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Author(s): Joyce Madancy
Source: *Modern China*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 436-483
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3181326
Accessed: 04/08/2013 10:58

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Unearthing Popular Attitudes toward the Opium Trade and Opium Suppression in Late Qing and Early Republican Fujian

JOYCE MADANCY
Union College

It has long been axiomatic among historians of late imperial and early Republican China that opium was a plague on the Chinese people—sapping their willpower and stamina, weakening the military, draining the Qing treasury while padding the coffers of the colonial Indian government, and reinforcing China's international image as an empire in decline. The settlements with Great Britain following the Opium War of 1839-1842 and the *Arrow* War of 1858-1860 ultimately compelled China to drop its own long-standing legal restrictions against the importation of foreign opium and sparked the growth of a lucrative domestic opium economy that eventually extended throughout the Qing empire.[1] By the turn of the twentieth century, opium was perceived as having caused widespread social dysfunction, and the drug served as a powerful metaphor for China's political somnambulism in the age of Western imperialism. In short, China had developed a serious opium problem—and along with it, a public

AUTHOR'S NOTE: *Much of the research reflected in this article was conducted under a grant awarded by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with China, administered by the American Council of Learned Societies and funded in part by the National Endowment for the Humanities. I would like to express my thanks to the following people who made my stay in Fuzhou possible and productive: Grant Alger, Keith Clemenger, Ryan Dunch, Liu Huiyu, Jason H. Parker, and Zhou Yongjun. Gratitude is also due to Union College for granting a junior sabbatical during which to pursue this work. Special thanks to reviewers Timothy Brook and Linda Grove for their helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this article, to Alice Falk for meticulous copyediting, and to Steve Averill, editor of* Twentieth-Century China, *for kindly granting permission to reproduce parts of an earlier article on Huang Lian's rebellion. Finally, like all of my work, this article is dedicated to Jack, Kevin, and Maya Kennedy.*

MODERN CHINA, Vol. 27 No. 4, October 2001 436-483
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rhetoric of condemnation that eclipsed the ambiguities of China's relationship with the drug.

The foundation of that rhetoric was the assumption that the Chinese people harbored an intense antipathy toward opium despite their inability to turn back imperialist aggression or combat the drug's addictive power. This article seeks to explore the validity of that assumption within the southeastern province of Fujian from just prior to the outbreak of the Opium War until the establishment of Guomindang authority in the 1920s. The analysis focuses on determining how residents of Fujian felt about the opium trade and the attempts to eliminate opium, how they expressed those sentiments (especially when their attitudes contradicted official policy), and how politics then and now have obscured the complexity of this story. I begin by briefly outlining the history of opium and opium suppression in China and Fujian, then analyze the historiographical obstacles encountered in the course of this study. The bulk of the article explores expressions of hostility to the opium trade as well as resistance to opium suppression in Fujian during three distinct periods. The first begins in the 1820s, when opium smuggling began in earnest, and lasts until the launching of the official anti-opium campaign in 1906. The second period constitutes the campaign itself (1906-1914), and the final period encompasses the warlord years and the rise of the Nanjing regime.

Fujian makes an important case study for a number of reasons, including its pattern of poppy cultivation and opium importation, the province's peculiar place in the history of China's troubled relationship with the drug, and the rich documentation left behind by officials and reformist elites involved in the late Qing/early Republican crusade against opium. Unlike the provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan, Fujian was never a major contributor to domestic poppy production, but because its small but important poppy crop coexisted with a thriving trade in imported opium, an analysis of Fujian's relationship with opium can touch on virtually all dimensions of China's opium problem. In addition, Fujian claims the dubious distinction of serving as the gateway through which opium smoking first entered the Qing empire (Waung, 1979: 209). As the illicit opium trade expanded beyond the confines of Canton (Guangzhou), Fujian's proximity and jagged coastline attracted smugglers and their customers.

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But Fujian was also the birthplace of Lin Zexu, China's most famous anti-opium crusader, and the imperialist origins of the opium trade (as well as the destructive nature of the drug itself) generated considerable ill will. When the battle against opium was joined in the early twentieth century, elites from Fujian plunged into the crusade with exemplary vigor. Working together, officials manned the formal anti-opium bureaucracy while elites founded unofficial anti-opium associations, and both groups documented the progress of the suppression campaign by tracking government legislation, issuing public proclamations, and distributing periodicals. Many of those materials survive and yield considerable insight into not only the structure of state efforts to control opium but also the reactions of the local populace. Although the authors of these documents most likely saw themselves as crusaders for public health and order, the difficulties they encountered reveal that their mission was not always as welcome as they had hoped.

OPIUM AND THE STATE IN LATE QING/ EARLY REPUBLICAN FUJIAN

As with the trade of any other commodity, the opium economy constructed in China and Fujian was at its heart a matter of supply and demand. Some poppies had been grown in China for medicinal or decorative purposes since antiquity, but the supply side of the Chinese opium equation really began in India, where merchants from Great Britain, the United States, and elsewhere saw an ideal opportunity to recoup the silver they spent so freely on Chinese goods such as tea and silk. These Western traders competed to feed a growing Chinese demand that seemed to be contained only by Qing proscriptions.

When the drug was first landed at various ports along the Fujianese coast, probably in the 1820s, smuggling networks dominated by local clan organizations quickly materialized to convey the opium to markets beyond the coast (Qi Sihe, 1959: *juan* 13; Lin Renchuan, 1985: 63-65; Xu Liangxiao, 1993: 137). By the time the importation of foreign opium was legalized in 1858, the smuggling trade was flourishing, and demand was already well established (USDS, 1849-1906: reel 1, no. 30, Jones to Secy. of State, 1 January 1857). That demand

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and the price of the foreign drug soared when opium was freed from the stigma and judicial constraints of illegality. From the 1860s until 1887, the high taxes levied on the foreign drug in the treaty ports of Fuzhou and Xiamen (Amoy) meant that much of the Indian opium consumed in the province was actually landed in other ports and transported over the border by smugglers (Lin Manhoung, 1979: 15).[2] However, at the turn of the century, the import and transit (*lijin*) taxes on opium still provided substantial revenue for the coffers of the central and provincial governments (Mann, 1987: 111-16; Luo, 1936: 2/575-76). In short, Fujian's opium economy had generated ties to interests both underground and aboveboard, meaning that suppression would prove doubly difficult.

The lucrative trade in Indian opium also tempted some of Fujian's farmers in the arable coastal regions to enter the market with a homegrown variety that was of lower quality but far cheaper than the imported narcotic.[3] Fujian's poppy crop was concentrated in the prefecture of Xinghua and the rural areas surrounding the ports of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou (ZZGB, 1909: 20/104-6). Although the total production of opium in Fujian was quite small,[4] it was well entrenched and proved especially difficult to eradicate when the Chinese government reimposed its ban on the drug. Most of the opium grown in Fujian tended to be consumed within the province. Customs officials observed that during this period, consumption appeared to increase among the lower classes that could only afford the cheaper domestic opium or an adulterated compound (IMC, Santuao, 1892-1901: 85; IMC, Foochow, 1892-1901: 109).

The increase in Chinese poppy cultivation after 1887 resulted in the steady reduction of British opium imports, as the latter lost a good portion of the Chinese market to the cheaper domestic drug. Legalization enabled the Qing state to tax opium in a number of different ways, including the transit tax mentioned above. Despite the enormous monetary benefits of legalization, the Qing government maintained its moral opposition to the opium trade, claiming that legalization and taxation of the drug helped it contain and monitor the flow. Cynics suspected that Qing morality had actually been overcome by financial exigencies, but when a reasonable opportunity for reform surfaced in 1906, the Chinese state moved quickly.[5] By that time, however, the opium trade had ceased to be a simple matter of foreign exchange and

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had spawned an immense economy that absorbed Chinese land, labor, and lucre along with the narcotic itself.

By the early twentieth century, the decline of Indian opium revenues, combined with a growing international outcry against the opium trade, convinced the British government to cooperate with the Chinese (Friend of China, April 1909, 26: 38-39; Reins, 1991: 108-24). The Qing government announced the launch of a comprehensive ten-year campaign to eliminate the sale, consumption, distribution, and cultivation of opium in September 1906; by 1908, the Chinese and British had signed an agreement whereby the latter agreed to reduce the amount of Indian opium exported to China by one-tenth over a period of ten years (China No. 1, 1908). One of the most controversial clauses in that agreement was the three-year trial period mandated by the British. From the outset, skeptical British negotiators and anxious Indian opium traders suspected that Chinese anti-opium initiatives were nothing more than an attempt to substitute Chinese opium (and the tax revenue it generated) for the foreign drug. The trial period gave Britain an opportunity to invalidate the agreement if the Chinese government could not demonstrate significant progress within those three years. But when the agreement came up for renegotiation in 1911, China's unanticipated success gained Chinese negotiators enough moral leverage to wrest important concessions from the foreigners.

The campaign in Fujian mobilized an impressive network of officials and unofficial elite-led reform groups and attained considerable progress before the 1911 Revolution. Opium dens were shut down, and opium consumption in brothels and other public places became illegal. Farmers were instructed to replace their poppies with edible grains or other useful crops. Opium smokers in urban areas were tallied and registered, and inveterate addicts were permitted to purchase a license to buy a carefully measured ration of the drug from licensed opium shops. The ration was gradually eliminated, along with the opium shops. Officials, military men, and other social exemplars were inspected, and those who were declared addicted to opium were expected to enter treatment centers run by the government, foreign missionaries, or unofficial reform groups. Illegal opium and opium-smoking equipment seized by the authorities were publicly

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burned in dramatic spectacles in the streets of Fuzhou and elsewhere (FQZJ, 1907: *baogao* section, 1; ZZGB, 1909, 20: 104-6).

The signing of a revised agreement with Britain on 8 May 1911, just months before the 1911 Revolution, marked an important new stage in China's attempts to eliminate its opium problem. The new agreement retained the original ten-year schedule, but with several important provisions that gave the Chinese government the chance to end the importation of Indian opium well before 1917. Article III stated that "Indian opium shall not be conveyed into any province in China which can establish by clear evidence that it has effectively suppressed the cultivation and import of native opium." That "clear evidence" was to be obtained by joint Sino-British investigation teams, which would tour each province that claimed to be free of the domestic drug. More important, Article II pledged to support Qing efforts by offering to end the Sino-Indian opium trade before the deadline when and if China could prove that it had eliminated all Chinese poppy cultivation (PRO/FO 233/134, Opium Agreement, 1911).[6] The eruption of the 1911 Revolution meant, however, that implementation of changes in campaign strategy in the provinces would have to wait until the chaos subsided.

