "Pao Huang T'ang" in Hu Ssu ching (comp.) "Kuo-wen Pei-ch'eng" in WHPF IV, pp.278-279; Tseng Yu-hao, Modern Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy p.61; M.E Cameron, op.cit. p.183; Tsur, op.cit. p.5.




enough, he could still be elected president of the future Chinese Republic for which they proposed to strive together with the revolutionary party.<sup>26</sup>

Hsu Chin, however, was never wholly reconciled to the idea of a revolution. With another reformer, Mo Meng-hua 摩孟華 he now sent a secret despatch to K'ang, objecting to the cooperation plans, and claiming that Liang was "falling into Sun's pit," and must be rescued at once.

On receipt of the two letters, K'ang Yu-wei was enraged, and immediately sent Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to Hawaii to form a branch of the Pao Huang T'ang. This was meant to wrench Liang away from the revolutionary influences in Japan, and it was effective. Before departure, however, Liang had obtained a letter of introduction from Sun to meet his brother Sun Mei in Hawaii. With this, Liang was able to gain adherents and financial support for the Pao Huang T'ang, and misled many of the overseas Chinese that his movement was being sanctioned by Sun Yat-sen. This caused the gradual drifting apart of even Sun Yat-sen and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and the cooperation movement was doomed.<sup>27</sup>

The failure of the constitutional reformers and revolutionaries to work together had thus depended much on the social and ideological differences between Sun Yat-sen and K'ang Yu-wei. K'ang, a renowned classical scholar, and a minor official who had enjoyed the rare distinction of sending in memorials direct

26) Li Chien-nung, op.cit. 1, p.209; Hao Yen-ping, op.cit. p.1  
Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 11, pp.31-35; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.8  
27) Li Chien-nung, op.cit. 1, pp.209-210; Hao Yen-ping, op.cit.  
p.101; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.88-89; Chih Kuei op.cit. p.8



to the throne, had been emotionally attached to the person of Emperor Kuang Hsü. He had therefore logically looked down upon the anti-Manchu rebel Sun Yat-sen, with his western medical education and secret society following.<sup>28</sup> Sun had considered himself one of "Four Brigands," while K'ang saw himself a "saint."<sup>29</sup> Sun's republicanism had also stood opposed to K'ang's constitutional monarchism, and neither had been prepared to give up his political ideal.<sup>30</sup>

In Liang Ch'i-ch'ao we have a more realistic and practical reform thinker.<sup>31</sup> Though uncertain that China had needed a "revolution" after 1898, he had admitted that "revolutionary changes" (pien k'o 变革) had been called for.<sup>32</sup> Liang had therefore been veering gradually towards the programme of the revolutionaries, before his tutor stopped him in time.<sup>33</sup>

28) See A.S. Waley, The Re-making of China (London, 1914) p.83; E.R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western World pp.86-87; Li Chien-nung, op.cit. I, pp.173-174; Hao Yen-ping, op.cit. pp.96-98; M.B. Jansen, op.cit. pp.78-81.

29) Li Chien-nung, op.cit. I, p.174.

30) Wu Tse, K'ang Yu-wei yù Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Shanghai, 1948) p.16; Tseng Yu-hao, op.cit. p.51; Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih pp.700-702; also see K'ang Yu-wei, (trans. L.G. Thompson) Ta T'ung Shu (London, 1958) and P.M.A. Linebarger, Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen (London, 1937).

31) S.Y. Teng and J.K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West pp.27, 220; Hughes, op.cit. p.124; Tseng Yu-hao, op.cit. pp.61-62; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.93.

32) Wu Tse, op.cit. p.89.

33) Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, op.cit. pp.734-735; R.S. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press p.118; Hao Yen-ping, op.cit. pp.98-99; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.109, also given in HHKM I, p.59; Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien III, pp.291-292; R. Scalapino and H. Schiffrin, "Early Socialist Currents in the Chinese Revolutionary Movement: Sun Yat-sen versus Liang Ch'i-ch'ao" in Journal of Asian Studies Vol.XVIII, No.3 (May, 1959) pp.321-342.



K'ang Yu-wei, meanwhile, continued travelling in Canada and America. In October, 1899, he arrived in Hongkong again.<sup>34</sup> His earlier stay of 1898 in the colony had been short and quiescent, and the Chinese government had made no representations to the British authorities who sheltered him. But by 1899, the growth of his Pao Huang T'ang, and the popularity with which he had been welcomed by the overseas Chinese during his journey abroad, had alarmed the government of the Empress Dowager. It was now determined to secure his arrest.

The revolutionaries in Hongkong however, now seemed disinterested in winning the alliance of K'ang Yu-wei. If anything, he was now regarded with animosity, for the Pao Huang T'ang had begun to rival the Hsing Chung Hui in soliciting financial support from the overseas Chinese communities. One of the ulterior motives behind the establishment of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao in Hongkong had been to counter the constitutional propaganda of the reformers.<sup>35</sup>

By this time, also, the governorship of Hongkong had passed into the hands of Sir Henry Blake (1898-1903). From the first, Blake was determined that the sovereignty of Hongkong in its treatment of citizens from friendly nations should not be undermined. He believed that as long as these visitors had not violated the laws of the colony, they should be given safe residen-

34) K'ang Yu-wei, Nan-hai K'ang hsien-sheng tzu-pien nien-p'u, 11, p.2b.

35) See Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih pieh-lu" in Ch'en Te-yün (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu p.117.



tial rights. Blake therefore strove to counter the efforts of the Chinese government to capture K'ang, and his policy of protection was to involve the British government in a dispute with the Chinese authorities over the presence of K'ang Yu-wei in Hongkong in 1899.

On 6 December, 1899, the Chinese Minister in London, Lo Feng-luh, presented a diplomatic note to the British Foreign Office demanding the expulsion of K'ang Yu-wei from Hongkong. It protested that Hongkong was being made a pied-a-terre by Chinese malcontents, and quoted as example the Taiping rebellion which had its seeds in the colony. Taking advantage of K'ang's recent sojourn in Japan and the United States, the Chinese government also claimed that both the Japanese and American governments had refused asylum for K'ang Yu-wei.<sup>36</sup> This was quickly found by the Foreign Office to be erroneous.<sup>37</sup> The Chinese Minister also attempted to draw upon the precedent of Sun Yat-sen's banishment from Hongkong in 1896, as justification for a similar demand in the case of K'ang Yu-wei.<sup>38</sup>


At this point, the British government made it clear that Sun Yat-sen had undoubtedly been a rebel against the existing government of China, while K'ang had been the confidant of the Emperor of China.<sup>39</sup> Thus, on this basis alone, the Foreign Office was unwilling to concede to the Chinese demand without

36) Lo Feng-luh to Salisbury of 6 Dec. 1899 in FO 17/1718 pp.199-201.

37) Campbell Minute of 6 Dec. 1899, ibid pp.203-205.

38) Sanderson Memorandum of 8 Dec. 1899, ibid pp.207-208.

39) Campbell Minute of 6 Dec, and draft to C.O. of 12 Dec. 1899, ibid pp.203-205.



hearing first the view of the local administrators in Hongkong.

When told of the Chinese note, Sir Henry Blake emphatically pointed out that the Hongkong government objected strongly to the banishment of K'ang Yu-wei, because he had been living a retired life since his arrival in the colony. Besides, he had done nothing to violate any of the terms of the existing Banishment Ordinance of Hongkong.<sup>40</sup> Blake therefore continued to offer protection to K'ang.

Soon, however, complications arose which tended to prolong Sino-British negotiations over K'ang's refuge in the colony. During the difficulties that ensued, Sir Henry Blake consistently advocated championship of the Chinese reformer, until the wider questions of international law and diplomatic relations with the Chinese Empire forced the Foreign Office to override some of the views presented by the Colonial Office.

It was learned that on 20 December, 1899, the Chinese government had issued a decree for the capture of the Chinese reformers K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and rewards were offered for either their arrest or assassination. It was also found that Li Hung-chang had recently been appointed Commercial High Commissioner, and then acting Viceroy of Canton.

As soon as this information was relayed to Hongkong, Sir H. Blake immediately protested that, knowing full well K'ang's presence in Hongkong, the Chinese offer of a reward for his assassination was tantamount to inciting murder in a British

40) Blake to Chamberlain of 17 Dec., enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 21 Dec. 1899, ibid p.217.



colony. It would mean, according to Blake, either serious expenses in, or complete abandonment of, the British duty to ensure the safety of law-abiding visitors to the colony.<sup>41</sup> Besides, the appointments of Li Hung-chang at this particular moment appeared that they were intended to afford him better opportunity in capturing K'ang Yu-wei.<sup>42</sup> J. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, therefore requested that the Foreign Office should draft a formal protest to the Chinese government.<sup>43</sup>

The Colonial Office had thus brought the attention of the Foreign Office to the implications of the Chinese measures against the reformers. Feelings were aroused, and there was talk of making an immediate draft to Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at Peking, that the British government intended to hold the Chinese government responsible for the kidnap or assassination of K'ang Yu-wei in Hongkong, and that a request for the withdrawal of the offer of reward should be made.<sup>44</sup> It was only the diplomatic insight of Lord Salisbury which prevented such a despatch being made. Lord Salisbury felt that it was hardly the business of the British government to interfere with the issue of decrees by the Chinese authorities.<sup>45</sup>


41) Blake to Chamberlain of 25 Dec. 1899, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 26 Dec. 1899, ibid p.226; the decree is given in Lin Shu-hui (ed) "Shang-yü san-i-liu t'iao" in WHPF II, pp.115-116.

42) MacDonald to Salisbury No.348 (confidential) of 22 Dec. 1899, ibid pp.218-220.

43) C.O. to F.O. (pressing) of 26 Dec. 1899 in E0 17/1718 p.225.

44) Bertie Minute of C.O. to F.O. of 26 Dec. 1899, ibid p.226.

45) Salisbury Minute of C.O. to F.O. of 26 Dec. 1899, ibid p.226.



With this restraint, Foreign Office opinion changed, and it was decided that if Hongkong continued to be used as a base for intrigues against the Chinese government in the south, it would indeed be "hard on the Chinese government." It was thus felt that K'ang should be persuaded to leave Hongkong of his own will and that it was perhaps "better to please the Chinese government in this case than Sir Henry Blake."<sup>46</sup> This met with Salisbury's approval, and it was suggested to the Colonial Office that K'ang should be induced to depart for Singapore.<sup>47</sup>

By this time, K'ang Yu-wei himself was already thinking of leaving Hongkong for Singapore.<sup>48</sup> The fact that the British sanctioned his removal to Singapore, which was another British colony, suggested that the British government had no real objection to harbouring Chinese political refugees, as long as they were far enough removed from Chinese territory to avoid risks of disturbances.

This, however, failed to satisfy the Chinese government. K'ang arrived in Singapore on 31 January, 1900, and the Chinese Minister in London was informed of this.<sup>49</sup> His reaction was another protest, that K'ang had only moved from one British colony to another, and he again demanded K'ang's banishment from Singapore.<sup>50</sup> This time, however, the Foreign Office would

46) Bertie Memorandum to Salisbury of 26 Dec. 1899, ibid pp.227-229.

47) F.O. to C.O. (immediate and confidential) of 29 Dec. 1899, ibid pp.230-231.

48) K'ang Yu-wei, op.cit. 11, p.3; Blake tel. to Chamberlain of 10 Jan. 1900, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. (confidential) of 11 Jan. 1900 in FO 17/1718 p.241.

49) Swettenham tel. to F.O. of 28 Jan. 1900, ibid p.243; F.O. to Lo Feng-luh of 3 Feb. 1900, ibid p.248.

50) Lo Feng-luh to Salisbury of 7 Feb. 1900, ibid pp.254-255.



not interfere, "unless he was guilty of illegal acts."<sup>51</sup> K'ang was therefore given similar protection by the Singapore government as he had enjoyed in Hongkong.

In the main, K'ang Yu-wei's two visits to Hongkong in 1898 and 1899 had been fruitless as far as the promotion of his Pao Huang T'ang was concerned.<sup>52</sup> His relations with the revolutionary party also remained hostile, which was to culminate in a positive breach of friendship in 1900. Meanwhile, however, the British government had to continue exchanges with the Chinese government over the question of the sanctity of British colonial possessions, which was brought out into the open by K'ang's flight into Hongkong.

Guided by Sir Henry Blake's policy of protection of Chinese reformers, the Colonial Office began to urge the Foreign Office that a protest should be made to the Chinese government against the offer of a reward for K'ang's capture, since it was still an incentive to assassination while K'ang remained on British soil.<sup>53</sup> The Colonial Office further requested that if K'ang was molested while he was at Singapore, which was so far removed from China, Britain should take a serious view of the matter.<sup>54</sup>


Lord Salisbury was at first reluctant to enlarge the issue

51) Salisbury Minute of above, 11 Feb. 1900, ibid p.255.

52) Huang Fu-luan, Hua-chiao yù chung-kuo k'o-ming (Hongkong, 1955) p.56.

53) C.O. to F.O. of 2 Jan. 1900, in FO 17/1718 p.232; C.O. to F.O. (confidential) of 11 Jan. 1900, ibid p.240; C.O. to F.O. (confidential) of 29 Jan. 1900, ibid p.244.

54) C.O. to F.O. (immediate and confidential) of 8 Feb. 1900, ibid p.255.



by attaching too much importance to the person of one Chinese reformer. But the Colonial Office persisted in its demands, and finally Lord Salisbury instructed that Sir C. MacDonald should be told to draft a protest, "but without any threat."<sup>55</sup>

Up to this time, Foreign Office policy had been directed mainly by the stipulations of the Colonial Office and the governor of Hongkong. There had been no real knowledge of the significance of their diplomatic measures when they were received by the Chinese government. Now Sir Claude MacDonald submitted <sup>two</sup> despatches which gave greater insight to the matter of K'ang Yu-wei, and helped the Foreign Office to come to a definite stand in regard to the demands of the Colonial Office as well as the activities of the Chinese government. It was clear that British policy had fluctuated with each despatch that came in.

Sir Claude MacDonald reported in the first letter that on 14 February, 1900, the Chinese government had posted another decree for the capture of K'ang Yu-wei, dead or alive. The reward offered had amounted to 100,000 taels, nearly £15,000. He therefore pointed out that it would have been practically impossible to get the Chinese government to withdraw an Imperial decree, and by now it was a question of two decrees. He also thought that the Chinese government was not doing anything out of the way in trying to capture K'ang, who, according to Chinese

55) Salisbury Minute of C.O. to F.O. of 1 Feb. 1900, ibid p.24  
F.O. to MacDonald Tel.No.16 of 5 Feb. 1900, ibid p.249.



laws, was a real traitor of the worst sort.<sup>56</sup>

In the second letter Sir C. MacDonald gave an account of an interview with Li Hung-chang, to whom he had protested against the decrees. He realised afterwards that as long as the Empress Dowager remained in power, no official in the government would even dare suggest that an Imperial decree be withdrawn. MacDonald therefore concluded that only by a display of force, such as "a concentration of the fleet followed by actively hostile measures," could the British hope to make their protest effective.<sup>57</sup>

For the first time, the Foreign Office was fully conscious of the gravity of the situation. It was immediately decided that Britain wanted no war with China over K'ang Yu-wei, and it was felt that MacDonald had "saved us from a difficult impasse into which the insistence of the Colonial Office would have led us."<sup>58</sup> MacDonald was accordingly told to regard the previous instructions of demanding the withdrawal of the decrees as suspended.<sup>59</sup> The Colonial Office was informed of the turn of events, and it finally requested that K'ang should be given police protection as long as he remained in Singapore.<sup>60</sup> This Lord Salisbury agreed to.<sup>61</sup>

56) Extract of private letter from MacDonald to F.O. of 15 Feb. 1900, ibid pp.261-262, 259-260. See Lin Shu-hui (ed) "Shang-yü San-i-liu t'iao" in WHPF 11, p.117 for the decree.


57) MacDonald to Salisbury No.36 (confidential) of 16 Feb. 1900 in FO 17/1718 pp.264-271.

58) Campbell Minute of above, 16 Feb. 1900, ibid p.271.

59) F.O. Tel. to MacDonald No.24 of 22 Feb. 1900, ibid p.279.

60) C.O. to F.O. (secret) of 20 Feb. 1900, ibid p.276.

61) F.O. to C.O. (secret and immediate) of 22 Feb. 1900, ibid p.277.



Events, however, had happened in Singapore which tended to increase the consternation of Sir Frank Swettenham, governor of Singapore and Penang, at having K'ang Yu-wei on his hands. On 1 February, 1900, the Acting Consul-general for China had handed to Swettenham a demand of the Chinese Minister in London for the banishment of K'ang from Singapore. When it had been explained that K'ang had not violated against any of the terms of the Banishment Ordinance, the demand had been mysteriously withdrawn the next day.<sup>62</sup> Now, rumours were rife in Singapore that a number of assassins had left Peking to seek K'ang in Singapore, that a revolution would soon occur in China, and that K'ang had been joined by another reformer, Dr. Yung Wing.<sup>63</sup> Swettenham's attempts to persuade K'ang to leave Singapore for his own safety failed to move the Chinese reformer.<sup>64</sup> In desperation Swettenham even contemplated a plan of secretly removing K'ang Yu-wei himself.<sup>65</sup> Finally, on 8 March, 1900, a proclamation was issued in the "Straits Times" in which the viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi (Li Hung-chang) had offered 40,000 taels for the capture of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. This was in addition to the 100,000 taels already offered by the Empress Dowager, making a total of 140,000 taels. The Shanghai

62) Swettenham to Chamberlain (secret) of 3 Feb., enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 13 Mar. 1900, ibid pp.288-289.

63) Swettenham Tel. to F.O. of 29 Mar. 1900, ibid p.309; Swettenham to Salisbury (secret) of 29 Mar. 1900, ibid pp.310-313.

64) D.O. to F.O. (secret) of ? Mar. 1900, with enclosures, ibid pp.298-300.

65) Swettenham to Lucas (private) of 24 Feb. 1900, ibid pp.301-306.



magistrate had also offered 5,000 taels for the capture of each.<sup>66</sup> Sir F. Swettenham therefore urged the Foreign Office to protest.<sup>67</sup>

By this time, however, the Foreign Office had already decided that unless Britain was prepared to resort to "a display of force" for them, the Chinese reformers must fend for their own safety. The offer of police protection, as was given to K'ang Yu-wei in Hongkong and Singapore, was the limit to which the British government was prepared to go. Besides, as the Tsungli-yamen had earlier explained to Sir Claude MacDonald, the offers of reward for the capture of the reformers had been addressed solely to the people of the Chinese Empire, and that K'ang Yu-wei would have been safe as long as he remained on British territory.<sup>68</sup> Swettenham was therefore told that "the Foreign Office can do nothing more for K'ang Yu-wei's protection."<sup>69</sup>

Yet the refuge afforded by the British government during 1898-1900 in Hongkong and Singapore had helped K'ang over a critical period. By this time, Hongkong and, to a lesser extent, Singapore, had become well-established revolutionary centres, and K'ang could hardly hope to gain many adherents for his Pao

66) Swettenham to Chamberlain (secret) of 10 Mar., enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 9 Apr. 1900, ibid p.318.


67) Tel. from Swettenham, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. (secret and immediate) of 13 Mar. 1900, ibid pp.286-287.

68) MacDonald to Salisbury No.41 (confidential) of 1 Mar. 1900, ibid pp.280-285.

69) Campbell Minute of Lucas to Campbell (private) of 16 Apr. 1900, ibid p.319.



Huang T'ang. But after 1900, pressure for his capture eased, as the Empress Dowager was concerned with other more momentous events in China.



## CHAPTER V

### The Waichow Rising of 1900 and the Canton Attempt of 1903

By 1900, the Hsing Chung Hui in Hongkong had gained stability as a revolutionary society, and the sympathetic attitude of many of the influential Chinese residents towards its programme had been encouraging. It had also attracted to its support large numbers of secret society adherents from the surrounding Chinese countryside. It was thus felt by the Hsing Chung Hui leaders that another armed attempt should be made against the Chinese government in the south.

° This attitude was further stimulated by events in China at this time. In 1900, the Boxer rebellion broke out in the northern provinces, and resulted in the invasion of China by the combined armies of eight foreign nations.<sup>1</sup> The attention of the Manchu government was thus expected to centre on activities in the north, and this presented the revolutionaries in

1) See Chapter 1, p.30.




Hongkong with an opportunity which "ought not to be lost."<sup>2</sup>

Before the revolutionaries in Hongkong had begun seriously to plot an insurrection, however, they were confronted in June, 1900, by an unusual proposition. Li Hung-chang, then viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, suddenly communicated with Sun Yat-sen, who was in Japan, and invited him to Canton for an interview. The viceroy presented Sun with a scheme of cooperation to secure the freedom of southern China from the Boxer disorders. He proposed that a force from the south should march to Peking, defeat the Boxers, and remove the Emperor and Empress Dowager from the influence of the reactionary party. If the Emperor and the Empress Dowager were dead by then, Li was prepared to declare the independence of the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and, with Sun Yat-sen's assistance, make them a separate principality.<sup>3</sup>

The receipt of such a proposal at this opportune moment, when the revolutionaries were themselves thinking of perpetrating a movement in the south, must have been heartening. On the other hand, Sun Yat-sen did not trust Li Hung-chang enough to risk his neck by going to the Canton yamen for the interview.

2) Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary, p.195; Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-chuan" in Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien 111, pp.378-379 explains that the Hsing Chung Hui sought only to use the opportunity presented by the Boxer rebellion, and had never contemplated aligning its activities with the northern rebels.

3) M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen p.86; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-tzu Waichow ch'i-i chi" in HHKM 1, p.235; Tel. from Blake to Chamberlain of 13 July 1900, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. (secret) of 13 July, 1900 in FO 17/1718 p.330; extract from the "Straits Free Press" of 2 August 1900, ibid p.338.




He therefore embarked for Hongkong, with Yang Ch'u-yün, Cheng Shih-liang, Miyazaki Torazō, Hirayama Shū, and two other Japanese.

Sun Yat-sen could not land in Hongkong, since the banishment order against him was still effective. He therefore remained on board the "Nippon Maru" when it arrived on 18 June, and sent his Japanese friends to meet Li Hung-chang's deputy, Liu Hsüeh-hsün 劉學詢. As a result of the meeting, it was decided that they should also approach K'ang Yu-wei's group of reformers, and work for a united movement. Though relations between reformers and revolutionaries had become strained by 1900, the prospects of an attempt to shake off Manchu rule at least in the south, had appealed sufficiently to the revolutionaries to try and seek K'ang's cooperation once more. The three Japanese, Miyazaki, Uchida and Kiyofuji, were thus sent to see K'ang Yu-wei in Singapore, while Sun went on to Saigon.<sup>4</sup>

Even before then, however, some of the revolutionaries in Hongkong felt that, in the event of Li Hung-chang's proposals being genuine, it would be wise if they could also have the support of the British government of Hongkong in the movement. This attitude was initiated by Dr. Ho Kai, and it immediately met with approval from the Hsing Chung Hui leaders. Consequently, a petition in English was drafted and sent to Sir Henry Blake, governor of Hongkong. It denounced the corrupt and inefficient

4) Li Hung-chang, Li Wen Chung Kung ch'üan-chi (1905) "Tien Kao" ch'dan 22, p.26b; Jansen, op.cit. pp.87-88; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-min i-shih IV, p.96; Hu Ch'u-fei, Tsung-li shih-lueh, pp.50-51.



rule of the Manchus in China, and advocated the establishment of a new federal government in the south, with a six-point programme of innovations. It thus appealed to the Hongkong government for help, or at least neutrality in case of a revolt. The petition was signed by Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yün, Ch'en Shao-pai, Cheng Shih-liang, Tse Tsan-tai, Teng Yin-nan, Shih Chien-ju, and Li Chi-t'ang.<sup>5</sup>

It was significant that in this move to secure the cooperation of the British government, the leading influence was that of Dr. Ho Kai, who personally drafted the petition, though he did not sign it. Being the Chinese representative on the Legislative Council of the colony, he therefore was best able to judge the attitude of the British authorities.

Meanwhile, in relation to a settlement of the Boxer crisis, the Peking court had begun negotiations with the allied powers, and the experience of Li Hung-chang in foreign diplomacy was urgently needed. Despatches were therefore sent to urge his return to Peking.<sup>6</sup> At first Li Hung-chang hesitated. One of his reasons had probably been uncertainty about the possible

5) Sun Yat-sen, op.cit. p.196; M.B. Jansen, op.cit. pp.86-91; Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu chih-ta-hsueh shih-tai p.82, Kuo-fu yü Ou-Mei chih yü-hao (Taipei, 1951) pp.86-91; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.77, IV, pp.92-96; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao I, pp.92-93; Hu Ch'u-fei, op.cit. pp.51-53; Wu Shou-i, Kuo-fu ti ch'ing-nien shih-tai p.86; Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung-Hui k'o-ming shih-yao" in Ch'en Te-yün (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu p.109b, also given in HHKM 1, p.66; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao I, pp.34-35; Tang Chen-ch'u, Kuo-fu shu-hsin hsuan-chi pp.18-21; Ku Yen-shih, Chung-kuo pi-mi she-hui shih pp.149-152.

6) C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe pp.120-124; Li Hung-chang, op.cit. "Tien Kao" chüan 22, p.26b, chüan 23, p.53b.



outcome of his proposition to Sun Yat-sen.<sup>7</sup> By July, however, Li had made up his mind. The position in Peking had become desperate, and Li Hung-chang had been appointed plenipotentiary to negotiate with the powers. This gave him sufficient authority to deal with the situation, and Li had decided to remain loyal to the government in the north. He thus prepared to take up his responsibilities at Peking.<sup>8</sup> It has been contended that in reality, Li Hung-chang had neither the determination, courage nor the military strength to realise his grand proposition.<sup>9</sup>


His plan however, had been favourably viewed by the governor of Hongkong. On 18 July, 1900, Li stopped at Hongkong on his way north to Shanghai. Sir Henry Blake, probably also moved by the petition he had recently received, now sought to use his influence to persuade Li to remain in the south and declare the independence of the two Kwang provinces.<sup>10</sup> It was already too late, for Li's mind had been made up. What was more important, however, was the fact that Blake had again displayed a genuinely sympathetic attitude towards the activities of the revolutionaries in the colony. This had been re-

7) Jansen, op.cit. pp.89-90 gives a number of theories for Li's reasons in proposing his plan to the revolutionaries; the "Straits Free Press" of 2 August, 1900, in FO 17/1718 p.338 claims that it was due to "the characteristic Chinese policy of buying over troublesome enemies"; there were also attempts by the Cantonese gentry to retain Li in the south, see Li Hung-chang, op.cit. "Tien Kao" ch'üan 22, p.35b and ch'üan 23, p.40; local opinion can also be seen in a letter from P'i Yung-nien to Hirayama Shū, in Ku Yen-shih, op.cit. pp.148-149.

8) C. Tan, op.cit. p.124; Li Hung-chang, op.cit. "Tien Kao" ch'üan 24, p.26.

9) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Li Hung-chang" in Yin-ping-shih ho-chi (Shanghai, 1936) Vol.XVIII, p.70.

10) Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.110, also given in HHKM 1, p.66; Sm




flected earlier in his treatment of Sun Yat-sen's violation of the banishment order against him, by coming to Hongkong again in 1900.

It had been in connection with the attempt to enlist K'ang Yu-wei's cooperation in the proposed independence movement of south China. After meeting Liu Hsüeh-hsun, the three Japanese despatched by Sun Yat-sen had sailed for Singapore to seek K'ang. During his stay in Singapore, K'ang Yu-wei and his British protectors had been in constant dread of hired assassins from China in search of K'ang. For this reason, his residence had been moved more than once to baffle his captors.<sup>11</sup>

Now, on 5 July, as soon as K'ang had heard of the arrival of three Japanese for the specific purpose of seeking him, K'ang had informed the Singapore police, suggesting that they were assassins. Accordingly, Miyazaki and Kiyofuji had been arrested on 7 July. (Uchida had suddenly returned to Hongkong). On being searched, incriminating objects had been found on them, including a sharp Japanese sword on each, and more than \$27,000 in foreign currency between them. It had also been discovered

Yat-sen, op.cit. p.196; Fu Wei-p'ing, Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng ch'u-pan-lüeh (Shanghai, 1928) p.8; see Ku Yen-shih, op.cit. p.152, a letter to Sun Yat-sen from a friend in Hongkong, 1900: "The governor of Hongkong has tried to persuade Li Hung-chang to declare the independence of Kwangtung, and establish a new order under you (Sun). Li seemed agreeable, and to have reform ideals. But the Boxer troubles are causing confusion with foreign relations, and the Manchu court is urging Li to go north. Li is forced to go, and the governor of Hongkong is trying to stop him ..." Also see Blake's statement to the press in the China Mail of 18 July 1900, p.2 col.5-7.

11) Swettenham to Salisbury (secret) of 29 Mar. 1900, in FO 17/1 pp.310-313.



that they had been sending and receiving telegrams in cypher.


The two Japanese had refused to give truthful accounts of their purpose in coming to Singapore. Finally, Sun Yat-sen had arrived on 9 July, 1900, and explained that they had really come to engage K'ang's cooperation. Sun had also laid claim to the money found on them. Even then, Sir Frank Swettenham had decided to take no chances, and on 11 July, 1900, the two Japanese had been banished from Singapore for five years. Swettenham had probably believed the rumour that, though it was genuine that Sun had desired to arrange joint action with K'ang, the purpose of the Japanese had been to obtain K'ang's head and the reward for it if K'ang had failed to join Sun's party.<sup>12</sup>

Whatever their ultimate aims, the Japanese had not achieved them, and on 12 July, they had returned to Hongkong together with Sun Yat-sen. There had been no meeting between K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen in Singapore, and the unfortunate incident had contributed to the already hostile feelings between the reformers and revolutionaries.<sup>13</sup>

From Singapore, the "Sado Maru" bearing Sun and the Japanese had been bound for Hongkong. On receipt of this information,

12) Swettenham Memorandum of 12 July 1900, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 9 Aug. 1900, ibid pp.341-349.

13) Wang Gung-wu, "Sun Yat-sen and Singapore" in Journal of the South Seas Society Vol.XV (Dec. 1959) pp.57-58; Miyazaki Torazō, (trans. Chung-kuo yen-chiu she) San-shih-san nien lo-hua meng pp.78-89; Chih Kuei, "Ch'ing-tai K'ang-Liang wei-hsin yün-tung yū k'o-ming-t'ang chih kuan-hsi chi ying-hsiang" in Chien-kuo Yüeh-k'an Vol. IX No.2 (Aug. 1933) pp.8-9; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-tzu Waichow ch'i-i chi" in HHKM 1, p.235; see also "A Reminiscer from Singapore" in the Hongkong Daily Press of 9 Nov. 1911, p.3 col.5.




Sir Henry Blake had immediately decided not to interfere with Sun's presence in the colony, despite the banishment order which had not yet expired. It must be remembered that, at this juncture, Li Hung-chang had still been hesitating about going north. Blake had thus hoped to hold Sun available for negotiations with Li, and increase the possibilities of realising his own plan of facilitating the formation of a new regime in south China.<sup>14</sup> Both the Colonial Office and Foreign Office had approved Blake's decision,<sup>15</sup> though he had been warned to beware of Sun's group using the colony as a base for planning insurrections in China.<sup>16</sup>

Yet it was at this time that the revolutionaries were indeed making plans for an armed rising against the Chinese government. The first meeting was held on board the "Sado Maru" which arrived at Hongkong on 17 July, 1900. Sun Yat-sen, unaware that Sir H. Blake had decided to allow him to land in the colony, summoned the local revolutionaries on board to attend the preparatory conference. When Chinese and British police were found on the vessel, the meeting was quickly adjourned, and was continued the next day. The objective of the 1900 rising was again to capture Canton. But the 1895 experience had taught the revolutionaries that it would have been wiser not to start

14) Tel. from Blake to Chamberlain of 13 July 1900, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. (secret of 13 July 1900, in FO 17/1718 p.330; Jansen, op.cit. p.89.

15) C.O. to F.O. (secret and pressing) of 14 July 1900, in FO 17/1718 pp.231-232.

16) Bertie to C.O. (secret and immediate) of 16 July 1900, ibid pp.336-337.



the rising at Canton, and instead, to seize the maritime area first, and then work in towards the city. The goal of this revolt was thus to be the city of Waichow, about one hundred miles east of Canton.<sup>17</sup>

The governor-general of Formosa, Kodama Gentaro, had earlier sent an emissary to Sun Yat-sen promising material support if a serious situation should arise in the south of China.<sup>18</sup> The final plans were therefore that Sun should proceed to Formosa via Japan, where he was to prepare reinforcements and wait until the rising had started before returning to the south. The direction of activities in Hongkong and Waichow was left in the hands of Cheng Shih-liang, assisted by three Japanese. Yang Ch'u-yün, Li Chi-t'ang and Ch'en Shao-pai were to remain in Hongkong to recruit financial and military aid.<sup>19</sup>

On 20 July Sun returned to Japan on board the same vessel to purchase fire-arms for the rising. Cheng Shih-liang also left for Waichow, together with Huang Fu 袁福, an important Triad leader who rallied enormous support for the rising. Shih Chien-ju 史堅如 a recent member of the Hsing Chung Hui, Teng Yin-nan and others left for Canton. By August, 1900, prepara-

17) M.B. Jansen, op.cit. pp.89-92; Miyazaki Torazō, op.cit. pp.91-92; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.110-110b, also given in HHKM 1, p.67; T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution p.31; Tse Tsan-tai, The Chinese Republic - Secret History of the Revolution p.19.

18) T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. pp.30-31; Jansen, op.cit. p.94.

19) Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-tzu Waichow ch'i-i chi" in HHKM 1, p.235; Jansen, op.cit. p.92; Miyazaki Torazō, op.cit. p.93; Cho Lu, op.cit. 111, p.664.




tions were practically complete, and Cheng Shih-liang had assembled about six hundred men from the secret societies of Kwangtung. The operational headquarters was made at a coastal area called San-chou-tien 三洲田.<sup>20</sup> Everything appeared to have been ready for the final outbreak.

