JAPANESE RULE OVER RURAL MANCHUKUO: STRATEGIES AND POLICIES

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

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DECLARATION

I, Mo Tian, declare that, except where otherwise acknowledged or noted, this thesis is entirely my own work.

Mo Tian

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This study is the outcome of a frustrating intellectual trajectory. It started as an enquiry into the political ideology of Manchukuo, but later on switched its direction to the examination of the political institutions of Manchukuo, and finally landed on the area of Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo. On the path towards completing this thesis, I have incurred debts to many individuals and institutions. This thesis would have never been possible without their assistance and support.

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ABSTRACT

The Japanese Kwantung Army created Manchukuo as a client state in northeast China in March 1932. The new entity followed policies that coincided closely with Japanese political and economic interests. In the enterprise of constructing Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities employed a set of strategies and policies to restructure the relationship between state and society. The strategies and policies established the Japanese power in the political domains of Manchukuo and facilitated drastic change in its socioeconomic structures. However, Manchukuo eventually dissolved after the Japanese surrender at the end of the Pacific War in August 1945.

Drawing from primary sources in Chinese, Japanese and Korean published in the 1930s and 1940s, this thesis presents a history of the central characteristics of Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo during 1932 and 1945. This thesis analyses the elements of Japanese rule that were expressed in the policies and practices implemented in Manchukuo. In doing so, the thesis illuminates the nature, strength and weakness of Japanese imperialism. This approach generates insights into the mechanisms and limitations of Japanese rule, and it contributes to the theoretical construction of Japanese imperialism.

Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo involved a high degree of political intervention in the military, economic and social spheres as well as the reorganisation of state structures. The Japanese authorities stablished public order through the elimination of social resistance and the construction of rural settlements; the reorganisation of the rural administration through the *baojia* and self-government initiatives; the establishment of rural financial order by organising cooperatives; the control of the procurement and distribution of agrarian output through coercion; and the management of labour through state mobilisation.

This thesis argues that the Japanese strategies and policies of control represented a process of reshaping state structures. The Japanese authorities demonstrated great skill in exercising control over the agriculture, government administration, and finance and labour relations in Manchukuo. The Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo revealed both effectiveness and limitations. The effectiveness was manifested in the establishment of social order and institutions to serve the needs of control. The limitations lay in the degree of compliance that the Japanese ensured in the local populace and in the extent to which the Japanese power penetrated into the production relations of the rural society.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACA	Agricultural Cooperative Association
APCA	Agricultural Prosperity Cooperative Association
APS	Agricultural Promotion Society
CA	Concordia Association
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
EADC	East Asia Development Company
FC	Fushun Colliery
FCA	Financial Cooperative Association
GGK	Government-General of Korea
MAPC	Manchuria Agricultural Produce Company
MCA	Ministry of Civil Affairs
MCB	Manchuria Central Bank
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFC	Manchuria Flour Corporation
MGC	Manchuria Grain Corporation
MSPMC	Manchuria Special Produce Monopoly Corporation
ODC	Oriental Development Company
SGGB	Self-Government Guidance Board
SMRC	South Manchuria Railway Company

LIST OF TABLES

Map 1. Map of Manchukuo in 1942

Map 2. Collective Hamlets Constructed by the GGK

Adapted from Chongmi Kim, *Chūgoku tōhokubu ni okeru kōnichi Chōsen, Chūgoku minshūshi josetsu*, Tokyo: Gendai kikakushitsu, 1992, 31.

Map 3. Safety Villages Constructed by the GGK

Adapted from Kim, *Chūgoku tōhokubu ni okeru kōnichi Chōsen*, 30.

Introduction

In March 1932, the Japanese Kwantung Army created Manchukuo, a client state of Japan, in Northeast China.[1] Although the Japanese authorities presented the new state to the world as a manifestation of the self-determination of the Manchurian people to shape their own future under Japanese guidance, the government structure was largely dominated by the Japanese officials and its policy was subject to Japanese instruction. In the process of constructing Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities restructured the relationship between state and society. They established Japanese power in the political domains of Manchukuo and facilitated drastic change in its socioeconomic structures. However, Manchukuo dissolved after the Japanese surrender at the end of the Pacific War in August 1945.

This thesis presents a historical account of the implementation and effects of Japanese strategies and policies for the rule over rural Manchukuo from 1932 to 1945. It examines how Japanese authorities used strategies and policies to control the social, political and economic activities of the population in rural Manchukuo; how they served the complex objectives and interests of the Japanese imperialistic enterprises; and particularly the extent to which the rural control extended to the rural population of Manchuria. It reveals the internal logic of Japanese rule by analysing the engagement of the ruling powers of the Japanese government and Kwantung Army during their fourteen years of consolidating rural control in Manchukuo.

Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo involved extensive reorganisation of rural resources and extended to almost every aspect of rural life, ranging from rural administration and settlement pattern to agrarian market and labour relations. This thesis addresses several overarching questions: What was the significance to the Japanese of controlling rural areas? How were Japanese policies implemented and revised over a fourteen-year period? What strategies were conceived and implemented in rural Manchukuo by the Japanese authorities? How were the control mechanisms shaped into vehicles for the state building of Manchukuo? What were their objectives and what did they actually achieve? What was the logic of Japanese rule? What were the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese rule? This thesis addresses these questions by looking closely into the implementation and effects of ruling mechanisms in rural

[1] In this study, the terms of "Manchuria" and "Manchukuo" are used distinctly. "Manchuria" is used to refer to the three provinces in Northeast China — Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, as well as the adjacent parts of Eastern Mongolia; "Manchukuo" is used to refer to the political entity established by Japan in Northeast China between 1932 and 1945.

Manchukuo, and demonstrates that dynamics of rural Manchukuo was largely shaped by the Japanese strategies and policies in the process of rural control.

Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo had important consequences for the governmentality of Japanese imperialism. Its significance necessitates an examination of how the strategies and policies were implemented, revised and evaluated by the Japanese authorities. Although Manchukuo was not a formal colony of the Japanese empire, the pattern of rule exercised by the Japanese authorities in Manchukuo was essentially similar to the pattern of colonial rule that Japan exercised in its formal colonies. It is for this reason that in this study, the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo is framed in the context of colonialism. Colonial rule is inextricably associated with goals of colonial enterprises. The goals of colonial enterprises could be either socially developmental, or economically exploitative and politically repressive. These goals included economic exploitation, acculturation, assimilation, affirming supremacy, and facilitating economic growth and social progress. Colonial rule is exercised by colonial authority to sustain the system of colonial governance in place. Colonial rule is a process of shaping socioeconomic relations. In colonial societies, the state and its agents as the coloniser constitute the powerful while subjects or citizens as the colonised are the powerless. The power of the coloniser determines that the range of activities over which they can exercise authority is limitless. To back its authority, colonial authorities usually utilise a wide range of strategies including the construction of incentives and the threat of coercion and persuasion.[2] Meanwhile, they clothe these strategies with political propaganda and slogans. The strategies employed by colonial authorities are forms of repression, oppression, exploitation and collaboration. The extent, to which colonial strategies can succeed in achieving their desired ends, depends on such factors as money, alliance, collaboration, determination, knowledge, torture, prison and intelligence.[3] In rural Manchukuo, the Japanese colonial authorities employed most of the above factors to establish a political order characterised by punishment and discipline.

General works on Manchukuo have focused on the political nature of Manchukuo. Duara highlights the contested nature of Manchuria in the geographical and historical imagination of China and Japan. Duara's approach is largely on the level of discourse and representation, rather than political economy. He discusses a number of

[2] W. Phillips Shively, *Power and Choice: An Introduction to Political Science*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993, 6.

[3] For a discussion of strategies for social control, see Paul Sites, *Control: The Basis of Social Order*, New York: Dunellen Publishing Company, 1973, 141-72. For a general discussion of typology of social control, see James J. Chriss, *Social Control: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, 36-54.

discursive representational means by which the Manchukuo regime sought to claim sovereignty. While Duara is ambitious in interpreting the ideological forces behind Japan's efforts of state building in Manchuria, his discussion under-examines how the exercise of power transformed ideas into policies.[4] Yamamuro analyses the rise and fall of Manchukuo by focusing on its political structures including state formation, ideology and institutions. Yamamuro covers how Manchukuo was formed, operated and transformed during its fourteen years of existence. Yamamuro shows the actors who were involved in the state-making process of Manchukuo. Specifically, he observes how the Japanese military conspired to found Manchukuo, and how the Kwantung Army worked to gain Chinese complicity.[5]

After the military takeover of Manchuria in 1931, Japan established authority in vast areas. Military control enabled the Japanese authorities to manipulate the social structure of Manchuria to accomplish their own goals. At the very core of Japanese thinking during this period was the question of what form of control should be adopted to ensure them access to the social and economic resources of Manchuria. At this time, the Japanese authorities faced considerable popular resistance in the rural areas of Manchuria. The widespread anti-Japanese resistance involved soldiers, farmers, and Communists who used rural Manchukuo as the base for launching the anti-Japanese movement.[6] Meanwhile, the endemic banditry caused great social disorder in rural Manchukuo. The conditions of rural Manchukuo as an unsettled and unstable society posed a serious threat to the Japanese military occupation of the region. In order to maintain social stability and establish a permanent presence in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army launched military suppression against the resistance forces.

In analysing the conditions of security in Manchuria in the early 1930s, scholars have explored the complex nature of the Japanese governmentality in suppressing local resistance. Li explores the roles of internal resistance forces in the political and social contexts of Manchuria and focuses on how Japanese authorities conceptualised banditry, and implemented administrative, ideological and military measures to suppress and

[4] Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
[5] Shin'ichi Yamamuro, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*, trans. Joshua A. Fogel, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.
[6] For the anti-Japanese resistance in Manchuria, see Tsunejirō Tanaka, *"Manshū" ni okeru hanman kōnichi undō no kenkyū*, Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1997; Lüyan Wu, Chuang Zhang, and Kun Wang, *Wei Manzhouguo fazhi yanjiu*, Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 2013, 194-206.

pacify resistance forces in Manchukuo.[7] Li demonstrates that the bandit suppression was not simply a military endeavour, but also a series of administrative and legal efforts by the Japanese and Manchukuo governments. Li argues that bandit suppression launched by the Japanese military was a means to obtain legitimacy and authority.

Lee and Mitter focus on local resistance against Japanese oppression, arguing that resistance occurred as a response to the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria. Lee examines the Communist movement in Manchuria that went through frequent policy shifts and organisational changes during the period of 1922 to 1945.[8] Lee shows that the mass movement, which was organised by the Communists who grew from having little interest in Manchuria into a principal force in local resistance, failed in Manchuria. According to Lee, while after 1937 in Manchuria the Communists obtained considerable popular support from the rural population of Manchuria, they only enjoyed scant success in their resistance to Japanese rule. Lee's study indicates that the Japanese rule over Manchuria remained formidable given their strategies and tactics in diminishing local resistance. Making use of Chinese sources, Mitter re-examines the common themes of resistance and nationalism in Manchuria by taking into account the multiple responses to Japanese occupation in Manchurian society. Mitter analyses the Chinese resistance to and collaboration with the Japanese in the initial period after the Mukden Incident in 1931.[9] Mitter argues that the Chinese resistance and nationalism have been exaggerated in historiography while a variety of responses to the Japanese occupation existed in Manchurian society. In his analysis, Mitter shows that the one-sided story of resistance is a myth.

Although scholars such as Mitter provide new perspectives on the social resistance in Manchuria, the mainstream approach in the scholarly debates about this area remains a nationalist one that acknowledges binary constructions of imperialistic repression versus national resistance, colonial exploitation versus national development. This nationalist approach has generated two effects. First, it has equated Japanese imperialism with the colonial authority that encounters the resistance and opposition of the colonised. Second, it has identified the colonised with class categories in Marxist terms. In other words, this approach shapes historical examination of colonialism in

[7] Yaqin Li, "'Bandit Suppression' in Manchukuo (1932-45)," Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2012.
[8] Chong-Sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
[9] Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

terms of oppression and resistance.[10] The approach that treats nationalism and colonialism as separate and isolated variables may not be adequate to capture the multiple possibilities of their interrelations.[11]

After the creation of Manchukuo in 1932, the security conditions of rural Manchukuo remained a considerable challenge to Japanese rule because the administrative system of Manchukuo was still at a rudimentary level and the Japanese were only beginning to establish their power in the Manchurian villages. In 1933, the Kwantung Army first reorganised a community-based system of civil control known in Chinese history as the *baojia* system. Its primary function was to maintain local order, collect taxes and organise civil projects. The Kwantung Army reintroduced the *baojia* system as a supplementary measure of police into the structure of local government when the police system was not fully established in Manchukuo.[12] With a clear agenda on social security, the *baojia* system was characterised by imposing collective responsibility on local inhabitants in rural Manchukuo. As a result of its structural organisation and function, the *baojia* system established an institutional rule that subjected rural inhabitants to organised surveillance.

The *baojia* system as a social control mechanism has been studied less in the context of Manchuria and more in the context of modern Chinese and Taiwanese history. Harris, Chen and Ts'ai have produced insightful discussions of the *baojia* systems in China and colonial Taiwan.[13] In examining the *baojia* system in Republican China, Harris argues that the *baojia* system revived by the Kuomintang in the 1920s served not only as a mechanism for local control, but also as an institution of local self-government.

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[10] This old analytical mode of Japanese imperialism is suggested in Wakabayashi's study on colonial Taiwan. See Masahiro Wakabayashi, "A Perspective on Studies of Taiwanese Political History: Reconsidering the Postwar Japanese Historiography of Japanese Colonial Rule in Taiwan," in *Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule: 1895-1945*, eds. Ping-Hui Liao and David Der-Wei Wang, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 20-1.

[11] This argument is developed on Shin and Robinson's argument on the historical narratives of colonial Korea. See Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, "Introduction: Rethinking Colonial Korea," in *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, eds. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999, 5.

[12] For a general discussion of the *baojia* system, see Masataka Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai: 'minzoku kyōwa' to hōchi kokka toiu futatsu no kokuze wo megutte," *Ajia taiheiyō kenkyū*, no. 20, February 2013, 37-51.

[13] Lane J. Harris, "From Democracy to Bureaucracy: The Baojia in Nationalist Thought and Practice, 1927-1949," *Frontiers of History in China*, vol. 8, no. 4, December 2013, 517-57; Ching-Chih Chen, "The Japanese Adaptation of the Pao-Chia System in Taiwan, 1895-1945," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 34, no. 2, February 1975, 391-416 and "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 213-39; Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai, "One Kind of Control: the Hoko System in Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1990.

In analysing the *baojia* system in colonial Taiwan, Chen and Ts'ai argue that the *baojia* system employed by the Japanese colonial authorities in Taiwan was more effective than the *baojia* system implemented in Qing China and it functioned as a policing organ and administrative unit in local control. The works of Harris, Chen and Ts'ai show the complex nature of the *baojia* system that operated in different historical and geographical contexts, and indicate links to the ways in which the *baojia* system operated in Manchukuo. While such scholarship is crucial to our understanding of how the *baojia* system evolved and worked in different contexts, it cannot be directly applied to the analysis of the case of Manchukuo in view of differences in time periods as well as political and social conditions.

In the scholarship of the *baojia* system of Manchukuo, Endō analyses the development, features and functions of the *baojia* system in Manchukuo as well as its conflict with Manchukuo's state policies and the factors underlying such conflict.[14] Endō argues that the structure of the *baojia* system was inconsistent with the state policies of ethnic harmony and rule of law in Manchukuo. First, regardless of the development of modern law systems, the state of Manchukuo still relied on collective responsibility (*lianzuo*) as a form of social discipline for control over the rural population. Second, the full exclusion of Japanese and partial exclusion of Koreans from the *baojia* system contradicted the rhetoric of "ethnic harmony" (*minzoku kyōwa*). Third, the notion of facilitating local self-government through the *baojia* system was self-contradictory because the system itself was intrinsically a policing mechanism established on violence.[15] While Endō's study briefly traces the *baojia* systems in the historical contexts of China and colonial Taiwan, it does not look closely into how they were practised in these contexts. This thesis develops Endō's study further by examining the *baojia* system in these historical contexts to better reflect the continuity and discontinuity in the structure and practices of the system.

After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Kwantung Army's large-scale military suppression of anti-Japanese resistance in Manchukuo greatly enhanced the public security in Manchukuo. The *baojia* system in the eyes of Kwantung Army leadership had not been an efficient measure in local government as expected. As one of the steps in the reform of local administration carried out in 1937, the Kwantung Army replaced the dysfunctional *baojia* system with a local self-government system

[14] Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai," 37-51.
[15] Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai," 48-9.

known as the *jiecun* system.[16] The *jiecun* system was devised on the models of local self-government in Japan. It functioned primarily as a local administrative mechanism to manage administrative and financial affairs in rural areas. Although the Japanese authorities permitted a certain degree of autonomy to local administrators in managing local affairs, the central government of Manchukuo still exercised tight control over rural administration through tax extraction and administrative directives.

Little academic attention has been drawn to the examination of the mechanism of local self-government in rural Manchukuo. The most important work on the *jiecun* system is the study by Okumura.[17] Okumura examines the development, characteristics and function of the *jiecun* system. Okumura argues that the *jiecun* system, which was modelled on the Japanese *chōson* system, excluded popular election from its structure and constructed local self-government in its structure as an ad hoc to facilitate political and economic integration in rural Manchukuo. Okumura also argues that the large administrative villages in the *jiecun* system were reconstructed on the model of local administrative system in Manchuria under Zhang Xueliang's regime in the 1920s. One important contribution of Okumura's study is to indicate the continuity and discontinuity of the *jiecun* system with tradition. An insightful addition to the discussion of the local self-government in Manchukuo is the preliminary research on local self-government in Japan by Steiner. In his study, Steiner discusses the structure and evolution of the local self-government of Japan from the Meiji Restoration to the postwar era.[18] Steiner examines the various levels of government including the neighbourhood, the muddling distribution of functions between them, the fiscal system and the way it makes local entities dependent on the state and the administrative structures of local entities. Although Steiner's discussion of local self-government in Japan does not relate directly to the local governance of Manchukuo, it provides a comparative perspective about the similarities and differences between the structures of local self-government in Manchukuo and in Japan.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Manchukuo as a supply base became increasingly important for Japan's economic autarky, and the need for Japan to ensure effective control over rural society necessitated the reinforcement of power. In doing so, Japan organised political mobilisation and economic reconstruction in rural

[16] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, Tokyo: Manmō dōhō engokai, 1971, 184-91.
[17] Hiroshi Okumura, "'Manshūkoku' gaisonsei ni kansuru kisoteki kōsatsu," *Jimbun gakuhō*, no. 66, March 1990, 15-39.
[18] Kurt Steiner, *Local Government in Japan*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.

Manchukuo, and extended power to all aspects of rural life. These strategies included the founding of the National Neighbourhood Association (*kokumin rinpo soshiki*) and launching of the village reconstruction movement.[19] The former stressed the role of the state in terms of mobilisation and placed rural neighbourhoods of Manchuria in the service of Japan's enterprises. The National Neighbourhood Association enhanced community association among inhabitants and improved mutual defence and agricultural production in rural areas. The latter had a strong economic agenda of increasing agricultural production by introducing farming technology to and extracting agricultural surplus from villages.[20] These efforts turned the rural society of Manchukuo into a massive machine that assumed a wide range of wartime duties such as food production, neighbourhood air defence, fire-fighting, and first-aid training.

The Concordia Association (*kyōwakai*) also had a prominent presence in the rural areas of Manchukuo during this period.[21] The CA was a political organisation established by the Kwantung Army in 1932 with the aim to encourage Chinese collaboration with Japanese rule in Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army controlled the operation of this organisation and turned it into an instrument of Japanese control. One important institutional function of the CA was the Union Council (*rengō kyōgikai*) which served as the legislature of the CA.[22] The Union Council was established at

[19] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 191-4.

[20] It should also be noted that during the 1940s, the Japanese military organised neighbourhood associations as agents of social control in territories of Japanese sphere of influence including Manchukuo, Japan and Indonesia. For a short introduction of neighbourhood associations in Japan, see Robert J. Pekkanen, *Japan's Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006, 85-129; Robert J. Pekkanen, Yutaka Tsujinaka, and Hidehiro Yamamoto, *Neighbourhood Associations and Local Governance in Japan*, trans. Leslie Tkach-Kawasaki, New York: Routledge, 2014; Benjamin L. Reed, *The Roots of State: Neighbourhood Organization and Social Networks in Beijing and Taipei*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012; "Introduction: State-linked Associational Life-illuminating Blind Spots of Existing Paradigms," in *Local Organizations and Urban Governance in East and Southeast Asia*, eds. Benjamin L. Read and Robert J. Pekkanen, London: Routledge, 2009, 1-26; Steiner, *Local Government in Japan*, 55-63 and 207-30; Ralph J. D. Braibanti, "Neighbourhood Associations in Japan and Their Democratic Potentialities," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 2, February 1948, 136-64. In Indonesia, neighbourhood associations were introduced on the island of Java by the Japanese military in 1944. Until 1966 when Suharto rose to power, neighbourhood associations were confined to Java only. For a discussion of the institutionalisation of mutual assistance in Java under the Japanese occupation, see Kazuo Kobayashi, "The Invention of Tradition in Java under the Japanese Occupation: The *Tonarigumi* System and *Gotong Royong*," Working Paper Series, no. 31, Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies of Ryukoku University, 2007, 1-37.

[21] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 76-158; Jianhua Liu, "*Weiman xiehehui yanjiu*," Ph.D. diss., Jilin University, 2010.

[22] For a case study of the Union Council, see Hiroshi Okumura, "Chihō tōchi ni okeru Manshūkoku kyōwakai no ichi: Manshūkoku kyōwakai dainanaji zenkoku rengō kyōgikai no

various levels of local government in Manchukuo to serve as the main channel through which the regional branches of CA conveyed their views to central leadership. Institutionally, they symbolised the "union of bureaucrats and the people". The Union Council was designed as a forum in which branch representatives, the government, and participants of other related organs could exchange their views unreservedly and realise the ideals of Manchukuo.[23]

Scholars have paid close attention to political ideology as a context for the analysis of the CA. Egler argues that the ideology and organisation of CA was characterised by ethnic harmony, which served to restrain the growth of nationalism, was rudimentary and obscure with an inclination to slide into the expediencies of propaganda.[24] Hirano, Suzuki and Okabe have systematically examined the historical development of the CA.[25] In his paper published in 1972, Hirano carefully explores the organisational structure and ideology of the CA. Hirano divides the history of the CA into an earlier period of political idealism and a later period of mass mobilisation. The former refers to the integration of national identities and establishment of legitimacy by promoting political ideals; the latter refers to the gradual cultural, spiritual and political subordination of Manchukuo to Japan.[26] Hirano argues that political mobilisation facilitated by the CA was aimed to maintain political stability and establish political legitimacy in Manchukuo. In his paper published in 1986, Hirano analyses the ideology of the CA by examining the formation, structure, function, and origin of ethnic harmony. Hirano argues that the Japanese authorities used the idea of ethnic harmony as an instrument to achieve political and national integration. According to Hirano, the limitation of ideology is that ethnic harmony should by no means be viewed as an intrinsic characteristic of national integration, and it is impossible to accomplish a true

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bunseki wo tōshite," in *'Manshūkoku' no kenkyū*, ed.Yūzō Yamamoto, Kyoto: Kyōto daigaku jimbun kagaku kenkyūjo, 1993, 157-89.

[23] Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011, 82-3.

[24] David George Egler, "Japanese Mass Organization in Manchuria, 1928-1945: The Ideology of Racial Harmony," PhD. diss., University of Arizona, 1977.

[25] Kenichirō Hirano, "Manshūkoku kyōwakai no seijiteki tenkai," *Nenpō seijigaku 1972: "Konoe shintaisei" no kenkyū*, 1972, 231-83 and "State-Forging and Nation-Destroying: The Case of the CA of Manchukuo," *East Asian Cultural Studies*, vol. 25, no. 1-4, March 1986, 37-57; Takashi Suzuki, "Manshūkoku kyōwakai shi shiron-1," *Kikan gendaishi* (1), Spring edition, May 1973, 28-51 and "Manshūkoku kyōwakai shi shiron-2," *Kikan gendaishi* (2), Winter edition, December 1974, 102-33; Makio Okabe, "Shokuminchi fasizumu undō no seiritsu to tenkai: Manshū seinen renmei to Manshū kyōwatō,"*Rekishigaku kenkyū*, no. 406, March 1974, 1-16.

[26] Hirano, "Manshūkoku kyōwakai no seijiteki tenkai," 277-82.

national integration simply through the idea of ethnic harmony.[27] In situating the CA in the context of Japanese imperialism, Suzuki's study examines the historical development and transformation of the CA. According to Suzuki, the CA exhibited the character typical of a political party and supplemented the Kwantung Army in maintaining local security and facilitating local administration. Suzuki argues that the CA served as the foundation of the wartime fascist regime of Japan.[28] Okabe examines the ideology, structure and activities of the Manchuria Youth League (*Manshū seinen renmei*) and the Concordia Party (*kyōwatō*), the predecessors established on the eve of the Mukden Incident. According to Okabe, although the Manchuria Youth League and the Concordia Party were not government organisations, their political enterprises served as an essential feature of Japanese rule in Manchuria. Okabe shows the significance of these two organisations. For the Manchuria Youth League, the engagement of the Kwantung Army and Japanese businessmen in its decision-making process was prominent. For the Concordia Party, it not only shaped public opinion and mobilised popular support in Manchuria, but also facilitated the formation of CA's ideological and political configuration.

These studies have examined the structure and development of CA as a political organisation supported by the Japanese military, but they have neither contextualised its role in rural society nor explored its connections with other control mechanisms. The role of the CA in rural Manchukuo becomes particularly important after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, during which period the organisation became integrated into a broader system of Japanese rural control. I do not challenge the conventional view that the CA acted as a political umbrella organisation of the Japanese Kwantung Army to mobilise popular support for Japanese rule in Manchukuo. Rather, I intend to complement the discussions of the CA by analysing its organisational features of village councils in relation to local self-government in rural Manchukuo. I suggest that village councils within the structure of the CA reflect the degree to which self-government was substantiated in the pattern of Japanese rule over rural society.

The Japanese authorities were well aware of the economic opportunities presented by Manchukuo, and openly sought economic development. The Japanese accomplishment of economic control was achieved principally by the seizure of land resources and the mobilisation of labour. The seizure of land resources was achieved by agrarian control, while the mobilisation of labour was substantiated by labour control.

[27] Hirano, "State-Forging and Nation-Destroying," 54-5.
[28] Suzuki, "Manshūkoku kyōwakai shi shiron-2," 132.

The Japanese authorities were determined to make the agrarian economy of Manchukuo self-sufficient. As the Manchukuo government enforced the industrialisation plan in 1937, the importance of agriculture as a base of industrial raw materials increased. The Japanese authorities also established a rationalised agrarian system in which resources could be evenly exploited to provide sources of income for the state. The Japanese established a labour control system to recruit, manage and mobilise labour. Labour was primarily drafted from rural Manchukuo and North China. The Japanese depended largely on the Chinese labour system for control over the labour force. The Japanese authorities gradually increased administrative intervention in labour control and turned labour service into a compulsory form of service.

Some scholars have analysed the ways of agrarian control by the Japanese authorities in Manchukuo. Kazama examines the agrarian control through the lens of circulation of agrarian capital and state control organisations.[29] Kazama argues that the Japanese capital penetrated into the agrarian market and diminished the Chinese native capital in the market share. Yasutomi argues that the penetration of Japanese power in rural areas was substantiated through financial organisations such as cooperatives, and that the agrarian control through financial strategies was eventually limited because of the resistance of farmers to use the service of the financial organisations.[30] Shibata argues that the financial organisations of Manchukuo failed to establish a firm presence in the rural areas and to penetrate completely into the rural sectors.[31]

The historiography of the labour control in Manchukuo takes an approach that views labour control as a binary discourse of exploitation and resistance. Historians have interpreted the labour control in terms of the nationalist-liberation struggle of workers. The Chinese and Korean labour force is viewed as cheap and unskilled workforce exploited by a discriminatory labour system, while the Japanese management of the labour force is perceived as a form of exploitation of workers. The labour policy of Manchukuo is characterised as being a self-serving policy driven by Japanese political and economic interests. The examination of labour is largely framed in the investigation of the labour relations of the South Manchuria Railway Company (*minami Manshū tetsudō kabushikigaisha*, SMRC). Myers examines the evolution of the industrial labour force in Manchuria, the size and distribution of the workforce, and the

[29] Hideto Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū: Nihon teikokushugi to dochaku ryūtsū shihon*, Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1993.
[30] Ayumu Yasutomi, "'Manshūkoku' no kinyū," Ph.D. diss., Kyoto University, 1996, 175.
[31] Yoshimasa Shibata, *Senryōchi tsūka kinyū seisaku no tenkai*, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 1999, 157.

source and movement of labour.[32] Matsumura, Xie and Eda examine the labour policies of the SMRC enterprises, the life conditions of the SMRC workers, and the workers' resistance movement against the SMRC.[33] Tucker argues that supply of labour and demand for labour created contradictions for the Japanese policymaking in Manchukuo. The contradictions emerged in the early period of Japanese rule and they became sharpened with the intensification of war and increasing economic difficulties after 1937.[34] This thesis complements the previous research on labour control by taking into account the labour relations in the agricultural sector of Manchuria. I argue that the outreach of the Japanese control of labour in rural areas was not facilitated directly by the implementation of labour policy, but was a consequence of the Japanese immigration policy.

As we have seen from the above, in general, over the course of fourteen years of managing Manchuria, the Japanese authorities designed a series of strategies to tighten their control over the rural life of Manchuria. These strategies combined the use of physical force and construction of ruling mechanisms. Specifically, the form of control exercised in rural Manchukuo constituted a sophisticated structure characterised by suppression of patriotic resistance, creation of policing mechanisms, founding of political organisations, rearrangement of local administrative systems, and reorganisation of agrarian structure and labour relations.[35] Overall, control mechanisms reorganised the political, social and economic relations of rural Manchukuo.

Some academic attention has been drawn to the organisation of rural Manchukuo. This scholarship uses the model that focuses on Japanese repression and local resistance to examine the aims, strategies and structures of Japanese control over the Manchurian rural society. The foundational works by Kazama, Che and Li have carefully considered the policies of control machines that operated in rural Manchukuo. Kazama's study surveys the development of control institutions in Manchukuo during the 1930s and 1940s by focusing on the *baojia* system and *jiecun* system, National Neighbourhood Association and the role of the CA in rural control in the 1940s.

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[32] Ramon H. Myers, *The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria: 1932 to 1945*, New York: Garland Publishing, 1982, 158-200.
[33] Takao Matsumura, Xueshi Xie, and Kenji Eda, eds., *Mantetsu rōdōshi no kenkyū*, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2002.
[34] David Tucker, "Labor Policy and the Construction Industry in Manchukuo: Systems of Recruitment, Management, and Control," in *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories*, ed. Paul H. Krastoska, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2005,
[35] Among these structures, the activities of the CA and the National Neighbourhood Association as well as the Japanese labour control were not limited only to rural areas, but extended to urban areas.

Kazama argues that the Japanese control over the Manchurian rural society was a form of weak government in which Japanese policies were inconsistent and subject to change.[36] Che's study on the local administration of Manchukuo is a comprehensive treatment of the Japanese control of Manchurian society. Che outlines the structure and character of the administrative classifications in rural control. According to Che, there were three periods in the development of local government in Manchukuo. Local government in the first period was placed completely under the supervision of police; local government in the second period adopted the model of Japanese local government and in the third period unified multiple control institutions into one single mechanism.[37] Che argues that rural control of Manchukuo was a dynamic system in which various patterns existed and techniques were employed. By locating Japanese rule in the model of conflict and resistance, Li examines various dimensions of rural Manchukuo under Japanese domination: village organisation and structure, transformation of land ownership, and agricultural control. Li argues that the significance of Japanese control over rural Manchukuo lies in two factors. First, in comparison with the Japanese rule in urban Manchuria, the rule in rural Manchukuo was much more intense and cruel. Second, rural Manchukuo was the main battlefield for anti-Japanese resistance led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in which the discourse of invasion and anti-invasion, oppression and anti-oppression, and domination and anti-domination were taking place.[38] Li suggests that the Japanese control over rural Manchukuo was a form of rule characterised by military dictatorship. Rural Manchukuo under Japanese control was a colony established by Japanese military authority. Its outlook should not be viewed as rural landscape formed under normal historical circumstances, but rather as a consequence of external forces. Li divided the extent of Japan's enterprises of rural control into three periods: the early period was a colonial regime established by violence. The middle period was a form of government that adapted to local conditions. In the late period, people in rural society were instrumentalised to back the Japanese war machine and directed towards the path of war.[39] While these works analyse the general structural classifications of the rural control systems in Manchukuo, they have not located the analysis in the context of the socioeconomic conditions of the rural

[36] Hideko Kazama, "Nōson gyōsei shihai," in *Nihon teikoku shugi no Manshū shihai: 15-nen sensōki wo chūshin ni*, eds. Kyōji Asada and Hideo Kobayashi, Tokyo: Jichōsha, 1986, 325.
[37] Jihong Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2000, 232-4.
[38] Shujuan Li, *Riwei tongzhi xia de dongbei nongcun*, Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2005, 2.
[39] Li, *Riwei tongzhi xia de dongbei nongcun*, 19.

society of Manchukuo and have not examined their relevance to the strategic thinking of the Japanese authorities in their rule of Manchukuo.

Taken together, the growing interest in the scholarship of Japanese rule over Manchuria acknowledges Japanese rule not simply as the direct use of force, but as an integrated political, economic and cultural system in which the Japanese authorities exercised their power in various ways. This view leads to the recognition of the multi-directional flow of power and the stronger emphasis on the variety of responses and experiences within the structure of Japanese imperialism.[40] The scholarship dedicated to the history of Japanese policy in Manchukuo has tended to examine the rural control systems developed by the Japanese separately as independent actors in the discourse of Japanese imperialism, and has not analysed the structural transformation of these systems. Moreover, they have paid little attention to the goals, techniques and effects of rural control strategies and their links to the representation and character of Japanese ruling logic. Scholarly examination of the Japanese strategies that does not take into account their social basis may not be able to reflect the essential nature of the Japanese colonial enterprises. Thus, it is worth making efforts to locate control strategies in their social basis. The challenge is to integrate the analysis of Japanese strategies in the broader context of the historical discourse of Manchuria to see how these strategies worked to mould the rural dynamics under the alien rule of Japanese imperialism.

This study attempts to illuminate the origins, nature and extent of Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo. The significance of this study is twofold. First, rural Manchukuo occupied a prominent position in the Japanese goals and strategies of managing Manchukuo. The goals of Japanese control lay largely in the exploitation of human and material resources in rural Manchukuo. It is for this reason that the Japanese power was deeply involved in economic and political activities of rural society. Rural areas also presented tremendous opportunities and challenges to the Japanese rule. Economically, rural Manchukuo as a supplier of foodstuffs was essential for Japan to retain its economic self-sufficiency. Politically, the rural society of Manchukuo was highly unsettled. The active guerrilla activity in rural areas threatened the very foundation of Japanese rule. The economic and political significance of rural Manchukuo made control over the rural area a vital part of Japan's enterprises in Manchukuo. Second, the

[40] For works taking this view, see Sandra Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society*, London: Routledge, 2002, 1931-33; Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 2003; Asano Mariko Tamanoi, *Memory Maps: the State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009; Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

process of control systems at work is a strong indicator of the colonial ideology and practice of Japanese imperialism. By integrating the local into the political and economic enterprises of Japan, control systems consolidated the Japanese rule over Manchukuo. Assuming the important status of rural Manchukuo and roles of control mechanisms in the overall structure of Japanese rule, an examination of Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo contributes greatly to our understanding of the rationale for Japan's imperialism in Manchukuo.

The principal argument put forth in this study is that the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo involved a high degree of political coercion and state violence. The Japanese authorities strengthened their rule over rural Manchukuo by means of counterinsurgency operations, the institutionalisation of systems of rural administration and defence, and the reorganisation of land and labour resources in rural areas. The Japanese rule revealed both effectiveness and limitations. The effectiveness was manifested in the establishment of social order and institutions to serve the needs of control. The limitationss lay in the degree of compliance that the Japanese ensured in the local populace and in the extent to which the Japanese power penetrated into the production relations of the rural society. Another argument is that the Japanese authorities made great efforts to achieve effective control by taking into account local conditions. In doing so, they consistently appropriated, reorganised and restructured control mechanisms in ways that could suit the needs of the Japanese blueprint and social conditions of Manchukuo. In consequence, the Japanese authorities adopted control strategies as experimental ad hoc measures in practice.

The limitation of this thesis lies in its scope and approach. First, this thesis limits its scope to the examination of Chinese, Koreans and Japanese communities in Manchuria. Assuming that forms of Japanese control over other ethnic groups also conditioned the internal logic of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria, this limitation would result in contributing to an incomplete picture of Japanese control logic in rural Manchuria. Second, the approach of this thesis is built on the dichotomy between repression and resistance, so it focuses on the unidirectional flow of Japanese military, political and cultural power in the governmentality of Manchukuo. In other words, my approach does not take into account the broader range of structures through which the Japanese rule operated and the mutual effects of agents, whether individuals or institutions, on colonial governmentality. Instead, the attention of the thesis is drawn to the authority structure of Japan as the ruler, rather than the responses of the local subjects of Manchukuo to the Japanese rule.

The sources used in this thesis consist of a diverse range of materials. One category of sources includes gazetteers and yearbooks published by the Manchukuo government. *Manzhouguo zhengfu gongbao*, *Manshū nenkan* and *Manshū keizai nenpō* are official records of polices of the Manchukuo government. Gazetteers and yearbooks cover not only data on laws, regulations, reports and statistics, but also internal information on the process of making and enforcing policies by local government. In this sense, they provide deep insight into the legal, administrative and ideological contexts in which the rural control was exercised in Manchukuo. Given their official nature, these sources are particularly useful to understand the Japanese thinking about organising Manchurian society. Another category of sources is magazines and journals published in Japanese and Chinese languages in the Manchukuo period. Each publication records articles on the local government of Manchukuo. The main publications are discussed as follows. *Kyōwa undō* is the official journal of the CA published from 1939 to 1945. This journal covers a wide range of topics including not only the policies of the CA, but also local administration and agricultural development of Manchukuo. *Manshū hyōron*, a magazine edited by the Japanese Sinologist and ideologue Tachibana Shiraki, covers articles written by Chinese and Japanese intellectuals, researchers from the SMRC, and officials in the Manchukuo government. Covering the entire period of Japanese occupation of Manchuria, *Manshū hyōron* published between 1931 and 1945 is an invaluable source of information to understand the official and non-official Japanese thinking of Japanese enterprises in Manchukuo. *Senbu geppō* is a monthly journal published by the SMRC from January 1937 to January 1945. This journal is dedicated to the propaganda production and security maintenance in Manchukuo. It covers informative articles on Japanese strategic thinking of and approaches to ideological control in the Japanese management of Manchukuo. *Kōnō* is a journal published by the Central Committee (*chūōkai*) of Agricultural Prosperity Cooperative Association (*kōnō gassakusha*, APCA) of Manchukuo between November 1940 and March 1945. This journal carries reports, statistics and data of Manchurian agriculture in the period of Japan-Manchukuo bloc economy. Its highly official record of government policies is a relatively reliable source of data to examine the conditions of Manchurian agriculture and rural society. *Mantetsu chōsa geppō* is the official journal published monthly by the Investigation Section of the SMRC. The journal covers research articles on a diverse range of topics including land, customs and social institutions of Manchuria. Its academically oriented content is a great source to understand Manchurian society from academic perspectives. Two monthly journals

Minseibu chōsa geppō and *Naimu shiryō geppō,* published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs *(minseibu,* MCA)[41] of the Manchukuo government in the 1930s, contain research articles on the details of government policies and conference proceedings related to the local administration of Manchukuo. In addition to the aforementioned sources, I also draw on a wide range of monographs and general studies on Manchuria published in the 1930s and 1940s. For example, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū*, a systematic study of the local insurgency in Manchuria conducted by the Manchukuo Ministry of Defence Advisory Department (*Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu*) in the 1930s, is consulted in this thesis. This Japanese study includes rich information about the Japanese strategies of political and military domination in rural Manchukuo. In spite of its highly political orientation, this material goes beyond the scope of political propaganda and provides a useful record of the rural society of Manchuria. The above sources are important in the sense of revealing how and why decisions were made for rural control. While the original sources used in this study contribute to our understanding of the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo, they also have limitations. The majority of the materials are sources produced by official organisations, so to a certain extent they carry a character of political propaganda. Their political orientation may result in producing biased and generalised assumptions in these sources.

This thesis proceeds chronologically, moving from the establishment of Manchukuo in March 1932 to its disintegration in conjunction with the Japanese surrender in August 1945. Each chapter has a thematic focus on the aspects of Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo. Taken as a whole, they can be read as a comprehensive analysis of the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo.

This thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter one is an account of the social, economic and political conditions of the rural society of Manchuria at the eve of the creation of Manchukuo in March 1932. This chapter focuses exclusively on such aspects of rural society as the nature of agriculture, the structure of villages, land relations, and population and immigration. In addition, this chapter also analyses the Japanese creation of Manchukuo as an incremental process of establishing Japanese political and economic interests in Manchuria. This chapter concludes that the Japanese interests in Manchuria on the eve of the Mukden Incident were principally economic.

Chapter two examines the Japanese counterinsurgency efforts to maintain public security in the early period of Manchukuo. The chapter examines the local resistance

[41] *Minseibu* (*minzhengbu* in Chinese) was renamed *minseibu* (*minshengbu* in Chinese) in 1937. The characters for "*sei*" refer to politics and livelihood respectively.

against Japanese rule and the Japanese counterinsurgency programs that included military suppression and construction of hamlets for the physical segregation of civilians from insurgents. This chapter argues that the Japanese authorities depended largely upon coercion and violence to maintain public security in the early stage of Japanese rule over Manchukuo.

Chapter three investigates the *baojia* system, a Chinese mechanism of social control that operated in rural Manchukuo between 1933 and 1937. This chapter examines the structural characteristics, application and scope of the *baojia* system, and argues that the Japanese authorities utilised the Chinese mechanism of social control as a tool to extract tax revenue and to build social stability in rural Manchukuo.

Chapter four discusses local self-government in rural Manchukuo in the period of 1937 to 1940. This chapter compares local self-government in Manchukuo with the tradition of local self-government in Japan, and suggests that the local self-government in Manchukuo was a variation of the Japanese local self-government that took into account the local conditions of Manchukuo. This chapter examines the aspects of organisation, administration and finance of local self-government, and argues that in Manchukuo a high degree administrative intervention by the state was involved in the local self-government and that the local government only achieved limited administrative independence.

Chapter five discusses the Japanese control over agrarian circulation. This chapter examines the expansion of Japanese capital in the agrarian system of Manchukuo and the penetration of Japanese administrative power in it. It shows the agrarian transition of Manchukuo from uncontrolled to controlled market mechanisms and direct state requisition and quotas. This chapter concludes that the Japanese agrarian control established a state monopoly over the pattern of agrarian production, the regulation of agrarian pricing, and the distribution of agrarian products.

Chapter six analyses the Japanese control over the labour force. This chapter examines the structure and the working conditions of the labour force, and the Japanese policy of compulsive labour service. This chapter argues that the Japanese authorities exercised increasingly tighter control over labour relations in Manchukuo. In the rural areas, the Japanese immigration brought about change in the structure of the labour force. The Japanese authorities also established a systematic network of control over the labour force through the Chinese system of labour management and the compulsory labour service for the state.

Chapter One: The Social Setting of Manchuria

By the time of the Japanese invasion in September 1931, the territory of Manchuria had been integrated into the sphere of influence of the Japanese empire. The Japanese commercial activities in Manchuria greatly enhanced the significance of the region to the Japanese interests, thus making Manchuria an essential part of the blueprint of Japanese imperialistic expansion. This chapter sets a background for the analysis of Japanese rule over the Manchukuo state during 1932 and 1945. First, this chapter analyses the socioeconomic structure of Manchurian society including its agrarian character, village structure, land relations and demographic structure. Then it examines the process of the penetration of Japanese power in Manchuria from the establishment of economic interests to the creation of the Manchukuo state. This chapter argues that the socioeconomic structure of the Manchurian society served as the social basis for the Japanese management of the Manchukuo state.

The Agrarian Conditions of Manchuria by 1931

The agriculture of Manchuria was characterised by the extensive use of labour, simplicity of farm tools and implements, and the absence of fallow. Farmers aimed to receive a maximum return from a unit of land through the intensive use of labour and a minimum expenditure of capital in the form of animal power and modern agricultural equipment. Farmers usually lacked capital to invest in farm equipment, so they made the tools and implements themselves. In consequence, the efficiency of agrarian production in Manchuria was low.[1]

The agriculture of Manchuria underwent a transition from subsistence farming to commercial farming at the turn of the twentieth century. By the turn of the twentieth century, the agriculture of Manchuria was characterised by self-sufficient farming. Farmers were highly self-sufficient and rarely needed the market for their basic provisions. Because of the extremely low demand for farm products in the market, commercial farming was almost non-existent. The railways constructed in Manchuria during this period created a basis for the development of commercial farming, and transformed Manchuria into an economic unit that was linked to the world through trade. Manchuria began to supply a growing demand for soybean for the international market.

[1] Wolf. Ladejinsky, "Agriculture in Manchuria – Possibilities for Expansion," *Foreign Agriculture – A Review of Foreign Farm Policy, Production and Trade*, vol. 1, no. 4, April 1937, 165.

In the 1920s, millions of soybean products were supplied to Japan, North America and Europe.

The size of farms varied greatly in southern and northern Manchuria, ranging from very small landholdings of an acre to holdings covering several hundred acres.[2] The average size of a farm was seven acres. In reality, farmers in large numbers owned less than seven acres, while a considerable number of them owned no land at all and were compelled to farm on rented land.[3] In northern Manchuria where land was relatively plentiful, the practice of large-scale faming was widespread. In southern Manchuria where the density of farm population was great, the average size of a farm was considerably smaller than in northern Manchuria. The farming was accordingly practised on a small scale.

The main crops grown in rural Manchuria were soybeans, wheat, sorghum, millet, and maize.[4] In 1931, the main five crops accounted for over 80 percent of the total agricultural output of Manchuria.[5] Among the five crops, soybean was the premier cash crop. Soybeans had been cultivated in Manchuria for centuries, but until about the middle of the nineteenth century the output was small and their utilisation was limited chiefly to local consumption. Soybean production increased rapidly with the improvement of the methods of oil extraction from soybeans and the general increase of their usefulness. Wheat was another cash crop grown mainly in northern Manchuria. Its production primarily targeted the domestic market. Sorghum, millet and maize were subsistence crops consumed locally. Sorghum was mostly produced in southern Manchuria, while millet was the chief food crop of northern Manchuria. Maize was the leading crop in the rough lands of southeastern and eastern Manchuria.[6]

The soybean output in Manchuria occupied a remarkable position in the total output of soybeans in the world. In 1930, approximately 60 percent of the world bean products were from Manchuria.[7] In the period of 1927 to 1930, Japan remained the biggest importer of soybeans from Manchuria in the world.[8] By 1931, Manchuria had

[2] Ladejinsky, "Agriculture in Manchuria," 164.
[3] Ladejinsky, "Agriculture in Manchuria," 163.
[4] Zhenan Quan, "'Manshūkoku'nōgyō seisan ni kansuru sūryōteki kenkyū," *Tōkyō keidai gakkaishi (keizaigaku)*, no. 245, 2005, 144.
[5] Quan, "'Manshūkoku'nōgyō seisan ni kansuru sūryōteki kenkyū," 135.
[6] John R. Stewart, "Manchuria: The Land and Its Economy," *Economic Geography*, vol. 8, no. 2, April 1932, 144.
[7] G. F. Deasy, "The Soya Bean in Manchuria," *Economic Geography*, vol. 15, no. 3, July 1939, 303.
[8] See Table 6 in Tim Wright, "The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression," *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 41, no.5, September 2007, 1087.

become the leading source of Japan's imports of soybeans. Beans were used in Japan for industrial purposes.