In Fujian, the political upheaval created a temporary vacuum of power that was taken by many opium farmers and smokers as an opportunity to openly resume their formerly illicit activities. When the new regime had established itself, however, the opium restrictions were revived. The campaign against poppy cultivation intensified and became increasingly coercive as opium farmers resisted efforts to uproot their crops. Because of that resistance, Fujian lagged behind many other provinces—including Sichuan—in its attempt to eliminate domestic poppy cultivation, and it was not placed on the list of those provinces authorized to exclude the importation of Indian opium until 1914. The absence of British oversight after the conclusion of the Sino-Indian opium trade, together with the pressures on the new Republic, meant decreased vigilance even before the death of Republican President Yuan Shikai marked China's descent into warlordism. After 1916, opium became a favorite source of revenue for embattled warlords, and colorful fields of poppies blazed in Fujian once again.

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RHETORIC AND REALITY: THE PROBLEM OF OPIUM IN HISTORY

To construct an analysis of attitudes toward the opium trade and opium suppression in Fujian, one must navigate around some fairly substantive historiographical obstacles. Compounding the more obvious difficulty of uncovering and interpreting evidence on a subject as controversial (and often illegal) as narcotics use and trafficking are the political implications of those sentiments today and during the late Qing/early Republic. When I began researching the official opium suppression campaign, I expected to find a wealth of Chinese documentation and secondary analyses. After all, this was a policy initiated by the Chinese themselves and designed to free China from the yoke of narco-imperialism, rescue the nation's reputation, and kindle a sense of patriotic pride. Yet until fairly recently, scholars in the People's Republic of China (PRC) showed a marked reluctance to deal with the issue of opium outside of the confines of the Opium Wars.[7] Materials on the Opium Wars are voluminous, as article after article and book after book rail against the immorality of capitalist greed and the calculated aggression generated by the imperialistic/colonial mentality. But not until the 1980s did the topic of opium suppression in the late Qing and early twentieth century become an acceptable avenue for historical exploration. Even then, many of the available works were situated squarely within a rhetorical framework (and political context) that left little room for impartial analysis.[8]

That framework, constructed from an amalgam of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong's thought, and Chinese nationalism supported a myth of peasant/mass nobility within which the reality of China's ambiguous relationship with opium did not fit comfortably. The story of opium suppression in the late Qing and early Republic not only illustrated the ability of the central state to play a leading role in condemning and combating the opium trade but also revealed the need for it to do so. If the masses, portrayed almost universally by PRC historians as the motive force of progressive revolution in China, had wholeheartedly opposed the importation of foreign opium and had felt the sting of imperialist oppression each time they lit an opium pipe, the market for British opium would not have expanded so rapidly, and the

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social dysfunction associated with widespread smoking would not have assumed the proportions of a national crisis. In fact, foreign involvement in the opium trade essentially ended at the treaty ports, where the drug was purchased, conveyed, taxed, distributed, prepared, sold, and consumed by Chinese. And what about the massive production of domestic opium in the latter half of the nineteenth century? Even a cursory examination of Chinese poppy production reveals a farming population that embraced opium as a cash crop and was sometimes willing to use violence to resist attempts to halt that profitable sideline. Thus, complicity in the opium trade on the part of the Chinese masses often has to be read between the lines of the dominant political discourse.[9]

In addition, a balanced view of opium reform also requires a more positive spin on regimes vilified by historians in China until quite recently. To describe and analyze the evolution of opium suppression policy, we must take a new slant on the Qing dynasty, often reviled as "degenerate, backward, and feudal" (Zhou Ruiguang, 1984: 161), as well as the Republic of the much-maligned Yuan Shikai, which guided this far-reaching social reform. Materials on the resurgence of opium addiction and the domestic opium trade in Fujian under warlord rule and Chiang Kaishek's Nanjing regime are understandably more plentiful. Finally, even those Chinese historians who laud the suppression campaign almost uniformly portray the policy as an initiative reluctantly adopted by an otherwise apathetic or coercive Chinese state in response to powerful mass sentiment against the drug. From this perspective, it was the Qing and Republican states—specifically their weakness in the face of imperialist pressures, financial mismanagement, favoritism toward the wealthy and landholding classes, and so on—that provoked grassroots resistance to the suppression policy the masses were said to have supported in principle.

To be fair, there is ample evidence of popular hostility to opium in Fujian before, during, and after the suppression campaign. Prior to 1906, some Fujianese expressed their aversion to the drug in folk songs and poems and fought opium abuse by joining groups that condemned opium smoking. During the official anti-opium movement, large numbers of ordinary Chinese sought treatment for opium addiction in official refuges, listened to anti-opium propaganda, and

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participated in events that celebrated the successes of the campaign. Even after the anti-climactic conclusion of the crusade, lyrical and other expressions of hostility toward opium persisted.

But not all Fujianese lamented the damage caused by opium abuse, and many stood to lose financial and physiological sustenance under the suppression policy. After all, while the British were at fault for supplying opium in ever-increasing quantities in defiance of Chinese law, many Chinese contributed to the problem by flouting the law in a variety of ways. Fujian could neither have developed nor sustained its thriving opium economy without a vast network of officials, merchants, transporters, distributors, and poppy farmers and opium smokers. Those individuals and any larger interests that they may have represented were the target of various stages of the late Qing/early Republican opium suppression campaign, and they did offer some resistance to the restrictions on their livelihood.

The remarkable progress of China's ambitious anti-opium campaign did not come smoothly or without objection from the Chinese people. Admittedly, violent resistance to suppression measures even at their most coercive was minimal in Fujian, given the scope of the opium restrictions. When the government restricted the amount of opium that could be sold or consumed, opposition tended to occur on an individual level and did not present serious problems for the state. Only when the focus of the campaign shifted to the elimination of the domestic poppy crop did relatively large-scale, organized resistance first appear, most sparked by popular resentment toward the coercive and sometimes capricious methods of enforcement adopted by the Chinese state. But the flourishing of the opium trade before and almost immediately after the campaign, as well as the problems that stymied official and unofficial opium reform mechanisms during the campaign, reveals that popular antipathy toward opium and the opium trade was by no means universal.

In their attempts to document grassroots hostility to the drug, recent Chinese chroniclers of Fujian's history have used the pages of county- and provincial-level *wenshi ziliao*[10] to introduce modern Chinese to the anger and sorrow of their ancestors as they shouldered the twin yokes of addiction and foreign oppression. The anti-opium songs and poetry featured in these publications testify to the existence of vocal opposition to the opium trade and to popular recognition of the

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damage wrought by the drug on Chinese bodies, families, and society, although there is no way to determine how representative they were of contemporary popular opinion. The folk songs in particular appear to validate the belief of the Chinese Communist Party in the power of popular culture to reflect and shape public opinion. Many folk songs lamented the horrific consequences of poverty, the oppression of women, and the tyranny of the landholding classes, while others addressed themselves to more specific social ills—among them, the deplorable consequences of opium smoking and addiction (Hung, 1994: 221-69). If similar odes devoted to the more pleasing effects of the drug existed, they may not have been recorded and probably would not be reproduced for public consumption.[11]

The work of Western scholars on opium also has been constrained by politics since many researchers rely primarily on the descriptions of opium-related social, physical, and economic damage offered by foreign missionaries who lived and worked among the Chinese. Such assessments of opium's impact often became mired in the missionaries' own moralistic and political agendas. Those agendas may have obscured the possibility that opium prohibition failed to generate violent resistance because abstinence and withdrawal simply were not that difficult, either because the drug was not as addictive as supposed or because most Chinese were moderate users.

Historian Richard Newman believes that graphic descriptions of the physical decline and suffering endured by opium addicts may reflect the honest mistake of missionary observers who confused the symptoms of disease, injury, or chronic poverty with the most common local Chinese remedy for those conditions (Newman, 1995). This thesis provides a useful caveat to scholarly dependence on missionary reports. Western missionaries often were presumed to operate within a relatively altruistic and impartial framework, but their desire to distinguish themselves from their less noble compatriots and to promote their own good works encouraged them to identify and document serious consequences from opium abuse. However, Newman's provocative research is limited to English-language sources, and his conclusions do not address the persistence of genuine Chinese hostility to the drug. After all, Chinese crowds regularly heckled missionaries whom they perceived as linked with the opium trade, and many Chinese opium addicts freely sought out missionary opium refuges for

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treatment. Other Western sources, such as the dispatches filed by representatives of the British, American, and French governments in China, corroborated many missionary observations while also taking great pains to report instances of Chinese resistance to the official suppression campaign.

Newman is part of a group of Western and Chinese scholars who recently have begun to recast the scholarly dialogue on opium, lifting it out of its long-standing home in the annals of diplomatic history and placing it firmly in the center of sociopolitical and literary analyses of Chinese history from the Opium War to the founding of the People's Republic.[12] As the editors of a recent collection of essays note, "In the last few years, the scholarly community has started to see opium as a more complex phenomenon with a multi-stranded history" (Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000a: 19). Opium has now become a lens through which we can examine state building, perceptions of social deviance and mechanisms for its control, and East-West interaction through medicine and religion, among other themes. Such an examination requires that we reread and rework classic sources on the Opium War to circumvent the historiographical obstacles noted above, incorporate recently discovered materials, and use historical and literary theory to address "a topic that, until recently, most historians assumed was adequately understood and therefore of little interest" (Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000a: 19).

What emerges from my study is the fundamental ambivalence of the Fujianese people toward opium, the opium trade, and the suppression campaign. Available sources indicate that popular outrage toward the flouting of Chinese laws and social conventions by opium importers and smokers, as well as a grassroots revulsion at the physical, moral, and socioeconomic consequences of opium abuse, existed side by side with considerable resistance to state suppression efforts. Even anti-opium propaganda can be productively mined for evidence of popular resistance. The *Fujian Anti-Opium Society Quarterly* (hereafter referred to as the *Quarterly*), in trumpeting the Society's impressive accomplishments, inadvertently sketched out the contours of the resistance that confronted reformers. The explanation for such complex popular attitudes toward the drug lies in a number of factors, including the time frame of these events, socioeconomic conditions, local power structures, geography, ideology, and the evolution of

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Chinese legal responses to opium. Careful navigation of this volatile historical terrain reveals that the simplistic narrative of China's troubled relationship with opium has long overshadowed a colorful spectrum of popular sentiment toward a habit simultaneously conceived of as social vice and economic windfall. What becomes abundantly clear below is the degree to which that sentiment was embedded in a larger social, political, and economic context.

