The Chinese Venture in K'am, 1904-1911, and the Role of Chao Erh-feng

Elliot Sperling

THE K'am (*Khams*) area of Tibet borders on the Chinese province of Szechwan. Yet the two areas are separated by more than a border. The K'am-pa(s), as the inhabitants of K'am are called, are part of a culture and a way of life quite different from that of their Chinese neighbours. While the majority of Chinese have traditionally been engaged in agriculture, the K'am-pa(s), like most of their fellow Tibetans, have pursued both nomadic and agricultural ways of life. The intellectual and religious traditions of the two peoples have developed differently, as have their social and political systems. In K'am, the differences between Tibet and China are further accented by the independent nature of the K'am-pa(s). In this century, they have risen up against both Peking and Lhasa. Their differences with Lhasa though are nowhere near as basic as those with China. Whatever problems arose between K'am and the central government at Lhasa, could not negate the ties of language, culture, and a common heritage that bound all parts of Tibet. The most important tie, however, was that of religion. K'am, like the rest of Tibet, contained numerous monasteries and a sizeable number of monks.[1]

In addition to the basic differences between China and Tibet, there was a general tendency for the Chinese to regard Tibetans as inferiors. Thus, most Chinese records, up until the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, refer to the K'am-pa(s) by using some of the several Chinese words that describe barbaric, uncivilised or aboriginal tribes.

In 1725, a few years after the first Ch'ing military expedition to Lhasa, the boundary between Tibet and China was fixed between the towns of Ba-t'ang (*'Ba'-thang*) and Ch'ab-do (*Chab-mdo*), with boundary markers having been erected along the Ning-ching mountains.[2] This made approximately half of traditional K'am a part of the Chinese province of Szechwan. This change in borders, however, did not change any of the basic differences between K'am and Szechwan. For the duration of the Ch'ing dynasty, "going beyond the frontiers" (Ch. *ch'u kuan*) to most Chinese in Szechwan, meant going west of Tachienlu or D'ar-tze-do (*Dar-rtze-mdo*),* the biggest Chinese outpost in the area. Located quite close to the traditional eastern border of K'am, Tachienlu had come under Chinese rule early in the eighteenth century.

* Also marked by its Chinese name Kangting in some maps.

Except for those areas of K'am closest to the Chinese border, most of the areas that had become part of Szechwan, experienced little change in their social or political structures during most of the Ch'ing dynasty. Chinese officials and small garrisons were simply sent to a few of the towns in K'am, in addition to the already present local officials. The new officials did little except provide transport for Chinese passing through, and tried to keep things peaceful. The Chinese and Tibetan areas of K'am were both largely the domains of the various chieftains (Ch. *t'u-ssu*) and their subordinate headmen (Ch. *t'ou-jen*). These *t'u-ssu* owed only a very loose allegiance to the central governments of either China or Tibet, and some were outrightly independent. In addition, no small measure of power was exerted by the various monasteries. Their huge populations[3] and often huge arsenals gave them dominant positions in many areas.

To quell any large-scale violence in their area, the Chinese generally had to bring troops in from east of Tachienlu. In that the Chinese viewed K'am as a wild uncivilised area, no large garrisons were set up. The policy of leaving most affairs in the hands of the indigenous rulers was considered satisfactory. The situation remained this way until the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty, when an active policy to subdue all of K'am and sinicise it as far as possible was put into practice.

Development and Related Problems

In December 1903, the Provincial Governor of Szechwan, along with several others, sent a memorial to the throne which gave consideration to the situation in "the borderlands of Szechwan", i.e. K'am, and to the idea of developing that territory, particularly in terms of agriculture and mining. The idea of developing K'am was not new, but had never been implemented, largely due to the lack of Chinese control over the area. This memorial noted the difficulty of the task, K'am being mostly a cold place with few agricultural products. This problem, it was felt, could be overcome to some extent through careful planning over the years. But there was one major obstacle that the authors of the memorial worried about, and that was the reaction of the local populace to any changes that the Chinese might make in their territories. The memorial stated that: "The character of the people is quite obstinate. They make their living as nomads . . . undeveloped land is used for pasturage, it's not discarded land . . . if one area is developed, then that's one area less for pasturage. If mines are opened in the area of the barbarians, then they will talk of geomancy (Ch. *feng-shui*) and of spirits in the mountains. They're very obstinate and simply will not budge."[4]

The memorial continued by saying, that to counter this, Chinese settlers should be brought in; certainly the K'am-pa(s) would not cooperate in such development schemes as the authors of the memorial envisioned. This step, however, would undoubtedly arouse resentment as the local people watched strangers moving in and taking over their lands.

The memorial noted this, but it was felt that the K'am-pa(s) must be made to acquiesce to Chinese plans. The memorial noted that: "It's hard to show them reason and entice them with advantages because of their arrogant nature. Military force must be used to suppress them; sternness and favours both used. Through control will come law; then benefits from the area will begin."[5]

Chinese control over their part of K'am was not secure enough for them to initiate development plans throughout the area, so it was proposed in the memorial that a first experiment in the development of mining, agriculture and commerce be attempted in Ba-t'ang. As there were already Chinese officials in residence at Ba-t'ang, and the climate there was warmer than in many other parts of K'am, it was felt to be a suitable place for this first experiment.

Early in 1904, the Szechwan Bureau of Mines sent two people to Ba-t'ang to meet and to discuss development plans with two of the Chinese officials there, Wu Hsi-chen, the Ba-t'ang Provisions Commissioner, and Wu I-chung, the Garrison Commander of Ba-t'ang. After looking into the situation, the two Ba-t'ang officials, in the spring, submitted a memorial in which they discussed the prospects for agricultural development of the land. They said that they had already obtained the assent of the local *t'u-ssu* to the idea of opening up the area for farming, but that they had run into opposition from the nearby monastery of Ting Lin. The lamas, not wanting an influx of Chinese settlers, protested that the land was only fit for pasturage and not for farming.[6]

In addition to the memorial, twelve articles were prepared as a set of proposed guidelines for land development in Ba-t'ang. The essential points were that: (a) development was to start in Ba-t'ang and expand from there. At first, one hundred Chinese settlers were to be brought in, the number to grow as development became more successful; (b) as the borderlands were lacking in numerous important items, farm tools, animals and dwellings were to be provided for the settlers; (c) funds to buy food were to be set aside, food being relatively expensive in the largely uncultivated frontier areas. Travel expenses were also to be paid to the settlers; (d) to further help develop the land, soldiers were also to be used for work in the fields. In addition to these points, it was noted that there would probably be trouble from local leaders, who were felt to be crafty and undependable. Therefore it was recommended that things be made very secure before the local people could be used in any development plans.[7]

At about this time, Feng Ch'üan, the Assistant Amban,* or Resident in Tibet (Ch. *Chu-tsang Pang-pan Ta-ch'en*), stopped in Ba-t'ang on his way to Ch'ab-do, where he was to take up residence. While there, he had an opportunity to see for himself what the area and conditions were like, and to meet with Wu Hsi-chen and Wu I-chung. Feng was quite impressed

* This is a Manchu derivative, designating a representative of the Manchu Emphlor in Tibet. The first Amban came to Tibet in 1724 during the reign of the Seventh Dalai Lama. In 1750, an assistant Amban was instituted.

with the possibilities of agricultural development in the area, noting that the ground was particularly fertile and could be put to use for agricultural purposes.[8] So at this time, it was decided to begin development along the lines suggested by the two Chinese officials. A small field was set aside for development and a small number of Chinese were engaged to farm it. The project was put in the hands of Wu Hsi-chen and Wu I-chung.[9] This was the beginning of China's development of K'am.

Feng was aware of the resentment that this was going to cause, and decided to curb at least one source of opposition: the monasteries. Monastic power in almost any part of Tibet was not something to be taken lightly. The head lama (khen-po, *mkhan-po*) of the Ting Lin monastery had been totally unwilling to support Chinese plans, and most of the clergy were also clearly opposed. These were serious threats, so Feng proposed that there be a limit placed on the number of lamas in each monastery and that for a period of twenty years no new lamas be admitted into any monasteries.[10] Feng had no sympathy whatever for the traditionally high position of the clergy in Tibetan society. "Feng felt that the lamas were tyrannical, that they harboured brigands and oppressed the people."[11] By limiting their numbers, he hoped to stabilise the area and check their power so that he could then proceed with the development of Ba-t'ang. Monastic power throughout Tibet, however, was too well entrenched and quite able to withstand anything Feng could do with the small number of troops he had brought with him. But Feng was an activist and would not be obstructed.

