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The Anfu Parliament in Republican China. The life and death of a failed single-party state, 1918–20

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ABSTRACT

The Anfu Club, which governed China in 1918–20, has often been seen as a factionalist grouping of corrupt and incompetent politicians handpicked by the military and kept afloat by Japanese loans and state subsidies. The fact that they had achieved domination in parliament through vote-rigging was often seen as sufficient to write off their achievements. This article argues that Anfu, which was East Asia's first single-party state, oversaw one of the most accomplished periods in the legislative history of the Republic of China. It was a highly efficient legislature which passed much-needed laws, thanks to rigorous inner-party discipline. It had an internationalist diplomatic line and it hoped to participate in planning for the post-war international order. Due to a lack of consensus in the military over how a single-party state should be run, however, Anfu found itself abused and scapegoated frequently and fought back using constitutional means, impeaching officials including the Premier, slashing the military budget by 20 per cent, and demanding cabinet appointments appropriate to its status as the parliamentary majority. Eventually this caused a rupture between it and its rival forces in the military, leading to the 1920 civil war that precipitated Anfu's collapse.

KEYWORDS

Republic of China; Anfu Club; parliament; single-party state; parliamentarism; Anhui Clique

The Second Chinese Parliament, better known as the 'Anfu Parliament' after the political group 'Anfu Club' (*Anfu Julebu* 安福俱樂部) that dominated it, was convened on 12 August 1918. It was closed and effectively dissolved on 30 August 1920 at the end of its third session, following the defeat in a war of its main backers, military strongman General Duan Qirui 段祺瑞 [Tuan Ch'i-jui] and the Anhui Faction. Anfu MPs numbered 384 out of 472 MPs, or some 80 per cent of the seats in both houses of parliament; the second largest grouping, the Research Clique (i.e. the ex-Progressive Party) counted only 20 MPs.¹ It was effectively a single-party state which secured its domination through extensive vote-rigging in elections and by enlisting the heads of all branches of

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¹After the Old Communications Clique left the Anfu Club and formed the Qiaoyuan 僑園 [Chiao-yüan] Club, the Anfu Club still controlled 330 seats in both houses of parliament, which was 70 per cent of the total. See Li Xin 李新 & Li Zongyi 李宗一, *Zhonghua Minguo shi di 2 bian* 中華民國史第二編 [History of the Republic of China, Series 2], 2 vols (Beijing, 1987), vol. II, p. 264.

government in its 86-member Club Council – equivalent to a Central Committee. In addition to the MPs, it had the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, leaders of the army, and officials representing banks, railways and the foreign service. The Club also frequently organized congresses (also known as plenums) for its MPs where voting took place on contentious matters. Anfu news organs notably included *Kung-yen Pao* 公言報 [Fair Comment] and *L'Impartial* 大公報. Meanwhile the Research Clique MPs often fought a David versus Goliath battle against the Anfu establishment. The Anfu Parliament has a notorious reputation in Republican Chinese history, being perceived as a tool of domination for Duan and his 'cronies', and as a stain on the record of the noble pursuit of democracy and responsible government during the early Republican era.² Anfu is very often not even seen as a proper political party but only as an interest group or faction, and is erroneously accused of having no proper internal organization, due to its secretiveness.

This article is the first to be published of three inter-connected articles trying to advance a more balanced view of the Anfu regime's intentions, achievements and legacies. The background to this paper will be documented in an article on the birth of the 'Progressive-Anfu System' and the monolithic political regime – what we refer to as a 'constitutional dictatorship of the gentry'. It will discuss the mainly continental European ideological currents, notably Organicism (and mechanicism) and State Socialism, that fed into the 'Corrective Revolution' of July 1917 against the restoration of Emperor Puyi, led by General Duan and the ex-Constitutional Monarchist and Progressive Party leader Liang Qichao 梁啟超 [Liang Ch'i-ch'ao]. It defeated absolute monarchism, political pluralism and economic liberalism at one stroke. This was on top of the pressing need for a National Unity Government after China had declared war against Germany and Austria – all of which led to a brief period of Progressive Party dominance in July-December 1917. A rupture then took place between Duan and Liang, necessitating the former to regroup his forces in the legislature (the new, officially-appointed Provisional Senate) and bureaucracy. On 8 March 1918 these men formally organized themselves as the Anfu Club, after a decision could not be reached over a more political name, such as the 'Democratic Club' or 'Popular Constitutional Club'.³ Anfu thus governed on the basis of a monolithic system first designed by the Progressives, who now totally found themselves side-lined. A third article will discuss the origins and legacies of the developmental economic policies of the 'Progressive-Anfu System', involving two courageous attempts at inducing economic lift-offs, the first in 1917 when Japanese finance, in the form of the Nishihara Loans, encouraged planning

²Qian Shifu 錢實甫, *Beiyang Zhengfu shiqi de zhengzhi zhidu* 北洋政府時期的政治制度 [The Political Institutions of the Beiyang Government Era], 2 vols (Beijing, 1984), upper vol., p. 33, 155. For condemnations of Anfu from critics during the period, see Nanhai Yinzi 南海胤子, *Anfu huoguo ji* 安福禍國記 [An Account of How Anfu Ruined the Country] (Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1985). For a typical factionalist view of the Anfu period, see A.J. Nathan, *Peking Politics – Factionalism and Failure of Constitutionalism* (Berkeley, 1976). On Anfu electoral irregularities, see Chang Peng-yüan 張朋園, 'Anfu Guohui xuanju – lun fuhua wei minzhu zhengzhi de banjiaoshi' 安福國會選舉 – 論腐化為民主政治的絆腳石 [The Anfu Parliamentary Election – On Corruption as the Stumbling Block for Democratic Politics], *Taipei Zhong-guang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan* 臺北中央研究院近代史研究所集刊30, (1998), pp. 149–224. Yet even standard works on parliamentary history or the works listed above have not devoted much length to Anfu's actual legislative operations, to the point where none of them have documented the start and end dates of the three Anfu-era parliamentary sessions. See for example Gu Dunrou 顧敦錄, *Zhongguo Yihui shi* 中國議會史 [A History of the Chinese Parliament], (Suchow, 1931).

³Wu Qiu 吳虬, *Beiyang Pai zhi qiyuan ji qi bengkuai* 北洋派之起源及其崩潰 [The Origins and Collapse of the Beiyang Faction] (Beijing, 2007), p. 82.

for various industrial sectors to profit from wartime raw material prices, including a 'First National Steelworks of the Republic of China'. Anfu considered transforming itself into a socialist party in 1919; in the 1920 attempt, an Economic Investigation Bureau was established. Agricultural cooperatives, peasant banks, hydro-electrification, motorways and the creation of a state-run banking cartel to counter financial imperialism were proposed. This suggests that Anfu was an ill-fated but also remarkably forward looking regime.

In this article, we examine the functioning of the 1918 Anfu Parliament from the point of view of its institutions and mode of operation rather than the usual 'factionalist historiography'. The creation of the Anfu system – a corporatist, monolithic party dependent on the military and commanding all three branches of government – had been necessary due to the provisions of the 1912 Provisional Constitution, modelled on the pluralist order of the French Third Republic (1870–1940). This was a parliamentary form of government, at the head of which was the Premier and his cabinet (State Council), and where the executive had no *de facto* right (as in France after 1878) or *de jure* right (as in 1910s–20s China) to dissolve parliament. Unless a single party governed the legislature and other branches of government, the system would have had all of the inherent instabilities of French multi-party pluralism, which wreaked havoc in Peking during the 1916–17 episode. The formation of most of the cabinets during the Anfu Era were therefore subject to extensive consultation and was mostly a smooth affair. For the first time in Chinese history (and the last in the ROC until 1978 in Taiwan when Chiang Ching-kuo assumed power) a peaceful transfer of power took place between two Presidents – Feng Guozhang 馮國璋 [Feng Kuo-chang] and Xu Shichang 徐世昌 [Hsu Shih-ch'ang]. This consensus did not last long, however, when Xu's ascent proved surprisingly to be the undoing of Anfu's hegemony. The true, unchallenged single-party phase of Anfu's existence proved to be very short, contrary to expectations.

Although the Anfu Parliament was a conservatively-inclined legislature, it became one of the most accomplished legislatures in early Chinese parliamentary history – from the point of view of its legislative and budgetary work, especially with regard to the quality of its motions and bills, and the process in which they were deliberated. We shall examine the Anfu Parliament's role in drafting in 1919 a new constitution that was never implemented, but which would have brought the Chinese political system closer to Franco-British practice in addition to absorbing certain lessons from the failed 1916–17 experiment in political pluralism. In the run up to the Paris peace conference, parliament was concerned about relations with Japan, the Shandong [Shantung] Question, and the protection of economic rights and overseas Chinese. The Anfu Parliament became a pioneer in Chinese parliamentary diplomacy, and this certainly demonstrated the professionalism of Anfu MPs. Yet their attempt to fight off manipulation by the military was due to a widely-held feeling of betrayal during the North–South Peace Negotiations and Versailles Peace Conference. Anfu was portrayed as the enemy of the public during the May Fourth Movement largely due to its alliance with the New Communications Clique; and despite leading a campaign urging the government to adopt a hard-line stance concerning Chinese sovereignty and insisting for months on not signing the treaty, they never received credit for it. Not only did this prompt Anfu MPs to acquire a mind of their own – they quickly became a golem that struck back. They stepped up their activities in an attempt to fend off challenges from various military

actors and the Research Clique (the ex-Progressives). Anfu exercised its constitutional rights to check-and-balance the executive, including impeaching a Premier, and conducting inquiries. The 1919 budget was the first in Chinese history to be passed independently by a legislature (the 1911–12 budget passed by the Advisory Council had to be submitted for royal assent), and indeed Anfu MPs succeeded in slashing military expenditure by a shocking 20 per cent. In fact, it has been argued that compared to the weak Peking Government, Anfu had been a strong parliament.⁴

However it was clear that Anfu was quickly losing its status as the party of the government, and was paving the way to a total rupture of relations with the executive and hence its demise. General Jin Yunpeng 靳雲鵬 [Chin Yun-p'eng], one of Duan Qirui's most-trusted lieutenants who was Premier in November 1919–May 1920 and again after Anfu was disbanded in August 1920, cosied himself to President Xu. General Jin regarded the increasingly active Anfu Club and the parliament that it dominated, not as a body with which he should consult over major policies and appointments, but as an embarrassment and oppositional force. Anfu being accused of selling China (and Shandong) out to Japan and also for 'blocking' the North–South peace negotiations by insisting on the legitimacy of the Anfu Parliament, did nothing to help the party's image in the eyes of Jin, a Shandong native. In addition, it was hated by Duan's rivals in the Peiyang establishment, the Zhili [Chihli] Faction. Jin was also a personal rival of Anfu's main organizer, General Xu Shuzheng 徐樹錚 [Hsu Shu-cheng]. Jin decided to disrupt if not to disown altogether this monolithic party system, with disastrous results. We shall examine the relations between Parliament and cabinet, to see how Jin's brash choice of finance, justice and communications ministers was strongly rebuffed by Anfu⁵ and contributed to a break up in their relations. Jin subsequently sided with the Zhili Faction when war broke out in July 1920, which saw the defeat of Duan and the Anhui Faction, and the dissolution of Anfu. Even then, the Anfu Parliament lingered on until its peaceful dissolution in August – which was an uneasy achievement.⁶ The stable institutional design of the Anfu Regime had worked, but what had failed was the formation of a consensus over the way with which the system should be run and its functions maximized. In other words, the military had created a party-state, but never really understood how they were to use it. They took its obedience for granted and ignored how Anfu, once created, would acquire distinct interests, and would need to be coaxed. When this golem fought back, the result was mutual ruin.