POPULAR HOSTILITY TOWARD OPIUM IN FUJIAN

Popular hostility toward opium abuse and the opium trade in Fujian province was expressed in a number of ways, including the composition of anti-opium songs and poetry, participation in heterodox religious sects that incorporated opposition to opium addiction into their ideological agendas, active support for the late Qing/early Republican opium suppression campaign, and opposition to the forcible cultivation of poppies under regional warlords in the early twentieth century. Fear and anger fueled many of these reactions, and the animosity toward opium was inseparable from the social and political turmoil that eventually toppled the Qing state and increased popular outrage at the depredations of Republican-era warlords. Opium was feared for the appalling toll it took on the bodies and families of addicts, as well as the way it empowered the foreigners who peddled the drug. But anger at this growing social problem also derived from a broader sense of dissatisfaction with the declining quality of life, the resentment of inadequate or extractive methods of reform, and the growth of a nationalism that condemned opium as the most blatant manifestation of Chinese weakness and Western imperialist greed. For most Chinese, opium addiction probably was symptomatic of China's more systemic sociopolitical illness, and hostility toward the drug was only one item on a larger list of grievances against the Chinese state and Western imperialists.

Despite their differences in form, geographical origin, and sophistication, the poems and songs woven into the following discussion share several of the themes mentioned above. Although generalized laments about the physical and moral perils of addiction can be found throughout this period, other themes appear to have evolved over time.

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Early slaps at Western imperialism and Qing corruption tended to give way to appeals to nationalistic pride in self, province, and country in the early 1900s; eventually, a tone of bitter resignation became dominant after the death of Yuan Shikai. Some of the works are eloquent and obviously were penned by witty and educated individuals; others are preserved through the recollections of ordinary Chinese. The latter tend to be more crude, and some were clearly intended to shock listeners with their graphic depictions of the toll of addiction. Whether any of the authors were outside the literati may be impossible to determine, but the popularity of these songs and poems among ordinary villagers implies a shared hostility toward opium and its impact on life in Fujian that appears to have transcended class differences.

ANTI-OPIUM SENTIMENT PRIOR TO THE SUPPRESSION CAMPAIGN

Hostility toward the opium trade from the 1830s to 1906 in many cases reflected a revolutionary, overtly political anger directed either at foreign imperialists or at the ruling dynasty. The Opium Wars may have demonstrated the sincerity of Chinese government opposition to opium imports, but the drug's subsequent legalization through a series of aptly named "unequal treaties" engendered a reservoir of ill will toward a Qing state too weak to enforce its will on foreign purveyors of the drug (despite the growing Chinese demand for opium). The problem with opium was but one symptom (or cause) of the internal strife that characterized the second half of the nineteenth century in China.

The events surrounding the first Opium War generated angry responses from educated Chinese, such as the anonymous priest who called himself "the Chrysanthemum Daoist." He composed an intriguing lyrical expression of hostility to opium in Fujian in the early 1840s. The twenty-stanza poem was elegantly carved into a rectangular tray made of the wood of the flowering pear tree. Firmly embedded in its specific historical context, the poem is punctuated by literary allusions and tied together by an undercurrent of sarcasm condemning all strata of Chinese society for their complicity in the flourishing opium trade. Within the small sample of anti-opium songs and poems discovered in the course of researching this article, this poem stands

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out as unusual for its author's explicit condemnation of Chinese complicity in the trade and his frank acknowledgment of the drug's powerful allure.[13]

In a tone that is often savage and mocking, the poet works his way through each layer of Chinese society, from the imperial court down to the common farmer. He skewers Chinese peasants for planting poppies and then claiming to the government that the land lay fallow. He indicts officials for their hypocritical condemnation of the trade while they themselves smoked the drug and their corruption allowed it to bypass legal restrictions. Chinese soldiers come in for particularly intense criticism because they allowed addiction to destroy their capacity to fight. One compelling stanza asks the military how it expects to defeat the enemy while using only opium pipes as weapons. Smokers among the literati are said to have diluted their intellect, and addiction is blamed for destroying the livelihoods of artists and craftspeople by making them listless and dispirited. Toward the end of the poem, the author rises to a more global condemnation of the drug, decrying the sins of smokers against their ancestors and illustrating the pitiful consequences for families of these unfilial men. Then his readers are provided with a jarringly crude description of the appalling physical damage suffered by individual addicts. The conclusion warns readers to avoid "sinking in the opium sea," which can cause more damage than excessive drinking and gambling—a sea whose seductive powers the author compared to the charms of a beautiful woman.

Another poet writing around the time of the Opium War, this time from Zhenghe county in the northwestern prefecture of Jianning, included the following poem, titled simply "Opium," in his book *Songs from Central Fujian*:

Materia Medica records the *yangfu* plant,
Afuyong is another name, they say;
Sown beneath the springtime moon,
Harvested till the first winter's day;
Foreigners gather the flower's sap,
Mix the poison and boil away;
Smoking the drug brings suffering,
But fragrance like an orchid, so they say;
The ignorant folk develop a need,
Like worms in smartweed, for more and more each day;

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For years the sickness was concealed,
So it isn't easy to push away;
Foreigners each day grow more and more rich,
While Chinese grow poorer by the day. [Song Kuaian, as quoted in Qi Sihe, Lin Shuhui, and Shou Jiyu, 1957: 1/335]

This author acknowledges the lengthy history of the poppy in China, but opium is clearly presented as a commodity prepared and imported by foreigners to seduce Chinese into giving up their wealth.

Quanzhou scholar Wu Zeng, writing at around the same time, included another poem in his book *A Stimulating Piece about Quanzhou Customs*. The lyrics bemoan the dehumanizing consequences of opium smoking:

People consume opium,
The drug consumes them whole,
Melts away one's fat and blood,
Devours the very soul.
To the marrow of the bone the craving goes,
Smokers are living devils, everybody knows.
New devils crave a little,
Old ones need much more,
Scorched black is the color of a new devil's face,
Of human color, an old devil has no trace. [Wu, quoted in Lin Renchuan, 1985: 68]

Eschewing the need to assign blame for China's opium problem, Wu's piece focuses on human suffering and the social stigma attached to longtime addicts, who were commonly referred to as opium devils (*yapian gui*) because of their inhuman appearance and behavior.

Another compelling testament to popular recognition and disapproval of the social ravages of opium addiction in Fujian was passed down orally from sometime during the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century in the following "Anti-Opium Song." The villagers of Xiamao, located in Yanping prefecture, are said to have composed the lyrics:

The opium pipe is made of *sihua* bamboo;
I lie on the mat in a shrimp-like curlicue.
Smoking a pipe, I see a light;

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the fire on the stove burns red and bright.
I gulp hot tea, purse my lips and start;
in a hundred ways the taste invades my liver and heart.
Yama himself runs the opium den;[14]
good men and women need not go in.
When first you smoke, the blood runs hot;
but smoke more, need more, and soon you are a sot.
Skin and bones, the fat became lean;
everyone calls me an opium fiend.
An opium addict cannot sit still;
sells his wife, his kids, and the land they till.
Wife and daughter, the fields he tends;
all go up in smoke in the opium den.
Evil merchants sell the drug to make money for the West;
disaster for the nation—it can't be for the best. [Xiao Qinglun, Zheng Xuezhang, and Shu Yin, 1987: 142-43]

The song vividly described the power of addiction, the terrible toll the drug exacted on both the body and family of the smoker, and the amoral greed exhibited by opium merchants. The anti-foreign sentiment with which the undated song concludes leads me to believe that it was composed before the Opium Wars and the boom in domestic cultivation, although the lyrics could also reflect the absence of a domestic poppy crop in this inland prefecture after the boom had begun. Folk songs such as this were and are viewed by the current Chinese government as expressions of long-standing class-based antagonisms that could be used to foster class consciousness and embroider the historical tapestry of peasant revolution with rich, emotional hues.

Anti-opium sentiment was not confined to poetry and song in the second half of the nineteenth century. Discontented individuals in Fujian increasingly turned to heterodox religious groups as they sought spiritual renewal in those troubled times, and many such groups required that members abstain from opium smoking. Spirit-writing societies and the "Emptiness sect" (*zhenkong jiao*) were examples of organized expressions of popular opposition to opium in Fujian before the suppression campaign was inaugurated. Known by a variety of names, the spirit-writing societies originated in coastal Fujian (in the Quanzhou region) and Guangdong provinces in the mid-Qing, and their influence spread to the island of Taiwan in the 1850s. Members believed that the spirits would communicate with

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them through mediums, who waited with planchettes ready to transcribe messages from the supernatural world onto sand tables. The messages usually related to specific prayers offered by the society, and in the mid- to late nineteenth century, those prayers often requested cures for opium smoking. In Taiwan, one such cure involved consuming a concoction containing the ashes of incense burned to summon the spirits mixed with the water used to clear the sand table. This allegedly efficacious combination often led to abdominal pain and vomiting. Smokers were also asked to burn their smoking equipment in front of the sand table to demonstrate their sincerity.[15]

The Emptiness sect apparently was a similar type of spiritual brotherhood. One of the primary requirements for membership was abstention from opium smoking, and a Chinese account credited the widespread appeal of the group to its position on the drug. This well-organized sect was headquartered in Youqi county, Yanping prefecture, an important commercial center that served as a hub for opium importers from the coastal areas who wished to transport their goods into Jiangxi province. The sect attracted followers primarily from lower-class workers such as "boatmen, shoemakers, prison guards, chairbearers, vagrants, small shopkeepers, and doctors" (Pan Youlian, 1989: 51-53). The popularity of these groups indicated a strong tendency among some nonelites to support anti-opium initiatives, but their role in the official anti-opium movement is unknown and likely problematic, given the anti-state bias implicit in such heterodox organizations.

Knowledgeable readers will wonder at the omission of any discussion of the Taiping Rebellion from this section since abstention from opium was a key pillar in Hong Xiuquan's social agenda. There is very little documentation regarding the impact of Taiping ideology on the masses of Fujian. The province generally fell outside the area of Taiping occupation, becoming a battlefield primarily during the frantic, bloody Taiping retreat from Nanjing. Ironically, the most significant impact of the Taiping Rebellion on Fujianese attitudes regarding opium may have been not a broadening of potential support for suppression but rather resentment toward the Qing state for violently suppressing the rebellion and for imposing the despised *lijin* tax, partly intended to cover the astronomical cost of battling the Taipings.[16]

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Anti-opium sentiment in Fujian also surfaced, on occasion, as part of a more generalized mistrust of Western missionaries. Vocal skepticism and pointed heckling greeted many British and American missionaries, as some members of the Chinese audience questioned their motives in the face of the prominent role played by their home nations in the Sino-Indian opium trade (MacGowan, 1907: 200, 340-41). Such reactions were particularly common during the mid-nineteenth century and remained prevalent in areas free of poppy cultivation. In Fujian, however, there was virtually no violence directed at missionaries solely as representatives of Western opium-importing nations, despite the predominance of imported opium in the province. The one notable exception may have been the so-called Kucheng (Gucheng) massacre of 1895, when a local vegetarian sect (*caihui*) killed eleven foreigners. The murders were rumored to have been committed in retaliation for alleged Western support of Japan during the recent Sino-Japanese War. However, widespread opium addiction in the Gutian area may have been partly responsible for the popularity of the society since some of its members joined the sect because it offered a supposed cure for opium smoking. Hostilities between the vegetarians and foreign missionaries may have arisen over competition for recruits from a similar social pool (Rankin, 1961: 30-32, 36-38; USDS, 1849-1906: reel 8, Hixon to Secy. of State, 2 May 1896).

