

University of Hong Kong

Faculty of Arts

Department of History

A Thesis


MANCHURIA, 1931-1936 : A STUDY OF POLICIES  
AND PRACTICES OF THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

Submitted by

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In Partial Fulfilment for the  
Degree of Master of Arts

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
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L. L.




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## CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I	INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY IN MANCHURIA .....	1
II	THE KWANTUNG ARMY AND ITS POLICY IN MANCHURIA .....	54
III	THE FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT ....	107
IV	THE KWANTUNG ARMY'S CONTROL SYSTEM IN MANCHURIA .....	164
V	RUSSO-MANCHOUKUO RELATIONS ....	216
	CONCLUSION .....	258
	APPENDIX .....	264
	ABBREVIATIONS .....	323
	BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	324



## CHAPTER I

### INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY IN MANCHURIA

This is essentially a background chapter and is therefore not confined by the year period set in the thesis title. For convenience it will be divided into three parts : dealing with i) the importance of Manchuria to China before the introduction of railways and before the appearance of either Japanese or Russian influence to the region, ii) the nature of Russian and Japanese interests in the region, and iii) the interaction between Chinese and Japanese interests, leading to the outbreak of the Mukden Incident. The interaction between Japanese and Russian interests is reserved for a later chapter dealing exclusively with Russo-Japanese relations in this region.

The basics of Manchurian politics are its strategic, economic, and political importance in relation to the three Great Powers bordering upon it.



Manchuria is situated at a remote corner in the North-east of the Asiatic Continent. Its prominence in Chinese history and in modern international affairs is primarily due to its overall strategic position.<sup>1</sup> Bordering upon it are three of the leading Powers in Asia : China, Russia, and Japan. The domination of Manchuria by any one of these Powers could pose a threat to the adjacent territorial holdings of the remaining two. This basic strategic consideration is complicated by political complications in the form of the vacillating loyalty of the population within this region.

Manchuria is a part of the belt of land in Central Asia traditionally haunted by the numerous

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<sup>1</sup> The importance of the geopolitik of Manchuria towards its neighbouring giants is generally recognised and has been emphasized by many prominent writers, e.g. George Sherwood, The World's Danger Zone (New York 1932); G.E. Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia (New York 1933) T.P. Etherton and H.H. Tiltman, Manchuria, the Cockpit of Asia (New York 1934); Owen Lattimore Manchuria Cradle of Conflict (New York 1932).



nomadic tribes. The political allegiance of these tribes has seldom ever been static. Most of their roaming grounds have been placed under the effective influence of either China or Russia. The control of Manchuria can serve either to consolidate Russo-Chinese influence in those regions or it can serve as a wedge for Japanese influence to enter into those secluded regions and put forward an alternative for the political allegiance of the nomads of Central Asia.<sup>2</sup>

Although strategic and political considerations have long loomed large in Manchurian affairs, its economic attraction was increasing in importance. With an estimated area of 380,000 square miles "Manchuria is a vast country with an area as large as that of France and Germany taken together."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> This point is illustrated by the triangular struggle for increase of influence in Inner and Outer Mongolia among Russia, Japan, and China. Refer G.M. Friters, Outer Mongolia and its International Position, Chapter IV in particular, (Baltimore 1949).

<sup>3</sup> Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations, signed at Peiping September 4th 1922, p. 26 (Geneva 1932). Hereafter referred to as Lytton Report.




This vast region, as compared with the densely populated areas of China and Japan, was still capable of much economic development even if this should be conducted purely along traditional agricultural lines. According to the Manchuria Yearbook of 1931 only 12.6% of the land was cultivated while an estimated 28.4% was cultivable.<sup>4</sup> Apart from its agricultural potentialities, the land, especially the mountainous regions, is rich in timber and mineral resources so vital to the development of modern industrial complexes.<sup>5</sup>

From whatever angle we view the affairs of Manchuria, it can readily be observed that the affect of events in Manchuria spreads far outside the region concerned and serves as an indicator towards the balance of power in Asia. In order to obtain a better perspective one must examine

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 27.


<sup>5</sup> Toa-keizai Chosakyoku (East-Asiatic Investigation Bureau) The Manchuria Yearbook 1931, pp. 92-110. (Tokyo 1931). South Manchuria Railway Company, Report on Progress in Manchuria 1907-1929, pp. 123-129. (Dairen 1929).



the general pattern of historical development in Manchuria and the nature of the interests of its adjacent Powers.

(i) China and Manchuria

In regard to China Manchuria has always been a frontier province which commanded both a strategic inroad into the North China Plain and a stable agricultural economic base, as contrasted with an unstable nomadic economy elsewhere along the nomadic belt, in the southern part of Manchuria where a sizable Chinese farming population had been built up. Its control in nomadic hands would threaten the very existence of the Chinese Empire because the combination of nomadic military striking effectiveness, the ease of access into China Proper, and the support of a stable agricultural economy, not to mention the expected collaboration from the Manchurian Chinese in the post-conquest administrative would prove too much for almost any organized Chinese



power to resist.<sup>6</sup>

The threat to the established power in China came not only from the nomadic tribes, whether of Mongol or Manchu origin, but from the Manchurian Chinese as well. The strategical importance of the region vis a vis North China makes the Manchurian Chinese realize how vulnerable China Proper really is and what a vantage point they have in their command should they choose to contest for authority in China Proper. The realization of their regional importance imbued in them a strong sense of localism making Manchuria an overriding factor in the internal as well as external affairs of traditional China.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, Collected Papers 1928-1958, (Paris 1959) Paper entitled "Chinese Colonization in Manchuria" (from the Geographical Review XXII No. 2, April 1932) pp. 308-310.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 310 : "The 'reservoir' region, both during periods of barbarian ascendancy and periods of Chinese ascendancy, is to be regarded as the key to the sovereignty of North China -- often of all China. It therefore has a regions importance which transcends both its racial and its cultural importance. However triumphant the northward spread of Chinese power, any Chinese population flowing into the 'reservoir' region

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
Any organized power, Chinese or foreign, in control of or established in Manchuria is in a position to undermine, and eventually to gain control over, the political structure in China Proper.

In spite of its importance towards the political integrity of China and centuries of association, Manchuria was not physically inhabited with an overwhelming Chinese population until after the 1890s.<sup>8</sup> Until the advent of steam and rail communication, Manchuria had remained as part of the migration grounds of Asiatic nomads. In the 20th Century the contest for Manchuria was no longer between unstable nomadic power and agricultural

(Continued)

inevitably becomes even more conscious of the fact that it can now exercise a control over the affairs of China behind it than that it can press forward to fresh conquests of barbarian territories." Acknowledging the strategical importance of Manchuria vis à vis N. China, Chiang K'ai-shek allied with Chang Hsueh-liang in 1928 and assigned to Chang N. China as his area of operation against dessident warlords there refer "Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese by Akira Iriye, Journal of Asian Studies 1960-61

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 308.




in which neither side had succeeded in establishing permanency. The new contestants, Russia and Japan, arriving in the wake of steam ships and railways, would be much more difficult to dislodge and their success might mean the permanent loss of the region to China. China had to gain permanency in Manchuria or let it be lost without any hope of redemption. As Professor Owen Lattimore says "We have to look at the territorial question not as the eager occupation of 'virgin' lands in which an impetuous nation is clamoring to demonstrate its vigor but as a wary manoeuvering to maintain control over lands which dominate North China strategically and in which Chinese authority has ebbed and flowed for centuries."<sup>9</sup>

The failure of a physical occupation of Manchuria by the Chinese in the form of a predominant immigrant Chinese farming population, in spite of their long association with the land and the unproportionate importance of the region towards the political stability of the whole of China,

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 311.



necessitates some clarification on the nature of Chinese immigration into Manchuria.<sup>10</sup> Had the Chinese successfully colonized Manchuria in the past, there would have been hardly any wedge for Russo-Japanese rival claims to establish themselves.

Manchuria was not a land of promise attracting enterprising pioneers.<sup>11</sup> It was essentially a frontier region where peace and security was practically out of the question. Nor was it an empty land: it had long been part of the hunting ground of the


<sup>10</sup> This is treated in detail by Professor Lattimore in his paper entitled "Chinese Colonization in Manchuria" (Geographical review XXII No. 2 April 1932). The student is referring to traditional Chinese immigration and this necessarily leads back to pre-Ch'ing days.

<sup>11</sup> In making this statement the student is referring to the period before the introduction of rail communication and it is stated from a Chinese point of view. It would be viewed differently by the nomadic raiders who did find rich plunder from the land. Refer Ibid., p. 30 "So far from being a 'virgin' country as is so commonly assumed, Manchuria is a vast territory with an important regional, racial, and cultural history of its own."



nomads and its physical occupation by Chinese farmers would undoubtedly lead to physical violence between established nomadic interests and intruding farming interests. No Chinese Government was willing to provide the necessary formidable army of conquest to advance farming interests simply because of the colossal costs entailed in such an adventure: the frontier of Manchuria being too extended and too far away from the source of supply in North China.

Deprived of any long term settlement in regard to this vulnerable point of China's national defence, successive dynastic rulers resorted to short term expedients. Efforts were made to help the nomads to settle on the land by teaching them agricultural methods and administrative procedures, hoping that a stable economy would make the warlike nomads less aggressive. This was countered by a simultaneous policy of "divide and rule" in the form of encouraging tribal feuds among the nomads in the hope of forestalling any kind of a grand unification



of their formidable fighting power.<sup>12</sup> This, however, had the adverse effect of maintaining the martial spirit of these problematical tribes and an able leader did at times unite the warring tribes and turned their spears towards the Chinese Empire instead.

In the long run Chinese statesmen were driven to the conclusion that the only long term policy feasible was that of the permanent settlement of a Chinese farming population in Manchuria. Chinese farmers, however, were extremely unwilling to emigrate to Manchuria unless hard pressed by the drift of circumstances. Peasants are generally conservative, but the Chinese farmer was even more so because of his cultural background. He was taught that China was the Middle Kingdom, that all around her were


<sup>12</sup> For traditional Chinese policy towards Manchuria refer E.O. Reischauer and J.K. Fairbank, East Asia The Great Tradition, pp. 349-350 (Boston 1958). Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History : "Chinese Colonization of Manchuria" and Inner Asian Frontier of China Chapter V (New York 1951).



barbarian tribes, that the best of everything was naturally endowed within the borders of the civilized world, i.e. the Chinese world. To ask him to emigrate outside of the civilized world was to ask him to degrade himself willingly.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless a sizable Chinese population did grow up in the south of Manchuria in the course of time under official encouragement. Armies were ordered to live off the land by resorting to cultivation and soldiers were allowed to settle with their families in this far corner of the earth. The aim was to provide local man-power resources for the defence of the Empire. In addition land grants were given to farmers willing to emigrate to Manchuria, offers which were taken only temporarily when floods,

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<sup>13</sup> This aspect of Chinese life has been aptly termed as Culturalism by E.O. Reischauer and J.K. Fairbank, East Asia The Great Tradition pp. 290-294. Refer also J.K. Fairbank, "Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West" (Far Eastern Quarterly 1942) and J.K. Fairbank and S.Y. Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System" (Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. VI, 1941).




droughts, and famines occurred in the neighboring provinces in North China. These refugee immigrants, mostly from Shantung because of the ease of sea communication, would return to their venerated homeland as soon as circumstances permit and only a negligible fraction remained as permanent settlers. It is this reluctance on the part of the Chinese to settle in Manchuria, coupled with the sparse population of the nomadic tribes, that made Manchuria a comparatively undeveloped land up to the 20th Century.

The traditional repugnance of Chinese farmers to settle in a frontier province, far away from the 'civilized' world and distant from home, was rendered more effective as a deterrent towards the colonization of Manchuria by the official Ch'ing policy of restricting Chinese immigration thereto to a minimum.<sup>14</sup> The conquering Manchus hoped to maintain their former homeland free from Chinese dominance so that they

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<sup>14</sup> E.O. Reischauer and J.K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition p. 365 on the Willow Palisade.




might have a place to retreat to should the Chinese re-assert themselves in China Proper. This policy was only reversed towards the end of the dynasty when the threat of Russo-Japanese infiltration was a more imminent danger towards Manchu authority in China.<sup>15</sup>

It is curious to note, however, that the erstwhile failing methods of Chinese colonization of Manchuria proved to be of immense success in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.<sup>16</sup> This new success resulted not only from a resumption of official encouragement in the traditional form of free land grants, the occurrence of floods and natural disasters, but also from the development of modern communication facilities. The sudden surge of refugees were brought over to Manchuria

<sup>15</sup> Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, p. 308.


<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 315: "The years of spectacular migration in which the yearly immigration first showed a preponderance of settlers over seasonal labourers -- and the figure amounted to something like a million a year with half a million permanent settlers -- were 1926-1928, ..."



by the economic interests of those Powers who had invested in the rail and steam communications of the region. The Japanese and the Russians provided refugees with low fares or no fares at all, welcoming them as a much needed source of manpower to open up the land. Modern means of communication not only brought them to Manchuria, but into the erstwhile inaccessible interior as well, and helped to dispense with the threat of nomadic raids. The horse is no match for the train. Further the refugees found their homeward way blocked by prohibitive fares, erected to keep them in Manchuria. By 1931 the population was estimated at about 30,000,000, mainly of Chinese origin.<sup>17</sup> It must be borne in mind, however, that this great increase of Chinese interest in Manchuria was coupled with corresponding growth of Russo-Japanese interests in the form of railways.

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<sup>17</sup> Toa-Keizai Chosaikyoku, Manchuria Yearbook 1931, p. 6 July 1930 population estimated at 29,198,000.



and other economic activities.<sup>18</sup>


(ii) The Nature of Russian and Japanese Interests

(a) Russian Interests

Russian interests in Manchuria were based mainly upon strategic and political considerations, the development of economic interest was almost incidental. Strategically she aimed at acquiring the right to construct a branch line of the Trans-Siberian Railway across the north of Manchuria to the Russian naval base of Vladivostok and to acquire a warm water port either in Korea or in Manchuria. Politically Tsarist Russia had her coveteous eyes on territorial expansion while later Soviet Russia aimed at the expansion of Communist influence particularly in the areas adjacent to the territories of the USSR.

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 272 Japanese investment in Manchuria totals over Y1,510,000,000 in 1928, about 73.2% of total foreign investment in Manchuria. Russia came next with about Y465,015,000, about 22.5% of total foreign investment.




Russian advance into Manchuria began right after the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895-96. China in her defeat looked to Russia as a potential ally against further Japanese encroachment. Russia was responsive in leading the Dreibund Intervention<sup>19</sup> which restored the Liaotung Peninsula to Chinese hands and in guaranteeing a loan for the Imperial Chinese Government to pay for war indemnities to Japan. As a reward Russia was granted the right to construct a railway across North Manchuria<sup>20</sup> to terminate at Vladivostok, specifically built for military transport. This was confirmed by the Li-Lobanov Treaty of Secret Alliance between China and Russia,<sup>21</sup> a document which allied the two signatory Powers against Japan.

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<sup>19</sup> J.V.A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894-1919 (New York 1921) p. 53 Identic Note of French, German and Russian Ministers to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding Retrocession of Liaotung Peninsula, Oct. 18 1895, p. 52 Japanese Imperial Proclamation regarding Retrocession of Liaotung Peninsula, May 10 1895.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 81 Treaty of Alliance between China and Russia, May 1896, Articles IV and V.


<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 81, Article I.



This valuable Russo-Chinese Alliance, which, if continued, would serve to stabilize conditions in the Far East, was terminated by the territorial avariciousness of Tzarist Russia in 1898. Taking advantage of China's internal difficulties and anticipating a breakdown of the Chinese Empire, Russia led the Western Powers in a wild Scramble for Concessions in China: leaseholds, special trading and mining rights, and whatever they could wring from the decadent Ch'ing administration in its attempt to buy a short lease of life. Russia obtained the lease of Port Arthur and Taliens, together with the right to construct a railway to join these new gains to the Chinese Eastern Railway.<sup>22</sup> Russian advance into Manchuria seemed unchecked when in 1900, under cover of the Boxer Rebellion, she even resorted to

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 119-121, Convention for the Lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, March 27 1898.




military occupation of the land.<sup>23</sup> She went even further by intruding into the Japanese preserve of Korea and meddled in the internal politics of that country too. Russian success, however, only brought the undercurrent of international rivalry in Manchuria to the surface; the mere fact of her success stimulated reaction both from China and Japan. The Chinese intensified their colonizing efforts while the Japanese confirmed their resolve to prepare for war against Russia. Russian defeat in 1905 restricted their influence to the northern part of Manchuria while later internal upheavals in Russia further upset the balance of power in Manchuria.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Russia evacuated only after China had agreed to give further concessions in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway and to indemnify Russia. Consult *ibid.*, pp. 329-330, preliminary Russo-Chinese Agreement regarding Manchuria, Jan. 30 1901, and Alleged Secret Russo-Chinese Treaty regarding Manchuria, Feb. 1901.


<sup>24</sup> H.M. Vincke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times pp. 177-178. Japan was willing to stay away from Manchuria if Russia would recognize Japan's special position in Korea.



The First World War and the Russian Revolution of 1917 engulfed Russia first in a life and death struggle in the West and then preoccupied all the energy she could afford in internal affairs. Her Far Eastern position was turned from one of advance to one of defence. Her natural enemy in this case was Japan, an imperial power condemned by the newly proclaimed Communist ideology. Her potential ally, on the other hand, was China, a nation in the midst of an all consuming revolution herself. As a counter part of his peace at all costs policy in Europe, Lenin tried to win Chinese support against Japanese incursion by renouncing all her special rights in China and in Manchuria.<sup>25</sup> Further the Far Eastern

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<sup>25</sup> D.J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in the Far East p. 180 (New Haven 1949). A) Statement of the Soviet Government dated Jan. 16 1918: "... a complete break with the barbarous policies of bourgeois civilization, which builds the welfare of the exploiters and a few select chosen nations upon the enslavement of hundreds of millions of toilers in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small states." B) Soviet Note to China July 25 1919: "The Government of Workers and Peasants has therefore declared null and void all the secret treaties concluded with Japan, China, and the former Allies..."



Republic was created giving it a semblance of democratic form to make it less repugnant to the neighboring Japanese and as a means to end the Allied Intervention.<sup>26</sup>

Russia soon regretted her earlier selfless renunciation of special rights in China. When it was done Russian Far East was not even in the hands of the Bolsheviks and so they had no idea as to what was involved in the defence of that region.

The Russian Far East consists of more than 6,000,000 square miles but only has a population of about twenty million.<sup>27</sup> To defend such a vast area with resources in Europe was almost an impossible task. Contrasted with this was the comparative economic development of Manchuria and Korea and

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 156-160.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 3, "In a geographical sense Russia occupies one sixth of the world's dry surface, nearly nine million square miles in Europe and Asia, of which about three fourths are in Asia." p. 1, Note No. 1 "about 20 million live in Soviet Central Asia."



their populations of 30 and 20 million respectively. When the Communists did assert their authority in the Far East they found out that the pivot of their defence in Asia was centred on the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was from North Manchuria that Russia could get the requisite economic support for her military requirements in the Far East. It was in this light then that the erstwhile idealists returned to assert their interests in Manchuria much to the consternation of the Chinese.

While strategically still on the defensive, the Communists were nevertheless thinking in terms of international revolution. The Comintern and their agents worked first in countries bordering upon the Soviet Union and this came into direct conflict with nationalist feelings both in China and in Japan. What was worse was that the Chinese understood the strategical vulnerability of Russia in the Far East and pursued a policy of forceful reacquisition of the Chinese Eastern Railway as part of the Nationalist programme of national rights recovery. This eventually led to open conflict




between Russia and China in 1929 in which the Chinese were defeated. This alarmed the Japanese with the length that the Chinese was willing to go to regain their lost rights. The Japanese also found that Russian interests could only be protected only if Japan stayed neutral and that severed relations between China and Russia made resistance towards Japanese advance impossible. The Russians returned to a policy of co-operation with Japan and started military action in 1929 only after Japanese neutrality had been assured them.<sup>28</sup>

This awareness led the Kwantung Army officers to advocate a war with Russia. Their logic was that in the course of Japanese expansion in the Continent a war with Russia was inevitable and that this war should come before Russia had regained strength. However, the drift of circumstances led them to act against the Chinese challenge first.

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 265-269.




(b) Japanese Interests

Japanese interests in Manchuria was of a more complex nature. Underlining all was a traditional Japanese aspiration for expansion on the Asiatic Continent. This aspiration had earlier been shown in the Korean expedition of Hideyoshi and its origin needs to be explained in cultural terms.

The East Asiatic states had had a world of their own prior to the development of global communication. In their conduct of international affairs the concept of a number of equal and sovereign states was non-existent; in this world inequality was the norm.<sup>29</sup> The Chinese Empire had always been the dominant Power in this corner of the earth: her inexhaustible resources in men and material, her cultural sophistication, her attainments in the art of administration all served to bolster the


<sup>29</sup> Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations, the Diplomatic Phase 1856-1880, Chapter I (Massachusetts 1960).



Chinese belief of their inherent superiority above and beyond those of bordering states and peoples. This sense of superiority was actually institutionalized in the Tributary System through which Chinese diplomatic relations with other states were conducted.<sup>30</sup> China would only have intercourse with those who willingly acknowledged themselves to be inferiors to her and would consent to show this by the means of an elaborate system of ritual. This Chinese claim to world paramountcy, however, was hardly ever pushed forward by the employ of military force because the Chinese Empire was already assuming unmanageable proportions and territorial gains were not uppermost in the minds of Chinese statesmen. The dynastic ruler wanted international recognition of his authority so as to confirm his rule in the eyes of his Chinese subjects.

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
<sup>30</sup> J.K. Fairbank, "Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West." J.K. Fairbank and S.Y. Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System."



Japan was also imbued with universal aspirations similar to that of China. Situated off the coast of mainland Asia, Japan was proximate enough to be influenced by continental cultural advances and distant enough for her to be immune from Chinese political pressure of any kind. Her culture itself only began to develop sophistication after Chinese cultural elements were introduced into the islands. But Japanese geographical isolation enabled her to give these borrowed elements a distinct Japanese application.<sup>31</sup> It was thus that Japan began a tradition of asserting her independence from Chinese universal claims, a tradition that was developed to the building of an alternative system of international relations in East Asia to be centred upon Japan as the paramount Power. Japanese universal claims, unlike that of the Chinese, had to be asserted, she had to prove herself above the Chinese in arms if not in culture.

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<sup>31</sup> G.B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan, pp. 105-110 (New York 1958).



In this Japan seemed to be well-endowed socially for her ruling elites were men-at-arms and not mere scholars as in the case of the Chinese. This natural Japanese aspiration for continental expansion was harnessed for over two hundred years under the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate. The Meiji Restoration, however, was precisely an anti-Tokugawa movement and the spirit of expansion was unquestionably re-established.

This basically aggressive Japanese expansionism was given a defensive guise by the drift of circumstances. With the appearance of Occidental sea power in the Orient, the Japanese were convinced that they were being faced with dangers of invasion, this feeling was especially acute after the Sino-British Wars of 1840 and 1860. Japan therefore launched herself upon a fervent movement for self-strengthening, rebuilding her system of government, setting up national armies and fleets on the model of European Powers, she even succeeded in establishing an industrial base to support the armament and economic needs of a modern war machine. She did




not stop with imitating the West in matters of national defence, she followed Western examples in the cause of colonial expansion as well, presenting her long established expansionist claims in terms comprehensible to the European Powers. When Japan resumed her traditional expansionist aspirations, the West mistook her as a pupil of European type of Colonialism.

The superiority of Western Arms and their presence in Asia, however, did complicate the Japanese problem of how to assert herself in Asia and to make the continent her private preserve. She was at a loss as to what attitude she should adopt towards other Asian countries: "Japanese imperialism in Asia had faced the dilemma of the need to unite with other Asian countries in defending themselves from Western domination and the need to control less powerful neighbours in competing against the Western powers."<sup>32</sup> While her wiser statesmen uttered the

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<sup>32</sup> Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. xv (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964).



ideal of Pan-Asianism and later gave it body and form in the so-called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, her strong military tradition led her towards a course of military conquest instead.

Whether it be defence or attack, Japanese interests on the mainland of Asia centred on lands proximate to the territorial holdings of the island Empire. Her initial pretext for expansion was purely based on strategical considerations and the acquisition of Korea was presented to the world as an absolute necessity, and, as Manchuria was bordering Korea in the north, it was only a logical deduction that the control of Manchuria was also absolutely necessary to the safety of the Japanese Empire.<sup>33</sup> Her pretexts, however, did not end with strategical ones. She emphasized her need for

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
Matsuoka Yosuke, "Japan and the Far Eastern Problem", *Asiatic Review* 1933, pp. 340-342. Here Mr. Matsuoka cites the threat of Communism and Manchoukuo as an essential bulwark against its spread in China.



expansion on economic terms such as her needs for supplies of raw materials, markets for the disposal of her products, and relatively undeveloped lands to hold her excessive population.<sup>34</sup> She even gave her expansionist aspirations a moral tone, claiming that it was her duty to help to modernize East Asia for the benefit of the whole human race just as the whites had claimed colonial holdings as the 'white man's burden'.<sup>35</sup> And if these pretexts would not suffice, then there was the sentimental claim that she had sacrificed thousands of her youths in the Wars of 1895 and 1904 and that such sacrifices must be rewarded, as if there had not been any war dead

<sup>34</sup> Ryusaku Tsunoda, William de Barry, and Donald Keene (compilers), Sources of Japanese Tradition, pp. 796-98: Hashimoto Kingoro expressing the need for colonial expansion. See also Matsuoka Yosuke, "Japanese interests in Manchuria", the Asiatic Review 1931, pp. 510-519.

<sup>35</sup> O. Tanin and E. Yohan, Militarism and Fascism in Japan, pp. 279-309: Araki Sadao on 'The spirit and destiny of Japan' (New York 1934).




on the opposite camp.<sup>36</sup>

Her pretexts, however, should not be dismissed entirely as mere fiction; there are certain elements of truth in them to make them sound credible to Japanese at home and foreigners abroad. Japan Proper is so short of natural resources that if she were to remain as a world Power, and there is no one to say that she should not be a world Power even today, she would have to gain control over or access to raw materials and markets. It was the militarism inherent in her civilization that led to the use of force as an instrument towards this end. She wanted the coal and iron of Manchuria to feed her furnaces, she wanted soya bean and mineral products to keep her light and chemical industries going, and she needed the China market to dispose of her main product: cheap cotton piece goods. It was thus her drive for a permanent place among the ranks of the great Powers, her deficiency in natural resources, and her pressing economic

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
<sup>36</sup> Matsuoka Yosuke, "Japanese interests in Manchuria," Asiatic Review, Vol. XVII, 1931.



difficulties vis à vis an expanding population that drove her towards relying upon militarism as the one means towards securing a place in the sun.

Irrespective of her pretexts and actual difficulties, her object of expansion remained unchanged: she aimed at the ultimate subordination of China, the traditional paramount Power in East Asia, via two different means: gradual economic penetration and forceful political aggression based on superior military strength. If the Western Powers were not present in Asia, Japan would have had her way in 1895. As it was she had to develop a strong navy to keep the distant sea-Powers off and a strong army to defeat the neighbouring rivals : Russia and China in that order.

As far as Manchuria was concerned, Japan gained a strong position there after her success in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. The Treaty of Portsmouth transferred Russian interests in South Manchuria to Japanese hands: a railway from Changchu



to Port Arthur, ancillary interests, and rights of administration along the railway zone.<sup>37</sup> It was Japan's sincere wish to develop these interests, whether of an economic or political nature, until Japanese control of the provinces was assured. The first forceful attempt in this direction was taken in 1915 when China was compelled to accede to most of the infamous Twenty-one Demands.<sup>38</sup> It should be borne in mind, however, that Manchuria was only one of the spheres of Japanese influence in China and overall Japanese policy there was affected by the turn of events in other parts of China and vice versa.

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<sup>37</sup> J.V.A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894-1919, p. 527, Japan and Russia, Protocol of Procedure in withdrawing Troops and Transferring Railways, Oct. 30 1905.


<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 1220-1230.



(iii) The Interaction between Chinese and Japanese Interests

(a) Chinese Reaction

One cannot expect the Chinese to remain inactive towards aggressive external pressures whether they be from Japan or other Occidental Powers. The history of Modern China is concerned mostly with her response towards the new world order she found herself in and, in the search for solutions of her many ills and defects, she found herself engulfed in the midst of a prolonged revolution, a revolution that is still very much alive today. China found its unity shattered by the presence of local warlords, but even in its most disorganized stage, there was always one government or another claiming unto itself the entire authority of the state and it was upon this Government that both Chinese reaction and foreign pressure applied themselves to. In 1931 this Central Government was situated at Nanking and claimed itself as representative of the nationalistic and reformative tendencies of the Chinese people.



The Chinese people had always regarded Manchuria as an integral part of China, an attitude that has been confirmed by international treaties with both Russia and Japan concerning the frontier provinces. Russia based her interests in Manchuria on treaties and agreements with China, she did transfer part of her acquired rights to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War, but this had to be confirmed by the Treaty of Peking<sup>39</sup> between China and Japan. The Nanking Government planned to extend its influence to Manchuria but was powerless to do so on two accounts: that the Young Marshall<sup>40</sup> still possessed well-equiped and well-trained troops and that the Japanese had threatened armed intervention should civil war be extended to Manchuria<sup>41</sup> for such would jeopardize Japanese established interests there.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 549: Japan and China, Treaty and additional agreement, relating to Manchuria, December 22 1905.

<sup>40</sup> Chang Hsueh-liang, ruler of Manchuria, popularly known in the West as the Young Marshall.

<sup>41</sup> Lytton Report, p. 47.



Japan desired to perpetuate a weak China so that that country might be amenable to Japanese pressure and that Japanese interests in China and Manchuria might be protected and that their expansion assured. This was unlikely as China was fast rejuvenating herself through revolution. Realizing this and bearing in mind the importance of control over Manchuria in Japan's efforts to develop a great power status, the Japanese tried the alternative of keeping Manchuria separate from the rest of China -- hence her open intervention first against the northward advance of the Nationalist forces in 1927 and second in warning Chang Hsueh-liang not to unite with the Nanking Government.<sup>42</sup>

The continued encroachment on Manchuria conditioned the reactions from various quarters in China. The Kuomintang was unwilling to commit itself in an all out military struggle with Japan, being certain that the military might of Japan at the time could crush the revolutionary armies under Generalissi-

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<sup>42</sup> See note No. 38.




Chiang Kai-shek with ease. On the other hand the existence of the Party depended upon its success in leading the nationalist feelings of the country. The Kuomintang was in the dilemma of neither willing to advance nor able to retreat. Its adopted policy at the time was to delay any decisive action until a more favourable moment -- as the slogan goes: "Trading space for time."