At the same time, Sir Henry Blake seemed to have considerable knowledge of the activities of the revolutionaries. He had an interview with "some Chinese gentlemen who are deeply interested in the reform movement," and they appeared to have given him detailed accounts of the programme of the revolutionaries. Blake, having failed in the earlier attempt to bring Li Hung-chang and the revolutionaries together in a joint movement in the south, now sought to persuade the British government at home also to champion the cause of the Chinese revolutionaries. He felt that an armed rising at that juncture might lead to anti-foreign disturbances. But he suggested to the Colonial Office that Britain could help the revolutionaries to secure whatever "fair and reasonable reforms" they desired, if they promised to abstain from an insurrection. He proposed that this could be done when the Boxer settlements had to be made with the Chinese Empire.<sup>21</sup>

The Colonial Office, however, could hardly be expected to

20) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.87; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.110, also given in HHKM I, p.61; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. pp.30-32; Jansen, op.cit. p.94.

21) Blake to Chamberlain (confidential) of 3 Aug. 1900, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. (confidential) of 7 Sept. 1900, in F0 17/1718 pp.365-367; Blake to Chamberlain of 18 Aug. 1900, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. (secret and immediate) of 18 Aug. 1900, ibid p.354.



concur with his suggestions, which would place the British government in an awkward position with regard to relations with the Chinese government, not to say international relations, if the question of Blake's promises were to be brought up at the Boxer negotiations. Sir Henry Blake therefore received terse instructions that he must put a stop to all insurrectionary actions in Hongkong, and deport all Chinese agitators.<sup>22</sup> With these instructions, there was nothing more that Blake could do for the revolutionary party.

From another source, however, came a movement which also tended to help the Waichow rising to a limited extent. At about this time, some members of K'ang Yu-wei's reform party decided to utilise the Boxer disorders and raise an insurrection in the Yangtze area. The leader of the movement was T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang 唐才常, who had been introduced to Sun Yat-sen by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao during the negotiations for cooperation in 1895. T'ang had been a friend of P'i Yung-nien, who helped to convince him of the advantages of raising a rebellion at that time. It was mostly because of P'i Yung-nien's championship of his movement which won for T'ang the encouragement of the revolutionary leaders.<sup>23</sup>

K'ang Yu-wei meanwhile, also approved of T'ang's plans,

22) Chamberlain to Blake of 20 Aug. 1900, *ibid* p.254.

23) Accounts of T'ang are given in "T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang teng-jen ch'u-an-chi" in WHPF IV, pp.89-90; Hao Yen-ping, "The abortive Cooperation Between Reformers and Revolutionaries, 1895-1900" in Harvard University, *Papers on China* Vol.XV, (1961) pp.99,106; Li Chien-nung, *Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih* I, p.210; Tse Tsan-tai, *op.cit.* p.20.




despite his open condemnation of revolutionary tactics. One of K'ang's purposes in visiting Singapore in 1900 had been to enlist financial assistance for T'ang from the overseas Chinese.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps Yang Ch'u-yün had correctly observed in June, 1899, that K'ang's party refused to work with the revolutionaries only because of rivalry for leadership. T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang's attempt now proved that the reformers were not averse to using revolutionary means when it seemed expedient.

T'ang proposed to raise the rebellion in Hankow, and the initial plans were made in 1899 in Japan. Before his group left for China for the final arrangements, a farewell banquet was held in Japan, and it was significant that leading revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen, Ch'en Shao-pai and Miyazaki Torazō were also present.<sup>25</sup>

In Shanghai, T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang organised the Independence Society (Tzu-li Hui 自立會) as headquarters for his movement. The revolt was planned for 9 August, 1900, but it was delayed several times for lack of funds. Finally, the plot was discovered by the agents of the Hankow viceroy Chang Chih-tung, and a number of arrests were made on the night of 21 August,

24) Li Chien-nung, op.cit. pp.210-211; M.E. Tsur, "K'ang Yu-wei" in Hankow Club Collected Papers Vol.XXXIX, p.5; Hao Yen-ping, op.cit. pp.106-107; Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.20; Sir F.A. Swettenham of Singapore, however, believed that T'ang did not have the authority or sympathy of K'ang Yu-wei in his movement, and that K'ang regarded him as being actuated by personal motives. Swettenham had probably been misinformed; see Swettenham to Chamberlain of 23 Jan. 1901, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. (secret) of 25 Feb. 1901, in FO 17/1718 pp.406-408.

25) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.90; Chih Kuei, op.cit. p.8.




1900. Sixteen of the participants were later beheaded, including T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang.<sup>26</sup>

The successful suppression of the Hankow rising was due also to British assistance in the Yangtze areas. The British authorities had at first tried to convince the members of the reform party of the futility of their movement. When friendly advice failed to avail, the British government then helped the Chinese administrators to take active steps in quelling the disorders. In this case, British interference was activated by fear that the overthrow of the constituted Chinese authorities in the Yangtze provinces would let loose all the disorderly rabble of the three central cities, however genuine the movement was for "reform", and however sincere their guarantees of non-aggression towards foreigners. It was felt that the order maintained by the present authorities was to be preferred to a "self-constituted government of high-sounding aims, but of doubtful experience and ability."<sup>27</sup> It could thus be seen that this

26) For accounts of the Hankow rising, see E.J. Smythe, "The Tzu-li Hui, some Chinese and Their Rebellions" in Harvard University, Papers on China Vol.XII, pp.51-68; Chang Nan-hsien (ed) "Keng-tzu Han-kou chih-i" in WHPF IV, pp.295-298; Chang Huang-ch'i, "Chi Tzu-li Hui" in HHKM I, pp.253-257; Li Chien-nung, op.cit. I, p.222; Li Hung-chang, op.cit. "Tien Kao" chuan 25, p.49b; Ch'en Kung-fu, Chungkuo k'o-ming shih (Shanghai, 1930) pp.7-11; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, pp.96-98; Acting Consul-general of Shanghai, E.H. Fraser, to W.L. Warren of 23 Aug. 1900, enclosed in Warren to Salisbury (confidential) No.137 of 30 Aug. 1900, in FO 17/1718 p.372; Liu K'un-i, Liu K'un-i i-chi (Peking, 1959) V, pp.2269, 2271-2272; Ku Kung tang-an kuan, "T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang Hankow ch'i-i Ching-fang tang-an" in HHKM I, pp.258-279; the China Mail of 24 Oct. 1900, p.3 col.1-2.

27) Fraser to Warren of 23 Aug. 1900, enclosed in Warren to Salisbury (confidential) No.137 of 30 Aug. 1900, in FO 17/1718.




attitude was in direct contrast to Sir Henry Blake's champion-  
ship of the new government envisaged for south China by the  
revolutionaries of Hongkong earlier in the year.

In its effect, however, the Hankow rising was to act to  
the advantage of the revolutionaries in Hongkong. This was  
because the rising, to a certain extent, had seemed a concerted  
move of both reformers and revolutionaries. P'i-Yung-nien,  
with his Yangtze area secret society following, had catered to  
both groups. The Japanese sympathisers, who managed the smug-  
gling of arms from abroad, had also supported both camps. As  
a result, both the Chinese and British authorities of the Yang-  
tze area became confused as to the activities of the constitu-  
tional reformers and the revolutionaries. There was a great  
deal of misinformation concerning the movements of Sun Yat-sen,  
K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in south and central China,  
and even Sir Henry Blake failed to distinguish between the  
activities of T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang and the Hsing Chung Hui.<sup>28</sup>

Thus encouraged, the Hongkong revolutionaries quickly  
completed preparations for their own rising, while the atten-  
tion of the authorities was diverted to the Boxers in the north

28) Accounts of conflicting despatches and reports can be seen  
in Warren (Acting Consul-general of Shanghai) to Salisbury (con-  
fidential) No.137 of 30 Aug. 1900, ibid p.372; Blake to Chamber-  
lain of 18 Aug. 1900, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. (secret and imme-  
diate) of 18 Aug. 1900, ibid p.354; Blake to Chamberlain of 3  
Sept. 1900, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 4 Sept. 1900, ibid p.375;  
Lo Feng-luh to Lansdowne of 12 Jan. 1901, ibid pp.391-393; Li  
Hung-chang, op.cit. "Tien-kao" chuan 25, pp.44-44b, 51b, chuan  
26, p.1b; see K'ang Yu-wei's statement disclaiming all connec-  
tions with events in Waichow in the "Correspondence" section of  
the China Mail, 24 October, 1900, p.3 col.2.




and the Hankow attempt in central China. On 5 October, the Waichow rising began, and there were initial successes for the revolutionaries. The whole maritime area between Waichow and Siuyang was occupied. Cheng Shih-liang then delayed action because of the shortage of arms, and waited for reinforcements to come from Sun Yat-sen.<sup>29</sup>

At this juncture, Ch'en T'ing-wei, who had earlier been suspected of treason during the 1895 Canton rising, and Yang Ch'u-yün, suddenly began negotiations with the Chinese government concerning the possible surrender of the revolutionaries in return for official posts and monetary reward.<sup>30</sup> The two had acted without authority from the Hsing Chung Hui, and though nothing came of the negotiations, Yang Ch'u-yün was to bring sufficient attention upon himself to become the object of vengeance for the Canton authorities.

Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen was desperately sending messages to Miyazaki to hurry the shipments of ammunition. It was only then that Sun discovered he had been cheated by a Japanese merchant in the buying of arms. A further disappointment came when the Japanese government underwent a change of ministers,

29) For the military operations of the rising, see Chou Lu, op. cit. 111, pp.664-666, and Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.98-101. The success of the rebels was also favourably reported in the China Mail of 4 October 1900, p.2 col.7 and 15 October, 1900, p.3 col.1; and on 18 October, 1900, p.3 col.1 a translation of the Manifesto issued by the revolutionaries was also given, called "A Patriotic Document."

30) Hsüeh Chün-tu, "Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yün, and the Early Revolutionary Movement in China," in Journal of Asian Studies Vol. XLIX, no.3, p.317; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.110b-111b, also given in HKKM 1, pp.68-70.



and the new Cabinet of Ito Hirobumi, who took office in September, 1900, refused to support the Chinese revolutionaries. Orders had been given to the governor of Formosa that the export of arms from Japan into Formosa, and the recruiting of Japanese officers in the Chinese revolutionary army, was to be prohibited. Sun himself was to be expelled from Formosa.<sup>31</sup>

These were severe blows to the revolutionaries, and they became the primary causes of the failure of the rising. By 22 October, 1900, the rebel forces had to disband, and the rising was ended. Sun Yat-sen's last message to Cheng Shih-liang was conveyed by Yamada Yoshimasa, who afterwards lost his way and was seized by the Imperial authorities. He thus became "the first foreigner who laid down his life for the Chinese Republic."<sup>32</sup> Cheng Shih-liang, Huang Fu, and most of the rebels were able to make their way back to Hongkong, where they were given hiding in the New Territories. The secret society participants received their pay from Ch'en Shao-pai in the offices of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, and were then told to disperse. This financial aspect of the attempt was mainly shouldered by Li Chi-t'ang.<sup>33</sup> Thus the Waichow rising, which had been prepared in such favourable circumstances, proved to

31) See Jansen, op.cit. pp.68-74, 96-97; Miyazaki Torazō, op.cit. pp.55-56, 69-72; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. pp.30-32; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-tzu Waichow ch'i-i chi" in HHKM 1, pp.236-241.

32) Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary p.198; also see Jansen, op.cit. p.96; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. p.32; Torazō, op.cit. pp.105-110; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.101-102; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-tzu Waichow ch'i-i chi" in HHKM 1, p.241.

33) Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.111b, also in HHKM 1, p.70.




be another disappointment for the Chinese revolutionaries of Hongkong.

Just then, news also arrived of the execution of Shih Chien-ju in Canton. Shih and Teng Yin-nan had been sent to Canton to prepare for the capture of the city as soon as the rising had succeeded. While waiting, Shih had conceived of a plan to start a disturbance in Canton, and thus distract the attention of the authorities from the activities in Wai-chow. Teng was skilful in making explosives, and so the two had decided to blow up the yamen of the acting viceroy of Canton, Te Shou 德壽. Putting together all their resources, they had bought several hundred pounds of dynamite. On 28 October, 1900, Shih planted the explosives at the yamen. His companions had boarded a vessel back to Hongkong as planned, but Shih was worried at not hearing the expected explosion. So he returned, and the next day reapplied the explosives, this time staying in Canton till he heard the explosion. Still not satisfied, Shih then returned to the yamen to investigate, and there was caught and, on 9 November, executed. The viceroy Te Shou was unharmed, but he was determined to wreak vengeance on the revolutionaries.<sup>34</sup>

This personal hostility of the viceroy towards the Hong-

34) Accounts of Shih Chien-ju's attempt are given in Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.671-672; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.112-112b; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.102-103; Teng Mu-han, "Shih Chien-ju shih-lüeh" in HHKM 1, pp.245-248; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. pp.30-32; Liao P'ing-tzu, "Shih Chien-ju an shih-i" in HHKM 1, pp.249-250; the China Mail of 29 October, 1900 p.2 col.6.




kong revolutionaries then resulted in the perpetration of a serious crime in the colony. It was a direct consequence of the Waichow rising. But, because the crime was executed with complete disregard for the territorial sovereignty of the government of Hongkong, it inevitably affected British interests in the colony. In the events that ensued, however, British policy was to display a similar lack of consistency and decision as had been with the earlier cases concerning Chinese revolutionary activity in Hongkong.

Viceroy Te Shou, after Shih Chien-ju's attempt on his life, now vented his annoyance at the Chinese revolutionaries on Yang Ch'u-yün. After the abortive Waichow rising, Yang had employed himself as an English school teacher in Hongkong, holding night classes at his residence at 52, Gage Street, on the first floor. Meanwhile, Te Shou convinced himself that Yang was responsible for all the recent rebellious activities, and on 28 November, 1900, a proclamation was issued to denounce him.<sup>35</sup> Yang had probably brought Cantonese official attention upon himself by indiscriminately boasting of his role in the Waichow insurrection, and in the attempted negotiations with the Chinese authorities.<sup>36</sup>

Consequently, on the evening of 10 January, 1901, while Yang was teaching a class, four Chinese gangsters came in, and one of them fired several shots into Yang, from which wounds

35) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.20; the China Mail of 12 January 1900 p.4 col.4.

36) See Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.112b-113; also given in HKKM 1, p.73.



he died the next morning. The assassins escaped in the tumult that followed, and the crime caused considerable sensation within the colony.<sup>37</sup> The revolutionaries were shocked, and from Sun Yat-sen in Japan came a letter to Tse Tsan-tai, dated 13 February, 1901, expressing grief over Yang's cruel death, and enclosing \$1,000 for his family collected from the Hsing Chung Hui in Japan.<sup>38</sup>

The local English press, too, expressed grave concern over the incident, and from the first, observed that Yang's murder implied Chinese official responsibilities. It was hoped that the governor would take a serious view of the case, and demand redress from the Chinese government for the affront to British prestige in the colony.<sup>39</sup> For two years, however, the Hongkong government failed to effect any arrests for the crime, despite the reward of H.K.\$500 offered by Sir Henry Blake for the capture and conviction of the murderers.<sup>40</sup>


Finally, on 5 April 1903, one of the four assassins, Lui Chui, alias Li Kwai-fan, was accosted and charged with the murder of Yang Ch'u-yün. He was tried in Hongkong, on 20-21 May, and convicted to death sentence, which was carried out

37) Accounts of the death of Yang are given in Chou Lu, op.cit. 1V, pp.1218, 1227; Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. pp.112b-113b, also in HKKM 1, pp.73-74; Feng Tzu-yu, K'uo-ming i-shih 1, p.8; R.C. Wilcox to J. Welsh of 26 May 1903, enclosed in Welsh to F.O. of 3 July 1903, in F.O. 17/1718 pp.523-524; Hongkong Sessional Papers, 1902 p.101; "A Coldblooded Crime" in the China Mail of 11 January 1901, p.2 col.7.

38) The letter is reprinted in Wah Kiu Yat Po of 6 August 1928, p.4 col.1; and translated in United Magazine of October, 1933, p.

39) See the "Editorial Comment" of the China Mail of 14 January, 1901, p.2 col.2; and a letter from a Chinese correspondent on 16 January 1901, p.2 col.5.

40) Reported in the China Mail of 14 January 1901, p.2 col.2.




on 17 June, 1903.<sup>41</sup> During the course of Lui's trial, however, the political character and official complications of Yang's murder were revealed, and strong feelings of indignation were aroused both on the part of the British government and that of the Chinese residents of the colony.

It was discovered that the four assassins had actually been hired by the viceroy Te Shou. The murder had been organised by the Chief of Police at Canton, Li Ka-cheuk 李家輝. Yeung Ching-kai, captain of a Chinese gunboat, had acted as intermediary between Canton and the four "braves" in Hongkong. They had at first tried to kidnap Yang, but when this proved difficult, assassination had been resorted to. For completing the plot, the gang had been rewarded \$2,000 each, and buttons of the fifth official rank. The actual assassin, however, had already been executed on 25 September, 1901, by the Canton authorities.<sup>42</sup> It would never be known whether this had been to appease British colonial indignation, or merely a means to silence an instrument who proved troublesome to the Canton officials.

Nevertheless, the Hongkong government, supported by the China Association of London and its branch in Hongkong, immedi-

41) Ch'en Shao-pai, op.cit. p.113, also in HHKM 1, p.74; Wilcox to Welsh of 26 May 1903, enclosed in Welsh to F.O. of 3 July, 1903, in FO 17/1718 p.523; Blake to Chamberlain (confidential) of 19 June 1903, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 31 July 1903, ibid pp.561-567.

42) F.O. Minute of C.O. to F.O. of 31 July 1903, ibid pp.530-534; the China Mail of 20 May 1903, p.4 col.6-7; 21 May 1903, p.5 col.1-2; 22 May 1903, p.5 col.1.



ately demanded strong action to be taken by the Foreign Office.<sup>43</sup> Despite the fact that no extradition treaty had existed between China and Great Britain, Sir Henry Blake felt that strong pressure could be justifiably used in this case to secure the trial and punishment in Hongkong of the remaining assassins and the captain of the Chinese gunboat.<sup>44</sup>

The Foreign Office at first tended to support Blake, feeling that some efforts ought to be made in the interests of justice. But it soon realised that the total absence of treaty arrangements, and the fact that the British government had recently refused to hand over to Chinese authorities the two journalists involved in the "Su Pao" case in Shanghai,<sup>45</sup> made it inexpedient to approach the Chinese government in the manner suggested by the governor of Hongkong.<sup>46</sup>


Sir Henry Blake, however, refused to let the case drop without some form of reparation from the Chinese government. He had earlier suggested that the viceroy Te Shou and the Police Chief Li Ka-cheuk should be cashiered from public office, and that compensation of \$50,000 be paid by the Canton government to the family of Yang Ch'u-yün. Now he pressed the Foreign Office to take these measures if extradition was

43) See "The China Association, Objects, Rules and Regulations" in Hankow Club Collected Papers Vol.XX.

44) C.O. to F.O. of 31 July 1903, in FO 17/1718 pp.561-567.

45) See Chapter VI, p.147.

46) F.O. Minute of 10 Aug. 1903, of C.O. to F.O. of 31 July, in FO 17/1718 pp.530-539; F.O. to C.O. of 19 Aug. 1903, ibid pp.600-604; F.O. to C.O. of 31 Aug. 1903, ibid pp.607-608; Satow Tel. No.222 to F.O. of 21 Sept. 1903, ibid p.609.



not to be demanded.<sup>47</sup>


In the end, it was Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister at Peking (1900-1906) who determined British policy. He directed the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact that the viceroy Te Shou, who after all had been the chief instigator in the crime, had already died on 15 January, 1904. Also, the Chinese government would expect the strictest proofs of guilt before consenting to try the officials implied in the murder. An acquittal of these men could not be risked, for it would encourage similar deeds of this nature in the future. Furthermore, the demand of compensation from the present viceroy would furnish an excuse for the Chinese government to refuse extradition altogether. Therefore, Satow concluded that it would be unwise to make representations to the Peking government, and that the final procedures to be carried out should be decided by the government of Hongkong.<sup>48</sup>

Accordingly, the Officer Administering the Government of Hongkong, F.H. May, (November 1903-July 1904), after a conference with the acting Consul-general at Canton, C.W. Campbell, decided that only the trial of the two remaining assassins would be demanded, together with a strong warning to the Chinese government concerning official complicity in such plots.<sup>49</sup>

47) Blake to Chamberlain (confidential) of 19 June 1903, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 31 July 1903, ibid pp.561-567; C.O. to F.O. of 26 Sept. 1903, ibid p.610.

48) Satow to May of 10 May 1904, enclosed in Satow to Lansdowne No.167 of 12 May 1904, ibid pp.660-665; Satow Tel. No.114 to F.O. of 10 May 1904, ibid pp.655-656.

49) Campbell to Satow No.54 of 11 July 1904, enclosed in Satow to Lansdowne No.261 of 26 July 1904, ibid pp.679-681.



But by this time, three years had lapsed since Yang Ch'u-yün's death. One of the assassins, Tung Cheong, had been decapitated in August or September, 1904, on charges in a Chinese court.<sup>50</sup> And Sir Matthew Nathan had taken office as governor in Hongkong (1904-1907). After reviewing all the circumstances of the case, Nathan now decided that no further steps should be taken against the Chinese government beyond suggesting to Sir E. Satow that, if the opportunity should arise, he was to bring the facts of Yang's case to the notice of the central government of China, and warn that it should discourage any attempt of Chinese provincial authorities to violate British territorial rights in the future.<sup>51</sup> This met with Foreign Office approval.<sup>52</sup>


And so proceedings over the murder of Yang Ch'u-yün, which had been perpetrated as a result of the Waichow rising, had been concluded to the satisfaction of the British government of Hongkong as well as the revolutionaries.<sup>53</sup> But before then, another revolutionary attempt had been carried out which was also brought on as a consequence of the Waichow rising. It was again organised in Hongkong, and in the end led to the occurrence of a crime which was similar in nature to the assas-

50) Nathan to Lyttelton (confidential) of 17 Nov. 1904, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 28 Dec. 1904, ibid pp.710-711.

51) Nathan to Satow of 17 Nov. 1904, enclosed in Satow to Lansdowne No.422 of 7 Dec. 1904, ibid pp.707-708; Nathan to Lyttelton (confidential) of 17 Nov. 1904, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 28 Dec. 1904, ibid pp.710-714.

52) F.O. to C.O. of 31 Dec. 1904, ibid p.726.

53) Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih-yao" in Ch'en Te-yün (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu p.113.



sination of Yang Ch'u-yün.

After the failure of the 1900 Waichow attempt, both Li Chi-t'ang and Tse Tsan-tai were bitterly disappointed. It was at this time that Li Chi-t'ang inherited a large legacy from his father, and he decided to use the money for another armed attempt against the Manchu government in Canton.<sup>54</sup> He enlisted the cooperation of Tse Tsan-tai, who, though he had renounced revolutionary activities after 1895, had probably been stirred by the death of Yang Ch'u-yün to agree readily to Li's plan. Tse then brought in an essential member of the conspiracy, Hung Ch'üan-fu 洪全福. Hung was a relative of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, and a veteran of the Taiping rebellion. Tse Tsan-tai had known him earlier, in November 1899, and had been impressed by his experience and military knowledge, as well as his openly anti-Manchu political views.<sup>55</sup>

The three conspirators thus began to plot their movement. It must be remembered that the attempt was an independent one, and neither the Hsing Chung Hui nor Sun Yat-sen was informed of the plot until afterwards.<sup>56</sup>

The first meeting to prepare for an attempt was held on 26 September, 1901, at which Tse Tsan-tai's father, Tse Yat-chong 謝亞松, was also present. They aimed to capture

54) Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Jen-yin Hung Ch'üan-fu Kuang-chou chü-i chi" in HHKM 1, p.315.

55) Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, op.cit. in HHKM 1, pp.315-316; Tse Tsan-tai, The Chinese Republic, Secret History of the Revolution p.16 Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'i kao 1, p.114.

56) Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, op.cit. in HHKM 1, p.316.




Canton, with the help of secret society members with whom Hung was on friendly terms. If the attempt were successful, a provisional government was to be established, and they intended to invite Dr. Yung Hung 駱錦暉, a returned student from America and a reform sympathiser, to be president. It was to be a commonwealth government under a "Protector," because Tse Tsan-tai felt that a republican form of government was too advanced for China and the Chinese.<sup>57</sup> It was thus clear that by this time, Tse had completely isolated himself from the republican ideals of the revolutionary Hsing Chung Hui.

Subsequent meetings were held in October, 1901. By July, 1902, they were able to establish their headquarters at 20, D'Aguilar Street, on the third floor, under the name of the Wo Kee Chan 伍記館. They called themselves members of the "Peaceful Heavenly Kingdom" (T'ai-p'ing shun-t'ien kuo 太平順天國) because of their determination to continue the unfinished work of the Taiping rebels. Other branch headquarters were also set up in various places of Kwangtung, under cover of different commercial concerns.

The final plan was to start their movement on 28 January, 1903. It was the eve of the Chinese New Year, and it was customary for all government officials to leave Canton to take part in a ceremony at the Wan Shou Kung 萬壽宮, just outside the city. The revolutionaries thus aimed to blow up the Wan

<sup>57)</sup> Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.16. Also see Lo Hsiang-lin, "Yung Hung yu Chung-kuo hsin-wen-hua yün-tung chih ch'i-fa" in Hsin Ya Hsueh Pao Vol.1, No.1 (Feb. 1956).




Shou Kung and seize the artillery, while the rebel forces would march in from five directions.

On 25 December, 1902, Tse Tsan-tai's brother, Tse Tsan-yip 謝錦棠 arrived in Hongkong from Singapore, and he was also asked to join the movement. In January 1903, all the military bands departed for Canton, leaving only three members behind to guard the Wo Kee Chan. On 25 January, Hung Ch'dan-fu and Tse Tsan-yip also left for Canton. The next day, however, the plot was discovered. The government of Hongkong had received information from the Chinese authorities, and consequently the Wo Kee Chan was searched by Hongkong police. A total of eight persons was arrested. A number of arrests was also made in Canton, and all the branches of the organisation were raided.

It was reported that the leakage of the conspiracy had come from a local artillery store which had failed to supply the arms ordered by Li Chi-t'ang, and instead, had revealed the plans to the authorities. Li and Tse Tsan-tai were able to give warning despatches to Canton in time, and Tse Tsan-yip returned secretly to the colony on 27 January. Hung Ch'dan-fu fled inland in disguise.<sup>58</sup>

58) Accounts of this attempt are given in Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. pp.20-23; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Jen-yin Hung Ch'dan-fu Kuang-chou ch'u-i chi" in HHKM 1, pp.316-318; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih pp.10-11, K'o-ming i-shih 1, p.139; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao 111, pp.674-675; T'an Yung-nien, Hsin-hai k'o-ming hui-i lu 1, p.46; Ch'en Kung-fu, Chung-kuo k'o-ming shih pp.11-13; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.114-116; the China Mail of 28 January 1903, p.4 col.6; Ku-kung tang-an kuan, "Hung Ch'dan-fu ch'i-i tang-an" in HHKM 1, pp.322-330.



In the discovery and frustration of this Canton plot, the Hongkong government had thus played a leading role. Consequently, the viceroy of the two Kwang provinces purported to convey to the British Consul-general at Canton expressions of thanks for the information and assistance he had received from the Hongkong authorities.<sup>59</sup> However, when nothing was found to implicate the persons arrested in Hongkong with the attempt against Canton, they were discharged on 31 January, 1903, and no official statement was made as to the reason for this sudden change of front.<sup>60</sup> This was probably received with dissatisfaction by the Canton authorities, who now sought to bring justice on the leading conspirators by resorting once more to unscrupulous means.


Hung Ch'üan-fu had secretly returned to Hongkong via Macao after the suppression of the attempt. It was then discovered that the Provincial Treasurer of Canton had clandestinely posted a reward for his capture, \$30,000 for seizing him alive, and \$20,000 for his assassination.<sup>61</sup>

This instigated the perpetration of another grave crime in Hongkong, which was to be connived at by the Canton authorities. On 8 March, 1903, a man named Cheung Cho-ting rented a

59) F.O. to Chang Ta-jen of 21 Mar. 1903, in FO 17/1718 p.512; F.O. to C.O. of 21 Mar. 1903, ibid pp.514-516.

60) The China Mail of 2 February 1903, p.5 col.1; Blake to Chamberlain (confidential) of 30 Apr. 1903, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 12 June 1903, in FO 17/1718 p.520; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, op.cit. in HHKM 1, p.318; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1V, pp.1228-1229.

61) Ch'en Chun-sheng, op.cit. in HHKM 1, pp.318-319; Blake Memorandum to Chamberlain of 19 June 1903, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 31 July 1903, in FO 17/1718 pp.547-553.




flat at No.305, Des Voeux Road West. On 12 March he went to Canton, where he became very friendly with a pedlar called Ng Luk 六六, who bore some resemblance to Hung Ch'üan-fu. Cheung had told Ng that he could find employment for him in Hongkong. Ng accordingly went to see Cheung at his flat on 16 March.

On 25 March, Cheung engaged an undertaker's launch, and with the help of coolies, removed a dead body from his house. The undertaker's launch was later met outside Hongkong harbour by a Chinese gunboat, and they proceeded to Tai Ping, the headquarters of Admiral Ho, where the body was taken out. Cheung had murdered Ng Luk, and now claimed the body to be that of Hung Ch'üan-fu. Cheung was subsequently given the reward of \$20,000. Meanwhile, Hung Ch'üan-fu was alive, and had left Hongkong on 31 March for Singapore.<sup>62</sup>

When the crime was discovered in Hongkong, Sir Henry Blake concluded that the action of the Chinese gunboat left no doubt of Admiral Ho's complicity in the gross violation of British territory. Evidence, however, was only sufficient to issue a warrant for the arrest of Cheung Cho-ting.<sup>63</sup> The Canton government was accordingly informed, and they promised to carry out an investigation into the case, as well as into the Canton attempt of January. In the end, a list of names of Chinese resi-

62) Blake Memorandum to Chamberlain of 19 June 1903, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 31 July 1903, ibid pp.547-553; Hongkong Sessional Papers, 1904 pp.505-508.

63) Blake to Chamberlain (confidential) of 18 June 1903, enclose in C.O. to F.O. of 31 July 1903 in FO 17/1718 pp.545-546.




dents of Hongkong was drawn up, who were suspected of having been concerned in the plot. Rewards were offered for the capture of some of them. Blake was adamant that none of these persons could have assisted Hung Ch'üan-fu or any other person in rebellious activities against the Chinese government. How ill-informed Blake had been in this respect could be gauged when the list had included such names as Li Chi-t'ang, Tse Tsan-tai and Tse Tsan-yip, the chief conspirators in the plot. Blake did admit, however, that Hung had been a prominent member of the conspiracy.<sup>64</sup>

Nevertheless, the British government persisted in the demand for the trial of the murderer of Ng Luk, and the severe punishment of Admiral Ho and other Chinese officials implicated.<sup>65</sup> In this case, Chinese compliance with the British demands was readily given. It must be remembered that the Yang Ch'u-yün case was being concluded at about the same time. The Chinese government thus realised that the British authorities could hardly be expected not to view with extreme seriousness the occurrence of a second crime which again grossly violated the sovereignty of the colony of Hongkong.

Therefore, by May, 1904, Admiral Ho was removed from office, the murderer Chang Cho-ting was executed in the presence of an officer from the British Consulate-general, all minor officials found guilty of connivance in the case were cashiered, and the

64) ibid pp.554-555, 559-560.

65) F.O. to C.O. of 10 Oct. 1903, ibid pp.627-628; F.O. to Satov No.303 of 10 Oct. 1903, ibid pp.629-630.




viceroy of Canton conveyed a letter to the Hongkong government apologising for the infringement of Hongkong territory, and expressing thanks for the assistance in the detection of the crime. The British government then concluded that "We have got full satisfaction."<sup>66</sup>

The abortive Waichow rising of 1900 had thus brought on a series of consequences which directly affected British interests in Hongkong. Despite Chinese requests for precaution, and British promises of vigilance, Hongkong had continued to be the scene of conspiracy for both the 1900 and 1903 attempts, as well as refuge for unsuccessful plotters. It had also become a ground on which the Canton authorities sought to bring ruthless vengeance upon individual members of the revolutionary party. Therefore, during the whole period of his administration, Sir Henry Blake was firm in the upholding of British territorial sovereignty, and regarded as intolerable the attempts of the Chinese officials to assassinate in Hongkong persons who may be obnoxious to them.<sup>67</sup> This view was shared also by journalists of the English language press, who tended to support the principles set down by Blake.<sup>68</sup>

66) Acting Consul-general to Satow (confidential) No.28 of 13 Apr. 1904, enclosed in Satow to Lansdowne No.151 of 29 Apr. 1904, ibid pp.642-643; Satow to Lansdowne No.174 of 17 May 1904, ibid pp.668-672; May to Lyttelton (confidential) of 28 June 1904, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 5 Aug. 1904, ibid pp.683-685; also see "Des Voeux Road Murder" in Hongkong Hansard of 12 July, 1904.

67) Blake to Chamberlain (confidential) of 30 Apr. 1903, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 12 June 1903, ibid p.520.

68) See the "Editorial Comment" of the China Mail of 22 May 1903 col.2, and 5 June 1903, p.4 col.1.



As for the revolutionaries of Hongkong, the failure of the two movements lost for them two of their most important supporters. The first was Tse Tsan-tai, who had earlier contemplated retiring from revolutionary activities. He now determined to abandon all active campaigns. He had joined the staff of the South China Morning Post in Hongkong, and decided to concentrate on literary activities. Even to the last, however, he still saw Sun Yat-sen in the role of a self-centred revolutionary promoter, and claimed that he retired "to avoid civil war and bloodshed, and to give Sun and his party a free hand."<sup>69</sup>


Miyazaki Torazō, the enthusiastic Japanese sympathiser, was the second person who was dispirited by the Waichow rising and the failure of the reformers and revolutionaries to cooperate. He also retired from revolutionary activities, and wrote his autobiography, in which he felt that he had made nothing of his life, only a "thirty-three years' dream."<sup>70</sup>

Sun Yat-sen however, was undaunted, and failure only moved him to renewed efforts. He felt that defeat at the hands of the Manchu authorities only served to rouse popular sympathy towards the cause of the revolutionaries, particularly when the reform party had been discredited by their stubborn aspirations to protect a powerless Emperor.<sup>71</sup> But Sun had also learned


69) Tse Tsan-tai, op.cit. p.23; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1229.

70) Miyazaki Torazō, op.cit. p.111; Jansen, op.cit. p.112.

71) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, p.104; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. p.32; Chou Lu, op.cit. I, p.21; Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West p.226; Wu Shou-i, Kuo-fu ti ch'ing-nien shih-tai pp.88; Chang Ch'i-chün (ed) Kuo-fu ch'üan-shu (Taiwan, 1960-1961) p.33; Chih Kuei, op.cit. in Chien-kuo Yüeh-k'an Vol.IX, No.2 p.



by his experiences, and now realised that overseas support and increased propaganda were essential features of a revolutionary programme. For this reason, it was soon felt that the Hsing Chung Hui was inadequate to serve these purposes and that a new, better-organised and more comprehensive revolutionary society was needed.




## CHAPTER VI

### Revolutionary Activity Before 1905, and the Establishment of the T'ung Meng Hui

The failures of 1900 and 1903, and the cruel deaths met by Yang Ch'u-yün and Ng Luk, had considerably disillusioned the revolutionaries in Hongkong. Morale was low among the Hsing Chung Hui members. Many participants in the risings had to flee to Japan or Southeast Asia, and those hiding in Hongkong had to live quietly. It was significant that no new members for the Hsing Chung Hui had been recruited after 1901.<sup>1</sup>

But the work of revolutionary propaganda was carried on by the official party organ, the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, in Hongkong. It was still under the direction of its founder Ch'en Shao-pai; but in catering to the financial needs of the Wai-chow rising, the newspaper ran into bankruptcy. Therefore, for three years, 1900-1903, it was amalgamated with a commercial concern, the Wen Yü T'ang 文裕堂. All the while, Li Chi-t'ang, as the company treasurer, continued to contribute

1) Feng Tzu-yu, "Hsing Chung Hui hui-yüan jen-ming shih-chi k'ao in Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien 111, pp.331-372.



generously from his personal resources.<sup>2</sup> Two new additions to its editorial staff now helped to uphold the revolutionary ideals of the newspaper.

In the spring of 1901, Cheng Kuan-kung 鄭寬公 was engaged as reporter for the Chung-kuo Jih-pao. Cheng was a Cantonese, and had gone to Japan where he studied at the Ta T'ung School as a scholarship student. He had thus become a close friend of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and had later joined the staff of the reformers' publication, the Ch'ing-i Pao 清議報 in Japan. But Cheng had soon begun showing revolutionary tendencies in his writings, and had therefore been dismissed from the Ch'ing-i Pao. He was then introduced to Sun Yat-sen in Yokohama, and thus began his association with the revolutionary party. With his appointment, Cheng introduced liberal and democratic ideas to the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, which was a welcome change from its usual scholarly articles.<sup>3</sup>

The second addition was Feng Tzu-yu 馮自由, appointed Japanese correspondent of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao in 1902. Feng was the son of Feng Chin-ju, and he had joined the Japanese

2) Ch'en Shao-pai, "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih pieh-lu" in Ch'en Te-yün (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu p.117, also given in HHKM 1, p.84; Feng Tzu-yu, "Hsing Chung Hui shih-ch'i chih k'o-ming t'ung-chih" in HHKM 1, p.156; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao 1V, p.156; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, p.135; T'an Yung-nien, Hsin-hai k'o-ming hui-i lu 1, p.135.

3) Accounts of Cheng are given in Chang Ching-lu, Chung-kuo chin-tai ch'u-pan shih-liao (Shanghai, 1953-1954) 1, p.80; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, pp.124-126, 100, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih p.42; F.T. Cheng, East and West (London, 1951) pp.81-84 describes meeting Cheng Kuan-kung, a clansman and close friend in Hongkong.



branch of the Hsing Chung Hui, of which his father was chairman, at the age of fourteen. His youth was thus spent in the company of Chinese revolutionaries in Japan, and he subsequently made the acquaintance of Cheng Kuan-kung. After 1902, Feng Tzu-yu was able to supply the Chung-kuo Jih-pao with authoritative and first-hand information on the activities of the Chinese in Japan, and this helped to increase sales of the newspaper in Hongkong to a large extent.<sup>4</sup> In 1903, the daily circulation of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao was recorded at 2,100 copies, in a Chinese population which stood at 307,050 in that year.<sup>5</sup>


Other members of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao staff were men enlisted in Hongkong, including Ch'en Shih-chung 陳詩仲 and Huang Shih-chung 黃世仲. Many revolutionary sympathisers in Kwangtung province also frequently sent in articles.<sup>6</sup> An outstanding contributor to the paper was Chang Ping-lin 蔣炳麟, one of the victims of the Su Pao case which occurred in Shanghai in the summer of 1903.

Chang Ping-lin was a scholar-reformer, who had joined the revolutionary group after the failure of T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang's rising in 1900. He had then helped to encourage a revolutionary student movement in Shanghai by publishing bold articles

4) Accounts of Feng are given in Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, p.102, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih pp.42-43; Ch'en Kung-fu, Chung-kuo k'o-ming shih p.17.

5) See Hongkong Blue Book of the year 1903; and Hongkong government, Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hongkong, 1841-1930 chart 7.

6) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, p.102, 169.



in the "Kiangsu Journal" (Su Pao 蘇報), attacking the Manchu government. In this movement, he was soon joined by Tsou Jung 鄭容, author of the "Revolutionary Army" (K'o-ming Chün 革命軍) which was "probably the most violent and outspoken attack on the Manchus ever written by a Chinese."<sup>7</sup> This pamphlet was also published and distributed in Hongkong by the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, under the slightly modified title of "Revolutionary Forerunner" (K'o-ming Hsien-feng 革命先鋒).<sup>8</sup>


Student agitation in Shanghai intensified, and the Chinese authorities soon stepped in. Decrees for the arrest of the Su Pao proprietors and editors were issued. Chang was arrested on 29 June, 1903, and Tsou gave himself up two days later. The British government had tried in vain to prevent their arrests.<sup>9</sup> In the end, it was through the intervention of the British Assessor that Chang and Tsou received from the Mixed Court sentences of imprisonment instead of death for a crime of sedition.<sup>10</sup> Tsou Jung later died in prison, on 3 April,

7) Hsüeh Chün-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution p.14.

8) Chou Lu, op.cit. IV. p.1241; Chang Ching-lu, op.cit. I, p.77; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. II, pp.52-57, III, p.154; Chang Ch'i-chün, Chung-hua Min-kuo ch'uang-li shih (Taiwan, 1953) pp.76-77.

9) F.O. to C.O. of 19 Aug. 1903, in FO 17/1718 pp.600-604; Satow Tel. No.222 to F.O. of 21 Sept. 1903, ibid p.609; also see its connection with the Yang Ch'u-yün murder in Hongkong, Chapter V, p.132.

10) For accounts of the Su Pao case, see Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, pp.78-84, 170-171, 195-196, II, pp.36-38, III, pp.174-182; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao I, p.109, III-III; T'ang Leang-li, Inner History of the Chinese Revolution pp.53-54; Chang Huang-ch'i, "Su Pao an shih-lu" in HHKM I, pp.367-386; Chang Hsing-jen, "Su Pao-an shih-mo chih-hsü" in HHKM I, pp.387-389; Chang Ping-lin, "Yü Wu Chih-hui t'a Su-pao-an shu" in HHKM I, pp.398-400; Feng Tzu-yu, "Chung-kuo Chiao-yü-hui yü Ai-kuo Hsüeh-she" in HHKM I, pp.481-484; Ku-kun tang-an kuan, "Su-Pao ku-ch'ui k'o-ming Ch'ing-fang tang-an" in



1903, but Chang Ping-lin continued his revolutionary activities from behind bars by writing anti-Manchu articles, and sending them secretly to Hongkong for publication by the Chung-kuo Jih-pao.<sup>11</sup>


After the sensation of the legal proceedings, some students in Shanghai rallied together again, and began the "People's Daily News" (Kuo-min Jih-jih Hsin-pao 國民日日新報) in November, 1903. It was in essence a continuation of the Su Pao, and was registered, this time, with the British consulate in Shanghai, under the name of a Cantonese citizen of Hongkong, Lu Ho-sheng 廉和生. But the management of the paper soon fell out among themselves. Ch'en Shao-pai had tried to help settle differences, even making a personal journey to Shanghai, but the newspaper had to be discontinued after a short time.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile, in Hongkong, other revolutionary journals began to be published, following in the wake of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, though none became as influential nor lasted as long as the Chung-kuo Jih-pao. Cheng Kuan-kung soon resigned from the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, due to policy disagreement with Ch'en Shao-

HHKM 1, pp.408-480; T'ao Ch'eng-chang, "Che-an chi-lüeh" in HHKM III, pp.11-12; Hsüeh Chun-tu, op.cit. pp.13-15; Cheng Ho-sheng, Chung-hua Min-kuo chien-kuo shih pp.32-33.

11) Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1241 relates that there had been some suspicion that Tsou Jung was poisoned by Manchu agents, but in Hsüeh Chun-tu, op.cit. p.39, no proof could be found by the committee set up by Huang Hsing in the middle of April to investigate the cause of Tsou's death; also see Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.83-84.

12) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.195-196, 11, p.85; Chang Ching-l<sup>op.cit.</sup> 1, p.87; Ko Kung-chen, Chung-kuo pao-hsüeh shih (Shanghai 1931) pp.157-158.



pai.<sup>13</sup> He then started other newspapers of his own. These included "The World Daily News" (Shih-chiai Kung-i Pao 世界公益報) in 1903, the "Canton Daily News" (Kuang-tung Jih-pao 廣東日報) in 1904-1905, and "The World's Most Interesting Journal" (Yu-so-wei Wei-i Ch'ü-pao 有所謂唯一趣報) in 1905-1906.<sup>14</sup> These were small-scale daily papers, generally light and satirical in contents, and they catered well to the lower strata of the Chinese society in Hongkong. In this way, they were even more successful than the Chung-kuc Jih-pao in spreading revolutionary ideas to the masses, though financial instability forced most of them to end publication soon after their establishment.

After the death of Cheng Kuan-kung in 1906, his comrades Ch'en Shu-jen 陳樹人, Liu Ssu-fu 劉思復, Hsieh Ying-po 謝英伯 and Huang Shih-chung strove to continue his work, and similar daily papers were published throughout the T'ung Meng Hui period in Hongkong.<sup>15</sup> After 1904, these also served a secondary purpose. In that year, the constitutional reformers began publishing the Shang Pao 商報 in Hongkong under the direction of Hsü Chin, and editorial battles were not infre-

13) There was also a suspicion that a friend of Cheng's had poisoned Cheng Shih-liang, the hero of the Waichow rising of 1900, who died suddenly after a meal taken with Cheng Kuan-kung in August, 1901. Ch'en Shao-pai tended to think the worst of Cheng Kuan-kung after this. See Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.108; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.100, 126.

14) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.126-127, 11, pp.46-47, 111, p.142, 153, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih pp.11-12; F.T. Cheng, op.cit. p.85.

15) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 111, p.142, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih p.14, 19.



quent between the reformers and revolutionaries in Hongkong.<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, the revolutionaries were busy in another aspect of the cultural field, the use of schools as a means of propaganda. With financial backing from Li Chi-t'ang and Li Yü-t'ang, the Hsing Chung Hui established the Kuang Han Hsüeh-hsiao 光漢學校 in Kowloon in 1904. Shih Ku-ju 史古愚, the brother of the 1900 martyr Shih Chien-ju, was engaged as principal, and Li Tzu-chung 李自重 the son of Li Yü-t'ang, as one of the teaching staff. Li Tzu-chung had been sent to study in Japan in 1900, and had consequently become an active member of the revolutionary group.<sup>17</sup>

The aim of the Kuang Han school was to furnish students with high education and military training, and in this respect, Li Tzu-chung's military training in Japan was quickly put to practical use. The school was favourably received by the Chinese community of Hongkong, and the trend towards military education spread to a number of other Chinese schools in the colony. In 1905, however, an envious school principal, reputedly frustrated in his attempt to engage Li in his own school, retaliated by informing the Colonial Secretary of Hongkong that the Kuang Han School and its military training was in preparation for a coup against the British government. As a result, the Kuang Han Hsüeh-hsiao was ordered to be closed, all military

16) Ko Kung-chen, op.cit. pp.172-173 gives a comprehensive list of all opposing publications in China and overseas; also see Chou Lu, op.cit. 11, pp.455-488.

17) For an account of Li Tzu-chung, see Woo Sing-lim, The Prominent Chinese in Hongkong Part I, p.53.



training in schools was to be banned, and Li was threatened with banishment.<sup>18</sup>

The British attitude in this case originated mainly from the caution of the Officer Administering the Government of Hong-kong, F.H. May, in dealing with reformers in the colony. May had received reports that the Chinese reformers were discussing political movements and using the colony as a base to direct operations in China. He had also felt that the situation was particularly aggravated by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905.<sup>19</sup> It was found that Chinese public opinion tended to show support for the Japanese cause, and the British feared that the trend would lead to another anti-foreign movement. Earlier, when K'ang Yu-wei had come to the colony in December, 1903, and had intended to stay some time, May had decided to banish K'ang, as well as a number of newspaper proprietors and editors (including those of the Shang Pao)

18) Feng Tzu-yu, opcit. 111, p.299, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih pp.12-13; Huang Fu-luan, Hua-chiao yu Chung-kuo k'o-ming (Hongkong, 1955) pp.50-51.

19) For general accounts of the war, see A. Malazemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904 (California, 1958); The Times, The War in the Far East (London, 1905); T. Cowen, The Russo-Japanese War (London, 1904); Great Britain, Committee of Imperial Defense, Historical Section, Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1909); E.W. Clement, A Handbook of Modern Japan (Detroit, 1910) pp.305-324; Sakuye Takahashi, International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1908); B.L.P. Weale, The Reshaping of the Far East (London, 1905); Lu Ssu-mien, Jih-Ngo chan-cheng (Shanghai, 1928); Ch'en Kung-fu, Jih-Ngo chan-cheng yu Liao-tung kai-fang (Shanghai, 1931); C.W. Young, The International Relations of Manchuria (University of Chicago Press, 1929).



for publishing allegedly anti-foreign and seditious articles.<sup>20</sup> The Foreign Office, however, had seen no reason for interference.<sup>21</sup> But May had still acted on his own initiative, and instructions had been given to carry out the banishment of the journalists.<sup>22</sup> It was thus easy to understand May's determination in banning the Kuang Han Hsüeh-hsiao.

At about the same time, Li Chi-t'ang also established the Li-Sheng Ke-chih Hsüeh-hsiao 李陞格致學校 in memory of his father, Li Sheng 李陞. But it was closed down after only six months, on the death of the principal, Professor Kuang Hua-t'ai 鄭華汰.<sup>23</sup>

It was thus evident that the Hsing Chung Hui had adopted a policy of intensified propaganda in the years before 1905. This was necessary in preparation for a programme of increased revolutionary activities. It was also in accord with Sun Yat-sen's realisation after 1900, that the revolutionary tactics employed up to then had proved unsuccessful, and that wider areas of overseas Chinese communities must be brought into the movement.


Sun Yat-sen therefore left for a second journey round the world in March 1903. In Hawaii, (October 1903-March 1904), he

20) May to Lyttelton (confidential) of 24 Mar. 1904, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 7 May 1904 in F0 17/1718 pp.645-648; Brewin, Registrar-general of Hongkong, to Thomson, Acting Colonial Secretary, of 22 Feb. 1904, enclosed in C.O. to F.O. of 7 May 1904, ibid pp.652-654.

21) Campbell Minute of above of 16 May 1904, ibid p.645.

22) May to Lyttelton (confidential) of 24 Mar. 1904, enclosed : C.O. to F.O. of 7 May 1904, ibid pp.645-648.

23) Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1667.




sought to revive the sagging morale of the Hsing Chung Hui, joined the American branch of the Triad society, the Chih Kung T'ang 致公堂, and also secured an American passport by making up a certificate testifying to his birth in the islands.<sup>24</sup> These measures were to render him assistance in his later travels and revolutionary career. From Hawaii he sailed to the United States, and thence on to Europe.<sup>25</sup>

Meanwhile, Japan was fast becoming an inspirational breeding ground for the Chinese revolutionaries. The first item on the Empress Dowager's post-Boxer reorganisation had been educational reforms, and hundreds of Chinese students had been sent to Japan by 1903. There they were suitably impressed by the political freedom, institutional progress and military advancement of the Japanese government, which at this time, courted Chinese friendship to counter-balance Russian ambitions in the Far East.<sup>26</sup> The young Chinese came from different social levels, and with various ulterior aims, but they were quick to participate in overseas student activities. These therefore became natural targets of infiltration for the Chinese revolutionaries in Japan.

24) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 11, pp.102-111; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.125-128.

25) T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. pp.43-44; H.B. Restarick, Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China pp.73-77; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 11, pp. 111-124; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.130-132.

26) See Liu K'un-i, Liu K'un-i i-chi V, p.2541; M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen pp.112-115; Kiang Wen-lan, The Chinese Student Movement (New York, 1948) pp.14-20; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. p.92; Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-ch'u'an" in Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien 111, pp.383-385; Sung Chiao-jen, "Sung Yü-fu jih-chi" in HHKM 11, p.209; Hsueh Chun-tu, op.cit. p.38,



The earliest student organisation in Japan was the "Encouragement Society" (Li Chi Hui 鼓志會) formed in 1900, which published the "Translation Monthly Magazine" (I-shu Hui-pien 譯書集成). This had included the translation of such thought-provoking treatises as the writings of Rousseau and Montesquieu.<sup>27</sup> In Yokohama, Feng Tzu-yu and Cheng Kuan-kung published the "Record of Knowledge" (K'ai Chih Lu 閱智錄) in 1900-1901.<sup>28</sup> And the Hunanese students Ch'in Li-shan , Chen Hsiang-yün 沈翔雲 , and Chang Chi 張繼 also started the "National Newspaper" (Kuo-min Pao 國民報) in June 1901, some of which articles became revolutionary in character.<sup>29</sup>


Then, in the winter of 1901, there was a rumour that the Manchu government considered leasing Kwangtung province to France. The Cantonese students in Japan immediately organised a protest movement, the "Kwangtung Independent Association" (Kuang-tung Tu-li Hsieh-hui 廣東獨立協會), led by Feng Tzu-yu, Cheng Kuan-kung and Li Tzu-chung. The movement obtained the approval of the Hsing Chung Hui, and it was the first time that overseas Chinese student activities had aligned with a revolutionary society.<sup>30</sup> This was followed by Chang Ping-lin's attempted movement in the spring of 1902. Chang had hoped to arouse student patriotism by organising a meeting

27) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.146-147; Ko Kung-chen, op.cit. p.166

28) Chang Ching-lu, op.cit. 1, p.80; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o ming kai-kuo shih pp.42-43.

29) Chang Ching-lu, op.cit. 1, pp.98-99; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, pp.143-145; Cheng Ho-sheng, op.cit. pp.32-33.

30) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.146, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih p.46; Hsueh Chun-tu, op.cit. p.35.




to commemorate the two hundred and forty-second anniversary of the Manchu invasion of China on 26 April, 1903, this being the day on which the last Ming Emperor killed himself. Chang thus wrote a long and stirring proclamation which was widely distributed among the overseas students. The Chinese Minister in Japan, Ts'ai Chün 崔鈞 however, managed to ban the movement before the proposed meeting was held. In the end, the meeting took place in Hongkong under the auspices of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, and was attended by revolutionary delegates from Canton and Macao.<sup>31</sup>

These student movements were short-lived and ineffectual; but they had been perpetrated with enthusiasm and patriotism. Therefore, when subjected to the influences of revolutionary propaganda, these activities soon became integral parts of the Chinese revolutionary movement. In this respect, Sun Yat-sen realised the need for military training among the student population in Japan.

Towards this end, Sun sought the assistance of two Japanese militarists, Captain Komuro and Major Hino. With their help, the secret "Revolutionary Military School" (K'ō-ming Chün-shih Hsüeh-hsiao 革命軍事學校) for Chinese students was established. The school, however, collapsed after Sun's departure from Japan in 1903. But the first group of graduates included Li Tzu-chung (who thus brought military education back to

31) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. pp.46-47; K'ō-ming i-shih 1, pp.84-89; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u kao 1, pp.109-110; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.7-8; Feng Tzu-yu, "Chang T'ai-jen yù Chih-na wang-kuo chih-nien-hui" in HHKM 1, pp.497-502.



Hongkong), Hu Han-min 胡漢民 and Hu I-sheng 胡毅生, all of whom were to figure prominently in the military history of the T'ung Meng Hui.<sup>32</sup>


At this time, a "Young Men's Association" (Ch'ing Nien Hui 青年會) was also formed by Chinese students in Japan, initiated by Chang Chi, in 1903. It became in essence a political society advocating republicanism under cover of an educational programme. When the Russians began an invasion of Manchuria in the same year, the Association formed a "Student Volunteer Corps to Resist the Russians" (Ch'u-Ngo I-yung Tui 抗俄義勇隊) in May 1903, with a programme of daily military training, strict regulations and much publicity. The Chinese Minister in Japan again had the Association suppressed, and what had started merely as a patriotic movement was now forced to become revolutionary.<sup>33</sup>

The result was the formation of a real, secret, revolutionary military organisation, the "National Military Education Society" (Chün-kuo-min Chiao-yü Hui 國民教育會), which managed to survive because of the care in keeping its existence from the knowledge of both Chinese and Japanese authorities. Thorough military training, including the plotting of rebellions, terrorist activities and the use of propaganda, was

32) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih, 1, pp.192-194; Jansen, op.cit. p.116; Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-ch'u'an" in Lo Chia-lun, (ed)

K'o-ming wen-hsien 111, pp.107-109; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, p.77.

33) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.151, 155-157; Lo Chia-lun, (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 1, pp.117-1 E.P. Young, "Ch'en T'ien-hua, a Chinese Nationalist" in Harvard University, Papers on China Vol.XIII (Dec. 1959) p.115.



given to members. On graduation, they were sent home to China for practical experience.<sup>34</sup>

Among the first to do so were two Hunanese, Huang Hsing 黃興 and Ch'en T'ien-hua 陳天華.<sup>35</sup> In 1903 they returned to Hunan, rallied a number of local adherents and returned students, including Chang Chi, Liu Kuei-i 劉揆一 and Sung Chiao-jen 宋教仁, and founded the revolutionary Society for the Revival of China (Hua Hsing Hui 華興會) in December, 1903. Huang was chairman, and secret society support was enlisted through the efforts of a Ko Lao Hui chief Ma Fu-i 馬福益. A rising was then scheduled to take place in Changsha on 16 November, 1904. But the plot was revealed beforehand, and the Hua Hsing Hui leaders fled for their lives.<sup>36</sup> Huang Hsing escaped to Japan, where he met Sun Yat-sen, and the two leaders found grounds for amalgamating their revolutionary movements.<sup>37</sup>


The Changsha rising meanwhile, had inspired another Hunanese, Wan Fu-hua 萬福華 to make an independent attempt. He

34) Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.10-11; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp. 162-166; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.123-125; Chiang Wei-ch'iao, "Chung-kuo Chiao-yü Hui chih hui-i" in HHKM 1, pp.489-490.

35) For brief biographies, see T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. p.55; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.3-12, 16-17; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1V, pp. 1265-1266, 1533-1535; E.P. Young, op.cit. pp.114-116; Feng Tzu-yu, "Changsha Hua Hsing Hui" in HHKM 1, p.505; Liu Kuei-i, "Huang Hsing ch'u'an-chi" in HHKM 1V, p.275.

36) Accounts of the society and rising are given in Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, p.676; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. in HHKM 1, pp.503-505; Liu K'uei-i, op.cit. in HHKM 1V, pp.276-279; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.17-19; Ch'en Kung-fu, Chung-kuo k'o-ming shih p.713; Ts'ao Ya-po, "Huang K'o-shiang Changsha k'o-ming chih shih-pai" in HHKM 1, pp.505-511.

37) M.B. Jansen, op.cit. p.116; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.18-23; Liu K'uei-i, "Huang Hsing ch'u'an-chi" in HHKM 1V, pp.277-281.




planned to assassinate the former governor of Kwangsi, Wang Chih-ch'un 王之春 on 19 November, 1904. But his shot missed its target, and Wan was instantly captured.<sup>38</sup> This again encouraged a native of Anhwei, Wu Yüeh 吳樾 to carry out a similar deed of heroism. In September, 1905, the Manchu government had despatched five ministers to go abroad and investigate the possibility of reforms for China. The insincerity of the plan had been evident to many Chinese patriots, and Wu decided to assassinate the five ministers before they left Peking. However, the explosives Wu intended to use on 24 September, 1905, went off unexpectedly, and Wu Yüeh was immediately killed.<sup>39</sup>

Revolutionary activity by 1905 had thus extended considerably from Hongkong into provinces in China, and overseas to Japan.<sup>40</sup> Hongkong, however, with its British atmosphere of political liberation and freedom of the press, still retained primary importance as the headquarters for a vigorous propaganda

38) See Chou Lu, op.cit. III, pp.678-679; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.23-24; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, p.137.

39) See Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih I, p.233; Chou Lu, op.cit. III, pp.684-685, IV, p.1248; Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-ch'uan" in Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien III, p.393; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih III, pp.197-204; Min Pao, "Li-shih Wu Yüeh i-chien shu" in HHKM II, pp.432-437.

40) Sung Chiao-jen, in "Sung Yü-fu jih-chi" in HHKM II, p.209, records that one of the most ardent sympathisers of the Chinese revolution in Japan was the politician Inukai Tsuyoshi, who was able to exert considerable influence in the policy of the Kenseito government; and one of the most enthusiastic financial supporters of Sun Yat-sen was Akiyama Teisuke, who said of Sun, "A man like Sun will not be seen tomorrow, or in fifty, or in a hundred years" in M.B. Jansen, op.cit. pp.121-122.




programme, and the base for plotting attempts against the Canton regime.<sup>41</sup> The few years before 1905 had therefore been a preparatory period. The abortive deeds of individual revolutionaries were read as tales of heroism by their comrades, and further spurred them on to renewed efforts against the Manchu government. Future efforts, however, needed greater unity and better organisation than the Hsing Chung Hui had been able to offer.

The formation of a new revolutionary society had already been contemplated by Sun Yat-sen as he travelled in America and Europe during 1904-1905. Meanwhile, the extension of revolutionary activities had resulted in the growth of district societies in China and abroad. There had been the Hua Hsing Hui of Huang Hsing in Hunan, in 1903. Others had included the "Society of Daily Knowledge (Jih-chih Hui 日知會) of Hupeh in 1904, the "Revival Society" (Kuang-fu Hui 光復會) of Shanghai in 1904, and the "China in the Twentieth Century Society" (Erh-shih shih-chi chih chih-na 二十世紀之支那) of Japan in 1905.<sup>42</sup> At the same time, the original Hsing Chung Hui had begun to decline in effectiveness and enthusiasm, owing to the repeated failures of its insurrections and the financial difficulties that ensued. It was therefore felt by Sun Yat-sen that a

41) The British government of Hongkong was wary of taking stringent measures against journalists, as it "might appear to be subversive of the freedom of the press," F.H. May to Lyttelton (confidential) of 24 Mar. 1904, in C.O. to F.O. of 7 May 1904, in FO 17/1718 p.648.

42) For accounts of these societies, see Chou Lu, op.cit.IV, p.14 Feng Tzu-yu, "Kuang-fu Hui" in HHKM 1, pp.515-519; Kung I-hsing, "Kuang-fu chün-chi" in HHKM 1, pp.530-533; Chang Nan-hsien, "Jih-chih Hui shih-mo" in HHKM 1, pp.555-571; Ts'ao Ya-po, "Wu-chang Jih-chih Hui chih yün-tung" in HHKM 1, pp.572-575.




comprehensive revolutionary league to unite the activities of all these different societies was necessary to direct future movements.

In the winter of 1904, Sun Yat-sen, while in London, was invited to visit Brussels by two Hunanese overseas students, Chu Ho-chung 朱紹中 and Ho Tsa-ts'ai 胡子才. They arranged meetings for Sun with other Chinese students in Brussels, and they all displayed enthusiasm for the revolutionary programme Sun preached. At the end of his visit, Sun suggested that an oath of allegiance be taken from all those present, as a means of ensuring fraternity and unity. From Brussels Sun then moved on to Berlin and Paris, where similar alliances were made with Chinese student groups, and the same oath was taken. This was in fact the beginnings of a new revolutionary society that Sun was planning to establish, and Brussels was to remain its European headquarters.<sup>43</sup>

In July 1905 Sun Yat-sen returned to Japan, and was met by hundreds of students at Yokohama. On 28 July he was introduced to Huang Hsing, and the two agreed to amalgamate their followers to form a new revolutionary organisation.<sup>44</sup> The next day, the Hua Hsing Hui held a meeting to discuss the question

43) Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 1, pp.140-144; Chu Ho-chung, "Ou-chou T'ung Meng Hui chi-shih" in Lo Chia-lun, (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien 11, pp.254-260; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 11, pp.132-141; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.36-37.

44) Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. p.40; Jansen, op.cit. p.117; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1V, p.1537; Feng Tzu-yu, "Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" in K'o-ming wen-hsien 11, p.148; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 1, pp.147-148.



of support for the proposed new society. Opinions were divided, and it was decided that enrolment should be a matter of individual preference. In the end the Hua Hsing Hui and the Hsing Chung Hui proved to be the two most important groups in the new society.<sup>45</sup>

A meeting was accordingly held on 30 July in Tokyo, at which leading members of the two revolutionary societies were present. It was decided that a new organisation was to be formed. The name for this was to be Chung-kuo K'o-ming T'ung Meng Hui 中國同盟會, generally shortened to T'ung Meng Hui 同盟會 (United League).<sup>46</sup> The party programme was determined, oaths of allegiance were taken (similar to that used by Sun in Europe), and a set of regulations was to be drawn up. A subsequent meeting was held on 14 August, in Tokyo, and then the formal founding of the T'ung Meng Hui on 20 August, 1905.<sup>47</sup> On that day, a large meeting was convened, at which representatives from seventeen of the eighteen provinces of China were present, as well as a number of Japanese sympathisers. The manifestos, regulations and detailed points of policy were adopted. Elections were held, and Sun Yat-sen automatically

45) E.P. Young, op.cit. pp.137-138; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.41-42; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, p.149.

46) Japanese influence on the Chinese revolutionary society was evident, as the characters T'ung Meng Hui had been the Chinese name of the Japanese society, "Kokumin Domeikai" established in September 1900 to resist the Russian threat in Northern Asia. See Jansen, op.cit. pp.107-110; Liu K'un-i, Liu K'un-i i-chi V, pp.2284-2285.

47) Teng Mu-han, "Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui ch'eng-li shih-jeh k'ao" in K'o-ming wen-hsien II, pp.246-247.



and unanimously filled the post of President of the T'ung Meng Hui. Huang Hsing was elected Deputy President (shu-wu 虞務). Some Japanese, including Miyazaki Torazō, were also accepted as members. It was then decided that branches of the League were to be established in China and abroad.<sup>48</sup>

Thus was formed the "United League" which was to coordinate the activities of all the Chinese revolutionaries inside and outside of China, and sustain their efforts till the final success in 1911. In its organisation and discipline, the T'ung Meng Hui surpassed all previous revolutionary societies, and its membership, ranging from students to businessmen, militarists to secret society agents, increased tremendously in the first few years of its existence.<sup>49</sup>

An official organ for propaganda was soon established, at first by taking over the "Erh-shih shih-chi chih-chih-na" magazine which had already been operated in Japan.<sup>50</sup> But on 27 August, 1905, this was banned by the Japanese government, because of the alleged publication of seditious articles. The

48) Accounts of the T'ung Meng Hui establishment are given in E.P. Young, op.cit. p.138; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, pp.44-52; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.148, 11, pp.146-153; Sung Chiao-jen, "Sung Yü-fu jih-chi" in HHKM 11, pp.211-212; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.149-152; Jansen, op.cit. pp.118-119; Feng Tzu-yu, "Chi Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" in K'o-ming wen-hsien 11, p.148; Chou Lu, "Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" in HHKM 11, pp.3-93; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.42-44; Chang Ch'i-chün, Chung-hua Min-kuo ch'uang-li shih pp.78-80; K'o-ming wen-hsien 11, pp.158-217 gives a complete list of T'ung Meng Hui members, and 11, pp.238-242 gives the set of regulations.

49) T'ang Leang-li, Inner History of the Chinese Revolution pp.49-53 gives detailed accounts of the T'ung Meng Hui organisation, composition and financial system.

50) Chou Lu, op.cit. 1V, p.1448; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 11, pp.159-166.



T'ung Meng Hui therefore set up its own journal, the Min Pao 民報 (Peoples' Journal). This was a highly successful periodical, the first issue of which appeared in November, 1905. Its editorial staff included such brilliant writers as Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛 and Chang Ping-lin, after his release from prison in June, 1906.<sup>51</sup>


Meanwhile, a branch of the T'ung Meng Hui was established in Hongkong. On 8 September, 1905, the following circular was sent to Hongkong from Japan:<sup>52</sup>

"The President of the Chung-kuo K'o-ming T'ung Meng Hui, Sun Wen, especially instructs its members Feng Tzu-yu and Li Tzu-chung, to enlist comrades from Hongkong, Canton and Macao... All those who are interested should approach these two gentlemen for enrolment..."

Feng and Li accordingly arrived in Hongkong in October. In November, a meeting was held in the offices of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, and the office-bearers of the branch society were elected. Ch'en Shao-pai was elected chairman, Cheng Kuan-kung, deputy, and Feng Tzu-yu, secretary. As for the ordinary members, Hongkong was one of three areas in which the former Hsing Chung

51) For accounts of the Min Pao, see Man Hua, "T'ung Meng Hui shih-tai Min Pao shih-mo chi" in K'o-ming wen-hsien 11, pp.218-238; Jansen, op.cit. p.120; Cheng Ho-sheng, Chung-hua Min-kuo chien-kuo shih pp.32-33; Chou Lu, op.cit. 11, pp.436-454; Sung Chiao-jen, op.cit. in HHKM 11, pp.212-213; E.P. Young, op.cit. p.139; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.266-271, "Chi-Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" in K'o-ming wen-hsien 11, pp.153-155; Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-ch'üan" in K'o-ming wen-hsien 111, pp.373-394; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. p.54. Also see T'ang Leang-li, Wang Ching-wei, a Political Biography (Peiping, 1931) pp.14-34 for an account of Wang Ching-wei.

52) Chang Ch'i-chün (ed) Kuo-fu ch'üan-shu (Taiwan, 1960-1961) p.398; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.153.



