



## The Bourgeois Revolutionary Struggles in Liaoning

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## **The Bourgeois Revolutionary Struggles in Liaoning**

The blood shed by the bourgeois revolutionaries in their heroic struggles in Liaoning (then Fengtian) was an integral part of the 1911 revolution which, however, had its own characteristics brought about by the historical conditions of the province. This essay is an attempt to define their characteristics and to draw some lessons from the experiences there.

### **I**

Liaoning<sup>1</sup> had long been the political, economic, and cultural center of the Northeast. From 1894 to 1911 it had endured the Japanese War, the Boxer War, and the Russo-Japanese War; it had also suffered from the feudal rule, economic exploitation, and an almost unbroken series of natural disasters. The result was "inescapably heavy taxation and years of starvation,"<sup>2</sup> which trapped the people in a "desperate situation."<sup>3</sup> Both the national and class contradictions grew in intensity, and so from 1906 the people of Liaoning began a continuous series of protests and struggles in various forms.<sup>4</sup>

It was under these circumstances that the bourgeois revolutionaries came to Liaoning after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. They were chiefly two types of people. First, the revolutionary intellectuals, who migrated to the Northeast voluntarily to fight for the integrity of the nation, included Beijing University students Ding Kaizhang of Hebei, Zhu Xilin of Jiangsu, and Zhang

Yong. These people "came out of the Shanhaiguan to organize a revolutionary army, . . . and to lay the foundation of the revolution,"<sup>5</sup> in the hope of "whipping up our spirit to annihilate the hideous elements; uniting our friends to get rid of the odor of sheep and goats."\* "We must dust away all our national humiliations, plant the banners of our full independence,"<sup>6</sup> "by defending our honor and recovering our sovereign rights."<sup>7</sup> They worked in a concentrated fashion in Xingjing (now Xinbin), calling on the green foresters and local strongmen "with a view to launching an armed uprising."<sup>8</sup> Later, both Ding and Zhang joined the Alliance Society to make further contributions to the revolution. Second, members of the Alliance Society were sent thither after the founding of the society in 1905 "to recruit revolutionaries."<sup>9</sup> The *Shengjing shibao* sponsored by the Japanese in the capital of Fengtian reported the news that "Sun Yatsen has dispatched his underlings to Fengtian." Their activities covered the capital city, Tieling in the north, Andong (now Dandong) in the east, and Yingkou in the south of the province; they also "infiltrated the west to talk with the residents there." "They tended to bring schools, students, and the gentry under their sway" and "for an uprising"<sup>10</sup> they "secretly gathered people together."<sup>11</sup> The "usually alert" officials of Fengtian became "alarmed" and quickly "instructed the prefectural authorities to take precautionary steps."<sup>12</sup> "Precaution" here meant "suppression." For a while the revolutionaries suffered serious setbacks.

But the malevolence of the counterrevolution did not dishearten them. To hasten the development of the revolution, the headquarters of the Alliance Society in Tokyo sent Song Jiaoren (chief inspector of the Department of Justice), Wu Kun and Bai Yuhuan (supervisors of the Department of Supervision), and Suenaga Takashi Setsu, the printer of the society's official organ, the *Minbao*,<sup>13</sup> to Dalian in the spring of 1907. In April the Liaodong branch of the society was established, "aiming at the seizure of Liaoning, then the capture of Shanghaiguan, and finally the occupation of Beijing."<sup>15</sup>

The establishment of the Liaodong branch marked the beginning of a new phase of the bourgeois revolutionary activities there and in the rest of the three eastern provinces. Thenceforth the Liaoning revolutionaries under the united leadership of the Alliance Society did a great deal of assiduous organizational and propaganda work for "an armed uprising" "to overthrow the despotic rule and to found a republic."<sup>16</sup>

First, they developed the organization of the branch and spread its influence. According to Ning Wu's recollection, they recruited new members from cultural and educational circles such as the elderly gentlemen Zhao Zhongyu and some teachers and students at Wenhui College, the Cadet School, and the Women Teachers' College—Zu Jiqing, Duan Wenxiang, and Zhang Shuqiu (Zhang Yong's elder sister). They also accepted new members from the village leagues (*lian Zhuanghui*) such as the "three Gu's" (Gu Renyi, Gu Renmin, and Gu Zhenbang), Ning Wu, and Liu Yong. Moreover, they penetrated into the army because of the conviction held by some revolutionaries that "a revolution must be backed by real strength which could come only from a large number of soldiers as comrades."<sup>17</sup> They developed new members of the Alliance Society not only in the 1st and 2d mixed brigades of the Qing army, but also in Zhang Zuolin's garrison and Du Lishan's old units.<sup>18</sup> The strategy study societies (*wuxue yanjiuhui*) in Xinmin and Jinzhou for instance and the camp schools (*suiying xuetang*) in Jinzhou for instance were the organizational forms they used to mobilize the men and "spread their influence."<sup>19</sup> Some revolutionaries under cover of instructors found their way into the Fengtian Cadet School and the Military Academy to enlist officers and men as members of the society. The Shandong soldiers at Xinmin organized themselves into the Shandong Association to facilitate their (clandestine) work at various places "without arousing suspicion."<sup>20</sup> Finally, the revolutionaries contacted the "mounted men" (*majun*, also known as "red beards," *honghuzi*, or "mounted bandits," *maze*) and the anticorruption green foresters who were to be found in the remote areas of Liaoning, in an utterly disunited existence. These fierce

fighters received both praise and censure. Zhang Yong and Wu Luzhen would have nothing to do with them whereas Song Jiaoren, Qi Genghuan, and Ning Wu planned to exploit their "antigovernment propensity" and "unite them in military action." At that time, the view of Song and the others was correct. Courageously Song contacted them and "swore brotherhood" with their leader. His letter to the chieftain of the mounted men could be used to show the attitude of the Alliance Society. It affirmed their goals of "helping the weak by repressing the strong," "protecting the people against tyrannical rule"; it exposed the crimes of "unbridled cruelty, slaughter of people, expropriation of their property, administration of harsh penalties on them, and imposition of extortionate taxes"; it pointed out the weaknesses of the mounted men who, having gradually forgotten their principles, scattered into disunited groups, "quite unable to embark on any lofty project"; it finally expressed the revolutionaries' wish to cooperate with them "in a concerted attack from the north and the south."<sup>21</sup> This letter awakened the anti-Qingism in the leaders of the mounted men and to a degree inspired them to follow and coordinate with the anti-Qing struggles waged by the society. These activities of the revolutionaries strengthened their organization and broadened the anti-Qing united front, thus contributing significantly to the revolution in Liaoning.

Secondly, [the revolutionaries] visited various places in the province over a three-month period, to propagate democratic thought. 1) They penetrated into cultural and educational circles and the new army, especially among young students, to sow the seeds of bourgeois democracy. For example, intellectuals like Shang Zhen, Chen Gan, Xu Jingxin, and others had been to the primary and secondary schools to do this type of work.<sup>22</sup> The revolutionaries also worked through "their sympathizers like Wu Luzhen, Peng Jiazhen, Lan Tianwei, and so on to ignite the revolutionary fervor of the new army."<sup>23</sup> 2) They made use of the newspapers. In the autumn of 1907 Xu Jingxin, the editor-in-chief of the *Shengjing shibao*, Shen Ganruo (c.n. Keshi) of the *Dazhong gongbao*, and Fang Guwei of the *Fengtian shangwu*

*ribao* devoted some space in their papers to “arguments in favor of revolution”<sup>24</sup> and exposed the corruption of the Qing government. At the same time, similar work was done by Zhao Zhonggu and Yang Dashi, both revolutionaries, in the capacity of sponsors of the *Guominbao* of Fengtian and Yao Congren as the manager of the *Dongsansheng ribao*. 3) [The revolutionaries] wrote and produced patriotic plays<sup>25</sup> and sold patriotic books, to fan people’s indignation against the feudal rulers and thus to lay the ideological foundation of tax protests and strikes.

Third, [the revolutionaries] influenced and promoted the spontaneous (*zifade*, sic) anti-Qing struggles. Before the establishment of the Liaodong branch of the Alliance Society, small-scale workers’ strikes, merchants’ boycotts of foreign goods, and ordinary people’s tax protests occurred at Yingkou, Haicheng, Andong, and Chaoyang. After it was established, the intensified propaganda work of the revolutionaries had its impact on the scope and depth of Liaoning popular struggles, “the Dongbian and the Liaoyang revolts” being notable examples. In February 1907 the Qing government, in the name of introducing modern projects, tried to extort more money by skillful manipulations. For example, it attempted to survey and measure the wooded hill land and wasteland in Fengcheng, Xiuya, Andong, and Kuandian in eastern Liaoning, thus bringing the class struggle into sharp relief, not only among the masses, but also in the “wealthy houses.” The leaders of the antisurvey movement were Gu Renyi of Zhuanghe and Baohuanan of Xuelizhang in Fengcheng, both “prominent land-tax payers” or “wealthy houses.” Their radicalism (*sixiang de jijin*) and conflict with the local officials inspired them to organize 30,000 “able-bodied” fighters who resisted officials who wanted to enter their territories and survey the land.<sup>26</sup> The people of Fengcheng tied up seven surveyors and killed or wounded three government soldiers.<sup>27</sup> Widely known clashes such as these produced an impact on the province as a whole and eventually compelled Xu Shichang, the viceroy of the three eastern provinces, to instruct Zhang Xiluan, the intendant of the Dongbian Circuit, to discontinue the survey. After the

preliminary victory of the local people, the situation along the eastern border seemed to quiet down, but its influence was far reaching. In the same summer [1907], 20,000 people staged the "Liaoyang revolt,"<sup>28</sup> provoked by heavy taxation.<sup>29</sup> This incident was directly connected with the revolutionary activities of Chen Gan and Shang Zhen.

Chen Gan, a Shandong man, was teaching at the Jinzhou Middle School in 1906 when he learned that De Zhongke had brought copies of the *Jinghua ribao* edited by his teacher, Peng Yizhong, from Beijing to Liaoyang. Anxious to read them, Chen approached Zhang Erwen, an old friend of his and sometime an educator in Liaoyang, to introduce him (to De). With De's help, he was able to organize a Newspaper Explanation Society and a half-day school of some 200 students on the eastern outskirts of the city. Later he set up a Bannermen's Primary School at Mashenmiao with Chen as the headmaster. In the winter of that year, he asked a schoolmate of his, Shang Zhen, of the Military Academy of the Three Eastern Provinces, to take a teaching post in Liaoyang. Chen and Shang were close friends and democratic revolutionaries. In the classroom they "tried to arouse martial spirit and revolutionary elan." At leisure they composed poems such as this:

China, and the world are now in contact—  
Oh, how glorious the five continents!  
Heaven and earth, wind and clouds—  
Oh history written with iron and blood!<sup>30</sup>

[Their activities] being objectionable to the prefect, Xuan Junying, a trap was laid for them but failed. Then the prefect had them arrested and chained to a pole beside a cesspool. This happened in the summer of 1907. Since the papers were highly critical [of the prefect's way of handling the matter], they were released and banished from the prefecture.<sup>31</sup> Xuan's exile of them and the second tax protest in Liaoyang in May 1908 were evidence that the revolutionary democratic propaganda had considerable influence.

Since 1908 the Liaodong branch [of the Alliance Society] had been growing in strength. After the "three Gus," the leaders of the Zhuanghe Village League, and other leaders of mass struggles joined the Alliance Society, the popular movement assumed a new outlook—the tax protests organized by the fishermen of Yingkou and the villagers of Ningyuan (now Xincheng) in Jinzhou and Dongping (now Gaixian), the strike of the oil and wine workers in Tieling, the rice riots in Andong, Kuandian, and Fengcheng, and the armed uprising led by Pan Yongzhong and Gao Piru in Zhuanghe and Fuzhou.<sup>32</sup> In the provincial capital there occurred a series of workers' strikes, merchants' strikes, rice riots, tax protests, and boycotts of Japanese goods.

