Crossed Histories

ASIAN INTERACTIONS AND COMPARISONS

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Crossed Histories

Manchuria in the Age of Empire

edited by MARIKO ASANO TAMANOI

ASSOCIATION FOR ASIAN STUDIES
and
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I PRESS
Honolulu

Asian Interactions and Comparisons, published jointly by the University of Hawai'i Press and the Association for Asian Studies, seeks to encourage research across regions and cultures within Asia. The Series focuses on works (monographs, edited volumes, and translations) that concern the interaction between or among Asian societies, cultures, or countries, or that deal with a comparative analysis of such. Series volumes concentrate on any time period and come from any academic discipline.

Printed in the United States of America

10 09 08 07 06 05 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Crossed histories : Manchuria in the age of empire / Edited by Mariko Asano Tamanoi.
p. cm.—(Asian interactions and comparisons)
Includes index.
ISBN 0-8248-2872-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Manchuria (China)—History—20th century. I. Title: Manchuria in the age of empire. II. Tamanoi, Mariko. III. Series.
DS783.7.C76 2005
951′.804—dc22 2004024161

University of Hawai'i Press books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources.

Designed by Rich Hendel
Printed by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group

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Series Editor's Preface

The original intention of this series was to encourage the publication of works that crossed borders within Asia. *Crossed Histories* not only fulfills this mission; it takes it to a new level altogether. The center of action remains largely within the confines of that vaguely defined region known in English as Manchuria, but the players come to Manchuria from various places in Asia and, indeed, the world: Japan, China, Korea, and Poland.

Until recently, Manchuria has not received the attention from scholars it deserves. There are many reasons for this—some scholarly, some political, some institutional—but over the past few years, a number of new books, articles, and dissertations are pushing the older impediments to serious research on Manchuria to the side and opening up fascinating vistas. The essays in this volume by authors of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Swiss, Canadian, U.S., and Indian extraction (who hold an equally dazzling array of passports and visas)—an international cast of characters in and of itself—comprise a fitting group to open up the international complexities of Manchuria on the ground in the first half of the twentieth century.

The Japanese ideologues who preached on behalf of a multicultural Manchurian state usually intended that, for all of its many-hued inhabitants, that Manchurian state would be led by the advanced hand of Japan. This direction became twisted as the years passed, and the excuses for Japan's overbearing guidance became ever thinner. Nonetheless, many thousands of refugees from around the globe made their way to Manchuria; whatever insidious aims the Japanese military may have had, these people from Russia, Poland, Korea, Armenia, and especially China (to say nothing of the tens of thousands from the home islands of Japan) saw only that Manchuria offered opportunities not available in their many homelands. Thus, the line that Manchuria was a "land of opportunity" was not, initially at least, an empty slogan; in fact, it was the very reason many chose it as a place to move to.

Manchukuo, the state established with Japanese sponsorship in 1932, was at first supposed to be a republic with the last Qing emperor, Puyi (1906–1967), serving as "chief executive." Puyi, however, was unhappy

from the start with being merely a figurehead. He wanted nothing less than to be returned to the Manchu throne as emperor, and in 1934 he got his wish.

What sort of model might the Japanese planners have had in mind when they imagined a multiethnic "republic" in the northeast corner of the Asian mainland, a sparsely populated land that would become a haven for many immigrants seeking new opportunities, a site at which they might be able to use their talents unimpeded by the constricting atmospheres of their native lands? Perhaps it was the "New World," later to be called America and later still the United States. It was to this land that many peoples escaping religious intolerance, ethnic persecution, and economic hardship set sail from the early seventeenth century forward. There they met an indigenous populace—all of whom were dubbed "Indians" despite their many and varied ethnic backgrounds and social practices—populating here and there a massive amount of extremely fertile and largely untapped terrain. They eventually formed colonies and seceded from the mother country, all the time miserably persecuting the native inhabitants surrounding them and, of course, importing for a time thousands of slaves.

By the 1930s when Manchukuo was set in motion, the United States had been in existence as a country for more than one hundred and fifty years, and few either there or abroad thought much about the natives of the region. The myth—to be sure, a myth based in reality—of the United States of America as a golden land of milk and honey, full of opportunity for the downtrodden, had seized hold of the popular imagination. Might not the same thing happen over time in Manchuria? Only time would tell, and ultimately time was one thing Manchukuo and its supporters did not have. The experiment died after a mere thirteen years, Puyi was arrested by the Soviets, countless Chinese "collaborators" were rounded up, and thousands of Japanese were "repatriated"; many of them, born in Manchuria, were returning to a "homeland" they had never seen.

Asian Interactions and Comparisons is proud to present this important volume. I am sure that many of the essays herein will, in the years to come, develop into full-fledged book manuscripts in their own right.

Joshua A. Fogel
Series Editor

Acknowledgments

This book is the result of the workshop "Japanese Imperialism/Colonialism in Manchuria," which was held on the campus of the University of California, Los Angeles, on January 12, 2001. Prasenjit Duara, Rana Mitter, Dan Shao, Michael Baskett, David Tucker, and I were participants. Joshua Fogel and Miriam Silverberg served the workshop as discussants. Because Duara's paper has been published as chapter 2 of his book *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (2003), it was withdrawn from the collection. Unfortunately, Thomas Lahusen and Barbara Brooks were unable to attend the meeting. However, Lahusen was later able to contribute a paper to this volume. After the workshop, I invited Suk-Jung Han to contribute a paper that is included in this volume.

The process of conceiving the idea for this workshop, organizing and holding it, and finally publishing this volume has been long. I have therefore a large number of people and institutions to thank. I thank all the participants of this workshop—the paper presenters, discussants, audience, and student assistants—for having made the workshop so enjoyable. My special thanks go to Joshua Fogel, who also oversaw the preparation of this volume for publication. Naomi Ginoza and Todd Henry, both graduate students of the department of history at UCLA, lent their help to me in tape-recording the entire workshop. Although I cannot name them individually, I thank the audience for their stimulating comments and questions.

I am grateful for the Center for Japanese Studies of UCLA and its director, Fred Notehelfer, who provided the generous Nikkei Bruin Fund to make this workshop happen. Mariko Bird at the center has been of great assistance to me in this whole process. Her contribution to this workshop is immense. I also thank Leslie Evans of the International Institute at UCLA who first recommended the publication of the papers presented at the workshop. Funding from the Comparative and Interdisciplinary Research on Asia (CIRA) at UCLA made the publication of this volume possible. I thank its director, Shu-mei Shi, and applaud her vision of future research on Asia.

Lastly, our collective thanks go to anonymous reviewers who shared their insights with us, and James Jo who offered us editorial help. Our collective thanks also go to Joanne Sandstrom, who remarkably improved the quality of our writing, and Cheri Dunn of the University of Hawai'i Press, who oversaw the production of this volume. Lastly, we are grateful to the executive editor of the University of Hawai'i Press, Patricia Crosby, for her help and courtesy from the beginning to the completion of the publication of this volume.

Mariko Asano Tamanoi

Introduction

> Manchuria, Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan were once important as the lands in which the "northern barbarians" of China's frontier maneuvered in war and migration, working out among their own tribes their destinies of conquest in China or migration toward the West. They are now becoming a field of contest between three types of civilization—the Chinese, the Russian and the Western. In our generation the most acute rivalry is in Manchuria, and the chief protagonist of the Western civilization is Japan—whose interpretation and application of a borrowed culture is of acute interest to the Western world, as on it turns to a great extent the choice which other nations have yet to make between their own indigenous cultures and the rival conquering cultures of Russia and the West. (Lattimore 1935, ix)

> The colonial powers involved in Manchuria are China, Russia and Japan, each of which has nourished recurrent ambitions of gaining a political hegemony over the whole physical region. Even under the current surface of peaceful coexistence and internationally fixed state borders, these ambitions are very much alive, and neither the Sino-Russian nor the Russo-Japanese border may be regarded as geopolitically stabilized. (Janhunen 1996, 31)

Manchuria today is unmistakably part of the sovereign territory of the People's Republic of China, and one of the thriving centers of industrialization. Yet the above two passages, written respectively in the 1930s and the 1990s, amply suggest that "Manchuria" was and still is a contested area between and among several national and ethnic groups. Owen Lattimore, a British journalist who traveled and resided in Manchuria in 1929–1930, is the author of *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict.* In this book published in 1935, Lattimore presented "Manchuria" as a field of contest between the Chinese, the Russian, and the Western civilizations. The major representative of the Western civilization, however, was Japan, which was then applying "a borrowed culture." These three civilizations, according to Lattimore, concealed the presence of the "northern tribes," particu-

larly the Manchus and the Mongols, who maneuvered in times of war and migration in Manchuria for many centuries. Juha Janhunen, the author of *Manchuria: An Ethnic History,* is a contemporary scholar of geography and history from Finland. In the passage above, Janhunen presents the postcolonial reality of "Manchuria," in which the interests of China, Russia, and Japan are still very much present. He thus underscores that the colonial era in "Manchuria" has not yet ended, nor will it end soon. Taken together, these two passages suggest that, metaphorically speaking, "Manchuria" has been "an empty space" since the seventeenth century, for any group of people who was (or is) interested in colonizing the area. This is most explicitly expressed in the *Ten Year History of the Construction of Manchukuo,* written by a group of Japanese bureaucrats around 1942. In this book the authors claim that Manchuria did not belong to any particular group of people but was a land open to all, including the Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and Mongols. Even the ethnic Manchus, they argue, are not entitled to claim themselves as the legitimate occupants of Manchuria because they once left the area to the south of the Great Wall to govern China. In this respect, they too are the "return migrants" to Manchuria (Takigawa and Etō 1969: 3–7).

It is not only the Japanese who "emptied" Manchuria: there were many other groups of people. This volume highlights some of these groups as well as the individuals belonging to them, and examines how they imagined "Manchuria" in the age of empire (from the late nineteenth century to 1945) and how they have remembered it since then. Hence, "Manchuria" in this volume is less about a geopolitical term than about an effect of geopolitical imaginaries of various individuals and groups shaped by imperialism, colonialism, Pan-Asianism, postcoloniality, and the present globalization. The quotation marks around "Manchuria" are therefore "to remind us that the very name is not only a contested site but also an allegory of a much larger and ominous phenomenon: that of the survival, until today, of the old imperial and colonial desires for expansion and 'living space'" (Lahusen, this volume). Today, such a contention over "Manchuria" most clearly emerges between China and Japan. The government of the People's Republic of China refuses to use "Manzhou" and calls the region Dongbei (Northeast China) or Weiman (false Manchuria) for an obvious reason: "Manchuria" is a product of Japanese imperialism, and to call the area Manzhou is to accept uncritically a Japanese colonial legacy. In contrast, in postwar Japan, sev-

eral names for "Manchuria" coexist: Manshū (Manchuria), Manshū-koku (Manchukuo), Man-mō (Manchuria-Mongolia), and its reverse, Mō-man (Mongolia-Manchuria). The Japanese, particularly those who had emigrated to Manchuria in the age of empire but were subsequently repatriated to Japan after 1945, use these terms almost interchangeably, as if they were still in possession of "Manchuria." Since 1945, "Manchuria" has been actively remembered, commented on, and studied in both China and Japan. In this respect, "Manchuria" belongs to the past as well as the present. While, for these reasons, "Manchuria" should always be enclosed in quotation marks, we use the term without them in the rest of this volume.

Thus, Rana Mitter examines Manchuria in the imaginations of Du Zhongyuan, an entrepreneur, journalist, and nationalist political activist from Northeast China in the 1930s, and of his reader, the Chinese petty urbanites in Shanghai living outside Manchuria. David Tucker examines Manchuria in the imaginations of the leading Japanese city planners and architects of the 1930s. Dan Shao examines Manchuria in the imagination of Aisin Gioro Xianyu, a Manchu princess who was executed by the Chinese Nationalist government in 1948, and of the Chinese, Japanese, and Americans who tried to represent her for their own interests. Michael Baskett examines Manchuria in the imaginations of the Japanese and Chinese audiences of the "goodwill films" *(shinzen eiga),* the movies produced in the 1930s and 1940s by Manei, the Japanese-managed Manchuria Motion Picture Company. Thomas Lahusen examines Manchuria in the imaginations of about seven thousand Poles who immigrated to Harbin in northern Manchuria in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Suk-Jung Han examines Manchuria in the imaginations of the state makers of Manchukuo (who included both Japanese and Chinese leaders) and of the state makers of North and South Korea during the Cold War era. And I examine Manchuria in the imaginations of Morisaki Minato, a student of Manchuria Nation-Building University between 1942 and 1944.

In the rest of this introduction, I aim to accomplish two tasks. First, I offer an overview of the history of Manchuria, anticipating that the readers of this volume are not necessarily familiar with the subject. The overview will emphasize the demographic aspect of the history of Manchuria. Fortunately, numerous books in English on the subject of Manchuria have been published since the 1970s.[1] I also note that, as a scholar

of Japan, I could not give sufficient attention to the documents on the subject of Manchuria written in Chinese, Korean, Russian, and other languages. In this respect, I hope all remaining chapters in this volume complement this introduction. Second, I discuss the three major common themes that emerged in the process of our collaboration: Pan-Asianism, nationalism, and memory.

An Overview of the History of Manchuria

Recent scholarship suggests that Manchuria was present in the minds of the Manchu and Chinese people since the seventeenth century. Pamela Crossley (1997, 6) writes that traditional "Manchu" culture and identity came into being in the early seventeenth century, when the Manchu emperors established the Qing empire in China. Similarly, Mark Elliott (2000) states that the Manchu rulers claimed Manchuria as their homeland and gradually transformed the undifferentiated frontier space into a place, designating all the place names north of the Great Wall in the Manchu language. Restated, since the early seventeenth century, the Manchu emperors tried to "turn their own homeland into a preserve of Manchu heritage unspoiled by Chinese or other foreign immigration" (Duara 2003, 41). Nevertheless, their efforts could not effectively stop the migration of the Han Chinese, coming from south of the Great Wall, from migrating to Manchuria. By the time Lattimore arrived in Manchuria, their presence was sufficient enough for him to say, "Historically, Manchuria was the great migration-ground of the Han Chinese for centuries" (1935, 3). In addition, by the late nineteenth century, Russia, Britain, the United States, and Japan began to openly claim their interests in the region. This made Robert Lee (1970, 60) claim that the term "Manchuria" is "a modern creation used mainly by Westerners and Japanese for their imperialistic ambitions." It is not that Lee was unaware of the scholarship of Manchu studies. Rather, he looked at Manchuria from the perspectives of the major imperial powers that exerted tremendous influence in the region.

By the early twentieth century, Manchuria became "the imperial melting pot," a multinational, multiethnic place (Mitter, this volume). This fact is well reflected in the population census of one of the major cities in northern Manchuria, Harbin, compiled by the Manchukuo government in 1933. This census includes the following categories: Chinese, Tai-

wanese, Soviets, Russian, Japanese (from Japan proper), Korean, British, American, German, French, Italian, Pole, Jew, Greek, Dutch, Turk, Austrian, Hungarian, Dane, Latvian, Portuguese, Czech, Armenian, Belgian, Serb, Swede, Latin, Romanian, Swiss, Indian, and other (Dai Harubin An'nai-sha 1933, 4–6). The populations of such large cities as Harbin may have been more ethnically diverse than Manchuria's countryside. Still, this census does not include such categories as Manchus, Mongols, and the Tungusic tribes. Nor does it include the approximately two thousand *nikkei,* the Japanese who had first emigrated to the United States and Hawai'i and then emigrated again from there to Manchuria after 1932. John Stephan states that, having left behind their relatives in the United States, most of whom were later sent to relocation camps, these *nikkei* became part of "the Japanese" in Manchuria (1997; see also Sano 1997). Whether all these groups of people assimilated in Manchuria is a question that we should ask separately. Yet the existence of such a bewildering array of national and ethnic categories is sufficient to claim that Manchuria in the age of empire was indeed the imperial melting pot.

Nevertheless, the following bears remembering: the majority population of Manchuria was and is the Han Chinese. Since the late nineteenth century, the Chinese have emigrated to Manchuria in large waves. Often described as the world's largest population movement, the average annual flow of Chinese from south of the Great Wall into Manchuria in the early twentieth century was estimated at five hundred thousand to two million. Thus, in 1930, W. J. Hinton wrote, "Like a deep bass refrain, in the varied discords of historical events during the years since the Revolution, is the roar of this human Niagara pouring into empty Chinese lands dominated by alien powers" (quoted in Chang 1936, 1). Similar views were expressed by several other Western journalists, politicians, and scholars, including V. A. Lytton, A. J. Toynbee, and J. E. Orchard (see also Gottschang 1987; Gottschang and Lary 2000). With this demographic condition of Manchuria in mind, let me now turn to the making of "Japanese Manchuria" from the late nineteenth century to 1945.

Japan's move toward Greater Japan began with the domination of its well-populated neighboring areas (Peattie 1984, 7). It was also an incremental process (Matsusaka 2001, 1). The victory over China in 1895 allowed Japan to acquire its first colony, Taiwan. With another victory over Russia in 1905, Japan gained control of the southern tip of the

Liaodong peninsula in southern Manchuria—the Guandong Leased Territory. These victories effectively eliminated both the Chinese and the Russian powers from Korea. Next, Japan occupied Korea (first as a protectorate in 1905 and then as a colony in 1910), turning it into "a gateway to colonize Manchuria." The Korean rice-cultivating farmers who had earlier migrated to Jiandao, the area of Manchuria bordering Korea, thus served as "molecules" in the diffusion of Japan's power from Korea to Manchuria (Park 2000, 195).[2]

Meanwhile, since the late nineteenth century, China had lived under the unequal treaty system forced upon it by Europe and the United States. It was a system first created by the British, who imposed it on a weaker state—China—in the name of the treaty of free trade (Duus 1989, xiv–xix). While creating this "empire without colonies," the Western powers honored China's territorial integrity. This is why, to join the Western imperial powers, the Japanese state originally took a cautious and realistic approach, relying on skillful diplomatic tactics within the framework of international cooperation (Hata 1988, 277–278). But as the military began to function as an increasingly independent and powerful group, Japan became enmeshed in aggressive military operations in Manchuria, and eventually China proper.

In 1905 and 1906, the Japanese state created three institutions in the Guandong Leased Territory—the office of the governor-general, the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR), and the Guandong Army—to "concentrate political power in their own hands, extract financial profits, and suppress any resistance to the Japanese-imposed political and economic order." The office of the governor-general administered the Guandong Leased Territory with executive, judicial, and legislative powers (Young 1998, 27, 29). The SMR eventually became much more than Japan's colonial railway company. It owned and operated extensive lines of railways and managed the so-called attached areas of land to these railway lines. The SMR also owned and managed numerous properties within these areas, launched various new industries, and set up its own research department to carry out extensive economic and scientific research relevant to the government of Manchuria (see Itō 1964, 1988; Myers 1989). The Guandong Army originated in the Japanese army's defense of the railway zones of the SMR at the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Over time, this military grew into a massive institution with the important mission of protecting Manchuria from the Chinese

nationalist movement spreading throughout China and from the threat posed by the Soviet Union after 1917 (Young 1998, 30; see also Yamaguchi 1967, 8; Shimada 1965; Coox 1989).

The history of Japan's expansion onto the continent between 1905 and 1931 is now the topic of several well-researched books (McCormack 1977; Young 1998; Matsusaka 2001). Here, I introduce only the major events that took place during this time period. First is the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911. The internal turmoil in China gave more opportunities to foreign powers to further encroach into Manchuria and China. Russia, for example, succeeded in making Outer Mongolia independent. In turn, the negotiations with Russia gave Japan "a sphere of influence in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia" (Hata 1988, 279). Second is the Japanese military's participation in the joint Allied intervention in the Russian Revolution in 1918. Although this intervention failed, the prolonged stay of the Japanese military in Siberia "enabled the Japanese troops to move freely throughout almost all of China" (281). Third is the growing challenge of Chinese nationalism to Japan's expansion. The establishment of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in 1912, its expansion under Chiang Kai-shek in the 1920s, the growing Chinese nationalism particularly after the infamous Twenty-One Demands, and the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 all pointed to the growing power of Chinese nationalism. When the regional warlords of Manchuria began to join the Chinese nationalist movement, the Guandong Army took decisive action, assassinating the most powerful warlord, Zhang Zuolin (see McCormack 1977, 124–126). Nevertheless, several months after the death of Zhang, his son, Zhang Xueliang, merged his troops with the Nationalist army. Japan's reaction to the growing nationalism in China reached its peak in 1931. Having missed the opportunity to occupy southern Manchuria in 1928, the Guandong Army seized Liutiaogou on 18 September 1931. By May of 1933, the army brought the railway zone and the four provinces of Jilin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Rehe under its control. The army also expelled "the estimated 330,000 troops in Zhang Xueliang's army" from Manchuria (Young 1998, 40). In 1932, claiming that Manchuria was separate from China, Japan established Manchukuo and presented it to the international community as a modern independent nation-state.

The characterization of Manchukuo—first as a republic and later as an empire—is by no means easy. In the words of Peter Duus, it was "a sepa-

rate state under Chinese leaders who took their orders from Japanese officers and civilian officials" (1989, xxiix). In this respect, Manchukuo was a puppet state of Japan and its de facto colony. Yet Manchukuo was born with all the symbolic formalities of an independent nation: a declaration of independence *(kenkoku sengen),* a head of the state (the last Qing emperor, Puyi), a national flag, an anthem (which later changed twice), and a capital (Xinjing, which literally means "new capital"). In other words, the Japanese "labored mightily to convince themselves and others of the truth of Manchurian independence" (Young 1998, 40–41).

How large was the Japanese population in Manchuria on the eve of the establishment of Manchukuo? How many more Japanese emigrated to Manchuria between 1932 and 1945? The prewar statistics on Japanese emigration are scant and unreliable. Information is particularly meager when the destinations of emigrants were within the areas under Japan's influence. The government seems to have paid little attention to the Japanese who left for those regions regarded as a part or extension of "Japan proper" (which the Japanese called *naichi,* "inner land"). A more compelling reason for the lack of information, however, is that Japan was a latecomer in colonial politics: the migration of Japanese laborers began only in the late 1880s (Ichihashi 1931, 618); the Japanese migration to Manchuria began but a few decades before the Russo-Japanese War.[3] From then on, however, Japanese policy makers encouraged their people to emigrate to Manchuria, partly because of the worsening relationship between Japan and the United States over the Japanese emigration to California. By the early 1930s, about two hundred forty thousand Japanese had moved to the cities in southern Manchuria, the region opened up by the SMR (Iriye 1981, 457).

The presence of the Japanese population, however, was insignificant in Manchuria for several reasons. First, Japanese occupied less than one percent of the total population of Manchuria, which was estimated to be thirty million. Second, except for the soldiers of the Guandong Army and other employees of the Japanese state, most Japanese migrants in Manchuria before 1931 were the so-called *tairiku rōnin* or "continental drifters," not settlers in the strict sense of the term. Lattimore observes, "The average [Japanese] peasant would far rather move to a town [within Japan] and become a factory worker than go abroad to take up land" (1935, 237). Before 1931, then, the Japanese in Manchuria who were not on official duties were largely small-scale entrepreneurs and the women

who catered to them. The number of Japanese agrarian settlers barely surpassed one thousand (Araragi 1994, 277; see also Wilson 1995). Hence, when Japan created Manchukuo, the majority of its thirty million population was Han Chinese. The ethnic Manchu, the term from which Manchukuo was derived, were few, or had already been greatly "sinified," that is, assimilated to the lifestyle of the majority Han Chinese.

During the Manchukuo era (1932–1945), the Japanese population in Manchuria rose by approximately three-quarters of a million. The expanding colonial state apparatus, namely the Manchukuo government, the SMR, and the Guandong Army, needed more personnel from Japan. The railway and urban construction boom attracted many fortune seekers from Japan, mostly the disadvantaged younger sons of poor families (Young 1998, 250–259). In addition, an increasing number of farmers crossed the Sea of Japan to settle in Manchuria. Assisted by the metropolitan government to acquire land, these farmers eventually numbered about 322,000 by 1945 (Young 1998, 328). The Japanese population in Manchuria at the end of the Japanese empire is thus estimated to be 1.5 million (Kōsei-shō 1997, 32). How does the postwar historiography of Manchuria present this contested region that has many names?

The postwar collaboration of the nation-centered historians in China, Japan, Russia, and Korea seems to have produced a dichotomous picture of either an "exploitative" or a "glorious" Manchukuo or, worse still, a picture without Manchuria (McCormack 1991, 106). Such collaboration, then, has not produced "crossed" histories but "divisive" histories of Manchuria. For example, Joshua Fogel noted to me that in 2002 he attended an international conference devoted to the topic of the Sino-Japanese War and World War II in East Asia. Needless to say, the topic of the Manchukuo regime played a major role in the papers presented there. The mainland Chinese participants made frequent use in their papers of the term *Wei-Man* to characterize that regime. Although Fogel has long heard and read such language in Chinese-language publications, he questioned a presenter from China early in the meeting about the use of what continues to strike him as a moralistic term. His aim was not to soften the realities of life under Japanese authority in Manchuria, but to try to move the discussion beyond the moralistic simplicities, and to understand Manchuria from within. Yet he was received by the speaker, an accomplished and well-published author, with a civility barely masking antipathy (personal communication).

The nationalist historiography of Manchuria also forced the organizers to change the site of one international conference on the theme of Manchuria. In 1998, the Beijing government denied Heilongjiang University, situated in the suburbs of Harbin, the right to hold a conference devoted to the history of the city of Harbin. For the Russians, particularly those who used to live in Harbin but returned to the former Soviet Union after 1945, Harbin was a city founded by their ancestors: in 1898, the Russians began the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, linking the Russian empire across Manchuria to Vladivostok. For their postcolonial descendants, it seemed natural to hold a conference celebrating the centennial of the city of Harbin with the Chinese and other international scholars. For the officials of the Beijing government, however, the birth of Harbin was by no means "related to the day when the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway started" on 9 June 1898 (Lahusen 1998). Prasenjit Duara has stated that the black-and-white understanding of Manchukuo is itself shaped by nationalist politics, which channel histories into very narrow passages (2003, 59). In examining Manchuria in the imaginations of various national and ethnic groups and the individuals belonging to them, our goal is to critically examine the dominant historiography of Manchukuo without losing the larger picture—the harsh reality of life imposed upon the Chinese people by the Japanese imperial apparatus—hence the title of this volume: *Crossed Histories.*

Common Themes

This volume complements several other edited volumes published in English on the theme of Manchuria. They include *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Duus, Myers, and Peattie 1989), *The Making of a Chinese City* (Clausen and Thøgersen 1995), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Duus, Myers, and Peattie 1996), and *Harbin and Manchuria: Place, Space, and Identity* (Lahusen 2000b). Yet the following common themes, we believe, make this volume unique among them, as I will elaborate below.

PAN-ASIANISM

By the time Japan created Manchukuo, the Japanese empire had already incorporated Taiwan, Korea, and Karafuto. It had also incorpo-

rated the equatorial Pacific islands known as Nan'yō, the former German colonies that Japan acquired at the end of World War I, together with China's Shandong Peninsula. To expand the Japanese empire, the Japanese state makers actively used such slogans as *dōbun dōshu* (same script, same race) and *isshi dōjin* (impartiality and equal favor under the Japanese emperor) (Peattie 1984, 97). These slogans implied the cultural proximity between the colonizer and the colonized (particularly the Chinese and the Koreans), as well as the "equality" between them under the sovereign power of the Japanese emperor. Note, however, that Manchukuo was not, in the eyes of the Japanese state makers, a Japanese colony. Hence, Japan could not make use of slogans to subordinate the colonized; instead, Japan needed other slogans to make Manchukuo appear to be an independent nation-state.

The scholars of Manchuria seem to agree that the Manchurian Youth League (Manshū seinen ren'mei), founded in 1928, was a major force behind the creation of the ideology of *minzoku kyōwa* or "racial harmony." It was a group of educated Japanese youth and small merchants who perceived Manchuria as the place where "Japan and China *(ni-kka)*" should coexist peacefully and together elevate the Chinese economy and culture (Hirano 1972, 238–239; Yamamuro 1993, 92–95; Yamaguchi 1967). Indeed, the ideology of racial harmony was also derived from the discourse of Chinese nationalism, or more specifically, Sun Yat-sen's proclamation of China's five races in 1912. While racism, assimilation, and autonomy (of each race) seem to have complicated Sun's idea, the notion of a unified Han nationality incorporating the other four races—Man (Manchu), Meng (Mongol), Zang (Tibetan), and Hui (Moslem)—constituted an important element in the Chinese nationalism (Duara 1995, 142–144). Yet we should not ignore the political environment in which the Manchurian Youth League was formed—a rising sentiment of Chinese nationalism against the Japanese in China. Thus, the members of the league utilized Sun's idea for the purpose of securing their leadership in the Pan-Asian space of Manchuria for protecting Japan's special interests and competing with the intensifying anti-Japanese atmosphere in Manchuria. Together with the members of another association of the Japanese youth, the Majestic Peak Society (Yūhō-kai), they tried to secure autonomy for Manchuria, paving the path to the creation of Manchukuo. For this goal, they required the ideology of racial harmony, but they emphasized the leadership of the Japanese in the name of Japanese-

Manchurian unity (Itō 1988, 141). Manchukuo, then, seems to have heavily relied on this slogan to create not so much Japan's colony as the Pan-Asian space where the Japanese were still able to exert imperial power.

In this volume, Suk-Jung Han demonstrates that the Manchukuo government tried to mobilize the maximum number of people into their state making by daily inviting them to participate in mourning ceremonies for Confucius, the Meiji emperor, Nurgaci, and Chinese and Japanese war heroes. After the onset of the Japan-China war in 1937, Japanese state makers tried to give the Japanese Shintoism a more prominent role. Yet they also patronized Confucianism to a great extent. For example, the name for "reign" for the first two years of Manchukuo, *datung* (J: *daidō*), means "Confucian unity." In this respect, Manchukuo was a land where both Confucian and Shinto shrines existed side by side. Han also argues that several years before the outbreak of the Pacific War, which capitalized on yet another slogan of the Japanese state—the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere—numerous rituals, rallies, and pageants on "Asian prosperity" *(xingya)* had already swept the major cities of Manchukuo. Anticommunism further strengthened the idea of the Pan-Asianism of Manchukuo. State makers tried to incorporate minorities, such as Muslims and White Russians, in anticommunist rallies. The White Russians, who fled the Russian Revolution of 1917, were "stateless people" in the official documents of Manchukuo. Thus, Manchukuo, which was acknowledged as an independent nation at least by Germany, Italy, and Spain, gave the state's protection to stateless people such as the White Russians, Poles (who did not regain the Republic of Poland until 1918), and Jews.

Some individual characters who appear in this volume "embody" Pan-Asianism. Yamaguchi Yoshiko and Kawashima Yoshiko, who appeared in the burgeoning popular culture of Manchuria in the 1930s, are such examples. Yamaguchi Yoshiko (known also as Li Xianglan and Ri Kō-ran, the Japanese pronunciation of her Chinese name) (Baskett, this volume), spoke Japanese, Chinese, and Russian. And in songs, dance, and the performing arts, she wore Chinese, Manchu, Korean, Taiwanese, Russian, and Japanese costumes. Kawashima Yoshiko had three other names and identities—Jin Bihui (Chinese), Aisin Gioro Xianyu (Manchu), and Chuandao Fangzi (the Chinese pronunciation of her Japanese name). In addition, she was a cross-dresser (which she claimed to be "of the Man-

chu tradition") (Shao, this volume). Both Yoshikos moved freely between Japan and Manchuria. Or rather, both needed and profited from Japan, China, and Manchuria.

Morisaki Minato is another such Pan-Asian figure. Having attended the Manchuria Nation-Building University, an institution that embodied the idea of Pan-Asianism, he desperately tried to integrate the interests of the Japanese and the Chinese (Tamanoi, this volume). In addition, the postwar publication of the history of the Manchuria Nation-Building University suggests that university authorities tried to hire both Owen Lattimore and Pearl Buck to its faculty (Yuji 1981)—meaning that Pan-Asianism in Manchuria was wide open to the West. Of course, the definition of "the West" may vary depending on who interprets it. For the Japanese leaders of Manchukuo, Russia represented the West: they actively incorporated Russians into a state-sponsored mass organization called Kyōwakai or the Concordia Association in order to make Manchukuo more credible for the Western imperial powers.[4] For Lattimore, however, Japan was "the chief protagonist of the Western civilization" (1935, ix). These differing interpretations of the West notwithstanding, the presence of the Russians, Poles (Lahusen, this volume), Jews (Lahusen, 2000a), and many other international groups of people made Manchuria exotic and cosmopolitan. And this is an important reason why Manchuria attracted not only Japanese and Chinese living outside the region, but also many other national and ethnic groups. In this respect, the Pan-Asianism of Manchuria in the early twentieth century was indeed "transnational," or even "global."

Yet genuine Pan-Asianism, in which people of all nationalities would have lived in harmony, never existed in Manchuria. In the age of empire, the Pan-Asianism was always a Japan-centered collective Asian consciousness (Baskett, this volume). This fact is reflected in another slogan that the Japanese state embraced, *minzoku shidō,* and its obverse, *shidō minzoku.* As a "leading race" *(shidō minzoku),* the Japanese were to guide the members of all the other races in Asia to its prosperous future *(minzoku shidō)*. These slogans appear in the writings of many Japanese intellectuals who lived in Manchukuo. For example, Tachibana Shiraki stated in 1939 that the Japanese people, as members of a leading race, were obligated to understand the wishes of everyone else belonging to other races and that everyone else in turn was obligated to cooperate with the Japa-

nese (1966, 183). Tanaka Takeo, an officer of the Japanese Ministry of Colonization, stated that racial harmony meant "constructing Manchukuo where Japanese play the central role with the members of each race helping the Japanese in proportion to their respective members" (quoted in Sugiyama 1996, 33–34). Likewise, Hirano Yoshitarō, a Marxist scholar of law, wrote in 1942 that the Japanese race was obligated to guide all the other races in Greater East Asia in order to liberate them from the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands (Hirano et al. 1966, 644).[5] It is clear from these quotations that a leading race refers not only to the Japanese elites but to every Japanese. People who are to be guided by the Japanese also have their obligation: to obey the Japanese and cooperate with them. The following episode, then, is extremely interesting in that it reveals the gap between Japanese imperial power and the slogan of racial harmony in the supposedly Pan-Asian space of Manchuria.

Sometime in the late 1930s, several key members of the Guandong Army were engaged in a heated argument as to which deity was to be enshrined in the Grand State Foundation Shrine for Manchukuo that was then under construction. One member suggested the combination of "the God of Heaven, the Meiji emperor, Nurgaci, and the spirits of dead soldiers of Japan and Manchukuo." Another member suggested "all the gods that have been worshiped by the Han Chinese except for those that are also worshiped by the Japanese." Yet another member suggested "all the gods worshiped by all the people in Manchukuo," while another recommended "Amaterasu Omikami," the mythological founding goddess of Japan. In the end, the Manchukuo government accepted the last recommendation and enshrined Amaterasu Omikami in the Grand State Foundation Shrine (Sakai 1994). The people of Manchukuo were thus forced to worship the mythological founder of Japan as the founder of "their" nation.

Duara has recently argued that, from 1911 to 1945, "the discourse of Eastern civilization, whether as superior to Western civilization or as necessary to redeem the latter, actually flourished in China as an intellectual, cultural, and social movement" and that this movement was closely connected to the similar movement in Japan (2003, 99–100). In other words, the discourse of Chinese nationalism (in the name of Chinese civilization) and the discourse of Japanese nationalism (in the name of Japanese civilization) were both connected to the discourse of Eastern or Pan-Asian civilization.

It is for this reason that Manchukuo provides us "a site to examine the workings of an ever opening history that refuses to be finally framed by the spatiotemporal vectors of the national histories of either China or Japan" (Duara 1998, 116). Nevertheless, Manchukuo did not, and could not, generate its own nationalism. Despite the claim of the Japanese leaders, the ever widening gap between Chinese anti-imperialist nationalism and Japanese imperialist nationalism kept Manchukuo from becoming an independent nation-state.

NATIONALISM

The two destructive wars of the twentieth century, Partha Chatterjee argues, are largely the results of "Europe's failure to manage its own ethnic nationalisms." Yet he also argues that the same wars gave the colonized people of Asia and Africa one of Europe's most magnificent gifts—nationalism (1993, 4). Chatterjee's thesis reveals some of the most important characteristics of nationalism at the end of the age of empire. First, nationalism can be both orderly and disorderly. While nationalism caused the two destructive wars of the twentieth century, it also liberated colonized people from both Western and Japanese imperialism and gave their nation-states independence. Second, the unit that exercises nationalism may vary greatly, from a single, small ethnic group to a large unit of multiple ethnic groups. Thus, it is always possible for a larger unit to challenge the nationalism of a smaller unit. Third, nationalism is like a living organism. An old nationalism that was a cause for imperial expansion might decay as a result of its confrontation with a young, anti-imperialist nationalism. In this volume, both Mitter and Shao speak to this complexity of nationalism in China in the age of empire.

Du Zhongyuan, who was born in a small village in Fengtian province in Northeast China, was a northeastern man and a Chinese nationalist. Naturally, what the northeastern provinces of China mean to the Chinese public outside the region itself became an important question for him. For Du's main readership, the petty urbanites in Shanghai, he was a leader against Japanese imperialism and a person who came from the hotbed of Chinese nationalism—Manchuria. These petty urbanites, however, held an exceedingly uncomplicated view of Chinese nationalism based on the idea of undifferentiated Japanese imperialism. In contrast, Du's idea of Chinese nationalism was considerably more complicated. Du

criticized the Chinese Republican bureaucrats for their corruption. He tried to separate the poor, hard-working, and ordinary Chinese from the elite. He also attacked the tendency of the Chinese public to celebrate only a few nationalist individuals such as Ma Zhanshan. Finally, Du also occasionally demonstrated his ambivalence toward the widespread collaboration between the Chinese and the Japanese in Northeast China.

Nevertheless, a simple Chinese nationalism was a powerful force to reckon with. Thus, Shao presents Aisin Gioro Xianyu as a Chinese woman whose Manchu identity was finally defeated by Chinese nationalism after the liberation of Manchuria. Xianyu was part of a generation that refused to identify themselves with China when the formation of the Chinese state was not yet completed. It is therefore possible to relate her Pan-Asian identity to her desperate resistance against not only the Japanese imperial power (which destroyed her Qing royal family) but also the Chinese Nationalist power (which eventually executed her). The Chinese Nationalist government did not interpret her crime as that of a Manchu against the Han Chinese. Instead, it interpreted her crime as treason, as that of a Chinese citizen against the Chinese government. This uncomplicated nationalism of the Chinese Nationalist government defeated Xianyu as a Manchu individual and challenged "the Manchus" as an ethnic minority.

Both Mitter and Shao, then, seriously question a dichotomous view of the anti-imperialist nationalism of China and the imperialist nationalism of Japan. They endorse the need for a methodology that is "capable of joining the history of modern nationalism with the understanding of nationalism as the producer of history" (Duara 2003, 9).

With regard to nationalism, David Tucker in this volume argues that some Japanese planners and architects tried to use the idea of imperialist nationalism to create a Japanese Manchuria. They designed a village suitable for a small settlement of farmers in Japan and extrapolated it for a population greater than three hundred thousand in Manchuria. Toward this goal, they toured Manchuria in military planes. Then, having returned home, they drew on a blank sheet a network of identical hamlets and fields. The only sign of an existing population in their plan was a small room in an outbuilding to house temporary Chinese agricultural laborers. In the end, such an inordinately abstract plan by these modern city planners was unrealized, and not one idealized village was built in Manchuria.

This very fact reveals the problem of an equally abstract notion of the imperialist nationalism of Japan. That is, while it is important to view the Japanese as colonizers, it is also important to understand that the Japanese settlers in Manchuria did not constitute a homogeneous group of people. Furthermore, the architects who planned a village for the Japanese agrarian colonists represented the elite. In contrast, most of the agrarian settlers were impoverished farmers who tried to flee rural Japan in the postdepression era. For them, Manchuria represented neither modernity nor the glory of an empire.

MEMORY

"The massive production and reproduction of memories of the last military conflict to have been named a world war" characterize the politics of East Asia today (Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama 2001, 1). Since Manchuria was and is still a highly contested area, it has currently become one of the most "remembered" geopolitical regions of East Asia, causing at times a war of memories among China, Japan, and Russia. Furthermore, since the people who lived in Manchuria in the age of empire have now moved to various other regions of the world, the remembrance of Manchuria is a phenomenon seen on a world scale. In this volume, Shao, Baskett, Han, and I speak of the memories of Manchuria and Manchukuo in postwar East Asia. While Han and I discuss such memories in the context of the 1970s, at the height of the Cold War system, Shao and Baskett discuss them in the context of the 1990s.

"Memory" in itself is a vast subject. Memory is infinite because all consciousness is mediated through memory. It is also social as one talks or writes about one's memory to share it with others. Memory is also complex, for it never exists in isolation from social context (Fentress and Wickham 1992, ix–xii). Thus, we must approach memory with due caution, and in this respect, the four approaches to memory that Ann Stoler and Karen Strassler have recently proposed are useful for anyone who is interested in the production and reproduction of memories of the two world wars. The first approach—a storage model—envisions memory as a storehouse of knowledge that contains the information about particular events in the past. The second—a hydraulic model—is a variant of the first: it interprets memory as a repository of alternative histories and subaltern truth. The third—an identity model—views memory as construc-

tions of and for the present. Stoler and Strassler then argue that each of these three models has its strength and weakness. For example, while it is impossible to transparently equate memory to (the narrator's experience of) a particular event, the first model is still valuable for empirical research. Anyone who relies on this model, however, must be aware of the interpretive problem that it elides: both memory and experience come to us only through mediation. The second model can be credited or discredited for the same reasons. Yet this model is useful when we think of the (lack of) power of those who remember the subaltern truth. Under this model, remembering may be an act of resistance by a marginal group of people. The identity model, which places more emphasis on what remembering does for the present than on what can be known about the past, best points to the nature of memory. This model leads us to critically examine the nature of memory as constructions of and for the present. Yet in using this model, we should keep in mind that memory is not a mere construct, nor is it a functional response to the need of and for the present. The need to integrate all these approaches thus calls for yet another model. Stoler and Strassler call this "memory-work": to treat memory as an interpretative labor, one should examine "not only *what* is remembered but *how*" (Stoler and Strassler 2000, 9; emphasis original).

In Manchukuo, the SMR built the Dahua Porcelain Company, where both Japanese and Chinese worked. Du "grudgingly" admired the Japanese effort to build this company. Still, for Du, "Sino-Japanese goodwill" meant the Japanese imperialists' plan to destroy the will of the Chinese masses to resist (Mitter, this volume). In 1995, Japanese film historian Yamaguchi Takeshi planned to present a set of "goodwill films," now reformatted into videos, to the Chinese government as an act of "goodwill" for the people of China. These films had been produced by the Manchuria Motion Picture Company in the 1930s and 1940s to mitigate Chinese misunderstanding of Japanese goodwill. The Chinese government refused to accept the videos, "for doing so would have appeared to be an official recognition of Japan's former Manchukuo regime" (Baskett, this volume). The same films were not remembered in the same way. In Japan in the 1990s, they attracted a fairly large audience who was nostalgic for Manchuria in the age of empire. In contrast, *Ri Kōran, the Musical* was well attended in both Japan and China. In China it was performed in a successful four-city tour in 1992 at the invitation of the Chinese gov-

ernment to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China (Baskett, this volume). This musical indeed promoted goodwill between China and Japan. The memory of such a flexible rhetoric as "goodwill," then, should be approached in terms of not only what is remembered but also how it is remembered. In this way, we can further reveal the complex nature of Manchuria in the past as well as in the present.

The idea of Pan-Asianism, however, seems to have been completely forgotten in postwar Japan. Here, the work of Oguma Eiji (1995, 2002) is insightful. In a lengthy work on "the boundary of the Japanese race," Oguma discusses the two major theories on the origin of the Japanese race, called respectively *fukugō minzoku-ron* and *tan'itsu minzoku-ron*. While the former was dominant before Japan's capitulation, the latter has become more popular since then. Each theory, according to Oguma, has two components. According to *fukugō minzoku-ron* a long and complicated process of intermarriage among the people of different races in Asia gave birth to the Japanese, and these people inhabited the Japanese empire. In contrast, *tan'itsu minzoku-ron* has the following two components: the Japanese constitute a single, pure race and share uniformity in language and culture; and the Japanese have inhabited the Japanese archipelago since ancient times. *Fukugō minzoku-ron* supports the creation and maintenance of the Japanese empire, while *tan'itsu minzoku-ron* endorses the postwar Japanese nationalism. Both theories are based on a considerable degree of distortion, and the contradiction between them is undeniable.

The ideology of racial harmony in Manchukuo evidently represents *fukugō minzoku-ron*. And yet, as I have already discussed, the contradiction between this ideology and "the Japanese as a leading race" eventually led Manchukuo to a path of destruction. In this volume, I demonstrate that the idea of *fukugō minzoku-ron* was quickly forgotten in Japan in the 1970s. The suicide in 1945 of Morisaki Minato, who embraced the cause of Pan-Asianism, was reinterpreted in the 1970s as the death of a young Japanese patriot for the Japanese emperor, in parallel with the suicide of Mishima Yukio, who died in 1970. Similarly, Han demonstrates the Manchurian origin of a variety of national ceremonies of North and South Korea in the Cold War era. Nevertheless, scholars of East Asia tend to see the origin of these national rituals and pageants solely in Japan simply because Korea was Japan's colony between 1910 and 1945. One of the goals of this volume, then, is to question the popular memories of the age of

empire, not in the system of nation-states but in Pan-Asian and transnational space.

