Ethnicity and Politics in Republican China

The Ma Family Warlords of Gansu

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The northwestern frontier of China and the northwestern frontier of America have much in common. Rough wilderness, sparse population, lawlessness, distance from the affairs of the greater society—these characterize the desert places of a nation, the outposts of its civilization. Frontiers lack the sharpness of definition we attribute to more central regions. They are perceived as important for the defense of the nation, not for their contributions to its character. Even America, the frontier nation par excellence, cannot be described mainly by reference to Montana.[1]

The peripheries remain underdeveloped compared to more central regions, or even to their own regional centers. In Skinner's mapping, Gansu lies on the periphery of the periphery, the border region of the northwestern Chinese macroregion. To a contemporary Han Chinese going there, the journey really was like the Bozeman trail:

> The road passed through hills and valleys that were at times bleak and empty, reminding me of what I had imagined the American wild west would look like, based on a movie I had once seen in

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> Shanghai. 'Where were the cowboys and Indians?' I asked myself, and later of course it turned out that I would be one of the cowboys and the Tibetans would be the Indians [Frolic, 1980: 146].

At the Gansu frontier, local variation within Chinese culture is muted, if not overwhelmed, by the fundamental contrast between sedentary agriculture and pastoral nomadism, between the cultures of Us and Them.

The periphery guards the core but does not always share its metropolitan concerns. The connection between the two is made by the frontier elite. Adapting to the geographic imperatives of border life is often painful for members of this class; the edge of civilization is bitter compared to the ideological and idealized home nearer the culture's core. A late Qing magistrate wrote in a Gansu gazetteer:

> The people of Haicheng (northeast Gansu) are by nature coarse and brutal, and they enjoy bringing lawsuits. The Han are weak, the Muslims strong, so the Han people's artfulness must match that of the Muslims. But they cannot compete with the Muslims in arrogance. When Han and Muslims begin a suit, each stubbornly holds to his position. . .Over a trifling copper or quarrelsome complaint they seek revenge. . .and it becomes a great law case. . . . So Haicheng is not the same as other counties. . .Magistrates must keep this in mind! [Yang, 1908: 10/18a].

Apart from the concrete task of repelling invaders, frontiers define the Others against which a culture or ethnic group can measure itself. As Said persuasively argued, European conceptions of "Orientals"—antithetical to us Occidentals—were not mere observations or objective attempts to understand alien peoples. They were rather the expression of "flexible *positional* superiority," the ability of the dominant to define both themselves and the subordinate (Said, 1978: 7). The people on China's frontier were forced or manipulated into that same inferior position by the Han, many of them accepting to some extent the hegemony of their imperious neighbor.

Following Said's argument, we may see that the Han Chinese, like the Europeans, drew on many facets of their culture to confirm their inherent superiority over neighboring peoples. The

tribute system was the political and ideological framework for a broad range of principles for contact with and evaluation of foreigners. These left very little place for explanation of the mutual adaptations that occurred at the frontiers, and they limited the ability of Han people to understand their neighbors. Instead, they specified stereotypes that dominated Han thinking, and sometimes behavior, regarding non-Hans. These fixed ideas loom large in the magistrate's conception above and still possess considerable power in China.

The geographic progression of core:periphery:steppe forms the model for Han cultural perceptions that divide the world into civilized:partially civilized:uncivilized zones. Civilization, of course, is measured by degree of adherence to Han ways. But only the theoretical boundary between Han and non-Han can be drawn in the metropolitan conceptions of the elite in distant cities. Clear distinctions may indeed be made between a Han farmer and a nomadic Mongol, but what of the Han who adapts to border topography by herding sheep, or a Muslim who settles in a frontier town, speaking Mandarin and selling cloth?

Thus distinction between Han and non-Han need not cover a broad range of characteristics. Ethnic groups may occupy similar economic niches, similar ecologies, may even speak the same language. Essentially, people must define themselves as different, must set consistent criteria for belonging to their group and not to some other. Such a process of self-definition identifies both Us and Them for all participants, though individuals may cross the boundary by adaptation or even conscious decision. The opposite sides of such an ethnic definition, however much they may have in common, always limit their intercourse with the Others. Such constraints magnify mutual misperceptions, distrust, and hatred by encouraging distortion and stereotype.

HUI BETWEEN THE WORLDS

In modern times, Gansu people have lived through change in their ethnic, religious, political, and cultural definitions. Like all Chinese, they have suffered the local effects of national and

international confrontations, while their location on the frontier imbued modern problems of identity and sovereignty with a particular urgency. Gansu had been one of China's crucial frontiers, and it took on additional importance in the twentieth century as part of the ground for the Nationalist-Communist conflict and as the destination for a vast wave of Han migration during and after the anti-Japanese war.

Despite its strategic position and rich natural resources, Gansu remains little studied, for its poverty and its foreignness rendered it unpalatable to the Han. Their inattention has affected foreign scholars. Inclusion of Gansu in generalizations about modern China might, however, provide useful insights. It is ironic, for example, that the time of China's most thorough disintegration in recent centuries, the warlord period, should have been the period of Gansu's *incorporation* into the Han-dominated political system of China proper, but that is precisely what happened.

It would be appropriate to begin with a review of Gansu's place in the literature of the Republican period, but it has none. Even books devoted specifically to warlords, such as Ch'en's (1979) monograph and Hsi-sheng Ch'i's (1976) quantitative study, do not discuss Gansu at all. The Chinese monographs mention the northwestern warlords only as a perverse, vaguely barbaric variation on a Han theme.[2] This is surprising in view of Gansu's strategic importance after the Long March and the stable rule of its local militarist clique, collectively known as the Ma Family Warlords (*Majia junfa*).

One explanation of this lacuna lies in the difficulty of including so many non-Han peoples and cultures in a provincial study. Tibet, Mongolia, Central Asia, and China meet in Gansu, so we find there a heterogeneous mix of ethnic groups that are the result of long frontier contact—the Muslim Mongols (Dongxiang), Muslim Tu (Baoan), Muslim Tibetans (Huang Fan), and sinified groups within each of these. In this article I shall describe the changes that took place on the northwestern periphery after the mid-Qing rebellions in order to propose a history and role for the Ma warlords.