Hui members simply joined the new society en bloc.<sup>53</sup> A branch was also established in Macao, where Cheng Kuan-lung and Liu Ssu-fu had prepared the ground since 1902, by founding a number of book societies to spread revolutionary ideas.<sup>54</sup>


Under Ch'en Shao-pai's management, the Chung-kuo Jih-pao thus also automatically became the publicity organ of the T'ung Meng Hui. But relations between Ch'en Shao-pai and Cheng Kuan-kung had been deteriorating since the latter's resignation from the staff of the newspaper in 1903. Ch'en, despite his sojourn at the Hongkong College of Medicine, was really a gentleman of the old school of thinking. He was enthusiastic about the revolution, but he sought to carry it through with the backing of the upper educated classes and wealthy business gentry. On the other hand, Cheng had travelled abroad, and had found many friends among the middle commercial and industrial classes, an "indiscriminately wide circle of acquaintances." It was thus difficult for them to work together on the committee of the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui.

Occasion for an outward clash came in the winter of 1905. The American government had suddenly decided to restrict Chinese labour immigration into the United States. This met with strong indignation in China, which responded with a wave of boycotts

53) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.104, 111, p.229; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, p.105; Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien 1, p.40 states that the other two areas were Hawaii and Hanoi.

54) Huang Fu-luan, Hua-chiao yü Chung-kuo k'o-ming p.57; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao K'o-ming kai-kuo shih pp.113-116.

55) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 111, p.228.




against American goods. Events culminated in the dramatic suicide of a certain Feng Hsia-wei 馮夏威 in front of the American Legation in Shanghai. The American government therefore opened negotiations, and the Chinese delegation included Dr. Ho Kai, Ch'en Shao-pai, and Li Yü-t'ang from Hongkong. An agreement was reached, and a treaty was concluded. Cheng Kuan-kung however, saw reason to attack Ch'en Shao-pai and the other delegates for signing the treaty without consulting public opinion. He used his Shih-chiai Kung-i Pao to voice his grievances, and T'ung Meng Hui unity suffered because of this internal conflict.<sup>56</sup>

But Ch'en Shao-pai remained a leading member of the Chinese community in Hongkong. Early in 1906, when the governor of Kwangtung, Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan 岑春煊 declared that the Canton-Hankow Railway was to be nationalised, the share-holders in Hongkong lodged a strong protest, and Ch'en was asked to be official adviser of the "Society of Shareholders of the Canton-Hankow Railway for the Protection of Railway Rights" (Yüeh-lu Ku-tung Wei-hu Lu-ch'üan Hui 廣路股東維護路權會). The Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui therefore rallied to their cause, and used the revolutionary publications to support their complaints. In return, the railway capitalists promised to repay the revolutionaries by financial contributions.

Helping the Chinese businessmen however only brought misfortune on to the Chung-kuo Jih-pao. The Kwangtung authorities

56) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.167, 111, p.230; Woo Sing-lim, The Prominent Chinese in Hongkong Part II, p.8.



retaliated against the revolutionaries by prohibiting the sale of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, as well as other subsidiary newspapers, in the Chinese mainland. This was a hard blow to the financial situation of the revolutionaries, especially when the promises of financial support from the railway shareholders had not materialised.<sup>57</sup> It was a difficult year for the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui.

Just at this time, it found itself further involved in a legal fray with K'ang Tung-p'i 康同璧, daughter of the reformer K'ang Yu-wei. Late in 1905, the Chung-kuo Jih-pao had published an account of K'ang Tung-p'i obtaining funds from overseas Chinese by fraudulent means in the United States. The newspaper now found itself sued for libel, and \$5,000 damages was demanded. Unable to meet the demand, Ch'en Shao-pai approached the railway shareholders again, only to be told that their promises had been made as appreciation of Ch'en's personal assistance, and had nothing to do with the Chung-kuo Jih-pao. In the end, the revolutionaries suffered a legal defeat.<sup>58</sup>

These difficulties, in addition to the hostility of Cheng Kuan-kung, had probably caused Ch'en Shao-pai to decide to abandon his official role in revolutionary activities. In Sep-

57) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.104-105, 166-169, 11, pp.222-225; also see Hu Han-min, "Yueh-Han tieh-lu shang-pan wen-t'i chih wei-chiai-chüeh" in HHKM 1V, pp.523-530.

58) ibid, 1, pp.105-106.




tember, 1906, he resigned from the post of director of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, as well as chairman of the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui. Feng Tzu-yu then succeeded to both positions. Ch'en had been one of Sun Yat-sen's closest comrades during the Hsing Chung Hui period, and was now seldom mentioned in active revolutionary history after 1906.<sup>59</sup> However, he was to give indirect encouragement to another kind of activity soon after his resignation. The establishment of the T'ung Meng Hui had indeed been the sign for a change of personnel in the revolutionary organisation. Many of the Hsing Chung Hui leaders in Hongkong had passed into oblivion after 1906, despite the fact that the Hongkong revolutionaries seemed to support one society as enthusiastically as the other.

The appointment of Feng Tzu-yu brought new enthusiasm to the T'ung Meng Hui in Hongkong. He obtained the support of his uncle Li Yü-t'ang, who in 1906 bought over the Chung-kuo Jih-pao and established a new board of directors. The offices moved to more spacious quarters at 301, Des Voeux Road. A Hunanese, Ts'ao Ya-po 曹亞伯, a former member of the Hua Hsing Hui, was engaged as the Chung-kuo Jih-pao correspondent in London, and he did much to facilitate news between Chinese revolutionaries in Hongkong and Europe.<sup>60</sup> The T'ung Meng Hui was also able to set up a number of social club-houses in various areas of the colony.<sup>61</sup> Li Yü-t'ang further offered the

59) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.106; Lo Chia-lun, (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien III, p.352.

60) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. III, pp.58-59; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1

61) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. III, p.235.




use of his two Chinese herb stores, the Kum Lee Yuen 金利源, and the Wing Lee Yuen 永利源, to the revolutionary society, chiefly for receiving overseas financial remittances under cover of business transactions. They became, in fact, the treasury of the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui till 1911.<sup>62</sup>

The period after 1906 was therefore one of renewed morale and vigour for the Hongkong revolutionaries. This was made possible by a handful of enthusiasts, who had the necessary financial resources to support their activities. This could also be seen in another aspect of the revolutionary programme.

The Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui embarked on a new means of propaganda by the use of the popular theatre. The idea originated in 1904, by a retired militarist Ch'eng Tzu-i 程子儀, who felt that stage plays would have far greater effect in spreading revolutionary ideas to the semi-literate masses than newspapers and pamphlets. To this end, he solicited the support of Ch'en Shao-pai and Li Chi-t'ang, who assisted with organisation and funds respectively, and organised the Ts'ai-Nan Song and Drama Group (Ts'ai-Nan Ko-Ch'u T'u'an 采南歌劇團) in Canton. By 1905, plays with revolutionary tendencies were performed in various villages of Canton, Macao and Hongkong. This pioneering effort was so successful that it was soon followed by other theatrical groups.<sup>63</sup> In Macao, Huang Shih-chung and a

62) Woo Sing-lim, op.cit. Part II, p.8; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. p.52; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.277, Hua-chiao K'o-ming kai-ku shih p.21.

63) Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1667; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih II, pp.241-242.




group of journalists formed the Drama Society (Yü T'ien She 優天社). One of its most popular plays was the one in which the execution of the woman revolutionary Chiu Chin 欽蓮 was depicted.<sup>64</sup>

The dissolution of the Yü T'ien She a few months later was followed by the establishment of the Yü-T'ien Dramatic Group (Yü-T'ien Ying-ch'ü T'u'an 優天影劇團) by one of its members, Huang Lu-i 黃魯遠, and Ch'en T'ieh-chün's 陳鐵君 Chen T'ien Sheng Society 振天聲 in 1906. This specialised in the production of plays exaggerating government corruption and advocating anti-dynastic movements. The deaths of the Empress Dowager and Emperor Kuang Hsü in 1908 was followed by a ban on all theatrical activities throughout the country as a sign of mourning. So with the help of Ch'en Shao-pai, a fund-raising tour in the name of charity was arranged for the drama society to travel in South-east Asia. This was only a cover for the society to continue propagating revolution among the Chinese communities abroad.

Meanwhile in Hongkong, Ch'en Chun-p'eng 陳俊明 and others had started the Society to Set Examples (Hsien-shen Shuo-fa She

64) Chiu Chin had been involved in a revolutionary attempt in Anking, together with another comrade Hsü Hsi-lin, in 1907. See Giles Lionel "Chiu Chin, a Chinese Heroine" in Hankow Club Collected Papers Vol.111; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1289; T'ao Ch'eng-chang, "Che-an chi-lüeh" in HHKM 111, pp.60-64; Ch'en Ch'ü-ping, "Chien-hu nü-hsieh Chiu Chin Ch'u'an" in HHKM 111, pp.184-186; and official records of the Anking case are given in Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien 1, pp.98-125; Ku-kung tang-an kuan, "Chekiang pan-li Chiu Chin k'o-ming ch'dan-an" in HHKM 111, pp.187-216, a "Hsü Hsi-lin Anking ch'i-i ch'ing-fang tang-an" in HHKM 111, pp. 112-177.




現身說法社) with similar groups in Macao and Canton. When the Chen T'ien Sheng returned from its tour in 1907, it merged with this in Hongkong to form the Chen Nan T'ien 振南天 Society. This was followed by the formation of the Chen T'ien Sheng Vernacular Drama Society (Chen T'ien Sheng Pai-hua Ch'u-she 振天聲白話劇社) with the help of Ch'en Shao-pai and financial backing from a local merchant Ch'en Keng-ju 陳庚矩. It was quickly popular because of the use of the vernacular language, and the satirical scripts, mostly written by Ch'en Shao-pai, proved tremendously effective in bringing anti-dynastic ideas across to the audience. This, and a few other smaller companies, lasted till after 1911, and many drama students went from the stage to the battlefield in 1911.<sup>65</sup>

Before this time, the Min Pao in Tokyo had maintained publication for a year, and a meeting of a few thousand revolutionary supporters was arranged on 2 December 1906 to celebrate its anniversary.<sup>66</sup> On this occasion, all monetary donations were acknowledged by the gift of a souvenir issue of the journal called the "Punishment from Heaven" (T'ien T'ao 天討) which was published on 18 April, 1907. This consisted solely of anti-Manchu articles contributed by writers representative of the various provinces of China.<sup>67</sup>

65) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 11, pp.242-246.


66) See Sun Wen, "Min Pao chou-nien chi-nien yen-chuo, tz'u" in HHKM 11, pp.274-282.

67) Man Hua, "T'ung Meng Hui shih-tai Min Pao shih-mo chi" in K'o-ming wen-hsien 11, pp.219-224; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.166; Chang Ping-lin, (ed) "T'ien T'ao" in HHKM 11, pp.283-394.



In Hongkong, the Chung-kuo Jih-pao therefore also helped to distribute the T'ien T'ao, which included a cartoon of the Emperor of China being beheaded. In doing this, the revolutionaries brought upon themselves the censure of the British government of Hongkong. It was believed that the Canton government had made representations to the Hongkong authorities concerning the spread of the seditious pamphlet. Therefore, at a meeting of the Hongkong Legislative Council on 3 October, 1907, debates were opened concerning the proposal of a bill entitled "An Ordinance to Prevent the Publication of Seditious Matter". The Attorney-general of Hongkong, the Hon. W. Rees Davis, in proposing the bill, explained that its object was to prevent Hongkong becoming a place where seditious pamphlets were printed and circulated with a view to their distribution in China. The Colonial Secretary, the Hon. F.H. May, strongly supported the bill. He felt that for some years past, the incontinence of the Hongkong native press towards the reigning dynasty in China "has been a serious source of embarrassment" for the British government. He then produced for the perusal of the Council, a translated copy of the T'ien T'ao.

At this juncture, it was suggested that the bill should be worded as to refer only to publications in the Chinese language. Dr. Ho Kai, senior member of the Legislative Council, and secret supporter of the Hongkong revolutionaries, immediately protested to this implication of "class legislation". Despite his efforts, however, the bill was passed as it stood;



and became law on 10 October, 1907.<sup>68</sup> The Chinese revolutionaries now realised that such legislation was clearly meant as a special warning to the Chung-kuo Jih-pao.<sup>69</sup>

The Hongkong revolutionaries, however, were not discouraged. After 1906, the T'ung Meng Hui embarked on a programme of intense revolutionary activities and military campaigns, and in this Hongkong served as an essential centre of preparation and liaison with other branches of the League. In February, 1908, the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui held re-elections, and Feng Tzu-yu was again elected chairman, with Huang Shih-chung as deputy, and Hsieh Hsin-chun 謝心淳 as secretary.<sup>70</sup> When the Chung-kuo Jih-pao again fell into financial difficulties, a new T'ung Meng Hui member, Lin Chih-mien 林直勉 readily purchased \$3,000 worth of the company shares, and thus saved it from bankruptcy. Since military action was now emphasised rather than merely propaganda, the newspaper sought to economise by moving into smaller offices, at No. 231, Hollywood Road, where it remained till after the final outbreak of 1911.<sup>71</sup>


Throughout its period, the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui worked closely with the headquarters in Japan. In December, 1905, the Min Pao editor, Ch'en T'ien-hua, committed suicide in Japan,

68) The Hongkong Hansard, 1907 pp.43, 55-56, 60; see also the "Editorial" of the China Mail of 20 September 1907, p.4 col.3-5, in which the English press disapproved of the proposed legislation, and charged the government with failure to recognise the distinction between publications which advocate liberty and reform, and others which counsel license.

69) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 111, p.235.

70) Ibid 111, p.237.

71) Ibid 111, p.244.



and the Hongkong revolutionaries immediately arranged for a memorial service to be held for him.<sup>72</sup> And when the Min Pao was finally banned by the Japanese government in 1909, the Chung-kuo Jih-pao readily took over the responsibility of being the only party propaganda organ.<sup>73</sup> The enthusiasm of individual Hongkong Chinese towards the revolutionary programme was also remarkable. Li Chi-t'ang, for example, in 1907 and 1908, realised the increasing financial difficulties of the Hongkong T'ung Meng. He therefore suggested that since his family was wealthy, but unwilling to support the revolution, a plan could be conceived to "kidnap" either himself, or the coffin containing the body of his father lying in Canton, and then secure ransom from his family, to be used for revolutionary purposes.<sup>74</sup> These suggestions were hardly practicable, but such was the spirit which characterised many of the leading T'ung Meng Hui supporters of Hongkong.


By this time, however, the T'ung Meng Hui had practically lost its headquarters in Japan, owing to the hostile attitude of the Japanese government. The important revolutionary centres had become the overseas branches in Hongkong and Southeast Asia.<sup>75</sup>

72) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 11, pp.129-131; accounts of Ch'en T'ien-hua's suicide are given in Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, pp.1265-1271; E.P. Young, op.cit. pp.114-146; Ts'ao Ya-po, "Ch'en T'ien-hua t'ou-hai" in HKM 11, pp.235-241.

73) Man Hua, "T'ung Meng Hui shih-tai Min Pao shih-mo chi" in K'o-ming wen-hsien 11, p.224; Feng Tzu-yu, "Chi Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" ibid 11, pp.155-156; Chou Lu, op.cit. 11, pp.436-437.

74) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 11, p.165.

75) Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-ch'u'an" in K'o-ming wen-hsien 11 p.400; T'ang Leang-li, Inner History of the Chinese Revolution p.62; Jansen, op.cit. p.127.




In this respect, Singapore soon stood next in importance to Hongkong in the Chinese revolutionary movement. The Chinese population of Singapore consisted chiefly of Cantonese and Fukienese who had emigrated to the Malay Peninsula to begin new lives by industry and perseverance. Thus, though the Chinese revolutionaries had enjoyed the support of society leaders and business magnates in Hongkong, in Singapore it was rather the middle and working classes who readily responded to revolutionary propaganda.<sup>76</sup>

Sun Yat-sen had already made himself known among the Chinese in Singapore by his visit to rescue the two Japanese from police custody in July, 1900.<sup>77</sup> By the end of that year, Singapore was further involved in the revolutionary movement when many participants in the two Hsing Chung Hui risings fled to the peninsula after the attempts had failed. The influx had included Yu Lieh, one of the four "Brigands" from Hongkong. By setting up a dubious medical practice, Yu soon made himself popular among the local working classes. In 1901, he established a secret society, the Chung Ho T'ang 中和堂, through which he preached the Hsing Chung Hui programme of revolution.<sup>78</sup> This

76) Hu Han-min, "Nan-yang yù Chung-kuo k'o-ming" in Teo Eng-hock, Nan-yang yù ch'uang-li Min-kuo (Singapore, 1934) pp.18-24; Huang Fu-luan, Hua-chiao yù Chung-kuo k'o-ming p.68.

77) See above, Chapter V, p.118; also Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. pp. 4-6; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.243, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih pp.72-78.

78) Wang Gung-wu, "Sun-Yat-sen and Singapore" in Journal of the South Seas Society Vol.XV, Part 11, p.58; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. pp.72-78, K'o-ming i-shih 1, pp.41,244; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, p.8 V.W. Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London, 1948) p.354.



organisation soon attracted the attention of three middle-class intellectuals, who were to figure prominently in the T'ung Meng Hui revolutionary history.

Tan Cho-lam 陳楚楠 was a Fukienese, and had earlier made contact with K'ang Yu-wei during the latter's stay in Singapore. He had been dissatisfied with the half-hearted measures of the reformers, and soon began contributing articles to the Hongkong Chung-kuo Jih-pao under the pen-name of "A young man who longs for the Ming period" (Shih-ming-chou chih shao-nien 應明期之少年) and subsequently enrolled in Yu Lieh's Chung Ho T'ang. Teo Eng-hock 朱永福 was a relation of Tan, and was a well-to-do shopkeeper. Lim Nee-soon 林義順, a Cantonese, was working as an apprentice in Teo's shop.<sup>79</sup> These were educated and intelligent men, who later broke away from Yu Lieh and his secret society elements, and became leaders of the Chinese revolutionary movement in Singapore.

Teo and Tan had joined a Young Men's Association in 1902, and soon converted it into the "Singapore Literary Society" (Sing-chou shu-pao she 星洲書報社), which attracted many young Chinese scholars. Gradually their discussions took on political features.<sup>80</sup> The three friends had also formed a private social club of their own, the "Peach Garden Recreation Club" (Hsiao-t'ao-yuan chü-lo pu 小桃源俱樂部), which was

79) For their brief biographies, see Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1620; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.249, III, pp.183-186; Wang Gung-wu, op.cit. p.58; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. p.68.

80) Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. p.91; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.88-92



not meant to be politically inclined. However, when the Su Pao case occurred in Shanghai in 1903, the club sent a telegraphic protest to the foreign consulates in Shanghai against the extradition of Chang Ping-lin and Tsou Jung.<sup>81</sup> From then on, the founders of the club began to use it as a shield for their political and revolutionary activities.

After the Su Pao case had been closed, Tan and Teo then put together their resources and reprinted 5,000 copies of the "Revolutionary Army" by Tsou Jung, under the title of "Essay on Survival" (Tu-ts'un P'ien 圖存篇). They also began publication of the Tu-nan Jih-pao 圖南日報 to continue the work of the Su Pao. Yu Lieh was asked to be honorary editor-in-chief of this newspaper. The journal, however, was not immediately popular, and they decided to assist its sales by the circulation of a printed western calendar bearing a revolutionary slogan. This was distributed in time for the new year of 1905.<sup>82</sup>

It was this calendar which brought to the attention of Sun Yat-sen the revolutionary activity in Singapore. Sun was in Hawaii when he accidentally came across a copy of the calendar, and he was so impressed by the independent ardour of these Singapore Chinese that he immediately contacted Yu Lieh, informing him that he wanted to meet the publishers of the calendar. This was done when Sun passed through Singapore on his way home from Europe to Japan in June, 1905. Before leaving Singapore,

81) Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, p.86; Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. pp.7-8; Fer Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.244.

82) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.244-245, 111, pp.183-186; Chou I op.cit. 1, p.86; Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. p.8; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.145.



Sun promised the three Chinese patriots that he would establish a branch of his new revolutionary society in Singapore.<sup>83</sup>

The Singapore T'ung Meng Hui was therefore formally established when Sun Yat-sen came to Singapore again in February, 1906.<sup>84</sup> Teo Eng-hock offered the use of his residential mansion, The Bin Chan House 晚晴閣, as headquarters. Of the twelve initial members, Tan Cho-lam was elected chairman, Teo vice-chairman, and Lim Nee-soon secretary. In July Sun returned, bringing the constitution and regulations for the branch society. Other club centres were also established in Singapore, and T'ung Meng Hui branches were set up in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Seramban, Malacca and Kuala Pilah.<sup>85</sup>

In 1906, the Tu-nan Jih-pao collapsed due to financial difficulties, and in July, 1907, it was replaced by the T'ung Meng Hui journal, the Chung-hsing Jih-pao 中興日報. T'ien T'ung 田桐, founder of the Erh-shih shih-chih chih-na magazine in Japan, was made editor of this, assisted by Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei. Sun Yat-sen also frequently contributed articles to this newspaper.<sup>86</sup>

The growth of the Singapore T'ung Meng Hui was rapid, and

83) Wang Gung-wu, op.cit. 1, pp.244-245, 111, pp.183-186; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, p.86; Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. p.8; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.145.

84) Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. p.9 records that Sun came again in August 1905, and drafted the T'ung Meng Hui regulations. It was not likely.

85) Wang Gung-wu, op.cit. p.60; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, p.87; Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. pp.13-20; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai kuo shih p.80.

86) Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. p.46; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.84-86 V.W. Purcell, op.cit. p.354.




by July, 1908, it became the headquarters of the Southeast Asia Regional Bureau (Nan-yang chih-pu 南洋支部) to coordinate the activities of various branches of the T'ung Meng Hui in Southeast Asia. Hu Han-min was made chairman of the Bureau.<sup>87</sup>

After Singapore, T'ung Meng Hui branches were also set up in various other areas of Chinese communities. In Burma, a branch was formed in 1907, due to the efforts of Ch'in Li-shan. In the Dutch colonies of the Malay Peninsula, earlier literary societies among the Chinese population became T'ung Meng Hui branches in 1908. Sun Yat-sen had visited French Indo-China in 1903 for the Hanoi Exposition, and had found the governor of Annam, M. Doumer, favourably disposed towards the revolution. In 1907 Sun visited Annam again with Hu Han-min, and was therefore able to establish a branch society there.

In the United States, Sun had already made contact with the local Triads, the Chih Kung T'ang. But the restrictive policy of the American government in controlling Chinese immigration had been an obstacle in the spread of revolutionary activities to America. Finally in 1907, a Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui member, Li Shih-nan 李大釗, who was an American citizen, returned to California. He therefore brought with him a set of T'ung Meng Hui regulations and membership cards. This prepared the ground for Sun Yat-sen's visit to the United States in October, 1909, when a branch of the T'ung Meng Hui was formu-


87) Wang Gung-wu, op.cit. p.63; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, pp.86-88; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, pp.161-163, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuc shih p.80.



lated. In Canada, revolutionary activities were initiated by Feng Tzu-yu. He arrived there to take up the editorship of a Chinese newspaper in 1910, and was therefore able to use it as a means of spreading revolutionary propaganda. Working through the local Triad societies, Feng also established a Department of Military Supplies (Ch'ou-hsiang Chu 筹餉局) in 1910.<sup>88</sup>

Thus the T'ung Meng Hui period had meant the spread of revolutionary activities to Chinese living in all parts of the world. At the same time, the revolutionaries were also engaged in a series of military campaigns against the Manchu government in the south of China. In this respect, Hongkong was again the most important among all the overseas centres, and the Chinese revolutionaries in Hongkong shouldered the heaviest organisational and financial burdens during this period of successive insurrections.

88) For accounts of the T'ung Meng Hui overseas, see Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, pp.77, 99-102; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, pp.133, 159-162, 11, pp.247-259, 272-274, 111, pp.338-345, 1V, pp.161-181, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih, pp.63-64, 91-112; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.69-76; T'ang Leang-li, Inner History of the Chinese Revolution p.43; M.B. Jansen, op.cit. p.115; Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo yü Ou-Mei chih yu-hao pp.106-109.




## CHAPTER VII

### Revolutionary Attempts During the T'ung Meng Hui Period

The establishment of the T'ung Meng Hui gave Chinese revolutionary activity a more organised and comprehensive form. Liaison could be constantly kept with the various overseas branches of the revolutionary league, as well as with the secret society elements of these areas. Financial and moral support seemed heartening, and within one year of its foundation, the T'ung Meng Hui embarked on an ambitious campaign of intensive insurrections against the Chinese government.

This policy was to some extent stimulated by the growing slackness of the Manchu programme of constitutional reform.<sup>1</sup> It was soon clear that the Empress Dowager, getting on in years, had hoped that in advocating a nine-year programme, unwelcome changes in the government would probably be made only after her own death. The Manchu Court too, envisaged reform as merely a means of further centralising authority in the hands of Manchu

1) See Chapter 1, p.31.



officials.<sup>2</sup> Wu Yüeh's single-handed attempt in September, 1905, had therefore represented the reaction to the Manchu reforms of one section of the Chinese nation.<sup>3</sup>


In the earlier Hsing Chung Hui period, insurrections against the Chinese government had concentrated mainly in the Kwangtung areas. Now, with well-coordinated support and wider following, the T'ung Meng Hui programme of activities included other provinces of south and central China. This necessitated greater financial backing and increased fields of propaganda. Material and moral support thus became crucial features of the revolutionary movement after 1905.

In this respect, the colony of Hongkong was again to play an essential role. The Hongkong branch of the T'ung Meng Hui soon became the centre for the collection and distribution of funds from all the affiliated sections of the revolutionary society. Firearms were either locally purchased, or smuggled in from abroad and stored in Hongkong. Propaganda was continually spread to the surrounding Chinese provinces.<sup>4</sup> Most important of all, the location of the British colony at the south-most tip of the Chinese Empire made it a convenient shelter for the Chinese revolutionaries when their movements proved unsuccessful. Therefore, throughout the period from

2) Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-ch'ih-shih I, pp.233, 250-252; J.O.P. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China (Philadelphia, 1912) pp.109-111, 113-116, 130-131; W.A.P. Martin, The Awakening of China pp.196-218.

3) See Chapter VI, p.158.


4) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih III, p.240, 257; "Chi Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" in Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien II, p.15.



1905 to 1911, the Chinese revolutionaries in Hongkong were kept busy with the preparations for insurrections, and resettling refugees after their failures.

In December, 1906, risings occurred in P'ing-hsiang 洋鄉, Li-ling 麗陵, and Liu-yang 劉陽, villages of Hunan and Kiangsi. These areas were rife with secret society adherents, many of whom had been followers of the Ko 耷 chief, Ma Fu-i, who had been executed in 1904 for his part in the Changsha rising. Liu Tao-i 劉道一, a member of the T'ung Meng Hui, had known Ma earlier in Japan. Now he decided to rally Ma's followers and start a rebellion as a form of vengeance for Ma's untimely death. Circumstances favoured him, because famine broke out in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi in the winter of 1906. A strike by the miners of P'ing-hsiang was soon turned into a general insurrection, which quickly spread into the nearby villages.

As soon as the T'ung Meng Hui heard of Liu's activities, reinforcements in the way of men and money were immediately sent from Hongkong for his assistance. Huang Hsing, deputy president of the T'ung Meng Hui, was fortunately in Hongkong in 1906, and he was able to assist the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui in making arrangements to facilitate the P'ing-Liu-Li risings. Huang had come to Hongkong for the purpose of trying to convert to the revolutionary cause an officer in the Manchu garrisons, Kuo Jen-chang 郭人漳. Huang had met Kuo earlier in Shanghai in connection with the Wan Fu-hua case in 1904, and with Kuo's transference to service in Kwangtung, Huang hoped



to enlist the cooperation of his regiment in T'ung Meng Hui activities.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, in spite of the supplies from Hongkong, the rising in Hunan and Kiangsi fizzled out, and was suppressed by Imperial troops within a week. Liu was captured and executed on 31 December, 1906.<sup>6</sup>

The failure of its first revolutionary attempt led to a reappraisal of the T'ung Meng Hui system of activities by its leaders. It was felt by Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min that the T'ung Meng Hui needed to improve its military organisation, to better prepare Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Hunan for active operations, and to increase overseas financial support. This resulted in the formulation of a Code of Revolutionary Tactics, (K'o-ming fang-lüeh 革命方略) to co-ordinate activities inside and outside of China during insurrections.<sup>7</sup> A significant development at this stage was the determination of the revolutionary leaders to enlist the help of the divisions of the Chinese New Army stationed at Nanking.<sup>8</sup> Two of its officers, I Ying-tien 儒映典 and Chao Sheng 趙聲 had

5) Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 111, p.229; Hsüeh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution p.24, 57.

6) Accounts of the rising are given in T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution pp.57-58; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao 111, p.694, 1V, p.1275; Cheng Ho-sheng, Chung-hua Min-kuo chien-kuo shih pp.37-38; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 1, pp.166-169; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Ping-wu P'ing-Li ch'i-i chi" in HHKM 11, pp. 463-475; and Ku-kung tang-an kuan, "P'ing-Liu-Li ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" in HHKM 11, pp.499-522.

7) T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. pp.58-59; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.172.

8) For accounts of the New Army see R.L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, pp.166-199; and J. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai pp. 100.



already expressed sympathies with the T'ung Meng Hui.<sup>9</sup> From these beginnings, the conversion of parts of the Chinese Army to the T'ung Meng Hui cause was to become a decisive factor in the final success of the revolution.

Within two months of its first defeat, the T'ung Meng Hui was preparing for a second attempt again. Earlier in 1905, a Cantonese, Hsü Hsüeh-chiu 許秋 had begun anti-dynastic activities in the Chao-chou 潮州 area of Kwangtung, and had even planned an insurrection for 19 April, 1905, with the help of secret society followers. But news of the plot had leaked, and Hsü had fled to Singapore. There he had met Sun Yat-sen, who had been impressed with his revolutionary ideas, and the large following he commanded among the rabble of Kwangtung. He had thus been invited to join the T'ung Meng Hui, and subsequently instructed to prepare for another attempt in Chao-chou, for which reinforcements would be sent from Singapore and Hongkong.

Hsü had therefore come to Hongkong in the summer of 1906, and had worked closely with Feng Tzu-yu and the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui in preparations for the rising. Sun had also sent for Japanese assistants from Tokyo, and from Singapore he had sent \$30,000 collected from the overseas Chinese. The date for the attempt was at first set for 19 February, 1907. But the Chinese authorities soon got wind of the activities, and it

9) Accounts of I and Chao are given in Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, p.77 Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-ch'u'an" in K'o-ming wen-hsien III, p.393; Li Chien-nung, op.cit. 1, pp.269-271.




was quickly postponed. Hsü remained in Hongkong, secretly re-organising his followers, increasing ammunition and enlisting funds.

This temporary suspension of action, however, led to repercussions in Huang-kang 黃岡, an area about thirty miles from Chao-chou. Hsü had considerable secret society followers there, and they became unduly agitated by the frustrated attempt at Chao-chou. On 21 May, a fray occurred in Huang-kang between some T'ung Meng Hui supporters and the Imperial troops stationed there. In the tense atmosphere of the area, this was precipitated into a rebellion by the next day. By then, Hsü had arrived to direct operations.

News of the rising was received by the Chinese in Hongkong with a fair amount of excitement, particularly for those with relatives or business interests in the afflicted districts. Yet there was general uncertainty as to the instigator of the riots, and much speculation as to the significance of the signatures "Suen" and "Hung" on the proclamations issued by the rebels.<sup>10</sup> When it was later found to be the work of the T'ung Meng Hui, however, and especially when one of the rebel chiefs was unjustifiably arrested in Hongkong, local opinion rose to the support of the Chinese revolutionaries.

There were in fact initial successes for the revolutionaries. After the Manchu garrisons were reinforced by additional

10) See the China Mail of 28 May 1907, p.5 col.1; 29 May, p.5 col.2-3; "Editorial" of 31 May, p.4 col.4; and 1 June, p.4 col.




regiments under Admiral Li Chun 李純 and Captain Chao Sheng  
however, the rebels found themselves surrounded and cut off  
from fresh supplies from Hongkong. By 29 May, 1907, the insur-  
rection was crushed. In their flight, a membership list of  
the T'ung Meng Hui was left behind by the leaders, and this  
led to large numbers of arrests by the Chinese authorities.<sup>11</sup>

Other revolutionaries were able to flee to Hongkong, where  
they were mostly given hiding at the farm of Li Chi-t'ang in  
the New Territories. This however, could only be a temporary  
measure, and Feng Tzu-yu appealed to the Singapore T'ung Meng  
Hui for assistance in resettling the refugees, and in paying  
off the revolutionary army. Consequently many were sent to  
Singapore, where Lim Nee-soon engaged a number to work on his  
rubber plantation.<sup>12</sup>

To Hu Han-min and a section of the T'ung Meng Hui, Hsü  
Hsüeh-chiu was held personally responsible for the disaster.  
The Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui had earlier sent \$10,000 to the  
Japanese sympathiser Kayano Nagatome to purchase weapons for  
this rising, and Hsü had been despatched to San-wei 沙尾 some  
days ahead to await the arrival of the cargo. This Hsü had

11) For accounts of the rising and Hsü Hsüeh-chiu, see Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.717-719, 1V, p.1300; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp. 174-179; Teo Eng-hock, Nan-yang yù ch'uang-li Min-kuo pp.28-31; Huang Fu-luan, Hua-chiao yù Chung-kuo k'o-ming pp.130-132; Chang Ching-sheng, "Ting-wei Chao-chou Huang-kang k'o-ming" in HHKM 11, pp.550-553; Teng Mu-han, "Ting-wei Huang-kang chü-i-chi" in HHKM 11, pp.541-545.

12) Chou Lu, op.cit. 1V, p.1666, 1621; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih p.4, K'o-ming i-shih 1, p.253; Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. pp.30-32.



neglected to do, and the vessel bearing the dangerous load had therefore proceeded to Hongkong. Fong Tzu-yu and Hu Han-min had thus been taken by surprise; but before they had been able to arrange for the safe storage of the cargo, the British authorities of Hongkong had received a request from the governor of Canton that a vessel illegally transporting military weapons should be detained. The Japanese vessel had therefore made a hasty retreat back to Japan.<sup>13</sup> This had undoubtedly contributed to the lack of weapons during the rising, and Hu Han-min, who had earlier disapproved of Hsü's enlistment in the T'ung Meng Hui, had not been unjustified in citing Hsü Hsüeh-chiu's negligence as a cause of the failure of the rising.

