DEFINING CHINESE WARLORDS AND THEIR FACTIONS

By Jerome Ch'en

'The warlords of twentieth-century China have received little scholarly attention.'[1] This omission is due, apart from the reasons given in Mr. Sheridan's 'Preface', to the historical significance of the men and their period not being fully appreciated. What sort of men were they? How did they rise to such great power? What effect did their abuse of power have on Chinese society? Why did the May Fourth Movement, the Washington Conference, the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, the reorganization of the Kuomintang, and the May 30th Movement use the misrule of the warlords as their back-drop? How far did the warlords undo the work of the restoration in the 1860's and 1870's? These are but a few pertinent questions. In a period of merely 16 years (1912–28), over 1,300 warlords had fought more than 140 provincial and inter-provincial wars. Such a period is bound to be complicated but should not daunt the curiosity of the historian.

Lately there has been encouraging news from the United States (but not yet from anywhere else) of various projects on Chinese warlords. It is hoped that they will eventually take this subject from the state of 'gossip columns' to that of proper history. Mr. Sheridan is one of the pioneers and his book on the life and career of Feng Yü-hsiang is the first such study to come off the press. It is an excellent book which deserves the full attention of the world of learning.

As the book is about a warlord (not about a *man*), it is natural to ask what Mr. Sheridan means by the term 'warlord'. On p. 1 he says: 'A warlord exercised effective governmental control over a fairly well-defined region by means of a military organization that obeyed no higher authority than himself'. This personal character of warlord armies, according to Mr. Sheridan, 'derived primarily from the late Ch'ing trends in that direction; the Peiyang Army was the outstanding example . . .' (p. 16) which became a personal army '. . . in the sense that it had no commitment to suprapersonal principles and goals' (p. 8).

If by 'suprapersonal principles' Mr. Sheridan means loyalty either to an emperor or to the nation, his definition is eminently acceptable; if by them he means, say, legitimate regional interests, then his definition does not say much. It seems that to arrive at a proper definition of the warlord it is necessary to trace the factors contributory to the growth of warlordism. In this endeavour we are helped by the views of several scholars before Mr. Sheridan. Let us give a few examples. Professor J. K. Fairbank writes in his *United States and China* (p. 164) on the causes and geographic bases of Chinese warlordism:

'It was based on the fact that coolie armies are easy to conscript and that Chinese provinces in many cases have natural geographic boundaries and

[1] James E. Sheridan: *Chinese warlord: the career of Feng Yü-hsiang.* xiii, 386 pp., 4 plates. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966. $10. (Distributed in G.B. by Oxford University Press. 80*s*.)

> can easily be made into military satrapies relatively independent of outside authority. . . . Other warlord areas were centered about key economic regions such as the Canton delta, the Chengtu plain in Szechwan, and the lower Yangtze valley around Shanghai and Nanking '.

Fairbank's first reason—' coolie armies are easy to conscript '—agrees with that put forward by T'ao Hsi-sheng 陶希聖, which traces the origin of both bandits and armies to the unemployed, surplus population of China. T'ao says :

> ' The unemployed people . . . were the cause of the emergence of militarism and warlords' satrapies '.[2]

Fairbank's second reason explains the geographic bases of the warlords' partitioning of China. Both reasons, however, fail to consider why warlordism rose after 1911. Overpopulation had existed long before that date and yet there was no warlordism even during the period of the decay of the Manchu monarchy. Tseng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t'ang, and Li Hung-chang were not warlords, despite their precipitating the growth of regionalism.

Like Fairbank, Wang Tso-shih 王造時 attaches great importance to the feeling of local affinity (*ti-fang kuan-nien* 地方觀念) as one of the contributory factors to the rise of warlordism. He writes :

> ' Most of the warlords and politicians understand this feeling and make no qualm in exploiting it in order to consolidate their power and influence. The ordinary people, deeply affected by it, are prepared to flatter and follow them and become their tools '.[3]

This feeling, in Wang's view, was responsible for the formation of warlords' factions such as the Chihli, Anhwei, and Fengtien cliques as well as the advocacy of the federation of autonomous provinces (*lien-sheng tzu-chih* 聯省自治).

Wang goes further to look for dynamic, historical reasons for the emergence of warlordism. He assumes that before the 1911 revolution China was a stationary, stagnant society organized round the Manchu monarch. After the 1911 revolution ' the monarch was overthrown, hence the loss of the centre of political life [in China]. The loss has not been made good by [the formation of] a new, democratic force and consequently for the past two decades there has been the strange phenomenon of warlords feuding in a nominally republican country '.[4] These warlords, according to Wang, were influenced by modern ideas but not inhibited by the old moral scruples, hence were able to develop from their defiance against the central government to the partitioning of China.[5]

Wang touches the heart of the matter by pointing out that China lost the centre of her political life in 1911 while unable to replace the loss with a new, democratic force. This surely is also what Sheridan means by ' suprapersonal

[2] *Chung-kuo she-hui yü Chung-kuo ke-ming* 中國社會與中國革命 ' Chinese society and Chinese revolution ', Shanghai, 1929, 86.

[3] *Chung-kuo wen-t'i ti fen-hsi* 中國問題的分析 ' An analysis of China's problems ', Shanghai, 1935, 49.

[4] ibid., 161.

[5] ibid., 167.

principles '. The passing of the Manchus resulted in the evisceration of the concept of ' loyalty to the throne ' (*chung-chün* 忠君). The hollow should have been filled, not by Wang's ' new, democratic force ', but by ' patriotism to the nation ', a concept beyond the comprehension of most warlords, particularly those in the north. Patriotism in this sense was a new idea introduced after the 1894–5 Sino-Japanese war, to take root in the minds of both the Reformers of 1898 and the revolutionaries in the 1900's. However, it either failed to penetrate into or merely superficially affected the minds of those less cultured soldiers. Since most of them were either illiterate or semi-literate, it is wrong to say, as Wang does, that the warlords ' have been influenced by modern ideas '. This general statement of his certainly does not apply to the northern warlords and applies only to a limited extent to their southern counterparts.

Liang Shu-ming 梁漱溟, too, looks for a historical reason, regarding warlordism as a product in the transitional period between the destruction of the old social order and the establishment of the new. Seeing no fundamental difference between bandit leaders and warlords, Liang asserts that the warlords ' do not depend upon a social order for their existence in the same way as aristocrats upon the feudal order and capitalists upon the capitalist order. On the contrary, their very existence makes any social order unworkable or unstable. The Provisional Constitution [of 1912] was destroyed by them ; so were the constitutions of the political parties. They were above law and institutions and could even unbashfully admit that they were irrational and harmful without this having the slightest effect on their existence '.[6]

Since the warlords did not depend upon any social order for their existence, they were not, in Liang's view, a legacy of the past. Instead, they were a new force, arising after the revolutions of 1911 and 1926. This observation enables Liang to come to the conclusion that it was revolution which created warlords.[7] It is not known whether he has modified his view on this since the 1949 revolution, but in order to understand and comment on it we must take a close look at the origin of China's modern army (*hsin-chien lu-chün* 新建陸軍) and some relevant aspects of the 1911 revolution.

The only division of the modern army organized and trained after the Shimonoseki Treaty and fortunate enough to have survived the Boxer war of 1900 was the *Wu-wei Yu-chün* 武衛右軍, the ' Right Division of the Guard Army ', under Yüan Shih-k'ai. In table I we shall find a list of Yüan's important lieutenants at Hsiaochan. Without a single exception, these officers fought for the Manchu throne in 1911 ; with only very few exceptions, they became great warlords afterwards. Thus Sheridan observes on p. 17 : ' it was this force that provided the nuclei for many of the leading warlord armies '. The fact that they existed as important military officers before 1911 suggests that the

[6] The warlords, Liang says, ' differ from bandits only in military strength, not in nature. Big bandit leaders are " promoted " to the rank of warlords while defeated warlords become bandit leaders ' : *Hsiang-ts'un chien-she li-lun* 鄉村建設理論 ' Theory of rural reconstruction ', Tsoup'ing, 1937, 100–1. Compare this with Sheridan, 19.

[7] ibid., 361.

foundation of warlordism was laid as early as in 1896 and tends to invalidate Liang's observation. Their loyalty to the throne may have come from their moral upbringing or, more likely, from Yüan's support of the Manchus at the critical stage of the revolutionary struggle. Their change from imperial officers to warlords was brought about by the removal of imperial rule and was made even more obvious after the wars of 1913 and 1916. Since these northern warlords were opposed to revolution in 1911, 1913, and 1916, it is difficult to accept Wang Tsao-shih's view that they were influenced by modern ideas; their opposition to revolution and their existence before 1911 make it hard for us to agree with Liang Shu-ming's that they were created by the revolution of 1911. The revolution did not *create* them; it merely *facilitated their birth.* They would have become military leaders anyhow; the revolution simply helped to transform them into warlords.

But the northern officers were not the only commanders of the modern army, as table II shows. An examination of the table will reveal that at the time of the 1911 revolution all the Japanese-trained commanders north of the Yangtze except Wu Hsiang-chen (12th B) and Chang Shu-yüan (10th B) were relieved of command (e.g. Chang Shao-tseng and Chia Pin-ch'ing), defeated (e.g. Lan T'ien-wei), or assassinated (e.g. Wu Lu-chen), whereas most of those south of the Yangtze declared their support of the revolution. The background of these officers will be described later. At this juncture, it suffices to know that they were agitators for and harbingers of the revolution. They helped to bring about the revolution; they were not created by it. This is an important difference between the northern and southern warlords.

The southern military leaders were not, however, the only forces which brought about the revolution. There were also the intellectuals of the China Revival Society (*Hsing Chung Hui* 興中會), and later, of the Alliance Society (*T'ung-meng Hui* 同盟會) such as Sun Yat-sen, Chang Ping-lin 章炳麟, Wang Ching-wei, and Hu Han-min; the gentry leaders such as T'an Yen-k'ai of Hunan, Jen K'o-ch'eng 任可澄 of Kweichow, Ch'eng Te-ch'üan of Kiangsu, and P'u Tien-chün 蒲殿俊 of Szechwan; and the secret societies such as those in Hunan, Shensi, Shanghai, and Kwangsi. All these forces provided leadership for the revolution, but it was only the modern troops in the south and the secret societies which gave it a popular basis. The provinces after the revolution therefore fell into the following categories: (i) those where the army was strong but revolutionary societies (particularly the secret societies) were weak—all the provinces north of the Yangtze except for Shansi and Shensi, and Fukien and Hupei; (ii) those where the army was comparatively weak but revolutionary societies were strong—Hunan, Kweichow, Kwangtung, Shansi, Shensi, and Szechwan; (iii) those where there was a balance of power between the contending forces—Kiangsu and Shantung; (iv) those where the army and the societies were both weak—Anhwei and Kiangsi. In the provinces in the first category, authority fell into the hands of the army leader or of someone who could command the respect of the army; in the second category,

it fell into the hands either of a military leader of another province (as in the case of T'ang Chi-yao's invasion of Kweichow) or of a revolutionary leader (such as Chiao Ta-feng 焦達峯 of Hunan, Hu Han-min of Kwangtung, Chang Feng-hui of Shensi, and Yin Ch'ang-heng of Szechwan); in the third category, the situation was fluid; in the fourth category, the overall authority fell into the hands of the leader of an external force (as in the case of Po Wen-wei of Anhwei and Li Lieh-chün of Kiangsi).

The point to be considered here is the balance of power between the army units and the revolutionary societies in the provinces. Although these two forces were not necessarily antagonistic, the control of one over the other could mean either the subjugation of the military to the civilian power or vice versa. The emergence of warlordism in an individual province therefore depended on this balance of power also. Where there was civilian supremacy, however temporary, there was no warlordism. Examples of this were Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Hunan.[8] Nevertheless, the overall picture of the country immediately after the revolution was a preponderance of the military over the civilian, and this preponderance was accentuated by the defeat of the revolutionary forces in the 1913 war.

Leaving aside the factors contributory to the development of warlordism in later years, the historical reasons for the emergence of military governments in China after the revolution were as follows.

(1) The overthrow of the monarchy removed the only understandable concept of loyalty in the eyes of soldiers who were not ready to replace the monarchy either with the concept of the nation-state or with the cause of the revolution. Hence the cohesion of the country was lost and separatism set in.[9]

(2) The revolution created power vacuums both in Peking and in the provinces which in many cases were filled by the existing power of the military. Only where there was a temporary supremacy of the revolutionary societies, was there an absence of warlordism.

(3) The inability of the revolutionaries to fill these vacuums was due to their own weakness which, in turn, could be attributed to two major factors—their reliance on the military for bringing the revolution to a successful conclusion and for organizing regional political apparatus, and the deficiency of revolutionary indoctrination (over-emphasis of the anti-Manchu racialistic programme and neglect of the democratic, economic, and social programmes).

In addition, there were also self-explanatory reasons: the existence of the modern army whose leaders, either in favour of or against the revolution, became warlords; the existence of unemployed people in their millions who could easily be recruited into local armies; and the feeling of local affinity which was exploited by military commanders in their attempts to create local military units.

[8] The modern brigade of Anhwei, for instance, was demobilized. See *Hsin-hai ke-ming* 辛亥革命 'The 1911 revolution', Peking, 1956, VII, 170.

[9] Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Yin-ping-shih ho-chi* 飲冰室合集 'Complete works of the *Yin-ping-shih*', Shanghai, 1926, 'Essays', *chüan* 30, 17. Liang discusses there the rulers of the 'tribes' in China.

These long- and short-term factors, operating together, made possible the emergence of warlordism in China after the 1911 revolution. The irony here is that both the incipient warlordism and nationalism of China began at the same time—after 1895. The former was initially an official creation (the Newly Created Army) which became the official successor to the disintegrated empire; the latter was a growing socio-political movement which always tried to harness the former but seldom succeeded.