In studying Gansu, I hope also to contribute to our understanding of Islam and Muslims, especially those who live outside

the Muslim heartlands of West Asia. Geertz's pathbreaking *Islam Observed* (1968), among others, has illuminated the radical diversity within the Muslim world and the intimate interaction between Islam and the local cultures within which it has taken root. In studying Islam in China, we undertake this task at an extreme periphery of the Muslim world, observing a Muslim minority surrounded and sometimes threatened by an overwhelming majority of non-Muslims. Study of Gansu's ethnic conflicts and compromises may enhance our understanding of peripheral China *and* peripheral Islam—a double-edged comprehension of perception and behavior on frontiers.

The Muslims came to China in the seventh century, so by the nineteenth they were a familiar part of many Chinese landscapes. Negative Han perceptions, often codified in law and almost always enforced in custom, had altered but not eliminated Muslim resistance to assimilation. Many Sino-Muslims, or Hui, maintained their identity with energy, asserting their own points of superiority over the Han. They did this despite a high level of material and linguistic acculturation, despite a tradition of male-Hui/female-Han intermarriage that eroded their Central Asian physical characteristics, even despite a consciousness of *belonging* in China.[3]

The Hui defended their solidarity and identity best in areas where they were more numerous. It would be tempting, but inaccurate, to draw a continuum of assimilation from far Xinjiang and Yunnan, with consciously exclusive Muslim communities, eastward to the thoroughly sinified Muslims of Jiangnan. But there were large, well-defined communities of Muslims in Beijing, Guangzhou, even in rural Shandong, that managed to remain Hui, if not strictly Muslim, despite long immersion in China proper. Even in Gansu, known for its recalcitrant Muslim solidarity, there was wide variation in assimilation, acculturation, and level of Islamic observance among communities and individuals.

A study of Gansu supersedes the simplistic generalizations of sinification and *laihua* (come and be transformed) propounded by the Han. Many levels of dominance are involved, not simply a Confucian moral dynamic. Muslims were gradually incorporated

into the Chinese economy; they gradually absorbed Han values. These processes accelerated as the Han state and society brought a combination of cultural pressure and *force majeure* to bear on its peripheries in order to constitute itself a modern nation. But Muslims also continued to go on the *hajj* if they could afford it and to absorb influences from the Muslim world to the west.

The Hui reaction to these modern pressures illustrates their double identity as Chinese and as Muslims. They remained insiders, involved in the complex events of China, and outsiders, defined as different by their Hui identity and their connection to non-China. They participated in both Chinese and Muslim modernist movements, resisting both full inclusion and complete exclusion.

THE ORIGINS OF THE MUSLIM WARLORDS

At least fourteen Muslims, all surnamed Ma, led armies or large parts of armies in Gansu during the late Qing and Republican periods. Two of them, Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Fulu, deserve mention though they died before 1911, for they contributed to the military institutions and ethos that pervaded the province by the time of the Wuchang incident. In addition to these "official" warlords, many community leaders, both religious and secular, led *mintuan* or other local levies and might be called part-time warlords. One group of religious leaders, the *jiaozhang* (the heads of Sufi orders or suborders) of the Jahriyya order of Naqshbandi Sufis, played an important role in leading the Gansu Muslims, though they never held military rank (Fletcher, 1978). The names and genealogies of the Mas are displayed in Table 1.

Though they represented as many as three distinct lineages, the Muslim militarists generally claimed Hezhou, now the Linxia Hui Autonomous Zhou, as their home. That localistic claim was justifed by the centrality of Hezhou in the dramatic history of the Gansu Hui. With China to its north and east, Tibet to its south and west, Hezhou thrived as a borderland entrepot. The Muslim

TABLE 1
Ma Family Lineages

A. Hezhou



B. Xining



C. Ningxia



NOTE: Le Fevre (1935) claims that Ma Zhongying was Ma Hongbin's nephew, the only relationship I have found among the various lineages.

merchants of the prefectural city carried Chinese manufactures to the Tibetans, buying wool and hides in exchange. About half of the city's population was Hui, and the markets and villages in the hinterland tended to be either Han or Hui, rather than a mixture (Ekvall, 1939: 19-20).

The Hezhou wall, built by the Han for their own protection, was stout and easily defended. The Hui, like their co-religionaries elsewhere in Gansu, had been banned from dwelling within the walls, so they set up Muslim suburbs. The main Hui suburb of Hezhou, Bafang, often fell victim to the war or riot instigated by one side or the other in episodes of ethnic confrontation.

Despite commercial symbiosis with both Tibetans and Han, the Hui of Hezhou had a sinister reputation as bandits and anti-state rebels. The "Hezhou Lao Huihui" served Han mothers as a bogeyman for disobedient children:

> When I was a baby, whenever I wouldn't stop crying, my mother would say to me sternly, 'Don't cry any more! If the Hezhou Lao Huihui hear you, they'll come and kill you!' [Xu, 1974: 45-47]

Hezhou was also a center of Hui religious life. Its *gongbai* (tombs of Sufi saints) numbered at least seven, and there were also schools to train religious professionals. Each tomb had prayer halls; there were a dozen major mosques and a host of minor ones; and many *ahong* (teachers) were available to chant the liturgy and read the Holy Book.

The other important centers for the Muslim militarists were Xining, the great market and temple city of northeastern Tibet; Ningxia, now Yinchuan, with its ancient irrigation system on the west bank of the Yellow River; and Zhangjiachuan, an isolated, all-Hui town at the eastern end of the province. After 1896, the jiaozhang of the Jahriyya, Ma Yuanzhang, and many of his followers lived there (Ma Chen, 1981: 297).

Xining had long been an important interethnic trading town, lying athwart the main road from Tibet to Mongolia, close to the Silk Road. Ningxia, too, lay on two communications routes, the Yellow River itself and one of the caravan roads from Mongolia



Figure 1

to Turkestan. Zhangjiachuan, on the other hand, was created as a Muslim center by Zuo Zongtang, who resettled large numbers of Shaanxi Hui refugees there after the 1860s rebellion, rather than allowing them to return home. Their land to the east had been claimed by Han and Hui loyalists, and Zuo had no intention of returning them to the status quo ante, risking a repeat of the bloodletting of two decades. Among these four centers, only Xining and Hezhou could easily communicate, and even that relatively short distance required a journey over rough country as well as a perilous crossing of the rapid, deeply cut upper Yellow River. The other two were separated not only by distance and difficult terrain but also by wide belts of Han settlement.

The history of Gansu's militarization had begun as early as 1781, when the Qing state intervened in a religious dispute between hostile camps of Muslims. The officials faced an aroused

minority population who saw the state as an invader in its own territory and who guarded their local power against outside interference. There were, however, Muslims as willing to fight for the Qing as against it, and state involvement created an atmosphere of mutual fear that led rapidly to violence. The history of this and subsequent armed conflict between Muslims and the Qing state has been described by a number of Chinese scholars (Li Songmao, 1982; Yang Huaizhong, 1981).