Soybeans were produced in Manchuria mainly for export. Before 1908, Manchurian soybeans were shipped only to China and Japan. With the extension and expansion of the markets in Japan, China and Europe, soybean production increased very rapidly and by 1929, Manchuria was exporting bean products.[9] As the most important crop in Manchuria, soybean products constituted 77 percent of the total value of all exports in 1898 and declined slowly to about 59 percent in 1931.[10] In 1930, of the total bean output in Manchuria, over 82 percent was exported to markets and offered for sale. Only 18 percent was consumed by producers.[11] Manchuria's export of soybeans grew at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent from 1908 to 1931.[12]

The outbreak of the Great Depression in late 1929 affected the growth of the agrarian economy of Manchuria. In general, the economic depression reduced the demands for the imports of the Manchurian agrarian products. The reduced demand in turn led to the decline of exports, domestic prices and farm incomes, and the rise of unemployment in the agriculture of Manchuria. For example, the soybean prices in Dalian expressed in gold currency declined from 100 in 1929 to 78.97 in 1930 and 46.97 in 1931.[13] The incomes of farmers in Heilongjiang fell from 170 yuan in 1927 to 81 yuan in 1931.[14] As the majority of cash crop was produced in northern Manchuria, the impact of economic depression was felt stronger in northern Manchuria. The export trade in this region declined sharply during 1929 and 1931. Shipments from Ang'angxi fell by 30 percent in 1931 and a further 60 percent in 1931, and those from Hailar fell by more than half from 1928 to 1931.[15] The depressed conditions of agriculture compelled many farmers to sell or lease their land in order to maintain their subsistence. According to a Japanese investigation about the land sale and leasing conditions in Benxi County, land sold in 1930 was three times the land sold in 1929, while land leased in 1930 was nine times the land leased in 1929.[16]

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[9] Ladejinsky, "Agriculture in Manchuria," 167.
[10] Kuntu C. Sun and Ralph Huenemann, *The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 26.
[11] Deasy, "The Soya Bean in Manchuria," 307.
[12] Sun and Huenemann, *The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, 28.
[13] Wright, "The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression," 1081.
[14] Wright, "The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression," 1097.
[15] Wright, "The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression," 1082-3.
[16] Shōbē Suzuki, *Manshū no nōgyō kikō*, Tokyo: Hakuyosha, 1941, 261.

The Social Character of Villages

In Manchuria, villages could be named in various terms such as *cun*, *tun*, *zhuang*, and *bao*, among which *cun* and *tun* were possibly most generally used. The variation in the names of villages is a customary linguistic practice in Chinese.

The Manchurian villages were settlements established as the extensions of kin and lineage relations, which served to strengthen residents' identity and militate against the influence of their surroundings. Settlers usually lived in densely populated villages, surrounded by farmland.[17] The pattern of settlement, as witnessed by Western travellers to Manchuria, was that the clustering of houses formed compact villages, protected by walls made first of mud and later brick or stone and surrounded by fields that expanded from the central core across an unbroken stretch of farmland to the edge of wilderness.[18]

In the Manchurian villages, houses were very close to each other. This was especially the case in central and southern Manchuria where population density was greater. The distance between villages was an average of approximately 2.2 kilometres with 2.52 kilometres in northern Manchuria, 2.29 kilometres in central Manchuria and 1.74 kilometres in southern Manchuria.[19] This pattern of dense inhabitation developed in part because of the need for protection from bandits and marauders, in part because of the need for mutual aid in farming, and in part because of the kin relations among village residents.[20]

The average size of household varied from region to region in Manchuria. The average household had approximately eight members. In northern Manchuria where household size was larger, the average number was 16.4 members.[21] Reports of Japanese investigation show that the most common size of household ranged from six to ten members.[22] Household size was a symbol of social status and wealth. Households of 30 to 50 members were usually landlords, while the average number was 7.3 members in the case of poor peasants.[23]

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[17] Guangyi Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu (1840-1931)," Ph.D. diss., Jilin University, 2007, 56.
[18] J. A. Wylie, "Journey through Central Manchuria," *Geographical Journal*, no. 2, 1893, 449. Cited in James Reardon-Anderson, *Reluctant Pioneers: China's Expansion Northward, 1644-1937*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, 140.
[19] Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu," 60.
[20] Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu," 56-7.
[21] Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu," 96.
[22] Jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Nōson shakai seikatsu hen: Kōtoku gennendo nōson jittai chōsa hōkokusho*, Shinkyō: Jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, 1937, 87.
[23] Jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Nōson shakai seikatsu hen,* 87-8.

According to the statistics published in 1931, the average village household and population in each province of Manchuria was as follows: 629.8 and 3005.3 in Liaoning, 174.7 and 1258.8 in Jilin, 74.3 and 466.8 in Heilongjiang and 275.8 and 1700 in Rehe.[24] This data suggests that the village size in Liaoning was an average of 47 households per village, in Jilin seven households, in Heilongjiang six households and in Rehe six households. The village size of Manchuria, however, seemed to have increased shortly after 1931. The Japanese investigation conducted shortly after 1931 in northern Manchuria, which is presumably Heilongjiang, shows that the average size was 10 to 50 households, among which 30-50 households was the majority.[25]

Age and sex distribution in the demographic structure of Manchuria suggest that Manchurian villages in the 1930s were generally communities of young adults with a noticeably high ratio of males. According to the statistics in 1931, sex division was 117 percent male in Manchurian villages. Sex division was 116 percent male in Liaoning; 114 percent male in Jilin; 126 percent male in Heilongjiang; and 123 percent male in Rehe.[26] The higher ratio of males in sex division can be partly explained by the nature of Manchuria as a society of high population mobility, in which some proportion of the population were single men who came to Manchuria from North China as sojourners for opportunities better than those at home in the 1920s.[27] Age distribution indicates that the proportion of 50 years or less was much larger than that of 50 years or more among all age groups in Manchurian villages. Exact data of age distribution is given by Russian statistics of 703 village households in northern Manchuria. The proportion of age group 1 to 10 was 27.4 percent; of 11 to 20 was 24.8 percent; of 21 to 30 was 14.2 percent; of 31 to 40 was 12.9 percent; of 41 to 50 was 9 percent. The proportion of 50 years or less was 88.3 percent.[28] We can draw similar conclusions about age distribution from the Japanese statistics of villages in northern Manchuria as well. In the selected villages of the Japanese investigation, the proportion of 1 to 10 years was 27.1 percent; of 11 to 19 years was 17.3 percent; of 20 to 30 years 20.3 percent; of 31-45 years 18.6 percent; and of 46 to 50 years 4.3 percent.[29] This data suggests that 50 years or less accounted for 87.6 percent in all age groups. The demographic structure of Manchurian villages

[24] Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu," 45.
[25] The Japanese data suggests that the selected villages for investigation were slightly larger than average in terms of size and scale of economic development. See Jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Nōson shakai seikatsu hen*, 13-5.
[26] Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu," 81.
[27] Ronald Suleski, "Regional Development in Manchuria: Immigrant Laborers and Provincial Officials in the 1920s," in *Modern China*, vol. 4, no. 4, October 1978, 419-34.
[28] Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu," 83.
[29] Jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Nōson shakai seikatsu hen*, 95-6.

exhibited a certain degree of unequal distribution of sex and a tendency of settlement by young residents.

The Manchurian villages developed various forms of cooperation based on kinship, work and other ties. In general, the social network of villages involved three major relationships: kinship, non-kin ties and association arising from informal organisations.[30] Kinship was the basis for village association and cooperation, resulting in work organisation based on lineage and clan. Kinship was also a corporate body serving as an alliance across common surnames and ritual unity celebration. Leaders in the kinship system, who were always male, established rules and regulations to administer community affairs and to supervise the conduct of kin members. As a rule, the regulations encouraged good conduct in the Confucian tradition and imposed punishment in the event of violation of rules. Non-kin ties were established through extended kinship relations and friendship in villages. The formation of non-kin ties was facilitated by the benefits of mutual assistance in farming and defence. In addition, such informal organisations as crop watching associations (*qingmiaohui*) also developed social bonds among village residents. The crop watching association was an organisation formed by villagers for the protection of grain. Initially, village households tried merely to protect their own fields with privately hired watchmen. When this practice proved to be costly, they joined with other villagers to make crop watching a common effort. Households paid a fee according to the size of their landholdings to the village heads, who would in turn use the money collected to hire farmers to stand guard in the fields.[31]

The social functions of the villages divided them into natural villages (*zirancun*) and administrative villages (*xingzhengcun*). The former was a single ecological unit integrated by economic production and social cooperation. The latter was a political unit assuming such administrative functions as tax collection.[32] The village leadership usually consisted of a headman, an assistant, and a village council constituted by four or five farmers. The headmen were local elites of large landholdings. The council members

[30] Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu," 95-118.
[31] Lili Nie, *Ryūhō:Chūgoku tōhoku chihō no sōzoku to sono henyō*, Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1992, 125; Songhai Zhang and Hongbin Wang, "Qingmiaohui zuzhi yuanyuan kao," *Dongfang luntan*, no. 1, 2010, 98-99; Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu," 157-8. For a general introduction to crop watching associations in Northern Chinese villages, see Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, 198-202.
[32] For the distinction of natural villages and administrative villages, see Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, 410.

were the same household heads.[33] The village leaders were accountable to the county official and local police. The main responsibility of village leaders was to manage village finance, school and temple facilities, self-defence corps and crop-watching associations.

The practices of agrarian marketing of farmers turned villages into units of economic production. The relationship of the Manchurian villages with the outside world was established through the marketing activities carried out by the village households. The market was a centre for economic and social exchange. Farmers participated in the periodic markets or standard markets in rural towns to sell part of their crops. On the market day, buyers and sellers came from a radius of several kilometres to engage in the commercial transactions of agricultural products. Buyers were small merchants and brokers. They engaged in bargaining with farmers for better prices. The market created competition that encouraged village households to engage in economic activities, thus facilitating the commercialisation of agrarian production and circulation.

Land Relations

Land ownership went through change in Manchuria. Under the Qing rule, the land of Manchuria was a state property. The government prohibited the sale and purchase of land. In the late period of Qing rule, the government relaxed land sale and purchase, and encouraged Chinese immigration to Manchuria. These measures facilitated the privatisation of land ownership in Manchuria.[34] At the turn of the twentieth century, the privatisation of land accelerated as a result of the change of government. In the period between 1911 and 1931, land ownership went through a rapid process of privatisation and commercialisation. The provincial governments of Fengtian, Jilin and Heilongjiang began to sanction free transaction of land owned by the privileged class of the late Qing government. In Heilongjiang, for example, land privatisation proceeded very rapidly. By 1931, over 95 percent of its land including wilderness had become privately owned.[35] Seeing land as a profitable commodity, many local landlords, gentry, merchants and warlords bought large tracts of land from provincial governments through their economic and political privileges, and became large landowners.

[33] Nie, *Ryūhō*, 125-6.
[34] Anderson, *Reluctant Pioneers*, 15-17; Bingbing Wang, "Jindai dongbei nongcun tudi zhidu," *Lantai shijie*, no. 8, August 2013, 27.
[35] Patrick Fuliang Shan, *Taming China's Wilderness: Immigration, Settlement and the Shaping of the Heilongjiang Frontier*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2014, 50-1.

According to development period, capital investment and labour intensity, the definition of landholdings varied widely in Manchuria. In northern Manchuria, large landholdings were more than 100 *xiang*[36] or between 50 to 100 *xiang*. In central Manchuria, large landholdings were above 500 *mu*[37] or above 70 *xiang*. In some areas of southern Manchuria, large landholdings were 70 *mu* or 10 *xiang*.[38]

Landholdings exhibited a pattern of uneven land distribution. The degree of unevenness developed gradually. According to the 1922 statistics, land distribution was more even in Fengtian and Jilin than in Heilongjiang. Among the total rural households of Fengtian, only 14.9 percent owned more than 100 *mu*; 20 percent owned 50-100 *mu*; 23.8 percent owned 30-50 *mu*; 21.4 percent owned 10-30 *mu*; and 10.9 percent owned less than 10 *mu*. Jilin came next in the scale: 26 percent owned more than 100 *mu*; 22.5 percent owned 50-100 *mu*; 27.4 percent owned 30-50 *mu*; 16.6 percent owned 10-30 *mu*; and 7.1 percent owned less than 10 *mu*. In comparison with the conditions of land concentration in Fengtian and Jilin, the conditions in Heilongjiang were significantly higher. 45.2 percent of farmers owned more than 100 *mu*; 22.9 owned 50-100 *mu*; and 31.9 percent owned less than 50 *mu*.[39]

Table 1.1. Land Distribution in Rural Manchukuo between 1934 and 1935

	Northern Manchuria		Central Manchuria		Southern Manchuria	
	Household	Area	Household	Area	Household	Area
Large Landowners	2.9	50.0	0.2	3.2	4.22	40.42
Medium Landowners	11.2	37.9	16.7	69.0	14.76	35.88
Small Landowners	10.5	10.0	17.5	22.3	15.47	13.71
Minute Landowners	12.2	2.1	16.7	5.5	33.04	9.99
Landless	63.2	---	48.9	---	22.51	---

Source: Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu," 224.

Statistics from 1928 about land distribution in northern Manchuria shows that among all the social class in Manchuria, rich and middle peasants accounted for the largest share of population and land ownership. The proportion of household and landholding is as follows: 26 percent and 3.6 percent for landlords, 65 percent and 53.5

[36] *Xiang* is a land measure equivalent to approximately one acre.
[37] *Mu* is a land measure equivalent to approximately 0.16 acre.
[38] Chong-Sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, 19.
[39] Yumin Li, "Minguo shiqi dongbei xiangcun diquan biandong tanxi," *Lanzhou xuekan*, no. 7, 2014, 38.

percent for rich and middle peasants, 8.7 percent and 35.7 percent for poor peasants. The proportion of wage labour was 0.3 percent and 7.2 percent.[40]

A Japanese investigation conducted between 1934 and 1935 reveals more comprehensive results about the conditions of land distribution of Manchuria. As shown in Table 1.1, the distribution of land was fairly uneven. In northern Manchuria, owners of large landholdings accounted for 6 percent of the number of households, but owned 60.6 percent of total land. In southern Manchuria, owners of large landholdings accounted for 4.22 percent of the number of households, but owned 40.42 percent of total land. In central Manchuria, owners of medium landholdings accounted for 17.6 percent of the number of households, but owned 69.0 percent of the total land.

Table 1.2. The Structure of Rural Social Class in Manchuria

Category	Southern Manchuria (Ten Villages)	Central Manchuria (Ten Villages)	Northern Manchuria (Seven Villages)
Landlord	2.8	11	7.8
Rich Peasant	4.0	0.5	2.5
Middle Peasant	14.2	15.0	14.3
Poor Peasant	14.8	20.4	13.6
Extremely Poor Peasant	23.5	28.7	23.1
Peasant Total	56.5	64.6	53.6
Wage Labour	13.5	17.9	34.4
Migrant Worker	2.3	---	---
Miscellaneous	4.4	6.5	5.3
Unemployed	0.4	---	---
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Manshikai, *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi*, Tokyo: Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi kankōkai, 1964-1965, 716.
Note: the data of landlord is a total calculation that includes large landlord, middle landlord, small landlord and extremely small landlord. The data of middle peasant is a total calculation that combines upper middle peasant and lower middle peasant. The sub-categories of middle peasant are combined because the differentiation of them is unspecified and unclear in the original source.

The rural class structure of Manchuria consisted of landlords and peasants. The acreage of land owned by landlords exceeded 700 *mu*.[41] In general, there were two types of landlords in Manchuria. This first type was called absentee landlords (*buzai dizhu*). Absentee landlords were usually gentry and warlords who rented out their land but did not live in rural villages. They retained a financial interest in their property in rural villages and invested in urban businesses. The second type was called managerial

[40] This data applies to the conditions of rural Manchuria in 1928. See Shoutao Yu, "Minguo shiqi dongbei nongcun de shehui jiegou qianxi (1912-1931)," *Neimenggu gongye daxue xuebao* (*shehui kexue ban*), vol. 21, no. 2, 2012, 8.
[41] Yu, "Minguo shiqi dongbei nongcun de shehui jiegou qianxi," 7.

landlords (*jingying dizhu*). Managerial landlords was an emerging class in Manchuria who attained their initial wealth primarily from hiring wage labour and selling part of their surplus products for profit. Their management of farming was professionalised and specialised, which had increased the agrarian productivity and commercialisation.[42]

Peasants consisted of tenants and wage labour. There were three categories of tenants: rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants. Rich and middle peasants owned an average of 100-700 *mu* per household. Poor peasants owned less than 100 *mu* per household on average.[43] Wage labour usually owned no land at all. They maintained subsistence by providing labour for landlords and rich peasants. In southern Manchuria, a large pool of wage labour was constituted by former tenants who had been forced to sell their land and turned into wage labour. In northern Manchuria, wage labour was often constituted by immigrants from North China who made a living by working on the farms owned by landlords and rich peasants.

The data about the general conditions of class division in rural Manchuria is unavailable. A rough estimate of the class division in rural Manchuria can be seen from a Japanese investigation conducted in the early 1930s that shows the structure of rural class in the selected villages of southern, central and northern Manchuria. As shown in Table 1.2, in selected villages of the Japanese investigation, the proportion of peasantry accounted for more than half of the rural population; the proportion of wage labour came next to that of peasant; and landlord constituted a very small portion of rural population in Manchuria. The high proportion of landlord and wage labour in northern Manchuria suggests that the scale of farming was much larger in northern Manchuria than in southern and central Manchuria.

Table 1.3. The Proportion of Wage Labour (unit: percent)

Category	Northern Manchuria	Southern Manchuria
Wage Labour	34.4	13.4
Semi-Wage Labour Or Extremely Poor Peasant	23.1	22.0
Extremely Poor Peasant and Migrant Worker	---	6.3
Migrant Worker	---	2.3
Total	100	100

Source: Manshikai, *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi*, 719.

[42] Li, "Minguo shiqi dongbei xiangcun diquan biandong tanxi," 39.
[43] Yu, "Minguo shiqi dongbei nongcun de shehui jiegou qianxi," 7.

The regional patterns of landholding pointed to different modes of labour relations. Small landholdings were worked by family labour, while large landholdings required more labour than the ordinary family could supply. The scale of farming in terms of land acreage and number of livestock determined the demand for labour, and shaped the structure of the distribution of wage labour in the rural class relations.

The proportion of wage labour varied considerably. In southern Manchuria where arable land was well cultivated, farming was managed on a small scale and family labour could meet the demand for labour in many cases. In northern Manchuria where there were large areas of land yet to be cultivated, large-scale farming was the prevalent form of farm management. The large scale of farming that was dependent on the intensive use of labour triggered the increase in the proportion of wage labour. According to the Japanese investigation conducted in the early 1930s which is shown in Table 1.3, the proportion of wage labour was 34.4 percent in northern Manchuria and 13.4 percent in southern Manchuria. The difference is about 20 percent, suggesting that labour intensity was higher in southern Manchuria than in northern Manchuria.

Population and Immigration

By 1931, the inhabitants of Manchuria were both indigenous peoples and immigrants. Indigenous peoples were Tungus, Mongols and Manchus who had inhabited the region long before the arrival of immigrants in the seventeenth century.[44] Immigrants were mainly Chinese and Koreans who settled in Manchuria for complex social, political and economic reasons. In 1931, the population of Manchuria was over 90 percent Chinese, with Manchus making up around 3 percent, Mongols around 6 percent, and Koreans, Russians and Japanese the rest.[45]

The rural population that was engaged in the agricultural sector in villages occupied a significant position in the demographic structure of Manchuria. On the eve of the Mukden Incident in 1931, the share of agricultural population in Manchuria was 80 percent.[46] The proportion of farming households in the total households of Manchuria in 1932 is as follows: 82.3 percent in Liaoning, 74.7 percent in Jilin, 78.5 percent in Heilongjiang and 79.9 percent in Rehe. This figure shows that farming

[44] For a short discussion of the ethnography of Manchuria, see Toshihiko Kishi, Mitsuhiro Matsushige, Fuminori Matsumura, eds., *20-seiki Manshū rekishi jiten*, Tokyo: Kabushikigaisha yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2012, 9-17; For a full treatment of the ethnic structure of Manchuria, see Juha Janhunen, *Manchuria: An Ethnic History*, Helsinki: The Fino-Ugrian Society, 1996, 31-90.
[45] F.C. Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 5-6.
[46] Xinzhe Yan, *Zhongguo xiangcun renkou wenti zhi fenxi*, Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1935, 4.

households constituted an average of 78.9 percent in the total households of Manchuria in 1932. Among the employed population that accounted for approximately 50 percent of the entire population, the proportion of the population who engaged in farming was an average of 37.47 percent.[47]

The Chinese immigration to Manchuria started in the Qing Dynasty. Their settlement was concentrated in southern Manchuria where natural conditions, previous acquaintances, and established communities made life seem familiar, comfortable and promising.[48] The Chinese settlement extended only limitedly to Jilin and Heilongjiang in northern Manchuria. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Chinese immigrants began to settle in northern Manchuria to cultivate the sizeable arable land. In consequence, the Chinese settlement expanded from the south to the north. According to one source, the population of Jilin and Heilongjiang increased rapidly in this period. The population of Heilongjiang in 1931 was almost twice that in 1912.[49]

In the early twentieth century, the Chinese immigration to Manchuria was driven by both push and pull factors. Push factors included the disadvantageous conditions of overpopulation, famine, civil war, and banditry in North China. Pull factors were the advantageous conditions of Manchuria, government policies of encouraging immigration, and the accessibility of transport. Manchuria provided immigrants with many opportunities of building railways, working in mines and factories, clearing the wilderness and growing soybeans. Moreover, the provincial governments of Manchuria in the 1920s encouraged immigration to Manchuria. They offered immigrants seeds, inducements of free land, free houses and financial assistance for the purchase of agricultural implements. These opportunities were publicised in Shandong and Hebei. In addition, the accessible water routes and railway network linking North China with Manchuria facilitated the mobility of immigrants and increased the number of immigrants.[50]

While some immigrants found work in urban industries and businesses, the greater proportion of immigrants went to the rural areas of Heilongjiang in northern Manchuria and engaged in farming. According to an estimate in 1927, more than 75

[47] This figure is an average calculated on the basis of Yamanaka's data. See Mineo Yamanaka, "'Manshūkoku'jinkō tōkei no suikei," *Tōkyō keidai gakkaishi (keizaigaku)*, no. 245, March 2005, 187-8.
[48] Anderson, *Reluctant Pioneers*, 137.
[49] Wenlin Zhao and Shujun Xie, *Zhongguo renkoushi*, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988, 510-1.
[50] Fan's study gives an overall analysis of the reasons for Chinese immigration. See Lijun Fan, "Jindai dongbei yimin yu shehui bianqian (1860-1931)," Ph.D. diss., Zhejiang University, 2005, 52-61.

percent of Chinese immigrants settled in Heilongjiang.[51] Because of the convenience of transport and easy access to market, immigrants initially concentrated along the railway lines. As the areas along the railway lines became crowded, new immigrants moved further away into the hinterland to seek for land for cultivation.

Tenancy was a common practice among the arriving Chinese immigrants. The reason lay in the financial conditions of the Chinese immigrants who were often poor farmers and owned small holdings of land at home in North China. The small holdings of land compelled them to lease additional land to maintain subsistence. According to the statistics in 1925, more than 60 percent of the settlers possessed little or no land at all.[52]

The prevalent form of tenancy in Heilongjiang, the area where most Chinese immigrants settled, was the system called *pangqing*. It consisted of two sub-categories. One was *pangneiqing*, under which the landlord supplied land, cattle, house and seed in return for 70 percent of the crop. The other was *pangwaiqing*, under which the tenant met the farming expenses as well as the cost of housing while the landlord supplied only the land.[53] Rent was paid in kind and cash. The rent in kind could be either fixed in amount irrespective of the length of tenancy, or variable depending on the quality of land and the amount of money invested by landlords and tenants.[54]

Korean immigration to Manchuria began as an individual pattern of population movement from the 1860s.[55] Some Korean farmers immigrated to Manchuria to search for cultivable land for farming. After the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, the Government-General of Korea (*Chōsen sōtokufu*, GGK) became the agent of Korean immigration to Manchuria. The large-scale cadastral land survey conducted by the Japanese colonial government in Korea between 1910 and 1918 deprived many Korean farmers of their land ownership, causing Korean farmers to immigrate to Manchuria.[56] Also, there was a rush of Korean political refugees and activists moving to Manchuria to organise an independence movement against the Japanese colonial rule in Korea. By

[51] Shan, *Taming China's Wilderness*, 19.
[52] Shan, *Taming China's Wilderness*, 54.
[53] Shan, *Taming China's Wilderness*, 61-2.
[54] Shan, *Taming China's Wilderness*, 62-3.
[55] For a detailed discussion of Korean immigration to Manchuria, see Yoshiie Yoda, "Manshū ni okeru Chōsenjin imin," in *Nihon teikokushugi ka no Manshū imin*, ed. Manshū iminshi kenkyūkai, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1976, 491-603; Guangri Zheng, "Riwei shiqi dongbei Chaoxianzu 'jituan buluo' yanjiu," Ph.D. diss., Yanbian University, 2010; Shengfeng Xin, "Chaoxianren de Manzhou yiminshi yanjiu," Ph.D. diss., Yanbian University, 2013.
[56] For a short discussion of cadastral land survey, see Gi-Wook Shin, *Peasant Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996, 40-2.

1931, Korean immigrants had settled in eastern Manchuria, the central area of southern Manchuria, the Jiandao region bordering with Korea, and the zones of South Manchuria Railway and Chinese Eastern Railway.[57] Jiandao was the centre of Korean settlement. In 1930, the total Korean population of Manchuria was over 600,000, while the Koreans in Jiandao alone amounted to nearly 400,000.[58]

The government of Manchuria generally deprived the Korean immigrants of the rights to obtain ownership after their arrival in rural Manchuria. Exceptions were made only for the Korean immigrants who had obtained Chinese citizenship. Even though the naturalised Korean immigrants were permitted to own land in Manchuria, their ownership was still insecure. The Chinese authorities could revoke their license in an arbitrary manner.[59]

The majority of Korean immigrants became independent farmers and tenant farmers due to the small number of naturalised Korean immigrants in Manchuria. Among 36,900 households in three counties of northern Jiandao in 1917, only 9 percent of Korean immigrants were naturalised to Chinese citizens. In 1928, only 14 percent of Korean immigrants among 63,479 households in northern Jiandao were naturalised to Chinese citizens.[60] In consequence, the majority of Korean immigrants were unable to own land, so they leased land from Chinese landlords and worked as independent farmers or tenant farmers. In the Hunchun area of Jiandao, the proportion of independent farmers and tenant farmers accounted for 92.3 percent in 1925 and 90.9 percent in 1926.[61]

The tenancy agreement was usually contracted orally, in some cases followed by a written note form the landlord. The length of a tenancy agreement was a period of five to twenty years, or five to ten years, or five to eight years. Rents were paid in either cash or kind. The cash payment of rent was made in accordance with the physical conditions of land. The rent was higher for cultivated land and lower for uncultivated land. The kind payment of rent was practised in the form of crop sharing. Farmers shared some of their crops with landlord as rent payment.[62]

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[57] Zheng, "Riwei shiqi dongbei Chaoxianzu 'jituan buluo' yanjiu," 11.
[58] Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea: Part I: the Movement*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 138-9.
[59] Xin, "Chaoxianren de Manzhou yiminshi yanjiu," 97.
[60] Xin, "Chaoxianren de Manzhou yiminshi yanjiu," 96.
[61] Yoda, "Manshū ni okeru Chōsenjin imin," 540.
[62] Yoda, "Manshū ni okeru Chōsenjin imin," 526, 549-50, 553-4; Xin, "Chaoxianren de Manzhou yiminshi yanjiu," 100-1.

Japanese Interests in Manchuria before 1931

By the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Manchuria had been of great strategic and economic importance to Japan. Strategically, Manchuria was the forefront of defence against Russian Communism and a base for Japan's further expansion on the continent. Economically, Manchuria was a secure source of raw materials and foodstuffs, a market for Japanese goods and prospective outlet for Japan's surplus population.[63] The strategic and economic importance of Manchuria propelled Japan to establish a sphere of influence in the region for imperialistic expansion.

Japan formally established its sphere of influence in Manchuria in 1905 following Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War. At this time, Japan secured a Manchurian territorial base in the form of the Kwantung Leased Territory (*Kantōshū*, KLT) located at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, railway rights in southern Manchuria, and the right to garrison the rail corridor between Port Arthur and Changchun. Japan sent military forces, which came to be known as initially the Kwantung garrison and subsequently the Kwantung Army, to southern Manchuria for the purpose of maintaining security in the region.

Japan consolidated its interests in Manchuria through the monopoly over railway transport. The significance of railway lay in its capacity to wield enormous economic power in proportion to the dependency of the Manchurian economy on its service. Railway was the primary means of transporting iron, coal, soybeans, rice and timber to the ports of Manchuria for export. Traditional overland transport or waterways might provide alternative support, but the speed and security of railway transport offered advantages incomparable with other modes of transport. The technology and capacity of railway in transport enforced a high degree of dependency of economic development on railway.[64]

In 1906, the Japanese government founded the SMRC to exercise its economic and administrative rights in Manchuria. The SMRC stood at the centre of the Japanese project in Manchuria during the period from 1906 to 1931. The company served as a semi-governmental organisation to engage in commercial enterprises in Manchuria. The SMRC was an agent of the Japanese government and as such its operations were subject

[63] John R. Stewart, *Manchuria since 1931*, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936, 36. For the perspective of the Japanese government on Japanese interests in Manchuria, see Gaimushō, *Relations of Japan with Manchuria and Mongolia: Documents B*, Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1932.

[64] Bruce A. Elleman, Elisabeth Köll, and Yoshihisa Matsusaka, "Introduction," in *Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History*, eds. Bruce A. Elleman and Stephen Kotkin, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2010, 5-6.

to the supervision of Tokyo. The SMRC was also a covert army installation because an important part of its mission was the development of military railways and other strategic facilities.[65] In general, the SMRC helped to stabilise Japan's long-term engagement in Manchuria and contributed coherence to Japanese activities in Manchuria.[66]

By placing the SMRC under its supervision, the Japanese government maintained firm control over the organisational structure of the company. The Japanese government retained the authority to appoint or approve all top management officials of the SMRC. The Japanese Prime Minister appointed the governor and vice governor. The board of directors, though elected by shareholders, required cabinet confirmation. The SMRC guaranteed the state a majority interest by mandating a 50 percent share of all stocks to the Japanese government with an additional 1 percent preserved for the Imperial Household. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*gaimushō*, MFA) supervised the company's external relations including business negotiations with Chinese and foreign entities, while the Japanese army exercised authority over matters of direct military relevance.[67] The Japanese government also exercised control over the SMRC through huge government investment. The company's charter initially set its authorised capital at 200 million yen, half of which was subsidised by the government.[68]

The enormous financial support from Japanese government made the company quickly grow into the principal instrument of Japanese economic expansion in Manchuria. By the 1920s, it had diversified into a wide range of subsidiary ventures in mining, manufacturing and trade and controlled the greatest share of Japanese economic activities in Manchuria. The SMRC also financed a large number of industrial enterprises and public entities. Through the SMRC, Japan's economic interests in

[65] Yoshihisa Matsusaka, "Managing Occupied Manchuria, 1931-1934," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, eds. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, 99.
[66] Yoshihisa Matsusaka, "Japan's South Manchuria Railway Company in Northeast China, 1906-34," in *Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China : An International History*, eds. Bruce A. Elleman and Stephen Kotkin, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2010, 46.
[67] Yoshihisa Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, 90.
[68] Tiezhuang Guo, "Shilun Mantie zhi guojia longduan zibenzhuyi he zhimin qinlüe jigou de shuangchong xingzhi," *Liaoning daxue xuebao* (*zhexue shehui kexue ban*), vol. 36, no. 2, March 2008, 104.

Manchuria expanded to the establishment of networks of railways, the organisation of financial institutions and the development of various industries.[69]

The Japanese government policy on the SMRC was poorly coordinated. To be sure, the Japanese government policy evolved largely around the logic of managing the SMRC on business grounds and of protecting the railway rights against competition. However, policymakers in Tokyo often held substantially different views of the venture of the SMRC.[70] Rival agencies often pursued conflicting agendas, either mild or aggressive in the extent and strategy of railway management.

The operation of the SMRC was not always favourable to the Japanese government either. Sometimes the SMRC's activities undermined the interests of the Japanese government. For example, the SMRC offered serious competition to Japanese domestic enterprises for them to launch business activities in Manchuria. The low-cost Fushun Colliery (*Fushun meikuang*, FC), a subsidiary company of the SMRC, constituted serious competition against Japanese domestic producers in the Asian coal market. The SMRC also impinged on the Japanese government policy of facilitating Japanese immigration to Manchuria. The SMRC's hiring practices favoured low-wage Chinese workers over Japanese workers, which reduced the employment opportunities for Japanese and deterred the inflow of Japanese immigrants into Manchuria.[71]

The Manchurian Crisis

During the late 1920s, restiveness began to grow within the Kwantung Army over the foreign policy of the Japanese government towards Manchuria. Although the officers of the Kwantung Army agreed on the terms of maintaining the Japanese sphere of influence in Manchuria, they opposed the anti-military orientation of civilian leaders in Tokyo. Some staff officers of the Kwantung Army considered the Tokyo policy on Manchuria as weak and passive. They favoured a direct control over Manchuria by force.[72]

The warlord Zhang Zuolin, the local ruler of Manchuria, stood gradually in opposition to the Japanese policies. A desire to install a leader in Manchuria who would be sympathetic to Japan led the senior staff officers of the Kwantung Army to engineer

[69] Ramon Myers H, "Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria, The South Manchuria Railway Company," in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937*, eds. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, 101-32.
[70] Matsusaka, "Japan's South Manchuria Railway Company in Northeast China," 46.
[71] Matsusaka, "Japan's South Manchuria Railway Company in Northeast China," 45.
[72] Sandra Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society*, London: Routledge, 2002, 1931-33, 18.

the assassination of Zhang in June 1928. The plotted assassination did not bring an outcome favourable to the Japanese authorities. Zhang Zuolin's successor, Zhang Xueliang, who was far from being a submissive collaborator, affiliated with the Kuomintang government and became increasingly unadaptable to Japanese wishes. Zhang's uncooperative position with Japan was reflected in his nationalistic policies and vigorous economic agenda for the expansion of transport facilities in Manchuria. Under Zhang's leadership, the Fengtian government adopted an active development policy and made several railway initiatives in Manchuria.[73] As the SMRC was the chief instrument of Japanese economic expansion in Manchuria, the Japanese were concerned that the Chinese railway schemes would shade into economic nationalism and that the competition from Chinese railways would threaten the Japanese interests in Manchuria.

The heightened Chinese nationalism during this period also damaged the Japanese interests in Manchuria. In Manchuria, the number of strikes and protests against Japanese businesses increased significantly between 1924 and 1928.[74] Further, several incidents including the Wanbaoshan Incident (*wanbaoshan shijian*) and the killing of Captain Nakamura Shintarō in mid-1931 led the staff officers of the Kwantung Army to think that Japan's relations with Manchuria had reached a point of crisis.[75] The Wanbaoshan Incident started as a dispute that broke out between Chinese and Korean farmers over irrigation rights. The conflict soon escalated into anti-Japanese activities in a number of Chinese cities.[76] Captain Nakamura was a Japanese military officer on active duty in Manchuria. In June 1931, he was captured and shot by Chinese soldiers who believed that he was a Japanese spy.[77] The death of Captain Nakamura inflamed the treatment of the issues of Manchuria in Japan and gave the Japanese military a persuasive argument in using force to settle issues relating to Manchuria. Lieutenant Colonel Ishihara Kanji and Colonel Itagaki Seishirō of the Kwantung Army masterminded a plan to seize the territory of Manchuria by force. On 18 September 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army set off an explosion on the railway outside Mukden to create the fiction of a Chinese attack. The Kwantung Army troops responded swiftly, occupying Mukden the following day and the entire region of Manchuria by early 1932.

[73] Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria*, 363-77.
[74] Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria*, 44.
[75] Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society*, 18-9.
[76] Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society*, 18-9
[77] Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society*, 19.

There existed opposition and resistance between Tokyo and the Kwantung Army in the course of Manchurian policy planning and execution.[78] The position of the Kwantung Army at the time of the Mukden Incident favoured a direct colonial rule over Manchuria. Ishihara and his associates had initially aimed for a plan of three steps. According to this plan, the Kwantung Army would follow the sequence of occupying, partitioning and annexing the territory of Manchuria. Shortly after the launching of military conquest, they began to rethink the goal of a straightforward colonial settlement and to entertain the idea of establishing a client state under Japanese control. The Kwantung Army's insistence that Manchuria be independent from China ran into opposition to the Tokyo policy that inclined towards recognising a regime with formal ties with China. Ishihara's scheme appeared to the officers in Tokyo to be too radical as a solution to the Manchurian crisis. Ishihara and his associates, however, fully committed themselves to the scheme of creating an independent Manchuria in defiance of the military and civilian leadership of Tokyo. Tokyo, fearing that the Kwantung Army would develop into a separate political entity, broadly approved the decisions of the Kwantung Army in January 1932.[79] In fact, the opposition between leaders of Tokyo and Kwantung Army was not so much a matter of difference in policy objectives, but in scope and timing. As far as the objectives of establishing control over Manchuria were concerned, there was marked agreement between both sides that adhered to not only maintaining but also expanding Japan's interests in Manchuria. To a large extent, this agreement undermined opposition between the two sides.[80]

The Creation of Manchukuo

In the aftermath of the Mukden Incident, the Kwantung Army and the Japanese government planned to exercise full control over Manchuria through a guarantee of a special relationship between Manchuria and Japan. The Kwantung Army drafted several blueprints to secure Japan's position in managing the affairs of defence, diplomacy and peace preservation in Manchuria.[81] Their plans for establishing an independent state

[78] Matsusaka, "Managing Occupied Manchuria," 103-4.
[79] Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria*, 377-87; W.G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, 175-94.
[80] Sadako Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria: the Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 131.
[81] There was considerable ambiguity among the staff of the Kwantung Army as to the strategy of Manchurian independence. A variety of blueprints were discussed between September and December 1931. These blueprints included The Draft Guidelines for the Government of Manchuria-Mongolia Republic (*Manmō kyōwakoku tōchi taikōan*) and The Draft Guidelines for the Establishment of a Free Manchuria-Mongolia (*Manmō jiyūkoku setsuritsuan taikō*) drafted

with sovereignty under Japan's tutelage were largely consistent with the policies of the Japanese government. Tokyo agreed with the plan of the Kwantung Army for the establishment of a client state of Japan and for the securing of Japanese interests in Manchuria.[82]

The Kwantung Army also received strong support from important social groups within Manchurian society who favoured the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria. These groups included Mukden businessmen and community leaders, former imperial members of the Qing Dynasty and Japanese communities in Manchuria. First, Mukden businessmen and community leaders were concerned with the stability and prosperity of Manchuria. In their eyes, Manchuria's interests could be best protected by separating from China and establishing an independent state under Japanese military protection. Second, the former imperial members of the Qing Dynasty dreamt of an imperial restoration and attempted to establish an independent Manchuria by organising a small army and preparing an independence proclamation. Third, the Japanese communities in Manchuria such as the Manchuria Youth League called for the creation of a state based on pan-Asian cooperation and Confucian principles of government. These groups all agreed that Manchurian independence was desirable, that a new regime not controlled by any Chinese warlord was essential, and that Japanese military protection was necessary to maintain the autonomy of Manchuria.[83]

The Kwantung Army reshaped the political making of Manchuria. They reorganised administrative organs at provincial level by utilising traditional self-governing bodies. In doing so, the Kwantung Army established local governments headed by prominent Chinese collaborators with Japanese support in Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang respectively. In the light of the disorderly and confusing growth of local self-governing bodies, the Kwantung Army decided to establish an independent organ to guide and direct them.[84] The Kwantung Army organised a Self-Government

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by Matsuki Tamotsu, the legal advisor to the Kwantung Army. Several complementary documents covered such topics as the development of Manchuria, the nature of Japanese advisors, the "internal guidance" policy and the concept of the new state. See Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria*, 121-2; Tetsuo Furuya, "'Manshūkoku' no sōshutsu," in *'Manshūkoku' no kenkyū*, ed. Yūzō Yamamoto, Kyoto: Kyōto daigaku jimbun kagaku kenkyūjo, 1993, 54-5.

[82] The plan was entitled "Shina mondai shori hōshin yōkō." See Donghui Zhao, "'Manshūjihen' to 'Manshūkoku' no setsuritsu," in *Manshūkoku toha nani dattanoka*, eds. Shokuminchi bunka gakkai and Chūgoku tōhoku rinkan 14-nenshi sōhenshitsu, Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 2008, 40.

[83] James Weland, "The Japanese Army in Manchuria: Covert Operations and the Roots of Kwantung Army Insubordination," PhD. diss., The University of Arizona, 1977, 259-63.

[84] Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria*, 119.

Guidance Board (*jichi shidōbu*, SGGB) in November 1931.[85] At the time of its inception, the SGGB aimed to put the local self-governing bodies in order and to improve local economic conditions. Shortly, it developed into an agency of fostering and coordinating the independence movement of Manchuria.[86] By January 1932, the SGGB issued a proclamation appealing to the people of Manchuria to overthrow the government of Zhang Xueliang, to join the Board as part of a popular movement towards independence of Manchuria, and to work together to set up a new administration that would improve the livelihood of people of Manchuria. A series of staff conferences were convened within the Kwantung Army in January and February of 1932 to deal with such concrete issues of preparing and coordinating the establishment of the new state.[87] By 18 February 1932, declarations of independence had been published severing the provinces of Manchuria from the Nanking government and the Kuomintang, and calling for the establishment of a new state.[88] The Kwantung Army proclaimed the founding of Manchukuo on 1 March 1932. Xinjing (Changchun) in central Manchuria was designated as the capital of Manchukuo. Pu Yi was appointed as head of state and to be elevated to emperor two years later. A slogan of "ethnic harmony" was advertised as the guiding principle of Manchurian administration. It called for equal treatment of the citizens of Manchukuo, regardless of their ethnic background.

Reshaping State Administrative Apparatus

By the time of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, four Japanese institutions had exercised administrative control over Manchuria: the SMRC, the Kwantung Army, the Japanese consulates and the Kwantung Administration (*kantōchō*), a civilian agency established in 1919 for governing the KLT. The four institutions in principle engaged in a division of labour. The SMRC engaged in the management of economic enterprises such as railways, coal mines and steel works. The Kwantung Army, which was reorganised from the Kwantung garrison in 1919, took charge in the maintenance of security. The Kwantung Administration, which was subordinated to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (*takumushō*) in Tokyo, undertook the administration of the KLT. The Japanese consulates, under the jurisdiction of the MFA in Tokyo, exercised consular jurisdiction to protect the Japanese residents and businesses in Manchuria.

[85] For a short discussion of the SGGB, see Guizhong Wang, "Guandongjun zizhi zhidaobu shimo," *Riben yanjiu*, no. 2, 1993, 63-6.
[86] Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria*, 119-20.
[87] Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria*, 128-9.
[88] Weland, "The Japanese Army in Manchuria," 270.

This administrative arrangement created disunity for these institutions to exercise power in Manchuria.[89] Although the regulation of the Kwantung Administration enabled the extension of its authority to the areas where the Japanese consulates had been established, it had little authority to supervise the consulates because the position of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was parallel to that of the MFA. There were also conflicts between the Japanese consulates and the SMRC. The president of the SMRC often disregarded the formal hierarchy and intervened in foreign affairs and the activities of the consulates.[90] The Kwantung Army regarded the protection of Japanese interests in Manchuria as one of its primary responsibilities. It also saw itself as an instrument of imperial expansion and armed diplomacy, thus competing with the MFA for leadership in dealing with affairs in Manchuria.[91] However, the influence of the Kwantung Army was largely restrained to military affairs by the other agencies.

After the Mukden Incident, the Kwantung Army eliminated the three competing administrative institutions and installed a governing body capable of overseeing all civil and military affairs in Manchuria. The Kwantung Army directly placed their commander in the top position of the Kwantung Administration. The Kwantung Army reduced the power of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs through a reform in 1934 in which the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was replaced with an office in the Cabinet. It also limited the administrative jurisdiction of the Kwantung Administration to affairs within the KLT. In the same year, the Kwantung Army decreased the intervention of the MFA in the administration of Manchukuo by creating a position of special ambassador and by abolishing the Japanese extraterritoriality in Manchuria. The special ambassador who served in the consulates was made accountable only to the army. The Japanese consulates used to take charge in protecting the extraterritorial rights of Japanese subjects in Manchuria. The abolition of Japanese extraterritoriality eliminated the influence of Japanese consulates in the management of foreign affairs in Manchuria. Although the MFA still retained the right to advise on foreign affairs, it lacked the authority to constrain the Kwantung Army, which reported only to the prime minister.[92] The Kwantung Army also diminished the role of the SMRC in economic planning and

[89] For a discussion of the disunity of jurisdiction in Manchuria with a focus on the MFA, see Barbara Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938*, Honolulu: The University of Hawai'i Press, 2000, 118-26.
[90] Hyun-Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2005, 53-4.
[91] Matsusaka, "Managing Occupied Manchuria," 100-1.
[92] Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed*, 54-5.

development. The Kwantung Army reorganised the SMRC, forcing it to divest itself of the many enterprises it owned and operated, demanding that it only manage the railway business in Manchuria, and insisting that it provide research support for planning Manchuria's economic development.[93] By 1933, the operation of the SMRC had been transferred into the hands of the Kwantung Army. These attempts established the central role of the Kwantung Army in the administration of Manchuria.