Impact of the Younghusband Expedition

In August 1904, while Feng was at Ba-t'ang, the Younghusband expedition reached Lhasa, where they stayed for over a month. To enforce Tibetan compliance with treaties previously signed by Great Britain and China, a new convention was signed by British and Tibetan representatives in Lhasa. The Chinese had had as little, if not less, control over affairs in central Tibet as they had had in eastern Tibet, and had thus been powerless to enforce any treaties in Tibet.

The result of the Younghusband expedition, for the Chinese, was to create fears about the vulnerability of their borders. If a British military expedition could reach central Tibet, it was not unthinkable that they could reach Szechwan via K'am. Whereas the south-west border of China had previously been considered safe from Europeans, it had now been disturbingly shown to be not so. The lack of Chinese control over Tibet had been made obvious, and it was felt that immediate steps were needed to remedy the situation. All of Tibet was now seen in a different light by the Ch'ing court. In the borderlands it was no longer a question of keeping local and neighbouring barbarian tribes quiet. It was now a question of shoring up defences in the face of a powerful imperialist neighbour. At the very least, that part of K'am that was under the jurisdiction of

China would have to have its defences consolidated. Therefore the court decided that the area of Chan-tui or Nya-rong (*Nyag-rong*) should be placed under Chinese rule. Chan-tui, though located north-east of Ba-t'ang on the Ya-lung (*Yar-lung*) river, well east of the boundary dividing Tibetan and Chinese areas of K'am, was still ruled by a *t'u-ssu* who was under the Tibetan government and not the Ch'ing court. Several Tibetan government officials resided in Chan-tui. Orders were sent down to Hsi Liang, the viceroy of Szechwan, for the transfer of Chan-tui to China. He passed them on for execution to the Amban (Ch. *Chu-tsang Pan-shih Ta-ch'en*) at Lhasa, Yu T'ai and to Feng Ch'üan, the Assistant Amban, who was at Ba-t'ang at that time. Yu T'ai felt that the situation in Tibet was still unstable, and put off taking action. The only time he had had much power in Lhasa was when the British had arrived, their advance having sent the Dalai Lama fleeing to Mongolia. Thus he was still rather unsure of himself. Feng Ch'üan, however, was quite eager to carry out the order. He was not as fearful as Yu T'ai and wanted to take positive action in K'am.[12] Perhaps he should have been a little more wary, for the circumstances were such that although he wished to carry out the transfer of Chan-tui from Tibet to China, he would not live to do so.

Dissension and Revolt

Feng's presence in Ba-t'ang had been growing more and more antagonistic to the local populace. The troops he had brought with him were newly trained and organised according to foreign military methods, not seen in the area previously. This further increased the feelings of alienation and subjugation among the K'am-pa(s) that Feng's moves had brought about. The added presence of a Catholic mission with French priests was another irritant to the Buddhist population, especially the lamas. It seemed as though Feng was sheltering a foreign doctrine, while at the same time placing restrictions on the Buddhist establishment.

When word got out that Feng was planning to evict all of the Tibetan officials from Chan-tui, things became quite serious. The Acting British Consul in Ch'engtu noted that: "Feng Ta-jen is headstrong, and it is evident that his plans must create serious disturbances, unless the Chinese garrisons in east Tibet are strengthened."[13]

Feng was urged by the Ba-t'ang *t'u-ssu* and the head lama of the Ting Lin monastery to quickly move on across the border into Tibet, but he paid no attention.[14] He was still considering plans for further land and mine development in Ba-t'ang. Oblivious to the magnitude of the dissatisfaction amongst the populace, he envisioned the development of 10,000 acres of land within three or four years.[15]

In the spring of 1905, open rebellion against Feng finally broke out. Feng had completely misunderstood the power of the lamas and their support amongst the people. In spite of the faults that Feng felt existed in the clergy, they were still an organisation whose large membership was

drawn from, and reflected, the different levels of Tibetan society. Most people had at least one relative in the monasteries. The populace saw threats against the clergy as threats against their own society and way of life. The head *t'u-ssu* and the assistant *t'u-ssu* of Ba-t'ang, whose authority Feng had interfered with, allied themselves with the people and the lamas. Feng had managed, through his ignorance and lack of concern for the local society, to turn everyone against him.

Beginning on the night of March 26, 1905, rioting erupted in Ba-t'ang and lasted for several days. A mob of over 500 attacked the field where the experiment in agricultural development was being undertaken. They destroyed the field and killed those who had been working the land. Troops in the area tried to quell the violence, but could not do anything. Numerous buildings were burned down and the situation rapidly deteriorated. Finally, on the night of April 2, part of a group, estimated at 3,500 or more people, razed the Catholic mission, killing two of the priests. The mob then took to the streets and attacked Feng Ch'üan's residence. In the ensuing struggle many soldiers and officials, including Wu I-chung, were killed. In the early hours of April 3, Feng made his way to the house of the head *t'u-ssu* while the people looted. Within a short while, when it became known where he had taken refuge, the people surrounded the house. On April 5, Feng managed to get out and with over 50 others tried to make his way back to Szechwan. He was ambushed in a narrow gorge not far from Ba-t'ang, however, and he and his whole party were killed.[16]

The Chinese reaction was to regard the uprising as just another manifestation of the barbarity of the K'am-pa(s). That they might have genuine grievances against Chinese actions did not enter into the Chinese assessment. Writing several months after the Ba-t'ang incident, the Amban in Lhasa, Yu T'ai, blamed it on the fact that the K'am-pa(s) ". . . are stupid, obstinate and hard to change . . . they are of a type completely violent and evil in the extreme . . . they are completely without remorse for what they've done."[17] Another report by a Chinese official, that wound up in the files of the British Foreign Office in London, claimed that the whole affair was the work of "lamas and aborigines."[18] The British suspected that the Dalai Lama or his supporters may have had a hand in the uprising, a view supported by the reports of one of the French priests who escaped from Ba-t'ang.[19] This does not seem likely, though, the Chinese having given the local residents more than enough incitement. The report of the priest may very well have been coloured by the antagonism that existed between the priests and the local lamas. The British were also quite aware of how unpopular Feng Ch'üan had become.

Having wanted to strengthen their border defences, the uprising in Ba-t'ang was the last thing the Chinese could have wished for. Their attitude regarding both the K'am-pa(s) and the border was such that they could not let Ba-t'ang slip completely from their control. The idea of such wild barbarians falling under the power of a foreign govern-

ment must have been frightening. The responsibility for crushing the revolt fell to Hsi Liang, the Viceroy of Szechwan, since Ba-t'ang was then a part of that province. To accomplish this task, he chose two people: Ma Wei-ch'i, the provincial Commander-in-Chief (*T'i-tu*) and Chao Erh-feng, the Magistrate (*Tao-t'ai*) of the Chien-ch'ang circuit of Szechwan.

Chao Erh-feng's Policies

From this point on, the story of the attempt to bring K'am into the political and cultural spheres of China during this period is largely a record of the work of Chao Erh-feng. He played the most important role in K'am in the few years of the Ch'ing dynasty that remained, and his actions continued to influence the course of Sino-Tibetan relations for many years after his death.

Chao was not a Manchu, but a Han Chinese. He had served in the province of Shansi as County Magistrate (*Chih-hsien*) in Ching-le and Yung-chi. After that, he held different posts in the Ho-tung area of the same province. Hsi Liang at that time was the Governor (*Hsün-fu*) of Shansi. When Hsi Liang was transferred to a post on the waterways, Chao continued to serve under him in various capacities. Subsequently Hsi Liang became Viceroy of Szechwan, and, impressed with Chao's ability, made him Magistrate of the district of Yung-ning in Szechwan. Chao distinguished himself here by personally leading his troops in quelling factional fighting involving secret societies. Over 100 offenders were executed, after which things settled down in the area. After this, Chao became Chien-ch'ang Magistrate, with headquarters in Ya-an near the K'am border.[20]

Following the uprising, Chao was ordered to provide back-up support for Ma Wei-ch'i, who was to lead the main thrust against Ba-t'ang. In late May, Chao left Ch'engtu for Tachienlu, where he secured supplies of rations and ammunition. He left Tachienlu for K'am on July 20, 1905. The head and assistant *t'u-ssu* of Ba-t'ang had been anticipating a strong Chinese reaction to the murder of Feng Ch'üan, as his position had been fairly high. Thus, they sent word to Hsi Liang that they had no intention of throwing off their allegiance to China, but that Feng and his reforms had antagonised the people beyond measure. They said that they would be willing to turn over the culprits to Chinese authorities, but warned that the dispatch of troops to Ba-t'ang would lead to a general rising of all the tribes in the area.[21] The officials were most likely trying to find a way to delay the inevitable Chinese advance. It would have been quite difficult for them to find and apprehend the culprits.

