ABANDONED JAPANESE IN POSTWAR MANCHURIA

The lives of war orphans and wives in two countries

Yeeshan Chan

ROUTLEDGE

Abandoned Japanese in Postwar Manchuria

This book relates the experiences of the *zanryū-hōjin* – the Japanese civilians, mostly women and children, who were abandoned in Manchuria after the end of the Second World War when Japan's puppet state in Manchuria ended and most Japanese who had been based there returned to Japan. Many *zanryū-hōjin* survived in Chinese peasant families, often as wives or adopted children; the Chinese government estimated that there were around 13,000 survivors in 1959, at the time when over 30,000 "missing" people were deleted from Japanese family registers as "war dead."

Since 1972 the *zanryū-hōjin* have been gradually repatriated to Japan, often along with several generations of their extended Chinese families, with the group in Japan now numbering around 100,000 people. Besides outlining the *zanryū-hōjin*'s experiences, this book explores the related issues of war memories and war guilt which resurfaced during the 1980s, the more recent court case brought by *zanryū-hōjin* against the Japanese government in which they accuse the Japanese government of abandoning them, and the impact on the towns in northeast China from which the *zanryū-hōjin* were repatriated and which now benefit hugely from overseas remittances from their former residents. Overall, the book deepens our understanding of Japanese society and its anti-war social movements, while providing vivid and colourful sketches of individuals' worldviews, motivations, behaviours, strategies, and difficulties.

Yeeshan Chan obtained her PhD from the University of Hong Kong and currently works as a freelance journalist. She has published investigative journalism under the pen name Yeeshan Yang.

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Contents

Foreword

When Japan annexed Manchuria in the 1930s it was seen as a great opportunity for expansion and utilization of the area's abundant natural resources. Subsequently, large numbers of Japanese civilians were recruited to settle there in small villages in a similar pattern to the way Hokkaido had been successfully colonized some 80 years earlier. However, the colonization of Manchuria lasted only a little over a decade before Japan's grand war adventure collapsed. In 1945 Soviet soldiers entered Manchuria, and the Japanese were forced to flee. Not all succeeded in getting away. Many were killed and perhaps as many as 20,000 women and children were stuck in or around the villages they had lived in. Those who did not take up the national call for suicide in the face of defeat managed to survive by becoming part of local Chinese peasant families by adoption or marriage or simply as extra hands in the households.

In the years after the war, Japanese people were repatriated from the various areas they had occupied, but the chaotic situation in China and the beginning of the Cold War prevented any significant repatriation of the abandoned women and children. Not until 1972 and the relaxation of China's relationship with the US and Japan did they get their first opportunities to visit their homeland and search for lost kin. By this time many had thoroughly adapted to life in China, and some of the youngest had lost all memory of Japanese life and language. Those who sought repatriation faced a choice of moving to Japan and losing their Chinese families or to settle for life in China.

In the 1980s, when Japan experienced a shortage of labour, immigration rules for the abandoned war wives and orphans and their families were relaxed to allow for import of a workforce that was at least not entirely foreign. On the Japanese side, their repatriation was warmly supported by a strong group of volunteers and activists who helped the newcomers settle and helped them with legal procedures to get support and bring more family members over.

Since the 1990s the abandoned Japanese in Manchuria have played a pivotal role in helping Chinese from North Eastern China to get to Japan, legally as well as illegally, and the community of repatriates and immigrants had reached 100,000 in 2005.

This book describes the lives of people suspended between urban Japan and rural Northeast China in great detail. It gives us an insight into the life politics they

exercise and the benefits gained and the costs accrued. Yeeshan Chan manages to get amazingly close to the thoughts and actions of the people she has studied. Her unique background as the daughter of an Indonesian expatriate father and a Chinese mother, living in China and later in Hong Kong (from where her father eventually returned alone to Indonesia), has provided her with an innate sense of differentness. This has been fine-tuned by years of living in Australia and combined with her linguistic background in several Chinese dialects topped up by fluent Japanese, has made it possible for her to blend into her informants' milieu and gain their confidence.

Yeeshan Chan has traced several families in all their complexity and engaged with their lives for a period of time while interviewing them about their motives and desires, their grudges and sorrows. In this book she shares with us the deep insights that she has gained. These insights carry significance not only for the understanding of Sino-Japanese immigrants to Japan, but her descriptions and interpretations of what she has learned is of wide interest to the study of migrant groups everywhere. It enlightens us with respect to general issues of migration, such as the life strategies chosen by migrants, how they survive, how they adapt, and how they cultivate their "roots" and negotiate their ties back to where they came from.

When I took on the task of supervising Yeeshan Chan's thesis work in 2004, I had no inkling of what an exciting job that would turn out to be. Reading some of the reports from her fieldwork felt like reading a mystery story – full of surprises and unexpected illuminations of a part of Japanese society that I had previously been only marginally acquainted with. Yeeshan Chan's reports from Japan and Northeast China also cast exciting new light over some of the dynamics of migration that I knew well from living in Europe. There, much is made of the European societies' strategies for the integration of those who are foreign in terms of ethnicity and religion. Far too rarely do we get to hear about the strategies used by the immigrants to make a life-world for themselves between their homelands and the edges of the European majority society.

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May 2010

Preface

Migration is "an ageless human strategy to improve life," but the creation of national borders and the "imagined" nation-states described by Anderson have transformed such "natural behaviour of human beings" into international migration (Borkert *et al.* 2006). People who have once emigrated from their native country and return many years later to reside again in their country of birth or ancestral nation are called "returning migrants." Return migration has taken place in various political and economic contexts in the post-colonial era under the rationale of ethnic citizenship guided by the principle of *jus sanguinis* – "the right of blood." During the early postwar years, Dutch people returned to the Netherlands from Indonesia, and colonial Japanese (called *hikiagesha*) returned to Japan proper from its formerly occupied territories. In the 1960s, French people (called *pieds noirs*) returned to France from North Africa; ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries were called back to Maoist China. People who could document their German ancestry were able to receive admission to West Germany as *aussiedler*, thereby strengthening the national resources of labor supply (Brody 2002: 88). Japan's shortage of unskilled labor began in the 1980s and also led to the admission of Japanese descendants of *nikkeijin* from Latin America and returnees from China and Sakhalin island in Russia. The "return migration" of descendants of an ethnic or national group is often complicated by romantic notions of national or ethnic reunification, and is seldom experienced smoothly.

The case of the *zanryū-hōjin* is particularly contested. Their repatriation from Japan's former puppet state of Manchukuo after being left there for decades brings forth memories of suffering in postwar Japanese society and creates complex feelings of guilt and responsibility. In the 1980s the moral claim for repatriation enabled *zanryū-hōjin* to experience warm homecomings, helped by enthusiastic volunteers, but in the 1990s such feelings of historical debt began to fade away after Japan had admitted large numbers of these newcomers and Japanese people began to feel ambivalence about their foreign behavior patterns. Tensions have been deepened by recent political activism, and the postwar Japanese government has been taken to court by plaintiffs from among the repatriates.

The popular TV drama called, in translation, *Child of the Vast Land*[1] and adapted from the novel written by Toyoko Yamazaki (1994), made *zanryū-hōjin* a familiar issue to the Japanese public. The protagonist experiences extremely brutal treatment

during the war in 1945 and later the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, his adoptive parents love him and the Chinese authorities nurture him to be a great man. His status as a well-educated engineer is in contrast to the experience of the majority of uneducated *zanryū-hōjin*. This protagonist refuses to repatriate to Japan but goes to Inner Mongolia instead, where he believes he can contribute more to humanity. This heroic decision implicitly reproaches the majority of *zanryū-hōjin*, who are eager to repatriate to Japan. There are negative feelings about this popular fiction among the *zanryū-koji* activists; they criticize the drama as standing for a liberal dictator, denying their rights to repatriate through the affirmation of humanitarian ideals.

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My gratitude goes to all my interviewees including *zanryū-hōjin*, their relatives and associates in China as well as volunteers and activists in Japan, who shared their thoughts and feelings with me and assisted my fieldwork research in both Tokyo and Heilongjiang. I owe a great debt to my mentor, Professor Kirsten Refsing, who is now the Dean of Humanities at Copenhagen University. Dr Peter Cave, my supervisor, helped me to intellectualize my thoughts and fieldwork data into systematic form. I appreciate Dr John Thorne, who guided me into anthropological studies. Finally, I thank my two lovely nieces, Alexandra and Marilyn, for showing me the meaning of family in their pureness and cheerfulness.

Japanese word list

3K Job	A Japanese acronym for a job which is or involves kiken/danger, kitanai/dirty, kitsui/difficult
danchi	団地 public housing estate
giyūdai	義勇隊 pioneer troops sent to aid in the cultivation of colonial villages in Manchukuo
hikiagesha	引揚者 overseas Japanese that returned to Japan proper during the immediate postwar years
jichikai	自治会 associations of self-management in public housing communities; rengō-jichikai 連合自治会 united committees of self-management in public housing communities
kaitakudan	開拓団 Japanese villages in the former Manchukuo
koseki	戸籍 household registry
kikokusha	帰国者 repatriates
kōseishō	厚生省 Japan's Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Labour 生労働省 which was previously the Ministry of Public Welfare and Health. This dissertation uses *Kōseishō* to refer to the Ministry in the new and old structures
NEET	Not in Education or Employment or Training
nikkeijin	系人 Japanese descendants residing in the Americas
RRB	Repatriation Relief Bureau operated under the Kōseishō
SFC	Settlement Facilitation Centre for returnees from China 中国帰国者定着促進センター operated and administered by the Kōseishō
SCAP	Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
shugakusei	就学生 language students

Chinese word list

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
Dongbei	东北 Northeast China
huaqiao	华侨 overseas Chinese
huaren	华人 ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality
hukou	户口 household registration
KMT	Chinese Nationalist Party
paojiedao	跑街道 a term of the Northeast dialect referring to the volunteer social work for neighbourhoods during the Maoist society
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSB	China's Public Security Bureau
qiaoxiang	侨乡 hometowns of overseas Chinese
xin-huaqiao	新华侨 new overseas Chinese who emigrated during the post-Mao era

Individual informant list

All personal names are fictitious. Several female informants are referred to as Mrs xx in order to clarify their spouse status. Occasionally Mr xx is used to clarify the person's gender and relationship in the context of a family.

Aoki, Sachiko	a *zanryū-fujin* who founded Tsuru-no-kai
Hanako	a Japanese housewife, a volunteer for Tsuru-no-kai
Handa	a male *zanryū-koji* and a columnist for the Chinese newspaper circulating in Japan
Hiroko	a Japanese woman engaging in the *zanryū-hōjin*-related volunteerism for two decades
Hoshino	a Japanese housewife living in Ichō-danchi, engaged in *zanryū-hōjin* activism
Kang	a Chinese official of a county government in Heilongjiang Province
Kyoko	a Japanese university student who volunteered for Tsuru-no-kai
Mariko	a female *zanryū-koji* and a volunteer of Tsuru-no-kai
Mei (the Shimodas)	an unidentified *zanryū-koji* who appears in Chapter 4
Miyuki	a third generation *zanryū-hōjin* who appears in Chapter 7 with her siblings and friends
Nakayama	a male *zanryū-koji* who appears in Chapter 3
Mrs Nakao	a *zanryū-koji*'s wife, a friend of Mrs Morita, who appears in Chapter 8
Naoko	a volunteer for Tsuru-no-kai
Ota	a *zanryū-koji* who is still unable to repatriate
Pan	a *zanryū-fujin*'s husband engaging in the marriage migration business
Setsuko	a feminist and a volunteer for *zanryū-fujin*
Shirasaki	a male *zanryū-koji* working at the *zanryū-koji* information center
Shizuko	a *zanryū-fujin* torn between her kin members in two countries
Suginami	a *zanryū-koji* activist

Wakata	a Japanese volunteer devoted to Tsuru-no-kai for 20 years
Yamaguchi, Ami	a *zanryū-fujin* who replaced her daughter-in-law after repatriation
Yoko	a *zanryū-fujin*'s daughter who appears in Chapter 8
Yuriko, Sakamoto	this *zanryū-fujin* life history is presented in episodes in different chapters

Family informant list

The Yamadas	Four generations of this family will be studied in Chapter 5. The names of individuals in this family are listed on pages 65–69
The Moritas	Two generations of this family will be studied in Chapter 5. The names of individuals in this family are listed on pages 70–71
The Nakajimas	Three generations of this family will be studied in Chapter 5. The names of individuals in this family will be listed on page 75
The Nagashimas	This family is studied win Chapter 8. The names of individuals in this family will be listed on pages 118–119

Prologue

Who are they?

Zanryū-hōjin refers to Japanese civilians left behind in the former Manchukuo. A few days before Japan's surrender in 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Manchuria, aiming to destroy Japan's colony. Japanese villagers faced more acute difficulties in escaping from violence than the settlers in urban areas. Many died in Soviet attacks or participated in collective suicides, while others starved, were victims of revenge from the Chinese, or suffered from disease. Most of those who survived did so in Chinese families as wives or adopted children. They have repatriated to Japan since the 1980s, often together with their extended Chinese family members of three generations. According to the *Kōseishō* definition, persons under the age of 13 on August 9 1945 were officially labeled *zanryū-koji* or abandoned war orphans. Persons over the age of 13 on that date were mostly women who had married Chinese men for survival but had been considered by the Japanese state to have stayed in China by their own choice. Now these women have increasingly been recognized as abandoned victims and have been named *zanryū-fujin* or stranded-war-wives[1] (Ward 2006b). A few adult male Japanese also remained in China after World War II, but too few to merit a name of their own, so this small number of people have simply been put in the broad category of *zanryū-hōjin* (Wu 2004: 7). Up to October 31 2005, it was recorded that the total number of *zanryū-fujin* repatriated at state expense was 3,808; *zanryū-koji* were 2,496, of whom 1,411 were unidentified orphans, a term referring to those who could not find their kin in Japan.[2] There are many *zanryū-hōjin* who were repatriated at their own expense but no official figure is provided. The population of state-funded and self-funded *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* families in Japan is officially estimated at not less than 100,000.[3] This figure includes their extended family members who arrived in Japan later by other means.

Almost all informants I met during my fieldwork call themselves *kikokusha*, meaning repatriates – even a *zanryū-koji*'s adopted Chinese son's Chinese wife called herself a repatriate. Terms such as "Japanese orphans" or "war orphans" or "repatriates or returnees from China" or "the second and third generation of war orphans returned from China" have often been used in the limited English academic literature about this community (Ebata *et al.* 1995; Efird 2004; Goodman 1990: 180–181; Narangoa 2003; Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 110–140; Tamanoi 2003; Tomozawa 2001). "War-displaced Japanese orphans" has often appeared in the

English language media. In some contexts, such terms have loosely included both *zanryū-koji* and *zanryū-fujin* in one category. The politics of naming this group is rather contested, as I will discuss in Chapter 2, here it is necessary to address this community as a whole with specific definitions to refer to specific members.

I use the terms *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* to refer respectively to Japanese women who remained and Japanese children who were abandoned in Manchuria to distinguish differences in characteristics between the two groups. Most *zanryū-fujin* and some *zanryū-koji* returned to Japan with memories of Japan, and their identity as repatriates is acceptable. However, some *zanryū-koji* discovered their "Japanese blood" in their middle or old age and "returned" to Japan with no memory of Japan. These include children and spouses of *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* in general. This study does not count these people as repatriates. On the other hand, aiming to deliver a comprehensive analysis of *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji*, this ethnographic analysis will focus on the transformations of these transnational families. Their spouses and offspring's stem families are therefore also important subjects in this research. The Japaneseness of *zanryū-fujin*'s and *zanryū-koji*'s extended family members are determinants for their residence in Japan and thus depends on their performances of socialization and identity in Japan. As their emigration to Japan relies on the historical creation of *zanryū-hōjin*, I use the historical term *zanryū-hōjin* to refer to all members of this group, including those family members who hardly possess any of the repatriate criteria.

Often *zanryū-koji* have been studied separately from *zanryū-fujin* as a single group of *zanryū-hōjin* (e.g. Ebata *et al.* 1995; Efird 2004; Narangoa 2003; Tamanoi 2003; Wang 2004; Zhang 2002). This is helpful to present a neat analysis out of the epic historical background. Academic attention has increasingly shifted towards *zanryū-fujin* in an attempt to equalize their status as war victims (e.g. Araragi 2000; Kinoshita 2003; Tokitsu; 2000: Ward 2006b). I shall make the complex relationships between three groups intelligible, including *zanryū-fujin*, *zanryū-koji*, and unidentified *zanryū-koji.* Interactions and comparisons between these three types of families together with their extended families are inseparable in this study. I will present a "jumbled" range of *zanryū-hōjin* throughout this book in order to produce more analytical and comprehensive research findings.

1 Approaches to the study of *zanryū-hōjin*

Aims

This essentially ethnographical study explores three significant areas: 1) transnationalization in East Asia; 2) ethnic and cultural roots; and 3) negotiations for betterment among the "powerless". First, the generations of *zanryū-hōjin* families have constituted an important type of actor in the long process of East Asian transnationalization. These people were hindered by Japanese military-operated migration activities, but their situation has now been eased in the context of China's modernization and Japan's late capitalism. Second, the concept of ethnic roots has been manipulated in both Japanese and Chinese societies, manifested through the processes of *zanryū-hōjin*'s repatriation and emigration to Japan. However, these migrants should no longer be seen as passive beings suffering from the loss of national identity, as *zanryū-hōjin* themselves actively exploit the idea of ethnicity to maximize their opportunities. Third, these migrant families have negotiated for favorable positions in the Sino-Japanese transnational market situation in a space within and between rural China and cosmopolitan Japan, where the control by the two nation-states is blurred – a space that provides *zanryū-hōjin* with a mixture of rules/resources, barriers/strategies, and freedom/uncertainties.

Throughout the study, ethnographic explanations and analytical measurements will focus on the following three major questions, which will be answered in the conclusion.

1 Today's East Asian transnational practices have been transformed from those involved in the creation of Manchukuo in the 1930s. To what extent have the aspirations of *zanryū-hōjin* migrant families been hindered or eased in this long process of transnationalization?
2 The concepts of ethnic roots and kinship have been manipulated in both Japanese and Chinese societies. How do *zanryū-hōjin* migrant families exploit these concepts to maximize opportunities? Can they become "repatriates" who want to distinguish themselves from other groups of migrants in Japan, and so be accepted as fellow Japanese by the mainstream Japanese?
3 How do *zanryū-hōjin* migrant families negotiate for favorable positions in the Sino-Japanese transnational market situation within the framework of two

nation-states? What rules/resources and barriers/strategies can be found in the space between rural China and cosmopolitan Japan?

Gaps to bridge

To give satisfactory answers to the questions above, my study must shift away from the existing works on the *zanryū-hōjin* literature. First, the concept of life-world has been advocated in migration studies to capture the overall life and multi-layered world of an encapsulated migrant experience (Ishii 2005). The dynamic life-world of *zanryū-hōjin* can be vividly depicted through interactions and comparisons between families, as well as within a family's transformation across national and cultural boundaries alongside the emergence of new inequalities within the family. However, this private sphere is still unexplored. In order to break through the stagnation of *zanryū-hōjin* studies, presenting thick ethnography to include their extended families can reach a deeper private sphere of this community and thus deliver a more comprehensive analysis.

Second, the classic approaches to ethnicity, identity, minority, and citizen rights have been dominant in the *zanryū-hōjin* studies (e.g. Araragi and his contributors 2000; Efird 2004; Narangoa 2003; Ward 2006). These foci are undeniably important in examining Japanese multiculturalism and testing out cultural beliefs about seeking a homeland. But these approaches may run the risk of uncritically and unintentionally harboring a fetishism of ethnicity, as their basic assumption is that *zanryū-hōjin* are ethnic Japanese who behave in Chinese ways, and therefore that their ethnic identities trouble them in both nation-states. In fact the majority of *zanryū-hōjin* don't display the quality of "repatriate," as many have "repatriated" with neither memory of Japan nor memory of any Japanese community life outside Japan. Most *zanryū-hōjin* had no ethnic relations in Japan but "repatriated" via marriages or ex-marriages. Their settlement in Japan is often taken for granted to be merely a matter of repatriation or returning to a homeland from exile, in conformity with the East Asian notion of ethnic roots. One of my major tasks is to decode this well-established concept of *roots* within the *zanryū-hōjin* literature. But I am aware that neither the classic approach to ethnicity nor *zanryū-hōjin*'s identity as repatriates can be undervalued, as the very premise of admitting them into Japan is their "Japanese blood."

This correlates to my challenge to the methodological perspective based on an understanding of *zanryū-hōjin*'s traumatic experiences during the war and the crisis of Cultural Revolution, advocated by Shinzo Araragi (2000). Such emphasis on victimization tends to assign *zanryū-hōjin* to a higher ranking of "Japaneseness" by highlighting them as "war-displaced Japanese." I shall provide more critical analyses and comprehensive ethnographies to tackle the relationship between the real lives of *zanryū-hōjin* and the label of "war-displaced Japanese." Critically, Kinoshita (2003) rethinks the politically loaded name *zanryū-koji* as an identity to Japanize some newcomers by employing the powerful word "orphan," despite the fact their existence in Japan is not much different from that of other Mainland Chinese immigrants. Following this academic path, this study recognizes that the

nature of *zanryū-hōjin* problems is similar to that of other immigrants coming from post-Mao China.

Third, the compelling experience in the sense of *zanryū-koji*'s ethnic identification as "Japanese" and/or "Chinese," measured by Efird (2004), is their suffering – as overwhelmingly expressed in the Sino-Japanese conflict over the establishment of Manchukuo and its aftermath. Discussing the *zanryū-koji*'s contradictory characteristics in terms of blood and culture, the author challenges conventional Japanese definitions of Japaneseness by reaching China situations to a satisfactory extent. But this work is not able to delve into the spheres of rural[1] Chinese society. In fact almost no *zanryū-hōjin* studies have been able to tackle rural Chinese mentalities. While much existing work focuses on the struggles of these migrants in adapting to metropolitan Japan, I argue that to understand the majority of *zanryū-hōjin* one must understand rural Chinese societies together with its changes during China's modernization. I develop the analysis of Chinese transnationalism, manifested through its transformations of global and economic in the contexts of overseas Chinese or *huaqiao*, hometown of overseas Chinese or *qiaoxiang*, and the new wave of overseas Chinese or *xin-huaqiao* who have emigrated during the post-Mao era.[2]

This involves a subsidiary aim in my task – revealing academic and journalistic works influenced by the Chinese nationalistic complex (e.g. Ma 1997; Wang Huan 2004; Wang Xiliang 2000; Wu 2004; Zhang 2002; and almost all media reports produced in Maoist and post-Mao China). Particularly, a work presented in the manner of Nazi analysis (Wang 2004) runs the risk of one-sided history. Driven by Chinese chauvinism, the author presents ideas of measuring racial blood and simply concludes that the Japanese orphans want to repatriate to Japan, because they are called by their racial blood. This proves to be a dead end for intellectual investigation.

Delving into the mindsets and political interests of new elite overseas Chinese and their practices of Chinese nationalism in Japan, the *zanryū-koji*-centric study done by Efird (2004), consists of comprehensive analyses of the multi-layered social and political dimensions that produce conflicts and unequal influences to facilitate or hinder social production and individual adoption of ethnic identifications. The author delivers a satisfactory analysis of Chinese patriotism as playing an important role affecting the social relations of *zanryū-koji*. I will pass over this topic and move on to explore how people create "market multiculturalism" in order to use cultural differences as resources for individual social mobility (Frisina 2006: [14]). In fact my ethnography finds limited practice of Chinese nationalism among *zanryū-hōjin* while it has significant influence on the more educated Chinese migrants as well as a handful of educated *zanryū-hōjin* members. This implicitly explains that *zanryū-hōjin* as flexible citizens (the major theoretical approach of this study) can negotiate for empowerment beyond abstract morals such as nationalism or racketeerism defined by nation-states.

Fourth, plenty of small-scale works about *zanryū-hōjin* are available in Japanese language. They deliver simple and insufficient outputs. Problems come from the research interest that aims to exploit the epic historical background with rushed research performances. In an essay in which a considerable description of the brutal

war is necessary to include, researchers thus hastily end up with statistical figures, such as the percentage of those who were repatriated because of longing for mother country, the percentage of those who experienced family conflicts in Japan, and so forth. Such shallow results can address little realities of the *zanryū-hōjin* life. One questionnaire-based analysis (Tsunashima[3] 1997) attributes the difficulties of the *zanryū-hōjin* youth to obtain spouses in Japan to the well-established analytical framework – Japan as a society of "hidden apartheid." Dialectically, I see these migrants gaining status in their villages by bringing in more Chinese family members to Japan, and their ability to do so changes power dynamics within the family.

Fifth, the existing historical works on *zanryū-hōjin* in English academia appear to have setbacks that need to be adjusted. The macro-historical picture of the returning migrants compares *zanryū-koji* in Japan with *aussiedler* in Germany (Narangoa 2003). This work seems to rely on Japanese official records and sources, and unintentionally simplifies the structural obstacles embedded within Japanese social and political institutions by emphasizing the Maoist politics that had produced major difficulties for the feasibility of repatriation. In view of this lack, my rich ethnography and my research sensibility, which is enhanced by my migratory family experience during the 1970s, will complete the story of the *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation more dynamically. Another work argues that the acceptance of *zanryū-hōjin* as exiled Japanese and the lesser recognition of *nikkeijin*'s Japaneseness suggest that the former colonial territory of Manchukuo still remains within the boundaries of the "imagined community" in postwar Japanese society (Ward 2006a). This analysis is plausible but seems pessimistic, as it takes *zanryū-hōjin*'s identity as that of multiple exiles – they were geographically exiled in China, then culturally exiled in Japan, and internally exiled in terms of their families, which were separated. However, the phenomenon of a family's kin members living in different countries has become commonplace in modern life. The analysis of the modernization of these former peasants is this book's focus.

Lastly, the abbreviation SFC stands for Settlement Facilitation Centre for the Repatriates from China or *chūgoku kikokusha teichaku sokushin sentā* in Japanese, which is a governmental organization. Its website provides a wide range of official information about *zanryū-hōjin* and academic works. Among these SFC-funded studies, most of the research focuses on the acquisition of proficiency in the Japanese language. Journalistic works and NGO booklets about *zanryū-hōjin* are available in Japanese and are used as academic sources. Based on oral histories and personal accounts, journalists and activists tend to morally condemn the Japanese state policy of abandoning Japanese women and children in the midst of violence and continuously leaving them in hardship by offering only poor assistance to their resettlement in today's Japan (Sugawara 1998, 1989, 1986; Sakamoto 1997; Ide 1991; Watanabe 1990; Nakajima 1990; Okaniwa 1985; Takatani 2002; Chinno 1992; Ogawa 1995; Kataoka 1993; Sugiyama 1996; etc). This cultural product, with its anti-war theme, often delivers a formulary storytelling of life courses with four stages: the settlement of Japanese villages in Manchuria; Japanese women and children suffering from war brutality; Japanese women marrying Chinese or

being adopted by Chinese for survival; and Japanese women and children facing barriers against their return to Japan. I aim to transform my thick ethnographies into more reliable academic material through vivid and investigative portrays of *zanryū-hōjin*'s worldviews, motivations, and behaviors that have fluctuated in the terrain that lies between metropolitan Japan and rural China, which has produced in them new desires and unsettled attitudes toward both countries.

Working framework

Modernization theory dominated migration studies during the early post-World War II decades, romanticizing migrants seeking innovation and knowledge in advanced societies through "adjustment" and "assimilation" in a progressive movement that was thought would eventually break down traditionalism. This Victorian view of human development was embedded within the fundamental premise of neo-classical economics, postulating that everyone can be free from social, cultural, political, and psychological concerns to make rational decisions in order to maximize self-interest (Kearney 1986: 333–336). The rise of dependency theory from the 1970s perceived the world as a single capitalist system, and migrants as capital and commodities flowing from peripheries to core areas. This grand theory had the advantage of working on both sending and receiving societies of migration at macro levels of political economy, but it tended to treat individuals as merely socio-economic animals and hardly tackled the life of migrants constantly negotiating under cultural, ideological and psychological restrictions (Kearney 1986: 338–341). Influenced by the above two hegemonic frameworks, rural migrants in metropolises have been treated as passive beings forced to flee because of severe homeland conditions, while migration studies have centered on minority people's citizen rights and the state's incorporation of immigrants according to concepts of national and post-national citizenship. In parallel, anthropological interests have largely remained with studies of ethnic identity and cultural change to elaborate the distinctions of *nature* and *culture* (Brettell and Hollifield 2000: p85 and p118).

The rise of the articulation approach rejects the assumptions of "a dichotomized progressive or backward world" and "a unitary global capitalist system." This new analytical tool can effectively deal with the variety of modernities produced out of struggles between capitalist forces and local communities in different parts of the world. It asserts that developing societies have various degrees of economic dynamism and "reproduce their distinctive forms in accord with their own structural imperatives" (Kearney 1986: 342–345). One insightful apparatus is the notion of flexible citizenship conceptualized by Aihwa Ong (1999). People making transnational moves may have ambiguous citizenship, but this ambiguity can be used as a remarkable privilege to maximize mobility and negotiate for power. Taking Chinese transnationalism as an alternative modernity associated with the logic of late capitalism that differs from Western-centric modernity, Aihwa Ong (1997: 3, 15) remarkably bridges the gap between global macro theories and local perspectives focusing on ethnic identity (Chineseness) and ethnic culture (Confucian values). Affluent migrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia engage in flexible

citizenship to take advantage of resources and opportunities of work, residence, education, and investment beyond restrictions and barriers imposed by nation-states and cultural concerns. Their transnational activities are a way of pursuing mobility, enhanced by the new constructions of social-spatial hierarchies and inequalities in the contexts inside and outside post-Mao China (Liu 1997). People pursuing high mobility in the dynamic transnational space through flexible strategies such as emigration is prompted by a Chinese way of modernism. It can be characterized as a hyper-modernism in response to the fast-changing global economic environment (Ong 1999: 6).

Flexible citizenship, as a profoundly powerful status, is not a patent possessed only by affluent overseas Chinese. While the majority of labor migrants sweat in unskilled labor markets in metropolitan centers with insufficient legal protection and are measured as second-class citizens, some rural Chinese from the Northeast, namely *zanryū-hōjin*, are given a path to enjoy flexible citizenship in Japan. The ambiguous Japaneseness they possess is assessed in connection with flexible citizenship by Tamanoi (2003: 528, 535). It important to make sense of *zanryū-hōjin* ambiguous, negotiated, complex, and contested relationships between their roots or "repatriation to mother country" and their routes or "emigration to an economically advanced society."

The idea of flexible citizenship can be downplayed as a "political fiction" because citizenship only functions within the nation-state based on a reciprocal relationship between duty and rights, and therefore "some terms are properly national and must remain so" (Turner 2006). However, migrant laborers as "hitchhikers of global capitalism" are vital to flexible, competitive, and dynamic economic spaces, and also play important roles in the contemporary imagination of nation-states (Borkert *et al.* 2006). Originally, citizenship was born as a means to *include*, but it has increasingly become *exclusive* alongside the fast changes in economic globalization (Mantovan 2006). Employing the concept of flexible citizenship, my anthropological task is to rethink new implications of citizenship adequate for the new era.

Another criticism against the approach of flexible citizenship is that it suffers from a poor sense of history (McKeown 2000: 981). To overcome this "thinness" Ong incorporates Harvey's concept of time-space compression to sophisticate the analysis of Chinese transnationalism that has been rapidly transformed when technological, financial and institutional innovations have changed labor markets and resulted in new patterns of production and consumption on a global scale in late capitalism (Harvey 1989: 147). Consequently all aspects of life have marked acceleration in a secular trend of time-space compression to current culture change when the mobility of peoples, ideas, lifestyles, and capitals have boosted (Kearney 1995: 551). To consolidate the theory-building of flexible citizenship by offering historical implications, I trace *zanryū-hōjin*'s time-space compression from the long transformation of East Asian transnationalism that has invoked changes of political strategies and ideologies alongside the creation of Manchukuo through the violent turmoil in 1945, the Cold War, the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972, and the following Chinese economic reform and Japan's opening of the door for foreign labor.

Examining the transformation process of East Asian transnationalism since the 1930s, the theory of *structuration* developed by Anthony Giddens can be applied as a general framework to work out the *structure* of resources availability and rules changed over political and economical climates in the two nations, that have hindered or helped *zanryū-hōjin* migrant families in negotiating for their positions in today's China and Japan. Conceiving *structure* as rules and resources organized and applied in spatial-temporal daily life (Dallmayr 1982: 20–21), *agency* and *structure* are always conditioned by one another; for Giddens, it is not necessary to assume that either side provides final answers. In making the reproduction of structures intelligible through social practices over the problems of centralized capital and bureaucratic power, the theoretical guidance of *structuration* is practicable to investigate *zanryū-hōjin*'s own interests in dealing with their transnational space, particularly manifested through the processes of *qiaoxiang* construction and its uses by local governments and civilians, as well as *zanryū-hōjin* themselves and their relatives.

Migration activities in the early twentieth century were implemented by colonial powers and conducted by military force, but since the 1980s the colonial legacy has been strategically used in new waves of migration through the agents of *zanryū-hōjin.* Regaining such "power" and "resources" in the new era of East Asian Transnational space, we will see how *zanryū-hōjin* do with their "liberation" to flexibly use their voices as victims and produce new ways of viewing history. This requires a specific conceptual tool to appraise their motivations, actions, and strategies. Alongside the logic of structuration, another thinking tool – life politics – is offered by Giddens. The tool measures the reflexive modern individual, merely portraying individuals' use of new strategies to make the best of their situation, although the underlying conditions of old oppression are maintained, as if nothing has really changed. But people practicing pragmatic "life politics" may internalize this situation as a transformation and thus no longer think of the fact that liberation is still a project. This book will prove the theory that life politics, as a sharp lens, can cleverly slant the actors of *zanryū-hōjin* – actively exploiting the concept of ethnic roots and the politics of history in their negotiations for desirable positions, whilst ethnicity and history are manipulated by both nation-states.

The transformation of people's private lives is one of the very characteristics of reflexive modernity in the process of detraditionalization by renewing self-identity (Giddens 2002: 64–65). Family, traditionally an economic unit, has been injected with new ideas. Marriage is increasingly based upon intimacy and emotional communication. Having a child is more of a decision guided by psychological and emotional needs, and traditional parental authority is replaced by democratic interaction. In the past neighbors were often one's life friends, while making friends nowadays is based on personal choice and mutual interests that require a building-up of self-identity to present a self to others. Giddens sees that such changes go "from the bottom up" through public institutions and social implications (Giddens 1992: 182), and theorizes these modernized relationships as pure relationships.

Many *zanryū-hōjin* families have jumped from rural Chinese societies to the highly developed metropolitan Tokyo. Tensions in personal relationships and family

relations are the major problems that my *zanryū-hōjin* informants have dealt with when leading modern lives in the Japanese metropolis, because these relations were formed when they were situated in disadvantageous positions in rural China. I shall apply the notion of pure relationships to measure to what degree my informants have modernized by examining how they have conducted relationships to respond to the old and new structures. Thanks to the fact that I could reach the private spheres of my informants, I am gifted to carry out a trial of pure relationships.

Methodology

In 2003 I completed six months of fieldwork in Tokyo, where I socialized intensively with *zanryū-hōjin* families. I also participated with the *zanryū-hōjin* activists and the Japanese volunteers in activism organized by several NGO groups. One of these, Tsuru-no-kai, a pseudonymous non-profit organization which provides volunteer services and consultations to the *zanryū-hōjin* members in Tokyo's western outskirts, was one of the major field sites. Another was Ichō-danchi,[4] a public housing community where a large number of *zanryū-hōjin* families lived together. In October 2003, visits were organized into rural areas in Heilongjiang Province to expand the fieldwork for one month. I saw my informants' relatives and friends in small villages near Wuchang, Fangzheng, and Boli. I visited my informants' families in Hegang and Qitaihe, two coal mine industrial settlements located in the north part of Heilongjiang. I also did intensive fieldwork in Ranshao,[5] a pseudonymous county with the largest number of *zanryū-hōjin* families. In some places, informants from Tokyo, who were either on holiday or conducting business in China, assisted with the fieldwork.

Subtle relationships were observed between the *zanryū-hōjin* in Tokyo, their Northeast China associates and the Fuqing people from the central coast of Fujian Province, a notorious staging ground for illegal Chinese emigrant operations. The term *zanryū-hōjin*, though unfamiliar to the majority of Chinese, is well known among the Fuqing people, and *zanryū-hōjin* and their hometown people often mention Fuqing. This connection can be traced back to the Japanese colonial rule over Manchuria, when the Fujianese joined the mass migration to Northeast China (Tamanoi 2003: 534). During 2004, in short visits to Fuqing, I met many informants who had returned from Japan, where they had made business deals with the *zanryū-hōjin* while they were illegal migrants. This connection provided an alternative perspective to the data collected from Tokyo and Heilongjiang.

I conducted intensive observation and dialogue with six *zanryū-hōjin* families and about 20 individual *zanryū-hōjin* while participating in their daily activities. Countless informal and unstructured interviews also included people related to the *zanryū-hōjin* issues in both countries, such as Japanese volunteers and Chinese officials. After my intensive fieldwork period, I made several short trips back to Tokyo to check up on my informants, and more extensive relationships with them were developed via international telephone calls. Up to 2010 contact has been maintained with two informants from Ranshao, one a local governmental official, the other a television journalist hosting a program about the county's emigrants to Japan.

I aim to study the actual experiences and positions of the *zanryū-hōjin* in the midst of a changing state as a direct result of the phenomenon of transnationalization. Instead of a large sample, the essential sampling requires the variability and the diversity that exists within the *zanryū-hōjin* population and their associates. The object of phenomenological research is to understand the way issues and concepts work, that is, the meaning of behavior. As a result, pure scientific sampling is not necessary (Bernard 1995: 72). I did not choose sampled informants methodically or numerically, but rather they were investigated and further investigated through repeated and continuing informal discussions and conversations with those with whom an immediate rapport was established during the first encounters. Fortunately, this simple random sampling allowed for a much wider range of informants, who later became the purposefully chosen primary and designated specific samples for this research. I socialized intensively with the targeted informants and they provided generous, unpretentious, and diverse data. My findings will be presented transparently, with lucid details.

The key methodology adopted in the fieldwork was everyday conversation about ordinary, mundane daily routines and matters. My ability to engage in everyday chit-chat is advanced by my migratory family's experiences, as they evolved over time from those of derogatively named disadvantaged migrants to those of persons recognized officially with flexible citizenships. Informants were particularly interested in discussing my direct kin – four people who have four different citizenships. My identity as a Hong Kong citizen holding an Australian passport was surprisingly appealing to the *zanryū-hōjin* informants. They were eager to know about the Hong Kong beyond that portrayed in films and were curious about my experience in adapting to Western society. In such "cultural exchange" interactions, learning the fascinating Heilongjiang customs and their own perceived Japanese cultural idioms was encouraged and entertaining.

My primary reason for choosing this specific topic is that I had studied another returned migrant group in earlier postgraduate studies, specifically, the Indonesian-Chinese who repatriated to Maoist China and later remigrated to capitalist Hong Kong. I did not continue further research on this subject because of its intimate and personal connection to my own family ties. My father was born in Indonesia, claimed as an "overseas orphan" by China's propaganda in the 1950s, and responded to the nationalist call to further his tertiary education in China. Despite living in China for 18 years, my father never felt China was his homeland. His foreignness, which provided him with privileges before the Cultural Revolution, became a threat during the political upheaval. In the early 1970s my father took the family to Hong Kong as soon as the CCP relinquished its closed-door policy and allowed the repatriated *huaqiao* to leave. During the 1970s and 1980s, Hong Kong society was severely prejudiced against the migrants from the mainland. In this new and strange land, my father secured himself a one-way trip and returned alone to his Indonesian home. To avoid producing a biased analysis, I chose to study a different community of returned migrants, with whom I had no personal connection. Although I remain an outsider to the *zanryū-hōjin* community, there is a real and close sense of its intricacies, and my father's obsession with seeking a homeland

is extremely beneficial to understanding the issues of *zanryū-fujin*'s and *zanryū-koji*'s national and cultural identities, as well as my *huaqiao* family experiences of similar social changes in different.

As well as being a enthnographer, I have experience in filmmaking that also involved collecting data from the field by establishing relationships with informants. I used to engage documentary projects concerning various rural Chinese issues, such as people's communes in the 1950s, the one-child policy, and ethnic minorities. This research for documentary projects has enhanced my sensibility about *zanryū-hōjin*'s experiences in rural China. As a result I could delve into their mindsets. Thanks to my alternative identity as a Chinese and a documentary producer, a group of the young *zanryū-hōjin* and Cambodian migrants suddenly exploded emotionally and wanted to teach me a lesson about Japanese moral values. I discovered more about their personhood developments along with their peculiar upbringing and backgrounds. Delving into such a private sphere, I realized that the historical and social relations handled by the highly theoretically orientated and orchestrated grand studies of the politics of *identity* and *ethnicity* may be insufficient to explain their desires and the strategies employed to overcome difficulties.

My identity as a "pitiful unmarried woman" was also surprisingly advantageous, and could be utilized to construct a field located within the private sphere of the *zanryū-hōjin*. Some informants tried to show their concern by finding me suitable husband prospects. An informant even offered me ¥5 million to engage in a fake marriage for the sake of sending her relative from China to Australia. Many of the *zanryū-hōjin* informants sympathized with the "pitiful" woman, and therefore my identity as an educated urbanite did not impose on them feelings of being regarded from a position of social superiority, cultural arrogance, or educated elitism. In their family gatherings I could listen to their complaints about their own family relatives and neighbours. These stories were intriguing, and sometimes my participation was essential to solving their family problems. They emphasized that they got me involved in meddling in their private matters because they wanted to treat me like a family member. Informants wanted my greater participation, setting up "tricks" or games, such as buying gifts. An informant even offered me ¥20,000 cash and expressed her disappointment if it was rejected; it was difficult to find suitable ways to repay this kind of debt. Some female informants offered invitations to their homes to collect "surprising data." After dinner, they usually insisted I stay overnight in their homes and continued to engage in gossip all night. They emphasized the point that I was probably the first researcher invited to stay in the Tokyo *zanryū-hōjin* homes and in their relatives' Heilongjiang houses. On several occasions, informants allowed me to participate in their interviews with other researchers and journalists. This position indicated their fearlessness about showing their double face, giving standard answers to the Japanese researchers while formulating different narratives for the Chinese interviewers.

Qualitative researchers and ethnographers overwhelmingly emphasize the "open-ended" interviewing technique's merit to validate fieldwork observations. I notice that most researchers of this topic's access to informants is through introductions by influential Japanese volunteers and high-profile activists. Such polite and authorized

acceptance may exclude a researcher from a subtle but critical area if informants are uneasy with a researcher's identity, as it allows the safeguarding of their "confidential region" (Berreman 1962: ivi). Social activists tend to take "research as necessarily a progressive political enterprise" and judge validity in terms of political ethics; consequently, if a research finding is judged to have undesirable political considerations it may be concluded to be false (Hammersley 2002: 12). As activism itself can be misconceived, I avoided interviewing the star activists and influential supporters such as Sumie Ikeda, Hideki Hayakawa, Kōsuke Sugawara, and Akio Ōkubo, who were major informants for various researchers, and whose opinions are more or less standardized and whose statements are well publicized in the media.

In participatory observation, anthropology's most important form of data collection, researchers are required to be the instruments themselves (Schensul *et al.* 1999: 273). In this sense, the research method of reflective conversation while playing the role of a humble person is most suitable for producing a newly envisioned book of the Japanese from China. I am cognizant, though, that in adopting this methodology, wide representation, standardization, and generalization may suffer because of the small sampling selection. It is important to note that ethnography diverges from standards of validity and reliability. However, as ethnographers study the human events' natural flow over certain time periods, numbers and sizes cannot be rigidly measured according to methods suitable for scientific laboratory control (Schensul *et al.* 1999: 273). As I used the reflective ethnographic methodology, these informants provided a new and rare set of data that is accountable, locatable, and effectively outweighs the obvious shortcomings.

Yet I am aware that every methodology has its limitations. A further study of *zanryū-hōjin* would thus benefit by using a larger sample and a broader range of methods that could test how far my findings are applicable to a larger population.

Scope and organization

First of all, certain terms need clarification. The terms "transnationalism" and "modernism" often appear in this book. The particular transnational space is located between the boundaries of rural Northeastern China and the Japanese metropolis. Modernization specifically refers to rural migrants' departure for a modern lifestyle. Thus these two terms are applied to indicate the social phenomena as the key issues in order to explore how my informants perceive modernity and live transnationalization.

The use of the name Manchuria, as the historical place name to refer to *zanryū-hōjin*'s home region in Northeast China, has been condemned by Chinese nationalism. I have encountered many Chinese intellectuals, including those self-proclaimed "liberal intellectuals," who attacked me for using this colonial term. They even said that the term Manchuria brought them feelings of shame and suffering. Such ultra-nationalistic behavior is worrying. I insist on using the word "Manchuria" as a way to protest against such threatening nationalism and its possible reoccurrence. This ex-colonial place name refers to an undeniable historical reality.

The biggest contribution that I can make to the study of *zanryū-hōjin* is to measure how they have been located within rural Chinese society, how they have dealt with *qiaoxiang* in present as an opportunity for negotiating power, and thus how these Chinese relations have transformed their lives in Japan. This focus accomplishes a new analysis of the Sino-Japanese marriage migration as the marker providing a useful measurement of changes in the private lives of the individuals concerned as situated in their two countries. As a result, examining racketeering practices is unavoidable, although I, of course, have no intention to stigmatize my *zanryū-hōjin* informants.

Ambitiously, I examine a "jumbo" group of *zanryū-hōjin* together with their extended families in this research. Dealing on such a large scale is not easy. Certain aspects that have been well studied previously are necessarily skipped over and the focus shifted. For instance, research on Japanese ethnic and cultural prejudices in relation to migrant minorities has been well studied (e.g. Befu 1993; Hicks 1997; Tamanoi 2003 and 2000; Tsuda 1998; Tsunashima 1997; Yoshino 1992). I will focus on internal racism by examining how *zanryū-hōjin* are discriminated against by the *zanryū-hōjin* who can display more metropolitan qualities, as well as by other Chinese migrants coming from urban centers with better education. From various individual cases illustrated throughout the book, we may find that other types of Chinese migrants or more sophisticated Chinese are located everywhere in their daily life.

The historical anthropologist (Tamanoi 2001) provides an insightful measurement to with which to treat the collective memory politics of war suffering in Manchukuo. The explanations of the historical formation of *zanryū-hōjin* (e.g. Kaji 2002; Fujinuma 2003) have done acceptable jobs. There is a satisfactorily comprehensive analysis to study the decisions made by *zanryū-hōjin* who settled in China by making comparisons with others who decided to settle in Japan over four periods (Wu 2004). With these successful works, my discussion about the historical formation of *zanryū-hōjin* can move forward to address more critical issues, such as logistics problems, personal choices concerning the repatriation schemes, and the politics of naming this group.

Zanryū-hōjin children's socialization and schooling situations in Japan have been fruitfully explored (Goodman 1990: 180–181; Kaji 2000: 233–287; Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 110–140; Ōkubo 2000: 325–354; Sekiguchi 2005). Japanese language acquisition has been a hot topic for Japanese researchers (Tomozawa 2001, 2002; Fujii and Tabuchi 2001; Kiyota 1995) who deal with *zanryū-hōjin* children's schooling and socialization. Japanese poverity is believed to be a major source of failure in schooling and socialization. It is well observed that most *zanryū-hōjin* youth tend to share the same difficulty – a cultural gap with their parents. I will specifically look at the parental roles in *zanryū-hōjin* children's assimilation by investigating emotionally charged and complicated intergenerational conflicts within the family.

There are various minority groups in Japan, such as Ainu, burakumin, *zainichi* Koreans, and migrant workers of many nationalities, but this study specifically deals with returned migrants who enter Japan's unskilled labor force, and thus the

most comparable group is the *nikkeijin* from South America. Among the *nikkeijin* literature, two works are mostly applicable to my study. Linger's (2001) skepticism about ethnic identity and his courage to work out a "non-theoretical" academic analysis under theoretical predictive guidelines are indeed admirable, and inspired me to look into the experience of another group of Japanese descendants. The strategic counter-identity among *nikkeijin* from Brazil studied by Tsuda (2003) can be compared to the more multifaceted *zanryū-hōjin*'s strategies to make use of their political and national identities.

This book divides into three parts. The first contains three chapters dealing with the structures that allow relatively less room for changes, under which many *zanryū-hōjin* may have thus responded to these social realities passively. The second contains three chapters to study family and intergenerational aspects in the transnational context to see how internal and external transformations take place and further evolve. The third contains two chapters, which mainly focus on the ways of these rural migrants negotiated empowerment in their two countries. At the end of each chapter I will provide a summary to address the discussions. Therefore the conclusion chapter will attempt to answer to the three core questions.

Part I

Structures

Zanryū-hōjin acting passively in response to social changes

2 *Zanryū-hōjin* within the flow of historical change

Up to the nineteenth century the Qing government had impeded Han immigration to this region, which was considered the homeland of the Manchus. When it allowed the Russians to develop cities and build railways and ports, Manchuria had a rapid increase of Han settlement from the southern provinces (Bernard 1993: 608–619). After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, the Russian ports and railways in southern Manchuria were taken over by the Japanese. Since the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the Han communities in Manchuria were ruled by the regional military power-holder. In 1934 Japan declared the area independent from China, appointed the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty to be the Emperor of "Manchukuo," and divided its colony into fifteen provinces. Under the Japanese administration, the majority of the Manchukuo population was Han Chinese, and its official slogan "the harmony among five races" was meant to refer to Japanese, Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, and Koreans (Tamanoi 2000). With Japanese investment and the region's rich natural resources, Manchuria became an industrial powerhouse. From 1937, Japan used Manchukuo as a base to invade China. This move proved foolhardy and expensive. On August 8 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, in accordance with the agreement at the Yalta Conference, and invaded Manchukuo. Manchuria was then divided into nine provinces under the Chiang Kai-shek government. Today it includes the three provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning as well as the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. The region is now called "the Northeast" or *Dongbei* in Chinese.

Colonial agricultural villages

The account of the *zanryū-hōjin* begins with the creation of colonial farm villages, or *kaitakudan* in Japanese, located in Manchuria. The Japanese imperial project of Manchukuo included an ambitious plan for village colonization, which, beginning in 1936, was an attempt to send a million farm households to *kaitakudan* over a period of twenty years. This target had not been reached at the time of Japan's surrender in 1945, but about 270,000 Japanese peasants had been resettled in Manchuria (Kinoshita 2003: 23; Wu 2004: 27). The *kaitakudan* were cultivated by about 30,000 members of the pioneer troops – or *giyūdai* in Japanese; they mainly consisted of boys under 18 and men over 45 – those were too old or too young to

become formal soldiers. After establishing *kaitakudan* units, these *giyūdai* members became cadres or leaders who managed and sustained *kaitakudan* operations under the supervision of the Kwantung Army, the major Japanese Imperial military power in Manchuria (e.g. Kinoshita 2003; Wu 2004; Watanabe 1990; Yamaguchi 1994; Sakamoto 1997; Kataoka 1993).

In the *zanryū-hōjin* lawsuit of the 2000s against the Japanese state, one of the witnesses, Sugawara[1] testified that he joined the *giyūdai* from his secondary school in Yamagata Prefecture when soldiers came to give patriotic lectures with propaganda movies in 1939. He was moved by the slogan: "For Japan, and for your own future in Manchuria, join the *giyūdai* immediately!"[2] Some families sent their children to *giyūdai* for education at state expense, although the "education" was completely a matter of military training.

Unlike the late ninteenth-century scheme of mass emigration to Hokkaido, where the major considerations were economic and demographic, the policy of Manchurian rural colonization aimed to assist Japan's military defense against the Soviet Union through cultural and economic influence. In Manchukuo, therefore, instead of seeking suitable, practical areas to ensure the livelihood of Japanese peasant emigrants, about 50 percent of the *kaitakudan* villages were placed in the north, near the border between Manchuria and Siberia; 40 percent were located in areas that were under threat of anti-Japanese ambushes; and only 10 percent were near railways (Kaji 2002; Kinoshita 2003: 23). Each *kaitakudan* unit was built up from a particular prefecture in Japan; thus, members of the *kaitakudan* carried over their previous occupations and continued to live with their hometown customs. At the time of the collapse of Manchukuo in 1945, it was recorded that 955 *kaitakudan* had been established (Wu 2004: 27).