Lamley's diagnosis of widespread social pathology in the *xiedou* areas of southeast China may be applied clearly to Gansu. The critical facts of economic rivalry, revenge, brutality, and long-enduring local conflicts all militate for a similar understanding of the northwest. In Gansu, feuding groups defined themselves by ethnicity, though never with absolute clarity. The "crowd-gathering armed affrays" of Fujian were certainly matched, both in scale and effects, by the wars among Han, Hui, Fan (Tibetans), and other non-Han people in late Qing and Republican Gansu (Lamley, 1977).

The 1781 and 1784 rebellions in Gansu both involved conflict over the Jahriyya suborder and its influence, and both were put down with relative ease by the Qing. They set the tone of violence for the next century and more. The great Muslim rebellion of 1862-1872 virtually eliminated the once-flourishing Muslim communities of Shaanxi, reducing their population from one million to fifty thousand. Ironically, this collective violence gave encouragement and legitimacy to the first Hui warlords by confirming and consolidating their alliance with the Qing against their militant co-religionaries.

The chronicle of the Ma warlords begins clearly in 1862. Ma Zhan'ao, an ahong of the Huasi *menhuan* (often called Khufiyya, or Old Teaching), was a Muslim commander at Hezhou when news arrived of the escalating violence in Shaanxi. Rather than slaughtering all the local Han and declaring a jihad, as our stereotypes and those of the Han would have us expect, Ma aided the local Han gentry in their escape from the aroused city (Yixin, 1895: 83/7b). He held the town without attempting to expand his domain until 1871.

In sharp contrast were the constant battles of the Shaanxi Muslims, driven from their homes, and of the Jahriyya of Ma Hualong in northern Gansu. The latter absorbed many of the Shaanxi refugees and their military units (known as the "Eighteen Battalions," *shiba ying*). Although Ma Hualong himself did not take any royal titles or display other obvious signs of rebellion, at least one of his subordinates did. He was certainly seen by the Qing as the chief instigator of the Gansu troubles. So despite his efforts to negotiate a settlement, Ma suffered defeat and then massacre at the hands of the Qing soldiery under Zuo Zongtang (Chu, 1966: 141-142; Nakada, 1959; 130-131; Ma Shouqian, 1981: 114f).

Ma Zhan'ao managed to preserve his political independence by handling Zuo more adroitly than most rebels. Zuo prepared his campaign against Hezhou with his customary care after destroying Ma Hualong at Jinjipu, but he could not easily defeat Ma Zhan'ao's seasoned fighters in the rough terrain of Taoxi, the only approach to Hezhou. A crucial battle was fought around Taizisi in late 1871, ending in defeat for Zuo. His advance halted; his men were thrown out of Taoxi altogether, forcing them to face yet another hazardous crossing of the swift, well-defended Tao river. Several high-ranking unit commanders were killed in the fighting.

Had Ma been a separatist Muslim fanatic, he surely would not have behaved as he did after this victory. While still mopping up the Han remnants in Taoxi, Ma sent his son and a subordinate to Zuo's field headquarters and proposed immediate surrender of Hezhou. He declared his loyalty to the Qing and his willingness to aid the Imperial armies in their further campaigns against the rebellious Hui. This hardly fits our image of a dedicated *mujahid.* For his surrender and subsequent anti-rebel activities, Ma Zhan'ao was awarded the *hualing wupin dingdai* (Feathered Cap of the Fifth Rank), a token of prestige requested by Zuo Zongtang himself.

Legitimate in Qing eyes, and responsible for sparing his territory from a bloodbath, Ma held sway at Hezhou until his death, when his son Anliang inherited power and titles. Ma Anliang lived well into the Republican period, a crucial actor in

local and provincial politics. After his death in 1918, at least two of his sons became warlords. Both Zhan'ao and Anliang receive short shrift from contemporary Chinese historians, who malign them as ethnic traitors for selling out to the Qing.

A second group of Gansu militarists, both Han and Hui, rose to power from the officer corps of Dong Fuxiang, a northern Gansu mintuan leader who became a highly respected and feared Qing general. His reputation was worst among foreigners, for he was stationed east of Beijing during the Boxer rebellion, and his forces were the most militant and least corruptible during the siege of the Legations.

> Those to the north and west—all Kansuh men under Tung Fu-hsiang—remain [ed] sullen and suspicious. From other directions, and especially on the east, where Jung Lu's troops were posted, it was possible to obtain supplies (small, but welcome) of eggs and vegetables, the sellers being smuggled through the Chinese soldiers' lines in spite of the prohibition of their officers, and it was from this side that the messengers came with all later letters. They declared, in fact, that they could not get through the [Muslim] troops on the western side without being shot [Tan, 1955: 114].

It is ironic that the "poorly disciplined rabble" from the northwestern marches was the most determined in the siege, least likely to slack off its vigilance for bribes or goods.

Two Muslim brothers, Ma Fulu and Ma Fuxiang, held command positions under Dong. Ma Fulu was killed before the Legation walls, but Fuxiang returned to Gansu as part of the Empress Dowager's personal escort. His intimate connection with events in the east pushed Ma Fuxiang toward a syncretic Confucian-Islamic vision of Hui interdependence with the Han. He believed that the Hui should—indeed, must—assimilate to Han ways, and he founded an Assimilationist Group, reviled by its detractors as the *Neixiang Pai*, to advocate that position in Gansu.

Though relatively little known in Gansu until that time, the assimilationist stand was far from new in China. As early as the late Ming, Wang Daiyu and others had used Confucian terms and

ideas in explaining Islam to Muslims literate only in Chinese. In a tradition reminiscent of Buddho-Daoist *geyi* borrowing, Wang and his successors represented an important group of elite Muslims who saw their own fate inextricably tied to that of China. Liu Zhi, the best known of the Sino-Muslim apologists, found no incompatibility between Islam and the teachings of Confucius. Like all Sino-Muslim and Confucian polemicists, he excoriated both Buddhism and Daoism as heretical. The classical learning of men such as Wang and Liu led them to claim, "The sacred book is the sacred book of Islam, but *li* [moral principle] is the same *li* which exists everywhere under Heaven" (Ford, 1974: 150).