Ma Wei-ch'i arrived in Ba-t'ang in the middle of the summer, and quickly overcame local resistance. He executed the head and assistant *t'u-ssu* and had their families sent to Ch'engtu. Chao did not accompany Ma to Ba-t'ang, but followed behind him and halted at Li-t'ang (*Li-thang*) where he stayed to hold the rear, and see that supplies were properly

moved ahead to Ma. Here, Chao set the pattern for his further conduct of affairs in K'am. When the *t'ou-jen* of Li-t'ang refused to provide the necessary wu-lag (*'u-lag*) or transport service, at the urging of the head *t'u-ssu* of Li-t'ang who was the illegitimate son of the wife of the head *t'u-ssu* of Ba-t'ang, the supply line to Ba-t'ang was threatened. Chao thereupon had two *t'ou-jen* quickly executed, and placed the head *t'u-ssu* and his assistant, who was also involved in the refusal to provide wu-lag, in custody.[22] With that done, supplies were able to be moved in. After Ma had been in Ba-t'ang for two months, Chao moved forward from Li-t'ang and joined him. Following Chao's arrival, several local officials and lamas, including the head lama of the Ting Lin monastery, who were deemed to have had a hand in the uprising, were executed.[23] Though Ba-t'ang was now considered to be relatively pacified, due to grain transport problems, Ma decided against remaining there with his troops.[24] He thus withdrew to Szechwan proper, leaving Chao in K'am with the mission of cleaning out the last pockets of resistance. Though Chao was now the top Chinese official in K'am, the only places firmly under his control were Ba-t'ang and Li-t'ang. The people in other parts of K'am were aware of what had been happening in Ba-t'ang. In many areas the population was extremely hostile to the Chinese—especially since the arrival of Chinese troops in Ba-t'ang and Li-t'ang—and in some areas near Ba-t'ang, the people had gone and joined in the fighting.

Following Ma Wei-ch'i's departure, Chao was kept busy with military affairs. He launched attacks on hostile K'am-pa strongholds in the vicinity of Ba-t'ang. In November 1905, barely a month after his arrival at Ba-t'ang, fresh fighting erupted there. Chao had to send for reinforcements, which were hurriedly rushed to him from Ch'engtu, in order to put down the trouble.[25] After this, he moved against Hsiang-ch'eng, a hostile area south of Li-t'ang that had formerly been subject to its *t'u-ssu*, but had declared its independence. Early in this campaign, Chao was obstructed by the areas of Tao-pa and Kung-ko-ling and was forced to attack them too. They were taken with no problems.[26] Hsiang-ch'eng, however, was a different matter. The Chinese had not dared to set foot in that place since 1894. In that year, a Chinese army officer from Li-t'ang and his son had been killed in Hsiang-ch'eng at the instigation of a lama there named P'u-chung Cha-wa. The usual party of Chinese troops had been sent to punish the offenders, but they were defeated and their commander was captured and flayed, his skin hung up and displayed as a warning to others.[27]

Chao Erh-feng arrived in Hsiang-ch'eng early in 1906, leading a large force of troops trained in foreign military methods.[28] He fought several encounters with local forces that consisted mostly of monks. The monks finally managed to retreat in force to the monastery of Sang P'i Ling, whose walls were quite thick and made it well suited for defence. Chao was forced to surround the monastery and begin a long siege. For several months the defenders held, but when Chao was able to locate and

cut off their source of water, their situation became desperate. P'u-chung Cha-wa hanged himself. The rest of the monks awaited reinforcements that had been requested from another monastery. However, the message asking for help had been intercepted by Chao, who, thereupon, used the ruse of having his men pretend to be the urgently needed warrior monks from the other monastery. By carrying out this deception, Chao was able to have the defenders open one of the gates to let their supposed rescuers in. When the gate was opened, Chao's troops rushed in. After fierce fighting, the monks inside surrendered. Chao was able to enter Sang P'i Ling monastery on June 19, 1906. At his orders, all of the surviving defenders were executed.[29]

With the fall of Hsian-ch'eng, Chao's "mopping up" operation in K'am was concluded for the time being. He had carried it through with considerable vigour, and had secured a sizeable piece of territory for the beginning of development schemes beyond what Fen Ch'üan had started. He had also developed a reputation for severity that inspired hatred and fear in K'am. Opposition to Chao, however, was not very unified. During the fighting, messengers had gone out from Ba-t'ang and the neighbouring area of San-yen to other places in K'am to enlist support, stressing that the Chinese were presenting a threat to Tibetan religion, particularly the Ge-lug-pa (*dGe-lugs-pa*; Ch. *Huang-chiao*) sect. No action came of this though, as local officials feared getting involved; they claimed that the rumours of what was happening were false and refused to give any assistance to the areas involved.[30]

As if to stress the general tension that lay between Tibetans and Chinese, in August 1905, there had also been a rising, in a Tibetan area of northern Yunnan, of "monks and barbarians."[31] Though this could have been partly in response to the trouble in Ba-t'ang, the Chinese Viceroy there, Ting Chen-to, had, through his callousness and lack of concern for the extensive looting of his soldiers, given the Tibetans there more than enough reason for dissatisfaction. It took a large amount of military force to put the rising down.[32]

Chao Erh-feng returned to Ch'engtu in November 1906. His mission was felt to have been carried out successfully and he was accordingly rewarded for his handling of the situation. Chao was awarded the *Bataru*, a Manchu military decoration, in addition to his having been given the rank of *Shih-lang* by Hsi Liang.[33] But even more significant was the fact that prior to his return, Chao had been designated Frontier Commissioner for Szechwan and Yunnan (Ch. *Ch'uan-tien Pien-wu Ta-ch'en*). This position was a new creation that reflected the changed attitude of the Ch'ing court towards the border areas near India, in the aftermath of the Younghusband expedition. K'am was now seen as an important line of defence, along with the rest of Tibet.[34] The Chinese felt that it was most important that the area of K'am, at least, should be changed from what they regarded as a wilderness to the kind of area that could be readily accessible to them, while still presenting obstacles to any other power that tried to get

a foothold there. The general idea was to develop and control the area as far along Chinese lines as possible. Chao's success in subduing the uprising in K'am re ommended him for this task.

After his arrival in Ch'engtu, Chao consulted in person with Hsi Liang, and by telegraph with Ting Chen-to on the situation in the borderlands, and the necessary steps to be taken there. He then submitted a memorial in which he gave a general review of the measures to be undertaken. These were: (1) appoint Chinese officials to take over from the *t'u-ssu*, (2) train more soldiers to keep things secure, (3) bring in Chinese settlers to work the land, (4) open mines and exploit the mineral resources of the area, (5) institute commerce on a scale capable of doing away with the problems of securing and transporting goods to and from the borderlands, and (6) promote education so as to change the "barbaric customs" of the local people and make them civilised. Chao then went on to state in the memorial that it was estimated that the undertaking would cost approximately 2,000,000 *liang** of silver to begin with, and 3,000,000 *liang* during normal years to continue.[35]

Though these plans received official sanction from the court, Chao had already begun making changes in the areas that he had taken. He had abolished the position of *t'u-ssu* in both Ba-t'ang and Li-t'ang, and had established Chinese officials there and in Hsiang-ch'eng. In these areas, the power of the remaining local officials, and of the lamas was severely curtailed. Other areas that had been under the jurisdiction of these places, such as Tao-pa and Kung-ko-ling, which had formerly been ruled by the *t'u-ssu* of Li-t'ang, were also put under Chinese officials.

In April 1906, Chao had promulgated a set of 43 regulations for Ba-t'ang.[36] A similar set of regulations, was also issued for Hsiang-ch'eng.[37] The regulations were aimed at making clear that the areas concerned were henceforth parts of China. They declared that all of the local people were subjects of the Emperor. The lamas were not to have the powers that they previously exercised, and what local officials remained, did so only within the framework of the new Chinese order. Both sets of regulations also set forth controls over various Tibetan customs including marriage, which now had to be monogamous; disposal of the dead to be done in the Chinese manner, especially in the case of parents, as an expression of the Confucian virtue of filial piety; and dress, which now had to conform to Chinese ideas of sexual morality—pants were required clothing for children, and urged for adults, to decrease the incidence of sexual misconduct. In addition, all were required to adopt Chinese surnames, the men were required to wear their hair in queues, and the people were enjoined to practise cleanliness and to construct public toilets.