After several years of hard work, the activities had brought the membership of the Liaodong branch to over 100, on the eve of the revolution,<sup>33</sup> who could influence some 35,000 people. "Their armed strength being impressive,"<sup>34</sup> they as a revolutionary force could match the Qing rulers in Liaoning. The activities of the Alliance Society alarmed Xu Shichang's successors, Xiliang and Zhao Erxun, who adopted a stick-and-carrot policy to suppress them. However, under the rapidly developing situation of the country as a whole, the sparks in Liaoning were about to light a prairie fire.

## II

The news of the Wuchang uprising was first published in a supplement of the *Dazhong gongbao*,<sup>35</sup> producing a tremendous effect, especially on the economy. The price of refined silver at Yingkou dropped violently, "touching off a crisis." A run on the branches of the Imperial, Communications, and other government banks began in the morning and lasted till 4 p.m. on October 16, 1911 "under the surveillance of bayoneted soldiers and police" while some 190,000 yuan of banknotes were cashed.<sup>36</sup> In Dalian the amount of notes cashed reached 250,000 yuan,<sup>37</sup> indicating a general loss of confidence in the government notes.<sup>38</sup> At Yingkou, Xinmin, and Liaoyang the prices of grain fluctuated drastically.



Politically there occurred two sharply contrasting situations: the chaos of the ruling class and the vigour of the revolutionaries. The dismay and panic were shared by officialdom from the viceroy, Zhao Erxun, down to the county magistrates. To maintain the status quo, Zhao adopted the following measures. 1) As soon as he heard the news from Wuchang, he at once returned from Qiqihaer to Fengtian city on October 14 and declared martial law, "to prevent untoward happenings." 2) On the 15th and 16th, he called a meeting of the heads of departments and circuits "to consider matters on public security."<sup>39</sup> 3) On the 16th, he saw Lan Tianwei and Wu Xiangzhen, the two brigade commanders, and Nie Ruqing, the regiment commander, "to make sure of their support." 4) On the 17th, he saw all the army officers in Fengtian city "to reaffirm their loyalty to the throne,"<sup>40</sup> "to die for the favors they had received from the emperor,"<sup>41</sup> and "to avoid acting impulsively on unconfirmed information."<sup>42</sup> 5) He imposed a total news blackout on the revolution—"all the newspapers are hereby notified that the publication of news on the rebellion led by the bandits (the Wuchang uprising—the author) be deferred,"<sup>43</sup> while the *Dazhong gongbao* was suspended because of the supplement on the Wuchang uprising it had published. All private telegrams were forbidden and the Police Commission was empowered to "open and inspect all correspondence between Fengtian officers and men and the people in Hubei and Hunan."<sup>44</sup> 6) In addition to the intelligence agents already sent to Shanghai, Nanjing, and Beijing, spies were planted at selected places in Liaoning to report on the activities of the revolutionaries.<sup>45</sup> 7) From the 17th, the telephone office "began a night shift" so as to "speed up the flow of orders of the government, army, and police."<sup>46</sup> 8) Zhao also organized the Security Association of the Citizens of Fengtian (Fengtian guomin baoan gonghui, hereafter the Security Association—the author)—"nominally for public security, but in fact it was anti-Republican and counterrevolutionary."<sup>47</sup> These eight measures, especially the Security Association, were a deadly threat to the revolutionaries.

The Security Association was the result of the cooperation

between the gentry and the constitutionalists. The idea, however, belonged originally to revolutionaries like Lan Tianwei and Zhang Yong, who had been planning for such an association in the capital city in preparation for the declaration of independence as a response to the Wuchang uprising. When the plan ripened, Wu Jinglian, speaker of the Provincial Council, and Yuan Jinkai, a member of the gentry, took control of the Security Association. They made use of the revolutionaries' demand for independence, which was gaining wide support, for their own usurpation of local administrative power. Having obtained Zhao Erxun's assent, the Provincial Council jumped the revolutionaries' gun by convening the inaugural meeting of the Security Association in the afternoon of November 12. Zhao Erxun was elected the director with Wu Junglian and Wu Xiangzhen, the commanding officer of the 39th Brigade of the 20th Division, as his deputies. Its eight departments were all headed by Fengtian bureaucrats and constitutionalists, appointees of the directors, except its supervisory body, the Advisory Department, which had the revolutionary, Zhang Yong, as its deputy head. The composition determined its antirevolutionary stance and its official statements—the regulations,<sup>48</sup> “the Fengtian army’s statement on the Security Association,” and “the Fengtian army’s public notice on public security”<sup>49</sup>—made clear that it was a reactionary organization ostensibly “for public security” but in fact to prevent the masses from resorting to “violence.”

The establishment of the association signified the gathering of the counterrevolutionary forces around Zhao Erxun to oppose the revolution openly and unscrupulously. The cavalry and infantry in Fengtian “took precautions by patrolling various sections of the city day and night since November 14.”<sup>50</sup> On the night of the 24th, the garrison was deployed around the vicerealty and the summer palaces while each of the city gates was guarded by twenty soldiers.<sup>51</sup> Then Zhao Erxun bared his teeth by ordering the army in Fengtian “to attack anyone who hangs out the white flag to show his support of Wuhan.”<sup>52</sup> Following the Fengtian Security Association, the local officials of Tieling, Liaoyang,

Fenghuangcheng, Yingkou, Andong, Gongzuling, Jinzhou, Xinmin, Hancheng, and Xiuyai set up their local security associations—in accordance with Article 9 of the regulations of the Fengtian Association: “All the prefectures and counties of the province shall establish their branch security associations.” Suddenly a black cloud hung over Liaoning and the counterrevolution was on the offensive.

Zhao's steps, however, did not subdue the bourgeois revolutionaries, who, encouraged by the victories at Wuchang, planned their countermeasures. 1) The important members of the Liaodong branch—Xu Jingxin, Chen Gan, Shang Zhen, Zhang Genren, Zuo Yunong—“called a series of secret meetings to prepare for an uprising and promote the independence of the three eastern provinces.”<sup>53</sup> The members of the Alliance Society met at Lan Tianwei's headquarters, electing Wu Luzhen, the commanding officer of the 6th Division, the commander-in-chief of the Barbarian Pacification Army outside the Shanhaiguan (because of Wu's transfer to Luanzhou on government orders, Lan replaced him) and Zhang Yong the military governor and commander-in-chief of Fengtian province. 2) The commanders of the routes of the Army were: Gu Renyi of Zhuanghe, southern; Qi Genghuan, western; Shao Zhaozhong, eastern; Ning Wu, central; and Zhu Jiqing, northern.<sup>54</sup> First, Gu was “to hoist the revolutionary banners” in Zhuanghe; then Yang Dashi in Fuzhou, Ning Wu, Liu Yong, and Baohuaman in Fengcheng were to organize uprisings of the militia; and Shang Zhen would infiltrate into Liaoyang to organize a student army in preparation for an uprising. 3) The Membership and Blood Society (Tiexuehui), and the Martial Spirit Society (Zhenwushe) were to be enlarged. 4) The Soldiers' Friendship Society (Junren lianlehui) formed by the Alliance Society and soldiers who were sympathetic with the revolution sent Shang Zhen and the staff officer of the 2d Mixed Brigade, Li Dehu, to Luanzhou, asking the commanding officer of the 20th Division, Zhang Shaozeng, to march on Beijing, occupy the environs of Tianjin, and declare the independence of Zhili. In case of failure, they would return to the capital of

Fengtian, to plan for the independence there with the unit under Lan's command.<sup>55</sup> 5) On November 6 the revolutionaries held a meeting at Lan's headquarters to plan "for the expulsion of Zhao Erxun" and the declaration of independence around the 15th of the month. 6) To rival the Security Association, the Progressive Alliance (*Lianhe jijinhui*) was to be established. These plans had a positive impact on the popular response to the revolution and curtailed the influence of the reaction.

However, on the question of independence the bourgeois revolutionaries were hopelessly divided. A small number of them insisted on a military operation [to achieve it] while the majority favored a "bloodless revolution"—a majority including not only army commanders Lan Tianwei, Zhang Shaozeng, and Wu Luzhen, but also the radical, Zhang Yong.<sup>56</sup> This schism was gravely detrimental to their cause. Although he maintained his "zeal for social reform"<sup>57</sup> and "resolve to die for the good of the people,"<sup>58</sup> Zhang Yong was no longer the man of quick decision of September 1905 when he and Wu Yue threw a bomb at the five ministers leaving the Qianmen station in Beijing on their way abroad. Not only was he slow and insensitive to the ugly and dark designs of Wu Jinglian and Zhao Erxun, he also allowed himself "to be drawn to join the provincial council by Wu"<sup>59</sup> and "to fall into Zhao's scheme by joining the Fengtian Security Association." His original idea was to use the respectability of a member of the association to work for the revolution—the expulsion of Zhao and the declaration of independence. Once in the association, his freedom of action was so severely restricted as to retard the progress of a provincewide uprising and independence, let alone to expel Zhao from Fengtian.

"The Security Association . . . deprived the people of freedom of assembly on the one hand and constrained the revolutionary party in the name of maintaining public security on the other. It also sent money and arms to the Qing army on the way to the south. We [the revolutionaries] were alarmed."<sup>60</sup> These new circumstances awakened Zhang Yong from his slumber, and he cooperated with Zhang Genren, Liu Danian, and others repre-

senting local groups to form the Fengtian Progressive Alliance "as an alternative to the Security Association"<sup>61</sup> on November 17. Zhang Yong was the director with Liu Danian, Zhang Genren, and Li Dehu as his deputies; there were also seven departments and a number of advisers.<sup>62</sup> Its leadership consisted of relatively prominent revolutionaries and constitutionalists, e.g., Wu Jinglian and Yuan Jinkai, who were elected the advisers of the alliance. Its regulations unambiguously announced "its goal of actively promoting a humanitarian political revolution."<sup>63</sup>

The nature of the Progressive Alliance was best explained by the "Manifesto of its Leader (Zhang Yong)" published in the *Shengjing shibao*. The manifesto stated: "The alliance respects humanitarianism and aims to inaugurate a Man-Han republican government. We therefore applaud the idea, should the Qing emperor decide to abdicate."<sup>64</sup> Once established, the alliance began a series of activities to overthrow the Qing regime and to introduce republicanism. 1) "It had talks with the consuls of Japan and Russia."<sup>65</sup> 2) It expanded its organization—according to Zhang Genren's estimate, "the revolutionaries had an armed force of 35,000 men, made contacts with the mounted bandits who showed willingness to support us in the event of an emergency, and were in touch with all the councillors, gentry, and merchants."<sup>66</sup> Most of the members [of the Alliance] were soldiers of the old and new armies.<sup>67</sup> 3) It waged a struggle against the gentry. For instance, in the capacity of the military adviser [of the Security Association], Zhang Yong objected to Zhao Erxun's order to transfer Zhang Zuolin, commander of the central route of the garrison and deputy head of the military department of the Security Association, to the capital city, in the hope of [finally] driving Zhao out of the province.<sup>68</sup> Zhang Yong and Zhang Genren went to see Zhao, asking him why Lan Tianwei was compelled to leave [the province], Zhuanghe and Ningyuan refugees were placed under military surveillance, and the shipment of money and arms to Beijing was not discontinued. They asked Zhao "to raise the white flag as soon as possible in order to make the people feel at ease."<sup>69</sup> Li Dehu and Gu Tianbao, the head of

military affairs [of the alliance] also asked Zhao to cease the shipment of ammunition to the Qing army and to allow the revolutionaries to organize two rural militia units at Shanhaiguan and Qinhuangdao.<sup>70</sup> Zhao ignored all these requests and demands. Finally throwing off his mask, he started to persecute the revolutionaries.<sup>71</sup> 4) The most notable activity of the alliance was to organize armed uprisings.