The local regime under Chang Hsueh-liang was also reluctant to serve Japanese interests if this meant the eventual separation of Manchuria from China and the current isolation of Manchuria from internal Chinese politics. Chang's interests was not just to uphold his authority in the North-eastern Provinces, but to extend it to within the Great Wall.<sup>43</sup> He understood the possible appeal of patriotism to Manchurian Chinese and he attempted to serve as the nominal leader of any nationalist

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<sup>43</sup> Akira Iriye, "Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XX, 1960-61, No. 1, pp. 33-43. See also Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, pp. 308-10 on regionalism in Manchuria.



feelings in Manchuria by openly declaring his allegiance to the Central Government at Nanking while in substance retained his actual control over affairs in Manchuria.<sup>44</sup>

This course of action was warned against him by several Japanese militarists and by the Japanese Government itself.<sup>45</sup> Chang calculated, however, that by uniting Manchuria with China he would have automatically acquired the all out support of the Nanking Government in military as well as political affairs in his efforts to limit, if not to oust, Japanese influence in Manchuria and that Japan, with her dependence on the China market would not dare to risk an open breach with the Nanking Government lest an all out boycott of Japanese goods might well end up in the economic collapse of Japan.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Akira Iriye, "Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese."

<sup>45</sup> See note No. 38.


<sup>46</sup> For Chang Hsueh-liang's policies consult Akira Iriye, "Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese" and Li Nien-chih, Notes on the So-called Manchoukuo (in Chinese) (Hong Kong 1954). For Chinese boycotts consult C.F. Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts (Baltimore 1933).



As for public reaction in China and Manchuria, this was restricted to the big urban centres and to the countryside where direct contact with Japanese or Japanese supported interests were arraigned against the local Chinese farmers.<sup>47</sup> The lack of nationwide reaction, especially among the huge farming population, was due to a lack of mass communication media. On the whole public indignation against Japanese pressure was most intense in areas where Japanese forces could strike effectively, i.e. coastal towns, rivers ports, and settlements near or on the land of railway concessions. This fact was important in the Japanese military decision in China later, they thought if they could gain control over these areas all anti-Japanese feelings and activities in China could be terminated once and for all but they only found themselves provoking the patriotic feelings of more Chinese than ever as they gained control over more and more territory in China.

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<sup>47</sup> The question of Korean settlers is a good example. Refer to Wanpoashan Case in the Lyttton Report.



Japanese desire for expansion and Chinese aim to maintain Chinese rule in Manchuria was the basic cause of Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria. It was a clash between the rising nationalist feelings in China and Japan. The complications in Manchuria did not start in September 1931, they had their origin in the opposing national interests of the two countries and assumed definite form ever since the leasing of Liaotung Peninsula to Japan in 1905. In 1931, however, the conflict took a violent turn and military action was finally resorted to. Before this time Sino-Japanese conflict had been carried on under various guises, the most notable ones being railway interests, administrative rights, the question of jurisdiction over Korean settlers, and the presence of the so-called Japanese Railway Guards -- this last was in fact an army of occupation.

(b) Mounting tension: Growing Chinese Assertiveness and Japanese Reaction thereto

As the armies of the Kuomintang surged northward in a determined effort to reunite the whole




of China, Japan became alarmed lest her present established interests, and the prospect of the future extension of these interests, should be brought to face an eventual termination. She was particularly sensitive about her special interests in Manchuria and came out openly against any Kuomintang forces entering the region. On May 28th, 1928, the Japanese Government sent to the leading Chinese generals a communication which read:

"The Japanese Government attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, and is prepared to do all it can to prevent the occurrence of any such state of affairs as may disturb that peace and order, or constitute the probable cause of such a disturbance.

"In these circumstances, should disturbance development further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin, and the situation become so menacing as to threaten the peace and order of Manchuria, Japan may possibly be constrained to take appropriate effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria."<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 47.



The rivalling Chinese Governments at Peking and Nanking both protested against this action and termed it as "an interference with Chinese domestic affairs, but also a flagrant violation of the principle of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty."<sup>49</sup>

The relations between China and Japan was further strained first by the murder of Marshall Chang Tso-lin,<sup>50</sup> second by the Young Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang's declaration of allegiance to the Nanking Government,<sup>51</sup> and finally by a note from the Nationalists to the Japanese minister at Peking, abrogating the treaty of commerce.<sup>52</sup> Not only was Japan's threat to use force against the re-unification of China ignored, but that the very

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>50</sup> The China Weekly Review, Who's Who in China, pp. 65-67 (Shanghai 1925). M. Perleberg, Who's Who in Modern China, p. 15 (Hong Kong 1954).

<sup>51</sup> Akira Iriye, "Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese."

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., "Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese."




basis of Japanese interests in China had been directly challenged. The Japanese Army radicals were led to the contention that the only practicable policy in China was the actual use of force.<sup>53</sup>

The actual conflict in Manchuria was started by Kwantung Army officers. They were impatient to act because they were in close contact with the Chinese and were irritated by the rising Chinese nationalist feelings which emboldened them to act against Japanese interests consistently. Since local friction played an important part in conditioning the thoughts and reactions of the Kwantung Army officers, it is necessary to write briefly on them.

Firstly, it is part of established Japanese policy to acquire a virtual monopoly of railway enterprises in South Manchuria. To attain this end it was necessary to prevent the development of an independent rail system operated and owned by Chinese. Her strongest claim to such a course of action was the fact that she could apply direct

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<sup>53</sup> A fuller discussion of alternative Japanese policies will be found in Chapter II.




military pressure upon any Chinese administration in Manchuria. To avoid unnecessarily provoking international censure, Japan ostensibly based her every move on existing treaties and agreements, accusing China of a lack of faith and integrity and claiming herself as the upholder of the sanctity of international law. The Japanese Government asserted that during negotiations prior to the signing of the Treaty of Peking of 1905, the Chinese Government had made a Protocol which read in part: "...they will not construct in its neighbourhood any parallel trunk line, or branch line, prejudicial to its interests."<sup>54</sup>

The validity of this Protocol was denied by Chinese authorities but Japan ruled otherwise. In the main Japanese efforts based upon this Protocol was successful as seen in the case of the Fakamen-Hsinmintun Railway project where a prior contract for its construction was signed between the Chinese

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<sup>54</sup> J.V.A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894-1919, pp. 554-55; Article 3.




Government and a British firm, but this had to be dropped because of Japanese objection.<sup>55</sup>

Secondly, another point of conflict was the question of Japanese rights of residence in the interior of Manchuria. Aliens do not necessarily create a problem unless they were used by some foreign states as instruments of national policy as it was in the case of Japanese subjects in Manchuria. Their presence was the excuse rendered for the setting up of a host of consular establishments throughout South Manchuria.

Japan made extraterritorial privileges as an instrument through which Chinese administrative rights over Manchuria could be systematically reduced. If Japanese immigrants were enabled to purchase land, then by a gradual process much of the administrative rights could be bought over and Manchuria would become a Japanese possession. The Chinese authorities, however, succeeded in forestalling such schemism

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<sup>55</sup> Cheng Lin, The Chinese Railways Past and Present p. 33, pp. 213-14 (Shanghai 1937 2nd edition).




by forbidding the sale or even the lease of agricultural and building land to aliens irrespective of nationality. This was of course contrary to the provisions of the 1915 treaties and notes between China and Japan. China denied the validity of these commitments as they were obtained under duress, Japan insisted on their validity on the premises of the sanctity of treaties.

Thirdly, the most dangerous frictions were concerned with the presence of two opposing armies each with growing nationalist feelings. One particular incident was used by the Japanese Army radicals to stir up warlike feelings in Japan and to force the hands of the Government to employ military force in the conduct of Manchurian affairs.

Captain Nakamura of the Japanese Imperial Army travelled to the interior of Manchuria in disguise, presenting himself and his aides as agricultural experts. On June 9 1931 they were arrested near Taonan and were subsequently shot.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 74.



This was eventually found out by the Kwantung Army and was interpreted as a deliberate insult to the Imperial Army. Strong reprisal was regarded as absolutely necessary.

That Captain Nakamura was on some secret military mission was unquestionable and as such he was liable to be shot on charges of espionage. The Chinese, however, compromised themselves by committing to lies saying that Nakamura was detained by Chinese military authorities and was shot by a sentry while attempting to escape.

On July 17 report of Nakamura's death reached Consul General at Tsitsihar and at the end of the month Japanese informed the Chinese that definite evidence pointing to the fact that Nakamura was killed by Chinese soldiery had been obtained. On August 17 the Japanese military released the first publication of the account of Nakamura's death. It insisted that the killing of Nakamura was an insult to the Japanese Army and Nation and tried to stir up chauvinist feelings on this plane.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp. 74-75.




Meanwhile attempts at a peaceful solution were earnestly sought for. On August 17 Consul General Hayashi and Major Mori of the Tokyo General Staff conferred with Governor Tsang Shih-I, Tsang subsequently sought instructions from Chang Hsueh-liang and it was decided to send a two men investigation team to conduct on the spot enquiries. Major Mori conducted an independent enquiry, compared it with that of the Chinese team, rejected the latter, and communicated this rejection through General Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief of Staff. Thus Major Mori had succeeded in impressing upon both the civil and military authorities of Japan's serious concern in the matter and these in turn pressed the matter upon the Young Marshall for a more decisive move.<sup>58</sup>

Learning of the seriousness the Japanese viewed the case, Chang decided to bow to force: appointed a second investigation team, sent Major

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 75.



Shibayama<sup>59</sup> to convey his conciliatory mood to military circles in Tokyo, and appointed Tang Eh-ho as special personal envoy to confer with the Japanese Foreign Office for a settlement. Furthermore Chang released to the press on September 16 that he agreed to negotiate with the Japanese and that Kuan Yu-heng was brought to Mukden charged with responsibility of the killing of Nakamura.<sup>60</sup> Thus it seemed the danger of military conflict had been averted.

### The Mukden Incident

The Kwantung Army, however, had had a plan of operation ready and had decided to act within the month of September whether the Nakamura Case came to a successful conclusion or otherwise.

On the night of September 18, a section of the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden was allegedly blown up by Chinese soldiers. Immediately coordinated

<sup>59</sup> Major Shibayama was a Japanese military adverse of Marshall Chang Haueh-liang.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 76.




Japanese military actions were taken over a wide area in Manchuria on the pretext of self-protection.<sup>61</sup> The Chinese military, acting upon orders from Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang, refrained from all forms of resistance.<sup>62</sup> Mukden fell into Japanese hands and Chinese administration began to break down.

In spite of non-resistance, military operations continued: "...the Japanese Army had attacked and destroyed the forces of Marshall Chang wherever they could find them and the only time

<sup>61</sup> R. Storry, "The Mukden Incident of September 18-19, 1931," *St. Antony's Papers*, 2 (1957). R.H. Ferrel, "The Mukden Incident", *Journal of Modern History* XXVII 1955, pp. 66-72.

<sup>62</sup> Lytton Report, p. 81, Note No. 1, quoting a telegram from Chang Hsueh-liang to his subordinates in Mukden: "Our relations with Japan have become very delicate. We must be particularly cautious in our intercourse with them. No matter how they may challenge us, we must be extremely patient and never resort to force, so as to avoid any conflict whatever. You are instructed to issue, secretly and immediate orders to all the officers, calling their attention to this point."



they stopped attacking was when there were no Chinese forces to attack..."<sup>63</sup> The Kwantung Army was clearly not limiting its action to the mere restoration of Army prestige; it was determined to settle all outstanding issues in Manchuria by force.

The Mukden Incident was a carefully premeditated move. Several weeks before the Incident the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo had reports from its consular officers that the Kwantung Army was getting ready for war with the Chinese. The first specific mention of a date on which fighting might begin seems to have reached the Foreign Office on September 15: Hayashi reported that a company commander at Fushan had called a meeting of Japanese police and ex-servicemen and had told his audience that an important 'incident' might break out on the evening

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<sup>63</sup> Foreign Relations of the U.S., Japan 1931-41, p. 45, Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, Nov. 19, 1931, Washington.




of the 18th.<sup>64</sup> This information led Baron Shidehara to press the War Minister to forestall possible insubordination in Manchuria. Minami, however, concurred only with a personal appeal directed to the Kwantung Army Commander and entrusted the message to a known sympathizer of direct action, Tatekawa. Possible Governmental intervention only speeded the Incident and Tatekawa saw to it that the message did not reach Honjo until the Incident had occurred.<sup>65</sup>

The Mukden Incident ushered in a period of Japanese dominance in Manchuria. It acted as a barometer showing the lack of a balance of power in

<sup>64</sup> G.R. Storry, "The Mukden Incident of September 18-19, 1931." R.H. Ferrel, "The Mukden Incident." IMTFE, Defense Doc. No. 2981 (found in microfilm reel No. DGen 117 of the University of Singapore Library. There is no page reference).

<sup>65</sup> G.R. Storry, "The Mukden Incident of September 18-19, 1931." R.H. Ferrel, "The Mukden Incident."



the Far East: Russia and China were decreasing in influence and, as the erstwhile imperial land powers, desired to maintain the territorial status quo as much as possible, while Japan, as the rising dominant power, tried to modify the status quo in her own favour. The struggle in Manchuria was but a part of this change in the balance of power. That the Japanese were not confining their long term continental policies to Manchuria can be seen in the policy considerations of the Kwantung Army.




## CHAPTER II

### THE KWANTUNG ARMY AND ITS POLICY IN MANCHURIA

This chapter is concerned with the Kwantung Army and its plans for Manchuria. As its policy was not in complete accord with that of the Tokyo Government, nor even with that of the senior Military Officers, the nature of internal Japanese politics has to be brought into focus with the Manchurian question. As Chinese elements are indispensable in the formation of a local regime, it is also necessary to bring in relevant aspects of internal Chinese history at the time. The chapter is therefore divided into four parts dealing with: i) the leading personalities connected with the Manchurian adventure, ii) the policy and objectives of the Kwantung Army, iii) factors conditioning Kwantung Army Policy, and iv) the Kwantung Army's problem of post occupation political settlement.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Only the choice of puppets is discussed in this chapter, for other aspects of the same problem please consult chapters III and IV.



(i) Leading Personalities

As the establishment of Japanese interests in Manchuria was in the first place the result of a successful war against Russia in 1904-5, and as the protection of the acquired interests was heavily upon the Army's shoulders, the military was placed in a position of influence in formulating Japanese policy towards the region. As the Kwantung Army was the sub-unit within the Army entrusted with defensive duties in Manchuria, this position of influence was more frequently exercised by the Kwantung Command than by the senior military officers in Tokyo.

The persons mainly responsible for events on and subsequent to September 18, 1931 were two staff officers of the Kwantung Army: Itagaki Seishiro and Ishiwara Kanji, Senior Staff Officer and Officer in charge of Operations respectively.<sup>2</sup> They were

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<sup>2</sup> I.G. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 80 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1957). Liang Ching-hsun, A Historical Narrative of the September 18th Incident, pp. 31-37 (New York 1954). Tanaka Ryukichi, Nihon Gumbatsu Anto Shi, p. 86 (Tokyo 1947).




mainly interested in the strategic possibilities of Manchuria and it was Ishiwara who tried to popularize the idea that with the acquisition of Manchuria, Japan would become a self-sufficient defence state.<sup>3</sup> To do this Okawa Shumei was sent on a lecture tour in Japan and in Manchuria to impress the idea upon Japanese rightist groups.<sup>4</sup> They had strong support from politically minded military men in Japan and their main contact in this respect was Hashimoto Kingoro, an officer of the Tokyo General Staff concerned with operational planning against Soviet Russia. Hashimoto had outspoken views on Japanese colonial expansion<sup>5</sup> and was a founder member of the Sakura Kai.<sup>6</sup> He was more concerned with social and political reforms

<sup>3</sup> T. Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, p. 133 (New Haven 1963).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 133. Liang Ching-hsun, p. 53.

<sup>5</sup> Ivan Morris (ed.), Japan 1931-45, pp. 64-66.

<sup>6</sup> Liang Ching-hsun, pp. 37-38.



at home, he agreed to support direct action in Manchuria only after the failure of the March Plot.<sup>7</sup> But neither Itagaki, nor Ishiwara, nor even Hashimoto were prominent in public; they remained as the manipulators and stayed behind the scenes as others took the front for them.

Those generally thought responsible for the events in Manchuria were the War Minister, General Minami Jiro, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, General Honjo Shigeru, his Chief of Staff, Miyake, and the Army Secret Service Chief in Manchuria, Colonel Doihara Kenji. Apart from these Army men personalities connected with the South Manchuria Railway Company were also suspected of complicity, therefore, Count Uchida, the President of the Railway Company, and Matsuoka Yosuke, a former Vice-President, were to be associated with events subsequent to September 1931 as far as the general public was concerned. These men, however,

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, see p. 38 for the aims of the Sakura Kai and p. 43 on Hashimoto's support for direct action in Manchuria.




were not the prime movers and were at best sympathizers of what had already taken place.

Minami being in the Cabinet was subjected to direct pressure from the Civilian members and, not being a man of strong personality, was not cut out for the role of either the actual or the nominal leader of Army radicals. It is true that he was outspoken, but this served merely to embarrass his colleagues in the Cabinet. In fact when a change of Cabinet occurred in December, Minami was replaced by a more reliable militarist, Araki Sadao. Minami's main part in the Manchurian adventure was that he did not actively prevent the actual staging of the Incident<sup>8</sup> and his involvement was at best a passive one.

General Honjo Shigeru regarded himself as being responsible for all that took place in Manchuria

<sup>8</sup> Perrel, "Mukden Incident: September 18, 1931" JMH, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, 1955. Storry, "The Mukden of September 18-19, 1931", St. Antony's Papers, 2 (1957). Liang Ching-hsun, pp. 61-65.



and in the final fall of Japan in the War. He felt this responsibility so keenly that he committed suicide specifically to show his remorse for leading his beloved country to disgrace.<sup>9</sup> Honjo was responsible only in form. Being the Commander-in-Chief, his approval had to be obtained either prior or subsequent to the events. Honjo, however, did not initiate the trend of events, he only formalized what had already taken place. The actual decision-making body in this case was the Kwantung Army General Staff and, seeing that his staff officers had agreed as to what actions should take place, Honjo felt it his duty to comply.<sup>10</sup> This degree of respect towards the opinion of the majority of one's subordinates is a peculiarly Japanese feature.

<sup>9</sup> IMTVE, Proceedings, p. 19258, exhibit No. 2403: Written statement of Honjo Shigeru purportedly written in early October 1945: "The true nature of the Manchurian Incident".


<sup>10</sup> IMTVE, Proceedings, p. 19246, exhibit No. 2401: testament of Honjo, September 12th 1946.



His Chief of Staff, Miyake, may be dismissed from the ranks of the conspirators on the same ground.

Colonel Doihara took active part in all that happened in Manchuria, still he can only be regarded as a figure of secondary importance. Above all he was not a staff officer and was thus denied a major share in policy making. His main importance lay in the need to make use of his secret service amenities and his connections with Chinese military leaders and politicians. He was one of the most notable 'experts' on Chinese affairs and spoke the language fluently. Doihara's duty was to organize a sizable number of collaborators in support of the Kwantung Army and in carrying out his duties in this connection. Doihara became one of the most conspicuous men in public.

As for the personnel of the South Manchuria Railway Company, they came out in support of the Kwantung Army only after it had acted. The Railway Company had rivalled the Kwantung Army as an instrument to further Japanese interests in Manchuria and was




naturally disinclined to support the Army in its desire to use force, but once force had been employed, the Railway Company could not see any reason that it should not reap the harvest thus prepared. The Kwantung Army had to depend on it for a supply of administrative personnel in the puppet government and for the economic exploitation of the newly gained domain. The underlining rivalry, however, remained.<sup>11</sup>

#### (ii) Kwantung Army Policy

The policy of the Kwantung Army was to place Manchuria under its exclusive control by the use of force. This policy is aimed at achieving the objectives of a) safeguarding and extending existing Japanese interests in Manchuria against rivalling Chinese and Russian influences, b) exploiting the resources of Manchuria in support of Japan's bid to stay on as a world power, and c) creating a

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<sup>11</sup> IMTPE, Interrogations, Aikawa Yoshisuke, 26/1/1946.



political model in Manchuria which was to be extended to Japan Proper.

The direct use of force and the pattern it follows will be discussed in the following Chapter. The mechanism for consolidating conquest gains will be discussed in the chapter following next. The economic exploitation of Manchuria has been treated by eminent authorities<sup>12</sup> and will be discussed only in passing in the latter part of Chapter IV. Here emphasis is placed on the third objective and its complementary value to the first two objectives.

According to Ishiara Kanji's testimony at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, it was his idea of how to deal with the Manchurian problem which came to influence Itagaki Seishiro and through him to influence the entire

<sup>12</sup> E.B. Schumpeter, Industrialisation of Japan and Manchoukuo (New York 1940). E.S. Kirby, The Economic Organisation of Manchoukuo, 1937 (unpublished thesis for the London School of Economics). F.C. Jones, Manchuria Since 1931.




General Staff of the Kwantung Command. He claimed that what he proposed was the creation of an independent state in Manchuria and Mongolia.<sup>13</sup>

"Independence" here, however, needs careful qualifications. The idea of creating a truly independent nation in Manchuria had never existed in the Kwantung Army although it had vociferously claimed the purity of its intentions to the outside world in this regard. Such claims can only be interpreted as efforts to secure formalization of their actions internationally -- to make an act of aggression appear acceptable in current international law. An independent Manchuria, ruled by its own people and free from interference in its internal and external affairs would in effect mean the ending of Japanese treaty rights in the region and would therefore be the last thing that these Japanese zealots desired.


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<sup>13</sup> IMTPE, Rejected Doc. No. 886, Sworn deposition of Ishiwara Kanji 16/1/47.




What the Kwantung Army wanted was a new Manchu-Mongolian State under its direct control, a country without any substance of independence as we understand the term, and that this control was to be independent, to be free from all interferences either from rivals or enemies of the Kwantung Army whether they be exerted from Japan, in Manchuria, or from abroad. The Kwantung Army desired to secure its own "independence" from authorities at home and this "independence" was transferred over to describe the puppet government which the Kwantung Army was to establish. This "independence" was to be ensured by an exclusive control over Manchuria so that the Japanese Government could not apply pressure upon the Kwantung Army via the usual means of curtailing military and financial supplies.

This "independence", however, was not sought for its own sake. It was a means towards the ends of invigorating Japanese expansion on the Continent and of pressing for social, political, and economic



reforms at home. In substance, this assertion for "independence" was aimed mainly against the Tokyo Government. Of course it was also an act aimed at undermining Chinese sovereign claims over the region through the pretext of self-determination of peoples and through the effort towards securing international recognition of the pretext as a fact.

Ever since the Meiji Restoration the Civil and Military Wings of the Japanese Government had been struggling for ultimate policy control in the country. The Japanese military had always been responsible for the country's policy and administration in the past and the Civil Government had existed but as an effete court at Kyoto. The Meiji Restoration, however, brought the Civil elements back into power, but these could not dispense themselves with the help of military elements. Indeed the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate was effected not by the Civil elements but by the anti-Tokugawa Daimyo and Samurai. Although Samurai status had




been abolished and feudal loyalties replaced by national loyalty around the symbol of the Tenno, the tradition of military rule, inbred into the minds of every Japanese, could not be erased. The conscript armed forces, the Army in particular, came to regard themselves as the rightful rulers of the country and that the Civil elements had usurped their power and that this usurpation had resulted in the current difficulties that Japan was facing internally and externally.<sup>14</sup>

The successful wars with China and then with Russia had built the prestige of the modern conscript forces, while the successes acquired during the First World War and the territories gained at the Conference tables raised the standing of that of the Civil elements. It should be noted in passing that both wings of the Japanese Government had, to a large extent, to build their prestige upon Japanese expansion and that basically their

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
<sup>14</sup> Y.C. Maxen, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 19.



aims were identical. The Civil elements, however, found an alternative to military expansionism in the promotion of Japanese industrial growth and expansion of foreign trade. Phenomenal industrial development during the World War years due to Allied supply demands had made the capitalist class in Japan a new force to be reckoned with and this class believed that prolonged peace was essential towards industrial and commercial development. The Civil elements were so successful that the Armed services found their prestige dwindling during the 1920s and that military expenditure, instead of increasing continually, was being reduced amidst a world generally in favour of disarmament.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The Washington Conference together with the signing of the Naval Agreement and the Nine Power Treaty, and the Signing of the Kellogg Pact are notable expressions of this trend. The Economic difficulties as a result of the great depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s made disarmament even more imperative.




Dissatisfaction against the ruling Civil elements was widespread not only among the officer corps but among the rank and file as well. Recruited mainly from rural areas they resented the Government's heavy taxation on agricultural interests while subsidies were given and much lighter taxation was levied upon the industrial and commercial concerns.<sup>16</sup> Their suffering was endued for the cause of national greatness and their disappointment brought home by the lavishness of the nouveau riche and the neglect of the armed forces. They felt that all was not well. Social inequality and economic injustice knit the armed forces together in a spirit of opposition to the Civil Government.

The Civil Government could remain in dominant control of the country so long as it was able to advance Japanese interests abroad. This became increasingly questionable when Japan was compelled to give up Shantung, to limit the building of war ships, and faced with variant forms of collective

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<sup>16</sup> T. Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 107-119 on Agrarian Impoverishment and the Young Officer




security in the Washington Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. Such steps were clearly aimed at restraining continued Japanese expansion.

Failing to gain policy control at home,<sup>17</sup> Army radicals resorted to independent action in Manchuria. It was an attempt to compel the Government to adopt the policy of military expansion. Even if the Civil element should refuse to tow the line, the Kwantung Army was confident that its actions could not be denounced in Japan -- its actions were based on selfless patriotic motives and no Government could afford to denounce patriotism and still hope to survive. If the Government should resort to disciplinary action by withholding finance and supplies, Manchurian resources could provide enough of the immediate wants of the Kwantung Army.

The implementation of independent action in Manchuria depended upon the failure of the Civil Wing and the higher military authorities in Japan to advance Japanese interests in Manchuria by other

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
<sup>17</sup> Liang Ching-hsun, pp. 41-43. Y.C. Maxen, pp. 78-79.



means. The Civil elements, as represented by the views of Baron Shidehara, advocated gradual penetration via the Japanese commercial interests in Manchuria. He was for non-interference in internal Chinese politics, he recognized Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, and he was for protecting Japanese special interests in Manchuria by a policy of co-operation with the Chinese Government.<sup>18</sup> His desire to keep Manchuria free from the turmoil of Chinese civil war failed when Marshall Chang Tso-lin moved his forces south of the Great Wall in a bid for power against the Nationalist Chinese forces. Chang's imminent defeat entailed the reunification of China and the eventual presence in Manchuria of a Chinese Government vouches to advance Chinese nationalist feelings: at that time taking the form of anti-foreignism and determined efforts to terminate her unequal treaties. The continuation of Shidehara's policy would be detrimental to Japanese interests in

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<sup>18</sup> S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, pp. 7-9.



Manchuria, interests which had been viewed as vital to Japan's national existence, or rather vital to her bid to continue world power status.

An alternative to Shidehara's policy was advocated by General Tanaka: to regard China and Manchuria as two distinct political entities.<sup>19</sup> Japan was to use force to draw a line between the combatants and, as the Manchurian regime would depend upon continued Japanese military protection for its existence, Manchuria would be amenable to Japanese dictates. Accordingly the Nationalist forces were halted in their northward drive and Marshall Chang was compelled to return to Mukden on pain of having all his forces disarmed. Tanaka, however, never had the chance to prove how workable this line of approach was.

Radical Kwantung Army officers were not in the mood for a limited application of force. They thought it was time to disarm the Manchurian

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 9-13.




forces whether Chang Tso-lin was amenable to Japanese control or not and that Japanese military forces should be the sole source of political power in Manchuria. In trying to impress this line of thought upon the Tanaka Cabinet, Chang Tso-lin was assassinated on his way back to Mukden.<sup>20</sup> Tanaka resigned after his subsequent failure to impose disciplinary actions upon the officers concerned, but his general approach was adopted by his successor, Wakatsuki. Chang Hsueh-liang, however, had his own ideas and his declaration of allegiance to the Nanking Government made the Japanese realize that the Tanaka approach was no longer practicable. And yet there was no alternative policy for the advancement of Japanese interests in Manchuria, Kwantung Army independent action in Manchuria came in to fill in this vacuum.

The "independence" of Manchuria was necessary from another angle. It had long been a Japanese

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 12-13.



tradition to separate the formal authority from the actual authority and it was the Kwantung Army's desire to create a formal body in Manchuria which could be used to assume all responsibilities while the substance of power was retained in the hands of the Japanese Army of occupation. Such a puppet government could be made to legalize every illegal act that the Kwantung Army had need to commit there.

This instrument for the evasion of actual responsibility was not set up because the Kwantung Army believed that what they did was wrong and so needed a cover. On the contrary, they believed in what they did in Manchuria and what they intended to do later in the Continent as right. They thought they were advancing the cause of humanity and that it was good for all Asia to have Japan as the leading nation, and basing upon such a premise, they started to build an ideal political entity in Manchuria. This attitude was well expressed in a manifesto issued in the name of Yu Chun-han on behalf of the



Autonomy Guidance Headquarters on November 10th  
1931:<sup>21</sup>

"We aspire to found an earthly paradise by doing away with despotism, misunderstanding, illusion and complication."

Although this was supposed to be directed against the former regime in Manchuria under Chang Ksueh-liang, it could just as well be applied to Japan Proper and the whole of Asia as far as the Japanese Army was concerned.

The Kwantung Army's desire for "independence" was a relative one, depending upon the political situation at home. If it found its policy coinciding with that pursued by the home Government, then the desire for "independence" would be reduced to a minimum and vice versa. The Kwantung Army officers, however, did not agree in one body as to whether internal reforms or territorial expansion was the

<sup>21</sup> Manchoukuo Yearbook 1934. See also IMTFE, Defense Document No. 953: Official announcement by the GHQ of the Kwantung Army, October 4th, 1931.




more important of the two and so there existed a potential difference of views within that body to make it likely to have shifts of policy emphasis from time to time.


Aggression committed in Manchuria was done under the influence of Japanese nationalist feeling. To the Kwantung Army and its sympathizers, advancement of Japanese national interests was a sacred task. In this they found both their strength and their weakness, strength in being able to carry on their aims in spite of general opposition, weakness in their inability to retreat when the odds were too great.

(iii) Factors conditioning Kwantung Army Policy

In spite of the command of an unchallengeable military force in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army found that in taking over the political control of the region and in its efforts to create a puppet government, its actions were conditioned to a certain extent by local and international factors. In the



first place the Kwantung Army was but one of the Japanese groups in Manchuria. Its first task was therefore one of gaining control over its Japanese rivals, namely the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Japanese Consular establishments. Secondly, now that the Kwantung Army had gained control over Manchuria, it found that the presence of a majority Chinese population compelled whosoever was in power to consider the interests of the Manchurian Chinese. A prolonged popular anti-Japanese guerilla war could very well tax the military strength of the Kwantung Army to the limit, especially if this was supported by both the Nanking and Moscow Governments. Thirdly, the actions of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the subsequent Shanghai Affair threatened the established interests of the Western Powers in China generally. It is true that their interests in Manchuria were slight when compared with those of Japan, but Japanese actions in Manchuria challenged their overall China



policies and therefore were regarded with gravity.<sup>22</sup>

The Japanese Foreign Ministry could exert little influence over the Kwantung Army because prior to September 1931 its own consular establishments in Manchuria had not shirked the use of force themselves.<sup>23</sup>

Its opposition now could easily be overwhelmed with the accusation of unpatriotic motives especially as, with the disappearance of the Chang Hsueh-liang regime, the consular establishments had virtually lost their raison d'être. To preserve appearances, however, the consular establishments were retained, but their direction was placed under the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army who was to serve concurrently as Ambassador Extraordinary to the puppet state of

<sup>22</sup> For the foreign policy of the U.S.A., England and France, please refer A. Rappaport, H.L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-33 (Chicago 1963).