In the 1930s, the movement of collective peasant emigration was supported by broad sectors of society, since it seemed to offer a solution to the problems of the impoverished rural sector in Japan. Acting in response to the national call, each prefectural authority cooperated with the mobilization of arranging peasant emigration. The village elites enthusiastically targeted the poor and weak Japanese peasants, promising enormous land grants and a status transformation from rural underclass to colonial leading race (Young 1998: 19, 401). In most cases, however, the land shortage problem alone was not enough to lead landless peasants to choose to move to strange, cold, and undeveloped places – in fact they were often enticed and bullied into moving (Young 1996: 89). This rural emigrant mobilization was sensationalized as a "Manchuria Fever" (Wu 2004: 20), which was facilitated by a bridal recruitment campaign. A plan to send one million brides to Manchuria was jointly proposed by the Colonial Ministry, the Agricultural Ministry, and the Education Ministry. Bridal associations were set up in many prefectures to recruit brides. Lectures were held to educate patriotic women, and bridal courses were opened for matchmaking (Fujinuma 2003). These single girls' idealistic agreement to marry *giyūdai* heroes increased the peasant household emigration. Apart from nationalistic idealism, another major motivation for the brides was the opportunity for underprivileged young women to improve social status by marrying Manchurian settlers (Chinno 1992; Ogawa 1995; Kataoka 1993; Sugiyama 1996). Many of

these "brides to Manchuria" eventually ended up remarrying Chinese men for survival after Japan's defeat; they later became the *zanryū-fujin*. Despite numerous Japanese-langauge documents about the brides, no reliable figure for their total number is available. This is because brides went to Manchuria as nurses, teachers, clerks, young wives, and cooks, as well as fiancées of *kaitakudan* heroes (refer to Table I in the Appendixes).

Sachiko Aoki was a Tokyo high school student in 1943. Her parents, who were running a vegetable retail business, were bitter that their only son had sacrificed himself on the battlefield to fulfill "national responsibility." They refused to emigrate to Manchuria but local leaders tried to persuade them everyday to make a "honourable decision," and the Aokis departed for Manchuria with four daughters in July 1943, and on arrival were assigned a shabby hut with insufficient food – a scenario far from that described in the propaganda they had heard in Japan. Sachiko's father was sick but the *kaitakudan* authority sent him to work far away from home. He died in November 1943. Sachiko's mother died in the following year, due to hard physical labor. Sachiko's elder sister married a *kaitakudan* man, while Sachiko taught in *kaitakudan*'s primary school without pay and could hardly feed her unmarried sisters.

Yuriko Sakamoto was born in a poor family in Yamagata and received little primary education in the early 1940s. Her elder brother went to Manchuria to keep livestock for the prefecture's *kaitakudan*, but his wife had to postpone her emigration and look after elderly parents at home. The Sakamotos decided to send Yuriko to join the elder son in Manchuria first in order to prepare for the whole family's settlement. Yuriko arrived in Manchuria in mid-1944. During the daytime she worked for the *kaitakudan*'s health center as a cleaner without pay. She cooked and washed for her brother during the evenings. She met Sato, a young man who worked in the health centre as a cook, and they got married at the beginning of 1945. Sato was summoned to battle by the Kwantung Army in July 1945. Yuriko continued to look after Sato's parents and grandparents.

Soviet attack in August 1945

At midnight on August 9 1945, in answer to Allied appeals for support and wishing to cement the Soviet Union's postwar position in the Far East, Soviet leaders initiated the invasion of Japan's puppet state, Manchukuo, hoping to capture it before the Japanese surrender (Glantz 1983: pxvii). Lacking in manpower, the Kwantung Army's response to the Soviet attack appeared to be to give up Manchuria. Accepting the propaganda of Imperial Japan, *kaitakudan* members were not aware of Japan's military defeat and the mounting hatred towards them among the local people. During the last few months before the Soviet military attack, the *kaitakudan* population consisted mostly of women, elderly people and children, since most adult men had been called up into the army and sent to the front lines, many of them becoming prisoners of war held in Siberia. Without access to transportation, most of the women, children and elderly peasant colonists had difficulty escaping to the urban centers established by the Kwantung Army for Japanese civilian refugees.

Most elderly colonists who lacked the physical strength to run away committed collective suicide, while some other colonists were forced into such group suicides in order to avoid humiliation and torment by the Soviet soldiers. Some attempted to escape to ports or cities to seek routes to return to Japan, but these civilian fugitives were often robbed and assaulted on their journey by Chinese bandit militias. Yet the revenge against the Japanese colonists was largely carried out passively, by ignoring their desperate need for food, shelter, and medical supplies (Kaji 2002; Kinoshita 2003; Wu 2004; Watanabe 1990; Yamaguchi 1994; Sakamoto 1997; Kataoka 1993; Narangoa 2003). It is estimated that the total number of *kaitakudan* fatalities under the 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria was 80,000 (Wu 2004: 28). Most male *kaitakudan* members had been enlisted in the Kwantung Army by the last summons, and thus many of them were able to survive. Older *kaitakudan* members lacked the physical strength to escape, and most of them died in collective suicide actions, which reflected their belief in the *bushidō* spirit advocated in imperialist propaganda.

Two surviving male *kaitakudan* members described that the Kwantung Army sought to enlist the last few men from each *kaitakudan* headquarters in July 1945 to fight against the Soviets in Siberia (Kaji 2002). These forces of male *kaitakudan* members consisted mostly of aged soldiers with weapons hardly sufficient for their self-defense. Meanwhile, to halt the pursuing Soviet troops, the Kwantung Army bombed bridges and cut telephone and electricity lines. This strategy did not stop the battle-trained Soviet soldiers from crossing the rivers, but it did cut *kaitakudan* women and children off from survival routes to the rail stations in urban areas. Many refugees managed to escape from collective suicides and military attacks or bandit militias only to run into dead ends on riverbanks. Some then participated in group suicides at the riverbanks and some attempted to cross the rivers and drowned. It is estimated that more than a third of the total *kaitakudan* population of 300,000 did not return to postwar Japan (Tamanoi 2001: 164). Apart from the 78,500 who died in the war, around 20,000 people remained in China. There were essentially two kinds of *kaitakudan* refugees – orphans, and women who became the so-called *zanryū-koji* and *zanryū-fujin.*

Sachiko Aoki narrated her war experience: While the Soviet airplanes flew overhead, the *kaitakudan* settlers were left with the sick, the elderly, women, and children. On August 12 the *kaitakudan* leader, an old man, commanded all members to abandon their property and flee. They walked to a station of the Kwantung Army and found many dead bodies. Along the way to Changchun they were attacked by bandits and many lost their lives and belongings. To hide from militias and vengeful Chinese, the *kaitakudan* leaders regrouped people in small groups, and commanded parents to kill their crying babies. Sachiko's elder sister was forced to kill her 5-month-old baby and soon became mad with grief. The hungry fugitives further suffered from burning sun, pouring rain, and mosquitoes. Being attacked by bandits several times, only 10 people remained alive in Sachiko's group, which had started with 40. On August 25 they finally knew that Japan had been defeated. Sachiko was knocked out by a robber with a thick club. She woke up and found that all her clothes had been stolen. She ran and fell down a cliff, breaking her leg. Her sister helped her

escape from the bottom of the cliff. A few days later they were attacked by bandits again. Her sister was struck in the neck with a sickle, and blood ran like tap water over her body. They finally found other *kaitakudan* members but they were shot dead as a group by the Soviets. Sachiko was taken into a truck filled with dead bodies, but managed to escape alone. She continued to flee, and fainted. At last she woke up and found she was sleeping in a Chinese peasant's house.

This description of the war turmoil resembles the memories of some *zanryū-koji* who saw the horror when they were very young. In a Japanese language class a repatriated female *zanryū-koji* gave an oral presentation of her memories from when she was six years old. Her *kaitakudan* was located in the northwestern-most part of Manchuria, on the border of Mongolia and Siberia, and was therefore one of the first to be attacked by the Soviets. The panicked and unarmed *kaitakudan* members' reaction to the attack was collective suicide. Many mothers were commanded to kill their own children. She was frightened to see her mother killing her 1-year-old baby sister and immediately ran away from her mother and the panic-stricken *kaitakudan* adults. She walked alone for two days until she could not move any more. She feel asleep and when she awoke she found herself with a Mongolian family.

The fate of women and children

The *kaitakudan* women and children who survived the military attacks, collective suicides, bandit assaults, and hardships of their escapes suffered further from hunger and disease in the refugee camps. When winter came, the hungry refugees had no fuel to endure the average temperatures of –20 to –30 degrees Celsius. In the extremely poor conditions in the camps, many refugees could not escape the rapid advance of endemic disease that took many lives. People possessing no valuables to exchange for food and medicines had to exchange their children for these necessities. In 2003 a *zanryū-koji*'s wife told me that at the end of 1945 her father went to rob the Japanese refugees kept in an empty cattle shed nearby, but he was too late as the refugees had already been robbed, so he went to the abandoned *kaitakudan* houses, where he found a piece of curtain. He sold it at a high price. Fifteen years later his daughter married a Japanese man from that refugee camp. Single women feared that if they stayed in the camps long they would be forced into sex slavery for the Soviets, and so eagerly married anyone willing to have them. Married women who had lost contact with their husbands decided to marry local men in order to survive. Under the prevalent anti-Japanese sentiment, nurtured during the unjust colonial rule, buying or taking Japanese refugees into one's own family was socially condemned among the Chinese, but many poor peasants were desperate to find farm laborers and to get married cheaply, and so did not mind recruiting Japanese refugees into their households. Japanese women and children could be sold at a market price equivalent to ¥60–70. Many orphans were seized by "Manchurian brokers" and sold into slavery to farmers, while other orphans were in the custody of the CCP's Eighth Route Army in areas controlled by the CCP (Wu 2004: 29; Nimmo 1988: 24, 28).

The Japanese public graveyard, located in Fangzheng county, serves as a museum to portray the situation of *kaitakudan* refugees in 1945.[3] There were four *kaitakudan* units nearby but none of them had a radio. Colonial villagers only learned of Japan's defeat when they saw refugees who passed through Fangzheng as they fled. They joined the refugees to seek opportunities to repatriate in Harbin. However, these large crowds of Japanese were forced back to Fangzheng by the Soviet troops. It is estimated that over 20,000 Japanese refugees were kept in Fangzheng. Most of them were accommodated in so-called refugee camps consisting of the likes of cattle sheds or caves. Suffering from high mortality rates from endemic disease and hunger, the refugees had no energy to take care of the dying, and sometimes they threw dying patients outside so that others might occupy their places. The total number of refugees in Fangzheng remaining alive after the extraordinarily cold winter of 1945–1946 was about 8,649. Of these it is estimated that 1,200 left refugee camps, 460 were taken by the Soviets, 2,360 died from disease and hunger, 1,200 tried to walk towards Harbin, 2,300 women married Chinese men in Fangzheng and other counties, and another 1,120 people, mostly children, were adopted by local families (Araragi 2000: 25; Narangoa 2003: 148).[4] During the traumas of war, giving children and women to local families seemed to be the only method of survival, but at the time Fangzheng's population was not large enough to absorb all of them, and some were taken by Chinese families in the neighboring counties.

When spring came, plenty of human skeletons were found around Fangzheng. At the time the CCP and the KMT were busy with their civil war, the Soviet troops were only interested in getting food from local civilians and Japanese women from the refugee camps. The social order of Fangzheng was maintained by a self-organized rural police, which collected about 4,500 Japanese bodies. It took three days and huge amounts of gasoline to burn these bodies. Consequently, the site where the bodies were burnt became a collective memorial spot for the surviving Japanese in Fangzheng, who built a shabby cemetery there in 1963. In 1984, the Japanese Embassy in China moved the remains of about 530 *kaitakudan* who died in collective suicides in 1945 from Gixi and buried them in the Fangzheng public graveyard.

Yuriko Sakamoto continues to narrate her war experience as a stranded war-wife: With insufficient water and food, other desperate *kaitakudan* fugitives started to throw babies into rivers and leave the elderly in wild forests. To approach the railway, Yuriko and other refugees needed to cross a river at midnight. She deserted her grandmother-in-law as she was too weak to carry the old woman. Arriving in Fangzheng, Yuriko met several *kaitakudan* groups who had all been kept in a cave-like refugee camp. The Soviets demanded that young Japanese women serve their soldiers. Each of the *kaitakudan* leaders wanted to protect the virginity of unmarried women and tended to send married women to the Soviets. Yuriko's husband was summoned by the Kwantung Army right after their wedding, and thus was seen as a suitable candidate to serve the Soviets. Yuriko emphasized that she was sick during her service to the Soviets and she did not remember anything. Coming back to the refugee camp, she faced a long and cold winter with temperatures of –30 degrees Celsius. Yuriko was desperate to marry a Chinese man to ensure her survival, but

she had lost leverage to choose a husband due to her service to the Soviets and had to marry a local man 20 years older than herself and in bad health.

Repatriation during the Chinese Civil War

The history of Japanese globalization – human dispersal and the quest for capital accumulation through military dominance – had resulted in over 6 million Japanese living outside Japan by the end of World War II (Befu 2000: 38). The immense task of repatriating Japanese from Manchuria, Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and North Korea fell into the hands of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), which appointed the *Kōseishō* to establish the Repatriation Relief Bureau (RRB) in October 1945 to take charge of the execution of repatriation programs. This postwar governmental body was under pressure to urgently repatriate military people and paid little attention to the plight of Manchurian Japanese civilians, who were stuck in refugee camps in the midst of material shortage and anti-Japanese sentiments. The wartime rhetoric of racial harmony in Manchukuo still echoed in the mindsets of postwar Japanese officials, and so the wartime ideology could still be useful to encourage colonial Japanese to stay harmoniously in the "East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" with local people (Narangoa 2003: 148).

The recent *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs who have sued the Japanese government have argued that the Potsdam Declaration assured both Japanese troops and civilians of repatriation. In a SCAP report, it is indicated that General MacArthur promised he would repatriate civilians once military demobilization was completed (McWilliams 1988: 9). This, the largest organized overseas relocation of people in history, was complicated by many factors: the lack of any precedents to follow; the involvement of large amounts of shipping and the dangers of mined ports; the requirements of many agencies to coordinate – not only SCAP and the Japanese government but also military commands including the Americans, the British, the Chinese, and the Soviets; and the further compounding of the problem by the worsened relations between the US and the Soviets and by the Chinese Civil War between the KMT and the CCP. The first repatriation scheme, aiming to bring back the Japanese military detained overseas, was drafted by the RRB under the *Kōseishō* in April 1946, reviewed and revised by SCAP, and approved at the end of November 1946. Apart from transportation, the repatriation scheme had to deal with a series of consequential problems: food and housing supplies, public facilities, and jobs and loans for veterans, as well as the conversion of foreign currencies and the military coupons brought into Japan by repatriates. It is estimated that more than one million Japanese civilians were in Manchuria at the end of WWII (Nimmo 1988: 21). In August 1946 three parties agreed the repatriation of civilians in Manchuria – the US, the KMT, and the CCP. However, the issue was not discussed in Japan's Diet until May 1948. In the same year, enforcement of a civilian repatriation scheme was pushed by hunger strikers in Tokyo's Hibiya Park, and the demonstrators demanded urgent arrangements for civilians returning home (Nimmo 1988: 87).

When the Cold War began soon after World War II, the two superpowers, the USSR and US supported the CCP and the KMT, respectively, in the battles in

China, which caused difficulties for many Japanese waiting to be repatriated from Manchuria. Some historical data shows that the American-operated repatriation program was successful in bringing millions of Japanese soldiers and civilians home from all areas within the first year after the war (McWilliams 1988: 10). It is arguable that, in view of the possibility of utilizing the defeated Japanese troops to combat the CCP, an efficient repatriation scheme for the Japanese in China was not an urgent matter for the powerful SCAP. Between 1945 and 1949, although Japan had completely lost its control over Manchuria to the Soviet Union, Japanese troops were retained in several major cities of China, where they continued to patrol the streets and to treat the Chinese with customary arrogance. Many high-ranking KMT officers had trained together with the now-defeated Japanese generals in Japan before the war and had formed close friendships. Instead of persuading the Japanese to surrender, the KMT generals secretly entered into agreements with them to use the Japanese forces to fight against the Communists. In return for Japanese help, the KMT protected Japanese interests in China. The Americans were initially eager to disarm the Japanese troops. But before the American commanders arrived in China to supervise the KMT, the KMT's ability to administer the cities was weakened by social disturbances created by the Japanese troops, who systematically destroyed large numbers of factories and industrial facilities. No specific explanations are available as to why the Japanese did this, but as described above, *kaitakudan* leaders also destroyed Japanese property before they fled, to leave nothing to the Chinese. Facing mass support that was rapidly shifting towards the CCP, the Americans became increasingly willing to overlook the fact that the KMT continued to make use of Japanese military resources (Gillin and Etter 1983). The KMT detained approximately 11,300 Japanese engineers and technicians and their 30,000 family members in Manchuria (Nimmo 1988: 28), although it had repatriated the unskilled Japanese laborers from the KMT-held refugee camps by 1949 (Gillin and Etter 1983: 510).

Historians generally agree that the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and settlers by the Soviets was not well managed (e.g. Nimmo 1988; McWilliams 1988; Gillin and Etter 1983; Narangoa 2003). One of the explanations for the fact that Japanese were repatriated from Southeast Asia and China proper more efficiently was that the Western Allies were better established in Southeast Asia while Manchuria, in contrast, was in the hands of the Soviets and the CCP (Narangoa 2003: 149). Both the Soviets and the CCP were keen to make use of Japanese manpower and to convert the Japanese to Communism. Lacking in manpower themselves, the KMT requested that the Soviets delay their departure from Manchuria. This paved the way for the CCP troops to entrench themselves in the rural areas of Manchuria (Nimmo 1988: 27). Thus many Japanese soldiers became prisoners of war and were kept in forced labor camps in the Soviet areas, and many civilian Japanese were coerced into serving the CCP, some in guerrilla battles. Some Japanese generals who did not want to follow the SCAP's demands that they disarm offered military support to the CCP in the hope of negotiating favorable conditions and positions in China (Gillin and Etter 1983: 515). In the course of attempting to carry out the repatriation schemes in the immediate postwar years, the RRB, under the *Kōseishō*

and supervised by SCAP, had to negotiate its way within these Cold War politics. Consequently, it is believed that, up to 1954, there were about 32,000 Japanese left in the former Manchuria (Nimmo 1988: 96), many of whom were *kaitakudan* refugees.

Repatriation during the 1950s

The postwar Japanese government did not recognize the CCP as the legitimate government of China. The nation was blockaded by the Allies after its involvement in the Korean War. Under the American occupation regime until 1952, the Japanese remaining in China thus became a tool for the CCP to open up a communication channel to the West via Japan, by expressing its willingness to repatriate all the Japanese in a radio broadcast. The "non-governmental" organization of the Chinese Red Cross was appointed by the Chinese government to mediate the repatriation program with three Japanese non-governmental organizations: the Japanese Red Cross, the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association, and the Japanese Peace Alliance Committee. A repatriation agreement between these Chinese and Japanese NGOs was made and came into force in 1953 (Wu 2004: 54). The CCP cadres decided on the priorities for repatriation of the different groups of Japanese. Refugees in camps and civilians without special skills to be exploited were sent home first. The prisoners-of-war were re-educated according to Communist ideas and then repatriated according to the results of their thought reform; the skilled workers remained longer, as the new nation needed their services. From March 1953 to the end of 1955 the CCP repatriated 27,904 Japanese, including civilians and war prisoners (Nimmo 1988: 96 and Wu 2004: 31). The primary interest of the CCP in offering assistance to Japanese repatriation was to maintain diplomatic contacts with the Allied nations. However, Japanese right-wing activists opposing the CCP caused problems, and when their anti-CCP action was stepped up with an insult to the national flag of the PRC in May 1958, the CCP announced that it would cease officially arranged repatriation programs in June 1958.[5]

The enforcement of the Household Registry Act as a centralized system since the Meiji period has functioned to identify Japanese lineage through official records of familial relationships. Incorporated in the system of household registry, or *koseki* in Japanese, the traditional family was given the official purposes of promoting values of loyalty and piety and was also used to define the relationship between an individual and the state, symbolized by the Emperor (Wagatsuma 1998: 12). In the citizenship law valid from 1899 to 1950 the family was conceived of as an entity to mediate between individuals and the nation. The spirit of the law was to attach individuals to the nation through households. One household had only one nationality. The master of a household had to be a man, and his wife and dependent children held their nationality only through him. Thus a Japanese woman who married a foreigner automatically became a foreigner and lost her Japanese nationality. Similarly, a child adopted by and dependent on a foreign father became a foreigner him/herself (Kaji 2002). In the 1950s repatriation programs, some Japanese civilians were refused entry to Japan due to their "non-Japanese" status.

The returnees deemed illegitimate were the stranded war wives who had married Chinese, the war orphans under 16 years old adopted by Chinese, the children born from intermarriage with non-Japanese, and the Chinese husbands who wished to accompany their Japanese wives home to Japan. In *Asahi Shimbun* articles in 1955 immigration officers complained about the CCP's loose control in loading too many "non-Japanese" into repatriation boats. These illegitimate repatriates were deported after brief visits to relatives in Japan. The stranded war wives would be offered the choice of either giving up Japan or giving up their Chinese families in order to return to Japan. To regain eligibility to repatriate under this immigration policy, the first necessary step for them was thus to divorce themselves completely from any Chinese kin (Kaji 2002). In reality, even those desperate to live in Japan felt it impossible to abandon their children in China and return to Japan alone. As for the orphans, most remained silent or were ignorant of the difficult repatriation scheme, as they were too young and their peasant foster parents were not interested in sending them back to Japan.

The new citizenship law of 1952 recognized women married to foreigners as Japanese nationals and preserved the right of a child begotten of a foreign father to choose Japanese nationality when he/she reached the age of 20. However, stranded war wives and Japanese children adopted by Chinese parents still faced difficulties regaining their Japanese nationality. Under the mono-citizenship principle, those who had naturalized themselves as Chinese nationals lost their eligibility to regain their Japanese nationality. Even had they wanted to renounce their Chinese nationality they were not able to fulfill the basic criteria for naturalization, which were that the applicant had to have been living in Japan continuously for five years, with a good record of law-abiding behavior, social responsibility, and sound economic standing (*Citizenship Law*).[6] Informal rules, such as requiring kinship sponsors to guarantee repatriates' legal and economic conditions, also effectively presented barriers, as they increased the pressure on relatives in Japan, who themselves had to struggle against many hardships during the immediate postwar years.

In 1959 the *Kōseishō* passed a special regulation to deal with unreturned Japanese. Arguably, this policy was a by-product of Cold War politics. Fearing that communism might penetrate into Japan with the repatriates from China, Japan's pro-Taiwan administration was reluctant to continue the investigations in China to find the unreturned Japanese. A bill proposing an announcement concerning "war dead" was drafted by the *Kōseishō*, passed by parliament and immediately enforced throughout Japan. It deleted the names of over 30,000 missing people from family registers and announced their deaths in war overseas – despite the fact that the Chinese reported to the Japanese government that there were over 13,000 Japanese still remaining in China. This law was aimed at stopping civil relations with the communist bloc and made itself easily acceptable to each Japanese family by offering free and convenient legal procedures to obtain compensation of ¥30,000 for each "death" (Sakamoto 1997). In addition, in the immediate postwar years, many active Japanese Communists appeared to be repatriates from China. Some had served the CCP and some had been educated in Maoism and Marxism in the war prisons (Gillin and Etter 1983: 516–517). Ironically, then, the 1959 policy seemed too late to impede

the Communist Japanese from entering Japan, but effectively denied the existence of Japanese orphans and stranded war wives in China, who had barely been imbued with any political awareness in their rural lives.

Before the CCP officially ceased its repatriation programs in 1958, official investigation of unreturned Japanese had penetrated into villages near the former *kaitakudan* locations (Wu 2004: 59). Between 1958 and 1976, although China was disturbed by political upheavals, about 1,000 Japanese civilians had repatriated, mostly returning through the British colony of Hong Kong (Wu 2004: 69). Kang, a county government official in Heilongjiang who was responsible for post-1972 repatriation programs for two decades, asserted that by the late 1950s China had no specific laws to define citizenship. Most rural people lived without identity documents, so *zanryū-koji* and *zanryū-fujin* lived in China without citizenship concerns. When they were urged to naturalize to become Chinese nationals in the early 1960s, they tended to cooperate with the Chinese government, as they had nowhere else to go and could only continue to live with their Chinese families. Some people did not naturalize because they were ignorant of the policy due to variations in carrying it out among different rural authorities. Others did not naturalize because they continued to wait for opportunities to repatriate. Frequently, these were *zanryū-fujin* whose language skills enabled them to keep in correspondence with their families in Japan. Those who did not naturalize were then legally regarded as foreigners living in China. Those who had not given up Japanese nationality were allowed to visit Japan if their families could obtain one-off travel documents for them in Japan.

Although China ceased its state-operated repatriation program for Japanese civilians in 1958 due to Cold War politics, until the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China's policy concerning visits to their homeland by Japanese who remained in China was still unofficially open. Any Japanese applying to visit Japan would be approved. But few families in Japan could afford their relatives' trips to Japan. Before the Cultural Revolution started, the authorities of Fangzheng County had assisted some *zanryū-fujin* to visit their homeland.

In 1966 a trip was arranged by the Yamagata Prefectural Government for women remained in China to visit homeland. Some women refused this opportunity, as they had lost contact with their families in Yamagata and did not want to upset their Chinese families. But Yuriko wanted to find Sato, her Japanese husband, who had disappeared after the Kwantung Army's last summons. She managed to meet Sato, who had repatriated to Japan in the early 1950s after several years of forced labor in Siberia. Sato had tried to find Yuriko but had failed. He then remarried and fathered a daughter while running a noodle shop. The possibility for Yuriko to stay in Japan depended on the legitimacy of her marriage to Sato, since they had never divorced. However, they had married outside of Japan proper, and her name had never been registered as a legitimate daughter-in-law by Sato's family. According to the Japanese citizenship law, Yuriko was merely a woman who had married a foreigner and had thus given up her Japanese nationality. The reunion of ex-husband and ex-wife was thus too late. After saving some money from six months' factory work in Yamagata, Yuriko went back to Fangzheng to continue her life as a peasant.

Shizuko learned that her mother in Japan had been seriously ill, but it took her father eighteen months to complete the procedures for Shizuko to visit her mother in 1966. She finally went to Japan in 1967 by sea from the British colony of Hong Kong, where necessary procedures required several weeks. Her father had to finance both her travel costs and the expenses of her stay in Hong Kong. After six months in Japan, she was torn by the brutal need to make a decision: whether to abandon her children and husband in China to fulfill her filial duty in Japan or to desert her sick parents for her family in China. At the time, Shizuko was informed that the Cultural Revolution had just started in China and that the Japanese there were being brutally punished. This news forced Shizuko to make up her mind: she decided that she could not leave her four daughters to suffer political punishment because of their Japanese mother. She went back to China in the midst of the chaotic upheaval.

Focusing on the repatriation issues in the 1950s, Wu (2004) finds that it was not uncommon for Japanese to refuse the call of repatriation. Parallel to the problems of repatriation discussed above, Japanese were under foreign occupation in their defeated country, with a collapsed economy, and the Japanese public was busy with the challenges of everyday survival. There was a political reaction against returnees from former colonies – people who had abandoned Japan to emigrate for material advantage (e.g. Kuramoto 1999). These returned colonizers were seen as failed opportunists who would receive no understanding and empathy if they admitted publicly that they had left their family members behind in Manchuria (Narangoa 2003: 150). In the 1950s, after a decade of adaptation to Chinese society, many Japanese had forgotten some Japanese language and had lost contact with their families in Japan. With their skills and education, although even those who had only primary education were employable and respected in Chinese society, they would have become *hikiagesha* in Japan if they had repatriated. The term *hikiagesha* refers to the repatriates from Japan's former colonies in the immediate postwar years. The meaning is equivalent to 'refugee' (Wu 2004: 226). In the 1950s, anyone who wanted to could repatriate, but the gap between Japanese and Chinese economic development was not yet significant. Some people who repatriated in the 1950s felt regret since they faced language and cultural problems and suffered from unemployment and low social status in Japan.

Suginami became an orphan at the age of four in 1945 and was adopted into a logging worker family. When he was six years old his adoptive mother ran away, and thereafter he lived with his adoptive father, who sent him to a rural primary school. When he was insulted as a "little Japanese ghost," his adoptive father punished those who had offended him. In 1950 some officials informed the father that they could arrange his adoptive son's repatriation to Japan. The son immediately refused. Japan was a strange place for him and his adoptive father was good to him. In 1953 his adopted father was assigned a carpenter's job in Mudanjiang City. Suginami was then transferred to the best primary school in that city, where officials often asked him if he wanted to repatriate to Japan. Suginami said no again and again. In 1954 he was 13 years old when his adoptive father died and left him with labor insurance to further his secondary education. A few years later he was offered a

scholarship to the Agricultural Technology University in Harbin. He then returned to Mudanjiang for a permanent position in a food company.

Ota was eight years old in 1945. His father was taken away by the Kwantung Army. Ota, along with his mother and two younger siblings, walked towards Harbin with the hordes of Japanese refugees. They walked at night and slept in forests during the day to avoid bandits. Before they arrived in Harbin, his mother got lost from Ota and his younger siblings after they were bombed by the Soviets, and Ota and his two younger siblings stayed in a refugee camp in Harbin for two years. He went to beg for food on the streets to feed his siblings. One day, after begging, he found that his sister was missing. In 1948 he gave his brother to a Taiwanese family, and just after that he found his mother in another refugee camp, and she scolded him for giving up the younger siblings. Ota did not get along with his mother and left her to follow a circus group. The circus master agreed to train him as a tightrope walker, and he performed with the circus in many places in Heilongjiang. During the 1950s, both Japanese acquaintances and CCP cadres had informed Ota about the repatriation programs. He was not interested. He wanted to be a tightrope walker. In the 1960s he was told that his mother had died sometime in the 1950s. Officials urged Ota to become a naturalized Chinese national but he did not do anything about it – believing that the paper would not stop people from calling him "little Japanese ghost" anyway. Since then Ota has been living in China with a "Foreign Resident Identification" document.

Politics of naming the group

The Manchurian-Japanese returned to Japan during the immediate postwar years labelled as *hikiagesha*, which carried a discriminatory nuance. The term Orphans of Japanese Nationals Remaining in China or *chūgoku zanryū nihonjin koji* used to appear in the *Kōseishō* documents; while Japanese women remaining in China rarely appeared in official documents.[7] This lesser official attention to *zanryū-fujin* results from the official assumption that these women had chosen to stay in China and thus they were not entitled to state assistance for their repatriation (Ward 2006b). In the early 1980s different terms such as *zanryū-dōhō* and *nikkei-chūgokujin* were proposed in discussions in the Japanese Diet as terms for unreturned Japanese in China. The term *dōhō* is slightly different from *nikkeijin*, referring to persons born of Japanese ancestors who emigrated to Hawaii or the Americas a century ago, supposedly of their own free will. The term *chūgoku zanryū-hōjin*, referring to Japanese civilians left behind in China as a group of returnees distinct from *hikiagesha* and *nikkeijin*, was officially approved in 1984.[8]

Some Japanese intellectuals reject the word *zanryū* as it suggests the concept of a voluntary stay in China, which they consider to be a distortion of history. They argue that families were forced to settle in Manchuria as a result of Japanese imperialism, and that they were abandoned in the midst of war by the state. The word *koji* too is not entirely realistic since many *zanryū-koji* are not quite orphans, as most of them have adoptive parents. Some Japanese children parented by their biological mothers in Chinese families were stepchildren of their mother's Chinese

husbands, since it was common for Japanese stranded war wives to remarry Chinese to enable their Japanese children from previous marriages to survive. While the word *zanryū* is under attack, interestingly, the term *zanryū-koji* continues to be used and highlighted in the recent activism – the word "orphan" carries powerful political connotations, signifying being abandoned not only by biological parents but also by an ancestral nation.[9]

Emphasizing the importance of understanding *zanryū-hōjin*'s traumatic experiences during the war and the Cultural Revolution, Araragi (2000: 19–47) refers to the subjects as *chūgoku kikokusha*, meaning repatriates from China. The term *kikokusha* carries a strong feeling of attachment towards the national heart as it gives a sense of ethnic homogeneity to subtly and powerfully links overseas Japanese and Japanese proper together as an inseparable people. This intellectual attempt fortuitously resembles the post-1972 repatriation schemes, which consigned *zanryū-hōjin* to a higher ranking of Japaneseness by highlighting them as "war-displaced Japanese." However, among the war-displaced Japanese, a few adult male Japanese found no justification for their claim that they had been abandoned in China by state policies, as they had been repatriated under the post-1972 *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation schemes. Many cases indicate a common phenomenon: that some *zanryū-koji* had led their lives as ordinary Chinese without knowing their backgrounds as adopted children or as Japanese orphans until they were told of it in their forties, fifties, or even sixties. A female *zanryū-koji* discovered her background at the age of 62 during a holiday in Japan, when she was told by a *zanryū-koji* friend that her arm's smallpox vaccination scar had the characteristic of pre-war Japanese smallpox scars, with four dots shaped in a square (::). She immediately went back to China, forced her dying father to admit that she was an adopted child and that she had originally come from a Japanese refugee camp.[10] Then she "repatriated" to her "mother country" at the age of 64. Did these people really suddenly feel the sufferings of being war-displaced Japanese when they learned of their backgrounds?

Nikkeijin also possess Japanese blood but my ethnography finds that their "Japaneseness" is accepted less than that of the *zanryū-hōjin*. For instance, there are industrial training courses offered to *zanryū-hōjin* family members by the Labour Department's Occupational Security Centre that come with a ¥140,000 monthly allowance during the training/study period. Mrs Baba is a *zanryū-koji*'s adopted son's wife who used to enjoy this scheme when she studied in a fashion design school. During that two-year diploma course in tailoring, Mrs Baba had several Brazilian *nikkeijin* classmates, who asked the staff of the Occupational Security Centre why they did not receive the allowance that Mrs Baba did. An official explained to them that this welfare scheme was only offered to the *zanryū-hōjin* members whose elder family members were left behind in China by war. Significantly, Ward (2006a) argues that the acceptance of *nikkeijin* as less Japanese results from the implication that they did not return from Japan's former colonies, which had once been included within the boundaries of Japan; the acceptance of *zanryū-hōjin* from Manchuria as the "war-displaced-Japanese" suggests that the former colonies may remain within a boundary of "imagined community" in contemporary Japan. While *nikkeijin* retain their identity as *nikkeijin* in Japan,

zanryū-fujin and *zanryū-koji* together with their spouses and offspring's extended families all want to be *kikokusha*. One of the major questions I shall examine in the rest of this book is: Can these people be transformed to *kikokusha* and thereby make the mainstream Japanese feel that they are all Japanese?

Summary

The ultimate failure of Japan's imperial power struggle caused some Japanese peasant settlers to become war refugees. During the period from 1945 to 1972 these unreturned Japanese became *zanryū-hōjin* when they were scattered throughout the vast land of Northeast China, failing to return to Japan because of a series of obstacles. The emphasis on war victim status may overlook other factors that have played an important role in creating *zanryū-hōjin* as a group.

I have examined the logistical difficulties in repatriating Japanese refugees between 1946 and 1949: how Japan in the 1950s was not considered an attractive option for those who had established an acceptable life in China; the attachment of *zanryū-hōjin* to their Chinese families and adopted parents; the barriers presented in the Japanese citizenship law and by the Cold War; and the deleting of "war dead" from family registers. It is difficult to identify a single cause, or particular oppressors, on which to blame the victimization of this group.

We can see that East Asian transnationalism in the first half of the twentieth century was manifested through the struggle between imperial powers for political domination (Duara 1997). Manchuria was the stage for this transnational phenomenon, and the "portable community" of Japanese peasants, now becoming *zanryū-hōjin*, who were passively uprooted by an enormous state machine. Along with changes in the global political economy, the wave of *zanryū-hōjin* settlement has emerged since 1972. Such migration movements carried out in the name of repatriation programs can be viewed as a peculiarly new form of transnationalization in East Asia, characterized by an emphasis on "ethnic origin." Once they access more fluid flows of information, knowledge and opportunities in today's transnational market, intensified by the economic trend towards globalization, these once-passive migrants and their offspring experience various cultural inputs, including tradition/modern, rural/urban, indigenous/foreign, as well as developed/underdeveloped, which have the potential to give them increased initiative and voice in negotiating power.

3 Personhoods formed in rural Northeast China

With Soviet encouragement, the CCP used Manchuria as a battleground against the KMT from 1945 until the end of the Civil War in 1949. During this period the CCP transformed the bases of traditional elitist oligarchy in the region by initiating a mass mobilization of peasants and mine workers (Levine 1987: 237), which proved its strength by defeating the urban-centric strategy of the KMT. As a result, many peasants and mineworkers supported the communists in the Civil War by besieging the Nationalists in the cities. Some informants proudly told me that the Northeastern peasants were the pillars of CCP support, and thus few dare to portray them critically, even though peasants elsewhere have often been teased by urban people.

Life in the rural Northeast

The household registration system or *hukou* in Chinese was a key institution for the suppression of rural-urban mobility in Maoist China. It classified all Chinese nationals into two categories. *Non-peasant householders* were provided by the state with daily necessities at the expense of the agricultural sector, were entitled to state-provided education and medical services, and had access to jobs, housing and retirement benefits. *Peasant householders*, however, could enjoy none of these benefits. The *hukou* classification was applicable from one generation to another and thus constituted a "birth-ascribed stratification" system, as it determined where a person could live and his/her entire life opportunities to change social rank, work, wage, welfare, and housing (Chan 1996: 135–136). The possibility for Chinese peasants to become urban workers within the rigid household registration system was extremely remote, as there was little chance of inheriting an urban worker's job. An indirect method to change household registry status was for female peasants to marry men who held urban worker status, although such peasant wives could only partially gain the benefits offered to other urban workers. Serving in the armed forces, however, provided the single direct ladder to status change, as soldiers were offered education and veterans received priority when workers were recruited from rural areas (Potter 1983: 485). This chance for peasant social mobility was closed for *zanryū-hōjin* since people classified as political "bad elements," such as those of Japanese origin, were not allowed to join the Army. As a result, *zanryū-hōjin* in

general possessed limited social mobility and educational opportunities. According to *zanryū-koji* activists, 30 percent of the orphans had had no schooling experience, 40 percent received incomplete education in primary school, and 20 percent had attended junior high school. Ten percent had had some tertiary education during the Cultural Revolution years, when universities were open even to the badly educated youth from the worker/peasant/soldier classes. On the other hand, most *zanryū-fujin* had received at least a minimal education as children in Japan.

Through the land reform, which began in the early 1950s, the Chinese state tried to abolish private ownership of land and other means of production and introduced a system of public ownership. From 1952 the majority of peasants throughout China were forced to set up mutual-aid organizations, and from 1955 peasant households were organized into semi-socialist cooperatives. From 1958 the cooperatives were merged into large-scale people's communes, in which local industry, agriculture, trade, education, and military forces were combined and governmental administration and commune management were merged (Yao 1994: 20–21). Every household contributed labo;r resources to collective production under a work-point remuneration system. The rural household economy was thus made up of three kinds of income in cash or in supplies of staple: income from participation in collective labor, income from private side-production, and income from the sale of individual labor or service. Under this mode of production, peasant households no longer relied on land or private estates but on the paid and unpaid labor of their members. The larger the amount of labor resources a family could contribute in the three sectors of the rural economy, the better the income of the family (Croll 1984: 51). Consequently, the peasantry's desperate demand for labor resources required strategies for creating large kinship groups through fertility, marriage, and adoption. This explains the generally large-sized families brought to Japan by each *zanryū-fujin* who had spent her entire reproductive years in China. In contrast, the *zanryū-koji*'s fertility was partially reduced by state population control measures initiated in the late 1970s, when they were still in their thirties.

The marriage law of 1950 seemed a radical break with the past, as it advocated free choice of marriage partners, promoted equal rights to education and inheritance for both sons and daughters, and aimed to abolish concubinage, child-bride marriage, and prostitution (Croll 1984: 45–46). However, this marriage law with a modern spirit changed the traditional practices in rural China very little. This is because the historical rural-urban divide had encouraged peasants to live in their ancestral villages and thus to continue patrilocal and patriarchal practices, by which women's labor and fertility continued to be regarded as property exchangeable through marriage. The economic reform in post-Mao China has actually aggravated the traditional practices (Croll 1984; Gao 1994). As a result, the state population control has succeeded in enforcing its one-child policy in the cities since the late 1970s, but the government has had to allow larger birth quotas for peasant households.

The local rural communities had suffered from high rates of infant mortality and of women who died in childbirth before the economic reform of the late 1970s. The role of human broker had been socially accepted, enabling the adoption of children

and the provision of wives for widowers. A human broker was not necessarily a professional businessperson. In some cases a family might pick up a deserted baby and sell it, while a second adoptive family could re-sell the baby at a higher price after improving the baby's health. Similarly, the sale of wives was possible. Thanks to the shortcomings of patriarchal rural kinship practices, the essentially labor-dependant agricultural economy, and the high rates of infant mortality, rural households had a high demand for wives and children, leading them to accept Japanese refugees. This provides an additional explanation as to why the resulting *zanryū-hōjin* community consisted almost entirely of women and orphans. They survived because they were transferable properties for peasant households, while adult male refugees could not bring their labor resources into the traditional kinship system. In contrast, the tradition of in-marrying husbands was largely practiced among relatives or within a clan, and therefore Japanese male refugees had little chance to survive in Chinese peasant households by in-marriages.

Chinese scholars and journalists tend to eulogize the *zanryū-koji*'s adoptive parents in order to satisfy their feelings of Chinese nationalism. In their writings (Wu 2004; Wang Huan 2004; Wang Xiliang 2000; Zhang 2002) phrases such as "great fraternity," "noble-minded compassion," "altruistic humanity", "we Chinese showed great mercy," and "the Japanese would never be as generous as we were" occur when they describe the motives of Chinese adoptive parents for fostering the children of an enemy race. Cases of *zanryū-koji* being mentally or physically tortured in their adoptive families are rarely mentioned by Chinese authors. Instead, they tend to emphasize that Japan's imperialism created many Chinese orphans and speculate that these Chinese children would have starved to death if they had been orphaned in Japan. Meanwhile, although cases concerning *zanryū-koji* who were bullied by their adoptive parents have been presented objectively in Japanese literature, such negative facts are often balanced by an emphasis on thanking the kind and good-hearted adoptive parents. Thus, the motivations of Chinese peasant households still remain over-simplified in scholarly investigation. Before the economic reform era began in the late 1970s, the demands for wives and adoptive children were both high among the poor peasant households in the Northeast, and both types of recruited family members were equally regarded as sources of labor power. Like adoptive parents, Chinese husbands also enabled Japanese women to survive together with their children of previous marriages, through recruiting them into their households as wives and stepchildren. However, both Chinese and Japanese societies have shown little gratitude to these Chinese husbands, while adoptive parents have been seen as saints.

In the activism of recent years the *zanryū-koji* activists themselves tend to generalize about the kindness of their Chinese adoptive parents. Such "collective memories" resemble the collective remembering of the former Japanese peasant settlers in Manchuria studied by Tamanoi (2001), which can be viewed as a political activity to press the Japanese government to share the financial burden of looking after their adoptive families in China. In 1983 the Japanese government agreed to pay a maintenance supplement of RMB60 per month for 15 years to Chinese adoptive parents through the Chinese Red Cross (Narangoa 2003: 152–153).[1] According

to a local official in Fangzheng, the Japanese government has not increased the maintenance supplement for the needy adoptive parents, despite rapid inflation.

Often, the reverence for "altruistic" Chinese adoptive parents derives from their change of residence in order to protect *zanryū-koji* in the midst of anti-Japanese sentiment. However, for those who suddenly gained the precious property of a child from a Japanese refugee camp, it was reasonable to rear the child with considerable care and protection in order to make use of this property in the future. During the Chinese Civil War from 1945 to 1949 rural areas were seldom governed under civil administration, and thus families found it easy to move away and hide their adopted children's Japanese backgrounds. This practice continued in the 1980s when the state policy of population control was strictly enforced by local cadres, so that rural women who gave birth to extra children would move away from their villages. Even under the control of a more refined legal and political system nowadays, the practice of stealing or selling children among rural Chinese communities has not stopped and is often reported by the Chinese media. The families can now "adopt" the child through bribery and no longer need to move away. *Zanryū-koji* often express adoration of their Chinese adoptive parents when describing how they were attacked by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution for harboring imperialist enemy's children. However, during the late 1940s this unexpected political consequence could not have been part of the cost calculation among the adoptive parents. Some *zanryū-koji* have speculated that, if they had been adopted by Shanghainese families, they would have faced fewer problems in adapting to the modern society of Japan; however, they might already be dead if they had been orphaned in Shanghai at the end of the war. In the rural Northeast, recruiting a child into one's household, with no transaction costs for adoption procedures, was considered as a property gain by needy families. The cost of adopting a child might have been less than recruiting a daughter-in-law. Nakajima, as illustrated in the seventh case study above, became even more adoptable when he inherited an old quilt from his former adoptive household. In contrast, for families in Shanghai, adopting a child might have involved a serious calculation of costs and consequences.

Individual experiences

The first individual case involves Yuriko Sakamoto:[2] Of the Japanese women desperate to marry a Chinese man in order to survive, young and virginal girls had an advantage in choosing healthy and productive husbands. Yuriko Sakamoto was considered a potential widow, as her husband was called to battle in Siberia and she was sent to serve the Soviet soldiers by *kaitakudan* leaders. Having lost her virginal status, she did not have much choice about whom to marry. In 1946 she married a Chinese man 20 years her elder in Fangzheng county, in the province of Heilongjiang. This husband was proud of having a Japanese wife who was good at keeping the house clean and organized. He often saved the best food for her. In this warm shelter, she gave birth to three children. Hardships arrived again when collective production was introduced in Chinese agriculture under the people's communes. Yuriko's husband lost the physical ability to do agricultural work due

to bad health. Yuriko became the only one who could contribute labor to the local cooperative unit, as her three children were too young to work. The minimum amount of labor that other families contributed to the cooperative unit was that of two persons per day. To accumulate sufficient labor points to feed the five members of her family, Yuriko went to the field before dawn and returned home after sunset. She worked twice as hard as the male peasants.

Fortunately Yuriko was the only one in the cooperative unit who could read and write, so she was soon assigned the lighter job of keeping records of labor points for the peasants. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Yuriko visited Japan in 1966 but felt unable to stay in Japan alone, and went back to China to look after her family there. During the Cultural Revolution, Yuriko's first Chinese husband died. To reduce the hardship imposed on a lone widow with three children in rural China's collective production system, Yuriko married another Chinese peasant. This marriage produced two more children, while she continued to work in the fields with what was now her third husband. When the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship was normalized in 1972, Yuriko's immediate reaction was to apply to return to Japan where she could earn a higher income. She started to seek assistance for repatriation from her hometown authorities since she could not afford the travel expenses on her own. She waited until 1977 for a hometown visit arranged by Yamagata Prefecture at state expense.

The following life-course narrative depicts a *zanryū-koji* named Shirasaki,[3] who escaped from political punishment during the Cultural Revolution. The 7-year-old Shirasaki was adopted by a villager near Mudanjiang City in 1945. His adopted family provided him with education and eventually he was admitted to Changsha Industrial University in Hunan Province, where he obtained a degree in hydropower engineering and later became a teacher at the university. During the Cultural Revolution the university's party committee was busy punishing politically problematic intellectuals such as ex-KMT members, repatriates from the West, exploitative capitalists, and counter-revolutionaries. Shirasaki had emphasized his identity as an uncultured man from a poor village, and no one targeted him as a political "bad element." Even his Japanese background was an open secret. In the daily political conferences Shirasaki was trained to express political criticism of his colleagues as class enemies, and his leaders were impressed by his creative words against Japanese imperialism. One female colleague was particularly impressed, and fell in love with him, but later she rejected his marriage proposal because he was a "little Japanese" – too short for her. Shirasaki was devastated by this and decided to marry a hometown *zanryū-hōjin* girl whose Japanese father had disappeared after being summoned by the Kwantung Army in 1945. He soon found a job in Mudanjiang City and formed his new family there. In 1972 the Mudanjiang PSB attempted to persuade him to naturalize as a Chinese, but he firmly refused to create a document, declaring that naturalization to Chinese meant to emphasize his original "little Japanese ghost," despite the fact that he had already become a Chinese. He was extremely stubborn at that time as he was young and was deeply hurt by the girlfriend. Thanks to his stubbornness, his repatriation procedure was much easier than that of others, since he had never been naturalized as a Chinese.

The following protagonist was physically and mentally tortured for political punishment during the Cultural Revolution. At the age of two in 1945, Handa was adopted by a noble Manchu family in the big city Shenyang.[4] His adopted family was treated as the local elite by various authorities. Handa grew up in a warm shelter without knowing his Japanese background. Obtaining a bachelor's degree in literature, Handa was assigned a job in the propaganda department of a state enterprise in Shenyang, considered a good post in 1965. When he applied for CCP membership, which required an in-depth personal background investigation, his Japanese blood was revealed. During the Cultural Revolution, Handa was punished as the offspring of Japanese imperialists; his adoptive mother was punished by Red Guards as an exploitative capitalist. After the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relation was renormalized, Handa and his adoptive parents regained their previous status as local elites. When Japan set up its consulate in Shenyang he started to look for his biological brother, who had been adopted by another family in the countryside. The reunion of the two brothers after 30 years was a tearful meeting, but after that, Handa could not relate to his brother, an uneducated peasant, any further.

In the summer of 2003, after having lived in Japan for 20 years, Handa admitted to me that although he had been tortured by the Red Guards, the most painful experience in his entire life was not the physical pain endured during the Cultural Revolution but his failure to attend his adoptive mother's funeral in China. This had been impossible because of his embarrassing financial situation in Japan. Handa asserted that many people who were punished during the Cultural Revolution were compensated somehow in the post-Mao period and that it was pointless to make critical attacks on the Cultural Revolution.

We now move to the experience of a Japanese orphan who claims that, although he suffered neither the brutalities of the Soviet military attack in 1945 nor those of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, his suffering was still greater than anyone else's. Orphaned at age four in 1945, Nakayama's adoptive father had occupied high-ranking positions in the Manchukuo Government in Mudanjiang. Their luxurious lifestyle was threatened by Japan's defeat. They took the 4-year-old Nakayama from the Japanese refugee camp and raised him with their servant's help. Later the couple had to hide in remote mountains from punishments as national traitors by both the KMT and the CCP. From the age of seven Nakayama started to serve his adoptive parents and became a target for their explosions of temper; they would beat him violently for even minor mistakes.

Throughout his childhood Nakayama suffered from hunger and had no shoes in winter; often he had to warm his feet in fresh cow's excrement. When he reached the age of 13 his adoptive father was accused of being an opium addict and was sent to a labor camp for correction. His adoptive mother sent Nakayama to beg for food to feed her. If he came home without food she would shout at him violently. He found work as a trainee in a wood products factory when he was 15. He gave his adoptive mother 80 percent of his wage. Later his adoptive father came home, and wanted to improve his political status by declaring to terminate his kinship with the "little Japanese imperialist," and demanded that Nakayama compensate him with fostering fees. After paying off his fostering fees Nakayama got married and

had five children. His adoptive parents started to rekindle their kinship by offering help with the childcare. Nakayama was moved by this sudden parental love and convinced his wife to let them mind their 5-year-old daughter. However, his adoptive parents kidnapped the child and demanded large sums of money. Nakayama had to raise money like a beggar to pay the ransom for his daughter.

In the late 1970s many Japanese orphans in Mudanjiang had started to find their kin in Japan. Nakayama had to deal with his adoptive parents again in order to search for his Japanese kin. In 1983 Nakayama was invited to search for his kin in Japan. He could not control his feelings of grief when he heard stories of kind adoptive parents from other *zanryū-koji*. Nakayama has never dared to watch the TV drama *Child of the Vast Land*, in which the protagonist, although assaulted during the Soviet attack and punished during the Cultural Revolution, is educated as a dignified man by his kind adoptive parents. He does not want to expose himself to further emotional upset by seeing this protagonist's fortunate life.

Impacts of the cultural revolution

Many studies point out that the great majority of victims of the Cultural Revolution were the educated and those who heeded Mao's call to "dare to rebel" against established authority (e.g. Ling 1972; Thurston 1987), although many people tended to exaggerate the "torture" experiences during that period. Three major motivations were involved.[5] First, those who had experienced failures outside China tend to dwell on the horrors of the Cultural Revolution as a psychological tool to accept a lower status than they might otherwise have enjoyed in China. Second, being a victim of the Cultural Revolution provides the proof of an upper-class background, as it was essentially a reaction of the lower classes against those perceived as more privileged. Third, cultural products such as literature and the arts have portrayed the CCP as sinful by emphasizing the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. For Chinese intellectuals, however, their actual grievances have, in many cases, to do with the denial of freedom to enjoy modern lifestyles, fine arts, and sexuality – all of which are rejected according to traditional values as well as according to those of the Cultural Revolution. To criticize Chinese traditions is unthinkable for Chinese intellectuals, as they have been nurtured and created by these same traditions. Thus, the Cultural Revolution, largely dominated by the lower classes, became the target of their criticism.

