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CHINESE COLONIZATION IN MANCHURIA*

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THERE are striking differences between Manchuria and other regions of pioneer settlement. The tension of international affairs alone is enough to distinguish it not only from Australia, the Argentine, or northwest Canada but even from the regions of European settlement in Africa, where the international and racial factors differ not in degree but in kind from those of northeastern Asia. Historically Manchuria is a part of the great migration ground of eastern and central Asia. In our time the form of migration is changing, but migration here is no new thing.

CULTURES OLD AND NEW

So far from being a "virgin" country, as is so commonly assumed, Manchuria is a vast territory with an important regional, racial, and cultural history of its own. The problems of modern colonization cannot be dealt with simply in terms of the numbers of colonists who settle annually and the number of new commercial opportunities created. Historical forces, which influence the affairs of the living, must be taken into consideration. Time and again races emanating from Manchuria and still to a certain extent represented there—of whom the most important now are not the Manchus but the Mongols —have led or shared in conquests of China and have established in China dominions of greater or less territorial extent in which the Chinese became politically a subordinate race. In fact China's immediate title to Manchuria derives historically from the conquest of

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China by the Manchus. In earlier periods, however, China had exercised a certain sovereignty over parts of Manchuria. Signs of the influence of Chinese culture can be detected in the remotest parts of the country and must often antedate by generations the actual arrival of Chinese colonists in decisive numbers.

The mere fact that the Chinese have a highly developed individual civilization is enough to place Manchuria, with Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, in a different category from all the other great regions of the world that are now being settled and civilized for the first time. This ought to be a glaring truth, but it has never been so treated. As a spectacle the Chinese colonization of Manchuria is so magnificent, the millions taking part and the rapidity of their spread have such a dramatic appeal that there cannot but be a tendency among Westerners—especially in a nation like America with a strong and highly sentimentalized pioneering tradition—to regard it as a spectacle in their own manner.

What is true is that the necessities of Manchuria are imposing on the Chinese an increased use of Western borrowings—which explains the relative material "progressiveness" of Manchuria in comparison with the rest of China—and that parallel with the Chinese expansion, in a characteristically Chinese manner, throughout Manchuria there is a direct application of Western methods, in the full Western manner, by Japan in the zone of the South Manchuria Railway and by Russia in a somewhat modified manner in the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The upshot of the present crisis will be a decision as between the mastery of the Chinese by the Western methods and the survival of the Chinese manner in spite of the Western methods that the Chinese tradition is increasingly forced to employ. This may completely alter the complexion of colonization and the colonial problem in Manchuria. In the meantime Westernization is not, as is too generally assumed, the solution of all the problems of the rapid Chinese expansion, but is in fact the most ambiguous of the problems raised by that expansion.

Now the men of action in China and Manchuria are, of necessity, men who have spontaneously emerged from the background of the genuine Chinese tradition. They are willing to use information of the Western type as a method of dealing with the West, but the vital processes of Chinese affairs they continue to handle in the Chinese manner. Even when we are in possession of facts, we do not necessarily know how they will be used in action. There is no other explanation of the phenomenon that the average study of Manchurian conditions, however convincing, fact by fact, may be the information that it retails, does not convey an impression of the whole truth about what is happening—still less about the way things happen. It must be emphasized that there cannot be any adequate study of Man-



FIG. 1—Map of Manchuria showing the provincial divisions, chief towns, and railways. The former designation of the "Three Eastern Provinces" has lately been replaced by that of "Four Northeastern Provinces" with the addition of Jehol to Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning. Compare with the maps of settlement zones, relief, and population density and distribution on pp. 198–199. Scale of map, approximately 1 : 14,000,000.

churian colonization until allowance is made for the essential difference between this field and the regions of pioneer settlement dominated by the Western tradition.

THE REGIONALISM OF MANCHURIA

The modern Chinese colonization of Manchuria began in the 1890's, following on measures adopted by the Imperial (Manchu)

government, which modified the theory and practice of land tenure and imparted in important respects a fresh character to the process of colonization. A word, however, must first be said about the character of the earlier colonization. Wherever the old populations and old social conditions of Manchuria can still be detected it is easy to discern the effects of a well defined historical process: the periodic assault on China of barbarian tribes from the north, alternating with Chinese reactions which threw back the invaders and extended Chinese authority and influence into barbarian territories. There is no opportunity here to go into the profound importance of the Great Wall in this connection: it must suffice to mention the significance of the country immediately north of the Wall as the "reservoir" area of the successive northern invaders of China.