Chao wanted not only to break the political power of the clergy, but also to diminish their influence amongst the people. In Ba-t'ang, he fixed limits of 300 to the number of monks allowed in each monastery.[38] In both

* A tael weight in pure silver, equivalent to 1⅓ ounce.

areas, the only temples allowed to be built were simply to be for traditional Chinese worship and sacrifice.[39] In the Hsiang-ch'eng regulations, lamas were restricted from living in monastic communities. Chao further says in these regulations, "The lamas of Sang P'i Ling monastery recited the scriptures from morning till evening. How could they be killed? The Tibetan Dalai is said to be a living Buddha (Ch. *Huo Fo*). He was defeated by foreign troops (i.e. the Younghusband expedition) and fled for his life. He couldn't even protect himself. How can he protect you, and give you blessings? If you think about it, it's really pitiful!"[40]

It can safely be said that Chao Erh-feng's aim was to sinicise K'am as far as possible, and in that way, make it into a secure barrier against the British and a source of profit for China. Of course, this could not be done overnight; especially if one was counting solely upon the K'am-pa (s) to speedily give up their traditional way of life, and adopt that of the Chinese. Chao therefore decided to bring Chinese settlers into the borderlands on a much larger scale than Feng Ch'üan had done. In the regulations for Ba-t'ang and Hsiang-ch'eng, Chao had provided for official assistance to anyone, Chinese or "barbarian" (man) who was willing to develop unused wasteland. On February 7, 1907, he issued a proclamation from Ch'engtu, where he still was, inviting settlement in the frontier area. The proclamation was sent out to all of the district magistrates in Szechwan, to be made known to the general population.[41]

This proclamation gave an exceedingly optimistic evaluation of the prospects for settlement of the frontier region. Chao told of his travels in the area, and, like Feng Ch'üan, of his realisation that there was much fertile land in the borderlands that was going to waste. The harvests of the local people were poor, Chao said, because they used crude implements; Chinese settlers, with their superior ways, would surely have better harvests.

The proclamation stated quite frankly that in former years, "These districts were under the despotic rule of the native chieftains. . .the Grain Commissaries there established, concerned themselves solely with the providing of transport and the forwarding of supplies. . .the troops stationed beyond the frontier were formerly so few in numbers that they only sufficed to fulfil the functions of couriers and were totally inadequate to protect the people. . ."[42] Thus there was a great deal of insecurity in the lives of the Chinese who had lived in these areas. But, Chao continued, "Ba-t'ang, Hsiang-ch'eng and Li-t'ang now have local officials similar to those in China. Should you be involved in trouble, you need simply appeal to the Court. The natives will assuredly no longer dare to impose on the Chinese. Armed posts have been established everywhere, and death was meted out last year to a great number of thieves and robbers,[43] so little danger of violence is to be anticipated from these gentry."[44]

Chao then went on to note the advantages of settling in K'am. The price of land in Szechwan was quite high, while in the borderlands, "Your efforts to improve the soil will be rewarded by its becoming your

own property, and the only payment required of you is that of the land tax at the time of harvest."[45] In addition, settlers would be provided with travel expenses and food supplies. The requirements were just that prospective settlers have good backgrounds, be under 30, not smoke opium, and be able to provide security so that they would not turn back with the funds given them. Terms for the repayment of all sums advanced were quite fair.

It was also stressed that living beyond the frontier was rather inexpensive. Families could live more economically than in China, and single men would find that "The females moreover are industrious, and the males lazy. A native girl taken as a wife will prove of great assistance in the work, for these women perform all the carrying of water, cooking of food, hoeing of the ground and cutting of firewood. Nor is any dowry necessary, for all that is needed is garments in which to clothe her."[46]

The proclamation concluded "The over-populated state of Szechwan renders the struggle for existence very difficult. Why then do you not hasten to this promising land?. . . I have issued this proclamation. . . that you may all know and hasten thither to escape from the clutches of poverty. It is most essential that you should not doubt the integrity of my intentions but should clearly realise that this step has been taken by me out of consideration for your sorry plight."[47]

As for Chao Erh-feng's true feelings regarding the situation in K'am, and the prospects for colonising and developing the region, they are probably better represented in a memorial written by him, and dated July 20, 1907.[48] In this memorial, he elaborated on the items that he discussed in the memorial he had submitted just after his return to Ch'engtu. In regard to all of the proposed measures to be taken in the frontier area, Chao felt there was considerable difficulty, as the region was "truly a wilderness to be opened for the first time."[49] In spite of the advantages that Chao had raised in his proclamation, most Chinese were still quite loath to move. He had to admit that the "promising land" was really not very promising to prospective settlers. The climate of the frontier regions was quite cold, and different from that in China proper. The farm implements available in K'am were crude, and of not much use to Chinese farmers. "In terms of housing, the borderlands are desolate. One can look, and it all seems boundless. For tens of *li** one won't see a home."[50] Housing and farm tools would therefore have to be provided for settlers. As opposed to these inconveniences, "The produce of Szechwan is not bad; the people live contentedly and don't want to move. Those who'd want to move to the borders are mostly destitute tenant farmers, without a *ts'un*‡ of land to themselves. If they are ordered to prepare their own farm tools and houses, then things will be most difficult to manage. It's not only farm tools and houses; outside the frontiers there aren't any

* The Chinese mile, which is one-third of the English mile.

‡ Half a thumb's length, used in a metaphorical sense.

stores. There are no places to buy food. When settlers first arrive, they'll need vast reserves of grains to fill their stomachs. Otherwise there will be disastrous starvation."[51] Without an influx of large numbers of Chinese settlers there could be little agricultural development in K'am, and prospects for such an influx did not seem good under the conditions then prevailing.

Chao felt that there should be speedy development of commercial and mining facilities. He noted that as far as commerce was concerned, "Whatever we need for daily use in China proper, such as vegetables and cotton cloth, the border areas have never been able to purchase. There have been no merchants to transport things for them."[52] The quick development of mining was important to Chao in that as he considered K'am to be fairly rich in mineral resources, a successful mining project could supply him with badly needed funds for the general development and administration of the frontier region.

In order to further strengthen Chinese control over K'am, Chao urged a build-up of troops in the area and a more complete Chinese administrative set-up. The central Chinese government felt that Chao could suffice with three battalions. But Chao pointed out that he had previously worked with five battalions, and that had still been quite difficult. Chao further warned that "The barbarian areas (Ch. *I ti*) that have never submitted to us are very numerous. We are restrained, while their arrogant and tyrannical practices do not diverge from the uncivilised. If we want to protect the frontiers, and we don't prepare during peaceful times, how can we ward off the enemy during a crisis?"[53] Chao also advocated greater consolidation of the administration of K'am, to keep the local population in the areas under his control in submission.

Another very important task, Chao felt, was the promotion of education. He regarded the K'am-pa(s) as being simple and naive to the point of following all sorts of strange doctrines that were presented to them (no doubt including Tibetan Buddhism). Thus he said that "The promotion of education seeks first to establish linguistic conformity and then to set out for them (i.e. the Tibetans) the principles of Confucianism (Ch. *Ming chiao*), to enlighten them towards China."[54] In the memorial that he had written after his consultations with Hsi Liang and Ting Chen-to, upon his return to Ch'engtu, Chao was optimistic about opening a school in the Ba-t'ang area, saying that the idea had been well received by the people there. Now he hoped to spread schools over different parts of K'am, and to use them as weapons against the influence of the Buddhist clergy.

The money that could be allocated for these steps in K'am was not very much. Of Chao's original request of 2,000,000 *liang* to begin development, only 1,000,000 was granted. The financial situation in most of the other provinces, from whence these funds would come, was not very good. Chao was hopeful though, that if adequate funds were found to make a good beginning, the borderlands would soon be able to provide all of the funds needed from the profits accruing from the various enterprises there.