Throughout the volume, I have left some inconsistencies in the spelling of the same terms intact. Such inconsistencies reflect the fact that Manchuria in the age of empire was indeed a Pan-Asian, transnational space where different languages were spoken. The Japanese leaders of Manchukuo ultimately imposed their own language upon all the other languages. Yet as scholars of Manchuria, our mission is to keep those languages alive through the examination of historical archives, written and visual documents, and people's memories, and to produce crossed histories of Manchuria.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Duara 2003, Matsusaka 2001, Mitter 2000, Young 1998, and McCormack 1977.
2. The Korean people, while in the ranks of the colonized in their own society from 1910 to 1945, fell into impermanent categories when displaced to other realms of the Japanese empire such as Manchuria (Brooks 1998, 26). Before 1932, the Japanese colonial government in Korea encouraged the Koreans to emigrate to Manchuria and to become naturalized Chinese. After 1932, the "Koreans" were often included in the category of the "Japanese" in the official documents of the Manchukuo government. Restated, in Manchukuo, the "Japanese" versus the "Koreans" (i.e., the colonizer versus the colonized) was often shifted onto another binary: the "Japanese and Koreans" versus the rest of the population in Manchukuo (Tamanoi 2000).
3. It is believed that the first Japanese person who emigrated to Manchuria was a woman named Miyamoto Chiyo. She emigrated to Siberia in 1886 and then to Harbin in northern Manchuria accompanying a Russian medical doctor. Women such as Miyamoto Chiyo were part of *jōshi-gun* or "the troop of young women." They were so called because of their contribution to the making of the Japanese empire: they worked on the frontier of the empire as maids, waitresses, and prostitutes and sent remittance in large amounts back home. For a detailed history of the Japanese migration to Manchuria, see Iriye Toraji 1981. This two-volume book was originally published in 1936 and 1942. The chapters on Japanese migration to Manchuria can be found in its second volume (chaps. 20–23). For a biography of Miyamoto Chiyo see Harubin Nichi-nichi Shinbun-sha 1933.
4. The Concordia Association tried to organize the entire population of Manchuria regardless of ethnicity. However, despite this original goal, the association became over time an instrument for the Guandong Army, which used it to mobilize the people and resources of Manchuria for Japan's war efforts (see Hirano 1972; Duara 2003, 60, 73–76).

5. Hirano Yoshitarō expressed this opinion at a panel discussion held in 1942 in which Tachibana Shiraki, Kiyono Kenji, Itakagi Yōichi, and Oiwa Makoto participated.

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1 Manchuria in Mind

Press, Propaganda, and Northeast China in the Age of Empire, 1930–1937

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We are beginning to understand Manchuria as a place in the Japanese imagination. Yet situating Manchuria in the *Chinese* imagination seems to be a work still at an earlier stage of progress (although see Duara 2003). Even the very question of whether "Manchuria" was a meaningful term for the Chinese is contested (Elliott 2000, 635). To give the region its own identity, for many Chinese, might come perilously close to admitting ideas of separatism and autonomy. Certainly the period between 1931 and 1945, when the Northeast was occupied by the Japanese, is now firmly situated in mainstream Chinese historiography as a time when China's national territorial sovereignty was most egregiously violated. This view is by no means inaccurate, but it is becoming increasingly clear that it is incomplete.

The Japanese created a vision of Manchuria in the minds of their public at a distance from the region itself; this distance enabled them to turn Manchuria into a place of heroic dreams for colonizers and migrants (Young 1998, chap. 8; Matsusaka 2001, 389–408). A rather different image of the same region was created for the Chinese public at the same time. Northeast China was not a blank slate, but for many Chinese outside the region, it was not a place associated with specific ideas, nor, crucially, was it yet inexorably associated with a dominant nationalist project. What I aim to do in this piece is to suggest that the process by which Northeast China became associated with the elite nationalist project in the public mind can be traced in significant part through examining one specific, prominent voice at the time. That voice is the voice of the Northeastern entrepreneur, journalist, and nationalist political activist Du Zhongyuan, one of the most skilled users of China's emergent mass-circulation press in the 1930s. Du's project of positioning Northeast China in the Chinese public's mind showed signal successes and failures, which I will examine below.

This piece suggests that Du, more than any other individual, managed to personalize a narrative of what Manchuria meant, tying an imaginative construction of the region to his own person (see Anderson 1983).[1] This was a risky enterprise, since it depended on creating a persona in whose image Manchuria would be reflected: as he said in one essay, "I represent the thirty-five million people of the Northeast" (Du 1936a, 39). However, it proved to be a successful formula in many ways. To create this connection in the mind of the public, the extrapolation of his own experience with the fate of an entire region, Du had to move from being merely a name on an editorial page to a complete figure in the eyes of his readers. It would not be enough simply to write his version of what was happening in the "hell on earth" that was occupied Manchuria, though he did that with an engagingly trashy verve. Instead, Du had to give an account in which he, as reporter, was brought to the forefront and himself became a character in the Northeastern story that was being written. More than that, he had to be a sympathetic character, with whom they would empathize. Below, I will suggest that Du not only created a propaganda of personality based on himself, but also created another character who took off in the public imagination, the resistance leader Ma Zhanshan. I will examine the effects of these personas to make an assessment of how effective Du was in his project.

In the argument below, I will use several contested definitions, and it is therefore useful to clarify what I mean by them. This piece concentrates on trying to illuminate what the Northeastern provinces of China meant to the Chinese public outside the region itself; to that extent, it is relatively silent on the effect of Chinese propaganda in Manchuria itself, not least because after 1931, Japanese censorship made it difficult and dangerous for Chinese nationalist material to circulate in the occupied region. Nonetheless, the idea of Manchuria is central to my argument, and therefore I should make it clear that I will use the terms "Manchuria" and "Northeast" interchangeably. In the 1930s, Dongsansheng (Three Eastern Provinces) and Manzhou (Manchuria) were used by Chinese-speakers, and although the Japanese used the term "Manzhou" to try to bolster their argument that the region was separate from China and always had been, the use of the term by Chinese did not necessarily mean acknowledgment of that argument (see Elliott 2000, 632–635; Tamanoi 2000, 252–259). The bulk of this piece also refers to the "Chinese" readership, and when it is not further qualified, this refers to the Chi-

nese readership in China outside the Northeast, and therefore not under Japanese occupation. Continuing use of the term "Chinese outside the Northeast" would be more accurate, since one of Du's tasks was to construct a seamless identity that united all Chinese on the subcontinental landmass, but to use the phrase repeatedly would become immensely cumbersome.[2] However, when specific differences between Chinese behavior in the occupied Northeast and outside it become relevant, I will make that distinction clear.

Du Zhongyuan: Self-made Man

Who was Du Zhongyuan (1898–1944)? He is not exactly unknown now, though he seems to have fallen into the middle to low ranks of historical significance, a drop from the notoriety he had in his heyday in the 1930s. He is best known for his activities in the National Salvation movement of that era, when nationalist activists (in some cases in association with the Communist Party) lobbied Chiang Kai-shek to change his policy of nonresistance to the increasing Japanese encroachment into North China. Between about 1930 and 1937, Du became one of the most prominent anti-Japanese, proresistance voices in China. He was given the platform of his mentor Zou Taofen's mass-circulation publications, *Shenghuo* (Life) and their successors. Du may well have had about a million and a half readers at his peak (Coble 1991, 81).

Yet it has been relatively little remarked upon that Du was a Northeasterner, and that his outlook was heavily shaped by growing up in the imperial melting pot that was Manchuria in the early twentieth century. His career reflects the diversity of influences on him. He grew up in an impoverished village in Huaide county in Fengtian province, and was then sponsored by local elites to attend school and then college in Shenyang. He returned to Huaide to teach English in 1917, but the influence of the New Culture movement on him had been strong during his college days, and he was inspired by the National Products movement to move from teaching into business (see Gerth 2003). He was particularly keen to set up rival business enterprises to those run by the Japanese, particularly the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR), in the Northeast. He later stated that porcelain, one of the products perhaps most archetypally associated with China, must be developed as a native product, regaining market share from the cheap Japanese imports that dominated

the market. He scraped together investment to set up his first factory just outside Shenyang. By the late 1920s, he was a prominent local businessman and official of the Liaoning Chamber of Commerce. From 1928 to 1931, Zhang Xueliang included Du in the group of prominent young nationalists around him who were charged both with spreading propaganda against the Japanese presence in the region and with developing locally sponsored modernization projects in areas such as transport, education, and broadcasting. During this time, Du also got to know Zou Taofen, already by then a well-known journalist in Shanghai, and started writing regularly for Zou's *Shenghuo* magazine.

After the Japanese occupation of September 1931, Du escaped to Beiping (as Beijing had been renamed at the time), where he became part of the group that founded the Northeastern National Salvation Society (NNSS). This was one of the most powerful groups involved in spreading propaganda to counter Chiang Kai-shek's policy of nonresistance to the occupation of Manchuria. Du's position as an editorialist on *Shenghuo* now became very useful, as it gave him access to a wide section of the Chinese reading public. Du wrote blistering editorials attacking the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to send troops to recapture Manchuria from the Japanese and advocating resistance to Japan as the most important issue facing China. Eventually, censorship and the fear of arrest forced *Shenghuo* to close down and Zou to flee abroad in 1933. At this point, Du started up a new journal, *Xinsheng,* to take on *Shenghuo*'s role of advocating resistance to Japan. It lasted until Du's arrest in 1935 for publishing and distributing an article that caused a diplomatic incident by insulting the emperor of Japan. During this time, Du's writing showed a distinct leftist tone, although he did not join the Communist Party (he would request membership shortly before his death). Even during his imprisonment in 1935–1936, Du was influential enough to have a book published (*Yuzhong zagan* [Thoughts in prison]), and after his release, he became a prominent voice in the National Salvation movement, which aimed to push Chiang into resistance to Japan. Shortly after the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Du moved to Xinjiang at the invitation of Sheng Shicai, the region's militarist leader, who was then sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party. However, the two fell out, and in 1944 Du was executed for subversion and association with the Communists.

Du used his column as a bully pulpit, with the aim of becoming in effect the "voice of Manchuria" in the Chinese public mind, and thereby

the most trustworthy interpreter of the Manchurian crisis. To do so, Du created an image of himself in his readers' minds that was intended to provide them with an image of what a Northeasterner was: nationalistic, enterprising, and anti-Japanese. It also failed to make much representation of other things a Northeasterner could be: non-Chinese, pro-Japanese, or female.

Du's Readers

At this point, it becomes important to know something more about who the readers were whom Du was aiming to influence with his propaganda on the Manchurian situation. We know that the periodicals in which his writing appeared were rewarded with enormous sales, and as Perry Link has pointed out in his analysis of urban fiction in Republican China, "[T]here has to be some important connection between an especially popular work and the psychology of its audience" (Link 1981, 7). Who read *Shenghuo* and *Xinsheng,* then? Both were published in Shanghai, and a large proportion of the readers came from that city. The Shanghai reader was of a particular type, and Du Zhongyuan, as we will see, knew a lot about what appealed to him (and the readers were primarily men).

Shenghuo and *Xinsheng* combined pithy political commentary with aspirational stories of young men who had come to Shanghai and, through diligence, prospered and made good: a traditional neo-Confucian view recast for a modern urban society. One large part of the target readership was a nascent lower-middle class, literate, but with only a few years' schooling, and desperate not only to move up into the world of the local well-off notable, but also not to slip back to the world of the unskilled laborer. This stratum, known to Chinese of the time as "petty urbanites" *(xiao shimin),* has been suggestively analyzed by Wen-hsin Yeh and Hanchao Lu, and was an elastic category; as Lu argues, it was defined at least partly by whom it excluded (the elite and the poor) rather than being homogeneous, and may have encompassed about 1.5 million of Shanghai's 3.5 million population in the 1930s (Yeh 1992, 186–234; Lu 1999, 63).

Among the varying occupational types that might be included were tradesmen and craft workers, clerks, small merchants, shop assistants, and school teachers and students. It also included skilled and semiskilled factory workers, who would not have regarded themselves as in the same

class as unskilled workers at all. For the most part, petty urbanite women would be the wives of men in these categories (Lu 1999, 61–64). In addition, many of them were immigrants to the city, often minor inland local elites who had moved recently as Shanghai began to boom. Lu has argued, though, that one of the main characteristics of the petty urbanites was not their (in reality very varied) professional affiliations, but the mentality that bound them together as a community: the petty urbanite was "a type of person whose outlook was limited by the community in which he or she lived" (Lu 1999, 63).

This understanding is crucial to reading Du's journalism. Du was not a typical member of the group; although he was certainly a migrant to the city, he had studied to college level and also spent many years abroad. Yet he knew the group well enough to be able to speak to its concerns in his writing.

These were people who were in a permanent balancing act, and who tended to be insecure and unhappy as a result. They disliked many aspects of Westernization and the modernity that Shanghai represented and were generally less open to ideas of reform than their better-off counterparts (Link 1981, 5). They also felt disenfranchised. The Nationalists had risen to power in part on the basis of the support of this type of emergent lower-middle class, but once established in power after the Northern Expedition of 1926–1927, Chiang Kai-shek sought to remove all autonomous power from the party and invest it in a structure loyal to himself instead (Fewsmith 1985, 8). Du's readers, then, felt that they had to look out for themselves. Furthermore, in the early 1930s, 0.33 million Shanghainese were unemployed out of the total population, and it was easy enough to join their number (Elvin 1974, 10). So the petty urbanites sought reassurance in their reading. They were the perfect audience for the style of popular fiction known as "Mandarin Duck and Butterfly": in other words, popular romances with no *overt* social message, quite different from the radical, nationalist, and socialist-inclined work of Lu Xun or Mao Dun, which the Chinese Communist Party would later celebrate (Link 1981, 5). *Shenghuo*'s great success, as Wen-hsin Yeh has demonstrated, came from its recognition of its readers' concerns and its ability to reflect them back. Again, although the journal circulated in many cities, Shanghai was a particular hub for its readers.

There is one important contextual issue for Du's readers that he occasionally refers to in his writings from before the occupation of September

1931, but never afterward. Most of Du's writing portrays an uncomplicated Chinese nationalism versus an undifferentiated imperialism, primarily Japanese. Again, this is fairly typical of much May Fourth–era writing. Yet by using this template, Du was downplaying important aspects of the reality not only of the city, Shanghai, in which he published, but the region, Manchuria, about which he wrote.

The periodicals in which Du wrote were published in the International Settlement of Shanghai, one of two foreign-controlled districts within the city's boundaries. A comparison with Cold War Berlin bears some further examination: just as West Berlin stood both as a provocation and an alternative to its eastern counterpart, the International Settlement stood as an alternative Shanghai on the Chinese city's doorstep. Manchuria too had many of these characteristics before 1931. Shanghai has been analyzed at great length, but the imperial encounter in Manchuria has been less often discussed in English.[3] The Russian presence in the region from the 1880s and the Japanese project that emerged in earnest from 1905 heavily shaped Northeastern Chinese perceptions. While there was hostility in many circles toward the Japanese, the imperial presence was not always wholly resented, as in the social imperialism practiced through the SMR.[4]

Chinese nationalists working in the settlement, of whom Du Zhongyuan was one, were people who had to juggle identities. On the one hand, their condemnation of imperialism in China was heartfelt and powerful. Anti-imperialism was clearly a source for popular mobilization, as shown by the demonstrations and boycotts surrounding the May Fourth Incident of 1919 (following China's humiliation at the Paris Peace Conference) and the May Thirtieth Incident of 1925 (where British and Japanese troops shot and killed Chinese demonstrators in Shanghai). However, these incidents were waves that crashed above a calmer sea of everyday experience of cooperation and collaboration with an imperial presence. This collaboration was most difficult to acknowledge for nationalist activists such as Du Zhongyuan. Their political mobility was dependent on the unique circumstances of the International Settlement. Chinese censorship laws prohibited attacks on Chiang Kai-shek's policy of appeasement of Japan over the invasion of Manchuria; they also prevented attacks on the Japanese, which Chiang feared might provoke further attacks in retaliation. However, publishers in the International Settlement were not subject to Chinese censorship. Naturally, the foreign-run police force and

the Shanghai Municipal Council had their own, distinctly unfavorable, attitude toward those they saw as trying to rock the status quo. Nonetheless, nationalists, communists, and other radicals all used the Settlement's special status to propagate their views. Collaboration with empire was an unavoidable reality for both writer and reader.

Before 1931, it is notable that a similarly fluid atmosphere existed in Manchuria, with rival political authorities, social groupings, and newspapers competing for public attention and the legitimacy that came along with it. Although the cities were much smaller than Shanghai (the largest in the region, Shenyang, had only a little over five hundred thousand inhabitants even in the 1930s), there was a well-developed commercial and political community. However, the occupation of 1931 removed all these ambiguities: the only choices available to people such as Du, implacably opposed to the Japanese, were to join the scattered guerrilla resistance or to escape to unoccupied China below the Great Wall.

Du's Persona: "Representing Thirty-five Million"

Shanghai readers "met" Du Zhongyuan and "understood" Manchuria through his columns. This was the time when the mass media were beginning to make an impact in China, and Du was one of the most skilled users of them, as well as one of the most ubiquitous.[5] In the 1930s, hundreds of short pieces appeared under his name—on politics, on travel, on his childhood. By the end of the decade, readers could claim to have an intimate knowledge of Du, or at least, of the image he wished to project of himself. In addition, after late 1931, they knew Manchuria through one other character in the Manchurian narrative to whom he gave life: the resistance leader Ma Zhanshan. This element of the story, however, proved more problematic in its success, as we will see later on.

Let us start with Du's own persona. Who was the man whom readers got to know through reading his work? The most important part of the character he created was someone who was in reality a comparative rarity before 1931: the Northeasterner who was proud of his regional identity but also totally committed to unity with the rest of a Chinese "nation" in the form of the Nationalist government led by Chiang. In fact, most of the nationalists around Zhang Xueliang had been rather distrustful of Chiang (and he of them), and the affiliation of the Northeast to the Nanjing government at the end of December 1928 had led to very little real

capacity for the new Nationalist administration to interfere in the Young Marshal's control of the region. This distinction between nationalism and adherence to the Nationalist government was not made by Du in his writings, nor is there any attempt to engage with the policy of *baojing anmin* (defend the borders, set the people at peace), which advocated a form of Northeastern autonomy at odds with creating a unified China in the short term (Suleski 2002). For him, there was no conflict at all between his identity as a Northeasterner and as a Chinese, and he was at pains to stress the patriotic Chinese nature of those living under Japanese occupation. He was happy to use crude racist invective, as in his piece "What is most frightening?" (Zui kepade shi shenme?), where he started a long piece on the history of Japanese expansionism in Manchuria not with any grand political statements, but with a piece of doggerel: *Pa gou, pa fei/ Pa Riben xiaogui* (I fear dogs, I fear bandits/ I fear the little Japanese devils) (Du 1936f, 83).

In addition, Du portrayed himself as a forthright proclaimer of basic truths. His language was earthy: a typical insult to someone he did not like is to "stick his aunt's head up a stinking dog's ass" (Du 1936d, 30). Even the title of his column, "Honest talk" (Laoshihua), reflected this self-image. This was not someone who stood on ceremony, but a friend who could be trusted. Furthermore, the reader of *Shenghuo* could also follow Du the travel writer as he described journeys to Beijing, Chongqing, or down the Yangtze. He was also prone to wax sentimental, frequently recalling his childhood in the Northeast, and he could also verge on the kitsch, as in the piece "Children are adorable" (Ertong shi zui ke'aide).

In one other respect, Du's self-portrayal was a departure from tradition, but also chimed with what the readers of *Shenghuo* would admire. This was his status as a self-made man. Describing his struggles to learn Japanese ceramics technology and to get together enough capital to set up his own factory, Du was abandoning the Confucian ideal of the scholar-official for a Western-derived model of entrepreneurship filtered through the Meiji writings of thinkers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi. The tradition of Chinese entrepreneurship had a long and distinguished history and had grown especially strong since the commercial revolution of the Song dynasty (960–1276). However, the dominant discourse, steeped in the Confucian ideal of the scholar-official, had tended to frown on commerce as a means of making a living. Du was explicit about his rejection of the past model of success:

> The way it was in the past in China, if a foreign student came home from abroad, no matter what he'd studied, his many relatives and friends always hoped he'd become an official! . . . When I returned home [from Japan] there were people hoping this of me, and they were constantly asking me straight out, quite rudely. But I had made up my mind, and just smiled back at them. (Du 1998, 4)

While making it appear as if he was striking out into the unknown against family wishes, though, Du was actually chiming quite cannily with his readers again. Most of them bought *Shenghuo* at least in part because of the aspirational stories of young men who had made good, and Du put himself in this tradition with his story. He also appealed to that increasingly large number of low-level elites who might have expected a traditional bureaucratic career but had been cheated of this by the fall of the Qing and had become part of the new class that aspired to rise through a Western-derived education (see Yeh 1992).

By turns inspirational, aspirational, sentimental, outraged, and outrageous, Du Zhongyuan created a public persona that made him, the Northeastern refugee, not just a stranger from a far-off part of China, but a figure with whom the readers could identify and empathize—someone just like them. As we know, this persona translated into huge sales. Furthermore, Du's presentation of himself as an "honest talker" through anecdotes and narratives about his personal life were leveraged into creating new narratives about the crisis in Manchuria and what it should mean to the Chinese public. The petty urbanites who read *Shenghuo* were the same readers who devoured Mandarin Duck fiction; they were uncomfortable reading classical fiction, but they also did not trust the ultramodern May Fourth generation, who appeared to undermine their certainties. The nationalist project was, for many, tied up with these alien elements in their minds. While Du was in reality strongly identifiable with the May Fourth generation, he played down this aspect of his background as he wrote to slip under his readers' barriers, his writing implying a sly complicity with their concerns. This complicity may account in part for absences as well as presences in his writing: for instance, there is little evidence of enthusiasm for women to emerge as commercial entrepreneurs. Du's vision was still very much a male construction.

This male-centeredness is visible in one piece where Du guided his readers through the development of nationalism, or as he presented it,

hypocrisy over nationalism. He mentioned youths in the late Qing in the Northeast who had "swallowtail beards and foreign leather shoes, organizing all sorts of assassination squads and revolutionary parties, their passion for national salvation bubbling over for a short while." But after the 1911 Revolution, they became "corrupt Republican bureaucrats, and their national salvation was discarded." He then talked about his period as an overseas student in Japan, where he was once again surrounded by young students advocating national salvation. At that time, "like an idiot," he "was overcome by respect" (*jinpei,* a phrase used of the emperor; here ironic) for them, but later saw them "hire foreign prostitutes, drinking wildly and running amok in brothels, feasting on success." Again, having embarked on bureaucratic careers, "so-called national salvation [was] out of the question." Du claimed to have lost faith in these "foreign scholars'" ability to save the nation, "because their bread is hidden inside some foreign big shot's mouth; but when the foreign big shots have been fought back, and imperialism has been destroyed, their skill at fawning on foreigners will be of no use" (Du 1936b, 38).

Some of Du's comments were pointed wisecracks. In one editorial of March 1934, entitled "Where are the national salvation patriots?" the mockery of the reformers who wore "swallowtail beards and foreign leather shoes" is the voice of someone wanting to appeal to the prejudices of the petty urbanite who felt threatened by modernity. This was the same nerve hit by Zhang Henshui in his best-selling novel *Fate in Tears and Laughter,* serialized in 1929–1930, which contains a character, Helena Ho, created specifically as a butt for jokes about Chinese who imitated Western clothes and manners. The novel sold hundreds of thousands of copies (Link 1981, 117). Furthermore, the targets of Du's attack, the "national salvation patriots," were people at a social level above that of the petty urbanite reader, former revolutionaries who had gone on to high office under the Nationalist government. These were people who had profited from the revolution that had pulled the rug from under the lower-middle classes who had invested in its success, and Du knew that his readers would have little compunction in blaming those profiteers for the country's ills. In this piece, he draws a clear distinction between the bureaucrats and his readers in the wake of the Manchurian crisis:

> After the national disaster of September Eighteenth [i.e., the 1931 Manchurian Incident], there was a period when the anti-Japanese na-

> tional salvation cry was shouted loud. . . . But not long after, it lessened to an inaudible voice. Up to now, we have only heard a bunch of shameless collaborators in the Northeast, bowing the knee and raising their voices to the puppet emperor in three cries of "Ten thousand years!" So where have these national salvation patriots gone? I'm suspicious. (Du 1936b, 36)

The phrase used for "national salvation patriots" *(jiuguo zhishi)* is in itself ironic, with overtones of sacrifice and martyrdom that were in strong contrast to the descriptions that follow. Du used the device of taking the reader through his life story, starting with reminiscences of the constitutional reformers he recalled from his youth:

> I was in a small village school in my old home in the Northeast. . . . At that time, there was a large group of national salvation patriots, who rushed down from the county town to the countryside, drumming and shouting hard about popular rights, advocating constitutional politics, and duping the old country hayseeds into throwing themselves onto the ground in front of them [in respect]. But afterward . . . the national salvation patriots of the time all became officials and gentry and served as councillors, taking opium and gambling, treating the common people as their meat and fish, and never speaking again of any great national salvation plan. (Du 1936b, 36)

In contrast to these characters, of course, Du concluded, "Real national salvation patriots" are "we, the hard-working, poor ordinary people" (38).

The last comment is a little disingenuous, since the "ordinary people" who read this were not peasants in villages or even, probably, educated local elites in small towns; they were the urbanite readers of *Shenghuo.* However, Du was flattering his readers for a purpose. He and the readers could share a laugh at the elites in charge, he implied, but they must also acknowledge the further truth that the nation *was* important, and that the loss of Manchuria was therefore important as well. This is noticeable in the way that Du invoked the concept of "the people" as a political tool, adapting the term as it had been used by his Qing predecessors (Judge 1996, chap. 6).

"The people" might be full of sterling worth when they were being touted as part of a putative citizenry, but foolish and unsophisticated

when they were attacked as being insufficiently "nation-minded." The most common appearance of "the people" was as heroic and stalwart, albeit in a vague and idealized way, to be used when Du wished to skewer some other target (notably collaborators or the Japanese). Later, though, we will explore some of the ways in which "the people" failed to live up to Du's standards.

Pieces such as "Where are the national salvation patriots?" served to position Du as someone with whom the readers would feel comfortable. Other pieces link into his purpose of shaping perceptions of Manchuria among those readers. Relevant here is a piece titled "Northeasterners must not forget they are Chinese" (Dongbeiren buyao wangji shi Zhongguoren), first published in *Xinsheng* on 14 March 1934. The piece begins as follows:

> This morning, I got up nice and early and opened the *Shishi xinbao*. The big headline "Northeasterners must not forget they are Chinese!" stared up at me. Your reporter is himself one of the refugees from the Northeast, so having seen this headline, how could I help but read on?

It continues:

> The *Foreign Affairs Monthly (Waijiao yuebaoshe)* received Vice-Minister Tang Youren at 5 p.m. on the 17th. . . . Chairman Wang Zhuoran . . . asked Tang to give some directions for the [Northeast National Salvation] Society's work. Tang then got up and spoke, and said that his opinion on the Northeastern problem was that we definitely couldn't recover the four provinces of the Northeast by military means, but there were also difficulties in using diplomacy. So our most important task of the moment is to make sure that at all costs, the people of the Northeast do not forget that they are Chinese. For the dissipation of their national consciousness is really to be dreaded. (Du 1936a, 39)

The opening of this piece is typical of Du's strategy of self-presentation. The unsuspecting reader might take seriously his claim that he just happened on this topic when he opened his morning newspaper. But the mention of his close friend Wang Zhuoran (a fellow committee member of the NNSS) suggests that the whole thing was a setup, by which Wang would ask provocative questions of Tang Youren, who would then provide answers for Du to tear apart in front of his huge readership. Tang was associated with Wang Jingwei's relatively pro-Japanese faction of the

Nationalist government and as such was a particular focus of anger for Du and the NNSS. In his riposte, Du firmly nails his colors to the mast as the sarcastic "voice of the Northeast":

> As your reporter, I would like to represent the 35 million people of the Northeast in thanking vice-minister Tang. But there are three things that make me suspicious. First, is it that the people of the Northeast have forgotten China, or that the Chinese government has forgotten the people of the Northeast? Secondly, what *sort* of Northeasterners have forgotten that they are Chinese? Thirdly, *how* can you get the people of the Northeast not to forget they are Chinese? (1936a, 40)

Du goes on to cite the tropes, which he in large part created and promoted, of Northeastern Chinese resistance to Japan: "organized volunteer armies . . . facing the twentieth century's most recent weaponry . . . unceasingly attacking the Japanese army," and "youth and students, provoked into a righteous rage . . . leaving [the Northeast] and begging for food in Beiping and Tianjin." With a flourish, Du concludes, "Can we say here that the people of the Northeast have forgotten that they are Chinese?" (1936a, 40). While a Japanese representation of Manchukuo was being developed, in which it was presented as organized, modern, and even glamorous, in contrast with supposed Chinese backwardness, Du was aiming to create an image of a very different Manchuria, a hotbed of resistance oppressed by cruel masters who made it a "hell on earth." Whereas the Japanese construction had the resources of a state behind it, Du had to draw on the capital of trust he had built up with his readers. It is therefore noteworthy that his success was as great as it was. On the one hand, it was presumptuous of Du to nominate himself as the spokesman for "thirty-five million people of the Northeast." On the other hand, it is notable that it is hard to find any Chinese voice of the period giving a prominent view that opposes him (and certainly no state-sponsored view).

Also key to Du's positioning of the Northeast in his readership's imagination was an issue that cut directly across another Japanese construction: that of race. Mariko Asano Tamanoi has examined in detail the way in which Japanese colonial agents constructed and reconstructed racial classification during the lifetime of the Manchukuo project. Crucial to one version of this taxonomy was the idea that Manchuria could not be regarded as a "Chinese" territory and the claim that "Manchuria did not,

and does not, belong to any particular race; it was, and is, a land open to all" (Tamanoi 2000, 255). In addition, it is becoming more evident that the region was perceived as being in some senses distinguishable in Chinese minds, rather than merely being "three eastern provinces" of a greater Chinese landmass. Mark Elliott has demonstrated that there was an increasing Chinese use of the term "Manzhou" in the Republican era, even by as anti-imperialist a body as the Chinese Communist Party, suggesting a willingness to recognize it as a region in terms that "did not grossly violate everyone's nationalistic sentiments at the time" (Elliott 2000, 635).

This gives some context to Du's next sally. In reading it, and subsequent extracts, one should understand that Nationalist censorship made it very difficult to refer in a hostile fashion to the Japanese. Therefore, Du used the device of placing an "X" or "XX" in the text where he wanted to refer to Ri or Riben (Japan/Japanese):

> I heard someone who had come from the Northeast say, "There was an X-nese soldier . . . who smiled at a Northeastern man from the countryside, . . . and asked, 'What country are you from? *(Ni shi na guo ren?)*' The old countryman . . . said, 'I'm Chinese (Zhongguoren).' The X-nese soldier . . . pummeled and kicked him, and the oldster . . . quickly said, 'I'm Japanese (Ribenren)' [in this case printed in full]. The X-nese soldier was even angrier, and beat him more cruelly. The oldster had no choice but to say, 'I'm not a person at all! *[Wo bu shi ren].*' Only then did the soldier laugh and go." (Du 1936a, 41)

The image of the old man (presumably fictional) being forced to deny his own humanity clearly tapped into the Social Darwinist concerns that shaped much of the May Fourth elite's conception of China's fate. Yet the one answer to the soldier's question *not* put into the mouth of the old man is "Wo shi Manzhouguoren" (I'm a Manchukuoan). Du was at pains to erase any conception that a separate regional identity of any sort could exist in Manchuria and to make it clear that the issue must be regarded as one of China versus Japan, nation to nation. This was ironic, since as mentioned above, Zhang Xueliang's alliance with Nanjing had always been uneasy and almost nominal. This ambivalence between Zhang and Chiang Kai-shek also goes some way to explain Chiang's reluctance to commit himself to the recapture of the Northeast from the Japanese occupation. Du's writing, however, aimed to erase these ambi-

guities in the public mind. One key marker of the success in bringing the Manchurian issue to the attention of the reading public was the publication in 1933 of Zhang Henshui's sequel to his best seller *Fate in Tears and Laughter*. All the characters return, but this time, they are depicted taking part in the anti-Japanese resistance in Manchuria. It was a sign of the time that the Mandarin Ducks were ready to be sent to war (Link 1981, 31–34).

"How Can There Be Goodwill?"

Yet we can also see the numerous elements left out of Du's representation of the Northeast (many of which appeared in distorted form in the Japanese version). In practice, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria had quickly led to widespread collaboration; local magistrates and leaders of chambers of commerce all over the occupied regions quickly came to terms with the occupiers and were allowed to continue in their old positions.[6]

Du occasionally referred to this ambiguity in his early, pre-occupation writings. In July 1931, during a time of tension between the Chinese and Japanese sides in the Northeast, but two months before the occupation began, Du wrote a piece in *Shenghuo* explaining his standpoint for his readers. The story he tells points up the opportunities and frustrations for a young man of the May Fourth generation living in a time of empire:

> By chance one day I read in a porcelain industry magazine an article about the . . . porcelain company the Japanese were setting up at Dairen, and I was very excited by it. The main gist of this article was that the Dalian SMR Company had set up a central experimentation office, and each year was spending a tremendous sum of money to build up full facilities to invite specialized talents from all over Japan to research and do trials on agricultural, mining, forestry, husbandry, fisheries, and all sorts of other matters in Mongolia and Manchuria. . . . In the porcelain industry, the Dahua company had been established in this fashion. . . . When I had read this essay, I thought that this company, which was jointly run by foreign officials and traders (I mean the SMR Company), in its encouragement and coaching of all sorts of enterprises was the opposite of China's sloppy and confused way of getting on with things, letting our precious resources be utterly plundered. This made me sigh very deeply. (Du 1998, 2)

The cause of Du's simultaneous admiration and concern can be seen in the publications of the Japanese-sponsored, Chinese-language press in the region, which provided a popular and subtle way of burnishing the social imperialism embodied in the SMR. The most prominent example of this was the newspaper *Shengjing shibao,* but also instructive is the journal *Dongbei wenhua* (Northeastern culture). In this journal, the Japanese presence is largely portrayed as modern and benevolent. The Chinese presence, in contrast, is generally portrayed in terms of the past: ancient monuments and classical literary texts, with little implication that there might be any aspects of modernity embraced by the Chinese without Japanese guidance. Most galling for Du and his like, though, was the Japanese portrayal of themselves as natives of the region. The grudging admiration in the piece above, however, turns to outright rejectionism after 1931. This change reflected the reality that for the Manchurian Chinese at least, the option of ambiguous collaboration with imperialism had turned into a rather starker choice of resistance, collaboration, or disengagement from politics. Thus, in one essay, "How can there be goodwill between China and Japan?" (8 December 1934), he asks, "What does 'Sino-Japanese goodwill' mean? We can state it categorically in one sentence: It is a plan by the Japanese imperialists to destroy the morale of the Chinese masses for resistance" (Du 1936e, 65). In another piece, "Pan-Asianism" (17 December 1934), Du gives the kiss of death to an idea that, he acknowledges, had originally been of great interest to Sun Yatsen, but that was again nothing more than a mask for Japanese imperialism (1936e, 66).

It was probably most troubling to Du that plenty of ordinary people in the Northeast itself seemed not to be overly concerned by the Japanese occupation, in contrast with the picture that he had built up in his writings. A hint of this comes in an editorial on "Pan-Asianism," where he admits that the Japanese techniques in Manchukuo have not been entirely fruitless: "The invaders are really clever, in particular Japanese imperialism. They can take 'respect for Confucius' and 'the Royal Way *(wangdao)*' and other antiquities and pander to the general masses in China who are backward-thinking" (Du 1936g, 70). There are shades here of Marx ranting at the peasants being taken in by Louis Napoleon or, closer to home, the angry retorts of the late-Qing reformers who complained that the ordinary masses failed to understand why reform was good for them (Judge 1996, 91–99).

Heavy Japanese censorship makes it difficult to know what people's feelings were about this type of collaboration. However, a series of articles in early 1935 by W. Lewisohn, a special correspondent for the *North-China Daily News* in Manchukuo, provides an intriguing insight into this question contemporaneous with Du's editorials. He reported that at the end of his trip, he traveled with a group of Chinese across the border:

> And here I had a striking example of the value of good roads as propaganda. My "Chungkuo jen" [Chinese] once more started suddenly to converse freely and cheerfully cursed the Japanese. Yet as we bumped and crashed over the execrable road until we were nearly thrown out of the truck, they one and all loudly and heartily agreed with the sentiments expressed by one of the passengers: "Aiya, if this was still in Manchoukuo, it would be a proper road. They are not allowed to steal the road-making money there!"[7]

"Good roads as propaganda" echoes the ambivalence that Du himself expressed when talking about his student days and his inspiration by the SMR's porcelain works. Aspects of Japanese rule that affected everyday Chinese lives, such as land appropriation and opium sales, shaped people's opinions of the occupiers in a negative way. Yet they were counterbalanced by other phenomena, whether it was the roads or the currency reforms. Lewisohn stated, "[T]he Chinese in Manchukuo . . . one and all, from the poorest rickshaw-coolie up, were loud in their praises of the stable currency that had been established. If the Japanese had done nothing else for Manchukuo, this alone would have been a great feather in their cap." Lewisohn concludes with the following words: "I certainly failed to discover among any class of Chinese the very slightest tendency to regard themselves as the citizens of a new state of their own . . . When Chinese spoke of Manchukuo, it was as if they were referring to some foreign country in which they happened to be living, and to whose foreign rulers they apportioned praise or blame for whatever was being done." But "[h]owever much they may resent being lorded over by the Japanese, I failed to discover among any class of Chinese a desire to return to the Kuomintang fold."[8]

How much credence to give Lewisohn is debatable, although again, the *North-China Daily News* is useful inasmuch as it does not have any particular ax to grind in this case. Perhaps it is worth noting that it may have been somewhat inclined to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt,

only because as the representative of one "settler" community in China (the British "Shanghailanders"), they may have wished to reflect well on the Japanese "settlers" in Manchukuo. But it is worth noting that, whatever the intentions of those setting it up, this alternative view of Manchukuo existed as a model to provide a counterpoint to Du's representations.

The Resistance Persona: Ma Zhanshan

I have suggested above that Du's success lay largely in positioning himself in his readers' minds as a trustworthy representative of Northeasterners, propagated through one of the most popular publications of the era. This propaganda of personality was further extended to valorize the story of the resistance leader Ma Zhanshan. Ironically, however, Du's very success in creating Ma as a character in the public mind led, in Du's own assessment, directly to failure in the wider task of raising mass anger against the nonresistance policy toward the Japanese in Manchuria.

Du made frequent reference after late 1931 to the resistance on the ground in Manchuria. Repeated mention of the brave volunteer forces carrying on guerrilla war against the Japanese was fine as mood music, but the public, again, required the abstract of resistance to be tied to a personality to make it work better as propaganda. The single most important icon of resistance was an obscure commander in northern Heilongjiang province, Ma Zhanshan, who shot to prominence after he launched a brief, doomed campaign to prevent the Guandong Army from entering Heilongjiang in November 1931. The "resistance battle at the river" lasted only three days before Ma was forced to retreat in the face of superior Japanese forces. However, Ma's action was a rare act of armed opposition to the invaders in the face of Chiang Kai-shek's nonresistance policy toward Japan. Promotion of the resistance seemed to go well in 1931–1932, with a Ma Zhanshan cult sweeping through major Chinese cities. But just two years later, Du lamented, things seemed to have taken a wrong turn.

In a piece from April 1934, Du attacked what he called the "dead end of the anti-Japanese hero," in which he attacked the Chinese tendency to celebrate individuals who have opposed Japan as heroes:

> The noun "anti-Japanese hero" is, basically, inappropriate. When Wellington defeated Napoleon in battle, nobody called him an "anti-

> French hero." When France's Joffre and Foch became commanders of the Allied Forces during the European War, nobody called them "anti-German heroes." But we Chinese have to have so-called "anti-Japanese heroes." Isn't this very strange? Mr. Han, in his "Small Talk" column in our fifth issue, said: "The country is the country of the masses, and Japan is the enemy of the masses." Opposing Japanese imperialism is the responsibility of the masses; it's not something that a few heroes can manage. (Du 1936c, 43)

Du went on to note that China had two million troops under arms, but dismissed their abilities; they attacked internal enemies happily enough, he claimed, but "waiting for a foreign enemy to advance, they're like mice seeing a cat . . . not even daring to let fly a fart." However, "[a]s it happens, there may be among them several big idiots who can't work things out . . . and they risk their lives against the enemy. The masses' respect for this is beyond words, and they therefore award this high title of 'anti-Japanese hero'" (1936c, 43).

The phrase "big idiots" *(dazhuang)* was, again, ironic. But Du's conclusion was meant to be quite serious: "This noun, the so-called 'anti-Japanese hero,' in fact encompasses the limitless tragedy and shame of the country and the nation!" Du concluded:

> So it's no surprise that there are very few anti-Japanese heroes indeed. Therefore, the ordinary masses haven't been able to avoid valuing them too highly. Because they have valued them too highly, they haven't been able to avoid being very deeply disappointed by them. After the September Eighteenth Incident, I was crying out [about the Japanese invasion] and running around in every province, and at that time, General Ma Zhanshan was fighting his resistance battle at the river. The masses of all the provinces along the Yangtze were shouting and singing his praises like crazy, and embellishing his history, even to the point where his photograph was placed in front of religious temples [as if he were a god]. (1936c, 44)

This refers to events that, on the surface, had seemed to be Du's greatest propaganda triumph. Du Zhongyuan, as a core member of the NNSS, had been using his column in *Shenghuo* to advocate an immediate military recapture of the occupied provinces. Ma Zhanshan's brief act of defiance proved a godsend to illustrate his cause. The story told here had

a hero, villains (both the Japanese invaders and, by implication, Chiang Kai-shek), and a clear resolution waiting to be made. With the help of pointed articles praising Ma and condemning Chiang, Du helped whip up popular anti-Japanese feeling in major cities, including Shanghai, that culminated in merchants sending money to support Ma and students signing up for corps to go to Manchuria and fight by his side (Coble 1991, 35; Wasserstrom 1991, 181; Mitter 2000, 148). Although Ma spoiled the effect by a temporary defection to the Japanese side in the winter of 1931–1932, the nationalist fever that he had inspired was enough to keep funds flowing to the NNSS and to promote the idea that the Manchurian occupation was a crisis for the entire nation, not just for the inhabitants of and refugees from the lost provinces. The Shanghai war of early 1932 also helped to inflame Chinese opinion outside Manchuria against Japan (Jordan 2001, 235–237).

Yet a combination of circumstances meant that the momentum of Du's campaign was lost. One important reason for this was the signing of the Tanggu Truce of May 1933, after which the climate of Sino-Japanese relations became calmer, and public outrage was not sustained. Du and his fellow activists had succeeded in creating a popular icon based on their construction of events in the occupied zone, Manchurian Chinese resistance personified. But propaganda is not a steering wheel that enables the driver to direct opinion as an undifferentiated mass; the public might be prepared to agree that the Manchurian crisis was indeed a major problem for China, and become angry with the Japanese. But it was a long jump from there to making the public acknowledge that the Japanese were a greater problem than any other, and deserving of *sustained* public attention.

This explains Du's frustrated tone toward the petty urbanites in the following piece, written over two years after the first bout of Ma Zhanshan fever. Clearly his narrative about Ma had taken off spectacularly, but, again in an echo of complaints about political campaigns in our own era, the personality, not the message, seemed to be foremost in people's minds:

> At that time [i.e., back in 1931], I saw the situation, and I secretly broke out into a sweat on [Ma's] behalf. When I went to Chongqing, one day, some gentlemen invited me for a meal. They then began to talk a great deal about General Ma's history. Someone said, "General Ma is

> a bold youth, about thirty years of age, he graduated from a military academy, he's talented in civil and military matters, and his place of origin is Sichuan. . . . [In fact, as Du knew, Ma was an illiterate former bandit who had had his moment of glory thrust upon him by circumstance, and was in 1931 already over fifty years old.] My family was a "close neighbor" of Ma's [in the Northeast], fifteen *li* away [1 *li* = 0.3 miles]. Having heard this story, I could only agree respectfully, fearing that if I exposed the truth, I would extinguish their enthusiasm. Their opinion seemed to be that they were hoping that General Ma would be the Monkey King in "Journey to the West," pulling out a hair, whirling round, and becoming 36,000 people, or travelling 108,000 *li* with one cartwheel. He doesn't fear airplanes, he doesn't fear mortars, he can sweep away the Japanese army. In sum, if China has an anti-Japanese hero, then we might as well let him bear the burden of the anti-Japanese duty alone. (Du 1936c, 44–45).

Du concluded by recalling that Ma Zhanshan had eventually fled the front line in Manchuria in late 1932, unable to continue fighting without support:

> General Ma is just an ordinary person, and his flesh and blood couldn't handle mortar fire, and his . . . guns couldn't shoot at airplanes, so finally he ran out of ammunition and assistance, and fled across the border. Then the masses got disappointed, and from disappointment, moved to sorrow, and from sorrow, to rage. They gradually lost respect for this "anti-Japanese hero." Some said that his personal morality was no good, and some said that he had embezzled funds. . . . [But] in the end, a General Ma is just a General Ma; to make the point thoroughly, he's just an ordinary soldier. Resisting Japan is the duty that a soldier should do to his utmost, so there's no need to raise him so high. . . . And you can't blame the defeat of resistance to Japan on him alone, so why must you curse him so bitterly? His poor personal morality is his individual business, and any embezzlement must be cleared up, but it has no connection with resistance to Japan. (Du 1936c, 45)

In the final lines of his piece, Du made his wider point, that the problem is not an individual like Ma, but a wider malaise:

> If you turn your heads to look, the people who are close to Japan are probably big officials, and non-resisting armies have received rewards.

> The masses have no means to punish them, and public opinion has not attacked them. This is clearly an encouragement to everyone to be slaves of a lost country. (Du 1936c, 45)

This message was not directed at the officials in the Nationalist government, or at the "masses" of the peasantry in China. It was squarely aimed at the petty urbanites who read *Xinsheng;* rather than lauding them as the true defenders of China, Du was attacking them for the reality that the Japanese were not uppermost in their minds. Du probably felt that he, not just Ma, was also being forced to "bear the burden of the anti-Japanese duty alone." But Du was protesting too much by claiming that Ma's "poor personal morality is his individual business . . . but it has no connection with resistance to Japan." It was Du who had been largely responsible for building him up into a personality who symbolized Manchuria. If he turned out to be a flawed personality—and as well as being a resistance fighter, he was also a sometime collaborator and embezzler—then Du could hardly be surprised at the public's unhappiness with his creation.