In creating an administrative structure for the new regime, the Kwantung Army devoted careful attention to the ways in which its aims could reliably be reflected in practice. Their first attempt was to make an administrative structure in which Japanese officials occupied most significant positions. The government structure of Manchukuo was divided into judicial, control, legislative, and executive branches. The central body in the government was the executive branch that consisted of a State Council (*kokumuin*) and Cabinet departments of civil affairs, foreign affairs, defence, finance, industry, transportation, and justice.[94] The State Council was headed by a Chinese Prime Minister and staffed by Japanese advisors. The commander of the Kwantung Army had the power to appoint and dismiss the Japanese advisors.[95] Below this was the General Affairs Board (*sōmuchō*, GAB), an advisory organ created to handle secret matters, personnel, and budget. Organisationally, the director-general received orders from the prime minister and handled the work of the GAB. The regulations of its departments were entrusted to the director-general for administrative affairs. Thus, the director-general held substantive control over state secrets, personnel matters, and finances, and important state business was decided upon and enacted by Japanese officials arrayed amid these various offices.[96] The Kwantung Army perceived the idea of concentrating important business in the GAB as the best option because it not only conformed to the quest for administrative efficiency, but also indirectly enabled their rule over Manchukuo by controlling those who held real power. Important policies of Manchukuo

[93] Myers, "Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria," 132.
[94] An education department was added to the government structure in 1933. Two years later, a department specialising in Mongol affairs was included in the administrative apparatus of Manchukuo government. See Xueshi Xie, *Wei Manzhouguo shi xinbian*, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995, 216.
[95] Yamamuro, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*, 121.
[96] Susumu Tsukase, *Manshūkoku:"minzoku kyōwa"no jitsuzō*, Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1998, 28; Yamamuro, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*, 122.

were set at regular meetings attended by director-general and chiefs of the GAB who reviewed and discussed bills introduced to the State Council.[97]

Second, the arrangement for exercising power in Manchukuo was also crafted in the Kwantung Army's practice of "internal guidance" (*naimen shidō*).[98] This practice was a system of political tutelage that guaranteed the plans of the Kwantung Army and Japanese government in the political management of Manchukuo. It acknowledged the involvement of the Japanese officials in the political decision-making of Manchukuo. In personnel allotment, for example, the Kwantung Army adopted the principle of controlling the strategic positions with a small number of Japanese officials. "Manchurians" were given top administrative positions and Japanese subsidiary ones, so the government organisation would appear to operate on the basis of the autonomous initiative of the "Manchurians."[99] The GAB was the exception to this rule. In this organisation, Japanese bureaucrats occupied the central positions and Manchurian ones assumed only subsidiary positions. The number of Japanese bureaucrats far exceeded that of Manchurian ones. From the top position of director-general for administrative affairs down, key positions were all allocated to Japanese bureaucrats. Japanese bureaucrats occupied at least 80 percent of these positions; in particular, the Japanese bureaucrats effectively controlled the pivotal functions of finance, personnel and resources.[100] The Kwantung Army found this approach to be practical and beneficial. It could not only soothe the Chinese nationalism and avoiding adverse international reaction,[101] avoid disfiguring the appearance of Manchukuo as an independent state and guarantee Japanese control over the planning and execution of important policies through the supervision of Japanese officials. The agency for enforcing "internal guidance" was the Third Section of the Kwantung Army set up in August 1932. On matters involving important political or administrative measures as well as decisions regarding the selection of Japanese officials, the GAB contacted the Third Section. After an investigation, reception of informal consent was requested in the name of the

[97] Although sources hardly exist to show general pictures of these meetings, Japanese recollections cited by Furuya show that this meeting was an important instrument for the Japanese policy making. See Furuya, "'Manshūkoku' no sōshutsu," 70.
[98] For a general discussion of "internal guidance," see Xie, *Wei Manzhouguo shi xinbian*, 202-4; Shin'ichi Yamamuro, "'Manshūkoku' tōchi katei ron," in *'Manshūkoku' no kenkyū*, ed. Yūzō Yamamoto, Kyoto: Kyōto daigaku jimbun kagaku kenkyūjo, 1993, 99-103.
[99] The term "Manchurians" referred specifically to non-Japanese citizens in Manchukuo.
[100] Yamamuro, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*, 120.
[101] Lüyan Wu, Chuang Zhang, and Kun Wang, eds., *Wei Manzhouguo fazhi yanjiu*, Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfadaxue chubanshe, 2013, 14.

Kwantung Army chief of staff to the director-general of the GAB. The Third Section also retained the authority of personnel appointment and dismissal.[102]

The GAB and Kwantung Army's "internal guidance" played an essential role in the Japanese strategy of administering Manchukuo. The Japanese intent of placing great emphasis on these two elements is evident in the Outline of a Plan for Guidance of Manchukuo (*Manshūkoku shidō hōshin yōkō*) ratified by the Japanese Diet on 8 August, 1933. It was determined that: "guidance of Manchukuo will fall primarily under the "internal guidance" of the chief commander of the Kwantung Army and the imperial Japan ambassador to Manchukuo, and it will be effectively undertaken by Japanese officials. Japanese officials shall become the core for the management of Manchukuo. The present system of the GAB shall be maintained."[103]

Conclusion

This chapter presents an overview of the social setting and political history of Manchuria. On the eve of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Manchurian society was principally an agrarian economy with a growing industrial sector. The chief characteristic feature of the agriculture of Manchuria was commercial farming oriented for export and trade. Manchurian villages acted as units of economic production and social network organised around kinship and cooperation. The unequal pattern of land distribution facilitated the formation of class division of landlords and tenants. Variation in the length of tenancy agreement and the method of rent payment existed in different regions of Manchuria. Change occurred in the demographic structure with the arrival of Chinese and Korean immigrants.

Before 1931, the Japanese interests in Manchuria were primarily strategic and economic. The Japanese authorities established their sphere of influence primarily through the economic activities of the SMRC. The Japanese control over Manchuria represented an incremental process of encroachment. It developed from the establishment of Japanese commercial interests in Manchuria to the political domination through the creation of the client state of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army rose to power rapidly with their military takeover of Manchuria in 1931. After the creation of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army centralised its authority in the state administration and became the main actor in the Japanese rule over Manchuria.

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[102] Yamamuro, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*, 125.
[103] Tatsuo Kobayashi and Toshihiko Shimada, eds., *Gendaishi shiryō-7*, Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1964, 589.

Chapter Two: Maintaining Public Security

After the Japanese military conquest of Manchuria, the Japanese authorities faced considerable popular resistance in rural areas. The resistance grew rapidly to become a security threat to the Japanese rule over the region. As a solution to this situation, the Japanese authorities instituted harsh counterinsurgency programs that included a large commitment of military force and the creation of "safety villages" (*anzen nōson*) and "collective hamlets" (*shūdan buraku*). These measures were created on an ad-hoc basis, rather than well planned with long-term objectives. This chapter examines the conditions of public security, the Japanese military suppression of popular resistance and their construction of hamlets as a means to segregate civilians from physical contact with insurgents. This chapter argues that the Japanese authorities successfully established their authority through force and coercion in the early stage of the state building of Manchukuo.

The Security Conditions

The security conditions on the eve of the Mukden Incident in September 1931 were unfavourable to the Japanese rule over the region. The political conditions were characterised by the rise of Communist insurgency. The economic situation also offered ample grounds for social instability. Economic depression severely affected the farmers, particularly because soybeans mostly for export comprised a large share of the income of farmers. The ravages of war and floods had also wrought economic havoc.[1]

The Jiandao region in Manchuria was particularly unsettled. Its social instability can be explained by two factors. The first factor is the rise of Communism. The Korean Communists began to organise radical activities in Jiandao in the early 1920s. By the time of the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in September 1931, Jiandao had already been the centre of the Communist-directed activities in Manchuria.

The second factor is the severe economic and political conditions that existed for the Korean farmers in Manchuria. Foremost were the issues of land and land rights. After the agreement signed between Chinese and Japanese governments in 1909, Koreans were permitted equal rights with Chinese with respect to land and property in only Jiandao. In other parts of Manchuria, Koreans could not own land unless they were

[1] Chong-Sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, 129-30.

naturalised Chinese citizens.[2] In 1930, 31.2 percent of all Korean farmers in Jiandao were pure tenants, possessing no land of their own, while only 13.7 percent of the Chinese farmers fell into this category.[3] The restriction of land rights and land use for Koreans by the Chinese authorities caused widespread poverty in the Korean communities. The Korean farmers also faced serious suppression by the Chinese authorities after 1925. For some time after the Koreans immigrated to Manchuria, the Chinese authorities supported the Korean immigrants. However, their position gradually changed because they began to see Koreans as an element in Japanese encroachment in Manchuria. In 1925, the Fengtian government and the governor-general of the GGK secretly signed an agreement to control Korean subversives in Manchuria. This agreement stipulated that the crackdown on Communists and Korean independence forces in Manchuria should be conducted through joint efforts of the security authorities of Manchuria and the Japanese police. Because the Chinese officials abused their power in the crackdown on Korean radicals, innocent Korean farmers were sometimes killed, molested, arrested, or driven off from their land.[4]

The difficulties for Korean farmers to maintain a livelihood aggravated social conflicts in the region. Resentment of Korean farmers against Chinese landlords and authorities developed into the Wanbaoshan Incident. The severe economic problems of Korean farmers also made Communism particularly appealing to them. At the time of the Mukden Incident, most Communist Party members in Manchuria were Korean peasants, over 800 out of a total of 1,190 in April 1931.[5] The politically active Koreans in the area caused deep concern to the Japanese authorities. They complained that Chinese officials were so lax that adequate security measures were impossible to apply. In 1930, they asserted that one-tenth of the adult Korean population in Manchuria could be accounted "Communist or sympathetic to the Communists."[6]

After the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931, the Kwantung Army confronted armed insurgency organised by several forces. These insurgent forces

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[2] Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea: Part I: the Movement*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 140.
[3] Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-1*, Tokyo: Kyokutō kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1969, 554.
[4] This agreement was signed by Yu Zhen, the head of the Police Affairs Bureau of Fengtian Government, and Mitsuya Miyamatsu, the head of Police Affairs Bureau of the GKK, so it is known as the Mitsuya Agreement. See Guangri Zheng, "Riwei shiqi dongbei Chaoxianzu 'jituanbuluo' yanjiu," Ph.D. diss., Yanbian University, 2010, 18; Xuanzhe Yin and Lie Tang, "Qianxi 'Sanshi xieding'," *Sheke zongheng*, vol. 29, no. 9, September 2014, 147-50.
[5] Anthony Coogan, "Northeast China and the Origins of the Anti-Japanese United Front," *Modern China*, vol. 20, no. 3, July 1994, 284.
[6] Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea: Part I: the Movement*, 138-9.

consisted of Communists, former warlord armies under the former Zhang Xueliang's regime and local bandits. Among these forces, the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army (*dongbei renmin gemingjun*) organised by the CCP and the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Armies under the leadership of General Ma Zhanshan played prominent roles.[7] The former consisted of small guerrilla units, while the latter consisted of a number of former mounted bandits and soldiers of the army under Zhang Xueliang's regime. In February 1934, the Central Committee of the CCP issued specific instructions to infiltrate the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups in Manchuria, and formed alliances with these groups.[8] In 1934, the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army was reorganised into the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army (*dongbei kangri lianjun*). The Communists took over the leadership of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army, which eventually encompassed the entire guerrilla movement in Manchuria.[9] The Communists gradually absorbed all other forces including bandits and warlord armies into their organisational structures. The reason for the growth in strength of the Communists lay in their superior skills and close ties with the masses. In contrast, the non-Communists was weaker because they paid less attention to the building of bonds with the masses.

The insurgent forces were fighting organisations regardless of their ideological and organisational features. The resistance groups organised their activities throughout Manchuria. Their weapons and ammunition were obtained by disarming the Manchukuo army, police and self-defence units. The structure of command in these organisations was hierarchical. The head had ultimate control over its internal functioning including organising raids and disturbing arms. The Communist and former warlord armies consisted of guerrilla units, intelligence units and divisions of platoons, squads and troops. Bandit gangs consisted of chiefs, deputy-chiefs and other roles. The authority in the groups of Communist and warlord armies was based on ideological and military disciplines, while the authority in the gangs was structured along brotherhood.[10]

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[7] Apart from the aforementioned two forces, other anti-Japanese resistance forces in Manchuria include the Kuomintang armies, workers, farmers, intellectuals and labourers. See Lüyan Wu, Chuang Zhang, and Kun Wang, *Wei Manzhouguo fazhi yanjiu*, Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfadaxue chubanshe, 2013, 194-206.

[8] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience, 1931-1940*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1967, 11.

[9] Jiying Sun and Hanxing Xu, "Hanman kōnichi undō to Nihonjin no hansen undō," in *Manshūkoku toha nani dattanoka*, eds. Shokuminchi bunka gakkai and Chūgoku tōhoku rinkan 14-nenshi sōhenshitsu, Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 2008, 238-58.

[10] Goichi Okamoto, "Manshū ni okeru Chūgoku kyōsantō to kyōsanhi," in *Manshū ni okeru kyōsanshugi undō*, Shakaimondai shiryō kenkyūkai, Tokyo: Tōyō bunkasha, 1973, 47-48, 83-4, 109-10.

The Communist and non-Communist forces both organised widespread guerrilla activities in the rural areas of Manchuria, in which the Communists played a more prominent role.[11] The Manchurian Committee of the CCP began to show interest in establishing a "united front" with non-Communist forces as early as 1932. They sought to bring their struggle against Japanese imperialism in line with the interests of the general masses. Since 1933, the Manchurian Committee of the CCP began to adjust its policy of building a broad united front by following the Comintern's directives of collaborating with anti-Japanese forces of all social backgrounds. The united front was formally established in 1935 and operated under the guidance of the Manchurian Committee. The united front consolidated the strength of the anti-Japanese forces by streamlining the command structure of guerrilla activities and by improving their relations with the general masses.[12]

The Threat of Insurgency

The guerrilla insurgency had several deterrent effects to the Japanese rule over Manchuria. First, the guerrilla warfare weakened the strength of the Japanese army. The insurgents engaged in guerrilla activities on a small scale. They organised small units to destroy railways, cut telegraph and telephone wires, and attacked collective hamlets, small cities and towns, and Japanese and Manchukuo security establishments. Their tactics of minimising losses and exhausting the Japanese forces weakened the strength of the Japanese suppression forces.

Second, the insurgents, in particular the Communists, established alliance with the masses through propaganda. The propaganda appealed to the farmers by fostering nationalism in the masses. The masses demonstrated favourable feelings towards the insurgents and they offered the insurgents material and intelligence support. According to Okamoto Goichi, a Japanese prosecutor in Okayama District Court, the attitude of the masses towards the anti-Japanese forces led by the Chinese Communists was highly favourable:

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[11] Comintern's classification of guerrilla groups of Manchuria in the early 1930s is provided in Lee's work. According to Lee, the classification was made by Wang Ming, the Director of the CCP's delegation to the Comintern in Moscow who was involved in directing the movement in Manchuria since 1932. His classification was as follows: 1) those consisting mostly of the former soldiers of Zhang Xueliang's old Jilin Army, 2) those composed of a combination of army troops and armed civilians, 3) those composed of farmers, who were in some instances also members of secret societies, and 4) those under the direction of the CCP. This classification was largely agreed by the CCP of Manchuria. See Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria*, 168-73.

[12] Li, "'Bandit Suppression' in Manchukuo (1932-45)," 81-2.

> The population in the base area tends to welcome the insurgents, either because they have accepted the propaganda or because they wish to avoid being harmed by them. Some young men are voluntarily joining the insurgent groups. On the whole, the people have favourable feelings towards the insurgents and have been helping them….There is a strong tendency for the masses to reply on the insurgent groups for the protection of their lives and property because the power of the authorities does not extend to their area. The relations between the insurgents and the people are very intimate, and it is difficult to distinguish one from the other.[13]

Third, the guerrilla activities threatened the Japanese strategic and economic interests in Manchuria. The regions occupied by the guerrillas were of vital importance to the Japanese authorities for security and economic reasons. Some of the guerrillas occupied areas adjacent to the Soviet border, where the Japanese began to fortify against the Soviet army. Others occupied areas where the agrarian and industrial resources were vital to the economic development of Manchuria.

The intensity, scale and effect of popular resistance organised particularly by the Communists in rural areas, however, should not be overestimated for several reasons. First, land reform pushed by the Communists could not have achieved much effect in practice. As a main component in the Communist strategies of winning popular support, the land reform appealed to landless farmers by the slogan of the equal distribution of land. However, farmers did not find the radical land reform to be very appealing because their conditions were not desperate and rural Manchuria with vast arable land and low population density still provided them with opportunities for upward mobility in the early 1930s. A study by Ramon Myers shows that in the Manchurian villages settled in 1909, one out of three families that moved into the villages as tenant farmers had already moved upward to landlord and owner-cultivator status by the early 1930s, and a third of 82 families migrating to these villages had become tenant households.[14] Second, the land reform stood against the interests of landlords. The call of the land reform for the confiscation of the land and property of the landlords damaged the interests of landlords, so it could not have received support from them. Third, the appeal for land reform was no more than an ideal that could be obtained only by overthrowing the Japanese rule in Manchuria. Apparently, this ideal was unachievable in the early 1930s, because the Communists at this time were short of funds and weapons to organise massive armed resistance. Therefore, although the anti-Japanese sentiments

[13] Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria*, 249-50.
[14] Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria*, 310. For the original research by Myers, see Ramon H. Myers, "Socioeconomic Change in Villages of Manchuria during the Ch'ing and Republican Periods: Some Preliminary Findings," *Modern Asian Studies*, vol.10, no. 4, October 1976, 610.

were heightened among farmers and landlords in rural areas resulting from Japanese invasion and Communist propaganda, the defect in the Communist strategies and the socioeconomic conditions in rural areas impeded the establishment of massive armed resistance in rural areas.

The Japanese Perception of Security Conditions

The Kwantung Army perceived the reasons for the social disorder accompanying the Japanese military takeover of Manchuria to have rested not only in the socioeconomic conditions of Manchuria, but also in the rise of Communism in the region. First, Manchurian agriculture had been characterised by low-level farming technology, small-scale management, conflicts between farmers and landlords, and the deterioration of agricultural economy. These characteristics constituted the social basis for the rise of insurgents.[15] Second, the rise of Communism added a political and ideological character to the social disorder of rural areas. In contrast to bandits who were relatively easier to suppress, the Communists remained a durable resistance force. They produced propaganda directed towards the general masses to oppose the Japanese rule. [16]

The Kwantung Army applied the word "bandits" indiscriminately to all armed groups that opposed the Japanese rule. These armed groups included simple marauders, secret societies, village defence forces, and the patriotic guerrillas. The Kwantung Army classified "bandits" into Communist, political and mounted bandits. Communist bandits were those who were engaged in guerrilla activities against the Japanese under the leadership of the CCP; political bandits referred to the former soldiers of Zhang Xueliang's regime; and mounted bandits were those who committed criminal acts without any political or ideological inclinations.[17] Communist and political bandits were regarded as the most threatening to the stability of the new regime, and therefore became the main target of Japanese suppression. In fact, only mounted bandits among the three categories could be perceived as real bandits in the conventional sense; the categories of Communist and political bandits were a political stigmatisation as a result of the Japanese perception of the security conditions of Manchuria.

The Kwantung Army believed that changes occurred in the conditions of anti-Japanese resistance forces. The main changes were the decline of "political bandits" and

[15] Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, Tokyo: Kyokutō kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1969, 16.
[16] Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, 4-5.
[17] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, Tokyo: Manmō dōhō engokai, 1971, 303-4.

growth of Communist forces. The Japanese perception of changes was evident in a police report prepared by the Japanese military in 1938:

> The insurgent groups in Manchuria underwent distinct changes in their characteristics after the establishment of Manchukuo. The first transitional period was marked by the strategic merger of the native bandits and the rebellious troops from the local armies, who had maintained distinct identities. The second transitional period was characterised by absorption of these bandits by the CCP on the one hand, and the establishment of political insurgent groups supported by influential political figures in China on the other. The third and final transitional stage was marked by the unification of all insurgents in the territory under the Communist hegemony operating with the slogan of "Oppose Manchukuo and Resist Japan."[18]

The Japanese Military Operations

The primary Japanese response to the anti-Japanese resistance was launching large-scale military operations. These operations were joint efforts of the Kwantung Army, the Manchukuo Army (*Manshūkokugun*) and the Manchukuo police forces. The Manchukuo Army was reorganised on the basis of the personnel of the Northeastern Army (*dongbeijun*) of Zhang Xueliang's regime. The Northeastern Army was a Chinese army that lacked discipline and efficiency. Soldiers often rebelled or deserted and many soldiers barely had any military training and were addicted to opium.[19] The Kwantung Army was concerned with the strength of this army in military operations, so they reorganised this army and placed Japanese military advisors in it. In the early period of 1932 to 1935, the role of the Manchukuo Army expanded gradually from maintaining public order to stabilising national defence. From September 1932, the Kwantung Army required the Manchukuo Army to take partial charge of the maintenance of peace and order in Manchukuo. From 1934, the Manchukuo Army began to engage in the national defence of Manchukuo.[20] By 1935, the Manchukuo Army consisted of twenty-six infantry brigades and eight cavalry brigades.[21]

The Manchukuo police forces were composed partly of members of the Chinese police forces of Zhang Xueliang's regime, and partly of new recruits. Japanese officers and advisors also worked in the police system of large towns. In the period of 1932 to 1937, the Manchukuo police forces engaged in not only the general police functions, but

[18] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 190-1. For the original text, see Chianbu keimushi, "Chian to keisatsu oyobi senden ni tsuite," *Senbu geppō*, vol. 3, no. 10, October 1938, 16.
[19] Li, "'Bandit Suppression' in Manchukuo," 114.
[20] Hidemi Higuchi, "Manshūkokugun," in *20-seiki Manshū rekishi jiten*, eds. Toshihiko Kishi, Mitsuhiro Matsushige, and Fuminori Matsumura, Tokyo: Kabushikigaisha yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2012, 451-3.
[21] Alvin D. Coox, *Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939-1*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985, 67.

also military functions to eliminate insurgents.[22] The Kwantung Army involved the police forces in their military operations against insurgents because it did not possess sufficient manpower to launch the military operations by itself. In comparison with the number of insurgents, the personnel strength of the Kwantung Army was very limited. It is estimated that the Kwantung Army controlled military manpower of only 10,400 men at the most by 1931, and there was a shortage of materials and personnel.[23]

There were three distinct periods of Japanese military operations against insurgents. The first period was between March 1932 and October 1933. The operations concentrated on annihilating the anti-Japanese troops of leaders who supported Zhang Xueliang, the troops of the warlords in Dongbiandao, and the troops in Rehe. In these operations, the Kwantung Army took the leadership role with the assistance of the Manchukuo Army. This arrangement was necessary because the Manchukuo Army was still taking shape in its early stage. The second period began in October 1933 and lasted for three years, in which the Japanese troops were deployed in various parts of Manchuria, the Manchukuo Army was trained and deployed, and the police forces were reinforced. Due to their growth under the sponsorship of the Kwantung Army, the Manchukuo Army and police forces became the main forces involved in the military operations, and the Kwantung Army was only playing a secondary role. The main objective of the Kwantung Army in this period was to exterminate the political bandits. The third period starting in October 1936 was characterised by the growth of Communist forces due to the establishment of the united front against Japanese rule in Manchuria.[24]

The Japanese Kwantung Army along with the Manchukuo Army and the Manchukuo police forces succeeded in destroying large-scale organised resistance by November 1933. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of resistance forces exterminated by the Japanese military suppression, but the Japanese official claims give a rough estimate. The number of resistance forces killed between 1932 and 1933 was over 16,000 and the wounded exceeded 7,000. By the spring of 1933 many of the principal leaders of the resistance had fallen in battle, surrendered, or fled to China or

[22] Jihong Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2000, 60.
[23] Alvin D. Coox, "The Kwantung Army Dimension," in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China: 1895-1937*, eds. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, 408.
[24] For a brief introduction of the military operations undertaken in these three periods, see Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 311-25.

Siberia.[25] The number of insurgents declined further from 50,000 in 1934; 40,000 in 1935; 30,000 in 1936; 20,000 in 1937 and 10,000 in September 1938.[26]

The decline in the number of anti-Japanese forces indicates the positive effect of the Japanese military operations indeed, but it is not to say that the anti-Japanese resistance forces had been exterminated completely, nor does it mean that the threat of resistance forces in rural areas ceased to exist. Rather, there was a strong tendency for the anti-Japanese elements to resort to guerrilla activities against the Japanese military suppression. Although only fractions of the originally active anti-Japanese forces were still in arms by the end of 1934, those who remained had been toughened by their experience in fighting Japanese armies. They had obtained rich knowledge of insurgency tactics and skills of survival, and they resorted to guerrilla tactics in mountains to avoid confrontation with the Japanese forces. Because the mountains and forests of Manchuria lacked transport facilities, large military operations of the Japanese armies became dysfunctional. As a result of the change in the terrain of military operations, the guerrilla activities continued to exhaust the Japanese counterinsurgency operations and the security threat continued to exist in Manchuria.

The Village Programs

In the early 1930s, the Japanese authorities enforced several village programs to combat the insurgency in Manchuria. These programs included the creation of safety villages and collective hamlets by the GGK and the Manchukuo government under the guidance of the Kwantung Army. The aims of the village programs were primarily security and to a lesser extent economic development. By enforcing the village programs, the Japanese authorities believed that it would defeat the anti-Japanese insurgency. The following section will examine the background and structure of these programs in the framework of Japanese security operations, and evaluate the effect of these programs in the Japanese strategies of counterinsurgency.

The Programs of the GGK

After the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, a large number of Korean farmers abandoned their homes in the hinterland of Manchuria and fled to the safe zones along the South Manchuria Railway lines. The number of Korean farmers increased from 2,948 in early October 1931 to 5,843 in late November and 9,428 at the end of

[25] Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria*, 160.
[26] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 189.

December. The number further amounted to 19,304 in mid-February 1932.[27] The Japanese authorities believed that these displaced Korean farmers could potentially join the anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria, so immediate measures had to be taken to accommodate them. In dealing with this situation, the GGK requested the MFA to take measures for the relief of the Korean farmers. The GGK consulted with the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and the MFA, which was put to the expense for resettling the Korean farmers, and made two broad decisions. The first decision was concerned with the provision of financial assistance to the Korean farmers for them to return to their original places of residence. The second decision was to construct villages to accommodate the Korean farmers who were unable to return home.[28] The first decision, however, did not reach the expected outcome. The majority of Korean farmers still remained in urban areas. One reason for the Korean farmers to stay was the widespread Chinese nationalist sentiments against Koreans in Manchuria. At this time, Chinese considered Koreans in Manchuria as the accomplice of Japanese imperialism, and subjected them to killing and plunder. Another reason was the floods that occurred in many areas of Manchuria in July 1931. As a result of the floods, Korean farmers lost their homes in rural areas and had nowhere to go.[29]

Table 2.1. Safety Villages Constructed by the GGK between 1932 and 1935

Village Name	Year	Location	September 1935		December 1940	
			Household	Population	Household	Population
Tieling	1932	Tieling County, Fengtian Province	269	1,235	383	925
Yingkou	1933	Yingkou County, Fengtian Province	1,035	5,461	1,870	4,176
Hedong	1933	Zhuhe County, Binjiang Province	789	3,372	728	1,825
Suihua	1934	Suihua County, Binjiang Province	337	1,314	446	1,142
Sanyuanpu	1935	Liuhe County, Fengtian Province	---	---	172	335
Total			2,430	11,382	3,639	8,423

Source: Renhe Piao, "'Manshū' ni okeru Chōsenjin 'Anzen nōson' ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu- Chōsenjin imin issei he no kikitori chōsa wo tsūjite,"*Hokkaidō daigaku daigakuin kyōiku kenkyūin kiyō*, no. 106, December 2008, 105.

[27] Chōsen sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu nenpō 1931-1932*, Keijō: Chōsen sōtokufu, 1932, 521.
[28] Yongzhe Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, Kyoto: Shōwadō, 2012, 27-8.
[29] Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 28.

It was against the background of the concerns of the GGK over the socioeconomic conditions of the displaced Korean farmers and the security threat they could potentially bring about to the region that the village program was implemented. This program served two functions. Politically, the construction of villages would prevent Korean farmers from having physical contact with the anti-Japanese elements. Economically, it would also provide a form of "protection" to the Korean farmers for them to be self-reliant. The program of accommodating Korean farmers included two parts: the creation of safety villages and collective hamlets. Safety villages were constructed as agricultural production units, while collective hamlets were built as rural security units exhibiting a paramilitary character. Between 1932 and 1935, the GGK built five safety villages throughout Manchuria in a division of three periods. During the same period, it also constructed twenty-eight collective hamlets in the Jiandao region. In collective hamlets, the main crops were soybeans, millet, potatoes and rice.[30]

Table 2.2. Collective Hamlets Constructed by the GGK in Jiandao

Construction Projects	Date of Completion	Number of Hamlets	Primary Goals	Time of Entering Hamlets		Year 1936	
				Household	Population	Household	Population
First Period	September, 1933	9	Refugee Aid	885	4,670	857	4,580
Second Period	March, 1934	16	Security Maintenance	1,373	----	1,538	8,148
Third Period	May, 1935	5	Security Maintenance	478	2,466	478	2,357
Total				2,706	---	2,873	15,285

Source: Yongzhe Jin, *'Manshūkoku' ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, Kyoto, Shōwadō, 2012, 33-4; Zheng, "Riwei shiqi dongbei Chaoxianzu 'jituanbuluo' yanjiu," 51-2.

The supply of funding for the construction of safety villages and collective hamlets came from different sources. In the case of safety villages, the main source of funds was the GGK and the East Asia Development Company (*Tōa kangyō kabushikigaisha*, EADC). The EADC was the largest firm with land and immigration operations in Manchuria. By 1930, it had become subsidiary company of the SMRC. In 1931, the GGK and the SMRC signed an agreement to supply funding for the program. According to this plan, subsidies of 100, 000 yen and 200, 000 yen would be endowed

[30] Chōsen sōtokufu, *Zaiman chōsen dōhō ni taisuru honfu shisetsu no gaiyō*, Keijō: Chōsen sōtokufu, 1934, reprinted in Kingendai shiryō kankōka, ed., *Senzen-senchū ki Ajia kenkyū shiryō 1, shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, Chōsen hen 24: shakai jigyō seisaku 'bōhin jigyō to keizai hogo jigyō'- ijyū to shisetsu 3*, Tokyo: Kingendai shiryō kankōkai, 1999, 40.

to the program annually by the GGK and the EADC respectively as of 1931.[31] Funding for constructing the collective hamlets came mainly from the GGK and the Oriental Development Company (*Tōyō takushoku kabushikigaisha*, ODC), but the Japanese Kwantung Army also provided some financial support. Headquartered first in Seoul and then in Tokyo, the ODC was established as a state enterprise of Japan in 1908. The company's operations in Manchuria started in 1918 when the company set up a branch office in Jiandao region.[32]

Table 2.3. The Supply of Funding for the Construction of Collective Hamlets (unit:yen)

Funding Period	The GGK	The ODC
April, 1933	96,000	96,000
April, 1934	68,000	---
April, 1935	33,000	63,000

Source: Zheng, "Riwei shiqi dongbei Chaoxianzu 'jituanbuluo' yanjiu," 50.

The police forces and self-defence corps enforced strong surveillance in the safety villages. Japanese consular police officers and recruited soldiers were stationed in the villages.[33] The number of police officers assigned to the villages was as follows: 18 in Yingkou, 30 in Hedong, 2 in Tieling, 15 in Suihua, and 200 in Sanyuanpu.[34] The self-defence corps was the village militia. Its organisation was intended to relieve the regular army forces from static defence duties and perform internal security function within villages. The annual report of the GGK in 1935 described the defence within hamlets as follows:

> Under the protection of self-defence corps … [inhabitants] engage in farming and other businesses. When sunset comes, [they] return to their home in the mud wall. At night, [they] shut their doors and stand sentry. [They] take precautions against the attack of bandits. [They] defend themselves and cultivate their land.[35]

The safety villages and collective hamlets were located in different areas. Safety villages were primarily constructed in fortified zones with accessible transport in southern and northern Manchuria. They were scattered along railway lines and around

[31] Zheng, "Riwei shiqi dongbei Chaoxianzu 'jituanbuluo' yanjiu," 42.
[32] Zheng, "Riwei shiqi dongbei Chaoxianzu 'jituanbuluo' yanjiu," 49.
[33] For a brief discussion of Japanese consular police in Manchukuo, see Erik W. Esselstrom, "Rethinking the Colonial Conquest of Manchuria: The Japanese Consular Police in Jiandao, 1909-1937," *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 39, issue 1, February 2005, 68-72.
[34] Shengfeng Xin, "Chaoxianren de Manzhou yiminshi yanjiu," Ph.D. diss., Yanbian University, 2013, 178. Another source suggests that the number of Japanese consular police assigned to station in safety villages was approximately 20 in Yinkou and 40 in Hedong. See Chōsen sōtokufu*, Zaiman Chōsen dōhō ni taisuru honfu shisetsu no gaiyō*, 36-7.
[35] Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 36.

urban areas where peace and order had been largely maintained. The collective hamlets were constructed only in Jiandao where the anti-Japanese resistance was active in Manchuria. Due to the conditions of public security in Jiandao, the Japanese authorities made strict criteria for the construction of collective hamlets. The construction was required to conform to the following standards: first, the hamlets had to be close to the areas where Japanese police were stationed; second, there had to be 300-400 *chōbu*[36] farming land in the vicinity of collective hamlets; third, construction materials had to be easily accessible; fourth, the area had to have the potential to be developed as a base for accommodating Japanese immigrants on their arrival; and fifth, the area had to be close to means of transport and its land could be used for building roads in future.[37]

Safety villages and collective hamlets were both designed to have strong physical structures for the purpose of defence and surveillance, but there were also differences. Safety villages were designed as relatively open structures with mud walls and blockhouses built for defence purposes, an administrative office in the village centre and the stationing of police forces. The average number of households of safety villages was 650 households. The average acreage under cultivation was 1685 *chōbu.*[38] Collective hamlets were smaller in scale and more compact in their physical structure. Each hamlet accommodated only one hundred households on average.[39] Collective hamlets were designed to have the following features: the area of hamlet itself was 5,776 *tsubo*.[40] The hamlet was surrounded by defence walls and ditches on its exterior, occupying an area of 460 *tsubo*; the defence walls were seven *shaku*[41] high and six *shaku* wide; the ditch was three *shaku* wide and three *shaku* deep; the distance between defence walls and ditches was two *shaku*; blockhouses accommodating five people were set up in the four corners of the hamlet; no obstruction objects were allowed to be placed on the road between the hamlet entrance and hamlet houses; the distance between hamlets and defence wall was five *ken*[42]; twenty-five households composed a residential unit and a hamlet consisted of four residential units; residential units were constructed around a square; two households shared a house as a unit; the hamlet head

[36] One *chōbu* is an equivalent of approximately 10 square metres.
[37] Zheng, "Riwei shiqi dongbei Chaoxianzu 'jituanbuluo' yanjiu," 52.
[38] The average is calculated on Jin's data of the situation of the five safety villages. See Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 39.
[39] Chōsen sōtokufu, *Shisei sanjūnenshi*, Tokyo: Meicho shuppan, 1972, 399.
[40] One *tsubo* is an equivalent of approximately 3.31 square metres.
[41] One *shaku* is an equivalent of approximately 30.3 centimetres.
[42] One *ken* is an equivalent of approximately 1.81 metres.

lived on the edge and had his own house without sharing it with anyone; and the distance between houses was six *ken*.[43]

Collective hamlets and safety villages took different patterns of administration. Under the guidance of the GGK and Japanese consuls, the Korean Residents Committee (*Chosŏn inminhoe*) within the hamlets directly administered collective hamlets. The Korean Residents Committee was an organisation established by the Japanese authorities in Manchuria in 1913. It was involved in a wide range of enterprises including the construction of educational and medical facilities for the Korean community and assistance for the Japanese authorities in consular affairs and population registry. The Japanese authorities placed its administration under the direct control of the MFA.[44] Administrative and security affairs of the collective hamlets were managed separately. The former was handled by the hamlet head, while the latter was handled by the self-defence corps in the hamlets. The self-defence corps was governed by the county magistrate at the local level of administration of the Manchukuo government.[45] The Korean Famers Association (*nongmugye*), a self-governing body in which thirty farmers were organised as a unit, carried out the administrative activities of safety villages. The GGK funded the Korean Famers Association in the areas of public welfare, education, medical care and self-government training programs.[46] After 1937, the GGK transferred the administration and facilities of safety villages to the Manchukuo government.[47]

The Manchukuo Government Program

The major problem encountered by the Japanese army after 1933 in subjugating the guerilla groups, particularly the Communist guerrillas, was the existence of a close relationship between the general masses and the guerrillas.[48] The Communists were using propaganda to mobilise support from farmers in rural areas. The Communist propaganda achieved the effect of appealing to farmers to oppose the Japanese rule. According to the diary of Ishigaki Teiichi who served as the vice-governor of Huanren

[43] Zheng, "Riwei shiqi dongbei Chaoxianzu 'jituanbuluo' yanjiu," 53.
[44] Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 98.
[45] Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 39.
[46] Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 39-40.
[47] Xin, "Chaoxianren de Manzhou yiminshi yanjiu," 178; Yoshiie Yoda, "Manshū ni okeru Chōsenjin imin," in *Nihon teikokushugi ka no Manshū imin*, ed. Manshū iminshi kenkyūkai, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1976, 591.
[48] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 25.

County in 1939, the strength of the the propaganda efforts carried out by the Communist guerrillas was their effective exploitation of farmers' grievances.

> The farmers are ignorant, but they are not so ignorant as to be unaware of the destitute condition they have fallen into. The Communists have been appealing to the masses by stressing this fact. The farmers will never follow the Communists blindly on the basis of emotional appeals that are detached from actual life, but when their livelihood, unremitting collective revolt may occur…. We are not afraid of Communist propaganda, but we are worried because the material for propaganda can be found in farmers' lives.[49]

The collective hamlet program emerged from the concerns of the Kwantung Army over the threat of guerrilla activities in Manchuria. In rural areas, the guerrillas had established a network in which farmers and anti-Japanese societies could provide material supplies and intelligence for the guerrillas. In the view of the Kwantung Army, it would be most effective to institute a program in rural areas on the model of village programs of the GGK.

The initiative of the Kwantung Army to build collective hamlets was quite similar to the initiative of the GGK. It flowed from the principles that the problem presented by guerrillas was political in its essence; that an effective counterinsurgency plan must provide the civilians and villages with protection and physical security, and that counter-guerrilla forces must adopt the same tactics as those used by the guerrilla himself. The difference was that the Kwantung Army's program lacked an initiative of social relief for farmers. A document complied by the Manchukuo Ministry of Defence Advisory Department illustrated the position of Kwantung Army on collective hamlets as follows:

> The close organisational connection between "Communist bandits" and "civilians" is the only feature seen in Communist activities…practices of the construction of collective settlements, consolidation of self-defence force, geographical segregation of bandits and civilians by force alone would be very effective [in containing] general bandits and political bandits.[50]

The Yanji Branch of the Government Office of Jilin Province formally proposed the program of creating collective hamlets in 1933. A conference was subsequently held in April 1934 by the Manchukuo government and the Kwangtung Army to discuss the feasibility of instituting the program. The MFA of Japan only showed lukewarm support for the program because a number of problems had emerged from the execution of the

[49] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 222. For the original text, see Teiichi Ishigaki, "Kyōsan chitai ni okeru senbu kōsaku," *Senbu geppō*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1939, 39.
[50] Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, 5.

program. These problems included the difficulty of selecting hamlet inhabitants, the establishment of a defence system, and lack of funding.[51] The Kwantung Army wanted to make the program established in a hasty manner regardless of the difficulties in practice. They strongly demanded the execution of the program promising that the Manchukuo Army would provide necessary support for the construction of collective hamlets.[52] The strong position of the Kwantung Army was derived from their concerns for public security. They believed that in areas infested by insurgents, it was essential to neutralise the masses and create physical separation of the guerrillas from the masses in villages. They expected from the construction of collective hamlets that the farmers would be placed in the guarded confines of collective hamlets in order to separate them from guerrillas.

Table 2.4. Collective Hamlets Constructed by the Manchukuo Government in Jiandao

Construction Project	Year	Yanji	Helong	Wangqing	Hunchun	Antu	Total
First Period	1934	6	6	6	7	---	25
Second Period	1935	10	6	5	7	---	28
Additional Construction for the Second Period		5	---	1	---	---	6
Construction Subsequent to Special Public Security Operations		---	---	5	---	7	12
Third Period	1936	5	5	5	3	6	24

Note: the data of the year when the project was launched is taken from Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 45-6.
Source: Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 43.

The Kwantung Army's position in the execution of the program resulted in the enactment of an edict promoting the construction of collective hamlets by the MCA of the Manchukuo government in December 1934, marking the official commencement of the collective hamlet program. The civilian authorities of the Manchukuo government, rather than the Japanese military, engaged in the execution of the program. They assumed the responsibilities of relocating the homeless farmers to hamlets. By the end of 1934, 36 hamlets had been completed in Jiandao. From 1935, hamlets began to be

[51] Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 44-5.
[52] Jin, *"Manshūkoku" ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 42.

constructed throughout Manchuria. The number of collective hamlets amounted to 1,136 in 1935 and 9,355 by the end of 1937. By 1939, 13,451 collective hamlets had been constructed.[53] The construction of hamlets slowed down only after the end of 1938 when the security conditions of Manchuria had greatly improved. The Manchukuo government decided that the construction work on collective hamlets could gradually cease in pacified areas from 1938.[54]

Compared with the hamlet program of the GGK, the program of the Manchukuo government was larger in scale. GGK's program focused only in the region of Jiandao, but the Manchukuo government's program expanded from Jiandao to other provinces in southern and northern Manchuria. The collective hamlet program was a huge project that forced relocation of large numbers of the population. About one million households or five million people were mobilised and relocated by the collective hamlet program. This figure accounted for over 14 percent of the total population of Manchukuo.[55]

Table 2.5. Collective Hamlets Constructed by the Manchukuo Government in Manchuria

Province	Number of County	Established by April 1936	Planned for 1936	Planned for 1937	Planned for 1938	Total
Binjiang	28	48	514	880	17	1,459
Jilin	12	767	618	254	178	1,817
Jiandao	5	101	24	---	---	125
Fengtian	13	51	120	34	11	216
Andong	8	49	100	50	16	215
Longjiang	6	13	709	15	14	751
South Xing'an	1	330	11	---	---	341
Sanjiang	13	---	83	---	---	83
Jinzhou	6	---	23	---	---	23
Total	92	1,359	2,202	1,233	236	5,030

Source: Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, Tokyo: Kyokutō kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1969, 28.

Although the program was enforced in areas of different geographical and economic conditions, its criteria in the selection of hamlet location and residents were generally uniform. Taking the case of Jiandao for example, the criteria were as follows: the location was in an area where fuel and building materials were easily attainable. An average of five to ten acres of land per family was available within a distance of five *li*[56] from the location. The site for the hamlet was in the centre of the farmland; it was not

[53] Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 159.
[54] Li, "'Bandit Suppression' in Manchukuo," 133.
[55] Li, "'Bandit Suppression' in Manchukuo," 134.
[56] One *li* is an equivalent of approximately 500 metres.

skewed to either side. The hamlet was located on high ground and the land should be dry and safe from flood. It also supplied potable water. The position was advantageous for defence against the attacks by bandits. The villagers had actual experience of agricultural cultivation and were qualified to serve as self-defence corps members.[57]

The Manchuria Central Bank (*Manshū chūō ginkō*, MCB) funded the construction of hamlets. Their funds were distributed in the areas of moving and constructing houses, training and clothing for self-defence corps members, purchase and transport of weapons, ammunitions and sundry items, and general administrative management.[58] A proportion of the total funds was provided to farmers in the form of loans. These loans were generally used to assist the farmers in relocation and constructing new houses. Loans were generally given in either cash or kind, and interest rates were generally 8 to 10 percent a year, with no repayment required for one to two years and with principal and interest payable in instalments for the third and fourth years.[59] Those who had received loans and were negligent in repayment wilfully or through carelessness would be charged with overdue interest in addition to the fixed interest.[60]

Table 2.6. The Number and Accommodation Conditions of Collective Hamlets

Construction Projects	Launching Date	Number of Hamlets	Total Number of Families to be Accommodated	Average Number of Families to be Accommodated per Hamlet	Actual Number of Families Accommodated
First Period	1934	25	2,504	100	2,397
Second Period	1935	28	3,650	130	3,032
Additional Construction for the Second Period		7	---	---	---
Construction Subsequent to Special Public Security Operation	Autumn 1935	12	---	---	---
Third Period	1936	24	2,650	110	---

Source: Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 99.

[57] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 96.
[58] The data of the areas in which funds were allocated is based on the expenditure for the common facilities of collective hamlets. See Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 100.
[59] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 171.
[60] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 97-8.

As indicated in Table 2.6, an average hamlet contained approximately one hundred households. Yet the total number of small households with fewer than twenty households was 40 percent of the entire farming households.[61] In Jiandao alone, there were 3,588 villages of fewer than twenty households throughout Yanji, Hunchun, Helong and Wangqing counties.[62] When such a great number of farmers abandoned the naturally formed villages and congregated in collective hamlets of one hundred households each, it would be reasonable to believe that shortage in land and food would have occurred. In fact, a corrective measure was taken to ease this problem. Small villages of ten to fifty households were built in the Dongbiandao area. They were either within the defence parameter of the regular hamlets or within the cordon connecting various hamlets.[63]

In hamlets, the police forces and self-defence corps who were equipped with weapons and ammunition enforced a joint defence system. In general, more than ten police officers would be stationed in one hamlet.[64] The membership of self-defence corps was compulsory for all males aged between eighteen and forty years. The head of the hamlet headed the corps. They were on full-time duty and rotated on shifts. The number of police officers and corps members occupied a substantial position in the total number of hamlet inhabitants. In Jiandao for example, there were an average of fifteen corps members in the first group hamlets. The number increased to twenty-nine in the second group hamlets.[65]Taking the most conservative figure that a hamlet generally accommodated an average of one hundred families, the assignment of ten police officers and fifteen corps members in one hamlet suggests strong concerns of the Japanese authorities with security.

Table 2.7. The Pattern of Land Ownership in Zhongping Village, Yanji County in 1937

Status of Land	Present Acreage (*tsubo*)	Percent of Total	Acreage before Settlement (*tsubo*)	Percent of Total
Self-Owned	231,000	32	320,800	40.8
Rented	493,500	68	465,100	59.2
Total	724,800	100	785,900	100

Source: Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, 46.

[61] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 138.
[62] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 137; Jin, *'Manshūkoku' ki ni okeru Chōsenjin Manshū imin seisaku*, 42.
[63] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 138.
[64] Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 160.
[65] The average is calculated on the basis of Lee's data. See Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 103.

One prominent feature of the land relations in collective hamlets was the increase of rented land and tenant farmers. As shown in Table 2.7, 68 percent of the land cultivated by the farmers of hamlets was rented. In comparison with conditions before the construction of hamlets, the farmers who tilled land on their own decreased from 40.8 percent to 32 percent and the tenant farmers increased from 59.2 percent to 68 percent. As revealed by Table 2.8, a trend for farmers to degenerate into tenant farmer status is clear. The self-employed farmers decreased from 27.6 percent to 15.5 percent. In contrast, partial tenant farmers who owned land on their own but rented land from others increased from 18.4 percent to 25.2 percent, and pure tenant farmers increased from 51.7 percent to 59.3 percent.

Table 2.8. The Status of Farmers in Zhongping Village, Yanji County in 1937

Landownership Status	Present Number	Percent of Total	Number before Settlement	Percent of Total
Self-Employed Farmers	16	15.5	24	27.6
Partial Tenant Farmers	26	25.2	16	18.4
Pure Tenant Farmers	61	59.3	45	51.7
Agricultural Labourers	---	---	2	2.3
Total	724,800	100	785,900	100

Source: Manshūkoku Gunseibu Gunji Chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, 47.

Table 2.9. Labour and Tax in Zhongping Village, Yanji County by 17 September 1936

Labour and Tax	Cumulative Total		Average per Household	
	Present	Before Settlement	Present	Before Settlement
Compulsive Labour (days)	3,598	700	49.3	9.6
Hamlet Dues (yen)	1436.58	594.60	19.68	8.15
Public Imposts other than the above (yen)	321.51	441	4.4	6.04

Original note: this study investigates the exact figures of hamlet expense, taxes and the number of days of compulsory labour after settlement of farmers of 73 households in a selected collective hamlet.
Source: Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, 50-1.

Compulsory labour and public imposts increased remarkably in collective hamlets. As shown in Table 2.9, the number of compulsory labour days for farmers increased about fivefold over the number of days they had to work in the villages of their original residence. Farmers were forced to pay dues and taxes to the hamlets, the

amount of which was much higher than before.[66] Changes in the demand for labour also occurred in collective hamlets. Compared with the conditions of the original villages of the farmers, the demand for permanent labour decreased from two men to one man, but the number of days of temporary hired labour increased almost threefold from 80 days to 203 days in collective hamlets.[67] This change indicates that there was a trend towards the diversification of labour and shortage of manpower in farming in the collective hamlets. This trend may also suggest that the labour that farmers had to provide was not necessarily limited to farming, but included communal construction of the public facilities of hamlets. The trend of the engagement of farmers in labour other than farming for the hamlets might have reduced the scale of agricultural farming and the demand for permanent labour. In consequence, farmers might have hired day labourers to fill the need in busy farming seasons and contributed to the increase in the demand for temporary labour.