Now we must ask what was Chinese warlordism and what kind of man was a warlord. As a working definition, Sheridan's is perfectly acceptable as far as it goes. But it does not distinguish a Chinese warlord of the twentieth century from a medieval baron of China, Japan, or Europe. Whereas medieval barons anywhere existed before the advent of nationalism, Chinese warlordism was born a twin of Chinese nationalism whose life story was complicated by the coexistence of modern ideological currents in post-revolution China. Therefore for an adequate definition of the modern warlordism of China, we must also analyse the warlords' mentality. Only when the latter is made clear can the former be properly given.

To begin with, let us consider the familial and educational background of the warlords. Of the 1,300 officers of the ranks of brigadier and above who flourished in the period 1912–28 and whose biographical sketches are available, 117 (including a few who were not warlords, see table III) were trained in Japan, 29 at the Military School in Tientsin, 61 at the Paoting Military Academy, and 22 were traditional degree holders. Altogether they made a total of about 229 (duplicates eliminated). In addition, there were also trainees and graduates of provincial military schools. The grand total should thus be between 370 and 400. In other words, the number of 'educated' warlords is unlikely to have exceeded 30 per cent of the total and the rest were mostly illiterate or semi-literate people from extremely modest origins.[10] Sheridan has given us some information about a few leading warlords on p. 19. Here we may also add the following. Chang Hsün began his career as a page-boy, Chang Piao as a body-guard of Chang Chih-tung, Chang Tsung-ch'ang as a bandit and later a doorman in Vladivostok, Chiang Kuei-t'i as a private soldier who never learnt to read and write, Hung Chao-lin as a pedlar and a 'contact man' for Kwangtung bandits, and Ts'ao K'un as a hawker.[11] As shown in table III, 23 warlords had definitely been bandit leaders before they became legitimate soldiers. Their general lack of education forced them to rely on their secretaries such as Li Yüan-hung's dependence on Jao Han-hsiang 饒漢祥 and Wu P'ei-fu's on Chang Ch'i-huang

[10] cf. *Hsin-hai shou-yi hui-yi-lu* 辛亥首義回憶錄 'Reminiscences of the 1911 uprisings', Hupei, 1957, I, 68.

[11] T'ao Chü-yin 陶菊隱, *Pei-yang chün-fa t'ung-chih shih-ch'i shih-hua* 北洋軍閥統治時期史話 (a popular history of the period under the rule of the northern warlords), Peking, 1957, I, 27 and 92; Chang Hsi-man 張西曼, *Li-shih hui-yi* 歷史回憶 'Historical reminiscences', Shanghai, 1949, 17; *Ke-ming wen-hsien* 革命文獻 'Revolutionary documents', V, 35; and Wu T'ieh-ch'eng 吳鐵城, *Hui-yi-lu* 回憶錄 'Memoirs', Taipei, 1957, 24b.

張其鍠. Although it is not possible to trace all the people in warlords' secretariats, it is safe to say, on the basis of the warlords' public statements, that these secretaries were traditional scholars [12] either indifferent or antagonistic to modern ideas and modern thought. Under the Confucian system, these members of an articulate élite were the civilian administrators who controlled the military; but now the roles were reversed. This was the class reversal after 1912.

The warlords were mostly superstitious people under whose patronage societies such as the *Ling-hsüeh Hui* 靈學會 and *T'ung-shan She* 同善社 flourished in Shanghai and Peking.[13] The golden age of these societies seems to have been 1918. In that year a road was planned in Peking to carry outgoing traffic from the city. But construction was stopped for geomantic reasons when the road reached the city wall. In the same year the date for the presidential election was decided by a fortune-teller; so was the date for starting work on a pagoda in Anch'ing. Chang Ching-yao, the governor of Hunan, had temples for worshipping the goddess of the Ninth Heaven built wherever he had fought and he ordered his soldiers to have the character *te* 得 and another, *sheng* 勝, written in the palms of their hands before they engaged their enemies. Ma Lien-chia 馬聯甲, the garrison commander of south Anhwei, invited Chang T'ien-shih 張天師, the chief priest of a Taoist sect, with his retinue and paraphernalia to exorcise the evil spirit believed to be the cause of his niece's madness.[14] Wu P'ei-fu, the strong man of the Chihli clique, decided to postpone his entry into Peking from 27 to 28 June 1926 because his fortune-teller considered the 27th inauspicious.[15] The same fortune-teller had earlier advised T'an Yen-k'ai, the governor of Hunan, on many occasions.[16] When Huang Shao-hsiung ordered his troops to destroy temples, he found them begging the gods' forgiveness before carrying out their orders.[17]

Superstitious people, as Tai Chi-t'ao 戴季陶 pointed out,[18] were not only hostile to science and new ideas, but also stout defenders of the Confucian tradition. In the case of the warlords this is not at all surprising, for they learnt both Confucian doctrines and superstitious beliefs in the same way as the Boxers and other members of secret societies, not from the classics and sūtras but from popular novels, operas, story-telling, and so on. Yüan Shih-k'ai's decree of 20 September 1912 instructed the people to practise the Confucian ethical canon, saying that the eight traditional virtues were the rules

[12] It is interesting to compare Wu P'ei-fu's writings before and after the death of Chang Ch'i-huang in 1927. There was a marked difference in style. See *Wu P'ei-fu hsien-sheng chi* 吳佩孚先生集 'Collected works of Wu P'ei-fu', Taipei, 1960, 251 and part I.

[13] *Lu Hsün ch'üan-chi* 魯迅全集 'Complete works of Lu Hsün', I, 389 and 413; *Tu-hsiu wen-ts'un* 獨秀文存 'Collected essays of [Ch'en] Tu-hsiu', II, 355, and IV, 289.

[14] *Tu-hsiu wen-ts'un*, II, 356–7.

[15] *Lu Hsün ch'üan-chi*, III, 301–2.

[16] *Wu P'ei-fu hsien-sheng chi*, 500–1.

[17] *Wu-shih hui-yi* 五十回憶 'Reminiscences at fifty', Shanghai, 1945, I, 135–6.

[18] Ch'en T'ien-hsi, 陳天錫 (comp.), *Tai Chi-t'ao hsien-sheng pien-nien chuan-chi* 戴季陶先生編年傳記 'A chronological biography of Tai Chi-t'ao', Taipei, 1958, 37.

of human relations instead of those of a despotic monarch.[19] His successors ruled China during even more troubled times and yet found opportunities to exhort the people on the same theme.[20] This clearly shows that from the establishment of the Peking government in 1912 until its fall in 1928 the warlords in control of it had remained consistently Confucian and tried to rule a country which had removed its Confucian institutions by applying Confucian political principles.

This strong persistence of traditional Confucian ideas was not confined to the Peking government. It also had its advocates in the provinces. In 1916 Chang Kuang-chien 張廣建, the governor of Kansu, suggested the establishment of Confucianism as the religion of the state; in the year following Yang Shan-te of Chekiang, Chang Hsün of Anhwei, and Ch'en Ping-k'un 陳炳焜 of Kwangsi, supported by Lu Yung-hsiang of Shanghai, demanded that an article be added to the Constitution to make Confucianism the religion of the state. Yang Tseng-hsin, the governor of Sinkiang, published his *Pu-kuo-chai jih-chi* 補過齋日記 'Daily jottings of Pu-kuo-chai', which consisted of nothing but epigrams of Confucius and his disciples, in Peking in 1921. Even the notorious Chang Tsung-ch'ang brought out an edition of the 'Thirteen classics' (*Shih-san ching*) and as recently as 1930 Ch'en Chi-t'ang of Kwangtung was still encouraging the teaching of Confucian classics in schools and the worship of the master in temples.[21]

The most loquacious in paying homage to Confucius was Wu P'ei-fu who, writing in his *Hsün-fen hsin-shu* 循分新書 'A new treatise on keeping to one's social status', 1929, aspired to reach sainthood by following the teachings of Confucius. In his view, the republic marked the decline of social morals and the only way to remedy this was to revert to Confucianism.[22] He was opposed to learning from other countries on two grounds. First, 'since China

[19] *Yüan ta-tsung-t'ung shu-tu hui-pien* 袁大總統書牘彙編 'President Yüan's collected letters and official papers', 1914, Taipei, 1962 ed., II, 17–18.

[20] Li Yüan-hung, *Li ta-tsung-t'ung shu-tu hui-pien* 黎大總統書牘彙編 'President Li's collected letters and official papers', Shanghai, 1921, 17–18; the Restoration edict of 1917 in Sun Yao 孫曜, *Chung-hua-min-kuo shih-liao* 中華民國史料 'Historical documents of the Chinese Republic', Shanghai, 1929, IV, 7; President Hsü Shih-ch'ang's 徐世昌 worship of Confucius in *Hu Shih wen-ts'un* 胡適文存 'Collected essays of Hu Shih', I, 226; Tuan Ch'i-jui's essay on domestic affairs, the *Nei-kan p'ien* 內感篇, in the *Cheng-fu Kung-pao* 政府公報 'Government Gazettes', 18 September 1925, or in *Ho-fei chih-cheng nien-p'u* 合肥執政年譜 'A chronology of Tuan Ch'i-jui's administrations', 1938, Taipei, 1962 ed., II, 18a–19a; and Chang Tso-lin's decree on the observation of social usages on 22 September 1927 in the *Cheng-fu Kung-pao* of the same date.

Hsü Shih-ch'ang also founded a middle school in Peking, *Ssu-ts'un chung-hsüeh* 四存中學, with overwhelming emphasis on classical training. See *Wu-ssu yi-lai han-yü shu-mien yü-yen ti pien-ch'ien ho fa-chan* 五四以來漢語書面語言的變遷和發展 'The changes and development of written Chinese since the May Fourth', Peking, 1959, 65.

[21] *Lu Hsün ch'uan-chi*, VI, 252; *Ch'en Chi-t'ang hsien-sheng chi-nien chi* 陳濟棠先生紀念集 'In memory of Ch'en Chi-t'ang', 3, 41, 43; *Cheng-fu Kung-pao*, 5 and 9 December 1916 and 15, 16, 23 February 1917. See also Li Chin-hsi 黎錦熙, *Kuo-yü yün-tung shih-kang* 國語運動史綱 'An outline history of the *kuo-yü* movement', Shanghai, 1935, 155–6.

[22] *Wu P'ei-fu hsien-sheng chi*, 3 and 153.

is the biggest and oldest country in the world, it stands to reason that her culture was the forerunner of world culture', and since world culture originally came from China, there seemed to be no reason for her to learn from others. Second, it was said that China needed to learn natural sciences and technology from other countries. Even these, according to Wu, had a root in her ancient culture and were highly developed by, for example, Kung-shu Pan 公輸般 who invented a 'prototype aeroplane' in the Warring States period and by Chu-ke Liang 諸葛亮 who invented a 'prototype automobile' in the Three Kingdoms period.[23] Because Sun Yat-sen urged the Chinese to learn from the West, Wu despised him.

What is specially interesting in Wu's writing is the lack of any concept of loyalty to the Chinese nation. He understood the meaning of being loyal to the throne and, in his view, to say that 'in the republican period we should not talk about being loyal to the emperor because we no longer have one' was 'to be pedantic'. '"Emperor" means "*shun*" (順 'to follow or obey') and "*ch'en*" (臣 'vassal, subject') means "*ch'un*" (群 'the masses'). The canon, "*chün wei ch'en kang*" (君爲臣綱) means therefore to "obey the wishes of the masses". This is the only valid interpretation of the "emperor-subject" relationship. Even if we do not talk about emperor and subjects any more, should we not even talk about the superior and his subordinates (*shang* 上 and *hsia* 下)?'[24]

It was precisely because of this kind of loyalty to his superior that Wu rejected the suggestion of the Japanese consul at Tientsin that he should transfer his allegiance from Ts'ao K'un (Wu's superior) to Tuan Ch'i-jui in November 1924 when the Chihli clique had just been defeated by Chang Tso-lin. He argued that since he was Ts'ao's *ch'en* 'subject', he had the duty to preserve his integrity as a *ch'en*.[25] Two and a half years later when Wu went to Szechwan, seeking protection under the wing of Yang Sen 楊森,[26] then the commanding officer of the 20th Army of the Kuomintang, he was in fact putting Yang under the strain of two conflicting loyalties. 'Regarding him as an enemy', Yang recalled years later, 'one should lure and capture him for rich rewards; treating him as a friend, for he and I were colleagues and friends, how can *I* deny him the right to live as a law-abiding citizen under the banners of "the blue sky and white sun?"' The compromise Yang eventually found between friendship and enmity was to welcome Wu as a guest and, at the same time, to report his hospitality to Chiang Kai-shek. '*My* hospitality', Yang said in his report, 'is based entirely on *my* personal relationship with Wu and *I* am prepared to be responsible for his good conduct.'

In both cases it was the particularistic, Confucian loyalty that triumphed; interests of the nation and the cause of the revolution were of only secondary importance.

What made the warlords' defence of Confucianism more remarkable was the

[23] ibid., 144. [24] ibid., 142–3. See also 390. [25] ibid., 407.

[26] Yang's memoirs in the magazine *Ch'un-ch'iu* 春秋雜誌 (Hong Kong), XXVI, 5–6.

strong anti-Confucianism of the progressive intellectuals after 1919. It was a sad commentary ōn Confucianism itself that it had to be defended by warlords and conservative, politically seldom coherent, scholars like Liu Shih-p'ei 劉師培, Chang Shih-chao 章士釗, and Lin Shu 林紓, with the latter attempting to use the influence of the former so as to make their view prevail.[27]

The reasons behind the warlords' defence of Confucianism are an interesting subject for study. Generally speaking, these soldiers were either completely ignorant or ill-informed of modern political thought. They possessed no political or ethical criteria other than their rudimentary Confucianism to judge the wisdom or folly of a policy or an action. Once they considered a policy or action wrong, they invariably attacked it on Confucian grounds. Indeed, these were the grounds on which the belligerents in the wars of 1913, 1916, 1920, 1922, and 1924 and the supporters and opponents of monarchial restorations of 1916 and 1917 argued their cases. Confucian canons were to them the only yardsticks of legitimacy and legitimacy meant respectability. Those who followed them were doing things in a legitimate or respectable way and those who did not were illegal and contemptible. Here lay the difference between a warlord and a bandit leader and also the reason for a bandit leader's anxiety to become a warlord. The distinction drawn by Sheridan on p. 19 is an oversimplification.

