

**GUANGZHOU, 1800-1925:
THE URBAN EVOLUTION OF
A CHINESE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL**

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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
Declaration

I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due acknowledgment is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualification.



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
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In the course of writing this thesis, I was heavily bothered by my mother's mental illness. My uncles and aunt, Ms. Lau King Ling, Mr. Lau Yat Hung and Mr. Lau Yat Tung, stood by me and gave me support. To them I am thankful.



Abstract of thesis entitled

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submitted by


Yeung Wing Yu, Hans

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Guangzhou played a unique role in modern Chinese history. It fostered transformation within the disintegrating Manchu empire (such as the Taiping Rebellion, the drastic reform program proposed by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and Sun Yatsen's revolutionary campaign), and served as a center of a series of political campaigns in the Republican era, such as the Constitution-Protection Campaign and the Nationalist Revolution in the 1910s and 1920s, and the formation of the Guangzhou Nationalist Government in 1931 in opposition to Jiang Jieshi's Nanjing Government.


Yet, our understanding of the city is based on its involvement in some larger history, but not the urban evolution of the city itself. This thesis is an empirical study of Guangzhou's urban evolution in the modern era. It explores the extent to which changes in the city's urban administration and urban construction and planning modernized Guangzhou. The significance and applicability of Guangzhou's urban experience as a model for other cities in China is also examined.

This study points out that the day-to-day administration of the city and the provision of social welfare in the late Qing and the early Republican period, were primarily due to the efforts of the street associations, and merchants and gentry in the form of city-wide or street-based charitable organizations. The expansion of the scope of functions and strength of these organizations was due to the indifference of the



local government towards urban affairs. Different from their counterparts in other cities, such as those in Shanghai who established the Shanghai City Council in 1905, the Guangzhou elites never thought of forming a true municipal institution. It was finally the local government which became an agent of modernization and initiated the establishment of a municipality in Guangzhou.

This study argues that this pattern of urban evolution in Guangzhou was closely related to the city's long history as an administrative center and the enhancement of the political status of Guangzhou in the first two decades of the Republican era. Marked by the construction of the Bund by Zhang Zhidong in 1888, the local government became actively involved in urban administration and construction. The local bureaucrats were legitimate force in these activities because Guangzhou was traditionally a city of *yamens*. However, the two major municipal institutions of Guangzhou, that is, the Guangzhou Municipal Office and the Guangzhou Municipality, were established in a period in which the provincial capital functioned as a *de facto* national capital counterbalancing the “warlord” regime at Beijing. It was the political need of “model creation” and “national capital construction” by the “southern regime” which pushed of the final success for the city’s urban reform and evolution.



*To my deceased adoptive parents,
Li Kut Man and Mak Ying*






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
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
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Conversion Tables of Currencies and Measures

Currencies

1 tael 兩 = 10 *qian* 錢 = 10 *fen* 分 = US \$1.63

Measures

1 *chi* 尺 = 1 Chinese foot or cubit = 14.1 inches

1 *zhang* �丈 = 10 *chi* = 3 1/3 meters




A Note on Romanization

Transliteration of Chinese names generally follows the *pinyin* system in this thesis, except for some names which are long familiar in the West. Therefore, Sun Yixian, Sun Ke, Hu Shi, and Beijing University will appear as Sun Yatsen, Sun Fo, Hu Shih, and Peking University respectively in this thesis. Romanization in Cantonese pronunciation is adopted for the island “Henan” opposite to Guangzhou proper, known as “Honam” in this thesis, as the adoption of “Henan” will cause confusion with the Henan Province.



Abbreviations

<i>BGHK</i>	<i>Guangzhou shi shizheng baogao huikan (1922-1924)</i>
<i>GDGB</i>	<i>Guangdong gongbao</i>
<i>GDQB</i>	<i>Guangdong qun bao</i>
<i>GZMGRB</i>	<i>Guangzhou minguo ribao</i>
<i>GZSSZGB</i>	<i>Guangzhou shi shizheng gongbao</i>
<i>HZRB</i>	<i>Huazi ribao</i>
<i>JZFGB</i>	<i>Junzhengfu gongbao</i>
<i>LHJ</i>	<i>Luhaijun dayuanshuai dabenying gongbao</i>
<i>SB</i>	<i>Shen bao</i>
<i>SZGY</i>	<i>Guangzhou shi shizheng gaiyao</i> (compiled by Guangzhou shi shizhengting zongwu ke bianji gu)
<i>XHRB</i>	<i>Xunhuan ribao</i>
<i>ZGRB</i>	<i>Zhongguo ribao</i>



Chapter One


Introduction

Guangzhou's significance as an empirical study of urban evolution

Guangzhou, played a unique role in modern Chinese history. Compared to other treaty ports such as Shanghai and Hankou which became pre-eminent after the coming of the West, Guangzhou was already functionary as the largest port in Asia during the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.).¹ It was the first city where a Maritime Trade Commissioner (*shibo shi*) was assigned to regulate overseas commerce and collect customs duties. From 1757 to the conclusion of the First Opium War in 1842, Guangzhou was the only port officially open to foreign trade. Guangzhou's significance in this era was reflected by the fact that this monopolistic trade was labeled the “Canton (Guangzhou) system of trade”.

Commissioner Lin Zexu's destruction of opium at Humen near Guangzhou, indirectly caused the beginning of the modern history of China, and its opening to the outside world. At the conclusion of the First Anglo-Chinese War (the “Opium War”) and the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, five ports were open to foreign trade of which Guangzhou was one. Guangzhou's long history of Sino-foreign interaction thus continued, though on a new basis, and changed the conditions of trade. Other areas of Sino-foreign interaction helped foster further transformations within the disintegrating Manchu empire. At mid-century the decade long Taiping Rebellion led by Hong Xiuquan (who was influenced by elements of Christianity), Kang Youwei's and Liang Qichao's drastic reform program of 1898 to save the monarchy, and Sun Yatsen's devotion to

¹ See Yang Wanxiu, *et al*, *Guangzhou waimao shi* (vol.1), pp.42-70.




revolution and the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty were all related to Guangzhou in one way or another. After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, Guangzhou was the center of a series of political campaigns, such as the Constitution-Protection Campaign and the Nationalist Revolution in the 1910s and 1920s, and the formation of the Guangzhou Nationalist Government in 1931 in opposition to Jiang Jieshi's Nanjing Government.

Guangzhou was not simply an ordinary provincial capital and an administrative center where the governments of various levels were seated, it was also a center of foreign trade, a seedbed of political conflicts at the provincial and local levels, and a stronghold of opposition to the central government. Yet, our understanding of the city is usually based on its involvement in some larger history, but not the urban evolution of the city itself.² In other words, we know the various political roles played by Guangzhou at different times, but know little about the evolution of the city *per se*.

By the late nineteenth century, Guangzhou had grown into be a large city with a population of about one million, according to some foreign accounts.³ Similar to other “treaty ports”, Guangzhou underwent substantial physical transformation in the modern era, with the construction of new roads and communications, the establishment of modern utilities and other infrastructure, like public health and pure water supplies, basic to urban life. Local Chinese in Guangzhou recognized the importance of transforming its urban landscape through their interaction with the Westerners in the city, and through

² For example, see Ming K. Chan, “A Turning Point in the Modern Chinese Revolution: The Historical Significance of the Canton Decade, 1917-27”, in Gail Hershatter, Emily Honig, Jonathan N. Lipman and Randall Stross (ed.), *Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain*, pp.224-41; Michael Tsang-Woon Tsin, *The Cradle of Revolution: Politics and Society in Canton, 1900-1927*.

³ According to some foreign estimation, Guangzhou already had a population of “fifteen hundred thousand” on the eve of the First Opium War. The Customs authorities estimated that the figure increased to three million in the first decade of this century. See David Abeel, *Journal of a Residence in China and the Neighbouring Countries*, p.47; Arnold Wright and H.A. Cartwright, *Twen-*



their appreciation of construction efforts in other Chinese cities, notably Shanghai.⁴ In these ways, Guangzhou showed no obvious difference from other “treaty ports” which served as “centers of change” to the traditional order, as Rhoads Murphey described it, under the impact of the West.⁵

There are ample studies of other treaty ports such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou, and so on, yet the urban evolution of Guangzhou has received little attention.⁶ Guangzhou’s history and development was also unique in many aspects compared to other treaty ports. Firstly, Guangzhou had a long history as an administrative walled city. Records show that Panyu, the ancient name of Guangzhou, was walled as early as the Qin dynasty in the second century B.C.. From then on Guangzhou functioned as an administrative center of southernmost China, and was the provincial capital of Guangdong from the Yuan dynasty (1260-1368 A.D.) onwards. It even served as the capital city of three short-lived regimes with their power base in Guangdong.⁷ Shanghai only functioned as a walled county level town since the sixteenth century, and Hankou was not an administrative city at all.

Guangzhou’s high administrative status was further substantiated by its role in foreign trade and its experience in dealing with foreigners. As mentioned, Guangzhou was an international port in the Tang dynasty, and for almost a century before the signing


⁴ *Tieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai and Other Treaty Ports of China*, p.784.

⁵ MacPherson, Kerrie L., *A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843-1893*.

⁶ Rhoads Murphey, “The City as a Center of Change: Western Europe and China”, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 44 (1954), p.360.

⁷ For example, see David Buck, *Urban Change in China: Politics and Development in Tsinan, Shantung, 1890-1949*; Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937*; Ying-hwa Chang, *The Internal Structure of Chinese Cities, 1920s and 1930s: An Ecological Approach*; Linda Cooke Johnson (ed.), *Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China*; William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889*.

⁷ These regimes included the Nanyue Kingdom (204-111 B.C.), Nanhan Kingdom (917-971 A.D), and the Nanming Regime (November to December, 1646).




of the Treaty of Nanjing, Guangzhou had monopolized all foreign trade. The city was continuously under Western influence more than any other Chinese city. This special experience of Guangzhou definitely produced profound impact on the city's architecture, urban construction and administration, an experience that other treaty ports only encountered after 1842.

Guangzhou experienced a different political development to most Chinese cities. It was a center of opposition in its modern history - to foreigners (such as the city-wide protest in 1847 and 1849), to the central government (such as the Constitution-Protection Campaign and the Nationalist Revolution in the 1910s and 1920s).

As a result, compared to other Chinese cities, the interaction of factors that led to Guangzhou's urban evolution appeared before and after the inauguration of the "treaty port" period. "Though with the phenomenal growth of Shanghai in the past few decades, Canton [Guangzhou] has long lost its premier position in the country, it remains nevertheless the largest city solely administered by Chinese, and is certainly the foremost metropolis in South China."⁸ This "foremost metropolis" underwent a slow process of urban modernization compared to other treaty ports such as Shanghai. Nevertheless, Guangzhou was the pioneer in ending China's condition of "city without city government", and created the first modern municipality in 1921, which later became a model widely followed by other cities in the Nanjing Decade (1928-1937).

Therefore, since the background to Guangzhou's urban transformation in the late Qing and early Republic was substantially different from other treaty ports, this thesis will provide a case study of its urban evolution as a provincial capital.

⁸ Ng Yong-sang, *Guangzhou: City of the Rams*, p.5.



Notes on previous studies

Studies of Guangzhou's urban development in the modern era are mostly descriptive. Edward Bing-Shuey Lee's *Modern Canton*, a classic textbook published in the Republican era, includes useful information illustrating how Guangzhou was transformed from an ancient Chinese city to a modern metropolis.⁹ Li Zonghuang's *Xin Guangdong guancha ji* (An Observation of New Guangdong) and Huang Yanpei's *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi* (The First Anniversary of the Founding of the Guangzhou Municipality) provide detailed information of and occasional criticism on the Guangzhou Municipality formed in 1921, but the content of both of them is confined to the period 1921-22.¹⁰ From the mid-1980s onwards, under the influence of the nationwide compilation of local gazetteers (*xiu zhi*), many studies on Guangzhou have appeared in Chinese journals such as *Yangcheng jingu* (Guangzhou Present and Past) and *Guangdong shi zhi* (Guangdong Gazetteer). These studies focus on local history, are limited in coverage and not substantiated by primary source materials. Even the newly compiled *Guangzhou shi zhi* (Gazetteer of Guangzhou), based on research done in the last decade, is sketchy in discussing the pre-1949 urban evolution of the city.¹¹ A recent monograph, entitled *Guangzhou chengshi fazhan shi* (A History of the Urban Evolution of Guangzhou) discusses the changes in physical layout, transportation, demography, industry and culture of Guangzhou, but it is only a general study. The theme of "modernization" is not clear, and the documentation is far from substantial.¹² From these publications, we get no idea of the administrative patterns or chronological changes of urban Guangzhou in

⁹ Edward Bing-Shuey Lee, *Modern Canton*.

¹⁰ Li Zonghuang, *Xin Guangdong guancha ji* and Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*.

¹¹ The *Guangzhou shi zhi* is a large publication in twenty-one volumes, many of which are still forthcoming. The volume three is on urban construction and planning. See *Guangzhou difangzhi bian-zuan weiyuanhui, Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.3.



the modern era. The city's change from a "medieval society" to a modern one is not depicted in a systematic and analytical way.

As there are no benchmark studies on the urban development of Guangzhou, it is necessary to borrow insights from research on other Chinese cities. Concerning the aspect of urban administration, T'ung-tsu Ch'ü's model of "formal-informal" paradigm is still useful and valid.¹³ Although Guangzhou was a city of *yamens*, the city was administered primarily not by government officials, but by social groups such as gentry and merchants. However, Ch'ü's underestimation of the role of merchants in local administration has been amended by subsequent scholars, notably Marie-Claire Bergère.¹⁴ Edward J.M. Rhoads' article on Guangzhou's merchant associations clearly shows the impact of merchants on the administration of Guangzhou, especially in the field of philanthropy.¹⁵ In describing the growing importance of merchants in providing municipal functions, Rhoads claims that the Guangzhou merchants could achieve some degree of city-wide cooperation through organizing charitable organizations. This conforms to the situation in Hankou as studied by William T. Rowe.¹⁶ This implies that at least some part of urban modernization was based on the activities of the merchant-oriented charitable organizations.

However, Rhoads' arguments were somewhat contradictory. While pointing out that the geographical and social boundary between gentry and merchant was not clear,

¹² See Chen Daiguang, *Guangzhou chengshi fazhan shi*.

¹³ See T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, *Local Government in China under the Ch'ing*, chapter 10.

¹⁴ See, for example, Marie-Claire Bergère, "The Role of the Bourgeoisie", in Mary C. Wright (ed.), *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913*, pp.229-95.

¹⁵ Edward J.M. Rhoads, "Merchant Associations in Canton, 1895-1911", in Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner (ed.), *The Chinese City Between Two Worlds*, pp.97-118.

¹⁶ William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889*, pp.319-20. Rowe asserts that merchant influence in the form of guilds was primarily responsible for the administration of the city, including important functions such as transportation, municipal defense and fire



Rhoads argues that the predominant strength of merchants and most of the merchant-funded charitable organizations were concentrated in Xiguan (Western Suburb), a point we will take up in this thesis. The role of gentry in urban administration was also vague in Rhoads' discussion. This raises questions on the local administration of the city: how was the walled city, where merchants had little power according to Rhoads, administered? If the gentry were the predominant force in the walled city, how did they provide the basic urban services to the residents as their merchant counterparts did in Xiguan? These questions point to the need to remap the geographical pattern of merchant strength, and to examine urban administration at a more grassroots level other than the guilds and merchant-based charitable organizations.


The street organizations were the grassroots-level of urban administration. Street organizations as an urban phenomenon is recognized by some researchers. For example, William T. Rowe fully recognized its function in “neighborly cooperation”, but this does not, according to Rowe, constitute a level of urban administration.¹⁷ Chinese researchers are interested in studying streets and their organizations in historic Chinese cities, particularly the *hutong* of Beijing. However, the study of Beijing *hutong* focuses on its cultural implications rather than its urban functions.¹⁸ Actually, the importance of street organizations in administering the city was observed by some foreigners in the late nineteenth century.¹⁹ Further research into the topic of “street administration” may substantially deepen our understanding of the hierarchy and pattern of urban administration.

fighting.

¹⁷ William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895*, p.82.

¹⁸ For the study of Beijing *hutong*, see Weng Li, *Beijing de hutong*; Zhang Qingchang, *Hutong ji qita: shehui yuyanxue de tansuo*.

¹⁹ For example, see Henry John Gray, *Walks in the City of Canton*, p.16. He observed the importance of “Kaifong”, as street and street associations were called in Cantonese, in cleansing drains.



Rhoads Murphey's changed perception of the role of treaty ports in transforming China brings us to the question of the true nature of the theme of "modernization" in modern China. Murphey revised his former ideas on the prominence of treaty ports as a "center of change", and underscores the effective operation, sometimes strengthening, of the indigenous system in China after the opening of treaty ports.²⁰ Rather than simply implanting the Western experience in China, China's "modernization" was based on its historical development with the incorporation or adaptation or adoption of ideas, systems and values from the Western experience.

The significance of urban planning on the creation of a municipality is explored by Kerrie L. MacPherson in her lucid study of the Greater Shanghai Plan. MacPherson argues that such a plan represented a vision for the future and the creation of Chinese municipal institutions equally as capable as those created by the foreign settlements of Shanghai.²¹ Shanghai's urban planning provides a case for comparison with Guangzhou's urban construction policy after the formation of the Guangzhou Municipality in 1921.

Empirical studies of modern Chinese cities are restricted to a few cities such as Shanghai, Hankou or Tianjin, where foreign influence was rather obvious. These studies are heavily influenced by the paradigm of the "treaty port", namely that quite a number of cities opened after the signing of treaties between China and foreign countries underwent revolutionary changes, primarily as a result of Western impact and example. Guangzhou was also a treaty port, but its slow progress of change and the relatively small influence

²⁰ See Rhoads Murphey, "The City as a Center of Change: Western Europe and China", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 44 (1954), pp.349-62; Rhoads Murphey, *The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China*, chapter 7, 8 and 9.

²¹ Kerrie L. MacPherson, "Designing China's urban future: the Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927-1937", *Planning Perspectives*, 5 (1990), p.48.



of foreigners, compared with other treaty ports notably Shanghai, drew less interest from urban historians. Among the limited researches on Guangzhou, Edward J.M. Rhoads' article on Guangzhou's merchant associations is definitely an important contribution to our knowledge of Guangzhou.²² However, Rhoads has focused on the merchants, but not urban construction and administration in general.

Partially under the stimulation of Western scholarship such as G. William Skinner's research on marketing structure, studies of Chinese cities by Chinese scholars have been fruitful in the past decade.²³ One of the distinguishing features of this scholarship is the longer time span of study (from ancient times to the modern age) and the wider choice of targeted cities. Recently, Chinese scholars have employed the theme of "modernization" in studying Chinese cities. Similar to the Western literature on Chinese cities, studies in China still focus primarily on the treaty ports and eminent cities which became prosperous after they were "forced" open by the Western powers. The choice of four cities, namely Wuhan, Tianjin, Chongqing and Shanghai, for study subsidized by the "China Social Science Fund" (*guojia shehui kexue jijin*) in the late 1980s and early 1990s are good examples.²⁴


Objective and methodology

The first objective of this thesis is to provide empirical knowledge of Guangzhou's urban evolution in the modern era. My functional definition of the term "urban evolu-

²² Edward J.M. Rhoads, "Merchant Associations in Canton, 1895-1911", in Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner, *The Chinese City Between Two Worlds*, pp.101-14.

²³ G.W. Skinner's works were collected and translated into Chinese. See Wang Xu (translated), *Zhongguo fengjian wanqi chengshi yanjiu: Shijianya moshi*.

²⁴ Zhang Zhongli, et al, *Jindai Shanghai chengshi yanjiu*; Wei Yingtao, et al, *Jindai Chongqing chengshi shi*; Pi Mingxiu, et al, *Jindai Wuhan chengshi shi*; Luo Shuwei, et al, *Jindai Tianjin chengshi shi*.




tion” in this thesis is the process of transformation of a city in four aspects, namely physical appearance, urban construction and planning, urban administration and the perception of what urban places are. The thesis will explore the process of urban transformation from the late Qing (ca. 1860) to 1925. This period covers important events and changes, such as the several attempts at urban reform in the late Qing by officials such as Zhang Zhidong, Cen Chunxuan and Zhou Fu, the efforts of transforming the urban landscape in the first two years of the Republican era, the Municipal Office (1918-1920), and the first years of the Guangzhou Municipality (1921-1925). Our discussion ends in the year 1925 because the establishment of a Nationalist Government in Guangzhou in 1925 marked the formal installation of party rule at various levels of local government, including the Guangzhou Municipality.

Ascertaining the extent to which urban evolution made Guangzhou modernized is the second objective of this thesis. To what extent did the establishment of a modern municipality in 1921, and the achievement of construction, mark the appearance of a modern Guangzhou? How did Guangzhou’s experience fit into studies of China’s modernization?


Guangzhou established the first modern municipality of China, and the Guomin-dang (literally “Nationalist Party”, hereafter known as GMD) promoted the Guangzhou model after the Nanjing Government was established in 1927. It is important to explore the significance and applicability of Guangzhou’s urban experience as a model for other cities in China, which is the third objective of this thesis.

To achieve the above objectives, both a chronological and thematic approach will be adopted in organizing and analyzing the information. In order to show how Guangzhou was transformed in the modern era, this thesis will deal with a broader time span. It will include the long history of Guangzhou before the modern era to show the



true nature of Guangzhou's urban transformation. Therefore, urban administration and urban construction and planning are the two major themes for discussion in this thesis. These two important themes represent the two forces shaping the complex phenomena of urban functions and how they interacted with various interest groups. The thesis will analyze the urban administration and its evolution, the urban construction efforts throughout the period, and their relationship with the "modernization" of Guangzhou. As Guangzhou was primarily a "Chinese" city without a strong and large foreign settlement, attention will be paid to the indigenous urban administrative system and its evolution, and its potential in initiating, endorsing and opposing new administrative elements. Besides making use of the "gentry-merchant" paradigm of the indigenous urban administrative system, the author will explore the functioning of a more grassroots-level system, that is, street organizations in Guangzhou. Special attention will be paid to how far this indigenous system contributed to, or worked against, the creation of a city government in the Western sense.

As a provincial administrative city of China, Guangzhou was influenced by various levels of government whose offices were located in the same city. The continuous existence of foreign influence also affected the urban construction and administration of Guangzhou. This thesis will thus consider the ideas and activities of major government officials at various levels in Guangzhou in both the late Qing and early Republican periods (such as Zhang Zhidong, Zhou Fu, Yang Yongtai, Wei Bangping, Chen Jiongming, Sun Fo and Sun Yatsen) and the ways that the urban evolution of Guangzhou was inspired by foreign experience. In other words, the author argues that the urban transformation of Guangzhou in the late Qing and early Republic was both a continuation of and a deviation from the past conditions of Guangzhou, creating a new environment with new elements, both local and foreign.



The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter One is the introduction, which reviews past studies and defines the research methodology and scope of study. Chapter Two presents a general account of urban construction and expansion from ancient times to 1860. The period which Chapter Three covers is the same as Chapter Two, but Chapter Three focuses on the urban administration of Guangzhou. Chapters Four to Seven discuss the urban transformation of Guangzhou. The aim of these four chapters is to trace and explain the process of urban transformation institutionally and administratively, and to delineate the changes to the urban landscape. Chapter Four covers urban planning and infrastructure in the period 1860-1917, followed by a discussion of the city administration in the same period in Chapter Five. Chapter Six examines the experience of the Guangzhou Municipal Office (*Guangzhou shi shizheng gongsuo*) from 1918 to 1920, and Chapter Seven deals with the experience of the Guangzhou Municipality (*Guangzhou shi shizhengting*) from 1921 to 1925. Chapter Eight is the conclusion which will summarize the findings of this thesis.

Notes on source materials

Source materials used in this thesis include both primary and secondary source materials, specifically, the series of accounts published in the *Guangdong wenshi ziliao* (Materials on Guangdong's Culture and History) and *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao* (Materials on Guangzhou's Culture and History) from the 1960s onwards. Quite a number of articles were devoted to the urban construction and development of Guangzhou in the late Qing and early Republic. Also consulted are the documents and recollections written by persons who had taken part in the urban construction process, such as Zhang Zhidong, Cen Chunxuan and Zhou Fu (all Qing local officials), and Sun Fo and Cheng Tiangu, the staff of the later Guangzhou Municipality. However, information recorded



in the *wenshi ziliao* is not always reliable, as the authors' reminiscences are somewhat distorted under the leftist ideology in the 1960s and accuracy is compromised due to the unreliability of personal memory. Historical accounts rendered by notable figures are sometimes exaggerated and self-serving.

This study is based foremost on primary source materials. As the later chapters will show, the creation of a “city government” was primarily the efforts of the local government and the political leaders. Archival materials are a substantial reflection of their perceptions. Government documents published in different periods, such as *Guangdong gongbao*, *Guangzhou shi shizheng gongbao*, *Luhaijun dayuanshuai dabenyi gongbao*, are carefully researched. However, such archival materials are not always readily available. For example, in the case of the Guangzhou Municipal Office, an important benchmark for the municipal modernization of Guangzhou, the Guangzhou City Archives only has three thin files for its three-year activities, which only include several documents on its establishment, some draft papers on its constitution and some petition documents prepared by the residents.²⁵ Many of the archives have been lost and destroyed in the frequent removals after 1949.²⁶ As a result, newspaper reports became a crucial supplement to the missing archival materials, providing a continuous chronological source of information, comprehensive in materials reflecting the socio-economic situations. Contemporary newspapers, primarily the *Huazi ribao*, *Xunhuan ribao*, *Guangdong qun bao*, *Guangzhou minguo ribao* and *Shen bao*, are used systematically. The annual and decennial reports published by the Maritime Customs of China also provide additional continuous sources of information.

²⁵ *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan*: 4-01/1/263, “Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo”.

²⁶ *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan*, *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan zhinan*, pp.2-3.



Chapter Two

Guangzhou Before 1860:

Urban Planning and Expansion

Guangzhou was a local administrative center since the Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.).¹ According to G. William Skinner's hierarchical model of urban places, cities in China generally belonged to the administrative and/or economic hierarchy. Guangzhou enjoyed a high position in both hierarchies long before the coming of the West.² It was a center of foreign trade since the Qin dynasty, and grew into an international port in the Tang. As a result, both foreign and local merchants had long been active in the city. By the mid-nineteenth century, Guangzhou was the seat of the county, prefectural and provincial government offices. The question of urban administration will be discussed in the next chapter. In this chapter, we will discuss the following questions: was Guangzhou a static city before the coming of the modern era? How did the political force represented by the various levels of *yamens* in the city and the economic force represented by the merchants influence the physical layout and trend of construction of the city? Under what conditions was the walled city of Guangzhou expanded? If the walled city was not expanded in response to population expansion, how was the problem of land pressure solved? In what ways did the development of Guangzhou before the coming of the modern era pave the way for further expansion and transformation?

¹ During the Qin dynasty, Ren Xiao was appointed head of Nanhai prefecture. He was succeeded by Zhao Tuo who founded the Nanyue Kingdom and established the capital at Panyu, a county of Nanhai prefecture where the present-day city of Guangzhou was located.

² For details of Skinner's model, see G. William Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems", in G. William Skinner (ed.), *The City in late Imperial China*, pp.275-351.



Guangzhou: its earliest setting


The urban layout of modern Guangzhou is the result of gradual expansion from a small walled city constructed in the Qin dynasty a bit south of Yuexiu Hill.³ The city's choice of site was heavily influenced by geomancy (*fengshui*).⁴ The city was backed by a mountain range which stretched from Dayu Mountain and ran southwards to the Yuexiu Hill located just north of the city. It enjoyed convenient waterway communication as it was situated at the confluence of the West River (Xi Jiang), North River (Bei Jiang) and East River (Dong Jiang). It faced the immediate riverbank at its south. The walled city constructed by Ren Xiao in the Qin conformed to the planning ideas of the “*kaogong ji*” (The Record of Skillful Artisans) in the *Zhou li* (Rites of the Zhou Dynasty), one of the Confucian classics. The city was constructed square in shape, and the four city walls were oriented to the cardinal directions - exact east, south, west and north respectively. However, the above geographical setting of the original Guangzhou city was even more influenced by the ideas found in the *Guanzi*, a famous collection of essays written in the “Spring and Autumn” (Chunqiu) era. The *Guanzi* makes the following note on urban construction:

“Always situate the capital and urban centers either at the foot of a great mountain or above [the back of] a broad river. To insure sufficient water, avoid placing them so high as to approach the drought [level]. To conserve on [the need for] canals and embankments, avoid placing them so low as to approach the flood [level]. Take advantage of the resources of Heaven and adapt yourself to the strategic features of Earth. Hence city and suburban walls need not be strictly in accordance with the compass and square, nor roads with the level and marking line.”⁵

³ Some old gazetteers of Guangzhou state that the walled city of Guangzhou was first established in the Western Zhou Dynasty (1100-771 B.C.), Spring and Autumn era (770-476 B.C.), or the Period of the Warring States (475-221 B.C.). However, many scholars now believe that the walled city was first established in the Qin dynasty. See Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.204-19; *Guangzhou shi shizhengting*, *Guangzhou yangtze shilue*, pp.3-4.

⁴ For example, see Qu Dajun, *Guangdong xinyu zhu* (Annotated by Li Yuzhong, et al), p.143.

⁵ Chapter five of the *Guanzi*; see W. Allyn Rickett, *Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China: A Study and Translation*, p.116.



It is clear that Guangzhou was sited consistent with the ideas of urban construction found in the *Guanzi* by the close attention paid to choosing a site with good geomancy.

The formation of the Inner and Outer Cities: a function of merchants and government


Before the Song Dynasty, Lingnan (literally “south of the Dayu Mountain”) was still known as a “barbarian” region of China. This was a place of exile for criminals.⁶ However, this did not prevent Guangzhou from experiencing substantial urban expansion due to its prominent status in local administration and foreign trade. From the Qin dynasty to the Tang, the walled city was expanded several times in order to protect the government *yamens* that had increased substantially in number following the ascendancy of the city’s administrative status. This government-initiated expansion was somewhat radiant in direction, that is, the former Qin Panyu city was embodied within the wall of the expanded city, and was retained as the administrative center after the expansion.

The expansion strategy was substantially changed in the Song dynasty (960-1126 A.D.). Before the Song period, expansion of the city walls was undertaken primarily to ensure that the walls would protect the expanding bureaucracy within the city. From the Song period onwards, the expansion of the walled city was undertaken primarily to protect commercial activity.⁷ As early as the Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.), commercial activities had some influence on urban expansion. Guangzhou was an international port by the Tang, and it became a commercial center for foreign merchants.⁸ The local government assigned a portion of land outside the western wall of the city as *fanfang*

⁶ See Zhang Qu, *Yue dong jianwen lu*, p.3.

⁷ For example, see Xu Xiaomei, “Gu Guangzhou de chengjian guihua kaolüe”, *Yangcheng jingu*, no.9, June, 1988, p.43.

⁸ Jiang Zuyuan and Fang Zhiqin (ed.), *Jianming Guangdong shi* (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1993), p.166.




(foreign residence). It became a prosperous commercial area, and the same phenomenon was seen later during the Qing Dynasty in Xiguan where most of the city's wealth gravitated. The urban landscape of Tang Guangzhou was changed substantially by the erection of many new structures, notably Buddhist temples and Arabian ceremonial halls.⁹ The prosperity of the western suburb continued in the Song. The government added the Eastern City and Western City to the original walled city. If we compare the size and orientation of the walled city in the Tang period with the Song as shown in Map 1, it is obvious that the eastern expansion was much less sizable than the western expansion. The new Eastern City was only expanded to recover part of the Han Guangzhou city which was excluded from the Tang city, and was primarily a residential area for government officials.¹⁰ On the other hand, the construction of the Western City encircled a vast piece of land developed by the merchants to provide protection and ensure the long-standing commercial prosperity there. Foreign merchants, especially those coming from Arabia, welcomed the extension of the walled city, as shown by their donation of a huge sum of money for the project.¹¹ The encirclement of the western suburb into the walled city was a harbinger of things to come. Economic activities - precisely the activities of merchants - would be a substantial force behind further urban expansion which would be subsequently endorsed by the local government through walling the new merchant zone.

The walled city underwent another substantial expansion in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.). The three formerly walled cities were amalgamated in 1370 to form

⁹ See Li Weiyun, *et al*, *Guangzhou zongjiao zhi*, pp.2-3, 135-6.

¹⁰ Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.284-7.

¹¹ Jiang Yongxing, "Huasheng si, Guangta shi fen jian yu Tang, Song liangdai de jianzhuwu", *Yangcheng jingu*, no.10, August, 1988, p.13; Luo Xianglin, *Pu Shougeng yanjiu*, p.147. Another source mentions that the donation was made, but the local government rejected it. See Li Weiyun, *et al*, *Guangzhou zongjiao zhi*, p.130.



EVOLUTION OF THE WALLED CITY FROM THE QIN TO THE QING

KEYS

- Panyu City built by Ren Xiao
- The Boundary of the City expanded by Zhao Tuo
- The Tang Guangzhou
- The Song Guangzhou (Eastern, Western and Central Cities)
- The Qing Guangzhou (Inner and Outer Cities)



a single walled city. It was further expanded in 1380 to include the Yuexiu Hill in the north.¹² This finally formed what was known as the “Inner City” to foreign tourists in the Qing dynasty. *Guangdong tongzhi* explained the northern expansion as follows,

“...Zhu Liangzu, the Lord of Yongjia, and Commander (*du zhihui shi*) Xu Liang, Lü Yuan believed that the old city was too low and narrow, thus submitted a memorial to the throne appealing for the amalgamation of the three cities into one, and opened up the hills in the northeast to expand the city.

“The north of the city was expanded for 800 *zhang*, and the Five-storey Pagoda (*Wu ceng lou*) was built to make the city splendid.”¹³


The above source suggests that the massive expansion was due to the inadequacy of space in the city and that the vast flat land beyond the northern wall of the Song city would increase the land supply. Actually, the creation of the new walled city was multi-purposed. Besides solving the land shortage, the expansion provided more effective defense of the city, as bandits had seriously affected the local order.¹⁴ The installation of the Five-storey Pagoda at the peak of the Yuexiu Hill and the construction of city wall down along the spur of the mountain range allowed the army to control an important high point of the city, thus fortifying the city’s security. The amalgamation of the three cities also solved the problem of traffic disconnection. In order to improve the transportation of the city, many of the former moats separating the three cities, which were then situated within the Inner City, were filled up. The amalgamation also helped to restore the areas left in ruins by the war against the former Yuan regime.¹⁵ Streets

¹² For the details of the expansion process, see Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.345-55.

¹³ Ruan Yuan, *et al* (ed.), *Guangdong tongzhi* (1822), vol.187, p.3420.

¹⁴ Ruan Yuan’s *Guangdong tongzhi* read that in 1373 (six years after the founding of the dynasty), “Yang Jing, the Commander of the Guangzhou *wei*, weeded out the bandits in the north sea.” See *ibid.*

¹⁵ Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, p.346.




were enlarged and extended. Streets of “two *zhang* and five *chi* in width and tens of *li* in length” were constructed.¹⁶

Although the area of the walled city was enlarged substantially, its layout remained basically unchanged down to the late Qing period. There existed several specialized zones. The eastern part of the walled city, which was just adjacent to the Qing Panyu county center, was the administrative and cultural center of the city. For example, important *yamens* such as the offices of the provincial administrator (*buzhengsi*), Panyu county magistrate and Guangzhou prefect were situated there in the Qing. It was also a zone of schools and examination hall.¹⁷ In the Ming and Qing, the Inner City was also where the garrison of the Imperial army was located. In the Ming, the area just beyond the *buzhengsi* office was chosen as the garrison headquarters of the four *wei*, a military unit in the Ming Dynasty. In the Qing, the western half of the Inner City was assigned as the Bannermen’s area. It is clear that the groups of bureaus did not shift from their original sites although Guangzhou as an administrative center had expanded substantially after the second century B.C.

In contrast, the “merchant zone” of the walled city was far less stable than the administrative zone. The western part of the Inner City, which had been the merchant-dominated Western City in the Song, showed a decline of prosperity after being amalgamated. Both the Chinese and Western merchants found that the city wall imposed great restrictions on transportation, and there was a dearth of unoccupied land around their properties for further development. The garrison of the Bannermen in the western half of the Inner City in the Qing marked the final collapse of this commercial area.

¹⁶ It was observed that the streets were “two *zhang* and five *chi* in width and tens of *li* in length.” See “Chongxiu Yangcheng jie ji” [A Record of Re-construction of Streets in Guangzhou (Yangcheng)], in Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, pp.32-4.



The merchants were determined to find an area to expand their activities. In mid-Ming, they began to shift their activities beyond the city wall, that is, to the new western suburb, such as the Seventeenth Ward (Shiqi fu), where one of the Maritime Trade Supervisors (*shibo tiju*, known as *shibo shi* in the Tang) was assigned.¹⁸ However, the undeveloped land west of the walled city was not such an ideal place for them. Their target was the wide stripe of land outside the southern wall of the walled city formed by the gradual sedimentary accumulation at the northern bank of the Pearl River. The merchants were attracted by the availability of land for commercial and residential purposes, and for the construction of piers. By 1500, this land had grown prosperous, where abundant residential buildings and merchant houses were built. More commercial activities moved in when the Xi'ao, an important river west of the city proper where many piers were situated, was silted, and the piers were shifted to the waterfront of the Pearl River along the "southern city". As a result, the place was transformed into a commercial center of the city. The fact that two of the southern gates were named as Youlan (Oil Market) Gate and Zhulan (Bamboo Market) Gate reflected the Outer City's development as an area of specialized markets. A contemporary wrote:

"[The land] outside the city is densely populated. The numerous foreign ships are closely tied to each other in a pattern like fish scales. Rich merchants and strange goods also gather there."¹⁹

Qu Dajun, a Qing writer, noted the prosperity of the area south of the Inner City:


"[During the Ming] the land beyond the Guide Gate²⁰ had a piece of prosperous land ten *li* long. The moat was at the south with many beautiful buildings joined to each other. The buildings were inhabited by prostitutes.... Over the

¹⁷ This included the Guangzhou Prefecture Confucian Hall (*xuegong*), Panyu Confucian Hall and the Examination Hall (*gongyuan*).

¹⁸ Liang Jabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, p.22.

¹⁹ He Yan, "Zongdu Wu gong zhu sheng waicheng xu", see Wu Daorong, Zhang Xuehua and Li Yan (ed.), *Guangdong wenzheng*, vol.3, p.125.

²⁰ Guide Gate was situated at the southern side of the city wall of the Inner City.



moat, there were markets with a hundred kinds of goods.... Merchants from everywhere came here.”²¹

It is evident that this piece of land had been transformed into a “central business district” in addition to another one situated at Shuangmendi near the administrative center in the Inner City which primarily served the officials and their families. The new commercial center enjoyed convenient transportation as piers were everywhere along the new river bank.²² Besides the availability of land for commercial purposes, entertainment, especially prostitution, was more readily available compared to the Inner City where governmental control was much stronger.

The local government planned to take up the responsibility of protecting this growing commercial center, as the land was exposed to the danger of being looted by bandits. During the reign of the Jiajing Emperor (1522-1566), bandits and Japanese pirates (*wokou*) invaded the coast of Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangsu and Guangdong which greatly affected the social order of the maritime area. Fortification was strengthened in various places. Wu Guifang, Governor-General of Liang-Guang (literally meaning “two Guangs”, referring to Guangdong and Guangxi), thought that:

“the walled city is intended to protect the people, and the people will feel safe when being protected. Although the Inner City [of Guangzhou] is solid, the area around the bank is not defendable. The city is peaceful now because we have rooted out the bandits, but preventive measures should be undertaken in order to strengthen the fortification. Therefore, an outer city should be built.”²³

This resulted in the completion of the Outer City in 1566, which was actually a southward extension of the walled city to the northern bank of the Pearl River. The completion of the Outer City put the commercial area under the government’s supervision,

²¹ Qu Dajun, *Guangdong xinyu*, vol.17.

²² Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, p.359.

²³ He Yan “Zongdu Wu gong zhu sheng waicheng xu”, see Wu Daorong, Zhang Xuehua and Li Yan (ed.), *Guangdong wenzheng*, vol.3, p.125.



providing the needed protection against piracy. “After the completion [of the Outer City], people in both the Inner and Outer Cities live in a stable environment and feel satisfied with their jobs.... Sounds of appreciation are heard.”²⁴

Government's approach to city expansion

The above brief discussion reveals two associated kinds of urban expansion. Urban expansion might take the form of the enlargement of the city wall, which was a government action. Land to be encircled might be barren land, such as the case of the inclusion of the area at the base of the Yuexiu Hill. It might also be land which had been developed and occupied by merchants. Therefore, urban expansion might take a second form, that is, the spontaneous activities of merchants who shifted and expanded their business to a new area. Merchants' activities sought more space which was unavailable in the congested walled city. Such a kind of expansion, however, was not always followed by corresponding actions by the local government. The local government was restrained by limited resources, and could not always extend the boundary of the walled city to provide defense for the newly-developed area. Therefore, newly-developed areas might reach a point of maximum growth, beyond which the merchants were not willing to have further development as governmental protection was not available, hindering business expansion.

Moreover, the local government's posterior encirclement of the developed area was only a formalistic city expansion. Taking the construction of the Outer City as an example, this construction only solved the strategic and security problems for that piece of merchant-developed land. The encirclement only put a boundary on the land, and no new land was reclaimed and no urban facilities were added.

²⁴ *Ibid.*




Up to now, our discussion seems to suggest that merchants' shift of business induced the most observable change in city land use. There was one exception to this impression. Political factors affected the land use pattern in the early Qing. After the Southern Ming court was exterminated by the Qing Court in 1650, Shang Kexi was appointed as the federator of Guangdong and he took the Inner City as his own "palace". Bureaus and many residents were compelled to move to the Outer City which soon became over-populated. When Shang Zhixin, the son of Shang Kexi who had succeeded his father, was defeated in 1680, rich people rushed back to the Inner City and competed for land there.²⁵ The withdrawal of Shang's army from Guangzhou might have released the land pressure for a while, but the garrison of the Bannermen in 1756 in the western part of the Inner City did create a new problem as regards land use. Land west to Sipailou (now Jiefang Road) was designated as the Bannermen's property.²⁶ Moreover, each of the sixteen Banners, eight for the Manchus and eight for the Han Chinese, had one arrow lane (*jiandao*) and one race court (*maquan*) for the Bannermen's military exercises.²⁷ They also built their own ancestral temple (*zongci*) there.²⁸ The western part of the Inner City, which was an important commercial center since the Tang Dynasty, was totally "militarized", and the original residents and merchants were deprived of their ownership there. Although a considerable part of this "Bannermen land" was later leased or sold to the Han people when the Bannermen generally became insolvent, the commercial status of the area was not restored, and land shortage was still

²⁵ Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, p.287.

²⁶ Being the garrison troops of the city, the Bannermen were not allowed to go beyond the city wall without the permission of the commander. Land, the most precious property in traditional China, was therefore granted to them as a means of living in the unfamiliar land.

²⁷ For these arrow lanes and race courts in Guangzhou, see Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, pp.275-410.

²⁸ Wang Zongyou, *Guangdong Manzu zhi*, p.136.



severe. There was a case when a Bannerman wanted to open a shop selling sauce. Although his factory was situated at Guangta Street on the “Bannermen land”, the shop was finally located in the eastern part of the Inner City, just opposite the Temple of City God (*Chenghuang miao*).²⁹ The immigration of Banner soldiers and their families in Guangzhou, which led to the confiscation of the properties of the local residents, created serious land shortage.

As the local government was not always prepared to take the initiative to expand the city to solve the problems of over-population and shortage of land, nor was it prepared to regulate land use pattern or construction density as necessary, it adopted a *laissez-faire* policy toward residential and commercial construction. To gain more land for expansion and at the same time secure governmental protection, residents might choose to maximize the existing land use pattern by squeezing buildings on every inch of land. Foreigners in the nineteenth century described this feature in the walled city of Guangzhou:

“The width of the streets varies from about three to fifteen feet, measuring from house to house; and the average width would probably not exceed eight feet. Even in passing through the business districts, I have frequently extended my arms and reached the opposite houses. The principal streets are occupied by merchants and mechanics, and their shops are so constructed as to open in front, and expose their contents to the observation of the passenger.


“Economy of room, to the exclusion of comfort, convenience, and cleanliness, appears to be the sole object in the lanes where the women and children are kennelled.”³⁰

“There is the most marvellous economy of space practised in this city, and from the roof of one of its high pawn towers you cannot perceive a break, no streets: the roofs of the houses seem to touch each other. Even in the narrow streets there are stalls in all available nooks and corners, and it is difficult for our [sedan] chairs to get along.”³¹

²⁹ Zhen Ren and Tan Shaopeng, *Guangzhou zhuming laozihao*, vol.1, p.124.

³⁰ David Abeel, *Journal of a Residence in China and the Neighbouring Countries*, pp.48-9.

³¹ John Henry Gray, Mrs., *Fourteen Months in Canton*, p.37.



Maximization of land-use also led to the appropriation of land, both public and private, which became a common phenomenon in the city. For example, after the Examination Hall was moved from the base of Yuexiu Hill to the southeast corner of the Inner City in the early Qing, the old place was promptly occupied by the residents. The local government repeatedly tried to restore the place as a historic site, but all attempts ended in failure.³² Nanyuan, a famous garden in the Outer City where poets met, was also occupied by residents after being surrendered.³³

The development of the suburbs

Suburbs were called *guan* in Imperial China.³⁴ For example, the western suburb of Guangzhou was called Xiguan.³⁵ Xiguan was situated outside the Taiping (Peace and Stability) Gate and Daxi (Great West) Gate. Most of Xiguan was undeveloped and full of natural beauty and fruit fields. The development of Xiguan was partially at the cost of the recession of the Outer City. The existence of the city wall imposed restriction on its further development. Government protection implied loss of freedom of movement, which was indispensable to commercial prosperity. The situation became worse when the Outer City became over-populated in the early Qing when many residents and *yamens* were forced to the Outer City by Shang Kexi. Thus, land used for residence far exceeded that for commerce.


The ascendancy of Xiguan was also a result of its favorable environment which enabled it to absorb the “excessive prosperity” of the Outer City. First of all, Xiguan was

³² Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, p.74.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.468.

³⁴ Dai Junliang, *Zhongguo chengshi fazhan shi*, p.262.

³⁵ Therefore, suburbs of Chinese cities might share the same names. For example, western suburb was equally labeled as “Xiguan”, eastern suburb as “Dongguan”, southern suburb as “Nanguan”, and northern suburb as “Beiguan”.




a vast piece of accumulated sediment which kept on enlarging due to the continual silting of the Pearl River. Access to the interior of this piece of land was first made possible by the opening of a small river in 1524. By mid-Qing, Xiguan had developed a dense river network. After passing the mouth of the Western Moat, boats could travel along streams like the Upper Xiguan River, Lower Xiguan River, Wicker Wave River and Litchi Bay River. Convenient transportation and the availability of vast flat land attracted the establishment of industrial plants. In fact, by the early nineteenth century, textile industry was concentrated there.³⁶ In turn, specialization also occurred in the area. Sixth Ward (Di liu fu), Seventh Ward (Di qi fu), Upper Ninth Ward (Shang jiu fu), Changshou Lane and Chazhai Garden were all areas of cloth production. The southern places specialized in selling clothes and the Eighteenth Ward specialized in the exchange of capital and other financial affairs.³⁷ Here, the influence of industry over the development of city could be seen clearly.

However, the most important factor which accounted for the ascendancy of Xiguan was foreign trade. In Qing, Guangzhou's traditional status as a trade center was greatly enhanced when the city became the only place for foreign trade. Before the First Opium War, Guangzhou was the only port through which foreign trade was conducted. Merchants of the Thirteen Factories (*Shisan hang*) were appointed as the Imperial agents to deal with foreign traders. The Thirteen Factories were situated at the bank just west to the western city wall. The whole of Xiguan therefore flourished. One foreigner described the situation as follows:

“As the shades of evening darkened around us, great numbers of lamps broke through the gloom, and appeared either ranged in rows, almost as far as the eye could reach, or changing their position and varying the general aspect, ac-

³⁶ Cheng Ming, “Qingdai Guangzhou gongye de jiegou he tese”, *Yangcheng jingu*, no.6, 1990, p.58.

³⁷ Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, p.387.



cording to the different directions of the moving vessels. The scene was more like magic than reality, and calculated to awaken ideas, or call up visions, which seldom visit collected minds in wakeful hours. As we approached the city our progress became more interrupted by crowds of boats, and such was their density when we arrived within a short distance of the landing-place, that the men were obliged to exchange their oars for short paddles, and work their way through whatever opening they could find or find.”³⁸

The Imperial agents who gained the privilege to deal with the foreign traders, that is, the Hong merchants like Wu Bingjian and Pan Shicheng, became the richest men in the country. For example, Wu Bingjian, known as Howqua by the foreign traders, claimed that he had a property of 2.6 billion in 1834.³⁹ These merchants lived in either Xiguan or Honam. John C. Kerr noted:

“The western suburbs contain a large part of the business, wealth, and manufacturing history of the City. Some of the finest streets, largest temples, best private residences, and all the silk weaving are in this part of the city.”⁴⁰

The wealth of this territory allowed quick recovery from calamity. The Xiguan Fire of 1822 is a typical example. Originating in a bakery shop, the fire raged Xiguan for two days and consumed more than seventy streets and ten thousand houses including the Thirteen Hongs.⁴¹ A contemporary writer was astonished by its quick recovery:

“Xiguan is a place of wealth, being ‘a forest of meat and an ocean of wine’ (*roulin jiuhai*). There is no difference between summer and winter, day and night. It is a pity that everything was destroyed by fire [in 1822]. The Guangzhou people did not feel anxious [about the disaster] and reconstructed the place in a few months’ time. It is now even more prosperous than before.”⁴²

The development of Xiguan represented a continuous trend of western expansion since the Han Dynasty (see Map 1). The continuous formation of alluvium provided the


³⁸ David Abeel, *Journal of a Residence in China and the Neighbouring Countries*, p.45.

