

War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria

Studies on Modern East Asian History

Edited by

Robert Bickers (*University of Bristol*)

Rana Mitter (*Oxford China Centre*)

Peter O'Connor (*Musashino University*)

VOLUME 1

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/smea*

War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria

*Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique during the
Northern Expedition*

By

Kwong Chi Man



B R I L L

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Zhang Zuolin (left), Zhang Zongchang (center), and Wu Peifu (right) met at Beijing, 28 June 1926. From Putnam Weale (Bertram Lenox Simpson), *The Vanished Empire* (London: Macmillan, 1926).

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at <http://catalog.loc.gov>
LC record available at <http://lccn.loc.gov/2016054819>

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 2468-8223

ISBN 978-90-04-33912-5 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-34084-8 (e-book)

Copyright 2017 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents

Acknowledgements ix

List of Illustrations xi

List of Abbreviations xiii

Note on Romanization xiv

Introduction: “Northern Expedition,” or the War for Northeast Asia? 1

State Formation and Geopolitics 5

Strategic History as an Approach 9

Northeast Asia and the “Northern Expedition” 11

The Military Factor 16

Structure 19

1 Becoming “The Eastern Three Provinces”: International Conflicts in Manchuria and Northeast Asia, 1850-1920 21

Introduction 21

Northeast Asia: Implications of Geography 22

International Relations of Northeast Asia, 1600-1920 27

China and Manchuria: From Empire to Nation? 35

Fengjin, Migration and Manchurian Society, 1636-1911 35

Manchuria and Mongolia after 1911 41

Regional Economy in Northeast Asia 43

Manchurian Economy before 1890 43

Reorienting the Manchurian Economy 45

The Competing Currencies 48

Concluding Remarks 50

2 Manchuria under Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique 52

Introduction 52

The Larger Context: Chinese Politics after the Abolition of the Examination System 53

The Ascendancy of Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique 58

Exploiting the Circumstances 58

Enlisting Elite Support 60

From the Fengtian Clique to Anguojun: Zhang’s Military Supporters 65

Decision-making Mechanism of the Fengtian Clique 67

Military and Economic Build Up and Their Consequences 70

Regionalism and Relations with the Central Government 75

<i>Japanese Connection Revisited</i>	77
Becoming a National Leader: Zhang Zuolin's Strife for Legitimacy and Political Power	79
<i>Zhang's Perception of the Nation's Problems</i>	79
<i>Zhang's Struggle for Political Legitimacy</i>	83
Concluding Remarks	88
3 The Fengtian Clique's Strategies and Their Failure, 1925-1931	90
Phase I, January-December 1925	93
<i>Overview</i>	93
<i>Responding to Political Vacuum in North China and the Soviet Design</i>	95
<i>The Anti-Fengtian War of 1925</i>	103
Phase II, January-September 1926	106
<i>The Fengtian Clique's Attempt to Restore the Beijing Government</i>	106
<i>Improving the Internal and External Situation through Decisive Battle: The Battle of Nankou, 1926</i>	110
Phase III, September 1926-June 1927	113
<i>Seeking Peaceful Resolution through War: The Creation of the Anguojun</i>	113
<i>Increasing Japanese Pressure and Changing British Attitudes</i>	118
<i>The Failure in Henan and Its Impact</i>	121
Phase IV, June 1927-June 1928	122
<i>Responding to Defeats: The Generalissimo Government and Peace Talk with the KMT</i>	122
<i>Cracks in the Beijing-Mukden Regime</i>	129
<i>Manchuria Encircled: The Coming of a Japanese-Soviet Alliance</i>	131
<i>The Final Straw: Military Defeats in Late 1927 and Early 1928</i>	133
Phase V, June 1928-September 1931	135
<i>Strategic Inconsistency of the Fengtian Clique</i>	135
<i>The Decline of the Fengtian Clique's Cohesion and Authority</i>	137
<i>Deteriorating Internal Condition and Geopolitical Situation</i>	140
Concluding Remarks	142
4 Military Dimension of the “Northern Expedition”	143
Introduction	143
Military Geography and the War in China in the 1920s	144
Warfare in China in the Mid-1920s	145
<i>Anguojun</i> , the National Pacification Army	149
<i>Organization</i>	152
<i>Equipment and Supply</i>	155

<i>Training and Recruitment</i>	156
<i>Cohesion</i>	157
<i>Relations with the People</i>	159
The Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu-Zhejiang Operations, Jan-Jun 1927	160
<i>Disaster of Dispersal: The Shanghai-Nanjing-Anhui Operations</i>	162
<i>The Henan Campaign: Background</i>	166
<i>The Henan Campaign: Mobility, Firepower and Geography</i>	168
The Battles of Xuzhou and Longtan, June-September 1927	176
<i>Situation After the Henan Campaign</i>	176
<i>Operational Success, Strategic Dilemma: The Xuzhou Battle and Prelude to Longtan, Jun-Aug 1927</i>	177
<i>A Strategic Gamble Lost: The Battle of Longtan, Aug-Sep 1927</i>	182
Tipping the Balance: The Autumn and Winter Campaigns of 1927	187
<i>The Situation After Longtan</i>	187
<i>Wrong Priorities: The Shanxi Campaign, Sep-Dec 1927</i>	188
<i>The Second Henan Campaign, Oct-Dec 1927</i>	192
Endgame: The Shanxi-Henan-Shandong Campaign of April 1928	195
<i>Seeking the Decisive Battle</i>	195
<i>An Operational Disaster: The Southern Zhili-Shandong Campaign</i>	197
Concluding Remarks	200
5 The Manchurian Economy and the Northern Expedition, 1925-1928	202
Introduction	202
The Fall of the <i>fengpiao</i> and Its Effects, 1926-1928	204
Financial Limitations Faced by the Fengtian Clique	212
<i>Limited Internal Revenue and High Expenditure</i>	212
<i>Decline of the Value of Silver</i>	216
<i>Japanese and Russian Presence and Their Financial Policies in Manchuria</i>	218
<i>Bankruptcy of the Central Government</i>	220
The Fengtian Clique's Attempts to Overcome Financial Difficulties	222
<i>Issuing fengpiao</i>	222
<i>Increasing Tax and Manipulating Currencies</i>	223
<i>Issuing Bonds or Borrowing</i>	226
<i>Collecting the Customs Surtax</i>	229
The Financial Collapse of the Fengtian Clique	233
<i>Failure to Secure Shanghai and the Financial Difficulties of Beijing</i>	233
<i>The Succession Crisis and North-South Peace, Jan-June 1928</i>	235
Concluding Remarks	238

Conclusion 240

Appendix 1: Literature Review 245

Appendix 2: A Note on the Sources 249

Appendix 3: Short Biographies of the Anguojun Figures 251

Appendix 4: Glossary 258

Appendix 5: Order of Battle of the *Anguojun* and the NRA, March 1927–
April 1928 262

Bibliography 285

Index 318

Acknowledgements

I would not have been able to complete this book without Prof. Hans van de Ven, whose guidance was impeccable. My examiners, Dr. Barak Kushner and Prof. Rana Mitter, also gave me invaluable advice; to discuss my work with them was a most joyful experience. I am also deeply indebted to the anonymous reviewers whose suggestions turned a thesis into a publishable monograph. I would also like to thank the academics and staff of the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge, including Prof. Roel Sterckx, Prof. Peter Kornicki, Dr. Joseph McDermott, Ms. Natahsa Sabbah, and Carol Pleasance. During my study in Cambridge, I was fortunate enough to meet George Mak Kam-wah, John Feng Heisn-hsiang, John Lee Tung-chun, Li Chen, Park Dae-in, Sam Yin Zhiguang, and Xu Mengyao, all post-graduates of the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. I could never forget the often-heated debates among us, the joyful times we spent together, and all the encouragement you gave me. I wish you all the best in your future endeavors.

My undergraduate supervisor, Prof. Yip Hon-ming from the History Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, inspired me all through the way and was always supportive. The late Prof. Gerald Jordan persuaded me to continue my study of military history after graduating from my Chinese University. His advice changed my life. Professors Frederick Cheung Hok-ming, Cathy Potter, David Lederer, and Dr Yoko Miyakawa all inspired and encouraged me to pursue my study and I am very grateful to all of them. Dr. Ma Zhendu of the Second Historical Archive of Nanjing allowed me to use the archival sources that broadened my understanding of the issue. The staff of the Second Historical Archive, the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, and the University Library at Cambridge also offered me kind assistance.

Prof. Ricardo Mak King Sang and Prof. Ho Lau Wing Chung of the History Department of the Hong Kong Baptist University have been exceptionally kind to me, and provided me with an ideal working environment to finish this book. Professors Chow Kai-wing, Lee Kam-keung, Lam Kai-yin, Chung Po-yin, Dr. Wong Man Kong, Dr. Tam Ka Chai, Dr. Bettina Dietz, Dr. Catherine Ladds, Dr. Loretta Kim, Dr. Fan Wing Chung, and Dr. Law Yuen Han have given me much encouragement and opportunity to work as a military historian in Hong Kong. Prof. Ian Chong of the National University of Singapore provided crucial assistance in my attempt to put Zhang Zuolin's case in a larger context. His work on modern state formation is most inspiring.

I would also like to especially thank Mr. Jin Xudong, an antique bookseller from China, who kindly sold and photocopied me the unpublished manuscripts of the reminiscences of the warlord officers. Without his timely rescue of the manuscripts from the garbage bins, the voices of some of these warlord officers would be lost forever.

When revising this thesis into a book manuscript, the author was aided by the 2013 General Research Fund of the Hong Kong University Grants Committee (Project No: 244313).

After all, without the patience and the caring love of my family this work could not have been finished.

Everyone mentioned above deserves all the credit of this work, and I alone should be responsible for all the faults and defects.

List of Illustrations

Figures

- 2.1 Zhang Zuolin as the defender of the Republic 86
- 2.2 Zhang Xueliang as the successor of Sun Wen 87
- 3. 1 Feng Yuxiang, bible in hand and dressed as a “Christian” priest, ousted Cao Kun 99
- 3. 2 Three soldiers playing 110
- 3. 3 “The incomplete reconstruction – it is why the Nationalists failed” 128
- 5.1 Monthly average exchange rate between *fengpiao* and 100 gold yen in Mukden, Jan 1926-Jan 1927 206
- 5.2 Daily exchange rate between *fengpiao* and 100 gold yen, 4 Jan 1927-29 Dec 1927 209
- 5.3 Daily exchange rate between *fengpiao* and 100 gold yen, 1 Dec 1927-30 Jun 1928 211
- 5.4 Daily exchange rate between *fengpiao* and 100 gold yen, 4 Dec 1926-30 Jun 1928 211

Maps

- 1.1 A Manchukuo map showing the relief of Fengtian, Jilin, Heilongjiang and Rehe 23
- 1.2 Railway of Manchuria 24
- 4.1 The “Funnel Effect”: the front lengthened as an army progressed south 146
- 4.2 Operations in Shanghai-Nanjing-Northern Anhui Area, 1 Feb-30 Mar 1927 164
- 4.3 Operations in Shanghai-Nanjing-Northern Anhui Area, 1 Apr-15 May 1927 165
- 4.4 Operations in Henan, 5-24 May 1927 172
- 4.5 Operations in Henan, 24-30 May 1927 173
- 4.6 *Anguojun* Retreat from Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang: May-Jun 1927 175
- 4.7 The Battle of Xuzhou, Jul-Aug 1927 179
- 4.8 Sun Chuanfang Advancing, 10 Aug-3 Sep 1927 181
- 4.9 The Battle of Longtan 24-28 Aug 1927 184
- 4.10 The Battle of Longtan 24-28 Aug 1927 (2) 185
- 4.11 Operations in Shanxi-Zhili-Henan-Shandong, 25 Sept-1 Nov 1927 190
- 4.12 Operations in Shanxi-Zhili-Henan-Shandong, 1 Nov-31 Dec 1927 191
- 4.13 Defeat and retreat of the *Anguojun*, 1 Apr-25 May 1928 199

Tables

- 2.1 Breakdown of the regular income of the Fengtian Province, 1923 75
5.1 Estimated annual income of Fengtian Province, 1926 213
5.2 Estimated annual expenditure of Fengtian Province, 1926 214
5.3 Estimated expenditure of the Fengtian Field Forces in China based on its strength in November 1927 215
5.4 Annual income of the Shandong Province, Apr 1926 to Mar 1927 in *yinyuan* 216
5.5 Yearly average exchange rate between kinds of *fengpiao* and 100 gold yen, 1914–1924 217
5.6 Year average silver price in New York, 1920–1928 217
5.7 Income of the Beijing Government, Jul 1927 234
5.8 Income of the Beijing Government, Apr 1928 234

List of Abbreviations

CB	Chenbao
CER	Chinese Eastern Railway
CP	China Political Reports, 1911-1960, Foreign Office
CWR	China Weekly Review
CYB	China Year Book
DGB	Dagongbao
FM	Fengxi junfa midian
FMX	Fengxi junfa mixin xuanji
FOCP	British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print
FRUS	Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States
GK	Gaimushō kiroku
GW	Guowen Weekly
JACAR	Japan Center for Asian Historical Records
KK	Kokuritsu kōbunsho kan
KMC	Kuominchun
NRA	National Revolutionary Army
RDN	Bōei shō bōei kenkyūsho, Rikugunshō dainichiki
SB	Shenbao
SFMCLR	Sir Frederick Maze's Confidential Letters and Reports
SMR	South Manchuria Railway
SR	Shijie Ribao
SS	Shuntian Shibao
USMI	U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911-1941
WIC	Week in China
ZMDZH	Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliaoj huibian

Note on Romanization

Throughout the book I use the pinyin system for Chinese and the Hepburn system for Japanese names and terms. There are exceptions as some of the names are better known in other romanization systems: Chiang Kai-shek (instead of Jiang Jieshi in pingyin); Kuomintang, KMT (instead of Guomindang, GMD); Kuominchun, KMC (Guominjun, GMJ); Kwantung (Guandong); Manchu-kuo (Manzhouguo), and Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan). The Glossary will be provided in the Appendices before the bibliography. Short biographies of the lesser-known warlord officers are also provided in Appendix.

Introduction: “Northern Expedition,” or the War for Northeast Asia?

When conducting research for this book, the author came across a group of hand-written manuscripts for the *Literary and Historical Materials* (*wenshi ziliao*).¹ This group of documents include: He Zhuguo, “Dongbeijun duikang beifa de bufen shifang (Some Facts about the Northeastern Army’s War against the Northern Expedition),” (1955); Zhang Yousan, “Yijiу erba nian Zhang Zuolin Beijing huairentang ying yishang guanyuan xunhua (Zhang Zuolin’s Speech to Officers of the Battalion Level or above in 1928),” (1964); Zhang Youluan, “Zhang Zuolin xiang Nanjing zhengfu qiuhe shibaiji (Zhang Zuolin’s Failure to Sue Peace with the Nanjing Government),” (1963); Pan Yuming, “Dongbei hangkong jianshi ziliao (Notes on the Short History of the Northeastern Air Force),” (1960s); Tian Yunqing and Pan Zhenying, “Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou (Sun Chuanfang’s Turn to Zhang Zuolin)” (1962). Most of these manuscripts were eventually published, but some of the contents were censored. The original manuscripts were discarded and then eventually reached the author through a second-hand bookseller. The censor deleted sentences and paragraphs from the original manuscripts, probably with the understanding that the originals would never be seen by others, so censored lines were simply crossed out by a thin red line instead of being completely darkened. For example, in Tian Yunqing and Pan Zhenying’s manuscript, they described a scene when his brigade was helped by locals near Pukou while fighting against the KMT forces in 1927:

¹ The *wenshi ziliao* was the product of a country-wide effort proposed by Zhou Enlai, Premier of the People’s Republic of China and launched by the PRC government through the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference from national and provincial to county levels. Tens of thousands of articles were collected from prominent pre-1949 political and military figures to ordinary people who could write (or dictate) their recollections. For an overview of the *wenshi ziliao*, see Annie K. Chang, “The Wenshi Ziliao Collection of the Center for Chinese Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley,” *Twenty-Century China*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2000), 103–8. For a critical reappraisal of the writing and collection of the *wenshi ziliao* and its relationship with the political and economic shifts of the PRC, see Martin Fromm, *Producing History through ‘Wenshi Ziliao’: Personal Memory, Post-Mao Ideology, and Migration to Manchuria* (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 2010).

[During the engagement near Pukou in March 1927] When the villagers saw [our] soldiers with “lotus-leaf hats”² coming, they were exalted. They gathered and offered us food, which we politely declined...

[During the Battle of Longtan in August 1927] Backed by two regiments of reinforcements, we advanced for more than fifty *li* (25km). It was very difficult to advance in a reed field with numerous ditches, but the villagers voluntarily came to our aid with large planks of wood dismantled from doors and windows. It was such a touching scene...³

The authors of these manuscripts were field officers of the northern warlord forces, some of which have faded into obscurity and little could be found about their lives.⁴ Others, such as He Zhuguo, had a distinguished military career during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Some of these officers’ legacies of involvement were purged before and after 1949 for one reason or another.⁵ Although one should not jump to the conclusion that the deleted parts are the more reliable version of the past or are more important compared to other sources, the reminiscences of this group of forgotten officers offer some

² The soldiers of Sun Chuanfang’s army wore a peculiar type of hat that resembled the shape of a lotus leaf.

³ Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, “Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou,” (1962) unpublished manuscript, 6, 24.

⁴ The term warlord is very difficult to define, as it is always politically charged, but Diana Lary’s definition is useful. Lary defines warlordism as “the possession of autonomous military force, the control of a base region, the use of force as the final arbiter, the reliance on personal rather than impersonal patterns of rule, and a ruthless and extractive attitude towards society and the economy.” In this sense, to a certain extent the NRA can be seen as a warlord faction. The warlords were so diverse in ideology and origin that one can hardly define them as a group, and tension existed between peculiarity and generalization in the studies on warlordism in early-Republican China. When looking at the republican warlords, one should not assume there was a certain “warlord behaviour” that is applicable to all Republican warlords and easily dismiss the role of nationalism and ideology in the warlords’ decision-making. For studies on the origin of warlordism in Republican China, see Diana Lary, “Warlord Studies,” in *Modern China*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Oct., 1980), 441; Ch’i Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China: 1916-1928* (Stanford, 1976); Hans van de Ven, “Public Finance and the Rise of Warlordism,” in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), 829-68.

⁵ For example, He Zhuguo was categorized and purged as a rightist during the Anti-Right Movement in 1957 because of his proposals, as a member of the Political Consultative Conference, about democraticizing elections and improving the livelihood of the peasants. His name was not rehabilitated until 1978. See Zhang Hong, “He Zhugo,” in *Liaoning shengwei dangshi yanjiushi, Liaoning dangshi renwuzhuan* (Shenyang, 2006), 186.

interesting alternative views to what is now known as the Northern Expedition, the military campaign launched by the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Chinese Nationalists Party (or Kuomintang, KMT), ostensibly to overthrow the northern “warlords” controlling the Beijing Government and a substantial part of Central and Northern China.

In June of 1926, the NRA marched north to overthrow the Beijing Government. To resist the NRA, the northern warlords, led by Zhang Zuolin, formed the National Pacification Army (*Anguojun*) later that year. Almost exactly two years later, when the vanguard of the NRA reached Jinan and threatened Beijing, Zhang decided to return to Manchuria, but was assassinated along the way. The war has been seen as the “National Revolution” led by the KMT, or as the “First Democratic Revolutionary War,” a name that highlights the communists’ role and suits their interpretation of history.⁶

These names privileged some historical narratives and suppressed others. The “First Democratic Revolutionary War” version puts the war in a history of successive revolutionary struggles from the Opium War (1839-1842), including the Taiping Rebellion and the 1911 Revolution. In this narrative, the bourgeois revolutions of 1911 and 1927 were preludes to a more complete proletariat revolution, with the May Fourth Movement during the 1920s being portrayed as a watershed between the “Old” and “New” Democratic Revolutions.⁷ In contrast, the KMT narrative put the role of Sun Yat-sen, the NRA, and Chiang Kai-shek at the forefront since the war was seen as a KMT-led “Northern Expedition” against the “warlords.” These narratives have been challenged by many, including Luo Zhitian, Rana Mitter, and many others, who pointed to their limitations

6 A typical view of the Northern Expedition as a war of unification could be found in Li Jiannong, *Zhongguo jin bainian zhengzhi shi* (Taipei, 1974, c. 1942); Guofangbu sihzengju, *Beifa zhanshi* (Taipei, 1967); Jiang Weiguo (ed.), *Beifa tongyi* (Taipei, 1980); Jiang Yongjing, *Guomin geming yu Zhongguo tongyi yundong* (Taipei, 1982); Huang Xiurong, *Guomin geming shi* (Chongqing, 1992); for an English work, see Martin C. Wilbur’s authoritative *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928* (Cambridge, 1984). Later scholars such as Luo Zhitian certainly pointed out the incompleteness of the KMT’s “unification.” Luo Zhitian, *Luanshi qianliu: minzu zhuyi yu minguo zhengzhi* (Beijing, 2001), 215. For a work that set the tone for generations of Marxist historical materialist narratives, see Hu Sheng, *Cong Yapian zhanzheng dao Wusi yundong* (Beijing, 1981). For the discussion of his work, see Li Huaiyin, *Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing* (Hawaii: 2012), 113-4.

7 Wang Zonghua, Ma Guying, preface; Zhang Yutian, *Zhongguo jindai junshi shi* (Shenyang, 1983), preface, 1-2; Zeng Xianlin, Zeng Chenggui, Jiang Xia, *Beifa zhanzheng shi* (Chengdu, 1991).

in explaining the genesis of modern China.⁸ However, a revision of the war from the perspective of the KMT's opponents is still lacking.

As Li Huaiyin suggested, instead of treating modern Chinese history as one pre-ordinated narrative leading to the establishment of a centralized state controlling a substantial part of the former territory of the Qing Dynasty, one should approach it from a “within-time” and “open-ended” perspective, that is, not to treat the historical changes of modern China as a pre-determined issue.⁹ It has been assumed that the emergence of China as a modern sovereign state was inevitable as the result of the nationalist movements and the activities of the Chinese Nationalists and Communist Parties. Historians have spent much effort trying to find evidence to substantiate the claim that such a process was inevitable. With more sources surfacing, such an argument has become increasingly difficult to defend.

Similarly, Prasenjit Duara has pointed out that the 1920s was “an open-ended historical situation” for Manchuria.¹⁰ It was an era when political boundaries were fluid and alternatives, however improbable in retrospect, were available. As Duara suggested, the Chinese claim on Manchuria was not uncontested:

The incorporation of Manchuria into the Chinese nation during a period of high imperialism presented considerable problems. While its demographic Sinicization should have made the political claim of Chinese nationhood easy, it was precisely the historical image of Manchuria as a frontier, a virgin land of “primitive” and martial peoples unrelated to the Chinese, that was to undergird imperialist – especially, but not only, Japanese – claims to the area.¹¹

⁸ Their studies on the cultural and intellectual changes during the 1920s shed much new light on the period and pointed out the limitation of the revolutionary narrative. See John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, 1996); Luo Zhitian, *Luanshi qianliu*; Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford, 2004), 3-152; Luo Zhitian, *Jibian shidai de wenhua yu zhengzhi: cong xinwenhua yundong dao beifa* (Beijing, 2006); Yang Tianhong, *Zhengdang jianzhi yu minguo zhengzhi zhouxiang* (Beijing, 2008); Wang Qisheng, *Geming yu fangeming: shehui wenhua shiyexia de mingguo zhengzhi* (Beijing, 2010).

⁹ Li Huaiyin, 267-72.

¹⁰ Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, Md., 2003), 41. I use “Manchuria” more often than *dongbei* (Northeast China) for the same reason as Duara, as using the latter term might “[impose] the perspective of subsequent historical developments and nationalist historiography.”

¹¹ Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 49.

Some of these alternatives were almost realized. For example, a Russian victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 would have made Manchuria a Russian/Soviet-satellite, like Outer Mongolia. Likewise, after the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese could have annexed Manchuria as they did Korea. Manchuria could have become the “motherland” of the Manchus, or have been “balcanised” into several states, with each backed by a neighbouring power.

This book tries to explain the reason why the alternatives did not work, and to analyse the attempts made by the Chinese warlord Zhang Zuolin (1875-1928), a migrant of Chinese descent who became the leader of a regional militarist group called the Fengtian Clique (*fengxijunfa*), to link up Manchuria with Northern China between 1925 and 1928, the period known as the “Northern Expedition” or the “National Revolution.” To understand Zhang Zuolin’s strategies and actions during the “Northern Expedition,” the focus should not be on a “China,” whose boundaries were, at that time, still not entirely clear, but on Northeast Asia. Without placing Manchuria and Zhang Zuolin in a Northeastern Asian context, his failure to turn Manchuria into a basis from which he expanded into China, and his reasons for attempting to do so, cannot be understood. “Northeast Asia” in this study includes Northern China, Manchuria, Mongolia, the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese Archipelago, and a part of Eastern Siberia. State or non-state players such as the Beijing Government, Zhang Zuolin’s Manchurian regime, the Nationalists (KMT), and the Communists (CCP), Japan, the Soviet Union, the Comintern, and the British Empire were all involved. This study explains the choices and decisions of Zhang Zuolin as flowing forth from the position he faced in Northeast Asia. It looks at the grand-strategic decisions of Zhang’s Fengtian Clique with reference to domestic and international relations in China and Northeast Asia, the economic situation in the region, and social and political structures of Manchuria. It also analyzes the warlords’ military strategy, revisits the campaigns during the Northern Expedition, and examines the impact of Zhang’s failure on the strategic situation in Northeast Asia.

State Formation and Geopolitics

“National Unification” movements in the 18th and 19th centuries, in retrospect, could be seen as expansion of a dominating polity within a perceived “nation”—Prussia in Germany and Piedmont in Italy are the obvious examples.¹² Manchuria under Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique could have

¹² For the unification of Germany see Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: the Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947* (London, 2006); for Italy, John A. Davis, *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*

been one such region for China during the 1920s. Some comparisons with Prussia and Piedmont are instructive. Manchuria, like Prussia, had a strong army and was among the leading economies in their region. Although their political leadership opted to “unify” a roughly defined territory in the name of nation-building, they were surrounded by potential and actual enemies. In its relative power and status vis-à-vis neighbouring polities, Manchuria was more like Piedmont: both were among the weaker powers in their regions. All three states tried to “unify” a country through military, political, economic and bureaucratic means; only Manchuria failed in its attempt. Why did Manchuria not become China’s Prussia or Piedmont? The nature of the state created by Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique and external factors were two important factors in answering this question.

Previous discussions on state-building placed much emphasis on internal driving forces and agents, such as the role of nationalism and the nationalist movements/leaders. Chong Ja Ian, on the other hand, suggested that external forces, especially the intervention of foreign actors, was equally or perhaps more important in the formation of sovereign states. As he pointed out, “sovereign statehood represents a departure from pre-existing political arrangements in most parts of the world during the mid-twentieth century...many polities in the global periphery existed as colonies, vassal states, and feudalized states to list a few examples.”¹³ He identified three main attributes for sovereign states: political centralization, territorial exclusivity, and external autonomy. Colonies, vassal states, and feudalized states all had “shortfalls” in one or another of these aspects. A colonial state could be political centralized and maintain territorial exclusivity, but was still subjected to external control. A vassal state could be centralized, but might not achieve complete territorial exclusivity and was to an extent subjected to foreign control. A feudal state could be more autonomous, but much less centralized politically.

Using the cases of China, Siam, and Indonesia (previously the Dutch East Indies) during modern times as examples, he argued that the external powers’ decision to intervene or not was based mainly on the opportunity cost of intervention, as perceived by the foreign actors. If the cost was low, a foreign actor would actively intervene and try to achieve monopoly in access to the target. On the other hand, if the cost of intervention is high, a foreign actor would

(London, 2000); Edgar Holt, *The Making of Italy 1815–1870* (New York, 1971). For a comparative discussion, see MacGregor Knox, *Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, 2000), 7-52.

¹³ Chong Ja Ian, *External Intervention and State Formation - China, Indonesia, Thailand, 1892-1952* (Cambridge, 2012), 4.

seek access to that country through less direct means of control.¹⁴ In short, he argued that foreign intervention, more specifically the competition of external actors over the access to the targeted state, also played a crucial role.¹⁵

The state Zhang Zuolin created could not be seen as a sovereign state. He never actually saw his polity as an independent nation, nor was it recognised as such by other states. As Chong suggested, the type of state that would emerge in China remained an open-ended question at least until the late 1930s.¹⁶ The problems and opportunities faced by Zhang when he rose to power in the 1910s were similar to those faced by the rulers of Siam in the latter half of the 19th century. At the beginning, King Chulalongkorn and Zhang ruled a decentralized polity that consisted of numerous local power holders. Economically, the areas under their rule were increasingly integrated in a volatile world market. In the case of Zhang, political decentralization was in the form of the semi-autonomous civilian and military governors in the three provinces of Manchuria. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, after he became the unchallenged political and military leader of the Fengtian province, the largest polity of all in Manchuria, Zhang was able to establish a relatively centralized polity by the early 1920s. More importantly, like the Thai King, Zhang created a centralized military to suppress internal challengers and was able to develop the infrastructure of the export of raw materials for further reforms.

In terms of territorial exclusivity, while King Chulalongkorn struggled to maintain the territorial integrity of his kingdom, Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique had to bear the existence of a number of foreign-controlled “special territories” within the area under their control, including “railway zones” along the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway, as well as the Kwantung Leased Territory that was garrisoned and administered by foreigners. The former was under Soviet influence, while the latter two were under Japanese control. There were also extensive Soviet and Japanese political and economic activities in the area controlled by the Fengtian Clique. On the other hand, both Prussia and the Piedmont faced no such problem as they were seen as sovereign states in the European system, and had a much greater control over the periphery of their territory. As it was impossible for the Fengtian Clique to maintain a high degree of territorial exclusivity, it always had to divert a considerable part of military forces in Manchuria when it was trying to fight in China Proper, otherwise the Clique risked its base being overrun by a determined attempt to take over by one of the neighbouring powers,

¹⁴ Ibid., 1-3, 28-30.

¹⁵ Ibid., 14.

¹⁶ Chong Ja Ian, 8.

or even by the foreign garrisons on the spot. As Chapter 4 shows, this was exactly what happened to Manchuria in September of 1931, three years after the death of Zhang Zuolin near his own capital Shenyang (Mukden).

As for the issue of foreign intervention, both Manchuria and Siam were sandwiched by powerful and potentially aggressive neighbours immensely greater in strength. As Chong Ja Ian pointed out, the perceived cost of intervention to a large extent determined the approach of intervention of the foreign actors over the targeted state. In the case of Siam, both Britain and France felt the cost of establishing direct control over Siam unjustifiable, especially in the context that it might lead to potential conflict between the two powers.¹⁷ In the case of Manchuria, both Japan and the Soviet Union continuously adjusted their approach towards the Fengtian Clique from offering alliances to exerting military pressure or even launching an outright invasion. More importantly, unlike Britain and France, the Japanese and Russian agents and their governments often shared very different views as to the best approach for Manchuria. Zhang and the Thai King also continuously adjusted their approach towards the foreign actors. Whereas the Thai King turned to and then was disappointed by the British during the Franco-Thai border conflict in 1893, Zhang understood that the Powers would not fight against one another for him. Zhang had steered between Japan and Russia without committing himself to either of them from 1917 to 1925, before he turned against the Russians and their allies in China afterwards. Unlike Britain and France, the Soviet Union and Japan were willing and able to intervene in Manchuria, and placed much geopolitical pressure on Zhang throughout the period covered by this study.

If Zhang and the Fengtian Clique owned a very powerful military like Prussia, they might have enjoyed more geopolitical freedom when dealing with the Soviet Union and Japan. However, the Fengtian Army, although a respectable force by the late 1920s, was still inadequate when facing the more efficient Soviet and Japanese forces. It was also smaller compared to the two powers' forces. Moreover, before 1871 Prussia and Piedmont had enjoyed to an extent the protection of Britain, which was determined to prevent the emergence of any predominant power on the European continent. No power, on the other hand, could guarantee the integrity of the Chinese polity in Manchuria (either as a semi-autonomous Chinese state or part of the Chinese Republic) with force. This left Zhang and the Fengtian Clique almost alone in fending off Manchuria's powerful neighbours. While King Emmanuel II of the Kingdom of Piedmont used part of the kingdom's territory (Savoy and Nice) to trade for

¹⁷ Chong Ja Ian, 201-5.

French support when he was unifying the Italian Peninsula, Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique could hardly take similar steps, as the territorial exclusivity of their polity was limited and trading territory for support with one of the powers would lead to reaction of other rival powers in the region. Of equal importance that made such a move impossible was the prevalence of nationalism among the Chinese in Manchuria and China Proper, making such a move politically unfeasible. Given the disadvantaged geopolitical situation facing Zhang and the Fengtian Clique, their achievements through war and political interactions with the neighbouring powers and the political forces in China Proper, as illustrated in this book, was remarkable.

Strategic History as an Approach

War played a crucial role in the rise and fall of Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique in Manchuria. To systematically approach the issue of war, this book adopts the framework of strategic history as outlined by Colin Gray. Strategic history sees as its subject the relationship between “politics and war,” “war and peace,” and “war and warfare.”¹⁸ This book pays attention to the tension between the uncertainties of war and the intention of the decision makers, the difficulties of defining a clear political goal and maintaining it despite the changing situation, and the relationship between the actual conduct of warfare and the post-war political dispensation. Strategic history also puts war in political, socio-cultural, economic, technological, military-strategic, geographical, and historical contexts.¹⁹ These dimensions form a useful framework for this study.

Strategic history is more than narratives of battles and campaigns because it focuses on the relationship between political ends and military means as well as the dynamics between strategic contexts and decision-makers. It differs

¹⁸ Colin Gray, *War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (London, 2007); Colin Gray, *Strategy and History: Theory and Practice* (London, 2006). For discussions on “strategy,” see Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, 2001); Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, Alvin Bernstein, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge, 1994); Archer Jones, *Elements of Military Strategy: an Historical Approach* (Westport, Conn., 1996); Colin Gray, *Modern strategy* (Oxford, 1999); Hans van de Ven (ed.), “introduction,” in *Warfare in Chinese History* (Leiden; Boston, 2000); Zheng Ruilong, *Jinglüe youyan (979-987): Song Liao zhanzheng junshi zainan de zhanlìe fenxi* (Hong Kong, 2003).

¹⁹ Colin Gray, *Strategy and History*, 4; Colin Gray, *War, Peace, and International Relations*, 8-10.

from narratives of military change that focus exclusively on the technology and see military change as a teleological process.²⁰ The strategic approach is also different from the “New Military History,” which concentrates on the social and cultural dimensions of the military, but often elides the actual conduct of warfare and the battles of armies.²¹ Perhaps more than other analytical frameworks, strategic history takes account of individual choice, interaction of opposing minds, circumstances, and dynamics between decision makers, events, and combat actions.

Looking at Zhang Zuolin and the coalition of the northern warlords from the perspective of strategic history extends the biographical approach that has dominated Warlord Studies since the 1970s.²² Although this work draws on the rich biographical studies of the warlords available, it does not focus on the life of one individual, nor does it share the emphasis on central-local relations of Warlord Studies. Although Warlord Studies devotes much attention to the warlords’ relationship with the Powers, their central-peripheral perspective overlooks the importance of intra and inter-regional factors. By assuming that the position of Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria was a peripheral one, some historians portrayed him as a “typical” warlord who competed for national power from his “virtually impregnable sanctuary on the fringes of the empire.”²³ They

²⁰ The best example of interpreting Chinese military history as a teleological process is the Zhongguo renmin geming junshi bowuguan (ed.), *Zhongguo zhanzheng fazhan shi* (Beijing, 2001).

²¹ Important works of New Military History include works by Jay Winter, Brian Bond, and others on the military’s impact on society, civil-military relations, war and nation building, and commemoration of war. Although this approach helped to elevate the study of military history as an academic discipline, historians such as Jeremy Black criticised this as “demilitarizing” military history. See Brian Bond, *War and society in Europe, 1870-1970* (New York, 1983); Jay Winter, *Remembering War: the Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, 2006). For Black’s criticism, see Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History* (London, 2004), 53-4.

²² Some examples of Warlord Studies: James Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yuxiang* (Stanford, 1966); Ch'i Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China: 1916-1928*, op. cited; Diana Lary, *Region and Nation: the Kwangsi clique in Chinese politics, 1925-1937* (London; New York, 1974); Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928* (Stanford, 1977); Diana Lary, “Warlord Studies,” in *Modern China*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Oct., 1980); Diana Lary, *Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 1911-1937* (Cambridge, 1985); Edward McCord, *The Power of the Gun: the Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism* (Berkeley, 1993). In the last decade, Chinese historians have also produced extensively researched works that were no longer bound by the KMT-CCP historiography. The best example of these works is Xu Yong, *Zhongguo jindai junzheng guanxi yu “junfa” huayu yanjiu* (Beijing, 2009).

²³ Gavan McCormack, 251-53.

could not fully explain Zhang’s strategic behaviour, and attributed his defeat to his over-ambition and lack of ideology.²⁴

Northeast Asia and the “Northern Expedition”

Hans van de Ven rightly points out that the Northern Expedition has to be placed in both domestic and international contexts.²⁵ This study is partly inspired by the works of William C. Kirby, William Skinner, and Hamashita Takeshi, who at different levels elucidated the importance of intra and inter-regional dynamics in Chinese history and helped us to move on from the “Sino-centric” to the East Asian and Global perspective.²⁶ The purpose of this study is to shift a “Chinese” political-military event from the nation-centric narrative to a regional and transnational framework.

“Manchuria” has long been a disputed territory. Even the name of the area was in dispute. The Chinese called the area “the Northeast” (*dongbei*), the Japanese called it “Manshū,” while the English world usually referred the area as “Manchuria” before the end of the Manchukuo. In the Cairo Communiqué of 1943, when the Allies stipulated that Japan had to return the area to China, the area was referred to as “Manchuria.”²⁷ The use of “Manchuria” here is only for the convenience, as it was by far the most well known name of the vast area

²⁴ A study of the relationship between geography and the Fengtian warlord by Michael Pillsbury has pointed out this fact by acknowledging the potential vulnerability of Manchuria. See Michael Pillsbury, *Environment and power warlord strategic behaviour in Szechwan, Manchuria, and the Yangtze Delta*, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Columbia University (1980), 279. However, Pillsbury’s work looks at the issue strictly from geopolitical and geographical perspectives.

²⁵ Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945* (London, 2003), 64.

²⁶ William C. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China,” in *China Quarterly*, No. 150 (Jun, 1997); Hamashita Takeshi, Ouyang Fei (tr.), *Jindai Zhongguo de guoji qiji: chaogong maoyi tixi yu jindai Yazhou jingjiquan* (Kindai chūgoku no kokusaiteki keiki) (Beijing, 1999), 8-9. Skinner excluded Manchuria in his study of the regional economic networks based on urban centers, as he pointed out that “Manchuria’s urban system was embryonic,” and the Chinese system of civil administration was only introduced fairly recently in the early 20th century. William Skinner, *The City in late imperial China* (Stanford, 1977); William Skinner, “Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History,” in *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1985); G. Skinner, “Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems,” in Arthur Wolf (ed.), *Studies in Chinese Society* (Stanford, Calif., 1978), 75-6; see also Prasenjit Duara, 44.

²⁷ “Cairo Communiqué, December 1, 1943,” National Diet Library Japan Website: <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46shoshi.html>.

concerned in this study. It is problematic to see Manchuria as merely a peripheral area of China or a Chinese territory that fell victim to Japanese and Russian imperialism. Until 1907, Manchuria was still ruled as a distinctive part of the Qing Empire, which officially kept Manchuria separate from China “south of the Great Wall” as its homeland. It was occupied by Russia from 1900 to 1905 and then by Japan, which seized it again in 1931. Until 1945, Manchuria was the stage of an international struggle that involved not only the surrounding countries but also the World Powers. Instead of being peripheral, Manchuria should be seen at the center of the stage where the changes in Northeast Asia since the late 19th century were being worked out.

As Michael Tsin suggested, “the term ‘nationalism’ hardly does justice to the multi-dimensional working of the myriad factors that enable or undermine, at times simultaneously, the project to construct a cohesive polity.”²⁸ Besides nationalism, the political map of Northeast Asia was shaped by the demographic, technological, and economic changes that took place from the 1850s. Whereas Russia and Japan increased their presence in Manchuria through railway construction, economic expansion, and war, the Qing Empire retained its influence through migration and expansion of local government. This period also witnessed the integration of Manchuria into the global market as a result of the infrastructure and institutions created by the three powers.²⁹

Zhang Zuolin, the leader of the Fengtian Clique, rose to power from being a local militia leader by successfully exploiting circumstances and the political, administrative, and military foundations of the Chinese presence in Manchuria laid by the Late Qing Reform. By working with the central government, military allies within Manchuria and the local elites, he gradually became the leader of the Chinese in Manchuria from the late 1910s. However, his success was checked by the situation in China, where constant civil wars and changing hands of the central government threatened his position in Manchuria, especially after 1924. Zhang faced a daunting task by then. To realize his ambition and protect his Manchurian regime, he had to unite the political and military forces in Northern China, end the civil war, restore the Beijing Government, provide viable solutions to the national political and socio-economic problems, legitimize his position in China Proper, and defend Manchuria against Japanese and Soviet encroachment. Zhang’s fortune in China and his position in Manchuria were interdependent.

²⁸ Tsin Tsang-Woon, Michael, *Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China: Canton, 1900-1927* (Stanford, 1999), 177.

²⁹ Kaoru Sugihara, “Introduction,” in Kaoru Sugihara (ed.), *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949* (Oxford, 2005), 1-3.

Zhang Zuolin's decision to advance into Northern China between 1925 and 1928 resulted from his appreciation of the strategic situation. Pressured by expansionist neighbours and left unprotected by an often-hostile central government, one solution for Zhang was to turn to either of the neighbouring powers of Japan and the Soviet Union. However, Zhang could not and did not take this course of action, as it would have deprived him of any authority in Manchuria and delegitimised his cause. The Soviet and Japanese treatment for their puppet rulers in Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo proved that Zhang had made the right choice by not turning to either power. In a letter to the military governors of Jilin and Heilongjiang in 1921, Zhang outlined his intention to consolidate his power by building up the economy and strengthening the military, an idea that persisted throughout his career:

As the rebellion in Mongolia and South China has yet to be quelled, the Beijing Government can neither attack its enemies nor defend itself.... If we can reform the Three Provinces, maintain internal peace, achieve self-sufficiency in armaments and recruit soldiers to defend our borders before disaster reaches our eyebrows, we can still be able to preserve the Three Provinces even if Beijing (China) is lost (to the powers). If we can retake South Manchuria and expel the foreigners, the Three Provinces can still stand proudly in the world. We can float loans abroad for armament and recruiting soldiers using our land as security, and then repay the loans after we have retaken South Manchuria....³⁰

The Japanese, who obtained a copy of this letter, interpreted it as Zhang's intention to create an independent Manchuria.³¹ However, subsequent events prove that Zhang's scope was never confined to Manchuria and he did not seriously consider creating an independent nation. Zhang largely followed his plan of securing his position through economic and military build-up, and manouvered between the Japanese and the Russians.

When the central government in Beijing was overrun by Feng Yuxiang and his KMT and Soviet allies in 1925, Zhang decided to launch a strategic offensive into Northern China to regain strategic initiative in Northeast Asia and safeguard his southern flank by establishing a friendly government in Beijing, which was seen as the seat of a legitimate Chinese national government until 1925 and was the diplomatic center of the country. The importance of Beijing

³⁰ Sai Hōten sōryōji Akatsuka Shōsuke, “Tōsanshō dokuritsu no fūsetsu nikansuru ken,” 20/9/1921, GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050187500, slides 178-9.

³¹ Ibid. 178.

did not escape many contemporaries. The British Minister to China, Sir Miles Lampson, had questioned the KMT's decision to move the capital to Nanjing, as he believed that such a move would endanger the Chinese position in Manchuria. Yan Huiqing, the ex-Foreign Minister of the Beijing Government, shared the same view.³²

A myriad of Northeast Asia-related factors undermined Zhang's scheme, however. One was the ambiguous historical-political link between China and Manchuria. Although there was a long history of Han presence in Manchuria, its political bond with China was weak. This was the result of distance, climate, the vastness of the area, and the prevalence of the non-Chinese regimes in the area. Not until the Ming dynasty did the Chinese establish some control over the area. As Arthur Waldron suggested, integrating the Chinese and the Inner-Northeast Asian parts of the Ming and Qing empires was a major political, administrative, and security challenge to their rulers.³³ As the problem of the lack of historical bonds resurfaced after the end of the Qing dynasty, the Chinese continued to search for the historical root of Chinese presence in Manchuria during the Republican period. This search highlighted rather than alleviated the problem.

Incompatible security needs between Northern China and Manchuria explained why Zhang never achieved the level of consensus at home necessary to fight a prolonged war in China. Although the Chinese in Manchuria saw Japan and Russia as immediate threats, political leaders in China Proper saw internal strife as their paramount security concern after the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 had made permanent foreign occupation of territory in China Proper improbable. Though nationalistic, the Chinese in Manchuria saw chaos in China as being irrelevant to them. Local elites such as Wang Yongjiang were convinced that the best way to protect Manchuria was to stay away from Chinese politics altogether. Wang's military colleagues, such as Zhang Zuoxiang and Wu Junsheng shared this view. Whereas the Prussians were able to persuade a significant number of German states to join the Prussia-led coalition by playing on the French threat during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Zhang Zuolin could not reconcile the perceived security priorities of the two components of his regime, Northern China and Manchuria, in 1925-1928.

32 Yan Huiqing; Wu Jianyong, Li Baochen, Ye Fengmei (tr.), *East-West Kaleidoscope, 1877-1944: an Autobiography by W. W. Yen* (Beijing, 2003), 216-7.

33 Arthur Waldron, "Chinese Strategy from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries," in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, Alvin Bernstein, *The Making of Strategy*, 94-6.

Zhang also found it difficult to integrate Manchuria with Northern China institutionally and economically. As Christopher Clark suggests, although the economic benefit of the German Customs Union (*Zollverein*) was limited, it highlighted Prussia's determination and ability to lead the German states. The process of making the *Zollverein* also built consensus among the states and boosted Prussia's authority.³⁴ Besides a lack of resources for carrying out a similar initiative, Zhang would have faced serious Japanese and Russian opposition if he had launched such a plan. It was difficult to reorient Manchuria's economy, which depended on commodity trade with industrialized countries. Meanwhile, as Chapter 1 discusses in detail, Japan had an increasing economic stake in Manchuria from the beginning of the 20th century. Ultimately, Zhang lacked the time and resources to introduce reforms in the Beijing Government and in Northern China in order to facilitate the integration of Manchuria and Northern China, as he had to face constant warfare in China and attempts to overthrow his position in Manchuria. Thus, although Zhang succeeded to a certain extent in presenting himself as a qualified leader of North China during the Northern Expedition, partly owing to disappointment with regard to the KMT, his action in China was not seen as beneficial to Manchuria.

Although one should not blame Zhang Zuolin's failure entirely on outside forces and geopolitics, it is difficult to exaggerate the geopolitical pressure imposed on him by the Japanese and the Soviets during the 1920s. In contrast, the KMT in Canton did not face any immediate threat of foreign invasion. In fact, they were helped by Soviet ambitions, especially in undermining international collaboration toward China. Although Zhang's resistance to the Japanese and the Russians has been studied in detail, the relationship between the War of 1925-1928 and the geopolitical design of Japan, Russia, and China in Northeast Asia has yet to be studied in detail.³⁵ The Soviets did not invade Manchuria until 1929, but their presence along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia was always threatening. Allied with the KMT and Feng Yuxiang, the Soviet Union almost succeeded in overrunning Northern China and Manchuria militarily in 1925-1926. By 1927, through his military counterstroke, Zhang had checked the spread of Soviet influence in Northeast Asia, but he failed to eliminate Feng, who used Soviet-KMT aid in his bid for power.

Zhang's grand-strategy also clashed with that of Japan, which aimed at dominating Northeast Asia through formal and informal imperial control. As

³⁴ Christopher Clark, *The Iron Kingdom*, 394.

³⁵ Mizuno Akira, Zheng Liangsheng (tr.), *Dongbei junfa zhengquan yanjiu: Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xueliang zhi kangwai yu xiezhu tongyi guonei de guiji* (Taipei, 1998), 3-20; Sima Sangdun, *Zhang lao shuai yu Zhang shao shuai* (Taibei, 1984).

they did not want a strong Chinese government uniting Northern China and Manchuria, the Japanese never approved of Zhang's venture and tried to sabotage it beginning in 1925. During the "Northern Expedition," the Japanese encouraged Chiang Kai-shek to ally with the smaller independent military factions in the North such as Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan in order to remove Zhang from Northern China. The result was the rise of a number of these leaders in Northern China who were unable to defeat one another and challenge the KMT's control over China. This weakened China's position in Northeast Asia and contributed to the fall of Manchuria in 1931.

Regional factors helped to shape the war and its outcome. However, many of the above-mentioned weaknesses would have been mitigated if Zhang had been able to translate military victories into political ones as the Prussians had done during the German Wars of Unification. This study therefore analyzes the military campaigns he led, and lost, in considerable detail. Zhang's failure on the battlefield determined the outcome of his bid to construct a new polity anchored at his base in Manchuria.

The Military Factor

The reason why the *Anguojun* failed during the Northern Expedition has seldom been asked because studies of the war have mainly focused on the KMT and the CCP. Nationalist historiography saw the KMT's "victory" as the proof of the superiority of the party's army and its nationalist and modernization program, whereas communist history argued that the importance of mass mobilization superseded other factors. It has been suggested by Hans van de Ven that the KMT was able to transform Canton as a base through successful fiscal and modernization reforms.³⁶ The alliance with the CCP has been seen as important, as with Soviet help the KMT emerged from a loosely organized group into one reliant on mass mobilization and ideology.³⁷ The Soviets armed the NRA during the early stage of the war and equipped it with organizational skills, propaganda techniques, and an ideology.³⁸ It has been argued that popu-

³⁶ Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism*, 90–2.

³⁷ Wang Qisheng, *Guogong hezuo yu guomin geming, 1924–1927* (Nanjing, 2006).

³⁸ Martin Wilbur, *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920–1927* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Tony Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China: the Role of Sneevliet* (Leiden, 1991); Alexander Pantsov, *The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 1919–1927* (Richmond, 2000); Peter Zarrow, *China in War and Revolution, 1895–1949* (London, 2005). KMT historiography saw the Three People's Principle, rather than the CCP's program, as being to one that mattered. One of the examples of this view is Zhang

lar support and its propaganda campaign helped the KMT to advance rapidly.³⁹ “Revolutionary diplomacy,” an attitude adopted by diplomats of the KMT such as Eugene Chen that stressed a willingness to take unilateral action and to challenge treaty rights, forced the powers, Britain in particular, to recognise the Nationalist Government as the legitimate Chinese state.⁴⁰ Military accounts stressed on the importance of the battles against the “warlords,” but the parties had different views on the importance of each battle. Success in winning the support of “neutral” warlords in the North such as Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan has also been seen as crucial.⁴¹

The standard narrative of the KMT’s success is a one-sided story, in which the northern “warlords” passively waited for their preordained destruction by historical force. This is one-sided, not only because it was generated by the victors—as Prasenjit Duara pointed out, unification of China under a centralized state was deemed inevitable in narratives of modern China.⁴² The Linear History of the nation state assumes there is a clearly defined “China,” justifies wars that claimed to build a modern nation, and suppresses alternatives by dismissing them as “halfway” or “transitional” in nature. Alternatives proposed by the “warlords” such as unification through negotiation, constitutionalism, and federalism were seen as their gambits to stay in power, deemed illegitimate and doomed to fail because they supposedly arose out of selfish motives rather than a real commitment to the Chinese nation.

The KMT’s “success” was seen as proof of the superiority of the KMT’s political and socio-economic programs over the “reactionary” warlords who understood neither nationalism nor modernity. A closer look at the events and the north’s reception of KMT propaganda challenges this view. The party’s “political works” (propaganda campaign) were much less successful than has been claimed. Popular mobilization was limited.⁴³ Although the KMT intro-

Zhaoran, “Beifa qianji guomin gemingjun yu zhixi jundui zhi zhanli bijiao,” in *Beifa tongyi liushi zhounian xueshu taolunji bianji weiyuanhui* (ed.), *Beifa tongyi liushi zhounian xueshu yantaohui* (Taipei, 1988), 55-81.

39 Martin Wilbur, op. cit; Peter Zarrow, 230; Zhang Zhaoran, “Beifa qianji guomin gemingjun yu zhixi jundui zhi zhanli bijiao,” op cit; Chen Youshen, *Chi bokeqiang de chuanjiaozhe: Deng Yanda yu guomin gemingjun zhenggong zhidu* (Taipei, 2009).

40 Li Enhan, *Beifa qianhou de geming waijiao, 1925-1931* (Taipei, 1993).

41 Donald Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China’s National Revolution of 1926-8* (Honolulu, 1976).

42 Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, 1995), 17-50, 177-204.

43 Donald Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*; Odoric Y.K. Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan* (Stanford, 1994), 51-162.

duced modernization reforms in Canton, these were not extended elsewhere during the war; the KMT's control of Canton was at best shaky. Crippled by factionalism, the KMT was no longer a coherent organization by 1927. Besides Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan who turned to the KMT, there were numerous smaller warlords in Southeast and Central China who joined the *Anguojun*, the most important of these being Sun Chuanfang. The "success" of persuading Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan to join the NRA (partly the result of Soviet and Japanese influence) and to destroy the Beijing Government under the control of Zhang Zuolin and the *Anguojun* weakened China's geostrategic position in Northeast Asia.

The different approaches adopted by Zhang Zuolin (and his military and civilian allies) and the KMT also revealed the change in Chinese warfare. Whereas men like Zhang opted for negotiation and compromise, the KMT insisted on destroying its opponents. This was because its leaders saw themselves fighting a war to eliminate their ideological opponents (the warlords were seen as the henchmen of imperialism) and to restructure the political order according to their doctrine. A similar view was long held by Sun Yat-sen, who was uncompromising as a politician, but it was the Soviet influence that reinforced this kind of uncompromising politics and held an ideological outlook in China. Under this influence, it was presumed that peaceful coexistence with those who did not completely submit to the KMT would deprive the KMT of its authority as it claimed leadership of a "national revolution," and would make it difficult for the party to contain internal dissent and external criticism. Thus, the KMT allied with Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, two manageable warlords, instead of reaching a compromise with the Beijing Government controlled by Zhang, another contender of national power.

The international attitude towards Zhang Zuolin's regime was also important and was the direct product of the military situation. The British government first approved of the northern warlords' moderation, but changed their minds when the KMT threatened to destroy their economic position in Central and South China and to dismantle the Maritime Customs Service, despite the advice from some of the diplomats on the spot. Britain's refusal to recognize the Beijing Government in late 1926 dealt a severe blow to the latter's legitimacy and tipped the north-south diplomatic balance to the KMT's favour. As will be discussed in detail, Beijing's financial problem in 1926-8 was, to an extent, the result of Britain's insistence on keeping the autonomy of the Customs Service. The Arms Embargo Agreement also posed much difficulty for Beijing in unifying China after its introduction in 1919. However, when the North briefly appeared to be winning and the KMT was seemingly slipping into disintegration in the summer of 1927, British representatives in China were

close to change their position once again. Only the North's defeats in the battle of Longtan and the subsequent Henan campaign prevented this.

Structure

This study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter historicises “Northeast Asia” by reviewing the conflicting security and economic interests among the regional powers and the impact of the transnational forces of migration, imperialism, and globalization. Chapter 2 focuses on the foundations of Zhang Zuolin's power, his relations with the central government, and his struggle for legitimacy in both Manchuria and China Proper. Zhang's success in exploiting military, economic, social, and democratic changes was more important than the Japanese attitude in explaining his position in Manchuria. However, some of his strengths in Manchuria became weaknesses when his reach extended beyond his base. Much of his social support originated from his ability to maintain peace and economic stability in Manchuria; when his war in China was draining the resources of his own base, the Chinese in Manchuria withdrew their support.

The third chapter analyses the grand-strategy adopted by Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique from 1925 to 1931 and the reasons for its failure. The Fengtian Clique's repeated attempt to enter China was a strategic move that aimed at freeing itself and Manchuria from perceived isolation and encirclement. This chapter explains why it adopted such a strategy by examining the contexts, the available sources, and the actions taken. It argues that Fengtian's strategy was undermined by the moves of its opponents, domestic and external difficulties, and military failures. It also deals with the changes in the Northeast Asian geopolitical situation as the result of the Northern Expedition, and suggests that internal dissension of the Fengtian Clique after 1928, Zhang Xueliang's grand strategy, and the KMT's policy of encouraging warlordism in Northern China partly explained the fall of Manchuria in September of 1931.

Chapter 4 revisits the military history of the Northern Expedition from the north's perspective. It looks at the changing military situation throughout the war and the major campaigns that were crucial to the defeat of the north. The Northern army fought effectively despite unfavorable strategic, political, and diplomatic circumstances, and even turned the tide in mid-1927. On the other hand, Zhang and his allies made numerous strategic errors and missed many opportunities. Although the KMT also made many mistakes, the North could not afford to make them because of its geopolitical and international position.

The cause of many of these strategic errors was an overcautious attitude induced by the North's precarious external position.

The fifth chapter looks at the war from the economic and financial dimension. Manchuria's position as part of a Japanese-centered economy helps explain the difficulty Zhang had in uniting Manchuria and North China. The collapse of Fengtian's currency in Manchuria was caused by the unfavorable political and military situation in China Proper and by Japanese intervention, rather than financial incompetence. The changing British attitude towards the political situation in China and its attempt to preserve the integrity of the Customs Service deprived the Northern leaders of the money needed to restore the government and fund their war effort. Although financial problems do not fully explain the *Anguojun*'s military defeats, they helped undermine its strategy.

Becoming “The Eastern Three Provinces”: International Conflicts in Manchuria and Northeast Asia, 1850-1920

Introduction

An English study on Manchuria in 1932 called it the “cockpit of Asia,” where “drama never dies.”¹ It had other names such as “the Balkans in East Asia”² and “the storm-center of Asia.”³ From 1850 to 1945, the conflicting security, political, and economic interests between several Chinese, Japanese, and Russian states, as well as non-state actors led to prolonged rivalries and occasional wars in the region.⁴ This period witnessed the rise and fall of once-prominent figures with many different titles whose careers were inseparable from Manchuria, such as Generalissimo Zhang Zuolin, his son Xueliang, General Roman Ungern von Sternberg, Ataman Grigory Semenov, Governor Wang Yongjiang, General Yang Yuting, Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, and many others.

This chapter focuses on the developments of Northeast Asia in the 19th and early 20th centuries that set the background of the war between 1925 and 1931. During this period, Manchuria experienced rapid change as its orientation moved from a Sino-centric world system to a Northeast Asian and global network. It became more integrated into “China” institutionally and socially, but geopolitics, imperialism, and the international economy pulled the area in a different direction. As the result of long-term forces, circumstances and individual actions, a “Chinese” regime emerged in Manchuria.

¹ Hubert Hessell Tiltman, *Manchuria: The Cockpit of Asia* (London, 1932), 1.

² Yu Juemin, *Manzhou youhuan shi* (Tianjin, 1929), 1.

³ Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (New York, 1932), 4.

⁴ The disputed boundary between China and Russia was not completely confirmed until 2005, when the last section in dispute was settled. Jiang Changbin, *Zhong-e dongduan bianjie de yanbian* (Beijing, 2007), 2.

Northeast Asia: Implications of Geography

Colin Gray suggests, “physical and political geography provide opportunities, challenges, and dangers, and help condition the frame of reference for official and public debate over national choices in policy and grand strategy.”⁵ The physical and historical geographies of Northeast Asia were of vital importance in Zhang’s strategy and its failure.

“Northeast Asia” roughly spanned from 100°-150° W and 30°-60° N. Several components stood out from a topographic map of this vast region: in the center was the Manchurian Plain, an area of gentle flatland as large as the North China Plain, surrounded on three sides by mountains. Southeast of the Plain was the Changbai Mountain Range that divided Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. To the west, the Greater and Lesser Khingan Mountains stretched from south to north, separating the Manchurian Plain from the Inner Mongolia Plateau and Eastern Siberia. Across the Tsushima Strait south of the Korean Peninsula was the Japanese Archipelago.⁶

Three major river systems run across the region. The Amur River (*Heilongjiang*), now the natural boundary of Russia and China; the Liao River (*Liaohe*), its tributaries spreading across the Manchurian Plain and the eastern part of Inner Mongolia (Rehe Province during the Republican period); and the Songhua River (*Songhuajiang*), flowing through both Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces.


According to the South Manchuria Railway Company, the size of Manchuria was 382,632 square miles, fifty-percent larger than modern France.⁷ Including Rehe Province, it was as large as France and Germany combined. As Owen Lattimore pointed out, it was necessary to distinguish the “historical geography of ancient Manchuria and the political geography of modern Manchuria.”⁸ Shaped by its environment, Manchuria was divided into three distinct components. South Manchuria, or Liaodong, was suitable for farming. Its northwestern part was the more arid western steppe—the territory of the nomads—while

⁵ Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace, and International Relations*, 137.

⁶ For Geography in Manchuria, see Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict*, 13-17; Bank of Chōsen, *Economic History of Manchuria* (Seoul, 1920), 8-9; Dudley Stamp, *Asia: a Regional and Economic Geography* (London, 1967), 551-4.

⁷ Bank of Chōsen, 6.


⁸ Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York, 1940), 103; Dudley Stamp, 551-4; Michael Pillsbury, *Environment and power warlord strategic behavior in Szechwan, Manchuria, and the Yangtze Delta*, Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Columbia University (1980), 249. Chinese studies on the area saw the different people in pre-modern Manchuria as part of a “Zhonghua nation.” See Li Deshan, Luan Fan, *Zhongguo dongbei guminzu fazhan shi* (Beijing, 2003), 1.



MAP 1.1 A Manchukuo map showing the relief of Fengtian, Jilin, Heilongjiang and Rehe. MAP IMAGE COURTESY OF THE NORMAN B. LEVENTHAL MAP CENTER AT THE BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY.

its eastern and northeastern parts were forest. Thus, although the river system in the Manchurian Plain favoured political integration, the different environments favored three types of civilization.⁹

9 Michael Pillsbury, 253.

MAP 1.2 *Railway of Manchuria*

The more populous and accessible Liaodong area dominated the region because other parts of Manchuria were too arid for farming.¹⁰ Although the climate of Liaodong was similar to that of Northern China, it was sealed off from the North China Plain by the mountains stretching from Inner Mongolia to the coastline. The mountains between the two made it “possible politically to cut off lower Manchuria from China.”¹¹ This prevented the emergence of a coherent Chinese-Manchurian polity until the Beijing-Mukden Railway had overcome the problems of distance and terrain.¹² As Duara suggested, whereas Manchuria was the springboard for those who wanted to conquer China and was constantly entangled with China, it was different to the provinces in China Proper because of the presence of the non-Chinese elements.¹³

Manchuria was situated in two of the six major “boundary regions” of China as outlined by Peter Perdue: the coastal boundary from Shanghai to Liaoning and the land frontier of Manchuria.¹⁴ Thus, Manchuria was vulnerable to threats from the steppe in the north and the sea in the east. This was especially so from the 1880s, when both Japan and Russia became expansionist powers in the area, with Japan a major maritime power. This presented a difficult strategic problem for anyone controlling Manchuria, including the Japanese, who had to defend Manchuria against the Russians between 1931 and 1945.

Although all sides depicted it as such to justify their claims, in the late 19th century Manchuria was not a virgin territory waiting to be “discovered” by “advanced” civilizations.¹⁵ Chinese presence in Manchuria, which can be traced back to before the Han dynasty, was limited to the area around Liaodong because of the superiority of the steppe cavalry.¹⁶ From the 7th century AD, the multi-ethnic (Sumo Mohe and Koreans) kingdom of Balhae controlled the area, up until the Khitan Liao Empire conquered it two centuries later.¹⁷ In the

¹⁰ The South Manchuria Railway suggested that in 1916, the population density of the Fengtian Province was 133 men per square mile, compared to 53 men per square mile when taking Manchuria as a whole. See Bank of Chōsen, 6, 10.

¹¹ Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, 107.

¹² Ibid., 105.

¹³ Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 43-4.

¹⁴ Fang Dewan (Hans van de Ven), “Zhongguo junshi shi beijing xia de Zhongri zhanzheng,” in Yang Tianshi, Zhang Yunku (eds.), *Zhongri zhanzheng guoji gongtong yanjiu zhi er: Zhanlue yu lici zhanyi* (Beijing, 2009), 150.

¹⁵ Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict*, 4.

¹⁶ Li, Xingsheng, *Dongbei liuren shi* (Harbin, 1990), 5.

¹⁷ Tang Sheng-hao, Peter, *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931* (Durham, N.C., 1959), 10; Li Deshan, Luan Fan, 48; Li, Xingsheng, 12-3.

12th century, the Jurchens (a conglomeration of Tungus and Sumo tribes) dismantled the Liao Empire and seized Northern China, establishing the Jin Dynasty, a polity that united both Manchuria and Northern China.¹⁸ In the Ming Dynasty, Chinese political control was established mainly in the southern part of Manchuria, again near the Liaodong Peninsula. The area was known among the Chinese as *guanwai* (outside the Pass) or *guandong* (east of the Pass).¹⁹ The “Pass,” Shanhaiguan Pass, was part of a Ming fortification system that marked the border of “China” throughout the Ming period.²⁰ During the last decades of the Ming dynasty, the area was occupied by a collection of ethnic groups and nomadic tribes, including the Manchu, which established firmer control over the area during the first half of the 17th century. Under the successive able rule of Nurhaci, Hong Taiji, and Dorgon, the Manchus created a written language, a bureaucratic structure that was partly inspired by the Chinese, and a formidable military based on the banner system.²¹

As Bernard Cohn suggests, manipulating knowledge of the area and people was a major means for modern states to establish their power. Knowledge of the region has long been, and still is, a contested ground between China, Japan, and Russia. Since the 1930s, Chinese scholars have believed that the Japanese and the Russians removed the centrality of China in the history of Manchuria in order to justify their imperialism. The use of the term “Manchuria” was resisted, as its use was seen as a Japanese and Russian attempt to separate Manchuria from China. Chinese historiography emphasized the historical root of Chinese domination over Manchuria and even Korea. It saw the history of the region in terms of teleological processes of racial integration and shrinking national boundaries resulting from imperialist encroachment that led to the emergence of the “Chinese” nation.²²

¹⁸ Peter Lorge, *War, Politics, and Society in Early Modern China, 900-1795* (New York, 2005), 50-73, 115-25.

¹⁹ Li Deshan, Luan Fan, 1.

²⁰ For a comprehensive study of Shanhaiguan, see Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China: from History to Myth* (Cambridge, 1990).

²¹ Jonathan Porter, *Imperial China, 1350-1900* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 105-7.

²² See Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: the British in India* (Princeton, 1996); Yeh Pi-ling, “The Chinese History Field’s Confutation on Japan’s Manchuria-Mongolia Policy after the Mukden Incident-An Inquiry Based on the First Volume of Manchuria in History,” in *Bulletin of Academia Historica*, Vol. 11 (Mar. 2007), 114-115; Jin Yufu, *Dongbei tong shi* (1941) (Taibei, 1969), preface; Zhang Bibo, *Zhongguo Dongbei jiangyu yanjiu* (Harbin, 2006), 1; Li Deshan, Luan Fan, 1-16; Jiang Xiusong, Zhu Zhaixian, *Dongbei minzu shigang* (Shenyang, 1993), 1.

Arthur Waldron points out that the founders of the Ming dynasty were confronted by an unprecedented security problem as they ruled both “traditional Chinese” lands and the northern territories that were geographically, ethnically, and culturally more oriented toward Inner and Northeast Asia. Eventually, the Ming turned inwards and constructed “The Great Wall” as a means to define and secure the border of “China.”²³ Although Liaodong remained part of the empire, the failure to secure it partly led to the collapse of the dynasty.²⁴ The Qing Empire inherited the same strategic situation, but it was able to maintain a strong presence in Inner Asia and Northeast Asia until the late 19th century because of the dynasty’s military capability (its army’s ability to combine firepower and mobility was unmatched by the Ming forces) and its flexibility as a “trans-cultural society” that combined components of different cultures, religions, and civilizations.²⁵ The new Chinese Republic had to confront a strategic problem similar to that faced by its predecessors (and successors, Japan and Manchukuo) despite the differences in geopolitical, demographic, economic, political, and technological conditions.

International Relations of Northeast Asia, 1600-1920

From the Sino-centric perspective, Manchuria was “incorporated” into China when the Qing Dynasty was established.²⁶ From the Manchu perspective, Manchuria was their homeland (also known as the “*longxing zhi di*” - the land where the dragon rises) and China Proper was part of a larger, multi-ethnic empire in which ethnic identities, as William Rowe noted, were “flexible, ambiguous, and negotiable.”²⁷ The Qing was an expansionary empire well into the 19th century; when Emperor Qianlong died in 1799, it controlled Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet through military conquests.²⁸ A large campaign was launched by the Qing to bring Xinjiang under control during the 1860s. Soon after the Qing conquered China Proper, the Russians reached Eastern Siberia.

²³ Arthur Waldron, “Chinese Strategy from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries,” in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, Alvin Bernstein, *The Making of Strategy*, 94-6.

²⁴ Li Jiancai, *Mingdai dongbei* (Shenyang, 1983), 192-200.

²⁵ Wang Hui, *Yazhou shiye: Zhongguo lishi de lunshu* (Hong Kong, 2010), xii.

²⁶ Zhao Zhongfu, “1920-1930 niandai de dongsansheng yimin,” in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 2 (Jun, 1971), 325.

²⁷ William Rowe, *China’s Last Empire: the Great Qing* (Cambridge, 2009), 11.

²⁸ Bruce Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989* (London, 2001), 57-68; Peter Lorge, *War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900-1795*, 158-74.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk that settled the frontier zone between the two empires was concluded in 1689 after a series of border skirmishes.²⁹ As the Qing did not see its boundaries as inviolable lines between “us” and the “Other,” it was unwilling to delegate resources from its primary security concerns (Zunghar and internal security) to fight against the Russians for a definitive boundary. Since the Russians were increasingly involved in Europe because of the reform of Peter the Great from the 18th century, Northeast Asia therefore remained stable for the next 170 years.

The East Asian world order, with the Qing at its center, was challenged in the mid-19th century.³⁰ Russia resumed its eastward expansion from the 1840s, especially after the Crimean War of 1854–6.³¹ Capitalizing on the Qing’s weakness in the Arrow War and the Taiping Rebellion, the Russians annexed the territory north of the Amur River and the northern part of Jilin between 1858 and 1860.³² The Russian presence was strengthened by the Trans-Siberian Railway, built between 1891 and 1896.³³ To secure the shortest route to Vladivostok, their only ice-free port on the Pacific Coast, the Russians persuaded the Chinese to enter a secret anti-Japanese alliance in 1896 and obtained the right to construct the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER, *Zhongdong tielu*) across Manchuria.³⁴

After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan strove to be an equal of the western powers through empire-building.³⁵ Japan followed America’s gunboat diplomacy and “opened” Korea, challenging the Qing’s tributary relations with the latter. Concern over the Russian menace prompted the Japanese to gain a continental foothold; Meiji leaders such as Yamagata Aritomo argued that Korea was Japan’s first line of defense against the Russians.³⁶ To frustrate the Qing’s attempt to maintain the tributary system and suppress Russian

²⁹ Yang Yulian et al., 107–10; Jiang Changbin, *Zhonge guojie dongduan de yanbian* (Beijing, 2007), 61–75.

³⁰ Hamashita Takeshi, *China, East Asia and the Global Economy* (London, 2008), 90.

³¹ David R. Stone, *A Military History of Russia from Ivan the Terrible to the Wars in Chechnya* (Westport, 2006), 135.

³² Hubert Hessell Tiltman, 4–6; Yang Yulian et al., 195; Jiang Changbin, 123–175; Gerard Fritters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position* (Baltimore, 1949), 44.

³³ Hubert Hessell Tiltman, 8–9.

³⁴ Jiang Changbin, 177. The Chinese also paid for the railway, but they had no place in its board of directors.

³⁵ Prasenjit Duara, *The Global and Regional in China’s National Formation*, 26; Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), 427; Zhang Yunku, *Jindai riben yatai zhengce de yanbian* (Beijing, 2009), 35.

³⁶ From Zhang Yunku, 41.

influence in the region, Japan fought against the Qing in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5.³⁷ The defeated Qing Empire ceded Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan, but Russia, Germany, and France pressured Japan to give up the latter.³⁸ This so-called “Triple Intervention” only strengthened Japan’s determination to wrest the control of Northeast Asia from the Russians.

Before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Russians controlled the railways in Manchuria, the Liaodong Peninsula, and Port Arthur, a fortified naval base. Manchuria was considered by the Powers as the sphere of influence of Russia after it had established a military rule there during the Boxer Uprising of 1900-1901. As latecomers, the Americans called for an “Open Door” policy in China to prevent themselves from being shut out from the country. However, even the Americans were ready to recognise Russian political domination in Manchuria in exchange for business rights in 1901.³⁹ The incorporation of Manchuria into the Russian Empire was seemingly irreversible. In 1902, however, Japan became Britain’s junior ally to check Russian expansion in East Asia. Unable to negotiate a share of power in Manchuria with the Russians, the Japanese attacked their fleet in Port Arthur in 1904.⁴⁰ The Japanese destroyed the Russian fleets, captured Port Arthur and Mukden (Shenyang), and inflicted heavy losses on the Russian army. Although the Japanese also suffered tremendous human and financial losses, the Russians gave in.

The war replaced Russian domination of south Manchuria with that of the Japanese. The Japanese believed that they were entitled to a privileged position because of their sacrifice in driving away the Russians.⁴¹ They annexed Korea, formed the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), and developed Dairen (*Dalian*) as a trading and colonial center. The Qing government agreed not to construct new lines parallel to the SMR or branch lines that might “prejudice” against it.⁴² This “agreement” caused much conflict between Zhang Zuolin and the Japanese during the 1920s. The Japanese established informal

³⁷ Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan from Tokugawa Times to the Present* (Oxford, 2003), 115-8; L.M. Cullen, *A History of Japan, 1582-1941 Internal and External Worlds* (Cambridge, 2003), 232; Marius B. Jansen, 432.

³⁸ For an international history of the Sino-Japanese War, see S.C.M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy* (New York, 2003).

³⁹ Huang Dingtian, *Dongbeiya guoji guanxi shi* (Harbin, 1999), 211-212; Gorelik, S.B. (Sarra Borisovna), Gao Zhixiong (tr.), *1898-1903 nian Meiguo dui Manzhou de zhengce yu Menhu kaifang zhuyi* (Heilongjiang, 1991), 68-77.

⁴⁰ Marius B. Jansen, 438-9.

⁴¹ Hubert Hessell Tiltman, 142-3.

⁴² “A Review of the Past and Present of Japan in South Manchuria,” 21/2/1928, F 2348/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 337.

imperial control over Manchuria but failed to colonise it, as life in the Manchurian hinterland was, as one British observer put it, “too harsh” for Japanese migrants.⁴³ However, Korean migration to Manchuria after Japan annexed the country in 1910 blurred the frontier between the Chinese territory and the Japanese Empire. As the Lytton Report on the Manchurian Incident of 1931 suggested, the Chinese saw the Koreans as the vanguard of Japanese penetration.⁴⁴ This explained the subsequent attempt made by the Chinese authority in Fengtian to evict the Koreans from the province. Russia maintained its position in northern Manchuria, and cooperated with Japan in order to keep out other powers such as the United States, which used the “Open Door” policy as a weapon for economic penetration.⁴⁵

When the 1911 Revolution started, the Japanese Government was ready to divide Manchuria up with the Russians.⁴⁶ However, the director of *Mantetsu* Nakamura Yoshikoto contemplated creating a *fait accompli* of a Japanese occupation of the whole of Manchuria by encouraging the revolutionaries.⁴⁷ Opposing Nakamura’s action, the Japanese Consul General in Mukden Koike argued that a better way of extending Japanese control was to contrast the chaotic “Eighteen Provinces” with a peaceful Manchuria under Japanese protection.⁴⁸ A Russo-Japanese takeover was prevented only because Governor Zhao Erxun and Zhang Zuolin maintained peace and order throughout the revolution (see Chapter 2 for detail). In 1912, Zhang Zuolin cracked down on a

43 F 2348/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 340-2; Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict*, 18.

44 Shen Mo, *Japan in Manchuria: An Analytical Study of Treaties and Documents* (Manila, 1960), 279.

45 F 2348/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 340; Jiang Changbin, 188-90; Hubert Hessell Tiltman, 22-3; Huang Dingtian, 241-55.

46 “Benye zhu-e dashi (Japanese Minister to Russia Motono ichirō) yu e-guo zhongli dachen (Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Nikolayevich Kokovtsov) guanyu qingguo shiju zhi tanhua jiyao,” in Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo Zhonghua minguo shi yanjiushi, *Riben waijiao wenshu xuanyi: guanyu xinhai geming* (Beijing, 1980), 107; “The American *chargé d’affaires* at Tokyo to the Secretary of State,” 15/10/1911, No. 893.00/566, United States Department of State: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1912 (FRUS) (Washington, D.C., 1912), 50. <<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/u/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1912>>.

47 Koike sōryōji, “dai san jū kyū hachi gō (telegram no. 398),” 12/11/1911, Shinkoku kakumei dōran no sai ni a keru teikoku no tai shin seisaku nami ni taido kankei zassan (gokuhi), in *Gaimoshō kiroku* (GK), JACAR, Ref. B03030264900, slide 10.

48 Koike sōryōji, “dai san yon kyū yon gō (telegram no. 494),” 12/11/1911, Shinkoku kakumei dōran no sai ni a keru teikoku no tai shin seisaku nami ni taido kankei zassan (gokuhi), GK, JACAR, Ref. B03030264900, slide 13.

plot to create an independent Manchuria by Japanese officers and Manchu princes.⁴⁹

Russia and Japan engaged in a new round of money-lending and railway construction to extend their control over Manchuria after the formation of the Republic of China.⁵⁰ When the First World War pre-occupied the European powers, Tokyo presented the “Twenty-One Demands” and an ultimatum to President Yuan Shikai, forcing him to accept many of Japan’s demands. With regard to Manchuria, the Demands extended Japan’s lease of territory, allowed its subjects to rent land for commercial use, and handed the control of the Jilin-Changchun Railway to the Japanese (after the Japanese promised a loan of 6,500,000 yen).⁵¹ In 1915, Japanese officers planned another coup, but the plan was scrapped in the face of diplomatic opposition.⁵²

Chinese resistance against the Twenty-One Demands forced the Japanese to abandon openly aggressive moves, but they continued to exert influence through loans to Beijing and Mukden.⁵³ In 1918, the Japanese lent the Duan Qirui government in Beijing 10 million yen for the Jilin-Huining Railway, 30 million for mining and forestry in Jilin and Heilongjiang, and another 20 million for three railways planned in 1913. This group of unsecured-loans was part of the notorious Nishihara Loan, but Duan Qirui’s Beijing Government appropriated a large part of it for the North-South War of 1918-1920. Zhang Zuolin, who controlled Fengtian after 1917, borrowed another three million yen for the reorganization of the province’s finances.⁵⁴

Although the “West” was divided as a result of the First World War, as William Kirby pointed out, the international order in East Asia changed very little: the extant treaty system remained.⁵⁵ The Powers exerted immense influ-

49 Huang Dingtian, 270-2.

50 Hsü Shuhsı, *China and Her Political Entity: A Study of China's Foreign Relations with Reference to Korea, Manchuria and Mongolia* (New York, 1926), 349-343; Hsü Shuhsı, *Essays on the Manchurian Problem* (Shanghai, 1932), 36.

51 F 2348/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 342; Hsü Shuhsı, *Essays on the Manchurian Problem*, 37-41.

52 Hsü Shuhsı, *Essays on the Manchurian Problem*, 44; Huang Dingtian, 276-7.

53 He Weimin, “Japanese Policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia during Okuma Cabinet and Hara Cabinet,” in *The Journal of the study of Modern Society and Culture, Niigata University* (Dec., 2006), 135-9.

54 F 2348/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 343; Hsü Shuhsı, *Essays on the Manchurian Problem*, 47.

55 William C. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China,” in *China Quarterly*, No. 150 (Jun, 1997), 442; David Scott, *China and the International System, 1840-1949: Power, Presence, and Perceptions in a Century of Humiliation* (Albany, NY, 2008), 202-205; Luo Zhitian, “Diguo zhuyi zhai zhongguo, wenhua shiye xia tiaoyue tixi de yanjin,” in *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, No. 5 (2004), 194-8.

ence over Chinese politics through the Customs Service, the diplomatic corps, the Bank Consortium, and Arms Embargo. They saw Manchuria as Japan's informal possession. Although the powers, with the exception of the Soviet Union professed to maintain the *status quo* and the Open Door policy, they guarded against anyone being too influential. International war did not occur in Northeast Asia until 1929, but East Asian international relations during the period were hardly stable. While post-war financial difficulties and growing Chinese nationalism after the Paris Peace Conference convinced the western powers that open intervention was no longer feasible, the Soviets and the Japanese were more active in China than ever.

Akira Iriye suggested that there were several attempts to change the international order in East Asia during this period.⁵⁶ To prevent the Japanese from controlling China after the Nishihara Loan, Britain and America imposed the Arms Embargo on China in 1919, and established a Bank Consortium to prevent another Nishihara Loan two years later.⁵⁷ The Washington Conference was held in 1921 to discuss the future of East Asia, during which Manchuria's status as an integral part of China was questioned. The French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand asked during the conference "What is China"?⁵⁸ To secure Japanese support for naval disarmament, Britain and America conceded that China's proposals on treaty revision and territorial integrity applied only in "China Proper." The Manchurian issue was nothing more than a bargaining ploy to keep Japan in line.

The Conference pleased no one, however. Disappointed Chinese intellectuals such as Chen Duxiu turned to a more radical form of nationalism.⁵⁹ Instead of heralding an era of cooperation, the Conference aggravated mutual suspicion among the countries. Although Tokyo became conciliatory towards other powers when Shidehara Kijūrō directed Japan's foreign policy, the "Washington System" frustrated many in Japan.⁶⁰ For several reasons they felt that Japan was isolated: because of its diplomatic experience at Versailles (when its proposal for racial equality was rejected); the United States and Australia's

⁵⁶ For a detailed discussion of the exceptional nature of international relations in East Asia after the First World War, see Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism, The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921–1931* (Cambridge, 1965).

⁵⁷ Stephen J. Valone, *A Policy Calculated to Benefit China: The United States and the China Arms Embargo, 1919–1929* (New York, 1991), 41–2; Cui Pi, *Jindai dongbeiya guojiguanxishi yanjiu* (Changchun, 1992), 370–1.

⁵⁸ Yeh Pi-ling, 114–5.

⁵⁹ Luo Zhitian, "Diguo zhuyi zhai zhongguo, wenhua shiye xia tiaoyue tixi de yanjin," 199.

⁶⁰ Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932* (Cambridge, Mass.; London, 2001), 227–8.

limitations on Japanese immigrants; and the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Ishii-Lansing Agreement of 1917 that acknowledged Japan's special position in China.⁶¹ Political leaders such as Tanaka Giichi saw the “Washington System” as an Anglo-American straitjacket to limit Japanese development in China, a view shared by the Army.⁶² After the Conference, the British found Japan “uncooperative, if not obstructionist” towards the China problem.⁶³

To secure their position in Manchuria, the Japanese turned to Zhang Zuolin, the local strongman (his rise to power will be discussed in Chapter 2), but only supported him so long as it was in their interest.⁶⁴ This attitude was made clear during the First Eastern Conference chaired by Hara Kei in 1921. It would stay the same until 1928.⁶⁵ As the British Ambassador to Japan Sir Charles Eliot pointed out, “[the Japanese] ...while anxious to keep on good terms with Chang Tso-lin [Zhang Zuolin], thought it unwise to commit themselves unre-servedly to the support of any one Chinese party...”⁶⁶ As early as in 1922, the Japanese told Zhang that they opposed his China campaigns. The Imperial Japanese Army General Staff even went so far as to declare its willingness to support any local leaders who would recognize Manchuria's special position.⁶⁷

Excluded from the “Washington System,” the Soviets pursued their own East Asian policy. The Soviets declared that they would give up Imperial Russia's rights in China in 1919 and 1920, an act welcomed with enthusiasm by politicians such as Sun Yat-sen and members of the intelligentsia, such as Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. By 1924, the Soviets had secured Feng Yuxiang and the KMT as

61 In the Ishii-Lansing Agreement of 1917, the United States recognized Japan's special interest in China and Manchuria; Marius B. Jansen, 522-3; Cui Pi, 382.

62 “Mr. MacDonald to Sir C. Eliot,” 22/9/1924, FOCP, Vol. 28, 280; Cui Pi, 373; Sanbō honbu dai roku ka (6th Bureau of the General Staff), “Ho-Jiki sensō go ni okeru Shina seikyoku ni tai shi teikoku no to ruheki taido (The attitude the Empire of Japan should take toward the political situation in China after the Fengtian-Zhili War),” 27/5/1922, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050252300, slide 351.

63 “Mr. MacDonald to Sir C. Eliot,” 22/9/1924, FOCP, Vol. 28, 280-1.

64 Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, 228-9.

65 Gavan McCormack, 59.

66 “Sir C. Eliot to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 8/1/1923,” FOCP, Vol. 5, 352-3.

67 “Nippon seifu no tai Chang Tso-lin saku (kakugi an utsushi),” 20/12/1922, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3030293200, slide 31-3; “Sanbō honbu dai roku ka, “Ho-Jiki sensou go ni okeru Shina seikyoku ni tai shi teikoku no to ruheki taido,” slide 348.

local allies.⁶⁸ As subsequent events show, Moscow was determined to recover the Chinese Eastern Railway and make Outer Mongolia a Soviet satellite. These arrangements, according to the Soviet agent to China, Adolph Joffe, made the Soviets “no different from other imperialists.”⁶⁹ Beginning in 1921, Moscow pressured the Beijing Government to negotiate over the railway issue by threatening to recognise Sun Yat-sen and Zhang Zuolin’s rival regimes.⁷⁰ Moscow also tried to discuss with Zhang in 1920 and 1921 the future of the CER and Mongolia, but Zhang remained determined to recover Outer Mongolia as soon as China was stabilized.⁷¹ Still, after the Sino-Soviet Agreement was finally concluded in May, 1924, Moscow signed a separate agreement over the CER with Zhang in September of that year.⁷² In exchange for Soviet promises to recognise China’s sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and withhold subversive activities, China recognised the Soviet Union. The Soviets also regained actual control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. As subsequent chapters will discuss, despite all these “agreements,” Sino-Soviet relations remained in flux because of the conflicts between Zhang Zuolin, Feng Yuxiang, the KMT, and the Soviets.

-
- 68 Shen Zhihua (ed.), Yang Kuisong et. al, *Zhong-Su guanxi shigang, 1917-1991* (Beijing, 2007), 14-5.
- 69 Li Liangming, “Lun Yue Fei (Joffe) guanyu Sun Zhongshan, Wu Peifu lianhe tongyi zhongguo de zhengce,” in *Shixue yuekan*, Vol. 10 (2003), 124-5.
- 70 Geng Yunzhi, “Wu Peifu yu Su-e ji Beijing zhishijie,” in *Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo Minguoshi yanjiushi, Sichuan shifan daxue lishi wenhua xueyuan bian, Yijiu erling niandai de Zhongguo* (Beijing, 2005), 89-97; Bruce Elleman, “Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China,” in *Modern China*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), 450-1; Mizuno Akira, Zheng Liangsheng (tr.), 122-5. Zhang Zuolin declared independence from the central government of Beijing after his defeat during the First Zhili-Fengtian War of 1922.
- 71 Mizuno Akira, Zheng Liangsheng (tr.), 122-4; Wang Zhuoran, “Meng Lu boshi (Dr. Paul Monroe) yu Zhang Zuolin tanhua jilu, 5/12/1921,” in *Zhuanji wenxue*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1979), 51-4.
- 72 Mr. MacDonald to Sir C. Eliot,” 22/9/1924, FOCP, Vol. 6, 282; Tony Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, 142; As Tang Qihua pointed out, the Beijing Government did make some headway in abolishing the unequal treaties with Russia. Although the Soviets wanted to preserve the treaty rights of the Russian Empire until further negotiation was arranged, the Beijing Government successfully inserted a “secret protocol” which forbade the Soviet Union from exercising those treaty rights. It was agreed that a Sino-Soviet Conference would be held after the signing of the agreement, but the Soviets prevaricated over this whenever it was proposed by the Chinese. Tang Qihua, “1924 nian zhong-e xieding yu zhong-e jiuyue feizhi wenti: yi mijian yidingshu wei zhongxin de tantao,” in *Jindaishi yanjiu* (2006), No. 3, 22.

China and Manchuria: From Empire to Nation?

Fengjin, Migration and Manchurian Society, 1636-1911

Migration was an important factor shaping modern Northeast Asia. After the Qing gained control of China Proper, it moved the Manchus from their homeland to secure the dynasty's control over a much larger and hostile "Han" population.⁷³ This migration (known as *cong lung ru guan*, "into the Pass [China Proper] with the dragon [the emperor],"") removed part of the population from Manchuria.⁷⁴ To revitalise the region, the Qing had to encourage Han migration, but fear of Han domination led to the reintroduction of the policy of "seal and prohibit (*fengjin*)" in 1668.⁷⁵ The Qing controlled the agricultural order of Manchuria to preserve its distinctiveness from the Chinese provinces.⁷⁶ It was divided into numerous hereditary settlements of the banner garrison. In the Fengtian province, 84 percent of arable land belonged to this kind of settlement in the 1680s. The Qing allied with the indigenous Mongol and Tungus peoples, who maintained tributary relations with the Qing rather than being ruled directly. As Han settlements were separated from those of the Manchu (*qimin fenjie*), the *xian* system that was used in China Proper was adopted to manage them only in some parts of Manchuria.⁷⁷ Although the Qing retained their hold on land, ethnic diversity gradually became the norm.

The culture of Manchuria was diverse despite the Qing's attempt to maintain Manchu dominance. The Qing promoted Shamanism and ancestral rites, and established banner schools (*zongxue* and *baiqi guanxue*) to maintain Manchu identity.⁷⁸ Confucian schools were also established, producing candidates for the Civil Service Examination. Besides Shamanism, Buddhism and Lamaism prevailed, alongside Islam, Daoism, Guandi worship, and redemptive societies such as the *Zailijiao*. This was an anti-Qing secret sect that turned

⁷³ As William Rowe summarizes in his seminal work on the history of the Qing, ethnic identities at that time changed according to circumstances. Many "Manchus" in fact had Han or other origins, although one should not assume that ethnic differences did not exist between the Manchus and the Han. See William Rowe, 12-3.

⁷⁴ Fan Lijun, *Jindai guannei yimin yu zhongguo dongbei shehui bianqian, 1860-1931* (Beijing, 2007), 28-9.

⁷⁵ Zhao Zhongfu, "1920-1930 niandai de dongsansheng yimin," 327; Jiang Xiusong, Zhu Zhaixian, 130; Christopher Mills Isett, *State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644-1862* (Stanford, Calif., 2007), 24; Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 41.

⁷⁶ Christopher Mills Isett, 23.

⁷⁷ Yang Yulian et al., 348-9.

⁷⁸ Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 42; Yang Yulian et al., 140-7; 566-8.

into a kind of popular religion and self-help group for the Han migrants.⁷⁹ Among these sects, the Morality Societies (*daodehui*) was influential in Manchuria until the end of the WWII. These religions and organizations later provided platforms for the local Chinese elite to establish their networks and help ethnic groups to preserve their distinctiveness. For example, Bai Yongzheng, the would-be chair of the Fengtian Provincial Assembly during Zhang Zuolin's time, was a patron of the *daodehui*.⁸⁰

Manchuria's distinctiveness was challenged by the influx of Han Chinese in the last decades of the Qing. From the mid-19th century, disturbances in China Proper pushed the Han Chinese into Manchuria. The Qing's lift of the ban on Han migration in 1895 speeded up the process. Between 1898 and 1915, the recorded population in Manchuria increased from five to twenty million.⁸¹ By 1912, the population of Fengtian reached 11.2 million, and that of Jilin and Heilongjiang reached 5.72 and 1.6 million.⁸² An important group of migrants (or their descendants), because of their influence rather than their number, was Han Chinese soldiers. From 1894 to 1900, thousands of them were sent to Manchuria. Many became bandits or local militiamen (the two identities often being interchangeable).⁸³ During the Russo-Japanese War, both sides recruited Chinese irregulars. Some of these men were to play an important political role during the Republican period. Zhang Zuolin was a trooper of the Yi Army during the Sino-Japanese War and fought for the Japanese in 1904-5. His future lieutenant Zhang Zongchang⁸⁴ fought for the other side.⁸⁵

79 Yang Yulian et al., 616; Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 118-119. In 1932, in a Manchukuo report, the (much smaller) Fengtian province had 697,317 Buddhists, 22,408 Taoists, 79,851 Muslims, 276 Lamaists, 27,843 Catholic, and 18,277 Christians. The Fengtian Province of the Manchukuo was a highly sinified province, as it mainly consisted of Shenyang and its surrounding area. The believers of the Zailijiao were probably included in the Buddhist category. See "Hōtentsho shūkyō tōkei hyō," c. 1932, KK, JACAR, Ao5020118100, slides 2-5.

80 Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 114.

81 Zhao Zhongfu, "1920-1930 niandai de dongsansheng yimin," 328; Yang Yulian et al., 449-50;

82 Fan Lijun, 60, 70, 85. In 1930, the estimated population of the Three Provinces was 34.4 million, among which 15.2 were living in Fengtian, 9.1 in Jilin and 5.3 in Heilongjiang. By 1931, the population was predominately Han Chinese. Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley, 2000), 23.

83 Hans van de Ven, "Public Finance and the Rise of Warlordism," 849.

84 See Appendix I.

85 Wang Tiehan, "Zhang Yuting xiānshèng de chūnian," in Sima Sangdun, *Zhang laoshuai yu Zhang shaoshui* (Taipei, 1984), 57; Su Quanyou, *Zhang Zongchang chuanzhuan* (Beijing, 2007), 27-8.

Immigration transformed the administrative and social-economic structures of Manchuria. As Prasenjit Duara suggested, “Manchuria became the laboratory to experiment with administrative, judicial, and legislative reforms conducted by the Qing in the last decade of their rule.”⁸⁶ In 1907, the Chinese local administrative system from provincial to *xian* level was transplanted into Manchuria.⁸⁷ After the ban on Han ownership of land was lifted, a Han land-owning group that was closely related to the bureaucracy and the business community emerged. The influx of Han also accelerated urbanization, although Manchuria remained predominately rural throughout the period concerned. By 1911, there were 50 towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants and more than 30 towns with a population between 4000 and 10,000. Among those that had more than 10,000 inhabitants, 28 emerged between 1840 and 1911 and 33 were in Fengtian province.⁸⁸ This trend secured Fengtian’s dominating position in Manchuria.

This influx of Han Chinese transformed Manchuria’s cultural outlook even before the end of *fengjin*. The first sign was the decline in the use of the Manchu language. In the mid-18th century, Emperor Qianlong was shocked to discover that officials from Mukden could no longer speak fluent Manchu. A survey in 1779 suggested that only “one or two in ten” could speak Manchu in Mukden. Similar developments took place throughout Manchuria.⁸⁹ Han migrants transplanted their indigenous culture. For example, the worship of Guandi, a prevailing Northern China religion, persisted among the migrants.⁹⁰ As Owen Lattimore put it, “when penetrating the Manchu sphere, it is evident that the Chinese never had to abandon or modify anything that was essentially Chinese in its outlook on life.”⁹¹ Rana Mitter suggested that the Han migrants shared a common cultural and historical identity that formed the basis of modern nationalism.⁹²

Despite these changes, Manchuria was by no means simply “sinicized,” Manchu and Chinese cultures coexisted and influenced one another. A local gazetteer of the Republican period suggested “the different old customs of Manchu and Han became similar after a long period of acculturation; current

86 Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 47.

87 Zhao Zhongfu, “Qingmo dongsansheng gaizhi de beijing,” in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 5 (Jun, 1976), 315-318, 332-5.

88 Yang Yulian et al., 450-2, 458.

89 Fan Lijun, 281-90; Henrietta Harrison, *China: Inventing the Nation* (London, 2001), 42-3.

90 From Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, 12; Yang Yulian et al., 615.

91 Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict*, 53.