A conservative legislature

Despite the Anfu Parliament being an 'Old Guard in a New Order', it had a relatively conservative political stance, and most people in it were content with the status quo, opposing any radical change against it – including a reversion to constitutional monarchy, towards which some Anfu MPs still held sympathies. Its utilitarian politics rather resembled the early English Parliament. In more than half a century after the 'Glorious'

⁴Deng Ye 鄧野, *Bali Hehui yu Beijing Zhengfu de neiwai boyi* 巴黎和會與北京政府的內外博弈 [The Paris Peace Conference and the domestic and external manoeuvres of the Beijing Government], (Beijing, 2014), p. 133.

⁵As opposed to existing historiography stating such pressure had come from Tuan himself, for example Lai Xinxia 來新夏 et al., *Beiyang Junfa shi*. 北洋軍閥史 [A History of the Beiyang Warlords], (Tianjin, 2000), p. 606.

⁶Gu, *Zhongguo Yihui shi*, p. 236.

Revolution of 1688, the English gentry was still an immense social force, and took up roughly two-thirds of the British Parliament in the 1760s. They, the most conservative, feudalistic and royalist class in English society, dominated the politics of the country. Chinese MPs elected in 1918, in terms of their background, had an average age of 43.5, some 7 years older than the average in the First (1912) Parliament. In terms of education background, a total of 22.9 per cent of MPs elected in 1918 possessed traditional civil service examination qualifications, higher than in the First Parliament. Some of these gentry who had traditional qualifications managed to be voted in, precisely because the revolutionaries had been excluded from the 1918 Anfu Parliament elections. In terms of professional experience, the majority were bureaucrats, educators or commercial professionals. Ninety-eight of them (21 per cent) had in fact been members of the late-Qing Advisory Council, or of the First Parliament, and thus had rich experience of parliamentary politics, as well as being politically relatively temperate.

The Anfu Parliament thus eliminated the generational conflicts in the parliament of 1912. Only two fist fights happened in the 12 August 1918–11 February 1919 session, and there were no aborted meetings due to the failure to meet the quorum – all of which stood in stark contrast compared to the First Parliament. Due to Anfu's strict procedures, which already studied matters and reached decisions before they were submitted to parliament, legislative efficiency was at an unprecedented high. According to the *Senate Gazette*, in the 30 sessions held during 1918–19, no less than 19 completed the items on the agenda of the day, and the other 11 completed most of the items despite having to prolong the meeting. Fifty-nine bills were discussed, 30 of them in relation to the executive and the legal code, 15 related to foreign relations, and 11 related to economics and popular livelihood. It was in the last three categories where the debates were most fierce. Twelve laws were passed or amended, including the *Civilian Official and Diplomat Examination Act*, the *Prefectural Self-Government Act*, and parliamentary organizational legislation. Such efficacy was the result of concerted efforts. The House of Representatives Speaker and Anfu party whip Wang Yitang 王揖唐 [Wang I-t'ang] declared at the closing of the session in February 1919 that 'It is a fortunate thing that this Normal Session of Parliament has seen strict adherence to discipline, consistent from start to end, and no repeat of the mistakes of the past'.⁷ This was another sign that Liang Qichao vision of 'government as machine' had succeeded, only that the beneficiary had become Anfu.

On 6 January 1919, the Anfu Parliament resolved to abolish the 1913 'Temple of Heaven Draft Constitution', named after the meeting place of the 1912 Parliament Constituent Committee. This meant a refutation of the draft's hyper-parliamentary principles, in that the legislature would have the right to veto decisions and appointments in the executive, but that the executive would have no right to dissolve the legislature. The new draft was completed in September 1919, and embodied more fully a system of cabinet responsibility, in that by giving the executive the right to dissolve parliament, a more bilateral power arrangement was created. This was in addition to providing the President with more powers for what Carl Schmitt calls a 'state of exception'.⁸ It no

⁷Guohui Bihuishi jishi' 國會閉會式紀事 [An Account of the Closing Ceremony of Parliament], *Canyiyuan Gongbao* 參議院公報 [Senate Gazette], 1st session, 6, (1919), pp. 143–4.

⁸See Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, tr. George Schwab (Chicago and London, 2005), 5–15.

longer provided for a smaller legislature permanently in session, a 'Commission of Parliament' similar to the post-1954 National People's Congress Standing Committee. Contrary to the Temple of Heaven Draft, the President could directly declare a state of emergency circumventing the Commission of Parliament, as well as grant amnesties circumventing the Supreme Court. He could also influence legal interpretation by appointing two members of the constitutional review body – the Chief Ombudsman [*Pingzhengyuanzhang* 平政院長] and the Chief Auditor. [*Shenjiyuanzhang* 審計院長] In addition to the Senate President, House Speaker and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, they formed a 'Special Conference' to supplant the role of the Parliament Constituent Committee [*Xianfa huiyi* 憲法會議]. This draft was never implemented due to internal strife and the uncertainties of the North–South peace negotiations. In these negotiations, President Xu appeared to be sympathetic to the south's consistent demands for the dismantling of northern institutions, and – paradoxically – possibly because it would also have given President Xu the many powers meant for once President-hopeful Duan Qirui.

The Anfu Draft also appeared to have absorbed the lessons of the battles of 1917, where a consensus could not be reached over how to distribute limited cabinet seats to multiple political and military factions to ensure wartime cohesion – anticipating perhaps the re-emergence of a multi-focal power sharing arrangement, which proved true. The new draft created ministers without portfolio, capped at two-thirds of the number of ministers also appointed by the President. The draft would have provided for a system more similar to Britain, notably in how the President (in the King's position) now had the power to dissolve the House of Representatives without the need for permission from the Senate, and to order a re-election. This meant that the Premier could now request the President to dissolve parliament, and the President could do so once for each parliamentary session. This eliminated a major issue arising from the 1912 Provisional Constitution not according such powers to then President Yuan Shikai, whose 'autocratic tendencies' the MPs feared and proved to be true. The changes enabled constitutional crises such as these to be resolved institutionally rather than militarily, and eliminated the need to resort to a dictatorial constitution like Yuan's 1914 'Constitutional Compact'.

Despite – or perhaps, due to its conservatism, the Anfu Parliament pushed the envelope when it argued for the economic interests of the high finance and the gentry-bourgeoisie. In 1916 a major financial crisis happened when Yuan Shikai's government, facing mounting military expenditure, decided to cease the silver convertibility of the banknotes of the two largest state-run banks, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications. The value of these banknotes fell to a fraction of the original amount, causing 'indescribable suffering on the part of the people'.⁹ Senator Wu Tsung-lien 吳宗濂, Anfu Club councillor and former diplomat, proposed a thorough auditing by the Audit Council and MPs who were financial experts, of the accounts of the two banks, to ascertain their amount of reserves and government debt. He also argued that the government should give the two banks total autonomy. When this was submitted to the Financial Committee, it was decided to confirm the principle that the General Managers of the two banks would be

⁹Di 5 ci huiyi sujilu' 第5次會議速記錄 [Stenographic Record of the 5th Meeting], *Canyiyuan Gongbao* 參議院公報 [Senate Gazette], 1st session, 2, (1918), pp. 68–75.

chosen by the shareholder's general assemblies, independently of the appointment of the Finance Minister.¹⁰ Wu preferred short-term bonds to restore convertibility, as opposed to the issuing of long-term bonds, reflecting a distrust of government repayment abilities. Senator Zhou Zuomin 周作民 [Chou Tso-min] was General Manager of Kincheng 金城 Bank – whose shareholders and deposit account holders were in large part prominent government and military leaders. Zhou argued that the banknotes issued by both state banks had been reduced to commodity status, and could regain currency status should the government embark on a radical currency reform making them the fiat currency, and also to repay all of the debt owed to both banks; he did not oppose the issuing of 'Seven-Year Bonds', if it could absorb excess currency.¹¹

A more poignant example of the conservatism – and the limits thereof – of this (could have been) constitutional dictatorship of the gentry, was in their hesitation to adopt Confucianism as the state religion. This had been spearheaded by the Confucian Association (*Kongjiaohui* 孔教會) which was led by Kang Youwei 康有為 [Kang Yu-wei] and the Anfu Translation Division Executive and Central Academic Caucus Senator – the Columbia University-educated Chen Huanzhang 陳煥章 [Chen Huan-chang]. Kang did not see Confucianism as being contrary to Republicanism, and indeed Chen argued in his tome *The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School*, praised by John Maynard Keynes,¹² that Confucianism placed emphasis on the development of artisanal industry and commerce, and thus suited the needs of capitalistic development. The Confucianism issue had been twice discussed during the 1912–13 and 1916–17 parliamentary sessions – the latter in the Constituent Committee. Yet the aims were not fulfilled. Kang Yu-wei's petition to Duan Qirui and Li Yuanhong 黎元洪 [Li Yüan-hung] in 1916 were ignored. The Association's naïve hope in 1916–17 of becoming the largest party in parliament, on the presumption that Confucianism still commanded paramount respect from the MPs, quickly evaporated in the face of greater political exigencies. Their fortunes revived somewhat when in 1918, 85 MPs led by Chen submitted a *Birthday of Confucius Bill* which was passed in September. Confucius' birthday on 27 August (Gregorian Calendar) was declared a holiday. Soon, Chen and 21 others submitted a *Heaven Worshipping Ceremony Bill*. To muster support, Chen attempted to organize such a ceremony at the Temple of Heaven with the help of the Interior Ministry; but two days before it was to be held, on 20 December 1918, the ministry withdrew its support, and the ceremony was cancelled. From then on the movement declined. Time was against Chen, for when he and 58 other MPs submitted the *Respect for Confucius Bill*, which was first debated in parliament on 24 May 1919, the May Fourth Movement which championed the overthrowing of Confucian traditions was already underway. Not only did the bill propose state ceremonies, it also advocated for the recruitment of ceremonial staff by the state, and the creation of a *University of the Classics*. The bill was never voted on due to the inability to form a quorum on several occasions from June to August, reflecting perhaps a lack of interest from MPs – and it was ultimately abandoned.¹³

¹⁰'Di 5 ci huiyi sujilu', pp. 68–75.

