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FACULTY OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

A Thesis

HONG KONG AND CHINA'S REFORM AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS:
AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE REPORTS OF FOUR HONG KONG
ENGLISH NEWSPAPERS (1895-1912)

Submitted by

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In partial fulfillment for the
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


DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work and that it has not been previously submitted to this university or other institutions in application for a degree, diploma or other qualification.




Lam Man-sum



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Abstract of thesis entitled "Hong Kong and China's Reform and Revolutionary Movements: An Analytical Study of the Reports of Four Hong Kong English Newspapers (1895-1912)" submitted by Lam Man-sum for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong in December 1984.

* * * *

China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War demonstrated that her reform attempts in the past two decades were a failure. The end of the war set in motion a series of renewed efforts at reform. There were the Hundred Days reform movement and after 1900, a Manchu sponsored reform programme. China's defeat in the 1895 war also strengthened the conviction of many enlightened Chinese intellectuals that the Manchu government was not interested in reforming the nation and was instead the major obstacle to the introduction of substantial reforms in China. The desire to remove the chief obstacle to reform in China led to the growth of an anti-Manchu revolutionary movement headed by Sun Yat-sen who plotted against the legitimate Chinese authorities at the fringe of the Chinese society.


This thesis sets out to examine Hong Kong's connections with these twin political currents of modern China through the daily editorial and news columns of the four Hong Kong English newspapers, the China Mail, the Hongkong Telegraph, the Hongkong Daily Press and the South China Morning Post.

The thesis would be divided into two parts. Part One would trace the broad and general views of the four



Hong Kong English newspapers on the developments of China's reform and revolutionary movements from the end of the Sino-Japanese War to the downfall of the Manchu dynasty. The result of the investigation in this part would give some ideas as to how the most articulate of all the western establishments in the China coast would respond to these situations of changes in modern China; how far they understood these change-orientated political movements and how they interpreted them to their readers. In addition, it would also allow us to arrive at some tentative conclusions on the role the Hong Kong English journalists played in China's political movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Part Two would make use of the Hong Kong English newspapers to discuss certain significant aspects of Hong Kong's interactions with China's reform and revolutionary movements. Specifically, the results of the investigation would help answer the question of what role these Hong Kong newspapers had expected Hong Kong to play in China's incessant search for modernity. Indirectly, such findings would also throw light upon our understanding of Hong Kong's unique role in China's reform and revolutionary movements.



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


ABBREVIATIONS*

Some sources which have long titles or which are required to cite frequently are abbreviated in footnotes and bibliography as follows:

Academia Sinica: <u>chi-k'an</u>	<u>Chung-yang yen-chiu yuan chin-tai shih yen-chiu so chi-k'an</u> (Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica)
<u>CM</u>	<u>China Mail</u>
<u>CKHTSLC</u>	<u>Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih lun-chi</u> (Symposium of modern Chinese history), edited by Chang Yu-fa, Taipei: Lien-ching publishing corporation, vol. 3, "Hsin-hai ke-ming".
<u>CKHTS: pao-kao</u>	<u>Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shih chuan-t'i yen-chiu pao-kao</u> (Reports of special topics research in modern Chinese history), Taipei, Chung-hua min-kuo shih-liao yen-chiu chung-hsin, 1970-1976, 5 vols.
<u>CKJP</u>	<u>Chung-kuo jih-pao</u> ("China")
CO	Great Britain, Colonial Office, Archives, Public Record Office, London.
Feng: <u>i-shih</u>	Feng Tzu-yu, <u>Ke-ming i-shih</u> (Reminiscences of the Revolution), 5 vols.
FO	Great Britain, Foreign Office, Archives, Public Record Office, London.
<u>HHKM</u>	<u>Hsin-hai ke-ming</u> (The Revolution of 1911), edited by Ch'ai Te-keng, et. al., Shanghai, 1957, 8 vols.

*The use of inverted commas within parenthesis indicates an original English title.



HHKM: chuan-chi

Chi-nien Hsin-hai ke-ming ch'i-shih chou-nien shih-liao chuan-chi
(In commemoration of the
seventieth anniversary of the
1911 Revolution, special
compilation of historical
materials), Canton, 1981.
2 vols.

HHKM: lun-wen hsüan

Chi-nien Hsin-hai ke-ming ch'i-shih chou-nien ch'ing-nien hsüeh-shu t'ao-lun hui lun-wen-hsüan
(In commemoration of the
seventieth anniversary of the
1911 Revolution, selected
conference papers from young
scholars), Peking, Chung-hua
Bookstore, 1983. 2 vols.

HHKMHIL

Hsin-hai ke-ming hui-i-lu
(Reminiscence of the 1911
Revolution), compiled by the
Committee on Written historical
materials of the national
committee of the Chinese
Republic's political consultative
conference, first published in
1961, reprinted by Literature
and History Resources Publishing
Co., Peking, 1981, 8 vols.

HHKMSLWH

Hsin-hai ke-ming shih lun-wen hsüan (Selected essays on the
history of the 1911 Revolution),
Peking, Joint Publishing Co.,
1981. 2 vols.

HKDP

Hongkong Daily Press

HKT


Hongkong Telegraph

HKWP


Hongkong Weekly Press

HKWS

Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih-nien wen-hsien (Documents
on the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the founding of the Republic of
China), edited by Committee on
the compilation of documents
on the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Founding of the Republic of
China.



<u>KHHKMSL</u>	<u>Kwangtung Hsin-hai ke-ming shih-liao</u> (Historical materials on the 1911 Revolution in Kwangtung).
<u>KMWH</u>	<u>Ke-ming wen-hsien</u> (Documents of the Revolution), edited by Committee for the Compilation of materials on party history, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Kuomintang.
HT	Hsüan-t'ung.
<u>HTJP</u>	<u>Hua-tzu jih-pao</u> ("Chinese Mail").
<u>HWYCTL</u>	<u>Hsin-wen yen-chiu tzu-liao</u> (Materials on research in journalism)
<u>JHKBRAS</u>	<u>Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.</u>
KH	Kuang-hsü
<u>NCH</u>	<u>North China Herald</u> (Shanghai)
<u>SCMP</u>	<u>South China Morning Post</u>
<u>SHHKMSLCC</u>	<u>Sun Chung-shan yù Hsin-hai ke-ming shih-liao chuan-chi</u> (Sun Chung-shan and the 1911 Revolution special compilation of historical materials), Canton, 1981.
<u>TLHLWC</u>	<u>Chi-nien Hsin-hai ke-ming ch'i-shih chou-nien hsüeh-shu t'ao-lun hui lun-wen chi</u> (Papers in commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of the 1911 Revolution).
<u>Wu: ts'ung-k'an</u>	<u>Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih ts'ung-k'an</u> ("Selected articles on contemporary history of China").




INTRODUCTION

China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War demonstrated that her reform attempts in the past two decades were a failure. The end of the war set in motion a series of renewed efforts at reform. There were the Hundred Days reform movement and after 1900 a Manchu sponsored reform programme. China's defeat in the 1895 war also strengthened the conviction of many enlightened Chinese intellectuals that the Manchu government was not interested in reforming the nation and was instead the major obstacle on the way of modernizing China. The desire to remove the chief obstacle to reform in China led to the growth of an anti-Manchu revolutionary movement headed by Sun Yat-sen who plotted against the legitimate Chinese authorities on the fringe of the Chinese society.

This thesis sets out to examine Hong Kong's connections with these twin political currents of modern China through the daily editorial and news columns of its English newspapers, the China Mail, the Hongkong Telegraph, the Hongkong Daily Press and the South China Morning Post.

Methodology

This thesis is intended to be an analysis of the attitudes of the four Hong Kong English newspapers towards China's reform and revolutionary movements and Hong Kong's involvement in them.



To understand whether a person is in sympathy or not and how sympathetic he is, we have not only to study the motives behind his sympathy but also the factors which might have influenced his attitudes. Moreover, a person's attitude is not static. It might change with time and circumstances. The same can also be applied to the attitude of a newspaper. To assess a newspaper's attitude, one should not therefore take a blanket disregard to the time and conditional scene upon which the statement of support and sympathy was found.

In addition, the assessment of press attitudes is complicated by the fact that the one who expressed the view is usually unknown as anonymity, a characteristic of British journalism, was observed in the British Colony of Hong Kong.* Sometimes, the editorial attitude of a newspaper may change markedly or varied greatly for the simple reason that different persons had penned the columns.

In writing this thesis, I do not intend to trace or sort out the particular views of certain journalists who were alleged to have been friends of some prominent Chinese reformers and revolutionaries. Anyway, this is virtually

*See, for example, CM, September 9, 1910. In defence of anonymity in newspapers, it sarcastically reasoned that if every paragraph was signed by the contributing member of the staff, the newspaper columns would only mean a "galaxy of self-advertisement". Moreover, as explained by the author, anonymity had its own intrinsic value, for it would obviate unnecessary embarrassment to both writers and persons about whom they had written in a small community like Hong Kong whose prominent citizens were in close intimacy with one another.




impossible. The approach that this thesis has adopted is necessarily an impressionistic one.

Approximate generalizations are drawn on a newspaper's stand towards China's reform and revolutionary movements by referring to the most prevalent and persistent views that had occurred frequently in the newspaper columns. Some minority, contradictory or exceptional statements in these newspapers are either ignored or their significances, if there were any, deliberately suppressed.

The procedure

This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter I provides the necessary background information to the four Hong Kong English newspapers, the principal sources for this thesis, in the concurrent period. Discussed in some depth would be the general characteristics of these four newspapers; the biographical data of some of those who served under them; their general editorial policy and the possible factors that might have affected it. The potential influence exercised by and the degree of representation of the Hong Kong English newspapers of the Hong Kong community and government would also be assessed too.

Subsequent discussion would then be carried on in two separate parts. Part One which consists of three chapters (II to IV) would trace the broad and general views of the four Hong Kong English newspapers on the developments of China's reform and revolutionary movements



from the end of the Sino-Japanese War to the downfall of the Manchu dynasty.

Chapter II highlights the two main reform attempts initiated by the Manchu government, the Hundred Days reform movement of 1898 and the post-Boxer Manchu reform programme. Special attention would be paid to the questions of how the Hong Kong English newspapers had portrayed these historic events; understood their causes, nature and significance and assessed their likely impact upon China and other foreign nations; what sort of attitude they had adopted towards these two legitimate change-orientated movements and what other alternative ways of reforming China they had proposed to their Chinese friends.

Chapter III deals specially with the Chinese revolutionary movement which was closely connected with Sun Yat-sen. Again, how the English newspapers understood their nature and aims and explained them to their readers; what sort of attitude these Hong Kong English newspapers had adopted towards a potentially disruptive political force would be investigated into.

The Chinese revolutionary movement culminated in the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and Chapter IV would focus on the momentous historical event which led to the downfall of a dynasty and the creation of a republic. This chapter would trace the Hong Kong press attitudes from the outbreak of the revolt in Wuchang to the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty. Narratives would be directed to the questions of how the newspapers understood the aims and nature of




this political upheaval, assessed their possible impact upon China and other nations; what sort of preference these Hong Kong English newspapers had made between the two Chinese armed camps; and the solution they favoured or even advanced to the two Chinese opposing forces to settle their political deadlock.

Part Two would make use of the Hong Kong English newspapers to discuss certain salient aspects of Hong Kong's interactions with China's reform and revolutionary movements. Specifically, investigation in this section would be directed to the question of how the Hong Kong English newspapers had evaluated Hong Kong's role and what they had expected Hong Kong to play in China's incessant efforts for modernity. This part would make up of two chapters (V to VI). Chapter V deals with three different aspects whereby Hong Kong was supposed to have contributed to China's future progress. Section one examines Hong Kong's coordination with China in the latter's anti-opium reform movement. Since the early nineteenth century, Hong Kong was an important opium distributing and in due course an important opium consumption centre. By the turn of the century, the British government was actively supporting the Chinese government in combatting the opium evil. In order to set an example to China and to show the world that Britain was sympathetic to China's anti-opium efforts, the Hong Kong government was ordered to close Hong Kong's opium divans, regulate the Hong Kong opium re-export trade,



discourage the domestic opium smoking habits. All these were done at a great sacrifice of Hong Kong's financial interests. How the Hong Kong English presses had responded to these altruistic efforts of the British home and colonial governments makes up the gist of this section. Section two deals with another possible way that Hong Kong might have played in China's modernization process. The building of the University of Hong Kong rendered Hong Kong into one of the most important educational centres in the Far East. Focus of this section would be placed on how the four Hong Kong English newspapers had conceived of this scheme from its inception, whether they intended it to fulfil the ideal of assisting China in the education of its people at the expense of the Hong Kong taxpayers, or whether they merely expected its aim to be that of satisfying the educational need of the local community. Section three deals with Hong Kong's possible involvement in China's future economic advancement through the construction of the Kowloon-Canton railway. Again, the attitudes of the newspapers towards this costly project would be studied in order to see whether the scheme was primarily intended to facilitate China's economic growth or that of Hong Kong only.


Hong Kong was to some extent affected by the Revolution in her northern neighbour, and chapter VI would study largely through the reports of the four Hong Kong English newspapers the question of how Hong Kong had been affected by the Revolution in China. It would trace the



newspaper reports on the intense enthusiasm manifested by the Hong Kong Chinese masses and the consequent rise of a potentially dangerous revolutionary situation in the British colony of Hong Kong. How the Hong Kong English newspapers had responded to this revolutionary situation and how they had reacted to the measures adopted by the Hong Kong colonial authorities to tackle with the situation would be the focus of this chapter.

Value

In studying the responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers to events in China, two things should be borne in mind. First, they were not important vehicles to shape diplomacy or influence the official policy or the community which they served. A study of this kind is undertaken primarily to satisfy the curiosity of those who want to learn something about these semi-neglected source materials especially their editorial attitudes in connection with certain political events and movements in China. Second, the reports of these four Hong Kong English newspapers were not always factually accurate. Their limits as intelligence agents were too well-known. They should be handled with care when they were treated as historical records. But that is not to say that these Hong Kong English newspapers were entirely useless in an academic sense. There is a general dire lack of materials in studying Hong Kong-China interactions. The Hong Kong English newspapers were one of the few places



where we can get a cornucopia of information on Hong Kong, China and their interactions. Moreover, their reports and especially their daily editorials on affairs in China while carrying little political weight and influence in the period they were in, were not totally devoid of interest and insight to the later-day historians. As one of the few most permanent and prominent western establishments in the China coast, their attitudes can to a certain extent reflect the feeling of the local foreign community or even the other English speaking communities on the China coast towards contemporary affairs in China.

In addition, the result of this study would give some ideas as to how the most articulate of all the western establishments in the China coast had responded to the situations of changes in modern China; how they understood these change-orientated political movements, and how they interpreted them to their readers. More significantly, it would allow us to speculate on the role that the Hong Kong English journalists had played in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Chinese political movements where they have been variously addressed as agents of imperialism and sympathisers of modern Chinese nationalism.


It is generally believed that a modern press would function as an agent or advocate of change. The results of this investigation would also tell us whether the four Hong Kong English presses were able to or desired to act in that capacity; and what sort of viable alternatives



they had offered to their Chinese friends in the course of their incessant search for modernity.

In the course of the narrative, some efforts were also made to compare and contrast the different opinions on questions of reform and revolution amongst the four Hong Kong English newspapers themselves and also with those of some contemporary English and Chinese newspapers as well. Hong Kong English press perspectives would also be compared to those of the other different English perspectives and viewpoints in the concurrent period to see whether the Hong Kong English newspapers were unique in their attitudes or whether their editorial policies were similar to the other contemporary foreign observers of Chinese affairs.

This thesis would also try to answer the question of how the Hong Kong English newspapers had evaluated Hong Kong's role and what they had expected Hong Kong to play in China's modernization process. Indirectly, this would also throw light upon the general trend of the relationship existing between the two places in the period under study and something about Hong Kong's unique role in China's reform and revolutionary movements.



Chapter I

BACKGROUND: THE FOUR HONG KONG ENGLISH NEWSPAPERS IN THE LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

The four Hong Kong English newspapers, the China Mail, the Hongkong Telegraph, the Hongkong Daily Press and the South China Morning Post were the chief English newspapers in circulation in Hong Kong in the period 1895-1912.¹ Of these four newspapers, the China Mail edited from Wyndham Street was the earliest, starting as a weekly on February 20, 1845. From February 1, 1867 onwards, it became an evening daily.² The first daily newspaper in the Colony should be the Hongkong Daily Press, edited also from Wyndham Street. It began its publication as a morning post on October 1, 1857.³ For over a decade, the China Mail and the Hongkong Daily Press were the only English newspapers in the Colony after their rivals, the Friend of China and the Hongkong Gazette and the Hongkong Register ceased publication in Hong Kong in 1859 and 1863 respectively.⁴ It was not until June 15, 1881 that a third newspaper the Hongkong Telegraph, an evening daily, edited from 6 Pedder's Hill made its appearance.⁵ On November 6, 1903, the morning daily, the South China Morning Post edited from 15-17 Connaught Road and since 1907 from Des Voeux Road was also in print.⁶ Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the British colony of Hong Kong had altogether four English newspapers.




General characteristics

A. Physical appearance

The four Hong Kong English newspapers consist of four to six folio pages with most of the pages divided into six to eight vertical columns. The first page and one or two more pages are fully covered with shipping notices and commercial advertisements. One can, for instance, refer to the earliest complete and extant edition of the South China Morning Post dated January 5, 1904.⁷ The edition consists of four folio pages with most of the pages in the form of vertical columns of seven. If coverage space is counted in terms of column, news items only occupy twenty-three out of a total of fifty-six columns, i.e. below 50% of the total space coverage of the entire newspaper. This is understandable. As the local reading population was very small,⁸ these newspapers simply could not sustain themselves by subscription alone. Advertisements obviously constituted their major source of revenue. This situation was admitted by E.H. Sharp, chairman of the Board of Directors of the South China Morning Post Limited, who once referred to advertisements as the "main source of income" of his newspaper.⁹

B. Scope of news coverage

These Hong Kong English newspapers obtained their information from a wide range of sources provided by their own local reporters and specially engaged correspondents, supplemented by Reuter's telegrams, translations and extracts from other China Coast and European newspapers



and also contributions from their local readers in the form of translations, signed and unsigned articles and letters to the editor, specialized reporting in the form of correspondence from former Hong Kong or China Coast residents, sometimes former editor or staff members of the China Coast newspapers, and also foreign missionaries, merchants and travellers in various parts of China.

Compared to their contemporary Chinese counterparts in Hong Kong which were mainly concerned with happenings in China, the four Hong Kong English newspapers placed more emphasis on world and local news.¹⁰ They were, nevertheless, also valued by their contemporaries in the North such as the Chinese Public Opinion (Peking), the Peking Post (Peking), the North China Daily News and its weekly adjunct, the North China Herald (Shanghai) for their intelligence about South China.

Though William Henry Donald had once written that the Hong Kong English newspapers were able to "keep the Colony excellently supplied with the happenings of the outside world",¹¹ local news often predominated the news and daily editorial columns. This was understandable as cable rates were expensive and direct overseas news services were not only costly¹² but very often unreliable.¹³ By the late nineteenth century, the proprietors of the Hong Kong English newspapers still employed the economical method of copying "stable" news from newspapers outside Hong Kong.¹⁴



C. Their strong commercial orientation

The four Hong Kong English newspapers were all founded as commercial ventures. The concern of the newspaper management with the business fortunes of the company was reflected in the annual reports of one of the Hong Kong English newspapers, the South China Morning Post. By the way, these reports also revealed that newspaper was not an attractive investment in Hong Kong throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although the business history of the other three English newspapers could no longer be traced, it is nevertheless hoped that the difficulties that the South China Morning Post encountered could to a certain extent reflect those of its other contemporaries.


The South China Morning Post certainly started with good promise. There were at least several excellent points in its favour over its rivals: it had a large initial capital of HK\$150,000; its retail price - 10¢ - for every single issue - was the cheapest. At a technical level, it also had a practical local monopoly in lithographic work and according to Lin Yu-lan, the most up-to-date printing machinery, the "Wharfdoles" [sic? Wharfedale] type.¹⁵

In the second annual meeting of the company, the chairman of the South China Morning Post Limited made an optimistic prognostication of the business of the company.¹⁶ There were some grounds for his optimism. The three departments of the company: the newspaper, the lithographic



and the general printing work could show a profit immediately after the lapse of an initial period of five months instead of the expected 12 months. Subscribers and advertisers of the newspaper showed a steady increase and its circulation, as boasted by its chairman, was as great as that of any other English newspapers in the Colony. In the third annual meeting of the company, the acting chairman C. Ewens again reported the growing prosperity of the company: the newspaper had got the largest circulation rate and the working accounts for the first five months of 1905 showed a profit of HK\$7,216.97 as compared to that of a profit of HK\$228.20 in the same period a year before.¹⁷ The predominance of the South China Morning Post was given official recognition when the Hong Kong Government allowed it the special privilege of reporting the cases in the Supreme Court.¹⁸

Despite a propitious start, the South China Morning Post was soon in financial straits. Financial problems plagued the company from 1905 onwards¹⁹ and led to a change in management in 1907 when the directorship of the company was passed to Joseph W. Noble, the Dental Surgeon.²⁰ It was under Noble's direction that the financial condition of the newspaper company gradually improved.²¹ In the seventh annual ordinary general meeting of the company, although the chairman G.C. Moxon had to admit the fact that the year's working was "not as favourable as that of the previous year", he was moreover able to tell the shareholders that the circulation of




the newspaper had been substantially increased during the past year and that its value as an advertising medium had been most generously recognized.²² In 1911, Noble also established connections with the Hongkong Telegraph.²³

The strong tie established between the local English newspapers and the leading mercantile bodies of Hong Kong also told us what the nature of these four Hong Kong English newspapers was. The Hong Kong branch of the China Association and the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce were the two leading organizations that represented the local mercantile interests. Some important members of these organizations such as J.J. Francis, W.F. Playfair, C.S. Sharp and R. Shewin were also directors or shareholders of the leading Hong Kong English newspapers. The annual reports of these two mercantile organizations also appeared in the Hong Kong English newspapers. These local business organizations always found at their backs the local English newspapers when they were making their wishes or demands known to either the British home and colonial governments and even the Chinese central and provincial authorities.

D. Their secular and professional outlook

The four Hong Kong English newspapers were secular newspapers. Their founders/publishers and subsequent successors were either long time practising journalists or China coast merchants who were interested in the printing and publishing trade.



In terms of staff employment, the four Hong Kong English newspapers were comparable to their contemporaries in China and elsewhere. They might have one or two chief editors and a number of assistant and sub-editors, possibly one to three local reporters and a number of correspondents in Canton and other large Chinese cities. The members in the editorial board were mainly trained in journalism or gained wide journalistic experience on the job in the Colony and in other different parts of the world.

The above generalizations can be supported by a random reference to the career pattern of some of the leading founders/publishers and editors of these four Hong Kong English newspapers.

1. The founders/publishers


The founder of the China Mail was Andrew Shortrede. He had gained journalistic experience in Sydney, Australia before coming to Hong Kong to serve as publisher in the China Mail in 1856. For two years, Shortrede was the sole proprietor of the paper. Shortrede's partner, Andrew Dixon from whom the China Mail got its Chinese title, the Te-ch'en-pao had been educated as printer in England before coming to Hong Kong to work with Shortrede. Dixon assumed full control of the China Mail after Shortrede's death in 1858.²⁴ Their successor George Murray Bain came to Hong Kong to serve as sub-editor in the China Mail on February 9, 1864. He became the publisher of the newspaper in 1872 and from 1879 to 1894



served also as editor of the China Mail. Until his death in April 1909, Bain held the chairmanship of the China Mail Limited.²⁵

The first publisher and proprietor of the Daily Press was George M. Rider but it was from Yorick Jones Murrow that the paper got its Chinese subtitle the Ma-la-pao. Murrow was engaged in the China coastal trade as early as 1838 before he became the publisher and proprietor of the Hongkong Daily Press from 1858 to 1884. His interest in journalism must have been very strong, for after his departure to English in 1867, he also founded the London and China Herald which lasted till 1870.²⁶ His partner Daniel Wares-Smith had worked in the Shanghai Recorder, for three years before joining the Hongkong Daily Press in 1870. Wares-Smith maintained his link with the Hongkong Daily Press serving ever since 1900 as its lessee from the Murrow family well after 1911.²⁷

The founder of the Hongkong Telegraph Robert Fraser-Smith²⁸ from whom the newspaper got its Chinese name the Shih-mi-pao was in control of the newspaper from 1881 till his death in 1895 when the Hongkong Telegraph was formally placed in the hands of new proprietors.²⁹ Fraser-Smith possibly had journalistic experience and training before the setting up of the Hongkong Telegraph. There is nevertheless not much information concerning his career background. J.P. Braga, manager and editor of the newspaper from 1902 to 1910 was also an experienced journalist. He was the grandson of Delfino Noronha, Hongkong's first printer, with whom Braga had worked for



almost a decade before he finally took charge of the Hongkong Telegraph.³⁰

The South China Morning Post which has survived to the present day as the largest and leading English newspaper was launched as a joint venture of banking and printing interests. One of its earliest directors A.G. Ward was the owner of the Victoria Lithographic Company. G.W.F. Playfair, also director, was the manager of the National Bank of China.³¹ Alfred Cunningham, editor and general manager, was in fact the motivating spirit behind the venture. Cunningham had gained several years of worldwide newspaper experience in London, Singapore and Shanghai and other cities and had previously been associated with such famous newspapers as the Shanghai Mercury, the Shanghai Daily Press and the New York Sun.³²

2. Other editorial staff

The career of Bain, the chief editor of the China Mail and Braga, editor of the Hongkong Telegraph, had already been mentioned. There are many other examples.

William Henry Donald, one of the editorial staff of the China Mail from 1903 to 1906 had several years of journalistic experience in Australia working with such newspapers as the National Advocate (Bathurst), Daily Telegraph (Sydney) and Argus (Melbourne).³³ Frederick Lionel Pratt, the associate editor and leader writer of the China Mail for some years since 1905 had worked as Reuter's associate correspondent at Peking in 1901, as the war correspondent for the London Daily Telegraph in



Manchuria, during the Russo-Japanese War, and served in the Australian newspapers, Age and Sydney Morning Herald before coming to Hong Kong. He later left Hong Kong to become the editor of the Siam Observer, the sub-editor and acting assistant editor of the North China Daily News and also the editor of the Shanghai Times before he returned to the Colony to act as the editor of the Hongkong Telegraph in September 1911.³⁴

T. Wright, editor of the Hongkong Daily Press for four years (1904-1908) had had previous newspaper experience in the North-China Herald (Shanghai) and in Japan.³⁵ Bertram Augustus Hale also editor (since 1903) and managing director (1908-1911) of the Hongkong Daily Press was an experienced journalist in Devonshire and London and other Far Eastern ports before coming to Hong Kong.³⁶

Chesney Duncan, editor of the Hongkong Telegraph in 1895-1899 served as special correspondent in Seoul, Korea for the Hongkong Telegraph, Japan Gazette, Shanghai Mercury and Chinese Times for six years and acted with Thomas Cowen, a sub-editor of the Hongkong Telegraph in the early 1890s,³⁷ as the joint lessees of the New Press (Shanghai) and the Shanghai Daily Press.³⁸ George Manington had served as the Paris correspondent of the Times before he was formally appointed assistant editor to the Hongkong Telegraph in September 1903.³⁹ Harold F. Piper, another editorial staff of the Hongkong Telegraph in 1904-5 commenced his journalistic career in Midlands, England and since the late 1890s went to the Far East to serve in the North China Daily News (Shanghai) and the Straits




Echo and the Bangkok Observer in the Straits.⁴⁰ A.W. Brebner, editor of the Hongkong Telegraph from January 1906 till his death in April 1910 had previously connected with the Aberdeen Free Press, the Daily Gleaner in Kingston, Jamaica, the London Daily Telegraph and at least two newspapers in the Far East, the Bangkok Times, Siam and the Straits Times.⁴¹

George T. Lloyd, an editorial staff of the South China Morning Post since 1904, succeeded Cunningham as General Manager and editor in 1907 and resumed editorship in 1911 after the resignation of Angus Hamilton. He had had newspaper experience in England for a number of years before coming to Hong Kong.⁴² Thomas Petrie, another editorial staff of the South China Morning Post in 1904-1911 had served as reporter in the Far Eastern ports and Bangkok for a number of years.⁴³ Angus Hamilton, editor of the South China Morning Post in 1910-1911 was a Far Eastern War Correspondent for the Pall Mall Gazette before 1904.⁴⁴

Other characteristics

A. The impact of personalities

The formation of these English newspapers was largely due to the efforts and ambitions of a few enterprising individuals. Before the 1880s, the Hong Kong English newspapers had only a small number of newspaper staff. Therefore, the newspapers were essentially personal organs reflecting the opinions of a few dominating personalities.




Fulminations and invectives which were quite common in those days were usually the result of personal prejudices. This was especially true for the China Mail. Even the Hongkong Telegraph in the early years of its foundation was treated as the personal organ of its founder Fraser-Smith.

By the turn of the nineteenth century, these newspapers were, however, gradually developed into ones of modern style professional journalism, largely thanks to the enlargement of the editorial staff, the widening of the reading public and the intensification of competition between these newspapers. Personal journalism had become both undesirable and impossible. Libels and unjustified personal criticisms were dropped and from the mid-1880s onwards, there was "a cooling of journalistic passions."⁴⁵

A writer in the SCMP 70th Anniversary Review also made the following remarks:

The turn of the 19th century heralded a new era in journalism in the Colony. Gone were the days when editors spent a good part of their careers behind bars for outrageous libels, and gone were the days when unrestrained personal vendettas and bitter rivalries were waged on newspaper battlefields. The days of professional, investigative journalism, of criticism founded on worthy principles had arrived.⁴⁶

One can find statements supporting the principle of a clean, independent, public-spirited and reliable newspaper in the columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers themselves.




By way of criticising the English newspapers in Japan especially those in Yokohama for the personal rancour with which these newspapers were conducted, the Hongkong Daily Press, for example, expressed the desire that "in the interests of public decency and for the sake of the good name of Englishmen among the native races", the conductors of some of the newspapers of the Far East should "keep their private animosities to themselves or to air them elsewhere than in the columns of their journals."⁴⁷ The Hongkong Telegraph of December 24, 1896 ran the following lines: "We have never written with malice prepense [sic] to hurt or annoy, and never without the belief, whether justified or not by the facts, that we were serving the public and the public interest in the best manner possible."

The Hongkong Telegraph of May 3, 1895 also editorially stated the following:

We desire to make the Hongkong Telegraph the most thoroughly reliable paper in the East, that we will spare neither expense nor trouble to make it so, and that shall unhesitatingly publish any corrections that may be needful if unintentionally we have at any time, or should at any time hereafter fall into error, as we undoubtedly shall, in all probability, for in the hurry of getting a news daily paper through the press it is not always possible to make the same minute investigation into statements brought to the editorial department as are necessary and desirable....

The speech at the inaugural dinner of the Hong Kong Journalists' Association by the president T.H. Reid can further illustrate the importance the journalistic placed



on honest and fair news reporting. Reid having spent 12 years in the profession in the Colony stated that he was quite proud that Hong Kong could have achieved a relatively "clean" press and stressed that a good journalist should follow an independent and honest course in their daily reporting and that the power of a newspaper should only be exercised in the improvement of the Colony and its people irrespective of creed, class or colour.⁴⁸

Strictly speaking, the four Hong Kong English newspapers in the period under survey were private enterprises performing public services. News in print were largely the concern of the general public of the time. Views of the newspapers no longer belonged to a few individuals or certain sectional or class interests from which these newspapers derived their financial support. They were set forth as independent and representative organ of the whole community. At least, the community was what these newspapers claimed to represent. The Hongkong Telegraph of August 26, 1896 says:

A really independent paper, whose information - no matter from what source - is carefully examined and checked, so far as circumstances and time permit, and whose opinions are the result of the personal study and investigation of the Editor, aided by the best available lights, is a very valuable production and ought to meet with subscribers and supporters everywhere.⁴⁹

Reporting on the Lienchau Massacre,⁵⁰ the China Mail of November 15, 1905 also stated the following view which helped shed some light on the general editorial policy of this newspaper. It ran as follows:



We affirm it as a rigid guiding principle that in the columns of a newspaper with a general circulation, all institutions, religious and otherwise, should be treated with absolute impartiality.... In a word our business is not the setting of theological question but to supply to the best of our ability and as far as human nature can be trusted, truthful news, and where necessary to make such comment as seems to be justified.

This striving for impartiality is understandable. As commercial newspapers, they should not advocate anything which was contrary to general public interests, otherwise as the China Mail itself had repeatedly pointed out, the moral support of its subscribers would be withdrawn and possibly the material support would also follow.⁵¹

Honesty and fairness of view were in the course upheld as the essential criteria in judging the achievement of an editor in his profession. On the retirement of T.H. Reid, China Mail's managing editor and part proprietor, the China Mail eulogized Reid as an excellent editor by referring to his "taking an impartial view of things" and his "currying no man's favour and fearing no man's frown". It further stated that although his editorial commentaries might inflict injuries on some, they were "never prompted by malice or prejudice or ill-will".⁵² Similarly, the Hongkong Telegraph in commemorating A.W. Brebner's death also described an ideal journalist of the time as the one who "could be reasoned with" but whose opinion "could not be moulded or subversed to individual interests".⁵³



B. The Chinese connections


1. With the non-revolutionary journals

As English dailies, they were of course mainly catering for the foreign reading public. Whether these four Hong Kong English newspapers also attempted to channel their views to the Chinese masses can be examined through their connection with some of the Hong Kong Chinese newspapers.

The most notable example was the Chung-wai hsin-pao (Chinese Daily Press), the earliest modern Chinese daily newspaper founded in the Colony.⁵⁴ The Chung-wai hsin-pao has generally been accepted as the "Chinese version" of the Hongkong Daily Press.⁵⁵ Some sources nevertheless indicated that the Chung-wai hsin-pao was "wholly financed and managed by Chinese" and its connection with the Hongkong Daily Press was their common sharing of the same office, a font of metallic Chinese type and the printing press possessed by the latter.⁵⁶

Without doubt, there was a close relationship between the China Mail and the Chinese daily, the Hua-tzu jih-pao. The latter was founded in 1864 by Ch'en Ai-ting (Chan Oi Ting) and Wu T'ing-fang.⁵⁷


R.S. Britton's remarks that there was at no time any foreign control over the Huz-tzu jih-pao might probably be a putative statement.⁵⁸ Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whenever the China Mail was quoting from the Hua-tzu jih-pao, it used to remark that it was adapted from "our native edition".⁵⁹



There were of course many clues which indicated a close relationship between the China Mail and the Hua-tzu jih-pao. For example, one of the early founders of the Hua-tzu jih-pao Ch'en Ai-ting was employed by the China Mail in 1868 or 1869 as reporter. It was not until 1874 that Ch'en left the China Mail office for the United States.⁶⁰ Other evidences were that the Hua-tzu jih-pao used the printing press and one of the premises of the China Mail⁶¹ its English counterpart. The China Mail reporting the death of George Murray Bain also stated that "in 1872 he [Bain] became proprietor of the China Mail and its offshoot the Wah Tze Yat Po [Hua-tzu jih-pao], and from that day to this [1900] these journals have been under his predominant influence".⁶²

Yet, one still wonders about the kind of control that the China Mail exercised upon its Chinese edition. Certain authorities did state that the China Mail had initially carried on some editorial supervision of the Hua-tzu jih-pao⁶³ but subsequently the Hua-tzu jih-pao was able to evolve an independent editorial policy of its own.⁶⁴

There is, nevertheless, a consensus of opinion in treating the Hsün-huan jih-pao (The Recurrence Daily) founded in 1874 as the first truly independent Chinese newspaper under purely Chinese direction and capital.⁶⁵ Its only connection with the Hong Kong English newspapers could only be found in the career of one of its first editors Wong Shing (Huang Sheng) who was a printer of the China Mail in 1861 before he founded the Hsün-huan jih-pao.⁶⁶



2. Relationship with the revolutionary journals

The Hong Kong English journalists were aware of the existence of many anti-Manchu newspapers in the Colony.

The Hongkong Telegraph of January 21, 1900 informed its readers the appearance of a new born contemporary, "China" [Chung-kuo jih-pao] whose aims were "to preach to the Powers China and set the whole of them right in their attitude to that unfortunate nation; to turn out the Manchus from their seat of government and generally to recast and remode the whole of the Far East". Similarly, the Hongkong Weekly Press of December 5, 1903 also mentioned the establishment of the "Shai Kai Kung Yik Po", [Shih-chieh kung-i pao] or the [World's News]. The Hongkong Weekly Press described this Chinese newspaper as "bold and outspoken in its advocacy of the principles of Reform" and that the newspaper was very popular among the local Chinese community and also those in the mainland.

Apart from these statements, there did not have, in my research into the contents of the four Hong Kong English newspapers in the period 1895 to 1912, any further clues to indicate that the Hong Kong English newspapers had any intimate and direct business intercourses with the Chinese revolutionary journals.

3. The role of the local Chinese in the development of the four Hong Kong English newspapers

Financial instability, as has been mentioned earlier, was a perennial problem for the owners of the Hong Kong English newspapers. In 1901, the Hongkong Telegraph was




purchased by a group of wealthy and prominent Chinese, including Sir Robert Ho Tung, Chau Siu-nin, Liu Chu-pai and Ho Fu and was turned into a limited company. For nearly a decade, this newspaper was under direct Chinese management.⁶⁷ Discussing the question of water supply in the Colony, the Hongkong Daily Press of November 22, 1902 tangentially touched the point that the Hongkong Telegraph was "owned by the Chinese" and was "generally understood to represent Chinese opinion in Hongkong". This seems to be, however, a much biased and exaggerated opinion, for editorial control of the Hongkong Telegraph was still in the hands of foreign journalists.

In 1903, Chinese capital was also invested in the South China Morning Post Limited, and Tse Tsan Tai [Hsieh Tsan-t'ai] was the comprador of the company from 1903 to 1907.⁶⁸ It is said that the Chinese investors intended the newspaper to be an organ for them "to give expression to their views".⁶⁹ Again, it is difficult to ascertain how far Chinese financial support would affect the editorial policy of this newspaper.

Even the Hongkong Daily Press was in one occasion being referred to by Henry Keswick*, in his address to the Legislative Council on the subject of the Ordinance limiting punishment by stocks, as a paper "controlled" by Chinese. The statement, however, provoked an immediate

*An unofficial member of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1907-1908; 1910-1911.



denial in the Hongkong Daily Press itself. Its issue of October 12, 1907 exclaims, "The Hongkong Daily Press, speaking for ourselves, is certainly not "controlled" by Chinese or by anything other than a consistent desire to tell the truth and shame the Devil"

A famous Chinese scholar and pioneer journalist Wang T'ao's hope that a western language Chinese-owned newspaper might be founded to present the Chinese point of view to the foreign readers⁷⁰ was certainly not yet materialized in Hong Kong in the period under survey, though the South China Morning Post was once alleged to have come closer to this ideal than any of its contemporaries in Hong Kong.⁷¹

Interestingly, Wang T'ao's hope was at least fulfilled although not in Hong Kong but at Peking with the establishment first, of the Chinese Public Opinion which started publishing thrice weekly on May 5, 1908⁷² and then its successor the Peking Daily News which started publishing on May 4, 1909. The latter was the first Chinese daily edited and published entirely by Chinese staff in the English language in China. Its managing editor was Li Sum-ling who was an editor of the China Mail and of the Chinese Mail for seven years before his taking up of this new post.⁷³

From the above account, one can conclude that the Hong Kong English newspapers did not establish any close, formal editorial or business connection with their Chinese counterparts. Except in translated reproductions of telegraphic messages and some news items appearing in the Chinese newspapers, the Hong Kong English newspapers rarely




heed to the editorial opinion of their Chinese contemporaries. It may be the case that they had had the conscious or subconscious notion that the Chinese newspapers in the Colony were something substandard. The Hongkong Telegraph for example was the one which treated its Chinese contemporaries with contempt and suspicion. It had stated - whether in a deliberate derisive or unintentional matter-of-fact manner - that the Chinese Mail (Wa Tsz Yat Po) [Hua-tzu jih-pao] was being edited by a Chinese "coolie"⁷⁴ and "a conglomeration of mud-headed scribblers".⁷⁵ In another issue, it expressed the opinion that with the exception of "two of the Chinese newspapers published in this Colony [which] are more or less clerically connected with our [English] contemporaries and are, presumably, carefully edited so far as is necessary to see that they publish nothing mischievous", the rest of them were prompt to vilify foreigners and incite anti-foreign disturbances in China.⁷⁶ This impression of the Chinese newspapers found its endorsement in the Singapore Free Press of June 5, 1895 which states that "even in our own Colony [Singapore] and in Hong Kong the Chinese press, with the enjoyment of liberty, is not able to rise very markedly above the ethical and intellectual level of the small reading public it serves".⁷⁷

To be sure, some rudimentary social intercourses were still maintained between the English journalists in the Colony and their prominent Chinese counterparts. For instance, in the birthday dinner of Wong Shing, one of the most famous Hong Kong Chinese pioneers in journalism,



the English newspaper journalists T.H. Reid of the China Mail, G.C. Cox of the Hongkong Daily Press and Chesney Duncan of the Hongkong Telegraph figured prominently among the guests invited to the meeting.⁷⁸ Some sort of connection existed in another and perhaps less pleasant level. The native Chinese newspapers also got used to the habit of reproducing, whether as a matter of convenience or economy, news items and articles from their English contemporaries. This kind of "connection" was certainly unwelcomed by the English newspapers. The China Mail of March 25, 1904 publicly complained that several native newspapers had been reproducing its special telegrams and warned that anyone reproducing its telegrams without express written authority would be subject to prosecution under Ordinance No. 14 of 1894 (The Telegraphic Messages Copyright Ordinance, 1894) whose infringement renders any person convicted liable to a penalty not exceeding \$100 for the first offence and not exceeding \$200 for any subsequent conviction, the alternative being three months imprisonment.⁷⁹ These translated reproductions from the English newspapers, nevertheless, allowed the majority of the local Chinese who did not understand English to get a glimpse of what had been expressed in the English newspapers.

These translated articles from the English newspapers which found their way into the Chinese newspapers had their limitations. They appeared in the Chinese newspapers at an irregular and random basis, and their selections for translation seemed to be completely at the pleasure of the Chinese newspaper staff concerned.



In any case, they could not be regarded as "exact" reproduction from the original version. More often, translations were at fault. As Archibald R. Colquhoun pointed out in his book, China in Transformation, the average translators in the employ of the Chinese newspapers were simply incompetent for their posts.⁸⁰ By sheer ignorance and personal prejudice, they could only produce "Chinese versions" of the subject they translated, Colquhoun said.


It is safe to assume that the desire of the Hong Kong English newspapers to reach to the Chinese community, or rather to gain a wider subscription did not achieve any significant measure of success. Their views could only have an immediate impact upon a coterie of Anglicized Chinese who understood English. These Anglicized Chinese in turn also made use of the English newspapers as vehicles to express their views and to defend the "interest of the Chinese community" in the Colony.

C. Relationship with the Hong Kong Government

Another point of investigation is whether the four Hong Kong English newspapers had adopted a pro-government orientation and what was the Hong Kong government's attitude towards these local English newspapers.

1. Business connection

Of the four Hong Kong English newspapers, the China Mail was the one that had maintained the closest, longest and earliest business relationship with the Hong Kong government. From 1845 to 1853 and then from 1855 to 1859, it held the contract for printing the government




gazette.⁸¹

With most of its columns filled with government proclamations and notices, the China Mail was in effect a quasi-official journal.⁸² This exclusive privilege did not, however, convert the China Mail into the tool of the government. Its connection with the Hong Kong government was on a purely business basis. The China Mail still enjoyed an independent editorial policy. The China Mail of March 1, 1907 stated that the China Mail in the early days had reserved to itself "the right to criticise the Government in fair spirit and temperate tone" and quoted the first issue of the China Mail the following remarks:

The pecuniary advantage to be derived from Government support will no more secure our advocacy of such of their measures as we would not otherwise approve of⁸³

It concluded that the China Mail had "lived up to its principles". The China Mail 76th Anniversary Number stated that during the period when the China Mail acted as printer for the government, it still criticized the government "as freely and as honestly as if it enjoyed favours".⁸⁴ Again, the China Mail 125th Anniversary Review also proudly claimed that "despite the fact it was an official organ of Government notices, the China Mail still maintained its editorial independence".⁸⁵ The China Mail's commercial tie with the Hong Kong Government was cut short when Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of Hong Kong, contracted with 'D. Noronha', a Portuguese printing firm, for producing the government gazette in December 1859.⁸⁶




Since then, the Hong Kong Government did not, to the best of my knowledge, make business deals with any local newspapers. It was not until 1905 that the Hong Kong Government entered into an agreement with the South China Morning Post for the official reporting of all important judgement given in the Supreme Court of the Colony and the reporting of such evidence as the Chief Justice might direct.⁸⁷ Why the Hong Kong Government particularly favoured the South China Morning Post at that time was not known, but the said arrangement incurred the jealousy of the Hongkong Telegraph which editorially criticised the Hong Kong Government for its "partiality".⁸⁸

2. Press criticism of Hong Kong government officials and polices

In the early founding days of the Hong Kong English newspapers, the Hong Kong English journalists often made frank and hostile criticisms of Hong Kong colonial officials and their polices. One can cite examples such as Andrew Dixon, George Murray Bain of the China Mail and indeed the names of editors in other Hong Kong English newspapers such as Yorick Jones Murrow of the Hongkong Daily Press and Robert Frazer Smith of the Hongkong Telegraph.⁸⁹

By the turn of the twentieth century, the Hong Kong English newspapers remained to be unequivocal critics of government policies though by this time, as stated in one of the Hong Kong English newspapers, criticisms were directed in the interest of what the journalist himself conscientiously conceived to have been the public weal



rather than based on any inherent desire to be against the government.⁹⁰

In general, in the period under study, the Hong Kong English newspapers were able to maintain a cordial relationship with successive governors. William Robinson was perhaps the only notable exception.⁹¹

3. Connection between the Hong Kong Government officials and the Hong Kong English newspapers

From the start, the four Hong Kong English newspapers were essentially privately owned business concerns. Since they were not government machineries, they were not required to adopt an editorial policy that was essentially pro-government in tone.

The British Government also did not favour any connection established by its overseas servants with the local newspapers. Under Regulation No. 79 of the Colonial Office Rules and Regulations, officials of all Crown Colonies were not allowed to be editor of a newspaper or to take any active part in the management of it. All colonial officials were discouraged from writing to the press anything especially those dealing with political subjects or measures or government.⁹² An anonymous writer in the China Mail of July 3, 1909 had stated that writing to the papers was held to be a "serious offence in officials"; it was "sternly repressed by higher authority" and in some cases connection with the press had "militated against the advancement of some officials". This rule was applied not only to British-born officials



but to Chinese subordinates as well. Tse Tsan-tai, for example, as a clerk in the employ of the Hong Kong Government, was once warned by the Colonial Secretary for "dabbling in politics" by publishing in the Hong Kong newspapers seditious articles against the Chinese government.⁹³ Nevertheless, this official code of conduct was not strictly enforced or observed. The Hongkong Telegraph of October 20, 1897, for example, cited an example in the Harbour Master R.M. Rumsey. Rumsey, this newspaper said, went scot-free even though he had contributed a letter to the Hongkong Daily Press discussing the feasibility of organizing a volunteer flotilla to defend Hong Kong from any surprise attack. Similarly, the China Mail of July 3, 1909 also cited an example in Sir Henry Brackenbury, Military Member of Council (1891-1896), British India. According to the China Mail, Brackenbury in his reminiscences in Blackwood's Magazine even boasted of his connection with the newspapers and ascribed his official advancement in great measure to his connection with the press!


4. Hong Kong Government's control of the local English newspapers

The local English newspapers were put under fairly little restraints from the side of the law. Relationship between the Hong Kong English press and the police was good. The Hongkong Telegraph Mail Supplement of July 6, 1907 proudly spoke of a sort of bon cammaraderie between pressmen and police in the Colony. The Hong Kong Government



was very liberal in its attitude towards the local publication and printing trade. There was no censorship of the local newspapers. The colonial authority certainly understood fairly well that the English journalists who cherished a long liberal tradition of freedom to report and criticize would greatly resent the introduction of any censorship restrictions. Indeed, the principle of freedom of the press was a matter of much journalistic concern and found its frequent champion in the columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers.⁹⁴ The Hong Kong Government's habit of keeping copies of some local newspapers in circulation was mainly for purposes of getting reference materials and providing information about these newspapers to the British home government.⁹⁵

Ordinance No. 2 of 1844, the first law relating to the publication of newspapers in the Colony simply required every printer and publisher of a periodical work to make a declaration before the chief magistrate of police that he was the printer and publisher, and that the printing or publishing was carried on upon premises described.⁹⁶ The only legal restraint imposed on the local newspapers was libel, a principle based on the common law of England. Hong Kong as a British colony also followed this legal practice.⁹⁷ As Ordinance No. 2 of 1844 made no provisions for the payment of fines or damages to be recovered in any legal action involving the publication of a libel, Ordinance No. 16 was introduced in 1860 at the suggestion of Governor Sir Hercules Robinson. This amended ordinance



required every potential printer or publisher to enter into a bond before the Registrar of the Supreme Court together with two sufficient sureties at £250 and his sureties in a like sum against damages and cost of conviction should he be found guilty of the offence.⁹⁸


Ordinance No. 16 of 1860 was superseded by Ordinance No. 6 of 1886 (the Printers and Publishers Ordinance) which required a new declaration whenever a change of proprietorship or address of the business occurred and raised the amount of sureties to £1,200.⁹⁹

The Ordinance of 1886 was amended by Ordinance No. 4 of 1891 which required a declaration from the actual printer or publisher when the original printer or publisher failed to exercise personal supervision of his business.¹⁰⁰

D. Inter-press relationship

We should not emphasise too much the differences between the four Hong Kong newspapers. Founded in a place with a very small reading public, they had to compete keenly with one another. To outstrip competitors, they were inclined to challenging the professional ability and honesty of one another. They would jump at news reports and editorial opinions of their rivals which they considered lacking in originality, accuracy or which were mere twaddies. Various sorts of inter-press squabbles can also be found in the columns of these four Hong Kong English newspapers.¹⁰¹

Commercial rivalry certainly strained relations but it did not lead to complete estrangement or the



adoption of a radically different or diametrically opposed editorial policy from among these Hong Kong English newspapers on every important issue of the day.

Difference in opinion did exist but they were the result of a genuine difference in their way of seeing things rather than of any deliberate and artificial creation.

Difference in editorial opinions were both expected and respected by these Hong Kong English newspapers themselves.


The Hongkong Telegraph of March 23, 1896, for example, informed its readers who did not peruse any other local newspapers than its own that it would give them a brief summary, daily, of the leading articles in the columns of its contemporaries and references to any correspondence to interest that might appear in them. Passionate squabbles did arise on occasions, but they were only touched off by trivial issues and would subside fairly soon and easily.

On the other hand, intimate links, although developing on a personal rather than an institutional level, were established between the staff of these four Hong Kong English newspapers. In January 1904, the Hong Kong Journalists' Association was formed with the major aim of promoting personal and social intercourses between members of the profession in the Colony.¹⁰² An executive committee with members coming from the four English newspapers was formed. The first President was Thomas Hird Reid of the China Mail, the posts of Honorary Secretary and Treasurer went to Ernest Alan Shewin of the



Hongkong Telegraph. Philip Walshingham Sergeant of the Hongkong Daily Press, Douglas Story of the South China Morning Post and William Henry Donald of the China Mail also served as the Committee members.

In addition, there were interchanges of staff and even management directors among these four Hong Kong English newspapers. Alfred Cunningham was the manager of the Hongkong Daily Press in 1899-1903 before he served as the editor and general manager of the South China Morning Post in 1903-1907.¹⁰³ Philip W. Sergeant, editor of the Hongkong Daily Press in 1900 later served the South China Morning Post as its London correspondent.¹⁰⁴ Thomas Petrie was a reporter in the employ of the China Mail in 1900-1902 before he joined the staff of the South China Morning Post.¹⁰⁵ Frederick Lionel Pratt was a leader writer for the China Mail since November 1905 before he joined the Hongkong Telegraph in 1911.¹⁰⁶ F. Hicks, sub-editor of the China Mail also joined the Hongkong Telegraph staff in May 1912.¹⁰⁷ J.J. Francis, one of the proprietors of the Hongkong Telegraph in 1895-1901 was at one time an editor and proprietor of the China Mail.¹⁰⁸ The most glaring example was of course J.W. Noble who was the chairman of the South China Morning Post Limited since 1906 and from 1911 onwards the director of the Hongkong Telegraph. This foreshadowed the subsequent merge of these two newspapers in 1916 under the control of a single company, the South China Morning Post Limited.¹⁰⁹




Representation and influence

A. General remarks

It is quite obvious that no conclusive answer can be given to the two basic questions of how influential and how representative of Hong Kong were these four Hong Kong English newspapers.

First, it is virtually impossible to tell who had and what kind of people regularly read these newspapers.

Second, even if readers of these newspapers can be identified, it may be fallacious to make the assumption that the purchase of a newspaper would imply the agreement of its views. Some readers do have the habit of expressing their personal and dissenting views in their letters to the editor. But the habit was not popular or widespread among the local Hong Kong community of the period. The people of Hong Kong tended to keep personal views to themselves; and the China Mail of September 9, 1910 had to admit that in Hong Kong there was the same diffidence in writing to the newspaper as elsewhere. Moreover, there is no guarantee that all these letters to the editor can reach the columns of a newspaper although the China Mail had once assured its readers that "the inclusion or rejection of a letter [to the newspaper] rested "on its merits as a matter of public interest, and not on the personality of the writer".¹¹⁰ It was also the common practice of the newspapers in Hong Kong of that period, following the British tradition of journalism, to require correspondents addressing themselves to newspaper editors



to forward addresses and sign names as evidence of good faith and anonymous correspondence as a rule was to be discarded.¹¹¹ The local Chinese of Hong Kong were certainly very apprehensive of attaching their real names and addresses to these public letters, otherwise, there was no need for the Hongkong Telegraph of August 3, 1895 to remind their Chinese readers that "until they were willing to comply with this universal requirement of respectable journalism", their letters were not allowed to appear.

Third, we do not know what kind of news or editorial attitudes appearing in these newspapers would attract the greatest attention of and support from their readers. The earliest clue I found to this question is provided by the Colonial Secretary W.T. Mercer who reported to the Colonial Office in 1865 that both the Hongkong Daily Press and the Hongkong Telegraph were read for their "valuable commercial information".¹¹² Additional clues can also be found in the contemporary Hong Kong English newspapers. On April 1, 1895, the new management of the Hongkong Telegraph, for example, announced in the newspaper column that the newspaper would hereafter devote its major attention to "shipping and commercial intelligence and then sporting news". A later issue of the Hongkong Telegraph (November 20, 1901) stated that "the whole life of Hong Kong may be summed up in two words, Dollars and Sport" and that "[n]obody appears to care about aught else" The South China Morning Post of February 23,



1904 reported that sports especially horse racing were the main preoccupations of the local community in their leisure. Robin Hutcheon in his book SCMP the First Eighty Years also mentioned that commerce and sport were the two dominant activities of the Hong Kong community in the period under study.¹¹³

Further, I have mentioned that the exact number of people who read these newspapers was not known. Moreover, circulation rate of the local English newspapers may be deflated or inflated by the coming and going of large numbers of itinerary travellers, tourists and globe-trotters. Hence, there is virtually no way to tell what exactly was the impact of the four local English newspapers on the more settled section of the local community.

Finally, using circulation figure, even if known, to determine the influence of a newspaper might be misleading. The actual number of readers of a newspaper may be greater or smaller than that suggested by its circulation figure, for generally a newspaper may circulate through different hands several times, or a person may purchase and read several newspapers at the same time. A reader J.S.E. in his letter to the editor of the Hongkong Telegraph on November 26, 1894 threw some light on the usual reading habit of the foreigners in the Colony: He went to the "Mandarin Free Library" which provided foreigners with latest issues of the Hong Kong English newspapers, glanced through the China Mail there and procured at the entrance to the establishment a copy of



the Hongkong Telegraph from a newsboy for home reading. Similarly, the Hongkong Telegraph of October 1, 1895 also stated that some individual members of the local community "do not now subscribe because they see the paper in their club or at their office". Moreover, the view of the Hong Kong local community might have been affected by newspapers coming from places outside Hong Kong. Commenting on the influence of the Review of the Times edited by Timothy Richard in Shanghai, the China Mail of December 21, 1901 also made this statement: "In Hong Kong, by a certain class of readers, there is no paper more eagerly looked for and more greedily devoured, than this monthly".


B. The Hong Kong English newspapers and the local community

1. Representation

Since these four Hong Kong English newspapers had Hong Kong as their base, it is assumed that thier proprietors would have placed in the forefront the local community as their sales target.

As English newspapers, it is safe to assume that their readers primarily came from the non-Chinese section of the community.

It has been said that the Hongkong Daily Press tended to address to the taipans in the Peak District;¹¹⁴ and the China Mail, the salaried Europeans in the Lower Level.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, nowhere is there any evidence available to indicate that some of these Hong Kong English newspapers ever tried to capture a particular kind of reader. It is



therefore better not to draw any artificial class line for these newspapers.

It is certain that the Hong Kong English newspapers had a small number of Chinese readers who contributed occasionally to their columns. In view of the low level of literacy, not to mention knowledge of the English language, then prevalent among the native population, the number of Chinese subscribing to these English newspapers must have been, as I have mentioned before, very small.

Also, in view of the small number of permanent denizens in the Colony, many subscribers to these newspapers might have simply been temporary visitors and globe-trotters. Writing against the government's attempt to license the newsboys, the China Mail revealed an interesting fact that "the people who purchase these papers are mostly visitors to the Colony, Naval and Military men, and officers of the Mercantile Marine",¹¹⁵ i.e. classes of people who were not permanent settlers of the place. This statement might tell us the real situation. Yet, we can only accept it at its face value as we cannot establish any definite proof for it.

Governor Sir Henry May once remarked that "the Press of Hong Kong did not express public opinion".¹¹⁶ His statement may to a large extent be true. Actually, one can even argue that public opinion did not simply exist in Hong Kong. The heterogeneous and the constant shifting nature of Hong Kong's population, the absence amongst its people of a communal feeling and devotion to their common



place of living; the traditional aloofness of the Chinese towards politics and public matters and the widespread ignorance of the native Chinese population led to the absence in Hong Kong of a positive political culture and the slowness of the political socialization process which were necessary for the public opinion formulation process.¹¹⁷

2. Influence


It is dangerous to assume that since these Hong Kong English newspapers selected for this survey were well-established, they would exercise a significant degree of influence upon the people of Hong Kong.

The small circulation rate of the four Hong Kong English newspapers tells us that the influence that these four Hong Kong English newspapers had exerted on the local community must be very limited indeed.

Besides, some evidences taken from the newspaper columns also indicated the fact that the people in Hong Kong did not hold the Hong Kong English newspapers and journalists in any great esteem.

According to the South China Morning Post of January 8, 1904, though a new era of professional journalism had arrived in the Colony at the beginning of the twentieth century, the professional status of the journalists in the Colony had not yet been recognized. This issue uttered the following lamentable remarks:

Elsewhere in the world the journalist stands on an equality with the lawyer, the physician, and the clergyman. Here, in the Far East, he is regarded as an excrescence, as a



something that is neither fish, flesh, fowl nor good red herring. He is a man set apart, eyed askance by the community, by society and by the clubs.


That is why the Hong Kong journalists found it necessary to form a professional association in 1904 to elevate and improve the status and quality of journalists in Hong Kong.

It was also stated in the Hongkong Telegraph of January 8, 1904 that a reporter, as a person, was only to be "tolerated" or "pitied", and that he always met difficulty in soliciting information from the leaders of Hong Kong in matters concerning the community.

Being aware of "the huge gap now yawning between the leaders of this Colony and ... the journalists", the China Mail in 1904 also found it necessary to assure the leaders of the local community of the public spiritedness of the journalists and the selflessness of their intention in news reporting.¹¹⁸

All these remarks let us wonder how journalists could have been expected to represent and speak for a community which had kept on ignoring or adopting an apathetic attitude to them.

The Hongkong Telegraph was certainly conscious of its limited influence. A "guide" rather than a "monitor" of public opinion was what this newspaper conceived of its role in society. It stated humbly that it "will endeavour to collect and present to its readers the materials out of which public opinion must be formed and grow" and that it "will not, as a rule, think for its readers, and pronounce ex cathedra but will strive to lead its supporters



to think for themselves and furnish them with the raw material for thought."¹¹⁹

C. The Hong Kong English newspapers' influence on the Hong Kong government

The Hong Kong government also adopted a carefree attitude towards the local English newspapers and their opinion.

Both the Hongkong Telegraph and the China Mail had expressed in their columns the feeling that the Hong Kong colonial government was neither mindful of local press criticism and advice nor did it particularly treasure their existence.

This kind of feeling can be detected, for example, in a complaint appearing in the Hongkong Telegraph of May 14, 1897 against the failure of the Secretary of the Sanitary Board to notify the local newspapers of the special meetings of the Board. It can also be reflected in complaints in these newspaper columns against the lack of satisfactory facilities in the Legislative Council and the Sanitary Board Chambers for the reporters to perform their duties.


The acoustics of these public meeting places, the China Mail of July 26, 1901 said, were "wretched", yet no improvement was made despite repeated press criticisms; and the reporters were as usual placed in the worst position for hearing, the China Mail of July 26, 1901 added. The China Mail of July 26, 1901 also mentioned that awkwardness was also experienced by the court reporters. According



to this issue, chairs at the court were usually occupied and reporters were thus forced to stand at the end of the Court room and take notes on their knees; depositions were kept away from them until reporters had to almost go on their knees and beg to be allowed to see them; appeals to the Magistrates for improvement received "scant courtesy" and were as a rule ignored. In one instance, a reporter of the Hongkong Telegraph even instituted legal action against a Chinese clerk engaged at the Magistracy for using insulting language towards him.¹²⁰

Commenting on the ill-treatment of the journalists by the Court officials, the China Mail made the ironic remarks: "If Hong Kong came within the jurisdiction of the Dowager-Empress of China she could scarcely do more, outside of actual suppression, to stifle the press than is done by the Magistrates".¹²¹ Improvement did not seem to have come after press complaints. The Hongkong Telegraph of September 6, 1904 aired the same grievance that representatives of the press were "treated little better than the prisoners in the dock" at the Magistracy.¹²²


Non-cooperation with the press representatives was not restricted to the subordinate staff at the Magistracy. The government servants at the Legislative Council, in the opinion of the Hong Kong English newspapers, behaved no better. The denial of the written replies to the questions asked at one of the Legislative Council session from the reporters on the scene occasioned another complaint from the China Mail.¹²³



The local English newspapers were certainly greatly inconvenienced by this kind of non-cooperative attitude adopted by some of these Hong Kong government officials. At one point, whether intentionally or otherwise, the Hong Kong government even seemed bent on stifling the press out of existence when it decided that the newsboys, the sales agents of the Hong Kong English newspapers, were hawkers within the meaning of the local ordinances and magisterial proceedings would be instituted against those unlicensed ones. The Hong Kong English newspapers, of course, promptly and strongly attacked this unfair and "oppressive" measure.¹²⁴

D. Influence of the Hong Kong English newspapers outside Hong Kong

Hong Kong was not the sole market for these Hong Kong English newspapers. The publishers of these newspapers during various periods also attempted to extend circulation to the neighbouring districts and other parts of the world.¹²⁵ By the second half of the nineteenth century, the China Mail had already had sales agents in Macau, other leading Chinese treaty ports, Japan, Saigon, Singapore, Penang, San Francisco and Calcutta.¹²⁶ It was also said that the overland edition of the China Mail publishing - first as a bi-monthly and then a weekly - from 1848 onwards found a steady and significant market in Britain.¹²⁷ By the turn of the century, the advertising blurb of the Hongkong Telegraph was able to announce proudly that the Hongkong Telegraph was "widely circulated in Japan,"




Cochin China, Ceylon, India and the Far East generally".¹²⁸

What exactly was the influence these overland editions of the Hong Kong English newspapers wielded upon the British home government and people and even the Chinese and non-Chinese communities in the China coast is impossible to gauge. Suffice it to say that it would not be very strong.


In general, Asian politics rarely stirred the ordinary masses in England. The personal impression from K'ang Yu-wei, the great Chinese reformer, may perhaps lay support to this statement. K'ang paid a visit to England after the failure of his reform attempts. It was reported in the China Mail of October 10, 1899 that he was shocked at the apparent apathy of the people there in regard to affairs in China and the reform movement in particular and their general ignorance even of recent happenings in China.

The Hongkong Weekly Press of November 21, 1895 disclosed the following information: "The majority of the most widely circulated London papers know scarcely of what goes on in East Asia". Most people in England were obviously not interested in affairs in China and this newspaper came to the view that "[t]he Penny Press of the metropolis are no doubt, from a business point of view justified in their policy of ignoring the Far East as being remote and therefore unimportant". The Hongkong Weekly Press of March 17, 1897 also said that few people in England would read the English newspapers published in the China coast at first hand. Moreover, the Hong Kong English newspapers



had been, in the period under study, commercially outstripped by their rivals such as the North China Daily News (Shanghai)¹²⁹ and the Times (London)¹³⁰ in sales markets outside Hong Kong. The effects of the Hong Kong English newspapers on the British public opinion at home should thus be negligible.

Nor could the Hong Kong English newspapers sway British official opinion at home. It was stated by one authority that before the First World War, the British government considered it unnecessary to "explain, still less to justify its policies to the public at large whether at home or abroad".¹³¹ It can thus be safely assumed that local public opinion as represented by the Hong Kong English newspapers was not treated seriously by the British home government. The South China Morning Post of December 14, 1907 frankly admitted that "local agitation [whether stirred up by the Hong Kong English newspapers or not] may be loud and very justifiable, but it becomes a soothing hum when it reaches the ear of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Commenting on the same subject, the Singapore Free Press expressed the opinion that public opinion in Hong Kong was only the opinion of the Secretary of State and that although the Hong Kong English newspapers might behave in quite obstreperous fashion, Downing Street did not as a rule choose to notice it.¹³² Interestingly, the South China Morning Post of December 14, 1907 advanced the idea that important questions affecting the interests of the Colony should be "transferred to the columns of



Home journals". The Singapore Free Press also suggested that Hong Kong should fashion for itself "a weapon whose grip shall be in Hong Kong and whose hammer-head shall be in London".¹³³

Summary remarks

From the above preliminary discussion of the nature of the four Hong Kong English newspapers, it is quite clear that they were the precursors of the free press of our modern time. They all set out to fulfil the task of providing information and performing the function of social and political criticism for their readers. Comparatively speaking, these four Hong Kong English newspapers represented one of the most permanent and also the most conspicuous of all the foreign establishments that were being transplanted into the China coast by foreigners.

While the early nineteenth century English newspapers were mostly missionary products and thus reflected a very strong religious flavour, the four Hong Kong English newspapers were very secular and commercial in outlook.

In addition, the staff of these four Hong Kong English newspapers were very experienced journalists and they were favourably inclined to sticking to the moral codes of conduct of their profession: honesty in news reporting and fairness of editorial views. Undoubtedly, they were able to achieve these cherished aims as there did not have any strong outside factor, as my preliminary research into the Chinese connections and their relations with the Hong



Kong government indicate, that could exert a very profound change in the editorial policy of any one of them.

Throughout the period under survey, the Hong Kong government did not impose any artificial restriction on their editorial policy. Their alleged connections with some local Chinese newspapers and certain Chinese reformers or financiers, as my initial researches into the nature of these newspapers show, were more superficial than real. Indeed, the views that these four Hong Kong English newspapers set out about China and the Chinese whether in Hong Kong or not, were in general very foreign or, to be more exact, English in outlook. My subsequent analysis of the editorial responses of these Hong Kong English newspapers to the issues of reform and revolution in China would further demonstrate and elaborate on this theme. It is obvious that their alleged Chinese ties were neither strong nor permanent enough to make any marked and lasting impact on the editorial policy of any one of them.



Chapter II


THE HONG KONG ENGLISH PRESS OPINIONS ON THE CHINESE REFORM MOVEMENTS

China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War showed that her self-strengthening attempts of the previous years were a total failure. Every enlightened Chinese was aware that invigorated efforts at reform were necessary. In the fifteen years preceding the 1911 Revolution, the Manchu government had sponsored two major reform programmes. They were the Hundred Days reform movement of 1898 and the post-Boxer Manchu sponsored reform movement. This chapter would focus on the responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers to these two radical reform movements initiated from above to see how far the Hong Kong English newspapers were in sympathy with these reform measures directed through the legitimate channels and whether they considered these measures adequate enough to reform and strengthen China. At the same time, it would also try to examine the other alternatives of reforming China as suggested by these Hong Kong English journalists.

The pre-Boxer period, 1895-1900

- A. The post-bellum China (1895-1898) as portrayed in the Hong Kong English newspapers

China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese war exposed her weaknesses to the outside world. Summing up China's position vis-a-vis other Powers immediately after the war, the Daily Press said, "China is no longer a Power to be




reckoned with. She is now generally regarded as a huge but flabby Empire held together rather by the mutual jealousies of other countries than by her own powers of cohesion.¹ The defeat also demonstrated the futility of China's pre-war reform attempts. Featured prominently in the columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers was a nation which possessed only a dismal future. The title headings of the Hongkong Weekly Press such as "stagnation in China", "the helpless China", "the nonprogressiveness of China" bear vivid testimony to this kind of pessimism.² Indeed, occasional parallels were drawn by the Hong Kong English newspapers between the Ottoman Empire, the Sickman of Europe and China, the Sickman of East Asia.³

This pessimistic feeling expressed for China was not due merely to China's defeat by a nation which China had despised before the war. It was also due to China's inability to learn from the lesson of defeat.⁴ Commenting immediately after the war, the Hongkong Daily Press of February 19, 1896 states:

Progress of any kind in China, whether political, administrative or material, would be very slow; that in point of fact, it was not likely to receive any great impetus by recent events, and might even, perhaps, be less certain and no more rapid than before the war with Japan. The crisis of affairs came and found the Government unprepared to meet it; the hour arrived but not the man; and the Empire, weakened and disorganised is yet unconvinced of the necessity for reform.


In short, the war, in the opinion of the Hong Kong English newspapers, failed to have any educational effect on China. China only felt the bad effects of the war and only that. The Hong Kong Daily Press comments: "It



is becoming more apparent every day that affairs in China are drifting into retrogression rather than making for progress".⁵ The Hongkong Telegraph of December 2, 1896 also stated the view that there was "no hope of reform in China" and that to talk of "the awakening of China" was a mere waste of time.

All the Hong Kong English newspapers and perhaps English newspapers elsewhere such as the Times (London) and North China Daily News (Shanghai) agreed that the major source of China's trouble could be found from within especially in its bureaucracy. Explicitly stated in the Hong Kong English newspapers was the view that the Chinese bureaucracy was "rotten to the core", "oppressive" and "iniquitous".⁶ The Hong Kong English newspapers were of course aware that there were exceptions to this rule. The Daily Press for example cited examples in Marquis Tseng [Tseng Chi-tse] and [Kuo Sung-tao]. But this newspaper also at the same time expressed regret that jealousy and distrust of colleagues and superiors and natural death would promptly efface these able and honest men in the Chinese officialdom.⁷ In the opinion of the Hong Kong English newspapers, the Chinese mandarins were indifferent to the need for reform. They were also obstructive in that direction; and still worse, they found a ready scapegoat for China's humiliation in the foreigners.⁸

Of the three Hong Kong English newspapers, the China Mail employed the bitterest terms against the Manchu government. In a highly critical tone that typifies the



general attitude of this newspaper towards the Chinese bureaucracy, the China Mail of May 15, 1895 states:

The Manchus have proved an absolute failure in every attribute of government. They have done nothing to ameliorate the condition of the people, nothing to produce reform in government or administration. They have done worse than nothing. By their system of government throughout the provinces, they have encouraged unscrupulous corruption and oppression.

The Hongkong Telegraph, on the contrary, was more reserved in its commentaries on Chinese domestic politics and officials. Perhaps, this newspaper might still retain some residual feeling of respect for China as a great Asian nation despite her defeat in the recent war. Endorsing Viscount Wolseley's statement that China possessed "every essential requisite for national greatness, though at this present moment she seems to lack the power to organize and properly mould and direct the energy of her vast population", the Hongkong Telegraph of April 2, 1895 reprinted Wolseley's article from the February 1895 issue of the Cosmopolitan. It may as well mention that the Hongkong Telegraph was the only English newspaper in the Colony that made the forecast that China would win in the recent war with Japan.⁹

There might also be a more practical reason for the newspaper's own cautious approach. The Hongkong Telegraph was convinced that journalists' Jingo blusters against the Chinese government would do more harm than good to the foreigners in China: they would only excite anti-foreign feeling among the common Chinese and alienate the Chinese officials on whose protection the lives and property of foreigners depended. That is why the Hongkong Telegraph



of September 6, 1894 had to make an appeal to the missionary correspondents of some Shanghai newspapers to stop their rabid rant against the Chinese officials; and the Hongkong Telegraph of November 23, 1896 also asked its northern contemporary the Peking and Tientsin Times which spoke of Sheng Hsüan-huai as a "wolf in sheep's clothing" in its November 14, 1896 issue to justify this hostile criticism on a high official of China.

B. Reforming China: from where and how?

Immediately after the war, the idea of reform in China caught on with the Hong Kong English journalists. To the Hongkong Telegraph reform was not only needed, but "most urgently needed".¹⁰ The questions awaiting further consideration were therefore from what source would reform come and what kind of reform was necessary for China. The China Mail did not reach any conclusion for the first point. Its March 12, 1895 issue only expressed the opinion that "If a revolution is to be effected it must either be the spontaneous act of the present rulers, or it must be the outcome of an enlightened conception of a higher ideal of government spread through the masses of the people". In all possibilities, the three Hong Kong English newspapers expected that reform could be introduced in China through two different channels.

1. Through the Chinese official and legal channel

As has been mentioned before, the Hong Kong English newspapers expected little or no organised and fundamental changes in China directed either by the young Chinese



Emperor who had nominally ruled the country since 1887 or by the Chinese officials after the Sino-Japanese War.

The Hongkong Telegraph of April 2, 1895 reprinted the February 1895 issue of the Cosmopolitan written by Viscount Wolesley the statement that China was in need of a great leader such as a "Napoleon" or a "Charles Gordon" but "China at this moment of trial does not possess one equal to the occasion".