92 Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, 12-4.

customs had their origin in either Han or Manchu culture..."⁹³ Diversity was the norm, and migrants identified themselves first with their homeland. Chinese national awareness also existed.⁹⁴ As Owen Lattimore observed:

No matter how effective the political autonomy of Manchuria at any given moment, China itself remains the major focus of the life of the community, eclipsing the importance of the Korean-Siberian-Mongolian frontiers...the autonomy tendencies of Chinese provinces reveal an omni-directional capacity. The autonomy of provinces, avoiding the stemming-off process of Western independence movements, works itself out in a coagulation of groups disposed with the lack of declared form of a "Chinese puzzle" about a center pulsing with life, and strongly felt and weakly defined. Unity of civilization, in spite of regional politics, reveals the strongly felt center, but it is a center without schematic definition....⁹⁵

This aptly described Zhang Zuolin's persistent interest in the situation in China; as Gavan McCormack pointed out, although Zhang never hesitated in defying the central government, he never subscribed to the Japanese idea of "Man-mo" (Manchuria and Mongolia) or the idea of an independent "Manchuria."⁹⁶

Colonization of Manchuria was seen by the contemporary Chinese as a means to protect China's boundary. The *Eastern Miscellany* (*dongfang zazhi*) suggested in 1907: "if we still fall asleep and not think of catching up (in colonizing Manchuria), in a few years it will be either the Slavs... or the short but nimble Yamato people who cultivate the land in Manchuria..."⁹⁷ Two decades later, an article in the National News Weekly (*Guowen Weekly*) suggested that "[it is] fortunate that our people became far-sighted and started to pay attention to our borderland... [Migration] could ease the population pressure of the hinterland provinces and frustrate the ambition of the strong neighbours..."⁹⁸

During the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese in Manchuria declared self-rule and formed local-defense forces. Although the word "*duli* (literally

93 Quote from Fan Lijun, 278-9.

94 Fan Lijun, 277.

95 Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict*, 182-3.

96 Gavan McCormack, 60.

97 Ge Xiao, "Lun yimin shibian zhi buke huan," in *Eastern Miscellany* (EM), Vol. 4, No. 7 (1907), 120; Ying Guang, "Ximin shibian siyi," EM, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1908), 1.

98 Dian Yu, "Ji dai kaifa de Dongbei nongye," *Guowen Weekly* (GW), Vol. 2, No. 10 (1925), 5.

independence)” was used, the intention of the locals was to form an autonomous government with wider political participation to protect their interest under Qing sovereignty.⁹⁹ The movement died down as the Qing disapproved, but the episode nevertheless strengthened the idea that Manchuria was part of China. After the war, Beijing introduced administrative reforms in Manchuria and established the provincial assemblies in 1907. As Duara noted, these reforms “spelled the end of Manchu domination of the frontier and the ascendancy of Han administrators, politicians, and militarists.”¹⁰⁰

The last decade of the Qing also witnessed the emergence of numerous Chinese public organs and voluntary associations in Manchuria. The burgeoning Chinese press in Manchuria reinforced the national awareness of those settled there. Besides major newspapers such as Gazette of the Eastern Three Provinces (*dongsansheng gongbao*) that had thousands of readers, there were numerous smaller newspapers such as Eastern Three Provinces Daily (*dongsansheng ribao*), Jilin Plain Chinese Daily (*jilin baihua ribao*), Fengtian Pictorial (*fengtian huabao*), and Fengtian National Daily (*fengtian guomin-bao*).¹⁰¹ Some, such as *guominbao*, advocated republicanism and equal citizenship between Han and Manchu.¹⁰² In 1909, these papers advocated the boycotting of Japanese goods when Japan proposed to build the Fengtian-Andong Railway.¹⁰³ During the outbreak of a bubonic epidemic between 1910 and 1911, the press urged state intervention, encouraged the Chinese to donate money as a patriotic act, and argued that maintaining personal hygiene was the duty of every citizen (*guomin*).¹⁰⁴ This national awareness was not the same as the ethnic nationalism advocated by the southern revolutionaries. When the *Tongmenghui* was trying to take over Manchuria, it abandoned its anti-Manchu slogans.¹⁰⁵ This revealed the unpopularity of anti-Qing revolutionary movement in Manchuria.

99 “Lun Manzhou dong wei lixian duli guo,” EM, Vol. 1, No. 6 (1904), 112; “Dongsansheng quanyi ce,” in EM, Vol. 1, No. 9 (1904), 191.

100 Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 47.

101 In 1924, the daily print of the *gongbao* was around 5,000. See Shina (fu hon kon) ni o keru shinbun kyū tsūshin ni kan suru chōsa/ taishō 14 nen 7 gatsu (July 1925) insatsu taishō 13 nenmatsu genzai (late 1924), Gaimushō gaikō shiryō kan (GGS), JACAR, Ref: B02130801400, slide 2.

102 Yang Yulian et al., 625.

103 Lin Mingde, “An-feng tielu gaizhu yu dizhi rihuo yundong,” in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 2 (Jun, 1971), 359.

104 Jiao Yunming, *Jindai dongbei shehui zhuwenti yanjiu* (Beijing, 2004), 34-5.

105 Zhao Zhongfu, “Xinhai geming qianhou de dongsansheng,” 128.

Publications about Manchuria flourished in China as well. Articles and books on Manchuria's economy, geography, and international situation appeared in magazines such as the *Eastern Miscellany* and the *Guowen Weekly*. Japanese and Russians also published extensively on these subjects. These publications, such as the Bank of Korea's report on the Manchurian economy, challenged China's claim over Manchuria by portraying Manchuria as a virgin land waiting to be developed by the modern nations of Japan or Russia. The Japanese press was also influential in Manchuria. *Shengjing shibao*, a Chinese newspaper published by the Japanese, printed 19,000 copies every day in 1924.¹⁰⁶

With official patronage, civil organizations such as the provincial assemblies, the chambers of commerce, and the education councils emerged. Educated urban elites, landowners and businessmen were now involved in the state. Businessmen from China Proper also formed *huiguan* based on their original provinces. The most important of them were the Shandong, Zhejiang, and Fujian *huiguan*, established in the late 18th century. There were also Jiangsu, Anhui, and Guangdong *huiguan*.¹⁰⁷ The elected provincial assemblies of Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang first convened in 1909, and continued to function after 1912. The press suggested that it was the duty of a "citizen" (*guomin zeren*) rather than of a Qing subject to vote.¹⁰⁸ After the formation of the Republic, several "political parties" such as the Democratic Party (*minzhdang*) emerged in Manchuria; as the next chapter shows, they were the foundations of Zhang Zuolin's power.

Another important factor for the emergence of a Chinese society in Manchuria was the education reform beginning in 1902. The Fengtian University (*fengtian daxuetang*) was established by the provincial government that year. By 1908, there were close to 90,000 students studying in modern Chinese schools and universities.¹⁰⁹ New schools such as the legal and administrative academies (*fazheng xuexiao*) and the police training academies (*jingzheng xuetang*) trained administrators for the modern branches of the government. Zhang Zuolin continued this project; between 1910 and 1931, the number of schools in Manchuria reached 10,404 (including four universities,

¹⁰⁶ Yang Yulian et al., 600-2; 623; See Shina (fu hon kon) ni o keru shinbun kyū tsūshin ni kan suru chousa/ taishou 14 nen 7 gatsu (July 1925) insatsu taishou 13 nenmatsu genzai (late 1924), GGS, JACAR, Ref: B02130801400, slide 2.

¹⁰⁷ Yang Yulian et al., 413-4.

¹⁰⁸ Jiao Yunming, 43; Zhao Yuntian, "Qingmo xinzhenqijian dongbei wenhua jiaoyu de fazhan," in *Shiyuan*, No. 5 (2007) <<http://jds.cass.cn/Article/20070922131551.asp>>.

¹⁰⁹ Yang Yulian et al., 585-90.

271 high schools, and 10,101 elementary schools).¹¹⁰ Graduates of these schools served as teachers, clerks, police officers, and bureaucrats throughout Manchuria. In the *Who's Who in Manchuria's Officialdom and Public Life* (*dongsansheng guanshenlu*), of the 640 “civilian” entries in Fengtian and Jilin, 214 graduated from these schools, and 116 from their counterparts in China.¹¹¹

The Late Qing Reform and the campaign to control the bubonic epidemic extended the state’s power into public security, health, and education.¹¹² More than laying the administrative foundation for Zhang Zuolin’s regime, they contributed to the emergence of the idea of the “Eastern Three Provinces (*dongsansheng*)” or “the Northeast” (*dongbei*, including part of Mongolia) both as a geopolitical concept and an administrative, institutional, and security reality. Administrative reforms, emergence of public opinion, and real and perceived foreign threat reinforced Chinese national awareness despite the strong provincialism among the Chinese in Manchuria.

Manchuria and Mongolia after 1911

Despite the abovementioned developments, Manchuria’s future was still uncertain when the revolutionaries seized Wuchang in late 1911. Besides the Japanese and Russians, several forces were at work when the Revolution broke out. The revolutionaries established their network in the New Army stationed in Manchuria, but had scant support from the locals. The most powerful faction was a temporary alliance between the loyalist governor Zhao Erxun and the commanders of the local militia. Their collaborators included the constitutionalists and the local elites. The Manchu nobles, backed by neither the people nor bayonets, aimed at establishing an independent Manchu nation after the abdication of the Emperor Puyi in 1912 as the Qing Emperor.¹¹³

Tension between the ideas of Manchuria as a Chinese territory and a “virgin land” unlike other Chinese provinces surfaced during the Revolution. National awareness among the Chinese in Manchuria existed, but not every nationalist saw Manchuria as part of China.¹¹⁴ As early as 1905, Sun Yat-sen suggested

¹¹⁰ Guo Jianping, *Fengxi jiaoyu* (Shenyang, 2000), 298.

¹¹¹ See Tanabe Tanejirō, *Dongsansheng guanshenlu* (Dairen, 1924).

¹¹² Hans van de Ven, “Public Finance and the Rise of Warlordism,” 850; Wu Jinying, “Cong dongsansheng shuyi wenti kan qingmo de neizheng yu waijiao,” in *Guoshiguan guankan*, Vol. 20 (Jun, 2009), 39-70.

¹¹³ Zhao Zhongfu, “Xinhai geming qianhou de dongsansheng,” in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 11 (Jul, 1982), 117.

¹¹⁴ Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Hong Kong, 1992), 97; Wang Ke; Feng Yiguang (tr.), *Minzu yu guojia: Zhongguo duominzu tongyi guojia sixiang de xipu* (Beijing, 2001), 187-91.

ceding it to the Japanese in exchange for their assistance. In 1912, Sun again offered Manchuria for loans, an offer rejected by the Japanese Army.¹¹⁵ Huang Xing talked of “the Eighteen Provinces” when asking for Japanese support.¹¹⁶ It is possible that Huang was implying the revolutionaries’ willingness to give up Manchuria; however, it is also possible that the statement revealed Huang’s unwillingness to include Manchuria in the new Chinese state.

The Chinese in Manchuria were well aware of their precarious position. In the conference between the revolutionaries, the provincial assembly, Governor Zhao Erxun, and the civil-military officials, the constitutionalist leader Wu Jinglian suggested that although the revolution was irresistible, the Chinese in Manchuria should guard against Japan and Russia rather than rashly joining the fight for or against it. The head of the Fengtian Military Academy, Song Gong, also played on the foreign threat to urge restraint. Zhang Zuolin, by then the commander of a local militia, also supported the governor and even guarded Fengtian, the provincial seat. Soon after Yuan Shikai became the president in 1912 and Zhao declared the incorporation of the Three Provinces into the new Republic.¹¹⁷ The opportunity for both the revolutionaries and the loyalists was gone. Manchuria’s status as part of China was reinforced by the Revolution.

Whereas Manchuria remained part of China, Mongolia emerged as an independent state. However, Mongolia was divided as a result of the power politics in Northeast Asia. From the 1860s, the Russians tried to make Mongolia their satellite. They were anxious to fill the vacuum left by the Qing during the 1911 Revolution.¹¹⁸ At that time, the Mongolian princes were dissatisfied with a Chinese rule that “jeopardized the supremacy of the Mongol feudal lords” and were alarmed by the influx of Chinese settlers.¹¹⁹ Backed by the Russians, an independent Mongolian state was created in 1911. Chinese protest against Mongolian independence was to no avail; negotiations with Russia and Mongolia were bogged down. By late 1914, “Outer” Mongolia was already

¹¹⁵ Yuan Weishi, *Jindai zhongguo lunheng* (Hong Kong, 2006), 139-40.

¹¹⁶ Yang Tianshi, *Haiwai fangshi lu* (Beijing, 1998), 100.

¹¹⁷ Zhao Zhongfu, “Xinhai geming qianhou de dongsansheng,” 123; Li Peiji, “Xinhai Guanwai geming cimoji,” in Zhou Kangxie (ed.), *Xinhai geming ziliao huiji*, Vol. 4 (Hong Kong, 1980), 112; The problem of diplomacy also became an excuse for the less determined New Army officer Zhang Shaozheng (the commander of the 20th Division) to abandon the plan to stage the revolution, see Yang Duo, “Xinhai geming shigang,” in Yang Haiqing, Sun Shili, Zhang Deying (eds.), *Xinhai geming xijian shiliao huibian* (Beijing, 1997), 131.

¹¹⁸ Li Yushu, *Wai menggu chezhi wenti* (Taipei, 1976), 1; Gerard Friters, 45.

¹¹⁹ Hubert Hessel Tiltman, 24.

considered lost.¹²⁰ To salvage the Chinese position, Yuan Shikai reorganised Inner Mongolia into the “Suiyuan Special Administrative Region (*Suiyuan tebiequ*)” and “Rehe Special Administrative Region (*Rehe tebiequ*)” in 1914. The Chinese planned to absorb these lands through colonization and railway construction.¹²¹

When internal strife engulfed Russia during the Revolution of 1917, China reasserted its control over Outer Mongolia. In 1918, Xu Shuzheng sent an expedition to force the Mongolian Government to withdraw its declaration of independence (the event was called by the Chinese the “retraction of autonomy” of Outer Mongolia, *waimeng cezhi*). It was a short-lived success. The restored Chinese position was first undermined by Xu’s high-handed policy that alienated the Mongols and then rooted out by the forces under Roman Ungern von Sternberg and the Red Army that defeated him.¹²²

The Soviets turned Outer Mongolia into a satellite state. As Liao Xiaoyuan pointed out, the division of Mongolia was permanent when Moscow adopted the “two-Mongolia” scheme proposed by Nikiforov, the Soviet representative in Ulan Bator in 1926. To retain the support of the KMT and the CCP, the Soviets recognized Inner Mongolia as part of China, but Outer Mongolia would become an “independent state” under Soviet protection.¹²³ This move not only frustrated the Mongolian nationalists’ attempt to unify Inner and Outer Mongolia, but also conflicted with Zhang Zuolin’s plan to “recover” Outer Mongolia. As the subsequent chapters illustrate, Soviet control over Outer Mongolia created much difficulty for the Northern warlords during the Northern Expedition.

Regional Economy in Northeast Asia

Manchurian Economy before 1890

Manchuria was an integral part of the regional economic system that centered on China until the late 19th century. Although Manchuria was an importer of food throughout the 17th century, trade with China Proper gradually grew in

¹²⁰ Gerard Fritters, 163–83.

¹²¹ J.R. Tighe, *Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northwestern Territory and Development in Early Twentieth Century China* (Leiden, 2005), 55–6, 78–82. Justin Tighe pointed out that the Chinese local elites in Suiyuan and Rehe favored absorption, while Yuan tried not to antagonize the Mongolian princes.

¹²² Gerard Fritters, 186–93.

¹²³ Liu Xiaoyuan, *Reins of Liberation*, 64–6.

the subsequent century as the result of prolonged peace, population increase, and increased agricultural production.¹²⁴ The Han Chinese dominated trade, as the Manchus were either uninterested in or too poor for business.¹²⁵

A trading network between Manchuria, the coastal provinces, and Northern China emerged in the 18th century. Soya bean was Manchuria's most important export product. When the British consul of Niuzhuang first arrived at Manchuria in the mid-19th century, he found that the bean trade was "an ancient and flourishing institution."¹²⁶ Bean cakes made excellent fertilizers for the sugarcane and cotton fields in Southern China. The volume of trade between Manchuria and Southern China was so large that there were over 10,000 Fujianese households conducting trade in Liaodong already in 1791. Through *huiguan*, trade links were established between Manchuria and Shanxi, Tianjin, Shandong, Fujian, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.¹²⁷ Trade of considerable scale was also conducted between Manchuria and Korea, although sometimes it was conducted in the name of tributary relations.¹²⁸

From the mid-19th century, Manchuria became one of the major breadbaskets in the empire, exporting foodstuff (*kaoliang* and bean) to the southern and south-eastern provinces. According to Christopher Isett, annual surplus of soya beans increased from 2.6 to 3.9 million *dan* (50 kilograms) in the late 18th century and to 7.8 million in 1875.¹²⁹ Before 1906, the majority of this surplus went to Southern China. Beans and grain from Manchuria freed agricultural land in Southeast China to produce cotton.¹³⁰ Thus, even before the coming of the west, Manchuria played a role similar to that of a colony by providing cheap food, raw material, and a market on one hand, and on the other by releasing land in the Jiangnan area for more profitable production.

¹²⁴ Christopher Mills Isett, *State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644-1862* (Stanford, 2007), 211.

¹²⁵ Yang Yulian et al., 366; Bank of Chōsen, 15.

¹²⁶ The actual place where the consul was set up was in Yingkou. It was named as the Consul of Niuzhuang because the British found Yingkou a better seaport, while the Treaty of Beijing in 1860 only opened Niuzhuang. See Bank of Chōsen, 16, 18.

¹²⁷ Bank of Chōsen, 18-9; Christopher Mills Isett, 364; Yang Yulian et al., 413-5.

¹²⁸ Takeshi Hamashita, Ouyang Fei (tr.), *Jindai Zhongguo de guoji qiji: chaogong maoyi tixi yu jindai Yazhou jingjiquan* (Kindai chūgoku no kokusaiteki keiki) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1999), 43.

¹²⁹ Christopher Mills Isett, 228.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 228.

Reorienting the Manchurian Economy

During the last decades of the Qing, the Manchurian economy developed in the context of the changes of the trade pattern described above. The first factor of change was the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) that devastated the bean trade between Manchuria and the lower Yangzi region. Meanwhile, the opening of the treaty ports along the Chinese coast changed the economic structure of East Asia. Manchuria became one of the hinterlands of a trading network that gradually centered on the great treaty port cities and later Japan.¹³¹

After the opening of Yingkou in 1872, trade between China and Manchuria steadily declined, as foreign imports (mainly textile products) replaced Chinese goods. Manchuria's agricultural products found new markets in the outside world. The Chinese shipping business between Shanghai and Manchuria was the first casualty. The reformist official Xiong Xiling reported in 1908 that the number of Chinese hulls ferrying products between Manchuria and Shanghai decreased from 3,000 in the 1870s to around 50 in the 1900s. The Customs figure shows that the ratio of foreign import to Manchuria via Yingkow (Yingkou) rose from 65% of total trade volume in 1872 to 78% in 1899.¹³²

Old links between Manchuria and China remained strong; through Shanghai, beans were now sold to Fujian, Guangdong, and Southeast Asia. However, the establishment of Dairen as a Japanese-controlled seaport after 1905 and the emergence of railways dealt a blow to the Manchuria-China trade relationship. The Japanese collected no duty from Japanese goods that entered Dairen, where the goods would then be sold in China Proper, driving out Chinese products. Japan also became the major consumer of Manchurian beans because the railway to Dairen now shipped the beans much quicker and with a lower cost.¹³³ There was a similar pattern in North Manchuria after the Chinese Eastern Railway was built. Bean cakes previously for South China now went to Japan and Russia; bean oil was shipped to Europe and the United States as industrial material (bean oil was a crucial raw material for the chemical industry). The volume of beans exported to Japan and Europe was 160,000 tons in 1907, 930,000 tons in 1909, and 2,720,000 tons in 1929. In 1912, 110,000 tons of bean cakes, 132,000 tons of raw beans, and 25,000 tons of bean oil were exported to China Proper, while 670,000 tons of bean cakes and 176,000 tons of raw beans

¹³¹ Takeshi Hamashita, *China East Asia and the Global Economy* (Oxon, 2008), 87–91.

¹³² Kaneko Fumio, *Kindai Nippon niokeru tai manshū toushi no kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1991), 22.

¹³³ Xiong Xiling, “Di yi ci tiaocha Ying-Wu shangwu bin,” in *Manzhou shiyeann* (Shanghai, 1908), 75; See also Yang Yulian et al., 439; Xiong Xiling, “Di er ci tiaocha Ying-Wu shangwu bin,” in *Manzhou shiyeann*, 79–81.

were exported to Japan.¹³⁴ Chinese refineries, previously supplying oil for the local population, now moved into the railway zones to produce oil for the international market.

From the 1900s to the 1920s, although the rest of China also witnessed spectacular growth, Manchuria's share of China's exports rose from 3.5 to 26%. Large-scale export was made possible because the railways surpassed the Liao River's limited capacity.¹³⁵ By the 1910s, Dairen overtook Yingkou as Manchuria's major outlet of goods. The interdependence between China and Manchuria declined. This was also the result of developments in Manchuria. For example, the flourishing flour trade between Manchuria and Central China was checked by the development of flour mills in North Manchuria.¹³⁶ By the 1920s, Manchuria was trading more with Japan and the World than with China. The Chinese trading network persisted, however. For instance, the Shandong merchants were active in the silk trade in Mukden. The shipping magnate Zhang Benzhen was able to construct a Chinese steam-shipping network that connected Andong, Shanghai, Qingdao, Tianjin, Yantai, and Dairen in the 1910-1920s. However, political strife in China hindered the growth of Zhang's business; for example, during the Second Zhili-Fengtian War in 1924, Wu Peifu reacquired many of Zhang's ships in his attempt to land troops on the Manchurian coast.¹³⁷

Agriculture and industry also expanded. 30,000,000 *mou* (666.5 square meters) of arable land were opened in Fengtian province alone from 1896 to 1911. Han settlers controlled more land than Manchus in the Fengtian province in 1907.¹³⁸ Two-thirds of arable land in Manchuria was cultivated by 1920. Agriculture developed mainly in the service of the export trade. Monoculture for soybeans was widely adopted. Whereas arable land in Manchuria increased by 170 percent from 1908 to 1930, land used for soybean production quadrupled.

¹³⁴ *Kantō totokufu minseibu shomuka, Monmō keizai jijō*, No. 6, 20/2/1917, *Naikaku bunko* (NB), JACAR, Ref: A06033518200, slides 46; Nishimura Shigeō, *Chūgoku kindai Tōhoku chiikishi kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1984), 143; Kaneko Fumio, 4; Herbert Bix, "Japanese Imperialism and the Manchurian Economy, 1900-31," in *The China Quarterly*, No. 51 (Jul-Sep, 1972), 428. See Tsukase Susumu, "Chūgoku tōhoku chiiki ni o keru daizu torihiki no dōkō Mitsui bussan," in *Kindai Chūgoku Tōhoku chiikishi kenkyū no shinshikaku* (Tokyo, 2005), 70.

¹³⁵ Bank of Chōsen, 17.

¹³⁶ *Kantō totokufu minseibu shomuka, Monmō keizai jijō*, No. 7, 20/3/1917, NB, JACAR, Ref: A06033518300, slides 14, 44.

¹³⁷ Ueda Takako, "Tōhoku ajian iokeru kajin nettowaku no seisei to suitai," in *Gendai chūgoku kenkyū*, No. 18 (2003), 77-79

¹³⁸ Yang Yulian et al., 444-5, 447.

pled.¹³⁹ Manchuria was producing 8,825,541 tons of cereals and 2,960,616 tons of beans in 1915. Although small holders owned much of the farmland, it was still too large to be handled by the owners alone. Throughout the 1910s, over 300,000 seasonal laborers from North China worked in Manchuria each year.¹⁴⁰ As land and labor were abundant while capital was not, there was little mechanization in agriculture.

Manchuria also underwent considerable industrialization, especially along the South Manchuria Railway zone.¹⁴¹ As Manchuria was at that time partly a Japanese colony (Dairen and the railway district), a large part of Japanese investment went to the *Mantetsu* or its spin-off businesses such as mining, infrastructure, utilities, and harbour works.¹⁴² Chinese industry also flourished, with some larger industries backed or run by the state. In 1911, 1,242 Chinese factories and workshops had more than seven employees. Steam-powered oil refineries replaced the old-style ones. The state dominated the armament and mining industries, while private capital focused on flour, textiles, and oil-processing. The Fengtian Arsenal hired over 20,000 workers in 1925,¹⁴³ but most of the Chinese industries in Manchuria were small workshops producing simple products such as matches, flour, or bean oil. Many of these industries enhanced rather than reversed Manchuria's economic drift towards Japan. Although the Mukden Arsenal was one of the largest in East Asia, it had to import raw materials from Japan. A large part of Chinese industry was in the service of international trade, again at the expense of traditional bean and commodity trade centers such as Yingkou and Mukden. In 1917, there were 72 Chinese bean-related factories within the Kwantung Leased Territory processing oil for the world market, with a capital value of 1,590,216 yen. Meanwhile, there were 10 Japanese bean factories with a total investment of 3,716,000 yen. The number of Chinese and Japanese factories and their respective total capital investments suggest that many of the Chinese “factories” were small workshops with limited capacity while their Japanese counterparts were usually mechanized mills.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Kaneko Fumio, 46; Herbert Bix, 429; Yang Yulian et al., 452; Bank of Chōsen, 129.

¹⁴⁰ “Economic Situation in Manchuria,” c. 1927, USMI, Reel 4, 416.

¹⁴¹ Bank of Chōsen, 187-92.

¹⁴² Kaneko Fumio, 98-100.

¹⁴³ Hao Bingrang, *Fengxi junshi* (Shenyang, 2001), 152-3.

¹⁴⁴ See *Kantō totokufu minseibu shomuka, Monmō keizai jijō*, No. 6, 20/2/1917, Ref: A060335 18200, slides 47-57; *Kantō totokufu minseibu shomuka, Monmō keizai jijō*, No. 11, 10/7/1917, NB, JACAR, Ref: A06033518700, slides 46, 64-6; Yang Yulian et al., 470.

The Competing Currencies

To facilitate interregional and international commodity trade, a sophisticated but unstable financial network emerged. China, Japan, and Russia all tried to control this network by introducing a dominating currency. The first Japanese attempt to unify the currencies in Manchuria started soon after the Russo-Japanese War. First established in Yingkou in 1899, the Japanese government allowed the Yokohama Specie Bank to establish branches in major cities in Manchuria and issued their silver-backed banknotes. The plan faltered because of the competition of the Chinese currency issued by the State Bank of the Fengtian Province (*fengtiansheng guanyinhao*) and the local Japanese's preference for gold-backed yen. The Bank of Chōsen's gold yen became the spearhead for the introduction of Japanese currency into Manchuria, especially after the Japanese government controlled by Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake delegated the mission to the Bank of Chōsen in 1917.¹⁴⁵

Meanwhile, Russian gold-rouble served a similar role in North Manchuria, but Russian economic power in the region declined during the Russian Civil War. The collapse of the Tsarist Government rendered the rouble worthless; the problem of redeeming these rouble notes was one of the causes for Fengtian-Russian friction during the 1920s. Having greatly profited from the war, Japanese businessmen filled the gap left by the Russians and poured money into Manchuria. By 1918, Japan's total investment in Manchuria reached 845 million yen, tripling the pre-war value.¹⁴⁶ By 1923, there were 17 Japanese banking corporations operating in Manchuria.¹⁴⁷ Although the majority of this increase was *Mantetsu*-related, a rapid increase in private investment was also seen.¹⁴⁸ The extraordinary increase in credit also channelled money to unprofitable business ventures and real estate speculation in Manchuria. Even the Bank of Chōsen was involved in these activities.¹⁴⁹ An economic bubble quickly developed.

Tighter credit after the war brought an immediate recession that continued throughout the 1920s. Post-war recession and the collapse of real-estate prices in Manchuria left the Bank of Chōsen with a large amount of bad debts. As it was Japan's major bank in Manchuria and Korea, it had to lend money to other smaller banks with similar problems. The Bank's decision to continue to send

¹⁴⁵ Yasutomi Ayumu, *Manshūkokū no kinyū* (Tokyo, 1997), 5.

¹⁴⁶ Kaneko Fumio, 205.

¹⁴⁷ Xu Jieping, "Dongsansheng jindai huobi jinrong," in *Liaoning wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 12, 102.

¹⁴⁸ Kaneko Fumio, 201-3.

¹⁴⁹ Yasutomi Ayumu, 33-4.

gold species to Japan further destabilized its banknotes.¹⁵⁰ The problem was exacerbated when Japan was hit by the US-engineered global gold-depression in 1920, and then by the Kanto Earthquake in 1923.¹⁵¹ After the Earthquake, the Japanese government issued the “Earthquake bonds” in order to speed up recovery. Many of these bonds were used to cover the bad debts. The bonds were the trigger for the financial crisis of 1927, when the banks and companies in Japan could no longer repay the debts. As chapter 5 discusses, the volatile financial situation in Northeast Asia throughout the 1920s had much to do with the devaluation of the Chinese currency in Manchuria that undermined Zhang Zuolin’s war effort in 1926-1928.

As Kaneko Fumio points out, growing Chinese national awareness and the Chinese’ attempt to modernize Manchuria themselves obstructed Japanese economic expansion during the 1920s.¹⁵² Although both sides benefited from economic development, the Chinese (especially the state) and the Japanese did not share the same goal. Besides the railway issue, their most important conflict was over the Chinese currency, *fengpiao*; the history of *fengpiao* was one of continuous struggle against various Japanese and Russians currencies.¹⁵³

The first modern Chinese currency appeared in 1905, when “small-value silver notes” (*xiaoyangpiao*), exchangeable for silver, were issued by the Fengtian Province State Bank for small-scale transactions. The State Bank was established in 1905 as part of the administrative reform in Manchuria. Although it was claimed as a joint venture of the state and private capital, it was being run as a state enterprise. The *xiaoyangpiao* could be used to exchange silver species (*yinyuan*) in Chinese banks in Manchuria. Due to their popularity, the amount of *xiaoyangpiao* in circulation reached 153 million *yuan* by 1917.¹⁵⁴ Although silver prices reached an unprecedented height during the First World War, the value of *xiaoyangpiao* against Japanese currencies declined. The Japanese Kanto government (*kanto totokufu*) claimed that the Chinese lacked silver species to back the notes, but the Chinese authority at Mukden believed

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 34, 37.

¹⁵¹ Mark Metzler, *Lever of Empire: the International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley, 2006), 132-7; Metzler points out that the cost of the Kanto Earthquake was “one-quarter of the damage caused to all of Japan during World War II.” See Mark Metzler, 146.

¹⁵² Kaneko Fumio, 308-9.

¹⁵³ Generally speaking, all Chinese paper banknotes issued from 1905 to 1931 in Manchuria were *fengpiao*. See Yang Naikun and Cao Yanxiong, 83; Yao Huiyuan, “Fengxi junfa tongzhi shiqi de Liaoning zhibi faxing,” in *Zhongguo qianbi*, No. 79, Apr 2002, 12.

¹⁵⁴ Yao Huiyuan, 13.

the Japanese destabilized the currency through rumors and amassing *xiaoyangpiao* to exchange silver species from the Chinese banks in Manchuria, including the State Bank.¹⁵⁵ The Chinese decided to make *xiaoyangpiao* convertible, but the Japanese protested against this. The Chinese only backed down when Japanese government lent them money to restore financial stability in 1917.¹⁵⁶

To stabilize the financial situation and circumvent the Japanese demand to make *xiaoyangpiao* convertible, the civil government of Fengtian controlled by Zhang Zuolin recalled *xiaoyangpiao* and introduced “currency exchange note” (*huiduiquan*) which were backed by *yinyuan* (the silver coins issued by Yuan Shikai or the Mexican bullion) in 1917. The new *huiduiquan* could not be exchanged for silver in Manchuria, but technically it could be used as an exchange note in Shanghai.¹⁵⁷ As the Financial Department of the Kwantung Leased Territory noted, the Chinese outmanoeuvred them by introducing a *de facto* convertible note.¹⁵⁸ As late as in 1919, the Fengtian authority still claimed that the issue of *huiduiquan*, bonds, and copper notes were only temporary measures and that they would be recalled. In reality, *huiduiquan* stayed. Even the Bank of China and Bank of Communication in Manchuria started issuing *huiduiquan*.¹⁵⁹ The fluctuation of *huiduiquan* during the War of 1925–1928 would be one of the reasons for Fengtian’s defeat, although not the only one. When *huiduiquan* became worthless in mid-1928 (see Chapter 5 for detail), a new *xianyangpiao* (silver specie note) was circulated by the State Bank under Zhang Xueliang’s control until the fall of Manchuria.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter reveals the background forces at work in Northeast Asia that affected Zhang Zuolin and the *Anguojun* during the War of 1925–1928. The Qing Empire’s decision to move the Manchu population into China Proper in the mid-17th century set the stage for the overwhelming changes in Manchuria in modern times, when great power politics, economic change, migration, and

¹⁵⁵ Yasutomi Ayumu, 16; Yao Huiyuan, 13.

¹⁵⁶ Kantōchō zaimubu (Treasury of the Government of the Kwantung Leased Territory, “Tosanshōkangō ron (A Study of the State Bank of the Eastern Three Provinces),” 1929, in JACAR, Ao6033520200, 167–9.

¹⁵⁷ Yao Huiyuan, 14.

¹⁵⁸ Kantōchō zaimubu, 170.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 170–5.

local administrative changes turned Manchuria from the backyard of the Qing into a contested territory between China, Japan and Russia. During the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and the 1911 Revolution, Manchuria and Mongolia's fate was uncertain. After two wars, a period of military occupation and a revolution, Manchuria remained part of the new Chinese Republic through the choice of the local authority and civil-military elites. International relations in Northeast Asia remained in flux after 1912, as the powers sought different ways to cope with rapid changes and protect interests that were seen as vital, especially the control of the railways. The new Republic and the local Chinese authority, in turn, attempted to strengthen their position and preserve the imperial boundary of the Qing. The conflict between the Chinese and the powers and among the powers themselves was to play a vital role during the War of 1925-1928.

On one hand, Manchuria became more “Chinese” than ever because of migration, local militarization, administrative reform, and the emergence of public societies and nationalism; on the other, the Qing and its successor's hold on Manchuria waned because of the foreign presence and the disturbance in the central government. This period also witnessed Manchuria's gradual integration into the global economy, thanks to the ever-expanding railway network, the railway companies, and developments in the financial sector. Rapid economic development and the emergence of the strategically important railway network accentuated regional rivalries between China, Japan, and Russia and more importantly, reoriented the Manchurian economy from one focused on China into one focused on Japan and the world. It was in this complex context that Zhang Zuolin, the focus of the next chapter, came to power.

Manchuria under Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique

Introduction

Gavan McCormack remarked that “even after perusing all the known available evidence in the effort to reconstruct his life and career, it has to be admitted that he (Zhang Zuolin) remains a shadowy and enigmatic figure.”¹ Much has been said and written about Zhang, who, unlike his famous son Zhang Xueliang, left few records and said little about his own history.² When the KMT suggested that the warlords were the imperialists’ running dogs during the Northern Expedition, Zhang was accused of being one who worked for the Japanese.³ Zhang complained in 1927 that he was “held up as a traitor” because of his position of gradual abolition of unequal treaties.⁴ Recently, Zhang’s name has been “rehabilitated” because of his resistance to Japanese demands. However, he is

¹ Gavan McCormack, 250.

² Regarding Zhang’s biographies, Gavan McCormack’s work remains unsurpassed thirty years after its publication. For a more recent study of Zhang, see Mizuno Akira, *Tōhoku gunbatsu seiken no kenkyū: Chō Sakurin, Chō Gakuryō no taigai teikō to tainai tōitsu no kiseki* (Tokyo, 1994); Hu Yuhai, Zhang Wei (eds.), *Fengxi junfa renwu* (Shenyang, 2001). It has been suggested that Zhang could only write his name and another four words (which was *daode weixin*, morality in heart), but this was one of the many myths surrounding Zhang. See Xu Dexuan, “Wo suo zhidao de Zhang Zuolin,” in Wang Guangdi (Sima Sangdun), *Zhang laoshuai yu Zhang shaoshuai* (Taibei, 1984), 120.

³ For these accusations, see Zhongguo guomindang Dangshi shiliaojian bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), *Geming wenxian*, Vol. 17 (Taibei, 1954), 46; Che Weihan, *Fengxi duiwai guanxi* (Liaoning, 2000), 1.

⁴ “Opinion of Chang Tso-lin,” April 1927, received May 31, 1927, USMI, Reel 8, slide 106. Hardly surprising, the liberal-minded foreign journalists were disgusted at Zhang Zuolin, who was seen as Japan’s henchman in China, see Milly Bennett, *On her own: Journalistic Adventures from San Francisco to the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1927* (Armonk, N.Y., 1993), 84, 86, 122; Hallett Abend, *My life in China, 1926-1941* (New York, 1943), 57.

still largely seen as a patriotic but anachronistic figure,⁵ whose defeat was almost inevitable.⁶

This chapter traces Zhang's rise to power and the difficulties he faced when he tried to present himself as a national political leader. After a brief review of the breakdown of political order in China during the late Qing and an examination of how Zhang exploited the events to elevate himself as the leader of the Eastern Three Provinces, this chapter sets out to analyze the foundations of his power. Zhang seized the opportunities inherent in the political and economic changes in Northeast Asia from the second half of the 19th century to build a progressive and authoritarian regime and an efficient army. Instead of simply relying on the Japanese, Zhang's power was based on political, social, financial, and military foundations.

Zhang's success in unifying the Three Provinces suppressed other alternatives for Manchuria, making it politically more integrated with the new Chinese Republic. Some of the foundations of Zhang's regime, however, became liabilities when his scope extended beyond Manchuria. The second part of this chapter discusses Zhang's attempt to legitimize his position in China and Manchuria when the traditional political order was breaking down; it also discusses how political power worked in China during the 1920s just before the age of ideological struggle and mass mobilization.

The Larger Context: Chinese Politics after the Abolition of the Examination System

Before turning to Zhang Zuolin's struggle for power and legitimacy, it is necessary to outline the problem of political legitimacy and explain how politics worked during the early Republican period. The Qing's defeats in 1894-5 and 1900-1, the abolition of the Civil Service Examination (*keju*) in 1905, the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1912, and the subsequent political strife afterwards led to a general atmosphere of uncertainty in China, particularly in the political realm. As Luo Zhitian pointed out, the emperor and the literati had been

⁵ Hu Yuhai, Zhang Wei, *Fengxi renwu* (Beijing, 2000), iv. Mizuno Akira even went so far as to argue that Zhang Zuolin cooperated with the KMT during the early stages of the Northern Expedition. See Mizuno Akira, Zheng Liangsheng (tr.), 204-15.

⁶ An example would be Kong Fanyi, "Xiandaihua, zuzhi quexian yu Zhongguo junfa tongzhi de zhongjie," in *Ershiyi shiji* (Jan., 2009), No. 82. <<http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/supplement/essay/0811039.htm>>. Accessed 30/1/2010; See also Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and authenticity*, 50.

the legitimate holders of political power. The Civil Service Examination had ensured ideological consistency, stability, and social mobility. Ever since the influx of western ideas in the mid-19th century, the hegemony of the traditional Confucian learning was challenged, and with it the socio-political order that was built around it. The expression of this change, the abolition of the civil examinations in 1905, confirmed the collapse of the old order. Luo rightly called it the most important institutional change in modern China.⁷ As Benjamin Elman suggested, the abolition of the Civil Service Examination not only “destabilized the dynasty’s natural constituency of degree candidates,” but also “left a cultural void,” namely the decanonisation of classical studies in favour of new and Western learnings that often came from Japan.⁸ The end of the Civil Service Examination also created a vacuum in politics, and caused much intellectual and social disruptions among the literati. Without a powerful replacement to fill the vacuum in the highest political order, various forces, including soldiers, modern intellectuals, professional revolutionaries, workers, and businessmen came to the fore.⁹ This period witnessed the diversification of Chinese thought, as Edmund Fung suggests:

Chinese thought in the Republican era was not dominated by Marxism, revolutionary socialism or any particular school of thought but instead was a mix of liberal, conservative and socialist thought that provided the intellectual and philosophical underpinnings for Chinese modernity.¹⁰

This diversity naturally made this period become what Rana Mitter describes as one with a “rich variety of political alternatives.”¹¹ Zhang Zuolin, a military leader, was one of those who found themselves handed an opportunity by the above-mentioned changes. As this chapter suggests, he was aided by many of the “new” political forces such as the modern bureaucrats and the business

⁷ Luo Zhitian, *Quanshi zhuanyi: Jindai zhongguo de xixiang shehui xueshu* (Wuhan, 1999), 161.

⁸ Benjamin A. Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley, 2000), 608.

⁹ For an in-depth discussion of the impact of the abolition of the Civil Service Examination, see Luo Zhitian, “Zhongguo wenhua tixi zhizhong de chuautong zhongguo zhengzhi tongzhi,” in *Zhanglue yu guanli* (1996), No. 3.

¹⁰ Edmund Fung, *The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era*, 20-1.

¹¹ Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution*, 104.

community, but on the other hand, barred from political participation by the prevailing discourse on civil-military relations, especially anti-warlordism.¹²

As Rana Mitter, Peter Zarrow, and Luo Zhitian have noted, the political culture of China experienced a thorough transformation during the late Qing and Early Republican period. The imperial system, supported by the Civil Examination System, was seen as anachronistic. Yuan Shikai's failure to revive the imperial system in 1916 was a poignant example to show the Chinese rejection of the old political culture.¹³ The early Republican period was marked by an uncertainty as to how politics should work. Alternatives such as militarism and revolutionary radicalism were advocated, but expectations about civilian rule outlived the traditional literati. As Luo Zhitian noted, when the late Qing reformer and bureaucrat Xu Shichang became the president (1917-1921), he was generally welcomed. Despite his close links with the *beiyang* warlords, he consciously cultivated his civilian image by paying much attention to the modern press, practicing traditional poetry and painting, and commissioning Huang Fu, a diplomat, to write a book in his name about China's situation after the First World War.¹⁴ His appearance in western garb during the ceremony commemorating the end of the First World War in 1918 also showed his determination to present himself as a modern civilian political leader. The modern press allowed the intellectuals to debate various issues and theories in public, provided a channel for the political leaders to present their image, and influenced how a particular political figure or group (such as the "warlords") was seen by the society. Xu Shichang remarked that, "the newspapers nowadays are more powerful than those in office."¹⁵ Although all political factions controlled the press to different degrees, all were under the scrutiny of the press at least until the mid-1920s, when the political power exerted much tighter control over the press.¹⁶

¹² Arthur Waldron, "The Warlord: Twentieth-Century Chinese Understandings of Violence, Militarism, and Imperialism," in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), 1073-100; Edward McCord, *The Power of the Gun*, op. cited.

¹³ Peter Zarrow, *After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924* (Stanford, 2012), 1-8.

¹⁴ Huang Fu was a *Tongmenghui* member; he later helped Chiang Kai-shek to solicit Japanese support in 1926. Zhang Xueji, *Huang Fu zhuan* (Beijing, 2005), 47-9.

¹⁵ Quoted from Luo Zhitian, *Jibian shidai de wenhua yu zhengzhi: cong xinwenhua yundong dao beifa* (Beijing, 2006), 37.

¹⁶ It should be noted that the KMT's control of the media was much stricter than that of the "warlords"; the difference of *Shenbao* of Shanghai before and after the KMT take over in March of 1927 is telling.

In the years after the 1911 Revolution, there was widespread moral panic among the Republic's political elite and disappointment towards the republican institution, especially after China's failure to retake Shandong in Versailles and the abortive North-South Peace Conference in 1919. Xu Shichang talked of the decline of morality as a source of internal strife in 1918; progressives such as Chen Duxiu expressed distrust of politicians within and outside of China.¹⁷ The Qing loyalist Liang Ji committed suicide in anger for what he perceived the Republic's failure to practice proper and honourable government in November 1918. Liang carefully planned his suicide for the Qing. He had waited for seven years because he wished to see if the Republic could "cherish this opportunity to reform," "lessen the peoples' suffering and alleviate their anger," and "prevent another bloody revolution." He decided to kill himself when he found that moral decline was "from the top down."¹⁸ This disappointment partly explained the resurgence of radicalism, originally limited to some of the revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen, among the intelligentsia and the students. However, radicalism did not solve the perceived problem of morality. When the KMT bloodily suppressed the communists in 1927, intellectuals such as Zhou Zuoren who previously supported the "new forces" in China had a return to the traditional culture.¹⁹ This suggests the continuous relevance of morality and the civilian ideal in Chinese politics despite the introduction of the New Culture Movement, mass mobilization, and indoctrination, at least during the 1920s.

Another important element of political discourse of the time, and with little doubt one of the most important, was nationalism. As Peter Zarrow noted, it was the widespread nationalism that explained the Chinese rejection to a return of the imperial system during the late Qing and early Republican period:

(it was felt) the imperial forms had to be rooted up if China was to become the rational, dynamic, and civilized nation-state that it needed to become if it were to survive in a dangerous world.²⁰

Luo Zhitian and Rana Mitter also showed the paramount importance of nationalism in the New Culture Movement (*xinwenhua yundong*). By the early 1920s, almost all political leaders in China proclaimed themselves nationalists.

¹⁷ Luo Zhitian, *Jibian shidai de wenhua yu zhengzhi*, 48.

¹⁸ All the quotes from Luo Zhitian, *Jibian shidai de wenhua yu zhengzhi*, 41-3.

¹⁹ Luo Zhitian, *Luanshi qianliu*, 243.

²⁰ Peter Zarrow, *After Empire*, 4.

One of the most common accusations between the contesting political contenders (be it warlords or the Nationalists) was “selling out the country (*maiguo*).” In fact, by attacking his political enemies as “country-selling bandits (*maiguozei*)” and portraying himself as a fervent nationalist, the Zhili warlord Wu Peifu had garnered much support among the Chinese before his crushing defeat during the Second Zhili-Fengtian War in 1924. The widespread impression that Zhang Zuolin was a Japanese protégé, in fact, was a constant embarrassment for Zhang when he was trying to establish himself as a legitimate national leader. On the other hand, he always described his major enemy in the north, Feng Yuxiang, as a Soviet puppet, not without reason or evidence.

Traditional political values that stressed a sense of responsibility for the common good, dedication to office, loyalty, and a commitment to maintaining order, as well as flexibility and compromise, represented by men like Xu Shichang, was gradually taken over by more uncompromising and fundamentalist attitudes.²¹ Xu tried to balance the power and interest of the major *beiyang* factions, and opposed the use of force among the *beiyang* group. Xu failed because of Wu Peifu, who repeatedly (and to an extent successfully) used force to solve the disputes among the *beiyang* militarists. Zhang Zuolin was somewhere between Wu and Xu. He was unlike Wu Peifu, who was confident of using force to settle political dispute, or Chiang Kai-shek, who saw war as a struggle that could only end with the complete defeat of the ideological opponent.²² Although Zhang was more willing to use force than Xu, he saw it as only part of the solution. In many cases, Zhang deployed his forces to threaten his opponents in order to gain leverage during negotiation. For example, without any real fighting, he controlled the provinces of Zhili, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui in 1925 through a mixture of military pressure and negotiation with the much-weakened central government controlled by Duan Qirui (see Chapter 3 for detail). Such restrain may not have come naturally; as Zhang’s position in Manchuria was always under foreign threat, he had to act with restraint. These features set the tone of Zhang’s grand-strategic decisions in 1925-1928 and were very much products of his experiences in his early years.

²¹ Xu Yong suggested that many of the *beiyang* militarists fell into the first category. See Xu Yong, op. cit.

²² For Sun’s uncompromising attitude and its repercussions, see Yang Tianhong, “Zhengdang jianzhi yu minchu zhengzhi zouxiang – cong ‘geming junqi, geming dangxiao’ kouhao de tichu lunqi,” in *Jindaishi yanjiu* (2007), No. 2.

The Ascendancy of Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique

Exploiting the Circumstances

Zhang Zuolin was among the countless Chinese who struggled for survival in Manchuria during the last years of the Qing, but he was different from others because his life was marked by several very successful exploitations of circumstances and events. Born in 1875, he was the third son of an impoverished family in Fengtian (now Liaoning) Province. His ancestors were among the earlier migrants to Manchuria, but his father was unable to sustain the family after dividing the estate with Zhang's uncles. He only received two years of traditional education, leaving school after his father's death. He briefly received training as a veterinarian, but had to abandon the career and became a fugitive after trying to avenge the death of his father.²³

Following a period of idleness, Zhang joined the Yi Army (*yijun*) commanded by Song Qing in 1894 and fought against the Japanese in Manchuria, but he stayed behind when it was redeployed after the war. Zhang was then hired by his father-in-law to protect his village as the head of an armed band.²⁴ During the anarchic period between the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, many bandit groups, or "Red Beards" (*honghuzi*), as they were known, were at the same time militiamen protecting their locale from other brigands and stragglers.²⁵

As a *honghuzi*, Zhang had his first taste of the complex international situation in Manchuria and formed the basis of what would become the "Fengtian Clique." Soon after Zhang formed his band, it was dispersed by a larger group sponsored by the Russians. He and the survivors joined with another bandit, Zhang Jinghui's, group. Zhang ultimately became the leader on the latter's request.²⁶ Zhang Jinghui would become one of Zhang Zuolin's lieutenants before losing his real power after the defeat of the Fengtian Clique in 1922; he became the first Premier of the Japanese puppet state Manchukuo in the early 1930s. As his band grew in size, Zhang sought amnesty from the government and became a militia commander in 1902. This proved to be the first of a series

²³ Wu Yuwen, "Zhang Zuolin dashi ji," in *Shenyang wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 12 (Shenyang, 1981), 1; Zhang Zhiqiang, "Zhang Zuolin jiaoshi, jiazhu ji jiakan," in *Shenyang wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 12 (Shenyang, 1981), 25-8; Miu Zhengliu, "Wo suo zhidao de Zhang dayuanshuai shiji," in *Zhuanji wenxue - meiyue zhuanti renwu zuotanhui: Zhang Zuolin*, Vol. 31, No. 4, 3; Hu Yuhai, *Fengxi zongheng* (Shenyang, 2001), 65-6.

²⁴ Zhang Zhiqiang, 33; Hu Yuhai, 70-4; Wang Tiehan, 57.

²⁵ Wang Tiehan, "Zhang Yuting (Zuolin) xiasheng de chunian," in Wang Guangdi, 57-58; Miu Zhengliu, 4.

²⁶ Hu Yuhai, 75.

of choices he made that propelled him to prominence. He was joined by Zhang Zuoxiang²⁷ and Tang Yulin,²⁸ who became the first generation of Fengtian leaders.²⁹ Zhang's willingness to form alliances ensured his subsequent success; this tendency persisted throughout his career. On the Qing's order, Zhang fought for the Japanese against Russian-sponsored *honghuzi* during the Russo-Japanese War.

The 1911 Revolution and the general breakdown of political order in China provided a golden opportunity for Zhang to rise further. After he had proven himself a competent commander in a series of bandit-suppression operations, Zhang's was promoted to the command of a battalion in 1907. On the eve of the Revolution, Zhang's battalion was stationed near Mukden, alongside New Army units led by revolutionary officers Wu Luzhen and Lan Tianwei.³⁰ When a revolutionary takeover of Mukden was imminent, the Governor General Zhao Erxun called in the garrison battalions. Zhang showed up first and thwarted the New Army's plot during the meeting between Governor Zhao and the officers from both the "old" and "new" armies. He then silenced the provincial assembly with the threat of force.³¹ After suppressing the revolutionaries, Zhang was appointed commander of the 27th Division (reorganised from the garrison battalions) when Manchuria joined the Republic.

In 1912, Zhang was only a division commander in Manchuria. It seemed unlikely that Zhang would advance as quickly in the future as he had done so far, since the Beijing Government under Yuan Shikai was determined to impose central control over Manchuria. However, political strife in Beijing again

²⁷ See Appendix I.

²⁸ See Appendix I.

²⁹ Chang Cheng, "Zhang Zuixiang shengping lueshu," Zhang Tingfan, Zhang Wenge, "Huiyi wode fuqin Zhang Zuoxiang" in *Jilin wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 7 (Changchun, 1988), 2, 13; Hu Yuhai, 77.

³⁰ However, although the garrison battalions were called the "Old Army (*Jiujun*)," their leaders, such as Zhang Zuolin, were hardly old: Zhang was only 36 years old in 1911. Hu Yuhai, 83.

³¹ It has been suggested that Zhao Erxun first summoned Wu Junsheng (1863-1928), whose battalion was closer to Mukden. However, Wu Junsheng was unwilling to enter the provincial capital because he understood that his troops were no match for those of the New Army. See Miu Zhengliu, 5; Hu Yuhai, 84; Wang Tiehan, "Zhang Yuting xiangsheng zhangwo dongsansheng junquan zhengquan de jingguo," in Wang Guangdi, 60-3. Wu later collaborated with Zhang Zuolin and suppressed the rebellion of the Mongolian princes in 1918. In 1921, he became the military governor of Heilongjiang, and held the position until his death with Zhang Zuolin in June of 1928. During Guo Songling's rebellion, he supported Zhang, although McCormack noted that he hesitated to aid Zhang during the early stage of the rebellion.

provided opportunities for Zhang. The first came during Yuan's monarchical movement. To secure Zhang's support, Yuan promoted Zhang as the military governor of Fengtian. When Yuan died in 1916, Zhang seized on the temporary confusion in the central government to expel the military governor of the Three Provinces, Yuan's appointee Duan Zhigui, by subtle threat of force. Duan was one of the senior commanders of the *Beiyang* Army loyal to Yuan Shikai since the early 1900s, but he had little control over the local military units. Zhang went unpunished, and he was actually promoted by the central government as Duan Qirui, who was controlling the government, needed Zhang's cooperation. In late 1918, Zhang's title was the Inspector General of the Eastern Three Provinces (*dongsansheng xunyueshi*). However, without the foundations of power discussed below, he might easily have ended up like Duan Zhigui.

Enlisting Elite Support

Without the support of local elites and the military, Zhang Zuolin could hardly survive as a local strong man, let alone the leader of Chinese in Manchuria. The ability to enlist the support of the local elite distinguished Zhang from other military leaders in Manchuria. Together with the military officers, these local elites formed the backbone of the so-called Fengtian Clique (*fengxi*), a political-military faction that was influential not only in Manchuria but also in China Proper during the period covered by this book.

Many of the local elite who supported Zhang were beneficiaries of the breakdown of political order since the end of the examination system in 1905. Before Zhang rose to power, his most important local allies had been Yuan Jinkai and Yu Chonghan, both natives of Fengtian.³² Yuan headed a local militia force in the early 1910s and took part in the introduction of the modern police system in the Fengtian province. Yu was educated in Japan, and became the diplomatic representative of the provincial government in 1911. When Yuan was reforming the police system, he brought with him Wang Yongjiang, another Fengtian native who later introduced numerous financial and bureaucratic reforms in Manchuria.³³ Yuan, Yu, and Wang all failed in the civil examina-

³² For Yuan Jinkai's life, see Xian Quan, "Ji Yuan Jinkai," in *Wenshi ziliaoxuanji*, Vol. 1 (Beijing, 1960), 95-105; Jin Yufu, "Yuan Jinkai biezhuan," in *Jilin Jilin wenshi ziliaoxuanji*, Vol. 4 (Jilin, 1983), 257-63. For Yu Chonghan, see Wu Fei, "Yu Chonghan qiren," in *Shenyang wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 2 (Shenyang, 1982), 43-9. Also see Tanabe Tanejirō, *Dongsansheng guanshenlu*.

³³ Jin Yufu, "Wang Yongjiang biezhuan," Wang Yanwei, "Wang Yongjiang yisheng gailue," in *Zhengxie Dalian shi jinzhou qu wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, Wang Yongjiang jinian wenji* (Dalian, 1993), 13-4, 30.

tions, and in different times they would probably have been kept away from office. The Late Qing Reform gave them another chance.

These men turned to Zhang Zuolin to wrest control of Manchuria from other political forces. Zhang Xilin, another Yuan Shikai's protégé who replaced Zhao Erxun as the governor in 1912, faithfully collaborated in Yuan's attempt to establish central control through bureaucratic and land tax reforms.³⁴ The KMT had a beachhead in the provincial assembly; radical revolutionaries such as Chen Qimei advocated military takeover.³⁵ The Mongol princes and Manchu loyalists turned to the Japanese army, which was involved in the coups of 1913 and 1915. There were Anhui, Hubei (President Li Yuanhong's supporters), and Fujian cliques in the officialdom of Fengtian province during the first years of the Republic.³⁶ The Anfu Clique, who controlled the central government after 1916, also tried to install their men in important positions.³⁷ In 1919, of the 949 officials in the Fengtian province, only 376 came from the same province. In short, more than half of the officials in Manchuria were from other provinces. It was the case because Xu Shichang (a Zhejiang native) favoured southerners when he was in charge of the province during the Late Qing Reform.³⁸

Feeling besieged, Zhang and the provincial elite led by Yuan Jinkai³⁹ quickly formed an alliance against the central government's orders and appointments.⁴⁰ Like their counterparts in other parts of China at that time, the

34 Sai Höten sōryōji Ochiai Kentarō, "Höten kankai no kinjō nikansuru ken," 27/12/1912, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050177100, slides 269-70; Sai Höten sōryōji Ochiai Kentarō, "Hötenshō shin kansei ni dai suru ninkan nikansuru ken," 1/2/1913, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050177200, slides 295-6.

35 Sai Höten sōryōji Ochiai Kentarō, "Saikin Hötenshō ni o kuru bunbo daikan kyū kakushu giin ni shimei tō chōsa," 26/3/1913, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050177300, slide 342; "Chin Kibi (Chen Qimi) to no inbō ni kan suru Kin Jusan (Jin Shoushan) kyōjutsu," 5/5/1914, GK, JACAR, Bo3050178400, slide 313.

36 Kantō totokufu rikugun sambōbu, "toku dai 1 gō," 9/12/1916, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050179600, slide 151; Höten mantetsu kōsho, "Höten kanjō ni okuru Fukukenbatsu to honshōha," 17/12/1914, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050179600, slide 157.

37 Nihon kōshikan fu bukan, "shi gokuhi dai 28 gō," 17/8/1917, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050182200, slide 333; Fukazawa rōji dairi, "dai 57 gō," 22/10/1917, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050182400, slide 392; Höten mantetsu kōsho, "Chō tokugun (military governor Zhang) nyū Shin (Tianjin) go ni o kuru Höten kankai no genjō," 24/8/1918, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050184000, slide 24.

38 Mantetsu Ryūkyō riji kyokuchō, "Hötenshō shusshin kanri no gensei," 16/1/1919, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050184200, slides 129-30.

39 For a biography of Yuan, see Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, 37.

40 Höten mantetsu kōsho, "Shinnin minseichō no hyōban," 3/11/1913, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050178000, slides 58-59; Kantō totokufu rikugun sambōbu, "chō dai 466 gō," 6/11/1913, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050178000, slide 71; Sai Höten sōryōji Ochiai Kentarō, "Hötenshō

northeast elite formed “political parties”—groups to protect their position and influence, rather than political parties, in the modern sense. In 1912, Yuan, Yu, and Sun Baihu,⁴¹ the future head of the Fengtian Chamber of Commerce, formed the “Democratic Party” (*minzhudang*). According to Japanese intelligence, this party consisted mainly of “local elites who were powerful before the Republic” and ex-officials.⁴² With the cooperation of the local elite, Zhang was able to manipulate the anti-tax protests to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the central government as well as the local civil authority.⁴³ Yuan Jinkai, who had considerable influence in the provincial assembly of Fengtian, discussed with Zhang to expel Duan Zhigui in 1916. Yu Chonghan helped Zhang to solicit Japanese acceptance using his Japanese network established when he was a Chinese language instructor teaching Japanese officers.⁴⁴ After Zhang rose to power, he was aided by the bureaucrats who were already serving in Manchuria such as Mo Dehui, Liu Shangqing, and members of civilian elites such as Bai Yongzheng, who was deeply involved in the *daodehui* in Manchuria and would head the Fengtian Provincial Assembly during the 1920s.⁴⁵ However, consistent with his habit of widening participation and seeking allies, when Zhang’s position in Manchuria was secured, he welcomed talented men from the rest of the nation. In 1924, one third of the officials and officers appearing in *Dongsansheng guanshenlu* (The Who’s Who in Manchuria’s Officialdom and Public Circle) still came from other parts of China, particularly Shandong and Zhili.⁴⁶

Zhang’s rule could not exist without collaboration with civilian bureaucrats, but he also needed (at least notionally) the consent of an institutionalized body to secure his position. The provincial assemblies were revived by Zhang in 1918 to serve this purpose. They did not bring about general political parti-

sakkō no seikai jōkei hōkoku, 13/11/1913, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050178000, slides 85-8; Hōten mantetsu kōsho, “Hōten seikai dōyō no chōkō,” 7/5/1914, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050178400, slides 304-6; Hōten mantetsu kōsho, “Hōten kanjō ni okuru Fukukenbatsu to honshōha,” 17/12/1914, op. cit, slide 157; Akatsuka sōryōji, “dai 94 gō,” 2/4/1917, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050181900, slide 143.

⁴¹ See Appendix 1.

⁴² “Hōten ni okeru Shina seitō kesa tō ni seki suru chōsa sho shintatsu no ken,” c. 1912, GK, JACAR, Bo3050706600, slide 113.

⁴³ Hans van de Ven, “Public Finance and the Rise of Warlordism,” 849-868.

⁴⁴ Wu Fei, “Yu Chonghan qiren,” 43-4.

⁴⁵ Bai was also an educationist and the author of the *Fengtian tongzhi*. See “Bai Yongzheng,” in Gao Wen, *Liaoning wenshi renwu lu* (Shenyang, 1993), 387. Mo was a Manchu whose ancestors first settled in the Northwest with the Qing forces before moving voluntarily into Manchuria. See “Mo Dehui,” in *Shenyang wenshi ziliao* (Shenyang, 1994), 128.

⁴⁶ See Tanabe Tanejirō, *Dongsansheng guanshenlu* (Dairen, 1924).

pation, but they allowed bureaucratic, commercial, and educational interests to be represented and consulted by the authorities. As Azar Gat pointed out when discussing Britain's success in the wars since the 18th century, the elite's identification of their interest with that of the state was an important factor.⁴⁷ Despite its limited power, the population participated in these assemblies because this could advance the status and economic interest of the elected and also provided opportunities to construct networks and to receive bribes, favors, and government posts.⁴⁸ As the Japanese pointed out, not without prejudice, the elections were full of bribery that was "characteristic" of Chinese elections. Nevertheless they were institutionalized and their regulations were elaborate. In 1927, over 800,000 people in Fengtian were eligible to vote for the members of the provincial assembly, electing 64 members out of 1,280 candidates⁴⁹ The overwhelming majority of the elected had received formal education. Even a Chinese county within the Kwantung Leased Territory asked to be allowed to join the assembly's election.⁵⁰

The chambers of commerce that emerged during the Late Qing reform were equally important for Zhang Zuolin. Ronald Suleski pointed out that they were "treated by local authorities as if they had semi-official status within the government."⁵¹ The chambers had to monitor the business environment, sponsor commerce and industry, and sometimes were responsible for collecting and transporting supplies for the Fengtian Army. Zhang also levied tax and supplies from the chambers in wartime. The business community cooperated with Zhang not only because he could protect the Chinese position in Manchuria, but also because the leading businessmen in Manchuria came

47 Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford, 2006), 489-490.

48 Hōten kōshochō, "Hōten jōhō dai 102gō," 5/9/1927, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo2031766600, slides 204-5.

49 After the first round of elections, those entering the second round would vote for one another in order to get the final desired result. For example, in the voting area consisting of Hailong, Niuhe, Huinan, and Jinchuan counties, 25,714 out of 29,964 votes were counted. And of the 40 men who entered the second round of the elections, two were finally elected to join the provincial assembly. The very high voting rate was probably the result of the mobilization of the local elites. Hōten kōshochō, "Hōten jōhō dai 102gō," 5/9/1927, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo2031766600, slides 201-4; Sai Kairyu bunkan shunin Saka, "Shō giin no yosen hei ni fukusen jōho nikansuru ken," 10/10/1927, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo2031766600, slide 213.

50 Hōten kōshochō, "Hōten jōhō dai 128 gō," 4/11/1927, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo2031766600, slide 218.

51 Ronald Suleski, *Civil Government in Warlord China: Tradition, Modernization and Manchuria* (New York, 2001), 114.

from the same social group as those forming the bureaucracy and the provincial assembly.⁵² The *Dongsansheng guanshenlu* shows that many of the members of the chambers of commerce were local (or Northern Chinese) elite who turned to business after the Qing abolished the Civil Service Examination.⁵³ This was a national phenomenon.⁵⁴ Wang Yongjiang and Lu Zongchao (who served as the director of Fengtian Chamber of Commerce in 1920-4) came from local business families; Zhang Zhiliang, the director from 1924-7, was an ex-official.

At the local level, Zhang Zuolin introduced the “meeting of local elders (*xianglao huiyi*)” as a local consultation body.⁵⁵ This was implemented throughout the Three Provinces and briefly in Shandong. For instance, when Shandong was under the control of *Anguojun* in August, 1927, Zhang Zongchang organized one such meeting in Jinan to ascertain the situation of the countryside. The selected “elders” voted with secret ballots and met Zhang personally to comment on various issues in their locale from the conduct of the officials and garrisons to infrastructure and education.⁵⁶

Tension existed, however, between civilian-commercial interests and Zhang’s political and strategic design, especially during the latter half of his rule in Manchuria. Support for Zhang dwindled when his war in China Proper did not match the immediate interests of the civilian elite and brought about the fall of the value of *fengpiao* after 1925. Wang Yongjiang’s fallout with Zhang in 1926 (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) was an expression of this declining support. Still, Zhang continued to exert authority over public organs until his final days. For example, with official sanction, the Fengtian Chamber of

⁵² Ibid., 115.

⁵³ Many entries started with “*zhizhong dushu, houxi shangye* (Studied since a child, but picked up business later)” or “*qigeng congshang* (Abandoned “farming” and turn to business).”

⁵⁴ Zeng Zhongkai, “Manqing keju feiqu hou chuantong shiren de dongxiang,” unpublished MPhil Thesis, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, 93-4.

⁵⁵ Wei Fuxiang, “Zhang Zuolin yu dongsansheng xianglao huiyi,” in *Dongbei difangshi yanjiu* (1992), Vols. 2, 117-23.

⁵⁶ Specifically, they had to comment on: 1) conduct of officials, 2) stationing regular units, 3) garrisons, 4) mines, 5) conduct of local elites, 6) extent of gambling and prostitution, 7) severity of taxation, 8) effectiveness of river dredging, 9) roads, 10) security, 11) conduct of police, 12) condition of education, 13) forestry, 14) gang activities, 15) opium trade, 16) conduct of the local governments’ staff, 17) irrigation, 18) salt, 19) paper currency, 20) militancy of the population, 21) brigands, 22) heritage, 23) communist activities, 24) fishery. See Sai Haku san gaimo shoki shō Sasaki Takayoshi, “San tō senshō kyōrō kaigi nikansuru ken,” 13/8/1927, Gaimushō kiroku, Shina chihō seihō kankei zassan/ hoku Shi seihō (GK, SCCKZ/ HS), Vol. 1, No. 3, Bo2031819900, JACAR, slides 31-7.

Commerce led the anti-Japanese protest in the fall of 1927 to disrupt the Japanese attempt to force Zhang to accept their terms during the railway negotiation.

From the Fengtian Clique to Anguojun: Zhang's Military Supporters

In addition to the civilians, Zhang was served by a group of professional officers who played the predominant role in the Fengtian Clique. McCormack pointed out that Zhang's ability in maintaining the loyalty of this group explained his wider success.⁵⁷ Ch'i Hsi-sheng argued that the Fengtian Clique was more cohesive because the personal bond between Zhang and his principle subordinates was strong.⁵⁸ While this is true, Ch'i overlooked Zhang's relationship with the civilians such as Wang Yongjiang, who also played an important role in the Clique's decision-making, and with the second and third generations of Fengtian commanders who were personally less close to Zhang. Personal ties with Zhang and his sons, self-interest, or regional bonds are insufficient explanations for the cohesion of the Clique. Unlike the outspoken (and consequently better-known) personalities such as Guo Songling and Wang Yongjiang, many of the Fengtian officers and bureaucrats were "silent modernizers" who believed that they were contributing to both Manchuria and China. Patriotism and awareness of the vulnerability of Manchuria were not lacking among the new generation of Fengtian soldiers. For instance, the Japanese considered Yu Zhen,⁵⁹ one of the corps commanders during the Northern Expedition, as an "extreme patriot."⁶⁰ This also explained why this new generation of officers such as Han Linchun⁶¹ were so enthusiastic in developing the Mukden Arsenal rather than relying on imported arms from Japan. To prevent the Fengtian Army from becoming dependent on Japan, Han Linchun, who at one time became the head of the Arsenal and later commanded an army from 1925 to 1928, invented the 7.92mm Year-13 Rifle (*shisan-nian-shi buqiang*) to replace the 6.5mm Japanese rifles used in the Fengtian Army.⁶² Regional bonds became less important after Zhang had complete control of Manchuria, when he became more willing to use men from other parts of China. For example,

57 Gavan McCormack, 251.

58 Ch'i Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China*, 71, 75-6.

59 See Appendix 1.

60 Sai Höten sōryōji Funatsu, "Höten senshō keimushochō Yu Chin no Shanghai keisatsuchōchō nimmei nikansuru ken," 25/9/1925, GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050060000, slide 138.

61 See Appendix 1.

62 Hu Yuhai, Zhang Wei (eds.), *Fengxi junfa renwu*, 163; Hao Bingrang, *Fengxi junshi*, 155.

generals He Zhuguo⁶³ and Ji Yiqiao⁶⁴ were from Guangxi and Hubei. Zheng Qian, Zhang's trusted advisor, was from Jiangsu. The high level of bureaucratization in the army, represented by its elaborate administration and logistics branches discussed below, also enhanced cohesion.

The first generation of Fengtian officers was a closely-knit group of militia commanders who had fought together before 1911 and shared the same goal of unifying the Three Provinces and establishing a “*dongbei* for the *dongbeiren*” (Manchuria for those in Manchuria).⁶⁵ After Zhang unified Manchuria, a new generation of Fengtian officers was brought in to modernize the army. The origin of these officers was not confined to Manchuria. All of them received formal military training, some abroad; a shared educational background was their prime source of cohesion. This new generation of officers even started a professional military journal in 1922 (named *Sprit Monthly, jingshen yuekan*) to discuss the military affairs among themselves, or to publish translated Japanese military works and manuals.⁶⁶ Yang Yuting, a *Shikan Gakkō* graduate, became Zhang's right-hand man. A Fengtian native, Yang was a licentiate (*xiucai*) when he went to Japan. He first served as a junior military bureaucrat in the Mukden Arsenal, then became Zhang's Chief-of-Staff and the head of the Arsenal. He brought with him other *Shikan* graduates such as Han Linchun, Jiang Dengxun, Yu Zhen, He Zhuguo, and Ji Yiqiao. All served as senior commanders during the war between 1925 and 1928—some were still active until 1949. After the defeat during the First Zhili-Fengtian War in 1922, the leaders of the first generation withdrew from the scene and were replaced by these *Shikan* graduates, Zhang Xueliang, and his close associate and mentor Guo Songling, who graduated from the Staff College of Beijing.⁶⁷

Zhang Zuolin and the elders trusted these officers, but the officers themselves were divided between the “Staff College Clique” led by Guo Songling and the “*Shikan* Clique” led by Yang Yuting.⁶⁸ Besides personal animosity and conflict of interest, they differed over the strategic direction of the Clique. Whereas the *Shikan* Clique favoured active intervention in Chinese politics, Guo opposed any military venture within the Pass after 1924 when he was given no

⁶³ See Appendix 1.

⁶⁴ See Appendix 1.

⁶⁵ Zhang Zhongfu, “Beiyang shiqi fengxi lingdao jieceng de bianhua,” in *Zhongyang yanjiu yuan guoji hanxue huiyi lunwenji* (Taibei, 1982), 1547–9.

⁶⁶ Kwong Chi Man, “Introduction of Modern Military Science in Republican China: Northeast Journal of Military Studies of the Fengtian Army as Example,” presented during the 2015 Annual Conference of the Chinese Military History Society.

⁶⁷ Zhang Zhongfu, “Beiyang shiqi fengxi lingdao jieceng de bianhua,” 1559–63.

⁶⁸ Hu Yuhai, 129–30, 132–4.

posts in China Proper. After Guo's rebellion in November of 1925, the Japanese graduates dominated the Fengtian Clique and side-lined Zhang Xueliang. He and his followers would dominate Manchurian politics only after they had Yang Yuting and Chang Yinhuai executed in 1929.⁶⁹

After the formation of the *Anguojun* in November, 1926, Zhang Zuolin had two major allies in China Proper. The first one was Zhang Zongchang, originally one of his brigadiers who eventually rose to become the military governor of Shandong. Although Zhang Zongchang was nominally the leader of a separate army (the Zhili-Shandong Army, *zhi-lu lianjun*), he still saw himself as a subordinate of Zhang Zuolin and was obedient to him until the end. The power-relationship between Zhang and his major ally during the Northern Expedition, Sun Chuanfang, was more complex. Sun rose to power as the commander of the 2nd Division of the Beiyang Army and was long seen as a major Zhili warlord in Central China (detail of his army see Chapter 4). When he joined the *Anguojun*, he coordinated his actions with the Fengtian forces and his army was provisioned and supplied by the Fengtian Clique after being driven out of Jiangsu and Zhejiang in early 1927. As Sun's forces lacked any independent source of revenue, he had to place himself and his army under the control of the Fengtian Clique. However, he would not hesitate in taking unilateral actions when deemed opportune; for example, he pressed on to attack Nanjing after defeating the NRA near Xuzhou in August, 1927, ignoring the advice from Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique (see Chapter 3 and 4).

Decision-making Mechanism of the Fengtian Clique

As Zhang was in control of a political-military faction consisting members from very different backgrounds, the decision-making mechanism of the Fengtian Clique deserves some attention. Before discussing it, however, one has to clarify the structure of the government of the Eastern Three Provinces from September of 1918 to June of 1928. From 1918 to 1922, Zhang Zuolin was the Inspector General of the Eastern Three Provinces. During this period, the Inspector General was the civil and military head of the provinces of Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang (Rehe was incorporated after the Second Zhili-Fengtian War). He was aided by a Chief-of-Staff of the Inspector General Headquarters (Yang Yuting first served in this post) and his staff. Zhang was also concurrently the civil (*shengzhang*) and military governor (*dujun*) of the Fengtian province, thus controlling the bureaucracy and the military of the province.⁷⁰ After the

69 Nishimura Nario, "Nihon seifu no chūka minkoku ninshiki to Chō Gakuryō seiken," in Yamamoto Yūzō, *Manshūkoku no kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1995), 12-20.

70 Hao Bingrang, *Fengxi junshi*, 21-2.

defeat against the Zhili Clique in May of 1922, Zhang openly broke away from the Beijing Government and established the Eastern Three Provinces Defense Headquarters (*dongsansheng baoan silingbu*). This headquarters streamlined the command of the Fengtian military by merging the headquarters of the Inspector General of the Eastern Three Provinces and the Fengtian Military Governor. Zhang became the Commander-in-Chief of the new organization, with Yang Yuting serving as his Chief of Staff and Zheng Qian serving as the head of the secretariat. The military governors of Jilin and Heilongjiang became the deputy commanders-in-chief, but their role was limited.⁷¹

With the establishment of the Eastern Three Provinces Defense Headquarters, the civilian governorship of the Fengtian province was given to Wang Yongjiang, previously the treasurer of the provincial government. Civilian governors were also appointed in Jilin and Heilongjiang, to prevent power being too concentrated in the hands of the military governors of the two provinces. Although the civilian governors held the influential position of managing the treasury of the provinces, they had little power over Zhang Zuolin, who was in theory their superior officer as the C-in-C of the Defense Headquarters, and they were appointed by the military governors and Zhang himself. Nonetheless, it did not mean that they were simply the rubber stampers of the militarists. As Chapter 3 discusses in detail, the Fengtian civilian governor, Wang Yongjiang, resisted Zhang's decision to continue the war in China and eventually resigned. The military of the three provinces was now under the control of the Military Reorganization Bureau of the Eastern Three Provinces (*dongsansheng lujun zhenglichu*), headed by the young officers named above, such as Guo Songling, Han Linchun, and Jiang Dengxun.⁷² This civil-military arrangement was largely unchanged until November of 1926, when the *Anguojun* was established.

The composition and function of the *Anguojun* headquarters was essentially the same as the Eastern Three Provinces Defense Headquarters, with the main exception that it moved to Beijing from Mukden. Some attempts were made to incorporate some non-Fengtian armies in Northern China under the command of the *Anguojun* headquarters. In June of 1927, when Zhang became the Generalissimo of the Chinese Republic (*Zhonghua minguo hailujun dayuanshuai*), the *Anguojun* headquarters was restructured to become the Generalissimo Government (*Dayuanshuaifu*). It was a highly centralized government that consisted of a Premier, a Foreign Minister, a Minister of War, and heads of internal affairs, finance, justice, education, commerce, industry,

⁷¹ Hao Bingrang, 34-5.

⁷² Later renamed as Military Training Bureau of the Eastern Three Provinces (*Dongsansheng lujun xunlianchu*).

agriculture, and communication. The Eastern Three Provinces Defense Headquarters was expanded to become the Generalissimo Headquarters, which controlled the operations of the *Anguojun* and was under the de facto control of Yang Yuting, the Chief-of-Staff of the Generalissimo Headquarters. The Ministry of War (*junshibu*) controlled the administration of the army, navy, and the small air force.⁷³

Although the provincial assemblies were powerless, opinion and advice could move upward through the civilian and military advisors who were involved in the decision-making process. From the chronological biography (*nianpu*) of Zhang Xueliang, the son of Zhang Zuolin who served as the nominal head of the Fengtian field army, the decision-making of the Fengtian Clique was mainly done in the conferences participated in by military and civilian heads; many of these conferences were held during the Northern Expedition, mostly in Beijing after the formation of the *Anguojun* headquarters. Participants of these conferences usually included Zhang Zuolin himself, his son Zhang Xueliang, Yang Yuting, Yu Guohan,⁷⁴ Zhang Zuoxiang (Military Governor of Jilin), Wu Junsheng (Military Governor of Heilongjiang), Wang Yongjiang (the Civilian Governor of Fengtian, and his successor), Sun Chuanfang, and Zhang Zongchang (the last two after the formation of the *Anguojun*).⁷⁵ Zhao Zhongfu described this system as a “military-led oligopoly.”⁷⁶ It was a potentially dangerous arrangement, as its effectiveness depended largely on its leader’s openness to advice, his ability to maintain the group’s cohesion, and loyalty of his principle subordinates. Moreover, as Zhang’s scope extended outside China, he had to take into consideration the opinion of his allies in China Proper (most importantly Sun Chuanfang) at the expense of the opinion of civilian officials and the Fengtian provincial assembly. The resignation of Wang Yongjiang in early 1926 (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) was the best example of the withdrawal of the Fengtian civilian officials from the decision-making process of the Fengtian Clique. The Fengtian decision-making mechanism was also prone to the problem of “groupthink” because preservation of the Clique’s cohesion was often deemed as important as allowing different opinion.⁷⁷

73 Hao Bingrang, *Fengxi junshi*, 61-2.

74 See Appendix I.

75 Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), *Zhang Xueliang nianpu* (Beijing, 2009).

76 Zhao Zhongfu, “Beiyang shiqi fengxi lingdao jieceng de bianhua,” 1543.

77 As Richard Hamilton points out, one of the important causes for the failure to evaluate the war plans critically before the First World War was the problem of groupthink. See Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, *War Planning 1914* (Cambridge, 2010), 18. On the other hand, over sensitivities on the problem of groupthink could lead to slow decision-making, sometimes even deadlocks.

Whereas Zhang was able to accept different opinion, his son was not so open. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, after Zhang Xueliang had Yang Yuting executed because he held a different opinion on the Clique's strategic direction, effective group decision-making ceased to exist.

Chinese biographies on Zhang Zuolin tended to portray him as an indecisive man who was easily influenced by others, especially when trying to explain his fateful decision to resist the KMT between 1926 and 1928.⁷⁸ Zhang delegated much power to his subordinates, but he could have the final say when he wanted it. Sometimes, this point was exploited by his subordinates, especially Yang Yuting, to pursue different goals. For example, in a telegram urging Zhang Xueliang to end the war against Feng Yuxiang quickly in May, 1926, Yang Yuting suggested, "If the war drags on, the Old Marshal (Zhang) may change his mind and complicate the affair..."⁷⁹ When Zhang Xueliang urged his father to play a greater role in the settlement of the central government, Yang again replied for him, "Since the Marshal had a firm conviction on that matter, I am afraid that further advice is unnecessary."⁸⁰ Even Zhang Zongchang, another man who allegedly exerted great influence on him in 1925-1928, could not go against Zhang Zuolin's will, as the latter once threatened to retreat back to Manchuria if his command was not carried out.⁸¹ After all, he had the final word on the most important diplomatic affairs; he personally handled the secret agreements with the Japanese during Guo Songling's rebellion and the negotiations thereafter.⁸²

Military and Economic Build Up and Their Consequences

To support a state governing a vast area, a sizeable and modern military force and a steady stream of income for the government were necessary. As Hans van de Ven pointed out, public finance was a key factor in republican politics. Zhang's control of public finance contributed much to his success as a political and military leader.⁸³ By skillfully manipulating local resistance to Beijing's land tax reforms, Zhang established firm control over public security as well as over a substantial part of public finance. Such control was augmented by the fiscal reforms directed by Wang Yongjiang after 1917 that accumulated in the

⁷⁸ Wang Guangdi, "Zhang laoshuai yu Zhang xiaoshuai," in Wang Guangdi, 39; Hu Yupei, 91-2, 133.

⁷⁹ "Yang Yuting fu Zhang Xueliang diangao," 11/5/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 21.

⁸⁰ "Yang Yuting fu Zhang Xueliang diangao," 10/5/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 73.

⁸¹ "Zhang Zuolin zhi Zhang Zongchang diangao," 22/5/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 22.

⁸² Luo Jinghuan, "Ri-Feng miyue," in Zhang Bofeng, Li Zhongyi (eds.), *Beiyang junfa, 1912-1928* (Wuhan, 1990), 503-4.

⁸³ Hans van de Ven, "Public Finance and the Rise of Warlordism," 849-68.

formation of Eastern Three Provinces State Bank (*dongsansheng guanyinhao*) in 1924.⁸⁴ The reorganised State Bank was at the same time the central bank, the treasury of the Eastern Three Provinces, and the Fengtian Clique's private coffer.⁸⁵ Through its spin-off businesses and money printing, the State Bank extended control over Manchuria's commodity trade. This also contributed to the overlapping of the business and bureaucratic elites.⁸⁶ The multi-role State Bank allowed the Fengtian Clique to exert greater control over the Manchurian economy and to tap its revenue to build up the Fengtian Army. The Fengtian Clique even had enough resources to continue the Qing's project of modernizing the Three Provinces' educational system.⁸⁷ This act augmented his legitimacy as the political leader.

Throughout the 1920s, the Fengtian authority engaged in railway construction, with the ultimate goal of building a Chinese railway network that linked different parts of Manchuria with China. In 1924, the Transport Committee of the Eastern Three Provinces (*dongsansheng jiaotong weiyuanhui*), chaired by Wang Yongjiang, was established.⁸⁸ Although the Chinese railways built during this period had little economic value, they were strategically important because they freed the Chinese from relying on the South Manchuria Railway when moving troops by rail.

The Fengtian Army and the police force in Manchuria were the backbones of the Fengtian Clique's power.⁸⁹ In one decade, the army changed from being

84 The new State Bank was a conglomeration of the old State Bank (*guanyinhao*), the Eastern Three Provinces Bank (*dongsansheng yinhang*), and Zhang's Fengtian Development Bank (*Fengtian xingye yinhang*). Yang Naikun, Cao Yanxiong, *Jindai dongbei jingji wenti yanjiu 1916-1945* (Shenyang, 2005), 78.

85 Kantōchō zaimubu (Treasury of the Government of the Kwantung Leased Territory, "Tosanshō kangingō ron (Study of the State Bank of the Eastern Three Provinces)," 1929, in *Kokuritsu kōbunsho kan* (KK), JACAR, Ao6033520200, 142-5.

86 For a detailed study, see Kong Jingwei, Fu Xiaofeng, *Fengxi junfa guanliao ziben* (Changchun, 1989).

87 For a discussion on the lack of advancement in education in modern Thailand between 1890 and 1920, see Bruce Reynolds, *Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945* (New York, 1994), 3. The Fengtian Clique increased the number of schools in the Three Provinces to 10,404 (including 4 universities, 271 high schools, and 10,101 elementary schools), not including military academies, between the 1910s and 1931. Guo Jianping, 298.

88 Mizuno Akira, Zheng Liangsheng (tr.), 160.

89 As General He Zhuguo pointed out, the "Fengtian Army" (Fengjun) should be named the "Northeast Army" (dongbeijun) because it was centrally controlled by Zhang Zuolin and his staff; it was called the Fengtian Army only because the people were accustomed to call it the Fengtian Army. See He Zhuguo, "Dongbeijun duikang beifa de bufen shifang," (1955), unpublished manuscript.

three divisions of second-line militiamen into a modernized force of over 200,000 men. To bring the Fengtian Army under centralized command and administration, in 1916 Zhang Zuolin organized his headquarters to consist of staff, logistics, judicial, and medical departments. It was staffed by professionally trained officers such as Yang Yuting. The power of Zhang's headquarters was later extended to Jilin and Heilongjiang when Zhang became the military governor of the Three Provinces. A centralized logistics system for the armies of the Three Provinces (known as the Fengtian Army together) was introduced in 1922. The Army even set up its own rationing and canned food factory (*Fengtian liangmochang*) that processed foodstuffs collected in each county.⁹⁰ The use of the railway in military transport was crude before 1922, but it was much improved by 1924 because of the formation of a centralized logistics command that controlled railway transport and the depots (*bingzhan*).⁹¹ Whereas the Zhili Army lacked supplies during the Battle of Shanhaiguan in 1924, the Fengtian Army received a continuous stream of supplies and reinforcements by rail. From 1922 the Fengtian Clique also built up a Chinese radio network, ending the Chinese reliance on the Japanese radio network in Manchuria.⁹²

The Fengtian Clique also established the Mukden Arsenal, capable of making small arms and mortars and imported extensively from outside sources.⁹³ According to the Japanese, in September of 1924 the Arsenal was able to produce "5 to 6 pieces of mountain guns of German design in a month and 25 Mauser rifles, 50,000 rounds of Arisaka rifle, 35,000 rounds of Mauser rifle (the 7.92mm Type-13 Rifle designed by Han Linchun mentioned above), and 80

90 Hao Bingrang, *Fengxijunshi*, 14-18; Wen Zhiqian, "Fengtian lujun liangmochang shilue," in *Liaoning wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 12, 45-7; Wen Zhiqian, "Fengtian lujun liangmochang shilue," 47-50; Hao Bingrang, 140, 148-50. Unique in China, the Fengtian army produced its own logisticians trained by officers who had studied in Japan. Between 1923 and 1927, 443 men were admitted to the Logistics School, some were serving officers, others graduates of middle schools. See Wen Zhiqian, "Fengtian junxu jiaoyu qinghuang jianyi," in *Liaoning wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 14, 52-3. The details of the running of the food factory will be discussed in the next chapter.

91 Hao Bingrang, *Fengxijunshi*, 138-9.

92 Wang Jiazhou, "Zhang Zuolin jianli dongbei wuxiandian wang," in *Liaoning wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 22, 109-10.

93 In a report to the Japanese General Staff, of the 26 cases of major arms deals and smuggling between January of 1922 and October of 1923, 16 went to Fengtian. Zhang traded extensively with foreign arms dealers, including the Americans, Russians, Japanese, French, Danes, Dutch, and Scandinavians. See Anthony B. Chan, 72-92; Lai Xinxia, *Beiyang Junfa shi*, 699; Sai Höten sōryōji Funatsu, "Tōsanshō heikōshō no heiki seisō nōryoku nikansuru ken," 19/9/1924, GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050757300, slide 519.

rounds of shells per day.⁹⁴ The production of small arms rounds increased dramatically in the next few years; by 1925, the Arsenal was able to produce 9,000,000 rounds per month, close to the number produced in all the arsenals in Japan during the Russo-Japanese War.⁹⁵ By March, 1928, the Arsenal could produce 200 guns per year (including 37mm infantry guns, 75mm field guns, 77mm cannon, 105mm cannon, and 150mm howitzers). At that time, only Year 13 rifle ammunitions were made in the Arsenal, showing the decreasing reliance on Japanese arms.⁹⁶ Between 1924 and early 1928, Mukden produced over 1,100 8cm mortars and 65 150mm heavy mortars for the entire *Anguojun*; no other armies in China owned such weapons.⁹⁷ Besides quantity, the quality and variety of the products of the Arsenal also surpassed other arsenals in China. For example, the rifle designed by Han was more accurate, durable, and had greater firepower than the 6.5mm rifles produced in the Hanyang Arsenal.⁹⁸ In early 1928, the Arsenal had finished a prototype of a new automatic rifle, following the mechanism of the German Luger automatic rifle.⁹⁹

Long before the Whampoa Military Academy was producing officers with three to four months training, the Military Academy of the Eastern Three Provinces (*dongsansheng lujun jiangwutang*) offered one year training to junior officers after 1919. From 1919 to 1930, 7,971 officers graduated.¹⁰⁰ They formed the backbone of the officer corps of the Fengtian Army and later the *Anguojun*. While the *jiangwutang* graduates filled the lower end of the officer corps, graduates of the Baoding Military Academy occupied the higher levels (discussed in Chapter 4 in detail). Baoding graduates also formed an important part of the instructional staff of the *jiangwutang*.¹⁰¹ The promotion and assessment of officers was based on examination or merit.

94 Sai Hōten sōryōji Funatsu, "Tōsanshō heikōshō no heiki seizō nōryoku nikansuru ken," 19/9/1924, GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050757300.

95 Nagoya Ko, "Manshu ni okeru heikōshō to sono keifu: Tōsanshō heikōshō to kabushiki-gaisha Hōten zōhensho," in *Gendai shakai bunka kenkyū*, Vol. 40 (Dec. 2007), 191.

96 "The Mukden Arsenal," 3/1928, USMI, Reel 6, slides 449-50.

97 "The Mukden Trench Mortar Arsenal," 5/1928, USMI, Reel 6, slide 445.

98 Hao Bingrang, *Fengxi junshi*, 155. As Wen Gongzhi, a contemporary, had noted, by the early 1920s that the rifles produced by the Hanyang Arsenal were considered as of "poor quality." See Chen Tsunkung, *The China Arms Embargo, 1919-1929* (Taipei, 1983), 176.

99 "The Mukden Arsenal," 3/1928, USMI, Reel 6, slide 450.

100 Li Chuanxi, "Dongbei jiangwutang," in *Liaoning wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 6 (Shenyang, 1981), 73-75.

101 108 Baoding graduates were instructors at the Military Academy of the Eastern Three Provinces.

To ensure local security and a steady supply of soldiers, the *baojia* system was introduced. In 1923, Yu Zhen categorized the counties in Fengtian into four grades, each having *baojia* troops of 160 to 420 men.¹⁰² This could not match the conscription system adopted by the Europeans during the First World War, but it sufficed between 1924 and 1928. For example, when the *Anguojun* high command requested 5,000 recruits in June of 1927, each *xian* from the provinces provided around 50 men. They were then grouped into reserve units.¹⁰³ Troops were also recruited from Northern China, particularly from Zhili and Shandong.¹⁰⁴

In late 1924, the Three Provinces had 32 reasonably-well equipped infantry and cavalry brigades, together with 4 independent artillery regiments and supporting units, totalling 170,000 men.¹⁰⁵ Zhang and the Fengtian Clique's complete control of the police force and the *baojia* system freed him from the task of internal security that troubled the regular army of the Zhili Clique between 1920 and 1924.¹⁰⁶ The army and the police force secured the Chinese position in Manchuria by acting as a deterrent to Japan and the Soviet Union. Hardly surprising, Manchuria was lost after the Fengtian Army was weakened by the disarmament in 1928-9, the war against the Russians in 1929, and participation in the War of the Central Plain in 1930.

The success of building up financial and military strengths was not without a price. It was at the expense of further tying up Manchuria's economy with that of Japan, since one of the state's major sources of revenue was the commodity trade between Manchuria, Japan, and the industrialized countries. Among the regular income of Fengtian Province, the Combined Tax (*tongjuan*), consisting of the taxes on various products, was the largest share of the province's revenue. One third of the Combined Tax was taxation on the production of soybeans (See Table 2.1). Much of the land tax was also collected from soybean fields. Military build-up sucked up money and resources that could have been used for industrial and infrastructural reinvestments that might have enhanced the economic autonomy of Manchuria. For example, the plan to

¹⁰² Kantōchō keimu kyoku, "Taishō jū-ni nen dai ichi junpō," 12/11/1923, GK, JACAR, B030 41584800, slide 51.

¹⁰³ SR, 11/6/1927.

¹⁰⁴ Hao Bingrang, 91, 96.

¹⁰⁵ Ding Wenjiang, *Minguo junshi jinji* (1926) (Beijing, 2007). 27-30.

¹⁰⁶ During a large part of 1920 and 1924 some of the best troops of the Zhili Clique, including Wu Peifu's own 3rd Division and the 14th and 24th Divisions, were used to secure the rural areas of Henan. The absence of these formations during the Second Zhili-Fengtian War in 1924 led to a rapid destabilization of Henan, and Wu's defeat turned the province into one of the most chaotic regions in China well into the 1930s.

TABLE 2.1 *Breakdown of the regular income of the Fengtian Province, 1923*

Land Tax	3,995,207
Combined Tax (the following items)	
Manufacturing Tax	748,921
Soybean Tax	2,075,295 (became 3,294,266 in 1925)
Salt Sales Tax	1,912,080
Forest Tax	925,000
Silk Tax	480,098
China-Korea Trade Tax (Zhongjiang Tax)	4,584
Weeds Tax	2,733
Boats Tax	15,598
Fish Tax	16,959
Others	47,461
Combined Tax Total:	(6,237,762)
Miscellaneous Tax (such as deeds, wine, mines, and others)	4,895,356
Income of Official Business	234,273
Other Income (including the surtax on the Combined Tax)	3,179,071
Total	13,646,313 (10,108,380)

Note: in *fengpiao yuan*, the exchange rate of that year was 1 *yinyuan* to 1.35 *fengpiao yuan*

Source: Kantōchō zaimubu (Financial Section, Kwantung Leased Territory, "Hōtenshō zaisei no genjō," 3/1927, GK, B02031788000, slides 12-32.

convert Huludao into a modern harbour throughout the 1920s was delayed because money was diverted to military build-up. Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the close link between the State Bank and the Fengtian Clique affected the stability of the *fengpiao* between 1925 and 1928.¹⁰⁷

Regionalism and Relations with the Central Government

In addition to financial and military build-up, Zhang made use of regionalism and the security needs of Manchuria in his bid for power. As Manchuria faced direct foreign threats and the central government could offer little protection,

¹⁰⁷ In a speech in 1928, Zhang saw the State Bank as one of his private enterprises. This attitude certainly affected public confidence in the State Bank and the *fengpiao* it issued. From Zhang Yousan, "Yijiū erba nian Zhang Zuolin Beijing huairēntang ying yishang guanyuan xunhua," unpublished manuscript, 1964.

the soldiers on the spot naturally played a predominant role in Manchurian politics. When the renowned intellectual Zhang Binglin was appointed as the Commissioner for the Development of the Three Provinces in 1913, the Fengtian provincial assembly opposed the appointment on the grounds that Zhang “knew nothing about the military.”¹⁰⁸ The Japanese found that although Zhang Zuolin was criticized for killing revolutionaries, his role in protecting Manchuria from foreign intervention during the Revolution won him much approval.¹⁰⁹

The Chinese leaders in Manchuria felt that the Republican government failed to protect their interests and would sell them to world powers. Their concern was justifiable. In 1913, Beijing borrowed money from Japan to build additional railways in Manchuria.¹¹⁰ Three years later, Yuan Shikai was forced to accept many clauses in the Twenty-One Demands. Zhang Zuolin even received reports about Yuan’s proposal to cede Jilin Province to Japan in exchange for the support of his monarchical movement.¹¹¹ When Duan Qirui’s government borrowed money from Japan in 1917, it again ceded railway rights in Manchuria.¹¹² Zhang openly opposed the Twenty-One Demands, and devised legal barriers to block the implementation of mining and the land-renting rights granted by the treaty.¹¹³ These actions rallied the Chinese elites in Manchuria around him.

After Zhang had unified Manchuria, he turned to the central government to secure and further his position. This explained his active intervention in national politics starting from his participation in the Corps of the Military Governors (*dujuntuan*) that openly commented on national affairs in 1917. However, as the result of his interventions, Zhang was increasingly seen by those in China Proper as a “warlord” who was meddling with politics and was trying to unify China from his peripheral enclave. He was also depicted by his opponents such as Wu Peifu as a Japanese puppet. Between 1920 and 1924, Zhang and the successive Beijing Governments were trapped in the “prisoners’

¹⁰⁸ Zhang Nianci, “Zhang Taiyan yu dongsansheng kaifa,” in *Shilin* (1993), No. 4. See <<http://www.cn-rn.com/crn-webapp/cbspub/secDetail.jsp?bookid=21701&secid=21804>>.