But there existed a disparity between the warlords' belief in Confucianism and their actual conduct, which cast a doubt on their sincerity as Confucian defenders. ' They insisted on talking about the " Thirteen classics " and so on, in spite of the fact that they were hardly literate. Therefore they appeared absurd and that their words did not match their behaviour disgusted people '.[28] This remark of Lu Hsün clearly implies that the warlords were insincere, or at least inconsistent. This may well be, but one must not overlook a characteristic of all warlords' public statements—they were always didactic, in the best tradition of the ' Analects ', exhorting others, not themselves, to comply to Confucianism. The letters, telegrams, public notices, and so on of Yüan Shih-k'ai, Li Yüan-hung, Tuan Ch'i-jui, and Wu P'ei-fu bore out this characteristic. A warlord always took the moral ground of his own action for granted while applying Confucian yardsticks only to credit his friends or discredit his foes. This inconsistency, however transparent, was not to them an important matter, for no warlord had ever been consistent in that sense. Had they been so while their opponents were not, they would have been in a more rigid and less manoeuvrable position.

To be charitable to oneself and censorious to others made the warlord appear self-righteous and suspicious of his colleagues. Self-righteousness generates indignation, hence quick temper, and the quick temper of a military leader in the absence of any institutional restraint can cause war. Furthermore, the warlord was often an ambitious man (Sheridan, 286–7), convinced of the

[27] Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, 62–72.

[28] *Lu Hsün ch'uan-chi*, VI, 253.

efficacy of military power for the fulfilment of his personal aims.[29] Ambition, unmitigated by a sense of duty to the nation or to his superior officer, could only enhance the warlord's suspicion and contempt of others. The rivalries between warlords were partly due to this.[30]

Their personal ambition was also made manifest through a love for archaic forms of personal glory. Their titles and addresses show this. The 'viceroy' was called *tsung-tu* 總督 in the Ch'ing dynasty, which was often shortened to *tu*, such as *O-tu* (viceroy of Hupei and Hunan) and *Che-tu* (that of Chekiang and Fukien). In the republican period the title of a provincial military governor had undergone several changes from *tu-tu* 都督 of 1912 to *tu-ch'ün* 督軍 of 1916, *tu-li* 督理 of 1922, and *tu-pan* 督辦 of 1924, but the character *tu* 'to supervise', to which all the glory of the title and office was attached, remained, so that the governors could continue to be called *O-tu*, *Che-tu*, and so on. This applies to the character *shuai* 帥 'Marshal' as well. In the same manner as Chang Chih-tung was called *Hsiang-shuai* 香帥, derived from Chang's courtesy name, Hsiang-t'ao 香濤, and Liu K'un-yi 劉坤一 *Yen-shuai* 硯帥, from his courtesy name Yen-chuang 硯莊, so were Wu P'ei-fu referred to as *Yü-shuai* 玉帥, from his courtesy name Tzu-yü 子玉, and Ch'i-Hsieh-yüan as *Fu-shuai* 撫帥, from his courtesy name, Fu-wan 撫萬. Like Li Hung-chang, Tuan Ch'i-jui was often referred to as Ho-fei 合肥—the place of their birth; so were Yüan Shih-k'ai as Hsiang-ch'eng and Li Yüan-hung as Huang-p'i. The sumptuous mansions, like that of Ch'en Chiung-ming in Haifeng[31] and 'the throne-like chair' of Chang Tso-lin 'with two life-like stuffed tigers beside him'[32] were symbols of status and personal glory.

Suspicious, ambitious, contemptuous, self-righteous, and contentious, the warlords were difficult allies for each other. Therefore the *Manchester Guardian* observed on 25 March 1927: 'To understand the Chinese war it is necessary to remember that an important part of strategy is the weakening of uncomfortable powerful allies'. In fact, one would be hard put to name a single

[29] Chu Chih-hsin 朱執信, '*Ping ti kai-tsao chi ch'i hsin-li*' 兵的改造及其心理 'The reform of the soldier and his psychology', in *Chu Chih-hsin chi* 朱執信集 'Collected essays of Chu Chih-hsin', Shanghai, 1921, II, 363. This is a stimulating study of the psychology of the Chinese soldier, though its views are seldom acceptable.

[30] On Chang Tso-lin's and Wu P'ei-fu's rivalry and tempers, see T'ao Chü-yin, *Pei-yang chün-fa t'ung-chih shih-ch'i shih-hua*, VI, 47, and Chang Hsi-man, *Li-shih hui-yi*, 26 and 81; on Chang Tsung-ch'ang's temper, see Chiang Monlin, *Tides from the West*, New Haven, 1947, 145; on Hsü Ch'ung-chih's jealousy of Chiang Kai-shek, see Tang Leang-li, *Wang Ching-wei, a political biography*, Tientsin, 1931, 106; on T'ang Sheng-chih's rivalry with Chiang Kai-shek, see C. Martin Wilbur and J. L. Y. How, *Documents on Communism, nationalism, and Soviet advisers in China 1918–1927*, New York, 1956, 370, 411, and 415; and on Tuan Ch'i-jui's temper, see Hsü Tao-lin 徐道鄰, *Hsü Shu-cheng hsien-sheng wen-chi nien-p'u ho-k'an* 徐樹錚先生文集年譜合利, Taipei, 1962, 1.

[31] Li Wen-chih 李文治 and others, *Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh-shih tzu-liao* 中國近代農業史資料, Peking, 1957, II, 22, and Feng Ho-fa 馮和法, *Chung-kuo nung-ts'un ching-chi tzu-liao* 中國農村經濟資料 'Source materials on China's agricultural economy', Shanghai, 1933–5, I, 919.

[32] J. Leighton Stuart, *Fifty years in China*, New York, 1954, 110.

alliance between warlords which was concluded purely for common political principles or aims. It is no exaggeration to say that all their alliances were expedient steps taken to further or preserve their common interests, for vain and ambitious warlords were also greedy and short-sighted. With the nature of alliances and allies being such, it is no wonder that none of their alliances lasted. The case of Feng Yü-hsiang is an excellent example. At the end of the Ch'ing dynasty Wang Yü-chiang, an Anhwei man, was given the command of the modern brigade in Shensi and because of him the brigade was officered by many Anhwei men. This Anhwei preponderance led to the appointment of Lu Chien-chang, another Anhwei man, to the governorship after the 1913 war. Lu was a prominent member of the Anhwei clique and his nephew was Feng. In the province there was another powerful warlord, Ch'en Shu-fan, who, having refused Lu's demand for money, drove the governor out of the province in 1916. In that conflict, Tuan Ch'i-jui, the leader of the Anhwei clique and uncle (not elder brother, as stated in Sheridan, 68) of Ch'en, sided with his nephew. Thus, becoming vengeful, Lu advised Feng to seek alliance with the Chihli clique. At the same time Feng was in great difficulty in getting pay and supplies from the Ministry of War whose vice-minister then was Fu Liang-tso, yet another member of the Anhwei clique. In 1918 Lu Chien-chang was arrested on the charge of being in league with some bandits and was 'executed'.[33] This was one of the reasons that led Feng to fight on the side of the Chihli clique in the 1920 war. Feng's alliance with Wu P'ei-fu, by no means an easy one, continued until after the first Chihli-Fengtien war in 1922. In that year, according to Feng, Wu demanded some 800,000 *yüan* from him (Feng was then governor of Honan) and his refusal was one of the causes of his transfer from the gubernatorial to the titular post of the Inspecting Commissioner of the Army. Again, according to Feng, on the eve of the second Chihli-Fengtien war in 1924 his troops were unable to obtain rifles and ammunition before being dispatched to Jehol. Feng stated:

> 'The distance was long and terrain difficult; supply was therefore by no means easy. His [Wu's] intention was to have us destroyed [by the enemy]. Yet [this arrangement] did not satisfy him. He sent Wang Ch'eng-pin to accompany and to keep an eye on me. He also dispatched Hu Ching-yi to follow me, with the instruction that if I turned against him, Hu was to deal with me on the spot'.[34]

Feng's lieutenant, Li Ming-chung, told a similar story:

> 'We were sent to the front without sufficient food, clothing, money, and

[33] Ch'en Ch'un-sheng 陳春生, '*Hsin-hai Shensi kuang-fu-chi*' 辛亥陝西光復記 'The recovery of Shensi in 1911', in *Ke-ming wen-hsien*, v, 127; *Cheng-fu Kung-pao*, 16 June 1918; Feng Yü-hsiang, *Wo-ti-sheng-huo*, II, 35 and 63; Li Chien-nung 李劍農, *Tsui-chin san-shih-nien Chung-kuo cheng-chih-shih* 最近三十年中國政治史 'A history of Chinese politics of the past thirty years', Shanghai, 1930, 366; T'ao Chü-yin, op. cit., I, p. 27, n. 9, and IV, 134; Wo-ch'iu Chung-tzu 沃丘仲子, *Chin-tai ming-jen hsiao-chuan* 近代名人小傳 'Short biographies of the famous people of modern times', Shanghai, 1920, 53–4; and Hsü Tao-lin, op. cit., *passim*.

[34] Feng, *Wo-ti sheng-huo*, II, 199 and 201, and III, 456–7 and 498–9.

> even without sufficient ammunition. In fact, Wu P'ei-fu's purpose might have been to get rid of us. . . . The question for us to decide was whether it was worth-while for us to die for him and the corrupt government. Our Marshal [Feng] called in his high officers and discussed the problem with them. We all decided it was not worth sacrificing our lives, so we came back to Peking '.[35]

Thus the Wu-Feng alliance came to its final breakdown. On this, Sheridan's analysis is most penetrating and his detective work is quite brilliant (pp. 139–40).

Another example of ephemeral alliances is to be found among the remnants of Kuo Sung-ling's troops after December 1925.[36] These troops under the command of Wei Yi-san 魏益三 were fighting on Feng Yü-hsiang's side to begin with. In June 1926 a part of them were led back to Chang Tso-lin by T'ang Chih-t'ao 唐之道, causing the collapse of Feng's defence of Peking, but the rest of them were still with Wei who did not rejoin Chang Tso-lin till May 1927.[37]

Instances like these can be found in almost every alliance in the records of the warlords. Chang Hsün would not have attempted the restoration of 1917 had he not had the support of some of the prominent warlords.[38] In the same year Chang Hsüeh-yen, commander of the 5th B in the 3rd D under Ts'ao K'un, was passed over when Wu P'ei-fu, then commander of the 6th B, was promoted.[39] Thus becoming jealous and disgruntled, he went over to the Anhwei clique, but eventually he returned to the Chihli clique to become Hsiao Yao-nan's chief of staff.[40] It must be remembered that Hsiao was Wu P'ei-fu's subordinate.

Anecdotes of unreliability like these are innumerable. In order to minimize or even to eliminate the element of unreliability, the warlords attempted to

[35] Interview with Marcus Cheng, chaplain-general to Feng's forces, *Manchester Guardian*, 17 June 1925.

[36] Fuse Katsuji 布施勝治, *Shina kokumin kakumei to Hyo Gyoku-sho* 支那國民革命と馮玉祥 ' China's national revolution and Feng Yü-hsiang ', Tokyo, 1929, 122–3 ; Mao Ssu-ch'eng 毛思誠, *Min-kuo shih-wu-nien yi-ch'ien chih Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng* 民國十五年以前之蔣介石先生 ' Chiang Kai-shek before 1926 ', Shanghai, 1936, VIIh, 73a. See also *Asahi Shibum*, *Times*, and *Manchester Guardian*, 27 and 28 December 1925.

[37] *Times*, 4 May 1927, and *Manchester Guardian*, 4 June 1927.

[38] In his telegram of 5 July 1917 Chang accused Ch'en Kuang-yüan, Wang Shih-chen, Ts'ao K'un, and Tuan Ch'i-jui of bad faith and tried to implicate almost everyone of any importance (see *Ke-ming wen-hsien*, VII, 57 and 75). Lu Chien-chang accused Tuan Ch'i-jui of laying a trap for Chang Hsün (see Feng Yü-hsiang, *Wo-ti sheng-huo*, II, 49). It seems likely that Chang's original plan also had the support of Lu Jung-t'ing, since these two were sworn-brothers (see Wo-ch'iu Chung-tzu, op. cit., 144).

Sir R. F. Johnston, in his *Twilight in the Forbidden City*, London, 1934, 140–6, blamed Chang Tso-lin and others for the fiasco of the restoration. He also says that according to the *Peking Leader* of 6 May 1917 Chang Hsün's restoration documents were taken to Paris. In his own account, P'u-yi says that Tuan Ch'i-jui actually agreed to the scheme of restoration (see *Wo-ti ch'ien-pan-sheng* 我的前半生, Peking, 1964, 109–10).

[39] The pattern of promotion shown in table II indicates that the commander of an odd-numbered brigade was more senior than that of an even-numbered one. The promotion of Wu P'ei-fu, instead of Chang Hsüeh-yen, was therefore quite unusual.