In another issue, the Hongkong Daily Press informed its readers that reform projects such as the Grand Trunk Railway running from Peking to Canton had been progressing slowly, and those of others such as the two mints at Canton and Soochow were intended to be a profitable private monopoly than to augment provincial revenues.¹¹

The Hongkong Daily Press also adapted from the Peking and Tientsin Times the news that Weng Tung-ho and Li Hung-tsao, two of the most determined opponents of progress and the most uncompromising members of the anti-foreign party, had been appointed to the Tsungli-yamen; and Weng, the Imperial Tutor whose influence over the young Emperor was "paramount" and "apparently absolute" was the head of the Yamen. From this piece of information, the Hongkong Daily Press came to the view that reform was for the time being quite unlikely in China. With the Conservatives at the helm of the state, a difficult period in Sino-Western relations was in fact forecasted by this newspaper.¹²

Reviewing the existing political situation in China, the Hongkong Daily Press remarks,



[T]here would seem to be no general adoption of any systematic changes; all the movements in the direction of improvement consist in isolated efforts by individuals to adopt such and such an invention, more with the hope of securing some immediate personal gain or advantage than with any design of benefitting the people generally. The Central Government has formulated no scheme whereby the communications and defences of the Empire generally can be secured, the administration reformed, the finances improved and revenue increased, and the education of the officials and people in Western science and learning promoted.¹³


It is obvious that the Hong Kong English newspapers all regarded the absence of good leadership as the major reason why China failed to reform herself.

Li Hung-chang, for example, was not so well-considered by all the Hong Kong English journalists and other British observers as one should generally be expected of from such a distinguished Chinese statesman.

The Hongkong Telegraph of August 19, 1895 agreed with the opinion of the Teintsin Press that Li Hung-chang was a capable statesman. This view was, however, strongly challenged by the other two Hong Kong English newspapers.

The China Mail questioned whether the title "the Bismarck of China" was too extravagant an acclamation for Li.¹⁴

The Hongkong Daily Press also called Li Hung-chang a "venal old humbug"; regarded him to be "much overrated as a statesman and a reformer".¹⁵ Why these two Hong Kong English newspapers were so disappointed with Li Hung-chang was that he only advocated reform in a limited area, namely, the development of railways and the reorganization of the navy. He did not advocate administrative reform nor did he attempt to clean the




Auguean stable of corruption existing in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the irony these newspapers saw Li's failure in the latter kind of reform was that even Li himself had greatly profitted from such a malpractice,¹⁶ although the China Mail had admitted in another leader on August 3, 1896 that "from amongst the sycophants and thieves, murderers and prevaricators who constitute official China, Li Hung-chang stands forth as perhaps the least condemnable".

It is of interest to state that the adverse comments of the Daily Press on Li Hung-chang provoked a rebuttal from its reader "A Chinaman" who regarded Li Hung-chang as a dignified, patriotic and far-seeing statesman and made the following comments:

Li may have his faults like other mortals, but in criticising those faults or shortcomings we should, to be fair, view the situation through Oriental spectacles and make due allowance for circumstances, incomprehensible to the average Western mind, over which neither Li nor any other Chinese statesman can possibly have control. He has done wonders. He has proved himself loyal to his Sovereign and true to his countrymen, and I am therefore proud to claim Li as a compatriot and subscribe myself.¹⁷


Trying to be prudent and fair, another issue of the Daily Press had to say that despite Li Hung-chang's various shortcomings, he was "still head and shoulders above his contemporaries in China".¹⁸ The China Mail of September 11, 1896 also expressed a similar opinion. It says, "Li Hung-chang with all his faults, has always shown a disposition to lead his countrymen along the paths of progress".



Sheng Hsüan-huai, another prominent Chinese statesman in the period who had won imperial favour was, in the opinion of the Hongkong Daily Press, no better than Li. Commenting on Sheng, this newspaper said that he was intelligent only in the direction of how to advance his political fortune through the employment of some of his ill-gotten gains.¹⁹ Disappointed with the stamp of men in power in Peking, the Hongkong Daily Press had but to lament: "What the hope is there of any scheme of administrative reform being inaugurated or if inaugurated, what chance is there of its succeeding".

While realizing that there existed some enlightened Chinese officials who favoured reform, both the Hongkong Daily Press and the China Mail believed that they were too few in number: "so far from the party of reform (if the existence of two or three officials who recognize the evils from which their country is suffering can be so named) being strengthened by the terrible lessons taught by the recent war", the Hongkong Daily Press states, "it would seem as if the party of corruption were stronger than ever".²⁰

Immediately after the war, the Hong Kong English newspapers were aware that China had contemplated reforming her naval and armed forces but they also knew that Chinese efforts at military reforms were only of a "perfunctory and casual kind", and that military-wise, the Daily Press said, "It will be some time before China will be able to command respect much less excite fear".²¹ In a later




issue on the same subject, the Hongkong Daily Press again commented that there was no general reorganisation of the Chinese forces which still suffered from a divided system of foreign instruction and control.²²

Even in such a small reform project as the building of railways, as advocated by Li Hung-chang, chance of its being successfully implemented the Hongkong Daily Press believed, was small. Apart from the lack of good leaders to direct things, there was according to this newspaper, no public money available for the purpose. Both Chang Chih-tung and Yung Wing experienced difficulty in trying to raise money for this purpose, the Daily Press said.²³

Chang Chih-tung, another great reformer of the time, according to the Hongkong Daily Press²⁴ was also incapable of generating progressive reform in China: he was honest but impractical and too suspicious of the intention of foreigners and placing too much confidence on the ability of the Chinese to conduct modern reform projects themselves. The tardy progress of a railway running from the mouth of the Grand Canal opposite Chinkiang to Peking was, the same newspaper said, due to Chang Chih-tung's insistence on Chinese ore and native capital.

It is nevertheless of interest to note that the only Chinese official who was viewed by the Hong Kong foreign journalists with a measure of favour in the immediate post-war period was Yuan Shih-k'ai. The Hongkong Telegraph of August 1, 1895 was able to reproduce an opinion from the North China Daily News which stated that Yuan was




"admittedly an able man" and that "he could if he would, enlighten the Emperor considerably".

With little hope of improvement from within, the Daily Press considered chances of reform from efforts outside the Chinese Empire. But this newspaper also believed that such a chance was "remote and slender".²⁵

The China Mail reported and endorsed a programme of reform proposed by Dr. Ho Kai. The programme was printed in the Hua-tzu jih-pao in a serial form for several days. The China Mail of May 21, 1895 carries a brief summary of all the essential points of the programme. In brief, the programme called for the suppression of corruption, the introduction of a constitutional monarchy, education, administrative, military and fiscal reforms, the construction of railways, the promotion of agricultural and manufacture and other minor reforms such as the granting of liberty to the press. The only limitation the China Mail said about the programme was that it might have little chance of acceptance unless the Central Government, prompted by the Empress-Mother and Li Hung-chang ... takes upon itself, either single-handed or with the aid of foreign officers, to crush the present deep-seated system of mandarin rule.

The Hongkong Telegraph of May 31, 1895 put forward editorially a similar scheme of reform for China. It says,

Reform to be speedy, to be effective, must be reform on existing Chinese lines. No other reform will be stable. No other reform is capable of taking immediate effect, and some present improvement is what is most urgently required - notably - tried to get rid of official corruption. "Given honest and capable officials



and three-fourths of the work of reform is done" "Honest and fairly well-paid officials would even under the present form of Government effect a wonderful reformation in the Celestial Empire in a very few years".

Nevertheless, this newspaper feels that constitutional reform was for the moment not quite suitable for China. Its commentary stressed that constitutional reform was only "a plant of very slow growth" and was "not to be established by a stroke even of the famous "Vermillion Pencil". This view was also supported by the Singapore Free Press of June 13, 1895.²⁶

2. Through foreign pressure and interference

Before we turn to examine the attitude of the Hong Kong English newspapers on this question, we may examine the question from the Chinese perspective first.

In general, the attitude of the Chinese intellectuals towards the question of what role the foreigners should play in China's reformation in the years after the Sino-Japanese War varied greatly.

At one end of the spectrum, there was a strong desire among a small number of enlightened Chinese especially those in the treaty ports who were anxious to see that the foreigners and foreign nations could generously help China reform herself. The most prominent example was Ho Kai of Hong Kong. Ho Kai in his letter to Lord Beresford had urged Britain to "come forward and ... apply the requisite pressures" for China's reformation.²⁷ Ho Kai's appeal found supporters in Hong Kong, though small the number might be. A Chinese with the pseudonym "The Chinese Sufferer" sent in his programme of reform for



China entitled "The Manifesto of People of China" to the offices of the Hongkong Telegraph on May 30, 1895 and that of the Singapore Free Press on June 5, 1895 expressing the hope of winning the sympathy and moral support of the "right thinking Englishmen". A Chinese student A.S. Yuen also expressed the opinion in his school journal that China by herself could and would never progress, and that her progress should come "by assimilation of foreign ideas".²⁸

At the other end of the spectrum, there were also many Chinese whether in China or Hong Kong, as observed by the Hong Kong English newspapers, who preferred China to conduct innovation by herself. And the political tendency of the time in China was to discourage the use of foreign advisers or capital in the Chinese reform projects. The Hongkong Weekly Press of February 13, 1896, for example, reported the Chinese proposal to discontinue the services of European officers on board Chinese steamers on the Yangtze.

The stand of the Hong Kong English newspapers was on the side of the small group of Anglicized Chinese in Hong Kong represented by Ho Kai.

Here, the readers should be reminded that the Hong Kong foreign journalists' conception of how to reform China and how China should be regarded as reformed was quite different from that of the average patriotic Chinese. The former expected a reformed China to be the one that would accept wholesale foreign ways and ideas, missionary efforts and more importantly, tolerate foreign economic



activities. Parenthetically, these desires of the Hong Kong English newspapers were in full accord with Britain's diplomatic and political objectives in China.²⁹ The latter on the contrary, expected a reformed China to be the one that was strong enough to resist foreign encroachment and the unreasonable demands of the foreign nations.³⁰

In addition, unlike the foreign missionary bodies who were interested in the moral and social advancement of the Chinese, the Hong Kong English newspapers, as representatives of an essentially mercantile community, were more interested in promoting foreign trade in China. One cannot help suspecting that their desire for a reformed China would only be a means to that end. The hostile opposition of the Hong Kong English newspapers to China's anti-opium movement³¹ and the relative tepid response to the evil of footbinding in China which the foreign missionary bodies were supporting with deep devotion and zeal³² can to a certain extent justify this assertion.

More interesting perhaps was the fact that these local English newspapers had demanded the extension of the frontier of the Colony in order to accommodate more industries and hence to participate in the profits of "China's awakening" even before any sign of that awakening was forthcoming.³³

The argument advanced by the Daily Press to reject the view of a certain foreign author that the Western nations should keep down or not to assist the black or yellow races in their pursuit of morality or physical or



intellectual civilization lest they should outstrip the West may further support this interpretation. It says, "More trade can be done with civilized than uncivilized races, so that from a commercial point of view the civilization of China is to be advocated". The same issue also added that, "the existence of barbarism is a standing menace to the security of our civilization, we cannot if we would erect a wall of separation between ourselves and the barbarous races, and hence we must try to eliminate their barbarism".³⁴ This idea falls in with that of the leading Anglicized Chinese community as represented by Ho Kai. Ho Kai using "Sinesis" as pen name in "Open letter to John Bull" appearing in the China Mail of August 22, 1900 emphasized also the point that a rejuvenated China would pose no threat to the West.³⁵

Throughout the 1890s, the Hong Kong English newspapers were firmly convinced that there was no hope of a real transformation of China without foreign, especially British, assistance.³⁶

To the Hong Kong English newspapers, the real difficulty for the West was how to force open the door of a recalcitrant China which stubbornly and persistently refused to accept foreign ways and ideas; assistants and capital. The China Mail of May 15, 1895 could only suggest that the foreign powers make use of China's present difficulties to force the Chinese Government to grant mines and railway concessions; throw open the country to outside trade and commerce. This was, according to the China Mail of October 14, 1895 the only way that China



could be improved under the undisturbed sways of its present rotten rulers of China.


This way of forcing China to seek reform under foreign pressure or guidance had its own weaknesses.

The China Mail cautioned that big investments in Chinese mines and railways might require protection "at the cannon's mouth"³⁷ and that it might lead to a partition of the Chinese Empire.³⁸

Both the China Mail and the Hongkong Daily Press then considered other alternative means. The China Mail of February 9, 1897 commenting on China's desire to readjust her tariff and likin, remarks, "If China needs more money she must get it by handing over the necessary taxation to the management of European administrators" and cited the example of Sir Robert Hart of the Imperial Maritime Customs in support of this view. Echoing the same point of view was the Hongkong Daily Press.

According to the Hongkong Daily Press, China could place her railway, financial or even political administration under boards or a board similar to that of the Imperial Maritime Customs managed by an European government element. It was anticipated that the British would exercise a predominant influence in these boards or board of management.

This was the way that China's reformation similar to that of Egypt come and China saved from partition by other Powers, the Hongkong Daily Press said.³⁹ Nevertheless, the Hong Kong English newspapers also realised that as international rivalry had been intensified in China, such a solution would be impracticable: other Powers would




certainly oppose British predominance. While believing that China should be left alone to work out her own regeneration, the Daily Press of November 17, 1898 was convinced that British wholesome guidance and coercion would immensely accelerate China's reform pace.⁴⁰

An ideal solution for the cure of the sickman of East Asia was put forward in the Westminister Review of March 1887 by William Robertson, a former assistant editor of the China Mail, in an article entitled, "A new solution in China". Robertson's article found its champion in the China Mail's leading article on April 15, 1897. Robertson suggested dividing the Chinese Empire into three or four zones with each zone possessing a distinct board and a single Power was allowed to exert a predominant influence in one of these zones. This would, Robertson believed, prevent the partition of China and respect the right of each power to maintain a predominant influence in certain part of China. This scheme remained dead letters. To put forward grandiose plans by the journalists is one thing; to carry them out by the politicians and diplomats is another totally different matter.

Influenced by the imperialistic activities of the time and seeing that China would not voluntarily reform herself, the Hongkong Telegraph for a while toyed with the idea of reforming China through partition. Its June 26, 1896 issue states admanantly:

We could do China and the Chinese infinitely more good by assuming the Government of a few of their maritime provinces than by leaving them to their own rulers and trusting to the teaching of missionaries, the healing influences of trade,



the force of example, and the constraining effects of treaty obligations to civilize them. How orderly, how well governed, how wealthy would the Kwangtung province now be if for the last thirty-five years it had been under English rule! What miles of railroads and carriage ways, of telegraph lines and transways; how many factories and mills, docks and steamers would it not possess! What an army might have been raised and disciplined out of its hardy and adventurous sons! How great the effect of thirty-five years of peace and prosperity and good government on the neighbouring provinces and on all China! Why should we not take it now?

In view of the general lawlessness, widespread misery, corruption and administrative chaos in China, the Hongkong Telegraph of January 12, 1898 momentarily hinted that these horrors of life would remain as long as China was China and would cease to be when China came under foreigners. But on second thoughts, the author of this article changed his mind: a partition of China would lead to the exclusion of British interests and influence in other Powers' spheres. In the same issue, he says:

What a dreadful fate it would be for the heathen Chinese, to reach salvation by a path which is not our path! No, we must not have China subdued nor partitioned; better leave her obstinate and unregenerate, and pray for her. Let her rather attain everlasting damnation than be rescued by anybody except us.

Moreover, as the Hongkong Daily Press had also pointed out there seemed to be a sort of tacit agreement amongst the treaty powers to prevent interference with China by anyone of their number.

Exasperated by the helpless situation in China, the Hong Kong English newspapers at times tended to give up their mental struggles. The Hongkong Daily Press ironically remarked that changes might come to China when oppression and corruption had reached a point that would



bring about China's own disruption and dismemberment!

In another issue, this newspaper also says, "If it in the long run be found impossible to save the Chinese Empire, would it not have been better to let the disruption take place at once".⁴¹


C. The Hundred Days Reform movement and the Hong Kong English newspapers

1. The historical background

In between the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Crisis, the single most important reform movement in China was the Hundred Days Reform attempt. The story has been so well-known that there is no need to state it here in any substantial fashion. Suffice it to say that this was the first political attempt of some Chinese reformers such as K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-chao to introduce radical innovations in China's political, institutional, economic and social systems. The movement had the patronage of the Emperor Kuang-hsü. For 103 days from June 11 to September 20, 1898 some forty to fifty reform decrees were issued in rapid succession touching upon the various aspects of China's political and socio-economic life. The movement however ended as abruptly as it came and culminated with the counter-coup by the conservatives headed by the Empress Dowager. The so-called Hundred Days Reformers had to flee the country or were left to face the untoward consequences.

2. The responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers

In the immediate post-war year, even the Hong Kong English newspapers could detect the evolvement of a strong




spirit of reformism in China. In the Hongkong Telegraph of May 31, 1895, for instance, appeared the "Manifesto of the People of China to the Emperor of China".

Commenting upon the reform proposals of the document, the Hongkong Telegraph stated that "We do not entirely concur in the opinions and suggestions put forward in this Manifesto, nor in the remedies suggested." The Hongkong Telegraph was of the opinion that "reform is needed and most urgently needed, but not reform on western lines.

Reform to be speedy, to be effective, must be reform on existing Chinese lines, no other reform will be stable".

The Hongkong Telegraph treated the programme as either too realistic or too sentimental. Commenting on the proposal to establish a constitutional government for China, the Hongkong Telegraph says, "Constitutional Government is a plant of very slow growth and is not to be established by a stroke even of the famous "Vermillion Pencil while the method of wearing the hair in a queue or not, the same newspaper continued, was insignificant. The Hongkong Telegraph believed that if China could put official corruption to an end, three-fourths of the work of reform could be done. Moreover, according to the same newspaper, China could effect a wonderful reformation if the people would support the government especially in such reforms as the prohibition of opium smoking or foot-binding and really intended to reform themselves.

In the first couple of the post-war years, the Hong Kong English newspapers made no prognostication of any significant and organized reform movement that could be



generated from those at the top of the Chinese Government. Anyway, what else could they expect of from a Chinese Emperor who was popularized as a "sicky youth with a melancholy appearance" and was in the habit of venting violent fits of passion by smashing furniture.⁴²


In actual fact, preparative works had been done by K'ang Yu-wei and his fellow reformers a couple of years well in advance of the actual launching of the reform programme.⁴³ Their main centres of activities were in Canton and Macao, and especially in Shanghai.⁴⁴

As Hong Kong was not chosen as the centre of activities of the reformers, the Hong Kong English journalists were certainly not fully aware of the schemes of K'ang Yu-wei and his reformers until they had fallen through. We can only get sporadic and indirect clues to the concatenation of events that culminated in the Hundred Days Reform movement and the coup d'etat of 1898.

On April 2, 1895, the Hongkong Telegraph reported the opinion of Viscount Wolesley expressed in the February 1895 issue of the Cosmopolitan about the Chinese Emperor:

"The future of China depends much upon the character and ability of the young Emperor, now only twenty-three years of age, but who has nominally ruled since 1887. If, like the second sovereign of his house, he be a man of an original and independent mind of broad views, and firm determination, he will call in the aid of foreigners to create an army and to command it until he has had time to educate a sufficient number of able Chinamen to replace them."

Similarly, the Hongkong Daily Press quoting information from a Shanghai morning newspaper stated that the young Chinese Emperor was dedicated to reforms and was "strongly




in favour of sweeping administrative changes".⁴⁵

The Hongkong Telegraph of August 1, 1895 cited from North China Daily News the news that "[S]ince the ratification of peace Yuan [Shih-k'ai] has been in retirement at his home in Honan, but for some reason the Emperor has shown unusual anxiety to see him; and the Governor of Honan received two edicts to discover Yuan and send him to Peking".

On December 19, 1895, the Hongkong Daily Press printed out the memorial signed by over a thousand of the Chü-jen to the Emperor Kuang-hsü. Historically, the document is known as the ten thousand word memorial affixed with the signatures of 603 provincial graduates who were gathered in Peking for the triennial metropolitan examination. The document was prepared by K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-chao. The whole affair is known as the "kung-che shang-shu" or "public vehicles presenting a memorial".⁴⁶

Obtaining the English translation from a certain Shanghai morning newspaper, the Hongkong Daily Press at once recognized it to be a "remarkable" document. The Hongkong Daily Press was able to point out two features revealed in the document: the strong desire of the petitioners to continue the war with Japan and secondly, and more importantly, their recommendations of a long series of reforms. The adoption of this reform programme, according to the Daily Press, would "revolutionize" China.


The programme as outlined in the document appearing in the Hongkong Daily Press of December 19, 1895 included



the establishment of a disciplined army, the construction of railways, the opening of mines, the formation of banks and post offices, the formation of colleges, schools and public libraries, schools for technical training, provisions for the indigent, the establishment of newspapers and magazines, a new system of education and of religious instruction in the tenets of Confucius, the despatch of officials abroad to acquire knowledge of foreign countries and in a rudimentary way, the establishment of a representative body elected by the people to discuss public affairs.

Towards this radical programme of reform, the Hongkong Daily Press was neither hopeful of its success nor sympathetic. Though feeling quite excited especially at the fact that the idea of representative government could be simmering in the minds of the Chinese intellectuals, the Hongkong Daily Press believed that these Chinese reformers could not be effected much from the "dry rot" of the Chinese body politic, for the same newspaper also detected the prevalence of sentiments of conservatism and the danger of an immediate reaction in China. The suppression of the "Chinese Reform Association" (ch'iang-hsüeh-hui) and its journal by Chang Chih-tung was a case in point, the Daily Press said.⁴⁷


According to the Hongkong Daily Press, the Chinese memorialists were not motivated by a genuine reform feeling but by "patriotism of a very conservative type". The Hongkong Daily Press believed that the Chinese memorialists were conservatives at heart. The moving spirit that



impelled them to abandon all their traditions and set aside their prejudices as to advocate the adoption of a programme that conflicted with some of their most carefully cherished beliefs was solely due to their desire to see the disgrace inflicted upon China by Japan wipe out. The same newspaper was quite disappointed to note that there was in fact "little appreciation of the source from whence the reforms proposed were to be drawn and the proposed adoption of so many institutions of foreign origin nowhere modified the spirit of antagonism against the western people".

The Hongkong Daily Press was convinced that the memorialists were not true admirers of the West. Reform was only an expedient adopted under the dire pressure of necessity. The same newspaper suspected that the memorialists still upheld their fancied mental superiority and at the bottom of the reform was an attempt to reassert China over the foreign nations. To quote an example as illustration, the Hongkong Daily Press stated that the revival of Confucianism by introducing a system of religious instruction in the tenets of Confucius was intended to "arrest the development of foreign religions in China" and with the revival and aid of Confucianism, "to civilize the barbarous nations". Anyway, the Hongkong Daily Press was of the opinion that China was hopeless and that preoccupying its columns in the late 1890s was China's "disruption" rather than its "awakening".⁴⁸

Then came the news of the failure of the reform movement. The kuang-hsü Emperor had abdicated; the




Empress Dowager had become regent again. Since September 22, the Chinese Emperor was mysteriously absent from all public functions, and nothing was ever heard of him.

Both the Daily Press and the Hongkong Telegraph culling second-hand information from Shanghai took in with the view that the Emperor was murdered,⁴⁹ and that K'ang Yu-wei who was responsible for the crime was at large.⁵⁰ It was also reported in the Hong Kong English newspapers that the request of the foreign ministers at Peking for an imperial audience was refused. On October 19, 1898, the Hongkong Telegraph was able to quote from the China Gazette the news that the Manchu Imperial clan had selected an adopted son of the late Emperor Tung-chih as the successor of Kuang-hsü.

Naturally, the Hong Kong English journalists were induced by the special political development in Peking to make speculations on what had actually befallen the Kuang-hsü Emperor: Was he still alive? Had he committed suicide or been poisoned? Was he seriously ill? Did he escape from the clutches of the Empress Dowager and in hiding?⁵¹ Intuitively, the Hongkong Telegraph of November 7, 1898 commented that no matter what happened to the Chinese Emperor, his existence would only be a "living death". The riddle was only solved when the Hongkong Daily Press of November 17, 1898 reported that a Japanese Minister was granted an audience with the Chinese Emperor.⁵²


The editorial policies of the three Hong Kong English newspapers were in favour of the Chinese Emperor. The Kuang-hsü Emperor was viewed as a patriotic and enlightened monarch who wanted to maintain the integrity of his Empire



and sought progress of his country through the adoption of western methods.

According to the Hongkong Telegraph, the Chinese Emperor "was not unsuited for the position which he held". The only "fault" the same newspaper found in the Kuang-hsü Emperor was that "he was unsuited to be the tool of the Empress Dowager".⁵³ On the contrary, the Empress Dowager was stigmatised as an autocratic and domineering woman; an arch enemy of progress and worse still, the "friend and tool of Russia".⁵⁴ Feeling very much dejected by the news of the failure of the reform attempt, the Hongkong Telegraph told its readers that the failure represented the triumph of the Conservative party over the Progressive party and that the reformers in China had received a severe blow and that the awakening of China would be retarded.⁵⁵ The Hongkong Telegraph of October 18, 1898 could not help asking: "Do the Powers intend to allow the advancement of China to be thrown back for an indefinite period by the assumption of full control of the Empire by the anti-progressive party?"


The fate of reform was sealed by the Coup. What followed were of course reports that steps were undertaken to eradicate all traces of the reform movement, namely, Li Hung-chang was to be restored to power and that the old literary examination was to be revived.⁵⁶ The only exception was in the Dowager Empress' edict immediately after the coup that missionaries in China were to be protected. Commenting on this edict, the Hongkong Telegraph of October 18, 1898 raised the suspicion that this was




only a "sop" thrown to the Powers in order to allow the Dowager's own reactionary policies to continue unhindered by external forces.

The Hong Kong English newspapers were not depressed by the failure of the reform movement. They did not expect that it would bring any fruitful results. As a matter of fact, the Daily Press had expressed the view that the leader of the movement K'ang Yu-wei was "void of mental ballast" and a "visionary".⁵⁷ Anyway, the Hundred Days Reform attempt had failed before the Hong Kong English journalists could have time to study fully its aims and programmes; and pass perceptive judgements on it.

For the time being, what the Hong Kong English newspapers was most concerned about were the effects of the failure of the movement upon British interests in China. The Hongkong Telegraph was one of the Hong Kong English newspapers that indicated that British interests would be gravely threatened by the failure of the plot. It asserted that the failure of the plot was due to the secret help of Russia to the conservative party.⁵⁸ But this newspaper could only base its assertion on the most tenuous ground that as Li Hung-chang was the supporter and right hand man of the Empress Dowager and as Li was also the tool of Russia, secret help from Russia must have been extended to the Empress Dowager through Li Hung-chang. To the Hongkong Telegraph, the success of the Conservative party in China would therefore advance Russian influence in China to the great disadvantage of Britain. The Hongkong Telegraph of October 19, 1898 called for the



application of the British Afghanistan policy in China: an "Abdur Rahman" should be installed in China to forestall Russian encroachment.⁵⁹ Russophobia manifested by the Hongkong Telegraph at this juncture was not surprising as English newspapers elsewhere were also "stridently anti-Russia" as one authority had indicated.⁶⁰ The application of a strong British policy in China was urgently required, for the Hongkong Telegraph of November 11, 1898 and November 17, 1898 also carried the news that Russian troops were pouring into Manchuria. Second, they believed that the failure of the reform movement would further aggravate the unstable political situation in China. The Chinese reformers though outweighed at the very moment, would not stay idle or give up their struggle, it said. The Hongkong Telegraph spoke vividly that Hong Kong was actually "on the brink of a slumbering volcano which may at any moment break forth into disastrous eruption". The Hongkong Telegraph quoted in extenso an editorial from the China Gazette which deplored the "indiscriminate destruction" of the more enlightened section of the Chinese and appealed to the Powers to step forward and save China from the path of decay. While regretting the persecution of the Chinese reformers, the Hongkong Telegraph was of the opinion that the Powers would not be so altruistic as to render help to these unfortunate men. According to the Hongkong Telegraph, some Powers especially Russia were "only too patient, anxious not for the awakening and opening-up of China, but for the old course of corruption and misrule to continue".⁶¹ Third, the persecutions of




reformers who were inspired by foreign ideas in the wake of the palace coup d'etat would, as pointed out by the Hongkong Telegraph, mislead the ignorant Chinese into believing that the foreigners would receive no protection throughout the Empire. It stated presciently that there would be an increase of anti-foreign outrages at no late date.⁶²

The post-Boxer decade, 1901-1911

A. The coming of reform and the initial reactions of the Hong Kong English newspapers, 1901-1904

Immediately after the Boxer incident had passed, the Manchu government began to undertake a reform programme. From its Canton correspondent, the Hongkong Telegraph became aware of the introduction of certain edicts which "certainly point towards reform" and that the reforms introduced bore a "distinct resemblance to those which cost the unfortunate Emperor his liberty".⁶³ Many other hopeful signs also came in rapid succession. The Hong Kong English newspapers were able to report that the two great Viceroys Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung had memorialized the throne for educational reform,⁶⁴ some ultra xenophobes had been purged; Yuan Shih-k'ai had been appointed since November 1901 to the viceroyship of Chihli on the death of Li Hung-chang and the Southern viceroys had been rewarded for their services in maintaining order in the provinces during the Boxer crisis.


The Hong Kong English newspapers realized that education and military were the main areas where the Chinese government



intended to reform. Successive issues of the Hongkong Telegraph informed the readers that significant changes in the Chinese educational system would be expected to take place.⁶⁵ The Hongkong Telegraph noted the strong desire of post-Boxer China to have herself posed as a first class pugilist. Referring to the three edicts of December 13, 1902 the Hongkong Telegraph of December 30, 1902 reported that Chinese military leaders of the different provinces were invited to learn the military systems in operation in Chihli and Hupeh and that the Central Chinese Government would place military matters at the top of the list of reforms to be carried out. Other significant reforms followed suit. The China Mail of April 20, 1904 reported that the revision of the Chinese legal code was being discussed and that a new mint was being opened at Tientsin (with American machinery) capable of issuing 600,000 coins a day.

The response of the Hong Kong English newspapers to these signs of changes was surprisingly lukewarm.


Commenting on the political situation in China, the China Mail of September 22, 1900 says, "It is absolutely impossible to hope that the Manchus will or that the Chinese, unassisted can establish a new and progressive government, such as the times demand". Like its evening contemporary, the Hongkong Telegraph was convinced that there could be no hope of China reforming of her own accord. China's complications in her external relations and her acute internal dissension, according to the Hongkong Telegraph of April 17, 1901, meant that China could only carry out



reforms at a very moderate pace. It held the persistent view that impressive reform edicts from the Chinese government would always remain paper works and that talking rather than action was characteristic of the Chinese.

Disheartened by the reactionary policy of the Manchu court, some leading European authorities on affairs in China such as Archibald Little suggested immediately after the Boxer crisis that the Powers could make use of the occasion to administer China as a protected state. On the schemes for the future of China, some Hong Kong English newspapers revealed dissenting thoughts. The China Mail was convinced that the time was opportune to impose upon the Chinese a more satisfactory form of government. This imposed government, the China Mail of September 22, 1900 said should be directed by Chinese, who were sympathetic with radical reforms, and Europeans and Americans, who were more or less conversant with the Chinese language, customs and the possibilities of the Empire. These new types of administrators for a new Chinese government, according to the China Mail, could be found among the Europeans well-versed in Chinese affairs in the various consulates and mission stations and among those Chinese who had received training in European languages and other branches of studies. This newspaper expected that genuine and progressive reforms could only be initiated from this group of people.


The Hongkong Daily Press had adopted an opposite point of view. Its January 23, 1901 issue objected to the interference of the Powers on China's internal affairs



as this would the Daily Press feared, lead to China's partition. It stuck to its previous opinion that lasting reform in China must come from within.

In general, the Hong Kong English newspapers held a very low estimate of the reforms introduced thus far and confessed that they had to take a pessimistic view of the state of affairs in China.⁶⁶ The main reason why China failed to reform herself, they believed, was her lack of good and reform-minded leaders. Reviewing the possibility of reform coming from within China, the Hongkong Telegraph cited a Chinese vernacular press Su-pao's statement that desirable reforms from China might be expected from three mediums; namely, the "Upper Class", the "Middle Class" and the "Lower Class".

The Upper Class that this article referred to was represented by the Empress Dowager, the Emperor and the heads of the different Boards in Peking. The Hong Kong English newspapers did not expect enlightened reforms to be initiated by the Empress Dowager. On the other hand, immediately after the suppression of the Boxer movement, they were clamouring for the removal of this chief culprit of the Boxer affair. The Hongkong Daily Press of February 12, 1901 suggested that the legitimate sovereign Kuang-hsü should be put back on the throne with the knowledge that "his personal rule would at least be no worse than the present".⁶⁷ Perplexed by Sir Robert Hart's "unvarying support" of the Dowager Empress as expressed in an article in the Revue de Paris of May 1901, the China Mail of June 19, 1901 exclaimed, "Radical reform there must be:



but, antecedent to everything must be the removal of this deigning and infamous woman from the position she has wrongfully usurped and wickedly filled". The China Mail of August 15, 1901 made the same suggestion again: "Could we have secured the person of the fierce tyrant and then banished her to a place of safety, the most determined enemy to progress and the west would have been removed out of the way". According to the Hongkong Telegraph of September 20, 1901 and November 5, 1901, so long as the Empress Dowager and her parasites remained in power there could be no hope for the peaceable regeneration of China. The Hongkong Telegraph of February 4, 1902 also expressed preference for the return to power of the Chinese Emperor and stated that he was "the only and sole hope for reform and an enlightened government". But this newspaper also realized that he was too circumscribed in power to do anything positive. On the other hand, the Empress Dowager and her myrmidons were too reactionary and conservative to reform the nation. The Hongkong Telegraph of November 17, 1902, for example, reported that Yung-lu, the man exercising power behind the throne, was not favourably inclined towards reform and was only a xenophobe who "connived at the slaughter of foreigners" and a reactionary with a past record of foiling the Hundred Days Reform attempt.


The Hongkong Daily Press also suggested the reinstatement of the Chinese Emperor Kuang-hsü. Its July 7, 1902 issue pointed out that "the Emperor Kuang-hsü is still surrounded by jealous myrmidons, and is not allowed



a free expression of opinion, while his subjects are held at an unapproachable distance, and he is practically kept out of touch or sympathy with them. It suggested that "if the tie [between the people and the dynasty] is to continue and to be strengthened, then the Emperor of China must emerge from his seclusion and become, like other sovereigns, a known and esteemed entity".

The Hongkong Telegraph was convinced that the ordinary Chinese masses were too ignorant to effect any meaningful reforms and the possibility of reforms coming from or directed by this class of people could thus be easily ruled out, the Hongkong Telegraph said.

Could reforms come from and be directed by the "Middle Class" i.e. the viceroys and governors of the different provinces? The view of the Hongkong Telegraph was that desirable reforms in China could only be expected from this class of people at the present moment. But patriotic and progressive provincial officials in China were still too few in number. The only exception, according to the Hongkong Telegraph was Viceroy Tao Mo of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and even measures introduced by this enlightened viceroy was rendered nugatory by his successors on his retirement. Commenting on the near breaking up of the Canton College for Western Learning after Tao Mo's retirement, the Hongkong Telegraph of October 2, 1902 stated that the tide of conservatism and reaction was rising in China again. The Hongkong Telegraph of February 13, 1903 further stated that there was "nowhere to be found among the governing class any



real indication of sincerity for reform" and that the metropolitan officials were only intended to fool the Powers to withdraw their troops and to conciliate the missionary temporarily in order to plan for a more successful Boxer rising in the future.


What puzzled the Hongkong Telegraph was the fact that the reform attempts in China seemed to have been simultaneously neutralized by other backward steps. Commenting on the hopeful signs of the time in China, the Hongkong Telegraph of December 19, 1901 simply said:

Just at present we have several very hopeful signs in the air but, and it is always so in China, when one comes to look at the other side of the account there are so many debit entries that they fully balance the credit side.

This view found a responsive echo in the China Mail. The China Mail of April 20, 1904 on the one hand stated that there were many new changes in China one of which was the rapid increase in the number of native newspapers. On the other hand it also mentioned the Chinese Government's desire to control such changes. Commenting on the question of whether China was awakening or not, the China Mail of May 23, 1904 further says:

In some respects, and at certain times, China has certainly acted as though she had at last decided to throw off the shackles of exclusiveness checking her advancement, but no sooner would the belief get abroad than a reaction would set in and she would drift back to her old placid state.

Discussing the same topic in the editorial of October 24, 1904, the China Mail reiterated this opinion and remarks:



It is the slowness with which China accepts and utilizes what the Nations of the West deem absolute necessities of Government and Commerce that creates a doubt in the best minds as to the reality of her Progressive Edicts. Too often she takes away with one hand what she gives with the other, showing that she is still bound in the grave clothes of the past, and only issues such Edicts as 'look-see', driven to it by outside influences and not from a deep conviction of her need.

B. Some general Hong Kong English press comments on the various aspects of the reform measures introduced Education and military were the two major areas where significant changes were introduced in China in the immediate post-Boxer years. China's educational reforms did not interest the Hong Kong English newspapers much while her military reforms only served to cause them alarm rather than appreciation.

1. Educational


The Hong Kong English newspapers were able to present an accurate view of the position of China's educational system taken from the pens of the foreign missionaries in China such as Rev. John C. Ferguson, Timothy Richard and Gilbert Reid who were more concerned with matters educational than the Hong Kong foreign journalists themselves. In general, foreign missionaries viewed China's change in her educational system with enthusiasm. The Hongkong Telegraph of February 14, 1903 quoting from the Globe that the establishment of modern schools for the teaching of western knowledge would "remove the chief cause of antipathy to foreigners, namely, ignorance". These missionaries at the same time also realized that much confusion and many imperfections were still connected with China's new



educational measures. Confusion and imperfections were the results of no definite scheme of education to act as basis; no suggestion concerning the curriculum, management and direction of these schools and an inadequate provision made for the financial maintenance of such institutions. There were also questions of understaffing and lack of qualified teachers and suitable textbooks. These difficulties arose mainly because of China's financial stringency. The Hongkong Telegraph of February 13, 1903 also pointed out another reason: the lack of official support. According to this issue, the conservative party instead of supporting the modern school system maliciously accused it of serving no useful purpose other than the training of the Chinese of foreign knowledge to prepare them for the day when China would be partitioned by the Powers.

2. Military

The Hong Kong English newspapers believed that China had certain ulterior intentions in her attempt at reform, especially at her military system. The Hongkong Daily Press of September 10, 1902 for example, was strongly opposed to rendering help by foreign governments to the Chinese Government to improve the latter's military capability. It strongly objected, in particular, to the raising of local Chinese defence forces in British possessions in the Far East as what the British home government had actually done in Weihaiwei by the creation of the First Chinese Regiment. A modern Chinese army trained in foreign territories and armed by foreigners



would, according to the Hongkong Daily Press, sooner or later turn their knowledge thus gained to account in China and would allow China to turn against foreigners at will.

The following paragraph taken from the Hongkong Daily Press would shed significant light on the Hong Kong English press attitude towards the awakening of China and especially China's attempt to reform her military system. It says:

Our objection to the enrolment of Chinese as soldiers, however, is not so much the difficulty of making them efficient and reliable, as the fact that, sooner or later, they would be sure to be drafted away to stiffen the Chinese Imperial forces or to act as drill-instructors in their own land. The Chinese, fortunately for the Western Powers, are not a military people, and, having regard to their vast numbers and bitter hostility to foreigners generally, we should be in no hurry to create a military spirit in the Central Kingdom. It may be urged that China can always engage foreign military officers as drill-instructors and thus raise an army disciplined and armed on the Western system, but such an army raised on their own soil, and really subject only to the will of the military mandarins, would never become formidable and would be always deteriorating. An army drilled and officered by Chinese soldiers who had for years been subject to Western discipline and training only might, however, become quite a different engine if these men had caught the military spirit

It is thus natural that this issue of the Hongkong Daily Press would greet the dissolution of the First Chinese Regiment in Weihaiwei, the first British experiment in training native Chinese garrison force, with "relief" rather than "regret".

3. Reforms urgently required in China


In general, the Hong Kong English newspapers were



far more concerned with issues that had a direct bearing on the lives and property of the foreigners especially those of the British nationals and British interests in China. The three main problems that they paid the greatest attention to were the necessity of China firstly to open up her inland waters of South China especially the West River;⁶⁸ secondly, to deal with piracy on the Pearl and West Rivers and finally to reform her currency.

The Hongkong Telegraph for example was the newspaper that attached great importance to the opening up of the inland waters of South China to foreign commerce. Its December 8, 1902 and January 1903 issues stated that the trade of the West River Delta was a matter of vast importance to Hong Kong. It therefore advocated the extention of the West River Traffic to foreign trade. As piracy would disturb the state of trade in the West River, the Hongkong Telegraph of September 5, 1902 also advocated the suppression of piracy in West River.

The lack of a standard currency hindered trade and was a headache to the foreign mercantile class in China. The Hong Kong English newspapers as spokesman of the mercantile class, of course, echoed the voice of their complaint. The standard currency used in China was the tael, a weight of silver bullion usually about one to one third ounce of varied purity and hence of unequal value. In use was also other currency such as the copper cash and old bank notes. The Hong Kong English newspapers always complained of this great variation and fluctuation of China's currency.⁶⁹ In Article 11 of the Mackay Treaty



of 1902 China agreed to take "the necessary steps to provide a uniform national coinage which would be legal tender in payment of all duties, taxes and other obligations throughout the Empire.⁷⁰ Yet, some years had to pass before any real improvement was made in this direction by the Chinese Government.

What made matters worse was that many Chinese provincial authorities were in the habit of issuing their own subsidiary coinage. Complaint of the Hong Kong English newspapers was specially directed to the flooding of depreciated Chinese subsidiary coinage in the Colony from the neighbouring province of Kwangtung. The South China Morning Post of August 24, 1904 for example stated that nearly 80 percent of the small coinage in circulation in the Colony was Chinese and not British money, and that China took from the Colony the limited amount of more valuable colonial coinage which never returned. Pressure was put on the governments concerned to deal with the situation.⁷¹

C. Continuation of reform and the general attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers, 1905-1911

The political conditions in China did not, in the eyes of the Hong Kong English newspapers, change much in the years following the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). The Empress Dowager, the notorious arch conservative, was still in full control of state affairs. But one direct impact of the Russo-Japanese war on China as both the Hongkong Telegraph and the South China Morning Post were able to point out, was the acceleration of the reform tempo.



They unanimously agreed that China was at least willing to reform herself. The Hongkong Telegraph of October 17, 1905 says, "A wave of reform" - that is to say, a general adoption of Western methods to meet the exigencies of a special occasion" had passed over the country ..." and that "China as a nation is moving slowly but perceptibly in the right direction towards the adoption of modern ideas" In another issue in the Mail Supplement of September 22, 1906, the Hongkong Telegraph even expressed amazement at "the rapidity with which the Chinese are travelling along the path of progress and reform". The South China Morning Post of March 12, 1907 shared such a view and remarked, "the old era, or eras, of superstition or obstruction belong entirely to the past". In another issue on July 4, 1907, the South China Morning Post spoke of "a bloodless revolution" going on among the Chinese; and in memorials by leading officials. In support of this view were other leading foreign newspapers and Chinese observers such as the Times (London) correspondent and the correspondent for the Pall Mall Gazette who made on-the-spot observations.⁷²

The reforming spirit was reflected in the liberal attitude adopted by the leading Chinese officials at court or in the provinces to most public issues of the day.

The Hongkong Telegraph of October 17, 1905 tells its readers: "A Commission⁷³ is on the point of leaving to study foreign principles and trade methods, and in a variety of ways it was clear that the far-seeing statesmen of China had awakened to a sense of their duties, and were



determined that China should be roused from her lethargy". This same newspaper expected that reforms in other areas would come fairly soon. Tsai Tse and the other high Commissioners who were sent to study western constitutional methods were reported by the Hongkong Telegraph of August 20, 1906 of "not merely submitting their views on political affairs to the throne but even going into the question of cutting the queue and adopting a new costume". Indeed, this suggestion for abandoning the queue, the symbol of the Han's subservience to the Manchus came as a surprise to the editor of the Hongkong Telegraph who was fully aware of the fact that public discussion on the subject had previously been strictly forbidden. The Hong Kong English newspapers also detected a new spirit among the Chinese provincial administrators.⁷⁴ As a matter of fact, the Hongkong Daily Press of December 21, 1907 quoted and agreed to the view of a writer E.G.J.M., in the Spectator that the local provinces were to be the chief motivating forces rather than the Central Government of all sorts of reforms to be introduced. This writer made the following conclusion:

The regeneration of China if it comes, will be accomplished by a series of local and provincial efforts and movements which may gradually be combined in a general advance, forcing by direct or indirect pressure the hands of the Central Government, or perhaps facilitating the accomplishment of its aims, if it should ever be inspired by a genuine spirit of reform.

An indication of this new reforming spirit at the provincial level was the local authorities' toleration of the Chinese students to demonstrate in the streets of Canton



against the evil of opium smoking. As explained by the Hongkong Telegraph, it was not so very long ago since a demonstration on any subject under the sun would have caused the officials to "quake in their shoes and foresee bloody revolution in the air".⁷⁵ Many arch conservatives gave way to reform-minded officials. In the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi the notorious anti-foreign Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan was replaced by the enlightened Viceroy Chou Fu. The South China Morning Post of March 15, 1907 reported that in Canton, there also emerged new waterwork schemes, new schools, a new prison, a new school for females and new bridges. It was obvious that the Hong Kong English newspapers expected more enlightened measures from these progressive provincial leaders.

The chief motivating force behind China's reform movement, as the Hong Kong English newspapers pointed out, was the universal feeling among the ordinary Chinese of China's backwardness. The Spectator, assuming an attitude of doubt in regard to the forces behind China's quickening pace of awakening listed four possible reasons. These were quoted in full by the Hongkong Daily Press of December 15, 1908. They were, first, the steadily increasing impact of European influences in China; second, the resolute and brave administration of a few enlightened rulers like Yüan Shih-k'ai, third, the general disappointment of the important policies of the Manchu dynasty and finally the "fundamental craving" on the part of the Chinese for some radical changes.




The view of the Hongkong Daily Press was that all these had helped to create and maintain the reform efforts which the Chinese were presently pursuing in earnest. But the chief reasons, according to this newspaper, were due to China's growing sensitiveness to the humiliating position among the nation and her impotence in many directions. The few enlightened Chinese rulers who were at present at the head of the reform movement were simply "taking occasion by the hand", the Hongkong Daily Press said.

Yet, the circumstances of the times as portrayed in the Hong Kong English newspapers were not favourable to the introduction of genuine reforms in China. All the Hong Kong English newspapers were able to point out that parallel to the major reformist current of the day, there was a conservative and reactionary counter-current.

According to the Hong Kong English newspapers, the chief source of this counter and reactionary current came from some conservative and corrupt high officials and Manchu nobles. These people nourished a deep-seated resentment against all that was enamoured of or associated with foreigners. The Hongkong Telegraph Mail Supplement of September 29, 1906, for instance, stated that these were the people who opposed the adoption of a constitution.

The South China Morning Post of March 15, 1907 also cited the example of a member of the Grand Council's objection to the students' waring of caps instead of "mandarin" hats to show the ever presence of this conservative force



in China. The Hongkong Daily Press of October 22, 1907 quoted and agreed to the Shanghai correspondent of the London Times' opinion that the Dowager Empress was "the clog on the wheel of reform". This view in fact found universal acceptance among the contemporary Western observers.⁷⁶

It is interesting to point out that Chang Chih-tung, a noted reformer in Chinese history in this period was treated by the contemporary Hong Kong English newspapers as an arch conservative. The Hongkong Telegraph of June 2, 1908, for example, informed its readers that rivalry existed and had existed for years between Yuan Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung who were the recognised heads of the two great political bodies of the Empire, the Progressives and the Conservatives. It is quite probable that Chang Chih-tung was viewed in such light not because of his opposition to reforms but because of his anti-foreign proclivity as seen in the leading role he played in the Rights Recovery Movement.

Besides innate conservatism, there was another reason as explained in one of the Hong Kong English newspapers, why the conservatives and reactionaries in the upper eschelon of society would oppose reform and changes. The China Mail of November 13, 1905 pointed out that these people feared that reform especially the establishment of representative institutions would affect their power and position in government. The China Mail of February 27, 1906 also quoted from the Times (London)




a letter written by a British merchant who had studied the situation in China for quite sometime. The letter drilled on the recently launched education reform and changes in the examination system ordered by the Empress Dowager. The writer said that the cancellation of the system of old curriculum for the official examination and ordering of examinations in western learning in their stead ruined the careers of the Chinese men of letters and converted them into a mass of discontented men spreading all over the Empire.

The Hong Kong English newspapers stated that conservatism also came from the grass-root level. Opposed to the reforming zeal of the ruling dynasty were the ignorant and conservative peasants and people especially those living in northern and the interior parts of China. The Hongkong Telegraph of October 17, 1905 cynically remarked that these Chinese reactionaries were forced to resort to modern means such as bombs to evince their antagonism to reform and to vent their grievance against the prevailing policy of the government. This issue expressed the unfortunate view that these symptoms of unrest would degenerate into Wanton outrages upon foreigners.

The most notorious example of defiance of foreign influence and infiltration ready at hand for the Hong Kong English newspapers to convince their readers of their reasoning was the Massacre at Lienchou which involved the lives of five American missionaries.⁷⁷

In regard to the sincerity of the Manchu court in




reforming the country, both the China Mail and the Hongkong Daily Press expressed a similar viewpoint.

Commenting on the Imperial Edict (March 6, 1906) which warned the people to desist from anti-foreign demonstrations, the China Mail of March 8, 1906 stated that it was simply issued for foreign consumption and intended to be a plea for ignorance in excuse of laxity of administration. The China Mail of June 22, 1906 also editorially insisted that the political manifestos of the Empress Dowager were only issued for foreign consumption, that she still nourished a deep hatred of innovation and that the reforming edicts were only intended to distract attention for some reactionary scheme she was contemplating.

The Daily Press of October 22, 1907 also stated that the edicts promising constitutional reforms were very "cunningly-worded" and the execution of other reforming edicts especially the one concerning administrative integrity were as remote as ever before. These reforming edicts could only bear fruit if the Reform Party were stronger and if the Emperor were back on his throne, this issue added.

In 1908, both the Emperor Kuang-hsü and the Empress Dowager Tzu-hsi died. The Dowager's three-year old grandnephew Pu-i succeeded to the throne with the father, the second Prince Chun acting as regent.


The Hong Kong English newspapers received the news of the death of the Empress Dowager with relief. The news meant the removal of the chief obstacle to reform in



China. The Hongkong Daily Press was convinced of the sincerity of the Prince Regent in promoting more fundamental changes in China. Its June 29, 1909 issue says, "There is little doubt that the new Regency is really desirous of introducing reforms" But this same issue also noted that the way was not clear for thorough reforms in China, and that the Prince Regent had met "powerful opposition" to all his schemes of amendments.

A revival of the spirit of reaction and conservatism was demonstrated by the fact that anti-foreign outrages tended to accentuate among the Chinese in the interior as time went by. The South China Morning Post of May 4, 1910 editorially said that the people of Hunan were being haunted by xenophobic feeling and came to the view that "contempt for the Western barbarians" was the most characteristic trait of the Chinese".

By 1910, at least one of the Hong Kong English newspapers had already had a new conception of the nature of the anti-foreign outrages in China. The China Mail of May 23, 1910 referring to the Chang-sha rice riot drew its readers' attention to the idea that the affair might have been instigated by the disloyal sections of the Chinese who deliberately involved the Manchu rulers in trouble with the foreign governments in order to expose the weakness and inadequacy of Manchu rule and discredit as far as possible the prestige of the ruling dynasty.




D. A more detailed study of the Hong Kong English press attitudes towards the two key Chinese reform programmes introduced in the years following the Russo-Japanese War

1. The Constitutional Reform Movement

a. The historical background

The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 notwithstanding its bad effects on China prompted the Manchu government to launch a constitutional programme. The war of 1905 was generally interpreted as a struggle between democracy and autocracy. Japan's victory was partly because of its adoption of a constitution which provided an effective means to bind the nation together in time of national crisis. Constitutional government suddenly became a fashion. Even autocratic Russia experimented with constitutional reform at home.

In 1906 an investigatory commission headed by Duke Tsai-tse was sent overseas to investigate foreign political systems as a prelude to the introduction of a constitution. Acting upon the recommendation of the Commissioners, the Court issued on September 1, 1906 an edict which promised the introduction of a constitutional government.⁷⁸ The decree of November 6, 1906 provided an institutional reshuffle which paved the ground for the eventual adoption of a constitutional monarchy. The traditional six boards were expanded into eleven modern ministries. The most important was the inauguration of the National Consultative Assembly (Tse-cheng yuan) which would be an institution to




give expression to public opinion. Other relevant preliminary measures were taken.⁷⁹ In August 1907 a Bureau of Constitutional Compilation was established. In September 1907 three officials were despatched to Japan, Britain and Germany to study constitutionalism. Two individuals, one Chinese and one Manchu were appointed to inaugurate a National Assembly. On October 19, 1907, provincial, prefectoral and district assemblies were ordered to be formed.

On February 17, 1909, the newly appointed Prince Regent ordered the establishment of provincial assemblies which were inaugurated on October 14. On November 4, 1910, in response to demands for the early convocation of parliament, the Prince Regent announced that he would shorten the period of constitutional preparation from nine to six years. A cabinet was organized on May 8, 1911. The Manchu government was overthrown before full constitutional government was implemented.


b. The Hong Kong English press attitudes

In response to China's desire to carry out a constitutional experiment, the Hong Kong English newspapers did not question the sincerity of the Manchu Government. They only wondered whether China could be ready for such a drastic political conversion.

Of the four Hong Kong English newspapers, the Daily Press was the only one that enthusiastically endorsed such an idea at the start. The Hongkong Daily Press of September 8, 1905 noted that the example of Japan might




influence China in introducing a system of representative government. Such an idea, the same issue said, was feasible in China because the instincts of the Chinese were not antagonistic to representative institutions. The respect of the Chinese to authoritarian rule was more apparent than real as this issue also noted that the autocratic form of government was actually held as a subject of ridicule by most of the Chinese vernacular newspapers. Moreover, this same issue also believed that the Chinese masses were well-qualified for self-government as seen in their abilities to organize themselves into associations of all kinds and in their power of combination and administration. The Hongkong Daily Press of November 2, 1905 reiterated such a view.⁸⁰ Other Hong Kong English newspapers disputed this attitude and believed that the Chinese were too ignorant of the democratic ideal. The China Mail was also interested in the idea of having a parliament being introduced in China. In response to the news that the Chinese Constitution would be based on the Japanese model and that the recommendation of Yüan Shih-k'ai and the travelling commissioners, a self-governing system would first be instituted at Peking and Tientsin, the China Mail of August 18, 1906 editorially suggested that the Chinese Government should have adopted a federal system on the pattern of the Commonwealth status of Australia and Canada whereby the provinces would each have a parliament of its own but would also send representatives to the Federal Parliament.




Even the Hongkong Daily Press itself had changed its attitude soon. Its August 1906 issue stated plainly that "to call the gift of a constitution a reform is wrong as a constitution was merely a "post-reform symptom not a reform in itself", and that the great mass of the people were unready for it. This newspaper believed that a more seasonable time for the introduction of a constitution into China was when the Empire had been overrun with railways and telegraphs.

The Hongkong Daily Press of July 20, 1907 was of the opinion that China's attempt at Parliamentary reforms was too premature. This newspaper found that not only the Chinese people as a whole but also the rank and file of the Chinese mandarindom were still unready for such a reform. Casting aside the question of the advisability of a parliament for China, the Hongkong Daily Press of November 25, 1907 stated that two questions should be solved before a parliament after the foreign model be truly established. First, the Chinese had to find a common means of communication as a representative body would compose of representation coming from different regions and speaking different dialects. Second, the Chinese representatives should not be restricted to the official and literate classes who were only the minority but should also include the mercantile and other social groups. In another issue on December 21, 1907 the Hongkong Daily Press brought in another question: it was necessary for the Chinese government to bring the central and provincial



authorities more into harmony before a national representative government be successfully introduced. This very issue, however, was found more sympathetically inclined to the Chinese demand for a representative government. Accordingly, it told the Peking authorities that "conservative as they are, they cannot but be aware that the time has come when it is no longer possible to hold the empire together unless the government is brought into conformity with the true interests of the country and the legitimate rights and aspirations of the people".

Successive issues of the Hongkong Daily Press continued to make unfavourable prognostication and comments on China's parliamentary exercise. Its July 9, 1908 issue for example questioned whether the effects of obtaining parliamentary government for China would necessarily be beneficial. It might, it said, result in strengthening politically and commercially China's position as a nation but it might also result in her utter downfall like Persia. Its September 22, 1908 issue made the cautionary remarks that democracy coming to extreme would in reality be autocracy. Its December 15, 1908 issue further admitted that there was little evidence of a fundamental craving of the general masses for a constitution and that the root of China's trouble lay in the rottenness of the financial system and not in the absence of a constitution. Constitutional government for China was only an ideal and as its August 26, 1909 issue remarked, a "foolish incongruous fancy".



Commenting on Ito Hirobumi's views about the practical difficulties facing China before she could implement constitutionalism, the Hongkong Daily Press of September 11, 1909 emphasized the fact that the greatest problem was the uniformity of administration especially in fiscal matters namely a national budget and a national currency. In another issue on October 6, 1909, it again urged that until finance in China was put on a sound basis, representative government could be nothing better than a delusion and a snare. In support of the view of the Hongkong Daily Press was the Hongkong Telegraph. Its February 17, 1910 issue stated that the Chinese were generally ignorant of the democratic ideal.⁸¹ Its August 11, 1910 issue also stated that it would be naive to expect that the opening of a parliament would solve any problem.⁸²


On September 3, 1906, the China Mail reported that the Chinese Imperial Edict (September 1, 1906) had announced that a Constitution would be introduced in the near future. The rejoicing of the Chinese over this what the China Mail regarded as "extremely non-committal" edict surprised the China Mail. The China Mail was in accord with the Chinese Government that the Chinese people were notoriously ignorant of democratic principles.

According to the China Mail, parliamentary form of government was not suitable for China for the time being. Its editorial of July 4, 1906 stated rather categorically that the creation of a parliament in China was "necessarily a rather dangerous adventure". Its reasoning was that in



view of the general ignorance of the Chinese people, political power would easily fall into the hands of demagogues who knew how to prevail upon ignorant voters. It therefore put forward the idea that in case of a parliamentary form of government being introduced in China, the ultra conservatives who knew how to "make haste slow" should be chosen to direct the whole thing themselves. In addition, a narrow franchise based on a heavy property qualification should be introduced to exclude those who were intellectually least qualified to exercise political power. In making such an opinion, the China Mail constantly referred to the recent disaster associated with the introduction of parliamentary form of government in Russia to support its idea that the ignorant people should not be allowed in their hands power for evil. In another editorial entitled China's unfitness for popular government two days later, the China Mail reiterated similar point of view as expressed in its previous issues about the introduction of parliamentary form of government in China. This time it gave an additional reason for its objection: it would be highly dangerous for the foreigners if "the voice of the ignorant masses who hate the foreigner with a hatred found, not upon knowledge but upon ignorance and prejudice was allowed to prevail."

With much irony, the China Mail of September 12, 1906 made the following prediction:



At the present rate of progress in China adult suffrage might, perhaps, be granted in about 500 years but any move in that direction before that time would be flying in the face of Providence.

In another editorial on September 13, 1906, the China Mail stated that there were many difficulties such as provincialism, inadequate preparation and lacking in experience that China had to overcome before she could carry out parliamentary reform and remarked that the Chinese leaders would certainly not be so stupid as to "show frantic haste" in this aspect of reform, a step which could only serve to "imperil their country and themselves".

Commenting on the Regent's decision to reduce the period for the inauguration of the Parliament, the China Mail questioned the wisdom of such an action. This issue also took note of the fact that the newly inaugurated National Assembly while possessing only consultative and deliberative functions was eager to establish the principle of responsibility of the Ministers of State to the people. It reported that on several occasions, the Chinese national assembly had criticized members of the Grand Council for failure to consult the Assembly before taking action or advice. Such a development did not, however, impress the China Mail. It expressed the opinion that the people should be adequately trained for their civic duties before a popular franchise and a responsible parliament be granted.

The idea of the China Mail fell in with that of the South China Morning Post. On January 3, 1907, the latter editorially remarked, "Before China is ready for parliamentary




powers such as educated and enlightened nations enjoy a comprehensive propaganda has to be accepted by the people and assimilated."

By 1910, the attitude of the Hong Kong English newspapers was in full accord with the Manchu government in regard to the implementation of a constitutional government. They did not question the sincerity of the Manchu government in such a reform attempt as some of them previously did. The Hongkong Telegraph of August 11, 1910 stated that the Chinese Imperial Government was "thoroughly in earnest in their resolve to institute a House of Parliament". The Hongkong Daily Press of October 5, 1910 also stated that the Manchu government had given proof that it would implement the promise made some four years ago. There was no occasion yet to question its honesty of purpose and that the Chinese throne in actual fact viewed with sympathy the steps taken towards the development of constitutional government.

Many contemporary Chinese had expressed the thoughts that fifteen years were too long for the implementation of a full constitution in China. The Hong Kong English journalists, on the other hand, did not raise any objection to the period specified.


The South China Morning Post took note of the fact that the Empress Dowager might have deliberately specified such a long period of time in order to ensure that there would be no change in the form of government during her reign. Yet, both the South China Morning Post of August 12



and August 29, 1906 expressed the same opinion that the general situation in China would not favour any immediate granting of a constitution. Such an act, the South China Morning Post of August 12 said, might result in a cataclysm. Moreover, the South China Morning Post of September 24, 1906 also said that reforming the system of administration was necessary before a parliament could be established. Its August 31, 1906 issue stated that a fifteen year delay was inevitable in China and "to sow the seeds of self-government in unprepared ground would be to court disaster and disruption on such a scale as the Armageddon". Its October 20, 1906 issue says, "We have greater confidence in the conquests of enthusiasm than in those of hysteria, of evolution rather than revolution".

The view of the South China Morning Post on this point was supported by the China Mail. Quoting from the Chinese Public Opinion, the China Mail of June 2, 1908 informed its readers that the public pressure for the early appointment of a date for the opening of a national assembly was mainly exerted by the self-governing society of Canton. Since this institution was responsible for numerous anti-foreign agitations and boycotts in the province, it is natural that what it hotly advocated would hardly secure favourable coverage in the Hong Kong English newspaper columns.

The editorial policy adopted by the Hongkong Daily Press was in line with its other Hong Kong English contemporaries. The Hongkong Daily Press of September 11,



1909 wrote in support of the view that because of the backwardness of the nation and the fact that vast administrative changes were required, a long time should be necessary before a constitution would formally be adopted in China. Criticism was also lashed out against the Self-governing Society of Canton. The advocacy of local autonomy by this body was, in the opinion of the Hongkong Daily Press, a source of fatal weakness rather than a source of strength to the state. The Hongkong Daily Press of October 6, 1909 said that the society which was now demanding representative form of government was simply tendering an "unasked for advice". It does not therefore surprise one that the Hongkong Daily Press of August 26, 1909 could have accepted the arrangement for a very restricted franchise in the election of provincial representative assemblies, a justified solution during the period of transition from autocracy to full democracy.

Referring to the establishment on October 14, 1909 in the provincial capitals of China Provincial Parliaments or deliberative councils, the Hongkong Daily Press of October 26, 1909 regarded this as an important epoch in the history of China. These Provincial Assemblies would serve as a useful check on the activities of the local officials and would wield influence on the local provincial budgets even though their resolutions had to be subjected to the approval of the Governor or Viceroy, this newspaper noted. One dangerous point arising out of the creation of these institutions, the Hongkong Daily Press of February 4,



1910 pointed out, was the possibility of sharp conflicts of opinion between the people represented by the Provincial Councils and the Imperial Government. This danger could only be averted, the Hongkong Daily Press said, by the presence of a strong leader at the head of the state.


The choice of the Hongkong Daily Press fell on Yuan Shih-k'ai. According to its February 4, 1910 issue, "although [Yuan] may not be a statesman in the highest sense of the word, he possesses judgement and strength of will and is the only man who has shown himself capable in any marked degree of the leadership of which China today stands in such dire need."

Yuan's political debacle did not affect the optimistic evaluation of the Hongkong Daily Press of the eventual success of the democratic experiment in China. The Hongkong Daily Press of April 29, 1910 editorially states:

If the new assemblies and the Chih-cheng Yuan make good use of the Powers given them the the experiment will have been justified and the extension of their powers and the broadening of the franchise should only be a matter of time.

Commenting on the conflict between the Provincial Assembly of Kwangtung with the Viceroy over the licensed gambling, the Hongkong Daily Press of November 2, 1910 also makes the following inference:


The conflict between the people and the officials which is evidenced in the assemblies of many provinces is certain to be accentuated for a time, but the old order must give place to new and the sooner the better The influence and power which the Provincial Assemblies are beginning to exercise and shows clearly enough that in the rising power of the democracy lies the best hopes of that thorough reform in the administration which is essential to the true progress and advancement of the state.



Unlike its morning contemporary, the Hongkong Telegraph responded to constitutionalism in China with alarm. Its February 17, 1910 issue preferred an "advisory council" to a "parliament with no control over the finances". It stated, "A parliament without control of funds is worse than a despotism for it is a continuous source of ill-feeling, chagrin and disappointment". Such a parliament would just function as an elaborate and exaggerated debating society and a safety valve for the use of explosive demagogues but nothing more, it added.⁸⁴ Its Mail Supplement of November 11, 1910 again said, "New Parliaments are dangerous. Our Chinese friends must exercise severe watchfulness, not only over their officials, but over their deputies". Its November 16, 1910 issue quoted the example of the refusal of the National Assembly to dissolve until it had its own way to justify its reason for anxiety. This issue in particular pointed out the fact that foreign support should not be given to a mere "talking shop" but to a representative body with the effective power of controlling the budget and re-establishing China's credit in the eyes of foreign nations.

In a leader on January 3, 1911, the Hongkong Telegraph slightly modified its tune on the subject. In response to the general enthusiasm of the Chinese in launching the Chinese Imperial Senate (or National Assembly), the Hongkong Telegraph says:

It is argued in some quarters that the Chinese as a whole are not yet educated up to a point which would justify popular government under provincial assemblies and that they did not desire it. To our mind, such an argument is utterly



absurd The Chinese nation, as a matter of fact, are particularly alive to the need for representative government, and they have peculiar capability of managing their own affairs once the incubus of officialdom has been removed from their midst.

But fairly soon in another issue on February 4, 1911, the Hongkong Telegraph readjusted itself to its previous unsympathetic stand. Its February 4, 1911 issue brought out certain hard facts which would, in the opinion of the Hongkong Telegraph dictate against the early and successful implementation of constitutionalism in China. These were, as listed in the newspaper columns, the lack of an educated mass, the lack of a good communication system, the lack of a sound financial system and finally the lack of a necessary democratic tradition. In regard to the last point, the Hongkong Telegraph made the following sweeping statement:

Physiologically the Chinese are not naturally adapted to constitutional government; the patriarchal form of administration is more fitted to their attitude towards life.

Believing that the recalcitrant attitude adopted by the Chinese representatives at Peking in the National Assembly would serve no useful purpose other than paralyzing the government, its February 10, 1911 leader advised that China should not behave like "a young man in a hurry" in its parliamentary experiment and that a wise and strong ruler be appointed to direct the government.

The Imperial Cabinet which was criticized by intelligent contemporary Chinese opinion as a shame was not interpreted by the Hong Kong English newspapers in such a way.


Commenting on the question of replacing the Grand Council by a Cabinet, the Hongkong Daily Press of August 20,



1907 had already stated that it would be excusable to have a near relation to the Emperor to head the Cabinet in order to prevent government from falling into the hands of the revolutionaries. While realizing that the cabinet if introduced, would be limited in power, the China Mail was convinced of its usefulness as a check on the Emperor and the bureaucracy.


The China Mail did not express surprise or disappointment when the composition of the first Chinese cabinet was known. "So far as the actual appointments go", its May 11, 1911 issue says, "they cannot by any means be regarded as startling" for it would seem that the Ministers for the various Departments are generally to be those officials who are now, in charge of the several Boards under the designation of Presidents". The only dissatisfaction the China Mail found was that the notoriously corrupt Prince Ch'ing could be appointed as premier to head the Cabinet. It expressed the idea that it would be a far wiser step to appoint a more active man to take the helm and guide the ship of state through the troubrous waters ahead.

While admitting that the representation of the Chinese elements was comparatively weak in this new Cabinet,⁸⁵ the South China Morning Post of May 18, 1911 expressed the thought that there could be room for improvement in the future. On the other hand, the South China Morning Post praised the measure as the "greatest stride towards reasonable and effective government". The chief figure



of the Cabinet Prince Ch'ing, this newspaper said, was "a man of strong will, keen discernment and having the ability to shape the destiny of the nation".

In response to the demand of 40 delegates from the Provincial Councils of China to Peking for the purpose of making representations to the Throne in favour of shortening the period set for the granting of a constitutional government from fifteen to nine years, both the Hongkong Daily Press of February 4, 1910 and its other morning contemporary supported the stand of the Ch'ing government. In granting a constitutional government, the South China Morning Post of February 8, 1910 for example, advised that China should do well to "hasten slowly". The Hongkong Telegraph of February 17, 1910 also stated that parliamentary reform in China should be gradual and slow.⁸⁶ To demand a parliament to be convened in 1911, the issue said, would be impracticable and too hot-headed. In a vast country like China, it would be impossible to prepare for a first election in twelve months, it added. The Hongkong Daily Press stated that China should not behave just like a "young man in a hurry". Such an act would be dangerous to a people not prepared to properly exercise their right when the necessary period of probation had been shortened. To inculcate to a populace public spirit and genuine patriotism, the Daily Press said, required a long period of time.⁸⁷ In response to the demand of the National Assembly at Peking for bringing into being the promised Imperial Parliament at once without further delay, the




Hongkong Daily Press of October 24, 1910 questioned whether this would be a wise and prudent step. "China needs an Ito. There seems to be no commanding figure in the Chinese political circle capable of controlling or guiding the new force now at work in China and so long as that is the case there will always be the danger that these forces will waste themselves in ill-directed effort or else break out into violent explosion. Certainly the time does not seem ripe yet for an Imperial Parliament in China", it said.

The Hong Kong English newspapers also took note of the fact that the persistent refusal of the Manchu Court to give in to the popular opinion might be politically suicidal. The Hongkong Daily Press of November 7, 1910 sounded the warning that the alternative to full parliament government might be revolution.

2. The anti-opium reform movement

a. The historical background

By the early nineteenth century, the Chinese government had grown concerned with and begun to discourage opium smoking and importation. Two wars were fought with Britain over the question of opium importation into China. In 1858, the importation of opium into China was formally legalized. The legalization of the trade naturally encouraged imports and domestic consumption. At the same time, it also directly boosted domestic production. By the mid-1880s Chinese domestic production had expanded so rapidly that it had surpassed the amount imported from outside.




The increased importation and internal production of opium meant that opium as a social evil further deepened its grip on the physical and intellectual well-being of the Chinese. Accompanied with the growing consumption, production and importation of opium was the rise of a strong moral sentiment in China for its total abolition.⁸⁹

Chinese public sentiment against the drug was fanned by the foreign missionaries in China. In due course, governments and peoples elsewhere also showed a disposition to cooperate with China. One of the early expressions of such an anti-opium sentiment in Britain was the formation in 1874 of the Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade (ASSOT).

The ASSOT demanded that Britain support Chinese efforts to suppress the traffic and withdraw all encouragement from and even prohibition of poppy growing and exportation in India.⁹⁰ The anti-opium views of the Society were expressed in its organ the Friend of China (1875-1917).⁹¹ In 1891 the British House of Commons made its first condemnation of the opium trade.⁹²


The campaign of the British anti-opiumists were encouraged by the vigorous efforts of both the Japanese and American governments who were also combatting the opium evils. In the United States, the American International Reform Bureau, an anti-opium organ similar to that of the ASSOT was founded in 1900 with the purpose of advocating international sanction against opium trafficking.⁹³ In 1901, the Bureau succeeded in getting the United States



Senate to adopt a resolution which invited other nations to unite in a treaty to forbid the sale of intoxicants and opium among "uncivilized races".

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Chinese government also made the first move against opium trafficking and smoking. In the treaty of Shanghai 1903 with the support of Britain, China banned the importation of Morphia and promised to stop its manufacture in China.⁹⁴ The Chinese government also undertook active steps to control the spread of opium cultivation, first, in Shansi.⁹⁵ Finally, in September 1906 in response to a petition signed by 12,000 missionaries, the Chinese government issued an edict applying the measures of taxing domestic opium out of existence and of stopping by gradual prohibition of both the cultivation and use of opium to every province of China.⁹⁶ The area of poppy cultivation was to be reduced by one tenth annually; registration of opium smokers was carried out; methods of treatment were introduced. Opium smokers under 60 years old were to cease the amount smoked by 20% annually and all officials under the age of 60 were ordered to abandon the habit within six months. By means of these measures, the Chinese government hoped to get rid of opium from the country in ten years time.