¹⁰⁹ Sai Hōten sōryōji Ochiai Kentarō, “Chō Shakuran (Zhang Xilian) no rai hō to Chō Jison (Zhao Erxun), jishoku setsu nikansuru ken, 25/10/1912, GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050177000, 186.

¹¹⁰ Zhang Bofeng, *Wanxi junfa yu riben* (Chengdu, 1988), 148.

¹¹¹ Kantō totokufu rikugun sambōbu, “chō dai 6 gō,” 15/1/1916, GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050180800, slide 113.

¹¹² Zhang Bofeng, *Wanxi junfa yu riben*, 148-9; Mizuno Akira, Liangsheng (tr.), 80.

¹¹³ Wang Haichen, “Zhang Zuolin yu ‘ershiji tiao’ jiaoshe,” in *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 2 (2002) <<http://www.omnitalk.com/miliarch/gb2b5.pl?msgno=messages/2655.html>>; Mizuno Akira, Liangsheng (tr.), 158.

dilemma," as they strived to undermine each other's position without realizing that cooperation would be beneficial to both. In 1921, Zhang claimed that he was unwilling to cooperate with a government that could not guarantee his position against internal and external pressures:

I am always criticised for defying the central government's order, but how can I obey it? The situation in Manchuria was different from other provinces in China as we have the two railways (CER and SMR)... We don't even have enough troops [to protect ourselves].... However, I am still criticised as a warlord who wanted to revive the Qing, which I only served as a junior officer....¹¹⁴

Successive masters in Beijing felt equally threatened by Zhang and the Fengtian Clique. Wu Peifu, who was in power between 1920 and 1924, was determined to invade Manchuria as he saw Zhang as a major obstacle to his "military unification" (*wuli tongyi*). It was this "prisoner's dilemma" that explained Zhang's cooperation with the anti-Zhili factions such as Duan Qirui and Sun Yat-sen between 1922 and 1924. However, the Second Zhili-Fengtian War of 1924 that toppled Wu Peifu and the Zhili Clique did not solve the problem between the central government and Manchuria. The war between 1925 and 1928 was about the same question.

Japanese Connection Revisited

Zhang and the Fengtian Clique's ascendancy have always been seen as the result of Japanese machination. In fact, anyone who wanted to control Manchuria had to deal with the Japanese, who were divided amongst themselves. The Qing loyalists received aid from the Japanese General Staff, while the revolutionaries were supported by the Pan-Asian ideologues in Japan such as Tōyama Mitsuru.¹¹⁵ Between 1912 and 1916-7, military leaders in Jilin and Heilongjiang turned to the Japanese whenever they faced pressure from Mukden or Beijing.¹¹⁶ When Meng Enyuan, the military governor of Jilin, was ordered to resign in 1917, his subordinates solicited Japanese support in

¹¹⁴ Wang Zhuoran, "Meng Lu boshi (Dr. Paul Monroe) yu Zhang Zuolin tanhua jilu, 5/12/1921," in *Zhuanji wenxue*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1979), 51-54.

¹¹⁵ "Beijing gaoshan dazuo (Col. Takayama Kimimichi) zhifudao canmou cizhang (Vice Chief of Staff Fukushima Yasumasa) dian," 31/1/1912, in *Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo Zhonghua minguo shi yanjiushi*, op. cit, 88-9; Kantō totokufu rikugun sambōchō, "kan den dai 53 gō," 21/6/1916, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050181000, slide 228.

¹¹⁶ Kantō totokufu rikugun sambōchō, "kan den dai 72 gō," 29/6/1917, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050182200, slide 284.

defiance of the central government and Zhang Zuolin.¹¹⁷ This shows the real possibility of Manchuria being “Balkanised” into blocs each supported by a neighbouring power. Zhang established contact with Japan through his Japanese advisors and the *Mantetsu* staff, but the Japanese government did not support him until he was the undisputed leader in Manchuria in 1920.¹¹⁸ As Chen Tsunkung pointed out, throughout Zhang’s rule in Manchuria he did not receive a substantial amount of Japanese arms.¹¹⁹

Initially, the Japanese and Zhang used each other. While the Japanese needed a local strongman to promote and protect their interest, Zhang needed a secure flank to unify the Three Provinces and to consolidate his position. However, their interests conflicted soon after Zhang became the Manchurian leader. In 1919, the Japanese consul in Jilin Morita Kanzō expressed his fear that when Zhang succeeded in unifying the Three Provinces, it would be difficult to stop Zhang’s anti-Japanese policies because Japan would no longer be able to manipulate the Chinese in Manchuria through a policy of divide and rule.¹²⁰ Zhang also guarded carefully against the Japanese. Sir Ronald Macleay, the British Minister to China, noted that Zhang had little sympathy towards the Japanese.¹²¹ When Zhang had a say in the Beijing Government in 1917 because of his alliance with Duan Qirui, he first asked for a voice in the central government’s foreign policy concerning his domain.¹²² After he had overthrown Wu Peifu in late 1924, he requested that the new Provisional Government name his appointee as the Chinese Minister to Japan.¹²³ As will be illustrated in Chapter 3, conflicts between the Fengtian Clique and the Japanese helped decide the outcome of the war between 1925 and 1928.

¹¹⁷ Kantōgun sambōchō, “kan den dai 101 gō,” 22/10/1917, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050182400, slide 421.

¹¹⁸ Mizuno Akira, Liangsheng (tr.), 108.

¹¹⁹ Chen Tsunkung, *The China Arms Embargo, 1919-1929*, 197.

¹²⁰ Morita ryoji, “dai 50 gō,” 15/6/1919, GK, JACAR, Bo3050184500, slide 262.

¹²¹ Chen Tsunkung, *The China Arms Embargo, 1919-1929*, 200.

¹²² Sōryōji Akatsuka Shōsuke, “Chō tokugun no Tōsanshō tōkatsu undō nikansuru ken,” 15/8/1917, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050182300, slide 339.

¹²³ Yang Tianhong, “Zhifeng zhanzheng zhishou de Beijing zhengzhi,” in *Zhengdangjianzhizhi yu Minguo zhengzhi zouxiang* (Beijing, 2008), 224.

Becoming a National Leader: Zhang Zuolin's Strife for Legitimacy and Political Power

Gavan McCormack and Zhang Yufa believed that “there is no discernible political or ideological principle” except ambition and self-interest behind Zhang’s actions.¹²⁴ This study suggests that although Zhang and the Fengtian Clique might not have been guided by a clearly defined ideology such as the Three People’s Principle, they were certainly led by experiences, values, and preferences when they were making strategic decisions. The search for legitimacy also embedded many of Zhang’s actions and was an important part of his political career. By looking at how Zhang and the Fengtian Clique tried to present Zhang as a legitimate political leader, we can also understand more about their perceptions of the nation’s problems and about how political leaders presented themselves before the age of popular mobilization.

Zhang's Perception of the Nation's Problems

Like other political leaders of his time, Zhang Zuolin talked of the solutions for China’s problems in order to enhance his political reputation by showing his understanding of the nation’s illness. His view reflected common perception. Zhang shared the view that moral decline among the nation’s political elite was as important as imperialism and socio-economic problems. In a circular telegram urging Beijing to launch a punitive expedition against the southwest provinces that declared independence in 1918, Zhang blamed “unscrupulous politicians” and corrupt officials for internal strife:

It has been seven years since the establishment of the Republic, but disasters and upheavals struck repeatedly as if there was no end...the unscrupulous ones seized opportunities to stir up troubles and put their conspiracies in motion....¹²⁵

When he was interviewed by Professor Paul Monroe from Columbia University in 1921, Zhang suggested that China’s biggest problem was the men in power rather than the republican institution:

¹²⁴ Gavan McCormack, 253; Zhang Yufa, “Minguo liren yuanshou de xingge tezhi 1912-1988,” in Lu Fangshang, *Lun Minguo shiqi lingdao jingying* (Hong Kong, 2009), 13.

¹²⁵ “Zhang Zuolin biaoshi yonghu dazongtong duinan yongbing midian,” 22/3/1918, in Zhongguo dier lishi danganguan (ed.), *Zhonghua Minguoshi dangan ziliao huibian* (ZMDZH), Vol. 3, No. 2 (Nanjing, 1991), 634.

China's greatest ill was its excess number of bandit-officials (*guanhu-zhi*)... They earned their salary for nothing; so it is hardly surprising that our country is poor and politics corrupted. These rascals should all be exterminated.... Those who serve as civilian or military governors or as ministers or commissioners could earn millions after serving for only two or three years...where did the money come from? ... If one wants to correct China's problem one has to eliminate the corrupt officials... There is not a single good man there. When one falls, another one will fill his place (He was referring to Jin Yunpeng, the Premier he allegedly supported). The foreigners believe China is a poor country; it is far from true, but all the money went to the purse of the corrupt officials. The small debt (of the central government) is nothing for China if law abiding and honest officials were in charge...¹²⁶

Moral condemnation provided an oblique way for Zhang to participate in politics and enhance his political prestige. As Edward McCord pointed out, the urge for the separation of civilian politics and military and the prevailing discourse of anti-warlordism delegitimised the soldiers' political participation during the early Republican period.¹²⁷ Zhang was trapped in the delicate situation of being powerful but lacking the legitimacy to intervene in politics.

Not unlike other militarists of his time, although Zhang subscribed to the rhetoric of anti-military intervention, he argued that the soldiers were often misled by "immoral" politicians. For instance, in a public statement issued in mid-1926:

The source of endless internal strife was undoubtedly the soldiers' intervention in politics (*junren ganzheng*)...; the greatest obstacle to the rule by the people (*minzhi*) was dictatorship.... Our central government is now impotent; telegrams flooded from all sides discussing the appropriate political solution.... On the surface, all these ideas are constructive, but if one takes a closer look they might be attempts of the disgraced and unemployed politicians who want to use the soldiers as a puppet to restore their position...¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Wu Xiangxiang, "Menglu yu Zhang Zuolin tanhua jilu," in Wang Guangdi, 105.

¹²⁷ Edward McCord, "Warlords against Warlordism: The Politics of Anti-Militarism in Early Twentieth-Century China," in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, Special Issue: War in Modern China (Oct., 1996), 796-8.

¹²⁸ "Zhang Zuolin yi huxian hyfa junxi zhengke yulong wuren zhiju, dongri (1 May) tongdian chuanguo," in *Shijie Ribao* (as sr below), 4/5/1926.

This statement was aimed at the members of the National Assembly who urged Wu Peifu to reconvene the Assembly of 1923 that accepted the Zhili Clique's bribe and elected Cao Kun as the president.¹²⁹ Not only did he launch a moral blackmail against Wu who intended to revive the Assembly, but Zhang also presented himself as the moral leader who was protecting the integrity of the Republican institution and preventing the "corrupted politicians" from having their way. The stress on morality in the above statements reflected Zhang's cultural conservatism, but more importantly showed how Zhang tried to exploit the prevailing moral panic to legitimize his intervention in politics.

On the other hand, unlike figures such as Feng Yuxiang who were quick to follow the ever-changing public mood, Zhang tried to present himself as the protector of order and tradition in order to win over the more conservative members of the Republic. During the "Northern Expedition," Zhang Zuolin was able to sense the changes in how politics worked in China, but he chose to stand as an opponent of the new trend. When he was about to proclaim himself the Generalissimo of the Chinese Republic in June, 1927, he stated in public:

Sweeping changes have taken place in the field of political theories ever since the outbreak of the First World War. Sponsors of extreme radicalism, being themselves puppets in the hands of certain foreign agents have not failed to seize the present opportunity for misleading the distressed people by their erroneous theories which are working havoc in the very nation which gave birth to them....¹³⁰

McCormack suggested that Zhang opposed communism because he wanted to please the western powers.¹³¹ However, if what he wanted was merely foreign support, Zhang could have eliminated an immediate threat to his position by allying with the Soviets instead of pleasing the British, who were neither willing nor able to improve his geopolitical position. Besides the perceived Soviet threat against his position and expectation of foreign (particularly British) support, Zhang's opposition of communism was also a necessary move for his domestic political agenda, as he was portraying himself as the protector of order and morality.

¹²⁹ It should be noted that in the same incident, the KMT, Li Yuanhong, and the Anfu Clique were also paying money to those not electing Cao Kun as the president.

¹³⁰ "Chang Tso-lin's Policy," in *wic* (Week in China), 2/12/1927, Vol. 8, No. 100, 12.

¹³¹ Gavan McCormack, 253.

Thus, Zhang talked of the “red menace” in traditional moral terms, denouncing the “reds” (specifically Chiang Kai-shek and Borodin) as those who had overthrown “traditional morality.”¹³² When negotiating peace with the KMT in 1922, Zhang suggested adding the principle of “People’s Virtue” (*minde zhuyi*) to Sun Yat-sen’s principles.¹³³ Not only was he trying to associate himself (rather unsuccessfully) with Sun, Zhang was responding to the moral panic among the nation’s elite. Zhang’s idea was similar to the “Nationalist Faction” (*guojiazhuyi pai*), a group of intelligentsia who saw the protection of traditional morality as being necessary during this period of change and uncertainty.¹³⁴ As Chapter 3 will reveal, when the revolutionary fervor waned and the spiral of revolutionary violence surged in many parts of the Republic during the second half of 1927, Zhang’s continuous stress on morality was a possible way to solicit public support.

Zhang was pragmatic enough to understand China’s deep-seated socio-economic problems and was convinced that the solution was economic modernization and an end to the unequal treaties. This idea was little different from that of the southern revolutionaries, encapsulated in Sun Yat-sen’s principle of “People’s Livelihood” (*minsheng zhuyi*). Besides moral rhetoric, he promised to “punish the greedy ones, promote honesty, encourage creativity and ensure cooperation between capital and labor” in his proclamation in 1927.¹³⁵ He suggested that the solution of the current upheaval was to improve the people’s livelihood through economic development and competition with other countries in the world market. He also claimed that there were no “classes” in China as all should be equally protected by the government. Order, he argued, would naturally follow if the people “cooperated and played their appropriate roles in the society.”¹³⁶ It seems that he saw it possible to extend the relatively efficient form of government in Manchuria to at least part of China; just how it could be implemented, however, was not illustrated in detail. Of course, whether he had the time and resources to realize these solutions was another matter. The failure to bring about new changes and to portray

¹³² SR, 8/12/1927.

¹³³ Zhang first made this comment when he met Sun’s envoy Wang Jingwei in 1922, and openly urged it during the peace negotiation with the KMT in 1927. SR, 15/6/1927; For Wu Peifu’s praise on Zhang’s idea in 1923, see Wu Peifu xianshengji bianji weiyuanhui, *Wu Peifu xiansheng ji* (Taibei, 1960), 428–9; SR, 15/6/1927.

¹³⁴ Ao Guangxu, “1920-1930 niandai guojiazhuyi pai zhi neizai wenhua lilu,” in *Jindaishi yanjiu* (2006), No. 2. Online version: <<http://jds.cass.cn/Article/20071211144000.asp>>. Accessed 30/1/2010.

¹³⁵ “Chang Tso-lin’s Policy,” WIC, Vol. 8, No. 100, 11–2.

¹³⁶ “San tulunhui kaimo,” GW, Vol. 4, No. 5, 9–10.

himself as a nationalist partly explained the cold reception he received when he controlled Beijing in 1927-1928.

Zhang's Struggle for Political Legitimacy

Responding to the moral panic and making promises to improve the people's livelihood were not enough to secure political authority during the 1920s in China. As he lacked legitimacy and was considered a warlord, Zhang had avoided taking direct responsibility of the central government in Beijing before he assumed the position of Generalissimo in 1927. As Zhang lacked legitimacy, he portrayed himself as the man who was open to political solutions. He tried to transform himself into a political leader by gathering the support of or working with other factions, preferably those more legitimate than him. Thus, when Yuan Shikai was forced to abandon the monarchical movement in the face of national opposition in May, 1916, Zhang issued a public statement to support Yuan in staying on as the president:

I believe that the situation in China has reached its most critical state. Internal and external threats emerge one after another. China is like a great building that is about to collapse or a holed boat about to sink...The "you-day (26 April 1916) telegram"¹³⁷ suggested that if Xiangcheng (Yuan Shikai) resigned, the country can be spared from war, and financial and diplomatic difficulties rectified. I disagree....It is very difficult to unify China, a country so large with so many different factions and armies.... What will be the solution if one faction or another opposed to the new head of state? Who should be responsible if we caused more wars by forcing Yuan to abdicate with the hope that this would end all wars?¹³⁸

Zhang sided with Yuan because he saw in the latter a central figure that could "unify" China, in this sense being a more legitimate national leader than the "many factions and armies." He also believed that a divided China would jeopardize his position in Manchuria. Similarly, when Zhang Xun advocated the restoration of the Qing dynasty after Yuan died in 1916, Zhang proposed bringing the issue to the National Assembly.¹³⁹

137 The April 26th telegram. It was the open proclamation of the southwest political leaders urging Yuan to step down.

138 "Zhang Zuolin yaoqiu weici Yuan Shikai zongtong diwei dian," 1/5/1916, in ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 2, 454.

139 Kantō totokufu rikugun sambōbu, "chō dai 53 gō," 21/6/1916, GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050181000, slide 227.

When Zhang declared war against Wu Peifu and Cao Kun in April, 1922, he again claimed that he was a supporter of unification and was open to different political solutions:

...peace would never come if the nation is not unified...I am now leading my soldiers into the Pass to use military power to back the unification movement.... As for the specific issue of national unification, the elders and veteran politicians should plan the concerning conferences and institutions openly and thoroughly. I am unqualified to attend these conferences, but I will not turn my back to public justice and be partial to a particular man or party, nor will I attack a particular party or man out of personal grudge....¹⁴⁰

Similarly, when he declined his subordinates' urge to take unilateral action to reform the Beijing Government in early 1926, Zhang explained:

...the constitutional and political problems would be discussed by the elders and dignitaries across the country...I am only a soldier; I have already declared not to interfere into politics.¹⁴¹

In January of 1926, when Zhang Zongchang urged him to join him in expressing their views on a political settlement, Zhang refused.¹⁴² Six months later, when Zhang was again urged by his subordinates to take a more active role in the central government by issuing the order for a punitive expedition against Feng, he replied:

As for abolishing all of Feng Yuxiang's titles and ordering a punitive expedition against him...I believe that this suits the popular demand. [However], since the central government is restored, it shall express its own views. It is desirable that you discuss the issue with the acting-Premier (Admiral Du Shigui), but it is inappropriate for regional officials (Zhang was the highest ranking official representing the Republic in Manchuria) to express their views, let alone to draft a statement for the central government.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ "Zhang Zuolin xuanbu shuaishi ruguan yi wuli wei houtun jiejue shiju tongdian," 19/4/1922, in ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 3, 62.

¹⁴¹ "Zhang Zuolin fu Zhang Zongchang diangao," 20/4/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 16.

¹⁴² "Zhang Zuolin fu Zhang Zongchang diangao," 13/1/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 1.

¹⁴³ "Zhang Zuolin fu Zhang Zongchang diangao," 17/7/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 29.

Zhang was anxious to have a say in Beijing, but he was aware of being accused of interfering in politics. Two months later, Zhang sent a telegram asking Wu Peifu, who was nominally in control of the government, to issue an order for the anti-Feng operation that had already begun nine months ago.¹⁴⁴ Zhang and his advisors were aware of the lessons learned in his previous attempts to exert greater influence over the central government between 1917 and 1925, attempts that had damaged his public image. This awareness caused much delay in reforming the Beijing Government after Wu's fall in late 1926.

Throughout his career, Zhang suggested that he was "unqualified because he was a soldier" and "open to different political solutions." These statements were catering to an audience who detested warlordism and civil wars, but they revealed Zhang's lack of a political agenda and of the ability to unify the country by force.¹⁴⁵ As veteran *beiyang* politician and diplomat Yan Huiqing noted, even when Zhang took control of Beijing in early 1927, he tried to widen political participation by inviting elder politicians and bureaucrats to participate in the discussion groups as advisory bodies to strengthen and more importantly to legitimize his position.¹⁴⁶

As mentioned, when radicalism grew in China after the May 30th movement, Zhang started to style himself as the protector of order and played the "red menace" card to present himself as a legitimate leader. As he was shown in the cover of the Beiyang Pictorial News (*Beiyang huabao*) in October 1927 (Fig. 2.1):

Above the picture of Zhang in full marshal attire was "May the Chinese Republic Live Tens of Thousands of Years." On the side of the pictures were the slogans "Eliminate Violence at Home (*nei qu baoli*)," and "Counter Foreign Oppression" (*nei yi qiangquan*). As he appeared in military uniform, Zhang admitted that he still lacked the political prestige to assume a political leadership position (thus he assumed the office of Generalissimo, following Sun Yat-sen's precedent, rather than President). He tried to enhance his authority by promising to maintain internal peace and defend the country against threats. As Van de Ven pointed out, the military classics in China saw war as an action to restore the "perceived cosmological and moral order which the empire embodied, whether threatened by external enemies or internal rebels," while "suppression of rebellion was justified in terms of righting the destruction by immoral bandits of the social bonds, hierarchies, and norms of

¹⁴⁴ "Zhang Zuolin zhi Wu Peifu diangao," 2/9/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 102.

¹⁴⁵ GW, Vol. 4, No. 24, 2-3.

¹⁴⁶ "Yan Huiqing bixia de Zhang Zuolin," in Wang Guangdi, 133.



FIGURE 2.1
*Zhang Zuolin as the
 defender of the Republic;*
*Beiyang huabao, No. 127,
 8 October 1927.*

society.”¹⁴⁷ Images like the above and the name *Anguojun* conveyed the idea of restoring normalcy by destroying sources of disorder, this time the KMT, the communists, and their alleged Soviet master.

Perhaps the piece that best illustrates how political power was expressed in the pre-Nationalist period in Northern China was a page in the *Beiyang huabao* in July, 1927, when the *Anguojun* was winning the war in the North (Fig. 2.2):

Under the calligraphy of “*tianxia* belongs to all (*tianxia weigong*)” dedicated to Zhang Xueliang by Sun Yat-sen were the portraits of the two men, the “respected national hero of China” and the “light in the North,” “the young general who took up great responsibilities,” and “the patriotic son of China.” The text in the middle described Zhang Zuolin’s alliance with the KMT in 1922-3 and suggested that both Zhang Zuolin and Zhang Xueliang had “endorsed” the Three Peoples’ Principles. The text included Zhang Xueliang’s speech to a

147 Hans van de Ven, *Warfare in Chinese History*, 9.



FIGURE 2.2

Zhang Xueliang as the successor of Sun Wen;
Beiyang huabao, No. 103,
13 July 1927.

group of young men, urging them to “be conscious” and “act on their words,” and Zhang’s “private” letter to his brother, claiming that he preferred “dying against the foreigners than in a civil war.” Dressed in a western suit rather than the more usual military uniform, the young Marshal was portrayed as a sophisticated and modern successor of Sun, someone more than a mere soldier like his father. However, military power still played the central role in this piece of propaganda: in the middle of the page was a showcase of the major commanders of the *Anguojun* (their diverse place of origin was emphasized in another issue of the magazine), a row of disciplined recruits, and a 150-mm howitzer unique in China. To the *Anguojun* leaders, it was moral superiority, alliance with or endorsement of prestigious/legitimate figures, willingness to counter foreign threats, diversity of origin, and solid military prowess that constituted political power. These were the *beiyang* militarists’ response to the prevailing

moral panic, distrust of bureaucracy and the institutions of the Republic, and anti-foreignism in the context of perceived foreign threats (in the form of anti-communism and the fear of Russo-Japanese invasion of Manchuria in North China, and the anti-British sentiment in the South).

Although Zhang Zuolin lacked legitimacy in China Proper, he could justify his rule as long as he could maintain order and the Chinese position in Manchuria. He understood this well, as he claimed during the meeting with Professor Paul Monroe:

...people never understand that the situation of the Eastern Three Provinces is different from other provinces. Thousands of miles of fertile land of the Three Provinces lies between Japan and Russia...I am not particularly capable, but I am still confident in protecting this bit of land for my country...¹⁴⁸

Thus, Zhang never turned to the Japanese or the Russians as Feng Yuxiang did, because taking such a line would alienate him from his power base, the Chinese population in Manchuria. Zhang became more nationalistic and sensitive to international relations in his search for legitimacy, but this limited his strategic choice afterwards.

To maintain his position in Manchuria, he had turned to regionalism occasionally. He revived the provincial assembly after Yuan Shikai died, and declared autonomy from the central government when the Zhili Clique that was hostile to him controlled Beijing between 1922 and 1924. Autonomous status was retracted after the Second Zhili-Fengtian War, but he switched to autonomy again when Feng Yuxiang seized control of Beijing in late 1925. After Feng was defeated, autonomy was again revoked. The repeated attempt to interfere in Chinese politics and the frequent change of titles between these years undermined his legitimacy in Manchuria. On the other hand, Zhang was forced to search for a new source of legitimacy in China in order to maintain his position in both Manchuria and North China. Subsequent events, however, reveal that he was less successful in achieving this goal.

Concluding Remarks

In a quest for survival, power, and legitimacy, from being an insignificant militia commander, Zhang Zuolin emerged as the most powerful man in Manchuria.

¹⁴⁸ Wu Xiangxiang, "Menglu yu Zhang Zuolin tanhua jilu," in Wang Guangdi, 106.

Exploiting the opportunity presented by the changes in the international, political, fiscal, economic, and social structures in China and Northeast Asia since the last decade of the Qing, Zhang and the Fengtian Clique built an authoritarian but progressive state, which was extending its control over the area's security, economy, and to an extent in other aspects such as education and local politics. The state established some control over the economy in Manchuria through fiscal policy and financial institutions and augmented its position by creating an efficient bureaucracy, a well-equipped army, and a modern police force. Zhang succeeded in legitimizing his position by cooperating with the local elites and forming a coherent political-military faction of the Fengtian Clique, opening up (very limited) political participation and presenting himself and the Fengtian Clique as the protectors of the Chinese in Manchuria.

Zhang was a pragmatic leader who quickly grasped the importance of legitimacy, coalition building, and consensus. He retained the loyalty of his military subordinates, and to a lesser extent the respect of civilians. Sensitive to his lack of legitimacy, he was open to different political solutions and negotiation. He increasingly stressed on the foreign threats on China as he rose to national prominence, partly as the result of his search for legitimacy. Because of Northeast Asia's complex international situation, Zhang was always cautious in his intervention in Chinese politics and sensitive to the international dimension of his actions. He was convinced that China's problem was the result of external encroachment and internal moral decline, and tried to play on these two themes to enhance his political authority. Zhang and the Fengtian leaders were little different from their KMT counterparts in their goals, but compared with Chiang Kai-shek or Wu Peifu, Zhang was a different kind of political leader, one who did not see politics in all-or-nothing terms and did not resort to use of force easily. As Ch'i Hsi-sheng noted, the Beiyang warlords, including Zhang, "always demonstrated a willingness to negotiate for a peaceful settlement."¹⁴⁹ Thus, the civil wars in the north (the Zhili-Anfu War, the First and the Second Zhili Fengtian Wars) were all preceded by a long period of negotiation between different parties, even when they were openly preparing for war. Zhang and the Fengtian Clique's approach to politics shaped the *Anguojun*'s strategy between 1925 and 1928.

¹⁴⁹ Ch'i Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China*, 218.

The Fengtian Clique's Strategies and Their Failure, 1925-1931

This chapter describes Zhang and the Fengtian Clique's strategy aimed at preventing the encirclement of Manchuria by hostile factions through a series of moves in China Proper. The Clique's goal was not to conquer China but first to preserve its position in Manchuria and then to establish itself as *one of* the national leaders through war, alliance forming, seeking foreign recognition, and building up political authority. To explain the Fengtian Clique's failure and to enhance our understanding of modern Chinese warfare in general, this chapter reconstructs the strategy of the Fengtian Clique between 1925 and 1931 and illustrates the connections between battles, politics, and international relations, with reference to the issues of political authority of the Fengtian Clique, its cohesiveness, and the effectiveness of its bureaucracy. It also suggests that one could see the wars in China between 1925 and 1928 as a series of closely related wars, including the Northern Expedition, which should be studied as a whole. When discussing Fengtian strategy, particular attention will be paid to the tension between war and politics, war and peace, and the general situation and particular engagements. Although the above-mentioned dimensions frame the following discussion, contingencies, human factors, and strategic interaction between opponents, as the following discussion shows, also affected the events.

Contenders for power in Chinese history have created momentum towards unification through political authority, bribery, coalition, deceit, external support, and success on the battlefield.¹ By the 1920s, although these factors were still relevant, Chinese political-military leaders needed more. To ensure success, they needed foreign recognition, a favorable geopolitical position and an efficient bureaucracy. Military success remained important, as it augmented or undermined all the above factors and created windows of opportunity for radical change.

The 1920s also witnessed the gradual transition from "limited" to "total" warfare in China. Although the states' ability to mobilize the society remained limited, the goals of the wars became total as it was not just about removing a particular political leader (or "warlord") or an unpopular group controlling the

¹ Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism*, 48; Peter Lorge, *War, Politics and Society*, 3.

Beijing Government but about comprehensive political, diplomatic, and even social and economic changes. Compromise became increasingly unacceptable as social mobilization, propaganda, and doctrinal struggle became more important. However, this transition was not complete and was shaped by China's condition. Although the KMT professed to fight a total war to eliminate warlordism and imperialism through mass mobilization, it lacked the military power, resources, institutional support, and competence to pursue such a war. On the other hand, although the political stand of the KMT prevented it from reaching a compromise with the *beiyang* militarists, it allowed the party to absorb those warlords who "embraced" its doctrines and to seek support from the neighbouring powers. This explained the KMT's reliance on using the smaller warlords in Northern China and to cooperate with Japan and the Soviet Union to undermine the Beijing Government when they had difficulties in conquering their enemy by force.

In gauging Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique's political prestige and the mood in the North, this chapter relies heavily on the Northern press and the observations of foreign diplomats. Guo Yuya's study of the northern newspapers during the Northern Expedition showed that public opinion in the North was often different from that of the KMT-controlled areas. She also pointed out that censorship in the North was less strong than in the South.² A study of the northerners' view towards the "Northern Expedition" and the "National Revolution" shows that although war was not welcomed, public opinion in North China, particularly in Beijing and Tianjin, still had hope that the Beijing Government would be revived.

From 1925 to 1931, the Fengtian Clique launched four offensives into China Proper. This period can be divided into five phases:

Phase I, Jan-December 1925: advanced into China Proper after the Second Zhili-Fengtian War

² Gao Yuya, *Beifang baozhi yulun dui beifa zhi fanying: yi Tianjin Dagongbao, Beijing Chenbao wei daibiao de tantao* (Taipei, 1999), 238, 273. For example, the Tianjin newspaper *Dagongbao*, which is quoted extensively in this chapter, evaded censorship because it was located in the Japanese concession. Although it was originally the official newspaper of the Anfu Clique, when it was launched again in 1926 it was a completely new organization. Its chief editors Wu Dingchang and Zhang Jilian had *Tongmenghui* background, and its main source of funding during the establishment was from Wu Dingchang. Throughout the Northern Expedition, it was no less critical of both the KMT and the militarists. The importance of these papers in expressing public opinion in the North is shown by their wide circulation; *Chenbao*, printed in Beijing, had a daily readership of 240,000 during this period.

Phase II, Jan-August 1926: the second advance into China against Feng Yuxiang's National Army, the KMT and the Soviet Union's ally in Northern China

Phase III, August 1926-June 1927: the Fengtian Clique tried to halt the KMT's National Revolutionary Army and force the KMT to accept coexistence

Phase IV, June 1927-June 1928: a continuation of the previous phase, the Clique attempted to consolidate his position in Northern China and revive the Beijing Government

Phase V, June 1928-September 1931: the Clique relied on the Nanjing Government to deal with the Japanese and the Soviets; another intervention in Northern China despite Fengtian's weakened state and unfavorable geopolitical situation. The phase ended with the Japanese seizure of Manchuria.

The unintended consequence of the Fengtian Clique's victory in the Second Zhili-Fengtian War against Wu Peifu in late-1924 was the strengthening of Feng Yuxiang and the Soviets' position in North China. To prevent being isolated in Northeast Asia again, Zhang tried to establish stronger influence over Northern and Central China in 1925. However, the resulting Anti-Fengtian War later in the year almost eliminated the Fengtian Clique and allowed Feng to establish a pro-Soviet regime in Beijing. The Fengtian Clique partly recovered its position after it had defeated Feng, but the situation in South China soon changed as the KMT started the Northern Expedition in mid-1926, which hindered the revival of the Beijing Government. To fill the power vacuum in Beijing and to prevent Feng's recovery, the Fengtian Clique adopted a risky but potentially profitable strategy of linking up Manchuria with Northern China.

To achieve its goal, the Fengtian Clique launched a limited offensive into Northern China, created the coalition force of the *beiyang* militarists *Anguojun*, and offered peaceful unification as an alternative to the KMT's revolutionary agenda. The Japanese, who did not want to see the Fengtian Clique unifying Manchuria with Northern China, supported the KMT overthrowing the Beijing Government; the British and the Americans turned to the "moderates" among the revolutionaries because the latter controlled the areas that were economically important to them. Still, despite the internal and external difficulties, it seemed that Fengtian was close to success in early 1927, partly because of the KMT's infighting. However, a series of military defeats caused by strategic overreach, operational errors, and local circumstances compromised the Fengtian Clique's plan to end the war early.

In response to the defeats in mid-1927, Zhang Zuolin assumed the position of Generalissimo in Beijing and tried to strengthen the Beijing Government and the link between Manchuria and Northern China. The northern militarists led by the Fengtian Clique continued to seek an agreement with the moderates of the KMT, and briefly succeeded in halting the Northern Expedition in the summer of 1927. However, the northern militarists could not defeat the NRA or improve the Beijing Government to the extent that it was accepted as a compelling alternative. The negotiations between the Fengtian Clique and the KMT throughout the first half of 1927 revealed the fundamental difference between the Fengtian militarists, who preferred unifying the country through political resolution, and the KMT leaders, who were determined to pursue the war until the Beijing Government was eliminated. As the KMT lacked the means to defeat the warlords, it allied itself with the smaller warlords in Northern China instead of agreeing to settle the national issue with the Beijing Government. As a result, the Nationalist Government of the KMT replaced the Beijing Government as the "national" government, but the price was military disintegration in Northern China and a weakening of the Chinese position in Northeast Asia.

Zhang Zuolin's successor Zhang Xueliang had to confront a more threatening domestic and geopolitical situation. His solution was to turn to the Nanjing Government for mandate and protection. Northern China was impoverished and politically impotent after the central government and the Inspector General of the Customs Service moved to the south. It was now occupied by numerous smaller warlords, the product of the KMT's decision to dismantle the *Anguojun*. The Fengtian Army was reduced and the public finances of Manchuria were weakened because of the previous wars. Recognition from Nanjing, however, could not alleviate the internal dissension within the Fengtian Clique and the breakdown of societal cohesion in Manchuria. Thus, whereas the Northern Expedition undermined the Chinese position in Northeast Asia in general, Zhang Xueliang's decisions to reduce the Fengtian Army, fight the Soviets in 1929, and intervene in the War of the Central Plains in 1930 only sped up the coming of a Japanese takeover in 1931.

Phase I, January-December 1925

Overview

In September of 1924, the Zhili Clique dominated the Beijing Government, and its leader Wu Peifu was about to launch a war to unify the country. Opposing Wu was the coalition of Duan Qirui, Zhang Zuolin, and Sun Yat-sen, heads of

the three major political factions in China. After weeks of intense fighting, Wu's forces were trapped in Shanhaiguan.³ On October 23rd, Wu's subordinate, Feng Yuxiang, seized Beijing, arrested the President Cao Kun, appointed his own cabinet, and formed the National Army (*Kuominchun*, hereafter referred to as the KMC).⁴ As the cabinet was recognized by none of the factions in China and the Powers, Feng invited Sun Yat-sen to Beijing to legitimize his action.⁵ On the other hand, with the support of the Fengtian Clique, the ex-Zhili military governors, Duan Qirui assumed the office of the Chief Executive of the Provisional Executive Government (*linshi zhizheng*) in November. Feng Yuxiang accepted this arrangement only because he could not counter Zhang Zuolin's force, which quickly entered Northern China and controlled Zhili and Shandong provinces.

Duan tried to act as the middleman between the factions in order to preserve his position. To arrange a post-war settlement and solve the constitutional issue, the Provisional Government convened the Reconstruction (*shanhou huiyi*), Constitutional (*xianfa huiyi*), and National Conferences (*guomin huiyi*). It also persuaded the powers to hold the Tariff Conference after solving the Gold Franc Dispute with the French.⁶ However, Duan's government was at the mercy of Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zuolin, and faced an increasingly volatile domestic situation. While the military governors and the KMC warlords ignored its orders, the KMT in Canton never recognised it. With Soviet aid, the KMC became the largest army in the North and was poised to dominate Beijing. This period also witnessed growing nationalism and anti-foreignism partly

³ For a detailed study of the war and its consequences, see Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism*. For a study of both sides' strategy before and during the war, see Kwong Chi Man, "Character and Circumstances: Wu Peifu and the Second Zhili-Fengtian War of 1924," unpublished M. Phil Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2007; Kwong Chi Man, "Searching for Decisive Battle: The Shanhaiguan-Rehe Campaign during the Second Zhili-Fengtian War of 1924," in Mak King Sang (ed.), *Decisive Battles in Chinese History* (Cosmobooks: Hong Kong, 2012), pp. 240-273.

⁴ Huang was a cabinet member at that time, but he was close to the KMT and Feng Yuxiang.

⁵ F 268/2/10, CPR (China Political Reports), 1911-1960, Vol.5, 102; Liu Manrong, "Sun Zhongshan 'Zhongyang geming' jihua yu Feng Yuxiang Beijing zhengbian," in *Zhonghua minguo shi yanjiu sanshidian* (Beijing, 2008), 1403.

⁶ The Gold Franc Dispute (*Jinfalang-an*) was a financial dispute between the Chinese, French, and Belgian governments over the Boxer Indemnity. As the result of the Chinese entering the First World War in 1917, the Chinese government was allowed to suspend the payment of the Boxer Indemnity for five years. After that, however, France, Belgium, and Italy insisted that the Chinese government should continue the payment and pay in gold instead of their depreciated currencies. This dispute was not solved until 1925. See Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism*, 32.

encouraged by the Soviets and their Chinese allies, especially after a British officer of the Shanghai Municipal Police had shot a group of Chinese protesters in Shanghai on May 30, 1925—an event that has become known as the May Thirtieth Incident.

Responding to Political Vacuum in North China and the Soviet Design

To respond to these developments, the Fengtian Clique took the following actions: 1) enhance its political prestige and geopolitical position through working with more legitimate figures; 2) extend Fengtian control in Central China; and 3) shift the cost of maintaining the Fengtian forces to China Proper.

The perceived Soviet and KMC threats, geopolitical concern, and financial considerations explained the above-mentioned moves. In December of 1924, the British Military Attaché in Beijing informed the Fengtian Clique of a Feng Yuxiang-Soviet plot to replace Duan with a commission headed by Sun Yat-sen. The Soviets promised to “exert pressure on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) to tie down the Fengtian forces” before Feng “expelled both Zhang and Duan.”⁷ Ever since this episode, the Fengtian Clique was determined to prevent the KMC from dominating Beijing and North China. Zhang told the Japanese in January of 1925 that it was his intention to “monitor the situation in Beijing.”⁸ According to the diplomatic representative of the Fengtian Clique, Yu Chonghan, the Clique wanted control of Shandong because it had to check Feng Yuxiang’s expansion in Henan and the Northwest.⁹ While the KMC extended its control over Henan, Shaanxi, Chahar, Suiyuan, Rehe, and Gansu during the year, the Fengtian Clique consolidated its control of Zhili (except for control of Beijing, which remained under KMC control), Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui in response.

Apparently, the Fengtian Clique was wary of the growing Soviet-Feng influence in Beijing. Zhang told his Japanese advisor Major General Kikuchi Takeo¹⁰ in January: “as there were no more men like Xu Shuzheng¹¹ around Duan Qirui,

⁷ Sai Tienshin sōryōji Yoshida, “Kimitsu yū hō dainigō,” 8/1/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050056500, slide 20.

⁸ Yoshida sōryōji, “dai go gō,” 11/1/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050056500, slide 32.

⁹ Sai Hōten sōryōji Funatsu, “U Chi'yukan (Yu Chonghan) no jikyokudan nikansuru ken,” 21/3/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050057100, slide 289. Zhang Zongchang was appointed military governor of Shandong in May.

¹⁰ See Appendix 1.

¹¹ Xu Shuzheng was a young general who was behind Duan Qirui’s military unification policy and the alliance of the beiyang militarists (the *dujuntuan*) between 1916 and 1920. He was later assassinated by Feng Yuxiang when he was trying to forge an alliance between Zhang Zuolin, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, and Duan Qirui in early 1926.

sooner or later Beijing will be filled with the ‘reds.’”¹² When Zhang met Sun Yat-sen in January, he refused to support Sun as long as the latter allied with the Soviets.¹³ Zhang said the same thing to Sun’s envoy Ye Gongchuo in 1923.¹⁴ As he believed that there was a Soviet-Feng plot against him, Zhang was dismayed by Duan’s inability to stop the intrusion of the KMC into Henan and Shaanxi. He suspected that Duan patronized the KMC to counter him.¹⁵ To “suppress Feng Yuxiang’s aggressiveness,” Zhang travelled to Tianjin from Mukden in May despite his subordinates’ opposition.¹⁶ As mentioned, Zhang’s anti-Soviet attitude was as much the product of his conservatism and the Soviet threat to his position in Manchuria as his desire to enlist domestic and international support. He told Major General Kikuchi that if the “reds” had occupied Beijing, he would “unleash his force” with the conviction that the powers would “rush to support him.”¹⁷

The Fengtian Clique also hoped the Provisional Government could improve its position in Northeast Asia. In particular, it wanted to recover the Chinese Eastern Railway during the new round of Sino-Soviet negotiations, which the Moscow-Beijing agreement reached in August of 1924 had promised would be held.¹⁸ However, Zhang Zuolin was convinced that the Chinese chief negotiator Wang Zhengting was pro-KMT and pro-Soviet. He was later persuaded by his subordinates to accept Wang, but he demanded the final say on matters concerning Manchuria.¹⁹ The failure of the Provisional Government to bring the Soviets to the negotiation table further convinced Zhang that it was under Soviet control.

¹² Sai Hōten soryōji dairi Uchiyama, “Chō Sakurin (Zhang Zuolin) kyū Yō Utei (Yang Yuting) no shigukudan nikansuru ken,” 14/1/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050056500, slide 43.

¹³ Hōten kōshochō Kamata Yasuke, “Sōn Bun (Sun Wen) to Chō Sakurin no kankei,” GK, JACAR, Bo3050056600, slide 56.

¹⁴ Xia'an huigao nianpu bianyinhui, *Ye Xia'an xiānshèng nianpǔ* (Shanghai, c. 1946), 217.

¹⁵ Funatsu sōryōji, “dai 33 gō,” 18/3/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050057100, slide 269. While Duan’s intention was unclear, his son Duan Hongye, who actively participated in politics during this period, was an ally of the KMC.

¹⁶ “Sir R. Macleay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Annual Report 1925,” 2/6/1926, F 3028/3028/10, op. cit, 307.

¹⁷ Sai Hōten soryōji dairi Uchiyama, “Chō Sakurin (Zhang Zuolin) kyū Yō Utei (Yang Yuting) no shigukudan nikansuru ken,” 14/1/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050056500, slide 43; Hōten kōshochō Kamata Yasuke, “Sōn Bun (Sun Wen) to Chō Sakurin no kankei,” GK, JACAR, Bo3050056600, slide 57.

¹⁸ CB, 26/3; 10/4/1925.

¹⁹ “Consul-General Wilkinson to Mr. Palairet,” 4/9/1925, F 2712/194/10, FOCP, Vol. 29, 157; CB, 11/5/1925.

Financial considerations also explained the Fengtian Clique's determination to maintain its influence over the Provisional Government. As Yu Chonghan told the Japanese, "finding a means to fund [Zhang Zongchang's army] was an urgent matter."²⁰ The cost of the War in 1924, some 70 million *yuan fengpiao* in total, led to drastic devaluation of the *fengpiao* (see Chapter 5). As the Fengtian Clique found it difficult to pay all of the Fengtian armies, making some of its generals military governors in China shifted the cost of maintaining their armies to the provinces in China. At that time, Duan Qirui had settled the Gold Franc dispute; it was expected the following Tariff Conference would bring a new source of revenue to the central government. In the same month, Zhang visited Cao Rulin, the head of the Bank of Communication, who had good relations with Duan, about using the French remittance of the Boxer Indemnity to cover his military expenditures.²¹

As Zhang lacked prestige and political authority to become a national leader, he worked with the head of the Provisional Government Duan Qirui even though he never fully trusted the latter. Zhang's image as a warlord remained a major obstacle as well. *Guowen Weekly*²² commented in May 1925:

[If] Zhang and Feng can abandon military build-up and concentrate on civilian endeavors... in a few years, the result will be apparent and they may win the approval of the people and become national leaders... If they act impetuously by [intervening in politics], all they can get is public condemnation...²³

Although Zhang was acknowledged as an important figure, he was not seen as having the legitimacy to play a major political role. The public attitude towards Zhang reflected the prevailing disgust towards warlordism. Although the period has often been portrayed as the prelude to a KMT-led national

²⁰ Sai Höten soryōji Funatsu, "U Chi'yukan (Yu Chonghan) no jikyokudan nikansuru ken," slide 289-90.

²¹ Funatsu soryōji (Consul Funatsu), "Su jorin no danwa yōryō hōkoku no ken (Main points of the conversation with Cao Yulin)," 26/5/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050058100, slide 170.

²² *Guowen Weekly* was a political commentary journal with Hu Lin, who also helped to establish the *Dagongbao*, as the chief editor. Started in August of 1924, *Guowen Weekly* was considered as one of the most prominent journals during the period and "widely read by educated Chinese" according to Japanese intelligence. After the KMT took Shanghai, the Guowen agency moved to Tianjin, and continued to publish through the 1930s. See "Shanghai" in *Shina (Fu Hon Kon (Hong Kong)) ni okeru shinbun kyū tsūshin ni kansuru chōsa*, 1926" in Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan (GGS), JACAR, Ref: Bo2130808100, slide 355.

²³ Zheng Zhi, "Buan zhi shiju," GW, Vol. 2, No. 18 (May 1925), 1.

revolution, a more apt description of the period would be a general lack of legitimacy and authority among the major political-military groups.²⁴ Despite Sun Yat-sen's personal popularity in Southern China (or more specifically some parts of Guangdong), the KMT was not popular in the North. Hu Lin, the editor of *Guowen Weekly* wrote: “[while] it is true that the *beiyang* warlords are to be blamed for the chaos, one can hardly agree that the southern warlords are of a different species.... Even without the manipulation from the North, their internal struggle goes on forever....”²⁵ To Hu, the KMT was only one of many southern factions during this period. *Dagongbao* (“The Impartial,” a Tianjin newspaper) commented in January:

“[The KMT’s two main agendas] are anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism. These two goals are indeed the popular demands of the nation...One should certainly praise the KMT’s ability to follow the trend...However, these two agendas are devoid of substance; no one would oppose them....”²⁶

It is telling that the right-wing KMT member Ye Chucang had to publish an article on *Guowen Weekly* to complain about the “unfair treatment” of the KMT by the press in August as the party was always being accused of “using” (*liyong*) the youth and the working-class.²⁷

Despite the revolutionary rhetoric he adopted when he was launching the coup in 1924, Feng Yuxiang was seen as a typical warlord. His coup was seen as merely an act of self-aggrandisement.²⁸ *Guowen* ridiculed his self-righteous attitude during the “revolution” to overthrow Cao Kun (Fig. 3.1):

After the shooting of the Chinese by the Shanghai Municipal Police in May and June, Feng Yuxiang called for war on Britain, but his rhetoric was criticized by intellectuals such as Liang Qichao and Ding Wenjiang for its emptiness.²⁹ Feng also had to deny being a communist and to claim that communism was not suitable for China.³⁰ This reflected the prevailing suspicion towards the role of the Soviet Union in the events in China despite the strong nationalistic

²⁴ See Arthur Waldron, *War to Nationalism*, 241-62.

²⁵ Zheng Zhi, “Beijing zhengbian hou zhi shiju,” GW, Vol. 1, No. 14 (Nov 1924), 2.

²⁶ “Mindang zhi zhengzhi shenghuo,” DGB, 18/1/1925.

²⁷ Ye Chucang, “Wei guomindang qingyuan yu yanlunjie,” GW, Vol. 2 No. 29 (Aug 1925), 18-9.

²⁸ Gong Zhan, “Beijing zhenbian ji,” GW, Vol. 1, No. 14 (Nov 1924), 6.

²⁹ “Mr. Palairret to Mr. Austen Chamberlain,” 5/7/1925, F 3914/194/10, FOCP, Vol. 29, 307; Liang Qichao, *Yinbingshi heji* (Beijing, 1989), Vol. 3, No. 42, 38; Ding Wenjiang, “Gaodiao yu zeren,” in CB, 19/6/1925, 3.

³⁰ Liu Jingzhong, et al, *Guominjun shigang* (Beijing, 2004).



FIGURE 3.1
Feng Yuxiang, bible in hand and dressed as a "Christian" priest, ousted Cao Kun, Guowen Weekly, Vol. 1, No. 14 (Nov 1924), 8.

feeling among the Chinese. On the other hand, the May Thirtieth Movement tarnished the reputation of Zhang Zuolin, who was convinced that the movement was a Soviet-KMC-KMT ploy for “domestic (political) purposes” and suppressed the anti-Foreign agitations.³¹ Since standing up against the foreigners became a source of political legitimacy especially after the May Thirtieth Incident, Zhang’s action cost him public support. As Consul-General Wilkinson pointed out, “...when Feng Yuxiang has undoubtedly increased his prestige in China and greatly strengthened his position by the support which he has given to the extremists, [Zhang Zuolin], on the contrary, would seem to have ruined his cause by opposing them...”³²

Lacking legitimacy and authority, the Fengtian Clique had little choice but to work with the Provisional Government. Throughout the summer of 1925, Fengtian delegates attended the meetings of the financial and

³¹ “Zhang Zuolin fu Wang Yongjiang dian,” 11/6/1925, FM, Vol. 2, 161.

³² “Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir R. Macleay,” 27/11/1925, FOCP, Vol. 30, 128.

military reconstruction committees and the Provisional National Assembly (*linshi canzhengyuan*). The provinces under Fengtian control held the elections of the delegates for the National Conference.³³ Still, the Fengtian Clique was attacked by the pro-KMT press such as *Jingbao*, which spread rumors about Zhang intending to proclaim himself president.³⁴ When Zhang was in Tianjin from May to August, he considered increasing his influence in Beijing by persuading Duan to reform the Provisional Government, but he abandoned the plan because his subordinates urged him to consider “the public mood.”³⁵ With limited prestige, Zhang could do little else than passively wait for the coming of the National and Tariff Conferences.

Zhang was unable to attract international support in 1925. The Japanese Consul-General in Mukden, Uchiyama Kiyoshi, suggested in January that the greatest problem for Japan would be if “Zhang became so strong that he might no longer rely on our (Japanese) support.”³⁶ The British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir Charles Eliot, noted that the Japanese “did not want to see him [Zhang] sweep the field and establish himself as the master of Peking, where he would have been out of their control.”³⁷ As Zhang insisted on playing a role in Chinese politics, Mukden-Tokyo relationship remained cool throughout the year.³⁸ Nor were the British sympathetic to Zhang. During a meeting with the

33 Hōten kōshochō Kamata Yasuke, “Hōten jōhō dai 40 gō,” 13/8/1925, in GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050059800, slide 38; Sai Kyokushigai (Juzijie) fukuryōji Shibasaki Roka, “Kokumin daihyō kaigi giin sho senkyo,” 27/8/1925, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050059800, slide 62; Sai Suchō (Suzhou) ryōji dairi Iwasaki Eizō, “Kokumin kaigi giin sho senkyo shikkō nikansuru ken,” 7/9/1925, GK, JACAR, Ref: Bo3050059900, slide 88.

34 “Chūō kakuha wakeau saikin sūsei – gō tsuki roku nich keihō (jingbao) shosai,” 6/5/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050057800, slide 20. Feng Yuxiang actually hoped Zhang would do that and lose all public sympathy “like Cao Kun.” Sai Pekin (Beijing) Banzai chūshō, “ban-den dai 59 gō,” 12/6/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050057900, slide 61. The editor of Jingbao Shao Piaoping (Zhenqing) was instrumental in forging the alliance between Feng Yuxiang and Guo Songling; he was later executed by the Shandong Army when they entered Beijing in April of 1926. See Sai Shina kōji Yoshizawa Kenkichi, “Keihō shachō (Shao Zhenqing) jūsatsu nikansuru ken,” GK, JACAR, Bo3040880700, slide 375.

35 CB, 5/6/1925; 7/6/1925; 19/7/1925; 24/7/1925; 11/8/1925; 29/8/1925.

36 Sai Hōten sōryōji Uchiyama, “Shina jikuoku no shōrai to Tōsanshō no tachiba nikansuru ken,” 19/1/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050056600, slide 72.

37 “Sir C. Elliot to Mr. Austen Chamberlain,” 16/1/1925, F 608/2/10, FOCP, Vol. 29, 6.

38 The cooling of this relationship was also because of Zhang's decision to build the Fengtian-Hailong Railway in July of 1925 despite Japanese protest. Citing the agreement between the Qing and the Japanese government, the Japanese believed that the new line jeopardized the business interests of the SMR. Zhang ignored the protest. Mizuno Akira, Zheng Liangsheng (tr.), 160-2; Gavan McCormack, 230; F 2348/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 340-2.

British Acting Consul-General Harold Porter of Mukden in February, Zhang complained about the unsupportive attitude of the British towards his anti-communist stand.³⁹ However, although Consul-General Frederick Wilkinson of Mukden pointed out that the Fengtian Clique “never abandoned the hope of allying with Britain,” London, which was more concerned with the China trade in general and the southern part of the country in particular, paid little heed to it throughout this period.⁴⁰

If the Japanese and British were unhelpful, the Soviets were hostile. As the Soviet Ambassador to China, Lev Karakhan, suggested during a special meeting of the Central Executive Committee held in Moscow in September, the goal of his government in 1925 was to “support the Canton regime, realize the agenda of the KMT in Peking, form a government in the capital, and create an alliance between the Zhili Clique, the KMC, and the Canton Government.”⁴¹ These actions would link up the Soviet allies in Northern and Southern China and establish a pro-Moscow regime that controlled the area from the Northwest to the Eastern and Southern seaboard of China. If this succeeded, the eastern flank of the Soviet Union would be secured. A successful “national revolution” in China might also spread the revolution to the Asian colonies, particularly India, causing much trouble for the British, seen by the Soviets as their most threatening enemy.⁴² In March of 1925, the China Committee was formed in Moscow by the Central Executive Committee to “coordinate the support of the KMT and other sympathetic organizations.”⁴³ In June of 1925, the Soviets decided to “launch a large scale propaganda attack” and to “divide and revolutionize” Zhang’s army.⁴⁴

To achieve these goals, the Soviets armed and funded the KMC and the KMT, sponsored the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord movements, and encouraged

³⁹ During the Second Zhili-Fengtian War, the British attempted to prevent the shipment of French aircraft to Fengtian. “Acting Consul-General Porter to Sir R. Macleay,” 13/2/1925, F 1427/2/10, FOCP, Vol. 29, 67.

⁴⁰ “Mr. Palairet to Mr. Austen Chamberlain,” 19/5/1925, F 2789/2/10, FOCP, Vol. 29, 164; “Consul-General Wilkinson to Mr. Palairet,” 4/9/1925, F 2712/194/10, FOCP, Vol. 29, 157.

⁴¹ “Chūō shikkō inki tokubetsu kaigi sekijō ni o kuru Karakhan no Shina nikansuru kōtō hōkoku (Karakhan’s oral report on the Special Meeting of the Central Executive Committee about China),” 11-14/9/1925, GK, JACAR, B03050060100, slides 180-2.

⁴² John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command: a Military-Political History, 1918-1941* (London, 2001), 238.

⁴³ Xue Xiantian, Jin Dongji, *Minguo shiqi zhongsu guanxi shi* (Beijing, 2009), 144-5.

⁴⁴ “E-gong (Bolshevik) zhongyang zhengzhi ju huiyi di 68 hao (tezhi di 51 hao),” in *Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi diyi yanjiubu, Liangong (Bu) gongchan guoji yu Zhongguo guomin geming yundong, 1926-1927* (Beijing, 1998), 636.

an anti-Fengtian alliance.⁴⁵ In exchange, Feng and the KMT recognized the Soviet position in Outer Mongolia, Northwest China, and the CER.⁴⁶ By intensifying their propaganda effort in China, the Soviets were instrumental in encouraging the anti-foreign outbreaks in May of 1925.⁴⁷ According to the intelligence obtained by the Japanese Minister to Vienna, Akatsuka Shōsuke, in October of 1925, based on the decision of the Central Executive Committee, Karakhan urged the Soviet organs in Beijing to “use all means to sabotage the Tariff Conference” because its success would prevent a revolution in China.⁴⁸ The Polish military attaché in Mukden found that the Soviets had handed 200,000 *yuan* to Guo Songling, a Fengtian general who later rebelled against Zhang Zuolin, and that they had tried to bribe the Chinese garrison and offi-

-
- 45 According to Japanese sources and the receipt confiscated during the raid of the Legation Quarter in April of 1927, from April to December of 1925 Feng received munitions worth over 11 million gold rubles. Over 40 Soviet instructors served in the First KMC alone. By being Feng's only source of arms, the Soviets hoped to secure their control over him. In October, not long before the war, the Soviets lent a further 2,000,000 yuan to Feng. “Sir R. Macleay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain,” 28/10/1925, F 6107/2/10, FOCP, Vol. 30, 64; “Sir R. Macleay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain,” 31/10/1925, F 6020/2/10, FOCP, Vol. 30, 67-9; “Sir R. Macleay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain” 24/11/1925, F 307/307/10, FOCP, Vol. 30, 99-100; Sai O(Austria) Akatsuka Shōsuke kōji, “Kyokutō hakenin hōkoku fū (Feng Yuxiang) to Rokoku (Russia) to kōshō no nikansuru ken,” 29/10/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo2030817700, slide 182; Yang Yuqing, “Guominjun yu e-gong (Bolsheviks) zhongyang zhengzhiju zhongguo weiyuanhui,” in *Jindaishi Yanjiu*, 2000, No. 3, 118.
- 46 In the spring of 1925, Feng agreed that Northwest China, including Shaanxi and Gansu, would form a “buffer federation.” In addition, two railways between Northwest China and “Mongolia” would be built, and the Soviets would have the right to settle inland. In April, the China Committee of the Politburo demanded that Feng recognize the Soviet Union’s position in “Mongolia” (it did not specify whether Inner or Outer) and to allow the establishment of concessions within the KMC controlled area. “Rokoku (Russia) to Fūng Yokushō (Feng Yuxiang) to no mitsu yaku nikansuru ken,” 13/10/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo3050149200, slide 300; Xu Jianying, *Minguo shiqi de Yingguo yu Zhongguo Xinjiang* (Urumqi, 2008), 90.
- 47 “Mr. Palairat to Mr. Austen Chamberlain,” 22/5/1925, F 2794/144/10, FOCP, Vol. 29, 167-8; “Sir R. Macleay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Annual Report, 1925,” 2/6/1926, F 3028/3028/10, FOCP, Vol. 19, 341-2. The Soviet actions breached the Sino-Soviet Agreement in 1924 that forbade subversive activities. However, it should be noted that the Fengtian Clique’s cooperation with the White Army also violated the same treaty.
- 48 Sai O (Austria) Akatsuka Shōsuke kōji, “Kyokutō hakenin hōkoku fū (Feng Yuxiang) to Rokoku (Russia) to kōshō no nikansuru ken,” 29/10/1925, GK, JACAR, Bo2030817700, slide 179.

cials in the CER zone before Guo took action.⁴⁹ The Soviets also sought rapprochement with the Japanese. In January, they agreed to recognize the Japanese interests in Southern Manchuria in return for Japanese recognition of Soviet rights in the CER. The Soviets even recognized the Twenty-One Demands three months later.⁵⁰

The Anti-Fengtian War of 1925

Despite the domestic and geopolitical pressures, if the Fengtian Clique had succeeded in maintaining peace when the National and Tariff Conferences were sitting, the Beijing Government could have regained tariff autonomy and proclaimed a new constitution. If that had been the case, public opinion might have become more supportive of the National Conference and Duan Qirui. This would have meant the restoration of a central government with authority over Manchuria and a substantial part of North and Central China. The Fengtian Clique, as a supporter of Duan's government, would have been able to play a greater political and diplomatic role.

However, the possibility of the above-mentioned developments prompted the potential losers to take action. As the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out in October, the expansion of the Fengtian sphere of influence in 1925 sped up the anti-Fengtian alliance:

[As it is believed that] the success of the Tariff and National Conferences will be fatal for their faction, the Zhili Clique and other unsatisfied elements are now rallying around the Hubei warlord (Shao Yaonan) with Wu Peifu as their leader and persuading Sun Chuanfang and Feng Yuxiang to take action... It is commonly seen that the army of the anti-Fengtian coalition is of no match against the Fengtian Army....⁵¹

Sun Chuanfang, the military governor of Zhejiang, attacked the Fengtian forces in Jiangsu in early October. A quick victory against Sun might have prevented the spread of war, but the Fengtian forces were caught off guard and were defeated in Xuzhou. The KMC seized the opportunity and invaded Zhili and

49 "Colonel Piggot to Sir C. Eliot," in "Sir C. Eliot to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 18/1/1925, F 613/10/10, FOCP, Vol. 8, 7; Gavan McCormack, 296; according to Zheng Dianqi Guo received 400,000 from the Dal Banque. See, Zheng Dianqi, 281. Kantōgun Sambochō, "dai 439 gō," 20/11/1925, GK, B03050149300, slide 389.

50 Bruce Elleman, "The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the CER, 1924-1925," in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (May, 1994), 478-9.

51 "Hō-ses (Fengtian-Zhejiang) sensō jōhō," 20/10/1925, GK, JACAR, B03050060200, slide 234.

Shandong, held by Fengtian generals Li Jinglin⁵² and Zhang Zongchang. Guo Songling, who was the commander of the Fengtian main army, allied with Feng and turned against Zhang on November 22nd. He was joined by KMT representatives such as Qi Shiying. To convince the soldiers turn back to Mukden, Guo and his collaborators had to tell the soldiers that Manchuria had been invaded by the Japanese.⁵³ Guo almost succeeded in overthrowing Zhang, but the latter weathered the storm in December because Zhang Zongchang and Li Jinglin's resistance in Shandong and Zhili prevented Feng from supporting Guo.

Efficient bureaucracy partly explained why Fengtian emerged victorious. Before Guo Songling rebelled in November, his troops had been armed, clothed, and fed by means of a modern logistical system. By ordering his army to rebel against Zhang, Guo cut his army off from its own supply line.⁵⁴ While Guo's army lacked everything and had to resort to foraging for food during the rebellion, Zhang's loyalists were abundantly supplied. For example, Mukden mustered 3,041,796 bags of dried rice for Zhang's army throughout the conflict. The Fengtian Military Food Factory (*liangmochang*) processed 5,000 cans of tinned beef in a day.⁵⁵ According to the report of the Kwantung Army, the Fengtian soldiers received "dried rice, flour, canned beef, salted meat and fish, and biscuits," all rare items in other armies in China. They were produced by the *liangmochang* or requisitioned by the civilian authorities in the counties.⁵⁶ The Fengtian Arsenal and Clothing Factory (*Fengtian pifuchang*) worked overnight to produce munitions and uniforms. *Baojia* recruits and the cadets of the Fengtian Military Academy were sent to the front.⁵⁷ It was the organizational

⁵² See Appendix 1.

⁵³ Guo Jingsan, "Guanyu Guomin gemingjun zhongshiling Guo Songling dao Zhang Zuolin de jingguo," in Rao Dongfan et, al, *Guo Songling fanfeng jianwen* (Beijing, 2008), 95. This book is a collection of the unpublished *wenshi ziliao* collected during the 1960s about Guo Songling's rebellion. It contains much new information about the rebellion.

⁵⁴ Kwong Chi Man, "Revisiting the Zhang Zuolin-Guo Songling War of 1925," in *Bulletin of Academia Historica*, Vol. 31 (Mar 2012), 1-38.

⁵⁵ Each pack is for one man's meal. Kantōgun Sambōbu, "Chō (Zhang)-Kaku (Guo) sen ni otekuru Shina guntai nikansuru shokansatsu hei hon senran ni kanren suru shobuntai, 3/1926, RDN, JACAR, C03022778300, slide 826.

⁵⁶ Kantōgun Sambōbu, "Chō (Zhang)-Kaku (Guo) senshi sōfu no ken," RDN, JACAR, C03022778300, slide 351.

⁵⁷ Between December 4th and 24th, the Fengtian Arsenal sent 54,569 rounds of artillery shells to the front despite it being closed for seven days to prepare for a possible demolition; each field gun had around 500 rounds. Given the relatively small scale of Chinese warfare, this was a substantial number. See Kantōgun Sambōbu, "Chō (Zhang)-Kaku (Guo) senshi sōfu no ken," slide 357; Kantōgun Sambōbu, "Chō (Zhang)-Kaku (Guo)

and bureaucratic efficiency of the Fengtian Clique, rather than the alleged Japanese assistance, that explained Guo Songling's "dramatic" defeat.

Although Zhang Zuolin survived, one of his best commanders, Jiang Dengxun, was murdered by Guo. Zhang Xueliang, who was Guo Songling's patron, was alienated. Although it suffered few casualties, the army had to be re-equipped, reorganized, and re-formed. The war also affected the economic situation in Manchuria and public confidence towards *fengpiao*. To prevent a possible Japanese intervention, Zhang signed a personal agreement with General Mutō Nobuyoshi, the Commander of the Kwantung Army, promising the Japanese to build five more trunk lines of the South-Manchurian Railway. In return, the Japanese declared that the SMR lines and the area within 12 kilometers of the line were demilitarized zones, and refused to allow Guo Songling's army to enter Yingkou.⁵⁸ The personal agreement between Zhang and the Japanese had haunted the former throughout the rest of his political career (and life).⁵⁹ Despite the difficulties above, however, the Fengtian Clique launched another strategic offensive in China Proper in order to maintain its position in Manchuria. This decision led to a new round of fighting in 1926.

sen ni otekuru Shina guntai nikansuru shokansatsu hei hon senran ni kanren suru shobuntai," slide 777.

- 58 On December 8th, the Kwantung Army issued the first warning towards the belligerent armies, claiming that Japanese interest should not be affected by the war. In respond, Guo asked for a definite extent of the Japanese Army's garrison zone. The Japanese government then declared a "demilitarized zone" stretching 12 km from both sides of the South Manchuria Railway on December 15th. On December 12th, one of Guo Songling's brigade was about to enter Yingkou, a city controlled by Zhang. The Kwantung Army refused entry of that brigade, claiming that the demilitarized zone was 30 km from both sides of the SMR. As it was clarified by the Japanese government on December 15th, Guo's brigade was allowed to stay within 4 km from Yingkow, as the Kwantung Army was ordered not to interfere with armies that were already within the demilitarized zone before the declaration. The Kwantung Army was ordered to disarm any Chinese armies entering the demilitarized zone, no matter whether they were "retreating or pursuing." Although that means Guo's army could not enter Shenyang directly, it also denied Zhang's army of a retreating route if they were defeated near their last line of defense in Juliuhe. See Kantōgun Sambōbu, "Chō (Zhang)-Kaku (Guo) senshi sōfu no ken," RDN, JACAR, C03022778300, slides 244-51; 252-7.
- 59 Rao Dongfan, "Guo Songling fandui feng Zhang dongjun jianwen jilue," in Rao Dongfan, et al., 12. Rao Dongfan, with the rank of Colonel, was a staff officer of Zhang Zuolin's headquarters during Guo Songling's rebellion.

Phase II, January-September 1926

The Fengtian Clique's Attempt to Restore the Beijing Government

During the chaotic Anti-Fengtian War, Wu Peifu re-emerged from his enclave in Sichuan and took command of the ex-Zhili forces in Central China. The restoration of Wu's control over the Zhili forces was not without problems; although many of the ex-Zhili militarists accepted his command, the local Hunan and Hubei units were less loyal. Provincial military leaders such as Tang Shengzhi also threatened Wu's position.⁶⁰ Sun Chuanfang, previously the Zhili military governor of Zhejiang, styled himself as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army of Five Provinces (*wushenglianjun*) while nominally recognizing Wu's authority. After allying with Wu Peifu in January of 1926, the Fengtian Clique counter-attacked against Feng Yuxiang, who was behind the anti-Fengtian alliance. As the Fengtian forces invaded Beijing from Shandong and Manchuria in January of 1926, troops under Wu entered Zhili and Henan from Hubei. Feng himself left China for Russia, but the Soviets helped him to build a fortified position at Nankou, around 30km from Beijing. Anxious to make peace with Zhang and Wu, his subordinates expelled Duan Qirui from Beijing in April. The result of these events was the restoration of the central government as before Feng's Coup in 1924. By mid-1926, the Fengtian Clique was able to achieve its goals of 1924-1925, namely to have a major say in the Beijing Government and its foreign policy concerning Northeast Asia, maintain a foothold in China Proper, and gain a share of the Tariff revenue.

Again, the situation in Northeast Asia shaped the Fengtian Clique's strategy. Its intention during this phase was apparent from Zhang Zuolin's response to the telegram issued in January of 1926 in Duan Qirui's name, ordering all factions to stop fighting:

The government allowed the KMC to advance towards Luanzhou (near Shanhaiguan) and let the Foreign Ministry discuss with Karakhan Soviet rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway ... Duan's government is already the puppet of traitors. I decided to maintain [my] rightful position in the CER and eliminate the KMC.... Soon [my army] will join Wu Peifu's force and the Shandong Army in the Central Plains.⁶¹

60 Zang Zhuo; Cai Dengshan (ed.), *Zang Zhuo huixilu* (Taibei: Independent Author, 2015), 186-9. Zang was the secretary of Tang during this period.

61 Shentian shibao, 26/1/1926.

Even before the above quote appeared on the *Shuntian Shibao*, Zhang ordered the Fengtian and Shandong armies to advance towards Beijing and Tianjin.⁶² The security of the Fengtian Clique's position in Manchuria and the central government was inseparable in Zhang Zuolin's mind; when addressing his troops in 1925, Zhang claimed: "[I] joined the Republic [after the 1911 Revolution] because I believed that I can protect our territory with the support of the central government."⁶³ The Fengtian Clique had many reasons to prevent the KMC from controlling the central government: in December of 1926, the Polish government sent the British Foreign Office a report about the recommendations of the *Revvoensoviet* (Revolutionary Military Council of USSR) for China and Northeast Asia. It stated that although "military action [to occupy the CER] should be avoided, it is advisable to await a suitable moment when not only Soviet claims would be satisfied, but consent would be obtained for the introduction of Red Army detachments into Manchuria for the protection of Soviet interests."⁶⁴ A pro-Soviet government in Beijing would have granted such consent, which would have allowed Soviet garrison within Manchuria. Thus, as soon as a friendly government was restored, the Fengtian Clique demanded Karakhan's dismissal, a greater say in the Sino-Soviet negotiations, and more autonomy to deal with Manchuria's diplomatic issues.⁶⁵

The dispute between Zhang Zuolin and his civilian ally the Governor of Fengtian Wang Yongjiang also revealed the importance of Northeast Asia in the Fengtian Clique's strategy. Wang resigned in mid-February in protest

62 "Zhang Zuolin zhi Zhang Zongchang diangao," 26/1/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 2.

63 Wang Xianglun, "Sanci xunjiao de zuiyi," in *Liaoning wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 1 (Shenyang, 1982), 61.

64 "War Office to Foreign Office – The R.V.S., The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Situation in China," 19/12/1926, FOCP, Vol. 31, 368.

65 For expulsion of Karakhan: SR, 3/5/1926; For greater say in Sino-Soviet negotiation: SR, 3/9/1926; 17/1/1927; SR, 6/9/1926, 3; Tang Qihua, "1924-1927 nian zhong-e huiyi yanjiu," in *Jindaishi yanjiu*, 2007, No. 4, 51-52; For diplomatic autonomy: Höten kōshochō den," 7/6/1926, in GK, KNKZ/SB, Vol. 38, No. 2, Bo3050062000, JACAR, slide 48; Yoshizawa kōshi, "dai 401 gō," 17/6/1926, in GK, KNKZ/SB, Vol. 38, No. 2 Bo3050062000, JACAR, slides 49-50; Wang Yuchao, *Beiyang renshi hua cangsang* (Beijing, 1993), 121; Hori Yoshitaka kōji dairi, "dai 492 gō," 4/8/1926, GK, Bo3050158800, slide 331; Hori Yoshitaka kōji dairi, "Tōsanshō no gaikō kengen kakuchōsetsu nikansuru ken (About the rumor of the expansion of the diplomatic power of the Three Eastern Provinces)," 17/8/1926, GK, Bo3050192600, slides 292-3; SR, 3/8; 15/8/1926. Wang Yuchao's book was a collection of the reminiscences of the beiyang statesmen and soldiers during the period. Some of these were not included in the *Wenshi Ziliao* series.

against the war with Feng Yuxiang.⁶⁶ Due to his importance in the Manchurian government, Wang's resignation was a major blow to the Fengtian Clique. When Zhang refused to end the war, Wang attacked his policy in public.⁶⁷ However, the fundamental difference between Zhang and Wang was not so much about war. As Zhang Zuolin pointed out, Wang had approved of the previous wars from 1920 to 1924.⁶⁸ Whilst Zhang and Wang wanted to preserve the Fengtian Clique's position in Manchuria, they adopted different approaches. Wang preferred ignoring what happened in China, but Zhang was convinced that his base was in danger as long as pro-Soviet elements controlled Beijing. A senior officer of the Clique, Zhang Jinghui, told the Japanese that although Zhang understood the war was not popular and financially damaging, he was convinced that he had to "stop the 'reds'."⁶⁹

The fundamental difference between Zhang and Wang was regarding Manchuria's role in republican and regional politics. It is instructive to see that a close associate of Wang told the Japanese that Wang's resignation was "a blow to the Japanese policy in Manchuria."⁷⁰ The British Consul-General in Mukden pointed out that the difference between the two men was one "between provincial/regional interest and national interest."⁷¹ Zhang saw the Soviet influence in Northern China and Mongolia not only as a threat to his regime but also to China, as their security was inseparable. He could not turn to the Japanese for protection because this would imperil his position in Manchuria. This explains why, despite the unpopularity of the war and Wang's resignation, Zhang believed he had no option but to fight in China Proper.

However, Zhang still lacked the prestige to play a greater political role in China Proper. While the northern press talked of the "red menace" after the chaos in Beijing in late 1925, it also saw Zhang's success against Guo as the result of Japanese intervention.⁷² Zhang had to work with Wu Peifu, who

⁶⁶ Hōten kōshochō Kamata Yasuke, "Ō shōchō no dan (Governor Wang's talk)," 30/1/1926, GK, Bo3050192100, slide 7.

⁶⁷ "Ō shōchō jishoku no riyū heiin Hōten seikyoku nikansuru hiken (Governor Wang's reasons for his resignation and my humble opinion)," GK, Bo3050192300, slide 151.

⁶⁸ Kantōgun shireikan, "dai 144 gō," 11/3/1925, GK, Bo3050192200, slide 104.

⁶⁹ Uchiyama soryōji dairi, "Jikyoku ni daishi Chō Kei-e no danwa nikansuru ken (Report on Zhang Jinghui's talk on the current political situation)," 5/3/1926, GK, Bo3050192200, slide 88.

⁷⁰ Uchiyama soryōji dairi, "Ō shōchō no kyoshū nikansuru ken (Report on Wang Yongjiang's future)," 13/3/1926, GK, Bo3050192300, slide 128.

⁷¹ "Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir R. Macleay," 4/3/1926, F 2028/10/10, FOCP, Vol. 30, 356.

⁷² Shen Yu, "Zhangliao weliao zhi zhongdong tieluan yu ruoji ruoli zhi dongsansheng," GW, Vol. 3, No. 5 (Jan 1926), 1.

lacked the means and competence to stabilize the situation. After he recaptured Beijing in April of 1926, Zhang stated that there were “no other suitable candidates for the positions of president and vice-president apart from himself and Wu, but the political issue should be discussed openly rather than dictated by those in power.”⁷³ He was ambitious, but he understood that he was not welcomed as the master of Beijing.

The Fengtian Clique’s “anti-red campaign” received scant public support. The people in Manchuria saw the war as an unnecessary venture that disrupted the economy. Those in China Proper opposed any war. The journalist Yan Shenyu condemned the Fengtian Clique for continuing the war and suggested that “the warlords are far from enlightened.”⁷⁴ A cartoon published in the *Guowen Weekly* in March 1926 showed three soldiers with the initials “Wu,” “Feng,” and “Zhang” playing on a seesaw supported by a man in agony (Fig. 3.2).

The press reported the Fengtian Clique and Wu Peifu’s victory against Feng Yuxiang with little enthusiasm. *Shishi Xinbao* in Shanghai commented: “Even if Zhang and Wu could cooperate...we should not be too optimistic about our country’s future... their character, nature, and experience make them ‘far-right’ figures..”⁷⁵ *Shishi Xinbao* was a widely read newspaper among intellectuals and was the paper for the Research Clique, a political group with Liang Qichao as its leader.⁷⁶ This reflected the Fengtian Clique’s lack of support among intellectuals, some of whom turned to the KMT or the “Nationalist faction” and were instrumental in shaping public opinion. Zhang and the Fengtian Clique’s unpopularity prevented them from playing a more active role in the restoration of the central government before the NRA launched the Northern Expedition.

Meanwhile, although the KMT’s quick victory against Wu Peifu in August of 1926 astonished the nation, the reception of the KMT in the North was mixed. A commentator with the pen name “Lao Gan” stated in October:

The warlords and bureaucrats certainly saw it [the Northern Expedition] as the spread of communism... The common people had no other opinion than opposing all wars... None of the “classes” (*jieji*) in China had such a diverse view as the “intellectual class” (*zhishi jieji*) had. The intel-

73 “Zhengfu zhongtung yu Zhang,” SR, 21/5/1926.

74 Shen Yu, “Zhanshi fufa zhi weiji,” GW, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Jan 1926), 1.

75 Zheng Zhi, “Henan zhizhan,” GW, Vol. 3, No. 6 (Feb 1926), 1.

76 Zhang Yufa, “Xinwenhua yundong shiqi de xinwen yu yanlun, 1915-1923,” in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1994), 290.



FIGURE 3.2

Three soldiers playing. "The people are the only sufferers," circa 3/1926, in Guowen zhoubaoshe, "Tizhoujian guoneiwei dashi shuping," in Shen Yunlong, Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan, Vol. 1 (Taipei, 1985), 509.

lectuals in China, perhaps with the exception of those in Canton, had no consensus view towards Chiang Kai-shek.⁷⁷

"Lao Gan" suggested that besides supporting or opposing the KMT's party rule, many hoped "Chiang would not play with communism, become a Soviet puppet, or turn into a warlord." During this period, the KMT lacked strong popular support in Northern China, but it was viewed in a more favorable light than Zhang Zuolin, who was seen as nothing but a warlord.

Improving the Internal and External Situation through Decisive Battle: The Battle of Nankou, 1926

The geopolitical and international positions of the Fengtian Clique slightly improved in early 1926 because the Soviet attempt to destroy the Clique was thwarted by the victory over Guo Songling. The Japanese were anxious to prevent the Fengtian Clique being involved in China again. Japanese Foreign

⁷⁷ Lao Gan, "Chuanguo zhishi jieji duiyu Jiang Jieshi beifa ying caiqu hezhong taidu," GW, Vol. 3, No. 38 (Oct 1926), 1-2.

Minister, Shidehara Kijūrō, ordered Consul-General Yoshida Shigeru of Mukden (a future Prime Minister in post-war Japan whose diplomatic career was closely linked to Manchuria) to “persuade” Zhang and the Fengtian Clique to stay away from Chinese politics in April. The Japanese feared that a renewal of the conflict between Wu and Zhang might lead to an anti-Japanese movement in China, as the latter was seen by the Chinese as a Japanese henchman.⁷⁸ Thus, Japanese representatives from the Army and the Foreign Ministry pressured Zhang throughout the summer to pull out of China.⁷⁹

On the other hand, although the British did not recognize the Beijing Government restored by Wu and Zhang, they welcomed an alliance between the two, especially when the Fengtian Army was poised to capture Nankou, a strategic pass northwest of Beijing, from the KMC. In June, through his Chinese Secretary Eric Teichman, the British Minister to China Sir Ronald Macleay urged Wu “with all the earnestness he could command” that he “should lose no time in settling any outstanding differences between him and Marshal Chang [Zhang], with special reference to the constitutional issue, in order that through the loyal cooperation of the two marshals the Kuo Min-chun might be speedily eliminated, or absorbed in the allied combination, and a stable Central Government established, representing a real coalition of the principal leaders in Northern China.”⁸⁰ By evicting the KMC from Beijing and capturing Nankou, the Fengtian Clique was finally seen by the British as an indispensable player in the North. However, because of the KMT’s success in Southern China, the British were to change their attitude soon, as the next section suggests.

The bureaucratic and logistic apparati that saved the Fengtian Clique in 1925 served it well again in his counterattack against Feng Yuxiang in 1926. Only the well-armed and well-supplied Fengtian Army could overcome KMC’s position in Nankou, which was deemed by foreign observers “practically impregnable unless first destroyed by heavy artillery.”⁸¹ The Fengtian forces concentrated their artillery to overcome the KMC’s position, a tactical feat

⁷⁸ Sai Peking Kyōshikan fu bukan, “dai 67 gō,” 17/4/1926, RDN, C01003770100, slide 12.

⁷⁹ “Shina jikyoku taisaku nikansuru ken (Suggestions to the measures taken for the situation in China),” 2/8/1926, GK, B02031895100, slides 198-200; “Jikan yori Matsui komon no denhō an (Draft telegram from the Deputy Minister of Army to Advisor Matsui),” 30/8/1926, RDN, C01003770800, slides 2-3, 7-11; “Jikan yori Matsui rikugun shōshō an (Draft telegram from the Deputy Minister of Army to Major General Matsui in Mukden),” 8/1926, RDN, C01003770800, slides 19-21; “Minister Shidehara’s telegram to Consul General Yoshida (no title),” 24/8/1926, RDN, C01003770800, slides 13-4.

⁸⁰ “Sir R. Macleay to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 16/8/1926, FOCP, Vol. 31, 63.

⁸¹ “Sir R. Macleay to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 30/9/1926, FOCP, Vol. 31, 215.

unseen in China.⁸² The ammunition needed was supplied by the Mukden Arsenal through the Beijing-Mukden Railway, managed by Chang Yinhuai, Yang Yuting's lieutenant.⁸³ This was a stark contrast with Wu Peifu's army, which was supported by the poorly managed Hanyang Arsenal and Beijing-Hankow Railway. The head of the Beijing-Hankow Railway reported in August that his railway was "unmanageable" because of the Zhili soldiers, who tried to run the railway without expertise.⁸⁴

Zhang's success at Nankou, however, partly led to a rather unexpected result. The Soviet representatives in China now urged the KMT in Guangdong to launch the Northern Expedition, before the situation in North China turned completely in Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu's favor. Meanwhile, Tang Shengzhi, the commander of a Hunan army nominally under Wu's command, rose against him and turned to the KMT in the summer of 1926. This led to an immediate advance into Hunan by the KMT forces, thus starting the Northern Expedition. The logistics problem that caused much difficulty for Wu during the Nankou campaign became the death knell for his cause, while he was trying to reinforce his beleaguered forces in Wuhan in August and September. Stretched along the Beijing-Hankow Railway, Wu's army fell apart when the NRA captured Hunan and Hubei in quick succession. The remainder of this force stayed in Henan and became several independent units led by Wu's subordinates such as Jin Yun-e, Tian Weiqin, and Qiu Yingjie. The KMT then split after occupying Hubei; instead of continue the northward drive, Chiang Kai-shek, the commander of the NRA, turned his force to Jiangxi and clashed with that of Sun Chuanfang.

Although the Fengtian Clique's victory in Nankou did not come quick enough to secure it more British support, and was somehow overshadowed by the KMT's success in Wuhan, the victory allowed the Clique to dominate North China after Wu Peifu's fall. *Dagongbao* noted in September: "after Wu's defeat in Wuhan... the public was shaken and the focus of all sides turned to Zhang Zuolin, the strongest figure in the North."⁸⁵ In the next phase, the Fengtian Clique was determined to use the opportunity to advance its position in Beijing and Northern China.

⁸² Zhang Renhong, "Dongbei paobing gaishu ji Zhou Zuohua yiwen," in *Liaoning wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 20, 134.

⁸³ SR, 19/5/1926; 30/6/1926. According to *Shijie ribao*, the Beijing-Mukden railway run by Fengtian was in "good condition."

⁸⁴ SR, 15/8/1926.

⁸⁵ DGB, 26/9/1926.

Phase III, September 1926-June 1927

Seeking Peaceful Resolution through War: The Creation of the Anguojun

Facing the collapse of the central government, increasing Japanese pressure, and a resurgence of Soviet influence in China, the Fengtian Clique allied with the northern warlords and created the *Anguojun*. It then launched a limited offensive to unify North China. This strategy was also a response to Wu Peifu's fall; the alternative to this course of action was to seek Japanese or the Soviets support or to accept the return of Feng Yuxiang in North China. In November of 1926, Zhang Zuolin invited most of his generals and some of the prominent northern warlords, including Sun Chuanfang, Zhang Zongchang, and Yan Xishan to discuss the situation in Peking. He then proclaimed the formation of the National Pacification Army (*Anguojun*), an alliance of warlords in Northern China. When Zhang assumed the position as the Commander-in-Chief of the *Anguojun*, the *Guowen Weekly* summarized the situation and the common expectation in the North after Wu had been defeated:

The Fengtian Clique...is the largest military group north of the Yangtze. If Zhang intends to pacify the Central Plain (*zhongyaun*) by force, he has to take responsibility [for the central government]. Even if Zhang prefers a political solution, he should stand up and present his policies to the nation.⁸⁶

The power vacuum in the North was probably in the Fengtian leadership's mind when they proposed to divide the country with the KMT during their negotiations from March to August of 1927. As early as August of 1926, Jiang Zuobin, a Hubei general who worked for the KMT beginning in 1926, was sent to Mukden by the Nationalist Government in Canton to discuss an alliance with the Fengtian Clique. The KMT promised to "end the Northern Expedition as where they reached (at Hubei)," allow Mukden to expand southwards, and make Zhang Zuolin the "chair of the central executive committee" of the national government. In turn, the Fengtian Clique demanded that the KMT could only control Hunan, Hubei, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangdong, and Guangxi. Zhang Zuolin or a northern candidate would be elected as the president, and the southerners would become vice-president and the first premier. The Fengtian Clique also demanded the KMT to "shake off foreign influence" in order to "prevent the civil war from escalating into an

86 "Guoneiwai yizhoujian dashiji," GW, Vol. 3, No. 44 (Nov 1926), 2-3.

international conflict." Party rule (*dangzhi*) was also rejected.⁸⁷ With Wu Peifu no longer an obstacle, the Fengtian Clique was now determined to further its influence to become not only the military but also the political leader of the North. In December, Li Dazhao reported to the KMT that Yang Yuting had drawn up a plan for Zhang's presidential campaign. Yang stressed that Zhang had to be the undisputed political and military leader in the North before assuming the highest position through a representative body with nation-wide participation, something similar to the aborted National Conference of 1925.⁸⁸

The idea of having a friendly central government to secure Fengtian's position in Northeast Asia and the perceived Soviet menace continued to prompt the Fengtian Clique to fight in China. During further negotiations with the KMT, the Fengtian Clique continued to demand the KMT to break away with the Soviets and asked for a free hand to deal with Feng Yuxiang; as CCP intelligence pointed out, he remained Zhang's "greatest fear."⁸⁹ Besides Feng's repeated use of treachery and assassination,⁹⁰ Zhang objected to Feng as a puppet of the Soviets, who were threatening his position in Northeast Asia.

In late August, the Fengtian Clique decided to sever communications between Feng and the Soviets by occupying Chahar and Suiyuan.⁹¹ The Clique also considered encouraging the Mongolian Princes to resist the Soviets in Outer Mongolia.⁹² The Japanese Army found that soon after the KMC had left Beijing, a new Mongolian army was formed by the Soviets to "prepare for a possible war with Fengtian and the revival of the KMC."⁹³ In the above-mentioned Polish intelligence report, the *Revvoensoviet* suggested, "the military-political importance of the USSR in relation to the civil war in China is considerably increased owing to [the USSR's] almost uncontrolled influence on Mongolia. Mongolia and its military forces may be regarded almost entirely as the reserve

⁸⁷ See Shanghai chūzai bukan (Naval Attaché in Shanghai), "kimitsu dai 187 ban den," 28/9/1926, GK, B03050161200, slide 216; Yang Tianshi, 232.

⁸⁸ "Li Dazhao guanyu zhuci Beijing zhengzhi fenhui baogaoshu," ZMDZH, Vol. 4, 1022-1023.

⁸⁹ "Feng-Yan lianhe wenti yu duifeng zhengce," 10/1/1926, in Zhongyang danganguan, *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuANJI*, Vol. 2 (Beijing, 1982), 420; Yang Tianshi, 222-3.

⁹⁰ In 1922, Feng had the commander of the Second Henan Division executed after capturing Zhengzhou; in 1925 he had Xu Shuzheng assassinated. These actions caused outrage among the Northern militarists.

⁹¹ "Zhang Zuolin zhi Yu Guohan dian," 28/8/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 83.

⁹² "Yu Guohan zhi Yang Yuting dian," 28/8/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 83

⁹³ Kantōgun Sambochō, "dai 269 gō," 13/5/1926, GK, B03050156700, slide 139;

"Sir R. Hodgson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 26/8/1926, F 3675/233/10, FOCP, Vol. 31, 106.

force of Soviet military-political activity in China.”⁹⁴ There was no evidence the British and Japanese had passed the information to the Clique, but its determination to sever the link between Feng and the Soviets suggested that it saw them as immediate threats. Although the Soviets declined Feng’s request to send Mongols to reinforce the KMC, they continued to supply him with arms and money, and urged him to move into Shaanxi to seek an opportunity to seize Henan and link up with the NRA from Hubei.⁹⁵

Japanese pressure was another driving force for the Fengtian Clique’s action in late 1926. Consul-General Yoshida continuously urged the Fengtian Clique to focus on Manchuria throughout the period. Backed by the Foreign Ministry, the Okura Group⁹⁶ offered Mukden a loan; in exchange, the Japanese demanded that the Clique stop fighting in China, introduce financial reforms with Japanese advisors and money, and extend the leased-territory of the SMR.⁹⁷ These terms aimed to confine the Fengtian Clique to Manchuria and place it under greater Japanese influence. Facing increasing Japanese pressure, as Gavan McCormack noted, “[A] greatly irritated Chang [Zhang] refused any concessions” and transferred his headquarters to Tianjin on November 10th. The date of his move was telling. Even though Sun Chuanfang’s position in Jiangxi was still strong on October 22nd, Zhang told the ex-Premier Jin Yunpeng he was “coming to Tianjin in days.”⁹⁸ Japanese pressure may explain why Zhang had to leave Mukden in a hurry when the situation in China was still unclear. After all, as Zhang had signed the informal agreement with General Mutō during Guo Songling’s rebellion, he had to be more powerful to be able to repudiate it. The best way to empower himself was to control the Beijing Government. In July, as a gesture to show he was defiant of Japanese control, Zhang went to Dalian and paid the Kwantung authority from his own coffer as a “gift” to Japan’s neutrality during Guo’s rebellion. When the Japanese mentioned the personal agreement, Zhang claimed that it could not be verified

94 “War Office to Foreign Office – The R.V.S., The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Situation in China,” 19/12/1926, FOCP, Vol. 31, 367.

95 Martin Wilbur, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 314.

96 Okura Group was one of the large business group (*zaibatsu*) in Japan before 1945. It was established by Okura Kihachiro and had a close relationship with the Japanese government.

97 “Hōtenha kōhoku shinshutsu to shika taisaku nikansuru ken (Reaction to the Fengtian Clique’s advance into the Jiangbei area)” 26/11/1926, GK, B02031895100, slides 232-3, 238-9.

98 “Zhang Zuolin fu Jin Yunpeng diangao,” 22/10/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 140.

"without the approval of the people of Manchuria" as it was a serious matter.⁹⁹

In sum, the Fengtian Clique's goal was limited, namely to enhance its domestic and geopolitical positions, by occupying Beijing. On the other hand, the KMT was pursuing the complete elimination of the "warlords". As Martin Wilbur pointed out, the KMT entered negotiation with the Fengtian Clique because it wanted to keep the latter out of the war for the time being.¹⁰⁰ Compromises and fudges were only temporary means to achieve a larger goal.

During this phase, political authority and public opinion remained in flux. There was a surge in sympathy for the KMT in the North during the early phase of the Northern Expedition. The popularity of the Three People's Principles was recognized. *Dagongbao* suggested, "the KMT won much acclaim in both the North and South by putting forward the Three People's Principles and the Five Powers Constitution...."¹⁰¹ *Chenbao* noted that it was widely believed in the North that the KMT's ideology (*zhuyi*) and organization explained its success.¹⁰² "On the other hand," as *Guowen Weekly* pointed out, the Northern warlords showed that they did not understand politics as they "only used force to generate fear... and disrespected public opinion."¹⁰³ *Chenbao* acknowledged the KMT's role as the representative of the new forces when it described the war as one "between the old and the new."¹⁰⁴ However, it goes too far to suggest that with its doctrines and Sun Yat-sen's legacy, the KMT had achieved indisputable political authority in Northern China. In September, the *Dagongbao*, which was no less critical of the warlords, commented:

How can we accept KMT dictatorship if we oppose warlord dictatorship?
 ... We see both will lead to disaster and we seriously oppose them.... All dictatorships, whether of the few or of the mass, if they ignore public opinion and oppress dissidents, are the same. Even if they can control [dissension] for a moment, they will just crumble suddenly... It is seldom noted that there are [also] imperialists behind the "reds". The Chinese Eastern Railway was the same as the South Manchuria Railway; the

⁹⁹ "Sir J. Tilley to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 3/2/1927, F 2079/2079/23, FOCP, Vol. 8, 217; Rao Dong fan, "Guo Songling fandui feng Zhang dongjun jianwen jilue," in Rao Dongfan, et al., 12.

¹⁰⁰ Martin Wilbur, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 394.

¹⁰¹ "Shiju de qushi," DGB, 15/10/1926.

¹⁰² Yuan Quan, "Zhuyi zhi liuxing," CB, 21/10/1926.

¹⁰³ "Douli yu douzhi," GW, Vol. 3, No. 49 (Dec 1926), 2.

¹⁰⁴ Bai You, "Yi kexue yanjiang jiefou shiju," CB, 5/10/1926.

occupation of Mongolia is no different from what is happening in Tibet...¹⁰⁵

At least among the sceptics, the KMT was seen as no less oppressive than the warlords:

If one submits to the Three People's Principles but not the dictates of the party's propaganda machine, one is accused of counter-revolution... both North and South armies treat public opinion as conquerors treat the conquered....¹⁰⁶

In contrast to the KMT, without a constructive agenda except that of eliminating the "reds," the Fengtian Clique fared worse. Hu Lin commented in September 1926: "the people certainly do not welcome "becoming red" (*qihua*), but they also fear "becoming black" (*heihua*)...." Hu depicted the "blacks" as "warlord oppression, decadent politics, excessive taxation, and widespread banditry," and argued that they were the source of radicalism.¹⁰⁷ As Sun Chuanfang admitted to the press after he was defeated in Jiangxi: "[the people] do not necessarily love the KMT, but they surely hate us [the warlords]."¹⁰⁸

However, as the Fengtian Clique had no real opponents in the North, it could take a more active role in politics. When Zhang was in Tianjin, *Guowen Weekly* criticised him for not stepping up to the plate:

Today, the strongest force north of the Yellow River is the Fengtian Clique.... Although Fengtian declared that it would not intervene in politics...having real force but manipulating behind the scenes is fooling oneself and others¹⁰⁹

Zhang was not "welcomed" as the northern leader, but he was seen as a powerful figure who should shoulder appropriate responsibilities. Other northern politicians such as Yan Huiqing, who served as Cao Kun's Premier, also shared the view that Zhang lacked the prestige to assume leadership.¹¹⁰ Thus, Yang Yuting insisted that Zhang become the president through a "legally plausible"

¹⁰⁵ "Junfa yu dangfa," DGB, 23/9/1926.

¹⁰⁶ "Chihua yu fangeming," DGB, 17/9/1926.

¹⁰⁷ Zheng Zhi, "Guomin zhi liangzhong kungbu de xinli," GW, Vol. 3, No. 36 (Sep 1926), 1.

¹⁰⁸ "Guomindang zhi chengbai yu guomin yundong," DGB, 20/8/1927.

¹⁰⁹ "Beifang shiju," GW, Vol. 3, No. 44 (Nov 1926), 1.