<sup>23</sup> Please refer Lytton Report on the Wanpoashan Affair.




Manchoukuo.<sup>24</sup> Even the formal responsibilities of the Foreign Ministry were stripped later when the Board of Manchurian Affairs was set up in Japan.<sup>25</sup> The Foreign Ministry did continue to concern itself with Manchurian affairs, however, as it was the only intermediary through which relations between Manchoukuo and the Western Powers were conducted.<sup>26</sup>

The South Manchuria Railway Company, holding most of the Japanese capital investment in Manchuria, was delighted that the Kwantung Army had erased the threat of Chinese competition and, although somewhat dismayed by the ascendancy of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, was confident that as far as the future economic exploitation of the region was

<sup>24</sup> F.C. Jones, p. 23: The Ambassador Extraordinary was appointed on August 8, 1932.

<sup>25</sup> Y.C. Maxon, p. 98.


<sup>26</sup> *Infra* Chapter V.



concerned the S.M.R., with its capital and personnel, would be indispensable to any established political order in Manchuria. Indeed it soon found its own interests advanced in the form of exclusive control of all railways in Manchuria,<sup>27</sup> and that many of its experienced administrators were recruited into the Manchoukuoan Government to hold key positions and to supervise over their Chinese collaborators. The S.M.R. supported the Kwantung Army for a price.

The Kwantung Army, however, did not relish the idea of sharing its spoils with the S.M.R. But in the absence of large scale foreign investment and in their avowed opposition towards the Zaibatsu interests at home, it found the S.M.R. indispensable in the early years of Manchoukuo. This diminution of the effective authority of the Kwantung Army in

<sup>27</sup> S.M.R. Company, Fifth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1936 (Dairen 1936) p. 65, "The Manchoukuo Government, under a contract signed on February 9th 1933, entrusted the entire management of the Manchoukuo State Railways to the S.M.R. Company."



one vital aspect of Manchoukuo was deeply resented and every effort was made to confine the S.M.R. within bounds. It should be borne in mind that the S.M.R. was controlled by the Tokyo Government<sup>28</sup> and through it the Civil elements could exert some pressure upon the Kwantung Army and thus intrude upon its cherished "independence". The Kwantung Army, therefore, drew up its own economic plans for Manchoukuo<sup>29</sup> and by 1937 was able to secure sufficient technical and financial assistance from Japan Proper through the help of Aikawa Yoshiyoke.<sup>30</sup> From then on the Kwantung Army imposed more and more control over the 'vital' industries or industries concerned with national defence in one way or another.

<sup>28</sup> J.V.A. MacMurray, p. 557: Government order concerning S.M.R. Co. with articles of incorporation, August 1st, 1906.

<sup>29</sup> IMTVE, Interrogations, Aikawa Yoshiyuke 26/1/1946.

<sup>30</sup> IMTVE, Interrogations, Aikawa Yoshiyuke 26/1/1946.



From 1937 on the S.M.R. was confined to the field of communication only and even in this field separate telegraphic and aviation companies were set up to further restrict the activities of the S.M.R.<sup>31</sup>

In regard to international relations, the Kwantung Army was prepared to flout all opposition. It knew that the Western Powers realized the impregnable naval and military position of Japan in East Asia<sup>32</sup> and that nothing short of a major war could dislodge Japan from her territorial gains. However, the Kwantung Army was willing to pay lip service to the principles upon which American and

<sup>31</sup> Board of Economic Warfare, Reoccupation Division in co-operation with the Economic Branch, Japanese Techniques of Occupation: Key Laws and Official Documents, Volume II, Manchoukuo (June 1943) pp. 441-453.

<sup>32</sup> The Naval Agreement and its non-fortification clause had made Japanese sea power supreme in her adjacent seas while the military weakness of China and the unpreparedness of the U.S.S.R. had left the Japanese Army with no comparable counterpart on the Asiatic Continent.



European China policies were based so that their opposition might not only be lessened but that their capital investments might be attracted to Manchuria to help to develop the resources of the region. This was why the Kwantung Army continually asserted its respect for the Open Door policy, its avowal of protection of foreign interests,<sup>33</sup> and its reluctance to proclaim the independence of Manchoukuo until the adverse opinion from the League of Nations and from the United States was a certainty. There was no fear of foreign intervention except from the direction of Soviet Russia, but Russia was in the midst of her economic reconstructions and therefore unlikely to do anything against Japanese moves in Manchuria.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> See IMTFE, Defence Document No. 953: Official announcement by the GHQ of the Kwantung Army, October 4th 1931, in which the Army denied any interference on diplomatic relations concerning Manchuria.

<sup>34</sup> H.L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-45, p. 1 (New Jersey 1945).




(iv) The Problem of Post Occupation Political Settlement

a. The form of government

The immediate task after the Kwantung Army had resorted to force in Manchuria was to stabilize political conditions there and to secure a framework through which political control could be effected. Before the Kwantung Army could proceed with any political plans it had in mind, however, it was faced with the prospect of lawlessness throughout Manchuria as a result of the sudden disappearance of the former regime and most of its administrative personnel and the presence of disbanded troops who had turned bandits in the countryside. The situation was gravest where the Kwantung Army was strongest, namely in Liaoning Province.

Anarchic conditions were not only menacing the Chinese populace but were detrimental towards Japanese lives and property too, the very things that the Kwantung Army had started fighting for to




preserve. Acting upon immediate necessity, urban administrations were formed under the direct participation of the Kwantung Army. The most notable example was that of Mukden where Colonel Doihara was appointed Mayor and prominent Japanese residents were organized to help him.<sup>35</sup> Direct rule was not the adopted policy of the Kwantung Army.<sup>36</sup>

The new political order arising out of necessity did not fit in with the plans of the Kwantung Army and was strongly objected to by the home Government. The Kwantung Army had to maintain itself as an effective striking force at all times and the use of its officers to administer Manchuria would greatly deplete its fighting ability. The home Government objected on the ground that there was no state of war existing in Manchuria and that

<sup>35</sup> Lytton Report, p. 106.

<sup>36</sup> IMTFE, Rejected Document No. 2943A, telegram from Consul General Hayashi to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Shidehara, 21/9/1951, Telegram No. 676. Cf. S.N. Ogata, pp. 41-47.



if the Kwantung Army should openly assume governmental responsibilities it would be very difficult for the Government to deny internationally that Japan had not acted outside the limits of "self-protection." The cabinet therefore ruled against the military administration of the occupied districts. This decision was subsequently wired by General Minami, Minister of War, to General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese garrison in Kwantung Province. In consequence, the military administrations inaugurated at Mukden, Antung, Yingkow, Changchun and other cities were abolished.<sup>37</sup> The cabinet decision thus allowed the original policy makers of the Kwantung Army to repudiate the actions of over-sealous officers on the scene and this in turn served as a face saving device for the Tokyo Government. A further objection was that the Chinese leaders who emerged to keep law and order were necessarily men of action and with some genuine

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<sup>37</sup> IMTIE, Rejected Document No. 2516, exert from Japan Chronicle on No Military Government.



local support, men who were not likely to be absolutely amenable to dictation. A notable example is the case of Li Yi. Li was the District Magistrate of Shenyang and after the outbreak of the Mukden Incident he formed a constabulary force of 600 men to keep law and order. He succeeded in doing this, but when the Manchoukuo Government was organized Li Yi was hastily replaced.<sup>38</sup>

Finding that neither direct military rule nor evolved emergency Chinese administration was suited to its objectives, the Kwantung Army was faced with the problem of setting up a government which could dispense with administrative duty on the one hand and amenable to Kwantung Army control on the other.


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<sup>38</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, How "Manchoukuo" Was Created, p. 14 (Information Bulletin No. 7, July 1933, Nanking).



b. Localism in Manchuria

Localism in Manchuria was favourable to the setting up of a Kwantung Army controlled Government. Manchurian society was distinct from that in China and Mongolia -- the agricultural and the nomadic respectively -- in that it was a frontier region between the two and that its society, together with all its heritage, was a hybrid one. This resulted in a constant conflict of loyalties, or rather a constant shift of loyalties, as the tide of Chinese and Mongol Power surged to and fro. Inhabitants of Manchuria were thus freed from continual loyalty to anyone but themselves and they were made aware of their commanding strategical position vis a vis either the Chinese or the Mongol domains. For centuries, however, it was dominated by either of the two and it was not till the 17th century that a nomadic-agricultural combine, based on the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia, did succeed in building an empire that was known as the Ch'ing dynasty.




The age old balance of power between the agricultural and the nomadic groups in Manchuria was upset in favour of the former with the advent of modern industry and mechanical means of communication. It not only strengthened the erstwhile strong economic position of the agricultural community, but it also reduced the military superiority of the nomads as well. The horse could not compete with the train nor the spear the gun.

What resulted was a gradual retreat of nomadic interests towards Central Asia where remoteness and scanty resources made the advance of agricultural and industrial interests difficult and uninviting. This naturally resulted in much bitterness and was shown in a Mongol desire to reassert themselves. As the Kwantung Army had its eyes on Mongolian lands, it gave special treatment to the Mongols in Manchuria and gave them as much substance of autonomy as was agreeable to the Kwantung Army itself.<sup>39</sup> This secured for it the support of Mongols in Manchuria

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<sup>39</sup> F.C. Jones, Manchuria Since 1931, Chapter III.



and gained for it much influence among Mongols outside Manchuria. It should also be borne in mind that the potential antagonists of Japan, namely the Chinese and the Russians, were the natural enemies of the Mongols. With this support Manchoukuo was potentially a base of operation against China and Russia via Inner and Outer Mongolia respectively. Further, by giving the Mongols protection from future encroachment by Manchurian agricultural interests, the Kwantung Army pressed the inherent racial antagonism under the surface and brought the germinating Mongolian nationalist feeling towards the more constructive task of re-uniting the Mongols of Manchuria, Mongolia, and other parts of Central Asia.

The Manchurian Chinese, on the other hand, was no less co-operative. They were endowed with the same lack of loyalty through a historical process and, although they were situated in a frontier region of China, they were more concerned with how to assert themselves upon the rest of China than




they were with the advance of Chinese frontier.<sup>40</sup> Accommodating themselves to a new ally, in this case Japan, in their traditional drive towards political control over the rest of China was a rational course to them. Chinese nationalist feeling was weak and influenced only the urban and intelligentia groups, the majority of the population continued to think and act along traditional lines. Added to these were the self-seeking motives of the Chinese leaders in Manchuria as contrasted with the aggressive devotion of the Japanese officer corps.

The Manchurian Chinese, however, were not trusted by the Kwantung Army no matter how amenable they were towards Japanese control. While it was indispensable to have Manchurian Chinese co-operation, the Kwantung Army was assiduous in introducing other elements to minimize their actual influence and to supervise over their activities. It was thus that the Chinese Monarchists were given the nominal

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<sup>40</sup>

Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, pp. 310-311 (Paris 1952).



exercise of central authority and Japanese advisors were introduced to exercise either supervision over or the actual execution of legislative and administrative duties. The Kwantung Army retained unto itself the all important policy-making power. A more detailed discussion of this aspect will be found in a later chapter concerning the structure and working of the Manchoukuoan Government.<sup>41</sup>

c. The Choice of Puppets

The problem of setting up a puppet government was not so much a question of the availability of willing tools; it was a question of their suitability for Kwantung Army purposes. What the Kwantung Army wanted were figures with the maximum prestige value, but with as little real influence -- in terms of military and administrative control -- as possible. The choice was open at the beginning and it was not till early 1932 that the actual choice fell on Henry Pu Yi, the former Emperor of China.

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<sup>41</sup> See Chapter IV.




Chang Hsueh-liang: Had it been feasible the Kwantung Army would have taken Chang Hsueh-liang as the most suitable puppet and, if Chang had been willing, the Kwantung Army had no need to resort to force in the first place. It is necessary therefore to account for Chang's aversion towards the Japanese and its connection with current events in China.

The problem for China at this time was reunification. The country found itself divided into so many spheres of influence, each dominated by a local warlord with or without foreign support. The cause of reunification was well under way when the Nationalists and Communists joined hands under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek in prosecuting the Northern Expedition. They were in the process of unifying the country when Party strife and foreign interests intervened. The Nationalists and the Communists waged a civil war of their own while Japan intrigued behind the scenes to intensify the struggle and openly prevented the Nationalists from conquering North China and Manchuria.




Such a declared Japanese stand ensured the safety of the Chang Hsueh-liang regime and, if his ambition had been a regional one, there should be no complication in Manchuria for the time being. Chang, however, was neither satisfied with the Manchurian domains nor was he willing to continue subservience to Japanese dictates. While it is true that he might have been slightly affected by the surging tide of nationalism, patriotic feelings were not the driving force behind his actions. He should be judged as a shrewd politician rather than a patriot, his main motives were mainly self-seeking: how to enhance his personal power when the forces under his command were no longer adequate vis a vis either the Japanese or the Nationalists. He tried his hands at the traditional game of balance of power. He knew that the Nationalists were kept out from Manchuria only by the presence of the Japanese and he hoped to limit the activities of the Japanese by declaring political allegiance to the Nanking Government. He calculated that this would secure



for him the support of the whole of China and this, with the powerful weapon of economic boycott, the presence of the Nationalists armies, and a generally favourable world opinion, would certainly be sufficient to deter the Japanese from resorting to arms in Manchuria. With one stroke he hoped to balance off the Nationalists and the Japanese with each other, while his open avowal of Chinese Nationalism would endear him to million of Chinese breasts and ensure him a prominent place in internal Chinese politics.

Chang, however, overestimated the support he would get from the Nanking Government and underestimated the extent to which the Kwantung Army, as distinct from the Japanese Government, would react towards such a political manoeuvre aimed obviously at frustrating Japanese designs on Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek was only nominally a nationalist while in fact he was one of the most unscrupulous warlords of the time. It may be said that in Chiang, Chang had met his match. Chiang's



main concern was not to secure Manchuria for China but how to secure control over Chang's forces, for these were the strongest organized force that could challenge his ascendancy in China. Chiang satisfied Chang's ego and tied up his forces by naming him as second in command and allotted to him the task of subduing opposing warlords and Communist in North and North-west China. As for support for Chang against the Japanese, Chiang continually warned the Manchurian warlord not to aggravate the Japanese as it was no time for war. The consistency of this warning made Chang realize that he would be left alone to face Japanese might and it was on this understanding that he had decided on a policy of absolute non-resistance so as not to give the Japanese any formidable excuse to resort to arms in Manchuria and that any incident arising might be dealt with diplomatically between Mukden and Tokyo, or Nanking and Tokyo, or even on a personal plane.<sup>42</sup> The lack


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<sup>42</sup> Lytton Report, see p. 81 for text of a telegram from Chang Hsueh-liang to his subordinates in Manchuria and see pp. 74-77 concerning Nakamura Case.




of genuine concern on the part of the Central Government for the Manchurian warlord can be seen when the Mukden Incident did break out. Apart from appealing to the League of Nations, the Central Government refused to commit itself.

Unable to cope with Japanese political pressure after 1928, the Young Marshall had to feign illness and stayed at Peking, away from his Manchurian domains. He was compelled to resort to the worst type of political expediency: evasion of responsibility for as long as possible. He hoped that his absence from Mukden and his constant demand for specific instructions from Nanking concerning foreign affairs in Manchuria would relieve the burden from his shoulders and be taken up by the Nanking Government as it should be if Manchuria were to be affirmed as Chinese territory. In which event any decision made would be fully backed by Chiang Kai-shek and all the forces under his command a much more formidable obstacle to the Japanese than if the Young Marshall were to stand and act alone.



Chiang Kai-shek, however, was no fool when matters concerning his personal ascendancy were concerned. He and his Government remained unmoved except for some half-hearted diplomatic moves so as to keep Chinese nationalist feelings under his influence. While Nanking remained non-committal, the Young Marshall also refused to take any decision on his own account except in so far as to try his best to appease the Japanese and so hoping to postpone a likely showdown to a more opportune moment for him and his associates. He did not seem to realize the intensity of the contradiction between his avowal of Nationalism and his practice of appeasement. He was actually encouraging Chinese nationalist feeling and Japanese expansionism at one and the same time. It was clearly a collision course.

The Kwantung Army also perceived the isolation of Chang Hsueh-liang and tried to make use of every existing friction to start a military conflict in Manchuria. The appeasing policy of the Young Marshall, however, made it very difficult



for the Kwantung Army to start action: the Young Marshall had instructed his generals not to resort to arms under any provocation while he himself humbled his pride to accede to Japanese demands upon the so-called murder of a Japanese agent by Chinese military authorities.<sup>43</sup> It was thus that a special incident had to be created as an excuse to start military activities without waiting for negotiations of any kind for fear of another humble submission on the part of the Young Marshall.

The destruction of a few feet of railway line, allegedly by Chinese troops, was interpreted as an insult to the honour of Japanese and hence was good enough for putting into execution a well-prepared plan of military occupation of Manchuria. When the Japanese soldiery arrived at the wall of Mukden the Commanding General and the Governor of Liaoning Province frantically telephoned the Young

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<sup>43</sup> Please refer Lytton Report on the Nakamura Case.




Marshall for instructions as to resist or to retreat.<sup>44</sup> Thinking of his own political future in China Proper, the Young Marshall refused to give specific orders either to resist or to retreat.<sup>45</sup> Resistance would have meant the certain annihilation of his forces and thus the end of all his political capital. Retreat would be cried against as traitorous or at least as desertion from active duty. The Young Marshall repeatedly asked them to follow the directions of the Central Government, that is he was adamant about evading formal responsibility at whatever cost. His generals in the field were thus left to choose among three alternatives: to resist, to retreat, or to surrender on their own initiative. To resist was death, to retreat would be giving up their vested interests, to surrender might be a way to protect personal fortunes and might even be allowed to continue their former

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<sup>44</sup> Li Nien-chih, Notes on the So-called Manchoukuo, pp. 69-71 (Hong Kong 1954).


<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 69-71.



status under Japanese auspices. Each individual took his own decision and under the circumstances the Japanese found an ample supply of willing political tools among the former subordinates of Chang Hsueh-liang.

The Kwantung Army found it advisable, however, to favour any particular provincial collaborator by raising him to a nominal political headship over all Manchuria. These former subordinates of Chang Hsueh-liang were men with solid backing in their own districts and had formidable military followings. Their co-operation was welcomed, of course, but to favour any one of them would incur the jealousy of the rest. Russia was always in the background and the Kwantung Army was apprehensive of her intrigue in the form of military supplies to anti-Japanese elements in Manchuria.

The Kwantung Army wanted a figure head, commanding sufficient respect but with no military following in Manchuria. The task of finding such a figure was entrusted to Colonel Doihara Kenji.




With his long years of service in China and his multifarious connection with Chinese warlords and politicians, he was well-endowed for the task. It should be emphasised in passing that Doihara was acting under orders from Itagaki and Ishiwara.<sup>46</sup> Since the men of influence in Manchuria were not suitable, Doihara turned his eyes to North China.

According to Li Nien-chih, Doihara first approached two retired warlords with the political headship of Manchuria.<sup>47</sup> These two were known to be pro-Japanese but they were not made for the role of puppets. Having no formidable military following of their own and learning that the Kwantung Army would not help them to rebuild their personal armies for furthering their own ambitions in China, they

<sup>46</sup> IMTIE, Interrogations, Doihara Kenji, 12/2/1946 in which Doihara testified that his missions to Tientsin was personally directed by Itagaki Seishiro.

<sup>47</sup> Li Nien-chih, pp. 95-97.




promptly refused to take any part in the proposed Japanese sponsored government in Manchuria.

The Chinese Monarchists: Doihara was more successful, however, in persuading Henry Pu Yi, the former Emperor of China, to become the head of the new state. On approaching Pu Yi, Doihara knew that Pu Yi and his followers were keen to find support from either Chinese warlords or foreign Powers in their long cherished bid for imperial restoration in China. Doihara, acting without authorization, assured Pu Yi with a monarchy in Manchuria just to lure him to Manchuria first. Pu Yi, however, found his followers split over the matter and he himself could not come to a definite decision. Doihara forced a decision on him by threat.<sup>48</sup> It should be understood, however, that Pu Yi was more than willing to enter into what he considered to be active politics again and he should not be considered as being forced to serve the Japanese.

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<sup>48</sup> Pu Yi, Autobiography, p. 272 (Hong Kong, 1964 in 2 volumes).



In fact the first overture for co-operation came not from the Japanese but from the Monarchists themselves. Ever since the Revolution of 1911 the Monarchists had been desiring and plotting for the restoration of the Manchu Court, contending that China could only have peace and prosperity under its age-long monarchical form of government and accredited all the civil strives after 1911 to the unhealthiness of the republican form of government which had been adopted. Their intrigue against the republic only resulted in their expulsion from Peking in 1924. They were soon given refuge in the Japanese legation and later in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin.

Three distinct groups could be distinguished among the Monarchists. Pu Yi himself headed one, advocating the use of some warlord's help in regaining political power. Pu Yi believed that political power was based on military might and he went so far as to send some of his trusted followers and kinsmen to Japanese military academies.



to be trained, intending them to be the nucleus of his future personal army. Pu Yi was also interested in building up contacts with various warlords and he succeeded in having the best relations with Chang Tso-lin and some of his subordinates.<sup>49</sup>

Pu Yi's most respected tutor, Chan Po-shum, was much more cautious and advocated a limited program: the restoration of the Ch'ing Court as existed after 1911. He had no ambition in seeing the revival of Manchu Power and believed that a political come-back was impossible. His supporters were mostly elderly men who were somewhat influenced by their desire for a peaceful ending to their lives.<sup>50</sup>

The most able monarchists, however, were found among the third group led by the rivals Law Chung-yu and Cheng Hsiao-hsu who advocated restoration

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., pp. 201-213.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 192.




by foreign intervention. They both intrigued for Japanese support, but while the former had his mind only upon Japanese help, the latter was thinking in terms of an international intervention in which not only could the monarchy be restored but that the intervening powers could be balanced off one against the other as well.<sup>51</sup> Law lost favour after he was found to have absconded with some funds and he retired to Dairen where he continued to build up contacts with the Kwantung Army.

When Pu Yi arrived in Manchuria, Law and Cheng again competed for ascendancy. This enabled the Japanese to manoeuvre the Monarchists to agree to a republican form of government. Pu Yi had to agree as his coming to Manchuria had committed him to a course of action irrespective of whether his earlier objectives were fulfilled or not. Instead of a Ch'ing restoration he found himself manoeuvred into becoming a Chief Executive, not of China, but of a projected Manchu-Mongolian State.

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 312-313.



The Kwantung Army chose Pu Yi because he had enough prestige in Manchuria and Mongolia and could therefore raise hopes among the Mongols of the appearance of a new Manchu-Mongolian Empire in Central Asia. The local warlords did not object to Pu Yi's position because they knew that he had no real influence and so their own interests were not endangered. The Japanese were pleased that the installation of Pu Yi did not raise local objections and that Pu Yi, without any military following and with no tangible roots in Manchuria, could easily be manipulated whether he was willing or otherwise. Pu Yi's position was entirely dependent upon continued Japanese support.



## CHAPTER III

### THE FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT

This chapter is concerned with an aspect of the implementation of Kwantung Army Policy: the creation of a controlled administration. For convenience the chapter is divided into three sections dealing with: i) the general pattern of Kwantung Army action in this respect, ii) the special organisations set up for the task of government building, and iii) the actual attempts at organizing an administration.

The declaration of independence in the name of the State Founding Conference on February 18, 1932<sup>1</sup> and the formal establishment of the

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<sup>1</sup> Japan Manchoukuo Yearbook 1941, p. 604.  
Lytton Report, p. 112.




new state of Manchoukuo on March 9, 1932<sup>2</sup> were the culmination of events since the occurrence of the Mukden Incident. It was no easy task for the Kwantung Army to call into existence a government which could dispense with the myriad details of administration over thirty million souls of different racial composition on the one hand, and, on the other, a government that was to be entirely subservient to all the policy dictates of its overlords in the Kwantung Army Headquarters. The complex political relations in Japan, Manchuria, and China -- all having due effects upon Manchurian politics -- almost made the task of the formation of a new state and a new government impossible. That an organized state did emerge in the course of five long months was in itself a fete to be applauded. The later

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<sup>2</sup> Japan Manchoukuo Yearbook, p. 604.

The formal establishment of Manchoukuo was set on March 1st, 1932, but Pu Yi was not in office until March 9th, 1932. The student therefore takes the latter date as the day of inauguration of the new State.



efficient working of the puppet administration clearly showed how much the Kwantung Army did understand the situation in Manchuria and its success must be attributed not only to the possession of a superior fighting force but to the single-mindedness and dedication of those responsible for the Manchurian adventure. It was also the inherent contradictions within the multiracial Manchurian society which enabled the Kwantung Army to secure willing support and to play a game of balance of interests among the various racial groups. It should also be borne in mind that the creation of Manchoukuo was not an end in itself, but rather a means to further Japanese continental expansion in the directions of China, Mongolia, and the U.S.S.R.

(i) General Pattern

In gathering material on the actual attempt on the formation of Manchoukuo the student finds that the process has a recognizable pattern. It




may be convenient to outline this pattern first so that the individual events in the process of government building may acquire a relevance to each other as the reader proceeds with the text. This recognizable pattern also substantiates the fact that Manchoukuo was created under an arranged policy of the Kwantung Army and not a spontaneous independence movement as the Japanese had claimed.


The initial step was invariably military conquest. Manchoukuo was founded by Japanese military might. It could not continue without the presence of a Japanese army of occupation. The assertion of this military might took the form of the destruction of the erstwhile controlling Chinese military forces either in battle or by forcing their disarmament and disbandment. As an accompaniment of this was the non-recognition of the local administrative organizations as they then existed,<sup>3</sup> an attitude that required administrative reforms subsequent to occupation.

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<sup>3</sup> Wellington Koo, Memoranda, p. 372. Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-41, pp. 14-15, Telegram 8/10/1931.



The formation of an emergency administration followed. With the forceful disorganization of the former civil and military establishments, the country was plunged into a state of lawlessness. The degree of this varied from province to province and was in direct proportion to the intensity of the military operations involved. The Kwantung Army had no desire for general lawlessness as this would tax the strength of its fighting units to the limit and would cripple the financial and industrial interests of Japan in the area. In this case the formation of emergency administrations became a necessity, the degree of urgency again varied from district to district in direct proportion to the extent of Japanese interests involved. Even in areas where Japanese occupation was not accompanied by administrative disintegration the Kwantung Army still insisted in the form of an Emergency Government as a process first to destroy the existence of the former regime both de facto and de jure and second as a transitional period during which the entire




plan of political readjustment of Manchuria of the Kwantung Army was not revealed to the local Chinese leaders in order to avoid unnecessary resistance.<sup>4</sup> These emergency governments usually took the form of a local Peace and Order Maintenance Committee entrusted with police powers. They were effectively in the hands of local leaders and the Kwantung Army interfered as little as possible. This lack of interference not only conserved the strength of the Kwantung Army but also gave a false impression to the local leaders that the Kwantung Army was sincere in its protestations in support of provincial autonomy.

With law and order restored, the logical sequence was to put the existing administration upon a correlated long term basis. It was in this stage that elements of Japanese control were introduced. The interim emergency administrations could not be allowed to continue for ever and the administration

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<sup>4</sup> *Infra*, pp. 160-161.



of the region must be placed upon a long term basis. To do this the Kwantung Army revived the former administrative system in the provinces but with one difference: all provincial administrative set ups had to undergo a 'reorganization' which meant no more than the introduction of Japanese control. This was done in three levels: the stationing of Japanese military forces in strategic areas, the introduction of Japanese advisors and the appointment of Japanese in key official positions.<sup>5</sup> These revived administrations were headed by a former prominent official and, to the general populace, hardly differed from the former regime at all. The bait for local co-operation was a vague promise of provincial autonomy.

With the stabilization of political conditions within Manchuria completed, the Kwantung Army proceeded with its plan of setting up a central government to


<sup>5</sup> F.C. Jones, Manchuria Since 1931, pp. 28-29. In Manchoukuo Japanese residents were regarded as Manchoukuoans. See also How Manchoukuo Was Created, p. 27 and S.N. Ogata, Delance in Manchuria, p. 39.



effect coordination between the provinces.

Simultaneous with this was an attempt to produce the appearance of a popular demand for independence from China and in the course of this attempt the Kwantung Army tightened its grip upon Manchuria down to the village level. These three distinct processes were complementary to each other and are therefore taken as one unit here. The provincial authorities, represented by the former military leaders, found their positions isolated. Their influence in the central government was kept to a minimum and their military following were either disarmed or transferred to the entirely Japanese dominated central government at Hsinking. Without a military following, the provincial leaders found their position dependent upon continued Japanese support.

Having had the machinery of provincial and central administration set up and having had local military power curtailed, the Kwantung Army then proceeded to formalize what it had already




achievcd. The inauguration of Manchoukuo was just a formal step and it is treated as a separate process because it was only towards the eve of this Inauguration that the provincial leaders were informed of the actual plans for Manchuria that the Kwantung Army had prepared long before hand. It was also a step aimed against possible international intervention by establishing a fait accompli before the arrival of the League's Commission of Enquiry.<sup>6</sup>

#### (ii) Government Building Organizations

The task of creating a puppet government was directly taken by the Kwantung Army and it was entrusted to the Fourth Department.<sup>7</sup> In order to evade formal responsibilities, however, and to increase efficiency, the Fourth Department organized

<sup>6</sup> Japan Manchoukuo Yearbook 1934, pp. 729-730. The League Commission was appointed on December 10, 1931 and it stayed in Manchurian soil from May to June 4th, 1932.

<sup>7</sup> Lytton Report, p. 111.




an Autonomy Guidance Centre -- later came to be known as the Self-governing Guidance Board. It came into being on November 10, 1931 and was ostensibly an independent body set up by local leaders to test the desire for autonomy in various quarters of Manchuria. In fact it was placed directly under the command of the Fourth Department while its members, with the exception of the nominal Chairman Yu Chung-han, were all Japanese.<sup>8</sup>

The headquarter of this Board, the Central Board, had its offices in Mukden. From there members were sent out to every district to set up Local Self-governing Guidance Boards and Executive Committees.<sup>9</sup> The members of these local Boards and Committees were mostly indigenous collaborators, but their Chairmen were invariably Japanese responsible to the Central Board.<sup>10</sup> All decisions

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 111. S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 119.

<sup>9</sup> Lytton Report, p. 111.

<sup>10</sup> China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Bulletin No. 7, July 1933. How 'Manchukuo' Was Created, p. 14.




were made by these Japanese Chairmen and the presence of local collaborators was just for show.

The real decisions were not made on the local level. Thus the Self-governing Guidance Board system was a channel through which the decisions of the Kwantung Army could be transmitted down to the local level and be executed. It was not a channel for public opinion to influence policy making as it was ostensibly set up for. At the best it was only used to keep the Kwantung Army informed of the temper of public opinion.


The Self-governing Guidance Board system was entrusted with two main functions. First it had to organize the collaborators and second it tried to secure popular support for the Kwantung Army and its associates.

