INNER MONGOLIA, 1912: THE FAILURE OF INDEPENDENCE

Robert B. Valliant
(St. John's University)

Inner Mongolia is one of those areas of the world about which very little is known. The Inner Mongols joined the Manchus in their conquest of China, and Inner Mongolia has remained a part of the Chinese empire ever since. But there was one time, in 1911-12, when it could have been different. A quick glance at the map will show the strategic position of Inner Mongolia (here I am speaking almost solely of Eastern Inner Mongolia). It is possible to think of everything west of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads as Inner Mongolia, and if the area occupied by affiliated tribes is included, an even greater portion of the Three Eastern Provinces may be considered as Mongol. Had the Inner Mongols become independent in 1911-12, the political map of Inner Asia and China might have been very different. Given the international rivalry between Russia and Japan in Manchuria, independence would have made the Chinese position precarious, particularly had the Mongols managed to expel the Chinese from Mongol lands. However such speculation, while interesting, must remain in the realm of "what if?".

The point at issue here is what happened to the Inner Mongols? The Outer Mongols managed to maintain their independence, and the Mongols of Barga had at least semi-independence for a number of years. Why did the Inner Mongols fail? According to Lattimore, the Inner Mongol princes did not join Outer Mongolia because they believed they would be overshadowed by the Outer Mongol princes; because of their economic dependence on China; and because they thought the Republic would be weak and manageable. He also noted that the failure of the two to unite must have been influenced by the policies of Russia and Japan.[1] Certainly Lattimore was very familiar with Inner Mongolia and we may accept his

reasons. However I propose to look at just one year, the key year of 1911-12, to see what, in the complicated interplay of events among Mongols, Chinese, Japanese and Russians, made the Inner Mongol princes cast their lot with their Chinese overlords and thereby throw away their best chance for independence.

In doing this I have relied heavily, indeed almost exclusively, on Japanese sources. I have done so because little other source material for the day to day flow of events is available in any language. This is explained in detail in the Postscript. In writing I have attempted to remove most of the Japanese opinion, since the Inner Mongols are the focus, not Japanese actions in Inner Mongolia.

Since Inner Mongol lands were being overrun by Chinese colonists who call on a well-armed army to protect them, the out-numbered Mongols were forced to depend on outside help to offset the Chinese advantage. The most natural friends were the Russians, Japanese and Outer Mongols, and all helped to some degree, providing the Mongols with guns, training, and in the case of the Russians, aiding the Barga Mongols. Yet the real crux of the situation lay in the Russia-Japan-China triangle. Only the Outer Mongols were interested in Inner Mongolia, and the Russians restrained them. That made relations with China, both with Yuan's government in Peking and with the Governor-General in Mukden, crucial for the Inner Mongols. For without Chinese aid and/or tacit acquiescence, Inner Mongol independence would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve and maintain.

Eastern Inner Mongolia (or just Inner Mongolia), defined as the Jerim, Juu-uda, Silingol and Jusutu leagues, contained about 129,000 square miles, of which 35% came under Mongol jurisdiction and 64% under the Chinese military governors of the Three Eastern Provinces and Jehol. Roughly 23% of the Mongol-administered land was under cultivation, and the Chinese cultivated the greater part of that. The corresponding figure for Chinese-administered land was 32%. According to incomplete Japanese population estimates of 1915, about 2,000,000 people lived in the Mongol-administered areas, and about 4,500,000 lived under Chinese jurisdiction. However a closer look at just the Jerim League will show what was happening. There 28.3% of the land was cultivated, 10.2% in the Mongol areas and 18.1% in the Chinese areas, or roughly 1:2, but the population statistics show a very different ratio. Only 129,000

people lived in the Mongol areas, whereas 2,493,000 lived under Chinese jurisdiction. That made the population ratio 1:19.[2] These last two figures tell the story. The Mongols were being dispossessed in their own land by the Chinese, and that is what made independence so attractive.

Between Revolution and Abdication: Peking.

In Peking after October confusion was the norm. Yuan shih-k'ai, who became Premier in November, advocated a constitutional monarchy as the best solution, and the Japanese, American and British governments agreed.[3] However, the Manchu royal family was unable to settle on a course of action. The Prince Regent and Prince Ch'ing were willing to go along with Yuan, but another faction led by Prince Kung and Duke Tsai-tse refused to have anything to do with Yuan. They accused the Regent and Prince Ch'ing of ignoring the ancestral power and declared that to join Yuan and make reforms would be an insult to the ancestors.[4]

The Inner Mongol princes in Peking were also divided, but at a meeting on December 3 the majority present opposed independence. On the same day Prince Kharachin presented the Chinese with a list of six requests: (1) that the Eastern Inner Mongols not be subject to the control of the Chinese governors in the Three Eastern Provinces and Jehol; (2) that each banner be permitted to train its own troops; (3) that the Mongols be allowed to collect taxes on Mongol produce and to use the money to administer Mongol areas; (4) that Chinese in Mongol areas be placed under Mongol jurisdiction; (5) that two Mongols be placed in the *Li-fan yuan* as senior councillors; and (6) that Mongols be allowed the same rights as Chinese under the constitution. Two days later a group of Mongol merchants endorsed the princes' views. The princes then asked one of their number to telegraph the Living Buddha in Urga and advise him to renounce independence. They feared that since Mongolia bordered both Russian and British territory, the two powers would interfere, and they particularly distrusted Prince Khanda (Khanda dorji wang, later Minister of War in Urga). They asked the *Li-fan yuan* to punish him for stirring up matters in Urga.[5]

No action was taken on the Mongol requests, and as the month of December wore on the attitude of the Mongols on the question of independence or republic hardened in favor of the former, while that of

the Manchus weakened. Perhaps as a result of a court conference on December 22 or 23, at which Prince Ch'ing agreed with Yuan on the need for a national assembly, more than 80 Mongol princes met in Peking on the 24th and agreed to accept a constitutional monarchy; however, they informed the cabinet that if a republican government was formed in China, all the Mongols would declare complete independence. At the same time the princes formed a United Mongol Society to reform Mongol customs and politics and to uphold Mongol rights. The idea seems to have been suggested by Kharachin and may have been an attempt to unite all Mongols into a kind of independence organization.[6]

The Mongols' idea of their relationship can best be embodied in the words of two of them, Kharachin and Darkhad. "Originally Mongolia was not part of China, but because it followed the Ch'ing royal house from the first day, it owes that house a great debt. Mongolia has absolutely no connection at all with China. Consequently, today when the Ch'ing court has been destroyed, Mongolia has no natural connection with China and should be independent." These were the words of Kharachin. Darkhad summed it up more succinctly, "If the Manchu court were destroyed and a republic established, all the Mongol princely families which have been subordinate to the Manchus would be under no obligation to continue their relationship with the Chinese form of government."[7]

With the court divided, military pressure from the south growing every day, and Yuan becoming more interested in the presidency of a republic, the stage was set for the imperial conference on January 17 which discussed Yuan's memorial of the previous day suggesting an early abdication. Seven Manchu princes, seven Mongol princes, the Empress Dowager and the cabinet attended. The Dowager broke out crying at Prince Ch'ing's declaration that abdication was the only way to preserve the dynasty, and the Manchu princes remained silent. But the Mongols vociferously opposed abdication. Nayantu claimed that the Mongols would not understand any form of government except a monarchy, and Dörbed intimated that China might be divided into north and south with a monarchy retained in the north and a republic established in the south. Prince Ch'ing rejected this, claiming that a country could not be formed of the north alone. The debate continued, but the meeting finally broke up with no decision.[8]

At the next meeting on the 19th, Prince Ch'ing opened the debate by declaring that he no longer regarded abdication as inevitable and that a

constitutional monarchy was acceptable. The Mongols and Manchus applauded this, but Chao Ping-chun raised the possibility of abolishing both the monarchy and the revolutionary government and establishing a provisional government in Tientsin. The Mongols objected that this would not resolve the issue of monarchy or republic, and once again they brought up the question of dividing China into a southern republic and a northern monarchy. Finally Chao decided to force the issue by declaring in the name of the cabinet that the present situation could continue no longer. If the matter remained unresolved the cabinet would resign. If the resignations were not accepted, the ministers would simply leave. Still no decision was made.[9]

After this meeting the Chinese adopted a conciliatory policy toward the Manchu and Mongol princes. Chao made the rounds of the princes attempting to persuade them that they had no other choice; they were not strong enough to resist the revolutionaries. For their part, the revolutionaries endeavored to allay Mongol fears. Wu T'ing-fang, the revolutionary foreign minister, declared that all the people would be equal under the law. The princes would be allowed to retain their ranks and stipends, and all the nobility would be given suitable rewards. To make the conciliatory policy more attractive, the revolutionaries began sending threatening letters to those Mongols who insisted on opposing the republic.[10]

Perhaps as a sign of a growing rift between the Manchus and Mongols, the Manchus excluded the Mongols and debated a course of action among themselves. By this time the Mongols were beginning to see the Manchus as irresolute in their opposition to abdication and a republic. So, shut out by the Manchus, the Mongols held their own meeting on the 21st to discuss the question of complete independence or federation and cooperation with the Chinese. Apparently the latter alternative was rejected because at an imperial conference on the 22nd both the Manchus and Mongols insisted on a constitutional monarchy.[11] After this meeting the situation deteriorated rapidly. Assassination removed Liang-pi, chief of the general staff and one of the Manchus most strongly opposed to abdication, on January 26. Then on the 28th the army agreed to Yuan's election as president after a republic had been proclaimed.