Chao envisioned China coming into K'am as a civilising force for the tribes of "barbarians". Thus he compared the Chinese venture in K'am with the British in Australia, the French in Madagascar, the Americans in the Philippines and the Japanese in Hokkaido. He chose these places as models to emulate, especially in bringing settlers in. In all of these areas, he noted, steps were taken to lessen the problems that settlers might have; China should also try to minimise the inconveniences, such as the lack of housing and farm tools, that settlers moving to K'am would have.

Chao's active policy in K'am, and the support of the central Chinese government for that policy, were largely due to the Chinese fear of British designs on Tibet that grew mostly out of the Younghusband expedition. In line with the new Chinese attitude towards Tibet, Yu T'ai, the Amban in Lhasa, was replaced by Lien Yü, and there was an investigation into Yu T'ai's actions in Tibet that resulted in his being sent back to China in disgrace. As his reluctance to undertake the transfer of Chan-tui to the Chinese Court indicated, Yu T'ai did not at all follow the vigorous ways of Chao Erh-feng. Chang Yin-t'ang, the new Commissioner for Tibet (Ch. *Ch'a-pan Tsang-shih Ta-ch'en*), conducted the investigation of Yu T'ai and concluded that his performance in the face of the Younghusband expedition and the obviousness of his lack of power in Tibet had brought disgrace to China. He accordingly submitted a memorial strongly condemning Yu T'ai and his subordinates.[55]

Chao Erh-feng remained in Szechwan from November 1906 until October 1908, though he was not out of touch with events in K'am. In early 1907, there was an uprising in the area of Yen-ching, originally subject to the Ba-t'ang *t'u-ssu*, by monks of the Ho-hsi La Weng monastery. He telegraphed orders to his troops in K'am, and the revolt was put down.[56] Shortly afterwards, Hsi Liang was transferred out of Szechwan and Chao became Acting Viceroy of the province. He did not, however, give up his post as Frontier Commissioner, but held the two posts simultaneously. He still remained in charge of all affairs in K'am. It was during this time that most of the work of developing and changing K'am took place, within the limits of the territories that had fallen to Chao before his return to Szechwan. Ba-t'ang, Li-t'ang and Hsiang-ch'eng were all organised into Chinese counties or *hsien* with Chinese officials. Chao began setting up schools in different places under Chinese management. He also brought in several foreigners to help with certain projects: Americans investigated the possibilities of opening a gold mine in Ba-t'ang; Japanese agricultural engineers were engaged to promote agricultural and forestry programmes; foreign engineers were employed to build a steel bridge at Ho-k'ou, between Tachienlu and Li-t'ang, and numerous other tasks were done, such as the creation of a tannery in Ba-t'ang, and the construction of rest houses along the roads of K'am.[57]

The most important project, however, the movement of Chinese settlers from China proper to K'am, was a large failure. Without a substantial influx of such settlers, Chao and his troops and officials could

never have a popular base of power, and would have to maintain themselves in K'am solely through military force. Of course, Chao had great hopes for his work in setting up schools, but those being educated were mainly young children, and he would have to wait quite a while before they were fully grown and indoctrinated in Chinese ways. For a two-year period following Chao's proclamation inviting settlement in K'am, a record kept of the number of settlers passing through Tachienlu on their way west, shows a monthly average of six.[58] The number of those who gave up and returned to Szechwan is not recorded. Perhaps, in spite of Chao's assurances of security, the fate of those who participated in Feng Ch'üan's experiment was still a deterrent.

Military Expansion

In February 1908, Chao was chosen to be Amban for Tibet. Chao's appointment signified the intention of the Chinese government to extend its control further into central Tibet. Chao took his primary duty in his new position to be colonisation.[59] He began making preparations for an eventual trip into central Tibet, in which he hoped to proceed as far as Lhasa.[60] In August, a newspaper published by the Chinese in Lhasa, carried the following item in anticipation of Chao's arrival there: "Don't be afraid of Amban Chao and his soldiers. They are not intended to do harm to Tibetans, but to other people. If you consider, you will remember how you felt ashamed when the foreign soldiers arrived in Lhasa and oppressed you with much tyranny. We must all strengthen ourselves on this account, otherwise our religion will be destroyed in 100 or perhaps 1,000 years."[61] The main fear of the Chinese was still British designs upon Tibet. The main fear of the Tibetans, however, had now become Chao Erh-feng. The news that he intended to come to Lhasa, bringing troops with him, caused considerable alarm in central Tibet. Chao's reputation for severity and his antagonism towards Tibetan Buddhism were by this time well-known. Stories of atrocities committed by his troops during 1905 and 1906 were widespread. The Tibetan government in Lhasa appealed through Lien Yü to the Ch'ing Court, asking that Chao's appointment as Amban be withdrawn. Lien Yü passed on the request, and on September 19, 1908, the Ch'ing Court ordered that an investigation be conducted into charges that Chao had "wantonly taken numerous lives, destroyed monasteries and plundered riches."[62] The investigation had no effect on Chao's work in K'am. However, the opposition of the Tibetans and possibly of a jealous Lien Yü resulted in Chao's never assuming the post of Amban.[63] His name was eventually withdrawn and Lien Yü remained as the sole Amban in Lhasa until the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty.

At the same time that Chao Erh-feng had been chosen to be Amban, his elder brother, Chao Erh-hsün, had been named Viceroy of Szechwan, in a move to bring about closer co-operation between Chinese officials

throughout Szechwan and Tibet.[64] In June 1908, Chao Erh-feng stepped down as Acting Viceroy of Szechwan, and his brother took over as Viceroy of that province. The two of them consulted together, and in August they submitted a memorial which set forth their administrative reorganisation of Ba-t'ang, Li-t'ang, Hsiang-ch'eng, Tachienlu and most of the areas subject to these places. Ba-t'ang and Tachienlu were each made into *fu* or prefectures. Li-t'ang and the area of San-pa became *t'ing*, or sub-prefectures, and Tao-pa, Ho-k'ou, Kung-ko-ling and Yen-ching were made into *hsien* or counties. Hsiang-ch'eng remained a county. A magistrate was also appointed for these areas with headquarters at Ba-t'ang.[65]

After his brother became Szechwan Viceroy, Chao Erh-feng no longer had to divide his time between Szechwan and K'am, and he began making preparations to return to K'am and resume his work of consolidating and expanding China's position there. After several months, he chose three battalions of troops, and on September 5, 1908, he left Ch'eng-tu heading west. He arrived at Tachienlu on October 16, and stayed there for over a month. While Chao was there, he had a stroke of good fortune, in an appeal for intervention in a succession struggle that had been going on for years between two half-brothers for the position of *t'u-ssu* of De-ge (*sDe-dge*). One of the brothers sent a messenger to Chao in Tachienlu and asked for his aid in unseating his brother, who at that time was the *t'u-ssu*. De-ge was a huge area that bordered on Ba-t'ang, Ch'ab-do and Chan-tui. Though it was located within the limits of that part of K'am that was supposed to be under Chinese influence, yet it had been unaffected by any Chinese moves in K'am since the Ba-t'ang uprising. The *t'u-ssu* of De-ge was, by virtue of the size of his realm, one of the most important local leaders in eastern Tibet, with influence throughout the area. Chao had now been given an opportunity, and sufficient excuse to send troops there and put someone he could control in the position of *t'u-ssu*, thus adding to the areas under his domination.

Chao left Tachienlu for De-ge on November 29, 1908. His march took him through areas in which there was scattered resistance, in many cases aided by Tibetan officials from Chan-tui. He arrived in De-ge on December 16, and began pacifying the area. The ousted *t'u-ssu* fled, but was able to resist Chao for over six months through numerous battles. Chan-tui provided further assistance to the K'am-pa(s) of De-ge by sending soldiers to aid them, and Chao had to dispatch one of his commanders, Fu Sung-mu, with some troops to halt them. Eventually, the ousted *t'u-ssu* was defeated, and forced to flee to central Tibet. But no sooner had Chao's claimant been made secure in the post of *t'u-ssu* than he asked, through Chao, that he be allowed to step down, and that De-ge be brought under Chinese control. He said, no doubt under heavy pressure from Chao, that "De-ge is a vast area with a sparse population. Those who spy on us are many, and ultimately I'm afraid we won't be able to protect ourselves. We are desirous of bringing Han people in to develop the land, to open it and increase the population."[66] The spectre of British intervention in

Tibet is most likely meant by the reference of those spying on De-ge. Again and again, Chao cited this as a cause for strong Chinese control of all parts of Tibet.