It is easy to go too far in this direction and claim that the public became indifferent to the fate of Manchuria after 1931. This is not the case: the region remained associated with anti-Japanese resistance in the public mind throughout the 1930s. Even during the lull in Sino-Japanese tension, the period when *Xinsheng* was being published, there are accounts in the press of anti-Japanese actions; for example, there were regular public ceremonies in memory of the Manchurian Incident.[9] However, a 1934 report in the *North-China Daily News* also noted "the great improvement in Sino-Japanese relations" in North China. It continued, "When one remembers the excitement, the intense boycott, the processions and posters, of only two years ago, one can only marvel either at the tactfulness of the Japanese or the practical common-sense of the Chinese."[10] One of Du's pieces supports this picture:

> Of course, now the Japanese imperialists are laughing proudly! Well, look! The number of Chinese studying Japanese and buying Japanese-language books is growing day by day. According to the Shanghai customs statistics, in the past ten months of this year, Japanese books have been imported to a value of 88,155 yen, which is a new five-year record. The number of Chinese going to Japan to study has also increased,

> and according to Japanese-language newspapers, the number of students studying in Japan has *increased* by 317. (Du 1936e, 66)

Du's outburst is backed up by statistics. Chinese take-up of Japanese Boxer Scholarships, and Chinese usage of Dojinkai hospitals, set up under a Japanese cultural agency scheme, show a rise between 1931 and 1937 (Lee 1989, 296, 297). The numbers would drop in the immediate aftermath of an aggressive Japanese incident, but would then rise again.

The need to think in a nuanced way about the level and nature of public concern about the Japanese, as well as the mere existence or lack of that concern, becomes clearer when we recall the nature of the petty urbanite reading community to whom Du was appealing. They kept their heads down, and although they could be moved to anger, until 1937 the Japanese menace that exercised Du so much was simply not the top priority in their minds as they struggled to survive in the face of economic depression and civil wars nearer home. The outbreak of war in 1937 finally forced them to make choices, just as the invasion of 1931 had finally forced a related, though not identical, set of choices on the inhabitants of Manchuria. The nightmare that must have haunted Du as he exhorted Shanghai's petty urbanites in the 1930s was what had happened to the equivalent strata, the small traders and craftspeople, in cities in the Northeast after 18 September 1931. In the period before the invasion, there was tangible public enthusiasm for anti-Japanese activities, such as boycotts and anti-opium demonstrations, organized by Du and his allies. But once the Japanese had invaded, the majority of these civilians who might have once marched against the Japanese in the streets of Shenyang or Harbin decided either to keep out of trouble or else to collaborate with their conquerors. We know enough about societies under occupation to realize that there was nothing unnatural about this reaction: few can afford to be heroes in an uncertain cause. But the prospect of a repetition of 1931 on a grander scale elsewhere in China after a Japanese invasion is clearly behind the urgency of Du's calls on his readers to embrace his vision of an all-encompassing, engaged nationalism.

Conclusion

The political context helps explain the fluctuating place Manchuria had in the Chinese public mind outside Manchuria. For Du, a North-

eastern Chinese nationalist, the recapture was clearly an all-consuming passion. But the other issues that concerned many Chinese in the mid-1930s show why Du was unable to turn propaganda into action. His publications continued to attract millions of readers throughout the 1930s, so it seems unlikely that readers had become mistrustful of his presentation of the Manchurian issue. But in their lives in the round, there were plenty of other issues of more immediate concern than the fate of the Northeast. A glance at the news agenda of the *North-China Daily News* shows that in 1934–1935, reporting of Sino-Japanese tensions is dwarfed by the level of coverage of the anti-Communist campaign.[11] In addition, 1934 marked the beginning of a deep downturn in the economy, and the volume of stories on this issue also reflect this situation.[12] Then, it is worth remembering that to advocate resistance in 1930s China meant, inevitably, an escalation of war. China was not wholly at peace at any time between about 1911 and 1949, and most petty urbanites, along with other Chinese, knew what war meant: ruined businesses, disrupted communications, and of course, injuries and deaths. For the Shanghainese, the Japanese campaign in the city in 1932, which caused hundreds of deaths and widespread destruction, was a warning of the perils of conflict (Coble 1991, 39–55). One cannot then necessarily make a link between Du's propaganda and the move to war. But it can certainly be argued that Du, more than any other individual, was responsible in defining what the Northeast meant, and who Northeasterners were, for the Chinese reading public in the 1930s.

NOTES

1. The influence of Benedict Anderson's idea of the "imagined community" is evident throughout this piece.
2. A similar complication arises for many authors who work on Nazi Germany: to write "Jewish Germans" and "non-Jewish Germans" when discussing Nazi racial policies is more accurate, particularly since the Nazis themselves made this distinction the center of their political project, but most authors have to cede to the need for conciseness and use "Germans" and "Jews" as opposable categories, with suitable apologies and disclaimers.
3. For recent discussions on the relationship between imperialism and the indigenous population of Shanghai, see the studies by Bickers and Wasserstrom (1995) and Goodman (2000). However, new work has started to emerge on Manchuria too. See, for example, Fogel (2000). Fogel's article appears in *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953,* edited by Robert

Bickers and Christian Henriot. This volume as a whole is an excellent guide to the question of collaboration with imperialism in China. Two stimulating recent works on transnationalism and Manchuria are works by Carter (2002) and Lahusen (2000).

4. On the SMR's role, see works by Ito (1988), Myers (1989), and Matsusaka (2001).
5. On the New Journalism of the 1930s, see books by Hung (1994, chap. 4) and Laughlin (2002).
6. This is, for example, reflected in the telegrams from "order maintenance committees" of local notables in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident. See studies by Wang et al. (1991, 254–374), and Mitter (2000, chap. 4).
7. "Manchukuo and her future destiny," *North-China Herald* (hereafter *NCH*), 23 January 1935, 152.
8. *NCH,* 23 January 1935, 152, 153, 154.
9. "Mukden Incident's anniversary," *NCH,* 26 September 1934, 455.
10. "Sino-Japanese relations improve," *NCH,* 31 October 1934, 168.
11. See, for example, "Reds, bandits and soldiers in Anhwei," *NCH,* 12 December 1934, 408; "Red influence in Sinkiang," *NCH,* 23 January 1935, 122; "Communist menace grows worse" and "Communist menace in Shensi," *NCH,* 27 February 1935, 327; "Kweichow free from invaders," *NCH,* 6 March 1935, 368; "Rout of the Communists continues," *NCH,* 17 April 1934, 92; "Dispirited Reds kept going by fears," *NCH,* 26 June 1935, 508.
12. See, for example, "The depression in Taichow," *NCH,* 9 January 1935, 47; "Depression times in Hankow," *NCH,* 6 March 1935, 369; "Chinese banks and stores in difficulties," *NCH,* 12 June 1935, 428.

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1 March 1934; (c) "Kang-X yingxiong de molu" (The dead end of anti-Japanese heroes), 14 April 1934; (d) "Qingnian de aiguo yifen" (The righteous patriotic anger of youth), 28 December 1935; (e) "Zhong X zenyang qinshan?" (How can there be goodwill between China and X?), 8 December 1934; (f) "Zui kepade shi shenme?" (What is the most frightening?), 24 December 1934; (g) "Dayazhiyazhuyi" (Pan-Asianism), 17 December 1934.

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2 City Planning without Cities

Order and Chaos in Utopian Manchukuo

DAVID TUCKER

In April 1933, some of Japan's leading planners and architects published a proposal to move more than 100,000 Japanese farmers to a network of fifty new villages in northern Manchuria. They planned these model villages to be supported by a 30-million-yen Japanese government subsidy, built with modern city planning methods, and furnished with a range of community facilities rare in impoverished rural Japan. As ambitious as this plan was, this group was not isolated, but had the close cooperation of the Guandong Army, the Japanese force that had torn Manchuria away from China and established its creature state of Manchukuo. An army expert on bandit defense was a plan co-author, and the army provided logistical support and made available its Intendency School research group (Rikugun keirigakkō kenkyūhan) for the plan. The group also included planners in the Japanese Home Ministry and received aid from the Home Ministry (Uchida, Kasahara, Katō, Kishida, and Hishida 1933, 537–563).

The village proposal was in line with ongoing work by the Japanese government and army to increase the Japanese population of Manchuria and relieve Japanese rural poverty through emigration, efforts that eventually brought more than 300,000 Japanese agricultural colonists to Manchukuo before its collapse in 1945 (Young 1998, 98).[1] Despite its harsh climate, Manchuria was attractive because of its abundance of relatively lightly settled agricultural land. The group compared mountainous mainland Japan—with 5,850,000 cultivatable hectares (only 15 percent of its total area) and a population density of almost 135 per hectare—to Manchukuo—with almost 33.6 million cultivatable hectares (18 million uncultivated), a total area of 119.5 million hectares, and a population density of 30 per hectare, and only about nine per hectare in the north (Uchida et al., 1933, 539–540).

The 1933 immigrant village plan was also consistent with the Guan-

dong Army's integration of spatial rationalization and planning into a highly ambitious development program for Manchukuo. This included the construction of national railway, highway, air transport, and communications networks and new or reconstructed industrial and administrative centers, including an elaborate national capital, Shinkyō. Not satisfied with this huge new capital at the completion of its five-year construction plan in 1937, Manchukuo authorities doubled the size of its planning area and embarked on an even more ambitious plan, including a subway system and ring road. During wartime, while authorities in Japan curtailed construction projects or built temporary structures to house government ministries, the Guandong Army continued Manchukuo's elaborate city building. The immigrant village plan was fully in line with these ambitions. One of its authors was the major consultant for Shinkyō's replanning. Another became head of Manchukuo's government architecture bureaucracy.

In global terms, the scale of this spatial planning and city building in occupied territory, sustained for more than a decade while war increasingly drained Japanese resources, was remarkable and deserves to be better known. This 1933 immigrant village plan, an early example of the application of modern city planning methods to rural settlements, shows how far the planning impulse extended in Manchukuo. The plan was in line with 1930s Western interest in regional planning and rural housing reform. Like planners in the West, Japanese planners used colonies and occupied territories as laboratories for homeland problems and for avant-garde planning. Before the Guandong Army's seizure of Manchuria, Japanese-controlled land in Manchuria was limited. The establishment of Manchukuo almost instantaneously opened this vast territory as "living space" for overpopulated Japan and as a full-scale laboratory for spatial planning. It allowed fusions of utopian desire and planned rationality such as this village plan.

The proposal is also noteworthy as an example of how Japanese planners failed to comprehend Manchurian demographic reality. Their imagination of Manchurian space as a vessel for Japanese nationality supposed that fortified village walls could exclude Chinese presence. To make Manchuria more Japanese, the Guandong Army tried to increase Japanese and limit Chinese immigration. But Manchukuo's mines and industries, not visible in this proposal for villages of Japanese self-sufficient farmers, required more Chinese labor. The Guandong Army's economic develop-

ment of Manchukuo only accelerated its demographic sinization (Wang 1971, 139, 145, 183).[2]

The 1933 Agricultural Immigrant Plan

Those who composed the 1933 agricultural immigrant village plan were at the center of Japanese planning and architecture. Based in the rapidly growing Tokyo conurbation, they were disturbed by both Japanese urban and rural poverty, and worked to alleviate widespread poor housing. Unaware of any published agricultural immigrant housing plans, or of other research to produce such plans, they believed the creation of Manchukuo provided the first opportunity to publish and receive feedback for a design for a hypothetical immigrant village. Even as the plan remained unrealized, it provided a model that appealed to later architects as illuminating problems of rural Japan (Nihon 1972, 1255–1256; Uchida et al. 1933, 538; Uchida 1969, 166–167).

The seizure of Manchuria provided a blank slate, or as city planners in Manchukuo put it, a white page, *hakushi,* on which ideal designs might be realized. These planners were not content to reproduce ordinary farm villages; instead they used techniques of modern city planning and architecture to design model communities with a range of city-like public facilities. They intended to integrate space and activity efficiently, so their design was based on analysis of the activities and spatial relationships of the imagined villagers themselves. They wanted to create a plan undistorted by the demands of commerce, the opposition of property owners, or already existing disorderly spatial arrangements—problems they and other Japanese planners had not escaped in metropolitan Japan. The village plan imagined a technical solution uncompromised by political or economic factors, but achieving this technical purity depended on the military occupation of Manchuria. It was the occupation that allowed pursuit of utopian plans.

The Planners

The most senior of the immigrant village planners was Uchida Yoshikazu (also read as Shōzo), 1885–1972, who became head of the Architecture Department of Tokyo University in 1933 and university president in 1943. Between 1935 and 1940, he served four times as the president of

the Kenchiku gakkai, Japan's main professional architects' association. In 1938, after its occupation by the Japanese army, Uchida directed the replanning of Datong, west of Beijing, a design later regarded as a model city plan (Uchida 1939). Kasahara Toshio, 1882–1969, highly influential in the development and institutionalization of Japanese city planning, had various Japanese government posts, including section chief of the Home Ministry's City Planning Bureau, and in 1936 became head of the Architecture Section of the Manchukuo government.[3]

Kishida Hideto, 1899–1966, also a Tokyo University architecture professor, was a leading architectural essayist and a postwar Kenchiku gakkai president. He was a consultant for the revised plan of Manchukuo's capital, Shinkyō, and for the plan for Canton after its occupation in 1938. Kishida was a major promoter of architectural modernism in Japan during the 1930s and 1940s and a mentor of architects who became major figures in postwar architecture, such as Maekawa Kunio and Tange Kenzō. Hishida Kōsuke was a Japanese Home Ministry planner who became head of its Air Defense research laboratory and the author of early materials on city planning (Hishida 1936). Katō Tetsuya, a specialist in bandit defense, instructor at the army Intendency School, and Kishida's former teaching colleague, provided a liaison with the army. Other army officers helped with research.[4]

City planning became established in Japan at the end of the 1910s, when Home Minister Gotō Shimpei organized a City Planning Study Committee, then established a City Planning Section within his ministry. Uchida and Kasahara were leaders of the city planning movement from these early days. As members of the City Planning Study Committee, they wrote the 1919 Urban Buildings Law (Toshi kenchikubutsu hō), which, with the 1919 City Planning Law (Toshi keikaku hō), remained the fundamental Japanese planning laws until their revision in 1968. They also had major roles in the reconstruction of Tokyo after the 1923 earthquake, a project that ended officially only in 1930. As head of the Reconstruction Bureau's Construction Section, Kasahara worked with Uchida to make the reconstruction a means to train much of a generation of young planners. Kasahara compiled these teachings in Japan's first city planning manual, published in 1928.[5] Uchida also used the reconstruction to instruct his Tokyo University architecture students, with whom he and Kishida designed and rebuilt much of the campus (Sorensen 2002; Fujimori 1993, 124–152; Isozaki 1978).

Uchida had a strong interest in housing reform, and the postearthquake reconstruction was a major opportunity to advance housing policy. The government used donated funds for earthquake damage to establish the Dōjunkai (Mutual Benefits Association), a housing foundation attached to the Social Bureau of the Home Ministry. The Dōjunkai built some of Tokyo's first model apartments in its attempt to improve housing standards. Like similar housing reform projects in contemporary Germany, the Dōjunkai projects were part of efforts to bring modern planning and rational design to Japanese cities.[6] More parks, wider and better-arranged streets, and fireproof and sanitary buildings would help make safer and healthier lives for Japan's city dwellers. Just as Japanese urban planners studied the problems of Western industrial urbanization and planning techniques used to combat them, so were Japanese architect-planners sensitive to developments in Western housing policy and the efforts of modernist Western architects to solve housing and social problems through design (Fujimori 1993, 147–152).

Modern planning provided not only impressive streetscapes and urban infrastructure, but also a way to understand how urban spatial arrangement related to both individual and total human activity, and to design accordingly. City planning was no longer only spatial design, but incorporated time and movement as well. Looking back in 1940, the modernist architectural critic Sigfried Giedion called this "conception of space-time" the basis of modern urban planning. He took as an example the 1934 plan for the extension of Amsterdam, which attempted to integrate the movement of people between home and work. Giedion argued that the task of planning was "not merely engineering works in the service of the population as a whole"; rather, the "focal point" should be the individual and the "interrelation of his activities with the total life of the city" (Uchida et al. 1933, 544–546; Giedion 1967, 810–813, 815–818; Uchida 1939, 21). Such an approach to the interrelated life of individual and community also characterizes the 1933 agricultural immigrant plan.

If conditions for Japanese urban poor were bad during the rapid industrialization of the early twentieth century, conditions for the rural poor, especially in colder and poorer Northeast Japan, were very bad during the agricultural depression of the 1920s. In addition to urban reform, Uchida and Dōjunkai members turned their attention to rural housing problems during the late 1920s, and housing research, with the assistance of Tokyo University architecture students, was under way when the

occupation of Manchuria brought the opportunity to create model agricultural housing (Fujimori 1993, 124–152; Isozaki 1978, 168–172).[7]

This turn to rural housing research extended to the countryside efforts to confront deeply rooted social problems through city planning and architectural design. This was a conceptual conjunction of two different realms—the modern, industrial city that had given rise both to modern planning and architectural modernism, and the almost premodern village housing of rural Japan. City planning and architectural modernism, through rational analysis of the built environment, seemed to offer solutions to both industrial urban chaos and poverty and to rural poverty. The attempt to apply modernist urban planning to Japanese rural poverty was the immediate background of the 1933 agricultural immigrant village plan.

The Utopian Empty Page

During June and July of 1932, Kishida and Katō toured Manchuria and carried out research used in the immigrant village proposal. That year was a time of intense activity and anticipation in Manchukuo, of imagined but not yet realized projects. Manchukuo officials and consultants worked long hours, researching, arguing, and planning factories, roads, cities that as yet existed only on paper. The main thrust of construction in Manchukuo would start only in the spring of 1933. The Tokyo architects and planners published their immigrant village plan in April of 1933, just as Manchukuo's construction season began. In the meantime, the army pursued the remnants of Chinese armed opposition and organized its new state.

Kishida was appreciative of the army's activities in Manchuria, and its treatment of him (in a speech years later, he recalled that Itagaki Seishirō, a major planner of the seizure of Manchuria and a powerful figure in its occupation, had addressed him as "sensei"). Conceding that architects' role in building the new state was less important than the army's, Kishida argued that architecture nevertheless had national significance for Japan and that its role in Manchukuo deserved discussion. As an army guest, Kishida observed bombing practice in Port Arthur and traveled extensively in military airplanes—his introduction to air travel. He preferred aircraft to trains to shorten the immense distances of the Northeast, and they encouraged him to develop an overview of what the land



Figure 2.1. Bird's-eye view of village network.
A planned network of immigrant villages stretches across the North Manchurian plain. Fortified housing areas are placed evenly in grids of rectangular fields divided by the dark notched bands of woodland. Illustration by Jose Cabrera.

beneath him offered. He was taken with the perspective from sixteen hundred meters: it provided a sense of vastness combined with speed much different from the seemingly unending time felt in trains bound to the earth. The immigrant village plan reflects that perspective of sixteen hundred meters (Kishida 1933; Kishida 1942, 61–64). The planners also relied heavily on research by the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) to provide a geographical and economic basis for their plan.

If we follow Kishida aloft (fig. 2.1, bird's-eye view of hamlets), we see the immigrant hamlets *(jūraku)* evenly set out across an almost featureless, unending plain. Each hamlet is embedded in a grid of rectangular fields that merge seamlessly with those of the hamlet's neighbors to the east and west. Crenellated bands of woodland and open space separate each hamlet from its northern and southern neighbors, and the woodlands provide convenient timber and firewood to the farmers. As far as the airborne eye sees, the plain is covered with this network of identical hamlets and fields.[8]

If we descend a bit to examine a hamlet more closely (fig. 2.2, lower



Figure 2.2. Bird's-eye view of a hamlet housing area.
At the center is the community building surrounded by a plaza, and then rows of 152 houses and lots. At the hamlet edge are the gated wall, moat, and the beginning of fields. Illustration by Jose Cabrera.

bird's-eye view), the immense scale of the planners' ambitions becomes evident. These are not merely clusters of houses, but rows of identical houses, gardens, and streets arranged around a central fortification and plaza, then surrounded by a wall, moat, and regular fields. These orderly complexes of housing and support facilities compose the hamlets that are the units of the village network. Kishida and Uchida spoke of Manchuria and China as an empty page on which they inscribed cities (Kishida 1933; Kishida 1942, 68–69, 76–77; Ooka 1933).[9] This plan takes the metaphor of an empty page, generally applied to the design of a single city, and extends it across the entire landscape. It assumes a blank slate wiped clean of Chinese farms and villages, and intends to completely occupy its emptiness. It plans space down to the level of a fraction of a meter as a rational, geometric settlement and agricultural network that erases distinctions between town and country. It delivers the countryside into urbanism, so that no space stands apart from urban design and architecture.

We can understand this more clearly by turning from aerial, two-dimensional overviews and approaching the plan through the logic that

dictates its geometric regularity. In the planners' conception, the hamlets are not only the housing areas, but units that integrate housing, fields, and all surrounding open space. Once they decided to make the hamlets identical repeatable units, their task was to determine the unit's size, shape, and configuration. Their aim was to create within these hamlets an economically and psychologically viable immigrant life. Since the immigrants would be permanent settlers, they must not miss Japan so much that, like earlier Japanese agricultural colonists in Manchuria, they would quit and return home. Therefore the plan provided not just dwellings, but also facilities to support an economic and cultural life suited to Japanese. What kind of design would bind the immigrants to Manchukuo's soil?

The planners assumed that each hamlet would have 150 households, and each household five persons and fifteen hectares of fields. Three hamlets comprised a village, or *mura,* of 450 households and 2,250 people, and shared administrative and community facilities. They chose a 150-household unit, which they estimated would have about two hundred young men, because they thought it the minimum size to provide enough men for defense and labor. Even if half these young men had to devote themselves to village security, the planners thought the remaining hundred sufficient to carry out a hamlet's agricultural work. If 150 households were adequate for security and agriculture, however, they were too few to support adequate modern community facilities. Hence the *mura,* which provided a sufficient economic base for shared educational, cultural, and administrative facilities (Uchida et al. 1933, 542–545, 553–554).

The planners, then, had to consider each hamlet as part of a larger *mura* as well as an individual unit. As they decided the dimensions of each hamlet, they considered two relationships—the distance from the housing area to its fields and its distance from its neighboring hamlets and the shared facilities of the *mura.* They posed this design problem as the relationship between housing and activities. They designed for labor-intensive agriculture that required a large population to work small pieces of land. Since villagers had to walk to their fields both to defend and to work them, the planners decided that the most distant field should be no more than a thirty- to fifty-minute walk from the hamlet housing. On the other hand, because hamlets shared community facilities and defense responsibilities, each hamlet should be as close as possible to its neighbors. After experimenting with various configurations they chose a



Figure 2.3. Hexagonal network.
In this geometrical utopia, each hamlet, with its fields and woods, takes the form of a hexagon. Three comprise a village, or *mura,* here indicated by the three adjoining hexagons with completed grids of roads and fields. At their juncture is an area with shrine, athletic fields, and other facilities shared by the three hamlets. Repetition extends the pattern across the plain. The three rows of hexagons show the structure of the connecting roads, with two completed gray bands that indicate woodland. Illustration by Jose Cabrera.

hexagonal arrangement (fig. 2.3, hexagonal network; and fig. 2.4, individual hexagon).

Although the planners incorporated the farmers' activities into their design, they did so in a way that flattened out messy complexities. They used a simple model of the activities of their subject, the individual immigrant farmer, and treated him as almost interchangeable with the farm household as a planning unit. Although they used urban planning techniques, their plan does not reproduce the multiplicity of urban life, and it shows little sense of social or occupational differentiation. Instead it envisions 150 smallholder units as the basis for (and analogous on a smaller scale to) the hamlet and *mura* units, with economic life as little more than domestic and agricultural labor. The individual was a landholder, a farmer, and defender of the village. Using this simple model, the planners could more easily visualize the economic and social lives of the inhabitants than could those planners who confronted the complexities of



Figure 2.4. Individual hexagon.
The central walled hamlet housing area is situated in a large open area with crops of limited height that will not give cover to attackers. Diagonal roads lead to other villages, and smaller roads bound rectangular fields. The grey areas are the hamlet woodlands. The pentagon at the bottom holds the facilities shared with two other hamlets. Illustration by Jose Cabrera.

a large city. The lives of these villagers consisted of work in and journey between a limited number of places—house and hamlet wall, garden and field, community center, school, and shrine—and the plan was a map of the connections between housing and these sites.

The planners fused this modernist space-time conception with an idea of a Japanese farmer-soldier as a militarily as well as economically repeatable unit. Each hamlet is a series of concentric defensive rings, and the

hexagonal design of the village network minimizes the distance to the next hamlet's aid during attack. Each housing area is surrounded by a wall two and a half meters high and three meters thick. Immediately outside it is a ditch two meters deep and three wide, and beyond it a six-meter perimeter road for warning and emergency movement. Between this and the main fields lies an area three hundred meters wide for a clear field of fire. Here there will be only short crops that give no cover to attackers (there were similar crop setbacks along Manchurian railways). The hamlet wall has only two gates, each with gun ports. The planners provided alternate designs for intricate gates with baffles and offset entrances to block gunfire and frustrate attack—one of the plan's few potential variations.

Inside the wall is a ring of defensive open space, then a perimeter defensive road around the housing. The housing area is a block of 152 house lots, each with garden and outbuildings, arranged so that houses face each other across the roads (fig. 2.5). The planners chose even the rectangular shape of these lots for defense: they provide a narrow frontage with minimal distance between houses. Under attack, farmers running out of their houses would be close together, not isolated, and so better able to fight collectively than if houses were farther apart. At the center of the housing area is a plaza crossed by roads, which provides another clear field of fire for the "final line of defense" that it surrounds. This last stronghold is the large central building that holds the hamlet offices, school, store, workrooms, and other community facilities. A hallway runs around its perimeter, presenting a doubled wall to attackers. The central building has four entrances, two with defensive towers. At its center is a courtyard, doubling as a final refuge for the women and children of the hamlet (Uchida et al. 1933, 547–553).

The planners envisioned this building as a center of community life, but not the only center. Each hamlet has autonomous functions housed in its central community building, but each *mura* has its own center in the uninhabited area where its three component hamlets join. At this *mura* center is a complex of major facilities that a single hamlet would be unable to support: a shrine, athletic track field, cemetery and crematorium. The most important is the shrine, which the planners called the "most necessary institution" for these "immigrants of the Yamato race," and they deliberately put it here, on higher ground facing south. To increase shrine dignity, they set it near a field and track for military drill



Figure 2.5. Housing area plan.
Two roads approach the fortified gates, from east and west. The hamlet is conceived as a sequence of defensive areas—moat, wall and gates, open space, houses aligned and concentrated so that armed householders can assemble quickly, defensive plaza, and fortified community building with a central open space to shelter inhabitants—but the large area given to the plaza and the circular road around the central building also shows the importance of design aestheticism to the plan's authors. Illustration by Jose Cabrera.

and sports festivals. This shrine, as a cultural center, was essential for a psychologically comfortable life for permanent Japanese immigrants, a central goal of the plan (Uchida et al. 1933, 550–551).

The shrine's isolation reveals a flaw produced by the plan's careful and regular order. The *mura* center is on the hamlets' periphery, and so the shrine, the center of *mura* life, is as distant as possible from the fortified housing areas. The shrine's isolation is reinforced because main roads run directly from hamlet to hamlet, and not toward the shrine. The *mura* shrine is too far from the hamlet housing area to visit daily because of the frigid and long North Manchurian winter and the threat of attack, so each hamlet has a branch shrine in its central building. The *mura* shrine area is uninhabitable, and nothing that requires constant attendance or

defense can be put there. Following the logic of locating shared community facilities equidistant from the three hamlet housing areas, the planners wanted to place a *mura* school at the shrine complex, but since this area is indefensible, they give each village a smaller branch school. The shrine priest, who doubles as *mura* head and so unites administrative and religious functions, also must live in a hamlet removed from the shrine. Despite their concern for shrine dignity and importance for the lives of the settlers from "the divine nation" the planners leave it with the crematorium and cemetery undefended against desecration or destruction by the enemy (Uchida et al. 1933, 550–551).

The planners' simplified analysis of villagers' activities was the basis of the plan's hexagonal structure, which yielded minimal distances between housing and activity sites. That structure dictated that shared *mura* functions, identified by the planners as vital to the plan's success, be located in a place central to the *mura* but peripheral to the housing areas—despite the plan's intended rational coordination of space and activity. The plan's purpose has become imprisoned within its design rationality. Its abstraction moves sites of central activities away from the places where people are active—the hamlets where they live—in the name of minimal distances between home and activity.

There is no obvious solution to this problem within this design. If the planners situated the *mura* shrine, athletic fields, cemetery, and school within one of the walled hamlets in order to defend them, that housing area would become much larger and require more defensive structures, as well as encroach into the area planned for its agricultural fields. The shrine and school also now would be too far from the other hamlets to be easily accessible by their inhabitants. In other words, the plan accommodates two sets of very different activities—those of the Japanese settlers and those of the enemy it defends against—but fails to coordinate them smoothly. The coordination of the immigrants' activities and structures provides the formal basis for the plan. The enemy, however, can be given no permanent location within the plan. The enemy appears only as activity that cannot be integrated successfully into the space-time conception but nevertheless retains an inescapable negative presence in the defensive structures and spatial arrangements.

The planners identify those enemies as bandits, *hizoku,* a term that included a range of farmers, guerrillas, and others drifting in the aftermath of war. The Guandong Army established villages of Japanese soldier-

farmers in border areas of Manchukuo to defend against the Soviet Union, but in this immigrant village plan there is only a hint of a Soviet attack: sections of village roads are paved for use as military airstrips. The plan defends against a specifically Chinese enemy, who might even have farmed the land Japanese immigrants now occupy and defend. The village plan portrays the entire plain as completely Japanese; one sees at first not even a sliver of Chinese space in its hexagonal regularity. The possibility of a Chinese attack that haunts the plan requires that its hamlets be walled and defensive. But the design also dictates that the settlement's "most necessary institution," the shrine, be left uninhabited and exposed to attack.

There is another Chinese architectural presence within each household. Judging that a Japanese-style house would not be warm enough during the harsh Manchurian winter, the planners designed house and yard in modified Chinese style. As a result, Japanese farmers inevitably would adopt aspects of Chinese domestic life. Further, they set aside a 3.5-square-meter room in an outbuilding to house temporary Chinese agricultural laborers, who should not stay in Japanese farmhouses. The planners based their design on their calculation that 150 households could supply adequate labor for defense and agriculture, but here concede the necessity for additional workers. The design at first appears to create a self-sufficient agricultural village of independent Japanese landholders, but it does so by housing Chinese temporary workers in outbuildings. Manchuria's supposedly empty page could not be completely erased of Chineseness (Uchida et al. 1933, 554–555).

The adaptation of the Chinese farmhouse, a type suited to North Manchuria, was rational. As the planners point out, some Japanese colonists in Korea had built Japanese-style houses unsuited to that climate. This could be a fatal error in Manchuria. Instead, the planners used as a model Chinese farmhouses built of local materials, such as brick, stone, wood, and thatch. Their design was a line of south-facing rooms, each with a *kang*—a large brick structure with a fire chamber and elongated interior flues that warmed those on its platform surface. The planners made a few small concessions to what they call Japanese taste, such as putting windows and ventilation on the north side of the house to relieve summer heat and placing closets on the north side.

The house design contrasts with typical Japanese urban house and apartment design in Manchukuo. Japanese urban architecture in Man-

churia typically combined modern construction methods and a Russian stove or other coal-fired heating system with Western and Japanese-style rooms, especially rooms with tatami mats. Indeed, the head of the Manchuria Architectural Association dated the practice of putting tatami rooms in Western-style buildings to the Russo-Japanese War, when Japanese soldiers hauled tatami into captured Russian houses in Dairen and Port Arthur. But these planners designed agricultural immigrant villages, rather than apartments or villas for officials or company employees. (Both Kishida and Uchida later were concerned with planning housing areas in large cities in occupied areas, Kishida in Shinkyō, Uchida in Datong.) The distinction between Chinese and Japanese space, maintained with a Japanese shrine and by segregating Chinese labor from Japanese residences, did not extend to residence style.

Here the concern that the settlers preserve their Japaneseness (e.g., with the familiar form of the shrine) does not prevent the placement of the immigrants in a Chinese-style house. This may have been a failure of imagination or a concession of the ideal of domesticating Manchuria to Japanese comfort to cost constraints. There was a larger economic problem here. Japanese labor in Manchuria was unable to compete with low-paid Chinese labor. Japanese analysts generally attributed this to Chinese willingness to accept a much lower living standard. Despite the efforts of the Guandong Army and the Manchukuo and Japanese governments to restrict Chinese immigration and encourage, even subsidize, Japanese immigration, development projects were impractical without cheap Chinese labor. Here, too, despite the intent to build a Japanese village, the plan provided for temporary Chinese labor, indicating that the immigrants' labor would be insufficient. The Chinese-style house shows the plan's cost limitations and the planners' belief that Japanese-style housing would be inadequate and that a lower standard of living might be necessary (Uchida et al. 1933, 554–555).

Here, without competition from Chinese landholders, the Japanese immigrants are to adopt a Chinese house. Nevertheless, the planners designed the farmhouses to support what they called a "middle-class farm family life." The plan aims at a basic standard of housing supported by expensive facilities and public works. These include a public bathhouse sited within four hundred meters of each house, village clinics and *mura* physicians, schools, athletic fields, an engineered road system, and a community center with postal, radio, and other facilities. The planners'

technique is to combine low-cost housing built of cheap local materials with expensive community facilities. They aimed at an economic development program to create a prosperous Japanese agriculture in Manchuria (Uchida et al. 1933, 554).

The economic assumptions underlying the plan are obscured by its design rationality and geometric precision. Like its Procrustean geometry, its finance plan is detailed, but also overly general and unrealizable. Financial precision comes from the plan's resemblance to subdivision development, as the planners compare village lot sizes to suburban lot sizes. Identical hamlet and housing components allowed the planners to standardize cost calculation. The village wall, for instance, built with the dirt from the borrow ditch that forms the defensive moat beside it, comes in at 20 yen per running meter, while the community building at the center of each hamlet is 10 yen per square meter. It is one problem to calculate costs for a housing development, however, and another to calculate income for a self-supporting hamlet. A general design for real estate development could work well in a variety of situations and topographies. This task was more complicated (Uchida et al. 1933, 558).

The planners imagined their site as level ground undistorted by rivers or hills. This approach was encouraged by Kishida's 1932 airplane survey —the "view from sixteen hundred meters"—which flattened out topographical unevenness and overlooked inevitable local variations such as marshes, dry patches, or infertile ground that would be vital matters to farmers working an acreage on the inhospitable North Manchurian plain. The planners offered the plan as a model that could be adjusted to local conditions, but even if it were stretched or shrunk to fit local geography, it still has a fundamental contradiction. It specifies that all houses face south; indeed the house design, open to the south, sheltered to the north, requires this. But it also aligns the houses to oppose each other across east-west roads, so half must face north. Orienting each house to face south would require major redesign of roads and house lots.

There are other fundamental problems. On one hand, the plan is designed to support a self-sufficient agricultural community based on hand labor and draft animals. On the other hand, the design requires substantial technological competence to implement. Each village is to construct an extensive engineered network of roads and plazas, including 117.4 kilometers of two-meter roads, 14.1 kilometers of eighteen-meter roads, an array of ten- and six-meter roads in the fields, as well as a further

43,000 square meters of road and 483,100 square meters of plaza inside the hamlet walls. The eighteen-meter trunk roads were actually complicated structures that included a central six-meter vehicle road bounded by four-meter tree belts, and then two-meter footpaths—a sort of rural miniboulevard. The planners specified the six-meter road width to allow two vehicles or carts to pass each other and to provide room for large military vehicles and formations of marching troops. The plan was militarized even to this extent.

It was necessary for the road network to be unvaryingly straight not only because the roads needed to accommodate military vehicles, but also because any deviation would cut into the farm fields. The planners calculated field size to be adequate to support a small household, and they were not generous. If the road network were imprecise, farmers could lose land to roads—a difficult situation in a marginal agricultural economy. The complicated road network would require surveying, as would the layout of fields and the lots within the housing area. Construction of each village would require engineering and surveying skills. The plan to build fifty *mura* represented an expensive commitment of technology and training, even if no machinery were used except that needed to pave the sections of road used for airstrips (Uchida et al. 1933, 548–549).

Planners discussed highway, military, and emergency air transportation, but not the railroad, Manchuria's most important transportation system. The Manchukuo government undertook an extensive road construction program, but it had barely begun in 1933, and the road system in northern Manchuria was poor. Railways were essential to immigration and agricultural transport—indeed to the existing network of regional market towns and urban centers. This was a strange omission, since the SMR had carried out much of the basic research the planners used to understand Manchurian agriculture. Soybeans were the mainstay of Manchurian agriculture, and it was the SMR that transported them to the port of Dairen, hundreds of miles from North Manchuria, for export into the growing global soybean market. These planned agricultural immigrant villages, however, are isolated from railroads and bear no apparent spatial relation to any city, town, or market.

There also is no variation of size among these villages, no hierarchy of administration or market, no industry. The planners attempted to avoid such a hierarchy by situating the *mura* community facilities in the unin-

habited intersection of three hamlets—attempting to solve urban problems by placing urban facilities outside the populated areas and making them only temporarily available. Yet the plan necessarily creates inequalities by privileging one hamlet above the others. The shrine priest is also the *mura* chief, and must live in one of the three hamlets. The one doctor for each *mura* must also live in one of them. One hamlet is to have the head school, the other two its branches. One village inevitably would become administratively more important. With this necessary unevenness, the development of an urban hierarchy is implicit, but unacknowledged in the plan (Uchida et al. 1933, 551).

Like the supposed equality of the hamlets, the equality of the inhabitants also is suspect. The planners suppose only a minimal division of labor beyond that implied by sex and age, neither of which receives much attention from them. Japanese agricultural immigrants to Manchuria tended to be young and male, as did all Japanese residents in Manchuria, a frontier region with heavily male-weighted sex ratios among both Chinese and Japanese inhabitants. The planners specify that each *mura* will have a priest and chief, along with a physician; that each hamlet will have two teachers; and that a postal and telegraph office will be included in the hamlet offices. Not only do these requirements imply occupational specialization, these are occupations that enjoyed status prestige in the 1930s. Furthermore, the immigrant settlements were to be heavily militarized, with militia functions and a strong likelihood of a command structure. All of this implies the development of social and economic differentiation that would have spatial implications that the plan's geometric rigidity is poorly equipped to meet.

The planners also designed commercial and financial structures to have a minimal division of labor. They include a cooperative store, a sketchily described cooperative financial institution, and community equipment repair and crop storage facilities. Such facilities also provide opportunities for occupational specialization and for unequal accumulation of wealth, to which the planners do not object. In fact, they anticipate differences in landholdings, and would allow farmers to own more than one of the equally sized fields. If there were still 150 households, as the plan requires for defense, some probably would lack land, raising the possibility of the tenancy that was associated with the Japanese rural poverty they did not want to replicate.

If there were fewer than 150 households, the hamlet's labor and de-

fense forces would be reduced. The planners do not discuss whether these differences in landholding, other forms of wealth, or family size would lead to differences in houses. Would wealthier farmers want to continue to live in a dwelling based on the house of poor Chinese farmers? The planners also do not attempt to solve problems of differences in land quality or of differences in distance of fields from hamlet housing, even though farmers with distant fields would spend much more of their time in unproductive walking to the fields than would those with fields close by. The planners make no attempt to compensate for differences in circumstances, except to say that they accept differences arising within capitalism and to suggest that such inequalities might be solved by differential taxation (Uchida et al. 1933, 550–553).

Uchida and Kishida's immigrant village plan was in many ways remote from existing conditions in Manchuria. Its future would be even more suspect. The plan assumes rapid development and construction (shelter against the harsh winter would need to be built quickly), but then anticipates stasis: the hamlet and *mura* build themselves and then become unchanging armed camps. Even peace would bring the problem of the redundancy of the hundred youths who had been devoted to security. The planners seem to expect steady birth and death rates (even though such immigrants were overwhelmingly young, and age distribution would likely remain heavily weighted as this cohort aged). They account for no in- or out-migration for these villages based on immigration. Even if such villages had been built and occupied, instability was planned into their artificial household spatial equality.

The Manchurian agricultural immigrant village plan attempted to extend modernist urban design to rural life. Its fundamental analytical tool, the space-time conception, was to understand spatially the activity of the subject. Its aim was to build so that planning would remove the barriers between residence and activity, so that daily life would flourish in the absence of poverty. The modernist planned city was built up out of a multiplicity of individual lives, in order to allow their individuality. In this plan, however, the individual subject is only an abstraction, with the Japanese farmer-soldier a repeating unit, and the plan based on these repeating units is as regular as the beehive its hexagonal design mimics. The quotidian has become geometrical and aestheticized. The soldier-farmer is always mobilized, always Japanese, but no longer in Japan. Looked at one way, the plan seems to achieve its goal of accommodating itself to the

life of the farmers. Looked at another way, it aestheticizes them, ever on guard or laboring in the fields overlooked by an empty shrine, ever Japanese.

The International Planning Context of the Agricultural Immigrant Plan

The Japanese occupation of Manchuria allowed a range of development projects. The occupation placed few limits on development and utopian idealism, and even encouraged utopian projects. This sort of utopianism was not unique to Manchukuo in the early twentieth century, nor was the conceptual development that this plan exemplifies, the application of urban planning techniques to rural development. This conceptual development occurred in several different areas of the world during the 1920s and 1930s, under a variety of political and social arrangements, but marked by asymmetricality in social or political conditions, just as were Japan and Manchukuo. The agricultural immigrant village in Manchukuo was just one of several such projects.

In the United States, the Roosevelt administration began an ambitious rural and suburban resettlement program after it took office in 1933 (Hall 1988, 129–132; Ghirardo 1989, 110–182).[10] In the 1920s, Italian Fascists also planned agricultural new towns and resettlement. After taking power, they began programs of agricultural colonization that emphasized urban design in Italy, as well as in Libya and Ethiopia. Like the American New Deal resettlement program, this Italian new town program incorporated an anti-urban critique (Ghirardo 1989, 129–130, 24–109; Henneberg 1996). The German Nazi regime also envisioned a rural resettlement program to ease its substantial urban problems. In part, it developed from a 1931 subsistence homestead measure aimed at unemployment relief. Gottfried Feder, housing commissioner in 1934 and a city planner who later was influential in Japan, advanced such plans, which combined an autarchic agriculturist ideology with urban planning concepts (Lane 1968, 205–206, 267n; Schenk and Bromley 2003; Feder 1939). But these American, Italian, and German examples seem to have had no influence on the Manchurian village plan.

An earlier attempt to apply urban planning methods to rural settlement developed in the Zionist agricultural colonies in British-occupied Palestine in the 1920s. Settlement planning, especially of garden city sub-

urbs, was an important feature of this colonization on what planners described, despite the region's very long habitation, as "still virgin land." Planners believed that agriculture necessarily would be the economic base of this colonization, but they recognized that agricultural colonists faced serious problems, such as adaptation to a new land and climate, change of occupation, and economic competition from an existing population with a "much lower standard of living." Thus it was necessary to "create an absolutely new type of agricultural colony" that would meet economic, hygienic, and modern agricultural demands, as well as be suited to local conditions. Urban planning was necessary for these "modern agricultural colonies," but these Zionist planners, like the Japanese village planners a decade later, found no urban planning research usable for agricultural planning. Nevertheless, they set out in 1921 to build an initial colony according to the "principles of modern urban planning." By 1930 they had built many such colonies, with some designs strikingly similar to the design solutions used by the Japanese planners in 1933.[11]

Despite the wide political and social differences in these four examples, they share features that can illuminate the 1933 Manchukuo village plan. There are great differences between the Nazi attempt to recover a pure Aryan agricultural past through modern planning, the Fascist attempt to reform agriculture and revitalize Italian life by exporting fascist agricultural settlements to colonial Africa, the New Deal's garden city rural settlements, and Zionist agricultural settlements in colonial Palestine, but also significant similarities. Each exhibits a determination to apply modern methods to confront problems of modernization and to rehabilitate deeply troubled or backward rural areas or open up what seems new land. There was a resulting sharp disjunction between existing settlements and the injection of the modern, as the most developed techniques of city planning were applied to rural areas supposedly far removed from industrial cities.

This combination of an attempt to escape from urbanization to the rural with city planning techniques that sought to make the rural more modern and more urban was occurring in a wide range of areas in crisis across the world, and this was the contemporary background of the Japanese city planners' design of the agricultural immigrant village plan in Manchukuo. Their attempt to apply city planning techniques to the construction of agricultural villages was not unique, but this proposal for an agricultural immigrant village network in Manchukuo is notable for its

combination of militarization, large scale, integration, utopian design-rationality, and extreme regularity.

Occupation and the White Page

The Manchukuoan village network remained in the world of the drawing board—the true empty page—but its utopian atmosphere should not mislead us into concluding that the immigrant village plan was far removed from actual conditions in Manchukuo. Japanese agricultural immigrant colonies were a real-world phenomenon that brought hundreds of thousands of settlers to Manchuria and continued during much of the Manchukuo era. These agricultural colonies were often militarized, and they continued to attract interest from architects, although without the degree of design rationality and integration of this village network plan. City planning, sometimes on a very large scale and often aiming at model or ideal cities, was an ongoing feature of Manchukuo and the Japanese occupation of China, despite the severe limitations of capital, building materials, and labor that these occupations eventually faced.

The commitment was rooted in the experience of the Japanese colonialism from which the occupation of Manchuria grew. Spatial analysis and control, government investment in urban and rural infrastructure, and sanitary, educational, and other cultural facilities became typical components of state-led economic development in the Japanese colonies of Taiwan, Korea, and the Guandong Territory. This was especially true of the SMR, which saw city planning as an important part of its "mission" to bring civilization and progress to Manchuria and Mongolia. As part of Japanese colonial management of the Guandong Territory and the SMR areas, the Guandong Army had a long involvement with city planning before it moved to seize all of Manchuria in 1931 and created Manchukuo. Itagaki Seishirō, one of the main army planners of the occupation of Manchuria was at the same time a member of the city planning committee for Dairen.

Accustomed to city planning's role in colonial administration, the army was highly receptive to the role of spatial planning in the planned economic development of Manchuria. Army plans for development included large-scale city and regional planning as important components of national economic development, which would be integrated and extend down to the local level.[12] The army encouraged utopian rhetoric of

a Manchukuo that would be a "paradise of the Kingly Way" and made no clear distinction between economic and cultural development. Manchukuo soon proved a paradise for city planners. The army immediately asked for new plans for three large cities—the industrial city of Shenyang, the northern center of Harbin, and the new capital of Shinkyō, which was to be built on bean fields bordering the agricultural market town of Changchun. Work on this new capital, planned to be a world city of a million featuring a checklist of every sort of cultural facility from a university and parks down to the first rubberized athletic track in Asia, began even before the official foundation of Manchukuo. By 1934, the army had requested plans for more than fifty cities and towns, two with populations to increase by 150 percent to a million in thirty years and others with controlled population growth of two, four, ten, or more times (Keizai chōsakai 1935, 41–44).