This syncretic doctrine, similar superficially to that propounded by the Jesuits in their desire to make Catholicism and elite Confucianism compatible, served several purposes. First, it informed Muslims who had been educated entirely in Chinese that their Islamic tradition had moral validity, from a Confucian as well as a Muslim point of view. Second, it broadcast to the non-Muslims the moral excellence of Islam, in contrast to "barbarian" creeds. Third, and perhaps most important, it defended Islam against identification as a *xiejiao*, heretical teaching, a label that carried both political and moral stigma (Ford, 1974: 151).

In their own eyes, and those of many co-religionists, the apologists had used Confucian terms and ideas without adulterating the perceived core of Islam in any way. During the warlord period, Ma Fuxiang, with his son Ma Hongkui and nephew Ma Hongbin, led the way in forging links between Gansu and China, between Han and Hui. They thus included the frontier in the conception Liu had formulated close to China's core two centuries earlier.

A third important lineage of Muslin warlords arose from the mintuan of Xining, whose leaders set up a semi-independent military force on the edge of Tibet. Using the revenues of the wool and hide trade between the grasslands and the east coast, among other commercial enterprises, this branch of the Ma militarists established the longest-lasting, most isolated of Gansu local

authorities. Its founder, Ma Haiyan, worked for Zhan'ao and Anliang before passing on his power to his own descendants in 1900.

Haiyan's eldest son, an imposing six-footer named Ma Qi, commanded the local mintuan that protected people and property around Xining. Ma Qi maintained this army, the *Ninghaijun*, for several decades, passing it on to his brother and sons. His lineage, as durable and adept at opportunistic alliances as any militarist group, has received a full study of its own (Hunsberger, 1978). Suffice here to say that Ma Qi, a straitlaced Muslim and a bloody ethnic warrior, controlled the Tibetan frontier of Gansu with ferocity toward the Tibetans and an eye on the political weathervane in China proper. His brother, Ma Lin, went to Mecca and found common cause with the Muslim modernist movements in the Middle East, in contrast to Ma Fuxiang's Confucian-style assimilationism.

The earliest Ma generals—Zhan'ao especially—fought against the Qing state, as did religious leaders such as Ma Hualong. They did not, however, ever brand the imperial system itself as illegitimate, and both tried to surrender and come to terms with their enemies when it seemed to their benefit. The next generation, raised after the 1872 surrender and convinced of Qing military superiority, committed themselves to peace within Qing limitations. Ma Anliang, Ma Qi, and Ma Fuxiang were willing to fight against other Muslims to maintain the peace, as Ma Zhan'ao had done. Their unity lay, in part, in opposition to contradictory elements in their own Muslim communities, against whom they had to act violently in 1895.

Like the 1781 troubles, the 1895 rebellion began over internecine rivalries at Xunhua, the stronghold of the Salar Muslims on the upper Yellow River. The Salars, of Central Asian origin, were among the first China-dwelling Muslims to be exposed to Naqshbandi Sufism, and their loyalty to their various jiaozhang was famed and feared throughout the northwest, adding to their reputation for mobility and banditry. Long-distance traders, both by river raft and by caravan, the Salars maintained connections with other Muslims and with Central Asia, where

their Turkic dialect served them most effectively. Among them both Ma Mingxin of the Jahriyya and Ma Laichi of the Khufiyya, two Naqshbandi initiates returned from Yemen, found converts on their return to China (Lipman, 1981: chap. 1; Sala zu jianshi, 1982: 31-39).

In 1895, more than a century after Ma Mingxin's execution by the Qing, ahong from the two groups again battled over accusations of sorcery, misleading the people, and so forth. Like the 1781 leaders, the 1895 combatants first tried the Chinese legal system as a remedy for rivalry.[4] They filed accusations in the prefect's yamen at Xining, requesting that a Qing judge pass on the legitimacy of Islamic leadership in their communities. With theoretical wisdom but disastrous results, the judge refused to render a verdict but sent the parties home with a lame admonition to behave. There they gathered crowds and prepared to fight it out in the streets. The fear of Salar violence was so strong in the Qing authorities that they sent a trigger-happy daotai to quell the disturbance. He aggravated the situation by killing a number of Salars to awe the rest. Under the threat of accusation as rebels, many Salars rebelled and besieged first Xunhua, then Hezhou.

The rebellion did not spread very widely, nor did large numbers of Muslims flock to the rebel banners, even in the core cities. Indeed, most well-known Hui leaders tried to keep violence under control and opposed the calls for anti-Han vengeance. Their warnings went unheeded, so the Muslim commanders and officials threw their weight on the side of the Qing. Suppression required almost a year and considerable cost, but the matter was never really in doubt. Too many Muslims chose not to oppose the Han/Manchu state, though some were forced into a rebellious stance simply because they lived in Hui villages or neighborhoods. Qing troops did not often trouble themselves to distinguish between "good Hui" and "weed Hui" when operating in hostile territory.

By the end of the rebellion in the spring of 1896, tens of thousands were dead, and everyone's worst fears had been realized. It was clear to the Qing that religious disputes among the Hui led to conflagration, in direct analogy to the presence of

heterodox sects in Han society. It was clear to the Gansu Han that their Hui neighbors were bloodthirsty fanatics, ready to go on the rampage. It was clear to the Hui that they were to be discriminated against, excluded, even slaughtered, because they were different. The total Qing victory did not bring final peace. Rather, the succeeding years brought constant, violent reminders of the barriers between common folk of different groups. But, in contrast, these same years also strengthened the ties between the Chinese state and one group of Gansu Muslim leaders.

The rebellion thus illustrated the disunity of the Gansu Hui, their vulnerability to attack at the local level and their leaders' general unwillingness to oppose the Chinese state. Accounts do not validate the common Han stereotype that Muslims are invariably and ferociously loyal to one another. Despite the call for a general uprising in Xunhua, Hezhou, and Xining, many Gansu Hui remained aloof or took the Qing side. Armament, organization, and numbers had been with the Qing from the start. Also with them was Ma Anliang, who succeeded because he served the Qing loyally. Like his father, he obtained officially sanctioned local authority, which later became that of the Muslim warlords. The mixed Han-Hui armies of Dong Fuxiang and Ma Anliang played leading roles in the northwest for the next 25 or 30 years, including many large and small battles against Gansu Muslims.

LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE HUI COMMUNITIES

Fu Yiling classified five imporant groups of leaders in the Hui communities during the late Qing: ahong, religious specialists; gentry, primarily successful military examination graduates; soldiers, many of them deserters or discharged officers of the Qing military; local mintuan leaders; and large merchants, especially from Shaanxi (Fu, 1945: 1-12). Such diverse backgrounds produced diverse goals and diverse motivations that led to conflict within Hui communities. Though we may hypothesize some general identity of Hui ethnic interests, in any real situation

Hui solidarity might be threatened or subverted by other loyalties or perceptions of self-interest, including those of class.

The local rulers of Hui communities controlled a military-religious-commercial system that was by no means unified. Elsewhere I have called this a "patchwork and network society," one in which the generalized solidarity of ethnic consciousness, the network, may be countered at any time or place by particular local or personal advantages (Lipman, 1984). A vision of Muslims as unified or possessing some inherent commonality that transcended all divisive characteristics—such a vision is deeply rooted in Western and Han misconceptions of Muslims and must be criticized carefully. With 1862 and 1895 as evidence, I contend that assimilation and acculturation do not advance with uniform rapidity, nor are they resisted uniformly by minorities. This is not to deny Hui solidarity, only to temper it with a realistic assessment of divisions within Hui society. The burden now is to demonstrate the nature of the solidarity, the networks and institutions that supported it.

As Lapidus and others have shown, Muslim communities tend to be self-contained, centered on mosques and other local institutions. Islam as a political system contains few centralizing structures beyond the Caliphate (Lapidus, 1975). In the seventeenth century, however, Sufi orders took up the task of unification, essentially a fundamentalist one, and began to proselytize in Central and East Asia (Rossabi, 1979; Fletcher, 1975). The two original contending parties in Gansu in 1781 were both Sufi suborders, and the formation of such groups proceeded rapidly during the following decades. By the late nineteenth century, the Sufi jiaozhang and his network of loyalty constituted one of the most important intercommunity links of Gansu Hui society, links that often extended well beyond the provincial borders.

Maintenance of these links required a solid political-religious identity, able leadership, and a stable socioeconomic base. Sufism was able to furnish the religious identity, through a system of undivided loyalty to the jiaozhang and his *silsila* (saintly lineage), through a satisfying set of rituals at tombs and other holy places,

and through a task—the purification of Islam, which had been corrupted its surroundings. The stable economic and social base was provided by the success of the northwestern Muslim communities as middlemen between China and non-China, a success that continued until massive Han migration took the task out of Hui hands in the twentieth century. The leadership, provided originally by Sufi saints and their disciples, evolved into a new form: the *menhuan,* or "leading lineage."

A menhuan is a family that depends, at least in part, on religious charisma for its success and status and that holds access to community leadership. Its leader has both secular and religious power through his control of contributions from the community, of *waqf* lands donated to religious institutions, and of the efficacy of the founder's tomb. Analyses of the nature of the menhuan differ widely from observer to observer, for the politics of the observer's present definitely affect the understanding of such complex institutions.

Contemporary Chinese scholars, proceeding from a socioeconomic, Marxist standpoint, see the menhuan as products of capital accumulation by religious leaders who used their power to exploit the ordinary Muslims economically (Minzu wenti yanjiu hui, 1980 reprint: 56-60). This socioeconomic explanation of the rise of the menhuan does explain their basis in land and wealth but does not distinguish them at all clearly from Hui communities in which no such institutions appeared despite the presence of wealthy leaders. Western and Japanese scholars, looking more closely at the religious aspects of the menhuan, contend that succession within Sufi orders, which often became hereditary, played a larger role:

> The creators of the menhuan, that is those who first transmitted their teaching and heard prayer, their graves are seen as holy after they die. At the same time their descendants also come to be seen as holy, and the [office of] religious leader becomes hereditary. An hereditary religious leader can pass on the land acquired through donations to the next generation, and thus develop into a great landlord [Nakada, 1971: 96-97].

For the early period of the menhuan's development, Nakada's analysis is accurate. But by the late nineteenth century, Gansu Muslim leaders had begun to operate more as powerful local lineages than simply as families of Sufi jiaozhang. The menhuan established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were associated primarily with local interests. They were named after the leading families themselves (e.g., Liu *men*, Ding *men*) or after the location of the family seat (e.g., Lintao *men*) (Luo, 1975). They were often created by splits within existing *men* over succession and inheritance. The secular functions of the menhuan, including establishment of commercial networks among Hui communities, stemmed directly from their unique centralizing capability, which was not characteristic of other Hui organizations.

As elsewhere is Asia, Sufi orders and suborders had taken on vital social and economic functions by virtue of hereditary succession (Ewing, 1983). Many Hui leaders of the nineteenth century were menhuan patriarchs by inheritance from their fathers. Ma Hualong, for example, inherited the title of daozong of the Jahriyya suborder, and Ma Anliang the leadership of the Huasi *men*, a name associated with Ma Laichi and the Khufiyya of the eighteenth century.

An additional tie to China, essential in the maintenance of Hui power and of the menhaun, lay in the economic sphere. Two imporant commodities, opium and wool, constituted a major portion of Gansu's trade with China proper. The rapid expansion of eastern markets for both of these products bound Gansu to the Han-dominated state as effectively as the Ma's apparent loyalty to the Qing. The eastern counties and the corridor shipped opium in large quantities to Mongolia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Hebei; the Muslim wool brokers of the Tibetan borderlands transported fleece by raft and caravan to Baotou and thence to the east coast.

Control over opium production, and especially its distribution, gave the Hui generals a source of revenue and a bargaining chip in their dealings with the Han. Opium revenue also made the province more attractive as a target for both migration and

invasion than its poverty and thin soil would indicate. The wool and hide trade, in contrast, was directed at the port cities, especially Tianjin. Japanese, British, and American firms brought a rapidly increasing demand for raw wool to China in the late Qing and early Republic. The Muslims of Gansu had both the means of transport, caravans and river rafts, and access to Tibetan and Mongolian producers. Thus by the twentieth century, as part of an evolutionary process, there were Muslim leaders associated with menhuan whose primary political identifications tied them to China. Their significant economic activities, too, lay eastward beyond the borders of Gansu (Lipman, 1981: 104-131 and 226-231).

THE ASCENDANCY OF THE MUSLIM WARLORDS

The intimate relationship between Hui leadership in Gansu and the Qing state may best be illustrated by the province's reaction to the Wuchang incident in 1911. Both the Governor-General of Shaan-Gan (Changgeng) and the Governor of Shaanxi (Shengyun) were loyal servants of the Qing. Ma Anliang, whose army had been incorporated into the Qing forces when he joined Dong Fuxiang, participated in their resistance to republicanism.