In the *zanryū-hōjin* activism that I observed from February 2003 to January 2004, the activists tended to emphasize the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. When I mentioned to them that the majority of my informants managed to avoid any harm during that upheaval, the activists tended to assert that they had heard of other *zanryū-hōjin* who had suffered a great deal. In the *zanryū-fujin* lawsuit, the defendant lawyers for the state argued that the plaintiffs had shown no intention of repatriating and thus it was not the case that Japan had created barriers against their repatriation. The plaintiff lawyers gave emotional speeches in court to point out that *zanryū-fujin* faced political risks if they expressed nostalgia for Japan. It is interesting that, although there is much evidence for Japan's abandonment policies

in the 1950s, it is the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1967, that is being used to make the case in Japan's courts nowadays. In 2002 Chinese journalists from China Central TV interviewed 16 *zanryū-koji* and their adoptive parents.[6] The resulting television program covered a wide range of issues concerning their life experiences in China. Ironically, however, the Cultural Revolution, which is seen as such a significant issue by the repatriated *zanryū-hōjin* and their supporters in Japan, went unnoticed by the Chinese TV journalists. Two possible factors may account for this. First, the interviewed *zanryū-koji* and their adoptive parents may not have wanted to upset the Chinese authorities by saying anything negative about China. Second, most of the interviewed *zanryū-koji*'s backgrounds were similar to those of my informants – peasants with low education who were thus not targeted as class enemies during the Cultural Revolution.

Kang asserted that the majority of *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* who lived in rural areas in Heilongjiang did not have to hide their Japaneseness and even lived through the Cultural Revolution unharmed, although they were under pressure because of their Japaneseness. Most of them were well trained to criticize class enemies and Japanese imperialism sharply in order to redeem their "racial guilt." Consequently, the repatriated *zanryū-hōjin* activists have consciously or unconsciously employed Cultural Revolution-style political skills in their activism in Japan. In the ongoing *zanryū-koji* lawsuit, for instance, the ritual of class struggle, with its "record of blood and tears," was adopted. At class struggle conferences during the Cultural Revolution an oppressed person would prosecute his/her former oppressors with a booklet entitled "record of blood and tears" in a ritual act usually performed on stage and so meant to be dramatic and emotional. In the current lawsuit, slogans to mobilize fellow *zanryū-hōjin* are chanted, employing Maoist phrases that were popular during the Cultural Revolution, such as "Solidarity is power!" and "No fear of death! No fear of obstacles! Fight to the end for the ultimate victory!"

Others who now claim themselves political victims lived through the Cultural Revolution unharmed. However, as a genuine torture victim Handa is reluctant to criticize the Cultural Revolution. This attitude implies that he is assertive about his identity in China as an educated urban elite, a status that was later returned to him after the Cultural Revolution. His torment was compensated for by the post-Mao government, which returned elite status to his family. The experience of the Cultural Revolution thus becomes evidence of status in Handa's migrant life. Shirasaki had been in a precarious political situation, but fortunately he was able to avoid political punishment for his Japaneseness. His emphasis on the sufferings from during the Cultural Revolution in his *zanryū-hōjin* activism can be understood as his feeling of hurt at being racially insulted as a "Japanese dwarf" in China. Moreover, in the major life courses narrated in Chapter 5, we shall see how Sawako acted as more a voluntary executioner of the Cultural Revolution than a passive victim, and how a bad-tempered Japanese orphan could save himself from political upheavals by his violent personality.

It is dangerous to assert indiscriminately the myth of victimhood during the Cultural Revolution. This is similar to the myth that "everyone in Japan was a victim

of the Asia-Pacific War," as claimed by the lawyers who defended the state in court on January 21 2004. I argue that, in the transnational social space occupied by the Mainland Chinese emigrants, the Cultural Revolution can be used as a peculiar currency to redefine the identity of one's past. I do not intend to deny the fact that many people lost their lives or their loved ones during the Cultural Revolution. However, it is important to note that the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution can be used as a tool by individuals or groups for a wide range of purposes. Through suffering from severe economic shortages, political pressures, low education, and low social status like other rural Chinese, according to several *zanryū-fujin*, Japanese women could work in their production units as clerks and thus enjoyed better social status in Maoist China than native Chinese wives who were mostly illiterate. It was also common that the Chinese husbands of *zanryū-fujin* were proud of their Japanese wives, who were good at keeping their houses clean and organized.

Post-Mao countryside as emigrant-sending society

The estimated global peasant population is 2.3 billion. China, as a migrant-sending society, has 0.9 billion peasants, constituting 40 percent of the total global peasant population (Sun 1996). China's economic reform has produced enormous ideological and social changes in the deep-rooted mindset of the Chinese peasantry. Traditionally, it used to be unthinkable for peasants to leave their land and village. However, peasants now swarm to the cities and are prepared to accept tremendous hardship and insults in the process. Over 100 million rural transients, classified as a "floating population" of peasant workers have moved to the cities to look for opportunities, even though they lack the permits to access jobs, housing, education, and medical services (Chan 1996: 140; Zhang 2001: 179). This radical transformation of Chinese peasants should not be considered merely on a domestic scale within China, as it has produced prominent effects beyond the national boundary. In rural Heilongjiang the overwhelming surplus of agricultural labor has been further aggravated by the prohibition of logging and redundancy from state enterprises. These factors have made it increasingly difficult for peasant migrants to compete for work in China's cities. One way to escape these conditions is to go overseas by whatever means possible. My informants in rural areas expressed their dream of going abroad and admired the "courageous" Fujian illegal migrants who have succeeded in breaking through various immigration systems – even though they knew about the 58 Fujianese who suffocated while being smuggled in a lorry container into Dover in June 2000.

Migrating to economically advanced areas gives access to wealth and grants rural people tremendous symbolic capital with which to negotiate power in the social context of post-Mao China. The word "peasant" carries potent negative suggestions of being "ignorant," "backward," "uncivilized," and "dirty". My informants in Tokyo would be easily offended if called "peasants" and would use the word as an effective insult to attack others. The stigmatization of peasants is not only due to the state's urban-hegemonic policies but is also embedded within the Chinese intellectual world, where cultural and scientific research on genetics serves to

promote the notion of peasants as genetically retarded (Dikötter 1998: 142–144). History had left China with a significant rural-urban hierarchical structure, and when it opened to global capitalism in the post-reform era social-spatial hierarchies were reinforced and reordered through the impact of mass media and the stimulation of people's imagination by international travel (Liu 1997: 92–94). The new social-spatial hierarchies construct new inequalities and rearrange the meanings of space, and this explosion of spatial images in post-reform China has done a great deal to reinforce rural people's everyday imaginations concerning space and power (Liu 1997: 95, 109). While the discourse of modernity and progress is a by-product of the economic reform, the countryside is meanwhile robbed both materially and ideologically and turned into a wasteland of moribund tradition (Yan 2003: 587). Constructing a meaningful identity of modernism, rural youth are urged to see the world through whatever means will allow them to achieve a modern personhood; they would otherwise rather commit suicide as a symbolic act (Yan 2003: 578–579).

Since 1989 many Chinese have entered Japan on language student visas, or *shugakusei* in Japanese (Morita and Sassen 1994: 161). The government believed that the influx of foreign students might solve the labor shortage caused by the bubble economy without the offer of immigrant status, as student visa regulations allowed the bearers to work four hours a day. Former Prime Minister Nakasone thus supported a plan to import 100,000 students within a short period, mostly from China (Yamanaka 1993: 81). By the early 1990s China's economic reform had not yet produced enough people who could afford to study overseas, and instead large numbers of surplus laborers sought the opportunity to earn "slave wages." As the *shugakusei* category of student did not require prerequisite educational qualifications, many thus borrowed money to pay language school fees for trying their luck in Japan with no interest in learning Japanese but were eager to find 3K jobs as soon as they landed; others tried to attend classes to maintain their documented status only when their working schedule was suitable. During Japan's long economic downturn, these overstaying *shugakusei* have faced serious difficulties, and there has been an alleged growth of Chinese illegal activity.

New overseas Chinese

The imperial law had formerly prescribed the death penalty for anyone caught going abroad (Wang 1992). Motivated by tapping wealthy resources, the late Qing government started to include Chinese abroad in its nationality law as *huaqiao*, as did the KMT regime and then the PRC, all of whom have considered that anyone born of a Chinese father and mother was a Chinese national, regardless of place of birth or place of residence (Fitzgerald 1972: 6). The term *huaqiao* ambiguously includes Chinese sojourners settled in foreign countries for an unknown period who plan to return to their mother country, but this does not accord with the situation in real life, as many Chinese emigrants have extended their stays abroad indefinitely and have produced generations of offspring with no intention to "return" to the "mother country" (Wang 1996: 1–2). This politically loaded term thus embodies the

concept of a kinship state and is intended to attach emigrants to their hometowns, or *qiaoxiang* in Chinese.

It has been observed that remittances and patriotic funds contributed by *huaqiao* communities were partially sufficient to offset China's balance of payments deficits in the first half of the twentieth century (Mackie 1993: xxxi). In the same year that the CCP took power in China, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was established to enforce a policy to "facilitate overseas Chinese remittances, serve the overseas Chinese compatriots" (Fitzgerald 1972: 54–57). All relatives and dependants of *huaqiao* as well as repatriates were thereby privileged classes created in the context of *qiaoxiang*. After the chaotic interruption of the Cultural Revolution, China followed the global trend of citizenship law and adopted the principle of *jus soli* in its new citizenship law of 1980, affirming that overseas Chinese with foreign citizenship would no longer be considered as *huaqiao* or non-resident Chinese nationals. However, in practice the Beijing government has tended to replace the term *huaqiao* with the politically correct term *huaren*, to refer to ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality only at the diplomatic level while permitting provincial and local authorities to revive traditional *huaqiao* policies as cultural practices (Huang and Godley 1999: 317) by upholding ethnic blood relations with overseas Chinese, thereby rehabilitating the important auxiliary forces of *huaqiao* and *qiaoxiang* in a utilitarian strategy to facilitate economic reform (Godley 1989: 335).

The new wave of Chinese emigrants or *xin-huaqiao*, characterized by those who emigrated from post-Mao China, marks a great change from the old Chinese migration phenomena, in which typically southern Chinese went to Southeast Asian countries to enter the unskilled labor force. It is even sketched as a proud and higher-status population by a new *huaqiao* scholar (Liao: 2004) in his study of the *xin-huaqiao* community in Japan, composed of investors with large capital, and of highly educated professionals who participate in high-tech industries, who have actively built up a sense of worldwide Chinese nationalism. This study seems to omit the existence of other types of Chinese migrants in Japan. Among the *xin-huaqiao* community there are Chinese brides marrying into rural Japanese families, so-called students who do not attend Japanese language classes, and the obtrusive Chinese illegal migrants. Such a focus on successful elites and skilled legal migrants can be seen as a conscious reaction of how Chinese scholars dealing with Japanese media depictions of "Chinese criminality" and an acute sensitivity to the historical Sino-Japanese conflicts (Efird 2004: 157).

A *xin-huaqiao* town can be found in Ōkubo, next to Shinjuku. It was previously a "Korean town" but recently it has been occupied by lots of Chinese-operated shops. In 2004 I looked at to cyber bars there. There were many, each was equipped with 300 to 400 computers, open 24 hours with no holidays, always full. The atmosphere was very much similar to the cyber bars I used in rural Heilongjiang. Apparently many of these cyber bar users were *xin-huaqiao* from rural Northeast. I overheard their loud online conferences with their Chinese associates via webcam, and often heard them bargaining for better quality lovers, making small business deals, and showing off their connections with *Dongbei* gangs, Fujian gangs, and Shanghai

gangs in Japan. Several cyber bar users told me that their families were not related to *zanryū-hōjin* but their routes coming to Japan were somehow related to *zanryū-hōjin*. Some gained visas through agents operated by *zanryū-hōjin* relatives; some had direct and indirect deals with *zanryū-hōjin*. To illustrate the diversified types of *xin-huaqiao* in Japan,[7] we shall look at both the traditional and the new types of *qiaoxiang* in the following sections.

Qiaoxiang developments

Hometowns of overseas Chinese or *qiaoxiang* traditionally developed in southern coastal areas. The status of *qiaoxiang* has been sought after under Chinese modernization policies from the late Qing monarchy reformers, to the republicans of the nationalist government, and the functionaries of the pre-Cultural Revolution (Fitzgerald 1972), as well as by post-Mao communist regimes. Its important position in China's modernization is due to the contributions made by overseas Chinese to their home villages in China.

In the traditional *qiaoxiang* of southern China, collective memories and nostalgic sentiments in relation to ancestral homes continue to exert a powerful hold on first-generation emigrants, whose offspring's curiosity to search for ancestral roots is thus aroused. Connections between rural *qiaoxiang* people and more sophisticated Chinese diasporas are bound up in the negotiation and reinvention of a Chinese cultural identity. Overseas Chinese have the leverages of remittance, investment, and charity activities to shape cultural forms and festival rituals as they wish in their *qiaoxiang*. On the other hand, the leverage of *qiaoxiang* people is also strong through providing the ancestral sources of lineage structure, which is often complicated with branch systems extending over generations throughout the world. Such lineage structure provides a source of fellow-feeling among overseas Chinese with related kin around the globe and enhances the worldwide network of Chinese diasporas. *Qiaoxiang* thus serve to strengthen links within Chinese diasporas through Confucian filial piety, which brings far-flung lineage members to participate in the development of home villages. The *qiaoxiang* people can also conceptualize the transferability of merits, in the mixture of Taoist and Buddhist religion, from one person to his/her whole family and offspring through charity carried out in the names of the dead. They often convince overseas Chinese to believe that good karma can arise from donations and displaying donors' names on schools, clinics, and temples (Kuah 2000). The overall negotiation process involved requires the creation of a "cultural economy," with obligations of remittance, charity and investment, referred to as "Confucian entrepreneurship" or "Chinese capitalism" in the contemporary discourse of economically successful Chinese diasporas (e.g. Berger 1996; Dirlik 1996; Nonini and Ong 1997).

Many *zanryū-hōjin* residing in urban Japan have retained close ties with their hometowns in rural China. They have actively facilitated the building of new *qiaoxiang* in the inland Northeast, which formerly had disadvantages in developing overseas emigration. I shall illustrate this phenomenon with the case of Ranshao, a fictious name of a county in Heilongjiang.

Suffering from poverty due to lack of economic development, nonetheless in 2003 Ranshao enjoyed the highest total personal savings – RMB1.7 billion – in Heilongjiang. The county has a total population of 220,000 people and, according to Kang, an official at the local foreign affairs bureau, as many as 35,000 of these live in Japan permanently (this figure does not include those who live in Japan on temporary visas or who have overstayed their visas). These emigrants have become a class of *xin-huaqiao* and their number snowballed from the original repatriation of *zanryū-hōjin*. At the end of WWII many *kaitakudan* women and children trying to make their difficult and dangerous way to the railway station in Harbin were kept in livestock huts in Ranshao by the Soviets; they later became Ranshao residents through marriage and adoption. Since the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in the 1970s, Ranshao has repatriated some 500 *zanryū-hōjin* from different families, and many of these have taken their large extended Chinese families with them to Japan.

Kang, an outspoken local official, dared to tell me of many sensitive issues but could not provide me with accurate figures. He explained that the county government office had moved several times and had failed to keep records. The most reliable figure he could provide was that he had repatriated a total of 500 *zanryū-hōjin* families to Japan since starting the job.A local TV program reported that Ranshao has 40,000 people living in Japan permanently and a large number of people living in Japan temporarily. Kang revealed that the larger figure provided by the local TV had been deliberately exaggerated to attract investment. The county government was negotiating a business project. As the county has no railways and lacks other basic infrastructure, the primary leverage with which it could bargain for good terms was its large number of *xin-huaqiao* living in Japan. The county was expecting a high tide of sojourners to come back with a lot of money in the coming years. This forecast enabled the county government to get the state funds to build necessary facilities such as houses, gardens, hospitals, and transport facilities, to cater for this expected influx. Such development could attract further business investment.

In casual conversations with people I met in Ranshao's county town, people proudly made such assertions as "Almost every family has at least one kin member living in Japan!" and "We have the highest savings per person in China!" A taxi driver and a teacher both told me that they came back from Japan because they were deported for overstaying. A waiter had wished to enter Japan but the cost of a visa had sharply increased. A Japanese language school had no teachers, yet engaged in the business of sending people to Japan by whatever channels. The schoolmaster proudly said that he could produce the documents required by Japanese immigration and had already found several Japanese husbands for his customers through his *zanryū-hōjin* friend. I saw my informants in Ranshao show great sympathy towards a TV journalist whose family had only one distant relative in Japan, which in their eyes meant that she came from an underprivileged family.

Local TV also helped to promote the self-image as a *qiaoxiang* town in Ranshao. Every *xin-huaqiao* in Japan visiting relatives in Ranshao was invited on this show. I saw one program in which, as was typical, the program host introduced the invited *huaqiao* VIPs to the audience with grandiose statements about their success in

Japan. Almost all invited *huaqiao* VIPs tend to talk about their "success" in Japan, while expressing their cultural attachment to their hometown. Both audiences and VIPs are satisfied with this kind of sensational talk of being "a success in Japan" and of "contributions to one's hometown".

From the mid 1990s, Ranshao authorities tried to establish official relations with Japan's local authorities to diversify emigration categories. But its official relationship with Yamagata Prefecture was damaged by an incident involving several Ranshao brides, who abandoned their Japanese husbands and ran away to cities for wage jobs, after having obtained permanent residence. Unable to offer attractive exchange programs to Japanese rural authorities, in 1996, with considerable effort, Ranshao established an agricultural training program in Yamagata, which agreed to teach the technique of growing watermelon seeds to two trainees from Ranshao under a six-month contract, with an allowance of ¥70,000 per person per month. To make this contract, the Ranshao government had to fight hard for autonomy from the provincial and central governments, because the higher levels of officials also wanted to send their people to Japan. At the end of the course, however, one person did not return home but ran away to Tokyo for a 3K job. This was reported as headline news in the Yamagata media and provoked the Japanese police. The Ranshao government officially punished this lawbreaker by announcing the termination of his employment with the seed company. In fact this lawbreaker received much harsher punishment in Ranshao, when he came home with only RMB70,000 earnings, and was accused by hometown people of closing future routes to training programs in Japan.

Unable to cement official relations, the Ranshao government set up a desk of civilian consultancy, providing Ranshao people with information about emigration and to assist them with private matters related to emigration. In the state of Japan, there are only three types of denizenship: 1) refugees; 2) skilled personnel; and 3) people who possess kinship ties with Japanese nationals. For Ranshao people, the only means to emigrate to Japan is via the third category. When I was with Kang, his mobile phone rang constantly with inquiries from local citizens. His telephone conversations overwhelmingly concerned matters to do with Sino-Japanese couple matching. One of his official responsibilities is to write and translate love letters between Ranshao and Japan. To facilitate marriage deals, Kang often attended the first meetings between the prospective Japanese husbands and their Ranshao wives-to-be. Ranshao women often bluntly ask Japanese men "How much do you earn?" Kang would interpret it as a sweet greeting to the Japanese man and then make the Japanese man more attractive by overstating his income. To protect Ranshao's reputation, Kang often warned Japanese men to choose mature women since they tend to be stable and loyal. Most prospective brides over 30 in Ranshao appeared to be divorcees with children from previous marriages, and they tended not to mention their children until they obtained permanent residency, which required three years of actual married life. In the end many of the children of Ranshao women's previous marriages have been taken to Japan.

Organizing the Chinese foster parents of *zanryū-koji* to visit Japan together is another official way of tapping into the financial resources of the Japanese

government and of *zanryū-hōjin* supporters in Japan (*Japan Economic Newswire* September 18 2001; *Yomiuri Shimbun* November 20 2002). According to the Association for Thanking Chinese Foster Parents established by *zanryū-koji* activists and Japanese volunteers, the terms and regulations of Japanese governmental assistance to foster parents have been amended several times but are hardly satisfactory (Oda 2000: 355–377). Kang said that donations obtained from the foster parent tours have been limited and are hardly enough to establish a collective facility to support aged foster parents. Moreover, Ranshao leaders have faced competition from other foster parent groups organized by other Chinese local authorities and other Japanese volunteer groups. For instance, Tsuru-no-kai raised funds from governmental agencies and donations from the private sector and built a retirement resort facility for foster parents of Japanese orphans in Changchun, which opened in 1996. However, few aged foster parents were willing to move from their villages and few could afford the heating bills and maintenance expenses (Oda 2000: 362; *Yomiuri Shimbun* November 20 2002).

Summary

I have sketched a broad picture of *zanryū-hōjin* lives within the social changes in rural Northeast China and have illuminated several contested issues. Given the above changes in the *zanryū-hōjin*'s hometowns, it is easy to understand why many *zanryū-hōjin* activists cannot stand the popular TV drama titled *Child of the Vast Land.* Their resentment comes from their life experiences – their personhoods have been fundamentally constructed upon the social and meaning systems of rural Northeast. It is unrealistic that a *zanryū-hōjin* individual would make the kind of idealistic decision that the protagonist does – he refuses to repatriate to Japan for family reunion but leaves his family to make "contributions to humanity" by going to the remote and underdeveloped Inner Mongolia alone. This humane and heroic decision can move many Japanese audiences to tears. However, my informants say that the best way to thank China is to return to China as a Japanese national or a resourceful *huaqiao* with affluent wealth. To do so, one must go to Japan first. In the eyes of Nakayama, whose life course is narrated above, the protagonist is not a hero but a heartless father who gives up his daughter's opportunity to have a future in Japan. The mindsets of *zanryū-hōjin* have been built upon Maoist countryside and their worldviews have been nurtured in post-Mao countryside – the site produced the desire to emigrate.

4 Repatriation since 1972

US President Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972 came as a shock to Japan and wrecked the foundation of its postwar foreign policy towards China; thus, its "two Chinas" policy was given up when Prime Minister Tanaka visited Beijing in the same year and normalized Sino-Japanese relations (Hsiao 1974: 102, 108). Subsequently, the enormously complicated job of repatriating *zanryū-hōjin* was again taken up. The laws and policies that had hindered *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation started to change, and it became necessary to deal with emerging complaints and disputes originating from them and from their Japanese relatives, volunteers, and lawyers. This dynamic process of repatriation requires a detailed explanation, as the existing research on *zanryū-hōjin* deals with insufficient and unspecified features of the post-1972 repatriation process. This essentially ethnographic and inductive chapter draws on the following sources for this purpose: legal references and records concerning the repatriation processes,[1] newsletters and pamphlets distributed by *zanryū-hōjin* related organizations, together with relevant knowledge learnt from my *huaqiao* family experience.

State policies

The development of the state policies on repatriation in the period after 1972 was summarized Shirasaki, one of my informants, who worked in the information centre of *zanryū-hōjin*-related NGOs: with no experience of addressing the needs of individuals, policy makers have learned to make reasonable adjustments to replace the former unworkable policies. Some short-lived policies did exist and were altered by individuals who won lawsuits against them. The major changes have been paralleled by amendments to the Immigration Law to cope with the demands of foreign laborers together with the consequences of illegal migration, as well as by amendments of the Family Law that have aimed to address social changes.

Temporary visits

Repatriation programs had not yet been officially reactivated when Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations were normalized in 1972. From 1973 to 1991 the *Kōseishō* allowed unreturned Japanese to visit Japan on a temporary basis with state financial

support if they could get agreement from their kin in Japan (Wu 2004: 78; Ward 2006b). Few *zanryū-koji* could enjoy this short visit offer as most of them had not retained contacts with their biological families in Japan, and therefore the major participants were *zanryū-fujin* who wished to find their kin in Japan to help them proceed with their repatriation to Japan for good. From 1991 the *Kōseishō* reduced the fund for the temporary visit program, assisting each unreturned Japanese to visit to Japan once every ten years (Ogawa 1995: 14–16). This policy was revised in 1993, allowing every unreturned Japanese to visit Japan every five years, and then in 1995 it was amended again, to fund each visitor annually (Ward 2006b). These changes were made because of a strike on September 5 1993, when 12 *zanryū-fujin* held a hunger strike at Narita Airport after their visits to Japan. They had never changed nationality in China, and pleased on their banner: "Prime Minister Hosokawa, please let us die in our mother country! We would not live another ten years to visit Japan again!" These women's repatriation had been blocked by official procedures that required kin sponsorship, which they saw as unreasonable, as they had lost contact with their Japanese relatives. The Japanese government responded to this demonstration by calling it an action of "coercive repatriation," while volunteers and lawyers were actively helping the women to repatriate. By April 1995 these women had all managed to settle in Japan with their families (Ogawa 1995: 14–16). Although each *zanryū-hōjin* was allowed to visit Japan once a year, in 1996 the amount of state assistance for travelling and temporary stay expenses were reduced.

Kin-searching tours

Since 1981, the *Kōseishō* has arranged regular tours for orphans to find their kin in Japan. During the period from 1981 to 1997 the size of these tours varied from 20 to 200 members. The number of tour members has significantly declined in the 2000s, since most orphans still alive have already repatriated (refer to Table II in Appendixes for the record of kin-searching tours). During these tours, each tour member is assigned an identity number. Tour members are counted and checked intensively by the *Kōseishō* officials when accessing airports, hotels, and even toilets. Two weeks of activities aimed at finding the kin of *zanryū-hōjin* in Tokyo and Osaka are managed by the *Kōseishō*, but rely heavily on volunteer labor and financial resources. Profiles of tour members are prepared during the tour period. Volunteer interpreters summarize each orphan's self-introduction briefly before releasing it to the major Japanese newspapers with attached photographs. Each orphan's self-introduction is also videotaped by volunteers to broadcast on NHK television programs. Such public announcements are the key means of calling for kin to come to meet their potential long-lost family members from China.[2] Some informants state that important data is sometimes omitted as a result of unprofessional interpretation and summarization by volunteers, causing confusion in finding kin, although at other times the volunteers are very efficient.

An illiterate peasant woman named Li Guizi took part in the kin-searching tour of 1991 along with 51 other tour members. She was discovered by a journalist that

had already found her sister on a previous trip. She admitted that she got on board inappropriately because she was under pressure to bring gifts to her local cadres, and she was attracted to the ¥200,000 cash officially given to each tour member. Moreover, many of my informants received different amounts from the kin-search tours. Some received gift packs of money from volunteers, instead of officially from the *Kōseishō*. Meetings with kin often generate sentimental and tearful scenes, and these events have been used to attract many journalists and volunteers. After two decades, organizers of the kin-finding events face a lack of volunteer support, because repatriates from North Korea have taken volunteers' attention away. Some *zanryū-hōjin* were pressured to volunteer for the recent kin-searching event, because they were asked to donate cash for the event. In general the accommodation, food, and gifts provided for recent tour members were of poorer quality than the *zanryū-koji* had enjoyed before.

Kin responsibilities

In 1975 the Ministry of Justice proclaimed that *zanryū-hōjin* entering Japan were to be processed according to the same immigration regulations as foreigners or refugees (Kinoshita 2003: 13). The existence of a qualified Japanese guarantor willing to sponsor a *zanryū-hōjin* family to reside in Japan was a key requirement for application. Nakajima (1990: 172) states in her journalistic investigation that, according to Japanese law before the 1989 reform, every *zanryū-fujin* or *zanryū-koji* applicant had to submit the documents below to repatriate.

- A statement of application to visit Japan with convincing reasons (applicants usually emphasize their Japanese ethnic origin and their longing for their mother country).
- A statement of application for travel at state expense.
- A letter from a kin member in Japan stating reasons for state assistance for travel expenses.
- A certificate of household registration with two forms of documentation – *koseki shōhon* and *koseki tōhon* – in which the name of the applicant must be included.
- An invitation letter from kin in Japan stating his/her responsibility for the applicant's life in Japan.
- A statement of sponsorship (if the kinsperson cannot present records showing him/her to be socially and financially sound, and thus a qualified guarantor, the kinsperson can ask another Japanese citizen who is qualified to be a guarantor and who is willing to take the responsibility).
- An employment letter issued by the sponsor's employer.
- Documents to prove the sponsor's financial standing and social reputation.

These officially required documents transfer the state's responsibility to civilian families. The immediate consequence of this has been manifested in tensions between *zanryū-hōjin* and their kin in Japan. Many families have refused to sponsor

their relatives from China because of the heavy responsibilities of looking after the settlement of a large family in Japan. The aim of state support for travel expenses was to assist those relatives in Japan who had financial difficulties. However, if a relative in Japan could prove such financial difficulty, he/she was simultaneously proving his/her inability to take responsibility for the settlement of the *zanryū-hōjin* family. The relative would then have to find a socially and financially sound third party as a sponsor. One informant told me that her relative in Japan first obtained agreement from a local politician, but that later the local politician withdrew his agreement, since he was required to present all kinds of personal and financial documents which caused problems concerning privacy and confidentiality. A number of *zanryū-koji* informants stated that their Japanese kin went to see them at kin-searching meetings out of emotional curiosity but then, due to the heavy responsibilities involved, pretended they did not recognize them. Kin responsibility, as the state emphasized in its repatriation schemes, contributed to the tragic experience concerning Fumiko's family, narrated in the section on the Yamadas in Chapter 5.

Settlement Facilitation Centers

In February 1984 the *Kōseishō* established the Settlement Facilitation Centre for the Repatriates from China (SFC) at Tokorozawa in Saitama Prefecture. Ten other SFCs were later established in different prefectures. Due to the sharp decline in numbers of repatriates from China during recent years, eight of these SFCs have now been closed down, leaving only those in Saitama and Osaka, which have extended their services to include repatriates from Sakhalin. The largest SFC is at Tokorozawa in Saitama, and accommodates about 30 families every four months – that is, 90 families a year, or 1,800 families in 20 years.[3] The SFC provides four months of live-in training for repatriates from rural China. The curriculum includes basic Japanese language and customs as well as an introduction to modern household equipment and urban facilities. The "graduated" repatriates are encouraged to learn more about Japanese lifestyles at the Independence Training Centers (ITC) established by the *Kōseishō* in cooperation with the municipal governments in many prefectures. The number of ITCs was expanded to 20 centers across the nation in 1995 but then reduced to 12 in 2002.[4]

The SFCs only accommodate those who repatriate at state expense, who are mostly *zanryū-koji*, as many *zanryū-fujin* had returned earlier at their own expense, and the state financial assistance only covers *zanryū-koji* and some *zanryū-fujin* themselves and their spouses, together with their dependants and unmarried children. Every *zanryū-koji* or *zanryū-fujin* can choose one married child's stem family to repatriate at state expense, on condition that this child agrees to take full responsibility for looking after his/her parents in Japan. Apart from travel expenses, a cash lump sum to facilitate an independent life is provided to each repatriate family when they "graduate" from the SFC. The amounts vary according to the number of family members. In 2002, a repatriate family of two adults and two children was provided with ¥566,200, plus ¥28,000 for each additional dependent child or

grandchild.[5] However, many potential repatriates have not wanted to wait for years for state-aided repatriation and have repatriated at their own expense. Such persons do not enjoy the services and privileges offered by the state. After spending an enormous amount of money for legal procedures and resettlement, they have then had to pay further legal fees to gain permanent residency or Japanese nationality. In comparison, those repatriated at state expense receive the support of SFC teachers, who help them to apply for housing and welfare and teach them to adopt Japanese-sounding names to enhance their "Japaneseness" and thereby avoid discriminatory attitudes in Japanese society (Yokoyama 2000: 150). A son of *zanryū-koji* told me that what he learnt from the SFC at Tokorozawa in 1985 was, to him, patronizingly simple. He felt insulted at being taught how to recognize traffic lights, how to make phone calls, how to post letters, and so forth. He admitted, however, that his peasant parents appreciated the SFC training.

Restoration of family registry

Koseki refers to household registry or census registry, the function of which is to identify those who are Japanese nationals. Since the enforcement of the Koseki Act in 1871 during the Meiji period, the traditional family system has been given legal status to incorporate the values of loyalty, obedience and piety, as well as to define the relationship between the individual and the state. In this centralized system, a private unit (the household) has become a unit of a public institution, as military conscription and mobilization have been imposed according to the *koseki*. This institution supports the notion of "blood" as the critical factor for belonging to the nation, which is symbolized by the Emperor (Wagatsuma 1998: 12–14). Japan's family institution is conceived of as an entity that mediates between individuals and the nation, and the Japanese citizenship law is to attach the individual to the nation through the household registry (Kaji 2002).

Repatriates who wish to hold Japanese passports have to restore their status in the family register, as this is a necessary legal step towards becoming a Japanese national. Many *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* were removed from their family registers in 1959, as they were deemed to have died in the war in Manchuria, but the Ministry of Justice began to reform regulations in 1984 to enable the repatriates to reactivate their legal identity in the Family Court through the principle of patrilineal kinship. Therefore, children born of *zanryū-fujin* or female *zanryū-koji* mothers and Chinese fathers were unable to inherit Japanese nationality from their family registry before the 1984 law reform and could only obtain Japanese nationality through the complicated process of naturalization. The law reform of 1984 adopted the principle of bilineality, which benefited children of *zanryū-fujin* and female *zanryū-koji* mothers born between January 1 1960 and December 31 1979, by allowing them to inherit Japanese nationality from their mothers.[6] This regulation was still discriminatory, as it aimed to exclude those children of *zanryū-fujin* who were born before 1960 – which meant most of them, as their mothers did not marry until the late 1940s. This regulation was ineffectively enforced and eventually abolished after several lawsuits were brought by children of *zanryū-fujin*.[7]

Restoring the repatriated orphans' legal identities in family registers often involves presenting the results of a blood test to prove kinship at the Family Court. Kinship confirmation by blood test is not an official requirement. It is based on the wish of two parties, the orphans and their potential kin. However, in many cases, families cannot present any kind of admissible evidence to prove kinship with their long-lost orphans other than this blood test. The cost of a blood test is between ¥120,000 and ¥200,000. The orphans are often poor and usually rely on their Japanese kin to pay for it. According to the choice of the relatives, either a DNA or an ABO test has been widely used. Several orphans have committed suicide or attempted to do so after being suspected of being "fake orphans" because of the results of the blood tests.[8]

The case of Sumie Ikeda,[9] a leader in *zanryū-hōjin* activism, provides an example of a problematic blood test result and its consequences. Sumie Ikeda's Chinese name was Xu Ming. She found her biological father in 1981 and came to Japan with her children on a one-off visiting permit. To stay in Japan permanently she had to restore her legal status in the family registry and thus regain her Japanese nationality. She was requested to present a blood test result, but it gave no evidence of kinship to her father. Soon the family court issued a decree to deport her, based on the judgment that if she was not her Japanese father's biological daughter, then she was not Japanese and therefore had no right to reside in Japan. Helped by volunteers and lawyers, she won her Japanese nationality in court after a difficult period by presenting other evidence of her Japaneseness. As she was denied her original name, Sumie Ikeda, she adopted the Japanese name Akiko Imamura, given her by her supporters. In 1996, she met her biological sister when she was volunteering for kin-searching activity. The two sisters tried another blood test and the result proved her kinship to her biological family, the Ikedas. She could then finally restore her legal identity in the Ikeda's family registry as Sumie Ikeda.

Unidentified orphans

In 1994 the Japanese government passed a bill in the Diet to facilitate more efficient repatriation programs for *zanryū-koji*. This included repatriating unidentified orphans at state expense. The unidentified orphans in question had been identified as Japanese in China but had failed to be recognized by their kin in Japan for various reasons and thus had failed to find guarantors to sponsor their repatriation. Interestingly, the law reform of 1994 did not change the deep-rooted Japanese system of sponsorship but adopted a strategy of hired sponsorship. Most of the hired guarantors were relatives or friends of the *Kōseishō* staff. Each hired guarantor received ¥50,000 from the government for the entire sponsorship period of six months. A guarantor could sponsor only one repatriate family at a time, or two *zanryū-koji* families in one year. The spirit of the new policy again shows that the Japanese government still leaves partial responsibility for repatriating *zanryū-hōjin* to civilians. Many unidentified orphan families adopt their guarantors' surnames, and settle in the public housing located near their guarantors' homes. Although these unidentified orphans' settlement in Japan had been delayed due to inability to find

kin, they asserted that they generally experienced smoother settlement than those who had Japanese kin to rely on. Once an orphan found his/her kin in Japan, the state immediately handed over all responsibility to the relative. This put both sides in difficult positions. Some even felt that they were being blackmailed.

Recent situation and implications of figures

Since 2000 the Japanese government has begun to recognize the eligibility of more *zanryū-koji* to settle in Japan permanently, based on factors other than kinship, since their potential relatives in Japan have either died or are too old to provide evidence. According to this policy, a Japanese orphan can be identified first by the Chinese authorities and second by Japanese officials stationed in China, who can make a judgment about an orphan's Japaneseness through face-to-face interviews.[10] Policy makers have begun to understand that Japanese families resent the responsibility of looking after *zanryū-koji* and *zanryū-fujin* relatives who are effectively strangers to them. The *Kōseishō* announcement of kin-searching tours in *Asahi Shimbun* (October 28 2002) clarified the new policy: The expenses of repatriation and settlement were to be shouldered by the state, in order to allow kin members to feel free to recognize their potential long-lost relatives. There are 1,520 orphans in China currently under investigation for possible Japaneseness.[11] Most of these people discovered their Japanese backgrounds late because they had only recently been informed by their adoptive parents, shortly before the latter's deaths.[12]

Repatriation at state expense has only been offered to: 1) *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* and their unmarried children under age 20; and 2) to one married child's stem family, who would shoulder the living costs of his/her parents in Japan. Up until 1994, every *zanryū-fujin* or *zanryū-koji* over 65 could repatriate with a child's nuclear family at state expense; the age requirement was changed to 60 in 1995 and 55 in 1996.[13] By October 31 2005, the total number of *zanryū-hōjin* repatriated at state expense was 6,300 households, of whom 3,808 were *zanryū-fujin* households and 2,496 were *zanryū-koji* households, and of which, in turn, 1,411 were households of unidentified orphans. These 6,300 households brought 20,164 family members to Japan at state expense.[14] Neither the official figures nor academic research indicate the numbers of *zanryū-hōjin* who have repatriated at their own expense, nor do we have a reliable number for family members brought to Japan at their own expense. The total population of the *zanryū-hōjin* community, including those repatriated at their own expense and their "called over" family members, is estimated at not less than 100,000. The plausibility of this figure is supposed in the official survey carried out in 2003 by the *Kōseishō* – one *zanryū-fujin* or *zanryū-koji* brings an average of 10.7 family members to Japan.[15] In my fieldwork data, the smallest number of family members brought to Japan was 11, within the household of a *zanryū-hōjin* named Nakajima; the largest number was brought by Sawako Yamada, who repatriated at state expense in 1988 with only three family members, although the rest of her 25 family members gradually migrated to Japan in later years.

The difficulty of obtaining official figures reflects the complicated procedures involved in repatriation and settlement. Applicants tend to use any available means

to enter Japan initially and stay for a certain period until other means become available for them to extend their stays. Many family members of *zanryū-hōjin* have obtained residency since the 1989 reform of Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition. This reform resulted from Japan's shortage of unskilled labor during its "bubble economy" period. It was based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, referring to parental nationality, which implied that Japan would allow labor migration for those of Japanese blood descent. Thus the *zanryū-hōjin* offspring, as well as the *nikkeijin*, whose ancestors emigrated to Latin America a century ago, were considered desirable unskilled labor for the Japanese economy (Morita and Sassen 1994: 153; Sellek 1997: 178–210; Spencer 1992: 762). The admission of *nikkeijin* was a means of killing two birds with one stone, since it was considered by conservative politicians to maintain racial purity while responding to the labor shortage (Yamanaka 1996: 76–77). This argument applies to the *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation as well.

After the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, it took nine years to start the *zanryū-koji* repatriation programs officially. The historical work on the post-1972 repatriation presented by Narangoa (2003) seems based on the official records, such as *Engo 50 Nenshi*, and seems to present the perspective of the Japanese state. This tends to simplify structural obstacles and explains this critical nine years as the result of the difficulties caused by China's Maoist politics (Narangoa 2003: 151–154). However, people who had overseas relations were allowed to leave China right after Nixon's and Tanaka's visits. Under China's newly established open-door policy, my own father's application for family reunion in Indonesia was approved in 1972 even though China had no diplomatic relations with Indonesia. My father then took us to Hong Kong in 1973 because the British colony's immigration authority had admitted many *huaqiao* who had left China but were still unable to reenter anti-communist countries. In fact, between 1972 and 1981 some *zanryū-fujin* had visited Japan at their own expense. It thus seems unlikely that China had a specific political interest in retaining *zanryū-koji* in China until 1981.

Maoist policies have certainly been a convenient excuse for the Japanese authorities to divert attention from the core problem – namely the legal difficulties caused by Japan's long-established household registry system. This rigid system led to the abandonment of Japanese people in Manchuria and still impeded their return between 1972 and 1981. It was the demand for unskilled labor that forced Japan to open its door to foreign laborers in the mid 1980s and 90s, which has facilitated the waves of *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation through granting various types of long-term residency or denizenship. Moreover, according to an analysis of official figures, there were 280,436 residents registered as spouses or children of Japanese nationals as well as spouses of permanent residents at the end of 2004, and it is observed that the applications for kin-based residency among the Chinese have rapidly increased (Ishii 2005).

Nongovernmental support[16]

Social activists and *zanryū-hōjin* supporters have emphasized that the efforts made in the post-1972 repatriation programs were given great assistance by volunteers.

After the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972, families who had members left in the former Manchuria began to organize themselves into groups to lobby the Japanese government to assist them in finding their long-lost family members in China. These groups were supported by *hikiagesha* who had returned to Japan from Manchuria in the immediate postwar years, members of Sino-Japanese friendship associations, liberal politicians, lawyers, journalists, non-fiction writers, and volunteers. At the same time in China many *zanryū-fujin* and some *zanryū-koji* who still remembered their Japanese family backgrounds began to make contact with Japan. Some of those who had forgotten the Japanese language walked hours from village to village to ask *zanryū-fujin* to write Japanese letters for them, while some wrote letters in Chinese directly to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing to find their families in Japan (Hashimoto 1978). These letters were translated into Japanese and transferred to local governments in Japan according to the specific prefectures indicated.

During the 1970s Chinese local cadres responded to the investigations of unreturned Japanese conducted by Japanese visitors with political caution. Most of these visitors had themselves lived in Manchuria before 1945 and some of them were former *kaitakudan* members who had returned to Japan in the immediate postwar years. Meetings with *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* were officially arranged and conversations were monitored. Several *zanryū-koji* informants from Mudanjiang City told me that they waited outside hotels for hours to get any chance to beg Japanese visitors to help find their families in Japan. Many visitors built up emotional bonds with *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* during their early trips to China, produced sensational reports and books for the Japanese public, and enthusiastically played an important volunteer role in facilitating the *zanryū-hōjin*'s settlement in Japan.

Under the hegemonic view of Japanese history within Japan, many Japanese people view themselves as victims of the war (Figal 1996). The Japanese state has been a central target to be blamed for having failed to protect the former Manchurian-Japanese in the collective memories expressed through popular publications. Tamanoi (2003: 529–530) argues that these narratives exclusively focus on war suffering as a political act. Some of the ex-Manchurian-Japanese who returned to Japan in the early postwar period have actively supported the *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation and settlement. One of their motivations can be viewed as an attempt to form a politically strategic alliance to increase their own status as war victims (Tamanoi 2001).

A Chinese official's perspective

Kang has been responsible for *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation from 1976 to the present. The first wave of repatriation from Ranshao began in 1975, when *zanryū-fujin* were granted temporary permits to visit Japan. Most applicants used temporary visits as an indirect preparation for permanent settlement, and in this way eased the pressure on their Japanese relatives, who worried about the heavy responsibilities involved in the permanent settlement. Many temporary visitors succeeded in extending their stay in Japan and established permanent residence via other legal channels over

time. They then gradually brought their Chinese families to Japan in later years under different policies. Kang's official duty was to identify who was a *zanryū-koji* or *zanryū-fujin* and whether his/her choice was to repatriate or to stay in China. This investigation was extremely easy, as in his county Japanese wives and adopted children had not needed to hide their Japanese background since being Japanese had not brought on political problems, as it might have done elsewhere.

The regular tours for confirming orphans' Japanese kinship were operated by the *Kōseishō*, with the assistance of Chinese authorities. Each county's Public Service Bureau (PSB) first investigated potential *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* who resided, or used to reside, in its administrative territory, and then submitted their profiles to the provincial PSB. The *Kōseishō* then gathered all profiles from different provincial authorities and investigated them in Japan. Validations relied on records from family registers and on memories of *kaitakudan* members who had repatriated in the early years. The *Kōseishō* issued lists of those who had been identified as Japanese to the Chinese central government to invite them to join the next tour to Japan to confirm kinship. First the *Kōseishō* lists were passed to local authorities through provincial governments, then the county officials went to villages to distribute gifts donated by both the Chinese and Japanese governments to *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* families to thank them for enabling the survival of Japanese women and children in Chinese families.[17]

The enlisted *zanryū-koji* tour members were gathered in the county towns. During the early 1980s it took a few days to make them presentable with new clothes and baths, provided by the central government. Chinese nationalism would not allow these shabby-looking peasants lose face for China. The tour members were particularly excited about receiving soap and shampoo for free. Then all of the tour members from different provinces met each other in Beijing. They were provided with nice hotel rooms and treated to banquets and sightseeing by the Chinese authorities while the *Kōseishō* officials processed their travel documents at the Japanese Embassy. Once the tour members were handed over to the Japanese they were required to follow a series of administrative procedures in order to prevent any tour member from going missing or running away illegally in Japan.

A case study

In 1994 Mei was invited on a kin-searching tour. The next year she repatriated with her husband and younger son at state expense. Most unidentified orphans could not remember their Japanese surnames, so they were encouraged to adopt their guarantors' surnames during their training period at the SFC. However, Mei's application to adopt a Japanese surname was not approved, although other repatriates' applications were approved easily. The delay in getting a Japanese surname approval meant a delay in obtaining Japanese nationality, which further delayed her other children's immigration to Japan. The *Kōseishō* staff did not tell her family the reasons for the delay but just told them to be patient. After they were settled in a public housing unit, a meeting with a Mr Shimoda, her potential brother, was arranged. She remembered this potential brother well, as he had appeared

at the kin-searching meetings during her tour in Tokyo. She was quite sure that he was her biological brother even though he refused to recognize her. Now the potential brother requested a DNA test. After matching their blood, hair, skin, and nails, their kinship was confirmed. She believed that her brother had deliberately delayed recognizing her until so that her family would be settled at state expense. He said he did not recognize her earlier because in her profile posted in the *Asahi Shimbun* she did not provide the information that she was left at a bath parlor in Manchuria. She was surprised to find that this key information had been omitted, as she had emphasized it repeatedly to the translators provided by the *Kōseishō*-led volunteer force.

Since the *Kōseishō* staff knew that she was a to-be-identified orphan, her adoption of a Japanese name was pending recognition from her kin. Once recognized by her brother, her whole family's legal status became totally dependent on this newly met brother, who controlled and managed all procedures concerning the family registry. Mei had been reported as war dead by her family in 1959. Restoring her legal status involved complicated legal procedures, which her brother was too busy to carry out. Despite the language barrier, she and her husband visited her brother with expensive gifts, but her brother often ignored their request to restore her legal status in the family registry, instead he was eager to explain (through writing *kanji*) how their father had suffered in Siberia, how their mother and two siblings had died during the war, and how he had escaped from the extreme hardships. In Mei's view, her brother was interested in justifying himself by saying that the family tragedy had been caused by the war, not by his heartlessness. However, Mei had little patience for listening to the history of the Shimodas; instead, she was eager to restore her legal identity in the family registry in order to get the rest of her family to Japan. After becoming an identified orphan, it took her two years of dealing with her brother to obtain her Japanese family name. The delay in adopting a Japanese surname caused a delay in reunion with her family in China, which indirectly affected the family's immigrant life in many ways, and caused deterioration in her youngest son's mental health.

Repatriation vs migration

The Japaneseness of *zanryū-hōjin* can be measured based on the three-element typology built by Fukuoka (2000): lineage, culture, and nationality. The criterion of lineage is the core of their Japaneseness. Based on this primordialist logic, the position of the Japanese state in the post-1972 repatriation was to allow *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* to find their ethnic roots, settle in Japan as repatriates, and restore their citizenship as Japanese. Consequently, the state can find neither reason to exclude their extended families nor efficient ways to assimilate their Chinese family members. It is observed that a country's perception of citizenship and national identity is closely linked to its policies regulating the admission of immigrants, despite the fact that the concept employed by the country in its immigration policies often does not correspond to reality (Kritz 1987: 960–961). *Zanryū-fujin*'s identity as repatriates lies in their memories about Japan, together with certain

cultural skills carried over from the past, but the other family members are viewed as migrants. This is in contrast to many *zanryū-koji*, whose identity as repatriates lies in Japan's economic heyday in the mid 1980s, which caused a shortage of unskilled labor. They came back to Japan as part of a large number of laborers to fill up the nation's 3K job market. Their resettlement in Japan is commonly seen as repatriation, despite the fact that these women have struggled with immigration policies and adaptation to a strange society. Behind the official reason for returning to their ethnic roots is the subjective goal of transforming their rural Chinese family members, after decades of being acculturated to Chinese society through marriage and child rearing, into migrant workers in Japan for their own betterment. Shimoda ended up feeling it would have been easier if she had never found her Japanese kin, as her biological brother unintentionally delayed her children's settlement in Japan.

China's open-door policy has spread compelling images of affluent *huaqiao* that have been magnets for mainlanders caught up in "leave the country fever" (Ong 1999: 48). This development is characterized by discourses of the future, modernity, and progress in the post-Mao countryside, which foster the desire to see the outside world (Yan 2003). This urge to emigrate has produced the new *huaqiao* communities throughout the world, which are viewed as embodying Chinese globalization as a way of life (Pieke *et al.* 2004). In this context, the possession of "Japanese blood" has acquired a meaning: it has become mainly a means to evade legal restrictions against economic migrants in the eyes of rural Chinese related to *zanryū-hōjin*. Almost all informants told me that every time they visited China they were treated as VIPs or friends by people who used to look down on them when they were peasants. But these informants were all aware of the reality: if they returned to hometowns for good with insufficient money to win villagers' hearts continually over a long period, life in their hometowns would be more miserable than that in Japan. For instance, another *zanryū-koji* family, surnamed Sōma, decided to naturalize their Japanese nationality in an effort to make repatriation procedures smoother. After a year of settlement in Japan, the Sōmas found that they could not adapt to such a cold society and decided to return to their Chinese hometown. Ironically, however, they could no longer afford to live there, because the village authorities imposed various heavy taxes on foreigners. They then returned to Japan and learned to adapt to the "cold" but rather safe society.

Kinship and quarantor

The inability to prove "Japanese blood" was not the primary factor causing the failure of *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation between 1945 and 1959, as explained in Chapter 2. The logistical difficulties, further worsened by immediate postwar international politics, caused more barriers against their repatriation. Nevertheless, the post-1972 repatriation is driven by the concepts of "ethnic blood" and "kin responsibility," which dominate the Japanese state's operational and administrative policies. Initially, the emphasis was on blood kinship as in the Japanese citizenship law, leading to the supposition that kin would be expected to look after the settlement

of their relatives from China. The Japanese word *nikushin* literally refers to "flesh intimacy" or "blood-related kin". Justified by this cultural notion, the state has found it easy and convenient to pass responsibilities on to families.

Emphasis on kin responsibility can be seen as the state's primary expedient for saving on costs in the *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation. It also benefits the state in negotiating these newcomers' identities. Evolution towards becoming a nation-state commonly involves reinforcement of national identity in order to enhance state sovereignty, which depends on the negotiation of identities between the state and its peoples. Relations between the state and immigrant groups are more complex, as these groups possess different cultures and histories. The negotiation of identities with multiethnic groups within a nation is thus a necessary task to maintain state sovereignty (Kastoryano 2002: 7). Identities are dynamic, abstract, fluid and emotional, can be changed through actions and interactions according to social and political environments, and are consequently difficult to negotiate and reshape according to the state's requirements (Kastoryano 2002: 4). Various agents are required to facilitate the state's negotiation of identities with newcomers. As revealed in the case studies, guarantors and relatives as well as volunteers acted as the state's agents to reshape and develop the behaviors and identities of *zanryū-hōjin* through offering support and advice. Some guarantors were public servants and others had to meet certain qualifications required by the state.

A characteristic of models of the nation is the link to a shared ancestral origin that justifies the present national identity. This is used to reinforce state sovereignty. Symbolic kinship terms such as "motherland," "father of the nation," or "homeland" are often used in nationalist discourse to posit the abstract community of citizens as members of a metaphoric kin group (Eriksen 1993: 108). The myth of Japan's nationhood as that of a single race was established during the Meiji Period (Oguma 2002: xxvii) and this state ideology has been further developed in the Nihonjinron theories of Japaneseness. The naturalization of kinship and nation is reflected through the consensus about calling *zanryū-hōjin* settled in Japan "*kikokusha*" (or repatriates). This term has the strong implication of returning to a homeland and can thus be used as an effective tool for the state to negotiate a national identity with the settlers through expectations of the settlers' efforts to assimilate into Japanese society.