The naming of the Board as Autonomy Guidance was in itself a gesture to attract the co-operation of local leaders. The initial move was to inform the prospective collaborators that the political settlement of Manchuria would take the form of



provincial autonomy. If this were true, it meant that the former administrative arrangements were to be continued and the former officials confirmed in their posts and spheres of influence. This was never the desire of the Kwantung Army and was only a means towards minimizing organized resistance. The guise of provincial autonomy was given up as soon as the Kwantung Army had established effective military control of the entire region and the local leaders had declared the independence of Manchuria.

From the beginning the all important task of the Autonomy Guidance or Self-governing Guidance Boards was to effect a general "reorganization" of the provincial administrations. This "reorganization" meant no more than the installing of Japanese advisors and effecting Japanese control. The previous administrative system was actually continued. The only positive contribution was that the various administrative aspects were now put down in black and white and made uniform. The re-organization was usually preceded by a formal declaration severing



of relations with the Nanking Government and an enforced disarming of the provincial military forces. This applied even to the most pro-Japanese collaborators.

In its work towards securing popular support, initially for an autonomous movement and later for an independence movement, the Self-governing Guidance Boards became in fact a propaganda agent. Handbills, lectures, demonstrations, public meetings, and any other means towards the same end were organized by the Local Boards.<sup>11</sup> They became the representative of the authorities to the people and the representative of the people to the authorities. It was no more than a magical instrument with which the Japanese wizards confused the senses of all beholders.

Bearing in mind the adopted approach and the instrument in hand, let us now turn to the actual events in each province right up to the formal inauguration of Manchoukuo.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 13-14.



(iii) Setting up AdministrationsMukden

The first phase, that of military conquest, was completed within a matter of hours after the alleged explosion on the South Manchuria Railway at the environ of Mukden City. Because of the disparity in numbers between the Japanese Kwantung Garrison and the Chinese Army, the Japanese had a previous plan of action in case of an emergency and this plan centred on the concentration of forces upon Mukden and the annihilation of the administrative centre of the Chang Hsueh-liang regime.<sup>12</sup>

The suddenness of the Incident set up a panic among the population there and the ones who reacted fastest were officials and administrators of the Chang regime, in short all those who had a stake with the existing government. All those who could afford it tried the expensive way of escape

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<sup>12</sup> IMTPE, Defense Document No. 886, Sworn deposition of Ishiara Kanji.



while those who could not remained in hiding.<sup>13</sup> With the entrance of Japanese soldiers and the so-called volunteers -- actually ronins in the employ of the Kwantung Army used as a vanguard to terrorize the populace -- the former administration simply vanished into thin air. Even prisons were deprived of their warders and the maintenance of law and order was left entirely to the Kwantung Army.<sup>14</sup> If similar happenings were to recur everywhere else, the civic life of the population might be seriously jeopardized and might do irreparable damage to Japanese financial and industrial interests while the Kwantung Army would find its operational plans paralyzed with the need to carry out police duties over the entire occupied area.

To dissipate its strength on non-military duties at a time when soldiers were sorely needed

<sup>13</sup> Lytton Report, p. 106.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.




in pushing forward the occupation and reinforcements were not anticipated was the last thing that the Kwantung Army authorities desired. It had to maintain its striking effectiveness to succeed in its present independent action and to outlast opposition at home. Law and order had to be secured through the medium of some emergency organizations.

The second phase, that of forming an emergency administration, was entrusted to Colonel Doihara Kenji, and on the 19th of September he was already appointed by the Kwantung Army as the Mayor of Mukden. He immediately called together a number of prominent Japanese residents and formed a Committee of Public Safety. With the help of these 'local' people Doihara succeeded in re-establishing law and order within the period of only three days.<sup>15</sup>

The third phase, that of introducing Japanese control, was unnecessary in the case of Mukden as

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid. S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 120.



the Committee of Public Safety was a body formed under the orders of the Kwantung Army, headed by a Japanese officer on active duty, and manned by Japanese residents. What was needed was the introduction of Chinese elements before the Municipal Government was formally re-established. Accordingly Dr. Chao Hsin-po, a prominent lawyer educated in Japan, was appointed as the new Mayor and he relieved Colonel Doihara on October 20, 1931.<sup>16</sup> Nominally the Municipal Government became a body independent of the Kwantung Army and the occupational forces could no longer be held for formal responsibilities concerning events in Mukden. Colonel Doihara proceeded with his work of contacting and sounding out prospective collaborators.

The new Mayor started his term of office with a characteristic denunciation of the former regime, a eulogisation of the Kwantung Army, and the severance of relations with the Nanking Government.

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<sup>16</sup> Lyttton Report, p. 106. How Manchoukuo Was Created




### Liaoning Province

The military conquest of Liaoning Province started with the Mukden Incident. In spite of its early start, however, the operation did not complete until January 1932.<sup>17</sup> This was not a sign of military weakness on the part of the Kwantung Army. The delay was caused by a struggle for control over the Kwantung Army between the officers in Manchuria and the General Staff in Tokyo. Accompanying this was the undercurrent of the restraining influence of the Civil Wing and the need to allay international reaction.

The entire campaign in Manchuria was started upon the pretext of the protection of Japanese lives and property from wanton Chinese attacks. As the Chinese did not even defend themselves against Japanese operations, the pretext was wearing thin. The Tokyo Government found it necessary at least to confine the actions taken by the Kwantung Army and to allay

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<sup>17</sup> Lytton Report, p. 92. S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, pp. 107-118.



international repercussions by declarations that Japan had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria<sup>18</sup> and that Japan would withdraw her forces as soon as conditions permitted. This open stand of the Government induced the Kwantung Army to be cautious with its operational plans as it was certain that reinforcements would not arrive from home.

The immediate objective of the Kwantung Army was the overthrow of the Chang Hsueh-liang regime. This objective was undermined when on September 27, 1931 Chang Hsueh-liang re-established his Manchurian administration at Chinchow and appointed his uncle Chang Tso-hsiang to take charge of affairs there. The Kwantung Army was determined to destroy this government. Its instrument was again its military forces and pretexts for attack were being created.

<sup>18</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-41, Vol. I, pp. 11-13.

<sup>19</sup> Liang Ching-hsun, A Historical Narrative of the September 18 Incident, p. 102.




The operational plan was based upon a two-pronged attack directed from the direction of Mukden and Tientsin. Colonel Doihara was sent to Tientsin to engineer anti-Japanese riots there so that the Japanese Garrison in the Japanese Concession -- with an estimated strength of about 600 at the time -- could have a legitimate excuse for requesting reinforcements and that the Kwantung Army could have an excuse of moving south towards Chinchow.<sup>20</sup> Although the avowed objective was Tientsin, it was obvious that Chinchow was the real target.

Action was taken quickly. Doihara succeeded in engineering the riots on the 8th and 26th of November. During this month the Kwantung Army massed its strength in the direction of Chinchow. As Chang Hsueh-liang's forces were regrouped there and Chang had had formal relations with Japan, General Honjo declared that Chang was no longer

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 102-103.




recognized by Japan<sup>21</sup> and intimated that there were many bandits in the environs of Chinchow necessitating punitive expeditions from the Kwantung Army. Reconnaissance flights over Chinchow were conducted and in the course of one of these Chinchow was bombed, causing some loss of life among the civilian population there. This was a pioneering act in the conduct of war and caused considerable international indignation.<sup>22</sup>

The Japanese Government had decided on limiting the development of events in Manchuria and was anxious to reassert its authority over an army in the field. To do this a traditional method of overruling the field commander with direct orders from the General Staff in Tokyo and sanctioned by the Emperor was resorted to. This struggle for control reached its height during the three weeks between November 5 and 28 and was concerned with

<sup>21</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-41, Vol. I, pp. 14-15.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 20-21.




actions of the Kwantung Army in Chinchow and in Heilungchiang.<sup>23</sup> Here we are first concerned with events in Liaoning Province.

It seems that actions against Chinchow were planned around November 27. Anyway information concerning the projected operation reached Tokyo immediately after the first riot in Tientsin and an Imperial Sanctioned Order to the effect that military movement towards Tientsin was prohibited was issued.<sup>24</sup> This Order apparently had no effect on the determined Kwantung Army and things were about to happen when on the 27th no less than three Imperial Sanctioned Orders were issued to stop any action against Chinchow. In the morning an Order disallowing movement towards Tientsin was issued, in the afternoon another was issued to the effect that Japanese forces should be restricted to east of Liao River, and this last Order was repeated twice

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 97-98. S.N. Ogata, pp. 107-115.

<sup>24</sup> Liang Ching-hsun, p. 103, quoting sources from The Road to the Pacific War (text in Japanese) Vol. III, p. 95.




later in the day.<sup>25</sup> The necessity to repeat its own urgent Orders showed that the Tokyo authorities were well aware that the Kwantung Army might disobey even an Order with Imperial Sanction. The Kwantung Army accepted the orders, however, and waited for political developments at home to take their course. On December 13, 1931 the Wakatsuki Cabinet fell and with it also disappeared any effective barrier towards the Kwantung Army. The operations against Chinchow were resumed and by the beginning of January 1932, the whole of Liaoning Province was occupied with the fall of Chinchow.<sup>26</sup>

The organization of a provincial government in Liaoning did not begin after the completion of military operations. It had started immediately after the city of Mukden was effectively occupied. It was done on two levels: provincial and district. As the primary aim was the restoration or the mainten


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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 103, quoting sources from The Road to the Pacific War, Vol. III, pp. 11-15.

<sup>26</sup> Lytton Report, p. 92.



of peace and order, the main emphasis was first placed on the District level. Former officials and prominent men were either invited or permitted to form police units. These units, however, were not allowed to carry arms and as far as possible their administrative functions were kept to a minimum. Japanese agents were sent by the Fourth Department, later by the Self-governing Guidance Board, to each district to direct and control the local leaders in their effort to organize police bodies and to make essential administrative changes. The official status of these Japanese agents was at first just contacts between the local authorities and the victorious Kwantung Army. The anomalous situation was soon made more respectable after the formation of the Self-governing Guidance Board on November 10 and these Japanese agents were made Chairmen of local Self-governing Executive Committees. These Committees existed either alone or with a Committee of Public Safety, in either case the Executive Committee acted as the controlling factor.



in all matters concerning the District and the Japanese chairman arrogated to himself a dictatorial voice. These Chairmen thus became in effect super-district magistrates.<sup>27</sup> In the District of Shenyang, Li Yi was at first allowed to form a police force of 600 men under his own initiative. But when law and order was restored, Li was immediately replaced.<sup>28</sup> Similar officials of initiative were replaced by less able men so as to ensure a Japanese ascendancy.

In its initial attempt to re-establish a provincial government the Kwantung Army deemed it most urgent to calm public apprehension and this it thought could be achieved by installing the former leading officials in a powerless pro-Japanese body. To attain this the existing President of the Liaoning Provincial Government, Lieutenant-General Tsang Shih-I, was approached on September 20, 1931 and

<sup>27</sup> How 'Manchoukuo' Was Created, p. 14.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 11.




invited to organize a provincial government.<sup>29</sup> Tsang had himself tried to contact General Honjo on the 18th and 19th without success. The Commander in Chief would not compromise himself in any action that might be interpreted as the recognition of the continued existence of the former administration. Tsang had himself harboured hopes of negotiation now that the Kwantung Army had avenged its honour and was unable to change his loyalties overnight. He accordingly refused the Japanese offer, for this he was put under arrest until he finally relented on December 13, 1931.<sup>30</sup>

According to Japanese thinking a prominent Chinese had to be put in the show window to calm the populace and to do this they compelled Mr. Yuan Chin-kai, a former Governor of the Province, into heading some sort of an emergency administration.

<sup>29</sup> Lytton Report, p. 107.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 107. How 'Manchoukuo' was Created, p. 10. S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 120.




According to an interview between Yuan and the American correspondent Edgar Snow, Yuan said that "About a month ago some Japanese military officers appeared one mid-night at my home and ordered me to accompany them. They said a kind of government had been established and that I was to be the nominal head of it. I declined. I was then informed that unless I accepted I might be imprisoned as an enemy of the state, or possibly be executed. My further protests were smothered and I was brought forcibly to these quarters I now occupy."<sup>31</sup> Yuan was actually made Chairman of the Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order which was established on October 5, 1931. This Committee consisted of nine members and all its decisions had to be approved by the Japanese military.<sup>32</sup> In describing the function and intention of the Committee

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<sup>31</sup> Edgar Snow, The Far Eastern Front, p. 89 (London 1934).

<sup>32</sup> S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 118, quoting sources from Kantogun Banboku Sonika, "Manshu jihen kimitsu koryaku nisshi" ("A Secret War Diary of the Manchurian Affair"), Vol. III, p. 95.



to the Lytton Commission, Yuan said that it "had been brought into being to preserve peace and order after the breakdown of the former administration. It assisted, moreover, in relieving refugees, in restoring the money market, and it attended to some other matters solely for the sake of preventing unnecessary hardship. It had, however, no intention of organizing a Provincial Government or declaring independence.<sup>33</sup> Thus in function the Committee was at best a community relief organization and, in its intended function of restoring peace and order, it could but issue proclamation after proclamation when due approval had been obtained from the Japanese military authorities. Although its functions were so limited, the Kwantung Army was determined to raise its prestige value by elevating its status by merely changing its official

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<sup>33</sup> Lytton Report, p. 107. Cable No. 1082 from Hayashi to Foreign Minister Shidehara. Arrived October 23, 1931. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Documents Relating to the Manchurian Affair." S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 120.




title. On October 21, 1931 the Committee was renamed as Liaoning Province Self-government Office.<sup>34</sup>

Although Yuan Chin-kai was against a separatist movement, the Liaoning Province Self-government Office was made an instrument towards that end. On November 7th, 1931 the Office was renamed as Liaoning Provincial Government ad interim and upon the occasion declarations on the independence of the province and on the severance of relations with Chang Hsueh-liang and the Nanking Government were made over the objections of Yuan.<sup>35</sup> On November 20 even the name of the province was altered to Fengtien to signify a complete break with the Chinese Republic.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Lyttton Report, p. 108.


<sup>35</sup> S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 120

<sup>36</sup> Lyttton Report, p. 108. S.N. Ogata, p. 120.



While the Provincial Government ad interim remained a powerless nominal body, the administrative organs of the province was gradually re-opened. These were nominally put under the Provincial Government ad interim, but in fact answered only to the military authorities for in each office Japanese advisors were installed and all decisions came into force only after the Kwantung Army had given its approval. The first administrative function to be resumed were those concerned with Japanese vital interests in Manchuria, namely in the fields of finance, industry, and communication. It was only after these had been re-organized that an over-all administrative body, the Supreme Advisory Board, was formed.

The first to resume function was the Board of Finance, which reopened its office on October 19th 1931. The immediate issue was to tighten the grip on the tax returns of the province and to stop any revenue from being remitted to the Chinchow authorities. To do this the Kwantung Army not only



restricted every decision unto itself but also tried to win popular support by putting the erstwhile taxation system upon a more rational and uniform basis. For this purpose a Financial Re-adjustment Committee was organized and, according to the Manchoukuo Government, on November 16th 1931 six taxes were abolished, four other reduced by half, eight were transferred to local governments, and all levies had to have a legal basis.<sup>37</sup> The actual implementation of these decisions had to take a much longer course as the evil of official greed and oppression among Chinese officials had a deep rooted tradition. It does show, however, the degree of devotion to the national cause between the Chinese and the Japanese at that time.

The second to resume function was the Board of Industry which reopened its activities on October 21st 1931. Following hard upon this was the Northeastern Communication Committee.<sup>38</sup> The latter

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<sup>37</sup> Lyttton Report, p. 108.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 108.




however, was separated from the Provincial Government ad interim on November 1st 1931 and was to take charge of all state railways not only in Liaoning but in other provinces as well. This Committee was the first central administrative organ to be formed but its main charge, the state railways, were soon to be turned over to the South Manchuria Railway Company.<sup>39</sup>

The over-all Provincial administrative organs were set up on November 10 1931 under the name of the Supreme Advisory Board. The Chairman of this Board was Yu Chung-han, but all important functionaries were Japanese. The avowed function of the Board was to supervise the Provincial Government ad interim while in fact it was the provincial government. It arrogated to itself all important administrative functions and under it were sections dealing with general affairs, investigation, protocol.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 108. South Manchuria Railway Company, Fifth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1936, p. 65 (Dairen 1936).




guidance, supervision, and an institute in self-government training.<sup>40</sup> This Supreme Advisory Board was mentioned earlier as the Self-governing Guidance Board and its dealings went outside the Province of Liaoning. Later when the Manchoukuo Government was set up, the Board had most of its administrative functions transferred to the proper provincial authorities and it was renamed as the Concordia Association. Its functions will be discussed later.

The final touch was added on December 13 1931 when Tsang Shih-I was released to replace Yuan Chin-kai as head of the Fengtien (Liaoning) Provincial Government ad interim.<sup>41</sup> The status of the Provincial Government did not change until after the formal establishment of Manchoukuo.

<sup>40</sup> Lytton Report, p. 108.


<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 108. S.N. Ogata, p. 120.



Kirin Province

In Kirin the Kwantung Army found it much easier to establish a regime independent of Chang Hsueh-liang; and subservient to Japanese dictates. The Governor, General Chang Iao-hsiang, was away at Chinchow attending his father's funeral. The Acting Governor Hsi Hsia, who, being a Manchu and imbued with monarchical ideas, perceived in the Japanese moves as a heaven-sent opportunity to further his political ends. Before the Japanese army came to him he went to the Kwantung Army to arrange for the occupation of Kirin and the re-organization of the provincial government.

Japanese military action in Kirin Province started simultaneously with the Mukden incident and Changchun was occupied on the 19th September 1931. Kirin city was at the other end of the Changchun-Kirin Railway and became vulnerable to Japanese attack. General Tamon at Changchun, however, did not have sufficient forces to launch an attack upon Kirin yet and he was glad to receive approaches from



his former pupil General Hsi Hsia. An interview between Tamon and Hsi Hsia took place on the 23rd September and Tamon agreed to send a token occupational force into the provincial capital.<sup>42</sup>

Having arranged with General Tamon, Hsi Hsia called a meeting of his officials and prominent men on the 25th September. Attending the meeting were some Japanese officers. The purpose of the meeting was to sound out if there were any objection towards the formation of a new provincial government under Hsi Hsia's leadership. There was no vocal opposition during the meeting as no local leader was prepared to defy the forces of Hsi Hsia and those of the Japanese in combination. Accordingly Hsi Hsia established a new provincial government on 30th September, with the accompanying declarations of independence and severance of relations with Chang Hsueh-liang and Nanking.<sup>43</sup> During the initial

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<sup>42</sup> Li Nien-chih, Notes on the So-called Manchoukuo, p. 75 (Hong Kong 1954).


<sup>43</sup> Lytton Report, p. 109.



period Hsi Hsia was given much autonomous authority. Hsi Hsia was needed not only to hold Kirin until more Japanese forces are available but also to help the Kwantung Army to spread its influence into North Manchuria.

At the very inception of the new Kirin Provincial Government, Hsi Hsia found that his authority was ignored by about half of the province and that certain generals loyal to General Chang Tso-hsiang, the former governor, grouped themselves together under the leadership of General Ting Chao and organized an anti-Kirin Government at Harbin on November 5, 1931. Hsi Hsia was despatched to dislodge these forces from the Special Administrative District. Hsi Hsia's campaign, however, did not succeed and only resulted in a stalemate.

Hsi Hsia's lack of military success and the Kwantung Army's subsequent knowledge that Russia would not intervene even if the Japanese intrude into North Manchuria greatly reduced Hsi Hsia's usefulness. The Kwantung Army was compelled to



resort to direct military action if its gains in Kirin were to be safeguarded. The liquidation of the Anti-Kirin forces, however, was connected more with the events in the Special Administrative District and would therefore be treated further there.


#### The Special Administrative District

This consisted of the railway zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway formerly under Russian administration. The Russian Revolution made it possible for the Chinese to regain administrative rights over the area, but the railway remained in Russian hands and the railway zone and the whole of North Manchuria still remained a sphere of Russian influence. It was this Russian presence that compelled the Kwantung Army to precede its military moves with political manoeuvring until either it had obtained all-out support from Japan Proper or it could be certain that Russia would not intervene against Japanese incursion into North Manchuria.



The political aim of the Kwantung Army was first to secure a separatist movement in Manchuria so as to annul Chinese claims of sovereignty by a counter assertion of the 'self-determination' of peoples. Since immediate direct military conquest of the Special Administrative District and Heilung-chiang Province was not feasible, the Kwantung Army still wanted the creation of pro-Japanese autonomous regimes in the area and to substitute conquest with political infiltration. If this did materialize the local warlords could still retain the main substance of their self-interest by allowing Japanese influence to replace imminent dominance.


The task of organizing a pro-Japanese front in North Manchuria was entrusted to General Chang Ching-huei, a retired military man of the former regime who still had much prestige among warlord circles and was at that time holding the office of the Chief Administrator of the Special Administrative District. At the outbreak of the Mukden Incident



Chang Ching-huei was in that city and he was immediately despatched to Harbin to re-establish his influence.<sup>44</sup>

Chang Ching-huei could not betray his pro-Japanese stand at the time because he had no military following of his own while the forces still nominally loyal to Chang Hsueh-liang were all around him -- in Heilungchiang, in parts of Kirin, and in the Special Administrative District. To secure his position, Chang first organized a police force in Harbin. Then on September 27th 1931 he called a meeting of the military leaders in the Special Administrative District to form an Emergency Committee, and, as none of these men had enough men or prestige to head the others, Chang was elected as the titular chairman. It must be noted that this Committee, with the exception of its Chairman, was anti-Japanese.

<sup>44</sup> How 'Manchoukuo' Was Created, p. 19.




Before Chang Ching-huei could manoeuvre for positioning, he found himself compromised by the Kwantung Army. Tsitsihar was occupied on November 19, 1931 and Chang was invited to head the new Japanese dominated Government.<sup>45</sup> This exposed Chang as a Japanese tool and when he agreed to assume office in January 1932, he found himself forcibly jailed by General Ting Chao and he was not freed until the occupation of Harbin one month later.

Thus Japanese attempt to use Chang Ching-huei to build a pro-Japanese Government in the Special Administrative District failed and again the Kwantung Army found that direct military action could not be avoided if it were to control the Special Administrative District. This military action, however, only took place firstly after the fall of the Wakatsuki Cabinet and secondly after the Kwantung Army had learnt that Russia would not intervene.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Lytton Report, p. 109.

<sup>46</sup> T. Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 219-23; Liang Ching-hsun, p. 95. ITRF Proceedings, Prosecution Document No. 2369, side memoire




The occupation of Harbin marked the re-instatement of Chang Ching-huei, the appointment of Japanese advisors, and the imposition of Japanese policy control. Chang continued to be a titular head, only this time he was under the Japanese masters.

In the Special Administrative District the local governments did not disintegrate. The instrument of government building, the Self-governing Guidance Board in Mukden had long been in full swing, so what remained was the systematic formation of self-governing Executive Committees and the appointment of all-powerful Japanese Chairmen to them. After the occupation of Harbin the scene in the Administrative District lost its individual character and merged itself into the common pattern found in all Japanese occupied Zones in Manchuria.

#### Heilungchiang Province

Heilungchiang was the largest and the least populated province in Manchuria. Rich in mining




and timber reserves, it was the farthest away from Japanese military pressure and difficulties in communication across the numerous streams and rivers and up the rugged mountain sides made the advance of Japanese forces into the area difficult. The Governor of the province was Wan Fu-lin, who, at the time, was with the Young Marshall at Peiping. The administration of the province was left to his sons while the military forces were put under General Ma Chan-shan, a cavalry officer who had first distinguished himself in helping Chang Tso-lin to crush the revolt of General Kuo Sung-lin.<sup>47</sup> Ma could not act independently as the Wan family continued to control the purse strings.

The Kwantung Army was both unable to spare enough forces for a campaign against Heilungchiang and was unwilling to intrude into a recognized Russian sphere of influence. It was, however, determined to exert political control over the

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<sup>47</sup> Li Nien-chih, p. 91.




whole of Manchuria. In its attempt to increase its political influence in Heilungchiang the Kwantung Army had at first approached Ma Chan-shan for his co-operation. Ma adopted a wait-and-see attitude and did not heed Japanese overtures. Then the Kwantung Army persuaded General Chang Hai-peng of Toanan, after giving him support in money and arms, to advance into Heilungchiang and claim the governorship for himself.<sup>48</sup> Chang Hai-peng started his operations in early October but his forces could not advance beyond the Nonni River after Ma had damaged certain railway bridges and the military situation therefore resulted in a stalemate while the Kwantung Army had suffered a political set-back in turning Ma to a definite anti-Japanese stand. In order to retrieve the situation, the Kwantung Army started to increase pressure upon Ma Chan-shan.

The initial pressure went through the Japanese Consular Office at Tsitsihar. On October 20, 1931 the Consul General requested Ma to have the bridges

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<sup>48</sup> Liang Ching-hsun, p. 95.




repaired as soon as possible. On the same day the Japanese sent some railway technicians to inspect damage and these were fired upon by Ma's forces. This stiffened Japanese attitude when on October 28 the Kwantung Army demanded Ma to have the bridges repaired by November 3, or else Japanese engineers would do the repairs under military escort.<sup>49</sup> Ma held firm until November 3rd when he accepted Japanese terms pending approval from the Central Government.<sup>50</sup> By now, however, the Kwantung Army had moved sufficient forces to the area to back up its earlier threats and was no longer in the mood for negotiation. Hostilities broke out on the 4th November, resulting in an initial Japanese disadvantage, a minor defeat which was soon reversed with the arrival of new re-inforcements.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Lytton Report, pp. 85-86. S.N. Ogata, pp. 107-111. Kantogun Sanbobu Somuka, "Manshu Jihen kimitai koryaku niesshi" ("A Secret War Diary of the Manchurian Affair"), Vol. II, p. 2.

<sup>50</sup> Lytton Report, p. 86.


<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 86-87. See also M. Zomoto, Sino-Japanese Entanglements 1931-2.



Ma Chan-shan's organized stand on the Nonni River, however, had immense psychological value for the Chinese. Ma was immediately raised to the level of a national hero, a symbol around which organized resistance might be pivoted in the future. The Kwantung Army certainly did not want this to happen and it first tried to effect the fall of Ma Chan-shan by a demand for his resignation and, upon refusal, by continued military operations against him.<sup>52</sup> Ma's refusal was as expected, but continued military operations were hampered by the military authorities at home.

The Manchurian adventure was launched against wiser counsel in Japan and the Tokyo Government had adopted the policy of limiting the scope of the adventure from the day of its inception. The continued military operations of the Kwantung Army, however, was a direct challenge to established


<sup>52</sup> S.N. Ogata, pp. 107-111. Kantogun Sanboubu Somuka, "Manshu jihen kimitsu koryaku nisshi" ("A Secret War Diary of the Manchurian Affair"), Vol. II, p. 2. Lyttelton Report, p. 87.



authority and the General Staff tried to carry out the Cabinet's decisions to a certain extent and to reimpose central control over the Kwantung Army by the expedient of overruling it with General Staff orders with Imperial Sanction. An incursion of the Kwantung Army into Heilungchiang was much dreaded by the General Staff because of complications on Russo-Japanese relations in the area. Consequently the Kwantung Army was overruled five times in its projected operations into Heilungchiang Province during the three weeks between November 5 and 25. These overrulings, however, had all the sound and fury of authority but it was observed only in the breach. The first order, issued on the 5th, forbade the Kwantung Army to go further than the Ta Shing Station.<sup>53</sup> This the Kwantung Army protested and led to a second order on the 6th affirming the effectiveness of the first.<sup>54</sup> The tension between

<sup>53</sup> Liang Ching-hsun, p. 99, quoting sources from The Road to the Pacific War, Vol. II, pp. 62-64.


<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 99, quoting from the same source.



the Kwantung Army and the Tokyo Government gave enough time for Ma's forces to retreat and regroup in strength and thus avoid instant annihilation. The Kwantung Army could not bear to see its prey escape and so renewed its operations on November 14 and 15.<sup>55</sup> This was in direct challenge to a specific order and the Tokyo General Staff tried to save its own face on the 17th by agreeing to military action should Ma refuse the Japanese demand to resign. Its giving way to the Kwantung Army angered the diplomatic service abroad and the Japanese Ambassadors to Britain, France, Italy, and Austria threatened to resign en masse if the Kwantung Army were not properly controlled. The General Staff again reversed its approval of the 17th the following day, but this had little effect except to show the Kwantung Army that the General Staff could just as well be ignored. Operations were pushed on while an order to evacuate Heilungchien

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<sup>55</sup> Lytton Report, p. 88. See also M. Zomoto, Sino-Japanese Entanglements 1931-2.



was received from Tokyo on the 25th.<sup>56</sup> The Kwantung Army did no more than report the evacuation and proceed with the actual operations. On November 19 Tsitsihar fell and Ma Chan-shan retreated with the remnant of his forces to Hailen. Ma could no longer pose as a military threat but his prestige now was valuable to the Japanese if he would only agree to co-operate. He had resisted the Japanese well and his co-operation could be used to show the world that 'self-determination' was not an empty protestation in Manchuria.

With Tsitsihar in its hands the Kwantung Army proceeded to form a subservient provincial administration. This did not gather momentum until the attitude of Ma Chan-shan was clarified on January 25th 1932. Meanwhile the Self-governing Guidance Board in Mukden manipulated the formation of Self-government Associations and the setting up of Self-governing Executive Committees together

<sup>56</sup> Liang Ching-hsun, pp. 99-100, quoting from The Road to the Pacific War, Vol. II, p. 74 and p. 82.




with their accompanying Japanese Chairmen. The Self-government Association in Tsitsihar even sent an invitation to Chang Ching-huei to come to be the provincial head of Heilungchian. Chang could not accept the offer, however, as Harbin was surrounded by anti-Japanese forces and Ma Chan-shan, with whom Chang Ching-huei had contacts on behalf of the Japanese, had not shown his approval for Chang to accept the office. If Ma should agree to Chang's appointment, Ting Chao's forces just might give Chang Ching-huei a safe-conduct to Tsitsihar. After a while, however, Chang could not resist the temptation to be a governor again and accepted the governorship in January, whereupon Ting Chao acted immediately and had Chang Ching-huei imprisoned. He was not released until the occupation of Harbin by Japanese forces in February 1932.<sup>57</sup>

Meanwhile the isolated position of Ma Chan-shan made him realize that further resistance was impossible.

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<sup>57</sup> Lytton Report, p. 109.




and he too succumbed to Japanese overtures and agreed to co-operate in return for the promise of a governorship in Heilungchiang and a War Ministership in the future central government. Ma was reinstated in Tsitsihar on January 25, 1932. On that day a Self-government Guidance Committee was formed and a Government similar to those in Liaoning and Kirin was set up under Japanese auspices.<sup>58</sup>

#### The Central Government

When the three provincial governments and the Special Administrative District administration were brought under Japanese influence the Kwantung Army thought it was time to set up a central government to co-ordinate between the provinces so that the dictates of the Kwantung Army could be translated into action more efficiently. As

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 110.




a preliminary measure the Osaka Asahi Shimbun held a public meeting at the Yamato Hotel in Mukden, calling together the main puppet figures in Mukden and representatives from the Kwantung Army for an exchange of views as to what form the new government and the new state should take.<sup>59</sup> The impression given was that nothing was as yet definite.