³⁹ Yang Wanxiu (ed.), *Guangzhou mingren zhuan*, p.76.

⁴⁰ John C. Kerr, *A Guide to the City and Suburbs of Canton* (1891), p.4.

⁴¹ Wen Xun, “Ji Xiguan huo”, in Wu Daorong, et al (ed.), *Guangdong wenzheng*, vol.5, p.435; *Chinese Repository*, vol.4, no.1, May, 1835, pp.31-6; *Canton Register*, 9 June, 1835, p.91.

⁴² Wen Xun, “Ji Xiguan huo”, in Wu Daorong, Zhang Xuehua and Li Yan (ed.), *op.cit.*, vol.5, p.435.



needed flat land for Guangzhou residents, primarily merchants who were the most responsive and active group in society, to shift their business and residence there.

The western expansion and the prosperity of Xiguan did not imply that other suburbs of the walled city experienced no changes. The gradual development of Honam was observable. Honam refers to the island on the southern bank of the Pearl River, but in the Qing, the term was used to refer to the spot of land in the northern part of the island only, just opposite Guangzhou proper. Before the Qing, this was only a place of temples and villas.⁴³ Its development was actualized partially as a result of political disturbances in the early Qing. Residents in the Inner City were forced to emigrate as most of the land was occupied by Shang Kexi and his army. When the Outer City became overpopulated, many residents moved to Honam. Local traders also found Honam an ideal place for unloading goods because of its straight river bank. Population thus increased there in the early Qing.⁴⁴ Cultivation of fruit and the famous “Honam tea” was in great demand by the residents in Guangzhou proper, making the river traffic between the two places extremely busy. Later, the merchants made use of the flat land and cheap labor from the villages to operate handicraft concerns on the island.⁴⁵ As a result, in the late nineteenth century, Honam was characterized by the co-existence of both agricultural and industrial production.

Dongguan (Eastern Suburb) also underwent some development, although very limited. There was a saying in Guangzhou, that is, *dongcun xiqiao*, meaning “poor in the east and wealthy in the west”.⁴⁶ Geographical limitations were the determining factor hindering its rise in prominence and wealth. Compared to Xiguan, Dongguan was much

⁴³ Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, p.412.

⁴⁴ *Haizhu wenshi*, vol.1, 1986, p.15.


⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.11.



closer to the Huangpu port, which was the place where numerous foreign traders unloaded their goods and used small boats to tranship these goods to Guangzhou Proper. However, the undulating landscape of Dongguan made the availability of flat land a problem. Xiguan and Honam, both of which were developed in late Ming and early Qing, faced each other and were only separated by a narrow river course. The walled city, Xiguan and Honam by mid-Qing had formed a rough entity in terms of economic activities, but Dongguan was definitely excluded because of its remoteness to Xiguan and Honam. River traffic, which was the major means of transportation in pre-modern Guangzhou, was not efficient from Dongguan to Xiguan and Honam. Firstly, the width of the Pearl River was much greater near the Donghaokou (mouth of the Eastern Moat) than off the riverbank of Xiguan. Secondly, the bank right of Donghaokou was blocked by two sandbanks called Dashatou (First Sandbank) and Ershatou (Second Sandbank) which were still barren at that time. There was only some commerce near Donghaokou, where many prostitutes gathered and became a famous place for “entertainment”.⁴⁷ More importantly, there was no mature stream network in Dongguan. This factor, accompanied by its undulating landscape and the lack of flat land, made Dongguan only a place of scenery rather than a commercial center. Moreover, transportation by road was not effective. There was only one major road leading out from the Dadong (Great East) Gate to Dongguan, with sub-roads connecting scenic spots like the Dongshan Temple and Dongming Temple. Extensive development was only possible after Xiguan was fully populated and developed in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

⁴⁶ Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, p.25.

⁴⁷ Ni Xiying, *Guangzhou*, p.32.



Compared to the Ming period, new wall construction encircling newly developed areas was not actively pursued in Guangzhou during the Qing Dynasty. While the local government in the Ming had greatly expanded the Inner City and built the Outer City, only two Chicken Wing Walls (*jiyi cheng*) were constructed three years after the Qing Dynasty was founded. These two walls started at the southeast and southwest corners of the Outer City respectively, and stretched perpendicularly to the north bank of the Pearl River, which partly enclosed the newly formed alluvium south of the Outer City. Granted that the function of city wall was a means of the local government to protect the population and wealth of the city, and considering that Xiguan had developed into the wealthiest place in the country, why did the Qing local government not extend the encirclement to the region, as was done in the past?


The foremost reason was simple. The Qing officials intended to minimize their responsibility in local administration. It must be remembered that local administrators were held responsible for every calamity *within* the city, including fire, flooding, drought, earthquake, locusts and so on. “In case of fires breaking out in the provincial capital, when more than ten houses are consumed, the governor is fined nine months’ pay; if more than thirty houses are burnt, he forfeits one year’s salary; if three hundred are burnt, he is degraded one degree.”⁴⁸ However, such calamity occurring in the suburbs would not subject him to the standard punishment. Including such a vast piece of land in the walled city would mean risking being held responsible for a much larger city area. Therefore, the local government chose to remain silent on the question of expanding the walled city.

⁴⁸ *Chinese Repository*, vol.2, no.5, September, 1833, p.202.



The reason for constructing the Outer City in the Ming was the existence of imminent threat from the Japanese pirates and Chinese bandits. Guangzhou actually faced a similar threat to its security in the Qing period, which should have justified the inclusion of Xiguan into the walled city. The most notable threat was the assault by the armies of the Heaven and Earth Society in 1854-55. However, enclosure was not effected in Xiguan. Xiguan was several times larger than the Outer City, and the local government found it impossible to acquire the finances and the requisite manpower to enclose the area. In fact, the local government was financially exhausted throughout the Qing period, and always had to depend on contributions made by the merchants. For example, the Hong merchants were forced to pay three million dollars as compensation to Britain, a sum that was supposed to be the responsibility of the government in order to fulfill the obligations stipulated by the Treaty of Nanjing. Moreover, Guangzhou was always embroiled in diplomatic issues, so that the attention of the chief administrators, including the Liang-Guang Governor-General and the Guangdong Viceroy, was always diverted from local urban problems.

The existence of foreign residence in Xiguan was probably another reason for not extending the city wall there. One of the reasons that foreign “factories” were allowed in Xiguan was that Xiguan was *outside* the walled city. Therefore, the case was rather different compared with the construction of the Outer City, as the place to be walled by the Outer City did not include any economic activities associated with foreigners. Therefore, as long as Xiguan was a major place of residence for foreigners, it was impossible for the city wall to be extended there no matter how wealthy and important Xiguan was.



Conclusion

The ideology of Guangzhou's urban expansion was an intermingling of the adherence to planning ideas in the Confucian classics, geomancy and pragmatic needs. Except for the initial construction by Ren Xiao, the walled city was never square in shape, and later the city wall was not always built in straight line according to the cosmological canon. As the city was gradually built up after numerous integrations of new land, streets appeared in different shapes, width and length. This irregular street pattern is even apparent in present day Guangzhou.


In spite of the expansions, the city layout and even the functional zoning remained very stable. The administrative zone of the city remained (even up to now) in or around the territory occupied by the former Qin city, which became the Middle City in the Song Dynasty, marked by Hui'ai Road (now Zhongshan Fourth and Fifth Roads) and Chengxuan Straight Road (now Beijing Road) in the Qing. The stability of the location of government offices was strongly influenced by the idea that the geomancy of the city should not be altered in any way. However, merchants' activities were least influenced by geomancy. They constituted the primary force for the city's continual "western expansion". In other words, the expansion of the area west of the Qin city boundary was essentially the result of private efforts, merchants being the most notable example.

The considerable size of Guangzhou in the Qing dynasty was the result of a gradual expansion of a small town from the Qin Dynasty, and reflected the energy of urban expansion and construction in traditional China. Both the local government and merchants took part in expanding the city boundary. This growth, both physical and commercial, was accelerated by Guangzhou's status as an international trading port. Guangzhou was never a static city. However, in the Qing period, the local government became less willing to devote money and energy to construct or reconstruct the city. It was again the



merchants who played an active and crucial role in transforming the suburbs, notably Xiguan and Honam, into populous areas with enormous economic activities.

Moreover, Guangzhou was on the eve of urban reform before 1860. The development of the riverain area of Xiguan reached a point of saturation, and more merchants and residents moved to the inland of Xiguan. As shown above, Guangzhou built up its transportation system on the river networks. The greater demand of inland transportation, due to the increase of population, cargo shipping and removal of human wastes, placed a heavier load on the silting rivers. This generated the need for substantial changes to the trends of expansion. The lack of undeveloped riverain land meant that further “western expansion” was impossible. Other less favorably sited suburbs, such as Honam and Dongguan, could have been developed though at a greater cost. Another alternative was to develop land transportation. Narrow lanes would have to be transformed into roads broad enough for efficient transportation, so that development of the more remote and barren parts of Xiguan and the Inner City could be possible. Both options would be a costly investment, but necessary for the maintenance of the city’s prosperity. The question was: who would be responsible for taking up such transformation? Was it the private sector - the merchants - or the local government? The coming chapters will explore this subject.




Chapter Three

Guangzhou Before 1860:

City Administration

As a traditional Chinese city, Guangzhou during the Qing Dynasty differed little from other cities in China in terms of administrative structure and functions. Administratively, the city of Guangzhou was similar to other provincial capitals. It was geographically separated into two counties, that is, Nanhai and Panyu counties. Magistrates of these counties provided the lowest level local governance to the city. It was also administered by bureaucrats of higher ranks, namely the prefectural-level bureaucrats (such as the Guangzhou Prefect) and provincial-level bureaucrats (such as the Liang-Guang Governor-General, Guangdong Viceroy and Guangdong Provincial Administrator), all involved in the daily running of the local government in providing some basic facilities to the residents. Therefore, whenever the term “local government” is used in this thesis for Guangzhou before the establishment of the Municipal Office in 1917, it refers to the overlapping activities of the three levels of bureaucrats who all resided in the walled city of Guangzhou. These seemingly pedestrian activities, however, appeared in concert with some unique features in the governing of the city. Commercial intercourse with foreigners, who were allowed to reside and trade only in Guangzhou before the First Opium War, served as a unique asset of the city and brought substantial changes to the mode of running public affairs in Guangzhou. The trend of self-government was also exceptionally well defined and strong, and was remarkable in providing welfare for the residents and safeguarding the residents from bandits (and foreigners as well). These important factors influenced the transformation of Guangzhou’s city administration, which produced an urban model unique




among the other treaty ports on the eve of the Second Opium War. This chapter will try to answer the following questions: how did the commercial intercourse with foreigners nurture changes in local administration? Who or which social group undertook such a transformation? As there was a hierarchy of bureaucrats with their offices in the city, why and how did the city develop a trend of self-government? What was the institutional foundation for its rise? In what ways did the trend of self-government contribute to the administration of the city? How was the city administered after 1860 influenced by this trend?

“Barbarian management”

This chapter will begin with a discussion of the management of foreigners, a special kind of local administration in Guangzhou. Foreigners before the Second Opium War did not gain equal status with the local Chinese. They were derogated as “barbarians” and even “foreign devils” (*fangui*), and they were told that their residence and trade in the port of Guangzhou was only granted by a lenient dispensation by the Chinese emperor. Both the central and local governments promulgated strict regulations in order to restrict the activities of the foreign merchants.¹ The Hong merchants, who monopolized foreign trade until the end of the First Opium War, also served as agents of the local government to ensure that the foreign merchants abided by such regulations. For example, after the trade season foreigners were required to leave the city of Guangzhou and foreign ladies were prohibited from entering the city. Foreigners could only conduct their trade through the Hong merchants who were licensed by

¹ Governor-General Jiang Youxian fixed a regulation in 1814 that when boats left Guangzhou, passes were to be issued from the Hoppo, which were to be inspected by various customs-houses along the Pearl River. Monthly lists of such passage boats were to be kept at the customs-houses, and also reports were to be sent to the Hoppo sometimes. *Canton Register*, 24 April, 1838, p.68.




the government to conduct this trade. The Hong merchants not only monopolized foreign trade but also served as the middlemen between the foreigners and the local officials. Foreigners were ordered to reside in the houses which were called "factories" provided by the Hong merchants. The "factories" and the nearby squares were the only places of public activities for resident foreigners, except for regular visits to the famous Huadi (Place of Flowers) in the southwest suburbs and Honam Island opposite the "factories". Even such visits had to be accompanied by linguists who were assigned by the Customs Superintendent to take care of the general affairs of the foreigners.

The local government intended to adopt a strict segregation policy to isolate the foreigners from the Chinese community. Foreigners were banned from learning Chinese. Every foreign "factory", irrespective of its size, could only employ eight Chinese servants. Except for these servants and those people associated with foreign trade, all Chinese were prohibited from communicating with foreigners. Even native peddlers were not allowed to sell their goods in the "factory" area.

In reality, the foreigners enjoyed much more liberty than allowed by official regulations, in both their business and daily living. Foreigners could bribe the officials in the Customs to conduct more trade than was stipulated. Although it was strictly proclaimed that the Hong merchants must settle their accounts before the conclusion of every trading season, they still owed huge debts to the foreign traders.² This made the Hong merchants more willing to adopt a friendly posture towards the foreigners, and this friendly relationship in turn put the Hong merchants in a better position to accept Western knowledge in city administration. This will be discussed in greater details

² Zhongguo di yi lishi dang'anguan (ed.), *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao*, vol.1, pp.172.



later.

The official segregation policy never worked well. It was partially a result of the non-interference policy adopted by the provincial officials, such as Lu Kun, the Liang-Guang Governor-General (1832-1835).³ In turn, the Hong merchants closed their eyes to the activities of the foreigners.⁴ The number of Chinese servants the foreigners employed was unlimited in reality. Residence of foreign ladies in the foreign “factories” seldom met with interference from the Hong merchants and local officials. Guangzhou people and peddlers were free to enter the “factory” square.⁵ Foreigners could travel to any part of the city whenever they wished, even without being accompanied by linguists. Foreigners could even lease their “factories”, which were properties of the Hong merchants.⁶ Rowing in the Pearl River was nominally banned, but the foreigners still organized a regatta in Guangzhou, and its activities always attracted thousands of people who crowded along the river banks of Guangzhou City.⁷ Presenting petitions to the city gates, which was prohibited by official regulations, was an established custom in the foreign community of Guangzhou. Sometimes, the foreigners even represented themselves as though they were the “monarch”, as police runners were sent to protect them during their travels, and they used force to open the way for

³ *Canton Register*, 1 July, 1834, p.104.

⁴ The Governor and the Customs Superintendent made a proclamation against the Hong merchants “conniving at and abetting vice in foreigners” in November, 1834. It stated that “Now we find on inquiry, that formerly there was a set of lawless, shameless Hong-merchants, who, whenever the barbarians entered the port and took lodgings, endeavored to make gain of them. For this purpose they adopted a hundred schemes to meet their wishes....” See *China Repository*, vol.3, no.8, December, 1934, pp.391-2. For other liberties enjoyed by the foreigners, see William C. Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, pp.1-3.

⁵ William C. Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, pp.12-5.

⁶ *Canton Register*, 12 December, 1837, p.198; William C. Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, pp.33-5.

⁷ *Canton Register*, 3 December, 1828.



them.⁸


Using the “barbarian management” system as a yardstick, some explicit administrative problems in Qing Guangzhou can be observed. Generally, the local officials chose to adopt a *laissez faire* attitude towards foreign activities in spite of the strict laws on paper. There was a great gap between the written regulations and reality. Violations of official regulations were not prosecuted by the local government according to the regulations. The local government even extended this *laissez-faire* attitude in its dealings with the native residents. The foreigners thus concluded that the Chinese government was weak and would not be harsh to them. As the local government held a non-interference posture, the foreigners were tacitly allowed to conduct activities in a wider scope, which could be viewed as an attempt to “Westernize” the Chinese Empire.

These activities imposed some observable impacts on the city’s administration and infrastructure. The management of fire and medical services provides us with two case studies.

Fire management

Guangzhou was a crowded city. As mentioned in the last chapter, the local government did not actively take up the administrative burden of regulating the land use pattern and construction density. The narrow streets, accompanied by the overwhelming number of wooden constructions in the city, disturbed the foreign traders who were fearful of the possibility of the speedy spread of fire. This anxiety was understandable as Guangzhou, similar to other pre-modern cities, frequently suffered from conflagra-

⁸ William C. Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, p.6.



tions.⁹ When using charcoal for cooking, warming and preserving things from damp, residents were sometimes careless, and fire broke out and consumed hundreds of houses and streets.¹⁰ The local residents' indifferent attitude towards these outbreaks also aroused the foreigners' sense of insecurity. When a fire was raging, the native residents usually just let the fire rage wherever it wanted burning out everything.¹¹ When foreigners aided in extinguishing the flames, they were not assisted by the local residents.¹² On the other hand, it was a common practice for both the residents and officials to pray to Huaguang, the "God of Fire". Even when a fire was still raging, government officials would just gather at the temples to offer incense to appease Huaguang.¹³ As a result, the properties of foreigners were at great risk.

The foreigners were determined to change the situation, primarily for their own safety. This was a long process and met with great resistance, especially from the local residents. The foreigners tried to introduce the European system of fire-fighting to China. In nineteenth-century Europe, the job of fire fighting was assumed by fire insurance companies which had their own brigades and fire engines.¹⁴ However, the local Chinese were not interested in the concept of "fire insurance", partially due to the high risk for such insurance companies considering the frequency of fires due to the

⁹ Fire had a considerable share of the local news reported in foreigner-run newspapers. Most of the information on the Guangzhou fires in this chapter comes from this kind of source.


¹⁰ Accounts by foreigners show that it was the Cantonese custom to burn charcoal for warmth in winter. For example, see *Chinese Repository*, vol.1, no.12, April, 1833, p.489; Henry John Gray, *Walks in the City of Canton*, p.23. The following is an example of a great fire due to careless use of fire. A resident in Xiguan burned incense in a morning of October, 1843, and caused a fire which consumed about 1,000 buildings and three of the foreign Hongs with value upwards to two millions taels. *Chinese Repository*, vol.12, no.10, October, 1843, p.560; vol.12, no.11, November, 1843, p.616.

¹¹ *Canton Register*, 9 June, 1835, p.91. It is reported that the Xiguan Fire of 1822 was exactly due to this reason that the whole piece of the prosperous Xiguan was burnt out.

¹² *Canton Register*, 9 June, 1835, p.91.

¹³ For example, see *Chinese Repository*, vol.4, no.7, December, 1835, pp.390-1.

¹⁴ Hazel Rossotti, *Fire*, pp.211-2.




close proximity of the houses.¹⁵ Other pragmatic suggestions also met with opposition from the local Chinese. For example, after the Xiguan Fire in 1822, foreigner residents suggested that a strip of land several feet wide surrounding the area of the foreign “factories” should be cleared as “fire lane” (*huolu*) to separate the “factories” from the houses of the native residents, as this could prevent fire from spreading. It would also facilitate the removal of the residents’ properties away from the conflagration. However, this invited strong opposition from the native residents in spite of support by the officials. The proposal was finally withdrawn.¹⁶ The residents were not willing to give up their property for such a fire break, and it was viewed as too costly a measure to prevent the spread of fire. However, the great loss of properties in the frequent fires finally made the local residents aware of the practicality of the Western fire-fighting system. In contrast to the previous apathy to the threat of fire, residents in the 1830s began to pull down houses to prevent the flames from spreading, a method for which they were indebted to the Europeans.¹⁷ This method was not only practised by residents who lived near the Thirteen Factories, but also by those living in districts as remote as the northern part of the walled city.¹⁸ This new method of preventing the spread of fire, together with the fire engines (imported from the West) owned by both the foreign traders and the Hong merchants, allowed the residents of Guangzhou to gain greater control over the spread of fire. From the mid-1830s onwards, the local residents were able not only to slow down the spread of flames, but

¹⁵ *Chinese Repository*, vol.4, no.1, May, 1835, p.30.

¹⁶ *Guangzhou shi shizhengting, Guangzhou shi yangge shilue*, p.24. In the same citation, it was said that initially Governor-General Ruan Yuan agreed to such a device on a bribe from the foreigners.

¹⁷ For example, there was a news report in 1832 stating “Formerly, the Chinese would not pull down their houses to stop the progress of fire; but they really do so now, old custom notwithstanding.” *Chinese Repository*, vol.1, no.6, October 1832, p.248.

¹⁸ *Canton Register*, 5 January, 1836, p.2.



also to change the direction of the fire.¹⁹ During a fire which occurred in 1836 in the Carpenter's Square of the Foreign Factories, the Hong coolies showed their skills in driving the "excellent engines" provided by Howqua, which "kept up an incessant stream of water" to extinguish the fire without causing destructive losses to the Factories.²⁰ The usefulness of these "imported" techniques made the locals more willing to cooperate with the foreigners in extinguishing fires, even in the midst of the Sino-British conflict in the 1840s.²¹ The effectiveness of the Western techniques made the local officials change their passive attitude in dealing with fire fighting. In order to compete with the foreigners, they appeared more frequently on the spot to guide fire fighting and spent more energy in seizing the plunder from "vagabonds" who took the opportunity of fire to break into houses.²²

Medical management

In Guangzhou, ordinary medical services were primarily provided by private doctors who often gave free consultation and even medicine gratis to the poor.²³ Medical services provided by the local government were mostly symbolic in nature. A dispensary named "Official Dispensary for the Residents' Benefits" (*Huimin yaoju*) was estab-


¹⁹ Nearly all Hong merchants owned fire engines. See *Chinese Repository*, vol.4, no.1, May, 1835, p.33; vol.4, no.10, February, 1836, pp.486-7. For the ability of checking the spread of fire, the 1835 Outer City Fire was a good example. In November, 1835, a fire consuming more than 1400 houses in the Outer City of Guangzhou was, according to an official report, occasioned by boiling tea. However, it was checked not to raid the house of the Governor-General within the Outer City. *Chinese Repository*, vol.4, no.7, December, 1835, pp.390-1.

²⁰ This is recorded in some details in William C. Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, pp.204-6.

²¹ *Chinese Repository*, no.14, no.2, February, 1845, p.104.

²² Such accounts appeared in great amount after 1835.

²³ For example, see *Chinese Repository*, vol.1, no.8, December, 1832, p.343. It recorded a story that there was an old doctor in Guangzhou making no charges upon the patients, but the patients always gave him some compensation, in kind or in money.



lished by the local authorities in the Ming, but abolished in the early Qing.²⁴ The situation corresponded to Raymon David Lum's argument that the government did not aim at providing aid to all or to even a large segment of the poor, since welfare services were only an expression of "ritual concern".²⁵

We have good reasons to question the effectiveness and adequacy of these private doctors even by traditional standard. Residents often held demonstrations, parading the idols of the "god of medicine" through the streets in order to "subdue all noxious influences".²⁶ On other occasions, they celebrated the Dragon Boat Festival a month in advance as it was believed that epidemics would flee when the drums of the dragon-boats were sounded.²⁷ The prevalence of such practices supports the contention that both private doctors and traditional Chinese medicine were far from satisfactory.

In contrast to the unsatisfactory curative effects of traditional Chinese medicine, a substantial advancement in Western medical science was observed in the early nineteenth century, especially in fields such as ophthalmology and surgery. To procure more effective treatment, the local Chinese never showed opposition to the introduction of Western medicine. It was observed that the establishment of the Ophthalmic Hospital in 1835 by Rev. Peter Parker was warmly welcomed by the Guangzhou residents of all classes.²⁸ Lin Zexu and Qi Ying, both having served as Imperial Commissioners, sought medical advice from the Hospital.²⁹ Even Xu Guangjin, the Liang-

²⁴ Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, p.111.


²⁵ Raymond David Lum, *Philanthropy and Public Welfare in Late Imperial China*, p.2.

²⁶ *Canton Register*, 2 June, 1835, p.86.

²⁷ *Chinese Repository*, vol.19, no.5, May, 1850, p.288.

²⁸ These included county magistrates, the Hoppo, provincial judges, private secretaries to the governor, and even officials from other provinces. See *Chinese Repository* and Sara Waitstill Tucker, *The Canton Hospital and Medicine in Nineteenth Century China, 1835-1900* for details.

²⁹ *Chinese Repository*, vol.8, no.12, April, 1840, p.625; vol.13, no.6, June, 1844, pp.302-3; vol.9, no.5, May, 1850, p.254.



Guang Governor-General in the late 1840s and 1850s and one who showed uncompromising hostility towards foreigners, made honorable and complimentary allusions to this institution.³⁰

The Hospital was not successful in promoting Christianity among the Chinese although this was the aim of its establishment, but it was undisputedly successful in winning the support and confidence of the native Chinese for its effectiveness in curing various kinds of diseases. For example, the second quarterly report in 1836, just half a year after the establishment of the Hospital, stated:

"Had the object been to swell the catalogue of patients received, and were the strength of an individual sufficient for the task of an adequate attendance, the aggregate might have been thousands. The difficulty has been in avoiding applications, rather than in obtaining patients. For nearly a month, the doors were nominally closed against new applicants...."³¹

The Hospital became more popular as time elapsed. The ninth report of the Hospital in 1838, three years after its establishment, read:

"The growing confidence reposed by the people in the skill of the foreign surgeon has been strongly displayed, in the degree of readiness with which they submit to painful operations, and even the loss of limbs...."³²

The demand for Western medicine grew so intensively that it prevented the Hospital from concentrating on ophthalmology, and it subsequently developed into a general hospital. However, this development reflected the Hospital's success and its popularity among the residents.


Impact of the foreigners on local administration

The above achievements in fire fighting techniques and medical management dem-

³⁰ *Chinese Repository*, vol.19, no.5, May, 1850, p.254.

³¹ *Chinese Repository*, vol.5, no.1, May, 1836, pp.32-3.


³² *Chinese Repository*, vol.7, no.11, March, 1839, p.569.



onstrated to the local Chinese the foreigners' ability and expertise in running urban affairs. As the Chinese were ready to accept some pragmatic Western methods in conducting some aspects of public affairs, it was not impossible that city administration would have been modernized on the basis of the Western model as the local Chinese had enjoyed benefits from the adoption of the western experience. A Western-style municipal modernization program however did not materialize before the Second Opium War as traditional Chinese political and cultural values were still dominant. Westerners as a whole were still contemptuously termed "foreign devils" (*fangui*), whose culture was assumed to be far inferior to Chinese culture. Local officials in Guangzhou adopted a two-handed policy towards the foreigners. On the one hand, foreigners had to be controlled and repressed if necessary, to dignify the Chinese Emperor, and on the other hand, some of their pragmatic facilities might be utilized but with some restrictions. The officials appreciated the effectiveness of the fire engines in extinguishing fire, but did not admire it as a preventive measure and there are no records or reports in the first half of the nineteenth century about the official purchase of such engines. Hong merchants and native residents, not the officials and the government runners, took up the job of buying and driving the fire engines.³³ It was therefore not surprising to find that the use of fire engines was restricted to the area around the Thirteen Hongs in the western suburbs, with the western part of the Outer City as the farthest limit.

Further development of Western-style medical practice was also blocked when the local officials showed firm opposition to the establishment of a floating hospital in

³³ According to the local news reports, it was the coolies employed by the Hongs and foreigners who became the first expert firemen in Guangzhou and helped drive the engines on all occasions of fires near the Thirteen Hongs. *Chinese Repository*, vol.4, no.1, May, 1835, p.33; vol.12, no.10, October, 1843, p.560; *Canton Register*, 9 June, 1835, p.91.



Huangpu in the late 1830s, a project which was supported by Lord Napier in 1834.³⁴ The support of the Hong merchants for the establishment of this floating hospital further suggests that these people, who were the pioneers in familiarizing themselves with Western practice, failed to influence and change the conservative local officials in improving city administration. As a result of the politicization of urban issues, Guangzhou failed to make use of its exclusive advantage of interacting with foreigners to modernize itself. After 1842, Guangzhou was gradually surpassed by other new treaty ports, notably Shanghai, in urban administration.

The trend of self-government

Guangzhou was not transformed into a modernized city in the Western sense before the Second Opium War despite its experience in “barbarian management”, but this special kind of management contributed nonetheless to the development of self-governance in Guangzhou, which was uniquely explicit and strong compared to other Chinese cities. This does not mean that the rise of autonomous force was solely a consequence of foreign interaction. Evidence shows convincingly that such a trend was indigenous in nature. The foreign factor only served to stimulate the existing trend. Before discussing how interaction with the West stimulated this autonomous trend in the first half of the nineteenth century, it is important to trace such a trend to show its indigenous origins.

³⁴ Before the First Opium War, foreign sailors were not allowed to go ashore at Huangpu and it was too inconvenient to go back to Macao for medical treatment in case of serious diseases. A surgeon named T.R. Colledge initiated the project of establishing a floating hospital, an idea fully sanctioned by Lord Napier before his death in Macao. *Chinese Repository*, vol.3, no.8, December, 1834, p.375; vol.7, no.1, May, 1838, p.56; vol.7, no.9 January, 1839, pp.481-2; *Canton Register*, 26 June, 1838, p.103.



Background to the growth of self-government: the inadequacy of official rule

Guangzhou's self-governing trend was rooted in the inadequacy of official rule. This does not imply that the local bureaucrats at various levels did nothing about local administration. On the contrary, they showed extensive interest in local administration including public security, criminal affairs, education, public morality, sanitation, transportation and economic affairs. However, the officials just proclaimed, but did not govern effectively. It is noteworthy that they issued proclamations on all matters of urban life, but except for publicizing their attitudes these proclamations were in fact not actualized in practice. As mentioned above, the foreigners' intentional violation of official regulations was seldom met by any policing on the part of the local government, and this fully demonstrated the officials' loose adherence to the established laws. The native residents were equally used to these "strict" proclamations, and their indifference to such proclamations was seldom punished by the officials. Officials issued lengthy proclamations ordering the residents to produce their own fire-fighting tools such as buckets, fire hoses and ladders, and reminding them to raise alarm in case of fire. The residents simply chose to ignore such notices.³⁵ As a result, the governmental efforts at fire prevention were futile. While the governmental policies had been too simple to cope with the complicated urban society, the local officials even did not have the necessary policing power and other executive measures to carry out such policies.

The inadequacy of policing power was ironically accompanied by the adoption of threats and punishment as the major tools used by local officials in the day-to-day run-

³⁵ For such proclamations, see Ning Liti, *Yue Dong shengli xinzuan*, pp.726-8; *Chinese Repository*, vol.16, no.7, July, 1847, pp.331-5. A proclamation by the Nanhai Magistrate in 1847 read "It is also necessary that the public furnish a discreet and able man [in the streets] who shall be appointed to procure labor and have the general oversight of business. Then if he gives his sole and undivided attention to affairs, they will proceed without difficulty, and the trouble of endless discussions will be avoided."



ning of the city. The principle of prohibitory measures was to make use of the residents' fear and create respect for the authorities to encourage good behavior of the residents. Government officials also employed threats to control their subordinates to secure their proper behavior.³⁶ Prohibitory orders did provide some useful guidelines in running the city and keeping it in good order. For example, dragon-boat races were officially banned to prevent causalities.³⁷ But in reality, the residents ignored the proclamations and the officials just stood idle when the competitions took place. Residents also ignored the officially imposed curfew.³⁸

The inadequacy of policing power and the futility of the prohibitory measures further exposed the weakness of the local government in implementing the much needed urban construction and improvement in local urban affairs.³⁹ Even maintenance work was not conducted in a proper manner. The maintenance of the city wall is a good example. The county magistrates were responsible for the maintenance work, but they always failed to keep it in good conditions. It was "suddenly" discovered in 1847, when Guangzhou was embroiled in the controversy with Britain over the

³⁶ In 1830, the Governor-General threatened to report the "incompetence" of the Nanhai and Panyu Magistrates to the Emperor if they could not solve the problem of robbery. *Canton Register*, 17 July, 1830, p.57.

³⁷ *Canton Register*, 14 April, 1835, p.58.

³⁸ On some occasions, it was ordered that the Guangzhou residents should remain in their houses after 10 p.m. to check incendiarism, but the residents generally did not obey this and incendiarism was reportedly still frequent. (*Canton Register*, 3 November, 1832, p.122; 3 December, 1832, p.134) Concerning the dragon-boat competition, the residents never obeyed the prohibitory proclamations by the officials, in spite of frequent causalities. (*Ibid*, 5 July, 1828, p.101)

³⁹ There were some exceptions to this assertion, such as the massive re-construction program conducted by Li Shizhen, Guangdong Viceroy from 1682 to 1687. This program aimed at dealing with the decaying situation brought by the war with Shang Kexi. It dealt with some social problems such as the construction of free graveland, re-settlement of the boat population and the fighting against bandits, which to some extent had solved some pressing urban problems. Viceroy Li also completed some important constructions, such as the Altar for Land and Grain (*Sheji tan*) and the Altar for Homeless (*Li tan*). However, Viceroy Li's greatest accomplishment rested with the recovery of Confucian order and the exemplification of the dignity of the imperial rule, an ideology shared by all government officials. See Wang Liqi, *Li Shizhen Li Xu fuzi nianpu*, pp.123-236; Qiu Juchuan, *Yangcheng guchao*, pp.170, 176, 574, 576; Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*,




city entry issue, that there were large-scale cave-ins in 80 spots of the city wall. After repeated orders from the Governor-General and the Viceroy, the magistrates finally made some repairs. However, only 15 spots were repaired, and 173 breaks in the wall were reported in the next year.⁴⁰ While work of such urgency was dealt with in a procrastinating manner, positive and active construction in other fields of urban affairs was beyond the capabilities and resources of the local officials.

All the above administrative limitations may be explained by two reasons. The first was institutional. Urban issues were presumably taken care by officials of various levels, that is, provincial, prefectural and county officials, who were stationed in the same city. Their administrative responsibility covered the whole province, prefecture or county, but not specifically Guangzhou city. There was no particular institution similar to a “municipality” in the Western sense to specialize in dealing with various city affairs and problems in Guangzhou. The existence of three sets of officials, whose job nature was more or less the same, frequently caused administrative confusion. The administrative division of the walled city under Panyu and Nanhai counties further divided administrative responsibility. Occasionally, such officials competed in issuing proclamations on the same issue.⁴¹ On other occasions, they all neglected certain important issues until they urgently needed to be addressed, for example, the repair of the city wall. Therefore, the officials usually remained idle in dealing with most urban issues. For example, the Xiguan Fire of 1822 had left “a huge mound of earth and rubbish” in front of the American Factory, which developed into a rubbish dump and even a place of burial, causing great nuisance to the foreigners. The dump was not

p.552.

⁴⁰ *Daoguang jian Guangdong fangwu weikan wendu liu zhong*, pp.693-9.

⁴¹ For example, the Provincial Administrator, the Hoppo and the Governor-General issued the same



removed until 1828 when the foreigners made strong protestations and used coercion on the local officials.⁴² Charitable activities were occasionally provided, such as when a newly appointed Guangdong viceroy distributed new clothes to the half-starved and half-naked trackers.⁴³ However, social problems were normally left unattended. Beggars were prevalent in the city, and their bodies after death were left on the streets without any measure taken by the government to deal with this problem.⁴⁴ The indifference of the local officials to urban problems urgently needed to be remedied, and this urgency facilitated the rise of autonomy in the city.

The second reason accounting for the lack of administrative competence was the financial weakness of the local government. Taxes collected by the local officials were at the complete discretion of the central government. The local government had to depend on “contributions” (*juan*), which were extra taxes levied on various trades. Even activities banned by the central government, for example, gambling, were sanctioned upon the payment of taxes.⁴⁵ The heavy dependence on such irregular taxes, which were largely shouldered by the merchants, was reflected in Table 3.1, which shows the sources of revenue from May, 1854 to June, 1855 for the campaign against the Heaven and Earth Society which took the opportunity of the Taiping Rebellion to

edict regarding the passage boats in April and May, 1838. *Canton Register*, 8 May, 1838, p.74.

⁴² The foreigners' strong desire of a clean environment, accompanied by the wish to avoid disturbance from the Chinese, accounted for their long intention to enclose their settlement. Enclosure would allow the foreigners to have the discretion to rule the area, avoiding dumping by the local Chinese and to keep out the beggars. For the foreigners' eagerness to remove the nuisances, see William C. Hunter, *The “Fan Kwae” at Canton Before Treaty Days 1825-1844*, p.70; *Canton Register*, 8 November, 1827, p.1; 15 January, 1828, p.17.

⁴³ John Barrow, *Travels in China, Containing Descriptions, Observations, and Comparisons, Made and Collected in the Course of A Short Residence at the Imperial Palace of Yuen-min-yuen, and on A Subsequent Journey Through the Country from Pekin to Canton*, p.562.

⁴⁴ For example, see *Canton Register*, 14 June, 1828, p.96; 2 September, 1829, p.77; 8 March, 1832, p.28; 20 May, 1834, p.80; *Chinese Repository*, vol.2, no.12, April, 1834, pp.574-5.

⁴⁵ “Gambling house” was also known as “custom house, which paid a certain amount of “custom” (tax) to the local officials to get a license.



attack Guangzhou and other places in Guangdong Province. The proportion of government income compared to the revenue raised from gentry and merchants was roughly one to five. The fight against Britain in the First Opium War depended much on the generous support of the local merchants.⁴⁶ The implication was clear enough. The local government was not self-supporting in dealing with serious affairs such as warfare or rebellion. The merchants made contributions not only during wartime, but also for urban affairs whenever funds were deemed necessary. Research shows that contribution by the Conscoo, the public body of the Hong merchants, for various uses by the Qing government amounted to 4,165,000 taels in the first thirty-five years of the nineteenth century.⁴⁷ In 1842, Pan Shicheng, a Hong merchant, initiated the repairing of the examination hall, which previously had been maintained by the provincial officials.⁴⁸ Pan not only initiated the project but financed it as well. While the officials only donated 1,000 taels, he made a contribution of 20,040 taels.⁴⁹ In a government document listing the names of the donors, the names of the officials only appeared after Pan, reflecting the prominence of Pan as the chief financier of the project.⁵⁰ This single event suggested that local merchants were more resourceful and enthusiastic than the officials in funding and participating in urban administration.

⁴⁶ These merchants included the Hong merchants, salt merchants and other native merchants. Their contribution was remarkable. Only a few examples are enough to illustrate this point. The Hong merchants donated eighty-six thousand taels in 1839 to build new forts around Guangzhou (*Chouban yiwu shimo (Daoguang chao)*, p.93). One hundred thousand taels were donated by the Hong merchants for Macao's defense (Ning Liti, *Yue Dong shengli xinzuan*, p.309). One hundred and twenty thousand taels were granted by the Hong merchants and salt merchants to the local government in 1842 for the use of the local government (*Chouban yiwu shimo (Daoguang chao)*, p.858).

⁴⁷ Kuo-Tung Anthony Ch'en, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760-1843*, p.95.

⁴⁸ Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, p.49.

⁴⁹ Ning Liti, *Yue Dong shengli xinzuan*, p.717.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*




Table 3.1 Sources of revenue for the campaign against the Heaven and Earth Society, May, 1854 to April, 1855

Source of income	Amount (tael)
Governmental income	552,169
Revenue directly or indirectly associated with the gentry and merchants*	2,706,779
Others	107,130
Total:	3,366,078

Source: Guangdong wenshi yanjiusuo and Zhongshan daxue lishixi (ed.), *Guangdong Hongbing qiyi shiliao*, pp.327-9.


* This included interest from the money deposited by the merchants, and contributions made by the merchants and street residents.

Institutional foundation for self-governance: Streets

The above institutional and financial limitations on local administration gave rise to a movement for local self-government, which gained strength in the first half of the nineteenth century. The basis of this force rested in the streets. Many urban historians, for example, William Rowe who has written impressively on Hankou, recognized the guilds as the most important element directing both social and economic life.⁵¹ This assertion is not applicable to pre-Second Opium War Guangzhou where the strength of guild still remained small. It was the street that served as the effective unit of administration and mobilization. As a result of its long history, and its well-developed commercial activities, Guangzhou was famous for her numerous streets and variegated street scenes. In 1897, the number of streets in Guangzhou had exceeded two thousand.⁵² Therefore, the data included in *Guangzhou chengfang zhi* (Gazetteer of Guangzhou Streets), a famous work by Huang Foyi published in the late 1940s, are definitely incomplete, but it is a good source to show the widespread distribution of streets in the Guangzhou city (as summarized in Table 3.2). According to Huang's

⁵¹ See William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889*, pp.319-20.

⁵² HZRB, 31 December, 1897.



work, there were a rough total of 464 recognizable streets in Guangzhou excluding Honam, with 207 within the wall and 257 in the suburbs, most of which had been opened before the mid-Qing. This extensive network of streets corresponded to the wide distribution of merchants. Although Xiguan was always regarded as the area of concentrated business activities, a recent survey of Guangzhou's old enterprises reflects that there were commercial establishments in every part of the walled city, especially in the eastern part of the Inner City (that is, the administrative zone of the city) and the western part of the Outer City.⁵³ The statistics on the number of burnt houses in the 1835 Outer City fire illuminated the prominence of merchants in the composition of street residents. Among the fourteen hundred houses consumed by fire, more than one thousand were shops.⁵⁴ These petty-merchants were the major inhabitants who played a crucial role in street management, providing manpower and money for specific projects.

Table 3.2
The number of recognizable streets in late Qing Guangzhou


Place of the city	Number of streets
Inner City	158
Outer City	49
Western Suburb	194
Eastern Suburb	33
Southern Suburb	27
Northern Suburb	3
Total:	464

Source: Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*⁵⁵

⁵³ This point is made on the basis of the materials in Zhen Ren and Tan Shaopeng (ed.), *Guangzhou zhuming laozihao*, 2 vol.

⁵⁴ *Chinese Repository*, vol.4, no.7, December, 1835, p.390.

⁵⁵ The book actually does not tell the exact number of streets in various parts of Guangzhou City. Maps and information from local gazetteers are used to compare with Huang's data to draw the rough figures presented in the table. The number of streets in the city must be greater as there were numerous streets on the maps simply labeled as "perpendicular street" (*zhi jie*) or "horizontal street" (*heng jie*), which are not counted as recognizable streets here. I am much indebted to Sharon Lai who has skillfully sorted out the confusing data and prepared the figures.




The street was the place where residents performed all their daily activities. Sir John Bowring vividly described the typical street scene: everything was done in the streets; reading, writing, carving, cooking, eating, drinking, smoking, singing, gambling and fortune-telling. Great self-control was necessary amidst the multitude of noisy coolies who ran about with their bamboo-supported burdens, calling on everybody to get out of their way, which one must do, to avoid being covered with filth or colliding with buckets, baskets, jars, water, chests, chairs and a thousand other dancing things borne along in full swing.⁵⁶

The street was characterized by its multi-functions. Street was the basic unit in the city for the protection of the life and property of the residents. Headed by constables, the street residents made arrangements for a constant nocturnal watch. They funded the construction of gates and rails, which were shut up every night to prevent crime. Watch-towers were always constructed during winter when fire and thievery were more frequent. Watchmen and constables were responsible for warning the residents in case of fire and thievery. There is evidence to show that the streets' self-defense was always more effective and self-initiative than the government police.⁵⁷ Street residents were assumed to keep sets of fire-fighting tools following the instructions of the local government. There were special wells called *taiping jing* (peace and tranquillity wells) in every street reserved for use during fire. Street residents were

⁵⁶ J.Y. Wong, "Sir John Bowring and the Canton City Question", *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester*, vol.56, no.1, 1973, p.228.

⁵⁷ For example, the constable reported accidents and took the wounded to the officials. *Canton Register*, 19 July, 1836, p.114. Another instance shows that the constable dealt with a poisoning case and reported to the Nanhai Magistrate. *Canton Register*, 3 July, 1830, p.53. On the other hand, there were occasional reports concerning the dereliction of duty of the official night police. For example, see *Canton Register*, 27 October, 1835, p.169.



also assigned the job of cleaning the streets by the magistrates.⁵⁸ Residents initiated the repair of roads and bridges.⁵⁹ Rich residents occasionally funded some entertainments.⁶⁰ The street also served as a ritual unit as there was a shrine in every street.⁶¹ The reality of street as an effective administrative unit was recognized by the officials who granted street residents the legal use of spears and hooks as weapons to resist robbers and other kinds of criminals.⁶² Zhu Guizhen, the Guangdong Viceroy (1830-1833), reiterated the responsibility of the street constables and street seniors to check unauthorized assembly by the masses.⁶³ All these facts show that the street was more than a unit of social life and self-defense: it was a unit of legitimate power playing a supplementary role to official administration.

The Qing government adopted the *baojia* system to organize the population in its empire for the taking of census and self-defense.⁶⁴ However, the *baojia* organizations in reality were also responsible for policing the city and preventing crimes. As streets also functioned as a self-defense unit as described above, to what extent was “street” associated with the “*baojia*” system as a grassroots-level administrative device? According to the *baojia* system, ten households would be organized into a *pai*, ten *pai* into a *jia*, and ten *jia* into a *bao*. Each unit elected its own head. In other words, the

⁵⁸ For example, see the notice issued by the Nanhai Magistrate in 1848. *Chinese Repository*, vol.18, no.12, December, 1849, p.664.

⁵⁹ *Chinese Repository*, vol.9, no.7, November, 1840, p.485.


⁶⁰ For example, during the birthday of Huaguang, the “God of Fire”, rich residents staged some plays after the rites. *Canton Register*, 29 September, 1835, p.153.

⁶¹ See John C. Kerr, *A Guide to the City and Suburbs of Canton*, p.2.

⁶² This legality is noted in a proclamation of the Panyu Magistrate in 1829. *Canton Register*, 3 October, 1829, p.85.

⁶³ *Chinese Repository*, vol.1, no.11, March, 1833, p.465.

⁶⁴ *Baojia* literally means “security groups and tithings”, and was translated as “Community self-defense system” by Charles O. Hucker. See Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, p.367.




system was organized at the bottom of society. In Guangzhou, however, the operation of the system functioned in a different way. The city was divided into several sections (*duan*), each with a sectional head, and these sections were coordinated by a *baojia zongju* (*Baojia Bureau*). Although the street which was made up of households was still the basic component of this system, the *baojia* system in Guangzhou was primarily bureaucratic in design. This reflected the major difference between street and *baojia*, that is, the former was a natural formation serving the interest of the street and the street members, and the latter was a bureaucratic establishment. Due to limited resources, a street might not always respond to the call of the *baojia zongju*. In other words, streets rarely identified themselves as a sub-organization of the *baojia* system, but saw themselves as self-contained and self-purposed units. The *Shen bao* reported that street organizations were unconcerned with *baojia* affairs since the inception of the system.⁶⁵ The ineffectiveness of the *baojia* system in Guangzhou showed in an indirect way that the numerous streets could not be easily controlled by any bureaucratic establishments, but by the streets themselves. Street residents chose to use their own resources to administer their affairs.

The street as an autonomous unit became more explicit after the beginning of the nineteenth century. The local government became financially weak and shifted more responsibilities to the street. The dredging of the Six Artery Ditches (*Liumai qu*) is a notable example. The ditches were vital for discharging waste water in the city into the Pearl River. Frequent dredging was necessary to clear the silts which might create great sanitary problems.⁶⁶ This was originally the responsibility of the county magis-

⁶⁵ *Shen bao*, 30 September, 1892.

⁶⁶ Pan Shangji, et al, *Nanhai xianzhi* (1835), vol.5, p.64. The arteries ran through the whole city functioning as an extensive drainage to remove rain water and sewage in both traditional and contemporary Guangzhou. For greater details of the Six Artery Ditches, see Chen Kun, *Liumai qu*



trates. However, this dredging work was gradually shifted to the merchants and residents of various streets. The government would only subsidize those who were “really poor”. This change was recorded in an official regulation in the Daoguang era.⁶⁷ Although this shift of duty was clearly an exploitation of the street residents, it implies that the street was tacitly recognized by the local government as a legitimate unit of city administration performing complicated functions.

The growing strength of this autonomous force in Guangzhou can be illustrated by two events, both of which happened in the western suburbs. The above-mentioned Xiguan Fire in 1822 completely destroyed two prosperous streets, namely the Fifteenth Ward (Shiwu fu) and the Sixteenth Ward (Shiliu fu), an area inhabited by rich merchants. Having decided to abandon the scorched area because of the great difficulty of re-construction, the occupants raised enormous subscriptions and moved the two wards northwards, an action which commanded lower costs and facilitated faster completion.⁶⁸ This symbolized the merchants’ high responsiveness, flexibility and ability in decision-making, not only in trying to recover losses, but also in making planned improvements. This contrasted sharply with the Qing government’s inability to fund the restoration of the Ming examination hall at the foot of Yuexiu Hill, which, according to the dictates of *fengshui*, commanded a very distinguished topography compared to the poor topography and dreary aspect of the newly built examination hall at the southeast corner of the Inner City.⁶⁹


While the above event showed the ability of merchants and street residents in mak-

tushuo. This is included in Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, pp.719-25.

⁶⁷ Ning Liti, *Yue Dong shengli xinzuan*, pp.726-8.