These facts made it clear that the Progressive Alliance was the political organization of the bourgeois revolutionaries in Liaoning. Its constituents were exceedingly complicated, however—such as the members of the alliance itself and of the Iron and Blood Society, Martial Spirit Society, and Recovery Hall (Kefutang); revolutionary intellectuals and soldiers of the old and new armies; Man-Han working people and gentlemen; revolutionaries and constitutionalists. There was no unified command, united action, or united effort. Facing the arrogance of Chinese and foreign reactionaries, its leaders, such as Zhang Yong, were often hesitant and timid. Zhang openly admitted: Our party “is well-prepared but in view of the close tie between the eastern provinces and Japan, it has not taken any rash action.”<sup>72</sup> Li Dehu shared the same view: Our party had for some time planned an uprising and yet “it is still delaying and reconsidering a decisive action” because of diplomatic complexities.<sup>73</sup> At the same time, Zhang Yong did nothing to expose the hypocrisy of the constitutionalists, although he knew that Wu Jinglian joined the alliance purely for personal reasons and that Yuan Jinkai was undermining the revolution while serving the interests of Zhao Erxun. But he naively hoped to win these two over to revolution by preserving his friendship with them. The information Yuan obtained from Zhang Yong and from the alliance meetings was passed on to Zhao, and it had harmful effects on the revolution. In addition, Zhang Yong and the others paid attention only to the morale and strength of the old and new armies and the mounted men sympathetic with the revolution, but none to their old habits and styles contrary to the interests of the revolution. The omission of doing painstaking propaganda and organizational work among these

armed forces could result only in their vacillation and damage to the cause. The focus of the revolutionaries' attention being on the urban upper strata and the armed forces at the expense of mobilizing the laboring masses, therefore they were weak and the roots of the revolution shallow. They could hardly avoid the fate of defeat in a decisive battle with the enemy.

### III

The establishment of the Progressive Alliance brought the revolutionary struggle in Liaoning to a new upsurge. Zhang Yong and the others chose to agitate for uprisings in the districts instead of in the capital city where "the enemy was too strong." This strategy would disperse government forces to the prefectures to deal with local unrest and then, it was hoped, in one stroke the revolutionaries could take Fengtian.<sup>74</sup> Consequently most of the revolutionaries were sent out to Zhuanghe, Fuzhou, Yingkou, Haicheng, Liaoyang, Ningyuan, Tieling, Kaiyuan, Andong, and Fengcheng, to mobilize the local troops and organize people's armies in preparation for a concerted action. Three large-scale and relatively important uprisings occurred in Zhuang-Fu, Liao-Huai, and Feng-An.

The Zhuang-Fu uprising broke out directly under the influence of the bourgeois revolutionaries, who selected the area as the center of their military activities. The people there had staged tax protests, rice riots, and armed actions from the autumn of 1906 to August 1911, whose impact was felt all over the three eastern provinces. This glorious rebellious tradition was being carried on by the local people after the Wuchang uprising by routing the garrisons on October 20 and then by giving support to the people's armies led by revolutionaries like Gu Renyi and Gu Zhenbang. "The leaders of the righteous people . . . sold their property worth more than 100,000 yuan" and even landlords and the monks of the Tainiangniang Temple "showed their support . . . by donating arms and ammunition, food grain, and money."<sup>77</sup> In a few days there was a people's army of 3,000 while Yang Dashi,

using his position as the excommissioner of police, led more than 1,000 police and militia to rise up in conjunction with the action taken by Gu Renyi.<sup>78</sup> These planned actions led to the foundation of the local junta of the Chinese Republic on November 27 with Gu Renyi as the commander of the 1st Guandong Army, whose command headquarters were at Lijia Wole nearer the battlefield. The manifesto of the uprising was carried in the *Shengjing shi-bao*,<sup>79</sup> which, to begin with, denounced the corrupt bureaucrats for bullying the people and snatching away their property in a manner "fiercer than beasts of prey." It went on to announce the purpose of the comrades and army in a campaign complementing the action of the revolutionary army in the south so that the new government to be established would "wipe clean the ruthless administration of yesterday and the corruption of the past," while offering "freedom" to the nation as a whole.<sup>80</sup> The command headquarters adopted two policies to ensure the success of the uprisings—to Japan, a request of strict neutrality of the Guandong viceroyalty and the Matetsu Kabushiki Kaisha;<sup>81</sup> to the government armed forces, an appeal for surrender "with the reward of ten taels of silver to each Bannerman, Han, Muslim, or Mongol, if he comes over with his weapons." The hope was "to overthrow despotism" with the power of the masses in this "opportunity of a millennium."<sup>82</sup> Under the influence of the uprisings, many Qing officers and men did come over and some other Qing officers decided "to desert their superior officers" or refused to fight and "to inflict damages on their compatriots."<sup>83</sup> "As the military action was about to begin and neither desertion nor retreat was feasible," some others even committed suicide as an expression of their protest.<sup>84</sup> On November 20 Gu Renyi's troops attacked the garrison stationed at Shuimenzi, in a two-hour action<sup>85</sup> during which the revolutionaries fought exceptionally bravely. The column led by Gu Renbang "broke through the enemy line three times as they charged with such bravery that the government troops gave up firing, either to surrender or to run away." In this battle only four revolutionaries were wounded while the garrison suffered hundreds of casualties and twenty were taken prisoner.



Even the garrison commander, Kueiyu, at Shapaozi was captured.<sup>86</sup> On the following day the revolutionary forces launched an attack on the garrison units retreating from Wafangdian to Yuantaizi, two *li* from there, and quickly took Shuimenzi. Soon after the victory, they put up public notices to calm the people.

The victories of the Zhuang-Fu uprising can be attributed to six factors. 1) Its aims were clear and precise—elimination of corrupt officials, “amelioration of the dire conditions of the people,”<sup>88</sup> “political reform and state reconstruction,”<sup>89</sup> and “eternal peace for the Republic of China.”<sup>90</sup> 2) The revolutionary army had excellent discipline, “did no harm to the local inhabitants,”<sup>91</sup> and announced six rules of conduct—“first, kill those who obstruct the advance of the Chinese Republican army; second, kill those who rape women; third, kill those who slaughter the Manchus; fourth, kill those who loot; fifth, kill those who do harm to the person and property of the foreigner; sixth, kill those who reveal military secrets to the enemy.”<sup>92</sup> 3) The revolutionaries adopted “a policy of Man-Han cooperation,” which was translated into the announcements of “erasing the Man-Han barrier” and “protecting the Manchus.” This nonirredentism aroused “widespread interest of the middle and lower strata of the Manchus in joining the revolution to topple the Qing dynasty,” some of whom gave up their valuable lives for this cause. 4) The enthusiastic support of the people, which was itself the result of the first three factors. Thousands of people enlisted in the revolutionary army; some were prepared “to die for Gu (Renyi)”;<sup>93</sup> some had white armbands ready “for them to join up in case Gu’s army came.”<sup>93</sup> 5) The revolutionaries work at demoralizing the Qing army and inducing the garrison to surrender was successful. It diminished the resistance and added strength to the revolution. 6) The uprisings came under the leadership and assistance of the revolutionary government in the south and the Progressive Alliance, as the revolutionaries in Dalian and Shanghai continued to supply the uprisings.<sup>94</sup> Lan Tianwei sent his secret envoy to a rendezvous with Gu Renyi and Yang Dashi at Fuzhou;<sup>95</sup> this was followed by another with Fan Guoliang and

Zuo Rulin sent by the revolutionary government in the south with the revolutionary flags to Fuzhou on December 1. These two envoys later went to the capital city.<sup>96</sup> The leaders of the uprisings discussed "the problems concerning their cooperation with the revolutionary army in the south" and "hoisted the flags presented to them by the southern envoys" at Gujianling, the Tainiangniang Temple, and Dongdeng.<sup>97\*</sup>

The Liao-Hai uprising took place simultaneously with the action in Zhuang-Fu. Being near the capital city and on the route from there to Dalian, the important city of Liaoyang was the place from where Shang Zhen, Cheng Qilu, Qi Genghuan, Xu Jingxin, and Shi Lei were sent to organize an uprising. On November 24 the Progressive Alliance despatched three members by rail to Liaoyang to do propaganda work. On the 25th, forty police trainees declared "their allegiance to the revolutionary party," and at 7 p.m. that day "they tied a white band on their left arm" to begin the uprising and immediately forced "the police on sentry duty to give up fifty repeating rifles and ammunition."<sup>98</sup> The next morning some twenty revolutionaries went to Liuerbao, a town of 12,000 households, took the police station and the town council as their headquarters; then they "went to talk with the people from house to house." They asked the people "to hand out white flags to show their support [of the revolution]" while recruiting soldiers "to consolidate their control of this place as a base for their advance to Liaoyang and for a stranglehold on Fengtian city."<sup>99</sup>

The growing revolutionary tide unnerved the police in Liaoyang, many of whom, taking their weapons with them, went over to the revolutionary army. "They wore a white band on their right (left) arm and walked openly in the city."<sup>100</sup> On the 29th, thirty "picked revolutionaries" came to Liaoyang from the capital city.<sup>101</sup> Then a convoy of cars came, carrying arms and ammunition from the capital via Shahezhen, guarded by the garrison of Haicheng under the command of their deputy commander, Xu Zhen. It was at Shahezhen on the 30th that the train was intercept-

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\*A sentence is omitted here—translator.

ed by the revolutionaries of Liuerbao, who took more than 100 rifles and 30,000 rounds of ammunition.<sup>102</sup> On the same day the revolutionary forces made their proposals known to the officials in Liaoyang, who, using a delaying tactic, "promised to reply the next morning."<sup>103</sup> When the next morning arrived, the officials broke their promise, a perfidy which led to the revolutionaries' switching from negotiation to fighting. At 10 a.m., Shang Zhen commanded eighty men to engage the 3d Battalion of the 3d Regiment outside the Gaolimen gate. An hour later he retreated under the pressure of tremendous odds. Thirty-three of the eighty were captured and six died, while the enemy casualties were no more than four wounded (including one officer).<sup>104</sup> This engagement was followed by another at the revolutionary command headquarters in Guojiadian, which was recalled by Cheng Qilu thus: "Zhao Erxun ordered the garrison of Liaoyang to encircle the Guojiadian and attack 'the picked men.'" Shang Zhen fled while "the picked men" and the revolutionaries there put up a stubborn resistance before breaking through the siege. "More than 100 died in action and another 100 were taken prisoner by the Qing forces in this battle."<sup>105</sup> The dead were "left at the roadside without the slightest sign of treating them humanely."<sup>106</sup> The uprising at Liaoyang thus failed. About the same time, a revolutionairy by the name of Zhao Zhonggu, using Yaowangshan in Dashiqiao as his base, was preparing for an uprising at Haicheng. He planted a number of students in the city to collaborate in his planned uprising, which came to be known to the local officials. The city police chief, Wan Juchuan, and 400 garrison troops immediately began an operation of suppression. Zhao Zhonggu then ordered Wang Huanzhang and the few hundred armed students under the latter's command to fight. They were soon defeated, having suffered more than ten casualties; all the students planted in the city were put into prison but were later rescued.<sup>107</sup> Shang Zhen, Cheng Qilu, Qi Genhuan, and others went back to the capital city after the defeat of the Liao-Hai uprising.