Blood test

There is a cultural belief among *zanryū-hōjin* from the rural Northeast that extracting blood is undignified and shameful. However, confirming kinship by blood test is the major step necessary for emigration and they will cooperate as required. For them, any kind of blood test is scientific and they would prefer to spend minimum money to extract blood – something they would normally shun and ridicule.

Despite the fact that a DNA test tends to be more accurate for determining a genetic relationship, the ABO blood-type test has been commonly used by Japanese relatives and *zanryū-hōjin*. Interestingly, the results of an ABO test have been accepted as validating legal documents by the Japanese family court, although

scientifically it achieves recognition of neither kin relationship nor ethnic lineage. In view of Foucauldian understandings of classification as a construction of power, even the most primitive system of classification in our social scientific discourse may produce profound consequences (Tamanoi 2000: 271–273). The historical and cultural specificity of blood classifications has thus become very powerful, with different meanings for postwar Japanese and rural Chinese.

The popular choice of the ABO blood-type test also reflects a tendency of Japanese society. It can be traced back to the prewar intellectual discourse on eugenic thought to prevent mixed-blood offspring being brought into Japan proper from its colonies, which was advocated by the Japanese Racial Hygiene Association. One of the measures was the Eugenic Protection Act, which was repealed only in 1996 (Oguma 2002: 216–226). The Japanese Racial Hygiene Association had attracted enthusiastic scholars to investigate blood type as the focus for eugenic theories, and research results had been published for general readership. This triggered blood-type mania in postwar Japanese popular culture.

The popular use of the ABO blood-type test symbolically invokes the very foundation of racial blood discourses in East Asia in the twentieth century: racial theorists attempted to root culture in nature to equate social groups with biological units (Dikötter 1997: 1–2). Such scholarship still informs recent doctoral research on *zanryū-koji* carried out by a scholar from the People's University in Beijing (Wang 2004), who positions *zanryū-koji* as a racially marginal group who deserted their kind Chinese adoptive parents to repatriate because they were called back to Japan by their racial instinct.

Citizenship law

Until the emergence of its bubble economy in the 1980s, Japan had never been considered a country that welcomed immigrants, and had explicitly kept unskilled foreign labor out. Thus, Japan had had far fewer immigration problems than other economically developed countries (Spencer 1992: 754). However, an unskilled labor shortage in the domestic economy during the 1980s put Japan's closed-labor policy under considerable pressure, and so the immigration law was amended in 1989. This "liberalization" was skilled-labor oriented, with ten additional categories. Its exclusion of unskilled laborers remained strict, specifically privileging descendants of Japanese born abroad up to the third generation, who were permitted to fill 3K jobs in Japan without restriction for up to three years (Spencer 1992: 762–763). As with many advanced economies in the West, important industries have become heavily dependent on migrant labor, and so these legal 3K workers have been allowed to reside in Japan permanently. The policy of admitting Japanese descendants is officially claimed to be for humanitarian reasons (Spencer 1992: 777). Ironically, this "humanitarian" policy brought very few *zanryū-hōjin* home in the first decade after the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972, prior to the emergence of the unskilled-labor shortage. It can be argued that the repatriation of large numbers of *zanryū-hōjin* owes a great deal to this reform of Japan's immigration law, which was carried out in order to solve Japan's problem of

the unskilled-labor shortage, as evidenced by the large numbers of migrant workers arriving in Japan after 1989.

This chapter stresses the significance of the biological conceptualization of kinship as nation in the post-1972 repatriation and thereby attempts to critically assess the *jus sanguinis* principle adopted by the Japanese citizenship law. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the world history of nation-states shows that not many states have implemented their citizenship laws on a single principle, either that of *jus sanguinis* or that of *jus soli* (citizenship by birth place). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the advocacy in the West of *jus soli* was to include individuals coming from different ancestral backgrounds into the nation based on the concept of the extension of Christianity, and thus "ethnic blood" counted for nothing in the community of the faithful (Scott 1930: 60). In the first half of the twentieth century, 17 countries in Europe still maintained *jus sanguinis* as their sole test of nationality, while citizenship laws in American countries were principally based on *jus sanguinis* but also contained provisions based on *jus soli*, while yet other states applied *jus soli* but contained provisions based on *jus sanguinis* (Scott 1930: 58–59).

Since World War II, the economically developed states have usually conferred citizenship rights on their residents based on the principle of *jus soli*. Recent research (Scalise and Honjo 2005) on the citizenship laws of 190 states finds that Japan is in a minority of developed states that does not offer dual citizenship, but many other states also have not adopted the principle of *jus soli.* The analysis indicates no correlation between development and *jus soli* conferral and suggests a trend that states are increasingly moving away from *jus soli* conferral. States under pressure from immigration are now beginning to rethink their citizenship laws in relation to socio-economic changes (Scalise and Honjo 2005). In light of this global trend to transform citizenship laws from *jus soli* back to *jus sanguinis*, the post-1972 *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation becomes a handy solution for Japan to conduct its return migration and absorb these migrants into its *koseki* system without radical legal reforms.

Summary

The process of nation-building involves the definition and regularization of the institutions that are necessary for the state to codify specific relations and roles in the family institution, similar to the institutionalization of previously kin-based societies (Borneman 1992). The post-1972 *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation program was enforced through policies that were essentially kin-based, providing a classic example of how the connection between kinship and nation is reinforced in Japan, subsequently leading the existing *zanryū-hōjin* studies into the discourses of kin relations and ethnic roots and leaving the dynamics of the construction of modern self by *zanryū-hōjin* unexplored.

Analysis of relations between states and immigrants reveals that the strength of a nation-state is related to the reappraisal of its legitimacy that it undergoes as a unified cultural and political entity that is territorially limited and consolidated as a sovereign state both inside and outside its boundaries (Kastoryano 2002: 7). This

phenomenon is accompanied by rhetoric referring to the "imagined traditions" of the public authorities who have removed the immigrants from the historical narrative of the assimilationist host nation by creating an identity reappropriation of their own within that narrative (Kastoryano 2002: 183–184). The immigration of *zanryū-hōjin*, conducted through the post-1972 repatriation schemes, fits into the aforementioned order as it links to the nation-state issues of nationalism, ethnicity, and economic class. The reappraisal of the Japanese state does not lead to any erosion of that state by the influx of immigrants or repatriates from rural China, with their unwanted behavior and resultant tensions, although there remains a mutual distrust between them and mainstream Japanese. This is because Japan's cultural and political territory is consolidated by policies based on blood relations, and its assimilationist aims are secured by its mainstream sectors, such as relatives and volunteers as well as the media, who create identities for the newcomer *zanryū-hōjin* based on their own narratives of Japan through hosting their settlement in Japan.

Part II

Families

Relationships within *zanryū-hōjin* families over a transnational space

5 Three family accounts

Kinship, as an institution of social bonds of descent and marriage between persons, has long suggested itself as a tool for the elucidation of symbolic and material power, and thus has always attracted the attention of anthropological studies. The classic anthropology tended to emphasize kinship ideology through symbolic systems and terminological structures. With the rise of alternative families and new technologies of reproduction alongside the disappearance of kin-based societies, the study of kinship cannot be confined to systems, since the domain of rules and structures has an ideological character merely indicating what people *should* do. However, kinship behavior analysis will not come to an end even if kin-based societies slip into the past, as kinship behavior is about how people *act* in accordance to their idealized kinship rules (Godelier *et al.* 1998: 1–4).

By approaching this community as a whole, including different classifications of kin relations, it can be complicated to elucidate a *zanryū-hōjin* family's history over three generations in the midst of rapid social change. Following the new wave of anthropological study of kinship behavior, it is necessary to dive into the private sphere to examine varied personal desires and family transformations within three types of households – the Yamada family, characterized as *zanryū-fujin*, the Morita family, categorized as *zanryū-koji*, and the Nakajima family, classified as the unidentified Japanese orphan. These three lengthy family narrations serve as a thick ethnography for the entire study. With these rich materials, produced from a "bottom up" angle, we can look into social relations of *zanryū-hōjin* through their changing kinship behaviours.

The Yamadas

The members of the Yamada family in the year that they emigrated to Manchuria:

FATHER: Took six daughters to Manchuria in April 1945, all of which became *zanryū-fujin.*

MOTHER: Died in Fukuoka in 1937, aged 33.

FIRST DAUGHTER: Emigrated to Manchuria and died in China; her five children and nine grandchildren repatriated with their spouses after her death.

SECOND DAUGHTER: Named Kiyoko. Did not emigrate to Manchuria but stayed in Japan and married a supermarket owner in Osaka; her sisters in China had a broken relationship with her.

THIRD DAUGHTER: Emigrated to Manchuria; repatriated with six children with their spouses and ex-spouses, as well as an unknown number of grandchildren.

FOURTH DAUGHTER: Named Fumiko. Emigrated to Manchuria; repatriated in 1980 at her own expense.

FIFTH DAUGHTER: Emigrated to Manchuria; repatriated with four children together with their stem families.

SIXTH DAUGHTER: Emigrated to Manchuria; repatriated with five children together with their stem families.

SEVENTH DAUGHTER: Died young.

EIGHTH DAUGHTER: Named Sawako. Emigrated to Manchuria at the age of 11; repatriated in 1988 at state expense with eight of her children's extended families.

Mr Yamada lost his wife in 1934 after she gave birth to Sawako, the eighth daughter, following his seventh daughter's death from disease. His elder daughters married. He found it difficult to feed the remaining six daughters in Fukuoka. Believing the propaganda that Japanese peasants in Manchuria enjoyed good harvests, he responded to the *kaitakudan* recruitment campaign in Saga Prefecture in March 1945, despite the fact that some Manchurian-Japanese had begun to doubt whether Japan would win the war and had started to repatriate. Mr Yamada and his daughters departed for Manchuria, traveling via Korea, and arrived at the *kaitakudan* located in present-day Tonghe in April 1945. The Yamadas were disappointed that they had no rice to eat but sorghum, a cereal, and potatoes. They had to build their own house and moved into it in August 1945, but then had to flee a Soviet military attack.

When the Yamadas found themselves struggling to survive in a refugee camp in Fangzheng County during the cold winter of 1945–1946, their initial strategy was to wed the eldest daughter to a Chinese man in exchange for food for the rest of the family. However, the husband could not feed such a large extended family and the second daughter had to marry to gain more resources for survival. It was not long before the third, fourth, and fifth daughters had also married for survival. Two had to marry out far away due to the lack of potential husbands in Fangzheng. Mr Yamada and the youngest child Sawako lived with the eldest daughter's household. From 1947 Sawako followed the Eighth Route Army everywhere to babysit generals' children. After Sawako left Fangzheng, Mr Yamada moved to live with his fifth daughter's husband's household. He died in 1960.

The stem family of the eighth daughter, Sawako

SAWAKO: Brought a total of 28 family members to Japan. Now is an active volunteer member of Tsuru-no-kai.

ZHANG: Sawako's husband; died in Japan in the late 1990s.

FIRST SON: Named Yishi. Came to Japan in his 40s with his wife and son, named Hisashi.

SECOND SON: Came to Japan with his stem family of four members.

THIRD DAUGHTER: Came to Japan with her stem family. Divorced in Japan; remarried another Chinese and brought him to Japan.

FOURTH SON: Died young.

FIFTH DAUGHTER: Came to Japan with her stem family. Divorced in Japan; she and her ex-husband brought their new Chinese spouses to Japan.

SIXTH DAUGHTER: Came to Japan with her stem family.

SEVENTH SON: Came to Japan as an unmarried teenager; twice married Chinese women, has one child from his second marriage.

EIGHTH SON: Came to Japan as an unmarried teenager; married once and divorced, no children.

Sawako is officially counted as an orphan, as her age was below 13 at the time of the Soviet military attack in 1945, although she was never adopted.[1] Following the troops of the Eighth Route Army, she arrived at Hegang, a coalmining town, in 1949 and continued to babysit generals' children. In 1952 she married a patriotic Party member and gave herself a Chinese name, Tian Hua. Her husband had dreamed of marrying a Japanese wife since he had heard that Japanese women did better housework. They lived in the workers' dormitory and gave birth to eight children. Sawako reared chickens to earn extra money for the family. She picked up rotten vegetables everywhere to feed the chickens and constantly fought for the right to keep over a hundred chickens in the neighborhood space. I saw that poor-hygiene, high-density living area in October 2003 during my fieldwork. It was easy to imagine why Sawako's neighbors were unhappy about her chickens.

As a model progressive working-class housewife, Sawako was appointed to be a *paojiedao* – a term in the Northeastern dialect referring to the members of a neighborhood committee in Maoist China.[2] The *paojiedao* volunteers, as moral guardians of the local community, mostly consisted of housewives, often uneducated ones, who were given the authority to mediate all sorts of conflicts among families in the neighborhood (Hareven 2000: 290). Sawako enjoyed a great deal of power in her *paojiedao* career. During the Cultural Revolution she was sent to study political propaganda by the city government and was appointed to teach Maoism in the neighborhood. Watching Sawako being interviewed by Japanese journalists and researchers in 2003, I observed that she often answered in slogan-like speech, and stressed the terror of the Cultural Revolution.

The other Yamada sisters lived in rural areas and resented Sawako for being what they saw as an arrogant city woman. After their father's death, Sawako stopped all contact with her sisters. In 1973 the fourth sister, Fumiko, sent a letter to inform Sawako she was going to visit Japan. The letter was addressed to Yamada Sawako of Hegang Coalmine Company in Kanji. It took a few weeks for the Party committee to translate the letter and then it was finally delivered to Sawako's husband. Afraid of being sent to work underground in the coalmines, he angrily berated Sawako for retaining contacts with her Japanese kin. Under such pressures Sawako was blocked

from receiving information concerning repatriation, and as a result could not bring her family to Japan until 1988. Ironically, with her outstanding abilities to survive in China, Sawako believes that she could have achieved great success in Japan if she could only have repatriated earlier. She brought eight married children and many grandchildren to Japan. Her husband died in Japan in the late 1990s.

Yishi

Yishi is Sawako's eldest son. He had been a coalmine worker with minimal education but learned Chinese medicine informally from a master. He arrived in Japan in 1992 and worked at 3K jobs for 10 years, suffering from serious back pain. Unable to endure hard physical labor, he wanted to go back to Hegang. Sawako registered a non-profit organization of cultural exchange and appointed Yishi to be the chairman of that empty NPO. With such a position Yishi was able to convince Hegang officials to grant him a campus together with teaching facilities for his new language school, which was opened in 2002. The mayor came to the school's grand opening. Sawako appeared in one photograph, cutting the ribbon for the school's grand opening among VIPs, making a speech in front of a big crowd. Underneath this photo, Sawako was introduced as a Vice-Chairwoman of Tsuru-no-kai, although her real position was that of a mere volunteer. Dressed in a fur coat in these photographs, Sawako looked amazingly sophisticated and important.

Aiming to exploit the opportunity of *shugakusei* visas, Yishi guarantees the students of his language school entrance to Japan with a package school fee of RMB8000 per person per semester. However, during my fieldwork in 2003 Yishi was upset that his school only had three students because the Japanese immigration authorities had announced they would stop issuing *shugakusei* visas to students from Mongolia, China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. To safeguard her son's business, Sawako sought help from liberal politicians, who had always been helpful, but unfortunately this time they could not change the new immigration policy. Eventually, the Hegang officials withdrew their support for Yishi's school.

The stem family the fourth daughter, Fumiko

FUMIKO: A *zanryū-fujin* born in 1927. Went to Manchuria aged 18; brought a total of 26 family members back to Japan.

SONG: Fumiko's husband; died in 1978.

FIRST DAUGHTER: Named Suqing. Came to Japan in her 50s with her large stem family consisting of three generations and 16 family members, of whom all adopted Fumiko's surname, Yamada.

SECOND DAUGHTER: Died in China in the 1980s.

THIRD DAUGHTER: Died in China in the 1980s.

FOURTH DAUGHTER: Named Yuki. Came to Japan at age 16 in 1980, married a Chinese man and gave birth to two children. Her husband divorced her and brought another Chinese wife to Japan; the new wife of her ex-husband also adopted Fumiko's surname, Yamada.

FIFTH DAUGHTER: Named Mari. Came to Japan at age 13 in 1980, married a Chinese man, adopted a baby girl from the in-law family and gave birth to two children; in 2003 Mari's stem family of five members lived in China with Japanese nationality.

Fumiko was so excited she was in tears when she heard that Prime Minister Tanaka was visiting China in 1972, as this offered the opportunity of going to Japan. Kiyoko, the second sister, agreed to sponsor Fumiko's application for visiting her home country. In 1973 Fumiko and her youngest daughter were allowed to visit Japan at state expense with a one-off document, although she had never naturalized as a Chinese. The fifth and sixth Yamada sisters succeeded in overstaying to earn money while waiting for alternative means to bring the rest of their families to Japan. However, Fumiko could not follow this plan. Her husband was seriously ill. She had to return to Heilongjiang. Continuing her life as a peasant, Fumiko waited for another opportunity to repatriate. During this period her eldest daughter, Suqing, got married and produced four children; her second daughter married but died giving birth, and her husband died in 1978.

Kiyoko agreed to help with Fumiko's self-funded repatriation with her two teenage daughters, as her supermarket needed three helpers. In 1980 Fumiko took Yuki and Mari to Japan. Kiyoko was not satisfied with the work done by Yuki and Mari, and refused to pay them proper wages. Fumiko therefore failed to remit money as she had promised to her oldest son-in-law, who had looked after her deaf daughter. When this deaf daughter was seriously ill, the son-in-law refused to take her to hospital because he was angry at Fumiko's failure to remit him money, and she subsequently died young. This tragedy damaged Fumiko's relationship with Kiyoko and Suqing's husband permanently. In the early 1990s, Suqing was in her 50s and already a grandmother. She begged Fumiko to apply for her family's immigration. Suqing's stem family of three generations was gradually settled in public housing units in Tokyo. Because she avoids seeing Suqing's husband, Fumiko has never seen her great grandchildren, even though they all adopted her surname. Fumiko's relationships with Sawako and other relatives were also destroyed, as they all resent Fumiko's little help with their repatriation.

Yuki and Mari

Working in factories, Yuki and Mari did not receive a formal education. Disgusted by their mother's affair with a man, they went back to Heilongjiang for a long holiday. In 1985 they both got married and brought their Chinese husbands to Japan. Yuki produced two children, as did Mari, who also adopted a baby girl from her husband's relative and brought that girl to Japan. Yuki's husband was highly educated and was depressed by his life in Japan as a 3K worker. He visited China frequently in the early 1990s and engaged in an extramarital relationship with an educated woman. Eventually he divorced Yuki to remarry the girlfriend, whom he brought to Japan as his second wife.

In the late 1990s, Mari's husband lost his left arm in a factory accident and could

not get full industrial compensation because he was a casual worker. He became depressed and insisted that Mari get him out of Japan. He returned to Heilongjiang to open a watch shop, and Mari ran that business while minding children. The business failed. He blamed Mari for causing the misfortune, and claimed he could have plenty of beautiful girls in China if only she would leave him. In 2003 Mari took her children to a remote town on the Russian border, where her husband was trying his luck in the extremely primitive conditions.

The Moritas

Morita was seven years old in 1945. His father was called by the Kwantung Army and his mother died in the midst of the Soviet attack. He and his 5-year-old sister were kept in the refugee camp. Meanwhile, the village leader of Galazi River, named Wen, wanted to adopt a son to help out his daughter, who solely shouldered the family's business of tofu production. He placed an order with a human-trader, who gave a bun to a little boy, Morita, at the Japanese refugee camp, and took him to the Wens. The elder daughter glanced at skinny Morita and angrily took him back to the refugee camp to exchange for a stronger boy, but then realized that Morita was the healthiest boy in the camp. Morita ignored his 5-year-old sister, who cried and begged him not to leave her alone, and followed the Wens back home. With the Wens Morita tried hard to speak Chinese in order to avoid being slapped when he did not understand their requests, and soon he had forgotten Japanese. Wen sent Morita to the village's primary school. No schoolmate dared to mention his Japanese background due to his over-sensitive and violent reactions. If Morita was offended at the mention of his Japaneseness he would immediately beat up the offender, regardless of age and gender, with whatever weapon he could find. Wen would also take revenge for his adoptive son by assaulting the offender with iron tools, and the elder sister would also shout at the offender. Morita soon became notorious as a "horrible Japanese ghost". When Morita was 14 years old, the elder sister married a family far away, and then Wen died soon after. No one in the village dared to adopt the terrible "Japanese Ghost," and so he left home to live with his sister's in-law family.

The members of the Morita family

MORITA: The male *zanryū-koji* who repatriated to Japan in 1985 with his wife and four unmarried children; died in Japan in 1994.

MRS MORITA: Her family name is Cai; she naturalized to be a Japanese national.

FIRST SON: Arrived in Japan at the age of 21. Founded and operated a fire equipment company with his younger brother in Tokyo; married an urbanized Chinese woman with two children.

SECOND SON: Named Shingo. Arrived in Japan at the age of 19; obtained a tertiary degree in Japan, specializing in environmental science. Became a business partner with the above-mentioned eldest brother; married an educated Chinese woman with two children.

THIRD DAUGHTER: Named Kasumi. Came to Japan at the age of 16; suffered from mental illness for a long time; married a Chinese man who ran away after gaining permanent residency.

FOURTH SON: Named Yoshio. Came to Japan at the age of 14; achieved a good education and career in Japan. Worked in Kobe; married a Chinese woman who ran away soon after gaining permanent residency.

When Morita reached the age of 20 he worked the local logging company, and then was sent to work in another logging site near his previous home in Galazi River Village. Morita wanted to marry his ex-schoolmate, Cai, and directly appealed to her father. Cai took only one minute to make the decision of marrying this "horrible Japanese ghost" – she was the only one of eight pregnancies of her mother's that survived – she had little leverage in choosing a husband due to this bad family record of fertility. They got married in 1959. Cai miscarried four times but finally produced four children who survived.

Morita habitually beat his wife, and no one dared to mention the word "Japan" to him as he would furiously hit anyone who said that word to him. He often violently punished neighboring kids who offended his children by calling them "Japanese." In 1963 local leaders were ordered to enforce the state's new policy of encouraging "foreigners" to take Chinese nationality, and they prepared an empty room to talk to Morita about this in order to deal with his violent reaction. Surprisingly, the meeting ended peacefully after a few minutes and Morita agreed to become a naturalized citizen. During the Cultural Revolution, two Red Guards came to Morita's house and chanted: "Japanese burned our houses and deprived us of our resources!" Morita went out to beat them up with thick clubs and shouted at them: "My nationality is Chinese!" This saved Morita from political pressure during the upheaval.

From 1972 "foreigners" living in China were offered privileges and benefits. Morita regretted having naturalized since his rights to these privileges and benefits were removed by his Chinese citizenship. To strengthen his foreign status, Morita wrote a letter to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, attaching his recent photograph to find his long-lost kin with the only information he had – his Japanese surname and the location of the *kaitakudan*. Morita received a reply in the late 1970s, written in Japanese, from the former *kaitakudan* leader, who was still alive, informing Morita that the *kaitakudan* refugees had been sent to Harbin by the Soviets soon after Morita had found shelter in the Chinese family. His little sister had repatriated with other *kaitakudan* refugees and his father returned to Japan from Siberia in 1947. His father had remarried in the 1950s and produced three children from his second marriage.

Morita was invited to join a kin-searching tour in 1982 and met his father and sister after 37 years. In the next year, his father was seriously ill and Morita went to visit his ancestral hometown in Sendai with his eldest son on a six-month visa. His stepmother was afraid that the eldest son would represent a threat to the family property that would be inherited by her own children. She strongly opposed Morita's plan to repatriate. As his father was in a coma, his stepmother was in control of the family register, the key document for repatriation application. Morita went back

to China disappointed. Three years later the conflict over the family property was solved, as his stepbrothers had ensured the property inheritance. Then the stepmother agreed to sign statements that she was responsible for taking care of the whole family's settlement in Japan. The regaining of Morita's Japanese nationality depended on tracing his previous existence in the family registry. Since his family's financial status did not qualify them as guarantors according to the official requirements, his stepmother appointed an influential local figure to be the guarantor; this involved a big favor debt, as the guarantor was required to disclose his personal and financial records.

Morita repatriated at state expense in 1985 with his wife and four children. The whole family was offered a four-month training course to learn how to lead their new life in Japan at the SFC located in Tokorozawa, where they made good friends with teachers and repatriate families. After leaving the SFC, the Moritas had to settle in Sendai, since they were expected to fulfill the homecoming responsibility. They lived under great stress from assimilation and pressure from kin relationships. In Sendai they rented a small house close to their ancestral home to fulfill kinship expectations. Morita and his wife soon found factory jobs. Their eldest son, 22, found a post as a trainee technician in a fire equipment company. Shingo, their second son, 19 years old, went to a Japanese language school in Tokyo with a plan for further tertiary study. Their third child, Kasumi, was placed with classmates four years her junior to compensate for her poor Japanese, under the advice of the guarantor. Interestingly the guarantor suggested that their youngest son should be placed in a class of his own age group. The Moritas faced necessary administrative transactions that required them to present a family register, but Mr Morita's stepmother seemed to enjoy the power she wielded as guardian of the family register. They were further pressured by Morita's sister, who pitched them into the Sōka Gakkai faith and forced them to make expensive donations to a religion they did not believe in. Morita urgently demanded that his whole family assimilate. He even corrected his habit of engaging in domestic violence, as the guarantor taught him that beating wife is the behavior of an uneducated peasant man and that a good Japanese man would never beat his wife.

As an object of derision as a "stupid Chinese" in the eyes of her younger classmates, Kasumi was often bullied at school. Morita remained silent and forced his crying daughter to continue school, because he hesitated to say anything negative about Japan to his guarantor. Once, a teacher slapped her face in front of other classmates after she failed to do what she was told. Morita would have taken violent revenge if his children had been called "little Japanese ghost" in China, but in Japan he adopted the "civilized" solution of accepting an official apology, as his guarantor suggested. Kasumi became extremely introverted. Eventually they were able to celebrate Kasumi's admission to a college in Tokyo. The necessity of protecting Kasumi was used as a justification for moving to Tokyo. They had previously failed to convince the guarantor they should move to Tokyo to look after their second son.

Once they did move to Tokyo, the family's situation was immediately improved by their eldest son's promotion and increase in salary from ¥85,000 per month in

Sendai to ¥500,000 per month. Their second son finished tertiary education and soon found work. Morita and his wife enjoyed better wages in Tokyo and could afford tertiary education for both Kasumi and their youngest son. More importantly, they enjoyed the freedom and sense of social mobility that living in the big city brought. Unfortunately, their happy family life only lasted two years, coming to an abrupt end when Morita suddenly died of a heart attack. Thanks to his previous efforts to appease his relatives in Sendai, the latter attended his funeral in Tokyo and buried his remains in the family cemetery in Sendai, next to his late father. After the funeral, Kasumi's fragile mental condition finally gave way. She became paranoi and started to say things like "They will discover that I'm from China" and "Don't assault me! My father was a full-blooded Japanese and so I'm a Japanese too!" Kasumi was sent to a mental hospital for a long period of treatment. Since her release from hospital, her entire life has been spent within the confines of her mother's social circle.

Helped by volunteers, Mrs Morita and Kasumi have been accommodated in a public housing flat and have been granted a substantial amount of state assistance. Kasumi obtained a larger monthly welfare payment, as she fitted the special category of physically or mentally disabled persons in Japanese welfare regulations. Through the Tsuru-no-kai channel, Mrs Morita found Kasumi a husband in China and brought him to Japan. Kasumi and her husband then lived with Mrs Morita in the same public housing flat, but after a few months Kasumi's husband ran away with their savings, aggravating Kasumi's mental condition. At about the same time, the youngest son's wife divorced him the day after her application for permanent residency was approved.[3] Both the runaway son-in-law and the daughter-in-law were apparently Shanghainese. Mrs Morita found no sympathy from other *zanryū-hōjin*, who had previously told her that Shanghainese were untrustworthy. When I went to Heilongjiang for fieldwork, Mrs Morita asked that sickles, beef knives, and instant curry rice packs be taken as gifts to her relatives. The gifts were not enough to distribute among a large number of people, causing one of her distant relatives to comment, "All she sends us is cheap rubbish, yet here we still treat her and her insane daughter like queens!" One relative revealed his bitter feelings towards Mrs Morita because she did not allow him to overstay in Japan after his three-month-visa in 1999. The worst that could have happened would be his deportation by the Japanese police, and he said he did not care.

Shingo, the second son, studied alone in Tokyo from the age of 19 and supported himself with a part-time job. He volunteered for Tsuru-no-kai during his university days and still retains good friendships with several politicians who have managed the NGO. However, when Mrs Morita and Kasumi were desperate for volunteer support they had to get in touch with Tsuru-no-kai through indirect channels, marked by gifts and favor debts. Having obtained a tertiary degree in environmental science, Shingo accepted a job with a big firm but later he joined his elder brother's fire equipment company. Both brothers have owned properties in Tokyo. With no intention of living in China, Shingo ensures his Japan-born children's bilingual capability. His eldest brother, however, feels superior when his Chinese acquaintances comment about his fully Japanized children who speak little Chinese. Shingo

hinted to me that pursuing a symbolic modernity through Japanization seems more important to the less-educated immigrants. The highly educated migrant parents tend to pursue mobility through knowledge and a better understanding of the world enhanced by bilingual capability – a valuable cultural capital.

Yoshio, the youngest son, obtained a master's degree in English translation and entered a big trading firm in Kobe. The Morita sons all began to do well in the metropolis. But this did not make Mrs Morita's life easier. She feels that her daughters-in-law discriminate against her. When they occasionally visit, she instructs Kasumi to serve them in the manner of a maid.

In February 2003 Kasumi accused a shop assistant of discriminating against her Chineseness, and in her enraged state, smashed the shop assistant's spectacles. Kasumi was kept in police custody for six hours and then put into a mental hospital for six months. The police insisted that Mrs Morita replace the spectacles for the shop assistant. Mrs Morita went to seek legal advice with a bilingual volunteer but she broke down crying at the law firm. The lawyer wished to talk to her sons for better understanding but Mrs Morita firmly refused, fearing that her sons would look down on her for being unable to cope with such a small thing. Mrs Morita called the guarantor in Sendai to obtain moral support in claiming that Kasumi was not responsible for the compensation demanded. In December 2003 Mrs Morita received another letter demanding compensation for a new pair of glasses. Then a distressed Mrs Morita wanted the Tsuru-no-kai volunteers to help her stop the constant letters demanding compensation, as she was worried it would add to Kasumi's mental problems. The volunteers found it difficult to be sympathetic with Mrs Morita's ignorance of the Japanese legal system. Dejected by the lack of support, a desperate Mrs Morita called me (the ethnographer) at 6:30 am to beg for help. With the help of a Japanese volunteer familiar with the labor regulations it was possible to obtain the relevant legal advice within 48 hours. During these hours she persisted in calling me, expressing her fear that her sons and Kasumi would discover her inept attempts to resolve the affair. Finally, the Bureau of Labor Insurance confirmed that Kasumi was unable to pay the compensation and was exempted from liability because of mental illness.

The Nakajimas

In 1945, at the age of three, Nakajima became an orphan. His adoptive father, Mr Li, who was a horse-wagon driver in Boli, died when Nakajima was nine years old. His adoptive mother remarried for survival. Orphaned again, Nakajima inherited a worn quilt. A neighbor family's children had insufficient coverlets, so he brought his quilt to live in that uncle's house. At age 11 Nakajima found himself a trainee job to make iron tools; he stayed with this small factory till 1993 when he repatriated to Japan. When he reached marital age Nakajima could not find himself a wife; he did not marry until his mid 30s, which was considered shamefully late in the rural Northeast. Knowing nothing about his birth date was considered an "empty" family background, and such identity could mean he was seen as having been abandoned after an illegitimate birth. Together with his poverty, he was thus an unappealing

spouse candidate as a young man. Having little leverage in choosing a spouse, he married a stout Chinese woman in bad health. Mrs Nakajima's leverage in choosing a husband was also limited because of her family's reproduction record; her mother gave birth to 14 children but only she survived childbirth. Mrs Nakajima quickly became very sensitive about her husband's unwillingness to walk with her on the street.

The members of the Nakajima family

NAKAJIMA: A pre-identified *zanryū-koji*. Brought 10 family members to Japan; lived in Ichō-danchi.

MRS NAKAJIMA: Came to Japan as a spouse of *zanryū-koji.*

YANLI: The eldest daughter. Her stem family used to live in Ichō-danchi, and later moved to the west side of Tokyo.

BAI: Yanli's husband, an ethnic Korean-Chinese.

ZULEI: The only son of Yanli and Bai.

YANHUA: Second daughter of the Nakajima's. Her stem family lives in a separate unit in Ichō-danchi.

ZHAO: Yanhua's husband; had an affair with another in-law family member.

FANFAN: The only son of Yanhua and Zhao.

WENXIONG: Third Son of Nakajima. His nuclear family lives in a separate unit in Ichō-danchi.

LICHUN: Wenxiong's wife; had an affair with Zhao.

LIJIANG: The only son of Wenxiong and Lichun

YAO: Nakajima's biological sister; refused to keep in touch with siblings after coming to Japan.

LIANJUN: The son of Nakajima's other biological sister, who refused to repatriate and died in China. Lianjun repatriated with his wife in 2003 for the sake of avoiding debt collectors in China.

In the early 1980s, a woman at the time named Yao came to Boli from Harbin and claimed that she was Nakajima's biological sibling and that their biological family had lived in a Nagano *kaitakudan*. Yao said she was nine years old at the time, and therefore was able to remember who adopted her two young siblings after their parents died during the Soviet attack in 1945. She was adopted by a number of families, as she had run away from one family to another after a period of time. At last she married a high-ranking cadre in Harbin, where she was able to access information concerning repatriation. As the oldest sister in the family she felt a responsibility to find her siblings before her departure for Japan. In that small town with its fixed population it was not difficult to find the late horse-wagon driver's adopted son.

Nakajima was happy to learn of his Japanese origins as this represented a chance to emigrate. Yao had also found another biological sister in Boli. But both siblings failed to show the gratitude Yao had expected. They did not get along well. Yao left them without providing further details about their Japanese family background.

This made it difficult for Nakajima to process his repatriation. The sister in Boli was not interested in repatriation and was reluctant to maintain a sibling relationship with the impoverished Nakajimas. After 10 years, a local official hinted that he could emigrate to Japan if he paid a bribe. In fact it was the *Kōseishō*'s new policy towards unidentified orphans. Nakajima discovered that his identity as a Japanese orphan had been confirmed in the PSB records, as Yao was able to describe another sibling's birthmark exactly, the shape still identifiable; thus her recognition of Nakajima as her biological brother was considered reliable. Spending a fortune in preparing documents in Boli, Nakajima and his wife finally repatriated at state expense in 1994, sponsored by two guarantors. He met the first guarantor, Nakao, a *Kōseishō* official, in 1985, when Nakao was investigating Japanese orphans in Boli; afterwards they corresponded for years with the help of translation. In 1991 Nakajima met Nakao again in Tokyo during his kin-searching tour.

When the Nakajimas were approved to enter Japan, Nakao was a guarantor for someone else, and he asked his neighbour, Shimada, to accept ¥50,000 to become the official sponsor and leave responsibilities to him. Therefore Nakajima adopted a Japanese surname from a combination of the two guarantors' surnames. While Mr and Mrs Nakajimas stayed in the SFC, Nakao helped them to obtain Japanese nationality, apply for a public housing unit, apply for welfare, furnish the flat, and install gas, electricity, telephone, and so forth. They received ¥420,000 in assistance from the state when they "graduated" from the SFC. They saved every yen to finance their children's immigration, and appreciated the used furniture and utensils given by their guarantor. One member of staff of the welfare department has been particularly nice to the Nakajimas because she respects their guarantor, although other *zanryū-hōjin* have considered her rude and irresponsible. Unfortunately, Nakao suddenly died before he could sponsor their three married children's immigration. As a welfare recipient Nakajima was not qualified to sponsor his married children to enter Japan, although he became a Japanese national. He found a young *zanryū-hōjin* member in the Ichō-danchi neighbourhood with Japanese nationality and a stable job who agreed to sponsor his children's settlement in Japan.

Nakajima had a biological sister in Boli, who Yao had found in the 1980s, and who had passed away a few years previously. This late *zanryū-koji* showed no interest in moving to Japan since her husband held a high position in the Boli government. However, her son, Lianjun, "repatriated" to Japan in 2003 because he was heavily in debt in China. His cousins in Japan (Yanli and Yanhua) helped him apply for a career-training course provided by the Labour Department's Occupational Security Centre, which came with a monthly allowance during the training period. However, Lianjun's application was refused because his mother had refused the *Kōseishō*'s invitation to visit Japan for a few days at state expense when she was alive. This record officially counted as her voluntary intention to stay in China and resulted in the automatic revocation of her rights to become a Japanese national together with her offspring's rights to enjoy Japan's civic services. However, he was still allowed to migrate to Japan due to his "half-Japanese blood."

The Nakajimas live in three units of a public housing estate or *danchi* in Japanese. Nakajima and his wife live in a unit downstairs from their daughter Yanhua's stem

family, and in the next building to their son Wenxiong's stem family. The stem family of their eldest daughter Yanli live in another part of Tokyo in housing provided by her husband's company. As welfare recipients, Nakajima and his wife's daily activities consist of visiting nearby *zanryū-hōjin* neighbors, looking after grandchildren for their working children, shopping for cheap groceries and watching Chinese satellite TV – though considered to be a luxury item that disqualifies the owner from eligibility for social welfare, this particular regulation has not been enforced in Ichō-danchi because it is regarded as a necessity for *zanryū-hōjin*.

To reduce costs of interpretation the local authorities offer public services with staff originally from China, and they work in a similar manner to that of Chinese cadres. For instance, a Chinese-speaking social worker asked the Nakajimas to mind her children as a favor in return for something provided by the official at the public level. Both Nakajima and his wife are physically weak. Seeking medical services from the state appears to be their main contact with life outside of their home. Through interpreters they often stress how terribly ill they feel, but they have never actually been diagnosed with anything. They believe that Chinese doctors provide better more and attentive treatment than do Japanese doctors, as Chinese doctors will give injections for minor ailments such as a cold. Therefore they prefer to seek Chinese medical services provided within the *zanryū-hōjin* community.

Nakajima locks a booklet upon which he has recorded various administrative numbers inside a jewelry box. These numbers include the reference number for his *Kōseishō* files, his *zanryū-koji* document number, the tour number he was assigned in 1991 when he came to Japan to search for kin, his welfare recipient number, and his passport number. These numbers have been well systemized within the modern bureaucratic machine, and Nakajima does not worry whether he is Japanese or Chinese as long as he remembers those numbers. As he says, "my identity is these numbers." Nakajima felt he had additional luck in being a male *zanryū-koji*, as he had observed that Japanese neighbors did not respect female *zanryū-koji*'s Japaneseness. However, he was also aware of the reality that Japanese national narratives align nationality with kinship. Nakajima did not know the term *jus sanguinis* but he understood its principle well: that the nation is built up as an enormous family by shared blood, and thus citizenship is conferred through blood (Linger 2001: 276–277). He had no problem internalizing this logic, as it was similar to the commonsense imbued by his Chinese racial beliefs. Some *zanryū-koji* could ritualize their blood relatedness to Japan by dealing with their Japanese relatives, although this was accompanied by tensions and disappointments. Nakajima did not possess such "evidence" to align his family with Japan psychologically or emotionally, but he needed to confirm his kinship with Japan by ritualizing the administrative numbers – repeatedly opening his precious box, memorizing each number, and then locking the numbers safely away again.

The Nakajimas long for Heilongjiang but can only visit their hometown once a year. Frequent travel would disqualify them from state financial assistance, and the welfare payments would be deducted during their absence from Japan. Visiting Heilongjiang is expensive. Hometown people have been spoiled by gifts and money from other *zanryū-hōjin* who have saved hard in Japan and like to play Santa Claus

when they return. They found a solution to reduce the heavy cost of gifts by collecting household items from the trash in a middle-class residence nearby, where they often picked out presentable items. The Nakajimas learned the terms "human rights" and "democracy" when they participated in Japan's largest lawsuit against the state, which was been initiated by over 2,000 *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs. They knew the chance of winning the ¥30 million demanded in war compensation was nearly zero, but there might be a small chance to win the legal right to reside in China, while continuing to receive welfare payments from Japan. There is a consensus in the family: the first generation hold Japanese citizenship to ensure permanent residency for the offspring, but the rest of the family retain Chinese nationality and Chinese names. Since the only capital the second generation can invest in Japan is physical labor, they would go back to China when they lost physical strength, as for the third generation they believe there will be dramatic changes in cross-border market situations which means holding a Japanese passport will not be always advantageous. The Nakajimas are aware of that few well-to-do migrants can psychologically afford to keep their original family names unchanged, while the rest try by whatever means to name themselves in Japanese ways for the sense of security. In this regard, the Nakajimas are proud of themselves.

Neither Mr nor Mrs Nakajima had a choice in choosing a spouse when they were young in Boli. In Japan Mrs Nakajima complains more bitterly about Nakajima's refusal to walk with her in public despite she accepted him when he was considered a loser in the social norms of Boli. In their marriage – of two poor spouse candidates – they continued to suffer from the comment "the bad matching the worse," imposed as a result of the social norms of rural Heilongjiang. This suffering created a strong sense of inferiority within the family, and their children continue to suffer.

Yanli

Nakajima's oldest daughter was born in 1968, grew up in harsh poverty and suffered from a strong sense of inferiority. Yanli studied hard and was admitted to a technical college in Qitaihe town, 45 km away from home in Boli, and obtained a diploma in pharmacy in 1989. In 1990 she started to work in hospital as a clerk in the pharmacy department. Yanli enjoyed a certain power as doctors and patients had to please her, sometimes with gifts, to get certain drugs. She exercised power over her younger siblings and scolded them as lazy and unprogressive every time she gave them pocket money. In college Yanli met Bai, who studied coalmine engineering. Their relationship was looked down on by both of their families. Bai came from a poor ethnic Korean village and his background was considered to be a huge limitation on social advancement. Yanli believed that her appearance did not allow her to get any better man and she had to "marry down" into the Korean family. Bai's parents were upset at their son marrying a Han woman. They believed North Korean women to be ideal daughters-in-law and that it would be easy to find one through wife-supplier agencies. They strictly upheld traditional Korean rules concerning the way a daughter-in-law should behave, and did not allow Yanli to dine at the table in the Bai family. Yanli and Bai tried to silence such prejudices by

giving money to both families. When their son Zhulei was born in 1992, the two families started to accept their "interracial" marriage.

In the 1990s the Bais started sending family members to work in Seoul as illegal migrants, and suddenly became rich. Yanli was displeased by her in-law family's joke that if Bai had gotten married later he would have had better chances to choose a beautiful wife. It did not take long before Yanli's insecurity was overcome – her *zanryū-koji* father's repatriation was approved. Bai was happy that an emigration opportunity would open for his wife and for himself. He invested all his savings into an intensive Japanese language course despite Yanli's family opposing him spending money this way.

Eventually, Bai arrived in Japan in 1995 with his wife and son, found accommodation in separate units in Ichō-danchi, and found 3K jobs nearby. Bai earned ¥12,000 per day working from 5 am to 8 pm at a construction site. In Japan Bai has a wider social network in the Korean-speaking communities, which helped him Japanize quicker. He paid to "upgrade" his diploma obtained in China to a degree in coalmine engineering and was admitted by a Japanese university as a postgraduate student of architecture. Yanli worked as a cleaner to provide the family's regular income till Bai obtained the professional license and found a high position in a construction firm. This achievement is seen as outstanding among *zanryū-hōjin*. As additional income would put the family in a higher taxation bracket, Yanli worked part-time and found fulfillment through volunteerism – a hobby that many Japanese housewife would like to have.

The Nakajimas started to be proud of Bai's remarkable success, while Yanli started to face a strong sense of insecurity as Bai started to demand that she serve him like a "proper Korean wife." To regain her status in the relationship, Yanli pleased Bai by sending her own savings to Bai's family. She went to Seoul twice to see Bai's family members who engaged in 3K jobs as illegal migrants there. In Seoul Yanli gained her confidence back easily as the Bais envied her permanent residency in Japan. Yanli was psychologically prepared if Bai should ask for divorce. If the day came, she would find a good job in Heilongjiang with a degree obtained in Japan. Passing university admission exams was highly competitive. Yanli paid to upgrade her pharmacy diploma to a degree in humanities, and was admitted to a postgraduate course of social work.

Yanhua and Wenxiong

Both the second daughter Yanhua and the third son Wenxiong were not interested in studying. Judging by physical appearance, Yanhua was not considered a very desirable bride. Due to a slight mental retardation, Wenxiong could not pass exams in primary school and was considered a very unwelcome husband-candidate by young rural girls. But their parents believed that Yanhua could find a good quality husband without educational investment if they made it clear that Yanhua's father was a Japanese orphan – a passport to Japan. This trick worked, Yanhua married Zhao, a handsome young man, who stopped working the day after their wedding, as everyone believed that he could earn lots of money once he emigrated with

Yanhua. Using the same trick, Wenxiong also found a beautiful wife, Lichun. Having recruited these two "good quality" spouses, the Nakajimas immediately experienced a sense of social mobility, as they now could remove the stigma of "the bad matching the worse."

In the second year of their settlement in Japan Yanhua discovered Zhao in bed naked with Lichun. Zhao was nearly killed by the furious Wenxiong. After this trauma Yanhua stopped talking to Wenxiong. Mr and Mrs Nakajima accepted both Zhao's and Lichun's apologies, and begged their two children to maintain their marriages for the sake of saving the family's face. They feared that the possible divorces of the two couples would immediately verify their failure to find good quality in-laws, which would be even worse than being identified as the previous "the bad matching the worse." In order to hide this "incestuous" adultery from becoming the subject of hurtful gossip, both Yanhua and Wenxiong became silent and anti-social. Nakajima's legal status as the head of this migrant family meant he could hold his parental authority over his son- and daughter-in-law by emphasizing their indebtness to the Nakajimas who brought them to Japan. This emphasis on their guilt has effectively driven Zhao and Lichun to behave humbly.

Yanhua could not heal her chronic insomnia. She visited Boli more frequently and started an extra-marital affair with a married man there. Exhausted by 3K jobs and emotional devastation, Yanhua and Zhao failed to learn Japanese and depend on their 6-year-old son to interpret all daily communications with the outside world. Occasionally, Japanese neighbors approach them for community duty matters, but usually Yanhua responds to them in poor Japanese: "My father is a *zanryū-koji*. What do you want?" Yanhua and Zhao complained that they suffered from an unsatisfactory social life in the "cold" Japanese society, where they were surrounded by uneducated *zanryū-hōjin* neighbors and workmates, yet their own limited education impeded them from making sophisticated Chinese friends.

In Boli I observed Yanhua's annual visit to her hometown. She dressed in colorful and shiny clothes and was surrounded by male acquaintances. She enjoyed seeing that those who were previously arrogant to her now submissively tried to please her. She proudly complained that she was exhausted from countless banquets and too many people wanting to treat her like a princess. Yanhua planned to leave her 6-year-old son in the in-law's custody, but faced complicated relationships with her in-laws. Yanhua had helped Zhao's eldest brother to open a restaurant, she was obliged to treat the second sister equally; then the third brother claimed that his financial problems were greater than that of the others. Meanwhile, Zhao's cousin argued that his situation was near collapse, while Zhao's parents tried to influence her to support their favorite nephews. Yanhua ended up having to give them all equal amounts of financial support. Then this caused even more serious family conflicts, as they argued about who was greedy and who did not deserve remittances. During her stay in Boli, each in-law came to speak ill of the other, driving Yanhua to lose her temper and yell at them: "I'll pay you to shut your mouth up!"

Yanhua wanted a romance to heal her long-lasting insomnia, which was a result of the preservation of the family face after an unbearable emotional trauma. But her parents strongly opposed her extramarital affair with a married man in Boli since it

may cause them to lose a hardworking son-in-law who earned about ¥800,000 per month and let Yanhua manage all his earnings. Likewise, living with his unhappy marriage, Wenxiong could not stop his long-lasting depression, which manifested itself in his abnormal silence. This in turn affected the personality development of his 9-year-old son, who had been abnormally silent as well. Wenxiong started going back to Boli more frequently to play around, leaving his wife to work in Japan and send him money regularly.

Summary

Through the above three family histories, I have examined what conditions *zanryū-hōjin* lived in when they formed kinship in Manchuria, how they conformed to it and confronted it, how their expectations for an idealized kin responsibility were left unfulfilled, and how they exploited kinship rules in their transnational experiences. The kinship ideology beneath citizenship law allows *zanryū-hōjin* families to use kinship to circumvent the nation-state's restrictions on economic migration, while at the same time their Chinese extended families use *zanryū-hōjin* to cultivate channels of economic betterment.

From their kinship behaviors we can make sense of *zanryū-hōjin*'s ambiguous and contested relationships between "repatriation to a homeland" and "emigration to an economically advanced society" alongside the path of modernization via Japanization and betterment via emigration. Their worldviews, motivations, and behaviors fluctuate in the terrain that lies between metropolitan Japan and rural China, which further produce in them desires and unsettled attitudes toward both countries. The complex and idiosyncratic selves have been nurtured, refashioned and transformed in both rural China and metropolitan Japan, and will be continually refashioned in those two countries. There is a dynamic triangular relationship between their specific personal interests, their transnational market situations, and the nation-state authorities in both countries.

By using the conceptual tool envisaged by Giddens, I have delved into the sphere of private life and produced a new and rich set of multifaceted implications. These insightful ethnographies not only contribute to the further study of kinship, but also scrutinize various thematic discussions in the following chapters. It is worth pointing out here that flexible citizenship, as envisaged by Ong, is a powerful position, where affluent Chinese in North America can tap resources beyond cultural and national boundaries. Interestingly, this sought-after status can be functioned among *zanryū-hōjin* as a capital to realize a family desire, and as a medicine to heal their family conflicts.

6 Family in transition

In the modern world, the personal and emotional lives of individuals have experienced the most important transformations from traditional social ties, which ascribed people's relationships according to the orders of clan, ethnic, or religious group. As the modern life changes people's sense of self, individualized and modernized relationships depend upon processes of working out mutual trust by respecting others' points of view and building up reciprocal and democratic communication with others. Such "pure relationships" can function best to sustain love-sexual relationships, child-parent relationships, marriage and family, as well as friendships (Giddens 2002). Traditional identity shaped people via external influences with the authority of custom, religion, and family; modern self is internally explored and reflexively projected (Gluck 1993: 216). As *zanryū-hōjin* jumped from rural society to the highly competitive metropolitan world, it is necessary to understand how personal sense of self, desire, emotion, conflict, and strategy have conducted their family relationships. From the private sphere we may have a better picture to look at how *zanryū-hōjin* have adapted to a transnationally modern life.

Yuriko Sakamoto

In 1977 Yuriko repatriated alone and started factory work in Yamagata to support her family in China. She maintained a friendship with Sato, her ex-husband, who had remarried and had a daughter. Sato's second wife was jealous of Yuriko's presence. Her hysterical manner affected Sato's noodle shop business and pushed Yuriko to move to Tokyo. Meanwhile, Yuriko's Chinese husband and five married children together with their stem families – a total of 42 kin – had gradually migrated to Japan. Yuriko settled them in Tokyo, where there were better job opportunities. Sato wanted to share life with Yuriko and planned to open another noodle shop in Tokyo. She had responsibilities for her Chinese family, and rejected Sato's plea. Sato decided to wait for Yuriko for a few years and used the noodle shop money to speculate in government bonds. But his wife took this investment away. Sato's misery increased when his only daughter refused to invite him to her wedding. Disconsolate and penniless, he begged Yuriko to start a new life with him. She refused him again, as she was busy solving problems of her immigrant family. One week later, Yuriko was informed that Sato had hanged himself. Mourning for

Sato, Yuriko started living separately from her Chinese husband in different flats. Her children from China took Yuriko's grief about Sato's death as a sacrifice for them and respected their mother more. Later, when her Chinese husband became seriously sick, Yuriko took care of him everyday till he passed away. She displayed this late husband's photograph in her flat and commemorated him daily with incense sticks. Yuriko's first Chinese husband had died in Fangzheng in the 1960s. Yuriko's eldest son moved his biological father's remains to Japan. Yuriko also regularly burns incense sticks for him.

Yuriko has lost all social contacts in Fangzheng but she encouraged her grandchildren to find spouses in China, where they could find a better quality of spouse. Yuriko's two daughters ran a restaurant in Tokyo serving Harbin-style dumplings. They planned to retire to Qingdao, a northeastern coastal city, where many *zanryū-hōjin* have bought houses. Yuriko's youngest son used to work for a Taiwanese company as a translator and, consequently, was better off than many *zanryū-hōjin* with 3K jobs. An old friend in Fangzheng convinced him to invest in a restaurant in Harbin and guaranteed that the investment would make him enough money in two years to buy a European-style house in Qingdao. He borrowed money to invest in that restaurant; however, the investment ended in a big loss. He then had to work two cleaning jobs to repay the debt.