The Manchu conquest of 300 years ago demonstrates most clearly a process that must have accompanied every previous conquest of the Manchu type. In this "reservoir," dominating the Great Wall by virtue of the plateau formation of Inner Mongolia, was repeatedly established a population composed of tribal followers of the conquest who remained outside of the conquered territory but were identified with the alien dynasty within the Wall. It supplied officials and troops to participate in the rule of China and drew from China a great deal of wealth in the form of subsidies to the tribal chief. The "banner" tribes of Inner Mongolia, who extend eastward into western Liaoning Province, are a living survival of the "reservoir" system.

The "reservoir" region, both during periods of barbarian ascendancy and periods of Chinese ascendancy, is to be regarded as the key to the sovereignty of North China—often of all China. It therefore has a regional importance which transcends both its racial and its cultural importance. However triumphant the northward spread of Chinese power, any Chinese population flowing into the "reservoir" region inevitably becomes even more conscious of the fact that it can now exercise a control over the affairs of China behind it than that it can press forward to fresh conquests of barbarian territories.

The crucial importance of such a regionalism, oriented as it is toward China with a tenacity apparently not to be overcome by any rise of nationalistic feeling, can hardly be exaggerated in a study of Chinese colonization beyond the Great Wall. A regionalism of this kind enters into the blood, it survives changes in the type of civilization and defies intellectual definitions of policy and expansionism. That this regionalism does survive and that it produces an inner discord in Manchurian affairs is proved by the categorical differences in temper and execution between Manchurian frontier policy, whether the frontier is Mongol, Russian, or Japanese, and the policy of that other inward-facing frontier still essentially defined by the Great Wall. The fact that the problem of regionalism as a

dangerous obstacle is instinctively appreciated is borne out by the strong feeling among Chinese that the regional term "Manchuria," used in all foreign languages, ought to be discontinued.

An Inward-Facing Frontier

Western opinion generally has been misled by the extraordinary acceleration in contemporary colonization and exploitation in Manchuria into the belief that "the Manchurian question" is essentially a problem of the New World; that Manchuria is in the forefront of the development of a new China; and that its problems are chiefly those of Chinese expansion, affecting external frontiers. In point of fact the crux of all Manchurian affairs is still the relation of Manchuria to China. The policies of the inward-facing frontier of regionalism still take precedence over the outer frontiers of the nation. It is not sufficiently realized that the growth of wealth and power in Manchuria still increases the pressure of Manchuria on China far more than it increases the pressure of China on Mongolia and the wilderness or on Japan or Russia. The frontiersman still has his back to the frontier.

What is in fact taking place is the revaluation of a still vigorous regionalism in terms of new categories of power—of which the chief are Western mechanics and the railway. Because of the comparative emptiness of the land the Western factors have had a freer play and a more immediate effect than in other parts of China, and this in itself accounts for a great deal of the superficial resemblance of colonization in Manchuria to colonization in Western lands.

As for the regions north of the Great Wall, the instinctive attitude toward them was long ago manifested. A positive expansion does not build limiting walls. There are no Great Wall systems in the South. For at least twenty-five centuries every extension of Chinese authority beyond what is now the line of the Great Wall, even when backed up by a move of population, has had a peculiar lack of vitality. Strategically and politically expansion beyond the Wall was defensive. The prime object was to secure the frontier; the acquisition of extra territory was incidental. Emigration beyond the Wall is bound up in the consciousness of the people with proverbs and legends of lament and despair.

We have to look at the territorial question not as the eager occupation of "virgin" lands in which an impetuous nation is clamoring to demonstrate its vigor but as a wary maneuvering to maintain control over lands which dominate North China strategically and in which Chinese authority has ebbed and flowed for centuries. The immigrants arriving in such numbers are not spontaneously and competitively thrusting forward to find room in which to release their pent-up

energies. They are less pioneers, carrying with them a young and confident tradition, than refugees, looking over their shoulders at a homeland unwillingly abandoned and burdened with everything they can save of the old tradition.

Politically the outlying provinces do not regard themselves as primarily the outposts of a growing empire in spite of the fact that they inevitably function as outposts. Their forward positions they occupy tentatively and maintain by shifts and compromises, and forward movement is hesitant. The ambition of the most able and energetic men looks backward, toward China. Subconsciously much more than consciously men are affected by the unbroken tradition of the "reservoir" where, throughout history, the tendency to expand the authority of China has been overborne by the tendency to turn and assert authority in China. I do not see how a man can merge himself at all in the popular feeling of Manchuria and not detect this urgent counterdrift.