The anti-opium struggle in China was soon transformed into an international reform movement. Having ascertained that China was really sincere in her attempt to eradicate the social evil,⁹⁷ Britain signed the Anglo-Chinese Convention with China in 1907 whereby on behalf of India,



the British government promised to decrease annually the amount of opium exported to China pari passu with the abolition of poppy growing in China.⁹⁸ The arrangement was to run for three years, and to be continued for an additional seven if it were found that China had meanwhile continued effective measures of suppression at home.⁹⁹

In the International Opium Commission which met at Shanghai on February 2-26, 1909, the Commissioners were unanimous in recognizing the sincerity of the Chinese Government in the anti-opium crusade, despite the fact that no trustworthy statistics as to the acreage under poppy cultivation in China was forthcoming.¹⁰⁰ Prompted by a desire to demonstrate to China the sincerity of her wish to cooperate with the Government in Peking towards the suppression of the opium traffic, Hamilton Wright, one of the American delegates to the International Opium Conference, had in preparation a short but drastic bill which placed opium except for medicinal purposes, under the ban. The bill was introduced into the House of Representatives simultaneously with the meeting of the Conference at Shanghai. It was passed by the House and subsequently adopted by the Senate. It provided that "after the first day of April 1909, it shall be unlawful to import into the U.S. opium in any form or any preparation and derives thereof."¹⁰¹

In 1941, the British Government consented to renew the opium prohibition agreement with China. By the agreement of May 8, no Indian opium could be imported into



China unless accompanied by a certificate issued by the Indian Government that such opium had been exported from India for consumption in China.¹⁰² To prevent non-certificated Indian opium being smuggled from Hong Kong into China, the Hong Kong Government was also instructed to introduce on September 1, 1911 an Ordinance to prohibit the import of non-certificated Indian opium into Hong Kong except for the use of the Hong Kong Opium Farmer.¹⁰³

In the International Opium Conference at the Hague (January 1912), the eleven participating nations agreed with Britain to take more effective measures to stop the smuggling of drugs into China, to close shops and dens in the foreign-controlled areas and to prevent opium from passing through the foreign post-offices in China. British efforts and the cooperation of the other Powers cleared the path to the eventual prohibition of the opium trade.¹⁰⁴

The Revolution of 1911 did not change the course of the Chinese Government in the prohibition of opium campaign. The new Chinese leaders were as sincere as and even more eager than their predecessors to stifle the habit of opium smoking and opium growth.¹⁰⁵


Britain also continued to support China's opium prohibition movement despite the confusion arising out of the Chinese Revolution which greatly handicapped the Chinese government's job of suppression.¹⁰⁶ Occasional breaches of agreement by the local Chinese authorities especially the one at Chekiang which led to strong protests from the British mercantile sector.¹⁰⁷



b. The responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers

The discussion of the Hong Kong English newspapers on the Chinese anti-opium movement in the period 1906-1911 centered on two main issues, first, the question of the sincerity and ability of the Chinese government in suppressing the opium trade within its territories; second, the question of whether opium smoking was an evil.


In the first few years when the Chinese Government was vigorously pursuing its nationwide anti-opium campaign, the Hong Kong English newspapers cavilled at the movement and treated it as a sham: China which had grown at least six times more opium than what was imported into the country¹⁰⁸ merely wanted to oust the better quality and more popular Indian varieties of Patna and Benares out of the market and establish a virtual monopoly of native opium.¹⁰⁹ The China Mail basing its comments on "the deliberate impressions of a gentleman well versed in things Chinese who had made an extended tour through the two neighbouring provinces" expressed doubt about China's sincerity in pursuing the anti-opium course. It came to the view that there was "not yet proof" that China was really suppressing the opium habit and the effects of the anti-opium edicts on South China was "practically nil".¹¹⁰ The China Mail also considered illogical in the statements expressed by the Shanghai correspondent of "The Times" and that of "C.B." appearing in the China Mail of May 13, 1908 that the British authorities should show China that they were willing to assist her in her



task despite China's failure to lay proof to her sincerity and ability to carry out her said intention.¹¹¹ The China Mail found a justification in their suspicion in the report of the Imperial Maritime Customs (1908) that the duty collected upon foreign opium had decreased by some Tls. 37,000 and that the duty on native opium had increased by about double that amount.¹¹²

The Hong Kong English newspapers believed that even if sincere in intention, the enthusiasm of the Chinese Government might only be temporary as it simply could not overcome the economic and financial losses incurred in opium suppression. The China Mail, for instance, stated that the Colony would be "the laughing stock of the Far East if, as seems highly probable, it is proved that China's sincerity is not of lasting quality."¹¹³ The Hongkong Daily Press of July 29, 1909 avers and says, "The best test of China's sincerity is to be found out not in the edicts and proclamations insisting on the suppression of the traffic, but in the way she meets the economic and financial difficulties which the enforcement of the fiats entails". The Hongkong Daily Press even feared that those Chinese depending on the growth of opium for subsistence might revolt if their livelihood was threatened and was quite surprised to report that there was not yet any widespread organized protests among the opium growers.¹¹⁴


The Hong Kong English newspapers believed that there might be the case that the will of the centre could not be enforced in the remote districts notably Yunnan and Kansu



which were controlled by corrupt or indifferent officials.¹¹⁵ The report of Max Müller, the British Charged a'Affaires at Peking on the Opium Question as quoted in the Hongkong Daily Press of January 27, 1910 indicated this clearly. Commenting on the state of the anti-opium movement in Canton in 1909, Müller's report says, "The licensing regulations are strictly enforced by the police in the case of poor smokers, and smoking is becoming a luxury confined to the rich who, apparently owing to the venality of the police, find no difficulty in evading the regulations, and can, therefore, continue to indulge in the habit in their own houses with impunity". The same report also stated that in the western districts of Kwangtung and the Island of Hainan, "the various regulations have remained a dead letter; the local officials have made no serious attempt to grapple with the situation". The China Mail of November 12, 1909 also cited the remarks of its correspondent at Canton that "while much good work has been done in decreasing the consumption of opium in the city, the results are anything but satisfactory in some of the districts.... Regulations more honoured in the breach than the observance...."

The Hongkong Daily Press of November 24, 1910 even advanced the idea that the Chinese anti-opium movement represented a part of "Young China's desire to indict the foreigner with a charge of moral injustice."


Though also highly suspicious of the intention of the Chinese Government,¹¹⁶ the South China Morning Post



seemed to have a better appreciation of the surge of genuine anti-opium feeling among the Chinese people and made the comment that "We cannot believe that such a strange and wonderful sight in a conservative China, split by races and languages and natural boundaries into constituents, can owe its being to the greed of Mandarins, or the desire to substitute Chinese for Indian opium..."¹¹⁷ In another issue, it cited the remarks of the Correspondent of The Times at Shanghai that there was "a strong and continuing impulse from the (Chinese) people, and especially the educated classes, against the use of opium..." in support of its view.¹¹⁸ In a later issue, it admitted that China's curtailment of poppy cultivation was "bearing fruit" in provinces such as Yunnan and Szechuan with the result that imported opium experienced a sudden rise in price in Hong Kong.¹¹⁹

What seemed to have convinced the Hong Kong English newspapers of the insincerity of the Chinese Government in the opium reform movement was its attempts to grant monopolies of sale of opium to some private opium dealers.


On June 7, 1910 a monopoly was granted by the Head Bureau of the Suppression of Opium in Kwangtung to Kuang-yung-yuan, a prominent firm of raw opium dealer in Canton. Every purchaser of imported raw opium in the two provinces of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi was required to pay a license fee to the monopolist firm to buy raw opium. Payment was calculated according to the amount of prepared opium which the raw drug could be made into. By means of this monopoly,



\$7 dollars would be exacted from every ball of foreign raw opium imported, and the taxation of every chest of imported opium would amount to \$300 in addition to 110 taels paid as Customs duty.¹²⁰


To the Hong Kong English newspapers, the Opium Monopoly was only a money-making concern of the Chinese provincial authorities to raise additional revenue in the name of reform; and to give a preferential treatment to the China-grown drug with the view to the ultimate exclusion of the more highly priced but superior opium of Patna and Benares. This action was again being interpreted by the Hong Kong English newspapers as a shameless and obvious violation of the additional articles 2, 3, 5 and 7 of the Chefoo Convention of 1876 signed at London on July 18, 1885 and article 14 of the French Treaty in 1858.¹²¹ The Hong Kong English press opinion fell in with that of the leading British an Hong Kong mercantile sector which exerted pressure on the British Government to look into the matter.¹²² The Chinese authorities as usual denied such a charge of treaty violation.¹²³

The South China Morning Post of June 28, 1910 stated that it was "China's bounden duty" to put no handicap on the foreign opium trade until it died a natural death in ten years. The Hongkong Daily Press of June 29, 1910 was also convinced that the Chinese monopoly was deliberately operated against the foreign imported opium as special Chinese officials were deployed in Swatow and



Canton, ports of importation of foreign opium. The Hongkong Telegraph further warned that if no action was taken against a nation which boldly broke one clause of a treaty, it would encourage it to break another, and another and merrily continue to repudiate the most solemn obligations.¹²⁴ In addition, the Hongkong Telegraph also expressed disappointment for the inactivity of the British Government over the matter.¹²⁵ It may perhaps be of interest to state that the attitude of the Hongkong Telegraph had changed within a couple of years from its usual pro-Chinese stand in regard to the Opium Monopoly Question to one of hostility. Citing the Indian Daily News (Calcutta) of June 30, 1910 reports, "We notice the Hong Kong papers are full of bitter complaints against the supineness which has permitted the latest move in the monopoly" and states, "The Hongkong Telegraph writes strongly but not unjustly". The attitude of the Hongkong Telegraph in regard to this point did not waver throughout this period. On the eve of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, this newspaper still remarks, "We have at present seen no grounds for altering our opinion that the Anglo-Chinese Agreement will be kept by only one party and that will not be China".¹²⁶

The China Mail bore the same point of view on this issue as that of its other contemporaries. Nevertheless, the China Mail found the Central Government of China excusable over the matter. Commenting on the extra tax



and opium monopoly in Canton, the China Mail of March 22, 1911 editorially referred to this as an "unlawful" impost and that it was "a scandalous over-riding of treaty rights by local officials in defiance of the wishes, nay, commands of Peking". While believing that the matter was not so serious as requiring a show of force on the part of the British government, the China Mail was convinced that the British Government did need to put "more backbone into its diplomacy" in dealing with this situation.

Unlike the Hongkong Telegraph, the China Mail was convinced that the Chinese Government was earnest in getting rid of the drug and its habit. Commenting on China's progress in its opium suppression policy, the China Mail of May 23, 1911 reported with satisfaction that cultivation of opium in both Yunnan and Szechuan had been completely stopped. The same issue also pointed out that much had to be done in other provinces such as Manchuria and Chihli and some of the eastern provinces and the success and failure of opium suppression in these territories, the China Mail noted, much depended on the personality of the viceroys concerned.

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In general, the Hong Kong English newspapers also tended to portray the opium smoking habit as at least not so evil a habit as that of the other legally tolerated ones and that its effects were not so extensive as what were generally expected.



The China Mail of December 28, 1907 treated opium as the "least" harmful kind of stimulants. Its June 19, 1908 issue advanced the idea that opium had nothing to do with China's material and moral degeneration and interestingly found a scapegoat in Confucianism. It says: "It has been the teaching of her great sages which has checked the progress of China and landed her in a condition in which she has to put up with every insult to which she is subjected". The same newspaper also stated that the smoking of opium was not extensive in China. It agreed to Cecil Clementi's report that only about 1% of the population of the Chinese Empire used the drug. The China Mail of May 23, 1911 on the one hand emphasized the prophylactic qualities of opium against malaria, on the other also mentioned the danger of driving the opium eater to become a slave to cocaine or hemp drugs or even morphia which were more destructive to health and morality than opium.

The Hongkong Telegraph commented in the same light. Its August 17, 1910 issue stated that opium when smoked in moderation was not so harmful as alcohol.¹²⁷ Its Mail Supplement of February 23, 1907 also printed a letter from "W.F." to the Pall Mall Gazette to support its idea that no physical deterioration was visible in opium addicts. This issue described the opium smokers as peaceable persons who quietly and softly enjoyed their smoke. It also argued that if an opium smoker could afford the habit and if his health allowed it, there would



be no ground for the government to interfere. In response to one of the resolutions passed by the Anti-opium conference of the Straits Settlement which tried to enforce compulsory registration of opium-smokers in the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay states, the Hongkong Telegraph of June 24, 1910 expressed disapproval with the reason that this was an unnecessary interference with personal privacy and liberty of individuals and might lead to an intolerable tyranny, espionage and concomitant blackmail; and therefore should not be entertained by any government.


Believing that all races would crave for stimulants of some kind, the Hongkong Telegraph feared that liquor would take the place of opium if opium smoking was to be banned.¹²⁸ This newspaper saw prohibition to Pandora's action of opening a new box which freed the drink demon to torment poor humanity. Violence, brutality, hateful sights and hideous sounds were the offspring of this demon, it said. In the opinion of the Hongkong Telegraph of June 24, 1910, the people of Hong Kong would have to be surrounded by thousands of noisy and disorderly drunkards instead of by thousands of peaceful and at least silent opium smokers.

There might also be the danger that opium addicts might become cigarette smokers too. The Hongkong Telegraph of March 10, 1910 raised the alarm that the Hong Kong market was flooded with cheap cigarettes which were particularly harmful to one's health. It treated



cigarette smoking as an "undoubted evil" and strongly suggested that the habit be banned especially among the younger members of society. Its June 24, 1910 issue again cited a certain prominent American bishop's remarks that cigarette smoking was a dastardly, degrading, ruinous vice to support its view. It expressed the opinion that since there was no interference with cigarette smoking and liquor drinking which were comparatively more harmful form of indulgence, it was unjustified for the government to prohibit opium smoking.

The Hongkong Telegraph was not the only newspaper in the Colony that had jumped on the bandwagon of those who believed that a decrease in the consumption of opium would lead to an increase in the use of cheap brand of spirits. The Hongkong Daily Press of April 2, 1910 believed that prohibition of opium would lead to other kinds of evils. Its September 21, 1910 issue stressed that a people could not be made virtuous by an act of Parliament and in suppressing the use of opium, there would be the danger of "stepping from the frying pan into the fire". In support of this view, it cited the review of the Statistical Secretary of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Chalmers' review of China's foreign trade in 1909 which disclosed an increase in imported spirits to nearly a million taels in value. Its October 21, 1910 issue disputed the view of the missionary body at home that opium in China was a "public source of degradation and misery unparalleled in any country in the world".



Its July 21, 1911 issue printed out a letter from its reader, "Beware". It stated that "the time will come when China's indulgence in alcohol will be so great that it will take not a battalion only, but a number of them, to police the towns. The nation which to-day is sober and peaceful - an inheritance from strong and sober ancestors - will become a nation of besotted warriors which the nations of the world will find it difficult to curb". Defending the habit of opium smoking, the Hong Kong Daily Press of November 24, 1910 said that both English and Chinese newspapers had given an exaggerated impression of the nature and extent of the opium evil. According to this issue, opium was not a deadly poison; its addiction did not lead one to crime and therefore its suppression was not necessary.

The South China Morning Post of Febrary 26, 1910 believed that opium smoking if not to excess would be quite harmless and that the addicted coolie was as reliable a workman as any in the world", and that smoking to excess could be prevented by the high price of the drug. Finally, it also agreed to the reports of R.C. Hurley and Frank Browne that the "drug habit was not worse than if as bad as the drink habit". In response to the growing demand for spirits in the Straits Settlements and in China, the same newspaper of May 30, 1908 at once linked the phenomenon with the question of opium restrictions in these places although it frankly admitted that the exact cause of the growing demand for spirits was difficult to ascertain.




In its April 21, 1908 issue, the South China Morning Post further states,

We are not particularly in agreement with those who would favour the continuance of opium on the ground that it is human nature, of the Chinese variety to need a vice for the sweetening of life, and that if the opium vice goes, a worse thing may take its place..."

But even the South China Morning Post became converted to such an argument subsequently in its March 31, 1910 issue.

This general attitude of the Hong Kong English press towards the opium problem was in complete harmony with that of the Hong Kong Governor's. Governor Lugard's attitude was reflected in his memorandum presented to the Legislative Council in March 1909.¹²⁹ According to Lugard, as long as a man was well-nourished opium smoking could do him little or no harm. In Hong Kong where wages were high and employment easy to obtain, Lugard believed that the addicted coolie could afford to feed well and also to pay for his smoke and there should be little or no problem created out of their indulgence in the habit. Lugard totally ignored the moral aspect of the question and only accepted opium to be a great economic evil in so far as it was an unproductive; time and money consuming habit. He therefore believed that abolition of opium should be done gradually and not by any precipitate actions. Personally, Lugard believed that precautions should be taken against other evils such as alcohol which according to Lugard produced more harmful effects than opium smoking as it would induce a person to aggressive action or crime. Moreover, the Governor also held strongly the view that




morphine or opium for eating would constitute a more serious danger to the welfare of the Chinese nation and would, if un-suppressed, replace opium smoking.¹³⁰

Some Observations

- A. Hong Kong English press comments on the possible ways to reform China

As representatives of an essentially foreign mercantile interest in the China coast, the four Hong Kong English newspapers did not favour any armed revolt in China. Anyway, they did not expect that any such kind of revolt would be successful or would serve any useful purpose for China. The Hong Kong English press discussion of how to save China wavered between reforming China from within and from without.

To the Hong Kong English newspapers, China's reform undertaken from without meant an amicable partition of China by the foreign powers. Referring to the situation in the decade following the Boxer rising, the Hongkong Daily Press stated that this solution was "manifestly unsound". Some problems must have to be overcome by those Powers which undertook to partition China, it said.¹³¹ First, the Powers had to administer a people having a different language and way of life; second, even if the partition of China could be done amicably among foreign nations, the Hongkong Daily Press pointed out that a partitioned China would eventually be a source of friction and jealousy among the Powers themselves. Finally, with




the rise of Chinese nationalism, the foreign Powers in the process of partitioning China would have to face Chinese passive resistance in the form of an economic combination of the Chinese merchants to boycott foreign goods and constant riots and disturbances worked up by a political combination of the Chinese secret societies which were capable of undermining foreign control in China.

In the opinion of the Hong Kong English newspapers, the Chinese were on the whole not impervious to new ideas and innovations by nature. The Hongkong Daily Press of September 20 1906 stated the encouraging news that railway and telegraph, much opposed by the Chinese in the pre-Boxer days, were now largely used by the commercial and official classes in China. From this fact, the Hongkong Daily Press drew two precepts for foreigners trying to help China. First, there was little use for them to rush things in China and second, in introducing changes in China, they should make it clear that it would be to her benefit.¹³²

The Hong Kong English newspapers preferred to see the gradual improvement of the Chinese administration by the existing Chinese Government. Having considered the inadvisability of partitioning China, the Hongkong Daily Press of October 30, 1907 says:


As matters now stand the future of China is left in her own hands; and it is for her to find means to supply such government to the country as will satisfy the people at large, prevent outrages against foreigners and preserve friendly relations with European nations.



The Hongkong Daily Press of November 4, 1907 further stated the opinion that a great rebellion in China could be averted by "reasonable reform honestly undertaken". This issue also pointed out that such kind of reform "need not wholly be after a foreign pattern, but it must be so to the extent of removing the just causes of complaint on the part of the people, in the form of arbitrariness, venality and corruption, which have all along been far greater enemies to China and have far more threatened her integrity and independence than any foreign nation ever has been or is at all likely to be in the present day".

Supporting the opinion of the Daily Press was the Hongkong Telegraph. Its Mail Supplement of February 15, 1908 also reported with a measure of satisfaction that the year 1907 was one of "consolidation of the force of reform and of suppression of the force of disorder".

What made the Hong Kong English press feel so frustrated was the fact that genuine reformers were always playing second fiddle in China's state politics. For a while, the Hong Kong English newspapers anticipated that the day would come when the Emperor Kuang-hsü would be reinstated and that his Hundred Days followers would come forward to serve the nation again. The death of the Emperor Kuang Hsu ruined all hopes of reforming China in this direction. Enlightened though the Prince Regent was, the Hong Kong English newspapers believed that he was not the man of calibre to initiate or direct reform programmes. With the spread of disturbances in China, the Hong Kong



English newspapers wanted a "strong man" to guide the ship of state through the stormy seas. The South China Morning Post of March 2, 1906 for example stated that it was only until the emergence of a "Cromwell" or a "Washington" could the Chinese masses be electrified into action and China saved from partition and fiscal absorption by the Powers.

B. Hong Kong English press comments on the effectiveness of the Manchu Reform Programme in solving China's problems


The Hong Kong English newspapers had for a long time felt sceptical that the Manchu Government would effect any kind of reform measures.

A couple of years before the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the Hong Kong English newspapers had already been exasperated by the existing conditions in China. Reviewing the existing situation in China, the South China Morning Post of October 11, 1909 made the following comments:

Reform is needed, on every one's lips, but, in spite of Imperial edicts and the labours of official commissions, the whole system of internal administration is still sunk in the old ruts of incompetency and corruption.

Again, its January 13, 1910 issue editorially says:

If China would take the lesson of modern civilization to heart, a catastrophe might be averted, but we are forced to the conclusion that up to the present she has given no indication that she desires seriously to set her house in order, and everything points to her going from bad to worse.




Indeed, the China Mail of February 8, 1910 reviewing China's constitutional progress since the decree of 1906 sounded the warning that China instead of advancing was "getting deeper and deeper in the mire". It cautioned the local Hong Kong residents who were concerned with the prosperity of the Colony that they should take note of this fact.

From time to time, the Hong Kong English newspapers stressed the fact that the fundamental source of China's troubles resided in the corruptedness of its civil service. But the problem, as stated in the South China Morning Post of October 11, 1909, January 13, 1910 and July 27, 1910 remained untackled. The Hong Kong English newspapers understood fairly well the crux of the problem. The South China Morning Post of January 13, 1910 stated that bureaucratic corruption of China was "a fault of the system more than the individual", a very perceptive view which other contemporary foreign newspapers and observers shared.¹³³ The South China Morning Post then suggested:

If China desires to take her place in the comity of nations, powerful and respected, it is essential that the present system be altered, and that each official be paid, not only enough to live upon, but such a sum as will leave a sufficient margin to set aside for his old age and family, compatible with the dignity of his position.

The Hong Kong English press response to the Manchu constitutional reform programme, the reform experience that had aroused the greatest expectation among the Chinese inside and outside China was from the start lukewarm. The South China Morning Post of January 13, 1910 raised this




question: "What advantage can possibly accrue in appointing provincial assemblies who are overshadowed by officials who are themselves vanal?" In its July 27, 1910 issue, the South China Morning Post again expressed the following view:

A thorough cleansing of the present system of bribery and corruption must first be inaugurated before any tangible results will accrue. It is from the head the first steps must be taken and not from the bottom, which seems to be the case at present.

- C. Hong Kong English press comments on the factors that would ensure the success of the Manchu Reform Programme
 - 1. China's willingness to accept foreign advice and aid China's salvation and reformation, the Hong Kong English newspapers believed, lay in her willingness to accept foreign aid and to learn from the foreigners.

Commenting on China's intention to reform her military system, the South China Morning Post of April 12, 1907 says, "If China intends to treat her army seriously she must either engage proper foreign instructors or send her own officers abroad to study", and that "foreign interference" the newspaper added, "is essential". In its October 11, 1909 issue, the South China Morning Post remarked that the chief problem of China was financial: "There can be no real prospect of salvation for China until her rulers realize, and are prepared to face, the magnitude of the financial problem with which she is confronted; for upon its solution all other reforms, constitutional and judicial, administrative and military, depend".




To solve her financial problem, the South China Morning Post said, China should appeal to the foreign nations to allow her, for instance, to raise her import duties from 5 to 13 or 15 per cent. The South China Morning Post persistently stuck to such an opinion and in many of its subsequent issues, this newspaper continued to drill on the same theme.¹³⁴

The Hongkong Telegraph Mail Supplement of February 21, 1908 also quoted the opinion of the Shanghai Mercury that the greatest obstacle to China's reforming successfully was her lack of capital and therefore China should resort to foreign capital for the purpose of reforming herself. The Hongkong Telegraph Mail Supplement of May 7, 1910 expressed the opinion that the only way to get China reformed was not by self-assertiveness and an amateur impatient interference and meddlesomeness but by patient learning and gradual acceptance of Western ideas and methods.

2. The availability of good leaders


Interestingly, ever since the Hundred Days Reform movement, the Hong Kong English newspapers were always in two minds about the Empress Dowager Tzu-hsi and the Chinese Emperor Kuang-hsü.

Although the Empress Dowager was never a popular figure in the columns of Hong Kong English newspapers, she was admired by the Hong Kong English newspapers as a capable and strong leader.¹³⁵ The Hongkong Telegraph of January 30, 1902 referring to the coup d'état stated that




it would hardly be an act of a person "either physically or intellectually weak". On hearing the rumour of the demise of Tzu-hsi, the South China Morning Post of February 24, 1904 at once sounded a note of alarm that China might be "rent asunder by anarchy and rebellion". The Hong Kong English newspapers were always in sympathy with the Emperor Kuang-hsü, but they did not see hope for a remodelling of the Empire from him: the Chinese Emperor appeared to be too much a weakling for such a herculean task. Such a task required a "strong man of the stamp of Yuan Shih-k'ai" possessing full control of China's armies, the South China Morning Post of May 23, 1907 opined. But that does not mean that the Hong Kong English newspapers would favour a dictatorship being established in China. They still preferred to see Emperor Kuang-hsü come out of his confinement and rule the nation. Nevertheless, they did believe that the role of the Emperor Kuang-hsü should be nominal and that he should entrust state affairs to men of ability. This is an opinion confining not only to the columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers but the writings of other contemporary China watchers as well.¹³⁶

In an enthusiastic tone, the South China Morning Post reprinted in extenso a speech by a Hong Kong Chinese Lo Yuk Shan which condemned revolution in China and supported the popular idea of having a strong man in China who was backed up by the Chinese Throne, clear-sighted enough to see the necessity of employing foreign



brains and foreign capital. But the wishes of the Hong Kong English newspapers were flouted when they learnt that even Yüan Shih-k'ai himself was forced into retirement. Reproduced in the Hongkong Telegraph Mail Supplement of May 7, 1910 was the pessimistic opinion of the China Association as expressed in its annual report 1908-9 that there was "little evidence in China of the leadership, chivalry, and the self-sacrifice which characterised and rendered possible the Japanese revolution".

It is therefore rather strange that the editorial attitude of the South China Morning Post towards Yüan Shih-k'ai could so radically change in a later issue on August 11, 1910. On hearing a rumour of a possible recall of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the writer of the editorial, instead of welcoming the news heartily, simply expressed the opinion that not much could be expected of from such a person. While admitting that Yüan Shih-k'ai during the time he was in power did much to improve upon the work of his predecessor Li Hung-chang in military affairs, the same writer also pointed out the fact that "he has never proved that he was a statesman". "What China wants is a statesman, not an opportunist, of which she has many and to spare", this writer said, and in addition it made the following observation: "Can the retired official be credited with the requisite ability to carry out the necessary reforms? We are afraid not. We fear it would be the addition of another cabal to the many already existent which have proved such a stumbling block to China's progress".




The opinion expressed in the issue cited above was only an exception. Subsequent editorial columns of the South China Morning Post ran their normal track again. Happily, the South China Morning Post of August 30, 1910 informed his readers of the Manchu Government's desire to finish its game of "Family Coach" and that the Chinese Court was considering the recall of men like Yuan Shih-k'ai, T'ang Shao-i, Hsü Shih-chang, Wu Ting-fang and other trained and competent officials. Referring to the difficulties that confronted the Chinese Government, the South China Morning Post of March 7, 1911 said that a man who had developed sufficient courage and strength of character was needed to dominate existing conditions in China. "Yuan Shih Kai is the man of the hour" for he was "the strongest man China has at the moment", the same newspaper opined.

Similar views on the recent changes in the higher offices of the Peking government at the Chinese capital were also expressed in the China Mail and other leading foreign newspapers in China and elsewhere of the time. The National Review of Shanghai, for example, whose commentaries on the appointment and recall of men of acknowledged ability were also the China Mail of August 25, 1910.

3. Hong Kong English press comments on the effects of the Manchu reform programme


The Hong Kong English newspapers were concerned with China's progress. Such a concern did not come purely




from an altruistic sentiment. The Hong Kong English newspapers also expected advantages to be accrued to foreigners especially to the British from an awakened China. These advantages were in part political and in part economic.

Economically, an awakened China might lead to the opening of China to foreign trade and commercial intercourse. The South China Morning Post of August 31, 1910 quoting the opinion of the Eastern Engineering that the awakening of China would lead to a rapid growth of Chinese industries. China would require "hundreds of million worth" of engineering material before she would be in a position to supply herself and this was a branch of the trade which Britain would do well to exert her utmost efforts in capturing.

Politically, the Hong Kong English newspapers expected that reforms or the promise of them would bring stability to China. A peaceful and orderly China would, without doubt, facilitate all kinds of trade activities while a disturbed China would only encourage anti-foreignism. But they always found themselves disappointed by the conditions in China. For some years after the Russo-Japanese War, the greatest problem facing China, as observed by the Hong Kong English newspapers, was China's political instability. The southern provinces of China were, in particular, in a constant state of turmoil. Common in the minds of the foreign observers of the time was the idea that a great rising such as the Tai Ping Rebellion would tear China asunder. The South China



Morning Post of May 23, 1907, for example, expressed pessimism at the existing situation in China and made the comment that the Chinese Empire was "honeycombed with disaffection" and that the one element which was undoubtedly wanting in China was stability.




CHAPTER III

THE HONG KONG ENGLISH PRESS OPINIONS ON THE CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Parallel to the Manchu-sponsored movements for peaceful transformation and progress of China was the anti-Manchu revolutionary movement initiated by Sun Yat-sen. Weak in its inception and experiencing many shifting fortunes, this political movement on the whole grew in strength and magnitude with the lapse of time. Under the nominal leadership of Sun Yat-sen the Chinese revolutionaries intended to overthrow the Manchu dynasty by violent means and to set up a republic.

The attitude of the four Hong Kong English newspapers towards this more radical and violent alternative for the salvation of China has remained shrouded in mystery. There is a dire need for a more detailed investigation into and evaluation of the content of these English newspapers to clarify this point. Existing literature dealing with or relating to this question do not provide us with a satisfactory or full treatment of the whole anti-Manchu movement from its inception to its ultimate success in 1911. Worse still, their views contradicted each other. On the one hand, these English newspapers have been treated by the Marxist historians as the "spokesman of western imperialism" in China and "sycophant of the Manchu dynasty";¹ and others as unsympathetic or maintaining only a neutral editorial policy to the Chinese revolution² or were only champions of foreign interests.³ On the other hand, they



were also said by many others to be the sympathizers or supporters of the Chinese revolutionary movement.

A prominent representative of the latter point of view is of course Tse Tsan Tai. Tse Tsan Tai had for a long time prior to the Chinese revolution quietly laboured through the English and Chinese newspapers for the furtherance of the cause of reform and independence.

In his book, the Chinese Republic, Secret History of the Revolution, Tse Tsan Tai has spoken of his close connection and friendship with a coterie of foreigners, in particular, a number of prominent Hong Kong journalists, D. Warres Smith, Alfred Cunningham, Thomas H. Reid, T. Cowen, Chesney Duncan, B.A. Hale, Thomas Petrie and Colin McD.

⁴ Smart. These men were said to be in sympathy with or even actively supporting the Chinese revolutionary cause.

For example, Chesney Duncan of the Hongkong Telegraph was alleged to be actively championing the cause of the Chinese revolutionaries in his editorial columns. Because of this, Tse recalled that Duncan had once been warned by the Hong Kong Colonial Secretary to be more careful with his public statements.⁵

Tse Tsan Tai's account constitutes one of the most important first hand sources to throw light on the role played by the foreigners in the Chinese revolutionary movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His book has been widely quoted and influenced many to state that significant connections had been developed by some foreigners with the Chinese reform and revolutionary movements.⁶




Although an ex parte account, Tse's book has wielded an important influence on the Kuomintang historiography on the Chinese revolutionary movement. This orthodox school establishes that significant connections had been developed by the foreigners with the Chinese revolutionaries and that the outsiders had played an important role in contributing to the success of the Chinese revolution.⁷ Tse's book was a convenient means to lay support to this party claim.

Two points arising out of Tse's account should be clarified before his statements can be accepted.

First, one should be wary of the fact that Tse Tsan Tai might have made extravagant statements. So far, many historians have accepted Tse's account without any reservation but personally I have much doubt about some of the claims that Tse had made in his book. Many of the friendly critics cited by Tse had no longer been closely associated with the revolutionary circle in the Colony when the 1911 Revolution broke out. As temporary sojourners in the Far East, they could not maintain permanent attention to the activities of the Chinese revolutionaries. There might also be the case that some of them had experienced a change in their attitudes. Even Tse Tsan Tai himself had withdrawn from political activities after 1903 and devoted himself to commerce and journalism.


Second, Tse frequently stated that so-and-so was in sympathy with his movement. "Sympathy" is such a loosely



defined term that if one does not express hostility, one can still be accepted as a potential sympathiser. It is therefore illusory or even misleading to use merely an adjective to determine a newspaper's attitude without any further explanation.

By tracing the responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers to the activities of the Chinese revolutionaries in China from the end of the Sino-Japanese War to the eve of the 1911 Revolution, this chapter is intended to assess the validity of Tse's book and the general impression created out of it that all the Hong Kong English newspapers had adopted a sympathetic editorial policy towards the Chinese revolutionaries.


Parenthetically, the readers should be reminded that in the pre-Boxer days, the Hong Kong English newspapers rarely used the term "revolutionaries" to refer to Sun Yat-sen and his followers. They called them "reformers" instead. The Hong Kong English journalists were of course fully aware that the means that these so-called reformers used to reform China was more violent. Terms like "revolution", "revolutionaries" or even "anarchists" had gained currency in the daily columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers since the Russo-Japanese War. It is obvious that these terms were much popularized by the domestic political events in Czarist Russia in this period although the term "revolutionaries" was first rendered to Sun Yat-sen and his men by the Japanese in the 1890s.⁸



One might easily assume that the Hong Kong English journalists employed the term "revolutionaries" in a western rather than in a traditional Chinese sense: they would address those who preferred a violent seizure of political power following the pattern of the French revolution as "revolutionaries" and not those who preferred a change of the Mandate of Heaven. The definition of the Hong Kong English journalists for the term revolutionaries was in fact very simple: revolutionaries were in their mind people who wanted to seize power by violence. In rendering this term to Sun Yat-sen and his followers, the Hong Kong English journalists did not mind about their ultimate political ambition. Most of the Hong Kong English journalists certainly realized that the Chinese revolutionaries under Sun Yat-sen intended to establish a republic in China but they also held the opinion that there was dynastic or "Ming" revivialist sentiment inside Sun's revolutionary camp.⁹

The period 1895-1900

The Hong Kong English press attitudes towards Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese revolutionaries were directly reflected in their reports to two specific events, namely, the Canton uprising of 1895 and the Waichow uprising of 1900; and indirectly in their general comments on the Chinese revolutionary movement as a whole.



A. The Canton uprising and the response of the Hong Kong English newspapers

1. The historical background

The Canton uprising of 1895 was the first of the series of abortive revolutionary attempts hatched by the Chinese revolutionaries in Hong Kong with a view to overthrowing the Manchu dynasty.

The plotting of the 1895 attempt was done by the newly organized Hong Kong Hsing-chung-hui. The Hong Kong Hsing-chung-hui was founded on February 21, 1895 and was a combination of two small groups of young and patriotic Chinese intellectuals in the Colony. The first group clustered around the Fu-jen-wen-she (the Literary Society) founded in March 1892 with not more than a score of members. Prominent among the group were Yang Ch'u-yun, Tse Tsan Tai, Liu Yen-pin, Wu Kan-chih and Wen Tsung-yao. The second group was tied by personal friendship with Sun Yat-sen.¹⁰

2. The attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers

The China Mail was the only English newspaper in Hong Kong that hinted at an anti-Manchu outburst in a series of editorials on March 12, March 15, March 16 and March 18.¹¹

The China Mail of March 12, 1895, for example, mentioned the existence of a reform party in South China. It says:




Quietly, unostentiously, cautiously, the inhabitants of South China have been fairly well organized, and all that is needed to kindle the flame of popular revolt is a leader of outstanding merit, a man of high principles and fearless spirit, who is prepared to march at the head of the Party of Reform and to lead it, if need by, against the disorganized soldiers of the Empire, even to the gates of Peking itself.

This same issue then gave a brief introduction of the aims and nature of this party of reform in South China. It said that the party was "not thoroughly organized" or "sufficiently well-equipped. It belonged to no secret society. It only "banded together for the sole purpose of reforming the government of the country, to effect a coup d'etat by peaceful means if possible". It aimed at a "constitutional upheaval" to rid their country of the iniquitous system of bureaucratic misrule which was shut out of China from western influences, Western trade and Western civilization.

The same newspaper said that the party did not enjoy the popular support of the Chinese masses who were ignorant of their lofty goal, but lacking in mass support did not prevent this newspaper from interceding with the foreign powers for this reform movement. It says:

The reformers have a good cause - The foreign nations ought to welcome this internal movement in favour of a radical change in the government of the country. Although there would be a disorganization temporarily of foreign trade, with all the horrors inseparable from civil war, but without this preface of disorder, there is little hope for reorganized and orderly China.

The same issue continues:



We hope the Foreign Powers will not seek to follow the precedent of the Taiping Rebellion. When the dissensions of the Wangs made it perfectly clear that China was not likely to benefit by the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, it was only right that the Powers should refuse to recognise a chaotic form of administration, but it is a moot point yet whether China would not have been in a better position today had it not been for the personal efforts of Chinese Gordon in quelling the Taiping Rebellion. If the present movement receives the countenance of the Foreign Powers it is bound to succeed. There is much that is nebulous in the scheme as we have seen it, but the proposed new constitution is based on Western lines and is well-adapted for the transition from the ancient customs and notions of the Chinese.... So far as we can see, if the movement is only started at once, it have every likelihood of success, for, as in the case of Japan, and, more forcibly perhaps, in the case of Egypt, foreign advisers would require to be called in until the constitution and the various Government Departments had been established on a working basis. Railways would be laid down, and mines would be worked, the reputed mineral wealth of China would be brought to the surface and utilised for manufactures on the spot, a fresh outlet would be provided for British enterprise and capital, and the long-deferred but frequently predicted opening up of China would at least be an accomplished fact.

In its March 15, 1895 issue entitled "the impending revolution in China", the China Mail reiterated this prophesy. Furthermore, it was proud to tell its readers that it was able to lay before them the "actual steps that have been taken by the Reform Party" whereas its northern contemporary the Peking and Tientsin Times was unable to do so.



Its March 16 issue said that many able Chinese were "willing to cast in their lot with the reformers and the movement had even the support of "some prominent officials throughout China" who were "prepared to throw in their lot with the agitators as soon as the rising has assumed promising dimensions".¹²

Then in its March 8, 1896 issue, the China Mail again made a long editorial summary of the alleged programme of the reformers.¹³ This programme included the practice of modern diplomacy, the getting rid of corruption, administrative innovations in the civil service examination, education and judicial reforms, the reconstruction of the army and navy on new line, and new means of collection of revenue. It also included the cutting of pigtails and the modification of the national dress. Of special interest were the two proposals alleged by the China Mail to be actively promoted by the reformers. The first was the intention of the reformers to set up a "constitutional monarchy" in China. This newspaper also stated that the reformers did not propose to set up a republic. It nevertheless admitted that at this stage it did not really know from which ruling family would the Emperor be selected. The second was their desire to construct railways and open up of mines. These reform programmes if implemented would, of course, facilitate trade activities. Actually, they were also persistently championed in the Hong Kong English newspaper columns.

The China Mail was highly pleased with the proposals of the reformers. In previous editorials it had expressed




agreement and support of the cause and in its March 18, 1896 issue, words of encouragement were again freely given:

If the Chinese only demonstrate to the world that there is a healthy spirit of reform awakening and a sincere desire to establish a government that will promote reform instead of keeping the people in abject poverty and ignorance, there is little doubt that the Powers will step in and recognise the new government and will lend every assistance possible. To succeed, the reformers have only to show themselves in earnest.

The China Mail of October 14, 1895 again stated the recurring rumours that a violent upheaval to overthrow the dynasty was going to happen and that the aim of the movement was to overthrow the dynasty and establish a new Constitution on Dr. Ho Kai's lines.

Although the China Mail found it indiscreet to reveal the whole secret to the public too soon for fear that it would "be injurious to a patriotic movement", it had already talked enough about it before the secret had finally leaked out. The failure of the plot was due to the treachery of a Chinese, but one just wonders whether information derived from the Hong Kong English newspapers helped increase the vigilance of the Chinese provincial authorities and indirectly contributed to the failure of the rebels to achieve an easy and surprise attack.


The China Mail seemed to have been strongly in sympathy and support of the movement from its inception. The uprising was entirely directed against the misrule of the Manchu Government, an objective with which the Chinese "reformers" and the journalists of the China Mail were in full accord. They were of the same opinion that the



Manchu officialdom was corrupt and oppressive and there was no reason why it should be allowed to stay. To the China Mail, there was an obvious reason to make the undoing of the Chinese bureaucracy more deserving. The China Mail suspected that the Chinese officials were behind the recent anti-foreign outrages. According to the China Mail of October 29, 1895, some Chinese officials had "in recent years managed to divert the restlessness of the ignorant populace into a side-track, as it were, by means of anti-foreign riots; the people are led more or less to regard foreigners as the root of all evil and the natural elements of disturbances thus find an outlet without endangering mandarindom as a whole".

The China Mail was also gratified to learn that the reformers could allow foreigners to play a significant part in the rising and that the reformers were in full trust of the foreigners. The original plot was disclosed to the foreign journalists beforehand; some foreigners were alleged to be asked to direct the event and were promised a free hand in doing so; the followers of the movement were said to be forbidden to commit any rapine or anti-foreign outrages. What made the movement doubly attractive was the expectation that China would be thrown open to foreigners when the scheme succeeded.

The support to the event by the China Mail was made plain to the people of Hong Kong. The China Mail of October 29, 1895 remarked,




The rising deserved support and encouragement. Good intentions, even if badly executed, should not be crushed but should be assisted into better ways by all possible means. The Revolutionists at least could not be worse than the present rulers.

The advice the newspaper given to the Manchu rulers was that they should try to forestall the reforms of the rebels by a reform programme of its own. But the possibility of such kind of involuntary action on the part of the Chinese Government was very slight. The same issue of the China Mail could only lament:

China will never do this, will never voluntarily reform; and the need for reform will drive the malcontents to more determined and better-planned attempts until finally they succeed, and the Manchu dynasty will give place to an era of regeneration.


Very interestingly, while the editors of the China Mail were in favour of the rebels, the correspondent of the China Mail at Canton, on the contrary, seemed to have borne a particular grudge against the leader of the movement who was named "Sūn Nam" [Sun Wen or Sun Yat-sen?]. This man's character, the correspondent said, was "not above suspicion" and whose patriotism was "not an adulterated virtue". With such a person as leader, the correspondent continued, the whole plot was destined to end in a "ridiculous fiasco". Sarcastically, the same correspondent also told the China Mail readers that Sūn Nam's qualification for leadership were not attested by his wisdom in making good his escape twenty hours before the arrival of his comrades" and expressed wishes that "it will be a happy deliverance to his followers and



friends if the uncertain tenure by which he hereafter holds his head will prevent his return to his old haunts".

Unlike the China Mail which was able to provide advanced information about the plot and its aims, both the Hongkong Daily Press and the Hongkong Telegraph possessed little or virtually no intelligence about the activities of this specific group of anti-Manchu reformers before the plot had publicly been discovered.

On the eve of the scheduled uprising, the Hongkong Daily Press still treated all sorts of rumours concerning an impending revolt in Canton as silly. While admitting that there were in existence in China some anti-Manchu societies which could foster a spirit of deep disloyalty to the reigning Chinese dynasty, the Hongkong Daily Press did not entertain any idea of a successful anti-Manchu revolt conducted by these secret societies in China or abroad. For one thing, although the Hongkong Daily Press was disinclined to accepting the Chinese official view that anti-missionary activities of the 1890s were the work of secret societies committed with the aim of embroiling the Chinese Government with foreign powers, it was convinced of the fact that some of these secret societies did possess anti-foreign designs.¹⁴ For another thing, certain weaknesses of these anti-Manchu rebel forces were too apparent to the Hongkong Daily Press: the rebel forces were small in number; they were not well led and properly organized; they did not have the necessary military training and experience. Reviewing the political situation in China in the mid-1890s, the Hongkong Daily Press




came to the view that chances of a successful revolution in China were very small and that the strength of the anti-dynastic movement had been vastly overrated.¹⁵

In response to information about the six hundred coolies who had left Hong Kong by the steamer "Powan" for Canton, this newspaper shared the common belief that they were "intended as recruits for the Chinese army".¹⁶ Only after the failure of plot did the Hongkong Daily Press realize that these coolies were intended to be recruits for a revolt at Canton. Moreover, this newspaper also had to rely on local vernacular newspapers to provide information about the movement of the Chinese revolutionaries.¹⁷

It is obvious that the Hongkong Daily Press did not support the attempt. The whole incident in the opinion of this newspaper appeared to be a farce. The coolie recruits were ignorant of the plan; had no idea of revolting against the existing Chinese authorities, and did not receive any training in the use of firearms. Schemes of this kind, the Hongkong Daily Press said, should naturally die of inanition.¹⁸ Moreover, this newspaper was not sure whether any foreigner was involved in the incident. It could not even ascertain the identity of a certain foreign who was rumoured to have helped the rebels to make dynamite bombs.¹⁹

The Hongkong Telegraph was also not in sympathy with the Chinese revolutionaries. It even disliked the name of Hong Kong being associated with their anti-Manchu activities, and stuck to its belief that the only real




danger which threatened the existence of the Manchu dynasty came within its own gates from the Kao-lao-hui, Triad and White Lily secret societies and not at its threshold.

In the wake of the 1895 uprising, the Hongkong Telegraph in an editorial (November 15, 1895) scorned the inability of the Hong Kong Police to deal with the Chinese revolutionaries lurking in the Colony and foil their plan before it was hatched. Sarcastically it made the remarks that the Hong Kong Police was only "very smart about running in poor hawkers". In regard to its ability to check anti-Manchu activities, this newspaper had the following to say:

The Hongkong Police are rapidly acquiring an unenviable reputation for skill in the fine art of closing the door after the horse has been stolen. Witness the late attempted revolution at Canton. Six hundred men were engaged in the Colony, under the very eyes of the Government, to massacre the rulers of our neighbours, and, in spite of the Arms Ordinance, several hundred revolvers were bought here, packed here in barrels, and shipped hence to Canton....

In a later issue on December 28, 1895, the Hongkong Telegraph became more sympathetic towards the Hong Kong Police. The inability of the Hong Kong Police to check the activities of the Chinese revolutionaries in the Colony, was because it was "grossly undermanned in the detective department", this issue said.




B. Journalistic perception of and comments on the Chinese revolutionaries and their activities between the two abortive Canton attempts

While realizing that anti-Manchuism was the major aim of the Chinese revolutionaries and that Sun Yat-sen was their leader, the Hong Kong English newspapers were at a loss about the other aims of the Chinese revolutionaries, the rest of the rebel leaders and more importantly, the strength of the rebel force.

The Hongkong Weekly Press of February 19, 1896 publicly stated that the existing anti-Manchu forces were only "a mere collection of a rabble of coolies armed with weapons they did not know how to use" and believed that feeble as the Chinese forces were when confronted by foreign soldiers, they were "invincibly strong" as compared with the undisciplined host of coolies or patriots. According to this issue, a rebellion could only have a chance if it was promoted by a military man who could secure a base on the coast. Nevertheless, the same issue also noted that no military man in China would ever be attracted by such ideals as reforming the country or saving the people from hardship and the ordinary Chinese traders or gentlemen were "as helpless as a babe".


A "reformer" found it necessary to contribute a letter to the Hongkong Daily Press in order "to remove a false impression created by the recent arrest and detention of Dr. Sun Yat-sin [Sun Yat-sen] by the Chinese Legation in London and to tell the outsiders something about the reform movement in China".



The letter was published in the Hongkong Daily Press on November 27, 1896.²⁰ The writer stated clearly that Yeong k'u-wan [Yang Ch'ü-yün] who was described as "a progressive man of sterling worth and unblemished reputation, a thorough patriot and reformer" was the leader of the reform movement and that "Dr. Sun Yat-sin [Sun Yat-sen] is only one of the chief organizers". He further stated that the reform movement was extensive and had adherents and sympathizers throughout the world. Styling himself as a reformer and that the movement he represented was for the purpose of reforming China, his intention as he disclosed it in the letter was "to see the emancipation of the great Chinese race from the bigoted and selfish Manchu yoke".

This letter certainly did not help improve a foreigner's understanding of the anti-Manchu movement, for appearing in the same issue of the Hongkong Daily Press was an editorial which disputed many of the points raised in the letter. For instance, the Hongkong Daily Press was the one that did not believe that the reform movement got any extensive support.

It is also quite clear that the Hong Kong English journalists were unable to keep close track of the major activities of the Chinese revolutionaries. After the abortive Canton uprising, Sun Yat-sen left Hong Kong first to Japan (in October 1895) and then America (by mid-December) and finally to England (on September 23, 1896).²¹ But the Hong Kong English newspapers failed to take note of his movement. It was nearly a couple of weeks after the



Canton episode that Sun Yat-sen's name reappeared in the columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers when the famous kidnapping incident at London²² was known in Hong Kong.

The incident caused a wild sensation in London but the Hong Kong community as disclosed in the China Mail of October 26, 1896 was only mildly stirred. The China Mail was the only newspaper that showed a serious concern with the incident.²³ The response of the other English newspapers to the event was rather lukewarm.

Commenting on Sun's narrow escape from the Chinese Legation in London, the China Mail of October 26, 1896 opined that the event served to discredit the Ch'ing government in front of British opinion at home. Sun's image as a revolutionary leader in the China Mail was favourable. It admitted that Sun was "an earnest reformer" despite the clumsy way he handled his anti-Manchu project in the abortive Canton uprising of 1895. The conduct of Sun's adherents was open to question. They were said to have composed of secret society members. The China Mail confessed that it entertained "no admiration" for these people.

Both Hongkong Telegraph and the Hongkong Daily Press did not interest themselves in the episode and the fate of Sun Yat-sen. The Hongkong Daily Press, nevertheless, bore a very interesting discussion of the incident in its columns. In an editorial devoted to the event, this newspaper brushed the chief antagonist of the story aside and discussed the event solely in connection with the



advisability of having a Chinese consul permanently stationed in the Colony. It says:

The outrage perpetrated by the Chinese Legation in London in the illegal arrest and detention of Dr. Sun Yat Yen [sic] is not a circumstance to occasion regret, so far as this colony is concerned; on the contrary it is one of the best things that could have happened. The Chinese Government is very anxious to have a Consul at Hongkong.... The case of Dr. Sun Yat Yen [sic] will open the eyes of the Foreign Office as to the character of Chinese officials and strengthen the case of Hong Kong against the appointment of a Chinese Consul in this Colony.²⁴

In this initial phase of the Chinese revolutionary movement, the stand of the Hongkong Daily Press and the Hongkong Telegraph could not at all be regarded as friendly.

In an editorial on November 27, 1896²⁵, the Hongkong Daily Press asserted that the revolutionary movement was unpopular among the Chinese people. It also treated the anti-Manchu standard of the rebel forces as nonsense, for it was convinced that the Manchus had been absorbed by the Chinese, and were only nominally the governing race. The strongest opponents of reform came from the Chinese statesmen and literati, this newspaper explained. It said:

The picture presented by our correspondent is that of a struggling nationality groaning under the yoke of a foreign tyrant, whereas the fact is that the Manchus have been almost absorbed by the Chinese and they are Chinese statesmen, not Manchus, who exercise the preponderance in the direction of their country's destiny.

The minority alien Manchu race should not be wholly responsible for China's plight. While admitting that




the existing Chinese government did not deserve any support, it did not favour its overthrow by force of arm either. In the opinion of this newspaper, a revolution in China would be a "helpless task". "To overthrow the Ta-Tsing dynasty and again place the Ming on the throne, this same issue said, "would probably signify no more than a change of name to the mass of the people". It would only plunge the country into anarchy; provide the excuse for foreign intervention and the partition of China. The Powers would not remain indifferent when trading conditions disrupted and a Chinese government having a large foreign debt perished, the Hongkong Daily Press added.

In a later issue, the Hongkong Daily Press even put forward the view that Britain should not afford any favour to the rebels in any part of the Empire.²⁶ In the case of a general insurrection in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, the Hongkong Daily Press prognosticated that Britain would be forced to step in and put down disorder in order to save innocent lives and protect British trading interests. These two reasons would provide Britain sufficient ground for intervention and undertaking the administration of places in revolt.

In the wake of the abortive Canton uprising, the China Mail was the only newspaper that was favourably inclined to Sun Yat-sen and the movement he represented.

A letter from an "intelligent" informer in Honolulu, Hawaii, appearing in the China Mail of August 16, 1897, for example, threw an excellent light, inaccurate in some




respects as it was, on Sun Yat-sen and the political movement he represented.

According to this letter, Sun, the father of the movement, was a Canton Chinaman who came to Hawaii as a boy and was educated in Rev. F.W. Damon's school. There, Sun was said to have learned a great deal of modern ideas of government, become an ardent republican and initiated an anti-Manchu movement.

Although the narrative of the letter focused primarily on Honolulu, Hawaii, the letter also disclosed the fact that a strong foundation for the movement was built in Hong Kong: a general treasury for the safe-keeping of funds from the revolutionaries was instituted at Hong Kong and more than a dozen Honolulu men were in Hong Kong and elsewhere awaiting the occasion to rise up against the Manchu authorities. The letter also came to a better appreciation of the strength of Sun's movement: the movement had a sound financial foundation; nearly \$2,000,000 was amassed in Hong Kong and that in Europe, America and in the province of Canton and Hong Kong, the movement gained popular support and a large number of white men had been enlisted to the cause and were associate members of the revolutionary society. The aims of the movement as disclosed in the letter were the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of a republic like the US and the opening of China to western trade and influence, aims which undoubtedly interested the average foreigners.

An exception should be taken of the China Mail's correspondent in Canton. This man adopted a lonely but




anti-revolutionary front in the China Mail's Canton correspondence columns. In the October 24, 1898 issue of the China Mail, this correspondent for example referred to the fact that "a large number of robbers in the western part of Canton were closely connected with Sun's party and complained that these men always tried to strike terror into the heart of the people by raising placards and spreading rumours of an impending insurrection."

In general, the Hong Kong English newspapers in this period were not exceptionally well-informed about Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary movement. News reports about the Chinese revolutionary movement appearing in their columns were usually taken from other newspapers. They were often inaccurate, conflicting and misleading. Even the China Mail which had editorially boasted of its close connection with the Chinese revolutionaries frequently committed the mistake of allowing unsubstantiated reports to appear in its columns.

Interestingly, the China Mail's opinion was that the commitment of these mistakes should be taken for granted in view of the general inaccessibility of information about Sun Yat-sen and his political movement. The following example would demonstrate how the China Mail handled unconfirmed reports on the Chinese revolutionaries from other sources.

The China Mail of August 11, 1900 reprinted from the Osake Mainichi a misleading statement that Sun Yat-sen had received a letter from the Hong Kong Governor Sir Henry



Blake and that the Governor had given his personal views as to British attitude in regard to the Boxer crisis.

The Hong Kong Government of course officially denied this matter. Unrepentent, the China Mail made the following statement in its defence:

In publishing the extract from the Osake Mainichi we placed little evidence in the statements therein contained, and we feel sure that our readers would not be duped into believing that the expressions of opinion attributed to H.E. Sir Henry Blake were authentic statements. The extract was published as serving to show the whereabouts of Sun Yat Sen and some of the means he was adopting to forward his schemes for reform.

In actual fact, the readers could be easily duped by this statement as nowhere did the China Mail tell them that this was an unconfirmed report.

C. The Waichow (Huichou) uprising of October 8-22, 1900
 1. The historical background

Taking advantage of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, Sun Yat-sen despatched Cheng Shih-liang to organize an uprising at Waichow, north of Hong Kong and Shih Chien-ju to Canton to plot a sympathetic movement. The revolutionaries had initiated activities along the coastal areas of Kwangtung and they were aided by secret societies and a number of foreigners too.²⁷ But the expected reinforcements and supplies from Formosa did not come and the plot failed. Meanwhile, Shih Chien-ju's attempt to blow up Governor-General Te-shou's office on October 28, 1900 was also discovered and this led to his capture and execution.²⁸



2. The Hong Kong English press attitudes


The Hong Kong English newspapers were quite let down by Sun's earlier Canton attempt which was carried out in a rash and farcical manner. By early 1900, even the China Mail which was previously interested in the idea of an anti-dynastic uprising in South China became disinterested. Its February 14, 1900 issue says:

We have heard so much of revolution in China during the past ten years that we have become sceptical not only of the sincerity of the would-be revolutionists but of the likelihood at any time of a force of Chinese sufficiently honest to trust each other being brought together in such numbers as to imperil the power of the authorities at Peking.

The support of the Hong Kong English newspapers to Sun's second anti-Manchu attempt seems to have been dictated more by the force of circumstance than by any friendly ties with the rebels, or the attractiveness of the personality of the rebel leaders and their programme.


In the North, the Boxers were waging a relentless war against all foreigners. Under the influence of this event, there was an interesting change in editorial attitude towards the subject of an armed anti-Manchu uprising in Southern China between the China Mail on the one hand and the Hongkong Daily Press and Hongkong Telegraph on the other.

At the start of the Boxer outbreak in the North, the China Mail dropped the idea of an anti-dynastic revolt in South China at once, for it began to worry that an armed revolt in Southern China would set free the restraining influence of the masses who, this newspaper suspected, were harbouring anti-foreignism.



The end of the Boxer crisis did not alter the view of the China Mail on this question. While objecting to the return of the reactionary party to power, its October 5, 1900 issue did not favour the desire of the Chinese reformers to make capital out of the situation and to seize political power. In response to rumours of impending revolts at Wuchang, Hankow and in South China, this issue suggested that the Allied Powers at Peking should shoulder the responsibility of reforming China by breaking the power of the anti-foreign party and encouraging a scheme of reform in the pattern of the Hundred Days Reform programme. It also expressed the view that all the loyal Reformers should "work in unison with the Allied Powers". In addition, it sounded a note of caution that any uprisings on the part of the revolutionaries would serve to embarrass the Allied Powers in their efforts to introduce reforms into the administration of China and bring ruin upon the revolutionaries themselves.

During the Boxer incident, the editorial policy of both the Hongkong Telegraph and the Hongkong Daily Press towards the Chinese revolutionaries were in a state of flux. These two newspapers did not give any editorial support to the Canton Uprising of 1895. They obviously changed their editorial stand in the initial phase of the Waichow Uprising, and were editorially in favour of the movement. The reason for such a drastic change in front was obvious. These two newspapers were greatly irritated by the Manchu Court's patronage of the Boxer movement. As strong defenders of foreign interests in China, they




surely would enthusiastically endorse any political movement that was anti-dynastic in nature.

As a matter of fact, the Chinese rebels themselves were also clever enough to make capital out of the existing situation. "Pyramid", a member of the Triad Society of the Kuei-shan District, Kwangtung was the first to explain the aims of his Waichow comrades to the foreigners. He stated in his letter to the Hong Kong English newspapers that his society was not a Boxer organization but the "Great Political Society of Masons". The aim of the movement was solely anti-dynastic; members "at home and abroad have sworn to oust barbarous Manchu usurpers from the throne of [their] fatherland and reinstate a Chinese ruler". It was not anti-foreign. Instead, after the overthrow of the Manchus, beneficial reforms would be instituted and the country would be thrown open to the trade of the world", the writer said. Finally, this writer also expressed the desire that the foreign nations especially Great Britain should observe strict neutrality or even extend friendly advice and support to his movement.²⁹

Published in the China Mail of October 18, 1900 was the Manifesto of the Waichow rebels. It stated that the object of hatred was the corrupt Manchu officials and not foreigners.

Successive issues of the Hongkong Daily Press confirmed the purely anti-dynastic nature of the Waichow uprising, and this served to directly popularize the movement among its readers. The Hongkong Daily Press of



October 16, for example, stated positively that the rebels did not appear to possess any anti-foreign feeling.³⁰


The Hongkong Daily Press of October 22, 1900 also reported that placards were issued and circulated among the rebels themselves that they should not molest any foreigners and their property in territories under their control.³¹

"The objects of the rebels", the Hongkong Daily Press said in another issue, "are very clearly defined. The principal end to which their efforts are directed is the subversion of the Manchus". "[t]he rebellion is in its tendencies the very reverse of that which has received the name of the "Boxer rising" in the north", the author added.³²

Whether the rebellion was anti-foreign or not became the chief issue for the Hong Kong English newspapers to determine their editorial stand. The following report from the Hongkong Daily Press reveals this clearly.

According to the Hongkong Daily Press of October 31, 1900, the reason why it favoured the rebel side was the reformers had shown a remarkable respect for missionaries and for westerners generally and that they did not do any damage to the persons or property of foreigners whereas many minor officials of the Canton government were still found conniving at anti-Christian attacks in direct contradiction to instructions from their superiors.³³

The Hongkong Daily Press in an editorial openly expressed regret that Britain had supported the Manchus during the Taiping Rebellion. It was the "folly" and



"crime" of General Gordon to prop up an incompetent and barbarous dynasty, this newspaper said.³⁴ The Hongkong Daily Press also endorsed the idea of North China Daily News of October 17, 1900 that the Powers should make use of this occasion to negotiate with the Chinese rebels for a new political arrangement in China.³⁵ This was indeed the first and the only occasion which the Hongkong Daily Press so unequivocally advocated foreign interference on behalf of the rebels. From these statements, it was quite clear where the sympathy of the Hong Kong English newspapers lied.

Nevertheless, sympathy for the rebels was only in words and even this was rendered conditionally. First, there was the press' misunderstanding of the intention of the rebels. The Hongkong Daily Press believed that the rebels just wanted to reinstate the Emperor Kuang-hsü to the throne.³⁶ In fact, a republic was in the mind of the rebel leaders. One just wonders what the press attitude was should it discover the real intention of the rebels. Second, the Hong Kong English newspapers felt concerned at the Triad connection of the whole movement. The Hongkong Daily Press of October 22, 1900 had to make the following cautionary remarks:

Unfortunately the name of Triad has evil associations, particularly to us in Hongkong and the Reformers must prove that they are opposed to many of the methods of the society before they can appeal successfully to the sympathies of the world.³⁷

While the Hongkong Telegraph was convinced by the alleged good conduct of the rebels,³⁸ the other two English



contemporaries did not share the same thinking. Some reports from the correspondents of the China Mail and the Hongkong Daily Press indicated that many Chinese villagers had been found fighting on the side of the Manchu Government.³⁹ The Hongkong Daily Press believed that the presence of lawless elements in the reform camp certainly accounted for the alienation of the native villagers from the movement although this point was disputed by "A Reformer" in his letter to the editor. This correspondent said that the native villagers were without arms and unaware of the potentials of the rebellion. They only assisted the Imperial force under pressure.⁴⁰

Third, the Hong Kong English newspapers preferred to see China's transformation through peaceful rather than violent means.⁴¹


Although the Hong Kong English newspapers by this time (1900) were unanimously in support of the movement, their sympathy appeared to have made no impact on the fortune of the rebels. With the collapse of the movement, the Hongkong Daily Press simply reasoned that the rebels "have chosen a bad time for their protest against the corruption of official China and a still worse method".⁴² This newspaper however made another appeal, to the Powers ineffectual it knew its result would be, to prevent the massacres of the rebels as it explained that there "might be genuine reformers among the rebel camp".⁴³



Although the Hongkong Daily Press reported Shih Chien-ju's attempt on the Governor-General's yamen,⁴⁴ this newspaper made no additional editorial commentary on the incident. This might give us a piece of evidence that this newspaper did not endorse political murder which it considered only as a dastardly and futile act. There was no intention for this newspaper to publicize this kind of incident and romanticize the one who committed it.

The gross mistake that the Hongkong Daily Press and Hongkong Telegraph committed in this period was their tendency to mix up Sun Yat-sen's movement with that led by K'ang Yu-wei.

These two movements of course closely resembled each other in many respects. Their leaders were mostly coming from Southern part of China; these two movements were suppressed by the Ch'ing government and that their leaders had to seek political sanctuary outside China; these two movements operated in more or less the same places; these two movements drew their sources of support from the overseas Chinese. Confusion for the outsiders arose from the fact that K'ang Yu-wei's Pao-Huang-hui (Emperor Protection Movement) also resorted to armed uprising against the Manchu government as shown in T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang's revolt of 1900. The China Mail of October 24, 1900 cited the two proclamations by Chang Chih-tung on the 19th and the 20th. These proclamations stated the popular rumour that in South China, K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen's parties had joined hands. A new party, the Tzu-li-chün (the Independent) with the Headquarters at Hankow was



formed, and it tried to effect a grand union among the other secret societies, the Kao-lo-hui, the Ta-tao-hui and Sun Yat-sen's party. These documents also stated that Sun Yat-sen had gone to Shanghai in furtherance of the object of uniting all the different parties together. Yung Hung [Yung Wing] and a young Cantonese educated abroad had played a conspicuous part in the amalgamation of the existing societies. T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang also acted as a kind of deputy for K'ang Yu-wei who was in hiding at Shanghai.

Moreover, it was also evident that the Chinese revolutionaries were making use of K'ang's name in connection with their movements in order to draw more popular support, and, K'ang Yu-wei had to send on October 24, 1900 a letter to the local Hongkong Telegraph to refute it.

Compared to the Hongkong Daily Press and Hongkong Telegraph, the China Mail had a better grasp of the situation of the revolutionaries. The China Mail of October 25, 1898 found it necessary to point out the mistake of the Hongkong Daily Press:

Our morning contemporary is incorrect - a stronger word would be more appropriate - when it states that Hong Yau-wei [K'ang Yu-wei] is a friend of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The progressive movement at Peking had absolutely no connection with the movement initiated or fostered by Sun Yat-sen.

"Philo China", a reader of the China Mail in his letter to the newspaper which appeared in the China Mail of October 31, 1898 entitled "The attack on Hong Yau Wei [K'ang Yu-wei]" says:



It is a shame to mention Hong's [K'ang's] name in conjunction with Suen Yat Sen's [Sun Yat-sen's]. The latter was a leader in a miserable attempt at rebellion in Canton a short time ago. That gentleman and his friends seemed anxious to cause trouble, but they were too much afraid of their necks to effect anything.

The Post-Boxer decade, 1901-1910

- A. Journalistic perceptions of and comments on the Chinese revolutionary movement
- 1. General understanding of the Chinese revolutionary movement

For some years after the failure of the Waichow campaign, the Chinese revolutionaries had abandoned Canton as their target. Their attention was shifted to the interior and remote regions of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan. As Hong Kong had not yet had direct telegraphic communication with these regions, the Hong Kong English newspapers had to content themselves with information taken from recently arrived travellers or traders from these regions or mail from missionaries stationed in these places or news items from newspapers elsewhere. The enforcement of a strict censorship by the Chinese Government against its native journals certainly interrupted a valuable channel of information for the Hong Kong English journalists. The Chung-kuo jih-pao (Hong Kong) which had despatched "special correspondents" to some of these scenes of revolts was perhaps one of the few Chinese newspapers that could carry some reports on the uprisings at P'ing-hsiang (November 1907), Chen-nan-kuan (December 1907) and Anking (November 1908).⁴⁵




Without direct contact and reliable first-hand sources of information, reports in the Hong Kong English newspapers about the Chinese revolutionary movement accordingly dwindled drastically. So exasperated by the lack of concrete information even about the movement of the leader of the Chinese revolutionaries that the Hongkong Telegraph had to endorse the view of the Peking and Tientsin Times that the frequent but conflicting news about Sun Yat-sen's whereabouts only served to contribute "a sense of incredulity" to their readers.⁴⁶

In general, the Hong Kong English journalists' understanding of the Chinese revolutionary movement headed by Sun Yat-sen did not improve markedly in the post-Boxer decade.

The only thing that the Hong Kong English newspapers was sure about was that Sun's political movement favoured a republican form of government and intended to resort to armed revolts to achieve this purpose and that it was quite different from K'ang Yu-wei's which preferred peaceful methods and wanted a constitutional monarchy.

The China Mail of February 26, 1906, for example, told its readers that K'ang's movement was orientated toward the West, it was not hostile to Manchu rule in China and that it favoured reform in China along a peaceful and western line. The Hongkong Daily Press of February 14, 1910 also stated that K'ang was the leader of the reform movement overseas since 1898. What distinguished K'ang's movement from Sun's, as pointed out by this newspaper, was




the methods he employed: K'ang Yu-wei preferred the peaceful transformation of China under the existing Chinese Government and advocated a constitutional monarchy. Actually, this issue also carried the information that the Manchu Government had contemplated granting K'ang Yu-wei and his followers at an early date a free pardon in order to enlist their services in the great constitutional experiment.

A few example would suffice to indicate the "rudimentary" stage of understanding that the Hong Kong English journalists had kept about the Chinese revolutionary movement.

The Hongkong Daily Press of December 23, 1905, for example treated the assassination of the Five Imperial Commissioners by Wu Yüeh only as an "isolated case of fanaticism" and the job of a "reactionary" who hated to see progress in China. This newspaper also treated the Huang-kang (Wong Kang) uprising in Ch'ao-chou (May 1907) and the Swatow Rebellion as a kind of local rioting.⁴⁷ It failed to establish connections between these affairs and the revolutionary movement of Sun Yat-sen.

Similarly, commenting on the unrests in Swatow and Waichow, the Hongkong Telegraph of September 17, 1907 frankly told its readers that it was not quite sure about who these rebels were and what they desired.

The China Mail and the Hongkong Daily Press also treated the New Army Revolt of 1910 as a kind of affray between disorderly soldiers and the police and that the incident was only touched off by the arrest of a few




soldiers.⁴⁸ They were certainly not aware that the spread of revolutionary ideas and the infiltration of revolutionaries into the Chinese New Army had been intensified by that time. Despite the fact that some three to four thousand Chinese soldiers had mutinied, the Hong Kong English newspapers light-heartedly disposed of the prevalent rumour that this was the beginning of an anti-dynastic rebellion. Instead of sticking to its usual alarmist stand, the Hongkong Daily Press of April 25, 1910 comforted its readers that "no political significance whatever should be attached to the incident and that the event only arose from small and trifling matters."

Needless to say, the articles in the Hong Kong English newspapers dealing with the Chinese revolutionary movement in the post-Boxer days were still highly unreliable and impressionistic. The following discussion of the journalistic views on the nature of the Chinese revolutionary movement would demonstrate the validity of this point.

2. Aims and strength of the Chinese revolutionary forces

Interestingly, a line of difference can be drawn to separate the South China Morning Post from the rest of the Hong Kong English newspapers understanding of the aims and potential strength of the Chinese revolutionary movement.

The South China Morning Post was quite confident that the Chinese revolutionaries were anti-Manchu, anti-dynastic and not anti-foreign. The Peking correspondent of the South China Morning Post commenting on the revival of anti-foreign spirits in North China says, "Personally I think that the spirit of aggression in the Chinese is largely,



if not entirely, anti-Manchu. The foreign feeling is being used as a lever as it were, to assist the real movement". Commenting on the Swatow Rebellion conducted by Sun's party, the South China Morning Post stated that its aim was not anti-foreign and the lives and property of the rebels were unmolested. The South China Morning Post of June 6, 1910 bore a similar point of view.

The other Hong Kong English newspapers thought differently. The Hongkong Telegraph Mail Supplement of March 3, 1906 quoting the North China Daily News pointed out that the outward profession of friendship with foreigners was incompatible with their desire to remove extraterritoriality or even foreign influence in China. The Hongkong Daily Press of June 8, 1907 also editorially stated that it was not convinced by Sun's professed friendship with foreigners. While reporting that Sun had expressed the hope that foreigners should not intervene in Chinese affairs and that he had promised preferential treatment to foreigners for giving the Chinese revolutionaries a free hand, the Hongkong Daily Press raised the suspicion that anti-foreignism was the real intention of the Chinese rebels.

In so far as the anti-dynastic aspect of these revolts was concerned, the Hongkong Telegraph was convinced that they were only directed against the local officials who were oppressive and corrupt. Commenting on the unrests in Swatow, Wong Kang and Waichow, the Hongkong Telegraph of September 17, 1907, stated positively



that the rebels there "did not openly suggest that the dynasty should be overthrown; their campaign would appear to be simply directed against those officials who have exercised their authority to oppress the people and wreak the worse features of their power on the unfortunate subjects committed to their care".

The South China Morning Post held a better estimate of the potential strength of the Chinese revolutionaries than that of the Hongkong Daily Press, the Hongkong Telegraph, and the China Mail.

The South China Morning Post of May 28, 1907, for example, reported that the Chinese revolutionary movement was growing in strength and magnitude and that the local Chinese authorities were powerless to deal with the situation.

The South China Morning Post also pointed out that the Chinese revolutionary party was very popular among the overseas Chinese. Its May 23, 1907 issue stated that the revolutionary party was financially supported by many enlightened overseas Chinese who found that all the promised reforms were indefinitely postponed and China was kept in a state of weakness by the rottenness of her dynasty.

The Hongkong Telegraph and the Hongkong Daily Press did not believe that the Chinese revolutionaries would achieve their goal of overthrowing the dynasty and established a republic in China after the model of the United States.

The Hongkong Telegraph Mail Supplement of March 3, 1906 quoting an opinion from the North China Daily News



that Sun's followers some years ago numbering over four hundred had by now dwindled to barely a hundred and that they were mostly coolies of the most degraded class or cowards who were only too anxious to buy clemency by betraying their fellow conspirators. It was not until late 1907 that the Hongkong Telegraph had become apprehensive of the growing strength of the anti-Manchu forces. Its September 17, 1907 issue says, "It is clear that the reform movement, which recently showed its character at Swatow, Wong Kang, Waichow and elsewhere is rapidly assuming wide proportions" and that the rebels were well-equipped with modern arms, enjoyed popular support and tended to join hands together.⁴⁹ But in another issue, it comforted its readers that the anti-Manchu forces were made up only of a "medley lot" who were incapable of unity.⁵⁰


Despite recurrent rumours and reports of widespread disturbances and an impending revolution in China, successive issues of the Hongkong Daily Press disputed these kinds of pessimistic reports and forecasts. The Hongkong Daily Press of May 31, 1907 editorially stated that rebellions were only local disturbances caused entirely by dearness of rice and consequent privations among the masses. The Hongkong Daily Press of June 8, 1907 stated that those who were involved in these local disturbances were not organized or professional revolutionaries but simply rioters and lawbreakers. The Hongkong Daily Press of July 4, 1907 even wondered why there was so much opposition to the ruling house when the nation had already



been converted to the cause of reforming the country.

Its August 26, 1907 issue also reminded that "Sun's party was small" and mattered no more than "a pip in a pumelo". Sharing the same point of view was the China Mail. Its March 2, 1908 issue expressed the opinion that Sun Yat-sen had been "practically made great by the Chinese government offering heavy rewards" and stated that Sun "was not at all the sort of character to be feared with regard to the re-construction or destruction of an Empire." "We have reason to believe that by ignoring him altogether China would rob him of any influence he may have", this newspaper opined.