¹¹'Di 5 ci huiyi sujilu', pp. 68–75.

¹²J. M. Keynes. 'Review – The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School. By Chen Huan-Chang. Columbia University Studies. (New York: Longmans. 1911. 2 Vols. Pp. xv+756.)', *The Economic Journal* 22, (1912), pp. 584–8.

¹³Han Hua 韓華. *Minchu Kongjiaohui yu Guojiao Yundong yanjiu* 民初孔教會與國教運動研究 [Research on the Confucianist Society and the Movement for a National Religion in the Early Republic] (Peking, 2007), pp. 63–4; 139–43.

With Duan Qirui and Liang Qichao's decision in September 1917 to convene a new Provisional Senate, members of the 1912 parliament who had gone to Canton to join Sun Yat-sen's Southern Military Government formed an 'Extraordinary Parliament', called as such because it never reached a quorum. In its war with the north, the south claimed to be defending the 1912 Provisional Constitution and its legitimate legislature. By the end of the 1918 election, which were clearly fraudulent, it was clear that the new Anfu Parliament, even if it served effectively the interests of the gentry, would not enjoy any legitimacy in the eyes of the public, save for perhaps a small section of it. The abolition of the Anfu Parliament, or of both parliaments, and whether or not to convene an independent Constituent Assembly in Nanking formed of both camps, became important points of contention during the Shanghai peace negotiations of early 1919, held in the backdrop of the restoration of peace following the end of the First World War. Both sides were high-handed – the north believing that it possessed military might, the south believing that it enjoyed popular backing, to the point where it insisted on punishing the northern 'makers of evil' as a condition – amounting to the north's unconditional surrender. Various stakeholders tried to broker compromises privately but all failed to materialize, and indeed the parliament issue was avoided by both sides until a month into the conference, in March 1919. Eventually negotiations broke down in mid-May, when the south resisted all attempts to reduce the severity of its demands and insistence on dissolving the Anfu Parliament. However, this did not create any sympathy for the north in the press; 4 May was soon to be detrimental to it.¹⁴

Parliamentary diplomacy

At the end of the First World War, with the seeming bankruptcy of Statism, 'Civilian Diplomacy' (*guomin waijiao* 國民外交) emerged as a fashionable term. Anfu and the Research Clique both formed groupings – the League of Nations Association and the Civilian Diplomacy Association respectively – to try influence state foreign policy as well as making contact with international bodies to seek assistance with regard to Chinese aims. The three main aims that the Peking Government set for itself were territorial integrity, resumption of national sovereignty (notably the retreat of foreign troops), and economic and tariff autonomy. Beginning in late 1918 parliament began to assert its rights to conduct some aspects of foreign policy in line with these aims,¹⁵ such as asking the government to consult parliament over the choice of representatives for the Paris peace conference.¹⁶ Taking Anglo-American examples as a reference, it also sought to establish a 'Diplomatic Investigation Commission' which would include, in addition to MPs and officials, university chancellors and Provincial Assembly representatives, as a platform on which the 'foreign policy public' could

¹⁴For a comprehensive study of the North-South Peace Negotiations, refer to Lin Tongfa 林桶法, *Minguo 8 Nian zhi Nan-Bei Yihe* 民國八年之南北議和 [The North-South Peace Negotiations of 1919], (Taipei, 1990).

¹⁵Department of State, ed., *FRUS, the Paris Peace Conference*, II: 492, 509–11. In Xu Guoqi, *China and the Great War – China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*, (Cambridge, 2005), p. 251.

¹⁶*Zhongyiyuan Gongbao* 眾議院公報 [House of Representatives Gazette], 1st session, 4, (1918), p. 66; 'Yiyuan Wei Rongxi tichu qingzhi zhengfu Ouzhan zhongju xunsu paiyuan fu Ou zhunbei canyu Heyi yi jiu weiju an' 議員韋榮熙提出請諸政府歐戰終局迅速派員赴歐準備參予和議以救危局案 [Motion from MP Wei Rongxi urging the Government to send envoys to Europe with the end of the European War in order to salvage the situation], *Canyiyuan Gongbao* 參議院公報 [Senate Gazette], 1st session, 3, (1918), p. 79.

supervise government diplomacy.¹⁷ Some parliamentarians were even angered that ex-Premier and Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang 陸徵祥 [Lu Cheng-hsiang] had been chosen to head the delegation without consulting them. Anfu Club Councillor and the leader of its radical wing, the Mongolian MP Heshigtu,¹⁸ as early as the August 1917 War Bill, had been indignified that the government paid only lip service to parliament's diplomatic rights, by sending none of its ministers to explain the bill to the MPs; the Premier and Foreign Minister were later forced to come to parliament. By early 1919 Heshigtu was adamant that they should be informed of the state of governmental preparations for the Conference. On both occasions Heshigtu found support in Guang Yunjin 光雲錦 [Kuang Yun-chin], a member of Anfu's foreign policy thinktank, the Political Investigation Committee Foreign Affairs Division (PIC-FAD).¹⁹

Shandong Senator and Anfu Club Councillor Yin Hongqing 尹宏慶 [Yin Hong-ch'ing] motioned that China reclaim its sovereignty in Shandong from Japan, citing the German invasion of Shandong and domination of its railways and mines as being 'painful like a wound on the skin'.²⁰ He argued against Sino-Japanese joint-management of the Shandong Railway and the conversion of Tsingtao into an international concession. He even advocated the taking back of the British naval port in Weihaiwei. 威海衛 He saw the powers' treatment of Shandong as an affront to Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points, and pleaded the government to adopt a hard-line stance when negotiating with Japan. Many MPs cited previous Japanese pledges of returning Shandong and its rights to China.²¹ The former diplomat and Guangdong Senator Huang Xiquan 黃錫銓 [Huang Hsi-chüan], for example, advanced six arguments based on international law, notably that the Tsingtao area had never been a German colony, having only been a concession, and that China therefore possessed full sovereign rights over it once they had been voided by Germany; that China due to its alliance to the Entente should not have to pay reparations to Japan for the return of Shandong; and that China should request a complete halt to the repayment of the Boxer Indemnity (which was in large part the idea of Kaiser Wilhelm II to 'economically murder' China) to all countries except the United States and Japan, the latter on the condition that it stuck to its then-new proposals to use the funds, like the United States, for educational purposes in China.²²

Huang also paid attention to the question of tariff autonomy,²³ whilst Anhui MP Hong Yulin 洪玉麟 [Hung Yü-lin] argued for the cessation of extraterritoriality due

¹⁷Yiyuan Rao Mengren ni qing zuzhi Guohui Waijiao Diaochahui jinyian' 議員饒孟任擬請組織國會外交調查會建議案 [Motion from MP Rao Mengren suggesting the establishment of a Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Investigative Committee], *Canyiyuan Gongbao* 眾議院公報 [Senate Gazette], 1st session, 4, pp. 131–2; 71.

¹⁸Heshigtu is transcribed into Chinese as Kexiketu 克希克圖 and rendered as Kohsikotu in English-language documents of the time.

¹⁹*Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 4, pp. 41, 43, 67.

²⁰Yiyuan Yin Hongqing duiyu Shandong Jiaozhouwan Jiaojilu Weihaiwei qingzi zhengfu yu Ouzhan Heping Huiyi liexi tiyi shouhui yi Zhong guotu er wei guoquan an' 議員尹宏慶對於山東膠州灣膠濟路威海衛請諮政府於歐戰和平會議列席提議收回以重國土而維主權案 [Motion by MP Yin Hongqing Regarding Kiaochow (Jiaohou) Bay, the Shandong Railway and Weihaiwei suggesting that the Government participate in the European Peace Conference to safeguard territorial integrity and sovereignty], *Canyiyuan Gongbao* 參議院公報 [Senate Gazette], 1st session, 4, pp. 112–13.

²¹*Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 4, pp. 98–9.

²²Yiyuan Huang Xiquan qingzi zhengfu canyu yixi qing jiang Xinchou Heyue weijing jiaofu zhi peikuan quanbu quxiao mianyu jiaofu jianyi'an' 議員黃錫銓請諮政府參予議席請將辛丑和約未經交付之賠款全部取銷免予交付建議案 [Motion by MP Huang Xiquan suggesting that Government participate in the Peace Conference and cancel all parts of the Boxer Indemnity that had not been paid], *Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 4, p. 116.

²³*Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 4, p. 96.

to advancements in Chinese judicial reform.²⁴ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed with the territorial demands, deeming that there was sufficient reason to take back colonies not only from Germany but also from other victorious nations, and that ‘there is nothing to stop’ China from requesting the return of Weihaiwei – which was eventually returned to China in 1929.²⁵ During the House session on 7 December 1918, of the 14 items on the agenda, 10 were about the Paris peace conference, all of which were passed by the House Foreign Relations Committee on 27 December.²⁶ MPs, particularly those from Shandong, advised in May – long before anti-Duan warlords such as the 61 generals led by Wu Peifu 吳佩孚 [Wu P’ei-fu] opposed signing the ‘suicidal’ peace treaty in June–July – that if the treaty’s provisions were not in China’s favour, China should not sign it.²⁷ They continued to warn the Chinese delegation in Versailles against signing the treaty, and eventually carried the day. The government was forced to reverse its stance and Wang Yitang and Li Shengduo 李盛鐸 [Li Sheng-to], heads of both parliamentary chambers, declared their opposition to the signature on 7 June.²⁸ Contrary to popular belief therefore, Anfu – at least its MPs and local leaders – had been a major force pushing for reclaiming national sovereignty, long before and certainly during the peace conference.

Anfu Diplomatic Liaison Division Executive and Jiangxi Senator Wei Sijiong 魏斯炘 [Wei Ssü-chiung], reminded the government that it should emphasize on Chinese sacrifices such as the sending of many Chinese labourers to the western front in addition to raw materials as the country’s qualification to attend the Peace Conference, in addition to supporting the establishment of the League of Nations.²⁹ Some MPs such as PIC-FAD member Zhou Xiuwen 周秀文 [Chow Hsiu-wen] argued that the Migrant Labour Affairs Bureau (MLAB) which governed matters related to Chinese labourers in the European battlefields should be reformed on the lines of the British or French ‘Colonial Office’ to protect the rights of overseas Chinese, in line with the anti- discrimination stance.³⁰

²⁴Yiyuan Hong Yulin deng qing quxiao lingshi caipanquan an’ 議員洪玉麟等請取消領事裁判權案 [Motion by the MP Hong Yulin on the cancellation of extraterritoriality], *Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 4, p. 134.

²⁵‘Shencha qing zi zhengfu duiyu Ouzhan Heyi liexi shit ichu shouhui Deguo zujie zhi Jiaozhouwan quanbu guotu an (Waijiaogu Weiyuanhui tichu)’ 審查請諮政府對於歐戰和議列席時提出收回德國租借之膠州灣全部國土案報告 (外交股委員會提出) [Motion (submitted by the Foreign Affairs Committee) suggesting that Government request the reclamation of all national territory in Kiaochow Bay conceded to Germany at the European Peace Conference], *Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 4, pp. 102–3.