The army's commitment to planning continued, and even grew, as it invaded all of China in 1937 and used city planning as a management tool. While the Japanese government was compelled to impose controls on construction and building materials in Japan in order to support the war effort in China, the army and the occupation regimes it controlled in China announced extensive plans for cities in China, including a twenty-year, 3,000-square-kilometer plan for a Greater Beijing. Kishida's plan for Canton and Uchida's for Datong were part of this long run of military enthusiasm for city planning. Their 1933 utopian plan for a network of agricultural immigrant villages in Manchukuo was not at all idiosyncratic. The rulers of Manchukuo were sympathetic to such utopian dreaming. The context of occupation and victory made such dreams seem realizable, just as it did the plans for new cities in China.

Like city planning, a tradition of subsidized agricultural colonies was a bequest of Japanese colonialism to Manchukuo. The dream of peopling Manchuria with Japanese agricultural immigrants extended back to the early days of the Japanese occupation of the Guandong Territory. The colonial regime soon recognized the fundamental difficulty of what the Guandong civil governor in 1913 called the "failure" of importing Japanese labor for agriculture. Japanese could not compete with Chinese whose "standard of living is so much lower, and who can afford to accept ridiculously cheap wages."[13]

Poor Japanese farmers newly arrived in Manchuria had great difficulty competing with Chinese already settled there, sometimes for genera-

tions, and with the migrants who flowed in from North China. The pre-Manchukuo solution, like the Manchukuo solution, was to subsidize agricultural colonization and subsidize it massively. After years of efforts, in 1930, the SMR organized the Dairen Agricultural Joint Stock Company, Dairen nōji kabushiki kaisha, with 10,000,000 yen in capital and the goal of settling five hundred Japanese farm households. It failed. In 1937, the Guandong government noted that in 1906 there had been 6 Japanese and 36,501 Manchurian (i.e., Chinese) agricultural households in the leasehold, figures that had increased in 1934 to only 406 Japanese, but 63,867 Manchurian farm families—hardly a successful outcome. Japanese agricultural immigration was, despite subsidization and Japanese administrative control of the colony, overwhelmed by the tide of Chinese immigration (Kantōkyoku 1937, 344, 354, 358–361; Dairen 1930). These unspectacular results did not discourage efforts to bring Japanese agricultural immigrants to Manchukuo. Even though large numbers of subsidized Japanese agricultural immigrants settled in Manchukuo, they were far outnumbered by Chinese immigration in 1939 alone.

What was new in Manchukuo, and following it, in China, was the exponential growth in the scale of available space and a similar growth in the size of plans. When, in 1931, the Guandong Army burst out of its confines in the cramped Guandong Territory and the SMR areas, it and its helpers became intoxicated with the prospect of controlling and using the seemingly endless resources of Manchuria, including its vast space. The planners of Manchukuo, including the authors of this agricultural village plan, saw the spatial possibility of Manchuria but refused or were unable to recognize the limitations of their abilities to impose a hyperrational, utopian spatial order on Manchuria and its people, however invisible those people are in that village plan.

The vision of utopian order in Manchukuo was deeply compelling. The basis of that order, however, was the disorder of warfare, a disorder that spread throughout China during the almost fourteen years of Manchukuo. The Guandong Army was determined to impose order on Manchuria, and besides instituting the most draconian measures within Manchukuo, this attempt propelled Japanese armies outside Manchukuo into North China, Mongolia, and eventually into a massive war in China and the Pacific that ended only after Japanese cities had been burned.

Manchukuo represented a particularly attractive opportunity to practice utopianism. The Manchukuo agricultural immigrant village plan is

an example of that utopianism, which the seizure of Manchuria made possible. It envisioned the white page of an almost endless Manchurian plain, either uninhabited or a wasteland of "bandits." On this imaginary landscape, architects used the most modern techniques to attempt their utopia. Such a determination to produce order was fundamental to the entire Manchukuo project, as it was to earlier Japanese colonialism. Within the increased scale of Manchukuo it seemed possible to achieve greater order, to dream greater dreams.

NOTES

1. Young (1998, 98) puts the number of agricultural emigrants at 321,882.
2. During the first few years after the founding of Manchukuo in 1932, the Guandong Army and the government of Manchukuo, in a controlled attempt to restrict Chinese immigration, tried to make Manchuria increasingly Japanese by encouraging Japanese immigration. At the same time they undertook labor-intensive development projects that required massive Chinese labor immigration. Manchuria's population was about 30.5 million in 1930 and reached 44.6 million by 1940. Immigration from China accounted for 25 percent of Manchurian population growth in the twentieth century, and Han Chinese made up the vast majority of the region. In 1940, there were 820,000 Japanese in Manchukuo, but they were only 1.8 percent of the total population. Furthermore, Chinese immigration accelerated as the regime intensified development, so that by 1940, population was growing at a five-year rate of 24.5 percent. Wang 1971, 139, 145, 183.
3. Uchida might be best known as the architect of the Tokyo University campus after the earthquake and of the Japanese pavilions at the 1939 New York and San Francisco world's fairs.
4. For Kishida's role in the development of Japanese architectural modernism, see works by Reynolds (2001) and Stewart (1987, 152, 171–172, 191–192). For his planning of Shinkyō and Canton, see Kishida 1942. Hishida was prominent enough in the Home Ministry that the article on city planning in the *Japan Times and Mail*'s 1936 survey *Architectural Japan* was published under his name.
5. Kasahara's *Kenchikubutsu hōki gaisetsu* (1954) went through many editions and continued to be published long after his death.
6. See the English-language translation provided for the proposal's title—"Model Plan of 'Siedlung' for the Agricultural Immigrant in Manshuu-Koku"—and the authors' comparison of their proposal to "contemporary Western domestic housing colony plans" *(kokunai shokumin kyojū keikaku),* "the so-called Seidlung" *(ji-torunku)* (Uchida et al., 1933 562).
7. For Uchida's role in agricultural housing reform, see Nihon kenchiku gakkai 1972, 1252–1256, 1271–1275.

8. This arrangement of rectangular fields backed by woodland is similar to the New Fields village plan at Satomi in Saitama prefecture near Tokyo (Andre Sorensen, personal communication).
9. The idea of the white space or blank canvas and blank slate was also an essential part of Western modern architecture and colonial planning.
10. The Division of Subsistence Homesteads and the Resettlement Administration began to build communities to establish economic self-sufficiency for the poor, in part as a measure against urban problems. Of these, the Greenbelt communities, which explicitly used garden city design, became influential urban planning achievements. The federal government had complete control over them and was able to use compulsory land purchase and to control construction in the realization of these plans.
11. According to Richard Kauffman, a planner active in Palestine since 1920. He presented several examples of these designs at the large 1931 Paris International Conference of Colonial Urban Planning (1932, 224–238).
12. This is evident in the 8 December 1931 policy draft for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia and the Manchukuo government's economic construction program, published in March 1933. See Katakura 1964, 291–292 and Manshūkoku Kokumu Sōri 1933.
13. See *Manchuria Daily News,* 14 February 1913.

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3 Princess, Traitor, Soldier, Spy

Aisin Gioro Xianyu and the Dilemma of Manchu Identity

DAN SHAO

I am a Chinese. Naturally I hate Doihara Kenji. As a person educated and brought up in Japan, I also hate him because I love Japan. As a member of the Manchu royal family, I hate him too because he destroyed the last good image of the Manchu dynasty in the mind of Chinese people.
—Aisin Gioro Xianyu, "Tribunal Record of the Defense Department," 18 July 1947.

In late March 1948, news agencies in China, Japan, and the United States reported that the Chinese Guomindang government had executed Aisin Gioro Xianyu (1906?–1948) for high treason.[1] In the Japanese reports, she was called "Manchukuo's Joan of Arc" or "a beauty in male attire" *(dansō no reijin)*.[2] Americans referred to her as the "Mata Hari of East Asia," while the Chinese knew her as the mysterious Jin Bihui (Radiant Jade) (see, e.g., *Dagong bao,* 26 March 1948; *Asahi shinbun,* 23 March, 26 March 1948; *Life,* 26 April 1948; *Newsweek,* 5 April 1948). Xianyu appears frequently under these names in postwar memoirs in Japanese, Chinese, and English, where her image varies from the licentious to the naïve. Beginning in the 1930s, her story has inspired novels and movies in China and Japan. She even makes a cameo appearance in Bernardo Bertolucci's *The Last Emperor,* turning up in a pilot's uniform at the last emperor's small court in Tianjin.

How did Aisin Gioro Xianyu, alias Kawashima Yoshiko, become the traitor Jin Bihui? Living in an era replete with civil and international wars, Xianyu's repeated crossing of national and cultural boundaries puts her squarely within an entire generation of people with complicated transnational and cross-ethnic profiles. In the following pages, drawing on newspapers, magazines, court transcripts,[3] biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs, I will document and examine the representations of Xianyu's identities from the 1930s to the present. My goal in observing these re-

configurations of Xianyu's identities is to study the interaction between transformation of individual identities and the process of nation building and state formation. Xianyu's case reveals in particular the impact of the Sino-Japanese contest over Manchuria on Manchu identity and the way in which Qing banner identity was redefined and obliterated within a framework of nationalistic legal, moral, and rhetorical codes.[4]

Xianyu was one of many who experienced China's passage from a dynastic empire to a republican state and the transition of Manchuria from a frontier area beyond the control of the Chinese Republican government to a self-claimed independent state whose nationhood was denied by the international world. During the first half of the twentieth century, Manchuria, the legendary space claimed as the Manchu homeland by the Qing court (Elliott 2000), became "the cockpit of Asia," where clashes between the colonialism of an expanding Japanese empire and the nationalism of a fledgling Chinese republic spawned different strains of ethno-nationalist rhetoric and experimental political ideologies. Confrontations arose between different versions of the past and the future for local inhabitants (Duara 2003). Territorial and identity boundaries shifted unpredictably, especially when Japanese imperialism created a transnational space in Manchuria, producing multitiered identities that people living in that space could use. Meanwhile, the Republic of China was also redefining the territorial boundaries of Manchuria as well as identity boundaries in the newly developing concept of the Chinese nation.[5] It was in such turbulent times that Xianyu tried to negotiate her personal ethnic and national identities. This study is an attempt to foreground the individual experience in identity formation.

For some time now, historians have focused on the institutional construction or "imagination" of collective identities, especially as regards ethnicity and nation. While this focus has produced much insightful scholarship, by and large it has come at the cost of examining individual or experiential aspects. That is, while historians often advocate bringing people's voices into historical studies, analyses of racial, ethnic, and national identities tend to dwell on collective identity, relegating individuals to part of a faceless background. As a result, though historical conceptualizations of ethnic and national identities have reached considerable breadth, individual reconfigurations of ethnic and national identities are sometimes overlooked, perhaps under the assumption that communal identities are imagined for the people and not by them. My belief is that

biographical research is important in helping us decipher the relations between an individual and his or her community.[6] If we define identity as a "*relationship* between self and others—[which] may hence be applied to any entity, individual or collective" (Dittmer and Kim 1993, 4), there is no reason why individual experiences of identity adjustment should be ignored in favor of the group experience. As Anthony Cohen suggests, "Looking at individuals' boundary transformations may alert us to the qualitative nature of collective boundaries" (1994, 66). I would also like to suggest that biographical studies of an individual's boundary transformations will help us to see the interrelations and disparities between scholarly, or "scientific," definitions and ordinary notions of ethnic and national identities.

Some may challenge my choice of such a well-known historical figure: "Why choose her, and not an ordinary person?" This is a fair question. Historians, of course, often lament their limited access to the voices of the "common man" or "common woman" in the past, and I can only join their lament. Nonetheless, I believe that Xianyu is a pertinent subject because, compared to scholarly and governmental definitions of ethnicity and nationality, her conceptualization of ethnic and national identities is as unscholarly or unscientific as that of less-famous people. An analysis of how Xianyu has been represented since the 1930s shows quite well that national identity is not necessarily the "master identity" by which an individual will identify him- or herself, or be identified by others. Xianyu's experiences and the stories about her in wartime clearly reveal the ambiguous, negotiable nature of ethnicity and nationality. In contrast, her trial for treason after the war demonstrates when and how the boundaries between groups, ethnic or national, are hardened. Furthermore, portrayals of Xianyu in media and literature after her death reveal that moral codes of different historical periods can revise her identity, where once that identity was considered nonnegotiable. Based on Xianyu's case, this chapter will trace how Manchu identity was transformed, negotiated, and redefined during an era of shifting political boundaries. All in all, her case offers the historian many avenues along which the gaps and correspondences between individual and collective identity may be examined. I will use the three names—Xianyu, Jin Bihui, and Kawashima Yoshiko—interchangeably depending on which of her identities is at stake.

"A flake of snow next to a hot stove": A Brief Biography of Xianyu

On 25 March 1948, Xianyu was led from her prison cell to be shot. Thus ended the short life of the fourteenth daughter of Shanqi (1866–1922), Prince Su of the late Qing dynasty (Rhoads 2000, 235–256; Shanqi 1928).[7] She told a journalist several days before the execution that she felt her life melting away, confiding, "Today I am like a flake of snow next to a hot stove."[8] How did this flake of snow get close to a hot stove?

Born in Beijing about 1906 (her exact date of birth remains unclear), Xianyu spent her childhood in two countries, China and Japan. A photo of the young Xianyu, taken in China about 1912, shows a girl about six years of age in a traditional Manchu dress (fig. 3.1) (see photos in Niu 1994). In another picture taken in 1916, young Xianyu, dressed in a Japanese kimono, stands by her foster father, Kawashima Naniwa (1865–1949), among a group of military students (Umemoto 1984). Behind the change from Manchu to Japanese dress is the story of how two ambitious men, one a Manchu prince and the other a Japanese adventurer, educated the little girl in their political ideals.

In 1912, when Xianyu was about six, the Manchu imperial court was forced to announce the abdication of its three-year-old emperor, Aisin Gioro Puyi. Xianyu's father, Prince Su, was unwavering in his support of the restoration of the Qing dynasty and the independence of Manchuria-Mongolia. A Japanese acquaintance, Kawashima Naniwa, who helped the Qing court with training at the Beijing Police Academy (Reynolds 1993, 164–172), also actively participated in the restoration movement. To procure assistance from the Japanese and to demonstrate his trust in Kawashima Naniwa, Prince Su gave up his fourteenth daughter, Aisin Gioro Xianyu, to him for adoption in 1912. Xianyu then was renamed Kawashima Yoshiko. The friendship between Xianyu's Manchu birth father and her Japanese foster father was based on the common dream of restoring the Manchu dynasty or, at least, the shared goal of winning independence for Manchuria and Mongolia. Their shared daughter inherited their restoration dream. At the age of twenty-two, Xianyu was married to Ganjurjab, the son of a Mongolian general who had once helped Prince Su with the restoration project in Mongolia.

Several years later, however, she divorced him and began a colorful life on her own. In the early 1930s she was involved in the establishment

Figure 3.1. Aisin Gioro Xianyu in about 1912.
She is about six years old and is wearing traditional Manchu dress.
Niu 1994.

of Manchukuo, helping the last empress to flee from Tianjin to Manchuria. She organized an army, the Anguo jun (Pacifying-the-state army), and participated in Japanese military actions at Rehe (1933).[9] During the war, Xianyu was known for her banner identity and Manchu royal blood. This identity gained her access to powerful Japanese and Chinese figures. She befriended numerous Japanese and Chinese military and political celebrities (Tanaka 1979, 449–468), and her social circle included such illustrious names as Tanaka Ryūkichi (1893–1972), Tada Hayashi (1882–1948), Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946), Doihara Kenji (1883–1948), and Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–1944).[10]

With the surrender of Japan in 1945, Xianyu was arrested and charged with treason. At her trial, she maintained that she was a Japanese national with Chinese blood on the grounds that she had been adopted by Kawashima Naniwa at a very young age and had been educated in Japan. She also used her banner identity to excuse her activities against the Republican government during the war. In the oral and written confessions submitted during her interrogation and trial, she consistently identified herself as a bannerperson *(qiren),* lending credence to her belief in the righteousness of her devotion to the restoration cause (Niu 1994, 170, 176, 188, 192, 253). Her defense lawyers also argued that Xianyu's wartime activities were motivated by her desire to restore the Manchu dynasty, which was a domestic problem between Manchus and Han, not a problem of treason against China. In the end, she was tried as a Chinese traitor. The court accepted the prosecutor's argument that because her father had Chinese nationality, she was a Chinese citizen. Accordingly, Xianyu was sentenced to death by the Supreme Court of Hebei on 3 March 1948, and on 25 March, she was executed in Beiping (now Beijing) (Niu 1994, 604–605; Masui 1977, 273–282; see also *Dagong bao,* 26 March 1948; *Asahi shinbun,* 23 March, 26 March 1948; *Yomiuri shinbun,* 26 March 1948; *Life,* 26 April 1948). Her body was claimed by a Japanese monk, Furukawa Daikō, and was sent to a cemetery for the Japanese in Beiping (*Dagong bao,* 26 March 1948; Kamisaka 1984).[11] In 1949, ashes from her bones were buried beside her foster parents' tomb at Matsumoto City, Japan.[12] Her birth father would most likely never have imagined that on the last legal form she signed before her execution his daughter would use her Chinese name, Jin Bihui, not her Manchu name, Aisin Gioro Xianyu (Niu 1994, 599).

How did her Manchu identity get lost in contemporary historical memory?

Xianyu Represented in Japan and America

Among the thousands of publications on Manchuria in Japan in the 1930s, Xianyu's background and her legendary adventures in Manchuria became well known. Her fame in Japan can be ascribed to a contemporary Japanese novel, *Dansō no reijin: Kawashima Yoshiko den* (A beauty dressed in male attire: A biography of Kawashima Yoshiko), written by Muramatsu Shōfū (1889–1961) and published in 1933.[13] Muramatsu's heroine, Mariko, is a princess from a Qing royal family who has a family background identical to Xianyu's. Mariko's birth father is "Shuku shin-ō" (Prince Su) of the Qing dynasty. Her Japanese foster father, a man named Kajiwara Yoshiru, is a close friend to Prince Su, and trained the Chinese police in Beijing. This obviously corresponds to an exact description of the real Kawashima Naniwa.

As he reported in the afterword to his novel, Muramatsu Shōfū interviewed Kawashima Yoshiko in person. Mariko's view of Manchurian problems in the novel reflected Xianyu's opinion. In the novel, when Mariko is asked whether Manchuria belonged to China, she answers:

> No, this is what the Chinese believe. We Manchus (Manshūjin) wouldn't think in that way. We Manchus annexed China. Now the Chinese are annexing Manchuria. Therefore, China is China, while Manchuria is Manchuria. They are different. Since we have our own serene emperor, we don't obey the rule of the Nationalist Party or Jiang Zhongzheng [Jiang Jieshi/Chiang Kai-shek] wherever we are. (Muramatsu 1933, 127)[14]

Mariko's view clearly reflects a very different understanding of the nature of relations between Manchuria and China, and between Manchus and Chinese, from that held by the Republican government.

Besides Muramatsu's novel, Japanese news reports and stories about Xianyu in wartime catapulted her to fame. She was invited to give public speeches on radio and in the city hall of Matsumoto, her Japanese hometown. She contributed an article to *Fujin kōron.*[15] News of Xianyu, a media darling, was plastered all over various newspapers. A report in *Asahi shinbun,* with a photo of her in military uniform, added ethno-

nationalistic and exotic color to the Japanese press coverage of the Rehe campaign, introducing her family background and praising her involvement in political affairs (22 February 1933; fig. 3.2).[16] The *Manchuria Daily News (MDN),* an English newspaper in Dalian, often reported her activities.[17] A young American woman who met Xianyu in China was surprised at the high reputation that Kawashima Yoshiko enjoyed among the Japanese, both in Japan and overseas: "I've never met a native-born Japanese who hasn't at least heard of the princess. Even in America the Nippons who read magazines from their home country know of her" (Woods 1937, 29).

Written accounts by the Japanese for the most part represent Xianyu as a brave woman, determined to restore the Qing dynasty. Although they never missed the point that she was a princess of the Qing royal house, they seldom used "Manchu" or "Manchus" to describe their heroine's ethnicity. Perhaps this was because Japanese popular notions of racial or ethnic conflicts between Manchus and Han were not as strong as scholarly notions. These authors took great interest in Xianyu's resistance to the Republic of China, her royal blood, and the unconventional social role she assumed as a woman (see, e.g., Umemoto 1957). For example, in the afterword to his novel, Muramatsu used the word *joketsu* (outstanding woman) to express his admiration for Kawashima Yoshiko's involvement in military campaigns and politics (Muramatsu 1933, 341–343).

Xianyu's life and career caught the attention of Americans, too. Kawashima Yoshiko was a myth from the Orient and came to attention at a time when the ostensible mystery of the Orient exercised a potent hold on the public imagination, as evidenced by the popularity of such figures as Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan. Willa Lou Woods was an American college student who took the opportunity offered by the Japan-America Student Conference held in Tokyo to travel around in Asia in the early 1930s. She met Aisin Gioro Xianyu in Tianjin and lived in her house for five days. When she returned to the United States, she published a memoir titled *Princess Jin: The Joan of Arc of the Orient.* Woods summarized Xianyu's experiences on the cover of her book as follows: "The remarkable story of a Chinese girl of many accomplishments. Born of royal blood, she was made an orphan by the Chinese rebellion of 1911. Educated in Japan, she returned to her native country at nineteen in an effort to help her people. While she is not in sympathy with the present government of China, she does not approve of the Japanese tactics" (Woods

Figure 3.2. "A beauty in male attire: Ms. Kawashima Yoshiko"
(Dansō no reijin: Kawashima Yoshiko jō).
Asahi shinbun, 22 February 1933. Reprinted by permission.

1937). This young American woman observed Princess Jin's daily life and listened to her stories. Woods seemingly was unaware of Xianyu's Manchu name, but she was fully aware of the complicated identities of "the Joan of Arc of the Orient." Woods brought up the question directly to Xianyu. She asked, "Up in Peking they sometimes call you Miss Yoshiko Kawashima, and sometimes Princess B. H. Jin, and sometimes Girl Commander. Why is that?" (Woods 1937, 8). Unfortunately Woods did not write down Xianyu's response.

Xianyu showed full hospitality to this young American, taking her to the theater, to the dance hall, and on bicycling excursions in Tianjin. She told Woods about her military experiences, including the Rehe campaign, and her espionage activities, such as her underground life as a taxi dancer and as an intelligence collector in Shanghai. Although some details about her life and career in Woods' memoir are wrong or exaggerated, Xianyu made the American fully aware of her determination to "restore the lost Manchu dynasty" (Woods 1937, 9). In Woods' eyes, Princess Jin was "between two fires"—"her adopted people" and "her own native country"—at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1931. Xianyu explained to Woods that she chose to support the Japanese because "she thought of the way in which her parents had been treated and her brothers killed" (Woods 1937, 18). How badly Xianyu's parents were treated or how her brothers were killed is unclear. In fact, her birth mother and Prince Su died when she was very young. Some of her brothers were still alive in the 1980s, when Kamisaka Fuyuko interviewed them. Nevertheless, Xianyu's complaint about the Republican government's treatment of her family reflects the awkward situation of the lives of Manchus in the years following the 1911 Revolution.[18]

Although Xianyu lived in Japan for a long time and perhaps experienced no prejudice for being Manchu, there are two possible reasons why she told Woods about the bad treatment her family suffered while in China. First, she was informed by her contacts or relatives in China of the bad conditions in which many Manchus lived. Second, she justified her support for Japan's stand in the Sino-Japanese War with the assumption that one was always right to defend the interest and honor of one's family and community against the forces or foes that hurt them. Perhaps she also tried to use Woods, who she thought could give her publicity in the West, to amplify her own importance and to enhance the image she

had of herself—a Manchu princess and soldier with a mission of revenge. Xianyu succeeded.

In Woods' memoir, Xianyu's political views are presented as being independent from both the Chinese and the Japanese side. When Woods expressed her support of China as a republic and her opposition to the Japanese invasion, she was reprimanded by Xianyu, who said that neither the Nanjing nor the Manchukuo government was satisfactory. Woods' memoir also emphasized Xianyu's critique of Puyi. Xianyu told Woods that "Puyi is too . . . too 'tender.' He does what Japanese tell him to." She added, "I will never do what they [Japanese] say" (Woods 1937, 12). Xianyu seems to have expressed her criticism of the Japanese frankly in front of Woods. Given the extent of Xianyu's Japanese connections this is a little surprising, and we cannot rule out the possibility that Woods, considering her American readers, might have wanted to highlight Xianyu's negative views of the Japanese in Manchukuo. Nevertheless, Woods describes Xianyu as a "truly remarkable girl," someone who held special political aims not in accord with the official views of either Republican China or imperial Japan, and who crossed the national boundaries between Japan and China geographically and culturally. Woods described Xianyu's house as "a strange mixture of Chinese and Japanese! . . . And they said that while the royal family itself is of Manchu descent, the princess acts for all the world like an informal American" (Woods 1937, 6). The ambiguity of Xianyu's complicated identities is further implied in Woods' alternating use of the terms "Chinese princess" and "Manchu princess" to describe her. Woods does not seem to be conscious of any difference between these expressions, suggesting that she believed them to be interchangeable. As a result, the reader is left to puzzle out on the meaning of "the Joan of Arc of the Orient": whose Joan of Arc was Xianyu? Was she the heroine of the Chinese or the Manchus?

This 1930s image of Xianyu as the Joan of the Arc of the Orient was replaced in the 1940s by that of the "Mata Hari of the Orient." Xianyu's espionage activities and her lifestyle no doubt contributed to this reputation (Burke 1947). In 1946, a military officer at the American embassy in China sent a request to the Military Committee of the Nationalist Party asking for an investigation of Xianyu's espionage activities (Niu 1994, 132–135). Her reputation as a spy was not limited to intelligence agencies. Western media called her Eastern or Japan's Mata Hari. An article in *Newsweek* (5 April 1948), reporting on her execution, opened with the

following lines: "To the Japanese she was 'Manchukuo's Joan of Arc.' . . . To the incautious Chinese officers she was Radiant Jade when, as the Mata Hari of Greater East Asia, she masqueraded as a dancing girl or prostitute in the cabarets and opium dens of Shanghai." In the 26 April 1948 issue of *Life* magazine, the title of an illustrated report on Xianyu's execution in Beiping reads, "Death of a spy: Chinese shoot 'Eastern Mata Hari' and display body outside the jail." Although this news reported Xianyu's Manchu identity, her Manchu name was unmentioned. Her image as a Mata Hari has lasted: in an October 1990 *Cineforum* movie review of Fong Ling-Ching's movie *Kawashima Yoshiko,* she was still referred to as "una Mata Hari." Her reputation as a Mata Hari predicted how her trial was going to end.

Manchu Joan of Arc or Chinese Traitor: Jin Bihui on Trial

About two months after the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, Aisin Gioro Xianyu was arrested at her house in Beiping. The Nationalist government accused her of being a traitor and charged her with the following crimes: serving as an official at the Manchukuo court and as chairman of the Manchukuo Overseas Students' Association in Japan, recruiting bandits and organizing the Dingguo Army for Manchukuo, participating in the Rehe campaign against China, passing confidential information to Japan, and trying to "revive the Manchus" *(fuxing Manzhouzu)* and move Puyi back to Beijing (Niu 1994, 148–150).

In the records of a series of interrogations as well as in Xianyu's written confession *(zibaishu),* Jin Bihui is the name most often used by herself and by the court. Name selection had subtle ethnic and national implications in Xianyu's case. The earliest official communications and files on her case all addressed her as Chuandao Fangzi (the Chinese pronunciation of Kawashima Yoshiko) followed by brackets in which her Chinese name, Jin Bihui, was added (Niu 1994, 8, 15, 19). Gradually, the Chinese name was used as the original name in official documents. One communication between Chinese authorities underscores the importance of this name change: "If her Japanese nationality *(riji)* is confirmed, she should be tried as a war criminal at the tribunal. If her Chinese nationality *(benji)* is confirmed, she should be tried as a Chinese traitor. . . . This question has been posed by the Committee on Trial for Treason" (Niu 1994, 97).

Xianyu did not notice the legal immediacy in the nuance of her choice of names until her defense counselors tried to base their defense statement on her Manchu ethnic background and nationality as a Japanese. At the beginning of a series of interrogations, Xianyu only used her Chinese name, Jin Bihui. In almost every interrogation the defendant was asked the same questions about her name, age, hometown, and address. Except for her address, Xianyu's answers varied over time. On 11 December 1945, her answer to the opening question was, "Jin Bihui. Age 32. From Beijing" (Niu 1994, 24). Later, Xianyu chose to emphasize her identity as a bannerperson and reclaimed her Manchu name. At an interrogation on 18 July 1947, Xianyu offered a very different answer to the routine opening questions:

> [My name is] Aisin Gioro (it means Jin, gold, in Chinese). [I'm] the eleventh generation with the generation name Xian. People of the eight banners [use] the generation name as the surname. My given name is Yu. My literary name is Dongzhen. Because I lived with a Japanese, Kawashima Naniwa, and for convenience in school, I was also named Kawashima Yoshiko. After the September 18 Incident [Mukden Incident], for the first time I knew that I was actually Chinese. I asked my elder brother Jin Bidong [about my background]. He reported to Puyi, who gave me the name Jin Bihui.[19] (Niu 1994, 242) (fig. 3.3)

On 15 October 1947, her answer to the routine opening questions at a debate session at the court indicates that she and her defense counselors tried to negotiate her identity. Her answer reads, "I am Jin Bihui. [I am] thirty-two years old. [I am of] Japanese nationality" (Niu 1994, 372). The next day, she added one short sentence to her answer. "I am Jin Bihui. Thirty-two years old. [I have] *Chinese blood lineage (Zhongguo xuetong),* [but] Japanese nationality" (Niu 1994, 384; emphasis added). Throughout her written confession, the interrogation records, and the defense statements, Xianyu never denied that she was of Chinese blood and that she was Chinese *(Zhongguo ren)*. However, her usage of the identity label "Chinese" was different from the prosecutor's; it was not related to citizenship. This difference revealed the slipperiness of the identity label in both dimensions of self-perception and others' designation.[20]

What she and her lawyers were negotiating was the relation between her Chinese, Manchu, and Japanese identities. Their defense focused on two questions: Did Xianyu have Chinese or Japanese nationality? And



Figure 3.3. "Written Record of Investigation by the Tribunal of War Criminals, Department of National Defense."
Here Xianyu explained why she had Manchu, Japanese, and Han names. Niu 1994, 242.

were her anti-Nationalist and pro-Japanese activities during the war pardonable, considering her Manchu background?

Xianyu demonstrated her identity as a Manchu bannerperson on various occasions. Although her lawyers used the phrase "Manchu-Han relations" in their defense statement, she did not use the term "Manzu" (Manchu) or "Manren" in her vocabulary of identity. To her lawyers, the tension between Manchus and Han Chinese was identical to that between *qiren* (bannerpeople) and Han people. To Xianyu, banner identity distinguished her from the Han population. She repeatedly demonstrated her consciousness of being a bannerperson in her interrogations and during her trial.[21] Her written confession and court transcripts will help us dis-



Figure 3.4. Xianyu's handwritten confession (in Chinese).
The character of *"qi"* for *"qiren"* (bannerpeople) is wrong. Niu 1994, 64.

cover more about her self-perception and her use of banner identity to justify her activities during wartime.

Xianyu confessed that at first she was glad that Puyi had returned to the land of their ancestors during the early Manchukuo years. She even had a dream that the north should be ruled by the emperor, and the south by Jiang Jieshi. However, the dire conditions in which most bannermen lived shattered her dreams of restoration. She concluded that the Japanese had no intention of helping either the Han or the bannerpeople, and that they just wanted to use the emperor. At the end of this written confession, she demonstrated her understanding of the relationship between Han Chinese and bannerpeople: "It does not matter whether [I am] a Han or a bannerperson. [The two groups] are an inseparable family. This is what I finally figured out while I am in prison" (Niu 1994, 46–65; quotation at 65) (fig. 3.4).[22] Whether or not she sincerely believed in the above statement, we do not know, but she seems to have concluded that mouthing the rhetoric of Manchus and Han as a single

"family" was something that those who would examine her written confession wanted to see.

Xianyu's statement on bannerpeople and Han being as a single family is unexpected, given that Xianyu elsewhere justified her support for Manchukuo by insisting on the distinctiveness of her banner identity. In her early written confession she explained how her banner identity affected her political views as follows:

> Bannerpeople had a strong sense of who they were *(qiren de xinli henzhong de)*. I was often unsatisfied with myself. I hated myself for being powerless. I always tried to restore the imperial palace and to invite the emperor back to the palace. If the emperor was in Beijing, and the south was given to Chairman Jiang [Jiang Jieshi] and if they cooperated and quickly built more and more industries, no one would dare to invade [China]. This was my dream when I was young. (Niu 1994, 58)

When asked if she wanted to restore Manchukuo to the former glory of the Qing dynasty, she answered, "I am a bannerperson. Of course I hope for that. However, bannerpeople are not talented. They are useless." She further challenged the investigator, who suggested that she could have helped Emperor Xuantong (Puyi) to restore the Qing, by stating, "If bannerpeople had enough power, [we] would not ever have given up the Qing dynasty to the Nationalist Party" (Niu 1994, 190, 192). Her repeated use of "bannerpeople" and comments on the weakness of her community showed not only her way of referring to "the Manchus," but also the mixture of great pride and great self-loathing, a key element of twentieth-century Manchus' self-perception of their ethnic identity (see Shao 2002, chaps. 2 and 5).

On other occasions Xianyu used her banner identity not only to defend herself, but to underscore the distinction between herself and her interlocutor as the Other, a Han Chinese. Asked once to state her father's name, she answered that she didn't know what it was. Clearly surprised, the investigator asked, "How can it be that you do not know your father's name?" She answered, "We bannerpeople do not call our fathers by their name" (Niu 1994, 170). What's more, when Xianyu needed to defend her unconventional life and style of dress, she used both her banner and Japanese identities to explain her Otherness. When she was asked whether it was Kawashima Naniwa's idea that she dress in man's attire, she answered, "Many of us bannerwomen dress in man's attire" (176). Later, when she

claimed herself to be a Chinese with Japanese nationality, her answer to the question on cross-dressing was that it was a fashion among Japanese women (326).[23]

Xianyu's self-identification as a bannerperson is also supported by her emphasis on the relation between herself, her ancestors, and the birthplace of her ancestors. Ethnic identities are often constructed with the notion of kinship, respect for ancestors, and a poeticized place defined as the original homeland of one's ancestors (Eller 1997; Smith 1986). Xianyu spoke repeatedly about her love for her ancestors when she explained why she thought Puyi should rule the north, why she allegedly stopped the Japanese plan to bomb Beijing, and why she went to Rehe to support Japanese military action. Because Puyi was her "lord" *(zhuzi),* she said, she had to help him; because her ancestral heritage lay in Beijing, she could not let the Japanese bomb the city; and because her ancestors originated from the Changbai Mountains, she went to Rehe and Manchuria to support the restoration movement (Niu 1994, 29, 181, 188, 192, 273). In this, one can see that Xianyu conceived of her banner identity as an Us that differed from the Han Other and that—despite her earlier statement on the "single family" of Manchus and Han—she perceived the relationship between the two groups as one of tension or even hostility. She regularly deployed not just her direct genealogical ties to the imperial family but her status as a member of the Eight Banners to justify her activities against the Republican government in wartime. In this respect, Xianyu's actions lay bare the legacy of the banner system in the formation of contemporary Manchu identity, as well as the alienation of some bannerpeople from the Republic of China.

Xianyu's defense counselors also believed that her wartime activities could be mitigated if her motivation could be explained as a Manchu-Han conflict, not a Sino-Japanese conflict. One of her lawyers argued: "According to the prosecutor's indictment, the defendant had intended to restore the Manchu dynasty because she inherited her father's will and received Kawashima [Naniwa]'s family education. This idea of restoring the Manchu dynasty is just a problem of domestic conflict *(neiluan wenti),* which does not deserve a charge of being a *hanjian*" (Niu 1994, 413).[24] The underlying assumption of such an argument is that because Xianyu was a Manchu, her wartime activities were targeted at the government that overthrew the Qing dynasty founded by her ancestors, and not at China per se, and that therefore her crime should not be considered trea-

son against China. The prosecutor rejected this argument, and in a series of documents equated restoration of the Manchu-Qing dynasty to treason against China.

On the other hand, Xianyu did not completely deny her Chinese identity, either. Sometimes she even adopted Chinese nationalist rhetoric to express her understanding of what patriotism meant and what an individual's responsibility was to the nation-state. Questioned several times as to why she returned to China about the time of the 1931 Mukden Incident, she answered that she was a young girl who had just discovered her Chinese identity, and she wanted to see China with her own eyes (Niu 1994, 271, 325). In her "Bianbaishu" (Notes of self-defense and explanation), she not only acknowledged her Japanese nationality, but also appealed to her "Chinese blood" when she explained why she wanted to be a good Chinese.[25] To prove her loyalty to the Chinese during the war years, Xianyu and her lawyers found several Chinese witnesses who testified that Xianyu saved them from Japanese imprisonment or persecution. One of the witnesses was a secretary of the Central Bureau of Investigation of the Nationalist Party who worked underground in Beiping in wartime.[26]

Besides using the rhetoric of nationalism and patriotism, Xianyu emphasized her love for the common people *(laobaixing)* several times in the last months of her life. In her last *jihaku sho* (confession), written in Japanese,[27] Xianyu claimed that she believed in *rōbyakushō shugi* (literally, "common-people-ism"). She ascribed the motivation behind some of her wartime activities, such as making public speeches on China in Japan, to her goodwill for China and the common people, insisting in her final appeal that she would not sacrifice the common people in order to restore the Manchu dynasty. Among other things, this shift from patriotic rhetoric to populism reveals to a certain degree Xianyu's dissatisfaction with the legal system of the Nationalist government. She frankly criticized the wrongs done by the court and the investigation authorities in her final appeal. Before her death, she left several notes to her defense lawyers in which she expressed her disappointment at the Chinese government in its treatment of her, asking, "When can our China have a real 'Harmony of the Five Ethnic Groups'? When can we see real happiness on the faces of ordinary people?" (Niu 1994, 516–517; Chinese translation, 518).

Xianyu was disappointed with the handling of her case by the Na-

tionalist government. She was frustrated by the lack of serious investigation and was appalled that the officials involved used only some letters, a Japanese novel, and a movie as evidence. Indeed, to dismiss her claim of Japanese nationality, the prosecutor made little serious effort to collect solid evidence, but simply claimed that the letter provided by Kawashima Naniwa, which Xianyu had expected to be useful to prove her Japanese nationality, was legally worthless. The same prosecutor had no legal documentation to verify the official confirmation of Xianyu's Chinese nationality either, offering the following argument:

> Those who volunteer to obtain nationality from a foreign country should get permission from the Department of [unclear in original; probably Civil Affairs]. . . . The defendant in this case cannot provide solid evidence to prove her foreign nationality. What's more, she had never obtained any permission from the Department of Civil Affairs [before she renounced her Chinese nationality], which means that according to the above law, she should not claim herself to be a foreigner in order to be tried as a war criminal. (Niu 1994, 494–495)

In her final appeal Xianyu complained with some justification about the requirement to secure permission from the Department of Civil Affairs of the Republican government before obtaining foreign nationality, pointing out that when she was adopted by Kawashima in 1912, Chinese nationality law was ambiguous. She questioned further, "What is nationality *(guoji)?* I know nothing about such laws. How should I have known how to renounce my Chinese nationality?"(Niu 1994, 503).

Being Bannerperson or Manchu-Chinese-Japanese?

Xianyu's question, and her difficult relationship with the Republican state, touches a long-ignored problem in studies of the Republican era, that is, the complicated identity transformation of bannerpeople. Not everyone identified themselves with the newly built community of the Republic of China. During the Qing dynasty, bannerpeople had a clear notion of their attachment to the Eight Banner system that was confirmed constantly by the regular intervention of banner officials and detailed practice of banner regulations in their lives. However, during the early Republican years, after the collapse of the dynasty, their emperor was suddenly treated as a "foreign emperor."[28] As his former subjects, how

and when did they realize that they were the citizens of the Republic, not aliens themselves? How did legal codes and institutional rules define their nationality?

The Qing court issued the first Chinese law of nationality on 28 March 1909, as a response to the rising number of disputes over the nationality problem of Chinese overseas between Western powers, which followed naturalization policy, and the Qing government, which forbade Chinese overseas to acquire foreign nationality (see *Daqing fagui daquan* 1901–1909, 2:995; Tung 1943, appendix: 60–61). Three years later, in November 1912, the newly established Republican government promulgated its nationality law and regulations. The Beijing government in 1914 and 1915 modified the 1912 version. In 1929 the Nationalist government issued another version. Nevertheless, the four Republican versions differed little from each other; all were based on the principle of jus sanguinis (right of blood).[29] The major difference between the Republican and Qing law of nationality is that the Republican law placed more emphasis on the right of blood in its articles concerning the loss of Chinese nationality. The Qing law of nationality allowed one who was adopted by a foreign father and lived with the foster father to renounce his or her Chinese nationality, while the 1929 Republican version did not have such an article concerning a foreign foster father, and only allowed "one whose father is an alien and has recognized him as his child" to renounce his or her Chinese nationality (Tung 1943, appendix: 28, 66).

Another point of relevance here is the stipulation under the Republican nationality law that one had to receive governmental permission as a precondition to renouncing one's Chinese nationality. Moreover, for Xianyu to have had her Japanese nationality recognized, she was required to produce household registration records *(koseki)* certified by the Japanese government. Xianyu failed to get such certification. According to a Chinese author who interviewed Xianyu's brother in the 1960s in Japan, Kawashima Naniwa sent a letter to the Chinese court with a statement that Yoshiko once had been listed on the household register of Kawashima's family. The statement was signed by more than three hundred residents of Shinanokō village (Nagano prefecture), where the Kawashimas once lived. However, Kawashima Naniwa himself did not provide any excerpt or copy of the family registration (Zhu n.d., 186; Yamaguchi 1987, 237).[30] A copy of the manuscript of Kawashima Naniwa's letter and a certification note from the Shinanokō village head collected in Niu

Shanseng's *Miwen* lends credence to the testimony of Xianyu's brother. In addition, Kamisaka found several letters between Xianyu and Kawashima Naniwa discussing how to forge some legal documents to prove her Japanese nationality (Kamisaka 1984, 203–206). According to an article in the *Manchuria Daily News,* it was Xianyu's younger sister who was formally adopted by Kawashima Naniwa, renamed Kawashima Reiko, and naturalized as a Japanese subject. At no time did Xianyu herself acquire Japanese citizenship (*MDN,* 11 October 1933).

Interestingly, Xianyu's Chinese nationality was not proven by any legal document, either, but by logical inference from the Nationality Law of the Republic of China. The confusion over her nationality can be attributed to the shifting borders between ethnic and national identities, as well as to the lack of a well-defined concept of nationality in the years immediately following the demise of the Qing. Indeed, it was only toward the end of the trial that Xianyu and her lawyers realized the importance of nationality in defining an individual's responsibility to his or her country, and thus what constituted treason. The failure to appreciate the importance of nationality earlier suggests that, despite the rise of Chinese nationalism, the concept of nationality as such remained vague for many people of Xianyu's generation. In fact, the Republican government failed to provide nationality certificates for Chinese overseas for quite a long time. It is reported that many overseas Chinese were expelled or abused because they did not have such a legal document. Twelve years after the establishment of the Republic, in 1929, various borderland provinces still had to appeal for issuing of nationality certificates from the ROC government (*Rehe sheng gongshu dang,* no. 1248, December 1929), which reveals that the notion of nationality and its legal importance had been weak even among the policy makers of the early ROC.

Meanwhile, in her own confession and court statements, Xianyu never denied being Chinese (Niu 1994, 384), but in arguing that her nationality was not that of the Republic of China but of Japan, she and her lawyers aimed to expand the definition of "being Chinese." However, her case reveals that in the early Republic, Manchu ethnic identity appears to have been subordinate to a larger "Chinese" identity. The term *Zhongguoren* (Chinese) as used by Xianyu and the court is less related to the idea of nationality, associated with the character *guo* (the state), and more related to ethno-national identity, which associates along the notion of historical heritage based on the inseparable interrelation between Manchus

and the Chinese state, as well as the concept of one single bloodline lineage from Emperor Yan and Emperor Huang shared by all the peoples of China *(Zhonghua minzu,* or *Huaxia zisun)*. *Zhongguoren* in this case became an intermediate identity label somewhere between ethnicity and nationality. The central point of Xianyu's defense was that she was a Manchu by genealogy, *Zhongguoren* by historical heritage, but a Japanese national by technicality.

In the final verdict issued by the Supreme Court of Hebei Province on 22 October 1947, the Chinese court ignored Xianyu's use of her Manchu identity to justify her wartime activities. Although her Manchu lineage was mentioned, only her Chinese and Japanese names were used to refer to her (Niu 1994, 423–425). A notice from the Supreme Court of Nanjing, which denied the defendant's appeal for a retrial and supported the previous verdict, also used only her Chinese and Japanese names (Niu 1994, 435–441; Masui 1977, 278–280).

Xianyu's *hanjian* crimes are summarized in the verdict as consisting of her espionage activities for the Japanese government, her participation in the organization of the "Puppet State of Manchukuo," her close relationships with Japanese high officials and officers, and her official and nonofficial positions in a series of "puppet" organizations in Manchukuo and China (Niu 1994, 423).