By 1910, popular rumours were that the situation in China was very critical and that an outbreak of Boxerism was inevitable. The Hongkong Daily Press of May 16, 1910 reported from a Chinese newspaper at Peking that signs of unrest in the provinces were growing and that there were at least a total of thirty-three outbreaks and disturbances at the beginning of the year (1910). The Hong Kong English journalists were not downtrodden by these depressed reports. The China Mail of May 25, 1910 stated that unrests in China were mainly caused by famines. Its July 13, 1910 issue even reported the optimistic news that the Chinese Government was exploring the possibility of winning the Chinese revolutionaries to its side by the introduction of a general amnesty.⁵¹ While admitting that the revolutionary organization led by Sun Yat-sen in China was very active, the Hongkong Daily Press of October 17, 1910 was also convinced that it was not half as strong



as it was a decade ago. Moreover, this issue also said that the Chinese revolutionaries had already lost their anti-Manchu raison d'etre, for the Government at Peking had adopted practically their whole scheme of reform short of a change of dynasty. The Manchu Court's sponsoring of a reform programme, according to the Hongkong Daily Press, served to "knock the bottom out of the revolutionary movement". Undoubtedly, the Hongkong Daily Press pinned its hope on the Manchu Government to reform the country. The only thing that worried this newspaper, as disclosed in its November 7, 1910 issue, was that the persistent refusal of the Chinese Throne to introduce enlightened reforms especially constitutional reforms might provide the excuse for the Chinese revolutionaries to advocate for a revolution in China.

B. Some journalistic comments on assassination as a political means


The earliest assassination attempt associated with the Chinese revolutionary movement occurred in October 1900 when Shih Chien-ju tried to murder the Manchu Governor Te-shou. Another famous case was the bomb outrage of Wu Yüeh against the five Imperial Travelling Commissioners at the Peking Railway Station in October 1905.⁵² Strangely, the Hong Kong English newspapers did not publicize these sensational events. Probably, the Hong Kong English newspapers regarded them as individual and isolated cases of fanaticism. Indeed, the Hong Kong English newspapers were unable to understand clearly the intention of those who committed these offences, let alone to have arrived



at any perceptive appreciation of their significance for their contemporaries. The Hongkong Daily Press of December 23, 1905, for instance, commenting on the bomb outrage against the Manchu Travelling Commissioners stated that this was done by the reactionary party with a view to blocking progress in China!

It was only after 1905 that the Hong Kong English newspapers gradually came to the view that the Chinese revolutionaries had resorted to assassination as the means to get rid of corrupt and hated Chinese officials or to wreak vengeance for their compatriots who suffered at the hands of these people. At the same time, they also began to suspect that these kinds of assassination activities were not isolated attempts but the instrument of an organization of some sort.

Whether the Hong Kong English newspapers endorsed assassination as a political means can be revealed in their reports on the attempt by Hsu Hsi-lun on the Anhwei Governor En-ming,⁵³ the most prominent assassination committed by one affiliated with Sun Yat-sen's secret party, the T'ung-meng-hui in the immediate post-Boxer period. While admitting that this incident would convince the Manchu Dynasty of the necessity of "concession and progress", the South China Morning Post of July 17, 1907 cautioned editorially that it might give an excuse for the reactionaries to check the movement towards progress in China. It quoted the view of a Chinese vernacular journal that the affair was the work of "a solitary Chinese



whose feelings of rabid hatred cause him to lose his balance of mind". With much confidence the South China Morning Post expressed the opinion that the Manchu Government was "moving slowly but surely into the light".

There were of course other assassination attempts committed by members of the T'ung-Meng-hui in subsequent years. The most famous were Wen Sheng-ts'ai's attempt on Feng-shan on October 25, 1911⁵⁴ and Lin Kuan-tz'u and Ch'en Ching-yueh's attempt on Li-chun.⁵⁵

On the whole, the Hong Kong English newspapers did not support assassinations of any kind whether in Chinese or in other places.⁵⁶ Suffice it to say that they all regarded assassination as a political vehicle to get rid of hated officials. It was also futile, as the killing of one in office would lead to the immediate replacement of another, they noted. They also believed that assassination attempts would only create disturbances and provide chances of pillage. Moreover, they were all confident that the Manchu government would reform the nation.

On the eve of the Chinese Revolution of 1911

Of the eight abortive armed uprisings organized by the T'ung-Meng-hui before the successful Wuchang Uprising, the Canton Uprising of April 27⁵⁷ was the most sensational. The Hong Kong English journalists were greatly excited by the event. They followed the whole affair closely and made long and detailed reports of it.



A. The historical background to the Canton Uprising of April 27, 1911

The original plot which later materialized as the famous April 27 Canton Uprising was first suggested by Huang-hsing in a letter dated May 13, 1910 from Hong Kong to Sun Yat-sen.

The plot was formally adopted at the Penang Conference of November 13, 1910 attended by Sun Yat-sen Huang-hsing, Chao-sheng, Hu Han-min, Teng Tse-ju and many other important members of the T'ung-meng-hui.

The plot involved the launching of an armed revolt in the city of Canton. Canton was chosen again because it was far away from Peking, the centre of Manchu power and close to the British colony of Hong Kong. Moreover, the people of the city were the most progressive because of the city's long contact with the outside world.⁵⁸ After the seizure of the city, military expeditions would then be mounted with a view to conquering the northern provinces of China. The planners expected spontaneous responses from sympathizers inside the city and in different parts of China.

In general, the plan was somewhat similar to the one in 1895, but unlike the earlier abortive attempt, Sun this time did not intend to rely solely on the local secret society members to do the fighting. He tried to recruit and organize 500 hand-picked vanguards from his Party followers.⁵⁹ A large sum of money of HK\$130,000 was targeted for the uprising.




In the months following the Penang Conference, preparations such as fund raising and the recruitment of vanguards were in full swing, and the Colony, because of its convenient geographical location in relation to Canton, invariably became a focal point of intense revolutionary activities.⁶⁰

A Central Planning Board (T'ung-chou-pu) was set up in Hong Kong at NO35 Happy Valley Road by Huang-hsing, Chao-sheng and Hu Han-min in January 1911. Sun Yat-sen could not be present in the Colony to direct affairs himself as the banishment order imposed on him by the Hong Kong government was still in force.

B. The reactions of the Hong Kong English newspapers to the assassination of Fu-ch'i

Before the Canton revolt actually commenced, a lone assassin Wen Sheng-ts'ai, acting on his own initiative, shot dead the Tartar-General Fu-ch'i in Canton on April 8.⁶¹ Wen was captured and in his depositions, admitted that he was a follower of Sun Yat-sen and that anti-Manchuism was the sole motive of his daring act. He was eventually executed a week later. On his way to the execution ground, Wen boldly called upon the local spectators to "take up where he had left off".

The Hong Kong English newspapers were greatly excited by the event. All of them carried very detailed reports of the circumstances leading to the assassination, the assassin's arrest and his confession statements.⁶² The reason why the Hong Kong English journalists were so



interested in the affair was that rumours were already widespread that a great revolt would sooner or later break out in China.

The stand of the Hong Kong English newspapers towards political terrorism was clearly disclosed in the murder of the Acting Tartar-general of Canton, Fu-ch'i. All the Hong Kong English newspapers adopted the same stand of denouncing Wen's action. It is clear that they did not condone the murder and disliked the name of Hong Kong being connected with the event.

The Hongkong Telegraph in a leader two days after the incident regarded the assassination as a "horrifying crime" and a "dastardly murder" and expressed sympathies to the victim and his relatives and regret at the incident.⁶³

Commenting on the same incident in an editorial, the China Mail also considered Wen a "fanatic", a "maniac" and a "simple minded fool" who fell in with the anti-Manchu propaganda of Sun Yat-sen's part and that his assassination attempt was a dastardly tragedy.⁶⁴

The Hongkong Daily Press followed more or less the same line by stating that Wen's attempt was a barbaric act and that political murder could not be tolerated no matter how noble its motive was.

The South China Morning Post, conscious of what had been happening in British-India at the moment, tried to deprecate not only the Chinese anarchists but also their Indian counterparts with the remarks that political murder and mob violence would not lead to the desired end of the instigators and that they were poor substitutes for




peaceful reform from above. The South China Morning Post had the opinion that violence would wipe out whatever outside sympathy held on the Chinese reformers and possibly would lead to anarchy and foreign intervention.

The views of the Hong Kong English newspapers on the subject resembled to one of the leading foreign observers on affairs in China.⁶⁵

It is also interesting to contrast the viewpoints of the Hong Kong English newspapers with the leading revolutionary newspaper in Canton, the K'o-pao (Ho Po or the Affirmative Daily) to see how different was their view on the same subject.

The K'o-pao was established by Tsou-lu and Ch'en Chiung-ming in Canton in March 1911 with the ostentatious purpose of supporting the anti-gambling motion of the Canton Provincial Assembly. The newspaper project was so publicised that it attracted the attention of at least the Hongkong Daily Press even before the newspaper made its debut in Canton.⁶⁶ At that time, the revolutionaries had begun their infiltration into the Provincial Assembly and other public institutions in order to cover up their identities. Tsou Lu thus served as secretary in the Assembly while Ch'en Chiung-ming was a provincial assemblyman. In actual fact, under the editorship of Chu Chih-hsin, the newspaper tried to inflame the public with anti-Manchu passion and win the Canton New Army to the cause of revolution. Anonymous contributions imbued with anti-Manchu sentiments from Hong Kong always appeared in the newspaper.



While the K'o-pao in a series of editorials lamented Wen's rash action, it still could not help commenting that Wen was a "brave patriot" whose action would be remembered by the Chinese for the years to come. It also openly stated that "many persons especially members of the New Army sighed deeply and shed tears when they saw his blood" on the execution ground. Because of its anti-Manchu remarks, the newspaper was suppressed by the Ch'ing authorities on April 22.⁶⁷

All the Hong Kong English newspapers believed that anti-Manchuism was the real cause behind the assassination though they had a different estimation of the strength of the revolutionaries and the popularity they enjoyed among the local Chinese population.

Both the South China Morning Post and the China Mail were of the opinion that the dastardly tragedy was not supported by the law-abiding citizens of Canton. But the Canton correspondent of the Hongkong Daily Press gave a different view of the matter by reporting that the crime "aroused very little spirit of indignation" among the Canton natives who even rejoiced in the fact that "there is one Manchu the less".⁶⁸ On another occasion, the Canton correspondent of the Hongkong Daily Press again reported that he came across some English compositions written by students in a famous school at Canton which regarded Wen as a "good, kind friend of China" and that "he should be set free in order to assassinate more Manchurians".⁶⁹




Whether the attempt was popular or not was not the immediate concern of the Hong Kong English presses. Anyway, the Hong Kong English presses were not very sure about this point. What really worried them was that the event was not simply an accident but a prelude to more widespread and serious risings and agitations which would surely lead to anarchy in China with unforeseen consequences for the foreign interests.

All the Hong Kong English newspapers treated the assassination as the portent of an impending crisis. The South China Morning Post, for example, judged that the murder was "but a small part of a more extensive outrage".⁷⁰ Events followed what these newspapers had expected, for two weeks later the Canton revolt occurred.

C. The Canton Uprising and the attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers


1. The revolt

On April 23, Huang Hsing and other revolutionary leaders had gathered in Canton and were ready for action. The date of the attempt was tentatively fixed at 26th. Partly because of the murder of the Tartar-general and partly because of leadages of the plan of the revolutionaries, the Canton authorities took special precautionary measures. They intensified its house-to-house searches for suspects and weapons; removed the firing pins and bullets from the guns of the Canton New Army whose members were mostly in sympathy with the revolutionaries; and called in a force of 3,000 troops from Kwangsi to guard the city.⁷¹



Because of increased official vigilance, the revolutionaries hesitated and vacillated. Some even suggested that the whole plan be cancelled. Huang Hsing eventually decided to postpone the date of the uprising to the 27th. But this final decision was made only late on the 26th and it came up too late to allow time to inform the other revolutionaries. Some revolutionaries who arrived at Canton on the 24th and 25th were just on their way back to the Colony while those staying in Hong Kong were totally unaware of the new date of rising.⁷²

As a result, only three detachments making up a total of about 160 men could be hastily gathered for the initial attack. One detachment under the leadership of Huang Hsing would attack the Viceregal Yamen; another would capture the arsenal at the Little North Gate; the third would burn the Manchu quarters inside the city. The revolutionaries only succeeded in burning the Yamen. Viceroy Chang Ming-ch'i could still make a narrow escape. The revolutionaries inside the city soon found that they had to fight against heavy odds since the closure of all the city gates when conflict flared up, prevented any outside reinforcements from entering the city. Early plans for the spontaneous responses from the New Army and the Canton Reserve Force did not materialize and the people of Canton were apparently not enthusiastic in joining the revolutionary cause. The result of the uprising was of course not totally unexpected.⁷³ About 86 revolutionaries making up the "cream" of the T'ung-meng-hui were either killed instantly in the fighting or captured and then executed later.⁷⁴




2. The Hong Kong English press comments

The uprising greatly intrigued the Hong Kong English newspapers. For some days after it was suppressed, the Hong Kong English newspapers still carried detailed reports and comments on the affair. Since Hong Kong was geographically close to Canton, the reporters of Hong Kong were better informed and could thus enjoy a decided advantage than their counterparts and rivals in other parts of China (with of course the exception of Canton) and in England.⁷⁵

All the Hong Kong English presses were of the opinion that the revolt was caused by a multitude of factors; some of these might have been connected with the recently-launched provincial reform programme; the abolition of opium-smoking and licensed gambling without any prior notice or compensation to the people concerned. The introduction of new taxes especially those on spirit in order to offset revenue losses from reform was also counted as a factor. The dearness of rice which hurt the livelihood of the ordinary people and the increased vigilance of an already meddlesome police and spy force who carried out their duties ruthlessly were, according to some presses, additional irritants. Other frequently mentioned factors such as corruption of the Court and civil service; the cowardice and inefficiency of the provincial forces were also cited as possible sources of trouble.


Although some of the above factors appeared in the Hong Kong English newspapers at one time or at another, their opinions always differed on the relative importance



of these factors. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong English newspapers all agreed that the major cause of the uprising was the racial hatred of the Chinese for the Manchus which they felt was quite deep-rooted to be suppressed at once.⁷⁶ Even the British Foreign Office accepted anti-Manchuism as the chief cause of the disturbances at Canton and that it was the Japanese government which deliberately encouraged such a spirit among the Chinese students in Japan.⁷⁷ This British official view had also been reflected in the Hongkong Telegraph which stated that anti-Manchuism was "a product of Japanese education which nourished nothing except Archophobia".⁷⁸

The Hongkong Telegraph even wondered why a revolt should ever occur in China as taxation was not excessively high; liberty of the people was not seriously restricted; the government though inefficient and weak as not at all harsh and tyrannical; and the life of the majority of the Chinese were even better than similar classes in Europe.⁷⁹ Indeed, this was the attitude shared by most of the foreigners who believed that the majority of the Chinese did not support the revolutionary movement which was only the job of a small group of young, fanatical and misguided zealots from Japan and members of the local secret-society such as the notorious Small Sword who wanted to free themselves from Manchu oppression and who were joined by the unemployed because of the closure of gambling dens and also by the ignorant and poverty stricken peasants.⁸⁰

It is also interesting to state here that the Hong Kong presses also touched on the sensitive question of




foreign oppression and the imminent partition of China as factors provoking the Chinese to action. But they emphasized that the imminent partition of China only came from unfounded and foolish rumours spread largely by the revolutionaries who made use of the existing difficulties between the Manchu government and the foreign powers to serve their selfish goal of overthrowing the alien Manchu dynasty. They also believed that if the revolutionary movement was not suppressed, it would very likely develop into major anti-foreign outrages as the ignorant Chinese masses would easily succumb to silly rumours. Probably, the mid-summer madness of 1900 was still fresh in the minds of the foreigners.⁸¹

In addition, the South China Morning Post of May 1, 1911 also raised the embarrassing question of the share of responsibility of the Colony on the week's trouble in Canton.

The South China Morning Post blamed the Hong Kong government for permitting too much freedom of movement and complete immunity to undesirable elements who were known to be insurrectionary agitators.

According to the press Wen Sheng-t'sai, the assassin of the late Acting Tartar-general, had lived in Kowloon and worked as a machine minder on the Kowloon-Canton Railway and openly spoke of his intention a day or two before leaving for Canton. And worse still, Wen was able to procure the tool of his crime in the Colony.

The South China Morning Post also added that the subsequent Canton revolt was plotted in the presence of a



well-known Hong Kong comprador when he was visiting Haiphong a few days before.

The press further complained of the spread of revolutionary sentiment among certain section of the Hong Kong community as revealed in the popularity of the saying that "the cook had been engaged who was to stew the Viceroy on the first of the moon".

The Hong Kong government would not probably tolerate any crime instigated by the Imperial government or by the revolutionaries in its territories. But it did not certainly have any authority to influence an event which was committed outside its jurisdiction. Moreover, not only the Hong Kong government but also the T'ung-meng-hui, of which Wen was a member, were taken aback by Wen's action. Should the intention of Wen be made known to the Hong Kong government, some preventive action might have been taken. Argued along this line, the guilt of the Hong Kong government could be cleansed.

The stand of the Hong Kong government was defended by the China Mail. In its April 13, 1911 issue, the China Mail stressed that the British principle of affording perfect liberty and hospitality to political refugees except those who grossly abused their privileges should be maintained.


On the whole, the Hong Kong English presses' understanding of the incident was elementary.

The Hong Kong English newspapers were only able to list out in general terms some possible factors that might



have caused the revolt and pointed out to their readers that it was the job of some Chinese youths especially those coming from Japan. Nowhere were the Hong Kong English newspapers able to supply their readers with the "inner side" of the story. For example, the Hong Kong English newspapers did not indicate clearly that the movement had connections with Sun Yat-sen and his party. Indeed, the contrary was the case. In its May 5, 1911 issue, the South China Morning Post reproduced a deposition from a captured young Chinese participant in the April 27th incident which stated that the leader of his society and the chief of the uprising was Huang Hsing and that his society "had no connection whatever with that of Sr. Suen Man, alias Suen Yat Sen, who was, as he called him, no better than a swindler whom he thought it below his dignity to join."

All the evidence tended to indicate that the Chinese revolutionaries were not anti-foreign, but still, omnipotent in the columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers was the view that any anti-foreign uprising would to a certain extent affect the foreigners and their interests in China. The apparent aim of the Chinese revolutionaries might be the overthrowing of the Ch'ing dynasty but the real intention, the Hong Kong English newspapers suspected, was the getting rid of all foreigners and their influence in China. The casual opinion coming from the Hongkong Telegraph of May 31, 1911 which stated that the Chinese revolutionaries were even more hostile to the foreign devil than the Chinese official classes themselves best exemplified this kind of



press anxiety generally felt about the Chinese revolutionary movement.

The unfavourable comments and news emanating from the leading Hong Kong English newspapers indicate clearly that they did not in any way favour the Chinese revolutionaries and their activities.

All the Hong Kong English newspapers placed great hope on the Manchu Government to reform itself and they certainly regretted to relate the April 27th incident with the recently launched provincial reform programme which they all agreed was misdirected and too radical. They all had the opinion that once the reform movement found its right channel and leaders, the revolutionary movement would subside. They deprecated violence and terrorism committed by the revolutionaries and they believed that any organized uprising would serve to interrupt peace and stability, worsen the existing condition, threaten the lives and property of the foreigners in China, and gravely affect trade.⁸² They were therefore relieved in seeing that the revolt was very shortlived and quickly suppressed,⁸³ and that its recurrence would not be allowed. In response to an appeal from the Viceroy of Canton to the Governor of Hong Kong to cooperate together in checking the illegal importation of arms and other contraband into Southern China, the South China Morning Post of May 5, 1911 stated heartily that the appeal should be welcomed as "an evidence of His Excellency the Viceroy's confidence in the neighbouring Government of Hong Kong" and expressed wishes that such a request be "promptly accorded" so that



the excellent relations which had existed between the two neighbouring governments and between the Viceroy of Canton and the Governor of Hong Kong could further be cemented.

The views of the Hong Kong English newspapers certainly reflected those of the wealthy Chinese and foreigners in Hong Kong. The wealthy section of the Hong Kong community probably feared that robbers and pirates who infested the Canton region would emerge from their lurking places when the energies of the Manchu Government were being absorbed in combatting the revolutionaries. Indeed this was what had actually happened in the districts of Fat Shan and Shun Teh on May 1 in the wake of the April 27th incident.⁸⁴

The Hong Kong newspapers clearly knew that the revolutionaries who participated in the April 27 revolt were not xenophobic. On the contrary, they were in outward appearance if not in sentiment very much influenced by the West. For instance, the China Mail reported that most participants in the April 27th uprising were queueless and wearing western dress and black leather shoes and even using weapons which belonged to the latest western model.⁸⁵

The leading Hong Kong English newspapers certainly were very much impressed by and of course puzzled at the unusual heroism and indifference to death displayed by the participants in the uprising and they now began to question the ability of the Manchu government to protect foreign interests should a rebellion of a more serious magnitude ever occur.⁸⁶




Chapter IV

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION OF 1911 AND THE HONG KONG ENGLISH PRESS OPINIONS

The Chinese revolutionary movement that began in the 1890s culminated in the Chinese revolution of 1911. The revolution had important historical repercussions as it brought the Manchu dynasty to an end and led to the establishment of a republic in China.

The spark of the revolt was initially touched off at Hankow, a city that was geographically quite distant from Hong Kong. Not until the beginning of November 1911 did the Hong Kong community feel its effects. Yet, the Hong Kong English journalists as usual were the first among those to recognise the political significance of the uprising to both China and other foreign nations. Their recognition of its importance can be revealed from the fact that they devoted a large amount of space to reporting and discussing the event especially from late October 1911 to early January 1912.

Before we begin to trace the responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers to the Chinese revolution as it took root in Wuchang, we will first of all discuss the general press reports on the railway controversy question and the Szechwan revolt which have historically been treated as the "remote" or "underlying" causes of the uprising at Wuchang. Emphasis would be placed on the views that the Hong Kong English newspapers expressed



concerning the inevitability of an anti-dynastic rebellion in China and their perceptions of the impact of an armed revolt, if it did occur, on the interests of foreigners in China and that of Hong Kong in particular.

The prelude to the Wuchang uprising and some comments from the Hong Kong English newspapers


A. The responses of the Hong Kong English presses to the railway nationalization question and the disturbances in Szechwan

1. The historical background

The trouble in Szechwan can be traced back to the question of how to finance railway building in China since the 1890s.

With a much depleted treasury, the Manchu government had to rely on both public and foreign loans for its railway construction programme. In 1898, a loan was negotiated with the American owned China Development Company (named in Chinese Ho-hsing Kung-szu) to construct the Canton-Hankow line.¹ The Company violated the contract by secretly selling two-thirds of its shares to a Belgian company.²

Fear of foreign financial control of Chinese railways led the Chinese gentry in the provinces where the proposed line would pass to demand the redemption of the right from the American company in 1904.³ The movement was supported by Chang Chih-tung, the viceroy of Hukuang⁴ who successfully negotiated with the Hong Kong government in 1905 a



£1,100,000 loan repayable in 10 annual instalments for the redemption of the Hankow-Canton railway concession.⁵ It was finally decided that the section of the Canton-Hankow railway in Hupeh province was to be administered by the provincial government; the sections in the provinces of Hunan, Szechwan and Kwangtung were to be managed by private enterprises under the supervision of the respective provincial governments.

However, it soon became clear that native subscription was insufficient for the purpose. The financial situation was further worsened by widespread corruption among the Chinese directors of the railway companies. At the suggestion of Sheng Hsüan-huai, the president of the Board of Communications since January 1911, the Court formally ordered on May 9, 1911 the nationalization of the Canton-Hankow and Szechwan-Hankow line.

On May 20, 1911, the Hukuang loan, a sum of six million sterling was contracted by the Manchu government with a four-power consortium for the construction of a railway from Hankow to Szechwan and for the completion of the Canton-Hankow railway. This nationalization programme led to widespread protests not only in Szechwan but also in Hunan, Hupeh and Kwangtung.

The situation in Szechwan was the most explosive. In response to the insistence of the governor of Szechwan Chao Erh-feng to enforce the nationalization policy, the Szechwanese organized many railway protection societies and attempted to thwart the scheme by a general strike.




The arrest of the ringleaders led to an open revolt which spread throughout the provinces and which the governor suppressed ruthlessly.⁶

2. The responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers

The Hong Kong English newspapers followed the railway controversy between the Central Chinese Government and the merchants of the provinces with interest and anxiety.

To start with, there is a marked difference in opinion between the Chinese and the foreigners towards the railway issue.

The Chinese in Hong Kong favoured the recovery of all the lost rights of China from foreign hands. The South China Morning Post of March 7, 1906 reported that the Chinese in Hong Kong received Lai Kai Pui, the leader of the Rights Recovery Movement from Kwangtung with enthusiasm and his idea of raising Chinese capital for the building of the Canton-Hankow Railway with interest. The Hongkong Daily Press of June 21, 1906 also mentioned the opinion of Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, the Viceroy of Liangkuang that a handful of Hong Kong merchants were in support of their counterparts in Canton in their protests against the official railway measures.⁷ It further stated that the protests were "louder" in Hong Kong than elsewhere in China because of Hong Kong's independent political status. The South China Morning Post of August 14, 1906 also reported that more than 20 branches of the Canton-Hankow Railway share-offices were set up in Hong Kong to receive money from Hong Kong shareholders. The Hongkong Telegraph of



March 4, 1907 and Mail Supplement of March 16, 1907 also mentioned that many Chinese in Hong Kong eagerly flocked to Canton and enthusiastically subscribed to the Canton-Hankow railway loan.⁸


The interested foreigners on the other hand believed that it was very unwise for the Central government to have handed over to the private merchants the right to construct railways. They supported the stand of the Chinese government in resisting the demand of the Railway agitators. Their support was aptly reflected in the Hong Kong English newspaper columns and in other leading English newspapers elsewhere too. Most foreign newspapers laid stress on China's need to nationalize its railways and to resort to foreign expertise and loan for this purpose; and that China's one and only hope for the future was to ask for the cooperation of western powers in carrying out her much needed scheme of reforms.⁹

By late May 1911, the Hong Kong English newspapers were fully cognizant of the fact that the nationalization scheme of the Ch'ing government had incurred widespread and stern opposition from the people in Szechwan, Hupeh, Hunan and Kwangtung¹⁰ and in Hong Kong too. The Hong Kong English newspapers, for example, reported in September 1911 that many Chinese associations in Hong Kong were opposed to the nationalization scheme and that a society of opposition named the Society for the Protection of Railways was also formed in Hong Kong. This society was accused by the Chinese authorities of indulging in circulating



seditious handbills in Canton.¹¹ News of the outbreak of a serious disturbance in Szechwan since August also reached the Colony in early September. By then, the affair in Szechwan had developed into unmanageable proportions for the Ch'ing government. Foreign troops and foreign gunboats were required to proceed to the province in revolt.¹² To the Hong Kong English newspapers, the basic causes of the controversy was "mercenary" in nature.¹³ But they also expected that the affair would eventually turn into a nationwide anti-dynastic uprising. The China Mail of June 12, 1911 noted that the Chinese in their protests had emphasized the fact that the Manchu government was foreign to China and therefore did not greatly interest itself in looking after the welfare of the Chinese people. On September 19, 1911, the Hongkong Telegraph editorially stated that the disturbances in Szechwan had developed into such a scale that "rebellion" would be a better term for them.


The Hong Kong English newspapers were, however, happy to report that in the Szechwan affair the foreigners were not molested. Commenting on the disturbances in Szechwan, the South China Morning Post of September 13, 1911 said, "It is quite unlikely that there will be any display of antagonism to foreigners". The Hongkong Daily Press of October 13, 1911 deriving its information from the North China Herald's interview with a missionary coming from Szechwan also reported that the railway agitators in Szechwan "called for absolute non-interference with



missionaries or foreigners generally, as well as foreign property" and even went "the length of protecting foreign property when in danger of damage by rioters or disorderly crowds". In particular, the efforts of the Viceroy of Szechwan to protect all the foreigners in the province naturally won the applause of all the Hong Kong English newspapers. Nor was the "self-restraint" of the local rioters left unmentioned or unappreciated in their daily columns. Observations made on the Szechwan affair and other previous Chinese revolts led the China Mail to make the inference that in the coming struggle between the people and government of China, it would be the "definite policy" of the revolters to offer no molestation whatsoever either to the persons or property of foreigners. As far as the disturbances in Szechwan was concerned, the Hong Kong English newspapers believed that the Chinese government would take up the reins soon.¹⁴ But for all the disturbances in the country to come to a rest, the advice that the Hong Kong English newspapers given to the Chinese government was that an Ito or Bismarck should be placed at the helm and that a programme of reform, especially constitutional reform, should be sincerely implemented.¹⁵

B. The Hong Kong English press comments on the possibility of a revolution in China


While being fully aware of the fact that China was infested with disturbances of various sorts throughout the year 1910 to the eve of the 1911 Revolution, the Hong Kong English journalists were at a loss about the magnitude



of these disturbances and the capability of the Chinese authorities in dealing with the situation. There was indeed much inconsistency and confusion in the views amongst the local English journalists and other foreign observers in regard to the exact political situation in China.

The China Mail, for example, was one of the Hong Kong English newspapers that fluctuated in its opinion on the subject of the evitability of an anti-Manchu and anti-dynastic revolution in China. Feeling was much concerned with the fact that Manchu misrule would goad the people into revolution; the China Mail of February 8, 1910 stated: "Happily for the Manchus the people whom they so grossly misgovern have no leaders nor organisation, no central idea such as inspired the men who made the Meiji era possible in Japan". The same issue then sounded as a cautionary note: "China is still too much of an inchoate mass, too much a mere congeries of people and clans, to make a big national rising possible". In an optimistic tune, the China Mail of May 25, 1910 strongly deprecated any assumption of anxiety and apprehension towards affairs in China. It said, "Compare the crimes of Europe and America either in numbers or violence with the crimes of China and who shall dare to say that this ancient empire comes off the worst in the comparison".


Reproduced in extenso in its June 8, 1910 issue was a report from an old resident of Hong Kong who was said to have spent many years in China and been well-versed



with both the written and spoken vernacular. This correspondent of the China Mail painted a dark picture of the existing situation in China. There was famine and scarcity of rice; there was also a growing influence of the Chinese revolutionaries and an intensification of their activities in China. In short, the writer said, "If we may judge from recent events there is little hope for anything but strife and bloodshed" and came to the conclusion that "It is however probable that we are on the eve of trouble, and we shall do well to be on the alert". Though admitting that the writer of this article was 'competent' enough to offer his opinion, the China Mail contradicted this opinion with a simple and casual remark:


It may be that the present state of uneasiness may result similarly in nothing untoward occurring, for when all is said and done John Chinaman is a singularly law-abiding individual so long as the bitter burden of existence does not crush too deeply into his soul.

While admitting that a certain amount of unrest did prevail in South China, the China Mail of June 13, 1910 believed that it was chiefly the fault of Viceroy Yüan Hsu-hsün. The removal of Viceroy Yüan and the instatement of a new and capable one such as Tuan Fang, the same press said, would at once "make troubles so freely bruited abroad simmer down to a state of innocuous quiescence". "The unrest so much spoken of in connection with the Yangtze Valley also", according to the China Mail of June 13, 1910, seemed "to have been greatly exaggerated as well as the story of the imminent rising of the people against the Manchu Government".



Quoting an authority from E.S. Little who had made a very extensive tour of the interior of China is a letter to North China Daily News, the China Mail concurred with the view that the rebel forces lacked efficient organization and capable, trustworthy leaders to start an uprising against the Manchu government. In its June 28, 1910 issue, the China Mail reversed its previously held judgement. Commenting on the problems facing the Chinese officialdom, it stated that it was "clearly manifested that in many places in the interior of China, a condition of unrest prevails bordering almost upon sedition". But fairly soon, the China Mail's editorial of July 23, 1910 stated again that a national rising in China was impossible.

The same inconsistency in editorial attitude can also be detected in the South China Morning Post. Succumbing to the rumours of an impending revolution in China, the South China Morning Post of May 9, 1910 stated the opinion that what China most urgently needed was peace and order. As regards the source of trouble, the South China Morning Post of June 11, 1910 explained that it was the "direct outcome of foreign teaching" though this same issue also emphasized the fact that the foreigners themselves did not "direct their influence knowingly against the Chinese throne." In another issue on June 16, 1910, the South China Morning Post stated the same view that the unrest throughout China at the present moment of reporting was simply "the workings of the law of progress". Allegorically, this issue said, "You cannot keep a child




in the nursery all its life. It was born to learn, and to learn it will" and in the process of learning, there might be "spasms of revolution, tears and futile kicking against the pricks". In response to the reports of growing trouble in Yunnan and Szechwan and rumours that Chinese soldiers, to a man, were with the anti-Manchu forces, the South China Morning Post of July 11, 1910, in a hopeless mood, said, "We do not agree that Europe should join the Manchus in quashing the rebellion: as it must come" and opined that it should be allowed to come "the sooner the better". Cynically, it concluded its paragraphs with the following lines:

Give the Manchus and the Chinese a clear field on which to fight out their differences and let us have done once and for all with these risings and riots and unsettling rumours.

Of course, the Hong Kong English newspapers were concerned with the disturbances in China as they were also very conscious of the fact that there might be a sudden revival of Boxerism in a disturbance in China. Although the South China Morning Post of June 11, 1910 stated that many anti-foreign outrages were reported in various parts of China, this issue also stated that they were of a local nature and that there was "not in China today anything even approaching to an organised anti-foreign movement".

The South China Morning Post of July 13, 1910 was not so optimistic. It reported a piece of information from its correspondent that the interior provinces of China, Yunnan and Szechwan, were in total disaffection and that "the soldiers to a man" in these places were "with



the revolutionaries". This issue also warned that the Chinese were "afflicted with a strange national hysteria" which prompted them to "rise up and burn and kill" and this hysteria might arise "from the most insignificant causes and all the foreigners in China would find themselves on a human volcano all of a sudden."

Yet, the South China Morning Post of July 27, 1910 also expressed an opinion which contradicted that of its previous one. It stated that "much unrest in China was made up by rumours and the strength of the rebel forces were overexaggerated by the local officials in order to "show their zeal in the suppression thereof". "Every little trouble of a local nature, which under proper government", the same issue continued, "could be suppressed without the least trouble", and that "many of the so-called secret societies which are causing the provincial authorities so much trouble would have died natural deaths".

Compared to the views of other Hong Kong English newspapers, the Hongkong Daily Press was the most definite on the question of the evitability of a revolution in China. While admitting that China had much been disturbed recently, the Hongkong Daily Press expressed the opinion that a national uprising would not break out. It says, "Conditions in China today are very different from what they were in the days of the Taiping rebellion, and we believe that terrible episode in the history of China is never likely to be repeated on the same scale".¹⁶ Its reasons were that the anti-Manchu forces were organizationally weak.




They also lacked popular support and a pragmatic programme of reform. The Hongkong Daily Press had confidence on the Manchu government to reform the nation successfully. It stated the following views:

The Utopia of the Reformers cannot be created in China in a single day or a decade, and it will never be reached by a bloody revolution, which can but serve to check political progress along the lines mapped out in the scheme of Constitutional Government which the Government is introducing under the steady pressure of an enlightened public opinion.¹⁷

So long as the Manchu government could gain the support of the troops by regular pay and good treatment, the Hongkong Daily Press opined, the revolutionaries would never get a chance.

By late 1910, the Hong Kong English newspapers also came to the view that most of the prevalent unrests in China were directed against the Chinese authorities rather than the foreigners. The South China Morning Post of July 27, 1910 editorially noted the changing nature of the recent riots and revolts in China: "The stranger within the gates of China has always had to bear the brunt of the animosity of the masses, nevertheless in the present instance it is not at them so much as the persons in power that the shafts are aimed". But at the same time, the Hong Kong English newspapers were also conscious of the fact that conditions in China could always go beyond their expectation and a revival of Boxerism could come at any moment despite foreign non-interference in these local risings. The South China Morning Post of August 5, 1910 states, "We must admit that troubrous times are before China. The Manchu throne



undoubtedly is threatened, and in its day of need may have as fellow sufferers the foreign population of China".

Meanwhile, the outbreak of the April 27th 1911 uprising in Canton turned the attention of the Hong Kong English journalists to events in the South. They all sensed impending trouble in China. The South China Morning Post of May 8, 1911, for example, reported the popular rumour among the people of Canton in the wake of the April 27th incident that the present quietness of the city was only a "lull" in the storm and that there was "every indication of the outbreak reaching the dimensions of the Taiping Rebellion".

On the whole, the news intelligence and editorial discussion of the Hong Kong English newspapers on the question of the evitability of a revolution in China in the months that immediately preceded the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution served to confuse rather than enlighten their readers. Certainly, other English newspapers in China and elsewhere must have failed to provide their readers with a better and more definite guide on this subject than their Hong Kong counterparts. The China Mail of July 23, 1910 made the following remarks:

People in England are greatly puzzled at the news which the papers print from day to day concerning China. One day they read of the unrest which threatens to throw the whole empire into a state of convulsions; next day they are told of the various steps being taken by prominent officials to spread the new learning and force the nation into the pacific path of modern progress. Hard on the heels of this comes news that the officials remain the same hopeless stumbling block of immovable conservatism that they have ever been: while the rise of the middle classes to




which all the traders and merchants belong, portends the beginning of a new era before whose vigorous onrush the officials will be swept away.

The Attitudes of the Hong Kong English Newspapers towards the Chinese Revolution of 1911

- A. The Wuchang uprising and the initial responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers
- 1. The historical background¹⁸

The failure of the April 27th rising eventually made some leading revolutionaries realize that something had been wrong with their strategy. To them, a shift in the centre of operation from the peripheral areas to the heartland of Central China was necessary. Accordingly, in July 1911, a Central China Bureau of the T'ung Meng Hui was established in Shanghai with Sung Chiao-jen as leader. The aim of the Central China Bureau was to capture the tri-cities of Wuhan (Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang). Members of the Bureau began to make serious efforts to win over the New Army stationed at Hupeh to the cause of revolution. They were being helped by the Common Advancement Society (Kung-chin-hui) founded in August 1907 and composed largely of returned students from Japan and secret society members and the Literary Society (Wen-hsüeh-she) founded in January 1911 consisting mainly of disaffected soldiers of Hupeh. As the attention of the T'ung-meng-hui turned to the more centrally situated provinces in the Yangtze regions, Hong Kong's role as a major operational base in the Chinese revolutionary movement was for the time being relegated




to a place of secondary importance.

On June 1, 1911, the Common Advancement Society and the Literary Society at Hupeh, taking advantage of the general unrest in Szechwan, planned to have a major uprising at Wuchang by the end of October. But on October 9, a bomb accidentally exploded in the revolutionary headquarters located in the Russian concession of Hankow and subsequent police action led to the arrest of 32 revolutionaries and the seizure of the register of names of disaffected officers and men in the local garrison.

To protect themselves, the disaffected members belonging to the engineering and artillery battalion of the New Army rose up in armed revolt on the morning of October 10. The Governor-General Jui-cheng and the Military Commander Chang-piao were completely taken by surprise and fled. The New Army rebels therefore had complete control of the city on the same day.

As decision for the rising was made only on a spur of the moment, there was general confusion within the revolutionary camp. All the important revolutionary leaders were not present at the scene of action and Li Yüan-hung, the Ch'ing Brigade Commander who did not have any revolutionary proclivity before was forced at gun-point to become the military governor of Hupeh. It was indeed a miracle that the rebels could succeed in striking an easy military victory and hence provided a good start for the revolution. On October 12, Hanyang and Hankow, the two neighbouring cities fell to the rebels.




2. The initial responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers

The Hong Kong English newspapers made no mention of the military revolt at Wuchang on October 10, the very day of its occurrence. This is because the correspondents of the other leading American and European newspapers were all absent from the scene of action¹⁹ and the Hong Kong English newspapers which relied heavily on the intelligence from these newspapers were "compelled" to commit for a couple of days the sin of omission even for such a momentous event in modern Chinese history.

Detailed news of the revolt at Wuchang only began to appear in the Hong Kong English newspapers two or three days after the initial spark of the revolt had been touched off. When news of the Wuchang revolt was known, the Hong Kong English journalists at once took the affair seriously. From thenceforth until the end of the year, the Chinese Revolution continued to dominate the news columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers.

The outbreak of an anti-dynastic revolt in China did not entirely catch the Hong Kong English journalists by surprise. China as the "land of riot and rebellion" was too well known to them. They had actually observed that China and especially its southern portions was infested with troubles of various dimensions and intensities in the couple of years preceding the actual outbreak at Wuchang. The Times (London) of October 14, 1911 also admitted that the "rebellion has not come as a surprise to those who have



had special opportunities of watching Chinese affairs during the last year or two". The only element of surprise to the Hong Kong English journalists was that this great anti-dynastic revolt could have been touched off at Wuchang. Prevalent rumours from China that the Hong Kong English newspapers were able to take note of all indicated that Canton or Peking would be the centre for another major anti-dynastic outbreak since the Canton uprising of April 27.

The initial impression from the Hong Kong English newspapers on the Wuchang uprising was that it was the most ominous looking and the worse one since the Taiping revolt and that it was "no mere flesh in the pan" that the Manchu Government had to contend with.

The Hong Kong English newspapers also came to the view that the rebellion was quite different from the Taiping or any previous disturbances in China: it was a well-organized, well-planned and deliberate attempt to overthrow the government and that supporters of the movement were not unruly crowd aiming at rapine.²⁰ The important role played by the army in the revolt was at once realized: the Manchu army had been honeycombed with revolution and that there was a large defection of troops in Hupeh.²¹

Despite these alarming signs, the Hong Kong English newspapers were convinced that the Manchu Government would weather this crisis again.

At heart, the four Hong Kong English newspapers did not welcome the news of an anti-dynastic uprising. The




Hongkong Daily Press of October 13, 1911, for example, questioned the necessity of an armed revolt in China when signs of improvement at both its national and provincial levels were visible and when China seemed to have been slowly but peacefully transforming itself under the Manchu dynasty. This newspaper sounded the cautionary note that if the rebels at Wuchang were expelled by the government troops, the revolt might spread southward through Hupeh and Honan to Kiangsi and Kwangtung.

Compared to the Times (London), the Hong Kong English newspapers adopted a more moderate and conservative attitude in regard to the feasibility of an armed revolt to overthrow the Manchu government in China. The general editorial stand the Times (London) adopted on this subject could be indicated by the fact that George Morrison, the Times leading correspondent in China and the one who penned most of the Times editorials on the Far Eastern Question, on hearing the news of an uprising at Wuchang, got very excited and "rode up and down the Legation Street saying that the end of the Manchu dynasty was at hand".²²

At the start of the Wuchang uprising, the editorial columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers were preoccupied with discussing the nature of the event: was it anti-dynastic or anti-foreign? What were its aims and who were its leaders?

a. Anti-Manchu or anti-foreign?

Quite clear to the Hong Kong English newspapers at the outset of the uprising was the fact that the revolt




was primarily an anti-dynastic movement.

The China Mail of October 13, 1911 stated the view that "practically all the recent rebellions in China had had their origin in the mistrust of, and contempt for what was regarded as an alien dynasty". While accepting the popular rumour that the spirit of the rising at Hupeh might have been encouraged by the railway question, this newspaper believed that "the primary cause of the cataclysm had to be sought in the old hatred of the Manchu dynasty".

That the revolt was not aimed at the foreigners was at once realized. Information coming from North China helped draw such a conclusion: the 1,500 foreigners at Hankow were safe; they were protected by the revolutionaries and were treated with "utmost consideration".²³ Li Yuan-hung, the newly elected President of the Young Republic was reported to have written to the Consular body at Hankow promising to give protection to foreigners. This official policy was confirmed by the report of Reuter's correspondent at Hankow which stated that the movement was anti-Manchu in character, that the revolutionaries had assured the consuls that they were not hostile to Europeans, and that the revolutionaries themselves had issued a proclamation threatening to decapitate anyone found guilty of injuring foreigners or interfering with trade.²⁴

Comparing the Hupeh rising to that of the Taiping rebellion, the Hongkong Telegraph stated that both movements were anti-Manchu and that the leaders of both were eager to win the support or at least the sympathetic neutrality




of the foreigners.²⁵

At this early phase of the Chinese Revolution, the Hongkong Telegraph was doubtful whether the rebels could stick to their non-xenophobic principle consistently in the long run. According to the Hongkong Telegraph, the leaders might try to keep terms with the foreigners but their followers might not possess the same thinking. The same newspaper felt that animus against the foreigners was still there behind this apparently anti-dynastic attempt.²⁶

b. Aims and leadership

The intention of the rebels was well-known to the outsiders. On October 13, 1911, three days after the Hupeh revolt, the Reuter's Peking correspondent reported that the revolutionary movement at Hankow aimed at the establishment of a republic under Sun Yat-sen. Sun's brother Sun Yu [sic] would become the president of the Provincial Assembly and that the noted scholar T'ang Hua-lung would become the viceroy of Hupeh.²⁷

The Hong Kong English journalists were not in doubt about the aim of the uprising. They just wondered whether Sun Yat-sen could really be the man directing action behind the scene. The China Mail obtaining its information from a "reformer" in Hong Kong wrote that the "instigators of the revolt regard Sun Yat-sen as a swindler". The same paper, nevertheless, suggested that Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing, another party leader, were capable of influencing the event as they had a big following and were




able to lay their hands on considerable sums of money.²⁸ Admitting that the leadership of the rebellion was unknown, the Hongkong Telegraph expressed the hope that it would preferably not be men of the Sun Yat-sen type who were only eager to "seek bubble reputation at the mouth of the offertorybag".²⁹ This derogatory attitude towards Sun was not restricted to the Hong Kong English newspapers alone. Many other contemporary westerners adopted the same attitude as subsequent pages would further reveal.

c. The uprising and foreign interests

The various foreign consuls at Hankow at the start of the Hupeh rising had decided to maintain a stand of neutrality. The requests of the Hupeh Viceroy Jui Cheng to the foreign consuls on October 11, 1911 to send gunboats to prevent the crossing of the river by the revolutionaries at Wuchang were declined.³⁰ The adoption of this policy reflected the conviction among the foreign consuls at Hankow that the revolution would not threaten foreign interests presently or in the immediate future.

The Hong Kong English newspapers were on the other hand less certain on this point. They were convinced that foreign interests in China and in Hong Kong were bound to be affected eventually. Expressed in the Hongkong Telegraph was the fear that the revolutionary leaders might have to deal with the difficulty of how to restrain their men since most of their followers were imbued with anti-foreign feeling. The Hongkong Daily Press shared the same view, and agreed to its correspondent's remarks that




the leaders might not be able to suppress anti-foreign feeling in the interior regions.³¹

Interestingly, the view of the Hong Kong English newspapers found an echo in a Britisher E.F. Borst-Smith, who was caught in the midst of the revolution in Shensi and was thus able to make observation of the anti-Manchu forces at close quarters. According to Borst-Smith, there were two parties within the revolutionary movement. The first was the "Young China", making up of young students who had studied abroad and who were mostly inexperienced and immature young men. The second group were the ignorant masses who joined the movement for rapine and it was this latter group that the true revolutionary leaders found it difficult to control.³²

Appearing in the Hong Kong English newspapers was another fear that if the rebellion was not suppressed soon, the trade of many countries in China would be affected eventually. The China Mail of October 13, 1911 therefore suggested that a joint meeting of the Powers whose trading interests were frequently and seriously jeopardised be arranged to consider this question.

The Hong Kong English newspapers were also worrying that defiance of central authority would lead to lawlessness everywhere. Stated in the Hongkong Daily Press of October 16, 1911 was the view that the uprising might allow those bad elements in China ample opportunity to plunder. If this really happened, the lives and property of the foreigners in China would certainly be affected.



So far, only the foreigners in China especially those in Central China were threatened by this crisis.

Nevertheless, the Hongkong Telegraph of October 13, 1911 warned that since Hong Kong is geographically a part of the Chinese Empire, Hong Kong should not view the affairs in Central China with purely academic interests, for the current revolution in the Chinese Empire could have an undesirable effect upon the Colony. It is clear that because of the above reasons, the Hong Kong English newspapers at the start of the Chinese revolution were, unlike their Japanese counterparts in Japan, not pro-revolution in tune.

B. Situation to the end of October 1911

A couple of weeks after the initial spark at Wuchang, every casual observer on Chinese affairs could realize that the revolt had already developed into unmanageable proportions for the Manchu dynasty. Reviewing the situation in China, the China Mail of October 18, 1911 stated that the rebels seemed to have everything in their favours: they had a big following; plenty of guns and ammunition, solid fortification and above all, they were on the defensive. Moreover, the same issue continued, they were in undisputed possession of the strategic cities of Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang, ensured an unlimited supply of arms and armament by capturing the Hanyang Arsenal and ingratiated themselves in the good opinion of the populace by adopting a pacific attitude to all but their Manchu enemies.³⁵ The Hongkong Telegraph of October 20, 1911 also reproduced a sketch of the career of



Li Yüan-hung, the newly elected leader of the Rebellion and the chosen President of the Chinese New Republic. By then, disturbances began to spread to other provinces. On October 22, Changsha declared its independence. It was quite clear to the Hong Kong English newspapers that the affair would last for a long and indefinite period of time. Signs of the weakening of the Manchu government were evident to the Hong Kong English journalists. On October 23, 1911, the Hongkong Telegraph reported that the Manchu Government was forced by the financial pressure to summon the National Assembly, a body it disliked, to discuss and arrange for foreign loans. On October 24, the Hongkong Daily Press reported that the Manchu fleet was without food and coal and that the International Group of financiers had refused to lend any fund to the Court. Four days later, it quoted a letter by Ku Hung-ming which had appeared in North China Daily News. The letter revealed the sad fact that the moral support of almost the whole body of literati in China was for the revolutionaries and that its writer was the only one absolutely loyal to the government in Shanghai.³⁶

During this critical period, two themes concerning the political development in China dominated the columns of these newspapers. First, a strong Chinese leader would be required to end this dilemma; second, if the revolution did not stop at once, foreign intervention would become inevitable.

1. Yuan Shih-k'ai: the strong man in China

The Hong Kong English newspapers believed that except



for the timely emergence of a saviour, the Manchu Dynasty could not sustain itself any long. The ideal choice the Hong Kong English newspapers selected for the Ch'ing Dynasty at this critical juncture was Yüan Shih-k'ai. As a matter of fact, Yüan Shih-k'ai was one of the few Chinese officials who enjoyed high esteem from the westerners ever since the Boxer days.³⁷ This western image of Yüan Shih-k'ai can be detected in the Hong Kong English newspapers. The South China Morning Post of March 9, 1906 for example stated that Yüan Shih-k'ai was the "strongest and ablest man [in China] today". The reinstatement of Yüan was a persistent cry in the columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers ever since Yüan's dismissal in 1909. Yüan's forced dismissal by the new Prince Regent Tsai-feng at that time was believed to be due to jealousies and machinations of the Manchu and Chinese reactionaries in the capital and Yüan's less capable colleagues.³⁸ In this moment of crisis in China, it is quite natural that the Hong Kong English journalists would think of Yüan, the "strong man" in China, as the "man of the hour" upon whose service the fate of the dynasty depended. They were of the same opinion that Yüan be invited to come out from his retirement to restore order for the Ch'ing government.³⁹ The anxiety felt by the China Mail was that Yüan having a grudge against the Prince Regent might refuse to render service to a dynasty in crisis. Moreover, this newspaper also worried that Yüan's influence in the modern Army had largely waned since his retirement: his loyal comrades in arms had "all passed




out of service" and the men at present in the ranks "know not Joseph".⁴⁰

2. The question of international intervention in the Revolution

Another concern of the Hong Kong English newspapers was that if the rebellion did not stop at once, other foreign powers especially Japan might intervene at any moment.

A couple of weeks after the start of the Chinese revolution, the Hong Kong English newspapers began to weigh the pros and cons of foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution. Without exception, the Hong Kong English newspapers hoped that the Powers would remain neutral unless foreign lives and property and foreign treaty rights in China were directly challenged. This attitude was shared by many other leading contemporary European newspapers.⁴¹

Nevertheless, the Hong Kong English newspapers also understood that as China was drifting into a state of anarchy, it was quite difficult for the Powers to stay neutral. The Hongkong Telegraph had on various occasions since the outbreak of the Chinese revolution harped on the partition theme. Its October 23 issue made the prediction that foreign intervention would come fairly soon as domestic trouble in China had hurt foreign trade adversely. In its October 31 issue, the Hongkong Telegraph again predicted that foreign intervention was the only single way to




"deprave Chinese the right to misgovern themselves".

Both the Hongkong Telegraph and the Hongkong Daily Press expressed wishes that the Powers act in concert and that the principle of Open Door be respected if the Powers were forced to resort to intervention.

The only minor point of divergence among the Hong Kong English newspapers was over the role played by Japan in the making of the Chinese revolt.⁴² Both the Hongkong Telegraph and the Hongkong Daily Press agreed with some Chinese sources from Peking that the revolt must have been instigated by Japan which tried to spread anarchy in China with the hope of an ultimate partition of the land to its own advantage.⁴³ The journalists of these two papers certainly did not have in their possession concrete evidence to support this allegation. To establish Japanese connection with the Chinese revolution, the Hongkong Telegraph of October 18, 1911 could only state that the Chinese revolutionaries had made use of a rising sun as part of the design for their new flag!


Japan's involvement in the Chinese revolt was disputed by the China Mail. It stressed emphatically that the revolution was not inspired and hastened by any foreign Powers. According to this newspaper, the movement was essentially an uprising of the Chinese against the hated Manchu rule and Japan's influence on the revolution was only indirect and exerted largely through the many prominent revolting Chinese students and army officers who had received Japanese education and training.⁴⁴



The British official policy in regard to the Chinese Revolution was one of strict neutrality, a policy which was very much publicized by the British newspapers.⁴⁵ Both the South China Morning Post and the Hongkong Daily Press were fully aware of the British diplomatic attitude. Appearing in their columns on November 11, 1911 was the speech of the Prime Minister Asquith delivered during the Annual Guild Hall Banquet in London on November 9: "the [British] government had no disposition to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of China". They realized that Britain would not intervene in the Chinese affair herself and that she would also exert influence very strongly against intervention by the other Powers. They were also aware that the United States was in accord with the policy of Britain⁴⁶ and that the other Powers would also follow a non-interventionist course in respect to the Chinese Revolution.⁴⁷

C. Reports of the Hong Kong English newspapers on the political situation in China from the last week of October to November, 1911

By the end of October 1911, China was still in the throes of revolution. The situation in China looked bleak indeed: the fortunes of war for both sides ebbed and flowed disturbances dragged on; trade was disrupted; outlawry abound everywhere and the ordinary people suffered terribly. It was quite likely that the domestic struggle would prolong indefinitely. The Hongkong Telegraph of October 27 lamented that disintegration and foreign domination would be the




possible outcome of the present crisis in China. Several trends of developments in China were quite clear to the Hong Kong English newspapers: that the fate of the Manchu Dynasty was doomed; and that the revolution was anti-dynastic and non-xenophobic. But still, the Hong Kong English newspapers found it indiscreet at this stage to extend support to a political movement the leaders' intention and ability of which were not yet fully disclosed.

1. On the nature of the Chinese Revolution

Towards the end of October 1911, it was very clear to the Hong Kong English newspapers that the Chinese Revolution was a purely anti-Manchu struggle though xenophobia as a motive of the rebels was not yet entirely ruled out.


Quoting the statement of Ku Hung-ming in North China Daily News, the Hongkong Daily Press of October 28, 1911 states that "the rebellion is against the continuance of a corrupt and inefficient administration rather than against Imperial personages". That the Revolution was mainly directed against the Manchu misrule especially against the unreasonable imposition of taxes was clearly stated in the Revolutionary Manifesto issued in a translated version by the Revolutionaries to all the major western newspapers in the China coast and Hong Kong.⁴⁸ According to the Hongkong Telegraph, the Manifesto reflected a strong desire on the part of the rebels to win foreign esteem and sympathy. The same newspaper nevertheless could not help wondering whether anti-foreignism was not in the background.⁴⁹



Similarly, the Hongkong Daily Press in an earlier issue also expressed the fear that it is possible that the leaders might not be able to suppress anti-foreign feeling in the interior regions.⁵⁰

News coming from the various major centres of disturbances in China indicated the same point: the revolutionaries had kept or tried to keep their words. In a press interview, H.D. Lombard an American tourist who had just arrived in the Colony from North China informed the China Mail reporter that the rebels had treated the foreigners most considerately: they had given them an escort through the town (Wuchang); looked after their baggage, and supplied coolies to do the carrying of the baggage. In general, Lombard said, the rebels did everything to assist the foreigners. Mr. Lombard was even convinced that "there is somebody at the back of this deal: this is no common or ordinary rebellion, a fact which is clearly shown by their protection of foreigners and the very diplomatic wording of their Proclamation".⁵¹


For more than two weeks after the initial spark had been touched off at Wuchang, the Hong Kong English newspapers did not understand fully the story of the Chinese Revolution. Although Sun Yat-sen as the chief instigator of the movement was quite well-known, the Hong Kong English newspapers were in the dark about the other leaders, their intention and abilities and the popularity they enjoyed among the rank and file and the ordinary people. The Hongkong Daily Press of October 28, 1911 was only able to quote the statement



from Ku Hung-ming in Shanghai that "[the] men who are at the bottom of the revolution belong to what is known as the Ke-ming-tang", called by foreigners the "Revolutionary Party". The Proclamation of the Revolutionary Manifesto did not help the Hong Kong English newspapers to learn more about the leadership and true intentions of the rebels. The Hongkong Daily Press of October 27, 1911 only detected a total "absence of aims among the rebels" and could not help asking the question: "The Manchu dynasty is to be overthrown, but what is to be substituted? A Chinese dynasty or a republic?" The Hongkong Daily Press sarcastically remarked that the only thing it was sure about from the Manifesto was that it did not contain a single word against the foreigners.⁵² The Hongkong Telegraph shared the same doubt by admitting frankly that it did not exactly know the nature of the revolution: whether it was instigated by one master mind or whether the Manchu rule was so rotten that attack on one of its supporting foundation at one point simply led to the fall of the whole structure.⁵³


2. The helpless Manchu Government

The political situation in China as far as the ruling dynasty was concerned, turned from bad to worse. On October 31, 1911 the Hong Kong English newspapers published the Edict of Abasement of the Ch'ing Court, which was issued a day before.⁵⁴ The news certainly came as a surprise to the foreign observers, for just four days ago, on October 27, Yuan Shih-k'ai, the strong man in China, was appointed the Imperial Commissioner in full charge of the military affairs



and Yüan was able to reverse the hopeless military situation of the Dynasty for a while with the re-capture of Hankow on November 1. On November 2, Yüan was appointed the Premier. To many, as explained by the China Mail, the Edict was simply "a ruse to bomboozle the reformers into laying down their arms".⁵⁵ The Hong Kong English newspapers had a different view of the subject. The China Mail was convinced that the Court was really driven by despair into taking such a helpless course.⁵⁶ The Hongkong Daily Press of November 2, 1911 formally admitted that the revolution had the full support of the Chinese people and in another issue a few days later remarks, "It looks as though nothing can now save the Empire from being partitioned into a number of independent States except the complete success of the revolutionary movement eventuating in the establishment of a strong Central Government in Peking, whose authority all the States are prepared to recognise."⁵⁸ The Hongkong Telegraph shared a similar view and even put its entire stake on the rebel side with the comments that the rising in China should better be termed a "Revolution" and that the final victory would belong to the rebels. On November 10, the Hongkong Telegraph reported that the Manchu Government was in dire need of fund and was forced to call the National Assembly, a body it hated, for money, and lamented that China's indebtedness might simply crumble the dynasty.


The political events in China turned out as what these Hong Kong English newspapers had expected. Provinces and municipalities declared themselves independent of the



Central Government in rapid succession: Changsha and Kiukiang on October 23; Nanchang and Yunnan on October 31; Shanghai on November 4, Chekiang on November 5, Fukien and Kwangtung on November 9 and Szechwan on November 27. By the end of November 15, provinces or two-third of China had seceded from the Central Government. A provisional military government headed by Ch'en Ch'i-mei was also set up in Shanghai. The recapture of Hanyang by the Imperial forces on November 27 failed to improve the situation. The helpless position of the Central Court was revealed in the November 28, 1911 issue of the China Mail. This issue evinced distaste in seeing the Prince Regent of China adopt a very cringing stand by issuing apologies to the people. This kind of action could not improve situation; it only served to heap contempt and contumely on the Dragon Throne, the China Mail said. The more manly course the Hong Kong English newspapers suggested to the Prince Regent was that he should either resign or simply await silently the outcome of the political crisis.

3. Journalistic image of Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Revolution

During the first two weeks of the revolt in China, the Hong Kong English newspapers did not expect that the revolt would succeed in overthrowing the Ch'ing dynasty despite the fact that G.E. Morrison, the leading authority on Chinese affairs had made known his opinion three days after the initial military spark at Wuchang that sympathies of the immense mass of educated Chinese in Peking and




Hankow were "unreservedly with the revolutionaries" and that "little sympathy was expressed for the corrupt and effete Manchu dynasty with its eunuchs and other barbaric surroundings".

In their estimation of the revolutionary situation in China, the Hong Kong English newspapers were very cautious and conservative.

It was towards the end of October 1911, with the ubiquity of revolutionary occurrences in China that they formally admitted that the revolutionaries were well-organized and that anti-Manchuism was widespread among the common people.

The tune of the Hong Kong English newspapers about Sun Yat-sen as the revolutionary leader did not change markedly in accordance with the changing fortune of the revolutionary cause. Indeed, enthusiastic views on Sun Yat-sen went parallel with the derogatory or deprecatory ones taken from other sources. Yet, in this final phase of the Chinese revolutionary movement, the Hong Kong English newspapers still did not seem to have succeeded in establishing any direct communication with the Chinese revolutionaries. Important information about and impressions on Sun Yat-sen were mainly culled from other newspapers which in turn derived their information from Sun's own foreign acquaintances notably Mrs. Archibald Little and Dr. James Cantlie.⁵⁹


The China Mail was the first newspaper to give the revolution and its leader Sun Yat-sen a sympathetic coverage.



In a leading article on October 30, the China Mail spoke of the revolution as entirely different from the Taiping Rebellion; there was no repetition of the terrible scenes which had characterized the latter movement. The same article also praised the ability of the revolutionary leaders in maintaining order not only among their followers but also in cities that they had captured. It further stated that the movement enjoyed popular support and that it was really a revolt of the Chinese people against the corruptions of the Manchu Government. Indeed, the China Mail only wondered why with ninety per cent of the population of the China proper in sympathy with the aims and objects of the revolution, the much hated Manchu yoke could not have been cast off at once. The only advice this newspaper offered to the revolutionaries was that they should "festina lente" in their attempt to clean the Auguean stables at Peking.

Other Hong Kong English newspapers were more slow and cautious in making their favourable comments. In late October 1911, the Hongkong Daily Press still assumed an equivocal attitude in regard to the possibility of success of the Chinese revolt and the capability of its leader Sun Yat-sen. This newspaper said,

In the first flush of enthusiasm the rebels may gain [as they appear to have] temporary successes; but in a body having no central purpose, dissension and discontent are bound to be produced whether success or failure be encountered. Previous successful rebellions have been under the influence of some predominant and central personality, or of some strong religious or fanatical motive, but no one can expect the personality of Sun Yat-sen, or



the negative programme he offers, to play the part that Hung Hsiu-ch'uan and his doctrines did for the Taipings, or Islam for the Panthay Rebellion.⁶⁰


The same stand was held by the Hongkong Telegraph.

Although the Hongkong Telegraph of November 18 accepted Sun as a practical and hard-headed leader with a constructive programme: a house-builder and not a house-breaker, it held in derision Sun's rank-and-file who were regarded as "knowing not what they were fighting for except trying to vent their anti-Manchu hatred". This press opinion found its echo in at least one contemporary English newspapers in North China, the Peking and Tientsin Times.⁶¹

4. To save China: a monarchy or a republic

All the English newspapers in Hong Kong were eager to see that the internecine struggle in China should come to an end as soon as possible. They feared that if the revolt in China continued unchecked, it would resolve itself into an endless struggle between the south and the north. They did not fail to realize that the chief obstacle for the early restoration of peace in China was the great disparity between the conservative North and the democratic South in the future form of government for China.

According to the China Mail of November 9, 1911, the South preferred a republican form of government after the style of the United States of North America or perhaps a series of independent republics taking as their boundaries the limits of the old provinces; whereas the North would like a constitutional monarchy following the British model under the nominal head of a Manchu emperor.



The four Hong Kong English newspapers were committed to a single view concerning the settlement of the present crisis in China. They favoured a limited monarchy in China; the Manchu boy emperor shorn of all powers would continue to reign at Peking while the "strongest and best-tried Chinese administrators" were allowed to form a Cabinet and rule the nation.⁶² Of course, it was understood that Yuan Shih-k'ai, the strong man of China, should be counted among the group chosen to run the administrative machinery of the nation.


The Hong Kong English newspapers were not interested or even believed in the possibility of a restoration of a Chinese [Ming] dynasty. Quoting Archibald Colquhoun's view, the Hongkong Daily Press supported the idea that the Ming descendant after 300 years had already lost the strong rallying attraction.⁶³ To the Hong Kong English newspapers, a republican form of government was also unthinkable. The explanation offered in the China Mail of November 17, 1911 was that: a congeries of republics in China would easily "lead to disruption and disaster" while bitter inter-provincial rivalries in China ruled out the possibility of a single republic.

To the Hong Kong English journalists, what China needed most at the present moment was not democracy but a stable and honest government and a programme of reform.

The China Mail of November 9, 1911 expressed the desire that "China must have some form of stable government and the sooner it comes into being the better". In support



of this view as the Hongkong Daily Press which stated in its November 3, 1911 issue that "the present revolt was not directed against the Imperial house but only against misrule". In reforming China, these Hong Kong English newspapers believed that foreigners should be allowed to play a more important role than they were previously. The Hongkong Daily Press of October 30, 1911 stated that the foreign Powers could act as guarantees to see that the reform in China be carried out faithfully. The Hongkong Telegraph of November 2, 1911 believed that the greatest obstacle for China to carry out the necessary reform was her shortage of the necessary funds. This newspaper therefore suggested that an international syndicate of the Powers be organized to help China to find money to carry out a programme of reform. For this project to be successful, the Hongkong Telegraph of November 2 stated that the Chinese themselves should first "abandon their suspicion of the foreign intention and their dog-in-manger attitude". In another issue 8 days later, the Hongkong Telegraph reiterated the view that as China could no longer draw any financial source even in the Customs revenue, no matter which side emerged victorious in the political struggle, China must have recourse to further foreign loans. The China Mail of November 9, 1911 stated that the new Chinese rulers should "summon to China's aid from the outside the best foreign advisers China could obtain" and avail to herself the "cheap capital of the West".



The political solution the Hong Kong English newspapers offered to China reflects their own underestimation of the republican sentiment among the ordinary masses in China, and their total lack of confidence in the ability of the Chinese to run and reform their country.


D. Some comments made by the Hong Kong English newspapers on the situation in China from December 1911 to the abdication of the Manchu dynasty, February 1912

During this short interval, two political developments in China captured the main attention of the Hong Kong English newspapers. They were, first, the peace negotiation at Shanghai and second, the formation of the Chinese republic.

1. The peace negotiation at Shanghai (December 18, 1910-January 2, 1912)⁶⁴

On December 1, 1911, Yuan Shih-k'ai sent T'ang Shao-i to Shanghai to negotiate with the revolutionary representatives headed by Wu Ting-fang. The Hong Kong English newspapers were proud to report that the chief negotiators of the two opposite camps had past connections with Hong Kong. It might perhaps be of interest to note that Wu Han-min had once suggested that Hong Kong be the site of this important meeting.⁶⁵ The Hong Kong English journalists should have felt far more exhilarated had they realized this.

Peace talks at Shanghai formally commenced on December 18, 1911. The initial response of the Hong Kong English newspapers to the news of the peace meeting was that they were happy to see a "lull" after several months of fighting




and disturbances. Before the commencement of the peace meeting at Shanghai, the Hong Kong English newspapers had already expressed desire for a quick settlement of the political crisis in China and publicized Yuan's scheme for a limited monarchy under the Manchu boy emperor. Wishfully, the China Mail of December 6, 1911 said, "the eventual marriage of the boy Emperor to a Chinese wife would realize in the next generation of the desire of the vast majority of the nation to see a Chinese dynasty once more reigning at Peking".

There were in the opinion of the Hong Kong English newspapers two major obstacles that had hindered the early realization of a limited monarchy in China. The first was the uncompromising stand of the Prince Regent; the second, the jingoistic and unconciliatory attitude of the South.

The Hong Kong English newspapers took note of the demands of the South which included, as stated in the Hong Kong English newspapers themselves, the absolute expulsion of the Manchus and the establishment of a thorough-going republic.

The uncompromising attitude of the South, the Hong Kong English newspapers believed, only served to prolong the negotiation indefinitely and would mean an advantage to the Manchu government as disunity within the revolutionary camp was daily apparent. The Hongkong Telegraph of December 12, 1911 shared the same view and stated that "the revolutionaries have everything to gain by a speedy arrangement of terms of peace".




On December 12, the China Mail reported the removal of the first obstacle: the Prince Regent had resigned. The China Mail nevertheless still expressed sympathy for the Regent. As a ruler, the China Mail said, the Prince Regent was "one of the most consummate".

The inauguration and progress of the peace negotiation did not alter the view of these Hong Kong English newspapers. They still stuck to their stand that Yüan Shih-k'ai was the only man capable of maintaining stability and order in China and that a republic was not an ideal form of government for China.

The China Mail of December 20, 1911, for example, warned that a republic for China was "impracticable" and would only mean a divided China and invite foreign intervention. In another issue dated December 21, the China Mail also spoke of a republic as an "airy, idealistic dream" and reiterated its earlier assertion that China was "not sufficiently advanced in the scale of social, mental or political development to set up and work the machinery of a modern republic".⁶⁶

Believing that the Powers would not intervene in the peace negotiation at Shanghai, the Hongkong Telegraph of December 26, 1911 stated that the Powers might alter their stand in case peace negotiations broke down and a protracted civil war ensued. This issue also expressed the thought that if foreign intervention was necessary, it preferred to see a concerted movement by the interested Powers.



It may be of interest to point out that the British official opinion had become less adamant than the Hong Kong English newspapers concerning the future form of government. The telegraphic instruction dated December 26, 1911 from Sir Edward Grey to Sir John Jordan made this clear: "We desire to see a strong and united China under whatever form of government the Chinese people wish".⁶⁷

2. Formation of the Republic

Sun Yat-sen arrived in Shanghai on December 25, 1911. On December 30, a Revolutionary Provisional Assembly at Nanking was established. On January 5, 1912, Sun was appointed the Provisional President of the United Provinces of China at Nanking. These news were not enthusiastically accepted in the columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers.

Even before Sun's arrival at Shanghai, the Hongkong Telegraph of December 12, 1911 had already expressed the thought that Sun's presence would not settle matters. Reviewing the political situation at the moment, the Hongkong Telegraph says, "[T]here is little unanimity among the members of the Provisional government, and it is certainly true that no common policy binds the revolutionary leaders at Shanghai and those at Wuchang. There is no actual head of the revolutionary movement, and there does not seem much likelihood that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who is expected shortly will be able to supply the deficiency". In another issue on December 16, 1911, the Hongkong Telegraph questioned Sun's fitness as a leader of the new China. Sun as the "proscribed leader of the southern malcontents" the same



newspaper said, "has been successful" but the same issue continued, "of Sun's actual capacity as an administrator nothing is known".

The China Mail of January 5, 1912 was also of the same view that Sun's presence at Shanghai and his election to the presidential office only tended to "complicate matters".

Parallel to this kind of depreciatory remarks on Sun Yat-sen was an eulogy of Yuan Shih-k'ai. While admitting that Yuan was very ambitious, the China Mail of January 5 also said that he was "intensely patriotic". It even made the forecast that Yuan would retire if a Republican form of government was established as "he honestly believes China would be better under a monarchy and because he himself would be the object of suspicion if he were at the present juncture to accept office under a Republican government".

Then came the news that Wu Ting-fang, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China had issued a Manifesto to all Friendly Nations from the Republic of China" to ask for the foreign recognition of the new Chinese Republic.⁶⁸ On January 15, 1912, the China Mail reported that the Ch'ing dynasty had abdicated. The Hong Kong English newspapers were not at all excited by this news. The Hongkong Daily Press expressed preference for Yuan's scheme of a limited monarchy and warned that with a great number of the people of China ignorant of representative institutions, this new republic in China might simply turn into another and more powerful depotism.⁶⁹ On its January




26, 1912 issue, the China Mail expressed doubt that the republic could stay any longer. In the opinion of the China Mail, the problems that this new republic had to face were quite insurmountable; its law enforcers the Min-chün (i.e. the citizen soldiers) were just outlaws; masses of people under it were ignorant of the democratic idea and that the new government was in dire need of fund, to name but a few of these problems cited by this newspaper. It is obvious that the Hong Kong English newspapers only treated the Chinese republic as a fait accompli and that they did not favour it.

Relating to the suitability of the Republican form of government for China was of course the question of diplomatic recognition.

The Hongkong Daily Press, to the best of my knowledge, was the first Hong Kong English newspaper that had raised this question. In an editorial dated January 11, 1912, the Hongkong Daily Press urged foreign recognition of this infant Chinese republic. By this time, the newspaper had already accepted the fact that the anti-Manchu revolution had the support of the majority of the Chinese south of the Yangtze.

Popular support was not the only reason for the Hongkong Daily Press to favour an early recognition of the Chinese republic. Even at this very stage of the Chinese revolution, this newspaper still questioned the suitability of a republican form of government for China. It did not even try to tone down its own anti-republican




opinions in its columns. The main consideration of the newspaper was the early restoration of peace in China. The Daily Press states, "... the sooner responsible government, whether republican, autocratic or socialistic is restored, the better it will be for everyone". This newspaper just feared that any delay in recognizing the new Chinese government would discredit it and might lead to a revival of counter-revolutionary attempts, and that any protraction of the period of anarchy in China would be prejudicial to foreign interests.


There was, however, a more specific reason why the Hongkong Daily Press favoured an early recognition of the new republic: it would free the foreign servants in China from the anomalous position of being employed by the Manchu government which no longer existed; and hold them responsible to a new government which was not recognized by their own government.

The Hongkong Daily Press of May 20, 1912 raised this issue again. Probably by this time, it had realized that the only alternative to republic was anarchy. Defending its stand for the early recognition of the Chinese republic, the Hongkong Daily Press said,

[T]here still remains the alternative of a strong or a weak Republic. A strong China need not be feared; it would be a prosperous China, but not aggressive - that the Chinese never have been. A weak China would speedily lead to fresh and repeated revolutions, culminating inevitably in partition with its calamitous consequences for the rest of the world. And the first step toward the construction of a strong China is the recognition of its government.