The most immediate threat to Ma, Changgeng, and Shengyun was the "revolutionary army" in Shaanxi, led and staffed by members of the Gelaohui and commanded by Zhang Fenghui. The Gansu loyalists had to choose between entrenching themselves in Gansu or attacking to the east. With Ma in the vanguard, they chose belligerence. Ma proposed raising 20 battalions of Hui braves, so Changgeng called a special meeting of provincial leaders to discuss the matter. They shilly-shallied, anxious about the arming of Hui even for such laudable motives. Ma's loyalty, demonstrated in 1895 and thereafter, carried the day, but armed Hui remained a focus of great concern for Gansu folk, both gentry and common (Mu, 1970: 26/ 41b-42a).

Ma attacked Shaanxi successfully, and Yuan Shikai thought the invasion serious enough to warrant alerting eastern troops. As

Ma approached Xi'an, however, an intermediary convinced him that the Emperor's abdication was real, that things had changed irreversibly, and he withdrew. Declaring his support for the Republic, Ma Anliang virtually ended northwestern resistance to the new government and earned himself the same chance his father had earned 40 years before. In company with many Qing provincial officials, he consolidated his local power, remained a mediator and broker in the Han-Hui relationship, and promoted the careers of numerous Hui in provincial and local office (Yu, 1979). Despite his association with Han notables, Ma's gestures toward the Republic did not end the rumors of an impending Muslim-Manchu coup. Shengyun kept up the good fight, and as late as 1918 he was reported as still trying to persuade Ma Anliang to rebel (Nakada, 1971: 103).

The organization of a new administration in Gansu required diplomacy and subtle leadership. The Hui, through Ma Anliang and Ma Fuxiang, needed reassurances as to Han intentions. Ma Fuxiang was sent to Ningxia as *tidu*, and Ma Anliang became assistant to the *dudu*, Zhao Weixi. Ma Qi held Xining safe, thus assuring that all three Muslim centers would remain securely under Hui control.

The next major threat to the Mas came in 1913 from Yuan Shikai's newly appointed *dujun*, Zhang Guangjian. Zhang brought a sizable contingent of Anhui troops to the provincial capital and established himself rapidly. Ma Anliang, headquartered at Hezhou, resented Zhang's presence but had plenty of troubles of his own. During 1914, the Bai Lang bandits entered Gansu, fleeing Shaanxi toward Sichuan. Forcing Ma Anliang and the other local generals to turn away from the provincial capital in self-defense, the bandits gave Zhang enough time to settle down in Lanzhou. He worked out a *modus vivendi* with the Han militarists of the eastern half of the province, leaving Ma and the local levies to deal with Bai Lang.

Devastating the whole southern part of Gansu, Bai and his cavalry behaved with particular brutality toward the Hui. Bai Lang, whatever his virtuous dynastic pretensions might have been, could not or did not control his followers when they faced

non-Han enemies. Ma Yuanzhang, the Jahriyya jiaozhang at Zhangjiachuan, was only one of many Hui leaders who organized militia to oppose Bai's advance. We have conflicting evidence as to the reception the bandits received from local Han, but no doubt regarding the Muslims.

Bai Lang despoiled the middle Wei valley, crossed into the Tao watershed, and was finally blocked from moving south by Sichuanese provincial troops. The Henanese army then erred seriously, turning west into the cul-de-sac of the Taozhou highlands. Ma Anliang and his Hui troops held the mountains to the north, the Tibetans lay to the west and south, the combined militias and Yuan Shikai's professionals were pursuing from the east. Bai Lang's frustrated, brutal response to this trap left the once prosperous town of Taozhou Old City a smoking ruin, its mosques burnt, its citizenry massacred (Farrer, 1917: Vol. II, 101). The bandit army then fled back to Shaanxi the way they had come, their proud enterprise halted by the terrain and the Gansu locals' tenacious resistance.[5]

The bandit raid provided an opportunity, neither the first nor the last, for Hui troops to protect Han civilians. In fact, this time the Hui armies defended the Han against other Han, not against rebellious minorities. Nonetheless, the presence of Hui soldiers invariably unsettled the Han people. In Tianshui, for example, a Han commander had been urged by local notables to dismiss or massacre his own Hui troops, who later suffered considerable losses defending the town against Bai Lang (North China Herald, June 29, 1912). Though several Hui commanders died in the fighting, and Muslim troops sometimes succeeded in fending off the bandit army, the Han could not divest themselves of this fear.

From 1911 onward, every outside commander in Gansu had to share at least some measure of power with the Ma warlords. The province was officially divided into eight military districts, each commanded by a *zhenshoushi*. In fact, this title simply gave legitimacy and an air of hierarchy to the existing rivalries and territorial fragmentation. Of the zhenshoushi under Zhang Guangjian, four were Han and four were Hui. The Han controlled the eastern part of the province, nearer to Shaanxi, while the Hui armies occupied Hezhou, Xining, Ningxia, and the

corridor. The death of Ma Anliang in 1918 created an uneasy coalition of the Ma warlords. Together they chafed under Zhang's continued occupation of "their" province, and together they complained to the Beijing government of his tyranny.

Zhang's economy eroded, and his power grew shaky in 1920, so he departed eastward to be replaced by Beijing's choice. The next governor might appropriately have been Ma Fuxiang, the most powerful of the Hui warlords. He had served the government loyally, had fought for the Qing and then the Republic, and had built a solid base of military and civilian support. He had been in command at Ningxia for years and also held sway over the western part of Inner Mongolia. If power, competence, and experience were primary qualifications, then Ma Fuxiang should have been appointed.

But the Han reaction against his consideration, even when it was first rumored, was widespread and strong. A Hui dujun meant a Hui-dominated province, with the terrifying Hui soldiers in control. For a people imbued with decades, even centuries of ethnic hatred and fear, that would have been an intolerable threat. Telegrams flowed to Lanzhou, particularly from the eastern counties, protesting Ma's consideration. The telegrams even included the old ethnocentric slogan of 1862, *Han Hui shi chou*, "Han and Hui are eternal enemies" (Mu, 1970 reprint: 30/21b).