[40] T'ao Chü-yin, *Wu P'ei-fu chuan* 吳佩孚傳 ' A biography of Wu P'ei-fu ', Taipei, 1957, 17–18 and 118, and also his *Pei-yang chün-fa t'ung-chih shih-ch'i shih-hua*, IV, 79.

strengthen personal ties with each other instead of forging a coherent political programme for their provinces. They relied on ' ties between classmates '. The Hsiaochan group (table I) not only furnished the leadership, but also marked the beginning, of the two great cliques of the northern warlords—the Anhwei and Chihli cliques. The inner circle of this group consisted of graduates of the Military School of Tientsin (*Pei-yang Wu-pei Hsüeh-t'ang*) who in the 1911 revolution showed a remarkable unity in giving support first to the Manchu throne and later to Yüan Shih-k'ai. With the sole exception of Ch'e Ch'ing-yün, all of them were to hold gubernatorial posts in the provinces. Their influence there did not come to an end until after the 1923 presidential election when Ts'ao K'un, the last of the Hsiaochan men to hold a provincial governorship, was ' elected ' the President of the Republic. In the years between 1912 and 1923 they had remained supreme in the provinces north of the Yangtze and south of the Great Wall.

The same cannot be said of the provinces south of the Yangtze, where after the 1911 revolution it was the Japanese-trained officers who were paramount. They controlled five out of 12 provinces to the south of the river as well as two others in the north.[41] Even more remarkable is that among these seven governors four were graduates from the Tokyo Imperial Cadet Academy in 1908 (the 6th class). Their classmates were one of the most influential, if not the most powerful, groups of officers in the history of modern China.[42] And at the invitation of Ts'ai O, who was a graduate of the 3rd class of the Cadet Academy, many of them served at the Yunnan Military School on their return from Japan, thus making the School a centre of revolutionary and reformist ideas.

Another group worthy of note consisted of graduates of the Paoting Military Academy, who were concentrated in four provinces—Hunan under T'ang Sheng-chih, Kwangsi under Li-Tsung-jen, Kwangtung under Li Chi-shen, and Szechwan under several warlords. (See table IIIE.) This particular classmate tie played an important role in the Northern Expedition of 1926–8, as many of the graduates supported the Wuhan government *vis-à-vis* Nanking and nearly all of them were in various degrees opposed to Chiang Kai-shek.

In addition to classmate ties, there were also groupings based on local affinity (*t'ung-hsiang* 同鄉). As a contrast to the Ch'ing dynasty ' principle of avoidance ' (avoiding the appointment of a man of a locality to hold an official post in that locality), most of the officers of the republican period served in the localities in which they had been born. The proper place for a Hunan soldier was Hunan ; for a Szechwan soldier Szechwan. His subordinates were also mostly men of the same locality. The reason for this was largely financial. As warlords' troops were financed by local resources, the warlord of a locality

[41] These were Sun Tao-jen of Fukien, Li Yüan-hung of Hupei, Li Lieh-chün of Kiangsi, T'ang Chi-yao of Kweichow, and Ts'ai O of Yunnan. In the north, there were Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi and Chang Feng-hui of Shensi.

[42] They include Chang Feng-hui, Chang K'ai-ju, Chao Heng-t'i, Chen Wen-yün, Chou Chün, Fang Sheng-t'ao, Ku P'in-chen, Li Lieh-chün, Liu Ts'un-hou, T'ang Chi-yao, Yen Ch'üan, Yen Hsi-shan, and Yü En-yang.

naturally disliked the presence of troops of a warlord of a neighbouring locality. Their presence was also resented by the local inhabitants, for it invariably put an additional financial burden on them. This was the root cause of the problem of ' guest armies ' (*k'e-chün* 客軍) which, in turn, were the root cause of many provincial wars. Additional financial burdens and more frequent wars due to the intrusion of ' guest armies ' helped to intensify regionalistic ideas and to strengthen the feeling of local affinity.

However, this is not to say that the resentment of strangers went to the extreme of a total cessation of interchange of officers and army units between provinces. In fact, when a man of province A was posted to province B, he may well have taken a large number of his fellow provincials with him. A case in point was the appointment of Wang Chan-yüan, a Shantung man, to the governorship of Hupei, with the result that many Hupei posts were taken over by Shantung men. Sometimes an invasion of troops from another province (i.e. *k'e-chün*) could produce the same effect. A notable case of this kind was the invasion of Szechwan by Yunnan and Kweichow troops during the 1915–16 anti-Yüan Shih-k'ai campaign.

When neither the classmate tie nor local affinity was strong enough to bind them together in harmony, the warlords resorted to arranging marriages between their children or to taking oaths of brotherhood (table IV). None of these arrangements, however, prevented them from fighting each other. T'ang Chi-yao, for example, fought against Yang Ching ch'eng (a graduate of the Tokyo Imperial Cadet Academy in 1907) and Ts'ao K'un against Tuan Ch'i-jui (both graduates of the Military School, Tientsin). Sometimes students even fought against their teachers—for example, Wu P'ei-fu's capture of Ch'ü T'ung-feng in 1920. Fellow-provincials also engaged each other in battle. Even sworn-brothers and warlords with their children in wedlock met each other on opposing sides of a battle-field. Wu P'ei-fu versus Chao Ti and Ts'ao K'un versus Chang Tso-lin were examples of these.

However, nothing was thicker than blood. No military father ever fought against his son, no father-in-law against his son-in-law, no brother against brother. Filial sentiments overrode factional interests, for the warlords had been brought up on Confucian ethical teachings and the superstitious fear of reprobation.

So much for the mentality of the warlords ; now let us revert to the matter of a definition. Since we are constantly nagged by the question of differentiating warlords from other soldiers, the importance of this matter can easily be seen. Indeed, attempts have been made to give a satisfactory answer to it, such as Chiang Kai-shek's five essential characteristics in his statement issued on 18 September 1927 in which he said that a warlord was a man who lacked a political principle (*chü-yi* 主義), occupied an area, had an insatiable lust for money and property, loved his own skin, and depended on imperialists for support.[43] Another eminent member of the Kuomintang, Hu Han-min, described a warlord :

[43] *Ke-ming wen-hsien*, XVI, 46.

> ' A soldier who ignores the interests of the nation and the people's demand for salvation and depends on the support of bureaucrats, corrupt politicians, local ruffians, bad gentry, and imperialists is a warlord '.[44]

Although both these definitions laid emphasis on a lack of political principles and on the kind of support the warlord drew, Chiang, unlike Hu, did not lose sight of the warlord's occupation of an area by the military power under his command. It is true that some prominent warlords did obtain foreign support, but to make this a characteristic would exclude many, especially small ones, who did not. Earlier, an article in the *Kuomintang Chou-k'an* 國民黨周刊 ' Kuomintang Weekly ', no. 7, 6 January 1924, 4, depicted the warlord simply as a man who controlled a territory and had a private army and this agrees with P. M. A. Linebarger's definition in his *Government in republican China*, New York, 1938, 45 :

> ' A *tuchün* was a military commandant ruling an area ranging from a few districts to a number of provinces '.

A more vivid picture of a typical warlord is to be found in Chang Yu-i's *Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh-shih tzu-liao*, II, 598 :

> ' Since the founding of the Republic, . . . soldiers have interfered in politics. Anyone who has under his command a few thousand men and calls himself a general invariably controls a few counties as his own fief. The greater ones occupy tens of counties and do anything with them as they wish. Wherever their troops go, houses are destroyed, fodder is taken away, and living quarters have to be provided for them. Their excessive demands often reach the amount of millions of dollars. All these are to be obtained on their behalf by the county magistrate, who, if he fails to meet their demands, is scolded, bullied, punished, and sometimes even imprisoned and killed. Then a new, trusted man is appointed to his place. This is to be seen everywhere '.

Nearly all these definitions agree on two basic characteristics of a warlord—a private army and an area under his control. Sheridan's definition is no exception. The army was private because it obeyed its commander who did not always obey the central government. In the area under his domination, the warlord ran the civil administration and extorted taxes in order to keep his men fed, clothed, sheltered, and equipped. For him and his men, this was candidly a way of living and therefore their basic aims were self-preservation and emolument. It followed that political principles or national interests did not normally enter into consideration, except when circumstances made them useful for the warlords' personal ends. The central government was treated by them likewise. When its orders were detrimental to the self-interests of the warlords, they were flouted. Alliances with other warlords, politicians, landlords, businessmen, parties, and so on were made for the same reasons and terminated when they ceased to have such usefulness. The running of the

[44] Address at an inspection of troops in Nanking, 18 April 1927 : Lo Chia-lun in *Ke-ming wen-hsien*, XIV, Taipei, 1954, 563–4.

administration, the obeying or disobeying of orders, and the making or terminating of alliances entailed political decisions and actions which were invariably justified in the high-sounding ethical terms of Confucius. This was partly due to the warlords' ignorance of other political and moral principles and partly due to the incompatibility of modern political principles to their conduct.

Prerequisite to the ascendancy of the warlord type were a weak central government and a vague political philosophy. The weakness of the central government was partly due to its ineffectual political apparatus and partly due to the existence of arrogant regional leaders. In other words, the interregnum in which they lived was both the cause and effect of their existence and they helped to prolong it. Had these soldiers been good Confucians, they would have been loyal to their emperor by preventing the emergence of the Chinese Republic of 1912; had they been good nationalists, they would have been loyal to the interests of the nation by uniting together for the defence of China. In either case they would not have been warlords but either the *ju-chiang* 儒將 (Confucian soldiers) or *kuo-chün chiang-ling* 國軍將領 (officers of the national defence forces). The fact that they became warlords of modern China was because they were bad Confucians and bad nationalists. In the final analysis, their personal considerations and self-interest always prevailed over their loyalty to either the throne or the nation. This is the historical characteristic of the modern Chinese warlord and this tallies with the fact that none of the 1,300 warlords of China had ever fought a war in defence of China's integrity before 1935.

From the point of view of declining Confucianism, the warlords were unscrupulous human beings; from the point of view of surging nationalism, they were odd spectacles of anachronism. Many of them whose behaviour was consistently unscrupulous or anachronistic are easily recognizable as warlords whereas others present a different and somewhat difficult problem. Should we categorize Feng Yü-hsiang as a warlord as Sheridan does? Should we describe Yen Hsi-shan, Li Tsung-jen, and other marginal personalities as warlords? Perhaps this is a wrong way to pose the question; perhaps a better way is to ask whose specific action or decision under a given circumstance should be described as that of a warlord.

A more important case is Chiang Kai-shek. Sheridan does not favour a straightforward answer as to whether Chiang was or was not a warlord. But 'it is certainly true', he goes on, 'that Chiang's rule of the party and the government resembled warlord rule in many respects. Chiang's power was based on regional control, just like that of the warlords. He headed an armed force that was loyal to him personally, largely through the officers of the Whampoa clique. He maintained his rule more through warfare and the manipulation of factions than through the normal operation of republican institutions, and thus he afforded warlords opportunities for their own maneuvers and intrigues' (p. 291). True, Chiang's power was based on his control over the richest region

of China, but the region and the central government in it showed two significant differences from any other region (e.g. the south-west) and any previous warlord central government (e.g. the Peking government of Tuan Ch'i-jui). In the first place, it represented China's best hope of unity under a clearly defined political programme ; in the second place, the government was the only legitimate, internationally recognized government. Sheridan's criticism of Chiang's manipulating of factions instead of relying on republican institutions presupposes the existence of viable republican institutions. This is a very daring assumption. In the judgement of Chiang, one must always bear in one's mind that he had led his country in a war of resistance against Japan for eight years—a feat unmatched by the performance of any other statesman in modern China. By any standard, this should qualify Chiang as a nationalist and therefore disqualify him as a warlord.

To illustrate this point, let us quote from Sheridan (p. 276) :

> ' Indeed, the very nationalism that Feng extolled required him to support national unity, and that entailed support of Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore when Chang Hsüeh-liang seized Chiang Kai-shek in the celebrated incident at Sian in December 1936, Feng promptly wired the Young Marshal, urging that Chiang be immediately returned to the capital and offering to go to Sian to serve as a guarantor of Chang Hsüeh-liang's safety '.

Feng sent the wire because he was perfectly sure that Chiang would not be killed. The death of Chiang at that juncture would have resulted in an intensification of the civil war against the Communists and others who were in favour of an anti-Japanese united front, thus defeating the mutineers' own purpose. Therefore Feng offered to guarantee not the life of the captured but that of the captor. In Feng's estimation, Chiang was the only leader who could weld the nation together in a war against Japan. No one else regarded any other warlord between 1912 and 1937 as being in a similar position to this.

Now let us turn to the question of factions of warlords. Sheridan fully appreciates the complexity, fluidity, and vagueness of the factions (p. 9). He sometimes adopts the traditional divisions (e.g. the Anhwei, Chihli, and Fengtien cliques, on pp. 67–8 and 125) and at other times attempts to invent his own categories (pp. 8–16). The use of geographical criteria in the traditional categorization is interesting, since it implies that the warlords lacked a coherent political programme to differentiate one clique from another. But it must not be assumed that the warlords who belonged to, say, the Anhwei clique were natives of that province. Table I shows that T'ien Chung-yü, a Chihli man, and Lu Yung-hsiang and Ho Feng-lin, both Shantung men, were members of the clique. The geographical criteria, though less misleading than any other, are none the less vague ; they show the differences neither in the interests nor in the policies of the cliques. The tasks of a historian are therefore to trace the origins of these cliques, seek the reasons for their formation, and explain, if possible, their main differences.