¹¹⁰ Yan Huiqing; Wu Jianyong, Li Baochen, Ye Fengmei (tr.), 203.

procedure such as a National Conference. He also urged Zhang to secure foreign recognition and include as many members from other political factions as possible to “show the process is not dominated by Fengtian.”¹¹¹ Thus, the Political, Diplomatic, and Financial Discussion Boards (*santaolunhui*) were organized and participated in by *beiyang* elders and bureaucrats across the northern factions. Zhang repeated that he was “unqualified” to become a political leader, and urged the elders to support him.¹¹² Zhang also met with students and businessmen when he arrived in Tianjin, as he did in Manchuria. The *Guowen Weekly* stated that though “commendable,” his action was “an acknowledgement of his weakness [lack of support].”¹¹³ Zhang’s reluctance to step in to rescue the Beijing Government from chronic financial difficulties (see Chapter 5 for detail) almost led to its complete collapse. As *Dagongbao* suggested in June of 1927:

The bureaucrats in Beijing were already impoverished; many branches were emptied because the staff went to the South... Professors and intellectuals abandoned the North... Although the South might not be an ideal place... it was much better than the dying North....¹¹⁴

By then, there was no effective bureaucracy in North China except for the Fengtian-controlled railways and the Beijing garrison. The appalling state of the Beijing Government undermined Zhang’s status and prevented him from seeking foreign support.

Increasing Japanese Pressure and Changing British Attitudes

During this phase, international status and geopolitical situation remained the weakest links in the Fengtian Clique’s strategy. The British Minister to Japan Sir John Tilley found that the Japanese attitude towards Zhang was unchanged and that they welcomed the success of the KMT, as they preferred Zhang to be confined in Manchuria.¹¹⁵ When the Foreign Minister Shidehara met Tilley in October, he denounced Zhang Zuolin, and told Tilley that he did not see the “Cantonese ideas as Bolshevism.” Even if the NRA was defeated, Shidehara

¹¹¹ “Li Dazhao guanyu zhuci Beijing zhengzhi fenhu baogaoshu,” in Zhongguo dier lishi danganguan (ed.), *Zhonghua Minguoshi dangan ziliao huibian* (ZMDZH), Vol. 4 (Nanjing, 1991), 1022-1023.

¹¹² “Santaolunhui kaimo,” GW, Vol. 4, No. 5 (Jan 1927), 8-10.

¹¹³ “Douli yu douzhi,” GW, Vol. 3, No. 49 (Dec 1926), 2.

¹¹⁴ “Beijing gaizhi,” DGB, 19/6/1927.

¹¹⁵ “Sir J. Tilley to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 27/8/1926, F 3937/10/10, FOCP, Vol. 31, 118.

argued, the ideas “represented by the Canton Government were spreading throughout China and would hold their ground.”¹¹⁶ Shidehara urged the British “to wait for the few years until the situation in China settles down,” instead of rushing to help Zhang.¹¹⁷ As Shidehara believed that a KMT success was geopolitically beneficial to Japan, he turned to the “moderates” of the KMT. Through Huang Fu, the Japanese expressed their sympathy towards Chiang Kai-shek.¹¹⁸ Huang was a Japanese-educated diplomat and an old guard revolutionary who urged Chiang to seek Japanese support.¹¹⁹ In January, the KMT informed the Japanese of their plan to suppress the communists.¹²⁰ After Chiang promised to respect Japan’s special position in Manchuria, Shidehara claimed openly that the KMT would “eventually unify China.”¹²¹

Japanese pressure to force the Fengtian Clique to return to Manchuria increased after Tanaka Giichi rose to power in April of 1927. Tanaka threatened Zhang by telling the latter’s advisor Machino Takema that he must solve the Manchurian question before the Japanese radicals got out of hand.¹²² The Consul General to Mukden, Yoshida, put forward a plan for “an effective Japanese takeover” of Manchuria as soon as Tanaka assumed his office.¹²³ The Fengtian leaders considered Tanaka as friendly, but they were soon disappointed.¹²⁴ Like Shidehara, Tanaka chose to side with Chiang instead of Zhang. In May, Tanaka instructed the Minister to China, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, to inform Chiang Kai-shek of his support in the purge of communists.¹²⁵ The Japanese played an important but often overlooked role in undermining Fengtian strategy and in supporting the KMT by disrupting Northern China. In May 1927, Colonel Doihara Kenji of the Imperial Japanese Army, a well-known China Hand, told Yan Xishan of Japan’s wish to confine the Fengtian Clique in Manchuria. When Doihara delivered the message, it was still unclear what the

¹¹⁶ “Sir J. Tilley to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 15/10/1926, F 5002/10/10, FOCP, Vol. 31, 274.

¹¹⁷ “Mr. Peters to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 11/3/1927, F 2554/2/10, FOCP, Vol. 32, 202.

¹¹⁸ Martin Wilbur, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 393; Shen Yunlong (ed.), *Huang Yingbai xiansheng nianpu changpian* (Taipei, 1976), 259-60.

¹¹⁹ Shen Yu, 290.

¹²⁰ Yada soryōji, “dai 16 gō,” 9/1/1927, GK, Bo2031895200, slides 257-60.

¹²¹ Shen Yu, 290; William Fitch Morton, *Tanaka Giichi and Japan’s China Policy* (New York, 1980), 64.

¹²² Machino Takema, “Events before and after the death of Zhang Zuolin,” in Chen Pengren, *Zhang Zuolin yu riben* (Taipei, 1988), 12-13; Takehiko Yoshihashi, 14.

¹²³ Gavan McCormack, 233.

¹²⁴ “Zhang Zuolin’s letter to Tanaka,” in Ihara Takushu, *Nihon to Chiūgoku ni okeru Seijo bunka sesshuron* (Chinese version) (Beijing, 2003), 440.

¹²⁵ Ihara Takushu, 441.

outcome of the fighting between the *Anguojun* and the NRA in Henan and Jiangsu would be. He asked Yan to “broker peace between the warring factions” and “take over Northern China.”¹²⁶ Although this incident was possibly an impetuous action by Doihara, confident of Japanese support, Yan joined the KMT and threatened the Fengtian Clique’s rear. This forced the *Anguojun* to abandon its position in Henan in June.

The British also hoped to cooperate with the KMT moderates to protect their economic interest in Southern China. The KMT-directed Hong Kong General Strike increased pressure on London. When the cabinet ruled out military action, the Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain appeased the KMT. The replacement of the pro-Beijing and pro-Zhang Sir Ronald Macleay by Miles Lampson, whom Chamberlain saw as his “right hand man,” represented a change in policy.¹²⁷ Chamberlain was anxious to know whether recognition of the KMT government could “strengthen the hands of the moderate elements.”¹²⁸ Lampson supported the turn because the KMT “realizes fully the weakness of our position *vis-à-vis* labor agitation.”¹²⁹ The result was the Foreign Office’s “December Memorandum,” which stated Britain’s acceptance of revising the unequal treaties and was seen as a sign of goodwill to the KMT.¹³⁰ Lampson hoped it “would appeal especially to the South,” and even doubted “if it will be enough.”¹³¹ The result of the December Memorandum was the meeting between Owen O’Malley and Eugene Chen and the British withdrawal from the Hankow Concession in early 1927. As if he was justifying the turn, Lampson reported to Chamberlain in December that the North was hopeless.¹³² This policy was also supported by Sir John Pratt, the adviser on Chinese affairs in the Foreign Office, who argued that Zhang was worse than the Nationalists.¹³³ In January of 1927, Lampson poured cold water on a request by Zhang’s envoy

¹²⁶ “Su Tiren deng riben wang jin weiqi beifang woxuan nanbei dian (the telegram from Su Tiren about Japan’s wish to let Shanxi maintain the north and broker peace between the north and south),” 25/5/1927, *Yan Bochuan xiansheng yaodian lu*, 252.

¹²⁷ Richard Grayson, *Britain and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy, 1924-29* (London, 1997), 186.

¹²⁸ “Sir Austen Chamberlain to Consul-General, Nanking,” 17/12/1926, No. 2, FOCP, Vol. 31, 354.

¹²⁹ “Mr. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 22/12/1926, No. 28, FOCP, Vol. 31, 370.

¹³⁰ “Consul-General, Hankow, to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 24/12/1926, FOCP, Vol. 31, 373; GW, Vol. 4, No. 1, 4; Edmund S.K. Fung, “The Sino-British Rapprochement, 1927-1931,” in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 17 (1983), 79.

¹³¹ “Mr. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 27/12/1926, No. 552, FOCP, Vol. 31, 379.

¹³² “Mr. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 27/12/1926, No. 551, FOCP, Vol. 31, 378.

¹³³ Chen tsunkung, *The China Arms Embargo, 1919-1929*, 200.

for financial assistance.¹³⁴ Thus, despite the Beijing Government's effort to maintain diplomatic relations with the Powers, it was no longer recognised as the Chinese government. The powers fudged when Beijing talked of levying the surtax as promised by the Tariff Conference, renewing treaties, and recovering the Tianjin Concessions.¹³⁵ Although the Americans were neutral towards both the North and the South, they cultivated a good relationship with Chiang Kai-shek.¹³⁶

In face of the Powers' attitude, Zhang vainly reminded the diplomatic corps of his gradualist approach towards treaty revision and his anti-communism. He complained to the Senior Minister Willem Jacob Oudendijk (the Dutch Minister) that he was ignored despite his position.¹³⁷ The American military attaché Major John Magruder noted:

Were it not for the obstacles placed in the way of the Russians by Chang Tso-lin, there seems little doubt, in the light of present information, that the whole of China would now be hopelessly in the grip of the Russians and their native adherents. It is clear why Chang Tso-lin is the object of vicious attack by the Communists, but puzzling in the extreme why Western opinion so blindly follows the Russian lead.¹³⁸

Zhang might have persuaded men on the spot such as Magruder and Oudendijk, and later even Lampson, but he could do little to alter the policy of London, Tokyo, and Washington. They were anxious to protect their economic interests, which Chiang Kai-shek seemed likely to do. Zhang moved a step further by raiding the Soviet Embassy in Beijing on April 7th, but this was soon overshadowed by Chiang's bloodier purge of the communists in Shanghai.

The Failure in Henan and Its Impact

Despite these limitations, the Fengtian Clique enjoyed unprecedented authority among the warlords in the North. When Zhang was "elected" as the Commander-in-Chief of the *Anguojun* in December of 1926, even Yan Xishan had to accept in public a position as one of the deputy commanders of the

¹³⁴ "Mr. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 3/1/1927, FOCP, Vol. 32, 96.

¹³⁵ Yang Tianshi, et al., *Zhonghua minguo shi*, Book 2, Vol. 5, 299.

¹³⁶ Wu Lingjun, *Meiguo yu Zhongguo zhengzhi, 1917-1928: yi nanbei fenlie zhengju wei zhongxin de tantao* (Taibei, 1996), 226-7.

¹³⁷ "Opinion of Chang Tso-lin," April 1927, USMI, Reel 8, slide 106.

¹³⁸ Ibid., slide 105.

Anguojun (although he never officially assumed the post).¹³⁹ Feng Yuxiang was only active in Shaanxi and the Northwest and could not challenge the Fengtian Clique's political authority. The head of the Diplomatic Discussion Board Sun Baoqi told the Japanese that the Fengtian Clique planned to hold a National Conference that would elect Zhang as the President "after the area north of the Yangtze was in Fengtian and its allies' control."¹⁴⁰ It was in the internal and external strategic contexts illustrated above that the Fengtian Clique launched the drive into Henan in the spring of 1927. In the meantime, the KMT in Wuhan also resumed the northern drive, this time led by Tang Shengzhi (details of the campaign will be discussed in Chapter 4). If the Fengtian Clique had won the battles in Henan and Jiangsu in May of 1927 and held the National Conference, even a limited one covering the Northern Provinces, the Fengtian Clique's political position would have become stronger. In this case, Yan might have been compelled to stay in the northern camp and the Powers might have adjusted their view as well. However, the setbacks in Henan and Jiangsu forced the *Anguojun* to give up the two provinces as well as their entire strategy.

Phase IV, June 1927–June 1928

Responding to Defeats: The Generalissimo Government and Peace Talk with the KMT

As the KMT entered another round of infighting after the *Anguojun* withdrew from Henan in May of 1927, the Fengtian Clique abandoned the plan of making Zhang Zuolin the president but retained his position in China. The Clique still hoped to eliminate Feng Yuxiang and reverse the military situation to the extent that Nanjing would agree to a ceasefire. To stabilize Northern China and enhance its political position, the Clique consolidated its control of the Beijing Government. If the Clique could succeed in achieving the above, it could have controlled an important part of Northern China, turning the situation into something similar to that in 1912 and 1918, when China was divided into two major blocs and both sides negotiated for unification. However, despite the fact that popular support for the KMT waned because of its internal problems, the Fengtian Clique was never able to improve the situation in Beijing and Northern China to the extent that would restore the authority of the Beijing Government.

¹³⁹ SR, 13/12/1926.

¹⁴⁰ Yoshizawa kōji, "ō den dai 89 gō ni kan," 27/1/1927, GK, B02031857900, slide 16.

The Fengtian Clique's strategy during this period can be summarised as: 1) to reform the central government; 2) to unify the North by defeating Feng Yuxiang; 3) to seek compromise with Chiang Kai-shek while resisting the Northern Expedition. After Zhang Zuolin was "elected" by his subordinates as the Generalissimo of the Chinese Republic, the *Guowen Weekly* and other northern newspapers published detailed reports about the decision-making process. While these reports were certainly censored by the authorities, they were rich in detail. The Fengtian Clique may have seen them as means to explain their decision to the public. In one way or another, they gave much insight on the *Anguojun's* strategy during this phase.

According to the press, on June 7th, a meeting of all the Fengtian leaders except Zhang Zongchang and Sun Chuanfang was held after Fengtian forces were withdrawn from Henan.¹⁴¹ To enhance their political position, the generals agreed to seek an alliance with Nanjing and "endorse" (*zancheng*) the Three Peoples' Principles, but insisted that a National Conference that was "not dominated by a single party" should be held to "discuss constitutional and political issues." They also agreed to reform the central government, and insisted that Zhang should either "step up or return to Manchuria and ignore Chinese politics." The generals also proposed to add the "People's Morality" (*mindezhu yi*) into the Three People's Principle in order to show the new alliance's "resolution to protect tradition."¹⁴² The urgency to improve the conditions of the Beijing Government was finally acknowledged, as Zhang quickly assumed the position of Generalissimo. Two clauses were instructive: 1) Feng Yuxiang had to be eliminated; 2) diplomatic issues "should be handled by the Beijing and Nanjing governments together."¹⁴³ They affirmed the continuous relevance of Northeast Asia in the Fengtian leaders' strategic consideration. The Fengtian Clique still feared that its position would be traded away by a central government in which it had no say. Probably with the experience of 1925-6 in mind, although the Fengtian Clique was ready to make concessions with the KMT, it could not accept the return of Feng in North China.

¹⁴¹ "Beijing gaiziji," GW, Vol. 4, No. 24, 26/6/1927; SR, 8/6/1927; CB, 7/6/1927; 8/6/1927. Zhang Zongchang and Sun Chuanfang joined the meeting a week later. According to Guowen, their insistence on fighting explained Zhang's decision to stay in Beijing and prevent a Fengtian-Nanjing compromise. However, this claim was questionable, as a KMT-Fengtian compromise was unlikely in the first place. Before Zhang and Sun participated in the conference it was already agreed that Fengtian would not accept the change of flag, a point insisted on by the KMT.

¹⁴² "Beijing gaiziji," GW, Vol. 4, No. 24, 26/6/1927.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

The negotiation between the Fengtian Clique and Nanjing lasted from April to September without result. Yang Tianshi suggested that the negotiation failed because Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique refused to submit to the KMT.¹⁴⁴ The Fengtian Clique might have preserved itself by changing the name of the army and the flag as Feng and Yan did. However, as *Dagongbao* pointed out in June, it would be self-destructive for Zhang to follow this course:

It is fortunate that Zhang refuse to change the flag... [Zhang is like] an old lady attributed to a respectable family who has many siblings and has not left her house for decades. A man suddenly persuades her to cut her hair, wear western dress...and go to dance halls. How can she not reject the proposal in anger? It is not hers but the man's fault. If she had actually done that, everyone would be filled with bewilderment...¹⁴⁵

Whereas historians such as Yang Tianshi suggested that Zhang could have ended the war by simply changing the flag, his contemporaries were less sure. In June, *Dagongbao* questioned the equation of “changing the flag” as “political solution”:

Although the nation is full of the “National Revolutionary” armies and the KMT’s flags are all around, do their leaders actually follow the Three People’s Principles? ... If Zhang had heeded Yan’s advice and changed the flag, all armies in China would become the NRA.... Can the revolution be considered a success? No, there are the communists. However, is the CCP not part of the NRA and under the KMT flag? Even those under the same name and flag can fight against each other... [Eventually], there will be “national revolutions” here, there, and everywhere (*chiyi guomingeming, piyi guomin geming*)...

The *Anguojun* leaders shared this view and portrayed themselves as the opposite of the “unprincipled” warlords. When the military situation was precarious in June, Zhang told the press, “I have my own principle, and I am not the type who keeps changing his allegiance.”¹⁴⁶ They “agreed” to the “Three People’s Principles” during the conferences in June, but the *Anguojun* generals refused to join the KMT. Yang Yuting told the press early in the year that since the Fengtian Clique had its own “zhuyi” he believed it “unnecessary to force one

¹⁴⁴ Yang Tianshi, 264-6.

¹⁴⁵ “Tuoxie wenti youyi kaocha,” DGB, 16/6/1927.

¹⁴⁶ “Zhang Zuolin fabiao zhongyao tanhua,” SR, 9/6/1927.

party to join the other as a prerequisite of peace.”¹⁴⁷ When the military situation was favorable to the North in mid-July, Huang Fu reported to Chiang that Fengtian opted for “dual unification” and “settling the unification problem through a national conference.”¹⁴⁸ Beijing reiterated the same position throughout the summer, but it was ignored by the KMT.¹⁴⁹

To Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan, the negotiation was only a smoke-screen. Yan admitted to Chiang Kai-shek in June that the peace talk was used to lure the Fengtian Clique to attack Wuhan. However, Yan pointed out that the Fengtian Clique had already saw through this plot and understood that “we would never reconcile with it [the Fengtian Clique].” Yan urged Chiang to continue the northern drive so that he could attack the Fengtian Clique from the rear.¹⁵⁰ As Yang Tianshi suggested, Chiang saw the negotiation partly as a means to pressure Feng Yuxiang to choose Nanjing rather than Wuhan.¹⁵¹ At that time, the left-wing KMT established a rival government at Wuhan and declared Chiang an enemy of the revolution. The KMT representatives in Beijing talked of a ceasefire and coexistence in front of the press when Chiang was preparing a counterattack against the *Anguojun* in Xuzhou (see Chapter 4), but this was muted after Chiang resigned in August.¹⁵² While North-South peace was the goal of the *Anguojun*, which was fighting a limited war for a tangible political settlement, the KMT never seriously considered a post-war settlement because it saw itself fighting an absolute struggle for an ideological goal. After the negotiation with Nanjing had ended without result, the North tried to reach an understanding with other KMT factions such as those of Tang Shengzhi and Li Jishen, but either they were eliminated or had little influence on the course of the war. An attempt was also made to use the renewal of the Tariff negotiations as an overture for North-South peace discussions in early 1928, but fighting broke out again before it had any result (see Chapter 5).

By August of 1927, the NRA had disintegrated into numerous factions: the Nanjing government, the Wuhan Government, the Guangxi Clique of Li Zongren, Tang Shengzhi’s Hunan Clique, the Guizhou Clique of Wang Tianpei and Yuan Zhuming (both of them soon to be killed by Chiang Kai-shek and

¹⁴⁷ SR, 14/4/1927; WIC, Vol. 8, No. 102, 26/2/1927, 4.

¹⁴⁸ “Huang Fu zhi Chiang Kai-shek dian,” 24/7/1927, *Huang Yingbai xiansheng nianpu changpian*, 294.

¹⁴⁹ “Nanbei tuoxie tan,” GW, Vol. 4, No. 30; Shen Yunlong (interviewer); Lin Quan (record), *Wang Tiehan xiansheng fangwen jilu*, 133; Yang Tianshi, 273.

¹⁵⁰ “Fu Liu Yu yu Jiang qia shang zhanlue dian,” 13/6/1927, *Yan Bochuan xiansheng yaodian lu*, 259.

¹⁵¹ Yang Tianshi, 262.

¹⁵² CB, 1/8/1927, also see Yang Tianshi 272.

Tang Shengzhi respectively), the pro-Wang Jingwei forces under Zhang Fakui, Li Jishen in Guangdong, the Sichuan warlords, Zhou Fengqi's Zhejiang Army, Chen Tiaoyuan's Anhui Army, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan's armies in the North, and last but not least, the Red Army after the Nanchang Uprising in August. Many of these factions (such as Zhou Fengqi and Chen Tiaoyuan, were products of the KMT's attempt to divide the camps of Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang by promising their subordinates of higher positions, usually provincial leadership.¹⁵³ Because of the infighting of the many factions, the Northern Expedition was suspended until November.

Thus, at least in the North, the "National Revolution" was losing its appeal. The seemingly endless internal strife and its inability to bring real changes stained the KMT's image. *Dagongbao* commented in November:

The South (KMT) occupied more than ten provinces for more than ten months, but we only heard of its internal strife rather than the people's voice. We do not care about how many party conferences were held... We are convinced that the organization of a national conference to decide the constitution is of utmost urgency...¹⁵⁴

After more than a year of repetitive propaganda and warfare, the honeymoon period between the public and the KMT ended. Although the image of Sun Yat-sen, the Three People's Principles, and the idea of national revolution remained influential, the KMT's insistence on portraying itself as the only legitimate national leader led to criticism in the North. The KMT leaders commanded little respect. As *Dagongbao* commented in August:

The non-party members are sympathetic to the nationalist movement that strives for the nation's freedom and independence rather than to the KMT. They are sympathetic to the Three People's Principles, but have no responsibility to follow the KMT leaders blindly... We demand real improvement; we gladly support anyone who can deliver this, no matter which party he is from. We shed no tears for any party that failed because it abandoned this goal, including the KMT that claims itself a revolutionary party.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Donald Jordan, "Provincialism within the Chinese National Revolution: The Case of Chekiang, 1926-1927," in F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas Etzold, *China in the 1920s* (New York, 1976), 127-46.

¹⁵⁴ "Nanfang shiju you yunniang bianhua," DGB, 10/11/1927.

¹⁵⁵ "Nanfang bianhua zhi duanpian de ganxiang," DGB, 17/8/1927.

Though they acknowledged their influence, those in the North did not see the Three People's Principles as unchallengeable doctrines. *Chenbao* suggested in 1928: "the Three People's Principles were in fact very vague...anything not about alien rule, absolutism, and draconian domestic policy can co-exist with it..."¹⁵⁶ Besides its failure to bring real changes, public opinion in the North was unimpressed by the KMT's insistence on party rule and the state of affairs in the Southern provinces. *Chenbao* commented in July of 1927:

We can hardly list any reconstruction works underway in the KMT-controlled provinces...The outstanding issues of the nation cannot be solved by reading [Sun Yat-sen's Last Will], hoisting the party flag and shouting slogans on the streets about overthrowing someone...¹⁵⁷

Similar sentiment was expressed in a cartoon published on the *Beiyang huabao*, a pro-*Anguojun* magazine in Tianjin. The KMT's new city-wall crumbled because its base was formed by bricks with the names of "warlords," "old bureaucrats," and "old politicians" (Fig. 3:3):

Although Zhang Xueliang had close ties with the founder of the *Beiyang huabao*, according to Feng Wuyue, the major sources of income of *Beiyang huabao* were its sales and advertisements. To ensure sales it could not overtly support any factions and had to respond to the popular mood.¹⁵⁸ In August, Lampson, who originally viewed the KMT in a favorable light, also reported that the KMT was no longer popular:

...the Nanjing Government was making little or no progress in consolidating its position. ...it had seemed perilously near collapse, and had undoubtedly by its extortionate methods of raising funds forfeited much of the popular support hitherto enjoyed by the Nationalist cause...¹⁵⁹

In contrast, the North was relatively peaceful during this period. This can be shown by the modest increase of Customs receipt in the North in 1927, compared to the drastic fall in the South (see Chapter 5).¹⁶⁰ This provided an

¹⁵⁶ "Fangeming yu weigeming," CB, 7/3/1928.

¹⁵⁷ "Dangzhi qiantu ruhe," CB, 13/7/1927.

¹⁵⁸ Zhang Yuanqing, "Dutu shidai de shenshang, dazhong duwu yu wenxue – jiedu 'beiyang huabao,'" in *Tianjin shehui kexue* (2002), No. 4; Zhu Canfei, "Beiyang huabao de xinwen chuanboxue jiedu," in *Qingnian jizhe* (2008), No. 15, 97.

¹⁵⁹ "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 22/8/1927, CPR, 562.

¹⁶⁰ "Sir M. Lampson to Austen Chamberlain," 20/1/1928, FOCP, Vol. 34, 178-9.



FIGURE 3.3

"The incomplete reconstruction – it is why the Nationalists failed" in Beiyang huabao, No. 116, 27 Aug 1927

opportunity for the *Anguojun* as an alternative to the KMT. However, as *Dagongbao* warned in August, the decline of the KMT could not help the North if it failed to reform:

If [the North] could do what the KMT promulgates and shake off decadence and warlordism, [the KMT defeat in Xuzhou] might be the end of the KMT... Success and failure depend on one's action rather than the others' failure...¹⁶¹

Besides this cautious acknowledgement of the potential of the Beijing Government to restore itself, there were even examples of sympathy towards the new government. When Sun Chuanfang's army was about to re-enter southeast China, instead of fleeing people prepared the Five-Colored Flags of the old republic.¹⁶² The Japanese Consul in Suzhou found that the locals

¹⁶¹ "Guomindang zhi chengbai yu guomin yundong," DGB, 20/8/1927.

¹⁶² Chenbao (CB), 1/9/1927, also see also Zhang Shiying, "Longtan zhanyi de pingjia yu fanxi," in *Jinian beifa qishi zhourian xueshu yantaohui*, 22; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1051, 1059.

"prefer the return of Sun."¹⁶³ Even Lampson saw the new administration in a favorable light in October, even in a rather patronising tone:

...here in North China Chang Tso-lin has established a Government which, with all its faults (and no one realizes their shortcomings better than I do), does make some attempt to govern and live up to its obligations and preserve internal peace.... It is...instructive to note that a man like Mr Lo¹⁶⁴, a liberal and a Nationalist at heart, has lost faith in the Kuo Min-tang and can only see salvation through the agency of a Northern leader like Sun Chuan-fang.¹⁶⁵

Had the Fengtian Clique been able to improve the conditions in the central government and the area under its control, its position in China might have survived.

Cracks in the Beijing-Mukden Regime

However, the Fengtian Clique failed to exploit this positive trend because of its inability to introduce enough reform in China and its insistence on solving the constitutional issues after the war despite the northern press's call for a new constitution.¹⁶⁶ The bureaucracy in Manchuria remained efficient and duly provided recruits and supplies to China without serious disruption throughout the war. The conditions of the Fengtian controlled Beijing-Mukden Railway, according to the Americans, was satisfactory.¹⁶⁷ However, with limited time and money, the Fengtian Clique could do little beyond that. The Generalissimo Government could not adequately fund its schools, universities, ministries, and even the overseas consulates.¹⁶⁸ Instead of hiring new staff, the government was busy dismissing its staff to cut costs.¹⁶⁹ There were some efforts to reform local administration in the area under the Fengtian Army's control, but

¹⁶³ Sai Soshū sōryōji Iwasaki Eizō, "Soshū chūton nangun jōkyō nikān hōkoku no kwn," 10/8/1927, GK, JACAR, B04010606500, slide 256.

¹⁶⁴ Luo Wengan, a member of the Generalissimo government.

¹⁶⁵ "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 1/10/1927, F 8922/959/10, CPR, Vol. 3, 567.

¹⁶⁶ "Fangong yi zhuyi gailiang zhengzhi," DGB, 9/11/1927.

¹⁶⁷ SR, 28/3/1927; SR, 11/6/1927; "The General Condition in Manchuria," 11/1927, USMI, Reel IV, 398.

¹⁶⁸ SR, 12/6/1926; 14/6/1926; 6/7/1926; 30/7/1926; 8/8/1926; 9/8/1926; SR, 11/6/1927; SR, 12/6/1927; 11/7/1927; SR, 15/7/1927; 2/8/1927; SR, 8/12/1927; "bannian lai zhi guoli jiuxiao," SR, 11/6/1927; "Beijing guoli jingda yu sili daxue," DGB, 18/11/1927. It was not until October of 1927 that the newly organized Capital University received a full monthly payment. SR, 21/10/1927

¹⁶⁹ SR, 25/3/1928; 2/4/1928; 3/4/1928; 4/4/1928; 8/4/1928.

it was not extended to Shandong held by Zhang Zongchang.¹⁷⁰ In the winter of 1927, because of continuous warfare, bandits, drought, and locusts, four to nine million people, mainly peasants, were close to starvation in Shandong and Southern Zhili. The authorities could do little and had to rely on voluntary associations such as the China International Famine Relief Commission.¹⁷¹ The failure to carry out famine-relief, which was seen as a basic function for a Chinese government, ruined the image of the Generalissimo Government. Although Zhang Zongchang agreed to return the provinces' administration to the central government in early 1928, not enough money and time were available.¹⁷² The condition of Zhili and Shandong provinces became so bad that Lampson believed "any change of ruler was welcomed," although he added that areas under the KMT control were in a worse state.¹⁷³

The war also eroded the societal cohesion of the regime of the Fengtian Clique. The Chinese in Manchuria answered the call of the authorities for a controlled anti-Japanese movement when Japan started to press their demands on Manchuria in September of 1927, but they had little enthusiasm for the war in China. When Major Magruder visited Mukden in November, he found the economic situation much better than elsewhere in China, but "everybody blamed the *fengpiao*, "the stupid device for financing Chang Tso-lin's military venture south of the Wall."¹⁷⁴ As the *fengpiao*'s devaluation continued, peasants began to rebel from early 1928. The Small Swords Society (*xiaodaohui*), with members among the Shandong migrants, emerged. Meanwhile, the area under KMT control experienced much worse disturbances such as the bloody Canton Coup in December of 1927, when the communists and Zhang Fakui's NRA troops fought for control of Canton. However, facing a complex geopolitical situation, Zhang could afford less social disruption than his southern counterparts. In May of 1928, even the public organs in Mukden, part of the foundation of Zhang and the Fengtian Clique's power, urged him to return to Manchuria.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁰ Chen Cungong (interview), Guan Manli (record), *Zhang Shilun xiasheng fangwen jilu* (Taipei, 1986), 29-34.

¹⁷¹ SR, 23/9/1927; 17/10/1927; 18/11/1927; 15/12/1927. Also see Andrew Nathan, *A History of the China International Famine Relief Commission* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

¹⁷² "Minute of Interview between His Majesty's Minister and Mr Liang Shih-yi (Liang Shiyi)," 31/1/1928, FOCP, Vol. 34, 272.

¹⁷³ "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 12/12/1927, FOCP, Vol. 34, 42.

¹⁷⁴ "The General Condition in Manchuria," 11/1927, USMI, Reel IV, 398.

¹⁷⁵ Höten kōshochō Kamata Yasuke, "Sanshō rengokai nitaisuru Gō tokuhan (Military Governor Wu Junsheng), 1/6/1928, GK, JACAR, B02031756000, slide 62.

Manchuria Encircled: The Coming of a Japanese-Soviet Alliance

Although the Fengtian Clique's internal position had some hopes of improvement, its geopolitical position remained perilous. The Japanese started to consider more drastic measures, besides pressuring the Fengtian Clique to give up Beijing and to entrust North China to Yan Xishan.¹⁷⁶ In June 1927, the Consul-General of Mukden, Yoshida Shigeru, recommended occupying the Mukden Arsenal and cutting the Beijing-Mukden Railway to force the Fengtian Clique to accept Japanese demands.¹⁷⁷ The plan was dropped because the Army did not want anything short of annexation of Manchuria if troops were involved.¹⁷⁸ In July, Tanaka met with the diplomats, soldiers, and officials of the Leased Territory of Kwantung in the Eastern Conference. None of the participants wanted a Beijing-Mukden regime. Yoshida suggested that Zhang and the Fengtian Clique had been using Japan to advance their ambition. The Commander of the Kwantung Army, General Mutō Nobuyoshi, argued that Manchuria should be divided into three autonomous entities.¹⁷⁹ Tanaka declared Japan would act unilaterally "according to her position."¹⁸⁰ In all, the conference re-confirmed the policy of extending Japanese rights in Manchuria and Mongolia and separating them from Chinese politics.

After the Conference, the Japanese intensified their efforts to solve the "pending cases," namely the unrealized clauses in the Twenty-One Demands such as the rights for the Japanese to rent land in the Fengtian province. To force the governor of Fengtian, Mo Dehui, to accept his demands, Yoshida threatened to close the Beijing-Mukden Railway to Chinese military traffic in July. With Zhang Zuolin's backing from Beijing, Mo refused. An immediate takeover of Manchuria was contemplated during the Dairen Conference held

¹⁷⁶ SR, 7/6/1927, 2; 13/6/1927, 2; SR, 19/6/1927, 3; "Yuan Liang's telegram to Chiang Kai-shek," 1/6/1927, in *Huang Yingbai xiansheng nianpu changpian*, 273.

¹⁷⁷ "Sai Hōten Yoshida soryōji no hokushi jikyoku nikansuru ken (Consul General of Mukden Yoshida's view on the situation in North China)," early June, GK, B02031895400, slides 339-41.

¹⁷⁸ William Fitch Morton, 91.

¹⁷⁹ "Yoshida soryōji no iken"; "Mutō shireikan no iken (General Mutō's view)," in "Toho kaigi (The Eastern Conference)," in Gaimushō (ed.), *Nihon gaiko bunsho. Showa-ki. I* (Documents on Japanese foreign policy, Showa era, Series I), Vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1995), 28-9.

¹⁸⁰ "Manmoō niokuru seijō no anteい hei ken'an kaietsu nikansuru ken (Document on stabilizing the political situation in Manchuria and solving the pending cases)," in "Toho kaigi," Gaimushō (ed.), Vol. 1, 42; "Amou soryōji no iken (Consul General Amou's view)," 31/5/1927, in "Toho kaigi," Gaimushō (ed.), Vol. 1, 61; "Closing of the Eastern Conference and the Instruction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs," in "Toho kaigi," Gaimushō (ed.), Vol. 1, 38.

in mid-August, but Tanaka rejected the proposal.¹⁸¹ Negotiation then continued with both Beijing and Mukden. With the control of Beijing, the Fengtian Clique had the initiative in the negotiations. Zhang referred the Japanese to the local authorities, which were under his control; without Beijing's consent, the promises of the local officials were nothing. The Minister to Beijing Yoshizawa admitted that he could achieve little while the Fengtian Clique appeared to be winning in August.¹⁸²

Still, the Japanese did not give up. When Yan Xishan invaded Zhili in late September, the General Staff urged a military intervention with British understanding and recommended the government to force the Fengtian Clique to comply as soon as possible.¹⁸³ Pressured from within and externally, Zhang signed another “agreement” with the head of South Manchuria Railway, Yamamoto Jōtarō, allowed the construction of five strategic railways.¹⁸⁴ The Fengtian Clique refused to turn it into a formal treaty, and again referred the Japanese to local officials.¹⁸⁵ Rather than complying with the Japanese, he turned against them. Despite inadequate funds, the Fengtian Clique finished the railways between Fengtian and Hailong and Dahushan and Tongliao.¹⁸⁶ The Clique also encouraged Chinese migration into Manchuria. In 1927, a million Chinese moved into Manchuria from Northern China.¹⁸⁷ Local authorities provided food, shelter, and free transport for the migrants to resettle in Manchuria; the policy continued in 1928.¹⁸⁸ In October, the Fengtian Clique ordered to banish Korean peasants, who were seen by the Chinese as Japanese infiltrators. The Korean holdings were also confiscated.¹⁸⁹

Tanaka responded by encouraging the Fengtian Clique’s enemies in China. He met Chiang Kai-shek in November and urged the latter to consolidate the

¹⁸¹ Takehiko Yoshihashi, 30.

¹⁸² Yoshizawa kōji, “dai 925 gō,” 24/8/1927, GK, B02030034000, slide 197.

¹⁸³ Dai ni hō (Second Division of the Chief of Staff), “Shina jikyoku ni taisuru hōshin (Reaction to the current situation in China),” 10/10/1927, GK, B02031895300, slides 314-6.

¹⁸⁴ Shen Yu, 320.

¹⁸⁵ Mizuno Akira, 176; Shen Yu, 320-1; Gavan McCormack, 244.

¹⁸⁶ Huang Henghao, “Wo dui dongbei jijiang wangshi de huiyi, Mo Dehui zai dongbei jijiang zuole duoxiaoshi?” in *Chunqiu zazhi*, No. 457; Mizuno Akira, 161.

¹⁸⁷ Wang Shan, “Jiuyiba shibian qian huabei yu dongbei jian renkou liudong de tedian ji yingxiang,” in *Xuexi yu tansuo*, Vol. 10 (1999). <<http://www.csscipaper.com/chinahistory/xdsll/8229.html>>; Cui Libo, “Lun minguo shiqi dongbei difang zhengfu ‘yimin shibian’ zhengce zhiding de yiju,” in Journal of Liaoning University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 36, No. 3 (May, 2008), 79.

¹⁸⁸ SR, 1/3/1928; 8/3/1928.

¹⁸⁹ Bai Rongxun, 226-8; Mizuno Akira, 176.

KMT's position in the South. The meeting has been seen as Tanaka's attempt to delay the Northern Expedition.¹⁹⁰ In fact, Tanaka's target was the Beijing-Mukden axis. Tanaka told Chiang that he considered moving the consulate to Nanjing, in effect recognising it as the seat of national government. He also promised that Japan would never support Zhang and the Fengtian Clique, and hinted that Japan wanted Feng and Yan, rather than Zhang, to control the North by suggesting that Chiang could wait for the three warlords in Northern China to fight against one another.¹⁹¹ In the meeting, Chiang promised to respect Japan's special rights in Manchuria.¹⁹² In February of 1928, Tanaka ordered the Minister in Beijing to press for tighter enforcement of the Arms Embargo against the Beijing Government.¹⁹³

The Fengtian Clique's conflict with Japan and the Soviet Union also brought the two powers together. In October, Tanaka's envoy Kuhara Fusanosuke presented to Stalin and Zhang Zuolin a proposal to create a "demilitarized zone." This would include part of Russian Eastern Siberia, part of Heilongjiang, and the northern part of Korea. Whereas Stalin was interested, the Fengtian Clique opposed the plan.¹⁹⁴ The Fengtian Clique understood that if the plan was put into practice, it could no longer use Russo-Japanese animosity as leverage. The Soviets had reached some sort of understanding with the Japanese between late 1927 and early 1928. In March of 1928, the Soviet Consul in Harbin claimed that the Soviets had nothing to fear from the Chinese because of their "recent agreement with the Japanese."¹⁹⁵

The Final Straw: Military Defeats in Late 1927 and Early 1928

The *Anguojun*'s inability to gain international recognition was closely linked to the military situation. When the North was seemingly able to hold Northern China, in the latter part of 1927 Lampson became markedly less hostile to Zhang and urged him to ally with the "moderates."¹⁹⁶ In November, when Yang Yuting approached Lampson for British financial assistance, the latter reportedly replied in "friendly and sympathetic sprit," and suggested that if the North

¹⁹⁰ For example, see Shen Yu, 322-3.

¹⁹¹ "Shōwa ni nen jūichi tsuki gō niche Shō Kaiseki to Tanaka Giichi shushō to no kaidan roku (Records of the conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Tanaka)," 5/11/1927, GK, B02030164700, slide 97.

¹⁹² Ibid., slide 95.

¹⁹³ Chen Tsunkung, *The China Arms Embargo, 1919-1929*, 153.

¹⁹⁴ William Fitch Morton, 109.

¹⁹⁵ "Consul Jones to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 31/3/1928, F 2217/22/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 384.

¹⁹⁶ "Chō Sakurin to Honkon sōtoku to no kaidanroku (Discussion between Zhang Zuolin and the Governor of Hong Kong)," 16/11/1927, GK, B02030809800, slides 315-9.

was able to end the war, “many things might be possible.”¹⁹⁷ Nonetheless, as the Fengtian Clique could not end the war, its international and financial status remained dubious. Despite Lampson’s attitude, the British government still refused to recognise Beijing or to negotiate over the return of the Tianjin Concession. As international recognition of a regime and its ability to abrogate the “unequal treaties” were crucial measures of success for a Chinese administration during this period, the Fengtian Clique’s failure in this respect was a blow to its domestic authority.

As Chapter 4 will discuss, this period witnessed the revival of the *Anguojun*’s military fortune and its ultimate failure. After Zhang became the Generalissimo in June of 1927, the military situation of the North improved. Seizing the opportunity created by the infighting of the KMT, the *Anguojun* retook Xuzhou and defeated Chiang in August. When the NRA was pushed back to Nanjing, Yan Xishan reverted to *de facto* neutrality. Lampson reported to London that in summer the North’s position was “stronger than ever.”¹⁹⁸ However, the *Anguojun* failed to hold its gains long enough to change the powers’ attitude. After Sun Chuanfang’s defeat in late August and Zhang Zongchang’s debacle in Henan in November, although the *Anguojun* crushed Yan Xishan’s army in September, the North no longer had the upper-hand.¹⁹⁹

One can compare the situation faced by Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique in late 1927 and that of Yuan Shikai in late -1911 and early-1912. At that time, the area under Yuan and his Beiyang Army’s control was confined to Zhili, Henan, Shandong, Manchuria, and part of Jiangsu and Hubei. The Beiyang Army still supported him, but Yuan found it increasingly difficult to provision it as the Beijing Government was close to bankruptcy. The Japanese and the Russians were ready to divide Manchuria among themselves. Like Zhang Zuolin, Yuan also lost Shanghai. However, Yuan was able to capture and hold Hankow and Hanyang, and was able to stop the revolutionaries from taking the Northern provinces, particularly Henan. Moreover, although Shanxi was not under Yuan’s control, its owner Yan Xishan willing to cooperate. Although the revolutionaries controlled more provinces, they could hardly defeat the North without prolonged fighting. This encouraged the British, who were unwilling to see the continuation of the war in China, to actively mediate peace between Yuan and the revolutionaries. It was for the same reason that the British tried to broker between Beijing and the KMT moderates in late 1927, although the latter were much less enthusiastic than in 1912.

¹⁹⁷ “Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 1/12/1927, F 378/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 33, 396-400.

¹⁹⁸ “Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 22/8/1927, F 8096/959/10, CPR, Vol. 3, 560.

¹⁹⁹ “Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 29/12/1927, F 1033/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 144.

Although Zhang also had a powerful army, the military situation he faced was much worse than that faced by Yuan Shikai, because he had to deal with a sizeable army under Feng Yuxiang, who emerged from Shaanxi and eventually captured Henan. By early 1928, Chiang Kai-shek had successfully built another coalition against the Beijing Government after allying with Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, and Li Zongren. Although the *Anguojun* still planned to retake Henan, it could hardly delegate enough resources to do so as it was vastly outnumbered and was surrounded by enemies from Shanxi, Henan, and southern Shandong. Zhang Zongchang's defeat against the NRA in April led to a complete collapse of the *Anguojun*'s Shandong front, and this prompted the Japanese Kwantung Army to step in and force Zhang Zuolin to leave North China by threatening to cut him off from Manchuria. In June, when Zhang tried to leave Beijing for Mukden, he was assassinated *en route*.

Phase v, June 1928-September 1931

After the death of Zhang Zuolin in June 1928, Zhang Xueliang succeeded his father as the leader of the Clique and promised to restore peace in Manchuria. However, in less than a year Manchuria was at war with the Soviets, as Zhang Xueliang tried to wrest the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway from the Soviets. The ensuing war, also known as the CER Incident, brought extensive damage to Chinese rule in Manchuria, revealed Fengtian's military weakness, and exposed the Nanjing Government's inability to support Manchuria. In 1930, Manchuria joined the Central Plains War, this time on the side of Chiang Kai-shek, when Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren, and Bai Chongxi fought against Chiang in defiance of the Nationalist Government's decision to disband a large part of their armies. This war further stretched the already weakened Fengtian Army to its limits. Seizing Fengtian's weakness, on September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army invaded and conquered Manchuria. This effectively ended the history of the Fengtian Clique as a major political-military force in China.

Strategic Inconsistency of the Fengtian Clique

The link between the fall of Manchuria in 1931, the CER Incident of 1929, and the Central Plains War in 1930 has been studied in detail.²⁰⁰ However, this

²⁰⁰ Wang Yuxiang, "Shilun Zhongdonglu shijian yu jiuyiba shibian," in *Shixue yuekan*, 1997, No. 4, 66-71, 79; Zuo Xiangwen, "Zailun 1929 nian Zhongdonglu shijian de fadong," in *Wenguo dangan*, No. 2, 120-7.

chain of events has seldom been examined in the context of Fengtian strategy between 1925 and 1928, when the Fengtian Clique risked strategic overreach to create a political bloc in Northern China that could secure its position in Northeast Asia. After Zhang Zuolin was assassinated, the Clique was at a cross-roads. Two strategic alternatives were put forward by Zhang Xueliang, Zhang Zuolin's successor, and Yang Yuting, who was largely responsible for the Clique's strategy as the Chief of Staff of the Fengtian Clique when Zhang Zuolin was in charge. As Yang was convinced that the superficial unification under the KMT could not last, he favoured a forward policy of holding the area east of Shanhaiguan and Rehe. On the surface, Yang favoured unity with Nanjing; at the same time, however, he urged Zhang Xueliang to preserve at least part of Zhang Zongchang and Sun Chuanfang's (50-70,000 strong) armies, lingering in the area between Tangshan and Shanhaiguan.²⁰¹ The assumption behind these actions were the inevitable fighting between Chiang Kai-shek, Yan Xishan, and Feng Yuxiang; Yang wanted to preserve the Fengtian Clique's presence in China Proper to prepare for an opportunity of a comeback. On the other hand, Zhang Xueliang was anxious to preserve his autonomous position, and only cooperated with the Nanjing Government when he believed that he could retain freedom of action while having the mandate and support of the new central government.

Again, this difference in strategy was closely linked to the internal power struggle in Manchuria. Zhang Xueliang was convinced that his position could never be secure as long as Yang Yuting remained powerful. As Yang did not try to hide the fact that he was influential, his enemies, including the Japanese advisors, played upon this fear.²⁰² Yang's growing influence throughout the second half of 1928 was particularly suspicious to Zhang, who feared that Yang would accept the Japanese demands on the five railways in exchange for Japanese support to remove him. In January of 1929, Zhang had Yang and his close ally Chang Yinhuai executed.²⁰³ The senior officers of the Clique were appalled. General Ji Yiqiao noted that experienced officers, many of whom

²⁰¹ Iriye Akira, "Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese," in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Nov. 1960), 36; Xiao Yuan, "Ji Yang Yuting," in Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Liaoning Sheng weiyuanhui wenshi zhiliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), *Liaoning wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 15 (Shenyang, 1988), 132; He Qianli, "1928 nian wo daibiao Bai Chongxi dao dongbei shangtan jiyao," in Zhengxie Tianjin shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), *Tianjin wenshi ziliao xuanji*, Vol. 52, 86.

²⁰² Wang Jiazheng, "Yikuai yinyuan he yizhang xiuju – Zhang Xueliang changbi Yang Yuting, Chang Huaiyin he xiumai riben zhengyoubendang (Seiyu Höntō) de neimo," in *Wenshi ziliao xuanji*, Vol. 3 (Beijing, 1960), 63-4.

²⁰³ See Appendix 1.

were from the *Shikan* Clique led by Yang, were “silenced and alienated.”²⁰⁴ After this, the collective decision-making system of the Fengtian Clique was replaced by Zhang Xueliang’s more dictatorial leadership.

Zhang Xueliang’s strategy was seemingly a compromise between those of Wang Yongjiang and his father. He tried to stabilize the financial situation of Manchuria by cutting down both the Fengtian Army from 40 to 15 brigades (losing one third of its manpower) and also the budget for the Mukden Arsenal.²⁰⁵ The rest of the *Anguojun* were disbanded or absorbed by Yan Xishan and Chiang Kai-shek, as Zhang Xueliang refused to accept any of them except Yu Xuezhong’s army.²⁰⁶ Zhang also continued his father’s aggressive policy against the neighbouring powers and succumbed to the temptation to intervene in Chinese politics despite the changes in the internal and external situation. He overlooked the fact that when his father’s position was weak in Manchuria, he showed much restraint in dealing with the Japanese and the Russians. Zhang Xueliang also overlooked that although Wang Yongjiang urged cutting military spending, he also advocated a restrained foreign policy and complete isolation from national politics. A good indication of Zhang Xueliang’s strategic inconsistency was his whereabouts and the deployment of the Fengtian Army before the Japanese invasion. Despite the continuous urging of the elders of the Clique such as Zhang Zuoxiang and Zhang Jinghui, Zhang Xueliang increasingly spent more time in Beijing than in Shenyang after the War of the Central Plain.²⁰⁷ To suppress the northern warlord Shi Yousan, a large part of the Fengtian Army was stationed in Northern China before the Japanese invasion, the majority of them the better equipped and trained troops, including all the artillery brigades.²⁰⁸ Zhang Xueliang’s failure to stick to either policy partly explains the fall of Manchuria in 1931.

The Decline of the Fengtian Clique’s Cohesion and Authority

Besides Zhang Xueliang’s inconsistent strategy, structural factors also had a bearing. First, the cohesion of the Fengtian Clique was weakened by the death

²⁰⁴ Guo Tingyi; Li Yushu; Chen Cungong, *Ji Yiqiao xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Taipei, 1985).

²⁰⁵ Ma Shangbin, *Fengxi jingji* (Shenyang, 2000), 234-5.

²⁰⁶ Except Yu Xuezhong’s 29th Corps, the remnants of Wu Peifu’s Army.

²⁰⁷ “Zhang Zuoxiang Zhang Jinghui deng Wei cuicu fan Shen (Shenyang) zuozhen Dongbei yu Zhang Xueliang wangfu dian,” in Liaoning sheng danganguan (ed.), *Fengxi junfa dangan shiliao huibian*, Vol. 11 (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe; Hong Kong: Dipingxian chubanshe, 1990), 99.

²⁰⁸ Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, 65; Jing Youyan, “Fengxi junshi jituan de xingcheng yu kuangzhan,” in Zhengxie Shenyang Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, *Shenyang wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 21, 69-70.

of Zhang Zuolin. The fact that Zhang Xueliang succeeded his father showed how fragile internal cohesion of the Clique was. As monarchy had ceased to exist in China, Zhang Xueliang's succession was rather problematic. Zhang was young, inexperienced, and suffered from health problems and an opium addiction. However, all other contenders of power in Manchuria were of similar caliber and influence, and only Zhang Zuolin had enough prestige and authority to lead them. Thus, Zhang Xueliang was accepted as the leader not because of his qualities, but because all other contenders would prefer him rather than others.

Zhang did not emerge as a mere figurehead. As mentioned, soon after his ascendancy to power he executed Yang Yuting and Chang Yinhuai, and purged the *Shikan* Clique. As Rana Mitter noted, Zhang Xueliang's decision to kill Yang Yuting and Chang Yinhuai was "more a sign of Zhang's weakness than his strength" that showed "his control was insufficient to enable him to reach a satisfactory resolution of the problem without recourse to terror tactics."²⁰⁹ One can draw parallels and differences between the generational transition in the KMT and the Fengtian Clique. There was bitter internal struggle among the would-be successors of Sun Yat-sen; the transition of power in Fengtian led to the murder of Yang and Chang. Like Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang found himself supported by a group of younger officers who had a close relationship with him. However, whereas Chiang established links with other groups such as the Zhejiang financiers, Zhang became increasingly reliant on the small group of loyal young officers where decision-making was concerned.

On the surface, by cooperating with Nanjing, Zhang became the second most prestigious militarist in the country when he became the Vice Commander-in-Chief of the NRA in 1930. In reality, however, his authority in Manchuria was undercut by Nanjing's attempt to extend its influence. Although in name he controlled the area north of the Yellow River after 1930, unlike his father, Zhang Xueliang had no real control over the warlords in Northern China. Ever since the KMT had eliminated the Beijing Government, it encouraged political and military disintegration in Northern China. The *Anguojun* was replaced by numerous minor warlords that were too powerful to be controlled by one another and too weak to challenge Nanjing.²¹⁰ His limited real authority probably explains why Chiang Kai-shek allowed Zhang to seem like a prestigious figure.

²⁰⁹ Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, 28.

²¹⁰ The whole process of this intrigue and disintegration is documented in detail in "Annual Report on China for 1929," FOCP, Vol. 20, 190-197; Also see Li Baoming, *Guojiahua mingyixia de sishuhua: Jiang Jieshi duì guomin gemingjun de kongjì yanjiu* (Beijing, 2010).

Within Manchuria, the cohesion of the Fengtian Clique declined after the end of the war. As the British annual report on Manchuria pointed out, in 1929 there were rumors about “a good deal of discontent among the older statesmen at the independent attitude of the young marshal” and “a possible weakening of the Manchurian confederacy.”²¹¹ As mentioned, the execution of Yang Yuting and Chang Yinhuai had alienated a significant part of the Fengtian officer corps. The removal of the older generation of civilian officials such as Yuan Jinkai and Zhang Xinbo also deprived Zhang of much elite support. In addition, after the change of flags, the new KMT organizations challenged the existing public organs that worked with Zhang Zuolin’s regime, thus undermining the coalition of the civilian elites and the soldiers. As early as in December 1928, Fengtian officers and officials were already wary of possible expansion of KMT activities in Manchuria.²¹² Later, Zhang Xueliang had to discuss ways to suppress “KMT infiltration” with his major subordinates.²¹³ Although Zhang and the leading officials and soldiers joined the KMT, many did not. When persuading Zhang not to intervene in the War of the Central Plain on behalf of Nanjing, Zhang Zuoxiang suggested:

Let us recall our relations with the current central government: the disbandment arrangements (of the Fengtian Army), the centralization of finance, the unhelpful attitude during our dispute with the Russians, and attempts to buy off our units... These events clearly speak one thing: it is always trying its utmost to undermine our position.²¹⁴

Those who lost their personal power during the transition from Zhang Zuolin to Zhang Xueliang were particularly alienated by the new regime.²¹⁵ It was instructive that Yuan Jinkai, the man who helped Zhang Zuolin to solicit elite support during the 1910s and an influential figure in the public organs, quickly turned to the Japanese during the Manchurian Incident.

²¹¹ “Annual Report on China for 1929,” FOCP, Vol. 20, 199.

²¹² “Guanyu fengsheng dangju zhunbei yu yi hi tongshi guachu dangwu coubeishe pai yi dizhi qianfu dang ren chengji zuzhi dangbu de wenjian,” Liaoning sheng danganguan (ed.), *Fengxi junfa dangan shiliao huibian*, Vol. 8, 4-6.

²¹³ Kantōchō keimu kyokuchō (Police Inspector of Kwantung Leased Territory), “Chō shirei (Commander-in-Chief Zhang Xueliang) saikō kambu himitsu kaigi,” 19/2/1929, GK, JACAR, Bo2031757100, slides, 409-10.

²¹⁴ “Zhang Zuoxiang zhi Zhang Xueliang xin,” FM, Vol. 5, 30-1.

²¹⁵ Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, 37.

Deteriorating Internal Condition and Geopolitical Situation

Between 1929 and 1931, despite Zhang Xueliang's promise to reform and maintain internal peace, the condition of Manchuria was not much improved. Mukden's attempt to disband part of the Fengtian Army and its inability to check the fall of the *fengpiao* led to a "notable increase in banditry" in Manchuria during this period.²¹⁶ The economic problem was accentuated beginning in late 1929, since Manchuria's commodity export market was hit hard by the Great Depression. After the death of Zhang Zuolin, important posts such as that of the commandant of Special Administrative Regions in the CER were held by incompetent officers such as Zhang Jinghui, who was known for obedience rather than ability. The defeat in 1929 against the Russians allowed the Soviets to wreak havoc on a large part of Jilin and Heilongjiang; not only did the defeat disrupt the economy of Jilin and Heilongjiang, but also the existing Chinese administrative apparatus.

The geopolitical situation facing the Fengtian Clique further deteriorated after it had abandoned Beijing. The Japanese soon accepted Zhang Xueliang's change of flag when they found that Manchuria's integration with China was minimal.²¹⁷ This acceptance contrasted with the fierce Japanese opposition to Zhang Zuolin's real attempt to integrate Northern China with Manchuria. However, the new master of Mukden quickly irritated the Japanese by declaring that the Chinese were going to finish the parallel rail lines and compete with the SMR. His approach only gave ammunition to the proponents of military takeover of Manchuria by the Japanese military led by Nagata Tetsuzan, Tojo Hideki, and Ishiwara Kanji, who gradually put their plan in motion from 1929.²¹⁸ As Rana Mitter noted, Zhang Xueliang's anti-Japanese posture alarmed the Japanese, "who worried that the spread of Chinese nationalist thought would lead to their eventual expulsion from the area."²¹⁹ While Mukden-Tokyo relations reached a low ebb after the change of flag, Mukden started a war with the Soviets. After the raid of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, Zhang Zuolin refrained from taking drastic action against the Soviets because of the growing Japanese pressure. When Zhang Xueliang rose to power, however, his attention shifted to the CER and he occupied it in July. Wellington Koo, who by then

²¹⁶ "Annual Report on China for 1930," FOCP, Vol. 20, 302; also see Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, 40, 60.

²¹⁷ "Annual Report on China for 1928," FOCP, Vol. 20, 108.

²¹⁸ For a detailed discussion of this group of officers and their arrangements before the Manchurian Incident, see Kawada Minoru; Wei Pinghe (tr.), *Showa rikugun no kikseki* (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2015).

²¹⁹ Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, 59.

served as an advisor in Manchuria, suspected that the Nanjing Government encouraged Zhang to fight in order to weaken the Fengtian Clique.²²⁰ No matter what Nanjing's intention, it was too pre-occupied and too far away to offer any help. During the Chinese Eastern Railway Incident, the Fengtian units involved (mainly Heilongjiang and Jilin troops) were swept aside by the Soviet Army that underwent a thorough modernization from 1926. This episode revealed the inability of Fengtian to maintain the integrity of the Chinese polity in Manchuria. It also showed the weaknesses in Zhang Xueliang's strategy of disarmament and reliance on the central government to support him in his struggle with external powers. After all, as Zhang Zuolin insisted, diplomacy had to be done always "with a loaded-gun in one hand."²²¹

Zhang's action against Japan and Russia encouraged them to form an anti-Mukden alliance. This was not entirely Zhang Xueliang's fault; Zhang Zuolin's anti-Soviet move and his refusal to accept the Japanese demands throughout 1925-1928 had already laid the groundwork for the Russo-Japanese rapprochement. His son's aggression only drew the two powers closer. During the CER Incident, the Japanese remained neutral, but in effect supporting the Soviets. They doubled their garrison in Manchuria, forbade the Chinese to use the SMR to transport soldiers, and launched manoeuvres that tied down Chinese troops.²²² The international situation was equally unhelpful, although this had little to do with Zhang Xueliang's actions. When the radical Japanese officers took drastic action, Britain and the US were too pre-occupied to intervene because of the Great Depression. Except for a feeble attempt to intervene through the League of Nations that led to the Lytton Mission, the western powers did nothing during the Japanese invasion in 1931.

Without any backing from the central government, the Fengtian Clique had to face Japan and the Soviet Union with a reduced, divided and battered army backed by an unsupportive society. It is hardly surprising that Fengtian could offer little organized resistance against the Japanese invasion in 1931. What is surprising is that many Fengtian officers and men organized rigorous guerrilla campaigns against the invaders without much support from Zhang Xueliang and the Nanjing Government. Some carried on resistance missions in Manchuria until 1934.²²³ This showed the importance of nationalism, at least

²²⁰ Zuo Xiangwen, 124-5.

²²¹ Zhu Mingshi, "Zhang Zuolin jiuren hailujun dayuanshuai jianwen," *Liaoning wenshi ziliaoxuanji*, Vol. 22 (Shenyang, 1988), 76.

²²² Wang Yuxiang, 69.

²²³ For the Chinese resistance against the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, see Guoshiguan shiliaochu, *Dierci Zhong-Ri zhazheng ge zhongyao zhanyi shiliao huibian: Dongbei yiyongjun* (Taipei: Academia Historia, 1984).

among some of the educated/regimentalized parts of the Chinese society in Manchuria.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has suggested that the government's authority, the leader's prestige, cohesion and consent, efficient bureaucracy, contingency, and favorable international and geopolitical positions were indispensable in the success of an early Republican political-military leader. These inter-related factors shaped the outcome of the Northern Expedition. To overcome the difficulties and weakness in these dimensions, Zhang Zuolin tried the strategy of unifying Northern China by force but ultimately failed.

Although the KMT had limited support in Northern China (and Manchuria), the *Anguojun* was never able to present itself as a better alternative because it lacked military success and resources to introduce enough reforms. Throughout the war, Zhang lacked the prestige and authority to fully secure his position in Beijing. Zhang's political and military build-up in Manchuria helped him to sustain the war for three years, but cracks in Manchurian society due to the pressures of the war started to appear in 1928. Although the *Anguojun* was able to unite many of the northern armies, it was unable to secure the cooperation of Yan Xishan or eliminate Feng Yuxiang. Partly because of the *Anguojun*'s military failure, Zhang was not recognized by the powers. Pressure from Japan and the Soviet Union hindered his attempt to establish his influence in Northern China.

Although Zhang Xueliang briefly became one of the most prestigious figures in China, ironically his authority in Northern China and Manchuria was limited compared to his father, and he had to face Japan and the Soviet Union alone. The defeats of 1929 and of 1931 have been attributed to Zhang Xueliang's decisions and the defeats of the Fengtian Army, but structural forces such as a lack of authority, a decline in societal cohesion, and economic problems were no less important. As the changing British attitude between 1925 and 1928 shows, many of these problems would have been mitigated by victories on the battlefield, but as the next chapter points out, although the *Anguojun* had some tactical and operational successes, it was unable to turn them into a political victory.

Military Dimension of the “Northern Expedition”

Introduction

As the previous chapter has looked into the interrelations between strategy, domestic and international politics, and the changing military situation during the Northern Expedition, this chapter looks at the operations and campaigns of the war that affected the above developments.¹ Previous studies of the Northern Expedition have explained the KMT’s victory by describing the NRA as an army driven by ideology, a new type superior to the warlord forces. However, although the NRA was different from the *Anguojun* since it opted for total rather than limited political wars, this study concurs with Donald Jordan’s view that the result of the war was not preordained by this fact. Donald Jordan’s review of the war has suggested that the war was largely decided on the battlefield as the NRA’s victories persuaded the warlords Li Zongren, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan to join the war against the Beijing Government.²

Donald Jordan and others who looked at the Northern Expedition from a military perspective were correct in pointing out the importance of battle in creating what Arthur Waldron called the “momentum of unification,” but they looked at the war mainly from the KMT’s perspective. Through an analysis of the *Anguojun* and the campaigns it fought, this chapter offers a revision of the military dimension of the war from the Northern perspective. It argues that the *Anguojun* was more than a loose conglomeration of rag-tag bandit-soldiers. This is the stereotype cultivated during and after the war by Chinese and foreign observers. The *Anguojun* resisted the KMT coalition for more than a year, and often fought effectively. This chapter contends that its defeat was owing to strategic and operational errors such as distribution of resources, poor decision-making, intelligence failures, and faulty command and control. Defeats were also the result of the difficulties entailed in coordinating a huge battlefield and also a general lack of resources. However, greater than all these problems, many of them also faced by the KMT, was that of overstretch as well as the fear of it. As this chapter shows, always fearing overstretching and

¹ When revising this chapter, the author was aided by the 2013 General Research Fund of the Hong Kong University Grants Committee (Project No: 244313).

² Donald Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, 275, 290.

geopolitical pressure, the Northern leaders made overcautious moves that prevented them from exploiting numerous opportunities.

This chapter begins by reviewing the military geography of Northern China, warfare during the 1920s, and the effectiveness of the *Anguojun*, before turning to the campaigns it fought. It puts the major campaigns in context, revisits their impact, and discusses their operational and tactical features. They include the Jiangsu-Anhui-Henan Campaign (March-June 1927), the Battle for Xuzhou (Jun-Aug 1927), the Battle for Nanjing (Aug-Sep 1927), the 2nd Henan Campaign (Sep-Dec 1927), the Shanxi-Zhili Campaign (Oct-Dec 1927), and the Henan-Shandong-Shanxi Campaign (April-May 1928). Because the *Anguojun* leaders always saw their campaigns as one coordinated effort, this study also highlights the interrelations between them.

Military Geography and the War in China in the 1920s

Location, accessibility, terrain, and geopolitics were all identified as vital factors for whether an area was suitable as a base for a Republican warlord.³ Manchuria was considered as a favorable base because of its “peripheral” position, but Michael Pillsbury has disagreed.⁴ He pointed out that although Manchuria was protected by the mountains in Rehe and the Shanhaiguan Pass, its flank and rear were exposed to Japan and Russia. Its capital Mukden and its arsenals were within easy reach of the Japanese. Because of these facts, the *Anguojun* always needed to divert its forces to deter potential invasion and secure communication between Manchuria and China Proper between 1925 and 1928.

On the other hand, geography allowed the Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan to exert strategic influence far beyond his fiscal and military strength. Without control of Shanxi, the *Anguojun*'s position in Northern China remained insecure. Shanxi, surrounded by mountains, is close to Beijing, with its boundary running parallel to the Beijing-Hankow Railway. The Shanxi warlord was able to disrupt its traffic from his mountainous stronghold, and did in 1927. Thus, large-scale operations south of the Yellow River were dangerous without Shanxi's cooperation. If the *Anguojun* had suffered a reversal south of the Yellow River, Shanxi could have threatened the Beijing-Tianjin area. On the

³ Ch'i Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China*, 142-9.

⁴ Donald Jordan, 288; Ch'i Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China*, 146; Michael Pillsbury, *Environment and Power*, 279.

other hand, a campaign to subdue Shanxi would have been costly and slow as the mountain passes were easy to defend.

Henan, the “land contested by all strategists (*bingjia bizheng zhi di*),” was always a crucial battlefield.⁵ Henan deserves its name as the center of China (*zhongzhou*): to its west are Shaanxi and Northwest China; to its east Shandong and Jiangsu; to its south Hubei; and to its north Shanxi and Zhili. The Beijing-Hankow and Longhai (Lanzhou of Gansu to Haizhou of Jiangsu) railways crisscrossed the province. The hilly terrain in its southwestern part provided shelter for regional warlords and local armed groups, while in the east and northeast plain large cities such as Kaifeng, Zhengzhou, and Luoyang were found. Henan was “a perfect battlefield but a place difficult to defend” because of its accessibility.⁶ As discussed below, its peculiar position and railway network made it a crucial objective for the *Anguojun*.

Another important geographic factor of warfare during this period was China’s railway system, the pattern of which roughly resembled the capital letter “A.” Beijing and Tianjin, the terminals of the Beijing-Hankow and Tianjin-Pukow railways, were at its top. The Longhai Railway that ran from Xian to the eastern seaboard of Jiangsu formed the bar between the diverging legs. While the faction controlling Beijing could use the railways to move and supply its armies, the diverging lines created a “funnel effect” that scattered the armies as they progressed south (Map 4.1).⁷ This caused much difficulty for the *Anguojun* when it was coordinating the armies to advance along both railways. Pressure from Shanxi added even more difficulties.

Warfare in China in the Mid-1920s


Arthur Waldron has suggested that wars in China intensified beginning in 1920 because of the expansion of the armament industry. He argued that warfare similar to that of the First World War emerged in China by 1924, but it was “not exactly like the Europeans” because of the vastness of the country and the prevalence of “deception, subversion, and psychological manipulation.”⁸ However, as Hans van de Ven pointed out, “[even] if Arthur Waldron’s

5 Odoric Y.K. Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan* (Stanford, 1994), 15.

6 Ibid., 17.

7 The idea came from Chris Bellamy, *Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War* (New York, 2007). Bellamy elegantly showed the difficulty facing the Germans invading the Soviet Union in 1941.

8 Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism*, 53–71, quotes from 71.



MAP 4.1 *The “Funnel Effect”: the front lengthened as an army progressed south*

comparison of the 1924 Zhili-Fengtian War with the First World War is useful to force us to consider the effect of war in creating the conditions in which the second rise of revolution could find a broad resonance, it, nonetheless, risks overstating similarities between warlord warfare and the total warfare of the First World War.⁹

⁹ Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism*, 78.

The “firepower revolution”¹⁰ in Europe between 1914 and 1918 had limited impact on Republican Chinese warfare. China lacked the industrial base and logistics apparatus to support such a war. As the country was too large and had too many strategic points that were far apart, the force-space ratio in China hardly resembled that of the Western Front. The firepower of a Fengtian corps was largely equal to a European division in 1916, but it covered a much wider front because of a larger battlefield.¹¹ Consequently, trench warfare had no place in the fighting. Flanking movements were common because of the Japanese influence on Chinese military education and the vast space available. The size of the armies was modest even by traditional Chinese standards. A coherent army of a contender of national power never had more than 4-500,000 men, far from enough to subdue the entire country.

Armies became more mobile also because of the use of railways; this gave armored trains an important role, especially in the North China Plains.¹² Cavalry remained relevant because of the vast size of the battlefield. Tanks, planes, and chemical weapons were employed, but their impact was negligible owing to their limited number and effectiveness. Nevertheless, the importance of mobility should not be overstated. The differing terrain in Northern and Southern China shaped different tactical approaches. While the southern forces relied on shock and mobility, the northern forces focused on firepower and were more road-bound. As discussed in greater detail below, when the northern armies met the lightly-equipped opponents from the south, they were able to inflict heavy casualties on them on favorable terrain. The battle of Linying in May of 1927 was an example, during which over 5,000 NRA troops were killed or wounded in a matter of days.

Communication and logistic capabilities were limited. Given the primitive state of the means of communication, command and control were difficult, especially on tactical and operational levels. Some northern units had wireless radios, but these were unreliable. As telegraph messages could be intercepted, messengers travelling by railway and sometimes airplanes carried important messages. This caused much delay in action, and at times led to dire consequences. When Chiang Kai-shek ordered the counterattack on Xuzhou in late

¹⁰ David Zabecki, *The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War* (London, 2006), 3.

¹¹ During the battle of the Somme in 1916, the frontage of a British division was around 1-3 km; the area covered by a Fengtian division would be considerably wider.

¹² As General Liu Zhi of the NRA noted, when the NRA reached North China, they had much difficulty confronting the *Anguojun* cavalry units. On one occasion in December of 1927, the northern cavalry routed the entire 22nd Division of the First Army Group. See Liu Zhi, *Wode huìyí* (Taipei, 1982), 61.

July of 1927, the *Anguojun* intercepted the telegram.¹³ Artillery and supplies had to be hauled by railway, which covered only the eastern part of the country. Many railways were mismanaged or damaged by war.¹⁴

The effectiveness of an army depended less on equipment or ideological motivation than on experience, terrain, and resourcefulness of commanders. The Shanxi army is an example. Well-equipped and reasonably trained, it melted away when facing the more experienced Fengtian Army. Only those under Fu Zuoyi exploited the city wall of Zhuozhou and offered staunch resistance against the Fengtian forces.

Although all sides possessed some warships, these had limited impact on the war except during the battle of Longtan. During the battle, the navy in Shanghai sided with the KMT and prevented Sun Chuanfang from reinforcing his army south of the Yangtze. Wu Peifu's bold plan to land on Huludao in 1924 and the Shandong army's amphibious attack against Dagu in 1926 were not repeated, because neither side had naval superiority. Throughout 1926-1928, the fleets of both sides became fleets-in-being, useful merely because their presence might deter the other side from landing behind their lines.

Because of the above reasons, intense but brief engagements such as the battles of Linying and Longtan was the norm, and they led to thousands of casualties. Their impact was multiplied by the media coverage received. The fighting in Longtan was reported in detail by northern newspapers such as *Chenbao*, *Shijie Ribao*, and *Dagongbao*. Still, no single battle could decide the outcome of the war, because none was large enough to destroy a faction's military capability and there was no single "decisive point" in China. Because of the wide media coverage, the political and military leaders of all sides had to confront the problem of information overflow when assessing the opponents' moves. On the other hand, strategic surprise was made almost impossible because of this.

The KMT-CCP tried to mobilize the population in Hunan through propaganda teams and agricultural reforms, but their success was very limited and popular mobilization was limited elsewhere. However, as the discussion of the Fengtian Army's experience in Henan showed, the war of 1925-1928 was not

¹³ See Liu Fenghan, Zhang Li; Mao Jinling, *Ding Zhipan xiasheng fangwen jilu* (Taipei, 1991), 25. On the other hand, as Liu Zhi suggested in his memoir, the NRA was able to intercept the telephone calls of the *Anguojun*. See Liu Zhi, *Wode huiyi*, 61. To ensure secrecy, *Anguojun* generals had to travel to Beijing for specific orders and plans. The delay caused by these travels led to dire consequences during the First Henan Campaign of April-May of 1927. Sometimes telegrams were copied by news agents, and their contents became known to the public even before they reached their intended audience.

¹⁴ "Railway Conditions in China," 10/12/1927, Week in China, Vol. 9, No. 141, 5-14.

just about confrontations between the major armies. As discussed below, both the *Anguojun* and the NRA had to confront the problem of rural policing. Although national political issues were still decided by the major warlords, the provincial warlords also had their role. Not unlike the Civil War of 1947-49, numerous autonomous armies were caught between the two large and relatively coherent camps in 1926. During the early stages of the war, many of these warlords seized the opportunity to expand after allying with the KMT.¹⁵ This phenomenon prevailed in Hunan (Tang Shengzhi), Hubei (Liu Zuolong and later He Jian), Zhejiang (Zhou Fengqi and Chen Yi), Jiangxi (Lai Shihuang), Anhui (Chen Tiaoyuan), Guizhou (Yuan Zhuming), Henan (Jin Yun-e), and Shaanxi (Zhang Zhigong). Many of them were originally Wu Peifu or Sun Chuanfang's subordinates or leaders of provincial armies that could trace their origin back to the late Qing military reforms. From 1926 to early 1927 they turned to the KMT, but many were ready to surrender to the *Anguojun* once the North seemed to be winning in the summer of 1927. Many of them were eliminated (Zhou, Wang, and Lai) by the Guangxi Clique or lost local power after the battle of Longtan. This cleared the way for Chiang Kai-shek to firmly establish himself in some of these areas in the subsequent decade. On the other hand, a number of Wu's subordinates (Qiu Yingjie, Yu Xuezhong, Tian Weiqin, and Zhang Zhigong) turned to the *Anguojun*. Although the local forces could not face the better-armed and more coherent armies from both sides, they helped the KMT and the *Anguojun* to hold the rural area and freed troops to fight the campaigns.

Anguojun, the National Pacification Army

Discussions emphasizing the superiority of the NRA or the importance of ideology have tended to exaggerate the size of the *Anguojun* (usually the former), but those regarding the difference between the “ideological soldiers” (*zhiyibing*) and the warlords’ “mercenary-bandits” have tended to underestimate the quality of the *Anguojun* soldiers.¹⁶ In 1929, the British military attaché in Beijing, Colonel George Badham-Thornhill, argued that the KMT emerged

¹⁵ Donald Jordan, “Provincialism within the Chinese National Revolution: The Case of Chekiang, 1926-1927,” in F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas Etzold, *China in the 1920s*, 127-46.

¹⁶ Jiang Weiguo (ed.), *Beifa tongyi*, 212; Diana Lary, 13; Luo Zhitian also pointed out that this is one of the myths in the study of the Northern Expedition. See *Luanshi qianliu: minzu zhuoyi yu minguo zhengzhi*, 186. Liu Zhi stated in his memoir that the *Anguojun* had more than 1,000,000 soldiers.

victorious because of the “well-directed, Moscow-inspired propaganda” that “[filled] the simple Southern minds with hatred of their brethren in the North, [and] created a temporary spirit of combat in men who...are pacifists by nature.” He believed that “a better equipped and trained Northern Army, with no slogans and left to [the soldiers] to think what it was all about, turned round and walked away in the face of an unfamiliar phenomenon they knew nothing about.” Instead of looking for military explanations, Colonel Badham-Thornhill attributed the North’s defeat to “[a] lack of morale and a true martial spirit.”¹⁷

Badham-Thornhill was one of the many who subscribed to this discourse, which was cultivated by the KMT and its allies. In January of 1927, the *Pravda* suggested that the NRA was different from and superior to the warlord armies because it was “politically conscious” and was a “true people’s army.”¹⁸ An article in July of 1928 in the NRA’s *Military Magazine* (*Junshi zazhi*) argued that only the soldiers armed with the Three People’s Principles could overcome the better-equipped *Anguojun*.¹⁹ Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly stressed these points in front of his Whampoa officers.²⁰ As Luo Zhitian pointed out, even before the war ended, the “myths” about the NRA became the standard explanation for the KMT’s victory.²¹

From May to June of 1927, Major Joseph Stilwell of the United States Army travelled from Tianjin to Pukou to inspect the front. Stilwell, a well-known “China Hand,” was to become the commander of the China-Burma-India Theatre during the Second World War.²² He commented on the northern forces:

...the usual coolie soldier, very poorly instructed, unpaid and badly fed, many of them have been conscripted; few of them have any idea why they are fighting, and none have their heart in it.... The high command does not even take the trouble to distribute propaganda or try to improve the morale and fighting ability of the men in any other way than an occasional harangue when they are to be used in action.... I was told on several

¹⁷ Colonel George Badham-Thornhill, “The Military Equation in China: Past and Present Manifestations, November 27, 1929,” FOCP, Vol. 37, 390-1.

¹⁸ Quoted from Yang Kuisong, *Zhongjian didai de geming: Zhongguo geming de celüe zai guoji beijing xia de yanbian* (Beijing, 1992), 123.

¹⁹ Huang Weilong, “Jundui jixu zhuyihua,” in *Junshi zazhi*, No. 3, 1/9/1928, 2.

²⁰ Qin Xiaoyi, *Xian zongtong Jianggong sixiang yanlun zongji* (Taibei, 1984), 284.

²¹ Luo Zhitian, 186.

²² For Stilwell’s life, see Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American experience in China, 1911-1945* (London: 2001, c1970); for a critical reassessment, see Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism*, first chapter.

occasions that it wouldn't do to let some of these units retain their arms, or they would simply turn bandit. Apparently, the only real factors that hold Chang Tsung Ch'ang's [Zhang Zongchang] forces together are fear of the southerners and Red Spears, and the stiffening due to the presence of a few Russians and the armored trains....²³

Stilwell was perceptive in sensing the growing importance of nationalism and ideological indoctrination that was part of the change from the warlords' limited warfare to the “total” warfare of the revolutionaries. However, this fact alone was insufficient to explain the North's military failure.

A month before Stilwell's trip, the American Minister in Beijing sent First Lieutenant David Barrett²⁴ to Zhili, Shanxi, Henan, and Jiangsu. Barrett reported that although Zhang Zongchang's forces were less well supplied and fed compared to the Fengtian Army, which was in very good condition. He found that the officers and men of the Zhili-Shandong Army were “elated by their recent success” (in holding the northern bank of the Yangtze). In addition, the propaganda campaign for soldiers and locals was in full swing, and the training of recruits was carried out “energetically.”²⁵ He noticed the problems of pay, desertion, and maltreatment of locals by the soldiers in Xuzhou, but he attributed it to the use of the Shandong military notes, an economic-administration problem.²⁶

The two conflicting reports reveal the difficulty of understanding the condition of the armies during this period. The time gap between Stilwell and Barrett's reports was crucial. Stilwell was inspecting an army that had just retreated hundreds of kilometers. He did not visit the Fengtian Army, and had little real communication with the locals and the northern soldiers. Barrett's visit of the northern army was probably more comprehensive, but he did not compare the *Anguojun* with the NRA. Neither man met Sun Chuanfang's troops. To different degrees, the above views were based on observation, but all were shaped by perceptions, incomplete information, and political interest. While the NRA was extensively studied,²⁷ little attention has been paid to the

²³ “Washington to Headquarters, U.S. Army in China, Tientsin, Stilwell's Report, October 1927,” USMI, Reel 5, slide 738.

²⁴ Barrett later participated in the American Mission to Yenan in 1944. See John Hart, *The Making of an Army “Old China Hand”: a Memoir of Colonel David D. Barrett* (Berkeley, 1985).

²⁵ “Observation on a trip to the *Anguojun* Front, Mar 1927,” USMI, Reel 4, slides 384-7.

²⁶ Ibid., slide 385.

²⁷ F.F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949*; Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism*, 79-87; Chen Yuhuan, *Chulu fengmang: Huangpu junxiao diyiqisheng yanjiu*

Anguojun, which was used as the contrast to the party army of the NRA. The following section focuses on the *Anguojun* and reviews its composition, equipment, training, cohesion, and relations with the people.

Organization

The *Anguojun* was the product of Zhang Zuolin's attempt to coordinate the northern armies to fight Feng Yuxiang and the KMT in 1926-1928. It was the successor of the "Anti-red Allied Army" (*taochilianjun*), the product of the alliance between Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu in early 1926. It consisted of Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian Army (*zhenweijun*, or *fengjun*),²⁸ Zhang Zongchang's Zhili-Shandong Army (*zhi-lu lianjun*),²⁹ Wu Peifu's Anti-bandit Allied Army (*taozeilianjun*),³⁰ and Sun Chuanfang's Allied Army of the Five Provinces (*wushenglianjun*) (See Chapter Three). The name "*Anguojun*" appeared when Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Zongchang, Sun Chuanfang, and other northern generals met in Tianjin to discuss the formation of a northern coalition in November of 1926. After the meeting, a headquarters was formed to coordinate the armies. The major strategic direction of the army was decided by the joint-leaders

(Guangzhou, 2007); Chen Yuhuan, *Fengyun jihui: Huangpu junxiao dierqisheng yanjiu* (Guangzhou, 2008); Chen Yuhuan, *Xiongguan mandaoye: Huangpu junxiao disanqisheng yanjiu* (Guangzhou, 2009); Peter Worthing, *Military History of Modern China, from the Manchu conquest to Tian'anmen Square* (London, 2007).

- 28 It suffered from much loss during Guo Songling's rebellion in November and December of 1925, but recovered under the command of Zhang Xueliang and Han Linchun.
- 29 When Guo Songling rebelled, Feng Yuxiang attacked Zhili Province, which was controlled by Li Jinglin, a member of the Fengtian Clique. Li was defeated, but was able to bring most of his army to Shandong, where they merged with another Fengtian general, Zhang Zongchang's, Shandong Army. Since Li was suspected by Zhang Zuolin of collaborating with Guo, he was removed from his command, and the Zhili Army was then controlled by Chu Yupu, one of Zhang's subordinates. See Li Zaolin, *Wode Beiyang junlu shengya*, 171. Although these armies were seen as "independent forces" in most discussions of this period, they had to turn to Zhang Zuolin for strategic direction, and never took independent action between 1925 and 1928. The so-called "Zhili Army" was an army built around Li Jinglin's Fengtian 1st Division. It drew most of its recruits from the Zhili province, and had no relations with the Zhili Clique. The same was true for the "Shandong Army," which was built around Zhang's Fengtian 2nd Division, but included many local Shandong forces such as the 5th Division and the 47th Brigade of the Beijing Government. See Ding Wenjiang, *Minguo junshi jinji*, 52, 56-8.
- 30 When Wu Peifu returned to national politics in late 1925, he rallied the ex-Zhili Clique forces in Hubei and Central China around him. By early 1926, his army consisted of the remnants of his old 3rd Division, the Zhili Clique's Hubei garrison, and the ex-2nd National Army originally under Hu Jingyi and Yue Weijun.

conferences, which were held at least 29 times from December of 1926 to December of 1927.³¹ However, as subsequent events show, the commanders sometimes acted against the agreed strategy due to miscomprehension, contingencies, or self-interest. A more tangible advantage of unified command was improved intelligence from local units or civil authorities. After its formation, the headquarters disseminated reports about enemy disposition and the general situation throughout the army. The surviving records of the 135th Brigade of the Zhili-Shandong Army stationed in Tianjin had 291 directives and situation reports from Beijing until September 18, 1927, showing that the headquarters did not exist in name only.³²

The *Anguojun* consisted of units of various quality. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Fengtian Army was arguably the most modernized military force (in western and Japanese sense) in China during this period. Sun Chuanfang's force was a conglomeration of five provincial armies and Sun's own divisions that could trace their origin back to the Beiyang Army. While the Anhui, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi contingents deserted or were destroyed before Sun joined the *Anguojun*, the Jiangsu troops and his divisions remained loyal throughout the war. Although it was the smallest among the armies of the *Anguojun*, the Japanese also noted that Sun Chuanfang's troops “understood their tasks” and were “well disciplined,” and that the officers “disseminated their orders thoroughly.”³³ The performance of Sun Chuanfang's army during the battles of Xuzhou and Longtan in 1927 contradicted stereotypes about the “warlord army.” In contrast, the Zhili-Shandong Army under Zhang Zongchang and Chu Yupu³⁴ had some of the worst troops in China. While units such as Xu Yuanquan's 6th Corps were experienced professionals, a significant part of the army was made up of bandits, provincial militiamen, or surrendered enemies.³⁵ No one, including Zhang, had any clue of the size of his army. Most of the Zhili-Shandong Army had no permanent base, and, even if they had, they were constantly redeployed. The 6th Corps fought continuously in Shandong,

³¹ The number of conferences counted from the entry of the chronological history of Zhang Xueliang. See Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), *Zhang Xueliang nianpu*, op. cited.

³² For an example of these reports, see “Anguojun Zhiliu lianjun di yibai sanshiwulu buchongtuan chuanshou guanyi beijun yu guomingemingjun zai lu yuan su diqu zhanfeng ji tanbao guomindang ninghan fenlie junshi dongtai de tongling, tongzhi (as “Anguojun Zhiliu lianjun di yibai sanshiwulu buchongtuan” below),” The Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, 1026-543.

³³ “Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928,” in RDN, JACAR, Ref: C01007465200, slide 62.

³⁴ See Appendix 1.

³⁵ For a breakdown of the composition of the Zhili-Shandong Army please refer to the Order of Battles section.

Zhili, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Henan between 1925 and 1928.³⁶ Zhang Zongchang lacked the time and resources to reorganize his army, and had to fight in undesirable times and places for his superior. The army only kept fighting for three years because of the efforts of largely unknown staff officers, such as the ex-Baoding instructor Li Zaolin³⁷ and the Staff College graduate Ding Zhipan.³⁸

The *Anguojun* soldiers were mainly from Manchuria and North China, but some were from other parts of China. They included the remnants of Wu Peifu's army led by Qiu Yingjie and Yu Xuezhong,³⁹ the Yi Army under Mi Zhenbiao,⁴⁰ Liu Zhenhua and Zhang Zhigong's Zhensong Army,⁴¹ and even

³⁶ The dates of the campaigns are as follows: southern Shandong (Nov 1925-Jan 1926), southern Zhili (Jan-Apr 1926), Jiangsu (Nov 1926), northern Anhui (Dec 1926-Apr 1927), Xuzhou (Jun-Aug 1927), eastern Henan (October-December 1927), and Shandong (Apr-Jun 1928)

³⁷ See Appendix 1.

³⁸ See Appendix 1.

³⁹ See Appendix 1.

⁴⁰ The Yi Army was one of the most long-lived military organizations in China during this period. It was first formed by Song Qing in 1865 as part of the Imperial Army, consisting mainly of the disbanded Huai Army. The Yi Army participated in the suppression of the Nian Rebellion and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. During the Republican period, it was stationed mainly in Henan, with detachments deployed in Rehe. The leaders of the Yi Army remained connected to the central government, and were close to the Zhili Clique between 1920 and 1924. After the Second Zhili-Fengtian War the Yi Army lost its Rehe garrison, and was incorporated in the 2nd KMC under Yue Weijun. When Yue was defeated in 1926 the Yi Army again became independent, and joined the *Anguojun* when the Fengtian Army entered Henan in early 1927. However, it was destroyed when Feng Yuxiang occupied the province, and its remnants joined Zhang Zhongchang's army. See Huang Zhengyuan, "Yijun yangtan," in *Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, Wenshi ziliao xuanji*, Vol. 10 (Beijing, 1960), 136-41.

⁴¹ Liu Zhenhua and Zhang Zhigong were the major bandit leaders in Henan during the late Qing and early Republican period. They formed the Zhensong Army during the 1911 Revolution, and turned to the Beijing Government afterwards in exchange for their position in Henan. When Wu Peifu was trying to eradicate regional warlordism, the Zhensong Army was reorganized, and Zhang Zhigong's army was reorganized as the 2nd Shaanxi Division and deployed in Shaanxi. The division participated in the Second Zhili-Fengtian War, but it performed poorly. Zhang was able to return to Henan, and he joined Yue Weijun's 2nd KMC with Liu Zhenhua. In 1926, Zhang cooperated with the Red Spear Society in defeating Yue, and took Luoyang in 1926. Liu tried to capture Xian, but was defeated by Feng Yuxiang's army coming from Shaanxi. Both Liu and Zhang cooperated with the *Anguojun* in April of 1927, but the Zhensong Army was defeated and incorporated into Feng Yuxiang's army, with part of it going over to Zhang Zongchang. See Li Yaozheng,

contingents of Guangdong and Guangxi troops under generals Liu Zhilu and Ma Ji.⁴² Zhang Zongchang even had a notorious White Russian “division” that was known for poor discipline and brutality.⁴³ While the incorporation of these units might have been brief and superficial, the armies under Liu Zhilu and Yu Xuezhong were fully incorporated into the *Anguojun*, and Yu’s troops even followed the Fengtian Army to Manchuria after the war.

Equipment and Supply

The *Anguojun* was better equipped than the NRA armies. For example, a typical Fengtian division (around 11,000 officers and men, 6,000 rifles, 24 machine guns, and 600 horses) in late 1927 had 36 mountain guns, 12 37mm infantry guns, and 24 light (80mm) trench mortars.⁴⁴ Although the Mukden Arsenals could supply the Fengtian forces, those under Zhang Zongchang and Sun Chuanfang often faced a shortage of munitions as priority was given to the Fengtian Army.⁴⁵ Still, the 6th Corps (with the actual size of a Fengtian division) of the Zhili-Shandong Army had at least 4 field guns and 30 trench

⁴² “Zhang Zhigong de qingmie shi,” in *Zhengxie Yiquan wenshi ziliaowei yuanhui, Yiquan wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 4 (Yiquan, 1985), 218-20; Meng Zhihao, “Zhang Zhigong zai xinan xian qudi hongchanghui zhizhan,” in *Yiquan wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 4 (Yiquan, 1985-), 232-3.

⁴³ Liu Zhilu was originally Chen Jiongming’s subordinate. After Chen was defeated in 1925, he led his 3,000 troops to the north and finally joined Zhang Zongchang’s army in October of 1926. See Wang Fumin, *Minguo junren zhi* (Beijing, 1992), 121; Xie Zhebang, “Guangyu Liu Zhilu de yidian shiliao,” in *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao cuangao xuanbian*, Vol. 4 (Beijing, 2008) <http://www.gzzxws.gov.cn/gzws/cg/cgml/cg4/200808/t20080827_5100.htm>. Accessed 4/2/2010.

⁴⁴ The 65th Division consisted of one White Russian brigade and one Chinese brigade. There were around 3,000 White Russians serving in the division, but the actual number in 1927 was only several hundred because of the severe losses against Sun Chuanfang during the war in 1926. Since then the White Russians were mainly deployed in armored trains. See Mou Zhongheng, “Laomaizi dui”; Liu Wenqing, “Guyong bai-ebing cimo,” in *Shandong sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui* (ed.), *Tufei junfa Zhang Zongchang* (Jinan, 1991), 72-82.

⁴⁵ “Hoku Shina guntai chōsa ni ken (Investigation of the Northern Chinese Army),” 20/1/1928, JACAR, C01007465200, slide 20; The Fengtian Arsenal produced two types of mortars between 1925 and 1931, they were the 80mm (Type 15) and 150mm models (Type 16), both modified version of the mortars designed by Donald “One Arm” Sutton. See Xia Jingshan, “Zhang Zuolin shiqi de Liaoning bijipao chang jianjie,” in *Dadong wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 5 (Dadong, 1991), 126.

⁴⁶ Consequently, Zhang and Sun occasionally had to resort to buying arms from Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Norway. See Zhang Bofeng, Li Zhongyi (eds.), *Beiyangjunfa, 1912-1928*, 486-9; SR, 27/5/1927; 11/2/1928.

mortars in 1927.⁴⁶ As Stilwell noted: “beside the usual types of rifles and pistols they (the Zhili-Shandong forces) are well supplied with machine guns, three inch mortars, mountain guns, three inch field guns, and a large number of Bergmann automatic rifles (sub-machine guns).”⁴⁷ As Zhang Zuolin was almost obsessed with advanced weapons, huge sums of money were spent on planes and tanks, which were yet to become decisive weapons because of their limited numbers and early stage of training. In 1926, the Fengtian Army spent 30,240,000 *fengpiao yuan* on its 45 infantry regiments, but it was spending 14,000,000 on its 100-plane strong flying corps.⁴⁸ With its elaborate logistics system (see Chapter 2 and 3), the Fengtian forces were less reliant on foraging compared to other armies in China. This could cause less disruption to the locals and was a real advantage in winning over support.

Training and Recruitment

Contrary to Stilwell’s assertion, not all *Anguojun* officers were coolies or misfits. The Fengtian Army was led by graduates from China and Japan. Between 1926 and 1928, 430 Baoding graduates (and its predecessors) served in the *Anguojun*, compared to 610 in the Canton NRA, 258 in the KMC, and 196 in Shanxi Army. It should be noted that while the NRA had more Baoding graduates, most of them were younger, thus less experienced, than those serving in the northern armies, and many were recruited during the final years of the Academy, when it was poorly run and administered. Of the fourteen divisional commanders under Sun Chuanfang in 1927, eight were Baoding graduates. In 1928, of the twenty-one brigade commanders of the Fengtian Army, four were Fengtian Academy graduates, twelve from Baoding, four from Shikan, and four from Staff Colleges of China or Japan. Aside from education, many *Anguojun* officers were experienced, and some participated in the fierce fighting between 1924 and 1926.⁴⁹

46 “Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928,” in *Rikugun shō dai nikki* (Records of the Ministry of War, RDN), JACAR, Ref: C01007465200, slides 20, 37.

47 “Washington to Headquarters, U.S. Army in China, Tientsin, Stilwell’s Report, October 1927,” 735.

48 Kantōchō zaimubu (Financial Section, Kwantung Leased Territory, “Hōtenshō zaisei no genjō,” GK, JACAR, Ref: B02031788000, slides 12-32.

49 The eight divisional commanders were Chen Yushen (b. 1889), Wang Ming (b. 1880), Wang Yazhi (b. 1893), Su Yan (b. 1890), Liu Shilin (b. 1879), Liang Hongen (b. 1892), Shangguan Yunxiang (b. 1892), and Ma Baocheng (b. 1891); The Fengtian brigade commanders were Liu Zhonggan (b. 1895), Wang Guide (b. 1886), Qiao Fang (b. 1893), Jin Jingqing (b. 1891), Chang Sheng (b. 1887), Chen Shen (b. 1892), Wang Hehua (b. 1900), Li Zhentong (b. 1893), Dong Yingbin (b. 1894), Liu Bin (b. 1894), Feng Bingquan (b. 1898), Liu Jinyi (b. 1894), Ren

Widespread poverty was seen as the reason why men joined the army during early Republican period.⁵⁰ However, this was not always the case. Recruitment was selective in some northern armies, the process often being monitored by local authorities.⁵¹ In the Fengtian Army, recruits were supplied by the *baojia* system, which was used to meet the quota set by the Fengtian Clique. Although this system did not prevent the use of press-gang, it worked throughout the war. Even Zhang Zongchang understood that untrained soldiers were liabilities rather than assets, and tried to disband the underage troops and bandits.⁵² Although the Japanese noted the decline in quality and discipline of the Fengtian Army after 1926 as the result of its expansion, the Fengtian commanders responded to it by introducing cadet corps in the units.⁵³ In fact, as financial limitations prevented the *Anguojun* from expanding in the way the KMT did, the numbers of the *Anguojun* remained stable from 1927 to 1928.

Cohesion

It is very difficult to generalize regarding the factors contributing to the cohesion of an *Anguojun* unit, although some points can be made. First, regional affiliation was an important factor for lower-level cohesion. Most of the soldiers of the *Anguojun* were from Shandong, Zhili, and Manchuria, and some were organized according to their place of origin. Second, although the *Anguojun* might lack an ideology, the idea of protecting the “Chinese way of living” against the perceived “red menace” helped motivate some of the

Shaoting (b. 1895), Wang Liangcheng (b. 1890), Qi Zhanjiu (b. 1884), Guo Dianju (b. 1886), Li Jinsheng (b. 1895), Bao Yulin (b. 1897), Zhang Zuojiu (b. unknown), Huang Shiyue (b. 1890), and Sun Shaoyin (B. 1880). Data collected from Chen Yuhuan, *Baoding junxiaojiangshuai lu* (Guangzhou, 2006).

