JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN MONGOL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS, 1912-1919

by

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Soviet, and indeed, other historians have been prone to see a determined advance into Manchuria and Mongolia by Japanese "imperialists," an advance calculated to turn those two areas into an independent Japanese-dominated state. Bagaryn Shirendyb, a Mongol historian, believes that after the Russo-Japanese treaty of 1912, Japan would have liked to put Inner and Outer Mongolia and Manchuria under its control.[1] He finds grounds for his thesis in the Japanese support of the Inner Mongol Prince Babojab both in 1913 and again in 1915. However, the best example for Soviet historians is the Pan-Mongol movement of 1919. Here they see the Cossack Ataman, Grigorii Semenov, as being manipulated by the Japanese imperialists.[2]

This paper seeks to look behind the broad term "Japanese imperialists." There were several groups involved in the execution of Japanese foreign policy. Some were imperialists; some were not. Perhaps one of the main features of Japanese foreign policy in the early 20th century is its lack of unity. By focusing on the three so-called independence movements in Manchuria and Mongolia in 1912, 1916, and 1919, we can perhaps arrive at a truer estimation of Japanese motives and actions. Just who were these groups? What were their interests? What were their objectives?

The First Independence Movement, Spring of 1912

It was not until two weeks after the Chinese Revolution of October 10, 1911, that the Japanese government decided on a formal

policy. As it related to Manchuria, the cabinet called for the maintenance of the status quo. It felt the time had not yet arrived for Japan to press forward for the settlement of her problems. These problems were defined as the extension of the lease on the Kwantung Territories and various matters concerning the South Manchurian Railway (SMR).[3]

A cabinet meeting in November spelled out Japanese policy toward Manchuria in more detail. Essentially the policy was one of neutrality. Japan would aid neither the Chinese government nor the rebels. More particularly Japan would avoid troop action unless the SMR or Japanese lives were threatened. The SMR was to be impartial and not transport either government or revolutionary troops. Should the railroad or Japanese lives be threatened, Japanese officials were to call on the Kwantung government for the assistance of Japanese troops. And if the Manchu court fled to South Manchuria, Japan would protect it.[4]

However, one of the difficulties for the Japanese in Manchuria was the inability of the government to enforce this policy. Other groups began to meddle in Chinese politics almost immediately. Among the first was the SMR. Its president, Nakamura Korekimi, provided funds for a Chinese revolutionary, Wang Kuo-chu. According to men actually involved, Nakamura was controlling Wang at the behest of Terauchi Masatake, Governor-General of Korea. Koike Chōzō, the Consul-General in Mukden, reported that Nakamura had even ordered two of his men to go north and disrupt traffic on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). After repeated complaints by Koike, Prime Minister Saionji Kimmochi, warned Nakamura not to interfere. Thereafter Wang was ordered out of the Japanese railway zone.[5] However, men working for the SMR were still aiding the revolutionaries in February.[6]

Another manifestation of disunity in Japanese policy was the action of the civilians, the contential adventurers or ronin. In fact the man behind the independence movement was a civilian, Kawashima Naniwa.[7] Kawashima claimed that he had the agreement of the Inner Mongol Princes Karachin, Pinto, Ao-khan, Bairin, Ao-khan beise and three more. Karachin had told him that Mongolia was not part of China, that the Mongols owed a great debt to the Manchus, but nothing to the Chinese nation. However, since the Mongols had little strength, independence could only be realized with Japanese support.[8] According to Kawashima's plan the movement would be strictly Mongol, but the Japanese would aid the Mongols behind the scenes. There was to be a rising in both Manchuria and Mongolia. Preferably in Manchuria first because without success there, a rising in Mongolia could be put down easily. With Manchuria in hostile hands how could Japan get aid to the Mongols? Since his plan would depend in large part on the good will of the Chinese officials in Manchuria, Kawashima was anxious that the Japanese aiding the revolutionaries be suppressed.[9]

The Chinese viceroy in Manchuria, Chao Erh-sun, and his lieutenant Chang Tso-lin, were opposed to the revolution at this time. This made some Japanese hope that Chao and Chang could be induced to declare Manchuria independent. Even the Japanese government made contact with them. However when Ochiai Kentaro, the Japanese consul-general in Mukden, expressed doubt as to Chang's usefulness to Japan and asked for a policy decision, Uchida Yasuya, the Foreign Minister, cautioned him about committing the Japanese government to anything.[10]

Soon afterward Chang began to speak of the inevitability of recognizing the Chinese Republic since neither he nor Chao had the arms or money to hold out.[11] Part of this "inevitability" involved

bribes by Yuan Shih-kai, president of the Republic.[12] Another part, no doubt, arose from the actions of the Japanese themselves. While Kawashima and his group wanted to use Chang, other Japanese were aiding the revolutionaries. When some revolutionaries tried to seize T'iehling there were Japanese with them. Then when Chang tried to send a punitive expedition, the Japanese guards in the city refused to let his troops enter. Nor would the SMR transport government troops to put down the revolutionaries.[13] It is little wonder that Chang doubted the policy of Japan.

As Kawashima envisioned his plan, one of the Manchu royal family, Prince Su, would be set up in Manchuria as the head of an independent state under Japanese protection. To this end Prince Su was smuggled out of Peking to Port Arthur.[14] However, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was not in favor of any action compromising Japanese neutrality and it wanted the Prince out of Japanese territory. After consultations with officials in the Army and Navy ministries, it was decided there was no place else to send him, so he remained in Port Arthur.[15]

The Japanese Foreign Ministry was determined to uphold its policy of neutrality, and in late February when Colonel Takayama Kimimichi told Ochiai, the consul in Mukden, that several Japanese were coming to Mukden to establish a Royalist Party, Ochiai suggested to Uchida that the movement be suppressed and Uchida agreed.[16]

At the same time Uchida proposed to Kawashima, via Fukushima Yasumasa, Vice-chief of the Army General Staff, that Prince Su be sent elsewhere. Kawashima again replied there was no place else for him to go. After negotiating with the Kwantung government it was decided Prince Su could stay on the condition he have nothing further to do with any independence movement.[17] When Kawashima became the

go-between for Prince Su and the movement he was ordered back to Tokyo to explain, but a decision of March 19 once again allowed the Prince to remain in Port Arthur.[18]

The Foreign Ministry's actions slowed the independence movement down because on March 23 Fukushima telegraphed Major Taga Munesuke in Peking that the times demanded caution and that the plan for a rising should be stopped. However the training of troops and the secret stockpiling of arms and ammunition were to continue.[19] Then in the middle of April the movement was almost ended when Kawashima was ordered back to Tokyo for good and Fukushima was made Governor-General of the Kwantung Leased Territories.