Under these circumstances there can be little doubt that debate among the Inner Mongols over independence or a constitutional monarchy

(they all rejected a republic) was furious. Their dilemma was a lack of strength. This had been the major factor hindering an independence movement from the outset. Even if they declared independence there was no way they could maintain it. Nor was there any unity of opinion on the question of joining the Urga government. Of the princes in Peking, only Darkhan, Bintü and Bo Wang (Prince Amurlinggui) were comparatively strong in their support of a constitutional monarchy, but they had little real strength.[12]

On February 2 rumors appeared that the United Mongol Society had telegraphed Wu that the Mongols would accept the Republic. These were quickly denied. Nayantu told Gilbert Reid that the Mongols would not oppose abdication but would oppose a republic. However, they would have no objection to a republican system being established in the southern provinces. The Mongol princes reaffirmed their determination in a telegram to Wu stating that the conditions exchanged between Yuan and the Dowager concerning the treatment of the royal house were the extent of Mongol concessions. Should there be any objection, the Mongols would break with China and declare their independence. Even on the day of abdication, February 12, the *Asahi* correspondent in Peking reported that all the Mongol princes had sent the government a telegram declaring that they would accept the Living Buddha and establish a country to be called "Mongolia." There is probably no way of ascertaining what the Mongols really thought. A good deal of their action must have been pure bluff, but there is a certain consistency in their views. At any rate, Bo Wang, representing the Inner Mongol princes, sent Yuan a telegram on February 20 congratulating him on his election as President.[13] Thus while not formally submitting, the Mongols appeared to be trying to make their peace with Yuan in Peking.

Stirrings of Independence in Inner Mongolia.

The news of the revolution had a diffuse impact in Inner Mongolia. What agitated the Mongols the most was the news from Hupei, Kiangsi and Szechuan that the Chinese were killing Mongols. The Mongols did not like the Chinese much anyway, and this only made them hate the men from the south even more. At the same time it made them feel more kinship with the Manchus.

While the fate of the empire was being debated in Peking, Bo Wang and Prince Darkhan went back to Inner Mongolia to consult the princes there. Bo Wang arrived in Mukden on December 17, ostensibly to inspect Mongol business plans and to proclaim certain political reforms, but there can be little doubt that his real purpose was to sound out Mongol and Chinese opinion. He held one meeting in his capital west of Ch'ang-t'u and another in the capital of the head of the South Gorlos banner. At this latter meeting an agent from Urga may have been present. On January 14 Prince Darkhan arrived in Mukden. He conferred with the Chinese Governor-General, Chao Erh-sun, two days later about the supply of arms and ammunition for a Loyalist army in Manchuria and about a common attitude toward Russia. He was also going to contact all the princes, dukes and other nobles of the Jerim League concerning a general meeting Bo Wang wanted to hold.[14]

Bo Wang's conference was held at the end of January. Only a few of the princes bothered to show up, and the results are uncertain. The Japanese military authorities found nothing special in the meeting, but the *Asahi* reported much debate over Bo Wang's insistence on forming a Loyalist army. Financial difficulties apparently prevented this. Nevertheless the prince persisted and went on to confer with Chao about personally raising an army of 4,000 men.[15]

The two princes may have been preparing the ground for an independence movement in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. On February 5 the *Asahi* reported from Peking that the Royalist Party (*Tsung-she-tang*) had failed, and its members were withdrawing to Manchuria to join the Loyalist Party (*Chin-wang-tang*). There the two planned to establish an independent Manchuria-Mongolia under Russian and Japanese protection.

If the Mongols in the south were reluctant to act, those in the north were not. On the morning of January 15 a band of Mongols proclaimed Hailar independent. They attacked the Chinese yamen, and the Chinese troops fled without a fight into the Russian railroad zone. There they were disarmed and sent to Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang province. A representative from Urga arrived soon afterward. After proclaiming Hailar independent, the Mongols moved on to Luan-pin-fu, the official Chinese headquarters about one mile from Manchouli. They told the Chinese to leave, or they would attack. When the Chinese did not comply the Mongols attacked and captured the town. That put them in control of most of the territory west of the Hsing-an mountains.[16]

A Loyalist movement began taking shape slowly. It had Japanese support, and Prince Su was the figurehead. On February 25 a group of Mongols met at Ch'ang-t'u and decided to raise a loyalist army. According to their decision Manchu and Mongol princes and dukes were to contribute men and money for military supplies. The Mongols would be responsible for raising and supplying the troops, but the leader would be a Manchu. While the army was being readied, negotiations might be held with the Chinese, but when the Manchus and Mongols won their victory their lands in Manchuria held by the Chinese would be restored.[17]

In fact the Royalist Party had no formal organization. Prince Su was its ostensible head, and it included Manchus, Chinese and Mongols. Most prominent were Prince Kung, Duke Tsai-tse, Chang Hsun, the Governor-General of Liang-kiang, T'ieh-liang, who had been commander of the Manchu forces at Nanking in October, Li Ching-i, Hsi-liang, Chang Ming-ch'i, Governor-General in Canton in November, and Sheng-yun, governor of Shensi. The party had little Chinese support, and its own bannermen had little stomach for the fight. Shen-yun tried to persuade Chang Tso-lin to advance on Peking in the name of the party, but little came of the proposed expedition. Of more direct importance to the party, no one would sell them arms. Because Chao was unsympathetic, he refused to permit the sale of rifles and ammunition, and the Japanese apparently did the same.[18]

Perhaps the deciding factor in the failure of the movement was the withdrawal of Mongol and Japanese support. By mid-April the Japanese Foreign Ministry had decided it had had enough of the activities of the adventurers and ordered them out of Manchuria. (However the Japanese did propose to continue their commitment to the Mongols; see below.) At about the same time Prince Darkhan became disenchanted with the Royalists, and high officials in Bo Wang's banner made known their doubts about Prince Su's intentions, thus implying little support.[19]

One can probably attribute this flagging support to the machinations of Yuan Shih-k'ai and his unwitting ally, Governor-General Chao, and to the "trend of the times". Since the Chinese military forces in Manchuria would either have to be neutralized or won over in order for a restoration to be effected, both Yuan and the Royalists watched them carefully. Yuan kept up a constant stream of envoys like Tuan Chih-kuei to sound Chao's and Chang Tso-lin's opinions. Chao treated these men courteously in order

that no misunderstandings arise, but he made no secret of the fact his sympathies lay with the monarchy. However, since he saw his main duty as maintaining order, he ordered his commanders, Chang Tso-lin and Feng Lin-ko, to suppress the revolutionaries. He did raise the Republican flag over the Governor-General's yamen on February 18, six days after the abdication, but he and his men did not cut off their queues. In addition to the envoys, Yuan distributed large bribes in the right places, and he appears to have won over Chang and Feng by promising them command of two new-style divisions to be created out of the old provincial forces (*hsun-fang-tui*). On the other hand, on the darker side, reports circulated that Yuan was sending assassins from Peking and Chefoo to get Chao and Chang.[20]

Yuan also worked on the Mongols. On the one hand he attempted to promote better feeling between the Chinese and Mongols. In early March the United Society of Chinese and Mongols (*Han-Meng lien-ho-hui*) was formed. Bo Wang was one of the founders, and its patrons included princes Nayantu, Naiman, Bintü, and Kharachin. Bo Wang also joined several other fraternal organizations. He was a patron of the Five Peoples' Progressive Society (*Wu-tsu kuo-min ho-chin-hui*), and an honorary patron of the Society for the Advancement of the Manchus (*Man-tsu tung-chin-hui*). The United Society of Chinese and Mongols may have been organized to head off another society that was forming among the Inner and Outer Mongol princes. At any rate, it was apparently suggested to the Mongols by T'ang Tsai-li, Yuan's Army Minister. Yuan's hand may also be detected in the United Mongol Society's decision to send a telegram to the Living Buddha advising him to give up his independence and submit to Yuan. This telegram was followed by a decision to send a Mongol envoy to tender the same advice.[21]

Throughout the spring Yuan used the threat of troops to keep the Mongols in Manchuria in line, but they were more a show of force than an actual threat. The Chinese relied chiefly on measures of conciliation. Lamas were used freely in an attempt to pacify the princes. Of course there was the usual resort to bribes. Yuan sent a letter to the Mongol princes in Peking in early March declaring that the recent disorders which had led to a loss of government were an unbearable shame. The princes would receive sufficient protection and should rest assured, and they should also stay in Peking. Furthermore, since they had all suffered losses

in the disorders, they would be given 10,000 taels each. On the more positive side, Yuan tried to reform the administration of Mongolia. He appointed Hu Wei-te governor. Hu was familiar with Mongol affairs, and he had a knowledge of military matters, but perhaps just as important, he had also been Minister to Japan.[22]

Mongols and Foreigners.

In order for the Inner Mongols to attain their independence, it is obvious that they would have to depend on outside help to counter the Chinese superiority in arms, numbers, and communications. That outside help could come from three sources: Russia, Japan, or Outer Mongolia. During the months after the Revolution in Wu-chang, the Mongols turned to both the Japanese and Russians for help.

During the early months of 1912 the possibility of Japanese aid was very real. In December 1911 Prince Kharachin approached Kawashima Naniwa, a Japanese employed by the Chinese and a close friend of Prince Su, the ostensible head of the Royalist Party, for a loan. Through Kawashima's aid Kharachin and Baγarin obtained ¥110,000 from the Japanese government in return for mining rights in the Juu-uda League.[23] The success of these two prompted others to try to obtain Japanese money. Bintü asked for a loan but was apparently refused, as was a man from the middle Kharachin banner who wanted to borrow ¥5000 to buy 300 rifles. Joriγtu, a prince in Karkhan's banner, asked for ¥70,000 in mid-April, and negotiations were still in progress at the end of May, but there is no indication that he ever received anything. In addition North Gorlos, Naiman and Jasaγtu (also known as Wu-T'ai, Otai, and Udai) were also rumored to be ready to approach the Japanese for money, but whether they did or not is uncertain.[24]

The purpose of the loans was usually arms. There were two ways the Mongols could obtain guns: secretly or with Chao's permission. The former way would be the most natural if the Mongols were seeking independence. Kharachin and Baγarin did make a deal for Japanese arms, and men from Bo Wang's banner questioned Major Miyauchi about buying 2,000 army rifles from the *Taihei-gumi,* the Japanese firm that also supplied the Chinese revolutionaries in the South. The Japanese Foreign Ministry agreed to the sale, and left it to the army to find a way to get the guns to the Mongols, thus implying a secret sale.[25]

The Mongols also used the second way. They could buy arms openly from the Japanese or from anybody else who would sell to them, but they needed Chao's permission first. Toward the end of May both Jasaγtu and Tüshiyetü had men in Mukden seeking Chao's authorization, claiming they needed the rifles for self-defense. Chao refused, saying he had to await a directive from Yuan. The representatives then turned to Chang Tso-lin and asked him to intercede. Chang did speak to Chao on their behalf, but Chao remained unmoved. He considered it too serious a matter and would only permit the Mongols to raise troops according to the old system—1,000 men per banner. If the princes wanted more, they would have to go to Peking and get Yuan's permission. However Chao may have relented somewhat; Darkhan was allowed to buy some arms and ammunition.[26]