These repeated appeals from the Hongkong Daily Press came to no avail. It was not until April 4, 1913 that the first Western nation, the United States, extended political recognition to the infant Chinese republic. Needless to say, this action of the American government was taken despite the appeal of the Hongkong Daily Press.⁷⁰



Chapter V

THE HONG KONG ENGLISH PRESS OPINIONS ON HONG KONG'S ROLE IN THE CHINESE REFORM MOVEMENTS

In chapter II, I have examined the responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers to the Chinese reform movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is generally alleged that Hong Kong had to a certain extent played a part in these Chinese reform movements, and that the Hong Kong English newspapers were the most enthusiastic and unfailing champions of the Chinese reform attempts.

I would therefore in this chapter also examine these alleged claims through the perspectives of the four Hong Kong English newspapers. Selected as case studies would be the three main issues which greatly shaped the interactions between Hong Kong and China. They were Hong Kong's contributions to China's anti-opium movement with the restrictions of its own opium transhipment trade, the closure of the local opium divans and the prohibition of opium smoking; second, Hong Kong's role in China's educational advancement with the building of the University of Hong Kong and finally, Hong Kong's part in China's economic development with the construction of the Kowloon-Canton railway.

In each of these issues, the Hong Kong English press opinions would be analyzed and contrasted with opinions of the Hong Kong Government and the local community and even opinions elsewhere. The result of these findings



would throw additional light on the attitudes that the Hong Kong English newspapers had adopted towards the Chinese reform movements: whether the Hong Kong English newspapers were really in sympathy with China's reform attempts and favoured Hong Kong playing an active part in them. Undoubtedly, the opium trade was the most lucrative business of the Hong Kong merchants and its restrictions would incur a great degree of financial sacrifice; and that both the University of Hong Kong and the Kowloon-Canton railway schemes were also costly projects. A study of the Hong Kong English press opinions on these issues was interesting precisely because it is in these areas that the conflicts between self-interest and altruism; pragmatism and idealism were most vividly seen. Indirectly, this chapter would also give us some ideas on what the responses of the Hong Kong Government and the local community of Hong Kong were to these three issues and what they expected Hong Kong to play in China's reformation in this period.

Hong Kong's contribution to China's anti-opium movement

A. The historical background

Hong Kong's early history was closely bound with the opium question. Hong Kong was ceded to the British as a result of the First Anglo-Chinese War (1839-1842), a war fought as far as the Chinese were concerned, with opium as its chief cause.¹ The cession of Hong Kong aggravated the opium problem. Soon after its becoming a British colony, its advantages to the opium traffickers became




obvious. As a free port under separate British jurisdiction and administration, the opium dealers could import opium freely into the Colony and sell it to Chinese purchasers from the mainland without fear of molestation from the Chinese Government. In due course, Hong Kong became one of the two most important distribution centres for the entire opium trade, the other being Shanghai.

Although opium trade was put on a legal footing after 1860, it remained to be a controversy in Sino-British relations for three more decades, and Hong Kong was one of the major sources contributing to the controversy. For one thing, legalization could not stifle the illegal importation of opium especially from Hong Kong. The local Chinese authorities in order to stifle the smuggling activities of Hong Kong, had enforced a custom blockade of the island between 1858 to 1887 by a number of Chinese custom houses reinforced by several revenue cutters.² For another, legalization of the opium trade also encouraged Hong Kong to develop into a thriving opium re-export centre³ and an opium consumption centre too.⁴ Hong Kong was thus an embarrassment to its northern neighbour when the latter was anxious to get rid of its national vice at the beginning of the early twentieth century.

B. Hong Kong's responses to the opium question before 1906

1. The rise of an anti-opium bloc in Hong Kong
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Hong Kong Government imposed very little control over the sale and




smoking of opium in the Colony. Opium smoking was regarded as a Chinese social custom rather than a criminal offence. There were of course several ordinances dealing with the sale of opium, the licensing of opium farms and the operation of opium divans. They included Ordinances No. 21 of 1844 and No. 5 of 1845 for the licensing of opium divans; No. 2 of 1858 for licensing and regulating the sale of opium; No. 23 of 1887 for the better regulation of the opium trade and Nos. 21 and 22 of 1891, the Prepared Opium and Raw Opium Ordinances. But these were only intended to regulate rather than stifle opium out of existence. Some sort of official control was only imposed in 1896 with the amendment of the Prepared Opium Ordinance of 1891 which imposed a stricter control over the operation of opium divans.⁵

The earliest anti-opium advocates in Hong Kong were thus people outside the official circle.


To the best of my knowledge, Tse Tsan Tai was the most prominent representative and one of the earliest advocates of the total prohibition of the opium trade in China. He advocated the suppression of the Indian Opium Trade in the Hongkong Daily Press of May 16, 1894 and took a leading part in the formation of an anti-opium society of South China in 1898.⁶

By the turn of the twentieth century, other leading missionaries of the British churches and missions in the Colony and educationists also became involved in the anti-opium movement. Nevertheless, there is no indication to show that these foreign missionaries were in any way



influenced by or ever established any connection with Tse Tsan Tai's movement. It seems more probable that the missionary group of Hong Kong was prompted to activities by the anti-opium campaigns waged vigorously abroad in China, Britain and other places such as Japan, the Philippines and Australia. Events in China seemed to have a more direct and immediate bearing on the anti-opium movement in the Colony. In April 1896, a Soochow Committee formed by some foreign missionaries in China attempted to revive the anti-opium crusade in China. It appealed to other missionary bodies to join the movement. The scheme of the Committee appeared in the Shanghai Mercury of April 10, 1896 and reprinted in the Hongkong Telegraph of April 15, 1896. At exactly the same time, the Chinese anti-opium movement reached a feverish pitch in Canton and manifested itself in a 2-day (August 16th and 17th) large procession of students enthusiastically supported by spectators in the streets of the city.⁷ The foreign anti-opiumists in the Colony responded to these events by a petition to the Hong Kong Governor protesting against the trafficking of opium and the existence of the opium monopoly in Hong Kong.

The petitioners based their arguments on the recent actions of the governments of China, Japan, the Philippines and Australia in declaring opium to be a social evil. Their main attack was at the opium farming method in the Colony. In the opinion of these petitioners, the system was morally indefensible and its existence only laid support to the claim whether wrongfully or not that the Hong Kong



Government intended to encourage the use of opium for revenue raising purpose. The farming method would serve to boost the opium trade as the opium farmer would endeavour to increase the profits by extending his business. The opium farming system failed to prevent the smuggling of the drug and allowed non-government body to possess formal government functions of supervising, detecting and policing. These anti-opiumists in Hong Kong were moderate in their response to the opium question than their radical counterparts at home, for they only advocated regulation rather than total prohibition of the drug. They appealed to the Hong Kong Government to run the opium farm itself with a view to eventually abolishing the use of opium except for medicinal purposes in the Colony.

2. The attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers

In regard to the opium problem in the Colony, the Hong Kong English newspapers were in complete accord with the stand of the Hong Kong petitioners. They regarded opium as a "necessary evil" and that it should be regulated rather than entirely prohibited.

The South China Morning Post believed that suppression of the local opium trade would lead to serious difficulties. As a free port, Hong Kong had to devise new means of enforcing the opium regulations.⁸ The South China Morning Post put the revenue derived from the local opium monopoly at HK\$2 millions and prohibition would lead to a great loss in this revenue.⁹ There might be the case, as pointed out by the South China Morning Post that prohibition of opium



would only serve to boost the trade in China, Macao or French Indo-China and encourage smuggling of opium and its more dangerous substitutes.¹⁰ Believing that the Hong Kong Government should keep its hands clean in the opium trade and its importation, it suggested that the government should do something to check the illegal aspect of the trade and more importantly, to regulate the local opium farm monopoly system. It says:

We think that it is the duty of the Government to end the present farming system ... and that it should itself run the opium monopoly. It would entail more expense upon the Government than the \$2,000 it at present spends annually in securing \$2 millions, but it would put an end to many abuses arising from powers the Government had no right to delegate and would safeguard our treaty obligations to China by checking smuggling - particularly of morphia.¹¹

The China Mail also accepted the fact that opium smoking brought more harm than good to the addicted and that the habit "at best satisfies a created taste; that in other cases, it worked pitiable havoc with individuals, and brought poverty to many families and homes". The China Mail supported the view that the Government should find some means to discourage the consumption of the drug and one of the best means of the government, according to the China Mail, was to place the opium farm under government control so that the drug could be so regulated that it could be brought gradually down to a vanishing point.¹²

C. The policy of the British Government in the opium question as affecting Hong Kong after 1906 and the Hong Kong English press attitudes



1. The British decision to close the opium divans in Hong Kong

Since the anti-opiumists in Britain treated Hong Kong as "one of the blackest opium spots" under British rule,¹³ the anti-opium section in the British Parliament led by Theodore Taylor saw the closure of Hong Kong's opium divans¹⁴ as one of the best ways to demonstrate to the Chinese Government that the British Government was in earnest in assisting it in the suppression of opium.

On May 6, 1908, W. Johnson moved a resolution in the House of Commons, seconded by T. Taylor, urging Secretary of State Earl Crewe to issue an order to the Governor of Hong Kong to close all the local opium divans as a preliminary step in the total prohibition of the drug in the Far East.

The revolution of the British Parliament was made as a direct response to the example of the Americans in the Philippines "not to reduce but to put an end to the opium".

Both mover and seconder informed the House that in Hong Kong "nothing had been attempted - nothing done" in the Colony to assist the Government of China in their endeavour to restrict the opium traffic. The resolution was accepted "without a division" by the House.¹⁵

In his telegram of May 5, 1908 to Hong Kong directing the Hong Kong Government to take "immediate steps" to close the whole of the opium divans, Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Colonel Seely, explained the rationale of the British Government as follows:




The Chinese Government has determined on the extermination of the opium habit, and having regard to the fact that Chinese subjects bulk so largely in the populations of our Crown Colonies of Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements it is expedient that we should bring our policy in this matter into line with China's.¹⁶

Strong objections were at once raised in the local English newspapers against the resolutions of the British Parliament. Mutually in support of the local English newspapers and with each other was the local mercantile community, the unofficial members of the Legislative Council and the Hong Kong Government.

Before we start our discussion on the attitude of the local English newspapers on this question, we may first of all turn to the response of the local mercantile community and the unofficial members of the Legislative Council and also that of the Hong Kong Government. This could enable us to compare the opinions evolving from the different sections of the local community and that of the Government with the Hong Kong English newspapers. Such a comparison allows us to see how representative were the Hong Kong English newspapers of local official and unofficial opinions and perhaps even the question of how influential was the press view upon that of the local government and the community.


The resolution of the British Parliament at once touched off a protest from the Hong Kong opium farmers who complained to the local English newspapers that the action of the British Government led to a two-third drop in their business.¹⁷ Apart from the local English newspapers, the Hong Kong mercantile community also aired their grievances




through their representative institutions, the Chamber of Commerce and the Hong Kong branch of the China Association. Both the Chamber of Commerce and the Hong Kong Branch of the China Association lodged strong protests against the closure of the opium divans. The South China Morning Post also made use of the occasion to send out questionnaires to 100 prominent Hong Kong businessmen and solicit their views on the following questions:

1. Will the closure of dens benefit the Colony morally?
2. Will the closure stop opium-smoking in Hong Kong?
3. Will the opium farmer be entitled to compensation?
4. Will the Colony suffer financially?
5. If answer to above is affirmative, how can the revenue lost be replaced?
6. Will the opium trade be diverted? If so, to what places?
7. Do you believe that China is in earnest in regard to opium suppression?
8. Is there any other observation you might wish to make?

The replies by S.D. Setna, J.W. Bolles, C.E. Warren, H. Ruttonjee, T. Arima, Fung Wa Chun and Lau Chu Pak were printed in the same newspaper. The editor deleted all answers to the third query "for a sufficiently obvious reason". As was expected, there were a wide range of opinions on most of the queries. But there was unanimity on two of these questions. All the respondents believed that the closure of the opium divans would not stop opium smoking in the Colony and that Hong Kong would suffer financially by such a measure.¹⁸




The immediate issue at stake nevertheless was temporarily shifted to the amount of consideration the British Home Government paid to the Hong Kong Government in its dealing with the domestic affairs of the Crown Colonies. On May 16, 1908, the Committee of the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce carried unanimously a motion protesting against the arbitrary orders issued by Earl Crewe instructing the Governor of Hong Kong to close immediately all the local opium divans without having consulted local Hong Kong opinion before.¹⁹ At the meeting of the Legislative Council on May 28, 1908, the representative of the Chamber of Commerce Stewart Murray brought forward the resolution of the committee of the Chamber of Commerce. The motion was seconded by Ho Kai. Ho Kai made it clear that in seconding the resolution, he would only want to maintain firstly, the dignity and the rights and privileges of the Legislative Council; secondly, the claim that the Council should be consulted on all matters affecting the finances and the welfare of the Colony; thirdly, the right of the public in Hong Kong to have some say or some voice in matters which might affect its prosperity and its revenue to save the Colony from serious losses especially at the present moment when the revenue of the Colony was on the decline and money was required for important public works. Personally, Ho Kai was in sympathy with the anti-opiumists. As early as 1901 when the question of repealing the Opium Ordinance of 1891 was brought up in the Legislative Council, Ho Kai expressed a wish that all opium farms, opium divans



and public houses where opium was smoked should be closed.²⁰ Although Murray's motion was supported by three other unofficial members, it was declared lost when the other eight official members voted against it.²¹

It must be noted here that Ho Kai, and especially those who did not have a stake in the opium trade, supported the measure to close the opium divans in the Colony. Ho Kai in seconding the motion also stressed the fact that he supported the resolution not because he thought the closing of the opium divans was a mistake or an undesirable thing. He also did not think that the opium farm was a benefit to the Colony. Instead, he regarded it as a "blot on the fair name of the Colony".²² Echoing Ho Kai's sentiment was "Colonists" who in his correspondence stressed the need to close all the divans though in a more gradual manner.²³


Hong Kong as a Crown Colony without doubt followed closely the footsteps of its mother country. In the Hongkong Administrative Report for the Year 1909, Sir Frederick Lugard reported that "in pursuance of the policy of His Majesty's Government, all opium divans in the Colony and the New Territories [all together 26 in number] were closed on the 1st March 1909 All remaining divan-keepers both in the Colony and the New Territories were notified that no licenses would be renewed after February 28, 1910". Additional restriction was at the same time imposed on the opium farmer. When the existing contract expired on March 1, 1910, the number of chests of opium that were allowed to be drawn was to be reduced to 900 and



might be progressively diminished. Strict control would be exercised on the opium farmer in his preparation and selling of prepared opium. Selling of opium to women and children was strictly forbidden.²⁴

Nowhere was the incompatibility of the role of the Governor of Hong Kong as representative of the British Crown and as administrator of Hong Kong revealed itself so clearly in this case. As a subordinate to the Colonial Secretary of State, the Hong Kong Governor had to ignore inconvenient colonial feelings and blindly follow the instructions of the Colonial Office to close all opium divans in Hong Kong. But as a genuine representative of the interests of the Colony he was deputed to administer, the Hong Kong Governor had to denounce the opium policy of the British Home Government which clearly hurt the interests of the people of Hong Kong. Therefore, in examining the opinion of the Hong Kong Governor, we should be aware of the dual role he performed and indicate clearly what capacity he was in when he was setting out his personal views.

In his memorandum presented to the Legislative Council, Governor Lugard expressed an opinion on opium as "representative of the people of Hong Kong". He stated that the opium policy of the British Home Government was not only unjustified but would also bring undesirable effects to the Colony. Lugard construed the British Government's decision to be a misconception of what would be the actual nature of a divan in operation in the Colony.



Lugard's arguments against the abolition were that they were orderly and quiet establishments. Their abolition would serve to spread the opium habit into the home where women and children would probably become participants or to other public places such as the theatres or streets or even the quarters of the Chinese servants of Europeans. Their abolition would not stop opium smoking. They were, in actual fact, a concomitant and result of the habit of opium smoking rather than an inciting cause. They served instead a useful purpose in containing smokers and thus bringing them under control and supervision. Moreover, the number of smokers using divans was small in the proportion of about 7 to 5 to those who smoked outside.²⁵

The view of the Governor as expressed in the memorandum was supported by other colonial officials. In his report to the Legislative Council on June 20, 1908, the Assistant Colonial Secretary C. Clementi raised objections to the abolition of the local opium divans from a more realistic point of view. According to Clementi, a proportionally greater number of people smoked outside the opium divans. The closure of opium divans would not force the opium smokers to forego their habits; it only forced them to carry on their habits in any place they chose to the probable detriment of the good order and sanitation of the Colony. It was also unfair to the non-smokers who were forced to compensate opium farmers and divan keepers and for the loss of opium revenue, Clementi asserted.²⁶

The Hong Kong English newspapers all supported the




stand of the Hong Kong Government, the unofficial members and the mercantile community in their protest against the action of the British Home Government. The anti-opiumists at Home were only regarded as "loud-voiced" fanatics and "narrow-minded" and "short-sighted" faddists who succeeded in swaying a "bewildered majority into accepting noisy assertion for proof". The British Government's introduction of anti-opium regulations to its Crown Colonies was treated as an attempt to "gain a reputation for generosity on the cheap by giving away what it was not its to give but of which it unfortunately had the power of disposal".

Realizing that it was helpless for the local Colonial Government to resist the Imperial Order, the China Mail nevertheless suggested that the Hong Kong Government make "the strongest protest against the proposed spoliation of residents".²⁷ In another issue, it expressed appreciation of the stand of defiance of the unofficial members.²⁸

The Hongkong Telegraph showed the same understanding and feeling of sympathy of the position of the Hong Kong Government, and stated that the Colonial Government was quite powerless and was forced to impose the Downing Street Fiat "against their will and at the expense of their own pocket".²⁹

The Hong Kong English newspapers unanimously regarded the unilateral action of the British Home Government as an affront and a wanton, gross and selfish political devise undertaken in total disregard of the colonial interests.

The South China Morning Post was the one which believed that



it had better close the opium divans gradually than by a stroke of the pen and supported the idea of convening a meeting to gather public opinion on the problem.³⁰ It also strongly attacked the "arbitrary" policy of the British Home Government. Such a policy, the South China Morning Post said, reflected the "arrogant self-righteousness" of the British Government. It regarded the action of the British Home Government as a good exhibition of its crass ignorance and total disregard of the interests of Hong Kong, and lamented that Hong Kong only served as a "species of moral doormat" for the British Home Government to wipe its "virtuous feet".³¹ The China Mail believed that the closure of the opium divans could not prevent opium smoking. It was only a kind of "virtuous posturing" of the Radical section of the Liberal Party to "lay up merit with easily fooled electors" for the sake of staying in office.³² The newspaper gave the following warning:

The policy of snubbing the Colony is tactically unwise. The strongest national tendency of late years has been for a greater defence to be paid to Colonial opinion and a Ministry which persists in ignoring that tendency is preparing a rod for its own back.³³


The "prophesy" of the China Mail came true a year later. The Hong Kong English newspapers found satisfaction in the reports of the political debacle of some Radical MPs such as Colonel Seely, Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Robert Laidlaw (East Renfrew); Bennett (Woodstock) who most conspicuously identified themselves in the British Parliament with the anti-opium campaign in China and the British Colonies of the East. Their political



demise, according to the Hongkong Daily Press revealed that their exaggerated descriptions they had given of the opium traffic both in the House of Commons and in their own constituencies had failed to "grip the imagination of the electors, as did the "Chinese Slavery" cry in 1906 which so materially helped the liberal tide to rise at the last election".³⁴

2. Other anti-opium measures

Besides the closure of opium divans in the Colony, the Hong Kong Government, in coordination with the British Home Government's attempt to help China prohibit opium smoking and trafficking, also imposed additional restrictions on the Hong Kong Opium Farmer under the new Opium Farming System. This system was established under the Opium Ordinance 1909, which authorized the opium farmer the sole privilege of preparing opium and of selling opium within the Colony (including the New Territories). Such rights also included the privilege of importing and exporting raw opium under a government permit; collecting and preparing raw and dross opium³⁵ for consumption for a period of three years from the 1st March 1910. But the number of chests of opium that the Opium Farmer was allowed to draw were to be reduced to 900 and might be progressively diminished.³⁶ Strict control would also be exercised on the Opium Farmer in his preparation and selling of prepared opium, for instance, selling of opium to women and children under 16 was strictly forbidden.³⁷ Restrictions were also imposed on the derivatives of opium and other harmful drugs.



Morphine might be imported, manufactured, and dealt in only by licensed persons. Export of morphine to countries prohibiting or restricting its importation was forbidden. Under the Pharmacy Ordinance No. 12 of 1908, as amended by Ordinances 9 and 29 of 1910, cocaine, its salts and preparations, can only be kept, dispensed, and sold by registered persons, and by Ordinance 9, of 1910 special powers are given in respect of search for, and forfeiture of, cocaine in all its forms.³⁸

Because of the restrictions imposed by the Anglo-Chinese agreement of May 8, 1911, the imports of raw opium from India to Hong Kong showed a drop of 10,457 chests or 32.9% as compared with a drop of 11.1% in 1910 and 14.5% in 1909. The exports to China from the Colony correspondingly decreased from 8,272 chests or 29.2% as compared with a decrease of 21.2% in 1910 and 9.7% in 1909.³⁹

The Opium Ordinance was amended during 1913 in several important respects. Generally speaking, anti-opium measures were further reinforced by the Hong Kong Government. For instance, although the opium farmers were allowed to renew their leases for a further period of one year from March 1, 1913, a special clause was inserted in the agreement reducing the amount of opium to be prepared in the farm during the year from 900 chests to 540 chests for local consumption and 120 chests for export. A provision was also made rendering it illegal for any person other than the Farmer or his licensees, to be in possession of a quantity exceeding five taels of opium.⁴⁰




Introducing together with the Opium Ordinance was the Pharmacy Ordinance which officially declared opium, morphine and compounds to be poisons and the seller was obliged to mark in English and Chinese the bottle or other package containing any such article with the name of the article, the word poison.⁴¹ The Ordinance effectively brushed off all the native remarks expressed in the Hong Kong English newspapers on the subject of opium-smoking as a wholesome habit.

There was no doubt as regards the intention of the Hong Kong Government in its anti-opium policy. Rather ironically, the introduction of the Opium Monopoly by the Hong Kong Government from 1908 inflated the local price of opium to such an extent that some even found it profitable to smuggle opium from China into Hong Kong.⁴² On the whole, the anti-opium crusade in Hong Kong achieved considerable results. In 1914, it was reported that the Opium Farm was taken over by the Hong Kong Government in March, and the restrictive measures adopted had already had a good effect.

D. The Hong Kong English press comments on the relative success and failure of the anti-opium movement in Hong Kong

As the previous paragraphs had well-demonstrated, the anti-opium measures were quite sincerely implemented by the Hong Kong Government. In response to the allegation that Hong Kong had made no attempt to restrict the opium traffic, Governor Lugard says,



The efforts of the Hong Kong Government in recent years have been consistently directed towards the abolition of illicit trade in either raw or prepared opium to China and there is evidence to show that its efforts have been attended with a large measure of success This is a benefit of the very first importance to China and has only been secured by constant efforts and some pecuniary loss to the Colony.

If the Hong Kong English newspapers really supported the anti-opium movement, they would wishfully expect that these measures would bear results. But the fact is when the anti-opium measures were introduced in Hong Kong, the English newspapers persistently expressed the view that they were a grave error and an utterly mistaken policy. Within a few years after the implementation of the anti-opium measures in the Colony, the Hong Kong English newspapers had already jumped to the conclusion that these measures were unsuccessful, unnecessary and even brought about more harm than good. Reports of the futility of the anti-opium measures of the Hong Kong Government not more than two years after they were being launched can be found in the Hong Kong English newspapers.

Commenting on the results of the restrictions of opium smoking in the Colony, the Hongkong Daily Press of May 3, 1910 said that many people died when they were forcibly separated from their habits and that the anti-opium measures only led to more harmful practices such as the swallowing and drinking of dross opium which were cheaper than opium. This newspaper was of the opinion that the people of Hong Kong were not opposed to the anti-opium measures. They only opposed the hasty and radical manner



in which these measures were being launched. It disputed a statement from a certain Peking journal that writers had been "hired" in Hong Kong and South China "to hoodwink the world" with the idea that China is not sincere in the anti-opium crusade. Convinced that opium smoking was a declining habit popular only among the older generation and therefore its complete disappearance was a matter of time, the Hongkong Daily Press came to the view that the "heroic measure" adopted in Hong Kong was largely unnecessary. Reports of the rapid drop in the daily consumption of opium in the Colony did not impress this newspaper. Its May 3, 1910 issue only cautioned that more harmful habits would take the place of opium.

The Hongkong Telegraph also said, "The closing of the divans has not led to any lessening in the consumption of opium in Hong Kong. There are as many smoking places in the Colony today as there were before the anti-opium edict was promulgated"⁴³ The China Mail came to the same conclusion and provided its readers one more concrete evidence: the increase in prosecutions against unsanctioned conversion of licensed eating houses into opium smoking places.⁴⁴ According to the China Mail and Hongkong Telegraph the suppression of opium smoking in Hong Kong and China only led to other harmful indulgences. They were eager to advance evidence to prove that there was an increase in the consumption of cheap and pernicious spirits, practice of opium eating and morphine injection and the spread of illegal smoking resorts in the Colony.⁴⁵ The




conclusion the Hongkong Telegraph drew was that "the Chinese community were not in general reaping any benefit from the restrictive measure putatively adopted by the Imperial Government and backed up by the Party in power in Great Britain".⁴⁶

E. The Hong Kong English press comments on the impact of the anti-opium measures on the finances of Hong Kong

The opium trade in Hong Kong represented a turnover of 30 million dollars a year. This was a conservative estimate without including the cost of labour, storage, insurance and freight that would have been earned from the trade.⁴⁷ The Hong Kong Government also derived a large proportion of its revenue from this trade. It could obtain from the local opium monopoly a sum approaching, for instance, one and a half million dollars in 1907 which made up nearly one third of the total revenue of the Colony and another sum of \$1,930 from the opium divan license fees.⁴⁸ It is thus natural that the Hong Kong English newspapers would put special emphasis on the possible adverse effects of the anti-opium movement on the finances of the Colony.


The China Mail of May 9, 1908, for example, stated that total prohibition of the opium trade would throw the finances of the Colony into "terrible disorder". The South China Morning Post of May 12, 1908 stated that the closure of the opium divans meant a "double burden" for the Colony as it would lose revenue from divan licenses, and



compensation to the opium divan holders and at the same time was facing a severe trade depression. The China Mail of May 29, 1908 made the estimate that the amount lost in revenue due to the closure of the opium divans and the restrictions imposed on the local opium trade would make up a quarter or one-fifth of the total revenue of the Colony. Governor Lugard also made the forecast in September 1909 that the loss in revenue as a result of the anti-opium measures would amount to some five lakhs. It was expected by the governor and others that the amount lost in revenue would be widened on a progressive scale stretching over a period of ten years.

Of course, Hong Kong had to pay dearly for its anti-opium measures. The Hong Kong Government reported in 1907 a deficit in the colonial revenue of HK\$490,000 and in 1908 another deficit of HK\$469,134.⁴⁹ But the long-term effects of the anti-opium measures on the economy of Hong Kong were not so serious as was generally expected by the Hong Kong English newspapers. The Colonial budget was very soon being balanced by various means. In 1909, a surplus of HK\$280,128 was reported.⁵⁰

Direct and indirect losses in revenue due to the closure of the divans were not large. By March 1, 1909, twenty-six opium divans were closed and a compensation of nearly HK\$12,000 was paid to the divan keepers dispossessed. No new licenses would be renewed for the remaining divans after February 28, 1910.⁵¹ The Hong Kong Government had to pay a compensation of HK\$11,613 to the 26 divan keepers



whose shops were required by the new law to close, and another sum of HK\$16,747 as compensation to the licensees of the opium and dross-opium divans whose divans had been closed as from March 1, 1910.⁵²


Thus, the compensation paid to opium-divan keepers amounted to HK\$28,000.⁵³ After the closure of the opium divans, tenders for the lease of the new opium farm for three years from March 1, 1910 were called for and the lease was granted to Messrs. Ho Kam Tong, Ng Li Hing, Lau Chu Pak and Chan Kai Ming at an annual rental of HK\$1,183,200. Lugard expected that the closure of the divans would reduce the letting value of the Opium Farm by at least HK\$600,000 per annum.⁵⁴ But there was only a loss of HK\$268,000 from the new opium tender as compared to the previous year.⁵⁵

As an emergency measure, the Hong Kong Government met its expenditure in 1908 by resorting to the Civil Servants Widows and Orphans Fund which amounted to some four lakhs of dollars.⁵⁶ Four possible long-term alternatives were suggested by the Hong Kong English newspapers:⁵⁷ first, compensation from Britain; second, obviating the local military contribution which amounted to 20% of the total local revenue, a sum which was nearly the equivalent of the revenue derived from opium; third, retrenchment and finally, raising new taxes.

A curtailment of the local military contribution which had long been urged by the local Hong Kong English newspapers and taxpayers⁵⁸ was again ignored by the British Government. In introducing the order abolishing the opium divans in



Hong Kong, the British Secretary of State explicitly stated that the British Government would grant the Colony a "substantial compensation" for any loss in revenue that might accrue as the result of the Colony's obedience of the will of the British Government. Hong Kong hoped that the grant would be at least 21 lakhs of dollars, a sum just enough to cover half of the total estimated loss in revenue in the opium trade. The promised imperial grant proved to be as generally expected in advance, not substantial enough. Britain only endowed Hong Kong with a grant of £9,000 for the year 1910 which was barely enough to cover just 42% of losses incurred in the anti-opium measures and a further grant of £12,000 each for the years 1911-1913.⁵⁹ The Hong Kong Government was therefore largely left to its own devices to balance the colonial budget. A retrenchment committee was formed but it did not achieve any significant savings in government expenditure.⁶⁰ The Hong Kong Government therefore had to rely chiefly on raising new taxes to solve its financial predicament. A law was thus passed on September 17, 1908 imposing duties on intoxicating liquors consumed in the Colony. A sliding scale of fees based on the evaluation of the premises were to be paid to the licencees. This measure would double the existing license fee on liquors. The Hongkong Telegraph believed that the Government would not achieve its aim. Commenting on the new liquor license ordinance, both the Hongkong Telegraph and the China Mail were of the same view that reduced consumption of liquor would more than counterbalance




the contemplated increase in revenue, and the Government instead of getting five to 7 lakhs estimate would actually obtain less than 2 lakhs precisely the same sum which were returned in the shape of license fees. Moreover the new law would ply out of business small dens and force many customers to give up the habit. The Hongkong Telegraph criticised the measure as an attempt to "kill the goose that lays the golden eggs".⁶¹ The Hong Kong Government subsequently introduced a revised scheme by imposing an excise duty on liquor.⁶² In passing the Bill, the non-official members of the legislative Council were not opposed to the principle but its operation i.e. the provision for the establishment of a Customs Service to secure the effective collection of the revenue therefrom. Murray Steward, the unofficial member was even said to be "staggered" in seeing the Bill being introduced in the Legislative Council.⁶³ The local English newspapers raised objections to the measure on the same ground. They were dissatisfied with the "preempt" action of the Government in giving effect to the liquors ordinance. They believed that the new ordinance would profit the wine merchants who were able to keep their stock well in advance. They believed that the maintenance of a Custom Service to protect the revenue from alcoholic liquors would be costly and that those excise officers with "illimitable" powers would easily abuse their powers. They were concerned with the fact that new measures would only penalize the hotel proprietors and benefit only the holders of adjunct licenses.



They also feared that the measure would serve to destroy Hong Kong's claim to be a free port,⁶⁴ and might perhaps, as the South China Morning Post of November 20, 1909 had pointed out, drive the bottling trade of the Colony to Macao, a free port.

From September 17 to December 31, 1909, the revenue collected on liquors and licenses amounted to HK\$101,844.20, of which \$32,603.61 was on European liquors and practically double that amount \$64,490.50 was on Chinese wines.⁶⁵ The Hong Kong English newspapers nevertheless still regarded this way of raising revenue unsatisfactory. The South China Morning Post, of March 11, 1911, for example, was discontented in seeing the few Europeans in Hong Kong being taxed "for the benefit of the innumerable Chinese who make their homes, in Hong Kong, where, free from the persecution of their own countrymen, they wax fat and grow rich". Accordingly it said, "As the Chinese are the only beneficiaries by the abolition of opium it is held that they should bear the brunt of making good the deficit", and supported the Singapore Free Press's suggestion that taxes should be levied on Chinese goods imported from the mainland.


Finally, all the regulations affecting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors were consolidated under the liquors Consolidation Ordinance No. 9 of 1911.⁶⁶ On the very date when the opium divans in the Colony were closed, all the provisions of the Ordinance to amend and consolidate the laws relating to opium and its compounds,



No. 23 of 1909 came into force.⁶⁷

This new opium ordinance imposed severe restrictions on the sale, consumption of opium, morphine and other compounds of opium inside and outside the Colony. A Government Monopoly of the sale of the prepared drug in the Colony would be instituted in 1913 on the expiration of the lease of the existing opium farm. Only the monopolist had the sole right of preparing opium for smoking and of selling the prepared drug. A very high price would be set for the prepared drug in order to price the habit out of its customers. Heavy penalties would be imposed for the illicit opening of a divan and for smoking in a divan. Similar controls were also imposed on the sale, use, preparation and manufacture of morphine and other compounds of opium. The Hongkong Administrative Report of 1911 reported that the trade in compounds of opium and morphine declined considerably; and two convictions were obtained against persons for illegally importing cocaine. In each case, a heavy fine of HK\$2,000 was imposed and the cocaine forfeited.⁶⁸

Both the British and Indian Governments also made suggestions to the Hong Kong Government to control and prohibit the importation of Turkish and Persian opium into the Colony in order to prevent the Colony from running the great risk of being made a base for opium smuggling when China had prohibited raw opium imports from January 1, 1912.⁶⁹ Eventually, at the suggestion of the Hong Kong Governor, a bill which would come into effect on March 1,



1913, was passed to prohibit the importation of raw Turkish opium, and to legislate so as to permit raw Persian opium to be imported only when it was to be re-exported to Formosa on the requisition of the Japanese Government.⁷⁰


F. Summary remarks

For several years since 1906, the Hong Kong English newspapers mounted a vigorous campaign against the opium policy of the British Home Government. Various arguments were advanced to justify their views and to convince their readers of the futility of the policy of the British Home Government. But the only lesson they learnt from their protests was that they were totally unable to influence the official policy and that their agitations were utterly bootless. The China Mail was the first to come to such a self-awareness. Its August 5, 1908 issue stated that their petulance were "unheeded at home once the authorities had made up their minds to pursue a certain policy, more especially if that policy squares with the desires of the ruling party in politics". By mid 1910, the Hongkong Telegraph also admitted the futility of its cries. The only thing it could do was to express the hope that both the Chinese Government and its sympathizers could strictly adhere to the pleaded word, to past agreements, and with utter sincerity to carry them out so that Hong Kong's great sacrifices and those of the Indian Empire would not appear merely idiotic, and enriching only a wicked class of wicked men. "To ruin vast trade interests and encourage repudiation of treat simply in order that a certain section



of persons in power in China may become rich on native opium while the worse form of drug vice flourishes worse than ever", its issue of June 10, 1910 says, "will be the triumph, the reproach, the comic shame of the net result". The newspaper emphasized that the act of repudiating past agreements and obligations was immoral and even shameless and became innately more so when hypocritically committed in the noble name of Reform and that personal advantage and enrichment should use the plea of salvation from the curse of the opium habit was a peculiarly repulsive form of verbal prostitution. It was not until early 1911 that the Hongkong Telegraph was formally convinced of China's sincerity in the opium reform movement.⁷¹


The reports of the Hong Kong English newspapers in regard to the anti-opium movement in China were pro-opiumist in tune. So were many other English newspapers published in the China Coast. As the Chinese Public Opinion of May 26, 1908 remarked, "It is worthy of note that foreign papers published in the Far East have, almost without exception, taken a sceptical view of the Anti-Opium Campaign". The only exceptions were perhaps the Chinese Public Opinion itself and its successor the Peking Daily News⁷² which were, however, English newspapers that were edited by Chinese staff in order to present Chinese point of view to foreign readers. The Chinese Public Opinion of May 26, 1908 interestingly summed up the Chinese impression of the response of the foreign newspapers' and especially those of Hong Kong to China's anti-opium reform movement. It says:



With regard to the Anti-Opium question most of the foreign papers are incredulous as to its genuineness. Some are sarcastic and others frankly declare that the whole thing is a bluff. Others again, the Hong Kong press in particular, are solidly against the movement, being apparently convinced that China intends to steal from the revenues of the Colony in order to enrich her own

Articles and letters of a similar character have been recently plentiful in the Hong Kong press and clearly indicate that China has not only to fight the opium curse, but also unscrupulous, mercenary foreigners, who would rather see our country [China] in the grip of an all absorbing vice than suffer a moderate (about 1.5th, we believe) loss of their Colony's revenue.

When the 1911 Revolution broke out and both Hong Kong official and public attention and interest accordingly shifted to China's political development, it was apparent that both Britain and the Hong Kong Government would not grant any changes to their opium policy nor would they care much about the Canton Opium Monopoly question. Probably, by this time, the people of Hong Kong had already given tacit acquiescence to the official stand in regard to the opium question. The frustrated mood of the Hong Kong English newspapers was aptly represented by an article of the Hongkong Telegraph which remarked, "To reopen the question of the merits and demerits of opium smoking would profit little at this stage ... the die is apparently cast and it seems probable that before many years have passed the opium trade will have dwindled to very small proportions" The only thing, the people of Hong Kong could do as suggested by its author was to press the Government to compensate those who were being hurt through the champion of a noble cause for China. The same article continues,




"accepting that as the position, it is nonetheless the duty of the Imperial Government, the Government of India, and our own Government, so far as it possesses the power, not to let pawky sentiment interfere with a sense of justice. The many honourable merchants who have been associated with the officially legalized opium trade should receive fair treatment. There should be a reasonable limit set upon the desire of well-meaning people to call a virtuous tune and look to someone else to pay the piper".⁷³

Hong Kong's role in China's educational advancement: the founding of the University of Hong Kong

A. Introductory remarks

Whether Hong Kong should become the centre of Western learning and education in the Far East and whether it should play an important role in educating the Chinese youths not only in Hong Kong but also those coming from China and thus help the latter's modern transformation remains to be a controversy among the local Hong Kong community. The Hong Kong English newspapers were the place where the main battles were waged. At the same time, the Hong Kong English journalists also interested and actively involved themselves in the controversy. The crux of the controversy rests of course on whether the government education policy should be geared to satisfy Hong Kong's local needs alone or whether that of China also. It also rests on whether the local Hong Kong taxpayers should shoulder the burden of providing education to those who were not permanent



settlers of the place.


B. The roles of the Chinese College of Medicine and the Queen's College and the attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers

In the days when the University of Hong Kong had not yet been founded, the materialization of the ideal of helping China to progress could only be expected from the two leading educational institutions in the Colony, the Chinese College of Medicine and the Queen's College.

The Scheme for the Hong Kong College of Medicine was first suggested by Sir Patrick Manson, Sir James Cantlie, Dr. Ho Kai and Dr. G.P. Jordan and others.⁷⁴ It started as a clinical school affiliated to the Alice Memorial Hospital in 1887. Initially, this medical school offered a three year course in Western medicine exclusively to the native Chinese. The founding name of this educational institution was the Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese. In February 1907 it was incorporated by the Hong Kong College of Medicine Incorporation Ordinance and its name was altered by the omission of the limiting phrase and since then students from other nationalities were also admitted to the College.⁷⁵


The Queen's College was one of the oldest educational institutions in the Colony. Started as a government school in 1862, it was at first known as the Central School. It was later re-named in 1889 the Victoria College and since 1894, the Queen's College.⁷⁶

That Hong Kong should play a significant part in



educating the Chinese from China by means of these two educational institutions were the contemporary opinions of a number of enlightened westerners and well-wishers of China in Hong Kong. The building of a medical college for Chinese was based on the noble ideal that the colony should be "a centre and distributor, not for merchandise only, but also for science". Patrick Manson, one of the chief champions of this noble ideal, states, "Hong Kong may give science and China may get it: but depend upon it the receiver will not fail to recompense the donor in many ways and many fold".⁷⁷ Sir Mathew Nathan, one of the enlightened liberal governors of Hong Kong, also pointed out the immense possibilities for Chinese students of engineering and surveying who could take a great part in the future development of China.⁷⁸

This noble ideal has been reinforced by contemporary researches into this subject. Commenting on the role of the College of Medicine in modern Chinese history, Professor Lo Hsiang-lin said that it was a "spring board from which western science and medicine were to be introduced to China".⁷⁹ His commendation was based on a solid foundation of facts. Sun Yat-sen, Chan Kam To, Wang Chung-hui and many other prominent figures who played an important role in modern Chinese history were past students of one or both of these institutions. Associated with them were also many men of lesser fame who nevertheless also played a significant but less conspicuous roles in the modern transformation of China.⁸⁰



The Hong Kong English newspapers always took note and felt proud of the successes that the past students of Queen's College were able to score on their returning to China. Commenting on the promotion of Taotai Wen Tsung-yao, the Director of the Foreign Bureau at Canton to the office of Resident Minister in Tibet, the Hongkong Telegraph of July 28, 1908 made use of the occasion to stress the beneficial influences to his subsequent successful career in China. Wen was able to derive from his residence in Hong Kong and the expansive ideas he gained through the medium of Queen's College where he pursued his studies and where he afterwards was engaged as a teacher.

The Hongkong Daily Press of November 19, 1908 cited from the Huang-lung-pao (the Yellow Dragon) the following information: "Of the 36 students selected by an intensive examination to enter the Customs College at Peking, at least 14 out of the 17 successful candidates at the Canton centre were from the Queen's College. Of the 10 other boys from the rest of China, there were probably some old Queen's College boys". The implications this newspaper wanted to bring forth to its readers were that these students upon graduation would certainly play significant roles in China's transformation and that the education they received in Queen's College, though of an elementary type, provided them the solid background for advanced study in other higher institutions in China and overseas.


Throughout the nineteenth century, the Hong Kong English community were not enthusiastic in supporting these



two educational institutions as preparation grounds for China's modernization process.⁸¹

The Hongkong Telegraph believed that the educational policy of the Hong Kong Government should first be geared to satisfy local needs first. Its October 7, 1905 issue pointed out the backwardness of local educational facilities to that of other British colonies such as the Straits Settlement and urged the government to devote more resources to the development of technical and commercial education in Hong Kong. Both the Hongkong Telegraph and the Hongkong Daily Press adopted a very utilitarian approach in its comment on the Medical College for Chinese. In its commendation for the work of the Medicine of College, the Hongkong Telegraph of October 7, 1905 only emphasized the great benefits this institution had brought to the local community. The Hongkong Daily Press of November 19, 1908 also said that the Medical College for Chinese was purely the desire of a few to achieve an ideal of helping a weak neighbour at the expense of the ratepayers of Hong Kong. It questioned whether Hong Kong would be duly reciprocated from China through such generosity. Quoting Dr. Manson's statement that China would not fail to "recompense Hong Kong in many ways and many folds", it remarks,

That may be so, but we have our doubts about the magnificent returns such philanthropy would bring to us in many ways and any signs that the Government of the Emperor Kuang-hsü recognises its obligations have not yet been manifested and, we fear, are not likely to be in our time, at all events.




The Hong Kong College of Medicine, which had been allotted by the government a site in Tai Ping Shan in 1905 abandoned the idea of building its own premise⁸² and funds which had been donated for a new Medical College were generously diverted to the University.⁸³

The foundation stone of the University was laid on March 16, 1910. The original intention had been that there should be at first two faculties - a Medical School which would take over from the College of Medicine and a Faculty of Engineering which would extend the instruction given at the Technical Institute.⁸⁴ But when in September 1912, a few months after the departure of Sir Frederick Lugard for Africa and in the year which marked the Golden Jubilee of Queen's College - the first undergraduate was admitted, there were three faculties - Arts, Medicine and Engineering, with an aggregate of seventy-two students. The governor Sir F.H. May was Chancellor.

D. The responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers to the idea of having a university established in Hong Kong


The China Mail which kept a past record of keen promoter of Chinese interests took the lead in the public discussion of the viability of having a western styled university established in the Colony and supported the idea throughout with unwearying persistency. Its editor W.H. Donald was the most enthusiastic supporter of the idea. In 1905 Donald invited two members of the Queen's College staff, the editor of the Yellow Dragon and H.L.O. Garrett



to write an article setting forth their views on the subject. The article which was published in the China Mail on December 15, 1905 stated that with the defeat of Russia, Britain and Japan would be the chief rivals in China. Japan was, this article said, wise enough to offer the Chinese students excellent educational facilities and hence spread Japanese influence and ideas through China. The authors of this article therefore arrive at the following point of view:

If the British Empire intends to hold its own and to spread its influence equally with its rival of the North something far more than elementary education is needed. What is needed is a regularly established system of higher education in Hong Kong - or in other words, a University There is no doubt as to the eagerness of the rising generation of Chinese to absorb Western ideas and Western civilization. A University established in Hong Kong would rank as an Imperial asset and any public money spent on it would be ... as well spent ... as, say, the early subsidy which provides the Ameer of Afghanistan with guns to defend India The Government must ... cast its bread upon the waters.

This article found a mixed reception. Dr. Bateson Wright, fearful that revenue from such an institution would be insufficient spoke out most strongly against the proposal. Wright in the Yellow Dragon and in the China Mail, emphasized the point that the University would have to be "a first class article, not a sham" and this, he thought, would prove too costly. "Of course, a bright, sparkling University might, like a Lucio Scientific Diamond, be got for considerably less". That would not do - "Tip top specialists", a president and four professors, would be essential: "total salaries £4,400 per annum".



Sir Frederick Lugard was the most well-known and energetic figure to pursue the project of a university with zeal. His first public mention of the subject was made at the 1907 Speech Day of St. Stephen's College.⁸⁵ The scheme was implicitly mentioned in another speech at the Speech Day of the Queen's College in 1908. He says:

Hong Kong can be very justly proud of maintaining such a school as this the largest Anglo-Chinese School in the British Empire, and probably the largest public school that we have in the whole Empire. It should be the boast and pride of Queen's College that it sends forth into the world to assist in the administration and to assist in guiding the destinies of China young men who have been trained in this College. We may confidently believe they will very seriously influence the future destinies of their country I hope myself some day to see Hong Kong become the centre of Western learning in the Far East.⁸⁶

Of course, the Governor was not satisfied to see the grand ideal of providing educational needs to the Chinese nearer home to be fulfilled by the Queen's College alone. He wanted something better: an Oxford or Cambridge to be built in the Colony. Only by offering educational facilities of an adequate character, he was convinced, could Hong Kong draw a large number of the young Chinese students who would otherwise be sent to Japan, America, Britain, and the continent of Europe.

Lugard's view was not supported by the British home government. The Foreign Office deprecatingly referred to the University scheme as "Sir Frederick's pet lamb".⁸⁷ Fortunately, the Governor had at his back a number of prominent citizens of the Colony who were keenly interested in the project. Sir Hormusjee Mody, a Parsee bill and




bullion broker, for example, donated in 1908 a handsome sum of HK\$150,000 for the building necessary for a university and an additional HK\$30,000 towards endowment.⁸⁸

A committee in charge of the proposed Hong Kong University Project was formed under the presidency of Governor Lugard. Members were prominent local officials and citizens and included the Bishop of Victoria, H.N. Mody, F.H. May, Ho Kai, Wei Yuk, Sir Paul Chater, H.E. Pollock, W. Chatham, E.A. Irving, A.M. Thomson and C. Clementi.⁸⁹ In addition, a sub-committee composed of leading Chinese members of Hong Kong was formed to promote the undertaking and collect endowment fund for the university.⁹⁰

On the whole, the Chinese of Hong Kong manifested real earnestness in the project. To raise funds, the Chinese sub-committee even resorted to the novel idea of engaging theatrical troupes to give a series of performances at the Taiping Theatre.⁹¹

In general, the scheme was favourably received by the Chinese in Hong Kong and elsewhere. Their enthusiasm was manifested in the large pecuniary backing they rendered to the scheme. Ng Li Hing gave the money for a medical college, Sir Robert Ho Tung endowed a chair of surgery, a Straits Chinese called Cheung Pat Sze assisted the arts faculty,⁹² and even the Viceroy of Canton, a man of the "old school of thought" contributed £18,000.⁹³

According to Nigel Cameron, "it was not thanks at all to the British (with the shining exceptions of Lugard and his wife) that a University came into being" and that



"Chinese and others were generally more liberal in Hong Kong's history than the ruling British".⁹⁴

Of the four Hong Kong English newspapers, the China Mail was undoubtedly the most enthusiastic and perhaps the only one that was sincerely interested in seeing the project accomplished. The others were convinced that Hong Kong would ill-afford such an unsolicited and costly magnanimity.

The South China Morning Post of April 6, 1906 did not hesitate to express the opinion that the scheme was only a "Utopia beyond the possibility of realization". In rejecting the scheme, the South China Morning Post offered a number of interesting considerations. First, it was convinced that the Hong Kong Governor would not be able to rouse official and public enthusiasm in Britain for such a project. The project was, the South China Morning Post remarked jokingly, "more within the scope of missionary enterprise, in which sentiment rules the purse-strings". Past experiences, the same issue continued, showed that it needed most serious local agitations to secure the consent of Downing Street for an additional one or two assistant surgeons to cope with public health and hospital duties in the Colony. The South China Morning Post then raised the question: How could one expect the British home government to support a costly project which did not benefit the Colony in the first instance? Second, the South China Morning Post was of the opinion that charity should start at home first. According to the South China Morning Post, "the duty of the Colony is first to minister




to its own actual needs and when this is accomplished it can, provided it possessed the means, generously provide opportunities for those other than British subjects".

It therefore put forward the suggestion that if a university of the first rank for South China was required for the benefit of Chinese, its location should be at Canton, and that it should be a purely Chinese institution, established and maintained with Chinese money or that the Chinese government should send their students to Japan for advanced education.

That was not to say that the South China Morning Post did not want Hong Kong to play a role in effecting China's modern transformation. The role the South China Morning Post expected Hong Kong to play should be a passive and limited one, a "living example" rather than an "active sponsor". It says,

Hong Kong has its own sphere of usefulness in a modest way, and it will need all its resources, mental and financial, for many years to come to remedy past omissions and indifferences and to keep pace with the needs of its growing population. When it comes really a first class city, possessing model institutions, it will be an object lesson which cannot fail to impress the Chinese with those admirable features which form the best part of British colonial administration.

Anyway, the South China Morning Post was convinced that the Queen's College annual turnouts would more than necessary satisfy China's need. Its March 4, 1907 issue upheld the Queen's College as a significant educational centre and potential reservoir of talents for China, and took the trouble in reminding the Chinese government that in the course of China's seeking the aid of foreign trained students



who had finished courses in political economy, finance and cognate subjects, it should not ignore the bright Chinese youths in the Queen's College.

Far more interesting perhaps was the editorial policy of the Hongkong Telegraph on the same subject. On previous occasions, the Hongkong Telegraph had kept on arguing against the idea that Hong Kong should shoulder the burden of educating the Chinese for China. By the turn of the century, the Hongkong Telegraph adopted a more liberal attitude in regard to the education of Chinese of Hong Kong. On some occasions, it went so far as to criticize the Hong Kong Government's parsimonious expenditure on local education.⁹⁵ Its September 22, 1905 issue put forward three main reasons to justify its attack: first, it would be Hong Kong's honour to be allowed to elevate the minds of the Chinese: second, the fulfillment of this leavening mission could eventually bring reward to the Colony; third, since a portion of the local revenue came from the local Chinese community, it might not be unreasonable that some should be spared for educating the Chinese themselves.⁹⁶ As regards the far-reaching proposal of having a university built in the city, the Hongkong Telegraph gave a conditional support. The Hongkong Mail Supplement of March 20, 1908 stated that "a university would be an excellent thing" but it also reminded those who were champions of the project that it should not be founded by increasing the burden of the local ratepayers. This attitude of the Hongkong Telegraph aptly reflected the opinion of the



majority representing mostly the non-Chinese community who had, before the university project was raised, criticized the government's foolhardiness in spending money on the education of those Chinese who returned to China and so were of no benefit to the Colony.⁹⁷

Hong Kong's role in China's economic development: the building of the Kowloon-Canton railway

A. General remarks

Pertinent foreign observers of Chinese affairs were eager to tell China how important railways would play in her modern transformation. They did not hesitate to point out in their writings that one of the chief causes of China's backwardness was her deplorable state of internal communication system.⁹⁸ In their opinion, the neglected state of her communication was responsible for the Chinese government's inability to deal with the twin evils namely, famine and rebellion. It also fostered the tendency of provincial autonomy as absence of communication link meant the failure of political control and led to the inability of China to develop her own internal and intraprovincial trade, they added.

For nearly three decades since the first railway line was laid in China, the Chinese were strongly opposed to railway projects thanks to their superstition and their suspicion that railway would be a convenient instrument of foreign aggression against China.⁹⁹ But by the late 1890s, both the Chinese government and the enlightened section of



its subjects were largely converted to the idea that railway was an important factor in China's economic advancement and an auxiliary for her national defence. What they had to consider was how to make a compromise between promises of economic and political advantages from building railways and the possibilities of foreign control of China.¹⁰⁰

The Hong Kong English newspapers on the whole strongly supported the idea of developing railways in China. Could they thus be counted among the friends of China by the strong support they gave to British railway projects in China? The Kowloon-Canton railway project was one of the greatest modern projects undertaken by the Hong Kong government. With reference to this project, the following pages would discuss what sort of attitude the Hong Kong English newspapers adopted towards the building of this railway. This would throw light on the motivation behind the Hong Kong English newspapers' advocacy of railway development in China. Before we turn to examine the attitude of the Hong Kong English newspapers, we should bring the discussion to its proper historical context first.

B. The construction of the Kowloon-Canton railway:

the historical background¹⁰¹


According to Hongkong Telegraph, the idea for such a scheme was evolved in the 1850s and 1860s and that many Hong Kong governors before Nathan had taken up the subject of the Kowloon-Canton railway as one of their pet schemes. The project was said by the Hongkong Telegraph of October 15, 1910 to have first intimated in the "local journals



of the 30th June, 1859".¹⁰² This newspaper in an earlier issue also cited an occasion in 1865 when it was seriously proposed to join up Hong Kong with Calcutta by a railway touching at Canton.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, it was not until in the mid-1890s that the idea for a railway linking up Kowloon with Canton was seriously discussed in the Hong Kong English newspapers.¹⁰⁴

The British Jardine, Matheson & Co. successfully negotiated with Sheng Hsüan-huai a preliminary agreement which was signed on May 13, 1898. The project was made feasible by the Sino-British Convention of June 9, 1898 through which the Chinese Government ceded the New Territories to the British for 99 years. The British motivation behind the cession of the Kowloon peninsula was initially strategic rather than commercial.¹⁰⁵ In February 1905, the British and Chinese Corporation took over the Canton-Kowloon Railway concession.¹⁰⁶ Negotiations were initiated between the British and Chinese Corporation and the Chinese Government for the building of this 121 miles of railways. It was arranged that the 22 miles of railway lines running through the British territory of Kowloon would be built by the Hong Kong Government and that of the remaining 99 miles lying within the Chinese boundary would be built by the Chinese government with a British loan.¹⁰⁷

The negotiations between the Chinese government and the British and Chinese Corporation lingered on for more than a year over the conditions under which a loan would




be contracted and the management of the Chinese section of the Canton-Kowloon railway be granted. It was finally agreed in the Kowloon-Canton Railway Final Loan Agreement of November 1906 that a British loan of £1.5 million bearing interest at 5% per annum for a period of 50 years would be granted to the Chinese government for the purpose of building the Chinese section,¹⁰⁸ and that the Chinese side of the section would be put under the joint British and Chinese management. The Viceroy at Canton would appoint a Chinese Managing Director who was to be assisted by a British engineer-in-chief and a British chief accountant.¹⁰⁹

Reliance on foreign loan for the project incurred much opposition among the Chinese gentry. Representations were made to the Chinese authorities concerned for the cancellation of the agreement,¹¹⁰ but their actions were to no avail.¹¹¹ The agreement was formally signed on March 7, 1907.¹¹²

Meanwhile, construction of the British section of the Kowloon-Canton Railway was commenced by the Public Works Department in late 1905¹¹³ and that of the Chinese side in April 1908.¹¹⁴ The British section was completed in October 1910.¹¹⁵ The whole line from Kowloon to Canton was opened to through traffic in October 1911.

- C. The attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers towards the idea of having a railway constructed to link up Hong Kong with Canton
- From the beginning of the evolution of the idea, the



Hong Kong English newspapers stood firmly behind the Hong Kong government and the Hong Kong branch of the China Association and the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, the two most important bodies representing the local mercantile interests and gave the project strong support.¹¹⁶ The Hong Kong English newspapers were always in the forefront in their protests when the progress of the construction work was unsatisfactory.¹¹⁷ Their enthusiasm in the project was reflected in the number of editorials they devoted to urge the quick commencement of the scheme,¹¹⁸ when Sino-British negotiation over the project was postponed indefinitely and when the holder of the concession was lukewarm with the construction work. Enthusiasm was never dampened by the fact that it was the most costly project that had ever been undertaken by the Hong Kong Government.¹¹⁹ Such an enthusiasm on the part of the Hong Kong English journalists, to be sure, was strongly motivated by commercial consideration. They perceived immense commercial advantages that could possibly be accrued to Hong Kong from such a project. The completion of the project would connect Hong Kong through Canton with the continental railway system of China. It was generally accepted that the opening of the interior of the vast empire of China would turn Hong Kong into the emporium of South, West and Central China¹²⁰ and further consolidate her position as the chief commercial centre in the southern portion of China. The Hongkong Weekly Press of February 19, 1896 expected that the connection of Hankow with Kowloon by a



railway would inaugurate a "new era" in the history of foreign trade with China. The Hongkong Telegraph Mail Supplement of February 10, 1896 also believed that the scheme would help developing the immense resources of China. A decade later, the same newspaper maintained the same point of view:

It has long been a subject of remark that Hong Kong is to a certain extent dependent entirely on the shipping. It is just possible that the construction of the railway to Canton may discover a hinterland which will give an impetus to the trade of the Colony and provide new sources of wealth for the community.¹²¹


The Hongkong Telegraph of February 8, 1906 regarded the railway as a "desirable boon" and stated that it was vital to the commercial interests of the Colony.¹²² The Daily Press of September 27, 1909 also expressed the same point of view. On the occasion of the opening of the Kowloon railway for traffic, the Hongkong Telegraph also reminded its readers that the railway was not only important in establishing direct and speedy communication between Canton and Hong Kong, but also in speeding up the development in the New Territories. The New Territories presently remained terra incognita would be converted into an important suburban residential district for overcrowded Hong Kong, the Hongkong Telegraph noted.¹²³

The material well-being of Hong Kong was the primary concern of the Hong Kong English newspapers in their discussion of the Kowloon-Canton railway project. Altruism as far as the Hong Kong English newspapers were concerned, could only be implicit from the fact that the



scheme might prove, indeed as it does eventually, that it would be commercially beneficial to both Hong Kong and China.

Instead of thinking of fostering the economic advancement of China through such a scheme, the Hong Kong English newspapers intended it to be an attempt to work against the material interest of China. They expected the result of the building of this railway would be the subordination of the ports of Canton and Whampoa to that of Hong Kong.¹²⁴ The scheme was also perceived by the Hong Kong English newspapers to be a necessary step to outmanoeuvre other nations in their commercial race with Hong Kong in the South China region. Numerous issues of the Hong Kong English newspapers mentioned France, Portugal, Belgium, the United States and even China as Hong Kong's potential commercial rivals. The South China Morning Post of April 28, 1904 and May 13, 1904 hinted at the fact that the U.S. government intended to introduce a railway to the mouth of the Canton river. Portugal was also reported to have attempted to negotiate a railway from Macao to Canton,¹²⁵ the South China Morning Post of January 28, 1904 stated the intention of the French colonial government to construct a system of railway radiating from Hanoi to Yunnan or through Kwangsi to Hankow making a through line from Hanoi to Peking.¹²⁶ The South China Morning Post of May 30, 1904 reported the Chinese government's attempt to build a railway from Heungshan to Macao. The Hongkong Telegraph of August 25, 1906, Mail Supplement of September




8, 1906, Hongkong Telegraph of December 19, 1906 and that of April 4, 1908¹²⁷ also reported the Chinese government's attempt to build a line from Canton to Whampoa. These railway projects would, in the opinion of the Hong Kong English newspapers, compete commercially with Hong Kong. Of special concern of the Hongkong Telegraph was the Whampoa-Canton railway project. The Hongkong Telegraph Mail Supplement of September 8, 1906 clearly indicated the potential danger of such a scheme to Hong Kong or even to British economic interests in the South China region.

It says:

The development of Whampoa holds a menace for the future of the port (of Hong Kong). We would suggest that the construction of the line from Canton to Amoy via Whampoa was part of a deliberate and apparently admirably conceived plan to wrest from Hong Kong her trade supremacy and not merely Hong Kong, but to win for South China the advantages now held by Great Britain.

If nothing was done to check this kind of development, the Hongkong Telegraph said, it might simply lead to the "decadence of Hong Kong". Interestingly, the Hongkong Telegraph of April 25, 1911 even carried the report of an observer in Manila that the building of the Kowloon-Canton railway would advance the prosperity of not only Hong Kong but also Manila, the two greatest emporiums of trade in the East. This observer was reported to have stated that a great volume of the transhipment trade had been transplanted from Hong Kong to Manila but the Kowloon-Canton Railway would help bring Hong Kong back to its old glory in its transhipment trade.¹²⁸



Chapter VI

THE IMPACT OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION OF 1911 ON HONG KONG AND THE RESPONSES OF THE FOUR HONG KONG ENGLISH NEWSPAPERS

This chapter only discusses some impact of the revolutionary movement in China on Hong Kong; how both the government and community of Hong Kong had responded to them and what the attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers were towards a potentially disruptive situation in Hong Kong. Examined largely through the Hong Kong English newspapers were also the respective roles played by both the Hong Kong Government, the Chinese masses and the Chinese mercantile elite of Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution.

Hong Kong on the eve of the 1911 Revolution


A. The impact of the political troubles in China on Hong Kong as reported in the Hong Kong English newspapers

Hong Kong was not directly affected by the turbulent political conditions in China in the couple of years preceding the outbreak of the Wuchang uprising.

By the time when the Szechwan disturbances flared up, the Hong Kong Chinese investors were no longer interested in subscribing to the Chinese railway shares. They were discouraged by peculation by some provincial officials of the capital for the Hankow-Canton railway project. In late 1906, represented by Chang Kang U (Ch'en Keng-yü);




Chan Chik U (Ch'en Hsih-ju) and Yeung Sai Nam (Yang Hsi-yen), the Hong Kong Chinese financiers filed a protest to Peking and declined to remit the first instalments on shares collected in the Colony to the Canton representatives of the Hankow-Canton Railway Bureau until they could be satisfied that the money was safely banked and could be accounted for.¹ Since then, there was a general reluctance among the Chinese of Hong Kong to take up the Chinese railway shares, including those for the construction of the Chinese section of the line to Kowloon.² The railway policy of the Manchu government certainly greatly alienated the influential mercantile class of Hong Kong and their counterparts in the southern Chinese provinces. The Hong Kong English newspapers were certainly justified in expressing the fear that if the revolt in Szechwan was not suppressed quickly, it would spread to the southern provinces and would easily gain supporters in Hong Kong. The South China Morning Post of September 13, 1911 made the forecast that the affair at Chengtu would be the "forerunner of similar troubles elsewhere". An ominous sign of events to develop in this direction was that the anti-railway strikers in Szechwan were asking other provinces for support and sympathy. Delegates from Szechwan as disclosed by the Times (London) of September 15, 1911 had been despatched to Hong Kong to enlist sympathizers among the local Chinese. The China Mail of September 18 and September 27, 1911 also reported that there were constant communications between the Association for the Protection



of Railways in Szechwan and its kindred Association in Kwangtung and that a similar outbreak would soon manifest itself in Kwangtung. Actually, two months before the Szechwan revolt, the Hong Kong Daily Press had already predicted that the whole of Kwangtung would be in a blaze of rebellion if the Central Government of China persisted in its nationalization scheme.

Of course, in a period of momentous upheaval in China, it is natural for the Hong Kong English newspapers to expect Hong Kong's northern neighbour to be the source from where defiance of authority and spirit of revolt were derived. The Chinese students of Hong Kong, as some Hong Kong English newspapers pointed out, were particularly susceptible to the spirit of revolt of the time. For example, in December 1910, a noisy "indignation meeting" was held by some 200 to 300 students in one school campus. The object of the meeting was to protest against the arrest of three of their schoolmates (only one was a Chinese) who were accused of obstructing an Indian policeman in the execution of his duty in a public street. This flagrant breach of school discipline resulted in the demonstrators being ordered to leave the College and denied admission to other government schools in the Colony for twelve months unless they agreed to pay a fine of HK\$10. The affair closed with the expulsion from the school of ninety-one boys who refused to pay the fine.³ The maintenance of good order was as explained by the Director of Education due to the institution of student prefects.⁴



The impact of the political conditions in China was felt by Hong Kong in other areas. Conservative estimates established that over 200,000 people left Canton immediately preceding and during the April 27th uprising.⁵ Nearly a quarter of them came to Hong Kong. The Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911 also reported that between April and May, at least 20,000 people entered Hong Kong. It is interesting to state, as revealed by the Hongkong Daily Press of May 8, 1911, that the influx of people from the mainland was countered somehow by an outflow of a small group of Hong Kong students in their senior forms who went back to Canton to look after their wives and children.

The sudden influx of people into the Colony since the April 27th Canton uprising put an additional strain on the housing problem which had already grown very acute. It also posed a great health hazard. There was widespread fear among the people of Hong Kong that the refugees would bring into the Colony with them plague, smallpox and diseases of other kinds. Fortunately, despite the influx of large number of questionable characters, Hong Kong in the couple of years preceding the 1911 Revolution remained to be orderly and peaceful. There was no need to increase the police force. The criminal cases reported to the Hong Kong Police in the year 1911 even dropped as compared to that of the previous year.⁶

Interestingly, the Hongkong Telegraph of May 6, 1911 found the exodus of people from Canton a blessing. On



behalf of the Hong Kong Government, it expressed the following "proclamation":


The Government of this Colony will now, and always, welcome with open arms all such Chinese as are now coming to Hongkong in hordes. They are China's best, it speels lose for Canton, but gain for Hongkong. Welcome all ye affrights!

B. Some journalistic responses to the activities of the Chinese revolutionaries in Hong Kong

After the April 27th Canton uprising, the Chinese political agitators had in the eyes of the Hong Kong English journalists intensified their anti-Manchu activities in the Colony. The China Mail of June 10, 1911, for example, reported that many open air meetings were being conducted by the Chinese revolutionaries in Hong Kong. In another issue on September 29, 1911, it again reported that many Chinese associations in Hong Kong were "printing, publishing and sending to Canton sheaves of publications stirring up the people to oppose the Government in their efforts to nationalize the railways".

In general, the response of the Hong Kong English newspapers to these anti-Manchu activities was one of depreciation. The China Mail of June 10, 1911, for example, stated that the advocacy of a revolution in the territory of a neighbouring and friendly power should not be tolerated for even a moment. In addition it also expressed the opinion that the colonial authorities should keep a watchful eye on these Chinese meetings.

The Hongkong Telegraph carried at least two hostile editorials against the Chinese revolutionaries in the




month preceding the Hupeh uprising.⁷ They all deplored that Hong Kong had been connected with the unrest in China. Concerned with the fact that the bitterest enemies of the Manchu government were to be found in the South in the provinces that geographically and commercially were in closest community with Hong Kong, they suggested that certain precautionary measures were necessary to avoid affording comfort to the enemies of the Chinese government and protect Hong Kong from any inevitable trouble in the future. If these anti-Manchu agitators were not kept in check, they would try to stir up anti-foreign sentiments among the Chinese youths of Hong Kong, the Hongkong Telegraph warned.

Hong Kong during the 1911 Revolution

- A. The political representations of the Wuchang revolt on Hong Kong and the responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers to situations in the Colony to early November, 1911

A week or so after the news of the Hupeh revolt had reached the Colony, Hong Kong remained quiet, but the growing tendency of unrest among the local Chinese soon began to reveal itself.


The first visible sign of disturbance came on October 17, 1911 when the office of the pro-Manchu newspaper Shang Pao was attacked by an angry anti-Manchu mob.⁸ During the celebration of the anniversary of the birthday of Confucius the next day (October 18, 1911) the




Yellow Dragon flags were largely absent.⁹ The Hongkong Telegraph of October 18 remarked that it was "the first time for many years [that] the flag of the Yellow Dragon has not been flown at the festival of the anniversary of the birth of Confucius in "Hongkong". Those who displayed the Imperial ensign found their shops and houses being stoned or surrounded by large angry crowds with shouts, "Down with the Manchus" until the flags were voluntarily removed or forcibly hauled down. It was reported that near the Supreme Court in Victoria Distirct, the crowd which exhibited anti-Manchu spirit had at one time swelled to over 400 persons.¹⁰ Isolated instances of queue-cutting in the streets, symbolising the defiance of Manchu rule, was also reported by the Hong Kong foreign newspapers.¹¹

As the Revolution progressed successfully from one province to another, the enthusiasm of the Chinese rose in due proportion. Queue-cutting, done forcibly or voluntarily, became more widespread. Many Chinese were reported to have returned from Singapore and Bangkok to Hong Kong en route to Canton to join the Revolution there and all the boarding houses were, as a result, full.¹² Rumours were also spread by the Hong Kong English newspapers that the revolutionaries in Hong Kong openly recruited fighting forces.¹³ Even the Hua-tzu jih-pao, a "neutral" newspaper, found its office being stoned on October 29 when it issued, rather unwittingly, an express stating that Hankow had been retaken by the Manchu forces.¹⁴

On November 4, the rumour that Peking had fallen began to spread through Hong Kong. Two days later, on



reading expresses which were distributed by some Chinese newspapers giving the text of a telegram which had been received from Shanghai by the Chinese Press Association in Hong Kong to the effect that Peking had fallen into the hands of the Revolutionaries and that the Emperor, the Prince Regent and Prince Ching had been taken prisoners,¹⁵ the Chinese masses in the Colony could no longer control their feelings any more. There was at once an outburst of "mafficking".¹⁶ Revolutionary flags were hoisted and fireworks were set off from almost every Chinese house in the lower part of the city. Many Chinese also came forth into the streets and proceeded to discharge five crackers, commandeer the trams and indulge in perpetual cheering, flag waving and other forms of jubilation. Hundreds of queues were removed and an impromptu procession was arranged to parade through the streets. The office of the Sheung Po (Shang Pao) again became the object of the fury of an angry mob owing to its denial of the truth of the rumour. The paper's office was wrecked and its editorial staff there suffered some kind of molestation. In fact, the premises of the newspaper would have been burnt down had it not been for the timely arrival of the police. Three rioters were arrested. For some days, the police had to maintain armed guards outside the newspaper premises and other Manchu government establishments such as the Communications Bank in Bonham Strand.¹⁷ Obviously, the Chinese masses did not pay much attention to the English newspapers. While publicly disclaiming




the same piece of information,¹⁸ the Hong Kong English newspapers were unmolested. Conditions in the Colony on that very day were such that Lugard regarded it as "the most outburst which has ever been and heard in the history of this Colony".¹⁹ Similarly, the China Mail also described the situation as just like "two or three New Years Days rolled into one".²⁰

The China Mail had the opinion that the whole affair was a pre-arranged one: plans had been made among the young reforming spirits of Hong Kong some days before and the firing of crackers commenced at a couple of revolutionary newspaper offices was the signal for the general demonstration.²¹

Celebrations by the masses did not go for nought, for a couple of days later, Kwangtung became independent. This news at once whipped up another wave of wild excitement and joyous celebrations in Hong Kong.

One should however take note of the fact that the expression of patriotic feeling in the form of mass rallies and indulgence of jubilation among the Chinese population in Hong Kong as discussed in subsequent pages was not a unique phenomenon. Other places with a large overseas Chinese population also experienced the same situation and perhaps with more unpleasant consequences. As reported in the Hong Kong English newspapers the Chinese in Macao, for example, on hearing the fall of Peking "went mad" over the news and carried on their demonstration of enthusiasm which had never been witnessed before²² and that enthusiasm



manifested among the Chinese of Macao for the establishment of the Kwangtung republic "knows no bounds".²³

B. The independence of Kwangtung (November 9, 1911) and the responses of the Hong Kong English newspapers

1. The historical background

The independence of Kwangtung constituted one of the major turns in the Revolution. The shifting of allegiance of Kwangtung, one of the most important provinces, showed that the fall of the Manchu dynasty was inevitable.

As has been mentioned earlier, after the setting up of the Central China Bureau at Shanghai, all the major activities of the Tung Meng Hui had already been directed to the Yangtze region. Chao Sheng, the prominent leader of the HKTMH, died in Hong Kong on May 18, 1911 while others once closely related with the Colony notably Huang Hsing had left for the north. Hu Han-min was the only one important leader within the revolutionary camp that was left in charge of affairs of the South China Bureau of the TMH²⁴, but the concurrent post he held in the Southeast Asia Regional Bureau also required him to travel to various places in the Malay peninsula. Hsieh Ying-po who had only recently succeeded Feng Tzu-yu (who went to Canada) as head of the Hong Kong branch of the TMH also went to Honolulu. Revolutionary activities in the Colony had thus to be directed by men who did not command a wide support. It was reported that the Chung-kuo jih-pao had run through three editors in about as many months. Therefore, after the failure of the April 27 Uprising, the




revolutionary movement in the South deemed to spend its force and drift aimlessly for lack of leadership. The revolutionaries in Hong Kong were mainly preoccupied themselves with making isolated assassination attempts and their major targets were Li Chun, the Canton naval commander and Viceroy Chang Ming-ch'i.²⁵

2. The situation in Canton

Since the April 27th incident, Canton was in a state of ever-present fear and uneasiness. This state of affairs was brought about partly by the recurring rumours that the revolutionaries would plan another major revolt in the near future; and partly by the undue interference of the people by the local police and soldiers. Succumbing to these groundless rumours and "official harrassment", were those who flocked to Hong Kong and Macao.²⁶ The Canton government of course took all the necessary precautions to prevent the outbreak of another revolt. The garrison of the city was reinforced by nine battallions of troops (3,000 strong) from Kiangsi under General Lung Chi-kuang; the politically suspected New Army units were disbanded; a new Detective Bureau was set up to assist the police to hunt down suspicious characters in the city. These counter-revolutionary measures seemed to be quite effective and a semblance of law and order was maintained in the city. But various sorts of defiance of government authority such as banditry, piracy and anti-gentry tax resistance were occurring frequently.²⁷

On the eve of the Wuchang Uprising, the Hong Kong English newspapers had made forecasts that revolutionary



outbreaks would occur in Canton. Nevertheless, with the exception of the abortive attempt on Li Chun on August 13, 1911 which became news headlines of the Hong Kong English newspapers, nothing significant really happened in Canton until two weeks after the Hupeh rising. Governor Lugard even decided to accept the invitation from the Government of India and applied to the Colonial Office for a six-week leave of absence to attend the Imperial Durbar at Delhi at the end of the year.²⁸ To the Hong Kong English newspapers, it was indeed a surprise that Canton which they regarded as the seat and hotbed of the revolution could remain so relatively undisturbed by the events in North China for such a long time.