The names of Japanese military men figure prominently in the first independence movement. The Governor-General of Korea, Terauchi Masatake was involved, but he evidently did not support the movement whole-heartedly.[20] Another man intimately involved was Fukushima Yasumasa. At times he almost seemed to be Kawashima's right-hand man. Of the military men in Manchuria and China, the most important were Colonel Takayama Kimimichi, Major Taga Munesuke and Captain Matsui Kiyoshi. They had been ordered to China after the Chinese Revolution to collect information on conditions in Inner and Outer Mongolia and on the Manchu royal family.[21] However their main activities seem to have been smuggling arms and getting money for the Mongols.

In December 1911 the viceroy in Manchuria, Chao Erh-sun, had complained about Japanese smuggling arms. The investigation by the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Political Affairs Bureau made in June 1912 noted two more cases. It even concluded that the Kwantung government had found various reasons for overlooking smuggling and avoiding punishment of those guilty.[22] However

the most famous case of smuggling involved Matsui, Taga and Captain Kimura Naoto. Matsui Kiyosuke was to go with Prince Karachin to Mongolia, talk to the influential men, recruit some troops and after the arms arrived, distribute them to the five Karachin and Bairin banners. Kimura Naoto was to go with Prince Bairin to recruit and train troops, and Taga Munesuke was to transport the arms to Manchuria where they would be turned over to Matsui.[23] Matsui and Kimura left Peking in early March with the princes and by the middle of May Taga had gotten the shipment as far as Kungchuling. There it was loaded on 50 freight wagons and called agricultural tools. While moving the shipment Matsui got into a fight with some Chinese and 15 Japanese, 9 Mongols and 30 Chinese were killed and most of the shipment was destroyed.[24]

The other Japanese activity involved loans for the Mongols. Kawashima telegraphed Fukushima in December 1911 that Prince Karachin was asking for 200,000 taels. Fukushima passed this request to the Foreign Ministry which approved it and forwarded it to the Yokohama Specie Bank.[25] Soon other Mongol princes were asking for money. Prince Bairin wanted 10,000 taels and Prince Pinto an unspecified amount.[26] The negotiating was done by Major Taga Munesuke to keep the Japanese official representative, Ambassador Ijūin Hikokichi, out of it. The contracts were in Ōkura Kihachirō's name. He was head of the Ōkura-gumi, a company involved in the sale of Japanese arms to China. The money was paid out according to a General Staff plan. Prince Karachin got ¥90,000 for 5 years at 3%; ¥10,000 to be delivered in Peking and ¥80,000 in T'iehling or Mukden. Prince Bairin got ¥20,000 on the same terms; ¥14,000 delivered in Peking, and ¥6,000 in T'iehling or Mukden wherever conditions should be better. In return as security the Mongols put up mining rights in the 5 banners of the Jo-oda

League.[27] These were Japanese government loans. Although the contract was in Ōkura's name, of the total ¥110,000, the Foreign Ministry supplied ¥80,000 and the General Staff ¥30,000.[28]

Early in 1914 Prince Amur Rinkui (better known as Bo Wang) of the Jerim League obtained a loan for ¥80,000 for 3 years at 8%. This was done through SMR.[29] Prince Bairin also received a 2 year ¥20,000 loan from the SMR, secured by the land tax, mining concession and grazing rights.[30] Unfortunately there is no information on how the money was used.

The first attempt by some Japanese to set up an independent Manchu-Mongol state under the aegis of Japan failed. Japanese historians have distributed the blame for this variously. Somura and Yamamoto see it in the disunity of Japanese policy and the fear of international complications.[31] However, Yui denies disunity was the reason, claiming that the Foreign Ministry had no policy until the British protest in February and the defection of Chao and Chang to Yuan's government undercut the movement.[32] Nishimura agrees, emphasizing the actions of Chao and Chang. However, he feels that the actions of Japan had little to do with these men going over to Yuan. Rather it was the pressure of internal events in China.[33] Finally, Kurihara offers a rather simple explanation. It failed because the Japanese government suppressed it.[34] These explanations all have an element of truth and it would be difficult to choose one over the others.

The Second Independence Movement, Spring of 1916

After the failure of the first independence movement matters did not settle down. On the contrary anti-Yuan feeling in Japan increased. This feeling brought about a new alignment of

personalities in the Japanese government who would support a renewed independence movement.

In September 1913 Abe Moritarō, head of the Political Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry was assassinated by one of the ronin. Abe had opposed the settlement of the Man-Mo problem by the acquisition of territory and had favored cooperation with the Powers and Yuan Shih-kai.[35] He had even drafted a proposal for the control of the Army and Navy in order to keep the Foreign Ministry's initiative in foreign policy.[36] However, Koike Chōzō, a former Consul in Mukden who replaced Abe became one of the most vociferous advocates of a settlement of the Man-Mō problem. The other main participants were Tanaka Giichi, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff and Fukuda Masatarō, chief of the Second Department (Intelligence) of the General Staff.

There were three possibilities open to the Japanese activists. One was to bring forward Prince Su again, which Kawashima did. A second was to support the Mongol Babojab. This was also done. The third was to try and persuade Chang Tso-lin to either declare Manchuria independent or join with Prince Su. This was also tried.

Again there was a difference of opinion on how to establish an independent state in Manchuria and Mongolia. However, this time, what is most noticable is the rivalry between Japanese officials and ronin. Uchida Ryōhei claims the Army was hostile toward his civilian-led plan but later changed its mind on the condition that the Army be in charge of carrying it out.[37]

The money to finance all these activities was obtained from the Ōkuragumi. Prince Su granted Ōkura a concession on the Yalu

as security. In addition he also pawned some of his treasures in a Tokyo pawnshop.[38] What happened to the money or even how much there was is a puzzle. Of the ¥1,000,000 from Ōkura about ¥200,000 was given to Prince Su and the remainder retained by the Japanese.[39] A contract was then signed with the Taihei-gumi (composed of the Ōkura, Mitsui and Takada companies) for the purchase of 5,000 rifles and 8 field guns and ammunition.[40] These were to be distributed to Prince Su and Babojab.