In addition to selling arms and ammunition to the Mongols, the Japanese also agreed to provide men to train troops in modern methods. This was particularly true in Baγarin's banner. The Japanese officer there, Kimura Naoto, reported that between June 1 and August 1, 100 men between the ages of 18 and 25 were to be trained, and then they would be replaced by 100 new men. In six months that would be 300 men, enough for three basic companies. Officers' training was to begin on June 15 and last for 100 days.[27]

Besides the Japanese, the Mongols also sought out their other natural allies, the Russians. When one of the princes travelled to Harbin in early December there were reports he was being courted by the Russians. These may have been just rumors because when Kharachin and Bintü visited the Russian Chargé in Peking and asked if Russia would supply aid if Inner Mongolia became independent, the Chargé turned them down. He conceded Outer Mongolia had full Russian support, but the Inner Mongols could expect only sympathy. This refusal was underlined when St. Petersburg also refused to supply money and arms to the Mongols living between the Tolo and Sungari rivers. When the Mongols then threatened to turn to Japan for support, the Russian government asked Tokyo to take a neutral attitude.[28]

Rejected in Peking, Darkhan and Bo Wang and Bintü asked the Russian authorities in Mukden for money. They wanted it for military activities and to purchase arms. At the same time one of the lamas close to Darkhan was going to start working to persuade the Mongol princes and lamas to depend on the Russians. The Russians also refused these requests,

yet rumors of a close relationship with the Russians would not die. In the middle of March a high official in Bo Wang's banner told the Japanese that North Gorlos had been won over by the Russians, and that Darkhan was now leaning their way. It was just a matter of time before they also won over Jasaγtu.[29]

Yet even while seeking Russian and Japanese aid, the Mongols remained suspicious of the ultimate intentions of both countries. This is vividly illustrated in the report of a meeting between a Japanese and the Mongols of Bo Wang's banner. The Japanese had lived in the banner for two years after the Russo-Japanese War supervising the school so he was familiar with the Mongols and had their confidence. The banner officials told him that they knew the Japanese were aiding the revolutionaries. In particular they referred to a certain military man and a consul. The Japanese claimed his country was neutral and that the military man was no longer in the army. The Mongols replied that they knew that, but it did not change anything. At the same time the men were no less suspicious of the Russians. They knew that Outer Mongol independence had been achieved only with Russian aid and that it was not true independence.[30]

Throughout the spring there were recurrent rumors of Russian aid for the Inner Mongols. In early May rumors spread that Jasaγtu had borrowed 30,000 taels. By mid-May the amount had increased to 4,000,000 taels, and now not only Jasaγtu, but also Jalaid and Gorlos were involved. Of course the princes all denied it, and the Tao-nan Prefect was disposed to accept this denial. Then in early June rumors reached Peking that the Mongols around Tao-nan (Jasaγtu) had borrowed 1,000,000 rubles.[31]

However it was more than just a question of Russian loans. The Russians had been intimately involved in the occupation of Hailar and the attack on Luan-pin-fu by the Barga Mongols in January. This was common knowledge, so when a newspaper reported in mid-March that Russian troops had entered eastern Mongolia, it was serious. But a telegram from Tao-nan denied this report. In the south some of the Mongols in Kharachin's banner wanted Russian protection, but as of the end of March there was no link between them and the Russians. What the Russians did do was increase their troops in the railroad zone. At the end of May the Heilungkiang Foreign Office reported to Chao that over 10,000 Russian troops were stationed in Manchouli, and troop movements continued into

July. The Chinese watched the Russians closely, and when a Russian representing the Chinese Eastern Railroad visited Tao-nan, the Prefect quickly reported that the man had come to open a branch consulate. Chao telegraphed the Russian consul-general in Harbin to stop such activity. According to a Japanese report the Russian did nothing more than survey commercial activity and arrange to buy some grain.[32]

The Japanese and Russian governments worried about the course of events in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. They had begun conversations in mid-October 1911 about what might be necessary to meet the new circumstances. Both were uneasy because they did not have an agreement that covered Inner Mongolia, and at the same time they were both involved with the Consortium that was going to make a loan to Yuan Shih-k'ai's government. Japan and Russia were not members, but they were anxious that the Consortium not infringe upon their rights and interests in the north.

A change may be detected in Japanese policy beginning about the middle of March. At that time both Japan and Russia agreed to join the Consortium on condition that their rights in Manchuria were recognized, but this still had to be negotiated with the Four Powers. Almost at the same time, the Japanese began to sense that Chao and Chang might not be trustworthy allies and that without them it would be impossible to establish an independent Manchuria-Mongolia, that is, support the Inner Mongols. Great Britain had already complained in February that Japan was not showing enough neutrality. So Japan became more cautious. The vice-chief of the general staff telegraphed his men in Inner Mongolia that a rising should be postponed, although the stockpiling of arms and the training of troops might continue, and in April the man who was really behind the "independent Manchuria-Mongolia movement," Kawashima Naniwa, was ordered back to Japan.[33]

As has been noted above, the Japanese did continue to train Mongol troops, and the Japanese army continued with its commitment to supply arms already purchased to Kharachin and Baγarin. These were captured in mid-June by the Chinese north of Cheng-chia-t'un after a fight in which several Mongols, Japanese and Chinese were killed and wounded. This was really the end of Japanese support to the Inner Mongols.[34]

The Russians were cautious from the outset. Except for aid to the Barga Mongols and to the Outer Mongols nothing was given to the Inner

Mongols. A definite answer here must await the publication of more Russian archival material. Such an attitude made sense to the Russians because there was no agreement between them and the Japanese to divide Inner Mongolia into spheres of influence. The agreements of 1907 and 1910 had applied only to Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Actual negotiations began in January 1912 and culminated in the agreement of July 8, but while the negotiations were in progress the Russians did nothing to disturb the Japanese.

Inner Mongols: Outer Mongols

Throughout the spring rumors circulated that the Inner Mongols were going to mount an independence movement, and this was enough to keep Chinese telegrams flying with dire warnings of this prince or that prince getting ready to rise up against the Chinese. The truth of the matter was much more complicated. A Chinese cattle dealer who had travelled in Inner Mongolia between October and February and who had done business with the Mongols for 20 years and knew them well, told the Japanese that of the 49 Inner Mongol banners, only Kharachin, Auqan, Ongniud, Tümed (all under the jurisdiction of the Jehol governor), Bo Wang, Bintü, and Darkhan (under the jurisdiction of the governors of the Three Eastern Provinces) were comparatively strong in their support of the Manchus. The other princes, he claimed, were opportunists, and eleven had sent envoys to Urga to congratulate the Living Buddha (both Baγarin, Ar-khorchin, Üjümüchin, Abaγa, Hochit, Sünid, Tümed, Dörbed, Jalaid, and Jarod).[35]

The nature of the relationship between the Inner Mongols and the government in Urga is not clear. In the six Inner Mongol leagues, 35 of the 49 banners submitted memorials declaring their submission. The 35 included the whole of the Silingol League, seven out of the 10 banners of the Jerim League, six out of the 11 banners of the Juu-uda League, (Ar-khorchin, both Baγarin, both Jarod, and Keshikten) five out of the six banners of the Ulanchab League, two of the five banners of the Jusutu League, and five of the seven in the Yeke-juu League. Submission, however, did not imply active support.[36]

There was constant communication between Inner Mongolia and Urga, both by envoys and letters. Bo Wang's banner sent a man at the beginning of April to observe conditions in Outer Mongolia and to make

arrangements for communications. Toward the end of May a Mongol told Chang Tso-lin that representatives from the 49 banners were then in Urga. There is no way of determining the authenticity of these reports, but it would seem natural to suppose there was a great deal of coming and going between Urga and the Inner Mongol banners.[37]

It was much easier to send letters. The Chinese constantly reported to Chao that letters were arriving from Urga and that these were having an important effect on the Inner Mongol princes. Certainly letters were coming, and the Japanese archives even contain one or two examples of them, but their effect is another matter. Darkhan was reported to have rejected them and sent them back out of a sense of duty to the Republic, and in the Juu-uda League Baγarin refused a request from Urga, transmitted by Ar-khorchin, the head of the league, for 25 mounted men from each banner to put down Chinese troops near Urga, and he expected the other princes to do the same. Another way the Living Buddha might have tried to win the Inner Mongols over was with appointments to office. On June 5 Urga appointed Kharachin to be the Inner Mongol Prefect.[38]

However envoys, letters and offices would not really help the Inner Mongols against the well-armed Chinese. What they needed was military help. This was to be provided by Toγtaqu (Toktokho), one of the most famous of the Mongol "bandits". Originally he had come from the Inner Mongol gentry class but had become disgusted with the continued sale of land to the Chinese by the South Gorlos prince. Toγtaqu took up the fight and led a band of men plundering, burning, robbing and killing Chinese merchants, and even the Mongol aristocracy did not escape his wrath. About 1910 the Chinese finally forced him out of Inner Mongolia, and he escaped to Outer Mongolia and ultimately became the Living Buddha's bodyguard.[39]

Rumors of this Mongol warrior appeared in Inner Mongolia in February 1912. He was fighting in Heilungkiang, Feng-t'ien and Jehol (a geographical impossibility), and he was winning. Probably closer to the truth were the reports that Toγtaqu was leading a band of men in the area around Tao-nan. The Chinese sent Wu Chun-sheng to Tao-nan, but before he left he told the Japanese that if he found Toγtaqu to be a Loyalist he would persuade the Mongol to wait until the time was right before striking. On the other hand, if Toγtaqu was a bandit or a supporter of the Republic, Wu would suppress him. Wu stayed in Tao-nan just two and one-half weeks, from March 27 to April 17.[40]

What worried the Chinese was reports that Toγtaqu also had 500 Russians in his party. These turned out to be just rumors, but Tao-nan was in a state of panic. The Prefect was anxious because of reports reaching him that Toγtaqu's appeals to the Inner Mongols living around Tao-nan had had a particularly strong effect on the princes, and they were vacillating in their loyalty to the Chinese.[41]

Since Wu returned from Tao-nan in just two and one-half weeks it is doubtful that any fighting took place (there are no reports of any). Perhaps Toγtaqu's presence around Tao-nan was just a rumor. But at almost the same time, the first part of April, reports came in from the Baγarin banners that Toγtaqu was leading a force of 500-600 men to make Baγarin submit. Then in the middle of May the Governor of Heilungkiang reported that Toγtaqu was training a force of 30,000 men in Outer Mongolia to invade Inner Mongolia. How much of this is rumor and how much truth is difficult to tell, but geography would seem to indicate that a great part was simply not true.[42]

The actions of the Inner Mongol princes betray a cautious attitude. Both Darkhan's and Bo Wang's banners were raising men and buying arms and ammunition, but they took no overt anti-Chinese action, and toward the end of May there is some indication that they may have been changing their minds about any commitment to fight for independence.