⁵⁰ Diana Lary, 17.

⁵¹ SR, 17/8/1927; 10/4/1927; 7/11/1927.

⁵² When the situation was less tense in June of 1926, Zhang Zongchang disbanded some of the less-effective soldiers and reorganized his army. 30,000 soldiers were disbanded in a month. See SR, 30/5/1926; 26/6/1926. In 1927, he planned to disband the underaged and overaged soldiers, and used the underaged ones to form a cadet regiment. See “Tongzhi – si yue ba ri (8/4/1927), wuhou wushi (5 p.m.) yu Tianjin ershiwu shi cammouchu,” and “Tongzhi – si yue ershiwu ri (25/4/1927) wuhou yi shi (1 p.m.) yu Tianjin di ershiwu shi cammouchu,” in *Anguojun Zhilu lianjun duli di san dadui chuanshou guanyu beijun yu guomingemingjun zai yu e yuan su dengsheng zhankuang ji tanbao guomindang fangmian junshi huodong de tongzhi* (as *Anguojun Zhilu lianjun duli di san dadui* below), Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, Ref: 1026-532; Huang Peixiang, “Younian xuebingdui,” in *Tufei junfa Zhang Zongchang*, 92-5.

⁵³ “Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928,” slide 20.

officers and soldiers. Both Sun Chuanfang and Zhang Zongchang compared the war to the Taiping Rebellion, as they were both about “protecting tradition” in their newspapers, leaflets, and songs for the officers and ranks.⁵⁴ More than resurrecting the fear of the Taipings, Zhang and Sun also implied to their soldiers that they were the modern Zeng Guofan and Hu Linyi, who restored peace in China.

Northern “anti-red” propaganda materials were more widespread than has been assumed. “Anti-red” leaflets and posters were all over Nanjing when the Anguojun propaganda detachment, led by the novelist He Haiming, arrived in February 1927. Wang Qisheng argued that the simple slogans and cartoons of the North might have been more effective for the less well-educated northern soldiers and peasants.⁵⁵ To counter the spread of the KMT’s ideologies, the Mukden Military Academy taught “anti-communism” beginning in 1926.⁵⁶ Ding Zhipan, a 31 year-old staff officer (in 1927) serving under Zhang Zongchang, recalled that although he and his colleagues concurred with the KMT’s urge for abolishing unequal treaties and warlordism, he believed that the “reds” were threatening Chinese culture, and was “disturbed” to see the female students with their bobbed hair in Beijing.⁵⁷

Training, discipline, and mid-low level leadership were also important factors for unit cohesion. Sun’s army was more resilient than its Zhili-Shandong counterparts because its soldiers were more experienced and had more training. As will be discussed, when Sun’s army was surrounded near Nanjing during the battle of Longtan, the scattered troops from different units rallied around

⁵⁴ “Tonggao Zhilu lianjun zhangshi,” June 1927, in *Zhongguo dier lishi danganguan* (ed.), *Zhonghua Minguoshi dangan ziliaohuibian* (ZMDZH), Vol. 3, No. 3 (Nanjing, 1991), 802-3; “Anguojun di san-si fangmianjun chuandan,” in *Anguojun Zhilu lianjun duli di san dadui chuanshou guanyu beijun yu guomingemingjun zai yu e yuan su dengsheng zhankuangji tanbao guomindang fangmian junshi huodong de tongzhi*, Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, Ref: 1026-532; “Lianjun ribao 26/12/1926,” GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050165700, slides 233-5. The *Lianjun ribao* was the official newspaper of Sun Chuanfang’s army.

⁵⁵ Wang Qisheng, “Beifa zhong de manhua yu manhua zhong de beifa,” in Nanjing daxue xuebao, online version from: <<http://jds.cass.cn/Article/xrzc/xrwk/200510/20051027143924.asp>>. The first propaganda team of the Zhili-Shandong Army was formed in December of 1926, but it was disbanded in May of 1927. SR, 23/12/1927; the Fengtian Army in China Proper also had its own propaganda detachment, which existed until the end of the war.

⁵⁶ “Dai nana ki kōbudō gakusei boshū, 12/12/1926,” in RDN, JACAR, Ref: B07090207800, 112.

⁵⁷ Liu Fenghan, Zhang Li; Mao Jinling, *Ding Zhipan xiansheng fangwen jilu*, 21. Many of his fellow officers were actually quite young. For example, Shangguan Yunxiang, one of Sun Chuanfang’s divisional commanders, was only 32 years old. Sun Jianyong, “Gu lujun zhongjiang Shangguan Yunxiang xiansheng shilue,” in *Shanghe wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 4 (Shanghe, 1994).

their brigadiers and formed pockets of resistance until the end of the battle. Personal loyalty was also important. For example, as his men considered the Henan general Yu Xuezhong to be a fair commander, they were willing to fight for him and followed him from Henan to Zhili and then to Manchuria.⁵⁸

Relations with the People

The relationship between the *Anguojun* and the civilians was complex. While the southerners hated the northern army in general and the Shandong troops in particular, the northerners often treated the *Anguojun* differently. Ding Zhipan recalled an episode when he followed the 6th Corps to recover Xuzhou in mid-1927 as a staff officer:

When the NRA (the Guizhou troops under Wang Tianpei) reached Shandong, they did not understand local customs. They washed their feet in the flour trays and (casually) entered the peoples' bedrooms... These acts caused much resentment among the locals. [In contrast], our unit was disciplined, and we marched with the cadets from Dezhou as propagandists who soothed our relationship with the locals. Thus, when we moved south to attack Wang Tianpei we received much help from the locals and were able to advance unobstructed....⁵⁹

Of course, the “help” mentioned in Ding’s memoir could be caused by fear of retaliation, discontent against the NRA, or hope of reward, but even the NRA found that it was not welcomed in Northern China.⁶⁰ When Sun Chuanfang was about to attack Longtan, the people in Shanghai secretly prepared the Five Color flags instead of fleeing. His troops also received much local help during the battle.⁶¹ In all, the rural population tended to welcome disciplined armies no matter what their affiliation was. As the Fengtian Army did not forage when it was advancing into Henan in 1927, it was able to maintain a peaceful relationship with the locals.⁶² Likewise, a brigadier of Sun Chuanfang’s army recalled that when his troops helped the locals to suppress the bandits and

58 Hui De-an, “Yu Xuezhong shilue” in *Linyi wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 8 (Linyi, 1991), 129-31.

59 Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928, op. cit, 24.

60 Chen Youshen, *Chi bokeqiang de chuanjiaozhe*. This was also the result of the north-south animosity during this period. See Guo Yuya, *Beifang baozhi yulun dui beifa zhifanying*.

61 Chenbao (CB), 1/9/1927, also see also Zhang Shiying, “Longtan zhanyi de pingjia yu fanxi,” in *Jinian beifa qishi zhounian xueshu yantao hui*, 22; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1051, 1059; Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, “Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou,” (1962) unpublished manuscript, 24.

62 “Observation on a trip to the *Anguojun* Front, March of 1927,” USMI, Reel 4, slide 382.

collect the harvest, they were welcomed.⁶³ In February of 1928, Sun urged Yang Yuting to fund his army directly from Beijing, as he argued that any attempt to extract resources from the local population would affect the image of the *Anguojun*. He added, “Feng Yuxiang was now hated in Henan because his army foraged and billeted in the province.”⁶⁴

In sum, the *Anguojun* was not a “loosely welded block of individual Northern leaders bound together by momentary ties of self-interest” as Sir Miles Lampson commented in early 1927.⁶⁵ The *Anguojun* fought bitterly against the NRA armies in a series of campaigns, which will be the focus below.

The Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu-Zhejiang Operations, Jan-Jun 1927

In early 1927, after the NRA had advanced into Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Fujian, it was poised to take Shanghai and Nanjing. As Feng Yuxiang returned from Moscow, the KMC from the Northwest threatened to destroy Wu Peifu’s residual position in Henan. On the other hand, the split in the NRA became more apparent after it captured Jiangxi, since Chiang Kai-shek established another power center in Nanchang to counter the Wuhan Government led by Tang Shengzhi, aided by Borodin and the communists. Chiang’s camp was also divided into various cliques (see Chapter 3). Thus, despite the KMT’s victories, the situation was still in flux.

The *Anguojun* responded to the situation by launching a strategic offensive into Central China. If the *Anguojun* had succeeded, it would have been able to isolate and destroy the KMC and consolidate its position north of the Yangtze. This would significantly strengthen the *Anguojun*’s position, perhaps even enough to force the KMT to suspend the Northern Expedition.

However, the *Anguojun* found it difficult to concentrate its forces on Central China because of other commitments. Besides securing Central China, it had to deter the Soviets and Japanese, guard against a revival of the KMC in the Northwest, and prevent Yan Xishan from joining the NRA. To achieve these goals, a substantial part of the Fengtian Army had to stay in Manchuria, the Beijing-Tianjin area, Inner Mongolia, and in the vicinity of the major railways in the North. Even when the situation was most critical in Henan in May of

⁶³ Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, op. cit.

⁶⁴ “Sun Chuanfang zhi Yang Yuting xin, 9/2/1928,” FMX, 885-6.

⁶⁵ Quote from the new British Minister to China Sir Miles Lampson’s report to London. See “Mr. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 11/1/1927, FOCP, Vol. 32, 109.

1927, only 80,000 out of 205,000 Fengtian forces were engaged there, with the rest guarding the *Anguojun*'s positions in Manchuria and Northern China.

As the *Anguojun* leaders were aware of the problem of overstretch, they allowed Yan Xishan to occupy Suiyuan (in Inner Mongolia) after the Fengtian forces had taken it from the KMC in December of 1926.⁶⁶ Although Yan later used it as a springboard to invade Zhili, the *Anguojun* had little choice. Since Suiyuan was sandwiched between Shanxi and the Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia, any further advance into the area would have extended the shared boundary between the *Anguojun* and the Soviet Union. As the *Anguojun* did not have enough troops to secure the area and fight in Central China simultaneously, it had to abandon its pursuit of the KMC (which re-emerged in Gansu and Shaanxi) and save its resources for the campaign in Central China. Still, this was barely enough to meet the situation in central China and the *Anguojun* had little strategic reserve available.

The *Anguojun* leadership saw Henan as the most important theatre of conflict. Thus, it was there that they sent the Fengtian field army under Zhang Xueliang and Han Linchun rather than supporting Sun Chuanfang, who was hard pressed in Shanghai and Nanjing. Although China was too large to have a single “decisive point,” the capture of Henan and Shanghai were of the utmost importance for the *Anguojun*. By taking Henan, the *Anguojun* could deny Feng Yuxiang's access to the Longhai Railway, separate him from the NRA, and threaten Wuhan directly. Shanghai was equally important. If the *Anguojun* had taken Shanghai, Beijing could have claimed a larger share of the Customs revenue and obtained a great deal of money from the Chinese business community. Most importantly, as Shanghai was also the site where most foreign interest lay, the powers would turn to the side that controlled it (unless that side was communist).

However, Henan was prioritized over Shanghai because the *Anguojun* leaders realized their limitations and focused on unifying the North. To the northern warlords, Henan was a more manageable target than Shanghai in early 1927. Although subduing Henan was difficult because of the existence of various local armies, sending troops to Shanghai was unfeasible. Northern troops were hated there; they had to fight with their back against the Yangtze; although Sun Chuanfang was cooperative, many of his subordinates preferred the KMT to Zhang Zongchang. These weaknesses were exploited by the KMT, which promoted the autonomist movement in Zhejiang to undercut Sun's position. If the Fengtian Army had been sent south of the Yangtze, it might

66 Guowen zhoubaoshe, 821, 827.

have been trapped there, or have suffered serious losses during the retreat. This would have led to the complete collapse of Zhang's position in Northeast Asia.

The *Anguojun* was mindful of the risks overstretching its resources and limited its goals, but its inability to distribute the available resources for the objectives explained its failure in the spring of 1927. The *Anguojun* was stretched to its limits, but it would have had the chance to achieve its goals had it utilized its forces more effectively. If Zhang Zongchang had minimized his commitments in the defense of Shanghai and Nanjing, the forces saved could have been employed to defend the Yangtze against the NRA in May. If Beijing had shifted more Fengtian troops from other areas to the Henan front, the *Anguojun* might have taken Henan. Such a victory could have strengthened its position in Northern China despite other fronts being temporarily weakened. A defeat in Henan, as it turned out, endangered other fronts anyway. The *Anguojun* leaders failed to understand that the best way to protect other fronts (which had not started fighting) was by defeating the southern forces. This failure arose because their geopolitical position induced them to act too cautiously.

Disaster of Dispersal: The Shanghai-Nanjing-Anhui Operations

On Beijing's orders, the Zhili-Shandong Army moved into Jiangsu in December of 1926. With the experience of 1925 in mind, the *Anguojun* headquarters, led by the Fengtian leaders, instructed Zhang Zongchang to strengthen his position in Anhui and not to cross the Yangtze. He was instructed to proceed slowly in order not to arouse hostility from Sun Chuanfang's commanders.⁶⁷ Just as the Shandong forces gathered around Pengpu on the northern bank of Yangtze in January of 1927, Sun stabilized the front after he had defeated Chen Yi's Zhejiang troops.⁶⁸ Zhang was then ordered to divert part of his army to cover northern Anhui and western Henan to protect the left flank of the Fengtian Army advancing into Henan.⁶⁹

The North's campaign in Shanghai was cursed by the poor judgment of Zhang Zongchang and the division between Zhang and Sun. When the NRA renewed its advance in February, Sun asked for reinforcements. Zhang could not ignore this request as Sun might have turned to the NRA to preserve his army. However, Zhang handled the situation in the least desirable way:

67 Guowen zhoubaoshe, "Tizhoujian guoneiwai dashi shuping," in Shen Yunlong, Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan, Vol. 3 (Taipei, 1985), 810. This is a compilation of the weekly news commentary of the Guowen Weekly magazine.

68 Guowen zhoubaoshe, 821; 827-28.

69 Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 139.

contrary to the Fengtian Clique's intention to use the Shandong troops to consolidate the *Anguojun*'s position north of the Yangtze, he sent most of his army to help Sun.⁷⁰ Worse yet, Zhang split his army into two isolated parts, with one taking up the defense of Shanghai and another in Nanjing and northern Anhui.⁷¹ Although Sun stayed in the *Anguojun*, this arrangement caused much resentment among Sun's commanders, who urged Sun to attack Zhang's army. Sun refused, in the belief that this would undermine the overall situation of the North.⁷² With several key commanders resigning, Sun's army retreated to the north of the Yangtze.

Hastily deployed and stretched along a 400-km front, the *Anguojun* lost any sense of initiative and the NRA was able to strike at any weak point on its line. The Anhui warlord Chen Tiaoyuan also turned to the NRA and threatened Pengpu, the *Anguojun*'s base along the Tianjin-Pukow Railway.⁷³ Facing enemies on both sides of the Yangtze, the *Anguojun*'s position in Nanjing and Shanghai was untenable. Consequently, the NRA cut communications between Nanjing and Shanghai in mid-March without much difficulty. Bi Shecheng, the commander of the Shandong forces in Shanghai, tried to surrender, but his army fled north.⁷⁴ The Shandong forces abandoned Nanjing on March 23rd despite their victory against Chen Tiaoyuan's forces in Anhui.⁷⁵ (Map 4.2)

The situation became favorable for the *Anguojun* when it was able to utilize its firepower and armored trains after it had returned to the plains north of the Yangtze. The NRA crossed the Yangtze after taking Shanghai and Nanjing but was repulsed near Pengpu by a counter-attack jointly organized by Zhang Zongchang and Sun Chuanfang.⁷⁶ As Donald Jordan has pointed out, this

⁷⁰ Hao Bingrang, 288-9.

⁷¹ SR; 27/2/1927; Wang Yuchao, *Beiyang renshi hua cangsang*, 144.


⁷² Guowen zhoubaoshe, 867; Ma Baoheng, “Sun Chuanfang wusheng lianjun de xingcheng yu xiaomie,” in Du Chunhe, Lin Binsheng, Qiu Quanzheng (eds.), *Beiyang junfa shiliao xuanji* (Beijing, 1981), 314; Meng Xingkui, “Wusheng lianjun de neimo,” *Wenshi ziliao cungao xuanbian* (WZCX), Vol. 2, 340.

⁷³ SR, 5/3/1927; 10/3/1927; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 875; 885; “Tongbao sanyue shiyi ri xiawu wushi yu Tianjin ershiwu shi canmou chu,” in *Anguojun Zhilu lianjun duli di san dadui*, Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, Ref: 1026-532.


⁷⁴ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 892; Li Zaolin, 188-9. Bi was later executed.

⁷⁵ SR, 22/3/1927; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 892; “Zhang Zongchang zhi Zhang Zuolin dian,” 22/3/1927, in Fengxi junfa midian (FM), Vol. 4 (Beijing, 1985), 6-7

⁷⁶ SR, 3/4/1927; Guofangbu sihzhen ju, *Beifa zhanshi*, 677-8; “Yang Yuting zhi Zhang Shiyi dian” 27/3/1927, FM, Vol. 4, 8; “Yang Yuting zhi Zhang Shiyi dian” 3/4/1927, FM, Vol. 4, 9; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 909; “Zhang Zuolin wei lujun (should be Sun Chuanfang's army rather than the Shandong Army) Duan Chengze lu gongzhan Yangzhou zhi Mo Dehui Zhang Zuoxiang dian,” 7/4/1927, in Liaoning sheng danganguan (ed.), in *Fengxi junfa*



MAP 4.2 Operations in Shanghai-Nanjing-Northern Anhui Area, 1 Feb-30 Mar 1927



MAP 4.3 Operations in Shanghai-Nanjing-Northern Anhui Area, 1 Apr-15 May 1927

reversal was air-brushed out of the KMT's narrative.⁷⁷ After stabilizing the front along the Yangtze, the Zhili-Shandong Army was busy laying siege to Hefei and clearing up local armies, many of them turning to the NRA for protection (Map 4.3).⁷⁸

Zhang Zongchang's attempt to defend Shanghai and Nanjing was a costly operational disaster. However, although the Zhili-Shandong Army had suffered, the core of Sun's army had been preserved because the former had taken up the frontline in February-March. If Sun's army had been eliminated during the campaign, the *Anguojun* would have been defeated much earlier, as it was impossible for Zhang Zongchang alone to resist the combined force of Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi warlords. By mid-April, it seemed that although Shanghai was lost, the *Anguojun* could still achieve its primary objective of holding the area north of the Yangtze, but such success depended on the Fengtian Army's progress in Henan, which will be discussed below.

The Henan Campaign: Background

Whilst the Zhili-Shandong Army was desperately defending Shanghai and Nanjing, the Fengtian Army marched into Henan. The wars in Henan in 1927 reveal the importance of the regionally-specific factors in Chinese warfare during this period. Geographically crucial, Henan was one of the most contested and militarized provinces after 1912. Numerous armed groups were stationed in Henan from 1911 onwards: the *beiyang* divisions, the Yi Army, the Zhensong Army, the Army for National Peace (*jingguojun*),⁷⁹ the National Reconstruction Army (*jianguojun*),⁸⁰ the provincial divisions, the Red Spears, and the old Henanese garrison battalions, relics of the Qing.

Zhao Ti, the military governor and the leader of the Yi Army between 1915 and 1922, survived and maintained central control by supporting the strongest faction in the Beijing Government. The province was relatively quiet despite

dangan shiliao huibian (FJDSH), Vol. 6 (Nanjing, 1990), 335; SR, 10/4/1927; 11/4/1927; 12/4/1927; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 916-7; "Yang Yuting zhi Zhang Shiyi dian," 13/4/1927, FM, Vol. 4, 10.

77 Donald Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, 124-5. This defeat was not related to the elimination of the communists in Shanghai, as the unit participating in the action was the 26th NRA Army. This was originally Zhou Fengqi's Zhejiang 3rd Division, which surrendered to the NRA in January of 1927.

78 Wang Hanming, "Zhang Zongchang xingbai jilue," in Du Chunhe, Lin Binsheng, Qiu Quanzheng (eds.), 349. Wang was Zhang's Chief of Staff until 1927, and commanded the army from 1927 to 28.

79 A pro-KMT militia stationed at the border of Shaanxi and Henan.

80 Another pro-KMT army under Fan Zhongxiu.

the existence of the various irregular armed groups, as most of them were stationed in the mountains in western Henan. Henan was quiet during the Zhili-Anfu War of 1920, as Zhao disarmed the single Anfu brigade there. After Feng Yuxiang expelled Zhao during the First Zhili-Fengtian War in 1922, the province became the main base of Wu Peifu, who removed Feng from the province and built a large training camp at Luoyang. The number of troops in Henan doubled between 1922 and 1924 as the local armies expanded and Wu Peifu brought with him his crack divisions.⁸¹

However, not even Wu Peifu could tame the local armies, which survived by surrendering to the central government while remaining independent. When Wu was defeated in 1924, Hu Jingyī's *Jingguojun* allied itself with Feng Yuxiang and seized the province. With Soviet aid, Hu and his successor Yue Weijun rapidly expanded their army (now the Second Army of the KMC) by absorbing bandits from Henan and Shaanxi.⁸² When this 300,000-strong army fell apart after Wu returned from Hubei in 1926, Henan had already become impoverished and filled with armies that were little different from brigands. Wu's defeat in Hubei in mid-1926 only worsened the situation, for he had to feed his defeated army with limited resources from Henan.

In response to the depredation and chaos after 1924, the Red Spears emerged.⁸³ Elizabeth Perry has suggested that the Red Spears were the product of the survival strategy adopted by the peasants in response to local crises. Unlike the mobile Nian Rebels⁸⁴ who pillaged along the way, the Red Spears mostly adopted the more stationary “protective” strategy. To protect the locale, they attacked stragglers, ambushed small parties of soldiers, and eventually fought large battles with armies passing through the area. Left wing KMT leaders such as Deng Yanda were impressed by their “revolutionary potential” (or his own idealism) and believed that they could be mobilized for the revolution. To the dismay of Deng, as the Red Spears were only interested in local affairs, his elaborate propaganda campaign to mobilize the peasants in Henan accomplished little. The Red Spears were hostile to any incoming armies, and attacked the Wuhan Army's railway traffic during the Henan Campaign.⁸⁵

81 Ding Wenjiang, *Minguo junshi jinji*, 22-5.

82 Odoric Y.K. Wou, 31.

83 Odoric Y.K. Wou, 15; Zhengxie Luoyang wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, *Luoyang wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 9 – ZhenSongjun zhuanji (Luoyang, 1990); Elizabeth Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945* (Stanford, Calif., 1980), 253.

84 See Bruce Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare*, 61-3.

85 Chen Youshen, *Chi bokeqiang de chuanjiaozhe*, 245-68.

The *Anguojun* adopted a different approach. Its leaders also considered the Henan Campaign as something more than a military operation and believed that the key to success was winning local support. The *Anguojun* forbade billeting of troops and foraging, and promised to abolish excessive taxation.⁸⁶ The Fengtian Clique took pains to ensure the normal running of the Beijing-Hankow Railway, provide relief to the local population, demilitarise the rural area, and seek the support of the local elites.⁸⁷ According to Lieutenant Barrett who followed the Fengtian Army, “apparently there [was] little friction between the civilian populations and the Fengtian troops” as the soldiers were reportedly “well disciplined.”⁸⁸ Since the *Anguojun* could not sustain itself by entirely living off the land as this would cause resentment, the campaign became costly and slow. The political advantage of winning the approval of the Chinese by restoring order in Henan certainly outstripped the financial cost, but before the *Anguojun*’s programs bear any fruit, the *Anguojun* had to wrest control of the province from the Wuhan Army and Feng Yuxiang.

The Henan Campaign: Mobility, Firepower and Geography

The *Anguojun*’s Henan campaign was first plagued by the Fengtian Clique’s indecision. Reluctant to fall out with Wu Peifu openly, the Fengtian forces lingered on the northern bank of the Yellow River from the autumn of 1926. Even after Feng Yuxiang defeated Liu Zhenhua, the pro-Wu Peifu warlord of Shaanxi, in December, the Fengtian forces still stayed on the northern side of the Yellow River.⁸⁹ Only when Wu’s principal commander, Jin Yun-e, had allied with Feng Yuxiang by the end of January of 1927 did Beijing finally decide to send an expedition commanded by Zhang Xueliang and Han Linchun into Henan.⁹⁰ As the Fengtian Clique remained unwilling to break with Wu, the advance was still slow.⁹¹ Wu’s camp was divided when the Fengtian Army entered Henan. When Wu resigned, the pro-Fengtian faction under Tian Weiqin and Qiu Yingjie joined the *Anguojun*, while the anti-Fengtian faction led by Jin Yun-e broke away from Wu and formed the Army for the Protection of Henan (*Henan baoweijun*).

86 SR, 12/2/1927; Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 141.

87 “Zhang Xueliang Han Linchun wei tonggao Henan baixing kunku qingxing ji suo caiqu jiuji cuoshi zhi Wang Shizhen Zhao Erxun ji Zhang Taiyan Wang Yongjiang deng dian, 22/3/1927,” FJDSH, Vol. 6, 321; SR, 11/2/1927; 28/2/1927.

88 “Observation on a trip to the *Anguojun* Front March of 1927,” USMI, Reel 4, slide 382.

89 Guowen zhoubaoshe, 828.

90 Shenbao, 26/1/1927; Zhou Congwu, “Jin Yun-e zeji,” WZCX, Vol. 2, 771-2.

91 SR, 11/2/1927; 21/2/1927; Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 139.

The Red Spears sided with or fought against the incoming armies according to circumstances. The Red Spears sometimes stood on the side of the *Anguojun*, as when they escorted the supply column to the beleaguered Fengtian forces during the battle of Shangcai.⁹² When the Wuhan NRA entered Henan, it encountered the Red Spears harassing its line of communication.⁹³ The Red Spears also fought against the local warlords who tried to expand during the war. For example, they destroyed Zhang Zhigong's army of 20,000 in May of 1927 when the latter was trying to suppress the Red Spears.⁹⁴ Feng Yuxiang also tried to use the Red Spears to extend his control over Henan, but finally clashed with them as soon as he tried to extract more wealth from the province.⁹⁵

The superiority of the Fengtian forces was shown during the invasion of Henan. Supported by armored trains, the Fengtian forces advanced south along the Beijing-Hankow Railway, crossed the Yellow River Bridge, occupied Zhengzhou, and took Xuchang in two weeks. With superior firepower they broke the resistance of Jin's army in late March. Although one Fengtian corps was disrupted by the sudden attack of the surrendered local force, it withdrew and returned by rail after respite.⁹⁶ The *Anguojun* pushed Jin into southern Henan and controlled almost the entire Longhai Railway. Many local armies and units previously under Wu Peifu joined the *Anguojun*, including those under Tian Weiqin, Zhang Zhigong, and Yu Xuezhong.⁹⁷ (Map 4.2)

However, the success in March gave a false sense of security to the *Anguojun* leaders, who failed to appreciate the danger of a joint invasion by the KMC and the Wuhan NRA. During the conference in early April, the attention of the high

92 Lu Dongchuan, “Zhang Xueliang youdai Fu Shangying,” wzcx, Vol. 2, 487.

93 “Guomin gemingjun di sanshiliu jun taofeng zhozhan jingguo,” in Henan difang shizhi bianji weiyuanhui, *Beifa zhanzheng zai Henan* (Zhengzhou, 1985), 171-2; “Gung Hao xiansheng fangwen jilu,” *Junxi yu minguo zhengju* (Taibei, 1985).

94 Wang Ruichen, Zhao Jisheng, “Zhang Zhigong yu Hongchanghui,” *Yanshi wenshi ziliao*, No. 4 (Yanshi, 1991), 133-5. It was impossible to know the exact size of Zhang Zhigong's force; it was estimated by contemporaries that Zhang had around 20,000 men.

95 Lu Shu-e, “Lun erci beifa zhong xibeijun yu hongchanghui guanxi de yanbian,” in *Journal of Capital Normal University (Social Science Edition)* (2007), No. 1.

96 “Zhang Xueliang zhi Zhang Zongchang deng dian,” 18/3/1927, FM, Vol. 4, 5; “Yang Yuting zhi Zhang Shiyi dian,” 20/3/1927, VM, Vol. 4, 6; “Yang Yuting zhi Zhang Shiyi dian,” 25/3/1927, FM, Vol. 4, 7; “Zhenweijun di shiqi jun canmouchu zhi Beijing ge buyuan deng dian,” 26/3/1927, 7; “Yang Yuting zhi Zhang Shiyi dian,” 26/3/1927, FM, Vol. 4, 8; “Yang Yuting zhi Zhang Shiyi dian,” 27/3/1927, FM, Vol. 4, 8; “Yang Yuting zhi Zhang Shiyi dian,” 29/3/1927, FM, Vol. 4, 8; Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 145-7.

97 “Li Zhenya, Yu Xuezhong, Zhang Zhigong, Xu Shouchun, Yan Riren deng zhoren zhenwei di shijiu zhi ershisian jun junzhang de tongdian,” FJDSH, Vol. 6, 373.

command shifted to mop-up action and post-war settlement. The Fengtian forces were ordered to destroy Jin Yun-e's forces and to garrison the cities.⁹⁸ In early May, Zhang Xueliang and Han Linchun received local representatives to discuss post-war settlements for the province, and they issued a circular telegram urging the end of the war and promising the abolition of excessive taxes in Henan.⁹⁹

The timing of the KMT-KMC invasion of Henan was most unfavorable for the *Anguojun*. Just as the Henan campaign was seemingly ended in favor of the North, the KMT forces from Wuhan invaded the province with Feng Yuxiang. Beginning in February of 1927, Moscow urged Wuhan to link up with Feng. Borodin also hoped the destruction of the *Anguojun* could boost Wuhan's prestige vis-à-vis Chiang Kai-shek. Feng, anxious to extricate himself from isolation, also encouraged Wuhan to strike north.¹⁰⁰ According to their plan, the Wuhan forces would attack from the south along the Beijing-Hankow Railway, and the KMC from the west along the Longhai Railway. Yan Xishan also agreed to invade Zhili and interdict the Beijing-Hankow Railway.¹⁰¹ The Fengtian commanders in Henan and those in Beijing underestimated the second threat. As it was believed that Feng lacked munitions, only one corps was deployed to defend western Henan along with Zhang Zhigong's poorly-equipped and trained troops. The rest of the Fengtian Army was scattered either to consolidate the *Anguojun*'s position in the province or to pursue Jin Yun-e.¹⁰² If the Wuhan forces had attacked sooner, the *Anguojun* would have been less dispersed to meet the invasion; if the Red Spears had delayed the Wuhan forces further, the Fengtian forces might have been able to consolidate their position by absorbing the local forces.

Faulty and delayed intelligence also prevented the *Anguojun* from reacting effectively to the coming onslaught. The vanguard of the Wuhan NRA made contact with Tian Weiqin's troops in southern Henan on May 5th, and the KMC

⁹⁸ SR, 3/4/1927; 4/4/1927.

⁹⁹ Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 153.

¹⁰⁰ Liu Fenghan, "Feng Yuxiang yu beifa," in *Jinian beifa qishi zhounian xueshu yantaohui* (Taipei 1996), 15-6.

¹⁰¹ "Telegram concerning Shanxi and Feng's attacks in separate directions," 1/5/1927; "Feng Yuxiang's telegram on attacking the Fengtian Army in a pincer movement," 15/5/1927; "Feng Yuxiang's telegram on taking synchronized action," 16/5/1927, in *Yan Bochuan xiansheng yaodian lu* (Taipei, 1996), 248.

¹⁰² Unknown to the *Anguojun* leaders, Feng had actually been supplied with arms by the Soviets since he had gone to Moscow in mid 1926. According to Liu Fenghan, he received 31,500 rifles, 51,000,000 small arms rounds, 272 machine guns, 60 artillery pieces, and 10 planes. Liu Fenghan, "Feng Yuxiang yu beifa," 8.

was spotted in west Henan five days later.¹⁰³ Tian, however, boasted of having halted Tang Shengzhi's army.¹⁰⁴ As late as May 15th, Zhang Xueliang was still in Beijing, occupied with the planning of Zhang Zuolin's visit to the front (a prelude to the National Conference of the Northern provinces according to the North's political plan) and with the arrangements with Tian.¹⁰⁵ By then, the North had lost the initiative. (Map 4.4)

The Henan campaign was a mixture of a war of movement and set-piece battle; it revealed both the importance and limitations of mobility and firepower in Chinese warfare during this period. As Han Linchun decided to conduct a fighting retreat before his army was concentrated, he only deployed one reinforced corps along the Beijing-Hankow Railway between Xiping and Zhumadian to resist the Wuhan army. Supported by armored train, this corps slowly withdrew northward from May 15th, resisting along the way.¹⁰⁶ When another corps joined the battle to flank the enemy facing Xiping, one of its brigades was outnumbered and outmanoeuvred by Zhang Fakui's corps near Shangcai between May 14th and 16th. The brigade was captured at the cost of around 3,000 casualties for the NRA.¹⁰⁷ Han continued to draw reinforcements from other parts of Henan, and prepared another position near Yancheng.

Despite the setback in Shangcai, the superior firepower of the Fengtian forces effectively halted Tang Shengzhi's army. The Fengtian forces were equipped with armored trains, mortars, “flat trajectory guns,” and even


¹⁰³ “Situation Report May 27 1927,” USMI, Reel 8, slide 126.

¹⁰⁴ “Zhang Xueliang wei Tian Weiqin bu zai Yunan jibai Tang Shengzhi ji ling di ba di ershiyi jun xiang Yusi yingji Fang Zhenwu de tongdian,” 13/5/1927, FJDSH, V6, 383-4.

¹⁰⁵ SR, 17/5/1927; CB, 17/5/1927.

¹⁰⁶ “Guomin gemingjun di shiyi jun taofeng zhuzhan jingguo,” *Beifa zhazheng zai Henan*, 172-3.


¹⁰⁷ “Guomin gemingjun di si jun taofeng zuozhang jingguo”; “Guomin gemingjun di shiyi jun taofeng zhuzhan jingguo,” *Beifa zhazheng zai Henan*, 141-6, 159-61; Bai Dongchuan, “Zhang Xueliang youyu Fu Shangying,” in *Wenshi ziliao cuangao xuanbian*, Vol. 2, 487; Zhang Zhiyao, “Fengjun sanxia Henan ji qi shibai,” in *Wenshi ziliao cuangao xuanbian*, Vol. 2, 491. As the result of this defeat, Zhang Xueliang had Chen Shen executed. Chen, the commander of the 46th Brigade, which was ordered by Han Linchun to reinforce the 12th Brigade. However, the 46th was 50km away from the battlefield, simply too far away to affect the result of the battle. Although Chen's performance was far from satisfactory, many considered Chen's execution to be one of the many arbitrary executions of Fengtian officers by Zhang Xueliang. For example, see Guo Tingyi; Li Yushu; Chen Cungong, *Ji Yiqiao xiansheng fangwen jilu*. Ji was the commander of the 45th Brigade during this battle.

MAP 4.4 *Operations in Henan, 5-24 May 1927*

tanks.¹⁰⁸ In response, Tang ordered Zhang Fakui to advance towards Linying to outflank the Fengtian forces.¹⁰⁹ Although the Fengtian Army had superior firepower, it was more road-bound and slower because of its larger number of heavy weapons and entailing logistic train. It was also poorly coordinated with

¹⁰⁸ The so-called “flat trajectory guns” were infantry guns modeled on the 37mm models used by the French during WWI. The tanks were French built FT-17s equipped with either machine guns or small cannons. “Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928,” in RDN, JACAR, Ref: C01007465200.

¹⁰⁹ “Guomin gemingjun di si jun taofeng zuozhang jingguo,” *Beifa zhazheng zai Henan*, 152.

MAP 4.5 *Operations in Henan, 24-30 May 1927*

its Henan allies. To counter Zhang's flanking movement, Han Linchun and Zhang Xueliang reinforced Tian Weiqin and the Fengtian forces near Zhoukou, and ordered them to attack Zhang Fakui's flank. However, the attack soon faltered because Tian's army disintegrated at the beginning of the fight. As a result, the Fengtian forces were, according to US intelligence, "thrown into confusion" and had to abandon Yancheng on 26 May.¹¹⁰ (Map 4.5)

¹¹⁰ "Situation Report Jun 6 1927," USMI, Reel 8, slide 113; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 950; Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 157.

By then, the Fengtian forces, numbering more than 80,000, were outnumbered almost two to one by the combined force of the KMC and the Wuhan NRA. Han slowly withdrew, but he inflicted heavy casualties on the Wuhan forces. Although it would have been possible to sap their momentum before they reached Zhengzhou, little could be done to stop Feng Yuxiang, whose army marched towards Luoyang and threatened the rear of the Fengtian Army. After a general attack from May 25th to 30th, the KMC took Luoyang and was poised to cross the Yellow River.¹¹¹ To the *Anguojun* leaders, the Henan Campaign was already a lost cause.

After the failed counterattack on 26th, the main Fengtian Army retreated to the prepared position near Linying and was more concentrated. Between May 27th and 28th, these units withstood a two-pronged assault from the Wuhan forces and again inflicted heavy casualties on them.¹¹² The southern forces relied heavily on shock tactics that were effective in the south where cover was plentiful in the rugged terrain and opponents had much less effective firepower. As General He Zhuguo of the Fengtian Army observed, the NRA's tactics were ineffective and caused unnecessary casualties (5,000 for the 4th Army alone) in Henan, as the troops were exposed to the firepower of the *Anguojun* on the plains. His brigade repulsed successive waves of NRA charges without committing the reserves and tanks.¹¹³ The Fengtian forces only retreated when Feng's army was already threatening Zhengzhou and Yan Xishan sending troops to Shijiazhuang.¹¹⁴ According to the American observers, the entire withdrawal from Henan was "accomplished in good order but not without considerable losses," mainly in terms of equipment (i.e. several tanks were abandoned at Linying).¹¹⁵

The Fengtian Army's defeat in Henan was understandable. They had spent a month chasing Jin Yun-e from Zhengzhou down to southern Henan and had


¹¹¹ Liu Fenghan, "Feng Yuxiang yu beifa," 17-8.

¹¹² Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan Jindaishi yanjiusuo (tr.), Aleksandr Ivanovich Cherepakhov, *Zhongguo guomin gemingjun de beifa: yige zhuhua junshi guwen de zhaji* (Beijing, 1981), 549. According to the Soviet advisor Cherepakhov the Wuhan forces lost 7-8,000 men, killed in a few days. Given the primitive state of medical care provided to the soldiers on both sides, many of the wounded soldiers would die later.

¹¹³ He Zhuguo, "Dongbei jun duikang beifa de yibufen shihuang," 1955, unpublished manuscript, unpaginated.

¹¹⁴ Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 158; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 962.

¹¹⁵ "Situation Report June 6, 1927," USMI, Reel 8, slide 114. For example, six tanks (out of a total of 18 bought) were abandoned in Henan. See Yue Chao, "Fengjin liangjun Zhuozhou zhizhan," in Zhengxie Zhuozhou shi wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, *Zhuozhou wenshi ziliao* (Zhuozhou, 1999), 22.

MAP 4.6 *Anqiujuan* Retreat from Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang; May-Jun 1927

several major engagements against Jin Yun-e before the Wuhan Army and the KMC struck. To win the war politically, the Fengtian Army had to secure the major cities and the railway to ensure public order, making it dangerously dispersed. The limited means of communication prevented any rapid concentration and cooperation of troops, while intelligence failures deprived the Fengtian forces of initiative. Local allies apart from Yu Xuezhong were unreliable. Unlike Feng and Tang who advanced for their survival, the Fengtian Clique could not risk its army in an all-out battle, as losing it would compromise its position in Northeast Asia. Although they brought back the army intact, the performance of the frontline commanders left much to be desired (for example, Han and Zhang Xueliang's failed counterattacks). However, by weakening the Wuhan Army, the *Anguojun* frustrated Wuhan and the Soviets' wish to destroy the Beijing Government in early 1927.

While the Fengtian forces were resisting Tang and Feng, the Nanjing NRA again crossed the Yangtze on May 15th. After the Fengtian Army had retreated north along the Beijing-Hankow Railway, there was no point in defending the north bank of the Yangtze. The Zhili-Shandong Army and Sun Chuanfang's forces then began a long retreat from the north bank of the Yangtze to southern Shandong that turned into a rout (Map 4.6).¹¹⁶ It was after this retreat that Stilwell observed the Shandong forces. However, just as the foreigners in Beijing and Tianjin were in panic because the NRA was seemingly about to arrive at any moment, the military situation was reversed again in July, presenting another opportunity for the *Anguojun* to end the war on more favorable terms.

The Battles of Xuzhou and Longtan, June-September 1927

Situation After the Henan Campaign

In early June, the situation was grim for the North. Henan was lost, Shanxi joined the NRA, and the NRA took Xuzhou and linked up with Feng. However, while the *Anguojun* was trying to shorten its front, the KMT armies from Wuhan and Nanjing turned against each other instead of moving further north, although without actual fighting. The next two months witnessed an abrupt recovery of the *Anguojun*'s position and the equally abrupt end of this trend. The North almost succeeded in restoring its position by stopping the NRA in Xuzhou, but it failed to hold its gain because of its defeat in Longtan. As the following sections will show, the success and failure of these two battles were

¹¹⁶ "Situation Report June 6 1927," USMI, Reel 8, slide 113.

as much related to the strategies of the confronting sides as to the more circumstantial factors such as chance and individual decisions.

Operational Success, Strategic Dilemma: The Xuzhou Battle and Prelude to Longtan, Jun-Aug 1927

After the campaigns in Jiangsu and Henan, Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, Tang Shengzhi and the Wuhan leaders such as Wang Jingwei and Eugene Chen were busy forming coalitions throughout June 1927. Chiang finally struck a deal with Feng by funding the KMC and promising to continue the Northern Expedition.¹¹⁷ To secure Feng's cooperation, the NRA occupied southern Shandong and drove the Zhili-Shandong Army to the edge of the Yellow River.¹¹⁸ After that, however, in early July, Chiang ordered six armies, including his own 1st and Li Zongren's 7th, to wheel south to meet the Wuhan Army, leaving the weaker units to continue the northern advance.¹¹⁹

An opportunity was thus presented to the *Anguojun*. After thwarting the mutiny of the Fujian contingent, Sun Chuanfang's army re-joined the Shandong front and then counterattacked with Zhang Zongchang.¹²⁰ As the *Anguojun* intended to make peace with Chiang and use Sun's army to retake Henan, it urged the two to stop at Xuzhou.¹²¹ However, Sun was convinced that this would be the best opportunity to defeat Chiang, and agreed to cease hostility only after the area north of Yangtze was recovered.¹²² After defeating Wang Tianpei's Guizhou troops, Xuzhou was recovered by the North on July 24th.¹²³ The fall of Xuzhou was rather unexpected to Chiang, who was anxious to restore the link with the KMC.

This time, not only did the *Anguojun* commanders have the benefit of better intelligence, they also showed better judgment and an unprecedented degree

¹¹⁷ Liu Fenghan, “Feng Yuxiang yu beifa,” 23. Feng urged Chiang to continue the Northern Expedition, promising to pressure the Wuhan Government not to attack Nanjing. See Tang Degang (ed.), *Li Zongren huayilu* (Shanghai, 1995), 352.

¹¹⁸ “Anguojun shilingbu guanyu Yu shizhang Yongchang zai Linyi kangji beifajun Bai Chongxi dengbu jingong de tongzhi,” in ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 3, 862; CB, 29/6/1927; 30/6/1927; Zhang Bingjun, *Zhongguo xiandai lici zhongyao zhanyi zhi yanjiu*, 233.

¹¹⁹ Zhang Bingjun, 236.

¹²⁰ On July 3rd, the commanders of Sun Chuanfang's Fujian army turned to the KMC, but the soldiers refused to follow him and rejoined Sun's army. CB, 5/7/1927; Zhang Bingjun, 233; Wu Zhenhuan, “Zhou Yinren yu Sun Chuanfang de guanxi ji Jiaodong shibian jingguo,” WZCX, Vol. 2, 373.

¹²¹ SR, 23/7/1927.

¹²² “Sun Chuanfang zhi Yang Yuting xin, 22/7/1927,” FMX, 687-8.

¹²³ Tang Degang, *Li Zongren huayilu*, 355.

of cooperation. The vanguards of the *Anguojun* brought back the news that the NRA was returning and the KMC was moving towards Xuzhou through the Longhai Railway. After they had the news of Chiang's intention, the northern commanders Xu Kun,¹²⁴ Xu Yuanquan,¹²⁵ and Sun Chuanfang decided to occupy the heights around Xuzhou. Since the terrain around Xuzhou was relatively gentle, the *Anguojun* were able to utilize their firepower and armored trains.¹²⁶

In contrast, the KMT's attack, led by Chiang himself, was undermined by communication problems and factionalism. Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were unenthusiastic; Feng Yuxiang was only interested in taking Xuzhou after the NRA had finished fighting. Feng too welcomed a setback for Chiang that would boost his influence over the Nanjing KMT.¹²⁷ On July 31st, when Bai used the newly incorporated Anhui troops to attack the eastern heights of Xuzhou, they were driven back by Sun Chuanfang. Chiang ordered a general advance towards Xuzhou separately from the south, but his army failed to break through Xu Yuanquan's position, and was repulsed after Sun arrived with reinforcements. The northerners then counterattacked with armored trains (Map 4.7).¹²⁸ Although the NRA had captured some trench mortars during the previous campaigns, no one knew how to operate them.¹²⁹ The *Anguojun* claimed a loss of 10,000 men during the battle, but the NRA probably lost more soldiers.¹³⁰ As a result of the defeat, on August 12th, Chiang resigned under pressure from Li and Bai.

The operational success in Xuzhou created a strategic dilemma for the *Anguojun* leaders. Should they recover Shanghai and Nanjing, or should they

¹²⁴ See Appendix 1.

¹²⁵ See Appendix 1.


¹²⁶ Li Zaolin, 193; Liu Fenghan, Zhang Li; Mao Jinling, *Ding Zhipan xiasheng fangwen jilu*, 24.

¹²⁷ Huang Daoxun, "Guangyu Jiang Jieshi diyici xiaye de jige wenti," *Jindaishi yanjiu*, 1999, No. 4, from <<http://jds.cass.cn/Article/20060406131834.asp>>.

¹²⁸ Huang Zheng, "1927 nian Longtan zhanyi qinlaji," in *Zhongguo renmin zhenzhi xieshang huiyi Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui wenshi ziliaojianjiu weiyuanhui bian*, *Jiangsu wenshi ziliaojianjiu*, Vol. 18 (Nanjing, 1986), 57.

¹²⁹ "Tongbao, 22/6/1927" in "Anguojun Zhilu lianjun di yibai sanshiwulu buchongtuan," The Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, 1026-543.

¹³⁰ "Jingji xianbing siling Wang Qi guanyu Xu Yuanquan dengbu zai Xuzhou jikui beifajun qingxing gei junshibu qing, 4/8/1927-8/8/1927," in ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 3, 817-819; "Tongzhi di 253 hao, 15/8/1927" in "Anguojun Zhilu lianjun di yibai sanshiwulu buchongtuan," The Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, 1026-543; Li Zaolin, 193-194; Liu Fenghan, Zhang Li; Mao Jinling, *Ding Zhipan xiasheng fangwen jilu*, 24-6; Huang Zheng, 57-58; For the battle from the KMT's perspective, see Zhang Bingjun, 243-7. For the figure, see ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 3, 819. No figure about this battle can be found from KMT sources.

MAP 4.7 *The Battle of Xuzhou, Jul-Aug 1927*

stick to the original plan and concentrate on Feng Yuxiang? Meanwhile, the *Anguojun* received feelers from the warlords in Central China, including Chen Tiaoyuan, Wang Pu, and Zhou Fengqi, about re-joining the *Anguojun*.¹³¹ There were also rumors about the KMT’s intention to abandon Nanjing.¹³²

131 “Junshibu canmouchu tongbao (33), 19/8/1927,” in Jingji xianbing siling Wang Qi guanyu Xu Yuanquan dengbu zai Xuzhou jikui beifajun qingxing gei junshibu qing, 4/8/1927-8/8/1927; “Junshibu canmouchu tongbao (34), 19/8/1927,” in Wang Qi deng guanyu Zhang Jingyao zai Wanbei kangji beifajun ji Zhang Zuolin chuanling jiazhang ling qing, 11/8/1927-7/9/1927; “ba yue ershisi ri tongbao, 24/8/1927,” in Beiyang zhengfu junshibu canmouchu guanyu Sun Chuanfang you Pukou Siyankou dujiang jingong Nanjing Zhenjiang dengdi dianbao, 24/8/1927-3/9/1927, in ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 3, 816; 820; 824. After the war both Zhou and Wang were forced to retire, and their army absorbed by Li Zongren.

132 “Tongzhi di 273 hao, 28/8/1927,” in “Anguojun Zhilu lianjun di yibai sanshiwulu buchongtuan,” The Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, 1026-543.

Representatives from the business community of Shanghai and Nanjing urged Sun to press on.¹³³ Northern spies reported that the riverside was lightly defended.¹³⁴ The head of the KMT-controlled navy, Yang Shuzhuang,¹³⁵ promised to stay neutral after Sun paid him 200,000 *yuan*.¹³⁶ Still, the Fengtian Clique urged Sun not to cross the river, as it feared that his advance would unite the KMT forces; Beijing still wanted to reach a ceasefire with Nanjing and concentrate the *Anguojun* in Henan to deal with Feng Yuxiang (Map 4.8).¹³⁷

Again, Sun Chuanfang argued that this was the best opportunity to cross the Yangtze.¹³⁸ From his perspective, it was certainly tempting. Based on the favorable information above, Sun decided to cross the Yangtze before the Nanjing KMT restored its position. He even dismissed the report from his subordinates about the strength of the NRA along the Shanghai-Nanjing Railway and accused them of trying to “undermine the morale of the troops.”¹³⁹

In retrospect, Sun’s decision undermined the *Anguojun*’s overall strategy. However, it is difficult to identify the better course of action even now, let alone with the limited information and time available back then. The victory in Xuzhou enabled the North to consolidate in Northern China and force the southerners to accept coexistence. Building on this success, the *Anguojun* might have been able to recover Nanjing and Shanghai, an action that would probably have changed the attitude of the Maritime Customs again and boosted the domestic and international position of the new Generalissimo Government. If the Nanjing Government had been destroyed, the Northern Expedition would have been halted and the *Anguojun* would have carried out its design for Northern China unobstructed. Nonetheless, despite the possible benefits, Sun’s decision facilitated another temporary alliance between the

¹³³ CB, 1/9/1927, see also Zhang Shiying, 22; Wang Yuchao, 156; “ba yue ershisi ri tongbao, 24/8/1927,” in Beiyang zhengfu junshibu canmouchu guanyu Sun Chuanfang you Pukou Siyankou dujiang jingong Nanjing Zhenjiang dengdi dianbao, 24/8/1927-3/9/1927,” in ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 3, 823; Ma Baoheng, 315.

¹³⁴ Huang Zheng, 59.


¹³⁵ Yang only joined the KMT clause in March of 1927, after the fall of Shanghai. Previously he allegedly worked for the Beijing Government but was largely independent. “Yang Shuzhuang,” in Li Xin, Sun Sibai, *Zhonghua mingguoshi renwuzhuan*, Vol. 7 (Beijing, 2011), 4525-8.

¹³⁶ Wang Yuchao, 157; Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, “Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou,” 35-6; Ma Baoheng, 317.

¹³⁷ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1051, 1059; Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, “Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou,” (1962) unpublished manuscript, 19.

¹³⁸ SR, 5/9/1927.

¹³⁹ Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, “Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou,” 21.



MAP 4.8 Sun Chuanfang Advancing, 10 Aug-3 Sep 1927

Guangxi Clique and Chiang Kai-shek's subordinates.¹⁴⁰ Still, had Sun been able to win the battle, this would not have mattered.

A Strategic Gamble Lost: The Battle of Longtan, Aug-Sep 1927

Ding Zhipan, the Chief of Staff of the *Anguojun* 6th Corps, suggested that Sun was defeated because he had underestimated the difficulty of a river-crossing operation.¹⁴¹ However, the Fengtian general, He Zhuguo, argued that defending a river was equally difficult, as the defender had to either disperse his forces on all possible crossings or to concentrate his troops and abandon the opportunity to inflict damage to the enemy while it was crossing the river.¹⁴² At that time, there was no bridge on the Yangtze linking the Tianjin-Pukow Railway and the Nanjing-Shanghai Railway. The average width of the Yangtze near Nanjing and Zhenjiang was around one kilometer. Thus, troops could only be brought to the other side of the Yangtze by ferries or smaller vessels. The NRA's attempts to cross the Yangtze in May and November of 1927 were supported by troops on the other side of the river in southern Anhui. When the NRA attacked across the Yangtze unsupported in April in 1927, it was quickly repulsed.

Sun's decision to fight was extremely risky. As his troops had to fight with their back against the Yangtze, there was nowhere to retreat. However, Sun was aided by his opponents. Although the Nanjing KMT still had a sizeable army, its leaders, He Yingqin, Li Zongren, and Bai Chongxi were divided and unaware of Sun's intention. NRA scout planes failed to spot Sun's army, although they found hundreds of boats gathered along the northern side of the Yangtze.¹⁴³ When Sun's army was about to cross the Yangtze, only He Yingqin was in Nanjing and the riverbank was lightly guarded.¹⁴⁴

Sun planned to envelope Nanjing by landing troops on both its sides, but the operation went wrong at the very beginning. On August 24th, part of Sun's army started to cross the Yangtze near Pukow, but they were fired upon by the

¹⁴⁰ Liu Peiyi, a member of the Jiangsu provincial assembly, recalled that he was told by more than one KMT officer, including Gu Zhutong, that Sun Chuanfang's attack prevented Chiang Kai-shek's subordinates in Nanjing from expelling Li Zongren. See Liu Peiyi, "Dui Ma Baoheng zhu "Sun Chuanfang wusheng lianjun de xingcheng yu xiaomie" de jiuzheng yu buchong," wzcx, Vol. 2, 381.

¹⁴¹ Liu Fenghan, Zhang Li; Mao Jinling, *Ding Zhipan xiasheng fangwen jilu*, 27.

¹⁴² He Zhuguo, "Dongbeijun duikang beifajun de bufen shihuang," (1955) unpublished manuscript.

¹⁴³ Zhang Bingjun, 252.

¹⁴⁴ Huang Zheng, 59.

KMT vessel carrying Li Zongren and other KMT leaders from Wuhan.¹⁴⁵ This persuaded the commander of the First Corps, Zheng Junyan, to abandon the operation west of Nanjing.¹⁴⁶ Instead of calling off the operation, Sun turned to the east.¹⁴⁷ On the evening of August 25th, elements of three divisions crossed the river near Longtan and Qixia, with diversionary attacks near Zhenjiang. After those attacking Qixia were repulsed, Sun sent subsequent waves of soldiers to Longtan to fight for the railway station, which changed hands multiple times.¹⁴⁸ Thus, all the troops that crossed the Yangtze gathered in the Longtan area. Sun himself stayed on the northern bank with the reserves, including most of his 2nd Division.

The operation was ruined by poor judgement and leadership. Although the success of the operation depended on speed and surprise, the commander on the spot, Liu Shilin, ordered the fresh reinforcements to dig in and rotate with the first wave on the afternoon of August 26th, he believed the latter were exhausted.¹⁴⁹ Throughout August 27th, only small-scale attacks were launched against the Longtan station and the surrounding villages, which were not secured until the evening of the 28th.¹⁵⁰ (Maps 4.9-10) By then, after two days of continuous fighting, Liu Shilin was overwhelmed by the situation. When he failed to reconcile his subordinates, who differed on whether they should advance towards Zhenjiang or Nanjing, Liu deserted.¹⁵¹ Shangguan Yunxiang¹⁵² of the 4th Division assumed command, and decided to persist in defense of the west and use the fresh troops to secure Zhenjiang for supplies.¹⁵³ By then, the NRA had already surrounded Longtan on three sides by pouring in

¹⁴⁵ Zhang Bingjun, 253; Tang Degang, *Li Zongren huayilu*, 369-70; Ma Baoheng, 317. This saved the 10th Division, one of the best units of Sun's army and one that played an important role in subsequent campaigns, from certain disaster.

¹⁴⁶ Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, “Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou,” 22.

¹⁴⁷ “Ba yue ershiqi ri tongbao, 27/8/1927,” in Beiyang zhengfu junshibu canmouchu guanyu Sun Chuanfang you Pukou Siyuankou dujiang jingong Nanjing Zhenjiang dengdi dianbao, 24/8/1927-3/9/1927, in ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 3, 824-5.

¹⁴⁸ “ba yue ershijiu ri tongbao, 29/8/1927,” ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 3, 825-6; Huang Zheng, 60; Ma Baoheng, 317-8; Zhang Bingjun, 256-7; Zhang Shiying, 9-10.


¹⁴⁹ Huang Zheng, 60

¹⁵⁰ “Guomin gemingjun Liu Zhi bu guanyu zai Longtan qianmie Sun Chuanfang canbu zhandou xiangbao,” September 1927, in ZMDZH, Vol. 5, No. 1, 411.


¹⁵¹ Ma Baoheng, 319.

¹⁵² See Appendix I.

¹⁵³ Tian Yunqing and Pan Zhenying, “Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou,” 23; Tian and Pan noted that they had received active assistance from the local population such as in building bridges. This description was later deleted in the published version.



MAP 4.9 The Battle of Longtan 24-28 Aug 1927

MAP 4.10 *The Battle of Longtan 24-28 Aug 1927 (2)*

reinforcements from Nanjing and Shanghai. Yang Shuzhuang's navy, previously bought off by Sun Chuanfang, also became hostile.

As the chain of command of both armies was confused, the battle was made up of many uncoordinated small-unit engagements such as Colonel Huang Zheng of the 2nd Division's attack on the villages near the Longtan station. Before the attack, the senior commanders only briefed Huang, commander of a cavalry regiment (in effect a mounted infantry regiment), as to the situation and his objective. It was left to him to then decide his own tactical approach (to flank his target from two sides).¹⁵⁴ Since the higher command of Sun's army was paralyzed early in the battle, troops rallied around any officers they could find, and the middle and low-ranking officers like Huang maintained cohesion. The battle was also marked by bitter hand-to-hand fighting because both sides lacked heavy weapons.

Just as Sun's army turned eastwards, Yang Shuzhuang's navy, which had stayed neutral throughout the battle, sealed off the Yangtze.¹⁵⁵ Meanwhile, the *Anguojun* navy from the north was kept away from the battlefield by the KMT shore batteries in Wusong.¹⁵⁶ Because of Yang Shuzhuang's intervention, the final group of the northern reinforcements were immediately cut off from the north when they arrived.¹⁵⁷ Still, resistance against the NRA's counterattacks continued despite most of the divisional commanders having already retreated to the north bank. When the northern troops were pushed against the waterfront, they started to surrender or desert. All organized resistance was over by the end of August.¹⁵⁸ Sun's army inflicted heavy casualties on the NRA, and would have succeeded if the senior commanders had been able to press the attack earlier or if Sun had sent in more reinforcements. *Chenbao*, a neutral newspaper, aptly commented, "While the attackers were too adventurous, the defenders were too lucky."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ Huang Zheng, 61-2.

¹⁵⁵ CB, 30/9/1927; Liu Peiyi, "Dui Ma Baoheng zhu 'Sun Chuanfang wusheng lianjun de xingcheng yu xiaomie' de jiuzheng yu buchong," wzcx, Vol. 2, 382; Huang Zheng, 61; the so-called KMT 2nd Fleet was originally loyal to Sun Chuanfang, only turned to the south in March of 1927, when their base of Shanghai was overrun.

¹⁵⁶ SR 22/8/1927; 23/8/1927; 4/9/1927; 5/9/1927. The northern flotilla attempted another breakthrough on 31 August and 1 September, but was again repulsed. See Zhang Bingjun, 262-3.

¹⁵⁷ Su Guiyong, Li Yaoxian, Li Jianyuan, Ren Qisheng, "Sun Chuanfang yu wusheng lianjun zhi xingmie," wzcx, Vol. 2, 332.

¹⁵⁸ Tian Yunqing and Pan Zhenying, "Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou," 25-34; Huang Zheng, 62; Ma Baoheng, 312-5.

¹⁵⁹ CB, 1/9/1927; also quoted in Zhang Shiying, "Longtan zhanyi de pingjia yu fanxi," 22.

The battle of Longtan did not eliminate Sun as has often been suggested. In all, of the roughly 40,000 men that crossed the Yangtze, at least one quarter of them became casualties and another quarter became prisoners.¹⁶⁰ The Japanese estimated that Sun's army lost one-third of its strength.¹⁶¹ However, some of the best troops, such as Sun's 2nd Division (except its cavalry regiment mentioned above), had not participated in the battle because they were barred by the KMT navy. Some of the formations that crossed the river withdrew to the northern bank as a unit and were rebuilt. This army was even able to offer much resistance against the NRA when the latter crossed the Yangtze in November. Tian Yunqing, a brigadier of Sun's army, recalled that some of its officers were still confident that they could defeat the NRA.¹⁶² Still, the defeat in Longtan was a great blow to the *Anguojun*'s confidence and caused much human and material loss. Nonetheless, these losses were less significant than the failure to halt the Northern Expedition or to change the national and international attitude towards the Beijing Government.

Tipping the Balance: The Autumn and Winter Campaigns of 1927

The Situation After Longtan

After Longtan, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan of Shanxi were determined to wrest control of Northern China from the *Anguojun*. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Japanese encouraged Yan to replace Zhang Zuolin as the hegemonic faction in Northern China from mid-1927. However, Yan hesitated because of the *Anguojun*'s success in July. As Sun was defeated and Zhang's relationship with the Japanese deteriorated because of their antagonism over Manchuria, Yan decided to take action. To protect himself from a possible pincer attack from Zhili and Shandong, Feng also urged the Shanxi warlord to fight the *Anguojun*.¹⁶³ On the other hand, the KMC in Henan remained the *Anguojun*'s prime target. This period witnessed extensive fighting in Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, Chahar, and even the vicinity of Beijing. In Southern China, with the northern threat temporarily removed, the Nanjing KMT turned to Wuhan and the smaller

¹⁶⁰ CB, 1/9/1927; Americans also estimated that Sun lost 10,000 soldiers. “Situation Report Sep 29 1927,” USMI, Reel 8, slide 139.

¹⁶¹ “Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928,” in RDN, JACAR, Ref: C01007465200, slide 62.

¹⁶² Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, “Longtan zhanyi hou wusheng lianjun zuihou de zhengzha,” WZCX, Vol. 2, 354. Tian Yunqing (1894-1963) was a Fujianese. He graduated from the Fujian Military Academy (*Fujian wubei xuexiao*). During the Second Sino-Japanese War, he served as a corps commander.

¹⁶³ Li Zaolin, 195.

warlords such as Zhou Fengqi, Chen Tiaoyuan, and Wang Pu, but unlike the war in Northern China and similar to the stereotypes of “warlord warfare,” the “battles” in the south were settled through bribes and recognition of position rather than actual fighting.

Wrong Priorities: The Shanxi Campaign, Sep-Dec 1927

The military situation in Northern China was quiet from August to September. Although Yan Xishan of Shanxi changed flags and occupied Shijiazhuang in June, communication between Taiyuan and Beijing continued. After the victory in Xuzhou, Zhang Zongchang was busy stabilizing the situation of Shandong, and waiting for the Fengtian forces to invade Henan together. Although Beijing wanted a second invasion of Henan, the Beijing-Hankow Railway to Henan from Zhili was blocked by the Shanxi troops in Shijiazhuang. The *Anguojun* negotiated with Yan, who showed a willingness to withdraw when the KMT was apparently losing in August. Nonetheless, as Sun Chuanfang was defeated in Longtan, the Shanxi commanders refused to leave Shijiazhuang.¹⁶⁴ A chance to recover Henan without fighting with Yan Xishan was thus lost. When Jin Yun-e rebelled against Feng Yuxiang and again declared independence in mid-September, the *Anguojun* contemplated seizing the opportunity to recover Henan. In response, Yan mobilized the Shanxi Army. Zhang Zuolin again tried to negotiate with Yan, but the Shanxi forces marched towards Kalgan from Suiyuan and attacked Zhili from Shanxi on September 29th.

The Shanxi army’s descent upon Zhili Province surprised the *Anguojun* leaders, but they reacted quickly and utilized the Beijing-Hankow Railway to their advantage. On October 2nd, a plan to coordinate the action of the Zhili-Shandong and Fengtian armies was devised by the *Anguojun* headquarters.¹⁶⁵ The *Anguojun* ordered the Fengtian forces to abandon their forward positions and concentrate near Baoding and Nankou. Zhang Zongchang was ordered to attack Henan from Shandong to pin down Feng Yuxiang (this campaign will be discussed in the next section).

The Shanxi Army that was ordered to capture Beijing and Tianjin was hardly a suitable tool for the job. Although it was well-equipped, the Japanese military considered it of limited combat value because of its lack of experience.¹⁶⁶ Li Zaolin, Zhang Zongchang’s Chief-of-Staff, dismissed it as “vulnerable.”¹⁶⁷ It was

¹⁶⁴ SR, 2/9/1927; 3/9/1927; 5/9/1927; ss, 19/8/1927; Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 174.

¹⁶⁵ Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 178.

¹⁶⁶ “Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928,” RDN, JACAR, Ref: C01007465200, slide 70.

¹⁶⁷ Li Zaolin, 196.

also in a bad position to mount the attack. Coming out from its mountainous enclave, its two pincers were separated by mountains but failed to cooperate. Its southern pincer was exposed as it moved northwards along the Beijing-Hankow Railway. While the *Anguojun* shortened its line of communication, the Shanxi forces extended theirs as they progressed. Worse, the *Anguojun* in Zhili would easily be able to sever communication between Taiyuan and Shanxi's southern pincer by attacking the Shijiazhuang-Zhengding area.

After occupying the territories abandoned by the *Anguojun*, Shanxi's attacks along the two railways faltered. On October 8th, the *Anguojun* headquarters ordered a counterattack on both railways, and troops were sent to flank Shanxi's southern pincer.¹⁶⁸ Three days later, the Fengtian forces under Ji Yiqiao captured Dingzhou, a railhead of the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway, and held the city against Shanxi counterattacks. When the Zhili-Shandong forces captured Shijiazhuang on October 14th with Ji's troops, the line of communication of the Shanxi forces in Zhili was severed (Map 4.11).¹⁶⁹


However, after confused fighting on October 12th, a Shanxi flying column of 7,000 men under Fu Zuoyi captured Zhuozhou, a town near the Beijing-Hankow Railway.¹⁷⁰ Since Zhuozhou was close to the railway line, the *Anguojun* ordered its general reserve to retake it. After two failed attempts to storm the walled town, Zhang Xueliang besieged the city until its surrender in late December. Despite the fact that the siege witnessed the appearance of many of the new weapons such as tanks and poisonous gas and attracted national attention, it had little strategic impact. Only a single corps and Zhang Xueliang's bodyguard brigade (total around 40,000 men) were involved, and the rest of the Fengtian Army continued to advance into Shanxi despite Fu Zuoyi's stout resistance.¹⁷¹

168 Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 180.


169 Yue Chao, “Fengjin liangjun Zhuozhou zhizhan,” in Zhengxie Zhuozhou shi wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, Zhuozhou wenshi ziliao, 18; “Situation Report 24 October 1927,” USMI, Reel 8, slide 150.

170 Yue Chao, 18; Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 182.

171 Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1144; “Situation Report 24 October 1927,” USMI, Reel 8, slide 151. The 30th Corps was later redeployed to another front and replaced by elements from Wan Fulin's 8th Corps. See “Situation Report November 22, 1927,” USMI, Reel 8, slide 164; Yue Chao, 20-23. Later, Zhou Zuohua, the commander of the Fengtian artillery, brought another artillery brigade to participate in the battle. Wan also deployed six tanks to join the battle, but three were lost during the attack. The siege finally ended on 6 January when Yan Xishan, fearing starvation within the city, agreed to allow Fu to surrender to the *Anguojun*. For the size of the Fengtian forces involved, see “Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928,” RDN, JACAR, Ref: C01007465200, slides 20-1.



MAP 4.11 Operations in Shanxi-Zhili-Henan-Shandong, 25 Sept - 1 Nov 1927



MAP 4.12 Operations in Shanxi-Zhili-Henan-Shandong, 1 Nov-31 Dec 1927

After repulsing the Shanxi attack, the *Anguojun* decided to subdue Shanxi to pave the way for an advance into Henan.¹⁷² In November, apart from those laying siege to Zhuozhou, the Fengtian Army entered Shanxi from Shijiazhuang and Kalgan, but its advance was slowed by the deteriorating weather and mountainous terrain.¹⁷³ Suiyuan was recovered, but the mountain passes prevented the Fengtian forces from going further.¹⁷⁴ Although the high command wished to make peace with Yan, the Fengtian forces were simply too slow to exert real pressure (Map 4.12).

In retrospect, instead of invading Shanxi in the winter, the Fengtian Clique could have sent a substantial part of the Fengtian Army to Henan in support of Zhang Zongchang's drive into the province (see below). However, the over-cautious high command used the Fengtian Army against Shanxi to clear the way for an invasion of Henan, instead of sending it to support an ongoing operation there. While the Fengtian Army was stalled in the attempt to capture the mountains in Shanxi, the Zhili-Shandong Army had to bear the brunt of Feng Yuxiang and Chiang Kai-shek's armies again.

The Second Henan Campaign, Oct-Dec 1927

When Yan invaded Zhili, Feng Yuxiang hurled his forces eastwards towards Xuzhou to re-establish the link with Nanjing and northwards to seize southern Zhili. On the other hand, to support the counterattack against the Shanxi army, the *Anguojun* headquarters ordered Zhang Zongchang and Chu Yupu to invade Henan to prevent Feng from helping Yan.¹⁷⁵ Meanwhile, Nanjing resumed its offensive against Wuhan after Sun Chuanfang was defeated at Henan and the return of Chiang Kai-shek from Japan. All these developments prevented any concerted action between the southern and northern KMT armies.

The details of the engagements during this campaign remain sketchy, but it is clear that both sides consisted of a large number of reluctant allies who undermined the plans of both sides. Chu first repelled Feng's attack on Xuzhou on October 15th, and then pushed steadily westwards with around 100,000 troops. As the *Anguojun* appeared to be winning, a Shaanxi general went over

¹⁷² Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1163.

¹⁷³ "Situation Report 8 November 1927," USMI, Reel 8, slides 157-8; "Situation Report 22 November 1927," USMI, Reel 8, slide 164; "Situation Report 20 December 1927," USMI, Reel 8, slide 170; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1171.

¹⁷⁴ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1150; 1170.

¹⁷⁵ Zhang Youkun, et al. (eds.), 180; Liu Fenghan, 33-4.

to the *Anguojun* and attacked the KMC from the rear. This allowed Chu to overcome the KMC's position near Lanfeng on October 17th.¹⁷⁶ (Map 4.11)

However, Chu was unable to exploit this success because of the *Anguojun* headquarters' decision to use the Fengtian forces to tackle Shanxi instead of Henan. Chu's troops pressed on alone, but they were halted by Feng Yuxiang's forces near Kaifeng.¹⁷⁷ Exhausted and without support, the Shandong forces could not withstand the KMC's counterattack.¹⁷⁸ In early November, they were driven back, partly because one of the recently surrendered Shaanxi divisions went over to Feng Yuxiang again and ambushed the Shandong forces. Around November 10th, when Chu Yupu was driven back to the east of Guide, the line was again stabilized.¹⁷⁹ By then, the war between Wuhan and Nanjing ended in the latter's favour, as the latter bought off most of the generals of the military leader of the Wuhan government, the Hunan warlord Tang Shengzhi. The Nanjing forces then crossed the Yangtze, and although Sun inflicted some damage on them near Mingguang, his outnumbered army withdrew northwards.¹⁸⁰

Chu Yupu's first defeat in Henan was not fatal, but Zhang Zongchang's decision to attack again led to a disaster with profound consequences. After the victory in early November, Feng Yuxiang waited for the Nanjing NRA to attack Xuzhou. Instead of preparing for defense, Zhang Zongchang decided to defeat Feng before the arrival of the Nanjing forces.¹⁸¹ The second attack on Kaifeng, however, ended in disaster, as the right wing of the Zhili-Shandong Army was smashed by a powerful counterattack from the KMC that began on November 24th. Several senior commanders were killed during the battle, a rare event that indicates the intensity of the fighting.¹⁸² Feng's forces chased the Zhili-Shandong Army to Xuzhou, but were repulsed by the joint forces of Yu

¹⁷⁶ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1123; Li Zaolin, 196.

¹⁷⁷ “Zhang Zongchang zhi Zhang Zuolin dian, 19/10/1927”; “Zhang Zongchang dian, 23/10/1927”; “Gongfu junshi bangongchu dian, 24/10/1927,” in ZMDZH, Vol. 3, No. 3, 828-30. Li Zaolin, 196; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1144.

¹⁷⁸ Li Zaolin, 197.

¹⁷⁹ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1151; Liu Fenghan, 34.

¹⁸⁰ SR, 20/11/1927; Guowen 1170; Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, “Longtan zhanyi hou wusheng lianjun zuihou de zhengzha,” WZCX, Vol. 2, 352-4.

¹⁸¹ SR, 12/10/1927.

¹⁸² Li Zaolin 197; “Situation Report 20 December 1927,” USMI, Reel 8, slide 171. For example, Pan Hongjun, a veteran *beiyang* officer who fought for the North from 1911, was killed during the battle as a corps commander of Zhang Zongchang's army.

Xuezhong, Zhang Zongchang, and Sun Chuanfang in early December.¹⁸³ After the battle, however, the NRA arrived. Facing the possibility of being surrounded, Beijing ordered Xuzhou to be abandoned.¹⁸⁴ The situation reverted to that of June of 1927, when the Nanjing KMT linked up with Feng Yuxiang through Xuzhou. (Map 4.12)

The Zhili-Shandong Army suffered devastating losses during the campaign. For example, four out of six of its armored trains were lost to the KMC.¹⁸⁵ Although it was always seen as the worst type of the warlord armies, the Zhili-Shandong Army pinned down Feng Yuxiang, and might well have succeeded in recovering Henan if it had been supported by the Fengtian forces. It also bought much time for Sun Chuanfang's army to recover, which allowed it to play an important role during the 1928 Campaign. However, Zhang Zongchang's disastrous second offensive destroyed any morale left in Zhang and Sun's armies.¹⁸⁶

When Zhang Zongchang was attacking Henan, Feng Yuxiang was suffering a dire shortage of money and supplies since he had yet to link up with either Wuhan or Nanjing. He had to resort to brutal means for extracting resources from the northwest. This brutality led to the bloody Gansu Rebellion of 1928-1929.¹⁸⁷ Opium was extensively cultivated in Shaanxi to ensure income.¹⁸⁸ The KMC's use of military notes also led to much discontent in Henan.¹⁸⁹ At that time, a determined Fengtian attack from southern Zhili might have been able to force Feng to abandon Henan, and the local forces might once again have gone over to the *Anguojun*. In fact, they had rebelled against Feng, including Jin Yun-e, who turned to the KMT in 1927. A comparison between the situation in 1927 and the Central Plains War of 1930 may help illustrate the importance of Henan; when Chiang Kai-shek took Henan (ironically with troops previously under Zhang Zongchang and Sun Chuanfang), Feng Yuxiang's army fell

¹⁸³ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1194; 1214; Wang Mouting, "Sun Chuanfang yu Feng Yuxiang de Xuzhou zhizhan," in Chuanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (ed.), *Zhonghua wenshi ziliao wenku*, Vol. 2 (Beijing, 1995), 812-4. Wang used the Chinese calendar system in his account.

¹⁸⁴ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1214; Li Zaolin 197.

¹⁸⁵ "Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928," RDN, JACAR, Ref: C01007465200, slide 35.

¹⁸⁶ Tian Yunqing, Pan Zhenying, "Longtan zhanyi hou wushenglian jun zuihou de zhengzha," 354-5. Tian and Pan noted that the generals within Sun's army started to think of leaving the army around December.

¹⁸⁷ Wang Yuchao, 164-169; Yang Xiaoping, *Ma Bufang jiazu de xingshuai* (Xining, 1986), 88-91; Wu Zhongli, Liu Qinbin, *Xibei wu Ma* (Zhengzhou, 1993), 148-50.

¹⁸⁸ Mi Zhanchen, "Feng Yuxiang jiqi Xibejun zai Shaanxi," WZCX, Vol. 17, 105.

¹⁸⁹ Xu Changlin, "Feng Yuxiang budui yuange gaihuang," WZCX, Vol. 17, 92.

apart as he could no longer provision it with the impoverished Northwest provinces. The Fengtian forces chose to attack Shanxi instead of focusing on Feng and Henan between October and December of 1927, which led to a crippling blow to the Shandong forces, the loss of Xuzhou to the Nanjing forces, and a further undermining of the *Anguojun*'s strategic position.

Endgame: The Shanxi-Henan-Shandong Campaign of April 1928

Seeking the Decisive Battle

As the weather was not suitable for large scale operation, the front was inactive from January until March of 1928. By then, all sides were reconsidering their strategy, forming new alliances, and preparing for the next campaign. The situation in Southern China remained unsettled, but Chiang Kai-shek was able to launch another “Northern Expedition” by forming a united front with Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren, and Li Jishen.

Beijing also reviewed its strategy. As its hope to find an ally in the south was frustrated, it decided to launch another offensive to defeat Feng Yuxiang. As Wen Gongzhi pointed out, outnumbered and surrounded, victory against one of the KMT armies was one way to regain strategic initiative for the *Anguojun*,¹⁹⁰ or at least buy more time for the Shandong Army to recover from the defeat in the last winter. Feng Yuxiang, whose army stood between those of Yan Xishan and Chiang Kai-shek, was the center of gravity of the KMT coalition. By defeating Feng, the *Anguojun* might have been able to force Yan to abandon hostilities, or at least stay defensive. Defeating Feng would also allow the *Anguojun* to recover the eastern part of the Longhai Railway and release troops to deal with Chiang. Success in stopping Chiang and Feng would strengthen the *Anguojun*'s position in Northern China, and might even force Nanjing to accept a peace agreement, at least for the time being, because of the war weariness of both sides (see Chapter 3).

With several months of lull, the *Anguojun* headquarters devised a more centralized plan for coordinating the Fengtian Army, the Shandong Army under Zhang Zongchang and Chu Yupu, and the army of Sun Chuanfang. The *Anguojun* finally dropped the plan to subdue Shanxi. As Zhang Zuoxiang, who was responsible for the northern sector of the Shanxi front, told his subordinates, “this is not where the result of the war would be decided; all we have to

¹⁹⁰ Wen Gongzhi, *Zuijin sanshinian zhongguo junshi shi*, Vol. 2, 375-6.

do is to pin down Yan (Xishan) and avoid unnecessary losses.”¹⁹¹ Part of the Fengtian Army was redeployed to southern Zhili, where they would invade Henan again with Chu Yupu.¹⁹² The Fengtian forces on the Shanxi front would hold their gains and only launch limited offensives. On the Tianjin-Pukow front, Zhang Zongchang would defend Hanzhuang to cover Sun Chuanfang’s advance into Henan from Jining.¹⁹³ It was suggested that part of the Fengtian Army be used in Shandong, but Zhang Zongchang claimed that he was able to defend Shandong with Sun Chuanfang.¹⁹⁴ Supposedly, this plan was an improvement on the strategy adopted in the previous winter, as the *Anguojun* now concentrated its effort on invading Henan.

The plan sounded sensible, but its execution had many flaws, some of them fatal. First, although Henan’s priority was higher than Shanxi, Beijing did not delegate enough resources to the Henan-Zhili front. The majority of the Fengtian forces still stayed in the Shanxi front, not enough to subdue the province while unnecessarily numerous for blockading it. The *Anguojun* headquarters deployed the majority of the Shandong Army in the forward position of Hanzhuang rather than the more defensible terrain near Tai-an, and this led to much apprehension among Zhang Zongchang’s staff.¹⁹⁵ The decision by the *Anguojun* headquarters to move Sun’s army into Henan would leave the Shandong forces to face the Nanjing NRA alone. In the conference held in Jining on March 26th, Zhang urged Sun to advance southwestwards instead of westwards in order to cover his right flank. A compromise resulted. Sun would first launch a surprise attack towards Xuzhou with Zhang Zongchang to disrupt Chiang Kai-shek’s advance, instead of immediately advancing westwards.¹⁹⁶ The plan was kept secret, and even before Sun left for the front, he declared that he was about to attack Feng Yuxiang.¹⁹⁷

This compromise solution was no less risky. Sun’s army had to attack against a much larger enemy; Zhang Zongchang still had to place his main force dan-

¹⁹¹ He Muxia, “Junlu zaji,” in Zhengxie Shenyang Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, *Shenyang wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 21, 111. He Muxia (1902-1984) was a graduate of the Fengtian Military Academy. In late 1927, he was regimental commander; he later served in the Manchukuo Army.

¹⁹² “Situation Report 9 April 1928,” USMI, Reel 8, 224; Wang Yuchao, 170-1.

¹⁹³ “Sun Chuanfang zhi Yang Yuting xin, 9/2/1927,” FMX, 885-8.

¹⁹⁴ Hao Bingrang, 309.

¹⁹⁵ Li Zaolin 201.

¹⁹⁶ “Situation Report April 9, 1928,” USMI, Reel 8, 221; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1387; Wang Yuchao, 171; Su Guiyong, Li Yaoxian, Li Jianyuan, Ren Qisheng, “Sun Chuanfang yu wusheng lianjun zhi xingmie,” WZCX, Vol. 2, 333.

¹⁹⁷ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1362.

gerously close to the front line. Most important, as the American observer pointed out, this plan failed because the *Anguojun* grossly underestimated the strength of Feng Yuxiang's army in the juncture between the Beijing-Hankow and Tianjin-Pukow fronts. Since the Fengtian Army did not delegate enough forces to invade Henan, Feng was able to disrupt Sun's attack towards Xuzhou.

Although the *Anguojun* armies suffered substantial losses during the preceding winter, they were largely made good by March of 1928. The strength of Sun's army reached 67,000, almost to the pre-Longtan level. An additional artillery brigade from Fengtian and a cavalry detachment from Shandong further strengthened it.¹⁹⁸ The Zhili-Shandong Army also prepared an entrenched position from Hanzhuang to Taierzhuang (about 40km in length).

By March, both sides poured troops in to the front, now stretching over the provinces of Zhili, Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, and Chahar. The Fengtian Army was in Chahar, the western part of Shandong and Zhili. Chu Yupu's army was in the area between the Beijing-Hankow and the Tianjin-Pukow railways. Further east was Sun Chuanfang's army in Jining; Zhang Zongchang's army was deployed from Hanzhuang-Lincheng to the coastline.

An Operational Disaster: The Southern Zhili-Shandong Campaign

According to the *Anguojun*'s original plan, the Fengtian Army was to occupy Henan. A preliminary attack was launched on April 1st in northern and central Shanxi to push Yan Xishan's army deeper into the province.¹⁹⁹ Before the Fengtian forces had advanced into Henan, some of the local armies in Henan had turned against Feng Yuxiang and tied down part of his army. Feng was unable to release these troops until the Guangxi troops of Li Zongren arrived at Henan by the Beijing-Hankow Railway in May.²⁰⁰

However, as mentioned, the *Anguojun* did not exert enough pressure on the KMC. On April 6th, around 40,000 Fengtian troops under Yu Xuezhong and Ji Yiqiao crossed the Zhang River and seized a beachhead. Heavy fighting at Zhangde ensued, during which the *Anguojun* had the upper hand. As a result of the Fengtian Army's success, Chu Yupu's army approached Daming, meeting little resistance from Liu Zhenhua's troops.²⁰¹ The situation along this front was favorable, but the collapse of the Shandong front forced the Fengtian

¹⁹⁸ “Situation Report 9 April 1928,” USMI, Reel 8, 221; Wang Yuchao, 171.

¹⁹⁹ “Situation Report 9 Apr 1928,” USMI, Reel 8, 224.

²⁰⁰ Hao Bingrang, 309.

²⁰¹ “Situation Report 25 Apr 1928,” USMI, Reel 8, 195; Liu Fenghan, Zhang Li; Mao Jinling, *Ding Zhipan xiansheng fangwen jilu*, 28-9.

forces to lift the siege on Zhangde and retire to their starting position on April 20th.²⁰²

A series of operational factors led to the collapse of the *Anguojun*'s position in Shandong. The NRA crossed the Grand Canal and attacked the northern position in Taierzhuang from the east and southeast, capturing the town on the same day.²⁰³ Zhang Zongchang's reliance on trench lines rather than deep area defense invited disaster. The loss of the armored trains during the previous winter prevented the Shandong forces from counterattacking effectively. The trench line was quickly outflanked, and the NRA reached the rear of the *Anguojun*. The attack disrupted the concentration of the northern troops behind the frontline and led to a complete collapse of the front.²⁰⁴ Zhang tried to restore his line in Tai-an, but the plan was rejected by the *Anguojun* headquarters, as it would have exposed Sun Chuanfang's base in Jining to the Nanjing forces. Instead, Zhang was ordered to hold Yanzhou.²⁰⁵ According to Zhang's Chief of Staff Li Zaolin, the Shandong Army simply did not have enough time to prepare a new line in the face of the NRA's attack (Map 4.13).

While the Shandong Army was crumbling, Sun Chuanfang advanced smoothly. Between April 10th and 14th, Sun's army defeated He Yaozhu and advanced to within 50 km of Xuzhou.²⁰⁶ To exploit his success, Sun ordered a corps to reinforce him, leaving only a division in Jining to guard against the KMC.²⁰⁷ Facing an imminent attack against Xuzhou, Chiang Kai-shek recalled part of his First Army and deployed his general reserve.²⁰⁸ Fortunately for Chiang, the KMC attacked Jining, Sun's base, from the west. By the time Sun received this news on April 16th, Jining was already lost.²⁰⁹ Sun retook the city, only to find that he was surrounded on three sides as the Shandong front collapsed.²¹⁰ Although his Chief of Staff believed that Sun could have saved the day by pressing on to capture Xuzhou, it was improbable, as Chiang still had a

²⁰² "Situation Report 25 Apr 1928," USMI, Reel 8, 195.

²⁰³ Zhang Bingjun, 306; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1369.

²⁰⁴ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1380-1.

²⁰⁵ Li Zaolin, 201.


²⁰⁶ "Situation Report 25 Apr 1928," USMI, Reel 8, 193; Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1381; Wang yuchao, 171.

²⁰⁷ Su Guiyong, Li Yaoxian, Li Jianyuan, Ren Qisheng, "Sun Chuanfang yu wusheng lianjun zhi xingmie," wzcx, Vol. 2, 333.

²⁰⁸ Zhang Bingjun, 309.

²⁰⁹ Guowen zhoubaoshe, 1381; Wang Yuchao, 171-2.

²¹⁰ "Situation Report 25 Apr 1928," USMI, Reel 8, 3.



MAP 4.13 Defeat and retreat of the Anguojun, 1 Apr-25 May 1928

substantial number of troops available, while the Shandong forces were in full retreat.²¹¹

With the fall of Jining, the retreat of the Shandong Army could not be checked.²¹² Narrowly escaping encirclement, Sun's army suffered significant losses. The state of the Shandong Army also quickly deteriorated. According to the Americans, the "great majority of the troops in this retreat literally walked the soles off their shoes, and this combined with the scarcity of food and the total lack of shelter left the vast horde without any idea of further resistance when they arrived in Tai-an."²¹³ As the result, the *Anguojun* headquarters ordered Zhang and Sun to abandon Jinan. On April 30th, the NRA troops entered Jinan, ending the *Anguojun*'s control over Shandong.²¹⁴

With the *Anguojun* apparently completely defeated, the Kwantung Army moved its headquarters to Mukden in May. The Japanese again forced Zhang Zuolin to accept the Japanese demands, hinting of cutting him off from Manchuria. This finally persuaded Zhang to abandon entirely his position within China Proper.

Concluding Remarks

Although the grand-strategy of the *Anguojun* was a sensible one, errors and failures on strategic and operational levels undermined its design. In particular, the failures to capture Shanghai, secure Henan, and eliminate Feng Yuxiang were fatal. In early 1927, the campaign to hold North China was close to success, but it was thwarted by Zhang Zongchang's decision to deploy the majority of the Zhili-Shandong Army to the south of the Yangtze and the Fengtian Army's failure to delegate more resources to the Henan front. This was as much a problem of overreach as distributing resources. When the *Anguojun* finally regained strategic initiative after defeating Chiang Kai-shek in August 1927, the chance for a political victory slipped away after Sun Chuanfang had suffered a crushing defeat in Longtan. Another opportunity was lost when Yan was defeated in November 1927, as the *Anguojun* again failed to exploit this success and strengthen its position in Northern China. Instead, the Fengtian forces were wasted in besieging Shanxi. Instead of Yan successfully tying down the Fengtian forces by launching an attack, Beijing tied its own hands by making

²¹¹ Meng Xingkui, "Wusheng lianjun zhi neimo," wzcx, Vol. 2, 341.

²¹² "Situation Report 25 Apr 1928," USMI, Reel 8, 193.

²¹³ "Situation Report 25 Apr 1928," USMI, Reel 8, 193.

²¹⁴ "Situation Report 9 May 1928," USMI, Reel 8, 249.

Shanxi their highest priority in the winter of 1927. Although the mistake was realized in early 1928, the Fengtian leaders who actually controlled the *Anguojun* still failed to delegate its assets effectively to achieve its goal, which was to retake Henan and defeat Feng Yuxiang. The failure of the Spring Campaign of 1928 was the result of operational factors such as dispersal of force, poor planning, and flawed intelligence rather than bad strategy. However, when one is trying to understand the operational failure of the *Anguojun*, one has to keep in mind that compared with the NRA, the *Anguojun* was in a disadvantaged geographic (the funnel effect of the Chinese railway network in North and Central China and the peculiar position of Shanxi) and geopolitical position, had many strategic burdens, and had to coordinate many theatres with limited means of communication.

The Manchurian Economy and the Northern Expedition, 1925-1928

Introduction

Although it has been overlooked in many of the accounts of the Northern Expedition, money was among the decisive factors for the outcome of the war.¹ As Hans van de Ven suggested, the ability to pay for the war was of paramount importance for the KMT's victory.² Studies on the North's economic mobilization and the economic history of Manchuria portrayed Zhang Zuolin's attempt to finance the war from 1925 to 1928 as a failure that led to widespread economic disruption and social unrest.³ The center of this narrative of failure was hyperinflation caused by the depreciation of *the fengpiao*⁴ (*maofang* in Chinese, *hōhyō bōraku* in Japanese). However, a close look at the pattern of the fall suggests that it was by no means an uncontrolled and irreversible fall. Rather, the rise and fall of the currency was closely linked to the strategy of the Fengtian Clique.

This chapter argues that the difficult financial situation determined the course Zhang and the Fengtian Clique followed. Rather than blindly printing money to pay for the war, the Clique used the state-controlled bank to mobilize Manchuria's resources to fund its strategic design in Northeast Asia that would eventually solve its financial predicament. The Clique took this risk, as its leaders believed that Chinese and foreign financial support would be forthcoming once the north appeared to be winning. It was the failure of a similar strategy in China that led to the collapse of the *fengpiao*. Other contenders for

¹ This chapter is an edited version of my paper on Modern Asian Studies. Also see Kwong Chi Man, "Finance and the Northern Expedition: From the Northeast Asian Perspective, 1925-1928," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (2014), 1695-739. There are only minor changes on this chapter.

² Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism*, 88-92, 125-8; Hans van de Ven's work was the only work that systematically discussed the financial dimension of the Northern Expedition.

³ Gavan McCormack, 191-204; Ma Shangbin, et. al., *Fengxi jingji*, 230-4; Yang Naikun and Cao Yanxiong, *Jindai dongbei jingji wenti yanjiu*, 83; Nishimura Shigeō, *Chūgoku kindai Tohoku chiūkishi kenkyū*, 153-7; Wei Fuxiang, "Lun Fengpiao maofang jiqi suiluo," in *Social Science Front Bimonthly* (1986), No. 3; Nishimura Shigeō, 106-7.

⁴ For a detailed discussion of the nature of the *fengpiao*, see Chapter 1.

power in China at that time faced different degrees of financial problems, and all saw war as one of the solutions. Hans van de Ven suggests that one of the motives for the Kuomintang to launch the Northern Expedition was what he called the 'military-fiscal cycle': they had to obtain additional financial resources, which would be used to support the military, by military and territorial expansion.⁵ Likewise, Feng Yuxiang turned to the Soviets and sought to control Northern China because the northwestern provinces could not feed his army.

Before Zhang Zuolin decided to fight in China in 1926, he faced a difficult and complex financial situation over which he had little control. The situation was caused by limited income and high military expenditures, a decline in the price of silver after the First World War, and Japanese attempts to control the Manchurian economy. These factors forced Zhang to seek new sources of revenue. Although Zhang controlled the Beijing Government after 1926, it received no revenue from the provinces and its only source of funds were the Customs income and the Salt Gabelle, which were hypothecated to foreign and domestic loans as well as indemnities. Even though the Tariff Conference of 1925 promised China that it could collect additional tariffs (known as the Customs Surtax), the Chinese Maritime Customs Service prevented the Beijing Government from actually collecting it, fearing such a move would antagonize the Kuomintang, which had threatened to dismantle the Service.

In the face of this volatile financial situation, Zhang Zuolin had several options such as increasing tax in Manchuria, issuing internal bonds, borrowing internationally, or seizing areas or institutions which had a steady income. The reasoning behind Zhang's policy was to buy beans from the peasants with newly issued Fengtian Dollars to earn foreign exchange that could then be used to fund the war in China—ostensibly to help the Clique financially. With a significant part of the Manchurian economy under Japanese control, Zhang could hardly raise more revenue there without alienating the Japanese, who were opposed to Zhang's move into China. It was impossible for him to issue internal loans through the Beijing Government, as it lacked credibility. The Chinese banking community turned to the Kuomintang, especially after it had captured Shanghai. Zhang could not borrow from an increasingly hostile Japan, whilst Britain wasn't willing to commit until the situation was clearly favorable to the north. Thus, in order to convince the British, the only viable option left to Zhang was to seize revenue centers such as Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai and thereby control a greater share of the Customs revenue, as well as the Salt Gabelle.

5 Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism*, 93.

Whilst the Fengtian Clique was trying to secure additional income to fight the war and stabilize the *fengpiao*, the political-military situation not only affected the value of the currency but also the confidence of the Powers and the Chinese towards the Mukden-Beijing regime. The inability of the northern army to hold Shanghai was a fatal blow, as it deprived the north from a steady stream of income that could have boosted the confidence of the people towards Zhang and the *fengpiao*. More important, as most of the trade between China and the other powers was conducted in the South, especially in Shanghai, the Powers and the Chinese Maritime Customs Service quickly turned to the Kuomintang once it was apparent that the north was unable to retake the city. This explained the perpetual financial difficulty of Zhang's Generalissimo Government from 1927 to 1928.

To illustrate Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique's attempt to deal with the financial problem between 1925 and 1928, and the relationship between the *fengpiao* and Fengtian strategy, this chapter first briefly describes the economic contexts of Manchuria, the fall of the *fengpiao*, and its impact. It then discusses the financial difficulties faced by the Fengtian Clique and its attempts to overcome them. It finally analyses the financial implication of the north's inability to hold Shanghai and the Fengtian Clique's failure to use the Customs issue to bring about a negotiated peace in early 1928.

The Fall of the *fengpiao* and Its Effects, 1926-1928

When describing the fall of the *fengpiao* between 1920 and 1928, Gavan McCormack wrote:

...although the Fengtian p'iao [the *fengpiao*] may be described as having weakened or declined through the fluctuation of 1920-1925, the Kuo Sungling (Guo Songling) rebellion marks a watershed, after which it can only be described as collapsing, somewhat in the manner of the French and German currencies after World War I. Early in 1927 it broke the 1,000 mark. By early 1928, it had sunk to 2,000, and 4,000 in February.⁶

Others too have described the fall of the *fengpiao* as one continuous, uncontrolled, and irreversible process that sped up over time.⁷ Before discussing the reasons for the fall, it is instructive to look at the "fall" itself; a closer look

⁶ Gavan McCormack, 193.

⁷ Yang Naikun and Cao Yanxiong, 83.

suggests that the fall was by no means as uncontrollable and irreversible as it appeared.

As mentioned, the *fengpiao* was practically nonconvertible. Its value was not entirely determined by the ability of the issuing banks to exchange the notes for specie. Thus, the immediate effect of the decrease of gold and silver specie held by the State Bank on the *fengpiao*'s price was limited. However, as it was exchangeable with gold yen, it could be affected by the long-term changes in the price of gold and silver. Confidence in the currency, affected by the major events during the war, was of utmost importance. McCormack has pointed out that the performance of the Fengtian currency had close links with the fortune of the Fengtian Army.⁸ The price of the *fengpiao* reflected the people's reaction towards specific events and showed their expectations regarding the future of Zhang Zuolin's regime. Since future trade (14 and 28 days) of *fengpiao* was also available, rumors and speculations also played a major role in the fluctuation of the *fengpiao* during these turbulent years.