Surveillance was strongly exercised within collective hamlets. One form of surveillance was the implementation of a census.[68] Each inhabitant must be registered in the official record and given an identity card. Family booklets were issued to each household in order to facilitate house-to-house control. Family heads were made responsible for reporting any change as it occurred. The census was a source of intelligence. It was an important piece of information because it would show relations of inhabitants in villages where human relations was generally based on family ties, property and income. The Japanese authorities also registered the fingerprints of male inhabitants aged between sixteen and sixty. In addition, police bureaus within the jurisdiction of villages issued a series of documents to village inhabitants who were older than twelve or fifteen years of age. The documents included residence certificates, travel permits, and shopping and carry-on goods permits. Village inhabitants were required to present these documents to the Manchukuo army officers and Japanese military police officers for inspection when requested. Those who failed to do so would be considered as collaborators of guerrillas and be subject to the penalty of confiscation of their possessions.[69] In the case of shopping permits, the Japanese police set restriction on the amount of goods inhabitants were allowed to purchase. Sellers were prohibited to sell goods to those whose order exceeded the permitted amount or to those who failed to present shopping permits in the actual transactions. Restricted goods were divided into

[66] Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, 51.
[67] Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, 51.
[68] Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 161.
[69] Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 161-2.

four categories: food, clothes, tobacco and opium, and weapon and ammunitions. This type of categorisation was made on the Japanese military assumption of what the guerrillas would most likely to request for the assistance of village inhabitants in material supply.[70] The primary goal of restricting the amount of goods that the village inhabitants could purchase was to cut off the material provision by village inhabitants to the guerrilla forces. In addition, measures of blocking material supply were also taken to restrict the area of farming and cultivation of certain types of crops. The land for the purpose of cultivation in hamlets was reclaimed only within four kilometres on the outskirts of the collective hamlets. There were also areas where the cultivation of crops was prohibited. These crops were normally potatoes, millet and beans that could be immediately consumed.[71]

The construction of collective hamlets varied from region to region, depending on the topography and economic conditions of the area selected for construction. Firstly, hamlets were generally much smaller in mountainous areas than those in the plains. The reason was that in mountainous areas it was very difficult to construct irrigation and flood-control facilities or means of transport to connect the farmers' homes to their farms. Hamlets were usually constructed near roads or at points close to means of transport. Secondly, different priorities were given to the hamlets constructed in the plains and those in mountainous areas. The hamlets constructed in the plains were strategically established as economic units, while those in mountainous areas were established primarily for security reasons. For example, in Fengtian Province where there was a large area of plain, considerations of economic factors were prioritised over security concerns. In contrast, in highly mountainous areas such as Andong and Jiandao, the construction was primarily concerned with security and only perfunctory attention was paid to economic factors. In addition, there was also a difference in funds allocation. While large hamlets received considerable sums of funds for construction, little or no funds were allocated to the construction of small hamlets.[72]

There is no data indicating whether the collective hamlet program was successful in segregating the people from the insurgents. Evidence hardly exists to suggest that there was a direct link between the improvement of the security conditions and the execution of the collective program in Manchuria. The effect of collective

[70] A case study of village surveillance in Dongbiandao in northern Manchuria gives a list of restricted goods, see Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyu-2*, 361-6. For the list of goods assumed to be requested by guerrillas, see Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu, *Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū-2*, 374-7.
[71] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 335.
[72] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 139-40.

hamlets on the improvement of the security conditions of Manchuria could only be assessed from the security facilities and administrative structure of the program. Then it would be adequate to suggest only from the physical characteristics and surveillance of the collective hamlets that the program established a front line in the contest between the Manchukuo government and the guerrillas. It is likely that the program strengthened the presence of the Manchukuo regime in villages by congregating farmers in fortified settlements and restricting the access of guerrillas to the public.

There seems to be adequate evidence to suggest that the economic effect of the program was negative. This was especially true to those farmers who were forced to relocate to hamlets constructed in the mountainous areas where bandits were rampant and the degree of house concentration was high. The small area of cultivation on mountains inevitably led to a shortage of cultivated land, working animals and farming equipment. The increased proportion of families without working animals and farming equipment would have forced the poorer families to depend on others for cultivation and transport, or resulted in the harsher use of human labour and primitive agricultural practices. These situations could have resulted in the reduction in the scale of farming, in the size of landholdings of the farmers, and in the increasing hours of compulsory labour. Thus, it is suggested that the collective hamlet program had an adverse effect on the agricultural economy of Manchuria. The negative effect of the collective hamlet program on the economy could also be evaluated from the conflicts of the timing of the agricultural harvest, farmers' attitude towards relocation and hamlet location. Farmers maintained their existence by cultivating their fields. When they were driven out from their land and forced to move into hamlets, they usually found little land to reclaim there because many hamlets were built in mountainous areas. Further, the considerable distance to the hamlets would have required long hours of commuting. It would have been difficult to expect crop production within the same year of their relocation, because a long period would have been required to reclaim the land.[73]

Conclusion

The Japanese military takeover of Manchuria in September 1931 brought about anti-Japanese resistance throughout the territory of Manchuria. The acts of resistance threatened the Japanese strategic, political and economic interests in the region, and constituted a significant undermining of the Japanese authority. The insurgents fought guerrilla wars to exhaust the strength of the Japanese army. Deeply concerned with the

[73] Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 130.

intensity and scale of the insurgency, the Japanese authorities focused much of their attention on carrying out counterinsurgency operations in Manchuria. In doing so, they engaged in large-scale military operations to suppress the insurgency. The Japanese authorities also implemented hamlet programs to segregate the civilians from the insurgents. As the components of the broader framework of Japanese counterinsurgency in rural Manchukuo, the hamlet programs included two parts that were initiated by the GGK and by the Manchukuo government. Both programs employed a mixture of military, economic and political measures, but the objective was largely military.

The use of military suppression was the principal means of directly reducing the influence of insurgency forces, and it served as the promoting force behind the hamlet programs. Instituted by different actors, under different circumstances and at different timing, the Japanese military operations and hamlet programs demonstrated coordination in the Japanese strategic thinking of counteracting insurgency. The Japanese authorities developed their counterinsurgency strategies on the basis of the assumption that in order to achieve the maximum effect of counterinsurgency operations, the employment of physical force must be supplemented by the physical segregation of civilians from insurgents. The intense and organised Japanese counterinsurgency reveals the increasing concerns of the Japanese authorities over security conditions and the significance of social stability in the Japanese rule over Manchuria.

Chapter Three: The *Baojia* System

After the Kwantung Army succeeded in eliminating the majority of insurgent forces and segregated the guerrillas from the farmers, the remaining major task was to detect and prevent the infiltration of guerrillas into villages and the flow of communications and supplies between the guerrillas and their sympathisers. Because the Japanese authorities were only beginning to establish their power in the Manchurian villages, and the administrative system of Manchukuo was still at a rudimentary level, these problems posed a considerable challenge.[1] The Japanese believed that effective rule should reply on not just physical force, but also on the capacity within village traditions for people to govern themselves. Against this background, the Japanese authorities revived the *baojia* system as a control mechanism in the villages of Manchuria. This chapter examines the application and nature of the *baojia* system by taking into account its legal and organisational structure and actual practice. It argues that the *baojia* as a tool for social control primarily served a temporary purpose of security and defence in the Japanese control logic and practice in Manchukuo.

Precedents – the *Baojia* in the Chinese and Early Japanese Empires

Historically, the *baojia* was a Chinese system of local control that detected criminals and collected taxes in villages. In this system, a number of households were grouped into a *pai*, a number of *pai* were grouped into a *jia*, and a number of *jia* were grouped into a *bao*. The number of both *bao* and *jia* varied according to the locality. Each *jia* and *bao* had its leaders, who were elected by household heads.[2] The origin of the *baojia* system may be traced to Wang Anshi's reform movement in the late eleventh century, but it reached its definitive form in the Qing period.[3] The major functions of the *baojia* were security guarding, taxation and household registration.[4] The limited authority of the central government in villages necessitated the application of the *baojia* in villages. The central government had no formal administrative control over the villages, and they

[1] Chong-Sik Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience, 1931-1940*, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967, 37.
[2] Ching-Chih Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 216.
[3] Ching-Chih Chen, "The Japanese Adaptation of the Pao-Chia System in Taiwan, 1895-1945," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 34, no. 2, February 1975, 393.
[4] Masataka Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai: 'minzoku kyōwa' to hōchi kokka toiu futatsu no kokuze wo megutte," *Ajia taiheiyō kenkyū*, no. 20, February 2013, 39.

only exercised a supervisory function over the administration of villages. The central government had to rely on the *baojia* system for the purpose of local administration.

The *baojia* was utilised by the Japanese as an auxiliary policing system in the colonial administration of Taiwan and the KLT. The Japanese authorities used this system because of their perception that the *baojia* could only be conveniently and profitably deployed in a territory where the Chinese constituted an overwhelming majority of the population. In Taiwan, the Japanese applied the *baojia* system only to the Chinese, not to the aboriginal populations. All the *baojia* officers had to report periodically the number and mobility of their residents to the local police who were stationed in villages. The Japanese also used the *baojia* to enforce their public health programs, to eradicate opium smoking, to repair roads and bridges, and to draft labour for large-scale works. In the KLT, the *baojia* was initially organised as a countermeasure to combat local "bandits" in June 1909 in Jinzhou and Pulandian, the rural region of KLT.[5] All *baojia* units in the KLT, as in the case of Taiwan, were placed under the direction of the local police officers.[6]

The *Baojia* in Manchukuo

For the Japanese authorities, security was a prerequisite to the economic and social development of Manchukuo. At the time of Manchukuo's establishment, security conditions in rural areas were not effectively maintained by the police forces. As early as March 1932, the Japanese authorities established the Police Bureau (*keimushi*) under the MCA as the central organ in charge of public security. In rural areas, the Japanese established a police enforcement system by setting up many police stations. Initially most staff in these stations were former police officers in the previous Chinese administration, and they were directly under the authority of the county governor. However, the police system in rural areas at this stage was limited and inefficient, in part because it had not developed into a unified national organisation, and in part because the police officers who were recruited from the former Zhang Xueliang's regime were often unskilled, illiterate and opium-addicted.[7] The efficiency of the police

[5] Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai," 40.
[6] Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," 225-6.
[7] The low qualifications of the Chinese police officers served as the main cause for the inefficiency of the police system. According to a former Chinese police officer in Andong County, the police forces in Andong had been 80 percent illiterate and largely opium-addicted. The director of the police branch in which he served was illiterate and could only put his seals on official documents. See Jianping Mou, "Wei Andong xian jingcha tongzhi de jijianshi," in *Zhimin zhengquan*, ed. Bang Sun, Changchun: Jinlin renmin chubanshe, 1993, 315. It should

system in rural areas led to problems in integrating the police system with local communities and in governing them effectively. The solution to this problem was achieved by installing the *baojia* system, a Chinese system of self-policing long used by the Chinese authorities in China and by the Japanese authorities in colonial Taiwan.

The *baojia* system was a three-level structure consisting of *pai*, *jia* and *bao*, each of which was headed by a headman and deputy headman. Ten households formed a *pai*, all the units of a *pai* formed a *jia*, and all the units of a *jia* formed a *bao*.[8] Therefore, a village was usually a unit of a *jia*, and several villages were a unit of a *bao*. In general, a household consisting of family members as well as hired employees if there were any was the basic unit of the *baojia* system. A *jia* was an equivalent of a village and a *bao* was an equivalent of a ward (*qu*) within the police jurisdiction.

The heads of *bao*, *jia* and *pai* were charged with similar responsibilities, including the maintenance of peace and order, the making of budget plans and the collection of tax. They were often the head of the local self-defence corps (*ziweituan*) and were directly involved in the operation of the self-defence corps. Meanwhile, the family head was responsible for reporting on security conditions in the locality in which he lived to the heads of *bao*, *jia* and *pai*.

Pai, *jia*, and *bao* were placed under the direct supervision of the police. Police inspectors were authorised to supervise the *baojia* leaders and to approve their appointment to the positions in the *baojia* system. The head of *pai* was elected by the head of each household in that *pai*; the head of *jia* and deputy head of *jia* were elected by the head of *pai* in that *jia*; and the head of *bao* and deputy head of *bao* were elected by the head of *jia* in that *bao*.[9] The head of *pai*, *jia* and *bao* each was assisted by a deputy head who would play an acting role when the head was away for sickness or other reasons.[10] On normal occasions, the *baojia* officers would work with the police in the prosecution of criminals. On special occasions such as village festivals when thieves were active, the *baojia* officers would assist the police in a joint effort to prevent burglaries.

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also be noted that apart from the Chinese police, the police forces of Manchuria at this time also included the MFA police, the Kwantung Leased Territory police and the military police of the Kwantung Army. See Fujio Ogino, "Kaisetsu: Chian ijihō seiritsu, 'kaisei' shi," in *Chian ijihō kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 4, Tokyo: Shinnippon shuppansha, 1996, 748-71.

[8] See Article One in the Provisional Baojia Code in Jihong Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2000, 238.

[9] See Article Three in the Provisional Baojia Code in Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 238-9.

[10] See Article Five in the Provisional Baojia Code in Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 239.

The *baojia* system in practice relied heavily on the mediating role of local elites and it reinforced the position of those elites. These elites were usually landlords or rich peasants who had the experience of working as officials in county government, businessmen, educators and police officers. They shared a set of values based on their acknowledged status and established trust with the rest of society. Under the *baojia* system, local elites usually assumed the positions of the head of *bao*, *jia* and *pai*.[11]

The idea of introducing the *baojia* system into the villages of Manchukuo seems to have originated from the concerns of officers of the Police Bureau about "bandit" incidents in rural areas. As early as May 1932, the *baojia* system was mentioned in the Police Bureau's guideline concerning the construction of Manchukuo's police forces. According to this guideline, in order to achieve a sound effect of peace preservation, it was not necessary for the moment to rush to improve the police system at county levels; rather it was essential to coordinate relations with local officials and to develop such institutions already in existence as the *baojia* system.[12] The importance of introducing the *baojia* system as a means of improving public security was also realised by Nagao Kichigorō, the first director of the Police Bureau who once served in the Kwantung military police. At the first conference of police affairs held in October 1932, Nagao stressed that the *baojia* system could be used as a means to improve public security in rural areas:

> … However, the land of our country is greatly vast, and transport and communications are not convenient either; further, the police forces are not developed yet, from which difficulties of the maintenance of peace and order would be inevitable.… But the conditions [of bandits] cannot be neglected, and the policing functions must be fully demonstrated. [We] must endeavour to study local conditions and be aware of threat in advance so as to implement preventive and suppressive measures. …as a means of preserving peace and order in local society, the *baojia* system may be an effective approach. [I] expect it to be enforced on the basis of study.[13]

The utilisation of the *baojia* as a self-policing system to combat "bandits" was also evident in a report which was sent by the Kwantung Army to the Ministry of War

[11] For an example of the background of elites who served as the leaders in the *baojia* system in Acheng County in Binjiang Province, see Nagasuke Zenshō, "Hinkōshō ajōken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō-1,"*Mantetsu chōsa geppō*, vol. 17, no. 11, 1937, 80-4.
[12] Jilinsheng gong'anting gong'anshi yanjiushi and Dongbei lunxian shisinianshi jilin bianxiezu, trans. *Manzhouguo jingcha shi*, Changchun: Jilinsheng gong'anting gong'anshi yanjiushi and Dongbei lunxian shisinianshi jilin bianxiezu, 1990, 445.
[13] Jilinsheng gong'anting gong'anshi yanjiushi and Dongbei lunxian shisinianshi jilin bianxiezu, *Manzhouguo jingcha shi*, 448-9.

(*rikugunshō*) in Tokyo for review in October 1936. This report stressed the frequency of "bandit" incidents and the need to adopt the *baojia* system as follows:

> …although the Manchukuo state has been founded, the aftermath of the [Mukden] Incident is still unsettled. Yet the state finances are meagre and state institutions are not developed. Particularly in the area of the maintenance of order, no matter how [hard] the Japanese army [tries] to maintain it in sincerity, given either the limitation of their geographical location and financial expenses, or the instigation of anti-Japanese elements, many people have turned to bandits out of [their] self-centeredness and discontent, and also the Russian Communists instigated them to become so, the establishment of the state [of Manchukuo] has become an existence of name only but not of reality. In view of this, it would be the best policy to rely upon the *baojia* system, the self-governing organisation of peace preservation that has a long history.[14]

The laws and ordinances for the organisation and operation of the *baojia* was formulated by the Central Committee for the Maintenance of Public Order (*chūō chian ijikai*), a security apparatus established by the Kwantung Army in June 1933. The committee was primarily charged with the investigation, drafting and reviewing of laws regarding peace preservation in Manchukuo. It was directly administered by the Kwantung Army and its chairman was directly appointed by the commander in chief of the Kwantung Army.[15] At the end of December 1933, the first law known as the Provisional Baojia Code (*zanxing baojiafa*) was promulgated by the MCA as the basic law setting principles for organisation the *baojia* system. To supplement this law with necessary adjustments, several sets of more detailed working rules were produced thereafter. The MCA promulgated the Rules of the Implementation of the Provisional Baojia Code (*zanxing baojiafa shixing guize*) on 17 January 1934, followed by the Understanding of the Implementation of the Provisional Baojia Code (*zanxing baojiafa shixing xinde*) and the Standards for the Baojia Rules (*baojia guiyue biaozhun*) on 3 February the same year.

It appears that the Japanese authorities did not have a long-term plan for introducing the *baojia* system and that they only adopted the *baojia* as an ad-hoc measure for control over the villages of Manchuria. A report issued by the MCA of Manchukuo revealed the temporary nature of the *baojia*:

> To make the *baojia* law a provisional one means that the *baojia* system is not necessarily to become a permanent institution. It is expected that alongside the development of the nation's political and ethical thought, the progress of culture,

[14] Naoaki Tominaga, *Hokō seidoron*, Shinkyō: Manshūkoku minseibu keimushi, 1936, 22.
[15] Masataka Endō, "Chian ijikai," in *20-seiki Manshū rekishi jiten*, eds. Toshihiko Kishi, Mitsuhiro Matsushige, and Fuminori Matsumura, Tokyo: Kabushikigaisha yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2012, 345.

> the improvement of the police system and the perfection of control laws, the time when such institution becomes unnecessary will come. It is our earnest desire that through the concerted efforts between government and people, the time of the abolition of this law will come as soon as possible.[16]

During the period of 1932 to 1934, the Kwantung Army were overall pessimistic in their expectations of the *baojia* system. In the same report sent in October 1936, the operation of the *baojia* system was described with comments such as "practical achievements were really few" and "there was no considerable progress in the first two years after the enforcement of the *baojia* system." [17]

Table 3.1. The Organisational Structure of the *Baojia* System

Province	Year of Investigation	*Bao*	*Jia*	*Pai*	Self-Defence Corps	Self-Defence Corps Member		
						Paid	Non-Salaried Standing Member	Non-Salaried Reserve Member
Jiandao	March, 1936	56	621	7,278	505(4)	55	31,556	
Jilin	March, 1936	172	3,232	54,546	664		59,761	
Andong	July, 1936	204	864	32,029	647	1,609	8,551	240,839
Fengtian	December, 1935	304	3,491	134,724	2,871	881	124,478	704,725
Sanjiang	December, 1935	116	1,401	13,534	616	881	4,676	8,254
Tonghua	The End of 1939	121	875	8,571	---	---	---	---

Source: Hwi-tʻak Yun, Ilche ha "Manjuguk" yŏnʾgu: hangil mujang tʻujaeng kwa chʻian sukchŏng kongjak, Seoul: Ilchogak, 1996, 204.

The Manchukuo government attempted to improve the effect of the *baojia* system in practice. The first attempt was to strengthen the police role in supervising the operation of the *baojia* system. In December 1934, the Kwantung Army set up judicial divisions (*shihōka*) in the Police Bureau of the Manchukuo government and provincial police departments to administer the operation of the *baojia*. The second attempt was to make a three-year plan in which a certain number of counties were designated for the introduction of special programs. According to a plan carried out by the MCA in July 1935, the government designated fifty counties in the country as the special regions for the implementation of the *baojia* and assigned professional officials to these counties to oversee the enforcement of the *baojia*. The third attempt was to expand the ideological

[16] Manshūkoku minseibu, *Hokō seido gaisetsu*, Shinkyō: Manshūkoku minseibu keimushi, 1934, 20.
[17] Tominaga, *Hokō seidoron*, 72.

effect of the *baojia* system. During the period of 1935 and 1937, the Manchukuo government organised workshops for training police officers in the country. In the meantime, the government produced propaganda with messages of the basic instructional introduction of the *baojia* directed towards the general public.[18] This period was also the heyday of the development of the *baojia* system. As shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, the number of *bao, jia, pai* and self-defence corps had amounted to significantly large numbers by the late 1930s. The number of *pai* for example, exceeded 440,000 in 1935. Assuming that 10 households constituted a unit of *pai*, then the households under the direct control of the *baojia* system would have amounted to 4,400,000 in 1935. This figure was a significant proportion of the total population of Manchukuo.

Table 3.2. The Extent of the *Baojia* System in Manchukuo at the End of 1935

Province/ Special City	*Bao*	*Jia*	*Pai*	Self-Defence Corps
Jilin	140	2,122	54,207	793
Longjiang	199	2,943	29,231	702
Heihe	20	118	1,092	41
Sanjiang	116	1,401	13,534	616
Binjiang	216	5,204	59,842	2,078
Jiandao	52	196	6,907	320
Andong	105	952	33,539	708
Fengtian	340	3,482	134,742	2,817
Jinzhou	94	870	53,938	692
Rehe	89	1,755	37,102	648
Xinjing	33	281	7,972	102
Harbin	12	279	4,907	280
North Manchuria Special Region	33	296	3,202	64
Total	1,458	19,900	440,197	9,861

Source: Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai," 43.

Collective Responsibility

Collective responsibility was a central element in the structure of the *baojia* system in Manchukuo. Collective responsibility was a form of mutual obligation whereby other

[18] Jilinsheng gong'anting gong'anshi yanjiushi and Dongbei lunxian shisinianshi jilin bianxiezu, *Manzhouguo jingcha shi*, 214-5.

household members would be held jointly responsible for the misdeed of an individual of the household, whether or not they had been directly concerned in the misdeed in question, because of their overall duty of supervision, which might or might not involve direct action. In some cases, the police inspector within whose jurisdiction the crime was committed was also held responsible.

The practice of collective responsibility ruled out the possibility of asserting complete independence of action. Jurists adopted this concept that responsibility for a given act extended beyond the individual actor in legal practices. According to this view, the illegal action of a single person could lead not only to the punishment of that person, but also to the punishment of many others held guilty merely by virtue of their association with the wrongdoer. Given the institutional centrality of the family, kinship was the base for the imputation of collective responsibility.[19]

The main crimes in which collective responsibility was most frequently invoked involved offences that directly affected the state and public security. Specifically, collective responsibility was attached to civil strife; abetting outsiders in troublemaking; endangering the public; violations of laws on national security. Sanctions incurred as the result of collective responsibility were imposed in the form of a fine. The fine would be imposed on the family head of the wrongdoer and the amount of the fine would be under two yuan. The amount of the fine was a huge sum of money, accounting for approximately 7 percent of the farmers' annual income.[20] However, the fine might also be reduced or waived in the following cases: inhabitants had informed the local police of the occurrence of crimes; or inhabitants had prevented harm caused by crime from happening; criminals have confessed to the local police before they were discovered.[21]

The application of collective responsibility in the *baojia* system mirrored the developmental nature of Manchukuo's legal practices. After the founding of Manchukuo, a variety of actors in Japan and Manchukuo sought to make use of law as a civilising agent, as a tool for the reform of thought, custom, and spirit. A modern legal system developed quickly on the models of laws of Japan, and colonial Taiwan and

[19] Joanna Waley-Cohen, "Collective Responsibility in Qing Criminal Law," in *The Limits of the Rule of Law in China*, eds. Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman, and R. Kent Guy, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000, 112.

[20] According to the Japanese investigation of 569 households of ten villages in ten counties in southern Manchuria in the mid-1930s, the average annual income of a farmer was 27.87 yuan. See Manshūkoku jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Hokuman nanman nōson jittai chōsa hōkokusho: sozei kōka hen*, Shinkyō: Jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, 1937, 340.

[21] See Article Nine in the Provisional Baojia Code in Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 240; Manshūkoku minseibu, *Hokō seido gaisetsu*, 34-40.

Korea.[22] Although modern legal institutions were established by the Manchukuo government, their underdeveloped nature left laws inherently weak. Collective responsibility was one of the developmental features of the legal practices of Manchukuo. It was functionally utilised as a deterrent to crime and sedition. The Japanese authorities exercised collective responsibility as an instrumentalist tool because they were unable to keep sufficient surveillance of a village community to be able to detect individuals and because they had little faith in the sympathy of the Manchukuo population towards their rule.

Household Control

When the *baojia* system was in place, the Manchukuo government neither applied any law on population registry nor had any official record of its population. It was not until 1940 that the Manchukuo government implemented a law on the registration of its nationals.[23] The absence of legal institutions concerning population made it difficult for the Manchukuo government to manage the demographic structure of the state, and perhaps more important, to monitor the identifying information and mobility of rural population in a period of social instability. In order to investigate the conditions of population, the Manchukuo government promulgated a series of ordinances as the legal basis for the investigation. On 7 February 1934, the MCA issued an ordinance for carrying out a household registry. On 3 August the same year, the ordinance was revised but not until 22 September did the Manchukuo government officially announce the ordinance to the public.[24]

As a legal supplementary agency of the local administration, the *baojia* system functioned to assist the police in registering households of villages. In carrying out the household registry, the police was to be the main force and the heads of *bao, jia* and *pai* of villages were to assist the police. The head of a village was to keep a record on the households and residents of his community. If a change in household members or structure was reported to them, they would report the change to the police officer in charge.

The household registers in the possession of the police were the basic records of local population and served as the basis for a modern population census. As a

[22] Thomas Dubois, "Rule of Law in Brave New Empire: Legal Rhetoric and Practice in Manchukuo," *Law and History Review*, vol. 26, no. 2, 2008, 288.
[23] Masataka Endō, "Manshūkoku ni okeru mibun shōmei to Nihon jinmin: kosekihō, minsekihō, kiryūhō no renkei," *Ajia kenkyū*, vol. 56, no. 3, July 2010, 1-11.
[24] Tominaga, *Hokō seidoron*, 62.

comprehensive source of intelligence on the local population, the household registers included the following information of the household members: name, current place of residence, occupation, place of birth, original place of residence, ethnicity, religion, and relationship to the household head. In addition, the government made a detailed list of people whom they considered to constitute a threat to the public security of the state and to be necessary for the special attention of the police. These people included those who were described as "politically active" and "morally corrupt".[25] The household registry was normally carried out more than once in every six months. However, the police would carry out the household registry more than once in a month if they found the local security conditions to be unstable.[26]

Tax and Finance in the *Baojia* System

In the early period after Manchukuo's establishment, the state control over tax collection was very limited. The remittance of tax and the communication between different levels of government on tax collection were both poorly organised.[27] It was not until 1934 that the Manchukuo government put in place a tax collection system. By 1934, two organs had been established by the Manchukuo government for the purpose of tax collection: the Tax Collection Bureau (*shuijuanju*) and the financial affairs department in county government offices. The former was responsible for the collection of state tax, while the latter was charged with the collection of county and village tax. In fact, the financial affairs department of many county government offices also collected state tax.[28]

The Manchukuo government commonly levied three categories of tax from villages: state tax, county tax and village tax. State tax included land tax and other taxes on livestock, grain and agricultural produce. County tax comprised a variety of business and sales taxes including butchering taxes on meat and fish, and a stunning array of taxes levied against establishments such as shop taxes and entertainment fees. The Manchukuo government also expanded their revenue sources by levying surcharges on state and county tax. Although the type and rate of state and county tax varied from

[25] Tominaga, *Hokō seidoron*, 125-38; Masataka Endō, *Kindai Nihon no shokuminchi tōchi ni okeru kokuseki to koseki: Manshū, Chōsen, Taiwan*, Tokyo: Akashi shōten, 2010, 255.
[26] Tominaga, *Hokō seidoron*, 62-3.
[27] Susumu Tsukase, "Manshūkoku shakai he no Nihon tōchiryoku no shintō," in *Chūgoku no chiiki seiken to Nihon no tōchi*, eds. Mitsuyoshi Himeda and Tatsuo Yamada, Tokyo: Keiojuku daigaku shuppankai, 2006, 124; Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū keizai nenpō*, Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1933, 307.
[28] Xiang Chen, "'Manshūkoku' shoki no nōson sozei kōka ni kansuru kōsatsu: hokuman chihō wo chūshin ni," *Gendai shakai bunka kenkyū*, no.48, July 2010, 57.

region to region, they were generally formalised by the government and placed under the control of the bureaucracy. Legal sanction was particularly given to the practice of making land taxes the main revenue of government. In contrast to state and county tax, more liberty was given to setting the criteria for village tax, so its type and rate was unfixed and varied from village to village. In general, the main component of village tax was the *baojia* dues, followed by self-defence corps fees, crop-watching fees, household fees and other miscellaneous fees. There was variation in the basis on which tax was collected. The *baojia* dues were collected on the basis of the acreage of landholdings. The more extensive the landholdings one owned, the more tax would be collected from one. Some other types of taxes were collected as a flat levy from households in villages. In such cases, each household would be burdened with the responsibility for an even share of tax payment.[29] The type and rate of village tax also varied considerably in villages. Some types of tax were collected in some villages, but not in others. The tax on crop watching, for example, was not collected in areas along railway lines where public security was well maintained.[30]

Village tax seemed to have made up the largest proportion in the three categories of tax. Two sets of data support this conclusive remark. The first set of data is the tax conditions of Nanhuangdi village in 1934. It shows that while the total amount of tax was 740.63 yuan, village tax alone was 485.69 yuan.[31] The second set is the data of villages of Yongji County in Jilin in 1936. It shows that the total amount of tax was 826, 38 yuan, with 399, 482 yuan for the *baojia* dues, 200, 947 yuan for state tax and 225, 451 yuan for county tax.[32]

The budgetary plan of villages was made by the *bao* heads. For the plan to be implemented, the approval of the county governor and the supervision of the police inspectors were necessary. The main sources of revenue in villages were the *baojia* dues levied on land, houses and business enterprises. In the villages of Yongji County, the annual revenue budget of 1937 was 399,482 yuan, while the budget of the *baojia* dues alone was set as 387,042 yuan.[33] The *baojia* dues were paid by the owners of land and house properties, and business investors. The socially disadvantaged in villages

[29] Yoshiki Enatsu, "1930 nendai no Chūgoku tōhoku nōson ni okeru kōso kōka: Manshūkoku no 'nōson jittai chōsa hōkokusho' no kijutsu kara," *Hitotsubashi ronsō*, vol. 120, no. 6, December 1998, 22. The data is a reflection of the conditions of villages in 1935.
[30] Nagasuke Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita)," *Mantetsu chōsa geppō*, vol. 18, no. 2, 1938, 188.
[31] Chen, "'Manshūkoku' shoki no nōson sozei kōka ni kansuru kōsatsu: hokuman chihō wo chūshin ni," 66.
[32] Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita)," 186.
[33] Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita)," 181.

including the aged, the widowed and victims of natural disasters were usually exempted from paying the dues.[34] The *jia* and *bao* heads were the crucial figures in the collection of the *baojia* dues. First, the *jia* heads would collect the dues from households within his jurisdiction, deduct a certain proportion from the amount collected for the expenses of *bao*, and deliver the remainder to the *bao* heads. The *bao* heads would then pay the budgetary expenses from the collected dues delivered by the *jia* heads. When there was a surplus, the *bao* heads would deposit the surplus in banks or other corporate establishments. Upon the collection of dues, receipts would be issued to payers, delivered to the county treasury department and kept in *bao* as records. The collection period of *baojia* dues varied from once a month and once a season to three times a year and twice in spring and autumn respectively. The police inspectors were charged with the supervision of the collection of dues. However, their supervisory role was just a formality and seldom put into practice.[35]

The main activities of villages that required financial support were the maintenance of self-defence corps, the local administration, crop-watching, public welfare and education. The majority of village expenditure were made in these areas. The largest proportion of spending went to the area of self-defence corps and administration of *bao* and *jia*. It included salaries of the corps members and administrative employees of *bao* and *jia*, the expenses of maintaining corps facilities and of training corps members. The expenditure on security within *baojia* was a central component of the Japanese attempt to bring local areas under control. In the case of Yongji County, over 50 percent of the expenditure went to the area of security. In the villages of Yongji County, the annual total expenditure in 1937 was 288, 863 yuan; the expenditure to maintain self-defence corps alone was 154,500 yuan, followed by the administrative expenses of *bao* and *jia* which were 84,230 yuan and 30,734 yuan respectively.[36] The significant position of expenses in the maintenance of security is an indicator of the nature of the villages in the *baojia* system that security was prioritised over any other areas of spending in villages.

There is no question that peasants were made by the *baojia* system to bear the burden of paying substantial fees to the government and the village administrations. Peasants were the largest contributor of the *baojia* dues. On the assumption that the amount of dues to be paid was determined by the acreage of landholdings, most dues

[34] Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita)," 181.
[35] Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita),"181-2.
[36] Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita)," 184.

would have been collected from landlords. In fact, the payment of dues for landlords was reduced to a lesser amount, so the burden of paying dues was transferred to self-cultivating farmers and tenants who only had small portions of landholdings in villages.[37] Peasants were also the largest contributor of tax. The data based on the conditions of tax payment of forty-seven households in Nanhuangdi village in 1934 suggests that self-cultivating farmers contributed 20 percent of the total tax, followed by landlord-tenants contributing 15.11 percent, landlords 13.17 percent, self-cultivating tenants 10.28 percent, tenant farmers 10.09 percent and agricultural labourers 8.5 percent.[38]

The Self-Defence Corps

The central component of the *baojia* system was the self-defence corps, a village defence force that played an important role during times of natural calamities and occurrence of crimes and insurgencies. The main task of the self-defence corps was to assist local police to combat guerrilla insurgents. The self-defence corps was originally organised as an auxiliary instrument of the police within the *baojia* system. It was stipulated in the *baojia* code that the self-defence corps was only to be organised when emergency arose or when it was deemed as necessary by police inspectors. Given its defence nature, the self-defence corps was organised throughout the regions where the *baojia* was applied and constituted the central activity of the *baojia* system. The organisational structure and the number of members of the self-defence corps depended on the local conditions of security. In areas where peace and order was well maintained, the crops members tended to be very few and the corps training tended to be not mandatory.[39]

The self-defence corps consisted of a headman, a deputy head and approximately thirty to forty corps members. In principle, a company commander *(tuanzong*) and a deputy company commander (*futuanzong*) headed the self-defence corps in each *bao*. A company head (*tuanzhang*) and a deputy company head (*futuanzhang*) headed the self-defence corps in each *jia*. However, there were also exceptions that more than one deputy company commander and deputy company head were assigned to manage the self-defence corps as necessitated by local conditions. The

[37] Takeo Sekiguchi, "Gaison zaisei no genjō to sono shomondai," *Manshū hyōron*, vol. 16, no. 8, 1939, 11.
[38] Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita)," 187-8.
[39] Kiyoshi Noma and Jungu Yamamoto, "Kaijōken ni okeru nōson gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jittai," *Mantetsu chōsa geppō*, vol. 18, issue 1, 1937, 98.

leaders of each self-defence corps was selected mutually by corps members. Police inspectors approved their appointment.

Village inhabitants who met the following criteria would automatically become members of the self-defence corps: male adults of eighteen to forty years of age and having a place of residence in *jia* for more than one year. However, the physically disabled and public servants excluding clerks (*yakuin*) of *bao*, *jia* and *pai* were ineligible.[40] The responsibilities of corps members included wearing uniform and armbands, participating in the defence for public security and disaster prevention, participating in the suppression of armed resistance and performing village patrols. When emergencies arose, they would immediately notify the Japanese police and assist them in responding to the situation. The corps members worked in shifts, and they dined and were accommodated in the corps headquarter. They were equipped with telephones so that they could report intelligence to and receive assignment from their higher authority in the county. In actuality, two types of members existed in the corps: standing members and reserve members. Standing members were charged with participation in the main activities of the corps. They were further categorised into armed and non-armed members. Armed members were equipped with weapons and worked in collaboration with police officers, while non-armed members attended to the general affairs of the *baojia* and corps. The appointment of the corps members was not necessarily fixed and they worked in shift on a monthly basis.[41]

The Manchukuo government reorganised the structure of the self-defence corps as early as 1934 primarily to reduce the expenses of the *baojia* system because the government found the corps to be too much of a financial burden to the villages. This attempt was aimed to reallocate funds used in self-defence corps to the construction of village security facilities. On 3 February 1934, the MCA promulgated a revised version of the *baojia* rules, in which amended provisions of the self-defence corps were provided. According to the new provisions, the outstanding individuals among corps members were to be selected to work for the police forces; the rest were to return to their original farming or other business; the members who left the corps were to be compensated with special allowances; salaried service in the corps was transformed into unsalaried and compulsory service; and the expenses saved from the total budget by reforming the self-defence corps would be reallocated to building policing

[40] See Article One in the Provisional Baojia Code in Che, *WeiMan jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 240.
[41] Noma and Yamamoto, "Kaijōken ni okeru nōson gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jittai," 97.

infrastructure.[42] In addition to the financial factor, the security factor also played in a part in the government effort of reorganising the corps. As a result of the Japanese military operations against insurgencies, the security conditions of villages had significantly improved by the end of 1935. The necessity of the reorganisation is evident in the guideline for the reorganisation of the self-defence corps issued by Yongji County in January 1936. The thrust of the guideline shows that given the improvement in the local security conditions, it was necessary to change the nature of the service in the self-defence corps from salaried employment to voluntary labour:

> However, the strengthening of the county police forces has not achieved a degree of thoroughness. Hence, it is needless to say that the activities of the self-defence corps members must act in accordance to the *baojia* code to cooperate with the police forces. To date, the bandit suppression that is the primary mission of the self-defence corps has almost approached to an end alongside the establishment of public security. Hereafter, the greatest mission [of the self-defence corps] is exclusively self-policing in villages….To date the public order has been established all over the country, the reorganisation of the salaried self-defence corps members shall now be implemented and obligatory self-defence corps shall be consolidated on the other hand, in an attempt to reduce the *baojia* dues and the burden of *bao* and *jia* residents and to allot the surplus of the reorganised self-defence corps to augment the security facilities.[43]

In the case of Yongji County, the reorganisation of the self-defence corps was significant in scale. After the county government enforced the plan of reorganisation in February 1937, aged members of the corps were eliminated and standing members of the corps were demobilised.[44] By March 1937, the number of standing members had been reduced from 1,591 to 935.[45]

It is difficult to assume that farmers of villages were positively motivated to serve in the self-defence corps. In general, farmers were more directly concerned with protecting their homes and managing their agricultural production than with helping the government to suppress "bandits". The self-defence corps members were young farmers who served as the main labour force in farming. In busy farming seasons, the needs of farming allowed them hardly any time off from their work. It would be natural to assume that financial rewards could have been a useful way to motivate the farmers to work for the corps. A talk given by Yonemitsu Sakuta from the government office of Jiutai County in Jilin Province at a conference on the *baojia* system suggests that financial reward was the primary motive of farmers to serve the self-defence corps.

[42] Manshūkoku minseibu, *Hokō seido gaisetsu*, 18-20.
[43] Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita)," 184.
[44] Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita)," 184.
[45] Zenshō, "Kitsurinshō eikitsuken no hokō gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jōkyō (shita)," 185.

According to Yonemitsu, the salaried service of the self-defence corps was an important factor that motivated farmers to work and the ineffectiveness of the *baojia* system was attributed to the unsalaried service of the self-defence corps.

> Since the promulgation of the Provisional *Baojia* Code in late 1933, the *baojia* system has also been promulgated in Jiutai County accordingly. If we were to speak of its outcome, however, there has been no effect at all. I have given it a lot of thought. I conclude that the *baojia* spirit and the obligatory self-defence corps as prescribed in the *baojia* code are unreasonable. It is a fact that the nationals of Manchukuo have a relatively weak sense of state. Bearing this in mind, I have tried to explain to them about loyalty and patriotism but there is little effect. In this sense, I have decided not to demand for [the organisation of] self-defence corps as specified in the *baojia* code. In my county, we did not follow the *baojia* code and [we] organised the [system of] salaried self-defence corps. Its effect has improved. It is my belief that in recent days the best public order has been achieved in Jiutai County in Jilin Province.[46]

Given the significant financial expenses in salary payment for the corps members, the Manchukuo government attempted to turn service in the corps into a compulsory duty after 1936. Although the compulsory service as an unpaid service must have discouraged farmers from serving in the corps, it appears that the attempt of the government to turn service in the corps into an unpaid and voluntary one was not strictly observed in practice. This point is shown in the case of Maohao *jia* of Fugui *bao* in Taonan County. When service in the self-defence corps was already unsalaried in Taonan County in 1937, the government employed two villagers to work for the self-defence corps. Their salary consisted of two parts. One part was deducted from the *baojia* dues of the village. The other part was contributed by landholding villagers.[47] Aside from the fact that the rule on salary was not strictly observed, the working shift system of the self-defence corps was also very flexible in practice. A report by the authorities of Haicheng County indicates the flexibility of the shift system of the self-defence corps:

> In principle, villagers work as standing members of the self-defence corps in shifts. When there are many villagers whose age is suitable [for the service in the corps], their working days should be shortened. In actuality, however, various kinds of inconvenience would be caused if training is not properly carried out. It would [also] be very inconvenient for corps members to work in shift within a short time. Furthermore, because it would also be a lot of pain for farmers to work frequently for the purpose of training in busy farming seasons, the corps members must tend to be specified. So, though there are not many such cases at the moment, there are

[46] Keimushi shihōka, "Hokō seido wo chūshin to suru shomondai," *Minseibu chōsa geppō*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1937, 101.
[47] Noma and Yamamoto, "Kaijōken ni okeru nōson gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jittai," 99.

still cases in which farmers pay a certain amount of compensation to certain people to work for them [in the corps].[48]

The Scope of the *Baojia*

As a rule, the *baojia* system was to be applied to the entire territory of Manchukuo. The only exception was Xing'an Province in Inner Mongolia, the region where the majority of the Mongolian population of Manchuria was concentrated. Initially, Xing'an Province consisted of three sub-provinces: East Xing'an, North Xing'an and South Xing'an. On 10 May 1933, the Manchukuo government established another province known as West Xing'an. On 1 December 1934, as part of a more general provincial reform, the four sub-provinces of Xing'an Provinces raised to independent provinces.[49] When the *baojia* system was introduced into the local administration of Manchukuo in 1933, the Kwantung Army found the security conditions of Xing'an Province to be quite manageable, and they pursued a policy that placed the Mongols in a special category distinct from their Chinese and Korean counterparts.[50] The Japanese authorities adopted a distinct policy for the administration of the Mongols primarily because the Mongols showed little resistance to the Japanese rule. The population of Mongols in Xing'an Province was one million, accounting for only 3 percent of the total population of Manchukuo. More important, due to the Japanese benevolent attitude towards Mongol inhabitants of Manchukuo in the early 1930s by granting them some autonomy[51] and the antagonistic attitude of Mongols towards Chinese rule, the Mongolian resistance against the Japanese rule was much milder than that of the Chinese and Koreans. A few years later, the *baojia* system was partially implemented in Xing'an Province. A *baojia* law was promulgated in South Xing'an in 1936 and took effect the following year. In addition, Kailu and Linxi Counties of West Xing'an introduced the *baojia* system in 1937. In the same year, the previous two counties along with Tongliao County of South Xing'an were assigned by the Manchukuo government to be the key counties for the enforcement of the *baojia* system.[52]

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[48] Noma and Yamamoto, "Kaijōken ni okeru nōson gyōsei soshiki to sono un'ei jittai," 98.
[49] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, Tokyo: Manmō dōhō engokai, 1971, 1258.
[50] For the Japanese policy to Mongols and Mongolia in Manchukuo, see Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 1254-6. For the Japanese policy on Manchuria and Mongolia and the administration of Xing'an Province, see Nirei Suzuki, *Manshūkoku to uchi Mongoru: Manmō seisaku kara kōan-shō tōchi he*, Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2012.
[51] James Boyd, "Faith, Race and Strategy: Japanese-Mongolian Relations, 1873-1945," Ph.D. diss., Murdoch University, 2008, 212-3.
[52] Jilinsheng gong'anting gong'anshi yanjiushi and Dongbei lunxian shisinianshi jilin bianxiezu, *Manzhouguo jingcha shi*, 216.

In practice, the *baojia* was applicable fully to Chinese, conditionally to Koreans and not at all to Japanese.[53] There was an exception to this arrangement in practice. In the areas of the Japanese consular jurisdiction in Jiandao, both Japanese and Koreans were subject to the control of the *baojia* system. Koreans in this area accounted for 60 percent of the entire Korean population of Manchuria by the end of June 1934. In the Hunchun area, for example, initially the Japanese policy was to subject Koreans to and exclude Japanese from the application of the *baojia*. However, modifications were later made to include Japanese in the *baojia* system because the Japanese authorities were concerned that the practice of excluding Japanese from the *baojia* system might involve public criticism. According to a report of the Japanese consul-general in Jiandao in May 1935, the *baojia* system was merely formally organised and no activities took place in the Japanese residential communities.[54]

The implementation of the *baojia* system in practice was consistent with the Japanese security policy in Manchukuo to subject Chinese and Koreans to and exclude Japanese from the rule of the *baojia* in practice. Several factors account for this practice. First, the adoption of the *baojia* system primarily served the purpose of eliminating the anti-Japanese elements. It was reasonable to subject Chinese and Koreans to such system because they constituted a threat to the Japanese rule. There was no reason to include the Japanese nationals in the system whom were considered to be of no threat to public security. Second, Japanese nationals still enjoyed extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo when the *baojia* was put in place. The rights of the Japanese nationals guaranteed their special legal status in Manchukuo. Third, the views of Japanese administrators in Manchukuo might also have played a part in the decision of excluding the Japanese nationals from the *baojia*. Some Japanese administrators believed that the enforcement of collective responsibility in the *baojia* system was a pre-modern and uncivilised practice and that the high level of civilisation of the Japanese nationals should not be subject to punishment as severe as collective responsibility.[55] This argument mirrored the Japanese logic of governing Manchukuo on the basis of racial and cultural hierarchy in which the Japanese were placed in a superior, civilised and modern position, while the non-Japanese were treated as inferior, barbarian and primitive subjects.[56]

[53] Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai," 44.
[54] Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai," 45.
[55] Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai," 46.
[56] Endō, "Manshūkoku tōchi ni okeru hokō seido no rinen to jittai," 46.