What is noteworthy is that in this 1947 verdict, the court did not mention the previous charge, raised in the 1946 indictment, of her efforts to revive the Manchus. This omission reveals to a certain degree the prosecutor's efforts to avoid directly answering the defense's argument that, because she was ethnically Manchu, Xianyu's restoration activities did not deserve the charge of treason. It is also worthwhile examining the Republican state's justification for trying Xianyu as a Chinese subject:

> The defendant, Jin Bihui, is a daughter of Shanqi, Prince Su of the late Qing court. She was adopted by a Japanese named Kawashima Naniwa. Although she was allegedly born in 1916 in Tokyo, Japan, and obtained Japanese nationality after her adoption, *according to Article I of the Chinese Law of Nationality, based on the principle of* jus sanguinis (*the right of blood,* xuetong zhuyi), *wherever one is born, in China or in a foreign country, no matter whether this person obtains the foreign nationality of his or her birthplace, as long as this person is born to a Chinese father, this person should be treated as a Chinese.* The defendant's father, Shanqi, moved

> to Japan after the Qing emperor abdicated. However, he did not lose his Chinese nationality. Even though the defendant was adopted by Kawashima Naniwa, and obtained Japanese nationality, according to the first item of the Law of Nationality mentioned above, she should be treated as one of the people of the Republic of China. According to the second clause of Article I of the Regulations on Special Criminal Cases, the defendant's crimes should be tried at this court [for treason]. (Niu 1994, 423; emphasis added)

These lines in the verdict directly reply to the defense's argument that Xianyu should not be tried for treason but for war crimes, because she held Japanese nationality and her motivation was to restore the Manchu dynasty (Niu 1994, 407). The verdict (death) was based on her Chinese bloodline, or more accurately, on the Chinese nationality of her father.

The final twist in Xianyu's chameleon-like identity game came when, before her execution, she asked permission to change from her prisoner's uniform into a Japanese kimono. This request was denied.[31] A note she wrote to a Mr. Zhang Pingsan, in which she said "Such a government [the Nationalist government] cannot last long," is written in Japanese (Umemoto 1984, n.p.). And in a note to her foster father, she asked Kawashima Naniwa to tell the young people to pray for the future of China (Niu 1994, 600). She demonstrated her Japanese identity vehemently, showed sympathy to China, and differentiated the Chinese government from China the country at the last moment of her life.

Perhaps because of her complicated background, of the two reports on her execution in *Dagong bao* on 26 March 1948, one expressed no condemnation of the crimes of which she was convicted, but professed strong feelings of regret: "Perhaps she was evil, but she was very smart and pretty till her death."

Xianyu Remembered in China

It is pointless to debate whether Xianyu deserved the death penalty or whether it was fair to try her as a *hanjian*. What is of interest is how she tried but failed to negotiate her identity to save her life, as discussed above. Of equal interest is how she has been remembered in China: the Chinese view illuminates not only the effect of nation-building on iden-

tity reconfiguration but also the limited influence of official history on public memory.

Xianyu's Chinese and Japanese names have become synonyms for a female traitor or a female spy in China today. In this, she has suffered a fate similar to such notorious figures as Mata Hari (Gertrud Margarete Zelle, 1876–1917) and Vidkun Quisling (1887–1945). For instance, after the 2000 presidential election in Taiwan ended in favor of the candidates of the Democratic Progressive Party (Minjin dang), Chen Shuibian and Lü Xiulian, Kawashima Yoshiko's name appeared in debates on cross-strait affairs at a Chinese Internet forum. A poster at the forum accused Lü Xiulian, who advocated Taiwan's independence and allegedly praised the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, of being "a Kawashima Yoshiko."[32] Xianyu's image as a Japanese spy is equally unforgettable. Much literature, Chinese and translated, highlights the mysterious life of Kawashima Yoshiko, perpetuating the aura of myth and secrecy surrounding her espionage activities and ensuring that she has remained well known to people in China and Japan long after the war (Zhu n.d.; Umemoto 1984; Yamaguchi 1993; Liu 1997). A summary of her life and career printed on the cover of a 1997 historical novel, *Minguo diyi nüjiandie* (The no. 1 woman spy of the Republic of China), is representative of the major themes in Chinese literature on Xianyu: "[She was] a bloodthirsty woman spy with a poisonous heart and dirty hands soaked with the blood of Chinese people; a flirtatious female who sold her body and stole much important intelligence information from the Nationalist Party and the country; a woman criminal who was shrewd but harmed others and herself, and who finally died for what she had done" (Liu 1997). However, the name Kawashima Yoshiko represents different images to different groups of people. A short news story from Guangzhou's *Yangcheng wanbao* (Yangcheng evening news) provides this account:

> Dateline Urumchi: "A common kitchen knife in China is called by the notorious name 'Kawashima Yoshiko'": Wang Shiyang, a retired official at the Urumchi Institute of Geological Prospecting and Designing, angrily told a journalist, "Isn't it outrageous that a kitchen knife is branded with the name of *a woman spy!*"
>
> Several days ago, with information provided by city residents, the journalist went to do an anonymous inquiry at the Beiyuanchun wholesale market at Artai Road in Urumchi. With little effort the journal-

> ist found such a knife [with the brand name "Kawashima Yoshiko"] at a knife vendor's stand. Clearly inscribed on the knives are the four characters "Kawashima Yoshiko," and a note nearby reads, "Made in Guangdong." When the journalist asked the vendor, "Do you know who this Kawashima Yoshiko is?" he answered, *"Definitely a Japanese."* When the journalist told him that Kawashima Yoshiko was a *Japanese spy,* he sneered, "So what is there to be afraid of? This knife is for chopping vegetables, not a man."[33] (Emphasis added.)

The anger of the retired official revealed that when judged against his standard of morals, the name of Kawashima Yoshiko was detestable. The vendor, who perhaps had less education or knew little about official accounts of her, used a different moral standard.

More than fifty years after her death, Xianyu appears still to be a figure who inspires mostly hatred and contempt in China. Yet because the markers of boundaries change with time and space, objective references to legal or moral codes by which identities are perceived also change. People have recently begun to reappraise historical figures who have been demonized or condemned in official history in late-twentieth-century China.[34] Although few representations of Xianyu express sympathy with her collaboration with the Japanese, her motivations and personality sometimes have undergone reevaluation. A 1995 book on the characteristics of Northeasterners *(dongbeiren),* one volume of a popular series on peoples from various regions in China, claimed that it was impossible to talk about women in the Northeast without first talking about Kawashima Yoshiko although she was a *hanjian* (Yang 1995). But the authors depart from the usual tone of censure and moral outrage, instead praising Xianyu—whom they consistently identify as Kawashima Yoshiko—for her ability to bear hardship and her determination to work for her political ideal of restoring the Manchu dynasty. That the authors refrain from condemning Xianyu for having cooperated with the Japanese and instead express admiration for her motivation represents a notable change in the verdict on Xianyu, especially given that this was a book intended for a popular audience, not a scholarly monograph.

The last decade of the twentieth century saw further permutations on themes relating to Xianyu's life, which have made their way into cinema and the stage. In 1990, the film *Kawashima Yoshiko,* directed by Fong Ling-Ching and based on Lilian Li's (Li Bihua) novel *The Last Princess of Man-*

churia, appeared in Hong Kong. The portrayal of Xianyu in this movie is startlingly sympathetic: she is depicted not as the sly and cruel traitor and spy, but as a helpless victim of changing historical trends. The character of Aisin Gioro Xianyu was also a key figure in the Japanese stage musical *Ri Kōran,* based on the life of Yamaguchi Yoshiko (Li Xianglan), the Japanese-born star of wartime Manchurian cinema who specialized in playing roles of Chinese women in colonial propaganda films. In April 1992 the Japanese Four Season Theater Company presented *Ri Kōran* on the stage in Beijing, prompting this reaction from one member of the audience: "For a proper understanding of the history of Sino-Japanese relations, what on earth does it mean to dig out the corpses of people like Yamaguchi Yoshiko and Kawashima Yoshiko, and to have them dance and sing on our stage?" (Wang 1992, 11).

A response to this question came from Wang Meng, a leading writer and prominent cultural figure. Wang addressed his friend's outrage in a 1992 article titled "Man, History, Li Xianglan." In this essay, Wang (who himself suffered greatly during the Cultural Revolution) revealed his sympathy for the helplessness of individuals to steer their life course amid the trends of historical changes. He emphasized the notion—which is not at all well-accepted in China—that even in World War II, when the demarcation between enemy and friend was assumed to be clear, there were shades of gray (Wang 1992, 12). The assumption of a clear demarcation between China and Japan during World War II, Wang argued, is a product of our era of nationalism, and does not accurately reflect the contemporary historical moment. For people like Xianyu who refused, hesitated, or were just too confused to identify themselves with any nation-state, such a demarcation did not exist. Given the continued strength of Chinese nationalism, it remains to be seen how widely this revisionist understanding of Xianyu's historical predicament will spread.

Conclusion

When Xianyu was asked about her view of the war criminal Doihara Kenji (1883–1948), her answer, quoted at the beginning of this chapter (Niu 1995, 253), reveals not only the multiplicity of identity but also the complexity of the individual's relation to communities at various levels. Clearly, Xianyu's frequent crossing since childhood of national boundaries that were themselves shifting resulted in cross-cultural dilemmas

and no little confusion in her configuration of who she was and where she belonged. The story of her life and career suggests that more studies of how constructed identities are perceived and consumed will be required for a more comprehensive understanding of the relation between individual and community.

It is natural, of course, that an individual should have a set of identities, rather than a single, unitary identity. Yet scholarly research on ethnic and national identities sometimes forgets this, and overlooks the fact that individuals who have cross-boundary experiences typically embrace a complex amalgam of identity traits that altogether reflect who they are. That is to say, in spite of the idealized wishes of governing regimes, people do not always identify themselves with clearly defined academic or official categories such as X ethnic or Y national group. In addition, the connotations and denotations of the labels for such categorizations change with time and place.[35] Xianyu, for example, was a bannerwoman, a Manchu from the royal family, and a Chinese whose country fought against Japan; simultaneously she plainly felt strong ties to Japan, where she spent most of her childhood and youth, and claimed Japanese nationality. Before being tried for treason, there was nothing to prevent Xianyu from embracing all these identities. However, once hauled before the court on charges of treason, the legal codes produced by state formation and nation building demanded hard identity boundaries, of which nationality was the master identity. At the trial for treason, there was no room for ambiguity.

Xianyu's experiences in wartime and at her trial offer yet another illustration of the constructedness of ethnic and national identities and reveal that identity cannot be negotiated at all times and places. Although Xianyu ascribed her individual responsibility not to the Chinese state led by the Nationalist Party but to her ethnic group and to the foreign state that promised to help that group, the Republican state legally defined her as a Chinese citizen and thus determined her guilt for betraying the community that it believed deserved her primary loyalty—China, the nation-state. Modern states retain the power to assign and determine a person's national identity, even though individual self-identification is the synthetic product not only of legal definitions, but also of individual calculation of interests and external perception. Conflicts over setting an individual's "true" identity are thus bound to arise. Under special circumstances, especially where national security is said to be involved, the

law may harden ethnic and national boundaries and attempt to impose a master identity on an individual. During the first half of the twentieth century, when the national boundaries between China and Japan were blurred and the boundaries between "Chinese," "Manchu," and "banner-person" were likewise fungible, Xianyu could use her complicated ethnic and national identities without encountering legal issues. In the years immediately after the war, however, she was forced to choose and to recast her identity into a singularity. She failed to do this, realizing too late that state formation makes previously ambiguous identities worthless and that nationality would be the basic identity used to distinguish traitors from war criminals.

As one of those who refused to identify themselves with the newly built Republican China, Xianyu was part of a generation who refused to identify themselves with China when the formation of state was not yet completed. Indeed, she was one of many thousands of people who crossed national and ethnic boundaries while those boundaries were shifting in Manchuria in the first half of the twentieth century. Recent studies of the lives and careers of immigrants from Japan and Korea have greatly enriched our understanding of the history of identity making in an era of nation building and nation destroying (see Brooks 1998; Kim 1992; Fogel 1998; Kuramoto 1999). Still, our grasp of the problems associated with border crossing and transnational peoples is limited by the geographical borders that divide China, Japan, and Korea today. We need to ask what borders they crossed, or believed they crossed, when such boundaries were blurred or unclear in the 1930s and 1940s.

My analysis of Xianyu's identities is not an attempt to explain every aspect of the interrelations between the officially defined "hard" boundaries (legal and institutional) and nonofficially perceived "soft" boundaries (cultural and individual) dividing people. This chapter tries to remind people to pay attention to the study of personal experiences and to think about the degree to which individuals can negotiate their ethnic and national identities in an era of nation building and state making. I would like to suggest that to study the transnational flow of people and ideas does not necessarily lead us to ignore hard boundaries between nation-states or to overestimate the negotiability of ethnic and national identities. The case of Xianyu reveals that even those who cross boundaries and reject certain imagined communities nonetheless had to use officially defined legal codes and socially acceptable ethnic and national

boundaries to identify themselves. I would also suggest that transnationals can be grouped into two categories—geographical and historical. To nationalize geographical transnationals such as overseas Chinese, cultural tools, such as nationalist rhetoric and narratives of collective historical memory, are important (Duara 1997, 1030–1051). But to historical transnationals such as Xianyu, their self-identification and definition of their relation to the community could be legitimate only in certain historical periods when community boundaries were shifting under historical conditions such as colonialism. The procedure of nationalizing this group of historical transnationals is closely related to the reconstruction of hard boundaries drawn during state formation. Studies of institutional state building are as important as those of ideological nation building to our understanding of the ascription/self-ascription of identities.[36] Ethnic and national identities are constructed not only with cultural and subjective markers (Barth 1969; Anderson 1991; Harrell 1995), but also with written legal and unofficial social codes, which are perhaps made of imagined markers but are used as objective references. Recent emphasis on the negation of nationalism and the political construction of national identity is based on the hypothesis that constructed or imagined parts of a nation-state are not as real as we thought or believed. Nevertheless, imagining the nation-state hardens boundaries with legal and socially accepted moral codes. In China, as Xianyu's case reveals, this process unambiguously defined Manchus as an ethnic group within the Chinese nation, without any right to pursue national sovereignty of their own.

NOTES

This chapter is adapted from my AAS poster session ("Two Yoshikos: Negotiating Ethnic and National Identities in Manchukuo") and chapter 4 of my dissertation ("Ethnicity in Empire and Nation: Manchus, Manchukuo, and Manchuria, 1911–1952"). It could not have been completed without the help of Professors Prasenjit Duara and Gavan McCormack, who read the first draft of a research paper on Yamaguchi Yoshiko and Kawashima Yoshiko and provided constructive and insightful comments; Professor Mark Elliott, who read various versions and edited the final draft; Professor Mariko Tamanoi, who kindly provided me the opportunity to present part of my study of Kawashima Yoshiko at the Sixth Annual Nikkei Bruin Conference at UCLA; and Professor Ding Yizhuang (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), who generously taught me invaluable information on Manchu history and sources of historic archives in Beijing. Special thanks go to Peter Pang (University of California, Santa

Barbara, library), who generously provided the first volume of the collection of court records on the Kawashima case from his personal library. *Figures 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4:* The cover of *Chuandao fangzi de jingren miwen* (The shocking secrets of Chuandao fangzi), ed. Niu Shanseng (1994), does not provide any contact information but only the name of the publisher: Hongkong Jinjian zixun jituan youxian gongsi. Despite my best efforts, I have been unable to locate the publisher to obtain permission to use these three images from their collection. I am grateful for all the help from Peter Pang at the East Asian Library, University of California, Santa Barbara, and Ellen McGill at Harvard-Yenching Library.

Epigraph. Niu 1994, 253. Doihara Kenji (1883–1948) was a Japanese army officer who was involved in a series of Japanese activities in China, such as the Mukden Incident (18 September 1931), when he was the director of Military Intelligence, and the plan for the independence of North China. He was found guilty at the International Tribunal for the Far East and executed in 1948.

1. Xianyu's birth date is not confirmed. According to *Nihon shi daijiten* (2:462), it is 23 May 1907. I checked the Manchoukuo edition of the Manchu royal genealogy (*Aisin Gioro zongpu,* 1938), but did not find her name and dates. On her tombstone in Japan, before her age (42) are two characters: *suitei,* meaning "estimated" or "presumed." See works by Watanabe (1972, 271) and Kamisaka (1984, 245–246).
2. Although most English writings on this regime spell its name as Manchukuo or, in its pinyin form, Manzhouguo, the Department of Foreign Affairs of Manchoukuo officially claimed that the English name of the state should be spelled as Manchoukuo. See its *Bulletin Extra,* 14 October 1932. In this chapter, I use "Manchukuo" to keep consistency with the style of this volume.
3. Photo-offset copies of the court scripts of Aisin Gioro Xianyu's case, collected by Niu Shanseng (probably a pen name) (1994), include interrogation records, Xianyu's written confession, communications with Chinese authorities, verdicts, defense appeals, and interviews.
4. The military basis of the Qing empire was the Eight Banner system, a social-political-military organization that included eight Manchu, eight Mongol, and eight Han banners. Banner identity was hereditary. Banner garrisons were stationed at strategic places throughout Qing's territory. For more details on the Eight Banner system, see Ding 1992; Elliott 2001.
5. For example, Chinese scholars in the early 1930s argued that the Northeast had been an inseparable territory of China since antiquity. See works on Dongbei by Li Ji (1932) and Fu Sinian (1932). The concept of a unified Chinese nation *(Zhonghua minzu)* made up of various ethnic groups, though ambiguous, became very popular in talks and writings about national salvation during the early twentieth century.
6. Pamela Crossley's biographical study (1990) of a Manchu family in *Orphan Warriors* is an example. Mariko Asano Tamanoi's article (2000) on racial categori-

zation also provides a nice example of using diary to analyze individual conceptualization of race.

7. Prince Su was the tenth generation of one of the eight highest-ranking Manchu princes. He was one of the few high-ranking Manchus who preferred war against the revolutionary army to abdication of the Xuantong emperor and demonstrated loyalty to the Qing dynasty. He was exiled to Lüshun (Port Arthur) after the emperor's abdication in 1912. He sold his private property to collect grants to support the independence of Mongolia-Manchuria. Kawashima Naniwa's restoration activities and relation with Prince Su even caught attention from the Chinese government. See telegrams from Zhao Erxun, the governor-general of the three eastern provinces, to his local officers and those between Zhao and Yuan Shikai in *Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian,* 204–205, 212. Shanqi also sent all his children to Japanese schools for education. See the confession by one of his sons, Aisin Gioro Xianjun, in Zhongyang dang'an guan (2000): 708–722.

   More information on Prince Su can be found in Kawashima Naniwa's article in *Manmō kenkyū ihō.* I found only part of this article published in installments in no. 2 (1915): 67–71; no. 3 (1916): 92–97; no. 7 (1916): 66–73.

8. See *Dagong bao,* 25 March 1948. "Kōro jō itten yuki" (A flake of snow on a red oven) was the inscription on the tombstone of Kawashima Naniwa's younger brother, who died in the Russo-Japanese War (Watanabe 1972, 271; Kamisaka 1984, 245–246). Kamisaka noticed that the signature beside the inscription was Prince Su's name, which means that Prince Su wrote the inscription (246). Xianyu must have known of this inscription.

9. Rehe province (1928–1956) covered parts of today's Inner Mongolia, Hebei, and Liaoning provinces. In January 1933, Japan declared that Rehe province belonged to Manchukuo. In February and March 1933, Japanese and Manchukuo forces attacked Chinese troops in Rehe. Because of Chiang Kai-shek's appeasement policy, Rehe was soon lost. The Rehe campaign ended with the Tanggu Truce, which drew a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping. Chinese troops had to be out of the zone, but Japanese troops could remain in the area because of their rights defined by the Boxer Protocol. Xianyu's involvement in this campaign, especially her organization of the Anguo (or Dingguo) Army, was one of the major crimes listed in the verdict.

   Xianyu's army consisted mainly of bandit troops. For her participation in the Rehe campaign and her ambition to expand her military power, see Sun 1993, 3: 114–118. Apparently, the Japanese did not treat this self-proclaimed "Commander" Jin seriously. See *Gendaishi shiryō,* 1964, 11: 793.

10. All were powerful high-ranking military and political figures of Japan during the 1930s and 1940s.

11. See a brief biography on Furukawa Daikō in Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., 1977, 1186–1187.

12. According to Niu (1994), half of Xianyu's ashes were buried in Japan, half in a public cemetery in Beijing. I have not found a second source to confirm Niu's information.
13. This novel was first published serially in a Japanese journal, then published as a book in 1933.
14. The term *manshūjin* used here can refer to either Manchurians (people who live in Manchuria) or the Manchus. Since this term is used to refer to people who "annexed" China, I think that "the Manchus" will be a better English equivalent here in content. In addition, in the context previous to the lines quoted here, Mariko's perception of *manshūjin* contains stronger ethno-nationalistic sentiments than regionalism when she argues that her self-identification of being a *manshūjin* is very different from her friends' identifying themselves as *Kantōjin* (people from Kantō area).
15. "Boku wa sokoku o aisuru" (I love the country of my ancestors), in *Fujin kōron,* September 1933. Kamisaka (1984) mentioned this article. I could not find the specific issue until Konrad Mitchell Lawson located the article and generously sent a copy from Japan to me in spring 2004.
16. According to this report, she was elected to take the position of commander of the Rehe Dingguo Army and was active in Japanese intelligence work.
17. I am grateful to David Tucker, who generously provided me with information about Kawashima Yoshiko in the *Manchuria Daily News (MDN).*
18. Information about the killing of Manchus during the 1911 Revolution can be found in several books by Manchu authors from the early twentieth century, such as Wu Zixiu's *Xinhai xunnanji* (Records of those who died in the 1911 Revolution) with supplement by Jin Liang, and a series of biographies in *Qingshi gao* (Draft of Qing history). Rhoads 2000 also provides evidence of anti-Manchu activities. Jin Qizong's memoir (1998) also reveals anti-Manchu emotions and movements in Beijing after the establishment of Manchukuo. Many Manchus and bannerpeople did not register as Manchu in the 1950s after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. This reflects to a certain degree that what they learned from their experiences of being Manchu in the first half of the twentieth century did not make them proud of their ethnic identity.
19. Xianyu served as a witness at the tribunal in Shanghai in 1947.
20. Though Xianyu's statement quoted above shows how she was trying to justify her silence on the nationality issue at the early stage of the trial, it also reveals the ambiguity and complexity of the term *Zhongguo ren.* As to the many registers of "being Chinese" and the representation of "the Chinese," see Tu 1994 and Ren 1996.
21. In the late Qing and early Republican period, there was a widespread misunderstanding that all bannerpeople were Manchu. In fact, the Qing Eight Banner system contained not only Manchu banners but also banners made of other ethnic peoples, such as Han and Mongols. See also note 4 above.

22. Xianyu's written confession shows that she was not good at Chinese writing. She wrote the first character of *qiren* incorrectly as "term man" instead of "banner-person" in her earliest confession titled "My Experiences." See figure 3.4.
23. Cross-dressing became a fashion among Japanese women during the interwar years, thanks to the popularity of Takarazuka Revue, an all-female theater troupe. See more details about the revue in Robertson 1998.
24. Interestingly, during the Qing dynasty the crime label *hanjian* was used to refer to cunning or troublemaking Han people or a Han who served as a spy for the enemy of the court. Here, I refer to memorials in *Gongzhongdang Qianlong chao zouzhe* (1982–1988, 7:82, 34:360–362; 41:773–774).
25. Xianyu claimed, "Actually I am of Japanese nationality. The reason why I did not mention this [before] is that I only have best wishes for the land of my ancestors *(zuguo)*. I am a good citizen of a great strong country. My friends often asked me, 'Aren't you Japanese?' It's right that I am of Japanese nationality. However, my blood lineage is Chinese. Therefore I want to be a good Chinese, and to do something good for the country and the people" (Niu 1994, 324–325).
26. Her witnesses include Cui Weiyun, a secretary of the Beiping Department, Central Bureau of Investigation (Niu 1994, 572), a well-known Peking Opera actress, Lian Huanong (Niu 1994, 87, 568), and a middle school teacher (Niu 1994, 340).
27. All of Xianyu's final notes to the judge, lawyers, and friends were written in Japanese. Her Japanese writing is much better than her Chinese.
28. The first clause of Articles of Favorable Treatment signed by the Qing royal household and the Republic of China in 1911 assured that the ROC would treat the emperor of the Great Qing as a foreign monarch *(waiguo junzhu)*.
29. Before 1909, China did not have any law of nationality. When international disputes concerning nationality arose, an unwritten rule was followed: the children of Chinese people were considered to be of Chinese nationality. But such a rule proved inadequate for dealing with increasingly complicated international contacts and legal cases. The problem was especially acute in cases where a conflict arose between the principle of *jus soli* of nationality law practiced by some Western colonial powers (who followed a naturalization policy in their colonies) and the Qing principle of *jus sanguinis*. This discrepancy led Qing legal experts to notice that many foreign nationality laws, while retaining *jus sanguinis* as their major principle, combined *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*. The Qing followed that pattern in the 1909 law of nationality. See Tung 1943, appendix: 60–61. For more details on the articles of the Republican nationality laws, see Tung 1943.
30. Li Xianglan recalled that Kawashima Naniwa claimed that the household register was burned during the Kantō earthquake.
31. According to Yamaguchi's memoir, Yamaguchi's two younger sisters visited Ka-

washima's mortuary tablet at Guanyin Temple in Beijing. And according to their accounts, in front of the tablet were clothes and facilities used by Kawashima in prison, among which was a new white kimono (Yamaguchi 1987, 236). Reports in *Dagong bao* on 26 March 1948 also mention that Jin Bihui wanted to change clothes, but they did not mention what clothes she wanted to wear for her last hour.

32. The Taiwan Affairs Forum at wenxuecity.com <http://www.chinese-military.com>. Accessed 19 March 2000. A biography of Kawashima Yoshiko was also posted on My China Forum under the title "The Charming Spy Chuandao Fangzi" <http://www.book-sea.net>. Accessed 8 April 2000.
33. "Chinese kitchen knife named 'Kawashima Yoshiko,'" *Yangcheng wanbao;* posted at *sina* news <http://www.sina.com.cn>. Accessed 7 June 2000.
34. This trend of reappraising historical figures is popular in Chinese mass media too. For example, a 2003 TV series, *Zouxiang gonghe* (Path to the Republic), reevaluates the foreign policies of Li Hongzhang, who has been called *maiguo zei* (literally, a "selling-country thief"), and portrays Empress Dowager Cixi as a talented female politician.
35. Tamanoi's *JAS* article (2000) on the complexity of racial classification in Manchuria provides convincing examples of the ambiguity of the racial categorization. *Manjin* can be translated as "Manchurians" or "Manchus." The English term "Manchus" has been frequently used in English writings to refer to the ethnic group whose Qing dynasty took power in China in 1644. Although scholars in the fields of Qing history and Manchu studies have debated over whether "Manchus" or "bannerpeople" is historically a more proper term for the ethnic group, in general English-language publications there is a clear distinction between "Manchus" and "Manchurians." The former refers to the ethnic group. In Manchukuo publications such as *Manshū renkan* (Manchuria yearbook) and *Government Bulletin,* "Manchurian" is usually used to refer to *manjin* or *manren* when it means people who lived in Manchuria.
36. The idea of state building referring to an institutional construction of a nation-state and nation building emphasizing ideological construction is borrowed from Eller 1997.

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4 Goodwill Hunting

Rediscovering and Remembering Manchukuo in Japanese "Goodwill Films"

MICHAEL BASKETT

Throughout 1995, Japan was awash with books, magazines, television shows, videos, films, museum displays, and many other events to coincide with two anniversaries: fifty years since the end of World War II and one hundred years since the birth of film. Examining these two anniversaries highlighted how interrelated they are. Many of the images we have of modern history come from moving images. One of the most intriguing developments linking these two commemorations was the discovery and release of a thirty-volume video set of "lost" films originally produced in Japanese-occupied Manchukuo during the 1930s and 1940s by the Japanese-managed Manchuria Motion Picture Corporation (Manei). The preceding year, a group of researchers including Japanese film historian Yamaguchi Takeshi rediscovered the large cache of more than three hundred Japanese and Japanese co-produced films in Russia's State Film Archives, many of which had been presumed to have been lost at the end of World War II.[1]

After the films were brought back to Japan and released on video, Yamaguchi planned to officially present a set of the videos to the Chinese government as an act of "goodwill" *(shinzen)* in order to "give the people in China who helped make these films a second chance to see them." Before Yamaguchi left for China, he received a telephone call from a former Manei actress, Yamaguchi Yoshiko, who had once appeared in many of these films under the Chinese name of Li Xianglian (pronounced Ri Kō-ran in Japanese). She cautioned him that the films represented a period of Japanese occupation that many Chinese would rather, and in fact had a right to, forget. Despite this, Yamaguchi (Takeshi) proceeded with his goodwill mission, but the Chinese government refused to accept the videos, for doing so would have appeared to be an official recognition of Japan's former Manchukuo regime. Eventually, the videos were deposited

at a Beijing television station, but far from becoming a symbol of goodwill between the two nations as Yamaguchi had hoped, they were denounced the very next day in China's largest daily newspaper the *Renmin ribao* as "legal proof of [Japanese] cultural invasion" (Yamaguchi 2000,15, 35–38).[2]

This was not the first time that the term "goodwill" had been used in Japanese-Chinese film relations. In fact, "goodwill films" or *shinzen eiga* were a well established part of Japan's imperial film project by 1940. Japanese film critics were generally critical of what they saw as a low artistic value in films produced throughout Japan's imperial film markets—and especially by Manei—but most approved of the genre's ideological goal to promote "goodwill and mutual understanding." Until relatively recently, few postwar film historians in Japan or abroad found goodwill films a worthy topic of serious study, citing similar reasons as their prewar counterparts (Cheng, Li, and Xing 1980, 189; Anderson and Richie 1982).[3] Speaking about Manei's films, Kitagawa Tetsuo said, "I don't even understand why anyone would want to see them. Manei is a shameful blot on Japanese film history" (Yamaguchi 2000, 19). After World War II, most of these films were believed to have been lost or destroyed and, together with a lack of scholarly interest, left in their wake a huge gap in Japanese (and Chinese) film history. As the opening example illustrates, these films may have been gone, but they were not forgotten. Nor had time diminished their power as ideological lightning rods; even half a century after their production they continued to spark strong controversy on both sides.

This chapter examines three sites in the historical discourse surrounding these goodwill films. The first site reviews goodwill films in their most familiar context—as Japanese attempts to construct idealized representations of Japanese-Chinese relations in 1940s feature films. Examining the films from this perspective assumes that the concept of goodwill was intimately linked with notions of Japanese Pan-Asianism, a Japan-centered collective Asian consciousness. In its practical application, this perspective encouraged less mutual understanding between Japan and China than the erasure of cultural and linguistic differences through the promotion of Japanese "imperialization" *(kōminka)*. Some goodwill films encouraged imperialization by blending cultures (in this case, Japan and China) together on screen in the form of interracial love melodramas.

Others, such as the majority of Manei's output, catered to the local audience's tastes first, and added ideology second. In both cases, the division between entertainment and propaganda was never clear, and the messages disseminated in goodwill films had an ambivalence that opened them up to a variety of possible readings.[4] My textual analysis of key scenes from the film *China Nights* (*Shina no Yoru,* 1940) illustrates that even in the most idealized representations of Japanese "goodwill," this ambivalence can be found in the form of Chinese resistance, which is treated with serious concern.

The second site extends conventional definitions of goodwill films as being solely a Japanese-Chinese phenomenon to examine an early Japanese-German film co-production entitled *The New Earth* (*Atarashiki Tsuchi,* 1937). Produced two years before codification of the continental goodwill film genre, *The New Earth* similarly attempted to paint Japanese-German goodwill in terms of interracial romance. Intriguingly, it did so through the subplot of the conquest of Japan's new earth of Manchukuo. My analysis of the production and reception of this film in Japan as a failed attempt at bilateral goodwill reveals many of the ideological chasms and conflicts that existed between Japan and Germany and would later plague Japanese-Chinese co-productions. Likewise, the fact that many Japanese film critics were openly critical of what they called Nazi film aesthetics and a trivialization of Japan and Manchukuo suggests both the fragility of Japan and Germany as ideological allies and the centrality of Manchukuo to Japanese empire discourse.[5]

Finally, I examine how Japanese notions of goodwill exceed the medium of film and tap into Japan's imperial legacy in the 1991 musical stage play *Ri Kōran, the Musical.* Loosely based on the life and career of Manei's biggest film star, this musical successfully incorporates many of the same rhetorical tropes of Japan's ideology of goodwill toward China and repackages it in the form of imperial nostalgia. In this musical, goodwill is both a central theme and also a key part of the vocabulary used in its advertising. The ambivalence of the message of goodwill reappears here in a contemporary nonfilm context but is at the same time directly linked to Ri Kōran's film legacy at Manei. The musical not only replicates the process of goodwill films in its blending entertainment and ideology seamlessly, but it reinvents (and perhaps in part revives) the Japanese empire by spawning a cottage industry of Ri Kōran goods. Before I proceed with my discussion of these three sites, however, an introduction of the

context surrounding Manei, where many Japanese-Chinese goodwill coproductions were produced, is in order.

No Place of Grace: Amakasu Masahiko and the Production of Manei Sovereignty

In August 1937, the Japanese government and the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) merged to create a semiofficial corporation *(kokusaku kaisha)* called the Manchuria Motion Picture Corporation, or Manei, that would control all film production and distribution in Northeast China (Ichikawa 1941, 128–131; Yamaguchi 1989, 41–48).[6] Manei was to become a dream factory; and like Hollywood, Cinecitta, or Babelsberg, it came to symbolize far more than a geographic point on a map. Manei's film industry was planned to compete on an international level; accordingly, the largest state-of-the-art film facilities in Asia were constructed in Manchukuo. At its peak, Manei had a fully developed film culture complete with local stars, popular film sound tracks, its own film magazines, and a wide variety of ancillary products that could rival anything to be found in mainland Japan. Manei was the heart of Japan's largest imperial film market, second only to the domestic market in Japan. Manei was one of the few success stories of Japan's imperial film project in that it took significant steps toward increasing production so that it could export films throughout the Japanese empire as well as to Germany and Italy (Harley 1940, 132; Kuwano 1942).

Conventionally characterized in postwar film scholarship as being harmonious with, and wholly subordinate to, the whims of the Japanese home islands, Manei was in fact a highly contested space that was in constant competition and frequently at odds with the domestic Japanese film industry. Manei's reputation as a dangerous maverick was mainly due to the arrival of industry outsider Amakasu Masahiko. Amakasu realized that as a center of film production Manei was not yet in a position to compete with Hollywood or Tokyo and made the first serious attempts to extend Manei's influence beyond Manchukuo's borders.[7] In a 1942 article entitled "Making Films for the Manchurians" published in the Japanese film journal *Eiga Junpō,* Amakasu revealed open antagonism toward the domestic Japanese film industry and ardently defended Manei as an independent enterprise: "There is not even the slightest reason why Manei should have to report any of its activities to the Japanese film world. . . .

Manei would not have had to build a film school or any such facilities if Japan had first attended to its duties and built one. However, it is precisely because Japan did not bother to build these facilities that we were left with no alternative" (Amakasu 1942).

Criticism of the Japanese film industry and its policies is not uncommon in Japanese film discourse throughout the 1940s, but what is unusual is the degree of criticism in Amakasu's remarks and that they came from an outside *(gaichi)* imperial film market. That Amakasu was able to make such statements was due less to his being a newcomer to the film industry than to his reputation as murderer of Japanese anarchist Osugi Sakae and his strong ties to the military. These factors seem to be what persuaded many in the Japanese film industry to regard Amakasu with a mixture of admiration and fear and to endure his harsh criticisms in silence (Mutō 1956, 223–234). An unnamed Japanese journalist describing Amakasu clearly chose his words after being rebuffed: "He was a little rude, but I learned to really like him. Even so, he was a little too personal" (Amakasu 1942). Amakasu was particularly critical of those Japanese who traveled to Manchukuo on the SMR, stayed in Japanese inns, spoke only Japanese, and returned to Japan to brag about knowing all about Manchukuo. Likewise, new employees arriving at Manei from Japan were routinely warned in a very egalitarian manner that their having held top positions in Japan did not necessarily guarantee the same at Manei (Tsuji 1987, 257).

Amakasu's own independent stance translated into a studiowide policy of material self-sufficiency. He hoped sovereignty would protect Manei from many of the troubles plaguing the Japanese film industry at that time, such as securing a reliable supply of raw film stock. The film industry in Japan had long been dependent on American and German film stock imports for its survival, and in 1938 this dependency shifted to the Japanese government when it commandeered all cellulose nitrate as a "necessary war material." Control of the film stock supply was also a decisive factor in getting filmmakers in imperial markets to collaborate with the Japanese film industry. In Shanghai, one of the most famous areas of anti-Japanese filmmaking, Chinese producer Zhang Shenhun cited that the promise of a steady supply of film stock was one of the greatest benefits of cooperating (collaborating) with the Japanese.[8] Amakasu boasted that Manei had managed to avoid such constraints by "scientifically" discovering a revolutionary new way to produce film stock entirely from locally grown materials: "Thankfully, Manchuria is blessed with a bountiful soy

crop, and it is from this that we chanced upon a way to create film base. Along with our success in producing gelatin, we are well on our way to producing all the product necessary for our needs" (Amakasu 1942).

It is unclear whether or not Amakasu and company were actually able to create film stock from a soybean base, but the image was powerful: in Manchukuo, they could grow anything they needed, even their own films. This linked back to a carefully constructed image of Manchukuo as the self-sufficient breadbasket of the Japanese empire that had been cultivated in film since the 1920s. By the late 1930s, film audiences throughout the Japanese empire were familiar with these on-screen fables of abundance that the Manei dream factory churned out. The promise of a new lifestyle in modern Manchukuo represented in Manei's films attracted spectators like a magnet as the war situation in Japan worsened throughout the 1940s, creating widespread layoffs, shortages, and starvation. Run as Manei was by a man who reinvented himself from a murderer into a film producer, its power as a dream factory cannot be underestimated.

Film personnel throughout the Japanese empire were drawn to Manei's relatively stable food supply and high salaries; in addition, Manei was also one of the few places where one could find work in the film industry. By all accounts, Amakasu's personal politics seemed to have little to do with who gained employment at Manei. Even those who were active in leftist film movements of the early 1930s and purged from the Japanese film industry as political subversives found a place at Manei. Through a combination of material wealth and ideological ambivalence, the institution of Manei was able to lure some of the best filmmaking talent from the major film industries of Asia despite its reputation as an industry complicit with a puppet regime (Yamaguchi 1989). Thus, Manei's population soon became as diverse as that of Manchukuo's and is often described as a huge melting pot of people from various backgrounds and political persuasions. In a postwar interview, Japanese actor Arashi Kanjūrō had the following to say about Manei's hodgepodge staff:

> Manei's Captain Amakasu was extremely right wing. Then there was an Otsuka something-or-other who worked under him, an ex-Communist who was mixed up in the Omori bank robbery. There was "Tendency film" screenwriter . . . Hara Kenichirō *[sic]* and director Tsuji Yoshiaki. . . . Everyone knew they were a couple of real leftists. And there

> was Kimura Sotoji, Uchida Tomu, and Yagi Hōtarō—it was a smorgasbord of Red Party leftovers. I guess Negishi Kan'ichi, who had been head over at Nikkatsu Tamagawa Studios, was running some sort of reemployment program for Communist Party members. I wonder what Amakasu thought about that. You've probably heard it said that in Manchuria the ghosts came out in the daytime. It gave me the creeps. I heard that Sakamaki Tatsuo, who years later became a Toei producer, turned up after the war in a Red Army officer's uniform! The thing is you could never tell what Manei really was 'cause its shady parts were so covered up. (Takenaka 1992)

In addition to political diversity, Amakasu took active steps toward making good his claims to "make films for the Manchurians" by increasing the number of Chinese who actually worked on the films. He raised Chinese workers' salaries to a more competitive level with their Japanese counterparts, and by 1945 the number of films written, directed, and acted by Chinese had grown dramatically. Yamaguchi Yoshiko remembers that Amakasu also protected his actresses, once refusing the request of a group of visiting Japanese for actresses to perform for them, saying, "Actresses are not geisha! They are artists" (Fujiwara and Yamaguchi 1987, 131).

Amakasu's production policies in Manchukuo were remarkably progressive at a time when it had become increasingly difficult for producers in Japan to make films that both satisfied audiences' needs for entertainment *(goraku)* and the government ideologues' demands for national policy *(kokusaku)*. Like Nazi Germany's "film minister" Joseph Goebbels, Amakasu had far less qualms (or restrictions) about integrating the two, saying that "it is not impossible to insert propaganda into entertainment."[9] Keenly aware of the local audience's preference for light entertainment films, he considered the production of a variety of such films crucial to winning grassroots audience support for Manei. In this respect, Amakasu's policies deviated substantially from those of his counterparts in mainland Japan who saw entertainment and national policy as inherently separate and irreconcilable forces. Amakasu produced films for the audience in Manchukuo with little regard for what was being done in the Japanese film industry.

> All Manei must do is to make films that the Manchurians will enjoy. There is absolutely no need to any make films that would exoticize

> Manchuria in the eyes of the Japanese. Japan would most likely make films that get it wrong anyhow, exoticizing only the more unusual aspects of Manchuria. We must never lose sight that our focus is on the Manchurians. And, once we gain some leeway, nothing should keep us from making films for the Japanese. (Amakasu 1942)

Amakasu's antagonism toward the Japanese film industry was not the only thing that isolated Manei; the films they produced also ran at odds with Japanese tastes. In contrast to the rhetoric spouted by Japanese politicians and ideologues that film was an ambassador of goodwill and harmony within the Japanese imperium, few Manei-produced feature films were screened in Japan. Japanese critics generally criticized those that were screened for their so-called low-quality stories, acting, and production values (Yamaguchi 1989, 130–133). Japanese film journalists visiting Manchukuo were often at a loss to explain the tremendous popularity of "low-quality" Manei films with local audiences and perplexed by the unpopularity of most Japanese films there. Many Japanese critics concluded that the blame for this discrepancy rested not on the Japanese films, but rather on local Chinese audiences, who were unable to appreciate films of a higher cultural level.

One such critic was Mitsukichi Kaya, who under the auspices of writing a film review of a Manei film seemed obsessed with the "suffocating, dirty, and dusty" conditions of the theaters and audiences in Manchukuo. Describing the theaters as spaces that were "filled with the distinctive stench of Manchurians," Mitsukichi extended his critical observations of the exhibition conditions in Manchukuo to include a wholesale condemnation of "Manchurian" cinema. For him, the local films were indicative of all of the undesirable character traits he found in the local population:

> This film was one of those Manei concoctions where everyone from the director and cameraman are Japanese supervisors but only the actors are Manchurians. The acting was poor and the story insipid, but even more mystifying was how they [the Manchurians] would roar in great belly laughs at the most absurd parts of the film. I, of course, never felt the least inclination to laugh. (Mitsukichi 1943, 35)

Constantly reminding Japanese film magazine readers of the differences between "our" Japanese films and "their" Manchurian films (much to the detriment of the latter), Mitsukichi indirectly posited that the "low"

quality of those films and the popular response to them were in some way linked to an inherent deficiency in the local people themselves. Mitsukichi's inability to understand what local audiences found so funny about these films led him to wonder whether or not such films were even necessary for the local audiences (1943, 34–35; Yahara 1942).

Such harsh criticism seems to suggest that goodwill films were targeted less for overseas imperial film markets than for the Japanese domestic market. This obvious division in film audience tastes pointed to a larger crack in the "Asia is one" ideology central to Pan-Asianism. In the absence of any preexisting common Asian consciousness, Japanese filmmakers created a new one from the ethnic and cultural ambiguity of Manei goodwill film star Ri Kōran. In this sense, her very presence became a powerful ideological symbol that confronted Japanese filmmakers and audiences with the fact that they were not the only ones in the audience: Chinese spectators were also buying tickets.

Ri Kōran and *Shina no Yoru:* Goodwill as Hard Love

Ri Kōran was born Yamaguchi Yoshiko in 1920 in the city of Fushun in Northeast China. Her parents moved from Kyushu to Manchuria when her father got a job at the South Manchurian Railway Company. Yoshiko's native language was Japanese, but she learned Chinese from her father, who tutored other employees in his company. She soon became so adept in Chinese that she was able to "pass" for Chinese at a Beijing girl's school. She was initially scouted by a Japanese agent to sing on a Chinese radio program in 1938 and was soon brought to Manei to dub songs in Chinese for feature films. Ri Kōran's exotic features, excellent singing voice, and native fluency in both Japanese and Chinese prompted producers to sign her as an actress in the film *Honeymoon Express* (*Miyue Kuaiche,* 1938). In 1939, Japanese executives at Tōhō Studios decided to exploit this talent by starring her with top actor Hasegawa Kazuo in a Tōhō /Manei coproduction entitled *Song of the White Orchid* (*Byakuran no Uta,* 1939). This would become the first of a trio of popular "continental goodwill films" that Ri would make with Hasegawa.

Goodwill films were an amalgamation of several genres, blending elements of romance, action, and melodrama with a touch of musical comedy. What set goodwill films apart from conventional melodramas was that although their plots revolved around ideological misunderstand-

ings, they were ultimately resolved romantically. The continental goodwill films starring Hasegawa and Ri invariably were situated in China and represented a romantic coupling between Japan and China, at times symbolically, at other times literally. The gender roles of this on-screen marriage of Japan with China perfectly dovetailed with the Japan-centered hierarchy of Pan-Asianist rhetoric and made Ri Kōran a star in both Manchukuo and the Japanese domestic market (Naito and Taguchi 1941).

One Japanese female film magazine reader vividly listed Ri's attributes saying that she was "beautiful, skillful at Japanese; why wouldn't fans love her?" Another male Japanese fan was especially enamored of her exotic physical appearance. He wrote, "Ever since your debut as a Manchurian actress, your bewitching continental appearance and beautiful voice remain as popular as ever. Your personality and appearance are perfectly suited to Manchu, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, or even Western dress depending on how one looks at you" (Naito and Taguchi 1941, 98–99). Yamaguchi's Japanese identity was kept a strict secret from her public, and even some of her colleagues, for the first three years of her career, and it appears that many Japanese believed that Ri Kōran was in fact Chinese. Recent work on the Chinese reception of Ri Kōran suggests that this may not have been the case (Stephenson 1999). In either case, Ri Kōran's appeal to audiences throughout the Japanese empire seemed to go beyond that of a "Manchurian" actress to her chameleon-like ability to imitate the dress and speech of other Asian ethnicities.