Let us begin with their beginnings. According to Wen Kung-chih 文公直,

the division between the north and south began in the anti-Yüan Shih-k'ai campaign in 1915–16, the Anhwei clique was formed in 1917 when Tuan Ch'i-jui started to train the War Participation Army (*Ts'an-chan Chün* 參戰軍), and the Fengtien clique could be traced back to 1907 when Hsü Shih-ch'ang was made viceroy of Manchuria and Chang Tso-lin and his fellow-bandits surrendered to him.[45] With the last-mentioned as the possible exception, the other two dates are doubtful. The first cleavage between the north and south appeared in the Boxer uprising of 1900 when the southern provinces made an alliance among themselves for their own preservation. Later, during the 1911 revolution, the signs and roots of the division between the north and south were clearly to be seen. Table V shows that in 1912 Yüan Shih-k'ai, representing the north (*Pei-yang t'uan-t'i* 北洋團體), controlled all the provinces north of the Yangtze and south of the Great Wall except for Shansi and Shensi and his influence also extended to Fukien through Sun Tao-jen, while the Kuomintang, representing a more progressive force, controlled in varying degrees Shansi and Shensi in the north and six other provinces south of the Yangtze. Shensi, however, was one of the exceedingly complicated provinces where Chang Feng-hui's grip was weak and as a consequence Yen Hsi-shan's channels of communication with the south through Shensi were constantly in jeopardy. However, Yen managed to preserve his position throughout the warlord period without being active in either warlord or Kuomintang politics. In the south, Li Yüan-hung, though he supported the revolution, was not a member of the Kuomintang. He and T'an Yen-k'ai, Yin Ch'ang-heng, Hu Han-min, and Po Wen-wei were all in a precarious position in their respective provinces, for immediately after the revolution the power patterns in these provinces were, like those in Shensi, complicated and fluid. Only in Kiangsi could the Kuomintang claim to have some real control and the rest of the south was in the hands of local warlords.

The defeat of the Kuomintang in the 1913 civil war saw Yüan's influence extended from four provinces in China proper to 10; the six new additions were all in the south. In 1915 he added Szechwan to the list of his conquests. Only the local warlords in the south-west—Lu Jung-t'ing of Kwangsi, Liu Hsien-shih of Kweichow, and T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan—could conceivably put up a resistance to his plan for unifying the country by force. It was at this stage that the clash between the north and south was sharpened and took the shape of anti-monarchism.

Now it is necessary to bring into our consideration the factor of strategic geography in order to understand the struggle between the north and south. Since the completion of the Peking–Hankow railway in 1906 and that of the Tientsin–P'uk'ow railway in 1911 the security of Peking, the capital, depended on the security of the 'A' shape formed by these two trunk lines and the

[45] *Tsui-chin san-shih-nien Chung-kuo chün-shih shih* 最近三十年中國軍事史 'A history of the Chinese Army in the past thirty years', 1930, Taipei, 1962 ed., I, chap. 2, pp. 2, 8, 10, and 49, and Tuan Ch'i-jui, *Ho-fei chih-cheng nien-p'u*, 36a.

Lung-hai railway which cut across them. The strategic importance of the Lu-Han railway (Peking–Hankow) was clearly seen by Chang Chih-tung when he proposed its construction in a memorial to the throne in 1889 :

> ' Fifthly, should incidents take place near the Metropolis, the soldiers of Hupei and Hunan and the well-trained troops of the Huai districts can be summoned by a telegram and sent by the [proposed] railway to the capital in a day. Should bandits harass other places, reinforcements can be dispatched [to the government troops] there and the campaign can be completed in 10 days. Logistically speaking, nothing else is more convenient than this railway '.[46]

The same argument can be applied to both the Tientsin–P'uk'ow and the Lung-hai. Thus the ' A ' shape became the heart of China ; a threat to any part of it was a threat to the security of the capital, be it in Peking or Nanking. The existence of the arsenals in Hanyang and Shanghai served only to enhance its vital importance.

In order to secure the defence of the ' A ' shape, it was imperative for the central government to maintain its control over the peripheral provinces which formed a belt running from north to south, from Shensi, through Szechwan, west Hupei, north Hunan, Kiangsi, to Fukien. Shensi, Szechwan, and Hunan were particularly important, for from Shensi by the Lung-hai, from Szechwan by either a northward advance to the granary in south Shensi or an eastward one to Hupei, and from Hunan along the Hsiang river to Lake Tung-t'ing and Wuhan, an insurgent army could poise menacingly against Peking or Nanking. It was precisely for these geographical considerations that the anti-Yüan Shih-k'ai armies of Yunnan and Kweichow had to invade Szechwan up the Yangtze valley in 1915–16, that the struggle for the hegemony of China was waged in these provinces, that most of the wars of the 1915–28 period were fought there, and that in these provinces there were the highest concentrations of armies.[47]

Had these railways existed in the 1850's to affect strategic decisions, the fate of the T'aip'ing rebellion would have been different. Because of their existence in this century, the 1911, 1926–8, and 1949 revolutions represented such a startling contrast to the pattern of the T'aip'ing war.

But throughout the warlord period, the ' A ' shape had never been

[46] Liu Chin-tsao 劉錦藻, *Ch'ing-ch'ao hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao* 清朝續文獻通考, Shanghai, 1921, *chüan* 363, 11073a.

[47] They were distributed as follows :

Shensi	131,000
Szechuan	122,000
Hupei	84,000
Hunan	165,000
Kiangsi	50,000
Fukien	71,000
Total	623,000

The total military strength of China then stood at 1,400,000 men : *Hua-tzu Jih-pao* 華字日報 (Hong Kong), 12 February 1919.

threatened by any of the southern warlords. The disputes between the north and south took place along the belt, the buffer belt, and it is there that most of the answers to the disputes are to be found. Moreover, it was the buffer which truly divided the north and south ; it was the buffer which helped to explain the differences between the Anhwei and the Chihli cliques.

One of the most thorny questions Yüan Shih-k'ai had to deal with after the defeat of the Kuomintang in 1913 was the sharing of the spoils among his followers. Table V shows that Ni Ssu-ch'ung, an Anhwei warlord, took over Anhwei and Tuan Ch'i-jui took over Hupei. But Tuan's incumbency there was a brief one and he was shortly afterwards replaced by Wang Chan-yüan, while Li Ch'un was appointed to Kiangsi and Feng Kuo-chang to Kiangsu. Thus along the Yangtze river east of the Wushan gorge, Hupei, Kiangsi, and Kiangsu were in the hands of one Shantung and two Chihli men who were all members of the Chihli clique. After Yüan's death the Anhwei clique controlled Shensi and Fukien and the Chihli clique Chihli, Hupei, Kiangsi, and Kiangsu. With Tuan Ch'i-jui predominant in the central government in Peking, the Anhwei clique soon extended its influence into Anhwei, Chekiang, and Hunan after the 1917 restoration. Immediately before the outbreak of the Anhwei-Chihli war in 1920 the Anhwei clique controlled Shantung, Shanghai, and Chekiang along the eastern sea coast of China. In other words, its domination of the Tientsin–P'uk'ow railway was established and the defeat in 1920 did not seem to affect this situation to any considerable extent. Its other spheres of influence were Shensi, Anhwei, and Hunan, not to mention Hsü Shu-cheng's activities in inner and outer Mongolia. Shensi and Hunan, however, remained complicated, for stationed there were also Feng Yü-hsiang's 16th Mixed Brigade (M.B.) and Wu P'ei-fu's 3rd D. Therefore the Anhwei clique's control over them could only be nominal. At the same time the Chihli clique could claim preponderance in Chihli, Honan, and Hupei, the provinces through which the Peking–Hankow railway ran, as well as Kiangsi and Kiangsu.

It is obvious that since the Yangtze basin was an inseparable economic unit, the riverine provinces should ideally have been placed under the warlords who could co-operate. The fact that Anhwei and Shanghai were occupied by the Anhwei clique was in itself undesirable from the point of view of the Chihli clique. Furthermore, the latter, controlling three buffer provinces along the Yangtze with Wu P'ei-fu as the spear-head deep in the south of Hunan, were in direct contact with the southern warlords. Naturally, their views on the north-south relationship and the resulting policy would be different from those of the Anhwei clique.

This, however, is not to say that the polarization of these two cliques began only after the 1913 war. It is highly probable that in their days at Hsiaochan (table I) the future leaders of military cliques had already been forming their personal associations and these associations became a consideration for the sharing of the spoils of the 1913 war, thus underlining the differences between two loosely associated groups of warlords. Once they were in control of

provinces, their vested interests heightened their differences from the personal to the political level.

The political question that persisted throughout the whole period of the warlords' rule was the unification of China. Paradox though it is, it does explain why leading warlords attempted to destroy each other. In such attempts they felt that they were different from their opponents ; they were not warlords at all. Every great warlord of this period seems to have agreed to the goal of national unification, but no one was willing to forgo a part of his vested interests in order to achieve it. Unification meant the unification of military command first and then of civil administration. But the questions were—by what means and in what form ? Yüan Shih-k'ai made his attempt by throwing his military weight against the Kuomintang and by imposing on the nation the 1914 Constitution Compact which even he himself was unwilling to observe. After his monarchy, the warlords had to find for China a form of state and a form of government. The search was punctuated with crises—the 1917 restoration fiasco and the wars of 1920, 1922, and 1924. Each of these crises was a constitutional one, for only an effective and stable constitution could have given China a stable political form.

Four great issues were involved in the constitutional crises. The two political problems were the distribution of power among the President, the Premier, the legislatures, and the provinces, and the unification of the command of the army ; the two technical problems were the adoptability of one of the constitutions made since 1912 and the legality of one of the parliaments elected since 1912. These issues deepened the disagreements between the north and south as well as between the cliques.

Generally speaking, the north, conscious of its combined strength, was bent on unifying the country, whichever faction was in power, whereas the south, lacking such confidence, was on the defensive. Fortunately for the south, a combined military strength of the north had never become available because the north had never been united after the death of Yüan. The Chihli clique with its domain immediately to the east and north of the buffer belt was in direct contact with the southern warlords. In case of a war of unification it was the Chihli clique which would bear the brunt of the attack unless it was prepared to allow others to use its domain as their rear. It was therefore in favour of unifying the country by peaceful means. The Anhwei clique, comfortably behind the Chihli clique, desired to kill two birds with one stone by demanding a war of unification. The destruction of the Anhwei clique in 1920 did not bring this policy disagreement to an end, for the Fengtien clique almost at once inherited the mantle of the Anhwei warlords by advocating a war of unification. Wu P'ei-fu, to be sure, did not change his peaceful tone until after the defeat of Chang Tso-lin in the 1922 war.[48]

[48] At this juncture, Chang Tso-lin came forward to champion the cause of federalism, to ward off any attempt by his victor to interfere in the affairs of Manchuria : *Hua-tzu Jih-pao*, 23 May 1922.

The southern proposal of a federation of autonomous provinces was a defensive measure, designed to preserve the vested interests of the south. It was a peace signal both to the north and to the southern warlords themselves.

It was against this general background that the activities of such subdivisions as the Tientsin, Paoting, and Loyang groups of the Chihli clique (p. 125) should be understood; it was against this background that many of Feng Yü-hsiang's decisions were made.

Before bringing this long review to an end, I would like to say a few words on what Mr. Sheridan calls 'residual warlordism' (pp. 14–16). This concept goes undefined, as he merely cites facts to prove the continued existence of warlordism after 1928. The Young Marshal, for example, went on to rule in Manchuria; Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan in the north and north-west; Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, and Ch'en Chi-t'ang in Kwangsi and Kwangtung; Lung Yün and a host of small warlords in Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechwan. No one can deny these facts or the unreality of Chiang Kai-shek's unification of China in the light of these facts. Yet it is precisely this nominal unification which is intellectually interesting. Chiang may not have had effective control over these provinces, but on the whole he held their allegiance. This allegiance was based on a political philosophy—the Three Principles of the People. Chiang even interpreted these principles in such a manner that they became acceptable to his supporters and the warlords. The situation after the Northern Expedition was then that the warlords gave their allegiance to Chiang in the name of the Three Principles or at times they defied him in the name of a different interpretation of the same principles. This is particularly true of Feng, Yen, and the Kwangsi clique.

Like Confucianism, the Three Principles had an inhibiting force on the regional military leaders; unlike it, those Principles had never been strong enough to preclude defiance. Even when in defiance, the warlords usually justified their action on the ground that they were truer followers of Dr. Sun's teachings than Chiang. They could do so only by having put into practice some reformist measures in their provinces. Feng, Yen, and the Kwangsi clique can therefore be called 'reformist warlords'.

The small warlords in Szechwan and Kweichow belonged to a different category. Their territories were not touched by the Northern Expedition and consequently the people ruled by them were politically less conscious. This made it easier for them to go on ruling Szechwan and Kweichow without too much thought of reform. Their false sense of security made them weaker, compared with Chiang and the other warlords, and this weakness was fully exposed by the Communist Long March in 1934 and 1935, which helped Chiang to bring them to their knees.

In the context of a general acceptance of the Three Principles of the People, military regionalism could resist effective unification not by rifles alone, but also by either socio-economic reform or widespread political apathy. After 1928 there existed then not only one but two kinds of warlordism—the

reformist and the 'residual'. The former was stronger, hence in a position to challenge Chiang's authority from time to time; the latter, residual in the true sense, uninvolved in national politics, and diffident in challenging Chiang, was in steady decline until its submission to the central government in 1935.

Regionalism in the Confucian background (1860–1911) was different from that in the interregnum (1912–28); that in the interregnum was again different from regionalism in the context of the Three Principles of the People (1929–37). This periodization is significant for it may help students of that aspect of Chinese history to understand the reasons why regionalism did not break up the Ch'ing empire and why China could reunite to fight the Japanese in 1937.

Apart from these two methodological points—an adequate definition of the warlord and an explanation of the formation of warlord factions—and their general implications, it is difficult to disagree with Mr. Sheridan on the main body of his book.[49] This, however, is not to say that no questions can be raised about it. While deeply impressed by Sheridan's analysis of the Metropolitan Coup (pp. 139–40), one may still ask why a staunch anti-Japanese soldier like Feng could have agreed to play the Japanese game in 1925. Sheridan seems to have explained the development, not of Feng's views, but only of the events. As Feng was the chief actor, the omission leaves one with a sense of dissatisfaction. Another point which might be raised here is Sheridan's assessment of Chiang's position after the Mukden Incident (pp. 270–1). The policy of non-resistance was widely attributed, not to Chiang, but to Chang Hsüeh-liang, and Chiang's personal prestige became actually higher, thanks to the propaganda work of the Blue Shirts (*Lan-yi She* 藍衣社).