²⁶*Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 眾議院公報 [House of Representatives Gazette], 1st session, 5, pp. 1–2.

²⁷Yiyuan Du Weijian deng zhiwen zhengfu duiyu Shandong Wenti buneng lingxing baoliu shio jiuyou ruohe jiangding zhuzhang zhi yiyuan zhiwen zhi dafu yu Shandong Qingyuantuan zhi pishi shifou yu zhengfu tongfu zeren shu’ 議員杜惟儉等質問政府對於山東問題不能另行保留時究有若何堅決主張至議員質問之答覆與山東請願團之批示是否政府同負責任書 [Question from MP Du Weijian et al over how the government intends to persevere with its claims should the Shandong Question be unable to be taken out from the Peace Treaty, and whether the government intends to bear concurrent responsibility for its reply to the MPs questions and to the Shandong Petition Group], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 4, p. 189; *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 3, pp. 28–30頁; *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 4, pp. 87–92; ‘Zhi Bali Hu Gongshi zhuan Gu Wang 2 Teshi dian’ 致巴黎胡公使轉顧王二特使電 (Telegram to Minister Hu in Paris for transfer to Envoys Koo and Wang), *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 2, p. 249.

²⁸‘Zhuandian’ 專電 [Telegram], *Shen-pao* 申報, 10 June 1919, p. 4.

²⁹Yiyuan Wei Sijiong qingzi zhengfu duiyu Ouzhou Huiyi shouxian zancheng Guoji Lianmeng bing yaoqiu zunzhong woguo zhi guoji pingdeng fayanquan jianyi’an’ 議員魏斯炘請諮政府對於歐洲會議首先贊成國際聯盟並要求尊重我國之國際平等發言權建議案 [Motion from MP Wei Sijiong suggesting that government first support the League of Nations at the European Conference and request equal international right of speech], *Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 6, p. 168.

³⁰Yiyuan Zhou Xiuwen qingzi zhengfu gaishe Qiaowuju congshi diaocha haiwai Huaqiao zhuangkuang tichu Bali heping Huiyi yaoqiu pingdeng daiyu jianyi’an’ 議員周秀文請諮政府改設僑務局從事調查海外華僑狀況提出巴黎和平會議要求平等待遇建議案 [Motion from MP Zhou Xiuwen suggesting that the government set up an Overseas Chinese

On 31 October 1918 an anti-Chinese pogrom in Kudus, Java which had started when ritual processions seeking protection from the Spanish flu led to a brawl, caused 11 Chinese deaths and the loss of half a million yuan of property plus 19 houses destroyed. The Java Chinese Council petitioned parliament against the inaction of the Chinese government.³¹ In April 1919 Siamese Chinese delegates visited Peking³² accusing the Siamese state of enacting discriminatory policies and forcible assimilation. On 2 May 1919, together with recommendations to the government regarding the Southeast Asian incidents, the House passed an act reforming the MLAB as the Overseas Chinese Bureau. Zhili MP Wang Baoyun 王葆鋆 [Wang Pao-yun] advocated what he called 'idealistic goals' (as opposed to 'realistic' economic and territorial ones) – such as the creation of a League of Nations based on equality, and an end to racial discrimination; the House passed this motion unanimously and had it immediately be sent to the government.³³

With voices such as these, Anfu was actively seeking to involve itself in planning for the post-war international order, at least in relation to China. That Anfu was implicated in 'treason' due to its alliance with the New Communications Clique, (NCC) of which a trio of high officials – Cao Rulin 曹汝霖 [Tsao Ju-lin], Lu Zongyu 陸宗輿 [Lu Tsung-yu], and Zhang Zongxiang 章宗祥 [Chang Tsung-hsiang] – the first two being members of the Anfu Club Council – were condemned for their deals with Japan, was a rather unfortunate outcome. Two of the NCC's secret agreements with Japan dating from 24 September 1918 – the *Preparatory Contract for the Jinan-Shunde [Tsinan-Shunteh] and Gaomi-Xuzhou [Kaomi-Hsuchow] Railways Loan* and the *Exchange of Notes on the Shandong Question* were particularly damaging to China's case at the Conference, although they stopped well short of surrendering Chinese interests outright. Public opinion and even certain provincial assemblies such as that of Hunan were relentlessly anti-Anfu.³⁴ The government decided to do nothing for Anfu, leaving it high and dry. Adding insult to injury, President Xu offered at the North-South Peace Conference – in exchange for Southern recognition for his Presidency – to abolish the Anfu Parliament despite it

Bureau to investigate the conditions of Overseas Chinese and request equal treatment at the Paris Peace Conference], *Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 6, p. 170.

³¹ 'Nanyang Zhaowa Quandao Huaqiao Gonghui deng qingyuanshu (Guanyu Gutu beinan Huaqiao yaoqiu peichang qingyuan Shijian)' 南洋爪哇全島華僑公會等請願書 (關於古突被難華僑要求賠償保護請願事件) [Petition from the South Sea Java All-Island Chinese Council et al (Regarding claims for compensation from Overseas Chinese victimized in the Kudus Incident)], Li Qiang 李強, *Beiyang shiqi Guohui huiyi jilu huibian* 北洋時期國會會議記錄彙編 [Compendium of Parliamentary Records from the Beiyang Era], 16 vols (Beijing, 2011) vol. XI, pp. 327–9.

³² Kawashima Shin 川島真, *Zhongguo jindai waijiao de xingcheng* 中國近代外交的形成 [The Evolution of Modern Chinese Diplomacy], Tian Jianguo (trans), (Beijing, 2012), p. 365; 'Lu Sian Huaqiao Shanghui daibiao Chen Yuan Liu Zongrao deng qingyuanshu (Guanyu qiaomin beinue qingzi zhengfu tichu Hehui yanzhong jiaoshe Shijian)' 旅暹羅華僑商會代表陳沅劉宗堯等請願書 (關於僑民被虐請諮政府提出和會嚴重交涉事件) [Petition from Chen Yuan, Liu Zongrao et al representing the Siamese Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Regarding the suggestion that the mistreatment of Overseas Chinese be subject of serious negotiation at the Peace Conference)], Li Qiang 李強 (ed), *Beiyang Shiqi*, pp. 323–6.

³³ 'Yiyuan Wang Baoyun tichu jianyi zhengfu duiyu Ouzhou heyi ying huifu ji ying yaoqiu zhi quanli yu ying tichang zhi Shijian ji yingqu zhi waijiao zhengce jianyan' 議員王葆鋆提出建議政府對於歐洲和議應恢復及應要求之權利與應提倡之事件及應取之外交政策建議案 [Motion by MP Wang Baoyun suggesting the rights to be requested, items to be advocated and foreign policy to be taken by the government at the European Peace Conference], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 1, (1919), pp. 115–31.

³⁴ 'Hepinghui qing jiesan Xinguohui dian' 和平會請解散新國會電 [Telegram requesting the dissolution of the New Parliament by the Peace Conference], *Shen-pao* 申報, 26 June 1919, p. 10; 'Hunan Shengyihui danxian fachu zhi tongdian' 湖南省議會單銜發出之通電 [Telegram independently issued by the Hunan Provincial Assembly], *Changsha Ta-kung Pao* 長沙大公報, 6 July 1919, p. 7; 'Shipping' 時評 [Editorial], *Shen-pao* 申報, 21 June 1919, p. 3.

having elected him. This laid bare to the Anfu men the very brutal truth – that instead of being the government party, they were actually no more than expendables. Anfu MPs like Wei Sijiong were livid,³⁵ and others argued that these agreements should be voided for they had not been sent before parliament and were therefore unconstitutional.³⁶ Questions were also asked of other loans and agreements signed by the Chinese government with Japan under Duan Qirui. Parliamentary members singled out the Sino-Japanese Military Pact of 1918, which was meant to cease operations at the end of the global hostilities, for immediate abrogation³⁷ – without regard to the fact that China was through this alliance by then part of a new global war against Communism, by intervening against the Bolsheviks in Siberia (and later, Outer Mongolia).

The Golem strikes back – impeachments and the 1919 budget

It should come as no surprise that the Research Clique, still bitter at the rigged 1918 elections, played a central role in fanning the hatred towards Anfu and the NCC during May Fourth,³⁸ with Liang Qichao reporting live by telegraph from Versailles on the latest insults sustained by the Chinese delegation. The two camps started to clash frequently after the Paris peace conference began – thus negating the gains Anfu made against political pluralism since 1917. President Xu Shichang, who saw Anfu as an impediment, set up a Diplomatic Commission in the Presidential Palace, and appointed almost exclusively Research Clique men,³⁹ notably Wang Daxie 汪大燮[Wang Ta-hsieh] and Lin Changmin 林長民 [Lin Chang-min] to it. The Research Clique's newspaper, *The Morning Post*, attacked Anfu for vacillating over the issue of signing or not signing the treaty.⁴⁰ In the initial stages, despite the fact that many Anfu MPs had made up their minds to oppose the treaty, the party as a whole still attempted to coordinate its stance with the government, and unwittingly became collateral to the actual vacillations of the executive. This weakened the Anfu somewhat in its retaliation against the Clique, when Guang Yunjin put forward a parliamentary motion asking for government sanctions on the members of the Diplomatic Commission for the alleged (and partly true) crime of trying to propose joint international management for China's railways, in an attempt to resolve its debt crisis.⁴¹ The Diplomatic Commission was also accused of

³⁵Yiyuan Wei Sijiong zhiwen zhengfu guanyu Shandong defang ying zi shouhui zhi liquan shifou yu taguo dingyou miyue xianqi dafu an' 議員魏斯炅質問政府關於山東地方應自收回之利權是否與他國訂有密約限期答覆案 [Question from MP Wei Sijiong over whether Government had signed secret agreements with other countries regarding rights that should be reclaimed and requesting an answer before a designated date], *Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 6, p. 87.

³⁶Qing dian Ouzhou Hehui founren siding zhi 21 tiaoyue ji Shunji Gaoxu ge caoyue tiyi'an' 請電歐洲和會否認私訂之二十一條約及順濟高徐各草約提議案 [Motion suggesting that a telegram be sent to the European Peace Conference denying that various agreements had been made regarding the 21 Demands and the Shunde-Jinan and Gaomi-Xuzhou Railways], Li Qiang, (ed) *Beiyang Shiqi*, p. 233.

³⁷Yiyuan Sha Mingyuan zhiwen zhengfu guanyu Qingdao ji qita Zhong-Ri guanxi jiaosheshu' 議員沙明遠質問政府關於青島及其他中日關係交涉書 [Question from MP Sha Mingyuan to the Government over Qingdao and other Sino-Japanese negotiations], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 6, p. 163.