Military Colonization

It may be said that under the Manchus the colonization of remote regions was primarily a question of strategy; and this applies especially to the Amur frontier, the North Mongolia-Siberia frontier, and Chinese Turkestan. Granted the fact that there was no urge toward colonization except as a matter of government policy and that all colonization was dominated by government officials, the garrison method of settlement was probably better suited than any other to the conditions of the time. The garrisons were regarded not as cantonments of professional troops permanently under arms but as groups of land-owning, self-supporting yeoman farmers with a military tradition. The able-bodied men were not permanently in service but were liable to be called on for service at need. The area brought within reach and under control must obviously have been far greater than the area actually opened to cultivation.

Military colonization at the present time shows very clearly the continuance of the old tradition. Its aim is still a combination of providing a population and providing a defense. But at the present time it illustrates the importance of new factors. The terms of land grants are a modification of the old system, and the governing ideas are largely the same; but they are hampered in fulfillment by the prime change of military organization from a system of regional levies engaged in soldiering only when called out to a system of mercenary professional armies. This in itself is an effect of Western influence; and consequently the armies, in spite of their inefficiency from a Western professional point of view, are a dreadfully efficient factor in the threatened destruction of the old Chinese way of life and the old values of civilization.

Because there is at present a superfluity of soldiers modern schemes of military colonization are normally drawn up with a view to the desirability of disbanding troops. The most obvious impediment to the successful disbandment and settlement on the land of professional mercenary soldiers is that they make very poor colonists. It is true that the majority of the men are country-bred and have either worked on farms or know something about farm life; but the overwhelming majority are men who have long been dissevered from their families and in their years of military service have lost the taste for the monotonous drudgery of farm labor. The social background of the soldier-colonist is thus as different as can be from that of the yeoman type available in Manchu days. Not only do the troops themselves tend to distrust the whole business of colonization, but they do not mix well with civilian settlers. Soldier and civilian colonists together tend to form a somewhat unassimilable *bloc* on the outskirts of older "natural" pioneer settlement.

In the upshot it is not surprising to find that military colonization tends to run a course of compromise. The majority of the land actually taken up on special military terms is acquired by officers who have enough capital to bring in civilian tenants and proceed in the manner of ordinary capitalists engaged in land development. If the region prospers the importance of the group of officials concerned in its administration and exploitation increases accordingly. This importance in turn demands an increased military establishment in order that the new regional-political group may make itself felt. From this derives the paradox that it is the usual procedure to send out recruiting agents to Shantung and Chihli to find farmers to be turned into soldiers to garrison a region that is ostensibly being developed as a measure for disbanding surplus troops, at the same time that refugees are also being gathered to colonize the region to produce revenue to finance the troops.

The Shantung Migration

So far as the natural pressure of population within China had an effect in promoting emigration before the period of Western impact it worked through the old Shantung type of migration and the spreading expansion of border communities along the fringe of the age-old "reservoir." In the first place there was the difficulty of escaping on foot or with animal transport only from a famine region and of passing through regions poor in cash and food reserves and unable to support refugees on their way to territories suitable for colonization. In the second place there was the extreme traditional repugnance toward migration and the stigma of despair and defeat attached to the permanent abandonment of the ancient home. In the third

place there was the special fear and dislike of all the "barbarian" country north of the Great Wall—the region of defense and fear, not of advance and hope. Thus along the whole land frontier it was exceptional to find any spread of Chinese colonists except such as was effected by specific order, as at strategic points like Jehol and Suiyüan.

The border population itself did tend to expand northward. The men of this population had a tradition and method of their own; but even so their expansion was a "spread" in character, lacking drive and the ambition of conquest. They moved forward tentatively when conscious of a strong China behind them but withdrew hastily or "turned Mongol" completely when the government weakened and the old forces of the "reservoir" reasserted themselves. For comparatively large numbers, bringing a strong definitely Chinese impact to bear on a comparatively short front, we have to look to the Shantung type of migration.

The long-established practice of migrating to Manchuria to work for a season in order to get funds for going back to China to stay is one of the evidences of the negative style of Chinese migration and illustrates its characteristic form of drift. On the other hand it has played a large part in the establishment of the Shantung element in the Chinese population of Manchuria and is also responsible for the fact—which might at first seem paradoxical—that the Shantung settlers are, by general recognition, the soundest and most successful of all immigrants. There is no adequate explanation other than the fact that the settler who derives from the old system of seasonal migration has behind him a solid tradition.