Soon after the introduction of the *fengpiao* in the late 1910s, Manchuria and China entered a period of political upheaval. This was reflected in, and led to, the fluctuation of the currency. There were intermittent falls and recoveries of the currency before and after the First and Second Zhili-Fengtian Wars, but the first significant fall occurred during the anti-Fengtian War which started in late 1925, when Sun Chuanfang attacked the Fengtian garrison in Jiangsu and Anhui. In October, the price of the *fengpiao* fell from around 160 yuan (*fengpiao*) to 200 yuan per 100 gold yen. In mid-December, when Guo Songling's troops were approaching Mukden, it reached the unprecedented low of 226 yuan.⁹ After the rebellion, the *fengpiao*'s price stood at around 200,¹⁰ but gradually fell to 430 by the end of May.¹¹ At that time, the Fengtian forces had moved into Northern China again; Wang Yongjiang, the civilian governor who was seen as the man behind the Fengtian Clique's finance, resigned in protest at Zhang Zuolin's decision to continue the war. The fall in value continued, and

⁸ Gavan McCormack, 192. Although McCormack points out the importance of external events on the exchange rate of the *fengpiao*, he does not look at the fluctuation of the *fengpiao* after January of 1926.

⁹ Yoshida sōryōji (Consul General Yoshida), "Manshu dōran no Hōtenhyō, tokusanmotsu ni kyū boseru eikyō to Hōtenhyō no shōrai nikansuru ken (Report on the financial status of Fengtian Province after Guo Songling's rebellion)," 12/1/1926, No. 598, in Gaimushō (ed.) *Nihon gaiko bunsho* (as NGB below), *Showa-ki* (Documents on Japanese foreign policy, Showa era), 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Tokyo, 1988), 564.

¹⁰ Yasutomi Ayumu, 35-6.

¹¹ Yoshida sōryōji, "Hōtenhyō no torihiki jōkyō nikansuru ken (Report on the exchange rate of the *fengpiao*)," 28/5/1927, NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 575.




FIGURE 5.1 *Monthly average exchange rate between fengpiao and 100 gold yen in Mukden, Jan 1926-Jan 1927.*

Source: Kantōchō zaimubu, “Tōsanshō kangingō ron Shōwa yon nen,” JACAR, Ao6033520200, 237-9.

at one point in July the price reached 573 *yuan*.¹² The expectation that the ‘impetuous warlords’ would mismanage the economy contributed to this fall.¹³ Currency speculation was another cause: it was not until Zhang Zuolin imposed a fixed exchange rate and shot several currency exchange dealers working in the Leased Territory in August that the rapid fall was checked. After this, the price stabilized at 400 *yuan* by the end of the year (Fig. 5.1).

The depreciation of the *fengpiao* in 1926 supposedly had a very adverse effect on both the Chinese and the Japanese in Manchuria. Japanese businessmen believed that the shrinking of Chinese purchasing power would lead to a decline in Japanese exports to Manchuria.¹⁴ However, Customs figures from the ports in South Manchuria (Dairen, Niuzhuang, Andong, and Harbin) show that there was a 13% increase in imports, offsetting a slight decrease in the

¹² Kantōchō zaimubu, Tosanshō kangingō ron, slides 237-9.

¹³ Kantō chōkan Kodama Hideo (Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory Kodama), “Kantō chōkan no tai Hötenhyō seiri iken (Opinion on the reorganization of the *fengpiao*),” 2/9/1926, No. 653, NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 663-4.

¹⁴ Yokohama shōkin ginkō tödoriseki tōyōka jichō Watanabe Rei (Watanabe Rei, Deputy Head of the Eastern Asian Bureau, Head Office of the Yokohama Specie Bank), “sho dai 10 gō (Letter no. 10),” NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 601. It should be noted that during this period there was no large-scale arms import to Manchuria.

import of textile products.¹⁵ As for the Chinese, the fall in the *fengpiao*'s value in 1926 mainly affected the lives of those who received fixed wages, such as clerks, factory workers, and soldiers. However, the number of strikes recorded did not increase.¹⁶ In August, an imminent strike of the workers in the Mukden Arsenal was avoided when the authorities agreed to raise salaries by 20–30%; similar measures were introduced throughout Manchuria.¹⁷ The soybean trade was affected minimally. Although the export of raw beans decreased from 54,204,000 HK tael in 1925 to 47,314,000 HK tael in 1926, this decrease was more than compensated for by an increase in the export of bean cakes and oil from 77,078,000 HK tael to 100,833,000 HK tael.¹⁸

The impact of the fall in the first half of 1926 might have been limited, but the value of the *fengpiao* plummeted again towards the end of the year. This falling phase continued until April-May of 1927 and witnessed a price drop from around 400 *yuan* in November of 1926 to 600 *yuan* in January of 1927, then from 600 *yuan* to 1,000 *yuan* from February to May. Unlike the fall in the previous year, which persisted throughout the summer, the fall at this point checked and remained stable. From 7 April to 4 December, the price was never outside the range of 800 *yuan* to 1,200 *yuan* and for most of the time it stayed around 1,000 (see Fig. 5.2). After a brief panic following a northern defeat in late May, the military situation improved; when the *Anguojun* defeated Chiang Kai-shek in Xuzhou in August, the price rose to 800 *yuan*.¹⁹ The relative stability of the north during the war was reflected in the price of the *fengpiao*. Nonetheless, as the northern army was defeated in Longtan, the *fengpiao*'s price soon returned to 1000, and remained stable until December.²⁰

As Keynes had predicted before the First World War, the printing of money in wartime might not immediately lead to uncontrollable inflation. Although the buying power of the *fengpiao* declined, the negative impact was offset by wage increases. By March of 1927, commodity prices had increased by 222% from early 1926, but the average wage of the workers had increased by 268%.²¹

¹⁵ Kaneko Fumio, 314; Yokohama shōkin ginkō tōdoriseki tōyōka jichō Watanabe Rei, "sho dai 10 gō," Watanabe Rei, "sho dai 10 gō," NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 601.

¹⁶ Nishimura Shigeō, 156.

¹⁷ SR, 4/8/1926.

¹⁸ Kaneko Fumio, 315.

¹⁹ Yoshida sōryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 5/8/1927, Gaimushō kiroku (GK), JACAR, Bo8060893700, slide 167.

²⁰ Yoshida sōryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 6/9/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slide 176.

²¹ Yoshida sōryōji, "Hōhyō bōraku toki eikyō hei ni Shinasonoku taisaku (A report on the fall of the *fengpiao*, its effects, and reaction on the Chinese side)," 29/3/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 116-8.

It was not until early 1928 that the rise of commodity prices finally rose above those of wages.²² However, although the currency remained “stable” throughout 1927, it was only one-third of its previous year’s value. As credit decreased, trade declined. From the Customs figures, the five major categories of imported goods (cotton textile, raw cotton, wheat flour, metal, and machinery) declined between 10 and 71%. Imports from Japan declined, and exports became stagnant.²³ The population was unhappy about Zhang’s handling of Manchuria’s finances.²⁴ Nonetheless, compared with the severe economic dislocation in Southern and Central China and famine or near-famine in Hunan, Shandong, and northwestern China, the situation in Manchuria was considerably better. In August of 1927, the British even noted a “slight improvement” in the economic outlook.²⁵ Major John Magruder of the United States’ Army observed in November of 1927:

Coming from the widespread pessimism among businessmen and officials in China Proper, which increases progressively as one goes south, one is immediately struck with the optimism among businessmen, foreign and Chinese, in Mukden. As to the prosperous conditions in Manchuria I heard of no dissenting voice. The atmosphere is infectious with high business adventure comparable to our own West. Even the Chinese masses on the streets look well nourished. Animals have replaced human transport, and the numerous cart animals are noticeably well fed. There is no unemployment in Manchuria [original underline]. The senseless inflation of the *fengpiao* is well known and causes immense difficulties to trade. Everybody condemns the *fengpiao*, but business thrives and men are prosperous in spite of this stupid device for financing Chang Tso-lin’s military venture south of the Wall.²⁶

In contrast to the decline of trade with Japan, trade between China and Manchuria actually increased during these years despite the difficulties. Dependence on Japan declined from 1925 onwards. Trade figures suggested

²² Sai Hōten sōryōji dairi Hachiya Terō, “Hōhyō bōraku toki eikyō hei Shinasoku no taisaku nikansuru ken (A report on the fall of the *fengpiao*, its effects, and reaction on the Chinese side),” 18/2/1928, GK, Bo8060893900, slide 346.

²³ Kaneko Fumio, 315, 317.

²⁴ Captain Malcolm Duncan Kennedy, *The Diaries of Captain Malcolm Duncan Kennedy, 1917–1946*, 20/4/1927, 84. University of Sheffield Library. <http://librarysupport.shef.ac.uk/kennedy_diaries.pdf>.

²⁵ “Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 24/8/1927, F 8095/144/10, FOCP, Vol. 33, 219.

²⁶ “Report on the General Conditions in Manchuria,” 11/1927, USMI, Vol. 4, slide 399.



FIGURE 5.2 Daily exchange rate between fengpiao and 100 gold yen, 4 Jan 1927-29 Dec 1927

Source: Sai Höten söryōji dairi Hachiya, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken (A report on the *fengpiao*'s exchange rate)," 15/1/1927, GK, Bo8060893600, slide 52; Yoshida söryōji, "Hötenhyō sōbahyō sōfu no ken (Attached chart on the *fengpiao*'s exchange rate)," 14/3/1927, GK, Bo8060893600, slides 87-92; Yoshida söryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken (A report on the *fengpiao*'s exchange rate)," 22/4/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 138-41; Yoshida söryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 8/6/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 162-4; Yoshida söryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 4/7/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 165-7; Yoshida söryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 5/8/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 167-9; Yoshida söryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 6/9/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 175-8; Yoshida söryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 5/10/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 191-4; Yoshida söryōji, "Jūgatsu naka Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken (A report on the *fengpiao*'s exchange rate in October)," 5/11/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 198-200; Yoshida söryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 12/12/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 202-4; Yoshida söryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 22/4/1927, GK, Bo8060893700, slides 138-41; Yoshida söryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 16/1/1928, GK, Bo8060893800, slides 235-7.

that whenever Manchuria was at peace with Beijing (or actually controlled it after 1927), the volume of trade between China and Manchuria increased (see Fig. 5.2). Still, since Manchuria traded as much with Japan as with China, the war was not seen as one that could bring benefit to the business community. Because Zhang Zuolin failed to end the war in 1927, the economic situation in Manchuria began to deteriorate.

The real collapse of the *fengpiao* happened between December of 1927 and early 1928, when the war was entering its final stage. The first three exchange days in 1928 witnessed the fall of the currency from 1,360 *yuan* per 100 yen to an unprecedented low of 2,000 *yuan*: it then stayed at 2,000 for the rest of the month, and plunged to over 3,000 in early February.

The impact of the collapse of the *fengpiao* in early 1928 on the lives of the Chinese in Manchuria was profound. This time, the sudden decline in purchasing power did not correspond with wage increases. Food prices tripled once more, but this time in less than a month (Fig. 5.3).²⁷ People refused to use the *fengpiao* for daily transactions and turned either to the *yinyuan* or gold yen, both of which were forbidden by the government for transactions.²⁸ With limited credit, trade was brought to a halt.²⁹ As many as 700 shops, most of them small businesses, went bankrupt between January and February, and as many as 5,000 shops suspended their businesses.³⁰ Most importantly, this time the peasants could not bear the fall. In early 1928 it had a limited effect on large enterprises as they had stockpiled *yinyuan* or gold yen beforehand, but small businesses and peasants had little means to weather the storm.³¹ Rural unrest became more apparent from January onwards, and the Small Swords Society (*xiaodaohui*) emerged.³² The most serious incident of all was the mutiny of a company of Heilongjiang cavalrymen in March because of the drastic fall in their real wages.³³ These disturbances were not serious enough to bring down

-
- 27 Sai Kairyū bunkan shunin Banni (Branch Officer of Hailong Bannai) "Hōhyō bōraku ni tomofu eikyō nikansuru ken (A report on the effect of the fall of the *fengpiao*)," 20/1/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slides 243-4; Sai Tsūka bunkan shunin Abe (Branch Officer of Tonghua Abe) "Hōhyō bōraku to Tsūka sōjō no eikyō nikansuru ken (A report on the fall of the *fengpiao* and the effects of disturbance in Tunghua)," 3/2/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slide 273.
- 28 Sai Gyūsō ryōji Kishida (Consul Kishida of Niuzhuang) "Hōtenhyō bōraku nikansuru ken (A report on the fall of the *fengpiao*)," 28/1/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slide 249.
- 29 Sai Tetsurei ryōji Tanaka (Consul Tanaka of Tieling) "Hōtenhyō sanraku eikyō nikansuru ken (A report on the effect of the fall of the *fengpiao*)," 3/2/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slide 281.
- 30 Sai Hōten sōryōji dairi Hachiya "dai 105 gō," 10/2/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893900, slide 310; Rana Mitter, *The Manchuria Myth*, 36.
- 31 Hōten kōshochō Kamata (Head of Mukden Branch Office of the South Manchuria Railway Kamata), "Kyūsei zengo ni otekuru Hōhyō bōraku no eikyō (The effect of the fall of the *fengpiao* since last year)," GK, JACAR, Bo8060893900, slide 320.
- 32 Sai Hōten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "dai 43 gō," 18/1/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slide 241; Hu Yuhai, Li Rong, *Fengxijunfa dashiji* (Shenyang, 2005), 463-7. Rural poverty allowed the Chinese Communist Party to seize the chance to stir up disturbances. After several punitive expeditions against the Small Swords Society, on May 1st, the Party instructed the communists in Manchuria to abandon the attempt to use the Small Swords Society to seize power in Manchuria. See Hu Yuhai, Li Rong, 472.
- 33 Sai Hōten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "Hōhyō bōraku toki eikyō hei Shinasoku no taisaku nikansuru ken," 18/2/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893900, slide 349.



FIGURE 5.3 Daily exchange rate between fengpiao and 100 gold yen, 1 Dec 1927-30 Jun 1928

Source: Yoshida sōryōji, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 16/1/1928, GK, Bo8060893800, slides 235-7; Sai Höten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 17/2/1928, GK, Bo8060893900, slides 336-8; Sai Höten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 13/3/1928, GK, Bo8060893900, slides 372-4; Sai Höten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 13/4/1928, GK, Bo8060893900, slides 402-5; Sai Höten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 10/5/1928, GK, Bo8060894000, slides 423-6; Sai Höten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 12/6/1928, GK, Bo8060894000, slides 430-3; Sai Höten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "Hōhyō sōba nikansuru ken," 9/7/1928, GK, Bo8060894000, slides 451-4.




FIGURE 5.4 daily exchange rate between fengpiao and 100 gold yen, 4 Dec 1926-30 Jun 1928

Source: From Fig. 5.1-5.3.

the Fengtian Clique, but they certainly undermined Zhang's claim to be a stabilizing force in Northern China and Manchuria.

In sum, the *fengpiao* experienced four slumps: January–August of 1926, December–April of 1927, December–February of 1928, and throughout the first half of 1929 (Figure 5.4). Although in general the *fengpiao* was undoubtedly falling, it was not a continuous fall. A similar pattern can also be identified in the falls during these years. Major falls started at the end of each year, and then the price would stabilize throughout the following year. This suggests that the Fengtian Clique's measures to control the price of the currency did not fail entirely. This pattern also had much to do with the trade pattern of Manchuria and with the Fengtian Clique's financial mobilization for war to be discussed below.

Financial Limitations Faced by the Fengtian Clique

The fall of the *fengpiao* has been attributed to the “unrestricted issuing” (*lanfa* in Chinese, *ranhatsu* in Japanese), which became a catchphrase for the misrule of warlords. However, few looked at the financial situation faced by Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique before the war. It was because those who studied the issue, including many contemporaries, assumed that without Zhang's military build-up and his ventures in China Proper, a healthy economy could have been built in Manchuria. This view was famously held by the governor of Fengtian, Wang Yongjiang, who argued that Manchuria should dissociate itself from China Proper and concentrate on economic development.³⁴ This section argues that such a view wrongly detached the economic issue from political and international relations and that it was the difficult financial situation in Manchuria that prompted Zhang to seek more revenue from outside.

Limited Internal Revenue and High Expenditure

As the previous chapters point out, to deal with internal and external threats, the Fengtian Clique had to maintain a high level of military build-up that Manchuria and the area under the north's control found difficult to sustain. It was unrealistic to discount the threats and focus on economic development: for example, in late 1925, Guo Songling rebelled and invaded Manchuria; during the war, the Soviets aided both Feng and Guo and threatened Northern Manchuria.

34 For a discussion of the tension between Wang Yongjiang and Zhang Zuolin, see Ronald Suleski, *Civil Government in Warlord China*.

TABLE 5.1 *Estimated annual income of Fengtian Province, 1926 in fengpiao and yinyuan*

Internal Income (including Land Tax, Combined Tax, Miscellaneous Tax, Income of Official Enterprises, fines, and additional miscellaneous taxes)	36,671,300 (10,447,140)
Salt Tax	42,000,000 (12,000,000)
Railway Income	16,800,000 (4,800,000)
Income from China Proper (mainly the tax income of the prefectures in Northern Zhili)	6,000,000 (1,714,285)
Bonds	50,000,000 (14,285,714)
Total	151,471,300 (43,277,514)

Note: Exchange rate 1 *yinyuan* to 3.5 *fengpiao*

Source: Kantōchō zaimubu (Financial Section, Kwantung Leased Territory), "Hōtenshō zaisei no genjō (The Current State of Fengtian Province's Finance)," 3/1927, GK, JACAR, B02031788000, slides 12-32.

Obtaining precise figures for the revenue of Manchuria is difficult as Mukden's budget was kept secret after 1923.³⁵ Moreover, most of the statistics were recorded in *fengpiao*, which witnessed a drastic fall throughout this period. Based on multiple sources and rough evaluations, the Financial Section of the Kwantung Territory authority estimated the regular income of the Fengtian Province in 1926 as 101.47 million *fengpiao*, or 29 million *yinyuan* using the exchange rate of October-November of 1926 (1:3.5). Another 50 million should be added as the Fengtian Clique issued a bond to "recollect" *fengpiao*. The total income of the Fengtian province was 151,471,300 *fengpiao*, or 43,277,514 *yinyuan* (Table 5.1). The estimated expenditure, including the wars in 1925 and Guo Songling's rebellion, was 145.07 million *fengpiao* or, 41.45 million *yinyuan* (Table 5.2).³⁶

The statistics of the State Bank show that its total draft for military expenditures in 1926 was considerably larger, between 52 and 73.6 million *yinyuan*.³⁷ The figure for 1927 was between 581 million and 1.2 billion *fengpiao*, or 93 to 193

35 Kantōchō zaimubu (Financial Section, Kwantung Leased Territory), "Hōtenshō zaisei no genjō (The Current State of Fengtian Province's Finance)," 3/1927, GK, JACAR, B02031788000, slide 10.

36 Kantōchō zaimubu, "Hōtenshō zaisei no genjō," slides 12-32.

37 The number of *yinyuan* was calculated according to the official rate of 0.8:1 between the *fengpiao* and *yinyuan* in 1926 and 0.16:1 in 1927. Although the State Bank did not keep precise figures for expenditure, the researcher of the Financial Section of the Kwantung Government suggested that since all expenditure and drafts went through the State Bank,

TABLE 5.2 *Estimated annual expenditure of Fengtian Province, 1926 in fengpiao and yinyuan*

Military Expenditure:	
1. Infantry (45 regiments)	30,240,000
2. Bodyguards (1 Battalion)	224,000
3. Cavalry (8 regiments)	8,820,000
4. Cavalry Raider (3 regiments)	337,500
5. Artillery (8 regiments)	7,756,000
6. Engineers (6 battalions)	1,344,000
7. Logistics (5 battalions)	1,344,000
8. Communications (1 brigade)	1,344,000
9. Auxiliary	1,000,000
10. Fengtian Arsenal	24,000,000
11. Flying Corps	14,000,000
12. Navy	1,200,000
13. Zhang Zuolin's headquarters	1,723,329
14. Fengtian Military Clothing Factory	1,441,412
15. Fengtian Military Ration Factory	3,692,948
16. Military Police, Fengtian Military Academy and others	608,653
17. Special Budget for war from late 1925 to mid-1926	35,000,000
Military Total	137,040,000 (39,154,285)
Administrative Expenditure	8,030,000 (2,294,285)
Total	145,070,000 (41,448,571)

Note: Exchange rate 1 *yinyuan* to 3.5 *fengpiao*

Source: Kantōchō zaimubu (Financial Section, Kwantung Leased Territory), “Hōtenshō zaisei no genjō (The Current State of Fengtian Province's Finance),” 3/1927, GK, JACAR, B02031788000, slides 12–32.

million *yinyuan*. Since the end of the year debt was much smaller than the total processed drafts, much of the draft during the year of 1927 was repaid, particularly those pertaining to the Arsenal.³⁸ According to the figures presented by the Financial Reorganization Committee in 1929, the military expenditure of the province in 1927 was 663 million *fengpiao* (87.4 per cent of

the actual expenditure must lie between the end of year total draft and total processed draft. See Kantōchō zaimubu, “Tōsanshō kangingō ron,” 337.

³⁸ Ibid., 355, 366.

TABLE 5.3 *Estimated expenditure of the Fengtian Field Forces in China based on its strength in November 1927 in fengpiao and yinyuan*

Infantry (96 regiments)	64,512,000
Cavalry (31 regiments)	34,875,000
Artillery (23 regiments)	22,298,500
Tank (4 regiments)	3,878,000
Engineers (28 battalions)	6,272,000
Logistics (27 battalions)	6,048,000
Heavy Weapons (7 battalions)	1,568,000
Communications (1 brigade)	1,344,000
Automobiles (1 battalion)	224,000
Bodyguards (4 battalions)	896,000
Flying Corps	14,000,000
Navy	1,200,000
Total	157,115,500 (44,890,123)

Note: Exchange rate 1 *yinyuan* to 3.5 *fengpiao*

Source: "Hoku Shina guntai chōsa ni ken (Investigation of the Northern Chinese Army)," 20/1/1928, JACAR, C01007465200, slides 20–31.

the total expenditure), or 106 million *yinyuan*.³⁹ The yearly upkeep of the Fengtian forces in China (including the Jilin and Heilongjiang contingents) was around 45 million *yinyuan*, almost the same as the income of the entire Fengtian Province in 1927 (Table 5.3). The rest of the military spending went to the Fengtian forces staying in Manchuria, the Mukden Arsenal (spending between 7 and 55 million *yinyuan*, close to the latter figure), the *Anguojun*'s navy, Beijing's Metropolitan Police and Gendarmes, and Zhang's allies in China.⁴⁰ As a result, the debt increased steadily from 274 million to 1.1 billion *fengpiao* between March of 1926 and January of 1928.⁴¹ This figure should be viewed with caution, as it does not take into account the fall of the *fengpiao*. In sum, it is safe to conclude that in late 1927 the military expenditures of Fengtian Province at least doubled from early 1926, and the Fengtian Clique was able to cover less than half the cost of the war by its normal income.

39 Kaneko Fumio, 502. See Hōten kōshochō Kamata, "Hōhyō zanraku toki gen'in – tokumu kikan jōhō (The cause of the fall of the *fengpiao* – from the intelligence service)," 14/1/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slide 226.

40 According to Sun, he received 800,000 *yuan* per month for this army. See SR, 20/7/1927.

41 Nishimura Shigeō, 154.

TABLE 5.4 *Annual income of the Shandong Province, Apr 1926 to Mar 1927 in yinyuan*

Internal Income (including Land Tax, Combined Tax, Miscellaneous Taxes, Income of Official Enterprises, Fines and Additional Miscellaneous Taxes)	19,370,000
Salt Tax (Not mentioned, but probably used to pay for the war)	
Others	4,930,000
Total	24,300,000

Source: Sai Sainan sōryōji Fujita (1927). Santōshō zaisei jōkyō hōkoku no ken, 10/6/1927, GK, JACAR, B02031840700, slides 138–9.

The exact military expenditure on the entire *Anguojun* is almost impossible to estimate since the records are patchy. The other two provinces in Manchuria were much smaller and less committed to the war: Jilin's annual income in 1929 was 18.8 million *yinyuan*, whereas its military expenditure was 10 million; military spending in 1929 was probably lower than the previous two years. In Heilongjiang, annual military expenditure was 6.3 million Harbin *dayang* (*hadayang*) in 1926.⁴² In contrast, Shandong was overburdened (Table 5.4). The income of Shandong between April of 1926 and March of 1927 was 24 million *yinyuan*, but 20 million were spent on the war.⁴³ In comparison, the South was financially better off as the southern provinces were far richer. Guangdong province alone was able to yield 79.2 million *yinyuan* between November of 1925 and October of 1926.⁴⁴

Decline of the Value of Silver

Since the *fengpiao* was convertible in theory, its exchange rate with gold-based currencies such as the Bank of Korea's yen was affected by the international silver price, which steadily declined after the First World War. Backed by silver, the *fengpiao*'s value was *unusually high* when it was introduced as a result of

⁴² Shimizu ryōji, "Kokuryūkōshō minkoku jūgo nendo kokuka saishutsu yosanhyō tatsunoken (The report on submitting the National Budget of the Heilongjiang Province in the 15th Year of the Republic)," 22/3/1927; Consul Shimizu, "Minkoku jūhachi, kyū nendo kitsurinshō saishutsu yosangaku (Estimates of the expenditure of the Jilin Province in the 18th and 19th Year of the Republic)," 10/4/1931, GK, JACAR, B02031787900, slides 7, 40–1.

⁴³ Sai Sainan (Jinan) sōryōji Fujita, "Santōshō zaisei jōkyō hōkoku no ken (The financial situation of Shandong Province)," 10/6/1927, GK, JACAR, B02031840700, slides 138–9.

⁴⁴ Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China*, 91.

TABLE 5.5 *Yearly average exchange rate between kinds of fengpiao and 100 gold yen, 1914–1924*

Year	Index	
1917	101	Introduction of <i>huiduiquan</i>
1918	97	
1919	93	
1920	100	Zhi-Anfu War
1921	139	
1922	135	First Zhi-Feng War
1923	138	
1924	168	Second Zhi-Feng War

TABLE 5.6 *Year average silver price in New York, 1920–1928 (US Dollar per 1 oz)*

Year	Price
1920	1.01940
1921	0.63096
1922	0.67934
1923	0.65239
1924	0.67111
1925	0.69406
1926	0.62428
1927	0.56680
1928	0.58488

Source: Nishimura Shigeō, 154.

the high silver price during the First World War.⁴⁵ Thus, its value stood on par with the gold yen in the first few years of its circulation (Tables 5.5 and 5.6):

After the war, the silver price dropped, and consequently so did the exchange rate of the *fengpiao*. The silver price fell around 30% from 1919 to 1920, and continued to decline throughout the 1920s. This partly explains the depreciation of the *fengpiao* between 1920 and 1930. Although the silver price remained

45 Shiroyama Tomoko, *China during the Great Depression: Market, State, and the World Economy, 1929–1937* (Cambridge, 2008), 33.

stable from 1921 to 1925, it fell by 40% from August of 1925 to August of 1926, the period when the *fengpiao* experienced its first crisis of confidence.⁴⁶ Thus, besides the anti-Fengtian War, the fall in the price of silver was another cause for the fall of the *fengpiao* during 1925–1926.

Japanese and Russian Presence and Their Financial Policies in Manchuria

Foreign presence in Manchuria, particularly Japanese activities, inevitably affected the *fengpiao*. When its value dropped rapidly after 1926, the Japanese in Manchuria encouraged the use of gold yen. As early as mid-1926, the Consul General of Fengtian, Yoshida Shigeru, openly claimed that it had already lost any credibility.⁴⁷ The Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Fengtian was a strong advocate of a positive policy in Manchuria as well as of the use of gold yen.⁴⁸ In 1927, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Manchuria urged the Japanese government to establish a central bank in Manchuria.⁴⁹ The Japanese currencies undoubtedly weakened the authority of the *fengpiao* as they provided readily available replacements. As Governor Liu Shangqing complained to the British Minister to China, Sir Miles Lampson, the reason why the *fengpiao* could not recover like the Franc was because the French did not have to deal with a competing currency like the gold yen.⁵⁰ The Chinese accused the Japanese of circulating rumors to undermine the stability of the *fengpiao* and of engaging in speculation.⁵¹ During this period, currency speculation was

46 Kantō chōkan Kodama Hideo, "Kantō chōkan no tai Hōtenhyō seiri iken," 2/9/1926, No. 653, NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 665.

47 Yoshida sōryōji, "Hōtenhyō geraku heibini Chūkokusaku no taisaku nikansuru ken (The fall of the *fengpiao* and the Chinese reaction)," 12/8/1926, No. 624, NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 632.

48 Ioridani Hōten shogikaitō (Head of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Fengtian Ioridani), "Hōtenhyō mondai taisakuan (Plans to react to the the *fengpiao* problem)," 13/9/1927, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893700, slide 181; The Association of the Japanese Residents in Manchuria also advocated the use of gold yen. See The Association of the Japanese Residents in Manchuria, "Sengen (Declaration)," 27/8/1927, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893700, slide 187.

49 Yoshida sōryōji, "Manshu kin'yu seido heini seisaku kaizen nikanshi yōsei no ken (Financial system in Manchuria and improvement of the government's policy)," 18/5/1927, NGB, Vol. 1, 613.

50 "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 21/1/1928, in FOCP, Part II, Series E, Vol. 34, 209.

51 "A Review of the Past and present Policy of Japan in South Manchuria," in "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 21/2/1928, FOCP, Vol. 34, 346.

rampant, particularly after Japan had issued Earthquake Bonds; much of this money went into circulation in Manchuria and Shanghai.⁵²

The *fengpiao* issue was also closely linked to the reorganization of international finance during the 1920s. As the United States became the largest creditor and holder of gold specie after the First World War, American financiers, such as Thomas Lamont, were determined to take advantage of their situation to restructure international finance. Japan too, benefited from the Great War, and financial bureaucrats such as Inoue Junnosuke wanted to emulate the Americans in East Asia and tried to use Japan's gold reserve to expand Japanese influence in China. In 1919, the Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo envisaged a plan of lending a gigantic loan of 500–600 million yen to China to dominate the country economically.⁵³ The plan did not materialize because of the post-war financial situation, but the plan was not entirely abandoned.

In late 1926, a similar idea on a smaller scale was put forward and endorsed by diplomats, such as Yoshida Shigeru and Kimura Eiichi, the head of the Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Similar to J.P. Morgan's scheme in the European countries such as Italy, the Japanese would lend money to the Chinese to reorganize their finances. In exchange, a central bank would be established in Manchuria 'with Japanese involvement' and Japanese financial experts would participate in the reform.⁵⁴ Zhang Zuolin rejected the plan, as he feared this would facilitate more Japanese influence in Manchuria.

Japan's intermittent attempts to return to the Gold Standard also affected the financial stability of Manchuria. As a result, from 1924 to late 1925 the value of the Japanese Yen increased by 25%, and continued to rise throughout 1926.⁵⁵ As the gold yen issued by the Bank of Korea was converted to Japanese Yen in Dairen on a 1 to 1 basis,⁵⁶ the rise of the Japanese yen inevitably contributed to the fall of the *fengpiao*. Japan's exports to Manchuria suffered as a result of the government's strong-yen policy, which in turn exacerbated the banks' bad debt problem since the enterprises were losing money. This resulting financial disruption threatened to burst the economic bubble built up in

⁵² Yasutomi Ayumu, *Manshūkoku no kinyū*, 38. According to Yasutomi, in early 1926, expecting the silver price to fall, the YSB branch in Shanghai bought large amounts of the British Pound, Yen, and US Dollar, so that when the price of silver did fall, the branch profited much from it. Later in the year when the Yen's price was falling the branch again bought up a large amount of Yen using the profit from the previous speculation.

⁵³ Mark Metzler, *Lever of Empire*, 123-4, 164.

⁵⁴ "Shina jikyoku to shi ka taisaku nikansuru ken (Report on responses to the situation in China)," 26/11/1926, GK, JACAR, Bo2031895100, slides 233, 238-9.

⁵⁵ Mark Metzler, 158.

⁵⁶ Yasutomi Ayumu, 36.

Manchuria during the First World War and explained the eagerness of the Japanese in Manchuria to replace the *fengpiao* with Japanese currencies.

After all, the Japanese and Russian presence deprived the Manchurian authority of a large part of the income that could have been used to stabilize the *fengpiao*. Zhang Zuolin could not tap the revenue of the SMR and CER, tax the Japanese businesses in the railway zone, or raise loans from Dairen's Customs revenues. He could not effectively punish the speculators who found refuge in the railway zone; Chinese businessmen also set up branches in the railway zones in order to evade taxes.⁵⁷ Despite Mukden's continuous urge to close it, the Japanese exchange house in the railway zone became a hub of currency speculation, with its volume of trade exceeding a million *yuan* a day.⁵⁸ Although the Fengtian Clique expected to use the Customs surtax income to stabilize the *fengpiao*, this was never available (discussed in detail below).⁵⁹ Unlike the Kuomintang in the South, it was impossible for Zhang to take overt action against Japan or Russia, which were both willing and able to completely take over Manchuria. Although it was difficult to substantiate the Chinese accusation that the Japanese had systematically plotted to bring down the *fengpiao*, the very fact that Japanese currencies were circulated in Manchuria had certainly undermined the people's confidence in the *fengpiao*.

Bankruptcy of the Central Government

When the Fengtian Clique controlled the Beijing Government, the latter was close to bankruptcy. The long-term causes for the financial problems of the Beijing Government during the mid-1920s were the decline of its authority since the late Qing period and the Powers' unwillingness to lend money to it during the 1920s. After the defeat of the Sino-Japanese War, the Qing Government had to pay 200 million taels to Japan as indemnities. Many of these indemnities were paid by Russian and French loans of extended period. As the Qing was defeated again during the Boxer War of 1899-1900, it had to pay the Powers one billion taels (or 67,000,000 Pounds) over the next 39 years. During the 1911 Revolution, the diplomatic corps seized the Customs revenue and used it to secure the indemnities and other foreign loans. Although there

⁵⁷ "A Review of the Past and present Policy of Japan in South Manchuria," in "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 21/2/1928, FOCP, Vol. 34, 346; "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 24/6/1927, F 6980/2/10, FOCP, Vol. 33, 130.

⁵⁸ SR, 20/1/1927.

⁵⁹ "Hōtenha no Hōtenhyō seiri keikaku no gaiyō (An overview of the Fengtian Clique's plan to adjust the *fengpiao*)," 6/1927, The Gazette of the Chamber of Commerce in Dairen, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893700, slide 157.

were moratoria on payments during WWI and some countries handed back the Boxer Indemnity, countries like France insisted to demand payment. In 1913, Yuan Shikai borrowed another 25,000,000 Pounds from the consortium of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan when he tried to revive a strong central government.⁶⁰ This loan was to be secured by the Customs and Salt revenues.

During the First World War, expansion of China's international trade and the rise in the price of silver improved China's ability to borrow. This led to another wave of large-scale foreign loans. Between 1917 and 1918, the Beijing Government under the control of Yuan's successor Duan Qirui borrowed 185 million yen from the Japanese (known as the Nishihara Loan), although they were not secured by Customs or Salt revenues, they were secured by the revenue or rights of various railway, resources production and utilities in North China and Manchuria.⁶¹ However, the Nishihara Loan alarmed Britain and America, and the post-war global economic stagnation prevented China to borrow more. As Mark Metzler suggested, after the Washington Conference in 1921 the Powers actually imposed a loan embargo on the Beijing Government.⁶² When the Zhili Clique was in control of the Beijing Government during the early 1920s, it could no longer secure large foreign loans.⁶³ By then, most of the Customs and Salt revenue were used to service the foreign loans, while sources of revenue from the provinces were not available as the authority of the central government declined.

As the result, successive governments used various sources of revenue to float internal bonds and loans. For example, the Minister of Finance Liang Shiyi created a set of bonds amounting to 96 million *yuan*, secured entirely by Salt Gabelle, in 1921 (thus it was called "the 96 Bond," *jiuliu gongzhai*).⁶⁴ These bonds could be bought and sold at stock markets, and their value reflected the people's confidence towards a particular government. When Feng Yuxiang was in control of the Beijing Government in 1925, he too tried to use the Salt revenue to borrow money. By the end of 1925, the domestic debt of the Beijing Government amounted to 680 million *yinyuan*, many of them unsecured, others secured by the Boxer Indemnity remittances, Salt Gabelle, or "Customs

60 Roberta Dayer, *Bankers and Diplomats in China* (London, 1981), 8-9, 12, 23-6.

61 Xu Yi, *Cong bainian quru dao minzhu fuxing: Beiyang waizaiyu xinhai geming de chengbai* (Beijing, 2006), 96-9.

62 Mark Metzler, 127.

63 Ibid., 111, 122; Mo Jianlai, *Wanxi junfa tongzhi shigao* (Tianjin, 2004), 145-57.

64 Zhang Qixiang, "Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de jiuliu gongzai shuping," in *Shixue yuekan* (2005), No. 6.

surplus" (the tariff revenue available to the government after repaying the foreign loans, called *guanyu* in Chinese).⁶⁵

The Fengtian Clique's Attempts to Overcome Financial Difficulties

In the face of a volatile financial situation that the Fengtian Clique could hardly control, the Clique attempted to increase tax revenue in Manchuria, issue internal bonds, borrow internationally, and seize areas and institutions that had a steady income. In essence, Zhang and the Fengtian Clique risked the stability of the *fengpiao* to support a war that had the potential to solve their financial problems in Beijing and Manchuria. In the second half of 1927, they were close to success, but the failure to end the war forced them to continue a policy that was detrimental to the confidence in the *fengpiao*. Despite the difficulties, however, the financial mobilization of the Fengtian Clique worked until early 1928.

Issuing fengpiao

Narratives on the *fengpiao* usually focused on "the problem of unrestricted issuing"; some even suggesting that it was the "worst example of convertible notes."⁶⁶ There was no consensus among contemporaries as to how many *fengpiao* were actually issued during these years. In March of 1926, the head of the Bank of Korea reported to Tokyo that there were as many as 400 million *fengpiao* being circulated after Guo Songling's rebellion, compared with less than 200 million the previous year.⁶⁷ He had no concrete proof of his estimation except his distrust towards the Chinese official statistics. Contemporary estimations based on exchange rate, issue number on the banknotes, and the projected expenditure of the provincial government produced figures from 300 million to a staggering 2.8 billion between 1925 and 1928.⁶⁸

According to the statistics obtained from the Eastern Three Provinces State Bank, the Financial Section of the Kwantung Leased Territory confirmed in 1929 that the actual amount of *fengpiao* issued was much less than was

65 Pan Guoqi, "Beiyang zhengfu shiqi guonei gongzhai zong-e ji qi zuoyong pingxi," in *Jindaishi yanjiu* (2007), No. 1, 78.

66 Quotation from Kaneko Fumio, 502.

67 Chōsen ginkō sōsai Suzuki Shimakichi (The Head of Bank of Korea, Suzuki Shimakichi), "Hōtenhyō no torihiki jōkyō nikansuru ken (Report on the exchange rate of the *fengpiao*)," 5/3/1926, NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 568.

68 Kantōchō zaimubu, "Tōsanshō kangingō ron," slides 205-20; Nishimura Shigeō, *Chūgoku kindai Tohoku chūkishi kenkyū*, 152.

estimated between 1926 and 1928, especially in 1926. Whereas the head of the Bank of Korea claimed that the Chinese had issued over 400 million, the Financial Section quoted a figure of 181 million. The Financial Reorganization Committee of the Eastern Three Provinces (*dongsansheng caizheng zhengli weiyuanhui*), organized by the Chinese in 1929 to settle the *fengpiao* issue, suggested a slightly higher figure (208 million in March 1926).⁶⁹ The same committee suggested that the amount of *fengpiao* issued by the State Bank reached 325 million in January of 1927.⁷⁰ Whilst the Kwantung Government stated 338 million as the figure for the end of 1927, the Reorganization Committee's figure for January of 1928 was 470 million. The disparity could only be explained by the increase of the *fengpiao* issued by the end of each year; this largely matched the pattern of the fall of the *fengpiao* presented above.

Although it can be safely assumed that the printing of the *fengpiao* was the cause of its fall, it does not entirely explain the persistent fall in the summer of 1926, the rise and fall during a large part of 1927, its general downward trend since the early 1920s, and the intense fluctuations overall during this period. The relationship between the *fengpiao*'s printing and the Fengtian Clique's financial mobilization for the war also needs to be clarified.

Increasing Tax and Manipulating Currencies

To sustain the war, the Fengtian Clique employed various ways to raise money in the area under its control. In Manchuria, the proportion of composition tax (tax other than land tax) in Fengtian Province's revenue increased from 41% in 1925 to 64.8% in 1927, showing a large increase in taxation on goods and services.⁷¹ In late 1927, Mukden even abandoned the ban on opium in the Three Provinces and Rehe.⁷²

The allegation that the northern warlords simply printed money to pay for the war was not without substance. As early as in the Zhili-Anfu War in 1920, Fengtian troops carried with them new banknotes specially to be used outside Manchuria.⁷³ Since these notes could not be used in Manchuria and its exchange with *yinyuan* was limited, they had little impact on the value of the

69 Kantōchō zaimubu, "Tōsanshō kangingō ron," slides 221-5; Nishimura Shigeō, 154.

70 Nishimura Shigeō, 154; Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, 195.

71 Nishimura Shigeō, *Chūgoku kindai Tohoku chiikishi kenkyū*, 148; Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, 196.

72 Gavan McCormack, 197.

73 Kantōchō zaimubu, "Tōsanshō kangingō ron," 156.

fengpiao (huiduiquan). Still, their issue undoubtedly affected the overall confidence in the *fengpiao* and stained the image of the Fengtian warlords.

As the warlords clearly understood the damage of these *ad hoc* measures to their reputation, they made considerable efforts to reclaim these notes. Since military scrip was unwelcomed by civilians and soldiers alike, the idea of printing them to cover the cost of war was not feasible. The warlords only saw military scrip as an emergency measure and a necessary evil to shift the cost of war to the neighbouring provinces. Throughout 1926, Zhang Zongchang recollect ed and burned much of the military scrip circulating in Zhili and Shandong; the Fengtian forces also had to allow the exchange of *fengpiao* in order not to alienate the population.⁷⁴ However, military scrip was never abandoned as there were no alternatives. For example, when Zhang Zongchang reinforced Sun Chuanfang in Jiangsu in late 1926, 10 million *yuan* in military notes were issued.⁷⁵

To an extent, Zhang Zuolin's subordinates in Zhili and Shandong did see money-printing as a means to cover the cost of the war. Zhang Zongchang had issued over 23 million banknotes of the Shandong Provincial Bank by mid-1927, and he issued another 15 million bonds.⁷⁶ As these currencies were more sensitive to the changing military situation, their collapse was as much the result of the political-military failure of the northern warlords as it was of overprinting. When Shandong was largely cleared of NRA and KMC troops in September of 1927, the price of the Shandong banknotes was almost on a par with *yinyuan*.⁷⁷ When the military situation deteriorated again in early 1928, the price suddenly decreased by 60%, effectively bringing an end to their value in commercial activities.⁷⁸

Although the Fengtian Clique was also compelled to print money to ease its financial problem, the scheme was carried out carefully to maximize gain and minimize economic disruption. The practice of using the bean trade to fund the war and stabilize the *fengpiao* started as early as 1920 and increased significantly between 1926 and 1929.⁷⁹ By the end of each year, the State Bank printed new banknotes to buy future produce from the peasants through both official and private dealers, who in turn sold the produce to Japanese exporters in

74 SR, 27/5/1926; 30/5/1926; 2/6/1926; 12/6/1926; 14/6/1926; 16/6/1926; 17/6/1926, 7; SR, 31/12/1926.

75 SR, 11/12/1926; 13/1/1927; 9/6/1927; 24/6/1927; 29/6/1927; 28/7/1927; 22/8/1927.

76 Su Quanyou, *Zhang Zongchang quanzhuan*, 165, 171.

77 SR, 1/9/1927.

78 "Acting Consul-General J.B. Affleck to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 27/3/1928, F2266/22/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 389.

79 Kantōchō zaimubu, "Tōsanshō kangingō ron," slide. 323.

Dairen in exchange for Bank of Korea gold yen, *yinyuan*, or YSB silver notes. Mukden then used the revenue to pay for the war or to re-collect the depreciated *fengpiao*. For example, from mid-January to early March of 1927, Mukden allowed an exchange of *fengpiao*, *yinyuan*, and gold yen on a limited scale, and this immediately led to a rise in the price of *fengpiao*.⁸⁰ However, as only part of the revenue was used to stabilize the *fengpiao* and the rest went to Zhang's war chest, the fall continued.⁸¹

By issuing new notes, manipulating commodity trade in Manchuria, and allowing controlled depreciation, Mukden was levying a kind of indirect tax from the Chinese in Manchuria. This method also allowed the state to expand its control over the economy through the State Bank. Mukden's measures also forced the Japanese to pay for its war as long as they needed raw material from Manchuria. Unlike the British during the American Civil War, who found an alternative source of cotton to those of the Confederate States, the Japanese could not find an alternative source of soybeans. Even the Japanese observers from the Financial Department of the Kwantung Leased Territory (*kantōchō*) admitted that Mukden's method was "rational" and "effective."⁸² In fact, the Fengtian leaders had little choice—blindly printing money or forcing the banking community to accept bonds would have backfired. It was impossible for Zhang to cover his debts by printing money even if he wanted, as the people in Manchuria could switch to other currencies, as they had done in 1928 despite the government's threat of punishment.

Throughout the war, Mukden tried to control the fall of the *fengpiao* by measures ranging from raising bonds to executing speculators. When the *fengpiao* fell substantially in 1926, Mukden blamed the "speculators" operating in the SMR zone and had several of them arrested and shot. This move soured Mukden-Tokyo relations; Japanese Consulate-General in Mukden, Yoshida Shigeru, accused Zhang of perpetuating a "reign of terror."⁸³ Zhang also issued a bond of 50 million in mid-1926 in Manchuria, ostensibly in order to "reorganize" the *fengpiao*. Although 70% of the bonds were purchased (many under compulsion), a large portion of the funds collected was used to fund war.⁸⁴ The government also forbade the use of *yinyuan* and gold yen for transactions

⁸⁰ SR, 17/1/1927; 19/1/1926; 8/3/1927.

⁸¹ Kantōchō zaimubu, "Tōsanshō kangingō ron," slide 325; "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 21/1/1928, F 1085/50/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 209.

⁸² Kantōchō zaimubu, "Tōsanshō kangingō ron," slide 325.

⁸³ Yoshida sōryōji, "dai 247 gō," 22/8/1926, NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 645; Yoshida sōryōji, "dai 257 gō," 28/8/1926, NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 655; Kantōchō zaimubu, "Tōsanshō kangingō ron," slide, 231.

⁸⁴ Kantōchō zaimubu, "Tōsanshō kangingō ron," slide 283.

and private exchange, but the Japanese, who believed that the Chinese were trying to drive their currency out of Manchuria, opposed the ban.⁸⁵

In late 1927 to early 1928, *fengpiao* was sacrificed in a gamble to achieve the grand-strategic goal of the Fengtian Clique, when the Fengtian leadership tried to muster all available resources for the campaign of 1928. Their confidence in their ability to obtain money from China Proper was shown by Zhang's promise in February of 1928 to limit Fengtian Province's military expenditures to 30 million *yinyuan* (one-third of the figure in 1927), or 50 million *yinyuan* in total for the Eastern Three Provinces. Zhang also promised to detach Manchuria financially from North China, as he expected that if the 1928 campaign were successful, the Beijing Government would thereafter be able to hold its own.⁸⁶

Thus, from late 1927 to early 1928, Mukden again used the *fengpiao* to mobilize the provinces' resources for war. In January of 1928, the government even decreed the use of *yinyuan* in tax collection, a move that signed the death warrant of the *fengpiao*. Mukden also abandoned the exchange control between *yinyuan* and *fengpiao* in Tianjin. They started to sell *fengpiao* in bulk by the end of 1927 in order to extract any single *yinyuan* or gold yen they could gather to pay for the 1928 Offensive.⁸⁷ It was these measures that led to the collapse of the *fengpiao* in January-February of 1928. During the collapse, even the staff of the State Bank and officials engaged in speculative trading of the currency. Since people were expecting the *fengpiao* to fall, they first sold those in their possession then bought more from the futures market. As the futures price of the *fengpiao* fell further, the collapse became irreversible.⁸⁸ Still, Mukden had not yet abandoned the *fengpiao*, probably fearing widespread social unrest. In January of 1928, the governor of Fengtian Liu Shangqing told the British of his determination to maintain the *fengpiao* and asked them for loans to stabilize it.⁸⁹

Issuing Bonds or Borrowing

Another option for the Fengtian leaders was to issue internal bonds in Beijing, but it was no easier than raising money in Manchuria. When Wu Peifu and

85 SR, 18/3/1927; Yoshida sōryōji, "dai 250 gō," 26/8/1926, NGB, 1926, Vol. 2, No. 1, 651; Kaneko Fumio, 504-5.

86 Sai Hōten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "dai 98 gō," 7/2/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slide 299.

87 Hōten kōshochō Kamata, "Hōhyō zanraku toki gen'in – tokumu kikan jōhō," 14/1/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slides 228-30; Sai Hōten sōryōji dairi Hachiya, "dai 46 gō," 6/2/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slide 295.

88 See Tanaka ryōji, "Hōtenhyō bōraku shin'in nikanshi hōkoku no ken (A report on the real cause of the fall of the *fengpiao*)," 3/2/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo8060893800, slides 278-9.

89 "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 21/1/1928, F 1085/50/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 209.

Zhang Zuolin took Beijing in early 1926, he expected to obtain internal and external loans to maintain the central government and end the civil war. Instead of acquiring loans, however, he inherited the government's previous debts and a bad credit history.⁹⁰ Even before the Fengtian Clique was in control of Beijing, the Chinese banking community had been unwilling to service any loans or bonds issued by the Beijing Government. This also had much to do with the manager of the Bank of China, Zhang Jia-ao (Chang Kia-ngao). Zhang came from a wealthy family in Jiangsu. He was educated in Japan before serving in the Bank from 1915. Armed with modern banking knowledge and connections in the banking circle, he became politically powerful. Through Huang Fu, who played an important role in linking Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese, Zhang turned to Chiang and financed his Northern Expedition.⁹¹

The Chinese Maritime Customs Service was also increasingly unwilling to cooperate with Beijing. A report submitted in 1927 by Leonard Arthur Lyall, the Inspector of Customs in Shanghai from 1919 to 1925, represented the Service's view. Lyall complained that the Inspector General Sir Francis Aglen:

by giving his guarantee for the repayment of internal loans secured on the revenue, [Aglen] has enabled the Peking Government to use for its own purposes not only the current year's revenue, but also the revenue that will be collected by the Customs throughout China for some years to come.⁹²

He believed that the loans only brought more wars to China:

[the] vast majority of the money borrowed has not been spent on any useful object. Much of it has been wasted, *and much more has been spent*

⁹⁰ The long-term causes of the financial problems of the Beijing Government during the mid-1920s were the decline of its authority since the late Qing period and the Powers' unwillingness to lend money to it during the 1920s. For the internal and external debt problems of the Beijing Government, see Roberta Dayer, *Bankers and Diplomats in China*, 8-9, 12, 23-6; Xu Yi, *Cong bainian quru dao minzhu fuxing: Beiyang waizai yu xinhai geming de chengbai* (Beijing, 2006), 96-9; Mark Metzler, *Lever of Empire*, 111, 122, 127; Mo Jianlai. *Wanxi junfa tongzhi shigao*, 145-57; Zhang Qixiang, "Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de jiuliu gongzai shuping," *Shixue yuekan*, No. 6 (2005); Pan Guoqi, "Beiyang zhengfu shiqi guonei gongzhai zong-e ji qi zuoyong pingxi," in *Jindaishi yanjiu*, No. 1 (2007), 78.

⁹¹ Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China*, 126.

⁹² "Report by L.A. Lyall on control of Revenue by Customs Inspectorate," 28/5/1927, *Sir Frederick Maze's Confidential Letters and Reports* (SFMCLR), 37.

*on armaments, which have been employed in civil war generally, and in attempting to conquer South China in particular [original highlights].*⁹³

Working in Shanghai throughout his career, Lyall held a very low opinion of the Beijing Government. He wrote:

...this Government has, for a number of years, been undeserving of any credit, and has used its credit merely to enrich its friends and promote civil war, [and] the improvement of its credit has not been a benefit to China.⁹⁴

This view was shared by other senior officers of the Customs Service. To preserve China's credit rather than the Beijing Government's, Aglen was determined not to allow the Chinese government to set up new loans, internal or foreign, with Customs revenue.⁹⁵ In late 1926, Aglen refused to ratify the cheque signed by Pan Fu, the new Minister of Finance.⁹⁶ When he rejected Pan's proposed loan to pay the interest of the 96 million Bond, its price fell substantially, causing a small financial panic in Beijing and further undermined the authority of the Beijing Government.⁹⁷

Thus, when Premier Wellington Koo proposed to arrange a new internal loan in the summer of 1926, it was opposed by both the Customs Service and Zhang Jia-ao.⁹⁸ In early September, another proposed bond issue was axed by the Customs Service, which argued that the Beijing Government was beyond any hope of revival.⁹⁹ The Chinese banking community in Beijing was equally uncooperative. When Koo met the head of the Chinese banks to discuss a loan of two to three million *yuan* for the Mid-Autumn Festival after the failed attempt to issue bonds, the bankers refused, saying they could only offer 500,000.¹⁰⁰ Still, the bank refused to pay when the metropolitan garrison went to the BOC with the cheque issued by the government, on the pretext that the contract between the bank and the government had not been signed. According

93 Ibid., 40. Original highlights.

94 Ibid., 43.

95 Chen Siqu, *Zhongguo jindai haiguan shi* (Beijing, 2005), 495-8.

96 SR, 1/12/1926.

97 SR, 5/12/1926; 11/12/1926.

98 "Edwardes' telegram to I.G.," 30/7/1926, SFMCLR, 5; "Edwardes' telegram to I.G.," 4/8/1926, SFMCLR, 6; "Edwardes' telegram to I.G.," 24/8/1926, SFMCLR, 7.

99 "Edwardes' telegram to I.G.," 1/9/1926, in SFMCLR, 8; "Edwardes' telegram to I.G.," 7/9/1926, SFMCLR, 9-10; "Edwardes' telegram to I.G.," 8/9/1926, SFMCLR, 10-1.

100 Wellington Koo, *Gu Weijun huayilu* (Beijing, 1983), 285-6, SR, 1/9/1926; 10/9/1926; 16/9/1926.

to Koo, the BOC breached convention, which was that of signing the contract after money had been paid. This almost led to a mutiny, and was resolved only because Koo had previously arranged another loan with an American bank.¹⁰¹

Zhang Zuolin's attempt to seek foreign loans was also met with little success. He first approached the Japanese for a loan in late 1926, but he abstained from borrowing from the Japanese because they demanded that he stop his campaigns in China.¹⁰² When Yang Yuting approached the British in November of 1927, the British Minister to China Sir Miles Lampson told him that it was possible, but only when the North was able to end the war with the Kuomintang.¹⁰³ Without new sources of revenue and foreign support, throughout the period when the Fengtian Clique controlled Beijing, it was unable to raise any internal or external bonds and had to rely on its Customs and Salt revenues (which could not be used as collateral for loans), tax income from the area under *Anguojun*'s control (which were mostly used for military purposes), and Zhang Zuolin's own contributions (see Tables H and I).

Collecting the Customs Surtax

The source of revenue that the Fengtian and *Anguojun* leaders saw as the life-saving straw was the Customs Surtax. Its origin was the Powers' decision to fix China's tariffs through the unequal treaty acts during the nineteenth century. After the establishment of the Republic in 1912, restoring tariff autonomy was a major diplomatic objective of successive governments in Beijing.¹⁰⁴ During the Washington Conference in 1921, it was agreed that after the signatories ratified the Nine Power Pact, a Tariff Conference would be held to discuss the Chinese tariff issue. Nonetheless, the conference was delayed by the "gold franc" dispute, which was solved after the Chinese accepted the French demand in 1925.¹⁰⁵ After three invitations, the Tariff Conference was scheduled

¹⁰¹ Wellington Koo, 284-9. Koo wrote in his memoir that the bonds were not issued. However, the newspaper in Beijing reported that the bonds were issued but that they were not recognized. See SR, 20/9/1926.

¹⁰² "Hōtenha kōhoku shinshutsu to shika taisaku nikansuru ken (Reaction to the Fengtian Clique's advance into the Jiangbei area)," 26/11/1926, GK, B02031895100, slides 232-3, 238-9.

¹⁰³ "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 1/12/1927, F 378/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 33, 396-400.

¹⁰⁴ Li Enhan, *Beifa qianhou de geming waijiao (1925-1931)* (Taipei, 1993), 91-5.

¹⁰⁵ During the First World War, although Britain and America remitted the Boxer Indemnity to China, France, Italy, Belgium, and Spain insisted that China should pay the Indemnity in gold rather than in their depreciated currencies. From 1922 to 1924, negotiations between China and France became bogged down, and the French government refused to ratify the Nine-Power Pact. The failure to restore tariff autonomy seriously handicapped

for October 26th, in Beijing.¹⁰⁶ Although subsequent wars in Northern China brought the Tariff Conference to a halt, it was agreed that China would have full tariff autonomy in 1929, and before that China could collect a surtax of 2.5% of the value of the imported goods. The conference was supported by America and Japan, who both wanted to use the new surtax to secure their loans, such as the gigantic Nishihara Loan.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, the British wanted to stop the Conference, and withdrew their representatives in April 1925.¹⁰⁸ Aglen supported the postponement, and suggested to the Customs office in London that Britain could use the seizure of the salt revenue in Tianjin by Zhang Zuolin's forces as an excuse to postpone the Conference indefinitely.¹⁰⁹

When the Beijing Government was seemingly about to collapse in late 1926, the only objective of Aglen and his second-in-command, Arthur Edwardes, was the preservation of the Customs Service, but both found it increasingly difficult to do this as the Powers, including Britain, were no longer willing to back the Service with force. Alarmed by the Kuomintang's decision to collect the surtax, Aglen urged the Powers to protect the Service by stressing its importance in maintaining trade and servicing foreign loans.¹¹⁰ Aglen argued that the Service could "weather any political changes that may come" if the Powers were willing to act.¹¹¹ He threatened the British Government with a possible Japanese takeover of the Service, and in December even wanted to mobilize the press in Britain to pressure the Foreign Office to take action to protect the Service.¹¹²

As the support of the Powers was unavailable, Aglen adopted an "opportunistic" attitude, as Chen Shiqi put it.¹¹³ When the Kuomintang appeared to be winning and were determined to collect the surtax itself, he was ready to compromise in order to protect the Service's position. In mid-November, he asked the Foreign Office for support in working out a solution that would "regularize new taxation and enable Maritime Customs to function in connexion with it if Powers determined not to resist."¹¹⁴ As Hankow had fallen to the NRA and the

Beijing's ability to keep its control over the provinces, particularly those in the South. See Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism*, 32.

¹⁰⁶ Chen Siqui, 126.

¹⁰⁷ Roberta Dayer, 230.

¹⁰⁸ SR, 1/5/1926; 6/5/1926.

¹⁰⁹ "Aglen to London Office," 13/6/1926, SFMCLR, Volume 2, 1926–1929, 3.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 28/11/1926, SFMCLR, 16.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 2/12/1926, SFMCLR, 18.

¹¹² Ibid., 1/12/1926, SFMCLR, 17; Ibid., 2/12/1926, SFMCLR, 18.

¹¹³ Chen Siqui, 160.

¹¹⁴ "Aglen to London Office," 13/11/1926, SFMCLR, 13.

fall of Shanghai was probable, the British government also became more conciliatory towards the Kuomintang. Aglen, still officially an employee of the Beijing Government, supported the move. In a telegram to the Foreign Office, he suggested that:

[The] opinion of [the] Chinese here interested in maintaining stability and avoiding catastrophe is that [a] more defined form of recognition of [the] Nationalist Government by Foreign Powers [is] inevitable in [the] near future and that meanwhile contact other than through Canton Consular representatives [is] very desirable.[end quote]

He also argued that Britain's recognition of the Kuomintang government would ease the 'inferiority complex' of the Kuomintang and make them more conciliatory.¹¹⁵

Perhaps to justify his turn to the South, Aglen became increasingly critical of the northern government. In early December, he cabled London that "[the] so called [Beijing] Government [is] approaching collapse and I believe Japanese recognition of South [is] imminent."¹¹⁶ He also argued that his refusal to remit the revenue of the surtax to the Beijing Government was an "impartial" act that placed the Service above politics.¹¹⁷ By then, Aglen was determined to preserve the Service by working with the Kuomintang government. Although it is difficult to evaluate how much the Customs Service affected Britain's attitude towards the situation in China, both shared the same idea that they had to work with the Kuomintang to protect their interests in China.

After using strike action to force the Powers to allow it to collect the surtax, the Kuomintang threatened to dismantle the Customs Service to paralyze the Beijing Government. In December of 1926, the Nationalist's Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen, told Aglen that if the Services complied with Beijing's instruction to collect the surtax, it might lead to a "disruptive effect on [the] Service." Anxious to protect the Service, Aglen accepted Chen's demand once the Kuomintang promised to leave the Customs Service alone. In the same telegram, to justify his action, Aglen noted that "Chang Tso-lin [Zhang Zuolin] here [is] trying to galvanise [the] Government into [a] semblance of reality but unless he can produce funds there will be no real change."¹¹⁸ This attitude partly undermined Zhang's efforts to raise money in Beijing.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 16/11/1926, SFMCLR, 14; Ibid., 28/11/1926, SFMCLR, 16.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 5/12/1926, SFMCLR, 19.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 13/12/1926, SFMCLR, 20.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 29/12/1926, SFMCLR, 21.

When the Beijing Government decided to collect the Customs surtax in the area under its control in early 1927, the north was controlling Shanghai, Tianjin, and other major ports in Shandong and Manchuria. Thus, Zhang was in an equal, if not better, position to threaten to dismantle the Customs Service. However, Beijing was unwilling to act unilaterally, as Zhang Zuolin wanted to present his approach as an alternative to the Kuomintang's "revolutionary diplomacy" to enlist external support. Whilst Beijing was planning to issue a bond secured by the surtax revenue, Aglen was in Hankow, seeking an understanding with the Kuomintang. Supported by Zhang Jia-ao, Aglen ignored Beijing's order to return.¹¹⁹ Aglen was in a difficult position. On the one hand, Beijing was determined to collect the surtax.¹²⁰ On the other hand, Eugene Chen threatened to dismantle the Customs Services if the Service collected the surtax for the Beijing Government.¹²¹ As Aglen did not follow Beijing's orders, he was dismissed by Premier Wellington Koo on February 1st. The Diplomatic Corps was astonished by the dismissal and urged Koo to retract his order.¹²² Koo refused, and was backed by the public who opposed foreign intervention in what was seen as an internal affair of the Chinese government.¹²³ The British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, tried to force Koo to retract his order by preventing Edwardes from assuming Aglen's post, but backed down when Beijing threatened to appoint Frederick Maze, the inspector of Shanghai, as Aglen's successor.¹²⁴ The dispute was temporarily solved when Beijing granted Aglen a one-year sick-leave instead of dismissing him.

Throughout 1927, the Japanese and the Customs Service tried to sabotage the North's attempt to collect the surtax. In early February, the acting Inspector General Edwardes ordered the inspectors in the northern ports not to collect the surtax despite Beijing's order.¹²⁵ The Japanese government claimed the surtax was a violation of the Nine Power Pact.¹²⁶ In February, the Japanese Minister to China, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, declared that Japan opposed the collection of the surtax no matter how it was collected, and called for a new Tariff Conference.¹²⁷ This Japanese opposition delayed the collection of surtax in the

¹¹⁹ Wellington Koo, 305.

¹²⁰ "Mr. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 3/1/1927, F 1934/2/10, FOCP, Vol. 32, 96.

¹²¹ Chen Siqui, 166.

¹²² Wellington Koo, 309.

¹²³ SR, 8/2/1927; *Dagongbao* (DGB), 15/2/1927.

¹²⁴ Wellington Koo, 309-12.

¹²⁵ SR, 9/2/1927.

¹²⁶ "Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir J. Tilley," 24/1/1927, F 706/2/10, FOCP, Vol. 32, 43.

¹²⁷ SR, 13/2/1927.

north. Among the major ports in the north, Andong and Harbin started to collect surtax in April, and Fengtian in May.¹²⁸

As the Japanese dominated trade conducted in Northern China and Manchuria, Japanese resistance against the surtax was fatal. Although leaders of the Fengtian Clique expected that the surtax would enable them to stabilize the currency and fund the war in mid-1927, they were to be disappointed.¹²⁹ Since then, the fall of the *fengpiao* had become more difficult to reverse. Japanese opposition persisted throughout the war. In January of 1928, the Clique tried to persuade the Japanese to cooperate on the surtax issue in exchange for a new Japanese consulate in Maoershan, but they refused.¹³⁰

The military situation also made it difficult for the North to collect the surtax. After the loss of Nanjing and Shanghai in March, the North could not claim a larger share of the surtax revenue.

The Financial Collapse of the Fengtian Clique

Failure to Secure Shanghai and the Financial Difficulties of Beijing

The loss of Shanghai and the north's failure to retake it decided the outcome of the financial contest between the Kuomintang and the northern warlords. In late 1927, the situation was similar to that of 1911, when the Southern forces were in control of most of the commercially developed areas in Southern China. However, the South's control was more complete in 1927, as Wuhan was also in the Kuomintang camp. It was a major reason for the Powers, in particular Britain, to turn to the South. In 1911, when the North and the South were negotiating peace, the British Minister to China, Sir Arthur Jordan, suggested that Britain could not ignore southern opinion because they controlled the area where British commercial interests were prominent. The German Minister, von Haxthausen, went further and suggested that Britain's China policy was driven by the commercial interest in Shanghai.¹³¹ The South's superior financial position in late 1927 was reflected by its ability to borrow: in September, the Beijing Government could only issue 5 million bonds secured by the surtax; at the same time the Kuomintang issued 24 million bonds backed by surtax rev-

¹²⁸ Chen Siqi, 157–9; SR, 31/3/1927.

¹²⁹ “An overview of the Fengtian Clique’s plan to adjust *fengpiao*,” 6/1927, The Gazette of the Chamber of Commerce in Dairen, GK, Bo8060893700, slide 157.

¹³⁰ Yoshizawa kōji, “dai 50 gō,” 17/1/1928, GK, JACAR, Bo2030035900, slides 352–3.

¹³¹ Yang Tianshi, *Cong dizhi zouxiang gonghe: xinhai qianhou shishi fawei* (Beijing, 2007), 272.

TABLE 5.7 *Income of the Beijing Government, Jul 1927 (in yinyuan)*

Customs Revenue (estimation)	500,000
Zhang Zuolin's personal contribution	100,000
Treasury of Zhili	65,000
Treasury of Shandong	25,000
Treasury of Fengtian (land tax)	40,000
Tianjin Customs (surtax revenue)	31,000
Manchuria Customs (surtax revenue)	30,000
Total	791,000

Source: SR, 21/6/1927.

TABLE 5.8 *Income of the Beijing Government, Apr 1928 (in yinyuan)*

Customs Revenue	220,000
Tobacco and Alcohol Tax	100,000
Salt Gabelle	14,000
Surtax Revenue	50,000
Ministry of Justice	20,000
Ministry of Communication	11,000
Chamber of Commerce	50,000
Proposed loan from the Customs Service	300,000
Ministry of Communication (reserved for the Ministry)	44,000
Zhang Zuolin's personal contribution (not mentioned but promised)	100,000
Total	865,000
Total, excluding Zhang Zuolin's contribution	765,000

Source: SR, 29/4/1928.

enue, and an extra 16 million bonds were issued in January of 1928.¹³² Without adequate money or credit, Zhang Zuolin could do little to exploit the infighting of the Kuomintang and compete with it politically (see Tables 5.7 and 5.8).

The inability to collect the surtax and float new loans severely handicapped the restoration of the Beijing Government. In June of 1927, the central government by itself could only muster 191,000 *yuan*, but it needed a minimum of

¹³² SR, 23/9/1927; 4/10/1927; 12/1/1928.

1,500,000 *yuan* each month to maintain its basic function.¹³³ While Zhang Zuolin himself provided 100,000 *yuan* every month, it had to rely on Edwardes and the Customs Service for the rest.¹³⁴ As Edwardes refused to recognize new loans, Beijing could only collect the customs revenue after the foreign loans were serviced. Throughout the year, the government's income remained around 300,000 to 500,000 *yuan* per month, but this was far from enough. To pay for the Generalissimo Government's budget in the Mid-Autumn Festival of 1927, 500,000 from the Customs Service was collected, and the government itself marshalled 300,000. However, 1,600,000 *yuan* was needed.¹³⁵ The government threatened to dismiss the Chief Inspector of Salt Gabelle if he could not hand over 200,000 to the government, but the Inspector refused because there was not enough revenue to service foreign loans.¹³⁶ Before the collapse of the Generalissimo Government, it was able to raise only around 400,000 *yuan* by itself.¹³⁷ As mentioned in Chapter 3, without adequate money or credit, Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique could do little to exploit the infighting of the KMT and compete with it politically.

The Succession Crisis and North-South Peace, Jan-June 1928

In 1928, the Generalissimo Government tried to settle the Customs issue and use it as an opening for a north-south peace conference. However, the April Campaign of 1928 ended not only this effort but also the Government itself. On January 27, 1928, the Finance Minister of the Nanjing Government, T.V. Soong, declared that China had achieved "tariff autonomy." Soong claimed that the Kuomintang had already controlled 16 provinces and 65% of the Customs revenue.¹³⁸ The press in Northern China questioned Soong's claim, and suggested that the Nanjing Government was no stronger than the Beijing Government controlled by the *Anguojun*.¹³⁹ Lampson dismissed the Kuomintang's claim as "absurd."¹⁴⁰

It was in this context that the Nanjing Government invited Edwardes to go to Shanghai in January, an action that revealed their conciliatory attitude. According to Wang Kemin, the North's representative to Nanjing, the

¹³³ SR, 21/6/1927.

¹³⁴ SR, 21/6/1927; 30/7/1927.

¹³⁵ SR, 2/9/1927.

¹³⁶ "Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 10/10/1927, F 8819/151/10, FOCP, Vol. 33, 308.

¹³⁷ SR, 14/1/1928, 3; SR, 29/4/1928, 3.

¹³⁸ DGB, 29/1/1927; Martyn Atkins, *Informal Empire in Crisis: British Diplomacy and the Chinese Customs Succession, 1927–1929* (New York, 1985), 68.

¹³⁹ DGB, 29/1/1927.

¹⁴⁰ Martyn Atkins, 69.

Kuomintang was ready to negotiate with the north and would “raise no objection to his [Edwardes’] appointment nor nominate a Southern Inspector-General with the object of splitting the Customs.” Even if Edwardes did not go, they would “allow things to stay as they are.”¹⁴¹ The Kuomintang also approached the Chinese Minister to the United States, Alfred Sze, for a possible “diplomatic rapprochement” with the Beijing Government, so that a united diplomatic delegation could be formed to discuss treaty revision with the Powers.¹⁴² Encouraged by Wang’s information, Edwardes decided to go to Shanghai. On January 19th, Lampson reported that Nanjing was willing to negotiate with the North on the Customs issue on “non-political lines.”¹⁴³

The Americans believed that Zhang Zuolin also wanted peace with Nanjing to “bring about an appearance of political unity in China sufficient to persuade the Powers that they are warranted in commencing negotiations for tariff adjustment and treaty revision.”¹⁴⁴ In fact, Beijing was thinking the reverse—it was hoping to use the issue of treaty and tariff revision as a starting point to end the civil war. Premier Pan Fu intimated to Lampson that the North was trying to bring about an understanding with Chiang Kai-Shek, whose position was affected by the success of the Guangxi Clique in Hunan and Hubei. According to Pan, although Chiang could not openly abandon his Northern Expedition, he desired to reach an understanding with the north. Lampson promised to urge Kuomintang leaders to “do the common sense thing and make peace.”¹⁴⁵ Lampson also met Liang Shiyi, who suggested that a united diplomatic delegation could be the starting point of a peace negotiation.¹⁴⁶

Lampson probably shared Liang Shiyi and Beijing’s views. In reply to Chamberlain’s query on the issue, he wrote that as other governments in China would repudiate any national tariff put forward by one government, it is important to have a meeting of all parties in China to discuss the issue. Lampson went on to suggest that after a commission had been formed to compile the tariff, a similar commission could be set up to negotiate with the Powers about this new tariff, therefore taking “the rights and functions of a united Foreign

¹⁴¹ “Sir Miles to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 11/1/1928, F222/46/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 9.

¹⁴² “The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State,” 20/2/1928, 893.00 P.R./3, No. 1403, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (PRUS), CC 1928 Vol. II, 121.

¹⁴³ “Sir Miles to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 19/1/1928, F 311/46/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 21.

¹⁴⁴ “The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State,” 1/3/1928, 893.00 /9851, No. 1410, PRUS, CC 1928 Vol. II, 125.

¹⁴⁵ “Sir Miles to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 31/1/1928, F 500/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 60.

¹⁴⁶ “Minute of Interview between His Majesty’s Minister and Mr. Liang Shiyi,” in ‘Sir M. Lampson to Austen Chamberlain,’ 1/2/1928, F 1398/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 271.

Affairs Commission so far as the tariff and its allied questions are concerned."¹⁴⁷ Lampson did not mention the peace negotiation to Chamberlain as the latter might have considered Lampson's involvement to be intervening in Chinese politics. Without the blessing of Chamberlain, any attempt to mediate between the warring parties had little chance of success.

With the probable support of the Generalissimo Government, the northern press also advocated using the tariff negotiation as a prelude for a national peace conference. The Peace Conferences of 1912 and 1919 may well have been in people's minds. In January, *Shijie ribao* reported that "sensible men" proposed to use the tariff issue as a means to unify the country's foreign relations.¹⁴⁸ A commentator of the *Dagongbao* was more direct. He criticised Edwardes for not using the opportunity of the negotiation to facilitate a ceasefire between the North and South.¹⁴⁹ Beijing soon formed a committee headed by Premier Pan Fu and consisting of Wellington Koo, Liang Shiyi, and other experts.¹⁵⁰ The active participation of these people suggested that those in the North did see the new conference as a possible breakthrough of the political deadlock in China.

However, the North's attempt to bring about a peace settlement in China floundered as Chiang Kai-Shek decided to continue the Northern Expedition in March. Pan Fu probably miscalculated when he said that Chiang actually wanted peace; in fact, Chiang was the strongest proponent of a northern advance in 1928. Chiang's allies, such as Feng Yuxiang, also opposed the tariff conference, claiming that it would only help the Beijing Government.¹⁵¹ As Chiang had to counter the growing power of the Guangxi Clique, he could not lose Feng as an ally, and in order to contain internal dissension, he decided to continue the war. In mid-January, to pay for the military campaign to unify China, the Nanjing Government issued an additional 16 million *yuan* bonds secured by the surtax.¹⁵² By early March, according to Lampson, Nanjing's program was already "either Peking or bust."¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷ "Sir Miles to Austen Chamberlain," 22/2/1928, F 731/5/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 128.

¹⁴⁸ SR, 20/1/1928.

¹⁴⁹ DGB, 26/2/1928.

¹⁵⁰ SR, 4/2/1928.

¹⁵¹ SR, 22/2/1928.

¹⁵² SR, 12/1/1928.

¹⁵³ "Sir Miles to Sir Austen Chamberlain," 20/3/1928, F 1339/5/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 252.

Concluding Remarks

The “collapse” of *fengpiao* was more the result of the political-military failure of the *Anguojun* between 1926 and 1928 than a failure of fiscal policy. Zhang had to sustain his war effort amidst the powers’ imperial presence, the volatile interwar international economic environment, the fall of the silver price, and Japan’s effort to restore the Gold Standard and expand her financial control in Manchuria. These factors also affected the *fengpiao*, an inconvertible currency heavily dependent upon faith in Zhang Zuolin’s military success.

To finance the *Anguojun*, the north stretched the banking system and commodity trade in Manchuria to its limits, but the pressure of war forced Zhang Zuolin to adopt measures that were detrimental to his financial and political positions. These actions were taken because it was expected that a Fengtian victory in China Proper would eventually free Zhang Zuolin from the above-mentioned constraints. However, the Fengtian Clique had to pay a political price for its financial mobilization. By allowing the depreciation of the *fengpiao*, Zhang weakened his people’s buying power. This might not have been a problem in other societies as the state could have stepped in to maintain the subsistence of the population through price control. However, as Japanese business interests saw Manchuria as a vital outlet for their products and investment, Mukden’s policy was seen as deliberately obstructive to “free trade”. The Japanese in Manchuria used the case to urge their government to act decisively in Manchuria.¹⁵⁴ Although Shidehara was unmoved by these urgings and even argued that Japan should give up its interest in Manchuria in exchange for a bigger market in China,¹⁵⁵ he was replaced by Tanaka, who favoured strong Japanese action.

The failure of Zhang Zuolin and the northern warlords to secure enough financial support was an important factor in their defeat and the collapse of the *fengpiao*. The Customs Service and the Powers played an important role in these intertwined issues. Although Zhang somehow managed to mobilize financial resources in Manchuria to support his war machine, he needed more money to reform the Beijing Government in order to compete with the Kuomintang politically and to minimize the impact of his financial mobilization in Manchuria. Without controlling Shanghai, Zhang could not enlist the support of the Powers and the Customs Service, and had to delay the

¹⁵⁴ “(no title) A joint petition of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Fengtian and the Japanese Residents Association in Fengtian to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Shidehara Kijūrō,” 4/9/1927, GK, B08060893700, 184.

¹⁵⁵ “Sir J. Tilley to Sir Austen Chamberlain,” 26/1/1928, F 1121/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 218.

introduction of the necessary reforms in the North, a prerequisite for foreign recognition and further help, and had to stretch the finance of Manchuria to its limit. Worse still, the inability to end the war prevented the *Anguojun* from obtaining new sources of revenue and from borrowing money from internal and external sources in order to stabilize the *fengpiao*. This pushed the Fengtian Clique into a vicious cycle of worsening financial and political situations.

The KMT's success in Hankow, Shanghai, and Nanjing and their threats to split up the Customs Service in late 1926 convinced the British Government as well as the Chinese Maritime Customs Service and the Chinese bankers to turn to them. To protect its image as a potentially competent central government, Beijing could not take extreme measures despite its desperate financial situation. It was in this context that Zhang Zuolin tried to levy the surtax and solicit foreign support. Japanese opposition against the surtax and the loss of Shanghai deprived the Beijing Government of much of the surtax income. On the other hand, after capturing Shanghai, the Kuomintang was able to use the surtax to issue bonds to fund its war effort.

By 1928, the future of the KMT was hardly promising, but the Powers did not change its attitude since the former was still controlling Shanghai and nominally Canton and Hankow. In contrast, the Generalissimo Government had little to offer besides its success in maintaining relative peace and stability in Beijing, Tianjin and Manchuria. Although the Generalissimo Government was successful in persuading Lampson to agree to use the tariff conference as an overture for a negotiated peace, the political deal between the major KMT warlords had finally encouraged Chiang Kai-Shek to renew the Northern Expedition, thus sealing the fate of the Generalissimo Government.

Conclusion

The outcome of the “Northern Expedition” was not preordained; nor was Manchuria destined to fall to the Japanese in 1931. Had Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique been able to stem the tide of the Northern Expedition and establish a stable regime in Northern China, their position in Manchuria and Northeast Asia would be a lot stronger than what it had been. Although internal dissension might exist, the presence of Zhang Zuolin (who was only 53 years old when he was killed in 1928) as a central figure might have prevented this bloc from falling apart. Zhang’s willingness to rebuild a central government in Beijing might also have strengthened the trend towards centralization in Northern China. Such development might provide a stronger deterrence against the Japanese government, if not the more radical Japanese Army officers. However, Zhang failed between 1925 and 1928. This study argues that such failure was the product of the strategic contexts, interactions between the strategic players in Northeast Asia, regional and international economic forces, contingencies, individual decision-making, and, most importantly, the fighting on the battlefield. The study of the rise and fall of the Fengtian Army and the *Anguojun* reaffirms that the issues of state-building, warfare, and the states’ attempt to monopolize violence are all inter-related. In addition, it reveals that besides the internal factors such as nationalism, organisation effectiveness and leadership, the “strategic contexts” outlined by Colin Gray, including the historical, geopolitical, political, technological and economic contexts, are all important determinants of success or failure in state-building. Besides, the decision-makers and the uncertainties of war are always relevant.

To stress the importance of these factors is not to downplay the importance of the sweeping cultural and ideological changes that took place after the late 19th Century. While not everyone fought and died for old or new ideas, these forces were increasingly important in mobilizing soldiers as well as the public and shaped the common perceptions of the warring factions. Despite the KMT’s weaknesses, Zhang Zuolin’s image as a warlord and the prevailing discourse of anti-warlordism were real obstacles for Zhang in re-establishing the authority of the Beijing Government. This period witnessed the growing importance of ideological struggle and mass mobilization in Chinese warfare. As the Chinese during the 1920s lacked the industrial, bureaucratic, and logistical apparatus, it could not sustain “total war” like European states in the two world wars. However, the KMT’s objectives during the Northern Expedition were total, namely nothing less than the elimination of the Beijing Government. It wanted to become the only legitimate regime in China. It claimed that it was

mobilizing the entire nation for the struggle. Nonetheless, while this precluded any chance of peace between the NRA and the *Anguojun*, it did not stop the KMT from using compromise to achieve its goal, especially by accepting the warlords who were willing to recognise Nanjing as their nominal head. The result of the KMT's refusal to cooperate with the Beijing Government and its compromises with the smaller warlords was continuous instability in Northern China and a weakening of the Chinese position in Northeast Asia.

This study has described the strategic contexts facing Zhang Zuolin and the militarists of the *Anguojun*. Although the *Anguojun* enjoyed considerable material superiority and was backed by a bureaucracy no less efficient than their KMT counterpart, its leaders operated in a much less favorable geopolitical environment to that encountered by the KMT. First, the historical-political link between "China" and "Manchuria" was not as strong as the Chinese later claimed. Manchuria had been a contested territory since the 1850s; Japanese and Russian (later Soviet) presence undercut and challenged Zhang Zuolin's hold of the area. While the KMT in Canton could realistically ignore the threat of foreign invasion, had Zhang underestimated the foreign threat, the destruction of his regime would have been assured. Zhang Xueliang's experience between 1929 and 1931 revealed such danger. The international situation in Northeast Asia shaped the strategy of the *Anguojun* and also the outcome of the war. Zhang, the leader of the Chinese in Manchuria and of the *Anguojun*, believed that his position in Manchuria would not be secured unless he was supported by a friendly central government or unless he actually controlled it. After 1925, the absence of such government and the perceived Soviet threat to overrun Northern China convinced him that he had to increase his presence within China Proper to preserve his position in Manchuria. This conviction shaped Zhang's action from 1916, when he rose to power in Manchuria. On the other hand, however, in the early Republican period, many Chinese saw Manchuria as a safe haven from the chaos in China. As some of the Fengtian leaders shared this idea, it led to a split of the Clique over its strategic direction. Whether to expand into Northern China or to concentrate on the development of Manchuria was the biggest strategic dilemma of the Fengtian leadership until the fall of Manchuria.

Besides the unfavorable geopolitical position, the Northern leaders also faced a complex international presence in China. The "Northern Expedition" was not only about the struggle between the *Anguojun*, the NRA, and the CCP. The Japanese, the Soviets, and the British were all active in shaping the outcome of the war. International recognition remained one of the deciding factors of the civil wars in China. The Powers' turn to the South significantly boosted the authority of the KMT. In contrast, Beijing's inability to maintain its

status as the recognized government and to revise the unequal treaties undercut its war effort. Such failure was partly because of the military failures of the *Anguojun*. Although many of the strategic players in this war were states or functioned as states, their agents sometimes had a different understanding of the situation and their actions might not have been compatible with the intention of their masters. The assassination of Zhang Zuolin by the radical officers of the Kwantung Army was an obvious example. Transnational institutions such as the *Mantetsu*, the Customs Service, and the Comintern were all no less important.

These strategic players often formed coalitions to achieve their goals, but more often than not they faced the tension between maintaining the cohesion of the coalition and persuading the members of the coalition to serve their strategy. Although the *Anguojun* was more coherent than the KMT coalition, which split into several hostile camps, Zhang Zuolin failed to exploit the full potential of the *Anguojun* because he could not completely harness Sun Chuanfang, who pursued his own goals when the opportunity presented itself. Sun's decision to cross the Yangtze in August of 1927 undermined the overall strategy of the *Anguojun*. The external powers often cooperated with the factions in China, but their goals were never the same. Although the Japanese encouraged Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to destroy the Beijing Government, they clashed with Chiang when they tried to prevent him from actually occupying Northern China. Likewise, Feng Yuxiang expelled the communists (both from Russia and China) once he had the support of Chiang Kai-shek.

Strategy-making was also about the internal politics of the decision-making body. The Fengtian Clique was divided into those who supported active intervention in China Proper and those who urged a policy of staying away from it. The controversies between Zhang Zuolin, Wang Yongjiang, Zhang Xueliang, and Yang Yuting revealed that difference in strategy was closely related to internal power struggle. For example, Guo Songling's rebellion was as much about different strategy as about Guo's personal ambition. Individual leadership and style were also of vital importance. Whereas Zhang Zuolin was able to maintain the cohesion of the Clique between 1926 and 1928, his son resorted to execution of dissenting officers in order to resolve the difference in strategic direction and establish his authority. This paralyzed the decision-making process of the Clique and partly explained its strategic failure in 1928-1931.

Although their immediate effect on the battles was limited, Zhang Zuolin had to respond to regional and international economic developments when deciding on his moves. The Sino-Japanese-Russian financial competition in Manchuria undermined Fengtian's effort to mobilize Manchuria's economy for war. The financial difficulties faced by Zhang including the fall of the value of

silver in terms of gold, the international credit shortage after the First World War, the Powers' loan embargo with respect to the Beijing Government, the formation of the Bank Consortium, and the Chinese Maritime Customs Service's turn to the KMT. Partly to solve its financial peril, the Fengtian Clique tried to expand into North and Central China in order to seize the sources of revenue. However, as the Customs Service was determined to stay away from the ailing Beijing Government, the *Anguojun* could gain little financially by controlling Beijing. The *Anguojun*'s failure to control Shanghai was crucial to its financial failure. Without Shanghai, the North could not claim the larger share of the Customs revenue or Surtax income. As most of the western Powers' trade with China was conducted in Shanghai, the loss of the city deprived the North of the loans and sympathy of the Powers, especially Britain. Without sufficient money, the *Anguojun* could not introduce the reforms necessary to win the "hearts and minds" of those living in the area under Beijing's control. It also forced Zhang Zuolin to rely on Manchuria to pay for his war, an action that destroyed the value of the *fengpiao*, alienated the population and soured his relations with the Japanese.

The *Anguojun* could have turned its military successes into political victories if it had secured Henan, defeated Feng Yuxiang, or captured Nanjing. As this study points out, these were not impossible. The lack of a clear ideology does not explain the defeat of the *Anguojun*. The difficult geo-strategic environment facing the *Anguojun* leaders required them to use their force carefully, while foreign threats tied down a substantial part of their army. Local warlords, willing to turn to the KMT for survival and expansion, infested Central China, the main battlefield area. Local elites and military groups such as the Red Spears and the petty warlords in Central China had their own agendas and influenced the course of events. Although the *Anguojun* fought well in some instances such as during the battle of Xuzhou, its failure to distribute its limited resources efficiently decided its fate. Beijing's decision to use the Fengtian Army to deal with Shanxi in the winter of 1927 rather than to invade Henan with Zhang Zongchang wasted an opportunity to destroy Feng Yuxiang's army and halt the Northern Expedition. This was the problem of prioritizing and of over-cautious planning, induced by the fear of (and actual) overstretch.

The *Anguojun*'s failure and the KMT's encouragement of military disintegration in Northern China after 1928 made the fall of Manchuria in 1931 more likely, if not inevitable. After Zhang Zuolin's death, Northern China was controlled by Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and an array of petty warlords. Feng and Yan's armies disintegrated during the War of the Central Plains in 1930, after which Northern China was in a state of virtual anarchy. Zhang Xueliang's inconsistent strategy between 1928 and 1930 courted disaster; he disarmed the

Fengtian Clique, demoralized it through his purge of Yang Yuting, and exposed its weakness to the Japanese by provoking the Soviets and joining the War of 1930. However, some of the structural factors were beyond Zhang's control. The Great Depression prompted radical Japanese officers to take action and weakened the cohesion of Manchurian society. The generational gap between Zhang Zuolin and Zhang Xueliang undermined the bond between the civilian and military elites in Manchuria, and exposed divisions among the Fengtian officers. By 1930, both internal and external conditions were unfavorable for any Fengtian intervention in the Pass; Zhang Xueliang's attempt to extend Fengtian influence outside Manchuria led to disaster. While the Northern Expedition might have given the Nanjing KMT and Chiang Kai-shek a so-called "golden decade,"¹ the price was chaos in Northern China throughout the 1930s and a weakening of the Chinese position in Manchuria and Northeast Asia.

Studies on the Northern Expedition and China during the 1920s usually focus on the internal state of China, and sometimes only on the area under KMT control. By taking a regional and transnational approach, however, one can better identify the factors contributing to success or failure in state-building in modern China and pinpoint the role of geopolitics, warfare, strategic interaction, and regional economy during such processes. The failure of the Beijing Government between 1912 and 1928 put in the context of the volatile international situation, particularly in Asia, after the First World War. The subsequent wars in China between 1931 and 1949 should be seen in the context of the political and military vacuum of Northern China after the collapse of the Beijing Government in 1928. The "civil wars" of Republican China were as much the products of the international situation and the strategic interplay between the Chinese contenders for power, Japanese, Soviets, British, and the Americans as the internal developments in China. There were recent studies "rehabilitating" warlords such as Wu Peifu, Zhang Zuolin, and even Yuan Shikai, highlighting their resistance against foreign intrusion and attempts to restore stability in China. This study suggests that a better approach to study the warlords is not to argue for their case but to elucidate the difficult local and international contexts they faced during the early Republican period.

¹ Zhongguo wenhua fuxingshe (ed.), *Kangzhan qian shinian zhi Zhongguo* (1937) (Hong Kong: Longmen shudian, 1965); Lloyd E. Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974); Paul Sih Kwang Tsien, *The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927-1937* (N.Y.: St. John's University Press, 1970) While some argued the period between 1927 and 1937 was a golden decade for the KMT, Lloyd Eastman and others argued that many of the weaknesses of the KMT during this decade led to its defeat against the Communists in 1947-1949.

Appendix 1: Literature Review

Previous works on the Northern Expedition have laid a solid foundation for this study. Works by Martin Wilbur, Harold Isaacs, Hans van de Ven, Tony Saich, Yang Tianshi, Wang Qisheng, Yang Kuisong, and others have discussed in detail the struggle between the Nationalists, the Chinese Communists and the Soviets.¹ Studies on the different aspects of Chinese society during the 1920s are also indispensable in understanding the background of the Northern Expedition.² Prasenjit Duara's "bifurcated history," Paul Cohen's call for moving further from a China-centric approach, and the regional studies by Hamashita and Duara also inspired this region-oriented study.³

Donald Jordan's *The Northern Expedition* and Odoric Wou's *Mobilizing the Masses* revisits the role of popular mobilization. However, although Jordan discussed in detail the KMT's military operations, he looked at the war mainly from the KMT's perspective.⁴ Hans van de Ven's discussion on the Northern Expedition in *War and Nationalism in China* adopted a more comprehensive approach by analysing in detail the military, political, economic and cultural contexts and the spiral of violence resulting from the "National Revolution."⁵ Scholars such as Tony Saich, Alexander Pantsov, and Yang Kuisong focused on the role of Soviet policies and agents, whereas Bruce Elleman argued that Soviet geopolitical design in Asia explained Soviet's China policy during

¹ Martin Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928* (Cambridge, 1984); Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (New York, 1968); Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945* (London, 2003); Tony Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China: the Role of Smeivliet* (Leiden, 1991); Li Yunhan, *Cong ronggong dao qingdang* (Taipei, 1966); Yang Tianshi, *Jiangshi midang yu Jiang Jieshi zhenxiang* (Beijing, 2002); Yang Kuisong, *Guomindang de liangong yufangong* (Beijing, 2008); Yang Kuisong, *Zhongjian didai de geming: guoji dabeijing xia kan zhonggong chenggong zhidao* (Beijing, 2010). For a comprehensive Japanese work on the Northern Expedition, see Tochigi Toshio and Sakano Ryōkichi, *Chūgoku kokumin kakumei - senkanki higashiajia no chikaku hendou* (Tokyo, 1997).

² For example, Ho Ping-ti and Tsou Tang (eds.), *China in Crisis* (Chicago, 1968); F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas Etzold (eds.), *China in the 1920s* (New York, 1976); Yang Tianshi, *Guomindang ren yu qianqi zhonghua minguo* (Beijing, 2007).

³ Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation* (London, 1995); Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, 2003); Prasenjit Duara, *The Global and Regional in China's National Formation* (London, 2009); Paul Cohen, *China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past* New York, 2003); Hamashita Takeshi, Ouyang Fei (tr.), *Jindai Zhongguo de guoji qiji: chaogong maoyi tixi yu jindai Yazhou jingjiquan* (Kindai chūgoku no kokusaiteki keiki) (Beijing, 1999).

⁴ Donald Jordan, *Northern Expedition* (Honolulu, 1976); Odoric Y.K. Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan* (Standford, 1994), 51-162.

⁵ Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China*, 64-130.

this period.⁶ As Yang Kuisong points out, focusing on outside factors is not an attempt to downplay China's internal conditions.⁷

Rana Mitter, Luo Zhitian, and John Fitzgerald paid particular attention to nationalism and the diverse cultural and intellectual environment before and during the period of the "National Revolution."⁸ In *From War to Nationalism*, Arthur Waldron points out that the socio-economic disruptions caused by the Second Zhili-Fengtian War in 1924 had weakened the North and sparked the nationalist movement that shaped subsequent political and intellectual developments in China. Yang Tianhong and Luo Zhitian further argued that the failure of Duan Qirui's attempt to revive the Beijing Government created a vacuum in Northern China. This explained the success of the Northern Revolution. Nonetheless, Luo Zhitian and others risked downplaying the role of war by suggesting the decline of the northern militarists, the relative coherence of the South in 1925-6, and pre-war shifts in political discourse against the North and the popular urge for unification already laid the foundation of the KMT's victory in the Northern Expedition.⁹ This study argues that the Beijing Government continued to have a future until its military situation became desperate in 1928.

Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Jerome Chen, Wang Qisheng, Zhang Ming, and Xu Yong's works on early Republican period discussed the social, cultural, and economic foundations of the warlords. A and the political contexts.¹⁰ Michael Sheridan's work on Feng Yuxiang is important for understanding Feng's opportunistic behaviour.¹¹ Works on individual warlords, however, cannot explain the behaviour of all the warlords because the "warlords" were so diversified. Hence, sweeping works on warlordism risk over-generalization. Little has been done to understand the lesser-known warlords such as Sun Chuanfang and the provincial warlords.¹²

⁶ Tony Saich, op. cit; Alexander Pantsov, op. cit; Yang Kuisong, *Guomindang de liangong yu fangong*, op. cit; Yang Kuisong, *Zhongjian didai de geming*, op. cit.; Bruce Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1927* (Armonk, NY; London, 1998).

⁷ Yang Kuisong, *Zhongjian didai de geming*, 3.

⁸ John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, 1996); Luo Zhitian, *Luanshi qianliu: minzu zhuyi yu Minguo zhengzhi* (Shanghai, 2001); Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution*, 102-52.

⁹ Luo Zhitian, *Jibian shidai de wenhua yu zhengzhi*, 260.

¹⁰ Ch'i Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China: 1916-1928*, op. cited; Jerome Chen, *The Military-Gentry Coalition: China Under the Warlords* (Toronto, 1979); Zhang Ming, *Wufuzhiguomeng: Zhongguo junfa shili de xingcheng ji qi shehui zuoyong* (Beijing, 1989); Wang Qisheng, *Geming yu fangeming: shehui wenhua shiye xia de Minguo zhengzhi* (Beijing, 2009); Xu Yong, *Zhongguo jindai junzheng guanxi yu "junfa" huayu yanjiu* (Beijing, 2009).

¹¹ James Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yuxiang* (Stanford, 1966).

¹² Lu Weijun and Wang Degang, *Sun Chuanfang* (Jinan, 1996); Wang Xiaohua, *Beiyang xiaojiang Sun Chuanfang* (Shanghai, 2000); Donald Jordan's study of the commanders of

Works on the wider context, such as Sino-foreign relations, political and economic developments, and Northeast Asia are indispensable for this study. Akira Iriye suggested in *After Imperialism* that despite the rhetoric of Self-Determination, unequal international relations between China and the powers persisted after the First World War.¹³ Studies by Wu Lingjun and Dorothy Borg discussed the United States' changing attitude towards the KMT.¹⁴ The studies of Shao Jianguo and others on Sino-Japanese relations during the Northern Expedition explained the internal and external reasons for Japan's shift from Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara Shigeru's policy of non-intervention to Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi's "active" policy.¹⁵ Roberta Dayer, Kaneko Fumio, and Mark Metzler's works have detailed the relationship between regional and international finance and geopolitics in Northeast Asia.¹⁶ Zhao Zhongfu examined the impact of Han migration and the changes in Manchurian society during the late Qing and early Republican period.¹⁷

Gavan McCormack's study on Zhang Zuolin dissected the complex geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia during the period concerned and explained the rise of Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique.¹⁸ Mizuno Akira forcefully pointed out that Zhang resisted the Japanese throughout his career.¹⁹ In his study on the governor of Fengtian province, Wang Yongjiang, and the "civilians" of the Fengtian Clique, Ronald Suleski describes Wang's conflict with Zhang as one between soldier and civilian. This study

the Zhejiang divisions was a notable exception. See *China in the 1920s*, 127–47.