As this fan letter suggests, Ri's chameleon-like ability to convey a sense of the foreign seemed to appeal to the film magazine readers and filmgoers. One gets a sense from these readers that Ri Kōran's appeal was less a matter of her "passing" as a specific ethnicity but rather her general ability to "imperialize" or assimilate Japanese language and customs. Her film roles tapped into this fluidity by casting her at different times as Chinese, Taiwanese, or Korean. In a two-page 1940 photo layout entitled "Ethnic Harmony—Ri Kōran's Transformations" in the Chinese-language film magazine *Manshū Eiga,* Ri literally represents the Japanese ideological slogan of the Harmony of the Five Races *(gozoku kyōwa)*. On the left-hand page in four small diagonally placed photos Ri is dressed variously in Japanese, Mongolian, Korean, and Russian traditional clothes, each marked with an ideograph identifying her nationality for that pose. On the right-hand page is a much larger picture placed squarely on the page with Ri in Chinese dress and no ideograph identi-

fying her nationality. The various different ethnicities and cultures of the Japanese empire are linked together by a common physical referent—Ri Kōran. As cultural assimilator and goodwill ambassador, she brings all of them together in the ambivalent space of Manchukuo.[10]

As this photo essay demonstrates, Ri was a powerful symbol of the limitlessness of assimilation, one who could go anywhere. The facility with which Ri adapted to foreign cultures, customs, and languages made the prospect of mutual understanding between Japan and other Asian countries seem almost as easy as a change of clothes. Her very presence smoothed over troublesome ethnic and linguistic differences while suggesting both a figurative and literal commonality among all Asian races. Ideally, by challenging the notion of cultural difference precisely by playing with it, she became a blank screen as it were upon which audiences could project their desires. However, in actuality, the racial and cultural perception gaps among the various ethnicities within the Japanese empire were serious problems that Japanese filmmakers treated with appropriate concern.

Shina no Yoru provides an especially lucid example of one distinct cultural gap between Japan and China. After losing her parents and her home in a Japanese bombing raid, the character of Keiran (played by Ri) is reduced to begging on the streets of Shanghai. Spectators are introduced to Keiran, who is wearing tattered Chinese clothes and sporting a dirty face, as she is being physically threatened by a Japanese man demanding that she return the money she borrowed from him. Hase (Hasegawa), a Japanese boat captain, and his friend Senkichi step in to break up the argument. Hase warns the Japanese against hitting women for no reason in front of the Chinese because it might give them a bad opinion of "us Japanese" and promptly pays off Keiran's debt, leaving her and the crowd behind.

Senkichi: How do you like that! We help her and now she's complainin'. She says you can't help her, then just walks off like that; it's a problem.

Hase: Well of all the . . . I suppose that she wants money?

Senkichi: No, she says he—'er that'd be you—are her benefactor. You're out the money . . . she doesn't want to owe you . . . so she'll go with you and clean, do laundry, anything, to pay you back.

Hase: Well tell her I can't be bothered and let's go.

Senkichi: Boss, she won't listen. Now she's sayin' she doesn't want to be in debt to any Japanese.
Hase: What? So you hate Japanese, do you?
Senkichi: Yeah, this one's a real Japanese hater.[11]

Establishing the lead Chinese character, in this case Keiran, as either anti-Japanese or unsympathetic to Japan's cause in Asia was a common plot device in the goodwill film genre. On the level of narrative, such conflict between the main characters was necessary to propel the plot and make the Chinese character's inevitable transformation from a Japanese hater to a Japanese lover all the more dramatic. Conflict between the characters in goodwill films occurred on several levels. The most common conflict was on the level of understanding the other person's feelings, which is typical to melodramatic genres. Likewise, as these were interracial love dramas, cultural and linguistic barriers were also sources of tension. Intriguingly, even though goodwill films represented a Japanese idealization of interracial relations in the Japanese empire, they also recognized that Asian resistance to Japan was neither unusual nor unexpected. In this respect, goodwill films functioned somewhat differently from the "Good Neighbor" films produced in the United States at the same time, which limited character conflict to romantic misunderstandings rather than allowing any questioning of the dominant ideology (Bender 2002).

A key point of character development in the goodwill films assumed that the Asian Other would challenge or more likely "misunderstand" Japanese intentions in Asia, but they could also be reeducated. Thus, what I call the "transformation-enlightenment" motif became a well-established part of Japanese goodwill films by the 1940s precisely because it functioned on both stylistic and ideological levels. In *Shina no Yoru*, the focus is on Keiran's education; it is assumed that once she is cleaned up and properly taught, she will naturally accept Japanese ideology. Japanese goodwill, expressed variously in the forms of concerned worry by the residents of the Japanese hostel and romantic love by Hase, is key to transforming Keiran into an understanding and obedient woman. This transformation is clearly illustrated in the scene where Keiran returns to the Japanese hostel soaked from heavy rain. The Japanese residents were worried about her because she had just recovered from a serious illness, and they welcome her back with warm food. Keiran reads their kindness

as trickery and knocks the tray of food across the room. Unable to contain himself, Hase grabs Keiran violently by the collar and slaps her hard across the face, knocking her into the wall and onto the floor: "Well, Keiran, I finally hit you. I guess I lose. That's my punishment for trusting too much in my own ability. I was an arrogant fool. Forgive me . . . you are free to go wherever you wish." Keiran, who had been violent only moments before, looks on stunned, and her transformation from resistance to enlightenment takes place: "Oh Hase-san. Don't make Keiran leave. Forgive Keiran! [bursting into tears]. It didn't hurt me. It didn't hurt at all to be hit by you. I'm happy, happy! I'll be an obedient woman, just watch. Please don't give up on me. Forgive me, forgive me!" Keiran's first step toward understanding what Japanese goodwill means begins with a hard slap. In her 1987 autobiography, Yamaguchi gave two reasons why she would never forget this scene. The first was that Hasegawa, the actor playing Hase, actually hit her full strength in the face, sending her sprawling to the floor. The other reason was that after the war, when Yamaguchi was arrested by the Chinese government and charged with treason, the prosecution showed this scene as evidence against her in a Shanghai court. Yamaguchi explained that Keiran's reaction to Hase's violence in this scene was a classic illustration of cultural difference between China and Japan. According to Yamaguchi, at that time if a Japanese man hit a woman in that manner, it most likely would have been taken as an expression of love. Yamaguchi explained that the slap symbolized the depth of the man's love for the woman, and she would be expected to return his violence with affection. Yamaguchi surmised that Japanese audiences probably interpreted this scene in this way, but explained that Chinese audiences found the scene demeaning. The difference in interpretation turned on the explosive issue of race:

> That was an expression that was understood only among Japanese. Had Hasegawa hit a Japanese character, there would be no problem, but the fact that the scene showed a Japanese Hasegawa hitting a Chinese Ri Kōran caused a serious problem. For the average Chinese, for someone who was hit to fall in love with the man who did it was regarded as doubly shameful. Far from arousing any respect for the depth of Japanese emotions, seeing this type of behavior pattern enshrined on screen only inspired Chinese hatred, making the Chinese

lash back against the daily injustices they suffered under the Japanese. (Fujiwara and Yamaguchi 1987, 137–138)

Goodwill films did not attempt to reflect these cultural differences accurately, but some reactions to these films as described in contemporary Japanese film magazines do suggest that there were spectators who found such representations of Chinese offensive. For example, in a roundtable discussion about another goodwill film, *Moon Over Shanghai* (*Shanhai no Tsuki,* 1941), Ri herself spoke openly about the negative reactions that such films created with Chinese audiences:

Hazumi: Have you heard anything from the Chinese about *Shina no Yoru* or *Shanhai no Tsuki?*
Ri: The Chinese don't see them as being very pleasant.
Hazumi: You mean they don't have a good feeling about them?
Ri: Of course not. I went with a Manchurian actress who became very upset. She said Japan only presented itself in a good light and showed absolutely no understanding of the good side of China and its people. (Zadankai 1942)

Nor were "Manchurian" actresses of the sort that Yamaguchi refers to the only ones disgusted by offensive Japanese representations of China and Chinese. Chinese intellectuals were also openly critical of and sometimes hostile to these representations as utter failures on the part of Japan to understand China. In a 1942 article in the Japanese film journal *Eiga Junpō,* one Chinese intellectual identified only as Xing wrote of Japanese attempts to dress and speak like Chinese: "Japanese seem convinced that by simply putting on long-sleeved Chinese gowns they can instantaneously transform into Chinese. Yet the gowns that they choose are not at all Chinese-like and only make them look extremely out of place" ("Pekin to Nihon Eiga" 1942). Chinese critics often charged Japanese filmmakers with knowing little about China and caring even less. For their part, Japanese filmmakers realized that films that starred an all-Chinese cast or those representing Chinese in a positive light, such as *Road to Peace in the Orient* (*Tōyō Heiwa e no Michi,* 1938), failed miserably at the box office in Japan. Likewise, various attempts to familiarize stories with Chinese characters set in China for Japanese audiences by either dubbing or subtitling also failed to interest audiences (Asai 1942, 22).

Japanese directors complained the language barrier kept them from using Chinese performers; they preferred to have Japanese actors memorize short lines of dialog in Chinese. However, as the preceding examples suggest, such attempts by Japanese performers to phonetically sound out Chinese dialog were generally met with derision by Chinese audiences. One Chinese critic openly lamented the poor Chinese linguistic ability of most Japanese performers, saying, "Although I probably should not say so, the Chinese that Japanese actors speak is not good. Audiences cannot understand what they are saying most of the time. I imagine their [Chinese ability] is the equivalent of Wang Yang's Japanese."[12]

Paradoxically, while a lack of mutual understanding between Japan and China was used as the rationale for producing goodwill films, it was precisely a lack of desire on the part of the Japanese to learn more about China on its own terms that complicated the smooth facilitation of production and the reception of goodwill films. Goodwill films are conventionally discussed as a Japanese-Chinese phenomenon, but there were also other instances of goodwill films being produced in radically different contexts.

Covering New Ground: Japanese-German Goodwill and Manchukuo

> We have called this film *The New Earth.* It is certainly new earth for us and for the Japanese film industry. I only pray that this new earth will bring forth fertile soil, that this earth will offer up many different plants that will eventually produce magnificent fruit. (Kawakita 1936, 67)

In 1936, three years before the goodwill film would become a recognized genre with the release of *Song of the White Orchid,* German director Arnold Fanck, known for popularizing the *bergfilm* or mountain film genre, and his cameraman arrived in Tokyo to direct *The New Earth (Atarashiki Tsuchi),* the first Japanese-German co-production. Coming within months of the signing of the Tripartite Treaty, *The New Earth* project was seen as an expression of Japanese-German goodwill and received official support from both governments. This film was meant to be the start of a line of Japanese "export films" that would laud the beauty of Japanese culture in order to provide "correct impressions" of Japan and its empire

to the world. It was also one of the few co-productions to officially recognize Japan's military presence in Manchukuo.[13]

Soon after production began, the Japanese side became concerned that Fanck's image of Japan was not correct. Fanck explained that he wanted to make a film that would be accepted in the German market and be palatable to Western audiences. Popular period film director Itami Mansaku (father of the late Itami Juzō), who was brought on board as a consultant, opposed the film's being turned into either a mere travelogue or Nazi propaganda. It was eventually decided that two versions of *The New Earth* would be produced—a Japanese version directed by Itami and an "international" version by Fanck (Hansen 1997).

The story, written by Fanck, told of a young Japanese man named Teruo (played by Kosugi Isamu) who went to study in Germany, where he met and fell in love with Gelda (Ruth Eveler), a young Nazi woman. Teruo returns to Japan with Gelda to break off his betrothal to his benefactor's daughter, Mitsuko. While in Japan, Teruo becomes inexorably drawn to his Japanese roots, and his heart gradually turns away from the foreign—including Gelda—to the domestic. Eventually realizing his love for Mitsuko, he races to her, crawling over burning rocks, to keep her from committing suicide. In the final scene, Teruo and Mitsuko have moved with their infant son to the Chinese continent, where Teruo happily farms the "new earth" of Manchukuo under the protective gaze of imperial Japanese soldiers.

The massive amounts of money, time, and personnel lavished on this superproduction clearly illustrate that expectations for the film's success ran high on both sides.[14] But can the success of international co-productions be evaluated by the film's popularity or critical reception? Inasmuch as the film reportedly had satisfactory box office in both Japan and Germany, it is possible to see this film as a moderate commercial success. However, given the factionalism and squabbles that plagued the film from its inception and made it necessary to produce two separate versions, it is hard to see this as an ideological success for either side. Almost immediately after its release, the question of the film's national identity became a heated and controversial topic of debate. For example, Japanese critic and screenwriter Sawamura Tsutomu wrote that despite the fact that Itami's version seemed to be the more "inconsistent, conceptual, and unfocused" of the two, it still seemed to him to be a *Japanese* film. Fanck's version, however, he condemned as being "definitely

not a Japanese film" (Sawamura 1941, 261–262). Sawamura offers an intriguing reading of how the blending of style and ideology coalesced into making the film appear to him inauthentic:

> The scenery that appeared on screen was definitely Japanese, but the way it was presented was Western *(bata kusai),* exhibitionist, and queer. By holding up a Buddhist *manji* to resemble a Nazi swastika, he portrayed [Japanese] temples as if they were the sole repositories of the Japanese spirit. Moreover, Buddhist statues were represented as if they wielded an absolute power. [Fanck] applied the Nazi spirit of self-sacrifice indiscriminately to the Yamato spirit. . . . While claiming to sing the praises of the Samurai spirit, what he was really praising was the German spirit. Although he openly recognized Manchuria, [Fanck] suggests that it is Germany that is requiring this New Order. (Sawamura 1941, 261–262)

Fanck's use of icons such as the *manji* to connote the swastika were not the only elements that linked *The New Earth* stylistically to Nazi filmmaking. The opening sequence of the film, where the camera descends through the clouds to the earth, immediately recalls the opening of *The Triumph of the Will* (1934). However, while these technical aspects were singled out for being the most ideologically questionable, they were precisely the elements upon which most Japanese critics heaped praise for their stylistic excellence. The exterior shots of Mt. Fuji and the blooming cherry blossoms were singled out for special praise. What seemed to be at the heart of Japanese criticism of Fanck's vision was a more serious charge that foreign filmmakers were fundamentally incapable of understanding Japan and at best could only achieve a superficial and ultimately trivializing picture of Japan and its cultural aesthetics. Japanese film critic Iwasaki Akira, who later worked at Manei under Amakasu, clearly articulated this sense that it was impossible for any foreigner to accurately capture the spirit of Japan:

> It is almost an impossible task for anybody to describe proportionally and properly a complex country like Japan, which contains all the complications and contradictions resultant from the juxtaposition and harmony of the past and the present, East and West, nature and modern science. No foreigner can possibly interpret all this, much less present it with creditable success, by a sojourn of one year and keenest

> observations of that time. The failure of *The New Earth,* therefore, is no fault of Dr. Fanck or his staff; it is due to the inadvisability, as would be obvious from the foregoing, of having a foreigner, however understanding and sympathetic, to describe Japan. (Iwasaki 1937, 18)

Iwasaki's impression was not unusual. In fact the very notion of goodwill between Japan and Germany seemed threatened as the notion of mutual understanding was dismissed by both sides as impossible. These expressions of Japanese suspicion and resentment of foreign (i.e., Western) representations of Japan were not simply unfounded, neurotic ramblings. Fanck himself shared some of the blame for the charges of inability to interact fairly. Speaking at a 1936 luncheon held for members of the Japanese film industry, Fanck shed some light on his opinion of Japanese performers and the motivations behind some of his production decisions on the film:

> Occasionally, if a Japanese . . . speak[s] English or German . . . with a Japanese accent [it is] convenient. . . . In my picture . . . we let Miss Setsuko Hara . . . speak the German language in her style. . . . This was difficult work for Miss Hara, who does not know the German language at all and we . . . had an immense amount of trouble . . . but [there] was a sort of inexpressible charm [for] us German[s] when we heard her pronouncing the German language with a foreign accent. In other . . . word[s], she made a better impression than if she had spoken German fluently. (Fanck 1937)[15]

It would be interesting to know what response, if any, the Japanese in the audience may have had to this remark, but unfortunately the record is silent on this point. On the one hand, Fanck's condescension toward his actors is not an unusual attitude for a director to take. Given the fact that Fanck was best known for making films that represented the almost mythic iconography of Germany's mountains, it may have been, as Janine Hansen states, that he wanted performers to be pliable mannequins that functioned like part of the landscape (Hansen 1997, 62–86). However, there is much to suggest a latent Orientalism in Fanck's remarks; he even said that he liked Japanese performers because one did not have to talk to them; they "just understood" what he wanted. If we are to believe Fanck, then German audiences similarly must have desired a make-believe Japan such as the one Fanck created because it most closely

corresponded to their predetermined ideas of the Orient. Thus, Fanck's failure to correct Hara's "charming" German accent is not dissimilar to Chinese criticism of Japanese representations of China and suggests a similar process of trivialization. Orientalist views of Asia in general have clear precedents in German film history. China in particular had long been a favorite setting for German directors as illustrated by the popular "exotic adventure" films that were produced since at least the late 1910s. However, after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, German films set in Manchuria such as *Struggle in Manchuria* (*Kampf un die Mandschurei,* 1932) and *Dawn* (*Fluchtlinge,* 1932) took on a decidedly political tone as Japan was not the only empire making films about Asia as a "new land."[16]

Ironically, it was the subplot of Manchukuo as Japan's "new earth" that was almost entirely ignored in the controversy over the various representations of Japan. In fact, most of the only verbal references to "earth" in the film are indirect, such as the scene where Teruo returns to his parents' farm to search out his roots. Early one morning he plunges both of his hands into a rice paddy and intently smells the earth as his father looks on approvingly and says, "It's good earth, but it's getting old. It's really gotten old." As if recognizing the problematic representation of Manchukuo in the film, Sawamura wrote, "At the end of the film Yukio *[sic]* and Mitsuko leave the narrow rice fields of Japan to go to Manchukuo where, under the protection and peace guaranteed by the Japanese army, they joyously plow the earth of a new continent with a tractor. This is one of the most important themes of this film, but for those countries that do not recognize Manchukuo, won't showing this be a problem?" (Sawamura 1941, 260).

Goodwill, Inc.: The Business of Remembering Manchuria

The topic of Japanese-Chinese goodwill reappeared in a 1995 revival of *Ri Kōran, the Musical,* a splashy two-hour menagerie offering a highly idealized account of the life of Yamaguchi Yoshiko. Based on Yamaguchi's 1987 memoirs and adapted and directed for the stage by Asari Keita, the story starts with Yamaguchi's treason trial at the Shanghai Military Tribunal in China immediately after WWII. The audience is led on a dramatized tour of the events in Yamaguchi's life through a series of flashbacks narrated by Kawashima Yoshiko, who acts as an ironic commentator reporting "historical" events from a decidedly contemporary per-

spective. For example, as scores of actors dressed in imperial Japanese military uniforms march across the stage singing the famous Japanese war song "Monday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Friday" (Getsugetsu ka sui moku kinkin), Kawashima sardonically instructs the audience: "Monday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Friday . . . that means there was no weekend, see? Not even one day off. It was around this time that the Japanese trait of overworking started to become a habit."[17] The attempts at humor are not played only for laughs; Asari explained that the musical was intended to be an antiwar statement: "I wanted to show the truth about war by combining facts within a fictional framework. I hoped to construct that truth by taking a balanced view of history *unswayed* by ideology" (Gekidan Shiki 1992b). Leaving aside for the moment the problem of Asari's ambitious attempt to create a new history without ideology, it is important to point out that his project closely resembled that of the producers of prewar goodwill films. Like them, Asari was faced with the formidable task of making Japanese imperial ideology entertaining; his solution was to simplify problematic ideological concepts such as the Harmony of the Five Races into musical shorthand. Songs such as "Manchukuo/Mongolia Is Japan's Lifeline" (Manmō wa Nihon no seimeisen) and the anthem-like centerpiece song of the musical, aptly entitled "Manchurian Dream" (Manchurian dorīmu), all compressed the ideology of Japanese empire into catchy, digestible parts.

> Five races, feel the joy
> Gathered here to light the flame of hope for Asia
> Five races, one heart
> We pledge forever our wish, the harmonious coexistence of the five races.
> Manchurian Dream, the ideal of Manchukuo,
> Manchurian Dream, Dream Country.[18]

Particularly noteworthy in this song, and throughout the musical, is the propensity to repeatedly represent Manchukuo in dream *(dorīmu)* imagery and even as a "dream country" *(yume no kuni)*. In fact, the entire Japanese empire is similarly explained as a lingering "vision" *(maboroshi)* in both the dialogue and song lyrics throughout the play.[19] The dreamlike musical metaphors evacuate the brutal history of Japanese imperialist aggression in Manchukuo, leaving in its stead a romantic vision of a

misguided but well-intended Japanese *dorīmu*. In direct contrast to the benign and ethereal lyrics, the music is epic and ostentatious on an imperial scale. At the performance I attended, older audience members were clearly moved. Some softly sang along to hyped-up rearrangements of familiar military, continent, and wartime songs being performed on stage while others audibly cried as the song "If We Go to Sea" (Umi yukaba) was sung. Even more striking were young audience members, who seemed to be participating in a sort of imagined nostalgia. Two young women, who appeared to be in their twenties, remarked that the 1930s song "Ye Lai Xiang" was nostalgic *(natsukashii)*. As neither young woman was old enough to have had any lived experience of the war, it is unclear what exactly about the song was nostalgic for them. Likewise, in the lobby after the play young and old audience members hummed snatches of the chorus of "Manchurian Dream" and other songs as they snapped up official CDs, posters, and programs.[20]

The new musical arrangements of traditional Japanese war songs created a dynamic new sound track for the faux imperial Japanese soldiers marching across the stage in bright new uniforms brandishing imperial flags. By reviving the iconography of the Japanese empire through its songs, banners, and language, Asari also managed to revive much of its energy in a sheer spectacle of sight and sound. Regardless of his motivation, Asari arrived at essentially the same dangerous conclusion as the producers of Yamaguchi's prewar goodwill films: musicals can make imperialist ideology entertaining.

Yamaguchi, who knew only too well the ideological lure that goodwill could have on audiences, apparently expressed reservations about Asari's initial version of the play. She said, "Reading the first draft, I was worried that it placed too much emphasis on 'Japan's fulfilling its dreams by creating Manchukuo,' and that [ideologies such as] Gozoku Kyōwa [The Harmony of the Five Races] and Odo Rakudo [The Kingly Way] might turn it into 'Viva Manchuria.'" Before giving her approval, Yamaguchi appears to have requested that Asari rewrite the play to more fully portray the ambitions of the Kanto army, the valor with which the Chinese fought, and "how much I suffered being torn between Japan and China" (Yamaguchi 1993, 201–202).

Given its themes of Japan's imperial past and the subjugation of China, one might expect that any popular reception of *Ri Kōran, the Musical*

would be limited to a Japanese audience. However, the tour program states that the musical was performed in a successful four-city tour of China in 1992 at the invitation of the Chinese government to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the normalization of Japanese-Chinese diplomatic relations. Moreover, the program boasted that this musical played a major role in the "promotion of bilateral cultural exchange and goodwill" between Japan and China. Translations of Chinese newspaper articles covering the Chinese reception of the play use decidedly less glowing language, but the headlines "*Ri Kōran, the Musical* a Smash Success in Dairen" evoke a similarly positive ambiance (Gekidan Shiki 1992b). What is so striking is that the musical's producers were able to successfully reemploy the same flexible rhetoric of goodwill as Japanese film producers had nearly fifty years earlier despite an entirely different set of historical conditions.[21]

The international success of *Ri Kōran, the Musical* suggests a disturbing continuity—that the Japanese empire is still capable of gathering formidable crowds, energy, and income from a veritable cottage industry of crossover media including movies, plays, music, and other memorabilia. The advertising of this musical, with its explicit reference to Japanese-Chinese goodwill, was eerily similar to that of the goodwill film genre, as was the marginality of the Chinese in the story. The musical amply illustrates the impossibility of Asari's attempts to recreate a history untainted by "ideology" and reminds us of Edward Said's admonition that imperialism does not end with the dismantling of the empire (Said 1993, 9).

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have emphasized the incredible flexibility and continuity of the imperial rhetoric of Japanese goodwill in both filmic and nonfilmic spaces and over time. The first point to note here is that goodwill films involve the creation of a notion of Japanese imperial identity in both prewar and postwar Japan. Central to the image of Manchukuo as a controlled space within the Japanese imperium is the idea that it really was not "foreign" to Japanese in the true sense of the word. Goodwill films helped to articulate Japanese notions of China, and particularly Manchukuo, as the breadbasket of empire and a sphere of opportunity for imperial Japanese subjects.

Manei was constantly competing with the Japanese film industry (and others such as those in Germany, Hollywood, and France) in Manchukuo and other Chinese film industries. Amakasu's Manei offers us a glimpse of an attractive empire in Manchukuo—a Japanese utopia for many Japanese film personnel who often found work at Manei regardless of their political persuasions. Further, Manei at one level suggests that Japanese rhetoric of co-prosperity was not an entirely empty promise. While it was true that opportunities existed for Chinese interested in learning the film trade, the greatest opportunities for advancement remained available to Japanese stars such as Yamaguchi who could negotiate cultural differences from the perspective of the occupier. Examining Manei warrants our attention because it was a dream factory. Like Hollywood, it was in the business of turning out dreams that were based not on reality but rather on a vague mishmash of ideologies. Likewise, Manchukuo's status was different from that of full-fledged Japanese colonies such as Korea or Taiwan or even semicolonial spaces such as Shanghai. Politically and ideologically, Manchukuo was liminal—an imperial space that was meant to exist independently of Japan yet inexorably linked to it.

Ultimately, goodwill films must be understood as interactions within imperial contexts. In the case of Japan and Germany, Manchukuo became a useful symbol for the German filmmakers because it represented one of the few common denominators between the two nations—an empire. Likewise, the struggle over "correct" representation of Japan in *The New Earth* represents the ambivalence of Japan's imperial identity vis-à-vis the West. For many in the Japanese film industry, Fanck represented the hope of overhauling what was considered to be a latent Japanese film industry into an "international" competitor able to compete with the West. However, Fanck's result was not all that different from Japanese film representations of Asia at that time. Further, they underscore the ambivalence of both the Tripartite Alliance and reveal the fallacy of goodwill as a tool for mutual understanding, showing instead a clash of two similar, but incompatible, imperial ideologies.

The viability of staging a production such as *Ri Kōran, the Musical* not only illustrates the extreme malleability of the concept of goodwill, but also shows that it adapts to various power regimes over time. Moreover, the very popularity of the musical, revived almost annually,[22] and its cottage industry of merchandise must be examined as they raise a moral

question of how the creators deal with profiting from the legacy of the same "empire" that they are ostensibly critiquing. For nearly two decades, Yamaguchi has promoted her past through a variety of media, thereby assuring that Japan's imperial legacy will not only be well remembered, but extended to newer generations. But the popularity and usefulness of the play are not simply in the hands of the Japanese. The success of the play in China argues that imperial legacies are sustained on both sides, not only that of the colonizer/occupier.

Here, I have only been able to touch on several aspects of representations of goodwill with regard to Manchukuo and filmmaking. Yet more study is needed to take into account a wider range of how films produced outside Manchukuo's boundaries and throughout the Japanese empire intersected (and still intersect) with Japanese imperial culture as a whole. Such an analysis would require reconsidering Japanese film culture in a much broader context. Such scholarship, some of it now being conducted, promises to illuminate our understanding of both Japanese film and Japanese imperialism as well as to demystify Japan's age of empire.

NOTES

1. In 1945 when the Soviet army invaded Manchukuo, all of Manei's film holdings were confiscated by the Soviet army and sent back to Moscow. Some films were returned to China, but the majority remained in Moscow until the end of the Soviet regime. The films were initially "rediscovered" about 1987; however, it took several years of negotiations to identify the films and negotiate their copyrights. Yamaguchi's intriguing account of the protracted negotiations with the Russians for the Japanese distribution rights highlights the complex nature of the notion of ownership in colonial spaces. Officially, neither the Chinese side nor the Japanese side wanted to claim ownership of these films as to do so would be tantamount to officially recognizing the former Manchukuo regime (Yamaguchi 2000, 35–39). For more on the Japanese news coverage of the discovery, see "Yomigaeru maboroshi no kinema," *Yomiuri shinbun* (evening edition), 26 November 1995 and "Kyū manshū eiga marugoto Nihon ni," *Asahi shinbun,* 9 June 1994. Throughout this chapter, I use the term "Manchuko" to refer to the Japanese-controlled state established in what is now known as the northeastern region of China after its usage in primary documents as well as to refer to both the area and the notion of Manchukuo as being constructed in a specific historical context. Likewise, I am aware that the terms "Manchuria" and "Manchurians" are ideologically loaded and refer readers to works by Duara (2003) and Tamanoi (2000) for a more in-depth discussion of

the ideological implications behind such terminology. For background on the 1995 thirty-volume VHS set *Eizō no shōgen: Manshu no kiroku* released by Ten Sharp, see Ishii Kaoru, 1995.

2. My translation. Yamaguchi omits the word "culture" from his Japanese translation of the original Chinese headline. See "Wenhuade yingxiang zhenci" *Renmin ribao,* 27 May 1995, reprinted in Yamaguchi 2000, 15.
3. Essentially all of the early major postwar Japanese film histories touch on Manei only briefly or ignore it entirely. See works by Iijima (1955), Tanaka (1980), and Iwasaki (1961). Serious study of Manei in Japan only began in the last twenty years, first with examinations by Tsuboi (1984), Satō (1987, 1995), and Yamaguchi (1989, 2000) and later by High (1995) and Yomota (2000a, 2000b, 2001). Significant impetus into the study of Manei also came from Chinese film scholars. Chang and Gu (1990) wrote a pivotal monograph on Manei that was translated into Japanese in 1999.
4. In a fascinating discussion of the commercial cinema of the German Third Reich, Eric Rentschler (1996) also questions this seemingly incontrovertible division between entertainment and propaganda as somehow being mutual opposites.
5. Janine Hansen (1997) has written extensively about the production and reception of this film in both Japan and Germany. My intent in this chapter is to extend that scholarship in a new direction. By looking at this co-production in the larger contexts of Axis film exchange (like the German-Italian co-production *Condottieri* made the previous year) and goodwill co-productions, I hope to establish an understanding of Japanese cinema during this period that is more closely in line with how its contemporaries saw it—as part of an imperial project. For more, see Michael Baskett, "The Attractive Empire: Colonial Asia in Imperial Japanese Film Culture, 1931–1953" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2000).
6. A pamphlet titled "The Manchuria Motion Pictures Corporation" (no publishing data listed) states the company's objective as being "to control the exportation, importation, and distribution of motion picture films and to carry on enterprises relating to the production of educational, cultural, and entertainment films, with a view to contributing to the exaltation of the national spirit and to the promotion of national education" (5).
7. Before Amakasu, Negishi Kan'ichi, former studio chief of the Nikkatsu's Tamagawa Studios, was in charge of Manei. Negishi was responsible for producing a string of so-called humanistic war films including *Gonin no Sekkōhei* (1938) and *Tsuchi to Heitai* (1939) before going to Manchukuo. Negishi's humanism, compared with Amakasu's "terrorist, militarism," resulted in the former's earning the nickname of "the mother of Manei" and the latter's, "the father of Manei" (Fujiwara and Yamaguchi 1987, 133). For more on Negishi's activities in Manchukuo, see Iwasaki 1969, 125–163.

8. For more on film rationing in Japan see Tanaka 1980, 3:22–28. On film stock as a "motivator" for cooperation with Japanese film policy in Shanghai, see Zhang 1942, 25.
9. For more on Goebbels' film as entertainment policies, see Moeller 2000, 106–114.
10. See "Minzoku kyōwa Ri Kōran no henka" 1940. For more on the fluidity of Ri's ethnicity, see Silverberg 1993, 30, 56.
11. Dialogue from the video version of *Shina no Yoru* (1940). The remainder of the scene follows:

    Hase: Steady man. You're Japanese, aren't you? Look at these Chinamen lining up to watch. If they see you hitting her for no reason, they won't think much of us Japanese now will they?

    Man: Shut up! I've been robbed and I'm gonna kill whoever did it! If you go easy on *these people,* before you know it, they'll be making fools of us Japanese!

    Hase: I needn't remind you of the times we live in. These Chinamen get their opinions of the Japanese from those they see here in Shanghai. It's our duty to mind our actions more than usual, isn't it? I'm only a passerby, but why don't you let me pay you the money. It's not much, but just cross it off to bad luck.

    For a different reading of this scene see Yomota 2000b, 108–118.
12. Wang Yang was a Shanghai Chinese actress who starred in three goodwill films, two with Ri Kōran. See "Chūgoku o haikei toshita Nihon eiga wa kore de yoi noka" 1940.
13. For more on the production and promotion of the film see Tōwa Shōji 1942, 93–103.
14. *Atarashiki Tsuchi* was funded in part by Tōwa Shōji Company; J. O. Studio, Kyoto; Terra Studios (Germany); and Arnold Fanck's own production company. Production costs were estimated at 660,000 yen, but the final budget was said to have totaled 750,000 yen (the *New York Times* quoted production costs at U.S.$215,000). The average production cost of a typical Japanese film at this time was about 50,000 yen, or less than one-tenth.
15. This article was published in ungrammatical English to which I have tried to remain as faithful as possible without altering the meaning.
16. German filmmakers clearly had their eyes on Manchuria and China until the end of the war as evidenced by titles such as *Zu neuen Ufern* (To new shores, 1937), *Das neue Asien* (The new Asia, 1940), *Alarm in Peking* (1937), *Geheimnis Tibet* (Secret Tibet, 1943), and *Quax in Fahrt* (Quax abroad, 1945). See Bauer 1950.
17. Gekidan Shiki 1992a, act two, scene one.
18. Ibid., act one, scene five.

19. The term *maboroshi* is used to refer to something illusory or no longer extant. It is commonly used today to refer to Manchuria and other parts of the former Japanese empire that no longer exist. Yamaguchi Takeshi refers to the entire cinematic output of Manei as an "illusory cinema."
20. My observations are based on the 11 March 1995 performance in Aoyama Gekijō, Tokyo. Cultural historian Yomota Inuhiko had a vastly different impression of a 1998 performance of the play. He found there to be too much historical background, which diminished any "entertainment value" in the musical (Yomota 2000b, 274–278). For a fascinating analysis of the Ri/Yamaguchi consumer boom as a postmodern phenomenon, see 317–320 in the same work.
21. One online source cited a total of 22,630 paid admissions during the sixteen performances in China. This site also notes that the play was also performed in Singapore with 8,090 paid admissions for its three performances in 1997 <http://www.netlaputa.ne.jp/~yayako/kouen/kiroku.html>.
22. In its revival in July 2003, nearly each performance was sold out. The advertising copy for this last run ran as follows: "For us as Japanese, this certainly is not a matter from the past" *(korewa watakushitachi nihonjin ni totte keshite kako no dekigoto dewanai)*. Asari's next musical, scheduled to begin after *Ri Kōran,* is *A Hill in a Foreign Land (Ikoku no oka),* which deals with a platoon of Japanese soldiers taken prisoner in the Soviet Union during World War II.

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5 Colonized Colonizers

The Poles of Manchuria

THOMAS LAHUSEN

Let us broaden the horizons of our national thinking, let us cut wide roads through the cordons, let us reach wherever Polishness lives and desires to live, let us awaken her, where necessary, from the state of lethargy, let us go ready for her defense to the farthest borderlands, let us build a new Poland beyond the oceans, let us create out of all this the one, modern national idea—and our forces will start to grow as never before.
—Roman Dmowski, "Reflections of a Modern Pole," 1903.

"Manchuria" continues to fascinate. After John Frankenheimer's *Manchurian Candidate* (1962), Bernardo Bertolucci's *Last Emperor* (1987), and Eddie Fong's *Last Princess of Manchuria* (1990), Poland has now given its own contribution to the Manchurian theme with Magdalena Lazarkiewicz's 1999 melodrama *To the End of the World (Na koniec swiata)*. The film's exhibition seems to have been limited (for the time being) to some festivals and more generally the Polish public, as we can judge from a "page," posted on the World Wide Web by the Friends-of-Poland-DC Yahoo Group. It announces the screening of *To the End of the World* at the Polish embassy in Washington, D.C., on 31 January 2001, with the following description:

> This is a drama of morality, love and madness.
> The 20th century is beginning.
> The action takes place in exotic Manchuria.
> At the beginning of the 20th century, a large number of Poles live in the Far East, residing among the Chinese and the Russians, building a railroad.
> The heroine of the movie—Teresa—arrives in Manchuria together with her husband—Kamil—just after their wedding.
> Deep in her heart, she knows that she doesn't love him at all.[1]

The World Wide Web is a treasure trove of the most unexpected and the most expected, the private and the public, the local and the global, a true mapping of our present world, including the representation of its past. Another of its "pages" displays a short text on the city of Harbin, written, as a link informs us, by a certain Jaroslaw Zawadzki, freelance translator, sales department clerk, teacher of English, who received his M.A. from the University of Warsaw Chinese Department, in his own words, "a jack-of-all-trades . . . keeping myself busy translating and teaching, my hobby being what you can see here: HTML, web graphics and Taiwan." The page reads:

> Harbin. Polish engineers sent there by the Russians to construct the East-China Railway track (Poland did not exist as an independent state at the time) founded this bustling town in what is today Chinese Manchuria at the end of the nineteenth century. It was on 11th April 1889 that Adam Szydlowski, the chief of the expedition, chose this place for the headquarters of the East-China Railway Company. In May a group of Polish engineers and Russian soldiers arrived at the site of an old distillery where the town was to pop up within no time at all. Although sponsored by the Russian drive to lay hold of Manchuria, Harbin was mostly a Polish town, designed by Polish architects and inhabited by Poles. There were Polish schools and cultural centers like the Gospoda Polska. Lots of Chinese and Russians settled there as well.[2]

Considering the real number of Poles who resided in Harbin and Manchuria, the historical validity of these lines is questionable, to say the least. That number never exceeded seven thousand (see Jablonska and Krakowski 1961; Wozniakowski 1976; Symonolewicz-Symmons 1978). But what these Web pages tell in the most succinct mode is the much more important story of representation. Zawadzki's historical musings and the announced setting of Lazarkiewicz's melodrama illustrate a much more contemporary issue—the symbolic territory where postcolonial dreams of lost and new empires are being "worked out."[3] The goal of this chapter is to show precisely a piece of this territory. Through the particular case of the "Poles of Manchuria" I would like to illustrate to what extent "Manchuria" was, and perhaps still is, an empty space to be filled. The quotation marks are there to remind us that the very name is not only a contested site but also an allegory of a much larger and ominous

phenomenon: that of the survival, until today, of the old imperial and colonial desires for expansion and "living space."

In an essay entitled "Remembering China, Imagining Israel" (Lahusen 2000), I attempted to show a particular case of "Harbin (or Manchuria) nostalgia," focusing on the memory of experiences of communal integration not yet broken up by the abstract mapping of the modern state. I argued that what made the experience of Jewish settlers and immigrants in China unique was their collective statelessness, added to the experience of a concrete place, referring, as one of them remembers, to a "personal life rather than to an abstract national history," a condition of "visitors" shared, to a certain extent, by their hosts, who were often "sojourners" themselves. In other words, neither the Jews nor their Chinese neighbors (most of them peasants from Shandong province who came to Manchuria as settlers themselves) had a national state—in the modern sense of the word—to refer to. The case of the Poles seems similar at first glance: after all, Poland disappeared from the map of Europe for more than a hundred years after its last partition by Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1795. On closer examination, however, the Poles living in Harbin, in the "extraterritorial zone" of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), and other places of Northeast China during the first half of the twentieth century experienced their status of émigrés in a fundamentally different way. Most of them came to China as formal subjects of the Russian empire. Many of them left as citizens of the Republic of Poland, resurrected in 1918 as one of the consequences of World War I. What they shared in their minds and attitudes was the dual status as colonizer and colonized. As Brian Porter writes in his recent book, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland,* "Poles were perhaps unique in that they saw themselves as a European society engaged in a civilizing mission vis-à-vis a set of eastern peoples, while simultaneously being subjected to imperial domination by one such 'Oriental' land (Russia)" (Porter 2000, 188). When Porter refers to the Poles as colonizers, he has of course in mind the eastern "borderlands" of Poland, the *kresy,* those territories that once upon a time were part of this half-mythical *Polska ot morza do morza* (Poland from Sea to Sea, that is, from the Baltic to the Black Sea), which included the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Jews.

Concerning the question how Catholic Poles related to Jewish Poles, many of the former did not consider the latter "Poles," precisely because they were "Jews," a fact that caused many Jews from Poland (and Rus-

sia) to emigrate to Manchuria, where attitudes and laws were much less restrictive.[4] A former resident of Harbin remembers, "My only identity was that of a Jew. And this is what I put on my high school diploma (Nationality: Jewish) in spite of the fact that I was a Polish citizen" (Menquez 2000, 82).[5]

As to the Russians, if they were not simply perceived as the "Asiatic horde of Muscovy," they represented "a nation that was oppressed but too uncivilized to realize it" (Porter 2000, 185). But in "Yellow Russia" (i.e., Manchuria) the Poles were inhabitants of what the leader and ideologue of the Polish nationalist movement Roman Dmowski has called "the farthest borderlands," the conquest of which would create "the one, modern national idea."

One of the main sources for studying the history of the Poles in Manchuria is Kazimierz Grochowski's *Polacy na dalekim wschodzie* (The Poles in the Far East), a book published in Harbin in 1928 (Grochowski 1928). The context of this publication is made apparent by the introductory chapter, presenting the creation in 1926 of an "active committee of Polish organizations in Harbin" (Komisja Czynna Polskich Organizacji w Harbinie) in response to the forthcoming Conference of Representatives of Polish People Living Abroad. One of the goals of this committee, composed of representatives of all institutions and unions of Poles in Harbin and its most important businessmen and industrialists, was to help prepare a colonial exhibition in Warsaw. During the meetings of the committee it became clear that the time had come to gather the forces of the emigration, to organize it better, "not only to preserve the cultural and linguistic specificities of the Poles of Manchuria and the Far East, but to help the fatherland in acquiring its missing colonies." To achieve this goal, writes the author, "it is important to take example from three other nations, which, because of the absence or quasi-absence of its own colonies and a highly organized overseas emigration, find themselves in conditions that are similar to Poland. These nations are Japan, Italy, and Germany" (Grochowski 1928, 3). In a later chapter, Grochowski proposes to his compatriots in Warsaw the creation of a colonial institute on the model of the German Colonial School of Witzenhausen an der Werra.

> Such a school would further the cause of Polish commerce and colonial expansion. . . . The existence of such a school would staff the Polish overseas settlements with effective pioneers of Polish commerce, in-

> dustry, and culture, and would lower the export of various failures and cripples, who, because of their incapacity of doing good work, poison our reputation in foreign countries and discourage Polish society to engage with overseas expansion. (Grochowski 1928, 205)

Grochowski was for sure neither failure nor cripple. The following biographical data are taken from recent Polish publications on Harbin and Manchuria (Cabanowski 1993; Kajdanski 2000).[6] Born in a small town in Poland, the author of *Polacy na dalekim wschodzie* graduated from high school in Lwow (one of the major towns of the Polish "borderlands" in Western Ukraine) and from the University of Vienna. He also studied in several mining institutes in Louvain, Pribram, and Freiburg. In 1901, he received his diploma in mining engineering and began working in East Asia in 1906. He was employed by the Okhotsk Mining Company and at various mining projects near Vladivostok and the Ussuri region, the Sikhote Alin range, the shores of the Sea of Japan, and the mouth of the Amur River. Grochowski prospected for oil on northern Sakhalin and for gold on the shores of the Okhotsk Sea and the Kolyma peninsula. While working for the Upper Amur Gold Mining Company in 1909, Grochowski did ethnographic work among the local "small peoples" of the Russian Far East (the Yakut, Tunguz, Oroqen, Gold, and Lamut), managing to compile dictionaries of the Tungus and Yakut languages. After being transferred to Hailar in 1914 he organized the North East Mongolia Concession in the Barga region. In the meantime, his scholarly interests had shifted to archaeology. After Barga lost its short independence under the rather adventurous leadership of Ataman Semenov and the "bloody baron" Roman Fyodorovich Ungern-Sternberg (see Stephan 1994, 149, 332–333, 337), Grochowski finally settled in Harbin in 1920, where he worked as a professor at the Henryk Sienkiewicz Lyceum. One of the creators of the Manchuria Research Society and the organizer of a Polish museum in Harbin, he was also the founder of the journal *Tygodnik Polski* (Polish Weekly), first issued on 16 April 1922. Grochowski died of a heart attack in Harbin on 12 March 1937.

In addition to his book, Grochowski left extensive notes on the geology, ethnography, and archaeology of the places he visited, scrupulously entered in eighty-six notebooks spanning thirty years. These diaries, deposited at the National Library in Warsaw, are exemplary illustrations of the colonial enterprise. Some excerpts were published by Kajdanski in

1986. The regions explored were scrutinized from all angles for future exploitation: from human geography (the ethnographic notes, the dictionaries) to the penetration of time (archaeology) and space (geology). We already saw that among Grochowski's ethnographic interests were the Oroqen, a hunting tribe that lived in the forests of northern Manchuria. He was therefore one of those "Russian" pioneers, mentioned by Prasenjit Duara in his recent book on the "East Asian Modern," who would inspire Japanese ethnographers in search of "primitive authenticity" in order to legitimize Japan's presence in Manchuria (Duara 2003, 180–188). Grochowski's search for "primitive authenticity" had a more immediate purpose—even if he intended to send his personal collection of ethnographic artifacts to the Lwow Museum (see Kajdanski 1986, 19). He obtained the North East Mongolia Concession for his own private benefits through the tsar's vice-consul in Hailar. After all, Grochowski was a Russian citizen. He named his company Fort Grochowski, probably inspired by the conquest of the American West. He had traveled to California and Alaska in 1912–1913 (see Kajdanski 1982, 17–18).

The Upper Amur Gold Mining Company disappeared in the turmoil of the civil war, and Fort Grochowski had to be abandoned when the region became Chinese. The oil that Grochowski discovered in the 1920s during a geological expedition in the greater Xingan mountain range, between Qiqihar and the western line of the CER (a find that outdid the Japanese, who were also prospecting but hadn't found anything), was reaped by the new legitimate owners of the land, thirty years later. It was indeed Grochowski who first located the famous Daqing oil fields (see Kajdanski 2000, 138).