The facility of sea communication first made it possible for men to migrate from a thickly populated region without passing through intermediate territory in which there was no room or need for them to a thinly populated region in which there was a demand for their labor. They could embark in Shantung at a number of convenient ports and disembark also at a choice of ports; while the valley of the lower Liao gave a direct route for penetration into the hinterland. The land approach was through the bottle-neck passage at Shanhaikwan, west and northwest of which penetration was limited physically by hilly country and politically by the comparatively unreceptive attitude of the Mongols. Moreover this region was more or less monopolized by the early-established frontier Chinese, whose great center was at Chinchow.

The shorter time and expense of the sea passage, together with direct access to regions where work could be found, encouraged the practice of seasonal migration and return. This was further encouraged by the fact that the great landholders of the "reservoir" had no particular need of tenants but benefited by extra "hands" during the short plowing, planting, cultivating, and harvest season.

With the extra labor they could produce a surplus of grain, a great part of which was also exported by sea. There is, however, no doubt that a certain number of the seasonal migrants remained, after perhaps one or two trips, as permanent settlers and that a far greater number could have remained in spite of the Manchu laws of land tenure if they had been impelled by a true quest for new lands and opportunities and elbowroom for new growth and self-expression. Indeed the seasonal migrants to Manchuria often prolonged their stay to several years without entertaining the idea of permanent settlement; and this type of long-term temporary immigrant is still very common. The land laws alone cannot account for the strong tendency to return to China after a season's work in Manchuria. To my mind it is proof of the orientation of the true Chinese tradition. The most successful emigrant and socially the most respected was the man who went out, made his money, and came back.

Increase of Permanent Settlers

When, however, railways and modern exploitation increased the demand for men in Manchuria, and the cumulative disasters of disintegration within China began to force up the supply of emigrants, the Shantung type of seasonal migration provided a transition-period link of inestimable value. Even so, the supply of permanent settlers never satisfied the potential demand, and seasonal migrants continued to outnumber permanent settlers until the situation in Shantung made it increasingly unsafe to return there with money. And, as it happened, the period of maximum disorder in Shantung, when famine augmented the effects of military demands and bandit depredation, coincided roughly with a period of minimum assertion in Manchuria on the part of both Russia and Japan. The years of spectacular migration, in which the yearly immigration first showed a preponderance of settlers over seasonal laborers—and the figures mounted to something like a million a year with half a million permanent settlers—were 1926–1928, with an abrupt check in 1929 when Russia at last jibbed at the pressure that was being put upon her, and the Japanese attitude hardened in sympathy with Russia.

Even at the height of the boom, when every form of immigration was modified as far as possible in favor of speed and general expansion, the Shantung tradition retained to a notable degree its own character and quality. While it submits to the manipulations of the great land agencies the Shantung family retains enough individual purpose to edge its way persistently toward a place where "neighbors" of the old home are already established. Time and again the same story can be heard from such a family, starving and dependent on charity but working toward a known goal: "If we can reach such-and-such a place, we have people we know."

One of the most exclusive fields of Shantung settlement is along the lower Sungari, from below Sanhsing to the Amur. In this region there is not only an overwhelming general preponderance of Shantung people on the land and in the towns, but in district after district there is to be found a remarkable proportion of people from the same county in Shantung.

One principal fact relating to the importance of the Shantung element in Manchuria is probably not generally recognized; the part played by Shantung men in military affairs. The soldiers, like the settlers, are linked by an unbroken tradition with the earliest Manchu days when Shantung men filled the Chinese Banners of the Manchu army. This association is of importance, for in an era of civil war promotion from the ranks is rapid and common. There is inevitably a large proportion of men of Shantung birth or extraction among important civil and military officials, and these men, when looking for opportunities of investment and exploitation, naturally turn to Shantung landholders, merchants, and industrialists. Thus the Shantung element ramifies through the whole economy and social structure of Manchuria.

Refugee Colonization

The development of railways modified the old conditions in a remarkable way. Refugees could be transported over great distances in a very short time and brought direct to regions that needed colonists. Railways, moreover, quite as much as the acquisitions of Western armament, destroyed the old military ascendancy of such "reservoir" people as the Mongols. Under the immemorial conditions when there was no appreciable difference in armament between Chinese and barbarians it needed a very large military effort on the part of the Chinese to confirm the conquest of very narrow strips of territory. Manchus, Mongols, and the Central Asian tribes, accustomed to warfare in terms of rapid mobility over great distances and to quick apprehension of the topography even of unknown country, offered a military problem as difficult and expensive to deal with as that confronting the British on the northwest frontier of India.