In its consequences, however, the Chao-chou and Huang-kang risings led to the arrest and trial in Hongkong of one of the rebel leaders, on a groundless charge. The victim of Chinese official wrath in this case was Yu Chi-cheng 余紀成, a Cantonese. He was a Triad member, and a close collaborator with Hsü Hsüeh-chiu in both the Chao-chou and Huang-kang attempts. He had also fled to Hongkong after the risings.

It happened that on 16 April 1907, a Chinese merchant was robbed by pirates near Huang-kang. The Chinese authorities immediately attributed the crime to the revolutionary party in Hongkong. But it was evident that the Chinese officials sought

13) Hu Han-min, "Nan-yang yù Chung-kuo k'o-ming" appended in Teo Eng-hock, Nan-yang yù ch'uang-li Min-kuo p.4, "Hu Han-min tzu-chuan" in K'o-ming wen-hsien III, p.398; Chou Lu, op.cit. I, pp.130-131; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. II, pp.199-206.



only to use this as an excuse to bring justice upon the leading conspirators of the Huang-kang rising.

This was substantiated by the fact that on 20 June, 1907, awards were posted for the capture of the revolutionaries, including \$1,000 for the seizure of Yü Chi-ch'eng. Subsequently, on 24 June, Yü was found in Hongkong, and on the same day, a requisition was made to the Hongkong government for his arrest on a charge of armed robbery. The date of his trial was then set for 15 November, 1907.

Even before then, the Hongkong revolutionaries fully realised that Yü had nothing to do with the alleged robbery in April, and that his extradition was demanded by the Chinese government solely because of his political activities during the recent rebellion. The failure of the rising had demoralised revolutionary ardour to some extent, both in Hongkong and South-east Asia, so the T'ung Meng Hui was determined to spare nothing in securing the freedom of Yü, and thus reinvigorate the party morale. The revolutionaries were thus fortunate to continue enjoying the active support of Dr. Ho Kai, who on 16 September, 1907, applied for and obtained a writ of Habeas Corpus for Yü Chi-ch'eng.<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, Feng Tzu-yu appealed to the Singapore T'ung Meng Hui, particularly to Tan Cho-lam and Teo Eng-hock, for financial assistance in handling the case. Response was prompt, and \$2,400 was quickly sent to the revolutionaries in Hongkong. The


14) See the China Mail of 16 Sept. 1907, p.4 col.5.



Singapore comrades also sent a formal appeal to the Hongkong government on behalf of Yü, and further published a statement, signed by a number of influential Chinese residents, including Teo, Tan, and Lim Nee-soon, testifying to the character of Yü, and the fact that he was well-off financially, with land and shops in Singapore, and he had therefore no cause to engage in piratical activities. From Hanoi, Sun Yat-sen also sent an application to the Governor of Hongkong, giving evidence that Yü was at worst only a member of a political society, and not a robber as he was charged.<sup>15</sup>

As a result of these activities, the trial of Yü Chi-ch'eng opened in favourable circumstances in November, 1907. Through the influence of Dr. Ho Kai, Sir Henry Berkeley, K.C. was engaged for Yü's defence, and from the first, it was obvious that they had a strong case. The delay in the production of Chinese witnesses to testify to Yü's supposed robbery, the exaggerated accounts they gave, and the offer of a reward for Yü's capture just four days before his arrest in Hongkong, all pointed to the fact that the Chinese authorities sought only to seize Yü for his political offense. Under the 1889 Ordinance of Hongkong, an amendment of the Law Relating to the Extradition of Chinese Criminals based on Article 21 of the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin, it was specified that offences of a political character

15) See Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.137-140; Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. pp.39-41; Feng Tzu-yu, K'uo-ming i-shih III, p.267.




were outside of its jurisdiction.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, after a number of hearings, Yü Chi-ch'eng was finally acquitted on 25 February, 1908. To prevent further trouble, the Hongkong government then supplied him with passage and sent him to Singapore, where he died in 1910.<sup>17</sup>

The acquittal of Yü was thus considered a major legal victory by the revolutionary groups in Hongkong and Singapore. But the case had also demonstrated the importance of influential revolutionary supporters from the Chinese communities of the colonies. It had been due mainly to the voluntary efforts of men like Ho Kai which finally saved Yü from being unjustly penalised for a crime he had not committed.

Even before the Yü Chi-ch'eng case was concluded, the revolutionaries in Hongkong were making preparations for another insurrection, this time to be in Waichow, at a coastal area called Ch'i-nü-hu 奇女湖. The district was under the administration of a harsh and corrupt governor, Ch'en Ch'ao-t'ang 陳兆棠, and the residents had had close contacts with the revolutionaries in Hongkong and Canton. Originally, Waichow was to be part of the Chao-chou rising, and Teng Tzu-yü 鄧子瑜, a native of Waichow with business concerns in Hongkong and

16) J.W. Carrington (ed) The Ordinances of Hongkong I, pp.658-667; Sir E. Hertslet (Comp) Treaties, Conventions etc. Between China and Foreign States II, pp.1130-1135.

17) For accounts of Yü's case, see Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. pp.38-44; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. III, pp.266-270; Chou Lu, op.cit. III, p.720; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.137-140; Chang Ching-sheng, "Ting-wei Chao-chou Huang-kang k'o-ming" in HHKM II, pp.550-553; the China Mail of 15 Nov. 1907, p.5 col.2-3; 17 Feb. 1908, p.5 col.3, and 25 Feb. 1908, p.4 col.6.



Singapore, had been sent there to organise the distraction.<sup>18</sup>


After the suppression of the Chao-chou rising, the T'ung Meng Hui therefore decided to raise in Waichow a separate attempt, in view of the preparations which had already been completed by Teng. Thus, on 2 June 1907, the rebel bands began clashes with the Imperial troops, and for ten days the T'ung Meng Hui had the upper hand. But supplies and ammunition soon ran out, and the revolutionaries were forced to disband. Once again, the rebels sought refuge in Hongkong, and were accommodated at Li Chi-t'ang's farm in the New Territories. Teng Tzu-yü was later banished from the colony because of his leading role in the insurrection.<sup>19</sup>

The consequence of this unsuccessful rising in Hongkong was to rouse feelings of disappointment among the revolutionaries. Coupled with this was a growing sense of hostility against the Chinese authorities, particularly with regard to Admiral Li Chun, whose regiment had been the cause for the suppression of both the Huang-kang and Ch'i-nü-hu attempts. It was at this time that Liu Ssu-fu decided to carry out an individual revolutionary deed by assassinating Li Chun.

Liu prepared himself by experimenting with the use of strong explosives in the open spaces of Li Chi-t'ang's farm, and in the T'ung Meng Hui headquarters in Macao. Then, on the

18) See Feng Tzu-yü, op.cit. IV, pp.182-185 for an account of Teng Tzu-yü.

19) Chou Lu, op.cit. III, p.724; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, p.181; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.141-145; see the China Mail of 5 June 1907 p.4 col.7; and 21 June, 1907, p.4 col.6.



morning of 11 June, 1907, Liu planted himself along a path in Canton through which Li Chun was expected to pass. However, a premature and accidental explosion resulted in causing injury only to himself. He was taken to hospital in Canton, where one of the doctors, Wu Han-ch'ih 伍漢持 connived at the sight of the explosives that Liu carried on his person. Yet such was the state of official nerves at the period that both Wu and Liu were immediately arrested for allegedly seditious activities. This led to agitated protests from the student population, medical and otherwise, but Li Chun refused to take chances, and Liu Ssu-fu was imprisoned for two years.<sup>20</sup>

In Anhwei province at about this time, however, another assassination attempt by a revolutionary achieved its purpose. Hsü Hsi-lin 除錫麟 succeeded in assassinating the governor of Anhwei, En Ming 恩銘, at the Anhwei Military Academy on 6 July 1907. But Hsü was arrested and executed, and the same fate awaited his accomplice at Chekiang, Chiu Chin 秋瑾 who thus became the first woman martyr in the cause of the T'ung Meng Hui.<sup>21</sup>

20) Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.722-723; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih pp.113-115, K'o-ming i-shih li, pp.207-211; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.181-182; the China Mail of 19 June 1907, p.5 col.5.

21) For accounts of the Anhwei, Chekiang cases see Chou Lu, op.cit. 1V, pp.1285-1289, 111, pp.727-733; T'ao Ch'eng-chang, "Che-an chi-lueh" in HHKM 111, pp.55-59; Chang Ping-lin, "Hsü Hsi-lin, Ch'en Po-p'ing, Ma Tsung-han ch'uuan" in HHKM 111, pp.178-181; Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien 1, pp.125-126; Feng Tzu-yu, "Chi Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" ibid 11, p.151; Ch'en Ch'u-ping, "Chien Hu n" hsieh Chiu Chin ch'uuan" in HHKM 111, pp.184-186; and the official records, Ku-kung tang-an kuan, "Hsü Hsi-lin Anking ch'i-i Ch'ing fang tang-an" in HHKM 111, pp.112-177; "Che-kiang pan-li Chiu Ch k'o-ming ch'tan an" in HHKM 111, pp.184-186.




Reports of the unfortunate death of these revolutionary comrades, as well as the repeated failure of the T'ung Meng Hui risings, contributed to a general atmosphere of ill-feeling among the ranks of the T'ung Meng Hui headquarters in Japan. As a result, there was an attempt by a number of Hunanese members to challenge Sun Yat-sen's leadership in the League.

The trouble arose ostensibly over the circumstances of Sun Yat-sen's expulsion from Japan. In February of 1907, the Manchu government had realised that Tokyo had been harbouring the headquarters of the Chinese revolutionary movement, and representations had been made to the Japanese government through the Chinese Minister Yang Shu 楊樞 that Sun should be expelled from that country. The Japanese government had subsequently decided to allow Sun to leave voluntarily, his period of exile being four years. About \$5,000 had been given him for his passage. From a Japanese friend Sun had also received 10,000 yen. Leaving behind 2,000 yen for the Min Pao, Sun had then left in March for French Indo-China, with Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei.

The Hunanese group, including Chang Ping-lin, Chang Chi, Sung Chiao-jen, T'an Jen-feng, T'ien T'ung, T'ao Ch'eng-chang, a leading member of the Kuang Fu Hui,<sup>22</sup> and also the Japanese Hirayama Shū, now accused Sun of misappropriating public funds. They further charged him with using inferior weapons and unnec-

22) The Kuang Fu Hui was the only revolutionary society which did not merge with the T'ung Meng Hui in 1905. See T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. p.49; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. p.46; Feng Tzu-yu, "Kuang Hui" in HHKM 1, pp.515-519; Chang Huang-ch'i, "Kuang Fu Hui lin hsiu T'ao Ch'eng-chang k'o-ming shih" in HHKM 1, pp.521-529.



essarily sacrificing the lives of young Chinese men for an unattainable ideal. It could thus be seen that their sudden insubordination really arose out of the despondency and frustration which enveloped the revolutionary scene in 1907.

Feelings against Sun ran so high that in October, 1907, Chang Ping-lin published a manifesto denouncing him, and Sun's picture was dramatically torn down from the wall of the Min Pao office and sent to Hongkong, where it was thought he had gone. It was also suggested that the T'ung Meng Hui should be reorganised with Huang Hsing as president, and Liu K'uei-i as deputy.<sup>23</sup>

In this crisis, Liu K'uei-i was alone trying to pacify the dissenting faction, and prevent an internal fissure within the T'ung Meng Hui. He desperately appealed to Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing, as well as Feng Tzu-yu and Hu Han-min in Hongkong, for assistance. Finally it was the calm reception of the information on the part of both Sun and Huang, together with Huang's assurance of his willingness to continue accepting Sun's leadership, which concluded the incident.<sup>24</sup> But it had shown that, at this juncture, as well as during the earlier struggle with Yang Ch'u-yün in 1895, Sun Yat-sen's leadership of the revolutionary movement had not been based entirely on the con-

23) Accounts of the threatened disunity are given in Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.176-178; T'ang Leang-li, op.cit. pp.61-62; Hu Han-min, "Nan-yang yù Chung-kuo k'o-ming" appended in Teo Eng-hock, Nan-yang yù ch'uang-li Min-kuo pp.4-5; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, pp.77-78; Feng Tzu-yu, "Chi Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" in K'o-ming wen-hsien 11, pp.156-159; Liu K'uei-i, "Huang Hsing chuan-chi" in HHKM 1V, p.288.

24) Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.50-54; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o ming kai-kuo shih p.84, K'o-ming i-shih 1V, p.289.




tinual and unanimous support of his comrades.

Sun Yat-sen meanwhile, was in Hanoi directing the Fang Ch'eng 戊城 rising of 1-17 September, 1907. The villagers of Ch'in-chou 鈸州 and Lien-chou 廣州 in south-west Kwangtung had been dissatisfied at the exceptionally heavy sugar duties levied by the local government. When appeals to the authorities had failed, they had then turned to the T'ung Meng Hui agents in the area for assistance. It had therefore been decided that an insurrection would have solved their problems. A significant aspect of this rising was the fact that both the militarists Kuo Jen-chang and Chao Sheng had given tentative promises of cooperation in the rebellion to Huang Hsing and Hu I-sheng.

In the end, however, they still feared to act with the rebel bands, and after a brief period of success, the rising was crushed. The rebels fled to French Indo-China.<sup>25</sup>

Between the winter of 1907 and the spring of 1908, three other unsuccessful insurrections were attempted by the revolutionaries. From 1-8 December, 1907, a rebellion was raised at Chen-nan-kuan 鐘南關, a strategic border area between Kwangsi and French Indo-China. This was the only rising at which Sun

25) For accounts of the rising, see Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.145-150; Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.734-737; Hu Han-min, op.cit. p.6; Teng Mu-han, "Shu Ting-wei Fang-ch'eng k'o-ming chün-shih" in HKKM 11, pp.546-548; and Sun Yat-sen's letters to Teng Tse-ju recording events, in Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.735-737; T'ang Chen-ch'u, Kuo-fu shu-hsin hsüan-chi pp.27-29; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.149-150; see also the Tung-fang Tsa-chih, No.7, 1907, "Kuang tung Hsin-chou hsiang-min k'ang-chüan" in HKKM 111, pp.367-368.



Yat-sen was personally present, and it resulted in his being expelled from French Indo-China for revolutionary activities.


The governor of Kwangsi was also instructed by the Peking government to offer an award of \$200,000 for his capture.

On 27 March 1908, Huang Hsing directed the Ch'in-lien-chou 鈸廉州 rising, which lasted only four days before it fizzled out for lack of supplies and food. In April, Hu Han-min organised an attempt at Ho-k'ou 河口 which aimed at the capture of Yünnan. Huang Hsing later also came to help and consequently caused his banishment from Hanoi by the French government.

The rebellion was crushed by 26 May, 1908.<sup>26</sup>

A common feature of all these revolutionary attempts was the fact that preparations had been mainly carried out in Hongkong, and then supplies, in the way of food and ammunition, had been secretly sent to the areas of activity. Feng Tzu-yu had known some compradores on board French vessels, and they had been useful in the transportation of reinforcements. Consequently, the years 1907-1908 had been active ones for the revolutionaries in Hongkong. Besides organising these attempts, they had also to resettle the large numbers of disbanded revolu-

26) For accounts of these risings, see Chou Lu, op.cit. III, pp. 738-745, IV, p.1311; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, pp.192-194, 199-206; Teo Eng-hock, op.cit. pp.62-65; Hu Han-min, op.cit. pp.7-16, "Hu Han-min tzu-ch'uuan" in K'o-ming wen-hsien III, p.395; Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.151-160; Hsueh Chun-tu, op.cit. pp.70-71; Chou Lu, "Ting-wei Chen-nan-kuan chih-i" in HHKM III, pp.217-220, "Wu-shen Yünnan Hok'ou chih-i" in HHKM III, pp.259-268; and the official records, Ku-kung tang-an kuan, "Chen-nan-kuan ch'i-i Ch-fang tang-an" in HHKM III, pp.221-228, "Yünnan Hok'ou ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" in HHKM III, pp.269-322; also the China Mail of 11 February 1908, p.4 col.7.



tionary troops who had fled to the colony. In this, the generous financial backing of some local residents, including Tseng Hsi-chou 曾錫周, Ma Pei-sheng 馬培生, Li Hai-yün 李海雲 and throughout, Li Chi-t'ang, had made the task easier for the T'ung Meng Hui leaders Feng Tzu-yu and Hu Han-min. The Singapore Chinese, such as Tan Cho-lam, also rendered invaluable help by offering employment to many of the refugees.<sup>27</sup>


Meanwhile, the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui headquarters had to move to larger premises, in view of its increased activities and growing membership. In March, 1909, it was transferred to Des Voeux Road, and was called the Peoples' Livelihood Literary Society (Min-sheng Shu-pao She 民生書報社). Frequent meetings were held there, and new members included many recruits from the Southern New Army stationed in Kwangtung.<sup>28</sup>

Sun Yat-sen left Singapore in May 1909 for another journey to Europe and America, and returned in June, 1910, to Penang.<sup>29</sup> T'ung Meng Hui activities during this period was thus left in the direction of Huang Hsing and Hu Han-min. For most of the period between 1908 and 1910 they were in Hongkong, and the colony really became the central headquarters of the revolutionary movement. Feng Tzu-yu had earlier suggested that, with

27) Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.162-175; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, p.283, 111, pp.237, 188-189, 240-241 where he gives an account of all the financial transactions of the period in Hongkong.

28) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 111, pp.242-244; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao 1, p.106.

29) For Sun's activities abroad, see Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, p.78; M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen pp.125-126; Lo Chia-lu op.cit. 1, pp.221-228.



the rapid succession of insurrectionary campaigns, the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui needed a separate committee to deal with military affairs.<sup>30</sup> His suggestion was now taken up, and the revolutionaries decided to expand and reorganise activities by establishing a Southern Bureau (Nan-fang chih-pu 南方支部) in Hongkong.

The Southern Bureau was formed in October 1909, with Hu Han-min as chairman, Wang Ching-wei secretary, and Lin Chih-mien treasurer, who often contributed to public funds out of his private resources. Sung Chiao-jen, who had come to the colony in April 1908, also served on the committee by issuing proclamations and supplying practical military advice.<sup>31</sup> The Bureau headquarters was located at Wongneichong Road, Happy Valley, and its function was the management of all military campaigns, and the coordination of support from Chinese provinces west and south of Hongkong. This left the T'ung Meng Hui free to concentrate only on internal activities of the colony. Its increasing membership necessitated another removal to larger offices. This time it was called the Young Mens' Literary Society (Shao-nien Shu-pao She 少年書報社 ) again situated along Des Voeux Road.<sup>32</sup>

The responsibilities of both the T'ung Meng Hui branch in Hongkong and the Southern Bureau were particularly heavy at

30) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. III, p.239.

31) Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1488; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, pp.21 218.

32) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. III, p.244; Chou Lu, op.cit. I, p.78, 106.



this time, because the South-east Asia Regional Bureau in Singapore was forced to move to Penang after 1909. The Singapore Chinese comrades had practically exhausted their financial resources in catering to the expenses of the risings of this period, as well as in resettling the hundreds of disbanded revolutionary troops who fled there. Enthusiasts like Tan Cho-lam and Teo Eng-hock had been near bankruptcy.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, the Chinese refugees were a disorderly lot, consisting mostly of bandits and ruffians. They were unaccustomed to the regular duties of lawful employment which was found for them. Incidents of blackmail, robbery and bribery were frequent, and the British government of Singapore found it difficult to continue to refuse the Chinese demand of extradition of these men. Penang, on the other hand, offered greater freedom and less interference from government authorities, though the Chinese population there had not been as numerous nor as enthusiastic about the revolution as had been in Singapore.<sup>34</sup> Thus financial and moral support for the future T'ung Meng Hui insurrections came mostly from the Chinese in Hongkong.

With the establishment of the Southern Bureau in Hongkong, military activity was again intensified. The earlier failures, due mainly to the lack of ammunition, had shown that cooperation from regiments of the Chinese Army was essential to armed attempts.

33) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 111, p.189

34) Huang Fu-luan, op.cit. pp.71-80; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih p.80; Chou Lu, op.cit. 1, pp.98-99; Wang Gung-wu, "Sun Yat-sen and Singapore" in Journal of the South Seas Soc Vol.XV (Dec. 1959) p.64.



Towards this end the Southern Bureau directed its energies.


The Chinese Northern Army, rigidly under the control of Yuan Shih-k'ai, was too remote and dangerously near the central government to be considered.<sup>35</sup> But the Southern Army offered considerable prospects of revolutionary infiltration. Many of its recruits have often been enlisted from provinces in which revolutionary activity had been most intense, and the men were frequently relatives or clansmen of leading revolutionaries. At this time, three regiments were stationed in Kwangtung, and among the men, Hu Han-min had known many who were graduates of the Kwangtung Military Academy. These included Chu Chih-hsin 莫執信, Hu I-sheng, Chou Lu 鄒魯 and Yao Yü-p'ing 姚雨平. Also, in 1907, the Canton government had begun a large-scale conscription for the Waichow Army, and many T'ung Meng Hui members had therefore found opportunity to make their way into the Chinese Army.<sup>36</sup>

The most important work of bringing the revolution into the Chinese Army, however, was carried out by the two former officers, Chao Sheng and I Ying-tien. Chao had earlier joined the T'ung Meng Hui, and in 1908, due to some disagreement with Kuo Jen-chang over the question of assisting the revolutionaries, he had resigned his commission.<sup>37</sup> He subsequently came to Hongkong, and devoted himself completely to T'ung Meng Hui

35) For accounts of the Northern Army, see J. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai pp.200-210 and R.L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power pp.48-50, 77-78.

36) Chou Lu, op.cit. ill, p.766.

37) Supra p.195.




activities. He was responsible for initiating many of his friends in the Army into the T'ung Meng Hui.<sup>38</sup> I Ying-tien, a native of Anhwei, had joined the Anhwei Army before transferring to the Kwangtung regiment. By 1906, he had already been introduced to revolutionary ideas, and when the Army was mobilised to crush the 1906 P'ing-Liu-Li risings, he had taken a short leave of absence rather than fight against the T'ung Meng Hui. In November of 1908, Hsiung Ch'eng-chi 興成基 organised the Anking revolt.<sup>39</sup> I Ying-tien had wanted to participate, but it had been over before he arrived, though he had managed to draw suspicion on himself. He had therefore also resigned his commission and fled to Hongkong. After some time, having joined the T'ung Meng Hui, he settled in Canton, and printed revolutionary pamphlets in connection with the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, distributing them among friends in the Kwangtung regiments.<sup>40</sup>

Thus by the end of 1909 prospects of support from the Southern New Army was heartening, and the T'ung Meng Hui decided to launch another rising at Canton. I Ying-tien was asked to direct military preparations, and the Southern Bureau in Hongkong

38) Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-ch'u'an" in K'o-ming wen-hsien lll, pp.403-404; Chang Shih-chao, "Chao Po-hsien shih-lueh" in HHKM lV, pp.312-315.

39) For accounts of Hsiung's attempt, see Chou Lu, op.cit. lll, pp.753-763, lV, pp.1313-1315; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Hsiung Ch'eng-chi mou-sha Tsai-hsün shih-mo chi" in HHKM lll, pp.235-237; Ku-kung tang-an kuan, "Anking ma-p'ao-ying ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" in HHKM lll, pp.244-258; Shih Ming, "Hsiung-an shih-mo chi" in HHKM lll, pp.238-339.

40) Chou Lu, op.cit. lV, pp.1324-1325; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih l, pp.289-290; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-hsü Kuang-chou hsü-chün chü-i chi" in HHKM lll, pp.358-360.



became the operational base. Soon many of the leading T'ung Meng Hui personalities were gathered in the colony, including Huang Hsing, T'ang Jen-feng, Sung Chiao-jen, and the new members Ch'en Ch'iung-ming 陳炯明 and Chou Lu.<sup>41</sup> Besides the Southern Bureau offices at Happy Valley, Feng Tzu-yu's residence at 76, Waterfront Street, and Sun Mei's house at Kowloon City also became scenes of intense activities. These included the purchase and manufacture of weapons and ammunition, and the making of flags. To this last Sun Mei, Feng Tzu-yu's wife, his mother-in-law, and Hu Han-min's wife all applied themselves.<sup>42</sup> Meanwhile, I Ying-tien set up his military headquarters in Canton, with five branch offices, and Liu Ssu-fu, recently released from prison for his assassination attempt, acted as liaison officer in Macao with Hongkong and Canton.<sup>43</sup>

Plans were rapidly nearing completion, and the date of the rising was fixed for 10 February, 1910, the Chinese New Year's Day. A telegram had earlier been sent to Sun Yat-sen, asking for \$20,000 to bear the expenses of the attempt. Sun, however, was able to remit only \$8,000, and the disappointment made it necessary to postpone the rising.<sup>44</sup>


At this juncture, the timely generosity of a Hongkong

41) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.290; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, p.1489; Hu Han-min, op.cit. III, p.404.

42) Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih pp.20-21.

43) Chou Lu, op.cit. III, p.766; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit., p.117, K'o-ming i-shih I, p.289.

44) Sun Yat-sen himself must have been anxious over his inability to provide the required sum, as his circular to enlist funds from the T'ung Meng Hui in Siam of 1910 shows, given in Chang Ch'i-chün (ed) Kuo-fu ch'dan-shu pp.342-343.




resident made the rising possible. He was Li Hai-yün 李海雲, a Cantonese and the nephew of Li Yü-t'ang. Employed as manager of a family business concern, the Yuen Tung Yuan Company 源同源, he had earlier known Feng Tzu-yu through the introduction of his brother Li Shih-nan. Now, in 1910, when Li heard of the financial difficulties of the T'ung Meng Hui, he readily took \$20,000 from his company treasury and donated it towards the insurrection. Fearing censure, which was not forthcoming, he then fled to Honan, where he continued to be active by forming civilian corps to help in the rising.<sup>45</sup>

With its financial situation once more secure, the revolutionaries in Hongkong now decided to raise the insurrection within the first fifteen days of the New Year. On 9 February, however, a few soldiers of the New Army were involved in a fracas with a shop-owner in Canton, and the police interfered. When two soldiers were arrested, the whole of the first regiment stationed in Canton came out the next day to seek vengeance. A riot consequently developed between the army and the police. This became in fact the premature start of the 1910 New Army revolutionary attempt.

In desperation I Ying-tien rushed to the Hongkong headquarters seeking advice and discussions with Huang Hsing and Chao Sheng. The general opinion was still to pacify the soldiers and end the riot. But by the time I Ying-tien returned to Canton, the situation was beyond control.

45) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.291-292; 307-308.




On 12 February, a Manchu garrison under Li Chun arrived, and the revolt was quickly crushed. I Ying-tien died in battle, and more than one hundred soldiers were arrested. It was discovered that the Canton authorities had got wind of the revolutionary activities among the Army, and had severely restricted the supply of weapons and ammunition during the Chinese New Year holidays. This and the precipitated start of the insurrection were the two main reasons for its failure.<sup>46</sup>

After this, the dispersed revolutionary comrades fled again to Hongkong, and they were settled as best they could at the Chung-kuo Jih-pao premises, the office of the Current Events Pictorial Journal (Shih-shih Hua-pao 時事畫報) which Lin Chih-mien had started in 1909, Sun Mei's house in Kowloon City, and mostly at Li Chi-t'ang's farm in the New Territories.<sup>47</sup>

The failure of this attempt was a disappointing blow to the leaders of both the Southern Bureau and the Hongkong T'ung Meng Hui. Feng Tzu-yu, chairman of the latter, was much demoralised. Just at this time, he was invited to take up the editorship of the Ta Han-Pao 大漢報 established by the Chinese revolutionary supporters in Canada. Feng therefore readily accepted

46) Accounts of the rising are given in Hu Han-min, op.cit. 111, pp.403-404; Ch'en Ch'un-sheng, "Keng-hsü Kuang-chou hsin-chün chü-i chi" in HKKM 111, pp.347-361; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.288-296; Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.766-769; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.222-224; the Hongkong Daily Press of 15 Feb. 1910, p.3 col.4; 16 Feb. p.2 col.5; 18 Feb. p.2 col.4; and 19 Feb. p.2 col.5; and the official records in Ku-kung tang-an kuan, "Kuang-chou hsin-chün ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" in HKKM 111, pp.362-366.

47) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, pp.288-296; Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.766-769.



the post, "to try and introduce the revolution to a new area." He then resigned his positions on the Chung-kuo Jih-pao and the T'ung Meng Hui, and left for Canada. The Chung-kuo Jih-pao was now put in the charge of the Southern Bureau, with Li I-heng 李以衡 as director, while Hsieh Ying-po replaced Feng as the local T'ung Meng Hui chairman.<sup>48</sup>


Meanwhile, the prevailing pessimism among the Chinese revolutionaries in Hongkong and elsewhere, brought on by the persistent failure of the T'ung Meng Hui insurrections, led to the determination of Wang Ching-wei to carry out some drastic deed to revive the morale of the party. Wang's despair had probably been aggravated by accusations from the constitutional reformers that the T'ung Meng Hui leaders had stayed safely behind while sending lesser members to the military campaigns, and also fears for the integrity of the T'ung Meng Hui itself after Chang Ping-lin's challenge of Sun's leadership of the League.<sup>49</sup>

As early as 1908, therefore, Wang had already contemplated the use of assassinations to dramatise revolutionary activity. Huang Hsing and Hu Han-min had subsequently tried to dissuade him. In an exchange of correspondence Hu had pointed out that individual deeds tended only to destroy the value of organised T'ung Meng Hui attempts. In his reply, Wang had argued,<sup>50</sup>

48) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. III, p.247.

49) T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution pp.63-71; Chou Lu, op.cit. III, p.784.

50) Hu Han-min, op.cit. III, p.402; Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chi-pai-nien cheng-chih shih 1, pp.287-289.



"...I have come to the last resort. You advocate military campaigns, but what is the use if there is no money to finance them? Enlisting support from overseas only yields little rewards, so how can we inflame people with revolutionary zeal? I am not skilled in military tactics, so my only choice is to sacrifice myself."


Wang had therefore begun making secret preparations, with the help of Huang Fu-sheng, and his future wife, Ch'en P'i-chün 陳璧君. In the summer of 1909 they had started experimenting with the use of explosives in Li Chi-t'ang's farm in the New Territories. In October, 1909, Huang had left first for Peking, where they had decided to assassinate some high Manchu dignitary. Wang had followed later in December.

At Peking they set up their headquarters under the name of the Hsiu Chen Photographic Studio 寶真影相館, and prepared to assassinate the Prince Regent. But the bomb that they planted for him was discovered on 31 March 1910, and after some investigations, both Huang and Wang were arrested by 16 April. As a special concession they were given only life sentences by the Manchu authorities.<sup>51</sup>

When news of this reached Hongkong, the Chinese revolutionaries exerted efforts to secure their release, to no avail. Sun Yat-sen had despatched a note to the Hawaii T'ung Meng Hui soliciting financial assistance in the attempt to rescue Wang Ching-wei.<sup>52</sup> Hu Han-min and Ch'en P'i-chün had also made a

51) Chou Lu, op.cit. III, pp.784-792; T'ang Leang-li, Wang Ching-wei, a Political Biography pp.42-46; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. III, p.244.

52) The letter is given in Chang Ch'i-chün, Kuo-fu ch'üan-shu p.4



journey around the overseas branch societies, and had managed to collect \$1,000.<sup>53</sup> But legal endeavours failed to secure the revocation of the sentence passed on Wang, and he was not freed till after 1912.

The T'ung Meng Hui period from 1906-1910 had thus been punctuated by these military and assassination attempts in various areas of the Chinese Empire. These activities had generally resulted in the suppression of the movements and the punishment or execution of the leading conspirators. Yet each attempt had served as an object-lesson for the organisers and a stepping-stone towards the final outbreak of 1911. The revolutionaries in Hongkong had undertaken a considerable share of the organisational and financial responsibilities of this period. Besides the few outstanding personalities who had helped to keep the revolutionary movement alive, there had also been cases of voluntary, anti-Manchu activities, which had given heart to the revolutionary party.

One such example had been Dr. Kuan Hsin-yen 閻心馬, a Cantonese and revered medical practitioner. On 15 November, 1909, he had initiated the "Society to Cut the Queue But Not to Change the Dress" (Chien-fa Pu-I-fu Hui 剪髮不易服會). On the same day, a massive inaugural meeting had been held at the Chinese Club, complete with musical bands, a tea party, and a procession through the streets to mark the queue-cutting ceremony,


53) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, pp.225-226; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. III p.247; Chou Lu, op.cit. III, pp.793-795.



which was generally accepted as a symbol of non-submission to Manchu rule. Among the six witnesses invited to the event had been Hu Li-yüan, the reform writer, and the Rev. Ou Feng-ch'ih, Sun's Chinese tutor.<sup>54</sup> This had thus shown that in Hongkong, revolutionary activities had been due as much to the efforts of supporters outside the T'ung Meng Hui as its own members.

In the coming crises of 1911, this aspect of the revolutionary movement in Hongkong was again evident. The continued absence of Sun Yat-sen, the T'ung Meng Hui president, from the colony since 1900 had shown that the Hongkong comrades were able to undertake revolutionary activities practically without central direction. With assistance from sections of the Chinese New Army and members of the Chinese community of Hongkong, the bloodless conversion of Kwangtung to republican government in 1911 was made possible.

54) An account of Dr. Kuan is given in Woo Sing-lim, The Prominent Chinese in Hongkong Part 1, pp.97-98.




## CHAPTER VIII

### The Events of 1911 and the Change of Government in Kwangtung

Chinese revolutionary activities in the period before 1911, as we have seen, had been mainly perpetrated from the southern areas of China, of which Hongkong had logically and naturally served as the nerve-centre of the movement. Starting with the formation of literary societies in the 1890's, the revolutionaries in Hongkong had continued to be actively involved in the formation of the Hsing Chung Hui, and throughout its period until the founding of a T'ung Meng Hui branch in the colony. The subsequent insurrections organised by the T'ung Meng Hui had also taken place mainly in south and south-west Kwangtung. The enthusiasm of the Cantonese comrades and the generous financial backing of the overseas communities had probably been a decisive factor. These risings, however, had all proved unsuccessful. Thus it was soon realised that activities originating merely from a small colony in the south were insufficient to upset the Manchu dynasty of China.