³⁸Tang Qihua 唐啟華, *Bali Hehui yu Zhongguo Waijiao* 巴黎和會與中國外交 [The Paris Peace Conference and Chinese Diplomacy], (Beijing, 2004), pp. 374–5.

³⁹Deng Ye, *Bali Hehui*, pp. 28–9.

⁴⁰Yoyi tongchi Anfubu zhi tongdian' 又一痛斥安福部之通電 [Another telegram lambasting the Anfu Club], *The Morning Post* 晨報, 28 June 1919, p. 4.

⁴¹Yiyuan Guang Yunjin tichu qing chengban fanghai waijiao yingsi maiguo wuzeren zhi guanliao zhengke an' 議員光雲錦提出請懲辦妨害外交營私賣國無責任之官僚政客案 [Motion by MP Guang Yunjin requesting punishment for bureaucrats and politicians who obstruct diplomacy, work for self-interest, sell the nation and bear no responsibility for their actions], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 3, p. 126.

circumventing the Foreign Ministry and remotely commanded the Chinese delegation, which parliament found to be outrageous. On 3 May 1919 the Commission dissolved itself.⁴² The previous day, Lin Changmin published an editorial on *The Morning Post* warning its readers of an immediate disaster for the nation, and this sparked-off the May Fourth Movement.⁴³

With Anfu under nationwide attack, Qian Nengxun 錢能訓 [Chien Neng-hsun], appointed Interior Minister in December 1917 and Premier on 20 December 1918, and seen as one of President Xu's men, had the unfortunate distinction of being impeached by the Anfu Parliament on 7 May 1919 and dismissed on 13 June. Guang Yunjin joined Li Jizhen 李繼楨 [Li Chi-chen] and others launched an impeachment for five main reasons – incompetent management of the North–South negotiations; appeasement of the southern camp (notably by offering to dissolve the Anfu parliament); issuing government 'Eight-Year Bonds' illegally when parliament was not in session and thus without its consent, and to make matters worse, refusing when parliament resumed session to re-submit the issue for approval; and also for illegally appointing officials, again when parliament was not in session.⁴⁴ All of this suggests a fundamental problem, namely that the chiefs of government did not understand how they should work with a government party, or, if we are to take things in a more sinister fashion, that they realized that Anfu had become an interest group in itself and that it would impose its influence on issues such as debt issuing and appointing officials to lucrative posts. These included the National Superintendents for tobacco, wine, and cotton. When questioned by angry MPs, Qian was reportedly 'at a loss for words'.⁴⁵

On top of these was the fifth accusation, that Qian was personally responsible for the disastrous diplomatic effort at Versailles. On 9 May Senator Wei Sijiong joined another House MP to issue Qian a Parliamentary Question. On 12 May, Qian, at wits' end, convened a 'Tea Dialogue Session' for MPs at Huairan 懷仁 [Huai-jen] Hall in Zhongnanhai 中南海 [Chung-nan-hai], the seat of government. He pleaded the MPs to come up with a solution for the treaty signature problem. Li Jizhen, a member of the Anfu training group for debate and public speaking, seized his chance to speak first, and literally scolded the hapless Qian before the whole of parliament:

There was a time when this government appointed diplomatic envoys without even submitting the matter for a vote in Parliament. Now that our diplomacy is at stake, you are asking Parliament for its views on the signature of the treaty, just so that should our diplomatic efforts fail, the blame could be shifted onto Parliament. We parliamentarians must not take the blame for others' fault, should there be a national outrage!⁴⁶

Most of the MPs present also spoke against signing the treaty, and even Wang Yitang voiced his support for Li. Qian had to apologize to the MPs, and despite pleas from President Xu himself, the Anfu MPs were unmoved.⁴⁷

⁴²Yiyuan Ai Qingyong qing tichu caiche Waijiao Weiyuanhui an' 議員艾慶鏞請提出裁撤外交委員會案 [Motion by MP Ai Qingyong requesting the abolition of the Diplomatic Commission], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 3, p. 92.

⁴³Deng Ye, *Bali Hehui*, p. 98.

⁴⁴Nanghai Yinzi, *Anfu huoguo ji*, (Chengdu, 1985), pp. 473–5.

⁴⁵Nanghai Yinzi, *Anfu huoguo ji*, (Chengdu, 1985), p. 376.

⁴⁶'Xinguohui dui Shandong Wenti zhi taidu' 新國會對山東問題之態度 [The New Parliament's attitude towards the Shandong Question], *Shen-pao*, 15 May 1919, sheet 2 p. 6.

⁴⁷Nanghai Yinzi, *Anfu huoguo ji*, (Chengdu, 1985), p. 375.

It was towards the end of May that Anfu tried to reconcile with government's insistence on signing the treaty, this time because Duan himself wanted that done.⁴⁸ On 24 May the State Council issued a national circular telegram saying that the delegation would attempt to salvage whatever they could, but should that turn out to be impossible, signature would be the only way out, though parliamentary approval would still be required.⁴⁹ On 26 May the House held a secret meeting and declared its support for the government's stance, on the condition that the text of the treaty be subjected to a vote prior to the signing.⁵⁰ Then it was revealed by the press that Chief Delegate Lu Cheng-hsiang had never sent Peking the treaty's text by telegraph.⁵¹ On 9 June the Anfu PIC held a meeting where Guang Yunjin made a stirring speech that not submitting the treaty for a parliamentary vote was 'no different to tyranny' and lambasted the government circular telegram for imposing the decision to sign on the provinces and attributed it to the heads of both parliamentary chambers. Those in attendance at the meeting issued a joint telegram denying their having ever consented to signing the treaty, and disowned the stance of the heads of both parliamentary houses as being personal views unrepresentative of the parliamentary body; moreover, the telegram denied that either person had ever made such a statement at all.⁵²

On 11 June, Qian and the cabinet resigned. Then interestingly – President Xu also issued his resignation. It has been argued that this was a carefully calculated plot. The Anfu Parliament had failed up to that point to elect a Vice President. Naturally, should Xu resign, there would be a power vacuum and a constitutional crisis, so he would be prevented from resigning. However, to do so would mean implicit approval of his stance to sign the treaty, and to recommence peace talks with the south. Neither would have been acceptable to Anfu, and as expected, Parliament rejected his resignation.⁵³ Xu's plot backfired immediately, however, when the heads of both parliamentary houses issued a statement that said the President had no right to resign when cabinet assumes all political responsibility under the Provisional Constitution. Qian must go, but Xu could stay, albeit with after a tremendous loss of face.⁵⁴ Xu attempted to replace Qian with veteran bureaucrat Zhou Shumo 周樹模 [Chou Shu-mo], and asked Duan to settle the matter. Duan then delegated it to his lieutenant, the Anfu organizer General Xu Shuzheng, despite Xu's objections. When he took this to Anfu, quite a few MPs reportedly rebuffed Xu by saying 'We parliamentarians do not have more obligation to listen to orders than you soldiers'.⁵⁵ To placate the Club, Gong Xinzhan 龔心湛 [Kung Hsin-

⁴⁸'Duan Qirui zhi Cao Kun deng pouxi bali Hehui qianzi yu fou zhi guojia lihai' 段祺瑞致曹錕等剖析巴黎和會簽字與否之國家利害 [Telegram from Duan Qirui to Cao Kun et al on how signing the Peace Treaty or not would relate to national interests], Lin Qingfen (ed), *Yan Xishan Dang'an – Yaodian Lucun* 閻錫山檔案 – 要電錄存 [The Yan Xishan Files – Important Telegrams], 10 vols (Taipei, 2003), vol. V, pp. 49–50.

⁴⁹'Guowuyuan dian Cao Kun deng chenshu zhengfu zhuzhang Ou He Cao Zhi qianzi liyou' 國務院電曹錕等陳政府主張歐和草紙簽字理由 [Telegram from the State Council to Cao Kun et al on the government's rationale for signing the European Peace Treaty], Lin Qingfen (ed), *Yan Xishan*, pp. 46–7.

⁵⁰'Zhuandian' 專電 [Correspondence], *Shen-pao*, 27 May 1919, p. 4.

⁵¹'Duiwai wenti yi lue jue ding' 對外問題已略決定 [The diplomatic question has roughly been decided], Gongyan Bao 公言報 [Fair Comment], 27 May 1919.

⁵²'Anfu zhi tebie dahui' 安福部之特別大會 [Anfu's Special Congress], *Shen-pao*, 12 June 1919, p. 5.

⁵³Deng Ye, *Bali Hehui*, p. 171.

⁵⁴'Zongtong cizhi wenti zuowen' 總統辭職問題昨聞 [News yesterday of the question of the President's resignation], *The Morning Post*, 12 June 1919, p. 2.

⁵⁵Ding Zhongjiang 丁中江, *Beiyang Junfa Shihua* 北洋軍閥史話 [Tales of the Beiyang Warlords], 3 vols, (Beijing, 1995), vol. III, p. 181.

chan], an Anfu extra-parliamentary member, was named Acting Premier instead. On 25 June the House warned the government again that the treaty would be nullified should there not be a vote.⁵⁶ At last on 28 June the Chinese delegation refused to sign the treaty, and Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun 顧維鈞) emerged as a national hero.

Yet it had been a disaster at Versailles. Anfu MPs decided that attack was the best defence and turned against the NCC, with 46 MPs signing a joint petition. This referred to NCC Finance Minister Cao Rulin as a wedge between the people's relations with the state, in addition to having made unwarranted accusations in his resignation against the protesting students and having claimed to have made a contribution to China by securing Japanese loans. This last point amounted to a threat against the government using foreign connections.⁵⁷ An inquiry against the trio was proposed.⁵⁸ A petition was sent to parliament by delegates from the Shandong Provincial Assembly, academic, agricultural, commercial and journalistic sectors requesting punishment for the NCC trio, plus the termination of the railway contract.⁵⁹ Some MPs even launched an attack on the Peace conference delegates. Li Jizhen made a diatribe accusing Lu Zhengxiang of acting 'in a self-important manner' due to having a Belgian wife; that Wellington Koo was 'young, brash, and spoke only passable English'; that Wang Zhengting 王正廷 [Wang Cheng-t'ing] was able to preach as a missionary because he was 'sordid and parochial'.⁶⁰ Yet nothing could salvage Anfu in the eyes of the nation.

The Anfu Parliament, designed to be a puppet of the military, thus began to quickly acquire a mind of its own, and daringly proceeded to reduce the military budget by 20 per cent in 1919. It was also a major feat in the context of the serious loss of face it sustained during May Fourth. The parliament, represented by Wang Yitang, argued for such powers on the basis of similar budgetary powers that European parliaments had,⁶¹ and the idea of deliberating the 1918 budget had been mooted at the start of the first parliamentary session, but was dropped as the year drew to a close. Efforts were then focused on securing the 1919 budget, which was submitted by a reluctant President Xu on 5 June 1919 after much haggling by the MPs, just before the start of the financial year on 1 July. It was followed the next day by the budgets for the four 'Special Accounts' for state industries – railways, telecommunications, postal services and sea transport. The total budget was some Mex \$ 540 million (the Chinese silver yuan being at the time the equivalent of a Mexican silver dollar, hence the designation), of which Central Recurring, Special Military and Provincial Military Expenses amounted to \$170 million, or one-third of the

⁵⁶'Shandong Qingyuantuan zhi jinxing' 山東請願團之進行 [Continued activities of the Shandong Petition Corps], *Shen-pao*, 28 June 1919, sheet 2 p. 6.