⁶⁸ Guangzhou shi Liwan qu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi (ed.), *Liwan quqing yaolan*, p.19; Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, p.383.

⁶⁹ Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, p.113.



ing responsive decisions, the following event would show their potential institutional strength. In 1830, street residents in Xiguan signed an agreement to form a larger association for the sake of protecting themselves from the attack of bandits. They set up some regulations to be obeyed by every signatory street. Affirming that "association of the inhabitants is the best way of attacking banditti", the regulations read:

"To defend each other they [the streets] enter into a subscription, partly assessed and partly voluntary. The sum assessed is one dollar per annum. The subscriptions amount to 3, 7, 8, or 10 Dollars. The Principle is, reward & forfeit. The subscribers all engage to come forward at the sound of the tocsin; to seize thieves, robbers &c. The public purse rewards the most vigilant with 10, 15, or 50, dollars, as the case may be; those who shun their duty, pay a forfeit. If the contracting parties engage in law-suits the PUBLIC PURSE must pay. If wounds be received, it must pay the Doctor; and if death occurs, it must pay the Parson - i.e. the funeral expenses, sacrificial rites &c &c."⁷⁰

The reason why Xiguan was the first place to witness the rise of such an organization is simple. Xiguan was a vast plain, accessible both to the Pearl River in the south and the numerous villages and towns in the north. Therefore, it was open to attack by rebels and pirates. Exclusion from the walled city meant weak governmental protection which made the merchants, who benefited from the trade conducted there, contribute funds to guard themselves from the loss of life and property. This spontaneous organization gained tacit consent from the local officials. This experiment exemplified the feasibility of the street as an element upon which larger amalgamation organizations might be constructed.

⁷⁰ *Canton Register*, 4 January, 1830, pp.2-3.



Institutional foundation for self-governance: Hong merchants and the gentrified merchants

Granted that the street was the potential basis for a larger unit of autonomous organization, such an organization needed professional and effective leadership. The Hong merchants were suitable candidates. Their capability in urban administration was acquired in the course of “barbarian management” before the First Opium War, by assuming sole responsibility in dealing with foreigners. After a new system of “security merchants” was introduced around 1735, these Hong merchants were put in charge of trade affairs and all other matters associated with foreigners.⁷¹ Due to the unwillingness of the local officials to deal with foreigners, the Hong merchants assumed the responsibility to “prevent... any breach of the ‘rules and regulation’ under which foreigners lived in or out of their Factories, to watch that they were ‘duly obedient’ as regards excursions.”⁷² They were granted considerable discretionary powers to deal with the foreigners. The complexity and comprehensiveness of “barbarian management” in turn increased the Hong merchants’ capability in developing a proto-municipality in Guangzhou. They functioned as property dealers by building the Thirteen Factories Street and a number of “factories” which were rented to the foreign merchants. They employed guards to maintain order in the area.⁷³ They were further charged with the responsibility of dealing with all criminal affairs concerning foreigners, especially sailors who from time to time caused troubles when wandering in the streets amongst the foreign “factories”.⁷⁴ Transportation was another field which the Hong merchants had authority. They owned many small boats, primarily Tanka boats,

⁷¹ Anthony Ch'en, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760-1843*, p.8.

⁷² William C. Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, p.219.

⁷³ Liang Jiabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, p.137; Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, p.395.

⁷⁴ Liang Jiabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, p.131.



for transportation between the Huangpu port and the foreign “factories”. The Thirteen Factories zone had served as a nurturing ground to develop the Hong merchants’ ability in dealing with comprehensive and complicated duties, in turn making them more professional than either the local officials or the ordinary street residents in urban administration. They were praised by foreigners as “intelligent, influential, and well-bred” and “honourable, liberal, genial”.⁷⁵


Moreover, the Hong merchants had long been used to conducting their business in an institutionalized manner. They formed their own organization, that is, *hangshang gongsuo*, known as Consoo to the foreigners, which served as the assembly of the Hong merchants for reaching compromises concerning foreign trade and matters of common interest.⁷⁶ Sometimes, even foreigners were invited to participate in the Consoo meetings, which showed that the Consoo was to some extent an open, representative institution of collective decision-making.⁷⁷ Financially, the Consoo was self-supporting through levying a kind of regular surtax on imported goods called “Consoo charges”. It should be recognized that no matter how great the discretionary power they might have had, the Consoo and the Hong merchants were still agents of the local government, commissioned to deal with the foreigners and were subject to governmental control. It may be due to this governmental control that historians have not pointed out the autonomous ability and actions of the Hong merchants. Indeed, the Hong merchants and their Consoo had evolved from their simple duty of dealing with foreigners and trade into a proto-type of municipal authority.⁷⁸ In the area under their

⁷⁵ William C. Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, p.218.

⁷⁶ Liang Jiabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, pp.391-2.

⁷⁷ For example, in the committee appointed for the examination of Hingtae Hong’s accounts, three out of the six members were foreigners. *Canton Register*, 29 August, 1837, p.144.

⁷⁸ The local officials occasionally exerted threats and severe punishment on the Hong merchants.




jurisdiction, they took charge of all affairs including street administration, property management, personnel management, police, markets, hygiene, transportation, fire-fighting, and even diplomacy.

As the Hong merchants enjoyed discretionary power endorsed by the government, and as they had developed what can be characterized as an open-minded mentality, they dared to act on their own will and challenged the official lines. This departure was partially due to their discontent with the local government which did not always accept the Hong merchants' suggestions. The above-mentioned case that the Hong merchants supported a proposal made by the foreigners to set up a floating hospital at Huangpu is an example. Another example is that Howqua, a prominent Hong merchant, made a huge donation of twenty thousand taels of silver for the immediate relief of the 1829 inundation. However, the local government used that sum of money for profit-making.⁷⁹

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Hong merchants enhanced their social status and influence in the field of local administration by initiating or participating in public welfare projects beyond the area of the Thirteen Factories. The year 1810 was a milestone for the Hong merchants. The Guangdong Viceroy sanctioned a

Hong merchants who had incurred debts to the foreigners might suffer exile to Yili. Liang Jiabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, pp.390-1; *Chinese Repository*, vol.1, no.10, February, 1833, p.424; *Canton Register*, 14 April, 1835, p.58. They were also subject to sentence by the local magistrate. For example, Lu Guanheng, known as Mowqua to foreigners, was sentenced by the Nanhai Magistrate in 1807 as a result of a fighting between the foreign sailors and officials of the Guangzhou Customs. Liang Jiabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, p.394.

⁷⁹ Howqua originally proposed that the local government would serve as a middlemen to transfer the money to the sufferers in a village of the Guangzhou suburbs. The government did not follow the proposal of Howqua, and used the donations for repairing dykes. After the donations had been consumed, the local government found that the reinforced dykes had been repaired by the inhabitants themselves before the flooding. The local government then ordered that the consumed donations should be regarded as a loan to the inhabitants, and they should repay the debts to the government, not the donor, in two years. This occasioned a great deal of murmuring among the Guangzhou people, and Howqua was reported feeling too foolish to put the donations under the administration of the government. See *Canton Register*, 16 July, 1829, p.69.




large-scale dredging of the Xiguan rivers, which was funded by the native merchants and residents. After the dredging was over, the Hong merchants donated a house in Xiguan to set up a Dredging Office (*Xiu hao gongsuo*) to take over the work of future dredging from the local government. The Office simultaneously functioned as a college, called Wenlan College for academic interflow. The Hong merchants also donated some property for lease, and the income would be used for further dredging.⁸⁰ This marked the extension of power of the Hong merchants to the whole of Xiguan, not only geographically but also functionally and institutionally through developing a new decision-making institution to take over some functions of the local government. The opening of the new College even enhanced the social status of the Hong merchants and made them more akin to the gentry as recognized local leaders.

Their provision of social services revealed the question of social identity. Their participation in the establishment of “voluntary granaries” (*yicang*) would serve as a case study. The Eastern and Western Huiji Granaries were established in 1837 to solve the problem of rice shortage resulting from the increased allocation of farmland for cash crops.⁸¹ Out of the total donation of 120,000 taels, 46,000 taels were made

⁸⁰ Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, pp.574-5; Liang Jiabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, p.409. Hong merchants who had made donations included Wu Bingjian (Howqua), Pan Changyao (Conseequa), Mai Qinting (Poonequa), Li Yanyu (Loqua), Lu Guanheng (Mowqua), Liu Dezhang (Chunqua), Liang Jingguo (Kinqua), Guan Xiang (Manhop), Xie Jiawu (Goqua) and Li Xiefa (Fatqua). There were another two donors who were not recognizable.

⁸¹ In 1727, Yang Wenqian, the Guangdong Viceroy, submitted a memorial to the Throne, stating that rice production in Guangdong could not meet the demand of the inhabitants. Even if there was bumper harvest, only half of the demand could be met. It was because the fields were used for commercial crops such as longan, litchi, sugar cane and tobacco leaf. Rice was imported from Guangxi which was in shortage. This issue was recorded in detail in Pan Shangji, *et al.*, *Nanhai xianzhi* (1835), vol.1, p.26. A degree-holder in the Daoguang era also wrote that “Guangdong people pursue profit in maritime trade. They do not favor agriculture which does not produce enough.” (Wu Daorong, *Guangdong wenzheng*, vol.5, p.353) This suggested commercialism had an early origin in the province. For rice production and consumption in Guangdong, also see Alfred H.Y. Lin, *The Rural Economy of Guangdong, 1870-1937: A Study of the Agrarian Crisis and its Origins in Southernmost China*.



by the Hong merchants.⁸² However, the Hong merchants did not mention their occupation as merchants but posed as degree-holders when they made donations for affairs of public concern.⁸³ This revealed that “gentry” was still a preferable social label for merchants, no matter how rich they were, when contributing to social services. The gentry commanded respect and obedience, and were the legitimate social group when various kinds of local affairs, such as burial and education, needed to be addressed.⁸⁴

A merchant, especially a successful one, always wanted to pursue the rest of his career as an official, or at least to have an official title. It was not unusual that local gentry were previously merchants, or had a merchant family background. The rise of the Xu family in Guangzhou represented such a case. Xu Baiting had been a salt merchant. His business brought him wealth and prestige. In the 1810s, facing a serious pirate disturbance along the Guangdong coast, he organized his own warship team and fought the enemies with greater enthusiasm than the governmental soldiers. His contribution was reported to the central government, and he was given a title of 3b grade. Xu was thus at once converted into an official, and participated in local politics and social affairs actively. Later, many of his descendants became influential in Chinese politics.⁸⁵

⁸² Liang Jiabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, pp.410-2. The contributions of the Hong merchants are as follows: Wu Chongyao (Howqua) 40,000 taels; Pan Wentao (Minqua) 2,000 taels; Xie Youren (Goqua) 2,000 taels; Wu Tianheng (Samqua) 1,000 taels; Yi Rongzhi (Footae) 1,000 taels.

⁸³ Liang Jiabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, p.412. For example, Wu Chongyao, known as Howqua to the foreigners, appeared as *juren*.

⁸⁴ In 1720 a number of gentry built the Home of Benevolence (*Dunren guan*) to collect the remains of the poor for burial. They also established a number of pieces of gravel land around the city, which gained the appreciation of the central government. The foreigners in the 1820s witnessed a local Chinese institution called the White Bone Society, whose function was similar to the Home of Benevolence. It is not known whether the two institutes were the same one. See Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, p.457; *Canton Register*, 9 August, 1828, p.122. For education, the gentry ran schools to educate the masses. For example, see the proclamation made by Zhu Guizhen, the Guangdong Viceroy, in 1833, *Chinese Repository*, vol.1, no.11, March 1833, pp.461-5.

⁸⁵ For example, Xu Xiangguang was Baiting's eldest son, who led the 1849 anti-British movement



After acquiring the status of “gentry”, merchants were able to take a more active and legitimate role in local affairs, backed by their financial strength. Considering that “buying official title” was so prevalent in the Qing Dynasty, the door of gentryship was always open to the merchants. For a city of enormous trade activities like Guangzhou, merchants with gentry titles, and “gentry” who gained their degrees by examination co-existed in great numbers. They formed a loose alliance, especially in the self-governance campaign which their leadership was needed to establish autonomous institutions.

Climax of autonomous organization: the anti-British campaign in the 1840s

The above discussion has argued that there were autonomous organizations in Qing Guangzhou, which gradually gained institutional strength in the form of street and merchant organizations in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, they did not constitute a clear movement of autonomy, basically because they were loosely organized, had limited geographical influence and there was no clear delineation of power and activities with the local government. This situation changed drastically after the First Opium War, and was directly associated with changes in the pattern of “barbarian management”. The post-war treaty settlement abolished the Hong merchants’ role as barbarian managers. Without the buffer of the Hong merchants, local officials came into direct interaction with the foreigners. These officials always chose to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the foreigners.⁸⁶ They intended to carry out the new pol-

in Guangzhou. Xu Yingkui was Baiting’s grandson, who was a trusted official of the Empress Cixi. The story of the Xu’s family is told in detail in Yi Ni, *Qianjiu jiaguo meng: Guangzhou Gaodi jie Xu shi jiazu*.

⁸⁶ Actually, the local government always chose to yield to the foreigners’ demand even before the Opium War. Although both the Penal Code of Qing China and the local officials claimed to uphold a determined ban on gambling, the officials often kept their eyes closed to the activities of the




icy that foreigners be allowed to enter the walled city of Guangzhou, as stipulated by the Treaty of Nanjing and applicable to other treaty ports, namely Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen and Fuzhou. This provision for the permanent residence of foreigners in the city was strongly opposed by the Cantonese, and, as Frederic Wakeman has pointed out, the local officials and the people were mutually alienated.⁸⁷ As a result, anti-foreign campaigns, notably anti-British campaigns associated with the above “Guangzhou city entry problem”, was a major local issue stimulating the development of autonomous institutions in the decade of the 1840s.

The level of autonomous institutionalization developed in line with the scale of antagonistic activities. It was a customary practice for the Guangzhou people to post placards (*changhong* or *jietie*) outside the foreign “factories” to impose threats. In addition to such written threats, further actions might be taken by a whole street to achieve a certain aim, for example, forbidding the residents to lease or sell their houses to the foreigners. Anti-foreignism served as an effective unifying force to push the street into a more “advanced” stage of autonomy by adopting collective actions, but by the mid-1840s it was still limited in terms of geographical expression, institutional structure and mass participation.

City-wide institutions showed signs of emerging in 1846. In January, there was a rumor that the British were about to enter the walled city. A riot broke out and some rioters burnt the *yamen* of Liu Xun, the Guangzhou Prefect, who was believed to have

gamblers and even legalized this banned activities to expand their revenue. However, the foreigners objected to the establishment of a gambling house in the Carpenter Square of the Thirteen Hong area. After repeated petitions to counteract the procrastinating attitude of the officials, the foreigners successfully made the Nanhai Magistrate pull down the gambling houses. See *Canton Register*, 26 January, 1836, p.14; 9 February, 1836, p.22.

⁸⁷ Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861*, pp.92-3. Also see John J. Nolde, “Xenophobia in Canton, 1842-1849”, *Journal of Oriental Studies*, vol.13, no.1, 1975, pp.1-22.



come to an agreement with the British.⁸⁸ Although the riot was quickly suppressed, anti-British sentiments remained fierce in the city. Representatives from the gentry and merchants issued a firm proclamation against the British's entry into the walled city.

It stated:

"For the protection of our families and the preservation of our lives we will firmly maintain the oaths we have taken, and never swerve from or alter our determination. If they [the British] truly keep their purpose, to enter the city, every house and every family will prepare heaps of stones, brickbats, &c., at their doors, and when the faithful signal the sounding of the gong is given, every street and lane shall be closed to prevent the escape [of the intruder]. If the barbarian multitude presume on force, and attack the gates, the people of every street will shower down their bricks and stones, and, shouting to each other from every quarter, will advance, slaughter the whole multitude, and then demolish their factories and burn up their ships, and allowing no one to escape."⁸⁹

It was simply a threat, but it clearly reflected that the Guangzhou people under the leadership of the gentry and merchants were well-prepared to develop some kind of city-wide organization involving "every house and every family" for the sake of self-protection.

Another massive clash more serious than the 1846 riot blazed up in the Thirteen Factories in April, 1847. A joint strike was set in by the masons and carpenters in the walled city.⁹⁰ Qi Ying, the Imperial Commissioner and Liang-Guang Governor-General, was denounced for his conciliatory attitude towards the British.⁹¹ The gentry in Guangzhou held an assembly and set some rules for defense against the British:

"Rule I. The inhabitants of all the shops and houses must hire militia, who will keep a constant patrol..."


"Rule II. Throughout the whole city, all the people must remove the boards

⁸⁸ *Chouban yiwu shimo (Daoguang chao)*, pp.1565-6.

⁸⁹ *Chinese Repository*, vol.15, no.1 (January, 1846), pp.49-50.

⁹⁰ *Chinese Repository*, vol.16, no.4 (April, 1847), p.189.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.188.



and panks from the roofs of their houses, and place instead many jars of water, ready to act against incendiaries; and must have ready prepared pots of lime, brickbats, stone, &c; and if they see a Barbarians enter the city, they must throw these down with thundering force, and not allow a single one to escape from their net.


"Rule III. ... Let all the people protect and defend each other, and forever guard their own possessions.

"Rule IV If any spread the report through the streets, that the Barbarians are entering the city, they must be traitors, designing by such reports to ascertain the actual condition of the city, and perhaps are seeking opportunities to plunder and rob. Let the inhabitants at once seize upon such and deliver them over, for examination, to the chiefs of the gentry; and if they are truly traitors, they must be sent to the proper authorities for trial; and if found to be good people, they must obtain from their neighbours and elders bonds for their good conduct, and then they may be liberated.

The above rules must be put in practice by the inhabitants of all the streets and lanes however small..."⁹²

These anti-foreign regulations were a benchmark for the development of autonomy in Guangzhou. They governed all streets in Guangzhou whatever their size. As a result, streets were transformed from scattered and unorganized self-contained units into components of a higher form of organization. They now emphasized some functions which were previously ignored, such as the maintenance of fire-fighting precautionary facilities. The most striking change was the role of the gentry (including merchants) in local administration. Traditionally, gentry exercised only informal power, playing a supplementary role in local administration. Their legitimacy and power rested finally on the consent of the local officials. Now, they gained the power to act independently because of alienation between the officials and the Guangzhou residents. Their independent acts can be shown in the above document. Firstly, when some suspects were seized, they were examined by the gentry, not the magistrates. Al-

⁹² *Ibid.*, p.192.




though such cases came under the final judgment of the local authorities, it must be remembered that in the past the constables had to report immediately to the local authorities when detecting any crime or disorder. Secondly, Rule IX stated that people spreading rumors that the British had entered the city would be regarded as "traitors". This should be understood as an explicit denunciation of the official policy that foreigners should be allowed to enter the walled city and that the Guangzhou people should welcome such entry. Through this regulation, the gentry conveyed a clear signal to the local government that officials would be equally treated as the enemy of the Guangzhou residents if they insisted on allowing foreigners to enter the walled city.

Furthermore, an autonomous organization of city-wide scale was created in 1849 to guard the city from the forced entry of the British.⁹³ This organization was under the leadership of Xu Xiangguang and Wu Bingjian. The former was a descendant of an eminent local salt merchant, while the latter was an ex-Hong merchant. The magnitude of the campaign was shown in the following official report:

"There are tens of millions of shops in the provincial capital. Each shop and each family donates a sum of money equivalent to one month's rent. Donations are equally shared by the owners and tenants.... The money is used for the employment of militia. A headquarters called Yicheng (Achieving Justice) Office will be established in the Guangzhou Prefectural Palace, directed by a number of elected gentry who must be honest and righteous. We are all comrades and shall make enthusiastic donations to achieve this righteous goal. The donated money shall be given to the person-on-duty in the Office and the gentry will keep the account to state clearly every item of income and expenditure. Money collected in the various streets shall be deposited in pawnshops in the streets. If there are no pawnshops in the streets, [the residents] should deposit their donations in shops which are rich and honest. And the money is for operating funds. People holding any posts shall not be paid in any form and they shall provide everything [stationery, furniture and so on] for themselves.... In case of death in battle, three dollars shall be given to the associated family for compensation."⁹⁴

⁹³ In 1847, Qi Ying made a promise to Sir George Bonham, the British Commissioner, that the British might enter the city in two years. Therefore, Bonham requested the materialization of the promise in 1849. *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao*, vol.7, pp.780-1.

⁹⁴ Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan (ed.), *Sanyuanli renmin kang Ying douzheng shiliao*,



Its strength and widespread influence on the city was reported in other non-governmental sources:

"Every household will provide men for the militia. Now there are over one hundred thousand men of militia in the streets of the Inner and Outer Cities. As all shops make donations, there has accumulated over hundreds of thousand dollars."⁹⁵

"[Xu Xiangguang]... tirelessly goes to every street and household persuading them to make donations. Guangzhou city, both within and without the city wall, is affected. Just in one month's time a militia of one million men has been organized. They are under the strict control of their respective streets.... The sum of money, which amounts to several hundred million taels, is entrusted to in the rich and honest merchants of respective streets..."⁹⁶

All this points to the institutionalization of autonomy in Guangzhou. Frederic Wakeman pointed out that a new administrative and fiscal system had been created parallel to the official system.⁹⁷ The officials played no role in this institutionalized organization which had its headquarters at the Guangzhou Prefectural Palace and extended its power over the whole city, embracing people of all classes.⁹⁸ Besides its institutional strength, this municipality-like organization was more impressive in terms of the functions it performed. Ordinary affairs originally administered by the streets were of course included, and were dealt with even more effectively.⁹⁹ It even took up some tasks hitherto performed by officials. One example was the attempt to conduct direct communication with the British government. The gentry and merchants wrote a letter to Sir George Bonham, persuading the British that they had no grounds to force entry

pp.286-7.

⁹⁵ *Chouban yiwu shimo (Daoguang chao)*, p.1675.

⁹⁶ *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao*, vol.7, pp.922-3.

⁹⁷ Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861*, p.151.

⁹⁸ Xu Guangjin and Ye Mingchen memorialized the Throne in 1849, stating that the militia were not "under the manipulation of the officials from the very beginning." *Chouban yiwu shimo (Daoguang chao)*, p.1678.

⁹⁹ It was revealed that crime and robbery in 1849 were more effectively checked than before. *Zhongguo di yi lishi dang'anguan* (ed.), *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao*, vol.7, p.929.



into the walled city.¹⁰⁰ In the midst of Sino-British hostility in the 1840s, the local government in Guangzhou was overshadowed by the unified force of the Guangzhou residents. The provincial officials praised the new institution, as shown in their firm support of its continual existence.¹⁰¹

Drawback of the development of self-government before the Second Opium War

However, it is important to point out that the limitations of this development of autonomy are more far reaching than its success. The extensive union of streets served only one aim, that is, anti-foreignism. After the British withdrew their decision of entering Guangzhou's walled city, the city-wide organization was quickly disbanded. Such an organization was re-established in 1854. Although it was still militant in nature, this time the enemy was not the British but the rebels of the Heaven and Earth Society. As a result, such city-wide organizations diverged significantly with the western concept of municipality whose origin was to improve the living environment on which the residents depended in order to conduct their various activities. In other words, institutional development of the street-based organizations did not lead to diversification of functions for improving the city infrastructure or solving urban problems. Taking the 1849 anti-British campaign as an example, there were no specialized personnel. All staff worked on a part-time basis. Xu and Wu as leaders were the exception, but they were exclusively concerned with the mobilization of the people and ask-

¹⁰⁰ It was stated that "All Chinese and foreigners can see that we Cantonese are unified and determined [to oppose your entry]. This is not the official orders that can let you enter." *Chouban yiwu shimo* (*Daoguang chao*), p.1675.

¹⁰¹ Xu Guangjin and Ye Mingchen memorialized the Throne, saying that "in the aftermath, the shops and households only need to pay the money, and the system can be run permanently." *Chouban yiwu shimo* (*Daoguang chao*), p.1678. Another memorial by the same officials reads "... it is obvious that protection given by the officials is much less effective than the commoners' self-protection." *Zhongguo di yi lishi dang'anguan* (ed.), *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao*, vol.7,



ing for donations from the residents. The administration of the various streets was still the job of the street constables. As urban administrators, the street constables differed little from the local officials who were also generalists, not urban specialists. In other words, the residents failed to transform the newly established autonomous institution into a truly municipal-wide creation to deal with various sustained and continuous urban problems.

Another weakness which prevented its further evolution was associated with the pro-official attitude of the leaders. This attitude was clearly shown in the leaders' proposal to erect tablets honoring Xu Guangjin, the Governor-General, and Ye Mingchen, the Viceroy, for "their success in preventing foreigners entering the city in April [1849]."¹⁰² It is fair to credit the leaders' ability in mobilizing and organizing the Guangzhou residents, but their pro-government attitude implied that the energetic organization they had created could not have replaced the incompetent local government but merely served as a voluntary supplement to the prevailing local administrative system.

Conclusion

Discussion in this chapter, and in the preceding chapter as well, showed that the local government had long been inactive in the administration of Guangzhou city. The day-to-day administration of various kinds of activities, such as expansion in the suburbs and re-construction after natural disasters, were all undertaken by informal administrators, primarily the merchants and street associations. However, an interlocking relationship between the informal and official administrations made neither part favor a



fundamental change of the traditional practice. The merchants and street associations fitted themselves into the vacuum created by the inadequacy of the local government, to exert their own will. But they still regarded the local government as the final jurisdiction. They never thought of taking over the whole urban administration from the local government.


As a provincial capital, Guangzhou's administrative uniqueness was shown by its long experience in dealing with the foreigner traders, and the wave of anti-foreignism in the 1840s. This worked for the development of autonomy, based on the augmentation of the informal administration, in two different ways. During the period of the "Guangzhou (Canton) trade", Guangzhou residents, especially the Hong merchants, benefited and learned from the Western experience of dealing with urban affairs. After the First Opium War, the anti-British sentiments helped to unify the local autonomous forces into a city-wide autonomous institution. However, the city-wide autonomous institution soon lost its momentum after the termination of the antagonistic relationship between the Qing government and the British, and leaders of the anti-British campaign took the initiative to seek recognition from the local government. This was due to two reasons. The first one was that the evolution of a city-wide institution was only temporary in nature, directed against foreign intrusion. The second one was that the city-wide organization only marked the maximum augmentation of street functions, that is, defense and police, under the leadership of pro-government merchants and gentry. Its seemingly institutionalized activities still operated within the old administrative mechanism, as shown by the direct control of the local officials immediately after the campaign was over. The organization was urban in form, but

¹⁰² *Chinese Repository*, vol.18, no.12, December, 1849, p.668.



military in essence.

From the experience of other treaty ports, notably Shanghai, commercial interaction between the local and foreign traders, and the existence of foreigner residents in the locality served as a catalyst to the modernization of urban administration of the treaty ports. Although Guangzhou had a longer history of interaction with foreigner traders and had benefited from the adoption of foreign approaches in some areas of urban administration, it lost her chance to evolve a truly autonomous body at the municipal level in the mid-nineteenth century. The influence of informal power, primarily that of the merchants, persisted and was even augmented after the subsidence of the anti-foreign campaign by the conclusion of the Second Opium War. However, the local government's attempt to end the "political anarchy" and its increasing interest in participating in local affairs in the reform era complicated the evolution of the administration of the city.



Chapter Four

Urban Planning and Infrastructure, 1860-1917

Guangzhou, like other treaty ports, underwent great changes in the modern era. It was one of the centers of reform undertaken by the Qing government. Self-strengthening officials, notably Zhang Zhidong and Zhou Fu, introduced many reform policies. Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao advocated even more fundamental reforms. Guangzhou became an important center of revolution during Sun Yatsen's republican campaign against the Manchu regime. Under these circumstances, Guangzhou was given an opportunity to transform itself into a modern city. This chapter will discuss the urban construction of Guangzhou in the period 1860-1917, and address the following questions: What were the urban problems faced by Guangzhou? Did the local government consciously adopt new planning tools to solve these problems? What were the attitudes of the residents to urban reforms? What were the major obstacles that hindered the modernization of Guangzhou in this period?

Background to the emergence of urban planning

Geographical setting

Every part of the city was undergoing change in the period concerned. For the walled city of Guangzhou, the density of population and buildings was increasing. The census conducted by the *Baojia* Bureau in 1895 revealed that the Inner City registered the highest concentration of population next to Xiguan,¹ notably in the southern and central parts of the Inner City which was, as pointed out in Chapter Two, a prosperous


¹ HZRB, 13 June, 1895.



area with a cluster of *yamens* and commercial activities. The northern part of the Inner City, relatively barren with fewer streets but plenty of ponds and farmland, caught the attention of the local government in the 1900s when new land was urgently needed to accommodate the large number of new government offices and buildings required for the new administrative “reforms” in late Qing. For example, the Great Marshal Pond (Jiangjun da yutang) at the foot of Yuexiu Hill near Dashi Street was reclaimed for building the Officials’ Children College in 1903.² In the same year, farmland growing vegetables near Tiangong Lane at the south of the Xiaobei (Little North) Gate was procured by Shen Fuyi, the Guangzhou Prefect, for the erection of the Political and Law Institute.³

While the northern part of the Inner City provided considerable land for these governmental projects, it was unsuitable for residential purposes because of the high costs of travel to the city center and the high cost of reclaiming the waste land. For residents of modest means, procuring land could be achieved by using low-cost methods, that is, occupying public land in the built-up areas for their own use, as mentioned in the Chapter Two. Such occupation of land was very notable over the channels of the Six Artery Ditches. After the Second Opium War, the government paid extra attention to maintaining the Ditches which were heavily damaged during the War. Dredging was repeatedly carried out. There were two such massive dredgings in 1870 and 1894 by Wang Kaitai and Jueluo Chengyun respectively, both of whom were Provincial Administrators. They established tablets over the Ditches to commemorate the events and, more importantly, to mark the limits of the Ditches to prevent further occupation by the inhabitants. The wish of these officials was shattered as the occupation of public land

² Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xuzhi*, vol.42, p.12b.



could not be stopped by this symbolic action. The tablets were destroyed and buried as foundation stones of new houses built over the Ditches.⁴ Such land occupation even happened around government *yamens*. A Provincial Administrator attempted to clear the illegally built houses encircling his *yamen* for the improvement of *fengshui*. His proposal was eventually given up because he was unable to force the numerous shops and inhabitants to move out.⁵

Such land occupation was actually impossible to check. Although experimental approaches were adopted to stabilize the boundaries of properties, such as reaching vague mutual agreements among the residents, the residents usually ignored such agreements.⁶ Land occupation had become a common tactic of “expansion” which happened in every established area. Reconstruction of houses after accidental demolition encroached on the streets, generating frequent conflicts among street inhabitants.⁷

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Xiguan was able to absorb the expanding population. Land occupation, common in the walled city, was also prevalent in Xiguan where many wealthy inhabitants desired more spacious houses. However, different from the situation within the walled city, the merchants and entrepreneurs were more willing to develop barren land that was available in great quantity in Xiguan. Actually, in the early Tongzhi era, only lower Xiguan adjacent to the river bank was developed as a commercial center. There were still many ponds in upper Xiguan with few occupants, and even the place immediately outside the Daxi (Great West) Gate was

³ *Ibid*, vol.42, p.12b.

⁴ *Ibid*, vol.3, pp.1b-4a.

⁵ *XHRB*, 15, 28 and 30 December, 1885; 9 January, 1886.

⁶ *XHRB*, 3 April, 1880.

⁷ For example, a shop owner in Gaodi Street reconstructed his devastated house and occupied a strip of land with a width a little more than one *chi*. This met with great resistance by the street residents. *XHRB*, 1 November, 1883.



barren where horse-riding was common.⁸ A crucial factor for the transformation of upper Xiguan into a densely populated region was the development of the weaving industry. Nearly all weaving factories of the city were located in upper Xiguan. As a result, pieces of cultivated land were gradually turned into a factory district, such as Jinhua Great Street, Jinglun Great Street and Masha Lane.⁹ In turn, barren land to the west of the weaving zone was developed into a residential area to accommodate the tremendous number of weaving workers. Baohua Street, Yaohua Street, Baoyuan Street, Fengyuan Street and Duobao Street were such newly built streets serving this purpose.¹⁰ Mostly completed before 1880, these new streets marked for the first time in Guangzhou the building of planned estates on a massive scale. While opening new streets was a common practice especially in Xiguan, the development of such streets was extraordinary in the sense that each street was actually a small zone with a network of well-planned sub-streets and lanes. The creation of such new estates attracted a well-to-do class of people there, who could afford the costs of travel to the remote walled city and the prosperous area of lower Xiguan.¹¹ In the 1890s, even part of Pantang, which was situated in the remote west of upper Xiguan, and its adjacent ponds were reclaimed and turned into residential land.¹² The extension of the geographical scope of upper Xiguan was paralleled by the increasing prosperity of lower Xiguan and Huangsha as shown by the opening of numerous new streets there.¹³

⁸ *XHRB*, 28 March, 1881.


⁹ Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, p.387.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp.388-91.

¹¹ The Inspector General of Customs, *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports open to foreign commerce in China and Corea, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-91*, pp.183-4.

¹² *HZRB*, 21 May, 25 October, 1895.

¹³ For example, Shانqingt Lane near the Eighteenth Ward (Shiba fu) (*XHRB*, 1 March, 1881), lanes in the Upper Ninth Ward (Shang jiu fu) (*XHRB*, 29 December, 1881), Tong'an Great Street in



The increasing prosperity and urbanization of the western suburb was not without cost. As Xiguan was originally a famous tourist center for its natural beauty and fruit fields, urban growth could only be achieved at the cost of the reduction of the natural scenery.¹⁴ Temples were not visited without the support of a pleasing natural setting. Ironically, urbanization also caused a decline of the entertainment industry. Following the completion of various estates, prostitutes who clustered in neighboring streets such as Hong'en Lane were expelled by the in-coming residents who were anxious of local safety.¹⁵

Although Xiguan had undergone substantial expansion, and both the indigenous and new residents found it very easy to buy pieces of land for street construction and improvement,¹⁶ development in Xiguan still faced challenges and limitations. Such challenges were especially irritating for residents of the new estates near Pantang. They were built on low-lying topography, and some of them were even built on drained ponds. These areas suffered from frequent and destructive flooding.¹⁷ Flooding occurred in the new estates right after their completion, such as the disaster on Baohua Street in 1880.¹⁸ Flooding reoccurred in 1885 with the water-level rising more than one *zhang* for nearly one month. In 1908, flooding again caused the water-level to rise 2 *chi*, affecting hundreds of streets in Xiguan.¹⁹ This partially explained why there were still many vacant

Huangsha (*XHRB*, 1881.6.28), and the Sixteenth Ward (Shiliu fu) at the north of the Tenth Ward (Dishi fu) (*HZRB*, 18 April, 1895).

¹⁴ *HZRB*, 21 May, 1895.


¹⁵ *XHRB*, 17 December, 1884.

¹⁶ For example, the residents of Yangren New Street bought a number of houses near the street gates, pulled them down, constructed a wider road for improving traffic and installed a small shrine. *XHRB*, 10 June, 1881.

¹⁷ Guangzhou difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.3 (Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 1995), p.224.

¹⁸ *XHRB*, 15-29 June, 1880.

¹⁹ See *XHRB*, 20-30 June, 16 September, 1885; *HZRB*, 24 June, 1908.



houses in those new estates, even though these houses were more commodious and situated in a better environment.²⁰

The reclamation of ponds and rivers for the construction of more houses not only reduced Xiguan's navigation capacity, but also undermined its drainage discharge capacity which was crucial in reducing the magnitude of the effects caused by flooding. In other words, its low topography and the unavailability of infrastructural support adversely limited its further expansion. Admittedly, there were other factors that enhanced the prosperity of Xiguan, notably the construction of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway starting in the 1900s with a proposed terminus at Huangsha, which attracted huge amounts of capital.²¹ These developments helped to maintain Xiguan's status as the most populous area of Guangzhou city.²² However, the merchants' planning efforts were restricted to a small portion of the area. Xiguan could no longer absorb new migrants if new planning tactics were not available and applied.


Honam was another place that had great potential for development. Similar to upper Xiguan, Honam consisted of farmland and barren land in the middle of the nineteenth century. It underwent urbanization at considerable speed. The *Decennial Reports* published by the Imperial Maritime Customs described the changes:

"Honam, divided by the river from Canton, has become more and more built over each year, and there are many godowns, matting establishments, and branch offices of business firms there, and it is the head-quarters of the launch-building yards, engine shops, coal yards, and ship chandlers. Land, in this direction especially, has risen in value; many of the fish and lotus ponds have been filled in and built on, and the rate at which such work is progressing gives promise that such ponds will soon cease to exist within a mile of the

²⁰ *XHRB*, 12 November, 1883.

²¹ *HZRB*, 24 April, 1911.

²² According to a census conducted by the *Baojia zongju* in 1895, Xiguan had a population of 279,604, constituting more than a half of the total population of the city numbering 509,288. *HZRB*, 13 June, 1895.



northern end of Honam....”²³

This nascent urbanization in the form of industrial development along the riverine area went hand in hand with the continuous expansion of agricultural land use. *Guangdong tushuo*, written during the Tongzhi era, stated that the number of villages in Honam had increased from thirty-three to seventy-three.²⁴ However, the trend of urbanization surpassed that of agricultural expansion. Farmland near the river bank was almost completely turned into streets and shops, and the boundary of the countryside was moving inland.²⁵ Similar to the development of upper Xiguan, this transformation in Honam was accomplished by the inhabitants themselves without governmental intervention. Dr. J. G. Kerr, the chief of the Canton Hospital, described Honam in 1900 as follows:

“To-day Honam is a large town with some two hundred thousand inhabitants, yet it was described towards the middle of the nineteenth century as ‘a small village’ and as ‘offering pleasant walks for recreation’!”²⁶


However, the gradual transformation of Honam did not raise its status in Guangzhou. Up to the 1900s, Honam remained as an island isolated from the city proper. The primary means of transportation between Honam and the city proper by small sampans could not cope with the increasing flow of traffic, which greatly hindered Honam’s great potential for development. In spite of its active economic activities and the rise of land price due to favorable factors such as the construction of the

²³ The Inspector General of Customs, *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports open to foreign commerce in China and Corea, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-91*, pp.183-4.

²⁴ Mao Hongbin, et al, *Guangdong tusuo*, vol.2, pp.13a-b.

²⁵ For example, the farmland of Dajitou, situated at the river bank opposite to Lianxing Street in the northern bank, was turned into busy streets (*HZRB*, 2 March, 9 September, 1895). Some other streets such as Qixing Street and Heming Street were also reclaimed from farmland. See Liang Dingfen, et al, *Panyu xian xuzhi*, vol.21, p.5a; Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.413-4.

²⁶ John Glasgow Kerr, *A Guide to the City and Suburbs of Canton*, 1904, p.3.



Guangzhou-Hankou Railway.²⁷ Honam was always overlooked as a place for development by the local government. For such significant issues as bund construction and police formation which the local government carried out vigorously in the last decade of the dynasty, Honam was always placed at the bottom of the agenda while Xiguan, Nan-guan and the walled city were given much higher priority. The pattern of conducting the census provided further evidence. According to newspaper sources, three rough censuses were conducted in 1895, 1908 and 1909 by the *Baojia* Bureau, Police Circuit and the two Magistrates respectively.²⁸ Except for the 1908 census, they did not include the Honam figures. As census figures can show how far a government can exert its power, the neglect of Honam by the *Baojia* Bureau and the two Magistrates, all of which were important governmental institutions in local administration, reflected that governmental intervention was weak there, and that the government did not consider Honam seriously as a necessary component of the city of Guangzhou. The inclusion of the Honam figures in the 1908 census was due to the newly established police bureaus there in the interim.²⁹ The critical need for transportation improvement was indicated in the midst of the construction of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway. Foreseeing that Honam would benefit from the potential enhancement of transport efficiency, speculators procured land of all kinds in Honam in expectation of a rise in land prices.³⁰

The port of Huangpu declined drastically in the 1870s due to competition from Hong Kong.³¹ In the early 1900s, it was little more than a small village with some his-


²⁷ HZRB, 7 January, 1902.

²⁸ See HZRB, 13 June, 1895; 31 July, 1908; 29 December, 1909 respectively.

²⁹ The census did not produce a figure for Honam. This was only a lump-sum population figure of 487,336 for the city part on the northern bank and Honam on the south.

³⁰ HZRB, 1 January, 1902.

³¹ North China Herald, 6 September, 1873, vol.11, p.195; 13 September, 1873, vol.11, p.212-3. From Xutang (ed.), *Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao (1840-1895)*, vol.1, p.7.



toric sites.³² Huangpu was subsidized partially because local officials in the late nineteenth century viewed Huangpu as important in terms of strategy and defense. This explained why the British-owned dock, purchased at substantial cost by Liu Kunyi, Liang-Guang Governor-General from 1875 to 1879, remained idle. Liu justified his action by claiming that Huangpu was “the second gate next to Humen, and must not remain under the foreigners’ control.”³³ The local government began to abandon this line of thinking in the 1900s, as Britain reportedly showed interest in developing Huangpu, which caught the attention of the Chinese government, both central and local. Because of British interest, the Chinese government claimed that only Chinese capital could be used to develop the place.³⁴ The Chinese government’s policy reflected its new evaluation that Huangpu was crucial to restoring the commercial status of Guangzhou in order to compete with Hong Kong, as Huangpu’s deep water port, if planned and utilized properly, would greatly enhance the port’s capacity for handling trade.³⁵

The northern bank of the Pearl River was another potential area for urban expansion. The alluvial land at the southern end of Nanguan was expanding. This kind of land, once formed, was endowed with transport convenience which enhanced efficient connections by river with both the city proper and the outer world, and in turn caused land competition. For example, the Medical Missionary Society’s Hospital, situated at Renji Street in Nanguan, acquired a piece of alluvium with a width of 85 *chi* in 1902.³⁶ The riverine part of Dongguan also underwent a limited process of urban sprawl around Donghaokou (Mouth of the Eastern Moat) where a piece of alluvial land was formed

³² John Glasgow Kerr, *A Guide to the City and Suburbs of Canton*, 1904, p.59.

³³ Zhongguo kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo disansuo (ed.), *Liu Kunyi yiji*, vol.4, p.1811.

³⁴ HZRB, 28 July, 1904.

³⁵ HZRB, 1 December, 1905.

³⁶ HZRB, 19 June, 1902.



during the Tongzhi reign, giving rise to a number of busy streets such as Yong'an Straight Street.³⁷

Urban problems

Guangzhou was in need of urban reform, as both the walled city and Xiguan, the two largest urban areas where most of the city's population resided, could not provide further land suitable for development to meet the increasing demand resulting from the expanding population. Such a need was particularly compelling when it was associated with urban problems affecting daily life and activities. Illegal occupation of public space of streets substantially narrowed down the streets, in turn producing immense traffic congestion. In some busy streets, the road might be as narrow as six *chi*, but the houses had a depth of two to three *zhang*.³⁸ Such streets were "so narrow that in the widest of them four men would find it difficult to walk abreast".³⁹ Sedan chairs, the primary mode of traffic in Guangzhou as well as other Chinese cities in the late nineteenth century, could not easily traverse the streets.⁴⁰ Even the smallest sedan chairs which could only carry one passenger caused trouble. It was an explosive and paralyzing situation as streets of several *chi* wide could not accommodate these sedan chairs and the huge volume of pedestrians, as well as the "uncountable" number of peddlers and hawkers who

³⁷ Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.185, 423.

³⁸ HZRB, 28 May, 1908.

³⁹ Arnold Wright and H.A. Cartwright, *Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai and Other Treaty Ports of China: Their History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources*, pp.784-5. Also see J.A. Turner, *Kwang Tung or Five Years in South China*, pp.23-4.

⁴⁰ By 1908, there were reportedly two thousand sedan chair companies and a total of about 20,000 sedan chairs in Guangzhou including those privately owned. It was not uncommon that a passenger could hire another chair immediately if the original one was broken on the way. Normally a sedan chair could accommodate one passenger only, but the size could vary substantially, the smallest being carried by two persons and the bigger by eight or more. See HZRB, 17 December, 1908; XHRB, 21 April, 1874.



carried their bulky goods on shoulder poles.⁴¹ Accidents were unavoidable as street users of every kind were not willing to give way. Streets in the Inner City was a bit wider due to the clustering of numerous *yamen*, so that larger sedan chairs could be used inside the Inner City. Guo Songtao, the Guangdong Viceroy from 1863 to 1866, complained that roads in the Outer City were much narrower than those in the Inner City, and he had to change to a smaller sedan chair when going out to the Outer City from the Inner City.⁴²

Quarrels and conflicts were intensified by another obstruction on the narrow streets, that is, the numerous gates. Street gates were a very important urban infrastructure in traditional Guangzhou. Their widespread construction in the city (always more than one in the busy streets) was indispensable to urban security, notably to stop strangers' wandering into the neighborhoods, to prevent crimes, and to safeguard the proceeding of the Civil Service Examination.⁴³ The street gate system and street security were highly associated with *tuanlian* which was a street-based practice with the street residents serving as guards and gate-keepers.⁴⁴ This defensive function of the gates, however, was acutely counterbalanced by a host of adverse consequences. They blocked the busy traffic by occupying precious space because the gate-keepers' houses were erected there and local residents liked to place some idols adjacent to the gates.⁴⁵ They were also popular parking sites for sedan chairs.⁴⁶ Gamblers and wanderers gathered there fre-

⁴¹ See HZRB, 21 December, 1895.

⁴² Guo Songtao, *Guo Songtao riji* (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1980), vol.2, p.136.

⁴³ For the construction of several gates along a street, see HZRB, 15 July, 8 August, 1895. For the safeguarding function of the street gates in the proceeding of the Civil Service Examination, see XHRB, 13 September, 1882.

⁴⁴ XHRB, 22 October, 1880; 13 December, 1881; 19 October, 1883.

⁴⁵ For example, see HZRB, 25 May, 1908.

⁴⁶ HZRB, 25 August, 1909.



quently, leaving behind rubbish and nightsoil.⁴⁷ Gates which were locked at night remained closed even during emergencies, delaying the transport of patients in critical condition to hospitals, sometimes resulting in death.⁴⁸ Occasionally, a gate was installed right outside a shop and resulted in conflict and even resistance by force from the shopkeepers.⁴⁹ Corruption was common amongst the gate-keepers who allowed persons to pass on condition of paying a bribe during the closure of the gates.⁵⁰

The city wall issue was similar to the case of street gates. The city walls were a sign of urbanity and a fundamental urban infrastructure in traditional Chinese cities, and were erected for defense by controlling the flow of people. Their value as a defense device was questioned after the mid-nineteenth century. A foreigner accurately observed: “[I]n the days of bows and spears, which the Chinese still retain, these grim walls must have rendered a city almost impregnable, but they offer little resistance to foreign artillery and dynamite.... The obsolete and puerile methods of defense explained at once the easy capture of the city by the English and French in the Opium War.”⁵¹

Numerous urban problems associated with the city wall affected daily life. Traffic was obstructed as a large number of shops and houses were built against the walls. Since local officials procrastinated in repairing the walls, as shown in Chapter Two, they sometimes collapsed after heavy rain, threatening the life of the residents. Furthermore, soldiers guarding the gates rented their houses to gamblers and merchants who used them as storehouses. It was an open secret that inhabitants could bribe the soldiers to


⁴⁷ HZRB, 25 August, 1909.

⁴⁸ For example, see XHRB, 14 August, 1884.8.14.

⁴⁹ For example, a shop owner in Xiguan, who was angered by the street head’s rejection to remove the street gate right outside his shop, demolished the gate by himself. He was punished by the street association and had to pay a great sum of penalty. See HZRB, 31 December, 1895.

⁵⁰ HZRB, 14 July, 1909; 30 June, 1910.

⁵¹ Edward S. Morse, *Glimpses of China and Chinese Homes*, pp.134-5.



gain entry or exit from the city after the gates were closed. Wealthy residents chose to live in Xiguan instead. During the 1858 British blockade, inhabitants in the Inner City preferred to move out of the walled city to places where they felt more secure. Travellers, especially merchants from abroad, found that the city wall was nothing more than an obstruction to their movement, making travel and business difficult if ships did not arrive on schedule.⁵²

The need for change was imperative to make Guangzhou economically competitive as a port. Modern roads gradually appeared in other treaty ports such as Shanghai and Nanjing, and yet Guangzhou, being the earliest port open to foreign traders, was still hampered by an outdated transportation network. The importation of rickshaws in the late nineteenth century encouraged the construction of new roads.⁵³ The local gentry and government began to see that the demolition of the city wall would allow wider roads to be constructed surrounding the city and enhancing accessibility to the city.⁵⁴ Therefore, the construction of the Bund and the imaginative 1907 Planning were initiated in order to address these questions.

Worsening public sanitation was another urban problem which signaled the necessity of urban reform. Rubbish dumping had for years been a common phenomenon. The seriousness of rubbish dumping was noted by the IMCS: "The harbor of Canton has,

⁵² For problems of the city wall, see John Henry Gray, *China: A History of the Laws, Manners, and Customs of the People*, p.6; *XHRB*, 26 February, 1880; 13 December, 1883; *HZRB*, 21 December, 1895; 30 September, 1903; 21 May, 1906; 26 and 30 July, 1910.

⁵³ Some sources state that the introduction of rickshaws to Guangzhou can be dated back to the first construction of the Bund in the late 1880s (for example, see *Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.3, p.467). In the first decade of the twentieth century, rickshaws developed into a crucial means of traffic at the outskirts of the city. In 1910, there were about 400 rickshaws running along the Bund and Dongsha Road, and their rise of charge would seriously affect the city transportation. See *HZRB*, 29 March, 1906; 7 December, 1910.