The inclusion of Japanese and Koreans in the *baojia* system in practice was at odds with their legal status as Japanese nationals residing in Manchukuo. Although there was no provision in the *baojia* code as to who should be subject to the rule of the *baojia*, it would be reasonable to assume that only the Manchukuo nationals were the subject to whom this law was applicable because the *baojia* system was enforced in the state of Manchukuo. However, no nationality law had been ever enacted in Manchukuo that could grant Manchukuo citizenship to the Japanese and Koreans living there. As a result of the absence of a nationality law, the Japanese and Koreans in Manchukuo still remained Japanese nationals. In addition, the Japanese nationals were recognised to have extraterritorial status in Manchuria and to be accountable only to the law of Japan by an agreement signed between Japan and the Republic of China in 1915. The legal status of Japanese was also given to Koreans living in Manchuria on the grounds that they were Japanese nationals. The extraterritorial status of the Japanese nationals remained in effect after the establishment of Manchukuo. From a legal perspective, under no conditions should the Japanese nationals have been subject to the *baojia* because the *baojia* was applicable only to the Manchukuo nationals. Therefore, there was no legal basis on which to subject the Japanese and Koreans, Koreans in particular, to the application of the *baojia*. [57]

However, it may not be sufficient to suggest that the inclusion of Koreans in the *baojia* system was completely at odds with their status as Japanese nationals. This is because the nationality of Koreans in Manchukuo was unsettled when the *baojia* system was in place. First, some Koreans in Manchuria held dual citizenship. The Japanese Nationality Law, which was passed in 1899, did not acknowledge dual citizenship. On the one hand, once a Japanese national acquired foreign citizenship, he or she would automatically lose his or her Japanese nationality. However, the Japanese Nationality Law was never introduced in practice in colonial Korea. The non-recognition of dual citizenship, which was applicable to Japanese, was thus not applicable to Koreans. A Korean who had registered in the household registry in colonial Korea would be treated as a Japanese colonial subject and could not renounce or lose his or her Japanese

[57] The inclusion of Koreans and Japanese in the *baojia* system may be viewed as an attempt of the Japanese authorities to construct a multinational identity and to foster minority ethnic rights in the political discourse of Manchukuo. However, this attempt was constantly interrupted by the Japanese policy of placing non-Japanese nationals in the subordinate position in Manchukuo. The state of Manchukuo became increasingly alienated from its own projects of fostering multinational identities. This argument is developed on Duara's general discussion of sovereignty and identity. See Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, 252-3.

nationality. In this sense, those Koreans who immigrated to Manchuria were considered as Japanese nationals by the Japanese law. The practice of making the Japanese Nationality Law inapplicable to Koreans, and particularly of prohibiting Koreans from renouncing their Japanese nationality, was for the convenience of exercising full control over the Korean population. On the other hand, it was stipulated in the provisions of the Nationality Law of the Republic of China in 1929 that foreign nationals were allowed to be naturalised into Chinese citizenship without renouncing their original nationality. This provision acknowledged the possibility for Koreans in Manchuria who already had obtained Japanese nationality to acquire Chinese nationality. As a result, many Koreans in Manchuria became holders of Chinese and Japanese nationalities. Second, many Koreans in Manchuria had no nationality. They had resided in Manchuria for decades without leaving any legal record in the household registry of either Manchuria or colonial Korea. The cost of returning to Korea to enter the registry prevented many Koreans living in Manchuria from going back, making it difficult for them to acquire Japanese nationality. The increasing ethnic and political tensions of the 1920s made it difficult for these Koreans to enter the Chinese registry in Manchuria either. Further, the subsequent creation of the Manchukuo state turned unregistered Koreans into illegal stateless aliens. While estimates vary, the number of unregistered Koreans in Manchuria was approximately 500,000 to 700,000 in the early 1930s.[58]

Conclusion

The Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo in the early period of Manchukuo was characterised by the utilisation of the *baojia* system. The *baojia* was a community-based system of social control that enabled the government's ability to extend control below the lowest level of the centralised bureaucracy into the heart of local communities. In other words, the *baojia* served the government's purposes in a range of situations in which formal mechanisms of the state for control were inadequate. The structure of the *baojia* of Manchukuo was modelled on the structure of the earlier Chinese *baojia*

[58] For a disucssion of the Korean nationality in Manchukuo, see Michael Kim, "Sub-nationality in the Japanese Empire: A Social History of the *Koseki* in Colonial Korea 1910-1945," in *Japan's Household Registration System and Citizenship*: *Koseki, Identification and Documentation*, eds. David Chapman and Karl Jakob Krogness, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, 120-3; Chunri Sun and Xingzhen Piao, "Wei Manzhouguo 'guojifa' de nanchan yu zaiman Chaoxianren de guoji wenti," *Dongjiang xuekan*, vol. 18, no. 2, June 2001, 48-52; Xiuyi Lü, "'Manshūkoku' ni okeru Chōsenjin kokuseki mondai kōsatsu," *Hiroshima hōgaku*, vol. 30, no. 1, June 2006, 107-26; and Masataka Endō, "Manshūkoku sōsōki ni okeru kokuseki sōsetsu mondai: fukugō minzoku kokka ni okeru 'kokumin'no sentei to kika seido," *Waseda seiji keizaigaku zasshi*, vol. 369, October 2007, 143-61.

systems. In the context of Manchukuo, the *baojia* system was primarily organised as an auxiliary police organisation to maintain order in villages. The *baojia* was neither aimed at legal and institutional construction of the state, nor was it intended to be instituted as a permanent control system. Its application was of a temporary nature and served the purpose of security and defence. Meanwhile, it would be reasonable to view the *baojia* codes issued by the Manchukuo government as ordinances, rather than a set of established laws playing significant roles in the legal apparatus of the state.

Collective responsibility placed a strong emphasis on the punitive dimensions of criminal justice to ensure the prevailing social order on a basis of deterrence. It imposed joint liability on household members in local communities for criminal offenses. The practice of collective responsibility did not seem to have represented much official effort of integrating the *baojia* into the modern legal system of Manchukuo. The utilisation of collective responsibility in the practice of rural control shows that although Japan was the model for building the legal apparatus in Manchukuo, the legal practice as in the case of collective responsibility still embodied certain characteristic features of the Chinese legal tradition.

It is likely that the *baojia* system brought little change in the class structure of villages. To a certain extent, the *baojia* may have consolidated the class division in villages. The Japanese authorities did not attempt to change the original structure of village leadership and they hoped to utilise the village heads as collaborators or agents to exert great influence on local affairs and the peasants. In doing so, the Japanese authorities normally appointed the rural gentry or clan leaders to take the top positions in the *baojia* system. In some cases, the village leaders chaired multiple positions in village administration and defence. As a result, the local elites in villages remained the ruling class of villages after the enforcement of the *baojia*.

It is difficult to evaluate precisely the effectiveness and utility of the *baojia* system in the Japanese rule over villages. It may be safe, however, to suggest that the presence of this system of police control in the countryside must have had some deterrent effect and worked to discourage the anti-Japanese insurgencies. The effect of the *baojia* can be observed primarily from the organisation of the self-defence corps. The operation of the self-defence corps might have subjected peasants to a disadvantaged socioeconomic position. Members of self-defence corps were mostly peasants aged from eighteen to forty years who served as the major labour force in farming. Peasants were in general uninterested in assisting the state to achieve the goals of eliminating insurgents, so it would be reasonable to assume that they did not feel

obliged to serve the self-defence corps. In addition, most positions in the corps were salaried, which placed a financial burden on the budget of the *baojia* system. Because the main source of income of the *baojia* system was tax, the tax burden would in turn have been imposed on peasants and have subjected them to difficult financial situations.

Chapter Four: The Local Self-Government in Towns and Villages

Following the improvement of security conditions in 1936, the central direction of Japanese policy shifted from public security to the integration of local administration into the state administrative apparatus for efficient control. The Japanese authorities sought to reshape local administration. Their efforts were first made in the abrogation of extraterritoriality and administrative reform. Following the administrative reform, they sought to formalise local administration. The Japanese authorities integrated the *baojia* system into a new local administrative apparatus called the *jiecun* system. The transition between these two systems was a landmark in the evolution in the Japanese policy on local government. The *jiecun* system was idealised in official rhetoric as the harbinger of self-government administration. Although the Japanese authorities were publicly committed to the idea of self-government for Manchukuo, in practice they ceded relatively little power to local administrative authorities.

This chapter examines the origins of local self-government in Manchuria and Japan, the abrogation of extraterritoriality and administrative reform in Manchukuo as the background against which the *jiecun* system was instituted, along with the administrative functions and the finance conditions of the *jiecun* system. This chapter argues that although the initiative of local self-government attempted by the Japanese authorities embodied a certain degree of local administrative independence, the government at central level still retained organised control over local bureaucracy and finance.

The Origin of Local Self-Government in Manchuria

The *jiecun* system, or the system of towns and villages, was a local administration system formally established by the Manchukuo government in December 1937. *Jie* refers to towns and *cun* refers to villages. In this system, a town consisted of over 20,000 households and a village consisted of approximately 1,000 households.[1] The size of a town was approximately the size of a *bao* and the size of a village was approximately the size of a *jia* in the previous *baojia* system. The *jiecun* system was fully implemented in southern Manchuria. In northern Manchuria, the *jiecun* system was only partially implemented and the *baojia* system remained in operation until the late 1930s. The administrative structure including personnel and territory of jurisdiction

[1] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, Tokyo: Manmō dōhō engokai, 1971, 189.

in towns and villages remained similar to that of the *baojia* system, so the *jiecun* system could be perceived as a form of continuation of the *baojia* system.

The *jiecun* system was not a new attempt at local self-government in Manchuria. Its structural origins may be traced to the *qucun* system implemented in Fengtian Province from 1925 to 1928.[2] The *qucun* system consisted of *qu* and *cun*, both of which were local administrative units. *Qu* means ward and *cun* means village. The *qucun* system was part of the administrative reform promoted by Wang Yongjiang, who served as the acting civil governor of Fengtian Province on behalf of Zhang Zuolin.[3] His initiative of local self-government materialised the Charter for the Separate Implementation of Ward and Village Agreement (*yiding qucunzhi danxing zhangcheng*) and the Provisional Law for Prefecture and Ward System in Fengtian Province (*Fengtian sheng gexian quzhi shixing guize*), promulgated by the Fengtian provincial government in August and October 1922 respectively. These regulations laid out the structure of local administration in which the territory of Fengtian Province was divided into administrative units of wards and villages. Each ward was placed under the jurisdiction of a county government and each village under the jurisdiction of a ward in the hierarchy of local administration. A head was assigned to the ward by the county governor as his direct agent for local administration. A head and a deputy head were assigned to the village. The ward head was charged with general administrative responsibilities within his territory of jurisdiction. His major role was to supervise the village head in such affairs as household registration, bandit elimination and public service for the local community. The village head was charged with assisting the ward head for a wide range of responsibilities including the maintenance of public order and the management of local finance.[4]

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[2] Although the *qucun* system was formally abolished shortly after the death of Wang Yongjiang in 1927, the system continued to function as a form of local self-government in practice until the eve of the Mukden Incident. See Yōzō Sekiguchi, "Hōtenshō sonraku jichitai no hatten katei," *Naimu shiryō geppō*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1938, 59. The term "Fengtian Province" may cause confusion. Its status as a local administrative division was established by the Qing government in 1907 and continued until 1929. In 1929, Fengtian Province was renamed "Liaoning Province". In 1934, the Manchukuo government divided "Liaoning Province" into three provinces: Andong Province, Fengtian Province and Jinzhou Province. In this sense, the "Fengtian Province" before 1929 and after 1934 referred to different administrative divisions.

[3] Yu Jiang, "State building, Capitalism, and Development: State-Run Industrial Enterprises in Fengtian, 1920-1931," PhD diss., The University of Minnesota, 2010, 31.

[4] For a short introduction of the *qucun* system, see Weidong Yang, "Minguo Beijing zhengfu shiqi dongbei difang xingzheng zhidu yanjiu," PhD diss., Jilin University, 2010, 255-60; Guangyi Wang, "Jindai dongbei xiangcun shehui yanjiu (1840-1931)," PhD diss., Jilin University, 2007, 128-33.

The structure of organisation and authority of the *qucun* system shows a certain degree of independence in local government. This form of independence was a relative one, compared with the previous conditions of local administration. Before the introduction of the *qucun* system, the local rural elites exercised domination through individual and corporate control of social resources. In contrast to the elite control over local communities as a private form of authority, the authority structure of the *qucun* system exhibited a strong public and official character. The *qucun* system established an official apparatus of government equipped by administrative offices and staffed by regular employees. The *qucun* law specified provisions about the appointment and dismissal of administrative personnel. Its finance was also organised in a way that a regular source of income was secured and the areas of expenditure were specified. In addition, its functions including the construction of local medical and educational facilities were not assigned by higher authorities, but organised on local initiatives.[5]

The Local Self-Government in Japan

The *jiecun* system was also patterned after the system of local self-government in Japan with historical variation and local adaptation. In Japan, the local administration system was termed "local self-government" (*chihō jichi*). The Japanese local self-government system was not aimed at much decentralisation of authority from the central government to the local level, and it reserved to the various central authorities a considerable measure of administrative control over local affairs. Local self-government in Japan was recognised by law as both an administrative organisation and a public legal body at local level.

In the tradition of Japan, rural communities comprised various social entities of different size and scale such as *tonarigumi*, *buraku*, *mura*, *koaza* and *ōaza*. A hamlet (*buraku*) normally consisted of several neighbourhood groups (*tonarigumi*), and a village (*mura*) included several hamlets.[6] Although it is difficult to assign a priority to any of the above unit or level as being basic to rural social organisation, it may be reasonable to use *buraku* as the model for ease of analysis. *Buraku* consisted of a number of scattered settlements, and each cluster of houses was surrounded by fields. *Buraku* was a community with marked solidarity where every member household joined

[5] Fengjie Wang, "Wang Yongjiang yu Fengtiansheng zaoqi xiandaihua yanjiu (1916-1926)," PhD diss., Northeast Normal University, 2009, 109-11.

[6] There may be variation about the structural hierarchy of the social entities in rural Japan. According to Nakano and Brown, the hierarchy of social entities follows the pattern of *ku*/*mura-buraku-tonarigumi*. See Takashi Nakano and Keith Brown, "Changing Rural Japan," *The Rice University Studies*, vol. 56, no. 4, October 1970, 196-7.

in cooperative endeavour in the maintenance of the irrigation system, roads, paths and ditches, and where every wedding and funeral was attended by a representative of every household. *Buraku* voted as a unit in local elections, each casting its ballots for candidates previously agreed upon as the one most likely to represent the interests of *buraku* politics. A form of self-government was developed in *buraku* by the residents' efforts of maintaining internal harmony and public interests.[7]

The early Meiji government enforced laws concerning the amalgamation of villages in an attempt to improve the administrative efficiency in rural communities. As a result, larger political and administrative units were created through village amalgamation in rural communities.[8] Following the amalgamation of villages, the Meiji government instituted the system of towns and villages known as the *chōson* system [9] in local administration by promulgating and enforcing laws concerning local self-government in 1888 and 1889. The law underwent a minor revision in 1911 and a major one in 1926. The *chōson* system was created specifically for extending state control into local administration. Towns and villages had councils and chief executive officers. The chief executives of towns and villages were elected by the assembly, but their appointment had to be ratified by higher authorities. The head of a town and village was honorary. The village assembly was directly elected by a restricted electorate, which was divided into two classes according to their taxpaying ability.[10]

Institutionalising the *Jiecun* System

A basic factor that contributed to the establishment of the *jiecun* system was the inefficient operation of the *baojia* system. The Japanese authorities found that the *baojia* system was institutionally unable to adapt to the needs of local administration. According to Takayama Kazumi, the head of the judicial department of the Police Bureau, the *baojia* was flawed in its structure, and its operation in practice reflected the disjuncture between theory and reality.

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[7] Huang uses *mura*, rather than *buraku*, as the model for his analysis. It is assumed that the designations of *mura* and *buraku* are more or less variations for the term village. I quote Huang's analysis by replacing *mura* with *buraku* for the consistency of my wording. See Donglan Huang, *Kindai Chūgoku no chihō jichi to Meiji Nihon*, Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 2005, 34.

[8] The first attempt of village amalgamation that was made between 1874 and 1886 reduced the number of towns and villages by 7,346. By the end of 1889, the number of towns and villages had been reduced to 15, 820 and the population of each town and village had increased in average from 550 to 2400. See Kurt Steiner, *Local Government in Japan*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965, 46; Huang, *Kindai Chūgoku no chihō jichi to Meiji Nihon*, 47.

[9] The administrative units of *chō* in the *chōson* system and *jie* in the *jiecun* system are both equivalent to towns.

[10] Steiner, *Local Government in Japan*, 48.

> …in fact, if we look at the expansion and establishment of the *baojia* system in this place [Binjiang Province], it did not work well. Its reasons, as I said earlier, are as follows: although the law was made in the second year of Datong [1933], since at that time, the spirit of law was not fully understood and it was urgent to make only the shape on the basis of law rather than out of the [needs] of reality, therefore, if we take a look at local [conditions] of *bao* and *jia*, we can see that they are tied to the fixed rules that ten households formed a *pai* and ten units of *pai* formed a *jia*. In fact, when *bao*, *jia* and *pai* were designated, perhaps I should say the society that developed naturally, the traditional society did not fit well for the life of the society [that has existed] in the mind of the people. In addition, it [the traditional society] has broken down. Now, the system of *baojia*, the institution of collective responsibility as well as the institution of self-defence corps, had no power to achieve the mission of the Baojia Code.[11]

Takayama implied that the administration of the *baojia* system had to be reorganised to accommodate the social change of Manchukuo. In order to make the system work, he suggested that the administrative structure of the *baojia* had to be reorganised:

> So, first we started to correct this actual situation. That is to say, at first we had a clear picture of the traditional society existing in the mind of people as a society, in other words, the conditions of neighborhood. We organised six, ten or twenty households into a *pai*, and amalgamated *pai* where there was collective consciousness [among inhabitants] together into a *jia*. After that, in future we will make [*pai*] become a unit of village, in other words a unit of administration, and make *pai* in which various activities could be organised to develop into a *bao*.[12]

The Japanese authorities considered local administration to be directly tied to the development of the solidarity and association among local inhabitants. They showed interest in replacing the *baojia* with the *jiecun* as the form of local administration. This direction of the Japanese policy was evident in a guideline issued by the MCA in May 1936. According to this guideline, the aim of governing local communities lay in the consolidation of the spiritual association of people in local communities and that the *jiecun* system could serve as the means of achieving this goal:

> The foundation of the *baojia* system lies in the spirit of neighbourhood fraternity. Its purpose lies in security and self-government. It is connected with the real life of people. Efforts shall be made to organise and consolidate such connection. In other words, the objective is to integrate it [the *jiecun* system] into the *baojia* system in places where the *jiecun* self-government organisation, or the basic institution of general administration, exists. In places where it [the *jiecun* system] has not been

[11] Keimushi shihōka, "Hokō seido wo chūshin to suru mondai," *Minseibu chōsa geppō*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1937, 91.
[12] Keimushi shihōka, "Hokō seido wo chūshin to suru mondai," 91.

> established yet, [we shall] provide guidance as we did for its original predecessor [the *baojia* system].[13]

The Japanese authorities intended to pursue in Manchukuo a gradualist approach to local self-government. They planned the integration of the *jiecun* into *baojia* to be an incremental process, rather than a radical transformation. Initially they implemented the system in southern Manchuria and subsequently expanded the system to northern Manchuria. The incremental approach to the implementation of the *jiecun* system is evident in the writing of Murata Fukujirō, the chief officer of local affairs in the MCA. Murata was an influential figure in the preparation of laws on the local self-government of Manchukuo. Before he was assigned to work on the project of local self-government of Manchukuo, Murata served as an officer in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*naimushō*) in the Japanese government responsible for drafting laws on local self-government in Japan.[14]

> The territory of our Manchukuo is wide. Ethnic issues and other situations vary. Therefore, institutions should comply with the local situation and must have flexibility. In order to avoid a nationwide unified institution, the government has been making a careful study of this matter pertaining to the establishment of this institution [the *jiecun* system]. After 1937, the system was incrementally implemented in regions with good social order and high level of civilisation. The current *baojia* system shall be its replacement in regions where the *jiecun* system is not implemented.[15]

The Manchukuo government experimentally introduced the *jiecun* system into the local administration of Fengtian Province as early as 1935. In February 1935, the Civil Affairs Department (*minseichō*) of Fengtian Province organised a committee to investigate the local administration in Manchukuo. The department also sent a group of officers on investigation tours to Japan, Taiwan and Korea. In Japan, they visited Kyoto, Osaka, Nara, Aichi, Niigata and other prefectures to study the Japanese *chōson* system. They visited local villages and attended briefings about the construction and implementation of the *chōson* system. Fengtian Province enforced a provisional form of the *jiecun* system in twenty-four counties within the province in 1935.[16]

In 1936, more provinces such as Jiandao, Jinzhou, Andong and Rehe followed Fengtian Province in implementing the *jiecun* system. The Manchukuo government

[13] For this guideline, see Naoaki Tominaga, *Hokō seidoron*, Shinkyō: Manshūkoku minseibu keimushi, 1936, 129-30.
[14] Jihong Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2000, 108.
[15] Fukujirō Murata, "Guojia yu jiecun (2)," *Neiwu ziliao*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1938, 8.
[16] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 185.

officially instituted the *jiecun* system in the local administration in December 1937 by promulgating a series of laws including the Fundamental Guidelines for the Establishment of the *Jiecun* System (*jiecun zhidu queli jiben yaogang*), the Rules for the Enforcement of the *Jie* System and *Cun* System (*jiezhi cunzhi shixing guize*) and the Self-defence Law of *Jie* and *Cun* (*jiecun ziweifa*). In 1939, the Guidelines for Nurturing *Jie* and *Cun* (*jiecun yucheng yaogang*) was promulgated providing that towns and villages would be the basic units for industrial development, education, health care and sanitation at the local level of administration. In the meantime, the guideline also provided that towns and villages as local administrative units collaborate with other local organisations for the purpose of smooth administration.[17]

The Abrogation of Extraterritoriality and Administrative Reform

The timing of the establishment of the *jiecun* system was directly relevant to the Japanese abrogation of extraterritoriality and the administrative reform of the Manchukuo government in 1937. Japan established extraterritoriality in Manchuria as early as 1905 following its victory in the Russo-Japanese War. They did so primarily on the grounds of the vast differences between the Japanese and Chinese standards of justice and punishment. The extraterritorial system proved to be of value to Japan because it not only provided legal form of protection for Japanese nationals against the laws and punishments enforced in Manchuria under the late Qing, but also worked as a vehicle for the expansion of their strategic interests in the region through the stationing of the army, the establishment of police and the exercising of consular jurisdiction. Under this system, the Japanese authorities gradually developed commercial enterprises and secured political control. After the creation of Manchukuo, however, this system restrained the efficiency of the Japanese administration because it allowed various actors including the SMRC, the MFA and the Kwantung Army to exercise power within their sphere of influence.

The Kwantung Army adopted the policy of the abrogation of extraterritoriality principally because of the following factors: first, by 1936 Japan had already established firm control over the state affairs of Manchukuo, so extraterritoriality was of no actual effect in practice. Second, extraterritoriality as a form of protecting Japanese special rights in Manchukuo would only serve to invoke public criticism and Chinese nationalism. Third, the abrogation would increasingly exclude the influence of Western imperialistic powers that exercised extraterritorial rights in Manchukuo. After the

[17] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 188-9.

creation of Manchukuo, a total of fourteen Western powers including Britain, the United States, Switzerland, Spain and so forth retained extraterritorial rights in the new state. The extraterritoriality exercised by the Western powers constituted a threat to the Japanese interests in Manchukuo. The Japanese abrogation of extraterritoriality would serve as a gesture of Japanese respect for the territorial sovereignty of Manchukuo to induce the Western powers to abolish their extraterritorial rights in the state. And fourth, the abrogation of territoriality would consolidate the Japanese rights in the SMRC zone by transferring the administration of this area directly to the Manchukuo and Japanese police. Before the abrogation of territoriality, the Japanese consular police administered the SMRC zone, but this police force was institutionally too weak to administer the entire area. Involving the Manchukuo police in the administration of the SMRC zone would greatly expand the Japanese capacity in protecting Japanese rights in the area.[18]

The abrogation was carried out in two phases. The first phase took place in 1936 after Ueda Kenkichi, the commander in chief of the Kwantung Army, and Zhang Yanqing, Foreign Minister of the Manchukuo government, signed an agreement on the tax system and industry of Manchukuo on 10 June 1936. The agreement primarily served the purpose of increasing tax collection for government revenue. The agreement also made Manchukuo's industrial and taxation laws applicable to the Japanese subjects in areas outside the South Manchuria Railway Zone. The second phase primarily served to abolish the Japanese judicial rights and symbolised the final abrogation of Japanese extraterritoriality in Manchukuo. On 9 November 1937, Ueda and Zhang signed another agreement to abolish Japanese judicial rights. In addition, this agreement also abolished the Japanese extraterritorial rights in areas of police, finance, tax, post, and communications.[19] Terms and clauses of this agreement were also applied to the SMRC zone.

The initiative of abrogation of extraterritoriality represented the increasingly direct administration of Manchukuo by Japan and the legal enshrinement of the special

[18] Lüyan Wu, Chuang Zhang, and Kun Wang, *Wei Manzhouguo fazhi yanjiu*, Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfadaxue chubanshe, 2013, 107-8.

[19] Ryūichi Tanaka, *Manshūkoku to Nihon no teikoku shihai*, Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2007, 16-7 and 84-107. Ryūichi's analysis primarily focuses on the abrogation of extraterritoriality in 1936. For a general survey of the Japanese abrogation of extraterritoriality, see Shōichi Soejima, "'Manshūkoku' tōchi to chigai hōken teppai," in *Manshūkoku no kenkyū*, ed. Yūzo Yamamoto, Kyoto: Kyōto daigaku jimbun kagaku kenkyūjo, 1993, 131-55; Lüyan Wu, Chuang Zhang, and Kun Wang, *Wei Manzhouguo fazhi yanjiu*, Beijing: Zhongguo zhengfadaxue chubanshe, 2013, 114-9.

rights that Japanese interests had already enjoyed in Manchukuo.[20] As a formal recognition of Manchukuo's claim to territorial jurisdiction, the Japanese abrogation of extraterritoriality was fundamental to shaping a unified administrative apparatus in the political structure of Manchukuo. The Japanese officials who worked for the administration of the SMRC zone entered the Manchukuo government. In consequence, the number of Japanese officials increased rapidly, and Japanese officials replaced Chinese officials to occupy all the important positions in judicial and police departments. For example, 5,000 police officers were absorbed into the police system and 3,500 of them were Japanese. Other government organs such as tax, post and local administration departments also absorbed a substantial number of Japanese officials.[21] The abrogation of extraterritoriality also consolidated the Japanese economic interests. It reduced the administrative expenses of the SMRC. Before the enforcement of the abrogation, the SMRC was burdened with huge expenses on the security, education and infrastructure construction of the SMRC zone. Alongside the transferal of the administration of the SMRC zone to the Manchukuo government, the SMRC was discharged from the financial burden in the construction of the SMRC zone.

In effect, the abrogation of Japanese extraterritoriality in Manchukuo paved the way for the reform of the administrative organisations of the Manchukuo government in 1937. The correlation between the abrogation of extraterritoriality and administrative reform was emphasised by Hoshino Naoki, the director-general of the GAB. Hoshino believed in the correlation between the abrogation of extraterritoriality and the administrative reform of the central and local governments of Manchukuo. His views are expressed as follows:

> As mentioned previously, in response to the reorganisation of central organisations, it is only natural that the reorganisation of local administrative organisations would be necessary. The traditional local administrative organisations are generally delayed in their development and remarkably over-standardised. It is for this reason that I felt that I was unable to expect a complete transformation of administration. According to the reform this time, I believe that a complete reorganisation and consolidation of the organisations that respond to local conditions and maintain close relations with the central government could be realised. With regards to details, however, it [the reform] is also directly relevant to the issue of the abrogation of extraterritoriality and the transfer of the administration of railway zones.[22]

[20] Thomas Dubois, "Rule of Law in Brave New Empire: Legal Rhetoric and Practice in Manchukuo," *Law and History Review*, vol. 26, no. 2, 2008, 308.
[21] Xueshi Xie, *Wei Manzhouguo shi xinbian*, Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1995, 425.
[22] "Gyōsei kikō kaikaku kankei hōki oyobi shiryō," *Naimu shiryō geppō*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1937, 46.

It may be claimed that the series of administrative reforms carried out in 1937 were the extension of Japan's abrogation of extraterritoriality because it furthered the Japanese attempt at reorganising the administrative structure at central and local levels of government. The reform was officially implemented on 1 July 1937, preceded by the promulgation of a guideline on 8 May 1937. The reform was intended to achieve the political and economic integration of the state. Its objective was articulated in the official rhetoric as "to improve the administrative efficiency of government, to coordinate relations between military and police, to consolidate institutional support for the economic control polices, to strengthen the government control over villages, to consolidate the relations between central and local governments and to develop local self-government."[23] The reform was initially implemented at the level of the central government. It focused primarily on centralising the administration in the State Council. The reform kept the GAB intact, leaving it as the central organ of state administration. The reform diminished the system of checks and balances of government by abolishing the Inspectorate *Yuan* and the parliamentary function of the Cabinet; it strengthened the role of the GAB by setting up three bureaus in charge of foreign, internal and Mongolian affairs; it streamlined the administration of the State Council by reducing its original number of departments from nine to six; and it unified the functions of the military and police in defence and security by integrating the Ministry of Military Affairs and the Police Bureau within the MCA into one single department known as the Ministry of Public Order.[24] In addition to the reform at the central level, the reform also expanded to the local level at the same time. The local reform of administration was termed the construction of local self-government. According to the reform guideline, the construction of local self-government had economic and political dimensions. Economically, the government would establish cooperatives as a means of consolidating the economic status of villages in the state economy. Politically, the government would institutionalise the *jiecun* system as a form of local administration.[25]

[23] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: sōron*, Tokyo: Manmō dōhō engokai, 1970, 559.
[24] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 11; Xie, *Wei Manzhouguo shi xinbian*, 413-417. The details of the administrative reform were published in the guideline of administrative reform promulgated by the State Council of Manchukuo on 8 May 1937. See "Gyōsei kikō kaikaku kankei hōki oyobi shiryō," 39-63.
[25] "Gyōsei kikō kaikaku kankei hōki oyobi shiryō," 43.

The Administrative Organisation of Towns and Villages

The administrative structure of the *jiecun* system included heads, assistant heads and accountants, secretarial clerks and technical assistants. The most important task of local government was the collection of taxes and fees. This task was conducted by local heads. They would collect taxes and fees imposed by the higher authorities and also make advance payments personally when the collected sum did not reach the required sum set by the central government. Local heads were also in charge of local construction projects and self-defence. The local bureaucracy was established by appointment, rather than by popular election. The appointment of chief executives of towns and villages was arbitrarily made at the will of the authorities in the central government. In effect, the appointment of chief executives followed the pattern as follows: the county governor would first organise a selection committee comprising three to five members; and then these members would recommend three candidates from among local inhabitants. The eligibility of candidates was limited to males over twenty-five years of age and who had held residence for at least two years within the territory of the town or village. The real decision of who was to be the executive officer was reserved to the county governor.[26]

The central government interfered in the administration of towns and villages in the form of "supervision". The supervising authority for towns and villages was county governor in the first instance and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo in the second instance. Towns and villages had authority over their inhabitants only as the agents for the central government. A national law or ordinance was the only instrument through which respective functions to towns and villages could be assigned. The aim of arranging supervisory authority for towns and villages was to permit interference by the higher levels of government in the administration of lower levels.

The administration of towns and villages adopted the principle of greater *jiecun* (*dajiecun zhuyi)*. Greater *jiecun* was the administrative practice of village amalgamation. The amalgamation resulted in the administrative, rather than physical, integration of several villages into one village. In most cases, the public offices previously scattered in several villages would be concentrated into one village along with the administrative personnel. The implementation of the principle of greater *jiecun* greatly reduced the number of villages in rural Manchukuo. In Fengtian Province, for example, the number

[26] Manzhouguo zhengfu, "Jiezhi cunzhi shixing guize," *Wei Manzhouguo zhengfu gongbao*, 21 December 1937, no. 1119, reprinted in *Wei Manzhouguo zhengfu gongbao*, ed. Weiman shiqi ziliao chongkan bianweihui, Shenyang: Liaoshen shushe, 1990, 872.

of villages was 3,236 in 1935. The number decreased to 1,356 in 1936 and to 939 in February 1938. Despite the fact that the actual number of villages varied in different provinces, the number of villages as administrative units decreased to one fourth of the total number of the original villages.[27] In Beizhen County of Fengtian Province alone, there were 108 villages when Manchukuo was founded in 1932. The number decreased dramatically to 32 in 1938. After 1940, the Japanese authorities continued to merge villages and the number decreased to only 20. In 1945, these twenty villages were further amalgamated into twelve.[28]

There is no direct evidence showing how and why the principle of greater *jiecun* was adopted by the Japanese authorities. The general assumption is that the principle of greater *jiecun* derived from the concern that small units of village could not adequately perform their tasks with limited resources of money and personnel; that the maintenance of a separate administrative apparatus for a small number of people seemed a wasteful endeavour; and that amalgamation would increase administrative efficiency and reduce the cost of management. Since village amalgamation was a common practice adopted by the government of Meiji Japan, the Japanese example could then shed some light on the case of Manchukuo. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Meiji government enforced the compulsory forced amalgamation of villages in rural Japan. The purpose was exactly to enhance administrative efficiency. Village amalgamation created a functional division between old villages and new villages as a result of the amalgamation. Old villages remained units of natural rural settlement, and new villages began to concentrate on exercising local administrative functions. As Steiner writes, the mass amalgamations split the governmental and the social functions into the new and old villages respectively. The new village was an artificial unit created for the decentralisation of power of the new Meiji government; the old village was both a unit of self-government and an "association for cooperative living."[29] It may therefore be suggested that the village amalgamation in Manchukuo was also attempted to achieve the purpose of reducing administrative cost and of enhancing administrative efficiency.

[27] Hiroshi Okumura, 34. "Manshūkoku gaisonsei ni kansuru kisoteki kōsatsu," *Jimbun gakuhō*, no. 66, March 1993, 34.
[28] The figure is taken from the oral testimony about the development of towns and villages by He Zonglin, a former village officer in Manchukuo. See Zonglin He, "Weiman beizhen jiecunzhi yange," in *Zhimin zhengquan*, ed. Bang Sun, Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1993, 262-3.
[29] Kurt Steiner, "The Japanese Village and Its Government," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 2, February 1956, 186.

The Characteristic Features of Towns and Villages

In the *jiecun* system, the concept of the honorary post (*meiyoshoku*) was important in the rights and obligations of inhabitants and the administration of towns and villages. An honorary post was a legal duty and service performed by local inhabitants on an unsalaried basis. It was widely applied in the local administration in Japan.[30] The origin of the honorary post may be traced to the Japanese concept of local self-government:

> According to the idea of local decentralisation of authority, administrative affairs are assigned to the local level and people share [the responsibility of] public affairs. To make self-government a reality, professional or full-time positions should be assigned. Apart from the obligations of their positions, it is generally required that the local people perform their duty on an unsalaried basis and that performing such duty is the obligation of local people. It is a duty for people to perform, one that is similar to the conscription in which young men should serve.[31]

As we can see from the above quote, public service in local administration is tied to the rights and obligations of local people. Because rights were granted to people, and obligations were assumed by them, an analysis of the law's provisions relating to the people at the local administrative level may be useful. In the Japanese *chōson* system, there was a clear distinction between inhabitant (*jūmin*) and citizen (*kōmin*). Inhabitant was defined as an individual who lived within the territory of town and village regardless of their sex, age, race, nationality or living conditions. They were entitled to a common use of the public establishments and property, and were subject to the duty of sharing the common burdens according to the law. Citizenship was limited to independent males of over twenty-five years of age who had lived in the town or village for more than two years. Citizens were entitled to the privilege of voting in the local elections, but inhabitants were denied this privilege. Only citizens could perform the honorary post. Sanctions would be incurred if citizens resigned from honorary posts without proper reasons. Sanctions normally involved a suspension of citizenship and an increase of tax payment.[32] It was precisely because citizens were granted rights in the first place that they had the franchise, obligation and duty to serve the state without receiving payment.

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[30] When the concept of local self-government was initially introduced into the local administration of Japan, public service at an honorary basis was nominal and it was not completely unsalaried in practice. Local administrators usually received allowances and they were charged with few responsibilities. See Hiroshi Okumura, "Kindai Nihon keiseiki no chiiki kōzō: chiiki shakai no henyō to chihō seido kaisei wo megute," *Nihonshi kenkyū*, no. 295, March 1987, 172.

[31] Zenshirō Tsuboya, *Shisei chōsonsei chūshaku*, Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1888, 299.

[32] Hanshishūsha, *Chōsonsei*, Nagano: Hanshishūsha, 1929, 2; Ernest W. Clement, "Local Self-Government in Japan," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 2, June 1892, 295-6.

In contrast to the application of these concepts in practice in the *chōson* system, no clear specification was made in the *jiecun* system about the rights and obligations of people, nor was there any distinction made between inhabitants and citizens. There is no direct evidence of why Japanese authorities made this decision, but it is likely that there was no legal basis on which people at local government level could exercise their rights and obligations and that their relations with the state were blurred and ambiguous. Given the absence of a legal basis for the rights and obligations of people, public service positions in towns and villages were usually not honorary posts, but salaried positions. Heads, assistant heads and administrative employees in town and villages were all salaried positions. The county governor decided their level of salary. In some cases, the local government took the initiative to increase the salary of local officers. For example, when the *jiecun* system was established in the towns and villages of Tieling County in 1937, the local government increased the salary of local officers as an incentive for the local officers to improve their administrative performance. [33] Considering that there had not been much price inflation in the local economy and that there was shortage in the local finances in Manchukuo by 1937, the salary increase of local bureaucrats should be perceived as a form of incentive rather than as an administrative response to the general local conditions of economy and finance.

Towns and villages exercised two types of functions: internal affairs (*koyū jimu*) and delegated affairs (*inin jimu*). Internal affairs were functions that the local entities were empowered to deal with on their own initiatives. These functions were largely concerned with managing local property and police affairs, maintaining the household registry, and building schools and medical facilities. Internal affairs were functions within which local authorities were their own masters in deciding local issues locally. Delegated affairs were functions assigned by the central or provincial governments to towns and villages or to town and village heads.[34] The delegated assignments created links between towns and villages and the departments of central government concerned with the assigned functions, so the higher authorities could ensure control over local administration. The most important category of delegated affairs was collecting taxes and fees. The central and provincial governments determined all types and rates of taxes and fees. Town and village administrators were simply delegated with limited authority

[33] The salary of village head increased from twenty yuan to forty yuan, and the salary of clerks increased from fifteen yuan to nineteen yuan. See Jirō Tō, "Hōtenshō tetsuryōken sonsei kakutei jisshi jōkyō, sono ni," *Naimu shiryō geppō*, vol. 1, no. 4, 1937, 2.
[34] Neiwuju jianduchu, "Jiezhi ji cunzhi yaogang gaishuo," *Neiwu ziliao*, vol. 4, no. 4, April 1938, 950.

to collect them. In spite of the division of functions in legal terms, internal affairs and delegated affairs were not clearly separated in practice. The scope of activities delegated by the state often expanded into many areas that were considered as local internal functions.

The assignment of functions may be seen as serving economical and practical ends. Because many functions such as building roads and bridges often exceeded the responsibilities of army and police, it would be practical to assign these responsibilities to the local administrators. It was also a matter of administrative efficiency that local issues could usually be better understood and resolved at the local level. Therefore, the assignment of functions was actually largely based on the assumption of what services were in the local interests and what services were in the state interests, rather than as a mark of respect for local rights.

An important feature of local self-government in towns and villages was the organisation of local councils. These councils had a formal existence based on a vague notion that a legislature of this kind might contribute to a smooth operation of local administration. In other words, the councils served primarily the purpose of ensuring greater participation of people and more effective implementation of rural programs. However, the Japanese authorities had no intention of making town and village councils into legislative organs with full-fledged functions of enacting laws, determining local budgets and expenditure, deciding on the creation and management of local properties and electing local leadership. Rather, their attitude towards the councils was ambiguous and their effort in establishing councils only served a temporary purpose.

Local councils were established at town and village levels selectively in different periods and forms. First, the councils organised in the towns with relatively high level of social and economic development were called *shigikai*. The members of these councils were elected by local inhabitants, subject to the approval of the Prime Minister of Manchukuo. Membership was honorary, and the duration of service was two years. The number of members ranged from five to ten. Councils convened a general meeting monthly or bimonthly. The meeting discussed local matters of finance, construction and security. Financial matters appeared to have been the main part of the agenda of local councils. Specifically, these matters included making budgets, raising local loans, drafting labour, and collecting fees and charges.[35] It is noteworthy that even though the fiscal matters were the main agenda of the general meetings, they were confined to discussing the way by which the money could be efficiently collected and submitted to

[35] Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 115-6.

the treasury of higher authorities. The councils did not have much authority beyond collecting fees and charges.

At the end of 1940, the Japanese authorities abolished the town councils and integrated their functions into the executive committee (*jōmukai*) of the local branches of the Concordia Association. The purpose was to reduce the cost of local administration and enhance the administrative efficiency. The CA was a mass political organisation established shortly after the founding of Manchukuo in 1932.[36] When the local councils of towns and villages were dissolved in 1940, the CA had already established a complex network of human and material resources in towns and villages. The association absorbed a large local population into its organisation and its membership increased rapidly. *Jōmukai* within the organisational structure of the CA were not only a local administrative apparatus, but also a platform for communication between the government and local people. Each *jōmukai* had a committee constituted by members of a range of social backgrounds. Local elites, members of the local branches of the CA and farmers associations were all on board. Thus, *jōmukai* represented the interests of a wider public.

Second, the councils set up in towns with low levels of socioeconomic development and in villages were called *kyōgikai*. When local self-government was instituted in the local administration in 1937, the Japanese authorities did not show much interest in establishing councils in these places. As mentioned previously, they only established councils, or *shigikai*, in a limited number of towns. Not until 1939 were *kyōgikai* conditionally established and they were usually replaced by *jōmukai* in places where the branches of the CA were established.[37] The *kyōgikai* was organisationally and functionally similar to *shigikai*, but its location was restricted to villages and economically underdeveloped towns.

[36] A basic literature on the topic of the CA is as follows: Kenichirō Hirano, "Manshūkoku kyōwakai no seijiteki tenkai," *Nenpo seijigaku 1972:'Konoe shintaisei' no kenkyū*, eds. Nihon seiji gakkai, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972, 231-83 and "State-Forging and Nation-Destroying: The Case of the CA of Manchukuo", *East Asian Cultural Studies* 25, no. 1-4, March 1986, 37-57; Takashi Suzuki, "Manshūkoku kyōwakai shi shiron-1," *Kikan gendaishi* (1), Spring edition, May 1973, 28-51 and Manshūkoku kyōwakai shi shiron-2," *Kikan gendaishi* (2), Winter edition, December 1974, 102-33; Makio Okabe, "Shokuminchi fasizumu undō no seiritsu to tenkai: Manshū seinen renmei to Manshū kyōwatō,"*Rekishigaku kenkyū*, no. 406, March 1974, 1-16.

[37] Zhongyang dang'anguan, Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'anguan, Jilinsheng shehui kexueyuan, eds, *Weiman kuilei zhengquan*, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1994, 519-28.

Finance as the Economic Function of Towns and Villages

The conditions of local finance show the extent to which local finances were independent from central control. The dependency of local finances on the control of the central government can be examined from investigating the following questions: what were the sources of local revenue? How much local revenue was raised locally and how much was received from the central government? How free were local governments to determine how revenue was expended? How much of local revenue was used on local projects and how much was used for the central government?

I will begin with a consideration of local revenue. The revenue of towns and villages was categorised as regular revenue and irregular revenue. A considerable share came from regular revenue, while irregular revenue accounted for only a very small portion of the total. According to the law, the primary source of local revenue was to be the income produced by collaborative labour by local residents, the income produced by personal properties, service charges and so forth. Only in the case of shortage was income to be derived from taxation.[38] In reality, tax was the most important source of the central government's revenue. If the decentralisation scheme of delegating power from central government to local government had included decisions on tax matters, the arrangement would have seriously limited the central government's capacity in fiscal matters. In consequence, the Japanese authorities had no intent to delegate to local governments their authority to determine the types and rates of tax. Governments below province level were given the authority only to collect tax. Local governments set up offices in towns and villages and employed regular staff to take charge of tax collection. As mentioned in Chapter three, the tax system of Manchukuo consisted of village tax, county tax, state tax and surcharges to these taxes. Rural population were required to pay not only county tax and state tax, but also village tax. Village tax was levied on land, houses, household and so forth. Land tax occupied the largest portion in village tax. The other sources of village tax were rents for the use of properties, service charges, negligence fees, loans and allocated charges for establishments benefiting only a part of the locality.[39]

State tax, county tax and village local tax were set at different rates. The rate of village tax was the highest, followed by that of county tax and state tax. A comparison

[38] For the provisions on town and village finance, see Article Twenty-One of the Jie System and Article Nineteen of the Cun system in Che, *Weiman jiceng zhengquan yanjiu*, 245 and 253.
[39] The specific types of taxes are shown in the table of local finance structure in Chen's work. See Xiang Chen, "'Manshūkoku' no nōgyō seisaku to nōson shakai," PhD diss., Niigata University, 2011, 47.

of county tax and village tax with land tax that is a common category of state tax shows this difference. In Fengtian Province, land tax varied from 0.1 yuan to 1.4 yuan per *xiang*. County tax varied from 0.67 yuan to 1.46 yuan per *xiang*. Village tax varied from 4.05 to 7 yuan per *xiang*. In general, the rate of county tax was 40 percent higher than land tax, and rate of village tax was four times of that of land tax. In Jilin Province, land tax was 0.615 yuan per *xiang* and county tax was 1.21 yuan per *xiang*. The rate of county tax was twice of that of land tax. In Heilongjiang Province, land tax varied from 0.0014 yuan to 0.357 yuan per *xiang*. County tax was 0.84 yuan per *xiang*. The rate of county tax was twice of that of land tax.[40] A comparison of town tax and village tax in several provinces shows that the government levied more taxes in villages than in towns. In Jinzhou Province, town tax was only 2.43 yuan per *xiang*, but village tax was 6.49 yuan per *xiang*. In Andong Province, town tax was only 0.66 yuan, but village tax amounted to 9.80 yuan per *xiang*. In Jiandao Province, town tax was 1.24 yuan per *xiang*, but village tax was 1.93 yuan per *xiang*.[41] In the case of land tax, rates were set according to the natural conditions of land and subdivided into complex categories. The rates were not fixed and varied from province to province. In general, the rates ranged from 0.1 yuan per *xiang* to 2 yuan per *xiang*. The most complex subdivision of tax rates was in Fengtian, where land tax was segmented into nine categories. Following Fengtian was Heilongjiang where there were three categories of land tax.[42]

The Manchukuo government greatly increased the amount of tax and non-tax sources of revenue between 1937 and 1942. As shown in Table 4.1, between 1937 and 1942, the revenue increased threefold from 34 million yuan to 115 million yuan. The revenue that was raised from taxation between 1937 and 1942 accounted for roughly 77.2 percent in the total revenue of local governments. The increase of local revenue may not be surprising because it was natural for the central government to place emphasis on taxing land for the purpose of increasing local revenue in a society like Manchukuo where agricultural farming played a significant role in the economy. What might be more interesting is that the increased revenue would have permitted greater government activities and greater government influence on the local economy. Table 4.2 also shows that between 1937 and 1942, there was a decrease of the proportion of tax and an increase of the proportion of other sources in the total local revenue. The

[40] Hirokazu Hirai, "Manshūkoku ni okeru naikokuzei kōzō no gaikan," *Hokusei ronshū*, vol. 48, no. 1, September 2008, 16.
[41] Takeo Sekiguchi, "Gaison zaisei no genjō to sono shomondai," *Manshū hyōron*, vol.16, no. 8, 1939, 18.
[42] Hirai, "Manshūkoku ni okeru naikokuzei kōzō no gaikan," 17.

revenue raised from tax decreased from 88.48 percent to 72.02 percent; while the revenue from other sources increased from 11.52 percent to 27.98 percent. This trend indicates that the local government was becoming less dependent on taxation as a source of local revenue.

Taxes were levied on an unfair and arbitrary basis. This point is well illustrated in the case of land tax. Land tax was levied in the form of flat tax rather than progressive tax.[43] This means that the land tax was levied at a fixed rate, regardless of the income of taxpayers. It puts the heaviest burden on the poor because they pay just as much as the rich. In consequence, taxpayers of all social classes including landlords, rich, middle and poor peasants paid the same fraction of their income in taxes. The unfair practice of tax payment is evident in Table 4.2 that shows the conditions of land tax payment by different classes in villages. Poor peasants owned 11.92 percent of land but paid 12.4 percent of the total tax take. Extremely poor peasants owned 5.46 percent of land but paid 8.1 percent of the tax take. In addition, the payment of village tax within different peasant classes was also an unfair practice. Poor and extremely poor peasants tended to pay more than did rich and middle peasants. As shown in Table 4.3, in contrast to the 53.2 percent by rich peasants and 57.2 percent by middle peasants, poor peasants paid 60.8 percent and extremely poor peasants paid 68.3 percent of village tax. Because village tax was levied at a much higher rate than rates of county and national tax, it is assumed that the amount paid by poor and extremely poor peasants was significantly higher than the amount paid by rich and middle peasants.