For want of oil or other colonial goods and because of the absence of means to exploit these resources for the one, modern national idea, the Poles of Harbin and Manchuria invested in another well-known commodity: Catholicism. Catholic religion was—and still is—the lion's share of Poland's own "regime of authenticity."[7]

Pope John Paul II's famous declaration during his first official visit to his homeland in 1979, according to which "Without Christ it is impossible to understand the history of Poland" (Porter 2001, 290), is well illustrated by Grochowski's account of the Poles of the Far East, starting with this short note, according to which "the Manchu alphabet originates in Syria (Palestine) and was brought by the intermediary of Nestorian monks first to Mongolia, and then to Manchuria. It came from

the Aramaic alphabet, which was used in Palestine during the time of Christ (after Hebrew became extinct)" (Grochowski 1928, 8). In this context, the Poles of Manchuria are shown as the true followers of those "Nestorian monks" in modern times. Here are the words of a Polish parishioner, welcoming a high visitor in 1921, Bishop De Guebriant, sent by Pope Benedict XV to Harbin and other places in the Far East:

> Providence, in its unfathomable judgements, has called us, the Poles, to play a very special role in the history of the East. During four centuries the Polish nation sheltered Christianity with its chest, and with it, Western civilization, from the Asiatic hordes, and it was the pioneer among the barbarous East. . . . The Poles in [Siberia and the Far East] are the only living element of Western culture. . . . We turn to Your Excellency with the request that the legal guardianship of the Catholics in Northern Asia, Siberia and Turkestan, in Northern Mongolia and Northern Manchuria, as well as the helm of the catholic missions in these countries be bestowed to the Polish nation and its priesthood. (Grochowski 1928, 35–36)

While the history of the building of the CER and the foundation of Harbin tells the story of Russian imperialism in China, the role of the Poles in this process is presented in a somehow contradictory light. On the one hand, Polish engineers and administrators are shown as participating at the highest levels in the organization and building of the railway (one of them, Adam Szydlowski, determined even where the city Harbin would be built and prosper;[8] another one—Stanislaw Kierbedz[9] —was not only the vice-president of the board of the society of the CER between 1895 and 1903 but also drew the plans for the famous railway bridge across the Sungari [Songhuajiang] river in Harbin). On the other hand, the early history of Polish emigration to Manchuria is framed in terms reminiscent of the history of early Christianity—that of persecution and slow proselytizing in an inhospitable and, at times, hostile environment. In a chapter on the "first Polish-Catholic parish" in Harbin, we learn that many Polish engineers and workers came to the Far East because conditions were better than in the "lithuanian-byelorussian" provinces, where the Polish and Catholic element was persecuted by the Russian government (Grochowski 1928, 16). The reader is informed of the first Polish ball in Harbin, organized in 1901 to raise funds for the first church in Harbin New Town *(novyi gorod)*. The first official document

written in Polish is the 19 March 1905 decree deciding on the construction of a Catholic church in Harbin. A report on the opening of the first Polish elementary school also mentions the mission to Harbin by a group of Polish Redemptorist fathers in August 1908. Despite the progress of Catholicism and Polishness (the Polish Catholic church St. Stanislas was inaugurated on 1 August 1909), persecution was still the order of the day: in 1913 the Russian authorities decreed that all officers of the railway battalions would have to adopt the Orthodox faith or get fired. Only one "mentally ill" Polish officer "embraced the Lutheran faith *[sic]* to keep his job" (Grochowski 1928, 17, 20, 22, 28). After relating further progress, such as the construction of a church in the Pristan district, in Manchuria station on the Russian border, and in Hailar, 748 kilometers from Harbin, the chapter concludes on an uplifting note:

> The Polish churches in Manchuria, Hailar, Harbin, and—in the future—in several other locations, are part of this chain of bastions, stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific. In them and around them, the true sons of Poland are gathered, cherishing the traditions of their forefathers: FAITH IN GOD, LOVE OF THE FATHERLAND, sacrifice for the poor, pity on the persecuted, respect for the native language and love of national traditions. . . . Many of the faithful are presently persecuted by the enemy, but this is nothing new, neither for the Church, nor for the Poles. Our fathers were witnesses to even greater persecutions of our Faith and Fatherland. But the omnipotence of God reduced to dust the former persecutors. LET US HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT TODAY'S PERSECUTORS WILL FEEL THE HAND OF GOD! (Grochowski 1928, 35–36; capitalization in original)

One could say, they did. The tsar was overthrown, the Bolsheviks replaced him, and the war was lost and Poland "resurrected" in 1918. Concerning the Polish émigrés of Manchuria, however, the consequences of the events following the October Revolution were not in their favor. At first, life seemed to pick up considerably. With the demise of Kolchak in Siberia, the number of Russians and other "Whites" in Manchuria increased dramatically. Harbin, in particular, was flooded with refugees of the civil war, and this increase caused the explosion of commercial and cultural activities. The late teens and early twenties can be considered the golden age of the multinational Harbin, soon followed, however, by its rapid decline. In a chapter devoted to the "Polish organizations in the

Far East," Grochowski counts about thirty Polish organizations in 1919 in Harbin alone. These included the Polish Military Union (Poles who had fought in the White armies), the Society for War Victims, the Polish Scouts, the League of Polish Women, the Polish Socialist Party, and, most important, the Polish Association (Gospoda Polska, which translates literally as "Polish Hostel"), established in Harbin in 1907.[10] Gospoda Polska hosted a library, a theater, and a primary school, and organized many social, cultural, and religious activities; it was the informal representation of the Poles of Manchuria before the rebirth of their state in 1918. Other Polish organizations, most of them military associations, existed in the Manchurian provinces: in Azhyhe, Mulin, Pogranichnaia, Hailar, Qiqihar, Anda, Hengdaohezi, and so on (Grochowski 1928, 74–75).

In 1922, the number of Polish organizations in Harbin was down to nineteen, and, in 1927, to fourteen. What happened? When on 9 September 1920 the Chinese Republic announced that it no longer recognized the organs of the former Russian regime, including its diplomatic missions, the Russians of Manchuria were deprived of their extraterritorial rights and became stateless overnight (see Bakich 2000, 56). Very soon they would have to become Soviet or Chinese, or remain without a passport. As for the Poles, with the disappearance of the tsarist state, of which they were citizens, and the emergence of their own state—the Republic of Poland—of which they became citizens, at least symbolically, the choice became clear: about two thousand of them left for Poland or other countries during that year (see Cabanowski 1993, 65–66). The Mukden (Shenyang) agreement, concluded between China and the new Soviet regime in 1924, caused further departures. The agreement established the principle of parity on the CER, that is, the principle that each Soviet employee of the CER must have a Chinese counterpart. It deprived those who had neither nationality of their jobs.

Grochowski must have felt the exodus as a personal failure, which explains probably some of the more passionate moments of his book. In a section devoted to the traces of Catholicism and the Poles in Siberia, he estimates the number of "Poles-Catholics" of both sexes in Asia (from the Urals to the Persian border, from China to the shores of the Pacific) at about two hundred thousand. He adds that there is also a qualitative aspect to these émigrés: they are "better fit for the harsh working and living conditions of the East than the western colonizers, the English, the Americans, and the French" (Grochowski 1928, 167). In a chapter de-

voted to the needs of the Polish element in the Far East of Asia, the author of *Polacy na dalekim wschodzie* voices a Spencerian point of view:

> We see from other examples of European people living in the Far East that without the injection of their original culture, which can only originate in the culture of the fatherland, that original culture is fated to degenerate. I will give the example of the Portuguese, who, in addition to their own colony in Macao, live in almost every port of China, and in sizable numbers. Despite the fact that they kept their Portuguese language and a quite important percentage of the purity of their race, they have adopted such negative traits that the English, the Germans, the Scandinavians, and the French do not take them for Europeans any more. A marriage with a Portuguese woman is considered the same misalliance as if one marries a Chinese or a Mongolian woman. Therefore, Poles who are born and educated in the Far East should go to study in Poland for at least three to five years, so that during the period of their intellectual maturation they can draw from the pure sources of Polishness. This goes not only for the boys but even more for the girls, who, to a greater extent, are prone to denationalization. Because nobody else will have in the future the duty to preserve in the families the Polish spirit, to educate the young generation in the Polish customs and Polish culture, and stand in to fostering the ideals of the fatherland for the head of the family, often busy with his professional and financial duties. . . . What will become of the children, educated by a mother who might still speak Polish, but who speaks English or French much better, and Russian best, while nothing relates her to Poland and who has the same exotic imagination about Poland as, for example, about Italy? (Grochowski 1928, 201)

The already mentioned memoirs of Konstanty Symonolewicz, the former Polish diplomat in Qiqihar and Harbin and later sociologist in the United States, are written in the same key, with painful-to-read passages on the filthiness, laziness, and ignorance of the various "Ivans," "Piotrs," or "Mishas" (i.e., the Chinese "boys" serving in the foreigners' households) or slippery remarks on the erotic exploits of some "locals," including a Chinese (male) servant and his Japanese (female) counterpart. Symonolewicz mentions some interracial marriages: "I saw foreign women who sincerely loved their Chinese husbands and usually found in them some hidden qualities." As to the reverse, "To enjoy a Chinese

woman is a matter of special taste. Polar opposites remain polar opposites, and there is nothing one can do about it" (Symonolewicz 1938, 10–12).

But let us go back to the author of *Polacy na dalekim wschodzie.* Grochowski's call to create a colonial school on the model of the colonial school of Witzenhausen is reiterated in a final chapter titled "The Japanese Market and Our Economic Expansion," in which the author notes the conditions that Poland shares with Japan, Germany, and Italy—that is, the absence, or quasi absence, of colonies and the necessity to acquire them. This is perhaps why, not surprisingly, the model of a "Yellow Russia" makes a comeback toward the end of the book: the author proposes to follow the example of those twenty-two villages of former Transbaikalian Cossacks, partisans of Ataman Semenov in the Barga region. These villages "live in abundance and independence. There is place enough in Barga for another couple of million inhabitants" (Grochowski 1928, 211).

Grochowski lived long enough to witness the entry into Harbin of Japanese troops in 1932, but we don't know what his feelings were. He also witnessed the creation of Manchukuo in 1932. Poland officially recognized the puppet state in 1938. According to a recently published article on the Polish diaspora in Manchuria, the decision was "motivated by the concern about the Poles living there" (Winiarz 2001, 391). After reading *Polacy na dalekim wschodzie,* one could imagine that the colonial dreams of its author were perhaps shared by the Polish authorities of the time, and that, indeed, "conditions" were similar in Poland, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The diplomatic relations between Poland and Manchukuo remained in force until December 1941. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the General Consulate of the Polish Republic in Harbin was closed. The Polish consul, Jerzy Litewski, was able to create a Polish Trust Committee (Polski Komitet Opiekunczy) and to keep open the Polish lyceum as well as the Gospoda Polska. Whereas many Russians, listed in the Japanese-controlled Bureau for the Affairs of Russian Émigrés,[11] were subject to recruitment, Polish citizens were normally not drafted. Their situation deteriorated, however, with the continuation of the war, and some of them were treated as stateless. According to Edward Kajdanski, himself a former resident of Manchuria, Harbin became a ghost city, or a city of (lost) illusions *(miasto zjawa),* where local conditions apparently created a common émigré identity, offsetting old national divisions. Kaj-

danski recalls the evening dances at the Harbin Yacht Club during the last years of the Manchukuo state: "Foxtrot and other Anglo-Saxon dances were severely forbidden by the Japanese authorities. So we danced waltz, the most popular of all being 'On the Hills of Manchuria.'[12] Luckily, the Japanese didn't know what words accompanied this music, composed during the Russo-Japanese war" (Kajdanski 2000, 129).

His predecessor Grochowski did not live to see the end of Polish Manchuria. The fate of his compatriots was similar to that of other Western émigrés of Harbin and Manchuria. In July 1949, three railway transports repatriated several hundred Poles via the USSR. Four hundred fifty remained in Harbin. Two hundred fifty returned to Poland during the 1950s. The others left for Australia, Brazil, Israel, and the United States (Winiarz 2001, 394). Some of them, like Edward Kajdanski, continue to write books. The dream of "a new Poland beyond the oceans" did not materialize, and Poles did not settle in the villages of Barga region, Manchuria. But there are always various screens to make dreams come true.

NOTES

1. Web site "Friends-of-Poland-DC" <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Friends-of-Poland-DC/message/67>. For a presentation of the film in Polish, see the Web site "Na koniec swiata" <http://www.gutekfilm.com.pl/na-koniec-swiata/>.
2. The Web page from which this quote is taken was still active when I presented an earlier version of this chapter at the March 2003 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in New York <http://shayalo.republika.pl/tajwan/armia/harbin/>. It has now ceased to be active. A new link provides information on the author <http://webprojects.republika.pl/pl_zh.html> and http://webprojects.republika.pl/cn/index.html>.
3. In an interview, Magdalena Lazarkiewicz, the director of *To the End of the World,* speaks about the "intimate and even secret" motivations she had to make the film. "I made it because I dreamt of it." See the Web site "Na koniec swiata" <http://www.gutekfilm.com.pl/na-koniec-swiata/>.
4. On the Jewish community in Harbin and its relations with the Russian and CER authorities, see Wolff 1999, 96–109.
5. On Jewish-Polish relations and the history of Polish judeophobia, see Porter 2000, 37–42, 158–167, 176–182, 227–232.
6. These histories are themselves largely based on Grochowski's book and his notes, as well as on memoirs of other former Polish inhabitants of Manchuria. These include the writings of Konstanty Symonolewicz, one of the higher officials of the Polish consulate in Harbin during the 1920s and 1930s (Symo-

nolewicz 1932, 1938). After his emigration to the United States, Symonolewicz became a well-known sociologist, publishing under the name Symmons-Symonolewicz.

7. As recently defined by Prasenjit Duara. The following lines are of direct relevance to the role played by the Catholic Church in Polish history:

> In order to be recognizable as the *subject* of history, the core of the nation has to be perceived as unaffected by the passage of time. This core often refers to none other than the unity of a people and its territory. In the nation's evolution there are historical vicissitudes during which a people may be driven out of its territory or enslaved, or become separated and lose consciousness of their original unity. But the historical destiny of the nation lies in the fulfillment or restoration of this unity and sovereignty of a people. National history is fully teleological in that its ends are to be found in its beginnings." (Duara 2003, 28)

See also Porter 2001, 289–299.

8. For a detailed narrative on this story, see Wolff 1999, 23–29. Wolff does not mention the "Polishness" of Szydlowski, and the spelling of the name is Russified (Shidlovskii). After all, "Shidlovskii" was a subject of the Russian state. For detailed sources on the Polish Catholic Church and its congregation in Harbin, see works by Misurek (1976 and 1977) and Chernolutskaya (2000).
9. Wolff refers to Kerbedz as "the highest-ranking Russian" on the CER (1999, 22).
10. For a history of how the tsarist authorities handled the Gospoda Polska and other national organizations in Harbin, see Wolff 1999, 105–108.
11. Biuro Russkikh Emigrantov, more often referred to by its acronym, BREM. On the BREM, see Bakich 2000, 61, and Breuillard 2001.
12. "On the Hills of Manchuria" (Na sopkakh Man'chzhurii), music by I. A. Shatrov, lyrics by S. Petrov, refers to the Battle of Mukden (the final land battle of the Russo-Japanese War), which took place February–March 1905. The lyrics include these lines: "You fell for Russia, perished for Fatherland, / Believe us, we shall avenge you / And celebrate a bloody wake." For more information and sound files of this song, see the Stanford University Web page <http://www.stanford.edu/class/slavic-gen194a/na_sopkakh/>.

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6 Those Who Imitated the Colonizers

The Legacy of the Disciplining State from Manchukuo to South Korea

SUK-JUNG HAN

Scholars in the Asia field are finally turning their attention to Manchukuo. Labeling Manchukuo as a puppet state has long hindered exploring its multifaceted character. Building Manchukuo was more complicated than Japan's outright takeover of Taiwan or Korea. Also, Manchukuo was a great laboratory for various modern projects. Grand narratives that describe the fourteen-year history of Manchukuo in terms of exploitation, heroic national resistance, or nostalgic development miss a wide space. An unknown part of Manchukuo is its role of linking the past and the future in the realm of state formation. A long time ago, some anthropologists proposed that cultural traits were transmitted from a center to marginal regions. Diffusion is not limited to cultural traits. According to John Meyer, the contemporary "world polity" is a cultural system, in which actors (nation-states) imitate each other regarding constitution, census, data systems, mass education, science, welfare policy, and so on (1999, 129). It follows, then, that strategies of state managers are also replicable.

Gerschenkron once—now famously—argued that there were some advantages for economic growth for late developers, who can bypass the trial and error of early developers (1966). Such logic holds true for latecomers to state making. In the 1930s, the rulers of Manchukuo bypassed the trial and error of earlier developers. State formation has been demonstrated to be a lengthy process or a "great arch" (Corrighan and Sayer 1985). It took centuries in the British, German, and Russian experiences and decades in modern Japan, the most famous latecomer (Raeff 1983; Norman 1940). However, the state makers in Manchukuo (which included not only Japanese but also Chinese leaders in the new regime) bypassed the trial and error and quickly built their own state. If we accept an analogy of the state as a building, the basic framework of the Manchukuo state was constructed during the first four months of 1932—the first year of the new state—and endured until its demise in 1945.[1]

The Manchukuo state was not built from scratch: the founders of the new state used foundations of the old. That old state was the warlord regime of Zhang Xueliang, which was driven out by the Guandong Army in 1931. A large part of the old regime, including the soldiery and bureaucracy, was bequeathed to Manchukuo. Moreover, the rules of Manchukuo copied much of the blueprint of the Meiji state. Originally, there was deep German influence in the formation of the Meiji state. Japanese leaders studied German political institutions and had the understanding of such reform from above. Influences were felt in the social policies of preventive action against socialism and thought guidance implemented by the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Education of the Meiji regime (Pyle 1974, 143).[2] As this chapter demonstrates, however, a significant but overlooked peculiarity of Manchukuo is that it influenced state formation and state policies in South and North Korea, particularly during the Cold War era. Hence, Manchukuo is best understood as a node between old and new states, between Western and Asian states.

The legacy of Manchukuo can be seen in numerous "naturalized" events in South and North Korea. So-called national ceremonies, such as paying a one-minute silent tribute to the war dead in front of monuments, marching, listening to lectures on the "current emergency situation," watching propaganda movies, making posters, entering student speech contests, attending rallies and big athletic meetings, and so on—largely related to anticommunism and all too familiar to South Koreans for several decades from the 1950s—were originally national events of Manchukuo in the 1930s.

Bruce Cumings once described North Korea as a corporate state (1993, 202–210). Its official discourse has been full of (Confucian) benevolence and loyalty. The leader, Kim Il Sung, was called *ubuyee* (father) of the whole nation. But leaders of North Korea merely followed the example of Manchukuo, which had adopted Confucianism as a kind of state ideology. Since such North Korean leaders were the very anti-Japanese guerrillas at the border of Manchukuo in their youth, they likely were well aware of the operation of the regime. While fighting their enemy, the guerillas came to resemble them. And up to the present, trips made by cadres of the North Korean Workers' Party to local industrial spots remind us of the energetic inspection activity of the Manchukuo bureaucrats. Kim Il Sung himself died during a local inspection in 1994. Officials of Manchukuo were dispatched from the capital or provincial capi-

tals throughout the country for up to two weeks per month. These trips were routine parts of their jobs year in, year out. Big sports festivals and mass games were Manchukuo's favorite events. A Soviet element, therefore, was merely one ingredient in North Korean state formation (Armstrong 1997, 328).

Although Manchukuo's imprint on North Korea was tangible, the crucial linkage is between Manchukuo and South Korea. There were four directions of influence in South Korean state formation. Those were from the American military occupation, the Meiji state, the colonial state, and the Manchukuo state. The United States was deeply involved in the process, guiding the creation of the army and the police force (Cumings 1981). Above all, the colonial state left a significant legacy. Similar to the legacy of the warlord regime in Manchukuo, the colonial state during the Japanese occupation (1910–1945) bequeathed a large part of its bureaucrats and policemen to the new liberated Korean state. Furthermore, there is an affinity between the colonial state and its descendant in that both "stood over society," wielding enormous power downward, if we use the jargons of state theorists.

There is, however, a crucial difference. While the colonial state left the ruling *yangban* class intact, the new state, particularly after Park Chung Hee's military coup, did not allow the existence of a powerful social class. The power of the landed class was gone before Park's coup; in its stead his regime fostered the business class. Hence, the state had no challengers, be it the landed or capitalist class. This was similar to the earlier situation in Manchukuo. There was no powerful landed class or business class in Manchuria. Manchukuo was an empty space for its state builders, a "brave new empire" that brought a utopian vision (Young 1998, 241).

In South Korea, Park's posthumous popularity rises high. Park's developmental state was praised as the driving force of the South Korean economic miracle. Its archetype was that of Manchukuo, which pursued grand projects unblocked by any social force. Strong states were built in both countries, strong enough to penetrate and discipline society deeply. Such overlaps were more than a coincidence.

Sponsored Confucianism

South Koreans grew accustomed to the Confucian ideology of loyalty and filiality *(choonghyo)* stressed by Syngman Rhee's regime (1948–1960)

as well as Park Chung Hee's (1961–1979). The postliberation ideology was different from the Confucianism of the Chosun dynasty, which had been not only the official ideology but also the basis of ethics and cosmic philosophy. The former was less intense than the latter. But Confucianism was still influential in the postliberation era. Important Confucian precepts, such as loyalty to the nation, were instilled in students. Such ideas were in part adopted from Manchukuo. It was Manchukuo that energetically patronized Confucianism. Manchukuo was different from mainland China, where Confucianism was severely attacked by the May Fourth intellectuals and their heirs. Also, Manchukuo was different from Japan in the 1930s, when Shinto became the state religion.

The official ideology of Manchukuo was formed through an amalgamation of Confucianism, Asianism, and Manchurian regionalism. Although the redemptive societies such as Daodehui were supported by the regime (see Duara 1997, 1034–1037), Confucianism was predominant, particularly in the early period (1932–1937, from state foundation to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War). One of the main official catchphrases of Manchukuo was the Confucian philosophy *wangdao* (the kingly way).[3] The name of the reign for the first two years was that of Confucian unity *(datung)*, surpassing the barriers of class, gender, and nationality. In a way, through Confucianism, the Japanese rulers of Manchukuo strategically garnered the loyalty of the Chinese landed class in the countryside. To get them to collaborate, every county office organized a Confucian Studies Group. The government built Confucian shrines in every county and officially performed religious services for Confucius two times a year (in spring and fall) across the country. (At this same time, Shintoism was becoming powerful within Japan and colonized Korea.) Also, after important official rallies, citizens used to visit Confucian shrines. The Boy Scout graduation ceremonies were always held at Confucian shrines. Every year, the government awarded people who exemplified Confucian virtues.[4] Confucian ethics became a subject on entrance and promotion examinations for students, teachers, and officials.

At the same time, the Manchukuo regime held a joint ceremony for Guandi and Yuefei, Chinese martial heroes in the ancient period and Song dynasty. The Japanese rulers officially promoted Confucian-style worship of these Chinese heroes, hoping to attain the loyalty of the Chinese populace. In the ceremonies for Confucius, Guandi, and Yuefei, mayors, county magistrates, and school principals emphasized the Con-

fucian virtue of filiality and its extension, loyalty to the new state. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, however, ways of honoring Confucius became less formal and became Japanized. People could just bow instead of kneeling down in front of his portrait. They were asked to wear the uniform of the Concordia Association (Kyōwakai), the unique grassroots organization to connect the government and people in order to propagate "racial harmony."[5] Shinto elements were added to ceremonies in the Confucian shrines. Also, monuments for the war dead began to replace Confucian shrines as sites for some important events, although the two were common in encouraging citizens' loyalty to Manchukuo. Manchukuo was being swept into the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). This was the new stage in its history. In a way, it was distraction from its own state building.

Mourning Ceremonies

Although monuments for the war dead began to supplement the Confucian shrines as sites for important ceremonies, the mourning ceremony, either for ancestors or soldiers, had long been an important part of Confucian practice inside and outside the home. In April 1935, officials and army officers attended a great mourning ceremony *(zhaohunji, shōkonsai)* at the newly built monument in the capital of Manchukuo. The assembly, opening ceremony, invocation of the spirits, enshrining of the dead, offering of food, and tributary speech solemnly proceeded in order. This was but one example of numerous mourning ceremonies of subsequent years, particularly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. At the third anniversary of the state foundation, the "great state foundation mourning ceremony" was held in Datung Park, and Emperor Puyi "honorably" participated. The next year at the same anniversary, "ten thousand citizens and students" attended and marched to the monument, bearing flags.[6]

The mourning ceremony for dead officials, policemen, and soldiers became an important event, second only to one for Confucius. Although the prewar Japanese society also had ceremonies for the war dead at Yasukuni shrine, they were not the same as those in Manchukuo. In Japan, all the war dead (except those who died in hospitals rather than on the battlefield) were enshrined in one place, Yasukuni. Ceremonies for all were held there at fixed dates. In Manchukuo, by contrast, ceremonies

were held at numerous places and at various times. Each ministry of the central government, central police board, army district, province, and county office organized a committee for constructing monuments. Monuments and plazas for the war dead were built across the nation.

Finally, in 1940, the Grand State Foundation Shrine, the Manchukuo version of Yasukuni, was completed (McCormack 1991, 114).[7] It was dedicated to about four hundred thousand people who "sacrificed their lives for founding Manchukuo." Every county has a name for such a ceremony. "Ceremony to soothe spirits," "ceremony to soothe the brave men's spirits," "ceremony for enshrining the loyal spirits," "memorial service for brave soldiers who died for the state foundation," and "memorial service for those who died during the bandit suppression" were those used throughout Manchukuo. Some services were held at the monument plazas; some were in temples.

After the Sino-Japanese War, some ceremonies were attuned to events in Japan. There was one for the war dead of the Russo-Japanese War, which was not directly related to the history of Manchukuo. Grand ceremonies were held on Japanese army and navy commemoration day. From the autumn of 1938, Manchukuo citizens attended ceremonies for the festivals of Yasukuni, too.[8] Also, a big ground for sumo wrestling, the Japanese national sport, was constructed in front of the grand monument of the Manchukuo capital, and the funeral for Saionji, the last Meiji oligarch *(genrō)* was held in Manchukuo. Japanese elements pierced the social life of Manchukuo citizens after the war.

The second stage of Manchukuo's history framed a formula that entwined memorial services with important events. People lived amid memorial services. Manchukuo became a funeral state. In February 1938 there was a memorial service commemorating the seventh anniversary of the entry of Japanese soldiers into Harbin. During the Sino-Japanese War, the number of mourning ceremonies dramatically increased. When the remains of the war dead were carried to the capital, citizens put out flags draped in black. Places of entertainment were closed. As the number of the war dead increased, this practice became customary. Monuments and memorial services were venues for delivering theatrical lectures to officials, soldiers, and students. Confucian and Shinto styles gradually became mixed in memorial services in a unique way. Those at provincial, city, or county levels were all-year-round events. In such ceremonies, governors and magistrates played the role of main mourner.

Among them, the first premier, Zheng Xiaoxu, was a born mourner who displayed his talent for writing beautiful prose for the war dead. When he died in 1938, the government prepared the first state funeral for him. On Emperor Puyi's charge, a special committee was organized. At this state funeral for the state founder, citizens expressed deep sorrow by abstaining from entertainment. All the government offices were closed. The Concordia Association patronized memorial services at schools and lowered flags to half-mast. All the citizens prayed together at 10:30 in the morning. No one mentioned that Zheng had been forced to step down three years before. His death was merely a prop for the theatrical state.

Jianguo Gymnastics

Most middle-aged and older South Koreans remember *jaegun* gymnastics in the 1960s. "Let's start *jaegun* gymnastics *(jaegun chejo shiijak),* one, two, three, four!" This was the signal song in the early morning across the country. It was broadcast for a long time in the 1960s following Park's military coup.[9] Most family members woke up to this song-like command and practiced *jaegun* gymnastics, still practically asleep. *Jaegun,* meaning "reconstruction" (of the state or nation), was the catchphrase of Park's regime. Several other songs about *jaegun* were written and propagated for citizens to memorize. The model for *jaegun* gymnastics were the *jianguo* (state foundation or construction of nation) gymnastics of Manchukuo. *Jianguo* and *jaegun* had the common Chinese character of "foundation" or "construction" ("jian" in Chinese, "gun" in Korean). *Jianguo* was an essential word in Manchukuo, from *jianguo* spirit and *jianguo* celebration day to *jianguo* university and *jianguo* exercise. Construction and reconstruction were key words for both Manchukuo and South Korea.

In Manchukuo, exercise and sanitation were important fields in which the regime invested. There were special weeks of exercise and street cleaning. During this time, the human body came under the jurisdiction of the state. One month after its foundation, the regime prepared an athletic meeting. Every May, the *jianguo* athletic meeting (later renamed the Manchukuo National Olympics) was held. Imitating the Nazis, the rulers of Manchukuo were interested in the physical training of citizens, and the Manchukuo Athletic Association was created. It had local branches at provincial and county levels. Provincial governors became heads of provincial branches. The association sent its staff to Japan for study and

even applied to participate in the Olympiad. Japanese and Swedish track and field associations acknowledged the Manchukuo counterpart. Newspapers in Manchukuo boasted that a Canadian basketball team visited Manchukuo in 1939.

Through sports, Manchukuo sought approval, which the regime was so thirsty for in the international world. Major cities built stadiums, and people participated in events such as the "marathon race between the capital and Jilin," the "citizens' marathon," the "Fengtian soccer match," and so on. The starting line for such races was often at a memorial monument of one kind or another.[10]

There was an inseparable relationship between the state foundation and exercise, between politics and sports. To commemorate Emperor Puyi's visit to Japan (for the first time in April 1935), April 6 was set as national gymnastics day. The next year, at the first anniversary of his visit, May 2 was designated *jianguo* gymnastics day. There were lectures to spread *jianguo* exercise across the nation. From 1937, the three days of March 1 (the state foundation day), May 2 (Puyi's visit to Japan), and September 18 (the Manchurian Incident) were fixed as *jianguo* gymnastics days. But there could be a "*jianguo* gymnastics day" at any time. In 1937, the Manchukuo Athletic Association planned to have athletic meetings in the name of "Athletic Manchuria" for one year. In September of the same year, there was "athletic week" in which a marathon, *jianguo* gymnastics, and ball games were held. And in 1939, members of the Concordia Association practiced *jianguo* gymnastics for a month. The foundation or reconstruction of nation was to be manifested through exercise in both Manchukuo and South Korea.

Anticommunist and Other Rallies

South Koreans grew sick and tired of anticommunist rallies *(bangongdaehue)* and "great gathering(s) for destroying Communists" *(myulgongdaehue)* under Syngman Rhee's and Park Chung Hee's reigns. Old folks and housewives led by officials of city districts and neighborhood districts and students led by teachers used to get together in great stadiums as they awkwardly shouted anticommunist phrases. Again, the model was Manchukuo. In prewar Japan, of course, there was mass mobilization (through such organizations as the military reservist and national

youth associations). After the Manchurian Incident, in particular, jingoism was spread through the news media, including magazines, movies, and literature. According to Louise Young, however, neither government repression nor market pressures can entirely explain the enthusiasm in the 1930s. It was voluntary. Journalists of *Asahi* or *Mainichi* supported the army because they had conviction (Young 1998, 79). Also, the main enemy for Japanese society was not necessarily Communist Russia (although it could be for the Japanese army). Hence, there were no anti-communist rallies in Japan. By contrast, such innumerable rallies were held in Manchukuo. Also, Manchukuo had many more occasions for rallies. Manchukuo was thus a pioneering place of maximum mobilization, where people were summoned day and night. The German- and Italian-style fascist gatherings flowed to both North Korea and South Korea through Manchukuo.

Initially, rallies in Manchukuo used the theme of *jianguo* to express Manchukuo's sovereignty among its people, although it was never recognized by the outside world. To celebrate its foundation in March 1932, citizens of the capital were asked to prepare decorated trains and rickshaws, signboards, air balloons, special lights and ribbons, posters of *jianguo,* and portraits of Puyi and the so-called founding fathers. Two years later, at Puyi's coronation, citizens were again asked to display flags and have celebrations, marching in the streets bearing flags. Lantern processions, street decorations, fireworks, and lectures followed. This was a model for subsequent celebrations that continued for the next fourteen years. In the first year, the celebration for state foundation spread across the nation. In Harbin, the Committee for Propagating State-foundation Thought provided a special week, presaging future campaigns lasting for a week. Citizens were summoned to several great gatherings *(dahui)*. In addition to the sports week and ceremony for Confucius and the war dead, they had to celebrate the New Year, Puyi's birthday (February), the state foundation day (March 1), Puyi's visit to Japan (May), commemoration for the Sino-Japanese war (July 7), Japan's acknowledgment of Manchukuo (September 15), and the commemoration of the Manchurian Incident (September 18).

In 1935, many more meetings were added, such as those for the first anniversary of Puyi's coronation, his birthday after the coronation, the exhibition for celebrating the coronation, the first state foundation cere-

mony after the coronation, his enshrinement, the celebration of his visit to Japan, the promulgation of the edict after his visit, the first anti–air raid week, national gymnastics day, Puyi's review of the navy, and athletic week. Celebrations continued all year long. In 1936, tree-planting day was added.[11] There were other celebrations, such as those for Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, the entry of Japanese soldiers into Manchuria, the visit of Japanese royal family members, and the abolition of Japanese privilege—even one for the founding of the post office.[12] The year 1937 saw a long list of gatherings, including those for the abolition of Japanese privilege, the friendship of three countries—Germany, Japan, Manchukuo—"the current emergency situation" after the Sino-Japanese War, the "special week to emphasize national spirit," the "campaign for mobilizing national spirit," and the "week for the national flag."

In addition, a great meeting—*guomindahui* (national gathering)—was introduced for the new war. Several decades later South Koreans frequently had gatherings of the same name. Above all, from the beginning of 1937, anticommunist *(fangong)* or "destroy communism" *(miegong)* national gatherings swept the country. In the city of Jilin, posters bearing slogans such as "Support the kingly way," "Red devil," and "The Communist Party is the enemy of all races" were written in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean and appeared in the main streets. The new anticommunist rallies in Manchukuo were related to the new situation in China and reflected the fear of a united front between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) after the Xian Incident at the end of 1936. "Anticommunism" suddenly became an important word in Manchukuo. The treaties that Manchukuo signed with Germany, Italy, and Spain were called "anticommunist treaties." Anticommunist rallies were sometimes held at the Guandi shrines or by the minority peoples (such as the Muslims or the White Russians). The Manchukuo regime used the religions of these minorities to attack the atheism of communism. Harbin, which had a big White Russian community, was one of the main stages of anticommunist rallies.[13]

In 1937 the state foundation day was more lavish than ever. In Fengtian, people displayed the national flag, learned the national anthem, and marched the streets, bearing flags. There were decorated trams and automobiles, commemorative seminars, a lecture tour, a speech contest, an exhibition, a gymnastics meeting, a "religious peoples' great gathering," a party for the elderly, a mourning service for the war dead, and the

like; leaflets were dropped from airplanes, and newsletters were distributed. These activities lasted for a week.

Nineteen thirty-eight was a particularly cruel year for Manchukuoans. Since it was an emergency period (the year after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War), more rallies than ever were held. On New Year's day, people bowed afar *(yohai)* to the royal palace (Puyi's residence) in Japanese style. February saw an anticommunist rally and a celebration for the national foundation day of Japan. Numerous ceremonies followed: the week from February 26 to March 4 was the "week for spreading state foundation spirit." Several events emphasizing the emergency situation were held during this week. Two days following this week, the "lecture for citizens" was held at the ceremony for Confucius. At the end of March, there was a joint ceremony for Guandi and Yuefei in several cities. At the beginning of April, there were photo exhibitions across the nation to "celebrate victories" on the China front. The duration of tree-planting day increased to four days. At the end of April, there was an enshrining ceremony for Yasukuni and the state funeral for former premier Zheng Xiaoxu. The week beginning April 23 was "the commemorative week for Puyi's visit to Japan." There were mourning services in various regions at various times. In May, there were celebrations for the Japanese emperor's birthday, the Italian delegate's visit, and five countries' normalization (Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, and Manchukuo).

In June, the "grand state foundation athletic meeting" and anticommunist rally commenced. In July, the first anniversary of the "China Incident" (the Sino-Japanese War), the enshrinement of Zheng Xiaoxu, a celebration for the anticommunist bloc, and a national frugality campaign followed. The city of Yanji had a lecture for national spirit every morning from July 1. In August, there was a mourning service for the war dead. In September, a "state foundation athletic meeting for the fifth anniversary of Japan's recognition of Manchukuo," an exhibition for victories, and an invocation ceremony for the spirits of the Manchurian Incident were held. In October, the authorities called a joint athletic meeting, a volunteers' gathering, and a grand enshrinement ceremony for Yasukuni; in November, a praying ceremony for national strength, a celebration for the occupation of Hankou, an anticommunist week, and an anti–air raid practice. Finally, in December, the Jianguo shrine was completed. The majority of these events would be repeated in the future. In addition, a gathering for "the reporting of Manchukuo delegates to

Europe," a national housewives' meeting, a national savings campaign, an "Asian prosperity" *jianguo* exhibition, and a "cities' federation for Asian prosperity" gathering were held.

In 1939, the celebration of Puyi's special edict (which was promulgated in 1935 after his visit to Japan) was renamed the "national gathering for Asian prosperity." Seven representatives, from Manchukuo, Japan, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Huabei (Northern China), Huazhong (Central China), and Huanan (Southern China), marched together bearing torches and solemnly held a ceremony igniting the torch for the games. Anti-British phrases swept in a national gathering in which several tens of thousands of people got together in July. From this year, "Asian prosperity" *(xingya)* appeared frequently, in such phrases as "Asian prosperity national gathering," "spirit of Asian prosperity," "Asian prosperity youth camp," "Asian prosperity day," and so on. Asian prosperity was the logical outcome of Asianism, one dimension of the Manchukuo official ideology. It presaged the appearance of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, a key term in the Japanese empire with the outbreak of the Pacific War. The Volunteer Army for the Sino-Japanese War was also organized. It had an inauguration ceremony in front of the Jianguo shrine. The ceremony included flag raising (of the national flag), obeisance to the palace afar, silent prayer for the war dead (or "the beautiful spirits who founded the state"), a congratulatory speech, a hurrah three times, and a closing; most of these activities would be used for decades to come by the South Koreans. Also noteworthy was a mobilization of Manchukuo youths to be dispatched to the China front.[14]

Docile students were also present. In addition to attending numerous rallies, they held speech contests and slogan-writing contests and prayed for the soldiers' bravery and safety. With the state foundation, each middle school sent a student to a students' speech contest to "cultivate the state foundation spirit" hosted by the educational board.[15] This became a model for subsequent students' speech contests in Manchukuo (and in South Korea decades later); a Manchukuo-Japan students' speech contest was also formed. From 1937, the Concordia Association hosted a youth speech contest every year. Teachers were also summoned to the contest and had to listen to youngsters' speeches, after bowing to the Manchukuo national flag and emperor three times.

As national gatherings became customary with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the rulers of Manchukuo introduced a thrift

campaign. The Concordia Association introduced the simple and frugal "Concordia-style marriage," attacking the "costly and complicated marriage in traditional style, which [is] not [in keeping] with the current emergency situation."[16] Abolition of waste and useless formalities was the key part of the "total mobilization of national spirit" that was promulgated in January 1940. On the newly designated "day for Asian prosperity" (April 3), people were asked to abstain from entertainment and liquor and to clean their homes. The day of full mobilization was near at hand. The people, who were suffering from the murderous schedule of rallies, were asked to maintain the spirit of temperance, simplicity, and self-control.

Inheritors in the 1970s

In May 1975, columns on national security, or "total mobilization and our nation," flourished in most newspapers of South Korea for a whole month. The Pen Club quickly declared its resolution on national security. Writers led a wave of anticommunist great gatherings across the nation. On May 2, tens of thousands of professors, students, and factory workers held large anticommunist gatherings in the big cities of Pusan, Daegu, Kwangju, Ulsan, and so on. The Ex-policemen's Association and Ex-congressmen's Association announced their resolutions on the same day.[17] The Farmers' Association, the Businessmen's Association, and the Association of Immigrants from North Korea followed them. Thirty-eight associations, including the Veterans' Association, created the National Council for Total Security. A million and a half citizens had great gatherings for citizens' unity for security in Pusan, Chinju, Daegu, Chunju, and Chungju. Intellectuals also joined in this wave. Professors of Soongjun University, Aju Engineering College, Sungkyunkuan University, Sogang University, and Sookmyung Womens' University announced their determinations. Forty thousand students from Seoul National University, Yonsei University, and Korea University were reported to have held gatherings for national security and a ceremony for burning an effigy of Kim Il Sung at the stake.[18]

On May 11, 1975, 1,400,000 citizens of Seoul gathered at Yuydo Plaza for the same theme and had the same burning ceremony. Someone wrote such characters as "national security" and "anticommunism" with his own blood after cutting his fingers. With this wave, the government promul-

gated the notorious Emergency Act 9 to prohibit protest against or even discussion of the so-called Yooshin Constitution (the new constitution of 1972, which guaranteed that Park Chung Hee would be president for life). Students' involvement in politics, spreading of rumors, even notice of such matters by the news agencies were now banned. If newspapers reported such matters, they could be closed. A previously unheard-of organization, the P.T.A. of Seoul National University, also announced its worry about students' involvement in politics. And there began the notorious "fundraising for national security," which would last for nearly two decades. Students, citizens, and businessmen were all required to donate money for national defense. It was an informal tax. Students at high school and college levels were organized into Students' National Defense Units. Schools essentially became military camps, where the student representative was called a "commander" of the unit. The Confucian ideology of loyalty and filiality was endorsed with a high degree of verve and enthusiasm. It became almost the state slogan. Huge stones with the same characters carved in them were built in many places, including plazas and parks across the nation. Most of the carvings copied the president's calligraphy.

South Korean leaders converted the defeat of the United States in Vietnam and Laos in May 1975 into an opportunity to strengthen their authoritarian regime and to attack dissidents. In just one month, South Korea became a kind of garrison state. Subsequently, Korean society became heavily militarized during Park's reign. Pedestrians had to stop at 6 o'clock in the evening while the national anthem was loudly broadcast all over the country at the ceremony of the lowering of the national flag at every office and school. People stood still to hear the song and the oath to the national flag. Also, Park heavily patronized the cult of Admiral Yi Soon Shin who, according to the Korean official historiography, drove out the Japanese navy at Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion at the end of the sixteenth century. His statues or monuments stood not only on school grounds, but also at the entrance to most mountains. The admiral's statue (and stature) embodied the Korean version of the ideals of Confucius, Guandi, Yuefei, and the anonymous war dead in Manchukuo. An amazing thing is that no country in the world besides South Korea during Park's regime could exactly repeat the disciplining methods of the Manchukuo state. It did so by imitating Manchukuo's national gatherings, mourn-

ing ceremonies, monuments for the war dead, students' speech contests, slogan making, marches, anticommunist rallies, gymnastics, and catchphrases of "construction" or "reconstruction," "total security," and "total mobilization."

Manchukuo as a Land of Opportunity

After the Korean historian Shin Chae Ho extended the national space of Korea to Manchuria at the beginning of the twentieth century, the lands of Manchuria came into the Korean nationalist historiography and historical consciousness.[19] However, inquiry into Manchuria in the colonial period was curiously discouraged by the postliberation regimes of South Korea for a long time. Manchuria was an epistemological vacuum. The life history of some famous figures stopped there. For instance, President Park's biographies, which stated that "he went to Manchuria with a big, blue dream in his youth," were silent about his youth (Cho 1998, 101). Manchuria was a blank sheet in which anything could be written. Hence, politicians in the 1950s and 1960s used to describe their past as anti-Japanese fighters in Manchuria. Actually, most Korean fighters were rooted out in the late 1930s. The number of anti-Japanese forces in Manchukuo (largely categorized as "bandits" by the regime) decreased to several hundred in the late 1930s (Coox 1989, 413; Kato 1989, 98). The Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, the last anti-Japanese force, was hunted down at the end in the winter of 1939 and almost demolished in February 1940 (Jiang et al. 1980, 528).

After Manchukuo was founded, it became a land of opportunity to many Koreans. The number of Korean immigrants from 1932 to 1940 was estimated to be about 720,000 (Kim 1994, 10). Korean newspapers in the 1930s described Manchuria as an exit from a crowded Korea, thereby further inducing immigration.[20] Some Koreans became low-rank policemen (Jones 1949, 69). Many who later would become leaders in many fields of South Korea spent their youths in Manchukuo. Even some respected nationalist intellectuals chose Manchukuo for their new (collaborating) lives. For instance, Choe Nam Sun, the famous poet who wrote the Declaration of Independence for the 1919 March First independence movement, taught at Jianguo University (Allen 1990, 788).

Three men who became presidents of South Korea also had been to Manchukuo. Park Chung Hee was an officer of the Manchukuo Army, and Choe Kyu Ha had a temporary position in the Manchukuo government. The extremely impoverished Chun Doo Hwan's family also crossed the border for a better life. It is symbolic that Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader, was a cadre of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, while Park was on the opposite side in Manchukuo (Suh 1988, 20). Indeed, Manchukuo incubated the leadership of both Koreas.

It was in the South Korean army that those who had been to Manchukuo rose conspicuously after the liberation. Korean officers of the Manchukuo army later comprised the nucleus of the South Korean army in the 1950s and supported Park's military coup in 1961.[21] They had witnessed historic incidents in Manchukuo, including the revolt of the Guandong Army against Tokyo (the Manchurian Incident), the state-led industrialization, bandit suppression, and the mass mobilization. The Syngman Rhee regime imitated Manchukuo in suppressing bandits;[22] all the rest of the techniques became hallmarks of Park's regime, which could be summarized as the making of a strong state, so strong as to lead to a rapid industrialization without hindrance, to domesticate its subjects in a military style. Park's coup truly signaled the advent of "Manchurians" in South Korea.[23] A critical ideologue linking both regimes was Yi Sun Kun, who was in charge of military historiography and propaganda for Rhee and launched a national education campaign and Hwarang ideology for Park.[24] He had been a Korean cadre of the Concordia Association in Binjiang province in Manchukuo (Im 2001, 177).