There are also three minor flaws in the text. 陳宧, the governor of Szechwan, should properly be romanized as Ch'en I;[50] 陸軍檢閱使 and 巡閱使 were very different posts and therefore should not be translated indiscriminately as 'Inspecting Commissioner' (p. 117); and it seems misleading to call the Chinese Anti-Fascist League 'a secret society' (p. 273 and p. 353, n. 11).

Neither these nor any other points will be sufficient to do any substantial damage to the standard set by Mr. Sheridan in his book on Feng Yü-hsiang.

TABLE I. THE HSIAOCHAN GROUP, 1896

Graduates from the Military School, Tientsin (*Pei-yang Wu-pei Hsüeh-t'ang* 北洋武備學堂)

Feng Kuo-chang 馮國璋, Chihli, aide-de-camp to Yüan Shih-k'ai, head of Infantry School, later leader of the Chihli clique

Tuan Ch'i-jui 段琪瑞, Anhwei, C.O. of the Artillery Corps, head of Artillery School, later leader of the Anhwei clique

Wang Shih-chen 王士珍, Chihli, C.O. of the Engineers Corps, head of Engineering School, later Minister of War

[49] I am unable to offer any criticism on the details about Feng's life and activities, partly because I do not know as much as Mr. Sheridan and partly because I wrote this review in Hong Kong, away from my files.

[50] I have made the same mistake in my book on Yüan Shih-k'ai.

Ho Feng-lin 何豐林, Shantung, instructor, later defence commissioner of Shanghai
Lei Chen-ch'un 雷震春, Anhwei, officer, later head of Department of Military Law
Li Ch'un 李純, Chihli, officer, later governor of Kiangsi and then Kiangsu, Chihli clique
Lu Chien-chang 陸建章, Anhwei, officer, later governor of Shensi, Anhwei clique
T'ien Chung-yü 田中玉, Chihli, officer, later governor of Shantung, Anhwei clique
T'ien Wen-lieh 田文烈, Honan, officer, later governor of Honan
Ts'ao K'un 曹錕, Chihli, officer, later governor of Chihli, Chihli clique
Tuan Chih-kuei 段芝貴, Anhwei, officer, later governor of Fengtien
Wang Chan-yüan 王占元, Shantung, instructor, later governor of Hupei, Chihli clique

Others

Chang Hsün 張勳, Kiangsi, officer of the Huai (Anhwei) Army, later governor of Anhwei
Chang Huai-chih 張懷芝, Shantung, officer, later governor of Shantung
Ch'e Ch'ing-yün 車慶雲, officer, later provost-marshal in Peking
Ch'en Kuang-yüan 陳光遠, Chihli, later governor of Kiangsi, Chihli clique
Chiang Kuei-t'i 姜桂題, Anhwei, officer of the Huai Army, later military commander in Jehol
Meng En-yüan 孟恩遠, Chihli, officer, later governor of Kirin
Ni Ssu-ch'ung 倪嗣沖, Anhwei, officer of the Huai Army, later governor of Anhwei, Anhwei clique
Pao Kwei-ch'ing 鮑貴卿, Mukden, officer, later governor of Kirin, Fengtien clique
Yin-ch'ang 蔭昌, Manchu, instructor, later aide-de-camp to Yüan, the President

TABLE II. THE MODERN ARMY IN 1911–12

District	Designation	Commander	Brigadiers
North of the Yangtze			
Chihli and metropolitan area	1st D	Ho Tsung-lien	1st B Li K'uei-yüan 2nd B Lan T'ien-wei●
	2nd D	Ma Lung-piao/ Wang Chan-yüan	3rd B Wang Chan-yüan/ Wang Chin-ching 4th B Pao Kuei-ch'ing
	3rd D	Ts'ao K'un	5th B Lu Yung-hsiang 6th B Ch'en Wen-yün
	4th D	Wu Feng-ling/ Wang Yü-chia/ Ch'en Kuang-yüan	7th B Ch'en Kuang-yüan/ Li Hou-chi 8th B Ho Feng-lin
	6th D	Wu Lu-chen●/ Li Ch'un	11th B Li Ch'un/ Ma Chi-tseng 12th B Chou Fu-lin
	20th D	Chang Shao-tseng●/ P'an Chü-ying	39th B Wu Hsiang-chen● 40th B P'an Chü-ying/ Hsiao Kuang-ch'üan

District	Designation	Commander	Brigadiers
Honan	15th D	incomplete	29th B Ying Lung-hsiang●/ Chang Hsi-yüan
			30th B not yet formed
Kirin	23rd D	Meng En-yüan	45th B Kao Feng-ch'eng 高鳳城
			46th B P'ei Ch'i-hsün 裴其勳
Shansi	22nd D	incomplete	43rd B Yao Hung-fa
			44th B not yet formed
Shantung	5th D	Chang Yung-ch'eng/ Chang Shu-hsün/ Wu Ting-yüan	9th B Chia Pin-ch'ing●/?
			10th B Chang Shu-yüan●
	24th D	incomplete	
Shensi	unknown		a brigade under Wang Yü-chiang 王毓江
Sinkiang	18th D	incomplete	35th B Yang Tsan-hsü
			36th B not yet formed
South of the Yangtze			
Anhwei	16th D	incomplete	31st B Chao Li-t'ai
			32nd B not yet formed
Chekiang	21st D	Hsiao Hsing-yüan	41st B Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsün
			42nd B Liu Hsün
Fukien	10th D	Sun Tao-jen●	19th B ?
			20th B Hsü Ch'ung-chih●
Hunan	13th D	incomplete	25th B Hsiao Liang-ch'en●
			26th B not yet formed
Hupei	8th D	Chang Piao	15th B Wang Te-sheng
			16th B Teng Ch'eng-pa●
	11th D	incomplete	21st B Li Yüan-hung●
			22nd B not yet formed
Kiangsi	14th D	incomplete	27th B Wu Chieh-chang●
			28th B not yet formed
Kiangsu	7th D	Tuan Ch'i-jui	13th B Chiang Yen-hang●
			14th B ?
	9th D	Hsü Shao-chen●	17th B Sun Ming●
			18th B Tu Huai-ch'uan●
	12th D	incomplete	23rd B Ai Chung-ch'i
			24th B not yet formed
Kwangsi	unknown		a brigade under Hu Ching-i/ Lu Jung-t'ing●
Kwangtung	25th D	Lung Chi-kuang	49th B Chiang Tsun-kuei●
			50th B Chang Tsai-yang
Kweichow			less than a regiment
Szechwan	17th D	Chu Ch'ing-lan	33rd B Chiang Teng-hsüan
			34th B Ch'e Ch'ing-yün (?)
Yunnan	19th D	Chung Lin-t'ung	37th B Ts'ai O●
			38th B Ch'ü T'ung-feng●

District	Designation	Commander	Brigadiers
Two newly formed divisions			
Fengtien	27th D	Chang Tso-lin	53rd B Yi Jung-t'ing 54th B Sun Lieh-ch'en
	28th D	Feng Te-lin	55th B Chang Hai-p'eng 56th B Chi Chin-ch'un

Abbreviations: D division
B brigade
● supported the revolution
/ replaced by
? name unknown

See J. Ch'en, 'A footnote on the Chinese army in 1911–12', *T'oung Pao*, XLVIII, 4–5, 1960, 437–8; *China Yearbook*, 1912 and 1913; *Ke-ming wen-hsien*, v, 127; and Sonoda Ikki 園田一亀, *Kaiketsu Cho Saku-rin* 怪傑張作霖 'Chang Tso-lin, the evil genius', Tokyo, 1921, 114, 121, and 149.

TABLE III. EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF CHINESE OFFICERS

A. *Traditional degree holders*

Chang Chen-fang 張鎮芳—*chü-jen* and *chin-shih*
Ch'ang Chih-ying 常之英—*chü-jen*
Ch'e Ch'ing-yün—*hsiu-ts'ai*
Ch'en Chiung-ming 陳炯明—*chü-jen*
Ch'en I—*pa-kung* 拔貢
Ch'eng Ch'ien—*hsiu-ts'ai*
Chu Ch'ing-lan—civil servant
Chu Jui 朱瑞—*hsiu-ts'ai*
Feng Kuo-chang—*hsiu-ts'ai*
Hsü Shao-chen—*chü-jen*
Kao Shih-tu—*hsiu-ts'ai*
Liu Hsien-shih 劉顯世—*lin-sheng* 廩生
Ma Fu-hsiang 馬福祥—*chü-jen*
Ni Ssu-ch'ung—*hsiu-ts'ai*
Po Wen-wei—*hsiu-ts'ai*
Sun Tao-jen 孫道仁—*yin-sheng* 廕生
T'an Yen-k'ai 譚延闓—*chin-shih, Hanlin* compiler
T'ang Hsiang-ming 湯薌銘—*chü-jen*
Ts'ao Jui 曹銳—*chien-sheng* 監生
Wu P'ei-fu 吳佩孚—*hsiu-ts'ai*
Yang Tseng-hsin 楊增新—*chin-shih*
Yen Hsi-shan 閻錫山—*chü-jen*

B. *Japanese-trained officers in the 1911–12 revolution and 1913 war*

Name	District	1911–12	1913
Chang Ch'un 張群	Shanghai	took part in revolution under Ch'en Ch'i-mei 陳其美	fought Yüan Shih-k'ai; fled to Japan
Chang Feng-hui	Shensi	took part in revolution; governor of Shensi	governor of Shensi

Name	District	1911–12	1913
Chang Huai-chih	Tientsin	defence commissioner	resigned
Chang K'ai-ju 張開儒	Yunnan	instructor at Yunnan Military Academy; took part in revolution	
Chang Shao-tseng	Chihli	commander of 20th D; sympathetic with the revolution; military commander of Suiyüan	military commander of Suiyüan
Chang Shu-yüan	Shantung	commander of Artillery Regiment and then 10th B	
Chao Heng-t'i 趙恒惕	Hunan	took part in revolution; led Kwangsi troops in Hunan	stationed in Hunan
Chao Yu-hsin 趙又新	Kwangsi	took part in revolution; dispatched to Kwangsi	fought Yüan Shih-k'ai
Ch'en Ch'i-mei	Shanghai	took part in revolution; commandant of troops in Shanghai	fought Yüan Shih-k'ai; fled to Japan
Ch'en I	Peking	deputy C.O.S. to Yüan Shih-k'ai	full general
Ch'en Wen-yün	Chihli	major-general	lieutenant-general
Cheng K'ai-wen 鄭開文	Kwangsi	major; took part in revolution	
Chiang Kai-shek	Shanghai	took part in revolution under Ch'en Ch'i-mei	fought Yüan Shih-k'ai; fled to Japan
Chiang Teng-hsüan	Szechwan	took part in revolution; commander of 33rd B	C.O.S. to governor of Heilungkiang
Chiang Tsun-kuei	Chekiang	took part in revolution; governor of Chekiang	ousted by Chu Jui
Chiang Yen-hang	Kiangsu	commander of revolutionary troops in Kiangpei	
Chou Chün 周駿	Szechwan	took part in revolution; commander of Szechwan 1st D	
Chou Tao-kang 周道剛	Szechwan	took part in revolution	
Ch'ü T'ung-feng	Yunnan	instructor at Yunnan Military Academy; took part in revolution	
Fang Sheng-t'ao 方聲濤	Szechwan	took part in revolution	commander of Kiangsi 3rd B; fought Yüan Shih-k'ai; fled to Japan
Fu Liang-tso 傅良佐	Peking	assistant secretary to Yüan Shih-k'ai	military commander in Chahar
Ho Ch'eng-chün 何成濬	Paoting	took part in revolution under Wu Lu-chen	fought Yüan Shih-k'ai; fled to Japan

Name	District	1911–12	1913
Hsiung K'e-wu 熊克武	Szechwan	took part in revolution; commander of Szechwan 5th D	commander of Szechwan 5th D
Hsü Ch'ung-chih	Fukien	took part in revolution; commander of 20th B and then Fukien 1st D	1st D redesignated 14th D
Hsü Shu-cheng	Peking	head of Dept. of Army Horses	led 80th MB in Outer Mongolia
Hu Ching-yi 胡景翼	Shensi	took part in revolution	went to Japan
Huang Hsing 黃興	Nanking	C.-in-C. of revolutionary army	fought Yüan Shih-k'ai; fled to Japan
Ku P'in-chen 顧品珍	Yunnan	instructor at Yunnan Military Academy; took part in revolution	
Lan T'ien-wei	Fengtien	commander of 2nd B; took part in revolution; defeated by Chang Tso-lin	
Li Lieh-chün	Kiangsi	took part in revolution; governor of Kiangsi	fought Yüan Shih-k'ai; fled to Japan
Li Yüan-hung	Hupei	Vice-President; governor of Hupei	acting governor of Kiangsi; recalled
Liu Ts'un-hou 劉存厚	Szechwan	took part in revolution	commander of Szechwan 2nd D; garrison commander of Chungking
Lo P'ei-chin 羅佩金	Yunnan	commander of 74th Regiment; took part in revolution	civil governor of Yunnan
Lu Chin 陸錦	Chihli	C.O.S. to governor of Chihli	colonel of 'Model' Regiment
Lu Chin-shan 盧金山	Chihli	major-general	lieutenant-general
Mo Ching-yü 莫擎宇	Kwangtung	not known	not known
Mo Jung-hsin 莫榮新	Kwangtung	bandit leader	commander of Kwangsi 2nd B
P'an Chü-ying	Chihli	commander of 20th D; defeated	
Shang Chen 商震	Shantung	took part in revolution; commander of a MB	
Shih Hsing-ch'uan 石星川	Hupei	supported Li Yüan-hung	
Sun Tao-jen	Fukien	commander of 10th D; took part in revolution	
T'ang Chi-yao	Yunnan	took part in revolution; governor of Kweichow	governor of Yunnan