Table 4.1. Revenue of Towns and Villages (unit: 1000 yuan)

Year	Tax	Percentage	Non-Tax	Percentage	Total
1937	30,402	88.48	3,957	11.52	34,359
1938	32,484	78.99	8,638	21.01	41,122
1939	46,872	75.16	15,489	24.84	62,361
1940	58,548	75.94	18,550	24.06	77,098
1941	69,394	72.31	26,574	27.69	95,968
1942	82,883	72.02	32,204	27.98	115,087

Source: Xiang Chen, "'Manshūkoku' no nōgyō seisaku to nōson shakai," PhD diss., Niigata University, 2011, 58.

A comparison of the local revenue and price index shows that the increase in the revenue of towns and villages over the period of 1937 and 1941 was slightly sharper than the increase of the cost of living and prices of goods. As shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.4, while the revenue of local government increased 3.35 times from 1937 to

[43] Sekiguchi, "Gaison zaisei no genjō to sono shomondai," 11.

1941, the price of public goods only increased roughly twofold in the same period. The index of wholesale price increased from 118 to 234; the index of retail price increased from 100 to 226; and the index of cost of living increased from 107 to 250. The faster increase of local revenue compared to market prices indicates that either the local governments might have received more authority from the central government in dealing with local financial affairs or the local administrative apparatus was becoming more functionally organised and efficient.

Table 4.2. Comparison between Land Acreage and Tax Amount

Class Category	Land Acreage (*mu*)	Percentage of Total Acreage	Tax Amount (yuan)	Percentage of Total Tax Paid
Large Landlord	432	2.49	141	1.3
Middle Landlord	489	2.83	126	1.2
Small Landlord	96	0.55	24	0.2
Rich Peasant	6,647	38.36	4,150	38.5
Middle Peasant	5,438	31.40	3,358	31.2
Poor Peasant	2,064	11.92	1,333	12.4
Extremely Poor peasant	947	5.46	879	8.1
Hired Peasant	1	0.02	13	0.1
Others	1,202	6.94	757	7
Total	17,321	100	10,795	100

Source: Takeo Sekiguchi, "Manshūkoku chihō zaisei no seikaku," *Mantetsu chōsa geppō*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1939, 30.
Note: 1). One *mu* is an equivalent of 666.7 square meters; 2) the table only reflects the conditions of the main landholding classes in villages, and other classes such as labourers and non-employed are excluded.

Table 4.3. The Proportion of Tax Payment by Peasants

Tax Type	Rich Peasant	Middle Peasant	Poor Peasant	Extremely Poor Peasant	Hired Peasant
National Tax	19.3%	15.2%	13.8%	10.4%	4.8%
County Tax	27.5%	27.6%	25.4%	21.3%	43.9%
Village Tax	53.2%	57.2%	60.8%	68.3%	51.3%

Source: Sekiguchi, "Manshūkoku chihō zaisei no seikaku," 31.

Table 4.4. The Market Price Index of Xinjing between 1937 and 1941

	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Wholesale	118	141	171	213	234
Retail	100	112	145	207	226
Cost of living	107	124	158	215	250

Source: Yūzo Yamamoto, "Dai tōa kyōeiken" keizaishi kenkyū, Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2011, 64.
Note: the price index was based on the investigation of the market price in Xinjing by the MCB.

Tax was a heavy burden to village residents. According to a Japanese investigation about 569 households of ten villages in ten counties in southern

Manchuria, the annual income of each household was an average of 180.53 yuan and the tax that each household was required to pay amounted to 18.97 yuan. This data suggests that tax accounted for approximately 10 percent of the annual income of residents.[44] Another Japanese investigation conducted in 1934 and 1935 covered the entire area of Manchuria. This investigation shows that the total annual income of each household in the villages of Manchuria ranged from 150 to 200 yuan. Village tax accounted for less than 5 percent of their annual income.[45]

Provincial and county governments were normally given subsidies by the national treasury, but the subsidies given to towns and villages from the national treasury were very limited. The local revenue of towns and villages was largely raised locally and thus was independent from the central or provincial government. In 1938, the financial aid given to towns and villages by provincial government accounted for only 2 percent of the local revenue. The aid slightly increased to 3 percent in 1940.[46] In comparison with the revenue raised from taxation, the income from the government aid was very insignificant.

Table 4.5. The Total Annual Expenses of Towns and Villages (unit: yuan)

	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942
Public Administration	10,066,673	12,310,971	19,296,704	26,298,691	38,183,724	50,015,805
	29.3%	29.94%	30.94%	34.11%	39.79%	43.46%
Self-Defence	7,685,167	4,850,395	4,736,446	4,377,200	4,414,428	4,066,747
	22.37%	11.80%	7.60%	5.68%	4.60%	3.53%
Education	7,711,710	9,962,441	14,703,085	11,905,626	17,966,433	18,865,346
	22.44%	24.23%	23.58%	15.44%	18.72%	16.39%
Public Works	997,368	1,236,277	4,154,860	3,531,099	4,307,790	3,455,175
	2.90%	3.01%	6.66%	4.58%	4.49%	3.00%
Building and Repairing	1,358,590	2,478,329	3,052,724	9,975,744	6,766,217	6,926,653
	3.95%	6.03%	4.90%	12.94%	7.05%	6.02%
Industrial Development	626,884	912,426	1,528,077	1,878,170	2,012,240	2,088,092
	1.82%	2.22%	2.45%	2.44%	2.10%	1.81%
Sanitation	340,091	575,452	1,137,027	1,832,814	2,402,202	2,710,609
	0.99%	1.40%	1.82%	2.37%	2.50%	2.36%
Public Loan	--	68,647	211,617	78,747	77,598	69,875
	0	0.20%	0.51%	0.13%	0.10%	0.07%
Other	5,573,247	8,726,956	13,540,861	17,228,218	19,837,332	26,887,976
	16.22%	21.22%	21.71%	22.35%	0.07%	23.36%
Total	34,359,730	41,121,894	62,361,401	77,106,309	95,967,964	114,586,278
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Source: Chen, "'Manshūkoku' no nōgyō seisaku to nōson shakai," 55.

[44] Manshūkoku jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Hokuman nanman nōson jittai chōsa hōkokusho: sozei kōka hen*, Shinkyō: Jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, 1937, 340-1.
[45] Manshūkoku jitsugyōbu rinji sangyō chōsakyoku, *Hokuman nanman nōson jittai chōsa hōkokusho*, 144.
[46] For the aid figure, see Hirokazu Hirai, "'Manshūkoku' chihō zaisei ni okeru 'shōchihōhi' no seiritsu," *Keizaigaku kenkyū*, vol. 53, no.3, December 2003, 244.

The main areas of local expenditure were public administration, self-defence, and education. The revenue also went into the areas of maintaining and developing local infrastructure facilities, public health and so forth.[47] Table 4.5 shows the major areas of local expenditure: administration, defence and education. There was a sharp increase in the expenditure of local administration and a sharp decrease in the expenditure on local defence. Expenses in public administration increased fivefold and their percentage of the total expenditure increased from 29.3 percent to 43.5 percent. There was a slight decrease in expenses on local defence; their percentage decreased by only 3.35 percent in 1942. The expenses in education increased almost threefold, but its proportion in the total expenditure actually decreased from 22.4 percent to 16.39 percent.

The governments only had a small degree of freedom to determine what tasks they wanted to undertake and finance. We already know from the blurred division of the functions of local self-government that there was a high level of control from the central government over the areas in which the local government had financial freedom. The patterns of local expenditure also indicate a low level of local financial independence. The level of financial independence can be observed from the functions of the main areas of expenditure. As shown in Table 4.5, most of the areas such as administration, education, construction and self-defence to which local expenditure went were nationally assigned functions. Most of the expenses used for exercising the nationally assigned functions were likely to be of a mandatory nature, and there was hardly any function that was based on local initiatives. Once the compulsory expenses were paid, there would have been hardly any money left for local governments to spend on projects that they might have wanted to attend to on their own initiative. It is reasonable to assume from the conditions of local finance on the expenditure side that there was a strong tendency of control by the central government over local finance.

We can see from the area of revenue and expenditure that the local finance in towns and villages was characterised by a high level of submission to national administration. On the revenue side, the government depended largely on tax as the most important source of revenue. The authority for setting rates and types of taxes was retained by the central government, and governments at town and village levels were denied the authority to make important decisions on local finance. On the expenditure side, the local finance was not devised to provide revenues for local activities, but to ensure that there would be sufficient funds expended in areas serving the interest of

[47] The specific areas of local expenditure are shown in the table of local finance structure in Chen's work. See Chen, "'Manshūkoku' no nōgyō seisaku to nōson shakai," 47.

state. The conditions of local finance indicated the impotence of local governments. The local self-government in towns and villages was entangled in a mesh of restrictive legislation and financial disability.

Conclusion

The *jiecun* system organised local administration from the county government down to the town and village level. Towns and villages became the basic units in the hierarchy of the state bureaucracy. Towns and villages took on both administrative and economic functions. The administrative functions included the maintenance of public services, such as building schools, roads and bridges, and the securing of local law and order. The economic functions were concerned with the management of local fiscal policies and taxation. Economic functions outweighed administrative functions and dominated the activities of these bodies in towns and villages. This imbalance was due to the priority of the Japanese interests in towns and villages. In fact, the Japanese authorities were concerned about stabilising their fiscal base from levying taxes, fees and charges.

There was a certain degree of administrative independence of towns and villages from the central government in the *jiecun* system. The system acknowledged the status of towns and villages as local public groups and their self-governing jurisdiction within a certain area of government activity, within which they took the initiative to plan and execute finances and their councils and officials were to some extent responsible for the local interests.

Although towns and villages had a structure of a given territory and population organised for local legislative or administrative purposes, their authority in important matters such as enacting laws and making financial plans was considerably constrained by the central government. The authority of the central government over the administration of towns and villages remained comprehensive and firm. There was hardly any sign of relaxation of central control over local bureaucracy and finance, making the bureaucratic structure of towns and villages rigid and leaving little room for local improvisation.

The extent to which towns and villages in the *jiecun* system could be viewed as local self-governing entities may also be observed from the degree of interference by the central government in local public affairs. The activities of the towns and villages were limited to those that were designed to enhance the welfare of the inhabitants but did not require the exercise of governmental authority over them. The authority of

making decisions on important matters such as finance was still entrusted to the central government, and the authority of local government in such areas was highly limited.

It is thus reasonable to suggest that the *jiecun* system supported an authoritarian hierarchy of control from the state in which the socioeconomic relations of towns and villages were regulated in terms of duties towards the state and that their basis of local government was the fulfilment of the needs of the state.

Chapter Five: The Logic and Strategies of Agrarian Reorganisation

The Japanese authorities relied on the agriculture of Manchukuo for the supply of food for local consumption and for the provision of raw materials for industrial growth. The Japanese authorities also relied on agrarian products for export to sustain the economic growth of Manchukuo. Soybeans, as the premier crop of the region, for example, supported the foreign trade of Manchukuo in the early 1930s and served as an important source of food for domestic consumption in Japan after the outbreak of the Pacific War in the 1940s. In the course of fourteen years of Japanese domination of Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities extended their control over agricultural production and circulation through a network of policies, capital penetration and administrative intervention.

Agrarian control was highly relevant to the state coercion exercised by the Japanese authorities to manage the economy of Manchukuo. Since the early 1930s, the Japanese authorities had pursued a policy of organising the Manchurian and Japanese economy into a single bloc. This policy promoted the practices of constructing Manchukuo into a base of food supply for Japan through control over agrarian production and circulation.[1]

This chapter examines Manchukuo's agrarian structure and the Japanese strategies of agrarian control that encompassed the reorganisation of grain warehouses, the creation of cooperatives, the establishment of control organisations and the enforcement of crop delivery. This chapter argues that although these strategies were not intended to change the basic structure of agrarian relations in rural Manchukuo, they enhanced the Japanese capacity to extend control to the agrarian production, circulation and rural life in Manchuria.

The Conditions of Agriculture in Manchuria

The structure of agrarian production in Manchuria was characterised by the cultivation of cash crops for export and subsistence crops for local consumption. The most important cash crops were soybean and wheat, and the most important subsistence crops were sorghum, millet and maize.[2] Soybean trade occupied a central place in the agrarian economy of Manchuria in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Throughout

[1] The agrarian policy was part of the Five-year Plan of Manchukuo. For a discussion of the Five-Year Plan of Manchukuo, see Yoshiro Miwa, *Japan's Economic Planning and Mobilization in Wartime, 1930s-1940s: The Competence of the State*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

[2] Zhenan Quan, "'Manshūkoku'nōgyō seisan ni kansuru sūryōteki kenkyū," *Tōkyō keidai gakkaishi (keizaigaku)*, no. 245, March 2005, 135.

this period, soybeans occupied 70 to 80 percent of Manchuria's exports. In 1930, Manchuria accounted for 60 percent of global production and a corresponding share of world trade in soybeans.[3] The market for Manchuria's soybean export extended from Japan and China to Europe. Prior to 1905, soybeans produced in Manchuria were exported to only Japan and China. After the end of the First World War in 1918, the soybean export extended to the European market. As shown in Table 5.1, soybean accounted for 28.3 percent of the region's entire crop output in 1932. The growing of soybean extended throughout Manchuria. Production was slightly greater in southern Manchuria than in northern Manchuria. Second to soybeans was wheat. In 1932, the acreage of wheat was relatively small, amounting to 7.4 percent of the total acreage under cultivation. Wheat growing was concentrated in northern Manchuria, where 90 percent of the total wheat output of Manchuria was produced.[4] Sorghum, millet and maize were cultivated primarily for the purpose of local consumption. Maize was chiefly used as a staple food. Sorghum and millet could be used not only as staple food, but also as raw materials for industrial production.

After 1931, the drop of prices and the restriction of foreign market, Japan and Germany in particular, as a result of the Great Depression greatly hit the agrarian economy of Manchuria and produced serious distress in rural areas. Many farmers fled the countryside and abandonded their land. The depressed agriculture robbed farmers of incentives to produce for market and encouraged them to produce for self-consumption.[5] Change also occurred in the structure of crop cultivation in Manchuria. Between 1931 and 1936, there was a decrease in the output of soybean and wheat for export. In contrast, the output of sorghum, millet and maize for local consumption slightly increased. Figures in Table 5.1 show that between 1931 and 1936, the output of soybean and wheat dropped from 36.6 percent to 30.3 percent and the output of sorghum, millet and maize increased from 49.6 percent to 56.4 percent. It was not until 1936 that the total agricultural output showed a considerable recovery, but the output was still below that of 1931.

[3] James Reardon-Anderson, *Reluctant Pioneers: China's Expansion Northward, 1644-1937*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, 179.
[4] Wolf. Ladejinsky, "Agriculture in Manchuria – Possibilities for Expansion," *Foreign Agriculture – A Review of Foreign Farm Policy, Production and Trade*, vol. 1, no. 4, April 1937, 171-2.
[5] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū keizai nenpō*, Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1933, 220-39.

Table 5.1. The Volume and Percentage of Total Agricultural Output (unit for output: thousand tons)

	Soybean	Other Beans	Sorghum	Millet	Maize	Wheat	Paddy Rice	Upland Rice	Other Grains	Total
1929	4,855	377	4,678	3,350	1,612	1,302	137	156	1,823	18,289
	26.5%	2.1%	25.6%	18.3%	8.8%	7.1%	0.7	0.9	10.0	100%
1930	5,360	370	4,771	3,299	1,589	1,384	154	158	1,780	18,865
	28.4%	2.0%	25.3%	17.5%	8.4%	7.3%	0.8%	0.8%	9.4%	100%
1931	5,227	313	4,497	2,960	1,706	1,530	159	163	1,853	18,458
	28.3%	1.7%	24.4%	16.0%	9.2%	8.3%	0.9%	0.9%	10.0%	100%
1932	4,268	278	3,729	2,615	1,542	1,133	110	137	1,550	15,363
	27.8%	1.8%	24.3%	17%	10.0%	7.4%	0.7%	0.9%	10.1%	100%
1933	4,601	304	4,022	3,184	1,759	863	166	143	1,804	16,847
	27.3%	1.8%	23.9%	18.9%	10.4%	5.1%	1.0%	0.8%	10.7%	100%
1934	3,398	277	3,470	2,123	1,503	643	200	126	1,046	12,935
	26.3%	2.1%	26.8%	16.4%	11.6%	5.0%	1.5%	1.0%	8.1%	100%
1935	3,859	327	4,103	2,968	1,903	1,015	296	147	1,106	15,962
	24.2%	2.0%	25.7%	18.6%	11.9%	6.4%	1.9%	0.9%	6.9%	100%
1936	4,147	341	4,241	3,187	2,072	959	442	155	1,093	16,830
	24.6%	2.0%	25.2%	18.9%	12.3%	5.7%	2.6%	0.9%	6.5%	100%
1937	4,352	327	4,315	3,226	2,240	1,126	549	140	1,069	17,515
	24.8%	1.9%	24.6%	18.4%	12.8%	6.4%	3.1%	0.8%	6.1%	100%

Source: Yasushi Iitsuka and Hideto Kazama, "Nōsan shigen no shūdatsu," in *Nihon teikoku shugi no Manshū shihai: 15-nen sensōki wo chūshin ni*, eds. Kyōji Asada and Hideo Kobayashi, Tokyo: Jichōsha, 1986, 435-6.

Declining exports, low bean prices and curtailed agricultural production called for stronger government intervention in agriculture. In March 1933, the Manchukuo government drew up an economic construction program prioritising the expansion of agricultural output and the cultivation of cash crops in the state agenda.[6] In February 1934, the Manchukuo government started to investigate such alternative crops as wheat in northern Manchuria and cotton and hemp in southern Manchuria.[7] In the meantime, the Manchukuo government encouraged the use of chemical fertilisers, enhanced the quality of seeds, improved irrigation, enriched soil, cultivated new lands, and introduced modern agricultural implements into farming.[8] They also tried to stimulate export, facilitate market growth, and promoted agricultural commercialisation.[9] In addition, the Manchukuo government began to exercise systemic control over the channels of agrarian distribution by reorganising grain warehouses and establishing agrarian control organisations in rural areas.

[6] Shujuan Li, *Riwei tongzhi xia de dongbei nongcun (1931-1945)*, Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2005, 165.
[7] Xiang Chen, "Nicchū sensō ni yoru 'Manshūkoku' nōgyō seisaku no tenkan," *Kan higashi Ajia kenkyū senta- nepō*, vol. 6, March 2011, 69.
[8] Manshikai, *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi*, Tokyo: Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi kankōkai, 1964-1965, 793-817.
[9] Manshikai, *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi*, 864-68.

Grain Warehouses

Grain warehouses (*liangzhan*) were small Chinese companies that bought grain and beans directly from the farmers and sold to millers, distillers, or larger wholesalers. The typical grain warehouse was a partnership, formed by several men who together contributed the capital, labour, and connections required to run the business.[10] Grain warehouses emerged in the urban and rural areas of Manchuria in the late Qing period. The commercialisation of soybeans after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 greatly facilitated the growth of grain warehouses in Manchuria. Grain warehouses developed rapidly along the South Manchuria Railway lines in southern Manchuria and at Harbin in northern Manchuria. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, 95 percent of soybeans that reached Manchuria's major ports passed through grain warehouses.[11] At the end of the Qing, there were six hundred grain warehouses operating in Manchuria.[12] The largest grain warehouses in terms of the scale of capital and operation were known as official grain warehouses (*guanshang liangzhan*).[13] The official grain warehouses were the subsidiary enterprises of the chief native banks in Manchuria that provided funding for their business operations.[14] Small grain warehouses were usually privately owned and operated by petty merchants. By 1932, grain warehouses had directly controlled the purchasing and selling of agrarian products to domestic and foreign markets in Manchuria.

Grain warehouses accumulated huge commercial capital through their marketing activities. Grain warehouses played the role of the intermediary between farmers and market. Petty merchants usually worked as the agents for grain warehouses. They bought grain and soybeans directly from farmers. Their transactions were made at prices set by grain warehouses. The petty merchants charged a handling fee on behalf of grain warehouses. The vertical arrangements between grain warehouses and petty merchants maintained the flow of capital into the rural areas and the removal of agricultural

[10] Anderson, *Reluctant Pioneers*, 188. For a general study of grain warehouses in Manchuria before 1931, see Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū ni okeru ryōsan*, place of publication unknown: Minami Manshū tetsudō, 1933.
[11] Christopher Mills Isett, *State, Peasant and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644-1862*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, 266.
[12] Isett, *State, Peasant and Merchant in Qing Manchuria*, 265.
[13] Fumio Kaneko, *Kindai Nihon ni okeru taiman tōshi no kenkyū*, Tokyo: Kondō shuppansha, 1991, 491.
[14] Before the Mukden Incident in 1931, there were four chief native banks in operation in Manchuria. They were the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces (*dongsansheng guanshanghao*), the Provincial Bank of Jilin (*Jilinsheng guanshang yinqianhao*), the Provincial Bank of Heilongjiang (*Heilongjiang guanshang yinhao*) and the Frontier Bank (*bianye yinhang*). See Ayumu Yasutomi, "'Manshūkoku' no kinyū," Ph.D. diss., Kyoto University, 1996, 6-8.

products to the market. Grain warehouse also functioned as a venue for the stocking and safekeeping of grain and soybeans. A handling fee was charged for the stocking of agricultural products. In southern Manchuria, products were stocked in yards; while in northern Manchuria, the products were often stocked in an area close to the railway. The proximity of grain warehouses to the railway facilitated the delivery and transport of grain and soybeans to market. In addition, grain warehouses generated profits for themselves by granting credit to farmers. When farmers were in need of money for their own purposes, they often turned to grain warehouses to borrow money. Grain warehouses loaned out their capital to make profits by earning interest. The interest rate of loans was two or three fen per month in most cases, but it sometimes could be very high.[15]

Grain warehouses established a dominant status in the trade of grain and beans through close ties with local business associations and government authorities horizontally and with petty merchants vertically. Grain warehouses established membership with local commercial associations and guilds. They received support from local authorities who designated them to act as brokers to command markets. Grain warehouses also controlled petty merchants by forging ties with them through debts and contractual obligations. Petty merchants who were short of capital often turned to grain warehouses for loans. Grain warehouses forwarded capital in return for securing their stocks in advance and tried to contract petty merchants as agents to buy grains on their behalf.[16] The binding of petty merchants by grain warehouses through debts and contracts tied merchants and farmers to engage in commercial activities with grain warehouses.

In the early period of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army attempted to consolidate Japanese capital in the Manchurian economy. The Japanese authorities established new banks by nationalising all the previous banks including their subsidiary enterprises and put the banking and credit system of the state under their control. These financial organisations included the MCB established in June 1932, the Chōsen Bank (*Chōsen ginkō*), the Yokohama Specie Bank (*shōkin ginkō*), the Shōryū Bank (*shōryū ginkō*), and the Mitsui and Mitsubishi Bank (*Mitsui Mitsubishi ginkō*).[17] The flow of Japanese

[15] For the functions of grain warehouses, see Manshikai, *Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi*, Tokyo: Manshū kaihatsu yonjūnenshi kankōkai, 1964-1965, 880-2.
[16] Isett, *State, Peasant and Merchant in Qing Manchuria*, 266.
[17] Ayumu Yasutomi, "'Manshūkoku' no nōgyō kankei kinyū," *Jimbun gakuhō*, no. 78, March 1996, 54-5.

capital from banks to grain warehouses increased dramatically from 63 million yuan in 1933 to 89 million yuan in 1934 and 170 million yuan in 1935.[18]

Table 5.2. The Conditions of Grain Warehouses in Southern Manchuria (unit: 1000 yuan)

Year	Number of Grain Warehouses	Total Capital	Capital per Grain Warehouse
1937	919	23,529	26
February 1943	1,382	68,280	49

Source: Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 38 and 47.

Table 5.3. The Conditions of Grain Warehouses in Northern Manchuria (unit: 1000 yuan)

Year	Number of Grain Warehouses	Total Capital	Capital per Grain Warehouse
1937	1,073	15,187	14
February 1943	517	26,577	51

Source: Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 38 and 50.

After the founding of Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities rationalised the operation of grain warehouses. In 1933, warehousing facilities were built specifically for the stocking of agricultural products. The construction of warehousing facilities was aimed to reduce the total volume of grain coming into grain warehouses so that the activities of grain warehouses in stocking agricultural products could be restrained.[19] In May 1933, the Manchukuo government demobilised the official grain warehouses and only allowed privately owned grain warehouses to continue their commercial activities in the circulation sector.[20] The attempt to retain the commercial activities of privately owned grain warehouses rather than eliminating them completely was made primarily because the Japanese considered grain warehouses as being of vital importance to maintain the soybean trade. In the eyes of Japanese policymakers, the soybean trade was closely connected to the income of farmers, and the stability of farmers' income was the precondition for rural security. The economic control enforced by the Manchukuo government in 1937 expanded the capital of grain warehouses in the circulation sector. During this period, the commercial capital of grain warehouses grew rapidly. As shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, the total capital of grain warehouses increased almost threefold in southern Manchuria and almost twofold in northern Manchuria from 1937 to 1943 in spite of the changes in the number of grain warehouses.

[18] Hideto Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū: Nihon teikokushugi to dochaku ryūtsū shihon*, Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1993, 92.
[19] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 85.
[20] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 86.

In the late 1930s, grain warehouses, in particular those with meagre capital, engaged actively in commercial activities in the black market. The government capacity to extend control over the market had been greatly restrained by the commercial activities taking place in the black market. The rationing controls and price restriction of government enforced by laws and regulations in the late 1930s gave rise to the proliferation of the black market.[21] Under these laws and regulations, only government was entitled to distribute crops to farmers in rationed amounts. The limited ration quota could not meet the lowest nutrition standards to maintain subsistence. For example, the government quota of daily commodities in Tongliao County in 1941 only reached one third of the volume demanded by farmers.[22] However, the government continuously adjusted the rationing standards to meet the deteriorating conditions of the supply of daily necessities. In consequence, farmers had to buy daily commodities in the black market. In addition, the government set prices for almost all consumer goods to prevent inflation. The government prices were the lowest prices at which sellers could sell their products. The low and fixed price set by the government greatly discouraged farmers from selling their crops to the government and encouraged them to sell their crops to the black market.

Village heads also played an important role in facilitating the expansion of the black market. Village heads held the power to receive from the government rationed goods and to distribute them to farmers. Because the government had little power to supervise the operation of village politics, village heads often turned the distributed materials into their own possession and sold them in the black market to make profits.[23]

A broad array of daily commodities ranging from foodstuffs to clothing was available in the black market at much higher prices. In Haicheng County in 1942 for example, the prices of the daily commodities sold in the black market was at least twice the government prices. In most cases, the commodities sold in the black market were five times more expensive.[24]

The commercial activities of the black market propelled the Manchukuo government to re-rationalise grain warehouses for agrarian control. In 1940, the Manchukuo government appointed grain warehouses as the government agents for the delivery of agricultural products. The Manchukuo government established grain

[21] Yūzo Yamamoto, *"Manshūkoku" keizaishi kenkyū*, Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2003, 63-5.
[22] Xiang Chen, "'Manshūkoku' tōsei keizai ka no nōson yamishijō mondai,"*Kan higashi Ajia kenkyū sentā nenpō*, no.5, February 2010, 86.
[23] Xiang Chen, "'Manshūkoku' tōsei keizai ka no nōson yamishijō mondai," 89.
[24] Xiang Chen, "'Manshūkoku' tōsei keizai ka no nōson yamishijō mondai," 88.

warehouse partnerships (*ryōsan kumiai*) to expand government control over the activities of grain warehouses in September 1940. The grain warehouse partnerships were larger organisations that merged the capital of individual grain warehouses. Partner grain warehouses engaged in the purchase and sale of agrarian products and other circulation-related activities. The pattern of grain warehouses in forming partnership was divided into voluntary partnership (*nin'i kumiai*) and investment partnership (*shusshi kumiai*). In the former arrangement, the partnership itself had no legal personality and it had limited liability for the debts of the partnership. In the latter arrangement, the partnership had a legal personality and member grain warehouses took active roles in the management of the partnership.[25] As shown in Table 5.4, the number of grain warehouses formed through investment partnership increased rapidly within two years from March 1941 to February 1943. In March 1941, the number of grain warehouses formed through investment partnership was only 30, accounting for approximately 20 percent of the total number of grain warehouse partnerships. In February 1943, the number rose to 70, accounting for approximately 45 percent of the total number of grains warehouses formed through partnership. In May 1944, the number of grain warehouses in investment partnerships further increased to 117, accounting for 87.3 percent.[26]

Table 5.4. The Conditions of Grain Warehouse Partnerships in 1941 and 1943

Year	Investment Partnership		Voluntary Partnership		Total	
	Number of Partnership	Number of Member Grain Warehouses	Number of Partnership	Number of Member Grain Warehouses	Number of Partnership	Number of Member Grain Warehouses
March 1941	30	962	123	3,757	153	4,719
February 1943	70	1,161	84	1,116	154	2,277

Source: Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 208 and 214-5.

Table 5.5. The Capital Scale and Structure of Grain Warehouses between 1940 and 1942
(unit: yuan and percent)

Year	-10,000	-30,000	-50,000	-80,000	-100,000	100,000-
1940	---	1,262	6,667	---	---	23,714
1941	4,720	2,085	997	30	363	58,386
1942	7,272	1,713	1,450	9,308	3,333	50,000

Source: Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 202.
Note: The data applies to the conditions of grain warehouses in twenty-one counties in Manchuria.

[25] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 208-9.
[26] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 216.

In addition, the Manchukuo government also selectively provided credit to grain warehouses after 1940. This credit concentrated primarily on small and large grain warehouses in terms of commercial capital holdings. As shown in Table 5.5, the credit issued by the government to the large grain warehouses with capital of more than 100,000 yuan increased twofold from 1940 to 1941; the same can also be said of grain warehouses with capital of less than 30,000 yuan. The government took this initiative because the grain warehouses of small and large sizes had fast return rates and investment would be worthwhile.

The Financial Cooperative Association

In order to lift agriculture out of the depths of the Great Depression, the government programs of Manchukuo evolved over several years into a complex policy regime of farming support and government credit. Beginning in 1933, the MCB enforced a program of short-term relief credit known as spring ploughing credit (*chungeng daikuan*) to farmers. The credit was a low-interest, at 0.8 percent a year. In 1933, the credit was granted to farmers in Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces. In 1934, farmers of Rehe Province were also included in the program as the recipients of the credit. The credit amounted to a total of 28 million yuan in 1933 and 1934. However, the credit was unable to have a decisive impact on the agricultural recovery and the majority of it was unreturned.[27]

The agricultural recovery of Manchuria demanded long-term investment in agriculture. The scale of credit services provided by the MCB was incapable of supplying the volume of funds for the agricultural recovery of the agricultural depression. The Manchukuo government found it urgent to establish financial organisations to invest in agricultural development. In September 1934, the Manchukuo government established the Financial Cooperative Association (*kinyū gassakusha*, FCA). The cooperatives were placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance (*keizaibu*), and followed the principle that one cooperative was to be established in every single county of the state. As shown in Table 5.6, from 1934 to 1939, the number of FCA grew rapidly from 48 to 145; the number of its employees increased from 15,000 to 874,000; and the number of households joining the FCA increased from 2,590 to 5,949.

[27] Yoshimasa Shibata, *Senryōchi tsūka kinyū seisaku no tenkai*, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 1999, 54.

Table 5.6. The Growth of the FCA between 1934 and 1939

Year	December 1934	December 1935	December 1936	December 1937	December 1938	December 1939
Number of FCA	48	82	103	107	126	145
Number of Employees	15,000	87,000	150,000	300,000	514,000	874,000
Number of Households	2,590	3,737	4,457	4,949	5,623	5,949

Source: Yoshimasa Shibata, "'Manshūkoku' ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai: gassakusha wo chūshin ni," *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō*, no. 408, 1981, 30.

The central figure in the management structure of the FCA was the director (*riji*). The director retained the authority of making the most important decisions regarding the operation of the FCA. Each FCA had an elected president (*shachō*) and a vice president who supervised the daily administration of the cooperative. Each cooperative also had an inspector (*kanji*) and five trustees (*hyōgiin*) who sat on the board of administration. The position of director was always reserved for Japanese officials. Chinese officials could only take up the positions of president, inspectors and trustees. The Chinese in the management level of the FCA were usually landlords and rich peasants.[28]

As the largest provider of financial services for farmers, the FCA was primarily involved in the distribution of loans to farmers. Most of the loans were secured and issued on a short-term basis. Land, livestock and farming implements were usually secured as the collateral for short-term loans.[29] The loans were granted in the form of both cash and kind. In addition to cash, the FCA also provided seeds, fertiliser, and farming implements as the form of loans.[30]

Initially, the cooperatives favoured a policy that enabled easier access to loans for landlords and rich peasants. Almost all the loans were secured with tangible assets and the process of evaluation was strict. As a result of such restrictive terms and conditions, middle and poor peasants could hardly receive any loans from the FCA. In 1936, the FCA relaxed the terms and conditions of loan application and set a special loan program intended for middle and poor peasants. The following year, the FCA began to issue special loans to peasants. To receive the loan, it was mandatory that peasants have no collateral for security and that they organise themselves into a group of five to apply. The limit of the loan was fifty yuan per person and its interest rate was

[28] Yūko Hamaguchi, *Nihon tōchi to higashi Ajia shakai: shokuminchiki chōsen to Manshū no hikaku kenkyū*, Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1996, 184-5.
[29] Shibata, "'Manshūkoku' ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai," 13.
[30] Shibata, *Senryōchi tsūka kinyū seisaku no tenkai*, 113.

identical to the interest rate of a short-term loan.[31] This program encouraged peasants to use loan services provided by the FCA. From June 1937 to June 1939, the proportion of secured loans in the total loans of the FCA significantly decreased from 76 percent to 51 percent. At the end of July 1939, the special loan accounted for 26 percent of the total loans provided by the cooperatives.[32]

The funding source of the FCA and government supervision constrained the activities of the cooperatives. First, among the bodies that funded the cooperatives in the form of deposits, government and banks contributed the greatest shares of funds. The deposits from FCA members accounted for only an insignificant proportion of the working capital of the FCA. As shown in Table 5.7, the deposits by members between 1934 and 1939 had always been below 10 percent, while the deposits by non-members accounted for more than 90 percent. Second, the Ministry of Finance supervised the management of the cooperatives. Provincial and county governments were not independent in making important decisions regarding the operation of the cooperatives. The government gave the Minister for Finance responsibility for supervising the operation of cooperatives. The Minister retained the authority of approving the appointment and dismissal of directors. The Ministry of Finance retained the highest authority in deciding on the structure, operation and internal policies of the cooperatives.

Table 5.7. The Volume and Percentage of Deposits of the FCA (unit: million yuan)

Year	1934		1935		1936		1937		1938		1939	
Member	0.0	0%	0.1	9%	0.2	3%	0.4	4%	1.3	7%	3.8	10%
Non-member	0.5	100%	2.0	91%	5.6	97%	10.7	96%	18.5	93%	36.0	90%
Total	0.5		2.1		5.8		11.1		19.8		39.8	

Source: Shibata, "'Manshūkoku' ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai," 30.
Note: the original table only includes the columns of "member" and "total". The data of the "non-member" column is calculated on the basis of the data of "member" and "total".

The Agricultural Cooperative Association

After 1937, the Manchukuo government implemented a comprehensive agricultural policy that regulated not only rural finance, but also farming technology, purchase and sale of agrarian products. As a step to rationalise the circulation sector and increase agrarian output, the Manchukuo government organised the Agricultural Cooperative Association (*nōji gassakusha*, ACA) and placed it under the supervision of the Ministry

[31] Shibata, "'Manshūkoku' ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai," 13.
[32] Hamaguchi, *Nihon tōchi to higashi Ajia shakai*, 188.

of Industry (*sangyōbu*) in July 1937.[33] The organisation of the ACA was a vertical administrative hierarchy. On the top of its administrative structure was the Ministry of Finance. ACA were organised at the county level. At the level of towns and villages, executive cooperatives (*jikkō gassakusha*) and offices *(banshichu*) were set up.[34] There were 75 cooperatives established in 1937, 29 in 1938 and 30 in 1939. The total number of ACA amounted to 153, among which 19 of them were financially independent from government subsidies.[35] By the end of 1939, the government had established 366 offices and 7,765 executive cooperatives across Manchuria.[36] The ACA were concentrated mainly in the provinces of Jinzhou, Fengtian and Jilin that enjoyed higher levels of economic development. In 1940, the number of ACA set up in these three provinces accounted for 43.2 percent of the total number of ACA in Manchuria. In contrast to these economically developed provinces, the number of ACA set up in provinces such as Heihe where social instability persisted was much smaller.[37] The main sources of funding of the ACA were subsidies offered by the MCB and the Manchuria Industrial Bank (*Manshū shingyō ginkō*). Founded by the Manchukuo government in December 1936, the Manchuria Industrial Bank engaged in commercial banking operations and extending long-term credit to industry.[38]

Compared with the FCA, the ACA provided a wider range of services. The ACA were involved in the purchase, supply, distribution and manufacturing of agricultural products. In addition, the ACA also granted a limited amount of credit to farmers. The credit service of the ACA was very similar to the credit service of the FCA. Most of the loans issued by the ACA were short-term loans. They were issued to assist farmers in purchasing farming implements and fertilisers. The ACA also issued long-term loans for the maintenance of agricultural infrastructure.[39]

One important function of the ACA was the operation of exchange markets (*jiaoyi shichang*). The ACA managed the exchange markets set up in various locations

[33] The central organ for the agrarian policymaking in Manchukuo was the Ministry of Industrial Development (*jitsugyōbu*) from 1932 to 1937, the Ministry of Industry from 1937 to 1940 and the Ministry of Agricultural Promotion (*kōnōbu*) from 1940 to 1945. See Susumu Tsukase, *Manshūkoku:"minzoku kyōwa" no jitsuzō*, Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1998, 176.
[34] Duanyong Fu, "Dongbei zhimindi nongye jingji xingtai de xingcheng yu nongye tongzhi de qianghua," in *Riben zhimin tongzhi yu dongbei nongmin shenghuo (1931-1945)*, ed. Shujuan Li, Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2014, 139.
[35] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, Tokyo: Manmō dōhō engokai, 1971, 791.
[36] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 792.
[37] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 110.
[38] Ann Rasmussen Kinney, *Japanese Investment in Manchurian Manufacturing, Mining, Transportation and Communications 1931-1945*, New York: Garland Publishing, 1982, 12.
[39] Shibata, "'Manshūkoku' ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai," 16.

of Manchuria. The number of exchange markets increased from 450 in 1938 to 762 in 1940. Exchange markets regulated the transactions of agricultural commodities. The transactions taking place in the exchange markets were made in cash and at fixed prices, and no longer followed the informal rules between sellers and buyers that allowed room for the settlement of the price and of the delivery of agricultural products.[40]

Table 5.8. The Sources of Funding of the ACA (unit: 1,000 yuan)

Source	1937	1938
MCB	646	13,620
Manchuria Industrial Bank	846	4,810
FCA	---	3,690
Financial Associations	---	320
Total	1,531	22,465

Source: Shibata, "'Manshūkoku' ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai," 32.

The control over the transactions of agricultural products by the ACA through exchange markets attracted limited farmer participation. Although the ACA prohibited transactions of agricultural products to be made outside the exchange markets, farmers were reluctant to trade in exchange markets. The reasons were twofold. First, exchange markets charged expensive commission fees and set formal procedures for the transaction of agricultural products. Farmers often found the transactions at the exchange markets bothersome and inconvenient. Second, grain warehouses still remained competitive in attracting farmers to trade directly with them. This was especially true in remote rural areas where the reach of the cooperative activities was limited. These two factors contributed to the small scale of commercial activities that were taking place in the exchange markets. In 1938, the transactions of agricultural products made in exchange markets only accounted for 43.3 percent of the total transactions of agricultural products in Manchuria.[41]

The Agricultural Prosperity Cooperative Association

Conflicts of interests arose between the FCA and the ACA arising from their involvement in commercial activities. The Kwantung Army perceived the conflicts as threatening to weaken the effectiveness of state control over agricultural output and rural finance. As a solution, in October 1938 the Kwantung Army proposed to reorganise the two cooperative associations in operation in Manchuria. The proposal

[40] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 107.
[41] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 108.

was further revised in December 1938, when the government mobilised material resources to facilitate industrial growth and devoted energies to strengthening the state financial system. On 18 September 1939, the government promulgated a plan to merge the two cooperative associations. The merger took place in April 1940, resulting in the formation of the Agricultural Prosperity Cooperative Association (*kōnō gassakusha*, APCA).[42]

The APCA was set up at the levels of central government, provinces, counties, towns and villages. The main organisational structure was the APCA established at the county level. Above the APCA was the Joint Associations (*rengōkai*) established at the provincial level. On the top was the highest decision-making organ known as the Central Committee (*chūōkai*), which was established in Xinjing. The APCA set up offices in towns and villages and the Agricultural Promotion Society (*kōnōkai*, APS) in hamlets.[43]

The operation of APCA was still largely reliant upon financial support from public bodies. Loans issued by the public bodies accounted for more than 80 percent of the total funds used for the operation of the cooperatives. Among the public bodies, the MCB remained the largest contributor. The loans issued to the cooperatives by the MCB continued to increase during 1939 to 1941 and dropped slightly in 1942. In December 1939, the loans totalled 40,000 yuan. The figure increased to 70,000 in December 1940 and 74,000 in December 1941. In December 1942, the figure decreased slightly to 64,000 yuan.[44] In contrast to the large share of public funds, funds contributed by APCA members accounted for less than 20 percent of the total funds.[45]

The outreach of the cooperative network in rural areas developed rapidly. On 1 August 1941, the total number of cooperatives reorganised at the county level amounted to 186, absorbing the former 125 FCA and 153 ACA. The new cooperatives extended to most counties of Manchuria, covering 88 percent of all the counties in Manchuria.[46] At the end of December 1941, offices were established in 53 percent of towns and villages; APCA were set up in 35 percent of hamlets in Manchuria; and 49 percent of the rural population were APCA members.[47] By the end of August 1943, the APCA had set up

[42] Shibata, *Senryōchi tsūka kinyū seisaku no tenkai*, 127-8.
[43] Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 797.
[44] Yasutomi, "'Manshūkoku' no nōgyō kankei kinyū," 66.
[45] Shibata, "'Manshūkoku' ni okeru nōgyō kinyū no tenkai," 21.
[46] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 161-2.
[47] Hisaichi Sekiguchi, *Manshū keizai jūnenshi*, Shinkyō: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha seikeibu, 1942, 482.

offices in 75 percent of towns and villages; the APCA had been organised in 73 percent of villages and 69 percent of the rural population had joined the APCA.[48]

The Manchukuo government expanded the influence of APCA on farmers by making the loans more accessible to farmers. Most of the loans issued by the APCA were short-term secured loans that served the financial needs of poor peasants. In order to borrow money from the cooperatives, peasants were required to apply collectively as a group through the local APS or through hamlets in which they lived. Individual application was not recognised. Normally the local APS or members of hamlets were collectively charged with the responsibility for using the loan. In areas where the association was not organised, peasants would also be required to apply for the loan collectively as a group. The APCA unified the daily rate of loans. The new rate was lower than the rates set by the previous FCA. In July 1940, the daily interest rate was 2.8 *qian* per day. The rate increased to 3 *qian* in 1941, but it was still lower than previous rates.[49]

The credit services of the cooperatives penetrated deeply into the rural life of Manchuria. The debt ratio of farming households in Manchuria in 1940 and 1941 suggest that almost half of the farming households had received credit from the cooperatives. As shown in Table 5.9, an average of 50.3 percent of all the farming households had used the financial services of the cooperatives by the end of 1940. The ratio was particularly high among poor peasants with small landholdings. In total, 81.5 percent of farmers whose landholdings were less than five hectares used the financial services of the cooperatives. The ratio of farmers with landholdings of less than three hectares was 62.8 percent. Despite the fact that a high proportion of farmers with small landholdings had received credit granted by the cooperatives, the credit that they had received was only for small sums of money. In contrast to the sums of money received by poor peasants, the sum of money received by landlords or rich peasants was much larger. A comparison of households with landholdings of more than 100 hectares and less than one hectare shows that the former received as much as twenty times the money that the latter did. As shown in Table 5.10, farming households which used the financial services of the cooperatives accounted for 41.80 percent. Non-farming households who used the financial services of the cooperatives accounted for 22.40 percent. It is reasonable to assume from the amounts of credit granted to these different rural classes

[48] Chūokai soshikika, "Kōnō gassakusha kabu kikō soshiki hiritsu ichiranhyō," *Kōnō*, vol. 4, no. 11, November 1943, 40.
[49] Hamaguchi, *Nihon tōchi to higashi Ajia shakai*, 192-4.

that cooperatives still favoured landlords and rich peasants. This policy of favouring landlords and rich peasants indicates that the conditions of poor peasants had hardly improved to an extent to which the Japanese could greatly relax the restriction of credit granting for them.

Table 5.9. Debt Ratio of Farming Households at the End of 1940 (unit: hectare, yuan and percent)

Farming Scale	Debt Amount per Household	Landlord	Merchant	Pawnshop	Individual	Cooperative	Other
Above 100	1,067	---	6.3	---	46.9	46.9	---
Under 100	633	4.6	1.3	3.3	43.8	47.0	---
Under 50	223	7.4	---	0.5	43.8	48.7	---
Under 20	122	6.4	0.8	---	56.2	36.6	---
Under 10	116	11.3	8.2	2.8	25.9	48.7	3.1
Under 5	115	2.4	0.1	2.8	11.8	81.5	1.4
Under 3	41	2.0	6.6	10.4	18.1	62.8	0.2
Under 1	21	9.9	14.7	9.2	21.2	44.9	---
Non-Management	26	12.0	1.7	1.9	59.4	24.8	---
Total Average	49	6.5	4.1	4.0	34.7	50.3	0.5

Source: Shibata, *Senryōchi tsūka kinyū seisaku no tenkai*, 133.
Note: the data is based on seven villages in two counties in Longjiang Province, seventeen villages in one county in Jinzhou Province, ten villages in one county in Fengtian Province, nineteen villages in two counties in Jilin Province, and six villages in two counties in Binjiang Province. Non-management refers to wage labour and managerial landlords.

Table 5.10. Debt Ratio of Farming Households in 1941 (unit: percent)

Farming Category	Cooperative	Pawnshop	Mutual Borrowing	Landlord	Merchant	Other	Total
Farming Households	41.80	1.55	43.68	5.76	5.36	1.85	100
Non-Farming Households	22.40	1.36	57.87	5.08	10.46	2.50	100

Source: Hamaguchi, *Nihon tōchi to higashi Ajia shaka*, 198.
Note: farming households refer to peasants. Non-farming households refer to wage labour, landlords, teachers, and miscellaneous workers. In this category, most of the non-farming households are assumed to be wage labour.

In addition to the presence of cooperatives in the rural financial sector, the practice of informal credit granted by villagers still prevailed in the rural financial activities. The prevalence of informal credit was rooted in the socioeconomic structure of rural Manchuria, where landless wage labourers and poor peasants accounted for 80 percent of the entire rural population.[50] Landlords usually charged wage labourers and

[50] Hamaguchi, *Nihon tōchi to higashi Ajia shaka*i, 199.

poor peasants expensive rent and demanded arduous physical labour.[51] This situation kept most of the farmers non-self-sufficient and compelled them to borrow funds from landlords, relatives, friends or usurers to survive. As shown in Table 5.9, an average of 34.7 farmers borrowed funds from individuals at the end of 1940. Table 5.10 shows that in 1941, the farming households who relied on mutual borrowing for funds accounted for 43.68 percent. In the case of non-farming households, the ratio was 57.87 percent. The ratio of mutual borrowing in the cases of 1940 and 1941 was very high, indicating the heavy reliance of farmers on traditional practices of money borrowing to maintain subsistence. Given the prevalence of mutual borrowing in rural financial activities, it is difficult to claim that the reach of cooperatives into rural finance had been comprehensive.