Anti-opium sentiment was not necessarily accompanied by blanket hostility to foreigners. Many Chinese joined Christian churches in Fujian precisely because of the anti-opium stance of the missionaries and the opium treatment facilities built by Western physicians. Some of the most devoted Chinese converts were former opium smokers rehabilitated in missionary hospitals and clinics.[17] For others, a healthy dose of anti-opium propaganda was part of the broader moral curriculum advanced in missionary schools and churches.

Additional evidence of popular opposition to opium that clearly eschewed any anti-foreign component surfaced on the eve of the suppression campaign in the villages outside Fuzhou, where the anti-opium work of mission hospitals in the city inspired villagers to seek help from Westerners for their own opium problems. One meticulously documented example concerned the small village of A-iong (Chinese characters unknown), a few miles outside Fuzhou. In late

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February 1906, with the agreement of their neighbors, two men who had been cured of their habit in a Church Missionary Society hospital in Fuzhou summoned the Anglican missionaries to the village. The evangelist-physicians spent two weeks attempting to cure all of the village's opium smokers, and when word of their success spread to other nearby villages, they took their treatment regimen to grateful villages in the rural areas around Fuzhou (Mercy and Truth, May 1907: 147-53).

Clearly, the opium problem generated a significant degree of popular antipathy in late Qing Fujian well before the announcement of the official suppression campaign in late 1906. Without further documentation, it is impossible to link that sentiment directly to grassroots support for that campaign, but the evidence available does indicate that expressions of hostility toward opium could be found in all strata of society, outside as well as within the major urban centers, and was as multifaceted as the problem itself.

POPULAR HOSTILITY TO OPIUM, 1906-1915

During the suppression campaign, popular hostility to opium generally was expressed through and interpreted as support for state policy. Many officials and unofficial elite-led reform groups became deeply involved in implementing and enforcing the campaign, and in many cases, they set the tone for reform. For this reason, the anti-opium songs and poetry cited in this section represent less the spontaneous expression of popular sentiment than the appropriation of the rhetoric of hostility by activists who supported suppression even while many of them came to reject the Qing state. But many others not directly involved in the mechanisms of reform also appeared to support the initiative, although to discern cooperation that is purely voluntary is admittedly difficult. Some smokers and their families took advantage of increased opportunities for treatment; in addition, eager audiences flocked to mass meetings and celebrations organized by opium reformers and officials. Some undoubtedly were drawn by the spectacle, but many must have come away influenced by the fiery speeches and the dramatic, public incineration of opium and smoking equipment. Such gatherings resulted from a conscious effort by Fujian's elite to draw ordinary Chinese into an emergent public space

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for political activism, a space created in part by opium reform. That elites felt the need for these efforts indicated a fundamental change in the nature of Chinese politics, and that so many responded revealed either a reservoir of popular support for suppression or a sense of obligation stimulated by a fear of the state's coercive powers.

Fuzhou was the site of several dramatic anti-opium demonstrations that attracted thousands of townspeople. Carefully organized and choreographed by local reformers, these meetings featured emotional speeches, bands, and colorful parades, and they culminated in bonfires fueled by confiscated contraband. The *Quarterly* claimed that the crowd was noisy and enthusiastic as it followed the procession and cheered the bonfires (FQZJ, 1908, 3: *zazhi* section, 20). By 1911, local elites in cities all across the province had set up a network of 112 branches (*zhishe*) of the Anti-Opium Society (IMC, Foochow, 1902-1911: 91), most of which also staged mass meetings, treated addiction, and distributed anti-opium propaganda. Mass rallies against opium also erupted outside Fuzhou, some without the guiding hand of the Anti-Opium Society. For example, one source claimed that in 1912, the people of Pucheng county (Jianning prefecture) rose up spontaneously and burned a large amount of opium seized locally (Zhang Xingzheng, 1987: 31).

Other local reform groups also participated in the official policy against opium. In the city of Fuzhou, members of the *qiaonan gongyishe* (literally, the South-of-the-Bridge Public Welfare Society) showed their support by sponsoring a branch of the Anti-Opium Society (QGZ, 1908-1909). Outside the capital, in Jianning prefecture, a branch society of the Fujian Anti-Opium Society was founded, followed by the establishment of an organization called the Brother-in-Law Society (*dabai hui* or *baida hui*). The grueling initiation ritual for the latter group, which required among other things continuous kowtowing from sunrise to sunset and the recitation of poetry with a mouth full of water, was said to cure opium addiction (Chen Guansan and Zou Xiutong, 1986: 43-44). All of these activities indicate that a significant degree of popular interest in and support for suppression accompanied the official campaign.

Modern education, presumably laced with a strong dose of nationalistic rhetoric, nourished popular hostility to opium, and students in missionary and government schools were among the most enthusias-

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tic promoters of the opium suppression campaign.[18] They turned out in large numbers for any public meeting or celebration, participated in anti-opium essay contests, and joined anti-opium organizations. According to the missionary George Newell, one very well-attended meeting was organized in 1907 by students of government schools in Fuzhou to discuss and celebrate Beijing's order to close down opium shops all over China. Missionaries, mission students, and Chinese officials were all invited to speak, and the gathering featured a boisterous procession of students in Western dress waving anti-opium banners (Newell, folder 2, letter dated 15 May 1907). Moreover, Newell also reported that in some locales, students seemed to view themselves as partly responsible for enforcing the campaign:

> A few months ago some students were returning from a government school for the holiday season, and in one of the villages through which they passed, they saw some poppies growing. They went over in a body and pulled up every plant and tramped them to pulp. No resistance was offered and nothing done about it, the conscience of the owners evidently not being quite clear about the matter. [Newell, folder 2, letter dated 7 April 1908]

The lack of opposition also may have reflected a healthy fear on the part of the farmers of individuals connected to the state-led campaign in any way. In addition, an American diplomat claimed that students of a Fuzhou military school took it on themselves to comb the city streets for violators of the opium restrictions and in one instance beat up a prominent scholar for smoking in public (USDS, 1906-1910: reel 104, 774/110-11, enclosure in Gracey to Secy. of State, 28 May 1907).

The Fujian Anti-Opium Society spread its message in a variety of ways, most of which are recorded in the pages of the Society's quarterly publication. For example, the *Quarterly* often included political cartoons that graphically depicted the toll of opium addiction on the physical and social body. One issue featured a number of anti-opium songs penned by supporters and promoters of opium suppression; these tunes were intended not only to *reflect* popular exultation but also to *produce* it. Translated below are the lyrics of several songs, reprinted in the *Quarterly*, that were sung in Fuzhou by local school-

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children when foreign opium imports into Fujian were halted in 1914. Presented as they were on an occasion of triumph, the songs signal a clear shift from fear and anti-foreignism to pride in nation and province. While all of the songs contain references to the Western origins of the commerce in opium, they also stress the current confluence of Chinese and Western sentiment against that trade.[19]

This first song was sung by students from a YMCA school and was representative of others at the same celebration (FQZJ, 1914, 12: *zazhi* section, 6-7):

This terrible thing—who can trace?
Disaster it brought to our native place.
The once-closed ocean was opened wide,
And allowed the poison to come inside.
A thousand ships, ten thousand again,
Continued to arrive without an end.
So many years, no one can say,
Our country weakened by the day.
The people drank that poisoned wine,
Drank till they lost their presence of mind.
Now East and West, hearts beat as one,
From today begins the prohibition!
By sealing off the river's source,
We can stop the poison's course.
From Fujian's rivers and mountains high,
Our country's flag waves in the sky.
And so, then, from this day on,
The people's illness is all gone!

A brief poem written by Society member Wang Junwen expressed his enthusiasm for the same event:

How can poppies blight our blessed land?
We wailed for help for many a year.
Now the filthy flow has finally ceased,
Today the Min River flows clean and clear.

And finally, a single verse from a longer song presented by the Xiehe School "joyfully celebrated the prohibition of opium imports" and reiterated the same themes:

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Taut in the wind our national flag flaps,
As the pipes are destroyed, the crowd all claps,
Flap, clap, flap, clap.
There are ten thousand ways to right this wrong,
And change our country from weak to strong,
The masses celebrate them in a song.

How accurately these children represented the sentiment of those "masses" is not easily determined. During the anti-opium campaign, it became difficult to distinguish genuine popular antipathy toward opium from a general tolerance of official policy or fear of state repression. The restrictions that closed down numerous opium shops and dens in Fujian's cities apparently met with relatively little resistance, while throngs of townspeople attended mass meetings, thousands enrolled in the state-controlled opium rationing scheme, and others sought treatment for addiction. The relative ease with which these anti-consumption measures were implemented may have reflected progressive urban reformism present long before 1906. But once the state had mandated opium reform, hostility to opium was no longer a matter of choice.

POPULAR HOSTILITY TO OPIUM AFTER 1916

After the death of Yuan Shikai, public feeling about opium changed once again, as the campaign sputtered to an inconclusive end. From the beginning of the warlord era into the 1920s and 1930s, the joy and pride that characterized the anti-opium celebrations of the early Republic gave way to despair. The Fujianese countryside was ravaged by competing warlord regimes and by the demands of the Nationalist regime in Nanjing, which all relied significantly on revenues derived from taxes on domestic opium (Zhou, 1999: 40, 61). Foreign diplomats, missionaries, and congregations of Chinese Christians petitioned the Chinese government and the international community to highlight the plight of many Chinese farmers and to beg for help; although significant efforts were made to organize a global response to the narcotics issue, China was left to deal with its own opium problem.[20]

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Most of Fujian's poppy crop after 1916 was grown in the traditional trouble spots of Xinghua, Quanzhou, and Funing prefectures along the coast. According to many Chinese historians, because of the ever-present need for revenues to pay for military expenses, farmers in those regions were encouraged and even compelled to cultivate opium poppies despite Nationalist attempts to revive the suppression campaign. For example, in 1922 in Fuan county (Funing prefecture), warlords apparently forced farmers to plant poppies instead of rice and wheat even after a devastating flood had decimated local food stores (Miao Xiaoning, 1988: 55).[21] Farmers in Zhangpu county (Zhangzhou prefecture) were said to have planted poppies to satisfy high land taxes imposed by warlords (Ya Ji, 1986: 29). Local authorities allegedly forced farmers in Shunchang county (Yanping prefecture) to meet a poppy quota set by those officials (Xia Weijian and Ye Xiangrong, 1987: 203). The need for military revenue was undoubtedly the primary impetus behind the resurgence of poppy cultivation in Fujian, but whether local farmers planted poppies because they were compelled to do so against their will—either by exorbitant taxation or by military force—remains uncertain. Most Chinese sources insist that heavy taxes made lucrative cash crops such as opium a regrettable necessity for otherwise unwilling Fujianese peasants.