Chao submitted a memorial noting the request of the new *t'u-ssu* and dividing De-ge and the areas subject to it into five units, on the Chinese administrative pattern: De-ge and Pai-yü were made *chou*, or counties (on a larger scale than *hsien*), T'ung-p'u and Shih-chü became *hsien*, and Teng-k'o was made a *fu*. A magistrate was also appointed for these areas, with headquarters at Teng-k'o. The *t'u-ssu*, having himself said that he was incompetent to fill his position, was removed. Eventually he was given a salaried ceremonial post and moved with his family to Ba-t'ang.[67] To underscore Chinese intentions in De-ge, the Reform Council in Peking, in approving of these changes, stated that "The native state of De-ge should be allowed to adopt our civilisation and come under our direct rule."[68] As far as possible, De-ge and other areas were to be detached from Tibet, both politically and culturally.

Throughout 1909, Chao worked on developing De-ge. He built a new road between the area and Ba-t'ang. There were still some hostile regions to his rear, such as Chan-tui, and Chao was able to by-pass them with the new road. In addition, he began using his own troops to cultivate vegetables.[69] The use of soldiers was no doubt due to the continued lack of response to his calls for Chinese settlers to come into K'am.

During 1909, the Ch'ing Court decided to withdraw Chao from the post of Amban. As was noted, he had never gone to Tibet to assume it. It was decided that Chao should deal solely with border matters while Lien Yü remained in charge of central Tibetan affairs. This was done largely to placate the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa who were opposed to Chao. Chao's headquarters were now fixed at Ba-t'ang.[70]

For some time the Chinese had come to feel that if they wanted to keep their defences as secure as possible they would have to institute stronger control over central Tibet. Reliance on the Dalai Lama's government was not felt to be very effective. Chao had had some problems during 1908, in trying to get the Dalai Lama's assistance in quelling trouble in San-yen, a part of Ba-t'ang. The trouble was believed to be caused by Tibetan officials who were acting in response to events in De-ge, and it was suspected that the Dalai Lama himself may have had a hand in it. As the Dalai Lama had come to Peking in his wanderings following the Younghusband expedition, it was decided to request him to send a personal written order to those involved in the trouble in San-yen, asking that they desist. However, the Dalai Lama made excuses, and in view of the time and distance involved, it was decided to simply let Chao use troops against the Tibetans in San-yen.[71] With the situation like this, the Chinese felt that without a strong military presence in Tibet, the area would be easy prey to the British. The idea of stationing a sizeable force in central Tibet became popular, and both Lien Yü and Chao Erh-hsün submitted memorials in favour of it. Lien Yü also hoped to implement the same sort of

development schemes in central Tibet that Chao Erh-feng had begun in K'am. The Ch'ing Court eventually approved the idea, and early in the summer of 1909 a force of 2,000 troops left Szechwan for Lhasa under the command of Chung Ying, a prefect (Ch. *chih-fu*) of that province.[72]

The Tibetans were strongly opposed to this dispatch of troops, and resisted them along their march. When they arrived at Ch'ab-do, inside Lhasa-controlled K'am, they found their route blocked by Tibetan troops. An urgent request was sent to Chao for assistance, and he responded with the start of a campaign that brought all of K'am into Chinese hands. Chao had only recently returned from putting down fighting in the De-ge region when he received word of Chung Ying's predicament. He quickly gathered his troops together and left De-ge for Ch'ab-do on December 4, 1909, arriving six days later. The Tibetans who were opposing the advance of Chung Ying's forces were easily dispersed by Chao, who now found himself in possession of Ch'ab-do, his first piece of territory in Lhasa-ruled K'am. He then sent part of his force with Chung as an escort to take him further into Tibet.

Chao and his reputation were well-known, and the Tibetans did not want to see him press into Tibet. Earlier, the Tibetan authorities had tried to secure a Chinese withdrawal from parts of K'am, claiming that the Tibetan border went up to just west of Ch'engtu. This naturally brought no response from the Chinese.[73] Now they sent out cables to various European powers stating that: "Though the Chinese and Tibetans are the same, yet nowadays the Chinese officer named Tao (sic) and the Amban Lien (sic), who resides at Lhasa are plotting together against us... they have brought many troops into Tibet and want to abolish our religion; so please ask the Chinese Emperor by telegram to stop the Chinese troops who are on their way."[74] The prospect of Chao coming to Lhasa was extremely frightening to the Tibetans, though in point of fact, the force that was coming was not under Chao, but had been independently raised in Szechwan to assist Lien Yü's work, and to strengthen China's position and her defences in Tibet.

After Chao was firmly in power in Ch'ab-do, it became obvious to some of the local people that he would not rest where he was but would continue by force of arms, if by no other means, to expand his domain. Bearing that in mind, and hoping to make the best of the situation, people from certain areas sent emissaries to him in Ch'ab-do' offering submission. Chao accepted such offers from the areas of Po-yul (*sPo-yul*) and Pa-su, and from the Thirty-nine Tribes. These offers sufficed for the moment, though they were not necessarily unanimous or effective in the areas concerned, as happened in Po-yul.

Chao, as expected, did not halt where he was, but continued pushing further into K'am. For the most part, his remaining time in the borderlands was taken up mostly in military campaigns. The plan to bring Chinese settlers into the area in large numbers was a failure, and thus left him without a foundation with which to continue other plans for develop-

ment. Therefore Chao simply worked on expanding the amount of territory under his control, and securing it as best as possible through the appointment of Chinese officials to the areas. Chao swept forward very quickly through eastern Tibet, taking many important regions such as Mar-k'am (*rMar-khams*) and Dza-yul (*rDza-yul*). Around late February 1910, Chao reached Gyam-da (*rGya-mda'*) which was not located in K'am, but in central Tibet, only six day's march from Lhasa.

At about the same time events in Lhasa were taking an important turn. Chung Ying had arrived there with his force of 2,000, early in February. The Dalai Lama had only recently returned from the wanderings that he had embarked on, in the aftermath of the Younghusband expedition. During his absence, he had come to hear of what was being done by the Chinese in eastern Tibet, especially in regard to the clergy, and was naturally quite alarmed. Thus, when Chinese troops arrived in Lhasa, he once more fled; this time to India. Chao, upon hearing this news, felt that a magnificent opportunity had arrived to undertake vast changes throughout Tibet, including changes in the religion and customs of the people. The Ch'ing Court did not want to further aggravate the tension that had arisen out of the Dalai Lama's flight, and thus rejected Chao's suggestions in spite of his vigorous advocacy of them. Chao also asked that the boundary between the borderlands and central Tibet be drawn at Gyam-da, even though it was about 150 miles west of the traditional border between K'am and central Tibet that ran along the Tan-ta mountains. This idea ran into strong opposition from Lien Yü, as it obviously cut down his area of control, and was not adopted.[75]

Chao turned back after reaching Gyam-da and returned with his troops to Ch'ab-do, arriving there in June 1910. He continued a hectic pace of military activities, leaving again on July 10, to subdue Dr'ag-yab (*Brag-g'yab*). Once done, he appointed a Commissioner (Ch. *wei-yüan*) to supervise the area. This was the way he organised administration in the areas brought under his control in this last stage of his career in K'am. A more thorough administrative set-up was to be developed later. After Dr'ag-yab fell, Chao was forced to send troops back to Hsiang-ch'eng where a mutiny of his own forces had led to a rising of the local people there. This was put down quite severely.[76]

As Chao continued his campaign, most of K'am fell or submitted to him, and before long, only some scattered areas remained outside his domain. San-yen had not been completely subdued, and had given him much trouble. In November 1910, he sent Fu Sung-mu to take the area, which he did after ten days. Again, as in other territories taken during this time, a Commissioner was appointed to the area.

Chao took his troops east, and in late January 1911, they arrived in Ba-t'ang, where Chao had the opportunity to test Tibetan students from the school he had established there. He must have been satisfied with the results, for he again memorialised the throne for funds with which to further local educational projects.[77] Wherever Chao went, he did not

cease moving against areas that still held out against him, and Ba-t'ang was no exception. While there, he mounted an attack on Te-jung in the south, where the monks had refused to submit to him. This and other areas quickly yielded.