Babojab was one of those princes of Inner Mongolia who renounced his loyalty to China and recognized the authority of the Outer Mongol government at Urga. Urga was paying him, but at the same time feared him. At one time he had a force of about 7,000, but the Chinese defeated him and he fled. His aim seems to have been to secure a place he could settle with his men and their families. In this area he wanted autonomy. This the Peking government refused to negotiate, and Urga feared settling Babojab and his men in one place because of their potential for trouble.

Although he asked the Russians for aid, the Japanese were his main suppliers of arms and instructors. He sent two envoys, Tasa Shubu and Bata, to Japan in search of arms in the summer of 1915. The Japanese government refused, but fortunately Tasa met Ōhara Takeyoshi who put him in touch with Kawashima. Kawashima and his group decided to aid Babojab because he had worked for Japan during the Russo-Japanese war. To get an idea of conditions in Babojab's camp, two Japanese, Aoyanagi Katsutoshi and Kizawa Nobu, went to Mongolia in late 1915. Aoyanagi returned the following January with his report.[41]

Kawashima's plan was then as follows: 1) in March to supply Babojab with food and ammunition. In the first part of July he

was to leave his base in Khalkha and by the middle of July he should reach Taonan-fu and Darkhan Wang-fu. By the last part of July first part of August he should reach the SMR territory around Kuochiatien; 2) in all cities of Manchuria to spy out the military conditions and lay plans for the raising of troops. Mukden would be divided into several areas. In addition to send Japanese reserve officers to Taonan-fu, Liao-hsi, Chinchou, Hsiao-ku-lun and Pei-shan-cheng-tzu; 3) to recruit 4,800 men from among the bandits who were loyal to the Ching. Of these 2,800 would be formed into three brigades in Dairen and 1,000 men each would be stationed in Antung hsien and P'i-tzu-wo to await Babojab's call.[42] The military, however, had other ideas and in late March Colonel Doi Ichinoshin, Major Koiso Kuniaki and Matsui Kiyoshi were sent to Manchuria. Doi was to take charge and merge Babojab's movement with the one under Prince Su.[43]

However, the Foreign Ministry and its representatives opposed any rising. On March 18 Ishii telegraphed Yada Shichitarō, the Consul-General in Mukden, to suppress those aiding Prince Su's Royalist Party and the revolutionaries.[44] On March 31 Tanaka Giichi, evidently feeling the pressure, telegraphed Nishikawa Torajirō, the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, that no action was to be taken until further notice.[45] Tanaka must have realized that it would not be easy to stop Doi because he later asked Nishikawa to watch Doi.[46]

In the meantime the Japanese were trying to use Chang Tso-lin. Ishii instructed Yada to try and persuade Chang that the best course would be to rely on Japan.[47] And Tanaka told Nishikawa to hint that it would be desirable for Japan if he (Chang) were independent, and that if and when he declared his independence, Japan would supply him with arms, ammunition and money.[48] However the Kwantung Army General Staff did not believe Chang could be trusted. Yada agreed but felt that in light of Japan's interests in Manchuria there had to be some accommodation with him.[49] Doi also opposed the idea of

Chang's declaring independence. He had no confidence in Chang and was afraid that once Chang was independent the Japanese would not be able to achieve their objectives. Nor did it accord with his plan for Chang to link up with the revolutionary faction. If Chang acted first, the revolutionaries, in whom a lot of money and time had been invested, would lose their opportunity.[50]

Then on April 20 Tanaka ordered Doi to stop preparations. His reasons were three: 1) Matters weren't going fast enough in the South. The arms and money wouldn't reach there before the middle of May, so there was no possibility for concerted action; 2) Yuan might use a rising in Manchuria as a pretext and unite the North and South behind him; 3) Since the over-all situation in China was going against Yuan, perhaps it would reach a point where he would be forced out of office.[51] However opinion in the Army was not united. Koiso returned to Tokyo in early May and talked to Tanaka and Fukuda, chief of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff. They explained Japanese policy and aims to him, but he thought he saw enough of a contradiction to go ahead. He then informed Doi and Nishikawa of the necessity of beginning preparations.[52]

Certainly part of these preparations meant shipping arms to Babojab. Babojab was even naive enough to ask the Russian authorities for permission to transport 1,000 rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition over the CER from Changchun to Hailar. He claimed the Japanese had sent them to Changchun.[53] Ishii asked the Japanese consul in Changchun, Yamauchi Jirō, to investigate. At the same time he instructed the consul in Tsitsihar, Nigame Heiji, to look into the activities of the Japanese in that area and their connection with Babojab.[54]

A report by a secretary of the consulate in Tsitsihar to Nigame described the ronin and their relationship to Babojab and

the way in which arms were shipped. Aoyanagi Katsutoshi was in charge of shipping the arms. Since one batch had been confiscated by CER officials, the Japanese had decided to take the shipments to Chengchiatun. The Mongols had to pick them up there. Although there were those who wanted to bribe CER officials, no decision had been made. At that time the ronin were hand-carrying the ammunition between Changchun and Harbin and eight boxes had already arrived in Harbin. Under Babojab there were 2,400 cavalry with rifles and ammunition. Yoshiwara, the secretary, felt some Mongols would insist on going ahead with the rising if there were no further possibility of obtaining arms from Japan. He also thought Babojab's two sons were being held hostage in Port Arthur.[55]

Yada knew Doi was determined to go ahead with the plot and asked for instructions. Ishii wired back that the General Staff had told him there must be some kind of misunderstanding, that there was to be no rising. He then ordered Yada to suppress any attempt.[56]

Yuan Shih-Kai's death in early June meant nothing to Doi. He thought a second or third Yuan would emerge and nothing would be changed, so he was going ahead.[57] However on the evening of June 7 an order came from Tanaka via Nishikawa forbidding any rising. The Japanese government had decided to support Li-Yuan-hung. Doi left for Tokyo two days later to clarify matters. Koiso claims Doi found opinion in Japan divided (just as Koiso had in May). The Foreign Ministry wanted to support Li, but the General Staff and others felt that the fighting and confusion in China would just continue. Finally on June 23 it was decided that if Li set up a cabinet and was responsive to Japanese opinion, then Japan would give its positive support.[58]