Oppressive taxes were also levied on the consumption and sale of opium, measures that in effect legalized the vice and apparently increased the financial oppression of the poor. In Jianyang county, bans on gambling, prostitution, and opium were replaced in 1931 by heavy taxes. Local rumor had it that one impoverished addict even sold his wife's pants to buy more of the drug (Wei Hongyuan, 1985). Warlords in Shunchang county established "opium paste administration offices" (*tugao guanlisuo*) to collect from opium dens a tax of four jiao per opium lamp (Xia Weijian and Ye Xiangrong, 1987: 203). The tone of these accounts implies popular support for suppression, or at least objections to taxes on opium, but there is no evidence of active sabotage of or rebellion against the revived opium economy.

Accordingly, literary expressions of hostility to opium lost their patriotic fervor and became gloomy; most focused on the decay of body and family that accompanied addiction. For example, this brief ditty was popular in the 1930s in the northwestern county of Jianyang:

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The sons of opium smokers are very few,
Smokers don't understand what to do.
Before they smoked, their families were fine,
Afterward, most of their wives left, too. [Wei Hongyuan, 1985: 54]

Around the same time, a Guomindang government propaganda team penned the following song, explicitly spelling out how opium smoking eroded traditional Confucian values:

When addiction kicks in, pity the family's plight,[22]
Even with good medicine, it's hard to set the spirit right.
The homes of hard-core addicts fall into decay, while moderate users keep debtors at bay,
All their friends and relatives arrive to cart it all away.
All it takes is one small pipe to rob a hero of his life,
His home and land are gone as well, he's left with naught but strife.
The friends about whom he used to care, come into the smoker's lair,
And take away everything that's there.
No matter how much cash is spent, to buy some land or pay the rent,
All that results is debt and hardship, that is the lament.
Workers, farmers, scholars, merchants—all kinds of men, you can find them hidden in an opium den,
No matter if they're good or bad, they share the mats again and again.
The children hate this terrible life, and complain to the ancestors about the strife,
But they pretend not to hear what goes on in this life. [Huang Yunqing, 1990: 28-29]

Yet another song—this one perhaps more "authentic" in its representation of grassroots sentiment—was recalled and sung to modern oral historians by an elderly man from Shanghang county in remote Dingzhou prefecture:

. . . [P]eople with no money,
Can only knit their brows.
First exchange your furniture,
Then sell your pants and blouse.
Continue by selling off your land,
And then selling your house.
It's just like moxibustion,
Burns your flesh until you shout.
Wives married off to a distant place,

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Children sold cheap to another house.
The family fortune squandered,
You become a solitary louse.
Beg for food and skip some meals,
Sleep in temples for lack of a house.
Plagued by sickness and poverty,
The situation worsens as each day goes by.[23]
Until finally, you just drop dead,
And not a soul blinks an eye.
No more relatives or friends,
And no family standing by.
The flyswatter hanging useless now,
It is the mosquitoes who come to cry.
Ground beetles also swarm around,
Toward the corpse rats and fleas turn their eye.
The four pieces of wood used as a bed,
Now serve as a coffin to lay in when you die.
It's carried out beyond the city walls,
Very little dirt is moved to make a place for it to lie.
The lament is that you were an opium fiend,
This is the end result—so long, goodbye. [Lan Hanmin, 1984: 20-21]

The song clearly reflected the peasant nightmare of a lonely pauper's burial and the collapse of a social support network among friends and relatives.

In sum, popular hostility to opium in Fujian existed before, during, and aafter the formal prohibition campaign. That hostility not only was based on the devastating social and physical damage attributed to the drug but also was directed at those responsible for its presence in Fujian, Chinese or foreign. Not everyone supported the crackdown, though, and attempts to eradicate opium smoking and eliminate Fujian's small but tenacious poppy crop were met with various forms of resistance.

RESISTANCE TO OPIUM RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS IN FUJIAN

Much of this discussion focuses on the first half of the nineteenth century prior to the legalization of opium imports, as well as on the period of the suppression campaign itself. It would be misleading to

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speak of resistance during most of the latter half of the nineteenth century, when imported and domestic opium was legal (though some smuggling persisted). In addition, the rapid expansion of Fujian's legitimate opium economy when legal restrictions were lifted could be viewed as illustrating the enduring financial and psychological appeal of opium. Before the treaties that legalized the importation of opium from abroad and the later measures that lifted the ban on cultivating poppies within Chinese borders, however, those who purchased, transported, prepared, marketed, grew, or smoked opium operated in open defiance of Chinese law. The same conditions held again in the early twentieth century, when the Qing government initiated the ten-year suppression campaign. After the cessation of British opium imports, particularly after the death of Yuan Shikai, opium suppression became a farce until the late 1920s, when the Nationalist regime ascended and the GMD sporadically attempted to restrict opium use.

RESISTANCE TO SUPPRESSION PRIOR TO 1906

Before foreign opium imports were legalized following the *Arrow* War, Fujian hosted a small but growing black-market trade in opium that took advantage of the province's coastal location, its navigable river systems, and its domination by strong local lineages. Driven north from Guangzhou by sporadic Chinese crackdowns on opium smuggling and a desire to attain easier access to tea-growing regions, Western merchants bearing opium made contact in the 1820s with Chinese traders in Fujian eager to transport the drug inland (Wong, 1998: 359).

The first center of opium smuggling in Fujian was Zhaoan county, located along the border with Guangdong near the city of Shantou (Swatow), but the trade soon shifted north to the jagged coastal regions around the trading ports of Quanzhou and Zhangzhou (Qi Sihe, 1959: 103-4). The small, isolated fishing villages in the latter areas, with their easy access to inland waterways, were particularly attractive. According to one account, the scene along the coastline was often chaotic, with "thousands upon thousands whistling to sailors on the [foreign opium] boats to make deals" (Lin Renchuan, 1985: 63-65).

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After the foreign opium was purchased, powerful local clans controlled the protection, transportation, and sale of the drug. For example, in Pujiang county, the Shi, Chen, and Ding clans were among those who cooperated willingly with British traders and set up extensive trafficking networks that moved opium throughout Fujian and into markets in the cities of Ningbo and Shanghai and as far north as Shandong province. One source described how the village of Yakou was transformed into a storehouse for the imported drug, with a neat row of warehouses set up along the docks, presumably in full view of local residents and officials (Xu Liangxiao, 1993: 137-38; Lin Renchuan, 1985: 63-65).[24]

The ingenious means used to conceal the drug from local authorities indicate that Chinese involved in the trade were aware of its illicit nature. Opium was discovered hidden among containers of goods such as betel nuts, fish, and cloth. On one occasion, the drug was molded to resemble swallows' nests, which presumably were then passed off to customs officials as culinary delicacies (Lin Renchuan, 1985: 63-65; Collis, 1946: 77-79). Often, however, official complicity made concealment unnecessary; in 1857, the American consul in Fuzhou charged that a number of firms openly conducted their unlawful trade in opium (USDS, 1849-1906: reel 1, no. 30, Jones to Secy. of State, 1 January 1857).

Even after opium was legalized, smugglers devised numerous schemes to transport the drug to eager consumers without having to pay the heavy taxes that served as the justification for lifting the prohibitions on its importation and transportation. The tax rate was extremely high at the treaty ports of Fuzhou and Xiamen, so many Chinese traders bought their opium at ports with lower taxes and smuggled it into Fujian (USDS, 1844-1906: reel 4, no. 42, LeGendre to Dept. of State, 30 September 1867; no. 45, LeGendre to Dept. of State, 28 May 1868). During the 1860s and 1870s, however, a legitimate system of opium importation and distribution grew up alongside this black market, and the state was able to establish control over much of the opium trade in Fujian by 1906.

The opium economy of Fujian was a complex framework of supply and demand that rapidly became an integral part of the society, economy, and politics of the province. By 1906, that framework included farmers, merchants, laborers, boatmen, boilers, bureaucrats,

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strongmen, and manufacturers of opium-smoking paraphernalia, not to mention the owners and patrons of pawnshops, brothels, wine shops, and opium dens, all of whom depended on either the financial or physiological returns of the opium trade in late Qing Fujian. One account estimates that at least 100,000 people were involved just on the supply side of that province's opium economy in the mid-nineteenth century, and that number undoubtedly increased substantially with the expansion of domestic poppy cultivation (Lin Renchuan, 1985: 68). Presumably, many of these individuals did not wish to see their livelihoods eliminated.

RESISTANCE TO THE OPIUM SUPPRESSION CAMPAIGN IN THE CITIES OF FUJIAN

To determine how and to what extent Fujianese resisted the official anti-opium campaign, we must first recognize that the restrictions elicited different popular reactions in the urban centers, where opium distribution and consumption were the primary targets of the campaign, than in the rural poppy-growing regions. The available evidence indicates that although steps taken to reduce consumption generally met with compliance, a sizable minority of Fujian's poppy farmers offered both passive and violent resistance to efforts to eliminate this profitable crop. Local socioeconomic conditions, as well as state enforcement strategies, largely determined the nature and extent of that resistance.

Urban dwellers might be expected to object to restrictions on the demand and supply of opium because the policy not only entailed substantial monetary sacrifices but also often meant physical suffering and limits on their personal freedoms. First and foremost, the suppression policy obviously meant the severing of a lucrative line of income for those involved in transporting, preparing, and selling the drug, as well as those who specialized in manufacturing opium-smoking implements. In addition, to force consumers to give up their habit, a census of smokers was ordered in most areas, and a rationing scheme was implemented.[25] Vigilance by officials, the new police forces (in some areas), and unofficial reform groups translated into constant pressure to comply with the opium restrictions. Yet sources indicate that although strong and frequent objections to these measures did

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occur throughout the province, resistance was scattered and uncoordinated, usually occurring spontaneously and on an extremely small scale.

Beginning in 1907 and continuing into the early Republic, opium shops, opium dens, brothels that also sold opium, and all other retail distributors were ordered to be shut down by provincial authorities. The lack of widespread resistance to this very visible measure was largely a function of the nature of the establishments and their clientele. These were marginal establishments that operated in the best of times at the outermost boundaries of acceptable society. Respectable, upper-class users generally prepared and smoked their drug at home, and resistance by customers who frequented opium dens probably would not elicit much public sympathy or support. This particular measure was a visible success in most urban areas, but sporadic resistance continued into the early Republic, as determined merchants secretly opened small dens.