⁵⁴ It was the foreigners who regarded it a waste to leave the wide walls with broad roadway on top idle while there were few users. For example, see Edward S. Morse, *Glimpses of China and Chinese Homes*, pp.134-5.



during the last decade, silted up to an alarming extent. This is caused by the banks of the river being used as a dumping-ground for rubbish from the city, by natural deposit, and by sweepings, ashes, etc., thrown overboard from the hundreds of passenger-boats and steam-launches passing through the harbor daily.”⁵⁵ To this account should be added the fact that the problem was street-based.⁵⁶ Open the window, throw out the rubbish - these were all the steps to dispose of rubbish by most street inhabitants. They might even throw out bricks which resulted in injury to the unwary.⁵⁷ The busier the street, the more serious would be the dumping of rubbish by hawkers and shopkeepers.⁵⁸ It was especially discouraging that many new streets in Xiguan built after the 1880s quickly became as dirty as the “developed” streets in the walled city.⁵⁹

Silting of the drainage system increased drastically. The reclamation of ponds in the northern part of the Inner City eliminated an effective means of storing the river water from the Baiyun Mountain, and the residents suffered from frequent inundations after every heavy rain.⁶⁰ The erection of electricity poles near sewers also obstructed the flow of water and quickened the process of rubbish accumulation and drainage silting. The adoption of new construction methods such as the use of piling further blocked the underground drainage.⁶¹ The occasional dredging performed by the Dredging Office in Xiguan and the local officials in the walled city never solved the problem of silting.

⁵⁵ The Inspectorate General of Customs, *China: Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce in China, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1892-1901*, p.188.

⁵⁶ Description of the seriousness of dumping rubbish on the streets is countless. For example, see HZRB, 15 May, 27 July, 1901; 29 January, 27 November, 1902; 17 October, 1903.

⁵⁷ HZRB, 14 May, 1901.

⁵⁸ For example, see HZRB, 27 November, 1902.

⁵⁹ HZRB, 6 July, 1904.

⁶⁰ Liang Dingfen, et al, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.42, pp.12b-13a.

⁶¹ HZRB, 3 October, 1910.



Silting, which was partially due to the wanton disposal of rubbish and nightsoil by the inhabitants, and to the building of houses over streams and moats, were important causes for the deterioration of the drainage system. Another important cause was the inhabitants' opening of hollows called "seepage hollows" (*shenjing*) inside their houses to discharge the sewage.⁶² This was an important factor accounting for the pollution of well water which was the sole source of drinking water before the twentieth century.⁶³ A foreigner believed that this worsening hygienic situation had caused epidemic diseases, notably the 1894 plague.⁶⁴

The construction of the Bund

It was against this background that the Bund project was initiated. Scholars of Guangzhou history agree that the Bund (also known as "Long Bund", *Changdi*) was the first modern road of Guangzhou and was significantly related to the urban and infrastructural development of the locality. The recently published *Guangzhou shi zhi* praised the construction of the Bund as "the beginning of road construction in Guangzhou".⁶⁵ Other sources also hold more or less the same view.⁶⁶

However, current understanding of the nature of the construction of the Guangzhou Bund is weak, especially regarding its relationship with the urban planning of the city. The Bund is often understood merely as a road on the Bund, but we know little about the Bund itself. Actually, "*di*" (bund) is a kind of "protective construction along


⁶² *Guangzhou difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui*, *Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.3, p.202.

⁶³ For example, see *XHRB*, 16 August, 1884; Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.154.

⁶⁴ J.A. Turner, *Kwang Tung or Five Years in South China*, p.34.

⁶⁵ *Guangzhou difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui*, *Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.3, p.6.

⁶⁶ For example, see Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng Guangzhou shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), *Guangzhou bainian dashiji*, vol.1, p.76; Zhen Ren (ed.), *Guangzhou zhi zui*, p.90; Yang Bingde, et al, *Zhongguo jindai chengshi yu jianzhu*, p.16;



the border of river, lake or sea against flooding.”⁶⁷ It was a very common construction in Guangzhou and other territories in Guangdong where the low-territories were criss-crossed with multifarious streams. Long before the construction of the “Long Bund”, the riverain areas of Guangzhou were always banded, such as the one along the Western Moat from the Second Ward (Di er fu) to the Fifth Ward (Di wu fu) to minimize the effect of floodings in Xiguan.⁶⁸ Even the construction of Shamian included “banding” around the island of Shamian and along the river bank of Shaji.⁶⁹

The whole of Guangdong suffered from disastrous flooding years before the “Long Bund” was constructed. Faced with this situation, Xu Gengbi articulated the importance of band construction and repair to prevent flooding when he served as Nanhai Magistrate from 1881 to 1882.⁷⁰ The West River (Xi Jiang) and North River (Bei Jiang) simultaneously caused a massive flooding in 1885. This flooding, lasting nearly one month, covered a vast region of Guangdong, including Guangzhou and Zhaoqing Prefectures, and destroyed much farmland.⁷¹ Both the local inhabitants and the government made great efforts in late 1885 and 1886 to repair or construct new embankments

Hu Jun, *Qing Zhang Wenxiang gong Zhidong nianpu*, p.98.


⁶⁷ Shuili dianli bu shuiguan si and Shuili shuidian kexue yanjiuyuan (ed.), *Qing dai Zhu Jiang Han Jiang honglao dang'an shiliao*, p.193.

⁶⁸ Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, p.176; Guangzhou shi Liwan qu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi (ed.), *Liwan quqing yaolan*, p.20; Guangzhou shi Liwan qu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), *Guangzhou shi Liwan qu zhi*, pp.77-8; Li Pingri, “Jin liangqian nian Guangzhou Zhu Jiang anxian de yanbian”, in Zhen Ren and Rao Zhanxiang (ed.), *Guangzhou shi zhi yanjiu*, pp.118-9. For this common practice in other places in Guangdong, see Shuili dianli bu shuiguan si and Shuili shuidian kexue yanjiuyuan (ed.), *Qing dai Zhu Jiang Han Jiang honglao dang'an shiliao*, pp.57-191. This source has complied materials on flooding and band construction in Guangdong for the period 1736 to 1911.

⁶⁹ Zheng Mengyu, et al, *Nanhai xian zhi* (1872), vol.5, p.19a; Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.51, 403.

⁷⁰ Xu Gengbi, *Buxianzhai mancun*, vol.5, pp.23b-24a.

⁷¹ See the memorial submitted by Zhang Zhidong, the Liang-Guang Governor-General, and Ni Wen-wei, the Guangdong Viceroy, concerning this flooding in *HZRB*, 1885.9.16.



around farmland to prevent further flooding.⁷²

The continual flooding substantially worsened the magnitude of the existing urban problems, and the Guangzhou Bund was proposed and constructed as a traditional device of water conservancy. While it is commonly believed that the project was initiated and completed in 1886, the project was only proposed in 1888, after Guangzhou suffered from serious flooding in 1887 and 1888.⁷³ Zhang Zhidong, the Liang-Guang Governor-General, wrote to the Guangdong Rehabilitation Bureau (*Shanhou ju*) on 19 October, 1888:

“Government land near the Provincial River has long been occupied [by local inhabitants]. Silting has become serious. Previously, merchants of the Jianyetang petitioned that a bund should be built to stop flooding and improve people’s livelihood. They proposed to donate three million dollars. [I] ordered the Rehabilitation Bureau and the Magistrates of Nanhai and Panyu to gather the gentry and merchants to discuss the matter. They thought that such an act is beneficial to the merchants and will produce great convenience to the common people. The matter is in fact urgent.... If we firmly build the bund, there will be many benefits. Firstly, occupation of land by individuals will be stopped, dirt will be removed and there will be no more silting. Secondly, broad roads will be constructed and transportation of goods will be smooth. Thirdly, more markets will be opened and commerce will be prosperous. Fourthly, more piers will be constructed for the Chinese government ships, warriors, and liners. Fifthly, warehouses will be widely built. Sixthly, streams will be opened perpendicular to the bund for the boats’ refuge. Seventh, silt dredged from the Eastern Moat and Western Moat will be used to build the bund. Bridges will be built to go across the two streams as an extension of the road. Moreover, the bund will be wide and high in landscape, streets will be clean. Small carts will be employed for travel. Strong men will be employed as patrollers. Machine boats will be used to do the dredging work. Shadow will be provided by the numerous trees. Travelers will benefit from the new electricity lighting device.... Righteous gentry and reliable merchants will be chosen to coordinate the project. They should have good cooperation. They should draft their own regulations and find the financial sources themselves. A

⁷² See *XHRB*, 10 August, 16 September, 28 December, 1885.

⁷³ For example, *Panyu xian xuzhi* published in 1931 asserted that Zhang Zhidong initiated the construction of the Guangzhou Bund in 1886. See Liang Dingfen, et al, *Panyu xian xuzhi*, p.15b. It was possible that Liang and other writers had confused the “Long Bund” with the bund along the Honam waterfront which was repaired massively in 1886. See Zou Lu, et al, *Guangdong tongzhi* (Unpublished manuscript), vol.87. Some sources mistakenly state that the construction of the Bund was only started in 1911. See *Guangzhou baike quanshu bianzuan weiyuanhui, Guangzhou baike quanshu*, p.120.



bureau should be set up to coordinate. Several phases should be divided and undertaken by the tenders. The project will be supervised by the government.... Land in Honam should also be surveyed and occupation of land should be banned.”⁷⁴

The project described in this document was noteworthy for two points. Firstly, it was initiated as a water conservancy project to strengthen the alluvium along the river bank into a solid bund, and to prevent further silting and flooding. The Bund would be developed into a commercial center by providing modern infrastructure such as the construction of broad roads and piers, and the provision of electricity. Secondly, this project was originally initiated by merchants, and organized along the lines of *guandu shangban* (government supervision and merchant undertaking). The role played by Zhang Zhidong, according to this document, was that of a middleman, recommending the feasibility of the project to the Rehabilitation Bureau which was in charge of the construction projects of the city.

Major adjustments were made after the project was accepted by the local government. Zhang added one important rationale to the project. Shamian was used as a justification. Shamian was a new foreign concession, which was originally an extensive mud flat converted into an island with massive granite embankment, separated from the mainland.⁷⁵ Zhang Zhidong wrote:

“The landscape [of Shamian] is made high.... The stone bund is steep, so that the river current can remove the accumulated sand here. Therefore, silting only occurs in the upper and lower river course, where the landscape is more gentle....”⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Zhang Zhidong, *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji*, vol.3, pp.1704-5.

⁷⁵ For example, see Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.51, 403; Smith, H.S., *Diary of Events and the Progress on Shameen, 1859-1938*, p.8; Arnold Wright and H.A. Cartwright, *Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai and Other Treaty Ports of China: Their History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources*, p.782.

⁷⁶ Zhang Zhidong, *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji*, vol.1, pp.509-11.



Therefore, according to Zhang, constructing a bund was not simply a water conservancy project, but also a feasible measure to imitate Shamian's superior living environment. Different from ordinary bund constructions which used mud and sand as materials, the Guangzhou Bund used granite strip as the major material.⁷⁷

Moreover, the project, which started in April, 1889, was made completely a government project. The project was to be exclusively funded by the government. "The expenditure can be paid by the government first, and the newly reclaimed land can be contracted to the gentry and merchants to settle the construction cost.... Xiguan and Nanguan have rich merchants who will be very willing to take possession of the land...."⁷⁸ Merchants, who had initiated the projects, were not allowed to play any further role in the course of construction. Zhang Zhidong argued that "it is difficult to collect funds from the merchants and the common people." Furthermore, while the merchants at the very beginning proposed to make a donation of three million *yuan*, Zhang wrote in his memorial to the throne that 0.4 million would be enough for the project.⁷⁹ The shift of management was in line with Zhang Zhidong's active involvement in local construction, such as the establishment of the Guangdong Mint and the Guangzhou Weaving Bureau. It also represented a struggle for profit between the merchants and the government. The local government intended to monopolize all returns which might arise from the project. This struggle for interests was commonplace in the local history of Guangzhou, which will be exemplified later in greater details.

Comprehensive adjustments were also made by Zhang in terms of the content of the project. The Bund was to be constructed L-shape, embracing the northern and western

⁷⁷ See Liang Dingfen, et al, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.4, pp.15b-17a; HZRB, 19 June, 1901.

⁷⁸ Zhang Zhidong, *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji*, vol.1, pp.509-11.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*



bank of the Pearl River. It would stretch from Chuanlongkou in the east, running west to Xiguan, turning towards the northern end of Shamian, then bending northward and ending at Zengbu. Besides shielding urban Guangzhou, the Bund would protect farmland from Zengbu in the north to Hengsha in the south. Furthermore, a new river outlet would be opened which would cut across the land of Honam from Zhoutouzui in the west to a point opposite Dongguan. It aimed at diverting the flow of the river in order to prevent flooding.⁸⁰

By late 1889, Zhang had finished the first phase of work, including the construction of a portion of the Bund around the Tianzi Pier in Nanguan and a new government pier. This selection of the above site partially showed Zhang's intention to take over the project. The Tianzi Pier was a government pier. This was the place where newly appointed officials, foreign guests and merchants from abroad would land.⁸¹ Visitors and officials, as Zhang hoped, would appreciate the Bund and compare it favorably with the bunds of Shamian and Shanghai, and in turn praise his ability to administer the locality. Compared to the Shanghai Bund built by the Shanghai Municipal Council in the late 1860s, the Guangzhou Bund was not intended to be used as a public recreational area. It turned out to be a place for commercial buildings, and the local government prompted merchants "to compete to bid for the land over the Bund."⁸² Such competition for land along the Bund lowered the rent level in Xiguan which was an established commercial center of Guangzhou.

Although Zhang claimed that the whole project could be completed in another "one and a half years", the project was actually suspended in late 1889 when Zhang moved to

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, vol.1, pp.509-11; 563-4.

⁸¹ See Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, pp.447-8.

⁸² Zhang Zhidong, *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji*, vol.1, pp.563-4.



his new post as Governor-General of Hunan and Hubei.⁸³ Primarily due to the alarming political situation, Zhang's successors in the 1890s showed no interest in carrying on the ten phases of the project he left behind, which included the Bund itself, "the addition of dams in Xiguan and Zengsha, the construction of piers for commercial liners, silt dredging of Zhoutouzui in Honam, the opening of a river mouth at Aoyuzhou and the invitation of tenders for electricity services and horse-carts that will be conducted after the completion of the whole Bund."⁸⁴ The project showed signs of revival in 1899 when a merchant called Lu Shaobing petitioned the local government for the resumption of the construction work at Huangsha situated to the west of Shamian.⁸⁵ Despite opposition by the local residents who believed that bund construction would accelerate the process of silting, the local government was firmly on the side of Lu.⁸⁶ The government's favorable attitude could be accounted for by the forthcoming construction of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway, with the terminus at Huangsha where the proposed Bund would pass around. The Railway would act as an economic stimulus to the city and, in turn, the demand for land and other infrastructures would increase. The construction of the Bund would definitely serve as a vital infrastructural foundation, to link up the remote Huangsha to other districts of the city such as Xiguan, Nanguan and the walled city.


To a large extent, the resumption of bund construction was a continuation of Zhang

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Zhang Zhidong, *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji*, vol. 1, pp.563-4. The memorial delineates the ten phases clearly. On the east of the Tianzi Pier: from there to the Hong Temple, from Hong Temple to the mouth of the Eastern Moat, from the mouth of the Eastern Moat to the Guanyin Temple, from the Guanyin Temple to Chuanlongkou. On the west of the Tianzi Pier: from there to Chaoyin Street, from Chaoyin Street to Yuanchang Street, from Yuanchang Street to Tongde Street, from the Western Fortress in Xiguan to Hengsha, from Hengsha to Pantang, from Pantang to Aokou.

⁸⁵ *HZRB*, 27 March, 22 October, 1901. This section had a length of 500 *zhang*, from Mibu in the east to Dadanwei in the west.

⁸⁶ The issue of opposition by the Huangsha residents roughly lasted from October 1901 to the early 1903. The following extracts may be representative: *HZRB*, 22, 23 and 24 October, 26 December, 1901; 1 February, 1902.



Zhidong's uncompleted plan since details laid down in Zhang's plan, such as the stipulation of sites and even the length of construction, were strictly followed. It would start at Chuanlongkou in the east, encircle the western part of the city and end at Huangsha. The only difference was the greater urgency for its completion. Tao Mo, the Liang-Guang Governor-General from 1900 to 1902, regarded the Bund as a prerequisite for further prosperity:


“The alluvial land along the northern bank of the provincial river (Pearl River) is to be filled and leveled. Piers and road will be constructed. The provincial capital (Guangzhou) will take on an entirely new look. This is an essential step to promote commerce.”⁸⁷

It was vital to provide more efficient port services in order to grasp the potential benefits that the Guangzhou-Hankou railway might bring. After leveling the undulating river bank, the Bund could provide better pier services and disseminate both goods and passengers quickly. An English source lucidly described the economic implications of the Bund: “The object is to bund the foreshore, to enable ships to come alongside and discharge straight into the godowns which are to be built.... The successful completion of this work will enable the quick discharge of steamers and relieve the congestion in the harbor, while it will further trade.”⁸⁸ According to a newspaper report, the anticipated number of new shops on the Bund would accumulate to about one-third of Xiguan's total.⁸⁹ Building up the Bund as a transport center would transform the area into a new commercial center. The high potential of land development was reflected by the merchants' competing for contracting the construction of other sections after Lu Shaobing

⁸⁷ HZRB, 2 May, 1901.

⁸⁸ The Inspector General of Customs, *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports open to foreign commerce in China and Corea, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-91*, pp.185-8.

⁸⁹ ZGRB, 19 March, 1904, p.3



started the construction of the Huangsha section on 5 July, 1901.⁹⁰

For such an important project, the local government was not willing to allow it to be a private undertaking. The local government formed the Bund Bureau (*Digong ju*) in February 1903 to take over the project and to plan the construction itself.⁹¹ The project was originally planned to be completed in late 1903, but it was delayed several times due to different problems, notably the brothel boats' refusal to move away from the river bank off Yingzhu Street in Nanguan, and the corruption of the Chen Liantai Factory which contracted the project.⁹² By June 1910, the Bund from Chuanlongkou in the east to Xihaokou (Mouth of the Western Moat) in the west, and the Huangsha section had been completed. The Shaji section, which was in the middle of the two Bunds, was left behind by the Bund Bureau due to the existence of British properties there.

The construction of the Bund was significant for the urban evolution of the city. The Bund created new land which soon developed into a prosperous area as well as addressing the problem of water control. Since a road was constructed on the Bund, the first traffic trunk connecting Shaji in the west and the remote eastern suburbs helped to knit the city together.⁹³ Although the Huangsha section appeared to be isolated due to the interruption of the Bund at Shaji, the terminus of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway increased the commerce at Huangsha. Merchants competed for land there to erect


⁹⁰ HZRB, 7, 9 and 13 March, 13 June, 1 July, 1901; 16 May, 19 November, 1902; 6 March, 1903; 12 and 18 November, 10 December, 1904.

⁹¹ HZRB, 16 December, 1902; 12 January, 1903.

⁹² The Bund Bureau repeatedly made miscalculations on the date of completion. In March 1903, it was estimated that the project would be finished within the same year. In December 1905, it was claimed that another six months was needed. In January 1907, it was said that the project would be finished before the summer. In March 1908, when the new company Tongxing took over the project, the Bureau scheduled the completion within eighteen months. See HZRB, 9 March, 1903; 22 December, 1905; 9 January, 1907; 21 March, 1908. For the brothel boats' protests, see HZRB, 21 October, 1903; 3 May, 8 July, 1904. For the corruption of the Chen Liantai Factory, see HZRB, 22 January, 27 March, 4 April, 1907; 16 December, 1908.

⁹³ HZRB, 28 June, 1910.





buildings and stores, in turn pushing up the land price, which was equally observable in other sections of the Bund.⁹⁴ The Bund Bureau also planned to make the place a testing ground for urban modernization. While buildings of Western-style architecture were encouraged at the Bund,⁹⁵ a modern road system with a trunk road crossed by a number of sub-roads was blueprinted, reportedly imitating the chess-board road system of Hong Kong.⁹⁶ The Bureau, however, was far from resourceful in materializing the whole scheme. Even the construction of the trunk road strained the resources of the Bureau.⁹⁷

This partial materialization of the new urban vision served as a benchmark in the urban history of Guangzhou. Current literature on Guangzhou's urban history follows rigidly the traditional gazetteer materials, concluding that the formal urban expansion of the city before the Republican period ended in early Qing, marked by the construction of the two Chicken Wing Walls at the southeast and southwest corners of the Outer City respectively.⁹⁸ As mentioned in Chapter Two, the formal enlargement of the city took the form of encircling new land created by the alluvium along the northern bank of the Pearl River, which was developed by merchants. The construction of the Outer City in the Ming Dynasty and the Chicken Wing Walls in the early Qing illustrated this model of expansion. By the same token, the construction of the Bund should be considered as another formal expansion undertaken by the local authorities, which was based on new urban ideology and planning tactics. Similar to the previous expansions, the local authorities pushed the city boundary towards the new alluvium already occupied by


⁹⁴ *HZRB*, 22 February, 21 March, 1905; 18 September, 1906.

⁹⁵ *HZRB*, 21 March, 1905.

⁹⁶ *HZRB*, 22 December, 1905.

⁹⁷ *HZRB*, 13 August, 1909.

⁹⁸ For example, see Chen Daiguang, *Guangzhou chengshi fazhan shi*, pp.117-8; Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.378-90.



inhabitants. What differed from the past was the form and function of expansion. The new encirclement took the form of bunding instead of extending the city wall. This reflected the reduced value of a physical blockade to protect the life and property of the residents. Instead, a higher degree of openness was necessary for Guangzhou's economic progress which showed a striking decline when compared to the prominent rise of Shanghai and Hong Kong. More piers were desired for regional and international communications. The Bund would eventually develop into a new economic and political center of the city, comparable with and even surpassing Shamian in terms of prosperity, beauty and modernity. New commercial centers located along the Bund taking advantage of traffic convenience would compete with Xiguan, and new governmental bureaus could be established there.⁹⁹ This explained why the Police paid so much attention to keeping order on the Bund.¹⁰⁰ Formal expansion in the form of the Bund marked the coming of a new era and the change of urban philosophy and landscape.


Tangible benefits accompanied this new urban outlook. Inhabitants in Guangzhou were attracted not only by the comparatively wide road and prospering commerce there, but also by the beautiful scenery with trees planted along the Bund imitating the wonderful landscape along the Shanghai Bund.¹⁰¹ This turned the Bund into a place of public gathering, recreation, relaxation and even public protests.¹⁰² In 1907, the Police Bureau invited merchants to open a new theater near the Jinghai Gate at Nanguan.¹⁰³ During the Dragon Boat Festival, the Bund attracted thousands of spectators who en-

⁹⁹ *HZRB*, 9 January, 1907.

¹⁰⁰ Horse riding was strictly forbidden along the Bund. Illegal stalls along the Bund were frequently expelled. See *HZRB*, 29 June, 31 December, 1910.

¹⁰¹ *HZRB*, 9 February, 1895.

¹⁰² Due to the gathering of large numbers of people there, political activists used the Bund as a place for public speeches (See *HZRB*, 1 January, 1910) The Bund was also a good place to enjoy the dragon boat races (*HZRB*, 5 June, 1911).



joyed both the game and the snacks available at stores nearby.¹⁰⁴

1907: The creation of an urban planning

Origin and components

The construction of the Bund revitalized the existing alluvial land and marked the last formal urban expansion of the city before the Republican period. Its completion acted as a catalyst to the improvement of economic conditions based on a germinative prosperity. The construction of the Bund actually served as the starting-point for more farsighted plans and designs by the local officials. A number of resolutions based on the anticipated completion of the Bund were made by officials in the first half of the year 1907, which actually constituted an ambitious, rational and well-justified urban planning. Not only was this planning unprecedented in Guangzhou's urban history, it was also certainly ahead of other Chinese cities ruled by the Chinese.


Zhou Fu, the Liang-Guang Governor-General from 1906 to 1907, was the person who initiated this planning. Although he had not received any professional training, he had been supervising civil engineering in places such as Beijing, Tianjin and Shandong since 1866. He was an assistant director of the Nanjing Engineering Bureau (*Jinling gongcheng ju*) and had proposed the establishment of the Tianjin Engineering Bureau (*Tianjin gongcheng ju*).¹⁰⁵ When he arrived in Guangzhou on 12 November, 1906, the part of the Bund near the mouth of the Eastern Moat had been completed in July.¹⁰⁶ His long experience in the field of engineering made him aware of the potentials of the new

¹⁰³ HZRB, 10 December, 1907.

¹⁰⁴ HZRB, 5 June, 1911.

¹⁰⁵ For Zhou's career, see Zhou Fu, *Minguo Zhou Yushan xiansheng Fu ziding nianpu*, pp.25-96; Zou Xiaozhan, "Zhou Fu", in Luo Ming, et al (ed.), *Qing dai renwu zhuangao*, pp.128-32.

¹⁰⁶ HZRB, 6 July, 1906.




Bund in solving the pressing hygienic and housing problems brought about by the expanding population in the walled city and Xiguan. Such potentials would become more realizable if the eastern suburbs were to be transformed into a new transportation center in view of the forthcoming opening of the Guangzhou-Kowloon Railway and the proposed construction of the Guangzhou-Xiamen Railway.¹⁰⁷ The road system and other urban infrastructure would have to be improved to support the increasing flow of traffic in the eastern suburbs. Zhou started by lengthening the Bund to connect the eastern suburbs with the city proper. The Bund Bureau planned to extend the Bund road to Dongjiaochang (East Parade Ground) and Yantang. This road system would be connected with Hui'ai Road in the Inner City through the Dadong (Great East) Gate.¹⁰⁸

Coinciding with the improvement of regional and local traffic, a scheme for the establishment of a new town was designed and implemented in January, 1907, and Chuanlongkou, a planned traffic node situated at the eastern end of the Bund with vast land, was chosen as the site of this first new town.¹⁰⁹ The scheme reportedly originated with the Bureau of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (*Nong gong shang ju*).¹¹⁰ A new bureau named New Town Bureau (*Xinshi ju*) was created to be in charge of the

¹⁰⁷ Due to the lack of financial resources, the construction of the Guangzhou-Xiamen Railway was shelved by the Ministry of Commerce of the Central Government after it was proposed. In late 1907, the project was suspended as the first section of the railway, which was planned to be constructed east of Guangzhou, overlapped with the Canton-Kowloon Railway. For the proposal and the report of the suspension, see *Dongfang zazhi*, 18 May, 1906, vol.3, no.4, pp.112-4; 2 October, 1907, vol.4, no.8, p.202.

¹⁰⁸ *HZRB*, 18 August, 1906.

¹⁰⁹ Chuanlongkou was a well-known place in Qing Guangzhou, as it was always referred to in the newspapers. However, this place has vanished as it is not recorded in Guangzhou maps published today. An up-to-date gazette of Guangzhou streets states that Chuanlongkou is an informal name applied to the junction of the present-day Baiyun Road and Dongchuan Road. This description is supported by a re-drafted Qing Guangzhou map, on which a place labeled Chuanlongkou matches the location of the above-mentioned junction. However, there is no information as regards the source of the re-drafted map. The re-drafted map is found in *Guangzhou shi wenwu zhi bianweihui* (ed.), *Guangzhou shi wenwu zhi*, p.36. Also see relevant descriptions of "Baiyun Road" and "Dongchuan Road" in *Guangzhou shi diming zhi*, pp.74, 82; Zhang Zhidong, *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji*, vol.1, pp.563-4.



“construction of houses, bridges and roads” and the creation of good hygienic conditions. The aim of the Bureau was to create a good infrastructural basis for the proposed new town in order to develop it into another commercial center to attract the excessive population and commercial activities from the existing city.¹¹¹ This new town project was regarded as the heart of the whole planning effort.

While land transport would play a more important role in Guangzhou, especially with regard to its connection with cities such as Hong Kong and Hankou, Zhou Fu intended to revive Guangzhou’s supremacy in sea transport. Therefore, the development of Huangpu, the only official port open to foreign trade before the First Opium War, was incorporated into Zhou’s planning to produce a more comprehensive and coordinated scheme. The Bund was planned to be extended from Chuanlongkou to Huangpu, on which a road would be built.¹¹² Zhou Fu desired the concurrent development of Huangpu as another “giant” commercial town properly connected with the city proper, and he appointed a special official for this end.¹¹³


Planning was also extended to Honam. One of the components of the planning, as mentioned above, was to disperse the expanding population of the city proper to the suburbs. Honam was included by the government because of its growing economic importance and the availability of vast land. However, the inhabitants in the city proper were definitely not willing to migrate to Honam if transportation between the two banks of the Pearl River was not improved. In order to enhance traffic efficiency and produce a sound infrastructural basis for the development of Honam, the construction of a bridge

¹¹⁰ HZRB, 11 March, 1907.

¹¹¹ The content of the project was briefly concluded in a petition by Zhou Fu written on May 15, 1907. See Zhou Fu, *Qiu pu Zhou Shangshu (Yushan) quanji*, pp.541-2.

¹¹² HZRB, 5 January, 30 April, 1907.

¹¹³ HZRB, 24 January, 1907.



across the Pearl River connecting the city proper and Honam was considered to be urgent in the 1900s. This idea was actually not new. It was recorded that the earliest attempt for a similar construction was made in the late 1780s when Fu Kang'an, the Liang-Guang Governor-General, initiated the construction of a simple bamboo bridge across the Pearl River, a project that failed to complete because of the lack of funds.¹¹⁴ Several other suggestions had been made from the 1890s to the mid-1900s, and Zhou Fu finally contracted the Honam bridge project to a merchant named Liu Xiangqing in January, 1907.¹¹⁵ Liu's company, named "Provincial River Iron Bridge Company Limited", planned to build three bridges, and the first bridge would be located outside the Youlan Gate.¹¹⁶ The bridge could be segmented with movable parts to allow for the passage of large ships. A road about thirty-six *chi* wide would be constructed on the bridge to allow for various kinds of traffic vehicles including trams, horse-carts, rickshaws and fire engines.¹¹⁷

Besides the Honam Bridge, the construction of the Honam Bund was another important component of the planning. Actually, the Bund Bureau had made plans to construct the Honam Bund in 1905, but suffered from repeated suspensions.¹¹⁸ Right after


¹¹⁴ HZRB, 13 June, 1902.

¹¹⁵ The local inhabitants were quite enthusiastic in making proposals about the bridge. In 1895, two gentry made such a suggestion, but met with no response from the government. Another two gentry surnamed Lu and Yu suggested in 1902 to build such a bridge and any income gained would be used to subsidize a medical school. Another merchant named Huang Jingtang made a proposal in 1906. Huang's proposal met with competition from the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway. See HZRB, 13 June, 22 December, 1902; 11, 22 and 31 October, 1906. For Liu's contract, see HZRB, 24 January, 1907. When the construction of the Honam bridge was re-initiated in the late 1920s, the municipality traced its origin to the above ideas in the Guangxu period. See *Guangzhou shizhengfu, Guangzhou Haizhu qiao*, p.1.

¹¹⁶ HZRB, 28 January, 1907.

¹¹⁷ For details of the construction, see ZGRB, 1, 18 and 19 March, 1907, p.3.

¹¹⁸ Some efforts were made in 1905 to mark the boundary along the Honam bank for the future construction of a bund. After the completion of the section at the mouth of the Eastern Moat, the Bund Bureau was reportedly "determined" to begin the construction in Honam. However, no financial resources were available, and the project was again shelved. See HZRB, 7 March, 1905; 6 and 10



the Honam Bridge project was approved, the gentry and merchants in Honam made enthusiastic petitions to the local government urging for the faster development of Honam into a commercial center. They urged for the quickening of the construction of the Honam Bund.¹¹⁹ The local government started the project in April, 1907. Surveying was reportedly conducted in that month. In turn, the construction of the Bund, managed by a separate Bund Bureau with its own regulations, was designed to be divided into thirteen segments.¹²⁰

While the idea of constructing the Honam Bund in 1905 was simply an application and extension of the Bund project to Honam without any coordination with the “northern Bund”, the Honam Bund in 1907 was no longer an isolated design but an important component in the overall planning. Accordingly, the Honam Bund was to merge with the “northern Bund” at Huangpu, and this bund system was to be further supplemented by the Honam Bridge due for completion in 1908. It was estimated by the Bridge Company that the Honam Bund would also be completed in the same year.¹²¹ An extensive road traffic network was designed, forming a triangular trunk line along the river banks of the Pearl River. Organic connection between the city proper, Honam and Huangpu would be achieved by carefully planned and constructed trunk roads. The completion of this traffic network reform would not only create new city centers such as Chuanlongkou, Huangpu and Honam with sound transportation, but would also enhance Guangzhou’s status as a center of communications with the intercourse of trunk roads, railways and ships.

July, 1906.

¹¹⁹ *HZRB*, 23 February, 1907.

¹²⁰ *HZRB*, 22, 23 and 30 April, 1907.

¹²¹ *ZGRB*, 19 March, 1907, p.3.




This expansion went in hand with the re-development of the walled city on the northern bank of the Pearl River. A number of key roads were chosen for widening in order to “promote commerce”. Two roads are worth mentioning because of their significance to the city’s planning. Hui’ai Street (present-day Zhongshan Road), an east-west road running from the Dadong (Great East) Gate in the east to the Daxi (Great West) Gate in the west and with numerous *yamens* on its northern side, would be broadened substantially and connected to Chuanlongkou. Furthermore, a perpendicular street running from Chengxuan Straight Street in the north to Yongqing Street in the south (present-day Beijing Road) would also be broadened, linking Hui’ai Road to the Tianzi Pier on the Bund. This road would be named Danan (Great South) Gate Road.¹²² These two roads would form a T-shape trunk road in the heart of the city. Considering that this trunk road would be linked to Chuanlongkou and the Bund, and in turn to Honam and Huangpu, it is obvious that the re-development project was aimed at creating a city-wide road network.

Planning also addressed the problems associated with the city wall. As mentioned before, the decline of its effectiveness for defense purposes was accompanied by the rise of various urban problems. In late February, 1907, upon the government’s suggestion and the gentry’s support, it was proposed that after the completion of the Chuanlongkou new town, the wall of the Outer City would be demolished for the building of new roads.¹²³ More radical opinions, supported by Beijing officials of Guangdong origin, called for its immediate demolition and for opening new roads to encourage commerce.¹²⁴

¹²² HZRB, 22 and 27 May, 1907; 21 December, 1909.

¹²³ HZRB, 1 March, 1907.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*



The local government also paid attention to other urban problems in the walled city. It became more active in clearing illegally built houses, which helped to redress the situation of narrowness of streets.¹²⁵ The construction of public market-places, which corresponded to the aim of “promoting commerce” in the 1907 Planning, commenced.¹²⁶ The New Town Bureau was responsible for the construction of market-places in the city proper. For example, the Changshou Temple in Xiguan was converted into a market-place. It was suggested that street temples, such as the one outside the Danan (Great South) Gate, should be converted into market-places.


Achievements

Admittedly, the 1907 Planning faced numerous problems, which will be discussed later. Successors of Zhou Fu, who left his post in mid-1907, did not show enough interest in continuing all the projects contained in the 1907 Planning. However, some of its ideas were still followed. In the last years of the Dynasty, many road projects were completed with governmental support. Following the road construction in the eastern suburbs, the local officials pushed for the construction of roads in Chuanlongkou, which was important for connecting the Bund with the remote Shahe, the destination of Dongsha Road completed in 1909.¹²⁷ The completion of this road in 1909 served as a

¹²⁵ HZRB, 12 June, 1907.

¹²⁶ The advantage of public markets had been recognized as early as 1905. Such markets would accommodate on-street hawkers and offer groceries at reasonable price in a clean and hygienic environment. Government officials, mainly the Provincial Judge, made very aggressive plans. One source records that 30 markets would be set up in the city proper and the suburbs (HZRB, 13 July, 1905). This promising development stalled in the following two years.

¹²⁷ In some local gazetteers, for example the *Panyu xian xu zhi* (vol.4, p.15b; vol.6, p.6a), it is asserted that the construction of Dongsha Road began in 1906 and was completed in 1907. This claim is upheld in recent publications, such as the *Guangzhou shi zhi* (vol.3, p.174), which presumably make reference to these old local gazetteers. However, contemporary news reports did not support this point. A report in HZRB, 12 May, 1909 remarked that Dongsha Road “will soon be completed”, and another report dated 2 August, 1909 noted that the Road had been completed. This showed that 1909 was the correct year of completion. See also HZRB, 10 June, 1910.




stimulating factor for further imaginative “planning”, notably an encirclement network of thoroughfares composed of the Bund in the south, Dongsha Road in the east, Dongbei (Northeast) Road in the north and the Dabei (Great North) Gate Road in the west, the latter two being planned by the Rehabilitation Bureau after 1909.¹²⁸

Significance

The above description outlines the main components of the 1907 Planning. Its significance is beyond doubt. The most important point to note is the adoption of a more sophisticated approach to urban expansion. In the past, inaccessible, sparsely populated areas were regarded as worthless. When a British company purchased some tomb land in Honam in 1902, it was thought of by the general public as foolish, not only because the company acquired some “useless” land according to the viewpoint of the natives, but also because it led to resistance by the local residents.¹²⁹ This logic virtually prevailed in other Chinese cities. For example, in Shanghai, the Chinese officials were generous enough to concede vast land considered worthless outside the walled city to foreigners, where subsequently the new city centers emerged. In the view of the traditional Chinese, lands that deserved development were those in the already developed area filled with shops and residents, making those areas even more prosperous. The continuous expansion of the city wall and the construction of the Bund in Guangzhou reflected this traditional approach to expansion. Therefore, in traditional China, there was little truly urban expansion undertaken by the government, only occasional re-construction or re-development. However, upholding such a principle was costly. Although it showed the government’s effort in protecting economic activities, it equally reflected the govern-

¹²⁸ HZRB, 2 August, 1909.



ment's inability and indifference in solving various urban problems resulting from the expansion of population. The government never thought of initiating urban expansion as a solution to such problems. Therefore, it is fair to characterize the 1907 Planning as a breakthrough approach in urban development. The gist of the planning was the incorporation of Honam, the eastern suburbs and the more remote Huangpu into the city proper, with improved infrastructure. Admittedly, re-development was still an important component of planning, but planning this time paid more attention to the establishment of new city centers in areas which were sparse in population. It was the first time that both development and re-development were organically integrated under one grand plan, and the local government was willing to give up some traditional urban components, notably the destruction of the outdated city wall.

The local government was also aware of the vitality of urban expansion for re-developing the built-up areas of the city. The successful development of Honam would serve as a planning tool to solve the ever-existing urban problems in the city proper by moving part of the population and economic activities to the southern bank of the Pearl River, followed by step-by-step re-development of the city proper.¹³⁰

Under the guidance of the new thinking, Zhou Fu and his government planned to conduct an eastward expansion. Although the eastern suburbs of the city were undulating with limited flat land, the area would still have great potentials for development if it was well connected with the city proper and other towns such as Huangpu by broad roads, tramways and railways. This would save Guangzhou from the problem of land shortage, and open a new chapter of urban expansion by reversing the trend of westward

¹²⁹ HZRB, 25 November, 1902.

¹³⁰ The urgency of building the Honam bridge was briefly explained by Zhou Fu in HZRB, 24 January, 1907.




expansion that had existed for centuries. Land in the eastern suburbs began to attract both private and public parties for development. A good example was the government's proposal to open up and develop Dashatou as an eastern extension of the Bund as a modernized island modeled on Shamian island and as a place of residence for overseas Chinese returning to the city.¹³¹ Later development of the eastern suburbs during the Republican and post-1949 eras incorporated the area into the city proper, and this proved the farsightedness of Zhou Fu.

Therefore, the 1907 Planning was a sensible, realistic and coordinated project. It envisaged the feasibility of making use of the new environment, that is, the forthcoming opening of railways, to develop the suburbs so as to alleviate the urban problems in the built-up areas. The local government planned that re-development of the walled city, with the demolition of the city wall as the first step, would commence after the Chuan-longkou new town was completed. This showed that the government was careful enough not to alienate the residents of the walled city before they could move to places of comparable prosperity and opportunity, such as the new towns.

The 1907 Plan was also significant in the sense that it served as a starting point for administrative reform. First of all, it was the first time that the local government paid serious attention to the development of the suburbs of a *cheng* (walled city). This extraordinary practice marked a change in the traditional administrative norm that official administration was not extendable beyond the boundary of the city wall. Although the term "provincial capital" still referred to the walled city only, whereas the proposed new towns were labeled as "markets" (*shi*), the walled city, its suburbs and the remote Huangpu would form an enlarged city. Secondly, some kind of a municipality in the

¹³¹ HZRB, 5 and 17 May, 1909; 3 January, 1911.



Western sense could emerge, as city-level government institutions were created to manage the planning, that is, the Bund Bureau and the New Town Bureau. This will be discussed in greater details in the next chapter. Thirdly, the Planning later encouraged the construction of a new administrative complex. When the broadening of the perpendicular Danan Gate Road was begun in 1911, it involved the demolition of the offices of the Provincial Administer and the Guangzhou Prefect. As this project coincided with the devastation of the Governor-General's office by the revolutionaries in March, 1911, Governor-General Zhang Mingqi decided that a new administrative complex would be constructed, possibly as a precautionary measure to enhance the security of the scattered *yamens* against further attacks by the revolutionaries.¹³² The site was the old Viceroy's office, the use of which had not been determined after that post was annulled in 1905.¹³³


Obstructions and limitations

It is quite clear that the materialization of the 1907 Planning would fundamentally change the urban landscape of Guangzhou. The realization of this Planning was, however replete with problems. The planning, though rational and feasible, was not matched by a sound financial base nor by a change in the attitude of the inhabitants towards the new development. Thousands of huts around Chuanlongkou needed to be re-developed, and this met the strong resistance of the residents. Zhou Fu was thus forced to amend his original design, and conceded that most of the houses would not be demolished.¹³⁴ This

¹³² The complex would amalgamate some major government organs, including the offices of the Governor-General, Provincial Administer, the Guangzhou Prefect, and even the Military Office (*Dulian gongsuo*), Statistics Department (*Tongji chu*), Education Officer (*Tixue si*), Circuit of Economic Promotion (*Quanye dao*) and the government coffers.

¹³³ For the administrative complex, see *HZRB*, 10 and 19 July, 1911. The Viceroy's office was assigned some short-term use after 1905, for example, by the Liang-Guang Higher Technical Institute in 1907 and by the Provincial Assembly in 1909.

¹³⁴ For the resistance and its result, see *HZRB*, 8 and 10 May, 20 June, 1907.



actually brought the new town project to a halt. The stoppage of construction at Chuanlongkou paralyzed the New Town Bureau, and the Bureau was dissolved in late 1908.¹³⁵ Besides the suspension of work at Chuanlongkou, the Bureau's dissolution was also due to Zhou's frequent interference, making the Bureau's existence only nominal.


The other two components of the project, that is, Huangpu and Honam, also faced serious setbacks. The "plan" for Huangpu was stalled because the local government never initiated construction, but waited for the private sector to initiate action.¹³⁶ The Honam scheme, which seemed to promise success with some actual work completed, met with adversity. Liu Xiangqing, Director of the Provincial Iron Bridge Company, suddenly died in November, 1907. Both his son and other shareholders of the Company were not willing to continue the work, and the Company was dissolved with the approval of Governor-General Zhang Renjun.¹³⁷ In the same month of Liu's death, the Honam Bund Bureau was also dissolved, and the construction of the Honam Bund was virtually forgotten by the local officials.¹³⁸ As a result, planning was actually forestalled as construction work for the three core components of the Planning, that is, Chuanlongkou, Huangpu and Honam, was not resumed after the above unforeseen events occurred in the latter half of 1907. The inability of the local government to continue the project showed that the 1907 Planning was a set of logical ideas but never carried through because the necessary resources were not available.

¹³⁵ The dissolution was mentioned in *HZRB*, 21 December, 1908, but the exact time of dissolution was not recorded. As the activities of the Bureau were still reported in the paper in April of that year, the time of dissolution should be between April and December of 1908.

¹³⁶ In 1911, an overseas Chinese named Zhang Hongnan proposed to the local government to form a corporation which aimed at constructing Huangpu as a prominent port of China. The negotiation presumably came to an end due to the political turmoil resulting from the Wuchang Uprising. *HZRB*, 31 August, 2 and 6 September, 1911.

¹³⁷ *HZRB*, 9 December, 1907; 4 January, 1908.

¹³⁸ *HZRB*, 14 November, 1907.



Although Zhou Fu was an official experienced in engineering work, his determination in carrying out the Planning was questionable. Before taking up his post in Liang-Guang, he seldom met mass opposition like that of the Chuanlongkou residents.¹³⁹ He swiftly gave up the Chuanlongkou project because of intensified mobilization of the residents by the revolutionaries who made use of the issue against the Qing. Urban reform and expansion was shelved if it threatened political stability.

While urban development schemes in foreign countries in the 1890s and 1900s paid much attention to improving the quality of the city environment, such as the Garden City idea as developed by the Englishman Ebenezer Howard and the City Beautiful Movement in American cities, the content of “expansion” and “development” in the case of Guangzhou was confined to the economic aspect, that is, the provision of more space for commercial use.¹⁴⁰ Originally, Zhou Fu approved of the Guangdong Mint’s proposal in July 1906, to build Chuanlongkou into a public garden.¹⁴¹ However, it was Zhou who renounced the project eight months later and ordered the construction of a new town at Chuanlongkou. To Zhou, an area with traffic convenience should be used only for the development of commerce, even with the sacrifice of natural beauty.

Development of land transport was a key component of the 1907 Planning. As a tramway was planned to be built on the proposed Honam Bridge, Wen Hao, who had a circuit title, proposed to the Bureau of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce to construct a tramway along the Bund so that a network of tramways would cross the Pearl River. This proposal, however, was rejected unexpectedly. The reasons given by the Bureau showed that the construction of the Bund and the whole 1907 Planning were planned in

¹³⁹ See Zhou Fu, *Minguo Zhou Yushan xiasheng Fu zidong nianpu*, pp.25-96; Zou Xiaozhan, “Zhou Fu”, in Luo Ming, et al (ed.), *Qing dai renwu zhuangao*, pp.128-32.

¹⁴⁰ Donald A. Krueckeberg, *Introduction to Planning History in the United States*, pp.41-54, 113.



a piecemeal manner:

“The area west of the Tianzi Pier is densely populated with uncountable shops. It is difficult to order their destruction. Concerning the east [of the Pier], only a limited number of lines can be created. The road will be assigned for the traffic of horse-carts, rickshaws and goods carts. Inquiry about the issue of tramway construction shall wait after the completion of the Bund.”¹⁴²

Although the Bund was the mark of urban modernization for the city and the starting point of the 1907 Planning, its use was not planned carefully at the commencement of its construction. This illustrated that the Bund could only serve as a logical starting point for numerous imaginary modernization ideas or projects, but failed to provide a solid foundation for further urban reforms.

Furthermore, the 1907 Planning did not intend to change the nature of Guangzhou as a river city. When the Guangzhou Chamber of Commerce (*Guangzhou zong-shanghui*) proposed in August 1907 to the Guangzhou Prefect to reclaim the Eastern and Western Moats for roads and shops, the Prefect responded by determined rejection because of the importance of the Moats for water discharge.¹⁴³ This explained why the different sections of the Bund were connected by simple bridges over rivers, but were not filled up to provide more land for shops.


Planning efforts in the early years of the Republic

The overthrow of the Qing Dynasty brought the hope of revolutionary changes to the province of Guangdong. From the proclamation of independence by Governor-General Zhang Mingqi in November 1911 to the failure of the Second Revolution in August 1913, the Guangdong government was under the firm control of the revolution-

¹⁴¹ For details of the public garden project, see *HZRB*, 6 and 28 July, 1906.

¹⁴² *HZRB*, 30 May, 1907.

¹⁴³ *HZRB*, 14 August, 1911.



aries. Policies were rather liberal, as seen by the fact that Guangdong was the first province in China which allowed female representatives to the Provincial Assembly.¹⁴⁴ Sun Yatsen proclaimed that the goal of political revolution had been achieved, and energy and resources should be directed to social and economic construction.¹⁴⁵ After he resigned from the Presidency in favor of Yuan Shikai, he returned to Guangzhou to promote industrial development and local construction. He had great hopes that Guangdong's reconstruction as a "model province" would be a testing ground for his "three peoples' principles" (*sanmin zhuyi*).¹⁴⁶

It was against this background that massive planning in Guangzhou commenced in the years 1912 and 1913 under the governorship of Hu Hanmin and Chen Jiongming. The details of the planning was clearly based on the 1907 Planning. The first project was to demolish the city wall, which was now regarded as a symbol of authoritarianism, and its demolition was taken to symbolize the coming of a new era. Hui'ai Road and Yonghan Road (previously Yongqing Road) would be broadened. The Bund would be extended westward to embrace the northern end of Shamian. Roads running parallel to the Bund were planned and a tramway was also planned. A "large port city" would be constructed by incorporating Guangzhou proper with Honam, Foshan and Huangpu.¹⁴⁷

The local government's enthusiastic reforms were not supported by the residents of the city. They felt that the financial resources of Guangzhou had been drained by revolutionary activities in late 1911, and they opposed any substantial change in spite of its great political meaning. Therefore, the local government yielded to the merchants'

¹⁴⁴ Yu Yanguang and Chen Fulin, *Nan Yue geju: Cong Long Jiguang dao Chen Jitang*, pp.21-2.