Conclusion

Manchukuo was a great laboratory. The state founders freely experimented with several ideas, from an ideal one (such as racial harmony) to an inhuman one (such as innumerable rallies). The latter were used much earlier in Manchukuo than in Japan or Korea. The various experiments of Manchukuo can be seen as the outcome of rapid state making. This rapidity was possible because Manchukuo inherited much of the past. It borrowed much material from an old state, copying the blueprint of the Meiji state (itself influenced by the contents of the German state). It also became a model for the Korean states after liberation. The Man-

chukuo state, in a sense, then, links the West and the East, the past and the future in East Asian countries.

NOTES

Special thanks to Alexis Dudden, who gave valuable comments about this essay.

1. *Manzhouguo zhengfugongbao* (Manchukuo government gazette) (hereafter *GB*), 4, 5, 16 May 1932.
2. Itō Hirobumi, the architect of the Meiji state, even imported many of the interior decorations for the throne room from Germany when building the new palace in 1888 (see Fujitani 1996, 77–79).
3. In addition to the kingly way were the catchphrases "racial harmony" and the "state foundation spirit." The latter was no less important than the kingly way. About Manchukuo's official ideology, see my article "The Problem of Sovereignty: Manchukuo, 1932–37." *Positions* 12.2 (2004).
4. The Minister of Education awarded the commendations based on reports from the governors and mayors. *GB,* 20 February 1933.
5. *Shenjingshibao* (Shengjing daily) (hereafter *SJ*), 2 September 1939.
6. *SJ,* 8 March 1935; 1 March 1936.
7. *SJ,* 16 September 1940.
8. *SJ,* 20 October 1938.
9. Its remake is being played even today in Korean military camps.
10. *SJ,* 24 June 1937.
11. In April, after a brief ceremony for the "great greening campaign," officials and citizens planted trees across wide regions. At the ceremony, the nationalist government was accused of deforestation. The official message of "the devastation of the deep forest of the Qing dynasty during the Republican era" was delivered to citizens. *SJ,* 21 April 1937.
12. *SJ,* 9 June 1936, 27 July 1936.
13. In Harbin, May 1 was designated as Anticommunist Day in 1940. *SJ,* 4 May 1940.
14. *SJ,* 1 May 1939.
15. *SJ,* 1 June 1933.
16. *SJ,* 25 October 1939.
17. *Chosun Ilbo* (Chosun daily), 2 May 1973.
18. Ibid., 3 May 1973.
19. About Sin and the rediscovery of Manchuria, see Schmid 1997.
20. For instance, a special column, titled "Manchuria and Korean Farmers," appeared for several months in a Korean newspaper in the 1930s. *Maeil Shinbo* (Maeil daily), June–September 1936.
21. Men from the Manchurian clique held the highest positions in the Korean

army in the 1950s: the chief of the general staff, the commander of the First Army, the commander of the Second Army (Han 2001, 243).

22. The Syngman Rhee regime, confronting the thorny problem of leftist guerrilla activity in many regions, presumably preferred officers from Manchukuo, who had the experience of bandit suppression.
23. It is ironic that the so-called Manchurian clique of both Korea and Japan met each other in the countries' 1965 normalization. The so-called Kishi mafia, or the Manchurian clique in prewar Japanese politics, was involved in the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan in 1965 (Johnson 1982, 1312; Halliday and McCormack 1973, esp. chap. 5). The Japanese foreign minister who was in charge of the normalizing process was Shiina Etsusaburō, Kishi's right-hand man.
24. Hwarang was a fighting unit in the Shilla dynasty. It was made up of young men who, according to Korean official historiography, sacrificed their lives in the unification war in the seventh century. It has become a model for cadets of the South Korean Military Academy (and every youngster in Park's reign). A central building of the academy is called Hwarangdae (Hwarang Center). Since the capital of the Shilla kingdom was near Park's hometown, Hwarang ideology is very regionally biased. This is one example of Yi Sun Kun's achievements.

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7 Pan-Asianism in the Diary of Morisaki Minato (1924–1945), and the Suicide of Mishima Yukio (1925–1970)

MARIKO ASANO TAMANOI

In 1970, a few months before publishing the diary of his older brother, Morisaki Minato, Morisaki Azuma encountered an extraordinary incident: Mishima Yukio, an internationally acclaimed writer and celebrity, committed suicide in the tradition of seppuku on the compound of the Ichigaya base of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Tokyo. For some time before his death, Mishima had demanded that the Japanese state restore the national army, a force forbidden by Japan's "peace constitution.[1] In Mishima's opinion, the Japanese state "dishonored" Japan by subordinating the country to the military might of the United States. By choosing death, Mishima intended to encourage the members of the Self-Defense Forces to rebel against the Japanese state. With this goal in mind, he had planned his death many months before. With the members of Tate no Kai (Shield Society), a group of his young followers, Mishima had written a manifesto to be read to the members of the Self-Defense Forces. The timetable for the day of his suicide required special planning. The members of Shield Society would first capture the commandant; Mishima would make a thirty-minute speech based on the manifesto; he and the members of Shield Society would make three cheers for the emperor; Mishima would then go to the room of the commandant and kill himself; Morita, a member of Shield Society, would behead him; and then he too would kill himself in accordance with Mishima's order. They rehearsed the whole process in a room at the Palace Hotel (in view of the Imperial Palace) for two days (see Nathan 1974, 271–280).

Mishima died on November 25, 1970, in accordance with the plan he so meticulously laid out. His speech, however, lasted for only seven minutes, for "no one was listening, and if they had been they could not have heard him above the jeers from the rest of the men. 'Come down off there!' 'Stop trying to be a hero!' 'Let the commandant go!' the angry soldiers shouted" (Nathan 1974, 279). In 1971, when Minato's diary was

published, it captured the Japanese readers' attention largely because of the ritualistic suicide that Minato too committed, on the beach near the base of the Japanese Imperial Navy in Mie prefecture. Minato, however, had killed himself on August 16, 1945. He died alone without anyone's help, for he had ordered his men not to search for him after Japan's capitulation. He did not die for the sake of the emperor as Mishima did. The only similarity between the men is the way in which they both died —a ritualistic seppuku. Otherwise, they do not have much in common. Consequently, Minato's family and friends seem to have been quite hurt by this unexpected attention that his published diary received from the Japanese public.

Izumi Santarō, who, together with Azuma, edited Minato's diary, openly expressed his disclaimer to the alleged similarity between the life courses of Minato and Mishima.

> I am the one who lived through the last war and witnessed numerous deaths. As such a person, I have no wish to whip the dead. Nevertheless, when I compare the deaths of Morisaki Minato and Mishima Yukio, I cannot help but smell something unjustifiable about the ritualistic suicide of the latter. If Minato were alive, he would have been a contemporary of Mishima. I have nothing to say about those who survived the last war because of their craftiness, thoughtlessness, or imprudence. [They are not worthy of my opinion.] But if they survived the war based on their solid principles, they should know the meaninglessness of choosing a death today. In this respect, Mishima should have killed himself on August 15, 1945. Instead of dying such a ritualistic and theatrical death,[2] he should have fought the ills of the present-day Japanese society. On the surface, Japan seems to be peaceful, but in reality, it is saturated with the battlefields that are cruel for many. If Mishima would have fought on such battlefields and died in the gutter, I would have celebrated his death from the bottom of my heart. (Izumi 1971, 240–241)

What led Minato to kill himself in the style of seppuku? What justifies Izumi's celebration of Minato's death over that of Mishima?

In this chapter, I attempt to answer these questions. Toward this goal, I read the diary of Morisaki Minato, a student of Manshū Kenkoku Daigaku (Manchuria Nation-Building University), in light of the death of Mishima in 1970. While reading Minato's diary, I began to see more and more

clearly the differences between the life courses of Minato and Mishima. The ideology that sparked Mishima's suicide is not the primary topic of this article. However, I strongly emphasize that, unlike Minato, Mishima had no vision of Pan-Asianism. A passage of the manifesto that Mishima distributed to the members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces on the day of his death, reads, "We will restore Japan to her true form, and in the restoration, die. Will you abide a world in which the spirit is dead and there is only a reverence for life? In a few minutes we will show you where to find a greater value. It is not liberalism or democracy. It is Japan. The land of the history and the tradition we love, Japan" (Nathan 1974, 271). Mishima died for the sake of Japan, "the land of the history and the tradition we love." He found "a greater value" solely in Japan and tried to restore the Japanese military to make Japan strong again in the greater East Asia sphere. In contrast, Minato had a very different vision of Japan. For him, Japan constituted only part of the Pan-Asian space. While he had left for Manchuria with the sense of Japanese racial supremacy over all the other Asian people, his racial pride dwindled quickly. His belief in the equality among the people in Asia made him question Japanese racial pride and Japan's policies toward its empire. On the day following Japan's capitulation, he therefore killed himself to protest the Japanese state, which, in his view, dominated the life of everyone (except for a handful of Japanese elites) in the Pan-Asian space. I admit that this is a bald argument. In the rest of this chapter, I will substantiate my argument with passages from Minato's diary. The Japanese media in the 1970s elevated Mishima's death as one of the most important events in Japan's postwar history. I would argue that, on the day of Mishima's death, the entire chapter of Pan-Asianism in Japanese history finally closed.

The Diary of Morisaki Minato

Minato was born in the town of Shimabara in Kyūshū in 1924, as the second son of a wealthy farm family. The portion of his diary that I read begins in 1940.[3] By then, his father had given up on farming and started a small construction and transportation business. At that time, Minato was a student at the local school of commerce. He was healthy, extremely bright (always the top student in the school's general examinations), and popular among his peers and neighbors. He also read widely,

from Goethe and Dostoyevsky to Lu Xun and Sun Yat-sen, as well as contemporary Japanese writers and philosophers.

A few words on Minato's diary are in order here. According to Azuma and Izumi, Minato left two sets of diaries: one he wrote for his teachers and military leaders (a common practice at Japanese schools) and another he wrote for himself. They published the latter, a more "personal" diary, and titled it *Isho* (The will). They apparently read it as Minato's will not only to them but also, more broadly, to the readers in contemporary Japan. They also made several editorial changes to Minato's diary, omitting some diary entries, simplifying or omitting Chinese characters and Chinese poems, and omitting politically sensitive parts in consideration of those who appeared in the diary and who were still living when it was published (see Matsumoto 1988, 15–16).

Already in his early youth, Minato seems to have cultivated a strong anti-authority mentality. In 1940, a year before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, in addition to attending academic classes, students received military training on numerous occasions. This diary entry comes from the time when he stayed at the barracks of the Forty-eighth Battalion as part of such training.

> 1 October 1940. From today on, for four days, I will stay in this military barracks. . . . Since Handa [the military camp leader] asked us to submit reports, I submitted one that was half a lie. That should be good enough, as I sound submissive. . . . I find life in a military barracks awfully boring and meaningless. I never want to go [to the military]. No one in this battalion is worth mentioning. Those who received a higher education have surely become impertinent. One is promoted to a higher-rank officer not because he is upright. A man who is garrulous, vulgar, and flattering will be promoted and awarded. If a genuinely cultured man joins this group of indecent men, what will happen to him? He will surely feel ashamed and angry. It is indeed painful to obey these men and hear them constantly call names. (11).

Minato is defiant not only of his superior; he is also defiant of his peers, who are blindly submissive to Handa.

Two years later, in 1942, Minato was admitted to the prestigious Manchuria Nation-Building University, having passed a highly competitive examination. Founded in 1937 on the recommendation of Ishiwara

Kanji, one of the highest-ranking officers of the Guandong Army, the Manchuria Nation-Building University was regarded as an embodiment of the ideology of *minzoku kyōwa*—racial harmony among all the races residing in Manchukuo. Ishiwara envisioned it as a place where the students of different nationalities would eat together, work together, and fight together against any element that would destroy Manchukuo (Yuji 1981, 17). He tried to staff the university with people of renown, inviting both Owen Lattimore and Pearl Buck to become professors there (64). Thus, the university attracted students from every corner of Asia, including China (proper), Taiwan, Korea, and Russia (Yuji 1981; see also Izumi 1971, 236; Manshūkoku-shi Hensan Kankō-kai 1970, 592–632).

The ideology of racial harmony is one of the many official slogans issued by the Manchukuo government. Its essence is expressed in the following two passages of the Declaration of Independence of Manchukuo:[4] "The will of thirty million people declares the establishment of Manchukuo and its separation from China," and "there shall be no differences among all those who live within this new territory. In addition to the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Japanese, and Korean people who already reside here, people of any other nationality will be treated equally with others, as long as they wish to reside permanently in Manchukuo" (Manshūkoku-shi Hensan Kankō-kai 1970, 219–221).[5] Since most of the residents of Manchukuo were Han (Chinese), Manchu, Mongol, Japanese, or Korean, the ideology of racial harmony was also called *gozoku kyōwa*—the harmony among five races. By the time Minato was admitted, approximately 450 students belonging to these diverse racial groups of Asia had already been enrolled in the university (Manshūkoku-shi, 42). However, in Minato's diary, only two racial category names appear repeatedly, *nikkei* and *man-kei*. More than half of the 450 students were *nikkei,* about 150, *man-kei*. Who were *nikkei* and who were *man-kei?* What places did they occupy among the five ethnic groups of people who resided in Manchukuo?

In Minato's diary, *man-kei* refers to the Chinese-speaking students. This category included both the Han Chinese and Manchu students. (Since the Manchu people had been greatly sinified by the early twentieth century, largely due to the influx of a large number of Chinese into Northeast China, I suspect that most Japanese would not have been able to tell the difference between Han Chinese and Manchus, with the exception of a few anthropologists.[6]) In addition, *man-kei* also included those students

who were not only from Manchukuo, but also from China proper and from Taiwan, Japan's colony from 1898 to 1945. In Manchukuo, the terms *nikkei* (of Japanese descent) and *man-kei* (of Manchurian descent) were often used for categorizing employees of public institutions, such as government officials, military officers, teachers, and students. The common suffix, *kei,* which I translate here as "of descent," also means "of blood." This is why *nikkei* also included the Japanese who immigrated to Manchukuo from the United States and Hawai'i. John Stephan argues that, for these *nikkei,* "Manchuria held out the promise of a multiethnic land of opportunity as distinct from white-dominated 'lands of opportunity' such as Australia and North America" (1997, 3). Leaving behind their relatives, most of whom were later sent to relocation camps during the Pacific War, they became part "of Japanese blood" in Manchuria together with the Japanese from Japan proper.[7]

In the official documents of Manchukuo, *man-kei* always appears as a pair with *nikkei.* Since *man-kei,* like *man-jin* or *manshū-jin,* refers to the Chinese-speaking population in Manchukuo, it served as a handy word to connote the stark difference of power between the largest population group *(man-kei)* and a small yet powerful group of Japanese *(nikkei).*[8] *Man-kei* students studied the Japanese language for many grueling hours; *nikkei* students studied Chinese (which they called *man-go,* the language of Manchukuo) for far fewer hours. *Man-kei* factory workers received only about 30 percent of a *nikkei* worker's wages (Yamamuro 1993, 281). *Nikkei* employees of the Manchurian Motion Picture Company ate white rice, while *man-kei* employees, sitting at the same table, ate *kaoliang* (J: *Kōryan,* a low-grade grain) (Yamaguchi and Fujiwara 1990, 119). When contrasted to *man-kei, nikkei* appeared to be a race apart.

Nikkei is different from another category, *nippon-jin,* which does not include the Japanese immigrants to Manchuria from the United States and Hawai'i. *Nippon-jin* must be Japanese who immigrated to Manchuria from Japan proper. And yet, until they came to Manchuria, they had never heard of the term *nikkei* applying to them. For example, Ishidō Kiyotomo, an employee of the South Manchurian Railway Company, was imprisoned by the Japanese thought police for his alleged collaboration with the Chinese nationalists for a Communist "revolution." He writes in his memoir that, until a prison guard told him so, it did not occur to him that he was *nikkei.* Ishidō was Japanese, and yet he became *nikkei* when imprisoned with *man-kei* prisoners. He notes, however, that *nikkei* were sent to

a separate prison, a considerably better one in comparison to the prison for *man-kei* prisoners (1986, 253). In other words, even among the prisoners, *nikkei* was a race apart from *man-kei*. I have discussed extensively the relationship between *nikkei* and *man-kei* because it is the distance in power between the two groups that tormented Minato. He found this distance insurmountable for the realization of racial harmony, his Pan-Asian dream. Thus, he eventually left the Manchuria Nation-Building University.

Even so, it is interesting to note that, when Minato left for Manchuria, he had an extraordinary sense of pride as a Japanese. For example, on 22 March 1942, he wrote:

> Hitler is a true admirer of Japan. This is why he sent numerous scholars to Japan. When he sent the Hitler Jugend [Youth], he asked its members to learn Japanese national history and observe Japanese citizens. Hitler himself tried hard to learn Japan's history. The more he learned, the more envious and fearful he has become. . . . A German once asked me, "Who is the greatest hero in Japan?" I immediately told him, "Japan does not have such a hero." He did not understand me. True, we do not have a hero. A hundred million of us Japanese are the heroes. Each one of us is trying to fulfill his own obligation. This is why we are able to realize "one hundred million with one heart." (36)

Because of his belief in racial supremacy, Minato, at this moment of his life, places Japan in the position of the leader and the teacher of world affairs.

The following diary entry further demonstrates Minato's conviction of Japanese supremacy.

> 3 November 1941. What kinds of treatment have the yellow and the black races received for the sake of "freedom" of the white race? What has the white race done to the Native American Indians? How has the white race treated the four hundred million people in India, the five hundred million people in our neighbor country of China, and those ignorant but innocent Indonesians? At this very moment, who are trembling with the determination to salvage Asia [from the white race]? . . . The vision for the world order must be the moral one, based on the ideal of harmony among all people. Each nation, and each race, must have its own place of peaceful living, fulfill its obli-

> gations, cooperate with each other and develop together [with other nations and racial groups]. This is what we expect as the new order for East Asia. This vision is entirely different from the ones of the Euro-American free nations' bourgeois regime, of Soviet Russia's dictatorial and autocratic regime, or of the German Nazis' exclusive and egoistic regime. (24)

Minato understands the world as one in which the white race dominates all the other races, including the black, Native American, Indian, Indonesian, Chinese, and Japanese people. But how did Minato see Manchukuo? How did he understand the Japan-China war that began in 1937? How did he understand the Chinese nationalist movement, which, by the early 1940s, was clear to almost everyone?

In the same diary entry as the above, Minato writes, "As the Euro-American powers colonized Asia and began exploiting China, the latter subordinated itself to the Western imperial powers and came into conflict with Japan, which had sought for peace in the East" (25). Minato therefore sees the Chinese nationalist movement as a result of China's own doing—that is, having subordinated itself to the West, China has forced itself to see Japan as its enemy and uses Japan to unify the country. Put another way, China is blind to its true enemy, the Euro-American imperial powers. Yet Minato also writes, "Japan should not have a drop of intention to defeat China. Rather, Japan should salvage the Chinese from the Euro-American exploitation and raise their standard of living from one of slaves to that of human beings. Then, together, we will build Asia for the people of Asia. We should not carry anything but a moral obligation of creating an Asia where its people will never witness another war" (25). At least at this moment, Manchukuo for Minato is a manifestation of the ideal relationship between Japan and China. Manchukuo, Minato writes, could not be built by simple cooperation between Japan and China: it emerged out of the inseparable relationship between Japan and China. Furthermore, Manchukuo forms only part of the Greater East Asia that Japan has sought to build. In this diary entry, Minato projects that China too will eventually become part of it. In this endeavor to build the Greater East Asia, Japan, Minato notes, is the leader and the teacher to lead all the other people in Asia. Here, again, Minato's pride as a Japanese is unmistakable: the Japanese or Yamato race is the purest and best of all and is destined to spread its values and ideals over all of Asia. For him, it is

the Japanese who are "trembling with the determination to salvage Asia." What I examine next is how his racial supremacy changed over time once he was in actual contact with *man-kei* students.

Immediately after he entered the university, Minato had to face *man-kei* and learn their language (Chinese), which he calls in his diary *man-go.*

> 8 April 1942. I feel great. I truly feel great that I came here. I want to attend classes as soon as possible. I would like to be able to speak the Manchurian language, so that I can speak with *man-kei* comrades. When they speak to us in Japanese, I become quite passive. It is true that the first- and second-year *nikkei* students lag behind *man-kei* comrades. *Man-kei* students are of splendid physique. Their strong sense of independence is reflected in their facial expressions and bodily comportment. We *nikkei* are still childish. We tend to be frivolous. (42–43)

Minato greatly admires *man-kei* students, but as a *nikkei* student himself, he knows he must compete with them, and he is ready to do so.

> 13 April 1942. I won't be defeated. I won't be defeated by *man-kei* students. I hear they make fools of us first- and second-year *nikkei* students. I heard such a story last night. They may be right. I know some *[nikkei]* who deserve this *man-kei* opinion. I gather that *man-kei* students, who normally do not express their emotions, try to go ahead of *nikkei.* That is fine. It is good that *man-kei* students study hard for this goal. But if they do so out of their narrow sense of nationalism, we *nikkei* should never be defeated by them. The "harmony" among races does not mean that we simply become friendly to each other without sharing the principle. (43)

To Minato, *man-kei* are taller, bigger, and more mature than "we *nikkei.*" The differences seem insurmountable as he sees them daily. The *man-kei* must be his comrades, and yet Minato finds them to be a race apart. Worse, even, they seem to have their own sense of nationalism, which Minato would not accept, because both *nikkei* and *man-kei,* Minato believes, must share the same principle. But what does he mean by "the principle"?

On 24 April 1942, Minato joined Kyōwakai, the Concordia Association. While the complex nature of the Concordia Association does not concern me here, I note that it was the only state-sponsored mass organi-

zation that existed in Manchukuo under Japanese tutelage (Duara 2003, 60; see also Hirano 1972). As the war between Japan and the Allied Forces progressed, however, it became the organization to mobilize Manchuria's resources for Japan's war efforts. On that very day when he joined the association, Minato writes:

> I do not believe a racial harmony to be harmony for harmony's sake: it should be a means to reach a higher goal. Restated, [racial] harmony should be a tool to build a nation of Manchukuo. If for whatever reason it is impossible to realize racial harmony, there is no reason for the continuing existence of Manchukuo. Even though we belong to different races and have distinct mores, customs, and modes of thought, we shall realize "harmony" if we all march together centrifugally to the common goal of "building Manchukuo." Some say we cannot attain harmony: this is because they do not think of [the future of] Manchukuo. (45–46)

The principle, then, is the realization of Manchukuo based on the ideal of racial harmony. In realizing this principle, Minato seems to think that *nikkei* and *man-kei* students should be equal partners. Here, his pride as Japanese seems to coexist precariously with his belief in the equality of all the races in Manchuria.

Meanwhile, Minato became close friends with more *man-kei*, Korean, and Russian students. He writes favorably of a *man-kei* student, Gao Zhenqi, who became angry at Watanabe's mean-spirited joke about his mother, and of Likhachev, who asked Minato in Japanese, after stuttering several times, "Are your, Mr., Sir, father a farmer?" (53). For Minato, respect for parents is an important element of Japanese-ness; Zhenqi and Likhachev share this value with him but not Watanabe, a *nikkei* student. He also writes of Pak Sam Jong with genuine respect for his patriotism and nostalgia for his country of Korea, now under Japanese colonial rule. Before attending the Manchuria Nation-Building University, he had thought the Japanese to be the chosen leader in Asia. Having met students from various corners of Asia, Minato now seems to have been quite confused. He writes:

> Recently, I feel my head is filled with sand. I feel exhausted. It is sad that I am not touched by anybody, anything. . . . The Concordia Association, the Nation-Building University, I understand them all right.

> Harmonizing races, building the base of the Great Imperial Manchukuo, maintaining our eternal prosperity, understanding the spirit of nation building, and training the future leaders of the Greater East Asia—but aren't these goals all superficial? (46)

On 9 June 1942, Minato, for the first time after he entered the university, uses the term *kan minzoku*—the Han people—in his diary. Although *man-kei* still appears in his diary after this date, what he does in this particular diary entry is to replace *man-kei* with *kan minzoku*. As I have already implied, such terms as *man-kei, man-jin,* or *manshū-jin* were forced upon the Chinese-speaking population in Manchukuo. This is, I think, best expressed in the following passage. In the late 1960s, Honda Katsuichi, a prominent left-wing journalist in Japan, visited China. What follows is an introduction to the narrative of remembrance of his Chinese interviewee, who experienced the Japanese colonial brutality.

> While passing by a Japanese police officer, he was asked, "What country are you from?" The Japanese police officers and those Chinese who worked for them [as spies] often asked this question to search for the anti-Japanese activists among the Chinese. If he would answer, "I am Manchurian *(man-jin),*" they would say, "All right." But if he would answer, "I am Chinese," they would regard him as an anti-Japanese, dangerous element, and would even jail him as a political criminal. Since imprisonment meant execution, none would identify himself as Chinese.[9] (Honda 1971, 112)

Honda, who does not accept the category "Manchurian" and hence calls his interviewee Chinese, knows the harsh reality of Japanese domination in Manchukuo. This interviewee lived in Pingdingshan during the Pingdingshan Incident and still lived there at the time of this interview. On 16 September 1932, Japanese soldiers near the industrial city of Fushun killed almost three thousand Chinese men, women, and children in reprisal for a resistance raid that the Japanese suspected had originated nearby (see Mitter 2000, 112–115). In light of this atrocity, the interviewee's survival in Manchukuo rested upon his stating that he was Manchurian.

It is unclear how Minato reached the realization that *man-kei* were after all the Han Chinese who lived in both Manchukuo and China proper. He writes:

> The Han Chinese do not easily open their minds. It is hard to become friends with them. But I hear if one becomes good friends with them, the friendship will go extremely deep. Yet they are quite reserved. They laugh and joke around. If something happens, however, they try to wear the mask of innocence and grow cold. When I exchange glances with *man-kei,* even with those whom I believe like me, they return sharp and guarded gazes. (54)

Minato becomes "more and more weary of *man-kei*" not because the Han Chinese are of a race apart from the Japanese, but because they seem to have their own sense of nationalism that Minato can no longer object to. He finds them increasingly "treacherous, impudent, crafty, and stubborn" (55). Minato writes of two *man-kei* students who, when they are expected to solemnly worship the imperial palaces of the Japanese emperor and the emperor of Manchukuo, Puyi, merely pretended to bow while talking and laughing (56). He writes of a continuous fight between Yamada and Zhenqi and a tendency among *man-kei* students to unite quickly among themselves against Yamada (58–59). He also writes about twenty *man-kei* students who were expelled from the university because of their participation in the anti-Japanese movement (56). All these events affect Minato greatly, and his frustration seems to have erupted on 22 June 1942, when he writes, "If all go like this, it means a complete failure. *Nikkei* and *man-kei* students are totally divided and opposed to each other. While *nikkei* are more enthusiastic about the idea of racial harmony, *man-kei* are united [against us], although they do not appear so. Outwardly, they are friendly. Immediately after we graduate, I am convinced, *nikkei* and *man-kei* will go their totally separate ways" (61).

Minato, however, is by no means a chauvinist. Rather, his weariness with *man-kei* students grows together with his skepticism toward Japan and its people. On 22 July 1942, the students at the university were asked to report to the class about how they had spent their vacations. Minato writes, "Almost all the *nikkei* students said that they spent the vacation having a good time, playing and eating a lot. In contrast, *man-kei* students reported the widespread poverty in Manchukuo's countryside [to where they had returned]. Isn't this the expression of their sharp protest against the Japanese authority?" (66–67). Minato does not stop here in his search for more knowledge about China and the Han Chinese, a process that brings him closer to Chinese nationalism. For example, on

26 July 1942, he writes, "Those who are truly concerned with the future of the Han Chinese may have gone either to En'an or to Jūkei" (62). En'an, or Yan'an, was the Communist base during the war, while Jūkei, or Chongqing, was the wartime capital for the Nationalist government. A few days later, he also writes, "I must study everything. What kind of nation is China *(shina)?* How determined are its people in pursuing their goal, and what fate awaits them? What kind of country is Russia? I do not know anything, do I? What has Japan done to its neighbors in Asia? What will Japan do in the future? Without answering these questions, we cannot discuss anything" (69). Here, Minato seems to have reached the following conclusion: Manchukuo is not separate from China but part of it; the Han Chinese constitute the majority race in China; and the Han Chinese have their own nationalism, as do Russians and Koreans; and their nationalisms are incompatible with Japanese nationalism.

In the following entry, he writes about the Chinese *(shina-jin* or *chūgoku-jin),* terms that now replace *man-kei* and "Han Chinese."

> 2 September 1942. I cannot but sincerely respect those Chinese who agonize [over the fate of China] and fight either from En'an or Jūkei. The people of China are all noble and passionate fighters. They know their mission, and they are ready to give up their lives for it. When I think of myself and my ignorance, I feel so depressed. . . . We cannot separate the Han in Manchuria from the Han in China proper. The Manchukuoans are after all Chinese *(chūgoku-jin).* The more patriotic they are, the more Chinese [rather than Manchukuoan] they become. Alas, those who genuinely think of Asia's future and whom we need as our comrades for our ideal are all on the side of our enemies. I must very much respect their anti-Japanese sentiments.[10] (70–71)

At about this time, Minato's frustration with Japan's policies toward China, and with the university authorities that blindly follow them, seems to be mounting rapidly. He complains of the school administrator who "does not know what to do with Chinese students except for mixing them with *nikkei*" (71). He also laments the loss of innocence among the "Han Chinese peasants and rickshaw men," now that they mingle with the "vulgar Japanese" (92–93). In these passages, I no longer sense Minato's pride as Japanese. It is not only the Japanese authorities but also the "vulgar Japanese" whom he abhors.

Although the following entry was written after he returned to Japan, it sums up Minato's descending pride as a Japanese. On 26 January 1944, Minato was with a group of travelers from Osaka on a train. He wrote:

> I feel angry that these whitish, weak, frivolous, and loquacious people are Japanese. Koreans and Chinese are much better than these Japanese. We will surely be defeated by the Korean and Chinese people who are strong in physique and have vigorous appetites for life. These human beings in front of my eyes—crafty, talkative, cowardly, egoistic, and nearsighted, with soft hands and restless eyes—proudly call themselves the Yamato race or the leading race. I feel ashamed [of being one of them] in front of the Koreans and the Chinese. (177–178)

In Minato's eyes, the Japanese have lost their racial superiority; they are not even equal with the other Asian people; they rank at the bottom among the races in Greater East Asia.

In his diary, Minato does not explain why he left the university. Izumi offers the following explanation:

> Among the students of various Asian races at the Nation-Building University, there were a fair number of those who questioned Japan's policies toward the Continent since the beginning of the Meiji era and who deliberated Asia's future. They secretly sent two groups of students to En'an and Jūkei to mediate peace negotiations between China and Japan. But they [failed and] did not return. Minato then organized another group, including himself, to secretly visit Jūkei. His plan was leaked to the school authority. Using his illness of beriberi as an excuse, the university forced Minato to return to Japan. (Izumi 1971, 236–237)

By then, however, Minato seems to have made his own decision to leave the university and apply for the Japanese navy. On 11 August 1943, he wrote, "I made a decision. Let's go. Let me be a soldier. If I fall in battle, I can fulfill my obligations as a man. If I survive, I will return and devote my life to the study of genuine aesthetics" (94). Minato's decision, which he later carried through, is hard to explain. Minato harbored anti-authority sentiments. He rebelled against the military and school authorities. He did not want to experience life in a military barracks again. He had cher-

ished Japan's moral, but not military, obligation toward China. He lost his racial pride as a Japanese. Why did he want to join the Japanese navy?

On 9 October 1943, Minato left the university to return home. At the time, he was still unsure of his decision, and the university had not yet formally issued a notice of termination.[11] Back in his hometown in Shimabara, Minato worked in his father's business while waiting for his conscription. He finally joined the navy in August 1944 and left for its base in Mie prefecture in western Japan. Though in the navy, Minato's plan was to become a kamikaze pilot flying out from the navy's aircraft carrier. The end of the war, in which he never fought, came quickly. Upon learning of Japan's defeat and the liberation of Manchuria, Minato, instead of "devot[ing] his life to the study of genuine aesthetics," chose to commit suicide.

In explaining Minato's decision to join the Japanese navy, Matsumoto Ken'ichi points to two possible causes. One is the "decadence" and "nihilism" that influenced the Japanese youth of Minato's generation. Another is Minato's agony over his inability to relate the state to the nation. Encountering the hard reality of the conflicts among different ethnic groups and their nationalisms, Minato abandoned the search for the meaning of the state, the nation, and the relationship between the two. Matsumoto cites the following entry from Minato's diary to support his argument.

> 21 April 1943. "The State has developed through force of arms; the race or nationality has developed through natural forces. The group formed by the way of might is the State; the group molded by the royal way following nature is the race, the nationality." Sun Yat-sen, *The Three Principles of the People*. The tragedy of three thousand years of Chinese history may be rooted in this very thought. On the other hand, I think Sun Yat-sen's words are deeply suggestive. I think it is here, in these words, where the possibility of Greater Asia's future lies.[12] (quoted by Matsumoto 1988, 88)

In this diary entry, Minato states that Sun's thought lucidly captures China's inability to develop the state through force of arms. Note that this was precisely the rhetoric used by the Japanese state to justify its colonial venture into China: since China lacks the state, Japan creates one for China, first in Manchuria and later in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity

Sphere. For Minato, however, two years of study at the Manchuria Nation-Building University proved this to be wrong. He realized that, while the Japanese "carried the state with them" to Manchuria, their nationalism was far weaker than the Chinese nationalism.[13] Still, he wanted to see the emergence of "natural forces" or "the royal way following nature" among the people residing in Manchukuo. He tried to believe in his ability to create, together with the Han Chinese, a Pan-Asian space of Manchukuo and the Greater East Asia.

If so, what troubled Minato is not so much the relation between the state and the nation as the relation between nationalism and Pan-Asianism. On this particular relationship, Prasenjit Duara argues that the transnational space of Manchuria was created when modern nationalism gained legitimacy in both Japan and China. Hence, Japan (and China) "rejected, required, and commandeered the ideology of transnationalism" for its construction and maintenance of nationalism. And yet, the Japanese state tried to dominate Chinese nationalism with its military might, instead of nurturing "the royal way following nature." Minato proved the latter to be a mere illusion, or worse still, a lie. Minato pondered not only the notions of the state, the nation, and the relationship between the two, but also the notions of nationalism, Pan-Asianism, and the relationship between the two. In the transnational space of Manchuria, Minato sought "the spiritual alternative to excessive materialism and individualism" of the West (Duara 1997, 1043). He anticipated the "natural forces"—the racial harmony—to emerge in the space of the Greater East Asia. Seeing Chinese nationalism raging in that very space, however, he realized that such a spiritual alternative was not possible. In the end, Minato rejected the ideology of transnationalism and joined the Japanese navy not because he embraced the Japanese state but because, as I will discuss shortly, he wanted to castigate the Japanese state that was interested only in oppressing the people of Manchukuo, instead of nurturing a racial harmony among them.

This is why, even after having made a decision to join the Japanese navy, Minato seems to have continued his search for the "natural forces" to build a Pan-Asian space. For example, commenting on interracial marriages, he writes:

> It is wrong to prohibit interracial marriages, but it is equally bad to promote them. We should simply leave this matter to the forces of

> nature. . . . If [Japanese] people are concerned that their race may become extinct and impure without deliberate policies, they should abandon their hope of eternal progress of a Japanese race. Such a weak race [that cannot survive without artificial policies] will perish after all. (150).

Minato then writes that he will celebrate the marriage of his dear *man-kei* and *sen-kei* friends if they choose their lifetime partners among Japanese women. He also writes:

> 26 February 1944. I predict that Japanese culture will constantly change. And I think it is perfectly all right that the Japanese national character changes accordingly. We cannot claim the plainness, mysteriousness, and serenity of the traditional Japanese culture to be the best in the world. These are merely the temporal qualities of a single ethnic nation. (194)

In these diary entries, we see the transformation of Minato's idea of race. It is no longer a biological or primordial notion. To the contrary, it is a dynamic concept: the characteristics of the members of one race constantly change as they open up their space to others. Race has no boundaries. Rather, its boundary is always porous, accepting and rejecting the members of other races and their cultures.

Minato's interpretation of *minzoku* parallels (or even goes beyond) that of Yanaihara Tadao (1893–1961), a liberal critic of Japanese colonialism, or Sun's idea of race and nationality. Yanaihara defines *minzoku* as a product of history and culture (including common languages and customs). Being a unit of modern nationalism, *minzoku* is expected to grow into an independent nation-state, after going through the process of "ethnic or racial self-determination." The latter is called *minzoku jiketsu* in Japanese and means that being aware of its common history and culture, the members of an ethnic nation mutually acknowledge the need of becoming an independent nation-state. Thus, while a single *minzoku* may include several racial groups, it does not necessarily constitute the state. While a *minzoku* may belong to two states, it could leave both states and create a single nation-state of its own. Kevin Doak (1995) translates Yanaihara's *minzoku* as the ethnic nation. Like Yanaihara, Minato seems to have believed in the possibility of such an ethnic nation for both Manchukuo and the Greater East Asia. Nonetheless, facing the reality of Chinese nation-

alism, he chose the force that was dominant—the Japanese state—only to castigate it in the end.

Conclusion

Isho ends six days before Minato's conscription. According to Azuma, however, Minato began to keep his diary again after he joined the navy. He remembers reading it. This diary was lost in a house fire in 1951. Azuma remembers it to be a daily journal, seen from the perspective of Yamamura Hamae, a farming woman near the navy base whose husband was killed in the war. Minato and his friends held meetings at her house, so he had many opportunities to speak to Hamae, an impoverished woman and a single mother of three children, and to observe her life. According to Azuma, Minato wrote little about his military training in his diary. Rather, in one entry, he expressed his anger against the Japanese state, which forced such women as Hamae into a life of servitude. In another entry, he lamented the corruption among the top-ranking officers of the navy: though they were keen to impose military rules on soldiers, they were not interested in ending the war. In yet another diary entry, he castigated the head of a weapons factory who, instead of taking care of the wounded factory workers, forced them to worship the Japanese emperor.[14]

Like Izumi, Azuma is not happy about the media's attention to his brother's diary. He says, that, unlike Mishima, who ordered one of his young followers to die with him (after he assisted Mishima's death), Minato told his peers not to follow his death. Remembering his brother, Azuma writes, "Though a quarter century has passed, the dead have always been young. But I still have to question myself. Is my brother's death that of a patriot of Japan? He died because of his love to others. He died out of his anger toward those who had oppressed his loved ones. He died because he was too young" (Azuma 1971). He believes that Minato killed himself because of his genuine love toward those people who were oppressed by the Japanese state. These oppressed included Japanese working-class women and men, *man-kei* students at the Manchuria Nation-Building University, and the Koreans under Japan's colonial rule. These oppressed people lived throughout the Pan-Asian space. Thus, Azuma is bitter about the media's focus on Minato's diary, and he has every reason to be.

Mishima died for the sake of Japan, the Japanese state, and the Japanese emperor, asking him to re-create a once strong Japan. Mishima identified only the Japanese people as the emperor's subjects, the citizens of the Japanese state, and the members of a single yet superior race. Mishima had no intention of including the Chinese or the Koreans, those who were once oppressed by the Japanese military, in Japan's national military. Here, we must take into account the fact that Mishima died in 1970, not in 1945. Japan of the 1970s had forgotten the Japanese empire of multiple races. Citing one of Mishima's works, *Bunka bōeiron* (Defending culture), Oguma Eiji posits Mishima as a conservative theorist of the idea of Japan as a homogeneous island nation. In *Bunka bōeiron,* Mishima argues that "Japan is a homogeneous nation with a homogeneous language, something rarely found in the world. Our nation has language and cultural traditions in common, and has maintained a political unity since time immemorial. The continuity of our culture is chiefly due to the fact that the nation is identical with the state" (quoted in Oguma 2002, 317). This quotation suggests that Mishima has totally forgotten Japan's imperial past, as well as the presence of Koreans and Chinese in postwar Japan.

Of course, Minato's complicity in the Japanese aggression is undeniable: with his ritualistic suicide, Minato may have tried to cleanse his sin. Nevertheless, the fact that he chose his death immediately after Japan's capitulation, when the Japanese public still remembered their vanquished empire, is deeply suggestive. Azuma reports of Minato's "insane" behaviors that he later heard from his brother's friends: Minato broke every possible military rule, constantly failing to report for duty. If so, can we interpret Minato's death as the following? With his ritual suicide, Minato wished to wake up the Japanese public to the nature of the Japanese state, or any state, which could easily deceive its citizens with its propaganda. He did not die for the sake of Japan. He was not a patriot. He died for the sake of those people oppressed by the Japanese state in the Pan-Asian space.

Numerous celebrities of the media, literary circles, and the entertainment world attended Mishima's funeral, which was orchestrated by another internationally known writer and a Nobel laureate, Kawabata Yasunari. Minato's funeral was a local one, held in the utter confusion immediately after Japan's capitulation. Then, many thought of his death as

an expression of his patriotism. In this chapter, by remembering Minato in the Pan-Asian space of Manchuria, I have challenged the haunting and yet dominant memories in postwar Japan, which assimilated Minato's death with the media-assisted ritual death of Mishima. For Minato, Japan was not a nation of a single ethnos: it was the empire of many ethnic groups. His published diary teaches us that we should remember the Japanese empire with the critical insights that only the oppressed people in the age of empire can bring to us.

NOTES

1. In Japanese practice, the family name comes before the given name. When a single element is used, it is the family name if there is no elegant pen name, and the pen name when there is one. I use "Mishima" as he had no such pen name. In defiance of this practice, however, I use "Minato" for Morisaki Minato, that is, his personal name. I do so largely to emphasize his youth (see Seidensticker 1983, viii–ix). I also do the same for the name of his brother, calling him "Azuma," instead of the more proper "Morisaki."
2. The theatricality of Mishima's death can be seen, for example, in the following passage of his will to his intelligence officer: "Dress my body in a Shield Society uniform, give me white gloves and a soldier's sword in my hand, and then do me the favor of taking a photograph. My family may object, but I want evidence that I died not as a literary man but as a warrior" (Nathan 1974, 273).
3. In my article "Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classifications: The 'Japanese' in Manchuria" (2000), I have already introduced to the reader the published diary of Minato. In this chapter, I have tried to develop a new argument about Minato by shifting focus to the Japanese media's treatment of the publication of his diary in the 1970s. All statements attributed to Minato are from Morisaka Minato 1971 and are referenced by page number only.
4. The Declaration of Independence of Manchukuo is called *kenkoku sengen*. Since the Japanese term for "declaration of independence" is *dokuritsu* (independence) *sengen* (declaration), the term *kenkoku sengen* invites some questions. *Kenkoku* means "establishing a country." Restated, it is the Japanese who "established the country"; the will of the people who resided in that country was therefore not reflected in its independence.
5. As I have discussed elsewhere (Tamanoi 2000), it was not always the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Japanese, and Korean people who constituted the five racial groups in Manchukuo. For example, the 1940 population census conducted by the Manchukuo government posits Han, Manchu, Moslem, Mongol, and Japanese (including Korean) people as five such groups.
6. For example, Omachi Tokuzō, himself a professor at the Manchuria Nation-

Building University, claims that the "Manchus" are distinct because they are native to Manchuria. All the other races residing in Manchuria, he claims, immigrants as well as current residents from other regions, are alien to Manchuria (1982, 149). He stresses the distinction between the Han and the Manchus, and argues that the latter should be more properly called "Manchu bannermen." He writes, "The glorious term [of the Manchus], from which the name Manchukuo is derived, should only belong to this particular race" (159). In these passages, I note Omachi's efforts to "romanticize" the Manchus.

7. See Sano 1997. Sano, a *nikkei* from the United States who immigrated to Manchukuo, served the Guandong Army. After Japan's capitulation, he was taken to a labor camp in Siberia as a prisoner of war with hundreds of Japanese soldiers.
8. In Tamanoi 2000, I erroneously translated *man-jin, manshū-jin,* and *man-kei* as "Manchu." Here, I correct my mistake, and argue that the Japanese terms *man-jin, manshū-jin,* and *man-kei* do not refer to a racial or ethnic category. Instead, they refer to the people who live in the region called Manchuria. Hence, the Japanese translation should be "Manchurian."
9. This passage certainly resonates with the voice of the Chinese nationalist Du Zhongyuan whom Rana Mitter introduces in his earlier chapter. To refer to a Chinese-speaking subject of Manchukuo, Du uses "a northeastern man." In other words, Du is "at pains to erase any conception that a separate regional entity of any sort could exist in Manchuria" because for him, Manchukuo is part of China (or does not exist) (see chap. 1 this volume).
10. Without going into the history of sinology in Japan, I point out here that, in early-twentieth-century Japan, the term *shina* had mostly negative connotations when it referred to contemporary China. *Shina* suggested that it was "helpless, antiquarian, arrogant, guileful, militarily incompetent, and misunderstanding of Japan's true aims" (Tanaka 1993, 201). This is why the postwar Chinese intellectuals were "so outspokenly upset with the term *shina*" although their arguments were not uniform (Fogel 1995, 66–76). The Japanese government's adoption of the term *chūgoku,* meaning "the middle or central kingdom," can be interpreted as a response to the criticism made by Chinese intellectuals.
11. Although it was still about two years before Japan's surrender, Minato's journey of repatriation was not free from hardships. A day before his departure, a Japanese vessel was attacked by the Allied forces and sank. As a result of this incident, the Port of Pusan in Korea (under Japan's colonial rule) was crowded with people waiting for their ship that never came. On 10 October Japan closed the routes between Japan, Korea, and Manchukuo, except for those traveling on official trips. At the port, hundreds of Japanese and Korean returning or traveling to Japan had to spend several nights on the bare ground. Worse still, Minato lost his ticket to return home. Meanwhile, trains brought more and more people from all over Korea and Manchukuo to the port, which was al-

ready burdened by inflows of travelers. When Japan opened the routes again, Minato's only chance to get on a ship was to sneak aboard. Still he was lucky enough to be able to return home on 13 October.

12. This particular entry has been omitted from Izumi's compilation of Minato's diary. I consulted Sun 1953 for translating this particular section.
13. This phrase, "carry the state with them," most probably originates in Seeley 1883. The book examines the history of England's colonization of the parts of the globe that were, in Seeley's words, "quite empty." Since they were so empty, Seeley argued, they offered an unbounded scope for new settlement for the people of England (1883, 46). Japanese colonists were similarly led to perceive "Manchuria" as an empty space.
14. Azuma's Preface is not paginated.

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