The official and unofficial reform groups that worked to implement and enforce these restrictions were granted extensive and intrusive police powers that potentially could terrify or anger those whom the measures affected. For example, the Fuzhou Anti-Opium Society conducted nightly raids of businesses, private homes, and religious and administrative establishments, and the *Quarterly* printed the names of violators. Branches of the Society carried out similar efforts throughout the province. The elimination of demand also threatened individual smokers with personal suffering. In the county seat of Xianyou (Xinghua prefecture), a British missionary noted that several of her chairbearers in that town complained, "If we do not eat opium, we could not carry the chairs" (IWCD, August 1899: 177-78). As evidence that they anticipated or had already experienced popular objections to their mission, the Society's regulations clearly stated that those who resisted arrest or caused the injury of an inspector or police officer would be punished severely (FQZJ, 1907, 1: *zancheng* section).

Another form of resistance that plagued provincial authorities in Fujian and that deserves far more attention than it can be given in this article was the smuggling of opium by Chinese from Taiwan who claimed extraterritorial privileges by virtue of their Japanese passports. Whether this constituted a deliberate policy by the Japanese

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colonial government or simply entrepreneurial ingenuity on the part of the Chinese traders was not clear. However, it drove home to opium reformers, and undoubtedly to the general populace as well, the point that the ultimate success of opium suppression had as much to do with the ability of the central Chinese state to remove the challenges to its sovereignty contained in the so-called unequal treaties as with the diligence of provincial authorities (USDS, 1910-1929: reel 113, 893.114/104, enclosures in Maynard to Secy. of State, 15 December 1913).

For the most part, open resistance to anti-consumption measures was confined to the owners of opium shops and dens and generally did not involve rank-and-file opium smokers. Passive resistance by smokers and local officials in the form of ignoring the regulations was far more common, especially in the countryside. The following patchwork of anecdotes indicates the type and degree of resistance most often encountered throughout the province during this part of the campaign. Beginning in the populous northeast, some owners of opium dens in Fuzhou attempted to get around the prohibition by conducting their business in boats floating along the rivers and canals of the city or by turning the homes of smokers into impromptu dens (USDS, 1906-1910: reel 104, 774/113-14, enclosure in Paddock to Rockhill, 24 July 1907). Others met with and begged the provincial judge to extend the deadline for the closure of opium shops (Newell, folder 2, letter dated 15 May 1907). Although availability of opium in the capital had been effectively curtailed, missionaries cautioned that "in the mountain villages twelve miles from Foochow the opium dens are still doing business in some places openly" (Foochow Messenger, April 1909: 1). In Gutian county (Fuzhou prefecture), a degree holder who managed the area's largest opium warehouse refused to comply with the prohibitions until arrested (IWCD, April 1910: 60, 106-7). Several years earlier, a prominent reformer leader in Gutian was ambushed on a back street by several dozen people—including seven women—and badly beaten. The attack apparently was in retaliation for a raid that publicly exposed opium dealers and some of their literati customers (CMS, Fuhkien Mission, Incoming Originals, 1900-1934, no. 228, letter from Woods dated 5 August 1907). In the prefecture of Funing, the intricacy of the retail trade complicated regulation, and on the eve

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of the 1911 Revolution, a few dens were still in operation (Miao Xiaoning, 1988: 54-55).

No poppies were cultivated in the western half of the province, and local suppression efforts there focused solely on eliminating demand for the drug. Enforcement of the restrictions was slower and more haphazard than in the northeast. And here, too, the fist of the suppression campaign came down far more forcefully in the big cities, making resistance outside those urban centers not only less likely but less necessary. In the prefecture of Jianning, for example, the very public closure of all opium dens in Jianning City in mid-1907 was not replicated in the surrounding countryside until more than a year later (CMS, Fuhkien Mission, Original Incoming, 1900-1934, no. 148, letter from H. S. Phillips, 29 March 1908). In addition, missionaries claimed that even in that city, many of the opium dens that were closed with great fanfare in 1907 continued to do business through less conspicuous side doors (Mercy and Truth, August 1908: 245-49).

The anti-opium campaign lost ground during the political chaos that accompanied the 1911 Revolution, but the new regime quickly asserted its support for suppression. As the campaign revived, resistance to opium reform of the same scope and nature continued in the cities of Fujian until the official conclusion of the campaign in 1917.

RESISTANCE TO REFORM IN THE POPPY-GROWING REGIONS OF FUJIAN

Before the 1911 Revolution, authorities were able to make some progress in reducing the amount of land planted in poppies, but the job was far from complete; in many areas, the campaign was quietly ignored. Provincial officials recognized the importance of eliminating the provincial poppy crop but feared the wrath of local poppy growers, who were renowned for their general truculence. In a memorial to Beijing in 1910, Songshou, governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, warned, "As for investigating and prohibiting the planting of opium, those specially assigned officials personally walk among the fields. [They] suffer [and the situation is] dangerous" (ZZGB, 1910, 32: 159-60). In some ways, however, the few cases of violence were far easier to deal with than passive resistance. In the latter, more complex

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situation, the complicity, negligence, or intimidation of local officials and elites made the truth difficult to ascertain and the proper state response equally difficult to impose.

In the southeast—the center of provincial poppy growing—enforcement of restrictions on selling and consuming opium was less stringent, so there was less need for resistance. For example, in Yongchun subprefecture, where opium consumption apparently had reached epidemic proportions by 1906, officials who were themselves longtime smokers posted but did not enforce anti-opium restrictions (PCE/FMC, box 10, file 1, Thompson to Dale, 22 December 1910). In the township of Shima, located southeast of Zhangzhou City, opium smoking was said to have been endemic among officials and the general populace. One author claimed that "local ruffians and hooligans not only smoked or ate opium, but also bought and sold it, eventually seizing a monopoly [on the trade in Shima]" (Lin Wenji, 1988: 60-62).

Before the 1911 Revolution, resistance to the anti-opium campaign did break out in Tongan county, the epicenter of Fujian's poppy cultivation since the mid- to late nineteenth century. During the late Qing suppression campaign, the strength and violence of clans in the Tongan area sometimes made enforcement quite dangerous. In one case reported by the U.S. consul at Xiamen, the Kang clan dominated the district just west of Tongan City and had made their living from opium cultivation for many years. The magistrate himself led an expedition in late 1908 or early 1909 to investigate the more intransigent clan members. When confronted, the violators pulled out the offending plants peacefully. However, when the magistrate ordered three clan leaders to accompany him to his offices to sign a pledge never to grow the poppy again, hundreds of villagers gathered to protest. Violence erupted when the crowd misinterpreted a warning shot fired by an overanxious yamen clerk. Troops were sent from Xiamen to help quell the violence, but most of the clan fled (USDS, 1906-1910: reel 107, 775/585, Arnold to Secy. of State, 28 January 1909). After that, the magistrate enforced the new restrictions with an iron hand, personally inspecting his jurisdiction for violations. He ordered the arrest of the elders of any village in which poppy plants were found and torched entire villages when faced with intransigence (USDS, 1906-1910: reel 108, 774/690, excerpt from China No. 3, 1909).

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The prefecture of Xinghua proved especially intractable, and resistance broke out in cities and rural areas. A British diplomat wrote that a half-dozen proprietors of opium dens in Xinghua City were publicly cangued for refusing to shut down their establishments, and a Western missionary physician claimed that although the city's opium shops briefly closed their doors, the owners talked the magistrate into a three-month reprieve (China No. 1, 1908, no. 28, report by Leech in Jordan to Grey, 27 November 1907; B. Van S. Taylor in Mercy and Truth, September 1907: 262-63). The campaign in Xinghua picked up momentum in its second year, but apparently progress was largely confined to the county and prefectural seats, with no interference at all with dens in the outlying villages. This situation persisted until the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution (Mercy and Truth, November 1911: 377-79).

In 1910, violence directed in part at opium reform broke out in the county seat of Putian. Evidently, new graduates of the local police school had banned roadside stalls and impromptu markets, charging vendors ten coppers to sleep unmolested by the side of the road (where presumably they awaited the next morning's business). An irate mob, indignant at these heavy-handed and seemingly arbitrary actions, burned down first the police sentry boxes and the police school and then the residences of Chen Qiao and Wu Hongbin, the two men responsible for local enforcement of opium prohibition. The incident reflected a link seen by the public between these two costly and intrusive reforms (Chen Zhangcheng, 1981: 113-16). Popular resentment reappeared along with opium reform after the Revolution, and it was no coincidence that Xinghua gave rise to the only large-scale violence directed at the anti-opium policy in Fujian.

Before 1911, Xinghua poppy farmers defied the restrictions, apparently with impunity, angering provincial officials and obstructing national goals for eliminating the plant. In May 1910, Governor-General Songshou submitted a memorial stating that the cultivation of domestic opium had been completely halted in Fujian. The central authorities were not that easily convinced, and on 19 April 1910, the Grand Council (*junji chu*) called on the Board of Finance (*duzhi bu*) to investigate the claims of provincial officials. Inspectors clandestinely traveled to Fujian and discovered that Songshou's assertion was false.

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In its subsequent report on the progress of the campaign, dated 27 September 1910, the board singled out Xinghua as Fujian's most conspicuous violator (ZZGB, 1910, 32: 159-60; 1910, 37: 339-41).

The Revolution brought political turmoil, and the transitional period was marked by a virtual vacuum of authority that caused the temporary breakdown of local mechanisms for reform. Once again, opium poppies blazed in the fields of eastern Fujian. The new Republic quickly regained control and reinstated the suppression campaign, but the tenor of the new regime was decidedly more militaristic than its predecessor, and the impact of that change on the conduct of the anti-opium campaign was rapid and profound. Furthermore, as a result of the renegotiation of the agreement with the British in May 1911, early conclusion of the Sino-British opium trade now hinged entirely on the eradication of Chinese poppies.

When the first reports of a so-called opium revolt in the Xinghua region reached the American consulate in Xiamen in June 1912, the situation was not viewed as serious by foreign diplomats.[26] By the time the conflict sputtered to its conclusion in the spring of 1914, however, the uprising had cost hundreds of lives, resulted in the burning and looting of numerous properties (many of them owned by Christians and Christian churches), and contributed to the sacking of Fujian's governor, a host of lesser Chinese officials, and the American consul in Fuzhou. A man named Huang Lian, who was also known as the Sixteenth Emperor or Number Sixteen, initially led the insurgents. Huang's protection of local opium fields, his anti-Christian bent, and his alleged imperial pretensions alarmed foreign observers and Chinese authorities, prompting attention and intervention on the national level.

Opium was not the sole cause of the uprising, but it became the focal point of most histories of these events because of its powerful symbolic and diplomatic significance. In fact, the revival of opium suppression was only one of many policies with which the farmers of Fujian were dissatisfied in the early Republic. In general, anti-government sentiment in Fujian and elsewhere had its origins in the frustration of peasant expectations.[27] Huang Lian's revolt represented the popular rejection of a revolution that many peasants had hoped would free them from the yoke of costly and invasive New Policy reforms, including opium suppression. It was the largest instance of resistance

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to the anti-opium campaign to confront Republican officials as they struggled to regain the ground they had lost during the revolutionary transition.