About ten days after the Zhuang-Fu uprising, revolutionaries,

e.g., Liu Yong, He Xiuzhai, Baohuanan, and Ning Wu, went into action in Feng(huangcheng)-An(dong). Earlier they and the mounted men had communicated with each other and the situation was judged favorable for an uprising. The strategic plan, agreed upon by Ning Wu and Shao Zhaozhong, a graduate of the Military Academy and commander of the Right Route of the Qing Garrison Battalion who was sympathetic with the revolution, was to assemble a battalion to cooperate with Baohuanan's troops in an attack on Fengcheng before going to Andong. On November 26, 200 soldiers came to Xuelizhan to the northwest of Fengcheng, ready to march on and take Yushulin. However, the government had received information of this movement and the garrison led by Ma Longtan ambushed the revolutionaries as they were having breakfast. Casualties were suffered by both sides, but the revolutionaries were surrounded by 300 or 400 enemy reinforcements, ran out of ammunition, and finally were defeated. He Xinzhai and twenty-six others were captured by the Qing troops. A rescue operation the next day was stopped [by the Qing garrison] at Longan while Ma Longtan hurriedly ordered the execution of He and his comrades.<sup>110</sup> In the morning of the 29th the revolutionaries' reinforcement arrived "to launch another attack which pushed back the garrison northward to a point only five *li* from Fengcheng."<sup>111</sup> At this time a revolutionary, Lang Huihe, deputy director of the Anfeng railway, sent his 200 men<sup>112</sup> to join the 2,000 under Baohuanan and Shao Zhaozhong in an assault on Andong, which was "repulsed because the promised reinforcement did not arrive."<sup>113</sup> Thereafter some revolutionaries fled to Zhuanghe,<sup>114</sup> some to Yantai, and others to the capital city.

Simultaneous [with the Feng-An uprising], Changtu, Kaiyuan, and Jinzhou (to the west of the capital city) were planning to take action, but because of insufficient preparation the plans were cancelled.

Although the uprisings had some useful results, they were quelled nonetheless by the government. For the defeat, the vacillation and feebleness of the bourgeois revolutionaries themselves were responsible. For instance, they paid little attention to the

propaganda and education, organization, and secrecy of action among the motley men under their command. Their assessment of the reactionary nature of the local rulers and their ideological preparation for military action left much to be desired. Their understanding of the "privileged" Japanese aggressors was so rudimentary that they always used "diplomatic considerations with regard to Japan" as the excuse for their timid inaction. Because of this, they were easily frightened by the propaganda of the Chinese and foreign reactionaries, with the result that their decisions were always circumscribed by a concern for Japan's interests. Moreover, the enemy of revolution was strong, treacherous, skilled at applying the "stick and the carrot," and difficult for the revolutionaries to deal with.

The "stick-and-carrot" method was frequently used by the reaction. As to how sweet was the carrot and how strong the stick, it depended upon the concrete situation and the reaction itself. The Qing officials in Liaoning were extremely dexterous. When Zhuang-Fu were set ablaze by the uprisings and the security of the capital city was in doubt, many prefectural and county leaders as well as those of the Security Association insisted on "conquest" (*kefu*, <sup>116</sup> "suppression") while some others wanted "a peaceful settlement."<sup>117</sup> The wily Zhao Erxun, though trembling with fear and hate, was wary of the consequences of a purely military solution. His emphasis was on "pacification" supplemented by "military pressure." More specifically, he instructed local landlords and officials "to issue exhortative notices and meet with leading trouble-makers—the purpose being to win them over through persuasion."<sup>118</sup> They should also send people "to call on and talk to the partisans."<sup>119</sup> In this way those revolutionaries who were wavering in their conviction were either bought or won over [by the government], ending in the cancellation of revolutionary action. After the Liao-Hai and Feng-An incidents, Zhao shifted to suppression. On the one hand, he quickly dispatched troops to the battlefronts<sup>120</sup> "to attack ruthlessly";<sup>121</sup> on the other, he ordered the local officials "to prevent unrest from happening, to nip it in the bud as it is happening, and to suppress it

when it happens." The order touched off a rash of persecution, especially after each uprising. A typical case of the slaughter of revolutionaries was that after the failure of the Liao-Hai uprising was reported in detail in the *Shengjing shibao*, eleven were chained and tortured; thirteen "were indiscriminately slashed on the head and arms" with blunt knives; "and one of them was decapitated by several strikes, in an indescribably gruesome way"; their heads were hung above the Gaolimen gate and their bodies "left at the roadside for wild dogs to devour with blood stains and liver and lights strewn everywhere." "Those who saw this were furious with the ghoulishness of the government troops."<sup>123</sup> The twenty-seven killed by Ma Longtan's soldiers "died in an incomparably atrocious manner instead of in the ordinary way of execution."<sup>124</sup> The enemy's cruelty did not frighten off the revolutionaries or the laboring masses, who either carried on the struggle in different forms or went to other places to wait for another opportunity. Realizing that brutal suppression did not lead to the anticipated results, the enemy once again resorted to pacification. In the meantime, the revolutionaries reaffirmed "our revolution being political not racial" and showed signs of weakening, of giving up "violence" in preference for "a civilized approach."<sup>125</sup>

As the unrest in the districts was gradually being put down, Zhao Erxun could concentrate on tackling the revolutionaries "against all unexpected incidents"<sup>126</sup> so as to win Yuan Shikai's favor and strengthen his own position. Zhao redoubled his "rigorous persecution" by uninhibited arrests and execution, especially when the news of Feng Guozhang's capture of Hanyang on November 27 and the insane massacre of the revolutionary troops there reached [Fengtian].<sup>127</sup> He ordered the prefect of Ningyuan, Wang Yuquan, to have the deputy directors of the Progressive Alliance, Zhang Genren and Liu Danian,<sup>128</sup> arrested on the charge of "sedition" on December 10, 1911<sup>129</sup> and escorted to the capital city for detention.<sup>130</sup>

Then came the news of the peace talks between the North and South in the British Settlement in Shanghai on December 18 and the convocation of the National Assembly, precipitating Zhao

Erxun's [new] counterrevolutionary maneuvers. On the one hand, he and Zhang Yong agreed to a truce pending the convocation of the National Assembly. In good faith, Zhang telegraphed Hong Dongyi, the head of communications of the Progressive Alliance, to cancel the plan for an uprising in Fushun.<sup>131</sup> On the other hand, Zhao perfidiously persecuted revolutionaries before the landing of the Northern Expeditionary Army on the Liaodong Peninsula. His instruction to the commander of the Front and Central routes of cavalry and infantry of the Fengtian Garrison, Zhang Zuolin, was "to seek out constantly their leaders and have them arrested so as to nip unrest in the bud."<sup>132</sup> Thus encouraged by Zhao, Zhang Zuolin had Zhang Yong, Baokun, and Tian Yabin killed.

In the evening of January 23, 1912, Yuan Jinkai, sometime deputy director and chief adviser of the Security Association, gave a dinner party at Deyilou on Pingkangli in Shenyang [sic, then Fengtian] in honor of Zhang Yong and Zhang Zuolin. Zhong Yong accepted the invitation for "he still naively hoped to win Zhang Zuolin over to the revolution" and was unsuspecting of Yuan's and Zhao's intentions. After the meal, Yuan "excused himself"<sup>133</sup> and left while the two Zhangs were walking and talking along the street. Suddenly two of Zhang Zuolin's plain-clothes men, Yu Wenjia and Gao Jinshan, fired at Zhang Yong who, now wounded, loudly cursed Zhao Erxun "until he stopped breathing.\* His body was exposed there overnight and his eyes remained wide open."<sup>134</sup> The body was taken away and buried the next day.<sup>135</sup> Subsequently Zhang Yong's home and the home of his elder brother, Zhang Huanbo, were searched by Yu Wenjia and the men under his command: Zhang Yong's close friends—a Manchu by the name of Baokun and the secretary of the Progressive Alliance and the editor of the *Guominbao*, Tian Yabin—were also killed.<sup>136</sup> For several days, Zhang Zuolin's soldiers "went out in small bands to loot, burn, and kill. Not one of those who had changed their costumes† was spared." A white terror descended on the capital city.<sup>137</sup>

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\*A sentence is omitted here—translator.

†Meaning chiefly the queue—translator.

The murder of Zhang Yong and the others was premeditated and planned. Zhang Zuolin reported: "[I] met Zhang Yong by chance on the street and questioned him; he thereupon drew out a gun to resist arrest. Yu Wenjia shot and killed him on the spot."<sup>138</sup> This is a shamelessly distorted version of the facts, an obfuscation of the murder plot. Historical evidence makes it abundantly clear that it was indeed a scheme. Three days after the incident, the *Shengjing shibao* published a report on "The Sensational Murder," which asserted that, first, the murder of Zhang Yong took place "at 20.00 hours" and those of Baokun and Tian Yabin "at the same time."<sup>139</sup> The simultaneity of the three murders made nonsense of "met . . . by chance" and "resist arrest." Second, on January 31 Zhao Erxun slandered Zhang Yong in a public notice that Zhang "confused and incited people, threatened and cheated them for personal gain, and repeatedly plotted to make trouble." Furthermore, the public notice went on, Zhang "was scheming to kill the commanders of the garrison like Zhang (Zuolin) and Feng (Linge). Since the situation is urgent, it is imperative that I must confidentially instruct the armed forces to take precautionary steps and to arrest [him]."<sup>140</sup> This notice was another evidence of a planned murder. Third, the crucial evidence was Zhang Zuolin's own confession. In his conversation with Japanese Consul General Ochiai, he said: "It was extremely dangerous, if Zhang Yong was not eliminated. If I had not killed him, he would have killed me. For the sake of public security, I had him executed."<sup>142</sup> Zhang Zuolin's accomplices were Yuan Jinkai and Zhao Erxun,<sup>142</sup> but the man behind it all was Yuan Shikai.<sup>143</sup> This bloody deed was Zhang Zoulin's way to curry Zhao Erxun's favor and his "repayment" for Yuan Shikai's appreciation [of his abilities].<sup>144</sup> Thereafter, Zhao and Zhang went on to strengthen their ties with Yuan. The Zhao-Zhang persecution of revolutionaries and the Zhao-Zhang-Yuan collusion marked the worsening of the revolutionary situation in Liaoning. However, the southern revolutionary government headed by Sun Yatsen was deeply concerned with the Northeast. For overthrowing the Qing and uniting the whole country under the Provisional Government of the Republic, the provisional



president appointed Lan Tianwei "military governor of the Northeast" and Shang Zhen commander-in-chief of the people's army there, in the hope that Shandong, Liaoning, and even the Northeast as a whole could become independent.

#### IV

At the beginning of 1912, Lan Tianwei was appointed the military governor and began to plan for the independence of the Northeast. The commanding officer of the 2d Mixed Brigade, he had participated in the secret meeting at his headquarters on how to drive Zhao Erxun out of the eastern provinces, but a subordinate of his, Li Hexiang, reported the meeting to Zhao. By the end of 1911 he was forced to relinquish his command before he left for Dalian and then Shanghai on November 22.<sup>145</sup> Because his name still commanded great respect in Liaoning, it was used in the public proclamation issued by the military governor, clearly stating that [the revolutionaries] wanted "to capture the eastern provinces, topple the Qing government, and help the people's government found the Republic of China."<sup>146</sup> At the same time a telegram went to the Nanjing Provisional Government, requesting the return of Lan to Liaoning, "to take charge of all the affairs." The decision of Nanjing was to appoint Lan the commander of a Northern Expeditionary Force, to recapture the Northeast, thereby hastening the arrival of a revolutionary high tide. Following that, [the force] would go on to threaten Zhili and destroy the Qing dynasty.