Meanwhile the provincial leaders were encouraged to come into a joint conference to decide on the future of Manchuria between them and the Kwantung Army gave every indication that it was prepared to countenance provincial autonomy. In fact before General Ma Chan-shan agreed to attend the meeting he was assured by General Tamon that the Kwantung Army would not interfere with any part of the conference proceedings.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>59</sup> How 'Manchoukuo' Was Created, p. 20.

<sup>60</sup> Li Nien-chih, pp. 137-139.



The provincial leaders were also aware that they had to come into conference in order to formalize their respective new gained positions and they wanted to establish an inter-provincial body which could exercise some authority over the individual militarists, act as a co-ordinating body, and to handle internal disputes peacefully. Besides the lure of provincial autonomy guaranteed by the Kwantung Army was just irresistible.

The inter-provincial meeting opened on February 17, 1932 under the Chairmanship of General Chang Ching-huei. Its proceedings continued for three days and it was later known as the State Founding Conference. Attending the meeting were Ma Chan-shan from Heilungchiang, Hsi Hsia from Kirin, Chang Ching-huei from the Special Administrative District, Tsang Shih-I from Liaoning, Chao Hsin-po from Mukden, a representative of Tang Yu-lin from Jehol, and two Mongols representing the Mongols of Hsing An District.<sup>61</sup> The Kwantung Army gave the


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<sup>61</sup> Japan Manchoukuo Yearbook 1934, p. 589.  
Lyttel Report, p. 111-112.



conference an absolute free hand as promised, neither did it demand a voice in the meeting nor even did it send an observer to supervise its progress. It was just too good to be true.

For the first two days the Conference went on without any incident. It was just a matter of confirming each other in his new office and everything went well. On the third day, however, a divergence of opinion appeared when the question of the form of the new co-ordinating body was discussed. All those present, with the exception of Hsi Hsia, agreed to re-establish the former North East Administrative Committee with each province having an equal say in its proceedings. Hsi Hsia, however, wanted to dispense with the system of Committee rule and to set up a central government with authority over the provinces. Hsi Hsia might have thought that with Japanese support he might just come to head such a central administration. Hsi Hsia was voted out and the North East Administrative Committee was re-established. The occasion was marked with a declaration of independence issued



by the newly resurrected Committee.<sup>62</sup>

It was at this moment that the Kwantung Army moved in to show the provincial leaders that the conference was a sham and that the vital decisions had already been decided on by the Kwantung Army. On the evening of the 18th Chao Hsin-po invited the Committee members to his residence for an informal exchange of views, ostensibly as a move to harmonize relations between Hsi Nsia and the rest. As this was an informal meeting the Kwantung Army could send a representative there without breaking its former pledge. So when the guests arrived they found to their dismay the presence of Ishiwara Kanji. Curiously enough, however, Ishiwara did not utter a word during the discussions between Hsi Nsia and the rest. But before the meeting broke up, Chao Hsin-po asked his opinion in an unofficial capacity and it was at this juncture

<sup>62</sup> Li Nien-chih, pp. 139-140. Lyttton Report, p. 112. S.N. Ogata, p. 78. Cable No. 104 from Ishii to Foreign Minister Shidehara. Arrived September 26, 1931. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Documents Relating to the Manchurian Affairs."




that Ishiwara revealed to the group that the Kwantung Army had its own outline plan for the political settlement of Manchuria. He advised the Committee to confine itself to drafting a new constitution for a new state and then dissolve itself upon completion of the task.<sup>63</sup> The provincial leaders dared not object as they were fully aware that the friendly advice was in fact a command and objection could likely lead to a firing squad. The Committee had been allowed to form itself as a means to show that 'self-determination' was practised. Later the formation of the new state was done in the name of this North East Administrative Committee.

On February 18 when the State Founding Conference reconvened it was formally decided that the North East Administrative Committee should become a constituent body.<sup>64</sup> In fact this decision had

<sup>63</sup> Li Nien-chih, pp. 139-141 and pp. 142-144.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., pp. 142-144.




no more than vocal value for the Organic Law, which had the force of a constitution in Manchoukuo, was not drafted by the Committee. All the Committee did was to give its assent. Then the date of inauguration of the new state was set for March 1, 1932, but the formal investiture of the office of Chief Executive upon Pu Yi was not done until the 9th.<sup>65</sup>

The highhandedness of the Kwantung Army out-maneuvred all the provincial leaders. One of them, Ma Chan-shan, however, made a dramatic escape from Mukden and raised the banner of resistance again only to find his forces annihilated and he himself a fugitive in Soviet hands.<sup>66</sup>


In the course of forming a puppet regime the Kwantung Army found that the direct use of force was indispensable, that collaborators were

<sup>65</sup> Japan Manchoukuo Yearbook, 1941, p. 604.

<sup>66</sup> Li Nien-chih, pp. 190-192.



plentiful that these collaborators had their own interests in mind, that, if Japanese interests were to be advanced, a tight control over the created regime had to be exerted. It remains for us to see how this control was being exerted in the following chapter.




## CHAPTER IV

### THE KWANTUNG ARMY'S CONTROL SYSTEM IN MANCHURIA


The political settlement in Manchuria, after the Mukden Incident and subsequent military conquest of the region, took the form of a series of controlling instruments each separate and independent of the other and all under the effective direction of the Kwantung Army. These controlling instruments may be divided into two types according to function: firstly there is the negative type, dealing with the stabilization of internal conditions in Manchuria and secondly there is the positive type, dealing with the organization of Manchurian resources to further the basic Japanese aspirations in Continental Expansion. This chapter is mainly concerned with the negative aspect of this controlling system.

In establishing a control system in Manchuria the Kwantung Army found itself dependent upon some



assistance from the Japanese civil elements in Manchuria and in Japan, and from the natives when direct contact with the populace was required. Continual efforts were made to minimize such dependence and certain principles were observed throughout the process. First, the military prowess of the Kwantung Army was to be increased. Second, the territorial forces were to be placed under the direct command of the Kwantung Army. Third, 'divide and rule' was practised by dividing civil and military administration, by enhancing the interests of racial minorities, and by insisting on the Central Government being informed of every detail concerning inter-provincial relationships. Fourth, the entire system was ridden with devices of check and balances. Fifth, centralization of every shred of authority upon the Kwantung Army.


The following pages will deal with the control system set up, namely i) control over other Japanese elements, ii) ideological control,



iii) administrative control, iv) legislative control, v) provincial administrative control, vi) military control, vii) supervisory control, and viii) economic control. The question of economic development belongs to the positive aspect of using Manchurian resources to further Japanese Expansionist aspirations and is dealt with here only in passing.

#### (i) Control over other Japanese Elements


The Kwantung Army was not the only organized Japanese group in Manchuria. The South Manchuria Railway Company with its vast economic interests and the Foreign Office with its many consular establishment, representing the Civil elements in Japan, were factors that the Kwantung Army could not ignore. The Kwantung Army was not antagonistic to either the South Manchuria Railway Company or to the Foreign Office as long as its policy of direct military action and its authority to control developments in Manchuria were not challenged.



There was no fundamental difference on policy regarding Manchuria among the Japanese. They all wanted the extension of Japanese interests there. Differences which did exist were concerned only with the means employed in attaining their common goal. The home Government, conscious of the importance of expanding trade to China Proper, was cautious in initiating any action which might provoke a general up-surge of anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese populace, resulting in a nationwide supported boycott of Japanese goods.<sup>1</sup> It was prone to further Japanese expansion by the application of pressure through diplomatic channels: to make gains at the conference table.<sup>2</sup> The S.M.R. favoured a gradual economic strangle-hold over Manchuria. These methods, however, were effectively countered by the rise of Chinese nationalist feelings.

<sup>1</sup> C.F. Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts, (Baltimore 1933).

<sup>2</sup> Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, pp. 7-9 (Los Angeles 1964).



Negotiations led nowhere while the Chinese carried on their Rights Recovery Movement. The S.M.R. itself was forced back by the building of competitive railways.<sup>3</sup>

Once the Kwantung Army had acted on its policy of direct military action, its rivals were ready to back it up. The Civil Government was ambivalent at the beginning, torn between diplomatic pressure and its desire to retain the loyalty of the Kwantung Army. Its initial reluctance was basically born of a fear of giving policy control to the military. The S.M.R. readily gave its support, perceiving that the Kwantung Army was dependent upon it for a ready supply of administrative personnel and facilities for economic exploitation.

The Kwantung Army, however, was not contented with just manoeuvring its rivals into supporting its policy. It wanted exclusive control over developments in Manchuria. To attain this end

<sup>3</sup> Lytton Report, pp. 48-62, on the railway issue. W. Koo, Memoranda, Document II, memorandum on the question of Parallel Railways and the So-Called 'Protocols of 1905'.




inducements were offered to elements in the S.M.R. and in Japan. First the S.M.R. was given sole control of all State Railways and the exclusive opportunity of operating and developing economic enterprises in Manchuria.<sup>4</sup> Second lucrative posts in the Manchoukuoan administration were offered to experienced administrators of the S.M.R. and young graduates from Japan. Such methods bore fruit in August 1932 when General Muto was appointed concurrently the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador Extraordinary: having charge over the Japanese civil and military elements in Manchuria.<sup>5</sup>

Although the Ambassador had legal authority over both the Kwantung Army and the Japanese consulate personnel, he was only the figure-head of the Japanese in Manchuria. The actual policy making body was still the General Staff of the Kwantung Army and

<sup>4</sup> South Manchuria Railway Company, Fifth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1936, p. 59 (hereafter referred to as SMR 5th Report).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 5. F.C. Jones, Manchuria Since 1931, p. 23.



thus the highest authority in Manchoukuo was a collective body and not an individual. The formal investiture of power in the hands of one person provided the indigenous collaborators with a central figure to lock up to without being baffled by the complicated power relationship among the Japanese. All formal documents relating to the relationship between Manchoukuo and Japan were signed by the Manchoukuo Prime Minister and the Ambassador Extraordinary, rectification by the Japanese Government was a mere procedural matter.

In this arrangement, however, the S.M.R. gained a more important position than was to the liking of the Kwantung Army. Its control over the economic affairs of the state and its staffing of most of the important posts of the Manchoukuoan Government made the S.M.R. almost an equal partner. Plans to lessen the importance of the S.M.R. were drafted, aimed at recruiting more personnel from Japan Proper and at finding an alternative source of capital and technicians. The importance of the



S.P.R. did not diminish until 1935 when, with the help of Aikawa Yoshiro,<sup>6</sup> the Kwantung Army decided to launch its first five years plan with capital from Japan. During the period of this study then, the S.M.A. was a powerful junior partner.

### (ii) Ideological Control

#### A. State Ideologies

With every government there is a philosophical explanation for its foundation and Manchoukuo was not devoid of an ideological base. In fact Manchoukuo found herself blessed with more than one ideological assertion and these were by no means complementary to each other.

According to Dr. Wellington Koo in his Memoranda to the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry in the capacity of Chinese Assessor: "...it was necessary, however, first to sponsor an indepen-

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<sup>6</sup> IMTVE Pre-trial interrogation of Aikawa Yoshiro  
26/1/1946.




movement so as to describe the new order of things in political nomenclature acceptable to the present mentality of the world. The Japanese have made generous use of terms such as 'racial consciousness', 'self-determination of peoples', and other ideals.<sup>7</sup> That the concept of the sovereignty of the people and principles of democracy were used to counter adverse world opinion was undoubtedly true, but such was not its only intended effect. The main aims of using democratic appeals were first and foremost to placate the suspicion of the local warlords -- people who had manipulated power themselves on republican pretensions and it was to their interest to maintain the same pretension even with a change of master -- that the erstwhile ideological screen was to be maintained and that vested interests had no need to apprehend drastic changes after the Japanese conquest had been completed.

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<sup>7</sup> W. Koo, Memoranda, Document XXVI, memorandum on the so-called 'independence' movement of the Three Eastern Provinces.



Secondly, the use of democratic terms was to satisfy a psychological demand on the part of the Japanese fighting forces themselves. They could not bear to think that they were waging an aggressive war and that right was not on their side. Rather, they prefer to convince themselves that their military actions 'liberated' the Manchurian inhabitants from a former tyrannical regime. That apart from the Young Marshall most of the former officials were reinstated in their former offices did not appear to the Japanese to be contradictory to their claims of 'liberation'. The Japanese were not believers in 'might is right', rather they believed that in order to triumph one must be in the 'right' and that victory would vindicate the righteousness of their cause. They were believers in 'right is might', strange as this assertion might appear to be. Their attitude is comparable to the pre-destination concept of the Puritans. Professor Maruyama Masao in his "Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics" made an observation




comparing the attitude of a German Nazi and a Japanese militarist: "...there is a striking contrast between the situation in Germany where thought and behaviour were entirely consistent, and that in Japan, where the two were remarkably at variance." To back up this observation the Professor quoted speeches from Hitler and Araki Sadao. Hitler addressed his generals before the invasion of Poland and told them straight that "...it is not right that matters, but victory." In Japan, however, Araki had to present Japanese military action as a righteous act in itself and this attitude was unconsciously caricatured in a speech by Araki in 1933: "...Needless to say, the Imperial Army's spirit lies in exalting the Imperial Way and spreading the National virtue. Every single bullet must be charged with the Imperial Way or the National Virtue, we shall give them an injection with this bullet and this bayonet..."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> I. Morris, Japan 1931-45, pp. 43-44 (Boston 1963); Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, pp. 90-95 (London 1963).



To fulfil this Japanese sense of 'right' and 'justice' the democratic ideals of 'independence' and 'self-determination of peoples' were ready at hand. Such ideals, however flattering to the Japanese conscience they might have been, were in direct contradiction to established Japanese political philosophy. The concept of the Sacred and Divine Right of the Emperor and the inviolable rights of the people in Manchuria were just not attributes of each other. This contradiction initially served to distinguish the individuality of the Kwantung Army's Manchurian policy from that of the Japanese Government, but when the latter was brought to accept the former's policy, this contradiction had to be circumvented somehow. Manchoukuo could not be built upon democratic appeals alone. The alternative of transplanting Japanese political philosophy to Manchuria was against the basic aim of the Kwantung Army at the time: namely to create a Manchoukuo 'independent' of control from Japan i.e. independent of authorities outside of the



Kwantung Army. Thus in an attempt to undermine the very democratic ideals that they had started in proclaiming, the Kwantung Army decided to bring in a counter force in the form of a Confucianist revival. The introduction of Pu Yi and his Monarchical followers into the administration was also a means to minimize the influence of the local warlords and as thus is an example of 'check and balance'. The Kwantung Army, however, could not disclaim its earlier assertion of the 'people's rights' all of a sudden and so it was that Manchoukuo was proclaimed as a Republic in 1932,<sup>9</sup> a Republic that acclaimed Confucianism and Wangtoa or the Kingly Way as state ideology<sup>10</sup> and guaranteed the 'people's rights' by an Ordinance on Civil Rights.<sup>11</sup> The Kwantung Army found its creation in a confusion of ideals from the very start.


<sup>9</sup> Japan Manchoukuo Yearbook 1934, p. 599.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 591. Cheng Heiao-hsu, The Kingly Way (Dairen 1934). R. Endo, Japan, China and Manchukuo: The Kingly Way (Tokyo 1935).

<sup>11</sup> S.M.R. 4th Report, p. 248f.



Whether democracy or Confucianism was the proclaimed basis of state authority, actual power of the state was derived from conquest -- Japanese military might was the highest 'ideal' that the new state could appeal to. The Kwantung Army was the 'people' and 'heaven' all rolled into one. Confucianism was vague and adaptable enough for the twists and turns required by the Kwantung Army to justify its multifarious activities and as such was adopted as the state ideology. Confucianism could even be twisted to stand for 'sovereignty of the people', for, unlike Shintoism in Japan, the people had the theoretical right of rebellion should the established Government prove unable to rule. It must be noted, however, that Confucianism remained as the official ideology only as long as it suited the purposes of the Kwantung Army. Circumstances changed rapidly, however, and with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the Greater East Asia War in 1941 the Kwantung Army found it necessary to convince the inhabitants of



Manchuria that it was as much their war as it was Japan's. In 1941 Pu Yi was forced to proclaim Shintoism as Manchoukuo's State Ideology and the war contribution of Manchoukuo was intensified day by day.<sup>12</sup>

#### B. The Instruments of Ideological Control


Propaganda and education are the two means through which ideological control was practised. Propaganda was placed under the charge of the Concordia Society and education was the concern of the Education Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs.

The Concordia Society was formerly known as the Self-Governing Guidance Board. It was directly under the charge of the Fourth Department of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. It was independent of the Central Government although its function was to build up popular support for the puppet regime.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Pu Yi, Pu Yi's Autobiography, p. 346.  
Manchoukuo Yearbook 1944

<sup>13</sup> Manchoukuo Yearbook 1943, pp. 165-184 on State Administration. Lyttelton Report, p. 111.



It was a political party created to support the regime.

The structure of the Concordia Society remained practically the same as that of the Self-governing Guidance Board. Its headquarters were at Hsinking, under it were local Concordia Societies in every District. The leaders of this Society were all prominent men of the various localities concerned. These, however, had little control over the affairs of the Society for actual control was retained in Japanese hands.

The Concordia Society organized public lectures, public demonstrations, and distributed propagandist handbills. Newspapers, radio, and all other means of mass media were at its disposal for propaganda purposes.<sup>14</sup> Besides propaganda work it was responsible for organizing the various communal bodies in Manchuria to support the puppet


<sup>14</sup> J. Gunther, Inside Asia, pp. 122-134 (1939).  
China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, How 'Manchou  
Was Created.



regime and to continue public charity work that was traditional among the Chinese.

Later the Concordia Society was made to appear as a kind of democratic institution. The Kwantung Army was unwilling to set up an elected assembly and instead conventions of the Concordia Society were held to give the populace an impression that some kind of a representative body was actually allowed to exist. The leaders of the Concordia Society, however, were either appointed or nominated by the Fourth Department.

Officially, the Concordia Society was regarded as an integral part of the Government. According to the Manchoukuo Yearbook 1943: "From the beginning of its career, Manchoukuo has been a state suis generis, with a two fold organization. One part of the structure is the Government organized by positive law, for the main purpose of discharging the authoritarian functions of the state, and the other is the Concordia Association, which is not a creation of positive law, but one whose object is




to fulfil the non-authoritarian functions of the state, to realize the ideals for which the new state was founded. These are the two component parts or two complementary sides of one state structure, neither being in subordination to the other.<sup>15</sup> The freedom of control from the Government in this case is another example of 'checks and balances.'

Education was also made a means of ideological control. The educational system of the region was put under the centralized control of the Bureau of Education of the Ministry of Civil Affairs.<sup>16</sup> Private schools were allowed to exist but they were no less controlled than were the government schools.<sup>17</sup> The aim was to build up a 'Manchurian national consciousness' and to restrict the development of

<sup>15</sup> Manchoukuo Yearbook 1943, p. 165-184.

<sup>16</sup> See Appendix L, chart on the organization of Manchoukuo, F.C. Jones, Manchuria Since 1931, p. 46.

<sup>17</sup> SMB 5th Report, p. 134.



higher education or, as the Japanese termed it 'undue emphasis upon mental training'. This meant that besides instilling the Japanese interpretation of events in Manchuria, the teachings of Confucius, the emphasis was on commercial and scientific subjects to the exclusion of the humanities.<sup>18</sup>

The first step was to effect control over the text books and the teachers. Many teachers and students fled as the Japanese military occupation progressed, while many teachers were unwilling to conform to Japanese demands. New teachers were trained and old ones were given a three-month training course at Hsinking.<sup>19</sup> Meanwhile many Japanese teachers were introduced to fill up the deficiency.<sup>20</sup> Text books were first revised by the Education Department of Fengtien Province and

<sup>18</sup> F.C. Jones, p. 47.

<sup>19</sup> Contemporary Manchuria, Vol. III, No. 1, January 1939, p. 122. F.C. Jones, p. 46.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 46.



the South Manchuria Educational Association.<sup>21</sup> Fifty-four of such text books were used provisionally pending upon better edited text books. In July 1932 the work of compilation was entrusted to a Text Book Compiling Supervisory Committee.<sup>22</sup> Actual compilation started in March 1933.<sup>23</sup> In 1934 sixteen text books and six teaching manuals were completed while in 1936 the second stage of compiling had been completed.<sup>24</sup>


As education was a means of popular control, the ultimate aim was compulsory education. The emphasis was laid on expanding Primary and Secondary Schools facilities. For higher education, Manchurians had to go to Japan. Besides supervising schools, the Education Bureau also took charge of what it termed as 'social education': creation of educational centres, the initiation of language

<sup>21</sup> SMP 5th Report, p. 135.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 135. F.C. Jones, p. 46.

<sup>23</sup> SMP 5th Report, p. 135.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 135.



courses, the installation of libraries, and the organization of popular lectures.<sup>25</sup> It can readily be seen that much of the work of the Concordia Association was repeated here.

Finally, to give a general picture of how far-reaching the educational system was it is helpful to note the total number of schools and students by 1938: schools 18,209; students 962,504.<sup>26</sup>


### (iii) Administrative Control (Central Government)

The structure of the Manchoukuo Government was mainly defined by the Organic Laws of 1932 and 1934.<sup>27</sup> A diagrammatic illustration of this structure is given in appendix one and should be

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 134. F.C. Jones, p. 50f.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> See Appendix, the Constitution of Manchoukuo Cf The Constitution of Japan, pp. 878-880, Japan Manchoukuo Yearbook 1941.



consulted on reading through this chapter. The structure will not be described here, but an attempt will be made in bringing out the ways in which this governmental machinery was worked and controlled.

First, in reviewing the Executive branch we find that it was headed by three counterbalancing institutions: the Emperor, the Privy Council, and the State Council. Theoretically the Emperor was the source of all authority within the state,<sup>28</sup> but in fact he was never allowed to act on his own initiative.<sup>29</sup> This restriction was not provided by law but by administrative practice. The Emperor had no office under his personal control and no matter how unlimited his claims to authority were he had to act through the State Council. But the Emperor did serve one purpose, he was the legal source of power and without his signature no important

<sup>28</sup> IMTPE Proceedings Defense Document No. 962, affidavit of Tamotsu Matsuri, Councillor of the Manchoukuo Legislative Bureau.

<sup>29</sup> Pu Yi, Pu Yi's Autobiography, p. 330. IMTPE Defense Document No. 962.



state document could be effective. He thus acted as a check upon the State Council. The Emperor's position became even more secure when Manchoukuo did not have a legal Legislative Body throughout its brief history of fifteen years and all its laws were issued in the form of Imperial Ordinances.<sup>30</sup> The Japanese, however, were not even content with balancing the Emperor against State Council. The appointment of a Prime Minister with Monarchical ideals, such as the first Prime Minister Mr. Cheng Hsiao-hsu, would make the co-operation between the two supposedly opposing institutions not only possible but very likely. It was to prevent this development that the Privy Council was established. This was purely an advisory body<sup>31</sup> and could only advise the Emperor to reject proposals made by the State Council.<sup>32</sup> The interests represented in this Privy Council, however, were those of the local

<sup>30</sup> See Appendix I, Chapter I, Article 9.

<sup>31</sup> See Appendix I, Chapter II on the Privy Council.

<sup>32</sup> IMTVE Defense Document No. 962.




warlords and one of their prominent member was appointed as President of the Council.<sup>33</sup> By practice every policy of national importance had to have the joint agreement of Emperor, State Council, and Privy Council before it could be carried out. This introduction of three counter-balancing institutions at the head of the Executive Branch of the Government points out that the Japanese were zealously practising the principle of 'checks and balances'.

Emperor, State Council, and Privy Council were so delicately balanced that if they were allowed to act on their own the Government of Manchoukuo would become impotent from the very first day of its inception. What was done was that the Japanese placed its direct control over one of these three and with military support pushed through any plans

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<sup>33</sup> F.C. Jones, pp. 25-26, the first President of the Privy Council was Chang Ching-huei.




that this Japanese operated branch would have through the remaining two institutions. This does not mean that Japanese control was restricted to any one of the three branches concerned. They were all riddled with Japanese advisors and were not allowed to express opinion opposed to the interests of the Japanese. But in the State Council, Japanese were found not as advisors but as the actual operating personnel of its offices.

According to the Organic Laws, the State Council consisted of the Prime Minister and Seven Ministers of State.<sup>34</sup> From 1932-34 the State Council was supposed to make decisions by vote, but in 1934 the Prime Minister was raised to be the only Minister of State and all other members in the State Council were made responsible to him.<sup>35</sup> The Ministers were each responsible for a Ministry and had authority over the branch of administration committed to his charge.

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<sup>34</sup> See Appendix I, Chapter IV on the State Council

<sup>35</sup> IMTPE Proceedings Defense Document No. 962.



In fact, however, neither the Prime Minister nor the Ministers had any actual authority to exercise. They were only the wielders of formal responsibility while actual power were being taken over by a so-called General Affairs Board in the State Council, General Affairs Bureaux in each Ministry, and a Japanese Vice-Minister in each Ministry. These General Affairs Bureaux were created to 'help' administration. In fact the Director of the General Affairs Board was the actual Prime Minister and his Board took care of all transactions of the Prime Minister's office and of the State Council. The Director was present in all Cabinet meetings and secretaries from his Board acted as Cabinet secretaries. They were present in a supervisory basis and they were Japanese nationals.<sup>36</sup>

The actual decisions were made in a conference of the Vice-ministers, attending this were the vice-ministers, the bureaux chiefs of General Affairs

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
<sup>36</sup> Ibid., section 5 on Meetings of the State Council, Vice Ministers, and Privy Council.



Bureaux, and presiding was the Director of the General Affairs Board. They were responsible neither to the Prime Minister, the Privy Council, nor even the Emperor. These were actually under their control. They answered only to dictates from the Kwantung Army Headquarters where they reported weekly the day after their conference to seek sanction of the conference decisions and proceedings from the military authorities.<sup>37</sup> They were the administrative technicians, as it were, and as such were given much policy initiation power. It was only after this sanction of the Kwantung Army had been obtained that minutes for the formal Cabinet meeting were drafted. The proceedings in these Cabinet meetings, and the subsequent sanction of a proposed draft by the Emperor and the concurrence of the Privy Council was just a meaningless process set down by the Organic Laws. The opposition of any one branch would be an act against the Kwantung

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
<sup>37</sup> D.M.



Army and would invite persecution.

The General Affairs Board and the various ministerial General Affairs Bureaux were the actual administrative institutions in the Central Government. The Director of the General Affairs Board being the head while the Bureau Chiefs and Vice-ministers were members of his 'cabinet'. Decision was made by vote and thus the Central Government was headed by a Committee. Everything passed through their hands and nothing could be done without their counter-signature.


This Japanese dominated administration was not staffed with military officers. The Kwantung Army could neither spare the man-power required nor were its officers familiar with administrative functions. This raised a difficult problem regarding personnel. Initially the Kwantung Army fell heavily upon the S.M.R. for a supply of experienced administrators. So we find that the first Director of the General Affairs Board was



Komai of the S.M.R.<sup>38</sup> This reliance upon a potential political rival could not be made a long term policy by the Kwantung Army. As an alternative the Kwantung Army established colleges in Manchuria for the training of government officials, admitting Japanese and locals on a fifty fifty quota basis. Besides positions in Manchuria were made attractive to draw promising young graduates from Japan itself. The entry of Japanese bureaucrats, however, was restricted until the policy of the home Government was in tune with that of the Kwantung Army and the military elements had gained control over policy decision there. The opportunities in Manchuria had the added benefit of increasing the popularity of the Army at home and secure for it a firmer popular support. The drawing of personnel from the S.M.R. was decreased until it was possible to have a Director of the General Affairs Board unconnected in any way with

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<sup>38</sup> F.C. Jones, p. 29: Komai was replaced by Hacki Hashine, who was unconnected with the S.M.R. in 1937.



the S.M.R.<sup>39</sup>


This suspected rivalry with the S.M.R. made the Japanese dominated Civil Administration in Manchoukuo a potential danger to the Kwantung Army. To forestall any untoward development, the Kwantung Army tried its best to limit the Government to administrative duties only. This can be seen in the earlier description of the instrument of ideological control of the Concordia Association. Another development was the isolation of the Government from any control over what nominally were its own fighting forces. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

#### (iv) Legislative Control

Although a separate legislative body was provided for by the Organic Laws yet there was no legislature existing apart from and independent of the Executive. The Organic Laws did make provisions

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<sup>39</sup> MIFFE, Interrogation of Naeki Hosuke 31/1/46.




for an elected Legislative Assembly but this never did come into being. It is necessary therefore first to describe the law making procedure and note the responsible elements and second to trace the reasons as to why a Legislative Assembly was not set up at all and third to trace the nominal attempts to fulfil the promises of the Organic Laws.

Laws were drafted by the Legislative Bureau of the State Council. Before the final draft was completed, liaison conferences between the Legislative Bureau and the various Departments concerned were held. After the draft had been completed, it was presented to the Vice-ministers' conference, then the ministerial conference, then the Emperor, then the Privy Council, and finally it was passed back to the Emperor for sanction and issuing as an Imperial Ordinance.<sup>40</sup> The institutions concerned with the process of forming and passing of laws

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<sup>40</sup> IMPE Proceedings Defense Document No. 962. I.K. Kawakami, Manchoukuo: Child of Conflict, p. 145.




were the same as those concerned with the Executive. It must be noted that the Legislative Bureau had no authority, it was only a body of legal experts. There was no division of Legislature and Executive as the Organic Laws pretended to do.

Efforts at forming the Legislative Assembly were made less than half-heartedly. The appearance of continued effort in this direction, however, was maintained. On the very day of the inauguration of the new state, March 9, 1932, Dr. Chao Hsin-po was appointed as Chief of the Legislative Assembly and was entrusted with the duty of seeing to its formation.<sup>41</sup> He therefore held various discussions and consultations with the Legislative Bureau. The Legislative Bureau, however, being itself a powerless body and could not make any decisions without consulting the various governmental departments concerned, could do no more than holding a series of liaison conferences.<sup>42</sup> The Executive was not

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<sup>41</sup> IMTPE Proceedings Defense Document No. 962 section 8 on the Legislative Yuan.


<sup>42</sup> Ibid.



keen in forming a Legislative Assembly which was to take over the legislative power which was then under its control. The main objection in the formation of a Legislative Assembly was the question of election. The Kwantung Army realized only too well that the Manchoukuo regime had no popular support and to hold elections would be a sure way to expose quickly this lack of support. Besides this there was also the complex problem of how to play down the influence of a majority Chinese representation in the proposed Legislative Assembly. Various alternatives to individual votes were put forward: in order to bring out the importance of racial minorities the principle of geographical representation was considered; in order to further diminish Chinese representation, introducing the principle of communal representation was thought of, giving the vote not to an individual Chinese but to a communal body such as a Commercial Business Society or an Agricultural Society.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.



Whatever the alternatives propounded, the net result was that the Kwantung Army saw no need to establish a separate Legislative branch. It did not intend to alter the Organic Laws, however, and instead a show of carrying out the promise of an elected assembly was maintained. Concerning the establishing of a Legislative Assembly, an Imperial Ordinance was issued in April or May 1932 dealing with the setting up of the Legislative Yuan Secretariat Section.<sup>44</sup> The Ordinance provided that the Secretariat Section was to study the prospective organization of the Yuan as well as to prepare for its inauguration. Meanwhile around 1933, a new organ called the Constitution Research Committee was officially formed, and Dr. Chao Hsin-po was appointed its chairman.<sup>45</sup> From this time on the question of forming an elected assembly was shelved and the vague promise of a new constitution, whose completion was never thought possible as the

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.




makers would not satisfy themselves with anything less than perfection itself, was to replace the definite promise of an elected assembly. The constitution Research Committee was given the duty of forming a constitution and a subordinate function of preparing for the inauguration of the Legislative Assembly. Neither of these aims was fulfilled upon the demise of Manchoukuo in 1945.