Name	District	1911–12	1913
Ts'ai O	Yunnan	commander of 37th B ; took part in revolution ; governor of Yunnan	recalled to Peking
Tu Hsi-chün 杜錫鈞	Hupei	took part in revolution ; acting commander of Hupei 3rd D	garrison commander of Hankow
Tu Huai-ch'uan	Kiangsu	commander of 18th B ; took part in revolution	commander of Kiangsu 26th D
Wang Ling-chi 王陵基	Szechwan	took part in revolution	colonel of Szechwan 'Model' Regiment
Wang T'ing-chen 王廷楨	Kiangsu	garrison commander of Tientsin	garrison commander of Nanking
Wu Kuang-hsin 吳光新	Fengtien	major-general	dispatched to Fengtien
Wu Lu-chen	Paoting	commander of 6th D ; assassinated	
Wu T'ieh-ch'eng 吳鐵城	Kiangsi	took part in revolution	fought Yüan Shih-k'ai ; fled to Japan
Yang Chin-ch'eng 楊藎誠	Kweichow	took part in revolution ; governor of Kweichow, ousted by Tang Chi-yao	
Yeh Ch'uan 葉荃	Kweichow	took part in revolution ; commander of Kweichow 1st D	
Yen Hsi-shan	Shansi	commander of 86th Regiment ; took part in revolution ; governor of Shansi	governor of Shansi
Yü En-yang 庾恩暘	Yunnan	instructor at Yunnan Military Academy ; took part in revolution ; commander of Yunnan Artillery Corps	

C. *Other officers trained in Japan*

Chang Hsüeh-chi 張學濟
Chang Hsüeh-liang 張學良
Chang Huai-pin 張懷斌
Chang Huan-hsiang 張煥相
Chang Tzu-chen 張子貞
Chang Yi-p'eng 張翼鵬
Ch'en Chia-mo 陳嘉謨
Ch'en Fu-ch'u 陳復初
Ch'en Shen 陳琛
Ch'en Yi 陳儀
Ch'eng Ch'ien 程潛
Chi-hsing 吉興
Chi Yi-ch'iao 戢翼翹
Chin Yün-o 靳雲鶚
Chou Yin-jen 周蔭人
Chu Shao-liang 朱紹良
Fang Ting-ying 方鼎英
Ha Han-chang 哈漢章
Han Feng-lou 韓鳳樓
Han Lin-ch'un 韓麟春
Ho Yao-tsu 賀耀祖
Ho Ying-ch'in 何應欽
Hsiang Ch'uan-yi 向傳義
Hsing Shih-lien 邢士廉
Hsü Yüan-ch'uan 徐源泉
Huang Fu 黃孚
Ku Cheng-lun 谷正倫
K'ung Fan-wei 孔繁蔚

K'ung Keng 孔 庚
Kung Pang-to 宮 邦 鐸
Liu Chien-fan 劉 建 藩
Liu Hsün 劉 詢
Lu Hsiang-t'ing 盧 香 亭
Lu Hsiao-ch'en 路 孝 忱
Ma Hsiao-chün 馬 曉 軍
Meng Chao-yüeh 孟 昭 月
Nieh Hsien-fan 聶 憲 藩
P'an Shou-cheng 潘 守 蒸
P'ei Ch'i-hsün 裴 其 勳
Shih Ching-t'ing 石 敬 亭
Shih Ch'ing-yang 石 青 陽
Shih To 石 鐸
Sun Ch'uan-fang 孫 傳 芳
Sung Ho-keng 宋 鶴 庚
Tai K'an 戴 戡
Tan Mou-hsin 但 懋 辛
T'ang Chih-tao 唐 之 道
T'ien Shu-nien 田 書 年
T'ien Wei-ch'in 田 維 勤
T'ien Ying-chao 田 應 詔
Ting Ch'ao 丁 超
Wang Ch'i 王 麒
Wang Chin-yü 王 金 鈺
Wang Ju-ch'in 王 汝 勤
Wang Po-ling 王 柏 齡
Wang Shu-ch'ang 王 樹 常
Wang Tzu-tung 王 玆 棟
Wang Yung-ch'uan 王 永 泉
Wei Pang-p'ing 魏 邦 平
Yang Chieh 楊 杰
Yü Chen 于 珍
Yüeh Wei-chün 岳 維 峻

D. *Officers trained at the Military School, Tientsin in the 1911–12 revolution and 1913 war*

Name	District	1911–12	1913
Chao Ti 趙 倜	Honan	commander of a brigade, Resolute Army; commissioner for military affairs of Honan	governor of Honan
Ch'en Chih-chi 陳 之 驥	Nanking	led Kwangsi troops in Nanking	commander of Kiangsu 8th D
Ch'en I	see A and B		
Chin Yün-p'eng 靳 雲 鵬	Shantung	commander of 5th D	acting governor of Shantung; full general
Ch'ü T'ung-feng	see B		
Feng Kuo-chang	Hupei see A	commander of 1st Army; governor of Chihli; commander of Imperial Guards	governor of Kiangsu
Feng Yü-hsiang	Chihli	captain in 20th D; sympathetic with revolution	colonel
Ho Feng-lin	Chihli	commander of 8th B	dispatched to Chekiang under Yang Shan-te
Ho Tsung-lien	Chihli	commander of 1st D	acting governor of Chahar
Hsü Shu-cheng	see B		
Lei Chen-ch'un	Honan see A	commander of Honan troops	commander of 7th D in north Anhwei
Li Ch'ang-tai 李 長 泰	Chihli	served under Wang Ju-hsien	

Name	District	1911–12	1913
Li Ch'un	Chihli	commander of 11th B ; then of 6th D	governor of Kiangsi
Li Hou-chi	Chihli	commander of 7th B	in charge of military affairs of Fukien
Lu Chien-chang	Peking	commander of left column of the army reserves	head of Dept. of Military Law
Lu Yung-hsiang	Chihli	commander of 5th B and then 20th D	
Shang Chen	see B		
T'ien Chung-yü	Peking	vice-minister of War	
T'ien Wen-lieh	Chihli	with Yüan Shih-k'ai in Changteh ; vice-minister of War	
Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsün	Chekiang	commander of 41st B ; A.D.C. to Yüan Shih-k'ai	commander of 1st B
Ts'ao K'un	Chihli	commander of 3rd D	commander of 3rd D
Tuan Ch'i-jui	Hupei	commander of 2nd Army	minister of war ; acting premier ; governor of Hupei
Tuan Chih-kuei	Manchuria	commanded troops in Fengtien	appointed military commander of Chahar
Wang Chan-yüan	Hupei	commander of 3rd B	commander of 2nd D ; full general
Wang Huai-ch'ing 王懷慶	Chihli	commanded troops in T'ungchow	
Wang Shih-chen	Peking	minister of war	resigned
Wang T'ing-chen	see B		
Wu Kuang-hsin	see B		
Yang Shan-te 楊善德	Chekiang	commanded a brigade in Chekiang ; ousted by Chiang Tsun-kuei	commanded 4th D ; back in Chekiang

E. *Graduates of the Paoting Military Academy* (*Paoting Chün-kuan Hsüeh-hsiao* 保定軍官學校)

Chang Chen 張貞, Fukien, KMT
Chang Ching-yao 張敬堯, Hunan
Chang Fa-k'uei 張發奎, Kwangtung, KMT
Chang Kuo-wei 張國威, Hunan, KMT
Chang Yin-wu 張蔭梧, Shansi, KMT
Ch'en Ch'eng 陳誠, KMT
Ch'en Chi-ch'eng 陳繼承, KMT
Ch'en Cho 陳焯, KMT
Ch'en K'o-yü 陳可鈺, KMT
Ch'en Ming-shu 陳銘樞, Kwangtung, KMT
Chiang Kuang-nai 蔣光鼐, KMT

Ch'in Te-ch'un 秦 德 純, under Feng Yü-hsiang, KMT
Chou Lan 周 爛, Hunan, KMT
Chou Tsu-huang 周 祖 晃, Kwangsi, KMT
Fu Tso-yi 傅 作 義, Shansi, KMT
Ho Chien 何 鍵, Hunan, KMT
Hsia Wei 夏 威, Kwangsi, KMT
Hsiang Ch'uan-yi, Szechwan
Hsieh Mo-han 謝 慕 韓, Hunan, KMT
Hsiung Shih-hui 熊 式 輝, KMT
Hsü Yung-ch'ang 徐 永 昌, Shansi, KMT
Hu Tsung-to 胡 宗 鐸, Kwangsi, KMT
Huang Ch'i-hsiang 黃 琪 翔, Kwangtung, KMT
Huang Shao-hsiung (hung) 黃 紹 竑, Kwangsi, KMT
Ku Chu-t'ung 顧 祝 同, KMT
Lai Shih-huang 賴 世 璜, Kwangtung, KMT
Li Chi-shen 李 濟 琛, Kwangtung, KMT
Li Ching-lin 李 景 林, Fengtien clique
Li Ming-yang 李 明 揚, Kwangsi, KMT
Li P'in-hsien 李 品 仙, Hunan, KMT
Liao Lei 廖 磊, Kwangsi, KMT
Liu Chen-hai 劉 鎮 海, Shensi
Liu Chen-hua 劉 鎮 華, Shensi
Liu Ch'ih 劉 峙, KMT
Liu Chih-lu 劉 志 陸, Kwangtung
Liu Hsing 劉 興, Hunan, KMT
Liu Mou-en 劉 茂 恩, Szechwan
Liu Mou-sung 劉 茂 松, Szechwan
Liu Wen-hui 劉 文 輝, Szechwan
Liu Yün-feng 劉 雲 峯, Yunnan
Lü Ch'ao 呂 超, Szechwan
Mao Ping-wen 毛 秉 文, KMT
Men Chih-chung 門 致 中, under Feng Yü-hsiang, KMT
Miu P'ei-nan 繆 培 南, KMT
Pai Ch'ung-hsi 白 崇 禧, Kwangsi, KMT
Shang-kuan Yün-hsiang 上 官 雲 相, KMT
Sun Chen 孫 震, Szechwan
Tai Chi 戴 戟, Kwangtung
T'ang Sheng-chih 唐 生 智, Hunan, KMT
Teng Hsi-hou 鄧 錫 侯, Szechwan
Teng Yen-ta 鄧 演 達, KMT
T'ien Sung-yao 田 頌 堯, Szechwan
Wang Ju-hsien 王 汝 賢, Chihli clique
Wang T'ien-p'ei 王 天 培, Kweichow
Wang Yi-che 王 以 哲, Manchurian Army
Wei Li-huang 衛 立 煌, KMT
Wu Hsin-t'ien 吳 新 田, Anhwei clique
Yang Ai-yüan 楊 愛 源, Shansi, KMT
Yang Shan-te, see D
Yeh Ch'i 葉 琪, Hunan, KMT
Yeh T'ing 葉 挺, KMT and Communist

F. *Warlords of bandit origin*

Chang Chih-kung 張治功	Honan
Chang Ching-hui 張景惠	Manchuria
Chang Ching-t'ang 張敬湯	Hunan
Chang Ching-yao	,,
Chang Hai-p'eng	Manchuria
Chang Ju-chi 張汝驥	Yunnan
Chang Tso-hsiang	Manchuria
Chang Tso-lin	,,
Chang Tsung-ch'ang 張宗昌	,,
Chang Ying-fang 張膺芳	,,
Ch'u Yü-p'u 褚玉璞	Shantung
Fan Chung-hsiu 樊鍾秀	Honan
Feng Te-lin 馮德麟	Manchuria
Han Yü-k'un 憨玉崑	Honan
Hung Chao-lin 洪兆麟	Kwangtung
Lu Chan-k'uei 盧占魁	Shensi
Lu Hsing-pang 盧興邦	Fukien
Lu Jung-t'ing 陸榮廷	Kwangsi
Lung Chi-kuang 龍濟光	Kwangtung
Lung Chin-kuang 龍覲光	,,
Mo Jung-hsin	,,
Sun Pai-wan 孫百萬	Shantung
T'ang Yü-lin 湯玉麟	Manchuria
Tsou Fen 鄒芬	,,
Wang T'ien-tsung 王天縱	Honan
Wu Chün-sheng 吳俊陞	Manchuria

TABLE IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN WARLORDS

Chang Chen-fang	*Yüan Shih-k'ai's cousin*; acting governor, Chihli and then Honan; governor of Honan (1912); imprisoned after the 1917 imperial restoration.
Chang Ching-t'ang	*Chang Ching-yao's youngest brother*; commander of Hunan 1st MB and then of 7th D (1918); executed in 1920.
Chang Ching-yao	*Chang Ching-t'ang's elder brother and Li Ch'un's pupil*; commander of 7th D (1916); governor of Chahar and then Hunan (1917); driven out of Hunan and cashiered (1920); worked for Chang Tsung-ch'ang and commander of An-kuo 3rd Army (1928); worked for the Japanese during the Anti-Japanese War; assassinated.
Chang Ching-yü	*Chang Ching-yao's younger brother*; commander of 7th Artillery Regiment of 7th D (1923).
Chang P'ei-hsün	*Chang P'ei-jung's brother*; commander of 18th Regiment of 9th B (1922) and of 9th B (1923).
Chang P'ei-jung	*Chang P'ei-hsün's elder brother*; commander of Ts'aochow garrison; commander of Shantung 3rd MB (1920); commander of Yenchow garrison (1923).
Chang Shao-tseng	*His child married one of Wu P'ei-fu's children*; inspector-commissioner of the Army; minister of war (1922); premier (1923), resigned in 1924; murdered in Tientsin in 1928.