Strategically this was a significant move taken under conditions of the military weakness of the revolutionaries while Zhili, Henan, and the Northeast remained firmly under Qing control. On January 16, 1912 Lan commanded a contingent of 2,000 Shanghai students, the Northern Expeditionary Army, to arrive at Yantai, Shandong, on the SS *Haiyong*, *Haizhen*, and *Nan-zhen*.<sup>147</sup> At Yantai he issued a declaration, saying that "the majority of the land forces of the Northern Expeditionary Army will proceed to the three eastern provinces, aiming at reoccupying the

said provinces in the near future.”<sup>148</sup> On the 17th the army telegraphed the [Japanese] Guandong viceroyalty, assuring that 1) “the person and property of the foreigner shall be protected by the military governor [Lan himself]” and 2) “the strict neutrality” of the South Manchurian Railway should be respected and “the Republican and Qing armies are expected to be treated equally.”<sup>149</sup> The purpose was obviously to reassure the Japanese and prevent them from interfering [in the military operations]. The arrival of the expeditionary army at Yantai was a great fillip to the revolutionaries in Liaoning across the sea lane.<sup>150</sup> Those in Zhuang-Fu, Liao-Hai, Jin(zhou), Chang(tu), and Kai(yuan) were buying arms and making new flags in preparation for uprisings. But the presence of this army and the people’s armies in Liaoning was inevitably a menace to the vested interests of the Japanese imperialists, hence their obstruction of the movement of the expeditionary army. On January 18 the commanding officer of the Japanese 2d Squadron visited Lan, to request that the army would “not land at any place in the neutral zone,” and that the belligerents would not “take any military action in the neutral zone of the leased territories.” Using “possible disturbances” as an excuse, the Japanese often unreasonably demanded that Lan must not land his troops “along the Manchurian coast” anywhere outside the neutral zone or that better still, Lan should “give up the planned landing altogether.”\* But Lan’s initial response was that “the plan to land at Huayuankou cannot be altered”; then he compromised: “if it is necessary to land at a point in the neutral zone, [the army] must first obtain Japan’s assent. No landing will be attempted before the assent is granted.”<sup>151</sup> Notwithstanding this agreement, Lan did not give up his original plan. On the 20th he notified the officers on the SS *Otowa*: “The strategy adopted by the revolutionaries aims at the independence of Manchuria” and this in turn “makes it necessary [for the expeditionary army] to land at places outside if not inside,\* the neutral zone.”<sup>152</sup> At the end of January Huang Xing telegraphed Lan: “Beijing is now

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\*Author to translator, May 16, 1982 on textual changes.

isolated. Your army should proceed with the northern expedition according to plan."<sup>153</sup> Thereupon Lan arranged to send three transporters under the escort of the *Haiyong* to carry his army to Huayuankou on the Liaodong Peninsula to prepare for landing, while he himself was aboard the *Nagata 19* to sail from Yantai to Dalian on the 31st, and to arrive on the same day, "in an effort to unite the groups of comrades."<sup>154</sup>

The advance party of the expeditionary army, about ten men, landed at Jianshankouzi in Zhuanghe on the 29th<sup>155</sup> and its main force landed at Piziwo, Dagushan, and Andong.<sup>156</sup> It soon established a beachhead at Zhuanghe and Andong with the help of the local people's armies, the mounted men, and the enthusiastic inhabitants. To calm the people and organize them, a series of proclamations in the name of the military governor, Lan Tianwei, were issued. The first was an order of tax exemption—"to abolish all the evil taxes, such as all the land and poll taxes in arrears before 1912, all the taxes and dues on local products before 1912, and all the miscellaneous taxes and dues not earmarked for local use." The consolidated tax office, too, was abolished.<sup>157</sup> Then on February 1 and 2 two similar notices were issued to explain the following five points. 1) They announced that the goals of the revolution were "to reform the administration," "to eliminate the tyrannical rule so as to make people feel at ease," "to construct a republican government and to ameliorate the people's suffering." 2) They exposed the misgovernment of the Qing, e.g., "taxing the people mercilessly in order to line officials' pockets and offering sovereign rights to win the favor of foreign powers." 3) They pledged that the revolutionary army "would strictly observe its discipline so that no one would suffer at its hands." 4) They called upon the people to unite: "May the old and new armies cooperate and be ready for action; may the officials and gentry stop sitting on the fence; may the scholars and students get organized and help each other; may the farmers, workers, and merchants donate money and supplies [to the army]; may the Han, Man, Mongols, and Muslims cease killing each other." 5) They assured the foreigners of the army's protection in

the hope that the imperialists would remain neutral—"the person and property of the foreigner shall carefully be protected" in order to strengthen friendly ties.<sup>158</sup>

After landing, the revolutionaries supported by the masses in uprising launched an attack on Zhao Erxun[’s troops]. The speed of their advance from the south and the east alarmed Zhao and other officials in the capital city. The government reinforcement of cavalry and artillery was unable to stop the revolutionary armies. An alliance forced by 300 soldiers of the expeditionary army and 100 Zhuanghe revolutionaries pushed eastward on February 3 and fought a *rencontre* with three patrol units of the Right Route of the garrison at a place about eight *li* to the north of Huayuankou, killing and wounding five and capturing forty of the patrol,<sup>159</sup> while the rest fled in the direction of Zhuanghe.<sup>160</sup> On the 4th people’s troops under Gu Renyi forced the deputy commander, Li Zirui, and an officer, Chen Baoshan, of the South Route of the garrison to surrender at Shuimenzi.<sup>161</sup> Later Lan Tianwei sent a man to visit the surrendered officers—Li was appointed commander-in-chief of the West Route and Chen a brigadier in the 1st Army.<sup>162</sup> The revolutionaries took Wafangdian on the 6th and Shao Zhaozhong’s unit captured Zhuanghe on the 10th as their enemies were either fleeing from or surrendering to them. They were welcomed by the poor people while even officials and gentry “hung out white flags to show their support.”<sup>163</sup>

The victory of the revolutionaries should chiefly be ascribed to the bravery of the expeditionary army and the people’s armies which left the enemy with no chance for defense, let alone counterattack. It was also due to the low morale of the Qing army, evidenced by the frequent mutinies.<sup>164</sup> Some Qing soldiers “deserted and went home”; others came over to the side of the people’s army. The rapidly developing situation in Liaoning shook the entire Northeast and strongly supported the anti-Qing struggles in the country as a whole. Under these circumstances, the last emperor, Puyi, had to abdicate on February 12, 1912 and authorized Yuan Shikai with full power to organize a provisional

republican government. The fall of the dynasty for which the revolutionaries had sacrificed their lives was now a reality.

The collapse of the dynasty was a great encouragement to the Liaoning revolutionaries who now were fighting with renewed energy, hoping to capture the capital city in twenty days<sup>166</sup> and then occupy Jilin and Heilongjiang—the liberation of the entire three eastern provinces. Exactly at this time (i.e., the 25th) Lan Tianwei received a telegram from the Nanjing Ministry for the Army, which said: “In view of the unity of the North and South, there is no reason to continue hostility. Henceforth, anyone who violates the armistice would be regarded as the common foe of both the North and the South, the enemy of the Republic. . . . All the armies shall remain where they are, strengthening their discipline and intensifying their drill.”<sup>167</sup> “The order of remaining where they are and awaiting further instructions” was like pouring “a bucket of cold water on the heads” of the revolutionaries in Liaoning. In anger, some of them wanted to fight on. One Wang Donghai indignantly remarked: “The recapture of Fengtian is already in sight; therefore I won’t obey this order! I won’t rest until Zhao Erxun and Zhang Zuolin are done away with.” With comrades’ persuasion and friends’ letters of advice, he reluctantly agreed to accept the order, but wept and lamented for “the lack of thoroughness of the revolution which is sowing a multitude of future troubles!” Having killed a landlord at the age of fourteen and gone through a checkered career before he joined the revolution, Wang’s penetrating observation and deep affection [for the revolution] were valuable qualities indeed. Nevertheless, there were not a few revolutionaries who could not see through Zhao Erxun’s true intentions and whose only duty was to obey orders.<sup>168</sup> In the end, the revolutionary armies decided to “obey the order” and call a halt.<sup>169</sup> By “the order” and by “obedience,” the revolutionaries committed a serious tactical error and jettisoned the Northern Expeditionary Army and the people’s armies.

At this time, Zhao Erxun, who had consistently been opposed to republicanism and proposed “to put the three eastern

provinces under special administration,"<sup>170</sup> now became "chameleonic." Ostensibly he supported the Republic, changed the calendar from the *renzi* year (1912) 1st month, 1st day to February 18, 1st year of the Republic of China, and unfurled the five-color flag.<sup>171</sup> He telegraphed Beijing to express his acceptance of "the decision on the form of the state."<sup>172</sup> But he also ordered the disbandment of the people's army and tried to undermine revolutionary organizations by ordering "the expulsion of all revolutionaries who were not Fengtian people" and "the resettlement" of all those who were Fengtian born. Anyone who refused to be resettled would be regarded as "trouble-makers" to be arrested and punished.<sup>173</sup> Shortly after this decree, Zhao and Zhang Zuolin unleashed "a ruthless persecution in which dozens of comrades were killed,"<sup>174</sup> thus showing nakedly their antagonism to the revolution and the people.

In the face of this persecution, the Liaoning revolutionaries did nothing in reply. Under military orders, the Northern Expeditionary Army and the major leaders of the military governor's office and the command headquarters of the people's army withdrew to Yantai where the military governor's office was abolished, while Lan Tianwei was sent on a tour of England by Yuan Shikai.<sup>175</sup> Soon the people's army, a thorn in Yuan's side, was reorganized into a division and reduced to a brigade by Yuan's staff officer, Qu Tongfeng, with Shang Zhen in command. In the winter of 1912 when Shang Zhen was received in audience by Yuan and Duan Qirui, the latter, making full use of the school tie of the Beiyang Military Training Course (Beiyang sucheng xue-xiao) of which they were on the staff while Shang was a trainee, bought the former over to their view. In the following spring Shang voluntarily disbanded the people army;<sup>176</sup> then, under Yuan and Duan's instigation, Shang Zheng had Wang Donghai, the advocate of military conquest of Liaoning, the opponent of the reorganization of the people's army, and a critic of Yuan, murdered.<sup>177</sup> By then, the Liaoning revolutionaries were so divided that some of them threw themselves in the arms of warlords, some sought government posts and personal wealth, some disap-

pointed ones (e.g., Shao Zhaozhong) retired to their farms, some (e.g., Xu Jingxin, Yang Dashi, and Zhao Zhonggu) stood for parliamentary elections, some (e.g., Li Bichen) even took the tonsure to become Buddhist monks, and some (e.g., Ning Wu) went to Nanjing in disgust.<sup>178</sup> Under this leaderless condition, only a handful persevered and fought another tragic battle in the anti-Yuan "second revolution."

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The above is a brief account of the struggle waged by the bourgeois revolutionaries in Liaoning in 1911. When it was in progress, the struggle was important and had its influence.

First of all, the bitter struggle, which had lasted several years, from the organization of the Alliance Society branch to the establishment of the Progressive Alliance, from the political work in the new army and the mounted men to the formation of the people's army, from the support of tax protests to armed uprisings, was a heavy blow to the reactionary rule in Liaoning that dashed the hope of transferring the central government of the Qing to that province.<sup>179</sup> In particular, the military action of the Northern Expeditionary Army in Yantai and southern Liaoning was strategically significant, complementing the independence movement in the South. It may be described as a fatal threat to the feudal monarchy; the imperial abdication and the heroic struggle of the Liaoning revolutionaries were [logically?] inseparable.

Second, apart from their work among the soldiers of Liaoning, the revolutionaries tried to win over the elite. Unreliable and eventually leading to the defeat of the revolution, the elitist approach sowed the seeds of dissension among the Liaoning armed forces and hastened the disintegration of the government system, as well as lessening the oppression of the revolutionaries, thus benefiting the mass movements and armed actions in the districts. The positive value of the persuasion, mobilization, and organization carried on by the revolutionaries among the elite should be recognized nonetheless.