The Agrarian Control Organisations

The government's Five-Year Plan launched in 1937 diverted substantial sums of money into industrial production. Beginning in 1937, government appropriations for arms purchases had increased dramatically, and in order to divert resources away from civilian goods towards munitions production, the authorities introduced comprehensive economic controls over foreign exchange, bank loans, and production and pricing in selected industries. However, foreign trade worsened as a result of the war in China in 1937. The shortage of foreign exchange restrained the ambitious plan for industrial development. This situation impelled the Japanese policymakers to use agriculture as the base to sustain the economic growth of the Manchukuo state.

Beginning in 1937, the Manchukuo government implemented a series of laws to regulate the prices of main crops such as rice, wheat and millet. However, the prices of agrarian products rose remarkably and the laws failed to achieve any effect in practice. In order to force the prices down, the Japanese authorities established a state monopoly over agrarian products in Manchukuo. In late 1938, the Manchukuo government set up the Manchuria Flour Corporation (*Manshū seifun rengōkai*, MFC) and the Manchuria Grain Corporation (*Manshū ryōkoku kaisha*, MGC) to regulate the distribution of grain within Manchukuo. The first organisation was in charge of the distribution of wheat and wheat flour. The second organisation was in charge of a wider range of products

[51] Kiyoshi Katō, "Manshū no nōgyō kinyū ni kansuru ichikōsatsu," *Nōji gassakusha hō*, vol. 3, no. 3, March 1940, 105.

including wheat and other grains. In December 1939, the Manchuria Flour Corporation was incorporated into the MGC.[52]

The government also began to exercise a monopoly on bean products. The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 cut off the outlet for the export of Manchurian soybeans. In response to the loss of the European market, the Manchukuo government aimed to export soybeans to Japan. In September 1939, the government enforced an act on the regulation of bean products. As the executive organ for the act, the Manchuria Special Produce Monopoly Corporation (*Manshū tokusan senkan kōsha*, MSPMC) was organised two months later with a monopoly in the circulation of soybeans.

Table 5.11. Agrarian Control Organisations in Manchukuo

Organisation	Establishment Time	Controlled Materials	Scale of Control
MFC	November 1938	Wheat and wheat flour	Purchase of wheat, sale, import and manufacturing of sale
MGC	December 1939	Grain	Production, distribution, pricing, import and export
MSPMC	1 November 1939 (planned)	Staple produce	Purchase and sale of soybeans, bean cakes and bean oil

Source: Sangyōbu daijin kanbō shiryōka, *Manshūkoku sangyō gaikan*, Place of publication unknown: Manshū jijō annaijo, 1939, 338; Iitsuka and Kazama, "Nōsan shigen no shūdatsu," 474-9.
Note: the source published in 1939 noted that the MSPMC was still under planning. Therefore, the information about this company might not be a reflection of real conditions.

The government monopoly in the circulation sector also extended to the transport of controlled products and appointment of agents for the distribution of products. First, the SMRC controlled the railway transport of soybeans in Manchuria. At this time, railway transport accounted for approximately 70 to 80 percent of the total soybean traffic. The SMRC issued special securities (*konho shōken*) for freight traffic.[53] The Manchuria Special Produce Monopoly Corporation only allowed soybeans that were purchased by the MSPMC to be transported by railway. The MSPMC was the sole buyer of the special securities issued by the SMRC. This practice prevented soybeans that were purchased by buyers other than the MSPMC to be transported by the railway and thus consolidated the monopoly of soybeans by the MSPMC. Second, the Manchukuo government appointed Japanese companies such as Mitsui & Co. Ltd.

[52] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 116.
[53] Takehiko Ishida, "Chūgoku tōhoku ni okeru ryōsan no dōkō: Manshū jihen mae ni okeru," *Hokkaido daigaku keizaigaku kenkyū*, vol. 24, no. 1, March 1974, 159-60.

(*Mitsui bussan*) and Mitsubishi Corporation (*Mitsubishi shōji*) as its agents to purchase beans directly from farmers.[54] Farmers were required to sell their soybeans to the Japanese companies at the officially fixed prices, and then the agents sold the soybeans to the corporation and finally the corporation sold the soybeans to the exporters. The agents acted as intermediaries between farmers and the corporation. The volumes of transactions of agricultural products handled by the agents were significant, comprising 97 percent of transactions in 1940.[55]

Table 5.12. The Delivery Volume of Agrarian Products (unit: thousand tons)

Crop	Year 1938		Year 1939		Year 1940	
	Quantity	Index	Quantity	Index	Quantity	Index
Soybean	3,253	100	1,258	39	1,471	45
Sorghum	1,037	100	489	47	542	52
Maize	876	100	529	60	729	83
Millet	491	100	388	79	505	103
Wheat	316	100	207	66	253	80
Rice	448	100	322	72	351	80

Source: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushikigaisha Shinkyō shisha chōsashitsu, *Daizu ryūtsū kikō no hensen*, Shinkyō: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushikigaisha chōsashitsu, 1943, 94.

The results of crop delivery in 1939 and 1940 were adverse. It appeared that farmers and local dealers were unwilling to market their crops through the control organisations. Their unwillingness was illustrated by the figures of delivery volume between 1938 and 1940. As shown in Table 5.12, the delivery of almost all the controlled crops decreased from 1938 to 1939 and 1940. The only exception was the delivery volume of millet that increased in 1940, but it was only a 3 percent increase in comparison with the volume of 1938.

The reasons for the decrease in crop delivery lay in the low price policy set by the government and the structural change in crop acreage. Table 5.13 shows the proportion of production cost to purchase price of controlled products in 1939 and 1940 in several regions of Manchuria. In the case of 1939, the purchase prices of most of the controlled crops except sorghum were set lower than the production cost. Soybean, the most important cash crop of Manchuria, was particularly cheap. Its purchase price only amounted to half of its production cost. Although the Manchukuo government increased the prices of controlled products in 1940, production cost still tended to exceed purchase price. The low price policy of the government largely discouraged farmers from supplying crops to the state and encouraged hoarding of crops. In the meantime,

[54] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 117-9.
[55] Yasutomi, "'Manshūkoku' no nōgyō kankei kinyū," 60.

many farmers chose to grow crops for self-consumption purposes, resulted in the reversion of production to subsistence crops. The changes in crop acreage structure, as shown in Table 5.14, indicates the decrease in the cash crop acreage and the expansion of the acreage of subsistence and other crops between 1939 and 1941. During this period, the acreage of soybean dropped by 6.37 percent and the acreage of wheat dropped by 2 percent. In contrast to the decrease of soybean and wheat, sorghum increased by 1.33 percent, maize 3.81 percent and millet 2.13 percent. The changes in the controlled crops are shown in the "others" section of Table 5.14, indicating that the acreage of unregulated crops increased by 2.1 percent.

Table 5.13. The Proportion of Production Cost to Purchase Price of Controlled Products
(unit: percent per 100 kilos)

Area	Soybean		Sorghum		Maize		Wheat	
	1939	1940	1939	1940	1939	1940	1939	1940
Keshan	58.1	70.9	106.4	73.0	94.1	98.3	88.9	93.1
Hulan	48.6	61.1	104.1	100.8	100.6	99.1	97.7	85.9
Shuangcheng	44.4	47.8	107.4	67.5	84.6	85.3	104.2	---
Shenyang	79.1	79.8	137.1	138.2	---	98.9	---	---
Liaoyang	62.8	79.0	---	98.1	---	101.2	---	---
Haicheng	57.9	76.7	---	102.1	---	101.8	---	---

Source: Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 127.

Table 5.14. The Percentage of Crop Acreage in Manchuria between 1939 and 1941 (unit: percent)

	Cash Crop		Subsistence Crop			Others	Total
	Soybean	Wheat	Sorghum	Maize	Millet		
1939	26.01	8.76	21.91	17.92	11.44	13.96	100
1940	22.10	6.17	23.28	20.91	12.21	15.33	100
1941	19.64	5.76	23.24	21.73	13.57	16.06	100

Source: Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 129.

In view of the adverse results of crop delivery, the government reorganised its agricultural control policy in 1941. In August 1941, the government merged the three organisations into a single one corporation known as the Manchuria Agricultural Produce Company (*Manshū nōsan kōsha*, MAPC). The company strengthened the monopoly of agricultural products by appointing nineteen companies with Japanese, local and foreign capital as its special agents (*tokuyaku shūbainin*) for the purchase of agricultural products.[56] Agents began to engage directly in commercial transactions to

[56] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 136.

obtain agrarian products. In the meantime, the government also discontinued the direct transactions taking place between grain warehouse partnerships and the company.[57] The circulation flow of agrarian products at this time was as follows. First, farmers sold their products at the exchange markets administered by the cooperatives. Then grain warehouses or grain warehouse partnerships bought the products from the exchange markets and delivered them to the agents.[58] Then the company collected products and sold them to domestic and foreign markets. In this circulation flow, the company was the end of circulation. The Manchukuo government abolished the system of special agents in May 1944 to save expenses in the circulation of agricultural products. [59] After the abolition of special agents, the circulation of agricultural products became more simplified and grain warehouses became directly affiliated with the MAPC for the sale and purchase of agrarian products.

The Manchukuo government directly managed the operation of the MAPC through administrative and financial measures. First, the government intervened in the administration of the MAPC by appointing officers to work at the MAPC. The officers were directly involved in the administration of the MAPC.[60] Second, the government and government banks were the primary financiers of the MAPC. Initially, the government provided the capital of 70 million yuan to establish the MAPC.[61] In later years, government banks became the primary financial contributor of the MAPC. In 1943, the total sums of credit provided by banks amounted to 1,000 million yuan. The sums of credit increased to 1,600 million yuan in 1944.[62]

Crop Delivery

Farmers were required to deliver their harvests to the state. They were usually paid when their crops reached the designated marketing organisations. Village heads and farmers carried out the delivery of crops by carts. The delivery was usually conducted at a fixed time and through the routes specified by the government. In order to prevent the crop from flowing into the black market, police were sometimes involved in guarding the transport of the crop. Those who did not follow the designated routes would be

[57] Yasutomi, "'Manshūkoku' no nōgyō kankei kinyū," 61.
[58] Iitsuka and Kazama, "Nōsan shigen no shūdatsu," 519.
[59] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 219.
[60] Li, *Riwei tongzhi xia de dongbei nongcun*, 224-5.
[61] Li, *Riwei tongzhi xia de dongbei nongcun*, 224.
[62] Yasutomi, "'Manshūkoku' no nōgyō kankei kinyū," 76.

subject to a penalty. The government also set up inspection spots and sent patrol teams to supervise the crop delivery along the delivery route.[63]

The delivery followed two patterns. In the first pattern, crops were transported by farmers directly to exchange markets, then delivered to the grain warehouses for manufacturing and packaging, and then delivered to the contracted dealers, before finally being distributed to the agricultural control organisations for sale or for export. In this pattern, farmers were not involved in the selection and packaging of their crop. In the second pattern, the government encouraged farmers to select and package crop on their own. The cooperatives would assign supervisors to villages to assist farmers in the process of primary manufacturing and packaging of crops. Afterwards, farmers would transport the crop directly to the exchange markets or the distribution centres of the cooperatives.[64] The second pattern of delivery had two effects. First, it increased the income of farmers. Farmers were given the freedom to trade their products at flexible prices. They were relieved from selling their crop to grain warehouses at the fixed price set by the government, which was much lower than the cost of production. Second, it eliminated the influence of grain warehouses in controlling the market. As discussed previously in this chapter, grain warehouses had accumulated huge volumes of capital from extracting profits in their trading with farmers. The direct delivery from farmers to dealers that were designated by the government diminished the role of the native capital in controlling the local market.

The Manchukuo government adopted several measures to facilitate the delivery of agricultural products from farmers. In October 1940, the government attempted to stimulate the rapid marketing of crops by paying farmers delivery bounties (*shukka shōreikin*). The bounty was a significant amount of money that accounted for an average of 14.25 percent of the standard prices of crops in the government bounty scheme.[65] The bounty scheme was a compromise between the need for raising crop prices and the low-price policy of the government aimed at controlling inflation. The government declared time limits for crop delivery to encourage rapid marketing of crops. For sorghum, millet and maize, a short marketing period of 1 October to 15 November was set. The period of soybeans was set as a period of four months from 1 October to 31 January. In the cases of rice and wheat, the government set several periods and announced sliding

[63] Li, *Riwei tongzhi xia de dongbei nongcun*, 234-6.
[64] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 171-2.
[65] Iitsuka and Kazama, "Nōsan shigen no shūdatsu," 492.

scales of bounties. The earlier and larger the delivery of rice and wheat was, the higher the bounty amount would be.[66]

The Ministry of Agricultural Promotion abolished the bounty scheme on 6 April 1941 and announced the enforcement of the advanced cash-payment (*sakizeni*) program for crop delivery. The program was officially launched two months later, and funds used for the program were supplied by the Ministry of Agricultural Promotion to the cooperatives. The program was applicable to the most important crops in Manchuria including soybeans, millet, sorghum and maize. In 1941, ten categories of crops were included in the program. In 1942, the number of categories increased to eleven.[67] In the advanced cash-payment program, the government contracted farmers about the time and volume of the delivery of crops. In practice, village heads would first collect from farmers the volume of crops they would deliver to the state. After that, the village heads would report the delivery volume to cooperatives and cooperatives would contract the exchange markets about delivery volume on behalf of the village heads. Cooperatives would pay a certain amount of money to the village heads in advance, normally one yuan per hundred kilos. Then village heads would distribute the money that they had received from the cooperatives to farmers. Village heads were charged with collective responsibility for the delivery of crops.[68] As a legal contract, the advanced cash-payment program tied farmers and village heads to the liability of delivering the contracted volume of products.

The advanced cash-payment program achieved only limited effect. In 1941, a total of 6,884,000 tons of crops were contracted through the program, but 5,482, 000 tons were purchased. The purchased rate accounted for approximately 80 percent of the contracted volume. In 1942, the contracted volume of crops totalled 5,641,000 tons and the purchased volume amounted to 5,980,000 tons. The purchased rate rose to 106 percent. However, the actual purchased crops were still 7.3 percent short of the government quota.[69]

After 1942, the government began to exercise compulsory administrative orders to perfect controls over crop delivery. The administrative efforts transformed crop delivery from a voluntary practice into a compulsory practice. The government organised squads of officers in the provincial, county and local levels of government.

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[66] For the time limit and bounty amount in the bounty scheme, see Toshio Yokoyama, *Manshūkoku nōgyō seisaku*, Tokyo: Tokaidō, 1943, 224.
[67] Yukio Inagaki, "Sakizeni seido ni tsuite," *Kōnō*, vol. 3, no. 6, June 1942, 4-5.
[68] Iitsuka and Kazama, "Nōsan shigen no shūdatsu," 512.
[69] Iitsuka and Kazama, "Nōsan shigen no shūdatsu," 513-5; Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi: kakuron*, 715.

The officers visited villages, assigned delivery quota to farmers, and appointed the routes for the transport of crops. The government also imposed additional demands for crops on villages that had met the government quota of crop delivery. For example, the government imposed an additional 0.3 million tons of crops on the government of Jilin Province in 1943.[70] In 1943 and 1944, the total volumes of additional crop deliveries amounted to 0.7 million tons.[71] The compulsory delivery of crops increased the delivery volume in 1943 and 1944, and the actual delivery exceeded the quota set by the government. In 1943, the quota was 7.32 million tons, but the actual delivery amounted to 7.67 million tons. In 1944, the quota was 8 million ton, but the actual delivery was 8.8 million tons.[72]

Rent control was another measure adopted by the government to facilitate crop delivery. In Manchuria, the payments of land rent were either variable or fixed in rate and amount. In the former arrangement, landlords paid the entire or partial cost of fertilisers, livestock, farming implements and seeds and sometimes even provided accommodation for tenants, while tenants only served as the farming labour for the landlords. Landlords exercised control over the supply of labour by the tenants, determining what crops to cultivate and how they were cultivated. Landlords and tenants shared crops on a 30/70, or 40/60, or 50/50 basis. The proportion of sharecropping varied across regions. In northern Manchuria, the sharecropping was practised on a 40/60 basis; while in southern and central Manchuria, crops were shared on a 50/50 basis. In the latter arrangement, the payment was fixed regardless of the quality of land and harvest. Contract making, in either oral or written form, was the standard for the fixed rent arrangement. Contracts were usually made in spring for the rent to be paid in autumn.[73]

Rent was generally collected in kind and only occasionally in cash. Sorghum, millet and maize were common types of crops used for the purpose of rent payment.[74] According to the data on rent relations in 1935 and 1936, the proportion of payment in kind was extremely high throughout Manchuria. Payments of variable and fixed rents in kind accounted for 83 percent in northern Manchuria, 97.6 percent in central Manchuria

[70] Xueshi Xie, *Wei Manzhouguo shi xinbian*, Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1995, 726 and 728.
[71] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 150.
[72] Xie, *Wei Manzhouguo shi xinbian*, 728.
[73] Li, *Riwei tongzhi xia de dongbei nongcun*, 127-30; Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū keizai nenpō*, Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1933, 45-8; Chūōkai chōsakōhōka, "Manshū ni okeru kosaku keitai no bunpu," *Kōnō*, vol. 5, no. 11, November 1944, 2; Katsuya Aikō, "Kosaku kankei ni tsuite," *Kōnō*, vol. 3, no.10, October 1942, 4-6.
[74] Chūōkai chōsakōhōka, "Manshū ni okeru kosaku keitai no bunpu," 2.

and 61.5 percent in southern Manchuria.[75] Tenancy arrangement in rural Manchuria indicates that barter rather than money remained the basic pattern of capital flow in the rural economic structure of Manchuria.

Since kind had been commonly accepted as a form of rent payment in Manchuria, large volumes of agricultural products were used for rent payment but not for crop delivery. The volume used for the purpose of rent was substantially large, constituting 18 percent of the whole agricultural output.[76] In addition, the agricultural products often flowed into the black market, an area beyond the reach of government control and regulation. Apparently, the volume of crops that did not go directly to the state was so considerable that the Japanese policymakers had to intervene.

The Manchukuo government started to regulate rent relations in 1943. On 16 November 1943, the government introduced a rent control program. The program restricted the form of rent payment between landlords and tenant farmers. Now only cash was allowed in rent payment; in-kind payment was prohibited.[77] This measure was aimed at preventing agricultural products from passing through the hands of landlords to the black market.[78]

The government's initiative in regulating rent payment appeared to have been ineffective in practice. According to the data on the pattern of rent payment in 1943, rent payment was still made primarily in kind. Rent in kind accounted for 43.1 percent in the whole of Manchuria. Its regional proportion was 62.1 percent in southern Manchuria, 47.2 percent in central Manchuria and 23.5 percent in northern Manchuria. In comparison with rent payment in kind, rent in cash accounted for only 17.9 percent in Manchuria as a whole, with 20.5 percent in southern Manchuria, 9.8 percent in central Manchuria and 18.3 in northern Manchuria.[79] It should be noted that the rate of rent in kind in southern Manchuria was much higher than other regions. Considering that southern Manchuria was the region with highest agricultural productivity, the volume of agricultural products used for rent payment in Manchuria might have been considerable, and substantial volumes of agricultural produce might not have gone directly into the crop delivery program of the state.

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[75] Manshūkoku sangyōbu, *Manshū ni okeru kosaku kankei: 1934-1936 nōson jittai chōsa hōkokusho*, Shinkyō: Manshūkoku sangyōbu, 1938, 235-40.
[76] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 175.
[77] Kazama, *Manshū minzoku shihon no kenkyū*, 175.
[78] Aikō, "Kosaku kankei nit suite," 3.
[79] Chūōkai chōsakōhōka, "Manshū ni okeru kosaku keitai no bunpu," 5.

Conclusion

The Japanese authorities directly intervened in agrarian production and circulation after the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932. The control over agrarian production and circulation is evident in the expansion of the reach of Japanese capital through the reorganisation of grain warehouses and the creation of cooperatives that provided financial services for farmers, the establishment of agrarian control organisations, and the enforcement of crop delivery first as a voluntary initiative and then as a compulsory practice. Specifically, the Japanese authorities extended their control over agriculture through the following strategies. First, the Japanese authorities diminished the status of grain warehouses that functioned as a guild-like organisation linking rural areas with urban areas in the sector of agrarian circulation. The Japanese authorities introduced Japanese capital into the operation of grain warehouses to reduce the strength of grain warehouses in accumulating capital in the 1930s and reorganised grain warehouses into larger associations formed in partnership to consolidate government control over the commercial activities of grain warehouses. Second, the Japanese authorities established cooperatives to strengthen government control over rural financial activity and to raise agricultural productivity. The initiatives of launching the cooperatives restrained the power of native capital and expanded the influence of Japanese capital in the rural economy. The cooperatives established parallel financial and marketing networks that would be competitive enough with grain warehouses, and linked farmers directly to the state. Although the financial services provided by the Japanese organisations penetrated deeply into the rural life, traditional financial practices still played an important part in the rural financial activity. Third, the Japanese authorities actively sought to maximise the appropriation of agricultural produce from the hands of farmers. The state not only needed the farmers to produce more, but it also needed to induce them to sell more of what they had produced. In doing so, the Japanese authorities initially set up state monopoly over major crops by establishing three separate companies and passing a number of laws. Subsequently the Japanese authorities integrated the three companies into a single company to unify control over agrarian procurement and distribution. The Manchukuo government combined the strategies of financial incentives, compulsory practices and rent regulation to increase crop delivery. In short, the Japanese agrarian control developed into a state monopoly that dictated cropping patterns, regulated crop prices, purchased and distributed crop supply, imposed output targets and extracted crops to sustain industrial growth. Agriculture became a means by which the state could utilise to achieve its own objective of effective rule.

Chapter Six: The Limit of Labour Control: Structure and Practice

In the fourteen years of managing Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities established a coercive state apparatus that extended from social organisation and popular surveillance to organised control over manpower. Labour control constituted an indispensable component of the state coercion of Manchukuo. Labour provided manpower necessary for the economic development of Manchukuo. The recruitment of labour was accomplished by false promises and by force. After being recruited, labourers were regarded as manpower to be used to the limit of their endurance. Labour service, which was compulsory in nature in most cases, required labourers to render service to the Japanese army in opening up highways, digging mines and constructing public works. In spite of the harsh working conditions of their service, labourers were required to work for mere subsistence.

The labour control system established by the Japanese authorities to recruit, manage and mobilise labour involved no direct state intervention in the early period of Manchukuo, but later evolved into a form of systematic and centralised state intervention. This chapter examines the structure of the labour force in the agricultural and industrial sectors and the labour control system in Manchukuo under Japanese rule. It argues that the Japanese labour control in Manchukuo evolved from a pattern of limited government intervention to a pattern of centralised control that involved coercion and compulsion.

Wage Labour in Rural Manchuria

Agricultural wage labourers were the basic component in the labour relations in rural Manchuria. Wage labourers remained a huge population and formed a pool of abundant and cheap labour in rural Manchuria. Agricultural wage labourers were divided by the term of employment into year, month and day labourers. Year labour constituted long-term employment; while month and day labour were short-term employment.[1] In the pattern of long-term employment, year labourers were contracted workers employed to work for a period of ten or eleven months. Year labourers engaged not only in agricultural labour but also in miscellaneous work such as the maintenance of houses

[1] Tomohiro Kanno, "Kita Manshū ni okeru konō to sonraku shakai: Manshūkokuki no nōson jittai chōsa shiryō ni sokushite," *Shigaku*, vol. 81, no. 3, July 2012, 123. Kanno's discussion is only concerned with the case of northern Manchuria. However, his differentiation of wage labourers also applies to the conditions of southern Manchuria.

and farming equipment.[2] Year labourers were normally the acquaintances of employers from the same villages who shared kinship ties with each other. The purpose of seeking labour from the resources of one's acquaintances was to guarantee employment credibility and security.[3] The contract of labour was usually renewed every year.[4] The unpredictability of the conditions of agricultural work and labour force determined the renewal of contract on an annual basis. Poor harvest, inclement weather, as well as the sickness and death in the labour force all attributed to the unpredictability of labour relations.

In the case of short-term employment, month labourers were usually employed to work during busy seasons. The term of employment was normally a period of two months from February to March and from September to October. The former was the period of fertilisation, while the latter was the period of harvest. In some cases, the term of employment could extend to as long as eight months.[5] Day labourers were employed to work at weeding and in the harvest for a period of one to three days only. Employers usually sought for day labourers at special rural labour markets, usually in the local market towns.[6]

Agricultural wage labourers were employed by both landlords and tenant farmers. Those landlords who did not engage in farming directly employed wage labourers to work on their land. Landlords who engaged in farming directly hired wage labourers on a temporary basis to supplement the labour supply in their households. Tenant farmers hired labourers to work along with them on the land that they leased from landlords.[7]

Agricultural wage labourers received their wages in cash and kind. In general, cash was commonly paid to short-term labourers and kind was usually paid to long-term labourers.[8] In the case of cash payment, the average wages in 1934 were eighty-one yuan per year for year labourers, eleven or twelve yuan per month for month labourers and 0.39 or 0.74 yuan per day for day labourers.[9] In the case of kind payment, grain was normally used as the form of wages. The types of grains that were used for wage

[2] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*, Dairen: Minami Manshū tetsudō, 1936, 75-6.
[3] Lili Nie, *Ryūhō: Chūgoku tōhoku chihō no sōzoku to sono henyō*, Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1992, 139-40.
[4] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*, 76.
[5] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*, 76-7.
[6] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*, 77.
[7] Nie, *Ryūhō*, 139.
[8] Kanno, "Kita Manshū ni okeru konō to sonraku shakai," 124.
[9] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*, 78.

payment varied from region to region in Manchuria. Soybean, millet, corn, wheat and sorghum were commonly accepted forms of wages.[10]

The wages of year labourers paid in accordance with a labour contract were relatively stable. In contrast to the stability of the wages of year labourers, there was much unpredictability in the wages of month and day labourers. In general, the wages of month labourers tended to be higher during harvest seasons and lower during fertilisation seasons. The wages of day labourers tended to be higher during weeding and harvest seasons and lower during the less busy time of the year.[11] In addition, the package of remuneration for wage labour included free food and accommodation for year and month labourers, but only occasionally for day labourers. The day labourers who lived in the same villages as their employers were often not offered accommodation.[12]

No comparative data is available about the conditions of the prices and wages in rural Manchuria, though we know commodity prices inflated remarkably in the Manchukuo period. It is therefore difficult to give a clear assessment about the living standard of wage labourers and its implications for labour relations in general. It is only possible to examine their living conditions from a case study of the composition of daily consumption of wage labour in Manchuria. An investigation conducted by the State Council of Manchukuo about the living expenses of labourers in Dadaosanjiazi village, Longjiang County suggests that 61 percent of their income was used for food expenses.[13] This high percentage indicates that the living standards of wage labourers might have been at a level so low that only a basic level of subsistence could be maintained.

The labour relationship between wage labour and employers represented an unstable structure that was subject to change and vulnerable to influence. The formation of the unstable structure can be explained by the following two factors. One, wage labour made the individual worker an economic unit. Working for wages stimulated individual workers to cut their family ties and move from villages to cities. Two, the labour relations were established on an informal form of oral contracts and on the basis of economic interests. Specifically, the contracts of wage labourers were not legally bound to formal rules, so the relationship between wage labourers and employers was only loosely regulated and the supply of labour was dependent largely on the basis of

[10] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*, 79.
[11] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*, 80.
[12] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*, 75-7.
[13] Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*, 83.

credit and trust. In addition, the relationship between wage labourers and their employers was driven primarily by economic interests, so the labour supply was not a form of exploitation as intense as the relationship between landlords and peasants in which peasants were legally bound to the land and subject to tight control by landlords. Although employers and labourers were acquaintances with each other in many cases, the kinship factor did not carry much weight in the contract. This relationship would be terminated automatically once their contract expired. The informality and economic nature of the contract led to vulnerability in their relationship.

Employed Labour in the Japanese Villages in Manchuria

In 1932, the Kwantung Army along with the Japanese Ministry of Colonial Affairs initiated a colonisation project to send some of the Japanese agrarian population to Manchuria. The Japanese farmers were sent to settle either near the border of the Soviet Union in northern Manchuria or near the South Manchuria Railway line. These areas could be used to ward off Chinese guerrillas and military forces near the border with the Soviet Union.[14] When the Japanese immigrants settled in Manchuria, they acquired land from the Japanese authorities. The acreage of land that they acquired from the Japanese authorities varied from 5 to 20 *chōbu* with 10 *chōbu* being the average.[15]

The Japanese Kwantung Army established several institutions to organise land acquisition. In the early 1930s, the East Asia Development Company was actively involved in land acquisition. The EADC was a subsidiary company of the SMRC established in Fengtian in December 1921.[16] After 1936, the Kwantung Army shifted the handling of land acquisition from the EADC to other institutions and the Manchukuo government. In January 1936, the Manchukuo government established the Manchuria Colonial Development Company (*Manshū takushoku kabushikigaisha*) to take over the business of land acquisition of the EADC. In September 1937, the MCDC was renamed the Manchuria Colonial Development Corporation (*Manshū takushoku kōsha*). In January 1939, the Manchukuo government founded the General Bureau for Colonial Development (*kaitaku sōkyoku*), an organisation reorganised on the model of

[14] Takemaro Mori, "Colonies and countryside in wartime Japan," in *Farmers and Village Life in Twentieth-Century Japan*, eds. Ann Waswo and Yoshiaki Nishida, London: Routledge Curzon, 2003, 183.
[15] Lecai Gao, *Riben "Manzhou" yimin yanjiu*, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2000, 325.
[16] For a discussion of the EADC, see Yoshiki Enatsu, "Kindai tōhoku Ajia chiiki no keizai tōgō to Nihon no kokusaku kaisha," *Tōhoku Ajia kenkyū*, no. 8, March 2004, 1-24.

the Colonial Development Department (*takuseishi*) within the Manchukuo government.[17]

The Japanese authorities often combined the adoption of official policy and intimidation or outright force against the Chinese farmers in the practice of land acquisition.[18] The Japanese policy concerning the type of land to be purchased from Chinese farmers was unclaimed fields, which Japanese settlers could reclaim and bring into cultivation. In practice, though, the Japanese authorities preferred land that was already being cultivated to avoid additional time and effort for reclamation. The Japanese authorities believed in the authority of village elites in pressuring the farmers in agreeing to the sale of their property, so they usually contacted the village headmen or elders to have them persuade farmers to sell their land instead of negotiating directly with farmers.[19] In actual transactions, the Japanese authorities always undervalued Chinese land and paid well below its market value. In most cases, the payment was very low, amounting to only less than one third of the market price.[20] For example, in 1932 and 1933 in Sanjiang, the Japanese authorities purchased uncultivated land at 2-4 yen per *xiang* and purchased cultivated land at 15 yen per *xiang*. However, the market price for uncultivated land was 5-25 yen per *xiang* and the price for cultivated land was 50-100 yen per *xiang* in this region during this time.[21]

The Japanese immigration brought about a structural change in the labour relations in rural Manchukuo. The change was characterised by the increase of employed labour and decrease of self-employed labour. This phenomenon can be explained by the shortage of labour facing the Japanese immigrants after their arrival in Manchuria. The shortage of labour was caused by the following factors. First, when the Japanese immigrants arrived in the designated locations for settlement, they were confronted with armed resistance organised by guerrillas, landlords and rich peasants. The local resistance not only compelled the Japanese immigrants to organise self-defence, but also pushed some immigrants to withdraw from the settlement program and

[17] Akiko Ozu, "Nihonjin imin seisaku to 'Manshūkoku' seifu no seido teki taiō: takuseishi, kaitakusōkyoku no secchi wo chūshinni," *Ajia keizai*, vol. 47, no. 4, April 2006, 7-10.
[18] Ronald Suleski,"Northeast China under Japanese Control: The Role of the Manchurian Youth Corps, 1935-1945," *Modern China*, vol. 7, no. 3, July 1981, 356.
[19] Suleski,"Northeast China under Japanese Control," 357.
[20] Hanfa Liu, "Nihonjin Manshū imin yōchi no kakutoku to genchi Chūgokujin no kyōsei ijyū," *Ajia keizai*, vol. 44, no. 4, April 2003, 23.
[21] Kyōji Asada, *Nihon teikoku shugi to kyū shokuminchi jinushisei: Taiwan, Chōsen, 'Manshū' ni okeru Nihonjin daitochi shoyū no shiteki bunseki*, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1989, 207.

to return to Japan.[22] Second, the locations in which the Japanese immigrants had settled were usually uncultivated land in northern Manchuria that demanded large input for reclamation. The unfamiliarity of Japanese immigrants with the land and climate conditions of Manchuria discouraged them from engaging directly in farming and pushed them to hire local labour to work on their farms.

The labour distribution of Japanese immigrants shows that the percentage of Japanese immigrants who engaged directly in farming was very small. The small percentage was common to the Japanese immigrants who came to Manchuria during different periods in the 1930s and 1940s. In the case of the first group of Japanese immigrants, only 30 percent of immigrants engaged in farming in 1933 and 1934. The actual number was even smaller because of sickness and other reasons.[23] Among the second group of Japanese immigrants who arrived between June 1934 and February 1935, those who engaged in farming accounted for 20 percent of total number of immigrants.[24]

Table 6.1. The Structure of Labour Force in Mizuho Village in 1940

		Number of Workers	Percentage
Self-Employed Labour	Male	19,881	26.3%
	Female	3,645	4.9%
	Total	23,526	31.2%
Employed Labour	Year Labour	32,171	43.6%
	Month Labour	4,092	5.4%
	Day Labour	13,171	17.4%
	Apprentice	2,516	3.4%
	Total	51,950	68.8%
Total		75,476	100%

Source: Kobayashi, "Manshū nōgyō imin no einō jittai," 451.

The rate of employed labour in the households of Japanese immigrants was much higher than that in the households of Chinese farmers. According to the Japanese investigation conducted in 1934, the general conditions of labour relations in the Chinese farming households in northern Manchuria was that an average of 6.7 persons were self-employed labour and 0.5 person was employed labour.[25] This figure shows that the main source of labour for Chinese farmers was family labour. According to the 1940 data about the general labour conditions of the Japanese immigrants in Manchuria,

[22] Hideo Kobayashi, "Manshū nōgyō imin no einō jittai," in *Nihon teikokushugi ka no Manshū imin*, ed. Manshū iminshi kenkyūkai, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1976, 416-8, 421, 425-7.
[23] Kobayashi, "Manshū nōgyō imin no einō jittai," 425.
[24] Kobayashi, "Manshū nōgyō imin no einō jittai," 426.
[25] Minami Manshū tetsudō kabishikigaisha chōsabu, *Hoku Manshū konō no kenkyū*, Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1942, 3-4.

the employed labour amounted to 0.45 year labourer, 1.10 month labourers and 29 day labourers in each Japanese household.[26] Apparently, there was a stronger tendency for the Japanese immigrants to hire labour than for the Chinese farmers to do so. The concrete example of Mizuho, a Japanese immigrant village in Heilongjiang Province in northern Manchuria, shows that the rate of employed labour in Japanese villages was extremely high. As shown in Table 6.1, the conditions of the labour force in Mizuho Village in 1940 shows that the employed labour accounted for 68.8 percent and only 31.2 percent of labour was self-employed labour. In the meantime, the percentage of long-term employed labour was higher than that of short-term labour.

The Structural Change in Labour Force

Table 6.2. Distribution of Labour Force by Sector in Manchuria in 1931

Sector	Agriculture	Industry	Commerce	Education	Military	Public Service	Total
Percentage	72.3%	7.6%	9.1%	8.2%	1.8%	1.0%	100%

Source: Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū keizai nenpō*, Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1933, 431.
Note: the data of this source was originally published in 1931, so presumably the data reflects the conditions of Manchuria in 1931.

The agricultural labour force played a predominant role in the structure of labour relations. Between 1932 and 1945, the majority of the economically active population of Manchuria were engaged in agriculture. The predominant position of agricultural labour is evident in Table 6.2, which shows that agricultural labour accounted for 72.3 percent of the total labour force of Manchuria in 1931.

Changes in the distribution of the labour force occurred with the urbanisation of Manchuria. The rapid industrial growth following the implementation of the Five-Year Plan in 1937 created somewhat greater demand for labour and facilitated movement of labour from rural areas to urban areas. With the pulling force from the industrial sector, the scale of movement of rural labour from the rural areas to urban areas rose slightly. Table 6.3 shows that the working population in the agriculture sector declined slightly and the working population in the mining and industry sectors increased slightly during the period of 1935 and 1942. However, the decline in the position of agricultural labour was only very small.

[26] Kobayashi, "Manshū nōgyō imin no einō jittai," 450.

Table 6.3. Distribution of Labour Force between 1935 and 1942 (unit: percent)

Sector	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942
Agriculture	38.40	38.46	37.56	37.31	38.59	37.50	36.48	35.44
Fishery	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Mining	0.49	0.55	0.62	0.73	0.72	0.82	0.91	1.00
Industry	2.49	2.59	2.69	2.81	2.74	2.85	2.94	3.04
Commerce	3.69	3.68	3.65	3.68	3.50	3.49	3.48	3.74
Transport	0.32	0.33	0.34	0.36	0.34	0.36	0.38	0.40
Public Service and Self-Employment	1.26	1.56	2.02	2.20	2.21	2.63	3.01	3.39
Family Business	1.75	1.72	2.00	1.61	1.25	1.38	1.51	1.63
Other Employment	1.14	1.42	1.80	1.94	2.17	2.52	2.85	3.18
Employment Total	49.65	50.43	50.79	50.75	51.63	51.67	51.68	51.66
Unemployment	50.35	49.57	49.21	49.25	48.37	48.33	48.32	48.34
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Mineo Yamanaka, "'Manshūkoku' jinkō tōkei no suikei," *The Journal of Tokyo Keizai University*, no. 245, March 2005, 187.

Table 6.4. The Movement of Farming and Non-Farming Population in Manchuria (unit: thousand)

Year	Farming	Index	Percentage in Total Population	Non-Farming	Index	Percentage in Total Population	Total	Index
1934	23,668	100	84.7	4,286	100	15.3	27,945	100
1935	24,896	105	86.3	3,952	92	13.7	28,848	103
1936	25,279	106	85.0	4,478	104	15.0	29,757	107
1938	24,568	103	76.7	7,463	174	23.3	32,031	115
1939	24,584	104	74.5	8,790	205	25.5	33,373	119
1940	29,608	125	72.5	11,234	262	27.5	40,842	146
1941	31,927	135	72.4	12,184	284	27.6	44,110	158
1942	33,423	141	72.8	12,477	292	27.2	45,899	164
1943	32,595	138	72.1	12,620	295	27.9	45,215	162
1944	32,488	137	67.4	15,723	367	32.6	48,211	173

Source: Roman H. Myers, *The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria*, New York: Garland Publishing, 1982, 179.
Note: data for 1934 excludes Xing'an Province; data for 1935 and 1936 excludes Xing'an and Rehe Provinces; data for 1938 and 1940 excludes Rehe and West, East and South Xing'an Provinces.

The movement of labour force can be seen as a natural movement of agricultural labour who either sought work in mines, factories and construction worksites in urban areas or sought employment from landlords and rich peasants in rural areas. The movement of the labour force can also been seen as the result of government attempt of regulating population mobility to enable the expansion of industrial production. As shown in Table 6.4, no drastic change occurred in the structure of the farming and non-farming population of Manchuria between 1934 and 1936. The percentage remained on an average level of 85 percent. After 1938, however, change in the population structure

became much more remarkable. Table 6.4 shows that the share of farming population started to decline from 76.7 percent in 1938 to 67.4 percent in 1944. The position of the farming population in the demographic structure of Manchuria in 1934 and 1938 suggest that the decline of the share of farming population was almost a difference of 20 percent.

Labour Supply and Demand

The supply of labour in the early period of Manchukuo was not a serious concern for the Japanese authorities. During this period, the supply of labour for urban construction was adequate because the depressed conditions in agriculture forced numerous villagers to move to cities. However, the labour supply only remained sufficient until the eve of the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. The war led directly to the decline of migrant workers from North China, whose number dropped from 399,000 in 1936 to 362,000 in 1937.[27] In spite of the decline of labour supply, labour demand continued to increase. The demand for labour became acute when the Manchukuo government implemented and revised the Five-Year Plan in 1937 and 1938 respectively. The plan set a huge quota for the production of metal, coal, machine tool, chemicals and construction industries.[28] In order to meet the production quota, the Manchukuo government needed to absorb one million workers into various industries within a period of five years.[29] The increasing demand for labour and decreasing supply of labour created an acute shortage of labour in Manchuria. As shown in Table 6.5, all the major cities in Manchuria except Dalian and Jinzhou were facing a shortage of labour at the end of July 1937.

The industrial development of Manchukuo created great demand for both unskilled and skilled labour. The demand for unskilled labour was estimated to be much greater than the demand for skilled labour. Because most unskilled workers came from the rural areas of Manchuria, rural areas became the main source for the supply of labour for the industries in Manchuria. In addition, there was demand for skilled labour. In order to meet this demand, the Japanese introduced programs to train skilled labour

[27] David Tucker, "Labor Policy and the Construction Industry in Manchukuo: Systems of Recruitment, Management, and Control," in *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories*, ed. Paul H. Krastoska, Armonk: Sharpe, 2005, 39.
[28] In comparison with the original plan, the revised plan greatly increased the demand for labour in mining industry. Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, *Manshūkokushi:sōron*, Tokyo: Manmō dōhō engokai, 1970, 532-46.
[29] Shujuan Li, *Riben zhimin tongzhi yu dongbei nongmin shenghuo: 1931-1945 nian*, Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2014, 277.

in Manchuria. The training took place primarily in the training centres in Fengtian, Andong and Harbin. However, exceptions were also made to send the skilled workers with exceptional skills to Japan for further training.[30]

Table 6.5. The Conditions of Labour Shortage at the End of July 1937

City	Number Needed	Number Available	Number Insufficient
Dalian	15,000	15,000	---
Fengtian	27,000	25,000	2,000
Xinjing	34,500	34,000	500
Anshan	5,000	4,000	1,000
Fushun	8,600	8,000	600
Harbin	10,800	10,000	800
Andong	2,500	2,000	500
Mudanjiang	21,200	19,000	2,200
Qiqihar	3,900	2,500	1,400
Jinzhou	3,000	3,000	---
Jilin	7,760	7,000	760
Construction	58,809	42,187	16,622
Other	30,036	21,276	8,760
Total	228,105	192,963	35,142

Source: Minami Manshū tetsudō chōsabu, *Manshū keizai nenpō*, Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1939, 441-2.

Table 6.6. An Estimate of Workers Needed by the Five-Year Plan

Year	Category	Ceramics and Construction Materials	Mining	Industry	Transport	Total
1937	Skilled	1,660	1,860	220	---	3,740
	Unskilled	151,542	21,000	1,600	402	174,544
1938	Skilled	310	670	1,930	---	2,910
	Unskilled	221,523	21,600	5,970	914	250,007
1939	Skilled	---	520	2,060	---	2,580
	Unskilled	204,963	24,400	3,130	914	233,407
1940	Skilled	---	2,260	4,520	--	6,780
	Unskilled	186,108	45,400	10,620	914	243,042
1941	Skilled	---	1,100	5,170	---	6,270
	Unskilled	118,741	69,600	12,970	922	202,233

Source: Minami Manshū tetsudō chōsabu, *Rōdō bumon kankei shiryō*, 6-8.

The labour supply and demand in the agricultural and industrial sectors were imbalanced. In the agricultural sector, there was a labour surplus. According to the estimates of the Manchukuo government, there was a sizable surplus in the supply of labour for agriculture during the period of 1938 to 1941. As shown in Table 6.7, labour surplus increased continuously for four years between 1937 and 1941. In contrast, the

[30] Keizai chōsa iinkai, "Rōdōryoku haikyū soshiki an (kaitei)," in *Rōdō bumon kankei shiryō*, Minami Manshū tetsudō chōsabu, Dairen: Minami Manshū tetsudō chōsabu, 1937, 164; Hideo Kobayashi, "1930 nendai 'Manshū kōgyōka' seisaku no tenkai katei," *Tochiseido shigaku*, no. 44, July 1969, 33.

supply of labour for the industrial sector could not meet the demand for labour. Shortages of skilled and unskilled workers were keenly felt in in almost all the sectors of industry. As shown in Table 6.6, mines needed the most workers, followed by the construction industry. The demand for unskilled labour in mines was estimated to increase continuously during this period.

Table 6.7. The Conditions of Labour Supply for Agriculture between 1936 and 1941

	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Needed	6,746,614	7,494,209	7,553,097	7,628,216	7,717,644	7,814,234
Available	6,376,476	7,873,370	7,968,634	8,065,051	8,162,634	8,261,402
Surplus		379,161	415,537	436,835	444,990	447,168
Shortage	370,138					

Source: Minami Manshū tetsudō chōsabu, *Rōdō bumon kankei shiryō*, 149-52.
Note: the data for the period of 1936 and 1937 reflects the real conditions of labour supply in thirteen provinces in Manchuria. The data for the period of 1938 to 1941 is an estimate of the conditions of labour supply in ten provinces in Manchuria, and it does not reflect the real conditions of labour supply in this period.

The Conditions of Labour Force

The working conditions in the industrial sector were extremely demanding for workers in terms of working hours. Working hours varied in Chinese and Japanese enterprises in Manchuria. In the Chinese enterprises of northern Manchuria, working hours were normally a minimum of twelve hours a day. In the manufacturing industries where wages were paid according to the workload completed, working hours ranged from fourteen to fifteen hours a day. In extreme cases, working hours amounted to eighteen hours a day. Working hours including rest breaks averaged fourteen hours a day.[31] In comparison with the working hours in Chinese enterprises, the conditions of Japanese enterprises seem to have been less severe. The data of August 1939 suggests that working hours in Japanese enterprises averaged 10.4 hours, of which 9.5 hours were actual working hours, while rest breaks were 0.9 hours. The average working days in a month were 27.6 days. However, this figure only reflected regular working hours excluding overtime work.[32] The same data also shows that the overtime work averaged approximately either 30 minutes or 90 minutes in some cases.[33]

The payment of wage varied in Chinese and Japanese enterprises. Chinese and Japanese enterprises both adopted the method of paying wages to workers in accordance

[31] Mantetsu sangyōbu shiryōshitsu, trans. *Hokuman ni okeru zairai kōgyō no rōdō jōken*, Dairen: Minami Manshū tetsudō, 1937, 48-9.
[32] Manshū rōdō kyōkai, *Manshū rōdō nenkan*, Shinkyō: Ganshōdō, 1941, 10.
[33] Manshū rōdō kyōkai, *Manshū rōdō nenkan*, 10.

with working hours and workload. In Chinese enterprises, wages were paid primarily by hours. Wages were paid to adult workers on monthly or fortnightly instalments. Apprentices were normally paid on a monthly basis. In most cases, workers were paid in both kind and cash. Only highly skilled or temporary workers were paid fully in cash. In order to encourage commitment of workers to their work, employers distributed loyalty bonuses to workers at the end of each fiscal year.[34] In the case of Japanese enterprises, wages were predominantly paid on a daily basis in factories and paid in accordance with their output in coal mines. The data of August 1939 suggests that factory workers who received payment on a daily basis accounted for 82.9 percent in the total number of workers. Workers in coal mines who received payment on their completion of output accounted for 53.9 percent of the total number of workers.[35]

Table 6.8. Monthly Wages of Labourers in the FC between 1939 and 1943 (unit: yuan)

Year	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
Japanese	105.2	110.07	118.79	134.5	151.69
Chinese	40.87	46.86	57.50	67	75.91

Source: Takao Matsumura, "Fushun meikuang gongren shitai," in *Mantie yu Zhongguo laogong*, eds. Xueshi Xie and Takao Matsumura, Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003, 350.
Note: the data on the Chinese labour only represented the employees whose ranks were higher than the ranks of regular employees. It is assumed that the wages shown in the data were the highest among all the Chinese employees.