In times past the most effective method of counteracting the Mongol strategy of raiding attacks and quick movement over long distances was the encouragement of lamaism and lama monasteries. The great, wealthy monasteries did to a certain extent tend to make the Mongols land-fast or at least vulnerable at fixed points and to impair their essential tradition. Railways clinched the decision. Wherever a region of frontier colonization is served by a railway there is no longer any doubt of the ascendancy of Chinese over tribesmen. Road transport by motor, the most modern development in Man-

churia—aviation not yet having reached the practical stage—enormously increases the range of operation from a railway base and has been used with great effectiveness in the Hsingan Colonization Project, in western Fengtien (Liaoning) Province, where a great stretch of land is being taken over from the Mongols and settled by civilians and troops together. In this region, the Mongols are held down by military outposts, linked by motor transport, while a railway is being built which will permanently decide the matter.

The true frontier tradition in Manchuria was always confined to a comparatively small and socially specialized population; and the advent of the railway is killing it. The present colonization of Manchuria represents a secondary stage dominated by "big interests" and dependent on a cheap supply of docile immigrants. The fact that the expansion into Manchuria is as yet predominantly agricultural gives a certain pioneering color to the present great population movement; but the fact that practically all the land open to colonization is already privately owned by the "big interests" determines the greater colonization phenomena.

The typical refugee colonist is a man who leaves his home in despair and unwillingly for a destination not chosen by himself but appointed for him by a relief organization or the recruiting agent of a landholder in Manchuria. Arriving, he is put on the land on terms in which he himself has little choice. This usually means rental terms as high as half or more of the yearly crop. Even if the terms make rental purchase possible, the interest charged for equipment and initial financing during the settlement years makes it extremely difficult for him to succeed in becoming a landowner with a clear title; and even if he does succeed in becoming a farmer with land of his own, he has to deal with a grain market and a transport system that are thoroughly under the control of great vested interests.

Settlement in the Outlying Districts

In the outlying districts, in order to hold the colonists on the land at all and keep them from drifting back to China or beyond the reach of organized control to become squatters, terms are granted which mean that for at least a generation the farmer will eat more and live better than he did in China. Basically, however, the economic and social system is not one built up in Manchuria—the time is past for that; the pace is too fast, and such societies can be found only in the heart of the old "reservoir" country—but one imported from China. This means that, aside from the political bias imparted by the regional feeling and the disruptive effect of Westernization, the new population as it grows tends to reproduce in full the situation as it is in China with the same problems of overpopulation, pauperiza-

tion, economic bondage to the land and landholders, and insufficient margins of food reserve and financial security.

The most favorable terms of all are offered in regions that are at the same time the frontier of Chinese settlement and adjacent to an international frontier—that is, to Russia. Where Mongols are still powerful, settlement on the edge of Mongol territory is also encouraged on specially favorable terms. The setback suffered by the Chinese as a result of the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute and the facile military successes of the Russians caused a feeling of the greatest uncertainty all along the frontier. As a result, this is the last region in which colonists are eager to settle of their own accord. Obviously, however, from the official point of view, the settlement of at least a screen of Chinese colonists all along the Amur frontier is a measure of imperative importance; while the great landholders are willing to give good terms in order to get their land opened at all.

Villages are marked out at convenient distances in absolutely virgin, uninhabited country, usually from three to six in a day's journey of twenty-five or thirty miles. Building timber is transported to these sites in advance. This is likely to be done or supervised by a special agricultural bureau centered in the nearest county town and linked by organization both with the local chamber of commerce and the provincial authorities. Colonists are recruited either by agents of the landholders themselves or by "old-timers," usually Shantung men, who, having gained experience as laborers, market gardeners, or small tenant farmers, are prepared to take up land on permanent tenure and have gone back to Shantung to fetch relatives, friends, and neighbors in order to form a congenial village nucleus. When the settlers arrive they build their own houses, using the timber provided and digging out earth, pressing it in wooden frames, and drying it in the sun to make adobe.

The settling down and perhaps the breaking of a little soil take up the first short season. Then the settlers hibernate for the first winter, living on provisions supplied under the settlement scheme. With the next thaw and the first full plowing season—draft cattle and plows are provided for them—each head of a family selects what land he likes near the village, and all plow as much as they can. They may not even know whose is the soil they plow. Virgin soil is often simply plowed and harrowed to break up the sod without planting; but sometimes a rough crop of beans is planted. A second plowing, in the following year, then gives the required depth.

In any case the third season produces a crop; and at the same time extra land can be broken. By this time, usually, the country has been "opened" enough for a reckoning. The actual landowners or their agents then arrive. The land is all re-measured, and owner and settler negotiate partition on the basis of six parts to the farmer

(without purchase price) and four parts to the owner (without charge for plowing). It may happen that a farmer finds he has been plowing for several owners; but most of the original land grants were so large that he will find he has only one owner to deal with. The site of the village itself is deducted from the reckoning, the landowners among themselves contributing its value. The title deeds for the farmer's land are then made over to him; and as for the four parts that revert to the original owner, he may rent or sell them as he pleases.