Third, in their propaganda, the revolutionaries focused on Man-Han unity instead of a narrow nationalism. This proved to be attractive to many Manchu people, who joined the anti-Qing ranks. For instance, when the Progressive Alliance came into being, they strictly forbade any reference to the then widespread anti-Manchuism, but replaced it with the slogan, "Man-Han unity." A correct policy is often the guide for [correct] action. Without such a policy, it would be hard to imagine that the son of a Manchu prefect, Baokun, and Baohuanan could join the revolution. Moreover, the revolutionaries carried out this policy in their action, e.g., the disallowance of killing Manchus in the Zhuanghe uprising and the opposition to a racial revolution announced by the revolutionary army in Liaoyang.<sup>180\*</sup>

Fourth, particularly valuable were the revolutionaries who gave up their property and income, risked their own safety, and disregarded their social status and career, as they plunged into the revolution to topple the decadent and traitorous Qing dynasty under difficult and dangerous conditions. They understood the principle that "the civilisation of the world is nourished with the blood of heroes." A wealthy man of Fengtian city,<sup>181</sup> Zhang Yong, abandoned a comfortable life and spent his fortunes on the revolution. Baokun, the son of a prefect, did the same. Many others who were not native born Liaoning men chose the brambled path of the revolution. In the heroic spirit of "history written with iron and blood," they pushed on the people's struggle in Liaoning with himself as the commander-in-chief, calling upon the soldiers and the educated people "to make sacrifices and to raise the righteous standard."<sup>182</sup> Meanwhile Baohuanan, Ning Wu, and others published an open letter "advising the people of the three eastern provinces against giving support to the villain [Yuan]." They called upon the people to fight the man "who had drunk the blood and sucked the bone marrow of the people of the three eastern provinces." "Do not pay a cent of tax even if this means risking our lives!"<sup>183</sup> They also distributed handbills,

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\*A sentence is omitted—translator.



e.g., "the Proclamation of the Yunnan [anti-Yuan] Government," "Beware of the banknotes and bonds issued by Yuan Shikai," and "the statement of Wang Anlan of the Progressive Salvation Society,"<sup>184</sup> which made known Yuan's irredeemable crimes—domestically "murdering founders of the Republic, suppressing public opinion, abolishing the National Assembly, tearing up the constitution, disallowing self-government, institutionalizing dictatorship, planting an army of spies everywhere, bribing people of different persuasions, levying heavy taxes, and keeping a horde of henchmen"; externally, offering our territories as gifts, pawning our railways, and giving up our sovereign rights. These handbills drew the attention of the people to "the changing color of our national map and the enslavement of the descendants of the divine and brilliant [Yellow Emperor]." All those whose "blood has not yet icy cold" "should join in an attack on the villain," so that "the freaks would be done away with before the cup of victory is drained. May the power of the citizens be preserved; may the Republic be preserved!"<sup>185</sup> Under the attack of the revolutionaries and the people of Liaoning and the country at large, the panic-stricken Yuan Shikai died in distress and disappointment.

However, the bourgeois revolutionary struggle failed to drive away Zhao Erxun, to change Chinese society, and to ameliorate the poor living conditions of the people. This failure can be attributed to two reasons. First, the Chinese national bourgeoisie was weak and irresolute in its armed struggles. Although "in certain periods of time and to a certain extent, it possessed the revolutionary quality of being antagonistic to foreign imperialism and the Chinese bureaucrat-warlord government, [it] was after all the bourgeoisie of a colony or semicolony. [It was] unusually weak economically and politically. [It] had preserved another quality, i.e., its propensity to compromise with the enemy of revolution. Even in the revolution, the Chinese national bourgeoisie was unwilling to break up completely with imperialism."<sup>186</sup> The revolutionaries did not dare to stage a coup in Fengtian city because they were afraid of annoying the Japanese

imperialists; the Northern Expeditionary Army delayed its landing at the Liaodong Peninsula because it was afraid of Japanese intervention and its consequent destruction [of the army]. They were "afraid." They even wishfully thought Japan could support the revolution, in the belief that it "has always been sympathetic with our party" and could show "some consideration."<sup>187</sup> Their cowardice and naivete encouraged Japan to be even more arrogant on Chinese soil. For instance, having landed on the peninsula, the Northern Expeditionary Army and the Qing army were doing battle, the Japanese Guandong viceroy, Ojima, went as far as to ask the revolutionary army to withdraw; otherwise "[the Japanese] would use force to make it leave or disarm it."<sup>188</sup> Zhao Erxun and his ilk felt "happy" about this, since Japan's interference could prevent the expeditionary army from coming northward along the railway. Second, the revolutionaries did not fully appreciate the chicanery of Zhao and the cruelty and homicidal mania of Zhang Zuolin,<sup>189</sup> and consequently tended to make concessions to and patch things up with them. The loss of the leadership of the Security Association, the exile of Lan Tianwei and Wu Luzhen, the murder of Zhang Yong were all due to this. A typical constitutionalist, the ambitious and perfidious Yuan Jinkai was Zhang Yong's drinking companion, who passed on many of the revolutionaries' secrets to Zhao and finally sold out Zhang's life. It was a lesson of blood for the revolutionaries. Third, like other bourgeois revolutionaries, the ones in Liaoning lost sight of the strength of the masses, unable to mobilize and organize them, and to depend on them for the struggle. The focus of their attention was on the upper strata, trying to persuade the elite to join the revolution; they also worked to mobilize the troops and local armed forces to stage uprisings. But this was far from being enough. Some members of the elite did their work in, even dedicated their lives to, the revolution, but under the firm control of Zhao and Zhang, these people could not be decisive. [What should have been] was for the revolutionaries to work hard and meticulously in the villages, to politicize and organize the peasants into great armies. Facts proved that the Zhuang-Fu uprising

was triumphant precisely because of this type of work whereas the weakness of those in the other districts was due to its absence. This was another valuable lesson. Finally, myopic as they were, the revolutionaries sought only short-term gains; they lacked unity; they fought for power and position. In fact they destroyed their own safeguard. Their defects were a major reason why the revolution in Liaoning did not attain any notable result. Other reasons for the failure were the overwhelming strength of the enemy, the continuous intervention of the imperialists, the collusion between Yuan Shikai and Zhao and Zhang—together they strangled the revolution. In the later phases of the revolution, power in Liaoning fell into the hands of Zhang Zuolin, who slaughtered no fewer than 400 revolutionaries,<sup>190</sup> to have their strength seriously crippled.

What has been described above concerns the pioneer bourgeois revolutionaries in Liaoning whose heroic deeds are praiseworthy but limited—an impediment which they did not know how to overcome. It must be pointed out that the most valuable lesson they learned from shedding their blood and sacrificing their lives was: it was impossible to bring the people's revolution to a victorious end unless the revolution was guided by a scientific theory, built on a solid revolutionary organization, and led by the most progressive class and its party, the Chinese Communist Party.

## Notes

1. Liaoning province used to be known as Fengtian province, which was created in 1907 to cover the territories of the present-day Liaoning, part of Hulun Buer and Cherim of Inner Mongolia, and the northwest and southwest of the present-day Jilin. Liaoning was the name given to it in 1929.

2. Zhao Kongyin, *Shenyang xianzhi*, ch. 15, Literature, 44.

3. Qiao Zhisun, *Nanjin xiangtuzhi* [The Geography of Southern Jin], 11.

4. See my article, "Xinhai geming qian dongbei renmin zifa douzheng shu lue" [A Brief Account of the Spontaneous Struggles of the People of the Northeast before the 1911 Revolution], in *Xinhai gemingshi congkan* [Collected Essays on the 1911 Revolution] 2, 125–28.

5. Ding Kaishan [Kaizhang], "Xinhai geming shiqi de tiexiechui" [The Iron and Blood Society in 1911], in *Jindaishi ziliao* 2 (1955):22.

6. Ding Kaishan [Kaizhang], "Kang O tiexiehui xi" [A Proclamation of the Anti-Russian Iron and Blood Society], originally published in the magazine, *Dalu* [Mainland], Shanghai, see *ibid.*

7. See the Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Fengtian governor's office, 1911 military no. 1386.

8. Qin Chengzhi, "Xinhai geming yu Zhang Yong" [The 1911 Revolution and Zhang Yong], in *Xinhai geming huiyilu* [Memoirs of the 1911 Revolution] 5, 594.

9. Li Peiji, "Xinhai guanwai geming shimoji" [An Account of the 1911 Revolution Outside of the Shanhaiguan], *ibid.* 5, 560.

10. "Geming dangyu santou" [Partisans Dispersed], *Shengjing shibao* (hereafter SS), Guangxu 32.10.19, (December 4, 1906).

11. "Gemingdang zhi youngyi" [Partisans' Intentions], SS, Guangxu 32.10.27, (December 12, 1906).

12. *Ibid.*

13. Amur Society, ed., *Toa senkaku shishi kitten* [Biographies of East Asian Pioneer Revolutionaries] 2, Hara Shoten, 1974, 403; Zou Lu, "Song xian-sheng (Jiaoren) zhuanlue" [A Short Biography of Mr. Song], in *Zhongguo Guomindang shigao* [A Draft History of the Chinese Guomindang] 6, Zhonghua, 1960, 1488. Suenaga Takashi (often mistaken as Suetsugu Takashi), Hirayama Shu, and six others joined the Alliance Society. See Zhao Jinyu, "Xinhai geming qianhou de dalu langren" [The Ronin on the Asian Mainland Before and After the 1911 Revolution], in *Zhongguo shehui kexue* [Chinese social sciences] 2 (1980):150.

14. About the time of the establishment of the Liaoning branch of the Alliance Society, there are two views—one dates it in *bingwu* (1906), according to Feng Ziyu, *Zhongguo geming yundong ershiliunian zuzhishi* [A Twenty-six-year History of the Revolutionary Organizations of China], 123; another dates it in *Dingwei chun* (spring of 1907) when "the branch in Liaodong was established," according to Zou Lu, *op. cit.*, 1654, in its biography on Wu Kun. Ning Wu, "Xinhai geming qianhou Dongbei diqu de geming huodong" [The Revolutionary Activities in the Northeast Before and After the 1911 Revolution], in *Liaoning ribao*, October 11, 1961. According to *Song yufu riji* [Song Jiaoren diary] in *Jianguo yuekan* [the monthly, National Reconstruction] 11, 4, Song wrote to the chieftain of the mounted men, Li Fengchun, on April 1 on the organization of the Liaodong branch of the Alliance Society. This is, I think, the most reliable dating.

15. Zou Lu, *op. cit.* 6, 1654, biography of Wu Kun.

16. "Liaodong yijun xiwen" [The Proclamation of the Righteous Army in Liaodong], in *Minbao* 20, 112.

17. Li Peiji, *op. cit.*, 29.

18. Ning Wu, "Dongbei geming jianshu" [A Short History of the Revolution in the Northeast], in *Xinhai geming huiyilu* 5, 537.

19. Feng Ziyu, *op. cit.*, Commercial Press, 1948, 293.

20. *Ibid.*, 294.

21. "Song Jiaoren zhi Lu Fengchun deng shouling shu" [Song Jiaoren's Letter to Li Fengchun and Other Chieftains], in Gu Yanshi, *Zhongguo mimi*

*huidangji* [An Account of the Secret Societies of China], in *Dongfang zazhi* 8, 10, ch. 1, 5-6.

22. See Feng Ziyou, *Geming yishi* [An Informal History of the Revolution] 2, Shanghai, 1947, 276-77.

23. Ning Wu, "Dongbei xinhai geming jianshu," in *Xinhai geming huiyilu* 5, 538.

24. See *Shandong jindaishi ziliao* [Modern History Material on Shandong] 2, 1958, 154.

25. Ning Wu, *op. cit.*, 538.

26. *Ibid.*, 539.

27. "Xiang zhi Dongbei minbian" [Details of the Dongbian Revolt], in *SS*, Guangxu 33.2.3 (March 16, 1907).

28. See my article cited above, 125-28.

29. *Shenbao*, Guangxu 33.5.8 (June 18, 1907).