The recent work of Roxann Prazniak (1999) highlights the ways in which new taxes, census taking, and other modern bureaucratic methods instituted before the 1911 Revolution alienated many Chinese farmers by extending the reach of the state and further empowering local elites. The variety of restrictions imposed on opium smokers, sellers, and growers; the registration and rationing schemes; and the coercive powers allotted to unofficial reform groups certainly seem to confirm her contention that members of the rural public were far less receptive to the call for reform than their urban counterparts. However, because opium suppression persisted across the revolutionary divide, the chronological boundaries of Prazniak's study leave certain trends obscured. The basic patterns and motivations for resistance accompanied opium reform into the Republican era, but the endurance of these attitudes speaks to the failure of the 1911 Revolution for much of the Chinese population and explains the rapidity with which anti-government sentiment reemerged.

The prohibition of opium probably sparked Huang Lian's revolt by stoking the long-standing anti-tax sentiment of the rebels. One of the primary concerns of Chinese authorities at all levels of government as they implemented opium restrictions was the need to replace the revenue previously supplied by the various taxes on the sale, cultivation, and distribution of the drug. Fujian was one of many provinces to address this problem by increasing the salt tax during the first years of the Qing anti-opium campaign, and Xinghua was known for its large salt deposits. The salt tax was raised again in the summer of 1912, just before the outbreak of the revolt, and one Chinese account points out that as Huang Lian and his troops marched to attack Xianyou later that year, the masses spontaneously rose up and destroyed the salt storehouses, among other properties (ZZGB, 1908, 20: 104-8; "Kaoding yu buchong," 1983: 68-69).[28] Huang Lian himself first gained local fame when he was arrested for leading a local tax revolt in the late Qing and managed a daring escape from prison in a casket after feigning his own death ("Kaoding yu buchong," 1983: 63).

The first major outbreak of violence occurred in August 1912, when peasants from a particularly impoverished region known as the

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Thirty-Six Villages (*sanshiliu xiang*) staged an uprising to demand that the land tax be abolished and that they be granted the right to plant opium poppies ("Kaoding yu buchong," 1983: 68). Huang Lian, who led the uprising, was reportedly protecting poppy fields for a fee. The rebels waged several inconclusive battles in the fall of 1912, but government soldiers soundly defeated them during an unsuccessful rebel assault on Xinghua City on 25 September 1912. Sporadic violence continued, as the authorities in Fuzhou and Beijing attempted to negotiate an end to the uprising (USDS, 1910-1929: reel 113, 893.114/57, Shanghai to Secy. of State, 15 January 1913; PRO/FO 228/2454, Jordan to Grey, 26 May 1913).

In early May 1913, the rebels again attacked, this time capturing the walled city of Xianyou; accounts of the conduct of Huang Lian and his troops during their two-week occupation of the city vary wildly. Chinese historians insist that with the exception of one death during the burning of the magistrate's yamen, the rebels behaved impeccably, and business inside Xianyou was conducted as usual throughout the occupation (Yu Qiqiang, 1983: 47). One anecdote did, however, recount that Huang summoned a local scholar and opium addict and had him publicly consume large amounts of the drug to assure residents that opium was no longer illegal. Huang then apparently issued a proclamation declaring that opium fields would not be taxed ("Kaoding yu buchong," 1983: 67). In contrast, the British consul attributed numerous instances of malfeasance and atrocities to the rebels, although his accusations were not confirmed by American or Chinese reports (PRO/FO 228/1872, no. 21, Werner to Jordan, 18 May 1913; PRO/FO 228/1869, Little to Jordan, 19 June 1913).

One thing on which all accounts agree is the abominable behavior of government troops on recapturing Xianyou. In late May, after most of the rebels had escaped from the city, the soldiers indulged in large-scale looting and killing, apparently targeting men with queues (Mercy and Truth, January 1915: 24-26; USDS, 1910-1929: reel 12, 893.00/1754, enclosure no. 26 in no. 46, Fowler to Secy. of State, 23 May 1913; PRO/FO 228/1869, Little to Jordan, 19 June 1913). The cutting of queues was not yet common in the countryside surrounding Xianyou, so soldiers had many potential targets. The incendiary effects of the soldiers' rampage on the populace were profound, and many now turned their anger on the Christians whom they held

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responsible for summoning the troops. Indeed, the Methodist Bishop Bashford, ostensibly to enhance the status and influence of local Methodists, had apparently told a large public meeting in Xinghua City in February that troops were coming from Fuzhou at his request. The soldiers had in fact been dispatched on the orders of President Yuan Shikai, but locally the damage was done (PRO/FO 228/1872, no. 8, Werner to Jordan, 28 February 1913).

By June 1913, the poppy season was over, and the revolt appeared to become decidedly anti-Christian, with the property and followers of the Methodist Episcopal Church (MEC) as its primary targets. At this point, the Chinese government and the local military appeared to prefer attempts at negotiation to a continuation of military efforts to squelch the revolt, and foreign authorities were outraged. The whole affair sputtered to a halt in June 1914, when the MEC accepted a cash indemnity from the authorities in Xinghua and Yongchun, although sporadic fighting and executions continued for months (USDS, 1910-1929: reel 14, 893.00/2168, enclosure to no. 136, Fowler to Secy. of State, 3 July 1914). Huang Lian himself disappeared, and rumors of his subsequent death from illness were never confirmed (USDS, 1910-1929: reel 14, 893.00/2276, Pontius to Secy. of State, 3 May 1915; Yu Qiqiang, 1983: 47-48; "Kaoding yu buchong," 1983: 64).

To label Huang Lian's uprising an "opium rebellion" (USDS, 1910-1929: reel 113, 893.114, enclosure to no. 57, Shanghai to Secy. of State, 15 January 1912)—in other words, a protest directed at the Republic's continuation of the anti-opium campaign—denies the complexity of the incident and obscures the many ways in which opium policy had become entangled with local social tensions and the twists and turns of national politics. Opium suppression was, however, one of the key arenas in which government policy—with its righteous tone of nationalism and its paradoxical ties to imperialist demands—clashed with peasant survival strategies. Huang Lian's protection of poppy cultivation had great appeal to the rebels of Xinghua, as did his promise that no taxes would be collected on the illicit crop. Even otherwise supportive Chinese sources do not defend Huang's promotion of opium cultivation, but most accounts note that state policy on opium and salt imposed great financial hardship on Xinghua. Much of the rebels' anti-Christian sentiment also stemmed from anger at the

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Methodist church's open support for the extractive policies of the late Qing and early Republican regimes.

Huang Lian's revolt raises important questions about the depth of popular support for China's opium reforms and suggests that resistance to the suppression campaign reflected a long-standing and deep-seated resentment directed at the authorities on both sides of the revolutionary divide. The proliferation of anti-opium societies and of mass meetings in Fujian seems to demonstrate strong popular support for the campaign in the cities, but most of the activists were the urban reformist elites so predominant in Joseph Esherick's classic analysis of the 1911 Revolution (Esherick, 1976: 130-33).[29] The Xinghua uprising indicates that in some rural locales, compliance with the opium restrictions may have signified not so much support as coerced obedience to a higher, more powerful authority. That authority often manifested itself by imposing taxes intended to extract the revenue for so-called progressive reforms from the pockets of those least able to afford the outlay or to enjoy the benefits.

RESISTANCE AFTER THE DEATH OF YUAN SHIKAI

Fujian was declared free of poppy cultivation by a joint team of British and Chinese inspectors in 1914, yet only a few years later, the Fujianese countryside saw a resurgence of opium growing and consumption. The collapse of central authority that accompanied the death of Yuan Shikai was both cause and effect of the warlordism that revived Fujian's opium economy. Systematic government attempts to enforce opium suppression did not resurface until the ascendance of the Nationalist regime in the late 1920s; in the interim, farmers in Fujian grew poppies to satisfy the financial demands of competing military authorities. Whether this constituted popular support for the provincial opium economy or simply a rational response to the coercive demands of those in charge is uncertain, although Western and Chinese histories insist that farmers sowed poppy seeds unwillingly. In any case, the question of resistance to suppression soon became moot.

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BEYOND THE RHETORIC

By the nineteenth century, the nature of the opium trade had become as problematic as opium smoking itself in China because the rapid spread of addiction was intimately tied to imperialist aggression and the decline of Qing authority. Accordingly, the Chinese government and nationalistic Chinese elites supported the elimination of opium imports from abroad and the eradication of domestic poppy cultivation and opium smoking at home. The early anti-opium crusaders, including the famous Commissioner Lin, recognized and deplored the corruption of the Chinese bureaucracy and the greed of Chinese merchants that enabled the illegal opium trade to flourish (Polachek, 1992: 142-44).

After the Opium Wars, however, this stream of Chinese rhetoric fed into and was overwhelmed by a swelling chorus of international condemnation of the Sino-Indian opium trade and its socioeconomic consequences. The loudest voices now belonged to outraged Chinese elite activists and Western missionaries (mostly from the United States and Great Britain). These groups sought to end the opium trade by calling attention to British greed and to the physical and moral decay that accompanied opium addiction. Acknowledgment of widespread Chinese complicity in the opium trade or of popular objections to opium reform would have seriously undermined the righteous fervor of those involved in the suppression movement, as it would have shifted the blame away from Great Britain. Until recently, similar concerns about undermining the fundamental dichotomy between the righteous masses and the exploitative elite/official alliance that justified the Communist revolution generated similar biases in sources available from the Chinese mainland.

In reality, anti-opium sentiment was common among the urban elite population before, during, and after the official anti-opium campaign. However, it remains difficult to say to what degree that outlook extended to the lower classes. It is true that throughout the century, stretching from the beginning of the illicit opium trade in Fujian in the 1820s to the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1927, some ordinary Chinese had expressed their hostility to opium and the opium trade in a variety of ways. Evidence of anti-opium sentiment among the masses of Fujian was manifested in occasional efforts to rid their

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villages of opium addiction, in the recollection of anti-opium folk songs decades after their composition, in the impressive size of audiences for urban anti-opium rallies, and in the popularity of heterodox sects that prohibited opium smoking. However, this cannot be taken as a groundswell of popular support for opium reform, given the depth and resilience of the provincial opium economy and documented incidents of resistance to the suppression campaign.