Nevertheless, Hongkong had been an essential and integral



part of the Chinese revolutionary movement. It had offered opportunity and accommodation to many of the revolutionaries, who gained the necessary training and experience in revolutionary tactics during their sojourn in the south. From the colony, comrades had been disseminated to all the Chinese provinces to make new contacts and establish affiliated organisations. It had also been in the south that the revolutionary infiltration of regiments of the Chinese New Army had begun. Hongkong had thus been the starting point as well as the sustaining ground of the Chinese revolution throughout the period before 1911.

By 1911, however, T'ung Meng Hui branches had been established in a number of provinces in China. The revolutionary movement had become diversified, and a gradual shift of emphasis from the south to the Yangtze regions was evident. In particular, activities had become intensified in Hupeh province, where the revolution was finally to erupt.

The earliest revolutionary society in Hupeh had been the Scientific Study Group (K'o-hsüeh pu-hsi shuo 科學補習所) formed in 1904. Its members had included Ts'ao Ya-po and Sung Chiao-jen. The society, however, had soon been banned by the authorities because of its connection with the Changsha rising of 1904. Ts'ao had then organised the Society for the Daily Increase of Knowledge (Jih-chih Hui 日知會) in the following year to continue its programme. This had actually become the Wuchang branch of the T'ung Meng Hui during 1905-1906. After its suppression for revolutionary activities, some T'ung Meng Hui members had established the Common Advancement Society



(Kung-chin Hui 共進會) in 1907, an affiliated organisation of the T'ung Meng Hui with special emphasis on the enlistment of secret society support. This had lasted till 1911, and its leaders had included Ch'u Cheng 許正 and Chiao Ta-feng 焦達峯.

Following the initiative of the southern revolutionaries, attempts had also been made to convert the Chinese armed forces in the Yangtze areas to the revolutionary cause. Towards this end, the Society of Self-government Studies (Ch'ün-chih hsüeh-she 春治學社) had been formed in 1908, and response from the New Army had been so encouraging that the society had planned a military coup in Hupeh in 1910. News however, had leaked, and the society had been dissolved. This had led to the establishment of the Military Study Society (Chen-wu hsüeh-she 振武學社) in the same year, which had quickly attracted many adherents, mostly militarists. When this had also been suppressed on suspicion of seditious activities, some of its members had followed with the formation of the Literary Society (Wen-hsüeh she 文學社) in 1911.<sup>1</sup> This and the Common Advancement Society became the two outstanding Yangtze revolutionary organisations which initiated the 1911 outbreak in Wuchang.

1) For accounts of the revolutionary societies in Hupeh, see Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih I, pp.247-256; Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-chuan" in Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien III, pp.445-453; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao III, pp.907-911; Hsüeh Chün-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution pp.95-98; Ou-yang Shui-hua, "Wu-chang K'o-hsüeh pu-hsi-su k'o-ming yün-tung shih-mo chi" in HHKM I, pp.551-554; Ts'ao Ya-po, "Wu-chang Jih-chih Hui chih yün-tung" ibid I, pp.572-576; Chang Nan-hsien, "Kung-chin Hui shih-mo" ibid II, pp.94-111, "Wen-hsüeh-she shih-mo" ibid V, pp.6-19, "Ch'ün-chih hsüeh-she chih shih-mo" ibid V, pp.23-29, "Chen-wu hsüeh-she chih shih-mo" ibid V, pp.30-37.



The growth of these revolutionary activities in central China thus tended to minimise the importance of Hongkong as an operationsl base. The Chinese revolutionaries in the colony, however, continued to support enthusiastically the T'ung Meng Hui cause. By 1911, the repeated failure of the insurrections in the preceding period had caused many of them to turn to assassination as a means of reinvigorating the party morale, as well as facilitating its programme of organised insurrec-tions by decreasing the numbers of their Manchurian enemies.

Thus in April, 1910, the China Assassination Society (Chih-na An-sha T'u'an 支那暗殺團) had been formed in Hong-kong. It was not affiliated to the T'ung Meng Hui, though its members were all adherents of the League. The organiser was Liu Ssu-fu, released from prison in the winter of 1909 after an un-successful attempt on the life of Admiral Li Chun in 1907. Liu had returned to Hongkong, in time to witness the disappointing result of the New Army revolt in Canton in 1910. He there-fore determined that assassination seemed the only alternative. Gathering seven other comrades, including Hsieh Ying-po, Chu Shu-t'ang 朱述堂, Ch'en Tzu-chio 陳自覺 and Li Hsi-wu 李西武 who managed the financial aspects, Liu established the Assassination Society, and himself drew up its regulations.

The object of their terrorist activities was mainly the high Imperial authorities of Kwangtung, particularly the gov-ernor Chang Ming-ch'i 張鳴岐 and Admiral Li Chun. Their plans also envisaged the sending of delegates to Peking to assassinate members of the Manchu royal family. A contribution of \$100




from a local sympathiser Hsiao Ch'u-pi 蕭楚璧 enabled the Society to procure premises in Bonham Road as its headquarters. At Yaumati in Kowloon a house was also rented for the purpose of making explosives, placed under the charge of Li Ying-sheng 李應生. Practical experimenting with the bombs and dynamite, which were sometimes bought from abroad and sometimes self-made, was carried out at Li Chi-t'ang's farm in the New Territories. In July, 1910, the headquarters moved to No.23, Mosque Street, and later to the Tsimshatsui area in Kowloon.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, before any assassinations were perpetrated, it was decided by the T'ung Meng Hui leaders that another insurrection could be organised. It was again to take place in Canton, for a number of considerations. Firstly, revolutionary feeling in the city continued to run high after the abortive 1910 Army coup d'etat. A considerable number of weapons were also still hidden there, unused since the last rising. Furthermore, Canton was conveniently close to Hongkong for the easy transport of arms and ammunition within half a day's journey. Besides, the British colony was also well-situated for flight should the necessity arise.<sup>3</sup> By this time, however, revolutionary activities were no longer confined to the south. Through Huang Hsing's liaison with the comrades in the Yangtze

2) Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, p.887; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih pp.22-24, K'o-ming i-shih 1V, pp.202-203.

3) See Hu Kuo-liang, "Hsin-hai Kuang-chou ch'i-i pieh-lu" in HHKM 1V, pp.263-264; Huang Hsing, "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu k'o-ming chih ch'ien-yin hou-kuo" in HHKM 1V, p.167; an incomplete version of Huang's work is also given in Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, pp.218-222.



areas, it was decided that during this insurrection, co-ordinated risings would also take place in the central provinces once the initial movement had begun in Canton.

In the summer of 1910, Sun Yat-sen had returned to Singapore after a European and American trip. In July, he moved to Penang, and subsequently summoned Chao Sheng, Hu Han-min, Huang Hsing and Teng Tse-ju to a conference to discuss plans for another attempt.<sup>4</sup> The leading revolutionaries therefore arrived at Penang in November, and the meeting held on 13 November, 1910, became the genesis of the Canton revolution.

The basic plans were soon laid down, and the next step was to procure the necessary financial backing. Sun Yat-sen made appeals to the overseas Chinese communities by letters and personal visits, and then in December left for a fund-raising tour to the United States.<sup>5</sup> Hu Han-min, Huang Hsing and Teng Tse-ju also made a number of journeys to enlist money from the Chinese in South-east Asia. In the final reckoning, nearly \$190,000 was collected for the rising from revolutionary sympathisers all over the world.<sup>6</sup> The enthusiasm of the Chinese mercantile class in Singapore and Penang was particularly

4) Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 1, pp.227-230; Wang Gung-wu, "Sun Yat-sen and Singapore" in Journal of the South Seas Society Vol. XV, Part 11, p.65; V.W. Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya p.355 also point out that at this time, Sun was warned by the Protector of Chinese to leave the country because of his revolutionary activities.

5) Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, p.807; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.231.

6) Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.807-809 gives a record of money received from all over the world.



heartening.<sup>7</sup>

After this, Chao Sheng, Huang Hsing and Hu Han-min returned to Hongkong, where a General Preparatory Department (T'ung Ch'ou Pu 總籌部) was formed in January of 1911. There seemed some uncertainty as to the leadership of this Department. Some accounts credit Huang Hsing with the chairmanship of the organisation, with Chao Sheng as vice-chairman.<sup>8</sup> Other records, however, claim that Chao was chairman.<sup>9</sup> Seven other posts were established, and they were filled by Hu Han-min (as secretary), Yao Yu-ping, Hu I-sheng, Lo Chih-yang 洛  
鐵揚, Ch'en Chiung-ming, Li Hai-yün and Hung Ch'eng-tien 洪  
承點.<sup>10</sup> The Department also sent out representatives to form branch offices in other Chinese provinces: T'an Jen-feng in general charge of the Yangtze areas, Chu Cheng and Sun Wu 楊武 to Hupeh, Chiao Ta-feng to Hunan, and Ch'en Ch'i-mei 陳其美 to Shanghai.<sup>11</sup>

7) Huang Hsing, op.cit. IV, p.167 records that over \$100,000 was received from them; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih p.88 states that the total received from just the British colonies of South-east Asia amounted to \$47,600.

8) Chou Lu, op.cit. III, p.809; Hu Kuo-liang, op.cit. IV, p.265.

9) Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-chuan" in Lo Chia-lun (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien III, p.408; Lo Chia-lun (ed) Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 1, p.232; Chang Shih-chao, "Chao Po-hsien shih-lüeh" in HHKM IV, p.314. Huang Hsing himself, also claim that Chao was the actual director of operations, see Huang Hsing, op.cit. IV, p.168.

10) There are also some discrepancies in the distribution of posts in the following accounts, see Chou Lu, op.cit. III, pp.809-810; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, p.232; Hu Kuo-liang, op.cit. IV, pp.265-266; Hu Han-min, op.cit. III, p.408; Ch'en Kung-fu, Chung-kuo k'o-ming shih pp.28-29.

11) Huang Hsing, op.cit. IV, pp.167-171; Feng Tzu-yu, K'o-ming i-shih 1, pp.218-222; Chou Lu, op.cit. III, p.811.



Thus, under these men, coordinated activities were to take place in these areas in conjunction with the rising in Canton. Huang Hsing had given T'an Jen-feng a sum of money for the purpose of organising rebellions in Hunan and Hupeh, and it was through T'an that the T'ung Meng Hui became closely aligned with the efforts of the revolutionary societies in the Yangtze regions.<sup>12</sup>


In Hongkong, meanwhile, the colony soon became the base of intense preparations and gathering ground for comrades from overseas and China. The local headquarters of the General Preparatory Department was located at No.35, Happy Valley Road. At the same time, another office was set up at Lyndhurst Terrace for the main purpose of making fire-arms and ammunition. All financial matters of this period were handled by Li Hai-yün, and Li Yü-t'ang's herb store, the Kum Lee Yuen, continued to serve as the collection and distribution centre of funds.<sup>13</sup>

At this time, it was found that the newly established Department had obviated the necessity of the Southern Bureau in Hongkong, which had been much weakened by the failure of the 1910 New Army revolt, and the financial difficulties that ensued. Besides, Hu Han-min, chairman of the Bureau, now found his services more urgently required as secretary of the Preparatory Department.<sup>14</sup> The Southern Bureau thus gradually dissolved itself.

12) See Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.98-99; Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, p.

13) Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, p.810; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1, p.279, 3

14) Chang Ch'i-chün (ed) Kuo-fu chüan-shu p.430.




Meanwhile, preparations for the rising continued. An unexpected event, however, occurred which was to prove detrimental to the ultimate success of the attempt, though it was carried out with the intention of facilitating the insurrection. This was the assassination attempt of Wen Sheng-ts'ai 温生豺.

Wen Sheng-ts'ai, a Cantonese and former member of the Chinese Army at Kwangtung, had joined the T'ung Meng Hui during a journey to South-east Asia. He had remained in Singapore since then. Now, when he knew of the plans for the 1911 rising, he realised that probably the strongest obstacles in the way of success was Admiral Li Chun. He therefore decided to contribute to the general activities of the T'ung Meng Hui by eliminating Li Chun. His decision, however, was not known to any of the revolutionaries, for Wen felt that a single-handed attempt ensured secrecy.

On 8 April, 1911, Wen stationed himself in Canton along a path Li Chun was expected to pass. When a procession came along, Wen fired from his gun. But instead of killing Li Chun, he shot and killed Fu Ch'i 戊禨 the acting Manchu Commander of Garrisons. Wen was instantly caught, and executed on 15 April, 1911.<sup>15</sup>

The attempt caused considerable excitement both in Canton and Hongkong. One of the highest of the provincials had been

15) For accounts of Wen's attempt, see Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 11, pp.290-294; Huang Hsing, "Fu Wen Sheng-ts'ai chi Fu Ch'i" in HHKM IV, p.172; Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.811-813, 1V, p.1326; the Hong Kong Daily Press of 10 April 1911, p.2 col.4; 11 April, p.2 col.5-6; 13 April, p.2 col.4; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.236-237 who claim that Wen had actually aimed to kill Fu Ch'i, having failed to find opportunity of approaching Li Chun.



killed in a most dramatic manner, and Wen, during his trial, admitted to being a member of an anti-dynastic society with comrades scattered all over the world. It was significant that public opinion in Canton was reported to be generally in sympathy with the captured assassin, and even many of the educated were rejoicing in the fact that there was one Manchu the less among the official hierarchy.<sup>16</sup> It was an ominous sign of the instability of the existing government.

Wen's martyrdom also caused some consternation among the revolutionaries in Hongkong. They calculated that its effect would be to make the Canton authorities particularly vigilant in watching and suppressing all suspicious activities. Nevertheless, plans for the rising were ripening.

In Canton, over forty headquarters were set up, under the guise of shops, commercial establishments or family dwellings. In this case, lady comrades filled an essential role. Ammunition and arms, the former manufactured in Hongkong and the latter bought from abroad, were sent from Hongkong into Canton in rice sacks for the "rice store", paint boxes for the "paint company", wig cases for the "wig-selling stores", and even in boxes of wedding presents for the "marriage ceremonies" among the revolutionary party.

On the military side, the New Army of Kwangtung continued to be subjected to intense revolutionary propaganda, led by

16) See the Hongkong Daily Press of 11 April, 1911, p.2 col.6 and 14 April, p.2 col.3.



Yao Yü-p'ing. With the help of Chu Chih-hsin and Chou Lu, Yao concentrated on converting his former colleagues and friends in the Rapid Results Academy (formerly the Military Academy), the graduates of the Bogue Military School and the student recruit camps.<sup>17</sup> By 1911, most of the graduates of the Rapid Results Academy had been promoted to official rank in the New Army, those of the Bogue Military School had become officers of the Circuit Battalions (Provincial Reserve Forces), and the student recruits had become leading members of the New Army. Conditions in the Army were therefore favourable for revolutionary infiltration. Yao set up secret contacts within its ranks, and initiated a large number into the T'ung Meng Hui. Chao Sheng and Huang Hsing were also able to yield much influence among the Circuit Battalions and the Regular Standing Army.<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, Chou Lu also began the publication of the K'o Pao 可報. It was organised with the backing of a number of progressive-thinkers from the newly established Provincial Assembly of Canton, and it was distributed among the troops to spread propaganda. Chu Chih-hsin was editor, and articles were daily submitted from anonymous writers in Hong-kong. In April, the K'o Pao gave wide coverage and expressed

17) The Military Academy was reorganised in 1906 by the governor Ch'en Ch'un-hsüan into the Rapid Results Academy (Su Ch'eng Hsüeh Hsiao 達成學校) which consequently led to a furore among the military students, thus making them easy targets for revolutionary infiltration. See Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, p.817, and Wen Kung-chih, "Hsin-hai k'o-ming yün-tung chung chih Hsin-chün" in HKKM 111, p.337.

18) Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.817-819.




appreciation of Wen Sheng-ts'ai's attempt, and it was consequently banned by the Canton authorities.<sup>19</sup>

By April, however, a Civilian Corp was formed, eight hundred "braves" were selected as the vanguard of the revolutionary army, sympathisers from the police and navy were contacted, and the inevitable secret society groups were organised. The revolutionaries therefore felt that the rising was due to start, and the date was tentatively set for 13 April, 1911.

A postponement, however, was soon found necessary. Wen Sheng-ts'ai's attempt had indeed caused the Canton authorities to strengthen their surveillance over the city, and it was difficult to act. Besides, funds from overseas had not been completely collected at Hongkong, and shipments of weapons from Japan and French Indo-china had been delayed.

It was also recorded that the cowardice of a revolutionary agent had caused the loss of a shipload of weapons. Just at this time, an accidental explosion of a merchant cargo of explosives in Hongkong had alarmed the British authorities. Fearing political implications, the harbour officials thus instigated a search of all incoming ships. Since the Hongkong revolutionaries were awaiting a shipload of weapons from Japan, the consternation was great. Huang Hsing therefore telegraphed to their agent, Chou Lai-su 周來蘇, to be cautious. Chou must have been unduly alarmed by this warning, for he simply

19) Chou Lu, "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu jih chih-i" in HHKM 1v, pp.259-261, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao 111, pp. 813-814 gives the Imperial proclamation of the ban.




threw the crates of arms into the sea during the journey. This had therefore resulted in a lack of fire-arms which necessitated the postponement of the rising.<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, when it was rumoured that two regiments of the New Army were to be transferred by the beginning of May, the rising was quickly fixed for 26 April, 1911. On 23 April, Huang Hsing left Hongkong for Canton, but on finding that weapons had not yet been sufficient, decided to postpone the rising. Chao Sheng's troops were therefore told to remain in Hongkong. On the 24th, however, Huang discovered that the Manchu authorities had learnt of the attempted insurrection, and were taking very strict measures of vigilance. Further delay would mean complete disbanding of their troops, and the fizzling out of the movement. Huang therefore shouldered the responsibility and decided to start on the afternoon of the 27th.<sup>21</sup> Chao Sheng's men, however, failed to arrive inside the city on time. The other groups in Canton soon scattered in face of the overwhelming opposition, and in the end Huang's troops alone faced the Imperial forces. Defeat was thus certain by 28 April.<sup>22</sup>

20) See Hu Kuo-liang, "Hsin-hai Kuang-chou ch'i-i pieh-lu" in HHKM IV, pp.267-268; Ho Ch'i-fang, "Chun-pei Huang-hua-kang Ch'i-i" in HHKM IV, pp.257-258.

21) This Canton rising of 1911 is sometimes called the "March 29 revolution", because it occurred on the 29th day of the third lunar month, which in 1911 fell on 27 April.

22) Accounts of the attempt are given in Chou Lu, op.cit. III, pp. 826-832; Huang Hsing, "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu k'o-ming chih ch'ien-yin hou-kuo" in HHKM IV, pp.167-171; Feng Tzu-yu, op. cit. I, pp.218-222; Hu Han-min, "Hu Han-min tzu-chuan" in K'o-min wen-hsien III, pp.409-411; Hsüeh Chun-tu, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution pp.88-93; the Hongkong Daily Press of 29 April, 1911, p.2 col.6; 1 May, p.3 col.2-3; 3 May, p.3 col.1-2; and Chou Lu, Kuang-Chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu k'o-ming chi (Changsha, 194



In estimating the reasons for the Canton failure, prime consideration must be given to the frequent change of dates for the start of the movement. This condition was aggravated by the lack of cohesion between the organisers in Canton and the headquarters in Hongkong. This was illustrated when Ch'en Chiung-ming had been sent on the afternoon of the 27th to inform Huang Hsing in Canton that the Hongkong groups had not been ready to move. On seeing Huang's men armed and prepared for action, however, Ch'en had returned to Hongkong without delivering his message. Huang had therefore not been told of the unpreparedness of the Hongkong comrades, until afterwards.<sup>23</sup> Huang Hsing was thus apt to attribute the failure of the rising to the negligence of some revolutionary comrades.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, Huang Hsing had probably taken the wisest course in deciding to rise on 27 April, or not at all.<sup>25</sup>

The lack of unity however, between groups within Canton itself during the two days of the movement was to the discredit of the revolutionary organisation. The forty headquarters in the city had been purposely kept ignorant of each other's activities, to better preserve secrecy. This in the end had contributed to a general confusion when the rising had started. An account is given of the troop under the command of Wen Tai-hsiung 温大猷 firing on Huang Hsing's men, because the latter

23) Huang Hsing, op.cit. IV, p.169.

24) Hu Han-min, op.cit. III, p.411, in which Huang named them as Yao Yü-p'ing, Hu I-sheng and Ch'en Chiung-ming.

25) Hsueh Chdn-tu, op.cit. pp.90-91 gives the reasons for Huang decision.



had not yet put on their arm-bands.<sup>26</sup>

There was also the factor of news having leaked to the authorities, despite the precautionary measures taken by the revolutionaries. It was discovered that an anonymous letter had earlier been sent to the viceroy of Canton, asking him to be the leader in a movement to set up a separate state in the two Kwang provinces. He had refused to entertain the idea; but it had also given him information of the conspiracy of the revolutionaries.<sup>27</sup> The leakage of information was also attributed to the treachery of Ch'en Ch'in-po 陳 鏡波 who had been entrusted with the purchase of a number of weapons, but who at the last moment had defected.<sup>28</sup> The lack of weapons had in fact been one of the prime causes of the failure of the rising. It could be traced to the general want of financial strength of the revolutionaries, as well as the confiscation of arms from many members of the New Army after the coup of 1910.<sup>29</sup>

Once again, the Chinese community in Hongkong was much stirred by news of the rising in Canton, particularly for the mercantile members with interests in the Chinese city. There was a ferment of excitement, and the vernacular press was eagerly scanned for the latest information. Even the English language press tended to admit that the rising, though abortive, was a sign of further disturbances to come, and that opinion

- 26) Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih I, p.292  
 27) Reported in the Hongkong Daily Press of 4 May 1911, p.3 col. ^  
 28) Huang Hsing, op.cit. IV, p.170; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.22  
 29) Li Chien-nung, op.cit. I, p.292; Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao III, p.825; Hu Han-min, op.cit. III, pp.303-304.



in Canton believed that the lull in the insurrection was only temporary. "Living in Canton just now is like living on a volcano; the slumbering fires beneath may break forth in uncontrollable fury at any moment."<sup>30</sup> Such was the effect of the T'ung Meng Hui revolutionary movement in Canton as well as other areas of south China.


The leading revolutionaries, meanwhile, were able to make their way back to Hongkong after the suppression of the attempt. Their escape from Canton city was in part facilitated by their comrades in the Canton Police Training School, who contrived to open the city gates for them.<sup>31</sup> In Hongkong, it was again the lot of the local comrades to make provisions for them, and a number was later sent to South-east Asia to seek their living.

At the same time, the Canton authorities continued to make an intense search for the rebels. A reward of \$100 had been offered for the capture of any revolutionary. Admiral Li Chun had also obtained permission from the foreign consuls concerned to search all ships arriving at Hongkong and Macao. (Most of the refugees were able to enter the colony only by disguising themselves.) In the end, twenty-nine executions were carried out, and later, the famous "seventy-two martyrs of the March 29 revolution" were buried at Huang-hua-kang 黃花崗.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30)</sup> The "Editorial" of the Hongkong Daily Press of 1 May 1911, p.2 col.1-2.

<sup>31)</sup> See Hu Kuo-liang, "Hsin-hai Kuang-chou ch'i-i pieh-lu" in HKKM IV, pp.268-274.

<sup>32)</sup> Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.835-840, 854-855; Ts'ao Ya-po, "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu jih chih-i" in HKKM IV, pp.239-241; the official records, Ku-kung tang-an kuan, "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu jih-chih-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" in HKKM IV, pp.324-330.



The significance of the failure of this insurrection in the south, so laboriously prepared, was now brought home to the leading T'ung Meng Hui members. This was in fact the fourth unsuccessful coup in Canton since 1895, and the revolutionaries began to look towards the Yangtze areas for their future operational base. Towards this end, the suggestion of T'an Jen-feng for the organisation of a department to direct activities was taken up. In July, 1911, the Central China Bureau of the T'ung Meng Hui (Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui Chung-pu Tsung-hui 中國同盟會中部總會) was set up in Shanghai, with T'an Jen-feng, Sung Chiao-jen and Ch'en Ch'i-mei as the chief directors. A number of branch offices was also set up in the central cities, and liaison was maintained with the armed forces.<sup>33</sup> The establishment of this Central China Bureau meant the final shift of the revolutionary centre from Hongkong to the Yangtze region, and after this time, the contribution of the colony towards the Chinese revolutionary movement was mainly in the form of isolated assassination attempts.

Both Huang Hsing and Chao Sheng, the chief conspirators, had been bitterly disheartened after the failure of the Canton rising. Chao had attempted suicide, and had died in Hongkong, on 18 May, 1911.<sup>34</sup> Huang Hsing, on the other hand, now determined to resort to assassination against the leading Canton

33) For accounts of the Bureau, see Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.91-911; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. pp.100-101; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.246-247; Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih pp.300-301.

34) Chang Shih-chao, "Chao Po-hsien shih-lüeh" in HHKM IV, p.31.



officials. He advocated the formation of a branch of the China Assassination Society in Canton for this purpose. Accordingly, \$20,000 was quickly collected from among local and overseas comrades, and a branch society organised.<sup>35</sup> It was to give expression to the frustrated Manchu-hatred of the Chinese revolutionaries in the few months before the final establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1912.

The Society had originally planned an attack upon the Prince Regent, Tsai Li 蔡禮 at Peking. Money had been collected, and explosives made in Hongkong during the months of July to October, 1910. One member of the proposed delegation to Peking, however, had suddenly disappeared on the way north, and so the plan had been temporarily dropped. Now, after the Canton revolt, the members decided that Li Chun and Chang Ming-ch'i were greater obstacles in the way of a successful revolution. These two officials thus became the target of their assassination activities.

An attack was first planned against Li Chun, since Chang Ming-ch'i had cautiously refrained from making public appearances after the March 29 revolution. It was to be carried out by two Cantonese, Lin Kuan-tz'u 林冠慈 and Ch'en Ching-yüeh 陳敬岳.

Lin had earlier known the revolutionaries in Hongkong, and in August 1911 had readily joined the China Assassination Society. When discussions began on the plot against Li Chun, Lin

<sup>35)</sup> Huang Hsing, op.cit. IV, p.171; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, p.2. Hsueh Chun-tu, op.cit. p.104.



volunteered his services. He was to be assisted by Li Hsi-wu, Chu Shu-t'ang and Kao Chien-fu 高劍父. At a farewell dinner in Hongkong before the group left for Canton in July, Lin had made a statement that he should be known by his pseudonym of Lin Kuan-tz'u, his real name being Kuan-jung 冠成, to prevent his mother knowing it if he should be killed as a result of the attempt.<sup>36</sup>


Ch'en Ching-yeh had come into contact with the revolutionaries in Malaya, where he had become a member of the secret society Chung Wo Tong. He was deeply distressed by news of the failure of the Canton rising, and also desired to take part in terrorist activities against the Canton officials. He therefore returned to Canton, and was asked to cooperate with Lin Kuan-tz'u in the attempt against Li Chun.<sup>37</sup>

In Canton they set up headquarters in a room at the T'ao Mei Hospital 豆美 (with the connivance of some sympathetic medical men), and the explosives were manufactured and sent to them from Hongkong. Li's movements were diligently spied on, and it was decided to waylay him at four points, Lin and Ch'en taking their posts inside and outside of the city gates respectively.

On the afternoon of 13 August, 1911, they were in their positions, and Lin threw a bomb at Li Chun and his entourage as they approached. Li was only slightly wounded, but Lin was

36) Chou Lu, op.cit. III, p.888; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, pp.201-212.

37) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, pp.214-215; Chou Lu, op.cit. IV, pp.1394-1395.



instantly killed, both by shrapnel from the bomb and by the shots of Li Chun's guards. Hearing the explosion, Ch'en prepared to flee, knowing that the mission had been carried out. But his European dress, lack of a queue, and the heavy box of explosives he was carrying aroused attention. After a chase, Ch'en was captured by police, and executed on 7 November, 1911. The other two assassins were able to throw their bombs into a river, and escaped to Hongkong. The attempt was subsequently given much publicity by the Chung-kuo Jih-pao in Hongkong.<sup>38</sup>

By this time, the revolutionary movement in the Yangtze area, under the direction of the Central China Bureau, was gathering intensity. The Hupeh comrades had decided to raise an insurrection in Wuchang in October, with the cooperation of regiments of the New Army. Various secret cells were set up, and on 24 September, 1911, a joint meeting had been held between the Common Advancement Society and the Literary Society to work for a united movement.<sup>39</sup>

At the same time, the controversy over the nationalisation of railways in Kwangtung, Szechwan, Hunan and Hupeh had reached alarming proportions.<sup>40</sup> It has been pointed out that though

38) Chou Lu, op.cit. III, pp.887-890; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, pp. 203-208, 215-216; Ts'ao Ya-po, "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu jih chih-i" in HHKM IV, pp.241-242, also see the Hongkong Daily Press of 16 August 1911, p.2 col.6.

39) Chou Lu, op.cit. III, pp.911-913; Hsüeh Chün-tu, op.cit. p.103; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, pp.249-251.

40) The edict of nationalisation is given in Cheng Lin, The Chinese Railways (Shanghai, 1935) pp.101-103. See accounts of railway disputes in Wang Jen-wen, "Hsin-hai Szechwan lu-chih tsui-yen" in HHKM IV, pp.415-423; Chu Tieh, "Hsiang-lu chi-shih" ibid IV, pp.549; Chou Lu, op.cit. III, p.911; and the official records, Ku-kung tang-an kuan, "Szechwan tieh-lu an tang-an" in HHKM IV, pp.457-52



the outcry raised by railway capitalists in Szechwan, where the furore was greatest, had not been based on any real revolutionary inclinations, it had in fact instigated a "social revolution", which had soon developed into a "national revolution".<sup>41</sup> At any rate, it tended to incite anti-dynastic feelings in the central areas, and acted to the advantage of the revolutionaries.

The proposed insurrection in Wuchang had to be postponed due to the increased vigilance of the authorities. The city, however, was in a state of acute agitation. On 9 October, an accidental explosion occurred in the Hankow revolution headquarters where Sun Wu was preparing fire-arms. Both the Imperial troops and the revolutionaries were immediately roused to action. The arrest of a number of comrades and the discovery of a list of soldiers involved in the revolutionary movement led to the precipitated outbreak of the Wuchang revolution. By the next day, Wuchang was captured and the revolution had extended to the other Chinese provinces.<sup>42</sup>

Even after the Wuchang outbreak of 10 October, 1911, how-

41) Kuo Mo-jo, "Fan-cheng ch'ien-hou" in HHKM IV, p.449.

42) For accounts of events of the revolution, see Chou Lu, op. cit. III, pp.911-922; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, pp.248-284; H.G.W. Woodhead, "The Revolution in China, 1911-1912" in The China Year Book of 1912; Li Shih-yüeh, Hsin-hai k'o-ming shih-ch'i liang-fu ti-ch'u ti k'o-ming yün-tung; Chi Chieh, Wu-chang chi-i ti ku-shih; J.O.P. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China pp.150-152; G. Lanning, Old Forces in New China (London, 1912) pp.311-318; Chang Ch'i-jo, Hsin-hai k'o-ming hui-i lu (Shanghai, 1945); Chung-hua min-kuo kai-kuo wu-shih-mien wen-hsien pien-mu wei-yüan-hui (ed) Hsin-hai k'o-ming yü Min-kuo chien-yüan Vol.1; vols. VI and VII of HHKM give accounts of the revolution province by province; also see vols. IV and V of K'o-ming wen-hsien.




ever, the China Assassination Society in Hongkong and its branch in Canton still continued its plan of an attack upon Admiral Li Chun. This time, Li Ying-sheng, head of the Canton society, decided to carry out the attempt. Unfortunately he was injured in the process of making the explosives, so his brother Li P'ei-chi 李沛基 took over the operation.

By now, Li Chun was sufficiently alarmed by the frequent attempts upon his person, to keep away from public appearances. At this time, news came from Hongkong through Huang Hsing that the Manchu general Feng Shan 馮山, known for his cunning and ferocity, was arriving in Canton on a special mission to curb subversive activities. The Assassination group therefore decided to attack Feng Shan first.

In Canton, the Ch'eng Chi 成記 grocery store was set up as cover for their headquarters, and from Hongkong the society members Li Hsi-wu, Chu Shu-t'ang and Liang I-shen 梁倚神 came to render assistance. Explosives were again sent from Hongkong, manufactured under the direction of Liu Ssu-fu. This time, the bomb to be used was so skilfully contrived that instead of being hand-thrown, which had cost the lives of previous assassins, it could be manoeuvered from a safe distance by the pulling of a rope.

The attempt was therefore successfully carried out on 25 October, 1911, with Li P'ei-chi operating the bomb safely hidden from the back of the store. Feng Shan was killed, and the assassins were able to escape to Hongkong without mis-




hap.<sup>43</sup> This was the first assassination attempt in which the object was achieved without loss of life for the revolutionaries, and it was ironic that by now the revolution was well on its way to its final success.

Yet it must be remembered that the seemingly disorganised and fruitless assassination attempts launched by the Hongkong revolutionary comrades during the period before 1911 had not been insignificant. Their repeated efforts against the Canton officials, especially Li Chun, was to lead indirectly to the peaceful transference of Kwangtung province to republican government.

This event came about through the surprising and totally unexpected change of front of Admiral Li Chun, erstwhile the deadliest enemy of the revolutionaries in the south. As soon as news of the fall of Wuchang on 11 October reached Canton, Admiral Li Chun decided to initiate negotiations with the Chinese revolutionaries in Hongkong. This was done through the assistance of two of his friends in Hongkong, Hsieh Liang-mu 謝良牧 and Sir Boshen Wei Yuk 倪玉，who was acquainted with Li Chi-t'ang.<sup>44</sup> The matter thus came to the notice of Hu Han-min. Hu was overjoyed, and wrote directly to Li Chun,

43) See Chou Lu, op.cit. 111, pp.891-893; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. 1V, pp.209-211; Ts'ao Ya-po, "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu jih chih-i" in HHKM 1V, pp.242-244; Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp. 264-265; the Hongkong Daily Press of 26 Oct. 1911, p.2 col.4 and 28 Oct. p.3 col.1.