Though conditions remained confused in China, the Foreign Ministry wanted the movement disbanded. Because the Army was so obstreperous, Ishii visited Yamagata Aritomo and asked him to persuade the military to come around.[59] It must have worked, but even then disbanding the movement was not easy, and some arms had to be seized by the consul in Changchun to keep the ronin from getting out of hand.[60] Finally an agreement was reached with Kawashima Naniwa. The men under Prince Su would be disbanded within sixteen days, each Japanese officer receiving ¥1,000-2,000 to return home. Babojab's Mongols who by this time had reached the area around Kuochiatien would withdraw from Japanese territory and would be provided with about ¥50,000 worth of arms, to be handed over on August 27 at Chengchiatun under the supervision of Matsui. All the arms confiscated in Dairen, except those destined for the Mongols, would be kept by the Kwantung government. As for the loan to Prince Su, it would be continued and the full amount would be given him, but the ¥215,000 used by Kawashima would be deducted.[61] Actually it is difficult to tell just how much money was used and what it was used for because figures don't agree. Koiso's report states that Doi received ¥500,000 from the Ōkura-gumi. Of this ¥54,000 was spent for personnel, ¥133,500 for supplies and ¥349,548 for secret expenses. A total of ¥537,048.[62]

One thing that might have hurried the Japanese disbandment of the movement was the Russian inquiry of August 14 on Japan's attutude toward the Royalist movement. The Russian government had information that the movement was being supplied, trained and led by the Japanese. Since the Man-Mo empire would include Russia's sphere of influence in Manchuria, she needed a clarification of Japanese policy to formulate her own attitude.[63] By the time the Japanese reply was received on September 7 the movement had already been disbanded officially.

However the fighting did not end. Babojab was fighting his way north when he was killed in October.[64] The remnants of his band along with the Japanese accompanying them finally reached the area around Hailar in December. In January the Russian Ambassador asked Motono Iichirō, the Foreign Minister, to take measures to keep the Japanese from aiding the Mongols in Russia's sphere of influence.[65] On February 1 the Japanese government informed the Russian Ambassador that Nigame Heiji, the Japanese consul in Tsitsihar, had been instructed to cooperate with the Russian Vice-Consul in Tsitsihar in settling the matter.[66] After some discussion the Japanese consul persuaded the ronin to leave.[67]

Two Japanese histories claim that the Mongols and their Japanese advisers captured Hailar in June 1917 and proclaimed it independent. When they heard rumors of Chinese and Russian troops movements against them on the CER, Irie Tanenori, one of the Japanese reserve officers, visited the Russian Vice-Consul in Hailar, Pavel Kirilovich Usatyi, and threatened to blow up the tunnel if the CER transported troops. Usatyi reportedly denied any intention of using the CER. Hailar remained independent until the ronin were forced to return to the south by the Japanese Army General Staff. Once they were gone the Russians and Chinese attacked and routed the Mongols.[68]

The Pan-Mongol Movement, Spring of 1919

The confused events in Russia, Manchuria and Mongolia following the Russian Revolution allowed yet another attempt to be made at an independent Manchuria-Mongolia. However this time the Mongols were the ones most involved. The Pan-Mongol movement and the Cossack Grigorii Mikhailovich Semenov are two intertwined strands. Yet Semenov's activities, the Pan-Mongol movement, and

Japanese interest in the movement and in Semenov are all distinct. The Japanese were aiding Semenov. There can be no question of that.[69] However this aid was to fight Bolsheviks, not to set up an independent Mongol state.

In the middle of February Ōtani Kikuzō, Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in Siberia, reported to Fukuda Masataro, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, that Semenov's plan was to sympathize with the Outer Montols and set up a state comprised of the Transbaikal Cossacks, the Buriats, the Outer Mongols in the Transbaikal, the Barguts and the Karachins. The capital would be in Hailar, the capital of Barga, and Semenov wanted to put his state under Japanese protection.[70] Yet a month later the Japanese military authorities in Tokyo were denying that Semenov was involved in the Mongol independence movement.[71]

At the same time the Army denied there were any Japanese participating in Semenov's movement. This was not the case. In March 1918 Captain Kuroki Chikayoshi, at his own request, had been appointed to Semenov.[72] There were also some ronin aiding Semenov. In February 1919 a group of them visited Mukden and in cooperation with one of Semenov's men decided to begin raising 2,000 Mongol troops. These troops would be sent to Siberia disguised as loggers and miners. According to the leader, Ishimoto Gonjirō, the money to finance the project was to come from the Japanese and French governments.[73] The Foreign Ministry however, disapproved, and Uchida Yasuya cabled Akazuka Shosuke, the Consul-General in Mukden to stop Ishimoto.[74]

This aid to the Mongols was indirect since it was routed through Semenov. The next step was for the Mongols themselves to ask the Japanese directly for aid. Apparently they never asked for much. The first request was to be allowed to send students

to Japan.[75] The second was for a printing press with moveable type so they could publish a newspaper.[76] A third was for three doctors and advisers. These men would stay in Manchuria for one or two years and be paid 1,000 rubles a month. Perhaps it was asking too much that the Japanese be men who could speak Russian and be interested in Mongolia.[77] The last request was for ten Japanese military instructors. At the same time the Buriats wanted to send ten Mongols to Japan for military training.[78] None of these requests seems to have been honored. If nothing else this would serve to indicate a lack of Japanese interest in Mongol independence.

What has come to be called the Pan-Mongol movement began to materialize with a series of preliminary conferences in January and February 1919. There was a Japanese observer at all of them. However the main conference was held in Chita, beginning February 25. Present were Semenov, Captain Suzue (called Suzuki in most writings) attached to the Japanese Third Division in Chita, six Buriats, five Barguts and three representatives of Inner Mongolia. Outer Mongolia refused to participate. Moreover, there were two Japanese advisers, Nakagomi Tomisaburō was one, about whom I have been able to find out nothing.