In mid-March Bo Wang was in Peking trying to purchase arms, and the men who remained behind in the banner were trying to raise a force of 1,000 men. Their ostensible purpose was self-defense, but they also wanted to get back all the land that had been rented to the Chinese. Yet there were a great many problems involved with raising even such a small force, and obtaining arms and training men were the chief among them. By early May reports said that Bo Wang was training 500 men, but a Japanese military man put the number at only 50. Moreover the instructors were from the old Imperial Guard, and they had little ability. In late May the banner managed to purchase 600 Russian rifles from the *Teihei-gumi*, in July it bought 950,000 rounds of ammunition.[43]

Even while this was taking place the Japanese thought they detected a difference of opinion between Bo Wang himself and the men in the banner. A recent arrival, a man who had been with Bo Wang in Peking, began speaking differently. He criticized the official in the banner who was in charge of raising and training troops, implying that such a course would

only cause trouble with the Chinese. The Japanese took this as a change in Bo Wang's views since the man had just come from Peking.[44]

Darkhan arrived in Cheng-chia-t'un around the middle of March. While there he was visited by many Inner Mongol princes, and presumably they talked about the developing situation, but none of the results of these talks are know. One of the most influential men in his banner and one of the richest, Joriγtu, was also in Cheng-chia-t'un. Joriγtu made no secret of his opposition to the Republic. This gave rise to many reports by Chinese officials that Joriγtu was secretly raising a large number of men to attack the Chinese. Rumors so unnerved the Liao-yuan (Cheng-chia-t'un) magistrate that he asked Chao to send troops.[45]

Darkhan's true feelings remain unknown. On May 28 he informed Chao that he had come from Peking on Yuan's order to proclaim the Republic, and he added that while many of the Mongols had not formally submitted to the Republic, they did not oppose it. Consequently, there was no need to send troops since that would only cause trouble. If this meant that Darkhan had accepted the Republic, the Tao-nan Prefect was not convinced. He noted that Darkhan and Joriγtu had raised a force of 500 men and bought 40 boxes of Japanese rifles and ammunition. Still, the banner did not come into open opposition, and Chao received reports from his spies that Darkhan had rejected frequent appeals from the Living Buddha to come over and fight the Chinese.[46]

To bring some order out of all the conflicting rumors that beset Inner Mongolia, Colonel Takayama Kimimichi drew up a report for the Japanese general staff on June 1 titled *Mōko jōhō. dai 2* (Mongol Intelligence No. 2). While Takayama may have been more optimistic about Mongol resistance to the Chinese than the situation warranted, it is still a good summary, and when it was drawn up the Chinese had still not halted the Japanese arms shipment to the Mongols. That was about two weeks away.

According to Takayama the number of Inner Mongol princes who believed in independence and who were raising troops was growing. The Chinese were worried and had been sending pacification envoys and agents to ascertain the situation, but all the princes, especially those gathered around Darkhan in Cheng-chia-t'un, publicly expressed their intention to submit to the Republic. Yet while doing so they continued to train troops and were even sending agents to Mukden to keep watch on the Chinese.

The Inner Mongols were being encouraged by the Living Buddha's constant solicitations through envoys and letters to join his government. These were tempting because of the Living Buddha's religious prestige, but also because he had Russian support and a capable military leader in Toγtaqu. All the young Mongols were awaiting his arrival from Urga and would flock to his banner when the time came.

Takayama found three tendencies present in Inner Mongolia. One group wanted to join Outer Mongolia and the Living Buddha. The northern princes were its principal supporters, but it also included the lamas and those who saw success assured by Toγtaqu's prestige. A second group, composed chiefly of central princes and commoners, felt Inner Mongolia should depend only on itself in attaining independence. Neither of the two would accept Chinese participation, and all Chinese would be expelled once independence had been achieved. The third group which included Kharachin, Bintü, Auqan, Darkhan and Joriγtu preferred to have Inner Mongolia join with Manchuria in independence. The Chinese occupied much of these princes' land, so while the Mongols had little love for the Manchus and Chinese, they did fear the military force the latter could command. Should Inner Mongolia join Urga, these princes would have to bear the brunt of the Chinese attack, and this made them amenable to cooperation with Chinese officials in Manchuria.

One of the most interesting parts of Takayama's report is an evaluation of the Jerim League leadership by a lama of the Imperial Temple of the Princes. This lama noted that although North Gorlos had planned to issue a declaration of independence, he had held off out of uncertainty of the consequences. South Gorlos also opposed the Republic, but he, too, had a weak will and a debt of over 200,000 taels. Tüsiye did not rank high enough among the princes to serve as a leader. Darkhan was the most influential man in the league and was strongly opposed to the Republic, which accounted for his early leadership. The second most influential man, Jasaγtu, also opposed the Republic. The lama did not know Tüshiyetü's opinion, but he thought it would be the same as that of the other princes. Bintü was young, possessed of a decisive nature and opposed to the Republic, but unfortunately was financially too weak to do much. The Jalaid prince whose territory was the furthest to the north opposed the Republic, but only at Russian instigation, and he did not seem to be trying to make himself independent. Dörbed was the same. The lama thought Bo Wang might have been bribed by Yuan.

Since the Jerim League princes were under the supervision of the Three Eastern Provinces, they always watched trends there very carefully. If the three governors and Chang Tso-lin all declared against the Republic, the Mongols would certainly rise and use the opportunity to declare their own independence. They had not yet done so because they were not prepared. The Jerim League was the leader, and as it went so would go the other leagues.[47]

Conditions in the Juu-uda League were about the same. The league was generally calm. Envoys from Urga came and went frequently, and they were having an effect on the Inner Mongols but not enough to make them join the Living Buddha. The league had rejected Urga's request for troops. The common Mongols did not believe that a country could exist without an Emperor, so they did not expect the Republic to last very long. The Mongol nobility was chiefly concerned with its own privileges, and two or three banners suffered sharp internal divisions. The Chinese were uniformly disliked, but the Mongols treated the Japanese and Russians well.

Kharachin and Auqan tried to sponsor a meeting on June 15 to discuss the situation, but no one showed up. They had expected the five Jusutu banners, and Naiman, both Auqan, the two Ongniud, both Baγarin and the Keshikten banners from the Juu-uda League. Ar-khorchin, the head of the Juu-uda League, rejected the idea of a special meeting completely. He felt the regular league meeting scheduled for the 17th was sufficient. In the early part of June Ar-khorchin had not yet made up his mind about which side to support, the Republic or Urga. Up to then he had been inclined to support the Republic if it would treat him as usual. However the frequent invitations from Urga and all the talk about the five equal races in the Republic, which would mean the end of his special privileges, had made him hesitate. He did not even bother to attend the Juu-uda League meeting on the 17th, and the princes and their representatives came to the conclusion that they would rather preserve their own privileges than fight for independence. They realized that without outside help a fight would be impossible, and even with such help, they did not have the necessary leadership. So the League decided (1) to watch all foreigners closely and prohibit the entry of Chinese agents; (2) to stockpile grain; (3) to increase the number of their troops and prepare a self-defense; and (4) to station men close to Peking, Jehol and Chih-fang to observe conditions in those cities.[48]

If the princes in Inner Mongolia maintained a cautious attitude, those who remained in Peking, the most Sinified of all, did what they could to squeeze concessions out of the Republican government. Prince Nayantu, representing the United Mongol Society, presented Yuan with 12 demands. They called for an end to the *Li-fan yuan*, asked equitable treatment for Mongols, and the retention of titles, treatment and pay for the nobility. Military and diplomatic affairs could be left to the central government. A few days later the princes asked that the Mongols be made the national army.[49]

Summer of Discontent

The summer of 1912 in Inner Mongolia was a mosaic of rumor and aborted action. The Chinese had intercepted the Japanese-led convoy that was carrying arms to Kharachin and Baγarin, and it was perhaps this action that led Yuan to order Chao on June 9 to send troops to suppress the Mongols. Since Chao's own informants reported there would be no rising, a meeting of the military authorities in Mukden discussed Yuan's order on the 18th, and Chang Tso-lin led the opposition to it. Yuan's order quickly became academic anyway since on the night of the 19th the Chinese soldiers in the city mutinied, and no troops could be sent anywhere.[50]

Yet the interception of the Japanese arms shipment does not appear to have disturbed Chao too much because he still permitted the princes to acquire arms. The Tümed prince asked Chao for a permit to buy 600 rifles, and Chao agreed to 300. Bo Wang's banner also received permission to purchase several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition.[51]

The Chinese officials continued to report rumors and "bandit" outbreaks. Sung Hsiao-lien, governor of Heilungkiang, called for quick action before the Mongols became too strong. He may have been partly justified because on July 15 the Chinese captured a Chinese who had been sent to Tsitsihar to recruit men for the Mongol army in Hailar. The man confessed his mission, and the Chinese authorities captured some of the equipment destined for the Mongols. Yet according to what a Mongol told the Japanese, the Mongol position in Hailar was deteriorating. Financial troubles were chronic, and the Russians had become cooler. The man told the Japanese that Barga independence would be relinquished on the condition that (1) Chinese and Mongols have equal rights; (2) the

administration of Hailar be chiefly Mongol; (3) there be no tax on exports from the interior of Mongolia; and (4) the livelihood of the common Mongols be protected.[52]