Then suddenly on April 21, 1911, Chao received notification that he was to be transferred from the post of Frontier Commissioner, and made Viceroy of Szechwan. His replacement in K'am was to be Wang Jen-wen, the Provincial Governor (Ch. *Fan-ssu*) of that province. Chao memorialised that the orders for his transfer be cancelled, but the Chinese government let them stand. Thereupon, he asked that Fu Sung-mu, who had served under him, be allowed to take over the post of Frontier Commissioner, and this was permitted.[78]

Chao's days in K'am were now numbered; he formally handed over the office of Frontier Commissioner to Fu on May 6, but remained in K'am for another two months, working with his successor, and making some further administrative changes. He brought many of the territories that had been taken during the latter part of his career in K'am, such as Kar-dze (*dKar-mdzes*), under the management of Chinese Commissioners. He also continued his military actions against areas that had still not submitted. He sent troops to subdue Po-yul, from where he had previously, in Ch'engtu, received emissaries, who claimed that the people of the area were not Tibetans, but rather the descendants of Chinese soldiers who had been sent to the frontiers generations ago, and had settled there. They produced clothing, food and various other items to back up their claim. Furthermore, they stressed that their territory needed the protection of China, as they were close to the border of India. Lien Yü sent Chung Ying's troops to occupy the area, but they were driven off; it seems not all of the inhabitants belonged to the group that had sent the emissaries. It took a large number of Chao's (now Fu's) troops to take the ostensibly submissive region of Po-yul.[79]

The one major area that remained to be taken was Chan-tui, the area whose transfer from Tibetan to Chinese administration had been planned years before by Feng Ch'üan. Through the years, it had simply not happened, and even in 1911 there were still Tibetan government officials there. Much trouble had been instigated by these officials in neighbouring areas, Chao felt. By this time, however, Chan-tui was surrounded by regions that had submitted, and was not very strong. As it lay on Chao's route, he was able to make a quick attack on it as he returned to China in July. Within a few days, the Tibetan officials had fled and Chan-tui was his.[80]

On July 17, Chao left the frontier region and returned to Szechwan. During his time in K'am, most of the area had been brought under Chinese administration, though there were still broad feelings of antagonism between the Tibetans who lived there and the Chinese who ruled. This was due to the failure of Chao's colonisation schemes, which led to Chinese reliance on a policy in which force was the main instru-

ment of control. This policy was continued by Fu Sung-mu for the brief time that he served as Frontier Commissioner, and he maintained a large garrison in K'am to patrol the area, putting down opposition when it occurred.

Fu Sung-mu's most significant act as Frontier Commissioner was to memorialise that K'am should be converted into a Chinese province under the name Sikang. The borders that he proposed stretched from Szechwan up to the Tan-ta mountains.[81] As most of the area had been organised into Chinese administrative units it was only a small step to convert it into a province.

The idea was not adopted, however, as revolution and chaos swept through China shortly after Fu submitted his memorial. In October revolutionaries rose in revolt at Wu-han in China, and soon Manchu authority vanished. What resulted was utter disorder as far as K'am was concerned. Fu was ordered by revolutionary partisans to give up his post, and he did so, returning to Ch'engtu. No one was sent to replace him, however, and the resulting power vacuum brought an end to much of what Chao Erh-feng had done. Before long, the Chinese troops in K'am, like those in central Tibet, mutinied, which made it quite easy for Tibetan troops and officials to move back into the area. The Tibetans soon pushed the Chinese back beyond the Dri-ch'u (*Bri-chu*) (Ch. *Chin-sha*)* river. A hastily raised force from Szechwan, under the Military Governor (Ch. *Tu-tu*) of that province had little effect on the situation. Eventually the river came to be the *de facto* boundary between China and Tibet, although there was quite a lot of seesawing back and forth over the years as trouble would flare up between the armies stationed in the area. China continued to claim all of the territory up to Gyam-da as hers. In 1939, the Chinese government finally declared the establishment of the province of Sikang, but by this time half of the area proposed for the province was not under Chinese rule.[82]

That part of K'am that was left under Chinese control saw a rapid decline in development in the years following Chao's departure. After the Chinese revolution, the constant changing of officials in the area halted progress, and these officials, through their greed and mismanagement wrecked the enterprises that Chao had begun. By 1916, an American missionary travelling in K'am was able to state that the whole project of development there had become a failure.[83]

Chao Erh-feng in Retrospect

Chao Erh-feng did not fare any better than his schemes. Following his return to Ch'engtu, he had to put down disturbances resulting from the nationalisation of the Szechwan-Hankow railroad. In doing so, a large number of people were killed and wounded and Chao was blamed for this. When the Ch'ing dynasty collapsed, the troops in Ch'engtu

*Known today as the Yangtse.

rebelled and Chao was left with no authority. He was at the mercy of the chaotic forces that controlled the city, and his handling of the railroad affair had given many a desire for vengeance. The self-proclaimed Military Governor of Szechwan, Yin Ch'ang-heng, attacked the Viceroy's residence and captured Chao. He was led to the provincial examination hall, where, cursing his captors, he was executed.[84]

It is generally recognised that Chao was very harsh in his administration of K'am. For this reason, Chinese writers generally do not pay much attention to him in writing about Tibet, other than noting which areas he brought under Chinese administration, that being considered his biggest achievement. A book published in Taiwan notes in passing, that "It's a pity that he (Chao) placed undue emphasis on military force and handled things too violently. He was unable to deeply understand the mentality, religion, customs or habits of the Tibetans or K'am-pa(s)."[85] Mainland publications, if they mention Chao at all, simply say that he was an advocate of "Great Manchuism" (Ch. *Ta Man-tsu Chu-i*), the Ch'ing policy of regarding all non-Manchus as inferiors.[86] Chao is generally considered to be an embarrassment to the Chinese, as the question of Sino-Tibetan relations is still very sensitive. In contrast, the Younghusband expedition gets much Chinese attention as an example of imperialist designs on Tibet.

As to the Tibetan opinion of Chao, an official Tibetan document from the Simla Conference of 1913-1914 states that "Chao Erh-feng is well-known to everybody as a most unscrupulous adventurer whose acts cannot be justified or condoned. . . Chao Erh-feng, out of mere thirst for blood, attacked and demolished the Chartin (Ch. *Hsien-cheng*) (sic) and other Buddhist monasteries and many other places and butchered many innocent men, both high and low. He destroyed several temples and villages by setting fire to them without any provocation, massacred many hundreds of lamas and lay people. He plundered gold, silver, and rare bronze images and many other priceless treasures and relics. He cast the bronze and copper offering vessels of worship into bullets and small coins. And most sacrilegious of all acts of vandalism was that he had paper soles of shoes made out of the leaves of the sacred Buddhist scriptures. . . ."[87]

Chao's antagonism to Buddhism, and the severity with which he carried out the occupation of many parts of K'am made it quite possible for him to have done at least some of the things of which he is accused. However, a more balanced view of him is given by Eric Teichman: "Though he was known to the Swechuanese by the nickname 'Butcher Chao' owing to his alleged tendency towards wholesale executions, and though his proceedings were doubtless at times characterised by great severity towards the unfortunate Tibetans who objected to submitting to the Chinese yoke, his reputation was nevertheless that of a just man; and, while he did not hesitate to behead a recalcitrant Tibetan chief or headman, he was equally ready to decapitate offenders amongst his

own officers and men. . . Chao Erh-feng's justice and fair dealings are remembered today in eastern Tibet as well as his severity . . . amongst the lamas, however, his name is universally execrated as the arch enemy, the destroyer of monasteries and killer of monks."[88]

The legacy that Chao would have liked to have left behind in K'am, that of extensive colonisation and agricultural, mineral and educational development, was unrealisable during and after his lifetime, due to the unwillingness of both Chinese and Tibetans to take part in it. The legacy that he did leave was one of discord; the extent of his march into Tibet resulted in China laying claim to all territory up to Gyam-da. The Simla Conference tried to define the status of Tibet vis-a-vis China and India, but floundered solely on the question of where the boundary between China and Tibet was to be drawn. Thus, Chao's actions led to China's refusal to enter into a written agreement on the status of Tibet, and the absence of any such agreement between China and Tibet eventually resulted in China's occupation of Tibet by force in 1951.

notes & references

1. With reference to the strength of the religious ties between K'am and central Tibet, it is entirely possible that the revolt in K'am of Tobgyal Pangdatsang in 1934 would not have eventuated if the Dalai Lama had not died in 1933. The idea of fighting against a reigning Dalai Lama does not sit well with most Tibetans. For details on the rising, see Tsipon W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, pp. 277-78.
2. Mei Hsin-ju, *Hsi-k'ang*, p. 48.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 142-55. The author travelled in K'am in 1932, and was able to ascertain the monastic population in six out of 31 areas into which the Chinese divided the region. In these six areas alone, the monks numbered over 20,000.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-14. *Feng-shui*, generally rendered as geomancy, usually refers to aspects of Chinese burial. As Tibetans in most cases do not bury their dead, the author was referring to their mystical attitude towards the landscape.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 215-17.
8. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, p. 18. Fu Sung-mu, *Hsi-k'ang Chien Sheng Chi*, p. 4.