According to official requirements, a welfare recipient must prove her/his inability to depend on her/his children. Yuriko thus lived separately from her children, but they all lived nearby and visited her everyday. The welfare package she received was ¥93,000 per month, free medical service, and free local transport. Yuriko could save ¥10,000 every month. Her major expenses were catering for her visitors with food and drink. She had many visitors every day. Yuriko was often asked by her Japanese friends questions like "Why have you married Chinese men twice? Why did you like Chinese men that much?" For years Yuriko could not find a suitable way to respond to this kind of annoying question.

Zanryū-fujin as household masters

The Japanese government interpreted *zanryū-koji* to mean orphans left in China "against their will" and women who married Chinese to survive the war turmoil of 1945 as people who chose to remain in China "of their own free will" (Tamanoi 2005; Ward 2006b). The establishment of the National Organization to Assist *Zanryū-koji* in 1983 did not include assistance for *zanryū-fujin* because they were not classified as victims. Responsibilities and assistance for these women's resettlement in Japan were largely left to their families and relatives. In light of these women's public situation, Japanese intellectuals have striven to redefine *zanryū-fujin*'s status as that of victims of abandonment by the state. The dislocation of *zanryū-fujin* constitutes a unique case in the study of women's migration in the context of Japan's globalization. During its imperialist expansion before the World War II, women migrants were put at the front line to cultivate colonial villages (Douglass 2000: 92). Then they became the "uprooted migrants" (Tokitsu 2000: 57) who lived in Chinese peasant households completely isolated from their ethnic

culture and language. Some *zanryū-fujin* even felt ashamed of their marriages to Chinese peasants (Araragi 2000: 25), but as Ward (2006b) writes, these stranded war wives had no choice but to remain in China.

Women's mobility through migration has been seen as a passive consequence of marriage, in order to achieve economic rationality as family strategies to deal with dispersed-kinship arrangements (e.g. Chant *et al.* 1992; Ellis *et al.* 1996; Pedraza 1991; Rosenzweig *et al.* 1989). This perspective correlates with international migration policies, and as the result large proportions of women have been admitted as the dependents of male migrants, despite the fact that they are the economic actors themselves (Zlotnik 1990: 373–374). The case of Yuriko supports the claim that women who migrate do not always do so in a passive move to join spouses, but may, in fact, play the role of active agents of change (e.g. Fan and Huang 1998; Piper 1997; Zlotnik 1990: 381).

Migration functions dynamically in the construction of gender roles (Douglass 2000: 91). Changes in the status of women can be compared before and after migration (Zlotnik 1990: 378). Through the life experiences of Yuriko we see that traditional male-female roles of household master and breadwinner have been sharply adjusted in the process of international migration. As a refugee Yuriko twice married Chinese peasants for survival. As a household master of the migrant family, Yuriko could live alone, mourning her late loved one, while still gaining her children's respect. Like the Yamada sisters whose life courses were narrated in the last chapter, thanks to traditional family institution and practices, these women survived as *zanryū-fujin*, although submissively and passively in that conventional kinship system. Later in the transnational space, these women became household masters as their migrant families not only legally relied on the Japaneseness of *zanryū-fujin* but also culturally and socially relied on them to lead a new life in Japan.

My fieldwork data indicates that most members of families centered on *zanryū-fujin* speak Japanese at home on a daily basis, in contrast to members of families centered on *zanryū-koji*, who speak poorer Japanese, and only in public. In gatherings with *zanryū-fujin* friends I observed that they liked making jokes in Chinese and sang Maoist songs, and often they switched between languages in conversations and sang Showa military songs. Many Japanese liberal politicians, lawyers, and volunteers tried to convince *zanryū-fujin* to take legal action against the state of Japan, claiming war compensation for them. However, most *zanryū-fujin* refused to participate in political actions, although they liked singing political songs. Such contradiction reflects their contradictory roles within their families as passive dependants and household masters.

Ami Yamaguchi

This *zanryū-fujin* repatriated in the early 1980s with six children. Ami Yamaguchi had suffered from low self-esteem in Heilongjiang. Attempting to improve her status, she emphasized her wealthy family in Japan but this failed to gain respect from her Chinese family, who often mocked her showy manner. When she became a mother-in-law she still could not empower herself over her daughter-in-laws and

further suffered from inferiority. However, Ami gained unexpected power when she brought the whole family to Japan. Among her four arrogant daughters-in-law, Xia, the eldest son's wife, had shown her the least respect. Ami's accumulated mental anguish was particularly targeted at Xia. She had secretly wished her son would divorce Xia and replace her with a daughter-in-law she liked. This desire could be realized in Japan, where she granted the whole family with the privileges of migration. Ami started arranging blind dates for her eldest son, urged him to visit a young woman in Harbin who promised Ami that she would be a filial daughter-in-law. This girl appeared to be educated and attractive.

With moral support from her grown-up children, Xia refused to sign the divorce document even though she had been insulted by her husband and mother-in-law. Her husband had stopped coming home, and he successfully got married in China and brought his new wife to Japan. Xia's children tried to prove that their father's second marriage was unlawful because of the corruption of Chinese officials, but failed. Up to this point, Xia's children felt threatened by Ami's power, as their grandmother had deliberately failed to apply for their permanent residency, with the intention of getting rid of Xia and of preserving leverage to gain the support of Xia's children. This tactic worked effectively, as the grandchildren now stopped standing up for Xia, and instead, tried to please their father's new wife, in order to ensure their permanent residency. Xia lost her residency in Japan as a *zanryū-hōjin* spouse, and her ability to stay in Japan depended on her children, whose own legal status derived from the "Japanese blood" inherited from Ami, on the basis of that one child needed her care.

Peculiar way of healing family conflicts

Existing studies on *zanryū-fujin* tend to focus on the war period and leave their dynamic migrant life in modern Japan rather thinly explored. There is one psychological study of the adjustments of *zanryū-koji* families settling in Japan based on 126 surveys (Ebata *et al.* 1995), but the statistical formulation falls short of explaining the individuals' psychological histories. It touches little on the long-seated inequalities within the family and fails to instantiate changes in such inequalities. Therefore the study simply assumes that migration causes family conflicts without explaining why problems surface specifically when a particular family experiences migration. To investigate change in the family, it is necessary to differentiate the roles of individuals as they interact, since different family members may initiate change or accept change at different points (Hareven 2000: 30).

Ami Yamaguchi married into a Chinese family for survival when she was a refugee and suffered from low self-esteem, which was worsened by her daughter-in-laws' superiority complex. The synchronization of the individual with the overall timing of the collective is a determinant of transitional timing. Ami removed the source of her bitterness by targeting Xia, and by providing a young and attractive daughter-in-law to replace her and satisfy her son. The change of Ami Yamaguchi's status within her family is an important one for the family's overall transformation. Another example of transitional timing involves the cumulative impact of historical events that

continue over several generations. In the case of Ami Yamaguchi's family, subsequent family conflict is likely to occur involving the third generation, who could restore Xia's status, as their legal status will no longer rely on grandma's "Japanese blood." Interestingly, I observed that other elderly informants cheered for Ami's final victory over the "lazy and arrogant" Xia. A younger, prettier, and more compliant daughter-in-law could gain Ami more prestige and status. By doing so Ami could also do a favor for her Heilongjiang relatives by bringing one more person to Japan.

A social worker who had handled divorce cases for *zanryū-hōjin* members for 20 years told me that the divorce rates were not only high among younger generations but also among elderly repatriated couples. Divorces among the first generation mostly originated from inequality within the marriages, inherited from their previously low leverage for recruiting quality family members through marriage and previous inability to earn respect from Chinese relatives as "little Japanese ghosts." After the *zanryū-koji* and *zanryū-fujin* became privileged by being able to bring Chinese family members to Japan this inequality swiftly turned upside down. The availability of quality spouses as replacements in China thus became a direct resource for releasing couples from bitter feelings of being oppressed by existing in-laws. This factor works in the opposite direction as well. When the visa dependents can secure their legal status in Japan, the *zanryū-hōjin* spouse may not continue in his/her powerful position. In many cases, people stay in unhappy marriages but tend to "fix" relationships through threatening their existing spouses by mentioning the abundant choices in China. Such a plentiful availability of spouse candidates produces further inequalities within *zanryū-hōjin* families, as they tend to remarry according to their leverage to choose persons who want to "marry up" to them. As a result, new marriages tend to suffer from more disputes or domestic violence.

Desire/tension within a flexible citizen family

Perceiving *zanryū-hōjin* as an integral part of the Japanese people, intellectuals encourage Japanese society to tolerate and accept their Chineseness through understanding their traumatic experiences in the politically disturbing China (Araragi 2000). Ironically, Nakajima (illustrated in the last chapter) indeed had suffered a great deal in China but his unpleasant experiences resulted from neither his Japanese background (he did not know about it until his 40s) nor the political punishment during the Cultural Revolution. Nakajima's suffering originated in the context of the traditional social norms of rural Heilongjiang. His homeless background had marginalized him, just as his wife's poor family record concerning reproduction had seen her marginalized by the rural Heilongjiang society. Their children were considered unwelcome spouse candidates in rural Heilongjiang. This sense of inferiority had nurtured a desire to attain the standards they recognize as those of a "happy family." Thanks to the colonial legacy, the Nakajimas could escape from the oppression, pressed by rural people who primitively labelled them "the bad matched with the worse."

The emigration fads in the post-Mao countryside and Japan's deregulation of restrictions against *zanryū-hōjin* facilitated the Nakajimas' liberation from the

cultural oppression in rural Heilongjiang. Once they were offered the opportunity to a change, considered that their first important task was not to learn the Japanese language but to find their children "good quality" spouses to remove the stigma "the bad matched the worse". However, the interest in the Nakajimas did not reflect the individual desire of their in-law family members, who married their children under the fashion of "marry up," in order for their own natal families to enjoy the resulting prestige in rural Heilongjiang. Once the good quality of in-laws got to Japan and obtained residency, the power relationships began to shift. The change of power dynamics started with the in-laws' open criticism of the appearance of the Nakajimas, followed by their affair. The Nakajimas achieved a consensus to maintain the broken-hearted marriages and continue to present the family's new prestige. Sustaining the "happy family" image among the *zanryū-hōjin* neighborhood in Ichō-danchi was not easy, as this community still engaged in judgmental gossip based on the norms and social meaning systems of rural Heilongjiang. The elderly *zanryū-hōjin* neighbors did not spend any money for entertainment. Their greatest enjoyment tended to be gossiping about others.

Home implies an intense sense of belonging to a specific space of family, homeland, or community, that is often associated with a drive to reproduce identities and traditions, and can be defined through its relation to unknown outside fears and dangers (Nadje *et al.* 2002: 6–8). The idea of home can bring a longing for a nostalgic past or a utopian future. Nakajima has no intention of freeing himself from the "prison" of Japan (as he calls it) to return to his "home" in China, which he sometimes longs for. He has joined in political actions to fight for citizens' rights because he is aware that his anti-government activities will not cause him any harm within Japan's system of democratic bureaucracy. In contrast, he would not do anything to oppose the Chinese authorities because he wants to ensure his access to his cultural homeland. Nakajima possesses little cultural skill to help with the Japanization of his family. He does not have an ancestral tomb, which would confirm his Japaneseness and give his children a sense of security to handle their migrant lives. However, Nakajima can ritualize this kind of sought-after status through a series of administrative numbers. In the transformation of Nakajima's home, the numbers identify the family's position in the global economy as flexible citizens. This advantageous position enables them to escape from their hometown's cultural oppression, and give them individual space where they can nurture their self-identities and exercise power to a certain extent. Although the modern home in Tokyo is strange to Nakajima, in it, he can build up an identity by ritualizing his numbers. With such numbers, his Tokyo home is safer than his hometown in Heilongjiang, where provided particularistic relationships according to ascribed social orders and networks encompassed by traditional belief systems (Weigert and Hastings 1977: 1182) had narrowly identified Nakajima as a worthless person.

In commentaries on *zanryū-koji* activism, it is observed that some *zanryū-koji* wish to be "flexible citizens" with allegiance both to their birth nationality and to China, where their personhoods were nurtured. Tamanoi (2005) argues that "they [the *zanryū-hōjin*] could provide a bridge to help overcome the continuing deep rifts

that divide the two countries because of the inability to reconcile issues left unresolved from a war that ended sixty years ago, but whose antagonisms continue to reverberate today." Nakajima was a *zanryū-koji* activist. If interviewed by the press, he would likely have expressed a similar logic, embellishing his potential to harmonize antagonisms between the two countries. Behind this public identity, Nakajima did not know how he could contribute to the building of a peace-bridge between the rival nationalisms, although he hoped the social distance between Heilongjiang and Tokyo was greater than the geographic distance. He needed a transnational gap to mend his family problems by hiding the shame. It was indeed not easy for the Nakajimas to reveal that their children sought pleasures in Heilongjiang to mend the pain caused by the in-law children's adultery, while punishing their spouses by spending their hard labor money earned in Japan during their long holidays in Heilongjiang. This insecurity has made Nakajima frantic about the ritual of keeping track of his administrative numbers in his sacred box. This ritual of numbers has functioned as a remainder of geographic and social distance, in which the disloyal in-law children have been constantly warned: "without this Japanese citizenship you would never have been able to come to Japan."

Local perspectives are keen on exploring the ethnicity of a minority group's citizen rights within a nation-state. These "ethnicity" and "citizen rights"' can be seen as an indissoluble link to nationalism, to notions of descent and blood, and to normative political systems of assimilation (Banks 1996: 189). Such nation-state perspectives tend to overlook the possibility that *zanryū-hōjin*'s well-being may not rely heavily on the success of their Japanization. It is expected that the children of these Japanese lineages will more easily achieve Japanization than those who have no blood relation to Japan. However, Bai, an ethnic-Korean Chinese citizen possessing no blood relation to Nakajima, found Japanese society much easier to assimilate to than he did Han Chinese society. In contrast, his wife, Yanli, who has supposedly inherited "half-Japanese blood," has adopted Korean traditions to consolidate her relationship with Bai to increase her self-esteem, in spite of the empowerment which Bai has achieved through Japanization. For the Nakajimas, the meaning of Japanese citizenship is not a matter of national/non-national or Japanese/Chinese. It is rather an opportunity, namely flexible citizenship, which can be used to enhance strategies, widen resources, and gain power. They exercise flexible citizenship in multi-directional processes, acting back and forth in the still-loose market in transnational space. In such a free place, Bai and Yanli could fake their Chinese academic records to obtain higher degrees in Japan, which helped them to keep open the possibility of returning to China or emigrating to South Korea. These multi-directional processes may create contested transnational spaces through multiple forces in both their sending and hosting societies (Peike *et al.* 2004: 10).

Cosmopolitanism via Japanization

The Japanese state's post-1972 repatriation policies, embedded within traditional kinship ideologies, encourage the repatriates to reside in their "original" hometowns

in Japan. This partly suggests a desire to reduce urban population burdens, and partly the need to reduce the cost of state support, in that it leaves the support of the migrants to their relatives. However, according to an official survey conducted on 4,094 *zanryū-hōjin* families who were repatriated at state expense through the SFC institution and who have been settled in Japan for over 10 years, 57.1 percent now live in the Greater Tokyo area, including nearby Kanagawa and Saitama prefectures; 19.6 percent live in Osaka; 10.2 percent in Aichi Prefecture; 8 percent in Nagano Prefecture; and the remaining 5.1 percent live in other prefectures.[1] In my fieldwork I heard many stories about how repatriates ran the risk of worsening their relationships with Japanese relatives by breaking promises having to do with kinship and ancestral responsibilities in order, like the Moritas, to resettle in metropolitan areas.

The primary motivation of *zanryū-hōjin* to become metropolitans is the easier access to 3K jobs offered in the cities. This is the major characteristic of big cities in the world where the presence of migrant workers from the Third World results in highly international populations. Radical Chinese intellectuals condemned peasant mentalities and behaviours as "backward" during the Maoist modernization movement, which emphasized urban development (Rofle 1992: 107). This phenomenon reinforced the long-lasting inequality and disparity between the urban and the rural in China. Spatial hierarchy becomes a tool in people's struggle for empowerment through urbanization. For underprivileged rural Chinese, going overseas is often seen as a shortcut to modernity. Few rural Chinese manage to go abroad, and those that do often do so through less-than-legitimate emigration channels. The colonial legacy through which *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* war victims have been given legal access to bring their families to an economically advanced country has provided another channel. Living in metropolitan areas can thus not only satisfy *zanryū-hōjin*'s psychological needs but can also help them to fulfill their obligations to provide status for their rural Chinese relatives through a transformation of status from peasants to urbanites in Tokyo and Osaka.

Cosmopolitanism is regarded as a newly recognized form of behavior, as it invokes the creation of common values among citizens of the world. In contrast to multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism deals with "the tendency of people to reproduce rigid notions of ethnic or minority culture and group belonging" (Vertovec *et al.* 2002: 5). The major motivation for people to create "market multiculturalism" is to use cultural and ethnic differences as resources of some sort for individuals to achieve social mobility (Frisina 2006: [14]). In metropolitan centers, information and images are "transmitted across the globe, people coming from different origins are no longer inspired by their traditions but rather are more protean, absorbing diversity in everyday dealings" in order to choose new lifestyles as they wish (Frisina 2006: 1–10). While cosmopolitanism tolerates differences and embraces cultural complexity, fundamentalist traditions of religion, nationalism, or ethnic identity find it disturbing, and often violently oppose it (Giddens 2002: 4–5, 48–50).

Escaping from the pressurizing expectations of Japanization among their Japanese relatives, many *zanryū-hōjin* desire a space that offers them freedom and tolerates their non-Japanese behaviors. This pursuit of cosmopolitanism for its attendant

access to economic benefits and cultural freedom presents a motive for the *zanryū-hōjin* to repatriate that is very different from that which is taken for granted – the desire to return to their homeland. Hypothetically, if they had channels to go to other metropolitan centers where they could enjoy similar citizen rights, Japan, their "mother country," might become their second choice. The cosmopolitan movement and condition of *zanryū-hōjin* demonstrate that these rural migrants from Northeast China can be fluid and mobile; they do not face "the choice to become or remain an alien or a non-national" (Beck and Sznaider 2006), nor do they face the choice to assimilate or resist.

The case of the Morita family illustrated in the last chapter indicates that they had experienced a desperate Japanization. They relied on their Japanese relatives to carry out the administrative procedures of the stem family's settlement in Japan, and felt it necessary to show their relatives the proper attitudes towards Japanization. However their Japanization was urged by their desire to pursue knowledge, mobility, and modernity, which required necessary cultural skills to advance their modernization. Mr Morita's desire to build a new home in Tokyo by breaking away from his ethnic roots in his ancestral town was intensified through his disappointment of the traditional kinship values and responsibilities emphasized as "Japanese culture" by his relatives, which challenged his manner of ruling his Chinese family. Therefore his identity as a repatriate was transformed into that of a rural migrant in the big city. After his death, Mrs Morita felt it necessary to enhance her modern status through his remains, which were accepted for burial in his biological family's tomb. In adapting to cosmopolitan life, tradition often mingles with modernity in odd ways (Giddens 2002: 43). In this paradoxical fashion, Mrs Morita accentuated her children's patrilineal Japanese blood as a legitimate Japaneseness.

Belief in "Japanese blood" appears to be more prominent among *zanryū-hōjin* than among the Japanese mainstream. Morita's daughter Kasumi appears to be particularly sensitive to attitudes that downplay her Japaneseness. Her mental disorder is apparently the result of a process of high pressure for assimilation, accentuated by her father's hyper-modernization. When offended by being called "little Japanese ghost," Morita reacted violently to punish offenders, even if they were children. He stopped the habit of beating his wife because he was taught that a Japanese man would not beat a woman. Regardless of how threatened Kasumi felt, in Japan Morita wanted to be Japanese and a violent reaction would make him appear "non-Japanese" and therefore less modern. Therefore Morita adopted a civilized reaction in accepting an official apology when his daughter was slapped in class. If it had been not Kasumi, but one of his sons who had been slapped in public, would Morita have reacted in the same way? Neither his widow nor his sons believed so.

Kasumi was an affordable cost in the family's modernization – granted by the tradition of discrimination against females. Later, when Mrs Morita tried to cope with the discrimination that she felt from her successful sons and sophisticated daughters-in-law, Kasumi, again, became an affordable cost. To sustain her authority as the mother-in-law, Mrs Morita commanded Kasumi to serve male family members like a maid, while Kasumi was willing to please her devoted mother submissively.

Summary

Desires and tensions nurtured and recharged alongside social changes across national and cultural boundaries within the above four families. Their motivations emerged when they desired to release themselves in Japan from structural constraints imposed by Chinese rural society. However, after this "liberation" they were left "alone" to create a sense of self in the vast modern world. They continue to refashion their motivations when they encounter obstacles and conflicts in such a new, free, and foreign space – namely Japan but in fact it just implies a modern world. They accept patriarchal values, practice traditional tricks, absorb new ideas, and overcome rules in order to tap resources, to heal tensions with others, and to reconstruct the meanings of home and self. The ways they act seem largely to remain within the social contexts and cultural meanings of rural northeast China. These "carried-over" behaviors are not necessarily understood merely as traditionalism, since tradition often can be used as cultural scripts (Erman 1998: 162) to cope with modernization. In other words, *zanryū-hōjin* want to ensure they can make the most of both worlds – from traditional and rural China to modern and metropolitan Japan. Applying traditional values and practices to resolve conflicts in their personal relationships, the *zanryū-hōjin* families I have studied under the measurement of pure relationships have achieved rather low degrees of modernization, even though such modernization is accelerated by their transnationalization.

The concept of pure relationships does depict the very characteristics of modernity, however, modernity and counter-modernity have remained in a dialectical relationship (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000: 288). The *zanryū-hōjin*'s route to modernity embarks from their counter-modern acts. Their pursuit of modernization lies largely within a historical trend, and their effort to acquire it mainly involves forming instrumental relationships – making use of relationships with others to gain material benefits and improve social status. As a result, their individualization or building of modern selves to handle pure relationships is disrupted by their instrumental relationships. Leading a life according to instrumental relationships means that individualization may be confined by dependence on others. These seemingly profitable and useful instrumental relationships may also produce negative effects and present a threat to the *zanryū-hōjin*. This raises the question of whether the agency of *zanryū-hōjin*'s life politics merely consist of new strategies of making the best of the same old deals.

The focus of this analysis is to understand modernization and its interlocking relations to ethnicity and its closely associated traditions and attitudes, which can by no means be ignored. It is important to see to what extent modernization and ethnicity continue to inhibit, and to what extent they are manipulated by, the people concerned, both rationally and intuitively. Rural migrants who demand "modernity" do not always act in the particular ways conceptualized by Giddens as life politics. In this sense, Giddens can sometimes be accused of wearing rose-tinted glasses – "bad old traditions" will be replaced by "good modernity." My informants tend to be strongly prejudiced in favor of those with all the kinds of capital that Bourdieu talks about. They look at the overall system of power and wealth within which they

arise, and at the structures that maintain this system-behind-systems. Although these ex-peasants may be learning modern practices of privacy/freedom/democracy/citizen rights, inadequately in many cases, they possess few skills to handle modernization individually. As a result, they use their flexible citizenship to build not only "modern" so-called "pure relationships," but also instrumental relationships that they consider will help them to secure the modernity they desire.

7 Generational tensions and personhoods developed in Japan

There were conflicts between generations in the majority of *zanryū-hōjin* households encountered in Japan. This phenomenon is not caused by emigration to Japan. The causes of discontent are complex, resulting from the difficulty of adapting to modern urban living and from intergenerational conflicts that are caused by changing desires among the young, and these in turn have been initially caused by changes in Northeast China's economic and social structure (Yan 2003) and exacerbated by the experience of emigration to an even more materially affluent and modern urban environment. On the other hand, *zanryū-hōjin* children are also affected by the strategies their parents use to cope with the difficulty of adapting to modern life in Japan. Some children rely on themselves in restructuring their own personhoods within the contradictions between the Japanese education system and their parents' traditionalism. Japanese schooling, as whole-personhood development in terms of the ideological Japanese spirit of collectivism and self-discipline, has affected *zanryū-hōjin* children who want to assimilate into mainstream Japanese society and tend radically and wholeheartedly to accept the collectivist values and practices.

Discontent among older generations

In Japan the majority of older *zanryū-hōjin* live separately from their children and grandchildren, despite the fact that these elders are imbued with traditional kinship values. Losing parental authority, these elders have to cope with the change of family order and face acute psychological and material insecurities in Japan. Their need for caring kin is particularly strong. According to a *Kōseishō* survey conducted between November 2003 and March 2004,[1] only 28.1 percent of extended stem families of *zanryū-koji*'s children and 38.4 percent of extended stem families of *zanryū-fujin*'s children were still living with their parents in order to fulfill the financial responsibilities to them; they had been repatriated at state expense with the agreement to look after their parents in Japan. Most of these children of *zanryū-koji* and *zanryū-fujin*, in fact, had left their parents within three years of arriving in Japan. The average age of the children of *zanryū-koji* surveyed was 34.8 years and the average age of the children of *zanryū-fujin* surveyed was 40.9 years. Of second-generation *zanryū-hōjin* (including spouses), 83 percent were employed;

48.8 percent of the first generation (including spouses) had received only pocket money (less than ¥10,000 per month) from their children.

In Tokyo I observed that *zanryū-hōjin*, especially those over 40, felt a general dissatisfaction with Japanese society, expressed in their complaint that "Japan is a cold society." However, I also observed that some of those who complained seldom mingled with mainstream Japanese in their daily lives, although they were surrounded by enthusiastic Japanese volunteers. Several *zanryū-koji* even told me that they had been moved to tears at the warmth extended to them by large numbers of Japanese volunteers in the first years of their settlement in Japan. Thus their sense of the "coldness" of Japanese society requires a critical analysis. Did the coldness they felt come from their interaction with "cold" Japanese people, or from their distaste for urbanized human relationships, in which they find it hard to obtain warmth and emotional support?

Before economic reform started in the late 1970s, rural Heilongjiang people interacted within their existing village social networks; villagers cherished people who were naïve and compliant rather than opinionated – people with qualities that would maintain harmony within a relatively closed society; calculating and ambitious people were unwelcome and tended not to prosper in these rural communities; households were kin-based, the family head being the grandfather and the least powerful member being the daughter-in-law; wife-beating was common and was regarded as merely a way for a husband to make things right at home (Yan 2003). An ideal happy family was one that achieved four generations living together harmoniously under the same roof. The oldest generation in such a family would live long enough to see their great-grandchildren, although in practice, families composed of more than three generations were rare. The powerless daughters-in-law could empower themselves in time by becoming mothers-in-law. Married sons and grandsons were expected to look after the older generations and fulfill ancestral duties; the older generations, in return, offered them guidance and advice about maintaining the household. Those who demanded the division of household property for the sake of their stem family's well-being were regarded as rebellious and selfish. It was common for a family of three generations all to sleep in the same bed, in order to save resources during extremely cold winters. Young couples usually slept in the corner of this bed, which was partitioned off by a fabric curtain. This type of communalistic family life meant that demands for privacy and individual material desires and desires for emotional communication were culturally condemned to the point of being almost unthinkable (Yan 2003).

In the post-reform years, this traditional mechanism of intergenerational reciprocity has broken down and been replaced by a new logic of balanced exchange. Young daughters-in-law, once the least powerful in the traditional kinship order, now play a major role in transforming the family institution through their expression of the three major components of their subjective worlds: autonomy, emotionality, and desire (Yan 2003: 15–16). The desires of rural youth for material well-being and social mobility have been enhanced by the widespread discourses of modernity in post-Mao China. Rural women have been offered better opportunities to seek social mobility in the outside world through marriage migration, thus leaving the

countryside with a shortage of potential brides. My fieldwork data shows that many young rural women in Heilongjiang wish to emigrate to Japan by marrying *zanryū-hōjin* and/or Japanese citizens. Meanwhile, to increase their leverage in the unbalanced marriage market, rural young men have begun to develop their romantic skills in order to be able to date and have girlfriends and satisfy the desires of young women for emotional communication. To achieve this, they pay attention to movies and popular songs from Hong Kong and Taiwan. With this leverage, brides-to-be and young daughters-in-law can influence their fiancés and husbands to fight against the traditional kinship order and authority with a view to achieving the independence of their nuclear families and protecting their own interests and freedom.

This transformation of private life in rural China has not been easy; it is a process full of confusion, anger, and suffering in both emotional and material terms, especially for the older generations. This rapid transformation of individuality among village youth is characterized by a surge of egotism, insofar as they emphasize with the right to pursue personal interests yet ignore moral obligations to other individuals and commitment to civic duty (Yan 2003: 217, 226). To cope with these changes and ensure security in their old age, parents employ a variety of strategies, such as redefining the notion of filial piety. To safeguard their relationships with their sons and grandsons, the older generations blame their daughters-in-law for causing such "evil" changes. In other ways, too, the transformation in private life has led to the transformation of kinship and social relations. Villagers have gone beyond the boundaries of inherited blood-based relatedness to build networks outside their villages through all kinds of social networks, which are largely based on making friends through personal charisma. This creation of extended relatedness involves considerable individual choice and agency (Yan 2003: 39).

One *zanryū-koji* who complained about the "coldness" of Japanese society gave me an example of what he meant: when husband and wife had quarrels in rural Heilongjiang, villagers would come up to mediate in the fight right away. But in Japan, no matter how violent the couple's fight might become, neighbors would be indifferent or would call the police to interfere in the couple's family affairs. He concluded this behavior to be evidence of the "heartlessness" of Japanese people. However, this type of behavior can best be described to be a characteristic of modern urban living in general. The boundary between "modern social relations" and Japanese "coldness" is thus unclear. The personhoods of older *zanryū-hōjin* were developed in pre-reform village society. They would have encountered a "coldness" of social relations similar to what they feel in Japan even if they were still living in their home villages. In the transnational terrain, the change immediately felt by *zanryū-hōjin* is *Japan* – more specifically, Japanese metropolises – where, however, they can avoid dealing with ordinary Japanese but must deal with urban Chinese migrants, including their own children and grandchildren whose personhoods are formed within the Japanese metropolis. Many older informants who complained about their rebelling children were aware of the changes in generational position in their villages, and thus do not simply go back to China even if they find life in Japan so uncomfortable.

Internal prejudices

Negative reactions toward migrants are largely due to psychological motivations to conceal pejorative ethnic attitudes in public behavior under a placid veneer of social politeness (Tsuda 1998: 358). This correlates to the situation of *zanryū-hōjin* in Japan. In fact the *zanryū-hōjin* I met in Tokyo seemed to face more severe discriminatory attitudes from other types of Chinese migrants than they did from the mainstream Japanese. I often heard stigmatizing words used to describe the *zanryū-hōjin* community by urbanized and educated Chinese, such as "bad quality" or "low-level." Some even blamed *zanryū-hōjin* for affecting the Chinese image in Japan as a whole. A university student from Nanjing was offended when she saw several *zanryū-hōjin* who were bargaining loudly at a vegetable shop in poor Japanese, saying "Chinese no money, sell me cheaper." Their failures of Japanization in general, comparing with other Chinese's successful Japanization, have caused many *zanryū-hōjin* to develop a complex of inferiority when they deal with other types of Chinese, often suspiciously. Their dealings with other Chinese migrants have often brought out the derogatory meaning of "*peasant*." I observed that *zanryū-hōjin* often used the word peasant or *nongmin* to refer to each other in a derogatory manner. The word peasant has become a malicious adjective, often used to attack others to redress conflicts. If they were hurt by Japanese racist attitudes they could make a fuss over racism to heal their dignity; but this will not work when they were despised and loathed by Chinese.

Tsuda (2003: 263–321) finds a strategic counter-identity among his *nikkeijin* research subjects: they enhance their Brazilian identity in order to escape from the pressures in Japanese society to behave like Japanese. *Zanryū-hōjin* coming from rural China with limited education, however, may apply quite different strategies to cope with prejudices than migrants from the Brazilian middle class, despite the fact that both migrant groups encounter similar Japanese people in public housing neighborhoods and 3K workplaces in daily life. Many *zanryū-hōjin* have experienced rapid social mobility, from peasants in rural China to urbanites in metropolitan Japan, they tend to regard lower-class Japanese as "failures" simply because they have had little social success in spite of having lived in a first-world country since birth. Their scornful attitude towards Japanese "failures" is one of their strategies for coping with ethnic prejudice, but it results in more racist encounters. One informant, showing a great deal of emotion, said to me that those "failures" might have committed suicide if they had not been able to find fulfillment through racist attacks against newcomers. In terms of class theory, *zanryū-hōjin* prejudice towards Japanese "failures" can be seen as an internal discrimination within a lower class.

Schooling as whole-person development

In Japan parents and teachers expect school to function as the training ground where children will learn how to behave socially, through activities that emphasize egalitarian participation, resolution of conflict by empathy for others, patience,

and a commitment and willingness to transfer individual accomplishment to the group (LeTendre 1999: 292). Not only are teachers responsible for the transmission of explicit knowledge, but also for counseling, guidance and discipline in a wide range of non-academic activities that are designed to enhance the development of the whole person. Both academic materials and the non-academic curriculum leave little time for teachers to tailor teaching to local needs (Fukuzawa 1994: 61–64). Activities under the umbrella of lifestyle guidance and group living appear to be significant pedagogies (LeTendre 1999: 284). The goals of lifestyle guidance are healthy social, emotional, and physical development including use of time, appearance, appropriate manners, home life, and empathy to others' needs or *omoiyari* in Japanese, sometimes emphasizing self-sacrifice.

Through extracurricular clubs, or *bukatsudō* in Japanese, students learn how to relate to seniors (*senpai*) and juniors (*kōhai*). Being a junior is a training of attitude: students must behave in a humble manner in evaluating themselves and be eager to learn from their seniors. Students are free to choose to voluntarily make a long-term personal investment in a club in which they can find self-esteem and opportunities for intense relationships. Many Japanese adults appreciate their previous training in self-discipline and self-perfection in the clubs, as it later helps them to relate to workplace settings. This positive view of socialization in *bukatsudō* training may explain the continuity of Japanese commonsense (Cave 2004). The exercises of group living and lifestyle guidance have indeed offered alternative ways of leadership and sense of community (LeTendre 1999: 284).

The emphasis on collectivism, *omoiyari*, and self-sacrifice as the foundation of moral training in the Japanese education system may subsequently lead to collective responsibility (Kuwayama 1996: 127). When a group fails, every group member must take responsibility; and when someone fails, all of his/her group co-members must share in the responsibility and punishment. Bullying can take place in institutionalized hierarchies inured to hard discipline (Cave: 2004: 411). School violence and school refusal, which began to appear in the media in the 1980s, implicitly indicated that Japanese students were starting to define their own identities against the identities ascribed by the education system (Yoneyama 2000: 92). These phenomena were seen as precipitating a crisis, and this eventually led to the debate on education reform in the mid 1980s and after.

Schooling for minority students

The children of Japanese expatriates returning to Japan from the West after having accompanied their parents while the latter were employed abroad were seen as a group of victims and as being different from the Japanese norm, and were called *kikokushijo*, meaning the children returned from overseas. Although born in Japan of Japanese parents, registered in Japan as Japanese citizens and able to speak Japanese as their native language, they were seen as less-than-Japanese because they had spent time in other cultures. As students, they were often thought to be more forward and opinionated than other students, and they were sometimes thought to lack the social and ideological skills necessary to be accepted by their

teachers, who assessed their behaviour according to the standards of Japanese commonsense. In a society where social status and employment are closely linked to the educational institution attended, fears about their children's future created a problematic issue for parents who sent their Western-influenced children back to the Japanese educational system. Fortunately, *kikokushijo* parents were often situated in the upper ranks of society and were equipped with financial means and acumen. They were able to lobby politicians and the Ministry of Education to develop a system of "re-Japanizing" their "disadvantaged" children in special schools, often elite private schools (Goodman 1990; Yashiro 1995). On the other hand, under the pressures of globalization, Japanese business people sought the qualities of Western influence. This allowed *kikokushijo* and their parents to manipulate their "international" qualities in their favor and obtain important educational and social advantages.

The case of *kikokushijo* showed that the standardized Japanese school system had not been designed to cope with children raised as Japanese who could not easily fit in for linguistic or cultural reasons. This presented particular difficulties for another type of *kikokushijo* – the *zanryū-hōjin* children. Goodman (1990: 180–181) observed that nearly 3,000 *zanryū-hōjin* children were registered in over 1,000 schools throughout Japan in 1986. The proportion of these children in the non-compulsory part of the educational system, such as high schools, colleges and tertiary institutions, was very low – only 5 percent of this age group enrolled in schools. Under programs set up under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, the clear policy was for *zanryū-hōjin* children to be assimilated as quickly as possible into Japanese society. Although categorized as *kikokushijo*, *zanryū-hōjin* children were differentiated from other such children and their education was budgeted separately, and insufficiently. Although the majority of them faced severe language and curriculum problems in Japanese schools, only 14 percent of the schools with *zanryū-hōjin* students offered special lessons for them, and only 4 percent had special teachers available to help them. Accounts of bullying of these children began to appear in the Japanese media.

The research on Brazilian *nikkeijin* children in Toyota City observed that Japanese students usually stayed with their homeroom for activities concerning lifestyle guidance trainings. Brazilian *nikkeijin* students were separated out from their homerooms and sent to international classrooms. This special curriculum for foreign students broke with the ethic of equal treatment that prevails in Japanese schools, and some Japanese students envied or even resented the international class that gave lenient treatment to foreign students. Although these Brazilian *nikkeijin* students were able to enjoy a greater degree of leniency within the Japanese school, they tended to suffer from lower prospects of passing entrance exams for further study (Linger 2001: 66–68).

The parents of *zanryū-hōjin* children from rural China tend to be less educated than *nikkeijin* parents from the middle class of Brazil. Strategies for the children's future are affected by the uncertain future of the families themselves. *Nikkeijin* parents hope that their children will acquire English and also retain their Brazilian language and culture, as they intend for them to go back to South America someday,

after the parents achieve certain economic goals (Ishii 2005). In contrast, *zanryū-hōjin* parents tend to have faith in the Japanese education system, although most of them keep their status quo as flexible citizens, setting up a family base in Japan in order to take advantage of opportunities provided by transnational markets. Thanks to their identity as war victims, certain official privileges have been specially provided for their children. For instance, although migrant children face few opportunities for post-compulsory education, some universities and high schools in the outskirts of Tokyo have special quotas for admitting *zanryū-hōjin* students, whose education has been budgeted for especially (but insufficiently), while no such arrangement exists for *nikkeijin* children (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 134).

Depending on how many migrant children there are in the school, some Japanese schools and teachers make significant efforts to help migrant children by creating a space of their own for them. Nonetheless, language problems create major difficulties. There has been a rapid increase of migrant children needing Japanese language assistance in elementary, junior, and senior high schools since the 1980s (Tomozawa 2002; Fujii and Tabuchi 2001). Teachers tend to believe that language assistance is sufficient, despite the fact that educational strategies aimed at migrant children are still in the process of formulation (Fujii and Tabuchi 2001). Lacking financial means, most migrant children have been sent to their local public schools, where it has long been assumed that students would only be Japanese and that any who were slightly different were to be assimilated. Migrant parents, such as those of *nikkeijin* and *zanryū-hōjin* schoolchildren, have challenged these assumptions and practices (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 129). However, they have not been powerful enough to make their voices heard or to improve their children's schooling environment, leaving it to individual school teachers to act on their behalf (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 135) and segregate these "deviants" from the mainstream, as Japanese schoolchildren are afraid of "different" classmates and might hurt the minority children (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 132). It seems that the Japanese school system is relatively inflexible in its response to migrant students, whose presence in Japan is a result of the global shifting of the labor market across nation-state boundaries.

One investigation reports that the figures for NEET (Not in Education or Employment or Training) migrant children have been rapidly increasing in Japanese society (Sekiguchi 2005). This is relevant to my fieldwork. A number of informants asserted that if children cannot come to Japan while they are still young enough to adapt to the new environment, it is better to postpone their arrival until they have finished secondary school in China, so that they will at least have sufficient knowledge and confidence to lead adult lives in Japan. This statement was made because they had seen many minority students experience difficulties in Japanese secondary education, resulting in further failure in their adult lives in Japan. In the case of the Moritas Kasumi went through Japanese secondary education in Sendai, a school that had little experience of foreign children and little capacity to recognize a foreign child's inability to cope with radical Japanization. Its principal's only solution to Kasumi's problems was to put Kasumi with classmates four years younger than herself.

A study of the language problems of *zanryū-hōjin* schoolchildren emphasizes the importance of getting the children to understand their identities by sympathizing with their grandparents' traumatic histories (Kiyota 1995). This emphasis is shared by the academic advocacy of Araragi (2000: 40–41) and Fujii and Tabuchi (2001), who propose that educational strategies for *zanryū-hōjin* schoolchildren should not neglect to encourage a positive attitude towards China. In Ishii's (2005) view, meanwhile, respect for migrant children's mother tongue and culture is linked to the establishment of the child's own identity, which is of great significance in the development of a positive view of the self. This idealistic aim, if realized, would result in a more multicultural approach in Japanese education. Some teachers have tried to give *zanryū-hōjin* a "happy coexistence" by consulting with their parents, encouraging them to teach their children both cultures; however, the teachers were not able to communicate with most *zanryū-hōjin* parents, who spoke little Japanese and were too occupied with daily survival to consider their children's cultural identities (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 132). I argue that whether migrant children develop a positive attitude towards their societies of birth may depend to a certain extent on their negotiations of independence from their parents, and may develop further through the complicated and contradictory processes of socialization in their host societies.

Studies of childhood affirm that children are not empty or passive, to be filled with values by adults. Rather, they are active social actors in their own right, finding their own sense of the environments they are brought into (Stephens 1995: 23). Migrant parents tend to explore new norms suspiciously and forego old values unwillingly. Migrant children are compelled to avoid isolation or even violence, and their intense desire to assimilate can be more determined than the assimilation policies attempted by the authorities of host countries. In this sense, children's conflicts over identity can be deeper than those of their less assimilated parents. However, migrant children may nonetheless be rejected, as their identities are critically questioned by the mainstream. This may either stop them from further assimilation or drive them into more strenuous attempts at integration as a way of clearing up their identity conflicts or crisis.

Camping as moral education

The following case is that of a sudden emotional explosion during my fieldwork interactions with Miyuki and her siblings. I analyze this incident because it seems to me to vividly exemplify the process of *zanryū-hōjin* children's radical assimilation. This extreme situation also casts light on the dynamics of their environment – the dynamics of Japan's moral education, through which the children have internalized values and developed their personhoods. The difficulties in the Sasaki siblings' upbringing provide us with insights into the lives of migrant children in contemporary Japan.

Miyuki, the granddaughter of a *zanryū-fujin*, was 26 years old during my fieldwork in 2003. She was taken to Japan at the age of nine in 1987. In the following year her father was seriously injured at work and her mother was also seriously ill,

and both parents stayed in hospital for two years. Miyuki and her three younger siblings were sent to an orphanage and taken care of by Japanese volunteers. When they returned home they could hardly communicate with their parents, either verbally or culturally. Miyuki became an interpreter between the two generations. From the age of 15, Miyuki became a parent in the family, guided her parents to deal with the rules and norms of Japanese society, and handled the family's daily problems and conflicts between the two generations. The burden of family responsibilities left Miyuki exhausted, to the extent that on several occasions she attempted suicide.

Miyuki repeatedly told me her sister's story. Yoriko, her second youngest sister, had been seriously bullied in primary and secondary school. Her parents had fanatically attempted to protect their daughters' virginity by not allowing them to socialize after school, creating a further social barrier for Yoriko. They had forcibly stopped Yoriko from painting, because they regarded painting as play, not homework. Her father became increasingly bad tempered, while her mother attempted to gain the children's attention through emotional behaviour and weeping. Yoriko received corporal punishment from her father, in front of teachers and classmates, as he believed that was what a good parent should do, although this parental approach did not work in Japan. Yoriko was extremely embarrassed by her parents. Subject to torments both at home and at school, Yoriko sought support from Miyuki, but the elder sister was busy with boys and dating. Once, Yoriko hysterically begged Miyuki to take her out. Miyuki refused, even though Yoriko repeatedly warned that she would never forgive Miyuki's heartless refusal. When attending middle school, Yoriko met Yasuyuki, a boy from a Cambodian refugee family who had adopted a Japanese-sounding name. Neither of them continued to high school education. They got married young and were NEET youth for a long time. For them, the most difficult thing to cope with in Japan was boredom. Once, when Yoriko had a minor dispute with her mother, Yasuyuki helped Yoriko by harshly beating her mother. Another time, when Yoriko had a minor quarrel with Yasuyuki's sister, he pushed Yoriko down a flight of stairs from the second floor.

In August 2003 Miyuki invited me to a camping event where I could meet her siblings, fiancé and friends. On the morning of the departure there was a typhoon. I waited for a cancellation notice but it did not come. The wait made me nearly an hour late in arriving at the meeting point. The camping site was inside a park called Youth Village, which was near the beach. Miyuki instructed everyone to queue at the outdoor reception in the pouring rain. We were issued utensils and bed sheets to be carried to a large room with futons, where over 20 of us were to stay. The major characters in the incident are the following:[2]

YORIKO: Miyuki's younger sister, in her 20s.

YASUYUKI: Yoriko's husband, who settled in Japan with his parents as Cambodian refugees.

SORA: A Cambodian girl who grew up with the Miyuki siblings in Ichō-danchi.

YUKI: Another informant (Fumiko's daughter) who did not know anyone related to Miyuki. I invited her to join the camping with Miyuki's approval.

KAZU: A university student engaged in *zanryū-hōjin* research who did not know anyone related to Miyuki. I introduced him to the camping group as a researcher and as a cameraman.

ETHNIC YOUTH: A group of university student volunteers which had formed to do activities for ethnic minority youth in Japan. About 15 members of Ethnic Youth participated in the camping.

Throughout the event Miyuki was busy giving instructions about what to do, when, and how. The first job assigned to Yuki and me was to slice the barbecue meat. We cut the meat slowly while chatting. Yoriko and Yasuyuki arrived in the late afternoon. Kazu set up the video camera and I started to ask questions. Everyone enjoyed being videoed. The rain stopped and everybody went out to the beach nearby to play with fireworks. Then, the drinking party began, with a lot of laughter. After midnight, Yuki and I were exhausted and went to sleep in the corner while the raucous party went on until 4 am. Yuki and I rose at 7 am to find everyone else sleeping soundly. We breakfasted and went for a quick swim. When we returned to Youth Village, everybody was at the reception area waiting to check out. Miyuki took them to the beach and instructed everybody to play in the water while she watched the bags and food. After a while, she announced that it was time for a shower.[3] Anxiously, Miyuki told us that Yoriko and Yasuyuki were angry about being videoed. Kazu and I officially apologized to them and promised that we would not use the tapes. Yoriko suddenly cried, and immediately gained everybody's sympathy. Yasuyuki then attacked Miyuki for not informing him about our presence in advance, claiming that he would not have come had he known of it. Miyuki's fiancé clarified that everyone received emails about our documentary project. But Yasuyuki forcefully insisted on finding the person responsible for not sending him said email. Sora tried to restore harmony to the situation by suggesting the crowd be dismissed and that they go home to check their email, but Yasuyuki targeted Sora as being responsible for this "sad mistake." Defending herself, Sora turned to blame Kazu and me. Kazu emphasized that he did not stop videoing because everyone was enjoying it. This placed Sora in a difficult position and resulted in her standing with Yasuyuki and making accusations against us.

I had instructed Miyuki to obtain everyone's permission in advance, before joining the camping. To avoid diverting the blame on to Miyuki, I kept silent. However, my silence discouraged Kazu, who was left to defend himself by saying that he had just followed my instructions. I then became the central target of the discontent. Yasuyuki shouted at Miyuki that she could not let me go with only a simple apology after hurting Yoriko so badly. Seemingly afraid, Miyuki blamed me for whatever she could and Yasuyuki helped to shift the blame, scolding me directly: "You're selfish! You even went to swim alone!" I was confused about what was wrong with going to swim alone. The Ethnic Youth members told me that by going to swim alone, I had tried to escape from cleaning up the room. I felt this was unfair, since I had not known when the others would wake up. Yasuyuki grasped this chance to accuse Miyuki of not informing me of their schedule. Sora started to accuse me: "Every adult should have the basic manners to check rules

and follow them. You were late. You were chatting away and sliced the barbecue meat so slowly. You didn't play with fireworks with us. You didn't drink with us. You didn't swim with us. You didn't inform us before going out this morning." Yuki defended us, saying we had not wanted to wake up the group. This seemed to spur on the Ethnic Youth group to attack Yuki and me with reproaches such as "Don't try to make any excuses!" and "Don't behave like a child!" Kazu now sided with the group and demanded that I rethink and recognize my guilt. The culmination was a long lecture about the virtues of solidarity (*danketsu*) and empathy (*omoiyari*) in formal Japanese speech (*keigo*) that differed greatly from the way they had spoken to me previously.

Interpreting the videotaping drama

The emotional explosion seems to trace back to Yoriko's accumulated depression, which was released by targeting Miyuki, who was driven by feelings of guilt due to her role as a surrogate parent for the family. The love/hate relationship between siblings was accidentally triggered at the videotaping event, as both Yasuyuki and Yoriko had looked for whatever opportunity to target Miyuki, even attacking her innocent guests. Finding themselves torn by the situation – Yoriko's pitiful tears, Yasuyuki's use of emotion, Miyuki's choice to blame me – the humanitarian young people from the mainstream, Kazu, and the members of Ethnic Youth, were driven to protect the "powerless." They united to accuse me of the following wrongdoings: 1) late arrival; 2) slicing the barbecue meat too slowly; 3) failing to socialize with the group till dawn; and 4) rising early to go for a swim alone without informing them. Such criticism was as illogically harsh as the proletarians criticizing the bourgeois during the infamous Cultural Revolution. Several of my Japanese friends believed that if I had defended myself in English I could have escaped the vicious persecution. In other words, if I were a Western researcher my "individualistic behaviour" would not have been a problem among the camping members. As Miyuki once said to me, Japanese people tolerate Westerners' individualistic behaviour, however, if a Chinese person behaves similarly to a Westerner, the Chinese would not be considered individualistic, but selfish.

This fieldwork drama is worth studying in the relationship between *omoiyari* upheld by Japanese youth and being a Chinese (selfish) researcher in Japan. The Japanese university students seem to have found themselves forced to take sides in an extreme situation, but their criticism of my "selfishness" was rather their reaction in accordance with the Japanese commonsense that they had long internalized through modern Japanese education.[4] *Omoiyari* – a sensibility to others' feelings and needs, involving the suppression of individual rights for the sake of maintaining group order – has been cultivated by the Ministry of Education as a treasured quality (Kuwayama: 1996: 117). They had gone through the *bukatsudō* training, which functions as a means of reproducing Japanese commonsense that continues to replicate Japanese self-sacrificing lifestyles (Cave 2004: 415). For them, promptness and a group-oriented spirit were part of Japanese moral integrity. The drama played by Yoriko and Yasuyuki provided them with a good opportunity to correct

my "offence" of disrupting the group's schedule. In this incident I could see the hostile attitudes shown toward me, a Chinese researcher, even though I acted in a smiliar way to how a Western researcher might have acted – individualistically.

During the drama surrounding the video filming, the Miyuki siblings, together with their migrant children associates, were performing "Japaneseness." Their emotional explosion was a way for them to demonstrate (to themselves as much as to anyone else) their "Japaneseness" and their difference from their parents – to show their understanding of and compliance with Japanese cultural norms by rebuking and lecturing me, someone from the Asian mainland, who possessed a symbolically generalized Third World identity, that of the place that their parents came from – for non-compliance with these norms. These migrant young people had often expressed ambivalence about Japanese society and their identities. This ambivalence can be seen in the process of formation during their adolescence and youth. Yet, at the same time, they were also radically conforming to Japanese norms. Through this videotaping drama, I saw the extremely difficult upbringing that the Miyuki siblings had experienced together with their friends, coming from refugee families. I also saw narcissism in these vulnerable and angry young migrants, who showed off their own maturity. It had been developed forcefully through helping their unassimilated parents to internalize Japanese commonsense and applying it in their own personhoods as hard-line Japanese. Such narcissistic confidence may drive their judgment of non-Japanese behaviors as backward, as a shortcoming. In the eyes of Miyuki and Sora, my first identity was not a researcher, but a Chinese, and therefore, not much different from their socially inept parents who could not behave as Japanese.

Their emotional explosion served me an "intimate" position to study their embarrassment of their poorly educated *zanryū-hōjin* parents, who had psychological disabilities in learning new norms. Their reaction to their parents, who they saw as stubbornly living within a "backward" worldview, was to totally assimilate into the mainstream in order to be independent of their socially inept parents. Such radical assimilation appears to be as stubborn as their parents, who wanted to lead their lives as *huaqiao*. Migrant youth at one level want to assimilate into mainstream Japanese society, and as one means of doing this, they have wholeheartedly accepted the collectivist values and practices that are imparted through the Japanese education system. In contrast to their parents, *zanryū-hōjin* children, particularly those who want to be nothing else but Japanese, tend to have little interest in transnationalism. In other words, their visions have been limited by the site – Japan – where they have developed their personhoods within the boundary of its culture.