Chang Tso-lin	*His children married those of Chang Hsün, Pao Kuei-ch'ing, and Chin Yün-p'eng and his fourth son was engaged to Ts'ao K'un's daughter*; commander of 27th D (1912) and concurrently of 28th D (1917); governor of Fengtien (1916–18); inspector-general of Manchuria (1918); Marshal of An-kuo Army (1927); assassinated in 1928.
Chang Hsün	governor of Kiangsu (1913); inspector-general of the Yangtze (1913); governor of Anhwei (1915); leader of the 1917 imperial restoration.
Chin Yün-p'eng	acting premier (1920) and premier (1921).
Pao Kuei-ch'ing	governor of Heilungkiang (1917) and then Kirin (1919); minister of war (1921); director of the Chinese Eastern Railway (1924).
Ch'en Chih-chi	*Feng Kuo-chang's son-in-law*; commander of Kiangsu 8th D; recalled to Peking in 1917.
Chin Yün-o	*Chin Yün-p'eng's brother*; commander of 14th D (1923); commander of 24th D and deputy C.-in-C. of Wu P'ei-fu's troops (1926); supported Feng Yü-hsiang (1927) and his own army disbanded.
Chung Ching-jung	*Chung Ching-t'ang's brother*; he and his brother commanded Ch'en Chiung-ming's 1st D and 2nd D in 1923–4.
Fu Liang-tso	*Tuan Ch'i-jui's brother-in-law*; governor of Chahar; deputy minister of war (1916); governor of Hunan (1917) and recalled; interned by Ts'ao K'un after 1920; released and worked for Chang Tso-lin (1921); died in 1924.
Kao Shih-pin	*Meng En-yüan's nephew*; commander of Kirin 4th B (1917) and Kirin 1st D (1919); killed by Chang Tso-lin in 1922.
Meng En-yüan	governor of Kirin (1916); defeated by Chang Tso-lin (1919); arrested on murder charge in 1920.
K'ung Fan-chin	*K'ung Fan-wei's brother*; both were brigade commanders in Shensi (1920–5).
Li Yüan-hung	*His daughter married one of Yüan Shih-k'ai's sons*; President (1916–17 and 1922–3); died in 1928.
Liu Chen-hua	*Brother of Liu Chen-hai, Liu Mou-en, and Liu Mou-sung, all commanders in the Chen-sung* (鎮嵩) *Army*; C.-in-C. of Chen-sung Army (1914); civil governor of Shensi (1918); served under Wu P'ei-fu (1924–5); surrendered to the KMT Army (1927).
Lu Chien-chang	*Feng Yü-hsiang's uncle and his son, Ch'eng-wu, was Meng En-yüan's son-in-law*; commander of 7th D and governor of Shensi (1914); assassinated by Hsü Shu-cheng's men.
Hsü Shu-cheng	was assassinated by Lu Ch'eng-wu in 1925.
Lu Jung-t'ing	*Lung Chi-kuang's son married one of his daughters*; governor of Kwangsi; opposed Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916; inspector-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi; defeated and driven out of Kwangsi (1924); active in Peking (1927); died in 1928.
Lung Chi-kuang	*Lung Chin-kuang's younger brother*; governor of Kwangtung (1913); opposed Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916; driven out of Kwangtung; died in 1925.

Lung Chin-kuang. deputy commissioner for military affairs in Kwangtung; his troops were destroyed by Lu Jung-t'ing in 1916.

Ma Chi *Lu Jung-t'ing's adopted son*; commander of Kwangtung 1st MB (1916), then Kwangtung 4th Hu-kuo (護國) Army (1917), and then Kwangsi troops in Kwangtung (1919); commander of Kwangsi 1st D under Wu P'ei-fu (1926); killed in action.

Ma Fu-hsiang *Ma Hung-k'uei's father*; deputy commissioner of military affairs in Ninghsia (1913); governor of Suiyüan (1921); assistant director of north-west frontier defence (1925).

Ma Hung-k'uei commander of 5th MB in Suiyüan (1922) and then 7th D of the north-west army; commander of KMT 4th Army (1927).

Ni Ssu-ch'ung *Ni Yü-fen's brother and Ni Yin-fu's uncle, all commanders in Anhwei* (1918); deputy inspector-general of the Yangtze; governor of Anhwei (1918); dismissed (1920); died in 1924.

Shen Hung-ying *Mo Jung-hsin's child married one of his children*; garrison commander of Chinchow and Lienchow (1916); served under Lu Jung-t'ing; stationed in Kwangtung; garrison commander of Peise (1920); commander of 17th D against Ch'en Chiung-ming (1923); driven out of Kweilin (1924); supported Ch'en Chiung-ming and was defeated by KMT (1925).

Mo Jung-hsin commander of Kwangtung 2nd MB; governor of Kwangtung (1917); defeated by Ch'en Chiung-ming.

Sun Yüeh *Ts'ao K'un's adopted son*; staff officer under Ts'ao (1912); commander of 15th MB (1920) and then of Temporary 4th D (1924); governor of Honan; commander of 3rd Kuo-min Army (國民); died in 1928.

Tuan Chih-kuei *Yüan Shih-k'ai's adopted son*; commander of troops in Manchuria (1912) and in Chahar (1913); governor of Hupei and then Fengtien (1914–15); retired in 1920; died in 1925.

Wang Wen-hua *Liu Hsien-shih's nephew*; commander of a Kweichow contingent in Szechwan; C.-in-C. of Kweichow troops in Szechwan; killed in 1921.

Liu Hsien-shih governor of Kweichow (1916), forced to resign by Lu T'ao in 1920, but returned to Kweichow with the help of Yüan Tsu-ming and T'ang Chi-yao in 1923–4.

Wang Ying-k'ai *Husband of two of Sun Ch'uan-fang's sisters and was close to Wang Chan-yüan*; commander of 1st D of the Standing Army (1904) and deputy commander of modern troops under Feng-shan in 1907.

Sun Ch'uan-fang commander of 21st MB (1917) and then 2nd D (1922); governor of Fukien (1923); inspector-general of Chekiang and Fukien; C.-in-C. of troops of five provinces (1924–5); defeated by KMT (1926) and completely stripped of all military power by KMT in 1928.

Wu Kuang-hsin *Tuan Ch'i-jui's brother-in-law*; commander of 13th MB (1913); governor of Hunan (1920); sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment; Minister of War and commander of 6th Fengtien Army (1924); retired (1925).

Sworn-brothers among military leaders

Chang Hsün and Lu Jung-t'ing
Chang K'ai-ju and Li Fu-lin
Chang Tso-lin, Chang Ching-hui, and Chang Tso-hsiang
Ch'en Chi-t'ang and Lin Shao-jung
Ch'en I and Ts'ao K'un
Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yü-hsiang
Chu Jui and Lü Kung-wang
Li Tsung-jen and Lung Yün
Liu Chen-huan and Yang hsi-min
Lu Jung-t'ing and T'an Hao-ming
Lu Yung-hsiang and Ho Feng-lin
Ts'ao K'un and T'ang Hsiang-ming
Ts'ao K'un and Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsün
Wu P'ei-fu and Chao Ti
Yüan Shih-k'ai and Chang Hsi-luan

TABLE V. MILITARY GOVERNORS OF THE PROVINCES

	1912 *Tu-tu*	1913–14 (after the 2nd 'revolution')	1915 (Monarchical Movement) *Chiang-chün*
North			
Chihli	Feng Kuo-chang(H)	●Chao Ping-chün(Y)	●Chu Chia-pao(Y)
Fengtien	Chang Hsi-luan(Y)		
Heilungkiang	●Sung Hsiao-lien		
Honan	Chang Chen-fang(Y)	T'ien Wen-lieh(H)	T'ien Wen-lieh(H)
Kansu	●Chao Wei-hsi	●Chang Kuang-chien	
Kirin	●Ch'en Chao-ch'ang		
Shansi	Yen Hsi-shan(K)	Yen Hsi-shan(?)	Yen Hsi-shan(?)
Shantung	●Chou Tzu-ch'i(Y)	Chin Yün-p'eng(H)	Chin Yün-p'eng(H)
Shensi	Chang Feng-hui(K)	Lu Chien-chang(H)	Lu Chien-chang(H)
Sinkiang	Yang Tseng-hsin	Yang Tseng-hsin	Yang Tseng-hsin
South			
Anhwei	Po Wen-wei(K)	Ni Ssu-ch'ung(Y)	Ni Ssu-ch'ung(Y)
Chekiang	Chu Jui(?)	Chu Jui(?)	Chu Jui(?)
Fukien	Sun Tao-jen(Y)	Liu Kuan-hsiung(Y)	Liu Kuan-hsiung(Y)
Hunan	T'an Yen-k'ai(K?)	T'ang Hsiang-ming(Y)	T'ang Hsiang-ming(Y)
Hupei	Li Yuan-hung(K?)	Tuan Ch'i-jui(Y)	Wang Chan-yüan(H)
Kiangsi	Li Lieh-chün(K)	Li Ch'un(H)	Li Ch'un(H)
Kiangsu	●Ch'eng Te-ch'üan	Feng Kuo-chang(H)	Feng Kuo-chang(H)
Kwangsi	Lu Jung-t'ing	Lu Jung-t'ing	Lu Jung-t'ing
Kwangtung	●Hu Han-min(K)	Lung Chi-kuang(Y)	Lung Chi-kuang(Y?)
Kweichow	T'ang Chi-yao	Liu Hsien-shih	Liu Hsien-shih
Szechwan	●Yin Ch'ang-heng(K?)	Hu Ching-yi	Ch'en I(Y)
Yunnan	Ts'ai O	T'ang Chi-yao	T'ang Chi-yao

(● = civilian; ? = doubtful allegiance; H = Hsiaochan group; K = KMT; Y = Yüan Shih-k'ai's relative or henchman)

	1916 (after Yüan's death) *Tu-chün*	1917 (after the restoration)	1920–1 (after the 1920 war)
North			
Chihli	Ts'ao K'un(Ch)	Ts'ao K'un(Ch)	Ts'ao K'un(Ch)
Fengtien	Chang Tso-lin(M)	Chang Tso-lin(M)	Chang Tso-lin(M)
Heilungkiang	●Pi Kuei-fang	Wu Chün-sheng(M)	Wu Chün-sheng(M)
Honan	Chao Ti(Hu)	Chao Ti(Hu)	Chao Ti(Hu-Ch)
Kansu	●Chang Kuang-chien	●Chang Kuang-chien	Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsün
Kirin	Meng En-yüan(?)	Meng En-yüan(?)	Pao Kwei-ch'ing(M)
Shansi	Yen Hsi-shan(?)	Yen Hsi-shan(?)	Yen Hsi-shan(?)
Shantung	Chang Huai-chih(?)	Chang Huai-chih(?)	T'ien Chung-yü(An)
Shensi	Ch'en Shu-fan(An)	Ch'en Shu-fan(An)	Feng Yü-hsiang(Ch)
Sinkiang	Yang Tseng-hsin	Yang Tseng-hsin	Yang Tseng-hsin
South			
Anhwei	Chang Hsün(Hu)	Ni Ssu-ch'ung(An)	Chang Wen-sheng(An)
Chekiang	Lü Kung-wang	Yang Shan-te(An)	Lu Yung-hsiang(An)
Fukien	Li Hou-chi(An)	Li Hou-chi(An)	Li Hou-chi(An)
Hunan	Tan Yen-k'ai(L)	Fu Liang-tso(An)	T'an Yen-k'ai(L)
Hupei	Wang Chan-yüan(Ch)	Wang Chan-yüan(Ch)	Wang Chan-yüan(Ch)
Kiangsi	Li Ch'un(Ch)	Ch'en Kuang-yüan(Ch)	Ch'en Kuang-yüan(Ch)
Kiangsu	Feng Kuo-chang(Ch)	Li Ch'un(Ch)	Ch'i Hsieh-yüan(Ch)
Kwangsi	Ch'en Ping-k'un(L)	Lu Jung-t'ing(L)	T'an Hao-ming(L)
Kwangtung	Lu Jung-t'ing(L)	Ch'en Ping-k'un(L)	Mo Jung-hsin(L)
Kweichow	Liu Hsien-shih(L)	Liu Hsien-shih(L)	Lu T'ao(L)
Szechwan	Lo P'ei-chin(L)	Chou Tao-kang(L)	Hsiung K'e-wu(L)
Yunnan	T'ang Chi-yao(L)	T'ang Chi-yao(L)	T'ang Chi-yao(L)

(An = Anhwei clique; Ch = Chihli clique; Hu = Huai Army; L = local warlords; M = Fengtien clique)

	1922–3 (after the 1922 war) *Tu-li*	1924–5 (after the 1924 war) *Tu-pan*
North		
Chihli	Ts'ao K'un(Ch)	Li Ching-lin(M?)
Fengtien	×	Chang Tso-lin(M)
Heilungkiang	×	Wu Chün-sheng(M)
Honan	Chang Fu-lai(Ch)	Yüeh Wei-chün(Km)
Kansu	Lu Hung-t'ao(Ch)	Lu Hung-t'ao(Km)
Kirin	×	Chang Tso-hsiang(M)
Shansi	Yen Hsi-shan(?)	Yen Hsi-shan(?)
Shantung	Cheng Shih-ch'i(An)	Chang Tsung-ch'ang(M)
Shensi	Liu Chen-hua(Ch?)	Wu Hsin-t'ien(An)
Sinkiang	Yang Tseng-hsin(L)	Yang Tseng-hsin(L)
South		
Anhwei	Chang Wen-sheng(An)	Cheng Shih-ch'i(An)
Chekiang	Lu Yung-hsiang(An)	Sun Ch'uan-fang(SCF)
Fukien	Sun Ch'uan-fang(Ch)	Chou Yin-jen(SCF)
Hunan	Chao Heng-t'i(L)	Chao Heng-t'i(L)
Hupei	Hsiao Yao-nan(Ch)	Hsiao Yao-nan(Ch)
Kiangsi	Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsün(Ch?)	Fang Pen-jen(SCF)
Kiangsu	Ch'i Hsieh-yüan(Ch)	Lu Yung-hsiang(An)
Kwangsi	×	×
Kwangtung	×	×
Kweichow	Liu Hsien-shih(L)	×
Szechwan	×	Yang Sen (L-Ch)
Yunnan	×	T'ang Chi-yao(L)

(× = no appointment; Km = Kuo-min Army; SCF = Sun Ch'uan-fang)