¹⁴⁵ Chen Xiqi, et al, *Sun Zhongshan nianpu changbian*, p.709.

¹⁴⁶ *Minli bao*, 4 and 5 May, 1912; *Minsheng ribao*, 18 May, 8 June, 1912. These are cited in Chen Xiqi, et al, *Sun Zhongshan nianpu changbian*, pp. 695, 699, 703.

¹⁴⁷ For the planning of 1912 and 1913, see *SB*, 20 January, 2 March, 1912; *HZRB*, 10 March, 2 and 10



demands that wholesale demolition of city walls should be postponed, and that only demolition of the section in the suburbs near Yuexiu Hill should commence.¹⁴⁸

Opposition coalesced over the widening of Yonghan Road. The local government made the widening of Yonghan Road the first road project because of its central position in the walled city, its prosperity and the potential income that could be procured from selling the new land on both sides of the broadened road.¹⁴⁹ Along the 4,300 feet of road with a width of 60 feet, 150 trees would be planted.¹⁵⁰ The widening would involve the demolition of the existing shops along both sides of the street. As compensation was minimal, the demolition of shops would create tremendous social problems including massive unemployment. Therefore, opposition was severe from the very beginning. The seventy-two *hang* merchants argued that there was no municipal government in Guangzhou, and that the construction proposal was only a governmental project not approved by the Guangzhou people.¹⁵¹ The reason why the merchants argued in this way was possibly due to the establishment of two municipal governments in Shanghai (in Zhabei and Nanshi) run by the Chinese.

Opposition of the Guangzhou residents was organized. Besides petitioning the local government, they also petitioned the central government in Beijing. Even President Yuan Shikai intervened under the advice of the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce. The Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing commented that Yonghan Road was wide enough and that pulling down shops in that street would only agitate the residents. In this in-


April, 28 May, 1913; 6 August, 1919.

¹⁴⁸ *HZRB*, 27 January, 1912.

¹⁴⁹ The total construction cost was 0.6 million, and the local government foresaw a total revenue of 1.3 million after selling the street land. See *HZRB*, 25 February, 1913.

¹⁵⁰ *HZRB*, 3 June, 1913.

¹⁵¹ *HZRB*, 18 March, 1913.



stance, merchants in Hong Kong stood firmly by the Guangzhou residents, and they pointed out that it would be unwise to introduce massive construction before poverty and depression brought about by the 1911 Revolution were solved.¹⁵²


Reportedly, the opposition of merchants in the walled city shifted the local government's attention to Honam, as Honam was less populated than the city proper and opposition to construction would be less intense. A proposal was made to construct 27 cross-shape roads in Honam. The government would take the initiative to construct a main road, and merchants were invited to construct the rest.¹⁵³

However, most construction programs were suspended after the Second Revolution in 1913. Local officials of revolutionary background, such as Hu Hanmin and Chen Jiongming, went abroad in exile, and Guangzhou came under the control of agents of Yuan Shikai. This does not suggest that they were completely against urban construction. Long Jiguang, the Military Governor of Guangdong (1913-1916) was hated by many Guangdong people for his oppressive rule in the province, but he managed to complete the Shaji section of the Bund in 1914. The Bund soon turned into a new center of the city. However, city administration was overshadowed by preoccupation with defense against the revolutionaries, who vowed to launch the "third" revolution in Guangdong.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, the ruling militarists adopted a traditional and conservative approach to rule the city. City walls and street gates were maintained and repaired regularly. As a result, urban construction was ignored.

¹⁵² For the opposition, see *HZRB*, 7, 12, 15 and 19 July, 23 August, 3 September (editorial), 1913.

¹⁵³ *HZRB*, 18 April, 1913.

¹⁵⁴ Chen Xiqi, et al, *Sun Zhongshan nianpu changbian*, p.897.




An examination of the forces of urban expansion

As mentioned above, overpopulation, land shortage and other urban problems relating to transportation and public sanitation gave rise to the necessity of re-developing and expanding Guangzhou city. While the need for change was observable, the question is: who would initiate change and provide the impetus for urban transformation? It was explained in Chapter Two and this chapter that the private sector was an important force in initiating change and expanding the geographical scope of the city through developing the suburbs, such as the construction of new houses and streets in the west of Xiguan, at the mouth of the Eastern Moat and along the river bank of Honam. These activities had produced a city much larger than that in the Tang or Song era, as the city boundary was extended outward. As a result, the private sector, notably the merchants, found it difficult to manage the enlargement of the city, and could not provide the supporting infrastructure - primarily transportation facilities - to connect the new urban settlements with the city proper. While the private sector proved too weak to complete the transformation of the city, the local government was the only alternative to continue the task. The appearance of large numbers of public buildings, which was a direct result of various reform movements especially the Late Qing Reform in the last decades of the Qing Dynasty, was apparently crucial in remolding the outlook of the city. Reforms created new governmental functions, and new institutions were also established to realize various kinds of new ideas. This mushrooming of new institutions and offices, notably schools and governmental bureaus, was no exception for Guangzhou and increased the demand for land. Construction of new buildings and the reconstruction of old sites to house these new institutions changed the urban landscape of the city, and should have helped to create a new Guangzhou.



This development however, was doomed, similar to the fate of the reform movements themselves. The construction of a large number of new public buildings in the city was influenced by the traditional approach of land use conversion. Whenever new bodies were created, they usually squeezed themselves into existing buildings, such as temples and governmental bureaus. The adoption of this old approach in the last decades of the Dynasty can be illustrated clearly by the establishment of new schools and new governmental bureaus. (See tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively) Temples and traditional colleges (*shuyuan*) were usually occupied or shared by other organizations which simply kept the buildings intact with rare re-decoration or renewal. In other words, the process of changing land use was accomplished as far as the building was “re-occupied”, always with no transfer of ownership.

This common feature, however, was particularized in the last decades of the Dynasty by specific historical background. The case of new colleges (*xuetang*) is the most exemplary. The establishment of the new colleges was presumably a starting point of modernization in the Late Qing Reform. Students were supposed to be trained with practical knowledge and skills instead of reciting the Chinese classics. Therefore, their rapid and widespread construction was decreed by the Emperor right after the Boxer Uprising. The introduction of the new educational system, with university at the top followed by middle schools, primary schools, kindergartens and other schools teaching practical skills such as normal schools and technical schools, created both a great demand for land and a construction boom. However, the anticipated result failed to materialize since the force of change was offset by the game of substitution, that is, the rapid rise of the new colleges was simply a functional and geographical substitution for the traditional colleges, civil service examination halls and other old educational institutions, which declined after the suspension of the Civil Service Examination. The new college



issue was primarily a political campaign and those institutions associated with traditional education made prompt but insincere response to the central decree simply by changing their names.¹⁵⁵ Though new land for construction was occasionally secured, such as for the construction of the Political and Law Institute and the Officials' Children College mentioned above, it must be pointed out that these two examples were exceptional. The Political and Law Institute, due to its importance as a training institute for the government, was among the few colleges which really underwent substantial expansion in Guangzhou, while the Officials' Children College could afford the costly construction since all students came from the families of the local officials.


This "substitution mechanism" distorted the structure of the new educational system, and only middle schools were newly constructed. Primary schools were almost left behind by the government, and they preferred to bargain with temples for space. But it seemed that the efforts of the initiators of primary schools were in vain. Guangdong was among the last provinces to establish kindergartens,¹⁵⁶ and primary-school and kindergarten students accounted for less than five per cent of population of the Guangdong province.¹⁵⁷

As the number of traditional colleges and temples was fixed, there was fierce competition to use them for the sites of new colleges, and this resulted in frequent conflicts. The struggle for the use of the Changshou Temple between a primary school and a com-

¹⁵⁵ HZRB made a very critical comment on the lip-service paid to Guangdong's educational reform. "It is particularly strange that in many prefectures and counties the new colleges were not used for teaching purpose, but for civil service examination. The new colleges are not erected on sound finances. They only follow the official classification of colleges." HZRB, 10 July, 1902.

¹⁵⁶ HZRB, 3 December, 1906.

¹⁵⁷ See a letter by overseas Chinese merchants to the provincial officials of Guangdong pleading for faster and more balanced development of education. "Out of the millions of youths and children at the age of education, there are only about twenty thousand primary school students. Guangdong has more or less the same population as Zhili, but the number of primary school students in Guangdong is less than one-seventh that of Zhili." HZRB, 22 July, 1910.




mercial school resulted in the takeover of the temple by the government for erecting a new market.¹⁵⁸ Conflicts also happened at the governmental level. While Fei Jingfu, the Nanhai Magistrate, intended to turn some confiscated brothels into a primary school in 1902, Gong Xinzhan, the Guangzhou Prefect, objected and insisted that they should be used for the site of a factory.¹⁵⁹

The construction of new colleges had a low governmental priority, partly because such land use could not generate good profits. Sometimes, a college had to move frequently to seek lower land cost, larger area and convenient traffic. In this respect, the case of the Guangzhou Middle College is typical. In June, 1902, Gong Xinzhan proposed to construct the Guangzhou Middle College which was to be a prefectural-level government school. The Viceroy's parade ground was chosen as the site for the campus. Conceivably due to traffic inconvenience, the site was given up and a new site near the mouth of the Eastern Moat was picked up in October. This site was again given up as the cost of transforming the alluvium was too expensive. In December, 1902, Gong made his "final" decision that the College would be built beside the Haichuang Temple in Honam. Before the completion of the building, the Guangzhou Prefectural Free School to the west of the Prefect's *yamen* was selected as the temporary campus. Discovering later that the site in Honam suffered from seasonal flooding, Shen Cituan (who succeeded Gong) changed his mind and decided on an area covered with fish ponds to the south of the Xiaobei (Small North) Gate. This long process of choosing an appropriate site finally ended when the traditional Yuehua College became available and was made the permanent campus in January, 1904. The College was expanded in 1907 by encir-

¹⁵⁸ HZRB, 28 February, 13 March, 1905.

¹⁵⁹ HZRB, 8 September, 1902.




clinging the adjacent Shaanxi Confucian Temple.¹⁶⁰ Whenever established buildings were available, new colleges were reluctant to fund new buildings, and this fostered a chaotic land use pattern. Therefore, colleges which failed to target existing buildings were often forced to suspend their activities. This happened to the Guangdong and Guangxi Higher Technical Institute in 1911 when Zhang Mingqi took up the old Viceroy's office to construct a new administrative complex.¹⁶¹

Table 4.1 Locations of new schools

School name	Original land use	Address	Year of establishment
Panyu Government Middle School	Guangzhou Confucian Palace	Hui'ai Street, Inner City	1906
Panyu Normal School	Guangzhou Confucian Palace	Hui'ai Street, Inner City	1906
Panyu Government Senior Primary School	Yushan College	Hui'ai Street, Inner City	1904
Panyu Government Elementary Normal School	Guandi Temple	Hui'ai Street, Inner City	1909
Guangdong and Guangxi Dialect School	Yuexiu College	Yansi Street, Inner City	1906
Guangdong and Guangxi Senior Technical School	Viceroy's Office	Hui'ai Street, Inner City	1907
Guangdong and Guangxi Short-term Normal School	Examination Hall	Inner City	1904
Guangdong and Guangxi Senior Normal School	Examination Hall	Inner City	1906
Guangdong Classics School	Yingyuan College and Jupo College	Foot of the Yuexiu Hill, Inner City	1908
Guangzhou Middle School	Yuehua College	Buzhengsi Back Street, Inner City	1902
Jiaozhong Normal School	Guangzhou Confucian Palace	Wenming Gate, Inner City	1902
Guangdong and Guangxi Junior Normal School	Yuexiu College	Yansi Street, Inner City	1905
Science Research Center	Xuehaitang Guangdong Dialect	Yuexiu Hill, Inner City Yansi Street, Inner City	1906

¹⁶⁰ For the issue of the Guangzhou Middle College, see *HZRB*, 26 June, 2 September, 30 October, 18 December, 1902; 8 and 14 January, 26 May, 1903; 29 January, 1904; 15 May, 1907.

¹⁶¹ *HZRB*, 31 July, 1911.




	School		
Panyu Junior Model Primary School	Yaoshi Nunnery	Xiaobei Straight Street, Inner City	1907
Panyu Government No.3 Junior Primary School	Zhengxian Temple	Nineteen Holes, Inner City	1905
Senior Primary School for Han and Manchu Banner-men	Translators' College (<i>Tongwen guan</i>)	Chaotian Street, Inner City	1906
Nanhai Normal School	Xihu College	Xihu Street, Inner City	1905
Panyu Normal School (extension)	Guandi Temple	Hui'ai Street, Inner City	1909
Primary School (not named)	Tianhou Temple	Jiubu Front Street, Inner City	1905
Qiming Junior and Senior Private Primary School	Lion Temple	Xiheng Street, Outer City	1905
Primary School (not named)	Wanshou Nunnery	Gaoji, Xiguan	1905
Dongguan Junior and Senior Model Primary School	Sangong Temple	Qianjian Street, Dongguan	1905
Panyu Government No.8 Junior Primary School	Doulao Palace	Xianxiang Street, Dongguan	1905
Panyu Government No.9 Junior Primary School	Yin Nunnery	Qianjian Street, Dongguan	1905
Fangcun Junior Primary School	Qigong Temple	Fangcun	1905
Panyu No.14 Junior Primary School	Duzhou College	Zhengzhou Village, Honam	1905

Source: Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.4; *Guangzhou baike quanshu*, p.121.

Table 4.2 Offices of governmental and public institutions

Name of institute	Address	Note
Widow Bureau	Wenming Gate, Inner City	Occupied the Sandazhong Temple in 1834
Rehabilitation Bureau	Longcang Street, Inner City	Occupied the Great Buddha Temple
Circuit of Economic Promotion	Wuxian Gate, Outer City	Occupied the office of the Guangzhou Customs in 1910
Finance Office	Hui'ai Street, Inner City	Occupied the office of the Provincial Administrator in 1910
Judiciary Office	Jiuyaofang, Inner City	Occupied the office of the Provincial Judge in 1909
Police Circuit Office	Nanchao Street, Inner City	Occupied the office of the Grain Circuit in 1906
Senior Court	Cangbian Street, Inner City	Occupied the <i>Likin</i> Office in 1910
Agricultural Land Survey Bureau, Panyu	Hui'ai Street, Inner City	Occupied part of Yushan College in 1897




County		
Arrest Bureau	Sihou Street, In- ner City	Occupied the Salt Transport Office in 1860
	Houloufang, Inner City	Occupied a military office as the new ad- dress in 1903
Provincial Judge	Yansi Street, In- ner City	Occupied part of Yuexiu College in 1895
Guangdong and Guangxi Dialect School	Yansi Street, In- ner City	Occupied part of Yuexiu College in 1906
Bureau of Agriculture, Industry and Com- merce	Yideshe, Outer City	Occupied the Tianhou Temple in 1906
School Affairs Office	Xiguan	Occupied part of Guangya College in 1906

Source: Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhu*, vol.4.

The situation of the new government organizations was somewhat different from that of the new colleges. Although some new government organs might take up the functions of existing organs, an issue which will be discussed in the next chapter, the relationship between these old and new organs was not guided principally by substitution, but co-existence. These new organizations, which were more specialized, were located quite far away from the traditional power center in the heart of the Inner City. The Government Paper Bureau, Telegram Bureau and the Electricity Bureau were examples, all of which were situated at the Bund outside the Yongqing Gate.¹⁶² The creation of the Bund thus provided a more central location for these new administrative offices in anticipation of the incorporation of Honam and Dongguan into the city proper.

However, the Bund was not transformed into a new administrative center. Although the new organs mentioned above were the products of local modernization efforts, their status was far from substantial when compared with other new organs established, such as the Rehabilitation Bureau, Police Bureau, Circuit of Economic Promotion, Bureau of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce and Finance Office, which were

¹⁶² Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.4, pp.13a-14a.



located in the traditional administrative center in the heart of the Inner City. As shown in Table 4.2, these new organs either shared space with existing government buildings or occupied temples and traditional colleges. The clustering of these new organs in the established administrative zone showed that the geographical expression of local administration was too stable to be changed. Even the careful choice of the seemingly new administrative center at the Bund was only an extension of the existing center in the Inner City. This observation is supported by their relative locations. The area outside the Yongqing Gate where new government organs were situated was at the southern end of the perpendicular road leading to the Provincial Administrator's *yamen* in the heart of the administrative zone. Because existing government buildings were occupied, newly formed government organs had to occupy non-governmental buildings, mostly temples, in order to maintain a centripetal pattern of administration. The Rehabilitation Bureau, which exerted great power and influence on local administration in the last decades of the Dynasty, is a typical example, occupying the Great Buddha Temple to the south of the Provincial Administrator's *yamen*.

As a result, the new governmental organs were even less a force of urban transformation than the new colleges. The choice of buildings for the new organs was highly restrictive. Existing governmental buildings were the most preferable sites as the establishment of new offices was always acted on promptly. Compared to the new colleges, the government did not consider the temples scattered around the city as proper sites for the new organs, simply because weak coordination of functions would result from the decentralization of the administrative core. Therefore, the administrative center still remained in the Inner City in spite of the appearance of numerous new government organs at the Bund and other sites. The burden of materializing the late Qing reforms bankrupted the local government whose fiscal position was eased somewhat by



minimizing expenditures and the selling of government properties.¹⁶³ The plan for the construction of the administrative complex in 1911, for example, was an attempt to economize both administrative expenditure and land use by integrating the numerous *yamens* into a single complex. Architectural components of traditional *yamens*, such as private gardens and rooms for servants, were minimized. Officials, such as the Provincial Administrator and the Guangzhou Prefect, seemed to accept the idea of an administrative complex because it might save them a considerable sum of money for daily maintenance.¹⁶⁴

Maximization of land use rate was a widely adopted principle for real estate of every kind and reflected the pattern of Guangzhou society. This worked with another accepted principle discussed above, that is, only prosperous as opposed to barren areas were considered as developable. These principles not only deterred the rate of urban expansion, but also hindered the development of important industries such as construction industry.¹⁶⁵ There were a number of factors working against the modification of these principles in the late Qing. Overcrowding in the developed area persisted although it was offset by the availability of many unoccupied territories which could still absorb considerable population.¹⁶⁶ Reclaiming land from rivers was repeatedly banned by the local government, but it was persistently practised and was the most common method of maximizing land use rate. Both factors blocked the success of the 1907 Planning which

¹⁶³ In a family letter, Zhang Renjun wrote: "... affairs in Guangdong are numerous and difficult to deal with. There are many reforms, but with no capable personnel and money...." Zhang Zhouzhong (ed.), *Zhang Renjun jiashu riji*, p.138.

¹⁶⁴ Officials of various levels still had to use their own purse for the daily maintenance of their *yamens*. See Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.4.

¹⁶⁵ The weak construction industry in Guangzhou was reflected by the frequent employment of Hong Kong architectural firms for local projects. For example, the project of the proposed administrative complex in 1911 was contracted to a Hong Kong firm named Xie'an. *HZRB*, 21 July, 1911.

¹⁶⁶ One example was Zhafen Street to the west of the Panyu Magistrate *yamen*. See *HZRB*, 16 September, 1897.




aimed at restructuring the urban pattern of Guangzhou. As a result, overpopulation and the enlargement of urban activities failed to activate immediate urban expansion. Honam remained isolated from the city proper, and Dongguan was still under-populated and only attracted lepers for residence purpose.¹⁶⁷

This conservation of the established urban pattern, however, did change later. Reclamation of rivers and ponds in the walled city and Xiguan gradually reached its limit and population had to be dispersed. The direction of population migration and urban expansion envisaged in the 1907 Planning was to Dongguan and Honam, and this was essentially followed in the Republican period. Various problems, such as hygiene, traffic and fire prevention, also encouraged progressive merchants and officials to plan improvements to the environment.

Urban infrastructure

To the ordinary residents of Guangzhou, urban expansion was not a means of solving various urban problems. Comparatively speaking, the modernization of urban infrastructure was conceived as more important as it produced more immediate effect on the inhabitants in every corner of the city. Abundant evidence showed that the local Chinese were passive in adopting changes in the city, but they did support the maintenance of the urban infrastructure as it affected life and property, such as fire fighting, or epidemic prevention. Completely new urban utilities, namely electricity, telephone and tap water were introduced in the last two decades of the Qing dynasty, and these modernization efforts made Guangzhou one of the most advanced cities in the country. The following paragraphs will show that Guangzhou's infrastructural development had a twofold na-

¹⁶⁷ *Guangzhou weisheng*, no.1, 10 October, 1935, pp.5-6.



ture, that is, solving inherent problems of the city, and introducing and acknowledging new ideas from foreign countries.

Electricity


Electricity was the foremost modern urban utility emplaced in Guangzhou. Records show that Zhang Zhidong first purchased an electricity generation machine in his *yamen* in 1888.¹⁶⁸ A public electricity company, known as “Canton Electric Light Company”,¹⁶⁹ was established in 1890 by Huang Bingchang, an overseas Chinese who returned from San Francisco. Guangzhou people still pay their respect to Huang not only for his establishment of the first electricity company in the city, but also for his determination to serve the Guangzhou people by refusing Zhang Zhidong’s suggestion to move the proposed plant to Wuhan where Zhang’s new appointment was seated.¹⁷⁰ Governor-General Li Hanzhang appreciated the merits of electricity for lighting purpose and which could reduce the frequency of fire.¹⁷¹ Huang’s company employed a foreign engineer who was responsible for furnishing the engines imported from Pittsburgh. Although the company obtained a license to supply electric light to the cities of Guangdong province, its business was actually limited to the city of Guangzhou, and promi-

¹⁶⁸ *North China Herald*, 18 August, 1888, vol.41, p.184; quoted from Sun Xutang (ed.), *Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao (1840-1895)*, vol.2, p.1019.

¹⁶⁹ Smith, H.S., *Diary of Events and the Progress on Shameen, 1859-1938*, pp.21-2.

¹⁷⁰ Huang Bingchang is commemorated in the current literature as a pioneer in Guangzhou’s electricity business. For example, see Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng Guangzhou shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), *Guangzhou bainian dashiji*, p.83; Qiu Zhuanying (ed.), *Guangzhou jindai jingji shi*, pp.146-7. For Huang’s establishment of an electricity plant and his refusal to move the plant to Wuhan, see *North China Herald*, 7 February, 1890, vol.44, p.152, quoted from Sun Xutang (ed.), *Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao (1840-1895)*, vol.2, p.1019; *Guangzhou jindai shi*, pp.19-20; The Inspector General of Customs, *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports open to foreign commerce in China and Corea, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-91*, pp.564-5; *HZRB*, 10 July, 1905.

¹⁷¹ *North China Herald*, 7 February, 1890, vol.44, p.152, quoted from Sun Xutang (ed.), *Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao (1840-1895)*, vol.2, p.1019.



nently the walled city.¹⁷² The company showed great enthusiasm in expanding its supply to the whole city, but this ambition was hindered by serious lack of capital and its unsophisticated machinery. This company was finally liquidated in 1899 and the plant was turned into a saw mill.¹⁷³

One year before the liquidation of Huang's company, a "far more pretentious company" was formed by an unknown merchant, whose business was far more successful than Huang's undertaking. Besides the walled city, Xiguan was included in the area of electricity supply. Its popularity was partially due to its enthusiastic operation of a fire-fighting brigade.¹⁷⁴ For such an important electricity plant, it is a great pity that much of its history has been buried. It is only known that the plant was set up outside the Wuxian Gate, and that the company quickly went into insolvency in 1899 after changing hands several times during its brief existence of one year.¹⁷⁵ The company was then taken over by the Shewan, Tomes & Company, a Hong Kong based British firm, presumably in 1901, and was renamed as China Light and Power Co., Ltd.¹⁷⁶ Although


¹⁷² The geographical scope of business was not mentioned in the available materials. It was mentioned in the *Decennial Reports* of the Imperial Maritimes Customs that public buildings, that is, governmental buildings clustering in the middle of the Inner City, were the primary customers of the plant. And the new plant set up by another merchant in 1898 focused its business in Xiguan where Huang's company failed to grasp. Therefore, the walled city was the only reach of Huang's company. See the Inspector General of Customs, *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports open to foreign commerce in China and Corea, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-91*, pp.564-5.

¹⁷³ The Inspectorate General of Customs, *China: Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce in China, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1892-1901*, p.196.

¹⁷⁴ HZRB, 30 March, 1897.

¹⁷⁵ For the brief history and the importance of this company, see the Inspectorate General of Customs, *China: Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce in China, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1892-1901*, pp.188, 196.

¹⁷⁶ Concerning the takeover company, the Chinese name was "Qichang". This name had been used by the famous Russell & Company which was an American operation. However, Russell was not the correct company because it was already closed in 1891. According to a business directory published in the 1910s, "Qichang" was shared by another firm called "Shewan, Tomes & Company" which was the firm that procured the 1898 electricity company. See *Directory and Chronicle of China*,



there were complaints from foreigners about the frequent interruptions of electricity supply, its business steadily grew after the takeover. The Shamian Municipal Council resolved in 1904 to replace the previous system of oil lighting by electric light in the streets of the island, and the Police Bureau promoted the installation of electric light in the city in 1905.¹⁷⁷

The local government adopted a non-interference policy towards the China Light and Power Co., Ltd. The autonomous status of the Company did not change until the 1905 anti-American campaign. Although the Company was funded by British capital, the Guangzhou residents thought it was dominated by the Americans and boycotted its business.¹⁷⁸ The Company fell into a most difficult period after the takeover, and the local government employed this golden opportunity to secure a franchise with the Company.¹⁷⁹ The most important achievement of the agreement was the takeover of the Company by the government after twenty-five years. Before the takeover, the local government imposed a limited, indirect control on the Company by means of taxation. It secured 4% tax from the Company annually and a progressive taxation scheme was devised. The local government also secured a big reduction in electricity charges for public buildings.

Although the Company was reportedly making good profits and even considered

Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Siam, Netherlands India, Borneo, the Philippines, &c, 1914, p.1071. For the process and time of the takeover, see the Inspectorate General of Customs, *China: Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce in China, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1892-1901*, p.196.

¹⁷⁷ Smith, H.S., *Diary of Events and the Progress on Shemeen, 1859-1938*, pp.21-2; HZRB, 23 June, 1905.

¹⁷⁸ HZRB, 24 August, 1905.

¹⁷⁹ For the details of the agreement, see HZRB, 10 July, 1905.




expanding its business to other Guangdong cities like Foshan,¹⁸⁰ the situation was getting precarious for those companies funded by foreign capital. Nationalistic sentiments, spurred by the 1905 anti-American campaign, the 1907 campaign against the concession of police jurisdiction along the West River to Britain, and the 1908 Nishin Maru incident, overwhelmed the province. These campaigns advocated the principles of self-sufficiency and nationalization, and called for the use of Chinese capital to operate companies of various kinds and the buying back of foreign companies affecting Chinese interest. The appropriation of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway Company and the competition for supplying electricity in Foshan, which was originally planned by the China Light and Power Company, were notable examples.¹⁸¹ Moreover, the policy of retrenchment of the local government greatly reduced the consumption of electricity, which led to a substantial loss of revenue on the part of the electricity company. In the midst of all of these adversities, the Shewan, Tomes & Company decided to give up its electricity business in Guangzhou, and the twenty-five year franchise was aborted by the advanced takeover by the local government in 1909 on a redemption of 1.5 million *yuan*.¹⁸² The Company was renamed “Great Qing Guangdong Electricity Supply Company”. In the end, the business of electricity supply, which was similar to other kinds of public utility, became not simply a venture for improving the urban infrastructure, but more a matter of political arrangement, as clearly evidenced by the prohibition of foreigners from holding

¹⁸⁰ HZRB, 31 December, 1906; 31 July, 1907.

¹⁸¹ In 1906, Cen Chunxuan ordered to turn the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway Company into government-owned. After a conflict between the local government and the residents, which involved the arrest of a gentry leader, Cen yielded to the demand of the local residents and allowed the Railway to be run by the Guangdong merchants. See HZRB, 9-17 February, 1906. In regard to the provision of electricity in Foshan, the Guangdong Chamber of Commerce stepped in to urge merchants in Foshan to compete for the provision when it came to note that the China Light and Power Company was to extend services to that town. See HZRB, 31 July, 1907.

¹⁸² HZRB, 29 May, 9 July, 1909.



shares of the Company after the takeover.¹⁸³ Here, the participation of the local government was associated with its intention to guarantee the “Chineseness” of the Company, though all foreign technicians were allowed to stay on.

The point of “Chineseness” can be further illustrated by another episode which happened around the time of the takeover of the China Light and Power Company. Two years before its takeover by the local government, a number of Guangzhou merchants petitioned the Bureau of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce to found a gas light company. This proposal won the attention of the Bureau as gas could serve as an alternative to electricity which was at that time operated by the British merchants. Thus, gas light was endowed with political significance. The process of bargaining between the Bureau and the initiators was protracted, and the final decision was not made until the completion of the takeover of the electricity plant. The proposal for providing gas light was rejected, as the takeover of the electricity plant by the Chinese meant that it was no longer needed to compete with the foreigners.¹⁸⁴ The need for dual power was no longer justified. The approval of a gas light company was deemed as detrimental to the operation of the newly-recaptured electricity company. Allowing competition was dangerous after “foreign privilege” faded out.

The business of the electricity company did not show any remarkable change after the 1909 takeover. The only change was the growing popularity of electric light as shown by two facts: first, the increasing installation of electric lights in the streets and second, the frequent illegal connection of lines.¹⁸⁵ Residents’ fear of the “leakage” of electricity in the earlier years was no longer a hindrance to the widespread use of this

¹⁸³ HZRB, 9 July, 1909.

¹⁸⁴ HZRB, 22 July, 1909.

¹⁸⁵ HZRB, 22 January, 17 June, 30 November, 1910; 6 September, 1911.




convenient utility. As electricity supply covered most of the populated areas of the city even including Honam, it substantially changed the traditional life-style of the city.¹⁸⁶ As a modern public utility, electric light widened the scope of human activities. The mushrooming of night activities, including the famous "flower market" during Lunar Chinese New Year, further popularized electric light.¹⁸⁷ The popular adoption of electric light served to facilitate economic and urban prosperity, and this in turn served as a good advertisement for electric light *per se*. Other cities in the province followed suit in acquiring this modern utility.

However, modernization was merely one aspect of the dual nature of this new utility. The popularity of electric light actually reinforced the traditional street administration. Government bureaus, such as the Police Bureau, simply promoted its adoption, and it was the street which sanctioned, financed and administered the electric lights. The street's control of this new and highly-needed utility made it more powerful as an administrative unit. Institutional conservatism produced severe struggles between streets and other urban administrative units, notably the Police Bureau which intended to exert effective control over the whole city.

Telephone

Compared with the development of other public utilities in Guangzhou, the history of the telephone was less complicated. Its founding did not originate from local demand or initiation, but was due to the interest of Sheng Xuanhuai, Director of the Bureau of

¹⁸⁶ Extension of electricity supply to Honam in the last years of the Dynasty was not supported by newspaper accounts, but this was assured by the Decennial Reports which maintained that "the area supplied now comprises the city of Canton, Honam, and the Foreign Settlement of Shameen." See the Inspectorate General of Customs, *China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1902-11*, p.150.



Telegraphs in Tianjin. In fact, the person in charge of the preparatory bureau set up in December 1902 was a follower of Sheng named Wen Zuocai, and the proposed bureau was to be directly controlled by the Ministry of Communications. It was thus not surprising that the Telephone Bureau was funded primarily by non-Guangdong source, as the set-up cost of 280 thousand *yuan* was apportioned by the Shanghai branch office of the Telegraph Bureau. Though the preparatory work was briefly interrupted in early 1903 when Sheng was expelled by Yuan Shikai who then took over the Bureau of Telegraphs, the erection of phone poles was completed in late 1903, and the operation of the system began on 12 January, 1904.¹⁸⁸

The telephone project of Guangzhou depended heavily on Japanese assistance. It was reported that Sheng's decision to install telephone services in Guangzhou and other cities including Beijing and Tianjin was heavily influenced by some Japanese advisers.¹⁸⁹ After the Telephone Bureau was established, a Japanese engineer was employed and the technology was imported from Japan.¹⁹⁰

The demand for telephones was considerable. The number of registered customers showed a six-fold increase: from 300 in 1904 to more than 2,000 in 1906.¹⁹¹ By 1906, the provision of telephone service covered all the major districts including the walled city, Xiguan, Nanguan, Shamian and Honam. Even the remote Huangpu was provided with limited service as Cen Chunxuan spent his furlough there. The Telephone Bureau considered its office at Weibian Street in the walled city, which was originally an office


¹⁸⁷ Guangdong sheng wenshi yanjiuguan (ed.), *Yuehai huichen lu*, p.129.

¹⁸⁸ Concerning the preparation of the Telephone Bureau, see *HZRB*, 27 October, 3 December, 1902; 15 April, 1903; 13 January, 1904; Chen Zhaoshen, "Jiu Guangzhou dianhua de jibi", *Yangcheng jingu*, no.5, October, 1990, p.42; Edward Bing-Shuey Lee, *Modern Canton*, p.71.

¹⁸⁹ *Guangdong shenghui jingchaju jingcha xunliansuo jiangyi: Guangzhou dili*, p.68.

¹⁹⁰ *HZRB*, 15 April, 1903; 5 November, 1904.

¹⁹¹ *HZRB*, 5 November, 1904; 5 May, 1906.



for examining officials, too small to cater for the increasing demand. Therefore, branch offices were set up in Xiguan and Honam. Although the Bureau declared that Dongguan and Beiguan, which were less populated, would not be included in the scope of service, we find that telephone service was extended to Beiguan by 1907.¹⁹² This reflected the Bureau's attempt to provide a comprehensive service covering the whole city.

This unanticipated modern mode of communication was much welcomed by the local residents, and caused far fewer local conflicts partially due to the lack of local interest in its administration and development. Unlike the provision of potable tap water which will be discussed in the next section, the Telephone Bureau did not lose many customers during political chaos because telephone as a public utility was still luxury and used by much fewer people. Connection problems, jammed lines and interjection of another line, which caused occasional complaints to the Bureau, did not reduce appreciation of this communication breakthrough that brought great convenience.¹⁹³ What really annoyed the Telephone Bureau was the frequent stealing of the copper lines hanging over the erected poles because the replacement of such lines was costly.¹⁹⁴

Potable tap water


Compared with other kinds of public utility, potable tap water was the least substitutable. Electricity was replaceable by other kinds of fuel such as kerosene, oil and candles, and telephones were a luxury.¹⁹⁵ Availability of potable water in Guangzhou

¹⁹² For the area of service provision and the establishment of branch offices, see *HZRB*, 3 December, 1902; 5 November, 1904; 3 June, 9 August, 9 September, 1905; 24 February, 1906; 22 May, 1907; *ZGRB*, 24 March, 1904, p.3; *Dongfang zazhi*, no.3, 25 March, 1904, pp.721-2.

¹⁹³ See *HZRB*, 22 June, 1907.

¹⁹⁴ *HZRB*, 1 October, 1904; 22 May, 1907.


¹⁹⁵ Newspaper reports commented that phones "were actually unneeded before its introduction to Guangzhou". See *HZRB*, 13 January, 1898; 31 December, 1906.



was always a critical issue. Clean wells were scarce in the city, and were usually located far away from the city proper, such as at the foot of Yuexiu Hill. Clogging of ditches by rubbish and human wastes produced more sewage which seeped into the wells in the streets. Well water was further polluted by alkalization resulting from the lack of rainfall, and by corpses which were not infrequently found in wells. Reportedly, the local government even transported clean sea water from abroad for household use during drought seasons, but it was too costly and the sea water was too salty to drink. The attempt to adopt Western methods to gain subterranean water by means of deep-drilling was impeded by the sandstone stratum of the city. The only feasible alternative was to hire porters to transport hill water to the city proper. Although the problem of the availability of potable water could be solved to some extent, the residents of the city still worried about the lack of a secure source of water supply for fire-fighting, especially during the drought season.¹⁹⁶

It is clear that the introduction of potable water was well backed up by social needs. However, it was difficult to employ this new technology. According to records, the earliest attempt to introduce tap water was made in 1882. He Kunshan, staff member of a foreign insurance company, wrote a forty-page proposal to the local government for the establishment of a waterworks after conducting a survey in conjunction with some British experts. Two alternatives were suggested, that is, directing river water from the Baiyun Mountain or establishing a waterworks in Zengbu on the bank of the Western River. Reportedly, there was initial eagerness among the officials and residents, especially the merchants, but such eagerness quickly cooled down. Governor-General Zeng

¹⁹⁶ For the problems of potable water and the alternatives to well water in Guangzhou, see Zeng Zhaoxuan, *Guangzhou lishi dili*, pp.3, 154, 197; HZRB, 20 March, 1901; 29 March, 1902; 24 February, 1904; XHRB, 10 June, 1874; 17 August, 1880; 14 October, 1882; 17 February, 1 August, 1883; 15 August, 1884.



Guoquan, who was instructed by the Throne to focus his work on the frontier conflict in Indochina and on the fortification of the locality, never sanctioned this project. Many gentry believed that the artificial readjustment of water flow would tremendously disturb the *fengshui* of the city, and petitioned the government to voice their opposition. The action of the gentry greatly influenced the attitude of the residents in the city, most of whom were not aware of the importance of improving hygiene and were unwilling to pay extra money for something that could be obtained conveniently in wells. Response to the invitation of buying shares of the waterworks, whose founding needed an initial capital of one million dollars, was negligible. The project was soon shelved.¹⁹⁷

He Kunshan's failure did not mark the end of local attempts to fight for the provision of tap water. Several abortive efforts by the merchants were recorded,¹⁹⁸ and it was the local government which finally took the initiative to raise the issue again in 1903, essentially due to the potentially attractive revenue.¹⁹⁹ The Police Bureau was designated to be in charge of the issue, but there was no response from the public until 1905 when a merchant named Wu Baoguang proposed to set up a waterworks to supply tap

¹⁹⁷ For the 1882 proposed waterworks and the conservatism it encountered, see *North China Herald*, 11 March, 1882, vol.29, p.139; 1 September, 1882, vol.29, pp.239-40; 15 September, 1882, vol.29, p.297; 4 October, 1882, vol.29, p.357; 29 November, 1882, vol.29, p.588; 10 January, 1883, vol.30, p.39; 27 April, 1883, vol.30, p.46; the above recited in Sun Xutang (ed.), *Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao (1840-1895)*, vol.2, pp.1020-2. Also see *XHRB*, 17 August, 13 September, 13 and 14 October, 1882; *HZRB*, 30 May, 1905; Wang Ding'an (ed.), *Zeng Zhongxiang gong (Guoquan) pidu, nianpu*, vol.2, p.647.

¹⁹⁸ In 1890, an anonymous merchant petitioned Governor-General Li Hanzhang for the founding of a waterworks, but the proposal ended up without definite resolution as Li imposed demanding requirements. In 1899 a merchant named He Xiuqi made another application. The application was well supported by the local charitable organizations, and approved by the local government. However, the government never issued the permit to He. While He repeatedly urged the local government, the matter was complicated in 1901 by the joining of a number of other merchants who competed for the right of establishment. *North China Herald*, 5 December, 1890, vol.45, p.680; 17 April, 1891, vol.46, p.477; recited from Sun Xutang (ed.), *Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao (1840-1895)*, vol.2, pp.1022-3. Also see *HZRB*, 8 March, 24 April, 10 May, 1 July, 5 October, 1901.

¹⁹⁹ For the local government's initiation, see *HZRB*, 30 December, 1903.



water for Guangzhou, including Honam.²⁰⁰ Although he proposed an annual contribution of fifteen thousand dollars to the local government, his proposal was finally turned down due to his unwise recommendation that 30% of the total shares were to be sold to foreigners. It was inevitably rejected by the government which strove to avoid agitating anti-foreign sentiments in the community.


The earlier proposal of He Kunshan bore fruit in October, 1905 when some Shanghai merchants expressed willingness to assist the founding of tap water construction in Guangzhou. The local government of Guangzhou made a prompt decision to carry out the project in the form of *guanshang heban* (joint undertaking by the government and merchants).²⁰¹ A capital of 1.2 million dollars was to be raised, with half the sum coming from the local government and the other half from the Shanghai merchants. The headquarters of the company was located in Shanghai, and a branch office was set up in Nanguan, Guangzhou. He Kunshan's unrealized plan was to be followed almost entirely, that is, a waterworks would be installed at Zengbu. Pipes would be used to connect the waterworks with the customers' residence, with a water tower constructed at Changshou Great Street in Xiguan. Technological support was sought from Shanghai where tap water was provided successfully.

The company (whose name cannot be ascertained), soon ran into difficulties.²⁰² The first problem was the difficulty of raising the necessary capital. By early April, 1906,

²⁰⁰ For Wu Baoguang's application, see *HZRB*, 17 and 19 April, 1905; *Dongfang zazhi*, no.9, October, 1905, "Commercial", p.96.

²⁰¹ For details of the decision to construct tap water in 1905, see *HZRB*, 19 and 26 October, 10, 14 and 25 November, 1905; 15 January, 1906; Hu Zhengzhong, "Guanyu Guangzhou zilaishui de ruogan shishi", *Yangcheng gujin*, no.11, October, 1988, pp.15-6; Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xuzhi*, vol.12, p.40a.

²⁰² From newspaper accounts, it is observed that various titles were applied to the company, such as Guangdong Provincial City Tap Water Company, Provincial City Tap Water Company, Guangdong Tap Water Company Limited, Guangdong Tap Water Bureau, and Guangdong Provincial River Tap Water Company. See *HZRB*, 8 February, 9 April, 24 July, 8 August, 1906; Hu Zhengzhong,



the government could only come up with a sum of fifty thousand dollars, which was ten thousand dollars short.²⁰³ The situation of the “merchant shares” was far worse. The Shanghai merchants, being assigned the role of fund-raisers in founding the waterworks, found it extremely difficult to convince the local merchants in Guangzhou about the credibility of the tap water company. Raising capital was made even more difficult by the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway conflict in January, 1906, which originated from the local government’s attempt to turn the Railway into a “government-run” business against the merchants’ firm request to put it under merchant administration.²⁰⁴ Although the conflict turned out to be a triumph for the merchants, it seriously dampened the desire of the local residents and merchants to invest in government-run business. Although the company only assigned a small number of shares open to the market in Guangzhou, local residents did not respond. As a result, the problem of raising “merchant shares” was not solved by August of that year in spite of guarantee made by the fund-raisers.²⁰⁵

Lack of fund substantially delayed the construction work despite repeated prompting by the government. As the expected quota of shares was marginally met in late 1906, the company promised in December, 1906 that “tap water will be supplied in the coming spring, and by late 1907 the areas supplied with tap water will cover the Inner City, Outer City, Dongguan, Nanguan, Xiguan and Beiguan, as well as Huangsha and Honam.”²⁰⁶ This pledge proved to be over-optimistic. An advertisement was put in the newspapers in January, 1907, inviting tenders for the installation of pipes, similar to the

“Guanyu Guangzhou zilaishui de ruogan shishi”, *Yangcheng gujin*, no.11, October, 1988, pp.15-6

²⁰³ *HZRB*, 2 April, 1906.

²⁰⁴ See *HZRB*, 7 March, 1906; Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng Guangzhou shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), *Guangzhou bainian dashiji*, vol.1, p.110.

²⁰⁵ *HZRB*, 16 July, 8 August, 1908.

²⁰⁶ *HZRB*, 12 December, 1906.



one advertised in January, 1906, almost one year ago.²⁰⁷ It is not known whether there were positive responses to the new advertisement, but the following facts implied its lack of success: the water tower, boiler, machine house and pipes were not installed or constructed by April 1907; and the first lot of small pipes only arrived at Guangzhou from Shanghai in December 1907.²⁰⁸

When the company began to install pipes after the needed funds were available, it was troubled by other problems. The laying of pipes entailed digging up the already narrow streets, which caused great inconvenience to the inhabitants. Some inhabitants reportedly retaliated by placing snakes and mice into the pipes.²⁰⁹ The provision of tap water also served as a threat to the porters transporting hill water. They protested to the local government for fear of losing their means of livelihood after the opening of the waterworks.²¹⁰ If the above protests were only short-term in nature, the problem of malfeasance, especially that of scamp work and stint material, definitely hindered the operation of the company. The amount of stone strips used in the construction of the water tank, which was a core structure of the project, was far less than that stated in the contract. Inferior material was also used for laying of pipes, causing pipes to explode when the whole system was first tested in April, 1908.²¹¹ Malfeasance was again shown in the timing of the survey. Comprehensive research on pricing strategy and the number of shops and households was conducted in May, 1907, after the installation of pipes had begun and many of the assets had been acquired.²¹² As a result of all the above

²⁰⁷ *HZRB*, 8 February, 1906; 17 January, 1907.

²⁰⁸ *HZRB*, 19 April, 2 December, 1907.

²⁰⁹ *HZRB*, 6 November, 1907.

²¹⁰ *HZRB*, 21 October, 1907.

²¹¹ For scamp work and stint material, see *HZRB*, 21 June, 1907; 21 and 22 April, 1908

²¹² *HZRB*, 24 May, 1907.



complications, widespread suspicion was aroused among the potential users. On some occasions, houses far away from the sites of pipe laying accidentally collapsed, and the owners of these houses blamed the company for causing the accidents.²¹³

Fortuitously, the problems mentioned above turned out to be minor. Following the test in April which led to the repairing of some pipes, the waterworks was inaugurated officially in August of the same year.²¹⁴ The figures in Table 4.3 show an optimistic picture which was difficult to predict before its founding. All suspicion had gone as the residents were impressed by the convenience of tap water. The number of registered households increased dramatically, about twelve times within four months after the inauguration of the waterworks. The company was eager to expand its business to cover all the prosperous areas in the city proper, as shown by the steady increase in the length of pipes, and the number of registered households.²¹⁵ The slight decrease of registration in 1911 was due to the moving of 2,020 households, in face of chaos in the revolution, to Hong Kong for temporary exodus. In general, the demand for tap water had been increasing, and the waterworks was capable of meeting the demand. The reservoir, which had a capacity of 8.75 million gallons per 24 hours, still had a surplus of 5.39 million gallons in 1911. The success of the waterworks made it a very profitable enterprise, with an annual net profit amounting to about six per cent of the capital expended.²¹⁶

²¹³ HZRB, 30 May, 2 and 5 June, 1908.

²¹⁴ HZRB, 22 April, 17 August, 1908.

²¹⁵ For the routes of the pipes in the city, see *Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.3, p.473.

²¹⁶ For the achievements of the waterworks, see the Inspectorate General of Customs, *China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1902-11*, pp.149-50.



Table 4.3

Length of pipes and number of registered households of the Guangzhou Waterworks


	Length of pipe (foot)	Number of registered household
1908	132,000	600 (August) 7,500 (December)
1909	250,000	-
1910	291,000	10,085
1911	322,648	9,708

Source: the Inspectorate General of Customs, *China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1902-11* (Shanghai: Inspectorate General of Customs, 1913), pp.149-50.

The sincerity of the company to serve the community was impressive. To prevent the spread of epidemic diseases, the company was ready to transport free and clean water to burnt areas of the city for use by fire victims, as was the case after the 1909 Dashatou great fire. Water was also shipped to Honam which was not yet connected to the waterworks by pipe. Sponsorship to streets for the installation of fire hose was also granted by the company.²¹⁷ The good intention of the company was also shown by the reform of the company in 1909. The company, directed by Chen Wangzeng who was the *daotai* of the Circuit of Economic Promotion, resolved to suspend the distribution of dividends on shares owned by the government, and use most of the profits for the extension of water pipes. Apart from Chen himself, all commissioners (*weiyuan*) designated by the government to work in the company were dismissed, and the directors of the company were to be fully accountable to all business. All these reforms aimed at creating a “business-like” image for the company.²¹⁸ The company’s efforts, however, did not gain the appreciation of the foreign community in Shamian. It continued to import water

²¹⁷ HZRB, 5 and 6 February, 27 November, 1909.

²¹⁸ For the reforms in 1909, see HZRB, 25 June, 2 September, 19 October, 4 and 27 November, 1909.



for drinking from Hong Kong and use river water for household purposes.²¹⁹

The response of the local residents was totally different from that of the Shamian residents. The popularity of tap water among the local residents was explicated by the positive recommendations made by the customers. Tap water was used by the residents not only for drinking and household purposes, but also for fire fighting. The customers complained that the suspension of tap water supply at night as agreed by the Shanghai directors, had deprived them of the vital means of fighting fire. They thus requested that tap water should be supplied twenty-four hours a day, and this was supported by Chen Wangzeng.²²⁰ Charitable organizations even suggested that tap water could be used to irrigate farmland in the countryside.²²¹ The popularity of tap water in the three years after the founding of the waterworks showed that the Guangzhou residents would welcome any paraphernalia of modernization that could serve their needs.

Conclusion

Infrastructural modernization brought about the most substantial physical change in urban Guangzhou in the last decades of the Dynasty. Railway and bund constructions were the two factors of paramount importance, which led to further evolution in infrastructure and urban planning. The successful founding of new infrastructure in the last decade of the Dynasty produced a substantially different Guangzhou when the Republic was established. The urban outlook was improved as a result of the erection of an electricity plant, a waterworks, a telephone system and a number of modern roads. The

²¹⁹ The Inspectorate General of Customs, *China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1902-11*, pp.149-50.

²²⁰ HZRB, 17 October, 1 November, 1910.


²²¹ HZRB, 4 September, 1911.