30. He Donglin, "Xinhai geming zai Liaoyang" [The 1911 Revolution in Liaoyang], in *Xinhai geming huiyilu* 5, 567.

31. See *SS* from Guangxu 33 to Xuantong 3 (1907-1911) and Wang Jingyu, ed., *Zhongguo jindai gongyeshi ziliao* 2, 2, 1257-1301.

33. Li Peiji, *op. cit.*, 29.

34. Ning Wu, *op. cit.*, 543.

35. See "Wei Dazhong gongbao feng duxian fafeng bing chao gedian qing fengdeng gengzheng yu" [Telegrams and Replies on the Suspension of the *Dazhong gongbao* by the Order of the Viceroy], see Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the liaison office of Fengtian, no. 1150.

36. The Imperial Bank cashed 120,000 *yuan*, the Bank of Communications 20,000 *yuan*, and the official bank 50,000 *yuan*. See Guangdong civil affairs officer, Shirani (Takeshi) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Naida, October 17, 1911, in Nihon Gaimusho, ed., *Nihon gaiko monsho*, vols. 44-45, supplement on the 1911 revolution (hereafter *Gaiko*), 5. I am not sure of my reading of the name Shirani Takeshi. It might simply be Bei Renwu.

37. *Ibid.*

38. See *Shina chosa hokokusho* [Reports on the Investigation in China] 2, no. 21, 59. Quoted from Nishimura Naruo, "Tosansho ni okeru shingai kakumei" [The Three Eastern Provinces in the 1911 Revolution], in *Lishixue yanjiu* [Historical Research], March 1, 1970, 18.

39. *SS*, no. 1483, Xuantong 3.8.26 (October 17, 1911).

40. *SS*, no. 1485, Xuantong 3.8.28 (October 19, 1911).

41. Feng Yuxiang, *Wode shenghuo* [My Life] 5, 107.

42. *SS*, no. 1485.

43. "Qinchai dachen shangshuxian Dongsansheng zongdu jianguan Dongsansheng jiangjun Fengtian xunfu Zhao ling" [An Order by Zhao, the Imperial Commissioner, Holding the Title of President of the Board, Viceroy of the Three Eastern Provinces, Concurrently Tartar General of the Three Eastern Provinces and Governor of Fengtian Liaison Office], no. 1150.

44. "Cheyue wanglai xianjian" [Inspecting Correspondence], *SS*, no. 1484, Xuantong 3.8.27 (October 18, 1911).

45. Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Fengtian governor's

office on the 1911 revolution, no. 4.

46. Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Fengtian liaison office, no. 1150.

47. *SS*, no. 1591, March 5, 1912.

48. "Fengtian baoanhui zhangcheng" [Regulations of the Fengtian Security Association], in *Jindai Zhongguo shiliao* [Chinese Modern Historical Material], no. 420, "Xinhai geming shimoji" [An account of the 1911 Revolution], Taiwan Wenhai publishers, 1969, 97-98. See *SS*, no. 1506, Xuantong 3.9.24 (November 14, 1911); *Hanmin ribao*, Yellow Emperor 4609. 9.30 (November 20, 1911).

49. *SS* no. 1506, Xuantong 3.9.24 (November 14, 1911).

50. "Lujun tanyu yinhang yinhao" [Banks and Money Shops under Army Surveillance], *SS* no. 1518, Xuantong 3.10.8 (December 27, 1911).

51. "Shengcheng fangwu jieyan" [Martial Law in the Capital City], *SS*, no. 1518, Xuantong 3.10.8 (December 27, 1911).

52. "Shifang jijin dangren zhi huigulu" [Review of the Release of the Radical Partisans], *SS* no. 1600, March 15, 1912.

53. Li Peiji, *op. cit.*, 29.

54. Ning Wu, "Laocan huiyilu" [Memoirs of an Old and Dilapidated Man], mimeographed, 74.

55. Li Peiji, *op. cit.*, 30.

56. Ning Wu, "Dongbei xinhai geming jianshu," in *Xinhai geming huiyilu* 5, 546.

57. Qin Chengzhi, *op. cit.*, 594.

58. *Ibid.*, 596.

59. Zhang Genren, "Guandong geming shimoji" [An Account of the Revolution East of the Shanhaiguan], in *Xinhai geming* 7, 403.

60. "Shifang jijin dangren zhi huigu," *SS* no. 1600, March 15, 1912.

61. Qin Chengzhi, *op. cit.*, 599.

62. Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Fengtian governor's office, 1911 military no. 1386; *SS* no. 1512, a special article on the Progressive Alliance of the three eastern provinces, Xuantong 3.10.1 (November 24, 1911).

63. "Lianhe jijinhui jianzhang" [Regulations of the Progressive Alliance], *SS* no. 1515, Xuantong 3.10.1 (November 21, 1911).

64. "Jijinhui zhi xuanyan" [A Statement by the Progressive Alliance], *SS* no. 1515, Xuantong 3.10.4 (November 24, 1911).

65. Zhang Genren, *op. cit.*, 403.

66. See note 64.

67. *Hanmin ribao*, Xuantong 3.10.11 (December 1, 1911).

68. Ning Wu, *op. cit.*, 548.

69. "Shifang jijin dangren zhi huigulu (xu)" (cont'd), *SS* no. 1601, March 16, 1912.

70. *Hanmin ribao*, Xuantong 3.10.6 and 11 (November 26 and December 1, 1911).

71. See note 69.

72. See note 64.

73. See note 70.
74. "Fuzhou baodong pianpianlu" [Notes on the Fuzhou Revolt], SS no. 1518, Xuantong 3.10.8 (November 28, 1911).
75. "Dongsansheng zongdu Zhao Erxun zouzhe" [The Viceroy of the Three Eastern Provinces, Zhao Erxun's Memorial], Xuantong 3.9.14 (November 4, 1911), in *Xinhai geming*, 411, 419.
76. See note 74.
77. "Zhuang-Fu baodong zhi ziman" [Zhuang-Fu Revolt Spread], SS no. 1518, Xuantong 3.10.8 (November 28, 1911).
78. Ning Wu, *Laocan huiyiluu*, 75.
79. This was Gu Renyi's statement. The revolutionary army also made a statement and "posted notes everywhere to make clear its political goals—respecting humanitarianism, eliminating the barrier between the Man and the Han, working for people's welfare, getting rid of corrupt and tyrannical officials, and planning for people's happiness." See SS no. 1524, Xuantong 3.10.15 (December 5, 1911).
80. "Gu Renyi zhi xuanyan" [Gu Renyi's Statement], SS no. 1519, Xuantong 3.10.9 (November 29, 1911).
81. SS no. 1520, Xuantong 3.10.10 (November 30, 1911).
82. "Fuzhou bianluan sizhi" [Four Reports on the Fuzhou Revolt], "Gejun zhaoxing" [On Calling the Rebels to Surrender], SS no. 1521, Xuantong 3.10.11 (December 1, 1911).
83. SS no. 1519, Xuantong 3.10.9 (November 29, 1911).
84. "Guanjun yingguan zhi zisha" [Suicide of a Government Officer], SS no. 1520, Xuantong 3.10.10 (November 30, 1911).
85. "Guanjun beicuo" [Government Troops Defeated], SS no. 1522, Xuantong 3.10.12 (December 2, 1911).
86. "Dongsheng geming jiyao" [An Outline of the Revolution in the Eastern Provinces], SS no. 1526, Xuantong 3.10.12 (December 7, 1911).
87. "Gejun shengsheng jiagong" [The Revolutionary Army Pushes On], SS no. 1523, Xuantong 3.10.13 (December 3, 1911).
88. "Gu Renyi zhi xuanyan," see note 80.
89. "Gejun zhi xuanyan" [A Statement by the Revolutionary Army], SS no. 1524, Xuantong 3.10.15 (December 5, 1911).
90. "Anmin gaoshi zhaolu" [A Public Notice Advising People to Keep Calm], SS 1525, Xuantong 3.10.16 (December 5, 1911).
91. See note 80.
92. See note 90.
93. See note 77.
94. Feng Ziyu, *Zhongguo geming yundong ershiliunian zuzhishi*, 281.
95. SS no. 1520, Xuantong 3.10.10 (November 30, 1911).
96. See note 86.
97. "Qishi zhi xuanyan buri fabiao" [The Declaration of the Uprising Is Expected], SS no. 1518, Xuantong 3.10.8 (November 28, 1911).
98. "Liaoyang jingwen" [Alarm from Liaoyang], SS no. 1518, Xuantong 3.10.8 (November 28, 1911).
99. "Liuerbao luanshi xiangqing" [Details of the Liuerbao Revolt], SS

no. 1520, Xuantong 3.10.10 (November 30, 1911).

100. "Liaoyang gejun huibao, xunjing xiang zhizhou dun" [Reports from Liaoyang Rebels. The Police Surrendered and Prefect Fled], SS no. 1521, Xuantong 3.10.11 (December 1, 1911).

101. "Guanyu Liaoyang luanshi yishu" [News on the Liaoyang Crisis], SS no. 1522, Xuantong 3.10.12 (December 2, 1911).

102. "Liaoyang gejun huibao. Fangying junhao beijie." [Reports from Liaoyang Rebels, Garrison Arms Stolen], SS no. 1521, Xuantong 3.10.11 (December 1, 1911).

103. "Gedang qishi xiaoxi" [News on Uprisings Led by Revolutionaries]. SS no. 1522, Xuantong 3.10.12 (December 2, 1911).

104. "Liaoyang zhanshiji" [Fighting in Liaoyang], SS no. 1523, Xuantong 3.10.13 (December 3, 1911).

105. Cheng Qilu "Guanwai geming huiyilu" [Memoirs of the Revolution Outside the Shanhaiguan], in *Xinhai geming huiyilu* 5, 564. Another source says that "more than 100 people died." Feng Ziyu, *Zhongguo geming yundong ershiliunian zuzhishi*, 296.

106. Liaoyang Consul Suzuki to Minister of Foreign Affairs Naida, December 4, 1911, no. 32. See *Gaiko*, vols. 44-45, supplement, 33.

107. Ning Wu in *Xinhai geming huiyilu* 5, 552-53; Zou Lu, *op. cit.* 4, 963.

108. Cheng Qilu, *op. cit.*, 564.

109. "Fengcheng luanshi xiangji" [Details of the Fengcheng Revolt], SS no. 3.11.2 (December 22, 1911).

110. "Shang duantoutaizhe ershiqi ren" [Twenty-seven Executed], SS no. 1521, Xuantong 3.10.11 (December 1, 1911).

111. "Gejun zhaque zhajin" [The Revolutionary Army Advances and Withdraws Unexpectedly], —SS— no. 1522, Xuantong 3.10.12 (December 2, 1911).

112. Ning Wu, *Laocan huiyilu*, 82.

113. Zhou Lu, *op. cit.*, 963.

114. Ning Wu, *op. cit.*, 82.

115. Li Peiji, *op. cit.*, 32.

116. "Duxian duiyu Zhuang-Fu luanshi zhi yijian" [The Viceroy on the Zhuang-Fu Revolt], SS no. 1523, Xuantong 3.12.1911.

117. "Liaoyang gejun huibao, duifu gedang banfa" [Reports from Liaoyang Rebels, Dealing with Rebels], SS no. 1521, Xuantong 3.10.11 (December 1, 1911).

118. See note 116.

119. "Paiyuan Zhaofu dangren" [Officials Sent to Pacify Rebels], SS no. 1524, Xuantong 3.10.15 (December 12, 1911).

120. "Diaodui zhujiao" [Government Reinforcement Sent], SS no. 1522, Xuantong 3.10.12 (December 2, 1911). "Zhang Zuolin chuma" [Zhang Zuolin Goes to the Front], SS no. 1522, Xuantong 3.10.12 (December 2, 1911).

121. "Dongsansheng zongdu Zhao Erxun zhi neige zongli Yuan Shikai dian" [Viceroy Zhao to Premier Yuan Shikai], Xuantong 3.10.11 (December 1, 1911) in the telegram archives of the Grand Council.