This conference decided to form a Mongol state consisting of Inner and Outer Mongolia, Barga and the Buriats in Siberia. It was to be a federation and a provisional government of four men was named. The capital was to be in Hailar, but was to be temporarily located in Dauria, a few miles from Manchouli on the Russian side of the frontier. Furthermore there would be a 24,000 man defense army. To maintain the government a 20-year loan was to be obtained from a foreign government against the security of the federation's gold, silver, salt and mineral wealth. In addition the lender was to have the unlimited right to build railroads. The conference also decided to send representatives to the Paris Peace Conference.[79]

The official Japanese representative, Suzue, listened in silence. His reports are neither more informed than those of the Russians, nor do they indicate any form of Japanese planning. A recent Mongol writer has claimed that Semenov instigated the conference, but that all the work was managed by the Japanese military officials backstage.[80] The evidence in the Japanese Foreign Ministry files will not bear this out.

Perhaps it is more significant that the conference sent two men to Kuroki with a report. Kuroki said he was satisfied with the work of the conference and would leave immediately for Japan. He even promised full support in the name of the Japanese government.[81] It is difficult to ascertain just where the basis for his statement lay. Fukuda, in a memo to the Chief of Staff, Uehara Yūsaku, wondered if Ōba Jirō, Commander of the Third Division, was sending Suzue to the conferences to furnish liaison with the Mongols or to spy on Semenov.[82] One would think that if Kuroki was so important the General Staff would have known of all Semenov's actions and had no need to spy on him.

Japanese military thinking on the Man-Mo question was embodied in a memorandum from Tanaka Giichi, the Minister of the Army, to Uchida Yasuya, the Foreign Minister. Tanaka saw Japanese policy toward Outer Mongolia and Barga as being intimately related to Japan's policy toward China. He advocated caution. Since China was trying to re-establish her position along her northern frontier while Russia was weak, any Japanese action there would be looked on with suspicion. Tanaka wanted to deepen Sino-Japanese cooperation, but he wanted to guide Chinese policy to the Mongols' advantage. He also wanted to encourage the Buriats and Outer Mongols to work together, and at the same time he felt Japan should prepare both China and Mongolia for Russian aggression.[83]

The official Japanese policy came with the cabinet decision of March 16. Concerning Japanese participation in a Mongol independence movement, the cabinet recognized that Japanese living in Manchuria and Siberia had a direct part in it. News of Japanese participation was common among Chinese officials in Peking and Manchuria. Therefore the cabinet decided that in the light of anti-Japanese feeling in China, Europe and the U.S., of the history of failure of the previous movements, and of the fact that it could complicate military and diplomatic relations with the other powers in North Manchuria and Siberia, all Japanese participation in a conspiratorial plot must be stopped. Military and civilian officials were strictly forbidden to participate in any conspiracy and citizens were warned to be cautious. Concerning Mongol students' coming to Japan and the request for a printing press, the cabinet felt that a decision should be put off pending further investigation.[84]

In spite of this policy, rumors of Japanese aiding the Mongols kept circulating. Chang Tso-lin was upset enough to threaten to aid the Koreans if the Japanese government did not halt the actions of its citizens.[85] Uchida asked his consuls in Manchuria to investigate. They did by asking the Chinese generals. On April 11 Obata Torikichi, the Ambassador in Peking, presented a note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry with the results. According to the note there were surprisingly few Japanese involved. Some around Mukden, but none in Tsitsihar or Chengchiatun. Most rumors were just that--rumors--and could not be verified.[86]

Because the Chinese were so agitated, Japanese Army officers were also recommending caution. The commander in Tientsin reported that Peking assigned the responsibility for an independence movement to Semenov, but felt that in the background the Japanese General Staff was pulling the strings.[87] Major General Satō in Tientsin warned of the same thing.[88] And Major General Higashi

in Peking thought that the foreigners were trying to use claims of Japanese participation in the Mongol independence movement to drive a wedge between Japan and China. He felt Japan should have absolutely nothing to do with any movement, and any Japanese involved should be suppressed.[89]

Evidently all this pressure had some effect. According to Speranskii Kuroki was replaced by Major Kurosawa. At Kurosawa's first meeting with the head of the Mongol provisional government, Neise-gegen, Kurosawa told him that there was no necessity of sending a Mongol delegation to Japan, that Japan would secretly support the Mongol movement with arms and money.[90] It would seem that Kurosawa replaced Suzue since the latter's name no longer appears on reports. At the end of May Ōba reported that Dashi Sampilon, a Buriat leader, said that Kurosawa had told him that Japan had no intention of aiding the Mongols.[91] Then in the middle of June Kurosawa himself reported that most of the people connected with the Mongol independence movement realized that there was no possibility of Japanese aid.[92]

According to the Russian vice-consul in Hailar, at the beginning of June the Mongols were losing confidence in Semenov, too. They had not gotten the loan Semenov had promised in February. No Mongol delegation had been sent to the Paris Peace Conference, nor had the meetings of the Mongol leaders with the foreign representatives, arranged by Semenov, yielded positive results.[93]

Finally the last hope of Japanese aid disappeared in October when Fukuda, the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, ordered Major General Higashi in Peking to inform the Outer Mongol government informally that Japan was in no way involved in any plot to aid Buriat Mongolia to become independent.[94]

Conclusion

One of the things that strikes one going through the documents is the lack of commitment to a plot to detach Manchuria from China on the part of the Japanese government. The government was more than willing to work for a settlement in Japan's favor, but that did not mean there was agreement on any one particular policy or even how a policy, once decided on, would be carried out. The Foreign Ministry was usually the one that advocated a go-slow policy, but even within that ministry men like Koike Chōzō were in a hurry to achieve the Japanese objectives. The Army, and within the Army the General Staff, was most often the agency of plans to secure a firmer base in Manchuria. But even within the Army opinion was divided. Then there was an agency like the South Manchurian Railway with plans of its own. In 1912 the government seemed to be feeling out Chang Tso-lin, but at the same time other Japanese were supporting the revolutionaries, Chang's mortal enemies. In 1916 the government again was willing to use Chang, but the activists on the scene in Manchuria objected, feeling Chang was not trustworthy. This disarray in Japanese policy hampered the execution of a peaceful policy (or even an aggressive one) and aroused the suspicions of the Powers.

Certainly the Japanese showed a great sensitivity to the actions of the Powers. Yui believes that in 1912 it was Great Britain that forced the Foreign Ministry to take a firm attitude toward the activists. In 1916 Russia also had an interest in any Japanese-sponsored independence movement that would encroach on her sphere of influence. When the Japanese government protested to the powers that it was trying to suppress the independence movements, it usually was. It was the civilian activists who were causing all the trouble. They and their sympathizers in the government and Army earned the Japanese government a bad name. But they were never strong enough to thwart government opinion when it decided to suppress them.