⁵⁷'Yiyuan Luo Zhengwei deng tihu tanhe Jiaotong Zongzhang Cao Rulin maiguo xianji jiyong mianzhi bing qing chaban an' 議員羅正緯等提出彈劾交通總長曹汝霖賣國嫌疑亟應免職並請查辦案 [Motion by MP Luo Zhengwei impeaching the Minister of Communications Cao Rulin for Quislingism requesting dismissal and a formal investigation], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 3, pp. 155–6.

⁵⁸'Yiyuan Xie Hongtao deng tichu dali maiguo qing zhengfu xialing chaban an' 議員謝鴻燾等提出大吏賣國請政府下令查辦案 [Motion by MPs Xie Hongtao et al requesting government orders to investigate major officials involved in Quislingism], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 3, p. 161頁。

⁵⁹'Shandong gejie daibiao qingyuan shu (Guanyu Ouhui Heyue Shijian) 山東各界代表請願書(關於歐會和約事件) [Petition from various social strata in Shandong (Regarding the European Conference Peace Treaty)] Li Qiang (ed), *Beiyang Shiqi*, pp. 331–5.

⁶⁰'Yiyuan Li Jizhen tichu tanhe Guowuyuan Qian Nengxun weifa shizhi an' 議員李繼楨提出彈劾國務員錢能訓違法失職案 [Motion by MP Li Jizhen to impeach State Councillor Qian Nengxun for contravening the law and negligence], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao*, 2nd session, 3, pp. 157–9頁。

⁶¹'Guohui Bihuishi jishi' 國會閉會式紀事 [An Account of the Parliamentary Closing Ceremony], *Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 6, (1919), pp. 149–50.

budget, compared to a mere \$400 million in revenue. The decision to slash the military budget had been made as early as the first reading in the House, and was consistently adopted by the Budget Committee as well as all subsequent readings. In its report on the budget, parliament criticized the chaotic uses of military funds, with huge variations between the budgets of divisions of the same size and nature, and expenditures inserted at random into centrally-commanded or provincial departments. Parliament therefore proposed combining the expenditures of central and provincial armies as one account, and to reduce the total by 20 per cent, or Mex \$30,495,688, and ordered the military to spend ‘under no circumstances’ more than 80 per cent of the original proposed amount.⁶² The budget was passed in mid-November. Logically, the military factions fumed with discontent, and this paved the way for Anfu’s doom less than a year later.

Anfu versus Jin Yunpeng – towards the final showdown

In 1918–19, relations between the different military factions – Anhui on one hand, Zhili and Fengtian on the other – began to sour due to the latter’s refusal to prosecute Duan’s war against the southern military government. When Zhili Faction leader Wu Peifu led a cluster of generals to issue the June 1919 telegram warning the government not to sign the Versailles Peace Treaty, it amounted to a direct challenge to the authority of the state. After Gong Xinzhan assumed Premiership, Wu’s telegram attacks intensified to the point where Gong had to resign. Duan had no choice but to seek a way to rebuild cohesion within the military. He discovered that he could make General Jin Yunpeng, one of his four ablest lieutenants and his former student at the Beiyang Military Academy, as Premier. Jin, a ‘shallow, arrogant soldier’⁶³ who had never studied abroad, was a sworn brother of Cao Kun 曹錕 [Ts’ao K’un], head of the Zhili Faction, and was also in-laws with Fengtian Faction leader Zhang Zuolin 張作霖 [Chang Tso-lin]. He was therefore an acceptable candidate from the point of view of all military factions, but hardly had impressive qualifications.

Logically this did not endear him to Anfu, who would have much preferred someone from the Anfu Club itself like Gong, or Wang Yitang, or their main organizer and Chin’s rival, General Xu Shuzheng, who happened at the time to be in Urga (Ulaanbaatar) leading an expedition army sent to recover Outer Mongolia. Anfu did not wish to embarrass Duan, and Duan in turn took Anfu’s submission for granted.⁶⁴ But Anfu did propose that in exchange for its support and the loss of a Premier who was one of their members, five of the most important cabinet portfolios would have to be given to Anfu leaders – a reasonable request given their parliamentary majority. This consisted of four Club Councillors – Li Sihao 李思浩 [Li Ssü-hao] (Finance Minister), Yao Zhen 姚震 [Yao Chen] (Justice Minister), Zeng Yujun 曾毓雋 [Tseng Yü-tsün] (Cabinet Secretary), Wu Bingxiang 吳炳湘 [Wu Ping-hsiang] (Interior Minister); and one Extra-Parliamentary Member, Zhu Shen 朱深 [Chu Shen] (Communications Minister). Li had previously been President of the Bank of China; Yao had been Chief Justice of the Supreme

⁶²Canyiyuan Gongbao, 2nd session, 3, pp. 105–203.

⁶³Shang Qiheng 尚其亨, ‘Zhi-Wan Zhanzheng’ 直皖戰爭 [The Zhili-Anhui War], in Zhang Bofeng 章伯鋒 (ed), *Beiyang Junfa* 北洋軍閥 [The Beiyang Army], 6 vols (Wuhan, 1990), vol. 3, p. 675.

⁶⁴Hong Yinsheng 鴻隱生, *Anfu Mishi* (1) 安福秘史 (一) [A Secret History of Anfu (1)], *Jindaishi Ziliao* 近代史資料 [Modern History Materials] 126, (2012), pp. 211–12.

Court; and Wu served as Metropolitan Police Commissioner. Tseng was a seasoned bureaucrat, and Chu had graduated with an LLB from Tokyo Imperial University.⁶⁵ In all, these choices were appropriate, and Jin Yunpeng dared not voice his opposition. On 31 October Anfu held an Election Preparatory Meeting at its Taipinghu 太平湖 HQ attended by some 300 MPs. Some made known their scepticism regarding Chin's sincerity over appointing the five Anfu ministers. It was ultimately decided that since parliament held the final decision over cabinet appointments, they would vote Jin in first as Premier.⁶⁶

Chin's appointment was duly passed in parliament on 3–5 November almost unanimously, by 249 to 7 votes (5 abstentions) in the House of Representatives and 103 votes to 1 in the Senate.⁶⁷ It was therefore no surprise that immediately after Jin became Premier, the argument exploded between him and Anfu on cabinet appointments, when Jin overthrew the Anfu recommendations and replaced Li Sihao as Finance Minister with a leader of the Old Communications Clique (OCC), Zhou Ziqi 周自齊 [Chow Tzū-chi]. The OCC, which had immense financial resources that Jin could rely on, had in late-1918 already fallen out with Anfu. Jin made these sudden alterations despite Li having been personally consulted before Jin was voted into power.⁶⁸ There were also changes to the Interior Minister, the Agriculture and Commerce Minister, and Education Minister, who were also replaced by men agreeable to President Xu and the Zhili Faction.

Anfu was desperate to fight back. At an Executive Meeting on 6 November at the Taipinghu HQ, the men fumed with anger that they had fallen for a trap.⁶⁹ They understood that the Bank of Communications, which had been seized from the hands of the NCC and handed back to the OCC following the May Fourth Movement, could supply some Mex \$4–5,000,000 a month for military expenditures; should that happen, Anfu would be totally shunted aside.⁷⁰ Anfu decided that they would block the nominations either by not forming a quorum or by using its veto powers.⁷¹ Its attempts to negotiate with Jin were blocked when he proclaimed that he would appoint his men as acting ministers by decree should Parliament stand in his way. On the other hand, Duan on 7 November requested the Anfu MPs to 'not be obstinate and squabble amongst ourselves'.⁷²

Facing this situation, Anfu resorted to the final compromise – they invited Jin to join their party. Jin point blank refused to do so, exclaiming that 'I am a soldier, and I must definitely not openly join a political party'⁷³ – despite knowing that several military men

⁶⁵Hong Yinsheng 鴻隱生, *Anfu Mishi* (1), p. 211.

⁶⁶'Jin Yunpeng zuge zhi xingshi' 靳雲鵬組閣之形勢 [The situation regarding Jin Yunpeng's cabinet formation], *Shen-pao*, 1 November 1919, p. 6.

⁶⁷'Jin Neige tongguo Xinzhongyuan' 靳內閣通過新眾院 [Jin Yunpeng's Cabinet has been passed by the New House of Representatives], *Shen-pao* 3 November 1919, p. 3; 'Jin Yunpeng zhi fenpei geyuan nan' 靳雲鵬之分配閣員難 [Jin Yunpeng's difficulties in distributing cabinet members], *Shen-pao* 5 November 1919, p. 6.

⁶⁸'Jin Yunpeng jiuzhi hou zhi xin geyuan' 靳雲鵬就職後之新閣員 [New cabinet members after Jin Yunpeng takes office], *Shen-pao*, 8 November 1919, p. 3.

⁶⁹'Jin Yunpeng zuge zhi bozhe' 靳雲鵬組閣之波折 [Troubles in Jin Yunpeng's cabinet formation], *Shen-pao* 9 November 1919, p. 6.

⁷⁰'Anfu Pai bizou Jin Yunpeng zhi anmu' 安福派逼走靳雲鵬之暗幕 [Dark intricacies surrounding Anfu's attempt to force Jin's departure], *Social Welfare* 益世報, 24 December 1919, p. 2.

⁷¹'Geyuan fenpei bozhe xuzhi' 閣員分配波折續志 [Account of the continued troubles with distributing cabinet positions], *Social Welfare* 11 November 1919, p. 6.

⁷²'Geyuan zhipai reng zai xiangchi zhong' 閣員支配仍在相持中 [Stalemate continues over cabinet member appointments], *Shen-pao* 10 November 1919, p. 6.