Bund, which was completed in 1914, became another city center where most of the modern constructions of the city were located. The quick incorporation of material modernization into daily life reflected a new facet in the psychology of Guangzhou's residents, that is, a willingness to seek improvements. It further showed the need for effective city-wide municipal institutions to provide services for the common interests of the residents. The effectiveness of infrastructural transformation was based on two circumstantial factors. The first was the availability of cooperation from the street organizations. Which aspect of the two-fold psychology of the street residents (namely sticking to traditional ways or willingness to look for improvement) became dominant was contingent on the interference of street administration and the likelihood of a substitute organization. The failure to improve street hygiene was rationalized by the street residents because they viewed the street organization as an effective unit for sanitation and did not desire change under extrinsic orders. However, greater elasticity was shown in their adaptation to modern utilities. In spite of some initial opposition, the usefulness of these new utilities convinced the residents that there was no substitute for them.

The second factor was the attitude of the government. After the conclusion of the Sino-French War, the local government was liberated from the "feverish war preparation".²²² The local officials began to pay attention to local construction, as shown by Zhang Zhidong's construction of the Bund in 1889. However, their interest in infrastructural construction was not strong before the conclusion of the nineteenth century. The postponement of the founding of the waterworks in Guangzhou for more than twenty years after He Kunshan's first proposal was primarily due to the government's

²²² The Inspector General of Customs, *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports open to foreign commerce in China and Corea, and*



procrastination. As will be shown in the next chapter in greater details, institutional change in the first decade of the twentieth century, such as the establishment of the Police Bureau and Circuit of Economic Promotion, provided a better environment in which more constructive attempts to advance infrastructural improvement became possible.

The progress of urban planning was less remarkable than infrastructural modernization. The initiation and materialization of urban planning was primarily based on individuals. Zhang Zhidong and Zhou Fu in the late Qing, and Chen Jiongming and Hu Hanmin in the early Republic, were the local officials who showed interest in introducing urban planning as a conceptual and practical means to solve urban problems. The 1907 Planning and that of 1912-1913, if successful, would create a “greater Guangzhou” including the developed Xiguan and Nanguan, a re-developed walled city and such developing areas as Dongguan, Honam and Huangpu. The city would be linked up by a transport network including the Pearl River Bridge connecting Honam and the city proper, a tram system and a road system at the outer ring of the city proper crossed by some trunk roads in the city proper, with the city wall demolished. Even the remote Baiyun Mountain was included in this grand scheme. A merchant named Feng Dali, in imitation of the tramway of Victoria Peak in Hong Kong, proposed to construct a tramway for tourists going to the Mountain, with the terminus outside the Dadong (Great East) Gate.²²³ Despite their enthusiasm, these schemes were not immediately accomplished, and their successors did not recognize the significance of city planning. The generally indifferent attitude of the local officials towards city planning contrasted with the efforts of the private sectors in providing urban infrastructure. As a result, planned urban expansion and infrastructural improvement proved to be two isolated phenomena.

on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-91, pp.544-5.



The provision of public utilities, except for telephone service, was entirely at the discretion of the companies themselves, and because of the lack of resources, they tended to operate their business in the prosperous areas of the city. As the 1907 Planning and the subsequent attempt of 1912-1913 failed to "create" new prosperous areas in Honam, Dongguan and Huangpu, the geographical scope of operation for the public utility companies was actually restricted. It is also important to note that the two planning attempts were never supported solidly by infrastructural extension to the planned areas. In this respect, the Guangzhou residents, though willing to employ new means to solve immediate urban problems, were basically conservative and lacked an overall urban vision based on comprehensive planning.

However, further development did occur. Urban redevelopment and modernization had laid down foundations, both physically and psychologically, for the modernization program in the later decades. The immediate proclamation of urban planning after the establishment of the Republic in 1912 was not only due to its political importance in establishing a "strong" and "modern" China but also its inherent practicality offering solutions to increasing urban problems. All these attempts sowed the seeds of further change, such as the final demolition of the city wall and the construction of wide roads by the Municipal Office which was formed in 1918.

²²³ HZRB, 3 September, 1909.



Chapter Five

City Administration, 1860-1917

Self-government, that is, municipal government, was not realized in Guangzhou before 1860, yet, the elements necessary for its creation were in place and evolved after 1860. There were substantial institutional changes in city administration in Guangzhou which preceded the process of infrastructural modernization and urban expansion. Many new institutions were implanted in the city after the conclusion of the Second Opium War. By the eve of the formation of the Municipal Office in 1918, Guangzhou had undergone substantial institutional change as evidenced by the maturing of a three-tier administration model, that is, the local government at the top, street administration at the bottom and a middle-level administration represented by the gentry and merchants. This new administrative pattern undoubtedly accounted for the transformation of the city's outlook as we have seen. Yet, infrastructural modernization and urban expansion met with many obstructions, which can partially be explained by examining the issue of city administration. How did the newly formed governmental institutions contribute to the trend of modernization and municipalization? How did the existing bureaucratic system correspond to the new institutions and the new trends? What were the factors obstructing greater accomplishment in urban modernization by the government? What efforts did the local inhabitants, particularly the gentry and merchants, make to redress the shortcomings of the government? How and to what extent did the new "middle-level" administration differ from the "autonomous organizations" previous to 1860? Was street administration, which was the basic-level administration of the city, strengthened or weakened by the formation of various supra-street organizations? Did city administration at various levels work harmoniously or antagonistically?



Top-level administration: Bureaucratic rule

The prevailing bureaucratic structure of Guangzhou remained basically the same after 1860, that is, Guangzhou was officially administered by the provincial, prefectural and county governments. Some adjustments were made, such as the installation of “circuit” (*dao*) -level institutions, notably the Circuit of Economic Promotion (*Quanye dao*) and Circuit of Police (*Xunjing dao*),¹ the abolition of the post of Guangdong Vice-roy in 1905 because of overlapping duties with the Governor-General, and the abolition of the post of Guangzhou Prefecture after the 1911 Revolution. Under the current of reform, officials serving various *yamens* had to pay attention to the new environment and take up new functions. New institutions were even formed, some of which were city-based institutions and contributed to the trend of municipalization.


The Rehabilitation Bureau

The establishment of the Rehabilitation Bureau (*Shanhou ju*) marked the first change in the bureaucratic administration of Guangzhou. The Rehabilitation Bureau, which occupied the Great Buddha Temple (*Dafosi*) as an office, was not a formal structure in the local bureaucratic system of the Qing dynasty. It was a temporary creation to re-normalize the operation of the local government and society after the Second Opium War. However, this *ad hoc* establishment turned out to be a long-lasting one which existed for about half a century until its incorporation into the Finance Office in 1910.²

The Provincial Administrator (*buzhengsi*), whose primary duty was to deal with the

¹ In the local administrative system of the Qing, circuit-level institutions had authority over the Prefectures. Some circuits were function-specific and had province-wide responsibilities, while others exercised full powers with limited areas in a province. The Circuit of Economic Promotion and Circuit of Police were of the former type, formed in the 1900s. For details of circuit-level administration, see Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, pp.487-8.

² See Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.4, p.5a.



finances of the province, was assigned as the head of the Rehabilitation Bureau. Therefore, the Rehabilitation Bureau could be considered as an extended office of the Provincial Administrator and also a “financial center for the whole province”.³ Commonly referred to by foreigners as the “Board of Finance”,⁴ the Rehabilitation Bureau managed various kinds of governmental finance. It administered loans with foreign banks, collected *likin* and house tax, and distributed copper coins.⁵ It also made continual efforts to bargain for more contributions from the merchants, and opened new tax sources by creating new professions. For example, the banned *ya* pawnshops, which allowed shorter period of redemption, were legalized by the Rehabilitation Bureau in 1858 in order to gain more income for military use.⁶ Customers dining in brothels were requested to pay a new tax in 1903.⁷ Its proficiency in seeking income partially accounted for its continuous existence after the Second Opium War.

However, the Rehabilitation Bureau was not simply a financial center. The need to open new sources of revenue granted it the power to administer many economic activities. It invited tender, received taxes, issued licenses, and solved conflicts between or within specific professions. It soon developed into an expanded administrative organ which had discretionary power over a wide range of urban issues. The following information reflected the comprehensiveness of the Rehabilitation Bureau’s duties.

³ HZRB, 25 February, 1905.

⁴ John Glasgow Kerr, *A Guide to the City and Suburbs of Canton*, p.34.

⁵ For loans with foreign banks, see HZRB, 5 December, 1903; 14 December, 1904. For the collection of *likin* and house tax, see XHRB, 11 May, 5 August, 1885; HZRB, 6 June, 1895. For the distribution of copper coins, see HZRB, 5 March, 1904.

⁶ Before 1858, there was only one kind of legal pawnshop in Guangzhou called *dang*. The redemption period was three years, charging a higher interest rate. Some illegal pawnshops appeared and competed with these *dang* pawnshops, which allowed a shorter redemption period of one year and charged a lower interest rate. Ou Jiluan, *Guangdong zhi diandan ye*, pp.1-2, 41; HZRB, 23 April, 1895.

⁷ HZRB, 18 May, 1903.



Public hygiene. The Rehabilitation Bureau was seldom directly involved in hygienic issues, but it facilitated such issues by providing financial assistance. It funded the dredging of the New Stream (*Xin yong*) near Shamian;⁸ funded the planting of trees;⁹ funded and administered the dredging of the Six Artery Ditches;¹⁰ lent money to the Police Bureau for cleaning activities;¹¹ and donated money to the Insane Hospital administered by John Kerr in Fangcun.¹²

Public construction and utilities. The Rehabilitation Bureau sent ships to transport clean sea water from abroad during drought seasons for household use; participated in the discussion on the demolition of the city wall;¹³ repaired the Nanhai God Temple in Huangpu;¹⁴ repaired the Examination Hall;¹⁵ funded and supervised government projects, such as the Bund;¹⁶ solved conflicts concerning the ownership of public property;¹⁷ and considered proposals for the founding of waterworks.¹⁸

Economics. The Rehabilitation Bureau passed through several reform movements after its establishment, and was heavily involved in local economic activities which was a primary focus of those reforms. The followings were examples: approving banks' char-

⁸ *HZRB*, 14 September, 1897; 24 May, 1909; 8 March, 1910.

⁹ *HZRB*, 28 October, 1908.

¹⁰ Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.3, pp.1b-2a.

¹¹ *HZRB*, 16 September, 1905.

¹² *HZRB*, 17 August, 1909.

¹³ *HZRB*, 20 August, 1909.


¹⁴ *HZRB*, 19 April, 1897.

¹⁵ *HZRB*, 8 August, 1901.

¹⁶ The case of corruption of Chen Liantai, the contractor of the Bund project, was decided by the Rehabilitation Bureau. Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.4, pp.15b-17a; *HZRB*, 11 July, 1907.

¹⁷ For example, see *HZRB*, 22 May, 1901 for the conflict over the construction of piers on land collectively owned by streets.

¹⁸ *North China Herald*, 5 December, 1890, vol.45, p.680, quoted from Sun Xutang (ed.), *Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao (1840-1895)*, vol.2, p.1022; *Dongfang zazhi*, no.9, September, 1905, p.96 (commercial).



ters;¹⁹ negotiating with merchants for the establishment of a cement plant;²⁰ approving the applications of various professions to establish their own guilds (*gongsuo*);²¹ testing applicants who intended to open institutes for sericulture, chemistry and paper making;²² and designing new scales of measurement.²³

Relief and rehabilitation. The Rehabilitation Bureau provided relief after fires,²⁴ and surveyed areas which suffered from natural calamities and provided relief.²⁵

Social involvement. The Rehabilitation Bureau purchased cheap rice, sometimes cooperating with charitable organizations;²⁶ regulated the operation of pawnshops which were a primary source of credit for many inhabitants;²⁷ managed and taxed the theaters,²⁸ and regulated the operation of opium houses.²⁹ Reportedly, the Bureau issued the order prohibiting gambling in 1874 under the instruction of Governor-General Rui Lin, but this order was soon rescinded and the merchants could contract for the opening of gambling houses on condition of paying a specified contribution.³⁰

Policing and public security. The Rehabilitation Bureau punished gentry who appropriated public monies,³¹ interfered in armed fightings,³² provided protection to

¹⁹ *HZRB*, 9 January, 1903.

²⁰ *Dongfang zazhi*, no. 7, July, 1905, p.130 (economics); *HZRB*, 22 April, 1901.

²¹ For example, see *HZRB*, 20 December, 1897.

²² *HZRB*, 15 January, 1902.

²³ *HZRB*, 29 September, 1902.

²⁴ *HZRB*, 15 June, 1897; 30 April 1903.

²⁵ *HZRB*, 4 November, 1904; 22 September, 1906; 20 May, 1909.

²⁶ *HZRB*, 2 April, 1902; 9 June, 1906.

²⁷ *HZRB*, 23 April, 19 July, 23 September, 1895; 25 October, 1902; 22 August, 1904; 3 January, 19 October, 1 November, 1905.

²⁸ *HZRB*, 6 February, 10 May, 1895; 28 May, 1902.

²⁹ *HZRB*, 6 August, 1907.

³⁰ *XHRB*, 8 June, 1874; 10 November, 1884.

³¹ *HZRB*, 6 July, 1909.



newly established charitable organizations;³³ approved the establishment of *tuanlian* in the locality;³⁴ helped the development and purchase of armaments;³⁵ sanctioned the establishment of factories producing military uniforms;³⁶ purchased fast boats for patrolling;³⁷ and protected boats.³⁸

Traffic management. The Rehabilitation Bureau regulated the running of ferries and tugboats;³⁹ invited tenders to contract out government ships,⁴⁰ and regulated the routes of navigation in conformity with stipulations in international treaties.⁴¹

The comprehensive scope of work of the Rehabilitation Bureau had significant implications for the administrative pattern of Guangzhou. Different from those provincial officials such as the Governor-General who always concentrated on political and military tasks, for example, Zhang Zhidong was ordered by the Throne to concentrate on coastal defense, the Rehabilitation Bureau joined the Provincial Administrator and was involved in the day-to-day running of the province and the provincial capital. It developed into an administrative center which undertook functions previously assumed by officials of various levels, such as the provision of supplies to various officials, a duty previously performed by the magistrates of Panyu and Nanhai.⁴² It was also the origin of new functions and policies in the era of reform, especially those associated with public

³² *XHRB*, 21 January, 1881.

³³ *HZRB*, 12 February, 1895.

³⁴ *HZRB*, 24 February, 1897.

³⁵ *HZRB*, 28 March, 14 May, 1904.

³⁶ *HZRB*, 2 July, 1906.

³⁷ *HZRB*, 13 December, 1907.

³⁸ *HZRB*, 31 December, 1907.

³⁹ *HZRB*, 28 September, 1895.

⁴⁰ *HZRB*, 9 June, 1897; 22 August, 1901.

⁴¹ *HZRB*, 13 November, 1901.

⁴² *HZRB*, 7 May, 1906.



utilities. As a result, the Rehabilitation Bureau became a coordinating organization which, on the one hand, made various decisions or received orders from higher-ranking officials, and, on the other hand, assigned duties to magistrates and prefects who acted as its agents and subordinates.

The Police Bureau


In the late nineteenth century, there existed several mechanisms in Guangzhou for the maintenance of public security.⁴³ The *baojia* system, as discussed in Chapter Three, was the basic security system, but it was ineffective due to the uncooperative attitude of the street residents. In contrast, the street-based *tuanlian* was rather important as a force of defense. The Arrest Bureau (*Jibu zongju*) supervised soldiers used as a public security force engaged in fighting against bandits and revolutionaries.⁴⁴ However, the sum total of these security forces was still not effective in eliminating theft. “It is said not to be safe at any time for pedestrians to carry a fan of any value in the streets.”⁴⁵

The establishment of a police force was regarded by the local officials as an effective remedy of the above problems and as a foundation for further reform.⁴⁶ Although the central government’s decree calling for the establishment of police forces in the provinces showed some confusion between police duties and those of the army,

⁴³ It is to be remembered that Western-style police institutions were established in 1858 after Guangzhou was seized by the Anglo-French joint forces. The institutions were abolished in 1861 when the foreign troops were withdrawn. See Steven A. Leibo, “Not So Calm an Administration: The Anglo-French Occupation of Canton, 1858-1861”, *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, no.28, 1988, pp.21.

⁴⁴ Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.4, p.5b; *HZRB*, 9 December, 1901. There is confusion concerning the time of its establishment. Liang Dingfen said it was established during the Tongzhi era, while the above-cited *HZRB* account asserted that it was founded by Governor-General Tao Mo in 1900.

⁴⁵ The Inspector General of Customs, *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports open to foreign commerce in China and Corea, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-91*, pp.564-5.



Guangzhou officials were eager to establish a police force solely responsible for fighting crimes in Guangzhou.⁴⁷ The Guangzhou Police experienced a long process of organizational development. It was established somewhat haphazardly in the Inner City on 16 January, 1903 by the Provincial Judge upon the conversion of the old *baojia* offices into police stations, and the two thousand policemen were ex-Green Standards (*lüying*) soldiers. Police branch bureaus were established in the Outer City and Xiguan in late 1903 and mid-1904 respectively.⁴⁸ Upon the prompting of the central government to speed up police establishment, Dongguan and Nanguan police bureaus were inaugurated in May, 1906, and Honam in July.⁴⁹ The central government resolved in July, 1907 that police offices in the provinces must be supervised by a new institution called the Circuit of Police (*Xunjing dao*), and the Guangzhou Circuit of Police was created in August, 1908 with the simultaneous foundation of the new Police Office (*Jingwu gongsuo*).⁵⁰

The previous expansion of police offices in Guangzhou meant the establishment of such offices everywhere in the built-up area of the city, and it showed no conformity to the existing local administrative structure. Re-adjustment of zonation for the police stations was taken in 1910, based on the boundary of Panyu and Nanhai counties bisecting Guangzhou in a north-south direction.⁵¹ “The police force consists of some 3,000 men, 1,500 of whom are armed. The city is divided into 11 districts and 19 sub-

⁴⁶ HZRB, 11 November, 1902.

⁴⁷ In a decree issued on 12 September, 1901, the Green Standards of various provinces were ordered to disband, and some elites were chosen to form the “standing army, reserved army and police army”. This showed that the central government was not aware of the difference of functions between police and army. Han Yanlong, *Zhongguo jindai jingcha zhidu*, p.122.

⁴⁸ Concerning the establishment of police stations in the Inner City, see HZRB, 9, 15 and 16 January, 1903. The times of establishing police in both the Outer City and Xiguan could not be ascertained by the sources available. It is known that police had been established in the Outer City and Xiguan by November, 1903 and May, 1904. See HZRB, 27 November, 1903; ZGRB, 3 May, 1904, p.3.

⁴⁹ HZRB, 21 September, 1905; 16 May, 29 July, 1906.

⁵⁰ Han Yanlong, *Zhongguo jindai jingcha zhidu*, p.129; HZRB, 19 August, 1908.



districts, each district being under the supervision of one captain, one lieutenant, one sergeant, and two corporals, and each sub-district under that of one captain, one lieutenant, one sergeant, and one corporal.”⁵²

Different from other *yamens*, both old and new, the Guangzhou Police was a city-based administrative institution. It was the most potential administrative entity to pay regular attention to urban issues and to exert influence on the residents because of the wide distribution of branch offices, the everyday interaction with the residents, and, most important of all, the availability of a stable income from the residents in the form of the house tax.⁵³ Actually, the original objective of the establishment of the Police was rather limited, namely, patrol. The job of catching thieves was left to the army.⁵⁴ However, the Police always made use of particular events to augment its authority, for example, through imposing various bans in 1908 in the name of paying respect to the late Emperor Guangxu and Empress Cixi.⁵⁵ Therefore, the Guangzhou Police developed from merely a patrol team against theft to a general organization exercising extensive power within a number of years. The following information shows the comprehensiveness of its authority, or at least its desire of exerting authority:

Policing and defense. This is the basic function of the Police. The maintenance of *hukou* (residence registration) was strictly followed. Moving homes within the city or immigration into the city for permanent residence had to be reported to the Police.⁵⁶ The

⁵¹ Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.8, pp.6a-b.

⁵² The Inspectorate General of Customs, *China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1902-11*, p.144.

⁵³ On house tax, see *HZRB*, 26 February, 1904.

⁵⁴ *HZRB*, 9 January, 1903.

⁵⁵ *HZRB*, 24 and 30, November, 8 December, 1908.

⁵⁶ *HZRB*, 22 March, 1906; 28 September, 1908; 24 August, 1911.



opening hours of the city gates were regulated.⁵⁷ The Police also dealt with criminal cases, such as coin forgery and theft. It employed modern technology that facilitated catching thieves, such as the telephone and wanted posters with photos.⁵⁸ It paid extra attention to places where residents might gather. Regulations supervising the running of theaters were issued to prevent the frequent conflicts that occurred there.⁵⁹ Movies were banned in the walled city on the ground that the provincial capital was a strategic site not suitable for this kind of amusement.⁶⁰

Social control. The Police was concerned with the maintenance of social morality conforming to established social norms. Gambling and opium smoking, though commonly thought of as a source of social evils, continued because owners of gambling and opium houses were willing to make substantial contributions to the Police, but the Police made efforts to regulate the operation of such houses.⁶¹ Brothel management was another area of Police concern. Prostitutes were protected from injustice, especially from the brothel keepers.⁶² Sometimes, prohibition was adopted as a security measure. For example, prostitute boats were banned after the 1909 Dashatou Great Fire which was partially caused by the jamming of prostitute boats on the river.⁶³ The Police also strove to minimize the social activities of women for maintaining their good conduct. Thus, the Police laid own many restrictions for women, such as setting time-limits for women to pray in temples; forbidding them to enjoy refreshment in tea houses, to act in dramas, to

⁵⁷ HZRB, 5 May, 1911.


⁵⁸ HZRB, 28 April, 1906; 22 March, 1907.

⁵⁹ HZRB, 25 October, 1907.

⁶⁰ HZRB, 10 February, 1911.

⁶¹ HZRB, 8 December, 1906; 20 December, 1907; 20 July, 1910.

⁶² HZRB, 11 January, 1906. For Guangzhou's prostitution issue, also see Virgil Kit-yiu Ho, "Selling Smiles in Canton: Prostitution in the Early Republic", *East Asian History*, no.5, June 1993, pp.101-32.



wander in the streets and to sit with men on the same horse carts.⁶⁴ The Police also tried to create a new ethics for the residents in the midst of reform. Taoist sacrificial ceremony, which was regarded by the Police as both superstitious and wasting money, was banned by the Police who insisted that the money should be given to the Police or used as funds for street administration.⁶⁵ However, it is important to point out that all the above attempts at social control met frequent resistance by the residents.

Street management. The Guangzhou Police, immediately after its inauguration, registered the households and shops of streets, in order to facilitate regular patrol.⁶⁶ With the expansion of their duties, the Police extended its scope of street management in order to improve the accessibility and cleanliness of the streets. Residents, both local and expatriate, were persuaded to move their houses in order to widen the roads.⁶⁷ They were also ordered to remove signboards, illegal stalls and all articles on the streets to maximize the public area.⁶⁸ The Police advised the street administrations to install lights along the roads.⁶⁹ They even tried to interfere directly with the administration of the streets through the arrangements they made with the street guards.⁷⁰

Hygiene. In addition to issuing orders prohibiting the sale of old tea-leaves, regulating the sale of infected meat, stopping the use of poisonous dye for mooncakes, requesting prostitutes to have medical check-ups, and ensuring the safety of medicine sold,

⁶³ *HZRB*, 5 February, 1909.

⁶⁴ *HZRB*, 20 August, 1906; 16 March, 1907; 21 February, 13 June, 1908; 1 April, 1909; 13 December, 1910; 19 June, 5 October, 1911.

⁶⁵ *HZRB*, 30 November, 1903; 18 October, 1907; 20 September, 1909.


⁶⁶ *HZRB*, 6 March, 1903; 8 January, 1904.

⁶⁷ *HZRB*, 17 November, 1906; 5 December, 1910.

⁶⁸ *HZRB*, 15 November, 1907; 13 February, 20 May, 9 September, 1909; 15 January, 1910.

⁶⁹ *HZRB*, 19 April, 1909.

⁷⁰ *ZGRB*, 5 May, 1904, p.3.



the Police ordered herbal stores to open all day for residents' medical consultation.⁷¹ Mortality statistics were supervised by the Police. Any death had to be reported to the Police, and burning the effects of the dead in the street was banned in order to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.⁷² The Police also dealt with the prevention of contagious diseases. Doctors of the T'o Mei Hospital, founded by the French in 1905, were hired as consultants to teach the policemen about preventive measures.⁷³

Regulation of business. The Police attempted to enforce the system of registration for porters and coolies.⁷⁴ Pawnshops were ordered to stop business at night to reduce the rate of robbery.⁷⁵ The issue of forged shares of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway was seriously handled by the Police.⁷⁶ It took strong measures fought against privately made wine.⁷⁷ Lucky draws as a means to attract more customers were banned.⁷⁸ It also made constructive efforts to promote industrial training by establishing factories.⁷⁹

Relief work. The Police operated its own regular fire-fighting teams which developed into an important service in the city. Relief to the poor was provided by distributing biscuits and money.⁸⁰

⁷¹ *Yangcheng gujin*, no.19, February, 1989, p.53; *HZRB*, 21 June, 1907; 22 May, 1908; 18 June, 27 September, 1909; 4 July, 1910.

⁷² *HZRB*, 26 April, 5 May, 1906; 18 May, 1910.

⁷³ *HZRB*, 16 March, 1904.

⁷⁴ *HZRB*, 25 June, 1906; 20 May, 23 August, 1910.

⁷⁵ *HZRB*, 27 November, 1907; 25 February, 1908.


⁷⁶ *HZRB*, 12 March, 1907.

⁷⁷ *HZRB*, 15 April, 1911.

⁷⁸ *HZRB*, 21 February, 1908.

⁷⁹ Peng Zeyi (ed.), *Zhongguo jindai shougongye shi ziliao, 1840-1949*, vol.2, p.557; *HZRB*, 7 August, 1907; 12 March, 25 July, 1910.

⁸⁰ *HZRB*, 26 June, 6 August, 1908.



Different from the Rehabilitation Bureau which was a provincial institution with the primary goal of expanding revenues, the establishment of the Police was more concerned with urban issues on a city-wide scale. The Police's wide-ranging power and wide geographical scope of activities made it function as a proto-municipality, albeit without any autonomous elements. It was highly possible that the surviving image (and reality) of a "weak government" could have been eradicated by the Police's exertion of ambitious control over areas where the authority of the government was weak, such as Xiguan, and over the streets, which were the basic-units of Guangzhou's city administration and where the local government seldom interfered. In other words, because there was no truly municipal government, the Police functioned since its inception as a city-wide authority touching on every walk of urban life. It became a sophisticated organization of modern urban administration, and handled the problems created by the county and prefectural *yamens* which had failed to fulfill their claims to look after the people and affairs under their control.

The establishment of the Republic of China was a benchmark for the development of the Police in Guangzhou. In the last years of the Qing Dynasty, the Guangzhou Police strove hard to become a city-wide authority, but encountered much difficulties and challenges. It was far from resourceful in employing professional administrators, and depended on the Nanhai and Panyu magistrates to supervise the sub-bureaus in the city.⁸¹ It even faced the threat of dissolution. The local government held ambiguous views about the development of the police force, and some officials did not appreciate the vitality and significance of the Police as a force of city administration. They saw no

⁸¹ HZRB, 3 August, 1907.



difference between the Police and the old *tuanlian* and Green Standards army.⁸²

The Guangzhou Police underwent drastic expansion after the downfall of the Qing Dynasty. The power of the two county magistrates dwindled drastically, and they functioned little more than tax collectors in Guangzhou.⁸³ The Police became more legitimate as a city-wide administrative institution, following the establishment of the Guangdong Provincial Capital Police Bureau (*Guangdong shenghui jingchating*) in 1912. In addition to the power it had enjoyed, the Police even attempted to counterbalance the influence of charitable organizations. For example, Chen Jinghua, Department Head of the Police, who was famous for his desire to expand the police force, decided to open a charity for women after the charitable organizations objected to the idea.⁸⁴ The Police also ran its own orphanage to provide supplementary support to charitable organizations.⁸⁵ Occasionally, it initiated some minor projects, such as dredging silted rivers and constructing bridges.⁸⁶

The evolution of city-based specialized institutions

The development of the Rehabilitation Bureau and the Guangzhou Police indicated that China's traditional administrative pattern was undergoing some changes. In the era


⁸² In January, 1905, a confrontation happened between the Police and residents of the Eighteenth Ward after the arrest of some residents who had deferred their payment of house tax to the Police. Viceroy Zhang Renjun and Governor-General Cen Chunxuan ordered the dissolution of the Xiguan Police, which had only operated for half a year, and the shifting of its work to the *tuanlian*. This order was subsequently not implemented, but this arbitrary predication of dissolution implied that high provincial officials regarded the Police and other old defense institutions as the same. See *HZRB*, 15 and 16 February, 1905.

⁸³ For example, see *HZRB*, 21 March, 1913.

⁸⁴ Gao Minchuan, "Jingchating zhang Chen Jinghua ban'an jianwen", *Yangcheng jingu*, no.4, August, 1987, pp.39-40; Chen Zhesan, "Chen Jinghua due Zhongguo geming de gongxian", *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.8, no.2, June, 1978, p.14-5.

⁸⁵ *Guangdong gongbao*, no.142, 18 January, 1913, p.10.

⁸⁶ For example, *Guangdong gongbao*, no.1001, 10 January, 1915, pp.7-31; *HZRB*, 4 June, 1915.




of reforms, bureaucratic establishments could not simply act as agents of the Imperial Throne and ignored urban affairs in the city where such establishments were located. Specialized institutions were set up to take up the responsibilities of improving the urban infrastructure and conducting city planning.

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, two specialized bureaus were established in Guangzhou in the 1900s. To take up the construction of the Bund, the Bund Bureau was established. It was responsible for the planning and construction of the Bund, and for monitoring the progress of the project which was contracted out to private contractors. The New Town Bureau was set up to manage the new town projects embodied in the 1907 Planning. These two bureaus were informal and *ad-hoc* in nature; yet, it is important to note that they were created to tackle specific urban issues and, in reality, assumed a wide range of powers such as the procurement of land for construction, surveying the planning of roads and infrastructure, the maintenance of public hygiene (such as dredging the Six Artery Ditches) and contracting-out construction projects. The New Town Bureau, though abortive, was originally designed as a planning institute for Guangzhou.⁸⁷ It was not impossible that they could have gradually developed into some kind of municipality in the Western sense of the word.

The two bureaus fitted in with the trend of the creation of city-based institutions in the wake of self-governing movement in the 1900s, following the establishment of various autonomous organizations and the proclamation of the *Cheng-zhen-xiang difang zizhi zhangcheng* (Regulations for the Local Self-Governing of Walled Cities, Towns and Villages).⁸⁸ However, the authoritarian approach adopted by the two bureaus and

⁸⁷ See Zhou Fu, *Qiu pu Zhou Shangshu (Yushan) quanji*, pp.541-2.

⁸⁸ For details of the Regulations, see Gugong bowuyuan Ming-Qing dang'anbu (ed.), *Qing mo choubei lixian dang'an shiliao*, pp.724-41.



the lack of popular participation agitated the local merchants and gentry, who were increasingly under the influence of the trend of self-government. The Bund Bureau adopted coercion in taking over private land for the construction of the Bund, causing frequent conflicts and protests by the people.⁸⁹ For such powerful bureaus which always took over private properties at prices that the land-owners found unreasonably low, the local residents had no say in the bureaus' decision-making. The Bund Bureau was managed by circuit-level officials who were appointed by the Governor-General, and the fund came from the Rehabilitation Bureau. The New Town Bureau was directed by officials including the Provincial Administrator, Guangzhou Prefect, Panyu Magistrate and other officials appointed by the Governor-General.⁹⁰ The masses' dissatisfaction with the Bund Bureau could be seen in a resolution passed by the Provincial Consultative Assembly (*Ziyi ju*) to abolish the Bureau for its irritating practice.⁹¹


The Guangzhou elite demanded some kind of municipality in the Western sense. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the seventy-two *hang* merchants, amidst their opposition to construction projects in 1912, deemed it unsuitable to proceed with urban construction before such a municipality was formed in Guangzhou. Actually, a proposal for forming a municipality had been raised immediately after the 1911 Revolution. Chen Jiongming, Acting Military Governor of Guangdong, put forward his municipal scheme in December, 1911, suggesting that a municipality covering the city proper and Honam should be created, free from the jurisdiction of Panyu and Nanhai counties and placed directly under the Military Governor.⁹² As he previously served as a member of the

⁸⁹ For example, see *HZRB*, 1 January, 1 February, 1909; 9 November, 1 December, 1910; 14 January, 11 August, 1911.

⁹⁰ *HZRB*, 8 May, 1905; 25 February, 22 March, 30 April, 28 November, 1907; 21 December, 1908.

⁹¹ *HZRB*, 9 November, 1910.

⁹² *SB*, 13 December, 1911.



Provincial Consultative Assembly, it was possible that his scheme was based on the desire of the residents in Guangzhou for such a municipality. Chen explained that his scheme was in imitation of municipal systems in “other countries”. This plan, however, was not carried out then because of the launching of military campaigns against the Manchu regime and the resignation of Chen Jiongming. It was shelved until Chen’s next rule in the province in 1921.

The trend of forming city-based institutions continued even after the 1911 Revolution. The Board of Public Works (*Gongwu bu*) was formed for the city planning program in 1912 and 1913.⁹³ Compared to the Bund Bureau, this new institution paid more attention to the use of professionals. The Board was under the charge of Cheng Tiandou (also known as T.T. Cheng) who had his education in Stanford and Chicago.⁹⁴ Wu Xilü, a civil engineer who graduated from Ohio Northern University and University of Illinois, and R.C. Johnson, concurrently the chief engineer of the Guangzhou-Sanshui Railway, were employed to map out construction work in the city.⁹⁵ The Board sanctioned the dredging of the Six Artery Ditches, registered those households which would be displaced in the proposed demolition of the city walls and sanctioned the construction of piers along the Bund.⁹⁶

However, political chaos arrested this trend towards the municipalization of bureaucratic administration. Following the failure of the Second Revolution, the Board of Public Works was abolished, and no specialized institution was formed until 1918.

⁹³ However, another source stated that the commission was entitled *Gongbing ju*, literally “Bureau of Army Engineering”. See Chen Yansheng, *Chen Jingcun xiansheng nianpu*, p.18.

⁹⁴ *Who's Who in China* (2th ed.) pp.29-30; HZRB, 16 December, 1911.

⁹⁵ “Canton's New Maloos”, *The Far Eastern Review*, January, 1922, p.22.

⁹⁶ HZRB, 13 and 15 January, 17 June, 1912.




Problems of the governmental circle in the midst of urban modernization

Two characteristics can be observed as regards the bureaucratic administration in Guangzhou in the period 1860-1917. Firstly, the local government devoted more resources for the construction for this provincial capital. The takeover of bund construction and the electricity plant, which were both initiated by merchants, were notable examples. Secondly, the local government acknowledged the importance of “city” as a functional unit of bureaucratic administration. The newly formed institutions such as the Police Bureau, Bund Bureau, New Town Bureau and the Board of Public Works were all city-based. Compared with previous institutions, they were more appreciative of the importance of expertise, and employed numerous experienced engineers for the city’s construction. The qualifications of officials of the existing *yamens* were also different from before. For example, Guangzhou Prefects became more open-minded and acquainted with *yangwu* (foreign affairs). Gong Xinzhan, who served as Guangzhou Prefect from 1902 to 1903, studied in Britain and was fluent in English. He also constructed a foreign-style garden in his *yamen* for the reception of foreigners.⁹⁷

The efforts towards providing effective governmental leadership under the current of reform were dampened by special political pressure arising from Guangzhou’s geographical setting. Guangzhou was the provincial capital of Guangdong Province which was situated in the southern frontier of the country. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, numerous frontier conflicts in Indochina and Taiwan threatened national security, and the provincial officials were preoccupied with the defense work of that province.⁹⁸ Moreover, Guangdong was the base of revolution, where numerous revolts were

⁹⁷ HZRB, 19 April, 1902.

⁹⁸ Governors-General Zeng Guoquan and Zhang Zhidong in the early and mid-1880s were concerned about the situation in Indochina and local defense. Governor-General Li Hanzhang and Viceroy Ma Piya concentrated on preparation against potential attack by Japan in mid-1890s. See Wang



launched. After the establishment of the Republic, the situation was not much improved. After the failure of the Second Revolution, the Chinese Revolutionary Party (*Zhonghua geming dang*) under Sun Yatsen made Guangzhou a base to launch the “third revolution” against Yuan Shikai. This threat to public order was intensified by frequent robberies and theft in the city and widespread bandit activities.⁹⁹ Therefore, the local and provincial officials were too busy in dealing with such problems, and had little time for infrastructural construction and improvement. This produced two damaging effects. Firstly, much money was spent on the maintenance of military strength, and both the attention of officials and financial sources were withdrawn from the sphere of modernization. Residents and trades of every kind had to pay enormous taxes to the local government for military use.¹⁰⁰ Military Governor Long Jiguang even petitioned the central government and suggested that Guangdong should be exempted from budgetary restriction and be allowed to spend as much money on the military work as he desired.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the stationing of a large army in the city to a great extent paralyzed the exercise of government power in administering the city. On some occasions, the military established their own police and taxed the residents.¹⁰²

Lack of financial resources prevented the change of administrative management to


Ding'an (ed.), *Zeng Zhongxiang gong (Guoquan) pidu, nianpu*, vol.2, p.661-4; Zhang Zhidong, *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji*, vol.1, pp.436; Li Jingshe, et al (ed.), *Hefei Li Qinke gong (Hanzhang) zhengshu*, vol.2, pp.831-42; Ma Jisen and Ma Jizhang (ed.), *Ma Zhongcheng (Piyaoyi) yiji*, vol.1, pp.14-5.

⁹⁹ Theft was reported day after day, as reflected by frequent newspaper reports. Dealing with theft and bandits was also an important subject in memorials to the Throne. For example, see Mao Chenglin (ed.), *Mao Shangshu (Hongbin) zougao*, vol.1, pp.23-5, vol.2, pp.1351-63; Zhou Fu, *Qiu pu Zhou Shangshu (Yushan) quanji*, vol.1, p.78; Yu Handu (ed.), *Yu Zhongcheng (Yinlin) zouyi*, pp.8-9.

¹⁰⁰ Examples were the heavy taxation on prostitutes and sale of opium, opening of new gambling houses. Yu Yanguang and Chen Fulin, *Nan Yue geju: Cong Long Jiguang dao Chen Jitang*, pp.13, 98-9; *HZRB*, 21 October, 1913.

¹⁰¹ *HZRB*, 20 November, 1913.

¹⁰² See *Guangdong gongbao*, no.717, 4 December, 1914, p.19; *HZRB*, 15 and 26 August, 1919; 6 March, 1920.



cater for the need of modernization. In the late Qing, the administration of various modernization undertakings was assumed by existing officials concurrently. The Guangzhou Prefect served as director of the waterworks, cement plant and government mint.¹⁰³ The Magistrates of Nanhai and Panyu counties had to shoulder a heavier workload. They served as subordinate officials of the Circuit of Economic Promotion and the Police Bureau.¹⁰⁴ The Guangzhou Prefect still made the two Magistrates his agents to do a wide range of jobs, and the latter were bereft of subordinates to carry out the new orders and policies.¹⁰⁵ In other words, the creation of new functionary units only created heavier burdens to the existing bureaucrats.

Financial hardship and the great administrative burden of governing Guangdong made officials of all grades in Guangzhou unwilling to stay long at their posts. This phenomenon was widely observed in the last decade of the Qing Dynasty. As the Panyu and Nanhai magistrates had to perform heavy administrative duties, and make up government deficit from their own purses, newly appointed magistrates used every excuse to refuse appointment.¹⁰⁶ It is interesting to note that higher-ranking officials frequently made concessions, for example, allowing the new appointees to shorten office hours.¹⁰⁷ Even Governor-Generals did not stay long at their posts. Zhang Mingqi resigned in 1911 because of financial difficulty.¹⁰⁸ Zhang Renjun resigned due to complicated negotiation

¹⁰³ *HZRB*, 20 February, 26 November, 1906.

¹⁰⁴ See *HZRB*, 14 December, 1909; 11 March, 2 November, 1910.

¹⁰⁵ For the magistrates' administrative subordination to the Guangzhou Prefect, see *HZRB*, 25 November, 1895; 4 February, 1896; 30 September, 1897; 7 April, 1904.

¹⁰⁶ For example, Chen Bohou, a newly appointed Nanhai Magistrate, refused the appointment because he was ordered to use his own money to make up the deficit left by his predecessor. See *HZRB*, 4 September, 1905. In regard to this prevalent deficit problem, the *Huazi ribao* commented that “it is always difficult [for newly appointed magistrates] to manage if he is not wealthy.” See *HZRB*, 19 May, 1905.

¹⁰⁷ See *HZRB*, 10 April, 19 May, 4 September, 1905; *ZGRB*, 5 March, 1904, p.3.

¹⁰⁸ *HZRB*, 12 August, 1911.



with foreigners.¹⁰⁹ From 1900 to 1911, there were nine changes of appointee for the post of Governor-General.¹¹⁰ The situation for magistrates was much worse. In the same period, there were at least eleven appointees for the post of Panyu Magistrate and twelve for the post of Nanhai Magistrate.¹¹¹ Inattention to duty and the short duration of service produced serious inconsistency in policies, notably the stoppage of the planning policy of 1907.

Right after the establishment of the Republic, financial hardship resulted in streamlining the bureaucratic structure of Guangzhou (*jianzheng zhuyi*). Existing personnel in the government was cut in great number to save expenditure. Honorarium to provincial assemblymen was reduced by fifty percent in May, 1912.¹¹² Under Long Jiguang's military governorship, provincial divisions of general affairs (*neiwu*), education and construction, all of which were created shortly after the 1911 Revolution, were abolished to save expenditure.¹¹³ Reduced resources and the lack of government departments responsible for construction explained why there was little construction in Guangzhou in the mid-1910s.

It was the above entanglements that led the local government to promote the development of non-governmental administrations as alternatives to the existing system

¹⁰⁹ HZRB, 13 December, 1907.

¹¹⁰ They were Li Hongzhang (1899-1900), Lu Chuanlin (1900), Tao Mo (1900-1902), De Shou (1902-1903), Cen Chunxuan (1903-1906), Zhou Fu (1906-1907), Zhang Renjun (1907-1909), Yuan Shuxun (1909-1910) and Zhang Mingqi (1910-1911).

¹¹¹ These figures are derived from the HZRB and the local gazetteers. For the Panyu Magistrates, they were Liu Bingkui (1899-1901), Qian Puru (1901-1903), Lü Daoxiang (1903-1904), Liu Neng (1904), Chai Weitong (1904-1905), Tang Shengsong (1905-1907), Zhuang Yunyi (1907-1908), Liu Qingtang (1908-1909), Zhou Rudun (1909-1910), Yang Shuqi (1910-1911), Yan Lu (1911). For the Nanhai Magistrates, they were Fei Jingfu (1901-?), Wang Songshan (1903), Yao Bohuai (1904), Fu Rumei (1904), Hu Mingpan (1905), Chen Bohou (1905), Yu Rujun (1906), Zheng Rong (1906), Zhang Fengjie (1908), Wang Ding (1910), Chi Zhongyou (1911), Wang Sizhang (1911).

¹¹² HZRB, 22 February, 1913; Zhongguo renmin xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), *Guangdong junfa shi dashiji*, p.21.

¹¹³ Guangzhou shi shizhengting, *Guangzhou shi yange shilie*, p.60; *Guangdong gongbao*, no.561, 3



to maximize the effectiveness of public mobilization. As will be discussed in the following pages, the street expanded as an administrative and functional unit in Guangzhou providing an even larger range of basic urban services and functions than before and this in turn gave the street more strength which the government could not compete.

Bottom-level administration: street

As the bottom-level administrative unit of Guangzhou, the street showed tangible differences after 1860. The first difference was its dissociation with mass politics, as demonstrated by the disappearance of radical, larger autonomous units based on streets. The street organization simply served as the bottom-level administrative unit on the tacit consent of the community and the local government. Another difference was the geographical and functional expansion of streets. The expansion of the city's populated area in the last decades of the Qing Dynasty resulted in a great numerical increase of streets. In 1897, there were slightly more than two thousand streets in which ninety thousand shops were located. The number of streets and shops rose to 2,591 and 93,621 respectively in 1904. The number of streets further increased to 3,000 in 1908 and 3,800 in 1911.¹¹⁴ New streets were constructed by private parties who acquired large pieces of land, as shown in the preceding chapter.

The increase of streets was accompanied by the expansion of street functions. As a legitimate administrative unit, the street not only continued to perform existing functions including public security, infrastructural maintenance and daily cleaning, but also took on many new functions, especially the improvement of infrastructure. Street heads were

June, 1914, p.1.

¹¹⁴ HZRB, 31 December, 1897; 29 April, 1904; 17 December, 1908; 27 June, 1910; ZGRB, 28 April, 1904.



urged by the Police Bureau to install electric light.¹¹⁵ The street provided an important source of financial and organizational support for the establishment of new schools.¹¹⁶ It was also indispensable for the popularization and modernization of fire-fighting services. In view of the widespread distribution of streets, the efforts they made for the improvement of infrastructure were a great contribution to urban modernization that the insolvent local government could by no means achieve.

The development of streets and the pattern of street operation can be illustrated by the mode of fire-fighting management. A noticeable aspect was the process of the acquisition of fire engines in Honam. Primarily due to the small number of streets, Honam residents were far from affluent to own their own fire-fighting facilities, and they had to depend on fire engines in the city proper across the Pearl River.¹¹⁷ Change was marked by the possession of fire engines by a number of Honam streets in the last years of the nineteenth century.¹¹⁸ The increase of fire engines in Honam made it possible to reverse the direction of assistance, and fire engines were sent across the Pearl River to help fighting fire in the city proper, as seen during the 1901 Xiguan great fire.¹¹⁹ The two-way assistance between Honam and the city proper later on reflected not only the development of both streets and urban landscape of Honam, but also the close cooperation of streets in the two separate regions.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ HZRB, 6 December, 1906; 3 March, 28 April, 1913; *Guangdong gongbao*, no.149, 27 January, 1913, p.19.


¹¹⁶ See HZRB, 23 September, 1 October, 24 December, 1904.

¹¹⁷ For example, see XHRB, 25 May, 1885.

¹¹⁸ HZRB, 11 April, 1901.

¹¹⁹ HZRB, 6 November, 1901.

¹²⁰ Accounts of such two-way assistance were recorded *passim* in contemporary news reports. For example, see HZRB, 18 January, 24 September, 1 October, 1902; 7 November, 1903; 23 and 28 January, 1904; 2, 4 and 17 January, 1905.



Although there were increasing cases that fire-fighting machines were operated by non-street organizations such as the waterworks and the police, the street was still the most important fire-fighting unit in Guangzhou. In the mid-1890s, a number of streets in Xiguan initiated the replacement of the old fire engines by more advanced mechanized engines of higher capability, and the competency of the new machines prompted other streets to follow suit.¹²¹ In case of fighting fire, each street would serve as one independent unit although in most cases streets would act collectively. The evolution of the remuneration system fully illustrated the autonomy and coercion exercised by the street. It was a custom that the owners of a house causing fire had to remunerate the fire teams which rendered help. If the house-owner was too poor to pay, or if he fled to avoid responsibility, the burden would be shifted to the whole street. This payment, originally voluntary, later became mandatory as the fire teams intended to take advantage of the situation to make profit. The owner of the house which had caused the fire, or the street organization in which that house was located, had to remunerate all fire teams which had come to fight the fire. Teams which arrived late or did not participate in fighting fire would also regard themselves eligible to claim remuneration.¹²² Residents of a street also took collective actions to prevent fire, for example, by allotting an attractive sum to those who could catch the incendiaries.¹²³ Therefore, the case of fire-fighting management showed clearly that the street served as a functional unit which promoted modernization through the introduction of modern appliances and as an autonomous unit which exercised full power in the administration of specific urban issues.

¹²¹ *HZRB*, 22 April, 24 September, 23 October, 2 November, 1895.

¹²² *XHRB*, 3 December, 1881; 3 January, 1882; 24 September, 29 November, 1883; *HZRB*, 25 March, 22 June, 1895.

¹²³ *HZRB*, 31 October, 1901.




The increasing role of the street as a functional and autonomous unit at the bottom level of city administration was to a large extent due to the inability of the local government to deal effectively with urban administration. Street conflicts, though notified to the magistrates, were always resolved by the street administration.¹²⁴ The streets even had the power to counteract governmental orders, as exemplified by their insistence on performing banned Taoist ceremonies and their jurisdiction over the fate of murderers without official endorsement.¹²⁵ The street organizations and residents were always prepared to counteract government infiltration into their administration. They were always indifferent to the *dibao*, literally translated as “district head”, who was a designated person for street administration under the *baojia* system. *Dibao* was always not a member of the street under his domain, as he secured his post simply by paying a “fee” to the *Baojia* Bureau. Street residents always regarded him as a man of insignificance.¹²⁶ Therefore, he was impotent in influencing decisions made by street representatives, and even in communicating official orders to the street residents.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ For example, the Nanhai Magistrate, Fei Jingfu, was requested by the residents of Baoyuan Street to settle the construction of a new pawnshop, but Fei asked the residents to solve the problem by themselves. See *HZRB*, 23 April, 1903.