In the south the Chinese pursued a policy of what might be called "minimal force." Troops were dispatched to put down the "bandits", and the Prefect in Tao-nan denied reports of Mongols buying arms and raising an army. When Yuan telegraphed he had information that North Gorlos was going to rise and ordered troops be sent, the governor of Kirin, Ch'en Chao-ch'ang, suggested the matter be handled in a much lower key. He had no knowledge of any rebellion and felt it would be better to send an envoy first. News of Yuan's order reached the Mongols, and the Tao-nan Prefect telegraphed Chao that the plan to move against the Gorlos had the league in an uproar. The Mongols claimed they knew nothing about any uprising, and the Prefect feared troop movements would only cause trouble. His feelings were echoed by the Harbin tao-t'ai.[53] In Peking Yuan was doing what he could. He knew that the Russians were behind the Outer Mongols, and since he was already negotiating with them he wanted to await the end of talks before undertaking any major action against the Mongols. At the same time Yuan tried to win over the Inner Mongol princes by promulgating a nine-article law detailing their treatment under the Republic. This law appeared in the *Cheng-fu kung-pao* on August 20 and was obviously based on the Mongol petition of May 26. However several important changes had been made in the Mongol original. Unchanged were the articles granting the Mongols equality with the Chinese and providing that Mongols fluent in Chinese might be appointed civil officials in China proper. The prohibition against the future use of the words "dependency", "colonization", and "encroachment" was also specified. The regulations confirmed the power of the princes and dukes, the hereditary titles, special privileges, pay and emoluments. They also promised not to change the official designation of the Khutukhtus (religious officials). What had been changed were the articles concerning diplomatic and frontier questions, and those relating to land and Mongol rights over it. Regarding the former, the regulations provided that all diplomatic and frontier questions remained the prerogative of the central government, although the local governments would be consulted on important matters affecting them. On the question of land, the most vital of all, the Chinese made no concessions. For example, Article 8 of the petition had called for all

Mongol lands being administered by the Chinese to be returned to Mongol control, and for certain Chinese administrative positions to be abolished. The regulations of August declared only that the grazing land of Chahar not under cultivation or Chinese government control would be returned to the Mongols.[54]

The question of land and what to do with it was the one that most deeply divided the Mongols and Chinese. As early as April the Ch'ang-ch'un tao-t'ai had proposed that Inner Mongolia be opened to Chinese settlement, and Huang Hsing, the southern military leader, had telegraphed Chao on June 3 that after the fighting was over the demobilized troops should be settled in Mongolia as farmers and merchants. Throughout the spring most of the Mongols had consistently opposed Chinese intrusions into their land (although there were reports that Joriγtu was in Mukden in April negotiating the sale of 800,000 *mou* (approximately 157,777 acres). Then during the summer there was another spate of reports of Mongols about to lease or sell more land to the Chinese. South Gorlos was supposedly negotiating with Ch'en for the sale of over 2,000 *shang* (3,550 acres), and in the middle of August Joriγtu and Darkhan were reported about to lease more land. Finally in September a former Minister of Finance, Hsiung Hsi-ling, sent a man into the North Gorlos banner to examine land. He wanted to open up 17,500 *shang* (31,062 acres) immediately.[55] What came of these reports is unknown, but the anti-Chinese feeling arising from the land problem was one of the contributing factors that led to the troubles around Tao-nan.

Something may have been afoot during the summer. There was a big meeting in Urga. Sheng-fu, head of Barga, left for Urga on July 5, and during the early part of July one of the officials in Bo Wang's banner told the Japanese that it appeared Outer Mongolia was getting ready to move. However, because news was not reliable, the banner had sent three or four men to Urga. The South Gorlos prince, the head of the Jerim League and a man close to the Sechin khan *aimak* (tribe), also sent an envoy to find out conditions in Urga. Then on July 27 the Living Buddha issued an appeal to the princes of Inner Mongolia to come over and fight the Chinese. This may be part of a pattern because on August 11 Sheng-fu telegraphed Hailar that the conference in Urga had ended and that it had been decided to raise 200,000 troops and 1,200,000 rubles. Hailar's share would be 20,000 men and 60,000 rubles, and then less than a week later reports

began arriving in Mukden that Toγtaqu was leading 4,000 men into Inner Mongolia.[56]

Mongol Rebellion and the Ch'ang-ch'un Conference

When the trouble finally came it was in the area around Tao-nan, the western-most Chinese outpost in Inner Mongolia. Just south of the Tolo River and about 170 miles north-north-west of Liao-yuan, it had been established in 1904 and included parts of the Jasaγtu, Tüsiye and Tüshiyetü banners. Here the Mongols remained herders, and they were being pushed back into the mountains by the Chinese farmers. It was also here that the dislike of the Chinese was most intense.

The Mongols started off well, and the Chinese sent Wu Chun-sheng and his troops to put them down. There were several pitched battles with the Mongols gaining early victories, but by mid-September Chinese strength and arms began to tell, and the Mongols began a retreat north. The two Inner Mongols leading the fight, Jasaγtu and Tüsiye, escaped into Outer Mongolia via Hailar.[57]

During the fighting there were constant reports of Russian arms and men aiding the Mongols. The Jalaid banner was supposed to be using Russian arms, but *Novoe Vremia*, the semi-official Russian newspaper, denied that St. Petersburg was supplying arms to the Inner Mongols. It noted that while Jerim League representatives might be gathering in Harbin at Urga's order to receive Russian arms, St. Petersburg had instructed Russian officials to refuse to provide any.[58]

In this case the paper reflected Russian policy accurately. At the time Russia was negotiating with Outer Mongolia, and the Russian negotiator firmly rejected any Outer Mongol claims for union with Inner Mongolia or Barga. He did allow the word "Mongolia" to be used instead of "Outer Mongolia", but he added that Russia would reserve the right to determine what territory besides Khalka would be guaranteed. In the same vein, the Russian foreign minister directed the consul-general in Urga to point out to the Outer Mongols that "the Russian rifles are not to serve for the armament of Inner Mongolians as this would be useless since the Chinese are unquestionably superior in military strength in this part of Mongolia. The arms are for the protection of Khalkha and the adjoining districts of Western Mongolia, for which purpose Mongolians can reckon

on support."[59] The Japanese themselves had long since given up on support of the Inner Mongols.

The possibility of foreign intervention set Chinese nerves on edge. Chao was already suspicious of the Japanese because of the rumored new Russo-Japanese treaty and Katsura Tarō's visit to Russia, and he quickly sent troops to Tao-nan. However Chang Tso-lin did not appear worried. He believed the Mongols would never succeed so long as they acted alone. Nor do the residents of Kirin and Ch'ang-ch'un appear to have been overly concerned. Those of Kirin were more interested in fighting foreign (Russian and Japanese) aggression, and those of Ch'ang-ch'un felt a conciliatory policy would be better than outright suppression.[60]

A policy of conciliation was just what the Chinese used. They fought around Tao-nan, but throughout the rest of Inner Mongolia they were content to rely on subtle persuasion and threat. Soon after the rumors of Toγtaqu's invasion appeared, the Chinese sent four cannon and several men to Cheng-chia-t'un and invited Darkhan and Joriγtu to inspect them, and within three weeks they had sent a large number of men to "protect" the princes. Some of these "bodyguards" broke into Joriγtu's residence, went to his princess' room and tried to rob her before they were finally persuaded to withdraw.[61] Governor Ch'en began a campaign to persuade the Gorlos to remain peaceful. He sent troops to Petuna and Ch'ang-ling and Nung-an *hsiens*, supposedly to fight bandits, but in reality to serve as a warning to the Mongols. At the same time he dispatched envoys hoping to win the princes over without an expensive military campaign.[62] Envoys were also sent to the Jusutu and Juu-uda leagues, where they paid particular attention to the West Ongniud, explaining the idea of the Republic of the Five Races and the situation in China.[63] Yuan did his part for conciliation. He passed out liberal rewards to the Mongol nobility. They were raised in rank, given money and allowed to wear certain articles of prestige. At the same time, Jasaγtu was stripped of his rank on October 7.[64]

In the north the governor of Heilungkiang was particularly pressed to carry out a conciliatory policy. Part of his province was in rebellion, and other Mongols were leaning toward the rebels. He began in September by forming the United Society of the Five Races (*Wu-tsu lien-ho-hui*) and sending envoys to the Mongols around Tao-nan who had not joined Jasaγtu. When the Jalaid banner did not attend the meeting of the Society,

Sung sent troops to cut communications between the banner and Jasaγtu. As Jasaγtu was beaten back, the Mongols became more sympathetic toward Sung, and Jalaid, who was only thirteen, his mother and all the other nobility travelled to Tsitsihar for a meeting of the Society. Sung treated them courteously and all joined. At this meeting the banner chiefs and Sung agreed (1) to cooperate on ways of pacifying the Mongols; (2) to encourage inter-marriage as a means of promoting harmony between Chinese and Mongols; (3) to establish the *pao-chia* (system of mutual responsibility) and *t'uan-lien* (local militia) as joint Chinese-Mongol organizations in those areas where the Chinese and Mongols lived together, and also to carry out a policy designed to make the Mongols bear the burden of responsibility for their rebellion; (4) to place in the hands of Chinese administrators all administrative and financial functions in those areas of the banners that had been opened for settlement.[65] This was clearly a policy of assimilation and sinicization.