⁷³'Zaizhi zuge tingdun Zhong zhi Anfubu' 再志組閣停頓中之安福部 [Another account of the Anfu Club's stalemate in forming a cabinet], *The Morning Post*, 17 November 1919, p. 2.

already sat on the Anfu Club Council. On 8 November Anfu held a 'Plenum of Parliamentarians' at Taipinghu HQ, where Chin's cabinet list was voted down unanimously. Jin continued to threaten to appoint by decree,⁷⁴ and claimed to Anfu leaders, the House Speaker and Vice-Speaker Li Shengduo (Chairman of the Anfu PIC) and Liu Enge 劉恩格 [Liu En-ko], that four provincial commanders had agreed with his cabinet list.⁷⁵ This was confirmed when telegrams of support arrived from Wu Peifu, Cao Kun, Zhang Zuolin and Li Chun 李純.⁷⁶ President Xu was resolute in supporting Zhou Ziqi to assume the Finance portfolio. It had become a situation where military faction leaders openly threatened a party with a parliamentary majority over the appointment of the executive, and rather than seeing this as a serious affront to constitutional principles, it was celebrated by 'democratic' newspapers opposed to the Peking government, such as *The Republican Daily News*.⁷⁷

Despite Jin's offers of funds to the Anfu Club, at the Club Congress on 15 November, attended by more than 200 MPs, there was unanimous distrust of Jin and a decision was made to launch a parliamentary offensive. They asserted parliamentary prerogative over cabinet appointments and pointed out the unconstitutionality of seeking provincial military support for such matters.⁷⁸ Anfu knew they had to have Li Sihao as Finance Minister to guarantee that the Ministry would underwrite the Club's expenses – some Mex \$140,000 a month.⁷⁹ Even Duan tried to persuade Jin to appoint Li.⁸⁰ This time, on 22 November, Jin relented, and agreed to having Li as Finance Minister.⁸¹ Yet precisely at this moment Xu Shuzheng came back from Outer Mongolia, and he was not pleased at the unconstitutionality of Jin's actions. He proclaimed that 'Should anyone threaten Parliament, I shall personally lead a crusade against him'.⁸² Anfu immediately stepped up its demands, and asked for the Interior, Agriculture & Commercial, and Education portfolios. On 28 November Anfu held a Luncheon Meeting to discuss the three portfolios, and Jin's cabinet list was subjected to a free vote by 252 MPs, in a remarkable exercise of inner-party democracy.⁸³ By 3 December the House and Senate had passed all cabinet nominations save for two of them, based on the inner-party voting results. Zhou Ziqi became instead President of the Currency Board.

This unprecedented 'Cabinet Incident' lasted for a whole month, and meant that the quest for a monolithic state had ended in total failure. Jin demonstrated, either utter

⁷⁴'Anfupai zhengchi geyuan zhi biebao' 安福派爭持閣員之別報 [A special account of the Anfu Faction's fight for cabinet positions], *Shen-pao*, 11 November 1919, p. 6.

⁷⁵'Geyuan zuori shangwei tichu' 閣員昨日尚未提出 [The cabinet members had not been proposed yet yesterday], *L'impartial* 13 November 1919, p. 1.

⁷⁶'Rangduo Zhong zhi zuge wenti' 攘奪中之組閣問題 [The cabinet question subject to contention], *The Republican Daily News* 民國日報, 14 November 1919, p. 3.

⁷⁷'Anfu zhi daji' 安福之打擊 [The Anfu Blow], *The Republican Daily News* 16 November 1919, p. 3.

⁷⁸'Zuge wenti reng zai tingdun zhong' 組閣問題仍在停頓中 [Cabinet question still in stalemate], *The Morning Post*, 14 November 1919, p. 2; 'Geyuan wenti yu Anfu Pai' 閣員問題與安福派 [The Cabinet Member Question and the Anfu Faction], *Shen-pao* 19 November 1919, p. 6.

⁷⁹'Jin Yunpeng zuge zhi bozhe', p. 6.

⁸⁰'Jin Yunpeng qufu yu An Xi' 靳雲鵬屈服于安系 [Jin Yunpeng capitulates to the Anfu Faction], *The Republican Daily News* 26 November 1919, p. 3.

⁸¹'Geyuan an yi tichu Xinzhongyuan' 閣員案已提出新眾院 [The cabinet member question has been raised in the New House of Representatives], *Shen-pao* 25 November 1919, p. 6.

⁸²'Geyuan wenti you jue ding shuo' 閣員問題有決定說 [News that the cabinet member question has been settled], *Shen-pao* 23 November 1919, p. 6.

⁸³'Xinzhongyuan tou geyuan piao qingxing' 新眾院投閣員票情形 [Situation in House of Representatives when cabinet members nominations are voted on], *Shen-pao*, 1 December 1919, p. 6.

contempt for Anfu or ignorance of constitutional procedures, or possibly both, to the exasperation of experienced legislators.⁸⁴ Jin had only himself to blame for the embarrassment he sustained. As expected, the clashes with Jin continued, due to his nepotistic appointment of a friend as Deputy Finance Minister over an experienced financial technocrat nominated by Anfu. Li Sihao threatened to resign as Finance Minister, and Jin was heard to say that 'If I, as Premier, cannot even appoint a Deputy Minister, but must be constrained everywhere by some faction, what fun is there to be a Premier like that?'⁸⁵ In January 1920, the staff of Peking's universities protested their salary arrears, and Jin attempted to scapegoat the pro-Anfu Education Minister by sacking him. Anfu cabinet members threatened to resign. At the Club Congress one MP declared 'If we the party wants Jin to go, Jin must go. If Jin retains Fu, our party will retain Chin. It should be known that whoever we the party decides to retain, must be retained by Chin.'⁸⁶

Soon new conflict happened over the replacement of Henan Provincial Governor and Military Commander. (*Dujun* 督軍 then known as *Tuchun*) Zhao Chou 趙倜 [Chao Chou], who held both positions, had tried to maintain neutrality between the Anhwei and Zhili Factions and thus incurred the wrath of the former. Duan decided to appoint his wife's younger brother, Wu Guangxin 吳光新 [Wu Kuang-hsin] as Henan Tuchun, along with Anfu Club Council Vice President, Senator Wang Yinchuan 王印川 [Wang Yin-ch'uan] as Henan Governor. This was passed by Jin's cabinet on 26 February. Yet President Xu would only agree to Wang's appointment. Jin suddenly decided that honouring promises was a virtue, claiming that he had pledged to the Zhili generals not to change any of the northern provincial commanders. He resigned on the 29, but cancelled it on 3 March upon pleas from Xu and a wavering Duan, possibly in fear of outright conflict.

With backing from his seniors, the tide turned and was now in Jin's favour. Anfu raised again its demands for the portfolios of Foreign Minister (which would be key to resolving the Shandong Question) and the Ministers of Education and Agriculture & Commerce (which could help with future elections⁸⁷) as well as the Henan Tuchun, by threatening to abstain from cabinet meetings, initiate an impeachment, and request Duan to form a cabinet.⁸⁸ Jin no longer sulked in private. The Anfu ministers ceased to attend cabinet meetings in March and later tendered resignation. Jin, pointing out there was still a quorum, carried on with business as usual.⁸⁹ He was reported to have said if the Anfu ministers 'cannot work with me, let them do their thing, and I'll do

⁸⁴ A veteran legislator, present in all parliaments since the 1911 Provisional Assembly, expressed his exasperation at the violation of basic procedural norms, which usually consisted of the parliament examining the political platform of the nominated Premier, followed by his cabinet list, before deciding whether or not to vote him into office; he blamed the affair on Duan, who gave Jin the audacity to backtrack on his earlier promises and to impose his will on parliament – something which caused a loss of face on Duan's part – especially when some of Chin's nominated cabinet members had been opposed to Duan or Xu Shuzheng. See 'Geyuan wenti zhi banzhi' 閣員問題之板滯 [The dullness of the cabinet member question], *L'Impartial* 1919年11月19日, 第1張。。

⁸⁵ 'Anfu Pai bizou Jin Yunpeng' 安福派逼走靳雲鵬 [The Anfu Faction forces Jin Yunpeng to go], *The Republican Daily News*, 26 December 1919, p. 3.

⁸⁶ 'Anfu Pai dao Jin zhi mihui' 安福派倒靳之密會 [Secret meeting by the Anfu Faction to remove Jin], *Shen-pao* 17 January 1920, p. 6.

⁸⁷ 'Gechao zuijin xingshi' 閣潮最近形勢 [Recent situation with the cabinet crisis], *Shen-pao*, 15 March 1920, p. 6.

⁸⁸ 'Jin Yunpeng zuori yi dao Yuan' 靳雲鵬昨日已到院 [Jin Yunpeng arrived at the State Council yesterday], *Social Welfare*, 5 March 1920, p. 3.

⁸⁹ 'Jin Ge anchao zheng lie' 靳閣暗潮正烈 [Turbulent undercurrents in the Jin cabinet], *Shen-pao*, 13 March 1920, p. 6; 'Anfu pai Jin yundong shangwei xi' 安福排靳運動尚未息 [Anfu's anti-Jin movement is still not dead], *Shen-pao* 9 March 1920, p. 6.

mine. If I refuse to collapse, could they ever demolish me?’⁹⁰ Under Duan’s pressure, the Anfu ministers briefly resumed attendance of cabinet meetings in mid-March. It was expected by *The Shanghai Times*, that Jin would collapse in a month and be replaced by Wang Yitang.⁹¹ By then Anfu was still aiming at no less than creating a total ‘Anfu Cabinet’. Yet the Club no longer had enough MPs to pass an impeachment, when Jin bribed and coaxed more than 130 Anfu MPs mostly from Fengtian, Zhili and Shandong,⁹² and including also those from the OCC, to form the ‘1919 Club’.

The final blow was dealt by the Shandong Question, where Jin and Anfu competed in their spinelessness. The question had been awaiting mediation either by the League of Nations, or by a third country, or be subject to direct Sino-Japanese negotiation. Public opinion was opposed to the latter option, but this was never excluded by the Chinese diplomats, who knew that it was also what Japan eagerly wanted.⁹³ In January-April 1920 the Japanese pressured the Chinese Foreign Ministry to begin negotiations. The Chinese government was split, with Jin, a Shandong native, announcing in public that he was opposed to direct talks, but instructing the Chinese Minister to Japan, Liu Jingren 劉鏡人 [Liu Ching-jen] that there would be ‘no alternative’⁹⁴ to direct negotiations. Jin then quickly backtracked when this was leaked to the press, and Anfu MPs briefly regained the offensive when Guang Yunjin accused Jin of hypocrisy.⁹⁵

Jin then openly requested that the rejection of direct talks be written into the Chinese communique to Japan in no uncertain terms. When the task however fell to Anfu member and Deputy Foreign Minister Chen Lu 陳錄, who understood that Japanese finances had been crucial to Anfu,⁹⁶ and who was also eyeing the Foreign Minister vacancy (after Lu Zhengxiang, a broken man after Versailles, had resigned⁹⁷) a deliberately ambiguous document was drafted – to the intense disliking of both Jin and President Xu. Jin was now furious, ordering that it refuse ‘adamantly and with no room for compromise’ any notion of direct negotiations. Chen was however supported by the Anfu ministers.⁹⁸ Anfu’s final option was to refuse to raise funds for Jin, when it redirected all requests for funds to Jin personally. This effectively forced him to resign, for Peking had previously taken small loans from various banks, yet even this has now grown to a phenomenal amount.⁹⁹ On 7–9 May Jin made three attempts to resign, and was finally granted leave and replaced by Admiral Sa Zhenbing 薩鎮冰 [Sah Chen-ping] on 14 May. When Anfu fell in mid-July and its leaders fled, following the Zhili Faction’s military defeat of the Anhui Clique, Jin resumed office on 9 August, and governed until 24 December 1921.