44) Sir Wei Yuk was a colleague of Dr. Ho Kai on the Hongkong Legislative Council, and was knighted in 1910. See his biography in Woo Sing-lim, The Prominent Chinese in Hongkong Part 1 p.4.




guaranteeing the safety of his person and property if he should defect from the Manchu government. Li Chun then sent his brother Li Tz'u-wu 李次武 to Hongkong to meet the revolutionaries.<sup>45</sup> A conference was accordingly held on 7 November, at which Hu Han-min, Li Tz'u-wu, Li Chi-t'ang, Hsieh Ying-po and Wei Yuk were present. Through his brother, Li Chun offered to surrender the Bogue forts to the revolutionaries, and to try and persuade the governor Chang Ming-ch'i to defect also. After this, the brother returned to Canton the next day.<sup>46</sup>

Li Chun's sudden change of allegiance had naturally given rise to widely divergent views as to the motives behind his defection. It has been contended that Li had been forced to give way by Hsieh Liang-mu, as well as the alarming advances of the revolutionary army in Waichow under Ch'en Chiung-ming and Hu I-sheng's direction.<sup>47</sup> Another account attributed his action to pressure from Chang Ming-ch'i. It was pointed out that Chang had remained stubbornly loyalist even after the fall of Hankow (1 November), and that he had forced Li's hand by taking over command of one of his regiments. Consequently Li had applied to Hu Han-min for help, through the Rev. Ou Feng-

45) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, p.248; Huang Hsing, op.cit. IV, p.170; Li Chun, "Kuang-tung kuang-fu shih-mo chi" in HHKM VII, p.246; but Wen Kung-chih, "Hsin-hai k'o-ming yün-tung chung chih Hsin-chün" in HHKM III, p.337 records that Li sent an uncle to Hongkong, whose name had yet to be verified; while Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, p.272 states that Li sent the Rev. Ou Feng-ch'ih to negotiate.

46) "Hu Han-min hsüan-pu Li Chun fan-cheng shih-ching shih-mo shu" in Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, pp.249-252; Hu's proclamation is also given in Li Chun, op.cit. VII, pp.247-249.

47) Chou Lu, op.cit. III, p.957. An account of the activities in Waichow is given in the Hongkong Daily Press of 10 November 1911 p.2 col.3.



ch'ih. Hu had thus named four conditions as basis for negotiating with Li: Li's personal letter of surrender and the hoisting of the revolutionary flag from the yamen, securing the submission of Chang Ming-ch'i, welcoming the revolutionary army into Canton, and giving up his military strength, including forts, gunboats and troops. Li had supposedly conceded to all the terms, and Chang was therefore left in an isolated position.<sup>48</sup>

Li Chun himself accounted for his betrayal of the Manchus by professing observation of the changing trend of public opinion towards a "revival of the Han Race". He had thus felt that national feeling was too strong to be stayed. Therefore, when Hu Han-min sent Hsieh Liang-mu to seek his cooperation, he had readily begun negotiations. His real motive he stated as "concern for the lives and property of the Cantonese people".<sup>49</sup>

Li's own justification was doubtless an attempt to vindicate his treacherous desertion of the Manchu government, for which he had served faithfully since 1903 in suppressing revolutionary movements in Kwangtung. Therefore, in a final survey of the various theories, one would tend to agree with Feng Tzu-yu that Li's apostasy arose out of fear for his own life and position, having regarded the events of Wuchang with a discerning eye. Li Chun simply sought to make the most out of a difficult situation in view of overwhelming odds.<sup>50</sup>

Meanwhile, on 8 November, the Provincial Assembly of Can-

48} Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, p.275.

49} Li Chun, op.cit. VII, pp.245-247.

50} Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, p.248.




ton held a meeting of leading citizens, and they decided to remain neutral. Chang Ming-ch'i was tentatively elected provisional governor of the republican government to be set up. Chang however, refused the post. After reelections, Hu Han-min was nominated, and was invited to establish the new order in Janton.<sup>51</sup>

On 9 November, Chang Ming-ch'i suddenly and secretly fled from Canton into Hongkong, followed by a number of his former subordinates. This left the direction of events in the hands of Li Chun, who therefore raised the revolutionary flag in the Canton yamen, and made way for Hu Han-min to take over the government. The republican government of Canton was subsequently organised, with Hu as provisional governor. Other posts were filled by a number of prominent Chinese residents from Hongkong, including Li Yü-t'ang as chief of the Finance Department.<sup>52</sup>

Li Chun stayed in Canton long enough to direct the welcome ceremonies and facilitate the change of government. And then he also suddenly left Canton for Hongkong. Leaving behind a note for the provisional government, Li Chun himself explained that some displaced Manchu officials had tried to bribe him to spy on the republicans. He had therefore felt it expedient

51) Kuo Hsiao-ch'eng, "Kuang-tung kuang-fu" in HHKM VII, pp.229-231; Chou Lu, "Kuang-tung kuang-fu" ibid VII, pp.224-227; Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao III, pp.956-959; Ma Hsiao-chin, "Kuang-chou kuang-fu yù Chou Chien-kung" in HHKM VII, pp.250-255.

52) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, pp.248-249; Li Chun, op.cit. VII, pp.245-247; the Hongkong Daily Press of 10 November 1911, p.3 col.1; 13 Nov. p.3 col.1; 17 Nov. p.2 col.4.



to leave.<sup>53</sup> His decision was also probably influenced by the disorder and mob-activitics that enveloped Canton immediately after the transference of government.<sup>54</sup> This and a real fear of attacks upon his person by some of those who still remained loyalist, were probably the real motives for Li's sudden disappearance.<sup>55</sup> Besides, he had nothing to gain by remaining. He had been wise to make the most of his glorified "patriotism" to the revolution rather than to stay on and provoke the reproach of both Manchu loyalists and the newly installed republicans.


While these activities were being carried out in Canton, the Chinese population in Hongkong proceeded to indulge in noisy celebrations when news of the fall of Peking and the establishment of republican government in Kwangtung reached the colony. Led by members of the T'ung Meng Hui and other residents, the celebrations took the form of organised meetings, firing of crackers, cutting off of queues in massive numbers, and even a raid upon the offices of the constitutional reformers' journal, the Shang Pao.<sup>56</sup> The various revolutionary clubs and offices were now closed, including that of the China Assas-

53) His note is given in Kuo Hsiao-ch'eng, op.cit. V11, p.235; see also Hu's proclamation in Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, p.252.

54) See Kuo Hsiao-ch'eng, op.cit. V11, pp.234-235; Ma Hsiao-chin, op.cit. V11, p.255.

55) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, p.248.

56) For accounts of the local celebrations, see the Hongkong Daily Press of 8 November 1911, p.3 col.1; 13 Nov. p.3 col.1; 15 Nov. p.3 col.2; there was also talk of dissatisfaction from certain Chinese quarters at the British government harbouring Chang Ming-ch'i, in 18 Nov. p.3 col.1.



sination Society.<sup>57</sup>


By 21 December, 1911, Sun Yat-sen had arrived at Hongkong on his way to Shanghai, together with General Homer Lea and Mrs. Lea.<sup>58</sup> Sun had been travelling abroad since December 1910 when he left Penang for Europe and America, and it had been in Denver on 12 October that he had read of the success of the revolution in Wuchang.<sup>59</sup>

Upon his arrival in Hongkong, Sun was met by Hu Han-min, Chu Chih-hsin and others. It was the opinion of these revolutionary comrades that Sun should stay in the south until they were sure of the situation in the north to be able to organise a republican government for the whole of China. Hu Han-min argued that the Northern Army was still loyal to the Manchus, and that if Sun arrived in Shanghai at this juncture, popular acclaim would result in his forming a government there. This he thought to be detrimental to the ultimate control and unity of the whole country. Hu therefore advocated that Sun should reorganise southern military strength first, and then proceed north in triumph. Sun Yat-sen, however, refused to subscribe to this "cowardly" attitude, and desired to begin negotiations

57) Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, p.211.

58) Homer Lea was an American militarist who became an enthusiastic supporter of the Chinese revolutionary movement. Accounts of Lea are given in J.W. Hall, Eminent Asians (London, 1929) pp. 47-48; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. IV, pp.186-187; Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu yü Ou-Mei chih yu-hao pp.94-104; and the Hongkong Daily Press of 22 December, 1911, p.3 col.5.


59) See Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. I, pp.231-284 for accounts of Sun's activities abroad; Feng Tzu-yu, op.cit. I, pp.233-235 records his activities in Canada.



with the northern faction.<sup>60</sup>

In face of Sun Yat-sen's determination, Hu and the others soon followed his way of thinking. Sun and Hu Han-min therefore left Hongkong and arrived at Shanghai on 25 December. (Ch'en Chiung-ming became the acting military governor in Canton.) By this time, the provisional government of China had been established at Nanking, and at an election meeting on 29 December, Sun Yat-sen was elected provisional president. Eventually, after further negotiations, China was declared a republic on 1 January, 1912.

60) Lo Chia-lun, op.cit. 1, pp.286-287.



## CHAPTER IX

### Conclusion


Hongkong's prominent role in the Chinese revolutionary movement evolved mainly out of its favourable geographical and social characteristics. Situated just out of reach of Chinese Imperial authorities, yet close enough for easy access to Canton, the seat of the Chinese government in the south, the colony was thus naturally endowed as a base for plots in Kwang-tung province, and a haven for rebels to flee Chinese vengeance. Being a customs-free port, it also offered opportunity for the smuggling of fire-arms from abroad. And socially, the Chinese community of Hongkong contained a considerable portion of intelligent, educated and sufficiently well-to-do gentry who could afford to spend their leisure hours in being politically interested in the affairs of the Chinese homeland. From these classes came the members of the Fu Jen Literary Society and the early comrades of Sun Yat-sen in the Hsing Chung Hui. As the movement progressed, more influential Chinese were drawn to the support of its activities, and their moral and financial encouragement helped to sustain revolutionary fervour during



difficult times.


One consequence of these activities being carried out in the colony of Hongkong was the inevitable involvement of the British government in the Chinese revolutionary movement. This aspect was especially marked during Sir Henry Blake's term of office as governor of Hongkong in 1898-1903. Blake stood for the protection of Chinese reformers, and the maintenance of British territorial sovereignty if the question of the extradition of Chinese political refugees arose. Therefore, during his administration, Blake repeatedly championed the cause of the Chinese revolutionaries in his despatches to the British Colonial Office and Foreign Office. In 1900, he even tried personally, though in vain, to convince the viceroy Li Hung-chang to work with the Hsing Chung Hui for a united movement in south China.

Blake's attitude, which was shared by most of the leading English press of the time, was doubtless motivated by a genuine desire to see reforms in China. Support for the revolutionary movement had become more widespread after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, which was followed by the scramble for concessions and the Boxer disaster in China. Most intelligent men, both Chinese and European, felt that it was impossible not to sympathise with any movement which had for its ultimate object the reformation of the Chinese government. Blake was confident that in the activities of the Chinese revolutionaries of Hongkong lay the possibility of such an event.



The nature of Chinese revolutionary activity in the colony took the form of organisational, propaganda and financial campaigns. Hongkong's proximity to the Chinese mainland made it the operational background of insurrections against the Chinese government in south and south-east Kwangtung, particularly during the two years of successive attempts in 1906-1908. The freedom of the press in the British colony enabled the Chung-kuo Jih-pao to exist throughout the period before 1911, a feature which no other major revolutionary publication enjoyed. Propaganda was thus continuously disseminated into adjacent Chinese territories from the colony. The Hongkong comrades also under took control of most of the financial matters of the revolution, by establishing collection and distribution centres under cover of commercial transactions, an expedient least likely to arouse official attention in view of the colony's status as a trading mart between east and west.


For a time, the revolutionaries in Hongkong also contemplated aligning their activities with those of the constitutional reformers from the north, especially when K'ang Yu-wei had to flee to the colony after the 1898 coup d'etat in Peking. It was an attempt to win the support of the scholar-reformers in China, over whom K'ang Yu-wei yielded considerable influence. K'ang, however, refused to entertain the idea of the scholar-gentry class cooperating with the anti-dynastic rebels in the south, and after this, the Chinese revolutionaries abandoned all hopes of a peaceful reform programme in China. Insurrectionary measures were then intensified.



Throughout the period 1895-1911, a total of eight revolutionary attempts were directly organised in Hongkong.<sup>1</sup> Each was a failure, resulting in the execution of some and capture of many participants. Yet each struggle inspired their fellow comrades to renewed vigour and increased revolutionary fervour, though momentary periods of frustration and disillusion were inevitable. At times, the disappointment of certain sections of the movement led to sporadic assassination attempts against the Chinese officialdom, both in the north and south, to give vent to their anti-Manchu feelings. These too, were mostly fruitless efforts insofar as their immediate objectives were concerned, as they generally led to the deaths of the assassins themselves. In the long run, however, they did serve to focus attention on the revolutionary movement. And, in one instance, in relation to the shift of allegiance of their persistent adversary, Admiral Li Chun, their work was crowned with overwhelming success. In this unexpected way, the peaceful transference to republican government of at least one Chinese province was assured.


By 1911, however, the Chinese revolutionary movement was no longer confined to the south, and Hongkong's position as an operational base was shifted to more centrally situated locations in the Yangtze regions. This was particularly notice-

1) The 1895 attempt in Canton, 1900 Waichow rising, 1903 Hung Ch'üan-fu attempt in Canton, 1907 Chao-chou Huang-kang attempt, 1907 risings in Ch'in-chou and Lien-chou in Kwangtung, 1907 rising in Ch'i-nü-hu of Waichow, 1910 New Army coup in Canton and the 1911 March 29 revolution.




able when prominent leaders of the revolutionary movement, who had formerly operated in the south, began to leave the colony to undertake more momentous activities in other areas of China or overseas. Feng Tzu-yu, the dominant figure in the T'ung Meng Hui period in Hongkong, left for Canada in 1910. Huang Hsing's connections with comrades in Hunan and Hupeh necessitated his frequent journeys to central China. Hu Han-min was generally left in charge of affairs in the south. Yet his concurrent posts in the South-east Asia Regional Bureau and the Southern Bureau in Hongkong also called for frequent trips to overseas areas in the Malay peninsula. Activities in Hongkong were thus left in the hands of lesser men such as Hsieh Ying-po and Li I-heng (chairman of the local T'ung Meng Hui and director of the Chung-kuo Jih-pao respectively). The earlier revolutionary promoters from the Hsing Chung Hui period, including Ch'en Shao-pai and Tse Tsan-tai, had long been disheartened and given up active campaigns. Sun Yat-sen had been abroad since his banishment from the colony in 1896.

It was therefore not surprising that in 1911 the Hongkong revolutionaries felt themselves in an increasingly isolated position, as events in central China gathered momentum. Nevertheless, even after the successful outbreak of the revolution in Wuchang in October, 1911, enthusiasts in the colony doggedly continued their efforts to organise an assassination attempt against the Tartar general Feng Shan. Perhaps it was fitting that they had their final reward, in that they were responsible for the organising of the republican government in Canton under



the direction of Hu Han-min.

Therefore, in a final analysis, while it is recognised that the rapid success of the Chinese revolution in 1911 could not be attributed entirely to the one and half decades of sustained effort by the revolutionaries in Hongkong, their activities undoubtedly played an integral and essential part. The Chinese revolutionary movement originated from the British colony, and from the formation of the first literary society in 1892, it steadily gathered in intensity. The activities of the southern revolutionaries were not always successful, but their deeds of heroism were given much publicity by the two leading propaganda organs, the Min Pao from 1905 to 1909, and the Chung-kuo Jih-pao in Hongkong. Consequently, the tide of revolutionary fervour which spread far into the corners of the Chinese mainland by 1911, radiated in great part from the original base in the south-most tip of the Empire, and led to the successful overthrow of over two hundred and fifty years of Manchu domination.



## APPENDIX 1

### Sun Yat-sen's Letter to Tse Tsan-tai

The following letter is included as an example of the close contact which Sun Yat-sen maintained with the revolutionaries in Hongkong during his long periods of absence from the colony. It also shows the personal interest he took regarding the activities and welfare of the revolutionary associates in Hongkong. For detailed references to this letter, see above, Chapter V, p.130.

The original letter is now in the possession of Mr. Tse Shu Man, son of the late Tse Tsan-tai.

Dear Kong-ju,

Immediately upon being informed of the murder in Hong Kong of our late friend Mr. Yeung, I circulated the information to all our fellow members. It is difficult to describe in writing how grieved the members and myself are towards the late Mr. Yeung's assassination.

So, on the night of the 7th of this month (Chinese calendar) members were summoned together for a memorial meeting, at which Mr. Yue made a speech and related in brief the biography of the late Mr. Yeung whose loyalty greatly moved all present.

I took the opportunity to produce a contrib-



ution sheet and explained that such contributions received were for Mr. Yeung's family. Contributions, which were enthusiastically donated by all present, amounted to a little over \$1,000. On behalf of the deceased's family, Mr. Yue tendered thanks, expressing the gratitude of the dead and the living. The meeting then broke up. What I have done for Mr. Yeung in Yokohama, is to pacify my conscience that a somewhat brotherly deed is done.

As regards the contributions, I will remit same to you for attention, c/o the "Chung Kuo Press", as soon as all are collected.

I hear that our associates in Hong Kong are also collecting contributions for the same purpose, and I wish to be informed of the amount at an early date.


I am now issuing, in my name, Death Notices re Mr. Yeung's death. The associates and/or Mr. Yeung's friends and relatives in places east of Japan have all been notified. But Mr. Yeung had a wide circle of acquaintances and you know them better than anybody else. I have therefore forwarded you 200 notices and hope you will send them on to all Mr. Yeung's friends in Hong Kong, and those places south, north, and west of Hong Kong.

This letter does not include all I wish to say.

Yours sincerely,  
SUN WEN

February 13, 1901.

P.S. I have also sent 100 Death Notices to Hsin-shou. Wish you would explain to him when you see him.




## APPENDIX 11

(Photographs by courtesy of Mr. Tse Shu-man)



This is perhaps the earliest photograph of a group of Chinese revolutionaries in Hongkong before Sun Yat-sen joined the movement. Tse Tsan-tai, seated third from the left, and Yang Ch'u-yün, at his ~~left~~<sup>right</sup> hand, were the two founders of this Fu Jen Literary Society.



WHEN SUN YAT SEN JOINED TSE TSAN TAI AND YEUNG KU WAN

照玉人要會中興年赤乙

1895



孫逸仙

雲衡楊

孫逸孫


Official photograph taken at the time of the founding of the Hsing Chung Hui in 1895 in Hongkong. Yang Ch'u-yün, the chairman of the party, is in the central position, with Tse Tsan-tai and Sun Yat-sen on the left and right respectively.

照合年戊戌本日在士志本日及仙逸孫雲衡楊



孫逸孫  
雲衡楊

Photograph taken in 1898 during a period when Yang Ch'u-yün and Sun Yat-sen were in Japan. Yang is seated second from the ~~left~~<sup>right</sup>, and Sun is standing directly behind him. They are flanked by Chinese revolutionaries and Japanese sympathizers in Japan, including Miyazaki Torazō, standing in the third row.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works covering the general reform movement in China, to which reference has been made in Chapter 1, have not been listed in the Bibliography.

## PRIMARY MATERIAL

### A. Official Chinese Collections

Ch'ing Shih Kao 清史稿 (Draft History of the Ch'ing dynasty) compiled by Chao Erh-sun 趙爾巽, 529 chüan. Peiping, 1927-28.

Ta-ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu 大清歷朝實錄 (Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty), 4485 chüan. Tokyo, 1937-38.

Hsin-hai k'o-ming 辛亥革命 (The revolution of 1911) edited by Ch'ai Te-keng 蔡德慶 et.al., 8 vols. Shanghai, 1957.

In particular, the following documents:-

"Ku-kung tang-an kuan 故宮檔案", "Sun Wen k'o-ming yün-tung Ch'ing-fang tan-an" 孫文革命運動清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary movement) in Vol.1.

"T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang Han-k'ou ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tan-an" 唐才常漢口起義清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of T'ang Ts'ai-

ch'ang's rising at Hankow) in Vol.1.

"Hung Ch'u'an-fu ch'i-i tang-an" 洪全福起義檔案 (Records of the Hung Ch'u'an-fu case) in Vol.1.

"Su Pao ku-oh'ui k'o-ming Ch'ing-fang tang-an" 苏報鼓吹革命清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of the incitement to revolution of the Su Pao) in Vol.1.


"P'ing-Liu-Li ch'i-i Ch'ing-fnag tang-an" 莆廩醴起義清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of the revolutions at P'ing-Liu-Li) in Vol.11.

"Fang-ch'eng ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" 防城起義清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of the insurrection at Fang-ch'eng) in Vol.11.

"Chen-nan-kuan ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" 鎮南關起義清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of the insurrection at Chen-nan-kuan) in Vol.111.

"Che-kiang pan-li Chiu Chin k'o-ming ch'u'an-an" 浙江辦理款項革命全案 (The complete records of the undertaking of Chekiang about Chiu Chin's revolutionary movement) in Vol.111.

"Hsü Hsi-lin An-king ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" 徐錫麟安慶起義清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of Hsü Hsi-lin's revolutionary attempt at Anking) in Vol.111.



"Yün-nan Ho-k'ou ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" 廣南河口起義  
清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of the revolutionary attempts at Yünnan and Hok'ou) in Vol.III.

"Kuang-chou Hsin-chün ch'i-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" 廣州新軍起義  
清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of the revolutionary attempt of the New Army at Canton) in Vol.III.

"Kuan-yü ch'ou-pei li-hsien ti yü-chih yü tsou-che" 關於籌立憲的諭旨與奏摺 (Concerning the edicts and memorials in preparing for establishing a constitution) in Vol.IV.

"Sze-chwan tieh-lu an tang-an" 四川鐵路案檔案 (Records of the Szechuan railroad case) in Vol.IV.

"Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu jih chih-i Ch'ing-fang tang-an" 廣州三月二十九日之役清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of the March 29 revolution at Canton) in Vol.IV.

"Kuang-tung ch'i-i ch'ien-hou Ch'ing-fang tang-an" 廣東起義前後清方檔案 (Ch'ing records of the events before and after the revolution in Kwangtung) in Vol.VII.

Wu-hsü pien-fa 戊戌變法 (The reform movement of 1898), edited by Chien Po-tsang 顏伯贊 et.al., 4 vols. Shanghai, 1953. In particular, the following documents:-

Lin Shu-hui 林樹蕙 (ed) "Shang-yü san-i-lu t'iao" 上諭三一六條 (316 Imperial decrees), in Vol.II.

Wang Ch'i-chü 王其渠 (ed) "K'ang Yu-wei tsou-i erh-shih-chiu p'ien" 康有為奏議二十九篇 (29 memorials from K'ang Yu-wei), in Vol.II.

I-ho T'uan tang-an shih-liao 義和團檔案史料 (Archival material on the Boxer rebellion), compiled by Kuo-chia tang-an chü Ming-Ch'ing tang-an kuan 國家檔案局明清檔案館, 2 vols. Peking, 1959.


Wu-hsü pien-fa tang-an shih-liao 戊戌變法檔案史料 (Archival material on the reform movement of 1898), compiled by Kuo-chia tang-an chü Ming-ch'ing tang-an kuan 國家檔案局明清檔案館, Peking, 1958.

## B Official British Collections

Great Britain, Foreign Office, General Correspondence, Series F.O. 17/1718, - "Chinese Revolutionaries in British Dominions, 1896-1905". Public Record Office, London. Foreign Office material in manuscript.

. Colonial Office, General Correspondence, Series C.O. 129 - "Governor's Despatches and Replies from the Secretary of State for the Colonies." Public Record Office, London. Reference to some documents in this series has been made by courtesy of Mr. G.B. Endacott.

Gooch, C.P. and Temperley, H. (ed) British Documents on the Orig



280

of the War, 1898-1914, 11 vols. London, 1926-38. Printed Foreign Office material.

The Parliamentary Debates. London.

Hertslet, Sir Edward (ed) Treaties, Conventions etc. Between China and Foreign States, 2 vols. London, 1908.

MacMurray, J.V.A. (ed) Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919, 2 vols. New York, 1921.

The Maritime Customs, Miscellaneous Series, No.30, Treaties, Conventions etc. Between China and Foreign States, 2 vols. Shanghai, 1917.

Carrington, Sir John W. (ed) The Ordinances of Hongkong, 2 vols. Hongkong, 1904.

Hongkong government, Administrative Reports. 1909-1911. (There is an interruption in the series between 1883-1909).

..... Hongkong Blue Book. 1901-1911. (There is an interruption in the series between 1891-1901).

..... Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hongkong, 1841-1930. Hongkong, 1932.

..... The Hongkong Government Gazette. 1895-1911.

..... Hongkong Hansard, reports of the meetings of the Legislative Council. 1895-1911.

..... Hongkong Sessional Papers, papers laid before the Legislative Council. 1895-1911.

### C Newspapers

It is regrettable that many of the revolutionary publications and other Chinese vernacular journals were not available to me, in particular, the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, which was an outstanding source of information on revolutionary activities in Hongkong. The following newspapers have been consulted, during the periods indicated.


China Mail (Hongkong). From 1895-1909, when the series was interrupted until 1920.

Chung-wai Jih-pao 中華報 (The Universal Gazette, Shanghai) Extracts from Wu-hsü pien-fa, Vol.111, for 1898.

Hongkong Daily Press. From 1895-1911.

Hongkong Telegraph. Available only from 1906-1907 (January - March).

Kuo Wen-Pao 國聞報 (National News), Tientsin). An extract from Wu-hsü pien-fa, Vol.111, for 1898.



Shen Pao 申報 (Shanghai Newspaper). An extract from Wu-hsü pien-fa, Vol. III, for 1898.

"Shih-wu Pao p'ing-lun wu-p'i'en" 時務報評論五篇 (5 essays from the Shih-wu Pao, Shanghai) in Wu-hsü pien-fa Vol. III.

## D Contemporary

The diaries, memoirs and general works of revolutionary participants, their later collections, as well as contemporary material on the Chinese revolution, are listed in this section.

Beresford, Lord Charles, The Break-up of China. New York and London, 1899.

Bigham, Clive, A Year in China, 1899-1900. London, 1901.

Blakeslee, G.H. (ed) China and the Far East. New York, 1910.

Bland, J.O.P., Recent Events and Present Policies in China, Philadelphia, 1912.

Borst-Smith, E.P., Caught in the Chinese Revolution. London, 1912.

Cantlie, J. and Jones, C.S., Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of China. London, 1912.

Chang Ch'i-chün 張其昀 (ed) Kuo-fu ch'üan-shu 國父全書 (Collected works of Sun Yat-sen). Taiwan, 1960-61.

Chang Hsing-yen 章行嚴 "Su Pao an shih-mo chi-hsü" 蘇報案始末記敘 (A description of the beginning and end of the Su Pao case) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol. I.

Chang Nan-hsien 張難先 "Keng-tzu Han-k'ou chih-i" 汉口之役 (The 1900 insurrection at Hankow in Wu-hsü pien-fa Vol. IV).

\_\_\_\_\_. "Wen-hsüeh-she shih-mo" 文學社始末 (The beginning and end of the Literary Society) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol. V.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Chen-wu hsüeh-she chih shih-mo" 武學社之始末 (The beginning and end of the Military Studies Society) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, Vol. V.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ch'ün-chih hsüeh-she chih shih-mo" 學會始末 (The beginning and end of the Society for Self-government studies) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol. V.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Kung-chin Hui shih-mo" 共進會始末 (The beginning and end of the Common Advancement Society) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol. II.

Chang Ping-lin 章炳麟 "Yù Wu Chih-hui t'an Su-pao an shu" 與吳稚暉談蘇報案 (A letter to Wu Chih-hui about the Su Pao case) in Hsin-Hai k'o-ming Vol. I.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Yù Huang-ch'i shu shu-yü-chung shih" 與黃漢書述獄中事 (A letter to Huang-ch'i about events in the prison) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol. I.



。 (ed) "T'ien T'iao" 天討 (Punishment from Heaven) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol.II.

。 "Ch'in Li-shan chuan" 秦力山傳 (Biography of Ch'in Li-shan) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol.I.

Chang Shih-chao 章士劍 "Chao Po-hsien shih-lüeh" 趙伯先事略 (An outline of events concerning Chao Po-hsien) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol.IV.

Ch'en Shao-pai 陳少白 "Hsing Chung Hui k'o-ming shih-yao" 中興革命史要 (Outline of the revolutionary history of the Hsing Chung Hui) appended in Ch'en Te-yün 陳德芸 (ed) Ch'en Shao-pai hsien-sheng ai-ssu-lu 陳少白先生哀思錄 (An obituary record of Ch'en Shao-pai). Canton, 1934?

Cheng Kuan-ying 鄭觀應 "Sheng-shih wei-yen" 盛世危言 (Warnings to a seemingly prosperous age) in Wu-hsü pien-fa Vol.1.

Chou Hsien-wen 周憲文 (ed) Li Wen-chung kung hsüan-chi 李文忠公選集 (Selected collection of Li Hung-chang's works), 5 vols. Taipei, 1961.

Chou Lu 劉魯, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao 中國國民黨史稿 (Draft history of the Nationalist party) 4 vols. Shanghai, 1938.

。 Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu k'o-ming chi = +九  
革命記 (An account of the March 29 revolution of Canton). Changsha, 1940.

。 Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang kai-shih 中國國民黨概史. (A General history of the Nationalist party). Taipei, 1953.

。 "Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" 中國同盟會 (The United League of China) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol.II.

。 "I-wei Kuang-chou ch'i-i" 乙未廣州起義 (The insurrection of 1895 in Canton) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol.1.

。 "Ting-wei Chen-nan-kuan chih-i" 丁未鎮南關之役 (The rising of 1907 at Chen-nan-kuan) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol.III.

。 "Wu-shen Yün-nan Ho-k'ou chih-i" 戊申雲南河口之役 (The risings of 1908 at Yunnan and Hok'ou) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol.III.

。 "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu jih-chih-i" 廣州三月二十九日之役 (The rising of March 29 at Canton) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol.IV.

。 "Kuang-tung kuang-fu" 廣東光復 (The restoration in Kwangtung) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming Vol.VII.

Chü Cheng 居正 "Chung-hua k'o-ming-t'ang shih-tai ti hui-i" 中華革命黨時代之回憶 (Reminiscences of the Chinese Revolutionary Party) in K'o-ming wen-hsien Vol.V.

Colquhoun, A.R., China in Transformation. London, 1899.

Committee for the compilation of materials on the party history of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomingtang, (ed) Kuo-fu chüan-chi 國父全集 (Complete collection of Sun Yat-sen's works), 6 vols. Taiwan, 1957.



Dingle, E.J., Across China on Foot: Life in the Interior and the Reform Movement. London, 1911.

. China's Revolution: 1911-1912. Shanghai, 1912.

Duncan, Chesney, Tse Tsan-tai: His Political and Journalist Career. London, 1917.

The Editorial Board of the Bureau of Chinese Historical Research (ed) Liu K'un-i i-chi 劉坤一遺集 (Collected Works of Liu K'un-i), 6 vols. Peking, 1959.

Farjenal, F., (trans. M. Vivian) Through the Chinese Revolution. New York, 1916.

Feng Tzu-yu 馮自由 K'o-ming i-shih 革命逸史 (Historical Sketches of the Revolution) 5 vols. Changsha, 1939, Chungking, 1943-46. (Only 4 vols. were available to me).

. Hua-chiao k'o-ming kai-kuo shih 華僑革命開國史 (History of the Revolution and the Overseas Chinese) Chungking, 1946.

. "Hsing Chung Hui shih-ch'i k'o-ming t'ung-chih" 暫中會時  
革命同志 (The Revolutionary Comrades During the Hsing Chung Hui Period) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.

. "ChangT'ai-jen yü Chih-na wang-kuo chi-nien-hui" 章太炎與  
支那亡國紀念會 (Chang Ping-lin and the Society to Commemorate the Loss of China) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.

. "Chang-sha Hua Hsing Hui" 長沙華興會 (The Hua Hsing Hui of Changsha) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.

. "Kuang-fu Hui" 光復會 (The Restoration Society) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.

. "Chi Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui" 記中國同盟會 (A Record of the T'ung Meng Hui) in K'o-ming wen-hsien vol.11.

. "Hsing Chung Hui tsu-chih shih" 暫中會組織史 (The History of the Organisation of the Hsing Chung Hui) in K'o-ming wen-hsien vol.111.


Hu Han-min 胡漢民 "Hu Han-min tzu-chuan" 胡漢民自傳 (The Autobiography of Hu Han-min) in K'o-ming wen-hsien vol.111.

. "Nan-yang yu Chung-kuo k'o-ming" 南洋與中國革命 (South-east Asia and the Chinese Revolution) appended in Teo Eng-hock 張永福, Nan-yang yu ch'uang-li Min-kuo 南洋與創立民國 (South-east Asia and the Founding of the Chinese Republic). Singapore, 1934.

. "Yüeh-Han tieh-lu shang-pan wen-t'i chih wei-chiai-chüeh" 粵漢鐵路商辦問題之未解決 (The Unsolved Problem of Merchant Management of the Canton-Nankow Railway) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1V.

. "Min Pao chih lu-ta chu-i" 民國之六大主義 (The Six Basic Doctrines of the Min Pao) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.11.

. (ed) Tsung-li ch'üan-chi 通理全集 (Complete Collection of Sun Yat-sen's Works), 5 vols. Shanghai, 1931.



Hu I-sheng 胡毅生 "T'ung Meng Hui ch'eng-li ch'ien erh-san-nien chih hui-i" 同盟會成立前二三年之回憶 (Reminiscences of Events Two or Three Years Before the Establishment of the T'ung Meng Hui) in K'o-ming wen-hsien vol.11.

Hu Li-yüan 胡禮垣. Hu I-nan hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi 胡翼南先生全集 (Complete Collection of Hu Li-yüan's Works), 18 vols. Shanghai, 1920.

Huang Hsing 黃興 "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu k'o-ming chih ch'i-en-yin hou-kuo" 廣州三月二十九革命之前因後果 (The Causes and Consequences of the March 29 Revolution in Canton) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1V.

K'ang Yu-wei 康有為 Kung Tzu kai-chih k'ao 孔子改制考 (An Examination of Confucius as a Reformer) Peking, 1920.

\_\_\_\_\_. Wei-ching k'ao 假經考 (Examination of the False Classics) Shanghai, 1936.