¹²⁵ The performance of the Taoist praying ceremony (*jianjiao*) had long been banned by the local government, though the reason was different from time to time. In the late nineteenth century, the official reason was to prevent conflict in the overcrowded city, but in the first decade of the twentieth century emphasis was put on its wastage of money. However, the repeated prohibitive orders were simply ignored by the residents, and the ceremony was still performed by streets on a large scale. Lunar new year parades characterized by the lion dance was also banned officially, but met with the same cool response from the street residents. See *XHRB*, 29 September, 1880; 17 February, 1881; 1 October, 1885; *HZRB*, 7 November, 1906; 15 September, 8 August, 1909. In addition, it was a custom that the street had judicial power and could make judgments contrary to laws. A Westerner witnessed the case of a Xiguan woman, who had killed her adopted daughter, being released by the street elders under her husband’s importunate begging, even though such a crime deserved severe punishment under the established laws. See John Henry Gray, *China: A History of the Laws, Manners, and Customs of the People*, pp.232-3.

¹²⁶ For the attitude of the residents towards *dibao*, see *HZRB*, 4 April, 1904.

¹²⁷ *Dibaos* were requested by officials of the New Town Bureau to negotiate with residents of the streets that were planned to be torn down. However, they claimed that they were not trusted by the residents. See *HZRB*, 10 May, 1907.



On the other hand, successful installation of new infrastructure seemed to suggest that the street administration could continue to survive in the new era. The survival of streets was maintained by their diverse sources of income, including remuneration obtained by sending fire-fighting teams to other areas, profits from the sale of nightsoil, incomes from leasing out street properties, and rent levies raised for both general expenses and special uses.¹²⁸ As a result, the street had the strength to function as an indispensable supplement to the local government in city administration.

However, the role of the street became questionable when Guangzhou entered the age of dynamism and transformation. Although the street could still exert control over a restricted area, this strength became a shortcoming. Maintaining small functional units instead of creating a centralized and coordinated larger unit was associated with high cost and low efficiency. Fire-fighting still provides a good example. In the 1900s, it was observed that the efficiency of street fire teams was affected by frequent conflicts among teams from different streets due to the struggle for water sources and the ambition to become the first team to put out fire in order to bargain for more remuneration.¹²⁹ In view of the frequent lack of coordination, fire teams coming from remote streets for fighting fire (for example, the fire team of Zhuhengsha in Dongguan in the case of the Xiguan Fire in 1901) should be viewed as an act of procuring income for their own streets instead of providing services for the general public of Guangzhou.¹³⁰

When the Police proposed in 1910 to centralize the management of these scattered street teams, the street residents showed great unwillingness and regarded this proposal

¹²⁸ House contribution was an easy and convenient source of fund for the street. This income was particularly helpful for special activities of streets, for example, the organization of *tuanlian* and street repairing. See *XHRB*, 21 January, 1882; 14 March, 9 November, 1883.

¹²⁹ For example, see *HZRB*, 8 November, 1901; 22 February, 1902; 27 January, 1910.

¹³⁰ For the joining of fire teams of Zhuhengsha in the 1901 Xiguan fire, see *HZRB*, 8 November, 1901.




as tantamount to official encroachment on street assets and coffers. Even the Guangdong Provincial Assembly had reservations about this issue. Knowing the objective of the proposal, the Assembly doubted the effectiveness of the local government in conducting negotiations with the streets and feared that centralization might incur mass resistance.¹³¹ The attitude of the assemblymen revealed the paradoxical status of the street. The street's appreciable contribution to infrastructural undertakings was counterbalanced by its limitation to the further expansion, and any remedial attempt which intended to undermine street power would probably incur social unrest. Such unrest was especially undesirable in Guangdong which was in the throes of revolution.

Moreover, the street administrative structure was problematic. Nominally speaking, there would be one manager (*zhishi* or *zhili*) in every street in charge of managing daily street affairs. From various proclamations made by the local government urging for election to this post, it is known that the post of street manager was frequently vacant.¹³² The street residents did not always want the existence of a standing manager. It is therefore not uncommon that the street chairman (*jiezhang*) and vice-chairman (*jiefu*) were the only administrators in the loosely organized street administration. As the street administration was loose, the street temple (*jiemiao*) which was the place for gathering and discussion, and the street coffer (*gongxiang*) which was administered by pawnshops in the street on a rotating basis, became the tangible symbols for the legitimacy of street administration. The street temple always owned considerable properties, and the street coffer stored up a sizable amount of cash for street use. Under such unprofessional management, these two assets often aroused the interest of the so-called “greedy peo-

¹³¹ For the issue of centralizing the street fire teams, see *HZRB*, 19 October, 1910.

¹³² There was such a case in 1901, when the local government intended to enlist the street managers in the collection of house contribution for repaying the Boxer indemnity. The government appealed for quick election since many streets did not have their managers. *HZRB*, 18 October, 1901.



ple".¹³³ The strength of street autonomy was thus undermined by corrupt administration.

Middle-level administration: supra street non-governmental institutions


The above discussion on the local government and the street reveals a very crucial question regarding the urban administration of Guangzhou entering the twentieth century. The local government wanted to exert stronger control over the whole city. Although the government only showed limited success due to its institutional and personnel incompetence, its efforts represented a trend of municipalization and a search for effective administration. Street administration made a partial response to this trend especially by its contribution to infrastructural projects, but it could not sustain city-wide modernization because of corrupt street management and geographical restriction. A vacuum existed between these two levels of city administration, and this vacuum was filled by some new supra street non-governmental institutions, constituting the middle-level administration of Guangzhou.

Gentry and merchants

In the last decades of the Qing Dynasty, the gentry still played a strong role in city administration and welfare, making up for inadequacy of bureaucratic administration. Regular duties, including the mediation of conflict and the staging of ceremonies, were performed by them.¹³⁴ Their concern for social welfare was shown by their maintenance

¹³³ For example, in 1904, residents of Qingping Street forced the Houtai Pawnshop to hand over the newly received street coffer, as the pawnshop was suspected to have committed corruption. *HZRB*, 8 April, 1904.

¹³⁴ For example, when Li Hanhang (1889-1895) was Governor-General, a conflict arose because of the resistance of the residents along the northern bank of the Pearl River to yield land to the government for the construction of a coal factory. The residents finally yielded to the government when a neighboring gentry called Cao Bingren initiated to hand over his land to the government. Besides, the gentry assumed the responsibility of constructing temples celebrating those people and



of some specialized bureaus, such as the Widow Bureau (*Xuli ju*) which provided financial assistance to widows.¹³⁵ In 1881, a new Burial Office (*Fenshan gongsuo*) was formed and run by the gentry, to end various notorious evils associated with the burial of the dead in Guangzhou. For example, robbers frequently exposed the buried corpses after stealing gravestone and buried articles for sale.¹³⁶

In addition to the gentry, merchants became a vital part of the “middle-level” administration. Here, “merchants” did not refer to the Hong merchants whose social status and influence declined following the collapse of the Cohong system, but to the *hang*-based petty-merchants who constituted the majority of the merchant population in Guangzhou. Admittedly, before the twentieth century, these petty-merchants had great difficulty playing a crucial role in city administration. The traditional divisions of *hangs* were too minute, and the very specialized nature of business resulted in frequent conflicts between *hangs*.¹³⁷ The strength represented by various guilds did not produce a substantial collectivity of merchants.


While the gentry served as a ritual symbol of the regime, the merchants’ rise to prominence in city administration was associated with their ability in generating incomes for the local government. The local government always welcomed merchants who took the initiative to contract themselves as tax farmers for specific *hangs* by paying a “legal”

old women who had the qualities of filiality and chastity. See Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.24, pp.16b-17a; *XHRB*, 15 January, 1881; 3 May, 1884.

¹³⁵ See *XHRB*, 12 April, 1881.

¹³⁶ Concerning the establishment and regulations of the Burial Office, See *XHRB*, 29 and 30 August, 8 and 13 September, 7 October, 8 November, 1881. Concerning its work and initial success, see *ibid*, 5 December, 1881; 26 February, 10 May, 21 December, 1882; 12 May, 1883.

¹³⁷ For instance, merchants dealing with new copper were severely criticized when involving themselves in the used copper business. Painters complained that the slab merchants should not get involved in painting. See *HZRB*, 12 February, 6 June, 1895; 17 July, 1897; 27 April, 1901. The taxation policy of the Qing, according to which *hang* was the basic unit to collect and submit contributions to the government, only reinforced the rigid delineation among the *hangs*.



bribe called *baoxiao*.¹³⁸ The local government always had good excuses to tax the merchants, even when such new taxes went contrary to the established governmental policies. For example, social evils such as gambling were tolerated because of uninterrupted contributions made by the merchants, and the huge amount of tax income from the gambling house supported numerous governmental organs, including the Military Bureau (*Junxie ju*), the Government Paper Bureau (*Guanzhi ju*), the Circuit of Economic Promotion, the Cement Plant and the Rehabilitation Bureau.¹³⁹ New levies on the operation of brothels were accepted by the government, so that the proclaimed ban on this industry was never enforced.¹⁴⁰ A newspaper account revealed four kinds of financial obligations imposed on the merchants by the government, that is, contribution (*baoxiao*), *likin*, additional levy (*jiajiao*) and apportionment among *hangs* (*tanpai*).¹⁴¹ The merchants formed a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with the government, as the profit-making aspiration of the merchants matched the government's eagerness to maximize revenue, a need that those of purely gentry origin could hardly fulfill.

The rise of the merchants, whose social influence was comparable to that of the gentry, was shown by the confusion over the term of "gentry". Judging from the popularization of the terms of *zhishang* (merchant with an official post) or *shenshang* (gentry-merchant), it is obvious that more and more merchants adopted a gentry label.¹⁴²


¹³⁸ For example, see *HZRB*, 2 and 9 April, 1897; 27 February, 1 March, 1901; 25 July, 1903.

¹³⁹ Gambling was traditionally a banned activity in Guangdong. A number of provincial officials such as Viceroy Ma Piya (1894-1895), were especially famous for their firm banning of gambling. However, merchants changed the titles of their contributions to "subsidy for navy expenditure", "subsidy for fort expenditure", "patriotic coupon" and others. It was commented by a newspaper that merchants running gambling houses "are bandits if not paying a contribution, and they are known as merchants after paying the contribution." See *HZRB*, 6 June, 26 July, 1895; 15 April, 1907; 11 January, 1910.

¹⁴⁰ See *HZRB*, 7 August, 1906; 28 December, 1910.

¹⁴¹ *HZRB*, 9 December, 1902.

¹⁴² It is exceptionally difficult to judge a person by his biography in local gazetteers as to whether he was a merchant or a gentry since the data included is sketchy. In most cases, figures of this kind



At the same time, the gentry's ability in urban administration was questioned by the local government. This happened long before the abolition of the Civil Service Examination in 1905. The administration of the Burial Office was illustrative. In studying the regulations of the Office, one article draws our special attention:


"Article 9... The Office is newly established. It is necessary for the gentry to pay cautious attention to the issue. After the thorough search [of existing graves] is accomplished, there will be no further evils if the regulations are strictly followed. [It is expected that] the pioneer gentry will leave temporarily for other business. They will have difficulty staying in the Office perpetually. It is proposed that the Office, when founded, be administered by the Aiyu Hall."¹⁴³

This showed that the local officials trusted the ability of the Aiyu Hall, the first charitable organization in Guangzhou which was administered by *hang* merchants, and regarded people with "pure" gentry background not as competent administrators. The weak administrative ability of the gentry was reflected by another issue. The Minglun Hall (*Minglun tang*) in the Confucian Palace (*xuegong*) of Guangzhou Prefecture served as the meeting place for Guangzhou's gentry. Reportedly, there were to be six elected gentry members to be in charge of the affairs of the Minglun Hall. However, the filling up of all vacancies seldom occurred. Re-elections were not held even when half of the persons in charge had passed away.¹⁴⁴ This substantially contrasted with the increasing institutional strength of the merchants, as seen by the formation of the Commerce Office (*Shangwu gongsuo*) in 1895, the Seventy-two Guilds in 1899, the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce (*Guangdong zong shanghui*) in 1905, and the Association for Self-

were categorized as gentry for the reasons that they often got a degree (through examination or purchase), had close relationship with the local government, and, most importantly, showed no clear evidence to be engaged in any particular business. A survey of gentry activities conducted in 1910 by the Guangdong officials indicated that "gentry" were increasingly involved in business and commercial activities. See *HZRB*, 17 March, 1910.

¹⁴³ *XHRB*, 8 September, 1881.

¹⁴⁴ See *HZRB*, 11 June, 1901.



Government of Guangdong Merchants (*Yueshang zizhihui*) in 1907.¹⁴⁵ Making use of the trend of self-governance in the 1900s, the gentry formed themselves into a new institution named Study Society for Local Self-Government in Guangdong (*Guangdong difang zizhi yanjiushe*) in 1907. However, this institution was much less active than other merchant institutions in local affairs, especially in patriotic campaigns.¹⁴⁶

Charitable organizations

The street was only a small self-rule unit with limited resources and functions to perform, and the local government was far from resourceful in providing city-wide welfare services to all residents. The birth and expansion of charitable organizations filled the vacuum. Traditionally, the gentry was the primary providers and administrators of philanthropic services.¹⁴⁷ However, the rise and popularization of charitable organizations reflected a change in the relative influence of the gentry and merchants. The Aiyu Charitable Hall (*Aiyu shantang*), acknowledgedly the first charitable organization in Guangzhou, was founded in 1871.¹⁴⁸ Its establishment was completely at the initiative of the Guangzhou merchants. Zhong Jinping and Chen Ciren, the chief initiators, secured some houses from Zhong Qianjun, the Salt Commissioner. These houses were confis-

¹⁴⁵ The Commerce Office was an informal merchant institution, which was formed in 1895 for raising fund from the merchants for the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895. See *HZRB*, 5 February, 1895. The Seventy-Two Guilds were formed in response to Grand Secretary Gang Yi's call to raise an additional 1.2 million taels for the Imperial treasury. See Edward J.M. Rhoads, *China's Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895-1913*, pp.36-7. For the establishment of the next two merchant associations, see Edward J.M. Rhoads, "Merchant Associations in Canton, 1895-1911", in Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner (ed.), *The Chinese City Between Two Worlds*, pp.106-110.

¹⁴⁶ This institution was actively involved in relief work for natural disasters and helping the poor. For example, see *HZRB*, 26 and 29 June, 1908.

¹⁴⁷ For example, see Raymond David Lum, *Philanthropy and Public Welfare in Late Imperial China*, p.55.

¹⁴⁸ There is evidence of earlier establishments. It is reported that a Hui'ai Clinic (*Hui'ai yiguan*) was founded in 1854 in Xiguan. Compared to Aiyu, this institution was specialized in nature, and concentrated on the provision of free medical services to the residents. See *Xia'er guanzhen*, no.3, March, 1855, pp.12b-13a.



cated properties previously owned by Pan Shicheng, a Hong merchant. Lu Gengyang, an overseas Chinese doing business in America, donated land along the northern bank of the Pearl River to the Aiyu Hall. The Hall was modeled after the Pushan Hall of Shanghai.¹⁴⁹ Its nature as a merchant organization was clearly shown by its system of management. For each year, two *hangs* would be elected as directors and the two *hangs* which had just retired would serve as deputies.¹⁵⁰ Other big charitable organizations in Guangzhou were also backed up by merchants. For example, the Chongzheng Charitable Hall was heavily supported by the silver *hang*.¹⁵¹ The Guangji Hospital stipulated that shops under its domain should make annual contributions.¹⁵²

The new charitable organizations were different from government-supported charities, such as the Foundling Hospital, in view of the wide scope of their philanthropic activities. Burial, clinical service, free education and smallpox vaccination were only some examples of services provided by these charities.

The expansion of charitable organizations was facilitated essentially by large-scale

¹⁴⁹ For the establishment of the Aiyu Charitable Hall, see Liang Dingfen, *et al*, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.21, pp.25b-26b; Gui Dian, *et al*, *Xuxiu Nanhai xianzhi* (1910), vol.6, pp.10b-11a; Huang Foyi, *Guangzhou chengfang zhi*, p.455.

¹⁵⁰ Aiyu Hall claimed that only the ten biggest *hangs* were eligible for the election. However, there were more than ten *hangs* on the list of directors in reality in spite of some overlapping from year to year. The following list shows the titles of *hangs* serving as Aiyu's directors in some years.

1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1894	1895	1897
Pearl hang	Beijiang	Rice hang	Tobacco	Beijing fruit	Nanbei hang	Paint hang	Silver hang	Sandal hang
Jade hang	hang	Oil hang	hang	hang	Paint hang	Fruit hang	Wheat hang	Native silk hang
Duck hang		Book hang	Fruit hang					


Beijiang literally means “north river” and refers to the Yangzi River, and the *Beijing* *hang* dealt with daily articles such as bamboo and wooden products presumably manufactured in places along the Yangzi River.

Nanbei literally means “north and south”. The *Nanbei* *hang* dealt with commodities of various kinds, primarily rice, herbal medicine and dry food.

(Sources: *XHRB*, 30 November, 1880; 20 December, 1881; 21 December, 1882; 19 December, 1884; 8 December, 1885; *HZRB*, 10 December, 1895; 3 March, 1897)

¹⁵¹ *HZRB*, 6 April, 1897.

¹⁵² *HZRB*, 18 November, 1897.



disasters that occurred during the Guangxu era. They devoted much efforts in relieving suffering and in turn built up a good reputation in the community.¹⁵³ The most notable example was the charitable organizations' involvement in saving life in the 1894 plague which swept through Guangzhou.¹⁵⁴ Some Xiguan merchants formed the Fangbian Club (*fangbian suo*) specially for the purpose of providing medical services to the victims. The Fangbian Club later evolved into the Fangbian Hospital and became leader of the “nine charitable halls”.¹⁵⁵

The expansion of the new charities, and their provision of needed services to the residents marked a trend towards specialization and municipalization. Besides the above example of fighting plague, the “cheap rice” campaign was equally illustrative. In the 1880s, the responsibility of providing cheap rice was reportedly assumed by eight parties, namely *hangs* merchants, county governments, public bodies (such as village associations and schools), government organs which generated incomes (such as the Customs, office of the Provincial Administrator, and so on), temples, rich merchants, salt merchants and family members.¹⁵⁶ The task was centralized in the 1900s by the “nine charitable halls” which regularized administration in an expert manner.

Though charitable organizations in Guangzhou came a bit later than those in Shanghai and Hong Kong, their strength grew even faster.¹⁵⁷ Before the establishment


¹⁵³ For the efforts of providing relief by the charitable organizations, see *XHRB*, 12 March, 1881; 29 June, 3 and 10 July, 1885. Also see Li Huichuan, “Guangzhou ge gongyi shetuan gaikuang”, *Guangzhou wenshi zilliao*, no.22, April 1981, pp.195-210.

¹⁵⁴ For the 1894 plague and the efforts of the charitable organizations in saving life, see Carol Benedict, *Bubonic Plague in Nineteenth-Century China*, pp.134-5; *Panyu xian xuzhi*, vol.44, pp.8b-9a.

¹⁵⁵ See Deng Yusheng, *Quan Yue shehui shilu*, “Fangbian yiyuan”, p.1a; Lu Yu, “Guangzhou de Fangbian Yiyuan”, *Guangdong wenshi zilliao*, no.8, June 1963, pp.139-50.

¹⁵⁶ *XHRB*, 27 July, 1880.

¹⁵⁷ Most of the important charitable organizations in Shanghai were formed before the Aiyu Hall. See Yu Yue, et al, *Tongzhi Shanghai xianzhi* (1882), vol.2, pp.21a-28a. In Hong Kong, the Tung Wah Hospital was formed in 1869, two years before the establishment of the Aiyu Hall. See Elizabeth Sinn, *Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital, Hong Kong*.



of the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce, they functioned as *de facto* merchant chambers which represented their interests and served as an intermediary between the government and the merchants.¹⁵⁸ It is noteworthy that it was these charitable organizations which mobilized the merchants to establish the official Chambers of Commerce, in response to the central government's order for establishing chambers of commerce in the locality.¹⁵⁹ Charitable organizations became the places where merchants looked for advice and leadership, and they were also indispensable to the government in mobilizing the merchants.¹⁶⁰ By the late nineteenth century, their significance was recognized by both the government and the community, and they were praised by the *Huazi ribao* as Guangdong's "mini-assemblies".¹⁶¹ Their strength was partially reflected by the amalgamation of a number of larger and more influential halls into the so-called "nine charitable halls".¹⁶²

The above discussion fits Edward J.M. Rhoads' observation of charitable organizations. He argues that "it was the merchants who principally financed and directed the charitable institutions", and that philanthropy was important in building up a "city-wide


¹⁵⁸ The charitable organizations arranged loans to merchants. They also petitioned the government on behalf of the merchants, mediated in conflicts between *hangs*, and advised the government on the taxation policies. See *XHRB*, 28 May, 1884; *HZRB*, 1 November, 1895; 27 July, 1897; 7 March, 1911.

¹⁵⁹ See *HZRB*, 24 August, 8 September, 22 and 27 October, 1903; 25 January, 24 March, 1905.

¹⁶⁰ *HZRB*, 23 July, 1903. Merchants suggested that a "Commercial Charitable Hall" (*Shangwu shantang*) be established to specialize in commercial affairs. The application of the title "charitable hall" on a commercial organization reflected the importance of charitable organizations for the merchants.

¹⁶¹ *HZRB*, 19 August, 1897.

¹⁶² The "nine charitable halls" referred to the Aiyu Charitable Hall, Guangji Hospital, Guangren Charitable Hall, Fangbian Hospital, Runshen Society, Huixing Charitable Hall, Shushan Hall, Mingshan Hall and Chongzheng Charitable Hall. Later, the inclusion of Renji Hospital produced the new term of "ten charitable halls". Runshen was situated in Dongguan, Fangbian in the northern Inner City, Huixing in the Outer City, Guangji in Nanguan, and the rest in Xiguan. See Gui Dian, *et al*, *Xuxiu Nanhai xianzhi* (1910), vo.6, p.12a; *HZRB*, 24 February, 1906; 14 June, 1910.



cooperation” of the merchants.¹⁶³ In reality, the real picture of charitable organizations in Guangzhou was much more complicated. The charitable organizations, especially those larger ones which provided services of a wide variety, showed strong dependence on official support. Governmental influence was exerted in several ways. When they were established, the charitable organizations had to be registered before the magistrates who would send soldiers to protect the charities from threats and bandits.¹⁶⁴ Financial assistance was another important aspect. The government sponsored the operation of many charities such as the Fuchu Society, Fangbian Club and Renji Clinic.¹⁶⁵ Even the Aiyu Hall received money from the government.¹⁶⁶ Charitable organizations faced financial hardship in launching the “cheap rice” campaigns, and their financial strength would never have recovered if the local government had not made generous financial support. The Shushan Hall, one of the “nine charitable halls”, received thirty thousand *taels* of silver from the government in 1904 to repay the heavy debts incurred in the “cheap rice” campaign.¹⁶⁷ On many occasions, relief work for other provinces was demanded by the government, and the charities made active response.¹⁶⁸ Thus the bigger

¹⁶³ Edward J.M. Rhoads, “Merchant Associations in Canton, 1895-1911”, in Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner, *The Chinese City Between Two Worlds*, p.104.


¹⁶⁴ For example, the Aiyu Charitable Hall was registered by the Guangzhou Prefect. See Gui Dian, et al., *Xuxiu Nanhai xianzhi* (1910), vol.6, p.10b. Also see *HZRB*, 14 October, 1897.

¹⁶⁵ See *XHRB*, 17 and 21 January, 1882; 20 November, 1883. This Fangbian Club, which was situated in Dongguan, was different from the Fangbian Hospital of the “nine charitable halls” in Honam. Actually there were many charities in Guangzhou, especially the smaller ones, bearing the same titles. For example, there was another Fangbian Club in Xiguan. The title Renji was used by at least three charitable institutions, one in Honam, one in the Inner City and one in Dongguan. See *XHRB*, 20 November, 1884; *HZRB*, 8 July, 1897; 20 October, 1908.

¹⁶⁶ When the Aiyu was established, Zhong Jinping, the Salt Commissioner, donated 4,000 taels. Another donation was made by the local government after a wind disaster in 1879. See Gui Dian, et al., *Xuxiu Nanhai xianzhi* (1910), vol.6, p.10b; Liu Kunyi, *Liu Kunyi yiji*, vol.2, pp.512-3.

¹⁶⁷ *HZRB*, 9 June, 1904.

¹⁶⁸ For example, relief work for Henan in 1895, Zhejiang flooding in 1897, Beijing poor in 1901 after the Boxer Uprising, and Anhui flooding in 1901 were all initiated and supervised by the government, though the charitable organizations were the primary force of mobilization. See *HZRB*, 18 September, 1895; 21 May, 1897; 25 March, 20 November, 1901.



charities, whose devotion to extensive services exhausted their limited resources, always maintained close working relationship with the local government in order to gain stable financial support.

These bigger charities even degenerated into merely assistants of the local government on specific occasions. For example, the government took the initiative in the “cheap rice” campaign in the early 1910s because the charities were too depleted to be the sole administrators of the campaign. Officials such as the Provincial Administer and the *daotai* of the Circuit of Economic Promotion chaired the campaign which was completely funded by the government. It was even decided that areas not under the jurisdiction of the Police would not benefit from the campaign.¹⁶⁹

It was the financial limitation of the large charities that fostered the emergence of small charities with greater independence and flexibility. Compared with the “nine charitable halls”, small charities were much more numerous and flexible. While about half of the “nine charitable halls” were located in Xiguan where merchant influence was prominent, and, as some sources argued, in the Nanhai half of the city, small charities could be found everywhere in the walled city and suburbs.¹⁷⁰ Table 5.1 provides a rough impression of the wide distribution of the smaller charities.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ *HZRB*, 12 August, 1910; 30 March, 29 April, 1911.

¹⁷⁰ For the strength of the merchants in the Nanhai half of the city, see the account in *HZRB*, 1 June, 1910.

¹⁷¹ This summary is based on the following materials: *XHRB*, 16 and 27 December, 1880; 2 February, 12 November, 31 December, 1881; 18 August, 1882; 30 June, 20 November, 1883; 1 February, 20 November, 1884; 9 January, 1886; *HZRB*, 5 March, 9 April, 1895; 8 July, 14 October, 29 November, 1897; 20 February, 16 May, 1902; 8 April, 1903; 23 May, 1904; 15 August, 1906; 29 August, 1907; 30 July, 20 October, 1908; 19 July, 1910; *Guangzhou shi Tianhe qu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi* (ed.), *Tianhe dashiji*, p.8; Liang Dingfen, et al, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.20, pp.34a-b; vol.24, pp.16b-17a; *Guangzhou shi Liwan qu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui* (ed.), *Guangzhou shi Liwan qu zhi*, p.623; Li Huichuan, “Guangzhou ge gongyi shetuan gaikuang”, *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao*, no.22, April 1981, pp.206-7.



Table 5.1 The location of some small charitable organizations in Guangzhou


Inner City	Gongshan Hall, Jishan Hall, Hua'ai Clinic (branch), Hua'ai Clinic (branch), Renji Clinic, Shengshan Hall, Mingshan Hall, Guangxing Charitable Hall, Zuile Charitable Hall, Shenggongcao Hall
Honam	Fangbian Hospital, Renji Hospital, Zanyu Charitable Society
Dongguan	Fangbian Club, Renji Charitable Hall, Leshan Hospital, Zunsheng Charitable Hall
Nanguan	Shoushi Charitable Hall, Yongchang Charitable Society
Xiguan	Hua'ai Clinic, Fangbian Club, Leshan Hall, Guangji Infant Hospital, Parturition Relief Society, Four Temples Charitable Hall, Zhide Infant Hospital, Huichun Charitable Hall, Lian'an Charitable Society, Aiqun Charitable Hall
Unlocated	Cuxin Hall, Fuchu Hall, Quanjie Hall, Chongben Charitable Hall, Jianshan Hall, Relief Society for the Poor and Widows

The wide distribution of small charitable organizations throughout the city refutes Edward Rhoads' assertion that "the charitable institutions were located in the Western and Southern suburbs."¹⁷² This wide distribution was matched by the diverse backgrounds of the persons in charge. Most of these small charities were funded and run by petty-merchants who were scattered throughout the city. Others were run by gentry or merchants with gentry background, especially in the walled city where gentry power was traditionally strong. Gentry's involvement in these charitable halls, such as in the case of the Relief Society for the Poor and Widows, showed that they tried to root out those corrupt welfare institutions established by the government.¹⁷³ Still others were formed by persons in charge of temples, such as the Four Temples Charitable Hall.¹⁷⁴ Whenever a new charity was established, the initiators would justify its creation as a response to

¹⁷² Edward J.M. Rhoads, "Merchant Associations in Canton, 1895-1911", in Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner, *The Chinese City Between Two Worlds*, p.104. Some other literatures share the viewpoints of Rhoads. For example, see Michael Tsin, *The Cradle of Revolution: Politics and Society in Canton, 1900-1927*, p.38.

¹⁷³ For the gentry's efforts, see examples in Liang Dingfen, et al, *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.19, pp.9b-11b; vol.20, pp.34a-b; vol.21, pp.25b-26b; vol.24, pp.16b-17a.

¹⁷⁴ The Four Temples Charitable Hall was run by four temples in Xiguan, namely the Sima Temple, Caishen Temple, Yiling Temple and Xishan Temple. See *Guangzhou shi Liwan qu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui* (ed.), *Guangzhou shi Liwan qu zhi*, p.623; Li Huichuan, "Guangzhou ge gongyi shetuan gaikuang", *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao*, no.22, April 1981, pp. 204-5.



those in need in a specific area which was weakly covered by other charities.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, need was a primary reason for the mushrooming of small charities in Guangzhou, and this pattern of operation conformed to the street-based administration. In other words, small charitable organizations dedicated their charitable activities to the neighborhood, and their activities were also funded by contributions made by the residents and shops within their domain. Street managers were often hired by the charities as voluntary workers, such as in the “cheap rice” campaigns.¹⁷⁶

The above understanding is important in helping us to draw up the hierarchical structure of charitable organizations in Guangzhou. Large charities represented by the “nine charitable halls” were at the upper end of the hierarchy. They were often general organizations which had relatively wide geographical coverage, as shown by their joint sponsorship of the “cheap rice” campaigns, each taking up a specific district as its domain.¹⁷⁷ They provided a wide range of social welfare including burial service, free education, medical consultation and treatment, congee distribution, disaster relief, and dyke repair for farmland, sometimes rendering such services to other places in or beyond Guangdong.¹⁷⁸ Some of these charities even provided special services, such as pediatric treatment by the Chongzheng Charitable Hall and surgery by the Huixing Charitable Hall.¹⁷⁹ Occasionally, these services were extended to non-Guangdong residents.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁵ For example, the Jishan Hall in the Inner City which was established in 1881 claimed that the poor patients would no longer need to “travel far”. *XHRB*, 12 November, 1881.

¹⁷⁶ *HZRB*, 30 October, 1902; 1 April, 1907.

¹⁷⁷ For example, the 1907 “cheap rice” campaign was jointly sponsored by the “nine charitable halls” as follows: the Inner and Outer Cities, Dongguan and Nanguan were administered by Guangren, Huixing and Runshen; Upper Xiguan, Beiguan and Pantang by Fangbian and Mingshan; Lower Xiguan, Fangcun and Huadi by Shushan and Aiyu; Honam by Guangji and Chongzheng. *HZRB*, 30 March, 1907.

¹⁷⁸ See Chen Rushen, “Jiu Guangzhou de cishan tuanti”, *Yangcheng gujin*, no.22, September, 1990, p.53; *XHRB*, 2 April, 15 and 18 June, 27 December, 1880; 12 March, 1881; *HZRB*, 2 December, 1895.

¹⁷⁹ *HZRB*, 21 July, 1897; 8 April, 1903.



These larger charities even participated in activities beyond social welfare. They employed their own armies for local defense, participated in patriotic campaigns such as the anti-American campaign in 1905 and the later campaign for regaining control of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway, and pressed the government on issues such as kidnapping, export of rice, inflation and social ethics.¹⁸¹ Their active participation in local affairs was accompanied by their close connection with the local government. Corresponding to their extensive activities, they had more diverse means of funding such as merchant donations, governmental support and even overseas sponsorship.¹⁸²

At the bottom of the hierarchy was a large number of small charitable organizations. They had less diverse sources of funding, such as the Shoushi Charitable Hall which owned a pier along the Bund.¹⁸³ Compared to the bigger charities, merchants were not the only source of financial and administrative backup, and their scope of business showed greater simplicity. Most of them specialized in one or two services, principally the provision of free education and medical service. A minority of them, such as the Parturition Relief Society, concentrated on providing one specific service. These organizations, which developed along with bigger ones, did not necessarily interact with their bigger counterparts although some of them served as agents or subordinates of bigger institutions such as the Aiyu Hall.¹⁸⁴ Comparatively speaking, they were more street-based, and functioned more purely as charitable organizations with less involvement in local affairs and with less interference from the government.

¹⁸⁰ For example, the Aiyu Hall founded a special clinic for non-Guangdong patients who were employed by any *hang*. *XHRB*, 8 March, 1883.

¹⁸¹ See *HZRB*, 7 November, 1895; 17 June, 8 October, 1897; 29 September, 1903; 19 July, 1910.

¹⁸² For example, the Fangbian Hospital sent officers to Southeast Asia to collect donations. *HZRB*, 25 December, 1907.

¹⁸³ *HZRB*, 15 October, 1909.

¹⁸⁴ For example, the Cunxin Hall was an active assistant of the Aiyu Hall. See *XHRB*, 27 December,




The above discussion provides the background information that enables us to come up with an accurate definition of charitable organizations in Guangzhou. Charitable organizations were organizations administered primarily by merchants (supplemented by gentry and local religious force), and were devoted to satisfying the basic needs of the residents through the provision of specialized or extensive social welfare free of charge. The geographical coverage of a charitable hall depended on its status and resourcefulness, but it must be confined to a specific area. Through their increasing engagement in the provision of philanthropic services, the merchants became more and more influential in social affairs. The bigger charitable organizations even became involved in local politics, although most of the “nine charitable halls” clearly stated in their regulations that they would only devote their energy to philanthropy and would not be involved in local conflicts.¹⁸⁵

Therefore, despite occasional difficulties in gaining financial resources, the strength and social influence of charitable organizations, including both the bigger and smaller ones, grew to a point that could not be neglected. After the establishment of the Republic, they were increasingly involved in non-philanthropic activities in the city. They always exerted their influence on local and even national politics. They petitioned the central government not to take side in the First World War.¹⁸⁶ Their prestige and influence on local politics could be reflected in Military Governor Long Jiguang’s forging a petition letter to President Yuan Shikai in the name of the “nine charitable halls” in 1916, in order to show the “wish of the masses” against the “National Protection Cam-

1880; 31 December, 1881.

¹⁸⁵ Deng Yusheng, *Quan Yue shehui shilu*, *passim*.

¹⁸⁶ SB, 13 June, 1914.



paign" (*huguo yundong*).¹⁸⁷

MERCHANTS' VOLUNTEER CORPS

The rising tide of revolution in the province provided an invaluable opportunity for the merchants to augment their power. The New Army Revolt in February 1910 posed a threat to the merchants who proposed to form a Merchants' Volunteer Corps (*Guangzhou shangtuan*).¹⁸⁸ Merchant institutions including the Chambers of Commerce and the Association for Self-Government of Guangdong Merchants showed enthusiastic support, and the charitable organizations were prepared to help in enlisting soldiers. The Merchants' Volunteer Corps was finally established shortly at the end of 1911.¹⁸⁹ The organization of the Corps was *hang* based. Its commander was elected among the prominent merchants of the province. Cen Bozhu, Chen Jianchi, Chen Lianbo and Jian Jinglun served as either commander or assistant-commander of the Corps, all being merchant leaders in the province.¹⁹⁰


The formation of an army or *tuanlian* in the name of the merchants produced far-reaching influence on the strength of merchant-based institutions, such as the Chambers

¹⁸⁷ Nan Yue geju: *Cong Long Jiguang dao Chen Jitang*, p.63.

¹⁸⁸ The organization of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps was only a matter of time. Records showed that the Xiguan merchants hired a government troop called *Anyong* (Army for Safety) for street defense. Some merchants were equipped with pistols for defense. A source tells that the earliest suggestion of forming a Merchants' Volunteer Corps was made in 1882 by an official called Peng Gangzhi. Governor-General Li Hongzhang initiated again in 1900. The merchants made their own proposal on the eve of the founding of the Chambers of Commerce in December, 1904, reportedly supported by Governor-General Cen Chunxuan. See *HZRB*, 22 October, 1895; 19 March, 1897; 22 December, 1904.

¹⁸⁹ Chen Xiqi, et al, *Sun Zhongshan nianpu changbian*, p.696. Li Fulin, a local militarist who had his power base in Honam, reminisced that the Merchants' Volunteer Corps of Guangzhou originated from the disbanded New Armies in Xiangshan County, Guangdong. See Li Fulin, *Li Fulin geming shiliao*, p.37. This reminiscence was supported by an account in *SB*, 22 November, 1911. Concerning the development of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps in 1910 and 1911, see *HZRB*, 18 and 22 February, 1910; 28 April, 1, 2, 4, 11, 17 May, 3 and 20 July, 14 August, 1911.

¹⁹⁰ See *HZRB*, 5 March, 1913; 27 February, 1919; *GDGB*, no.1683, 15 February, 1918, p.14.



of Commerce and the big charitable organizations. Different from the street *tuanlian*, the Corps was fully supported by the *hangs* in Guangzhou and organized much more systematically. Its patrol function not only undermined the defense function of street *tuanlian*, but also challenged the legitimacy of the local Police. It served as an indispensable force at critical times, notably during the 1915 Great Flooding when the Corps helped demolish falling houses and rescue the flood victims.¹⁹¹ This military strength helped to institutionalize the merchants in Guangzhou.

Interactions between the three levels of administration

In the previous sections, we have produced separate accounts of the three levels of administration. In reality, the administrations of different levels never remained isolated. They interacted actively with each other, producing different kinds of relationship.

Interaction between the government and streets

For the local government, the era of reform in the late Qing and the early Republic was also a period of greater participation in local affairs. The operation of new city-based bureaucratic institutions, particularly the Guangzhou Police, meant interference in areas of work undertaken by the informal administration. This threatened the interests of the street associations. The street security system was under threat, as the establishment of the Police in 1903 provided an opportunity for tearing down street gates as the police gradually replaced *tuanlian* as a city-wide security force. The residents resisted an order of demolition issued by the Police in 1910, and the Police finally yielded when the tide of revolution rose. Contrary to the original order of the Police Bureau, a “campaign” of

¹⁹¹ For the contribution made by the Corps, see HZRB, 19, 22 and 24 July, 1915. For the flooding, see Lao Yifeng, “Yimao nian Guangzhou shi shuizai”, *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao*, no.35, 1986.8,



street gate construction and reinforcement commenced after the Huanghuagang Revolt in April, 1911. The magnitude of this campaign was testified by the erection of iron gates beside the common wooden gates, reflecting no doubt a sense of insecurity among the inhabitants.¹⁹²

A strong control over the streets was deemed urgent by Military Governor Long Jiguang after the Second Revolution in 1913 to check revolutionary activities. The traditional *baojia* system was reinforced. The union of every five households was forced into a defense unit. Every street was to elect a head (*jiedong*), and such heads were placed under the Patrol Office (*Jicha gongsuo*) which was formed in 1914 to maintain public order and check revolutionary activities.¹⁹³

The street leadership could not always resist the legitimate request of the local government to make “public use” of street resources. The nightsoil money issue was a typical example. Street administration secured a kind of “nightsoil merchants” (*fengbu shangren*) to collect human waste for sale as fertilizer in the countryside. These merchants secured two kinds of contract, one with the street administration called “wet nightsoil” (*shuifen*) contract, the other with the owners of public toilets called “dry nightsoil” (*ganfen*) contract.¹⁹⁴ Available materials show that toilets were set up for nightsoil and urine separately.¹⁹⁵ Income from the sale of nightsoil produced substantial income for the operation of the streets. The sale of nightsoil profited the street in two ways. Competition between nightsoil merchants for the right of monopolizing the dis-


pp.215.

¹⁹² For the issue of street gate destruction from 1909 to 1911, see *HZRB*, 13 March, 17 April, 14 July, 18 and 25 August, 1909; 3 and 13 May, 26 and 28 June, 3 August, 1911.

¹⁹³ For the *baojia* system, see *GDGB*, no.702, 17 November, 1914, p.9; *SB*, 15 and 17 December, 1914.

¹⁹⁴ See *HZRB*, 1897.12.31; “Regulations”, *Guangzhou shi weishengju, Weisheng niankan* 1923, pp.9-12.

¹⁹⁵ There was a type of simple toilet called “urine crock” (*niaogang*) in Guangzhou before the twentieth



posal of nightsoil in a specific street always resulted in large contributions to the street administration. The nightsoil merchants also paid an additional sum of money as *yagui* (security deposit). These incomes were placed under the administration of charitable organizations, pawnshops or “reliable” merchants in the street, upon which interest accrued.¹⁹⁶ The nightsoil money attracted the attention of the local government in the 1900s. There was a proposal to make use of this money to establish kindergartens in 1902.¹⁹⁷ This proposal was rejected, but the streets in the Inner City were still ordered in the same year to contribute thirty percent of the nightsoil income for the founding of the Police Bureau.¹⁹⁸ The submission of nightsoil money became a recurring problem for the street. It was reported that the streets made silent resistance by under-reporting the income figures to the government.¹⁹⁹

The nightsoil money issue was also associated with the Police’s attempt to improve public sanitation in the city. In 1905, it was suggested by the Guangzhou Prefect, the Nanhai and Panyu Magistrates and various charitable organizations that fifty percent of the income from the sale of nightsoil would be used to support a cleaning bureau under the Police’s administration.²⁰⁰ Subsequently, cleaners received a ticket from the police

century. See *HZRB*, 25 July, 1910.

¹⁹⁶ There are few materials available on the operation of the sale of nightsoil. The brief description in the text is based on an account about two nightsoil merchants competing for the right for monopolizing the disposal of nightsoil in a street in Dongguan. See *HZRB*, 31 December, 1897.

¹⁹⁷ *HZRB*, 1 September, 11 November, 1902.

¹⁹⁸ See *HZRB*, 30 August, 1 September, 11 November, 1902.

¹⁹⁹ *HZRB*, 25 January, 1910.

²⁰⁰ The first attempt at forming a specialized cleaning bureau was made in 1891 when a cleaning company was established and chartered by the local government. Another similar organization was formed seven years later by Wei Zongbi, who was affiliated with a charitable organization called Congshan Hall. However, it was later dissolved due to financial problems and disagreement amongst the initiators. In 1901, a number of “cleaning bureaus” were set up in the city by gentry, merchants and charitable organizations. The Guangzhou Police wanted to take over the issue in 1904, by assigning policemen as part-time cleaners. For these attempts, see the Inspector General of Customs, *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc., of the Ports open to foreign commerce in China and Corea, and on the Condition and*



officers upon the completion of the cleaning job everyday; they also received a bonus if additional rubbish was collected after fulfilling the assigned quotas.²⁰¹ It turned out that the collection of rubbish became more effective than ever under the supervision of the Police Bureau. In a proclamation by the Police in 1910, the work of the cleaners was praised and the dumping of rubbish, which still persisted after the implementation of the new measures, was attributed to the street inhabitants who dumped waste and rubbish after the cleaners had finished their rounds.²⁰²


The conflict between the street administration and the local government was further intensified by the Police's decision to contract out the construction of 120 urinary toilets to the Fengheng Company, with the money obtained to supplement the dredging of ditches.²⁰³ The new urinary toilet, constructed in the form of a small cubicle to accommodate one person and intended to replace the old, turned out to be a terrible experience for the street residents. While the old ones remained, little thought was given to choosing places for the installation of the new urinary toilets. Some were erected on projected constructions over streams; and some at the middle of the road immediately in front of shops, some in streets previously with no toilets. Still worse was the solely profitmaking stand of the Fengheng Company, with no efforts to administer the toilets after their construction. The result was so nightmarish that urine spread everywhere on the streets since the vessels for urine were never emptied, and latecomers simply urinated outside the toilets. Pollution was also observed in those streams over which such toilets were

Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-91, p.564; HZRB, 27 July, 6 and 17 August, 1901; 29 January, 1902; 27 June, 22 December, 1904; 4 and 8 September, 1905. For the new system in 1905, see HZRB, 5 and 6 June, 16 September, 1 January, 1905; 4 September, 1907; 25 January, 1910.

²⁰¹ HZRB, 28 September, 1906; 25 April, 1908.

²⁰² HZRB, 11 August, 1910.

²⁰³ HZRB, 20 June, 25 July, 1910.



built. Street residents were angered because the construction was without their consent or administration. Many residents sealed up the toilets and on some occasions simply destroyed them. The workload of the Police was further increased by maintaining these toilets and teaching the residents how to use the toilets properly.²⁰⁴

Besides exploiting the resources of the streets as a whole, the government also shifted financial burdens to individual households and shops. The government regarded house contributions as a convenient source of income, and competed with the street administration in forcing inhabitants to pay extra contributions for governmental purposes. While the government's collection of such contributions was infrequent in the nineteenth century, it became regularized in the first decade of the twentieth century.²⁰⁵ The most notable example was that the day-to-day running of the Police was fundamentally maintained by the rent levies.²⁰⁶ Despite the unwillingness of the streets as shown by their slow response to such a kind of collections, both the street coffers and individual dwellers incurred great loss under governmental coercion.²⁰⁷


Although the street administration showed severe opposition to governmental intervention, the street could not escape from dwindling as the basic unit of administration.

²⁰⁴ On the issue of the installation of new urinary toilets, see *HZRB*, 31 August, 2 and 23 September, 23 and 29 December, 1910.

²⁰⁵ Under the instruction of Viceroy Mao Hongbin, the Guangzhou Prefect Mei Qizhao enforced the collection of house contribution in 1864 for the employment of soldiers and the repair of some forts outside the Dabei (Great North) Gate during the anti-Taiping campaign. Mao Chenglin (ed.), *Mao shangshu (Hongbin) zougao*, vol.2, pp.1501-7. In 1885, the Rehabilitation Bureau followed Mei's approach and initiated another collection for the coastal defense of Guangdong. For ordinary households, a contribution equivalent to two months' rental was paid to the government. *XHRB*, 3 and 6 January, 10 March, 1885. After the Boxer Uprising, the central government ordered the Guangdong authorities to assist in paying the indemnity to the Powers, and the local government shifted the burden to the residents by collecting house contribution. See *HZRB*, 22, 30 and 31 July, 1, 2 and 3, August, 1901; Liang Dingfen, et al., *Panyu xian xu zhi*, vol.9, pp.4a-8a.

²⁰⁶ *HZRB*, 4, 16 and 28 December, 1903; 23 January, 4 and 26 February, 1904.

²⁰⁷ For the slow response and resistance of the residents to the collection, see Hwei-shung Gao, "Police Administration in Canton", *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol.10, no.2, April, 1926, p.336; *HZRB*, 9, 11 and 18 October, 21 December, 1901; 29 January, 1902.




Although the streets' ability in tackling crisis did not show remarkable decline, as evidenced by the quick reconstruction and repair of street gates in 1911 in coping with the revolutionary tide, both finance and functions previously performed by streets were gradually centralized by the government. As a result, the autonomous strength of the streets was strikingly reduced.

Interaction between the streets and the merchant organizations

As street resources were constantly under the "exploitation" of the local government, street residents and administrations became increasingly dependent on the street-based charitable organizations. Charitable organizations provided needy services to the street residents, and were an important supplement to the limited functions of the street administration. Sometimes, they also assisted in the street administration by serving as coffer keepers as they had better reputation than ordinary merchants or pawnshops. Through the provision of such services, charitable organizations benefited by enlarging their sources of capital and current assets, and in turn enhancing their liquidity position.

Interaction between the government and the merchant organizations

The interaction between the government and merchants or merchant organizations produced the most complex kind of relationship. While the charitable organizations and other merchant organizations were undergoing a process of expansion, the local government also started to introduce various reforms and expand its power and activities through centralizing resources from both the street administrations and merchants. In turn, these two levels of administration competed not only in providing urban services, but also in maximizing their control of financial resources. Considering that the local government did not have enough funds to publish its own gazette, the adoption of the



principle of *juandi guigong*, that is, “turning in every cent of public money”, made it clear that the government made striking efforts to minimize the cost of operation, and inventing or manipulating every possible source of revenue to fund the expanding scope of activities.²⁰⁸

This competition for financial resources was counterbalanced by their cooperative relationship. The local government was aware of the institutional strength of merchant organizations in providing social welfare to the residents and their immense influence in local affairs as shown by the 1905 Anti-American Campaign.²⁰⁹ The government also lacked financial and administrative strength to challenge the established order of merchant organizations. For the charitable organizations, it was increasingly difficult to obtain resources. Due to the generally depressive state of economy, there were fewer donations to the charitable organizations. Sometimes, they asked the Police for help, making use of its “threatening disposition” to appeal for donations from people.²¹⁰ The best example to illustrate the insolvency of the charitable organizations was the case of the Rescue Office (*Jiuzai gongsuo*). It was formed by representatives of various charitable organizations in Guangzhou to deal with the aftermath of natural disasters. Presumably, the Office was funded by various charitable organizations. However, in 1914, after serious flooding occurred in the province, the Office organized open gambling activities to raise funds.²¹¹ In the 1915 Great Flood, the Office proposed a 1.2

²⁰⁸ In 1905, Governor-General Cen Chunxuan proposed to publish a government gazette as a means to open up the government to the public. However, the proposal was shelved due to the lack of money to hire reporters. *HZRB*, 7 July, 1905; 11 May, 1906. For *juandi guigong*, see the account in *HZRB*, 25 January, 1910, which reported that the Police urged the street organizations to contribute the nightsoil money honestly.