⁹⁰ ‘Qiluo wuding zhi neige’ 起落無定之內閣 [Cabinet in uncertainty], *The Morning Post* 15 March 1920, p. 2.

⁹¹ ‘Effect of the Anfu members of the cabinet resigning crisis feared’, *The Shanghai Times*, 9 March 1920, p. 6.

⁹² *The North-China Herald*, 5 June 1920, p. 573.

⁹³ Ma Jianbiao 馬建標, ‘Yaoyan yu waijiao – Huashengdun Huiyi qian “Lu’an zhijie jiaoshe” chutan’ 謠言與外交——華盛頓會議前‘魯案直接交涉’初探 [Lies and diplomacy: A first investigation into the ‘direct negotiations about the Shantung question’], *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究, 4 (2008), pp. 55–70.

⁹⁴ ‘Jin Yunpeng jing yao zhijie jiaoshe’ 靳雲鵬竟要直接交涉 [Jin Yunpeng requests direct talks], *The Republican Daily News*, 26 November 1919, p. 3.

⁹⁵ ‘Guang Yunjin zhiwen Jin Yunpeng’ 光雲錦質問靳雲鵬 [Guang Yunjin questions Jin Yunpeng], *The Republican Daily News*, 22 March 1920, p. 3.

⁹⁶ Zhongyang Guoshi Bianjishi 中央國史編輯社 (ed), *Xu Shuzheng Zhengzhuan* 徐樹錚正傳 [A Biography of Xu Shuzheng], (Taipei, 1985), pp. 35–6.

⁹⁷ Zhongyang Guoshi Bianjishi (ed), *Xu Shuzheng Zhengzhuan*, p. 34.

⁹⁸ ‘Beijing zuijin zhi zhengchao’ 北京最近之政潮 [The recent Peking political crisis], *Shen-pao* 11 May 1920, p. 6.

⁹⁹ ‘Jin Zongli jueji cizhi yi’ 靳總理決計辭職矣 [Premier Jin has decided to resign], *L’Impartial*, 9 May 1920, p. 1.

Conclusion

An outsider may well make the judgment that Anfu was merely a faction that knew no better than squabble over short-term interests. Most historians of Anfu have unfortunately not been much better than outsiders in this regard. Putting aside their verdicts for now, what is clear is that Anfu had participated deeply in the legal and administrative modernization of China by means of active legislation and exercising checks-and-balances on executive power. It even contributed crucially to the professionalization of the diplomatic corps, by voting into existence the *Examinations for Diplomats and Consular Staff Act* of 16 August 1919.¹⁰⁰ All of this demonstrated the very substantial progress Chinese administrative governance had made in less than a decade, after the revolution that toppled the Manchu Empire had built East Asia's first internationally-recognised republic.

Anfu's achievements were indeed significantly constrained by the political rivalries that took place. Many of the impeachments never achieved their intended effect. Its diplomacy was in tatters. What's more, Anfu's aim of building a monolithic party state was never accomplished. It is true that Anfu engaged in election rigging, at a time, one must note, when no legislation against electoral fraud existed in China; Anfu's allied group, the NCC, signed secret agreements with Japan in exchange for loans to help Duan's war against the south, something that could be understood given the circumstances of the global and internal emergency. Yet apart from these, the Anfu Club itself, considered in isolation, was actually quite law-abiding.

In all power struggles, Anfu advanced its interests using only constitutional mechanisms, and requested nothing that the constitution did not allow them to have – which was natural given the fact that many Anfu MPs had had extensive legal training. If something must be blamed, then that should be the 1912 Provisional Constitution, which with its hyper-parliamentary system, gave the executive under President Xu and his men no right to dissolve the Anfu Parliament, resulting in a very uncomfortable cohabitation.¹⁰¹ In light of President Yuan Shikai's previous coup against constitutionality, his successor, Xu, could be said to have exercised considerable restraint, which unfortunately did not ultimately prevent the Zhili warlords' use of military force to overthrow Anfu. Yet most of the rights that Anfu exploited were ones that would have existed in any modern constitution. For instance, article 34 of the 1912 Provisional Constitution made senatorial approval of cabinet members and diplomatic envoys a legal necessity. Article 35 stipulated that the President could, with the approval of the Senate, declare war, conclude peace, or sign treaties – on the basis of which Anfu had tried to disown the NCC's secret agreements, with good reason.¹⁰² On many occasions the government

¹⁰⁰Kawashima Shin, *Jindai wajiao*, p. 131.

¹⁰¹Yang Tianhong 楊天宏, 'Lun "Linshi Yuefa" dui Minguo zhengti de sheji guihua' 論〈臨時約法〉對民國政體的設計規劃 [On the 'Provisional Constitution's' design and planning for the political institutions of the Republic], *Jindaishi yanjiu* 1, (1998), pp. 102–29.

¹⁰²Guowuyuan zifu Yiyuan Du Dihua zhiwen zhengfu luxu xuanbu gezhong tiaoyue hetong heyi bujiao Guohui zhuyi wen' 國務院諮覆議員杜榑華質問政府陸續宣佈各種條約合同何以不交國會追議文 [Reply from the State Council on MP Du Dihua's question on why the government does not submit any of the treaties and agreements it is publishing for Parliamentary approval], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao* 眾議院公報 [House of Representatives Gazette],

was accused of announcing its decisions first to the press, and only submitting them later to parliament.¹⁰³ It could also be argued that the use of Finance Ministry funds to pay for the Club's expenses was not prohibited by law, and is something taken as a matter of course in any monolithic party regime – which had never ceased to be Anfu's ultimate goal.

Anfu was hardly ever properly respected by the Executive as being the sole government party – because the Executive often found more willing backers in some part of the military – or as the originator of decisions. This, in addition to the many attempts to circumvent Anfu, forced Anfu to become an interest group not just *in itself*, but *for itself*. The collusion between President Xu and Anfu's main rival, the Research Clique; Premier Qian and Duan's attempts to scapegoat Anfu for a humiliating treaty; and Premier Jin's attempts to impose his choice of cabinet members on Anfu without knowing that, even in the US, 'senatorial courtesy' implied the need for prior consultation with MPs – these all rightfully indignified and sullied Anfu's pride as a professional and well-educated corpus of legislators and bureaucratic modernizers. Anfu, which had sought to build a constitutional dictatorship of the gentry, was now beaten, insulted and labelled the enemy of the nation, for a diplomatic disaster for which they should never have borne total responsibility.

Anfu gazed into the future of the post-war world, and wished intently to play a part in it. Its MPs unanimously passed a motion to congratulate, in the name of the Republican Parliament, the various parliaments of the Entente nations over their victory in the First World War – a sign of the internationalization of China's internal institutions.¹⁰⁴ On 4 April 1919 they telegraphed the Peace Conference and the leaders of the United States, Britain, France and Italy, requesting support for China's reasonable demands and to uphold the principles of international law.¹⁰⁵ Anfu MPs fought tirelessly and contributed to a campaign to stop the signature of the unjust Treaty, and pleaded for the rights of migrant Chinese. It is only very recently that Chinese historians have given Anfu any credit for this demonstration of nationalist integrity and internationalist forward thinking.¹⁰⁶

By mid-1919 Anfu became a frightened beast. The generals had created it as a puppet, but defeated themselves when Anfu, which could have done so much the nation and indeed for them, was abused and cast aside like an unwanted bride. Few military leaders or even the Anfu organizers appeared to understand the real potential of the single-party state, and the Soviet Union which was embroiled in a civil war at the time was hardly a model for China, especially given Anfu's Anti-Communist stance. Thus Anfu plodded on, and finally decided that to do justice to itself, it must rise as a golem, and command respect (plus secure essential financial resources) through

2nd session, 2, p. 199. To this, the government made the pathetic excuse that since the treaties had already been concluded, resubmission to parliament was out of the question.

¹⁰³Yiyuan Du Dihua zhiwen zhengfu luxu xuanbu gezhong tiaoyue hetong heyi bujiao Guohui zhuiyi shu' 議員杜棣華質問政府陸續宣佈各種條約合同何以不交國會追議書 [Question from MP Du Dihua on why the government does not submit any of the treaties and agreements it is publishing for Parliamentary approval], *Zhongyiyuan Gongbao* 眾議院公報 [House of Representatives Gazette], 2nd session, 2, p. 146.

¹⁰⁴*Canyiyuan Gongbao*, 1st session, 3, p. 64.

¹⁰⁵Zhi bali Pinghe Yihui Ying Shouxian, Fa Zongli, Yi Shouxian, Mei Zongtong Dian' 致巴黎和平會議英首相、法總理、義首相、美總統電 [Telegram to the British Prime Minister, the French Premier, the Italian Prime Minister, and the US President at the Paris Peace Conference], Li Qiang (ed), *Beiyang shiqi*, vol. XII, p. 321.

¹⁰⁶Such as Deng Ye, *Bali Hehui*, pp. 96–8.

non-cooperation and intimidation. This was not beyond comprehension. Ultimately, Anfu was asking for proper acknowledgment as the parliamentary majority. Their basic demand was clear and reasonable – ‘Whoever becomes Premier must execute our party’s platform’.¹⁰⁷

Thus Anfu descended to the level of factional politics. Even then, for Samuel Huntington, factionalism is merely the first stage of the development of a modern political party, before it polarises (by linking itself to social forces), expands, and institutionalizes.¹⁰⁸ Anfu showed every sign that it could have matured, just like many parties in early western democracies. The extensive inner-party democracy in Anfu was a very promising sign of what could have been. Yet it was ultimately the group of military men, too complacent with their armed prowess and too proud to seek guidance from the mandarins and what would later be called ‘swine MPs’, who ignited the resistance of Anfu. When they too started fighting amongst themselves, Anfu became collateral to them. With the undermining of popular confidence in Anfu by an enormous alliance of political actors, what was also unwittingly destroyed was any remaining trust in relatively liberal government and faith in constitutional parliamentarianism. And with Anfu’s collapse, only the warlords were left in the barren, bomb-cratered landscape – something not helped by the Zhili generals’ own corrupt and inept dabbling at parliamentarianism and constitution-making in 1923–24. As the country sank ever deeper into a long civil war that would only end in 1950, people were increasingly converted to believing that monopolistic party regimes, each time more draconian than the last, were the way out. Thus one could argue that Anfu’s short and brutal existence ending in 1920, foretold the destiny of China in the century to come.

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¹⁰⁷Jin Yunpeng xiatai hou zhi gemianguan’ 靳雲鵬下臺後之各面觀 [Various views after Jin Yunpeng’s resignation], *Social Welfare*, 16 May 1920, p. 2.

¹⁰⁸S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven and London, 2006), pp. 412–20.

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