122. "Fengtian xunfu Zhao wei tongchi zhaode geming mingci ji gaige



zhengzhi zhi yi [Fengtian Governor Zhao Notifies that "Revolution" Means "Political Reform"], in Liaoning Provincial Archive, archives of the liaison office, no. 1159.

123. "Youyou shang duantoutaizhe shisanren" [Thirteen More Executed], SS no. 1525, Xuantong 3.10.16 (December 6, 1911).

124. See note 110.

125. "Zhaofu wuxiao" [Pacification Failed], SS no. 1527, Xuantong 3.10.18 (December 8, 1911).

126. See note 121.

127. "Guanjun zhi xiongcan" [Atrocities of Government Troops], SS no. 1524, Xuantong 3.10.15 (December 5, 1911).

128. "Zhuiji Liu jun beidishi qingxing" [When Mr. Liu Was Arrested], SS no. 1546, Xuantong 3.11.11 (December 12, 1911).

129. Guo Xiaocheng, "Zhongguo geming jishi benmo. Dongsansheng geming jishi" [A History of the Chinese Revolution: The Revolution in the Three Eastern Provinces], in *Xinhai geming* 7, 393.

130. Ibid., 395.

131. "Hong Dongyi shilue" [A Short Biography of Hong Dongyi], in Liaoning Provincial Archives.

132. "Zhang Zuolin baogao shahai Zhang Yong, Tian Yabin de chengwen" [Zhang Zuolin's Report on the Killing of Zhang Yong and Tian Yabin], in Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Fengtian governor's office, 1911 military, no. 1386.

133. "Zhi Fengtian zhi da shahai" [On the Sensational Murders in Fengtian], SS no. 1565, Xuantong 3.12.7 (January 25, 1912).

134. About the place where Zhang Yong was killed, there are different reports. One source says that it was on the street; another, in Feihongguan; and yet another, just outside of Feihongguan. I follow here "Zhang Yong shilue" [A Short Biography of Zhang Yong], in Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Shenyang county government, 1, no. 238. See also *Manqing bishi* [A Secret History of the Qing], *Xinren chunqiu* [A History of 1911 and 1912], *Minguo yeshi* [An Informal History of the Republic], all of which have a biography of Zhang Yong. See also Qin Chengzhi, *op. cit.* (The wide open eyes refer to the unhappiness of the deceased when he was dying, according to Chinese tradition—translator.)

135. Qin Chengzhi, *op. cit.*, 603.

136. The SS reported that Zhang Yong's elder brother, Zhang Huanbo (sometimes mistaken to be "Bohuan") was killed at the same time. This is wrong. According to Qin Chengzhi, when Yu Wenjia and his men went to search his home, Zhang Huanbo was out and therefore escaped death. See *Xinhai geming huiyilu* 5, 603-604.

137. Guo Xiaocheng in *Xinhai geming* 7, 398.

138. See note 132.

139. See note 133.

140. "Zhao Erxun suofa gaoshi" [Zhao Erxun's Public Notice], in Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Fengtian governor's office, 1911 military, no. 1386.

141. "Fengtian Consul General Ochiai to Minister of Foreign Affairs Naida" January 27, 1912, no. 50, in the *Gaiko*, vols. 44-45, 303.

142. See *Xinghuabao*, January 27, 1912.

143. See *Hanmin ribao*, January 28, 1912 and *Yueduo ribao*, January 30, 1912. The work of verification done by Chen Guizong in "Xinhai geming shiqi Dongsansheng de geming huodong" [The Revolutionary Activities in the Three Eastern Provinces in 1911] (in *Shizue jikan*, 1956, no. 2) is reliable.

144. To strengthen Zhang Zuolin's support, Yuan Shikai "rewarded" his opposition to the independence of the three eastern provinces with "an army uniform and other things worth 2,000 yuan" and he in return "presented a *jinseng* worth 6,000 yuan to show his gratitude." See "Yuan neige jiangge Zhang tongling" [Premier Yuan's Gift to Commander Zhang], SS no. 1547, Xuantong 3.11.12 (December 31, 1911).

145. "Lan Tianwei dangqi fu Hu" [Lan Tianwei Goes to Shanghai Alone], SS no. 1518, Xuantong 3.10.8 (October 28, 1911).

146. "Manzhou gejun zhi xiwen" [A Statement by the Manchurian Revolutionary Army], SS no. 1524, Xuantong 3.10.15 (December 5, 1911).

147. According to Shimada's report in the *Manshu nichinichi shimbun*, the expeditionary army had 600 men on the warship and 1,500 on the transporters. See "Vice-Consul Aiba of Chefoo to Minister of Foreign Affairs Naida" January 17, 1912, no. 2, in the *Gaiko*, vols. 44-45, supplement, 291.

148. "Lan Tianwei zhi shengyan" [Lan Tianwei's Statement], SS no. 1561, Xuantong 3.12.2 (January 20, 1912).

149. "Lan Tianwei zhidian Guandong dudufu" [Lan Tianwei to the Guandong Viceroyalty], SS no. 1561, Xuantong 3.12.2 (January 20, 1912). But the wording in the Japanese report is slightly different, see "Guandong Viceroy Ojima to Minister of Foreign Affairs Naida" January 18, 1912, enclosure in confidential telegram no. 50, in the *Gaiko* vols. 44-45, supplement, 295.

150. "Dairen Civil Affairs Officer Soga to Fengtian Consul General Ochiai" February 1, 1912, *daimin* police confidential no. 261, in the *Gaiko* vols. 44-45, supplement, 311.

151. "Commander of the 2d Squadron to the Minister for the Navy Saito" January 23, 1912, see *ibid.*, 295.

152. "Officers of the *Otowa* and C-in-C Lan in Conference" January 18, 1912, no. 28, see *ibid.*, 311.

153. "Diancui beifadui xunsu jinbing" [Telegram Urging the Expeditionary Force to Advance], SS no. 1572, Xuantong 3.12.15 (February 2, 1912).

154. See note 150.

155. "Dongsansheng zongdu Zhao Erxun zhi neige waiwubu dian" [Viceroy Zhao Erxun to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Cabinet] January 30, 1912, in the telegrams of the Grand Council; "Minister Ijuin to Minister of Foreign Affairs Naida" (February 1, 1912) no. 78, in the *Gaiko*, vols. 44-45, supplement, 308.

156. "Guandong Viceroy Ojima to Minister of Foreign Affairs Naida" (February 3, 1912) no. 202 (confidential), in *ibid.*, 314.

157. "Zhonghua minguo Junzhengfu guanwai dadudu Lan hemian shui bugao" [Military Governor Lan's Notice on the Exemption of Taxes], in

Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Fengtian liaison office, no. 1155.

158. "Gejun shiyu. Zhonghua minguo Junzhengfu guanwai dadudu Lan bugao" [A Revolutionary Army's Notice: Military Governor Lan's Public Notice], 1.2., 1st year of the Republic, in SS no. 1576, Xuantong 3.12.20 (February 7, 1912).

159. "Minister of Foreign Affairs Naida to Chargé d'Affairs Yamaza" February 5, 1912, no. 28, see the *Gaiko*, vols. 44-45, supplement, 316.

160. "Minjun jinbi zhi xianzhuang" [The People's Army Pushes On], SS no. 1580, Xuantong 3.12.24 (February 11, 1912). The same paper, no. 1579 (of the previous day), reported that "government troops suffered grievous losses"—it was untrue.

161. "Li bangtong touxiang gemingjun" [Deputy Commander Li Surrendered to the Revolutionary Army], SS no. 1579, Xuantong 3.12.23 (February 11, 1912).

162. "Lan Tianwei qianshi weiwen" [Lan Tianwei Sent Representatives to Show Goodwill], SS no. 1580, Xuantong 3.12.24 (February 11, 1912).

163. "Wafangdian zhanling" [Wafangdian Captured], SS no. 1579.

164. "Xunfang bingbian" [Garrison Mutinied], SS no. 1585, February 27, 1912.

165. "Bingxin wajie zhi xianxiang" [Army Morale Collapsed], SS no. 1579.

166. Ning Wu, *Laocan huiyilu*, 90.

167. "Nanjing Lujunbu zhuanzhi Sun dazongtong xunling" [President Sun's Instruction Via the Ministry for the Army in Nanjing], SS no. 1584, Xuantong 3.12.29 (February 16, 1912).

168. Lan Tianwei did realize "Zhao (Erxun) and Zhang (Zuolin) only ostensibly supported the Republic." He did not, however, swing his comrades to this view. See "Lan Tianwei zhi shengbian" [Lan's Rebuttal], SS no. 1588, March 1, 1912.

169. Ning Wu, *op. cit.*, 90.

170. *Xinghuabao*, February 21, 1912. The so-called special administration meant the "little court in Manchuria" organized by Prince Gong, Prince Su, and others with Gong as the head of state and Zhao Erxun as the prime minister, SS February 14, 1912.

171. "Yizhou xiangua wuse guoqi" [Yizhou Hoisted the Five-Color Flag], SS no. 1586, February 28, 1912.

172. In Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Fengtian governor's office, general, no. 82.

173. "Duxian shiyu dangren ge'an jiu'ye" [Viceroy's Order that Revolutionaries Be Resettled], SS no. 1587, February 29, 1912.

174. See note 170.

175. Ning Wu, *op. cit.*, 91. See also his "Dongbei xinhai geming jianshu," in *Xinhai geming huiyilu* 5, 557 and "Luanzhou geming xianlie shilue. Lan Tianwei" [Martyrs of the Luanzhou Revolution: Lan Tianwei], in *Xinhai geming* 6, 364.

176. Cheng Qilu, *op. cit.*, 565.

177. Ning Wu, *Laocan huiyilu*, 90–91.
178. Ning Wu, “Dongbei xin hai geming jianshu” in *Xin hai geming huiyilu* 5, 556–57.
179. The Progressive Alliance proposed to “coordinate with the South, and to harass the rear of the government troops in the North, so that the emperor would not dare to return to the East and Zhao would not dare to be neutral.” In Liaoning Provincial Archives, there is “Linshi jixunju juzhang Feng Ziyou yaoqiu Fengtian dudu Zhang Xiluan huanfa Zhang Yong beichao jiachan de ziwen” [Feng Ziyou Memorandum to Fengtian Governor Zhang Xiluan on the Rendition of the Confiscated Property of the Late Zhang Yong], in archives of the Fengtian governor’s office, 1911 military no. 1386.
180. “Zhaofu wuxiao” [Pacification failed], SS no. 1527, Xuantong 3.10.18 (December 8, 1911).
181. According to the list of Zhang Yong’s property in Xiaobeiguan, Fengtian city (in Liaoning Provincial Archives, archives of the Fengtian governor’s office, 1911 military no. 1386), it amounted to 65,357 taels, which qualified Zhang as a wealthy man. See Ding Zeliang, “Youguan xin hai geming shiqi Dongbei ruogan shishi de yixi ziliao” [Some Historical Material on the 1911 Revolution in the Northeast], in *Shixue jikan* 2 (1956).
182. “Liaodong huguojun tao Yuan xuanyan” [The Anti-Yuan Declaration of the Liaodong State Protection Army], SS, May 6, 1916.
183. Liaoning Provincial Archives, Yingkou county government archives, 1, no. 19.
184. *Ibid.*
185. “Jiuguo jijinhui Wang Anlan xuanyan” [A Declaration by Wang Anlan of the Progressive Salvation Society], in Liaoning Provincial Archives, Yingkou county government archives, 1, no. 19.
186. Mao Zedong, “Xin minzhuzhuyi lun” [On the New Democracy], *Xuanji*, single volume edition, 634.
187. See note 150.
188. “Minister of Foreign Affairs Naida to Fengtian Consul General Ochiai” December 12, 1912, no. 77, in the *Gaiko*, vols. 44–45, supplement, 327.
189. See note 150.
190. *Ibid.*