This method contrasts well with the standard in more developed regions, where from the beginning the settler is likely to find himself a tenant paying a rental of half his crop or more with little chance of acquiring ownership. Under these special terms the settler becomes a landowner on a scale that would require a generation of toil and a lot of good luck as well in his native province. The original owner is left with 40 per cent of his land; but this 40 per cent by virtue of having been opened is worth the whole of the original undeveloped holding. Often the original landowner remains the largest individual landholder of the region and its most important capitalist.

The new peasant-proprietor is not subject to land tax until the seventh year. From the fourth year to the seventh, inclusive, he pays off by instalments the capital cost of the building material, equipment, livestock, food supplies, and so forth, with which he had been supplied in advance. Thereafter he pays ordinary land tax, police dues, and so forth. "You are well off here," I said to one such man, "enough people to open the land but plenty of land for expansion. Not too many people and too little land, like Shantung." "Ha!" he replied, contentedly; "you wait a couple of generations! We'll be running around like ants!" And indeed, judging from the visible rate of development in many regions where settlement has once taken hold, I think that in two generations many of the new settlements of today will be approximating to agricultural districts generally in North China in size of farms and ratio of land tax to capital value.

Negative Characteristics of Refugee Colonization

The refugee colonists as a body illustrate all the most "negative" characteristics of so-called "pioneer" colonization when undertaken by a society of advanced civilization. Being quite unable to fend for themselves they are poor material to begin with. Being emigrants by necessity only they have not the mental attitude that facilitates adaptation. Indeed, they are inclined to resent everything in food, climate, housing, and so forth that is not "like home"; even though, with properly directed energy, the environment might be made better than home. Moreover—ironic though this may seem—the relief projects and colonization projects that are most efficiently run and

treat the refugees best have the most trouble with them. Relief of the old type was purely defensive. Grain was issued from the local state granaries, and taxes were remitted; if the grain gave out the people died. That type of relief has gone. The new, "dynamic" type, with its overtones of expansion and the creation of new wealth, is essentially a new concept; and the reaction of the conservative, simple-minded peasant tends to be: "You must be getting more out of this than I am. Anyhow, this is not my idea. I am not responsible for being saved. You are responsible for bringing me here. Now you ought to do something more for me."

The losses by desertion from relief-colonization projects are very high. To minimize defection organized colonization projects endeavor to secure a high proportion of married settlers with children. Even this admirable measure, however, does not wholly obviate the loss. Only too often the family that is able to hang together at all is one that has enough resources of its own or ability among its members to support itself and eventually find its way home again without going to the dreaded extreme of migrating to Manchuria. On the other hand many desperate people, in order to secure cheap transport to Manchuria, band themselves hastily into fictitious families—a man and a woman who are not married gathering up several children not their own and applying for relief as a family. When such a group is placed on the land very little discontent is enough to make the man abandon his adventitious family.

Secondary Migrants

In contrast to refugee settlement is that of the secondary migrants. These are men with families; men whose forbears have been in Manchuria for several generations and who derive from the old pre-railway times of the drifting spread into Manchuria. They are chiefly to be found in lands taken over from the Mongols, but they differ from the first-line frontiersmen of the old "Mongol reservoir" in that they are definitely not a "mixed class"; they rarely have Mongol blood and rarely speak Mongol. At the same time they have a strong "reservoir" color. Naturally they are of the greatest value in extending the frontiers of Chinese occupation and are looked on with high favor by the officials concerned with border expansion. They form an admirable core for any project of new colonization; the pity is that, owing to the pace of modern colonization brought about by railway construction, their numbers cannot be multiplied fast enough to keep up with the opening of suitable new territories.

They are the only settlers who, as a class, have capital, which they raise by selling out the land they have previously developed and enhanced in value in order to move on. Their careers are thus worked

out in terms of continuous generations, not of a single lifetime. The land their fathers or grandfathers took up on the edge of Mongol territory has doubled and trebled in value through the arrival of later colonists and the growth of communications and markets. They themselves have a personal or family background of "raw" land. They know the working of frontier methods and the ways of frontier officials; and they know that as they prosper they increase their prospects of having sons graduate into the ranks of the real controlling classes—the officials and the "big interests." Indeed, patriarchs of such groups often have a semiofficial standing and are frequently consulted by the officials.