The first reaction of the majority of the Mongol princes of the Jerim League to the rising and pacification policy was indecision. Then in late August Darkhan sent an urgent messenger to all high banner officials asking them to gather for a discussion of the situation and to make a decision on a common attitude toward the declaration of independence by the northern banners, but the meeting was never held. By this time Darkhan and Joriγtu were under guard in Cheng-chia-t'un and perhaps this made the other princes reluctant to come. When officials from his banner urged Darkhan to return to the banner headquarters, he refused. The head of the league, South Gorlos, then took the lead. In response to Ch'en's envoys who told him to renounce independence and join the Republic, he replied that he would give a definite answer after consulting the ten banners. The meeting was scheduled for Cheng-chia-t'un during the first part of October, but on September 25 Ch'en informed the Mongols that the conference would have to be held in Ch'ang-ch'un. The Mongols agreed.[66]

By the middle of September there was already a noticeable change in the Mongols' attitude toward the Chinese. Officials who had talked rather freely before to the Japanese now became more evasive. One of the men from Bo Wang's banner who had proved a good informant before now told the Japanese that a meeting in Bo Wang's banner in mid-September had been only a normal one, and he went on to say that he did not believe

Jasaγtu had declared independence. The fighting was only a bandit rising. According to this man Bo Wang had no intention of joining the rising; in fact he was going to Peking shortly. Self-interest made it undesirable for the banner to go to war with the Chinese. Other indications that the Mongols had changed to a more pro-Chinese stance soon followed. There was a report that prior to the conference in Ch'ang-ch'un the princes would ask that Jasaγtu and Tüsiye be stripped of their positions; that Tüshiyetü be rewarded for his aid to the Chinese government; that Jalaid be given a special prize; and that all other princes be given awards based on their work. Then Bo Wang's banner stopped training troops.[67]

The conference finally opened on October 28 with a number of auspicious signs. Telegrams arrived at the tao-t'ai's yamen from Yuan telling Ch'en to work with all his might to conciliate the Mongols and asking South Gorlos to invite all the princes to Peking so that Yuan could personally approve their work. There was even a telegram from the former Ch'ing emperor ordering Bo Wang to advise each Mongol prince to accept the Republic. Although the conference was supposed to be an all-league one, only North and South Gorlos, Dörbed, and Bo Wang showed up. All the rest sent representatives. On the Chinese side, the Kirin governor, Ch'en Chao-ch'ang, was the principal figure. Neither Chao nor Sung attended, but there were several military men and tao-t'ais present. Peking also sent representatives.

The first session began at 3:00 p.m. on the afternoon of October 28 in the tao-t'ai's yamen. The proceedings were kept strictly secret and only formally named delegates were allowed inside. Ch'en opened the meeting with a speech in which he emphasized the previous close connections between Mongolia and China. Now that China had become a Republic he expected those close ties to be continued. Of course the Mongol princes would receive the same treatment under the new government. He noted the uprising around Tao-nan and the suffering caused by the Chinese troops, but at the same time he also pointed out that foreign countries were waiting and watching for any opportunity to encroach upon Chinese rights. That was why the government used such force, and it would do so again if there were other attempts at independence. Naturally the government desired a peaceful settlement, that was why this conference had been called. He ended by calling on the Mongols to submit to the Republic and their privileges would be continued.

During his talk Ch'en presented several articles for the Mongols' consideration. Unfortunately the two sources for this speech disagree, so there is no way to know for sure just what the articles contained. According to what the Mongols told the Japanese, they were assured the continuation of their ranks and salaries and their hair and clothing styles. All Mongol loans would be assumed equally by both sides, and the Mongols would be allowed to elect two representatives to the lower house from each of the ten banners. The other source is a report on the conference provided the United States consul in Mukden by the Mukden Foreign Office. It contained a translation of Ch'en's speech and also a copy of the six conditions. Five of the six dealt with ranks and lamas, and the sixth stated that the regulations for the treatment of the Mongols which had been published in August would be promulgated.[68] While there is no way to reconcile these two accounts, it should be noted that in both the Chinese policy was one of confirming the existing privileges of the nobility and making no concessions on the question of land and taxes.

There are also different versions of what the Mongols asked for. One Mongol told the Japanese that they wanted only four things: two concerned hair and dress. The third asked that 30% of all the grain and animal tax collected by the Chinese be returned to the Mongol princes, and the fourth would have allowed the sale of land at the princes' discretion with no interference by the Republican government. The first two are innocuous. The last two are not. Darkhan, Bo Wang, Bintü, and South Gorlos had all wanted this 30%. They had asked for 50%, but the Chinese had been unwilling. South Gorlos had been negotiating with Ch'en in August and September for his 30%, and a lack of money was behind his reported sale of land in the summer.[69] The lack of money was a chronic problem for the Mongol princes. It accounted for most of their debts to the Chinese and the settlement of those debts by selling land.

Two more sets of demands were also reported by Japanese officials in Ch'ang-ch'un. In both of these there were six articles, and they were identical in all except one: (1) all territory to be preserved as before; (2) princes can train and equip defensive troops; (3) Chinese government to compensate Mongols [and Chinese] for losses suffered at the hands of the Chinese expeditionary forces; (4) all land leased to the Ch'ing government to be returned, but land might be leased to the Republic in the future should the need arise; (5) area of open land in Mongolia not to exceed that

already recognized. In one source the sixth article called for the Chinese expeditionary force to be withdrawn quickly, and in the other this was changed to prohibit the establishment of a new province in Inner Mongolia.[70] There is no reference to ranks, salary, hair and dress here, but no doubt they were discussed.

In his reply to Ch'en's speech, the South Gorlos prince said that he personally agreed with the Republic and would try to persuade each banner to accept it, but he could not force agreement. The synthesis of Mongol views was that they had no objection to the Republic, but they were unhappy because they had all suffered at the hands of the Chinese when the "bandits" had been suppressed. The rising had been the work of the Outer Mongols inciting "bandits". The Inner Mongol princes had nothing to do with it. The Mongol demands were presented as a kind of guarantee against further Chinese encroachment.

When Ch'en replied that the Chinese had also suffered at the hands of the Mongols, the Mongols withdrew their demand for compensation. The governor then went on to say that he could not give a definite answer to the Mongol demands, but he hoped to see things go peacefully. He called on the Inner Mongols to recognize the Republic, for even if they became independent under foreign protection, the foreigners would only steal their rights and property. Moreover the Chinese would attack and that would certainly mean a loss of life and property. Ch'en also made the princes sign an appeal to the Outer Mongol government to renounce its independence.[71]

The Mongols met the following day to discuss the Chinese offer, but there is no report of their discussion. On November 1 the Mongols finally met the Chinese Pacification Commissioner, Chang Hsi-luan, who had arrived in Ch'ang-ch'un only the day before. He added little to what had already been said, merely calling on them to recognize the Republic, to exert themselves to see that Outer Mongolia renounced its independence, and to suppress the Royalist Party members in their banners. Once again South Gorlos repeated that the Inner Mongol princes had not been responsible for the rising, that all had agreed to the Republic and would work hard for it.[72]

With that the conference ended, although the partying continued for several more days. No formal decisions were made. The Japanese reported that some form of document was signed and sent to Peking. It may or may

not have recognized the Mongol demands, and the Chinese got the only copy of it.[73]

What then were the results of the conference? The U.S. consul reported that official circles in Mukden considered the outcome "entirely satisfactory," although there was a noticeable lack of enthusiasm among the Mongols for the government. The Ch'ang-ch'un correspondent of the *North China Herald* declared "it was no conference at all, merely a friendly re-union of some of the Government's representatives and certain Mongol princes who are not unfriendly towards the Republican Government."[74] Three versions of the results have been published, all very different. One appeared in the *Chi-ch'ang jih-pao* on November 5. It is said to be Chao's formulation of Yuan's desires which the Mongols accepted. There were nine articles concerning ranks, salaries, tribute, hair, and also more substantial matters such as taxes, encroachments on Mongol lands and foreign loans. Article 2 declared that all taxes in Mongolia would remain as before; article 3, that all land taxes collected by Mongols would remain as before; and article 5, that the Republican government would make no encroachment on Mongol lands, and the Republic refused to recognize loans contracted by the Mongols after the Republic was established if those loans did not have the Republic's consent.[75] The second source of the final communique is a report in the *North China Herald* of November 9 of a telegram which had appeared in the *Shih-pao* and listed ten articles from the conference. They were mostly Mongol concessions, and offered little inducement to the Inner Mongols to accept the Republic. The third source is six articles that the Russians obtained. In return for Mongol recognition of the Republic, the Mongols would be allowed to retain their titles receive their subsidies, elect members to the Chinese parliament. Chinese troops would be withdrawn from Mongol lands, but free lands in Mongolia could be colonized by Chinese so long as they did not introduce Chinese institutions in them.[76] Once again, unfortunately, there is no way to reconcile these reports.

Epilogue

After the conference Inner Mongolia settled down. Kharachin, the man who had plotted independence with the Japanese joined the Kuo-min-tang, and Nayantu and Naiman joined Yuan's Republican Party

(Kung-ho-tang). Moreover the Mongols elected and sent members to both houses of the National Assembly. Bo Wang and Joriγtu represented the Jerim League in the Upper House and another man from Bo Wang's banner sat in the lower house.[77]

The Inner Mongol princes also shifted over to the Chinese position on the Russo-Mongol treaty. Tüshiyetü, West Kharachin, Auqan, West Üjümüchin, and East Center Ordos of the Jerim, Jusutu, Juu-uda, Silingol, and Yeke-juu leagues respectively and a man from the Ulanchab League all sent Yuan a telegram calling on him to enter negotiations with Russia to revise the treaty and preserve all of Mongolia. The United Mongol Society met on November 16 issued a statement declaring that the Russo-Mongol Treaty concerned only Urga and a minority of the Mongols and had no connection with all of Mongolia and therefore was invalid.[78]

Perhaps the best indication of the state of affairs was the telegram of the new Governor-General, Chang Hsi-luan, to Yuan on November 26. He reported that all was calm in Tao-nan and that the Mongol princes seemed inclined to the Republic. He did note that the Royalists were trying to stir up trouble on Urga's order, but the Mongols had arrested some of these men and turned them over to the Chinese. In short, Chang believed that the Mongols had sincerely submitted to the Republic.[79]

To return to the points mentioned at the outset, the Inner Mongols needed outside help to achieve and maintain their independence. Yet such aid proved elusive. After some initial support, the Japanese changed their minds in mid-March and offered little in the way of further encouragement. They were busy negotiating an agreement with Russia to delineate spheres of influence in Inner Mongolia. The Russians offered nothing so far as we know, and they effectively checked whatever aid the Outer Mongols might have provided. This made relations with China more important. Chao was interested chiefly in maintaining order, and Yuan was doing everything he could to woo the princes over and keep Inner Mongolia within the empire. Ultimately the majority of the princes succumbed to the Chinese blandishments of rank and money. Only two rose and the Chinese defeated them easily.

Yet if the Princes did not fight, they did what they could to squeeze more authority from the Chinese. They demanded more of the Chinese taxes; they petitioned Yuan for more jurisdiction over their land, but they failed because they could not coerce the Chinese into making the

concessions. Even as late as the Ch'ang-ch'un conference the Mongols attempted to expand their rights, but time and the "trend of the times" were against them.