¹³ Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: the Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

¹⁴ Wu Lingjun, *Meiguo yu Zhongguo zheng zhi, 1917–1928: yi nanbei fenlie zhengju wei zhongxin de tantao* (Taipei, 1996); Dorothy Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925–1928* (New York, 1947).

¹⁵ Shao Jianguo, *Beifa zhanzheng shiqi de zhongri guanxi yanjiu* (Beijing, 2006).

¹⁶ Kaneko Fumio, *Kindai nippō niokeru tai man shū tōshi no kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1991); Mark Metzler, *Lever of Empire: the International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley, 2006); Roberta A. Dayer, *Bankers and Diplomats in Republican China* (London, 1981).

¹⁷ Zhao Zhongfu, "1920–1930 niandai de dongsansheng yimin," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 2 (Jun, 1971), 325–43; Zhao Zhongfu, "Qingmo dongsansheng gaizhi de beijing," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 5 (Jun, 1976), 313–35; Zhao Zhongfu, "Xinhai geming qianhou de dongsansheng," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 11 (Jul, 1982), 117–30; Yang Yulian et al., *Qing dai Dongbei shi* (Shenyang, 1991).

¹⁸ Gavan McCormack, 250.

¹⁹ Mizuno Akira; Zheng Liangsheng (tr.), *Dongbei junfa zhengquan yanjiu: Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xueliang zhi kangwai yu xiezhu tongyi guonei de guiji* (Taipei, 1998).

believes this is an argument that deserves to be revisited.²⁰ The difference between Zhang and Wang lay in their strategies to save Manchuria from regional isolation and did not result from a fundamental civil-military conflict. Recent Chinese studies on the Fengtian Clique provide important details of the internal affairs of the clique.²¹

Studies of the Northern Expedition from the military perspective such as *The First Draft of the Military History of the National Revolutionary Army* (1946), *The Military History of the Northern Expedition* (1967), and *Northern Expedition and Unification* (1981) were carried out by the Nationalist army.²² As the purpose of these studies was to extract military lessons for the KMT military, they adopted the perspective of the Nationalists and ignored the wider context of the warlords' decisions. Only *Northern Expedition and Unification* briefly discussed the strategies of the northern warlords.

The Northern Expedition has always been seen as a proof of the superiority of the Nationalist's party army.²³ Military histories concerned with this period rightly focus on the Whampoa Military Academy, the party army, and modern weaponry. However, the NRA was far less effective than many accounts have suggested, whereas the *Anguojun* was not the outright failure that Nationalist accounts have argued. The warlords produced disciplined and cohesive armies that could defeat the NRA if probably led and deployed. During the actual battles, the performance of the Whampoa Army was less than satisfactory, and the KMT forces did not defeat the northern warlords by themselves.

²⁰ Ronald Suleski, *Civil Government in Warlord China: Tradition, Modernization and Manchuria* (New York, 2002).

²¹ Hu Yuhai, Zhang Wei (eds.), *Fengxi junfa chuanshu* (Shenyang, 2001).

²² Chen Xunzheng (ed.), *Guomin gemingjun zhanshi chugao* (Taipei, 1971); Guofangbu sihzheng ju, *Beifa zhanshi* (Taipei, 1967); Jiang Weiguo (ed.), *Beifa tongyi* (Taipei, 1980).

²³ F.F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949* (Princeton, 1956); Bruce Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989* (London, 2001); Zhongguo renmin geming junshi bowuguan (ed.), *Zhongguo zhanzheng fazhan shi* (Beijing, 2001); Peter Worthing, *A Military History of Modern China, from the Manchu conquest to Tian'anmen Square* (Westport, 2007).

Appendix 2: A Note on the Sources

This book makes use of new sources and re-examines the existing ones. For archival sources, this work mainly rely on documents from the Second Historical Archive in Nanjing, the British Foreign Office, the US Military Intelligence Reports, the Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Institute for Defense Studies of Japan. Many of the Chinese archival sources have been published, and the most important of these are *Zhonghua minguo dangan ziliao huibian* (Collection of Archival Sources of Republican China) and *Beiyang junfa* (Beiyang Warlords).¹ These compilations consist of statistics, telegrams, and reports, but since they can be inaccurate and fragmented, they were cross-checked with other sources. The Fengtian encrypted telegrams and private letters—*fengxi junfa midian* and *fengxi junfa mixin*—are valuable, and they are seldom used for the study of the Northern Expedition.² I have also used the records of the Customs Service, in particular for the discussion of the Beijing Government's finances between 1926 and 1928.

The Japanese sources are of vital importance for this study because of the comprehensive intelligence network set up by the Japanese since the 1900s.³ Besides the consulates, the major source of information was the army detachments in China and the South Manchuria Railway (*Mantetsu*).⁴ The documents are now available at the Japan Center for Asian Historical Record (JACAR). They consist of statistics, daily reports, intercepted messages, and summaries of the situations. These sources fill many gaps in the study and help scrutinise the existing sources.

Newspapers such as *Chenbao*, *Dagongbao*, *Shenbao*, *Yishibao*, *Shijie ribao*, and *China Weekly Review* also provide much information about the events. Nonetheless, the Republican newspapers have to be used critically as they were sometimes censored and always politicised.⁵ Though inaccurate at times, newspaper sources are useful to assess public opinion and the popular mood of the period. Other contemporary

¹ Zhongguo dier lishi danganguan bian, *Zhonghua minguo shi danganziliao huibian* (Nanjing, 1979); Lai Xinxia (ed.), *Beiyang Junfa* (Shanghai, 1988); Zhang Bofeng, Li Zhongyi, *Beiyang junfa* (Wuhan, 1990); Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi diyi yanjiubu, *Liangong (Bu) gongchan guoji yu Zhongguo guomin geming yundong, 1926-1927* (Beijing, 1998).

² Liaoning sheng danganguan bian, *Fengxi junfa mixin xuanji* (Beijing, 1993); Liaoning sheng danganguan bian, *Fengxi junfa midian* (Beijing, 1985).

³ The Japanese archival sources were available in the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), <<http://www.jacar.go.jp>>.

⁴ For the Japanese spy network during the Republican period and the men behind it, see Tobe Ryōichi, *Nihon Rikugun to chūgoku, "Shina-tsu" ni miru yume to satetsu* (Tokyo, 1999), 20-67.

⁵ Gao Yuya, *Beifang baozhi yulun dui beifa zhi fanying: yi Tianjin Dagongbao, Beijing Chenbao wei daibiao de tantao* (Taipei, 1999); Edward McCord, "Cries That Shake the Earth: Military

publications and journals, such as the *Eastern Miscellany* and *Guowen Weekly*, are of vital importance in gauging the popular mood and ideas. Republished contemporary publications such as those in *Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan* are also valuable.⁶

As for contemporary works, Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Impey's account of the Second Zhili-Fengtian War and the Civil War in 1925 discusses in detail the fighting technique of the Chinese armies. Ding Wenjiang's *Recent Records of the Republican Military* (1926) and Wen Gongzhi's *Chinese Military History of the Past Thirty Years* (1930) has provided much information and shaped subsequent discussions of the military history of the period. Soon after the Northern Expedition, Zhang Zhisheng published *The Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army* on *Eastern Miscellany*, a prominent journal of the period.⁷

Since the 1960s, oral histories of the Republican period have been collected in China and Taiwan. In China they were compiled under the title *The Historical and Literary Sources* (*wenshi ziliao*) and in Taiwan *The Oral History Series* (*koushu lishi*). These reminiscences of surviving officers and civilian officials from all sides have to be used carefully, as at the time these oral records were collected the history of the Republican period was still influenced by the political parties. The seldom-used biographical sources about those serving under the warlords sometimes provide important details previously overlooked by the studies that focused on the KMT or CCP.⁸ As mentioned earlier in the introduction, the author has also collected several unpublished manuscripts of the memoirs of the officers serving in the warlord armies. These manuscripts were intended to be part of the *wenshi ziliao*, but were not published (or heavily edited) due to their content.

Atrocities and Popular Protests in Warlord China," in *Modern China*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), 7-8.

6 Shen Yunlong, *Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan*, Vol. 1-3 (Taibei, 1966).

7 Lawrence Impey, *The Chinese Army as a Military Force* (Tientsin, 1926); Lawrence Impey, "Chinese Progress in the Art of War," in *China Weekly Review*, 27/12/1924; Wen Gongzhi, *Zuijin sanshinian zhongguo junshi shi* (Shanghai, 1930); Ding Wenjiang, *Minguo junshi jinji* (1926) (Beijing, 2007); Zhang Yufa, et al., *Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji* (Taipei, 1980), Vol. 7, 263-339.

8 Charles Drage, *General of Fortune: the Story of One-Arm Sutton* (London, 1963); Li Zhaolun, *Wode Beiyang junlu shengya* (Beijing, 1998); Guo Tingyi; Li Yushu ; Chen Cungong, *Ji Yiqiao xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Taipei, 1985); Shen Yunlong; Lin Quan, *Wang Tiehan xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Taipei, 1985); Zhang Pengyuan, Lin Quan, Zhang Junhong; Zhang Junhong, *Yu Da xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Taipei, 1989); Liu Fenghan, Zhang Li; Mao Jinling, *Ding Zipan xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Taipei, 1991); Guo Tingyi, Wang Yujun; Wang Yujun; Liu Fenghan, *Wang Chongping xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Taipei, 1996). These oral histories have been collected by the Academia Sinica since the 1970s, and all of these officers later served in the KMT army.

Appendix 3: Short Biographies of the Anguojun Figures

Zhang Zongchang (1881-1932)

came from an impoverished village of Shandong. He first went to Manchuria as a laborer, and then became a coolie leader who had close link with the local bandit groups. During the 1911 Revolution, Zhang organized a small cavalry detachment to join the revolutionaries at Nanjing. He then rose to command a regular army unit of the new Republic, and became President Feng Guozhang's adjutant and a divisional commander. After his unit was destroyed during the North-South War, he turned to Zhang Zuolin. In 1923, with the permission of Zhang, he sought the cooperation of the White Russians stranded in Manchuria-Soviet border and organised a Chinese brigade with a White Russian detachment. During the Second Zhili-Fengtian War he distinguished himself by leading this brigade across the Rehe province and capturing Luanzhou behind the Zhili Army's line. He was then sent by Zhang Zuolin to occupy Xuzhou and Shanghai in 1925, and became the military governor of Shandong until 1928. After the death of Zhang Zuolin he pleaded Zhang Xueliang to allow his army to return to Manchuria, but was refused by the latter. He then launched a desperate attack against the Fengtian Army, but his troops were dispersed and absorbed by both the Fengtian Army and the NRA. Zhang sought refuge in Japan until 1932, but was assassinated when he returned to China in the same year.¹

Zhang Jinghui (1871-1959)

was a Fengtian native. After he joined Zhang Zuolin, they surrendered to the Qing Government. In 1910, he entered the Fengtian Military Academy. Thereafter, he served under Zhang Zuolin as regimental commander, brigadier, and then divisional commander. However, after the First Zhili-Fengtian War he was withdrawn from frontline service, but remained Zhang Zuolin's close associate. After the death of Zhang Zuolin he was made the Governor of the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone, but was little more than a figurehead. When the Japanese invaded Manchuria he collaborated with the invaders and became the Premier of Manchukuo from 1935 to 1945.²

Zhang Zuoxiang (1881-1949)

a native of Fengtian, came from an impoverished family in Jinzhou. He received some classical education, but was forced to discontinue when his brother was killed in a

¹ Su Quanyou, *Zhang Zongchang chuanzhuan*, op. cit.

² Chen Zhixin, et. al., *Jilin wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 18 (Changchun: Zhengxie Jilinshi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 2000), 388-410.

feud. He then worked as a bricklayer in Mukden, before he became a fugitive after avenging his brother's death. In 1901, he and his band of bandits surrendered themselves to Zhang Zuolin, who was the leader of a larger local militia group. He was known as the leader of the "old faction" of the Fengtian Clique, and firmly supported Zhang during Guo Songling's rebellion. When Zhang Zuolin was assassinated, he supported Zhang Xueliang to succeed his father. After the fall of Manchuria, he withdrew to retirement, and refused to serve in the Manchukuo government.³

Tang Yulin (1871-1937)

was a Shandong immigrant. He spent his early years as a bandit, before joining Zhang Zuolin's group. Although he had seen much frontline service, his army was usually deployed in the secondary fronts due to his lack of military education and the quality of his troops. In 1928, he became the military governor of Rehe, but his failure to hold the province in 1933 against the Japanese invasion ended his political and military career.⁴

Sun Baihu (1861-1920)

was a native of Tianjin. He was a *junshi* before the Qing abolished the Civil Service Examination. In 1900 he went to Fengtian to work as an official of the Resettlement Bureau (*Xianhouju*). He became a councillor of the Provincial Assembly (*Fengtian ziyiju*) in 1909, and was briefly the head of the Eastern Three Province State Bank. In 1919, he became the head of the Fengtian Chamber of Commerce, until his death in 1920.⁵

Han Linchun (1885-1931)

was also a Fengtian native. He joined up in the New Army in 1904, and was sent to the *Shikan Gakkō* in the same year as an artillery officer. He served in the Qing Government as a weapon specialist beginning in 1908, and served in the Ministry of War of the Beijing Government until 1922. After a brief tour of duty in the United States as the military attaché, he went to Europe as a representative of the Ministry of War in the Chinese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Between 1922 and 1924, Han was mainly responsible for the running of the Mukden Arsenal. By September of 1924, he was in frontline service, serving as a corps commander and then the commander of all

³ Zhang Yufa, Shen Songqiao, *Dong Wenqi xiansheng koushu lishi* (Taibei: Academia Sinicia, 1986).

⁴ Shang Chengshan, "Tang Yulin Shengping Huiyi," in *Jinzhou wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 8 (Jinzhou, Zhengxie Jinzhoushi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui), pp. 145-8.

⁵ Dongbei renwu dacidian (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1992), p. 737.

the Fengtian Army in China Proper with Zhang Xueliang. Han suffered a stroke in late 1927 and died in 1931.⁶

Yu Guohan (1886-)

was a Fengtian native. He was trained in *Shikan Gakkō* before becoming an instructor of the Baoding Military Academy. He served in the Fengtian Army from 1914, first as a staff officer and then as an instructor of the *jiangwutang*. He became a senior staff officer of the Eastern Three Provinces Defense Headquarters in 1922 and eventually became the Deputy Minister of War of the Generalissimo Government. He was demoted to become an advisor of Zhang Xueliang after the death of Zhang Zuolin and engaged in business afterwards.⁷

Yu Zhen (1887-1959)

was a native of Fengtian. He was sent by the Qing Government to the *Shikan Gakkō* in 1906. When he returned to China in May of 1911, he served in the Fengtian Province as a staff officer. A close associate of Yang Yuting, he was seen as one of the major figures of the “Shikan clique.” In the early 1920s, he was responsible for the military police and the *baojia* system of the Fengtian province, before becoming a corps commander. After the death of Zhang Zuolin and Yang Yuting, he withdrew from frontline service and was responsible for opening up new lands in Fengtian. After the Japanese takeover, he refused to serve in the Manchukuo army, and lived a quiet life throughout the war. It was noted that he had aided the communist anti-Japanese activists during the war.⁸

He Zhuguo (1897-1985)

was a native of Guangxi. He entered the Baoding Military Academy in his early years, and then studied in the *Shikan Gakkō*. He first served as an instructor of the Baoding Military Academy, then became a field officer of the Fengtian Army. He became a brigadier in 1927, and fought against the Wuhan NRA during the Henan Campaign. In 1930, he led the Fengtian Army into the Shanhaiguan again, this time supporting the Nanjing Government. He gained much prestige when he fended off a Japanese attack against Shanhaiguan in 1933. He was among the conspirators of the Xian Incident of 1936, and gradually turned to the communists afterwards. He survived the Cultural Revolution.⁹

6 Wu Yuwen, “Han Lunchun,” *Zhonghua minguoshi ziliao congkao*, Vol. 10 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2000), 266-72.

7 Zhang Kejaing, *Tieling-shi zhi* (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1999) 312.

8 Ibid., 77.

9 Hu Bilin, Fang Hao (eds.), *Minguo gaoji jiangling liezhuan* (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun chubanshe, 2006), 473-4.

Ji Yiqiao (1885-1976)

a native of Hubei, received classical education in his youth. He also studied in a modern school established by the reformer Zhang Zhidong. His cousin Ji Yifei studied Japan in late 1890s, and had participated in the anti-Qing movement. In 1906, Ji Yiqiao was funded by the Fengtian provincial government to study in the *Shikan Gakkō*. Ji participated in the Xinhai Revolution and saw action in Shanghai. He then went to serve under Tang Jiyao, the strongman of Yunan, and worked as a military instructor. In late 1922, he was invited to Fengtian by Yang Yuting, and became the Chief-of-Staff of Han Linchun. In 1927, he commanded a brigade of the Fengtian Army, and had participated in the Henan campaign and the war against Yan Xishan, during which he distinguished himself by cutting off the bulk of the Shanxi Army from its base. Ji later became the Chief-of-Staff of Zhang Xueliang; during the Japanese invasion, he urged Zhang Xueliang to resist. He withdrew from military service after he became disillusioned with Zhang. He stayed in Beijing during the Second Sino-Japanese War, but refused to collaborate with the Japanese. He became one of the key members of the Chinese Social Democratic Party during the late 1940s and went to Taiwan afterwards.¹⁰

Chu Yupu (1887-1929)

a native of Shandong, was a bandit leader before he joined Zhang Zongchang's army in 1913, when the latter was a brigadier under Feng Guozhang. This started the long cooperation between Zhang and Chu, well until the latter's death in 1929. During the Second Zhili-Fengtian War, Chu was a regimental commander under Zhang, and then became a brigadier afterwards. When Feng Yuxiang's KMC was evicted from Beijing and Tianjin in early 1926, he became the military governor of Zhili, and held this position until the end of the Northern Expedition. He was known to be fiercely anti-communist. In 1929, when he returned to Shandong after a brief exile, Chu was murdered by Liu Zhennian, a local warlord who served under Chu as a brigadier.¹¹

Li Zhaolin (1892-1961)

was born in Beijing. After he had graduated from the Baoding Military Academy in 1911, he became a junior officer of Cao Kun's 3rd Division. In 1913, he entered the Nanyuan Aeronautic Academy (Nanyuan hangkong xuexiao), and became one of its first graduates. Li also served as an instructor of the Baoding Military Academy. During the early 1920s, he served in the Zhili Clique, and was the Chief-of-Staff of the 15th Division during the Second Zhili-Fengtian War. He then joined Zhang Zongchang's army and served

¹⁰ Guo Tingyi, *Ji Yiqiao xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1985).

¹¹ Wang Zhimin, *Shandong zhongyao lishi renwu*, Vol. 6 (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2009), 145-7.

as Zhang's Chief of Staff until June 1928. He withdrew from the military after the war and became a businessman.¹²

Ding Zhipan (1894-1988)

was a native of Jiangsu. He had received classical education, but entered the Jiangsu Military Academy after the Civil Service Examination was abolished. After serving in the Jiangsu provincial army for over 10 years, he became the Chief of Staff of Xu Yuanquan, who was a divisional commander under Zhang Zongchang in 1925. He then served under Xu until 1938.¹³ He gradually rose to become the Chairman of the Jiangsu Provincial Government and a Policy Advisor of the Nationalist Government when it withdrew in Taiwan.

Li Jinglin (1885-1931)

came from the Zhili province. He joined a local army in 1900, and then joined the New Army two years later. He then received formal military education in the Baoding Military Academy, and then served under Feng Guozhang. In 1922, he went to serve under Zhang Zuolin, and became a divisional commander during the Second Zhili-Fengtian War. In 1925, he became the military governor of Zhili, but was no longer trusted by Zhang Zuolin because of his initial inaction during Guo Songling's rebellion in November of 1925, despite Li actually fighting to delay Feng Yuxiang's troops near Tianjin.¹⁴ He withdrew from active military service afterwards after the Northern Expedition and became one of the leaders of the movement to promote "Chinese" martial art.

Chang Yinhuai (1876-1929)

was born in a Shandong immigrant family in Jilin. He was educated as an administrator in the Fengtian Law and Public Administration Academy (Fengtian fazheng xuetang). After serving briefly as a judge of a military court, he was sent to administer the Chinese railways in Manchuria. In 1927, he directed the construction of the Dahushan-Tongliao Railway that the Japanese considered as a threat to the South Manchuria Railway. He was executed by Zhang Xueliang with Yang Yuting in 1929.¹⁵

¹² Chen Yuhuan, Baoding junxiao jiangshuailu, 331.

¹³ Liu Fenghan, et. al. Ding Zhipan xiansheng fangwen jilu.

¹⁴ Wang Fumin, 219-20.

¹⁵ Tian Yong, "Chang Yinhuai," Liaoning wenshi ziliao xuanji (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1986), 23-32.

Xu Kun (1887-?)

a native of Zhili, entered the Baoding Military Academy in 1905. After serving in the beiyang 3rd Division, Xu was accepted by the Staff College of Beijing in 1913. After graduation, he served under Zhang Zongchang ever since. According to Zhang Zongchang's Chief-of-Staff Li Zaolin, when Zhang Zuolin was assassinated in June of 1928, Xu's unit was still intact. However, he refused to surrender to the KMT and withdrew from the military.¹⁶

Xu Yuanquan (1886-1960)

was a native of Hubei. He was graduated from the Nanjing Military Academy in 1910. He had participated in the Wuhan Campaign during the 1911 Revolution. After the revolution, he joined Zhang Zongchang's army, and served under him until Zhang Zuolin's death. He then joined Chiang Kai-shek's army and participated in the War of the Central Plain and the first phase of the Sino-Japanese War. After his army was destroyed during the early battles of the war from 1936 to 1938, he retired from front-line service.¹⁷

Shangguan Yunxiang (1895-1969)

was a native of Shandong. He joined the Beiyang Army 2nd Division after he was graduated from the Baoding Military Academy in 1919. He served under Sun Chuanfang, who was by then a brigadier. He gradually rose to command a division in 1927, and was captured during the battle of Longtan. However, he soon escaped and returned to his unit. When Sun retired in June 1928 he joined the NRA, and had participated in the War of the Central Plain, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Civil War of 1947-1949. He withdrew to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek and continued to serve as a senior officer in the NRA until the 1960s.¹⁸

Yu Xuezhong (1890-1964)

was originally one of Wu Peifu's corps commanders. After Wu Peifu retired to Sichuan in late 1927 Yu left the army and returned to his home in Shandong. His army was first incorporated into Feng Yuxiang's army, but Yu's subordinates brought the army to northern Anhui and urged Yu to resume his command. Refusing the KMT's commission, Yu led his army to join the *Anguojun* in December 1927. His army was instrumental

¹⁶ Wang Dongbin, *Dongbei renwu dacidian*, Vol. 2 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1992), 545.

¹⁷ Wang Fumin, 445-6.

¹⁸ Chen Yuhuan, *Baoding junxiao jiangshuailu*, 9-10.

in stopping Feng Yuxiang's attempt to capture Xuzhou in the same month.¹⁹ After the Northern Expedition he and his army joined the Fengtian Clique; he played a major role in North China politics after the fall of Manchuria and eventually became one of the senior NRA commanders during the Second Sino-Japanese War. He retired from active military service in 1944 and withdrew from politics in 1949, only to be recalled by the new regime during the 1950s and served various posts in the PRC.

¹⁹ Mou Zhongheng, "Huiyi Yu Xuezhong zhangjun," in Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Tianjin shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, *Tianjin wenshi ziliao xuanji*, Vol. 52 (Tianjin, 1990), 3-4.

Appendix 4: Glossary

96-million Loan Bond 九六公債	<i>Dagongbao</i> 大公報
Alfred Sze 施肇基	Dahushan-Tungliao Railway 打虎山 - 通遼線
Amur River 黑龍江	Dairen Conference 大連會議
<i>Anguojun</i> , National Pacification Army 安國軍	Dairen 大連
Army for the Protection of Henan 河南保衛軍	<i>daode weixin</i> (morality as the central idea) 道德為心
Bai Yongzheng 白永貞	Debuchi Katsuji 出淵勝次
Balhae (Bohai) 渤海	Deng Yanda 鄧演達
Bank of China 中國銀行	Ding Wenjiang 丁文江
Bank of Chōsen 朝鮮銀行	Ding Zhipan 丁治磐
Bank of Communication 交通銀行	Disbandment Conference 編遣會議
<i>baoban geming</i> (monopolizing the revolution) 包辦革命	Doihara Kenji 土肥原賢二
<i>baojing anmin</i> (protecting the territory, maintaining civil stability) 保境安民	<i>Dongsansheng gongbao</i> 東三省公報
Beipiao 北票	Du Shigui 杜錫圭
Bi Shecheng 畢庶澄	Duan Zhigui 段芝貴
Cao Kun 曹锟	<i>Eastern Miscellany</i> 東方雜誌
Cao Rulin 曹汝霖	Eastern Three Provinces State Bank 東三省官銀號
Caozhou 曹州	Enjinsha 燕塵社
Central Plains War 中原大戰	Eugene Chen 陳友仁
Chahar 察哈爾	<i>fengjun</i> 奉軍
Chang Yinhuai 常蔭槐	<i>fengpiao maofang</i> 奉票毛荒
Changbai Mountain Range 長白山	Fengpiao 奉票
Chen Tiaoyuan 陳調元	Fengtian Development Bank 奉天興業銀行
Chen Yi 陳儀	Fengtian Military Academy 東三省陸軍講武堂
<i>Chenbao</i> (Morning Post) 晨報	Fengtian-Hailung Railway 奉天 - 海龍線
<i>linshi zhezheng</i> Chief Executive of the Provisional Executive Government 臨時執政	Financial Bonds 金融公債
Chinese Eastern Railway Incident 中東路事件	Financial Reorganization Committee of the Eastern Three Province 東三省財政整理委員會
Commander-in-Chief for the Security of the Eastern Three Provinces 東三省保安總司令	Greater and Lesser Khingan Mountains 大、小興安嶺
Commander-in-Chief of the League of the Five Provinces 五省聯軍總司令	Guandi 關帝
<i>conglung ruguan</i> (following into the Pass with the dragon) 從龍入關	<i>guandong</i> 關東
Constitutional Conference 憲法會議	Guide 歸德
<i>guanyu</i> Customs revenue 關餘	Guo Songling 郭松齡
	<i>guojia zhuyi pai</i> 國家主義派
	<i>Guowen Weekly</i> 國聞週報

Hanzhuang 韓莊	Li Shizheng 李石曾
Hara Kei 原敬	Li Zaolin 李藻麟
Harbin <i>dayang</i> 哈大洋	Liao Empire 遼
He Chengjun 何成濬	Liao River 遼河
<i>hōhyō bōraku</i> (rapid fall of fengpiao) 奉票暴落	Liaodong 遼東
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation 匯豐銀行	Linying 臨潁
<i>honghuzi</i> 紅鬍子	Liu Shangqing 劉尚清
Hu Jingyi 胡景翼	Liu Shilin 劉士林
Hu Lin 胡霖	Liu Zhenhua 劉鎮華
Huaian 淮安	Liu Zhilu 劉志陸
Huang Fu 黃郛	Liu Zuolong 劉佐龍
Huang Xing 黃興	Longhai Railway 隘海鐵路
<i>huiduiquan</i> 匯兌券	Longtan 龍潭
Huludao 胡蘆島	<i>longxing zhidi</i> (The place where the dragon rises) 龍興之地
Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party 內蒙古人民革命黨	Lu Rongting 陸榮廷
Inoue Junnosuke 井上準之助	Luo Wengan 羅文幹
Ji Yiqiao 戢翼翹	Ma Ji 馬濟
Jiang Baili 蔣百里	Machino Takema 町野武馬
Jiang Dengxuan 姜登選	Manzhouli 滿洲里
Jiang Zuobin 蔣作賓	Matsui Iwane 松井石根
Jilin-Changchun Railway 吉長鐵路	Matsui Nanao 松井七夫
Jilin-Huining Railway 吉會鐵路	Meng Enyuan 孟恩遠
Jin Dynasty 金	Mi Zhenbiao 米振標
Jin Yun-e 靳雲鶴	<i>minde zhuyi</i> 民德主義
Jingbao 京報	Mo Dehui 莫德惠
Jining 濟寧	Muto Nobuyoshi 武藤信義
<i>junfa hunzhan</i> (free-fight fo the warlords) 軍閥混戰	Nankou 南口
Kailuan Mining Company 開灤公司	National Army, Kuominchun (KMC) 國民軍
Kalgan 張家口	National Conference 國民大會
Kuhara Fusanosuke 久原房之助	National Peace Army 靖國軍
Kuriye 庫倫, now Ulan Bator	National Reconstruction Army 建國軍
Lai Shihuang, 賴世璜	National Revolution 國民革命
Lan Tianwei 藍天蔚	National Revolutionary Army (NRA) 國民革
<i>lanfa/ ranhatsu</i> (uncontrolled issuing of fengpiao) 濫發	命軍
Lanfeng 蘭封	Nationalists Party (KMT) 國民黨
Leonard Arthur Lyall 賴法洛	North China Plain 華北平原
Li Jinglin 李景林	Northeast KMC 東北國民軍
Li Jishen 李濟深	Okura Group 大倉組
Li Liejun 李烈鈞	Pan Fu 潘復
	pending cases 懸案
	Political, diplomatic and financial discussion boards 政治, 外交, 財政討論會
	Provisional National Assembly 臨時參政院

Qiu Yingjie 寇英傑	Treaty of Aigun 瓊瑲條約
Qixia 楠霞	Treaty of Beijing 北京條約
Reconstruction Conference 善後會議	Treaty of Nerchinsk 尼布楚條約
Rehe Province 热河省	Tsushima Strait 對馬海峽
Rehe Special Administrative Region 热河特別區	Twenty-One Demands 二十一條
River Defense Flotilla of the Northeast 東北江防艦隊	Vladivostok 海參威
Saburi Sadao 佐分利貞男	Wakatsuki Reijirō 若槻禮次郎
Saitō Hisashi 斎藤恒	Wang Kemin 王克敏
Second KMC 國民二軍	Wang Pu 王普
Seiyukai Party 政友會	Wang Yongjiang 王永江
Shang Zhen 商震	Wang Zhengting 王正廷
Shangcai 上蔡	Wei Yisan 魏益三
Shangguan Yunxiang 上官雲相	Wellington Koo 顧維鈞
Shanhaiguan Pass 山海關	Wu Jinglian 吳景廉
Shenbao 申報	Wu Junsheng 吳俊陞
Shidehara Kijūrō 幣原喜重郎	Wu Luzhen 吳祿貞
Shijiazhuang 石家莊	Wu Peifu 吳佩孚
Shijie ribao 世界日報	Wuyuan 五原
Shuntian shibao 順天時報	Xia Chao 夏超
Sir Francis Arthur Aglen, Sir 安格聯	xianyangpiao 現洋票
Song Gong 崇恭	xiaoyangpiao 小洋票
Song Qing 宋慶	xinguojiadang 新國家黨
Songhua River 松花江	Xinmin 新民
Suiyuan Special Administrative Region 綏遠特別區	Xinyang 信陽
Sumo Mohe 栗末靺鞨	Xiong Xiling 熊希齡
Sun Chuanfang 孫傳芳	Xiping 西平
Sun Yue 孫岳	Xu Qian 徐謙
Taierzhuang 台兒莊	Xu Shuzheng 徐樹錚
Takahashi Korekiyo 高橋是清	Xu Yuanquan 徐源泉
Tan Yankai 譚延闡	Xuchang 許昌
Tang Yulin 湯玉麟	Yamagata Aritomo 山縣有朋
tao-chi lianjun (anti-Red Allied Army) 討赤聯軍	Yamamoto Jōtarō 山本条太郎
taozei lianjun (anti-Bandit Allied Army) 討賊聯軍	Yamanashi Hanzo 山梨半造
Terauchi Masatake 寺內正毅	Yan Huiqing 顏惠慶
the Liaodong Peninsula 遼東半島	Yancheng 鄖城
the Nishihara Loan 西原大借款	Yang Bing 楊丙
Tian Weiqin 田維勤	Ye Gongchu 葉恭綽
tong-er butong-yi 統二不統一	Yi Army 穀軍
Transport Committee of the Eastern Three Provinces 東三省交通委員會	Yingkou 營口
	yinyuan 銀元
	Yishibao 益世報
	yizhi 易幟
	Yokohama Specie Bank 橫濱正金銀行
	Yoshizawa Kenkichi 芳澤謙吉

Yu Guohan 于國翰	Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽
Yu Xuezhong 于學忠	Zhao Ti 趙倜
Yuan Jinkai 袁金鑑	Zheng Junyan 鄭俊彥
Zaozhuang 褒莊	Zheng Qian 鄭謙
Zhang Binglin 章炳麟	Zhengzhou 鄭州
Zhang Jia-ao, Chang Kia-ngao 張嘉璈	Zhensong Army 鎮嵩軍
Zhang Jinghui 張景惠	<i>zhenweijun</i> 鎮威軍
Zhang River 漳河	<i>zhi-lu lianjun</i> (Zhili-Shandong Allied Army) 直魯聯軍
Zhang Xilin 張錫麟	Zhong-e miyue 1896 中俄密約
Zhang Zhigong 張治公	Zhongzhou 中州
Zhang Zhijiang 張之江	Zhou Fengqi 周鳳歧
Zhang Zongchang 張宗昌	Zhoukou 周口
Zhang Zuolin 張作霖	Zhumadian 駐馬店
Zhang Zuoxiang 張作相	Zhuozhou 淮州
Zhangde 彰德	

Appendix 5: Order of Battle of the *Anguojun* and the NRA, March 1927-April 1928

March 1927¹

Anguojun (formed in December 1926)

Sun Chuanfang

Jiangsu to Songjiang	50,000
Kiangsu forces (in Anhui)	30,000
Former Fujian Army	3,000
Total	83,000

Zhang Zuolin

Beijing-Tianjin	20,000
Kalgan	10,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway	10,000
Beijing-Hankow Railway to Northern Henan	70,000
Rehe	20,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	40,000
Total	170,000

Zhang Zonchang

Shandong and Tianjin-Pukow Railway	40,000
Anhui and western Henan	40,000
Jiangsu	40,000
Total	120,000

Henan Allies (Mi Zhenbao and Qiu Yingjie)

Grand Total: 403,000

The KMT Armies (Only abstract number will be provided in subsequent charts)

Chiang Kai-shek

1st Army (Fujian and Zhejiang)	15,000
2nd Army (Jiangxi)	12,000
3rd Army (Jiangxi and Anhui)	12,000
4th Army (Hubei and Jiangxi)	12,000
5th Army (Guangdong)	10,000
6th Army (Jiangxi)	10,000

¹ "The Military Situation," 3/1927, USMI, Reel 5, slides 582-3.

7th Army (Anhui and Jiangxi)	10,000
8th Army (Hankow)	15,000
9th Army (Hubei)	12,000
10th Army (Hubei)	12,000
11th Army (unknown)	unknown
12th Army (Guizhou-Hunan border)	8,000
13th Army (Henan)	12,000
14th Army (Jiangxi)	10,000
15th Army (Hubei)	12,000
16th Army (Guangxi)	10,000
17th Army (Fujian and Zhejiang)	10,000
Total	182,000
Kuominchun (Feng Yuxiang)	
Gansu and Shaanxi	90,000
Shaanxi allies	15,000
Total	105,000
Grand Total	287,000

April 1927²

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Jiangsu)	
Total	50,000
Zhang Zuolin	
Beijing-Tianjin	20,000
Kalgan	10,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway	10,000
Beijing-Hankow Railway to Northern Henan	15,000
Henan	70,000
Rehe	20,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	60,000
Total	170,000
Zhang Zonchang	
Shandong and Tianjin-Pukow Railway	35,000
Xuzhou and western Henan	40,000
Anhui	60,000
Total	135,000

² "The Military Situation," 4/1927, USMI, Reel 5, slides 584-6.

Henan Allies (Liu Zhenhua, Mi Zhenbao and Qiu Yingjie)	40,000
Grand Total:	435,000

The KMT Armies

The Southern KMT Armies

First Route Army Group (Shanghai-Jinjiang)	58,000
Second Route Army Group (Nanjing)	57,000
Third Route Army Group (Central Anhui)	71,000
Fourth Route Army Group (Northern Hubei)	62,000
Total	248,000
Units not included in above formation (9 Armies)	122,000
Henan Allies (Jin Yun-e, Wei Yisan, Tian Weiqin) ³	90,000
Kuominchun	105,000
Grand Total	565,000

May 1927⁴

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Jiangsu, along Grand Canal)

Total	50,000
Zhang Zuolin	
Beijing-Tianjin	15,000
Kalgan	10,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway	10,000
Beijing-Hankow Railway to Northern Henan	10,000
Henan	80,000
Rehe	20,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	60,000
Total	205,000

Zhang Zonchang

Shandong and Tianjin-Pukow Railway	35,000
Xuzhou and western Henan	40,000
Anhui	60,000
Total	135,000
Henan Allies (Liu Zhenhua, Mi Zhenbao and Qiu Yingjie)	75,000
Grand Total:	465,000

³ Tian later turned to the north, but his army had little fighting value.

⁴ "The Military Situation," 5/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slides 122-4.

The KMT Armies

Chiang Kai-shek	307,000 ⁵
Tang Shengzhi	125,000 ⁶
Feng Yuxiang	90,000
Grand Total	522,000

27 May-6 June 1927⁷

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Jiangsu-Shandong border)

Total	50,000
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (Baoding-Shijiazhuang, Jilin troops)	20,000
7th Corps (Beijing Garrison)	15,000
8th Corps (Zhengdingfu, Zhili)	18,000
9th Corps (Kalgan)	15,000
10th Corps (Zhangde)	17,000
11th Corps (Zhangde)	12,000
15th Corps (Zhengdingfu, Zhili)	20,000
16th Corps (Weihui)	19,000
17th Corps (Weihui)	18,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	40,000
Total	214,000 ⁸

Zhang Zonchang

Shandong	120,000 ⁹
Henan Allies (Qiu Yingjie)	8,000
Grand Total:	402,000

5 Although the US report listed Chiang's troops as 345,000, the 4th and 5th armies joined the Wuhan Government and participated in the First Henan Campaign of 1927. In this number, around 100,000 (including the 19th Army (Chen Yi), 26th Army (Zhou Fengqi), and the over 57,000 Sichuan troops) only joined the NRA in name only.

6 Including 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th, 35th, and 36th armies.

7 "The Military Situation," 3/1927, USMI, Reel 5, slides 582-3.

8 "The Military Situation," 4/1927, USMI, Reel 5, slides 584-6.

9 Tian later turned to the north, but his army had little fighting value.

7 June-7 July 1927¹⁰

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Jiangsu-Shandong border)

Total	40,000 ¹¹
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (Baoding-Shijiazhuang and Beijing-Shanhaiguan)	20,000
7th Corps (Beijing Garrison)	15,000
8th Corps (North Bank of the Yellow River)	18,000
9th Corps (Kalgan)	15,000
10th Corps (North Bank of the Yellow River)	17,000
11th Corps (Gaoyang and Dezhou)	12,000
15th Corps (Shijiazhuang)	20,000
16th Corps (Baoding)	19,000
17th Corps (Baoding)	18,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	40,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	224,000
Zhang Zonchang	
Shandong	110,000 ¹²
Henan Allies (Qiu Yingjie)	8,000
Grand Total:	382,000

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek	282,000 ¹³
Yan Xishan	100,000
Feng Yuxiang	90,000
Grand Total	472,000
The Wuhan Government (Abstracted estimation)	
Tang Shengzhi	95,000 ¹⁴
Neutral Armies in Henan	125,000

¹⁰ "The Military Situation," 5/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slides 122-4.

¹¹ Although the US report listed Chiang's troops as 345,000, the 4th and 5th armies joined the Wuhan Government and participated in the First Henan Campaign of 1927. In this number, around 100,000 (including the 19th Army (Chen Yi), 26th Army (Zhou Fengqi), and the over 57,000 Sichuan troops) only joined the NRA in name only.

¹² Including 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th, 35th, and 36th armies.

¹³ "The Military Situation," 6/6/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slides 111-3.

¹⁴ The Americans estimated that the Fengtian Army lost 26,000 men in Henan, Ibid., 111

8 July-3 August 1927¹⁵

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Jiangsu-Shandong border)

Total	70,000 ¹⁶
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (Baoding, Beijing-Shanhaiguan)	20,000
7th Corps (Beijing Garrison)	15,000
8th Corps (Baoding)	18,000
9th Corps (Kalgan)	15,000
10th Corps (Dingzhou)	17,000
11th Corps (Baoding)	12,000
15th Corps (Dingzhou, south of Baoding)	20,000
16th Corps (Baoding)	19,000
17th Corps (Baoding)	18,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	40,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	224,000
Zhang Zonchang	
Shandong	110,000
Henan Allies (Qiu Yingjie)	8,000
Grand Total:	413,000

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek

Southern Jiangsu-Anhui-Zhejiang	147,000
Xuzhou-Southern Shandong	88,000
Yan Xishan	100,000
Feng Yuxiang	90,000
Grand Total	425,000

The Wuhan Government (Abstracted estimation)

Tang Shengzhi	122,000 ¹⁷
Neutral Armies in Henan	125,000

¹⁵ The Americans estimated that the Shandong Army lost 15,000 men in Anhui-Jiangsu,
Ibid., 111

¹⁶ "The Military Situation," 7/7/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slides 115-7.

¹⁷ Updated according to latest report.

4 August-31 August 1927¹⁸

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Jiangsu-northern Anhui)

Total	60,000 ¹⁹
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (Baoding, Beijing-Shanhaiguan)	20,000
7th Corps (Beijing Garrison)	15,000
8th Corps (Baoding-Zhengding)	18,000
9th Corps (Kalgan)	15,000
10th Corps (Zhengding)	17,000
11th Corps (Central and Southern Zhili)	12,000
15th Corps (Zhengding)	20,000
16th Corps (Baoding)	19,000
17th Corps (Baoding)	18,000
29th Corps (Baoding)	8,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	40,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	232,000

Zhang Zonchang

Shandong	100,000 ²⁰
Henan Allies (Qiu Yingjie)	8,000
Grand Total:	400,000

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek (“retired”, army controlled by Li Zhongren,

He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi	146,000
Yan Xishan	100,000
Feng Yuxiang	100,000
Jin Yun-e	50,000
Total	396,000

The Wuhan Government (Abstracted estimation)

Tang Shengzhi

Other kmt Armies

¹⁸ “The Military Situation,” 31/8/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slides 132-4.

¹⁹ Reduction of 10,000 because of desertion and casualties.

²⁰ Reduction of 10,000 because of casualties, desertion, and disbandment of ill and underage troops.

Zhang Fakui	25,000
Neutral Armies in Henan	75,000

1 September-29 September 1927²¹

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Jiangsu-northern Anhui)	
Total	50,000 ²²
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (Baoding, Beijing-Shanhaiguan)	20,000
7th Corps (Beijing Garrison)	15,000
8th Corps (Baoding-Zhengding)	18,000
9th Corps (Kalgan)	15,000
10th Corps (Zhengding)	17,000
11th Corps (Central and Southern Zhili)	12,000
15th Corps (Zhengding)	20,000
16th Corps (Baoding)	19,000
17th Corps (Baoding)	18,000
29th Corps (Baoding)	8,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	40,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	232,000
Zhang Zonchang	
Shandong	100,000
Henan Allies (Qiu Yingjie)	8,000
Grand Total:	390,000

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek ("retired", army controlled by Li Zhonggren, He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi)	118,000
Yan Xishan	100,000
Feng Yuxiang	100,000
Total	318,000
The Wuhan Government (Abstracted estimation)	
Tang Shengzhi	107,000

²¹ "The Military Situation," 29/9/1927, USM1, Reel 8, slides 137-9.

²² Reduction of 10,000 because of casualties, probably more.

Other KMT Armies

Zhang Fakui	20,000
Li Jishen	40,000
Neutral Armies in Henan	125,000²³

30 September-24 October 1927²⁴

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Jiangsu-northern Anhui)

Total	50,000
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (Baoding, Beijing-Shanhaiguan)	10,000
7th Corps (Beijing Garrison)	15,000
8th Corps (Baoding-Zhengding)	18,000
9th Corps (Kalgan)	15,000
10th Corps (Zhengding)	15,000
11th Corps (Central and Southern Zhili)	12,000
15th Corps (Zhengding)	15,000
16th Corps (Baoding)	17,000
17th Corps (Baoding)	16,000
29th Corps (Baoding)	8,000
30th Corps (Beijing – previously part of the 6th Corps)	10,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	30,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	226,000 ²⁵

Zhang Zongchang

Shandong	120,000 ²⁶
Henan Allies (Qiu Yingjie)	8,000
Grand Total:	404,000

²³ Jin Yun-e again declared independence.

²⁴ "The Military Situation," 24/10/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slides 148-50.

²⁵ Losses during the early phase of the Fengtian-Shanxi War taken into account.

²⁶ 20,000 Henan troops gone over to Zhang Zongchang when the Zhili-Shandong Army marched west.

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek ("retired", army controlled by Li Zhongren,	
He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi)	149,000
Yan Xishan	90,000 ²⁷
Feng Yuxiang	80,000 ²⁸
Total	318,000
The Wuhan Government (Abstracted estimation)	
Tang Shengzhi	107,000
Other KMT Armies	
Zhang Fakui	25,000
Li Jishen	30,000
Independent Armies	
Jin Yun-e	50,000
Neutral Armies in Henan	75,000 ²⁹

25 October 1927-22 November³⁰

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Jiangsu-northern Anhui, organized into 5 corps)	
Total	50,000
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (Beijing-Suiyuan Railway)	17,000
8th Corps (Juzhou)	18,000
9th Corps (Beijing-Suiyuan Railway)	15,000
10th Corps (Fuping)	15,000
11th Corps (Baoding to Shijiazhuang)	12,000
12th Corps (Beijing-Suiyuan Railway)	15,000
15th Corps (Baoding)	15,000
16th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	17,000
17th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	16,000
29th Corps (Baoding)	8,000
30th Corps (Taizhou, Shanxi)	18,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	80,000

²⁷ Reduction due to combat losses and desertion.

²⁸ Combat losses and part of Liu Zhenhua's army turned over to Ankouchun.

²⁹ Jin Yun-e again declared independence.

³⁰ "The Military Situation," 22/11/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slides 161-3.

Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	276,000 ³¹
Zhang Zonchang	
1st Corps (Jinan)	
7th Corps (Xuzhou)	
11th Corps (Xuzhou)	
12th Corps (Xuzhou)	
14th Corps (South of Shijiazhuang)	
17th Corps (Xuzhou)	
2nd Corps (Longhai Railway)	
3rd Corps (Longhai Railway)	
5th Corps (Longhai Railway)	
6th Corps (Longhai Railway)	
10th Corps (Jining)	
13th Corps (Jining)	
20th Corps (Jining)	
24th Corps (Jining)	
Total	110,000 ³²
Henan Allies (Qiu Yingjie)	8,000
Grand Total:	444,000

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek (“retired”, army controlled by Li Zhongren, He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi)	255,000 ³³
Yan Xishan	90,000 ³⁴
Feng Yuxiang	90,000
Total	435,000
The Wuhan Government (Abstracted estimation)	
Hunan warlords	87,000
Other KMT Armies	
Zhang Fakui	25,000
Li Jishen	35,000
Independent Armies	
Jin Yun-e	50,000

³¹ Losses during the Fengtian-Shanxi War taken into account

³² Reduction by 10,000 due to combat losses.

³³ Increased because of formation of new units and surrender from the Wuhan Government.

³⁴ Reduction due to battle losses.

Neutral Armies in Henan	75,000 ³⁵
-------------------------	----------------------

Late November 1927

*Anguojun*³⁶

General Headquarters of Anguojun (Zhang Zuolin, He Fenglin)

30th Corps (Yu Zhishan)	(18,000) ³⁷
31st Corps (Zheng Zesheng, ex-Shanxi army)	5,000
Beijing Garrison	8,000
Irregulars and Metropolitan Police	27,911 ³⁸
Machine Guns	168
Artillery	236
Total:	43,000
1st Army (Sun Chuanfang)	
2nd Division (Li Baozhang)	6,000
4th Division (Shangguan Yunxiang)	6,000
7th Division (Liang Hongen)	2,600
8th Division (Cui Jingui)	5,000
9th Division (Duan Chengze)	4,000
10th Division (Zheng Junyan)	7,000
11th Division (Ma Baoheng)	4,000
12th Division (Su Di)	5,000
13th Division (Lu Dianchen)	3,000
14th Division (Liu Shilin)	4,000
15th Division (Song Futian)	5,000
13th Mixed Brigade (Wang Leshan)	900
15th Mixed Brigade (Wang Yazhi)	800
29th Mixed Brigade (Liang Hongpu)	900
30th Mixed Brigade (unknown)	800
1st Reserve Brigade	1000

³⁵ Jin Yun-e again declared independence.

³⁶ Figures, if not specified, come from "Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928," in *Rikugun shō dai nikki* (Records of the Ministry of War, RDN), JACAR, Ref: C01007465200.

³⁷ As the Japanese had grossly overestimated the number of the Fengtian Army, the number of the Fengtian forces will use the American number, in blankets, of the same period.

³⁸ This section includes guards of Ankuochun Headquarters, the Transport Command (responsible for railway traffic), Garrison of Jingshao, the Military Police units, the Metropolitan Police, the police units of the Zhili Province, and various garrison units in Tianjin. See "Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928," slides 32-3.

Small Arms	42,500
Machine Guns	214
Artillery (including mortars)	58
Armored Train (manned by White Russians)	2
Total:	56,000 (50,000) ³⁹
2nd and 7th Army (Zhang Zongchang and Chu Yupu)	
1st Corps (Zhang Zongchang)	15,220
2nd Corps (Zhang Jingyao)	4,800
3rd Corps (Cheng Guorui)	2,000
4th Corps (Fang Yongchang)	8,400
5th Corps (Wang Dong)	
6th Corps (Xu Yuanquan)	8,000
7th Corps (Xu Kun)	12,000 (rifles)
8th Corps (Shi Qingshan)	
9th Corps (Jiang Mingyu, ex-Liu Zhenhua Army)	
10th Corps (Du Fengju)	6,000
11th Corps (Zhang Zongfu)	6,000
13th Corps (Liu Zhilu)	10,000
14th Corps (Sun Huiyuan, ex-Henan local army)	20,000
15th Corps (Chen Wenchao, ex-Wu Peifu Army)	30,000
16th Corps (Yuan Zhenqing)	10,000
17th Corps (Qiu Yingjie, ex-Wu Peifu Army)	8,000 ⁴⁰
18th Corps (Fan Zhongxiu, Henan bandits)	
20th Corps (Li Zaolin)	4,000
22nd Corps (Xu Baochang)	
23rd Corps (Yang Qingchen)	
24th Corps (Pan Hongjun)	
25th Corps (Mao Yongen)	
26th Corps (Zhang Wanxin, ex-Wu Peifu Army)	
27th Corps (Li Yaozheng, ex-Wu Peifu Army)	
28th Corps (Ji Yuanlin, ex-Wu Peifu Army)	
29th Corps (Zhang Jiwu, ex-Yi Jun)	
30th Corps (Yu Xuezhong)	
Total:	(110,000) ⁴¹

39 American estimation in blankets, see "The Military Situation, 22 November 1927," USMI, Reel 8, slide 161.

40 "The Military Situation," 22/11/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slide 161.

41 This excluded the large number of recently incorporated Henan formations. Ibid., 161

3rd and 4th Army (Zhang Xueliang and Han Lunchun, later Yang Yuting)	
8th Corps (Wan Fulin)	(18,000)
10th Corps (Wang Shuchang)	(15,000)
11th Corps (Liu Wei)	(12,000)
15th Corps (Chi Jinchun)	(15,000)
16th Corps (Hu Yukun)	(17,000)
17th Corps (Yong Jin)	(16,000)
29th Corps (Ji Yiqiao)	(8,000)
Artillery Brigade	6,000
Tank Regiments (with accompanying infantry)	2,700
Body Guards Brigade	3,000
Reserves	8,400
Logistics	3,000
Engineers	2,600
Small Arms	118,060
Machine Guns	468
Artillery	1,646 ⁴²
Aircraft	20
Tanks	18
Other vehicles	20
Total:	222,900 ⁴³
5th Army (Zhang Zuoxiang)	
5th Corps (Tang Yulin)	(20,000)
6th Corps (Zhang Zuoxiang)	(17,000)
9th Corps (Gao Weiyue)	(15,000)
12th Corps (Tang Yulin)	(15,000)
Small Arms	31,320
Machine Guns	126
Artillery	328
Total:	45,150 ⁴⁴
6th Army (Wu Junsheng)	
The Manchuria Garrison	(80,000)
Garrison along the Beijing-Mukden Railway and Shanhaiguan	(10,000)

⁴² Of which there were 788 field pieces, 252 "flat-trajectory guns," 486 trench mortars, 120 heavy guns. See "Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928," slide 21.

⁴³ American estimation excluded the auxiliaries.

⁴⁴ Only 9th and 12th Corps were counted as part of the 5th Army Group in the Japanese report, see "Hoku Shina guntai chōsa no ken, 1928," slide 22.

Grand Total of the Anguojun (estimation) (444,000)⁴⁵

22 November-20 December⁴⁶

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Lincheng-Hanzhuang, organized into 5 corps)

Total	50,000
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (Hunyuan, near Datong)	17,000
8th Corps (Juzhou)	18,000
9th Corps (Hunyuan)	15,000
10th Corps (Longquanguan)	15,000
11th Corps (Baoding to Shijiazhuang)	12,000
12th Corps (Hunyuan)	15,000
15th Corps (Shijiazhuang)	15,000
16th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	17,000
17th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	16,000
29th Corps (Shijiazhuang)	8,000
30th Corps (Pingxingguan, Shanxi)	18,000
Jilin Cavalry Corps (Dezhou, Shandong)	10,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	80,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	286,000

Zhang Zonchang

1st Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
7th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
11th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
12th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
14th Corps (South of Shijiazhuang)	
17th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
2nd Corps (Lincheng)	
3rd Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
5th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
6th Corps (Lincheng)	
10th Corps (Jining)	

45 "The Military Situation," 22/11/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slide 162.

46 "The Military Situation," 20/12/1927, USMI, Reel 8, slides 167-9.

13th Corps (Jining)	
20th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
24th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
29th Corps (under Qiu Yingjie, Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
20th Corps (under Yu Xuezhong, in Lincheng)	
Total	100,000 ⁴⁷
Grand Total:	436,000

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek (“retired”, army controlled by Li Zhongren, He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi)	265,000
Yan Xishan	90,000
Feng Yuxiang	90,000
Total	445,000
Other KMT Armies	
Zhang Fakui	30,000
Li Jishen	55,000
Independent Armies	
Hunan warlords	87,000
Jin Yun-e	50,000
Neutral Armies in Henan	75,000

21 December-17 January 1928⁴⁸

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Lincheng-Hanzhuang, organized into 5 corps)	
Total	50,000
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (Yinzhou)	17,000
8th Corps (Juzhou)	18,000
9th Corps (Ningwu)	15,000
10th Corps (Longquanguan)	15,000
11th Corps (Baoding to Shijiazhuang)	12,000
12th Corps (Yinzhou)	15,000
15th Corps (Shijiazhuang)	15,000

⁴⁷ Decreased due to combat losses, but augmented by the addition of Yu Xuezhong's army.

⁴⁸ “The Military Situation,” 16/1/1928, USMI, Reel 8, slides 173-6.

16th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	17,000
17th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	16,000
29th Corps (Shunde)	8,000
30th Corps (Wutai)	10,000
31st Corps (Yinzhou)	18,000
Jilin Cavalry Corps (Dezhou, Shandong)	10,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	80,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	296,000
Zhang Zonchang	
1st Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
7th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
11th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
12th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
14th Corps (near Zhangde)	
17th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
2nd Corps (Lincheng)	
3rd Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
5th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
6th Corps (Lincheng)	
10th Corps (Jining)	
13th Corps (Jining)	
20th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
24th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
29th Corps (under Qiu Yingjie, Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
30th Corps (under Yu Xuezhong, in Lincheng)	
Total	100,000
Grand Total:	448,000

The Nanjing kmt (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek	171,000
Guangxi Clique	115,000
Yan Xishan	90,000
Feng Yuxiang	90,000
Total	445,000
Other kmt Armies	
Cantonese	40,000
Li Jishen	55,000
Independent Armies	
Hunan warlords	87,000

Jin Yun-e	50,000
Neutral Armies in Henan	75,000

17 January-11 February 1928⁴⁹

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Lincheng-Hanzhuang, organized into 5 corps)

Total	50,000
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	17,000
8th Corps (Handan)	18,000
9th Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	15,000
10th Corps (Longquanguan)	15,000
11th Corps (Baoding to Shijiazhuang)	12,000
12th Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	15,000
15th Corps (Shijiazhuang)	15,000
16th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	17,000
17th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	16,000
29th Corps (Shunde-Handan)	8,000
30th Corps (Fanzhi)	10,000
31st Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	18,000
Jilin Cavalry Corps (Dezhou, Shandong)	10,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	80,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	296,000

Zhang Zonchang

1st Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)
7th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)
11th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)
12th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)
14th Corps (Daming-Dezhou)
17th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)
2nd Corps (Lincheng)
3rd Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)
5th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)
6th Corps (Daming-Dezhou)

49 "The Military Situation," 11/2/1928, USMI, Reel 8, slides 230-3.

10th Corps (Jining)	
13th Corps (Jining)	
20th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
24th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
29th Corps (under Qiu Yingjie, Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
30th Corps (under Yu Xuezhong, in Lincheng)	
Total	88,000 ⁵⁰
Grand Total:	436,000

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek	171,000
Guangxi Clique	113,000
Yan Xishan	90,000
Feng Yuxiang	100,000
Total	474,000
Other KMT Armies	
Cantonese	20,000
Li Jishen	65,000 ⁵¹
Independent Armies	
Hunan warlords	80,000
Jin Yun-e	50,000
Neutral Armies in Henan	
	75,000

11 February-10 March 1928⁵²

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Yanzhou-Jining-Western Shandong)	
Total	60,000
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	17,000
8th Corps (Shunde)	18,000
9th Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	15,000
10th Corps (Longquanguan)	15,000
11th Corps (Baoding to Shijiazhuang)	12,000

⁵⁰ 20,000 were disbanded but 8,000 of Qiu Yingjie's troops were added.

⁵¹ Addition of 10,000 by ex-Zhang Fakui's forces.

⁵² "The Military Situation," 10/3/1928, USMI, Reel 8, slides 196-9.

11th Corps Reserves (newly organized, Beijing)	12,000
12th Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	15,000
15th Corps (Suiyuan)	15,000
16th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	17,000
17th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	16,000
20th Corps (under Yu Xuezhong, ex-Shandong 30th Corps, in Handan)	15,000
29th Corps (Shunde-Handan)	18,000
30th Corps (Fanzhi)	10,000
31st Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	18,000
Jilin Cavalry Corps (Dezhou, Shandong)	10,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	80,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	336,000
Zhang Zonchang	
1st Corps (Zaozhuang-Taierzhuang)	
2nd Corps (Zaozhuang)	
3rd Corps (Jinan)	
4th Corps (Linyi)	
6th Corps (Daming-Dezhou)	
7th Corps (Zaozhuang)	
8th Corps (Lincheng)	
9th Corps (Zaozhuang)	
10th Corps (Jining)	
11th Corps (Linyi)	
12th Corps (Jining)	
13th Corps (Caozhou)	
14th Corps (Daming-Dezhou)	
15th Corps (Daming-Dezhou)	
23rd Corps (Caozhou)	
25th Corps (Taierzhuang)	
29th Corps (under Qiu Yingjie, Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
30th Corps (new, southwestern Shandong)	
Total	76,000 ⁵³
Grand Total:	472,000

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek	183,000
-----------------	---------

53 Transfer of Yu Xuezhong's army to the Fengtian Army.

Guangxi Clique	113,000
Yan Xishan	90,000
Feng Yuxiang	100,000
Li Jishen	65,000
Fujian KMT	20,000
Total	571,000
Independent Armies	
Hunan warlords	80,000

10 March-9 April 1928⁵⁴

Anguojun

Sun Chuanfang (Yanzhou-Jining-Western Shandong)

1st Corps	
2nd Corps	
3rd Corps	
4th Corps	
5th Corps	
13th Corps (Guangdong troops served under Zhang Zongchang)	
23rd Corps (Shandong troops)	
Total	67,000 ⁵⁵
Zhang Zuolin	
5th Corps (Rehe)	20,000
6th Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	17,000
8th Corps (Shunde-Zhizhou)	18,000
9th Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	15,000
10th Corps (Longquanguan)	15,000
11th Corps (Shunde)	16,000
12th Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	15,000
15th Corps (Shijiazhuang)	15,000
16th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	17,000
17th Corps (west of Shijiazhuang)	16,000
20th Corps (under Yu Xuezhong, ex-Shandong 30th Corps, in Zhizhou)	15,000
28th Corps (Shunde-Handan)	15,000
29th Corps (Zhizhou)	18,000

54 "The Military Situation," 9/4/1928, USM1, Reel 8, slides 220-3.

55 Many soldiers were new recruits.

30th Corps (Fanzhi)	10,000
31st Corps (North of Yanmenguan)	18,000
Jilin Cavalry Corps (Dezhou, Shandong)	10,000
The Eastern Three Provinces	80,000
Beijing-Mukden Railway to Shanhaiguan	10,000
Total	349,000
Zhang Zonchang	
1st Corps (Zaozhuang-Taierzhuang)	
2nd Corps (Zaozhuang)	
3rd Corps (Jining)	
4th Corps (Linyi)	
5th Corps (Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
6th Corps (Daming-Dezhou)	
7th Corps (Zaozhuang)	
8th Corps (Lincheng)	
9th Corps (Zaozhuang)	
10th Corps (Jining)	
11th Corps (Linyi)	
12th Corps (Jining)	
13th Corps (Caozhou)	
14th Corps (Daming-Dezhou)	
15th Corps (Daming-Dezhou)	
20th Corps (Lincheng)	
25th Corps (Taierzhuang)	
29th Corps (under Qiu Yingjie, Jinan-Taian-Yanzhou)	
30th Corps (new, southwestern Shandong)	
Total	76,000
Grand Total:	492,000

The Nanjing KMT (Abstracted estimation)

Chiang Kai-shek	
Brought forward	100,000
Stayed behind	114,000
Guangxi Clique (Hunan-Hubei-Guangxi)	138,000 ⁵⁶
Yan Xishan (Shanxi)	90,000
Feng Yuxiang (Henan)	100,000

56 Incorporation of the Hunan forces and the local forces in Hunan, Hubei, and Guizhou, disbanded 42,000 of them in the process.

Li Jishen (Guangdong)	65,000
Fujian KMT	20,000
Total	627,000
Independent Armies	
Hunan warlords	12,000

Bibliography

Chinese Primary Sources

Beiyang Huabao (Tianjin) 北洋畫報

Chenbao (Beijing) 晨報

Chunqiu (Hong Kong: Chunqiu banyueshe, 1957-) 春秋

Dagongbao (Tianjin) 大公報

Guowen Weekly (Shanghai, Tianjin) 國聞周報

Junshi zazhi (Nanjing) 國民革命軍軍事雜誌

Shenbao (Shanghai) 申報

Shijie Ribao (Peking) 世界日報

Shuntian Shibao (Beijing) 順天時報

The Eastern Miscellany (Shanghai) 東方雜誌

Yishibao (Tianjin) 益世報

Zhuanji wenxue. Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe. 《傳記文學》。台北：傳記文學出版社。

Zhang, Youluan. “Zhang Zuolin xiang Nanjing zhengfu qiuhe shibaiji, unpublished manuscript for wenshi ziliao (1963). 張友鸞。《張作霖向南京政府求和失敗記》。未刊文史資料手稿。

Wang, Yuting. *Dongbei yinxiang ji*. Shanghai: Shixianshe, 1933. 王雨亭。《東北印象記》。上海：上海實現社，1933。

Wang, Maoting. *Dongsansheng zhi shihuang*. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1929. 王慕庭。《東三省之實況》。上海：中華書局，1929。

Zhu, Qi. *Riben qinlue manmeng zhi yanjiu*. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuju, 1930. 朱契。《日本侵略滿蒙之研究》。上海：商務印書館，1930。

Chen, Bowen. *Dongsansheng yipie*. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuju, 1924. 陳博文。《東三省一瞥》。上海：商務印書館，1924。

“Anguojun Zhilu lianjun di yibai sanshiwulu buchongtuan chuanshou guanyi beijun yu guomingemingjun zai lu yuan su diqu zhanfong ji tanbao guomindang ninghan fenlie junshi dongtai de tongling, tongzhi,” The Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, 1026-543
〈安國軍直魯聯軍第一百卅五旅補充團收存關於北軍與國民革命軍在魯皖蘇地區戰況及探報國民黨甯漢分裂軍事動態的通令〉。南京第二歷史檔案館藏。

“Anguojun Zhilu lianjun xuanjiang dier budui xinbian taochige,” The Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, 1026-543 〈安國軍直魯聯軍宣講第二部新編討赤歌〉。南京第二歷史檔案館藏。

“Anguojun fengxi jiangling Zhang Xueliang Zhang Zongchang deng dianchen zai Yu-Wan jingnei yu Guomin gemingjun jiezhan qingxing,” The Second Historical Archive,

- Nanjing, 1011-834 〈安國軍奉系將領張學良張宗昌等電陳在豫皖境內與國民革命軍接戰情形〉。南京第二歷史檔案館藏。
- “Anguojun Zhilu lianjun duli di san dadui chuanshou guanyu beijun yu guomingemingjun zai yu e yuan su dengsheng zhankuangji tanbao guomindang fangmian junshi huodong de tongzhi,” The Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, 1026-532 〈安國軍直魯聯軍獨立第三大隊收存關於北軍與國民革命軍在豫鄂皖蘇等省戰放及探報國民黨方面軍事活動的通知〉。南京第二歷史檔案館藏。
- Cao, Rulin. *Yisheng zhi huiyi*. Hong Kong: Chunqiu zazhishe, 1966. 曹汝霖。《一生之回憶》。香港：春秋雜誌社，1966。
- Chen, Tsunkung. (interview); Guan, Manli (record). *Zhang Shilun xiansheng fangwen jilu*. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1986. 陳存恭、官曼莉。《張式綸先生訪問紀錄》。台北：中央研究院，1986。
- Chen, Jiongming. *Zhongguo tongyi chuyi*. Shanghai, 1928. 陳炯明。《中國統一會議》。上海，1928。
- Chen, Pengren (ed.). *Zhang Zuolin yu Riben*. Taipei: Shuiniu chubanshe, 1988. 陳鵬仁。《張作霖與日本》。台北：水牛出版社，1988。
- Chuanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliaowei yuanhui (ed.). *Zhonghua wenshi ziliaowenku*, Vols. 1-20. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1995. 全國政協文史資料委員會編。《中華文史資料文庫》。北京：中國文史出版社，1996。
- Ding, Wenjiang. *Minguo junshi jinji* (1926). Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 2007. 丁文江。《民國軍事近紀》。北京：中華書局，2007。
- Dongya tungwen hui. *Duihua huayilu*. Beijing, 1959. 東亞同文會。《對華回憶錄》(日：對支回顧錄)。北京：商務印書館，1959。
- Du, Chunhe. Lin, Binsheng. Qiu, Quanzheng (eds.). *Beiyang junfa shiliao xuanji*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe: Xinhua shudian Beijing faxingsuo, 1981. 杜春和、林斌生、丘權政編。《北洋軍閥史料選輯》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，1981。
- Fujioka, Hiraku. Wu, Zhiqiang (tr.). *Manmung jingji daguan* (1929). Taipei: Wenhui chubanshe, 1999. 藤岡啓；吳自強譯。《滿蒙經濟大觀(1929)》。台北：文海出版社，1999。
- Gao, Wen. *Liaoning wenshi renwu lu*. Shenyang: Liaoning renwen chubanshe, 1993. 高文。《遼寧文史人物錄》。瀋陽：遼寧人民出版社，1993。
- Gu, Tiaosun. *Jiazi neiluan shimo jishi* (1924). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007. 吉齋孫。《甲子內亂始末記實》。北京：中華書局，2007。
- Gu, Tiaosun. *Yichou junfa bianluan jishi* (1926). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007.
- Gu, Tiaosun. 《月丑內亂始末記實》。北京：中華書局，2007。
- Guangzhou shi zhengxie xuexi he wenshi ziliaowei yuanhui. *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao cuangao xuanbian*, Vol. 4. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2008. 廣州市政協學習和文史資料委員會。《廣州市文史資料存稿選編》。北京：中國文史出版社，2008。

- Guo, Tingyi. *Wang Chongping xiansheng fangwen jilu*. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1996. 郭廷以。《汪崇屏先生訪問紀錄》。台北：中央研究院，1996。
- Guo, Tingyi. *Ji Yiqiao xiansheng fangwen jilu*. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1985.
- Guo, Tingyi. 《戢翼翹先生訪問紀錄》。台北：中央研究院，1985。
- Guowen zhoubaoshe (ed.). *Guoneiwai yizhou dashiji*. Taipei: Wenhui chubanshe, 1985. 國民週報社編。《國內外一週大事記》。台北：文海出版社，1985。
- He, Zhuguo. “Dongbeijun duikang beifa de bufen shifang” (1955), unpublished manuscript. 何柱國。《東北軍對抗北伐的部份實況》，未刊文史資料手稿。
- Henan difang shizhi bianji weiyuanhui. *Beifa zhanzheng zai Henan*. Zhengzhou, Henan renmin chubanshe, 1985. 河南地方史誌編輯委員會。《北伐戰爭在河南》鄭州：河南人民出版社，1985。
- Huang, Jiamo. *Bai Chongxi jianjun beifa shiliao*. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1994. 黃嘉謨。《白崇禧將軍北伐史料》。台北：中央研究院近代史研究所，1994。
- Ji, Xiaofen. Shen, Youyi (eds.). *Zhonghua Minguoshi shiliao waibian: qian Riben Moci yanjiusuo qingbao ziliao*. Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1996. 季嘯風、沈友益等編。《中華民國史史料外篇：前日本末次研究所情報資料》。桂林：廣西師範大學出版社，1996。
- Jiang, Shenghuang. *Shiqi niandao beifa quanjun zuozhan jihu mingling jingguo hebian*. Nanjing: Junyong tushushe, 1931. 江聲煌。《十七年度北伐全軍作戰計劃命令經過合編》。南京：軍用圖書社，1931。
- Jiang, Yongjing. *Beifa shiqi de zhengzhi shiliao: yijiu erqi nian de Zhongguo*. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1981. 蔣永敬。《北伐時期的政治史料：一九二七年的中國》。台北：正中書局，1981。
- Jiang, Zuobin. *Jiang Zuobin huiyilu*. Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1967. 蔣作賓。《蔣作賓回憶錄》。台北：傳記文學出版社，1967。
- Jingshi wenshe (ed.). *Minguo Jingshi Wenbian*. Taipei: Wenxing shudian, 1962. 經世文社。《民國經世文編》。台北：文星出版社，1962。
- Koo, V.K. Wellington. *Gu Weijun huiyilu*. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983. 顧維鈞。《顧維鈞回憶錄》。北京：中華書局，1983。
- Lai, Xinxia. *Jin sanbainian renwu nianpu zhijian lu*. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1983. 來新夏。《近三百年人物年譜知見錄》。上海：上海人民出版社，1983。
- Li, Hengzhen. Xu, Datong. Zhang, Jinshou. “Wo-men suo zhidao de Zhang Zongchang” in *Shandong wensi ziliao xuanji*, No. 3. Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1982, pp. 1-23. 李恒珍。〈我們所知道的張宗昌〉，《山東文史資料選輯》，第3輯。濟南：山東人民出版社，1982，頁1-23。
- Li, Pinxian. *Li Pinxian huiyilu*. Taipei: Zhongwai tushu chubanshe, 1975. 李品仙。《李品仙回憶錄》。台北：中外圖書出版社，1975。

- Li, Zaolin. *Wode Beiyang junlu shengya*. Beijing: Jiuzhou tushu chubanshe, 1998. 李藻麟。《我的北洋軍旅生涯》。北京：九洲圖書出版社，1998。
- Liang, Qichao. *Yinbingshi heji*. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989. 梁啟超。《飲冰室合集》。北京：中華書局，1989。
- Liaoning sheng danganguan (ed.). *Fengxijunfa dangan shiliao huibian*. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe; Xianggang: Dipingxian chubanshe, 1990. 遼寧省檔案館編。《奉系軍閥檔案史料匯篇》。南京：江蘇古籍出版社；香港地平線出版社，1990。
- Liaoning sheng danganguan. *Fengxijunfa midian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985)
- Liaoning sheng danganguan. 《奉系軍閥密電》。北京：中華書局，1985。
- Liaoning sheng danganguan. *Fengxijunfa mixin xuanji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993)
- Liaoning sheng danganguan. 《奉系軍閥密信選輯》。北京：中華書局，1993。
- Liaoning sheng danganguan. *Liaoning Sheng danganguan zhencang Zhang Xueliang dangan* (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999)
- Liaoning sheng danganguan. 《遼寧省檔案館珍藏張學良檔案》。桂林：廣西師範大學出版社，1999。
- Liaoning shengwei dangshi yanjiushi. *Liaoning dangshi renwuzhuan*. Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 2006. 遼寧省委黨史研究室。《遼寧黨史人物傳》。瀋陽：遼寧人民出版社，2006。
- Linyishi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui. *Linyi wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 8. Linyi: Linyi wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1991. 臨沂市委員會文史資料委員會。《臨沂文史資料》，第8卷。臨沂：臨沂文史資料委員會，1991。
- Liu, Fenghan. Zhang, Li. Mao, Jinling. *Ding Zhipan xiansheng fangwen jilu*. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1991. 劉鳳翰、張力、毛金陵。《丁治磐先生訪問紀錄》。台北：中央研究院，1991。
- Liu, Mou'en. Cheng, Yufeng. *Liu Mou'en huiyilu*. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1996. 劉茂恩。《劉茂恩回憶錄》。台北：臺灣學生書局，1996。
- Liu, Yifen. *Minguo zhengshi shiyi*. Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 1998. 劉以芬。《民國政史拾遺》。上海：上海書店，1998。
- Liu, Zhi. *Wode huiyi*. Taibei, Wenhai chubanshe, 1982. 劉峙。《我的回憶》。台北：文海出版社，1982。
- Mi, Rucheng. *Zhonghua Minguo tielushi ziliao*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002. 滅汝成。《中華民國鐵路史資料》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2002。
- Pan, Yuming. "Dongbei hangkong jianshi ziliao," (1960s), unpublished manuscript. 潘裕明。《東北航空簡史資料》，未刊文史資料手稿。
- Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (ed.). *Wenshi ziliao cungao xuanbian jingxuan*. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2002. 全國政協文史資料委員會編。《文史資料存稿選編精選》。北京：中國文史出版社，2002。
- Quanguo zhengxie. *Guangdong sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui*, *Guomin gemingjun beifa qinlaji*. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1994. 全國政協廣東省

- 政協文史資料委員會。《國民革命北伐親歷記》。北京：中國文史出版社，1994。
- Rong, Mengyuan. Zhang, Bofeng (eds.). *Jindai baihai*. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe; Chengdu: Xinhua shudian, 1985. 積孟源、章伯鋒編。《近代稗海》。成都：四川人民出版社；新華書店，1985。
- Shandong sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (ed.). *Tufejunfa Zhang Zongchang*. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1991. 山東省政協文史資料委員會編。《土匪軍閥張宗昌》。北京：中國文史出版社，1991。
- Shandong sheng Shanghe xian weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.). *Shanghe wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 4. Shanghe: Shanghe wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1994. 山東省商河縣委員會文史資料研究委員會編。《商河文史資料》，第4卷。商河：商河文史資料委員會，1994。
- Shen, Yunlong (ed.). *Huang Yingbai xiansheng nianpu changpian*. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1976. 沈雲龍。《黃膺白先生年譜長篇》。台北：文海出版社，1976。
- Shen, Yunlong. *Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan*, Vol. 1-3. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1966.
- Shen, Yunlong. 《近代中國史料叢刊》。台北：文海出版社，1966。
- Shen, Yunlong. *Shi Jingting jiangjun koushu nianpu*. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1997.
- Shen, Yunlong. 《石敬庭將軍口述年譜》。台北：中央研究院，1997。
- Shen, Yunlong. *Wang Tiehan xiansheng fangwen jilu*. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1985.
- Shen, Yunlong. 《王鐵漢先生訪問紀錄》。台北：中央研究院，1985。
- Si, Wenqi (ed.). *He Zhuguo jiangjun shengping*. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1992. 施文淇編。《何柱國將軍生平》。北京：中國文史出版社，1992。
- Su, Zhirong et al. *Bai Chongxi huiyilu*. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987. 蘇志榮。《白崇禧回憶錄》。北京：解放軍出版社，1987。
- Tanabe, Tanejirō. *Dongsansheng guanshenlu*. Dairen: Dongsansheng guanshenlu kanxingju, 1924. 田邊種治郎。《東三省官紳錄》。大連：東三省官紳錄刊行局，1924。
- Tang, Degang (ed.). *Li Zongren huiyilu*. Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1995. 唐德剛。《李宗仁回憶錄》。上海：華東師範大學出版社，1995。
- Tian, Yunqing. Pan, Zhenying. "Sun Chuanfang toukao Zhang Zuolin qianhou,"(1962) unpublished manuscript. 田蘊清、潘振英。《孫傳芳投靠張作霖前後》，未刊文史資料手稿。
- Wan, Renyuan. Fang, Qingqiu. (eds.), *Zhonghua Mingguoshi shiliao changbian*. Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1993. 萬仁元、方慶秋編。《中華民國史史料長編》。南京：南京大學出版社，1993。
- Wang, Guangdi (Sima Sangdun). *Zhang laoshuai yu Zhang shaoshui*. Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1984. 司馬桑敦。《張老帥與張少帥》。台北：傳記文學出版社，1984。

- Wang, Yuchao. *Beiyang renshi hua cangsang*. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1993.
王毓超。《北洋人士話滄桑》。北京：中國文史出版社，1993。
- Wang, Zanting. *Gensui Feng Yuxiang ershiyu nian*. Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe: Shandong sheng xinhua shudian, 1983. 王贊亭。《跟隨馮玉祥二十餘年》。濟南：山東人民出版社；山東省新華書店發行，1983。
- Wei, Yan-hui (ed.). *Li Han-hun jiangjun beifa kangRi shilu*. Guangzhou: Zhong-guo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Wu-chuan xian weiyuanhui, 1988. 韋燕徽。《李漢魂將軍北伐抗日實錄》。廣州：中國人民政治協商會議吳川縣委員會，1988。
- Wu, Ji. *Beiyangpai de qiyuanji qi bengkui* (1937). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007. 吳虬。
《北洋派崛起源及其崩》。北京：中華書局，2007。
- Wu Peifu xiansheng ji bianji weiyuanhui. *Wu Peifu xianshengji*. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1960. 吳佩孚先生集編輯委員會。《吳佩孚先生集》。台北：吳佩孚先生集編輯委員會，1960。
- Xia'an huigao nianpu bianyinhui. *Ye Xia'an xiansheng nianpu*. Shanghai: Xia'an huigao nianpu bianyinhui, 1946. 遇菴匯稿年譜編印會編。《葉遇菴先生年譜》。上海：遇菴匯稿年譜編印會，1946。
- Xiong, Xiling. *Manzhou shiyeann*. Shanghai, 1908. 熊希齡。《滿洲實業案》。上海，1908。
- Xu, Yishi. *Yijialu xiaopin*. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009. 徐一士。《亦佳廬小品》。北京：中華書局，2009。
- Yan Bochuan xiansheng jinian huibian. *Yan Bochuan xiansheng yaodian lu*. Taipei: Yan Bochuan xiansheng jinianhui, 1996. 閻百川先生紀念會編。《閻百川先生要電錄》。台北：閻百川先生紀念會，1996。
- Yan, Huiqing. Wu, Jianyong. Li, Baochen. Ye, Fengmei (tr.). *East-West Kaleidoscope, 1877-1944: an Autobiography by W.W. Yen*. Beijing: shangwu yinshuguan, 2003. 顏惠慶著；吳建雍、李寶臣、葉鳳美譯。《顏惠慶回憶錄》。北京：商務印書館，2003。
- Yang, Haiqing. Sun, Shili. Zhang, Deying (eds.). *Xinhai geming xijian shiliao huibian*. Beijing: Zhonghua quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 1997. 陽海清、孫式禮、張德英編。《辛亥革命稀見史料匯編》。北京：中華全國圖書館文獻縮微複製中心，1997。
- Yao, Dongfan. et al. *Guo Songling fanfengjianwen*. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2008. 姚東藩等。《郭松齡反奉見聞》。北京：中華書局，2008。
- Yu, Juemin. *Manzhou youhuan shi*. Tianjin, 1929. 予覺民。《滿洲憂患史》。天津，1929。
- Yuan, Jinghua (ed.). *Zhang Shizhao xiansheng nianpu*. Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2001. 袁景華。《章士釗先生年譜》。長春：吉林人民出版社，2001。
- Zang, Zhuo; Cai, Dengshan (ed.). *Zang Zhuo huiyilu*. Taipei: Independent Author, 2015. 暱卓；蔡登山編。《臧卓回憶錄》。台北：獨立作家，2015。

- Zhang, Bofeng. Li, Zhongyi. *Beiyangjunfa, 1912-1928*. Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe; Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1990. 章伯鋒、李宗一主編；編者聞黎明、李學通、王善中。《北洋軍閥，1912-1928》，卷1-6。武漢：武漢出版社；北京：新華書店，1990。
- Zhang, Pengyuan. Lin, Quan, Zhang, Junhong. *Yu Da xiansheng fangwen jilu*. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1989. 張朋園、林泉、張俊宏。《於達先生訪問紀錄》。台北：中央研究院，1985。
- Zhang, Youkun, et al. (eds.). *Zhang Xueliang nianpu*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2009. 張友坤等編。《張學良年譜》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2009。
- Zhang, Yousan. "Yijiу erba nian Zhang Zuolin Beijing huairentang ying yishang guanyu-an xunhua," unpublished manuscript, 1964. 張友三。《1928年張作霖北京懷仁堂營以上官員訓話》，未刊文史資料手稿。
- Zhengxie Dalian shi Jinzhou qu wenshi ziliaoj weiyuanhui. *Wang Yongjiangjinian wenji*. Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 1993. 政協大連市金州區文史資料委員會。《王永江紀念文集》。大連：大連出版社，1993。
- Zhengxie Henan Sheng Luoyang Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliaoj yanjiu weiyuanhui. *Luoyang wenshi ziliaoj*. Luoyang: Zhengxie Henan Sheng Luoyang Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliaoj yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1985-. 中國人民政治協商會議河南省洛陽市委員會文史資料研究委員會。《洛陽文史資料》。洛陽：中國人民政治協商會議河南省洛陽市委員會文史資料研究委員會，1985-。
- Zhengxie Shengyang shi Dadongqu weiyuanhui wenshi ziliaoj weiyuanhui (ed.). *Dadong wenshi ziliaoj*. Dadong, 1987-. 政協沈陽市大東區委員會文史資料委員會編。《大東文史資料》。大東：大東區委員會文史資料委員會，1987-。
- Zhengxie Shenyang Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliaoj yanjiu weiyuanhui. *Shenyang wenshi ziliaoj*. Shenyang: Zhengxie Shenyang Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliaoj yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1981-. 政協瀋陽市委員會文史資料研究委員會。《瀋陽文史資料》。瀋陽：政協瀋陽市委員會文史資料研究委員會，1981-。
- Zhengxie Tianjin shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliaoj yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.). *Tianjin wenshi ziliaoj xuanji*. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1978-. 中國人民政治協商會議天津市委員會文史資料研究委員會編。《天津文史資料選輯》。天津：天津人民出版社，1978。
- Zhengxie Yiquan wenshi ziliaoj weiyuanhui (ed.). *Yiquan wenshi ziliaoj*, Vol. 4. Yiquan: Zhengxie Yiquan wenshi ziliaoj weiyuanhui, 1985. 政協衣川文史資料委員會。《衣川文史資料》。衣川：衣川文史資料委員會，1985。
- Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi diyi yanjiubu. *Liangong (Bu) gongchan guoji yu Zhongguo guomin geming yundong, 1926-1927*. Beijing: Beijing tushuguan; Xinhua shudian, 1998. 中共中央檔案研究室第一研究部。《聯共布共產國際與中國國民革命運動》。北京：北京圖書出版社，1997。

- Zhongguo dier lishi dangangan (ed.). *Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian*. Nanjing, Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1979. (ZMDZH) 中國第二歷史檔案館編。《中華民國史檔案資料匯篇》。南京：江蘇人民出版社，1979。
- Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Yanshi Xian weiyuanhui xuexi, wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui. *Yanshi wenshi ziliao*. Yanshi: Yanshi Xian weiyuanhui xuexi, wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1987-. 中國人民政治協商會議偃師縣委員會學習、文史資料研究委員會。《偃師文史資料》。偃師：偃師縣委員會學習、文史資料研究委員會，1987-。
- Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Hebei Sheng Zhuozhou Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui. *Zhuozhou wenshi ziliao*. Zhuozhou: Hebei Sheng Zhuozhou Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1988-. 中國人民政治協商會議河北省涿州市委員會文史資料委員會編。《涿州文史資料》。涿州：河北省涿州市委員會文史資料委員會，1988-。
- Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Jilin weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui. *Jilin wenshi ziliao xuanji*. Jilin: Jilin weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1964-. 中國人民政治協商會議吉林委員會文史資料研究委員會。《吉林文史資料選輯》。吉林：吉林委員會文史資料研究委員會，1964-。
- Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Liaoning Sheng weiyuanhui wenshi zhiliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.). *Liaoning wenshi ziliao*. Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1965-. 中國人民政治協商會議遼寧省委員會文史資料研究委員會編。《遼寧文史資料》。瀋陽：遼寧人民出版社，1965-。
- Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui. *Wenshi ziliao xuanji*. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1960-. 中國人民政治協商會議全國委員會文史資料研究委員會。《文史資料選輯》。北京：中國文史出版社，1960-。
- Zhongguo renmin zhenzhi xieshang huiyi Jiangsu sheng weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui bian. *Jiangsu wenshi ziliao xuanji*. Nanjing: Jiangsu wenshi ziliao bianji bu, 1962-1987. 中國人民政治協商會議江蘇省政協文史資料委員會。《江蘇文史資料選輯》。南京：江蘇文史資料編輯部，1962-1987。
- Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jindaishi ziliao bianjizhu (ed.). *Jindaishi ziliao*. Beijing, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1954-. 中國社會科學院近代史研究所近代史資料編輯部編。《近代史資料》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，1981。
- Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo (ed.). *Bai Jianwu riji*. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1992. 中國社會科學院近代史研究所編。《白堅武日記》。南京：江蘇古籍出版社，1992。
- Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan Jindaishi yanjiusuo (tr.), Aleksandr Ivanovich Cherepakhov. *Zhongguo guomin gemingjun de beifa: yige zhuhua junshi guwen de zhaji*. Beijing: Zhongguo kexue chubanshe, 1981. 亞·伊·切列潘諾夫，中國社會科學院近代史研究

- 所譯。《中國國民革命軍的北伐：一個駐華軍事顧問的札記》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，1981。
- Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo Zhonghua minguo shi yanjiushi (ed.). *Riben waijiao wenshu xuanyi: guanyu xinhai geming*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1980. 中國社會科學院近代史研究所中華民國史研究室編。《日本外交文書選輯：關於辛亥革命》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，1980。
- Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo “Koushu lishi” bianji weiyuanhui (ed.). *Junxi yu minguo zhengju*. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1996. 中央研究院近代史研究所《口述歷史》編輯委員會編。《軍系與民國政局》。台北：中央研究院近代史研究所，1996。
- Zhou, Kangxie (ed.). *Xinhai geming ziliao huiji*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1980. 周康燮編。《辛亥革命資料彙輯》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，1980。

Japanese Primary Sources

- Nippon gaikōbunsho dejitaruakaibu, taishō 14 nen (1925) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/t14-22.html>>. 日本外交文書デジタルアーカイブ，大正14年(1925年)，第2冊下巻。
- Nippon gaikōbunsho dejitaruakaibu, taishō 15 nen (1926) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/t15-21.html>> <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/t15-22.html>>. 日本外交文書デジタルアーカイブ，大正15年(1926年)，第2冊上巻。日本外交文書デジタルアーカイブ，大正15年(1926年)，第2冊下巻。
- Gaimushō (ed.), *Nihon gaiko bunsho. Showa-ki. I* (Documents on Japanese foreign policy, Showa era, Series 1), Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1988-1995) 外務省。《日本外交文書，昭和期 1》。東京：外務省，1988-1995。
- Kokuritsu kōbunsho kan (KK), Ajia rekishi shiryō senta (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records) <<http://www.jacar.go.jp>>. 国立公文書館
- Gaimushō kiroku (GK), Ajia rekishi shiryō senta (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records) <<http://www.jacar.go.jp>> 外務省記録
- Bōei shō bōei kenkyūsho, Rikugunshō dainichiki (RDN), Ajia rekishi shiryō senta (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records) <<http://www.jacar.go.jp>>. 防衛省防衛研究所，陸軍省大日記
- Tōa Dōbunkai. *Tai-Shi kaikoroku*. Tokyo: Taishi Kōrōsha Denki Hensankai, 1936. 東亞同文會。《對支回顧錄》。東京：對支功勞者傳記編纂會，1936。

English Primary Sources

China Year Book, 1925 (Shanghai)

China Mail (Hong Kong)

China Weekly Review (Shanghai)

North China Herald (Shanghai)

Week in China (Peking)

United States Department of State: Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): <<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS>>.

Paul Kesaris (ed.), *U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911-1941* (microfilm) (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1983)

Kenneth Bourne and Cameron Watt (eds.), *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (FOCP)*, Part II, Series E

Robert L. Jarman, *China Political Reports, 1911-1960* (Slough: Archive Editions, 2001)

Bank of Chōsen, *Economic History of Manchuria* (Seoul, 1920)

Booker, Lee Edna. *News is My Job* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1940)

Captain Malcolm Duncan Kennedy, *The Diaries of Captain Malcolm Duncan Kennedy, 1917 – 1946*, 20/4/1927, University of Sheffield Library <http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/library/libdocs/kennedy_diaries.pdf>.

Hansard Records (Commons), UK Parliament <<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1927/apr/11/police-search-peking>>.

John Benjamin Powell, *My Twenty-five Years in China* (New York: Macmillan, c1945)

Lawrence Impey, "Chinese Progress in the Art of War," in *China Weekly Review*, 27/12/1924

Lawrence Impey, *The Chinese Army as a Military Force* (Tientsin, 1926)

Milly Bennett, *On her Own: journalistic adventures from San Francisco to the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1927* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, c1993)

Sir Frederick Maze's Confidential Letters and Reports (SFMCLR), Volume 2, 1926-1929, from *China: Trade, Politics and Culture, 1793-1980 Project*: <<http://www.amdigital.co.uk/Collections/China-Trade-Politics-and-Culture-1793-1980/>>.

The League of Nations Statistical Yearbook on the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, 1926, <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register_files/LeagueofNations1926bookletprotected.doc>.

Who's Who in China (Shanghai: The China weekly review, 1936)

Chinese Secondary Sources

Anhui sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.). *Anhui shengzhi: Junshizhi*. Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1995. 安徽省地方志編纂委員會編。《安徽省誌軍事誌》。合肥：安徽人民出版社，1995。

- Ao, Guangxu. "Shiheng de waijiao: Guomindang yu zhongsu jiaoshe," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 58, Dec 2007, 141-192. 敖光旭。〈失衡的外交—國民黨與中俄交涉〉，《近代史研究所集刊》，第58期，2007年。
- Beifa tongyi liushi zhounian xueshu taolun ji bianji weiyuanhui (ed.). *Beifa tongyi liushi zhounian xueshu yantaohui*. Taipei: Beifa tongyi liushi zhounian xueshu taolun ji bianji weiyuanhui, 1988. 北伐統一六十週年學術討論集編輯委員會編。《北伐統一六十週年學術研討會》。台北：北伐統一六十週年學術討論集編輯委員會，1988。
- Che, Weihan. *Fengxi duiwai guanxi*. Shenyang: Liaohai chubanshe, 2000. 車維漢。《奉系對外關係》。瀋陽：遼海出版社，2000。
- Chen, Shiqi. *Zhongguo jindai haiguan shi: Minguo bufen*. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999. 陳詩啟。《中國近代海關史－民國部分》。北京：人民出版社，1999。
- Chen, Tsunkung. *The China Arms Embargo, 1919-1929*. Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1983. 陳存恭。《對華軍火禁運》。台北：中央研究院近代史研究所，1983。
- Chen, Tsunkung. "Minchuo lujun junfuo zhi shuru," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, No. 6 (1977), pp. 237-309.
- Chen, Tsunkung. 〈民初陸軍軍火之輸入〉，《中央研究院近代史研究集刊》，第6期，1977年。
- Chen, Xunzheng (ed.). *Guomin gemingjun zhanshi chugao*. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1971. 陳訓正編。《國民革命軍戰史初稿》。台北：文海出版社，1971。
- Chen, Youshen. *Chi bokeqiang de chuanjiaozhe: Deng Yanda yu guomin gemingjun zheng-gong zhidu*. Taipei: Lianjing, 2009. 陳佑慎。《持駁殲槍的傳教者：鄧演達與國民革軍政工制度》。台北：聯經出版事業公司，2009。
- Chen, Yuhuan (ed.). *Minguo Guangdongjianglingzhi*. Guangzhou: Guangzhou chubanshe, 1994. 陳予歡編。《民國廣東將領誌》。廣州：廣州出版社，1994。
- Chen, Yuhuan (ed.). *Baodingjunxiao jiangshuai lu*. Guangzhou: Guangzhou chubanshe, 2006.
- Chen, Yuhuan. 《保定軍校將帥錄》。廣州：廣州出版社，2006。
- Chen, Yuhuan (ed.). *Chulu fengmang: Huangpu junxiao diyiqisheng yanjiu*. Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 2007.
- Chen, Yuhuan. 《初露鋒芒黃埔軍校第一期生研究》。廣州：中山大學出版社，2007。
- Chen, Yuhuan (ed.). *Fengyun jihui: Huangpu junxiao dierqisheng yanjiu*. Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 2008.
- Chen, Yuhuan. 《風雲際會黃埔軍校第二期生研究》。廣州：中山大學出版社，2008。
- Chen, Yuhuan (ed.). *Xiongguan manda: Huangpu junxiao disanqisheng yanjiu*. Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 2009.