Immediately after the Hupeh Uprising, many foreign journalists expected that a spontaneous revolt in Canton would occur. The Times (London) of October 12, 1911 opined that a sympathetic outbreak at Canton would be inevitable when the city was simmering with revolutionary agitation for such a long time. The South China Morning Post also gave universal publicity to the Reuter's Peking correspondent's statement that there would be troubles in Canton soon.²⁹ Its October 18, 1911 issue commented that the present peaceful state of affairs in Canton was deceptive and that the whole city was charged with a strong spirit of revolution. This newspaper explained that the present moment of calmness was solely due to the absence of Huang Hsing who was too preoccupied with the revolutionary movement in Hunan and to the shrewdness or



timidity of the other revolutionaries. The South China Morning Post of October 18, 1911 also said that there were many revolutionary leaders staying in Hong Kong but these men were only willing to "prepare the balls for others to fire and were "unwilling to come out to direct things themselves".³⁰ The same thing, according to the South China Morning Post, could also be applied to their colleagues in Canton: These men "preferred to sit on the fence watching the progress of events", and if real promise of ultimate triumph revealed itself, they would assist in the final approach to viceroy; and if not, they would continue to preserve a virtuous peace.³¹ This newspaper also treated Canton as a kind of "weather-vane" to indicate which way the wind of the revolt had veered in China.³²

Hong Kong contributed to a certain extent to the growing tension in Canton. The reports of its English and Chinese newspapers of an impending revolt in Canton served to alarm the population of the city. Of particular importance was perhaps the influence the Hong Kong vernacular newspapers exerted on the Cantonese in the city.³³ It was stated by one authority that at least three of the nine Chinese language newspapers in Hong Kong actively championed the revolutionary cause and only one was loyalist in tone.³⁴


Indeed, one of the things, law and order notwithstanding, that was worrying the Canton authority, was that the Hong Kong vernacular Chinese newspapers tended to exaggerate the progress of the Revolution in the North. That is why



Ch'iang Kung-yin, a trusted servant and a Canton gentry³⁵ had to be despatched by the Canton Viceroy to the Colony to convene a meeting of the Chinese editors and to ask them to tone down their writings concerning the revolt and to wait patiently for the result of the revolution.


Viceroy Ch'ang was reported to have told the Hong Kong Chinese editors that if two or three more provinces would secede from the Central Government and declare independence, Kwangtung would follow the same course.³⁶

Two weeks after the Hupeh revolt, pressures from within and from without were being exerted on the Viceroy Chang Ming-ch'i for declaring independent the province under his jurisdiction. For example, the Viceroy received on October 18, 1911 from Hong Kong, a letter purporting to have been written by Huang Hsing. This letter threatened a general uprising in Kwangtung unless the viceroy shifted his allegiance to the Chinese revolutionaries within five days.³⁷ The Viceroy did not budge an inch. On October 25, 1911, seeing that the days of the Manchu rule in China were numbered, the influential people in Canton held a meeting to discuss the political situation. It was decided that Kwangtung should remain neutral in the present revolutionary struggle and that Kwangtung should be established as an independent province with Chang Ming-ch'i as president. The viceroy vacillated at this proposal. Four days later, with the re-capture of Hankow by the Manchu forces, the viceroy made up his mind: he forcibly suppressed the independence movement and the hoisting of independent flags.³⁸



By the first week of November 1911, the Hong Kong English journalists had already noticed that the independence of Kwangtung was the subject that the "influential men" of Kwangtung had much talked about in their social gatherings.³⁹ In regard to the question of the independence of Kwangtung, the Hong Kong English journalists supported a policy of "wait-and-see". The China Mail of October 30, 1911, for example, remarked that "the decision of the gentry and literati of Kwangtung - acquiesced in by the Viceroy... to remain neutral and to decline to supply either money, arms or men to other provinces is... imbued with strong common sense". "The time is not yet ripe for the province to throw off its allegiance to the central authority in Peking", it said. The South China Morning Post of November 2, 1911 also supported the stand of neutrality of the Canton viceroy. It believed that the Viceroy was "the man of the hour" who could keep the different factions at arms length and save the city from a possible uprising.


The Hong Kong English journalists of course had the lives and property and the trading interests of the foreigners in the province in their mind. They feared that the shifting of allegiance in the province would lead to the outbreak of a mini-scale civil war in the province. They were also highly suspicious of the intentions of the so-called revolutionary army who were reported to have been advancing towards Canton. The Hongkong Daily Press of November 3, 1911, for example, reported the rumour that



some 8,000 robbers had been enlisted as soldiers under the revolutionary banner in the surrounding districts of Canton. Reported in the columns of the Hong Kong English newspapers were also a gradual deterioration of law and order in Kwangtung: looters were harassing the surrounding villages of Canton and the customs stations along the Canton-Kowloon Railway lines; and the Hong Kong government was required to despatch three gunboats to reinforce the foreign defence corps in Shameen.⁴⁰

3. The independence of Kwangtung

On November 8, 1911, identical telegrams were sent by Ch'iang Kung-yin to the Pao-chieh kung-hui (China Press Association)⁴³, the Tung Wah Hospital, the Sze Yap Kung-so (the Sze Yap Commercial Association), the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Hua-Sheng Hui) and the various Chinese clubs in Hong Kong requesting them to send representatives to Canton to take part in the meeting held by the Cantonese to discuss the condition of the city and the programme of the Chinese revolutionaries.⁴² On November 9, 1911, Kwangtung had become independent and Viceroy Chang Ming-ch'i was forced to take refuge in the house of the British Consul-General, Jamieson.⁴³ Through the good offices of Jamieson, the ex-Viceroy and his three staff arrived in the Colony on board HKS Handy.⁴⁴ The next day, the Magistrate of San On District also sought sanctuary in the Colony.⁴⁵ Admiral Li Chun also came to the Colony to seek British protection.⁴⁶



4. The reactions of the Chinese masses to the independence of Kwangtung

The local Chinese masses were eager to show their political sympathy for the Revolution. On hearing the news of the independence of Kwangtung, the Chinese in Hong Kong immediately carried out joyous celebrations; crackers were set off and the revolutionary flags were hoisted. The situation in the Colony on November 9th was such that the China Mail of November 7, 1911 uttered the following remarks: "it would be safe to affirm that of every hundred Chinese in Hong Kong ninety-five per cent widely and recklessly so".⁴⁷ The joyous celebrations of the Chinese in Hong Kong lasted for some days and reached their height only on November 13, a day fixed by the Chinese in Hong Kong to be a public holiday and a day of universal celebration. Nearly HK\$100,000 worth of crackers were expended on that day.⁴⁸ Reviewing the situation in the Colony immediately after the independence of Kwangtung, Governor Lugard had to admit in his telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that "feeling in Hong Kong was ardently republican".⁴⁹ Lugard in his despatch to the Colonial Office two weeks later again stressed the point that "[t]he Chinese of Hong Kong almost to a man not only sympathise with the Revolution, but are profoundly moved by feelings of intense enthusiasm of it".⁵⁰

While believing that the celebrations might have been pre-arranged, the Hong Kong English journalists failed to ascertain who directed the crowds from behind. Nevertheless, at least the Hong Kong English newspapers



were contented to make the assumption that these people wanted all celebrations to be done in a peaceful and orderly manner. The China Mail of November 8, described one of the street scenes during celebrations as follows:

There were big crowds at the Praya as usual, but they were in a good mood and any inclinations to break the peace were curbed by a number of flags being carried through the masses bearing good advice, telling the crowd that such behaviour as took place on Monday [November 6] was foolish in a foreign colony and was only likely to lead to proceedings which would be very distasteful.


The South China Morning Post of November 14, 1911 also emphasized the fact that the Chinese in Hong Kong were celebrating the peaceful establishment of a new government and the bloodless revolution in Kwangtung.

In the opinion of the China Mail of November 15, 1911, apart from the Chinese revolutionary leaders, some "peace-loving" members of the community also played an important role in restraining the crowd. In the incident when a group of Chinese were chasing some young European boys in the street, an old European resident who happened to pass by was reported to voluntarily act as mediator and persuaded the crowd to stop. Nor did the crowd entirely lose their heads. On being reminded that the British authorities would not tolerate any mob rule and would be hard on them, they dispersed.

5. The reactions of the Hong Kong Government

The Hong Kong Government was styled by the political troubles in China.

As a British Crown Colony, it had to be in full accord with Britain's policy of maintaining a neutral stand



between the Manchu government and the Chinese revolutionaries across the border. As a matter of fact, since the Hupeh rising, the Hong Kong government had kept on steering a middle course between the Manchu government and the Chinese revolutionaries across the border. It had done nothing effective to succour the Manchu government by concrete assistance of any form such as loans and ammunition. Only a small quantity of ammunition probably for defence purpose was shipped to Canton on November 3, 1911. Contracts signed before the outbreak of the revolution for large supplies of ammunition and Maxim guns were not fulfilled.⁵¹ The only thing the Hong Kong Government did was on November 7, 1911, in response to an appeal from the Canton Viceroy: it suspended the through railway service to Canton from Hong Kong.⁵² In addition, political sanctuary was extended not only to the revolutionaries but also to the ex-Manchu officials.⁵³ The principle that political sanctuary could only be extended to those who promised to give up conspiracies and plots of any kind was maintained throughout the Chinese revolution in China.

On the other hand, the Hong Kong government also had to wink at the rejoicing activities of the crowds of Hong Kong. Even cracker-firing which was prohibited by local law was tolerated. Two considerations influenced the adoption of a policy of non-interference by the Hong Kong Government. First, all kinds of open-street celebrations were conducted in an orderly manner; second, under a state




of excitement, any undue interference by the local police would easily convert any demonstration, no matter how peaceable its intention was, into riots and bloodshed.⁵⁴

The following account would further demonstrate the stand of the Hong Kong government towards the rejoicing activities of the crowds of Hong Kong. When both Wei Yü and Ho Ch'i informed the Governor of an impending public demonstration on November 13th in recognition of the declaration of the republic in Canton, the Governor could only reluctantly give his consent on condition that cracker-firing would be permitted from 12 a.m. to 2 p.m. and on the understanding that it was to signify the accomplishment of the task with the absence of bloodshed. Lugard stipulated that the public should be informed through the local newspapers that the real cause of rejoicing was not the independence of Kwangtung but its being achieved in a bloodless manner. In addition, the governor also warned that persons firing crackers outside the prescribed time would be prosecuted.⁵⁵

6. The attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers


The reactions of the Hong Kong English newspapers were in full accord with the Hong Kong government. The Hong Kong English newspapers were convinced that the public display of anti-Manchu sentiment was an embarrassment to the Hong Kong Government: the Manchu government was recognized by the British government as the legitimate government of China and Hong Kong as a British colony should closely follow the British diplomatic practices.



This official policy of non-interference in the local celebration activities won the approval of the Hong Kong English newspapers. The China Mail, for example, commented that "the colonial Government were wise under the circumstances to let the excitement spend itself without interference. But steps should be taken to prevent a recurrence".

Though the real intention of the Chinese masses who involved themselves in the celebration activities in streets were unknown, the Hong Kong English journalists sincerely wished that they were not motivated by anti-Manchu feeling but by the fact that Kwangtung had changed hands without bloodshed and without any greater disturbances of trade than had already been incurred.⁵⁷


Interestingly, the sympathy of the Hong Kong English newspapers did not go to the Chinese revolutionaries who had achieved the task of terminating Manchu rule in the province. The Hong Kong English journalists found the hero of the political revolution in Kwangtung in the ex-Viceroy Chang Ming-ch'i. The relationship between the Viceroy and the Hong Kong English newspapers had been very cordial since the former's appointment to the Viceroyship of the two Kwangs.⁵⁸ Young and possessing a genuine reforming mind, Chang Ming-ch'i's record as Viceroy, in the opinion of the Hong Kong English newspapers, was a satisfactory one: he had done much to improve the lot of the people, eradicate social evils such as gambling, relax the burdensome taxation and suppress piracy and brigandage. All the Hong Kong English newspapers were deeply impressed



by the Viceroy's handling of the question of secession. They believed that it was due to the efforts of the young Viceroy that an inevitable bloody civil strife and disastrous upheaval in Kwangtung were prevented.⁵⁹ The Hong Kong English journalists understood the dilemma that the Viceroy had faced. They were of the opinion that although he might sympathize with certain aspects of the revolutionary movement, his sense of loyalty to the Manchu precluded him from becoming the President of the new Republican Assembly for Kwangtung when it was offered.

The decision of the Canton Viceroy to take refuge in Hong Kong was generally accepted by the Hong Kong English newspapers as a "wise step". On his arrival, the ex-Viceroy was assured by the Hong Kong government of safety and protection during his stay in the Colony. What was worrying the Hong Kong Government, as expressed vividly by the South China Morning Post, was that the ex-Viceroy's opting for Hong Kong might just be like "jumping out of the frying pan into the fire" as at this moment, Hong Kong was very much embraced by a spirit of anti-Manchuism.⁶⁰ That was why Governor Lugard had to make a special appeal to the Chinese leaders during the Legislative Council meeting on the very day of the arrival of the ex-Viceroy for their cooperation in making Chang's stay in the Colony a peaceful one.⁶¹

To the relief of the local English newspapers, the responses of the Chinese community of Hong Kong to the arrival of the Chinese ex-Viceroy was quite lukewarm. According to the South China Morning Post, the ex-Viceroy



was only "recognized by few in Hong Kong and his arrival here when it became known occasioned much surprise".⁶²

As a matter of fact, Chang Ming-ch'i was unmolested during his stay in the Colony until his departure for Shanghai on November 17.⁶³ The precautionary measures and the special appeal of the Hong Kong Governor seemed to have been rather unnecessary.

7. Some journalistic impressions of the new Kwangtung government

The Hong Kong English newspapers did not hold the newly established Kwangtung government in any high esteem. The main reason was that the new Kwangtung government failed to restore law and order in the province. The Hong Kong English journalists even anticipated that there might be a deterioration of law and order in areas under the control of the new government. The province was too well-known for being full of pirates and brigands. The Hong Kong English journalists were worrying that the alleged release of 2,000 criminals by the new government from all the jails would further worsen the situation in the province.⁶⁴ Reviewing the conditions in Kwangtung immediately after independence, the South China Morning Post stated that the independence of the province was only a "misnomer" and that peace in the province was only maintained by several brigand chiefs each with a large following. These men would be ready for plunder and violence at any moment.⁶⁵ That Hong Kong English newspapers also questioned the ability of the leaders in




the new Canton government. In the eyes of one Hong Kong English journalists, these new leaders were just idealists, visionaries and demagogues with no concrete or definite plan for government,⁶⁶ and that the financial insolvency of the government, temporarily eased by heavy contributions from the Hong Kong merchants and subscriptions elsewhere, might simply crumble the government.⁶⁷ The South China Morning Post of November 24, 1911 also lamented the prevalence of piracy on the West River. Such was their suspicion of the new government that they expressed the opinion that Canton was "without any qualification for self-rule"⁶⁸ and that independence was just a "hallucinatory quantity."⁶⁹ They lamented the departure of Chang Ming-ch'i who in their opinion, was the only man capable of handling the situation in Kwangtung. His departure only meant the undoing of all that he had done for the people of Canton during his viceroyalty.⁷⁰

C. The response of the Hong Kong English newspapers to the situation in Hong Kong from November 1911 to 1912

To Governor Lugard, a crisis seemed to have subsided with the peaceful transition of government in Kwangtung.

A day after the independence of Kwangtung, Governor Lugard telegrammed the Colonial Office expressing his desire to join the Durbar and proposing to leave on November 16.

The Governor advised that the General Officer Commanding act as Officer Administering the Government. His optimism was not shared by the staff in the Colonial Office. His telegram actually came as a surprise to the Colonial Office.



The tense situation in China made it inadvisable for the Governor to absent himself from the Colony. Lugard had to drop the idea a few days later.⁷¹ The Hong Kong English newspapers did not feel optimistic either.

From the start of the Chinese revolution, the Hong Kong English newspapers were worrying that the intense nationalism which was unfolding itself in China would whip up waves of anti-foreign feeling among the native Chinese especially among the younger members in the Colony. The independence of Kwangtung served to heighten this nationalistic fervour of the Chinese in Hong Kong. Just a week after the secession of Kwangtung, the China Mail began to speak of the rise of a new spirit of independence and restlessness among the younger section of the Chinese community of Hong Kong. It cautioned that "the rulers of this British colony would do well to notice it and pay careful attention thereto". This newspaper then cited two cases where Chinese crowds were seen to rise in fury and chase in one case an Indian and in another, some foreign youths in the streets. What was worrying the China Mail was that any slightest accident committed on the part of the Europeans in public places could easily be interpreted to mean insult and could provoke the Chinese crowd into anti-foreign outbursts. This same issue then sounded out the warning that if such spirits were not suppressed, there would be troubles between the Chinese and non-Chinese population of Hong Kong in the near future.⁷²

During the first two weeks of November 1911, the




Hong Kong Government tried to minimize chances of friction between the Government and the Chinese. For example, when District Officer of the New Territories D.W. Tratman on November 17 reported that a police launch in Mirs Bay met resistance in its effort to collect licence fees from Chinese fishing boats plying in British waters, he was told to instruct the police there not to collect any more.⁷³ At the same time, the Hong Kong Government also tolerated the activities of the Chinese crowds who seemed to have acted within reasonable legal limits. No serious and unpleasant incidents which could endanger the lives and property of the foreign residents of the city were reported. The government believed that the revolutionary party was not popular among the local populace though it was quite obvious that many Hong Kong Chinese residents might have sympathized with the movement.

The principal efforts of the Hong Kong Government were directed towards the maintenance of law and order in the Colony. To this end, the Hong Kong Government had the support of the four Hong Kong English newspapers.

Before the outbreak of the Hupeh uprising, the Hong Kong Government had already thought of introducing some sort of control over the revolutionary activities in the Colony. The strike of the printers in the Victoria District, Hong Kong⁷⁴ provided the government with the occasion for action.

The printers' strike was initiated in early October 1911. The trouble originated in the office of the South



China Morning Post because of the personal spite between a European and a Chinese employee. The dismissed Chinese employee appealed to the Guild of Printers and Compositors with controlled the "hands" of all section of the printing trade of the Colony. The Guild Executive called for a strike against the South China Morning Post with the result that the newspaper lost almost all its Chinese staff overnight. As the Hongkong Telegraph was also closely affiliated with the South China Morning Post, it also became the target of the strikers. On October 15, 1911, representatives of the owners of the printing firms in the Colony sent a letter to the government complaining against the Chinese Printing Guild. It called upon the Government to take some action to restrain the evil influence exerted by this Chinese guild.⁷⁵ At the suggestion of the Executive Council, Governor Lugard decided to banish eight members who formed the Committee of the printing guild.⁷⁶

Subsequent action of the Hong Kong Government to end the strike by deporting the Vice-president of the Guild worsened the situation and led to a general strike of all the members of the Guild on November 18, 1911, the very day when the Vice-president was deported.⁷⁷


In the heat of the printers' strike, the government introduced the Ordinance No. 47 of 1911, or the "Societies Ordinance". This Ordinance allowed the government to have the power of supervising the numerous clubs and societies which had come into existence in Hong Kong during the recent years.



The subject of registration of all clubs and societies was not new. It was raised in 1894 by the Captain Superintendent of Police Henry May after a series of organized faction fights between the Tungkun and Sze Yap coolies had broken out in the Colony.⁷⁸ The subject was revived in early 1895 when the government began to suspect that certain unlawful clubs and societies had played an important role in organizing and inciting the coolie class to strike against the inspection of all lodging houses following the outbreak of the bubonic plague in 1894.⁷⁹

In June 1910, after the formation of the Sze Yap Association by a prominent revolutionary sympathizer Li Yuk Tong, the Registrar-General Brewin also recommended to the government that legislation should be introduced for the registration of all clubs and societies in the Colony,⁸⁰ a recommendation which was also endorsed by the leading English newspapers in the Colony. Suffering from a strike of its Chinese printers in one of its departments since April 27th 1911 at the instigation of the recently formed Printers' Guild, the South China Morning Post in its May 8, 1911 issue, with much petulance, suggested that 11 trade guilds should be checked as they were "secret Societies" in "even the narrowest definition of the term" and that they were "capable of great immediate harm to individual enterprise and, by ultimate combination, unless checked, to the general well-being of the Colony".

The Ordinance No. 47 of 1911 superseded the Triad and Unlawful Societies Ordinance, 1887. It required



registration with the Registrar-General of all the clubs and societies in the Colony except those which had been exempted by the Hong Kong Government.⁸¹

The apparent reason for the government in introducing this Ordinance, as explained by the Registrar-General Brewin, was to deal with the series of labour troubles in the printing offices of the Colony. Interestingly, the introduction of the Bill even raised the apprehension of the Labour Party in Britain. In the House of Commons, the party leader Keir Hardie questioned the government whether the proposed Ordinance regulating clubs and other organizations in Hong Kong was intended to be used for the suppression of bona fide trades union organizations. He suggested that care should be taken to safeguard the right of workers there.⁸²

That the Ordinance was also intended to exercise some kind of restraint on those societies whose purpose was to encourage the revolutionary movement in China was well-known to the journalists in Hong Kong and elsewhere.⁸³ By subsection 4 of section IV of the Ordinance, the Hong Kong Governor could refuse recognition of a society if it was proven that such a society was likely to be used "for unlawful purposes or for purposes incompatible with the peace or good order of the Colony", or that its action and proceedings appeared "calculated to excite tumult or disorder in China or to excite persons to crime in China".


Although the strike was directed against the four foreign newspapers in the Colony, the ten Chinese daily



newspapers suffered most and many of them had to stop business. Indirectly affected were also the ten foreign and thirty-nine Chinese printing firms. The foreign staff of the European newspapers and companies managed to take up the jobs of their Chinese strikers and continue business as usual. The strike finally broke. Seeing that the foreign newspapers were largely unscathed, the strikers voluntarily resumed work without their demand being granted.

It was thus quite right for the Hongkong Daily Press of October 10, 1911 to express regret that the Societies Ordinance could not achieve its publicly announced function of solving the labour trouble in the Colony. According to this newspaper, existing legislation such as the Conspiracies Ordinance⁸⁴ and the Employers' and Servants' Ordinances⁸⁵ had already been able to meet the need in controlling those trade guilds which were incompatible with the peace and good order of the Colony. It came to the conclusion that the Ordinance obviously only aimed at those societies with a political nature.


Undoubtedly, with the passage of the Societies Ordinance, the Hong Kong Government was equipped with a legal weapon to deal with all kinds of secret societies. The government, however, only intended the Ordinance to be a precautionary measure. The subsequent applications of the Ordinance showed that "recognition was the rule, and prohibition the exception".⁸⁶ In general, as one authority indicates "The 1911 Ordinance did not achieve its objectives.



It failed to give increased control and tended to drive some unlawful societies underground".⁸⁷


By November, the Hong Kong Government also realized what a threat it would mean to the foreign section of the community if this "unintelligent passion for politics" of the local Chinese went unchecked. To retain the confidence of the people of Hong Kong in British authority and to tell the local agitators that the colonial government was always in a position to enforce its will, the Hong Kong Government adopted in rapid succession a series of precautionary measures. The police force in the urban areas was reinforced by the engagement of extra Indian policemen. Twenty soldiers from the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI) were also temporarily enrolled as police.⁸⁸ The District Watchmen Force numbering 124 men were also required to help patrol the streets in the Chinese quarter of the city.⁸⁹ Special guards were being deployed in the weapon depots; police stations in the outlying districts were reinforced by companies of the KOYLI which were stationed at the frontier from the 13th to the 20th; the gunboat HMS Handy was also sent on the 20th to stand on guard in the Mirs Bay.⁹⁰

Fortunately the districts bordering China were peaceful. There was no incursion made by banditti or other Chinese armed forces. The only "border incident" happened on the 14th when several armed Chinese revolutionaries carrying a flag were caught in the New Territories. Their trespass was unintentional. They were only ignorant of



the frontier. On hearing their arrest, Governor Lugard at once ordered their release and that their arms be returned to them on the frontier.⁹¹ The incident nevertheless satisfied the desire of the Hong Kong English newspapers for sensation. They told their readers that this was an attempt to "violate" the Hong Kong border. It was only some days later that they apologized for giving a rather misleading account of the incident.⁹²

On the other hand, since early November 1911, the situation in the urban districts became tense. An indication of the coming of more troubles was the Hong Kong Tramway boycott. The affair occurred in November 1911.⁹³ The trouble originated in the Company's refusal to accept other than legal tender for its fare. The measure was undertaken in response to the government's desire to check the flooding of Chinese subsidiary coins into the Colony. But the step was highly unpopular among the Chinese travelling public because the fares cost more, and was even construed by most Chinese as an affront to their "lately-deposed Emperor" and the newly awakened spirit of nationalism. It is interesting to point out that other travelling companies, namely, the High Level Tramway Company and the Star Ferry, which also refused to accept Chinese subsidiary coins, were not sanctioned by the Chinese. The business of the boycotted company would have been hurt had it not been for the timely intervention of the Hong Kong Government which interpreted the boycott as a calculated attempt to bring discredit to the government.



Soon, rowdyism was sweeping all over the urban areas. The policemen on duty in streets were frequently stoned by mobs.⁹⁴ As a demonstration of strength, a military parade through Victoria and Yaumati, the two most disturbed districts was arranged on November 26, 1911 by four companies of the KOYLI armed with rifles fixed with bayonets.⁹⁵

Whether the dramatic demonstration of force could achieve its purpose of overawing the local Chinese into submission is not certain but at least the Chinese did not seem to have been antagonized by this action.⁹⁶ The South China Morning Post reported that the patrol created little sensation in the city and practically no obstruction was offered to the troops and only at one or two points were there any half-hearted attempts to boo the troops. The only unpleasant incident as revealed by the newspaper was the throwing of stones at the parading party from one building in the course of construction with the result that two soldiers got hurt.⁹⁷ Moreover, the Hong Kong English newspapers were all in favour of strong measures to deal with the situation. The China Mail of November 27, 1911 remarked,

The action of the Colonial Government in sending armed patrols through the streets of Hong Kong, Kowloon and Yaumati to overawe the rabble, has met with the unanimous approval of the Colony. Some such display of the firm hand of government was absolutely necessary, and its effect, we are glad to see, has been most salutary.

Parenthetically, the tense situation in China and the consequential disturbances in Hong Kong also aroused



the attention of the British Parliament. Colonel Yate (Melton, Opposition) in the meeting of the House, suggested altering the administration of Hong Kong by appointing a military governor there under arrangements similar to those other important British overseas naval bases such as Malta and Bermuda.⁹⁸

The situation in Hong Kong did not of course develop in such a way that warranted a radical alteration in its system of administration. Moreover, the South China Morning Post of November 23, 1911 also expressed confidence in the present Governor Lugard in dealing with every emergency. "With His Excellency [Lugard] at the head of affairs, there is abundant confidence that any possible situation would be dealt with in the most efficient manner ...", this newspaper noted. The main concern of the Hong Kong Government was that it should not mismanage a potentially disruptive situation, lest the Chinese radicals would be unnecessarily provoked into committing anti-colonial outrages.


Towards the end of the month, the situation in Hong Kong was such that the Hong Kong Government had to introduce, on November 29, a proclamation⁹⁹ issued under Section 6 of the Peace Preservation Ordinance No. 10 of 1886¹⁰⁰ as amended by Ordinance No. 52 of 1911. The amended Ordinance empowered the local magistrate during the continuance of any proclamation under the Ordinance to administer flogging upon persons who had been arrested for a number of offences against the peace and order of the Colony in addition to



the ordinary penalties. Male offenders would be subjected to strikes of "cat" while young offenders under sixteen would be subjected to flogging by "birth".¹⁰¹ Previously, only persons belonging to the criminal class were subjected to this kind of corporal punishment.¹⁰² From December 1911 to February 1912, fifty-one persons were flogged for criminal and disorderly conduct under this ordinance.¹⁰³

The seriousness of the situation in Hong Kong was fully appreciated by the Hong Kong English newspapers themselves. A day before (November 28th), the South China Morning Post predicted that the government would be forced to invoke the Riot Act (1885) if conditions continued to worsen.

The Hong Kong government in introducing this drastic measure acted cautiously. Special attention was paid to the fact that, on the one hand, the instrument and the method of its administration were not unduly severe, and on the other hand, that they were adequate for their purpose and similar to those employed in other British colonies.¹⁰⁴ Governor Lugard in the Legislative Council meeting emphasized that the Bill was not introduced to stifle Chinese nationalistic feeling but only served to discourage the criminals from congregating in the Colony and to punish those law-breakers who were mainly people of recent importation from outside. As usual, he made a special appeal to the leading Chinese residents of the city, especially the two Chinese members of the Council, to support the measure which, the governor stressed, would



guarantee them the peace and security and protection of life and property, which they expected to enjoy under the British flag.¹⁰⁵ As an emergency measure, the Bill was able to pass through all its stages in a single session - and without any opposition.

The response of the Hong Kong English newspapers to this measure was also favourable. The South China Morning Post said that few would find fault with the prompt action taken by the government for the suppression of riotousness in Hong Kong as recent disturbances had demanded firm steps to be taken and further remarked that "necessity of the Bill might be regretted but its wisdom was unquestionable."¹⁰⁶

The China Mail of December 1, 1911 also wrote editorially in support of the measure of the Hong Kong government. It was convinced that the resident or the British-born Chinese of Hong Kong were very law-abiding subjects of the King. The real trouble-makers were those "undisciplined rabble" who had taken up their abode in the Colony during the past two months. To these group of people, the China Mail made the following warning to them:

This is a British Colony, not an appendage of China. The peace of this Colony is the King's peace and it behoves all who find shelter within its borders to remember the fact and bear it well in mind.

The wave of rowdyism, nevertheless continued throughout December 1911. Coupled with it was an increase in crimes in streets.¹⁰⁷ According to Governor Lugard, the increase in crime rate was due to the "importations into the Colony of doubtful characters" during the Chinese Revolution.¹⁰⁸



The Chinese natives were also found adopting a "truculently insolent" attitude towards the Europeans.¹⁰⁹

From the 2nd to 21st December inclusive, the streets were patrolled at irregular periods by strong military pickets accompanied by police and a system of police pickets as party substituted for the ordinary beat duties and continued to the end of the year 1911.¹¹⁰

Concerned with their own personal safety, a large number of foreign residents especially those living in the outlying districts rushed to buy firearms and altogether 345 permits to possess arms were issued by the government in 1912 as compared to 287 in 1911.¹¹¹

The blame for every sign of defiance of European authority from interference with the police, the forest guards, the tax-collectors and other government staff in the execution of their duties; molestation of Europeans and snatching from European ladies, negligence of duties by housemaids in the employ of Europeans or even the disobedience of the boys of the Hong Kong Club was under such circumstances put on the revolutionary movement in China.¹¹²

The Printer's strike and tramway boycott organized by the Chinese and directed primarily against the European firms were of course viewed in the same light by the Hong Kong English newspapers. Strikers and boycotters of both, were said to be largely influenced by and misunderstood the revolutionary doctrine of "independence".

Contrary to conditions in neighbouring countries under colonial rule where the native Chinese enthusiastically




celebrated the news of the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty and the establishment of a republic,¹¹³ the general conditions in Hong Kong and across the borders were comparatively more peaceful. They did not have any upsurge of disturbance and mob violence again.


The situation across the border at the beginning of 1912 improved.

The newly established Canton government despite its inadequacies as revealed in the foreign newspapers was not at all anti-foreign. On the contrary, far from adopting any foolish attitude of belligerence or defiance, it tried its best from the very beginning of its formation to develop understanding with the British diplomatic representatives at Canton and to win the goodwill and peaceful cooperation of the Hong Kong government, and other foreign governments. The Bureau of Foreign Affairs of the new Canton government always kept informing the British Consul-General Jamieson and other foreign representatives and reporters the condition of the city and its surrounding districts and the measures and policies of the new government.¹¹⁴

To assure the foreigners of the safety in Canton and the ability of the new government to maintain law and order, the new government offered protection for the foreigners in the city and its surrounding districts. It was reported that it went so far as arranging a visit of some 600 American tourists to the city on Decmeber 27, 1911.¹¹⁵



The new Canton government was in particular eager to re-establish friendly relations with the Hong Kong government, probably with the early revival of trade in mind. Notable examples of its profession of friendship towards Hong Kong were its disapproval of rowdyism and the action of the strikers during the Compositors' Strike¹¹⁶; its afforts to restore law and order along the Hong Kong China borders by sending 300 soldiers to guard Sham Chun;¹¹⁷ the promise of Tu-tu Hu Han-min to comply with the request of the Hong Kong governor to prevent any influx of bad elements into the Colony from Canton.¹¹⁸ The last one was no easy task, as it was frankly admitted by Hu Han-min that it was difficult to distinguish bad characters from those proceeding to the Colony on legitimate business. Nevertheless, to express a genuine cooperative spirit, Hu offered to insert a cautionary notice in all the Canton newspapers and even in the Hong Kong press and instruct the lecturers to educate the crowds to refrain from any ill-considered labour movements and rowdyism which only served to alienate foreign sympathy from the revolutionary movement. The West River, the most notorious pirate-infested waterway which a year before led to a controversy between the two governments of China and Hong Kong was well-patrolled by the two governments of China and Hong Kong was well-patrolled by the new Chinese government and the river was even reported to be enjoying "a much larger measure of security than many other parts of the Province".¹¹⁹ Indeed, every attempt was made by the new Canton government



to satisfy the requests of the Hong Kong government and no grievance was allowed to be left unattended. It did not lodge any special complaint against the foreigners and foreign governments. Both the new Canton government and the natives of the city only disagreed to the presence of fortifications on Shameen and of Indian troops (from Hong Kong) there which showed a lack of confidence in the Chinese government; and desired their removal.¹²⁰

The Hong Kong English journalists were highly pleased with these efforts of the new Canton government.¹²¹ Governor Lugard was the one who found the responses of the Canton Government sincere and satisfactory. The only things he advised the Canton government to do were the deployment of reliable detectives on the wharves and the river steamers to prevent the departure for Hong Kong of any known criminals and the prohibition of the smuggling of explosives from Hong Kong.¹²²

Trade between the two places soon revived. The Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1912 was able to state that in spite of considerable insecurity of life and property in the Kwangtung Province, trade except in the limestone business between the province and Hong Kong was good.¹²³


In the urban areas, law and order prevailed again. Governor Lugard could report in January 1912 that while the obstruction of the police continued, it was less serious than before and that the molestation of Europeans in streets and elsewhere had almost ceased.¹²⁴ Certain



precautionary measures were however maintained; for example, detectives were required to accompany European ladies to do the shopping. A printed circular was also issued by the Captain Superintendent of Police to remind the ladies to carry a police whistle as a means of communication.¹²⁵


On February 26, 1912, Proclamation No. 9 of November 29, 1911 declaring the Colony to be subjected to the provisions of Sections 7 to 14 of the Peace Preservation Ordinance was rescinded.¹²⁶ Special guard which since December 1, 1911 had been mounted by the Volunteers for the protection of the Armoury at the Volunteer Headquarters had been discontinued with effect from February 4, 1912.¹²⁷ The four local arms-dealing firms were no longer necessary with effect from February 27 to keep their stocks of arms and ammunition at the Green Island Government Depot.¹²⁸

Perhaps, the only single notorious symbol of defiance of British Colonial rule which occurred after the establishment of the new Chinese Republic was the abortive attempt on the life of the new Governor Sir Henry May on July 3, 1912.¹²⁹ But the event was in no way connected with the new Chinese government in Canton and was only the job of a young Chinese living in Hong Kong named Li Hong Hung (Hing?) who detested the British prohibition of the circulation of Chinese copper coins in the Colony and compulsory repatriation of Chinese from South Africa.¹³⁰ To deter any further attempt personal or political on British authority, a severe penalty of life imprisonment with hard labour was imposed on the culprit of the crime.¹³¹



The Hong Kong English newspapers were strongly in favour of the imposition of a heavy sentence and were convinced that the event would not be condoned by all the "right-thinking Chinese" of Hong Kong.¹³²

Towards the end of the year (1912), the tramway boycott which was launched at the beginning of November 1911 also broke within a day or two after the introduction of the Boycott Prevention Ordinance (Ordinance No. 41 of 1912). This Ordinance forbade any undue and improper interference with, or hampering of, lawful business and commercial undertaking, and imposed on certain "proclaimed" districts where it was, thought the boycott was being instigated, a special punitive tax on their residents.¹³³ The Chinese members of the Legislative Council mounted a tram to signify the end of the affair. The whole episode in the official opinion failed to achieve its political purpose and only created a very serious public inconvenience. The Times (London) reported that all the smaller Chinese dealers in the Colony in piece goods would boycott British manufacturers for three months as a protest against the measure.¹³⁴ The reported protest did not however eveutuate. The Tramway Company even received some HK\$450,000 from the government as compensation.




Some Hong Kong English press opinions on the role of the leading and responsible Chinese of Hong Kong in the Chinese Revolution

In the previous Sections I have discussed the attitudes of the Hong Kong Chinese masses and Hong Kong government to the Chinese Revolution and the attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers to their reactions. In this section I will deal with the reactions of the Hong Kong leading and responsible Chinese elite of Hong Kong to the Chinese Revolution and the comments of the Hong Kong English newspapers on their role in the Chinese revolutionary movement and the Chinese Revolution.

One should take note of the fact that since Hong Kong was a port of mart, the leading and responsible Chinese of Hong Kong represented an essentially mercantile interest group.


Before the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty, the foreign presses of Hong Kong had already suspected that the leading Chinese in the Colony had a hand in the anti-Manchu movement. The Hongkong Telegraph of May 29, 1911 expressed displeasure at the active role played by the leading Chinese of Hong Kong, particularly that of the merchant class, and according to the paper, "nowhere than in Hong Kong were there more enthusiastic supporters of the anti-Manchu revolt who had offered liberally of their substance to help forward the revolutionary cause". This newspaper also stated that the Revolution was engineered largely from a block of building in Bonham Strand.¹³⁵



There was also a general feeling that the leading Chinese of Hong Kong could exert a certain degree of influence on political events in Canton. This was publicly disclosed by the China Mail on the eve of the independence of Canton when Kong Heung Yan was reported to have "sent down a telegram to various Chinese societies in Hong Kong inviting them to send up representatives to attend a meeting to discuss the important questions of military expenditure, treatment of the Manchus, restoration of law and order and a new government machinery as well as "the date of independence". Nor were the leading Chinese of Hong Kong uninterested themselves in affairs in Canton, as the same newspaper also reported that on hearing that the meeting was eventually held without waiting for the attendance of the Hong Kong representatives, the commercial Chinese of Hong Kong were very indignant and several meetings were held in the Colony to discuss the matter.¹³⁶

The active role the Hong Kong merchants might have played was also suspected by the Chinese across the border. A rumour was spread in Shanghai that Lau Chu Pak, a notable loyal British subject of Hong Kong was associated with the revolutionary activities by sending arms in boxes addressed to the Central China Famine Relief Committee in Shanghai. Mr. Lobenstine, Secretary to the Committee had to clear the doubt by publicly stating that what Lau had sent in were bona fide relief contributions in the form of garments and biscuits'.¹³⁷

That a large majority of the responsible and leading Chinese in the Colony had been closely connected with the



new Canton Government also came to the knowledge of the Hong Kong English newspapers. After the independence of Kwangtung, the China Mail of November 15, 1911 reported that the Sze Yap industrial and commercial community of Hong Kong had "sent up about 40 or 50 representatives to Canton" and they "practically administered the government and that "hundreds of Chinese formerly employed in Hong Kong by the firms were also seeking office in the minor official positions of the Province".

In regard to the desire and ability of the leading Hong Kong Chinese to influence Canton politics, the South China Morning Post of November 11, 1911 reported with surprise that a hundred or so Hong Kong merchants in a letter sent to the Provisional Council of the Canton government against the establishment of a plague ward at Whampoa for the detention of sufferers returning from Hong Kong and Macao could use very strong words and demand the dissolution of the Council over such a minor grievance. The China Mail of November 18, 1911 also reported that a meeting was held the day before by the leading Chinese of Hong Kong at the Chinese Commercial Union to consider the convening of a Society in Hong Kong. Something unusual about this Society, as stated in this issue of the China Mail, was that it could represent the various districts of Kwangtung, accept complaints from them and take representations to the Canton government for adjustment.

After the formation of the Provisional Military Government at Canton, the Hong Kong English newspapers all expressed surprise at seeing that large subscriptions were




sent by the Hong Kong Chinese merchants belonging to the Sze Yap industrial and commercial community i.e. merchants coming from the four districts of Sun-ning, Sunhui, Kaiping and Yanping to Canton to help carry on the government despite the fact that the political disturbances in China had already incurred them very heavy financial losses.

A week after the formation of the new government at Canton, the China Mail had already reported that a total of about half a million had been despatched.

That the Hong Kong Chinese merchants had played a significant part in the Chinese revolution and that they had contributed generously to the cause of the Revolution were quite well-known to the Hong Kong English newspapers. Less well-known were the motives behind their involvement in Chinese politics. Did the Hong Kong English newspapers interpret the actions of the Hong Kong Chinese merchants to be a natural manifestation of innate patriotic feeling for a strong and reformed China which led many of them enthusiastically donated vast sum of money to that end or did they interpret their actions to be affected by other reasons?

As early as January 1911, the Hongkong Daily Press had hinted that the patriotism of the Hong Kong Chinese merchants as manifested in their enthusiastic donations to the Chinese revolutionary cause was not voluntary. It suspected that there might be instances of "forced" donations. The Hongkong Daily Press of January 19, 1911 reported that "in Hong Kong grievous bodily harm has been threatened to men who have hesitated or declined to contribute".




In the view of the Hong Kong English newspapers, the patriotism of the leading Chinese of Hong Kong was not so voluntary and altruistic as they were reported in the newspaper columns. It was highly conditional: since a reformed China would facilitate trade, the Hong Kong English journalists believed that the Chinese merchants of Hong Kong also hoped that such a transformation could come peacefully. The China Mail of October 25, 1911 remarked, "so long as the Reformists were content with a mere verbal campaign all the sympathy of Hong Kong residents went out to them and money was freely contributed towards the propaganda". What this newspaper tried to convey to their readers was the idea that the minds of the leading Hong Kong Chinese would waver should they find that the revolution hurt adversely their interests. "It was but human nature to squeal when the shoe pinches", this issue of the China Mail said. As a matter of fact, the shoe of the Hong Kong Chinese merchants did pinch and pinched soon. The Hongkong Telegraph of October 21, 1911 reported that "business in Hong Kong is already suffering severely". The Hongkong Daily Press of October 24, 1911 revealed an estimate worked out by the leading Chinese merchants of the Colony which placed the loss on the stoppage of trade of the port as a result of the political upheaval in China, at HK\$3,000,000. The China Mail of October 25 also made the observation that "many of the wealthier Chinese in Hong Kong were "altering their views slightly" regarding the blessings to be brought about by



the Revolutionists as the worsening situation in the Yangtze Valley caused a serious dislocation of trade.

In the "Commercial Share Report", the Hongkong Telegraph of November 18, 1911 stated, "We have to report on another week of inactivity in our local share market". Conditions were not so bleak as it appeared and this same issue also noted that "taking the stocks generally there has not been any serious decline in values". The Hongkong Telegraph on November 24, 1911 remarked that the Chinese merchants began to feel their shoe pinching and their foreign counterparts shared such a feeling too. While the "Share Report" of the Hongkong Telegraph on December 16, 1911 optimically noted that "a fair amount of business has been put through during the week and there has been a general improvement", pessimism was revealed again in its December 30, 1911 issue. This issue stated that the Chinese Revolution had pressed hard upon the foreign merchants of Hong Kong who were scarcely recovered from the after effects of the Russo-Japanese War. How the Chinese Revolution had affected the local trade was also revealed in the South China Morning Post of March 2, 1912, which stated that the political conditions in China were the grave concern of all the local merchants in their company meetings.



SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

In this section, I would sum up briefly the opinions of the four Hong Kong English newspapers on China's reformed revolutionary movements and also their opinions on the role Hong Kong played in these movements. I would assess the nature of the Hong Kong English newspapers as reflected in their responses to the political events in China and finally I would also evaluate the functions of the four Hong Kong English newspapers in China's reform and revolutionary movements.


Hong Kong English press opinions on China's reform and revolutionary movements and their opinions on Hong Kong's role in these movements

Of the four Hong Kong English newspapers, the China Mail was the most radical in criticising the Chinese administration. Yet, on the whole, the editorial difference between the China Mail and the other Hong Kong English newspapers was more apparent than real. The reports of these Hong Kong English newspapers on China's reform and revolutionary movements carried many similar and persistent viewpoints.

In general, the Hong Kong English newspapers in China were discontented with the Manchu rule and conditions in China since China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. They found the conditions in China in the 1890s very deplorable. The Chinese bureaucracy was corrupted to the core; robbery




and piracy were rife; there were also frequent outbreaks of anti-foreign outrages. The expressions of hatred for the Manchu rule in China that were found in the Hong Kong English newspapers reached their climax on the eve of and one or two years after the Boxer uprising. It was quite clear that the Manchu government was unable to restore order and stability. It was in this period that Sun Yat-sen's political movement posed a new radical alternative to the Hong Kong English journalists. Undoubtedly, some Hong Kong English journalists were interested in the anti-Manchu revolutionary movement led by Sun Yat-sen during its inception stage. Despite the existence of the alleged friendly ties between Sun Yat-sen and some Hong Kong English journalists, Sun's movement was, however, rarely held in any high esteem by the Hong Kong English newspapers. As China had failed to reform herself as demonstrated in the failure of the 1898 reform movement, the threat of the partition of China was frequently raised in the Hong Kong English newspapers. The Hong Kong English journalists disliked foreign intervention of any kind. In their opinion, a stable Manchu dynasty in China was preferable to a new Chinese government, a partitioned China or even anarchy. They did not question the sincerity of the Manchu court in introducing reforms in the country especially in the years after the Russo-Japanese War. They all agreed to the fact that reforms in China should essentially be a ruling class activity and that it should be slow and gradual. They distrusted the intentions of



the Chinese revolutionaries who were viewed as potential disturbers of the peace. For more than a decade, they were looking for the emergence of strong men in China at both national and provincial levels in China. Yuan Shih-k'ai was their chosen candidate to guide the ship of state in a stormy sea. In the eyes of the Hong Kong English journalists, Yuan appeared to be the only one capable of restoring order and protecting the lives and property of the Chinese and foreigners in China. Revolutionary upheavals would only bring about anarchy and the almost inevitable necessity of European intervention.

The Hong Kong English newspapers preferred to see China progress gradually under western tutelage. A reformed Chinese government along western lines would not only create a strong government capable of protecting western interests but also enlightened enough to open up the country to foreign trade and commerce. Politically, the Hong Kong English journalists did not want any partition of or foreign intervention in China. They favoured a constitutional monarchy rather than the radical republicanism of Sun Yat-sen's type. Economically, they wanted China to allow foreigners to invest in her mining and railway projects; to remove her own likin and other artificial obstacles to free trade. These attitudes of the Hong Kong English newspapers towards affairs in China followed closely the conservative English newspapers in the treaty ports of central and north China.


With the exception of the China Mail in 1895, the



Hong Kong English newspapers seldom advocated armed revolts to overthrow the legitimate Chinese authorities even in the days before the introduction of the Seditious Publications Bill in Hong Kong (1907). There was not much radicalism found in their columns. The Hong Kong English newspapers probably feared that advocacy of radical ideas in their columns such as the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty might create an unpleasant effect upon the Chinese population of Hong Kong even though the Hong Kong English newspapers were rarely read by the ordinary Chinese masses. The Hong Kong English newspapers were quite moderate in their comments on Chinese government and affairs in China compared to the Chinese vernacular journals in the Colony and even to their English contemporary in Singapore, the Straits Times.¹


Fundamentally, the Hong Kong English journalists were in favour of peaceful progress in China. So, after the Russo-Japanese War, in view of the hopeful change that had come over China, the Hong Kong English journalists supported the reforming efforts of the Manchu dynasty again. The following account taken from the recollections of a Hong Kong English journalist who was a friend of Sun Yat-sen can aptly demonstrate this point:

While my sympathies were and still are - with the Reform Party in China, I felt that the trend of affairs at Peking was towards reform through the legitimate channels of the Imperial Government, and I strove to dissuade Sun from making any further effort to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. It was also pointed out to him that China's commitments to foreigners were so great and the undesirability of disturbing the even flow of trade so strong that there was a possibility -



to put it no more strongly - of the Powers intervening to support the Imperial authorities, thus rendering efforts at revolution on the lines of China for the Chinese absolutely hopeless.²

The Hong Kong English newspapers also came to the same view that Hong Kong's role in China's reform and revolutionary movements should necessarily be a limited one. Though in the period under study, the Hong Kong English newspapers expressed pride in seeing Hong Kong advance under British rule, they did not, however, expect that Hong Kong could or would play an active role in China's transformation. In their opinion, Hong Kong could at its best only be able to set an example for China to follow. Their primary concern was the financial and economic well-being of the Colony. That is why they were hostile to the anti-opium movement waged in China and Hong Kong. They favoured the building of the University of Hong Kong and the Kowloon-Canton railway mainly because they were convinced that these projects might bring beneficial effects to Hong Kong in the long run. While supporting Hong Kong to be a sanctuary for political offenders, they did not want the Colony to turn into a hot-bed of anti-Manchu activities. They supported the Hong Kong government to introduce measures to check revolutionary activities in the Colony. Their editorial stand scarcely wavered when the Chinese revolutionary movement culminated in the Chinese revolution of 1911. Prosperity, law and order of Hong Kong were the primary concern of the Hong Kong English newspapers. They deprecated revolts against legitimate authorities which they believed could only



invite lawlessness and anti-foreign outrages.

Nature of the Hong Kong English newspapers as reflected
in their reports on affairs in China


A study of the opinions of the four Hong Kong English newspapers on affairs in China would tell us something about the nature of the four Hong Kong English newspapers.

In my opinion, the four Hong Kong English newspapers were just ordinary English commercial newspapers similar to those found on the China coast and elsewhere. It is quite true that the Hong Kong English newspapers were at times initial of the Chinese government and affairs in China.

But that does not mean that they supported the Chinese revolutionary movement. Views that the Hong Kong English newspapers emitted did not tally with the allegation that they were sympathisers of the Chinese revolutionaries.

Their criticisms of the Manchu administration were considered by themselves to be within the normal functions of a responsible newspaper. These functions were to expose abuse, to defend the weak against the oppression of the strong, and to enlighten the masses.³ Their editorial attitudes for most of the time were governed by the changing conditional scenes in China rather than by their alleged friendly ties with the Chinese reformers and revolutionaries.

Their outlandish, secular and mercantile outlooks could also be revealed in their opinions on China's reform and revolutionary movements. Their outlandishness was reflected in the superficiality in their understanding of




the Chinese affairs and problems, their continual and general denigration of things Chinese and the capabilities of the Chinese and their own self-inflated view of the importance of the foreign presence in China. No matter how sincere in intent, they presented China's problems and their possible solutions to their readers from an essentially foreign point of view and with a strong western flavour. The Hong Kong English newspapers were wholeheartedly in support of introducing reforms in China through the legitimate channel. As champion of foreign and especially British interests in China, they were more interested in the political and economic rather than educational and social aspects of China's reform movements. Their primary concerns were that the lives and property of foreigners in China should be protected and that foreign commercial activities in China should be promoted. The reforms they proposed to China were thus mainly aimed at achieving these ends. Their reform proposals included the building of railways, the opening of mines, the opening up China's interior to foreign trade and commerce and the readjustment of China's tariffs and likin systems. What enraged the Hong Kong English journalists most was the inability of the Chinese government to maintain law and order, observe international treaties and its erection of many barriers to free trade such as the existence of the likin system. They considered the expansion of trade in China to be a universal panacea: it could not only benefit China but other nations participate in it.



Functions of the Hong Kong English newspapers in the Chinese reform and revolutionary movements

The role the Hong Kong English newspapers played as an agent of change for China was a very limited one. One thing we should take note of was that the Hong Kong English journalists were small in number but they were highly visible in society. There was thus, as one authority has stated, a large gap between their "nominal importance" and their "limited real importance".⁴ The views they expressed in the newspaper columns were very often spontaneous and sentimental reactions to certain significant issues in China. They did not expect that their opinions would carry any weight or results. They also did not take the trouble to formulate any scheme of reforms they proposed for China in great detail nor were they as private advocates in a position to affect the course of developments in China.


In Chapters II and III, I have discussed, at some length, the attitudes of these four Hong Kong English newspapers to the Chinese reform and revolutionary movements. It was alleged by Tse Tsan Tai that all the Hong Kong English newspapers were actively supporting the Chinese reform movement. The South China Morning Post, under which Tse served as compradore, was in particular said to be a reformist vehicle.⁵ But Tse Tsan Tai had, as my chapter III had already pointed out, made extravagant claims. There was, as one authority pointed out, no mention of reform in China or of other lofty goals when




the South China Morning Post was born. A.G. Ward, one of the early directors of the South China Morning Post Company Limited, told the shareholders that the South China Morning Post was only a newspaper "very much better and more interesting than its rivals".⁶

It is true that a few Hong Kong English journalists were acquainted with certain notable radical Chinese reformers and revolutionaries. But the average Hong Kong English journalists whether they were friends of the Chinese political radicals or not, as reflected in their writings were hardly ideological firebands. They had only a more mundane idea of defending truth, morality and justice in mind. Their comments on the Chinese political radicals for most of the time were not friendly. The latter were regarded as house-breakers rather than house-builders. The Hong Kong English journalists considered true patriots to be those who sought peaceful transformation of their nations.

On the whole, the role that the Hong Kong English newspapers played in China's reform and revolutionary movements was usually indirect and rather unconscious. Appearing in their columns were free translations from Chinese newspapers and other sources numerous seditious articles and information about the anti-Manchu forces.⁷ Their intention to print out these articles was not to popularize the cause of the anti-Manchu forces or to provoke anti-Manchu feeling among their readers. These articles were reproduced as ordinary news items which they



thought might interest their readers.⁸ They did not expect that these articles would produce any political effect on either the foreign or Chinese communities in Hong Kong and elsewhere.




NOTES

Chapter I

1. Some files of the HKWP were also consulted in the writing of this thesis. The HKWP was a weekly summary of important articles appearing in the HKDP. It should not be considered as a separate newspaper.
2. See E.J. Eitel, Europe in China, p. 247; Prescott Clerke, "The development of the English-language press on the China coast, 1827-1881", pp. 77-8; the Hong Kong Guide Book 1893, p. 99; Newspaper Society of Hong Kong (ed.), Newspaper news; a history of English language press in Hong Kong; Frank H.H. King & Prescott Clarke (eds.), A research guide to China-coast newspapers, 1822-1911, p. 59, China Mail, 125th Anniversary Review, p. 4. See also Ko Kung-chen, Chung-kuo pao-hsüeh shih (A History of Chinese Journalism), p. 83; P'an Hsien-mu, "Ya-p'ien chan-cheng hou ti Hsiang-kang pao-k'an" (Hong Kong's periodical journals in the post-Opium War period), HWYCTL:11 (1981), pp. 239-240. Both Ko and P'an mistakenly stated that it was only until 1876 that the CM became a daily. The CM at first started publishing in Pottinger Street Central.
3. See Clarke, "The development of the English-language press...", p. 217; the Hongkong Guide Book, p. 100; Newspaper Society of Hong Kong (ed.), Newspaper News; Ko Kung-chen, p. 83; China Mail, 76th Anniversary Number, March 1921, p. 3; P'an Hsien-mu, loc. cit., HWYCTL:11 (1981) p. 245.

The word "Hongkong" was not included in the title of the newspaper until a few years after its appearance. One article jokingly explains this to mean the lack of confidence of the founder of the paper in the Colony's permanency as a centre of British activity. The article states, "If it had been decided that the community should move to Chusan or any more favoured spot, [the founder] probably thought that the Hongkong Daily Press might move with it, and took care to leave his way of escape open". See Hongkong Daily Press, Anniversary Supplement 1857-1917, p. 2.

4. The Friend of China was established in Macao on March 17, 1842. Its second issue was published in Hong Kong on March 24. It can thus be regarded as the first English newspaper in the Colony. Its first editor was John Carr, an Australian. Carr was soon



replaced by Robert Strachan. Its early compositors were all Portuguese. Governor Davis had a very low opinion of this paper and stated that it chiefly catered for the "low level to which the dregs of the community naturally flows".

The Hongkong Register was published as a daily in 1845. In 1860, it changed its name to HongKong Registrar and Daily Advertiser. Governor Davis once said of this newspaper as the mouthpiece of the big commercial firm, the Jardine, Matheson and Company. His view was later disputed by his successor Bonham.

See CO129/19/1086 of April 24, 1847; CO129/33/8731 of August 23, 1850, Newspaper Society of Hong Kong (ed.), Newspaper News; Robin Hutcheon, op. cit., p. 4; P'an Hsien-mu, "Ya-p'ien chan-cheng hou ti Hsiang-kang pao-k'an" (Hong Kong's periodical journals in the post-Opium War period) in HWYCTL:11 (1981), 237-238.

5. See the Hongkong Guide Book, p. 100; China Mail, 76th Anniversary Number, March 1921, p. 7; P'an Hsien-mu, loc. cit., p. 252.
6. See Hutcheon, pp. 12 & 16; CM, November 6, 1903, p. 4, col. 6.
7. A facsimile of this issue can be found in SCMP: 70th Anniversary Review, pp. 37-44. For a detailed analysis of its content, see Nigel Cameron, Hongkong: The Cultured Pearl, pp. 148-9.

The first extant but incomplete issue of the SCMP was dated November 6, 1903. Robin Hutcheon's book has a facsimile reduction of this issue in seven pages. See p. 13 et seq.

8. The exact daily circulation rate for these English newspapers was treated as a commercial secret and was as a rule not disclosed to the public. See, for example, Hongkong Blue Books, 1900-1912, the section on "Return of the Principal Publications".

In the first year of its foundation i.e. 1903, the SCMP was said to have a regular daily subscription of 236. See Robin Hutcheon, SCMP, the first eighty years, Hong Kong, SCMP, 1983, p. 16. Two years later, the number rose to about 300. See ibid., p. 22. In 1906, the SCMP's subscription was 600, a figure which was stated to be quite close to that of the HKDP in the same year. See Feng Ai-ch'un, Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih, p. 74; Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang pao-yeh fa-chan shih, p. 34. Compared to that of their leading contemporaries in China, the daily subscription rate of these four Hong Kong English



newspapers is very modest indeed. North China Daily News, the leading English newspaper in Shanghai, for example, had a daily circulation of some 1,600 issues in 1902. See Woodhead, Adventures in Far Eastern Journalism (1935), p. 2. The circulation rate of the SCMP and that of the other Hong Kong English newspapers in other years can not yet be ascertained.

The potential local subscribers for these four Hong Kong English newspapers should understandably number not more than a few hundred. The resident foreign population in the Colony hardly swelled to 20,000 during the first decade of the twentieth century. The number of non-Chinese in the Colony in 1906 was 12,415 and the number only rose to 13,157 in 1911. See CM, "The Census", June 12, 1911. See also SCMP: 70th Anniversary Review, p. 21; G.R. Sayer, Hong Kong 1862-1919, Appendix V, "Population of Hong Kong 1862-1919", compiled from Historical and Statistical Abstract of the Colony of Hong Kong 1841-1930, Hong Kong, Noronha Co., 1932.

The number of Chinese in Hong Kong who were equipped with the language to read these English newspapers was not known. Suffice it to say that the number should not surpass that for the non-Chinese at any time in the period under study.

9. See speech delivered in the Second Annual Meeting of the SCMP Ltd., published in SCMP, May 12, 1904, p. 2.
10. See Elizabeth Sinn, "Materials for historical research: source materials on the Tung Wah Hospital 1870-1941 the case of a historical institution", unpublished seminar paper, October 1982, p. 29.
11. Cited from SCMP, 70th Anniversary Review, p. 24.
12. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the standard charge for press cables from Britain to Australia and to India was one shilling per word. See The Times (London), A newspaper history 1785-1935 (London, 1935), p. 118. The transmission rate to Hong Kong cannot be found. It should have been higher.
13. It may be of interest to note that Reuter's service was not highly appreciated by the Hong Kong English newspapers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. HKT of May 1, 1896, for example, complained that Reuter had always conducted the supply of news to Hong Kong in a "thoroughly unbusinesslike way", that "the Colony was very inefficiently supplied with news by Reuter as compared with other places; and that Hong Kong had to "pay a big price for very little". Similarly,



frequent delays of messages of importance by Reuter's agency culminated in a vehement exclamation in CM's editorial column on August 13, 1901: "Reuter's telegrams are better than no telegrams at all, and that about all that can be said for Reuter's service".

On the development of Reuter as an international news agency, see Ono Hideo (translated by Ch'en Ku-t'ing), Ko-kuo pao-yeh fa-chien shih, Taipei, Cheng Chung Book Store, 1980, pp. 58-9; The Times (London), A Newspaper History 1785-1935, chapter XXI, pp. 122-4.

14. See, for example, Hutcheon, p. 31. HKT of February 12, 1897 also stated that some news items that were concerned with affairs other than that of the Colony and China and that were of "sufficient general interest" to the local community were reproduced from newspapers arriving by mail to the Colony from different parts of the world.
15. See Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang pao-yeh fa-chan shih, p. 34; Hutcheon, pp. 14-6; SCMP, May 12, 1904, p. 2.
16. Hutcheon, p. 23; SCMP, May 12, 1904, p. 2.
17. SCMP, June 8, 1905, p. 7, col. 4.
18. See SCMP of December 13, 1905 as mentioned in HKT, December 13, 1905, reprinted in Mail Supplement, December 16, 1905.
19. See, for example, the report of the fifth annual ordinary general meeting of the South China Morning Post Limited, reprinted in CM, December 30, 1907, p. 5 & SCMP, December 31, 1907. The directors of the company mention the "disappointing nature" of the accounts of the company. See also Hutcheon, pp. 12, 14, 18 & 22.
20. For a brief biography of Noble, see Who's who in the Far East (June), 1906-7, p. 249; King, pp. 72-3.
21. Hutcheon, p. 33.
22. The report of the company meeting appears in CM, December 15, 1909, p. 4; and also SCMP, December 9, 1909. The latter issue states that the profit for the year ending 31st August 1909 was HK\$25,506.29 leaving a reduced debit to be carried forward of HK\$31,096.38.
23. See King and Clarke, p. 74.
24. See King and Clarke, pp. 58-9; 122; 148-9; Feng Ai-chun, Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih (History of Chinese journalism), p. 52; Prescott Clarke, "The development of the English-language press on the China Coast, 1827-1881", pp. 88-92; 149-52.



25. See King and Clarke, p. 122; P. Clarke, p. 422; Who's who in the Far East (June), 1906-7, p. 12; Addenda Section "B"; Henry Lethbridge, Hongkong: Stability and Change, p. 265, n. 34; Hutcheon, p. 7; CM, April 21, 1909; April 24, 1909, p. 4; SCMP, "Death of Mr. G. Murray Bain. An old resident", April 22, 1909, p. 2, col. 4-5; Bain was treated by Henry May, the Officer Administering the Government as "the doyen of the Press in the Far East", see CM, "Social and personal", August 5, 1910, p. 4, col. 4; see also China Mail, 125th Anniversary Review, Hong Kong, China Mail Office, 1970, p. 16.
26. See King and Clarke, pp. 64, 139-140; Feng Ai-chun, Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih, p. 52; Hongkong Daily Press: Anniversary Supplement 1857-1917, p. 4.
27. See King and Clarke, p. 153.
28. For more information about the career of Fraser-Smith, see King and Clarke, pp. 71-2 & 127; Clarke's M.A. thesis, pp. 470; 482-3; Feng Ai-ch'un, Chung-kuo hsin-wen-shih, p. 74.
29. See HKT, "Introductory", April 1, 1895. One of Fraser-Smith's immediate successors was J.J. Francis. See Lethbridge, Hongkong: Stability and Change, p. 264, n. 27. J.J. Francis was reported to have "held a large interest in the Hongkong Telegraph" at the time of his death. See HKT, "Obituary", September 23, 1901. The CM at the death of J.J. Francis also reports, "At one time, Mr. Francis was editor and proprietor of the China Mail, and at the time of his death had not severed the connection with the Hongkong Telegraph acquired in 1894." See CM, "The late Mr. J.J. Francis. An interesting career", September 23, 1901. Peking and Tientsin Times of October 5, 1901 reporting the death of J.J. Francis also makes these remarks: "Mr. Francis, if we mistake not, was more than a tyro at the journalistic profession, and acquired an interest in that quondam enemy of dullness as the 'Hongkong Telegraph'."
30. See King, pp. 155-6; see also HKT, "Presentation to Mr. J.P. Braga, Business Manager of 'Hongkong Telegraph' retires after nine years' service" in Mail Supplement, November 5, 1910, p. 379.
31. See King and Clark, p. 73; Hutcheon, p. 12.
32. See Who's who in the Far East (June) 1906-7, pp. 66-7; King and Clarke, p. 120.
33. Who's who in the Far East (June) 1906-7, p. 80; King, p. 123. (Refer also to previous pages on Donald).



34. King, p. 144; Who's who in the Far East (June), 1906-7, p. 269; CM, November 13, 1905, p. 4, col. 5; HKT, September 4, 1911, p. 4, col. 3.
35. King, pp. 160-1; HKDP, July 9, 1908.
36. Who's who in the Far East (June), 1906-7, p. 122; King, p. 129.
37. See SCMP, May 28, 1906, p. 6, col. 6. This issue also reported that "Cowen was said to have some of a New Castle family long connected with journalism".
38. See Who's who in the Far East (June), 1906-7, p. 84; King and Clarke, pp. 119 & 124; HKWP, "Shanghai Newspaper Suit", July 19, 1902, p. 49; see also Schiffrin, p. 71, n. 52; p. 79, n. 66, p. 82 quoting from Arnold Wright, p. 359.
39. See "Death of Hongkong Journalist", HKT, August 29, 1904 & CM, "Death of Mr. G. Manington", August 29, 1904, p. 4; SCMP, "Death of Mr. George Manington", August 30, 1904, p. 5, col. 7.
40. See CM, April 5, 1905, p. 4, col. 5, "Local and coast news. A Journalist's death: Mr. Harold F. Piper".
41. See Brebner's obituary appearing in CM, April 20, 1910, p. 4, col. 3; HKT, April 20, 1910 (editorial), reprinted in Mail Supplement, April 21, 1910, p. 126, col. 4-5.
42. King, p. 134; SCMP, 70th Anniversary Review, p. 24; Hutcheon, p. 28.
43. King, p. 143.
44. King, p. 129; SCMP, 70th Anniversary Review, p. 24; Hutcheon, pp. 33-4.
45. See Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years, p. 7 & p. 30.
46. See p. 21.
47. See HKWP, July 24, 1895. The English newspapers in Japan refused to be viewed in such light. A reply from the Japan Herald of August 3, 1895 was printed in HKT, August 13, 1895, p. 3, col. 1.
48. SCMP, January 18, 1904, p. 5, col. 5-7; see also CM, January 18, 1904, p. 5.
49. See HKT, "Notes and Comments", August 26, 1896.
50. Lienchau was in northern Kwangtung. The incident referred to the attack by a Chinese riotous mob on




the American Presbyterian mission station at Lienchau in October 1905. See Edward J.M. Rhoads, "Nationalism and xenophobia in Kwangtung (1905-1906): the Canton anti-American boycott and the Lienchow anti-missionary uprising" in Papers on China, XVI (1962), pp. 167-177.

51. See CM, "Privileges of the press", October 9, 1905; "Press v. journal", June 19, 1906, p. 4, col. 5-6.
52. See CM, "Editorial comment: homeward bound", May 25, 1904.
53. See HKT, April 20, 1910, reprinted in Mail Supplement, April 23, 1910, p. 126, col. 4-5.
54. There are two unsettled controversial issue about the Chung-wai hsin-pao. The first is over its date of publication. The HKDP of November 1, 1907 & December 1, 1909 state that the Chung-wai hsin-pao was first issued in 1857.

Some recent researches, however, state that the first issue of the Chung-wai hsin-pao appeared in 1860 or 1861 instead of 1857. See Lin Yu-lan, Hsian-kang pao-yeh fa-chan shih, p. 70ff. See also Rosewell S. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800-1912, p. 39; Linda P. Shin, "Wu T'ing-fang: a member of a colonial elite as coastal reformer", in Reform in Nineteenth-century China edited by Cohen and Schrecker, p. 265; G.B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (O.U.P., 1964) p. 113.

But there are also many who have been convinced that 1858 should be the more appropriate date. See Ko Kung-chen, Chung-kuo pao-hsüeh shih (A history of Chinese journalism), p. 73. See also Feng Ai-ch'un, Hua-ch'ao pao-yeh shih, pp. 4 & 6; Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih, pp. 50 & 52; Li Me, "Hsin-hai ke-ming shih-ch'i Kwangtung pao-k'an lu" in HWYCTL, 3rd edition (May 1980), pp. 170-1; Me Szu-yüan, p. 118.

The second controversy focuses on the personal connection of Wu Ting-fang [Ng Choy] with this Chinese newspaper. Ko Kung-chen in Chung-kuo pao-hsüeh shih stated that the founder and first editor of the Chung-wai hsin-pao was Wu Ting-fang. See p. 73. Ko's view was supported by many others. See, for example, Linda P. Shin's abstract to her Ph.D thesis, "China in transition: the role of Wu Ting-fang (1842-1922) which stated that Wu "founded the first Chinese-language daily newspaper while working as a translator in the Hongkong Police Court", see Dissertation Abstracts International 31, pt. 3 (1970-1); see also Shin's "Wu T'ing-fang: a member of a colonial elite as coast l reformer", pp. 265-6; Chang Yun-chao, "Wu Ting-fang's contribution towards political reforms in late Ch'ing period", Ph.D thesis, HKU, 1982, abstract and pp. 6-7.



Other recent researches nevertheless also claim that the first editor of the Chung-wai hsin-pao should be Wong Shing instead of Wu Ting-fang. Wu only worked as a translator for this newspaper. See Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang pao-yeh fa-chen shih, p. 70ff; R.S. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800-1912, p. 39; Lethbridge, p. 158, n. 61; P'an Hsien-mu, loc. cit., HWYCTL:11 (1981), p. 246.


Wu Ting-fang subsequently rose to the position of lessee and manager of the newspaper before his departure to England to study law in 1874. His brother Ng Chan took over his newspaper duties. When Ng Chan died, Chiu Yu-tsun succeeded him as sub-lessee and general manager until 1908 when the latter also died. See HKWP, December 31, 1896, p. 503; HKDP, June 12, 1908; Chinese Public Opinion, "Death of a Chinese journalist", July 14, 1908.

The Chung-wai hsin-pao was at first issued in alternate days. It was converted into a daily in 1864.

55. To support given to this view, see P. Clarke's M.A. thesis, p. v.
56. The HKT of December 20, 1902 and HKDP of December 1, 1909 stated that the two newspapers were issued in the same office. For support given to this view, see Britton, p. 39; HKDP, December 1, 1902, p. 2, col. 3. See also Lo Hsiang-lin, Hong Kong and Western Cultures, p. 201
57. See P'an Hsien-mu, "Ya-p'ien chan-cheng hou ti Hsiang-kang pao-k'an", in HWYCTL:11 (1981), p. 240; Chang Yun-chao, "Wu Ting-fang's contribution towards political reforms in late Ch'ing period", unpublished Ph.D thesis (1982), HKU, p. 7. The Hua-tzu jih-pao was at first published in alternate days. It became a daily in 1874.
58. See R.S. Britton, p. 47.
59. See, for example, CM, June 17, 1905, p. 4, col. 4.
60. See Chang Yun-chao, op. cit., p. 7; see also August 7, 1905, p. 4, col. 6. After the departure of Ch'en Ai-ting, the business of the newspaper was passed to his son Ch'en Tou-yüan. See CM, April 15, 1898, p. 2, col. 6; Ko Kung-chen, p. 74. When Ch'en Tou-yüan left Hong Kong for Canton in 1898, proprietorship fell in the hands of the editorial staff of the newspaper, Pan Fei-shing or (Pan Lan-shih, editor since 1892) and Lai Wen-shan and Yen Ch'ing-p'u. See Lo Hsiang-lin, Hongkong and Western Cultures, p. 206; "Hsiang-kang hua-wen pao-yeh yen-pien", A Century of Commerce.