The myth of "China Dragon"

Zhulei was the only son of Yanli and Bai. During my fieldwork period he was 11 years old. Once, Yanli's son came home with serious wounds, so she went to the school to find out what was going on. To her astonishment, the homeroom teacher admitted that she had seen several of the larger boys beating Zhulei, but she had not interfered, as she believed that Zhulei deserved the punishment. In

tears, Yanli emphasized that it was the teacher's responsibility to stop the violence. The teacher then blamed Yanli's failure to train Zhulei in proper behavior. Yanli, still tearful, went to talk to the principal. She complained that allowing a mob of big boys to beat her powerless son was an action violating human rights – a term that Yanli often used in connection with *zanryū-hōjin* activism. The teacher, now also in tears, explained to the principal that her action was right according to the Japanese spirit. The principal calmed the situation in a diplomatic manner but did nothing to solve the problem.

Zhulei kept coming home with injuries consistent with bullying, explaining that he had fallen down the stairs or crashed his bike. Yanli complained to the school for a second time, more dramatically than the first time. She accused the teacher of not having any feelings. The teacher in turn accused Yanli of being an irresponsible parent based on evidence provided by a questionnaire concerning home activities. From the answers, the teacher had deduced that Yanli had not fed her family properly. In fact Zhulei was well satisfied with the noodles and dumplings provided by his mother, but had filled out "No" in his Daily Life Notebook in response to the question's specific wording – "Do you eat *rice*?" Unable to make Yanli feel guilty, the teacher insisted on calling her husband, Bai, who worked in a Japanese company and so would better understand Japanese virtues. Suddenly confronted with an emotional, crying teacher at work, Bai had no choice but to talk politely on the phone. Yanli felt that the teacher had been cunningly able to defeat her by having a "civilized conversation" with her husband and mocking her as an ignorant parent.

Transferring Zhulei to a different public school would have incurred the huge cost of changing residence. Zhulei appeared to be a very independent kid. He could play alone for hours and would react hysterically when his concentration was disturbed. He would abruptly demand that others play with him, and he could make jokes to strangers. With such an independent character, Zhulei found it difficult to make friends in Japanese public primary school and thus was often beaten by classmates. Even in a new public school, Zhulei's individualistic personality might lead to similar problems. It might have been a solution to send him to a *kikokushijo* private school, where individual differences were tolerated. Such prestigious schools are expensive and Zhulei would also face new difficulties in a highly competitive environment among elite students with Western influences. Finding no easy answer, Yanli and Bai decided to try to change Zhulei's personality to fit him into the existing school.

Meanwhile, Zhulei had developed better techniques to cover up happenings at school, since parental complaints could only cause him more suffering. The teacher had also become more skilful in marking Zhulei as an ethnic outsider with insufficient knowledge of Japanese moral integrity, by emphasizing the subtle nuances of the Japanese language that neither Zhulei nor his parents could manage. It seemed from my observations that Zhulei's Japanese was not much different from that of other Japanese children. However, his teacher succeeded in neutralizing Yanli's complaints by emphasizing Zhulei's lack of understanding of the nuances of Japanese.

Yanli attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince her liberal Japanese associates that Zhulei had been mistreated. They suggested she take the teacher to court and present the evidence as part of a legal action. Expecting similar difficulties in dealing with Japanese lawyers, Yanli and Bai considered they would likely lose the lawsuit, and that going to court might negatively affect Zhulei's future schooling through unfavourable comments on his *naishinsho*[5] the confidential school report that circulates from school to school. In desperation, Yanli tried to approach "China Dragon," a mythical gang of *zanryū-hōjin* school victims who had supposedly banded together to relieve the oppression imposed by Japanese schools and solve grievances. However, instead of finding members of "China Dragon," they found only other angry parents who were also looking for "China Dragon" and could only share their disappointment that "China Dragon" appeared to be a legend, even a fantasy of desperate *zanryū-hōjin* parents.

Remarks on the Zhulei case

This is a disturbing case, though it would be unwise to generalize from this one case about the attitudes of Japanese schoolteachers towards migrant children. The teacher's reaction to Zhulei's case has two implications. First, it was acceptable for some boys to beat the one who did not fit in the group activities. Second, her behavior reflects her inexperience in handling his mother's behavior – very different from those who tend to encourage teachers to strictly discipline their spoiled children to improve social skills in order to secure their future in a competitive society (Field 1995: 60; Kuwayama 1996: 119; Hill 1996: 103). Yoshino (1992: 27–30) sees a form of cultural nationalism practiced in contemporary Japan, in that although the ability of non-Japanese to speak Japanese may now be accepted, it is still assumed that they do not understand the subtleties and nuances of the language because they are not born Japanese. This explains that the homeroom teacher insisted on talking to a more compliant parent, assuming he would understand Japanese rules better. Interestingly, this trick defeated Yanli, who had been confident of her social skills in dealing with Japanese norms.

Zhulei and his parents were considered relatively well-assimilated but still faced difficulties no less than those of unassimilated parents. Pushed by desperation, they looked for "China Dragon" for something of a solution, despite the fact that other *zanryū-hōjin* parents who sought protection from "China Dragon" tended to be those who could not speak Japanese at all. I had often heard of "China Dragon" from the Japanese police, from *zanryū-hōjin* members, and from other types of Chinese migrants.[6] One Japanese academic work (Kinoshita 2003: 79) briefly refers to a juvenile gang named "Dragon" as the only place to go for the *zanryū-hōjin* children who had been excluded by the Japanese education system. Throughout the fieldwork period I could hardly find anyone from this juvenile gang,[7] except for one informant who claimed that his acquaintance used to participate in "China Dragon" when it was first established during the early 1990s. Ha said that taking revenge on Japanese children who bullied them at school, China Dragons ambushed their offenders outside school and attacked them with clubs.

Yanli was aware of another disadvantage that had subtly affected Zhulei's popularity at school: Zhulei lacked a Japanese-sounding name. As a loving parent, she considered giving up her husband's Korean family name, but this would have involved a decision to naturalize their citizenship and would thus have affected the family's long-term goal of maintaining access to China and/or Korea for future advancement. In this way, the family's uncertain future has affected Zhulei's assimilation. Yanli planned to send Zhulei to Australia for secondary education in order to live in a larger transnational space across national boundaries. But Zhulei did not like the idea of going to Australia.

Summary

Migration, or repatriation, is one of the major ways for *zanryū-hōjin* parents to obtain better conditions to ensure their children's well-being. A study of the risks of mobility finds that, in an international economy that requires fluid movement of both labor and capital, the institutions of family and school can moderate the losses of social capital that are the result of the negative effects of migration. In migrant families with unsupportive and uninvolved parents, the diminished social capital provided by parents does not compensate for the loss of community social capital caused by a family's move (Hagan *et al.* 1996). I argue that intergenerational tensions in migrant families are more complex than simply results of unsupportive and uninvolved parents. As illustrated by the *zanryū-hōjin* families, intergenerational conflicts have been sharpened by the contrast between the discontent of the older generations and the successful assimilation of the younger generations. The causes of the discontent with their lives in Japan that the older generations feel are complex. These causes cannot be attributed only to the experience of emigration to Japan, as generational positions in Northeast China have also radically changed, alongside the changes in economic and social structures. The discontent of the older generations of *zanryū-hōjin* mainly results from: 1) the difficulty of adapting to modern urban living, exacerbated by the experience of emigration to an even more materially affluent and modern urban environment; and 2) changing desires among the young.

Japanese education, as a means of transmitting the spirit of group consciousness, harmony, obedience, and empathy to others through disciplined training, has served to produce stable Japanese labor relations, but has little experience in coping with the challenge of transnational flows that bring in various types of non-Japanese students. There is an attempt to bring school bullying and ethnic discrimination in Japan together within one analytical model of the social structure. This research finds that the collectivist ideology of Japanese society and the Japanese education system in particular may perhaps accentuate *zanryū-hōjin* children's desire to assimilate (Mihashi 1987). The outcome of this drastic assimilation has produced a cultural gap between *zanryū-hōjin* children and their parents. Some *zanryū-hōjin* children have struggled against their parents, who have given them inapplicable social skills and valueless cultural capital, and instead managed to make their own sense out of the world they inherited passively from their parents. They want to fit

in with their immediate environment and assume a Japanese identity that would facilitate this. Undergoing such processes of radical assimilation, these children may be confined within a cultural boundary, as their seemingly extreme "Japaneseness" allows little flexibility and few strategies that might be employed within their parents' transnational world.

Perhaps the success of the younger generations' assimilation partly explains what it is that stops the discontented older generations from going back to China when they find life in Japan so uncomfortable. Without going back, they can still be compensated by finding spouses in China, which depend on their staying in Japan and using their official residence status as capital. Lastly, this chapter finds that although the structures of capital/centralized power/bureaucracy firmly exist, some *zanryū-hōjin* youth can exercise their life politics as if they have been transformed into reflexive modern individuals. They adopt strategies and make choices independently, at least from their parents. This agency, manifested through their ability to handle individualization, although in a Japanese collectivist way, shows that they are able to deal with modernity by finding other resources within themselves and within both migrant and mainstream Japanese society. As indicated in the two case studies, Zhulei and Miyuki together with her migrant youth friends, showed less interest in transnationalism as they developed their personhoods in Japan. Their parents, on the other hand, seem to be more oriented towards a transnational environment.

Part III

Negotiation

Strategies for betterment

8 *Qiaoxiang* practices and profiting from kinship

As partially studied in Chapter 3, *qiaoxiang*, the hometowns of overseas Chinese, has a sought-after status in the context of China's modernization. The southern coastal areas have had advantages in developing *qiaoxiang*, while the northern inland areas have suffered from disadvantages. *Zanryū-hōjin* have rapidly facilitated the development of new *qiaoxiang* in the Northeast within a short period, allowing these areas to close the gap with the traditional *qiaoxiang* in southern China, where overseas emigration took off centuries ago.

Old and new *qiaoxiang* practices

Zanryū-hōjin's activities in *qiaoxiang* differ from traditional *huaqiao* groups, such as the Singaporean Chinese, studied by Kuah (2000). Their Japanese blood has no significance for the different ways they maintain ties with *qiaoxiang* people, and their *qiaoxiang* ties are similar to those emigrants who went abroad during the post-Mao period. In some senses, they are even comparable with those of the illegal emigrants from the classic *qiaoxiang* of Fuqing on the southern coast, who seek whatever new channels they can find to labor in foreign countries. For traditional *huaqiao* groups, visits to *qiaoxiang* are often driven by nostalgia and curiosity about ethnic roots. One of their major interests in *qiaoxiang* appears to be focused on traditional issues. To obtain financial resources and negotiate for favorable positions in relation to overseas networks, *qiaoxiang* people tend to react to such traditionalism enthusiastically by reinventing their hometown's cultural identities. Engrossed in the ideologies of modernization and globalization promoted by the state of China, *qiaoxiang* people's eyes are opened to the outside world by images that they can only see from the media. They long to hear of modern novelties, international travel experiences, and possibilities of seeking high mobility via adventurous journeys overseas. None of the *huaqiaos* can satisfy them with tangible accounts, but recent emigrants can tell them how to get a visa to enter economically advanced countries, how to find a 3K job, how to save money through cheap rent, food, transport, and opportunities that are free of charge.

Economic class differences are an obvious factor affecting interest in modernity versus interest in the search for ancestral roots and the building up of the *qiaoxiang*. The ex-peasant *zanryū-hōjin* on welfare in Japan cannot afford to do much

to build up the *qiaoxiang* even if they want to like those of Kuah's (2000) informants from Singapore. Perhaps if the *zanryū-hōjin* become rich in Japan they might try to gain face by contributing money to rebuild ancestral houses and become sentimental about their ancestral origins in Japan and/or China, as indicated by a rare case in Fangzheng, where a repatriated *zanryū-koji* who had succeeded economically in Japan built a large tomb inside the Japanese Public Graveyard for his adoptive Chinese parents. To encourage more *zanryū-hōjin* donations, the local authority allowed his family tomb to be built next to the public tomb in which over 5,000 Japanese were buried. His donation was officially ¥5 million, although the payment had not been fully settled as of October 2003, during my fieldwork period.

In Heilongjiang and Fuqing I observed that the images and experiences of the outside world brought in by long-established overseas Chinese were not appealing to *qiaoxiang* people, who held different perceptions or even agendas for seeing the outside world. The ability to endure hardships was highly valued by the *qiaoxiang* people. The lifestyles and choices presented by long-established overseas Chinese tend to be distant from the *qiaoxiang* people's concern about how they might achieve high mobility through a period of hard work sojourning abroad.

In the relationships between *qiaoxiang* people and *zanryū-hōjin* there is a process of negotiation of cultural identity, which are characterized as modern qualities. Many *zanryū-hōjin* I met would never spend a cent for entertainment in Japan. Some never even try the cheapest snack, *onigiri*, supplied by convenience stores everywhere, much less luxury products as perfume or cologne. Interestingly, however, I observed that some of these ex-peasants bring delicate perfumes to their relatives and friends in their hometowns, who would otherwise never use a single drop in their lifetimes. Both givers and receivers would excitedly comment on the sophistication of the perfumes, and symbolically engage in a ritual of "seeing the world" through these French-made gifts brought in by people with access to boutiques in Tokyo.

The practices of Chinese culture and rituals in host countries have been often identified, in the discourses of diasporic phenomena, as characteristic of the diasporic Chinese who emerged as a united global Chinese community. This emphasis on ethno-cultural rights and identities tends to blur social inequalities (Dirlik 2002). My observation of new *huaqiao* and *zanryū-hōjin* in Japan finds that they generally do not celebrate Lunar New Year. Some are even proud of this, as they see their indifference to traditional Chinese festivals as signifying modernization. They have little interest in preserving traditional rituals and customs in *qiaoxiang*. Although they are keen on worshipping ancestral or local deities for the sake of gaining psychological security, this practice can be compared to the modern phenomenon of people seeking *fengshui* or horoscope advice to enhance their psychological and spiritual well-being in modern living.

Charitable activities and transferring merits by displaying a donor's name on buildings in the *qiaoxiang* are unattractive to *zanryū-hōjin*. They have better ways to make their "face." Although they are labor migrants in Tokyo, once they have holidays in *qiaoxiang* they immediately become an elite class of *huaqiao*. With such

swift mobility and the high satisfaction it can bring, any desire to place their names on public buildings through charity is diminished. Their limited financial capacity is already drained by their kin responsibilities. This is probably the main reason for them practicing *qiaoxiang* different from other Chinese diasporas. Therefore, any concern with broader and deeper genealogies or lineage branches would be a sensitive topic in that it would result in pressure for *zanryū-hōjin* to look after more relatives. The greatest benefit that the *qiaoxiang* can gain from *zanryū-hōjin* is the facilitation of the export of cheap labor from the *qiaoxiang*, by whatever means. As reported in the Japanese media, crimes committed by *zanryū-hōjin* members tend largely to involve bringing Chinese to Japan through fake kin relationships (e.g. *Japan Economic Newswire*, August 19, December 3, 25, and 29 2001 and January 21 2002; *Asahi Shimbun* June 26 2002).

The development of the new *qiaoxiang* in the Northeast can be characterized as a phenomenon that emerged when the new waves of Chinese emigration took off during the post-reform years. Yet this transnationalism is not a sudden economic miracle produced by the post-Mao policies. It is rather traced from the creation of Manchukuo through the violent turmoil in 1945, the survival in Chinese peasant households, the Cold War and the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972, following Chinese economic reform and Japan's opening of the door for foreign labor. In this long transformation of East Asian transnationalism, migration activities in the first half of the twentieth century were implemented by colonial powers. From the 1980s, the colonial legacy has been strategically used by *zanryū-hōjin* as a major emigration channel, at the same time it has been strategically used by *qiaoxiang* people to produce new *huaqiao* through creating Sino-Japanese kinship ties.

Fake orphans?

Adoption is a form of creating kinship ties. In the case of *zanryū-hōjin* and their *qiaoxiang*, there is a historical outlook on survival through creating kinship ties with Chinese families by adoption, and this has been carried over into today's emigration by the first generation from the war turmoil of 1945 in order to strategically overcome the constraints set by Japanese immigration. The following issues concern the factors affecting emigration to Japan as "fake orphans."

Orphaned by history

In 1946 the Chinese civil war battle between the CCP and the KMT in Changchun produced many orphans in the Northeast. Like Japanese orphans, these Chinese orphans also grew up in adoptive families in rural areas. It would seem that they might have been able to pass themselves off as Japanese orphans when Japan opened the door to take their orphans back. Kang, the official of the Ranshao county government, asserted that in China's neighborhoods and workplaces, personal and family backgrounds were like an open book, as Chinese culture and politics encouraged everybody to meddle in everybody else's affairs. Before Japanese identity

was considered a channel for emigration, most Japanese orphans had already been specially marked in PSB records as potential "bad elements." A person who claimed to be a Japanese orphan had to be investigated thoroughly, in an investigation involving all his/her associates from childhood to the present. It was unlikely that a fake orphan would be able to buy out such a large number of associates and get them all to tell lies for him/her. Even if such a fake orphan successfully passed investigation in China, the chance of passing the *Kōseishō*'s investigation would be small.

Orphaned by human trade

As discussed in Chapter 3, the Northeastern rural communities had suffered from high rates of infant mortality, and thus women tended to give birth many times until the beginning of China's economic reform in 1978. The role of "human-brokers" had been a socially accepted one and had helped to fill demands for adopted children. One of my informants is a *zanryū-koji* whose biological mother left her with a stranger. After a few months this adoptive family gave to her to their distant relative when she was ill. Later, the relative sold the baby girl to another village at a high price after improving her health. The girl had grown up in the third adoptive family. This meant that her adoptive parents had only heard a second-hand story about the baby girl's Japanese background.

Real orphan but fake offspring

Ota[1] has lived with a foreign resident document throughout the CCP regime, he also speaks fluent prewar Japanese, and his arm bears a characteristically prewar Japanese smallpox scar, with four dots in a square (::). The *Kōseishō* officials took this type of smallpox vaccination scar as one kind of evidence to identify Japanese orphans. Due to bad health and unstable work as a tightrope walker in a touring circus, Ota remained unmarried, adopted a son named Dong, and sent money regularly to Dong's biological family. Ota retired in 1990 and moved to live with Dong's family, helping them to take care of a fish farm. Ota had no interest in leaving China. But his adoptive son urged him to go to Japan. With the help of an agent, Ota agreed to submit the application to the *Kōseishō* in 1996, stating that he wanted to repatriate with his six children and six extended families. The agent was arrested by the PSB in relation to racketeering activities. In 1998 Ota submitted a second application, wanting to repatriate with his only "biological" son. This lie was necessary because Japan accepted *zanryū-hōjin*'s foster children under age six only (e.g. *Asahi Shimbun* April 26 2005). The second application was rejected again. In 2001 Ota apologized to the Kōseishō officials for his previous lies, and applied to repatriate with his adopted son's family. This third application was also rejected because three other men, all claiming to be Ota, had also applied for repatriation. Ota now has the nickname of "the last Japanese remaining in China." He takes this as an insult, even more hurtful than his previous nickname of "Little Japanese Ghost."

Outlet for "black children"

The Fifth National People's Congress proclaimed family planning a pillar of state policy for achieving the national goals of modernization in industry, agriculture, science, and defense. Population control was written into the highest law of the country as Article 53 of China's new Constitution, adopted in 1978. The State Family Planning Commission was established in 1981. The leaders were sharply aware of over-population as a major hurdle to be overcome for China's modernization effort, and thus they built a strong foundation so that, regardless of future leadership changes, family planning as a priority for China would continue (Orleans 1979). The creation of the one-child policy in 1980 seemed economically sensible to many urbanites. Rural families were to be allowed two children per household, but this proved an unrealistic policy and has, over two decades, brought on some horrendous social consequences. While the generation of the siblingless has developed in the cities, the brutal killing of infant girls and "black" or illegitimate children has been commonplace in the countryside (Kane 1987).

Pressured by tight birth quotas, rural cadres often brutally enforced birth control. I heard stories of several female *zanryū-hōjin* who had hid their pregnancies, given birth outside their home villages and left the illegitimate babies to grow up elsewhere. One informant told me that his birth date was legally January 1, her sister's legal birth date was February 2, and the third sibling's legal birth date was March 3. These birth dates had been assigned by the local government after the authority had lost all documents in a fire. He hinted that the officials had been willing to legalize "black children" through "accidents" because of attractive bribes. These "black children" can be legalized through *zanryū-hōjin* families who are legal migrants to Japan. It is likely that some ruthless rural officials had received bribes to legitimize "black children" beyond the state's population control through putting "black children" into *zanryū-hōjin* families' household registrations as their biological offspring. Some families may simply make the deals by accepting money, some may be forced to make the deals.

Some *zanryū-hōjin* settled in Japan have still been haunted by "black children" problems. For instance, Gao migrated to Japan in the mid 1990s at age 55 through marriage with a divorced female *zanryū-koji.* His emigration enabled his son by his previous wife to get loans in China to expand a cattle farm in Heilongjiang, but he could not remit enough money to repay the loan due to his limited income from 3K jobs in Japan. With his own financial problems, his son could not pay the fine for having an extra child beyond the birth quota and so gave the baby girl away. Later the Gaos wanted the baby girl back, as a fortuneteller said that she would become a powerful figure in the future. Gao asked his *zanryū-koji* wife to buy his granddaughter back, but no matter what price Gao offered, the adoptive family refused to return the baby girl. A year later, Gao's son produced another baby girl and could afford to pay the fine this time. But the Gaos were charged RMB80,000 for two extra births, including that of the baby girl he had given away. The adoptive family refused to pay the fine for the first "black" child and argued it was Gao's liability to pay the fine. Gao then had to ask his *zanryū-koji* wife to settle the fine.

In addition, Gao expects that some day his wife will legalize his second "black" granddaughter through emigration to Japan.

Finding spouses in China

Rural–urban migration often involves a chain migration process by kinfolk of extended families, where kinship networks are not only the most important source of help in the city but are also the foundation for establishing a new community in the host society (Choldin 1973: 175). As described in Chapter 3, the Ranshao case indicates that marriage is the major channel for creating kinship with *zanryū-hōjin*, as well as with Japanese citizens, within the process of chain emigration. I shall illustrate this in the following cases of marriage migration practices among my *zanryū-hōjin* informants.

Mrs Morita and her friends

Suffering from poor mental health, Kasumi had been socially inept. Mrs Morita had to find her a husband in China. After screening the candidates introduced by *zanryū-hōjin* friends, Kasumi was interested in seeing a Shanghainese candidate, named Wu, who was Mrs Nakao's nephew. To facilitate the matchmaking, Mrs Nakao offered Kasumi and her mother accommodation in Changchun. The result was that Kasumi married Wu one month after she met him, and brought him to Japan as the spouse of a Japanese citizen. Wu then started treating Kasumi and Mrs Morita with contempt. A few months later Wu stole their bankbooks and disappeared. It was too late to stop bank withdrawals and they lost ¥3.7 million. Kasumi was traumatized and sent to a mental hospital. Wu's spouse visa, granted for one year, was not cancelled, and it was hoped that this would oblige Wu to return, but instead he found another Chinese woman with permanent residence who agreed to marry him. Mrs Morita ended her friendship with Mrs Nakao, who refused to take responsibility for introducing a bad spouse to the Moritas. Interestingly, Mrs Nakao's reputation in the wider *zanryū-hōjin* was not affected, since she was able to arrange to bring another two relatives to Japan through marrying other *zanryū-hōjin.* Moreover, Mrs Morita's youngest son, Yoshio, was divorced by his Shanghainese wife after the latter got permanent residence in Japan. Since then, Mrs Morita developed more contacts to find spouse candidates in Heilongjiang, as she hated Shanghainese.

One of Mrs Morita's contacts is Pan, a *zanryū-fujin*'s husband, who has been in the Sino-Japanese matchmaking business for 15 years. Pan often brags about the enormous size of his clientele and patronage. He once met a Japanese man on a flight from Niigata to Harbin who was going to meet a marriage prospect at the airport, introduced by another agent. Pan called up his associates in Harbin as soon as he could use his mobile phone after the airplane landed. Within 30 minutes his associates produced another candidate at the airport meeting point, and Pan insisted on introducing his "niece" to the Japanese man. Meanwhile, the other woman discovered that "her Japanese man" had been taken, and so she called up

her friends to arrive at the airport immediately. This business dispute ended up in a group fight at the international airport. I heard of a similar incident in Dalian. Although such stories might be apocryphal, they illustrate the way informants see the Sino-Japanese marriage-brokering situation.

Yoko, the daughter of a *zanryū-fujin*, claimed that she was Mrs Morita's best friend, but she spoke angrily about Mrs Morita to me. Yoko's daughter, then in her late 20s, had migrated to Japan several years previously and then divorced her illiterate husband soon after she had brought him to Japan. She then became available for another marriage. Mrs Morita promised to introduce Pan to her, as she claimed he could find a rich man in China for her daughter's remarriage. Yoko's daughter was excited about this possibility and bought an air ticket to Harbin for the introduction. However, Mrs Morita refused to provide the contact in Harbin. Mrs Morita explained to me that she had not continued with the matchmaking because Pan had found another *zanryū-hōjin* woman who was a better choice for the man to marry.

Hisashi and Ishii

Sawako Yamada's favorite grandson, Hisashi, achieved good academic results throughout his secondary education in Japan, and worked for a department store to save money. Influenced by his family, Hisashi looked forward to seeking opportunities in China, as it would have been difficult for him to become a boss in Japan. In 2002 Hisashi and his father opened a Japanese school in Hegang. Hisashi immediately became the school's principal. The school needed a trustworthy person to look after the business. Hisashi soon found a fiancée through an introduction by his father's friends, and his fiancée worked at the school as a general manager. The school had to employ native Japanese teachers in order to recruit more students. Sawako, utilizing her social networks in Tokyo, found Ishii, a volunteer Japanese teacher who had taught Yanli for one year.

Ishii agreed to work in Hegang for a salary of RMB2,000 per month (about USD240). Aware that such a wage would not keep a teacher from Tokyo, Hisashi tried to find Ishii a wife in Hegang in order to stabilize the employment. However, there was a misunderstanding in this deal: Yanli had already introduced Ishii to a Chinese girl residing in Beijing a few months previously. He wanted to spend some time with this girl before deciding to marry her, but could not find a job in Beijing. Therefore Ishii accepted the job in Hegang, with the plan to seek a job in Beijing later. The "fiancée" worried that Ishii would be taken by a woman in Hegang, and insisted on taking care of Ishii in Hegang. Hisashi was disappointed when he saw Ishii arrive in Hegang with a Chinese fiancée from Beijing. The friendship between Sawako and Yanli was immediately destroyed because of the presence of Ishii's fiancée. In the end, Ishii only worked for the school for three months because his fiancée did not get along with anyone in Hegang.

The Nishidas

The Nishida family had an unmarried daughter, aged 31. She became half-paralyzed after a brain operation. Since she could not speak Japanese she was not able to be cared for in hospital. The Nishidas decided to find her a husband to look after her at their home in Ichō-danchi, the public housing estate located in Kanagawa Prefecture. They went back to their hometown in Heilongjiang and chose a handsome 27-year-old university graduate named Cao, who understood that he was to marry and look after a half-paralyzed woman. His application for a fiancé visa was smoothly approved, as his marriage was to a disabled citizen and such marriages constituted a special, prioritized category. According to an informant in Ichō-danchi, before Cao's departure to Japan, he proudly told his parents and siblings not to work hard and worry about money anymore because he would send them a lot of money from Japan. The Nishidas kept this son-in-law's passport to ensure that he would not run away. This is a common strategy practiced by *zanryū-hōjin* families in Ichō-danchi. Their calculation is that a spouse from China can be kept by renewing his/her visa on an annual basis. If the spouse can prove his/her loyalty for 3 years, then the repatriate family should apply for permanent residency for him/her.

The Nishidas believed that Cao would stay with their daughter for at least three years to obtain the residence permit, by which time the Nishidas would have domesticated him with offspring responsibilities. However, Cao was desperate to run away from his fiancée, whose ears and eyes were running with a smelly, yellowish liquid. The Nishidas, meanwhile, were pressuring him to have sex with his new wife in order to get her pregnant as soon as possible. Sensing that Cao would give up the chance to get a longer-term visa and leave them immediately, the Nishidas destroyed Cao's address book so that he could not contact his acquaintances in Japan to help him escape. Cao tried to seek help from *zanryū-hōjin* neighbors but received little sympathy. One of my informants was sympathetic to his desperate situation but dared not help him because she did not want to worsen her neighborly relationship with the Nishidas. On the fourth day after his arrival in Japan, Cao ran away from the Nishida family without any documents, money, or contacts with acquaintances.

The extended Nagashima[2]

NAGASHIMA: A *zanryū-koji* who brought 19 family members to Japan, divorced and then brought another Chinese wife to Japan.

MRS NAGASHIMA: Remarried Mr Nagashima in her 50s; tried by whatever means to bring the three children of her previous marriage to Japan.

YUGANG: Mrs Nagashima's first son; his marriage to a *zanryū-koji*'s daughter was arranged by his mother.

REIKO ARAI: Yugang's wife, a *zanryū-koji*'s daughter; she and her husband have two sons who adopted Reiko's Japanese surname, Arai.

XUEMEI: Mrs Nagashima's second daughter; the main character of this case study.

THIRD DAUGHTER: She has tried many ways to enter Japan but has failed; living in Heilongjiang, relying on remittances sent by her mother from Japan.

This case study begins with Hirai, a Japanese child left behind in rural Heilongjiang after World War II who found his kin in Japan in the early 1980s. His biological sister refused to sponsor his repatriation. To find an alternative way to repatriate, Hirai visited other abandoned Japanese who were scattered in remote villages. His fifth daughter, Reiko, worked in Harbin restaurants to finance his research trips. Faced with discrimination against peasants by urbanites, Reiko improved her status by indicating that she had possibilities to emigrate. She refused to date admirers in the city, believing that they would dump her. Reiko arrived in Japan in 1996 when she was 26 years old, only to be regarded by her community as an old maid. The Hirais wanted to find her a husband among repatriates but most repatriate youths wanted to find urbanized or educated spouses in China. The chairwoman of Tsuru-no-kai then introduced the Hirais to Mrs Nagashima, a Chinese woman married to a repatriate, who was desperate to find a wife with Japanese nationality for Yugang, her eldest son from a previous marriage.

Mrs Nagashima's husband, a *zanryū-koji*, brought 19 Chinese family members to Japan from Fangzheng when he repatriated in the late 1980s. However, he began to dislike his wife's "peasant" appearance and divorced her, returning to Fangzheng to choose a good-looking woman from among many available candidates. Because of the fierce competition, one of the candidates, in her late 40s, deliberately concealed that she had three children from a previous marriage. This woman eventually became Mrs Nagashima. After five years of married life in Japan, she obtained Japanese citizenship and wanted to bring her three grown-up children, including Yugang, to Japan. However, the children's applications for a family reunion were rejected because no legal documents existed to prove their kinship to Mrs Nagashima. The Hirai family willingly accepted Yugang, believing that Reiko was too old for a better choice. Reiko flew to Heilongjiang and married Yugang on the seventh day after their first meeting. He entered Japan on a spouse visa within two months. After five years of marriage, Reiko had two children. Yugang and their children adopted Reiko's Japanese family name, Hirai, and gained Japanese nationality. The Hirai family willingly accepted Yugang, believing that Reiko was too old for a better choice. Reiko flew to Heilongjiang and married Yugang on the seventh day after their first meeting. He entered Japan on a spouse visa within two months. After five years of marriage, Reiko had two children. Yugang and their children adopted Reiko's Japanese family name, Hirai, and gained Japanese nationality. He did not adopt his stepfather's surname, Nagashima, because of widespread reports of deportations of non-blood-related foreign stepchildren (e.g. *Japan Economic Newswire* August 21 2002; *The Japan Times* March 16 2005; *Asahi Shimbun* March 8 and April 26 2005).

Xuemei, Mrs Nagashima's second child, attempted to enter Japan by various methods, including a marriage transaction with a repatriate's son introduced through Tsuru-no-kai's chairwoman Aoki. However, this husband failed to meet the immigration requirements needed to bring Xuemei to Japan, as he was unemployed.

He refused to find a job and continuously blackmailed Mrs Nagashima for pocket money. Mrs Nagashima's daughter-in-law, Reiko, finally enabled Xuemei to enter Japan on a three-month-visa as a kin babysitter for her second baby. Xuemei entered Japan immediately and tried to find another husband within the three months so that she could remain legally. Some Japanese lawyers had branched out into the lucrative marriage broker business, and it was through a law firm and Sawako Yamada, a Japanese speaking volunteer, that Xuemei found her future husband. This 49-year-old Japanese man paid an advance of ¥1.5 million to see marriage candidates and then gave Xuemei ¥600,000 to pay off the demands of her first husband. According to Japanese law, a divorcee like Xuemei can only remarry six months after the date of signing the divorce decree. However, Mrs Nagashima and Sawako worried about something happening in the interim to upset this "perfect match." On their advice, Xuemei moved into her prospective husband's apartment to consolidate their relationship sexually.

Kyoko, a Japanese university student and a volunteer for Tsuru-no-kai, had handled all application procedures for Mrs Nagashima's children to enter Japan. She was shocked to find that Xuemei could not speak any Japanese, despite having wanted to come to Japan for years. This suggested to Kyoko that prostitution of some sort was Xuemei's real aim in Japan, instead of family reunion as she had claimed. By law, Xuemei should have lived in her sister-in-law's household for three months to babysit her nephew instead of living in a man's home. Kyoko felt that she had been involved in "trafficking in women" and was compelled by moral obligation to inform the Japanese immigration authorities about Xuemei's illegal behavior. In the end, however, she did not report Xuemei to the governmental authority, but she expressed her sense of moral culpability by comparing her role as a volunteer to that of the lawyers who have made profits through "trafficking in women." Meanwhile, Mrs Nagashima started to plan strategies to bring another daughter to Japan and expected Kyoko would help her again. Kyoko found it difficult to refuse outright and decided to leave Tsuru-no-kai.

Marriage as business

This section examines the causes, processes, and consequences of the formation of new Sino-Japanese kinship ties by the waves of Chinese rural brides (Fan and Huang 1998) to relieve the rural "bride drought" in Japan (Knight 1995). Subsequently, it will be shown that *zanryū-hōjin*'s transnational marriage practices can be made intelligible in terms of their roles of mediation between these two phenomena that influence international marriages between rural China and Japan. A variant of marriage migration practice – that involving Fuqing people – will be discussed to elucidate the rapid development of new *qiaoxiang* in the Northeast according to new ways of using kinship ties.

Rural Japanese bachelorhood has rapidly increased, while the accompanying out-migration to urban areas has caused large-scale rural depopulation. As Japanese women become increasingly well educated, they are reluctant to marry into rural families where they would have to do agricultural labor, and men who stay behind

in the countryside as family heirs thus find themselves unable to attract brides. Faced with this social crisis of involuntary rural celibacy, local governments and agricultural organizations have established municipal matchmaking and marriage consultation facilities to offer free services to find wives for local men (Knight 1995: 9). Over the past two decades, state-sponsored services have cooperated with private marriage brokers. By 1993 Japan already had more than 5,000 such brokers (Iwao 1993: 66), and this number has since increased with the rapid development of the international marriage brokering industry in the late 1990s. Kang, the official of Ranshao county government, also verified this rapid increase in Japan's international marriage brokering industry in recent years.[3] One of the essential tasks in this matchmaking involves helping rural men with their social ineptness and sexist manners, as well as teaching them how to present positive images to young women; however, Japanese rural men's social ineptness remains a major factor in the increase in involuntary bachelorhood (Knight 1995: 14), and state-sponsored mediation has shifted towards cooperation with international marriage brokers to find Japanese rural men foreign brides from less-developed areas such as the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Sakhalin Island, Mongolia, and China (Piper 1997). During the 1990s the number of brides coming from Mainland China rapidly increased. Between 1989 and 1999 Japanese immigration authorities recorded that 43.5 percent of the total number of foreign brides were Chinese (38,900 persons), with the second largest group being Filipinas, who constituted 30.8 percent (Higurashi 2003). The type of involuntary bachelorhood mentioned is not exclusive to rural areas but is also a problem in urban areas, where economically underprivileged men and eldest sons with heavy family responsibilities also face difficulties in finding Japanese wives. In 2000, the ratio of international marriage in Tokyo was recorded as 1:10 – i.e. of every ten couples, one couple was composed of spouses of different nationalities (Higurashi 2003).

In Maoist China, rural women's fertility and labor were dominated by the double burden of patriarchal rules and collective agricultural production (Yan Hairong 2003: 580–583). In the post-reform era, the "floating population," recorded as 120 million in the mid-1990s, rushed into the urban labor market from rural areas, without any entitlements to urban jobs, housing, education, or medical services (Chan 1996: 140). A door to urban migration has opened for female peasants who marry men holding the status of urban workers, since ex-peasant wives can partially enjoy the state-provided benefits offered to other urban people (Potter 1983: 485). The custom of bride price negotiated between parents and informal brokers had remained in the Maoist countryside. The economic reform in post-Mao China has deepened the concept of women's labor, fertility, and sexuality as property exchangeable through marriage (Croll 1984; Gao 1994). Marriage migration thus has been practiced as a path for Chinese female peasants to overcome their restraints and disadvantages. Pioneer female marriage migrants inform their sisters, relatives, and villagers about marriage opportunities elsewhere. This snowballing of marriage migration through kinship and social networks is further expanded by the rise in entrepreneurs such as marriage brokers and advertisement agencies in the couple-matching market (Fan and Huang 1998: 236).

As a result, international marriage migration becomes a thinkable, practical, and desirable business as a means to overcome individuals' constraints and as one kind of flexible strategy adopted by social agents – rural Chinese women and rural Japanese men. Fan and Huang (1998: 235) observe that urban men who marry rural women tend to be older, poorer, or handicapped mentally or physically, all of which limits their ability to find marriage partners locally. Rural female marriage migrants have the lowest education among all types of female migrants, while their rate of labor force participation after migration is higher than for other types of female migrants. This suggests that female marriage migrants are active participants in the economy, challenging the notions that marriage migration is primarily a family-related move and that marriage migrants are passive movers (Fan and Huang 1998: 239). In her study of Filipina wives of Japanese men, Piper (1997) also places female migration through international marriages in a broader context of labor migrant relations. On the other hand, international marriages in Japan emphasize the transfer of the wife from her foreign natal family to the marital Japanese family – but it is problematic for a foreign bride to become an exemplary typical traditional wife while facing cultural and language barriers in a strange environment (Knight 1995: 16–17). According to my *zanryū-hōjin* and new *huaqiao* informants in Japan, the phenomenon of rural Chinese brides escaping from their rural Japanese husbands to find work in Tokyo is not unusual. Rural Chinese women's willingness to endure hardships in strange environments can be interpreted as the price they must pay for mobility and modernity.

Comparison with Fuqing practices

My informants in Heilongjiang have a tendency to compete with the emigration development in Fuqing, although this southern coast area has been viewed as a model of a transgression zone. Stemming from a centuries-long tradition of sojourning to make a fortune, Fuqing emigration is constantly evolving, and migrants are continually finding new ways to emigrate and new destinations to go to (Pieke *et al.* 2004: 18). During my fieldwork in Fuqing, I was amazed to find that people there were aware of the alarming human-cargo tragedies in Dover in 2000 and in Iraq in 2005, but were still eager to spend a fortune to find ways to go abroad. Those who managed to endure great hardships overseas were mostly coming from financially well-off families (Liang and Ye 2001). Everyone I encountered on the streets or in restaurants could tell the market prices and safe routes concerning illegal emigration, as well as the current situation of immigration controls in the economically advanced countries. Some informants had just returned from Japan, and told me they had engaged in minor illegal activities in cooperation with *zanryū-hōjin* members. These documented migrants were very approachable and, more importantly, their Japaneseness would ensure lighter punishments if they were caught. This data verifies the observation of Wakata, the former director of Tsuru-no-kai, with his 20 years of volunteer work for *zanryū-hōjin*, who asserted that illegal immigrant documents have been largely produced in Heilongjiang and Fuqing, sold at prices from ¥300,000 to ¥1 million depending on the type of kinship to the *zanryū-hōjin* family and the degree of risk involved.

Marriage as a business of migration has been a by-product of restrictive migration policies of nation states (Staring 1998: 237). Ishii (2005) provides an official estimate, reported in January 2002, of 280,436 applicants for residency registered as spouse or child of a Japanese national, many of these spouses being from China. Facing such a huge number of overstayers, the government created a Special Permission for Residency to put illegal migrants on a legal footing by real marriage to a Japanese national or by having produced a child with a Japanese. The number of Special Permission for Residency permits increased from 2,497 in 1998 to 6,930 in 2000. However, there were still an estimated 224,067 illegal overstayers. Then, the government announced another scheme, of "Smooth Settlement," to legalize overstayers in March 2000. The conditions of the settlement include that: 1) the person has a child produced with a Japanese national under his/her guardianship; 2) the person has parental authority regarding the child; and 3) the child is recognized by a Japanese father. In other words, this Smooth Settlement extended legal denizenship beyond family relationship – a foreign female who divorces her Japanese husband can still reside in Japan as the spouse of a Japanese national as long as she has produced a child with the Japanese husband.

Thanks to this kin-based immigration policy, reinforced again and again in Japan, *zanryū-hōjin* can be targeted by illegal migrants looking to make deals for bogus marriages. Marriage of convenience is an easier option for illegal female emigrants, as with the high availability of single male Japanese, the demand for female emigration can easily be satisfied. But, men attempting to emigrate via bogus marriage find it difficult, since most unmarried Japanese women are unwilling to engage in the marriage trade. Male emigration to Japan via marriage, however, is not completely closed to Chinese men. Demand for Chinese spouses among *zanryū-hōjin* members offsets the gender imbalance in the marriage trade to some extent, since female as well as male *zanryū-hōjin* seek Chinese marriage partners.

The new *qiaoxiang* county of Ranshao has given Sino-Japanese marriages official support, but in Fuqing Sino-Japanese marriages have been mostly arranged by snakeheads. The term "snakehead" for Fuqing people refers to a worldwide trade network specializing in emigration, rather than to individual gangsters. This giant snakehead network is manifested in Fuqing as involving legitimate businesses such as language schools, marriage agents, job centers, and trading consultants. The market price for a bogus marriage to a Japanese citizen or a permanent residency holder is not high – about ¥500,000 per transaction during my fieldwork period. However, the additional costs involved in validating and maintaining such a fake marriage are heavy. They include:

- Fees to legalize the status of an overstayer if the bogus marriage commences after arrival in Japan.
- Travel expenses for the bogus spouse to come to meet and marry in China if the bogus marriage commences before entering Japan.
- Rents for a large flat to accommodate a Fuqing family and a *zanryū-hōjin* family together. Such a flat is essential to withstand intensive investigation by Japanese immigration authorities. It is common, in such an arrangement, for

both the Fuqing couple and the *zanryū-hōjin* couple to divorce; the Fuqing man then marries the repatriate woman, and vice versa. However, these marriages are merely legal transactions to gain residency for the Fuqing couple. Within the shared flat, the Fuqing and *zanryū-hōjin* couples continue their original relationships.

- Potential blackmails – a spouse visa is usually granted for one year in Japan, and the buyer of a bogus marriage service will face further negotiation for renewal of the spouse visa each year.

My informants in Fuqing explained that illegal emigration has been regarded as part of a man's responsibility for his families' well-being in Fuqing's tradition. Since Japanese immigration authorities have begun to pay close attention to the various illegal activities of some Fujianese, bogus marriage has begun to be regarded as a relatively safe way to emigrate. However, it is hard for Fuqing men to find women in Japan to engage in bogus marriage contracts. In order to overcome the increasing difficulties faced by Fuqing people who seek to emigrate illegally, many fathers and husbands now encourage their daughters and wives to emigrate through bogus marriages. Since bogus marriages involve a long period of time and high maintenance costs, the illegal Fuqing emigrants prefer to contract marriages with *zanryū-hōjin* members.

The marriage migration as a business involves two kinds of deals. One is the bogus marriage, which involves legal documents without actual married life or sexual intercourse; the other is the marriage of convenience, in which the spouses actually fulfill husband-and-wife responsibilities to each other, at least for a certain period of time. According to my Fuqing informants, engaging in a bogus marriage that only requires signing papers is regarded as an unexceptional business, while having a real married life with a foreign man for the sake of gaining permanent residency is morally unacceptable. Interestingly, my Ranshao informants claimed that hardly any of their women have engaged in bogus marriages, whereas bogus marriages have been set up with Fuqing people, and that the Japanese authorities stopped approving spouse visas for Fuqing applicants after discovering 500 cases of fake marriage in 2002, all involving Fuqing people. Kang, the official of Ranshao county government, emphasized that he always encouraged Japanese men to choose wives in Ranshao on a practical basis in order to nurture long-lasting marriages. It is apparently true that most Ranshao women actually live with their Japanese husbands for at least three years. Paper marriage is easier to control through legal action. The Fuqing people's flexible strategies seem to be limited by their kinship ethics. Ranshao people, however, accept having a real marriage with a foreigner to avoid confronting national laws and are able to enter Japan through legal channels because of their more flexible kinship values. This way of considering kinship seems to have been a key in enabling Ranshao to develop its new *qiaoxiang* so rapidly, much faster than the traditional *qiaoxiang*'s development in southern China.

On the "marriage problem"

The questionnaire-based study of repatriates' marriage issues by Tsunashima (1997) argues that Japanese society's discriminatory attitude toward repatriates from China is shown in the marriage problems faced by repatriate youth, who have found it difficult to obtain spouses in Japan and tend to find spouses on short trips back to China. This is plausible evidence for the claim that Japan is a society of "hidden apartheid." Yet employing a dialectical perspective can deal with human behavior in terms of reciprocal causation between the opposing forces which move a system forward in time (Wilk 1996: 141), and it can be argued that *zanryū-hōjin* are not simply a mob of pitiful people passively enduring prejudice or passively waiting for acceptance by Japanese society. As a marginalized group living under Japan's mainstream rules and norms, the repatriates have in fact been taking actions and adopting strategies by utilizing all the socio-cultural capital they possess to help them in the pursuit of their interests (Wilk 1996: 141).

Under the principle of *jus sanguinis* or the law of blood, lineage is regarded as the primary determinant of Japaneseness. Thus, Japan grants citizenship to those who possess "Japanese blood," such as *zanryū-hōjin* and *nikkeijin* (Sellek 1997: 201–204). Consequently, marriage becomes a tool for the repatriates through which they can wield and display power. Set in a transnational space and possessing flexible citizenship, the repatriates are able to act as opportunists and transnationalists, exploiting their ambiguous situation in Japan and negotiating power in China for their betterment. In many cases, repatriates appear to have recruited spouses almost as a sort of ritual to demonstrate to other Chinese their pride in having Japanese passports. In Ichō-danchi there was a popular saying in the Northeastern dialect – a metaphor referring to the fact that one can select the best among the abundant supplies of spouses in China. First-generation repatriates in general have suffered from low social status in both China and Japan and have often never enjoyed a feeling of being respected in their entire lifetimes. Most of them are keen on finding spouses in China for their children and grandchildren, and sometimes spouses for themselves as well. They particularly enjoy the processes of searching for, choosing, questioning, commenting on, and rejecting male and female candidates in China. This "window-shopping" for spouses, as practiced by the repatriates, can be understood as a negotiating process to regain their dignity.

Handa, the *zanryū-hōjin* writer who regularly contributes articles to the Chinese newspapers circulating in the Chinese migrant communities in Japan, suggested in an interview that the majority of repatriates have tried to overcome their inferior status through "eugenic" reproduction. They try their best to find highly educated husbands for their daughters and granddaughters and beautiful wives for their sons and grandsons. The possibility of their marrying sophisticated Japanese is limited by the prejudices within Japanese society, but many Chinese of higher status have responded to these attempts to recruit spouses. In some cases, first-generation repatriates have divorced their peasant-stock spouses in their 60s and then brought urbanized Chinese to Japan as their new spouses. The high rates of divorce in this community reflect inequalities within their marriages. They had got married in

China when they were "little Japanese ghosts," but when they were able to bring Chinese spouses to Japan the asymmetry of their marriages turned upside down. However, the choices of spouse have often resulted in tragedies among the *zanryū-hōjin* community. It is difficult for these former peasant families to keep the most highly desirable Chinese spouses for long, especially given the alternative opportunities provided by life in a developed country. The breakdown of first marriages then causes more Chinese spouses to be brought to Japan for second marriages. There are many stories going around concerning repatriates who were abandoned by their Chinese husbands or wives after the latter had gained permanent Japanese residency, which requires three years of married life. The repatriates' continuous demand for new spouses from China, together with the shortage of Japanese wives for rural Japanese men, which I will discuss below, has fuelled the industry of marriage brokers and agents. Even though both Yuriko Sakamoto and Fumiko Yamada have lost social contacts in China after two decades of residence in Japan, they still encourage their offspring to find spouses in China, not only because they can find good quality spouses there, but also because Japan's marriage market offers them limited opportunities to "marry up."

In light of the rapid increase in the demands for foreign brides created by Japan's rural "bride drought" (Knight 1995), many Asian women from poor societies have married into Japanese families. Among Chinese migrants, those who marry rural Japanese men tend to be stigmatized as women with limited leverage to find better spouses for marriage migration. Pushed by this stigma, Chinese migrants married to Japanese tend to emphasize whatever successful status their spouses may have. However, marrying Chinese who have permanent residency in Japan is regarded as respectable and based on emotional communication. For *zanryū-hōjin*, marrying a Chinese is thus not a "Plan B" merely to resolve problems but a direct channel for marrying up, as they can afford to marry based on their own choices of partners with whom they can engage in linguistic and emotional communication. Some *zanryū-hōjin*'s children insist on marrying less affluent Japanese, while their parents tend to ask for bride prices. In Ichō-danchi, *zanryū-hōjin* residents measure the quality of a Japanese son-in-law according to the bride price that he can pay. The fiancée of one of my informants was a factory technician who could not afford to pay ¥1 million to her *zanryū-hōjin* parents. In short, while the possibility of marrying sophisticated Japanese is limited by various social factors, China provides numerous spouse candidates of good quality.

The *zanryū-hōjin* community indeed suffers discrimination in the society of Japan, as argued by Tsunashima (1997). Their "marriage problem" is, however, also one faced by some Japanese men, while the *zanryū-hōjin* have more advantages for overcoming this problem through their transnational connections. They have been active in making use of the kinship ideology embedded in Japanese immigration law to circumvent the nation-state's restrictions on economic migration, with the assistance of NGO volunteers, and have been facilitated in doing so by the large supply of spouses from *qiaoxiang*. With the symbolic capital of their Japanese citizenship, they can enjoy a satisfactory status among their hometown people by playing the game of window-shopping for Chinese spouses. Anthropological

research on marriage in many societies has affirmed that marriage has often operated as a form of exchange and as an opportunity to create political and social alliances. The *zanryū-hōjin*'s ambiguous citizenship, together with their kinship and marriage practices, has enormous personal, social, and economic ramifications.

Why racketeerism is possible

Law and crime are created in a culture where people negotiate social changes, and this negotiation is interconnected with state and local practices in the enforcement of perceived socio-cultural values and desired hierarchies of power (Parnell 2003: 7). A few years ago Narangoa (2003: 158) presented figures from the Japanese media, according to which 60 percent of the applications to "return" to Japan in 1998 were bogus, and in Osaka the rate was 80 percent. If these sensational media reports are reliable, it is worthwhile to explore critically why and how racketeerism has been widely practiced among *zanryū-hōjin* members and their *qiaoxiang* associates.

It is taken into consideration that "Chinese capitalism" possesses little accumulation of ideology akin to the "Protestant ethic" that emphasizes the accountability, predictability, controllability, impersonality, efficiency, and democracy which ensure the development of modern management techniques (Godley 1999: 267, 269). Even though the Confucian virtues of loyalty, trust, harmony, and filial piety are upheld in the discourses of Chinese diasporas, the exploitation of human relationships is likely to harbor corruption or racketeering activities (Godley 1999: 272). Taking advantage of cultural roots, both central and local authorities revive the *qiaoxiang* ideology and appeal to a supposedly instinctual desire for homeland as a political card played to tap the financial resources of overseas Chinese. Loyalty to "the motherland" is also played upon by overseas Chinese to increase their competitiveness in dynamic China trade activities. Both parties exploit *qiaoxiang* ties to reduce transaction costs, particularly at a time when the laws and regulations have not been firmly enforced (Woon 2002: 185). As new social meanings of space have been reinforced and experienced in China's everyday life (Liu 1997: 93), the transgression zones entered by those seeking emigration channels and shortcuts leading to success have become more and more socially acceptable.