Searching for a compromise, the Beijing government selected Zhang Guangjian's assistant, Lu Hongtao, as dujun. A Gansu Han, Lu had married his daughter to Ma Hongkui, Ma Fuxiang's oldest son, placing him in a delicate balance of personal and political relationships. When Lu was appointed, Ma Fuxiang went to Mongolia and left his nephew, Ma Hongbin, in charge at Ningxia. Lu's inheritance was a disastrous economy, a weak provincial army, an empty treasury, a province shattered by earthquakes, droughts, opium addiction, unstable currency, and military fragmentation. The dujun's authority reached no further than his own most distant loyal garrison, for the zhenshoushi held the real local power and governed their districts independently if they could. Apart from the Muslims, Lu had to cope with Dong Fuxiang's Han ex-subordinates in east Gansu. They had been

entrenched there for years and had no intention of giving up their percentage of the Wei valley's revenues, primarily derived from the opium trade.

Lu chose not to confront them but to allow them independence, with his authority at Lanzhou as *primus inter pares*. Lu Hongtao, like many petty warlords, had his eye on the wider arena of militarist politics. In 1924 he sent a gift of 4,000 Gansu horses to Wu Peifu, hoping to enter a clique by using Gansu as collateral. But a stroke felled Lu before he could become a national participant, and he left the province late in 1925. None of his subordinates could tolerate being ruled by any other, so they fought the issue all over east Gansu until Li Changqing won an unsteady and pyrrhic victory. By 1926, most of the province, except for the Muslim warlords' domains, was solidly in the hands of a new contender, Liu Yufen and the Guominjun, sent to secure Gansu by the titular *duban* of the northwest, Feng Yuxiang (Sheridan, 1966: chap. 7).

Duan Qirui appointed Feng to control the northwest, so their enemies immediately sent messengers to Gansu to organize anti-Feng resistance. Wu Peifu and Zhang Zuolin approached all of the zhenshoushi, but only the Han responded positively, the Hui biding their time until the power balance became clearer. Wu did establish relations with Ma Qi, but not of an intimacy that required Ma to act against the Guominjun (Yao Lingjiu, 1965).[6]

Undaunted, Liu Yufen drove the Han generals either out of the province or into retirement and secured the main road from Xi'an to Lanzhou. Ma Hongbin, Ma Lin, Ma Tingxiang, and Bei Jianzhang, a Han who commanded a largely Hui army at Hezhou, followed the lead of Ma Fuxiang and made their peace with Liu and Feng (Yao Lingjiu, 1965). Using Feng as a stepping stone, Ma Fuxiang achieved several national offices during the late 1920s, and he convinced the others that the Guominjun offered the best prospect for maintaining their prerogatives in Gansu.

But the goal of using Feng to maintain order while enjoying discreet independence could not be realized. Feng and Liu needed to bleed Gansu dry of revenue and manpower in order to

participate in the eastern wars, especially Feng's campaigns against Zhang Zuolin. The imperatives of battle did not permit the existence of independent military power in Feng's rear, nor could Feng allow the province's crucial revenues to fall into others' hands.

In 1927 the northwest was again plunged into warfare, made doubly devastating this time by natural disasters. The spring brought no rain for the second consecutive year, and cereal supplies were exhausted. The Liangzhou earthquake struck in May, causing as much damage as the 1920 Haicheng quake that had killed Ma Yuanzhang, the popular and charismatic jiaozhang of the Jahriyya. Hundreds of thousands were left dead, injured, or homeless. The physical damage and loss of life were deplorable, and so was the emotional shock. Taxed to the limit or beyond by their government(s), pressed into service as soldiers or transporters, robbed, beaten, raped, starved, brutalized—the ordinary people of Gansu had to cope with slow death and clear seismic signs of Heaven's displeasure (Kang, 1931).

The Muslim warlords could gain from this oppression if they could direct its violent results, either against Feng Yuxiang or against other local rivals. Most actively anti-Feng was Ma Tingxiang of Liangzhou, Ma Anliang's third son. He made arrangements for delivery of modern weapons from Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria, and when they arrived in late 1927 he made his move. Among the Hui militarists, only Ma Qi saw advantage in supporting him, covertly. The others stood back, several of them remaining nominally in Feng's service for another year or two (Ma Peiqing, 1966). Ma Tingxiang's fight against Liu did not bring victory but only increased misery for the people of the Gansu corridor, over whose towns and dead bodies the issue was fought. Han massacres of Hui and Hui massacres of Han marked this small but devastating local war.

Another young Muslim officer began a campaign against the Guominjun independent of Ma Tingxiang. Ma Zhongying, Sven Hedin's "Big Horse," was a "nephew" (actually a cousin) of Ma Qi and, one source claims, of Ma Fuxiang (Le Fevre, 1935: 139). He left Xining with a few men in 1928 at the age at seventeen. He

reached and besieged Hezhou a few months later with thousands of followers, gathered from the discontented Salars and other Muslim ethnic groups in Huangzhong and Taoxi. He commenced a two-year campaign that ranged from the Wei valley to the corridor, from the Sichuan border to Ningxia (Fan Manyun, 1965: sections 2-3). Ma Zhongying and his young officers were not engaged in jihad as far as we know. They were the wild young men of the border, reacting to political anarchy by looting some towns, killing some Han, and raping some women. They rebelled against Feng, to simplify things somewhat, for the fun of it.

The common people of the province suffered dreadfully in the process, including residents of the Ma clans' home district in Hezhou. In revenge for Ma Zhongying's and Ma Tingxiang's excesses, Liu Yufen devastated Hanjiaji and Dahejia, killing or driving out all of their inhabitants (Kang, 1931; Fan Manyun, 1965: section 5). On the other side, Ma Tingxiang's younger brother, occupying southern Gansu in 1930, retaliated against an ally of the Guominjun by slaughtering the 7,000 residents of Li Xian (Ma Peiqing, 1966).

When Feng Yuxiang went eastward to ally with Yan Xishan in an unsuccessful campaign against the victorious Northern Expedition of the Guomindang, several of the Muslim generals went with him. Those who stayed behind defected to the Nationalists. They were led again by Ma Fuxiang, who found it easy to repudiate his alliance with Feng on the grounds that Feng had been acceptable only when he cooperated with Nanjing. Those who went with Feng defected along with Han Fuju in May 1929, effectively ending Feng's career. Some of the Ma family succeeded in obtaining Guomindang titles and confirmation of their local power in Gansu; others faded into relative obscurity. But all had voluntarily joined the local militarist system perpetuated in the initial years of the Nanjing decade, repudiating any idea of Muslim separatism.