\_\_\_\_\_. (trans. L.G. Thompson) Ta T'ung Shu 大同書 (The One-world Philosophy) London, 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. (K'ang T'ung-pi 康同璧 ed.) Nan-hai K'ang hsien-sheng tzu-pien nien-p'u 康南海先生自編年譜 (K'ang Yu-wei's Chronological Autobiography), 2 vols. Peking, 1958.

Kent, P.H., The Passing of the Manchus. London, 1912.

Lanning, George, Old Forces in New China. London, 1912.

Li Chun 李準 "Kuang-fu Kuang-tung shih-mo chi" 光復廣東始末記 (A Record of the Beginning and End of the Restoration in Kwangtung) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.VII.

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啟超 Wu-hsü cheng-pien chi 戊戌政變記 (The Coup d'état of 1898). Yokohama, 1899.

\_\_\_\_\_. Yin-ping-shih tz'u-yu shu 飲冰室自由書 (On Freedom) Shanghai, 1937.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Li Hung-chang" 李鴻章 (1901) in Yin-ping-shih ho-chi 飲冰室合集, vol.XVIII. Shanghai, 1936.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Wu-hsü cheng-pien chi-shih pen-mo" 戊戌政變紀事本末 (A Record of the Beginning and end of the Reform Movement of 1898) in Wu-hsü pien-fa vol.1.

Liu K'uei-i 劉揆一 "Huang Hsing chuan-chi" 黃興傳記 (A Record of the Biography of Huang Hsing) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.IV.

Man Hua 曼華 (pseud. of T'ang Tseng-pi 楊增璧) "T'ung Meng Hui shih-tai Min Pao shih-mo chi" (The Min Pao During the Period of the T'ung Meng Hui) in K'o-ming wen-hsien vol.11.

Richard, Timothy, Forty-five Years in China. New York, 1916.

Sun Yat-sen, Kidnapped in London. Bristol, 1897.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Hongkong Hsing Chung Hui hsüan-yen" 香港興中會宣言 (A Statement at the Founding of the Hsing Chung Hui in Hongkong) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.



- "K'o-ming yüan-ch'i" 革命源起 (The Origins of the Revolution) in Hsin-hai K'o-ming vol.1.
- "Min Pao fa-k'an tz'u" 民報發刊辭 (The Foreword of Min Pao) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.11.
- The Principle of Livelihood. Taipei, 1953.
- Fundamentals of National Reconstruction. Taipei, 1953.
- San Min Chu I. Taipei, 1953.
- The Principle of Democracy. Taipei, 1953.
- The Vital Problem of China. Taipei, 1953.
- The International Development of China. Taipei, 1953.
- Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary. Taipei, 1953.

Sung Chiao-jen 宋教仁 "Sung Yu-fu jih-chi" 宋濱夫日記 (Diary of Sung Chiao-jen) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.11.

T'ang Chen-ch'u 唐振楚 (ed) Kuo-fu shu-hsin hsüan-chi 國父書信選集 (Selection of Sun Yat-sen's Letters). Taipei, 1952.

T'ao Ch'eng-chang 陶成章 "Che-an chi-lüeh" 漢集紀略 (Outline Record of the Chekiang Case) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.111.

Teo Eng-hock 張永福 Nan-yang yü ch'uang-li Min-kuo 南洋與創立民國 (South-east Asia and the Founding of the Chinese Republic). Singapore, 1934.

T'ien T'ung 田桐 "T'ung Meng Hui ch'eng-li chi" 同盟會成立記 (The Establishment of the T'ung Meng Hui) in K'o-ming wen-hsien vol.11.

Torazo, Miyazaki, (Trans. Chung-kuo Yen-chiu she 中國研究社) San-shih-san nien lo-hua meng 三十三年落花夢 (The Thirty-three Years' Dream). Tokyo, 1943.

Ts'ao Ya-po 曹亞伯 "Huang K'o-chiang Chang-sha k'o-ming chih shih-pai" 黃克強長沙革命之失敗 (Huang Hsing and the Defeat of the Changsha Revolutionary Attempt) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.

• "Wu-chang Jih-chih Hui chih yün-tung 武昌日知會之運動 (The Activities of the Society for the Daily Increase of Knowledge in Wuchang) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.

• "Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu jih-chih-i" 廣州三月二十九日之役 (The Rising of March 29 at Canton) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1V. (Large sections of this work has been found to be similar to the relevant chapter of Chou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih-kao, vol.111)

• "Ch'en T'ien-hua t'ou-hai" 陳天華投海 (The Suicide of Ch'en T'ien-hua) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.11.

Tse Tsan-tai 謝錫泰 The Chinese Republic - Secret History of the Revolution. Hongkong, 1924.

Tsou Jung 鄭容 K'o-ming Chun 革命軍 (The Revolutionary Army) n.p. 1903.



Woodhead, H.G.W., (ed) "The Revolution in China, 1911-1912" in The China Year Book of 1912.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The T'ung Meng Hui" in The China Year Book of 1914.

Wu Chih-hui 吳稚暉 "Shang-hai Su Pao an chi-shih" 上海蘇報案記事  
(A Memorandum on the Su Pao Case in Shanghai) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.

Wu Ju 吳汝鉞 (ed) Li Wen-chung kung ch'u'an-chi 李鈞公 公全集 (Complete works of Li Hung-chang) 100 vols. 1905.

Yü Ho-chung 余和中 "Ou-chou T'ung Meng Hui chi-shih" 歐洲同盟會紀事  
(A Record of the European Branch of the T'ung Meng Hui) in K'o-ming wen-hsien vol.11.

Yuan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱 "Wu-hsü jih-chi" 成城日記 (A Diary of 1898) in Wu-hsü pien-fa vol.1.

#### SECONDARY MATERIAL

Anonymous, "Secret Societies in China" in Hankow Club Collected Papers, vol.XVIII.

Anonymous, Hongkong, a Short History of the Colony Hongkong, about 1927.

Arlington, L.C. Through the Dragon's Eyes. London, 1931.

Backhouse, E. and Bland, J.O.P. Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking. London, 1914.

Balfour, S. Hongkong Before the British. Hongkong, 1941.

"Betty", Intercepted Letters, a Mild Satire on Hongkong Society. Hongkong, 1905.

Bland, J.O.P. Li Hung-chang. London, 1917.

Braga, J. (ed) Hongkong Business Symposium. Hongkong, 1957.

Britton, R.S. The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800-1912. Shanghai, 1933.

Cameron, M.E. The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912. Stanford, 1931.

Cecil, A. British Foreign Secretaries, Studies in Personality and Policy. London, 1927.


Ch'ai Te-keng 蔡德慶 et.al. (ed) Hsin-hai k'o-ming 辛亥革命  
(The Revolution of 1911) 8 vols. Shanghai, 1957.

Chang, C. Third Force in China. New York, 1952.

Chang Ch'i-chün 張其昀 Chung-hua Min-kuo ch'uang-li shih 中華民國創立史  
(A History of the Founding of the Chinese Republic). Taiwan, 1953.



- . Chung-hua Min-kuo shih-kang 中華民國史綱 (An Outline History of the Chinese Republic). 12 vols. Taiwan, 1954.
- Chang Ch'i-jo 長義若 Hsin-hai k'o-ming hui-i lu 辛亥革命回憶錄 (Reminiscences of the 1911 Revolution). Shanghai, 1945.
- Chang Ching-lu 張靜盧 Chung-kuo chin-tai ch'u-pan shih-liao 中國近代出版史料 (Historical Material on Publishing in Modern China) 2 vols. Shanghai, 1953-54.
- Chang Ching-sheng 張競生 "Ting-wei Chao-chou Huang-kang k'o-ming 丁未潮州黃岡革命 (The Revolutions of 1907 at Chaochou and Huang-kang) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.11.
- Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry. Seattle, 1955.
- Chang Hsiao-ch'ien 張效乾 Chung-kuo chin-tai cheng-ch'ih shih 中國近代政治史 (A History of Modern Chinese Politics) Taipei, 1959.
- Chang Huang-ch'i 張董溪 "Chi Tzu-li Hui" ~記自立會 (A Record of the Independence Society) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.
- "Kuang Fu Hui ling-hsiu T'ao Ch'eng-cheng k'o-ming shih" 光復會領袖陶成章革命史 (The Revolutionary History of the Leader of the Restoration Society, T'ao Ch'eng-chang) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.
- Chang Po-chen 張伯楨 Nan-hai K'ang hsien-sheng chuan 南海康先生傳 (Biography of K'ang Yu-wei) Peking, 1932.
- Chao Chi-pin 趙紀朴 Chung-kuo che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang 中國哲學思想 (Chinese Philosophical Thought). Shanghai, 1948.
- Chatterji, K. National Movements in Modern China. Calcutta, 1958.
- Ch'en Ch'ieh 陳捷 I-ho T'uan yün-tung shih 壴和團運動史 (History of the Boxer Movement). Shanghai, 1931.
- Ch'en Ch'un-sheng 陳春生 "Keng-tzu Wai-chou ch'i-i chi" 庚子東州起義記 (A Record of the Revolutionary Attempt of 1900 at Waichow) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.
- "Jen-yin Hung Ch'dan-fu Kuang-chou chü-i" 壬寅洪全福起義記 (A Record of the 1903 Revolutionary Attempt of Hung Ch'dan-fu in Canton) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.
- "Ping-wu P'ing-Li ch'i-i chi" 戊午萍醴起義記 (A Record of the 1906 Revolutionary Attempts at P'ing-Li) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.11.
- "Wu-shen Hsiung Ch'eng-chi An-king ch'i-i chi" 戊申集成基安慶起義記 (A Record of Hsiung Ch'eng-chi's Attempt at Anking in 1908) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.111.
- "Keng-hsü Kuang-chou Hsin-chün chü-i chi" 庚戌廣州新軍舉義記 (A Record of the Revolutionary Attempt of the New Army at Canton in 1910) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.111.
- Ch'en, Jerome, Yüan Shih-k'ai. London, 1961.
- Ch'en Kung-fu 陳功甫 Chung-kuo k'o-ming shih 中國革命史 (His-



tory of the Chinese Revolution) Shanghai, 1930.

. Jih-Ngo chan-cheng yù Liao-tung kai-fang  
(The Russo-Japanese war and the Opening of the Liaotung Peninsula) Shanghai, 1931.

. I-ho T'uan yün-tung yù Hsin-ch'ou ho-yüeh 義和團運動與  
辛丑之約 (The Boxer Movement and the 1901 Treaty) Shanghai, 1933.

Ch'en Kung-lu 陳恭祿 Chung-kuo chin-tai shih 中國近代史 (Modern Chinese History) Shanghai, 1935.

Chen, S. and Payne, R. Sun Yat-sen, a Portrait. New York, 1946.

Cheng, F.T. East and West. London, 1951.

Cheng Ho-sheng 鄭鶴聲 Chung-hua Min-kuo chien-kuo shih 中華民國  
建國史 (History of the Establishment of the Chinese Republic) Shanghai, 1946.

Cheng Lin, The Chinese Railways, Shanghai, 1935.

Chiang Hsing-te 蔣星德 Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng chuan  
(Biography of Sun Yat-sen). Taiwan, 1950.

Chien Po-ts'an 蔣伯安 et.al. (ed) I-ho T'uan 義和團 (The Boxer Society) 4 vols. Shanghai, 1953.

. Wu-hsü pien-fa 戊戌變法 (The Reform Movement of 1898), 4 vols. Shanghai, 1953.

Chih Chieh 志杰 Wu-chang ch'i-i ti ku-shih 武昌起義的故事 (The Story of the Revolution at Wuchang) Hankow, 1956.

Chih Kuei 志圭 "Ch'ing-tai K'ang-Liang wei-hsin yün-tung yù k'o-ming t'ang chih kuan-hsi chi ying-hsiang" 清代康梁維新運動與革命黨之關係及影響 (The Reform Movement of Kang and Liang in the Ch'ing Dynasty, its Relation to the Revolutionary Party, and its Influence), in Chien-kuo Yüeh-k'an 建國月刊 vol.1X No.2 (August, 1933).

"The China Association, Objects, Rules and Regulations" in Hankow Club Collected Papers, vol.XX.

Ching Shan 景善 (trans. J.J.L. Duyvendak) The Diary of His Excellency Ching-shan, Being a Chinese Account of the Boxer Troubles. h.d.

Chow, V.Y. "Sun Yat-sen's 'fatherhood' of New China" in United China Magazine. October, 1933, Shanghai.

Chung-hua Min-kuo kai-kuo wu-shih-nien wen-hsien pien-mu wei-yüan-wei (ed) Hsin-hai k'o-ming yù Min-kuo chien-yüan 辛亥革命與民國建立 (The 1911 Revolution and the Establishment of the Chinese Republic) 2 vols. Taiwan, 1961-62.

Clement, E.W. A Handbook of Modern Japan. Detroit, 1910.

Clyde, P.H. The Far East. New York, 1953.

Collins, Sir Charles, Public Administration in Hongkong. London 1952.

Comber, L. Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya. New York, 1959.



Cowen, T. The Russo-Japanese War, From the Outbreak to the Battle of Liaoyang. London, 1904.

Creel, H.G. Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung. Chicago, 1953.

de Bary, W.T., Chan Wing-tsit and Watson, B. Sources of Chinese Tradition. New York, 1960.

Der Ling, Princess Two Years in the Forbidden City. New York, 1914.

Dilke, Sir C.W. Greater Britain. London, 1894.

The Editorial Board of the Bureau of Chinese Historical Research  
中國科學院近代史研究所史料編輯室 (ed) Yang-wu yün-tung 洋務運動  
(Foreign Matters) 8 vols. Shanghai, 1959.

Edwards, N.P. "The Story of China in Hankow Club Collected Papers, vol.XV.

Eitel, E.J. Europe in Asia, the History of Hongkong from the Beginning to the Year 1882. London, 1895.

Endacott, G.B. A History of Hongkong. London, 1958.

Fan Wen-lan 潘文淵 Chung-kuo chin-tai shih 中國近代史 (History of Modern China) Peking, 1950.

Fitzgerald, C.F. Revolution in China. London, 1952.

Fleming, P. The Siege at Peking. London, 1959.

Foster, J.W. (introduction) Memoirs of the Viceroy Li Hung-chang. London, 1913.

Fu Wei-p'ing 傅維平 Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng chuan-lüeh 孫中山先生傳略 (A Brief Biography of Sun Yat-sen) Shanghai, 1928.

Gangulee, N. (ed) The Teachings of Sun Yat-sen. London, 1945.

Garvin, J.L. and Amery J. The Life of Joseph Chamberlain 4 vols. London, 1932-51.

Giles, Lionel, "Chiu Chin: A Chinese Heroine" in Hankow Club Collected Papers, vol.III.

Green, O.M. The Story of China's Revolution. London, 1945.


Hall J.W. Eminent Asians. London, 1929.

Hao Yen-p'ing, "The Abortive Cooperation Between Reformers and Revolutionaries (1895-1900)" in Harvard University, Papers on China, vol.XV. (1961).

Ho Ch'i-fang 何其芳 "Chun-pei Huang-hua-kang ch'i-i" 豪華圈起義 (Preparations for the Revolutionary Attempt at Huang-hua-kang) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.IV.

Holcombe, A.H. The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution. New York, 1930.

Hsiao Kung-ch'uan 蕭公權 Chung-kuo cheng-ch'ih ssu-hsiang shih 中國政治思想史 (History of Chinese Political Thought), 6 vols. Shanghai, 1946.



. "Weng T'ung-ho and the Reform Movement of 1898" in Tsing-hua Journal of Chinese Studies, New series 1, No.2 (1957).

. Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century. Seattle, 1960.

Hsü Shih-shen 許思慎 Kuo-fu k'o-ming yüan-ch'i hsiang-chu 國父革命緣起詳註 (Detailed Notes on the Origin of Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Movement) Taiwan, 1954.

Hsüeh Chun-tu, "Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yün, and the Early Revolutionary Movement in China" in Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XIX no.3 (May, 1960).

. Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution. Stanford, 1961.

Hu Ch'u-fei 胡去非 (ed) Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng chuan 孫中山先生傳 (Biography of Sun Yat-sen) Shanghai, 1933.

. Tsung-li shih-lüeh 總理事略 (Outline of Events Concerning Sun Yat-sen) Changha, 1940.

Hu Chun 胡鈞 "Chang Chih-tung nien-p'u" 張之洞年譜 (Chronological Biography of Chang Chih-tung) in Wu-hsü pien-fa, vol.IV.

Hu Kuo-liang 胡國樑 "Hsin-hai Kuang-chou ch'i-i pieh-chi" 辛亥廣州起義別紀 (A Separate Account of the Revolutionary Attempt at Canton in 1911) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.IV.

Hu Sheng 胡鍾 Sun Chung-shan k'o-ming fen-tou hsiao-shih 孫中山先生革命奮鬥小史 (A Brief History of Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Struggles) Hongkong, 1948.

. Ti-kuo chu-i yù Chung-kuo cheng-ch'ih 帝國主義與中國政治 (Imperialism and Chinese Politics) Shanghai, 1948.

Hu Shih and Lin Yu-t'ang, China's Own Critics. Peiping, 1931.

Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance. Chicago, 1934.

Hu Ssu-ching 胡思敬 (ed) "Pao Huang T'ang" 保皇黨 (The Society to Protect the Emperor) in Wu-hsü pien-fa, vol.IV.

Hua Lin-i 華林一 Chung-kuo Kuo-min-t'ang shih 中國國民黨史 (History of the Nationalist Party) Shanghai, 1931.

Huang Cheng-ming 黃正銘 Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih lun-chi 中國外交史論集 (A Collection of Discussions on the History of Chinese Foreign Relations) 2 vols. Taipei, 1957.

Huang Chung-huang 黃中黃 "Sun I-hsien" 孫逸仙 (Sun Yat-sen) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.1.


Huang Fu-luan 黃福鑑 Hua-chiao yù Chung-kuo k'o-ming 亂世與中國革命 (The Overseas Chinese and the Revolution), Hongkong, 1955.

Huang Hung-shou 黃鴻壽 Ch'ing-shih chi-shih pen-mo 清史記事本末 (Essential Records of the History of the Ch'ing Period) 8 vols. Shanghai, 1929.

. "Chia-shih li-hsien chi tsu-chih kuei-tsui nei-ko" 假偽立及成政體內閣 (The False Establishment of a Constitution and the Formation of an Imperial Cabinet) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.IV.



- Hughes, E.R. The Invasion of China by the Western World. L. Black, 1937.
- Hummel, A.W. Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912) 2 vols. Washington, 1944.
- Ingrams, Harold, Hongkong, London, 1952.
- Ireland, A. The Far Eastern Tropics! London, 1905.
- Jansen, M.B. The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. Cambridge, Mass. 1954.
- Johnston, R.F. Twilight in the Forbidden City. London, 1934.
- Joseph, P. Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894-1900. London, 1928.
- K'ang T'ung-chia 康同家 K'ang Yu-wei yü Wu-hsü pien-fa 康有為與戊戌變法 (K'ang Yu-wei and the 1898 Reform Movement). Hongkong, 1959.
- Kennedy, A.L. Salisbury, 1830-1903, Portrait of a Statesman. London, 1953.
- Kiang Wen-han, The Chinese Student Movement. New York, 1948.
- Ko Kung-chen 史公振 Chung-kuo pao-hsüeh shih 中國報學史 (A History of Chinese Journalism) Shanghai, 1931.
- Ku Yen-shih 古研氏 et.al. (ed) Shih-chiai chih pi-mi chieh-she 世界之秘密社會 (The Secret Societies of the World) 13 vols. Shanghai, 1925.
- Ku Yen-shih, Chung-kuo pi-mi she-hui shih 中國秘密社會史 (History of Chinese Secret Societies) Shanghai, 1927.
- "Kuang-tung Ch'in-chou hsiang-min k'ang-chüan" 廣東欽州鄉民抗捐 (The Refusal to Pay Taxes of the Villagers of Ch'in chou in Kwangtung) in Tung-fang Tsa-chih 東方雜誌 No.7 of August, 1907.
- Kuo Hsiao-ch'eng 郭孝成 "Kuang-tung kuang-fu chi" 廣東光復記 (A Record of the Restoration in Kwangtung) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.VII.
- Kuo Mo-jo 郭沫若 "Fan-cheng ch'ien-hou" 及正前後 (Before and after the Return to Rectitude) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.IV.
- Langer, W.L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902. New York, 1951.
- Levenson, J.R. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China. Massachusetts, 1959.
- Li Chien-nung 李劍農 Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-ch'ih shih 中國近百年政治史 (The Political History of China in the Last Hundred Years) 2 vols. Taiwan, 1957.
- Li Shih-yüeh 李時岳 Hsin-hai k'o-ming shih-ch'i liang-Hu ti-ch'ü ti k'o-ming yun-tung (The revolutionary Movements in Hupeh and Hunan in the Period of the 1911 Revolution) Peking, 1957.
- Liao P'ing-tzu 廖平子 "Shih Chien-ju an shih-i" 史鑒如集拾遺



(Study Notes on Shih Chien-ju's Case) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.1.

Lin Mousheng, Men and Ideas, New York, 1942.

Lin Yu-tang, Press and Public Opinion in China. Shanghai, 1937.

Linebarger, P. Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic. New York, 1925.

\_\_\_\_\_. Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen. London, 1937.

Lo Chia-lun 罗家倫 et.al. (ed) K'o-ming wen-hsien 革命文獻 (Documents of the Revolution) 13 volx. Taiwan, 1953-56.

\_\_\_\_\_. Kuo-fu Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'u-kao 國父孫中山先生年譜初稿 (A First Draft of the Chronological Biography of Sun Yat-sen) 2 vols. Taipei, 1958.

Lo Hsiang-lin 罗香林 Kuo-fu yu Ou-Mei chih yu-hao 國父與歐美之友好 (Sun Yat-sen and his European and American Friends). Taipei, 1951.

\_\_\_\_\_. Kuo-fu chih ta-hsüeh shih-tai 國父之大學時代 (The University Days of Sun Yat-sen) Taiwan, 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Jung Hung yu Chung-kuo hsin-wen-hua yün-tung chih ch'i-fa" 寢閑與中國新文化運動之發 (Information on Jung Hung and China's New Culture Movement) in Hsin-Ya Hsüeh Pao 新亞學報 vol.1, No. 1, 1956.

Lo Hsiang-lin et.al. Hsiang-kang ch'ien-tai shih (Hongkong and its External Communications Before 1842). Hongkong, 1959.

Lu Chih-chih 呂直之 et.al. Ch'en Chiung-ming P'an-kuo shih 陳炯明叛國史 (History of Ch'en Chiung-ming's Rebellion) Fuchow, 1923.

Lu Ssu-mien 吕思勉 Jih-Ngo chan-cheng 日俄戰爭 (The Russo-Japanese War) Shanghai, 1928.

Lyttelton, E. Alfred Lyttelton. London, 1917.

Ma Hsiao-chin 馬小進 "Kuang-chou kuang-fu yu Chou Chien-kung" 廣州光復與周劍公 (The Restoration in Canton and Chou Chien-kung) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.VII.

MacNair, H.F. China's New Nationalism and Other Essays. Shanghai, 1926.

Malozemoff, A. Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, with Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War. California, 1958.


Martin, W.A. P. The Awakening of China. London, 1907.

Mei Ying 梅影 "Wu-hsü cheng-pien chen-wen" 戊戌政變珍聞 (Valuable Information on the Reform Movement of 1898) in Jen-wen Yueh-k'an 人文月刊 vol.VII No. 10, December, 1936, Shanghai.

Mills, L.A. British Rule in Eastern Asia. Oxford, 1942.

Morgan, W.P. Triad Societies in Hongkong. Hongkong, 1960.

Morse, H.B. International Relations of the Chinese Empire 3 vols. London, 1910.



- Muramatsu, Yuji "Some Themes in Chinese Rebel Ideologies" in A.F. Wright (ed) The Confucian Persuasion. Stanford, 1960.
- Newton, T.W.L. Lord Lansdowne, A Biography. London, 1929.
- Ou-yang Shui-hua 故陽瑞華 "Wu-chang K'o-hsüeh pu-hsi-suo k'o-ming yün-tung shih-mo chi" in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.
- P'an Kung-chan 潘公展 Ch'en Ch'i-mei. Taipei, 1953.
- Pao Tsun-p'eng 包遵彭 et.al. (ed) Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung-wei-hsin yü pao-shou 中國近代史論 (Discussions on Modern Chinese History - Reform and Reaction) Taiwan, 1956.
- Pei Hua 貝華 Chung-kuo k'o-ming shih 中國革命史 (Chinese Revolutionary History) Shanghai, 1933.
- P'eng Fen 彭芬 "Hsin-hai sun-6h'ing cheng-pien fa-yuan chi" 清政變源記 (A Record of the Origins of the Manchu Abdication and Overthrow of the Administration in 1911) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.1V.
- Pennell, W.V. History of the Hongkong General Chamber of Commerce, Hongkong, 1961.
- Peplow, S.H. and Barker, M. Hongkong, Around and About. Hongkong, 1931.
- Powell, R.L. The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912. New Jersey, 1955.
- Purcell, V.W. The Chinese in Malaya. London, 1948.
- Reeve, B. Timothy Richard, D.D. China Missionary, Statesman and Reformer. London, n.d.
- Reischauer, E.O. and Fairbank, J.K. East Asia: The Great Tradition. Boston, 1960.
- Restarick, H.B. Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China. Yale, 1931.
- Ridge, W.S. "Governmental Changes and National Movements in China, 1911-1912" in Hankow Club Collected Papers, vol.XIX.
- Romanov, B.A. (trans. S. Jones) Russia in Manchuria. Michigan, 1952.
- San-min Kung-ssu 三民公社 (ed) Sun Chung-shan i-shih chi (Collection of Anecdotes about Sun Yat-sen) Shanghai, 1927.
- Sayer, G.R. Hongkong, 1841-1862, Its Birth, Adolescence and Coming of Age. Oxford, 1937.
- Scalapino, R. and Schiffarin, H. "Early Socialist Durrents in the Chinese Revolutionary Movement: Sun Yat-sen versus Liang Ch'i-ch'ao" in Journal of Asian Studies, vol.XVIII, No.3 (May, 1959).
- Schlegel, G. Thian Ti Hwui, the Hung League, or Heaven-Earth League. Batavia, 1866.



Schrecker, J. "Pao Kuo Hui: a Reform Society of 1898", in Harvard University, Papers on China, vol.XLV, (December, 1960).

Shih Cheng 鄭錦 (ed) Kuo-min k'o-ming yao-lan 國民革命要覽  
(An Examination of the Essentials of the National Revolution).  
Shanghai, 1928.

Simpson, B.L. (Pseud. of B.L.P. Weale) Indiscreet Letters from Peking. London, 1906.

Smith, A.H. China in Convulsion 2 vols. New York, 1901.

Smith, C.A.M. The British in China and Far Eastern Trade. London, 1920.

Smith, S.P. China From Within, or the Story of the Chinese Crisis. London, 1901.

Smyth G.B. et.al. The Crisis in China. New York, 1900.

Smythe, E.J. "The Tzu-li Hui: Some Chinese and their Rebellions." in Harvard University, Papers on China, vol.XII. (1958).

Song Ong Siang, One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore. London, 1923.

Soothill, W.E. Timothy Richard of China. London, 1924.

\_\_\_\_\_. China and the West. London, 1925.

Stanton, W. The Triad Society, or Heaven and Earth Association. Hongkong, 1900.

Steiger, G.N. China and the Occident, the Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement. New Haven, 1927.

Stokes, G. Queen's College, 1862-1962. Hongkong, 1962.

Stuart, J.L. Fifty Years in China. New York, 1954.

Su Ch'i-ch'u 蘇錦祖 "Ch'ing-t'ing Wu-hsü ch'ao-pien chi" 清廷戊戌  
朝變記 (The Coup d'etat of 1898 in the Manchu Court) in  
Wu-hsü pien-fa vol.1.

Takahashi, Sakuye International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War. London, 1908.

Tan, C. The Boxer Catastrophe. New York, 1955.


T'an Yung-nien 譚永寧 Hsin-hai k'o-ming hui-i lu 辛亥革命回憶錄  
(A Record of Reminiscences of the 1911 Revolution) 2 vols. Hongkong, 1958.

T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution. London, 1930.

\_\_\_\_\_. Wang Ching-wei, a Political Biography. Peiping, 1931.

T'ang Tsou-p'ei 唐復培 Min-kuo ming-jen hsiao-chuan 民國名人小傳  
(Brief Biographies of Famous Men of the Republic) Hongkong, 1955.

Teng Mu-han 鄧慕韓 "Shih Chien-ju shih-lüeh" 史堅如事略 (An Outline of Events Concerning Shih Chien-ju) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.1.



。 "Chung-kuo T'ung Meng Hui ch'eng-li shih-jih k'ao" 中國同盟會成立記 (An Examination of the Date of the Establishment of the United League) in K'o-ming wen-hsien, vol.ll.

。 "Ting-wei Huang-kang chü-i chi" 丁未黃岡舉義記 (A Record of the 1907 Insurrection at Huang-kang) in Hain-hai k'o-ming vol.ll.

。 "Shu Ting-wei Fang-ch'eng k'o-ming chün-shih" 遂丁未防城革命軍書 (Writings of the Events of the Revolutionary Army at Fang-ch'eng in 1907) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.ll.

Teng, S.Y. and Fairbank, J.K. China's Response to the West 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass. 1961.

The Times, The War in the Far East. London, 1905.

Ts'ang Fu 倭父 "Li-hsien yün-tung chih chin-hsing" 立憲運動之進步 (The Progress of the Movement to Establish a Constitution) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming vol.IV.

Tseng Yu-hao, Modern Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy. Shanghai, 1930.

Tsiang T'ing-fu 蔣廷黻 Chin-tai Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih tzu-liao chi-yao 近代中國外交史資料輯要 (A Collection of Essential Sources of Chinese Modern Diplomatic History) 3 vols. Shanghai, 1931-34.

Tso Shun-sheng 左舜生 (ed) Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien shih chih-liao ch'u-pien 中國近百年史資料初編 (First Edition of Historical Materials on China in the Last Hundred Years). 2 vols. Shanghai, 1926.

。 Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien shih chih-liao hsü-pien 中國近百年史資料續編 (Subsequent Edition of Historical Materials on China in the Last Hundred Years). 2 vols. Shanghai, 1933.

。 Hsin-hai k'o-ming shih 辛亥革命史 (History of the 1911 Revolution). Shanghai, 1935.

Tsur, M.E. "K'ang Yu-wei" in Hankow Club Collected Papers, vol. XXXIX.


Thomson, H.C. China and the Powers, a Narrative of the Outbreak of 1900. London, 1902.

Tuan Ch'ang-t'ung 段昌同 (ed) "K'ang Yu-wei shu-tu san-p'ien" 康有為書片三篇 (Three Letters of K'ang Yu-wei) in Wu-hsü pien-fa vol.ll.


Waley A.S. The Remaking of China. London, 1914.

Wang Ch'i-chü 王其炤 (ed) "Ching-shih ta-hsüeh-t'ang chi ch'i-t'a hsüeh-t'ang" 京師大學堂及其他學堂 (The Peking University and Other Academies) in Wu-hsü pien-fa vol.IV.

。 "Ch'iang-hsüeh-hui chi ch'i-t'a hsüeh-hui" 強學會及其他學會 (The Self-Strengthening Society and Other Literary Societies) in Wu-hsü pien-fa, vol.IV.



- 。 "Shih-wu Pao chi ch'i-t'a pao-chih" 時務報及其他報紙  
 (The Shih-wu Pac and Other Newspapers) in Wu-hsü pien-fa vol.IV.
- Wang Gung-wu, "Sun Yat-sen and Singapore" in Journal of the South Seas Society, vol.XV, Part II (December, 1959).
- Wang Hsing-hui 王興瑞 "Ch'ing-ch'i Fu-jen Wen-she yù k'o-ming yün-tung ti kuan-hsi" 清朝轉仁文社與革命運動的關係  
 (The Fu Jen Literary Society and the Revolutionary Movement in the Ch'ing Period) in Shih-hsueh Tsa-chih 中學雜誌 vol.I.  
 no.1 (December, 1945, Chungking)
- Wang Jen-wen 王人文 "Hsin-hai Sze-chwan lu-shih tsui-yen" 辛亥四川路事罪言 (Provocative Words Concerning the 1911 Railway Events at Szechuan) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming voi.IV.
- Wang Yen-wei 王彦威 (ed) Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao 清季外文史料 (Historical Material on Foreign Relations of the Ch'ing Period) 164 vols. Peiping, 1935.
- Ward, J.S.M. and Stirling, W.G. The Hung Society 3 vols. London, 1925.
- Weal, P. The Fight for the Republic in China. New York, 1917
- Weale B.L.P. The Re-shaping of the Far East. London, 1905.
- Wen Ching (pseud. of Dr. Lim Boon Keng) The Chinese Crisis From Within. London, 1901.
- Wen Kung-chih 文公直 "Hsin-hai k'o-ming yün-tung chung-chih Hsin-chün" 辛亥革命運動中之新軍 (The New Army in the 1911 Revolutionary Movement) in Hsin-hai k'o-ming, vol.III.
- Williams, S.W. The Middle Kingdom. 2 vols. New York, 1913.
- Woo Sing-lim, The Prominent Chinese in Hongkong. Hongkong, 1937.
- Wright A. (ed) Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China, Their History, Commerce, Industries and Resources. London, 1908.
- Wright, M. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism. Stanford, 1957.
- Wu Shou-i 吳壽頤 Kuo-ru ti ch'ing-nien shih-tai 國父的青年時代 (The Youth of Sun Yat-sen) Taipei, 1960.
- Wu Tse 吳澤 K'ang Yu-wei yù Liang-ch'i-ch'ao 庚有為與梁啟超 (K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao) Shanghai, 1948.
- 。 "Wu-shü cheng-pien yù hsin-chiu t'ang-cheng" 戊戌政變與新舊勢 (The 1898 Coup d'etat and the Struggle Between Old and New Factions) in Chung-kuo Chien-she 中國建設 vol.VI, No.6 (September, 1948)
- Wu Yung, The Flight of an Empress. London, 1937.
- Yang Fu-li 楊復禮 "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao nien-p'u" 梁啟超年譜 (Chronological Biography of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao) in Wu-hsü pien-fa vol.IV.
- Young, C.W. The International Relations of Manchuria. University of Chicago Press, 1929.



Young E.P. "Ch'en T'ien-hua (1875-1905), a Chinese Nationalist" in Harvard University, Papers on China, vol. Xlll, (December, 1959).