Settlers of this type tend to move as communities and will be found in groups all of whom lived in the same old villages and benefited by their loose group and class association in bargaining for the new lands and founding the new villages. Their land operations are apt to be complicated owing to differences in value between old lands and new. Often they will even settle for a generation or more on comparatively poor land, waiting until better regions are expropriated from the Mongols. Thus there is a long stretch of land between Szepingkai and Taonan in western Fengtien (Liaoning), filled with abandoned villages, whose inhabitants have moved on west of Taonan or southwest toward Kailu. West and northwest of Taonan can also be found contingents of secondary migrants from the Petuna (Sincheng) region who, with the weakening and withdrawal of the Mongols, have overpassed the inferior lands between their old homes and their new settlements; although actually their new lands may not be so rich as the fields they formerly owned. They have sold out good land, moved across poor land, and settled in land of medium grade, having nicely calculated the profits to be made by selling out developed land, buying at least three times the acreage of undeveloped land, and opening it to cultivation in order to clear a further profit.

This type of settler is far less conspicuous in non-Mongol regions, because there, the land not being "Mongol" but "public," the settler was able in the past to settle as a squatter on land chosen for a permanent home and to arrange terms of tenantry or purchase when the land was eventually released for settlement and passed into private ownership.

Opium Colonization

Of all forms of unassisted colonization in Manchuria, especially of adventurous colonization, with the exception of the Shantung style of migration, the most fruitful and creative has undoubtedly been opium colonization. Opium has played in Manchuria the part played by gold in California, Australia, and elsewhere. The fact is plain and ought to be frankly recognized that thousands of square

miles in frontier regions of Manchuria now inhabited by industrious and prosperous population could never have been opened up and settled so early, rapidly, and thoroughly without the lure of opium.

In China at the present time the most serious abuse in opium production, creating a social danger far greater than the tax on society of unproductive drug addicts, is forced cultivation of the poppy. The normal form of overproduction is that found in territories where land taxation is enforced at a rate that can only be met by poppy-growing; the revenue usually being spent in the maintenance of armies. Production on such a large scale brings down the price and increases consumption; but, more than that, it weakens the economic structure by reducing the area under food crops. In a region where enforced poppy-growing has reduced food crops to a bare subsistence level one bad season can precipitate a famine.

On almost every frontier of settlement in Manchuria these evil features are altered in a most remarkable way. The pioneer settler can often make out of opium a profit offered by no other crop. Agricultural Manchuria, in strong contrast with China proper, lives by the export of its produce in bulk over comparatively long distances. The producing areas nearest to the service of railways and river steamers have so great an advantage that the new settler, moving out to the fringe of cultivation, faces a difficulty in getting his grain to market at a profit; and this difficulty increases rapidly with the distance. If, however, he produces opium, his problems are solved.

The settlement of the lower Sungari, from Sanhsing to the Amur, was due chiefly to opium cultivation; much more, by universal local testimony, than it was to the river steamers. First the opium made it profitable to increase the steamer transport, and then the increased transport made it profitable to increase the production of grain and soya beans. Fuchin, the largest town on the Sungari below Sanhsing, grew from a village of Fishskin Tatars to a town of probably well over 100,000 population in a few years chiefly because it was the center of a great poppy-growing region. From farmers and traders alike can be heard the tale of the boom years and easy money when opium was the paying crop. Opium has been driven out now toward the farther fringes, but that does not mean that Fuchin suffers from depression. It has several flour mills which are credited with profits equal to the total invested capital every normal working year. In spite of the long up-river haul to Harbin it does a flourishing trade in agricultural produce; and, if trade on the much shorter and easier down-river haul to Russian territory across the Amur were freed of legal restrictions, it would increase enormously.

A comparable region is that which will be traversed by the Solun railway, now under construction. Here, on the western frontier of Manchuria, all Chinese colonization in advance of the railway was

based either on the supply of grain to the Mongols or of opium to the Chinese market. With the introduction of an official program of colonization in that region poppy-growing has been forbidden, and many of the original colonists, discontented with the law, have moved on beyond its reach.

A frontier opium-producing region is, on first acquaintance, lawless and bandit-infested; but in reality there is far more peril for the stranger than for the people of the region. Banditry is ruled by strict convention. Many of the bandits are themselves poppy-growers in season. A great number of them are recruited from outside adventurers, but others are drawn from among the unmarried men of the poppy-cultivating villages. The men with families live in the villages, and often the bandits are financed by subsidies from opium villages which they protect from the law. There are, by common report, "outlaw" opium villages on the Chinese side of the Ussuri that are virtually autonomous. They defend their valley approaches, govern themselves, and hold themselves independent of ordinary civil administration, admitting no officials and paying no taxes.