Postscript

Writing about the activities, the hopes and desires of the Inner Mongols presents a major problem. The Mongols themselves left nothing in writing. That leaves a variety of secondary sources. To begin with the easiest. The American consular reports from Manchuria do contain some useful information, but the Americans depended on the Chinese for their information, and the Chinese told them only what they wanted the Americans to hear. There is only one indication that the American consul bribed a Chinese official to secure a copy of a Chinese telegram. I have not looked at the British documents, but as a general rule, neither the British nor the Americans were in a position to aid the Mongols, nor would they have been interested in doing so.

Russian sources are also lacking. What documents have been published deal either almost exclusively with Outer Mongolia, or with topics of more import to over-all Russian strategy. The best compilation, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma*, with one or two exceptions, has virtually nothing of interest concerning the Inner Mongols in the period discussed here. The newspaper *Novoe Vremia* did carry reports from Harbin, etc., but that is not the same as official government documents. A short compilation of newspaper reports from Harbin in the *Dal'nevostochnoe obozrenie* No. 1 (16) (Jan.-Feb., 1912), 67-68, 99 is symptomatic of most newspaper reporting. It is mostly rumor and fantasy.

I have found no collection of Chinese sources dealing with Inner Mongolia on the day-to-day basis under review here, but given the nature of the relationship, Chinese sources would have to be scrutinized carefully. The Chinese were interested in keeping the Mongols in thrall, and anyone who disagreed was a "bandit". We do have a partial record of Chinese opinion. The Japanese bribed a man in the governor-general's secretariat and got copies of incoming and outgoing telegrams. These are in Japanese translation, and sometimes in the original, in the Japanese foreign ministry archives. I propose to accept these almost without reservation since it would serve little purpose for the Japanese to distort the Chinese messages,

and given the rivalry among the Japanese army general staff, the Kwantung Government-General and the consular officers, it would have been almost impossible anyway. The Japanese commentary on the telegrams is another matter.

That leaves the Japanese sources which are by no means complete. I have relied on the foreign ministry and army-navy archives microfilmed after World War II. One reason is obvious. The Japanese were well informed about what was going on in China and Manchuria. The American Minister, Calhoun, said they were "the best informed of all nationals represented here...". In Manchuria they could call on men with years of experience who knew the Chinese and the language well, and in Inner Mongolia, on men who had spent several years teaching in Inner Mongol schools and knew the situations in the banners. In addition the Japanese received copies of the Chinese telegrams, and they had broken at least part of the revolutionaries' cypher.

The conferences in Peking in January 1912 are a good example of their resources. Reports went back to Tokyo from three different sources. Kawashima Naniwa got his information from the Manchu, Prince Su, and probably at times from the Mongol Kharachin. His reports went directly to the vice-chief of the general staff. The Japanese Minister, Ijuin, got his information from the Japanese doctor attached to the Legation who in turn relied on Darkhan. And Aoki Nobuzumi, the military attache, had his own sources, principally Kharachin and Dörbed.

Until about May the Mongols appear to have spoken rather freely to the Japanese, but thereafter, when they decided the Japanese could not be relied on and the Japanese adventurers had been mostly withdrawn, the Mongols were not quite so forthcoming. At times some of them tried to mislead the Japanese. Still, the Japanese had so many informants they could usually find out an approximation of what the Mongols were up to.

Yet however much the Japanese may have known, and there is a good deal in the archives in Tokyo I have seen but not examined, their records present only one side of the picture, but it is an important side and should be consulted in the future, particularly in the light of the paucity of Russian materials.

NOTES

My thanks to Prof. John G. Hangin of Indiana University for the transliteration of Mongol names and for the information in fn. 36.

1. Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria* (New York, 1934, reprint, 1969), pp. 18, 123.
2. Kantō tōtokufu. Minseibu. Shōmuka. *Man-Mō keizai yōran* (Tokyo, 1916,), pp. 688, 691, 696-97.
3. Ikei Masaru, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911," *JAS*, XXV (Feb., 1966), 219-221.
4. Japan. Foreign Ministry. Archives. MT 1.6.1.46, Shinkoku kakumei dōran ni kansuru jōhō; rikugun no bu. reel 151, pp. 1105-06, Aoki to Jichō, Nov. 27, 1911.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 1544-45, Aoki to Sōchō, Dec. 9, 1911; *Asahi*, Dec. 6, 7, 10, 17, 1911.
6. JFMA. Telegram series. reel 148, pp. 17, 88-89, Ijuin to Uchida, Dec. 30, 1911. MT 1.6.1.71, Shina seitō oyobi kessha jōkyō chōsa ikken. reel 157, p. 96. *Asahi*, Dec. 31, 1911.
7. Aida Tsutomu, *Kawashima Naniwa ō* (Tokyo, 1936), p. 162. JFMA. Tel. 148, pp. 16, 656-62, Ijuin to Uchida, Dec. 23, 1911.
8. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.46. reel 152, pp. 2519-20, Aoki to Sōchō, Jan. 17; pp. 2554-56, same, Jan. 18; Tel. 149, pp. 691-92, 696-99, 701-04, Ijuin to Uchida, Jan. 17, 1912. According to Kawashima's account it was at this meeting that Chao Ping-chun first suggested that both the monarchy and revolutionary governments be abolished and a provisional government established in Tientsin. Aida, *Kawashima*, pp. 123-24. However such standard Chinese sources as Ch'ing shih pien tsuan wei yuen hui, ed., *Ch'ing shih* (Taipei, 1962), VIII, 6226, place this suggestion at the meeting of the 19th.
9. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.46. reel 152, pp. 2562-64, Aoki to Sōchō, Jan. 20; pp. 2615-17, Taga to Sōchō, Jan. 21, 1912. Tel. 150, pp. 783-92, Ijuin to Uchida, Jan. 20, 1912. *Asahi*, Jan. 20, 1912.
10. JFMA. Tel. 150, pp. 791-92, Ijuin to Uchida, Jan. 20; pp. 835-36, same, Jan. 21, 1912. *Asahi*, Jan. 20, 1912.
11. JFMA. Tel. 150, pp. 835-36, Ijuin to Uchida, Jan. 21; pp. 898-900, same, Jan. 22; MT 1.6.1.46. reel 152, pp. 2627-29, Aoki to Sōchō, Jan. 22, 1912. Aida, *Kawashima*, pp. 141-42.
12. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. Kakukoku naisei kankei zassan. Shina: Mōko no bu. reel 112, pp. 108-22, Hoshino to Uchida, Feb. 6, 1912.
13. *Asahi*, Feb. 5, 7, 14; *North China Herald*, Feb. 3, 10, 1912. United States. Department of State. Records Relating to Internal Affairs of China, 1910-29, microfilm, 893.00/1228, Calhoun to State, March 8, 1912.
14. *Asahi*, Dec. 19, 31, 1911; Jan. 14, 17, 19, 20, 1912.
15. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 108-22, Hoshino to Uchida, Feb. 6, 1912. *Asahi*, Jan. 31, 1912.
16. USDS. 893-00/1115, 1159-62, Maynard to State, Jan. 25; Feb. 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, 1912. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.46. reel 152, pp. 2489-90, Hoshino to Jichō, Jan. 16, 1912.

17. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.62. Shinkoku kakumei dōran-go no jōkyō ni kansuru kaku-shō oyobi fu, ken chō hōkoku zassan; rikugunshō oyobi sanbō honbu. reel 155, pp. 562-63, Hoshino to Jichō, March 5, 1912.
18. *Ibid.*, reel 156, pp. 989-90, Takayama to Jichō, March 28; reel 157, pp. 1740-62, "Shina jiji mondai," May 23; MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 258-59, Takayama to Jichō, May 29; pp. 339-44, "Sanbō honbu: Mōko jōhō dai 1," June 14, 1912.
19. Robert Valliant, "Japanese Involvement in Mongol Independence Movements, 1912-1919," *The Mongolia Society Bulletin,* XI, no. 2 (Fall, 1972), 1-7. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 174-76, 177-81, Ochiai to Uchida, April 21, 23, 1912.
20. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.62. reel 155, pp. 526-27, Hoshino to Jichō, March 4; reel 156, pp. 796, 919, 1065-66, Satō to Sōchō, March 18, 24, April 2, 1912; pp. 816-17, Takayama to Jichō, March 19, 1912.
21. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.71. reel 157, pp. 107-08. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 137-44, Mizuno to Uchida, March 29, 1912. *Asahi,* March 18, 21, 1912.
22. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, p. 145, Hayashi to Uchida, April 10; pp. 160-62, Kibe to Uchida, April 8; MT 1.6.1.62. reel 156, p. 1090, Morita to Sōchō, April 4; MT 1.6.1.4-6. Kakukoku naisei kankei zassan. Shina: Manshū no bu. reel 115, pp. 445-47, Ochiai to Uchida, April 16; Japan. Army-Navy Archives. Shinkoku jihen kankei shorui. Kaigun: kōgai, meirei, kunrei, ōfuku. reel 53, pp. 69, 459-60, Taga to Jichō, March 12; p. 69, 474, same, April 14, 1912.
23. Valliant, *op. cit.*, 1-7.
24. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.62. reel 156, p. 930, Hoshino to Jichō, March 25; MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 341-42, "Mōko jōhō dai 1," June 14; Tel. 155, pp. 5481-82, Ochiai to Uchida, April 20; JANA. reel 53, pp. 69. 467-69, 69, 471-72, Taga to Jichō, April 1, 10; p. 69, 474, Jichō to Taga, April 15, 1912. *Nihon gaikō bunsho,* XLIV-XLV, no. 581, Uchida to Ijuin, Feb. 2, 1912.
25. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 163-70, Ochiai to Uchida, April 18; Tel. 153, pp. 4415-17, Ochiai to Uchida, March 17; Tel. 155, Uchida to Ochiai, March 19, 1912.
26. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 339-40. "Mōko jōhō dai 1," June 14, 1912.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 420-21, "Mōko jōhō dai 6," July 10, 1912.
28. *Nihon gaikō bunsho,* XLIV-XLV, no. 523, Uchida to Motono/Ochiai, Feb. 19, 1912. Aida, *Kawashima,* pp. 146-48. *Asahi,* Dec. 3, 1911; Feb. 11, 1912.
29. JANA. reel 53, pp. 69, 463-64, Kishi to Taga, March 11; pp. 69, 459-60, Taga to Fukushima, March 12, 1912. JANA. Shinkoku jihen kankei shorui. Rikugun sanbō honbu hōkoku. reel 69, p. 38, 844, Hoshino, March 22, 1912.
30. JANA. reel 69, pp. 38, 831-32. Morita taisa no hōkoku, March 11, 1912.
31. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4, reel 112, pp. 245-48, 250-52, 298-300, 348-51, Ochiai to Uchida, May 21, 22; June 5, 8, 1912. *Asahi,* June 2, 1912.
32. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.62. reel 156, p. 839, Hoshino to Jichō, March 20; JANA. reel 53, pp. 69, 471-72, Taga to Jichō, April 10; MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 389-99, "Mōko jōho dai 3," June 21; pp. 505-06, "Mōko jōho dai 9," July 22; pp. 534-37, "Mōko jōhō dai 12," Aug. 3, 1912, USDS. 893.00/1115, 1161, 1218, Maynard to State Jan. 25; Feb. 7, 8, 15, 1912.