This pretence disheartened even Dr. Chao Hsin-po, one of the most zealous Japanese supporters, and he resigned from his duties concerning the Legislative Assembly and the proposed constitution in the fall of 1934.<sup>46</sup> The various offices which he held were not continued and the nominal functions were transferred to the Privy Council.

The Japanese were willing to establish a representative assembly and resort to elections as well if only they could succeed in controlling public opinion as easily and effectively as they controlled

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.



the Executive. Efforts were made to manipulate public opinion by the traditional method of press control and censorship. These, however effective, were negative means. The Japanese wanted to cultivate public opinion which would actively support its measures in Manchoukuo and this was done via the means of education and propaganda previously mentioned. The Concordia Society, founded on 25th July 1932,<sup>47</sup> gradually came to assume the additional duty of forming a Legislative Assembly, or rather to give an appearance of the existence of a similar body. Members from its local organizations were sent to joint assemblies or congresses from time to time.<sup>48</sup> Such Concordia Society Congresses, however, were not given any Legislative power but they could be transformed into a Legislative Assembly any time should the political situation demanded it. These congresses

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. Manchoukuo Yearbook 1943.

<sup>48</sup> IMPE Proceedings Defense Document No. 962.



were not filled with elected members but by appointed ones. Meanwhile the Kwantung Army was content with its hold over the Executive and Legislature and was therefore unwilling to launch into any novel political experiment that might undermine, however slightly, their established hold. It must be noted that the Concordia Society was not amenable to control by the Central Government technically. It was directly a charge of the Fourth Department of the Kwantung Army Headquarters and the Government could only use its facilities through the Kwantung Army. It was a means of separating the administrative and political control of the country into two, with the Kwantung Army in control of both.

#### (v) Provincial Administrative Control

The administrative division of Manchuria did not change until in December 1934 when the country was redivided into fourteen provinces.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> SMB 5th Report, p. 3.




Each province was subdivided into Districts and villages, in the case of Mongolian provinces the subdivision was the Banner. The work of boundary demarcation started in February 1934 with the appointment of the Local Administration Research Committee.<sup>50</sup>

Ordinances regarding the organization of provincial governments were issued in 1932, 1934, and 1937.<sup>51</sup> According to these the provincial governments were directly under the charge of the Ministry of Civil Affairs -- which was under the control of its own General Affairs Bureau and which in turn was under the General Affairs Board. These, however, only showed the connection between Central and Local Government and it still remains for us to find out the ways and means of exerting Japanese control over the provincial government.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> Appendix, Ordinance No. 13. SMR 5th Report, p. 189. Manchoukuo Yearbook, 1943.




The degree of control over the provincial governments was limited as compared with the degree of control attained in the Central Government. The main difficulty here was that of language, where the administrators had to have direct contact with the populace, the Japanese found themselves entirely dependent upon their Chinese colleagues.<sup>52</sup>

The local governments were most effectively controlled on the Provincial level. Here the governor was given administrative and police powers over his province. Matters concerning tax collection, budget, and military movement, however, were not within the reach of Provincial authorities.<sup>53</sup> The governors were usually member of the former warlord regime. The Japanese saw to it that he had no actual control over either his civil administration or his territorial forces. Under the governor were five Bureaux: General Affairs,

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<sup>52</sup> I.M.T.F.E Proceedings Defense Document No. 962. P.C. Jones, p. 30.

<sup>53</sup> SMR 5th Report, p. 2.




Civil Affairs, Police, Commerce and Industry, and Education.<sup>54</sup> The real authority of the provincial administration was the General Affairs Bureau, again staffed by Japanese bureaucrats appointed by the General Affairs Board in Hsinking. The Bureau was in charge of confidential affairs, personnel, documents, custody of official seals, accounting, and affairs not connected with other Bureaux.<sup>55</sup> Besides the Bureau Chief was to act as governor during his absence.<sup>56</sup> The governor thus remained as a figure head and performed formal functions such as signature, public appearances, and giving the impression that the natives did have a major say in government. The General Affairs Bureau, however, found its authority limited by financial controls from the Central Administration and challenged by Japanese military advisors to the territorial armies.

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<sup>54</sup> Appendix I, Ordinance No. 13 on the Provincial Government.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., Article 9.

<sup>56</sup> NFFE Proceedings, Defense Document No. 962.



The Japanese also tried to bring out the potential racial rivalry between Mongolians, Koreans, and Chinese. Mongolian and Korean territories were clearly marked as separate provinces and Chinese influence there excluded. These being minority races, they had to depend upon Japanese support in order to exclude further Chinese incursions. They were thus naturally pro-Japanese and anti-Chinese. The Mongolian provinces were placed under a Department of Mongolian Affairs in December 1934.<sup>57</sup> These Banners were given some control over taxation and finance in their administration.<sup>58</sup>

#### (vi) Control of Military Administration

Military administration in Manchoukuo was nominally under the Central Government. The Ministry of War was in charge and was responsible to the Prime Minister. In fact, however, the administra-

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<sup>57</sup> SMR 5th Report, p. 3.


<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 3.



of military forces was reserved for the Kwantung Army. The Ministry of War was the only Ministry without a General Affairs Bureau, hence the only ministry outside of Japanese bureaucratic influence.

The command of military forces was, according to Law, an Imperial prerogative. As Pu Yi had little freedom of action, this prerogative was exercised by the Kwantung Army Headquarters. The means of achieving control over the Manchoukuoan forces was by obtaining the power of appointment, control of finance, and control of the source of military supplies.

The War Ministry was at first headed by Ma Chan-shan. The appointment was upon the direct advice of the Kwantung Army. The Minister, however, was only a figure head and the Ministry was filled with Japanese officers. The appointment of these Japanese officers were in the form of a military order from the Kwantung Army Commander-in-Chief and could be dismissed only by him. The Ministry



personnel therefore was under the direct charge of the Kwantung Army.

Although it was not controlled by the Central Bureaucracy, the Ministry of War did participate in the Vice-Ministers' conference. It was there to see that Kwantung Army directives and policies were adhered to by the bureaucracy.

The Provincial forces were those of the local leaders and were their political capital. It was impossible to relieve these warlords of their command without provoking their resistance. The first step to weaken resistance was the reorganization of the taxation system where every tax had to be legalized by and collected by the Central Government and the local warlords received their allotment from Hsinking.

The second was the control of military supplies. This was comparatively simple as the Arsenal in Mukden was in Japanese hands while outside help from Russia was unlikely because of pacific Russian posture at the time.



The most thorny question was how to infiltrate and take over command of the territorial armies. This was done by intensifying the process of appointing advisors to the provincial armies and a special department was created in the Kwantung Army to deal with this.<sup>59</sup> Japanese officers were appointed by the Kwantung Army and responsible to the Kwantung Army. They were given the substance of command over the territorial armies and, in case of resistance, finance and military supplies would be withheld and, if still obdurate, Japanese forces could be called in. The local warlords were not able to resist this trend and those who did resist -- such as Ma Chan-shan and Li Tu -- were annihilated.


The advisors were mostly men of the military intelligence service and had some knowledge of local affairs. The initial problem was a lack of sufficient supply of advisors. This was at first remedied

<sup>59</sup> IMTPE Proceedings, Prosecution Document No. 612: "The Guidance of Military Government of Manchoukuo".



by calling officers on the reserve list to serve and later, when re-inforcements from Japan arrived, by more officers in active service.

As power in Manchuria, whether local or Japanese, was built on military resources, the Central Bureaucracy found its control over the provincial administration challenged by this independent military wing. It naturally wanted control over these forces and advocated this to the Kwantung Army Headquarters. Its arguments were that an advisory system could not be maintained on a permanent basis and that the existence of two independent authorities -- civil and military -- would make the carrying out of policies difficult. To these arguments the Kwantung Army turned a deaf ear. It insisted that since power was based on military might, it was absolutely necessary for the Kwantung Army to continue direct control over all fighting forces in Manchuria.



(vii) Supervisory Control


Two supervisory systems were established to check against corruption and anti-Kwantung Army activities. The Supervisory Council was set up on the model of the Censorial System of traditional China, but its main function was confined to that of auditing accounts. It sent agents all over Manchuria to supervise tax collection and official expenditure. It was independent of the Central bureaucracy and responsible directly to the Kwantung Army.<sup>60</sup>

The Military police system was also introduced. In substance it was a secret police establishment and its instrument was mainly spying and terror.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> See Appendix and F.C. Jones, p. 30.

<sup>61</sup> IMTTE Proceedings, Prosecution Document No. 612.




(viii) Economic Control

Finally we come to the positive aspect of the Kwantung Army's control system, the organization of Manchurian resources for the furtherance of Japanese continental expansionism. The student is only treating this aspect in passing as other eminent authorities had already dealt with the topic in detail.<sup>62</sup> The efforts in this field fell mainly upon the economic field and is concerned particularly with the industrial sector.

The Kwantung Army, and other Army Radicals in Japan for that matter, was immensely influenced by the pattern of totalitarian economic planning in the U.S.S.R. They too wanted to secure complete control over the nation's resources and to apportion them as they saw fit. The aim in Manchuria then was to secure complete control over its economic activities. This aim, however, was not feasible

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<sup>62</sup> E.S. Kirby, The Economic Organisation of Manchukuo, 1937 (unpublished thesis for the London School of Economics), Y.C. Jones, Manchuria Since 1931, E.B. Schumpeter, THE EXPANSION OF Japan and Manchukuo (New York 1940).




at the beginning, or, even if feasible, the risks involved were too much even for the Kwantung Army. The overriding factor to consider at the beginning was the stabilization of conditions and to do this the short term policy of letting everything stay as they were was practised as far as possible. This practice of economic *laissez-faire* and the avowed aim of totalitarian economic control was in direct variance with each other and some kind of compromise was bound to appear.

As a first step towards a controlled economy, the Kwantung Army first brought the sector of industry concerned with military supplies into state control. Accordingly, laws were passed to this end<sup>63</sup> and the industries of Manchoukuo were defined into vital and non-vital categories,<sup>64</sup> the former being the ones considered to be connected in one way or another with national defence. Thus

<sup>63</sup> E.B. Schumpeter, Industrialization of Japan and Manchoukuo.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. Cf. Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau, Japanese Trade and Industry, pp. 114-11 (Tokyo 1936).



coal and steel were definitely put under control while the remainder could be subjected to state control any time should the Kwantung Army deem it possible.

The main obstacle to all but economic control was a basic lack of capital outlay. By the continuance of a semi-free enterprise economy the Kwantung Army not only hoped to encourage private investment and prevent the outflow of capital, it also hoped to attract foreign investment to Manchoukuo. This accounted also for its continued assertion of observing the Open Door Policy. Foreign investment in Manchuria under Japanese rule was negligible unless one can put Japan under the category of a foreign nation.


As the financial position of Manchoukuo Government improved — so the source of capital of the Kwantung Army improved — the degree of economic control was gradually increased also. But with the outbreak of war in 1937 and 1941, the war effort had to be redoubled and the emphasis



on the control of armament and associated industries increased while the remainder of the economy continued to operate under a tolerated laissez-faire condition.

Apart from the control of vital industries, efforts were made in two other directions, namely the building of strategic railways and the fostering of military colonies along the Manchoukuo-Mongolia-Russia frontier. The aim was to build a radiating network of railways facilitating military transport on the one hand and the development of local source of man power on the other in case of an eventual Russo-Japanese clash on the continent.


The insistence of an independent military wing, the division of administrative and political control, all made the carrying out of a central Government directive difficult. What did result was the calling of liaison conferences in all levels in order to streamline administration. This resulted



in a pattern of Committee rule throughout Manchuria. Some of the most important of these ruling Committees were the General Staff of the Kwantung Army and the Vice-Ministers' Conference.


All these Committees had no legal basis of authority over affairs in Manchuria and apart from the General Staff, the composition of each liaison conference was irregular. There was much ground for brilliant men to secure influence over such conferences. The centre of influence in any one Committee therefore tended to follow able personalities rather than an important office.

The general tendency, in spite of the elaborate network of checks and balances, was towards a gradual simplification of the governmental machine and more effective centralization of policy control not upon the central bureaucracy but upon the Kwantung Army General Staff. As the basis of power in Manchuria was military force, and military force was but a means towards an end, policy control was apparently the most vital, but it must be borne



in mind that effective policy control was dependent on the possession of irresistible force.

The Manchoukuo Government can also be termed as a Dual Government with the Kwantung Army holding policy control and Japanese bureaucrats performing the requisite administrative duties. Formal authority, however, continued to reside in Chinese hands.




## CHAPTER V

### RUSSO-MANCHEOUKUO RELATIONS

This chapter is concerned with the Kwantung Army's effort in ousting Russian influence from North Manchuria, its interest in further expansion in the direction of Russia and Outer Mongolia, and the tense relation resulting therefrom. For convenience the chapter is divided into six sections dealing with: 1) the drawbacks on the conduct of Manchoukuoan diplomacy, ii) the confrontation of Russo-Japanese interests, iii) Russian Policy, iv) the Chinese Eastern Railway Question, v) the Outer Mongolian Question and vi) border disputes between Russia and Manchoukuo.

#### (1) Limitations on the Conduct of Manchoukuoan Diplomacy


The Doctrine of Non-recognition, first



propounded by Secretary Stimson and later subscribed to by the League of Nations,<sup>1</sup> defeated Kwantung Army attempts to establish formal relations between Manchoukuo and the outside world.<sup>2</sup> This was necessary as a general process towards securing the legality of Manchoukuo and towards the attraction of foreign capital investment in the region. Its enforced diplomatic isolation, imposed upon it by a world devoid of any other means to cope with the situation arrived at by Japanese arms, made the Kwantung Army and its puppets dependent upon the Japanese Government for diplomatic services. This dependence was further strengthened by the current belief that Manchoukuo was a Japanese creation, as indeed it was, and that no agreement or treaty with that body could

<sup>1</sup> Foreign Policy of the United States, Japan 1931-41, pp. 76 and 120. A. Rappaport, H.L. Stimson and Japan 1931-33, Chap. IV (Chicago 1963). H.L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 97-109 (New York 1936).

<sup>2</sup> Japan Manchoukuo Yearbook 1934, pp. 592-593, "Foreign Minister's Note."




be effective without confirmation from the Japanese Government. Manchoukuo's diplomatic isolation was complete and its de jure recognition later by the Axis Powers<sup>3</sup> modified this isolation to only a very limited extent. The Axis Powers had no desire whatsoever to treat Manchoukuo as a distinct and separate political unit and extending recognition to Manchoukuo was simply a move to confirm Japan's position in Manchuria.

The diplomatic isolation of Manchoukuo was a heavy blow to the ambitions of the Kwantung Army leaders. It was a condition they had tried to avoid by giving false promises of upholding the principles of the Open Door Policy and denials of territorial ambitions over the region.<sup>4</sup> It impaired


<sup>3</sup> Japan Manchoukuo Yearbook 1941, pp. 639-642. F.C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954). IMTFE Proceedings, pp. 6037-45 Minutes of Privy Council Meeting concerning the participation of Hungary and Manchoukuo in the Anti-Comintern Pact.

<sup>4</sup> Foreign Policy of the United States, Japan 1931-4 pp. 11-13. The pretence was also aimed at attracting foreign capital to help to develop Manchurian resources.



their authority over a vital aspect of the region's political affair.

This isolation, however, also made diplomatic approaches towards Manchoukuo less effective as such effectiveness depended very much on the urgency of the need for foreign contact on the part of the Kwantung Army and on the amount of control which the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo could exert over it. As long as diplomatic affairs were relegated second to military measures as a policy instrument, the Kwantung Army was unwilling to come into any political settlement with any Power as this would compromise its stand in internal Japanese policies. The Tokyo Government, on the other hand, would strive to increase diplomatic activities in lieu of military action as a means to lower the influence of the army. Thus diplomacy and internal politics were interwoven in Japan. Bearing this in mind it was advantageous to an outside Power to insist upon direct dealings with Tokyo so as to lessen the use of Kwantung Army's threat of military action.




This accounted for a basic difference regarding the technicalities upon which mutual contact should be conducted between Russia and Manchoukuo. The issue was not solved until August 1934 in the midst of negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

(ii) The Confrontation of Russo-Japanese Interests

Japanese military actions in Manchuria did not limit itself to the ousting of Chinese political control over the region but at taking over the Russian sphere of influence in North Manchuria as well. Russia had no military force in Manchuria as she had waived her special rights in Manchuria after the 1917 Revolution<sup>5</sup> and her later return in 1924 did not bring with it her railway guards. Military protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway was in Chinese hands.

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<sup>5</sup> A.S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China 1917-1924, pp. 272-275, Karakhan Manifesto, Sept. 27, 1920 (New York 1954).



Russian military intervention in Manchuria, however, was a possible move in 1931 and the Kwantung Army had to take its possibility into consideration in its military designs on North Manchuria.<sup>6</sup> It was to Russia's interest to halt Japanese continental expansion in the direction of Russia and Outer Mongolia as early as possible as this would prevent the extension of a long and exposed common frontier and make future defense all the more difficult. Indeed if Russia had been in a strong military position and capable of dealing with Japan single-handed then she would most probably have intervened. The danger of this intervention was so real that the Kwantung Army did not dare to resort to direct military occupation of North Manchuria. Instead Chinese collaborators were sent to evict opposing Chinese warlords on Japan's behalf.<sup>7</sup> It was only

<sup>6</sup> S.N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 54. Statement of Imaura Hitoshi to Eto Shinkichi on January 12, 1958. In the possession of Kindai Chugoku Kenkyoinkai, Tokyo Bunko.


<sup>7</sup> Liang Ching-hsun, pp. 95-96. Lettter Report, pp. 85-89.



upon the failure of these collaborators to fulfill their function in North Manchuria that the Kwantung Army did proceed with its military moves in and towards North Manchuria. Even then Russian life and property were scrupulously safeguarded until Japanese military and political control over the region had been established. Once this was done, however, the Kwantung Army was faced with the same problems as were facing the Russians: the defense of an exposed and extended frontier. The pre-requisites of this was the elimination of Russian influence in Manchuria and the re-demarcation of frontier lines so as to give Manchoukuo a better defensive position.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> G.A. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 77 (New Jersey 1961). "Japanese Army opinion kept the inevitability of war with the Soviet Union and the consequent need for all-out military preparedness." This attitude is particularly true of the Kwantung Army. But even this group had to gain time for organizing Manchurian resources. The drift of events and the subsequent involvement of Japan in China and in the Pacific made an all-out war with Russia out of the question. So it is that I claim Japanese immediate objectives in regard to its relations with Soviet Russia was of a limited and defensive nature the period in question. Consult IMTFE Proceeding, pp. 23298f on the attitude of the Japanese General Staff towards Russia. (To be continued.)



Although the initial phase of the problem was one of defense, both sides had in view a long term plan of expansion. The Kwantung Army had in view the realization of Japan as the dominant Power in East Asia and its attainment had to be accompanied by the humbling of China and the expulsion of Russia from this area. Its main policy instrument was military might.<sup>9</sup> Russia had in view the realization of the world-wide spread of Communism, beginning with countries with territories contiguous to the Soviet Union. It was essential to both to safeguard their respective spheres of influence, to build up their economic and military power, and to infiltrate into the other's sphere with political workers and secret agents. Defense remained the primary objective up to the first phases of the Second

(Continued)

*Ibid.* Def. Doc. No. 1323, pp. 23302-23389. Cf.

*Ibid.* p. 7419 excerpt showing Japan intended to occupy the Soviet Far East in case of war with the U.S.S.R.

<sup>9</sup> G.A. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 71 (New Jersey 1961).




World War<sup>10</sup> and the posing of an attacking position by the Kwantung Army should be interpreted as a tactical move rather than policy manifestation.<sup>11</sup> Viewing the insurmountable difficulties of defending an extended frontier with limited man-power resources, the Kwantung Army poised itself on an attacking position and left to the Red Army all the problems of defense.

The attitude towards expansion between Russia and Japan was fundamentally different. Russian policy was based on theories and practices of self-sufficiency. Eventually expansion of the Soviet system is regarded as desirable, indeed as inevitable outcome of history, but Russian policies of expansion are regarded as optional. Their primary concern is to buffer their frontiers against

<sup>10</sup> IMTFE Proceedings, p. 23298. Affidavit of Moritake Tanabe, Vice-Chief of Army General Staff in November 1941.

<sup>11</sup> IMTFE Proceedings, pp. 13302-23389 Def. Doc. No. 1323, Affidavit of Shinichi Tanaka, Chief of First Department (operations) of General Staff Office 12/10/1940-7/12/42.




what they regard as the danger of counter attack and imperialist war. Consequently in any territory bordering on the Soviet Union the first priority is to prevent the success of local regimes, or the penetration of foreign influences, hostile to the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup> Basically Soviet policies were defensive on the military plane and aggressive on the political plane.

Japanese expansion policy also based itself on a narrow interpretation of history: that it was Japan's destiny to be the dominant Power in East Asia. Territorial expansion, however, was not optional. In asserting her predominance in East Asia Japan had to prove herself in arms and this, in modern terms, had to be supported by heavy industries and abundant supply of raw materials. Poorly endowed in natural resources, Japan sought to acquire them by extending her territorial

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<sup>12</sup> O. Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, p. 43 (New York 1955).



holdings. To do this she had to race against the re-emergence of both China and Russia and to take advantage of the economic difficulties that were facing the United States and European countries in the 1930s. With the acquisition of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army deemed it essential to halt expansionist moves in favour of exploiting the natural resources of Manchuria and building up a firmer industrial base for the Army. But this suspension of expansionist moves was not shared by other Japanese militarists. Their contention being that Manchuria did not have all the raw materials essential to a self-sufficient defense state.<sup>13</sup> The Kwantung Army's defiance of the home Government was copied by other regional armies and the overall national policies of Japan could no longer be effectively co-ordinated and failed to be of a consistent and coherent nature. In this

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<sup>13</sup> Manchuria was found to be particularly lacking in petroleum reserve. See IMPEX Proceedings, pp. 25016-23, Def. Doc. No. 1955 on Japan's need for petroleum, cf. T. Yoshihashi Conspiracy at Mukden, p. 133 (New Haven 1963) on the idea of a self-sufficient defence state.



light we must separate the aims of the Kwantung Army from those of Japanese elements elsewhere. That is to say the basic defensive policy adopted by the Kwantung Army in Manchuria did not reflect the sum total of Japanese national policy -- if 'policy' can still be used to describe the general direction in which her militarists were leading her.

### (iii) Russian Policy

Russia found her possible reactions towards the Kwantung Army's use of force preconditioned. Russia had resorted to the same expedient in 1929 with Japanese connivance and it was only natural that Japan should expect Russian connivance in return.<sup>14</sup> Further the lack of a regional balancing


<sup>14</sup> D.J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia, Chap. XI (New Haven 1949). Soviet Russia in the Far East, p. 7 (London 1949). H.L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-45, pp. 1-3. N. Beleffi, Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929-31, pp. 70-74, Vol. I (New York 1947).



Power -- as China was negligible in terms of military prowess -- Russia's comparative military weakness vis a vis Japan, and Russia's unwillingness to cooperate with a capitalist country such as the United States, even on a diplomatic plane, to hinder Japanese advance made the only sensible course for Russia to pursue in the Far East to be one of co-operation with Japan. The aim was to prevent a defeat of the Soviet Union at the hands of Japan and the approach was to maintain good neighbour relations with Japan and the avoidance of conflict with her at all costs. In other words: appeasement or as the slogan goes "inpenetrable reserve, invincible restraint!"<sup>15</sup>

Auxiliary to this policy of appeasement on the part of Russia was an active encouragement for other nations to resist Japanese aggression. This simultaneous functioning of two seemingly

<sup>15</sup> D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia in the Far East, p. 3. M. Beloff, p. 78.




contradictory policies was possible because Russia had control of the Comintern. Anti-Japanese moves were made in its name and the Soviet Government could therefore disclaim formal responsibility connected. So coinciding with appeasement was the increasing of Communist propaganda against Japanese militarism.<sup>16</sup>

The lack of active Russian reaction to Japanese moves in the Far East made it appear like the existence of a close Russo-Japanese entente in the area. This greatly strengthened Japanese diplomacy. Without Russian support, neither the United States nor any European Power could exert enough pressure upon Japan even to slow down her pace of expansion.

The adopted Russian policy of appeasement, however, came in for a severe test after September

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 14-17. C.B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists 1931-45, p. 16 (New York 1958).



1931 when Japanese expansion first intruded into a recognized Russian sphere of influence in North Manchuria. Initially both the Japanese Foreign Office and the Kwantung Army were anxious to calm Russian apprehensions by refraining from direct military involvement. Koki Hirota, Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, assured Russia that Japanese military action would be restricted to South Manchuria while the Kwantung Army resorted to indirect military action in regard to North Manchuria.<sup>17</sup> But encouraged by Russian neutrality the Kwantung Army extended its military action into North Manchuria while Hirota explained to Russia that the actions were temporary and that Japanese forces would be evacuated as soon as possible.<sup>18</sup> But once its

<sup>17</sup> Liang Ching-hsun, pp. 95-96. S.N. Ogata, pp. 107-108. A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1933, p. 519 (London 1934). Kantogun Sanbobu Somuka, "A Secret War Diary of the Manchurian Affair", Vol. II, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia in the Far East, p. 6.




political and military control of the region had been established the Kwantung Army had no mind to leave, instead it planned for the ultimate expulsion of Russia from the area.

At this stage Russia was anxious to come to some kind of definite arrangement with Japan so that they could avoid a clash over divergent interests in the same area. The emphasis of Russian national policy at the time being internal state building and she was in the midst of her second Five Years Plan. In order to obtain Japanese co-operation, Russia took a definite pro-Japanese stand in the Manchurian issue. The first move was taken at the height of Japanese military action in Manchuria when in December 1931 Russia proposed a Russo-Japanese Non-aggression Pact. This was tantamount to a formal declaration of non-intervention in Manchuria<sup>19</sup> and removed a

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<sup>19</sup> IMFE Proceedings, Prosecution Document No. 2369; aide memoire of Litvinov. A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1934, p. 668. N. Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, p. 79.



fear of a flanking attack from Russia. Further the Japanese were allowed to transport troops on the Chinese Eastern Railway.<sup>20</sup> The Chinese Consul at Blagoveshchensk was told to leave,<sup>21</sup> and Russia refused to participate in the Lytton Commission of Enquiry because of Japanese objection.<sup>22</sup> When clashes did occur between Russian and Japanese interests, these were first attributed to be the doing of third parties trying to complicate the good relations between Russia and Japan.<sup>23</sup> Such all out efforts in no way satisfied the Kwantung Army and instead of securing its tolerance of existing Russian interests in North Manchuria, active efforts to the contrary were exerted instead.

<sup>20</sup> D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia in the Far East, p. 6. M. Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, p. 80.

<sup>21</sup> D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia in the Far East, p. 8.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.



The Kwantung Army was not adverse to a political settlement with Russia, but confident of the military weakness of the latter Power, the Kwantung Army would only agree to such a settlement on its own terms. First it wanted control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, second it wanted to redraw the boundaries of Manchoukuo so as to make it much more defensible, and third it was not willing to stop infiltration into Outer Mongolia. And so Russo-Manchoukuo relations were mainly concerned with these issues.

#### (iv) The Chinese Eastern Railway


The Chinese Eastern Railway was built to strengthen Russian defensive and attacking capabilities *vis à vis* Japan.<sup>24</sup> It was natural then that the

<sup>24</sup> J.V.A. MacMurray, pp. 81-82, "Li Lozanoff Treaty." It was intended to strengthen the supply line of Russian naval bases in the Far East: Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Direct challenges to Japanese naval predominance in the Far East.



Kwantung Army should regard its acquisition by Japan as indispensable, and that compromise was impossible. The question remained was how should the disputed Railway be acquired. If the matter had been left entirely in the hands of the Kwantung Army, then the taking over of the Railway would be in the form of a forcible military action. But the Kwantung Army itself was weak in numerical strength. Military action against the Chinese Eastern Railway could only be taken after Russia had reached to deliberate efforts to provoke her into military action. Once Russia had started military moves, the Kwantung Army was certain that the home Government could not refuse it all out support in a war of 'defense'.

The initial phase of the Chinese Eastern Railway question was concerned with deliberate provocations from the Kwantung Army. As the Railway was not protected by Russian Railway guards, the Kwantung Army saw to it that the Railway was to be accorded as little military protection as possible. This opened the Railway to robbery,




looting, and killing by the 'bandits' roaming around the countryside.<sup>25</sup> These 'bandits' were mostly disbanded Chinese soldiers and their action may or may not have been actually ordered by the Japanese. The unprotected Railway found its operations so disturbed that there was no hope of making it a financially profitable concern. This, however, was not sufficient a pressure to cause the Russians to give up their essentially strategic railway, nor were they provoked enough to send an army to its protection.

Failing to evince a response from the Russians by indirect means, the Kwantung Army resorted to applications of direct pressure upon the personnel of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Upon the flimsiest of pretexts, leading executive personnel

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<sup>25</sup> IMTFE Proceedings, p. 35958: Cross examination of Togo Shigenori. Ibid., IPS Document No. 3334B, Statement by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. to Mr. Ota, April 16, 1933.



of the Chinese Eastern Railway were arrested and imprisoned without trial.<sup>26</sup> The Soviet Government did no more than protest to the Japanese Government in Tokyo.<sup>27</sup> And, sensing that even lack of resistance would not be able to stop the Kwantung Army from a direct military take over of the Railway, the Russians started to send rolling stock across the border to Russian territory.<sup>28</sup> This move, however, was effectively checked by the Kwantung Army by simply closing the frontier between the two countries and through traffic was no longer allowed.<sup>29</sup> This compelled Soviet Russia to take

<sup>26</sup> IMTIE Proceedings, pp. 29441-45. M. Beloff, pp. 167-168.

<sup>27</sup> D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia in the Far East, p. 20. A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1933, pp. 521-522, April 16, 1933. note from Karakhan to Ota.