The Japanese adopted a discriminatory policy on workers' wage. Although wage levels varied from enterprise to enterprise, there was a marked difference in the wages of Japanese and Chinese workers. In the case of factories, the average wage of Japanese workers was approximately three times of that of the Chinese workers. In 1936, the nominal wages of Japanese and Chinese workers were 2.33 yuan and 0.71 yuan respectively.[36] In 1939, the wages of Japanese male and female workers were 3.78 yuan and 1.82 yuan respectively. The wages of Chinese male and female workers were 1.09 yuan and 0.53 yuan respectively.[37] In coal mines, the nominal wage of Japanese male workers was an average of 3.33 yuan in 1939. However, the nominal wages of Chinese male and female workers in the same year were only 0.98 yuan and 0.30 yuan respectively.[38] A comparison of the wages of the Japanese and Chinese employees in

[34] Manshū rōdō kyōkai, *Manshū rōdō nenkan*, 16-8.
[35] Manshū rōdō kyōkai, *Manshū rōdō nenkan*, 18-9.
[36] Takao Matsumura, *Nihon teikokushugi ka no shokuminchi rōdōshi*, Tokyo: Fujishuppan, 2007, 187.
[37] Manshū rōdō kyōkai, *Manshū rōdō nenkan*, 26.
[38] Matsumura, *Nihon teikoku shugika no shokuminchi rōdōshi*, 188.

the Fushun Colliery further illustrates the wage differences between Japanese and Chinese labour force. The enterprises made efforts to increase wages for workers after 1938, but the increase still did not keep pace with the increase of the prices of consumer goods in Manchuria. As a result, the purchasing power of workers actually declined in spite of their wage increase.

After the enterprises recruited workers, they had great trouble in keeping them firmly in the workplace. Workers remained in the workplace only temporarily and they usually maintained a high level of mobility. A very large number of workers stayed employed at a single job for six months to a year only.

Labour turnover increased rapidly from 1939 to 1940. As shown in Table 6.9, there was a general increase in labour turnover from September 1939 to August 1940. Labour turnover increased continuously from September 1939 and peaked in June 1940 at a rate of 8.89 percent. Labour turnover dropped slightly to 7.22 percent in August 1940.

There are few substantial data on the reasons for the turnover rate of workers in the enterprises, so it is difficult to make accurate assessment on the overall conditions of labour turnover in Manchuria. We can, however, evaluate several factors that might have contributed to the turnover rate of Chinese workers in general. The high turnover rate can be explained by the conditions of both workplace and workers. The long working hours and low wages in the enterprises discouraged workers to remain loyal to their workplace. Japanese employers made only limited efforts to provide training for workers. The number of Chinese workers was extremely high in the workplace. In the case of a machine tool factory in Fengtian, in 1934 about 96 percent of its workers were Chinese and only 4 percent were Japanese. In 1939, the Chinese workers still accounted for about 91 percent while Japanese workers made up only 5 percent.[39] Chinese workers usually maintained weak loyalty to the workplace. They usually worked just long enough to earn the amount of wages they wanted, and then they either moved to another job or simply returned to their villages.

Turnover rate created a vicious cycle in the workforce. In order to maintain output levels, the enterprises usually forced employers to extend working hours. This attempt resulted in the loss of production, the reduction of performance levels, unnecessary overtime and low morale from other workers who had to cover the workload of the workers who left the workplace, and high accident rates.[40]

[39] Myers, *The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria*, 189.
[40] Myers, *The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria*, 186-7.

Table 6.9. The Number of Workers Leaving and Entering Industry in 1939 and 1940

Period	Number at the Beginning of Month	Hired	Departed	Final Number	Rate of Labour Turnover
September 1939	37,400	3,061	2,566	37,904	6.82%
December 1939	38,615	5,479	3,025	41,069	7.60%
February 1940	37,308	5,198	2,988	39,518	7.78%
April 1940	41,964	5,325	3,649	43,640	8.53%
June 1940	44,364	3,400	3,920	43,844	8.89%
August 1940	44,365	3,425	3,211	44,579	7.22%

Source: Myers, *The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria*, 190-2.
Note: labour turnover is calculated on the basis of Myer's data. The formula for the calculation is the number of departed workers divided by the average of the numbers of workers at the beginning in one month and at the end of the year and then multiplied by 100.

Labour Recruitment and Management

Labour was primarily recruited from Manchuria and North China. For the recruitment of labour from Manchuria, the Japanese circulated posters advertising work opportunities in rural areas, or hired local people to recruit labour through their personal connections, or hired agents to recruit labour by contracting them to provide the quota of labour needed.[41] For the recruitment of labour from North China, the Japanese established the Dadong Company (*Dadong gongsi*) as their agent to handle the matters of investigation of prospective labourers, the recruitment and transport, and the issuance of identity papers. The Dadong Company was capitalised at 0.1 million yen and supervised by the Japanese intelligence agency in Tianjin. When the company was established on 1 April 1934, it had a head office in Tianjin and several visa-processing offices in North China and a branch in Dalian. On 16 February 1935, the Japanese authorities reorganised the Dadong Company into a partnership venture capitalised at one million yen. Its head office was relocated from Tianjin to the Manchukuo capital Xinjing. Its main functions remained the handling of matters related to immigration and labour control.[42]

The Japanese enterprises in Manchuria, most of which were the SMRC enterprises, depended on the *batou* system to recruit and manage labour. The *batou* system was an arrangement that integrated labour procurement, management and care.[43] The *batou* was a subcontractor who acted as the intermediary between workers and

[41] Shengzhen Zhang, "Zhulu tumu gongren de laowu wenti," in *Mantie yu Zhongguo laogong*, eds. Xueshi Xie and Takao Matsumura, Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003, 245.
[42] Myers, *The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria*, 198; Toshio Kojima, "Manshūkoku no rōdō tōsei seisaku," in *Mantetsu rōdōshi no kenkyū*, eds. Takao Matsumura, Xueshi Xie, and Kenji Eda, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2002, 34-5.
[43] Tucker, "Labor Policy and the Construction Industry in Manchukuo," 51.

employers. He not only recruited and delivered workers to employers, but also provided food, temporary housing and recreation for workers. *Batou* received wages from the employers, deducted a percentage from the wages and then distributed the balance to the workers.[44] In this way, *batou* were directly involved in the recruitment and management of workers, and they retained full authority to employ, dismiss, and discipline workers. *Batou* were paid on the basis of the completion of their output quota and employers had no authority to supervise the labourers in any way.

The organisational structure of the *batou* system consisted of chief *batou* (*dabatou*), sub-*batou* (*xiaobatou*) and workers. The basic unit of the system was a squad of workers. A sub-*batou* was in charge of each squad. The number of workers managed by the chief *batou* varied. A chief *batou* might have more than one thousand workers or only thirty or forty workers under their control.[45]

The *batou* system offered advantages to both the employers and workers. To the Japanese employers, it was convenient to depend on the *batou* system for the direct management of workers because of cultural and linguistic barriers in communicating with Chinese workers. To the workers, the *batou* system offered security and protection in payment, transport, accommodation and medical care. Given such advantages, the *batou* system retained strong connections with both Japanese employers and local workers in Manchuria.

The Japanese policy on the *batou* system underwent changes during their fourteen years of labour control in Manchuria. Between 1932 and 1937, Japanese enterprises generally entrusted the recruitment and management of labour to *batou*.[46] Between 1937 and 1940, the Japanese authorities restricted the *batou* system and sought other means of recruiting and managing labour. From 1940 to 1945, the Japanese authorities relaxed the control over the *batou* system in labour recruitment and management.[47]

Between 1932 and 1937, the Japanese authorities concluded that the direct involvement of the *batou* system in recruiting and managing workers had weakened the capacity of the Japanese control over the labour force. The Japanese enterprises reduced the authority of *batou* in labour management and reinforced their own control over

[44] Minami Manshū testudō kabushikigaisha keizai chōsakai, *Manshū no kūrī*, Dairen: Minami testudō, 1934, 36.
[45] Gōichi Takei, *Manshū no rōdō to rōdō seisaku*, Shinkyō: Ganshōdō shoten, 1940, 171.
[46] Chunling Fan, "Lun Mantie meikuang xitong yapo xia Zhongguo laogong de fankang douzheng," Master's thesis, Northeast Normal University, 2008, 14.
[47] Kenji Eda, "Shūshō," in *Mantetsu rōdōshi no kenkyū*, eds. Takao Matsumura, Xueshi Xie, and Kenji Eda, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2002, 496-7.

Chinese workers. In the case of the FC for example, the Japanese employers were directly involved in the management of *batou*. The Japanese employers not only directly supervised the work performance of *batou*, but also appointed and dismissed *batou* and sub-*batou*.

Table 6.10. The number of *Batou* in the FC between 1931 and 1943

Year	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
Number	128	107	118	109	76	71	82	93	224	391	340	343	439

Source: Xueshi Xie, *Mantieshi ziliao*, vol. 4, no. 2, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987, 568.

From 1937, the Japanese enterprises further reduced the role of the *batou* system by direct recruitment and employment. In 1940, the FC set up recruitment offices in several cities in North China and sent agents to the recruiting areas to recruit workers.[48] However, these efforts to eliminate the influence of *batou* in labour management were only made on a narrow scale and the effect was limited. Even though in some cases workers were hired directly by the FC, the FC still relied on *batou* to supply them with workers.

After 1940, the Japanese enterprises reutilised the *batou* system of labour control. According to the rules of the FC revised on 1 February 1940, a new level of *batou* known as the operations *batou* (*zuoye batou*) was set up under the sub-*batou*. Now the *batou* system became a four-level structure consisting of *batou*, sub-*batou*, operations *batou* and workers.[49] The FC also raised the salary of *batou* and workers to stimulate commitment of workers to improve their work performance, to prevent turnover and to develop the loyalty of workers to their workplace. As shown in Table 6.10, the number of *batou* in the FC fluctuated between 1931 and 1937, and it did not show a trend of consistency. However, the number after 1937 increased rapidly from 82 in 1937 to 439 in 1943. The rapid increase in the number of *batou* shows that the Japanese enterprises tightened their control over the labour force.

The government regulation of the labour force was only effective on group labour hired through the *batou* system, which was only part of the labour force. Group labour accounted for less than one third of the total labour force in Manchuria. Between 1937 and 1940, group labour accounted for 17 percent, 29 percent, 33 percent and 31 percent in the total number of the labour force in Manchuria.[50] Even in 1939 when the

[48] Matsumura, *Nihon teikokushugi ka no shokuminchi rōdōshi*, 179.
[49] Fan, "Lun Mantie meikuang xitong yapo xia Zhongguo laogong de fankang douzheng," 14.
[50] Matsumura, *Nihon teikokushugi ka no shokuminchi rōdōshi*, 178.

number of group labour employees was at its peak, they accounted for only one third of the total number of migrant workers. In addition, group labour workers had only limited choice of occupation. They were only allowed to work for the areas of vital importance to the state: civil engineering, mining, industry and communications. Among these four areas, the largest number of workers entered the civil engineering and mining industries. In 1940, the number of workers in these industries accounted for 93 percent in the total number of group labour employees.[51] Aside from the group labour force, individual labourers who entered Manchuria for employment or family reasons constituted the majority of labourers in Manchuria. However, individual labour was largely free from government regulation. Given the greater share of individual labour in the total number of the labour force in Manchuria, the Manchukuo government failed to exercise full control over the labour force.

The Labour Control System

1. Policies and Organisations

The Japanese authorities adopted two diametrically opposed policies on labour control in Manchukuo. From 1932 to 1937, the Japanese adopted a mild labour policy of limited government intervention. Under this policy, the government depended on North China for the supply of labour. The government, however, restricted the mobility of labour from North China to Manchuria due to concerns with security. From 1937 to 1945, the Japanese pursued an aggressive labour policy that involved compulsion and coercion in the conscription of labour.[52]

The labour policy in the period between 1932 and 1937 was a result of the balanced demand and supply of labour and the Kwantung Army's concerns with public security. Although the industrialisation plan initiated by the Manchukuo government greatly increased the demand for labour, the supply of labour was adequate. At this time, the size of the labour force from North China remained one million per year.[53] Depressed conditions in the agricultural sector in Manchuria forced numerous farmers to move to industrial sectors at this time. The Kwantung Army perceived Chinese workers from North China as a potential threat to the public security of Manchuria, so in 1937 they established a labour control system to restrict the mobility of the labour force from North China to Manchuria.

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[51] Matsumura, *Nihon teikokushugi ka no shokuminchi rōdōshi*, 178.
[52] Li, *Riben zhimin tongzhi yu Dongbei nongmin shenghuo*, 272-85.
[53] Shujuan Li, *Riwei tongzhi xia de dongbei nongcun (1931-1945)*, Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2005, 256.

The labour control system was made up of a committee, a law and an organisation that dealt directly with labour relations. The committee, known as the Labour Control Committee (*rōdō tōsei iinkai*), was set up within the Kwantung Army. It had twenty-seven members on board who were leaders of the Kwantung Army, the Manchukuo government, the SMRC, the GGK and other government bodies. The organisation was the Dadong Company. The law was the Restriction of Foreign Labour Force (*gaikoku rōdōsha torishimari kisoku*) enforced in March 1935. This law designated the Dadong Company as the sole agent for foreign labour control.[54]

The direction of Japanese labour control policy changed dramatically in 1937 as a direct outcome of the implementation of the Five-Year Plan and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In comparison with the previous labour policy, the current labour policy became increasingly interventionist and active. In 1937, the sharp decline in the immigration of Chinese workers entering Manchuria made the recruitment of labour increasingly difficult. This situation propelled the Japanese authorities to shift the focus of their labour policy from limited government intervention to systematic and centralised government control.

The labour control system during this period was made up of an organisation for the implementation of labour control, a committee for the legislation for labour control and two laws. The organisation was the Manchuria Labour Association (*Manshū rōkō kyōkai*) established on 7 January 1938. It was funded by various public bodies including the Manchukuo government, the SMRC, the Dadong Company, and the Manchuria Civil Engineering Company (*Manshū doboku kenchiku kyōkai*). The organisation was in charge of the distribution, registration, training and employment of labour. Among these responsibilities, the organisation was primarily involved in the registration of labour. The organisation registered workers in the system, issued workers identity cards and collected their fingerprints to serve security purposes.[55] The committee was the Labour Affairs Committee (*rōmu iinkai*) established in July 1938.[56] It set quotas for the labour from North China into Manchuria. The first law was the Labour Control Law (*rōdō tōseihō*) promulgated on 1 December 1938 and enforced on 30 January 1939. This law provided a legal basis for the extension of working hours and reduction of wages in the workplace. The second law was the National Mobilisation Law (*kokka sōdōinhō*),

[54] Takao Matsumura, "Nihon teikokushugi ka ni okeru 'Manshū' he no Chūgokujin idō ni tsuite," *Mita gakkai zasshi*, vol. 64, no. 9, September 1971, 44.
[55] Matsumura, *Nihon teikokushugi ka no shokuminchi rōdōshi*, 161-2.
[56] Toshio Kojima, "Manshūkoku no rōdō tōsei seisaku," in *Mantetsu rōdōshi no kenkyū*, eds. Takao Matsumura, Xueshi Xie, and Kenji Eda, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2002, 37.

proclaimed by the Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro in March 1938. Its provisions were applied to Manchukuo in order to control the material and human resources. The National Mobilisation Law gave the Manchukuo government unprecedented powers to mobilise labour.[57]

The labour shortage grew more urgent when the Pacific War started in December 1941. The labour shortage derived in part from the Kwantung Army's restriction of money order remittances to North China. This initiative prohibited Chinese workers from sending money back to their hometowns in North China. The exchange of the Manchurian currency to the currencies in circulation in North China was also restricted. The money restriction discouraged workers from continuing to work in Manchuria and caused high labour turnover from Manchuria to North China.

Wartime conditions made the recruitment of labour from North China more difficult. In response to this situation, the Manchukuo government established the New Labour System (*rōmu shintaisei*) on 10 September 1941 to directly control the recruitment and distribution of labour in Manchuria.[58] In this system, the labour conscription shifted from North China to Manchuria. The Labour Control Law was amended for the government to control the labour force directly, while the Manchuria Labour Association was reorganised into the Labour Service Promotion Association (*rōmu shinkokkai*) in October 1941. This association succeeded the Manchuria Labour Association in the roles of the mediation of workers, the protection of workers, and the improvement of labour management and the implementation of labour control. This new association represented the interests of the SMRC. The SMRC placed its employees in the key positions of the association and provided substantial funds for its operation.[59]

2. Compulsory Labour Service

The Manchukuo government turned to coercion and compulsion for labour conscription. The coercive system of labour conscription included the organisation of labour service corps and the recruitment of compulsory labour. These efforts were intended to pull all available labour resources into the workplace to increase productivity.

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[57] Toshio Kojima, "Manshūkoku no rōdō tōsei seisaku," 43-5.
[58] Toshio Kojima, "Development of Labour Policy in 'Manchukuo' and Its Limit, 1933-1943," in *Economies under Occupation: The Hegemony of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War II*, Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2015, 86.
[59] Kazuhiko Itō, "Mantetsu rōdōsha to rōmutaisei," in *Mantetsu rōdōshi no kenkyū*, eds. Takao Matsumura, Xueshi Xie, and Kenji Eda, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2002,163.

On 9 February 1942, the Manchukuo government issued two administrative orders to conscript labour: Emergent Labour Service Rules (*rōdōsha kinkyū shūrō kisoku*) and Emergent Labour Recruitment Guidelines (*rōdōsha kinkyū boshū yōkō*). These orders authorised the government to conscript labour through coercive and compulsory measures. In case of necessity, employers could submit a proposal to the MCA for the supply of labour. Their proposal included the place and type of work and number of workers needed. The MCA would in turn order the local governments to deliver workers. After receiving the orders from the MCA, local governments at city, county or village levels would start to conscript civilians. Adult males aged between eighteen and fifty were all eligible for the compulsory labour service. The sources available suggest that the number of civilians conscripted for the compulsory labour service was approximately 480,000 in 1943 and 700,000 in 1944.[60] The selection of workers varied from region to region. In some cases, workers were conscripted by the government arbitrarily. The process of conscription was as follows: upon receiving the order of labour conscription from the higher level of government, the county governor would select workers from the government's workers register by lot; then the authorities would inform the selected workers of the details of the work, including the date and venue of work; afterwards, these workers would be organised into teams and sent to the agent in charge of receiving the conscripted workers or local administrators.[61] In other cases, one member from each household in villages was registered by the county government as reserve labour. Their names were numbered in a sequential order in the register of workers. Once the order for labour supply was made, the county government would conscript workers according to the order of names in the register.[62]

It appeared that physical labour and money could both be used as the form of the compulsory labour service. In the case of physical labour, village heads would enlist peasants from villages to fulfil the government quota of compulsory labour. Rich and middle peasants often hired poor peasants to substitute for the compulsory labour service. As a result, poor peasants constituted the majority of peasants drafted for the compulsory labour service. For example, in Shang village of Zhangwu County in Jinzhou Province, wage labourers and tenant peasants accounted for 83 percent of the

[60] Xueshi Xie, "Manshūkoku makki no kyōsei rōdō," trans. Izumi Eda, in *Mantetsu rōdōshi no kenkyū*, eds. Takao Matsumura, Xueshi Xie and Kenji Eda, Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 2002, 78.
[61] This is the case of Qingeng village in Lishu County of Siping Province. See Xie, "Manshūkoku makki no kyōsei rōdō," 79.
[62] This is the case of Liaodian village in Acheng County of Binjiang Province. See Xie, "Manshūkoku makki no kyōsei rōdō," 79.

total number of peasants who were drafted for compulsory service from January to March in 1942.[63] In addition, money could be used to substitute for physical labour. In this form of service, village heads would collect from peasants the amount of money assigned by the government. Peasnats paid the money according to the size of their landholdings. The larger the land was, the larger the amount of money collected.

3. Youth Labour Service

The Japanese authorities targeted youth in Manchuria as an enormous and strategic source of labour for agricultural production, public construction work and military conscription. Towards the end of the 1930s, the Japanese launched compulsory national labour service to command the loyalty and devotion of youth to the state. Youth labour was mobilised broadly for military and civil purposes. Young people served in a wide range of projects including the construction of military facilities and the transport of strategic resources, roads, bridges, and planting of trees.

The idea underlying the youth labour service in Manchuria originated in Nazi Germany's Hitler Youth (*Hitler-Jugend*) and National Labour Service (*Reichsarbeitsdienst*). The concept was adopted by Handa Toshiharu, the head of the Planning Department of the headquarters of the CA. Handa believed that it would be in the interest of the government to utilise the youth of the country to supplement the supply of labour for the construction projects of the state. According to Handa, when conscription was introduced in Manchukuo in 1940, the male adults whose age met the requirement of military service amounted to 300,000; however, only ten percent could be conscripted into military service. For strategic reasons, it would be extremely important to draft the remainder of the youth into labour service through compulsory measures.[64] After his return from an investigation tour in Nazi Germany in 1938, he pushed the Manchukuo government for the establishment of a youth labour service. Handa proposed the establishment of the national labour service to Itagaki Seishirō and Tōjō Hideki.[65]

The Kwantung Army approved Handa's proposal of youth labour service by introducing the National Labour Service Law (*kokumin kinrō hōkōhō*) in 1942. This law took effect on 1 January 1943, making the youth labour service compulsory. After the enforcement of the law, a youth corps was organised; male adults aged between twenty-

[63] Xie, "Manshūkoku makki no kyōsei rōdō," 79.
[64] Xie, "Manshūkoku makki no kyōsei rōdō," 84.
[65] Xie, "Manshūkoku makki no kyōsei rōdō," 83-4;

one and twenty-three were legally obliged to serve in the corps for a term of twelve months. They were involved in construction projects for national defence, railways and roads, flood control and tree planting, land improvement, agricultural and industrial production, and disaster relief.[66] This law was amended in March 1945 to extend the age range from 21-23 years to 21-30 years.[67]

The National Labour Service Corps (*kokumin kinrō hōkōtai*) was divided into general corps (*ippantai*) and special skills corps (*tokugitai*). The general corps was composed of battalions (*daitai*), companies (*chūtai*), platoons (*shōtai*) and squads (*buntai*). A company was the basic unit of organisation. A company consisted of five platoons, and a platoon consisted of two squads. The basic membership of a company was three hundred, and the basic membership of a company was twenty. The special corps was composed of battalions and companies.[68]

The mobilisation for youth labour intensified towards the end of Japanese rule in Manchukuo. The number of youths mobilised compulsorily into the national labour service increased rapidly from 1943 to 1944. In 1943, the goal was set to mobilise 116,000 youths for labour service and the number achieved was 80,000. In 1944, the number achieved was 250,000.[69]

Conclusion

The Japanese made no drastic change in the composition of the labour force of Manchuria. The labour force was still concentrated in the agricultural sector of Manchuria. The labour relations in the agricultural sector were centred on wage labour. Wage labourers were mainly landless labourers who engaged temporarily in agriculture. Rapid industrialisation of the economy of Manchukuo facilitated the mobility of labour from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. The labour relations in the industrial sector were characterised by harsh working conditions and high turnover rates.

The Japanese authorities increasingly intervened in labour recruitment and management. Initially the Japanese authorities relied on the *batou* system to recruit and manage the labour force in Manchuria. This system was effective in delivering large

[66] This is taken from Article Four and Ten in the National Labour Service Law. See Isao Watanabe, "Kokumin kinrō hōkōsei to kyōwa undō," *Kyōwa undō*, vol. 5, no. 8, August 1943, 36-7.
[67] Xie, "Manshūkoku makki no kyōsei rōdō," 86.
[68] This is taken from Article Two, Three and Four of the Ordinance on the National Labour Service Corps. See Watanabe, "Kokumin kinrō hōkōsei to kyōwa undō," 38.
[69] Xueshi Xie, "Manshūkoku makki no kyōsei rōdō," 78 and 86; Toshiharu Handa, "Kokumin kinrō hōkōsei jisshi no genjō ni tsuite," *Kyōwa undō*, vol. 5, no. 8, August 1943, 8.

numbers of workers to the enterprises for limited and flexible time periods. As the Japanese labour control policy developed into a more centralised system, the direct labour management by the *batou* system conflicted with the Japanese efforts to rationalise labour arrangement. Towards the end of Japanese rule in Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities took the initiative of managing labour, but their efforts were only made on a limited scale.

The Japanese labour policy was a short-term strategy that served a temporary purpose. It was largely shaped by the Japanese struggle with labour demand and supply in Manchuria. From 1932 until 1937, the Japanese labour policy developed from the Japanese concerns of maintaining internal security. After the Mukden Incident, the Japanese authorities restricted the Chinese immigration to Manchuria as a complement to promoting Japanese immigration. This policy interrupted the population mobility from North China to Manchuria. When this policy came into conflict with the increasing demand for labour under the Five-Year Plan in 1937, the Japanese authorities pursued an aggressive labour policy that involved direct state intervention in labour relations. After 1940, the Japanese authorities reduced their dependency on North China for labour supply and turned to Manchuria. In the meantime, the Japanese authorities implemented coercive and compulsory measures to conscript labour.

The efficacy of the Japanese labour policy in Manchukuo was reflected more in the industrial sector and less in the agricultural sector. This is evident in the number of workers conscripted into the factories and mines of Manchuria. In contrast to the effect of labour policy in the industrial sector, the power of Japanese labour regulation penetrated only limitedly into rural areas. The effect of Japanese labour policy in rural Manchukuo is evident in the increase of wage labour in the structure of labour relations in rural Manchukuo. The increase was facilitated by the Japanese employment of Chinese labour on a regular basis and on a large scale in Japanese villages. The employment of wage labour, however, was necessitated by the Japanese immigration policy. Thus, the position of wage labour in the labour relations in rural Manchukuo served only as an indirect outcome of the Japanese labour policy in Manchukuo.

Conclusion

The Japanese creation of Manchukuo in the face of difficulties and resistance was an enormous task. The Japanese authorities made enormous investment in the suppression and pacification of local subjects, as well as in the construction of political and economic structures for the consolidation of the regime. This study has explored the attempts undertaken by the Japanese authorities to reshape the social structures of Manchukuo between 1932 and 1945. This study has also examined the structure of Japanese power in rural Manchukuo. By drawing mainly on primary and secondary sources in Chinese, English, and Japanese, this study investigates the nature, motive and logic of Japanese strategies and policies in rural Manchukuo. This study has shown that the Japanese rule took subtle and complex forms of control in Manchukuo. Set in the discourse of Japanese imperialism, this study seeks to answer the following questions: how were the control mechanisms shaped into vehicles for the empire building of Manchukuo? What did the Japanese authorities actually achieve in their rule over the rural society? What was the strength, limitations and logic of the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo?

This study treats the Japanese authorities as heterogeneous forces exercising their will on Manchurian society. Multiple actors served as the agents of Japanese imperialism for the rural control of Manchuria. The main actor was the Kwantung Army. It manipulated the political and economic management of the Manchukuo state and eliminated competition from other Japanese agents. The fundamental role of the Kwantung Army in the political and economic control of rural Manchukuo lay in its authority to reshape the social and economic structures of rural areas. Aside from the Kwantung Army, other Japanese agents including the Japanese government and Japanese enterprises also played a part in the rural control of Manchuria. These agents, however, carried out policies that were in line with the intent of the Kwantung Army and were subject to supervision by the Kwantung Army.

This study does not treat the Japanese immigrants who settled in Manchuria as the agents of Japanese imperialism. Admittedly, the Japanese immigrants received privileges in Manchukuo. The Japanese immigrants not only had easier access to employment opportunities and land reclamation, but also were excluded from the institutional surveillance that the Japanese authorities exercised over the local subjects in rural Manchukuo. They also brought about structural change in labour relations in rural areas. However, the Japanese immigrants came to Manchuria only as part of the

scheme of Japanese imperialist expansion and they were subject to the rule of the Japanese authorities. In this sense, they were not involved directly in ruling local subjects and thus only played a minor role in the Japanese venture in Manchukuo.

Although Japanese imperialism established its sphere of influence in Manchuria on the eve of the Mukden Incident in 1931, the Japanese influence in rural Manchuria was very limited. During this time, the SMRC acted as the agent of Japanese imperialism and conducted extensive commercial activity in the southern part of Manchuria. Although Japanese imperialism was involved in the commercialisation of soybeans produced in rural Manchuria, the Japanese interests focused principally on the industrial sector and the Japanese power exerted limited impact on the rural society of Manchuria. Rural Manchuria remained an agrarian economy where kind rather than cash was the currency of commercial activity.

In the Manchukuo period, rural areas grew increasingly important for the Japanese imperialistic endeavours. The Japanese authorities perceived rural areas as a major source of raw materials for the economic development of the Japanese empire. The Japanese authorities engaged actively in the formation of Japanese capital and the establishment of agrarian monopoly in the agricultural sector in order to achieve a monopolistic position in the Manchurian economy.

Japan created Manchukuo as a client state. Although the Manchukuo state was nominally sovereign, its government was subject to Japanese military occupation and its policy was subject to Japanese instruction. The administrative structure of the Manchukuo government was a bureaucratic-military establishment under the control of the Kwantung Army. At the central level, the Kwantung Army established an administrative structure that was capable of overseeing the civil and military affairs of Manchukuo. As a system of political tutelage, it reflected their plans in the political management of Manchukuo. Japanese officials dominated the bureaucracy and left little space to Chinese officials for improvisation. At the local level, the Kwantung Army introduced the illusionary practices of local self-government into the rural administration. The administrative structure created a sense of legitimacy of government that tied local subjects together into the organisational structures of the state.

Japan created Manchukuo by force and violence, but it aimed to build an enduring social and economic basis in the new state rather than mere military might. Shortly after the founding of Manchukuo, the Japanese authorities worked to establish a new social order by reshaping the social, economic and political structures of the state.

The logic of Japanese rule followed a pattern of combining physical force, administrative construction and economic exploitation.

The use of force was prevalent in the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo. The physical force employed by the Japanese authorities took the forms of counterinsurgency operations, residential relocation of civilians and compulsory labour service. This form of control involved direct efforts to bring people living outside state authority under state control and encompassed the construction of institutions and capacities that enabled those efforts. Civilians were pressed into service for the state, taxes were forcibly extracted from agricultural classes, and local rulers were dismounted over a superior structure of authority.

Force alone was insufficient to maintain effective control over a large indigenous population in Manchuria. As the state hegemony settled down, the Japanese authorities reinforced their position through the abrogation of extraterritoriality and an administrative reform. These efforts consolidated the Japanese capacity to intervene directly in the political control of Manchukuo and enhanced the administrative efficiency of central and local governance.

Japanese rule penetrated deeply into the agricultural sector in economic terms. The Japanese rural control provided a basis for commercial and industrial activities in Manchukuo. The Japanese rural control over agriculture rationalised capital formation, agrarian production and distribution, and facilitated agricultural commercialisation. Through the reogranisation of agrarian finance, the Japanese authorities eliminated the native capital and introduced Japanese capital into the agricultural sector. The Japanese authorities established control institutions to supervise the production and distribution of agricultural products. In this process, the Japanese authorities actively employed measures of coercion and compulsion to maximise the effect of control. In consequence, the Japanese agrarian control in Manchuria facilitated a transition from uncontrolled to controlled market mechanisms, and then to direct requisition and quotas in the agricultural sector. Agrarian control enhanced the state capacity of control over the rural economy of Manchukuo.

Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was characterised by the establishment and consolidation of Japanese power. The Japanese authorities built up state apparatus for administrative control, political mobilisation and economic exploitation. The Japanese control relied on a dynamic of shifting strategies of coercion, pacification and construction. The Japanese strategy of regime consolidation strengthened the coercive capacities of the state in political and economic realms.

Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was pragmatic. The Japanese authorities showed only lukewarm interest in the welfare of local subjects, but considerable interest in political domination and economic exploitation that would bring them tangible benefits. The extraction of tax and agrarian resources from rural areas revealed the pragmatism of the Japanese rule. Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was also highly repressive. The Japanese authorities frequently resorted to force to sustain their rule. Repression took physical and institutional forms that included military suppression of resistance and sophisticated forms of social surveillance. Japanese rule put local subjects into service for the state through tax contribution, agrarian product delivery and compulsory labour service. Although Japanese rule was repressive, we should not view it simply as plunder, but rather as exploitation through development. The Japanese authorities made continuous efforts to construct rural administrative structures and to rationalise agrarian production and distribution. These efforts facilitated social development and economic growth in the rural society. It is necessary to point out, however, that although the Japanese authorities were not averse to the social development and economic growth of rural Manchukuo, their ultimate goal was to advance Japanese imperialistic interests, rather than to benefit the local subjects in the long run.

The Japanese authorities were remarkably successful in their rule over Manchukuo. The strength of Japanese rule lay in their competence in building state apparatus and social structures. These efforts involved eliminating local resistance, segregating civilians from insurgents, establishing a tax system to generate government revenue, utilising rural defence mechanisms, controlling the rural market, facilitating the formation of commercial capital and drafting labour for the construction of the economy. The Japanese rule extended power from the central government down to the bottom of rural society and laid the foundation for political and economic integration. Eventually, the Japanese rule transformed rural Manchukuo into structures that served the interests of Japanese imperialism, and facilitated the political stability and economic development of Manchurian society.

The Japanese authorities promoted changes in the rural society of Manchukuo, but within specific limits. The changes were confined to the area of rural administration and economic restructuring, rather than deeper levels of social spheres such as local traditions and customs. The limit of the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo appears to be their inability to bring about drastic change in the land ownership system of rural Manchukuo. Although the Japanese power facilitated the increase of wage labourers in

the rural labour force, the landownership system of rural Manchukuo remained largely untouched. The Japanese reluctance to change the class structure in rural society can perhaps be explained by the fact that they saw it useful to keep the class structure intact in order to extract agricultural resources and to keep the countryside stable. The limit of Japanese rule is also evident in the effectiveness of labour control. The Japanese authorities were only able to control a small proportion of the labour force in Manchukuo. Japanese labour control did not extend to the majority of the rural population. In general, the Japanese authorities lacked both experience and time to create ruling mechanisms in rural areas that could suit the social, political and economic conditions of rural areas. This defect resulted in the implementation of inconsistent policies and practices in the actual control.

This study has demonstrated that the Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was characterised by an absence of attention to the welfare of local subjects. The attitude of Japanese authorities towards local subjects was generally arbitrary and hostile. They perceived local subjects as suspect and dangerous. They adopted discriminatory policies that treated local subjects as inferior and developed sophisticated forms of social surveillance to monitor them. Japanese rule harmed the physical wellbeing of local subjects. The Japanese rule forced local subjects to relocate to hamlets constructed by the government. The Japanese rule established repressive institutions, laws and orders to discipline local subjects. The Japanese rule forced local subjects to contribute to the state economy by paying tax, delivering agrarian products and providing labour services.

The Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo was a historical process continuously negotiated, contested, re-created, and altered by challenges from within and without. In the process of rural control, control mechanisms were reorganised, either enhanced or reduced, in their structure and function. Some were not improvised on the spot, but drew upon older styles of social control in the Chinese and Japanese tradition. These strategies not only constructed Japanese power in the centre of rural life, but also actively sought to encourage the use of local initiatives and structures. The Japanese strategies and policies of control over rural Manchukuo constituted a form of inventing tradition.

This study has it has limitations. In order to generate a comprehensive understanding of Japanese strategies and logic in Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo, there is a need for more case studies to allow further assessment of rural control under Japanese imperialism in Manchukuo. In addition, there is also a need to examine the long-term consequences of the Japanese policy for political and social developments in

Manchuria after 1945. This is because the impact of Japanese rule over rural Manchukuo did not end immediately with the collapse of the Manchukuo regime. Rather, Japanese rule left in the region a significant legacy that exerted a profound impact on the subsequent attempts of state building by the Communists in Manchuria.

GLOSSARY

Notes:

1. The sources are identified in the languages of their origins. The pinyin system is used to transliterate Chinese terms, the Hepburn system is used to transliterate Japanese terms, and the McCune–Reischauer system is used to transliterate Korean terms. Exceptions are made for terms that are accepted as English terms such as Kuomintang, Manchukuo and Mukden.
2. Macrons are included on long Japanese vowels. Macrons are omitted in the Japanese place names that are commonly encountered in English such as Tokyo. Macrons are not omitted in cases in which place names are part of publishers' names that appear in footnotes and bibliography.
3. Where relevant, the Chinese terms are followed by Japanese pronunciation and the Japanese terms are followed by Chinese pronunciation. Korean terms are followed by Japanese pronunciation.
4. Chinese and Korean terms are given in the traditional Chinese characters. Japanese terms are given in modern Japanese characters.
5. Where terms share the same transliteration but different characters, the page number of the term that appears less frequently in the text is given.

Acheng 阿城

Aichi 愛知

Andong 安東

Ang'angxi 昂昂溪

Anshan 鞍山

Antu 安圖

anzen nōson 安全農村

banshichu 办事处

bao 保

bao 堡 (p.21)

baojia guiyue biaozhun 保甲規約標準

baojia 保甲

batou 把頭

Beian 北安

Beihamatang 北蛤蟆塘

Beizhen 北鎮

Benxi 本溪

bianye yinhang 邊業銀行

Binjiang 濱江

buntai 分隊 fendui

buraku 部落

buzai dizhu 不在地主

Changchun 長春

Changrenjiang 長仁江

Changxingdong 長興洞

chianbu 治安部 zhianbu

chihō jichi 地方自治

chō 町

chōbu 町歩

Chōsen ginkō 朝鮮銀行

Chōsen sōtokufu 朝鮮総督府

chōson 町村

Chosŏn inminhoe 朝鮮人民會 Chōsen jinminkai

chungeng daikuan 春耕貸款

Chunxingcun 春興村

chūō chian ijikai 中央治安維持会 zhongyang zhian weichihui

chūōkai 中央会

chūtai 中隊 zhongdui

cun 村

dabatou 大把頭

Dadaosanjiazi 大道三家子

dadong gongsi 大東公司

daitai 大隊 dadui

dajiecun zhuyi 大街村主義

Dalian 大連 Dairen

Daomugou 倒木溝

Dong’an 東安

dongbei kangri lianjun 東北抗日聯軍

dongbei renmin gemingjun 東北人民革命軍

dongbeijun 東北軍

Dongbiandao 東邊道

dongsansheng guangshanghao 東三省官商號

fen 分

Fengitan 奉天

Fengtiansheng ge xianquzhi shixing guize 奉天省各縣區制試行規則

Fengyandong 鳳岩洞

Fugui 富貴

Fushun meikuang 撫順煤礦

Fushun 撫順

futuanzhang 副團長

futuanzong 副團総

gaikoku rōdōsha torishimari kisoku 外国労働者取締規則

gaimushō 外務省

Gongzhuling 公主嶺

guanshang liangzhan 官商糧栈

Haicheng 海城

Hailar 海拉爾

Handa Toshiharu 半田敏治

Harbin 哈爾濱

He Zonglin 何宗林

Hebei 河北

Hedong 河東

Heihe 黑河

Heilongjiang guanshang yinhao 黑龍江官商銀號

Heilongjiang 黑龍江

Helong 和龍

Hoshino Naoki 星野直樹

Huanren 桓仁

Hulan 呼蘭

Hunchun 琿春

hyōgiin 評議員 pingyiyuan

inin jimu 委任事務

ippantai 一般隊 yibandui

Ishigaki Teiichi 石垣貞一

Ishihara Kanji 石原莞爾

Itagaki Seishirō 板垣征四郎

jia 甲

Jiandao 間島 Kantō

jiaoyi shichang 交易市场

jichi shidōbu 自治指導部

jie 街

jiecun 街村

jiecun yucheng yaogang 街村育成要綱

jiecun zhidu queli jiben yaogang 街村制度確立基本要綱

jiecun ziweifa 街村自衛法

jiezhi cunzhi shixing guize 街制村制施行規則

jikkō gassakusha 実行合作社 shixing hezuoshe

Jilin 吉林

Jilinsheng guanshang yinqianhao 吉林省官商銀錢號

Jinfosi 金佛寺

jingying dizhu 經營地主

Jinzhou 錦州

Jinzhou 金州 (p.69)

jitsugyōbu 実業部 shiyebu

Jiutai 九臺

jōmukai 常務会 changwuhui

jūmin 住民

Kailu 開魯

kaitaku sōkyoku 開拓総局

kanji 監事 jianshi

kantōchō 関東庁

keimushi 警务司 jingwusi

keizaibu 経済部 jingjibu

ken 間

Keshan 克山

kinyū gassakusha 金融合作社 jinrong hezuoshe

koaza 小字

kokka sōdōinhō 国家総動員法

kokumin kinrō hōkōhō 国民勤労奉公法

kokumin kinrō hōkōtai 国民勤労奉公隊

kokumin rinpo soshiki 国民隣保組織

kokumuin 国務院 guowuyuan

kōmin 公民

konho shōken 混保証券

kōnō gassakusha 興農合作社 xingnong hezuoshe

Kōnō 興農

kōnōbu 興農部

Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿

kōnōkai 興農会

koyū jimu 固有事務

ku 区

Kuomintang 國民黨 Guomindang

kyōgikai 協議会 xieyihui

Kyoto 京都

Kyōwa undō 協和運動

kyōwakai 協和会 xiehehui

kyōwatō 協和党 xiehedang

li 里

liangzhan 糧棧 ryōsan

lianzuo 連坐

Liaodian 料甸

Liaoning 遼寧

Liaoyang 遼陽

Linxi 林西

Lishu 梨樹

Liuhe 柳河

Longjiang 龍江

Longxingdong 龍興洞

Longyanping 龍岩坪

Luotuohezi 駱駝河子

Lüshun 旅順

Ma Zhanshan 馬佔山

Manchukuo 滿洲國 Manzhouguo

Manmō jiyūkoku setsuritsuan taikō 満蒙自由国設立案大綱

Manmō kyōwakoku tōchi taikōan 満蒙共和国統治大綱案

Manshū chūō ginkō 満州中央銀行

Manshū doboku kenchiku kyōkai 満州土木建築協会

Manshū hyōron 満洲評論

Manshū keizai nenpō 満洲経済年報

Manshū kyōsanhi no kenkyū 満洲共産匪の研究

Manshū nenkan 満洲年鑑

Manshū nōsan kōsha 満州農産公社

Manshū rōkō kyōkai 満州労工協会

Manshū ryōkoku kaisha 満洲糧穀会社

Manshū seifun rengōkai 満洲製粉連合会

Manshū seinen renmei 満州青年聯盟

Manshū shingyō ginkō 満洲興業銀行

Manshū takushoku kabushikigaisha 満州拓殖株式会社

Manshū takushoku kōsha 満州拓殖公社

Manshū tokusan senkan kōsha 満洲特産専管公社

Manshūkoku gunseibu gunji chōsabu 満洲国軍政部軍事調査部

Manshūkoku shidō hōshin yōkō 満洲国指導方針要綱

Manshūkokugun 満州国軍 Manzhouguojun

Mantetsu chōsa geppō 満鉄調査月報

Manzhouguo zhengfu gongbao 滿洲國政府公報

Manzhouli 滿洲里

Maohao 茂好

Matsuki Tamotsu 松木侠

meiyoshoku 名誉職

minami Manshū tetsudo kabushikigaisha 南満州鉄道株式会社

Minseibu chōsa geppō 民政部調査月報

minseibu 民生部 minshengbu

minseibu 民政部 minzhengbu

minseichō 民政庁 minzhengting

minzoku kyōwa 民族協和 minzu xiehe

Mitsubishi shōji 三菱商事

Mitsui bussan 三井物産

Mitsui Mitsubishi ginkō 三井三菱銀行

Mitsuya Miyamatsu 三矢宮松

Mizuho 瑞穂

mu 畝

Mudanchuan 牡丹川

Mudanjiang 牡丹江

mura 村

Nagao Kichigorō 長尾吉五郎

naimen shidō 内面指導

Naimu shiryō geppō 内務資料月報

naimushō 内務省

Nakamura Shintarō 中村震太郎

Nanhamatang 南蛤蟆塘

Nanhuangdi 南荒地

Nanking 南京 Nanjing

Nara 奈良

Niigata 新潟

nin’i kumiai 任意組合

Niuxinshan 牛心山

nōji gassakusha 農事合作社 nongshi hezuoshe

nongmugye 農務稧 nōmukei

ōaza 大字

Okamoto Goichi 岡本吾市

Osaka 大阪

pai 牌

pangneiqing 耪内青

pangqing 耪青

pangwaiqing 耪外青

Pulandian 普蘭店

qian 銭

Qingeng 勤耕

qingmiaohui 青苗會

Qingshanli 青山裏

Qiqihar 齊齊哈爾

qu 區

qucun 區村制

Rehe 熱河

rengō kyōgikai 聯合協議会 lianhe xieyihui

rengōkai 連合会 lianhehui

riji 理事 lishi

rikugunshō 陸軍省

rōdō tōsei iinkai 労働統制委員会

rōdō tōseihō 労働統制法

rōdōsha kinkyū boshū yōkō 労働者緊急募集要綱

rōdōsha kinkyū shūrō kisoku 労働者緊急就労規則

rōmu iinkai 労務委員会

rōmu shinkokkai 労務興国会

rōmu shintaisei 労務新体制

ryōsan kumiai 糧桟組合

sakizeni 先銭

sangyōbu 産業部 chanyebu

Sanjiang 三江

Sanyuanpu 三源埔

Senbu geppō 宣撫月報

shachō 社長 shezhang

shaku 尺

Shandong 山東

Shang 赏

Shangmingyuegou 上明月溝

Shenyang 瀋陽

shigikai 諮議会 ziyihui

shihōka 司法科 sifake

Shimennei 石門内

Shitouhezi 石頭河子

shōkin ginkō 正金銀行

shōryū ginkō 正隆銀行

shōtai 小隊 xiaodui

Shuangcheng 雙城

shūdan buraku 集団部落

shuijuanju 稅捐局

shukka shōreikin 出荷奨励金

shusshi kumiai 出資組合

Siping 四平

sōmuchō 総務庁 zongwuting

Suihua 綏化

Tachibana Shiraki 橘樸

Taipinggou 太平溝

Taiyangcun 太陽村

Takayama Kazumi 高山一三

takumushō 拓務省

takuseishi 拓政司

Taonan 洮南

Tazigou 塔子溝

Tianjin 天津

Tieling 鉄嶺

Tōa kangyō kabushikigaisha 東亜勧業株式会社

Tōjō Hideki 東条英機

tokugitai 特技隊 tejidui

tokuyaku shūbainin 特約収買人

tonarigumi 隣組

Tonghua 通化

Tongliao 通遼

Tōyō takushoku kabushikigaisha 東洋拓殖株式会社

tsubo 坪

tuanzhang 團長

tuanzong 團総

tun 屯

Tushanzi 土山子

Wanbaoshan shijian 万寶山事件

Wang Ming 王明

Wang Yongjiang 王永江

Wangqing 汪清

Wolonghu 臥龍湖

Wuzhan 五站

xiang 响

Xiaobaicaogou 小百草溝

xiaobatou 小把頭

Xilinhe 細鱗河

Xing’an 興安

xingzhengcun 行政村

Xinjing 新京 Shinkyō

Xuedaishan 雪帶山

yakuin 役員

Yanji 延吉

yen 円

yiding qucunzhi danxing zhangcheng 議定區村制單行章程

Yingkou 營口

Yonemitsu Sakuta 米光作太

Yongji 永吉

Yu Zhen 於珍

yuan 圓

Yuan 院 In (p.99)

zaiseibu 財政部 caizhengbu

zanxing baojiafa shixing guize 暫行保甲法施行規則

zanxing baojiafa shixing xinde 暫行保甲法施行心得

zanxing baojiafa 暫行保甲法

Zhang Xueliang 張學良

Zhang Zuolin 張作霖

Zhangwu 彰武

Zhongping 仲坪

Zhongpingdong 仲坪洞

zhuang 莊

Zhuanjiaolou 轉角樓

Zhuhe 珠河

zirancun 自然村

ziweituan 自衛團

zuoye batou 作業把頭

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