33. Valliant, *op. cit.* 4-5. Japan. Gaimushō. *Nichi-Ro kōshō shi* (Tokyo, 1969), pt. 2, pp. 217-225.
34. Marius Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford, 1970), pp. 139-40.
35. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 117-21, Hoshino to Uchida, Feb. 6, 1912.
36. Sh. Sandag, *Mongolyn uls töriin gadaad khariltsaa, 1850-1919* (Ulan Bator, 1971), I, 302-03. I do not read Mongol and am grateful to Prof. Hangin for this reference.
37. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 163-70, Ochiai to Uchida, April 18; p. 340, "Mōko jōhō dai 1," June 14, 1912.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 279-80, Kibe to Uchida, June 5; pp. 345-47, Ochiai to Uchida, June 7; pp. 432-47, "Mōko jōhō dai 7," July 10; pp. 819-21, "Mōko jōhō dai 20," Sept. 12, 1912.
39. Michael Underdown, "Banditry and Revolutionary Movements in Late 19th and Early 20th Century Mongolia," in Paul C. Winther, ed., *Bandits, Rebellions and Revolutions in Asia* (forthcoming).
40. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 117-21, Hoshino, Feb. 6; pp. 135-36, Ochiai to Uchida, April 1; MT 1.6.1.62. reel 156, pp. 773-74, Takayama to Jichō, March 16, 1912.
41. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 216-21, Ochiai to Uchida, May 8; MT 1.6.1.62. reel 156, p. 857, Morita to Sōchō, March 21; pp. 888-89, same, March 22, 1912.
42. JANA. reel 53, pp. 69, 471-72, Taga to Jichō, April 10; MT 1.6.1.4-4, reel 112, pp. 250-52, Ochiai to Uchida, May 22, 1912.
43. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 177-81, Ochiai to Uchida, April 23; pp. 200-06, same, May 2; pp. 267-68, Morita to Uchida, May 24; p. 342, "Mōko jōhō dai 1," June 14; p. 502, "Mōko jōhō dai 9," July 22; MT 1.6.1.62. reel 156, p. 742, Morita to Sōchō, March 13, 1912.
44. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 403-05, "Mōko jōhō dai 3," June 21, 1912.
45. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 200-06, Ochiai to Uchida, May 2; pp. 232-34, same, May 17; pp. 275-78, same, May 25, 1912.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 295-97, Ochiai to Uchida, May 31, 1912. After this telegram Takayama judged Darkhan to be a weak-willed old man who would do what Chao asked. Also pp. 298-300, Ochiai to Uchida, June 2; pp. 341-42, "Mōko jōhō dai 1," June 14; pp. 345-47, Ochiai to Uchida, June 7, 1912.
47. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 358-73, "Mōko jōhō dai 2," June 18, 1912.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 420-25, "Mōko jōhō dai 6," July 10; pp. 432-34, "Mōko jōhō dai 7," July 10; pp. 819-21, "Mōko jōhō dai 20," Sept. 12; pp. 517-18, Kimura to Jichō, July 25, 1912.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 301-17, Ijuin to Uchida, June 1, 1912. *Asahi*, June 7, 1912. *North China Herald*, June 1, 1912.
50. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 345-57, 355-57, 380-82, 417-19, Ochiai to Uchida, June 7, 13, 27; pp. 470-72, "Mōko jōhō dai 8," July 13; MT 1.6.1.4-6. reel 115, pp. 606-07, Fukushima to Uchida, June 20, 1912.
51. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, p. 502, "Mōko jōhō dai 9," July 22, 1912.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 406-08, 451-56, 556-57, 568-70, Ochiai to Uchida, June 18; July 4; Aug. 3, 9; pp. 495-97, 580-88, Ihara to Uchida, July 15; Aug. 13; MT 1.6.1.4-6. reel 115, pp. 782-86, "Kantō tōtokufu rikugun sanbōbu dai 326. Shina jiji," July 15, 1912.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 541-43, 547-49, 558-59, 560-61, 562-64, 565-67, 571-72, 597-98, Ochiai to Uchida, July 28, 31; Aug. 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 17, 1912.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 301-17, 656-62, Ijuin to Uchida, June 1; Aug. 22; USDS. 893.00/1520, Myers to State, Dec. 6, 1912. *China Year Book, 1913* (Shanghai, 1914), pp. 570-71.
55. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 207-09, 321-23, 598, Ochiai to Uchida, May 3; June 5; Aug. 17; MT 1.6.1.4-6. reel 115, pp. 776-78, "Kantō tōtokufu rikugun sanbōbu dai 326. Shina jiji," July 31; reel 116, p. 932. Hoshino to Jichō, Sept. 26, 1912. *Asahi,* April 2, 1912. USDS. 893.00/1328, Fisher to State, April 27, 1912.
56. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, p. 501, "Mōko jōhō dai 9," July 22; p. 516, "Mōko jōhō dai 10," July 24; pp. 547-49, 606-07, 649-50, Ochiai to Uchida, July 31; Aug. 17, 25, 1912.
57. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.62. reel 156, pp. 857-58, 888-89, 1027-28, Morita to Sōchō, March 21, 22, 30; MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 135-36, Ochiai to Uchida, April 1, 1912. Lattimore, *Mongols of Manchuria,* pp. 119-21.
58. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-6. reel 116, p. 930, Hoshino to Jichō, Sept. 26; MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 752-54, Ochiai to Uchida, Aug. 31, 1912. *Asahi,* Sept. 12; *North China Herald,* Sept. 21, p. 811; *Novoe Vremia,* Aug. 31; Sept. 2, 1912.
59. Gerard Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position* (Baltimore, 1949), p. 71. Robert A. Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century* (The Hague, 1964), pt. 1, p. 67. George A. Schreiner and B. de Siebert, *Entente Diplomacy and the World* (New York, 1921), p. 40.
60. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 718-24, Sakō to Uchida, Aug. 29; pp. 784-90, Hayashi to Uchida, Sept. 3; pp. 630-31, Satō to Jichō, Aug. 27, 1912.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 597-98, Ochiai to Uchida, Aug. 17; pp. 805-06, 950, Amano to Uchida, Sept. 7; Oct. 9, 1912.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 609, 610-11, 626-28, Hayashi to Uchida, Aug. 24, 25, 26; pp. 715-17, 758-59, Ochiai to Uchida, Aug. 30, 31; pp. 838-42, Amano to Uchida, Sept. 11, 1912. *Asahi,* Aug. 30, 1912.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 981-82, Kimura to Jichō, Oct. 22, 1912.
64. *North China Herald,* Sept. 28, p. 908; Oct. 11, p. 185; Oct. 26, p. 257; Nov. 9, p. 387; Nov. 16, p. 465; Nov. 23, p. 541; Nov. 30, p. 616, 1912.
65. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 890-94; reel 113, pp. 1101-03, 1137-45, Ihara to Uchida, Sept. 19; Oct. 28; Nov. 1, 1912.
66. *Ibid.*, reel 112, p. 652, "Sanbō honbu dai 533," Aug. 29; pp. 727-32, Ochiai to Uchida, Sept. 1; pp. 936-37, Amano to Uchida, Oct. 3, 1912.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 954-56, Amano to Uchida, Oct. 9; pp. 963-64, Ochiai to Uchida, Oct. 12, 1912.
68. *Ibid.*, reel 113, pp. 1212-26, Fukushima to Uchida, Nov. 19, 1912. USDS. 893.00/1520, Myers to State, Dec. 6, 1912.
69. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-6. reel 115, pp. 776-78, "Kantō Tōtokufu rikugun sanbōbu dai 326. Shina jiji," July 31, 1912. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 112, pp. 934-36, Amano to Uchida, Oct. 3, 1912; reel 113, pp. 1159, "Kantō tōtokufu rikugun sanbōbu," Nov. 12, 1912.
70. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 113, pp. 1082-93, Sakō to Uchida, Oct. 29; pp. 1216-17, Fukushima to Uchida, Nov. 19, 1912.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 1094-97, Sakō to Uchida, Oct. 30, 1912
72. *Ibid.*, pp. 1105-09, Kibe to Uchida, Nov. 2; pp. 1219-20, Fukushima to Uchida, Nov. 19, 1912.
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 1082-93, Sakō to Uchida, Oct. 29; p. 1181. Fukushima to Uchida, Nov. 12, 1912.
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75. *North China Herald*, Nov. 23, 1912, pp. 511-12, JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 113, pp. 1134-36, Hayashi to Uchida, Nov. 5, 1912.
76. Rupen, *op. cit.*, p. 71
77. Satō Toshizō, *Shina kinsei seitō shi* (Tokyo, 1940), pp. 70-71, 75. *Hupei ke ming chih chih lu* (Chungking, 1945), pp. 407, 411-12.
78. *Nihon gaiko bunsho*, XLV/2, no. 1163 Ijuin to Uchida, Nov. 19, 1912.
79. JFMA. MT 1.6.1.4-4. reel 113, pp. 1241-45, 1325-27, Fukushima to Uchida, Nov. 21; Dec. 1, 1912.