- Chen, Yuhuan. 《雄關漫道黃埔軍校第三期生研究》。廣州：中山大學出版社，2009。
- Cheng, Linsun. Zhang, Zhixiang (eds.). *Zhang Fuyun yu jindai Zhongguo haiguan*. Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2007. 程麟蓀、張之香編。《張福運與近代中國海關》。上海：上海社會科學院出版社，2007。
- Cui, Pi. *Jindai dongbeiya guojiguanxishi yanjiu*. Changchun: Dongbei shifan daxue chubanshe, 1992. 崔丕。《近代東北亞國際關係史研究》。長春：東北師範大學出版社，1992。
- Dai, Yifeng, et. al. (eds.). *Zhongguo haiguan yu Zhongguo jindai shehui: Chen Shiqi jiaoshou jiuzhi huadian zhushou wenji*. Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 2005. 戴一峰等編。《中國海關與中國近代社會：陳詩啟教授九秩華誕祝壽文集》。廈門：廈門大學出版社，2005。
- Ding, Zhongjiang. *Beiyang junfa shihua*. Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chubanshe, 1992. 丁中江。《北洋軍閥史話》。北京：中國友誼出版社，1992。
- Fan, Lijun. *Jindai guanneiyimin yu zhongguo dongbei shehui bianqian*, 1860-1931. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007. 范立君。《近代關內移民與中國東北社會變遷》。北京：人民出版社，2007。
- Fang, Dewan (Hans van de Ven). "Zhongguo junshi shi beijing xia de Zhongri zhanzheng," in Yang Tianshi, Zhang Yunku (eds.), *Zhongrizhanzheng guoji gongtong yanjiu zhi er: Zhanlue yu lici zhanyi*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2009. 方德萬。〈中國軍事背景下的中日戰爭〉，楊天石、臧運祜編著，《中日戰爭國際共同研究之二：戰略與歷次戰役》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2009。
- Furuta, Kazuko. *Shanghai wangluo yu jindai dongya: shiji shiji houbanqi dongya de maoyi yu jiaoliu*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2009. 古田和子。《上海網絡與近代東亞十九世紀後半期東亞的貿易與交流》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，2009。
- Gao, Yuya. *Beifang baozhi yulun dui beifa zhi fanying: yi Tianjin Dagongbao, Beijing Chenbao wei daibiao de tantao*. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1999. 高郁雅。《北方報紙輿論對北伐之反應：以天津大公報北京晨報為代表的探討》。台北：台灣學生書局，1999。
- Gorelik, S.B. (Sarra Borisovna). Gao, Zhixiong (tr.). *1898-1903 nian Meiguo dui Manzhou de zhengce yu Menhu kaifang zhuyi*. Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991. 戈列里克著；高鴻志譯。《1898-1903年美國對滿洲的政策與門戶開放主義》。哈爾濱：黑龍江教育出版社，1991。
- Guo, Jianlin. *Beiyang zhengfu jianshi*. Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2000. 郭劍林。《北洋政府簡史》。天津：天津古籍出版社，2000。
- Guo, Jianlin. Tang, Aimin. Su, Quanyou (eds). *Minchu beiyang sanda neizhan jishi*. Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe, 2003. 郭劍林、湯愛民、蘇全有。《民初北洋三大內戰紀實》。天津：南開大學出版社，2003。

- Guo, Jianlin. *Wu Peifu zhuan*. Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2006. 郭劍林。《吳佩孚傳》。北京：北京圖書出版社，2006。
- Guo, Jianping. *Fengxi jiaoyu*. Shenyang: Liaohai chubanshe, 2000. 郭建平。《奉系教育》。瀋陽：遼海出版社，2000。
- Guofangbu sihzheng ju. *Beifa zhanshi*. Taipei: Zhonghua dadian bianyinhui, 1967. 國防部史政局。《北伐戰史》。台北：中華大典編纂會，1967。
- Hamashita, Takeshi. Ouyang, Fei (tr.). *Jindai Zhongguo de guoji qiji: chaogong maoyi tixi yujindai Yazhou jingjiquan* (Kindai chūgoku no kokusaiteki keiki), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1999. 濱下武志著；朱蔭貴、歐陽菲譯。《近代中國的國際契機：朝貢貿易體系與近代亞洲經濟圈》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，1999。
- Hao, Bingrang. *Fengxi junshi*. Shenyang: Liaohai chubanshe, 2002. 郝秉讓。《奉系軍事》。瀋陽：遼海出版社，2001。
- Hu, Sheng. *Cong Yapiān zhānzhēng dào Wǔsì yundòng*. Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1981. 胡繩。《從鴉片戰爭到五四運動》。北京：人民出版社，1981。
- Hu, Sheng. *Zhongguo gōngchandang de qishinian*. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1991.
- Hu, Sheng. 《中國共產黨的七十年》。北京：中共黨史出版社，1991。
- Hu, Yuhai. *"Jiu yi ba" shibian qian Dongbei jingnei waiguo junshi shili yanjiu*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006. 胡玉海。《九一八事變前東北境內外國軍事勢力研究》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，2006。
- Hu, Yuhai. Zhang, Wei (eds.). *Fengxi junfa renwu*. Shenyang: Liaohai chubanshe, 2001. 胡玉海、張偉。《奉系軍閥人物》。瀋陽：遼海出版社，2001。
- Hu, Yuhai. *Fengxi zongcheng*. Shenyang: Liaohai chubanshe, 2001. 胡玉海。《奉系縱橫》。瀋陽：遼海出版社，2001。
- Hu, Yuhai. Li, Rong. *Fengxijunfa dashiji*. Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2005. 胡玉海、李蓉。《奉系軍閥大事記》。瀋陽：遼寧民族出版社，2005。
- Huang, Dingtian. *Dongbeiya guoji guanxi shi*. Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999. 黃定天。《東北亞國際關係史》。哈爾濱：黑龍江教育出版社，1999。
- Huang, Daoxuan. "Guanyu Jiang Jieshi diyici xiaye de jige wenti," in *Jindaishi yanjiu* (2001), No. 1, pp. 139-61. 黃道炫。〈關於蔣介石第一次下野的幾個問題，《近代史研究》，第1期，2001年，頁139-161。
- Huang, Xiurong. *Guomin geming shi*. Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1992. 黃修榮。《國民革命史》。重慶：重慶出版社，1992。
- Jiang, Changbin. *Zhong-e guojie dongduan de yanbian*. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2007. 姜長斌。《中俄東段邊界的演變》。北京：中央文獻出版社，2007。
- Jiang, Chaoqun. Wang Tungjin, "Qiansi beiyang junfa dui zhengzhi tongzhi hefaxing de suqiu," in *Journal of Xuchang University*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2007), pp. 106-9. 蔣超群、王

- 東進。〈淺析北洋軍閥對政治統治合法性的訴求〉，《許昌大學學報》，第26卷，第3期，2007年，頁106-109。
- Jiang, Weiguo (ed.). *Beifa tongyi*. Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gongsi, 1980. 蔣緯國編。《北伐統一》。台北：黎明文化事業公司，1980。
- Jiang, Xiusong. Zhu, Zhaixian. *Dongbei minzu shigang*. Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1993. 蔣秀松、朱在憲。《東北民族史綱》。瀋陽：遼寧教育出版社，1993。
- Jiang, Yongjing. *Guomin geming yu Zhongguo tongyi yundong*. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1982. 蔣永敬。《國民革命與中國統一運動》。台北：正中書局，1982。
- Jiang, Yongjing. *Baoluoting yu Wuhan zheng quan* (Taipei: Zhuan ji wenxue chubanshe, 1972)
- Jiang, Yongjing. 《鮑羅廷與武漢政權》。台北：傳記文學出版社，1972。
- Jiangsu Sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui. *Jiangsu Shengzhi: Junshizhi*. Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2000. 江蘇省地方誌編纂委員會。《江蘇省誌軍事誌》。北京：軍事科學出版社，2000。
- Jiao, Yunming. *Jindai dongbei shehui zhuwenti yanjiu*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2004. 焦潤明。《近代東北社會諸問題研究》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，2004。
- Jinian beifa qishi zhounian xueshu yantaohui*. Taipei: Zhonghua junshi xuehui, 1996. 《紀念北伐七十週年學術研討會》。台北：中華軍史學會，1996。
- Jinian beifa zhanzheng qishi zhounian xueshu yantaohui. *Beifa luncong: jinian beifa zhanzheng qishi zhounian xueshu yantaohui lunwen xuan*. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1997. 紀念北伐七十周年學術研討會。《北伐論叢：紀念北伐七十周年學術研討會論文選》。廣州：廣東人民出版社，1997。
- Jin, Yufu. *Dongbei tong shi* (1941). Taipei: Tailian guofeng chubanshe, 1969. 金毓黻。《東北通史》。台北：臺聯國風出版社，1969。
- Kong, Jingwei. Fu, Xiaofeng. *Fengxi junfa guanliaoziben*. Changchun: Jinlin daxue chubanshe, 1989. 孔經緯、傅笑楓。《奉系軍閥官僚資本》。長春：吉林大學出版社，1989。
- Kwong, Chi Man. "Revisiting the Zhang Zuolin-Guo Songling War of 1925," in *Bulletin of Academia Historica*, Vol. 31 (Mar 2012), 1-38. 鄭智文。〈郭松齡事件新探〉，《國史館刊》，第31卷（2012年3月）。
- Lai, Xinxia. *Beiyanjunfa shi*. Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe, 2000. 來新夏。《北洋軍閥史》。天津：南開大學出版社，2000。
- Lai, Xinxia. "Beiyanjunfa yu riben: ershi shiji mo zhongguo xuezhe de yanjiu," in *Xueshu yuekan* (Aug. 2004), 79-86.
- Lai, Xinxia. 〈北洋軍閥與日本二十世紀末中國學者的研究〉，《學術月刊》，2004年8月。

- Li, Baoming. *Guojiahua mingyixia de sishuhua: Jiang Jieshi duì guomin gemingjun de kongjijianjiu*. Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 2010. 李寶明。《國家化名義下的私屬化：蔣介石對國民革命軍的控制研究》。北京：社會科學出版社，2010。
- Li, Deshan. *Zhongguo dongbei guminzu fazhan shi*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003. 李德山。《中國東北古民族發展史》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，2003。
- Li, Enhan. *Beifa qianhou de geming waijiao (1925-1931)*. Taibei: Academia Sinica, 1993. 李恩涵。《北伐前後的革命外交》。台北：中央研究院，1993。
- Li, Jiancai. *Mingdati dongbei*. Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1983. 李健才。《明代東北》。瀋陽：遼寧人民出版社，1983。
- Li, Jiannong. *Zhongguo jinbainian zhengzhi shi*. Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1971. 李劍農。《中國近百年政治史》。台北：商務印書館，1971。
- Li, Liangming. "Lun Yue Fei (Joffe) guanyu Sun Zhongshan, Wu Peifu lianhe tongyi zhongguo de zhengce," in *Shixue yuekan*, Vol. 10 (2003), pp. 122-5. 李良明。〈論越飛關於孫中山吳佩孚聯合統一中國的政策〉，《史學月刊》，第10期，2003年，頁122-125。
- Li, Xin. Li, Zhongyi (ed.). *Zhonghua minguo shi*. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981-. 李新、李宗一編。《中華民國史》。北京：中華書局，1981。
- Li, Xingsheng. *Dongbei liuren shi*. Harbin, heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1990. 李興盛。《東北流人史》。哈爾濱：黑龍江人民出版社，1990。
- Li, Yunhan. *Cong ronggong dao qingdang*. Taipei: Zhongguo xueshu zhuzuo jiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1966. 李雲漢。《從容共到清黨》。台北：中國學術著作獎助委員會，1966。
- Li, Yushu. *Wai menggu chezhi wenti*. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1976. 李毓澍。《外蒙古撤治問題》。台北：中央研究院近代史研究所，1976。
- Liaoning Sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi (ed.). *Liaoning Shengzhi: Junshizhi*. Shenyang: Liaoning kexue jishu chubanshe, 1999. 遼寧省地方志編纂委員會辦公室主編。《遼寧省誌軍事誌》。瀋陽：遼寧科學技術出版社，1999。
- Lin, Mingde. "An-feng tielu gaizhu yu dizhi rihuo yundong," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 2 (Jun, 1971), pp. 345-64. 林明德。〈安奉鐵路改築與抵制日貨運動〉，《中央研究院近代史研究集刊》，第2卷，1971年7月，頁345-364。
- Liu, Jingzhong. *Guominjun shigang*. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2004. 劉敬忠。《國民軍史綱》。北京：人民出版社，2004。
- Liu, Jingzhong. *Feng Yuxiang de qianban sheng: jian duì qi zizhuan "wode shenghuo" bianxi*. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2004.
- Liu, Jingzhong. 《馮玉祥的前半生：兼對其自傳「我的生活」辨析》。北京：人民出版社，2009。

- Lu, Fangshang (ed.). *Lun Minguo shiqi lingdao jingying*. Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuju, 2009. 呂芳上編。《論民國時期領導精英》。香港：商務印書館(香港)有限公司，2009。
- Lu, Ren. *Fushuai yiwen jishi: ji Zhang Xueliang de laozuochen Zhang Zuoxiang*. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1991. 魯仁。《輔帥逸聞紀實：記張學良的老佐臣張作相》。北京：中國文史出版社，1991。
- Lu, Weijun. Wang, Degang. *Sun Chuanfang*. Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 1996. 呂偉俊、王德剛。《孫傳芳》。濟南：山東大學出版社，1996。
- Lu, Yan. "Lun Wang Rongjiang de zhiFeng xixiang," in *Journal of Liaoning Normal University*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2001), 96-8. 魯岩。〈論王永江的治奉思想〉，《遼寧大學學報》，第24卷，第2期，2001年，頁96-98。
- Luo, Zhitian. *Quanshi zhuyanyi: Jindai zhongguo de xixiang shehui xueshu*. Wuhan: Wuhan renmin chubanshe, 1999. 羅志田。《權勢轉移：近代中國的思想社會學術》。武漢：武漢人民出版社，1999。
- Luo, Zhitian. *Luanshi qianliu: minzu zhuyiyu minguo zhengzhi*. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2001.
- Luo, Zhitian. 《亂世潛流民族主義與民國政治》。上海：上海古籍出版社，1999。
- Luo, Zhitian. "Diguo zhuyi zhai zhongguo, wenhua shiye xia tiaoyue tixi de yanjin," in *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, No. 5 (2004), pp. 192-205.
- Luo, Zhitian. 〈帝國主義在中國文化視野下條約體系的演進〉，《中國社會科學》，第5期，2004年，頁192-205。
- Luo, Zhitian. *Jibian shidai de wenhua yu zhengzhi: cong xinwenhua yundong dao beifa*. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006.
- Luo, Zhitian. 《激變時代的文化與政治》。北京：北京大學出版社，2006。
- Mao, Jiaqi. et. al. *Bainian cangsang: Zhongguo guomindang shi*. Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 2005. 徐梁伯、馬振贊、茅家琦。《百年滄桑中國國民黨史》。廈門：鷺江出版社，2005。
- Mao, Jinling. "Beiyang Zhixi jundai zhi yanjiu, 1917-1927," unpublished M.Phil thesis, Chinese Culture University, 1987, now stored in National Central Library, Taipei. 毛金陵。《北洋直系軍隊之研究》，未出版碩士論文，中國文化大學。
- Kawada, Minoru. Wei, Pinghe (tr.). *Showa rikugun no kikseki*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2015. 川田稔著；韋平和譯。《昭和陸軍の軌跡》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2015。
- Mizuno, Akira. Zheng Liangsheng (tr.), *Dongbei junfa zhengquan yanjiu: Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xueliang zhi kangwai yu xiezhu tongyi guonei de guiji* (Taipei: Guoli bianyiguan, 1998) 水野明著；鄭樑生譯。《東北軍閥政權研究：張作霖・張學良之抗外與協助統一國內的軌跡》。台北：國立編譯館，1998。
- Pan, Guoqi. "Beiyang zhengfu shiqi guonei gongzhai zong-e ji qi zuoyong pingxi," in *Jindaishi yanjiu* (2007), No. 1, pp. 76-95. 潘國旗。〈北洋政府時期國內公債總額及其作用評析〉，《近代史研究》，第1期，2007年，76-95。

- Peng, Chuanyung. “E-feng xieding’ shi sulian congxin kongzhi Zhongdong tielu de zai-baoxian tiaoyue,” in *Xiboliyananjiu*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2010), pp. 67-71. 彭傳勇。〈《奉俄協定》是蘇聯重新控制中東鐵路的再保險條約〉，《西伯利亞研究》，第37卷，第3期，2010年，頁67-71。
- Shaanxi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.). *Shaanxi Shengzhi: Junshizhi*. Xian, Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 2000. 鎮西省地方志編纂委員會編。《陝西省誌軍事誌》。西安：陝西人民出版社，2000。
- Shao, Jianguo. *Beifa zhazheng shiqi de zhongri guanxi yanjiu*. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2006. 邵建國。《北伐戰爭時期的中日關係研究》。北京：新華出版社，2006。
- Shen, Yu. *Riben dalu zhengce shi, 1868-1945*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005. 沈于。《日本大陸政策史》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2005。
- Shen, Zhihua (ed.). Yang Kuisong et. al, *Zhong-Su guanxi shigang, 1917-1991*. Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2007. 沈志華。《中蘇關係史綱》。北京：新華出版社，2007。
- Su, Quanyou. *Zhang Zongchang quanzhuan*. Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 2007. 蘇全有。《張宗昌全傳》。北京：經濟日報出版社，2007。
- Sun, Jinji. *Dongbeiya minzu shi yanjiu*. Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1994. 孫進己。《東北亞民族史研究》。鄭州：中州古籍出版社，1994。
- Suzuki, Takashi. Zhou Qiqian (tr.), *Riben diguo zhuyiyu Manzhou*. Taipei; Jinhe chubanshe, 1998. 鈴木隆史原著；周啓乾譯，《日本帝國主義與滿洲》。台北：金禾出版社有限公司，1998。
- Tang, Qihua. “1924 nian zhong-e xieding yu zhong-e jiuyue feizhi wenti: yi mijian yidingshu wei zhongxin de tantao,” in *Jindaiishi yanjiu* (2006), No. 3, pp. 1-23. 唐啟華，〈1924年中俄協定與中俄舊約廢止問題：以密件議定書為中心的探討〉，《近代史研究》，第3期，2006年，頁1-23。
- Tang, Degang (Record).. *Zhang Xueliang koushu lishi* (Oral History of Zhang Xueliang). Beijing: Zhongguo dangan chubanshe, 2007. 張學良口述；唐德剛著，《張學良口述歷史》。台北：遠流出版事業股份有限公司，2009。
- Tao, Juyin. *Wu Peifu zhuan* (1940). Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1998. 陶菊隱，《吳佩孚傳》。上海：上海書店出版社，1998。
- Tao, Juyin. *Beiwayjunfa tongzhi shiqi shihua*. Beijing: sanlian shudian, 1983.
- Tao, Juyin. 《北洋軍閥統治時期史話》。北京：三聯書店，1983。
- Tian, Baoguo. *Minguo shiqi ZhongSu guanxi, 1917-1949*. Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1999. 田保國，《民國時期中蘇關係》。濟南：濟南出版社，1999。
- Tuotuo, Zhangshifuziyu su-e zhimi. Hohhot: Yuanfang chubanshe, 2008. 托托，《張氏父子與蘇俄之謎》。呼和浩特市：遠方出版社，2008。
- Viktor Nikolaevich, Usov. Lai, Mingchuan (tr.). *20 shiji 20 niandai sulian qingbao jiguhan zai Zhongguo*. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2007. 烏索夫著、賴銘傳譯，《二十世紀二十年代蘇聯情報機關在中國》。北京：中國人民解放軍出版社，2007。

- Wang, Fumin. *Minguo junrenzhhi*. Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1992.
王俯民，《民國軍人誌》。北京：中國廣播電視出版社，1992。
- Wang, Guangdi (Sima Sangdun). *Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan*. Hong Kong: Xinghui tushu gongsi, 1986. 司馬桑敦，《張學良評傳》。香港：星輝出版社，1986。
- Wang, Haichen. "Zhang Zuolin yu 'ershiyitiao' jiaoshe," in *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 2 (2002) <<http://www.omnitalk.com/miliarch/gb2b5.pl?msgno=messages/2655.html>>. 王海晨，〈張作霖與二十一條交涉〉，《歷史研究》，第2期，2002年。
- Wang, Hongbin (ed.). *Zhang Zuolin yufengxijunfa*. Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1992. 王鴻濱編，《張作霖與奉系軍閥》。鄭州：河南人民出版社，1992。
- Wang, Hongbin. Xiang, Nan. Sun, Xiaoen (eds.). *Dongbei jiaoyu tongshi*. Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1992. 王鴻濱、向南、孫孝恩編，《東北教育通史》。瀋陽：遼寧教育出版社，1992。
- Wang, Ke. *Minzu yu guojia: Zhongguo duominzu tongyi guojia sixiang de xipu*. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001. 王柯，《民族與國家：中國多民族統一國家思想的系譜》。北京：中國社會科學出版社，2001。
- Wang, Qisheng. "Beifa zhong de manhua yu manhua zhong de beifa," in *Nanjing daxue xuebao*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2004), pp. 78-89. Online version from: <<http://jds.cass.cn/Article/xrzc/xrwk/200510/20051027143924.asp>>. 王奇生，〈北伐中的漫畫與漫畫中的北伐〉，《南京大學學報》，第41卷，第3期，2004年，頁78-89。
- Wang, Qisheng. *Geming yu fangeming: shehui wenhua shiye xia de Minguo zhengzhi*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2009.
- Wang, Qisheng. 《革命與反革命：社會文化視野下的民國政治》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2009。
- Wang, Qisheng. *Guogong hezuo yu guomin geming, 1924-1927*. Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2006.
- Wang, Qisheng. 《國共合作與國民革命，1924-1927》。南京：江蘇人民出版社，2006。
- Wang, Tiehan. *Dongbei junshi shilue*. Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1972. 王鐵漢，《東北軍事史略》。台北：傳記文學出版社，1972。
- Wang, Xiaohua. *Beiyan xiaojiang Sun Chuanfang*. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2000. 王曉華，《北洋梟將孫傳芳》。上海：上海人民出版社，2000。
- Wang, Xinsheng. Sun, Qitai (eds.). *Zhongguo junfashi cidian*. Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1992. 王新生、孫啓泰編，《中國軍閥史詞典》。北京：國防大學出版社，1992。
- Wang, Yuxiang. "Shilun Zhongdonglu shijian yu jiuyiba shibian," in *Shixue yuekan*, 1997, No. 4, 66-71 王玉祥，〈試論中東路事件與九一八事變〉，《史學月刊》，第4期，1997年。
- Wang, Zonghua. Ma, Guying. *Zhongguo da geming shigang (1924-1927 nian)*. Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 1993. 王宗華、馬菊英編，《中國大革命史綱》。廣州：中山大學出版社，1993。

- Wen, Gongzhi. *Zuijin sanshinian zhongguo junshi shi*. Shanghai: Taipingyang shudian, 1930. 文公直，《最近三十年中國軍事史》。上海：太平洋書店，1930。
- Wei, Fuxiang. "Zhang Zuolin yu dongsansheng xianglao huiyi," in *Dongbei difangshi yanjiu* (1992), No. 3, 117-23. 魏福祥，〈張作霖與東三省鄉老會議〉，《東北地方史研究》，第3期，1992年。
- Wei, Fuxiang. "Lun Fengpiao maofang jiqi suiluo," in *Social Science Front Bimonthly* (1986), No. 3.
- Wei, Fuxiang. 〈論奉票毛荒及其衰落〉，《社會科學戰線》，第3期，1986年。
- Wu, Jinying. "Cong dongsansheng shuyi wenti kan qingmo de neizheng yu wajiao," in *Guoshiguan guankan*, Vol. 20 (Jun, 2009), 39-70. 吳俊瑩。〈從東三省鼠疫問題看清末的內政與外交〉，《國史館館刊》，第 20 期，2009 年。
- Wu, Lingjun. *Meiguo yu Zhongguo zheng zhi, 1917-1928: yi nanbei fenlie zhengju wei zhongxin de tantao*. Taipei: Dongda tushu, 1996. 吳翎君。《美國與中國政治，1917-1928：以南北分裂政局為中心的探討》。台北：東大出版社，1996。
- Wu, Zhongli. *Xibei wu Ma*. Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1993. 吳忠禮。《西北五馬》。鄭州：河南人民出版社，1993。
- Xu, Jianping. "Lun Qingmo dongbei xianzheng gaige de tedian," in *Zhongguo bianjiang shide yanjiu* (2004), Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 30-5. 徐建平。〈論清末東北憲政改革的特點〉，《中國邊境史地研究》，第14卷，第 2 期，2004 年，頁 30-35。
- Xu, Jianying. *Minguo shiqi Yingguoyu Zhongguo xinjiang*. Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2008. 許建英。《民國時期英國與中國新疆》。烏魯木齊：新疆人民出版社，2008。
- Xu, Yong. *Zhongguo jindai junzheng guanxi yu "junfa" huayu yanjiu*. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009. 徐勇。《中國近代軍政關係與軍閥話語研究》。北京：中華書局，2009。
- Xie, Hengtian. *Minguo shiqi zhongsu guanxi shi*. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2009. 薛銜天、金東吉。《民國時期中蘇關係史》。北京：中共黨史出版社，2009。
- Yan, Hao. *Beijing de yulun huanjing yu wenren tuanti, 1920-1928*. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2008. 顏浩。《北京的輿論環境與文人團體》。北京：北京大學出版社，2008。
- Yang, Kuisong. *Zhongjian didai de geming: Zhongguo geming de celüe zai guoji beijing xia de yanbian*. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1992. 楊奎松。《中間地帶的革命：中國革命的策略在國際背景下的演變》。北京：中共中央黨校出版社，1992。
- Yang, Kuisong. *Zhonggong yu Mosike de guanxi: 1920-1960*. Hong Kong: Haixiao chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1997.
- Yang, Kuisong. 《中共與莫斯科的關係》。香港：海嘯出版社，1997。
- Yang, Kuisong. *Guomindang de "liangong" yu "fangong"*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2008.

- Yang, Kuisong. 《國民黨的聯共與反共》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2008。
- Yang, Kuisong. "1927 nian Nanjing Guomindang qingdang yundong zhi yanjiu," in Yang Kuisong's own site: <http://www.yangkuisong.net/ztlw/sjyj/000241_10.htm>.
- Yang, Kuisong. 〈1927年南京國民黨清黨運動之研究〉，楊奎松個人網站。
- Yang, Naikun. Cao, Yanxiong. *Jindai dongbei jingji wenti yanjiu (1916-1945)*. Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 2005. 楊乃坤、曹延洵。《近代東北經濟問題研究》。
瀋陽：遼寧大學出版社，2005。
- Yang Tianhong, "Zhifeng zhanzheng zhihou de Beijing zhengzhi – Duan Qirui linshi zhezhengfu duibeiyang tixi de zhenghe," in *Shixue yuekan* (2008), No. 4, pp. 64-72. 楊天宏。〈直奉戰爭之後的北京政治段祺瑞臨時執政府對北洋體系的整合〉，《史學月刊》，第4期，2008年，頁64-72。
- Yang Tianhong, *Zhengdangjianzhi yu Minguo zhengzhi zouxiang*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2008).
- Yang Tianhong, 《政黨建置與民初政治走向》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2008。
- Yang Tianhong, "Zhengdangjianzhi yu minchu zhengzhi zouxiang – cong 'geming junqi, geming dangxiao' kouhao de tichu lunqi," in *Jindaishi yanjiu* (2007), No. 2, pp. 18-39.
- Yang Tianhong, 〈政黨建置與民初政治走向從革命軍起革命黨消口號的提出論起〉，《近代史研究》，第2期，2007年，頁18-39。
- Yang, Tianshi. *Haiwei fangshi lu*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1998. 楊天石。《海外訪史錄》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，1998。
- Yang, Tianshi. *Jiang shi midang yu Jiang Jieshi zhenxiang*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002.
- Yang, Tianshi. 《蔣氏密檔與蔣介石真相》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2002。
- Yang, Tianshi. *Guomindang ren yu qianqi zhonghua minguo*. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007.
- Yang, Tianshi. 《國民黨人與前期中華民國》。北京：中國人民大學出版社，2007。
- Yang, Tianshi. *Tanzhi xingshuai duoshaoshi: Minguo shitan*. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2008.
- Yang, Tianshi. 《彈指興衰多少事：民國史談》。北京：中共中央黨校出版社，2008。
- Yang, Tianshi. *Cong dizhi zouxiang gonghe: xinhai qianhou shishi fawei*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002.
- Yang, Tianshi. 《從帝制走向共和：辛亥前後史事發微》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2002。
- Yang, Xiaoping. *Ma Bufang jiazu de xingshuai*. Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1986.
楊效平。《馬步芳家族的興衰》。西寧：青海人民出版社，2002。
- Yang, Yulian et. al. (eds.). *Qing dai Dongbei shi*. Shenyang: Liaoning sheng xinhua shudian, 1991. 楊余練等編著。《清代東北史》。瀋陽：遼寧教育出版社，1991。

- Yang, Yunruo. Yang, Kuisong. *Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo geming*. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1988. 楊雲若、楊奎松。《共產國際和中國革命》。上海：上海人民出版社，1988。
- Yang, Yuqing. "Guominjun yu e-gong (Bolsheviks) zhongyang zhengzhiju zhongguo weiyuanhui," in *Jindaishi Yanjiu* (2000), No. 3, pp. 117-133. 楊雨青。〈國民軍與俄共（布）中央政治局中國委員會〉，《近代史研究》，第3期，2003年，頁117-133。
- Yao, Huiyuan. "Fengxi junfa tongzhi shiqi de Liaoning zhibi faxing," in *Zhongguo qianbi*, No. 79 (Apr. 2002), pp. 12-6. 姚會元。〈奉系軍閥統治時期的遼寧紙幣發行〉，《中國錢幣》，第79卷，2002年4月，頁12-16。
- Yeh, Pi-ling. "The Chinese History Field's Confutation on Japan's Manchuria-Mongolia Policy after the Mukden Incident-An Inquiry Based on the First Volume of Manchuria in History," in *Bulletin of Academia Historica*, Vol. 11 (Mar 2007), 105-142. 葉碧苓。〈九一八事變後中國史學界對日本「滿蒙論」之駁斥—以《東北史綱》第一卷為中心之探討〉，《國史館學術集刊》，第11卷，2007年3月，頁105-142。
- Yuan, Weishi. *Jindai zhongguo lunheng*. Hong Kong: Roundtable Enterprise, 2006. 袁偉時。《近代中國論衡》。香港：Roundtable Enterprise，2006。
- Zhang, Bibo. *Zhongguo Dongbei jiangyu yanjiu*. Harbin; Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2006. 張碧波。《中國東北疆域研究》。哈爾濱：黑龍江人民出版社，1990。
- Zhang, Bingjun. *Zhongguo xiandai lici zhongyao zhanyi zhianiu*. Taipei, self published, 1977. 張秉均。《中國現代歷次重要戰役之研究》。台北：撰者出版社，1977。
- Zhang, Huateng. *Beiyang jituan jueqi yanjiu, 1895-1911*. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009. 張華騰。《北洋集團崛起研究》。北京：中華書局，2009。
- Zhang, Jungu. *Wu Peifu zhuan*. Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1968. 章君穀。《吳佩孚傳》。台北：傳記文學出版社，1968。
- Zhang, Ming. *Wufu zhiguomeng: Zhongguo junfa shili de xingcheng ji qi shehui zuoyong*. Beijing, Guoji wenhua chuban gongsi, 1989. 張鳴。《武夫治國夢：中國軍閥勢力的形成及其社會作用》。北京：國際文化出版公司，1989。
- Zhang, Nianci. "Zhang Taiyan yu dongsansheng kaifa," in *Shilin* (1993), No. 4. <<http://www.cn-rn.com/crn-webapp/cbspub/secDetail.jsp?bookid=21701&secid=21804>>. 章念馳。〈章太炎與東三省開發〉，《史林》，第4期，1993年。
- Zhang, Pengyuan. *Lixianpai yu xinhai geming*. Taipei: Zhongguo xueshu zhuzuo jiang-zhu weiyuanhui: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1969. 張朋園。《立憲派與辛亥革命》。台北：中國學術著作獎助委員會，1969。
- Zhang, Yong. "From the Eighteen-Star Flag to Five-Color Flag," in *Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2002), pp. 106-14. 張永。〈從「十八星旗」到「五色旗」——辛亥革命時期從漢族國家到五族共和國家的建國模式的轉變〉，《北京大學學報》，第39卷，第2期，2002年3月，頁106-114。
- Zhang, Yufa (ed.). *Zhongguo xiandaishi lunji*. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1980. 張玉法。《中國現代史論集》。台北：聯經出版事業公司，1980。

- Zhang, Yufa. "Xinwenhua yundong shiqi de xinwen yu yanlun, 1915-1923," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1994), pp. 285-329.
 張玉法。〈新文化運動時期的新聞與言論，1915-1923〉，《中央研究院近代史研究所集刊》，第23期，1994年6月，頁285-329。
- Zhang, Yunku. *Jindai riben yatai zhengce de yanbian*. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009. 臢運祜。《近代日本亞太政策的演變》。北京：北京大學出版社，2009。
- Zhang, Yutian et. al. *Zhongguo jindai junshi shi*. Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1983. 張玉田等。《中國近代軍事史》。瀋陽：遼寧人民出版社，1983。
- Zhao, Yuntian. "Qingmo xinzhenqijian dongbei wenhua jiaoyu de fazhan," in *Shiyuan*, No. 5 (2007) <<http://jds.cass.cn/Article/20070922131551.asp>>. 趙雲田。〈清末新政期間東北文化教育的發展〉，《史苑》，第5卷，2007年。
- Zhao, Yunpeng. "Zhang Zuolin beizha qian de yifeng mixin," *Minguo dangan*, No. 3, 2002, pp. 99-101. 趙雲鵬，〈張作霖遭炸前的一封密信〉，《民國檔案》，第3卷，2002年，頁99-101。
- Zhao, Zhongfu. "1920-1930 niandai de dongsansheng yimin," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 2 (Jun, 1971), pp. 325-44. 趙中孚。〈1920-1930年代的東三省移民〉，《中央研究院近代史研究集刊》，第 2卷，1971年6月，頁325-344。
- Zhao, Zhongfu. "Qingmo dongsansheng gaizhi de beijing," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 5 (Jun, 1976), pp. 313-336.
- Zhao, Zhongfu. 〈清末東三省改制的背景〉，《中央研究院近代史研究集刊》，第 5 卷，1976年6月，頁313-336。
- Zhao, Zhongfu. "Xinhai geming qianhou de dongsansheng," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 11 (Jul, 1982), pp. 117-130.
- Zhao, Zhongfu. 〈辛亥革命前後的東三省〉，《中央研究院近代史研究集刊》，第 11 卷，1982年7月，頁117-130。
- Zhao, Zhongfu. "Beiyang shiqi fengxi lingdao jieceng de bianhua," in *Zhongyang yanjiu yuan guoji hanxue huiyi lunwenji*. Taipei: Academic Sinica, 1982, pp. 1541-1570.
- Zhao, Zhongfu. 〈北洋時期奉系領導階層的變化〉，《中央研究院國際漢學會議論文集》。台北：中央研究院，1982，頁1541-1570。
- Zeng, Ruilong. *Jinglüe youyan (979-987): Song Liao zhanzheng junshi zainan de zhanlie fenxi*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003. 曾瑞龍。《經略幽燕(979-987)：宋遼戰爭軍事災難的戰略分析》。香港：中文大學出版社，2003。
- Zeng, Xianlin. Zeng, Chenggui. Jiang, Xia. *Beifa zhanzheng shi*. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1991. 曾憲林、曾成貴、江峽。《北伐戰爭史》。成都：四川人民出版社，1991。
- Zhang, Xueji. *Huang Fu zhuan*. Beijing tuanjie chubanshe, 2005. 張學繼。《黃郛傳》。北京：團結出版社，2005。

- Zheng, Changchun (ed.). *Zhongdong tielu lishi biannian: 1895-1952*. Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1987. 鄭長椿。《中東鐵路歷史編年》。哈爾濱：黑龍江人民出版社，1987。
- Zeng, Zhongkai. "Manqing keju feiqu hou chuantong shiren de dongxiang, 1905-1926 (A study on the Future of Traditional Intellectuals after the Civil Service Examination Abolished in Late Ching China, 1905-1926)" unpublished Mphil Thesis, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. 曾重凱。〈晚清科舉廢除後傳統士人的動向〉，未刊碩士論文，國立政治大學。
- Zhongguo renmin geming junshi bowuguan (ed.). *Zhongguo zhanzheng fazhan shi*. Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 2001. 中國人民革命軍事博物館編。《中國戰爭發展史》。北京：人民出版社，2001。
- Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo; Zhang, Haipeng. et. al. (ed.). *Zhongguo jindai tongshi*. Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2007). 中國近代史研究所；張海鵬等編。《中國近代通史》。南京：江蘇人民出版社，2007。
- Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo Minguo shi yanjiushi, Sichuan shifan daxue lishi wenhua xueyuan bian. *Yijiu erling niandai de Zhongguo*. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005. 中國社會科學院近代史研究所民國史研究室、四川師範大學歷史文化學院編。《一九二〇年代的中國》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2005。
- Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo (ed.). *Zhonghua minguoshizyanjiu san-shinian, 1972-2002*, Vol. 1-3. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2008. 中國社會科學院近代史研究所編。《中華民國史研究三十年》。北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2008。
- Zhongguo wenhua fuxingshe (ed.). *Kangzhan qian shinian zhi Zhongguo* (1937). Hong Kong: Longmen shudian, 1965. 中國文化建設協會編。《抗戰前十年之中國》。香港：龍門書店，1965。
- Zhu Mingshi, "Zhang Zuolin jiuren hailujun dayuanshuai jianwen," in *Liaoning wenshi ziliao xuanji* (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin, 1988), pp. 76-81. 朱銘軾。〈張作霖就任海陸軍大元帥見聞〉。《遼寧文史資料選輯》。瀋陽遼寧人民出版社，1988，頁76–82。
- Zuo, Xiangwen. "Zailun 1929 nian Zhongdonglu shijian de fadong," in *Wenguo dangan*, No. 2, 120-7. 左相文。〈再論1929年中東路事件的發動〉，《民國檔案》，第2期，2004年。

Japanese Secondary Sources

- Bai, Rongxun (Korean). *Higashi Ajia seiji gaikoshi kenkyu: "Kanto kyoyaku" to saiban kankatsukan* (Tokyo: Ōsaka Keizai Höka Daigaku Shuppanbu, 2005. 白榮勛。《東

- アジア政治・外交史研究：「間島協約」と裁判管轄権》。東京：大阪経済法科大学出版部，2005。
- He, Weimin. "Japanese Policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia during Okuma Cabinet and Hara Cabinet," in *The Journal of the study of Modern Society and Culture, Niigata University*, Vol. 37 (Dec., 2006), pp. 129-44. 何 炳民。〈1914年-1921年における日本の満蒙政策：大隈内閣から原敬内閣までを中心に〉，《現代社会文化研究》，第37卷，2006年，頁129-144。
- Ihara, Takushū. *Nihon to Chūgoku ni okeru Seiyo bunka sesshuron*. Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 1999. 伊原 澤周。《日本と中国における西洋文化攝取論》。東京：汲古書院，1999。
- Kaneko, Fumio. *Kindai Nippon ni okeru tai manshū toushi no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Kondō Shuppansha, 1991. 金子文夫。《近代日本における對滿州投資の研究》。東京：近藤出版社，1991。
- Mizuno, Akira. *Tōhoku gunbatsu seiken no kenkyū: Chō Sakurin, Chō Gakuryō no taigai teikō to tainai tōitsu no kiseki*. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1994. 水野明。《東北軍閥政権の研究：張作霖・張学良の対外抵抗と対内統一の軌跡》。東京：国書刊行会，1994。
- Nagoya, Ko. "Manshu ni okeru heikōshō to sono keifu: Tōsanshō heikōshō to kabushiki-gaisha Höten zōhensho," in *Gendai shakai bunka kenkyū*, Vol. 40 (Dec. 2007), 187-204. 名古屋 貢。〈満洲における兵工廠とその系譜：東三省兵工廠と株式会社奉天造兵所〉，《現代社会文化研究》，第40卷，2007年。
- Nishimura, Shigeō. *Chūgoku kindai Tōhoku chiikishi kenkyū*. Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 1984. 西村成雄。《中国近代東北地域史研究》。京都：法律文化社，1984。
- Shibutani, Yuri. *Bazoku de miru "man shū"*. Tokyo: Kodansha, 2004. 濱谷由里。《馬賊で見る「満洲」》。東京：講談社，2004。
- Tobe, Ryouichi. *Nihon Rikugun to chūgoku, "Shina-tsū" ni miru yume to satetsu*. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1999. 戸部良一。《日本陸軍と中国》。東京：講談社，1999。
- Tochigi, Toshio and Sakano, Ryoukichi. *Chūgoku kokumin kakumei - senkanki higashiajia no chikaku hendou*. Tokyo: Chūoudaigaku shuppanbu, 1997. 栃木利夫・坂野良吉。《中国国民革命—戦間期東アジアの地殻変動》。東京：法政大学出版局，1997。
- Ueda, Takako. "Tōhoku ajia ni o keru kajin netowaku no seisei to suitai," in *Gendai chūgoku kenkyū*, No. 18 (2003), 77-83. 上田貴子。〈東北アジアにおける華人ネットワークの生成と衰退〉，《現代中国研究》，第18卷，2003年。
- Yamamoto, Yūzō (ed.). *Manshūkoku no kenkyū*. Tokyo: Rokuin Shobō, 1995. 山本有造編。《満洲国の研究》。東京：綠蔭書房，1995。
- Yamaura, Kanichi (ed.). *Mori Kaku*. Tokyo: Mori Kaku Denki Hensankai, 1941. 山浦貫一編。《森恪》。東京：森恪傳記編纂會，1941。

Yoshiki, Enatsu. et. al. (eds.). *Kindai Chūgoku Tōhoku chiikishi kenkyū no shinshikaku*. Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2005. 江夏由樹等編。《近代中国東北地域史研究の新視角》。東京：山川出版社，2005。

English Secondary Sources

- Atkins, Martyn. *Informal Empire in Crisis: British Diplomacy and the Chinese Customs Succession, 1927-1928*. New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1995.
- Balderton, Theo. *The World Economy and the National Economies in the Interwar Slump*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003.
- Bickers, Robert. *Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism 1900-1949*. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1999.
- Biddle, Stephen. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Bix, Herbert. "Japanese Imperialism and the Manchurian Economy, 1900-31," in *The China Quarterly*, No. 51 (Jul-Sep, 1972), pp. 425-43.
- Black, Jeremy. *War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Black, Jeremy. *Rethinking Military History*. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Black, Jeremy. *The Age of Total War, 1860-1945*. London: Praeger Security, 2006.
- Black, Jeremy. *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Bonavia, David. *China's Warlords*. Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Bond, Brian. *War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- Bond, Brian. *The Pursuit of Victory: from Napoleon to Saddam Hussein*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Borg, Dorothy. *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928*. New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations,, 1947.
- Brandt, Conrad. *Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.
- Brunero, Donna. *Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China: the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 1854-1949*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Chan, Anthony. *Arming the Chinese: the Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-1928*. Vancouver; University of British Columbia Press, 1982.
- Chang, Annie K. "The Wenshi Ziliao Collection of the Center for Chinese Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley," *Twenty-Century China*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2000), 103-108.
- Chen, Jerome. *The Military-Gentry Coalition: China Under the Warlords*. Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1979.

- Ch'i, Hsi-sheng. *Warlord Politics in China: 1916-1928*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Chan, Gilbert and Etzold, Thomas. (eds.), *China in the 1920s*. New York: New Viewpoints, 1976.
- Clark, Christopher. *Iron Kingdom: the Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947*. London: Allen Lane, 2006.
- Cohen, Eliot; Gooch, John. *Military Misfortunes: the Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
- Cohen, Paul. *China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past*. London; New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Cohn, Bernard. *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: the British in India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Cornebise, Alfred. *The United States 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912-1938*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2004.
- Cullen, Louis. *A History of Japan, 1582-1941 Internal and External Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Shavit, David. *The United States in Asia: a Historical Dictionary*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.
- Davis, John. *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Dayer, Roberta. *Bankers and Diplomats in Republican China*. London: Frank Cass, 1981.
- Dikötter, Frank. *The Age of Openness: China before Mao*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008.
- Dikötter, Frank. *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press; London: Hurst & Company, 1992.
- Drage, Charles. *General of Fortune: the Story of One-Arm Sutton*. London: Heinemann, 1963.
- Dreyer, Edward. *China at War: 1901-1949*. New York: Longman, 1995.
- Duara, Prasenjit. *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. London: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Duara, Prasenjit. *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.
- Duara, Prasenjit. *The Global and Regional in China's National Formation*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Eastman, Lloyd. *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Elleman, Bruce. "Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China," in *Modern China*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), pp. 450-80.
- Elleman, Bruce. "The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the CER, 1924-1925," in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 459-86.

- Elleman, Bruce. *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1927*. Armonk, N.Y.; London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
- Elleman, Bruce. *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989*. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Elman, Benjamin. *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
- Erickson, John. *The Soviet High Command: a Military-Political History, 1918-1941*. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
- Etherton, Percy Thomas. and Tiltman, Hubert Hessel. *Manchuria: The Cockpit of Asia*. London: Jarrolds, 1932.
- Fairbank, John. and Twitchett, Denis. *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. n, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 2*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Fenby, Jonathan. *Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present*. New York: Ecco, 2008.
- Fitzgerald, John. *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- Fritters, Gerard. *Outer Mongolia and its International Position*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1949.
- Fromm, Martin. *Producing History through 'Wenshi Ziliao': Personal Memory, Post-Mao Ideology, and Migration to Manchuria*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 2010.
- Fung, Edmund S.K. *The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: the New Army and its Role in the Revolution of 1911*. London and Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1980.
- Fung, Edmund S.K. "The Sino-British Rapprochement, 1927-1931," in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 17 (1983), 79-105.
- Fung, Edmund S.K. *The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Gat, Azar. *War in Human Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Gordon, Andrew. *A Modern History of Japan from Tokugawa Times to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Graff, David and Higham, Robin (eds.). *A Military History of China*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002.
- Gray, Colin. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Gray, Colin. *Strategy and History: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Gray, Colin. *War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007.
- Grayson, Richard. *Britain and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy, 1924-29*. London: Routledge, 1997.

- Green, Colin Robert. "The Spirit of the Military (*Junren Hun*): The Tradition and its Revival in the Republican period," The University of British Columbia, 2003. Unpublished PhD Dissertation.
- Hamashita, Takeshi. *China, East Asia and the Global Economy*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Hamilton, Richard. and Herwig, Holger. *War Planning 1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Harding, Harry. "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations, and Reservations," in *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 136 (Dec 1993), 660-686.
- Harrison, Henrietta. *China: Inventing the Nation*. London: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Hart, John. *The Making of an Army "Old China Hand": a Memoir of Colonel David D. Barrett*. Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985.
- Hou, Fu-wu. *Central government of China, 1912-1928: an institutional study*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957.
- Ho, Ping-ti and Tsou, Tang (eds.), *China in Crisis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Hsiao, Liang-lin. *China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1974.
- Hsü, Shuhsei. *China and Her Political Entity: A Study of China's Foreign Relations with Reference to Korea, Manchuria and Mongolia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1926.
- Hsü, Shuhsei. *Essays on the Manchurian Problem*. Shanghai: China Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1932.
- Imlay, Talbot. and Tofy, Monica Duffy (eds.), *The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military Strategic Planning under Uncertainty*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Iriye, Akira. *After Imperialism: the Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Iriye, Akira. "Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese," in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Nov. 1960), 33-43.
- Isaacs, Harold. *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*. New York: Atheneum, 1968.
- Isett, Christopher Mills. *State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644-1862*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Jansen, Marius. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Jones, Archer. *Elements of Military Strategy: an Historical Approach*. Westport, Conn., 1996.
- Jordan, Donald. *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976.

- Kirby, William C. "The Internationalization of China," in *China Quarterly*, No. 150 (Jun., 1997), 433-458.
- Knox, MacGregor. *Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Kowert, Paul A. *Groupthink or Deadlock: When do Leaders learn from their Advisors?*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002.
- Lary, Diana. *Region and Nation: the Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937*. London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Lary, Diana. "Warlord Studies," in *Modern China*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Oct., 1980), pp. 439-470.
- Lary, Diana. *Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 1911-1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Lary, Diana. "Review: *China at War, 1901-1949* by Edward Dreyer," in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 185-186.
- Lary, Diana. *Republican China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007..
- Lattimore, Owen. *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*. New York: American Geographical Society, 1940.
- Lattimore, Owen. *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict*. New York: Macmillan, 1932.
- Lee, Chong-Sik. *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- Li, Huaiyin. *Reinventing Modern China: Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing* (Hawaii: Hawaii University Press, 2012).
- Liu, Xiaoyuan. *Reins of Liberation: an Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911-1950*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006.
- Liu, F.F. *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.
- Lorge, Peter. *War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900-1795*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Luttwak, Edward. *Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Marshall, Alex. *The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800-1917*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak. *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932*. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001.
- McCord, Edward. "Cries That Shake the Earth: Military Atrocities and Popular Protests in Warlord China," in *Modern China*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 3-34.
- McCord, Edward. "Warlords against Warlordism: The Politics of Anti-Militarism in Early Twentieth-Century China," in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, Special Issue: War in Modern China (Oct., 1996), pp. 795-827.
- McCord, Edward. *The Power of the Gun: the Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

- McCormack, Gavan. *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1977.
- McKercher, B.J.C. and Hennessy, Michael (ed.). *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996.
- Mead, Kullada Kesboonchoo. *The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism*. London; New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Metzler, Mark. *Lever of Empire: the International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
- Millard, Thomas. *China, Where it is Today and Why*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928.
- Mitter, Rana. *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Mitter, Rana. *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000.
- Morton, William. *Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.
- Nathan, Andrew. *Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
- Nish, Ian Hill. *Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period*. Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger, 2002.
- Paine, Sarah. *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5: Perceptions, Power and Primacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Palmer, James. *The Bloody White Baron: the Extraordinary Story of the Russian Nobleman Who became the Last Khan of Mongolia*. New York: Basic Books, 2009.
- Pantsov, Alexander. *The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 1919-1927*. Richmond: Curzon, 2000.
- Paret, Peter. *Clausewitz and the State*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Paret, Peter.; Craig, Gordon and Gilbert, Felix. *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Perry, Elizabeth. *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1980.
- Pillsbury, Michael. *Environment and Power: Warlord Strategic Behavior in Szechwan, Manchuria and the Yangtze Delta*, Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Columbia University (1980).
- Porter, Jonathan. *Imperial China, 1350-1900*. London: Rowan & Littlefield, 2016.
- Powell, Ralph. *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912*. Princeton; Princeton University, 1955.
- Pye, Lucia. *Warlord Politics; Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China*. New York: Praeger, 1971.
- Rawski, Thomas. *Economic Growth in Prewar China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

- Reynolds, Bruce. *Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Rowe, William. *China's Last Empire: the Great Qing*. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Saich, Tony. *The Origins of the First United Front in China: the Role of Smeivliet*. Leiden: Leiden, 1991.
- Schrecker, John. *The Chinese Revolution in Historical Perspective* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004.
- Scott, David. *China and the International System, 1840-1949: Power, Presence, and Perceptions in a Century of Humiliation*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008.
- Shen, Mo. *Japan in Manchuria: An Analytical Study of Treaties and Documents*. Manila: Grace Trading, 1960.
- Sheridan, James. *Chinese Warlord; the Career of Feng Yü-hsiang*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966.
- Sheridan, James. *China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in China History, 1912-1949*. New York: Free Press, 1975.
- Sih, Kwang Tsien, Paul. *The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927-1937*. N.Y.: St. John's University Press, 1970.
- Skinner, William. "Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History," in *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1985), pp. 271-92.
- Skinner, William. *The City in Late Imperial China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977.
- Stamp, Dudley. *Asia: a Regional and Economic Geography*. London: Methuen; New York: Dutton, 1967.
- Stone, David. *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the Wars in Chechnya*. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006.
- Strachan, Hew. *Financing the First World War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Shiroyama, Tomoko. *China during the Great Depression: Market, State, and the World Economy, 1929-1937*. Cambridge, Mass: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Sugihara, Kaoru (ed.), *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949*. Oxford; Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Suleski, Ronald. *Civil Government in Warlord China: Tradition, Modernization and Manchuria*. New York: Peter Lang, 2002.
- Suleski, Ronald. *The Modernization of Manchuria: an Annotated Bibliography*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1994.
- Tang Sheng-hao, Peter. *Russian and Soviet policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1959.
- Tighe, J.R. *Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northwestern Territory and Development in Early Twentieth Century China*. Leiden: Leiden, 2005.

- Tuchman, Barbara. *Stilwell and the American experience in China, 1911-1945*. London: Phoenix, 2001, c1970.
- Tsin Tsang-Woon, Michael, Nation, *Governance, and Modernity in China: Canton, 1900-1927*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- Tsou, Tang. "Interpreting the Revolution in China: Macrohistory and Micromechanisms," in *Modern China*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr., 2000).
- Valone, Stephen. *A Policy Calculated to Benefit China: The United States and the China Arms Embargo, 1919-1929*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
- van de Ven, Hans. "Public Finance and the Rise of Warlordism," in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 829-868.
- van de Ven, Hans. "War in the Making of Modern China", in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, Special Issue: War in Modern China (Oct., 1996), pp. 737-756.
- van de Ven, Hans (ed.), *Warfare in Chinese History*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2000.
- van de Ven, Hans. *War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Wakeman, Frederic Jr. and Edmonds, Richard Louis (eds.), *Reappraising Republican China*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Waldron, Arthur and Cull, Nicholas. "Modern Warfare in China in 1924-1925": Soviet film propaganda to support Chinese militarist Zhang Zuolin," in *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, August, 1995.
- Waldron, Arthur. *The Great Wall of China: from History to Myth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Waldron, Arthur. "The Warlord: Twentieth-Century Chinese Understandings of Violence, Militarism, and Imperialism," in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 1073-1100.
- Waldron, Arthur. "War and the Rise of Nationalism in Twentieth-Century China", in *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 57, No. 5, Special Issue: Proceedings of the Symposium on "The History of War as Part of General History" at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, New Jersey (Oct., 1993), pp. 87-104.
- Waldron, Arthur. "Chinese Strategy from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries," in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, Alvin Bernstein, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Waldron, Arthur. *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-5*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Wei, Henry. *China and Soviet Russia*. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956.
- Wilbur, Martin. *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Wilbur, Martin. *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Wolf, Arthur. (ed.), *Studies in Chinese Society*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978.

- Worthing, Peter. *A Military History of Modern China, from the Manchu conquest to Tian'anmen Square*. London: Preager, 2007.
- Wou, Odoric Y.K. *Militarism in Modern China: the Career of Wu Pei-Fu, 1916-39*. Folkestone, Eng.: Dawson, 1978.
- Wou, Odoric Y.K. *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
- Wright, Richard. *The Chinese Steam Navy 1862-1945*. London: Chatham, 2000.
- Young, John. "The Hara Cabinet and Chang Tso-lin, 1920-1," in *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1972), pp. 125-142.
- Yoshihashi, Takehiko. *Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1963.
- Zabecki, David. *The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Zarrow, Peter. *China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Zarrow, Peter. *After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Index

- 1911 Revolution, *see* Xinhai Revolution
- Aglen, Francis, 227-228, 230-232
- agriculture, 22, 25, 35, 44-47, 64, 69, 148
- Akatsuka Shōsuke, 13, 62, 78, 102
- Allied Army of Five Provinces (*wusheng lianjun*), 106, 152-153
- Amur River (Heilongjiang), 22, 28
- ancestral rites (Manchu), 35
- Andong, 46, 206, 233
- Anfu Clique, 61, 81, 89, 91, 167, 217, 223
- Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 29, 33
- Anguojun Headquarters, 69, 152-155, 162, 188-189, 192-193, 198, 200
- Anguojun, v-vi, viii, xi, 3, 16, 18, 20, 50, 64-65, 67-69, 73-74, 86-87, 89, 92-93, 113, 120-125, 127-128, 133-135, 137-138, 142-145, 147-163, 166, 168-170, 174-180, 182, 186-189, 192-201, 207, 215-216, 229, 235, 238-243; formation, 113-117; organization, 152-154; equipment, 155; training, 156; recruitment, 156
- Anhui, vii-viii, xi, 40, 57, 61, 95, 126, 144, 149, 153-154, 160, 162-165, 175, 178, 182, 205
- anti-communism, 88, 101, 109, 121, 158,
- Anti-Fengtian Alliance of 1925, 101-105
- Anti-Red Allied Army (*taochi lianjun*), 152 armored train, 147, 151, 155, 163, 169, 171, 178, 194, 198
- arms (of the Fengtian army); 72-73, 155-156
- Arms Embargo of 1919, 32; tighten of, 133
- Army for National Peace (*jingguojun*), 166-167
- Arsenal, 47, 65-66, 72-73, 104, 112, 131, 137, 144, 155, 207, 214-215
- artillery, 74, 104, 111, 137, 148, 170, 189, 197, 214-215
- Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry (Japan), 219
- assassination, 3, 95, 114, 135-136, 242; of Xu Shuzheng, 95, 114; of Zhang Zuolin, 3, 135-136, 242
- Association of Japanese Residents in Manchuria, 218, 238
- Austen Chamberlain, 96, 98, 100-103, 111, 114, 116, 118-121, 127, 129-130, 133-134, 160, 208, 218, 220, 224-226, 229, 232, 235-238
- Automobiles, 215
- Badham-Thornhill, George, 149-150
- Bai Chongxi, 135-136, 177-178, 182
- Bai Yongzheng, 36, 62
- Balkans, 5, 21, 78; danger of Manchuria being “balkanized”, 5, 78; Manchuria being described as the Balkans, 21
- bandit, 36, 57-59, 80, 85, 117, 130, 140, 143, 149, 151-154, 157, 159, 167, 251; banditry in Manchuria, 36, 57-58, 140; Zhang Zuolin as a bandit, 57-59; official being described as bandits, 57, 80; banditry in North China, 130, 167, bandit soldiers in warlord armies, 157; Zhang Zongchang as bandit, 251; banditry in Henan, 167
- Bank Consortium, 32, 221, 243
- Bank of Chōsen, 22, 25, 44, 46-48, 222
- bank, 22, 25, 32, 40, 44, 46-50, 71, 75, 97, 202-203, 205-206, 213, 216, 218-219, 221-229, 238-239, 243; Bank of Korea, 40, 48-49, 216, 219, 222-223; Yokohama Specie Bank, 48-49, State Bank of the Fengtian Province, 48-50, 71; Japanese banks in Manchuria, 48-49, 218; Bank of China, 50, 228-229; Bank of Communication, 50, 97; Eastern Three Provinces State Bank, 71, 75, 205-206, 213, 222-229; Chinese bankers in Shanghai, 203; Japanese attempt to control the State Bank, 219; Chinese bankers in Beijing, 228-229
- banknotes, 48-49, 64, 75, 97, 105, 130, 140, 156, 202, 204-220, 222-226, 233, 238-239, 243; Japanese banknote in Manchuria, 48; *fēngpiào*, 49, 64, 75, 97, 105, 130, 140, 156, 202, 204-220, 222-226, 233, 238-239, 243
- banner system, 26, 35
- Baoding Military Academy, 73, 156-157, 188
- baojia*, 74, 104, 157, 253
- Barrett, David, 151
- battle, 2, 9-10, 16-19, 72, 90, 94, 110, 122, 143-144, 147-149, 153, 158-159, 167, 169, 171, 176-177, 179, 182, 184-189, 193-195, 242-243; importance of, 9-10, 16-19; Battle of Henen (Henan campaign), 122, 144, 148, 168-176; Second Battle of Henan, 187-188, 192-195; Battle of Longtan, 2, 148-149, 153, 158-159,

- 182-187; Battle of Nanjing, 144, 162-166; Battle of Nankou, 110-112; Battle of Shanhaiguan, 72, 94; Battle of Xuzhou, 144, 153, 176-182; Shansi-Zhili Campaign, 144, 188-192; Henan-Shandong-Shanxi Campaign (1928), 144, 195-200
- bean (soya), 44-47, 74-75, 203, 224-225
- Beijing, iv, vi-viii, xii, 1, 3-5, 10-15, 18, 21-22, 25, 28, 30-31, 34-36, 39, 41-42, 44, 53, 55, 59-60, 66, 68-70, 74-79, 83-85, 88, 91-96, 98, 100-104, 106-109, 111-112-113, 114-116, 118-123, 125, 128-129, 131-138, 140, 142-145, 148-155, 158, 160-163, 166, 168-171, 174, 176, 180, 187-188, 194-197, 200, 203-204, 209, 215, 220-222, 226-243
- Beijing-Hankow Railway, 112, 145, 168, 189
- Beijing-Mukden Railway, 133
- Beiyang Pictorial News, 85
- beyiang*, 55, 57, 60, 66-67, 69-70, 85, 87, 89, 91-92, 95, 98, 107, 118, 127-128, 134, 152, 153, 155, 163, 166, 179-180, 183, 193, 221-222, 227, 256; Zhang Zuolin's linkage with the *beyiang* faction, 55; factionalism with the *beyiang* clique, 57; willingness to peaceful settlement, 89-91; elders, 118
- Bergmann sub-machine gun, 156
- bingzhan* (logistics base), 72
- bonds, 49-50, 203, 221-222, 224-229, 232-234, 237, 239; Earthquake Bonds (Japan), 49, 219; Chinese bonds in Manchuria, 50, 203, 213, 225; bonds issued by the Beijing Government, 221, 226-229, 233; bonds issued in Shandong, 224; bonds issued by the KMT, 233-234, 237
- Borodin, Mikhail, 82, 160, 170
- Boxer, 29, 94, 97, 220-221, 229; Boxer War, 220; Boxer Indemnity, 94, 97, 220-221, 229
- bubonic plague, 39, 41
- budget, 137, 213-214, 216, 235; of the Fengtian province, 213-214; of the Shandong province, 216; of the Generalissimo Government, 235
- bureaucracy, 6, 26, 37, 41, 54, 60-66, 71, 85, 88-90, 104-104, 109, 111, 118, 127, 129, 219, 240-241; in Manchuria during the Qing, 26, 37, 41; reforms in Manchuria, 54-55, 60-66; efficiency, 104-105, 111, 129
- Cairo Communiqué, 11
- Canton Coup, 130
- cavalry, 25, 74, 147, 186-187, 197, 210, 214-215
- censorship, 1, 91, 123, 249; modern, 1; censored during the 1920s, 91, 123, 249
- centralization, 4, 6-7, 17, 26, 68, 72, 139, 195, 240; comparison of the Thai Kingdom and Manchuria, 7; role of centralized state in narratives of Chinese history, 17; organization of the Generalissimo Government, 68; centralization of the command of the *Anguojun*, 72, 195
- Chahar, 95, 114, 187, 197
- chamber of commerce, 40, 62-64, 154, 218, 220, 223, 252; Fengtian Chamber of Commerce, 40, 62-64, 252; Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Fengtian, 218, 154; Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Manchuria, 218; Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Dairen, 220, 223
- Chang Yinhuai, 67, 112, 136, 138-139
- Changbai Mountain Range, 22
- Changchun, 31-32, 59, 71
- Chen Jiongming, 155
- Chen Qimei, 61
- Chiang Kai-shek, 3, 16, 21, 26, 28, 30, 35, 55-57, 66, 68, 82, 89, 105, 110, 113, 119, 121, 123, 125, 131-133, 135-138, 147, 149-150, 160, 166, 170, 177-178, 182, 192, 194-196, 198, 200, 207, 227, 236-237, 239, 242, 244, 256
- Chief Inspector of Salt Gabelle, 235
- China Committee (Soviet Union), *see* Soviet Union
- China Eastern Railway, xiii, 28, 34, 77, 95, 102-103, 106-107, 135, 140-141, 220
- China International Famine Relief Commission, 130
- Chinese Communist Party, 5, 10, 16, 43, 114, 124, 148, 210, 241, 250
- Chinese Eastern Railway Incident, 135-136, 141
- Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 18, 20, 32, 93, 161, 180, 204, 227-239; surtax, 121, 203, 220, 229-234, 237
- Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), 1, 3-5, 13-19, 33-34, 43, 52-53, 55-56, 61, 70, 81-82, 86, 89, 91-94, 96-102, 104, 109-114, 116-120, 122-130, 133-134-136, 138-139, 142-143, 148-150, 152, 157-158, 160-161, 166-167, 170,

- Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang)
 (cont.) 176, 178-180, 182-183, 186-188, 192, 194-195, 202-204, 220, 229-236, 238-243; comparison of geopolitical position with the Fengtian Clique, 15; alliance with the Soviet Union, 33-34; position in Manchuria, 61; negotiation with Zhang Zuolin in 1922, 82, 86; image in the north, 98-100, 109-110, 117, 126-128; peace talk with Zhang Zuolin, 113-116, 122-125; Japanese support, 118-120, 132-133; changing British attitude towards, 120
- Chu Yupu, 152-153, 192-193, 195-197, 254
- Civil Service Examination (*keju*), 53, 64
- Cockpit of Asia, 21
- colonialism, 6, 26, 29-30, 38, 43-44, 47; Dairen as a colony, 29, 47; Japanese difficulties in colonizing Manchuria, 30; Chinese colonization of Manchuria, 38; Chinese colonization of Suiyuan and Rehe, 43; economic colonization of Manchuria, 44, 47
- Comintern, 5, 242; also see Soviet Union
- Communism, 3-5, 16, 56, 64, 81, 86, 98, 109-110, 119, 121, 124, 130, 158, 160-161, 166, 210, 242; also see Chinese Communist Party; also see Soviet Union
- conscription, 74
- conservatism, 54, 81, 96
- Constitution Conference, 94
- constitution, 11, 84, 94, 103, 116, 123, 126, 129
- constitutionalist (*lìxiānpái*), 41-42
- Culture, 4, 9-10, 27, 31, 37-38, 54-56, 81, 158, 240
- Currency Exchange Note (*huiduiquan*), 50, 217, 224
- currency, see finance
- Dagongbao, xiii, 91, 97-98, 112, 116, 118, 124, 126, 128, 148, 232, 237
- Dahushan, 132
- Dairen, 29, 41, 45-47, 62, 131, 206, 219-220, 225, 233
- daodehui*, 36, 62
- December Memorandum, 120
- Democratic Party, 62
- Deng Yanda, 17, 167
- Ding Wenjiang, 74, 98, 152, 167
- Ding Zipan, 148, 154, 158-159, 178, 182, 197
- Doihara Kenji, 119-120
- Du Shigui, 84
- Duan Qirui, 31, 57, 60, 76-78, 93-97, 103, 106, 221
- Duan Zhigui, 60, 62
- Eastern Conference, 33, 131; First Eastern Conference, 33; Second Eastern Conference, 131
- Eastern Three Provinces Defense Headquarters, 68, 69, 72
- education, 35, 40-41, 58, 71-72, 129, confucian schools in Manchuria, 35; Fengtian University (Fengtian daxuetang), 40; legal and administrative academies (zhengfa xuexiao), 40; police training academies (jingzheng xuetaung), 40; number of schools in Manchuria, 71; education councils, 40
- Edwardes, Arthur, 228, 230, 232, 235-237
- Eighteen Provinces (*shibasheng*), 30, 42
- famine, 130, 208
- Feng Yuxiang, 10, 13, 15-18, 33-34, 57, 70, 81, 84, 88, 92, 94-96, 98-100, 102-103, 106, 108-109, 111, 113-114, 122-123, 125-126, 135-136, 141-143, 152, 154, 160-161, 167-170, 174, 177-180, 187-188, 192-197, 200-201, 203, 221, 237, 242-243
- fēngpiào*, see banknotes
- Fengtian Air Force, 156, 214-215
- Fengtian Clique, 5-9, 11-12, 19-20, 23, 25, 30-31, 33, 35-37, 39-42, 46-50, 52-53, 55, 57-69, 71-79, 81, 83, 85, 87-97, 99-125, 127, 129-142, 146-148, 151-163, 166-174, 176, 180, 182, 188-189, 192-197, 200-205, 212-215, 218, 220, 222-227, 229, 233-235, 238-243; formation of, 58-60; elite support of, 60-65; military of, 65-67; decision making mechanism, 67-70; military and economic build up, 70-75; regionalism of, 75-77; connection with Japan, 77-78
- Fengtian Food Factory (*liangmochang*), 72, 104
- Fengtian Military Academy (later Military Academy of the Eastern Three Provinces), 42, 73, 104, 196, 214, 251, 253

- Fengtian National Daily (*Fengtian guomin-bao*), 39
- finance, 2, 18, 20, 29, 31-32, 36, 41, 48-51, 53, 60, 62, 68, 70, 74-75, 83, 89, 93-95, 97, 99, 108, 115, 118, 121, 130, 133-134, 137-139, 156-157, 168, 202-205, 208, 212-214, 216, 218-228, 233, 235, 238-239, 242-243; Zhang Zuolin borrowing from Japan, 31; competing currencies in Manchuria, 48-50, 130, 204-212, 218-220; financial build-up by Zhang Zuolin, 70-75; role in Fengtian strategy, 97, 108, 115, 118, 157, 168; attempt to seek foreign financial assistance, 121, 133, 226-233; Zhang's attempt to raise fund, 212-216, 222-226; problem of the Beijing Government, 220-222; 233-235
- Financial Reorganization Committee of the Eastern Three Provinces (dongsansheng caizheng zhengli weiyuanhui), 214, 223
- firepower, 27, 73, 147, 163, 169, 171-172, 174, 178
- flag, 123-124, 127-128, 139-140, 159 188; KMT and Fengtian dispute over, 123-124, 127
- France, 8 9, 14, 32, 72, 94, 97, 101, 172, 204, 218, 220, 229
- Fu Zuoyi, 148, 189
- Fujian, 40, 44-45, 61, 160, 177, 187
- Gansu, 95, 102, 145, 161, 194
- garrison, 7-8, 35, 59, 64, 102, 105, 107, 118, 141, 152, 154, 166, 170, 205, 228; foreign garrisons in Manchuria, 7-8, 105, 107, 141; banner garrison in Manchuria, 35; garrison battalions in Manchuria, 59
- Gazette of the Eastern Three Provinces (*dongsansheng gongbao*), 39
- Generalissimo (*dayuanshuai*), 21, 58, 68-69, 81, 83, 85, 93, 122-123, 129-130, 134, 141, 180, 204, 235, 237, 239
- Germany, 5-6, 14-16, 22, 29, 72-73, 145, 147, 155, 204, 221, 233
- globalization, 19
- Grand Canal, 198
- groupthink, 69
- Guandi (religion), 35, 37
- guandong* (east of the Shanhaiguan Pass), 26
- Guangdong, 40, 45, 98, 112-113, 126, 155, 216
- Guangxi, 66, 113, 125, 149, 155, 166, 182, 197, 236-237
- Guangxu, 82
- Guangzhou, 44, 152, 155, 157
- guannei* (inside of Shanhaiguan Pass), 35
- guanwai* (outside of Shanhaiguan), 26, 42
- guanxi*, 10, 29, 34, 52, 101, 169, 177
- guerrilla, 141
- Guizhou, 113, 125, 149, 159, 177
- gunboat, 28
- Guo Songling, 59, 65-66, 68, 70, 100, 102, 104-105, 110, 115-116, 152, 204-205, 212-213, 222, 242; relationship with Zhang Xueliang, 66; rebellion in 1925, 104
- Hachiya Terō, 208-211, 226
- Haizhou, 145
- Han Linchun, 65-66, 68, 72, 152, 161, 168, 170-171, 173
- Hankow, 112, 120, 134, 144-145, 169-171, 176, 188, 197, 230, 232, 239
- Hanyang, 73, 112, 134
- Harbin Silver Currency (*hadayang*), 216
- Harbin, 25-26, 29, 133, 206, 216, 233
- He Haiming, 158
- He Yaozhu, 198
- He Yingqin, 182
- He Zhuguo, 1-2, 66, 71, 174, 182
- Hefei, 166
- Heilongjiang, xi, 13, 22-23, 29, 31, 36, 40, 59, 67-69, 72, 77, 133, 140-141, 210, 215-216
- Henan baoweijun (Army for the Protection of Henan), 168
- Henan, vi-viii, xi, 17, 19, 74, 95-96, 106, 109, 112, 114-115, 120-123, 134-135, 144-145, 148-149, 151, 154, 159-162, 166-177, 180, 187-188, 190-197, 200-201, 243
- hongchanghui*, see Red Spears
- Huai Army, 154
- huiguan*, 40, 44
- Hunan, 106, 112-113, 125, 148-149, 160, 193, 208, 236
- identity, 27, 35, 37-38; flexibility of, 27; Manchu identity, 35; Chinese identity in Manchuria, 37-38
- Imperial Japanese Military Academy (Shikan gakkō), 66, 137-138, 156
- independence (of Manchuria), 7, 13, 34, 38-39

- industry, 15, 45-47, 63, 68, 74-75, 145, 147, 240; oil as industrial material, 45; industry in Manchuria, 46-47, 63
- infantry, 73-74, 155-156, 172, 186, 214-215
- Inoue Junnosuke, 219
- Inspector (Chinese Maritime Customs Service), *see* Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 227, 232,
- Inspector General (of Chinese Maritime Customs Service), *see* Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 93, 227, 232, 236
- Inspector General (of the Eastern Three Provinces, dongsansheng xunyueshi), 60, 67-68
- Inspector General of the Three Provinces Headquarters, 67, 72
- intellectuals, 32-33, 53-56, 82, 98, 109, 118
- intelligence, 62, 97, 102, 114, 143, 153, 170, 173, 176-177, 201, 215
- Italian Peninsula, 9
- Japanese Kanto Government (kanto totukufu), 46-47, 49, 61, 76-77, 83
- Ji Yiqiao, 66, 136-137, 171, 189, 197
- Jiang Jieshi, *see* Chiang Kai-shek
- Jiang Zuobin, 113
- Jiangsu, vii-viii, xi, 40, 57, 66-67, 95, 103, 120, 122, 134, 137, 144-145, 151, 153-154, 160, 162, 175, 177-178, 182, 205, 224, 227
- jiangwutang*, *see* Fengtian Military Academy
- Jiangxi, 112, 115, 117, 149, 153, 160
- Jin Yunpeng, 80, 115
- Jining, 196-198, 200
- Joffe, Adolph, 34
- journalist, 52, 109
- Kaifeng, 145, 193
- Kalgan, 188, 192
- Kamata Yasuke, 96, 100, 108, 130, 210, 215, 226
- Kantōchō, 50, 71, 74-75, 139, 156, 206, 213-214, 222-225
- Kantung Army, 104-105, 115, 135, 200, 242
- Kaoliang (gaoliang), 44
- Karakhan, Lev, 101-102, 106-107
- Khingan, 22
- Khitan, 25
- Kikuchi Takeo, 95-96
- Kimura Eiichi, 219
- King Chulalongkorn, 7
- Kodama Hideo, 206, 218
- Kokovtsov, Nikolayevich, 30
- Korea, 5, 22, 25-26, 28-31, 38, 40, 44, 48, 75, 132-133, 216, 219, 222-223, 225
- Korean Peninsula, 5, 22
- Kuhara Fusanosuke, 133
- Kuomintang, *see* Chinese Nationalist Army
- Kwantung Leased Territory, 7, 47, 50, 63, 71, 75, 131, 139, 156, 206, 213-214, 222-223, 225
- labor, 47, 82, 120; KMT agitation of, 120
- Lai Shihuang, 149
- Lamaism, 35-36
- Lamont, Thomas, 219
- Lampson, Sir Miles, 14, 120-121, 127, 129-130, 133-134, 160, 208, 218, 220, 225-226, 229, 232, 235-237, 239
- landowners, 37, 40
- lanfa* (uncontrolled issue of money), 212
- Lanfeng, 193
- Lanzhou, 145
- laomaozi* (Russians), 155
- Late Qing Reform, 12, 37, 39-41, 55, 61, 63; in Manchuria, 37, 39, 63
- Lattimore, Owen, 21-22, 25, 30, 37-38, 120
- Legation Quarter, 102
- Li Dazhao, 33, 114, 118
- Li Jishen, 125-126, 195
- Li Yuanhong, 61, 81
- Li Zongren, 125, 135, 143, 177-179, 182-183, 195, 197
- Liang Ji, 56
- Liang Qichao, 98, 109
- Liang Shiyi, 221, 236-237
- Liao River (Liaohe), 22, 46
- Liao Zhongkai, 64
- Liaodong (Peninsula), 22, 25-27, 29, 44
- Liaoning, 2, 25, 48-49, 52, 58, 62, 72-73, 107, 112, 132, 136-137, 139, 141, 155, 163
- Lincheng, 197
- Linyi, 158-159, 177
- Linying, 147-148, 172, 174
- Liu Zhenhua, 154, 168, 197
- Liu Zhilu, 15
- loan, *see* finance
- locusts, 130
- Longhai, 145, 161, 169-170, 178, 195

- Longtan, vii-viii, xi, 2, 19, 128, 148-149, 153, 158-159, 176-178, 182-188, 193-194, 197, 200, 207
- Loyalist (Manchu), 41, 42, 56, 61, 77
- Luanzhou, 106
- Luoyang, 145, 154, 167, 174
- Lytton Report, 30
- Ma Baoheng, 156, 163, 180, 182-183, 186
- Ma Bufang, 194
- Magruder, John, 121, 130, 208
- Manchu, 5, 26-27, 31, 35, 37-39, 41, 44, 46, 50, 61-62, 152
- Manchukuo, xi, xiv, 4, 11, 13, 23, 27, 36, 58, 196
- Manchurian Incident, 26, 30, 132, 135, 137
- Maoershan, 233
- May Thirtieth Incident, 95, 99
- Maze, Frederick, 227, 232
- meeting of local elders (*xianglao huiyi*), 64
- migration, 1, 5, 12, 19, 30, 33, 35-38, 50-51, 58, 130, 132; Chinese migration to Manchuria, 12, 35-38, 51, 13; Korean migration to Manchuria, 30, 132
- military attaché, 95, 102, 114, 121, 149
- Military Reorganization Bureau of the Eastern Three Provinces, 68
- militia, 12, 36, 41-42, 58, 60, 66, 72, 88, 153, 166
- mindezhu yi*, 123
- Mingguang, 193
- Mongolia, 5, 13, 15, 22, 25, 27-28, 31, 34-35, 38, 41-43, 51, 59, 61, 102, 108, 114-115, 117, 131, 160-161
- monoculture, 46
- Mutō Nobuyoshi, 105, 131
- Nagata Tetsuzan, 140
- Nakamura Yoshikoto, 30
- Nanchang Uprising, 126
- Nanchang, 126, 160
- Nanjing, vii-ix, xi, 1, 14, 16, 67, 79, 92-93, 118, 122-125, 127, 133-139, 141, 144, 153, 157-158, 160-166, 176-180, 182-183, 186-187, 192-196, 198, 233, 235-237, 239, 241, 243
- Nankou, 106, 110-112, 188
- National Army (Kuominchun), 94-96, 99, 101-103, 106-107, 111, 114-115, 154, 156, 160-161, 167, 169-170, 174, 176-178, 187, 193-194, 197-198, 224; formation, 94; expansion, 95-96, 102-103; cooperation with the KMT, 99, 101; Soviet support, 101-102, 114; invasion of Henan, 170-177; cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek, 177; in Second Henan campaign, 192-195
- National Conference (*guominhuiyi*), 94, 100, 102-103, 114, 118, 121-126, 171; Zhang Zuolin's plan to organize, 171
- National Conference, 94
- National News Weekly (Guowen Weekly), 38, 40, 97-99, 109-110, 113, 116-118, 123, 128, 159, 161-163, 166, 168, 173-174, 180, 189, 192-194, 196, 198
- National Reconstruction Army (jianguojun), 166
- National Revolution (*guomin geming*), 4, 18, 52, 91, 98, 101, 124, 126, 245-246
- National Revolutionary Army, 2-3, 16-17, 18, 67, 93, 104, 109, 112, 115, 118, 120, 124-125, 130, 134-135, 138, 143, 147-152-153, 155-163, 166, 169-171, 174, 176-180, 182-183, 186-187, 193-194, 196, 198, 200-201, 224, 230, 241; success in Hunan and Hubei, 112; cooperation with the KMC, 115; factionalism within, 125; alleged importance of ideology, 150; comparison with *Anguojun*, 151-152; operations in early 1927 in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Fujian, and Zhejiang 160, 162-163; cooperation with local warlords, 166; Henan campaign, 169-176; Battle of Xuzhou, 176-182; Battle of Longtan, 182-187; Second Henan Campaign, 192-195; 1928 Campaign, 195-200
- nationalism, 2, 6, 9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 32, 36-37, 39, 51, 56, 83, 88, 90, 94, 98, 126, 140-141, 145-146, 150-151, 202-203, 216, 227, 230, 240
- Nationalist faction (*guojiazhuyi pai*), 82, 109
- navy, 29, 32, 69, 114, 148, 180, 186-187, 214-215; role during the Battle of Longtan, 148
- newspaper, *see* press
- Nikiforov, 43
- Nishihara Loan, 31-32, 221, 230
- Niuzhuang, 44, 206, 210
- Northern Expedition, 1, 11, 143, 202
- North-South Peace Conference, 56
- Nurhaci, 26
- Ochiai Kentarō, 61, 76

- officer, 1-2, 31, 41, 59-60, 62, 65-66, 68, 72-73, 77, 95, 105, 108, 136, 138-141, 150-151, 153-156, 158-159, 171, 182, 186-187, 193, 240, 242; of *Anguojun*, 1-2, 151, 153-158, 187; of Fengtian Army, 60, 62, 65-68, 72-73, 136, 138-141
- Okura Kihachiro, 115
- Oudendijk, Willem Jacob, 121
- overstretch, 143, 161-162, 243
- Pan Hongjun, 193
- Pan Zhenying, 1-2, 159-160, 180, 183, 186-187, 193-194
- Paris Peace Conference, 32, 252
- Paul Monroe, 34, 77, 79, 88
- peasant, 2, 130, 132, 158, 167, 203, 210, 224
- Peking, *see* Beijing
- Pengpu, 162-163
- Piedmont, 5-8
- poisonous gas, 189
- Poland, 102, 107, 114
- Politburo (Soviet Union), 102
- Political, Diplomatic, and Financial Discussion Boards, 118, 122
- Pravda, 150
- press, 39-40, 55, 91, 98, 100, 108-109, 117, 123-125, 129-130, 133, 148, 157-158, 180, 186, 229-230, 235, 237; Chinese press in Manchuria, 39; Japanese press in Manchuria, 40; 39-40, 55, 91, 98, 109, 123, 148, 158, 186, 229
- prestige, 80, 85, 91, 95, 97, 99-100, 108, 117, 138, 142, 170
- propaganda, 16-17, 87, 91, 101-102, 117, 126, 148, 150-151, 158-159, 167; propagandists of the NRA, 159
- provincial assembly, 36, 39-40, 42, 59, 61-64, 69, 76, 88, 100, 182
- Provisional Government of 1925, 78, 94, 96-97, 99-100
- Provisional National Assembly (linshi canzhengyuan, 1925), 100
- Prussia, 5-8, 14-16
- Qi Shiyong, 104
- Qi Zhanjiu, 157
- Qianlong, Emperor, 27, 37
- Qiao Fang, 156
- Qing Empire, the, 4, 12, 14, 27-29, 35-37, 39-42, 44-45, 50-51, 53, 55-56, 58-59, 61-64, 71, 77, 83, 89, 100, 149, 154, 166, 220, 227
- Qingdao, 46
- Qiu Yingjie, 112, 149, 154, 168
- railway, xi, xiii, 7, 12, 22, 24-25, 28-29, 31, 34, 39, 43, 45-47, 49, 51, 65, 71-72, 76-77, 95-96, 100, 102, 105-106, 112, 116, 118, 129, 131-132, 135-136, 140-141, 144-145, 147-148, 160-161, 163, 168-171, 176, 178, 180, 182-183, 188-189, 195, 197, 201, 210, 213, 220-221
- recognition, 90, 103, 118, 120, 133-134, 188, 231, 239, 241; foreign recognition of the Fengtian Clique, 90, 118, 133-134, 239; Japanese recognition of Soviet Rights in CER, 103; of the Nationalist Government, 120, 231
- Reconstruction Conference, 94,
- Red Spears (*hongchanghui*), 151, 155, 166-167, 169-170, 243
- regionalism, v, viii, 75-77, 88
- Rehe, xi, 22-23, 43, 67, 94-95, 136, 144, 154, 223
- religion, 27, 35-37; *see also* Guandi
- Republic of China, 8, 27, 31, 40, 42, 51, 53, 56, 59, 61-62, 68, 79, 81-82, 84-86, 88, 107, 123, 216, 229
- Retraction of autonomy of Outer Mongolia (*waimeng cezhi*), 43
- Revolutionary Military Council of USSR, (Revvoensoviet), 107, 114
- rifle, 65, 72-73, 155-156, 170
- ruble, 102
- rumors, 50, 100, 107, 139, 179, 205, 218; role in financial situation, 50, 205, 218; role in politics, 100, 139, 179
- Russia, 5, 8, 12, 14-15, 21-22, 25-26, 28-31, 33-34, 36, 38, 40, 42-43, 45, 48, 51, 58-59, 88, 102, 106, 121, 133-134, 137, 139-141, 144-145, 151, 155, 218, 220-221, 241-242; Tsarist Russian penetration into Manchuria and Mongolia, 12-13, 25, 28-31, 40, 42-43, 58-59; Russian currencies in Manchuria, 48-49
- Russian Revolution, 43,
- Salt Gabelle, 203, 221, 234-235

- school, *see* education
- seal and prohibit (*fengjin*), 35, 37
- self-rule, of Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, 5, 29, 36, 38, 48, 58-59, 73, 141
- Semenov, Grigory 21
- Shaanxi, 95-96, 102, 115, 122, 135, 145, 149, 154, 161, 166-168, 192-194
- Shamanism (religion), 35
- Shandong, vii-viii, xi-xii, 40, 44, 46, 56-57, 62, 64, 67, 74, 94-95, 100, 104, 106-107, 130, 134-135, 145, 148, 151-159, 162-163, 166, 176-177, 187-198, 200, 208, 216, 224, 232, 234
- Shangcai, 169, 171
- Shanghai Municipal Police, 95, 98
- Shanghai, vii-viii, xi, 25, 31, 44-46, 50, 55, 65, 95-98, 109, 114, 121, 134, 148, 159-166, 177-178, 180, 182, 186, 200, 203-204, 219, 227-228, 231-233, 235-236, 238-239, 243
- Shanguan Yunxiang, 156, 158, 183, 256
- Shanhaiguan, 26, 35, 42, 72, 94, 106, 136, 144
- Shenyang, 2-3, 8, 26-27, 29, 36, 41, 47, 52, 58, 60, 62, 71, 73, 105, 107, 136-137, 141, 196, 210
- Shi Yousan, 137
- Shidehara Kijūrō, 32, 111, 118-119, 238, 247
- Sichuan, 34, 106, 113, 126
- silver, vii-viii, xii, 48-50, 203, 205, 216-219, 221, 225, 238, 243; Manchurian currencies backed by silver, 48-50; decline of silver price, 203, 216-219
- sinicization, 4
- Sino-Russian alliance against Japan in 1898, 28
- Sino-Soviet Conference, 34
- Small Swords Society (*xiaodaohui*), 130, 210
- Sneevliet, Henk (Marlin), 16
- soldier, 2, 10, 13, 36, 54, 65, 74, 76, 80, 84-85, 87, 104, 107, 109-110, 112, 131, 139, 141, 143, 149-151, 154, 157-158, 167-168, 174, 177-178, 183, 187, 207, 224, 240; Chinese soldiers in Manchuria, 36; political status, 54, 80-85; Fengtian soldiers, 65, source of Anguojun soldiers, 154-157
- Song Gong, 42
- Song Qing, 154
- Songhua River (Songhuajiang), 22
- South Manchuria Railway, 29-30, 47-48, 61-62, 77-78, 100, 105, 115, 140-141, 220, 225, 242, 249
- sovereign state, 4, 6-7
- Soviet Union, 5, 7-8, 12-13, 15-16, 18, 25, 32-34, 43, 57, 74, 81, 86, 91-92, 94-96, 98-99, 101-103, 106-108, 110, 112-115, 118, 121, 131, 133, 135, 140-142, 145, 150, 160-161, 167, 170, 174, 176, 203, 212, 241; post-ww1 diplomacy, 32-34; Sino-Soviet Agreement, 34; policy towards Mongolia, 43, 102, 108, 114-115; relationship with Feng Yuxiang, 57; 94-96, 106, 167, 170; design in 1925, 94-90, 102; attitude towards Zhang Zuolin, 101, 102, 107, 108; attitude towards Japan, 103, 131-133; role in the beginning of the Northern Expedition, 112; raid of Beijing Embassy by Zhang Zuolin, 121, Sino-Russian Conflict over the CER, 140-141
- Soviet-Japanese understanding of 1925-1928, 103, 133
- Stalin, Joseph, 133
- Stilwell, Joseph, 150-151, 156, 176
- students, 40, 56, 118, 158
- Suiyuan, 43, 95, 114, 161, 188, 192
- Sumo, 25-26
- Sun Chuanfang, xi, 1-2, 18, 67, 69, 95, 103, 106, 112-113, 115, 117, 123, 126, 128, 134, 136, 148-149, 151-153, 155-156, 158-163, 176-183, 186, 188, 192, 194-198, 200, 205, 224, 242
- Sun Yat-sen, 3, 18, 33-34, 41, 56, 77, 82, 85-87, 93-95, 98, 116, 127, 138
- Sutton, Donald, 155
- Suzhou, 100, 128
- Taierzhuang, 197-198
- Taiping Rebellion, 3, 28, 45, 158
- Taiyuan, 188-189
- Takayama Kimimichi, 77
- Tanaka Giichi, 21, 33, 119, 131-133, 238, 247
- Tang Yulin, 59, 97, 157
- Tangshan, 136
- tanks, 147, 156, 172, 174, 189, 215
- Tariff Conference, 94, 97, 100, 102-103, 203, 229-230, 232, 237
- taxation, 61-64, 70, 74-75, 117, 168, 170, 203, 213, 216, 220, 222-223, 225-226, 229-230, 234; in

- Manchuria, 61-64, 70, 74-75, 203, 213, 222-223, 225-226
- telegraph, 147
- Terauchi Masatake, 48
- Thailand, 6-8, 71
- Tian Yunqing, 1-2, 159-160, 180, 183, 186-187, 193-194
- Tianjin, 21, 44, 46, 61, 91, 96-98, 100, 107, 115, 117-118, 121, 127, 134, 136, 144-145, 150, 152-153, 157, 160, 163, 176, 182, 188, 196-197, 203, 221, 226, 230, 232, 234, 239
- Tianjin-Pukow Railway, 145, 182, 196-197
- Tokyo, 30-32, 45-46, 48, 52, 67, 100, 121, 131, 140, 205, 222, 225
- tongmenghui*, 39, 55, 91
- Transport Committee of the Eastern Three Provinces (*dongsanshengjiatong weiyuanhui*), 71
- Treaty of Nerchinsk, 28
- Tsingtao, *see* Qingdao
- Tsushima Strait, 22
- Uchiyama Kiyoshi, 96, 100, 108
- United Kingdom, 5, 8, 14, 17-18, 20, 26, 29-30, 32-33, 44, 63, 78, 81, 88, 92, 95, 98, 100-101, 107-108, 111-112, 115, 118-121, 132-134, 139, 141-142, 147, 149, 160, 203, 208, 218-219, 221, 225-226, 229-233, 235, 239, 241, 243; Siam and Britain, 8; attitude towards Manchuria, 14, 30, 44, 139, 141, 208; attitude towards the Nationalist Government, 17, 231, 233; refusal to recognize the Beijing Government 18, 111, 229-233; in Washington Conference, 32-33; attitude towards Zhang Zuolin, 100-101, 111-112, 118-120, 133-134, 229; role in Customs Service dispute, 231-233.
- United States, 28-30, 32-33, 49, 55, 72, 92, 121, 129, 141, 150-151, 173-174, 187, 197, 219, 221, 225, 229-230, 236; Open Door Policy, 29; recognition of Russian interest in Manchuria, 29; Arms Embargo of 1919, 32; Washington Conference, 32-33; turning to the KMT, 92, 121; financial policy for Asia, 219; Tariff Conference, 229-230
- university, *see* education
- urbanization (in Manchuria), 11, 37, 40
- urbanization, *see* city
- Urumqi, 102
- Vladivostok, 28
- Wang Jingwei, 71, 82, 126, 177
- Wang Kemin, 235
- Wang Tianpei, 125, 159, 177
- Wang Yongjiang, 14, 21, 60, 64-65, 68-71, 99, 107-108, 137, 168, 205, 212, 242
- Wang Zhengting, 96
- warlord, 2, 5, 10-11, 22, 36, 39, 41, 43, 52, 55, 57, 62-63, 65, 67-68, 70, 76-77, 80, 83, 85, 87, 89-94, 95, 97-98, 101, 103, 106, 109-110, 113-114, 116-117, 121, 124, 126-128, 133, 138, 143-146, 149-151, 153-154, 158, 161, 163, 166, 168-169, 179, 187-188, 193-194, 206, 212, 223-224, 233, 238-241, 243; definition, 2; in political culture, 54-57, 80, 83-85
- Washington Conference, 14, 32-33, 221, 229
- Watanabe Rei, 206-207
- weapons, 30, 73, 147, 156, 172, 186, 189, 215
- Wellington Koo, 140, 228-229, 232, 237
- Whampoa Military Academy, 73, 150, 248
- Who's Who in Manchuria's Officialdom and Public Life (guanshenlu)*, 41, 60, 62, 64
- Wilkinson, Frederick, 96, 99, 101, 108
- Wu Peifu, iv, 34, 46, 57, 74, 76-78, 81-82, 84-85, 89, 92-95, 103, 106, 108-109, 112-114, 126, 137, 148-149, 152, 154, 160, 167-169, 226; alliance with Zhang Zuolin, 106-109
- Wuchang, 41
- Xian Incident, 253
- Xibeijun, 169, 194
- Xinhai Revolution, 3, 30, 39, 41-42, 59, 107, 220, 233, 251, 256
- Xiong Xiling, 45
- Xiping, 171
- xiucuai* (licentiate), 66
- Xu Shichang, 55-57, 61
- Xu Yuanquan, 153, 178-179
- Xuzhou, vii-viii, xi, 67, 103, 125, 128, 134, 144, 147, 151, 153-154, 159, 176-180, 188, 192-198, 207, 243
- Yamagata Aritomo, 28
- Yamamoto Jōtarō, 132
- Yan Xishan, 16-18, 113, 119, 121, 125-126, 131-132, 134-137, 142-144, 160-161, 170, 174, 187-189, 195-197, 243

- Yancheng, 171, 173
 Yang Yuting, 21, 36, 58-59, 66-70, 72, 96, 112, 114, 117, 124, 133, 136, 138-139, 160, 163, 166, 169, 177, 196, 229, 242
 Yangtze (River), 11, 22, 113, 122, 148, 151, 160-163, 166, 176-177, 180, 182-183, 186-187, 193, 200, 242
 Yangzhou, 163
 Ye Gongchuo, 96
 Yellow River, 117, 138, 144, 168-169, 174, 177
 Yi Army (yijun), 36, 58, 154, 166
 Yingkou (Yingkow), 44-48, 105
 Yinyuan (silver dollar), xii, 49-50, 75, 136, 210, 213-216, 221, 223-226, 234
 Yokohama Specie Bank, 48, 206-207, 219, 225
 Yoshida Shigeru, 95, 111, 115, 119, 131, 205, 207, 209, 211, 218-219, 225-226
 Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 100, 107, 119, 122, 132, 232-233
 Yu Chonghan, 60, 62, 95, 97
 Yu Xuezhong, 137, 149, 154-155, 159, 169, 176, 194, 197, 256-257
 Yuan Shikai, 31, 42-43, 50, 55, 59-61, 76, 83, 88, 134-135, 221
 Yuan Zhuming, 125, 149
 Yue Weijun, 154, 167
 Yunnan, 113
zaibatsu, 115
 Zailijiao, 35-36
 Zeng Guofan, 158
 Zhang Benzheng, 46
 Zhang Binglin, 76
 Zhang Binglin, 76, 168
 Zhang Fakui, 126, 130, 171-173
 Zhang Jingyao, 179, 274
 Zhang River, 197
 Zhang Xueliang, xi, 15, 19, 21, 50, 52, 66-67, 69-70, 86-87, 93, 105, 127, 135-142, 152-153, 161, 168-171, 173, 176, 189, 241-243
 Zhang Zhigong, 149, 154-155, 169-170
 Zhang Zongchang, iv, 36, 64, 67, 69-70, 84, 95, 97, 104, 113, 123, 130, 134-136, 151-155, 157-158, 161-163, 166, 169, 177, 188, 192-198, 200, 224, 243
 Zhang Zuolin, iii-vi, viii-ix, xi, 1-3, 5-10, 12-15, 18-19, 21, 29-31, 33-34, 36, 38, 40-43, 49-55, 57-61, 63-73, 75-81, 83-89, 91, 93-96, 99, 102, 104-108, 110, 112-115, 118-119, 122-124, 131, 133-136, 138-142, 152, 155-156, 159, 163, 171, 179-180, 183, 186-188, 193, 200, 202-206, 209, 212, 214, 219-220, 224, 227, 229-232, 234-236, 238-243
 Zhang Zuolin-Duan Qirui alliance in 1917, 78
 Zhang Zuolin-KMT alliance 1921-1924, 86
 Zhang Zuolin-Sun Chuanfang Alliance of 1926, 113
 Zhang Zuolin-Wu Peifu Alliance of 1926, 111
 Zhang Zuoxiang, 14, 59, 69, 137, 139, 163, 195
 Zhangde, 197-198
 Zhao Erxun, 30, 41-42, 59, 61, 76, 168
 Zhejiang, 40, 61, 67, 103, 106, 113, 126, 138, 149, 153, 160-162, 166, 175
 Zheng Qian, 66, 68
 Zhengding, 189
 Zhengzhou, 114, 145, 169, 174, 194
 Zhenjiang, 179-180, 182-183
 ZhenSong Army (zhenzongjun), 154, 166-167
 Zhili, 33, 46, 57, 62, 66-68, 72, 74, 77, 81, 88-89, 91-95, 101, 103-104, 106, 112, 130, 132, 134, 144-146, 151-159, 161-162, 166-167, 170, 176-177, 187-194, 196-197, 200, 205, 213, 221, 223-224, 234
 Zhili-Fengtian Wars, 34, 46, 57, 66-67, 74, 77, 88, 91-92, 94, 101, 146, 154, 167, 205, 246, 250-251, 254-255
 Zhili-Shandong Army (zhilu lianjun), 67, 151-153, 155-156, 158, 162, 166, 176, 177, 188-189, 192-194, 197, 200
zhongdonglu, see China Eastern Railway
 Zhongjiang Tax, 75
 Zhou Fengqi, 126, 149, 166, 179, 188
 Zhou Zuohua, 112, 189
 Zhou Zuoren, 56
 Zhumadian, 171
 Zhuozhou, 148, 174, 189, 192
 Zollverein, 15
 Zunghar, 28