Finally in 1919 when the time was opportune to set up an independent Manchu-Mongol state in Manchuria the Japanese showed little interest. There were men like Kuroki involved, but he could be classed more as a civilian activist than as a representative of the Japanese government. It was Suzue, not Kuroki, who was the observer at the Mongol conferences. Perhaps the greatest indication of a lack of interest on the part of the Japanese was their refusal to honor even the simplest Mongol requests. It was not until later that the balance changed and authorities in Manchuria gained enough confidence to oppose the desires of Tokyo.

FOOTNOTES

1. Bagaryn Shirendyb, Istoriia Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Revoliutsii 1921 goda (History of the Mongol Peoples' Revolution of 1921), (Moscow, 1971), p. 42.

2. Ibid., pp. 42, 105-109, 145; also see his earlier Mongoliia na Rubezhe XIX-XX vekov (Mongolia at the turn of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries) (Ulan Bator, 1963); A. F. Speranskii, "Materialy k istorii interventsii. Rol' Iaponii v pan-mongol'skom dvizhenii," (Materials on the history of the intervention. The role of Japan in the Pan-Mongol movement), Novyy Vostok, 2 (1922), 591-603.

3. Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon Gaikō Nempyō narabini Shuyō Bunsho (Chronological Table and Main Documents of Japanese Diplomacy) (hereafter NGBS), (Tokyo, 1965), I, 356-357. On Japan's China policy see Ikei Masaru, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911," JAS, XXV (Feb. 1966), 213-227.

4. #347 Uchida to Koike, Nov. 10; #348 Ishimoto to Uchida Nov. 12, 1911, Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (The Diplomatic Documents of Japan), special vols. XLIV-XLV, Shinkoku Jiken (The Chinese Revolution of 1911) (hereafter NGB, XLIV-XLV) (Tokyo, 1961).

5. #345 Koike to Uchida, Nov. 8; #350 Nov. 12; #351 Saionji to Nakamura, Nov. 13; #353 Koike to Uchida, Nov. 13; #356 Nov. 15; #361 Uchida to Ochiai, Nov. 28; #367 Nov. 30; #369 Ochiai to Uchida, Dec. 2, 1911. NGB, XLIV-XLV.

6. Aida Tsutomu, Kawashima Naniwa Ō (Kawashima Naniwa) (Tokyo, 1936), #69 Kawashima to Kukushima, Feb. 1, p. 149; #85 Feb. 17, 1912, pp. 154-155.

7. Kawashima first went to China in 1886 and soon became a China specialist with a good command of the language. During the Sino-Japanese War he was an interpreter for the Japanese Army. After the Boxer Rebellion he became head of a school for teaching Chinese police Japanese methods. While he was in Peking he met Prince Su. They became so close that the Prince gave Kawashima his fourteenth daughter in adoption.

8. Aida, Kawashima, p. 162.

9. Ibid., #59 Kawashima to Fukushima, Jan. 27, p. 144; #69 Feb. 1, 1912, p. 149.

10. #420 Uchida to Ochiai, Feb. 2; #433 Ochiai to Uchida, Feb. 5; #446 Feb. 8; #448 Uchida to Ochiai, Feb. 9, 1912. NGB, XLIV-XLV. Yui believes this hesitation on the part of the Japanese government was caused by the British ambassador's note to Uchida of Feb. 16. The ambassador hoped Uchida would advise the Japanese consuls to have nothing to do with a separatist movement. Yui Masaomi, "Shingai Kakumei to Nihon no Taiō," (Japan's response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911), Rekishigaku Kenkyū, 344 (Jan. 1969), 9. For the note, #469 English Ambassador to Uchida, Feb. 16, 1912. NGB, XLIV-XLV.

11. #463 Ochiai to Uchida, Feb. 14, 1912. Ibid.

12. #463 Ochiai to Uchida, Feb. 14, 1912, Ibid; also Sonoda Kazuki, Kaiketsu Cho Saku-rin (Great Chang Tso-lin) (Tokyo, 1922), pp. 67-68.

13. Aida, Kawashima, #85 Kawashima to Fukushima, Feb. 17; #86 Feb. 17, 1912, pp. 154-55.

14. Henry McAleavy, A Dream of Tartary (London, 1963), pp. 155-156; also #423 Ijūin to Uchida, Feb. 3; #288 Ochiai to Uchida, Feb. 4; #289 Oshima to Ichida, Feb. 5, 1912. NGB, XLIV-XLV.

15. Kurihara Ken, "Dai ichiji Dai niji Man-Mō Dokuritsu Undō to Koike Gaimushō Seimukyokuchō no Jishoku Mondai," (The first and second Manchuria-Mongolia independence movements and the resignation of Koike, head of the Political Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry), in Kurihara, ed., Tai-Man-Mō Seisaku Shi no Ichimen (One aspect of policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia) (Tokyo, 1966), p. 142.

16. #485 Ochiai to Uchida, Feb. 21; #486 Uchida to Ochiai, Feb. 22, 1912. NGB, XLIV-XLV.

17. "Manshū oyobi Shina Kakuchi ni okeru Gaikō Hōshin Kankaku no Jitsurei (Taishō 2-nen, 6-gatsu, Seimukyoku chōsa)" (Actual examples of the divergence of diplomatic plans in all areas of China and Manchuria (June 1912. Investigation of the Political Affairs Bureau), Kurihara, Tai-Man-Mō, pp. 324-325; also Aida, Kawashima, #92 Kawashima to Fukushima, Feb. 23, 1912, p. 157.

18. "Manshū oyobi Shina," p. 325.

19. Yui Masaomi, "Shingai Kakumei," p. 9.

20. Inaba Masao, "Shingai Kakumei Kanke, II," (Concerning the Chinese Revolution of 1911), Kurihara, Tai-Man-Mō, p. 305; also Kokuryūkai Kokushi Uchida Ryohei Den, (Patriot Uchida Ryōhei) Tokyo, 1967), p. 508.

21. Inaba, "Shingai Kakumei," pp. 291-298.

22. "Manshū oyobi Shina," pp. 324-325.