<sup>28</sup> D.J. Ballin, Soviet Russia in the Far East, p. 18.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 18. A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1933, p. 521. M. Beloff, p. 167.



a definite stand as to defend or to give up her interests in North Manchuria and she chose to withdraw from North Manchuria altogether. But on doing so she hoped to get as much from Japan as possible and so the withdrawal was proposed to Japan in the form of the selling of her half interest in the said railway.<sup>30</sup>

The Japanese Government, however, could not take up the Russian offer even if it had wanted to. It had little control over affairs in Manchuria as the region was strictly a private preserve of the Kwantung Army and its sympathizers. On the other hand it was bad policy to refuse to settle a dispute by peaceful means especially when the opponents had declared before the start of negotiations

<sup>30</sup> S.M.R. 5th Report, p. 58. IMTIE Proceedings Defense Document No. 2753. Ibid., pp. 29617-19; excerpts from Litvinov's Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (Moscow 1937). A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1933, p. 522.



that she was to give up her interests. As to the price demanded by the Russians for such a retreat, well it would be paid for by Manchurian resources as Russia had proposed payment by instalment<sup>31</sup> and so there was no question of costing Japan anything. The problem facing the Tokyo Government was whether it could exert sufficient pressure upon the Kwantung Army to bring it to agree to come to the conference table. Fortunately, even the Kwantung Army was vulnerable to attack if it should be accused of unpatriotic motives. Togo Shigenori, the Director of the Bureau of American-European Affairs, perceived the Kwantung Army's vulnerable point and he managed to persuade the cabinet to agree to force the Kwantung Army to negotiate. In doing this Togo not only secured the support of his civilian colleagues but acquired the help of influential military men as

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<sup>31</sup> S.M.R. 5th Report, pp. 59 and 65.




well.<sup>32</sup> The Kwantung Army was adamant about one thing, however, it would not agree to let the Tokyo Government to negotiate on its behalf. Russia on the other hand distrusted the Kwantung Army and its puppet Government in Hsinking, she would only negotiate when active participation by the Tokyo Government was assured. This led to the formula proposed by the Tokyo Government: that Russia and Manchoukuo were to negotiate directly, negotiations to be conducted in Tokyo, and that Japan was to participate as the ally of Manchoukuo.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> IMTFE Proceedings, Defense Document No. 2753. Military circles were against purchasing the CER. Togo persuaded Yamaoka Juke (Director of Bureau of Military Affairs in War Ministry) and Nagato Tetsuzan (Chief of 2nd Department of the General Staff) to support him in solving the CER. question by peaceful means, May 23rd 1933 Cabinet decision: "that the proposal of the Soviet Government should be accepted, that Manchoukuo should be advised to be the purchaser, and that the Japanese Government should use its good offices to smooth the progress of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo."

<sup>33</sup> D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia in the Far East, p. 18. A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1933, p. 523.




This procedural arrangement failed to work. Part of original Russian hopes in offering to negotiate was to terminate Kwantung Army pressure being applied on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Instead of halting such actions, however, the Kwantung Army intensified them as a means to compel the Russian negotiators to agree to the terms demanded by the Manchoukuoan representatives.<sup>34</sup> The problem that ended the first phase of the negotiation in deadlock was that of the immense difference between the price demanded and the price offered.

Negotiations were conducted in Tokyo upon Russian request. Manchoukuo was nominally represented by her Ambassador to Japan, Ting Shih-yuan, while actual authority was in the hands of Chuichi Ohashi, Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs at Hsinking.<sup>35</sup> Thus through Ohashi the Kwantung Army retained

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 526-528.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 524. S.M.R. Report, p. 58.




actual control of negotiations on the Manchoukuo side. Ohashi was a Japanese national appointed to the Manchoukuo Government by the Kwantung Army and could only be dismissed by the Kwantung Army. Russia was represented by her Ambassador to Tokyo, Yourenoff.<sup>36</sup> She could not send anyone of higher rank as the Manchoukuo chief representative was of ambassadorial rank. The Japanese Government was chiefly represented by Togo Shigenori.<sup>37</sup>

As long as the Kwantung Army had complete control over the negotiations, success was unlikely. The Kwantung Army believed that the Chinese Eastern Railway could be either taken or duplicated at any time and therefore to pay a high price for it was not worthwhile.<sup>38</sup> Japanese diplomats such as

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 58. A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1932, p. 524.

<sup>37</sup> IMPEX Proceedings, p. 35632. Direct examination of defendant Togo Shigenori. Ibid., Defense Document No. 2753.


<sup>38</sup> Ibid., Defense Document No. 2753. SACR, 5th Report, p. 58.



Hirota and Togo, however, advised negotiation and purchase so as to avoid unnecessary military clash with Russia. Russia, on the other hand was aware of the difference of opinion between Hsinking and Tokyo and therefore demanded a high price to give herself an advantageous negotiating stand. She asked for 250 million gold roubles on the contention that her original investment totalled 411 million gold roubles, and this after allowing for depreciation would come to about 210 million gold roubles, this plus 40 million for adjacent lands and forest areas would make the total come to 250 million gold roubles.<sup>39</sup> Manchoukuo, on the other hand, was confident of getting the Railway anyway and so offered as low a price as possible: 50 million gold roubles. She contended that the actual value of the Chinese Eastern Railway should be only half of the cost of its duplication and that Russia could only claim half of this as she only had a half-interest.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 58.




in the Railway. The cost of duplicating was estimated at 130 million gold roubles and one fourth of it would be about 32 million gold roubles. The 50 million offer was therefore claimed to be a generous offer.<sup>40</sup> The vast difference between the two figures made negotiations difficult while the staunch stand adopted by the Kwantung Army just did not allow the Russians to have any bargaining power. Negotiations dragged on without success and as a last effort to save the talks Russia lowered her demand to 200 million gold roubles in August 1933.<sup>41</sup> The Kwantung Army remained obdurate and consequently the negotiations reached a deadlock and had to be suspended.<sup>42</sup> Obviously direct negotiations between Russia and Manchoukuo would not yield any results.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 59. IMTTE Proceedings, Defense Document No. 2753.



Negotiations were resumed in 1934, formally still under the former arrangement of direct negotiation between Russia and Manchoukuo, with Japan acting as a participant friendly to Manchoukuo. In fact, however, the Japanese Foreign Office now carried on the burden of negotiation with Russia and subsequently tried to bring the Kwantung Army to agree to what they had agreed with the Russians. As a result of these Yourenoff-Hirota conversations the final price was fixed at 170 million gold roubles, including 30 million earmarked as retirement fund.<sup>43</sup> The price agreement was reached early in 1934, but Russian demand for a Japanese payment guarantee delayed the final agreement from being signed until March 23rd 1935.<sup>44</sup> The final agreement stipulated that one third of the price was to be paid in cash

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<sup>43</sup> S.M.R. 5th Report, p. 59. IMTFF Proceedings, Defense Document No. 2753. A.J. Teynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1934, p. 672.

<sup>44</sup> S.M.R. 5th Report, p. 59. H.L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-45, p. 43. A.J. Teynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1934, p. 673.



and the balance in goods, while the transfer of the Railway and its appurtenances was to be effected on the date of the signature and the dismissal of the Soviet employees was to take place upon three months' notice.<sup>45</sup> The Japanese Government, in the Hirota-Yourenneff Note, undertook to guarantee the exact fulfilment by the Manchoukuo Government of "All the obligations of payment, in money as well as in goods," while the Hirota-Ting Note explained that such a guarantee was given in compliance with the wishes of the Soviet Union "in view of the close and special relations existing between Manchoukuo and Japan."<sup>46</sup>

#### (v) The Boundary Question

Border disputes and armed clashes between Russian troops and Japanese soldiers started as soon as the Kwantung Army had completed its occupation


<sup>45</sup> S.M.R., 5th Report, p. 62.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 59.




of Manchuria. In view of the fact that the Kwantung Army was unwilling to start a general conflict with the Soviet Union, its aggressiveness along the Russo-Manchurian border needs to be explained. The main difficulty lay in the fact that Russia and Japan were in occupation of the same nomadic region in which no boundary had existed. The imposition of a frontier line could not effectively check the numerous frontier crossings by the local populace, namely the nomads. The existence of such a loose border control was tolerable when one of the parties concerned was not in any bargaining position, but when Japan replaced China as the ruling Power neither Russia nor Japan would allow the state of affairs to continue and both acted vigorously to close the frontier.

The frontier line drawn by the Russians had been made in the days of her dominance in the region and with a view to put any Power to the south and east of her frontier at a strategic disadvantage. This became apparent to the Kwantung Army on its



actual occupation of North Manchuria and it was a state of affairs that it was determined to alter for military considerations, as distinct from her political ambition of ultimate Japanese expansion into the Russian Far East. The methods employed were to force various local fait accompli by the use of force and to compel Russia to accede to changed conditions by a policy of continued military pressure all along the frontier.

These border incidents had another raison d'etre in that it was difficult to protect an extended and exposed frontier. The Kwantung Army was only too conscious of its shortage of manpower and was preoccupied with the need to have its forces concentrated and to facilitate their speedy transportation should the occasion required. Therefore, instead of building elaborate defensive networks along the frontier, as the Russians did, the Japanese deliberately engineered border incidents so as to force the Russians to adopt a defensive stand and be occupied with costly defensive networks.




In this light then, the Kwantung Army deemed it in-advisable to have any negotiated settlement along the frontier.

The Russians were anxious to secure comparative peace along her Eastern Frontier. Her selling of the Chinese Eastern Railway was aimed at removing Russo-Japanese conflicting interests and hoped that after the sale Japan would lessen her constant border disturbances. So immediately after the Railway Agreements the Soviet Government proposed the establishment of a mixed commission for settling border disputes.<sup>47</sup> The Japanese Government was for the idea, but the Kwantung Army and the South Manchuria Railway Company objected to it and insisted that such a commission could only be set up after the boundary lines had been redrawn.<sup>48</sup> Finally Russia had to give way and agreed to the basic principles of border redemarcation. Negotiations were started between Russia and Manchoukuo, but

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<sup>47</sup> IMTFE Proceedings, p. 35633. Direct examination of defendant Togo Shigenori. Ibid., pp. 35417-2.


<sup>48</sup> IMTFE pp. 35417-23.



as in the case of direct negotiation in the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute, direct border negotiations also ended in a deadlock. The Russians would not agree to give up strategically important areas and definitely would not dismantle her border fortresses as demanded by the Kwantung Army on the contention that the Trans-Siberian Railway was so near the border and vulnerable to attack and so the border must be heavily guarded.<sup>49</sup> Although negotiations were of no avail, a general conflagration was never in danger of breaking out for the simple reason that both contestants were basically adopting a defensive position. Military conflict of one kind, however, was inevitable and the border was plagued with constant local clashes between Russian and Japanese troops. This marked in essence a definite change in Soviet policy, instead of appeasement, the policy of military contendment was employed. This state of affairs continued until 1941 when both Russia

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<sup>49</sup> H.L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-45, p. 69, quoting editorial on IZVESTIA June 18, 1936.




and Japan were occupied with military preparations elsewhere and were both apprehensive of a military conflict between the two in the Far East. As a result of this mutual apprehension the Russo-Japanese Non-aggression Pact was signed.<sup>50</sup>

#### (vi) The Outer Mongolian Question

Whereas Kwantung Army policy in regard to the Russo-Manchurian frontier was basically one of defence, its policy vis a vis Outer Mongolia was fundamentally different. The declaration of the establishment of the new Government of Manchoukuo, dated March 1, 1932, spoke of the state as comprising "the territory of Manchuria and Mongolia."<sup>51</sup> The immediate aim of the Kwantung Army was therefore to


<sup>50</sup> D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia in the Far East, p. 7.

<sup>51</sup> G.M. Friters, Outer Mongolia and its International Position, p. 234 (Baltimore 1949).



extend the artificial independence movement to Inner and Outer Mongolia and to bring the two territories into the political framework of Manchoukuo. In regard to Inner Mongolia it was a simple continuation of the military conquest method. Outer Mongolia, however, presented a more challenging problem as there existed a strong group of Mongolian nationalists who were dependent upon Russian support.

The Kwantung Army tried to set up centres of loyalty within Manchoukuo that would appeal directly to the hearts of the Mongols. First the province which bordered on Outer Mongolia was made an autonomous region and the Mongols there, numbering some two million, i.e. double the population of Outer Mongolia itself, given as much control over their own affairs as possible. Secondly Pu Yi was made Emperor of Manchoukuo, hoping that the idea of a Mongol-Manchurian Empire would again appeal to Mongolian nationalists. Such methods, however, would be of little avail if the Kwantung Army did not back them up with a show of military force.



Consequently the question of boundary was also brought up in this sector, but the main emphasis here was not to redraw the frontier but rather the absorption of Outer Mongolia into Manchutikuo. Outer Mongolia could not withstand Japanese might: with a population of only one million and an exposed frontier it could not defend itself against the mildest of Kwantung Army attacks. It could only choose between securing active Russian support and military protection, or submission to Japanese demands.

Although frontier re-demarcation was much on the surface in the Manchoukuo-Outer Mongolian disputes, the real question at issue was Japanese demands to send representatives from Manchoukuo to protect Manchoukuo interests in the Mongolian capital and to participate in the settlement of frontier incidents.<sup>52</sup> Later they went even further by asking for permission to send five additional

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 235. H.L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, p. 57.




representatives to various parts of Mongolia, of which three were near the border.<sup>53</sup> These representatives could be used to co-ordinate the efforts of Mongolian Clerical and Secular Nobles to overthrow the pro-Russian revolutionary government and to re-establish the old order with Japanese help. Even should this political plot be forestalled, these representatives could act as intelligence agents passing out vital information to Japan in preparation for the day when she would come into Mongolia by force of arms. The border incidents were created to make direct negotiation between Mongolia and Manchoukuo unavoidable and the subsequent sending of Manchoukuo representatives feasible.

The Mongolian Government, however, foiled Japanese designs by refusing to hold negotiations of any kind even after serious border incidents had occurred. Its only reply was to meet force with force. Considering the fact that Mongolia had only

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 57. Fritars, p. 236.




a population of one million, her decision to resist force by force must have had the solid backing of Russia first. The Japanese were of the same opinion and the Japanese Military High Command in Manchoukuo declared in October 1935 that the flat refusal of Outer Mongolia to exchange representatives conveyed the impression that her liberty of action was restricted by another agency.<sup>54</sup>

Japanese attempts to gain entrance into Mongolia continued by increasing her military harassment of the Manchoukuo-Mongolian frontier and succeeded in forcing a border conference between Manchoukuo and Mongolia held at Manchouli in 1935.<sup>55</sup> The question discussed were concerned with border demarcation, but as the Japanese had no mind of settling the question as yet the conference could not but end in failure.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 236.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 237. H.L. Moore, p. 56.




Continued Japanese pressure necessitated some active support from Russia. This was done by Stalin when in an interview with a Times correspondent he made it known that a Soviet-Mongolian Protocol of Mutual Assistance had been concluded.<sup>56</sup> The Japanese Foreign Office immediately reacted by declaring that this Protocol was to be regarded as a military alliance, deplored the presence of overwhelming Russian influence in Mongolia, and demanded an equal share of this influence in the name of Manchoukuo.<sup>57</sup> Other than this, however, the Japanese were not ready to do anything as yet.

Failing to expand its influence into Outer Mongolia, the Japanese had to forestall the reverse to materialize. They were afraid that the amount of autonomy given to the Hsingan Province may give

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<sup>56</sup> The Times (London April 2, 1936).

<sup>57</sup> G.M. Fritters, Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, p. 238.



the Mongols there enough freedom to come into some arrangements with their blood kin across the border and lead to their secession from Manchoukuo one day. Therefore four leading officials of Northern Heingan were shot in April 1936 for conspiring with the Outer Mongolians during the Manchuli Conference and for aiming at the independence of the province.<sup>58</sup> This incident may be indicative of a change of immediate Japanese objective in regard to Outer Mongolia, for the moment active advance was halted at the frontier.


Border incidents, however, continued all along the Russo-Mongol-Manchu frontier. The aim of these was to put Russo-Mongolian forces on the defensive for the tactical reason of putting the heavier demand on human and natural resources on the opposite side. The situation arrived at was a constant recurrence of border incidents making

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 239.



the boundary a highly unstable one. The instability that was inherent on the Manchurian plains themselves was now pushed north westward. The essential frontier instability remained.



## CONCLUSION

The international complications in Manchuria during the late 19th and early 20th centuries were due mainly to the fact that no one single people or nation succeeded in making the region their undisputed possession. This basic lack of political stability was the result of the fact that Manchuria was in itself a borderland, an entire region where nomadic and agricultural interests met and mingled and where no distinct line could be drawn between the two.

The nature of Manchuria as a borderland changed radically, however, with the invention of rail and steam communication. The nomads of Central Asia were eliminated as a major power factor and the erstwhile agricultural interests to the North and South of them now found themselves face to face in Manchuria -- Russia and China competed for a permanent hold over the region. Japan came as a



late contender and brought sea-power to bear upon Manchuria for the first time.

The international rivalry between Russia, China, and Japan was underlined by one fact: the abject weakness of China. Russia was occupied with internal and European affairs. Japan remained unopposed should she assert her dominance over the region.

Japanese expansion, however, would upset the then balance of power in the world. The Western Powers, particularly the United States, would try to prevent Japanese expansion -- but this had to be done short of military means. The Japanese Government was adverse to outright expansion, fearing the consequent international repercussion. The Japanese military, particularly those responsible in the field, pressed for immediate expansion via military means. The Civil-Military struggle in Japan therefore revolved round this issue. As Y.C. Maxen and S.N. Ogata have shown so succinctly, the Japanese Military's actions in Manchuria was



outright insubordination and, under cover of patriotism, the very insubordination succeeded in wresting the control of foreign policy from the Civil elements.


The conquest of Manchuria, however, was not simply a military affair. Without all-out support from the Japanese Government the Kwantung Army had to carry out its conquest with very limited resources in men, material, and finance. To overcome these, local collaboration was actively encouraged. And thanks to the peculiar political tradition of the Manchurian Chinese -- which I have termed as Localism -- collaborators were plentiful.

With Manchuria in its command, however, the Kwantung Army had to create an effective administration. Without any precedence to follow, the Kwantung Army had to go the hard way of trial and error: the Manchoukuo administration followed mainly the pattern of the former Chinese administration while changes were effected all the time to suit




Japanese needs. Its main aim was not the welfare of Manchurians, but the use of Manchuria to further Japanese interests -- namely ensuring Japanese control, developing Japanese commercial and industrial interests, and above all, the organizing of Manchurian resources for the ultimate objective of future Japanese Continental expansion. In practice, however, the Japanese were riddled with one obstacle no matter how much centralized control they had over the administrative network, they found that when direct contact with the populace was required they had to depend on the loyalty of their Chinese collaborators. Realizing the importance of this questionable loyalty, the Japanese tried to inculcate a distinct Manchoukuoan national consciousness and the importance of Japan-Manchoukuo co-operation. The means employed were education and propaganda. Given time this attempt was capable of showing favourable results.

Besides complications with Manchurian Chinese, the Kwantung Army found its authority shared by




professional Japanese bureaucrats. The Kwantung Army neither had the technical knowledge of nor the man-power for running a government. It had to depend on either Chinese collaborators or bureaucrats from either the SMR or Japan Proper. As Chinese loyalty was questionable, the Kwantung Army found its Japanese allies indispensable. This allowed the development of a distinct Civil interest in the Kwantung Army dominated Government of Manchoukuo. Manchoukuo Government can be termed as a Dual Government with the Kwantung Army wielding policy control and the bureaucrats performing administrative duties.

Japanese conquest of Manchuria was not a simple matter between China and Japan. The Kwantung Army might have been stopped should Soviet Russia decided to intervene in the early stages. The intervention was apprehended by both the Japanese Government and the Kwantung Army. But positive Russian overtures to the contrary soon emboldened the Kwantung Army not only to occupy the whole of



Manchuria but to oust the remnant of Russian interests there as well. Even with the elimination of Russian interests, however, the Japanese did not stop their military harassment of Soviet Russia. In its attempt to protect an extended frontier with limited resources, the Kwantung Army adopted an aggressive attitude in order to put the problem of defence mainly in Soviet hands. What resulted was a constant recurrence of border clashes between the two countries while neither desired their extension into a major conflict.




## APPENDIX

THE ORGANIC LAW OF MANCHOUKUO AND OTHER LAWS GOVERNING  
VARIOUS GOVERNMENT OFFICES

(Extract from Manchoukuo, Foreign Office, The Chief Executive's Proclamation, The Organic Law of Manchoukuo and Other Laws Governing Various Government Offices, pp. 4 - 45 -- Hsinking 1932)

## CONTENTS

ORGANIC LAW OF MANCHUKUO .....	265
ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE STATE COUNCIL .....	272
ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL .....	279
LAW GOVERNING THE SUPERVISORY COUNCIL .....	282
ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE COUNCIL .....	288
ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE BUREAU OF LEGISLATION ....	307
ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE DIVISION OF STATISTICS ....	309
ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF HSING-AN PROVINCE .....	311
ORGANIZATION LAW OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS .....	315
PROVINCIAL LAW GOVERNING THE COUNSELLORS OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT .....	31
ORDINANCE NO. 3 PROVINCIAL ADOPTION OF FORMER LAWS. 31	
DIAGRAMATIC CHART OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION OF MANCHOUKUO .....	31




## ORGANIC LAW OF MANCHOUKUO


Translation

## CHAPTER I. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

- Article I. The Chief Executive shall rule Manchoukuo, the State of Manchuria.
- Article II. The Chief Executive shall represent Manchoukuo.
- Article III. The Chief Executive shall be responsible to the entire people.
- Article IV. The Chief Executive shall be nominated by the entire people.
- Article V. The Chief Executive shall exercise the legislative powers with the approval of the Legislative Council.
- Article VI. The Chief Executive shall supervise and control the State Council and exercise the administrative powers.
- Article VII. The Chief Executive shall cause the courts of justice to exercise the judicial powers in accordance with law.
- Article VIII. The Chief Executive shall issue orders for the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and happiness of the people and for the execution of laws. He shall, however, have no power to revise laws with such orders.



- Article IX. In case it shall be impossible to convene the Legislative Council either to maintain public peace and order or to avert emergency calamities, the Chief Executive shall be empowered to issue, with the approval of the Privy Council, emergency ordinances which shall have the force of law. Such emergency ordinances must, however, be reported at the following session of the Legislative Council.
- Article X. The Chief Executive shall determine the organization of the administration, appoint and dismiss government officials and fix their salaries, except in case of those which are otherwise especially provided for in the present Organic Law or in other laws.
- Article XI. The Chief Executive shall have the power to declare war and peace and to conclude treaties.
- Article XII. The Chief Executive shall have the supreme command of the military, naval and air forces.
- Article XIII. The Chief Executive shall have the power to grant amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments and rehabilitation of rights.




## CHAPTER II. THE PRIVY COUNCIL

Article XIV. The Privy Council shall be composed of Privy Councillors.

Article XV. The Privy Council shall, when consulted by the Chief Executive, submit its opinions relative to the following matters:

- (1) Laws.
- (2) Ordinances.
- (3) Budgets.
- (4) Treaties and agreements negotiated with foreign nations and declarations to foreign countries issued in the name of the Chief Executive.
- (5) Major appointments and dismissals of governmental officials.
- (6) Other important matters relating to the affairs of the State.

Article XVI. The Privy Council may present its views to the Chief Executive on important matters relating to the affairs of the State.



### CHAPTER III. THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL


- Article XVII. The organization of the Legislative Council shall be decided separately by law.
- Article XVIII. All legislative and budgetary bills shall require the approval of the Legislative Council.
- Article XIX. The Legislative Council may present proposals concerning important matters of the State to the State Council.
- Article XX. The Legislative Council may receive petitions presented by the people.
- Article XXI. The Legislative Council shall be convoked annually by the Chief Executive. The duration of the ordinary session shall be one month; it may, however, be extended by the Chief Executive if he shall deem it necessary.
- Article XXII. One third or more of the total members of the Legislative Council shall constitute a quorum.
- Article XXIII. Proceedings at a session of the Legislative Council shall be decided by a majority of the members present. In case of a tie-vote, the Chairman shall have the casting vote.
- Article XXIV. The sessions of the Legislative Council shall be open to the public. Closed sessions may, however, be called on demand by the State Council or by a resolution of the Legislative Council.



- Article XXV. Legislative and budgetary bills passed by the Legislative Council shall be approved, promulgated and executed by the Chief Executive. In the event of the legislative and budgetary bills being rejected by the Legislative Council, the Chief Executive shall request the Council for their reconsideration by presenting his reasons thereof. When further rejected, the Privy Council shall be consulted for a decision thereon.
- Article XXVI. The members of the Legislative Council shall not be held responsible outside the Council for their discussions and decisions within the Council.

#### CHAPTER IV. THE STATE COUNCIL

- Article XXVII. The State Council shall take charge of all administrative affairs by order of the Chief Executive.
- Article XXVIII. The State Council shall consist of the Departments of Civil Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Industry, Communications, Justice, and Education.
- Article XXIX. The State Council shall have a Prime Minister and each of the Departments a Minister.



Article XXX. The Prime Minister and the Ministers of the Departments may attend the sessions of the Legislative Council at any time and may have a voice at its deliberations but shall have no vote.

Article XXXI. The Prime Minister shall countersign all laws, ordinances, and messages relating to the affairs of the State.

(Revised October 5, First Year of Tatung, 1932 :-


All laws, ordinances, military orders and messages relating to State affairs shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned in charge of their respective affairs.)

## CHAPTER V. THE COURTS

Article XXXII. The Courts shall, in accordance with law, conduct trials of civil and criminal cases. In case of administrative litigation and other special trials, however, special provision shall be made by law.

Article XXXIII. The organization of the courts and the qualifications of the judges shall be determined by law.

Article XXXIV. The judicial officials shall command independence in the discharge of their duties.



Article XXXV. The judicial officials shall be dismissed except by trials on criminal offence or disciplinary punishment, and shall not be subjected to suspension, transfer of position or office, and reduction of salary, against their will.

Article XXXVI. The trials and judgements of courts shall be open to the public. Cases which threaten public order and peace, or which are detrimental to public morals, however, may be closed to the public by law or decision of the Courts concerned.

## CHAPTER VI. THE SUPERVISORY COUNCIL


Article XXXVII. The Supervisory Council shall supervise and audit the accounts. The organization of the Supervisory Council and its functions shall be determined separately by law.

Article XXXVIII. The Supervisory Council shall consist of Supervisors and Auditors.

Article XXXIX. There shall be no dismissal of Supervisors and Auditors, except for criminal offences or disciplinary punishment, and they shall not be subjected to suspension and transfer of office, or reduction of salary, against their will.

### Supplementary Provision


Article XL. This Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, the First Year of Tatung.



## ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE STATE COUNCIL

Translation

- Article I. The Prime Minister shall, by the order of the Chief Executive, take the lead of Departmental Ministers in conducting the administrative affairs of the State. In case he is unable to discharge his duties, one of the Ministers, by order, shall act in his stead.
- Article II. The Prime Minister shall have the power of appointing or dismissing officials in accordance with authority invested in him or by special authorization.
- Article III. In case of necessity the Prime Minister may suspend or cancel the appointments, dismissals or dispositions of Departmental Ministers.
- Article IV. The Prime Minister shall have full supervision over his subordinate officials, and shall make recommendations to the Chief Executive relative to their appointments, dismissals, resignations, rewards or punishments. Those of the officials of the Grade of Delegated Appointment or below shall be decided by the Prime Minister himself.



- Article V. For the purpose of establishing coordination and unity in the administrative affairs of the State, as well as maintaining a proper equilibrium of a general situation, there shall be sessions of the State Council. The State Council sessions shall be presided over by the Prime Minister and shall be attended by the Departmental Ministers, Director of General Affairs Board of the State Council, Chief of the Bureau of Legislation, Minister of the General Administrative Office for Hsing-an Province, or their authorized representatives.
- Article VI. The following matters shall be submitted to the sessions of the State Council:
- (1) Laws, ordinances, military orders and budget.
  - (2) Treaties and important diplomatic matters.
  - (3) Disputes between various Departments over matters of jurisdiction.
  - (4) Expenditures not included in the budget.
  - (5) Other important matters relating to the affairs of the State.
- Article VII. The Ministers of the various Departments shall have charge of duties of their respective Departments under the leadership of the Prime Minister.



The organizations of the individual Departments shall be determined separately.

Article VIII. The Prime Minister shall have direct control over and take charge of confidential matters, and matters relating to personnel, accounting and supplies of the Departments through the General Affairs Board established for that purpose.

Article IX. The General Affairs Board shall consist of the following members:

Director of the General Affairs Board -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Mi-shu-kuan (Secretaries to the Director) -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.


Li-shih-kuan (Directing-Secretaries) -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Chi-cheng (Experts) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan (Secretaries) -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.

The General Affairs Board may have an Assistant Director -- the Grade of Selected Appointmen



- Article XI. By order of the Prime Minister, the Director of the General Affairs Board shall direct and supervise officials of the various sections in charge of the affairs of the Board.
- Article XII. The Assistant Director shall assist the Director and in case the Director is unable to discharge his duties, the Assistant Director shall act in his stead.

The Mi-shu-kuan shall take charge of confidential matters and matters specially entrusted to him.

The Li-shih-kuan and Chi-cheng shall take charge of office work and technical matters by order of the Director.

The Shih-woo-kuan shall discharge their duties by order of their superior officials.

The Shu-kuan shall discharge their duties under the direction of their superior officials.


- Article XIII. The General Affairs Board shall consist of the following four Bureaux. Each Bureau shall have a Chief of Li-shih-kuan rank:

Secretariat Bureau.

Personnel Bureau.

Accountants Bureau.

Supply Bureau.



Article XIII. The Secretariat Bureau shall take charge of the following:


- (1) Confidential matters.
- (2) Promulgation of laws, ordinances and orders of the State Council.
- (3) Custody of official seals.
- (4) Despatches and receipts of official communications.
- (5) Publications.
- (6) Accounting and general office affairs.

Article XIV. The Personnel Bureau shall take charge of the following:

- (1) Appointment and dismissal promotion and demotion of the officials.
- (2) Discipline, rewards and punishments of the officials.
- (3) Salaries, allowances and pensions.
- (4) Elections of Representatives (to Legislative Council).

Article XV. The Accountants Bureau shall take charge of the following:

- (1) General budget and general settlement of accounts.



- (2) Budget for special accounts and their settlement.
- (3) Management of National bonds and funds.
- (4) Receipts and expenditures of National treasury.
- (5) Classification of receipts and expenditure.

Article XVI. The Supply Bureau shall take charge of the following:

- (1) Constructions and repairs.
- (2) Supplies.

Article XVII. The Regulations governing the Sections of the different Bureaux shall be determined by the Director of the General Affairs Board.

Article XVIII. The present Organization Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, the First Year of Tatung.

N.B. Certain important revisions have been effected in the Organic Law of Manchoukuo as a result of the decision reached on October 3, First Year of Tatung, at the regular session of the State Council. The changes embodying the following points received the approval of the Privy Councillors and were promulgated on October 5 of the same year.

1. Whereas according to the original stipulations the Prime Minister alone bore the responsibility for State affairs, under the revised



system the responsibility will be shared by the other Ministers who will act under the leadership of the Prime Minister and who will be held accountable for the affairs of their respective Departments.

2. All laws, ordinances, military orders, and other instructions issued by the Government will hereafter be countersigned by the respective Ministers concerned, as well as by the Prime Minister who was the only person who countersigned such documents heretofore.

3. The title of the head of the General Affairs Board of the State Council has been altered from that of "Tsungwu-Changkuan" to "Tsungwu-Tingchang", or from "Chief" to "Director".


- (a) As the result of the above revisions, the powers of the individual Ministers of the State Council have been enlarged and their responsibility made definite.
- (b) A more efficient and smooth execution of State affairs is expected from now on.