Thus, while many Fujianese were decrying the damage wrought by opium, many of their compatriots were deeply involved in sustaining the opium trade. The opium suppression campaign did make considerable progress in a remarkably brief time, but the crusade was never completely successful, and the rapid resurgence of the opium economy in the warlord years could only have been possible in the absence of broad-based or well-organized popular support for opium reform. Although violent resistance to even the most coercive suppression measures was minimal in Fujian, it did occur—and small-scale or passive resistance was endemic in the poppy-growing regions of the province. In fact, the difficulties of enforcing opium restrictions, as well as the ease with which Fujian's opium economy reappeared during the revolutionary transition and after the death of Yuan Shikai, point to the likelihood that the lower classes for the most part complied with the restrictions when enforcement was strict and resumed cultivating, selling, and smoking opium when it was not.

In other words, the thoroughness of enforcement was directly tied to the popularity of state-mandated reforms and the strength of the Chinese state at the national, provincial, and local levels. Although the crucial and very visible role of the state in establishing and sanctioning Fujian's opium suppression campaign inspired nationalistic feelings among some Chinese, it also generated considerable ill will among those targeted by government taxes and regulatory mechanisms. Just as popular hostility to opium and the opium trade was part of a larger anti-state, anti-imperialist sentiment that fueled Chinese nationalism in the early twentieth century, resistance to opium suppression was encompassed within a broader opposition (especially in China's rural areas) to the intrusive, extractive nature of the New Policy reforms.

Understanding the nature of China's relationship with opium is not an easy task, given the historiographical impediments to research, as

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well as the changing perceptions of addiction. The often passionate anti-opium rhetoric that has dominated much of the history of the drug in China obscures a Chinese population torn between lofty nationalism and financial gain. Although the opium trade undeniably began in earnest with British smuggling of the drug, the trade could not have grown without Chinese distributors and consumers. Likewise, the anti-opium campaign could not have achieved what most observers felt was considerable success without the support of much of the elite population. To reexamine China's well-documented relationship with opium, we must remove it from the moralistic and political rhetoric that has overly simplified the complex socioeconomic dynamics of its trade and use and obscured the fundamental ambivalence of the Chinese people toward this much-maligned drug. At the same time, the very act of exploring the links between opium and state building, nationalism, and modernization requires the construction of an interpretive framework that can contain the many facets of China's opium economy.

NOTES

1. The term *opium economy* should not be understood to imply that opium was the dominant commodity in the late Qing economy. It instead signifies the extent to which this single good generated an extensive and entrenched network of individuals who imported, conveyed, distributed, prepared, sold, taxed, or used it.

2. The implementation of the Additional Article of the Chefoo Convention, signed on 18 July 1885, caused a decisive shift in the pattern of foreign opium importation into Fujian and effectively channeled more opium-related revenue into central government coffers. The article established a fixed, onetime charge of 110 taels per picul of imported opium—80 taels for transit tax and 30 to cover the export duty—both of which were to be collected by the Imperial Maritime Customs. This measure was designed to eliminate excessive or arbitrary taxes, thereby enabling the foreign drug to remain competitive with the cheaper domestic opium (Morse and MacNair, 1931: 366-67).

3. The Fujian farmers' embrace of opium production can be interpreted in several ways. As the text implies, the removal of laws against cultivation probably inspired previously law-abiding or timid farmers to invest in this cash crop. At the same time, it is also possible that the quantity of domestic poppy cultivation convinced the Chinese state that only legalizing the trade offered the hope of controlling it. And finally, as many cynics in Britain speculated, the profits being generated by the opium trade may ultimately have proved too tempting to a financially strapped Qing treasury.

4. In 1904, for example, estimates of Fujian's total production of opium ranged from 4,000 to just over 9,000 piculs, while the province of Sichuan was said to have produced 200,000 piculs (Adshead, 1984: 51; Li Wenzhi, 1957: 461-62).

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5. If the imposition of official taxes was truly intended to discourage domestic cultivation in Fujian, then the measure must be considered a dismal failure. On the other hand, if those policies are interpreted as an attempt to undermine the smuggling trade by establishing government control or to raise revenue while maintaining the appearance of propriety, then the assessment must be quite different. Rivalries for opium revenues among Chinese authorities at the local, provincial, and central government levels began when the transit tax was instituted in the mid-nineteenth century, but by 1906, the central state had taken important steps to assert its control. Aside from the obvious financial benefits for Beijing of opium taxation, it can also be argued that the move toward centralization was indeed a logical step toward state control and eventual suppression of the domestic trade. In addition, the channeling of opium revenues away from provincial coffers may have inclined provincial officials to accept a nationwide scheme to do away with the trade altogether.

6. The agreement with Britain did exempt the major opium transit center of Shanghai from the ban against importation until all other provinces had been declared free of domestic poppy cultivation, a decision that ultimately saddled the Chinese government with enormous stocks of the foreign drug in 1918.

7. Historians on Taiwan appear far more willing to delve into the opium trade with impartiality. Important works have been contributed by Chen Yongfa, Lin Manhoung, and Zhang Yufa, among others. Chen Yongfa (1990) asserts that the Communist Party raised much-needed revenue through clandestine involvement in opium trafficking, despite Chinese Communist Party rhetoric to the contrary. Lin Manhoung (1979, 1985) looks at the Chinese production and distribution of opium, as well as the lucrative taxation of the drug. Zhang (1987) states quite strongly that opium suppression was a top-down initiative that was not prompted by grassroots activism.

8. To be fair, not until the 1990s did Western academics take a closer look at opium outside the standard framework of diplomatic relations. A recent conference, titled "Opium in Chinese History" (held in Toronto, May 1997), attracted dozens of scholars, several of whom explored the suppression campaign; others highlighted the complicity of Chinese merchants and officials in establishing, expanding, and sustaining the global narcotics network. Many of those essays appear in Brook and Wakabayashi (2000b). The work of Frederic Wakeman, Jr. also is an exception to this rule, and his now-classic work *Strangers at the Gate* (1966) explores the social consequences of the Opium War on the people of Guangdong.

9. This generalization excludes the work of historian Lin Renchuan of Xiamen University, who does not hesitate to condemn corrupt Chinese officials, opium dealers, and smugglers who facilitated the trade, along with the despotic clans that strong-armed and cowed the local populations. However, Professor Lin's well-researched and evenhanded article on opium in Fujian did not appear in print until 1985.

10. These collections of historical and literary materials, published periodically from the 1960s on, are the responsibility of *wenshi ziliao* committees in each county in China. They are designed to educate modern Chinese about the past by using oral histories and otherwise obscure materials housed in local historical archives (some of which are closed to foreign researchers). Using a number of indexes, I have located the vast majority of wenshi ziliao articles on opium in Fujian: although they constitute an invaluable means of accessing popular sentiment, they also present problems for researchers today. Many do not contain footnotes, and most are careful to include some kind of moralistic condemnation of the drug and the pre-1949 regimes under which China suffered from its most serious opium problems. For more on this valuable but problematic source, see Cochran (1996).

11. I did locate several opium pipes and other smoking paraphernalia dating from the late Qing that were inscribed with poems rhapsodizing on the unearthly delights of opium smoking. The geographical origins of the equipment are unknown. Many thanks to Deborah Hull-Wolski,

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collections manager for the Department of Anthropology Collections at the Museum Support Center of the Smithsonian Institution in Suitland, Maryland, for permitting me to examine these and other artifacts and to R. LaVerne Madancy for arranging my visit there on 21 August 2000.

12. See Brook and Wakabayashi (2000b) for essays by more than a dozen of these individuals, many of whom have since published books on their opium-related research. The bibliography of the Brook and Wakabayashi volume contains most of the new research in this exciting subfield.

13. My discussion of this poem by the Chrysanthemum Daoist derives from Zhou Ruiguang (1984). Because the numerous allusions and slang make an elegant translation extremely difficult to produce, I do not include the verses themselves in my discussion.

14. Yama was the king of hell in Chinese cosmology.

15. See Wang Shiqing (n.d.). Evidently, the Taiwanese incarnation of this society launched a well-organized and very popular anti-opium movement at the turn of the twentieth century, but the anti-Japanese undercurrent drew a crackdown by the Japanese occupation authorities. Many thanks to Professor Philip Clart of the University of Missouri–Columbia for making Wang's article available to me.

16. For more on the Taipings in Fujian, see Ma Guanwu (1981), Cai Rujin (1983), and the standard references by Franz Michael (1966-1971) and Vincent Y. C. Shih (1972). Some discussion of the Taipings also appears in various mission sources.

17. Missionary publications are full of anecdotes to support this statement about Chinese converts. See also Latourette (1929: 480-85) and Gewurtz (1985: 21-24).

18. For an excellent discussion of Christian involvement in the opium campaign and many other nationalistic movements in the early twentieth century, see Dunch (2001).

19. The songs (and the *Quarterly* contained many more than are quoted here) have a decidedly formulaic quality; their marked similarity in meter and phrasing implies commonalties in the background of the composers. Many were probably Chinese Christians educated by missionaries or were Chinese reformers who worked closely with missionaries in the opium suppression campaign.

20. For example, as early as February 1915, a group of Chinese Christians in Ningde county, Funing prefecture, submitted a petition complaining that a new district magistrate by the name of Zhu Ding had presided over a loosening of opium restrictions. They enclosed a poppy leaf to add emotional weight to their complaint. Chinese and English versions of the petition are included in PRO/FO 228/2461.

21. Many thanks to Steve Averill for bringing this source to my attention.

22. In the poem, the author actually refers not to family but to the six relations (*liuqin*)—mother, father, elder brothers, younger brothers, wife, and children.

23. Here I must ask for the reader's indulgence. In the original song, the last line of each couplet maintains the same rhyme throughout the song, but since English has far fewer rhymes than Chinese and I have a far more limited an imagination than the poem's author, I was forced to shift halfway through.

24. Both authors cite the same source, *Rongma fengtao ji* ("The Stormy Life of a Warhorse" collection), but a search for that volume in libraries and archives in Fuzhou proved fruitless.

25. Many of the New Policy reforms required some form of census taking, a process that engendered tremendous anxiety among the local population, who feared that this information would be used against them by foreigners or the Chinese state. For a number of examples of this anxiety, see Prazniak (1999).

26. For a more in-depth discussion of this compelling incident, see Madancy (1995).

27. Lucien Bianco (1991: 21-38) has shown that protests against levies on land, salt, and opium were among the most common forms of peasant resistance during the early Republic.

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Esherick (1976: esp. 250-52) also discusses briefly anti-Republican sentiment in the countryside of Hunan and Hubei. Ted Gurr (1970) discusses the revolutionary ramifications of relative deprivation.

28. For a similar occurrence in nearby Guangdong province, see Hsieh (1972).

29. As noted earlier, Esherick (1976: 250-52) explicitly acknowledges the rapidity of popular disillusionment with the Revolution in the countryside.

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Joyce Madancy is an associate professor of history at Union College in Schenectady, New York, where she offers courses on China, Japan, and Korea. Her current project, tentatively titled "The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin: The Opium Trade and Opium Suppression in Fujian Province, 1820s-1920s," is being revised for publication by Harvard East Asia Publications.

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