23. Aida, Kawashima, p. 163.

24. Kurihara, "Dai ichiji," p. 144; Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Stanford, 1970), pp. 139-140.

25. #515 Kawashima to Fukushima, Dec. 6; #516 Kurachi to Inoue, Dec. 12, 1911. NGB, XLIV-XLV.

26. #518 Uchida to Ijūin, Feb. 2, 1912, Ibid.

27. #525 Ijūin to Uchida, Feb. 29, 1912, Ibid.

28. #530 Ijūin to Uchida, Mar. 8, 1912, Ibid.

29. #425 Yamakawa to Koike, Jan. 9; #429 Yamaza to Makino, Jan. 22; #430 Makino to Tokonami, Jan. 22; #436 Yamaza to Makino, Feb. 18, 1914, NGB 1914, II.

30. #438 Makino to Yamaza, Apr. 14; #439 Apr. 19; #440 Yamaza to Katō, May 11, 1914, NGB 1914, II.

31. Somura Yasunobu, "Shingai Kakumei to Nihon," (The Chinese Revolution of 1911 and Japan), Kokusai Seiji: Nitchū Kankei no Tenkai (International Politics: The Development of Sino-Japanese Relations) (Mar. 1961), p. 51. Yamamoto Shiro, "Shingai Kakumei to Nihon no Dōkō," (The Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the Trend of Japan). Shirin, XLIV, no. 1 (Jan. 1966), 43.

32. Yui, "Shingai Kakumei," p. 10.

33. Nishimura Shigeo, "Tō-San-Shō ni okeru Shingai Kakumei," (The Chinese Revolution of 1911 in the Three Eastern Provinces), Rekishigaku Kenkyū, 358 (Mar. 1970), 26.

34. Kurihara, "Dai-ichiji," pp. 150-156.

35. Imai Seiichi, "Taishō-ki ni okeru Ginbu no Seiji-teki Chi'i," (The Political Position of the Military during the Taishō Period), Shisō 402 (Dec. 1957), 108.

36. NGSB, I, 369-376.

37. Uchida Ryōhei, pp. 564-569; for the cabinet decision of March 7, 1916, see NGSB, I, 418-419. The Army-civilian differences may also be seen in the biographies to Tanaka and Kawashima.

38. Kuzuu Yoshihisa, Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden (Stories and Biographies of Pioneer East Asian Adventurers), (hereafter TSSK), (Tokyo, 1933), II, 630-631. For the memo and contract between Prince Su and Ōkura see #857 Kuroki to Uehara, Mar. 30, 1916. NGB, 1916, II.

39. Aida, Kawashima, p. 224, claims Kawashima got ¥2,000,000 from Ōkura. However Tanaka's biography says only ¥1,000,000. Tanaka Giichi Denki Kankō-kai, Tanaka Giichi Denki (Biography of Tanaka Giichi), (Tokyo, 1958), I, 633-634. Of this ¥1,000,000, ¥200,000 was applied to the loan redemption, ¥300,000 remained with Koike and ¥500,000 was given to the General Staff. Also see #939 Hayashi (Peking) to Ishii, Sept. 6, 1916. NGB, 1916, II.

40. Tanaka Giichi, I, 634.

41. Information on Babojab comes from Komissia po izdaniiu Dokumentov epokhi Imperializma, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia v Epokhu Imperializma; Dokumentov iz Arkhivov Tsarskogo i Vremmenogo Pravitel'stva, 1878-1917 gg. 3rd. Ser. #525 Usatyi to Sazonov,

Apr. 13, 1915, VII, p. 2; #349 Krupenskii to Sazonov, July 19, 1915, VIII, pt. 1; #729 Usatyi to Krupenskii, Sept. 18, 1915; #899 Oct. 12, 1915, VIII, pt.2; #97 Krupenskii to Sazonov, Oct. 28; #260 Nov. 16, 1915; #456 Neratov to Krupenskii, Dec. 7; #643 Usatyi to Sazonov, Dec. 27, 1915, IX; #20 Miller to Sazonov, Jan. 16, 1916, X. TSSK, II, 625-630; Aida, Kawashima, pp. 214-217. Also see the entry under Aoyanagi Katsutoshi in Tōa Dōbunkai, Tai-Shi Kaiko Roku (Memoirs about China) (Tokyo, 1936), II, 1339.

42. Aida, Kawashima, pp. 228-229.

43. Tanaka Giichi, I, 630.

44. #854 Ishii to Yada, Mar. 18, 1916, NGB,1916, II.

45. #858 Tanaka to Nishikawa, Mar. 31, 1916, Ibid.

46. #863 Tanaka to Nishikawa, Apr. 6, 1916, Ibid.

47. #867 Ishii to Yada, Apr. 9, 1916, Ibid.

48. #868 Tanaka to Nishikawa, Apr. 10, 1916, Ibid.

49. #870 Yada to Ishii, Apr. 13, 1916, Ibid.

50. #873 Yada to Ishii, Apr. 16, 1916, Ibid. The attempted assassination of Chang on May 30 does not seem to be connected with Doi's opposition to Chang. Rather it seems to have been an isolated incident by one of the ronin. TSSK, II, 634-635.

51. Tanaka Giichi, I, 630.

52. There are three different sources for what happened in Tokyo. In his memoirs Koiso says virtually nothing and doesn't even mention Doi's name. He says he was in Manchuria strictly for topographical work. Katsuzan Kōsō [Autobiography], (Tokyo, 1963). However Fukuda's biography contains a report written by Koiso in which Koiso says that Fukuda as much as gave him the go ahead. Kuroita Katsumi, Fukuda Taishō Den (General Fukuda's Biography), (Tokyo, 1937), p. 276. In still another report written by Koiso is the version above, Tanaka Giichi, I, 636-638.

53. #878 Russian Ambassador to Ishii, Apr. 21, 1916. NGB, 1916, II.

54. #881 Ishii to Yamauchi, Apr. 22; #882 Ishii to Nigame, Apr. 22, 1916, Ibid.

55. #888 Yoshiwara to Nigame, May 8, 1916, Ibid. Whether they were hostages or not is difficult to tell. In March Prince Su's seventh son, Hsien K'uei went with the Japanese to Babojab's camp and in return Babojab's oldest and second sons, Nunnejab and Kanjujab, went to Port Arthur, Aida, Kawashima, p. 232.