61. The China Mail occupied the house at the corner of Wyndham Street and Wellington Street and the two adjoining houses in Wellington Street, the second of which was leased to the lessees of the Chinese Mail, the Hua-tzu jih-pao. See HKT, January 14, 1895, p. 2, col. 2; HKWP, January 17, 1895. See also Britton, pp. 46-7.
62. See CM, April 21, 1909.
63. See, for example, Ko Kung-chen, p. 74; Frank H.H. King and P. Clarke, p. 65; Feng Ai-ch'un, Hua-ch'iao pao-ye shih, pp. 6 & 9; Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih, p. 53; Li Me, "Hsin-hai ko-ming shi-ch'i Kuangtung pao-k'an lu", HWYCTL, 3rd ed., May 1980, p. 171; Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang pao-ye fa-chan shih, p. 30.
64. See "The Hong Kong origins of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's address to Li Hung-chang", in JHKBRAS, 21 (1981), Dr. Ng stated in her article that "in 1886, the Chinese Mail became an independent paper with Ch'en Ai-ting as its editor" (see p. 171). She cited no source for this information. Anyway, Ch'en was not in the Colony in the 1880s though his son Ch'en U Men was the lessee of the HTJP by 1905. Ko Kung-chen stated that the HTJP became an independent paper after a fire had wrecked its office. See p. 75. The fire that Ko referred to might have broken out in January 1895. See HKWP, "Fire at the "China Mail" office", January 17, 1895, p. 44. Others such as Feng Ai-chun and P'an Hsien-mu offered 1919 to be the year when the HTJP became independent of the CM. See Hua-ch'iao pao-ye shih (A History of Journalism of overseas Chinese), Taipei, Students Bookstore, 1977, p. 9; "Ya-p'ien chan-cheng hou ti Hsiang-kang pao-k'an", HWYCTL:11 (1981), p. 240.
65. See Feng: i-shih: 1, p. 166; see also Chen Hsüeh-lin, "huang Sheng Ch'u'an", History Society Annual, 1960, pp. 37 & 39, n. 10; Yuan Ch'ang-ch'ao, Chung-kuo pao-ye hsiao-shih, pp. 29-30; Feng Ai-ch'un, Chung-kuo pao-ye shih, pp. 9 & 10, Li Me, loc. cit., p. 171; Me Szu-yuan, p. 119; P'an Hsien-mu, loc. cit., p. 248.
66. Ch'en Hsüeh-lin, loc. cit., pp. 37-8; no. 6; Thomas E. LaFargue, China's first hundred, pp. 11-3; Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang pao-ye fa-chan shih, pp. 69 & 74; Britton, p. 45; Ch'en Hsüeh-lin, "Huang Sheng: Hsiang-kang hua-jen t'i-ch'ang yang-wu shih-ye chih hsien-ch'u" (Wong Shing: A distinguished Chinese of early Hong Kong), Ch'ung-chi Hsüeh-pao (The Chung Chi Journal) 3.2:226-231 (May 1964). Wang T'ao was another founder of the newspaper. Wang was known as the "father of Chinese journalism". See Judson M. Lyon, "Protonationalism in China, 1874-1890: The Institutional Reformers", in Asian Profile, 8:4 (August 1980), p. 304. See also Wm.T. de Bary,



et al., p. 717. Ko Kung-chen, A History of Chinese Journalism, p. 119; see also Lo Hsiang-lin, Hong Kong and Western Cultures, p. 58, p. 202. See also Ch'en Tsu-sheng, "Wang T'ao" in Hsin-wen chiai jen-wu compilation committee compiled, Hsin-wen chiai jen-wu, Chung-hua ch'u-pan she, 1983. Included in Ch'en's article was a review of the editorial policy of the newspaper under Wang T'ao.

Whether Wu Ting-fang was on the editorial staff of this newspaper was open to doubt. See Chang Yung-chao, op. cit., p. 7.


67. See King, p. 27, 71-2; Feng Ai-ch'un, Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih, p. 74; Hutcheon, p. 7 & 24.
68. See King, pp. 27 & 71-2; Hutcheon, pp. 24 & 28.
69. See Hutcheon, p. 24.
70. See Ko Kung-chen's Chung-kuo pao-hsueh shih, p. 104. Wang T'ao's opinions were mostly expressed in the Hsün-huan jih-pao. His newspaper articles were collected in T'ao-yüan wen-lu wai-pien (reprint, Taipei, 1959). See Ng Lun Ngai-ha, "A survey of source materials in Hong Kong related to late Ch'ing China", Ch'ing shih wen-ti, 4:2 (1979), p. 156, n37.
71. See SCMP: 70th Anniversary Review, p. 21.
72. For information about the general character and editorial policy of Chinese Public Opinion, see its issues on May 5, 1908, p. 2 & 3; May 9, 1908, p. 3; May 12, 1908, p. 3, "A false report", May 14, 1908, p. 3; "To elucidate our policy", May 16, 1908, p. 3; May 21, 1908, p. 3, col. 2. Although under Chinese editorial management, the Chinese Public Opinion "had occasional assistance from English journalists in Peking", see HKDP May 13, 1909. Chinese Public Opinion had a Chinese companion, the Pe-king jih-pao (Peking Daily News). According to the HKDP of February 1, 1910, the Peking Daily News and the Peking Post (established in early 1910) were the only English newspapers at Peking and that both aimed at "giving the Chinese view of affairs". The Peking Post was, nevertheless, run by "qualified European journalists". The commonly held contemporary foreign opinion was that the Peking Daily News as an expositor of the Chinese side of international complications should necessarily adopt an anti-foreign stand. The HKDP was, however, convinced that the Peking Daily News genuinely intended to remove misunderstanding between China and other foreign nations and to prevent their recurrence. Some of articles from the Peking Daily News, as the HKDP of August 30, 1910 pointed out, because of ignorance of the real state of affairs, might have failed this avowed aim.



73. See Peking Daily News, May 11, 1909; May 12, 1909; May 19, 1909; May 20, 1909 (editorial); May 29, 1909 (editorial); May 31, 1909, p. 5, col. 2-3.
74. See HKT, November 23, 1894, p. 2, col. 5.
75. HKT, January 14, 1895, p. 2, col. 2.
76. HKT, July 18, 1895.
77. This article is reprinted in HKT, June 14, 1895.
78. See HKT, December 24, 1895, p. 2, col. 5.
79. For more details about this Ordinance, see Hongkong Government Gazette, vol. XL, 8th December 1894, pp. 1053-4.
80. See p. 245.
81. See Prescott Clarke, "The development of the English-language press on the China coast, 1827-1881", pp. 119, 123 & 130; King & Clarke, p. 61. See also G.C. Hamilton, Government Departments in Hong Kong 1841-1969, "The History of the Hong Kong Government Gazette", pp. 10-12.

Both the Friend of China and the Hongkong Register had before 1845 successively been accepted as the official organ of the Hong Kong Government when the Colonial Government decided not to establish a printing press of its own. See No. 149 & No. 150 of CO129/10 of April 6, 1844; CO129/4/812 of August 25, 1843. Governor Davis at once opted for the newly founded CM as its first editor Andrew Shortrede was obviously a man of connection and means. According to the Governor, Shortrede could bring with him an introduction letter from the Colonial Office and establish an effective correspondence with the London newspapers. Governor Bonham, however, sought the Hong Kong Register as the official organ of the government when Shortrede made malicious remarks on him. See CO129/11/982 of March 1, 1845; CO129/19/1086 of April 24, 1847; CO129/43/10655 of August 29, 1853. Bonham's successor Bowring renewed the contract with Shortrede for conducting Government Gazette and printing. See CO129/51/8357 of July 3, 1855.

82. See King and Clarke, pp. 61-2; Feng Ai-ch'un, Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih, p. 52.
83. See "China sixty-two years ago", p. 5, col. 3-4.
84. See "Introductory", p. 3.
85. See p. 4.




86. 'D. Noronha, Government Printer' became 'Noronha & Sons, Printers to the Hong Kong Government' in January 1868 and 'Noronha & Co.' in July 1879. See G.C. Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 12-3. Delfino Noronha, a Portuguese resident of Hong Kong, was the owner of this printing firm until his death in 1900. His eldest son H.L. Noronha took over the business of the company until death, (April 11, 1905). H.L. Noronha was previously manager of the company until 1876 when he went to Singapore. See CM, "The late Mr. H.L. Noronha", April 12, 1905, p. 4, col. 6. See also p. Clarke, p. 253.
87. See SCMP, December 13, 1905, p. 7, col. 4.
88. See HKT, December 13, 1905, reprinted in Mail Supplement, December 16, 1905.
89. References to these early day quarrels between the Hong Kong English newspapers and the Hong Kong government can be found in P. Clarke, pp. 104-5, 164ff; Feng Ai-ch'un, Hua-ch'iao pao-ye shih, pp. 4-5; Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih, p. 52; Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang pao-ye fa-chan shih, pp. 32-3; China Mail, 125th Anniversary Review, pp. 5 & 9; CM, April 21, 1906.
90. See HKT, April 20, 1910, Mail Supplement, April 23, 1910, p. 126, col. 4-5.
91. HKT, for example, admitted that it was not counted upon as one of Governor William Robinson's friends. See HKT, "Sir William Robinson, G.C.M.G.", October 30, 1897; see also HKT, "Sir William Robinson", January 31, 1898.

Interestingly, one can compare this press remark on Robinson with those on Matthew Nathan. The South China Morning Post, for example, once expressed proudly that "His Excellency [Matthew Nathan] has always been a good friend to journalists". See SCMP, April 6, 1907, p. 6, col. 5-6.

92. See HKWP, September 29, 1897, p. 252; HKT, October 20, 1897 (editorial).
93. See Tse Tsan Tai, The Chinese Republic, secret history of the Revolution, Hong Kong, SCMP, 1924, p. 8.

Tse Tsan Tai was an "active" reformer in Hong Kong in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For additional information about his career, see "Tse Tsan Tai" in W. Feldwick, Present day impressions of the Far East and prominent and progressive Chinese at home and abroad, London, Globe Encyclopedia, 1917, pp. 583-585. See also Huang Chia-jen, "Tsai Hsiang-kang chiao ke-ming te Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai" (Tse Tsan Tai,



the one who conducted the revolution from Hong Kong), Ta-hua, 1:3 (September 1970), 13-15; Chao Shan-ming, "Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai shih-lüeh pu-i (shu-chien)" (Addenda to Tse Tsan Tai's career (letters), Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh, 21:2.

94. See CM of October 26, 1898 states "of all the glorious fruits of Western civilization there is nothing greater than the freedom of the Press". For other press statements in support of this principle, see HKT, December 28, 1895; HKDP, September 17, 1902, reprinted in HKWP, September 22, 1902, p. 216; HKT, November 28, 1902, p. 4, col. 4; CM, October 9, 1905; SCMP, September 14, 1909; SCMP, October 6, 1911, p. 6.
95. See HK Government's letters to the editors of the Hongkong Register and Government Gazette and the Friend of China asking for copies of their newspapers, enclosed in Nos. 157 & 158, CO129/10 of April 16, 1844. The Governor of Hong Kong was instructed by the Colonial Office in a circular dated February 9, 1847 to provide the British home government from time to time with the most recent information concerning the principal newspapers in circulation in the Colony. See, for example, CO129/43/10655 of August 29, 1853; CO129/106/10774 of September 6, 1865; CO129/111/3256 of February 9, 1866.
96. See CO129/77/5047 of March 22, 1860. See also P. Clarke, pp. 105-6. The Ordinance was cited in full by Clarke.
97. The first law respecting defamatory words and libels introduced on August 24, 1843. Libelled parties could sue for damages by reference to this ordinance. It was subsequently amended by Ordinance No. 3 of 1854 and Ordinance No. 1 of 1887 (the Defamation and Libels Ordinance). The Law and Libel Amendment Ordinance, 1901 brought the libel law of Hong Kong into line with that of England. For details concerning all these ordinances, see Hongkong Government Gazette, December 2, 1854, pp. 214-215; January 15, 1887, pp. 21-3; The Ordinances of Hong Kong (1937 edition), vol. 1, pp. 262-269; Hongkong Government Gazette, February 16, 1901, pp. 374-375; Hongkong Hansard, Session 1900-1901, p. 27.
98. For details about this ordinance, see CO129/77/5047 of March 22, 1860; Hongkong Government Gazette, December 1, 1860, p. 258; P. Clarke, p. 225.
99. See CO129/226/8453 of April 5, 1886. Details of the Ordinance can be found in Hongkong Government Gazette, March 27, 1886, pp. 218-223.
100. See CO129/249/11113 of April 28, 1891.



101. A few examples would demonstrate the existence and the nature of these squabbles.

Example 1: The Sino-Japanese War provided the occasion for a substantial press squabble to develop between the HKT on the one side and that of the CM and HKDP on the other. The existence of a press squabble can be reflected in the HKT's criticisms of the CM and HKDP in their lack of ability and enterprises providing accurate special telegraphic information regarding the affair and in its attacks of the CM's war correspondent in Japan, T.C. Cowen. See HKT, "Our local contemporaries", August 1, 1894; HKT, "The China Mail and its funny man", August 23, 1894; see also HKT, November 8, 1894; November 13, 1894; November 17, 1894, p. 2, col. 4; November 23, 1894, p. 2, col. 5; January 3, 1895, p. 2, col. 4-5; January 16, 1895, p. 2, col. 2-4.

Example 2: The HKT of March 5, 1895 ["Journalistic claptrap"] charged the HKDP of being unfair and unfaithful to a departing Justice with an honourable, brilliant and spotless career.

Example 3: The CM blamed the HKT for filching from its columns a verse contributed by a reader "Q" to its March 26, 1895 issue. While regarding the CM as too "hypercritical" over such a trifling poaching, the HKT printed an apology on its April 16, 1895 issue.

Example 4: The HKT and HKDP crossed swords over the question of flogging. See HKWP, June 18, 1896, p. 496.


Example 5: The HKT of June 21, 1897 laughed the HKDP of being too "grandmotherly in its views".

Example 6: The SCMP of June 23, and June 26, 1905 criticised the HKDP of inducing one of its Chinese workmen to take French leave and of shielding him from legal prosecution.


Example 7: The HKT of December 13, 1905 accused the SCMP of having secret dealing with the government and securing the contract for reporting all important judgement given in the Supreme Court alone.

Example 8: The HKT of August 14, 1906 lashed out in very severe language against its junior contemporary the SCMP for unwarranted and unacknowledged appropriation of news items from certain of its recent issues.

Example 9: The CM of July 17, 1911 argued against the unbridled freedom of the trade guilds in Hong Kong and criticized the SCMP of adopting an inconsistent stand on the question. The SCMP defended



- its stand and in addition accused the CM of unwilling to help a colleague in straits.
102. See SCMP, January 8, 1904, p. 4; January 18, 1904, p. 5; CM, January 8, 1904, p. 4; January 18, 1904, p. 5; HKT, "Hongkong Journalists' Association" and "Press Association for Hongkong January 8, 1904; HKWP, January 25, 1904, pp. 61-2.
103. See H.H.F. King and P. Clarke, p. 120.
104. Hutcheon, p. 23.
105. See H.H.F. King and P. Clarke, p. 143.
106. Ibid., p. 144; Who's who in the Far East (June) 1906-7, p. 269; HKDP, June 17, 1907, p. 2, col. 3; HKT, September 4, 1911, p. 4, col. 3.
107. See HKDP, April 11, 1912.
108. HKT, September 23, 1901.
109. See H.H.F. King, pp. 72 & 142; Newspaper Society of Hong Kong (ed.), Newspaper News: a history of English-language press in Hong Kong (1971), Hutcheon, p. 27.
110. See CM, "Anonymous Correspondence", September 9, 1910, p. 5, col. 5.
111. See, for example, CM, "Notice to Correspondents", December 30, 1904, p. 4, col. 3; SCMP, "Notice to correspondents", May 8, 1911, p. 6, col. 3.
112. See CO129/106/19774 of September 6, 1865.
113. See p. 20.
114. See Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang pao-ye fa-chan shih (The development of the press in Hong Kong), p. 34. In 1906, the Peak had a population of 601 and by 1911, the number stayed at 723. See CM, "The Census", June 12, 1911.
115. Commenting on the Hill District Reservation Scheme, CM of April 4, 1904 stressed the fact that it was a consistent upholder of the cause of the low-salaried Europeans in the lower levels. But it did not tell us in the same issue or in other issues that it only served the interest of this class of people and would totally ignore others' in the community.
116. See CM, April 8, 1904, p. 4.
117. Cited from China Mail, 76th Anniversary Number, March 1921, p. 3.




118. Stephen Hoadley makes use of the Hong Kong society of the 1960s as his case study for questions relating to political culture and socialization. See Hoadley's "Hong Kong is the lifeboat: notes on political culture and socialization", Journal of Oriental Studies 8:1 (January 1970). His explanations can also be applied to the Hong Kong society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
119. Cited by SCMP, January 9, 1904, p. 4.
120. See HKT, April 1, 1895.
121. See CM, "A pressman's troubles. Insult at the Magistracy", September 8, 1904, p. 4, col. 7.
122. CM, July 30, 1903, p. 4.
123. HKT, September 6, 1904.
124. CM, December 7, 1903.
125. CM, April 8, 1904 [editorial]; April 13, 1904, p. 4, col. 3; SCMP, April 11, 1904 [editorial].
126. See King and Clarke, pp. 3-4, 23 & 26. Hutcheon also stated that the Hong Kong English newspapers had maintained a "large up-country sale", see SCMP: the first eighty years, p. 2.
127. See China Mail, 125th Anniversary Review, p. 11.
128. The overland editions were normally published to coincide with the departure of the mail (via Siberia) for England. For more information about the Overland China Mail, see P. Clarke, pp. 78, 113-4; 296. See also its advertisement in CM, May 10, 1910. According To Clarke, the Overland China Mail was not in circulation in England by 1909.

By the turn of the century, other Hong Kong English newspapers had also had weekly editions. They contained, like the Overland China Mail, main news items from the local daily edition. The weekly edition of the HKDP was known as the Hongkong Weekly Press; the HKT, the Mail Supplement or the Hongkong Weekly Telegraph; the SCMP, the South China Weekly Post. With the exception of the HKWP, and the mail Supplement of the HKT, all other weekly newspapers are not available for my perusal. I have only come across two indices for one issue of the Overland China Mail and the Hongkong Weekly Telegraph respectively in CM, September 13, 1909, p. 8, col. 1 and HKT, November 3, 1911, p. 5, col. 5.

129. See "Intimation", May 13, 1904, p. 5.




130. SCMP of April 23, 1906, for example, considered the North China Daily News as the "leading journal in China" and frankly admitted that "no other journals ever seriously challenged the Daily News owing to the capacity of its editor [Robert Little], its strong connections all over China, [and] its sound financial position". Moreover, since was close to the Central Office of the Inspectorate General of Customs, the chief nerve-centre of all kinds of intelligence gathered from its different sub-offices throughout the Chinese Empire, it was naturally stood head and shoulder above the Hong Kong English newspapers in the provision of news concerning China.
131. One notable advantage that the Times (London) enjoyed was that it had maintained very capable correspondents in the Far East. George Ernest Morrison, the Times (London) correspondent at Peking (1897-1912) was perhaps the best known example. HKT of May 15, 1911 considered him to be "a leader of the press". For a brief introduction to his career, see Chin-tai lai-hua wai-kuo jen-ming tz'u-tien (A Dictionary of names of foreigners coming to China in the modern period), Peking, 1981, pp. 339-340. For more information about Morrison the man and his journalistic career, see C.A. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, (Angus & Robertson, 1967) and The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, edited by Lo Hui-min in two volumes, (Cambridge University Press, 1976).
132. See Philip Taylor, "Publicity and diplomacy: the impact of the First World War upon Foreign Office attitudes towards the Press" in Retreat from Power, studies in Britain's foreign policy of the twentieth century, vol. 1: 1906-1939, edited by David Dilks, p. 42.
133. See reprint in HKT, September 2, 1908, Mail Supplement, September 4, 1908.
134. See ibid.




Chapter II

1. See reprint in HKWP, "The political situation in the Far East", December 11, p. 438.
2. See, for example, HKWP, September 10, 1896 (editorial); July 29, 1897 (editorial). On this point, the attitude of the Hong Kong English newspapers was quite typical of that of the other prevalent contemporary foreign opinions on current affairs in China. Books written by western observers of the period bear such titles as "The breakup of China" (written by Lord Charles Beresford) or "China in decay" (written by Alexis Krausse). See also Liu Ch'iu-nan, Chung-kuo chin-tai wai-chiao shih, Taichung, Kuo-li chung-hsing tai-hsüeh, 1972, pp. 93-4. Pessimistic expressions on the future of China were also found in other leading contemporary works on China and even among the British officials and diplomats. See ibid., p. 104; and Henry Norman, The Peoples and Politics of the Far East (New York, 1895); D.C. Boulger, "The New Situation in the Far East", Contemporary Review, December 1895; R.K. Douglas, "some Peking politicians", Nineteenth Century, December 1896, pp. 796-906; V. Chirol, The Far Eastern Question, Chapter II, "China after the war", also quoted by Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 386 & 461, quoted in Wang Tseng-tsai, Ying-kuo tui-hua wai-chiao yü men hu k'ai fang cheng tse, p. 103 & 109, no. 3.
3. See, for example, HKWP, "The regeneration of China", June 6, 1895; HKWP, July 30, 1896; CM, January 17, 1898 (editorial).
4. See HKWP, February 19, 1896; "Progress in China", February 13, 1896.
5. See HKWP, September 10, 1896.
6. HKT of December 2, 1896 stated that Valentine Chirol, the Times Correspondent in a series of letters to the Times on the Far Eastern Question had talked of the Chinese Government as a "mass of corruption". In his book, Chirol also stated that the corruption, incompetency and the disastrous defeat were the "inevitable result of a system of government rotten to the core". See The Far Eastern Question, p. 14. See also HKWP, "China's corruption", April 11, 1895, p. 263.
7. See reprint in HKWP, "A Hunanese reformer", January 16, 1896, p. 45.



8. See North China Daily News, "Who is to blame?" reprinted in HKT, September 18, 1894 & September 19, 1894; North China Daily News, "Can China reform?", reprinted in HKT, March 2, 1897, p.3, col. 2.
9. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, the HKT believed that Japan had "no staying power and no real strength" against a "colossal power" like China. See, for example, HKT, "Why should China sue for peace?", November 8, 1894. A subsequent issue on January 6, 1895 frankly admitted that the HKT was "as grievously in error as anybody" in foreseeing that Japan would emerge as victor.
10. See HKT, May 31, 1895, (editorial).
11. Ibid.
12. See HKDP, reprinted in HKWP, October 10, 1895.
13. See HKDP, reprinted in HKWP, "Progress in China", February 13, 1896.
14. See CM, May 15 & May 18, 1895.
15. See HKDP, June 18, 1896 (editorial).
16. See HKWP, "The regeneration of China", June 6, 1895; see also "The Far Eastern Question III - the moral bankruptcy of China" by Times special correspondent reprinted in CM, November 2, 1895.
17. See HKT, June 18, 1896, p. 3, col. 1-2. It is impossible to tell whether there is any real significance lying in the fact that a reader of the Daily Press had to send a letter which criticized the editorial policy of the Daily Press to the HKT. This may perhaps lay support to my suspicion that the HKT had pursued a pro-Manchu government editorial policy at least during the few years in between the Sino-Japanese War.
18. See reprint in HKWP, September 10, 1896.
19. See reprint in HKWP, October 28, 1896; see also HKWP, "China and her leaders", November 4, 1897, p. 339.
20. See HKWP, October 28, 1896.
21. See reprint in HKWP, "The political situation in the Far East", December 11, 1895, p. 438; see also CM, "Reform in China", January 28, 1899 which quoted Chang Chih-tung's "An exhortation to learn" that an army was the first thing necessary to China's salvation.
22. See reprint in HKWP, "Military reform in China", June 24, 1896, p. 515.




23. See reprint in HKWP, September 10, 1896.
24. See HKWP of June 6, 1895; September 4, 1895. See also HKWP, "China and her leaders", November 4, 1897, p. 339. See also CM, November 2, 1895, reprinted from "The Far Eastern Question" by the Times Special Correspondent. According to V. Chirol, Chang Chih-tung and Li Hung-chang were "enemies to the knife, and representing two opposite and conflicting tendencies, each of them possesses qualities which at least lift him out of the herd of sordid and ignorant mandarins who form the bulk of the ruling class". See his book, The Far Eastern Question, p. 23.
25. See reprint in HKWP, October 28, 1896.
26. See reprint in HKT, June 24, 1896.
27. See Lord Charles Beresford, The Break-up of China, New York and London, 1899, p. 218, quoted also in Harold Z. Schiffriin, "The Enigma of Sun Yat-sen", in Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution, p. 446.
28. See A.S. Yuen, "Can China progress by herself?" in St. John's College Echo, reprinted in No. III of The Yellow Dragon & HKT, October 10, 1899, p. 3, col. 2-3.
29. See "The Far Eastern Question", HKT, April 8, 1895. See also HKWP, February 4, 1899; see CM, October 30, 1895, "The Times on British policy in China, November 2, 1895.
- For other contemporary western accounts on British policy in China, see Krausse, A.S., The Story of the Chinese Crisis, pp. 190-1.
30. Before 1905 the radical Chinese intellectuals tended to direct their anger chiefly at China's weaknesses vis-a-vis the foreign nations and their denunciation of the Manchu Government stressed its inability to resist foreign aggression. See also M.C. Wright, p. 4.
31. Three ideas stood out prominently in the Hong Kong English press comments on the opium question in the pre-Boxer days. First, they believed that the western nations should not be blamed for the introduction of opium into China. The Chinese had addicted to the drug before the arrival of the Westerners. The Indian Opium Monopoly was on the decline for nearly a decade since the 1880s and that China had grown more poppy for domestic consumption than that which was imported from abroad, they argued. See HKT, April 15, 1896; September 4, 1897; HKWP, "The Opium Trade", July 22, 1896; February 26, 1898.




Second, they regarded opium smoking as not a very harmful form of indulgence and that it should be regulated rather than prohibited. See, for example, HKWP, February 26, 1898. Third, they were suspicious of the real intention of the Chinese Government in the anti-opium struggle and its ability to accomplish all that it would undertake in the way of suppressing the opium habit and the opium trade. See, for example, HKWP, August 29, 1895; HKWP, December 22, 1897, p. 483; February 26, 1898. What seemed to justify the bitter criticisms of the Hong Kong English newspapers concerning the sincerity of the Chinese government in the opium prohibition movement was the repeated attempts of the local Chinese provincial authorities to introduce an opium tax on imported opium. The Chinese provincial authorities at Shanghai, for example, were reported to have in July 1895 sought to levy a war tax of Tls. 20 per chest (later Tls. 12 per chest) in the form of a license fee on shops selling opium. This attempt failed because of strong representations forwarded by both the Indian government and also the British Acting Consul-General at Shanghai Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Peking. See HKWP "Taxes on opium", September 18, 1895; Reports from the China Gazette, reprinted in HKWP, "Abandonment of the opium squeeze", September 26, 1895; HKWP, "Increased taxation of opium", August 29, 1895; HKWP, October 10, 1895, p. 271 reprinting an article, "Abandonment of proposed taxation of foreign opium" in The Mercury.

32. At first the question of foot-binding did not interest the Hong Kong English newspapers. Indeed, before 1895, foreigners who were not missionaries had virtually done nothing to suppress this purely Chinese social evil. It was only after Mrs. Archibald Little had waged a vigorous campaign against it that the Hong Kong English newspapers' interest in the movement was roused. See, for example, the HKWP of May 9, 1895, p. 341 which supported the anti-foot binding movement and made an appeal on behalf of the anti-foot binding society to the Hong Kong Government to make the practice punishable by law. The HKT also tried to publicize the campaign. See HKT, "Footbinding in China, address by Mrs. Archibald Little", February 15, 1900, p. 2, col. 5-6; HKT, "The anti-foot binding movement", March 5, 1900, p. 3, col. 2. In April 1895, Mrs. A. Little formed the T'ien Tsu Hui (Natural Feet Society) in Shanghai. Branches of this society were soon formed in other other cities including Hong Kong. Mrs. Little was able to convert a number of prominent Chinese officials to his cause including Chang Chih-tung. Interestingly, in the same period, K'ang Yu-wei also waged a vigorous campaign against foot-binding and set up a Pu Tsan Tsu Hui (No bind feet Society) in Canton. See Mrs. Archibald Little, Intimate China,




Chapter VII, "Anti-footbinding". This Chinese anti-foot binding society also opened an office in Shanghai. See Intimate China, p. 551.

33. See CM, October 9, 1895.
34. See HKWP, "The duty of the White to the coloured races", March 4, 1896.
35. Quoted also in Schiffelin, p. 446. See also HKT, January 24, 1901, p. 5, col. 1.
36. See, for example, HKWP, "Mandarin arrogance and the prospect of reform", April 11, 1895, pp. 262-3.
37. See CM, October 14, 1895.
38. See CM, May 15, 1895.
39. See HKWP, March 12, 1898.
40. See HKWP, "Reform in China", November 19, 1898, p. 411.
41. See HKWP, March 12, 1898.
42. See The Times (London), "The Far Eastern Question", reprinted in CM, November 2, 1895, V. Chirol, The Far Eastern Question, p. 20.
43. This is an opinion from a contemporary historian Tso Shun-sheng. See his Chung-kuo chin-tai shih ssu-chiang (Four Talks on Modern Chinese history), HK, Yu-lien publishing co., 1962, p. 103. For a brief summary of the preparative work of the Chinese radical reformers, see Li Ting-i, "The first cultural and social reform movement in modern China", in Essays in Chinese studies presented to Professor Lo Hsiang-lin on his retirement, pp. 279-283.
44. The reform zeal of the radical reformers was so apparent that it was even visible to the outsiders Mrs. Archibald Little in her Intimate China reported that "...on returning to China in the autumn of 1897, I found in Shanghai evidences of Progress and reform on all sides. A Chinese newspaper generally spoken of in English as Chinese Progress was being issued regularly, and newspapers edited by friends of its editor were coming out in Hunan and even in far-away Szechwan." p. 551.
45. See HKWP, "Mandarin arrogance and the prospect of reform", April 11, 1895, pp. 262-5.
46. See Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, p. 446; Don C. Price, Russia and the roots of the Chinese Revolutions 1896-1911, p. 24 & 228, n. 43; Tso Shun-sheng, Chung-kuo chin-tai shih ssu-chiang (Four Talks




on Modern Chinese History), pp. 95-6; NCH, December 6, 1895; Robert L. Worden, "The views of J.O.P. Bland on K'ang Yu-wei and the Chinese reform movement", Asian Profile, 3:6 (December 1975), p. 564, n. 10; M.E. Cameron, The Reform movement in China, 1898-1912, pp. 26-7.


47. See reprint in HKWP, February 5, 1896, pp. 107-8; "Collapse of the Chinese Reform Association", Quoting news from a newspaper correspondent dated February 12, 1896 at Peking. Mts. Archibald Little viewed this act as a retrograd step and would mean the end of what promised to be the awakening of China. See Intimate China, p. 549.
- T'ang T'sai-chang and Yen Fu were members of the Chung-kuo Ch'iang-hsüeh hui, Shanghai. (Deliberative Association of China). Yung Hung gave it his support and became President of the Association. See Lo Hsiang-lin, Hong Kong and Western Cultures, pp. 121-2; Maribeth E. Cameron, The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1931, p. 28. For more information about this association and its publications, see Ko Kung-chen, pp. 121-2; Tso Shun-sheng, Chung-kuo chin-tai shih ssu-chiang (Four Talks on Modern Chinese History), HK, Yu-lien publishing co., 1962, pp. 99-100. According to Archibald Little, this reform movement was initiated and supported largely by at least three well-known foreigners, two of them well-known missionaries, and it met with much support and encouragement from all classes. See Intimate China, p. 550. John E. Schrecker, "The reform movement of 1898 and the Ch'ing-i: reform as opposition", in Reform in Nineteenth-century China, pp. 296 ff.
48. See, for example, HKDP, reprinted in HKWP, March 12, March 14 & March 19, 1898.
49. See HKT, September 24, 1898, HKWP, "Reported murder of the Emperor of China", September 24, 1898, p. 248.
50. See HKT, September 24, 1898.
51. See HKT, September 23, 1898; September 27, 1898; HKT, "Notes and Comments", October 3, 1898; HKT, "Notes and Comments", October 10, 1898; HKDP, November 12, 1898, reprinted in HKWP, "The foreign representatives and the Chinese Emperor", November 19, 1898, p. 410.
52. Reprinted in HKWP, "Reform in China", November 19, 1898, p. 411.
53. See HKT, "Wanted: An Emperor!", October 19, 1898; HKT, "Notes and Comments", October 20, 1898.
54. See HKT, "Wanted: An Emperor!", October 19, 1898.



55. See, for example, HKT, "Notes and Comments", October 10, 1898.
56. See HKDP, October 20, 1898, reprinted in HKWP, "Setting back the clock of progress", October 22, 1898, p. 329; North China Daily News, reprinted in HKWP, "Imperial Decrees", October 22, 1898, p. 336. See also HKT, November 23, 1898.
57. Quoted in CM, October 25, 1898.
58. See HKT, September 27, 1898 (editorial); HKT, "Notes & Comments", October 3, 1898.
59. See HKT, "Notes & Comments", October 10, 1898.
60. See Don C. Price, Russia and the roots of the Chinese Revolution 1896-1911, p. 69.
61. See HKT, "Notes & Comments", October 3, 1898.
62. See HKT, "Notes & Comments", November 23, 1898; HKT, March 9, 1900, p. 2, col. 3.
63. See HKT, September 9, 1901. The idea that the post-Boxer Manchu reform programme resembled that of the Hundred Days Reform programme was again expressed in HKT, October 12, 1901, p. 3, col. 3. Gilbert Reid in his article "Methods of reform in China and their net results" also touched on and agreed to this point. This article appearing in North China Daily News was reprinted in HKT Mail Supplement, July 18, 1903, pp. 4-5; North China Daily News in an article, "The real objective of reform" stated that the educational reforms in 1902 were "in the line of the reforms proposed and commanded by the Emperor himself four years ago". See HKT, May 14, 1902, p. 3, col. 3.
64. See HKT, October 12, 1901.
65. See HKT, March 15, 1901, p. 3, col. 2; October 12, 1901; May 14, 1902 quoting from North China Daily News.
66. This view was shared by the Times (London); North China Herald, see Cameron, p. 62. Percy Horace Kent in The Passing of the Manchus also stated that the keynote of the domestic policy of the Empress Dowager was "the maintenance of the prestige and position of the Manchu dynasty". See p. 30.
67. See reprint in HKWP, February 17, 1900, p. 102.
68. Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, the Pei Ho and the yangtze were the only rivers to the interior open to the foreigner for the purpose of trade.




- The Si Kiang (West River) rises in Yunnan. Since the early 1870s, the British had recognised its commercial capabilities for it could accommodate big steamers over a course of 350 miles above Canton. In 1898 this waterway to the interior was also open to foreign merchants. See Alexis Krausse, China in decay, pp. 10 & 245; China Mail, 76th Anniversary Number March 1921, p. 8.
69. See, for example, SCMP, January 9, 1904, p. 2, col. 2-3.
70. See Putnam Weale, The Truce in the Far East, p. 359. For the full text of the treaty, see Part III, Appendix 1, "The British Commercial Treaty with China", p. 592.
71. See SCMP, January 9, 1904, p. 4; August 24, 1904, p. 4, col. 5 & 6, October 1, 1904; SCMP, October 3, 1904, p. 4, col. 6; SCMP, November 11, 1904.
72. See, for example, reports of the Times correspondent at Peking on his journey to South China from Peking and other correspondents in South China appearing in the South China Morning Post of March 15, 1907; report of the correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette reprinted in HKT, Mail Supplement of December 29, 1906 and reports by M. Jean Rodes of the La Geographic reproduced by the HKT of November 23, 1908; B.L. Putnam Weale, a keen observer in Chinese political affairs also came to such a view. He opined immediately after the Russo-Japanese War that both the material outlook and the institutional framework of China was changing for good. See his The Truce in the East and Its Aftermath, pp. 262-264. Another western contemporary in China W.A.P. Martin formerly president of the Chinese Imperial university also stated in his book that China was "the theatre of the greatest movement now taking place on the face of the globe" and that it was far more significant than the Russian revolution for it did not aim at a political revolution but the social transformation of the oldest, most populous, and most conservative empire. See The Awakening of China, preface.
73. This refers to the investigatory commission despatches to study the constitutional governments of the different nations. The despatch of the first delegation making up of five commissioners Duke Tsai Tse, Tai Hung-tze, Hsu Shih-chang, Tuan Fang and Shao Ying in August 1905 was interrupted by a bomb attack. A second reconstituted delegation set out in December 1905 and returned home in July 1906. See Immanuel Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, p. 506. For a more detailed study, see Sun (Zen) E-tu, "The Chinese Constitutional missions of 1905-1906", Journal of Modern History, 24.3 (1952) 251-268.



74. See HKT, Mail Supplement, August 25, 1906.
75. See HKT, August 14, 1907, reprinted in Mail Supplement, August 17, 1907, p. 263, col. 4-5; HKT, Mail Supplement, July 6, 1907, p. 211, col. 4; reprinted from HKT, July 7, 1907.
76. See, for example, E.L. Putnam Weale who in his The Truces in the East and Its Aftermath stated, "Every reform in China has to be made in such fashion that it can never be recorded against the Empress Dowager that she tampered with the structure raised by her Imperial ancestors". See pp. 265-6.
77. Lienchou was a small sub-prefecture standing midway between Canton and the treaty port of Wuchow a couple of hundred miles from Hong Kong.
78. For the decree of September 1, 1906, see Kent, The Passing of the Manchus, pp. 37-8.
79. See ibid., p. 38.
80. See also reprint in HKWP, "Representative Government in China", November 4, 1905.
81. See reprint in Mail Supplement, February 18, 1910, p. 49, col. 6; p. 50, col. 1.
82. See also reprint in Mail Supplement, August 13, 1910.
83. See reprint in Mail Supplement, February 18, 1910, p. 49, col. 6; p. 50, col. 1.
84. See reprint in Mail Supplement, February 18, 1910, p. 49, col. 6; p. 50, col. 1.
85. The first Imperial Cabinet had thirteen members. There were eight Manchus of which five had royal connections, four Hans and one Mongol. See Tso Shun-sheng, Four Talks on Modern Chinese History, p. 266.
86. See also reprint in Mail Supplement, February 18, 1910, p. 49; col. 6; p. 50, col. 1.
87. See HKDP, July 2, 1910; October 5, 1910.
88. The contraband opium traffic also legalized at a duty of 30 taels per 100 catties by section 1 of Rule V of the "Agreement in Pursuance of Articles 28 and 29 of the Treaty of Tientsin", signed at Shanghai on November 8, 1858. The principle of legalization had already been raised and applied by some local Chinese officials at some ports to raise additional revenue for their provincial coffers. The legalization clause of the 1858 treaties thus only gave formal consent to a fait accompli.



89. See Yu En-teh, Chung-kuo chin-yen fa-ling pien-chien shih, pp. 105-7; 116-8.
90. Cultivation of poppy in British-India was restricted to Bengal and the United Provinces and a small area on the frontier of Upper Burma. See HKT, July 5, 1906.
91. See D.E. Owen, British Opium Policy in India and China, pp. 262; 311-315.
92. See HKT, December 29, 1904 (editorial).
93. See HKT, December 29, 1904 (editorial).
94. See Yu En-teh, p. 137; Eames, The Englishmen in China, pp. 566, 569-570.
95. See HKT, Mail Supplement, March 11, 1905.
96. See Kent, The passing of the Manchus, pp. 33-4; see also Yu En-teh, p. 125; J.O.P. Bland and E. Backhouse, Recent Events and Present Policies in China, London, 1912, p. 43; J.W. Bashford, China, 1916, p. 336. According to Bland, the Times correspondent at Peking, the regulations were "the most masterly state document issued in China for many years, leaving no loophole for evasion", see Bland, p. 436. See also HKT, November 27, 1906, reprinted in Mail Supplement, December 1, 1906.
97. To ensure that China would fulfil her obligations in the opium agreement, Sir Alexander Hosie, Consul-General at Tientsin; had been despatched to make a tour of the Chinese provinces of Shansi, Shensi, Kansu, Szechuan, Yuannan and kweichow, formerly the most important centres of poppy cultivation. See M.E. Cameron, The Reform Movement in China, pp. 155-6. For details of his journey, see Sir Alexander Hosie, On the trail of the opium poppy, a narrative of travel in the chief opium-producing provinces of China (London, Philip, 1914). Although he reported that progress at suppression was moving at an uneven pace in the different provinces, he was convinced of China's sincerity in the movement. See "Report by Sir A. Hosie on the cultivation of the poppy and the production of opium in the provinces of Shansi, Shensi and Kansu" enclosed in FO 415/1752/40048 of October 19, 1910; "Report by Consul-General Sir A. Hosie on the cultivation of the poppy and the production of opium in the province of Szechwan", enclosed in FO415/178-/13298 of March 4, 1911; "Report by Consul-General Sir A. Hosie on the cultivation of the poppy and the production of opium in the province of "Yunnan", enclosed in FO415/1789/18425 of April 15, 1911; "Report by Consul-General Sir A. Hosie on the Cultivation of the poppy and the production of opium



in the Province of Kueichow", enclosed in FO415/1789/25427 of May 31, 1911. His reports were also enclosed in Parliamentary Paper (Cd. 5658), June 14, 1911. See also HKT, July 29, 1909; The Times (London), June 14, 1911; Owen, p. 341; see also Kathleen Lodwick, p. 432.

98. See J.B. Eames, p. 567; J.O.P. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policy in China (1912), p. 436.
99. See Yü En-teh, p. 121.
100. Yü En-teh, p. 122-3; HKT, May 7, 1910; Owen, p. 340; HKDP, August 15, 1910 (editorial).
101. HKT, May 6, 1909 (editorial), reprinted in mail supplement, May 8, 1909.
102. For the full text of the Opium Agreement of May 8, 1911. See "Agreement Relating to Opium, 1911", enclosed in FO415/1789/20178 of May 8, 1911. See also The Parliamentary Paper, Treaty Series, 1911, No. 13 (Cd. 5660), June 13, 1911. A summary of its major provisions appeared also in the Times (London), May 9, 1911.
103. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, p. 22; D44-47.
104. Yü En-teh, p. 150; HKT, January 26, 1912. For more details about the Conference especially from the British perspective, see "Further correspondence respecting opium", part V, January to June 1912, passim, in The Opium Trade, vol. 2 (1912).
105. See "Opium notification by President Sun Yat-sen", taken from "Nanking Government Gazette" of March 2, 1912; "Text of orders issued by President Sun to Ministry of Interior regarding prohibition of opium" from "Nanking Government Gazette" of March 6, 1912; "Order by Yuan Shih-kai" from "Nanking Government Gazette" of March 14, 1912; Peking Daily News of March 18, 1912; Peking Daily News, "China's fight against opium" enclosed in FO415/1557/19097 of April 18, 1912; "Opium and the Republic", from North China Daily News of May 11, 1912; "The opium trade", from North China Daily News of May 15, 1912, enclosed in FO415/1557/26345 of May 31, 1912, Jordan to Grey, FO415/1584/27825 of June 12, 1912; "Presidential Order dated June 11, 1912" taken from the Gazette, June 14, 1912, enclosed in FO415/1584/30613 of July 4, 1912.
106. See Owen, pp. 353-4; see also Grey to Jordan, FO415/1557/24605 of June 17, 1912; "Opium and the Republic", from North China Daily News of May 11, 1912; "The Opium Trade" from North China Daily News of May 15, 1912; "The Opium Trade" from North China Daily News of May 17, 1912 & "The Opium trade" from North China Daily News of May 18, 1912. All enclosed in FO415/1557/26345 of May 31, 1912.




107. See Messrs. E.D. and Messrs. David Sassoon and Co. to F.O., in FO415/1557/27607 of June 28, 1912; "Foreign Banks to Senior Consul", FO415/1584/29537 of June 26, 1912 (Enclosure); "Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China to FO" in FO415/1584/29738 of July 12, 1912; "Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce to Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong" enclosed in FO415/1584/30158 of July 15, 1912; "Messrs. David and Messrs. E.D. Sassoon and Co. to Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce", enclosed in FO415/1584/30158 of July 15, 1912; see also Messrs. D. and Messrs. E.D. Sassoon and Co. to Foreign Office in FO415/1584/30773 of July 19, 1912; "Messrs. D. Sassoon and Co. to the Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong", enclosed in FO415/1584/31410 of July 23, 1912. Messrs. E.D. and Messrs. D. Sassoon and Co. to Foreign Office in FO415/1584/41553 of October 3, 1912.
108. HKDP, June 18, 1909.
109. HKT, August 17, 1910 reprinted in Mail Supplement, August 19, 1910; also see "The opium trade", CM, May 9, 1908.
110. "The Opium Question", CM, May 11, 1908.
111. Ibid.
112. The report was published in CM, May 28, 1908, Paraphased in "The Opium Question", CM, May 29, 1908.
113. CM, May 29, 1908.
114. See HKDP of March 23, 1910.
115. See SCMP, "Where the poppy blows", December 21, 1909; HKDP of March 23, 1910; CM, "The Opium Question", May 18, 1908; June 15, 1908, p. 4, col. 4.
116. The SCMP of December 21, 1909, for example, still tells its readers that "China is perpetrating an enormous bluff with the object of driving the foreign product out of the market and retaining within her own vast limits a more lucrative business".
117. See SCMP of September 9, 1907.
118. See SCMP, May 12, 1908.
119. See SCMP, November 3, 1909, "Hong Kong and the Opium Market".
120. See HKDP, June 14, 1910, June 15, 1910; June 18, 1910; June 27, 1910, p. 2, col. 2; June 29, 1910; CM, June 10, 1910, p. 5, col. 3; HKT, June 18, 1910; HKT, August 27, 1910, Mail Supplement, pp. 284 & 286. The regulations (in English translation) regarding the tax on prepared opium licenses were also enclosed in FO415/1752/25500 of June 24, 1910.



Actually, on some previous occasions, the Chinese government had attempted to introduce opium monopolies at Nanking and Canton. The action was naturally subjected to severe protests of the Hong Kong English newspapers. See SCMP, November 9, 1907, "Opium monopoly at Nanking. Report of the Chamber of Commerce and China Association". Additional details of the opium monopoly at Nanking was discussed in Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, FO415/1718/1143 of December 21, 1909. It was also reported in the China Mail of September 25, 1908 that the Canton authorities had made an attempt to introduce a monopoly and the action was frustrated through the action of the Canton Consul General Fox.


121. See, for example, CM of June 13, 1910, p. 4, col. 6; see also SCMP, "Hongkong Chamber of Commerce Annual Meeting", March 21, 1911, p. 8. See also Hewett to Grey, telegram, FO415/1718/20787 of 10, 1910.
122. See Hongkong General Chamber of Commerce to Mr. Max Müller dated Hong Kong May 7, 1910, in FO415/1718/22013 of May 31, 1910, enclosure 1 in No. 79; Enclosure 2, in No. 79; Opium merchants to Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, dated Hong Kong, May 5, 1910; Messrs. David Sassoon and Co.; and Messrs. E.D. Sassoon and Co. to Consul-General Jamieson dated May 2, 1910, enclosure 4 in No. 79. See ibid.
123. See SCMP, October 10, 1910, p. 2, col. 7, "The Canton Opium Monopoly, Viceroy's communication to the British Consul General".
124. See HKT, June 10, 1910; HKDP, June 15, 1910 (editorial).
125. See HKT, November 10, 1910, Mail Supplement, November 11, 1910. The reason as explained by the Canton Consul General Jamieson in his despatch to the British Charge d'Affaires Max Müller at Peking on June 8, 1910 was that the taxation was not differential. The latter agreed and was convinced that the Chinese Government's aim was to prevent the storing of large stocks of opium in private hands. See Max Müller to Grey, FO415/1718/18616 of May 25, 1910; Jamieson to Max Müller dated Canton, May 11, 1910, FO415/1719/22013 of May 31, 1910, enclosure 3 in No. 79; Hewett to Grey, FO415/1718/20787 of June 10, 1910; Max Müller to Grey, FO415/1718/20887 of June 11, 1910, see also enclosure in CO129/367/22433.
126. See reprint in HKT, Mail Supplement, July 30, 1910, p. 251, col. 1.
127. Reprinted also in Mail Supplement, August 19, 1910.




128. See HKT, May 11, 1908, Mail Supplement, May 15, 1908; HKT, June 3, 1909, reprinted in Mail Supplement, June 5, 1909; HKT, January 26, 1912; HKT, "Paying the piper", August 16, 1911.
129. Lugard's memorandum presented to the Legislative Council was reprinted in HKT, Mail Supplement, March 13, 1909.
130. See letter to the Earl of Crewe, dated Hong Kong, September 24, 1909, in FO415/1718/219 of December 16, 1909, enclosure 2 in No. 2; also in FO415/1718/17147, enclosure 2 in No. 49.
131. See HKDP of October 30, 1907 and November 4, 1907 which had drilled on the subject of a partition of China.
132. Reprinted also in HKWP, "Chinese opposition", September 22, 1906, p. 183.
133. For the opinions of other foreign newspapers on the question, see CM, "Chinese officials", June 28, 1910; the Shanghai Mercury, reprinted in SCMP, August 16, 1910, p. 5, col. 7.

The pervasiveness of bureaucratic corruption in China had long been noted by foreigners well-versed in affairs in China. See, for example, T.T. Meadows, as quoted by Colquhoun in China in Transformation, p. 193; Archibald John Little, Gleanings from fifty years in China (1908), pp. 98-9; A.S. Krausse, The story of the Chinese Crisis, London, Cassell, 1900, pp. 20-1; Alexis Krausse, China in decay, pp. 56-9; Norman, The Peoples and politics of the Far East, pp. 266-8, 282-5; H. Borel, The New China, a Traveller's Expressions, p. 127-8.

134. See, for example, SCMP, "Foreign advisers for China", May 18, 1910 (editorial); SCMP, August 31, 1910 (Editorial); September 10, 1910, "Helpless China"; SCMP August 24, 1910 which drilled on the importance of railway to the development of modern China and stated that China's resorting to and honest use of foreign loans would greatly facilitate the construction of railway.
135. Modern historians have been at variant over this point. John Gilbert Reid states, "removal of the ruling dowager empress was expected to mean loss of a strong hand which had held the disintegrating nation together since the Tai-ping rebellion", see The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 12 and that her death in 1908 led to the revival of the idea of partition, see p. 14.



136. The impression of the average foreigners on the Kuang-hsü Emperor was that he was physically weak, timid and emotional but at the same time they never doubted about his "reformist" inclination. Mrs. Archibald Little speaks of the young Chinese Emperor "a young man of weak physique, and lacking in the characteristics of a Cromwell or a Bismarck, but that he is, in spite of all, a young man with aspirations and a real wish for his country's good". See Intimate China, p. 518. Mrs. A. Little also noticed the popularity the Emperor enjoyed amongst his subjects. See ibid., p. 564 & 567. B.L. Putnam Weale, also stated in The Truce in the East and Its Aftermath that "... the Emperor, in spite of his effacement and reported weakness, might do great things if he had trusty advisers, and really ruled" and that Yuan should be the man to come to the front, see pp. 266 & 269.




Chapter III


1. See, for example, Fang Han-ch'i, Chung-kuo chin-tai pao-k'an shih (A History of Modern Periodical Press of China), I: 31-8.
2. See Feng Ai-ch'un, Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih, p. 72; Wright and Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai and other treaty ports of China, p. 365, cited by Schiffriin, p. 71. See also Dennis R. Duncanson, "British attitudes to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", in Symposium on the History of the Republic of China, I: 289. F. Gilbert Chan, "Socialism and Single Tax: Liao Chung-k'ai in Kwangtung (1912-1913), Symposium on the History of the Republic of China, II: 332.
3. Schiffriin, p. 71.
4. See Tse Tsan Tai, pp. 5-6; 8-9.
5. See ibid., p. 8, cited also by Ng Lun Ngai-ba, "A survey of source materials in Hong Kong related to late Ch'ing China", Ch'ing shih wen-ti, 4:2 (1979), p. 142; Wu Hsiang-hsiang, Sun Yat-sen hsien-sheng ch'uuan, vol. 1, p. 122.
6. See, for example, Chung Yu-fa, "Wai-jen yü Hsin-hai ke-ming" (The foreigners and the 1911 Revolution) in Academia Sinica: chi-k'an, III (1972), reprinted in CKHTSLC: 439; Lü Shih-p'eng, "Hsing-chung Hui Hsiang-kang ju hui chu chih-shih chih yen-chiu" (A study of the comrades who had joined the Hongkong Hsing-chung-hui) in Chin-tai Chung-kuo, 26:70.12, p. 212; Huang Chia-jen, "Tsai Hsiang-kang chiao ke-ming te Hsieh Tsuan-t'ai" in Ta-hua I:3 (1970), 13-5; Wu Hsiang-hsiang, Sun Yat-sen hsien-sheng ch'uuan, I: 121-2, 128, 172; 287-8, 324; Robin Hutcheon, pp. 11-2; Lam Yau-lan, Hsiang-kang shih-hua, p. 112.
7. See Winston Hsieh, Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911, p. 12.
8. See Sun Yat-sen hsien-sheng ch'uuan, vol. 1, p. 145.
9. See, for example, HKT, "The Ming dynasty", April 17, 1911, p. 4, col. 3. This issue reported that the Chinese revolutionaries intended to observe the "feast of the Ming Dynasty" and several Chinese papers of Hong Kong which supported them would not publish on the 18th of April.




10. For more information about the early revolutionary activities in Hong Kong and the formation of the Hsiang Chung Hui, see Mary Chan Man-yue, "Chinese Revolutionaries in Hong Kong 1895-1911", M.A. Thesis, HKU, 1963, chapter II.
11. Some of these have been quoted in extenso in Schiffelin, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution, pp. 72-4; Wu Hsiang-hsiang, Sun Yat-sen hsien-sheng ch'uan, vol. 1, pp. 121-2
12. Quoted also in part by Schiffelin. See p. 74.
13. See Schiffelin, pp. 74-5.
14. See HKWP, "Is there sedition in China?", March 14, 1895, pp. 187-8; HKWP, "Secret societies and the responsibility of the Chinese government", September 12, 1895, p. 190; see also HKWP, "The Chinese government and the secret society plea", September 18, 1895, pp. 219-220, reprinted from the Peking and Tientsin Times; HKWP, "The responsibility of local officials for anti-foreign outrages", September 26, 1895, p. 228.
15. See reprints in HKWP, "Secret societies and the war", February 28, 1895; HKWP, "China's ability to suppress revolt", October 10, 1895, p. 264.
16. See reprint in HKWP, "Departure of coolies for Canton", October 30, 1895, p. 329.
17. See, for example, HKWP, "The attempted insurrection at Canton", November 13, 1895. A large portion of this article merely cited information in connection with the Canton uprising from the Chung-wai hsin-pao.
18. See HKWP, November 7, 1895, pp. 340-1.
19. See HKWP, November 21, 1895
20. See reprint in HKWP, December 3, 1896, pp. 419 & 433.
21. See Sun Chung-shan nien-p'u (Biographical chronology of Sun Chung-shan), Chung-hua (1980), pp. 31-33.
22. This episode happened between 11th to 17th October, 1896. For a historical treatment of this incident, see Shirley J. Bactstrom, "Sun Yat-sen: kidnapped in London", Journal of East Asiatic Studies, Sheng, Four Talks on Modern Chinese History, pp. 275-7.
23. CM was the only newspaper that reprinted a series of London newspapers on the incident. See CM, November 26, 1896; November 27, 1896; December 1, 1896, p. 5, col. 5; December 2, 1896, p. 3, col. 5-6; December 24, 1898; December 28, 1896, p. 3, col. 7; December 29, 1896; December 31, 1896.



24. See reprint in HKWP, "The outrage by the Chinese Legation", October 28, 1896, p. 324. Interestingly, the Chinese revolutionary organ in Hong Kong, the CKJP also opposed the appointment of a Chinese consul but on a different ground. See CKJP of October 22, 1907 (editorial).
25. See reprint in HKWP, "The reform movement in China", December 3, 1896.
26. See reprint in HKWP, "Rebellions in China", July 23, 1898.
27. See Emmanuel Hsu, pp. 559-560; T'an Yung-nien, vol. 1, 36-7' 158-9; 160-188.
- For Hong Kong English press reports on the movement, see HKWP, "The Kwangtung revolt, particular concerning the southern rebellion", November 3, 1900, p. 346; HKWP, "Correspondence. The Kwangtung Rebellion", November 3, 1900; HKWP, "The government and the rebels in Kwangtung", January 5, 1901.
28. See T'an Yung-nien, vol. 1, pp. 193-197; Schiffriin, p. 249.
29. See HKT, October 10, 1900 cited also by Schiffriin, p. 244; see also HKDP, October 11, 1900, reprinted in HKWP, October 13, 1900.
30. See reprint in HKWP, "The Southern disturbances", October 20, 1900.
31. See reprint in HKWP, "The Kwangtung revolt", October 27, 1900.
32. See reprint in HKWP, October 27, 1900.
33. See reprint in HKWP, "The Kwangtung Revolt", October 31, 1900.
34. See HKDP, October 22, 1900, reprinted in HKWP, "The Kwangtung Revolt", October 27, 1900.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. See HKDP, October 22, 1900 reprinted in HKWP, October 27, 1900. The Hong Kong Government had been seriously troubled by Triad activities during the early history of the Colony.
38. See "report from the East River area" dated October 17 in HKT of October 22, 1900, quoted also in Schiffriin, p. 242.




39. See CM, "The trouble in the South, October 25, 1900; HKDP, October 31, 1900, reprinted in HKWP, "The truth about the Kwangtung rebellion", November 3, 1900, p. 345.
40. See HKWP, "Correspondence. The Kwangtung Rebellion" dated October 31, 1900, reprinted in HKWP, November 3, 1900, p. 357.
41. See HKDP, October 22, 1900, reprinted in HKWP, October 27, 1900.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. See HKWP, December 1, 1900, p. 434; see also CM; "Canton news", October 30, 1900; CM, November 10, 1900, p. 5, col. 1.
45. See Tseng Hsü-pai, Chung-kuo hsin-wen shih, p. 26; Ch'en San-ching, "Hsiang-kang Chung-kuo jih-pao ti ko-ming hsüan-ch'uan" in "International Academic Symposium on Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Hong Kong", Chu Hai Journal, No. 13 (November 1982), p. 81. This article is also reprinted in Chung-shan Quarterly, (1983).
- Some extant issues of the CKJP also carried commentaries and reports on the revolts in Fang Ch'eng (September 1907) and Ch'ing-lien. See, for example, CKJP of September 11, 1907; September 28, 1907; September 13, 1907, October 1, 1907, October 3, 1907; October 8, 1907 and November 12, 1907.
46. See HKT, Mail Supplement, March 6, 1908. Interestingly, the HKDP was one of the newspapers that stuck to the habit of telling the readers the whereabouts of Sun Yat-sen. See, for example, HKDP, November 24, 1908, p. 2, col. 2; HKDP, December 5, 1908, p. 2, col. 3; HKDP, December 15, 1908, p. 2, col. 3; HKDP, March 3, 1909, p. 2, col. 4.
47. See HKDP, "The disturbances near Swatow" & "The Swatow Rebellion", May 30, 1907, p. 2, col. 3.
48. See HKDP, February 17, 1910; CM, "The Canton disturbances, February 15, 1910, p. 4.
49. See also reprint in Mail Supplement, September 20, 1907, p. 303, col. 4.
50. See HKT, Mail Supplement, March 6, 1908, p. 82, col. 3.
51. This alleged peaceful compromise between the Chinese Government and the Chinese revolutionaries did not materialize. CM of August 27, 1910 reported that the leaders of the reformers, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and




K'ang Yu-wei and the leading revolutionary Sun Yat-sen were excluded from the general amnesty. See CM, August 27, 1910, p. 8, col. 6.

52. See T'an Yung-nien, vol. 2, pp. 476-8; Tso Shun-sheng, Four Talks on Modern Chinese History, pp. 264-5.
53. For historical treatments of the incident, see T'an Yung-nien, vol. 2, pp. 234-5; Tso Shun-sheng, Four Talks on Modern Chinese History, pp. 305-6.
54. For historical treatments of this incident, see T'an Yung-nien, vol. 2, pp. 229-230; Tso Shun-sheng, pp. 324-5; Kent, The Passing of the Manchus, p. 197.
55. See T'an Yung-nien, vol. 2, pp. 217-8; 228. See also Tso Shun-sheng, p. 324. For journalistic accounts and comments see HKT of August 15, 1911; CM's article reprinted in HKT, August 25, 1911, p. 2, col. 6.
56. See, for example, CM, "The bomb argument", March 3, 1908.
57. The date is equivalent to the twenty-nineth day of the third lunar calendar as used in the pro-Republican days. Hence, the event is also known as the March 29th Canton Uprising.
58. Thomas B. Lee: "The Canton Revolution of 29 March 1911". Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, St. John's University, 1971, p. 72.
59. Ts'ao Ya-po, "The campaign of March 29th" in HWKM: IV, 198; Ts'ou Lu: Kuang-chou san-yueh erh-shih-chiu ke-ming shih ("A History of the April 27th Canton Revolt"), p. 30. N.B. The number of vanguards later swelled to 800.
60. For more details concerning the Penang Conference, the plot and the subsequent preparation works by the revolutionaries overseas and in Hong Kong prior to the April 27th Uprising, see Tsou Lu, ibid., Chapters 1-3; Hsueh Chun-tu, Huang Hsiang and the Chinese Revolution, pp. 79-84; Chan, Mary May-yue, "Chinese Revolutionaries in Hong Kong 1895-1911", Unpublished M.A. thesis, HKU, 1963, pp. 214-216.
61. For an historical account of the incident, see "Wen Sheng-tsai's assassination of Fu-ch'i" in HKWS, ser. 1, no. 14, pp. 695-6: "Wen Sheng-tsai assaulted Fu-ch'i" in HHKM: IV:172. The British official view of the event can be found in "Memorandum on the subject of the murder of the Acting Tartar General" from Jamieson to Jordon, FO371/1090. For the rationale behind this and other assassination attempts and assassination activities in the late Ch'ing period,



- see Edward S. Krebe, "Assassination in the Republican revolutionary movement", Ch'ing shih wen-ti, IV:6:45-80; Yen Ch'ang-hung, "Hsin-hai ke-ming chung ti an-sha huo-tung chi ch'i p'ing-chia" in TLHLWC:1 (1983) 766-792.
62. CM, April 11, 1911, p. 6, col. 4, reprinted from the CKJP; HKDP, April 13, 1911, p. 2, col. 4; SCMP, April 12, 1911, p. 7, col. 1; HKT, April 14, 1911, p. 138, col. 1-2; HTJP, April 10, 1911, April 11, 1911 and April 14, 1911, p. 2.
63. "A dastardly crime", HKT, April 10, 1911, p. 4, col. 1-2.
64. See also, CM, "The tartar-general assassinated in Canton", and "Further details" reprinted from Wah Tsz Yat Po's service, April 10, 1911, CM, April 13, 1911, p. 6, col. 2-3.
65. See, for example, P.H. Kent, The Passing of the Manchus. Kent expressed sympathy for the victim Fu-ch'i who was said to be a harmless old gentleman of agreeable presence and dignified mien, whose only offence was to be born a Manchu and to represent a hated order". See p. 68.
66. See HKDP, January 17, 1911, p. 3, col. 4.
67. See Tsou Lu, op. cit., pp. 22-3; Tsou Lu, "The Canton March 29th Uprising", HHKM:IV: 260-1; "Reminiscences by Tsou Lu", HKWS, ser. 1, no. 1, 137-8; Edward J.M. Rhoads, pp. 199-200; Chan, Mary Man-yue, p. 219; NCH, April 20, 1911, p. 303 and May 6, 1911, p. 332; Feng Ch'iu-hsüeh, "Hsin-hai ch'ien hou T'ung-meng-hui tsai Kuang-sui hsin-wen chiai-huo tung tsa-i", p. 103; Li Me, "Hsin-hai ke-ming shih-ch'i Kuangtung poa-k'an lu", in HWYCTL, p. 161; vernacular paper suppressed", SCMP, April 26, 1911.
68. HKDP, April 11, 1911, p. 2, col. 5-6; April 13, 1911, p. 2, col. 1-2.
69. HKDP, April 24, 1911, p. 2, col. 5.
70. See SCMP, "The Canton outrage", April 12, 1911, p. 6, col. 3-4.
71. Edward J.M. Rhoads, pp. 199-201, NCH, May 6, 1911, p. 343.
72. Ibid.
73. Details of the fighting can be found in Huang Hsing, "The Canton Uprising of March 29 and its influence", HKWS ser. 1, no. 14, pp. 1-5; Tsou Lu, "The course of the March 29th Uprising", KMWH:67:238-244; Mo Ch'i-




p'eng, "Notes on the March 29th Canton bloody revolt", ibid., 245-252; CM, April 29, 1911, p. 7, col. 1; May 1, 1911, p. 6, col. 4-6; Vice-consul Comber, "Memorandum on the revolutionary attack in Canton on April 27, 1911", CO129/383, pp. 613-4; Roger E. Lindsell, "The Outbreak in Canton of April 27th to 30th 1911", CO129/383, pp. 617-622; Edward J.M. Rhoads, pp. 200-202; Wu Yuzhang, pp. 104-5.


74. Of the eighty or so martyrs of the incident, the prominent figures were mainly Chinese students returning from Japan while the ordinary rank-and-file were Chinese coming from the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Fukien or from South-east Asia. Li Man-fu, a native of Kwangtung and the manager of the CKJP was the only one in the list who had a more immediate connection with Hong Kong.

For analytical studies of seventy-two of these martyrs whose identities could be recognised, see HHKM:IV: 246-255; Ting Shen-tsun, "The names, native districts, ages and career patterns of the martyrs of the April 27th uprising" in KHHKMSL:63-7. A quarter of these martyrs came from Hua-hsien of the Kwangtung province. See Hsu Wei-yang, "A report on the martyrdom of the Hua-hsien's eighteen martyrs in the April 27th uprising" in ibid., 51-7.

75. E.g. The Times (London) carried only very brief notes on the Canton disturbances. See The Times (London) April 28, May 1, May 2 and May 3 concerning news on the Canton uprising.
76. CM, April 28, 1911, p. 7, col. 1-2; "Causes of discontent", May 1, p. 6, col. 2-3; "Red Revolt", SCMP, p. 6, col. 3-4; HKT, editorial, May 3, 1911, p. 4, col. 1-2; HTJP, May 3, 1911.
77. Roger E. Lindsell, "Memorandum on the outbreak in Canton of April 27 to 30th 1911", FO371/1090, p. 84 also quoted in Sun, Mary May-yue, Ph.D thesis, p. 275.
78. HKT, April 19, 1911, p. 3, col. 1-2 quoted from the National Review.
79. HKT, May 1, 1911, p. 7, col. 1.
80. Ibid., HTJP, editorial, May 3, 1911, p. 2; NCH, May 6, 1911, p. 343.
81. CM, April 28, 1911, p. 7, col. 1-2; April 29, p. 6, col. 2-3; May 1, 1911, p. 6, col. 4-6; SCMP, April 29, 1911, p. 6, col. 2-3; HKDP, May 1, 1911; HTJP, editorial, May 6, 1911; NCH, May 6, 1911, p. 332.
82. See HKT, April 14, 1911, p. 4, col. 1-2; April 15, 1911, p. 4, col. 1-2; May 3, 1911, p. 4, col. 1-2; HTJP, April 28, 1911 (editorial).




83. See, for example, HTJP, May 2, 1911, p. 2.
84. See SCMP, May 2, 1911, p. 7.
85. CM, May 1, 1911, p. 6, col. 4-6; May 2, 1911, p. 7, col. 1.
86. Roger E. Lindsell, "Memorandum of the outbreak in Canton", CO129/383; CM, May 1, 1911, p. 6, col. 4-6; HKDP, May 1, 1911, p. 3, col. 2.



Chapter IV


1. For the activities of the American railway company in China to 1905, see W.R. Braised, "The United States and the American China Development Company", Far Eastern Quarterly XI:2, (1952), pp. 149-159.
2. See M.E. Cameron, The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912, pp. 188-9; Lo Hsiang-lin, Liang Cheng: Chinese Minister in Washington (1903-1907), p. 6 & chapter 2.
3. See HKDP, November 30, 1904, reprinted in HKWP, "The awakening of the Waiwupu", December 3, 1904, p. 411.
4. See Daniel H. Bays, China Enters the Twentieth Century, chapter 8.
5. For the question of the redemption of this railway, see Sun (Zen) F-tu, Chinese Railways and British Interests, 1898-1911, p. 74 ff., Lee En-han, "Chung-meい shou-hui yeeh-han t'ieh-lu ch'üan chiao-she" (Sino-American negotiations on the recovery of Canton-Hankow Railway rights) in Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih shih-yeh-chiu lun-chi, 317-391; see also Chang Yun-chao, Ph.D thesis (1982), pp. 178-184.
6. For a more detailed discussion of the Szechwan railway controversy and the subsequent riotous outbursts, see Tsan Fu, "Protest against the Hukuang Railway loan", Eastern Miscellany, VIII:6 (19/8/1911), p. 21 ff; HHKM: IV, "Ssu-ch'uan tieh lu an tang-an", pp. 457-522; E.J. Dingle, China's Revolution: 1911-1912, chapter XIV. For a general treatment of the subject, see Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, pp. 565-7; Ch'üan Han-sheng, "Tieh-lu kuo-yu wen-t'i yü Hsin-hai ko-ming" (The railroad nationalization question and the 1911 Revolution), in Wu: Ts'ung-k'an, pp. 230-271; Tai Chih-li (ed.), Ssu-ch'uan pao-lu yün-tung shih-liao (Documents on the Szechwan railroad revolt).
7. See HKWP, "The viceroy and the railway", June 25, 1906, p. 444.
8. Reprinted in HKT, "Canton-Kowloon Railway", Mail Supplement, March 9, 1907.
9. The attitude of the Hong Kong English newspapers on the subject can be found in CM, May 24, 1911; September 15, 1911; SCMP, "Railway in China", June 13, 1910; "Railway in China", August 24, 1910; May 31, 1911; HKT, September 19, 1911; HKDP, September 23, 1911.




The Times (London) of November 16, 1907 suggested that the British Government should "stand solidly behind the [Chinese] Central Government" in the matter. Cited from Sun Mary Man-yue, British Policy and the Chinese Revolutionary movement, 1895-1912, Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1968, p. 284. Similarly, the Peking Daily News was reported to have said, "We think foreign money should be welcome for the development of China's immense resources and railways especially. We object to foreign money only when it carries political designs which tend to the impairment of China's sovereignty, when it means that China has to pay double for what she needs and to receive half for what she sells". Quoted from SCMP, September 5, 1910, p. 4, col. 7.

Recent researches into the attitudes of contemporary French newspapers on the same subject have come to the same conclusion. See, for example, Chang Fu-jui and Ho Chen-hui (trans.), Hsin-hai ke-ming shih-ch'i Fa-kuo yü-lun (French Public Opinion and the Chinese Revolution of 1911) in Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih ts'ung-k'an, 3:51; Ch'en San-ching, Fa-kuo yü Hsin-hai ke-ming, in Chin-tai wai-chiao shih lun-chi, p. 115.

10. See SCMP, "The road to progress", May 25, 1911; Chinese Telegrams. Nationalization of railways", May 26, 1911; CM, "China's railway problem", June 12, 1911.
11. See HKT, September 4, 1911, p. 5, col. 1; HKT, "The Canton press", September 28, 1911, p. 4, col. 6; HKT, September 30, 1911, p. 2, col. 3; CM, "The Viceroy's dilemma", reprinted by HKT, September 30, 1911, p. 2, col. 5.
12. See SCMP, September 13, 1911; September 15 & September 16, 1911.
13. See SCMP, June 13, 1910.
14. See HKDP, September 23, 1911; CM, September 27, 1911.
15. See HKDP, September 30, 1911.
16. See reprint in HKT, May 18, 1911, p. 7, col. 1.
17. Ibid.
18. The following account is only intended to be a very brief introductory to the subject. The development and the various aspects of the event have received extensive historical treatment. For recent bibliographical guides and introductions to the 1911 Revolution, see Joseph W. Esherick et al., "A Symposium on the 1911 Revolution", Modern China, 2:2 (1976); Edmund S.K. Fung, "Post-1949 Chinese




- historiography on the 1911 Revolution", Modern China, 4:2 (April 18, 1978), 181-214; Michael Gasster, "Dialogues and research notes: Sun Yat-sen and the Revolution of 1911: a report on a conference", Asian Thought and Society V:13 (April 1980), 61-73; Winston Hsieh, Historiography on the Revolution of 1911, Hoover Institute, 1975; Liu Te-lin and Ho Shuang-sheng, "Chien-kuo i-lai Hsin-hai ke-ming shih tzu-liao ch'u-pan shu-lueh" (A brief discussion of the published material on the history of the 1911 Revolution since the founding of the nation) in TLHLWC: III (1983), 2196-2215; Liu Wang-ling, Hsin-hai ke-ming ta-shih lu, p. 126 ff; Stuart R. Schram, "Some recent studies of revolutionary movements in China in the early twentieth century", in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 35 (1972); Yukio, Yamane, Hsin-hai ke-ming wen-hsien mu-lu, (1972), with addenda in TLHLWC: III (1983), 2428-2442; Wang Teh-chao, "Hsin-hai ke-ming shih yen-chiu ti hsin-tung hsiang (Address)", in A History Journal of the History Society, United College, CUHK, New Series, vol. 8, November 1982.
19. See Dingle, China's Revolution, 1911-1912, p. 43.
20. See, for example, HKDP, October 13, 1911; CM, October 13, 1911, October 14, 1911 & October 16, 1911.
21. See CM, October 16, 1911; HKDP, October 13, 1911 & October 16, 1911.
22. Cited from G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 243.
23. See Dingle, China's Revolution, 1911-1912, chapter IV.
24. On October 12, 1911, the Hupeh Military Government issued the Proclamation of the Hupeh Revolutionary Government to the Foreign Consuls at Hankow. It included seven clauses: a. All treaties with foreign nations would remain binding; b. All loans with foreign governments would be repaid; c. the lives and property of foreigners would be protected; d. The rights of foreigners in China would be respected; e. Treaties signed with the Manchu government after this date would not be recognized of; f. Those assisting the Manchus would be regarded as enemy; g. Material of war to the Manchus would be confiscated. See Liu Chiu-nan, Chung-kuo chin-tai wai-chiao shih, Taichung kuoli chung-hsing tai-hsüeh, 1972, p. 140; see also WSNWS: ser. 2:1: 377-8 quoted by Ch'en San-ching, "France and the 1911 Revolution", in Chin-tai wai-chiao shih-lun chi, pp. 117-8; Reid, The Manchu abdication and the Powers, p. 243; Dingle, pp. 328-9. See also SCMP, October 13 & October 14, 1911; HKDP & CM, October 16, 1911; HKT, October 13, 1911. See also J.S. Thomson, China Revolutionized, pp. 24-5; see also Fu Ch'i-hsüeh, A Diplomatic History of China, pp. 231-2.




25. See HKT, October 16, 1911.
26. See HKT, October 13, 1911.
27. See CM, October 14, 1911, p. 7 & SCMP, October 14, 1911.
28. See CM, October 16, 1911.
29. See HKT, October 18, 1911.
30. See Ch'en San-ching, "Fa-kuo yü Hsin-hai ke-ming" (France and the Chinese Revolution of 1911) in Chin-tai wai-chiao shih lun-chi, pp. 116-7; Ch'en San-ching, Fa-kuo Lo-shih (Ulysse-Raphael Reau) yü Hsin-hai ke-ming in Chin-tai wai-chiao shih lun-chi, p. 241; Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 243; C.T. Liang, The Chinese Revolution of 1911, p. 19; A Pictorial History of the Republic of China: its Founding and Development (1981), vol. 1, p. 118.