The Manchurian Bandit as a Frontiersman

The bandit, properly understood, is in some respects a valuable frontiersman and pathfinder. The old banditry of Manchuria is recognizably divided into several regional types. In addition to the opium banditry there is the banditry of the central region of Kirin and Liaoning, the banditry of the Mongol frontier of western Liaoning and western Heilungkiang, and the banditry of the wildernesses of northern Heilungkiang, which has a somewhat milder counterpart in northernmost Kirin.

The banditry of the forested and hilly country of the central region of Kirin and Liaoning is strongly colored by "reservoir" traditions and has an unbroken connection with the old days when most of the bandits were Chinese who had not succeeded in establishing tolerated settlements. Many of these bandits are still lumbermen, hunters, and ginseng-gatherers by turns.

The banditry of the Mongol frontier is peculiar in that many Mongols are among the bandits. Mongol banditry breaks out only on the fringe of Chinese colonization where numbers of Mongols whose pastures have been taken and who have not been properly provided for either by the colonization officials or their own princes turn their hands against all men. Pastoral Mongols do not like to live within less than a day's ride of Chinese villages, partly because they are afraid of being governed and taxed but chiefly because their livestock trespassing on fields might be the cause of quarreling. It is in this gap that the bandits range.

Where there is practically no clash of populations to foment banditry, as in vast stretches of northern Heilungkiang and Kirin, it is largely a winter avocation of settlers in thinly populated regions. The winter season is long, and, while numbers of people then engage in the carting trade, hauling grain to market, others are idle for lack of subsidiary occupations like stock raising or home industries. Moreover, winter is the season of travel, the roads of packed snow being at their best. In Heilungkiang, until recently at least, banditry had the reputation of being often a kind of "racket" engaged in by people who had relatives among the troops or petty officials who could protect them from being too seriously pursued. At any rate it is certain that where the Sungari forms the boundary between the provinces of Heilungkiang and Kirin (it being possible to cross on the ice in winter) the common people consider the bandits of their own side a nuisance but part of the natural social order and usually amenable to diplomacy and reasonable arrangement; while they loathe and dread the bandits from the other side of the river.

One of the important economic effects of banditry is that over wide regions transport by oxcart is common where horses would be more efficient and would be used were it not that bandits leave oxen alone but are in perpetual need of horses as remounts. The introduction of motor transport is tending to solve this problem. I do not think, however, that the delay to intensive colonization is altogether an evil. Banditry often expresses the feeling of resentment held by the true frontiersmen against the powerful interests that own great stretches of wilderness land. The more they can make themselves feared the better chance they have, when the eventual period of negotiation comes, of securing good terms from the great landholders on whose land grants they have founded villages. By their tradition of independence and self-sufficiency they tend to add to the quality of the community, offsetting the poor "tone" of purely refugee colonization, too helpless and too much at the mercy of a limited and overpowerful class. The greatest danger of banditry in Manchuria, in fact, is that the old indigenous kind, with its occasional flashes of the Robin Hood instinct, may be entirely overwhelmed by the savagely destructive soldier banditry that harries so many thousand square miles of China proper.

The Motive for Migration

The reservoir-bred, secondary migrant and the semi-outlaw opium-growing settlers are probably the nearest in tradition and feeling to the old-style Western pioneer; at least to the early pre-railway American pioneer—and, like the early Western pioneers, they are the survivors of an older order. They cannot stand the pace of a

machine-grounded economy; their style of life demands a training too long drawn out and too close a linkage of tradition-informed generations.

It is noteworthy that the "pioneer" in one of the oldest and most typical Western senses of the word, the "lonely settler," is almost unheard of. This is of significant interest because it means that the quest for loneliness, the hunger for an empty land in which a man can express his own starkest individuality, are psychological characteristics of an individualism that is not congruent with the Chinese tradition and the Chinese civilization. The farthest-outlying frontiersman forms for himself a group connection by attaching himself to Mongols, Manchus, or other non-Chinese tribes; the second-line frontiersman moves forward as part of a group; the squatter is always found as an extension of the group, never wholly removed.

What Western observers, with too glib a facility, call the "land hunger of the Chinese peasant" is not the primary motive power. Far from being hungry for the land in Manchuria, the great mass of the colonists are in flight from the land in China. Perhaps the commonest of all reasons given by immigrants for coming to Manchuria is that in the old home they *chan pu chu*, they "can't stick it," "can't hold on." It is the fact that they are migrants without option that throws colonization into the hands and under the control of land magnates and exploiting groups.