Anthropological analysis of illegitimate activities should start with the assumption that the criminal–victim relationship is interlocked with other social relationships (Bohannan 1960). The relationship between *qiaoxiang* and racketeerism can be seen as a process operating within the political economy and depending upon ambiguous laws and loose bureaucratic systems, as well as on the merciless use of human relationships. I observed that people in both Ranshao and Fuqing talked about racketeering activities freely, as simply a part of their economic success. My informants in Fuqing proudly showed me around the beautiful villas built by former illegal emigrants to Japan. One villager pointed to a stunning villa and enviously told me that the owner made a fortune in Japan by engaging in robbery. In Tokyo, too, I often encountered *zanryū-hōjin* informants gossiping about others' racketeering behavior, with no intention of reporting it to the authorities. This "none of my business" attitude affirmed that fake *zanryū-hōjin* would never be discovered

by the Japanese immigration if they did not come into conflict with their Chinese acquaintances. According to my informants, most racketeering *zanryū-hōjin* were reported by their vengeful acquaintances after disputes over practical matters.

Many had practiced racketeering on a daily basis in rural China, as such practice was the only way to get things done. For instance, applying for a passport in 1995, Yanli was charged RMB880, despite the standard price being set at RMB180 per person by the Beijing authorities. Yanli argued for the fair fee, but was told to go elsewhere. Yanli went to the provincial authority but was told that she must apply for the passport from her local government. Eventually Yanli had to go back to the local official, by which time she had to pay RMB2000, or her passport application would be delayed. In another example, when Mrs Morita applied for Japanese citizenship, the Japanese immigration officer did not believe that she had no siblings, assuming that Chinese peasants usually had many siblings. She explained that she had had eight siblings but all had died young. The officer then asked her to present birth and death certificates for all eight siblings. Mrs Morita did not know their names or birthdays as many had died just after birth, but the officer refused to accept this explanation. As a result, the Wuchang official charged Mrs Morita a huge amount of money to forge documents for the eight dead babies. In dealing with this sort of kinship documentation problem, a common strategy among *zanryū-hōjin* is to add more family members in the documents, and distribute these "kin" quotas around or sell them to emigration brokers. One *zanryū-fujin* brought seven children to Japan. The last two children seemed too young for her age of fertility, unless she had given birth to them at age 51 and age 53, respectively. She was paranoid when dealing with government officers and dared not even look at a police station. As she has been friendly to everyone, so far nobody has reported the suspicions that she brought children not her own into Japan.

Beyond legal controls or obedience to national authorities, transnationalism can be exploited in many ways. The flexible *zanryū-hōjin* citizens are situated in such a free zone. According to individual choices, some people take this space as a goldmine to tap resources and/or to empower themselves. Therefore, depending on the nature of the actions taken, such transnational space can harbor various kinds of transgressing activities. Two *zanryū-hōjin* informants gave me an ethical excuse to justify their cheating on public transport costs: Japan owes them. This sentiment has been enhanced through the pro-*zanryū-hōjin* volunteerism and activism.

Racketeerism can be sustained through Japanese volunteerism. Upholding human rights, NGOs have advocated fair treatment of migrant workers within Japan, often including undocumented foreigners (Roberts 2000). Relevant press reports (*Japan Economic Newswire* August 26 2002; *Shinnō Mainichi Shimbun* October 10 2002) testify that a *zanryū-fujin*'s son was sentenced for smuggling illegal migrants from the coast into the country by truck. When he committed this crime he had not yet acquired naturalized Japanese citizenship. After he served for a four-year prison sentence the immigration authorities deported him as a "foreign" criminal. This deportation was opposed by *zanryū-hōjin* supporters, who branded it a form of victimization arising as a consequence of the war, and they requested the court to consider that, because he had been in Japan for so long, he had no relatives left in

China. On top of this, his *zanryū-fujin* mother cried and begged, stating that she would not want to live if he was deported. After a mass petition with thousands of signatures of support, he was finally allowed to stay in Japan.

A woman in her 70s named Gong, who claimed that her husband was a Japanese left behind in Fuqing, repatriated together with a big family in the early 1990s. Gong sought volunteer help at Tsuru-no-kai to bring one of her grandsons to Japan. She emphasized that not only his grandfather (Gong's husband) was Japanese but that his mother (Gong's daughter-in-law) was as well. It seems a historical miracle to find that a Japanese would have been left in Fuqing after World War II and have a son who, two decades later, would marry the daughter of another Japanese who had also been left behind after the war. However, although members of Tsuru-no-kai gossiped in Chinese about the suspicious identity of Gong, no one opposed Sawako, the *paojiedao*-style volunteer, when she accepted Gong's case. The Japanese volunteers were ignorant of Chinese issues and were keen to help Gong, as they had not had many clients recently. Knowing that Japanese citizenship law permits any child of a Japanese parent to become naturalized as a Japanese at age 20 even if he/she lives overseas, the Japanese volunteers asked Gong (through Sawako as interpreter) why her grandson hadn't become naturalized, since he planned to come to Japan. Gong explained that her grandson's birth was not registered, as his parents' marriage had not been either, the couple having been married before having attained the legal age for marriage. Gong further explained that all her children and grandchildren had lived in China without administrative registration or legal papers. When they needed documents to apply for repatriation, Gong's husband had gone to the local government to register their marriages and their children's births. The local officials had been angry and said that it would be difficult to fix lawfully. The problem then was extended when the officials found that the grandsons were from various places throughout China, despite the fact that their parents were all from Fuqing. This situation existed because the births of the grandchildren were beyond the constraints of the one-child policy, so that her daughters and daughters-in-law had had to give birth elsewhere as fugitives beyond the range of the law. Eventually, Gong's husband fixed all the problems with the local government by paying a large bribe.

In Tsuru-no-kai, the Japanese volunteers' job duties include processing documentation for *zanryū-hōjin*. There was a discrepancy in one certified document applying to Gong's case: Although Gong wanted to bring her grandson to Japan, the document stated that the applicant was, in fact, her nephew. Sawako suggested that Gong recertify the document but Gong insisted that it was a small mistake and that it would cost her a lot of money to get the Chinese officials to correct it. Kyoko, a Japanese university student, had constantly dealt with documents carelessly produced by the Chinese authorities for four years as a volunteer, during which time she had fixed discrepancies in name, gender, birth date, and birth place in her translations, and the documents she had handled had been accepted by the immigration authorities as legal. She did not question whether Gong's grandson and nephew were the same person – she simply translated "nephew" into "grandson." Eventually the application for Gong's grandson was successful, because Tsuru-no-kai offered

the solid sponsorship of the members of its Executive Committee – mainly liberal politicians who held seats in both local governments and/or the Diet.

Summary

Through the various cases illustrated above, we can see that both *zanryū-hōjin* and *qiaoxiang* people have tapped resources and sought opportunities in the transnational space, where legal systems between nation-states fail to be effectively enforced. In many cases, *zanryū-hōjin* find the kinship ideology beneath citizenship law useful to circumvent the restrictions in two nation-states on economic migration, while at the same time, the local manifestation of the Chinese state also uses emigrants to further its economic development. To satisfy their own needs and cope with rapid social changes, most *zanryū-hōjin* have held somewhat permissive attitudes toward racketeerism, while some have played dynamic roles in facilitating the business of Sino-Japanese marriage migration, and have actively cooperated with illegal migrants.

The formation of such close ties between *zanryū-hōjin* and *qiaoxiang* reflects the fact that their desires and motivations have been nurtured from similar cultural logics, market situations, and the institutions of the post-Mao countryside. Thus their actions and strategies have effectively helped develop the new *qiaoxiang* in Northeast China. This transnational process, facilitated by racketeering activities, is not a unidirectional process but goes hand in hand with local situations in other countries (Pieke *et al.* 2004: 10). In Japan the local situation is characterized by a shortage of Japanese brides, demands for low-wage laborers, and NGO assistance.

Life politics is about the choices an individual makes when he/she disengages from traditional limits or structural restrictions. However, individual choice may continue to be restricted, as the structures of capital/centralized power/bureaucracy still firmly exist. Although *zanryū-hōjin* families liberated from China's peasantry are able to access Japan's metropolitan opportunities and seem to have a wide range of choices, they are still confined within the structure of the nation-state and the market systems that restrict people and limit the scope of their decision making (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000: 297). The agency of *zanryū-hōjin*'s exercising of life politics appears to be able to consolidate the *qiaoxiang* development, but cannot transform the widespread racketeerism that has been structured and practiced as ethically acceptable activities in *qiaoxiang*. In other words, the theory of life politics measuring the reflexive modern individual merely consists of new strategies of individuals making the best of the same old deals.

Individuals act to creatively maximize choices, and these actions have the capacity to bind time and space together in relation to contradictions and dominations in social formations (Karp 1986: 135). Arguably, racketeering is a wilful action mutually engaged in by *zanryū-hōjin* and *qiaoxiang* people to tap resources and maximize interests. Thus institutional systems, cultural logics, market situations, and new and old practices are all applied and restructured by individual actions, and all have independent effects in shaping a new type of Chinese globalization,

by taking off from the transgression zone between rural Northeast China and the Japanese metropolis.

While individuals exercise their life politics according to the fad for emigration, we can see radical transformations of gender tradition among rural Northeastern Chinese. Marriage was a life-goal and divorce was considered unthinkable in rural and traditional Chinese society, but such attitudes are now less evident among today's rural youth. People overtly use this sanctified practice as a practical route to seek modern personhoods or individual social mobility. Traditionally, the fate of widows and divorcees was tragic, but now a divorced woman may possess leverage to find a good-quality second or third husband, as long as she holds permanent residency in an economically advanced country.

9 Volunteerism and activism

Volunteers have played a major role in the efforts to assist *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation and settlement since 1972. Several activists emphasized to me that the efforts to assist the post-1972 *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation and settlement have largely been made by volunteers. Within Japan, there has been a proliferation in the number of NGOs that give help to *zanryū-hōjin*, as well as to the *zanryū-koji*'s adoptive parents in China.[1] Such NGOs offer a wide range of services that may be difficult for governmental immigration-related policies to enforce objectively (Douglass and Roberts 2000: 10). As discussed in previous chapters, Japanese volunteerism has enhanced and improved immigration-related information, skills, channels, and legal loopholes for *zanryū-hōjin* migrants.

The organization and its volunteers

Tsuru-no-kai[2] was founded in 1982 and was originally made up of about 10 *zanryū-fujin* led by the chairwoman Sachiko Aoki. This NGO soon enlisted over 1,000 *zanryū-hōjin* clients with solid support from a large number of volunteers consisting of lawyers, politicians, journalists, intellectuals, celebrities, university students, housewives, and business tycoons. Thanks to the chairwoman's public speaking skills, Tsuru-no-kai gained plentiful media attention and bountiful charitable donations during the 1980s and 90s, and was able to set up three operational centers and nine language schools within Tokyo and its environs. It established networks with lawyers' associations and governmental authorities in Japan, as well as having an official relationship with the Heilongjiang authorities. Tsuru-no-kai won a human rights prize granted by the Tokyo Lawyers' Association in 1989, as well as recognition from an American women's group in 1992 and a Tokyo women's group in 1994. The *Kōseishō* also honored it as the best *zanryū-hōjin* support group in 1995 and its chairwoman (Aoki) and director (Wakata) as the "best volunteers" of all those involved with repatriates in 1998.

Wakata was first a volunteer Japanese language teacher for Tsuru-no-kai, and was seconded to consult on members' social and family problems. He was then employed in the directorship as a full-time paid staff member, and his activities led to membership of the Democratic Party. Wakata actively participated in protest activities on behalf of *zanryū-hōjin*.[3] He visited the hometowns of *zanryū-hōjin*

several times in connection with the setting up of a statue to thank Chinese adoptive parents and a residence to accommodate numerous adoptive parents in the city center of Chang Chun. He assisted numerous researchers in studying this community and helped to create curricula for teaching Japanese language in the *zanryū-hōjin*-related governmental programs. Supported by lawyers and liberal politicians, Wakata facilitated the *zanryū-fujin* lawsuit against the state to claim compensation in 2001, and he took part in the election of the Mitaka City Assembly in April 2003. Unfortunately he lost in the election in spite of the huge amounts of money he spent on the campaign. His loss included his family's savings and a large amount of Tsuru-no-kai's resources. Since then Wakata has seldom appeared in *zanryū-hōjin* activities, and has worked for a salary in a private language school in order to support his family.

The Ministry of Education has made efforts to institutionalize volunteerism in national education programs through the process of education reform during the 1990s (Ogawa 2004: 83). Ever since its establishment, Tsuru-no-kai has never been short of student volunteers. New students join each year to replace those who start new lives elsewhere. Some have never left Tsuru-no-kai and continue to develop their volunteerism into political careers. The student volunteers have raised money through selling self-made products at university festivals to finance Tsuru-no-kai's operational costs. Thanks to the attractive homemade dumplings voluntarily made by *zanryū-hōjin* members, the student volunteers have made an average annual net profit of ¥600,000. This revenue has mainly been allocated to the running costs of the language classroom, group activities, and the weekly consultancy for solving members' daily problems, at the spaces provided by local governments. University students are heavily burdened by a busy schedule – coping with exams, earning pocket money through part-time jobs, and volunteering. In many cases, they volunteer for several organizations at the same time in order to expose themselves to more "clients." Some volunteered to gain relevant experience for their resumes, such as language teaching. Others volunteered to enhance their knowledge of law and politics. Many want to expand their social networks through volunteerism.

Kyoko, a university student majoring in Banking and Finance, has volunteered for Tsuru-no-kai since she was 18. The first case she handled was to help a middle-aged member who did not speak good Japanese. He was assigned work separately from other employees but later the employer denied that he was employed, and refused to pay him ¥175,000 for the work he had done. Kyoko attempted to reason with the employer via phone calls but was rudely shouted at. She then collected the unpaid wage for the member by sending registered letters to the employer once a week. She explained the situation to the post office and obtained free postage service. Two months later, the employer finally paid her client the full amount. Despite being busy preparing examinations and with two part-time paid jobs, Kyoko never excused herself from volunteer duties for Tsuru-no-kai as she admired the chairwoman Aoki. She stayed with Tsuru-no-kai after Aoki left daily operations to the less respectable Sawako because she could not find any other volunteer work near her university. However, Kyoko revealed her disappointments about volunteerism. One was that she could not resolve an ethical issue of "trafficking in women," as

accounted in the case of the Nagashimas in the last chapter. Another one was about Wakata's integrity – he took part in the election for the Mitaka City Assembly out of personal ego, and declared bankruptcy after losing the election to avoid paying back his debt to Tsuru-no-kai, leaving a serious financial problem for the organization.

Both Setsuko and Naoko volunteered for Tsuru-no-kai as well as for other NGOs. Setsuko, a divorced woman with a teenage daughter studying in the US, had been active in feminist activities while making a living by teaching English in several cram schools. Naoko, a retired woman in her late 60s, was an active left-wing activist and a writer on anti-imperialist politics. They both participated in writing about *zanryū-fujin*'s war experiences and published some of their works in pamphlets, distributed in Japan through NGO networks. They kept their relationships with Tsuru-no-kai through membership fees and donations. During my fieldwork period, they organized regular meetings to discuss *zanryū-hōjin* issues with Tsuru-no-kai's members. Except for Sawako, no other *zanryū-hōjin* had ever attended, as members found it tedious to hear their feminist ideas and political speech. Offering generous help for several *zanryū-hōjin* women, on the other hand, Naoko and Setsuko did not support the *zanryū-hōjin* lawsuits as a political activity to improve *zanryū-hōjin*'s welfare, because it would be at the expense of the already insufficient pool of the national pension scheme.

Hanako was a Japanese housewife in her late 40s who spoke some Chinese. She had volunteered for several NGOs that offered services to migrants, including Tsuru-no-kai. She held a critical view of Japanese volunteerism as a potential danger in its similarity to the prewar "nationwide mobilization," which had been manipulated by the military government, but she still participated in volunteer work. In 2002 Hanako had a paid job at a migrant children's institute opened by the Kunitachi City Government. In order to cut costs the local government planned to close the school or reduce working hours. The teachers did not care about money but wanted to volunteer for the school under a similar schedule and responsibility as in their previously paid work. Hanako, in contrast, upheld the rights of workers, but she failed to convince colleagues that it was the government's responsibility to pay properly for qualified teachers. Refusing to volunteer for the school under the government's manipulation, Hanako started to devote most of her free time to Tsuru-no-kai, as she deeply admired the chairwoman, Sachiko Aoki.

Because of her bad health, Aoki had stopped attending the weekly consultancy to help solve members' daily problems. Since then, there was a serious decline in Tsuru-no-kai's clientele as many members began to have an aversion to Sawako, who took over Aoki's duties. The maximum number of service-seekers at Kunitachi was four persons per week, but during the late 1990s there were constantly long queues of members waiting for help. Sawako explained that the decline in clientele was because the majority of *zanryū-hōjin* families had been settled in Japan for some time and so needed less help in recent years. I observed another volunteer site operated by the Kokubunji City Government where one-to-one Japanese lessons were provided and transport allowance was given to volunteers. As a result, a large number of volunteers were attracted to help with the migrants' language problems. They were driven into competition with each other in order to keep

regular students by offering extra help to solve the migrants' daily problems. Unintentionally, they ended up helping illegal migrants. I also observed a third volunteer site, in Kanagawa Prefectural Centre, where the government building provided a large space and many facilities for volunteer groups. Each group had their own locker labeled with its different organizational name. At this site, Hiroko, a middle-aged woman who had volunteered for migrant laborers, including *zanryū-hōjin*, for 20 years, has established her own volunteer group, named Yukka-no-kai.[4] Every time I visited Hiroko she was waiting for clients, and she often curiously asked me how many clients other NGOs got, and then emphasized to me that she was usually very busy, in order to hide what I interpreted as her embarrassment at having few clients. Another volunteer often waited for clients next to Hiroko, and once she was thrilled to tell me that three Shanghainese students were coming to learn Japanese from her. However, her students were one hour late and then interrupted her teaching to discuss how to get a visa to the US. I will follow up on the abundant supply of volunteers in Japan in later sections.

Hanako insisted that the significant decline in clientele of Tsuru-no-kai was due to the inappropriate qualities of its volunteer services. Hanako tried to improve the situation by replacing Sawako's influence over student volunteers. Unfortunately her Chinese was insufficient to guide the young volunteers. Hanako suggested to the Tsuru-no-kai committee that another experienced Chinese-speaking volunteer should be invited to attend the weekly consultancy. During my fieldwork as a volunteer with Tsuru-no-kai I witnessed that after only two weeks this new volunteer, Yanli, was discouraged from working with Sawako, who got rid of her by using rude and hurtful words. Once a male member with painting skills came to Tsuru-no-kai saying that he was desperate for a job. Yanli could find him a job at her acquaintance's company but Sawako simply refused to help him, as this would have enhanced Yanli's position in the NGO. Yanli's grievances against Sawako made Hanako even more worried about the organization's future.

Insider volunteers: Sawako and Mariko

Sawako had been depressed when she first settled in Japan because of a lot of troubling realities. Her life as a migrant in Japan rapidly changed after she met the chairwoman of Tsuru-no-kai in the mid-1990s. She was then inspired to cultivate a volunteer career of providing services to *zanryū-hōjin*, which seemed to fulfill her, much as had her previous career as a *paojiedao*. Sawako then began to gain enormous benefits from meddling in others' private lives. She started to make great efforts to speak Japanese fluently and intelligently in order to be a qualified Tsuru-no-kai volunteer. She started to behave like a sophisticated urbanite, with smart clothes and make-up, to talk about human rights, and offer most of her free time to help Chairwoman Aoki. To enhance her influence in Tsuru-no-kai, she took her grandsons, who were high school students, to carry out the translation work and fill in application forms in order to monopolize the major volunteer tasks for her.

When Aoki began to suffer from bad health in 2000, Sawako's bilingual ability and her knowledge of *zanryū-hōjin*'s needs, together with her devotion to Tsuru-no-

kai, were recognized by the committee members. Gossip about Sawako's misdeeds had mounted: these included her inability to keep members' privacy, her insulting members as "hopeless peasants," her refusal to help members who did not please her, her doing more favors for those who offered gifts, and her trying to get rid of any volunteers who had the potential to replace her.

Mariko, a *zanryū-koji*, grew up in a sheltered environment with loving adoptive parents. But her Japanese background was a disadvantage when it came to finding a husband from the privileged classes. She hid this fact and married a military man in a big city, who belonged to the high class in Maoist China. He eventually discovered her deception and has been furious for many years. This bitterness in the marriage also meant that her children suffered. Mariko brought the whole family to Japan in 1988, and divorced him in 1991. She raised three daughters and one son by working two shifts in a 3K job. For sending her two daughters to private school for better education, Mariko managed to get welfare assistance from the Sumida District Government while maintaining a full-time job in Saitama Prefecture at night, secretly. This violation of the welfare regulations was never discovered, since she divided her activities into two shifts of day and night in the two separate administrative areas.

In recent years Mariko has been free of financial difficulties, since her daughters have all "married up" to well-to-do Japanese men. She admires Aoki and often shows affection to the old lady as a daughter would do. As a result of this friendship, Mariko was appointed to be one of the Tsuru-no-kai's Japanese-speaking *zanryū-hōjin* volunteers, in charge of the center that specifically provides consultations and services for the *zanryū-hōjin* members from inner-city Tokyo. Compared with Sawako, Mariko did not speak very good Japanese, but she earned herself a better reputation. This was because she could offer more desirable "social work" to the members, such as Chinese medical treatment, spiritual healing, fortune telling, and shamanist practices to expel evil. She said that her supernatural powers were recharged regularly from a hermit monk when she visited China once a year. Mariko appeared to be soft and discrete, and these qualities enabled her to provide alternative "social work" services with the assurance of maintaining confidentiality.

Sawako and Mariko empowered themselves through their own forms of volunteerism. These two tough women, as illustrated by their struggles, disliked each other but shared negative attitudes toward experienced volunteers who presented a threat to them. They believed that no matter how fluently the Japanese volunteers could speak Chinese they could never provide what *zanryū-hōjin* members really wanted. In a study of Latino women's community activism in the US, Abrahams (1996: 785) argues that volunteering offers migrant women a chance to develop untapped dimensions of their energies, talents, and contributions. Exploiting cultural resources inherited from China and structural resources provided by Japanese social institutions, both Sawako and Mariko have benefited somewhat similarly, bridging the gap between the supplies of Japanese volunteerism and the needs of the *zanryū-hōjin* members. With her corrupt volunteerism, Sawako achieved high social mobility in Hegang and Tokyo. Through her unprofessional volunteerism *vis à vis* the standards of Western neo-liberalism, Mariko gained enormous

psychological benefits, not only healing her past wounds but also compensating her with a new personhood.

At the community level, the roles played by Aoki, Sawako, and Mariko in Tsuru-no-kai, although arguably driven at least in part by self-interest, have transformed the *zanryū-hōjin* volunteerism from an ideologically driven mainstream force to a self-managing force. These women have worked behind the scenes to redefine the needs and meanings in their transnational context and direct social resources by increasing accessibility for *zanryū-hōjin* members (Abrahams 1996: 777). In offering special services to address the particular needs of *zanryū-hōjin*, they take the risk of providing transgressing and shamanistic services.

Volunteers and activists in Ichō-danchi

The public housing estate of Ichō-danchi is approximately 15 km from the center of Yokohama, and consists of about 3,500 units in 80 buildings provided by Kanagawa Prefecture. As 20 percent of the units accommodate migrant households coming from developing countries, this public housing area has been given the nickname "International Village." Half of these migrant families are *zanryū-hōjin* – approximately 300 households. Most units have two rooms, a bathroom, and a dining room with an attached kitchen. Each tenant pays a different amount, according to the family's regular income. For the units with elevators, the range of monthly rents is ¥20,000–40,000. For the units in low buildings without elevators, the range of monthly rents is ¥18,000–30,000. A large proportion of *danchi* residents tend to be welfare recipients. Living on welfare is regarded as shameful among Japanese families, and so it is an issue of privacy. However, migrant residents tend to be open about depending on governmental assistance, which further stereotypes them as unwelcome migrants. Households are divided into eight self-management associations, or *jichikai* in Japanese, according to the location of their blocks, arranging communal corporative duties by rotating responsibilities among the member households. Each household pays ¥800 per month in management fees to its *jichikai*, of which part is allocated to Ichō-danchi United Committees to share fire insurance and administration costs as the central cooperative body, and part is kept by the *jichikai* for general maintenance. Every household is enlisted in the monthly rosters of its *jichikai* to share cleaning jobs around the public spaces and facilities. A community center built inside Ichō-danchi Primary School offers indoor facilities to residents and multi-functional rooms for volunteers. A large proportion of the these rooms are used for migrant-oriented volunteerism, to teach Japanese language, and to offer consultation about labor disputes and domestic problems.

Hoshino, a Japanese housewife in her 50s, has lived in the *jichikai* for 25 years and volunteers there. Recently she was elected to be the Chief Officer of Ichō-danchi United Committee, where she deals with complaints about migrant residents who refuse to clean outside their flats. To her surprise, one *zanryū-koji* said to her: "I suffered so much in China to redeem Japan's war crimes for all of you Japanese! What do you want from me now?" Other researchers argue that the *zanryū-hōjin* seldom share community responsibilities because they are seldom invited to participate

in community meetings and activities (Zhao and Machida 2000: 146). To resolve disputes and misunderstandings, *jichikai* volunteers rely on interpreters to communicate. The interpreters are mostly other types of Chinese immigrants. Hoshino had encountered refusals to share community duties as *zanryū-hōjin* believed that the interpreters must be speaking for the Japanese side.

There were 29 *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs from Ichō-danchi recorded in January 2004. Hoshino actively supported the *zanryū-koji* lawsuit against the Japanese government, and helped to enlist a large number of supporters in the public housing community. She found that some people had unhappy experiences with *zanryū-hōjin* neighbors but were mobilized to support their lawsuit. This support curiously rested on their hope to stop the government from sending troops to Iraq, in order to safeguard their own children's lives. The Japanese public took *zanryū-koji* to be war victims, and Japanese parents worried that their children might become war victims if they were sent to Iraq. Their support was thus limited to a political interest in humanitarianism, justice, and peace. They did not support the *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs claims for financial compensation or an increase in welfare support.

Hoshino proposed free legal advice for migrant residents to help solve their daily problems. This idea was opposed by many *jichikai* members as the service would involve high expenses for hiring lawyers and multilingual interpreters. The prefectural government supported her proposal as an effective way to prevent family violence and suicides. The weekly legal consultancy started from November 2003. Only a few migrants came to seek help. Other informants told me that the Japanese residents in Ichō-danchi organized a protest against the Public Housing Department of Kanagawa Prefecture Government for putting too many foreigners into their neighborhood. As an activist of the community, Hoshino told me that she had never heard of such a protest. In 1995, with *jichikai*'s support, she proposed to the local government not to allocate too many foreigners into their community and to let other public housing communities share the costs of assisting migrant residents.

Yanli had encountered several Japanese Communist Party members when she lived in Ichō-danchi. Hayatani was one of them. Ten years earlier he had established a small volunteer group stationed in Ichō-danchi, to target migrant residents. However, migrants from China, Vietnam, and Cambodia were scared of their revolutionary "Internationale," as they had heard it called in the socialist countries they had fled from. Hayatani and his colleagues changed their soliciting methods by offering one-to-one Japanese lessons door-to-door. Yanli was one of their students. For over five years, they had called on Yanli weekly to check her schedule to see when was a good time for giving her private lessons. Even such good-hearted teachers often encountered refusal by migrants, who were exhausted after all-day 3K jobs. After a long period, Hayatani and his colleagues had finally secured their influence among migrants in Ichō-danchi. Unfortunately this small group was divided by ideological fissures, and eventually established even smaller volunteer groups.[5]

In one case, a trash-recycling factory near Ichō-danchi suddenly closed down without paying 27 *zanryū-hōjin* workers their salaries for five months. Before running away, the employer paid the Japanese workers in full. Yanli's husband, brother,

and brother-in-law were among the unpaid workers. They reported the case to the police but were told that dealing with it was not a police responsibility. Employers running away from paying wages was a common problem in China and people usually blamed it on bad luck. Hayatani insisted on claiming the salaries for the victims from the Labor Department. Yanli was inspired by a motivation to stand up for workers' rights. She went to demonstrate in front of the Labor Department and enlisted supporting signatures in the street. This labor activism led by Hayatani was carried out for 18 months, and finally each victim was compensated with 60 percent of the payable salary through a labor insurance scheme.

Yanli was involved in another activism, concerning a *zanryū-fujin* who had died in China before she could repatriate. One of her children was a full-blooded Japanese, born before she had married a Chinese for survival. This full-blooded Japanese child repatriated in the early 1980s. Due to bitter feelings from his childhood, he deceived his step-siblings by saying that half-blooded Japanese children could not repatriate if they married. But this did not stop the step-siblings from coming to Japan; they forged documents to conceal their marriages and children. After settling in Japan they discovered their right to bring spouses and children to Japan, but the immigration authorities did not recognize their spouses and children as their existence had already been legally denied. Hayatani decided to fight against the inflexible bureaucracy and took the *zanryū-fujin*'s children to the Immigration Department to explain their situation. Yanli accompanied them as an interpreter. In the end, they succeeded in bringing their spouses and children to Japan.

Lifestyle choice/state manipulation/life politics/self-directed force

Being a volunteer has become a socially recognized identity and volunteering has become an accepted part of national policy in Japan (Nakano 2000). People understand that volunteering may mean sacrificing material rewards that might be earned through paid work. But it helps them to realize individualization through self-actualization. Japanese postwar prosperity has brought the idea that an individual may choose from a diversity of lifestyles, just as consumerism has meant diversified consumer choices. Similarly, volunteerism has emerged as an alternative and supplement to mainstream life paths. People who cannot find sufficient personal satisfaction in the workforce are willing to make volunteering a central part of their self-identity, as it offers them an attractive and attainable means of gaining public respect. Nevertheless, according to Japan's mainstream social values, men have less flexibility, because they are required to succeed at paid work for their families, while women experience less conflict when volunteering. This gender difference might explain the risk taken by Wakata, the ex-director of Tsuru-no-kai, as the result of a personal need to raise his status by becoming a professional politician alongside his 20 years of volunteering.

Optimistically, NGO support for migrant labor in Japan creates a means by which citizens may help to realize the rights of foreign migrants, despite the fact that the national government policy does not welcome the settlement of foreign

migrants in Japan (Roberts 2000: 276, 295). Volunteerism provides resources for migrant members to negotiate for power in their families and communities and promotes values regarding the needs and meanings of a community. Once identity, community, and work for social justice are constructed through the process of collective identity production, personal experiences that vary tremendously can be organized into a central confrontational force to develop the discourse of state responsibilities (Abrahams 1996: 780). Before their repatriation, *zanryū-hōjin* were scattered in remote villages throughout Northeast China, where a *zanryū-hōjin* community can hardly be said to have existed. Japanese volunteerism certainly aided the entrenchment of the community identity of *zanryū-hōjin*. In the development of their own identities, the *zanryū-hōjin* volunteers, such as the chairwoman Aoki, the *paojiedao* Sawako, the shamanist Mariko, and the newly-joined Yanli, injected powerful resources into the *zanryū-hōjin* community and brought their daily lives into mainstream institutionalized power structures (Abrahams 1996: 776). The identities of *zanryū-hōjin* have been fluctuating, with their exploration of resources and seeking of interests, in the *transnational* situation. Playing the role of conduits between the *zanryū-hōjin* community and institutional power structures, the *zanryū-hōjin* volunteers have been well aware of such unsettled identities within their community.

Adopting a Foucauldian approach to the concept of power, Ogawa (2004) takes the institutionalization of volunteerism as a macro-political process, intentionally produced and reproduced by the agency of the state. Under the 1998 Law to Promote Specific Nonprofit Activities, municipal governments organize residents into various volunteer organizations to provide social services in local communities. The aim of this policy, manifested in the globally dominant neo-liberal politics with an emphasis on market rationality, is to cut costs of public administration. While many Japanese citizens find satisfaction and respect from volunteerism, the state can conveniently recruit volunteers, particularly through uncomplicated or naïve ideologies.

The National Organization to Assist *Zanryū-koji* was established in 1983 under *Kōseishō* supervision to raise money from individuals, associations, and enterprises as a centralized fund to allocate resources to assist *zanryū-hōjin* under the principles of volunteerism. In the past two decades, this government-embodied organ has financed a large number of NGOs who help *zanryū-hōjin* throughout Japan.[6] The ideology of blood as a means of belonging to a culturally and ethnically unified nation has been tenaciously promulgated in the post-1972 *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation schemes in support of what is presented as a movement of reunification. The same logic has also been carried over into the *zanryū-hōjin* settlement in Japan, practiced as an assimilationist policy. Thanks to the widely shared belief in a "unified nation," the state of Japan finds it relatively easy to mobilize masses of volunteers to share the state's responsibilities.

Almost all of my informants asserted that they were moved to tears when they were surrounded by plentiful and enthusiastic Japanese volunteers during the 1980s and the early 90s. However, they soon felt subtle pressures from the wholehearted Japanese volunteers to "Japanize," and as a result avoided seeking help from them.

In effect, *zanryū-hōjin* volunteerism has been fulfilling a role that benefits the state by negotiating identities among these ambiguous Japanese. Analysis of relations between states and immigrants reveals that negotiating identities with immigrants is necessary to strengthen a sovereign state (Kastoryano 2002: 7). This phenomenon is accompanied by the rhetoric of "imagined traditions" from the public authorities that aims to create an identity reappropriation of the society's mainstream in historical narratives as the assimilationist host nations (Kastoryano 2002: 183–184). Therefore the task of negotiating identities with immigrants can be achieved not only by state policies but also through civilian institutions – e.g. those of the Japanese volunteers. In 2003 I still witnessed a very energetic and ideologically driven volunteer force serving the *zanryū-hōjin* community, despite the fact that its clientele had rapidly declined in number.

There are gaps between the services offered by Japanese volunteers and the clients' needs and desires. These gaps have allowed the *zanryū-hōjin* self-directed volunteers to take over the institutional jobs and dominate the force of volunteerism in Japan. Substantially, this transformation has resulted in imbalances between the supply of Japanese volunteers and the *zanryū-hōjin* clients. The over-supply of volunteers has pushed volunteers to provide extra services to *zanryū-hōjin* members, including harboring racketeerism, in order to maintain the clientele for volunteerism. Douglass and Roberts (2000: 10) point out the rapid expansion of volunteer services as a challenge against immigration policies, legal procedures, and the practices that cause difficulties and barriers against migrant labor's settlement in Japan. This can be explained by the concept of structuration: the *zanryū-hōjin* self-directed volunteers exercise their choice and action within the conditions governing the ideologically driven volunteer force, and as a result, their activities have transformed the structures of Japanese volunteerism (Giddens 1984: xxxi, 181).

Volunteerism offers lifestyle choices to individuals and potentially leads to self-actualization (Nakano 2000). This volunteerism can also be explained in terms of Giddens' concept of life politics, which refers to self-actualization through making decisions in the midst of abundant choices and seeking "generative power in an inertly and reflexively ordered environment," emphasizing the "*rights* to work out justifiable forms of life in order to pave the road to self-actualization in the context of global interdependence" (Giddens 1991: 215). Although motivations varied among the volunteers mentioned above, their volunteering manifested their personal life politics within the context and structure of Japanese volunteerism.

Both Sawako and Mariko gained a material and a spiritual sense of power from their volunteering. Their motivations are thus rather clear: self-actualization through helping their community in their own ways. Perhaps practiced in a more sophisticated way, Yanli's volunteerism rested on a similar ground of life politics, as what she wanted from volunteering was to improve her self-esteem. Hoshino's volunteering in Ichō-danchi seems a promise of a lifetime of politics for a well-educated Japanese housewife. Hanako could have a similar "free choice" but her life politics carried out in the field of volunteerism has been torn by her awareness of workers' rights. Wakata told me that he started helping *zanryū-hōjin* 20 years ago because he chose to lead a life to fulfill his idealism – an alternative satisfying lifestyle. Such

free choice later became his life politics when his choices for careers were limited to a salary job in a private school. The life politics of Hayatani in Ichō-danchi seems to have gone through a similar path from idealistic "free choice" towards the practicalities of professional volunteerism. In contrast, Kyoko's volunteerism began with her life politics. She was neither keen on fighting against social injustice nor Chinese-related studies. She just wanted to volunteer so that she could be recognized as a progressive youth. She chose to volunteer for Tsuru-no-kai because it was close to her university and residence. Her life politics reached a critical point when she felt that she had assisted racketeers to bring Chinese into Japan.

From activism to lawsuits[7]

On the level of activism, there were large gaps between the demands of *zanryū-hōjin* plaintiffs and the attitudes of their Japanese supporters, who were interested in a liberal social movement within Japan's domestic politics. This section illustrates how and in what ways Japanese activists, volunteers, lawyers, and politicians have been motivated to conduct *zanryū-hōjin* activism and become involved with a large-scale lawsuit in order to fulfill their own domestic agenda. Although various political and humanitarian kinds of idealism were manifested in the *zanryū-hōjin* activism, Japanese supporters and lawyers worked with their Japanese citizenship, which is more than a passport or a nationality, as it also indicates the lineage of Japanese ethnicity. They helped *zanryū-hōjin* to sue the state for: 1) abandoning *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* in wartime; 2) denying them citizenship by deleting them from family registries as war deaths in the 1950s and setting barriers against their repatriation; and 3) further abandoning them by providing inadequate assistance for their settlement in Japan. The key justification for upholding *zanryū-hōjin*'s rights through legal action is that these plaintiffs possess "Japanese blood" and thus are entitled to the rights granted to every ordinary Japanese national.

Ioriya Iwao is the former head of the National Organization to Assist *Zanryū-koji*.[8] He was born in Manchuria and grew up there before repatriating to Japan in October 1946 from Fushun. Ioriya witnessed the high death rates of inmates in the Japanese refugee camps and the fact that the weak *kaitakudan* refugees were not given priority to repatriate. In the postwar years he became a lawyer of sound reputation. He started to support *zanryū-hōjin* activism in 1977 and actively participated in organizing both civil and governmental organizations to assist the repatriation and settlement of *zanryū-hōjin*. As an influential lawyer, Ioriya and his followers have played a crucial role in facilitating reforms of Japanese laws that hindered *zanryū-hōjin* from repatriating and settling in Japan. He has worked with a group of lawyers to restore Japanese nationality for over 1,000 repatriated orphans by voluntary legal services.[9] At the age of 86, in 2001, he established a voluntary legal team for the *zanryū-fujin* plaintiffs to take the state to the court, and Ioriya was a key witness.[10] He also founded a study group called Friend's Club for Issues of the Repatriates from China, through which systematic investigations of all *zanryū-hōjin* related issues are adopted by the SFC website, operated by the *Kōseishō* as a type of official source.[11]

In response to the parliamentary rejection of a bill concerning the improvement of social welfare for the retired *zanryū-hōjin* earlier in 2001, lawyers and liberal politicians, mostly the committee members of Tsuru-no-kai, led by Ioriya, called for political action through a lawsuit and claimed ¥20 million in compensation, which the state should pay to each victim. However, even though they offered legal services for free, the lawyers only enlisted three *zanryū-fujin* plaintiffs, including Aoki and Sawako, who filed the suit with the Tokyo District Court in December 2001. There was a general unwillingness to take political action among *zanryū-fujin*. Some activists explained that they feared losing their existing welfare. Interestingly, two *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs suggested that since racketeering requires a good command of the Japanese language in order to build up business networks, *zanryū-fujin* had the opportunity to maximize their interests by engaging in racketeer activities, as most of them spoke Japanese language. Thus they may have preferred to keep a low profile to avoid drawing attention from the legal system.

Since the early 1970s, Kōsuke Sugawara,[12] as an ex-Manchurian-Japanese, began to travel to the former Manchuria extensively as a journalist to investigate the situation of unreturned Japanese. He has become a key figure in the long-lasting social movement of *zanryū-hōjin* activism and has published numerous books about *zanryū-hōjin* (e.g. Sugawara 1986; 1989; 1998). He has organized lobby groups to push for legal and political reforms to allow the repatriation of *zanryū-hōjin* faster and in larger numbers. Since his retirement from *Asahi Shimbun* he has personally sponsored many unidentified orphans, who have adopted his surname as Japanese citizens. In the mid-1990s, Sugawara established Japanese language schools with government funding to facilitate the repatriates' adaptation to Japan. He founded the Kanagawa Association for Welfare Support for Repatriates from China, the Fuso Association and the Association to Thank Foster Parents in China and appointed suitable *zanryū-koji* to lead and operate them. He mobilized a signature campaign to support the petition to improve social welfare for *zanryū-hōjin*. The effectiveness of his political network manifested itself in the fact that he persuaded 48 Diet members to submit a bill supported by 100,000 signatures. The bill, however, was rejected by the Diet in 2001. Now in his 80s, Sugawara continues to advocate Japan's largest ever lawsuit against the state.

As a result of his long contribution to *zanryū-koji* activism, Sugawara enjoys much better political resources than Ioriya and his associates. Utilizing his well-established social networks, Sugawara succeeded in mobilizing a team of lawyers who had just defeated the state in court for its treatment of leprosy patients. The lawsuit, accusing the state of abandoning the *zanryū-koji*, was filed with the Tokyo District Court in December 2002, involving 629 *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs and 183 lawyers supported by large-scale street demonstrations. An amount of ¥33 million in war compensation was claimed, of which ¥3 million would be payable to the lawyers and ¥30 million to each plaintiff. This encouraged the plaintiffs to anticipate that the lawyers would do a good job for them, since their pay would be ensured even in the case that they didn't win the full amount.

On the larger scale of political movement, Sugawara occupied three important positions: 1) chairmanship of the Citizens Coordination for Restoration of Human

Rights to *Zanryū-koji*, through which he succeeded in raising substantial funds and creating mass mobilization; 2) chief representative of the counsel for the plaintiffs, by which Sugawara acted as a spokesman for the uneducated plaintiffs; and 3) one of the key witnesses for the plaintiffs, for which Sugawara used over 1,700 media reports and official records collected over decades as evidence to present to the court. An activist revealed to me that Sugawara faced difficulties in finding a suitable leader among the few educated *zanryū-koji*. Some claimed themselves highly educated but it was discovered that they had faked their educational backgrounds. Those who had genuinely achieved tertiary education in China showed no interest in mingling with uneducated *zanryū-hōjin*. Only a handful of educated *zanryū-koji* preferred to lead their political struggle by their own political skills acquired from China's Cultural Revolution. In Tokyo I often heard them using Maoist slogans such as "Solidarity is power!" and "Down with Japan's imperialism!"

Activists found it impossible to mobilize *zanryū-koji* through an appeal to the ideas of human rights alone. Every plaintiff was required to pay a ¥10,000 annual membership fee to cover the costs of this class-act lawsuit. Mrs Morita received a call from a *zanryū-koji* activist on behalf of the Fuso Association, which was said to be supervized by Sugawara. The activist wanted to persuade her to take part with a simple calculation: "¥10,000 of membership fee can be exchanged for ¥30 million in compensation!" She was interested in this deal but wondered if she was qualified to join on behalf of her late husband. Misunderstanding her hesitation, he impatiently responded in a scornful tone: "Don't be so stingy! Even a peasant would know how wonderful it is to make ¥30 million out of ¥10,000 investment!" Mrs Morita was offended. Another activist told me that he recruited plaintiffs through the same kind of statements, adding that, "You won't have any trouble getting that ¥10,000 as you can save it from going without two seafood meals!" This method of persuasion worked effectively. Sugawara did not like this way of mobilization but found it ineffective to oppose it.

Comparison with the state treatment offered to the victims of abduction by North Korea was also an effective method for mobilization of plaintiffs and a strategy that was used in court. Japanese media had shown great sympathy toward these recent repatriates. The state legislation, brought into effect on December 4 2002, provided every single repatriate from North Korea with ¥170,000, every couple with ¥240,000, and every 3-member nuclear family with ¥270,000 in welfare per month. However, the maximum monthly welfare offered to the repatriates from China was half of the special economic assistance to the repatriates from North Korea. The *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs argued that the returnees from North Korea were not victims. They received high education in Japan, occupied high-ranking positions in North Korea, and came back to Japan with employable skills. If they had been kidnapped by North Korea, they should claim compensation from North Korea; whereas *zanryū-hōjin* families had been forced to settle in Manchuria and had then been abandoned as a matter of Japanese military policy, left with tremendous tragedies and hardships, and had come back to Japan without skills of language or for employment. This competition over degrees of victim status further included comparison with the bereaved families of Japanese soldiers killed and wounded

during World War II, who had received handsome compensation for decades from the postwar government, even though almost nothing had been given in compensation to the *zanryū-hōjin* civilian war victims. This competition can be seen as a result of political skill nurtured by *hikiagesha*, the ex-Manchurian settlers repatriated to Japan during the immediate postwar years, who have been *zanryū-hōjin*'s major supporters. Analyzing autobiographies and self-histories published by individual *hikiagesha*, Tamanoi (2001: 166) argues that their collective memories of sufferings at the end of World War II were their negotiated goods to compete with various groups for the rights and priorities to war compensation.

The plaintiffs had other complaints. On top of the low welfare scheme, various restrictions were put on *zanryū-hōjin* recipients. Visiting China, attending English classes, wearing jewelry, using air-conditioning in summer and heaters in winter were all counted as luxury expenditures, and would disqualify or cause deduction from a welfare dependant's payment. One *zanryū-koji* in Yokohama wanted to visit his adopted father in hospital, but a local government staff member suggested that he should go back to China forever. Another *zanryū-koji* in Kyushu was notified that his welfare payment had been cancelled in April 2003, citing three facts as indications of his reluctance to integrate into Japanese society: 1) he installed a satellite dish to receive Chinese TV programs; 2) he frequently traveled to China; and 3) he repatriated six years ago but still could not speak Japanese.

According to the welfare regulations, everyone receiving compensation from the state would have to deduct from it the total amount he/she has received from state welfare payments. For those who have relied on welfare for 10 years, a large proportion would be deducted from their compensation. After receiving the balance amount, they would lose the qualification to apply for welfare immediately, since they would have savings in the bank. Supposedly all lawyers and supporters understood this reality. However, I was surprised to find that many plaintiffs did not know of it. Sawako was shocked to be reminded by me, because she had been surrounded by Japanese intellectuals, lawyers, and politicians who had never said anything about it. Another *zanryū-koji* activist was angry when I mentioned this reality, and warned me not to spread this harmful news. This hidden issue raises two critical questions. What motivations did the activists, led by Ioriya and Sugawara, have for mobilizing such a political action in the name of helping the *zanryū-hōjin* plaintiffs? Were the pitifully stereotyped *zanryū-hōjin* actually an effective political resource to fulfil the Japanese social activists in their political struggle to gain public influence?

The slogan "The war hasn't finished yet" used in *zanryū-hōjin* activism successfully drew mass support during my fieldwork period in 2003, when the Japanese public was anxious about the government's dispatch of the Self Defense Forces to Iraq – an issue which once again brought Japan's long-standing anti-militarism to the fore. In such a climate, the *zanryū-hōjin* activism was soon integrated into Japan's domestic politics as a field in which social activists and groups could demonstrate and enhance their political influence. This movement successfully enlisted those who were not sympathetic to *zanryū-hōjin* but worried their sons would be sent to Iraq. Accompanied by extraordinary publicity, the Association for Supporting the

Zanryū-koji Lawsuit was formed in 2003 to absorb donations. Various women's groups also made efforts to mobilize the masses to support the *zanryū-koji* lawsuits by collecting signatures and donations in support (*Josei News* January 20 2004).

Another slogan – "Fight for the right to lead a human life" – was also often chanted in the *zanryū-koji* activism. This pursuit of restoration of human rights stresses the key term "abandoned citizens" (Ōkubo 2006), similar to both the political identity of war victims and to the legitimate status of "orphans" – a potent metaphor for aging adults who were still unable to belong to their "own" home because of the state's policy of abandoning them (Tamanoi 2005). Stating a wish to live as respectable human beings like mainstream Japanese, it seemed to *zanryū-koji* that they were justified as a marginalized group in Japanese society who has been seeking for a homeland where they would be entitled to have identities, rights, and a place to die (Tamanoi 2005). This message is rather politically powerful in the context of East Asian beliefs that people have their own roots, whether culturally, or ethnically, or socially defined.

This political message can be contested, as it may convey different meanings to address alternative perspectives on the identities of *zanryū-hōjin*. As I have asked throughout this research, how and in what ways have *zanryū-koji*, together with the other *zanryū-hōjin*, found their identities in Japan? Perhaps they know their desires better than their identities, and that seeking strategies to realize their desires is more urgent than seeking such categorical "identities." Using the established belief in "roots" certainly helps these flexible citizens to maximize their interests in the transnational market situation.

To attract more *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs, the Tokyo Association for Coordination was established in April 2002 as an umbrella organization to unite all *zanryū-hōjin* groups in Tokyo and its environs. It would function as a coordinating unit to facilitate *zanryū-hōjin* lawsuits. The Association filed in other prefectures. By the end of 2003, the nationwide total number of plaintiffs had increased to 1,502. Paralleling this increase in the number of plaintiffs, the lawyer team was expanded to over 300 lawyers. This, the largest lawsuit in Japan's history, offered them the chance to win good reputations and thus enhance their professional careers. Several activists proudly told me that high-quality lawyers had made themselves available.[13] By October 2005 the nationwide total number of *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs had increased to 2,029 persons out of the total 2,494 repatriated *zanryū-koji* (refer to Table III in Appendixes).[14]

On 24 July 2003, the defense argued that Manchukuo had been an independent state and thus Japan was not responsible for the *zanryū-fujin* plaintiffs who were victimized in Manchuria (*Asahi Shimbun* July 28 2003). This aggravated the feelings of many *zanryū-hōjin* and their supporters and subsequently facilitated another *zanryū-fujin* lawsuit filed with nine plaintiffs at the Kochi District Court in November 2004. By October 2005, the *zanryū-fujin* lawsuit had been heard nearly 20 times.[15] The defendant lawyers for the state presented a document signed by Sawako's cousin in the 1950s saying that Sawako could be deleted from the family register in Japan because she had married a Chinese and preferred to live in China. This was used as evidence to prove that the plaintiffs had stayed in

China voluntarily, and that it was therefore not Japan that created barriers against the plaintiffs repatriation. Sawako emphasized that she did not marry her Chinese husband for love but for survival,[16] and made her emphasis convincing by stressing the horrors she experienced during the Cultural Revolution.

As for the *zanryū-koji* cases, the state procrastinated in the lawsuit by checking minor details in each hearing without putting forward any argument. This suggested that the state's strategy might be to wait for *zanryū-koji* to die out. This impelled a major push for the counsel of the plaintiffs to expand the *zanryū-koji* activism to nationwide lawsuits. On January 22 2004, the state finally made three arguments. First, they argued that though Japan has taken good care of the plaintiffs, they have responded by suing the state for more money. At the conference concerning the lawsuit's progress, a microphone was passed among the crowd of *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs, who got extremely angry after hearing the statement and expressed their anger emotionally (*Asahi Shimbun* July 26 2005). However, when a microphone was passed to a female *zanryū-koji* who was murmuring in tears and the conference interpreter asked her to raise her voice, we heard her swearing and cursing, in her Northeastern dialect, about her "heartless" children, and it was embarrassing for the interpreter to deliver such indecent words to the Japanese supporters. The rest of *zanryū-koji* blamed this woman's "peasant behavior" on the state, saying that it had been the abandonment policies that had led to her indignity.

Fears of enlarging the gap between the plaintiffs and mass support had made the counsel warn plaintiffs to stop talking about compensation money, as they shifted the issue of the lawsuit towards anti-imperialism. When the state made its second point, that the plaintiff's tragedies should be blamed on the Soviet Army, and its third point, that all Japanese people were war victims and the plaintiffs should learn to tolerate hardship like other ordinary Japanese have done, the arguments proved provocative and again enhanced mass support for the *zanryū-koji* activism.

Results of the lawsuits

Among the series of *zanryū-fujin* lawsuits filed in 15 district courts, the Osaka District Court was first to hand down a ruling, on July 6 2005. The court rebuffed the claim of "the right to lead a human life" as unjustifiable, as it was abstract in concept without a specific legal interest. The plaintiffs' right to compensation was deemed indefensible, as the lawsuit was filed more than 50 years after they were orphaned, whilst an illegal act should be applicable within the 20-year statute of limitation (*Kyodo News* July 5 2005). Their arguments were nothing other than a claim for compensation for war damage; but there were no grounds or law to specifically treat orphans, who were only one part of a total of 6 million repatriates, and even air raid victims had received no benefits, as a *Kōseishō* official argued (*Kyodo News* July 10 2005). Whether or not to institute a law to support the lives of orphans was left up to the broad discretion of the legislative and administrative branches (*Kyodo News* July 6 2005).