Although the various consuls had promised to be "strictly neutral", some military supplies were still gone to the Manchu government unofficially from Britain, Russia and Japan at the beginning of the conflict. See Ch'en Dan-ching, "Tsu-chiai yü Chung-kuo ke-ming" in Chin-tai wai-chiao shih lun-chi, pp. 95-6 quoted from Hsin-hai ko-ming, vol. 8, p. 344. The role the Germans in Tsingtao played in supplying ammunitions to the Manchu imperial troops in November when the revolutionaries had cut off their supplies at Shanghai, Hanyang and Nanking arsenals was discussed in J.S. Thomson, China Revolutionized, p. 408. Thomson also noted the irony in the German imperial policy in his book: "... With all their criticism of the "Yellow Peril", the German foreign office at the beginning of the revolution, was at heart pro-Manchu".


31. Despite the professed intention of the revolutionary leaders to protect foreigners, there were still, in the course of the revolutionary struggles, some attacks on foreign missionary stations in the interior. The anti-missionary incident at Sianfu (October 1911) was the most notorious. See Kent, The Passing of the Manchus, pp. 131-2. But Ment explained that these incidents "formed no part of an anti-foreign movement" and that they were "inevitable in a country where government control is weak and people of alien race insist on working at distant places". In this respect, the revolutionaries sinned only by omission rather than commission. It was also stated in another source that missionary stations with the exception those at Wuchang were largely left untouched in the throes of the Revolution. See A.J. MacFarlane, "In Central China", in J.W. Bashford (ed.), China Mission Year Book 1912 (Shanghai, 1912), quoted by



- Wong Tai-hang, "Protestant Missionary Concepts of Reforms and Revolutions in China 1895-1911". M.A. dissertation, HKU, 1976, p. 77.
32. See E.F. Borst-Smith, Caught in the Chinese Revolution, pp. 33-4.
33. Reprinted in HKT, October 14, 1911.
34. Only the Osaka Mainichi's response to the Chinese Revolution was analyzed in any meaningful detail by Marius B. Jansen in The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, p. 133 et seq. But Jansen also states the view that "on the whole [the Japanese] reporters were conspicuously pro-revolution in China". See p. 133.
35. See reprint in HKT, October 19, 1911, p. 2, col. 4.
36. See HKDP, October 30, 1911.
37. The westerner who was the most ardent supporter of Yuan Shih-k'ai was G.E. Morrison, the Times Correspondent at Peking. For his comments on Yüan, see for example, the Times (London), "The new Viceroy, an appreciation", October 16, 1911. According to James Cantlie, "The power and influence Yüan possesses has been duned into my ears for many a day - "Yüan is the greater power in China not Sun Yat-sen" and "that Troublesom friend of yours is only an agitator that Yuan will soon settle". See James Cantlie, Sun Yat-sen and the awakening of China, p. 125. The image of Yüan as a strong man in China was in line with the prevalent contemporary Western opinion of the time. See T'ao Chü-yin, Pe-yang chün-fa t'ung-chih shih-chi shih-hua, vol. 1, p. 104; see also Ch'en San-ching, "Tsu-chiai yü Chung-kuo ke-ming" in Chin-tai wai-chiao shih-lun chi, pp. 96-7; Ernest P. Young, "Yüan Shih-k'ai's rise to the presidency", in M.C. Wright, China in Revolution. The First Phase, 1900-1913, pp. 428-9; Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1981, pp. 194, 209-210.
38. See, for example, SCMP, April 3, 1907; February 5, 1909; October 4, 1909.
39. See, for example, HKT, October 18, 1911, October 23, 1911; CM, October 18, 1911 and October 25, 1911; HKT, October 31, 1911. According to the SCMP of October 18, Yüan's refusal to accept the viceroyty of the affected provinces would give the rising "a definite moral impetus". Echoing the same point of view the HKT of October 23, 1911 stated that Yüan's refusal to act has to some extent "weakened the position of the Government".
40. See CM, October 18 & 25, 1911.




41. For brief references to the opinions of some European newspapers on this subject, see HKT, "Reuter's telegrams: the Rebellion: European Press causious", October 19, 1911. See also HKT, "The rebellion: European press opinions", October 24, 1911, p. 1, col. 5. The presses cited included the Daily Mail, the Daily Chronicle, the Daily Telegraph, the Times (London), Le Journal Des Debats (France). Invariably, these newspapers supported a benevolent neutrality of the Powers in favour of the rebel side.
42. For a historical account of Japan's official and public responses and its role in the Chinese Revolution, see Masaru Ikei, "Japan's response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", Journal of Asian Studies, XXV:2 (1966), 213-227; M.B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, pp. 131-53; Sun Mary Chan, Ph.D thesis, p. 297-8.
43. See HKDP, October 16, 1911; HKT, "Reuter's Telegrams, the Rebellion, the Rebellion and Japan", October 17, 1911; HKT, October 18, 1911.
44. See CM, October 18, 1911.
45. The London and China Express of October 20, 1911, for example, carried the following report: "It is officially stated that the policy of Great Britain in the present situation in China will be limited to taking every means considered necessary for protection of the lives and the property of her nationals". Quoted in Dingle, China's Revolution, 1911-1912, p. 138.
46. N.S. Bose, American Attitude and Policy to the Nationalist Movement in China (1911-1921), p. 8.
47. For the responses of the various Powers to the Chinese Revolution of 1911, see Kuo Heng-yü, "Ngo-kuo yü Hsin-hai ke-ming" in Ta-lu tsa-chih (The Continent Magazine), 37:6:18; P'eng Tse-chou, Hsin-hai ke-ming yü Jih-pen Hsi-yüan-szu nei-ko, in Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih ts'ung-k'an (Selected articles on contemporary history of China) edited by Wu Hsiang-hsiang, vol. 6, pp. 14-5; see also Ch'eng San-ching, "Fa-kuo Lo-shih (Ulysse-Raphael Reau) yü Hsin-hai ke-ming", Chin-tai wai-chiao shih lun-chi, p. 243; Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics, pp. 193, 194 & 197.
48. See CM, October 26, October 28, 1911.
49. HKT, November 23, 1911.
50. HKDP, November 13, 1911.
51. See CM, October 26, 1911.
52. HKDP, October 27, 1911.




53. HKT, November 6, 1911.
54. For the full text of the edict in English translation, see Cameron, The Reform Movement in China, pp. 130-1; Kent, The Passing to the Manchus, pp. 160-1; see also the North China Daily News reprinted in HKT, November 7, 1911, p. 5 and the Times (London), October 31, 1911.
55. CM, November 2, 1911.
56. See CM, November 2, 1911.
57. See HKDP, November 2, 1911.
58. See HKDP, "Yüan as Premier", reprinted in HKT, November 9, 1911, p. 2, col. 5.
59. See reports from HKDP's correspondent in London, HKDP, October 17, 1911; also HKDP, November 13, 20 & 23 of 1911. The HKT of November 7, 1911 reprinted an interview record by a reporter of the Daily Chronicle with Mrs. Cantlie who spoke of Sun Yat-sen as the "Garibaldi of China". See also "Sun Yat-sen, a reminiscence from Singapore" in the Times (London), reprinted in HKT, November 20, 1911, p. 4, col. 4-5. The HKT was convinced that the term "Garibaldi of China" was "extravagant" and "begotten largely of long standing friendship". See HKT, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen arrival in Hongkong, December 21, 1911, p. 4, col. 2-3.

As far as the HKT was concerned, it did not make any attempt to suppress the unfavourable views from these excerpts for any side of the antagonists. A derogative view on Sun Yat-sen from the Daily Mirror was reprinted in its November 11, 1911 issue, see p. 1, col. 7.

60. Peking and Tientsin Times of November 25, 1911, for example, remarks, "Seven-tenths of the rank and file of the revolutionaries have not the faintest notion that they have flocked to the Republican standard merely because of their hereditary dislike of the Manchu conquerors". This article was reprinted in Woodhead, The Truth about the Chinese Republic, p. 31.
61. Article reprinted in HKT, October 27, 1911, p. 2, col. 4.
62. See HKT, November 2, 1911, November 23, 1911; CM, "The Revolution", reprinted in HKT, November 7, 1911, p. 2, col. 5; CM, November 17, 1911; HKDP, November 7, 1911.
63. See HKDP, November 7, 1911.
64. For the events leading to and the course of the peace negotiation at Shanghai, see Ch'en San-ching, "Fa-kuo yü Hsin-hai ke-ming", Chin-tai wai-chiao shih lun-chi,




- p. 125; Tso Shun-sheng, Four Talks on Modern Chinese History, pp. 382-384; Kent, The Passing of the Manchus, chapter XXVIII, "The Peace Conference at Shanghai"; T'an Yung-nien, Vol. 2, pp. 344-345; Dingle, China's Revolution: 1911-1912, p. 200.
65. See HKWS, series II, "K'ai-kuo kuei-mo", II, 506-510, quoted by Louis Sigel, "Revolution by diplomacy: A re-examination of the Shanghai Peace Conference of 1911", in Papers on Far Eastern History, 19 (March 1979), p. 139.
66. See reprint in HKT, December 21, 1911, p. 2.
67. Cited by Wang Chung-hui in his foreword to Ch'en Kuo-ch'üan (trans.), Hsin-i ying-kuo cheng-fu k'an pu Chung-kuo ke-ming nan-p'i shu in Chung-hua min-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chiai-shao ti-i ch'i, p. 377; also quoted in J.G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912, p. 268.
68. See, for example, HKT, "New Republic seeks recognition. Appeal from Wu Ting-fang", December 16, 1911, p. 5. The manifesto was quoted in Dingle, China's Revolution, 1911-1912, pp. 5-7.
69. See HKDP, "Danger of a Republic", reprinted in HKT, January 22, 1912, p. 2.
70. America's recognition of the Chinese republic has been studied by Cheng Emily Hwa, "United States policy during the Chinese revolution", Ph.D thesis, University of South Carolina, 1963, chapter v; N.S. Bose, American Attitude and Policy to the Nationalist Movement in China (1911-1921), p. 46 ff.




Chapter V

1. For the early history of the Sino-British opium trade and the events leading to this war, see Yü En-teh, Chung-kuo chin-yen fa-lien pien-chien shih; D.E. Owen, British opium policy in China and India; Lu Fan-chih, Ya-p'ien chan-cheng yü Hsiang-kang (The opium war and Hong Kong), Hong Kong, 1983.
2. The blockade was initiated by the Governor-General of Liang-kwang Jui-lin in 1858. For details, see W.S.K. Waung, The Controversy, Opium and Sino-British Relations 1858-1887, p. 26 ff; Owen, pp. 274-7; Endacott & Hinton, The Fragrant Harbour, pp. 41-2.
3. By 1906, Hong Kong's opium trade had valued more than £5 million. See Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang shih-hua, p. 130.
4. The right to refine and sell opium locally was farmed out by the Hong Kong government to private hands at a monthly rental. By the late 19thC, revenue from the Opium Farmers made up one-sixth of the total annual income of the Hong Kong government. One-tenth of the local Chinese aged over fifteen were addicted to the drug. See Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang shih-hua, p. 130.
5. See G.H. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai, p. 118, HKWP, September 9, 1897.
6. See Tse Tsan Tai, p. 8.
7. SCMP, August 18, 1906; HKT, August 25, 1906, Mail Supplement, p. 243, col. 5.
8. See SCMP, June 20, 1906.
9. SCMP of June 9, 1906; August 28, 1906. The Hong Kong Government introduced an opium monopoly in 18 leased for a specific period of three years to a farmer for the sole right to prepare opium for sale and to sell it in the Colony. Additional restriction was imposed upon the opium farmer. Since 1891, the opium farmer was allowed to draw 1,800 chests of opium per annum in order to prepare and sell it.
10. SCMP, June 18, 1906; August 28, 1906; June 25, 1909 & July 9, 1909.
11. SCMP of August 20, 1906 [editorial].
12. CM of August 21; and September 24, 1906.



13. See HKDP, September 2, 1909; HKDP, October 21, 1910.
14. Divans were places where opium was sold for smoking on the premises or where a fee was paid for the privileges of smoking. In Hong Kong there were 190 divans. They were under the control of the police, the Sanitary Department and the Protector of Chinese. A divan usually consisted of a single room which if were full might accommodate 30 persons at a time. Divans were only open from 6 a.m. to mid-night. Divan license cost HK\$10 (£1) per annum and was renewable annually. Women and children were absolutely forbidden in a divan. See Lugard's Memorandum presented to the Legislative Council reprinted in HKT, Mail Supplement, March 13, 1909, p. 100.
15. See Chinese Public Opinion, May 19, 1908, p. 3, col. 3.
16. See SCMP, May 15, 1908; HKDP, November 19, 1909.
17. See, for example, HKT, May 12, 1908; reprinted in Mail Supplement, May 15, 1908.
18. See "The Opium Question. What Hongkong Businessmen think" SCMP, May 19, 1908, p. 7 and May 20, 1908. See also P'an K'ung-yen, "Hsiang-kang chin-yen shih-hua" in Li Chin-wei edited, Centenary History of Hongkong, p. 61. See also Lin Yu-lan (lam Yau Lan), Hsiang-kang shih-hua (Hong Kong Historical Notes), Shanghai Book Store (3rd ed. 1980), pp. 131-2.
19. See HKT, Mail Supplement, May 23, 1908, p. 181, col. 4. The Chamber of Commerce composed of Messrs. David Sassoon and Company; E.D. Sassoon and Company and other leading Parsee firms of Hong Kong which had carried on a large and thriving opium business in China. The attitude of this merchant association in the opium issue was naturally pro-opiumist. See Peking Daily News, "Pro-opiumists at work", June 25, 1909.
20. See G.H. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai, p. 118.
21. See HKT, Mail Supplement, May 29, 1908; see also Chinese Public Opinion; "The Opium Question in Hongkong", June 9, 1908.
22. See HKT, Mail Supplement, May 29, 1908.
23. See SCMP, "The Opium Question", correspondence by "Colonists", May 19, 1908.
24. See CO129/356/16998 of April 19, 1909.
25. Lugard's memorandum was reprinted in HKT, Mail Supplement, March 13, 1909, p. 100.




26. See HKT, Mail Supplement, Jun 4 20, 1908, p. 217. Interestingly, the Chinese Public Opinion, a newspaper having an anti-opium stand, referred to Clementi as the "prominent opium champion of Hong Kong" and commented on Clementi's report in very harsh terms. See Chinese Public Opinion, August 15, 1908.
27. See CM, May 9, 1908 (editorial).
28. See CM, "The opium question", May 29, 1908.
29. See HKT, October 5, 1910, reprinted in Mail Supplement, October 8, 1910.
30. SCMP, May 12, 1908, [notes and comments].
31. SCMP, July 1, 1908.
32. "The Opium Question", CM, May 29, 1908; "Opium Facts and Fallacies", CM, May 21, 1908; "The Opium Question", CM, June 18, 1908.
33. "The Opium Question", CM, June 18, 1908.
34. See HKDP of January 28, 1910, p. 2, col. 2.
35. Dross opium is the residue from the opium pipe after smoking.
36. From 1895 until the new contract began, the opium farmer had been allowed an annual maximum of 1,800 chests. The average withdrawals over the period 1895 to 1908 were 1,231 chests a-year. See "Memorandum", enclosed in F)415/1584/45560 of October 26, 1912.
37. See HKT, October 1, 1909, Mail Supplement, p. 363, col. 3; "Restrictions on the opium and morphine traffic in the Eastern countries", Eastern No. 114 of CO882/9; Lam Yau Lan, Hong Kong Historical Notes, p. 132.
38. See "Restrictions on the opium and morphine traffic in the Eastern Countries", Eastern No. 114 of CO882/9.
39. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, D44-5. The following table shows the quantity of opium imported and exported.

Year Chests	1910	1911
Imported:	31,743	21,286
Exported:	28,347	20,061

Source: Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, D55.




40. See G.H. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai, p. 18.
41. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1909, p. 2.
42. Prepared opium from China was prohibited from exporting to Hong Kong by a Chinese Imperial Rescript in early 1908. The law was strictly enforced by the Viceroy of Canton. See SCMP, March 13, 1908; p. 6 & CM, March 3, 1908, p. 4, col. 4 & CO129/351/16754 of May 9, 1908. But the smuggling of prepared opium from China into the Colony was quite rampant. According to the report of Governor Lugard from August 1907 to January 1908, the average number of seizure of prepared opium illegally imported into China has exceeded one per cent per day. See HKT, Mail Supplement, March 13, 1909, p. 100. Situation soon changed. See CO129/377/ of May 1, 1911, p. 8-11.
43. See HKT, August 6, 1910, reprinted in Mail Supplement, August 13, 1910.
44. "The opium Prosecutions", CM, February 9, 1911.
45. HKT, October 5, 1910, reprinted in Mail Supplement, October 8, 1910, p. 1; "Suppressing opium smoking", CM, February 7, 1911.
46. HKT, August 6, 1910, reprinted in Mail Supplement, August 13, 1910.
47. SCMP, May 91, 1908, p. 7; HKT, Mail Supplement, Dec. 31, 1908.
48. SCMP, May 19, 1908; HKT, April 22, 1908.
49. See Hongkong Blue Book for the year 1907, reprinted also in SCMP of May 11, 1908; and the Hongkong Blue Book for the year 1908.
50. See Hongkong Blue Book for the year 1909, reprinted also in "The Hongkong Blue Book for 1909 and the Opium Question", CM, August 5, 1910.
51. See Hongkong Blue Book for the year 1909, reprinted in HKT, August 6, 1910, Mail Supplement, August 13, 1910; HKDP, March 12, 1910 (editorial).
52. See CO129/365/12483 of March 23, 1910.
53. See HKDP of March 12, 1910; CO129/365/12483 of March 23, 1910.
54. CO129/356/16998 of April 19, 1909.
55. See HKDP, October 2, 1909 (editorial); HKDP, March 12, 1910.



56. HKDP, August 16, 1908 (editorial); September 19, 1908, (editorial).
57. See, for example, HKT, April 22, 1908; SCMP "Our depleted revenue", February 25, 1911.
58. See, for example, Letter-to-editor by Crepusculum in HKDP, August 18, 1909, p. 2, col. 3.
59. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1909, p. 23; ibid., 1910, p. 23; ibid., 1911, p. 22; CO129/365/12483 of March 23, 1910; The Times (London), March 8, 1911; HKDP, March 11, 1911 (editorial); SCMP, "The substantial contribution", March 10, 1911; CM, "Hongkong opium losses. Further grants from Imperial Government", March 9, 1911.
60. See HKT, Mail Supplement, December 31, 1909.
61. See HKT, August 17, 1909, reprinted in Mail Supplement, August 20, 1909.
62. See report of the meeting of the Legislative Council, reprinted in CM, August 13, 1909, p. 4.
63. See HKDT, September 22, 1909 (editorial).
64. See HKT, September 13, 1909, reprinted in HKT, Mail Supplement, September 17, 1909; September 20, 1909, reprinted in Mail Supplement, September 25, 1909; September 18, 1909, reprinted in Mail Supplement, September 25, 1909; also HKT, Mail Supplement, December 31, 1909; HKDP, August 16, 1909 (editorial); August 23, 1909; September 17, 1909 (editorial); September 20, 1909, September 22, 1909 (editorial); CM, "Liquor licenses", August 17, 1909; "The proposed liquor Ordinance", September 11, 1909.

Hong Kong was declared a free port by the Proclamation of June 7, 1841.


65. See Report of the Imports and Export Office with regard to the Liquor traffic, reprinted in HKDP, of June 7, 1910; see also Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1909, p. 24, reprinted in part in CM, "Hongkong Blue Book for 1909 and the opium question", August 5, 1910.
66. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, C16.
67. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1909, p. 23. The Ordinance No. 23 of 1909 (The Opium Ordinance, 1909) was further amended by Ordinance No. 39 of 1911 (The Opium Amendment Ordinance, 1911). See enclosure in F0415/1518/40062 of October 11, 1911.



Previously, there was virtually no or little official restriction being imposed on the sale and consumption of compounds of opium or morphine prepared for use in Hong Kong. Ordinance No. 8 of 1891 (the Prepared Opium Ordinance) was intended to regulate the local opium Farm and did not touch upon the subject. An amendment Ordinance No. 10 passed in September 1904 only imposed a royalty of 3 dollars per tael payable to the opium farmer on opium compounds imported for sale or use in Hong Kong. Ordinance No. 15 of 1906 passed in November 1906 imposed a royalty of 30 dollars per tael on morphine imported into the Colony. See "Memorandum by Mr. [C.] Clementi respecting Royalty on Compounds of Opium and Morphine", FO415/1718/219 of December 16, 1909, Enclosure 3 in No. 2; also enclosed in FO415/1718/17147 of May 12, 1910.

68. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, D46.
69. See Jordan to Grey in FO415/1584/29380 of June 25, 1912; see also India Office to Colonial Office dated July 10, 1912 and "Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe" dated June 27, 1912 enclosed in FO415/1584/30418 of July 17, 1912; India ofice to Foreign Offic in FO415/1584/31517 of July 24, 1912; CO to FO, in FO415/1584/31791 of July 26, 1912.
70. See "Memorandum", enclosed in FO415/1584/45560 of October 26, 1912.
71. See HKT, "The strong spirit", February 11, 1911.
72. See, for example, the Peking Daily News of June 18, 1909, "Important Opium edict" & June 19, 1909, "The Opium Edict" [editorial].
73. HKT, January 26, 1912.
74. See Jean Cantlie Stewart, The Quality of Mercy, pp. 42-3; Ng Lun Ngai-ha, Interactions of East and West, p. 122; Chiu Ling-yeong, "Ho Kai (1859-1914): A Hong Kong Elite, Reformer and Revolutionary", in Chu Hai Journal 9 (December 1976), p. 203; CM, "Basis for a University", March 17, 1908.
75. See Calendar of the Hongkong College of Medicine for 1908-9, Cited by HKDP, "The Hongkong College of Medicine", November 4, 1908, p. 3, col. 4; G.H. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai, p. 68.

For nearly two decades of its existence, over 102 students had been enrolled and 36 had become qualified as "licentiates". Although the graduates of the College were allowed to practise in Hong Kong, their qualifications were not recognised by the General Medical Council of Britain or by the Hong Kong Government, see HKDP, January 11, 1908, p. 3; Jean Cantlie



Stewart, The Quality of Mercy, p. 62; G.H. Choa, The Life and Times of Sir Kai Ho Kai, pp. 116-7; Ng Lun Ngai-ha, Interactions of East and West, p. 123.

76. The history of this college is provided in The Yellow Dragon, "A Short History of Queen's College", LVI (Summer 1961), pp. 51-3; "Founder's day essay competition, History of Queen's College up to 1881", LXII, (Summer 1967), pp. 57-8; Cheung Man-ki, "The Central School - the Earliest Government Secondary School in Hong Kong", Shih-chao hsin-kan hao, vol. 4 (June 1978), G. Stokes, Queen's College.
 77. Quoted in HKT, August 8, 1896 (editorial).
 78. Quoted in SCMP, March 4, 1907 (editorial).
 79. See Lo Hsiang-lin, Hongkong and Western Cultures, p. 167 & 176.
 80. Sun Yat-sen was a student of the Central School from 1884 to 1887 and a graduate of the College of Medicine for Chinese in 1892. See Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu chih ti-hsüch shih-tai, quoted also by Ng Lun Ngai-ha, Interactions of East and West.
- Cham Kam To and Wang Chung Hui were students of the Queen's College in the 1890s. See Who's who in China, 3rd edition, Shanghai 1925, pp. 110-111; 800-801 respectively quoted in Cheng Man-ki, "The Central School - the Earliest Government Secondary School in Hong Kong", pp. 34, 49, 53-4.
81. This issue was first raised in 1868 when the school authority of the Central School tried to change its curriculum in order to prepare its students to join the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. The local community raised its objection on the ground that it was not worthwhile for the government to spend a large amount of public money to educate the youths for services in China. See Cheng Man-ki, op. cit., p. 47. For another later treatment of the local community's response to this question, see HKT, "A matter of moment", October 7, 1905, reprinted in Mail Supplement, October 14, 1905.
 82. The Hongkong College of Medicine (for Chinese) since its foundation did not have its college buildings, instructions for its students were carried out in the Alice Memorial Hospital, the Nethersole and Ho Miu Ling Hospital, the Government Civil Hospital, Queen's College, the Royal Sanitary Institute, the Public Mortuary, the Bacteriological Institute as well as the Tung Wa Hospital. See HKDP, "The Hongkong College of Medicine", November 4, 1908, p. 3, col. 4.



83. The funds mainly came from a bequest of property valued at HK\$10,000 under the will of Tang Chuk Kai in late 1906 and a donation of HK\$50,000 by an old Hong Kong resident Ng Li-hing in 1907. See HKDP, "The Hongkong College of Medicine", November 4, 1908, p. 3, col. 4; HKDP, January 11, 1909, p. 3, col. 5; CM, "The Hongkong University", March 13, 1908; G.H. Choa, op. cit., p. 68.
84. For some brief information about the Hongkong Technical Institute, see Lin Yu-lan, Hsiang-kang shih-hua, p. 126; CM, "Basis for a university. Two existing institutions", March 17, 1908, p. 4.
85. See CM, January 15, 1908 cited by Ng Lun Ngai-ha, Interactions of East and West, p. 124.
86. Quoted from Stokes, Queen's College, pp. 264-5.
87. See Nigel Cameron, p. 144; James Pope-Hennessy, Half-Crown Colony, p. 130; G.H. Choa, op. cit., p. 97.
88. See SCMP, May 30, 1908, p. 7; HKDP, "The proposed Hong Kong University. The governor's appeal. Endowment fund of £110,000 required", January 11, 1909, p. 3, col. 5; CM, "Mr. Mody's Magnificent gift", March 16, 1908; CM, "The University, The Scheme possible. An endowment wanted", March 16, 1908.
89. See HKD, "The proposed University for Hongkong", February 16, 1909, p. 3, col. 1-2.
90. See HKDP, February 16, 1909, p. 3, col. 1-2 & HKT, Mail Supplement, December 4, 1909, p. 445, col. 6.
Members of this sub-committee included Chang Kang-yu, Ho Kai, Lau Chu-pak, Ho Kam-tong, Ng Hon-tse, S.W. Tso, Chau Shiu-ki, Sin Tak-fan, Wong Fa-lung, Lai Kwei-pui, Lee Po-kwei, Leung Hok-lau, Fund Chuen-yuen, Ho Ngok-lau and others.
91. See HKT, Mail Supplement, December 4, 1909, p. 445, col. 6.
92. See Nigel Cameron, p. 144.
93. See HKT, Mail Supplement, "Hongkong University. Chinese appreciation", October 28, 1910, p. 371, cited from the Peking Daily News.
94. See Nigel Cameron, p. 144.
95. The Hong Kong Government's expenditure on education averaged no more than 4% of the total revenue. In 1905 the Hong Kong government even tried to lower the standing expenditure on education from 3.95% to 2.73%. See HKT, Mail Supplement, September 23, 1905; HKT, October 7, 1905 & Mail Supplement, October 14, 1905.




96. Reprinted also in Mail Supplement, September 23, 1905.
97. See Stokes, Queen's College, p. 33.
98. See, for example, Colquhoun, China in Transformation, chapter iv: the question of communications, especially pp. 86, 89 & 92; W.A.P. Martin, The Awakening of China, p. 205; Archibald Little, Gleanings from Fifty Years in China (1908), p. 41.
99. The first railway in China was the Woosung Railway which was built by the British. It was opened to traffic on June 30, 1876. See "The first railway in China - some little details of the original Shanghai-Woosung line" in The Far Eastern Review (December 1919), pp. 757-760. Because of popular opposition, it was purchased by the Chinese government in 1878 and wrecked by it. The line was only rebuilt in 1897. See A. Krausse, China in Decay, pp. 278-80; Chang Kia-Ngau, China's Struggle for Railroad Development, p. 2; Cheng Lin, The Chinese Railways, Past and Present, pp. 2-8.

Krausse regarded railway as "practical and progressive" and derided at the Chinese objuration of railways as "machinations of the foreign devils". His opinion indeed represented contemporary western opinion on China's railway question. See China in Decay, p. 277.

100. See Mrs. Archibald Little, Intimate China, p. 573 quoting an interview from the CM with K'ang Yu-wei. The latter was reported to have criticized the Empress Dowager of misappropriation of the railway fund and said, "Every sensible man knows that railways...are essential for the well-being of a country". See also Mrs. Archibald Little, Gleanings from Fifty Years in China, pp. 52-3.

A few most enlightened Chinese officials had by the early 1880s recognized that railways were beneficial to China. See Chang Lin, Chinese Railways, Past and Present, pp. 11-2.


101. See Lee En-han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, pp. 160-9.
102. See HKT, "The Kowloon railway", October 15, 1910, reprinted in Mail Supplement, October 22, 1910.
103. See HKT, "Kowloon-Canton railway", February 8, 1906, reprinted in Mail Supplement, February 10, 1906. The China Mail 76th Anniversary Number, March 1921 took note of this project, and treated it as the principal event of the year although the scheme was eventually mooted. See p. 6.



104. See, for example, HKWP, "Railways in China", December 4, 1895; HKWP, "Progress in China", February 19, 1896.
105. The placing of the Kowloon peninsula under British control would obviate the danger that enemies of Britain would make use of the range of hills for the purpose of bombarding the settlement in the South. See Alexis Krausse, China in Decay, p. 259.
106. The British and Chinese Corporation was formed by the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Jardine, Matheson & Co. in 1898. See Endacott & Hinton, The Fragrant Harbour, p. 121.
107. See Lee En-han, p. 162; Sun Zen E-tu, p. 84 ff.
108. For the terms of the loan, see HKT, November 24, 1906; HKT, "The Canton-Kowloon Railway", December 5, 1906, reprinted in December 8, 1906, p. 363. See also Chang Kai-ngau, China's Struggle for Railroad Development, N.Y., The John Day Co., 1943, p. 163; Mongton Chih Hsu, Railway Problems in China, p. 134; Cheng Lin, The Chinese Railways, Past and Present, pp. 43-4.
109. See HKT, "Canton-Kowloon Railway", March 4, 1907, reprinted in Mail Supplement, March 9, 1907; see also Hsu, Railway Problems in China, pp. 134-5.
110. See HKT, "The Canton-Kowloon Railway", December 5, 1906, reprinted in Mail Supplement, December 8, 1906 p. 363; see also HKT, "Kowloon-Canton Railway Agreement", December 19, 1906; HKT, "Our New Territory and the Railway", September 17, 1910 reprinted in Mail Supplement, September 24, 1910, p. 1. See also Mi Ju-cheng, Ti-kuo chu-i yü Chung-kuo t'ieh lu (Imperialism and the Chinese Railways), p. 138.
111. See HKT, "The Canton-Kowloon Railway. Loan agreement upheld", Mail Supplement, December 29, 1906.
112. For the full text of this agreement, see Kent, Railway Enterprise in China, Appendix F, No. 4, pp. 287-297.
113. See HKT, "Kowloon-Canton Railway", Mail Supplement, November 11, 1905; China Mail 76th Anniversary Number, March 1921, p. 9.
114. See Cheng Lin, The Chinese Railways, Past and Present, p. 100.
115. See ibid., p. 133.



116. Successive Governors of Hong Kong and other mercantile bodies such as the Hongkong Chamber of Commerce and the China Association (Hongkong Branch) were strong supporters of the scheme. See P.H. Kent, Railway Enterprise in China, pp. 173 & 175.
- For the role of Governor Nathan in the scheme, see Anthony Peter Haydon, "Sir Matthew Nathan: British Colonial Governor, 1899-1910", Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1968, pp. 96 ff. See also HKDP, April 20, 1907 (editorial) G.H. Choa, op. cit., pp. 96-7.
- For that of Governor Lugard, see Margery Perham, Lugard, the Years of Authority 1898-1945, p. 308 ff.
117. See HKWP, "Progress in China", February 19, 1896.
118. See, for example, SCMP, April 28, 1904; May 13, 1904; May 25, 1904; June 4, 1904; July 15, 1904; July 18, 1904; October 21, 1904; October 31, 1904; November 26, 1904, HKT, Mail Supplement, "Kowloon-Canton Railway", November 11, 1905.
119. The HKDP of May 15, 1909, for example, tried to arouse public attention to the ever-expanding estimate of the cost of constructing the British section of the Kowloon-Canton railway and in its May 20, 1909 issue questioned whether the Colony be called upon to pay for the colonial section of the Kowloon-Canton railway "considerably more than the work was worth." The SCMP of July 9, 1909 & July 28, 1909 suggested that the work should better be entrusted to a responsible contractor by means of a public tender.
- The original estimate of the cost of construction of the railway was HK\$8 million. But by 1910, it had risen to 12 million dollars. See HKT, "Million of dollars no object", March 11, 1910, reprinted in Mail Supplement, March 12, 1910, p. 76, col. 6 & p. 77, col. 1.
120. See J.S. Thomson, China Revolutionized, p. 190.
121. See HKT, Mail Supplement, November 17, 1906.
122. See HKT, "Kowloon-Canton Railway", February 8, 1906, reprinted in Mail Supplement, February 10, 1906.
123. HKT, "Official Opening of the Kowloon Railway", October 1, 1910, reprinted in Mail Supplement, October 8, 1910, p. 1.
124. In the agreement on the Canton-Kowloon Railway loan Agreement, the British Government had inserted a clause to the effect that no railway was to be built to compete with the Canton-Kowloon Railway to its detriment. This clause was designed to prevent the Chinese



Government from opening a port in the vicinity of Canton in competition with Hong Kong. See Chang Kia-ngau, China's Struggle for Railway Development, p. 189; Mi Ju-cheng, Ti-kuo chu-i yü Chung-kuo t'ieh-lu (Imperialism and Chinese Railways), p. 138.

As has been mentioned earlier, the gentry of Kwangtung had raised objections to resorting to British loan for the construction of the Chinese section of the Kowloon-Canton railway. That the railway was not popular among the average Cantonese can again be reflected from the fact that for more than two decades after its construction, the Cantonese had made no serious efforts to connect the railway with the Canton-Hankow line for fear than if direct connection was effected between these two railways, cargoes would not be transhipped in Canton but would go directly to Hong Kong, thus reducing the prosperity of Canton. See Chang Kia-ngau, p. 184.

125. For information about Macao-Canton railway, see Lu Yen, "chiu-kuang t'ieh-lu chien-tsao shih (The History of the Building of the Kowloon-Canton Railway" in Hsiang-kang chang-ku (Historical Records of Hong Kong), pp. 195-8.
126. Interestingly, France also raised objection to the building of the Kowloon-Canton railway on the ground that this British project was an "injury to French interests in South China". See A.J. Sargent, Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy, p. 234. French activities in Indo-China and South-western part of China were subjects of grave concern for many British writers especially during the 1890s. It was generally feared that France attempted politically to absorb Southern China and economically competed with Britain for the control of the China trade in this part of the Chinese empire. For a brief reference to French activities in Indo-China and Southern China, see Sargent, p. 233; A. Krausse, China in Decay, pp. 205-6.
127. Reprinted also in Mail Supplement, "Trade rivalry between Canton and Hongkong", April 11, 1908.
128. See also reprint in Mail Supplement, "Two emporiums. Hongkong and the Philippines. What the Canton-Kowloon Railway will do:", April 28, 1911, p. 161, col. 6.



Chapter VI


1. See SCMP, August 14, 1906 (editorial). The SCMP of August 18, 1906 also made the following report: "The Hongkong agents of the promoters of the Yueh Han Railway are in disfavour at Canton. The leading men in the city have met in solemn conclave to discuss resolutions..."

Ch'en Keng-yü, Ch'en Hsih-ju and Yang Hsi-yen were the chief agents of the Hankow-Canton Railway Bureau in Hong Kong. Their assigned task was to promote among the local Chinese the purchase of railway shares and to collect money therefrom. See Lo Hsiang-lin, Liang Cheng: Chinese Minister in Washington (1903-1907), p. 44.

2. For brief references to the Canton Government's efforts in disposing of the shares of the Chinese section of the Canton-Kowloon railway and the response of the Hong Kong Chinese community, see HKT, "Canton-Kowloon railway", March 9, 1907, reprinted in Mail Supplement, March 9, 1907; HKT, "Canton railways", Mail Supplement, March 16, 1907, p. 74.
3. See Stokes, The Queen's College, p. 96; Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1910, appendix N41; HKDP, December 5, 1910 (editorial); CM, "Queen's College", January 24, 1911.
4. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, Appendix N3.
5. See CM, May 5, 1911, p. 7, col. 1; HKT, "Canton news", May 18, 1911, p. 1, col. 5; CM, "The Census", June 12, 1911; CM, May 23, 1911, p. 7, col. 4; HKDP, June 12, 1911.

Macao also faced the problem of a sudden influx of some 10,000 people from Canton.


6. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911.
7. See HKT, September 12 & September 30, 1911.
8. See HKT, October 18, 1911, p. 5; SCMP, October 19, 1911, p. 6; October 21, 1911, p. 8 quoted also in Rhoads, pp. 215 & n39.
9. See HKT, "Insulting China's flag. Significant occurrence in Hongkong", October 18, 1911, p. 5, col. 2. See also The Times (London), October 19, 1911; Cf. the birthday of Confucius celebrations in Hong Kong a year ago. See CM, September 30, 1910, p. 4, col. 3.



10. See HKDP, October 19, 1911.
11. See HKT, October 23, 1911.
12. HKT, October 23, 1911.
13. On October 23, 1911, the HKT reported a rumour that the revolutionaries in Hong Kong were openly recruiting troops in the Yaumati District at the rate of 8 taels per month. On November 10, 1911, the HKDP also reported that many artisans and others were being induced to leave their occupation and join the revolutionary army by the tempting offer of a salary of HK\$15 per month.
14. CM, October 30, 1911, p. 6.
15. See CM, November 7, 1911, p. 6; HKT, "Mafficking in Hongkong", November 7, 1911, p. 4.
16. See SCMP, November 7, 1911, p. 7, col. 1; CM, November 7, 1911, p. 6; also enclosed in CO129/381/41103; HKT, November 7, 1911, p. 4; HKDP, November 7, 1911; Hongkong Administrative Report for the Year 1911, pp. 23-4; also Appendix J. The date stated in the report of the Captain Superintendent of Police should be November 6 instead of November 9; see also SCMP, "A mafficking mob", November 8, 1911, p. 6, col. 3-4.
17. See HKDP, November 9, 1911, p. 2; CM, November 7, 1911, p. 6, November 8, 1911, p. 6.
18. See, for example, CM, November 6, 1911, p. 6; HKT, November 7, 1911, p. 5, "Telegrams: the rebellion: Peking not captured"; November 8, 1911, p. 1, col. 1, "Telegrams. The rebellion: Peking not taken" & "An unfounded rumour"; SCMP, "A baseless rumour", November 9, 1911, p. 7, col. 3.
19. See CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911.
20. See CM, November 7, 1911, enclosed in CO129/381/41103.
21. See CM, November 7, 1911, p. 6.
22. See HKDP, November 9, 1911; SCMP, November 16, 1911, p. 7.
23. See HKT, November 16, 1911, p. 1, col. 4 & SCMP, "Macao notes", November 16, 1911, p. 7, col. 6.
24. The South China Bureau of the Tung Meng Hui was set up in 1909 to coordinate revolutionary activities in the South and Southwest provinces of China while the Hongkong Tung Meng Hui was responsible for revolutionary activities in the Hong Kong Macao-regions.




25. See Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution, p. 209.
26. See CM, June 7, June 27 and June 30, 1911; see also Rhoads, p. 213.
27. Rhoads, pp. 211-2.
28. See CO129/378/20274 of June 20, 1911; CO129/378/24224 of June 28, 1911.
29. See SCMP, October 14, 1911.
30. See ibid., October 18, 1911.
31. See ibid., October 26, 1911, p. 8; November 2, 1911.
32. See ibid., October 27, 1911.
33. When the Hupeh revolt broke out, the ban on the Hong Kong Chinese newspapers was lifted by the Canton authorities. See Hongkong Administrative Report, 1911, Appendix C22.
34. Rhoads, p. 210.
35. A short biography was enclosed in CO129/399/6641, p. 356-8.
36. See SCMP, October 18, 1911, p. 7, col. 3; quoted also in NCH, October 28, 1911, p. 223.
37. See "Diary of events in Canton", drawn up by Acting Vice-Consul Combe of Canton, enclosure 8, CO129/381/41103.
38. See Enclosure 3 & 8, CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911.
39. See SCMP, November 2, 1911.
40. See, for example, CM, November 2, 1911, p. 6; SCMP, November 8, 1911.
41. The China Press Association was founded in 1907. See Me Szu-yüan, "Ch'i-shih nien-lai chih Hsiang-kang pao-ye", in Chang Min-sheng (ed.), Ch'i-shih nien-lai chih Kuang-tung, 1864-1933, p. 121.
42. See CM& SCMP, November 9, 1911, p. 7; November 10, 1911; The Times (London), November 9, 1911. The telegram was reprinted in HKWS, 2nd ser., vol. 4, p. 443.
43. See Jamieson to Lugard, telegrams, dated November 9, 1911, enclosed in CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911; The Times (London), November 10, 1911; CM, November 10, 1911, p. 6.




For the events leading to the change of government in Kwangtung, see Mary Chan Man-yue, Chinese Revolutionaries in Hongkong 1895-1911, chapter VIII. For a contemporary newspaper account, see HKT, "Secret history. How Canton fell. The declaration of independence", January 19, 1912, p. 5 & p. 8, reproduced from HTJP, January 4 & January 6, 1912.

44. See CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911; The Times (London), November 10, 1911; CM, November 10, 1911, p. 6.
45. See CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911.
46. See Mary Chan Man-yue, Chinese Revolutionaries in Hong Kong 1895-1911, M.A. thesis, HKU, 1963, pp. 234-5.
47. See also enclosure in CO129/381/41103.
48. See HKDP, November 14, 1911, also enclosed in CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911; HKT, "Canton's independence", November 14, 1911, p. 4, col. 4-6; SCMP, "Hongkong Chinese celebrate", November 14, 1911, p. 2, col. 3-5.
49. See CO129/381/36258 of November 10, 1911.
50. See CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911.
51. See The Times (London), November 4, 1911.
52. See Confidential despatch of November 21, 1911 in Lugard to Harcourt, November 23, 1911, CO129/381/41103; Lugard to Harcourt, confidential, January 5, 1912, CO129/388/3505; Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, p. 14. The Kowloon-Canton railway service was not resumed until December 14, 1911 when conditions in China had become more settled.
53. As mentioned before, ex-Manchu officials such as Li Chun and Chang Ming-ch'i had sought temporary sanctuary in Hong Kong after the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution. The Customs Taotai from Yunnan was another example. See The Times (London) of November 17, 1911.
54. See Lugard to Harcourt, CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911.
55. See CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911, enclosure 2.
56. See ibid.
57. See SCMP, November 9, 1911; HKDP, November 9, 1911.




58. See, for example, SCMP, "Chang Ming Chi", January 4, 1911 & "The new viceroy. A Chinese impression", January 6, 1911, p. 6, col. 7.
59. See SCMP, "Canton's viceregal genius", reprinted in HKT, November 10, 1911, p. 2, col. 5; SCMP, November 10, 1911; see also CO129/381/36258 of November 10, 1911; CM, November 10, 1911, p. 6.
60. See SCMP, November 10, 1911, p. 7.
61. At the Legislative Council meeting of November 9, Lugard said, "it is a British tradition that hospitality is never refused to those who seek it in distress, and I have every confidence that the Chinese community of this Colony, whatever their political sympathies may be, will be glad to afford hospitality to a guest who was lately a high official, and who has done his utmost to prevent bloodshed, and has, so far as we can judge, been wonderfully successful in his efforts to this end", see CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911; see also HKT, November 10, 1911; HKDP, November 10, 1911; SCMP, November 18, 1911, p. 7, col. 1; CM, November 9, 1911, p. 6, col. 5, "Viceroy coming to Hongkong. Sir F.D. Lugard's appeal".
62. See SCMP, November 10, 1911.
63. See CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911; CM, November 17, 1911, p. 6; HKT, "The ex-Viceroy leaves the Colony for Europe", November 17, 1911, p. 5, col. 1; SCMP, "The Revolutions - the ex-Viceroy leaves the Colony for Europe", November 18, 1911, p. 7, col. 1.
64. See, for example, HKDP, November 11, 1911; SCMP, November 16, 1911, p. 7, col. 6. The Hong Kong English newspapers thought that this was the act of the Canton provisional government. But according to Ho Kai and the other Hong Kong leading Chinese, the criminals were released by the ex-Viceroy Chang Ming-ch'i just before his departure. See Lugard's conversation with Ho Kai in CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911, Enclosure 5.
65. See SCMP, November 13, 1911, p. 7, col. 1-2; November 18, 1911; November 15, 1911, p. 6, col. 3-5.
66. See HKT, November 15, 1911; May 8, 1912 & June 6, 1912.
67. See SCMP, "Canton news: financial stability of the new government", November 18, 1911, p. 2, col. 4. Actually, the financial condition of the Canton Provincial Government had grown acute on the eve of the Chinese revolution. See The Times (London), October 17, 1911.
68. See HKT, November 15, 1911.
69. See HKT, November 15, 1911; SCMP, "Kwangtung's trade", November 15, 1911, p. 6, col. 3.



70. See SCMP, November 18, 1911.
71. See CO129/381/36266 of November 10, 1911; CO129/381/36813 of November 14, 1911; CO131/43, No. 37 of November 14, 1911.
72. CM, November 15, 1911, p. 6.
73. See CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911, enclosure 7.
74. Details of the strike can be found in HKT, October 9, October 13 & November 15, 1911; SCMP, November 13, 1911, p. 6, col. 3-5; Hongkong Administrative Reports, 1911, C20-21; 1912, p. 29, C19; NCH, December 23, 1911, p. 787.
75. See CO131/43 of October 18, 1911, p. 446.
76. See CO131/43, No. 38 of November 16, 1911 & no. 41 of December 4, 1911, p. 457.
77. See CM, November 18, 1911, p. 3, col. 3; The Times, (London), "Outposts of Empire, record of the years: Hongkong", May 24, 1912.
78. See CO129/399/7204 of January 16, 1913.
79. See G.B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, p. 217; J.W. Norton-kyshe, The History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong, II: 377; England & Rear, Chinese Labour Under British Rule, p. 208.
80. See CO129/399/7204 of January 16, 1913.
81. For details concerning the Societies Ordinance of 1911, see the Hongkong Hansard, Session 1911, pp. 203 & 236; the Hongkong Government Gazette, November 17, 1911, pp. 479-483; Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, Appendix C16-17; SCMP, November 16, 1911, p. 6. The list of exempted and registered societies appears yearly from 1911 to 1919 in the Hongkong Government Gazette.
82. Robin Hutcheon, SCMP the First Eighty Years, p. 37.
83. See, for example, SCMP, "Hongkong's guilds", November 11, 1911, p. 7; SCMP, November 13, 1911, p. 6, col. 3-5; see also NCH, November 18, 1911, p. 406.
84. Combination in unreasonable restraint of trade was regarded as a criminal conspiracy and was made punishable by certain English Acts of Parliament which Hong Kong also adopted. The earliest one of such acts was the Combination Act of 1825 which was subsequently modified into the Criminal Law Admentment Act of 1871 and also the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875. See England and Rear, Chinese Labour under British Rule, p. 235.




85. The employers' and Servants Ordinance No. 45 of 1902 was a summary and extension of the provisions of the previous and similar ordinances such as the Ordinance of 1844 entitled "An Ordinance for the Preservation of Good Order and Cleanliness within the Colony of Hong Kong and its Dependencies" and also the Private Coolies Ordinance of 1902. The Ordinance No. 45 of 1902 afforded a means of enforcing a contract of service to the employers who were inconvenienced by absenteeism and misconduct of their servants. Breaches of such contract were considered a criminal offence punishable by a fine. See England and Rear, pp. 154-5 & 233.
86. See J. Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement, 1919-1927, p. 126, quoted also in Joe England and John Rear, p. 75.
87. See Joe England & John Rear, p. 209.
88. See Lugard to Harcourt, confidential, CO129/388/3505 of January 5, 1912; SCMP, November 27, 1911, p. 7, col. 3; Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, Appendix J.
89. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1912, p. 24. For the maintenance of this voluntary vigilance force, the Hong Kong Government contributed HK\$2,000 every year.
90. See CO129/301/41103 of November 23, 1911, enclosure 7; SCMP, "Fighting near British border", November 14, 1911, p. 2, col. 5.
91. See CO129/381/41103 of November 23, 1911.
92. See, for example, SCMP, November 18, 1911, p. 7, col. 1; HKT, November 17, 1911, p. 5, col. 1; CM, "The Revolution. The frontier incident", November 17, 1911, p. 6, col. 4.
93. Details of the incident can be found in Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1912, p. 29; Appendix C19; HKT, November 15, 1911; Nigel Cameron, Hongkong: The Cultural Pearl, pp. 156-7.
94. See SCMP, November 23, 1911, p. 11, col. 4.
95. See CO131/43, no. 41 of December 4, 1911, p. 456; SCMP, "Troops patrol Hong Kong streets", November 27, 1911, p. 7, col. 3; SCMP, November 28, 1911, p. 6; CM, November 27, 1911, p. 4; HKT, November 30, 1911; Hongkong Administrative Report for the Year 1911, Appendix C16-7; The Times (London), November 27, 1911.



It is interesting to note that Yaumati was regarded by the CM as a "hot-bed of revolution". See issue of November 7, 1911, p. 6.


96. See SCMP, November 28, 1911.
 97. See SCMP, "Hongkong patrolled", November 28, 1911, p. 6, col. 5.
 98. See CO129/386/37033 of November 16, 1911; The Times (London), November 21, 1911; SCMP, "Military Governors", November 23, 1911, p. 6, col. 3-5.
- The subject of a military governor for Hong Kong was once advocated by an "ex-official" in the HKDP. Realizing that at times of a serious riot or an impudent aggression from China, it was always the General who must come to the fore, this ex-official believed that it was "the right thing to give the General a prominent place on both the Council boards, so as to keep him in unbroken touch with current affairs". He further suggested that it was "a very pregnant question whether, in view of recent political developments in the East the Governor should not always be an Admiral or a General". See HKWP, November 19, 1896, p. 394.
99. See CO131/43, no. 39 of November 29, 1911, pp. 453-4; no. 40 of November 30, 1911. The proclamation was published in the Hongkong Gazette Extraordinary, November 29, 1911; SCMP, "The Colony's peace", November 30, 1911, p. 7, col. 6.
 100. The Ordinance of 1886 provided for the making of a proclamation by the Governor-in-Council whenever it appeared necessary for the preservation of public peace; during the existence of such a proclamation any person, not being a natural born subject of His [or Her] Majesty (whether such person had been naturalized under any colonial ordinance or not), could be banished by order of the Governor-in-Council. See The Ordinances of Hong Kong (1937 edition), vol. 1, 249 ff; also Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty 1898-1997, pp. 171 & 236, n. 41. The Ordinance was not repeated until 1967.
 101. See the Hongkong Legislative Council meeting in the Hongkong Hansard, Session 1911, November 30, 1911, pp. 244-5; Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, pp. 23-4; Appendices C17 & J; SCMP, November 30, 1911, p. 7. See also CO129/381/1714 of December 11, 1911, p. 343.
 102. Whipping of prisoners was done in accordance to Ordinance 12 of 1865 entitled "An Ordinance for the further security of the Residents in this Colony from personal violence", and subsequent amendments embodies,



for instance, in No. 3 of 1881 and also the Flogging Ordinance No. 3 of 1903. See CO129/388/6611 of January 30, 1912 and also The Ordinances of Hong Kong (1937 Edition), II, 998 ff.

103. See N.J. Miner, "An attempt to assassinate the Governor in 1912", JHKBRAS, 22 (1982), p. 280.
104. Lugard to Harcourt, Confidential, January 5, 1912, CO129/388/3503.
105. Hongkong Legislative Council Meeting, November 30, 1911 in Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1911, pp. 244-5; SCMP, December 1, 1911, p. 8, col. 1-3.
106. SCMP, December 1, 1911, p. 6, col. 3-4.
107. See N.J. Miners, "The attempt to assassinate the governor of Hong Kong", JHKBRAS, 22 (1982), p. 280.
108. See SCMP, "A police warning", December 8, 1911, p. 6, col. 3-5.
109. This was the impression of J.J. Stodart Kennedy, the General Manager of the Hong Kong Tramway Company, Limited. He took such an impression as "a man in the street observing without any real inside knowledge". His impression was certainly very typical of the rest of the local non-Chinese residents who found themselves embroiled in the moment of crisis especially the few months after the overthrow of the Manchus. Many non-Chinese residents of the Colony certainly exaggerated the magnitude of the disturbances and the anti-foreign feelings among the native Chinese, a mistake which Kennedy himself frankly admitted. See enclosure in CO129/388/5840 of January 27, 1912.
110. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1911, Appendix J.
111. See Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1912, Appendix I.
112. According to the Hongkong Administrative Report for the Year 1911, Appendix M, towards the end of 1911, the forest guards encountered considerable difficulty in two or three cases in bringing persons arrested for forestry offences to the Police Station as the residents of the villages which the forest guards had to pass came out in force and released the prisoners.


The "revolts" of the boys in the Hongkong Club were mentioned in HKT, "Club boys revolt refuse to obey orders", January 4, 1912; HKT, "Trouble at the Hong Kong Club", January 5, 1912, p. 5. See also HKDP, January 8, 1912, p. 3, col. 1.




113. In Singapore, as stated in the SCMP of February 16, 1912, the tendency towards lawlessness and braggadocio among the local Chinese residents was strongly felt. In Netherlands-India (Dutch Indonesia), the local colonial administration's refusal to permit the display of the new flag of the Chinese Republic and the celebration of the inauguration of a republic for China in 1912 led to disturbances and mob violence everywhere (with the exception of Batavia). Rioting soon developed in the direction of anti-colonial rule. As a response to the colonial ban on the Republican flag, the Dutch flags were publicly trampled, government servants were assaulted; the Chinese quarters refused to exhibit any Dutch flags on the occasion of the birthday of the Netherlands Royal family. The Dutch colonial authorities suppressed these riots ruthlessly. For example, in the riot of February 19, 1912 in Java at least three native Chinese were killed, more than 10 got hurt and several hundreds were arrested. See Yang Yü-ju, Hsin-hai ko-ming hsien-chu chi, pp. 246-7; Lea Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism, pp. 129-130; 161-162; Peng Meng, "Sun Chung Shan tsai Hsin-hai ke-ming shih-ch'i ti fan-ti ai-kuo ssu-hsiang-chi-nien Hsin-hai ke-ming ch'i-shih chou-nien" in Chung-kuo chin-hsien-tai shih lun-wen chi, p. 5; J.O.P. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China, p. 195.

Similar disturbances by local Chinese were also reported in Kuala Lumpur, British Malaya, Kobe, Japan, (See Yang Yü-ju, Hsin-hai ke-ming hsien-chu chi, p. 246) and Toronto, Canada. (According to J.O.P. Bland, in Toronto, "more than a thousand Chinese residents celebrated the inauguration of the Republic by a joyful procession and a banquet. See Recent Events and Present Policies, p. 195).


114. This was reflected in Jamieson's despatches to Lugard, enclosed in CO129/388/3503. See also an interview between the Daily Press Correspondent at Canton with the Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the new Canton Military Government, reproduced in HKDP, January 24, 1912, p. 3.
115. Mentioned in Jamieson to Lugard, December 15, 1911, CO129/388/3503.
116. See despatches between Lugard and Jamieson, enclosed in CO129/388/3503; see also SCMP, November 29, 1911, p. 6.
117. Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1912, Appendix I.
118. See despatches Between Lugard and Jamieson, CO129/388/3503.



119. Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1912, pp. 29-30.
120. See HKDP, January 24, 1912, p. 3; HKDP, February 22, 1912, p. 3.
121. See, for example, HKDP, January 23, 1912; HKT, May 21, 1912.
122. Lugard to Jamieson, enclosure in CO129/388/3503 of December 20, 1911.
123. See p. 29.
124. See CO129/388/3503 of January 5, 1912.
125. See ibid.
126. See CO131/43, no. 3 of February 26, 1912, p. 533; CO129/389/11256 of March 13, 1912; The Times (London), May 24, 1913.
127. See CO129/38911256 of March 13, 1912.
128. See CO129/389/11256 of March 13, 1912; CO131/43, no. 5 of March 27, 1912, p. 538; CO131/43, no. 43 of May 8, 1912, p. 604.
129. Sir Frederick Lugard left the Colony on March 18 to take up the governorship of Northern and Southern Nigeria and Mr. Severn administered the Colony until the arrival of Henry May.
130. See CO129/391/26076 of July 24, 1912; CO129/396/20762 of July 4, 1912; Hongkong Administrative Report for the year 1912, p. 31; The Times (London), July 5-6, 1912; HKT, July 5, 1912 quoted in Nigel Cameron, pp. 151-2.
- For the most recent treatment of this "only attempt ever made to assassinate the governor of Hong Kong", see N.J. Miners, "The attempt to assassinate the Governor in 1912", in JHKBRAS 22 (1982).
131. See The Times (London), July 19, 1912.
132. For a brief summary of the attitude of the SCMP & CM to this episode, see N.J. Miners, loc. cit., pp. 283-4.
133. See the Hongkong Government Gazette, December 20, 1912, pp. 616-9; CO129/394/2222 of December 30, 1912, Hongkong Hansard, Session 1912, pp. 108-110; CO131/43, no. 36 of December 13, 1912.
134. See The Times (London), December 19, 1912.



135. The Chinese drug store in Bonham Strand East was the local headquarters of the T'ung-meng hui. It is therefore quite surprising that the Hong Kong Government did not interfere despite the fact that its existence became an open secret.
136. CM, November 9, 1911, p. 6.
137. HKT, January 17, 1912, p. 4, col. 2.



SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

1. The Straits Times was not available for perusal. It is assumed that one of its passages reprinted in the SCMP would be representative enough in regard to this paper's opinion on the issue of a revolution for China. It stated in unequivocal language the following statement: "We do not scruple to say that we have an unqualified contempt for the so-called Chinese government, and, believing that a revolution is needed to bring about reform, we sympathise most heartily with the aspiration of the Reform Party, whose object is, without question, to overthrow the present government and replace it by one most worthy of the name". Although this paper did not approve of the policy of murder and outrage, its realization that the power-holder would not easily yield to the popular demand led it to reach the opinion that "[w]e see no prospect of improvement in China except along the red road of revolution". This reprinted passage was very seditious indeed. While reproducing this article in full, the SCMP found it safe to affix a statement in the same column that it "did not endorse the view expressed therewith". See reprint of this article in SCMP, October 8, 1907.
2. See HKDP, "China's leader of Rebellion. Personal sketch of Sun Yat Sen by a correspondent in the "Daily Chronicle", November 13, 1911, p. 6, col. 1-2.
3. See, for example, CM, October 26, 1898.
4. See Albert Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Twentieth Century, p. 99.
5. Robin Hutcheon, SCMP, the First Eighty Years, p. 12.
6. Ibid., p. 15.
7. The HKWP of October 29, 1898 for example reprinted from North China Daily News "an open letter from K'ang Yu Wei". It should be noted that K'ang Yu-wei's writings were banned in the Chinese vernacular newspapers in China after the coup of 1898. The HKWP of May 12, 1900 carried a letter to "vindicate the bad things said against the Chinese reformers". The HKWP of May 26, 1900 printed the debate between the reformers and revolutionaries in their columns. The CM of October 18, 1900 translated the Manifesto of the Waichow rebels. Similarly, the HKT of July 20, 1904 and HKT of February 18, 1905 also reprinted interviews from the Chinese rebel leaders explaining the aims and nature of their movement to their readers.



8. The CM of October 18, 1900, for example, in translating the Manifesto of the Waichow rebels stated that its intention was to enable the reader to form a conception of the causes that have been at work to bring about the present disturbances and also the ideas and hopes of these men in raising the standard of rebellion". In other words, it aimed at enlightening its readers of the nature of the Waichow uprising rather than to popularize the movement among its foreign readers.



APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

NEWSPAPER STAFF LIST, ca 1895-1912 (INCOMPLETE)

A. China Mail

Proprietor/manager

George Murray Bain (proprietor, 1872-1909)
William Henry Donald (managing editor, 1904-1906;
managing director, 1906-8)

Editor:

Thomas H. Reid (1894-1904)
William Henry Donald (1904-1906)
A. Bellamy Brown (1908-1911)

Others:

Thomas Reid (member since 1891)
Thomas Petrie (reporter, 1900-1902)
William Henry Donald (sub-editor, 1903-4)
Frederick Lionel Pratt (Leader writer, since 1905)

B. Hongkong Daily Press

Business manager/lessee/managing editor:


D. Wares Smith (manager, 1889)
D. Wares Smith & George C. Cox (Joint lessees, 1900)
Alfred Cunningham (managing editor, 1899-1903)
Bertram Augustus Hale (lessee since 1903; managing editor,
1908-1911)

Editor:

Alfred Cunningham (1899-1903)
R. Chatterton Wilcox (1875-1900)
George C. Cox (1889-1899)
Philip W. Sergeant (since 1900)
T. Wright (1904-1908)
Bertram Augustus Hale (1908-1911)

Others:

Wilfrid Victor Pennell (reporter since 1912)



C. Hongkong Telegraph

Publisher/manager:

J.J. Francis (publisher, 1895-1901)
 J.P. Braga (manager, 1902-1910)
 J.W. Noble (publisher, 1911)

Editor:

Chesney Duncan (1895-1899)
 E.F. Skertchly (1898-1902)
 J.P. Braga (1902-1910)
 E.A. Snowin (1902-1906)
 A.W. Brebner (1906-1910)
 E.B. Helme (1910-1911)
 Frederick Lionel Pratt (1911)
 Alfred Hicks (1911 onwards)

Others:

Thomas Cowen (sub-editor in the 1890s)
 George Manington (Assistant editor, 1903-4)
 Harold F. Piper (Assistant editor (?), 1904-5)

D. South China Morning Post

Director/General manager/compradore


Creasy Ewens (director 1903)
 G.W.F. Playfair (director 1903)
 Arthur G. Wards (director 1903)
 Alfred Cunningham (General manager, 1903-7)
 Tse Tsan Tai (compradore, 1903-1907)
 Ernest Hamilton Sharp (dircetor, 1903)
 G.C. Moxon (director, 1903)
 J. Scott harston (director, 1904)
 Joseph W. Noble (director since 1906)

Editor:

Alfred Cunningham (1903-1907)
 Douglas Story (1903 onwards)
 George T. Lloyd (1907-1910)
 Angus Hamilton (1910-1911)
 Thomas Petrie (1911)

Others:

Philip W. Sergeant (London Correspondent, 1903-?)
 Tom Clark (reporter, 1903-4)
 Thomas Petrie (sub-editor, 1904-1907; assistant editor, 1907-1911)
 George T. Lloyd (assistant editor, 1904-7)
 R.A. Lowry (chief reporter 1907-1909)



APPENDIX II

Rulers of China, ca. 1895-1912

Kuang-hsü 光 緒 1875-1908

Hsüan-tung 宣 統 1908-1912

Governors-General of Liang-kuang, ca. 1895-1911

T'an Chung-lin 譚 鍾麟 , 1895-1899 (KH21-25)

Li Hung-chang 李 鴻章 , 1900 (KH26)

Te-shou 德壽 (Acting), 1900 (KH26)

T'ao-mo 陶 模 , February 1901 - September 1902 (KH26-28)

Te-shou 德壽 (Acting), 1902-3 (KH28-29)

Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan 岑 春煊 , April 1903-September 1906
(KH29-32)

Chou-fu 周馥 , November 1906-July 1907 (KH32-33)

Chang Jen-chün 張人駿 , September 1907-July 1909
(KH33-TH1)

Yüan Shu-hsün 袁樹勛 (Acting), 1909-1910 (HT1-2)

Chang Ming-ch'i 張鳴岐 , 1910-1911 (HT2-3)



APPENDIX III

GOVERNORS OF THE COLONY OF HONG KONG, ca. 1841-1912

Capt. Charles Elliot (Administrator)	January-August 1841
Sir Henry Pottinger (Administrator) (Governor)	August 1841-June 1843 June 1843-May 1844
Sir John Francis Davis	May 1844-March 1848
Sir Samuel George Bonham	March 1848-April 1854
Sir John Bowring	April 1854-May 1859
Sir Hercules George Robert Robinson	September 1859-March 1865
W.T. Mercer (Acting)	1865-1866
Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell	March 1866-April 1872
Sir Arthur Edward Kennedy	April 1872-March 1877
Sir John Pope Hennessy	April 1877-March 1882
W.H. Marsh (Acting)	1882-3
Sir George Ferguson Bowen	March 1883-December 1885
W.H. Marsh (Acting)	1885-7
Major-General Cameron	1887
Sir George William Des Voeux	October 1887-May 1891
Major-General Digby-Barker (Acting)	1891
Sir William Robinson	December 1891-January 1898
Major-General W. Black (Acting)	1898
Sir Henry Arthur Blake	November 1898-November 1903
F.H. May (Acting)	1903-4
Sir Matthew Nathan	July 1904-April 1907
Sir Frederick John Lugard	July 1907-March 1912
Sir Francis Henry May	July 1912-February 1919



GLOSSARY OF CHARACTERS FOR SELECTED CHINESE NAMES AND TERMS*

Anking 安慶

Chang Chih-tung 張之洞

Chang Han-chieh 張漢傑

Chang Ming-ch'i 張鳴岐

Chang Piao 張彪

Chao Sheng 趙聲

Ch'ao-Chiu (Chao Chou) 潮州

Chau Sik Nin 周錫年

Ch'en Ai-ting (Chan Oi Ting) 陳鵠亭

Ch'en Ch'i-mei 陳其美

Ch'en Ch'i-ming (Chan Kai Ming) 陳啓明

Ch'en Chin-t'ao (Chan Kam To) 陳錦濤

Ch'en Ching-yüeh 陳敬岳

Ch'en Chiung-ming 陳炯明

Ch'en Hsih-ju 陳席儒

Ch'en Keng-yü 陳慶虞

Ch'en Shao-pai 陳少白

Ch'en Shu-jen 陳樹人

Chen-nan-kuan 鎮南關

Cheng Kuan-i [or Cheng Kuan-kung] 鄭貫一 (鄭貫公)

Cheng Shih-liang 鄭士良

*Names and terms in the text are romanized according to the Wade-Giles system with some slight modifications in certain cases. All other forms of romanizations are put in brackets. In the text, common names and terms follow usages adopted largely by the local English newspapers.



Cheung Pat-sze 張 鴻 仕

Ch'iang-hsüeh hui 強 學 會

Ch'iang Kung-yin (Kong Hung Tan) 江 孔 股

Ch'ien-heng-hang 乾 行

Ch'ing-i pao 清 議 報

Chou Chao-chün 周 曙 君

Chou Fu 周 瘦

Chu Chih-hsin 朱 執 信

chü-jen 舉 人

Ch'u-pao 楚 報

Chung-hua min-kuo shih-liao tsung-pien 中 華 民 國 史 料叢 編

Chung-kuo jih-pao (Chung Kwok Yat Po) 中 國 日 報

Chung-wai hsin-pao 中 外 新 報

En Ming 恩 銘

Feng Hua-ch'üan (Fung Wa Chun) 馮 華 川

Feng Shan 凤 山

Feng Tzu-yu 馮 白 由

Fu Ch'i 尹 琦

Fu-jen wen-she (Foo Yan Man Ser) 輔 仁 文 社

Ho Ch'i (Ho Kai) 何 啓

Ho Chin-t'ang (Ho Kam Tong) 何 錦 崇

Ho Fu (Ho Fook) 何 福

Ho-hsing kung-szu 合 興 公 司


Ho Tung 何 東

Hsieh Tsan-t'ai (Tse Tsan Tai) 謝 繢 泰

Hsieh Ying-po 謝 英 伯

Hsing-chung hui 興 中 會

Hsü Hsi-lin 徐錫麟



Hsü Shih-chang 徐世昌

Hsun-huan jih-pao 循環日報

Hu Han-min 胡漢民

Hua-hsing-hui (Hua Sheng Hui) 華興會

Hua-tzu jih-pao (Wa Tsz Yat Po) 華字日報

Huang Hsing (Wong Hing) 黃興

Huang-kang (Wong Kang) 黃岡

Huang-lung pao (Wong Lung Po) 黃龍報

Huang Sheng (Wong Shing) 黃勝

Huang Shih-ch'i 黃時祈

Huang Shih-chung 黃世仲

Huichou (Waichow) 惠州

Hung Hsiu-chüan 洪秀全

Hung Tsun-kwei [or Hung Ch'üan-fu] 洪全貴 (洪全福)

I K'uang (Prince Ch'ing) 奕匡 (慶親王)

Jui Cheng 瑞澂

K'ang Yin-t'ien 康陰田

K'ang Yu-p'u (K'ang Kuang-jen) 康有溥 (康廣仁)

K'ang Yu-wei 康有爲

Kao-lao hui 哥老會

Ke-ming-tang (Kok Ming Tong) 革命黨

K'o-pao (Ho Po) 可報

Ku Hung-ming 庫鴻銘


Kuangtung jih-pao 廣東日報

Kuang-hsü 光緒

Kuang-yung-yuan (Kwong Wing Yuan) 廣榮元

Kuei-shan (Kwai Shin) 歸善

Kung-chin hui 共進會



Kung-chü shang-shu 公 車 上 書

Kuo Sung-tao 郭 嵩 濤

Li Hung-chang 李 鴻 章

Li Hung-tsao 李 鴻 藻

Li I-heng 李 以 衡

Li P'ei-chi 李 沛 基

Li Hsiu-ling 李 心 鏞

Li Ta-hsing 李 大 醒

Li Ying-sheng 李 應 生

Li Yü-t'ang 李 煙 堂

Li Yuan-hung 黎 元 洪

Li Chi 李 箕

Li Chun 李 淬

Liang Ch'i-chao 梁 啓 超

Lienchau 連 州

Lin Kuan-tz'u 林 冠 慈

Lin Yu-lan 林 友 蘭

Ling-hai pao 嶺 海 報

Liu Chu-pai (Lau Chu Pak) 劉 鐸 伯

Liu Hsüeh-hsün 劉 學 記

Liu K'un-yi 劉 坤 一

Liu Ssu-fu 劉 思 復

Liu Yen-pin 劉 燕 賓

Lo Hsiang-lin 羅 香 林

Lu Chi-shun [chien-k'ang] (Luk Kin Hong) 陸 駿 純 (陸 建 康)

Lu Hao-tung 陸 皓 東

Lu O-sheng [Yüeh-sheng] 盧 譯 生 (岳 生)

Lu Hsin 盧 信



Lung Ch'i-kuang 龍濟光

Ma-la pao 猛刺報

Min-chün 民軍

Min-pao 民報

Ming 明

P'an Ta-wei 潘達微

Pao-chieh kung-hui 報界公會

Pao-huang hui 保皇會

Pao-liang chü (Po Leung Kuk) 保良局

P'ei Ching-fu 裴景福

P'ing-hsiang 萍鄉

P'u-i [The Hsüan-tung Emperor] 溥儀 (宣統帝)

Shang-pao (Sheung Po) 商報

Shao-nien pao 少年報

Sheng Hsüan-huai 盛宣懷

Shih Chien-ju 史堅如

Shih-chieh kung-i pao (Shai Kai Kung Yuk Po) 世界公益報

Shih-mi pao 士蔑報

Shih-pao (Shat Po) 實報

Shih-shih hua-pao 時事畫報

Su-pao 蘇報

Sun Wu 孫武

Sun Yat-sen [Sun-wen] 孫逸仙 (孫文)

Sung Chiao-jen 宋教仁

Sze-yap kung-so 四邑公所


Ta-ch'ing pao-lü 大清報律

Ta-ch'ing ying-shua-wu chuan-lü 大清印刷物專律

Ta-tao hui 大刀會



Tai-ping shan 太平山
 T'ang Hua-lung 湯化龍
 T'ang Shao-i 唐紹儀
 T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang 唐才常
 Tao Mo 陶模
Te-ch'en pao 德臣報
 Te Shou 德壽
 Teng Tse-ju 鄧澤如
T'ien-t'ao 天討
 Tsai Nai-huan 蔡乃煌
 Tsai Ch'un (The T'ung-chih Emperor) 载淳 (同治帝)
 Tsai Feng (The second Prince Ch'un) 载灃 (醇親王)
 Tsai T'ien (The Kuang-hsü Emperor) 载湉 (光緒帝)
 Tsai Tse 载澤
 Tse-cheng-yuan 資政院
 Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan 岑春煊
 Tseng Chi-tse (Marquis Tseng) 曾紀澤
 Tsou Lu 鄒魯
 Tsungli-yamen 總理衙門
 Tuan Fang 端方
Tung-fang-pao (Tung Fong Po) 東方報
 Tung-kun 東莞
 Tung Hua 東華
 T'ung-ch'ou-pu 統籌部
 T'ung-meng hui 同盟會
 Tzu-hsi [The Empress Dowager] 慈禧
 Tzu-li chün 自立軍
 Wang Ch'ung-hui 王寵惠



Wang T'ao 王 韶

Wei-hsin jih-pao (Wai-san Yat Po) 維 新 日 報

Wei Yü (Wei Yuk or Wei A Yuk) 章 玉 (章 茲 玉)

Wen Sheng-ts'ai 溫 生 才

Wen Tsung-yao 溫 宗堯

Wen-hsüeh she 文 學 社

Weng Tung-ho 翁 同 餘

Wu K'an-chih 胡 幹 芝

Wu Li-ch'ing (Ng Li Hing) 吳 理 卿

Wu T'ing-fang [Wu Ts'ai] (Ng Choy) 伍 延 芳 (伍 才)

Wu Yüeh 吳 楪

Yang Ch'ü-yün 揚 衢 雲

Yang Ho-lin 揚 鶴齡

Yang Hsi-yen (Yeung Sai Nam) 楊 西 巖

Yin-shua chu-ts'e tsung-chü 印 刷 訂 冊 總 局

Yu Shao-wan [Yu Lieh] 尤 少 純 (尤 烈)

Yu-so-wei wei-i-chu pao (Yau Sho Wai Wai Yat Ts'ui Po)


有 所 謂 唯 一 趣 報

Yüan Shih-k'ai 袁 世 凱

Yüan Shu-hsün 袁 樹 助

Yung Lu 榮 祿

Yung Wing (Jung Hung) 容 閎



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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