## ORGANISATION LAW OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

Translation

- Article I. The Privy Council shall consist of Privy Councillors.
- Article II. The Privy Council shall have a President and a Vice-President who shall be appointed by the Chief Executive from among the Councillors. The President shall assume full charge of the Council's affairs and sign the official documents and papers issued by the Council. The Vice-President shall assist him, and in case the President is unable to discharge his duties, shall act in his stead.
- When both the President and the Vice-President are unable to discharge their duties, one of the Councillors, by order, shall act instead.
- Article III. Decisions of the Privy Council shall be reached by the sessions of the Council.
- Article IV. One-half or more of the Councillors shall constitute a quorum at a session of the Privy Council.
- Article V. Proceedings of the Privy Council sessions shall be decided by a majority of the Councillors present. In case of a tie-vote, the President shall have the casting vote.



Article VI. The President may in case of necessity cause the Prime Minister, Ministers of the Departments, and the President of Supervisory Council, or their respective representatives to attend the sessions of the Privy Council and to express their opinions upon matters on hand.

Article VII. The President shall have the power to appoint, whenever necessary, an Inquiry Committee selected from among the Councillors to examine special matters.

Article VIII. In the Privy Council there shall be established a Secretariat consisting of the following:

The Chief of the Secretariat  
-- the Grade of Selected Appointment.


Secretaries -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Subordinate officials -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.


Article IX. The Chief shall take charge of the general affairs of the Secretariat by order of the President.

The Secretaries shall attend to affairs of the Secretariat by order of the Chief.

The Subordinate officials shall attend to the office affairs under the direction of their superior officials.




- Article X. The President shall submit recommendations to the Chief Executive through the Prime Minister for the appointments and dismissals, rewards and punishments of the Chief of the Secretariat and the Secretaries. Similar matters relating to the Subordinate officials may be determined by the President himself.
- Article XI. The present Organization Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, the First Year of Tatung.




## LAW GOVERNING THE SUPERVISORY COUNCIL

Translation

- Article I. The Supervisory Council shall be subordinate directly to the Chief Executive and independent of the State Council.
- Article II. The Supervisory Council shall consist of the following staff members:
- President -- the Grade of Special Appointment.
  - Chian-chia-kuan (Supervisors) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.
  - Shen-chi-kuan (Auditors) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.
  - Mi-shu-kuan (Secretaries to the President) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.
  - Shi-woo-kuan (Secretaries) -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.
  - Shu-kuan (Subordinates) -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.
- Article III. The President shall lead and supervise his subordinate officials and shall direct the general management of the Council. In case the President is unable to discharge his duties one of the Bureau Chiefs, by order, shall act in his stead.



- Article IV. The President shall submit recommendations to the Chief Executive through the Prime Minister relative to promotions, demotions, resignations, rewards and punishments of the officials of and above the Grade of Recommended Appointment; those of officials belonging to the Grade of Delegated Appointment or below shall be decided by the President himself.
- Article V. The Chian-chia-kuan shall take charge of supervisory duties by order of the President.
- The Shen-chi-kuan shall take charge of auditing duties by order of the President.
- The Mi-shu-kuan shall take charge of confidential and other specified matters by order of the President.
- The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to duties assigned to them by order of their superior officials.
- The Shu-kuan shall attend to affairs under the direction of their superior officials.
- Article VI. The Supervisory Council shall consist of the following Bureaux.
- General Affairs Bureau.
- Supervisory Bureau.
- Auditing Bureau.



Article VII. The General Affairs Bureau shall take charge of matters relating to:

- (1) Confidential affairs.
- (2) Custody of official seals and documents.
- (3) Personnel.
- (4) Official correspondences and statistics.
- (5) Accounting and general office affairs.


Article VIII. The General Affairs Bureau shall have a Chief appointed from among the Mi-shu-kuan.

The Chief of the Bureau shall, by order of the President, direct and supervise his subordinate officials and shall manage the affairs of the Bureau.

Article IX. The Supervisory Bureau shall take charge of the following affairs, exclusive of those of the Auditing Bureau.

- (1) Supervision over unlawful acts or unjust dispositions on the part of various Government offices.
- (2) Supervision over offences of officials.

Article X. The Supervisory Bureau shall have a Chief appointed from among the Chian-chia-kuan. The Chief of the Bureau shall take charge of affairs of the Bureau by order of the President.




Article XI. The Auditing Bureau shall have charge of matters relating to the following:

- (1) Supervision over the enforcement of budgets of various Government offices.
- (2) Examination of receipts, expenditures and settlements of accounts of various Government offices.
- (3) Examination of cash, documentary securities and articles possessed by various Government offices.
- (4) Examination of transactions of cash and securities conducted by banks for the various Government offices.
- (5) Examination of the accounts of public and private organizations established especially in accordance with law.
- (6) Supervision over offences of the officials.

Article XIII. The Auditing Bureau shall have a Chief appointed from among the Shen-chi-kuan.

The Chief of the Bureau shall take charge of affairs by order of the President.

Article XIV. The reports on the supervision and auditing shall be certified at a meeting of the Bureau Chiefs and submitted to the Chief Executive by the President.




- Article XIV. When, as a result of supervision and auditing, it shall be found that offences of the administrative offices and their unjust dispositions require reforms, the President may, based upon the resolutions adopted by the meeting of the Bureau Chiefs, submit opinions thereon to the Prime Minister and may request him for his report on their disposition.
- Article XV. When, as a result of auditing, it shall be found that certain officials concerned are obliged to make certain indemnifications, the President, acting on the resolution adopted by the Supervisory Bureau meeting, shall communicate the same to the Prime Minister for enforcement after determining the degree of responsibility.
- Article XVI. When, as a result of supervision or auditing, it shall be found that punishments of certain officials are necessary, the President may, acting upon the resolutions adopted by the Bureau meeting, communicate the same for punishment to the Commission on the Disciplinary Punishment of Officials.
- Article XVII. The President may, at any time, submit his views to the Chief Executive, based on the results of supervision and auditing.  
He may also submit his opinions on the administrative and legal revisions if found necessary.



Article XVIII. The detail regulations regarding the functions of the Supervisory Council shall be determined separately by ordinances.

Article XIX. The present Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, the First Year of Tatung.



ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE STATE  
COUNCIL

Translation

CHAPTER I. GENERAL REGULATIONS


Article I. The Departmental Ministers shall have charge of the affairs of their respective Departments under the leadership of the Prime Minister.

Affairs whose jurisdiction is not clearly defined or matters which concern two or more Departments shall be referred to the State Council for settlement.


Article II. In case the Departmental Ministers shall deem it necessary to enact, abolish or revise any law, ordinance, or military order which concern their repective Departments, they shall prepare necessary proposals for presentation to the Prime Minister.

Article III. The Departmental Ministers may request for a State Council session to deliberate on matters pertaining to the affairs of their respective Departments.

Article IV. The Departmental Ministers may issue orders governing the affairs of their respective Departments by the authori invested in them or by special authorization.



- Article V. The Departmental Ministers may issue orders or instructions relating to matters of their respective Departments to the Governors of the Provinces (excepting the Governor of Hsing-an Province) as well as to the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board.
- Article VI. The Departmental Ministers shall direct and supervise the Governors of the Provinces (excepting the Governor of Hsing-an Province), as well as the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board, concerning the affairs under their respective jurisdiction, or, in case the orders and dispositions of the latter shall be deemed to be in violation of the established rules or detrimental to the public interest, may cause such orders or dispositions to be either suspended or abolished. Matters of serious import, however, shall be referred to the Prime Minister for direction.
- Article VII. The Ministers shall direct and supervise the officials in their respective Departments and submit recommendations to the Chief Executive through the Prime Minister regarding their promotions, demotions, resignations, etc., or rewards or punishments, excepting those of officials of the Grade of Delegated Appointment or below in which case they shall be decided by the Ministers themselves.
- Article VIII. Each Department of the State Council may have a Vice-Minister who shall assist the Minister. In case the Minister is unable to discharge his duties, the Vice-Minister shall act in his stead.



Article IX. Each of the Departments of the State Council shall have its own Bureaux. Each Bureau shall have its own Chief to be appointed from among the Li-shih-kuan or Chi-cheng-Regulations governing the subdivisions under various Bureaux shall be determined by the Ministers.

## CHAPTER II. THE DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

Article X. The Minister of Civil Affairs shall take full charge of affairs relating to local administration, police, public works and public health, and further direct the Governors of various Provinces (the Governor of Hsing-an Province being excepted) as well as the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board.

Article XI. The Department of Civil Affairs shall consist of the following five Bureaux:

- (1) Bureau of General Affairs.
- (2) Bureau of Local Administration.
- (3) Bureau of Police.
- (4) Bureau of Public Works.
- (5) Bureau of Public Health.

Article XII. The General Affairs Bureau shall take charge of matters relating to:

- (1) Confidential affairs.
- (2) Custody of official seals and documents.
- (3) Personnel.
- (4) Accounting and general office affairs.



Article XIII. The Bureau of Local Administration shall take charge of matters relating to:

- (1) Local administration.
- (2) Self-government administration.
- (3) Public associations  
(guilds etc.)

Article XIV. The Bureau of Police shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) Peace-preservation police.
- (2) Administrative police.

Article XV. The Bureau of Public Works shall take charge of the following matters:


- (1) Construction works under the direct control of the Department.
- (2) Supervision and assistance of the local construction works.
- (3) Expropriation of land.

Article XVI. The Bureau of Public Health shall have charge of the following matters:

- (1) Plague prevention, vaccination and public hygiene and sanitation.
- (2) Health and medical administration.

Article XVII. The Department of Civil Affairs shall have the following officials:

Mi-shu-kuan (Secretaries to the Minister) — the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointmen



Li-shih-kuan (Directing-secretaries)  
-- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Chi-cheng (Experts) -- the Grade  
of Selected or Recommended  
Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan (Secretaries) --  
the Grade of Recommended  
Appointment.

Shu-kuan (Subordinates) -- the  
Grade of Delegated Appointment.

**Article XVIII.** The Mi-shu-kuan shall take charge  
of confidential and other specified  
matters by order of the Minister of  
the Department.

The Li-shih-kuan shall take charge  
of matters by order of the Minister.


The Chi-cheng shall take charge of  
the technical matters by order of their  
superior officials.

The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to  
assigned affairs by order of their  
superior officials.

The Shu-kuan shall attend to general  
office work under the direction of  
their superior officials.

### CHAPTER III. THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**Article XIX.** The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall  
direct and supervise the Ambassadors,  
Ministers and Consular officials  
stationed abroad and shall have charge



of diplomatic and trade negotiations with foreign countries and of matters relating to protection of nationals abroad.

Article XX. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall consist of the following four Bureaux:


- Bureau of General Affairs.
- Bureau of Commercial Affairs.
- Bureau of Political Affairs.
- Bureau of Information and Publicity.

Article XXI. The Bureau of General Affairs shall take charge of matters relating to:

- (1) Confidential affairs.
- (2) Custody of official seals and documents.
- (3) Personnel.
- (4) Accounting and general office affairs.

Article XXII. The Bureau of Commercial Affairs shall take charge of matters relating to:

- (1) Commerce and navigation.
- (2) Investigation of economic conditions of foreign countries.
- (3) Protection of nationals abroad
- (4) Consular affairs.



Article XXIII. The Bureau of Political Affairs shall have charge of the following:

- (1) General diplomatic affairs.
- (2) Treaties.
- (3) International Conferences.
- (4) Diplomatic Agents stationed in foreign countries.

Article XXIV. The Bureau of Information and Publicity shall have charge of the following:

- (1) Information and Publicity.
- (2) Intelligence.
- (3) Culture.

Article XXV. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall have the following staff members:

Mi-shu-kuan (Secretaries) --  
the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.


Li-shu-kuan (Directing-Secretaries)  
-- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Fan-yi-kuan (Translators) --  
the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan (Secretaries) --  
the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan (Subordinates) -- the  
Grade of Delegated Appointment.

Article XXVI. The Mi-shu-kuan shall have charge of confidential and other specified matters acting by order of the Minister.



The Li-shih-kuan shall have charge of affairs assigned to them by order of the Minister.

The Fan-yi-kuan shall have charge of interpreting and translating by order of the Minister.

The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to their business by order of their superior officials.

The Shu-kuan shall attend to office affairs under the direction of their superior officials.

#### CHAPTER IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

**Article XXVII.** The Minister of Defence shall supervise and control military affairs and take charge of national defence and military operations.

**Article XXVIII.** The Department of Defence shall consist of the following two Bureaux:

Bureau of General Staff.

Bureau of Military Supplies.

**Article XXIX.** The Bureau of General Staff shall take charge of the following:

- (1) General affairs.
- (2) Military operations.
- (3) Training of troops.
- (4) Organization of army and recruiting.
- (5) Medical matters.
- (6) Judicial affairs.



Article XXX. The Bureau of Military Supplies shall take charge of the following:

- (1) Arms.
- (2) Military supplies.

Article XXXI. Matters relating to the officers and officials to be placed within the Department of Defence shall be determined separately.

#### CHAPTER V. THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE


Article XXXII. The Minister of Finance shall take charge of matters relating to taxation, monopoly, currency, control of monetary circulation and State properties.

Article XXXIII. The Department of Finance shall consist of the following three Bureaux:

- Bureau of General Affairs.
- Bureau of Taxation.
- Bureau of Finance.

Article XXXIV. The Chief of the General Affairs Bureau shall take charge of the following:

- (1) Confidential matters.
- (2) Custody of official seals and documents.
- (3) Personnel.
- (4) Accounting and general office affairs.



Article XXXV. The Bureau of Taxation shall take charge of the following:

- (1) Levy and collection of national taxes.
- (2) Administration of taxation.
- (3) Levy and collection of customs revenues.
- (4) Administration of customs.

Article XXXVI. The Bureau of Finance shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) Currency.
- (2) Control of monetary circulation.
- (3) Supervision over financial establishments.
- (4) Management of State properties.

Article XXXVII. The Department of Finance shall consist of the following staff members:

Mi-shu-kuan (Secretaries) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Li-shih-kuan (Directing-Secretaries) -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Chi-cheng (Experts) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan (Secretaries) -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan (Subordinates) -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.

Article XXXVIII. The Mi-shu-kuan shall take charge of confidential and other specified matters by order of the Minister.



The Li-shih-kuan shall take charge of assigned matters by order of the Minister.

The Chi-cheng shall attend to technical duties by order of their superior officials.

The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to matters assigned to them by order of their superior officials.

The Shu-kuan shall attend to general office affairs under the direction of their superior officials.

## CHAPTER VI. THE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY

Article XXXIX. The Minister of Industry shall take charge of matters relating to agriculture, forestry, stock-farming, mining, commerce, industry and other industrial enterprises.

Article XL. The Department of Industry shall consist of the following three Bureaux:


Bureau of General Affairs.

Bureau of Agriculture and Mining.

Bureau of Industry and Commerce.

Article XLI. The General Affairs Bureau shall take charge of the following:

- (1) Confidential affairs.
- (2) Custody of official seals and documents.
- (3) Personnel.
- (4) Accounting and general office affairs.



Article XLII. The Bureau of Agriculture and Mining shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) Agriculture and subsidiary enterprises.
- (2) Forestry and afforestation.
- (3) Stock-farming.
- (4) Marine products.
- (5) Mines and geology.

Article XLIII. The Bureau of Industry and Commerce shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) Commerce and trade.
- (2) Industries.
- (3) Weights and measures.

Article XLIV. The Department of Industry shall be composed of the following staff members:

Mi-shu-kuan -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.


Li-shih-kuan -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Chi-cheng -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.

Article XLV. The Mi-shu-kuan shall take charge of confidential and other specified matters under order of the Minister.



The Li-shih-kuan shall take charge of assigned matters under order of the Minister.

The Chi-cheng shall attend to technical matters under order of their superior officials.

The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to matters assigned to them by order of their superior officials.

The Shu-kuan shall attend to general office matters under order of their superior officials.

## CHAPTER VII. THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS

**Article XLVI.** The Minister of Communications shall assume administrative affairs relating to railways, posts, telegraph, telephone, aviation, water transport and other matters pertaining to communications in general.

**Article XLVII.** The Department of Communications shall consist of the following four Bureaux.

Bureau of General Affairs.


Bureau of Railways.

Bureau of Postal Affairs.

Bureau of Water-transport.

**Article XLVIII.** The General Affairs Bureau shall take charge of matters relating to the following:

- (1) Confidential affairs.
- (2) Custody of official seals and documents.



- (3) Personnel.
- (4) Control of aviation.
- (5) Accounting and general office affairs.

Article XLIX. The Railways Bureau shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) Administration of railways and affiliated enterprises.
- (2) Supervision over traffic on hand.

Article L. The Postal Bureau shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) Posts.
- (2) Telegraph and telephone.

Article LI. The Water-transport Bureau shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) Water transport.
- (2) Beacons.
- (3) Supervision over merchant vessels and mariners.

Article LIII. The Department of Communications shall consist of the following staff members.


Mi-shu-kuan -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Li-shih-kuan -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Chi-cheng -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.



Article LIII. The Mi-shu-kuan shall take charge of confidential and other specified matters by order of the Minister.

The Li-shih-kuan shall take charge of assigned matters by order of the Minister.

The Chi-cheng shall attend to technical duties by order of the Minister.

The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to matters assigned to them by order of their superior officials.

The Shu-kuan shall attend to general office affairs under the direction of their superior officials.

## CHAPTER VIII. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Article LIV. The Minister of Justice shall supervise all courts and procurators' offices, take charge of matters relating to judicial trials of civil and criminal cases and non-contentious matters, as well as other subjects relating to judicative administration.

Article LV. The Department of Justice shall consist of the following three Bureaux:

Bureau of General Affairs.


Bureau of Judicial Affairs.

Bureau of Execution.

Article LVI. The General Affairs Bureau shall take charge of the following:

(1) Confidential matters.

(2) Custody of official seals and documents.



- (3) Personnel.
- (4) Accounting and general office affairs.

Article LVII. The Judicial Bureau shall take charge of the following:

- (1) Establishment and abolition of courts and their jurisdictions.
- (2) Civil and criminal cases, non-contentious and other judicial matters.
- (3) Procuratorial matters.
- (4) Registration of people, mediation under mutual trust, and public certification.

Article LVIII. The Bureau of Execution shall take charge of the following:

- (1) Execution.
- (2) Prisons.
- (3) Reformatory and protective measures for minors and protective measures for ex-convicts.
- (4) Amnesty.


Article LIX. The Department of Justice shall have the following officials:

Mi-shu-kuan -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Li-shih-kuan -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.



Article LX. The Mi-shu-kuan shall take charge of confidential and other specified matters by order of the Minister.

The Li-shih-kuan shall take charge of assigned matters by order of the Minister.

The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to assigned matters by order of their superior officials.

The Shu-kuan shall attend to general office affairs under the direction of their superior officials.

#### CHAPTER IX. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Article LXI. The Minister of Education shall take charge of matters relating to education, religion, rites, customs and national or popular thoughts.

Article LXII. The Department of Education shall consist of the following three Bureaux:


Bureau of General Affairs.

Bureau of Education.

Bureau of Religious and Social Works.

Article LXIII. The General Affairs Bureau shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) Confidential matters.
- (2) Custody of official seals and documents.
- (3) Personnel.
- (4) Accounting and general office affairs.
- (5) Investigation and statistics.



Article LXIV. The Bureau of Education shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) School education.
- (2) School sanitation.
- (3) Arts and sciences.
- (4) Compilation and revision of text-books.

Article LXV. The Bureau of Religious and Social Works shall take charge of the following matters:

- (1) Popular or national thoughts.
- (2) Social education.
- (3) Religion.
- (4) Rites and customs.

Article LXVI. The Department of Education shall consist of the following staff members:

Mi-shu-kuan -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Li-shih-kuan -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.


Pien-shen-kuan -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Tu-hsueh-kuan (School Inspectors)  
-- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Chi-cheng -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan -- the Grade of Delegate Appointment.



Article LXVII. The Mi-shu-kuan shall take charge of confidential and other specified matters by order of the Minister.

The Li-shih-kuan shall take charge of assigned matters by order of the Minister.

The Fien-shen-kuan shall take charge of the compilation of national text-books and the revision of the contents of text-books or other educational or cultural publications, by order of the Minister.

The Tu-hsueh-kuan shall inspect and supervise schools by order of the Minister.

The Chi-cheng shall attend to technical matters by order of the Minister. The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to matters under the direction of their superior officials.

The Shu-kuan shall attend to general office affairs under the direction of their superior officials.

#### Supplementary :

Article LXVIII. The present Organization Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, the First Year of Tatung.

N.B. The original Bureau of Education was detached from the Department of Civil Affairs on July 5, the First Year of Tatung, and the Department of Education was subsequently created, the Regulations governing the same coming into force on July 15, the First Year of Tatung.



## ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE BUREAU OF LEGISLATION

Translation

Article I. The Bureau of Legislation shall be subordinate to the State Council and shall take charge of matters relating to:

- (1) Draft and examination of proposed bills of laws, ordinances, military orders, and orders of the State Council.
- (2) Examination of drafts for treaty ratification.
- (3) Custody of original copies of laws, mandates, military orders, ordinances and orders of the State Council.
- (4) Investigation and research of legal systems of foreign countries.

Article II. The Bureau of Legislation shall consist of the following staff members:


Chief of the Bureau -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Counsellors -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.


Shih-woo-kuan -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.

Article III. The Chief of the Bureau shall direct and supervise his subordinates and take full charge of the affairs of the Bureau.



- Article IV. The Chief of the Bureau shall submit reports to the Prime Minister on questions of promotions, degradings, resignations, rewards and punishments of the officials of the Grade of Recommended Appointment or above; those of officials of the Grade of Delegated Appointment or below shall be decided by the Chief of the Bureau himself.
- Article V. In case the Chief of the Bureau is unable to discharge his duties, one of the Counsellors shall act in his stead.
- Article VI. The Counsellors shall examine the proposals and make investigations under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau.  
 The Shih-woo-kuan shall take charge of matters under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau.  
 The Shu-kuan shall attend to general affairs under the direction of their superior officials.
- Article VII. The Bureau of Legislation may establish sub-divisions within itself, the duties of which shall be determined by the Chief of the Bureau.
- Article VIII. The present Organization Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, the First Year of Tatung.



## ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE DIVISION OF STATISTICS

Translation

Article I. The Division of Statistics shall be attached to the Bureau of Legislation.

Article II. The Division of Statistics shall take charge of matters relating to:

- (1) Collection and examination of reports and materials of statistics from various government offices.
- (2) Statistics of fundamental conditions of the State.
- (3) Study of statistics, domestic and foreign.
- (4) Compilation of statistics.

Article III. The Division of Statistics shall consist of the following staff members:


Chief of the Division -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Tung-chi-kuan (Statistician) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.


Shih-woo-kuan -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.

Article IV. The Chief of the Division shall take charge of matters of the Division by order of the Chief of the Bureau of Legislation.



- Article V. The Tung-chi-kuan shall take charge of statistics by order of the Chief of the Division.  
The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to assigned matters by order of their superior officials.  
The Shu-kuan shall attend to general office affairs under the direction of their superior officials.
- Article VI. The Division of Statistics may create sub-sections the duties of which shall be determined by the Chief of the Division.
- Article VII. The present Organization Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, the First Year of Tatung.



ORGANIZATION LAW OF THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE  
OFFICE OF HSING-AN PROVINCE

Translation

Article I. The General Administrative Office of Hsing-an Province shall be subordinate to the State Council and shall assume all administrative duties of Hsing-an Province; it shall assist the Prime Minister in the government of other specified areas in Inner Mongolia under various banners.

Article II. The General Administrative Office of Hsing-an Province shall consist of the following staff members:

Minister -- the Grade of Special Appointment.

Vice-Minister -- the Grade of Selected Appointment.

Tsian-yu-kuan (Counsellor) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.


Mi-shu-kuan -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Li-shih-kuan -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Chi-cheng -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.


Shu-kuan -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.



- Article III. The Minister shall have full supervision and general direction over his subordinates in the management of the affairs of his Office. He shall also supervise the governors of the sub-provinces of Hsing-an Province.
- Article IV. The Minister shall issue orders regarding administrative affairs of the Province in accordance with powers invested in him or by special authorization.
- Article V. The Minister may cancel or suspend orders and dispositions of the Governors of Sub-provinces of Hsing-an Province, in case he shall deem them to be contrary to established rules or detrimental to public welfare, or acts committed ultra vires.
- Article VI. The Minister shall submit proposals to the Prime Minister whenever he shall deem it necessary to enact, abolish or revise any laws, ordinances or orders relating to matters under the former's jurisdiction.
- Article VII. The Minister shall submit reports to the Prime Minister relating to appointments, dismissals, resignations, rewards and punishments of the officials belonging to the Grade of Recommended Appointment or above; those of officials belonging to the Grade of Delegated Appointment or below may be determined by the Minister himself.
- Article VIII. The Vice-Minister shall assist the Minister and take charge of general affairs; in case the Minister is unable to discharge his duties, he shall act in his stead.



- Article IX. The Counsellors shall offer advices on being consulted by the Minister, or take charge of duties by special order of the Minister.
- Article X. The Ni-shu-kuan shall take charge of confidential and other specified matters by order of the Minister.  
 The Li-shih-kuan shall take charge of assigned matters by order of the Minister.  
 The Chi-cheng shall attend to technical matters by order of the Minister.  
 The Shih-wockuan shall attend to assigned matters by order of their superior officials.  
 The Shu-kuan shall attend to general office affairs under the direction of their superior officials.
- Article XI. The General Administrative Office of Hsing-an Province shall consist of the following three Divisions:  
 Division of General Affairs.  
 Division of Political Affairs.  
 Division of Industrial Development.
- Article XIII. The General Affairs Division shall take charge of matters relating to:  
 (1) Confidential affairs.  
 (2) Custody of official seals and documents.  
 (3) Personnel.  
 (4) Accounting and general office affairs.



Article XIII. The Political Affairs Division shall take charge of the following:

- (1) Local Administration.
- (2) Self-government administration.
- (3) Police and local self-defence.
- (4) Religion.
- (5) Education.


Article XIV. The Industrial Development Division shall take charge of matters relating to:

- (1) Pasturage.
- (2) Agriculture and forestry.
- (3) Mining.
- (4) Commerce and industry.

Article XV. Each Division shall have its own Chief appointed from among the Li-shih-kuan or Chi-cheng.

The functions of each Division shall be determined by the Minister of the Office.

Article XVI. The present Organization Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, the First Year of Tatung.



## ORGANIZATION LAW OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

### Translation

Article I. A Provincial Government shall be established in every Province (with the exception of Hsing-an Province).

Article II. Each Provincial Government shall consist of the following staff members:

Governor -- the Grade of Special Appointment.

Li-shih-kuan (Directing-Secretaries) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Ni-shu-kuan (Secretaries) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.


Chi-cheng (Experts) -- the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment.

Shih-woo-kuan (Secretaries) -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shih-hsueh-kuan (School Inspectors) -- the Grade of Recommended Appointment.

Shu-kuan (Subordinates) -- the Grade of Delegated Appointment.

Article III. The Governor shall enforce the laws and orders, and assume all administrative affairs of his Province under supervision and direction of the Prime Minister and various Department Ministers; he shall also exercise supervision



and direction over his subordinate officials.


He shall submit to the Prime Minister reports on the promotion and degradation, resignations, etc., rewards and punishments of officials belonging to the Grade of Recommended Appointment or above; those of officials of the Grade of Delegated Appointment or below shall be determined by the Governor himself.

Article IV. The Governor shall issue Provincial orders regarding administrative affairs of his province in accordance with powers invested in him or by special authorization.

Article V. The Governor shall direct and supervise various district magistrates in accordance with powers invested in him or by special authorization.

The Governor may cancel or suspend such orders or dispositions of the district magistrates which are deemed to be contrary to established rules or detrimental to public welfare, or which are acts committed ultra vires.

Article VI. Whenever the Governor requires troops for the maintenance of public peace and order, he shall submit a request for the same to the Prime Minister. In case of an extraordinary emergency, however, he shall have power to request the local military commander for the despatch of troops.



Article VII. The Li-shih-kuan shall have charge of assigned matters by order of the Governor.

The Chi-cheng shall attend to technical duties by order of the Governor.

The Shih-woo-kuan shall attend to assigned matters by order of their superior officials.

The Shih-hsueh-kuan shall inspect schools and attend to educational matters under direction of their superior officials.

The Shu-kuan shall attend to assigned matters under direction of their superior officials.

Article VIII. The Provincial Government shall consist of the following Boards:

Board of General Affairs.

Board of Civil Affairs.

Board of Police.

Board of Industry.


Board of Education.

Article IX. The Board of General Affairs shall have charge of matters relating to:


- (1) Confidential affairs.
- (2) Personnel.
- (3) Documents and statistics.
- (4) Custody of official seals.
- (5) Accounting.
- (6) Affairs not specifically assigned to any other Board.



- Article X. The Board of Civil Affairs shall have charge of matters relating to:
- (1) Supervision over self-government administration.
  - (2) Public works.
  - (3) Famine relief and charity.
  - (4) Control of national properties.
  - (5) Land.
  - (6) Other administrative affairs not specifically assigned to any other Board.
- Article XI. The Board of Police shall have charge of matters relating to:
- (1) Police.
  - (2) Hygiene.
  - (3) Opium suppression.
  - (4) Mediation of disputes.
- Article XII. The Board of Industry shall take charge of matters relating to:
- (1) Agriculture, industry, commerce, forests, mines, and marine products.
  - (2) Control of governmental enterprises.
  - (3) Reclamation or exploitation of waste lands and immigration.
  - (4) Development of farms and water-power.
  - (5) Weights and measures.



- Article XIII. The Board of Education shall have charge of matters relating to:
- (1) Education and arts.
  - (2) Rites, customs, and religion.
- Article XIV. The Chief of the Board of Police shall direct and supervise the provincial police officers to carry out police affairs by order of the Governor.
- Article XV. Regulations governing the sub-sections of the different Boards shall be determined by the Governor.
- Article XVI. The present Organization Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, First Year of Tatung.



PROVISIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE COUNSELLORS OF  
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

Translation


- Article I. Counsellors shall be provisionally appointed to the Provincial Governments (the Grade of Selected or Recommended Appointment).
- Article II. The number of the Counsellors for each Province shall not exceed six, one of whom may belong to the Grade of Selected Appointment.
- Article III. The Counsellors shall offer counsels to the Governor when requested for and shall participate in important affairs of the Province.
- Article IV. The present Law shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, First Year of Tatung.



## ORDINANCE NO. 3 PROVISIONAL ADOPTION OF FORMER LAWS


Translation

- Article I. The laws which have heretofore been in force and whose provisions are not in conflict with the fundamental policy of the establishment of the State, national conditions and laws, shall be uniformly adopted provisionally.
- Article II. In case no laws are found adoptable because of their being in contradiction to the provisions set forth in the preceding article, such laws which have been invalidated by order of the Kuomintang government may be put in force if they are adoptable in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article.
- Article III. In case no laws are found applicable, owing to the stipulations of the two preceding articles, the existing customs and usages shall be observed, and in case neither of these is in existence, discretion shall be exercised.
- Article IV. The present Ordinance shall come into force on the Ninth day of March, the First Year of Tatung.




## STATUTARY CHART OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION OF MANCHOUKUO

Standing: May, 1940



## ABBREVIATIONS

AR	Asiatic Review
CER	Chinese Eastern Railways
CSPSR	Chinese Social and Political Science Review
FEQ	Far Eastern Quarterly
FPR	Foreign Policy Reports
JAS	Journal of Asian Studies
JMH	Journal of Modern History
PPP	Pan Pacific Progress
SMR	South Manchuria Railway



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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