9. Mei, p. 278.
10. Eric Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*, p. 20. Sir Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, p. 369. *Further Papers Relating to Tibet* (Cd. 5240), (hereafter cited as *Papers*), *No.* 24, p. 18.
11. Wu Feng-p'ei, ed., *Ch'ing-chi Ch'ou Tsang Tsou-tu*, You Tai 2, p. 3.
12. Mei, p. 70; Fu, p. 4.
13. *Papers*, *No.* 12, p. 13.
14. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, ch. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, p. 18; Fu, p. 4.
15. *Papers*, *No.* 12, p. 13.
16. *Ibid.*, *No* 23, p. 17; Wu, You Tai 2, pp. 4-5; *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, p. 18; Fu, p. 4. The last three sources note that Feng left the head *t'u-ssu's* house under truce. The first source tells an interesting story of Feng escaping by throwing rupees at the crowd around the house; in their haste to get at the money, the mob let Feng dash through their ranks.
17. Wu, You Tai 2, pp. 21-2.
18. *Papers*, 23, *No.* p. 17.
19. *Ibid.*, *No.* 25, p. 19; *No.* 11, p. 12.
20. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 111, p. 3. The chief compiler of this work was Chao Erh-feng's elder brother, Chao Erh-hsün, who later became Viceroy of Szechwan. Nevertheless, the treatment of Chao in this history does not seem to be unduly sympathetic to him because of this fact.
21. *Papers*, *No.* 18, p. 15; *No.* 22, p. 16.
22. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, p. 17; Hu Chi-lu, *Hsi-k'ang Chiang-yü Su Ku Lu*, p. 6. The head *t'u-ssu* eventually escaped to Tao-pa, Kung-ko-ling, and ultimately central Tibet.
23. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, p. 5; Hsieh Pin, *Hsi-tsang Wen-t'i*, p. 42.
24. Hsieh, p. 42.
25. *Papers*, *No.* 45, p. 30.
26. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, p. 17. On fleeing to Tao-pa and Kung-ko-ling, the head *t'u-ssu* of Li-t'ang encouraged these areas to resist the Chinese advance.
27. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, p. 17; Mei, p. 316; Hsieh, p. 44; Fu, p. 6; Younghusband, pp, 371-2.
28. Younghusband, p. 371; Teichman, p. 21. Younghusband says that Chao took 2,000 soldiers, Teichman says 3,000.
29. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, p. 17; *Papers*, *No.* 229, pp. 144-5.
30. Wu, Yu Tai 2, p. 22.
31. *Shih Erh Ch'ao Tung Hua ju*, vol. 30, p. 5463.
32. *Ibid.*, vol. 30, p. 5463; *Papers*, *No.* 229, p. 145.
33. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 111, p. 3; *Papers*, *No.* 229, p. 145.
34. T'iao Hsi-kuang, *Ch'ou Tsang Ch'u-i*, pp. 25-9.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-9 contains the text of the memorial.
36. *Papers, No.* 159, pp. 88-9 contains the text of the Ba-t'ang regulations in English.
37. T'a Tao-nan, *Pien-chiang Cheng-chih Chih-tu Shih*, pp. 191-9.
38. *Papers, No.* 159, p. 99.
39. *Ibid., No.* 159, p. 99; T'ao, p. 195.
40. T'ao, p. 196.
41. *Papers, No.* 182, pp. 108-10 contains the text of the proclamation in English.
42. *Ibid., No.* 182, p. 109.
43. It has always been general practice for Chinese government authorities to refer to those who defy or oppose them as bandits and robbers, regardless of the political motivations involved. One need only read propaganda currently put out in the People's Republic of China and in Taiwan, to see that each side still uses the same terms to refer to the other.
44. *Papers, No.* 182, p. 109.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid., No.* 182, p. 110.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Shih Erh Ch'ao Tung Hua Lu*, Vol. 30, pp. 5677-80, contains the text of the memorial.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 5678.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.* A contrary opinion with regard to trade in K'am is voiced by W.M. Rockhill in *The Land of the Lamas.* On pp. 281-2, he notes a considerable variety of items that pass from Tachienlu into Tibet. His observations are the result of a journey through Am-do *(A-mdo)* and K'am in 1888 and 1889.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 5679.
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ch'ing Shih Kao* vol. 129, *fan pu* 8, p. 23. Wu, Chang Yin-t'ang 2, pp. 17-20.
56. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 129, *fan pu* 8, p. 21; Hsieh, p. 37.
57. Hsieh, p. 37; Fu, p. 21.
58. Mei, pp. 214-6.
59. *Ch'ing Shih Kao*, vol. 111, p. 4.
60. *Papers, No.* 254, p. 161.
61. *Ibid., No.* 284, p. 178.
62. *Ta Ch'ing Li Ch'ao Shih Lu, Te Tsung Ch'ao*, Vol. 11, 34th year, 8th month, pp. 11-2.
63. T'ao, p. 189. Lien Yü was extremely jealous of anyone who seemed to encroach on his authority. This is quite obvious from his later intrigues against the commander of the Chinese army in Tibet, after the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty. As for his relationship with

Chao, the imperial orders were that Chao was not to replace Lien, but to work with him. Thus there were to be two Ambans. Even so, Lien remained jealous of Chao.

64. *Shih Erh Ch'ao Tung Hua Lu,* vol. 30, p. 5839.
65. During this and subsequent administrative changes, new Chinese names were often given to the reorganised areas. Thus Ba-t'ang, in Wade-Giles romanisation changed from Pa-t'ang to Pa-an, and Li-t'ang likewise changed from Li-t'ang to Li-hua. These new names were not necessarily permanent; as a glance at a recent map of the People's Republic of China will show.
66. *Ch'ing Shih Kao,* vol. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, p. 16.
67. *Ibid.,* vol. 126, *t'u-ssu* 2, pp. 15-6; Hsieh, pp. 87-8; Hu, p. 30; *Papers,* No. 297, p. 185; Teichman, pp. 24-5; Younghusband, pp. 374-75. All contain accounts of the submission of De-ge to Chao.
68. *Papers,* No. 310, p. 193; Younghusband, p. 375.
69. *Papers,* No. 297, p. 186.
70. *Ch'ing Shih Kao,* vol. 111, p. 4. Chao had originally asked that his appointment as Amban be withdrawn so that he could concentrate on matters in K'am. The Court let the appointment stand until it became obvious that there was much opposition to Chao in Tibet. This source simply notes that in 1909, the Court adopted Chao's suggestion, and he was relieved of duties as Amban and left solely in charge of border matters.
71. *Ibid.,* vol. 129, *fan pu* 8, p. 24.
72. *Ibid.,* vol. 129, *fan pu* 8, pp. 24-5; Cheng Shih-tun, *Ch'ing-mo Min-ch'u Wai-jen Ch'in Wo Hsi-tsang Shih,* pp. 56-7.
73. Teichman, p. 26.
74. *Papers, n* 297, p. 187.
75. Teichman, p. 30.
76. *Ibid.*
77. Hsieh, p. 39.
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ibid.,* p. 64 *Ch'ing Shih Kao,* vol. 111, p. 5; Hu, p. 20.
80. *Ch'ing Shih Kao,* vol. 111, p. 5; Hsieh, pp. 39-40. Chinese sources note that Chao was welcomed by the people who were glad to be rid of the Tibetan officials. While it is true that officials from central Tibet often abused their positions and were resented by many K'am-pa(s), it still seems unlikely that Chao, with his reputation for severity and antagonism towards the Tibetan culture, could have received any sort of genuine welcome.
81. Chang Ch'i-yun, ed., *Ch'ing Shih,* vol. 7, p. 5726.
82. T'ao, pp. 199-200.
83. Mei, p. 10.
84. *Ch'ing Shih Kao,* vol. 111, pp. 5-6.
85. T'ao, p. 190.
86. Huang Fen-sheng, *Hsi-tsang Ch'ing-k'uang,* p. 113.

87. *The Boundary Question Between China and Tibet*, p. 47.
88. Teichman, p. 37.

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