56. #901 Yada to Ishii, June, 6; #902 Ishii to Yada, June 7, 1916, NGB, 1916, II.

57. Tanaka Giichi, I, 639.

58. Tanaka Giichi, I, 639-640.

59. Hara Kiichiro, ed., Hara Takashi Nikki (Diary of Hara Takashi) (Tokyo, 1950), VI, 437. Entry for June 24.

60. #917 Yamauchi to Ishii, Aug. 1; #920 Ishimoto Kantarō (Dairen) to Koike, Aug. 1; #922 Ishii to Yamauchi, Aug. 1, 1916, NGB, 1916, II.

61. #936 Shirani to Ishii, Aug. 21; #939 Hayashi to Ishii, Sept. 6, 1916, NGB, 1916, II. Tanaka Giichi, I, 642-645.

62. Tanaka Giichi, I, 645.

63. #918 Russian Ambassador to Ishii, Aug. 14, 1916. NGB, 1916, II.

64. After Babojab's death Kawashima took his children in hand and educated them. The oldest daughter married Prince Su's ninth son. All Babojab's sons were graduated from the Rikugun Shikan Gakko in Japan. The oldest went to Urga and worked for the Ministry of Education and Religion and disappeared after the Soviets arrived. His second son, Kanjujab, married Kawashima Yoshiko. She was the daughter Kawashima adopted from Prince Su. The third son worked in the Ministry of Mongol Affairs of the government of Manchoukuo. Aida, Kawashima, pp. 277-278.

65. Japan Foreign Ministry, Nichi-Ro Kōshō shi (History of Russo-Japanese Negotiations) (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1969), pt. 2, p. 292.

66. Nichi-Ro Kōshō shi, pt. 2, p. 293.

67. Inaba Masao, "Dai-niji Man-Mō Kyōji Kankei," (Concerning the Second Man-Mō Rising), Kurihara, Tai-Man-Mō, pp. 375-378.

68. Aida, Kawashima, pp. 280-292; TSSK, II, 675-682. Both of these accounts seem to be based on a manuscript by Irie Tanenori one of the main participants.

69. James W. Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia (New York, 1957), pp. 354-355, has a list of equipment supplied to Semenov by the Japanese.

70. Japan Foreign Ministry, MT 1.6.1.4-5, Mōko-Buriato Dokuritsu Kankei (Sept. 1918-Dec. 1919) (Concerning Mongol-Buriat Independence) Microfilm reel 115 (hereafter MBDK). Ōtani to Fukuda, Feb. 16, 1919, frames 91-92. Unfortunately Semenov's autobiography ignores this episode. O Sebe (Harbin, 1938).

71. Memorandum of Janihara Masanao, head of the Political Affairs Bureau Apr. 12, 1919. NGSB, I, 479-480; #477 Uchida to Satō (Harbin), Apr. 28, 1919. NGB, 1919, I. Both comment on this fact.

72. Takeuchi Kakuji, Kuroki Chikayoshi to Semenofu to no Kankei (The Relationship Between Kuroki Chikayoshi and Semenov) (Tokyo, 1928), p. 4. Kuroki Chikayoshi (1883-1924) was a military attache in Russia 1914-1917. When he was recalled he was attached to General Nakajima Masatake in Harbin. While there he met Semenov and decided to aid him. In March 1918 Kuroki was appointed to Semenov to help outfit and organize soldiers. In September 1918 Kuroki resigned his commission and devoted himself to Semenov. He fell ill several times and had to return to Japan where he finally died March 14, 1924.

73. Akazuka to Uchida, Feb. 22, 1919. MBDK, ff. 135-138.

74. Uchida to Akazuka, Feb. 23, 1919. MBDK, ff. 138-139.

75. Ōba to Fukuda, Oct. 10, 1918, ff. 3-4; Nov. 26, 1919, ff. 5-6; Feb. 3, 1919, ff. 81-84; Feb. 20, 1919, ff. 89-90; Satō to Uchida, Feb. 24, 1919, ff. 58-59. MBDK.

76. Ōba to Fukuda, Feb. 20, 1919, ff. 89-90; Satō to Uchida, Feb. 24, 1919, ff. 58-59. MBDK.

77. Ōba to Fukuda, Feb. 21, 1919. MBDK, f. 70.

78. Ōtani to Fukuda, July 10, 1919. MBDK, ff. 521-522.

79. Speranskii, "Materialy," pp. 594-595. Gerard Friters, Outer Mongolia and its International Position (Baltimore, 1949), pp. 227-228, takes his information from Speranskii.

80. B. Shirendyb, Mongoliia na Rubezhe, p. 172. This point is difficult to substantiate. However the desire for independence did not originate with nor was it propelled by Semenov. This is amply shown in F. Shulunov, "Buriatskie Natsional-Demokraty i Grazhdanskaia Voina v Buriato-Mongolii," (The Buriat National-Democrats and the Civil War in Buriat Mongolia) Bor'ba Klassov, 5 (1936), 49-59.

81. Speranskii, pp. 594-595.

82. Fukuda to Uehara, Feb. 1, 1919. MBDK, ff. 79-80.

83. Tanaka to Uchida, Feb. 14, 1919. MBDK, ff. 127-129.

84. Cabinet decision, March 16, 1919. MBDK, ff. 123-125.

85. Ōtani to Fukuda, Apr. 4, 1919, f. 243; Akazuka to Uchida, Apr. 5, 1919. ff. 259-260; May 1, 1919, ff. 434-436. MBDK. This was important because on March 1st there had been a mass demonstration for Korean independence.

86. Obata to Uchida, Apr. 15, 1919. MBDK, ff. 388-397.

87. Commander in Tientsin to Fukuda, Mar. 24, 1919. MBDK, ff. 228-229.

88. Satō to Fukuda, Apr. 1, 1919. MBDK, ff. 240-241.

89. Higashi to Fukuda, June 17, 1919. MBDK, ff. 487-488.

90. Speranskii, p. 601.

91. Ōba to Fukuda, May 31, 1919. MBDK, ff. 473-474.

92. Kurosawa to Fukuda, June 16, 1919. MBDK, f. 482.

93. Speranskii, p. 602.

94. Fukuda to Higashi, Oct. 23, 1919. MBDK, ff. 575-576.