In sum, Han-Hui interaction became more and more intimate at the level of the military elite. From Ma Zhan'ao's surrender in 1872, to Ma Anliang's subordination to Dong Fuxiang and his alliance with Shengyun, to Ma Fuxiang's submission to and then

betrayal of Feng Yuxiang—in Gansu we find a gradual turning away from Muslim political independence toward unity with the Guomindang, the Han nationalists. Although this unity may have been more instrumental than sincere, designed more to keep the Guomindang at bay than to serve its aims, the involvement of the Hui warlords in Chinese politics had strong assimilating effects on them as leaders, and on their communities (Hunsberger, 1978).

Part of this process was a redefinition of the Hui connection to the Muslim world of West Asia. In the eighteenth century a China-dwelling Muslim who wanted to go on the hajj went west, taking years on the journey. By the late nineteenth century, Chinese Muslims could take ship in Shanghai and enjoy a few weeks of British hospitality en route to the Holy Land. Modern transport made the pilgrimage much more accessible, and it improved communication between this far-flung outpost of Islam and the core in Arabia. But ironically, this closer tie to the Middle East was drawn from a tighter, less elastic connection between the Hui and *China*. The Muslims of the northwest no longer looked west, even if they searched for Muslim relationships. They looked east, to and across China. Ma Tingxiang searched for allies among the Han warlords, not among the chieftains of Central Asia, in his rebellion against Feng Yuxiang. He notified Zhang Zuolin, who had money to give and weapons to send.

Thus we may see in late Qing and Republican Gansu a changing of direction, from the caravans of the eighteenth century, which brought Sufism and other Muslim currents to the frontiers, to the possibilities engendered by nationalism and imperialism. Hui participated in Pan-Islamic movements, but they generally did so as representatives of the Guomindang, not just of China's Muslims.

As a final illustration of this changed world of Gansu, we may examine the Muslim Brotherhood, *Ikhwan* in Arabic, as it appeared and flourished in China. Founded by a hajji from the Dongxiang who returned from Mecca in 1893, this fundamentalist, reformist movement spread widely in the northwest, reaching and influencing ahong as far away as Shandong. This Muslim brotherhood was consciously modeled after the Arabian Ikhwan,

also called Ahl-al-Sunna, a movement that, like eighteenth-century Sufism, aimed at a purification of modern Islam. Sufism itself, especially its "impure" or "heretical" social institutions, became the target of these reformers.

The founder of the Chinese Ikhwan, Ma Wanfu (known as Guoyuan after his native place) came under the protection of Ma Qi after being driven from Gansu by an enraged Ma Anliang. Ma Wanfu held that the menhuan, the power base of Ma Anliang among many others, represented a heretical Sufi and Han accretion to true Islam and should be eliminated. The Ikhwan held powerful appeal, with its emphasis on the authority of "pure" Arabian Islamic ritual and texts. It did not, however, represent a merely reactionary, foreign-inspired attempt to remove the Hui from all Han influences or practices. Although Ma Wanfu himself spoke only Dongxiang Mongolian at home and discouraged his family from learning Chinese, other Ikhwan leaders, such as Hu Gaoshan, ahong of Ningxia, became well-known patriots. After discovering anti-Chinese prejudice during his pilgrimage to Mecca in the 1920s, Hu returned to China to help build a strong and united nation state to protect both Han and Hui. One of his extant broadsides from the 1940s calls upon the Almighty to protect and help "our government and nation" in its war against Japan (Ma Kexun, 1981; Ye Zhenggang, 1982).

CONCLUSION

The Ma family warlords of Gansu could gather and maintain power in their native province because they had built a long-standing relationship with the Qing state, because they could support themselves economically, and because they were willing to forego separatism in favor of gradual political assimilation. The growing power of the Chinese state on the Gansu frontier, from Zuo Zongtang's army to the Guomindang and massive Han migration in the 1940s, forced them to draw closer to China in order to remain semi-independent of China.

It is easy to see how Muslim influence in the twentieth century should come, even to the far northwest, via China proper. Hui contact with the Pan-Turkic movement was cut off by the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the defeat of Central Asian "Nationality Socialism." Hui leaders established contact with both the elitist modernizers and the fundamentalist reformers of the Middle East through their new status as participants in New China. Thus had the Hui elite of Gansu changed, from Ma Mingxin to Ma Buqing. The former returned from Arabia as a reformist Sufi, attached to the Muslim heartland and bent on Islamic purification. The latter studied the Confucian classics, served in the Chinese army, then fled to Taiwan from his native northwest in 1949 to become an advisor to the Nationalist Ministry of Defense. Still not completely assimilated, the Hui leaders of Gansu had taken a decisive step toward more complete incorporation of their communities into China.

NOTES

1. Lattimore (1962: 135-138) argues that China and America have qualitatively different kinds of frontiers. The expanding, irreversibly mobile American frontier contrasts sharply with the "ebb and flow" frontiers of Inner Asia. But at the North American frontiers, a dominant, already urbanized culture absorbed and changed others while adapting itself to marginal land, in much the same way the Chinese did.

2. A romanticized praise-and-blame account of the Mas may be found in Chen (1974), a semifictional work with a negative view of warlords. Apart from this type of material, Chinese authors have not paid much attention to the northwest. Recently, however, the subject of Islam and Muslims in China has reemerged as a topic of interest for Chinese historians, and several symposium volumes have been published by Ningxia People's Publishing Company.

3. Ford (1974) shows clearly that Liu Zhi and other Sino-Muslim apologists believed Confucianism to be a compelling moral doctrine worthy of respect and compliance despite its non-Muslim origins. Such a view would be credible only among people accustomed to and satisfied with life in China.

4. Both in the eighteenth century (Ford, 1974: 153) and in the late nineteenth (Mu, 1970 reprint: 24/40b), Muslims turned to Chinese legal remedies to mediate or judge disputes within their communities. Although usually seen as autonomous and self-governing, these Hui clearly assigned at least some measure of legitimate jurisdiction to the secular state, non-Muslim though it was, in which they lived. It is significant that state jurisdiction was perceived as including some matters of religious, internal concern for the Hui communities.

5. A draft chronology of Gansu's history being circulated among scholars in China does not mention the sack of Taozhou, though it does narrate Bai Lang's raid into the province. Farrer's account, and those of Chinese observers, leave no doubt as to the battle's outcome (Mu, 1970 reprint: 28/28a-b), but such behavior on Bai's part would belie the "righteous uprising" label with which his raid has been characterized, especially since the brutality was directed at an already oppressed minority.

6. A number of manuscripts of reminiscences by old members of Liu Yufen's and Ma Tingxiang's staffs were made available to me in China in July 1983. I have cited Fan Manyun, Ma Peiqing, and Yao Lingjiu in this article, all authors of such *huiyilu*.

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