However, the focal point of the court battle was whether the state had been under the obligation to bring about their early repatriation and provide support for their

settlement in Japan, especially for those who could not speak Japanese and did not have the means to make ends meet (*BBC Worldwide Monitoring* July 6 2005). The state argued that it had conducted investigations shortly after diplomatic ties were restored with China and had sufficiently supported orphans who had returned to Japan (*Mainichi Daily News* July 6 2005). The state also argued that the plaintiffs' suffering was mainly rooted in their lack of language ability, which caused difficulties in landing jobs and resulted in more than 60 percent of them living on welfare. To solve this problem, the government has established various institutes throughout Japan to assist the repatriates in learning Japanese. The government had also opened the Support and Communications Centers for People Returning from China[17] in Tokyo, Osaka and Fukuoka between 2001 and 2004, but the plaintiffs had seldom paid visits there even though officials of these centers had made great efforts to venture out teaching language (*Yomiuri Shimbum* July 7 2005). After this first ruling, plaintiffs met the press in various parts of the country and expressed their anger and urge to fight until a ruling held the government accountable (e.g. *Kyodo News* August 15 2005; *Yomiuri Shimbun* July 7 2005). Many ascribed their poor Japanese to their abandonment, as they sighed: "What could I do in China after being abandoned?" (*Kyodo News* July 10 2005).

After four and a half years of struggle in court – since the end of 2001 – a ruling on the *zanryū-fujin* lawsuit was handed down by the Tokyo District Court on February 15 2006. In contrast to the Osaka court, the Tokyo court showed sympathy towards the plaintiffs' situation by acknowledging the government's *political responsibility*, saying that the government assistance offered to the women was insufficient. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had been provided with public housing and, although insufficient, they had been receiving welfare and special pension provisions. Therefore, their claim concerning the state's *legal responsibility* for compensation could not be recognized. Judge Hiroshi Noyama ruled that women and children left behind in China in the chaos at the end of the war had only two choices: to risk their lives by not accepting help from the Chinese or to receive aid and run the risk of not being able to get to Japan. The judge said that the state bears responsibility towards the Japanese public as a whole, not to each individual citizen, since the state's illegality under the State Tort Liability Law is unfounded (*Asahi Shimbun* February 18 2006; *Associated Press Worldstream* February 15 2006; *Japan Times* February 16 2006).

The *zanryū-fujin* plaintiffs and their supporters said they would appeal, as the ruling was completely frustrating and unexpected, the court having recognized most of the facts regarding the situation the women faced in China. Two plaintiffs said that they could not die peacefully, as the ruling was unjust. They filed a further case at the Supreme Court on February 24 2006. Preparing for the first hearing at the Supreme Court on 6 July 2006, the counsel of the *zanryū-fujin* plaintiffs relies heavily on chairwoman Aoki's public speech to enhance mass support. Struggling with her bad health, Aoki has followed up with a series of public speeches about the brutal war experiences she had in Manchuria.

Before the ruling result on February 15 2006, Sawako Yamada had made a shocking speech about the brutal war experiences in advance of the preparation for

a further appeal. In this public statement, she had reduced her number of children from eight to five. She cried out that many talked about hardships in Japan right after the war, but the women left behind in China went through many things that were especially mortifying, sad and shameful. She recalled, in tears, that her elder sister, 16 years old in 1945, was selected by the *kaitakudan* chief as the bride for a Soviet soldier notorious for his repeated rapes (*Asahi Shimbun* February 14 and 15 2006). In my understanding of the Yamada sisters and their hostile relationships with Sawako, I believe that they would have totally denied such a story and would have tried by any means to stop Sawako telling of this shameful experience if they had known Sawako's intention. Whether true or false, it was certainly not easy for Sawako to spell this out in the court as she had emphasized it to the media. Sawako cried out that her sister sacrificed herself for every one of the Japanese refugees in Manchuria (*Asahi Shimbun* February 14 and 15 2006). Sadly, it seems that now Sawako felt that she had to sacrifice and reveal the painful memory of her sister's experience in exchange for the political opportunity to sustain her career in Japanese volunteerism.

While other district courts proceeded with investigations and hearings, the final trial at the Tokyo District Court of 1,092 *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs was set for May 24 2006, and was to rule on the partial number of 40 plaintiffs, with another 40 plaintiffs to be decided on January 30 2007, another 40 plaintiffs to be ruled on later and so forth. The ruling of May 25 2006 concluded that the state bore no legal responsibility for the plaintiffs' painful experiences and difficulties in adapting to Japan but admitted that the state had a humanitarian responsibility to improve its assistance to the plaintiffs.[18] Until new legislation can be established to specifically address the damages of *zanryū-hōjin*, the further rulings are unlikely to make any difference. In the end, although this failure of the legal action seems to have been predictable, it provided Japanese social activists and politicians with another stage on which to operate to further *zanryū-hōjin* activism – a stage on which they can not only gain more publicity and political reputation but where their NGOs and NPOs can also absorb plentiful donations from a wide range of social sectors in Japan.

Summary

The *zanryū-hōjin* group has offered the copious force of Japanese volunteerism a clientele basis. Compared with Japanese volunteers, the less-professional *zanryū-hōjin* volunteers seem better able to satisfy the needs of clients. This return migrant group has also offered a stage for lawyers through Japan's largest lawsuit, and for liberals, left-wingers, and star-activists, it has offered an attractive platform from which to engage in Japan's domestic politics. In return, these activists/volunteers/politicians/lawyers have helped to construct a coherent and mobilized *zanryū-hōjin* community with some sense of identity. In the process of constructing such a collective identity, the rural migrant *zanryū-hōjin* have been modernized by the sloganized notions of democracy and citizen rights. Internalizing these sentiments of modernity, those who used to accept disadvantages in China are no longer tolerant of the disadvantages that they encounter in Japan, and they may continue to view

Japan as owing them a debt. This tendency reflects the fact that their modernization largely rests on the supply of political ideologies by Japanese activists, but lacks individualization in the kind of daily practice of life politics that I have studied in the previous chapters. Yet their understanding of human rights and citizens' rights is insufficient to see the reality that democracy involves individual responsibility to the nation-state, while democratic government may face institutional limitations and barriers.

One Japanese volunteer who had offered services to *zanryū-hōjin* for over two decades pointed out to me that the Chinese government can simply command employers to offer jobs to specific needy people, but the Japanese government has to negotiate and convince employers through incentive policies. Even if factories agreed to employ the staff, those workers must keep their jobs on the merit of their own work performance.

10 Conclusion

To what extent have they transformed?

Modernity has never been a single unified entity as its convergent forces and processes have been unleashed across the world (Deshpande 2003: 29). The *zanryū-hōjin* families and individuals have led their lives in the Sino-Japanese transnational space – a market situation within and between rural China and cosmopolitan Japan, where the control by the two nation-states is blurred. Whilst resources can be tapped in this space, these rural migrants face a mixture of rules, barriers, and uncertainties. How have these migrants transformed in this space that provides them with a mixture of rules/resources, barriers/strategies, and freedom/uncertainties? How and what modernity have they gained? To answer these questions, we must measure three significant areas – transnationalization, roots, and negotiations, which this book has aimed to explore.

Transnationalization in East Asia

Manchuria, the Northeast, has been one of the most significant sites of East Asian transnationalism. Its migration activity has been practiced in various ways, and has evolved through changing global political and economic developments. Beginning in the eighteenth century the Russian imperial interest in the Far East brought influxes of European settlers and facilitated the building of Manchurian metropolises in Harbin, Port Arthur, etc. The creation of Manchukuo in the 1930s brought a large number of Japanese people who spread over the vast land of Manchuria. Although economic and socio-cultural activities involved exchanges between Japanese, European, Chinese, Korean, and other ethnic groups, transnational practices were dominated by military struggles for political influence among the imperial powers (Duara 1997; Tamanoi 2000). The underprivileged Japanese peasants had little choice but to settle in Manchuria, in accordance with military schemes. Many Japanese peasants could not return to Japan proper after the violent war years of the 1940s – it is estimated that more than a third of the total *kaitakudan* population of 300,000 did not return to postwar Japan (Tamanoi 2001: 164). Within the former Manchukuo there were essentially two kinds of internal *kaitakudan* refugees: orphans and women, who became the so-called *zanryū-koji* and *zanryū-fujin*, respectively. Their repatriation was further blocked during the Cold War period and was hindered by structural barriers presented by Japan's rigid citizenship law and

China's economic underdevelopment. During this transnationally stagnant period, both *zanryū-koji* and *zanryū-fujin* can be described as passively uprooted migrants who survived in rural Chinese households spread over all of Northeast China, where they could neither live in a Japanese community nor practice Japanese culture or use the Japanese language, and so were therefore completely assimilated into rural Chinese traditional lifestyles.

From the 1980s, China's economic reforms and Japan's open door for migrant labor combined to release the *zanryū-hōjin* from this structural bondage. These families, who had had little autonomy before, started to relocate, and their return migration activities produced crucial effects that triggered a big wave of emigration to Japan. The emigration fad has created more and more "hitchhikers of global capitalism" (Borkert *et al.* 2006) in the Northeast countryside, some of whom seek their luck in South Korea, Russia, or wherever else countries will admit them, legally or illegally. New *qiaoxiang* have thus been established in the economically underdeveloped Northeast rural areas much more quickly than the traditional *qiaoxiang* were developed in southern China, where emigration history can be traced back for centuries. The *qiaoxiang* phenomenon is characterized as Chinese globalization in studies of Chinese diasporas. Here I emphasize that the new and fast *qiaoxiang*-building in Northeast reflects a peculiar sort of Chinese globalization characterized by main actors who are rural people willing to take high risks in order to set themselves free from structural limitations by going overseas. Without the transnational historical product of *zanryū-hōjin* families and their crucial role as bridge-builders between Japan and the underprivileged rural communities in the Northeast, the East Asian transnationalism manifested in the former Manchuria would not have seen significant development.

The post-1972 *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation triggered war memories among ex-Manchurian-Japanese and introduced a Sino-Japanese element into East Asian transnationalism. Repatriation of ex-colonists from previously occupied territories, politically described as a homecoming, is a common phenomenon worldwide. What makes the *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation unique is that it is connected to the Japanese public's war memories after so many years. Togami argues (1997: 6) that Japanese migration often occurred under war-related conditions. Subsequently, postwar Japanese society was left with bitter feelings spread widely throughout various social sectors. The arrival of *zanryū-hōjin* revitalized these war memories among the ex-Manchurian-settlers. These people had taken the issue of the unreturned Japanese in the former Manchukuo as an agenda in their activism in the postwar years. They and their offspring have actively engaged in cultural and journalistic productions and have occupied influential positions in legal and political spheres. Starting from the 1970s, they have searched for unreturned Japanese in China and have lobbied for changes in the laws that have hindered *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation. They have made huge efforts in assisting *zanryū-hōjin* settlement in Japan and have organized *zanryū-hōjin* to voice their political claims in recent activism. It is these ex-Manchurian settlers and their children who have effectively incorporated the newcomers, whom they see as war victims, into Japan's domestic politics.

One may ask critically: if *zanryū-hōjin* could not be cultivated as a useful political resource, would the ex-Manchurian settlers still have enthusiastically supported them for over three decades? Such political interests are revealed in the ex-Manchurian settlers' witness statements in testimonies at the hearings of the recent *zanryū-koji* lawsuit. Unable to work out legal feasibilities with hundreds of lawyers, the activists among the ex-Manchurian settlers used the court as a political stage to demonstrate their criticism of the former Imperial Japanese policies. For instance, Sugawara, an influential supporter of the *zanryū-hōjin*, emotionally confronted the state: he himself had been recruited by the *giyūdai* because of its patriotic propaganda. It can be argued that war memories carried over into the political activities of ex-Manchurian-settlers have fastened *zanryū-hōjin* and Japanese society together, and thus the *zanryū-hōjin* community members, consisting mainly of rural Chinese, have been accepted as returnees and repatriates. Six decades after 1945, the return migration of *zanryū-hōjin* families shows its significance in East Asian transnationalization in a peculiar way: the *zanryū-hōjin* families, previously with few choices, now receive moral and social support in modern Japan.

This activism, accentuated as supporting "war-displaced Japanese" with "traumatic experiences," is widely participated in by Japanese intellectuals, including journalists and academic researchers (e.g. Araragi 2000). In spite of the fact that recent studies of migration and ethnicity have broadly shifted away from discussions of multiculturalism and assimilation, the existing *zanryū-hōjin* studies tend to renew these discourses in order to treat *zanryū-hōjin* as a special class/ethnic/historical category that differs from that of their counterparts, the returned-migrant *nikkeijin* from Latin America. This theoretical approach does not appear entirely satisfactory, as it continues to deal only in binary positions, such as Japanese versus foreign, multicultural versus mainstream, assimilation versus resistance, without telling a full story of transnational identity. However, it reflects the mindset of today's Japanese intellectuals, which is built upon collective memories of the war, and seemingly facilitates an idealistic agenda to mobilize Japanese society according to a moral obligation to accept *zanryū-hōjin* as returnees from Japan's former colony. Indeed, these Japanese descendants are different from the *nikkeijin* descendants of Japanese emigrants, returned from Latin America. As argued by Ward (2006a), the acceptance of *zanryū-hōjin* together with the lesser recognition of *nikkeijin*'s Japaneseness suggest that the former colonial territory of Manchukuo still remains within the boundaries of the "imagined community" in postwar Japanese society.

The politics of war memory in Japan, which has also driven the *zanryū-hōjin* activism, has broadly been divided between two standpoints, those of the left and the right. However, escaping from rural restrictions in order to pursue a better life in the metropolis, *zanryū-hōjin* families show little interest in such ideologically driven domestic politics, trying only to grasp anything that is useful for tapping resources and opportunities. Giddens (1994) argues that the globalization of cultural change in everyday private life has rendered both socialist and liberal visions of public life obsolete, as they are unable to deal with the personal relations that may become a major arena of democratization. The perspectives of Japanese activists and intellectuals, therefore, barely touch the complexities of *zanryū-hōjin*'s desires. Indeed,

every migrant or repatriate would be happy to see a multicultural Japanese society that tolerates the newcomers' foreignness. However, few migrants or repatriates would consider this long-term possibility as a factor in their decisions to settle in Japan. My informants did not consider this external factor, as they could not count on any change in Japanese social attitudes. Calculating according to a short-term perspective – e.g. hard labour in exchange for owning a house, the availability of education, opportunities for social mobility and a modern lifestyle – appeared to be more practical for obtaining results from their efforts and reflexive actions in hitchhiking their way to modernity. The vision of "war-displaced Japanese" and "repatriates" unintentionally distances itself from the changes of global capitalism because it cannot see the significance of the *zanryū-hōjin* within the context of the transnational global economy.

While aspects of global capitalism have played an important role in East Asian transnationalization, a global macro-perspective such as Immanuel Wallerstein's world system theory is not useful to measure this transformation. It emphasizes the "needs" of core countries along a single axis as the forces that determine the global division of labour and resources (Ong 1999: 241). This suggests that powerless peasant *zanryū-hōjin* migrants from the periphery of rural China will eventually be passively assimilated into the mainstream core culture of Japan. This vision deals with global economical developments unidirectionally, obscuring the fact that these "powerless" rural migrants have had the capacity to build a new *qiaoxiang* in the Northeast. This is a central issue in the development of global capitalism – the emergence of reflexive modernity – which the macro theory of world systems fails to deal with.

In contrast, Ong (1999: 4) looks at the "cultural specificities of the global process" with the aim of filling the gap in studies of transnationalism between local perspectives and global macro-theories. She conceptualizes flexible citizenship and sovereignty as a matter of the accumulation of capital and power as well as a matter of individual strategies (Ong 1999: 3, 6). Such a flexible citizenship approach can be digested within the framework of structuration as a theory of social change. Giddens takes system as recurrent social practices, resources drawn upon by actions and interactions between actors, where "structure is the unintended outcome of the agents' bringing about of effects" (Karp 1986: 135), with the effects achieved through rules and resources applied in daily life. Subsequently, structuration is regarded as the production of structures alongside the reproduction of systems and resources, measuring continuity or transformation. The changes in *zanryū-hōjin* families from passive uprooted migrants to a privileged migrant group of "war-displaced Japanese" have resulted from the ways the *zanryū-hōjin* case has been used by both *zanryū-hōjin* themselves and Japanese activists in different ways and with different purposes. Examining this transformation within the framework of structure and agency, the questions then arise: how much success do or can *zanryū-hōjin* and their supporters have? What are the limits and costs of this success?

The historical creation of *zanryū-hōjin* has, in turn, created legitimate migration flows from China to Japan and has provided political resources for Japan's

domestic politics. Belief in ethnic blood; kinship practices, including marriage and adoption; the fad for going overseas in the post-Mao countryside; and Japan's shortage of unskilled labour in the 1980s can be all described as comprising the structure of recurrent social practices in today's cultural system of East Asian transnationalism. Within this structure, *zanryū-hōjin* families have tapped and created resources through their goal-directed actions, making marriage and adoption into useful tools to enhance their personal mobility in two countries. By doing so, they have produced the structure of a new *qiaoxiang* in the rural Northeast, which has further facilitated, in conjunction with official interests, the production of more new *huaqiao* migrants who do not possess "Japanese blood." On the other hand, Japanese activists, politicians, and volunteers have tapped the resources of the deep-rooted belief in ethnic roots to connect the *zanryū-koji* case to their collective memories of the war. They have produced the structure of *zanryū-hōjin*'s public life within the system of Japan's domestic politics with the vigorous force of their activism. In other words, the success of *zanryū-hōjin* families' transformations after settling in Japan seems most evident in the social impacts that they have produced in the two countries. The limits of this success can be reflected in the fact that *zanryū-hōjin* families have gained few practical benefits from the recent large-scale collective lawsuits, which have catered to the agendas of Japan's domestic politics. The costs of the success can be traced in the family tensions that I have shown in the previous chapters, which have partly been the result of a lack of skill in handling individualization and partly the result of the practice of "marrying up" to a "good" quality of spouse, found in China. Moreover, the Japanese immigration authorities also bear a cost – the influx of the new *huaqiao*.

Ethnic roots or desired routes?

The concept of ethnic roots has been manipulated in both Japanese and Chinese societies. *Jus sanguinis* aligns nationality with kinship; the nation is, by virtue of its shared blood, an enormous family. It has been argued that the principle of *jus sanguinis* is interlocked with the indigenous theories of Japanese distinction commonly gathered under the rubric *nihonjinron*, which involves a simplistic assumption that the imagined Japanese race has unique genetic and cultural qualities, which may be affirmed as superior. This eclectic literature specializes in celebratory studies of Japanese uniqueness as an entity variously hypostatized as Japanese society, or the Japanese personality, or the Japanese brain, or the Japanese language, or Japanese sensibility (Befu 1993; Yoshino 1992). China, too, has a long history of ethnic and racial prejudice. Barbarism is conceptualized as the quality of not being Han Chinese in the Five Classics, which comprise the main syllabus of Confucianism defining cultural superiority. This yardstick emphasizes alien groups' loyalty to the Han Chinese mainstream, which has the ability to sinicize "aliens" (Dikötter 1992; Wu 1991). In the light of its victimization as a nation that suffered under Western colonialism, ethnic and racial prejudice is now seen as virulent and widespread in the West, while it is claimed that they are absent in China. In fact, historically rooted ethnic and racial discourses were reconstructed in response to the Western

and Japanese intrusions of the mid-nineteenth century in order to reassert China's cultural and political institutions (Dikötter 1992).

Zanryū-hōjin families have experienced this deep-rooted East Asian cultural belief in racial blood. They suffered from their Japaneseness as a lower class of people in Maoist China. Later their "Japanese blood" gave them the opportunity to emigrate. The ethnic issue was further complicated by official procedures in the post-1972 *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation programs. Each of these rural migrants had to present sufficient proof of his/her Japanese background and deal with strangers of Japanese kin or guarantors in order to transplant their Chinese household register (*hukou*), which indicated a *class* identity, into the Japanese family register (*koseki*), which had an *ethnic* implication. Accompanying this transformation from lower class to ambiguous ethnicity, there existed a small number of *zanryū-fujin* and *zanryū-koji* who repatriated with memories of Japan or a Japanese community in the former *kaitakudan*; the rest of their extended family members illustrated few characteristics of the so-called "repatriate." In the era of the compressed time-space, the war refugees' survival through creating kinship ties with Chinese families by marriage and adoption in the war turmoil of 1945 has now been carried over into chain emigration, and has thus facilitated the rapid development of new *qiaoxiang* – the very symbol of Chinese transnationalism. Therefore, the extended family members, who possess less Japaneseness but full Chineseness, must be included as an integral part of the *zanryū-hōjin* group. Without their participation, the community of *zanryū-hōjin* in Japan would not have reached its actual numbers of about 100,000 people and the emergence of *qiaoxiang* would not have taken place in the rural Northeast.

Available critiques tend to discuss how *zanryū-hōjin* migrant families have been pressured by the assimilation imposed by Japanese society. This can be argued as an alternative ethnic-based perception, as it tends to underrate the extent to which *zanryū-hōjin* have pressured themselves to assimilate, not into specifically *Japanese* society, but into the highly competitive *modern* society. Cosmopolitanism, typified as an urge to become "citizens of the world" (Vertovec and Cohen 2002: 1–10), may explain the phenomenon more realistically: the desire of *zanryū-hōjin* families to "repatriate" is that of rural migrants who are given the opportunities to try their luck in one of the world's centers. The cultural differences between metropolitan Japanese and rural Chinese do make assimilation difficult, as do any cultural differences, whether they are *ethnic* differences or *traditional/modern* differences. Therefore, cosmopolitanism is often in constitutive tension with assimilationist ideologies (Clifford 1997: 252). Modern Japanese cultural products (from household goods to food and popular culture) have penetrated into many East Asian societies. Within this cultural market, the currency of Japaneseness and the currency of modernity are exchangeable, and can often be exchanged at similar rates. Understandably, *zanryū-hōjin* migrants are particularly motivated to become "repatriates" rather than to become new *huaqiao* members. With this official ethnic identity, they can create "market multiculturalism" in the space between rural China and metropolitan Japan as a resource for individual mobility – e.g. they can profit from the desperate aspiring emigrants in China and the illegal overstayers

in Japan, exploiting different marital ideologies and spouse availabilities between China and Japan.

Apart from the ethnic issue, *zanryū-hōjin* migrant families have the identity of war victims, distinguishing them from other returnees – e.g. the Brazilian *nikkeijin*. Japanese NGO volunteers, activists, lawyers, and journalists have helped to reconstruct this war-victim identity. According to the logic of the "roots" belief, everyone must have his/her own roots, whether these origins are culturally or ethnically or socially defined. The mega-message of the *zanryū-hōjin* activism conveyed to the Japanese public was the right to lead a life that is equal to that of ordinary Japanese. Most *zanryū-hōjin* do indeed have this desire, but such a desire has little connection with the so-called identity crisis. Both *zanryū-hōjin* themselves and their Japanese supporters have dramatized the ambiguity of Chineseness and Japaneseness as a feeling of suffering, inherited from the brutal war. It was indeed puzzling to see them marching on central Tokyo streets loudly chanting "I am Japanese!" – in the Chinese language. This scene can be compared with those of ethnic minorities in China, who often perform for tourists (largely Han-Chinese) in their colorful and exaggerated ethnic costumes, singing "traditional" songs about how wonderful is to be Mongolian or ethnic-Korean – but in Putonghua, the Chinese national common language. For many of those who have emigrated to Japan under the banner of *zanryū-hōjin*, there is little identity crisis – rather, the "Japanese identity" or "Chinese identity" is largely a performance.

Ordinary Japanese are the people that *zanryū-hōjin* members envy the most – because ordinary Japanese are modern and educated. I observed that my *zanryū-hōjin* informants faced more severe discriminatory attitudes from other, more urbanized and educated, Chinese, than they did from the mainstream Japanese. Partly because more sophisticated Chinese migrants are located everywhere in relation to their daily lives in Japan. Through numerous individual cases, we have found that these metropolitan Chinese migrants are their children's spouses, their lawyers, their travel agents, their medical doctors, or even their welfare officials who offer Chinese-speaking service to them. Older *zanryū-hōjin* had generally experienced little schooling and seemed to suffer from a psychological incapacity to learn things such as a new language. This shortcoming produced unfavorable family environments for their children, whose dealings with other Chinese migrants have brought out the derogatory meaning of "peasant stock." The word peasant has become a malicious adjective, often used to attack each other to redress grievances. If their feelings are hurt by Japanese racist attitudes they can loudly attack to heal their wounded dignity; but this will not work when they are despised and loathed by their Chinese associates. Certain attitudes and actions are not inherently racist but can be used effectively in a "racist" context. Racism thus may become a container to pigeon a particular situation of these attitudes and actions (Banks 1996: 179). According to my observations, they tend to emphasize racist oppression in order to enhance their victim status among the Japanese public.

Identities can be dynamic, abstract, fluid, and emotional. For transnational migrants, identities can be redefined in actions and interactions, changed according to social and political environment, and reshaped by internalizing cultures

and ideologies (Kastoryano 2002: 4). *Zanryū-hōjin* migrants tend to differentiate their identities in many ways, in order to tackle particular circumstances (Banks 1996: 188) in their transnational encounters. As recounted throughout this ethnography, a *zanryū-hōjin* can be simultaneously a generous gift giver in China and a poor garbage picker in Japan; a traditional wife at the same time as a household master; a successful sojourner in China and at the same time a political activist fighting for citizen's rights in Japan; a powerless peasant and at the same time an upright citizen who would assist the Japanese immigration authorities to deport racketeers; and while some have emigrated to Japan in pursuit of modernization, some have "repatriated" to Japan to resolve particular problems, such as escaping from heavy debts in China. Can they become "repatriates," so that mainstream Japanese can feel that they are all Japanese? I argue that this is not an important concern for many *zanryū-hōjin*, because what matters to them is that their status as Japanese repatriates is recognized by their Chinese associates. Providentially for them, the mindset of today's Chinese is also built upon deep-rooted racial discourses, and many Chinese do accept *zanryū-hōjin* as Japanese. Perhaps the day when the mainstream Japanese accept *zanryū-hōjin* as "Japanese repatriates" may come if *zanryū-hōjin* are willing to give up enjoying their ambiguous identities, which allow the benefits of tapping into the resources of the two countries. This acceptance is likely to become fact, as discussed in Chapter 7, for at least some of the third generation of *zanryū-hōjin*, those radical assimilationists who have little interest in Chinese ways of transnationalism.

In my observation of my *zanryū-hōjin* informants' daily life in Tokyo, they are seldom concerned about whether they are Japanese or Chinese, although some activists talk about their identity crisis as a cliché, for political purposes. Among middle-aged *zanryū-hōjin* there is a common vision of potential interests to be tapped through their transnationalism. In Japan these people face well-established and systematized market conditions. As latecomers, the only way to pursue their interests is to accept the rules prescribed by the mainstream and the arrangements for earning from 3K jobs. In their Chinese hometowns, meanwhile, there are rapid but chaotic economic developments without refined systematization or meticulous planning, and *zanryū-hōjin* have been situated in a position to influence the rules in China and make good deals using their Japanese connections and knowledge. Using false university degrees, for instance, is a common deception in post-Mao China and Chinese authorities would be suspicious of it, but Japanese authorities tend to be insensitive to, or insufficiently aware of, this deception. Moreover, those who fail in Japanization or those who plan to return to China for good tend to enhance their influence in the transnational marketplaces by presenting Japanese names, Japanese citizenship and knowledge obtained in Japan; while those who speak Japanese like natives or those who do not intend to live in China tend to uphold their Chineseness to ensure other opportunities provided in the transnational space.

I have studied the transformed meanings of *zanryū-hōjin*'s ethnic roots and "Japanese blood," paying close attention to Chinese ways of modernization as manifested through the cult of "going abroad." This complicated relationship allowed for the supplementation of Japan's unskilled labor force as it opened to admit Japanese

descendants and attempted to kill two birds with one stone: resolve Japan's labor shortage while maintaining its "racial purity" (Yamanaka 1996: 76–77). Whether *zanryū-hōjin* are "Japanese" or "Chinese" or even "Sino-Japanese" is not worthy of investigation, as this ambiguity in fact does not cause many problems in the everyday lives of these flexible citizens. Focusing on discussions of modernity and cosmopolitanism, however, I do not underestimate the potential of making use of ethnic issues as bargaining chips of nationalism.

Negotiation

The existing *zanryū-hōjin* studies tend to portray this group as "powerless," focusing on the ethnicity of the *zanryū-hōjin*, or seeing them as a marginal minority or as "war-displaced Japanese." This "powerlessness" has been overwhelmingly mobilized by Japanese volunteers and politicians of both the left and right wings, and *zanryū-hōjin* have become hyper-vigilant with respect to those seen as holding greater power. *Zanryū-hōjin*'s racketeering activities behind the Japanese immigration authorities' backs seem to manifest their exaggerated reaction to the power relationship with the "rigid" Japanese state policies, with the "cold" Japanese people, and with their "heartless" Japanese relatives – as they often said to me, "Japan owes" them. This reaction to the perceived powerful is subsumed by their *qiaoxiang* associates, who use it as a self-serving excuse to justify their racketeering activities against the Japanese legal system by seeing themselves as national victims of Japanese imperialism. Kang, the official of the Ranshao County Government, claimed that, compared with the war crimes committed by the Japanese military, "the Chinese emigrant invasion to Japan" does little harm to Japanese society. Many Chinese emigrants, both legal and illegal, justify their earning of money by hard labor in Japan as an indirect route to "rescuing their nation."

Although uninterested in exploring their "powerlessness," I do not intend to place *zanryū-hōjin* migrants in a high or privileged position. Instead I have demonstrated when, what, and how desires were nurtured among my *zanryū-hōjin* informants; when, what, and how structural obstacles were overcome; and when, what, and how resources were found and created to realize their desires. I take *zanryū-hōjin* out of their perceived powerless position to conceptualize the life politics of these non-European ex-peasants. Life politics emerge in the era of reflexive modernity. Giddens (1991; 2002) explains reflexive modernity by breaking away from both early modernity and post-modernity. Early modernity refers to the Enlightenment project of modernization, which took off in the nineteenth century's industrial revolution in the West, promising autonomy, self-determination, free agency, and scientific innovation for the individual to exercise his/her choice. Power in early modernity was regarded as a hierarchical domain, and so people strove to eliminate exploitation, inequity, and oppression in order to liberate themselves from traditional constraints. From Karl Marx's *Communist Manifesto* to the recent rise of postmodernism, Enlightenment thought has been challenged as non-traditional power forces oppressing class/ethnic/gender minorities.

Negotiating the challenge of postmodernism, the concept of reflexive modernity

has been presented. People now live in a world of globalization and detraditionalization and face a plethora of choices, and they no longer celebrate emancipation from the confines of traditional society, but face the new set of uncertainties manufactured in the age of reflexive modernity. An individual's well-being no longer depends on the struggle for liberation but depends upon his/her life politics – the arrival at the "limits of decision-making governed by purely internal criteria" (Giddens 1991: 223). People exercise "free choice" and thus take the risks connected to the choices they have made, especially when globalization has radically loosened up the grip of tradition and people have gained the capacity to lead their lives autonomously. In this final discussion, I choose marriage practices as one aspect of everyday life to assess *zanryū-hōjin*'s social relations together with the effects, implications, and changes that they have produced through their life politics.

Traditional kinship and gender practices among *zanryū-hōjin* in their rural Chinese households were construed according to a limited set of models. Young people were expected to respect the elderly, relatives were bound to take care of relatives, neighbors and co-villagers were committed as life-friends without a friendship-building process, marriage was women's only livelihood, life as a divorcee or a widow was extremely difficult, and thus marriages were maintained as a means of survival with little emotional communication. Globalization has facilitated rural people's modernization and driven everybody into a world of reflexive modernity, fundamentally altering the nature of all traditional personal relationships and gender practices, which in post-traditional societies have been replaced by "pure relationships" to the democratization of personal relations – sex/love relationships, parent-child relationships and friendship – all built upon emotional and democratic communication, maintained through efforts of building mutual trust (Giddens 2002: 51–66). A number of the case studies illustrate the high rates of divorce and inter-generational conflict among *zanryū-hōjin* migrant families that have emerged since they have started to experience a transnational life. This phenomenon of family tensions indicates that social changes involve the bringing-about of a modern conjunction of emotional needs in private life, and the construction of a modern self means that the individual deals with her/his situation alone in the vastly new and resourceful modern world (Hammond 1993: 1,199). Doubts and ambivalences are privatized when the individual translates complex and risky estimates into his/her decisions for leading a meaningful life (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000: 289), and so individualization plays an important role in causing family transitions.

However, deharmonization of the *zanryū-hōjin* families cannot be measured by the variables of individual desire for emotional communication and trust built upon openness and democratic attitudes towards others, as Giddens conceives. Leading a modern life, "one can no longer simply rely on tradition to establish what to do in a given range of contexts, people have to take a more active and risk-infused orientation to their relationships and involvements" (Giddens 1990: 62). Finding good-quality spouses in China is a classical example of the risks often taken by the ex-peasant *zanryū-hōjin* individuals who want to build up "post-traditional relationships." However, they seldom fight against the ascribed relationships formed

upon traditional social practices. Their individualization struggles are accompanied by doubt, uncertainty, choice and risk and seem infused by reflexive modernity, yet they do not supplant old values and practices (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000: 287). Their newly formed spousal relationships are not "pure relationships" in the sense that they are not built only on love/friendship/sexual feelings. In fact, often they are very instrumental – about gaining status, mobility, life opportunities, higher standards of living, etc. In some cases, they are engrossed in fixing imbalanced relationships previously formed when they had fewer opportunities to negotiate for equality in their personal relations. In this sense, they seem to be somewhat between the "traditional" and "pure" relationships. To a certain extent, their previously imbalanced positions may determine the ways *zanryū-hōjin* practice life politics in today's transnational space, which explains the change from "traditional" relationships to "instrumental" relationships. Their ways of healing imbalanced relationships appear to be largely based on psychological needs rather than on reflexive or risk-calculated actions (as studied in Chapter 6), and these often produce further conflicts among family members. This family de-harmonization can be viewed as partaking in a certain degree of modernization only because modernity offers them a stage to exercise life politics to handle their personal relations by making choices.

The *zanryū-hōjin*'s modernization in terms of building up pure relationships in a highly competitive metropolis seems to point in a different direction from that conceived by Giddens, although his concept of pure relationships involves the modern characteristics of a "double-edged phenomenon" (Giddens 1990: 7). While individuals render the world a better place in which to exercise free choice, psychological insecurity is embedded within this freedom. Many *zanryū-hōjin* experience bitter feelings after being abandoned by "good-quality" Chinese spouses, but they are still urged to pursue self-identity or high status in this way, since they are given such life opportunities by modernity. The shortcut to undress themselves of their peasant qualities is to marry urbanites, since intimate relationships can be privileged as metaphor and focus of self-identity in modern life (Dean 1993: 822).

The *zanryū-hōjin*'s private life trend towards "instrumental relationships" suggests that this trend is connected with their class position in a late-capitalist global society. It has had an enormous impact on the changes of gender and kinship culture in their hometowns. Critiques from feminist anthropology have often exposed the dominant man and his control of women and culture, and Third World women have been portrayed as victims, while women-centred practices or matri-focality have been thinly explored (Blackwood 2005: 42–44). Until the 1980s gender and kinship practices among rural communities in the Northeast were not much different from those revealed in such feminist critiques of tradition (Yan 1996; 2003). The demands for Chinese spouses among the *zanryū-hōjin* families in Japan have promoted a woman-centered activity of marriage migration in the Northeast that has opened the eyes of local authorities there to the possibilities of developing an industry of marriage migration to overcome economic underdevelopment in their rural society. With this institutionalized marriage migration industry alongside the new *qiaoxiang* development, rural women no longer take marriage as a life path.

Rural women now tend to see marriage as a shortcut to a modern life. Families also see daughters as "valuable," as daughters can become links to a modern lifestyle for the rest of the family. Widows or non-virgins were once seen as undesirable brides, but now they can choose good-quality husbands after getting a foreign passport. This change of gender ideology also reflects an overall change on broader social levels. In 2003, during my field trip to a village town in Heilongjiang with an unpaved main street, I could not find a hotel with clean water to wash my face, but I found a internet cafe to access email. Investment in the internet cafe business was indeed more important than the tap water system, even more important than a paved road for economic development, as rural youth needed a channel to access the outside world more urgently.

It can be concluded that *zanryū-hōjin*'s reflexive actions of seeking instrumental relationships to construct their modern selves have played a role as an agency in the liberalization of traditional gender ideology and thus have paved a road to sweeping changes in traditional practices in the rural Northeast. Meanwhile, with large kinship systems and families in disarray – characterized by marriages that end in divorce, the elderly conceived as a problem, the break down of parental authority – people now believe in the marital ideology that is solidly embedded within the immigration laws in today's world. Without studying the life politics of *zanryū-hōjin*'s private spheres, the activities that they engage in within such a dynamic transnational market would not be transparent and would be further obscured and distorted by the discourses of ethnicity, war victims, marginal minority, and citizen rights.

The premise of studying private life trends here is to delve into the *zanryū-hōjin*'s trend towards modernity and individualism. However, one should not forget that marriage has always been partly instrumental. Certainly the marriages of *zanryū-fujin* and the adoptions of *zanryū-koji* in 1945 were instrumental. But then, how many younger *zanryū-hōjin*, or how many metropolitan people in the world, can afford "pure" relationships? In other words, one cannot have "pure relationships" as long as one has instrumental needs, no matter if the society is traditional or modern.

Apart from the better labor wages offered in the Japanese metropolis, there are other types of resources offered to *zanryū-hōjin* by Japanese society – the official recognition of their special status as repatriated war victims, Japanese volunteerism that facilitates political actions, cosmopolitanism that offers them freedom from traditional constraints, and Japanese modernity as an exchangeable currency with which to negotiate favorable positions with their Chinese associates. While *zanryū-hōjin* experience modernization in Japan, the modernization of rural Chinese has also played a role in shaping *zanryū-hōjin*'s modern selves in Tokyo at the same time. This modernization force unleashed from China is evident through the fact that *zanryū-hōjin* can seldom gain satisfaction by depicting their success in achieving modernity to Japanese people. Instead, many of them are keen on converting their Japanese identities and experiences into a currency of modernity in order to consume in post-reform China, for greater satisfaction of modernity – indeed, they do look relatively more "modern" than their Chinese associates.

Appendices

Table I Major events of the *kaitakudan* in Manchuria

1932	Manchukuo was established. First group of 492 emigrants supported by the armed forces departed from Tokyo Station.
1933	Second group of 455 emigrants supported by the armed forces departed from Harajuku Station.
	First conference regarding the purchase of land for the emigrants in Manchuria.
1934	First group of 30 brides arrived in Harbin.
1935	Second group of 130 brides to *kaitakudan* arrived in Manchuria.
	Fukushima Prefecture sent 13,380 women to Manchuria from January to October, including 251 geisha, 299 prostitutes, 752 servants, 654 waitresses, 4,638 babysitters, 4,929 factory workers, and 1,857 women of other categories.
1936	The state decided to send 1 million families to Manchuria within 20 years.
	The Women's Association of Overseas Japanese established agricultural training centers in Kanagawa Prefecture to train emigrant brides.
1937	Nagano Prefecture sent out 100 *giyūdai* to Manchuria from Tokyo Station.
	The Patriotic Women's Association, The Women's Association of Defense, and Military Support Committees joined together to facilitate the emigration to Manchuria.
1938	5,000 *giyūdai* members divided into 11 groups were sent to Manchuria.
	The Colonial Ministry started the bridal recruitment for the emigrants in Manchuria.
	The Ministry of Agriculture cooperated to establish 35 bridal training schools.
1939	All ministries of Japan endorsed the plan to send 1 million brides to Manchuria.
1940	21 graduates from a girl's school of colonial cultivation departed for Manchuria from Niigata.
1941	7 girls' schools for colonial cultivation were established in different prefectures.
1942	57 bridal training instructors arrived in Manchuria.
1943	28 nurses arrived in Manchuria for colonial cultivation.
	250 female youth arrived in Manchuria, devoted to the building of Manchukuo.
	Manei Film Company started the production of *Brides in Colonial Village*.

(*continued*)

Table I Major events of the *kaitakudan* in Manchuria (*continued*)

1944	Over 30 nurses and midwives arrived in Manchuria.
1945	The Kwantung Army summoned about 50,000 adult males from all *kaitakudan* villages in Manchuria, and left the rest of the *kaitakudan* population, essentially women, children, the elderly, and the sick.

Source: *Tairiku no hanayome* by Chinno 1992: 232–235.

Table II Record of kin-searching tours

Tour date	*Number of tour members*	*Number of kin found*
1981 Mar	47	30 (63.8%)
1982 Feb	60	45 (75%)
1983 Feb	45	25 (55.6%)
1983 Dec	60	37 (61.7%)
1984 Feb	50	27 (54%)
1984 Nov	90	39 (43.3%)
1985 Feb	90	39 (43.3%)
1985 Sept	135	41 (30.4%)
1985 Nov	135	34 (25.2%)
1986 Feb	130	34 (26.2%)
1986 June	200	79 (39.5%)
1986 Sept	200	64 (32%)
1986 Oct	100	33 (33%)
1986 Dec	42	15 (35.7%)
1987 Feb	104	28 (26.9%)
1987 Nov	50	10 (20%)
1988 Feb	50	13 (26%)
1988 June	35	12 (34.3%)
1989 Feb	57	9 (15.8%)
1989 Mar	46	12 (26.1%)
1990 Nov	37	4 (10.8%)
1991 Nov	51	6 (12%)
1992 Nov	33	4 (12.1%)
1993 Oct	32	5 (15.6%)
1994 Nov	36	5 (13.9%)
1995 Oct	67	7 (10.4%)
1996 Oct	43	4 (9.3%)
1997 Sept	44	3 (6.8%)
1998 Oct	27	5 (18.5%)
1999 Nov	20	2 (10.0%)

Source: Settlement Facilitation Center for Repatriates from China, www.kikokusha-center.or.jp

Table III Nationwide *zanryū-koji* plaintiffs by 19 Oct 2005

Number of Plaintiffs	*District Court*
1093	Tokyo
21	Kakoshima
209	Nagoya
109	Kyoto
59	Hiroshima
4	Tokushima
46	Kochi
85	Sapporo
144	Osaka
27	Okayama
65	Kobe
67	Nagano
25	Sendai
34	Yamagata
103	Fukuoka
Total: 2,091	

Source: Support and Communication Centers for People Returned from China, www.sien-center.or.jp/about/ministry/reference_02.html

Notes

Preface

1 The Japanese title is *Daichi No Ko*.

Prologue

1 The term *zanryū-fujin* is translated as Japanese women left behind. In this book I choose to use "stranded war wives" translated by Ward (2006b).
2 Settlement Facilitation Centre for repatriates from China (SFC). www.kikokusha-center.or.jp. Last accessed November 24 2005.
3 SFC. www.kikokusha-center.or.jp. Last accessed November 24 2005.

1 Approaches to the study of *zanryū-hōjin*

1 I do not intend to ignore that there is a small number of *zanryū-hōjin* coming from urban China. However, I focus on the majority of *zanryū-hōjin* who come from rural communities in Northeast China and their mindsets are largely built upon the rural Chinese society.
2 My vision of New Overseas Chinese is in a global context, in contrast to Efird (2004)'s discussion of New Overseas Chinese which confines itself to the context of Chinese migrants in Japan.
3 According to several informants, Tsunashima comes from a *zanryū-hōjin* family background.
4 Chapter 9 provides more details of this public housing estate.
5 This book studies various aspects of Ranshao County in several chapters. Abundant data was collected from the very outspoken officials in this county. For protecting the informants there, this book must address this county with a pseudonymous name.

2 *Zanryū-hōjin* within the flow of historical change

1 Refer to details of Sugawara in Chapter 9.
2 *Shōnin chōsho* – Japan's court record of witness investigation. No: 27907. Dated March 10 2004. This legal document contains rich data about the *zanryū-hōjin* subject.
3 The display is managed by the Fangzheng authorities to attract Japanese visitors, materials are largely provided by Japanese visitors.
4 I obtained these figures from an internal news booklet titled *sensō wo mita* published by Hino Social Education Centre in May 1995. Araragi (2000: 25) and Narangoa (2003: 148) also adopted these figures in similar ways.
5 http://home.s01.itscom.net/i-ioriya. Last accessed on March 20 2006. This is Ioriya's website, who established the Friend Club of Zanryū-hōjin Issues as an information

center, some of which's data has been adopted by the governmental organization SFC website www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/

6 *Citizenship Law*. www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/kokusekiho.html. Last accessed March 16 2006.
7 Ioriya's collection of *zanryū-hōjin* information at http://home.s01.itscom.net/i-ioriya. Last accessed March 20 2007.
8 Ioriya's collection of *zanryū-hōjin* information can be found at http://home.s01.itscom.net/i-ioriya. Last accessed March 20 2007.
9 As a parallel it is worth mentioning that my Indonesian-born father is not an orphan in any sense, but he described himself as "an orphan from overseas who is longing for the mother country" in official documents when he was called back to Maoist China.
10 Wang (2004) presents this case in her book. I also heard of the same case during my fieldwork.

3 Personhoods formed in rural Northeast China

1 RMB60 (worth about USD8.80) was a month's salary for ordinary Chinese workers in the 1980s. There was a severe inflation in 1990s and nobody could have survived on RMB60 for more than a week.
2 Part of her life course was described in the last chapter; her experience after repatriation will be continued in Chapter 6.
3 During my fieldwork period in Tokyo, Shirasaki had worked in the information centre for the nationwide *zanryū-koji* lawsuits against the state as an information manager.
4 Handa was a writer who had contributed articles to the Chinese newspapers circulated among Chinese communities in Japan during my fieldwork period.
5 This observation is based on my own close associations with mainland Chinese emigrants in Hong Kong, Japan, and other Western countries.
6 The documentary program *Recording the Ignored History* (jilu bei hulue de lishi) was produced by CCTV in 2002. This TV material was organized into a non-fiction book with the same title, written in Chinese by Zhang Xiangdong.
7 Internet Press of New Huaqiao in Japan, available at www.jnocnews.com. Last accessed August 10 2010.

4 Repatriation since 1972

1 Legal materials – the recommendations to the state made by lawyers (*kankokusho*) and the court record of witness investigation (*shōnin chōsho*) contain rich and specific data concerning *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation. I had collected these data and figures during my fieldwork period. As these data and figures are my first-handed materials, I will use them essentially in Chaper Four and Chapter Nine in order to transform these loose and raw materials into a more systematic and academic mode.
2 *Asahi Shimbun* November 23 2005, page 37; November 25 2005, page 38; December 8 2005, page 37; reported the official announcement of *zanryū-koji* kin-searching activity.
3 *Shōnin chōsho* – a court witness investigation record. No. 27907, dated March 10 2004.
4 *Kankokusho* – a recommendation made to the state by the United Association of Kyushu Lawyers, dated July 6 2004.
5 *Kankokusho* – a recommendation made to the state by the United Association of Japanese Lawyers, dated on March 24 2004.
6 *Kankokusho* – a recommendation made to the state by the United Association of Japanese Lawyers, dated on March 24 2004.
7 No official data for this deregulation is provided. However, the in Chapter Nine concerning a lawsuit brought by the children of a deceased *zanryū-fujin* reflects the general situation of immigrating children of *zanryū-fujin*.

8 *Shōnin chōsho* – a court witness investigation record. No. 27907, dated March 10 2004.
9 This book uses Sumie Ikeda's real name. Her story has been repeatedly reported in newsletters, pamphlets, and websites of *zanryū-hōjin*-related NGOs as an example of the difficulties and barriers to *zanryū-hōjin* repatriation set by the state. Also refer to Efird (2004: 73–95) for more details of Sumie Ikeda.
10 *Kankokusho* – a recommendation made to the state by the United Association of Japanese Lawyers, dated March 24 2004.
11 SFC. www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/joho/mihanmei/new_kojisagashi_f.htm. Last accessed March 20 2007.
12 A *Kōseishō* announcement, posted on www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/. Last accessed November 14 2004.
13 SFC. www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/kikokusha/kiko_jijo/chugoku/mhwdata/index_f.htm. Last accessed March 20 2007.
14 SFC. www.kikokusha-center.or.jp. Last accessed November 24 2005.
15 Statistics and reports of Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Labor, posted at www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/kikokusya/03/betsu.html. Last accessed March 20 2007.
16 Chapter 9 has further critical discussions about this issue.
17 During the 1970s and the 80s the gifts provided by the Chinese government were blankets or teapots; those provided by the Japanese government were small electronic items.

5 Three family accounts

1 Officially, anyone under 13 at that time was categorized as an orphan by the Japanese government. But there were some people, like Sawako, who were under 13 at the time but did not lose their parents.
2 When I was a child in Wuhan, an old woman of the Residential Committee had bullied me because my parents refused to lend her grain coupons. I have also heard many negative comments concerning *paojiedao* women who interfered and destroyed people's private lives with their power.
3 Accounts of Kasumi's and Yoshio's marriages will be given in Chapter 7.

6 Family in transition

1 SFC. www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/kikokusha/kiko_jijo/chugoku/mhwdata/index_f.htm. Last accessed October 5 2005.

7 Generational tensions and personhoods developed in Japan

1 SFC. www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/kikokusha/kiko_jijo/chugoku/mhwdata/index_f.htm. Last accessed October 5 2005.
2 The presence of Ken (Miyuki's brother), Yukari (Miyuki's sister), and Seiko (another *zanryū-hōjin* teenager) will be minimized, for readers to comprehend this complicated case study more easily.
3 The training in discipline at Japanese schools' off-campus activities is described as highlighting the principle of enduring unpleasant situations by observing the rules, being prompt and knowing when and how to do what; where anyone who fails to behave accordingly would be considered selfish (Kuwayama 1996: 116).
4 Yuki avoided the moral pressure and did not take the Ethnic Youth's side against me because she was feeling ill by the heat, otherwise the group would probably have made her say something for them, as she admitted later.
5 Teachers' ability to control students' and parents' behaviour through fear of the *naishinsho* has been described by Field (1995: 60).
6 Many informants told me that they had heard of "China Dragon" from the media. However, there were no relevant reports available on the internet when I searched it in August 2005.

7 Mao Feng, the Tokyo-based foreign correspondent of the international Chinese news-weekly *Yazhou Zhoukan*, also verbally provided me with details about "China Dragon" similar to those that Shingo had provided. Mao Feng could not provide me with any published materials, although he said he had interviewed some members of "China Dragon."

8 *Qiaoxiang* practices and profiting from kinship

1 Ota's life experience was partly illustrated in Chapter 2.
2 Nagashima's first wife, children and grandchildren, together with their existing and divorced spouses, also have extended families, which are not included in this case study.
3 This concerns Kang's major work duties and thus his verified data should be close to the reality.

9 Volunteerism and activism

1 SFC (www.kikokusha-center.or.jp) provides a long list of volunteer groups led by local authorities throughout Japan to assist *zanryū-hōjin* and other types of migrants.
2 Tsuru-no-kai has appeared in previous chapters in the accounts of *zanryū-hōjin*'s personal experiences, since this NGO was one of my fieldwork focuses. This section focuses on its operation and its major volunteer members.
3 E.g. Wakata had opposed the immigration policy of deporting those non-Japanese children who were brought to Japan as step-children.
4 Yukka-no-kai at www.max.hi-ho.ne.jp/miyairi/
5 E.g. Center for Multicultural Information and Assistance, see www.tabunka.jp/tokyo/
6 The list of NGOs receiving funds for assisting *zanryū-koji* is available at www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/chinese/sien_map/nicchuuyuuko.htm
7 Apart from my fieldwork data, sources and figures adopted in this section are mainly based on legal documents, pamphlets, and newsletters circulated by the *zanryū-hōjin* activism support groups. Some of these groups have websites, which are listed in the Bibliography.
8 This book uses his real name because Ioriya is a well-known figure.
9 Sakura-Kyodo Law Firm; see www.sakuralaw.gr.jp. Last accessed on March 20 2007.
10 *Shōnin chōsho* – the Witness Investigative Record. No: 27907, dated March 10 2004.
11 Friend Club of Repatriates from China, see www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/resource/new-resource_f.htm
12 This book uses his real name because Sugawara is a well-known figure.
13 The plaintiff lawyer teams. See www.geocities.jp/kkosio2000/; www.geocities.jp/czk_oka/; www16.ocn.ne.jp/~kojikobe/zanryukojitop.html; www.geocities.jp/genkokusien/; www.geocities.jp/zanryukoji2003/; www.geocities.jp/zanryuufk2004/top.html. All last accessed March 20 2007.
14 Kyoto Plaintiff Delegation. See www.geocities.jp/genkokusien/zenkoku.html. Last accessed October 21 2005.
15 Association of Repatriates from China. See http://kikokusha.at.infoseek.co.jp/. Last accessed October 21 2005.
16 In contrast to her public talk, Sawako had often showed great affection towards her late husband when talking to me in private.
17 Support and Communication Centers for People returned from China. See www.sien-center.or.jp/
18 Supporting *Koji*'s Struggle. See www.jdla.jp/cgi-bin04/column/zan/diary.cgi. Last accessed October 21 2005.

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