²⁰⁹ The *hang* merchants played an active role in the campaign. See *HZRB*, 30 May, 27 July, 2 and 11 August, 3 October, 1905.

²¹⁰ *HZRB*, 28 March, 6 December, 1918.

²¹¹ *GDGB*, no.695, 9 November, 1914, p.12.



million budget to rehabilitate the flood victims. The Office itself could only make up 0.2 million. Charitable organizations in Hong Kong, including Tung Wah, contributed another 0.2 million, and the rest had to be financed by the local government.²¹²

Impact of the three levels of administration on urban construction

The local government did not see urban construction purely as a means to improve people's livelihood and the living environment. The improvement of infrastructure, which has been discussed in detail in the preceding chapter, was largely associated with and even originated from the practice of cost minimization and revenue maximization. In the late Qing, many infrastructural projects in Guangzhou were contracted out to merchants to save money and more importantly to gain contributions from the merchants. Therefore, merchants not only contributed to the government coffer as tax farmers, but also helped to modernize the city as project initiators. However, this cooperative relationship between the merchants and government was tarnished by the government's frequent complaints over the amount of contributions made by the merchants. It was exactly due to this grievance that the Rehabilitation Bureau and the Bund Bureau refused to grant the merchants a franchise to operate rickshaws near the completion of Dongchuan Road and Dongsha Road.²¹³ Merchants were used to offering sizable contributions to the government to back up their proposals, such as the proposals they made in 1901 for the construction of the Bund, which the initiators promised to assign sixty percent of the revenue to the government.²¹⁴ As stated above, the Bund project was

²¹² GDGB, no.992, 30 October, 1915, p.9.

²¹³ See HZRB, 18 August, 1906; 21 December, 1908. Yang Youjian, who applied to contract the operation of rickshaws on Dongchuan Road for ten years, proposed to pay an annual contribution of 1,600 dollars. The Rehabilitation Bureau regarded the amount of contribution as too small and rejected Yang's application.

²¹⁴ HZRB, 7 March, 13 June, 1901.




placed under the government's administration due to anticipating huge profits, but the desire for quick income induced the Bund Bureau to re-consider contracting the project to merchants. A proposal was made promising a contribution of 0.3 million dollars on securing the Bund contract although it was subsequently aborted.²¹⁵

As a result, the local government was highly selective in taking over infrastructural projects, and the fate of many infrastructural projects rested on the participation of merchants. The Pearl River Bridge Project, which was a crucial component of the 1907 Planning was halted after the death of Liu Xiangqing, the initiator, and the government had no intention to take over the project. As no merchants showed interest in applying for the project, the Pearl River Bridge remained an unrealized dream in Qing Guangzhou.

The widespread street administrations heavily influenced the pattern of road construction before the establishment of the Municipal Office in 1918. As the street residents were bothered by the increasing intervention of the local government, they showed resistance to any road construction projects which involved the re-construction of existing streets. A good example was the resistance to the widening of Yonghan Road in 1912-1913, as mentioned in the preceding chapter. The avoidance of large-scale opposition by street residents explained why new roads such as the Bund, Dongsha Road and Dongchuan Road connecting the Great East Gate and Chuanlongkou, as well as new modes of transportation (including rickshaws and horse carts) were found along the city boundary where mature street-level power was minimal.²¹⁶ It also partly explains why the gentry and merchants initiated the demolition of city walls as this would not be subject to the intervention of street organizations.

²¹⁵ HZRB, 30 September, 12, 18 and 25 November, 10 December, 1904.



Conclusion

In the era of reform and revolution, all the three levels of administration functioned as agents of modernization to some extent. However, they did not undergo balanced developments. The top- and middle-level administrations underwent the most vigorous expansion in the late Qing and the early Republic, while the bottom-level administration, that is, the street, dwindled substantially. This shift of balance reflected a change in the concept of the “public”. The three levels of administration represented two domains of the concept, that is, “public” based on the streets and that based on the city as a whole. These two “public” domains conflicted with each other and resulted in competition between the different levels of administration. The nightsoil money issue was a good illustration of the conflict of the concepts of “public”. While the government claimed that the submission of nightsoil money for cleansing purpose should be used for the interest of the entire city, the street administration maintained that the retention of such money was crucial for administrative purposes at the street level. Therefore, when the local government exerted stronger control over society and implemented city-wide construction programs, it had difficulty reallocating resources. The role of local government became weaker as merchant organizations, particularly charitable organizations, competed with the local government as “city-wide” administrators. As a result, the local government always gave up reform policies. The following statement proposing the stoppage of reforms, made by Governor-General Zhang Mingqi in 1911, was representative:

“The income of Guangdong Province (including that for local and national purposes), amounts to about twenty-six or twenty-seven million [*taels*]. The burden on the people is indeed very great. In recent years, there are many reforms. The local authorities endeavor in this business, causing financial deficits.... Even if the reforms are to be continued grudgingly, their effectiveness is doubtful. We have no certainty about their results in the locality. Resources


²¹⁶ For the construction of Dongchuan Road, see *HZRB*, 12 May, 1909; 10 June, 1910.



may be exhausted before the results are seen.... Money shall be saved for the organization of *tuanlian* to protect the locality and eliminate banditry. The burden on the people should be reduced, so as to improve the people's livelihood.”²¹⁷

As a result, the local government only provided some basic services such as safeguarding local order. As the city, especially the walled city, was experiencing drastic decline, urban construction could not be suspended eternally. It is mentioned in the preceding section that merchant organizations were conscious that they were far from resourceful in undertaking massive construction in spite of their widespread influence in the city. Merchants' dependence on the bureaucracy, coupled with the trend of municipalization represented by the emergence of city-based institutions formed by the local government, foretold that change in city administration for further urban construction must come from the bureaucracy. The establishment of the Municipal Office in 1918 was such an attempt.

²¹⁷ HZRB, 18 October, 1911.



Chapter Six

The Municipal Office, 1918-1920

The year 1918 was a milestone in the urban history of Guangzhou. Eleven years after the first proposal for demolishing the city walls and constructing a network of roads in Guangzhou was raised, a determined effort was made in 1918 to materialize this splendid urban project. The task was undertaken by a new institution called the Municipal Office of Guangzhou City (*Guangzhou shi shizheng gongsuo*) which was formed specially for the purpose of municipal construction. It was the first city-level administrative institution of Guangzhou responsible for the construction of roads, tramway, markets and so forth. During its brief existence from 1918 to 1920, it brought about fundamental changes to the urban landscape and to the traditional conservatism of the Guangzhou residents. More importantly, the experience of the Municipal Office served as a prelude to a more revolutionary change, namely, the subsequent formation of the Guangzhou Municipality, which was China's first municipality.

We know very little about this important institution. Quite a number of Chinese works on Guangzhou history mention this institution briefly, but ignore its significance for the subsequent urban development of Guangzhou.¹ These works seldom provide accurate information as regards the date of its establishment and the persons in charge of the key posts.² The lack of research on this important topic is possibly associated

¹ See Yang Wanxiu and Zhong Zhuo'an, *Guangzhou jianshi*, p.388; Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng Guangzhou shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiuhui (ed.), *Guangzhou bainian dashi ji*, p.176.


² Common errors include the assertions that the Municipal Office only had one director instead of two; and that it was formed in November, 1918 instead of October. The actual time of demolishing the city wall was also inaccurate. For example, see *Guangzhou shizhengfu xinshu luocheng jinian zhuankan*, p.6; *Guangzhou zhinan* (1934), p.112; *Xin Guangzhou gailan*, p.8; *Canton: Its Port, Industries and Trade*, p.6.



with the extraordinary status of Guangzhou in the 1910s. To most historians, Guangzhou was important because of its centrality in the political conflicts with the northern regime, and the struggles between the Guangxi warlords, Sun Yatsen and other political factions within the “Constitution-Protection Government” (*hufa zhengfu*). Although the Municipal Office re-developed the city proper and laid down a good foundation for more radical changes in the subsequent decades, its efforts were not appreciated primarily because of its association with the hated rule of the Guangxi warlords in Guangdong. For example, Wu Zunshan, who was a representative serving in an anti-Guangxi warlord conference, wrote an essay in late 1920 labeling the work of the Municipal Office as evidence of the Guangxi power-holders’ evil activities in Guangdong.³ Researchers are discouraged from attempting an in-depth study of the history of this important institution in view of the lack of systematic publications released by the Municipal Office. Yet, the experience of the Municipal Office was an important missing link in the evolution of the city.

In this chapter on the urban evolution of Guangzhou in the period 1918-20, we will examine the following questions: Why was the Municipal Office founded in a period during which Guangdong was ruled by non-Guangdong people, that is, the Guangxi warlords? What factors led the provincial government to initiate municipal reform? In what ways was municipal reform related to previous reform proposals? What were the institutional characteristics of the Municipal Office? Although the Guangzhou residents, especially the merchant leaders, had previously supported urban reform and construction, why did they see municipal reform as harmful to their interests and in turn conduct city-wide and nation-wide opposition to it? While previous re-

³ Tan Weizhong, *Gengshen Yue ren quzei shimo ji*, p.144.



form efforts were always given up when confronted with opposition, why did the Municipal Office still adopt resolute measures in the face of large-scale opposition? In what ways did the brief experience of the Municipal Office lay a foundation for the subsequent inauguration of the Guangzhou Municipality which introduced more radical and comprehensive policy on urban construction?

The origins of the Municipal Office

Inadequacy of the official version

In a communication to the Military Government in September, 1920, the Guangdong Military and Civil Governors recalled the need of municipal construction when Guangzhou became the capital city of the southern regime in 1917:

“Guangdong is an important coastal region where trade with foreign countries is active. The Guangzhou-Hankou and Sichuan-Hankou Railways will soon be opened. Guangzhou is actually the largest trading port in south China. It became a capital city after the Military Government was established there. If there is no drastic municipal reform, our might will not be shown and further development will be hindered.”⁴

This document illuminates the change in the political status of Guangzhou after the Constitution-Protection Campaign was launched, one of the background factors for the founding of the Municipal Office. Moreover, the Campaign was launched in August, 1917, but the Municipal Office was not formed until October of the following year. Further documentation is needed to explain the correlation between the change of Guangzhou’s political status and the founding of the Municipal Office.

One justification for the establishment of the Municipal Office was related to the livelihood of the Bannermen. After the downfall of the Qing Dynasty, the Bannermen in Guangzhou lost both political privileges and the means of livelihood. To help the

⁴ Jun zhengfu gongbao, xiu no.212, 25 September, 1920, p.26.



impoverished Bannermen who were no longer subsidized by the government, a proposal was raised in August, 1918 by Yang Yongtai, Head of the Finance Department, and Wei Bangping, Head of the Police Department.⁵ It suggested selling all public property in the Bannermen's zone located in the western half of the Inner City. The revenue so obtained would be used for funding the livelihood of the Bannermen and for developing commercial activities in the Bannermen's zone by demolishing the adjacent city wall, thus improving its transportation links with the prosperous area of Xiguan. In addition, a large textile factory would be constructed to provide employment for the jobless Bannermen.⁶ According to archival materials, this proposal directly led to the creation of the Municipal Office in October of the same year, but it does not adequately explain later developments.⁷ Firstly, the income from the sale of public property in the Bannermen's zone was exclusively used for municipal construction, and none of it was used for the relief of the Bannermen themselves.⁸ Therefore, the Bannermen in Guangzhou protested vigorously.⁹ Secondly, the question of the Bannermen's livelihood was intentionally ignored after the formation of the Municipal Office. According to the first draft of the *Regulations of the Municipal Office of Guangzhou City* (hereafter known as *Regulations of the Municipal Office*), the General Division of the


⁵ The Bannermen's Livelihood Office (*Baqi shengji chu*) was formed after the downfall of the Qing Dynasty to maintain the livelihood of Bannermen in Guangzhou. The Office was abolished during Long Jiguang's rule, but a Bannermen's Livelihood Commissioner was appointed instead. However, these attempts resulted in failure, as the policies were always unacceptable to the Bannermen. For example, a proposal was raised in June, 1918 to the effect that the Bannermen might privatize their leased houses on condition of a contribution equivalent to 150 times the rent they paid, and that sum of money would be used to subsidize the livelihood of poorer Bannermen. See *GDGB*, no.920, 5 August, 1915, p.27; *HZRB*, 28 June, 1918; 11 September, 1918.

⁶ For the proposals, see *HZRB*, 29 August and 17 September, 1918.

⁷ See *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan*: 4-01/1/263-1 & 2, "Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo".

⁸ This was admitted by Wei Bangping, one the directors of the Municipal Office. *HZRB*, 15 December, 1920.

⁹ See *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan*: 4-01/1/263-2, "Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo".




Municipal Office was assigned the task of “taking care of the livelihood of the Bannermen”, but this was changed to “dealing with the public and private property of the Bannermen” in subsequent versions of the *Regulations*.¹⁰ The management of the Bannermen’s property did not necessarily lead to the improvement of their livelihood. Thirdly, the geographical scope of municipal construction went far beyond the boundary of the Bannermen’s zone from the very establishment of the Municipal Office.

The unbalanced development of the city of Guangzhou: a key to the issue

The work of the Municipal Office concentrated on the demolition of the city wall and the construction of modern roads, but the extant literature seldom emphasizes that such work was solely concerned with the area *within* the walled city, especially the Bannermen’s zone as reflected in the above proposal. Recognition of this fact is important to help us to understand that the need for undertaking radical construction projects in the walled city reflected the unbalanced development of the city of Guangzhou.

This unbalanced development could be traced to the late Qing. As shown in Chapter Four, most of the physical transformation of the city took place beyond the city walls, notably in Xiguan and the Bund. In the decade before the establishment of the Municipal Office, the Bund underwent the greatest development compared with other districts of the city. Even before the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, it had already developed into the most prosperous district of Guangzhou where theaters and brothels were concentrated.¹¹ The last section of the Bund was completed in 1914. This brought further prosperity to the Bund since it became the first cross-city road in Guangzhou. This road stretched from the Kowloon-Canton Railway station in Dashan-

¹⁰ See Guangzhou shi dang’anguan: 4-01/1/263-1 & 3, “Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo”.



tou to eastern Shamian. It was fifty feet wide and 2.25 miles long, and was the longest and broadest road in the city.¹² A system of new roads running parallel to the Bund was also constructed, such as those at the East Bund.¹³ Therefore, the Bund had become the traffic center of the city. Its role in external and intra-city communications, as reflected by the numerous piers along the Bund as well as the numerous rickshaws and automobiles, contributed much to the rise of the Bund's land value.¹⁴ As a result, various industries and professions competed to erect buildings there. Modern and high-rise towers mushroomed along the Bund. Department stores such as Sincere and Daxin chose the Bund as the site for of their Guangzhou headquarters. Daxin's 12-storey concrete building, erected on the western end of the Bund and equipped with sophisticated lifts, was the tallest building in south China and a symbol of Guangzhou.¹⁵ This modern urban landscape gave much pride to both the local government and the Guangzhou residents. There was a tendency that the Bund would substitute Xiguan as the most prosperous commercial center of Guangzhou.

The creation of the Bund and its prosperity marked the local government's successful attempt at urban modernization. In a communication to the local government, the Director of the Guangzhou Maritime Customs Service made a highly complimentary appraisal of this "showcase" development, and suggested that the local government


¹¹ HZRB, 1 November, 1911.

¹² The Inspectorate General of Customs, "Southern and Frontier Ports", *China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc, of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1912-21* (vol.4), pp.200-1.

¹³ GDGB, no.831, 22 April, 1915, p.19.

¹⁴ The first automobile in Guangzhou was seen on the Bund in 1916. Edward Bing-Shuey Lee, *Modern Canton*, p.5.

¹⁵ Lin Jinzhi and Zhuang Weiji (ed.), *Jindai Huqiao touzi guo nei qiye shi ziliaoxuanbian (Guangdong juan)*, pp.549, 563.



should take great care in the construction and maintenance of piers.¹⁶ The Government Property Clearance Office, responsible for pier management, immediately responded to this request and stipulated that people who constructed or repaired piers should report to the Office. Strict construction regulations were implemented there. For streets with over-hangs, gates were prohibited along the pavements in order not to obstruct traffic flow on the Bund.¹⁷

As shown in Chapter Four, the construction of the Bund was incorporated as one component of an imaginative planning drawn in the last years of the Qing to modernize Guangzhou. The failure to implement the details of the planning led to faster decline of the walled city in contrast to the development of its outskirts. Even some traditional functions of the walled city showed decline. For example, there were many guildhalls (*huiguan*) and hostels in the walled city of Guangzhou to accommodate the multitude of candidates sitting for the Civil Service Examination.¹⁸ After the suspension of the Civil Service Examinations in 1905, many hostels moved to the Bund and Xiguan. Commerce declined in the walled city. It became a purely administrative center where most of the government offices were seated. It was geographically isolated from the Bund and Xiguan where commercial prosperity and transport convenience made them the real heart of the city. The walled city's communication with these districts was further cut off as the city wall gates were always closed during the frequent political turmoils in the 1910s.

The walled city's decline was also due to the power-holders' preoccupation with wiping out revolutionary activities. They paid little attention to improving conditions

¹⁶ *GDGB*, no.1006, 16 November, 1915, pp.12-3.

¹⁷ *HZRB*, 12 December, 1913.

¹⁸ *Guangzhou difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui*, *Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.6, pp.596-7.



within the city wall, and made extraordinary efforts to strengthen the military garrison of the walled city. For example, Military Governor Long Jiguang constructed thick cross-street walls to isolate his residence from his neighborhood.¹⁹ He even ordered the removal of residents in certain streets, such as Houxiang Street, for security reasons.²⁰ Special police and military forces were stationed in the walled city.²¹ Some people carrying cameras in the walled city were arrested for taking photos of Yuexiu Hill which was a major garrison point in the city.²² The local government firmly rejected a merchant's proposal to build a road near the Dabei (Great North) Gate, which was adjacent to Yuexiu Hill, on the ground that this was not a busy commercial district.²³

The over-emphasis on the strategic importance of the walled city, together with the fast development of its outskirts, had a disastrous effect on urban development. The frequent closures and irregular opening hours of the city gates paralyzed commercial activities within the city as all shops suspended their business during the closure of the city gates.²⁴ Street gates in the walled city, many of which were demolished after the 1911 Revolution, were re-installed during the reign of Military Governor Long Jiguang, and temporary forts along the streets were built when street warfares broke out.²⁵ Patrol by soldiers during Long Jiguang's rule greatly reduced the flow of people on the streets; shops were compelled to shut down much earlier; and hawkers were

¹⁹ *HZRB*, 8 September, 1913.

²⁰ *HZRB*, 15 February, 1916.


²¹ For example, see *GDGB*, no.1705, 13 March, 1918, p.1.

²² *HZRB*, 19 July, 1916.

²³ *HZRB*, 13 November, 1913.

²⁴ *HZRB*, 1 August, 1916.

²⁵ For information of the city wall gates, street gates and forts, see *SB*, 3 September, 1913; *HZRB*, 2 September, 20 October, 18 December, 1913; 1 January, 1914; 13 January, 11 May, 1916;



cleared from the streets.²⁶ The repressive policies adopted in the walled city produced a sense of insecurity, and many people simply moved out. It was only during the 1915 “Great Flood” that numerous victims moved from the low-lying Xiguan to the Inner City that was built on higher land.²⁷ The continual emigration of residents made the walled city decline further. It lost much wealth and able street administrators. The carrying out of ordinary street functions was hampered. Left unattended, many century-old mud houses, especially those located in the Bannermen’s zone, collapsed in the rain, causing many casualties.²⁸ The Gongbei Tower, a famous monument standing in the middle of Yonghan Street, was in danger of collapsing due to the lack of maintenance.²⁹ The loss of street wealth also worsened sanitary conditions in the walled city, and the place suffered from frequent epidemics.³⁰

After the governorships of Hu Hanmin and Chen Jiongming in the early 1910s, the local government seldom discussed urban problems in the walled city. However, the sale of public property by the local government provided some information on the relative conditions in different districts in the city. The methodology of our analysis is based on the assumption that the sale of public property by the local government was a profit-oriented activity. While the local government had a long list of properties in hand in various parts of the city, including the Inner City, the Outer City and the Bund, it could only make profitable deals by selling properties located on sites with the greatest traffic convenience and resale potentials.

²⁶ Guangzhou shi shizhengting, *Guangzhou yangtze shilue*, p.60.


²⁷ HZRB, 10 January, 1914.

²⁸ HZRB, 14 and 21 July, 1915.

²⁹ HZRB, 7 August, 1920.

³⁰ GDGB, no.1285, 17 October, 1916, p.1.

³⁰ “Canton Trade Report”, *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1914*, p.1002.




The local government was a big landowner. As the walled city was Guangzhou's traditional administrative center, there was much public property owned by the local government. The local government also possessed land of other districts in the city through confiscation and creation (such as the Bund). Incomes from the sale of public property constituted a substantial source of revenue. Therefore, the local government always ignored orders of the central government stipulating that such incomes should be categorized as a kind of national income.³¹ The local government during Long Jiguang's rule sold public property to the private sector at very low prices.³² Most of the liquidated public properties were located in Xiguan or along the banks of the Pearl River including the Bund, Huadi and Fangcun, all of which were easily accessible. Public property for sale inside the city wall usually received little attention in auctions in spite of repeated advertisements before auctions.³³

In 1916, the local government conducted a lucky draw, using public property as prizes. Both the first and second prize winners would be granted property located at Haizhu which was a commercial center on the Bund. The third, fourth and fifth prize winners would be awarded property located in the Outer City immediately inside the city wall.³⁴ Both groups of property were reasonably accessible although the second group of property was comparatively less accessible due to the barrier of the city wall. It is noteworthy that the government did not select public property in the Inner City as prizes because they were too remote from the Bund. The sale of the land where the

³¹ For submitting revenue from the sale of public property to the central government, see *HZRB*, 12 November and 4 December, 1915.

³² See *HZRB*, 29 November, 1913; 12 July and 28 September, 1916; *GDGB*, no.587, 3 July, 1919, advertisement p.1.

³³ *HZRB*, 23, January, 1915; *GDGB*, no.587, 3 July, 1914, advertisement pp.1-4; no.738, 30 December, 1914, pp.23-4; no.924, 10 August, 1915, pp.20-1; no.1182, 16 June, 1916, pp.3-5; no.1195, 1 July, 1916, pp.11-2.



Guangzhou Telegraph Bureau was located is also illustrative. The Bureau commanded a site of commercial prosperity and convenient transportation on the Bund. This good location greatly enhanced the price of land occupied by the Bureau. The government thus decided to sell this valuable site in 1918, and ordered the Bureau to move into the less accessible walled city.³⁵ These two cases of property sale clearly illustrate that the local government was aware of the different demands for land within and without the city wall, the higher value of public property beyond the city wall and the adverse effect of the city wall on land value inside the walled city. The city wall not only reduced accessibility to the land inside, but also caused numerous casualties because of the frequent collapse of the walls.³⁶

This finding is fully supported by the behavior of buyers who knew too well the kind of property they liked to acquire. A merchant whose company was named Hongdetang bought a small piece of land located east of the Wuxian Gate in the Outer City from the local government. He found out that the site was actually too narrow to construct a house for business and demanded its return to the government.³⁷ The narrowness of this site was due to competition for land in view of the convenience enjoyed by the area. Compared with land in the heart of the walled city, sites contiguous to the wall of the Outer City were much more connected with the outside world. Transport convenience enhanced the value of property there, and led to fierce competition for land. As a result, the land was segmented into extremely tiny plots. In another case, there were two hundred blocks of public property put up for auction in the

³⁴ *GDGB*, no.1190, 26 June, 1916, p.6.

³⁵ *HZRB*, 18 and 22 May, 6 June, 1918.

³⁶ See *HZRB*, 12 September, 1913; 29 March, 27 July, 1915.

³⁷ *GDGB*, no.1220, 31 July, 1916, p.10.



three months after Guangdong claimed independence in April, 1916. However, only four successful deals were made through public auctions.³⁸ The situation did not improve after Long Jiguang was expelled and replaced by the Guangxi military leaders who became the *de facto* rulers of Guangdong. The ex-Guangzhou General *yamen* building, located in the Bannermen's zone in the western half of the Inner City, was converted into a market, but no one was willing to rent a place there. Finally, the market was occupied by illegal hawkers.³⁹ Compared with property located beyond the city wall, property in the walled city were seldom successfully sold. They were left idle and did not generate any profits for the local government.

Non-governmental proposals during the governorship of Zhu Qinglan

After Long Jiguang was driven out of Guangdong, the new Civil Governor Zhu Qinglan introduced reforms to the walled city. Although Zhu supported Yuan Shikai's bid for monarchical rule, he behaved as a reformist during his governorship in Guangdong from June, 1916 to August, 1918.⁴⁰ He supported Sun Yatsen's Constitution-Protection Campaign by placing his personal army under Sun. Zhu's army became the first revolutionary army under the commander of Sun and the Guomindang.


Initiatives of reform came from the merchants and the Merchants' Volunteer Corps following the end of the repressive rule of Long Jiguang. They regarded conditions in the walled city as intolerable and petitioned the local government for the removal of forts along streets in the walled city and the construction of new roads.⁴¹

³⁸ GDGB, no.1220, 31 July, 1916, p.10.

³⁹ GDGB, no.1698, 5 March, 1918, pp.9-11.

⁴⁰ Xie Benshu and Feng Zuyi, et al, *Xinan junfa shi* (vol.1), pp.254; Li Jiezhi, "Zhu Qinglan yu jianli yuan Min Yuejun de guanxi", *Sun Zhongshan san ci zai Guangdong jianli zhengquan*, pp.73-7.


⁴¹ HZRB, 13 and 18 October, 1916.



They perceived the importance of speeding up the construction of roads so as to revitalize the walled city, and they believed that piecemeal construction would not attract population and commerce back to the walled city. Therefore, they came up with a masterplan for the fundamental re-development of the walled city. The Corps put forward the proposal in November, 1916, explaining the rationale for urban changes.⁴² It was said that Guangzhou, a key city in south China, lacked urban infrastructure. Although some measures such as the construction of the Bund were taken, most parts of the city did not benefit from such measures. The proposal thereby suggested the establishment of a large Sino-foreign tramway corporation. Tramways would be constructed throughout the city. Construction work would start in the Outer City, and followed in the Inner City and Honam. Bricks and other materials left after the demolition of the city wall would be sold, and the revenue would fund tramway construction. The corporation's franchise was to last for twenty years, subject to renewal after the conclusion of the period.

The proposal concluded by listing various benefits that could be gained from the materialization of the project. It was said that both the private and public sectors would gain tremendous income. The broadened roads would form an efficient intra-city transportation network corresponding to the railways. Improved transportation would also facilitate the mobilization of armies. The local government would find it easier to liquidate property in hand and invite tenders for the construction of public gardens. Improved transportation would help to disperse population and commerce to the suburbs, in turn improving hygienic condition in the walled city. An efficient intra-city transportation network would attract investment, and Guangzhou's economic

⁴² For details of the plan, see *HZRB*, 20 November, 1916; 16 August, 1919.



status would surpass that of Hong Kong and Macau.

The enthusiasm of the merchants and the promises raised by the proposal interested Civil Governor Zhu Qinglan. He granted immediate approval of the proposal and ordered the Department of Police to coordinate the execution of the plan. The Department of Police acted quickly. It was reported that Wang Guangling, Head of the Department of Police, agreed with the proposal that the construction of tramway should start in the Outer City. He also mapped out the tramway routes in December, 1916.⁴³ The provincial government proposed in 1917 to employ demobilized soldiers to demolish the city wall.⁴⁴


Zhu's interest in the project was reflected in his interview with T.R.E. MacInnes, a Canadian lawyer, in early 1917. MacInnes "proposed to take down the ancient walls of the city, and cut a number of boulevards through the narrow streets, for the purpose of operating a tramway service."⁴⁵ He and his team also conducted some surveying of the city walls.⁴⁶ It was highly possible that MacInnes' participation in the project and his visit to Guangzhou was by invitation of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps which had proposed the construction of tramways. However, Zhu's sanction of the tramway proposal was stalled because Zhu forfeited his governorship by antagonizing the Guangxi warlords in Guangdong. Zhu had also proposed to form the "Municipal Affairs and Public Welfare Society" (*shizheng gongyi hui*), which was modeled on the Beijing experience, for the study of municipal affairs and the preparation of municipal

⁴³ For the police's cooperation with the Merchants' Volunteer Corps, see *HZRB*, 2 and 9 December, 1916.

⁴⁴ *SB*, 18 May, 1917.

⁴⁵ For T.R.E. MacInnes, see "The Kwangtung Tramway Co., Ltd", *The Far Eastern Review*, vol.18, no.9, September, 1922, pp.597-8; *HZRB*, 9 August, 1919.

⁴⁶ *SB*, 3 May, 1917.



reforms.⁴⁷ However, the Society was not formed by the end of Zhu's governorship.

Determination of the local government to carry out municipal reform

Although Zhu Qinglan had little achievement in re-developing Guangzhou during his governorship, the efforts made by the merchants pointed to the urgency of reform. The political contests between different political factions in Guangzhou had consumed much energy, and it was again the local government that finally took up the job of urban reform.

The reason for the local government's final determination to carry out such reform was associated with the financial hardship of the government. Theoretically, the local government had a wide range of incomes. Gambling, though banned repeatedly, was still an important source of government income.⁴⁸ Rent levies and the issuance of bonds were also important.⁴⁹ However, intense competition amongst different political factions in Guangzhou had eroded the financial base of the local government. The local government had contracted numerous loans with both native and foreign banks. Public property of every kind were used as mortgages for these loans. *Guixi ju Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo*, a classic study of the Guangxi clique's domination of Guangdong from 1916 to 1920, presents a full list of loans with Guangzhou's public property as mortgages.⁵⁰ However, while the Guangxi power-holders in Guangdong used pro-

⁴⁷ HZRB, 17 January, 1917.

⁴⁸ HZRB, 16-7 March, 1915; "Canton Trade Report", *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1917*, pp.1140-1; "Canton Trade Report", *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1918*, p.1128; Yu Yanguang and Chen Fulin, *Nan Yue geju: Cong Long Jiguang dao Chen Jitang*, p.98.

⁴⁹ HZRB, 31 August, 1918.

⁵⁰ Li Peisheng, *Guixi ju Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo*, pp.24-49. Also see Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng Guangzhou shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiuhui (ed.), *Guangzhou bainian dashiji*, pp.180, 198-201, 206; Yu Yanguang and Chen Fulin, *Nan Yue geju: Cong Long Jiguang dao Chen Jitang*, p.102; Zhongguo renmin xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), *Guangdong junfa shi dashiji*, pp.112, 115,



vincial property as security at will, they also had to bear the responsibility of repaying loans contracted before their reign in Guangdong. For example, the ex-yamen offices of the Qing Provincial Administrator and Guangzhou Prefect were used as security by Long Jiguang in arranging a two-year loan of three million dollars with the Bank of Taiwan, a Japanese banking institution, with effect from 2 April, 1916.⁵¹ The loan was due in 1918, and since the Finance Department found it impossible to repay the loan from regular sources of revenue, it resolved to liquidate the Cement Plant in Honam and government land at Dashatou for the repayment.⁵²


Newspapers reported that the local government returned to the sale of public property in the walled city as a means to increase governmental income immediately before the establishment of the Municipal Office.⁵³ To attract potential buyers, it was necessary to improve the infrastructure of the walled city. Two cases on the eve of the establishment of the Municipal Office are worth mentioning. The first was associated with the revival of Yonghan Street's reconstruction, which had been proposed in the 1907 Planning and the 1912-1913 construction program. A fire razed Yonghan Street on 17 January, 1918. Sixty-four blocks on the southern section of the Street were destroyed. The Police Department decided to start the reconstruction to broaden the Street into a modern road, a proposal raised in 1913 but soon shelved due to local turmoils and mass opposition. Reconstruction would not only widen the road but also transform it into a trunk road connecting the Bund with the heart of the city where a large amount of public property was located. When the Municipal Office was

123-8, 134.

⁵¹ *HZRB*, 18 March and 3 May, 1919.

⁵² *HZRB*, 18 March, 1919.

⁵³ For example, see *HZRB*, 22 August, 1918.



established, the Yonghan Gate of the Inner City had been demolished and road construction was ready to commence.⁵⁴


The second case was associated with Kuting Lane, a small lane to the west of the Finance Department office. From late 1915 onwards, the local government had invited buyers for the old *yamen* offices around Kuting Lane, but this met with no response.⁵⁵ The Finance Department was disappointed and considered improving the accessibility of the area by road construction. As Kuting Lane ran across the area linking it up with Hui'ai Road, the Finance Department decided in April, 1918 to turn the Lane into a broader road. The notice issued by the Finance Department was self-explanatory: “[The reconstruction of Kuting Lane] can revive commerce [in the Inner City]. The government will benefit by selling the land created after its completion.... Speedy reconstruction is deemed urgent as military campaigns need funding in great amount, and the reconstruction will benefit both government finances and city transportation....”⁵⁶ This north-south running road was completed in November, 1918, soon after the establishment of the Municipal Office.

These two examples exhibited the changing mentality of the local government. First of all, the government sensed the decline of the walled city compared to its outskirts. It appreciated the urgency and practicality of initiating construction programs, more massive in scale than the construction of the Bund. The government also grasped the relationship between road construction and the sale of public property.

⁵⁴ For the reconstruction of Yonghan Street in 1918, see *HZRB*, 11 September, 9, 17 and 31 October, 1918; The Inspectorate General of Customs, “Southern and Frontier Ports”, *China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1912-21* (vol.4), pp.218-9.

⁵⁵ See *GDGB*, no.1010, 20 November, 1915, p.20.

⁵⁶ For the notice, see *HZRB*, 3 April, 1918. Also see *HZRB*, 1 April, 10 June, 28-9 November, 1918. The name “Kuting Road” does not appear on present-day Guangzhou maps. It may have been



To promote the sale of public property, the accessibility of the walled city must first be improved. The completion of new roads would create new land that could either be sold or used as mortgages for loans.⁵⁷ In other words, municipal construction was seen as a means to create wealth and a way to solve long-standing problems of the walled city, both of which were common concerns of the provincial officials.

While the need for further urban reform was seriously considered by the local government, the adoption of institutionalized action, that is, the formation of a specialized *gongsuo* (office), was largely a result of circumstantial factors. Guangzhou suffered from serious natural disasters in 1918, such as an earthquake in February and flooding in the summer months.⁵⁸ Guangzhou had exceptionally more rainfall in 1918, especially in May, June and August, which more than double the normal amount.⁵⁹ It was reported that the walled city, especially the Outer City, was more seriously affected than other parts of the city. The narrow lanes were all flooded and coolies were employed to carry people across the flooded streets.⁶⁰ Remedial actions were urgently needed to save the city's economy and the livelihood of the residents.

Yang Yongtai played a crucial role in initiating the establishment of the Municipal Office. Yang was a graduate of the Politics and Law Institution of Beijing, a member of the Political Study Clique (*zhengxue xi*) and a close associate of the Guangxi military leaders in Guangdong.⁶¹ He firmly supported the Guangxi Clique in expelling Sun

renamed as Guangren Road or Huaning Lane running perpendicular to Yuehua Road.

⁵⁷ It was reported that the Municipal Office proposed to assign new land reclaimed from the demolition of the city wall as mortgage for loan. See *HZRB*, 19 February, 1919.

⁵⁸ *GDGB*, no.1689, 22 February, 1918, p.3; *SB*, 5 June, 1918; *HZRB*, 12 August, 1918; Chen Xin and Guo Zhiqun, *Xianggang quan jilu*, vol.1, p.158.

⁵⁹ *Guangzhou shi shizhengfu tongji gu*, *Guangzhou shi shizhengfu tongji nianjian*, pp.1, 9.

⁶⁰ *HZRB*, 29 May, 1918.

⁶¹ See Li Fulin, *Li Fulin geming shiliao*, p.24.




Yatsen from the Military Government, although he was formerly a member of the Tongmenghui formed by Sun. Yang was a pragmatic politician and a power seeker. He was awarded Head of the Finance Department of Guangdong by the Guangxi military leaders in mid-1918.⁶² He was ambitious and wanted to climb up the ladder of officialdom, expand his personal influence in the province and check his political opponents.⁶³ He actually intended to seek the Guangxi Clique's support in realizing his ambition to become Civil Governor of Guangdong. To show his ability as a chief administrator as well as to bribe the Guangxi Clique, Yang introduced a fundamental re-development scheme for the walled city to augment government income. Actually, he followed the logic of his predecessor, Zeng Yan, in constructing the Kuting Lane. The difference was that Yang intended to re-develop the entire walled city, demolish the city wall and construct new broad roads. The Finance Department would benefit in two ways: firstly, through the increased sale of public property; and secondly, through the addition of new sources of income such as the sale of land reclaimed from the demolition of city wall, the collection of taxes by allowing rickshaws to run on the broad roads within the walled city, and the increase of land tax resulting from substantial rise in land price after the completion of the network of modern roads. These potential sources of income were particularly appealing to the local government which had faced mass opposition when introducing the tea tax (*ping ming juan*).⁶⁴ As a result, Yang proposed to form a specialized institution for the demolition of city walls and the construction of modern roads.

⁶² See *Guangzhou minguo ribao*, 19 April, 1933.

⁶³ For example, it was reported that Yang Yongtai refused to fund the operation of the Civil Governor's office. Li Yaohan and Zhai Wang, who successively served as Guangdong Civil Governor, maintained their offices by acquiring tax incomes from Zhaoqing which was controlled by Li's and Zhai's army. See HZRB, 3 October, 1919.

⁶⁴ See HZRB, 25 February, 29 July, 1918.



Yang secured the support of Wei Bangping in initiating the establishment of the Municipal Office. Wei Bangping was a graduate of a military academy in Japan. He had a rather long history of serving the Guangdong military after the establishment of the Republic. He served as a military advisor to Hu Hanmin in 1912-1913, and as a commander since 1916. In 1918, he was concurrently Commander of the Fifth Army, Head of the Police Department of Guangdong and Head of the Police Department of the Provincial Capital of Guangdong. During the first half of 1918, Wei was sent by the Military Government to fight against the northern warlords. Warfare between the southern and the northern regimes was suspended after an armistice was signed in May, 1918. Wei thereby returned from the battle front to invest more energy in local affairs in order to build up his personal influence. What drew Wei and Yang together was the customary practice of the Heads of the Finance and Police Departments coordinating with each other to deal with problems of the province. For example, Yan Jiazhi, the Finance Department head, and Deng Yaoguang, the Police Department head, were ordered to establish the *ad hoc* Guangdong Relief Planning Bureau (*Guangdong chouzhen chu*) in 1914 to deal with the aftermath of a serious flooding.⁶⁵ This explained why Wei was nominated as co-initiator and co-director of the Municipal Office soon after his return to Guangzhou.

The triumph of the Guangxi Clique in the Military Government in 1918 facilitated the establishment of the Municipal Office. The Military Government chaired by Sun Yatsen was reorganized under the collaboration of the Guangxi Clique and the Political Study Clique. In the new Military Government established on 5 July, 1918, Sun was downgraded from being the Grand Marshal to one of seven marshals, whereas the

⁶⁵ GDGB, no.583, 29 June, 1914, p.17.



Guangxi Clique exerted firm control over the Military Government by placing its supporters inside. The Guangxi Clique was proud of this achievement and regarded 5 July as the formal date of the inauguration of the Military Government, not 10 September on which Sun Yatsen founded the first Military Government of the Constitution-Protection Campaign in 1917.⁶⁶ To show their superiority over Sun and the northern regime, as well as their potency as the new leaders of the “capital city”, the Guangxi Clique paid more attention to Guangzhou’s construction and sanctioned the proposal put forward by Yang Yongtai and Wei Bangping for the establishment of the Municipal Office which would facilitate municipal construction and bring about a boom in the property market.

The institution and work schedule of the Municipal Office

The evolution of its title


The Municipal Office was established on 22 October, 1918, with the Great Buddha Temple (*Dafosi*) as its office.⁶⁷ According to the *Regulations of the Municipal Office*, the Municipal Office had two directors which were filled by Yang Yongtai and Wei Bangping and whose appointments were approved by Military Governor Mo Rongxin and Civil Governor Li Yaohan.⁶⁸ The title of the Office underwent three changes before adopting the title known to us.⁶⁹ The initial title was *Guangzhou shizheng ju* (Municipal Bureau of Guangzhou). It was then changed to *Guangzhou*

⁶⁶ JZFGB, xiu no.87, 9 July, 1919, pp.15-6.

⁶⁷ Before the completion of decoration, the Guandi Temple at Yushan was made the temporary office. SB, 29 October, 1918.

⁶⁸ HZRB, 3 October and 6 November, 1918.

⁶⁹ For the change of titles of the Municipal Office, see *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan*: 4-01/1/263-1 & 3, “Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo”; Zhao Zhuo (ed.), *Guangdong danxing faling huizuan*, p.94; HZRB, 3 October, 1918; *Guangzhou baike quanshu bianzuan weiyuanhui*, *Guangzhou baike*



chengxiang shizheng gongsuo (Municipal Office of Guangzhou Walled City) which was the first title formally adopted by this institution. According to an order of Mo Rongxin and Li Yaohan on 7 October, 1918, a seal with this title had been made for the use of the Municipal Office.⁷⁰ This title suited the purpose of the Municipal Office well as the primary aim of establishing the Office was to change the physical appearance of the walled city (*chengxiang*).⁷¹ However, this title caused legal confusion as the *Regulations of the Municipal Office* did not restrict the Office's work to the walled city. The first draft of the *Regulations* stated clearly that the Office had authority over "deeds and taxation of the real estate of the provincial capital, Honam, Huadi and Fangcun", a stipulation which was retained in subsequent drafts of the *Regulations*.⁷² As a result, the word *chengxiang* was deleted from the title which then became *Guangzhou shizheng gongsuo* (Municipal Office of Guangzhou). This was not the final title. In the first proclamation of the Municipal Office issued on the day of its establishment, another title *Guangzhou shi shizheng gongsuo* (Municipal Office of the Guangzhou City) was adopted with the word *shi* (city) being added. The extant documents deposited in the Guangzhou City Archives reveal that it was Mo Rongxin and Li Yaohan who favored the inclusion of the word "city" into the title.⁷³


quanshu, p.283; *Yangcheng jingu*, no.25, February, 1991, p.16.

⁷⁰ *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan*: 4-01/1/263-1, "Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo".

⁷¹ *Chengxiang* (walled city) usually appeared in the expression "inside and outside the walled city" (*chengxiang neiwai*). It also excluded suburbs such as Honam. See HZRB, *passim*.

⁷² This became Article 8, Section E in the final version of the *Regulations of the Municipal Office*. See Zhao Zhuo (ed.), *Guangdong danxing faling huizuan*, pp.94-8.

⁷³ See the handwritten documents in *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan*: 4-01/1/263-1, "Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo". Yang Yongtai and Wei Bangping submitted a report to Mo Rongxin and Li Yaohan on 22 October, 1918 on the establishment of the Municipal Office. A drafted version of the regulations of the institution was attached. The title of the regulations was *Guangzhou shizheng gongsuo zuzhi zhangcheng* (Regulations of the Organization of the Municipal Office of Guangzhou). Mo and Li deleted the word *zuzhi* (organization) and inserted *shi* (city) between *shizheng* and *gongsuo*. As a result, *Guangzhou shi shizheng gongsuo* became the final title of the Municipal Office.




The finalized title reflected a new urban concept adopted by the local government. In traditional China, only walled cities (*cheng*) were regarded as proper urban places.⁷⁴ This old concept was challenged by the phenomenon of urban expansion in the late Qing and the early Republican periods, which led to disproportionate development of the suburbs of the walled city. As such prosperous suburbs had become inseparable parts of the walled cities, re-developing the walled cities would serve to catch up with the prosperity of the suburbs and from new urban entities. In labeling such an expanded urban entity including the walled city, with or without the city wall, and the immediate or more remote suburbs, old names such as *chengxiang* (walled city) were no longer applicable and a new terminology was used. It was against this background that Mo Rongxin and Li Yaohan adopted the title *shi* (“city” or “market”) for this purpose. In the case of the Municipal Office, *shi* did not have the meaning of “municipality” that was later attached to this word. It simply implied an expanded urban settlement centered on the walled city and including its suburbs such as Honam, Huadi and Fangcun, as stipulated by the *Regulations*. In other words, the Municipal Office entailed a geographical concept and denoted a city-wide institution not restricted to any part of the “city”. Therefore, the formation of the Municipal Office marked the maturity of city-wide efforts at urban construction, a task which the streets and charitable organizations had failed to perform.

The adoption of this title produced profound effects on urban activities of various kinds. The naming of new constructions always included the full title of “Guangzhou City”, such as “Guangzhou City First Garden” planned by the Municipal Office.⁷⁵ The

⁷⁴ For example, see Sen-dou Chang, “The Morphology of Walled Capitals”, in G. William Skinner (ed.), *The City in Late Imperial China*, p.75.

⁷⁵ HZRB, 19 October, 1918.




word “city” always followed “Guangzhou” in newspaper accounts and formal documents.⁷⁶ The Municipal Office even considered the issuance of “city bonds”.⁷⁷ This conceptualization of “city” as a new level of local administration fostered further institutional changes. The Military Government’s proclamation of China’s first municipality system in 1920 was definitely nurtured by the experience of the Municipal Office.

Institutional characteristics

The Municipal Office adopted a rather informal title, *gongsuo*, simply meaning “office”. *Gongsuo* as a title was popular among the merchants and in the government. The Drainage Dredging Office (*Qing hao gongsuo*), Burial Office (*Fenshan gongsuo*) and Rescue Office (*Jiuzai gongsuo*) were some examples. Actually, municipal institutions in Chinese cities in the 1910s and 1920s widely adopted the title of *shizheng gongsuo* (municipal office), such as those of Nantong and Wuxi in Jiangsu, Kunming in Yunnan, Taiyuan in Shanxi, Chengdu in Sichuan, Changsha in Hunan, and Beijing. These bureaucratic establishments did not aim at bringing about any institutional breakthrough, but devoted their energy to municipal construction. Similar to its counterparts in other Chinese cities, the Municipal Office of Guangzhou City was a branch institution of the provincial government. The regulations governing its work were at the discretion of the provincial officials. The provincial government regarded the establishment of the Municipal Office as an executive act. The Office’s legitimacy rested on the approval of the provincial government, and the approval of the Provincial

⁷⁶ See the tramway construction contracted by the Guangdong Tramway Company Ltd. (*HZRB*, 9, 11-6, 18-20 August, 1919). Also see *HZRB*, 18 November and 24 December, 1918; 4 and 24 March, 5 May, 29 December, 1919; 3 and 19 March, 3 April, 7 May, 26 July, 11, 19 and 26 August, 9 November, 1920.


⁷⁷ *HZRB*, 6 August, 1919.



Assembly was not required. However, the Provincial Assembly was of the view that the work of the Municipal Office had infringed on the Assembly's authority, especially in the disposal of provincial property and in construction. The tramway issue, which will be discussed in this chapter, is a notable example. No wonder the Provincial Assembly never recognized the legal status of the Municipal Office. The Assembly regarded the Municipal Office as *ad hoc* in nature, and was not responsible for its operation. It made the Civil Governor responsible for the Office's decisions, and it never communicated directly with the Municipal Office.⁷⁸ This institutional weakness intensified the masses' opposition to this infant organization.

Yang Yongtai and Wei Bangping were appointed directors of the Municipal Office according to the customary practice that the heads of the Finance and Police Departments should coordinate with each other in dealing with the problems of the province. However, the re-adoption of this model by the Municipal Office only represented a temporary personnel arrangement. This point was reflected by the modification of a phrase in the *Regulations of the Municipal Office*. In the first draft of the *Regulations* governing the initial Municipal Bureau, it was stated clearly in Article 2 that “[T]he heads of the Finance and Police Departments shall be the directors of the Bureau.”⁷⁹ However, this phrase in the same article was modified in subsequent versions: “[T]he Office has two directors who are appointed by the Military and Civil Governors.” (See appendix) This opened up the possibility that successors to the current directors would be professionals in municipal affairs rather than political heavyweights. It paved the way for the Municipal Office to be transformed into a truly city-controlled institution to the exclusion of provincial personnel.

⁷⁸ For example, see *HZRB*, 1, 2, 5 August, 22 September, 1919.




Both archival and newspaper materials provide sketchy information about the staff of the Office, such as their number, qualifications and working experience, terms of employment and so forth. However, the extant materials revealed that the Municipal Office had full discretionary power to employ staff below the grade of vice-director. As the immediate target of the Municipal Office was to demolish the city wall and construct modern roads, it employed technical staff trained in such works. As both Yang and Wei were political appointments, they recommended Cao Ruying to be Vice-Director of the Municipal Office. In spite of his military background, Cao was also a land surveyor. He served as Chief Surveyor of the Guangdong Agricultural Land Bureau (*Qingtian zongju*) in 1896. After the establishment of the Republic, he was the head of the Navigation Department and the Ministry of Communications, and a supervisor of the Board of Conservancy Works of Guangdong (*Guangdong duban zhihe shiyichu*). In addition to his expertise, his appointment was certainly associated with the fact that he was a former teacher of Yang Yongtai and employed by Yang as Director of the Government Property Section of the Finance Department.⁸⁰ In the actual operation of the Municipal Office, Cao acted as a decision-maker. He was recognized for his great contribution to the Municipal Office as he was in charge of most of the important projects. After he resigned from the post and became Director of the Board of Conservancy Works of Guangdong in August 1919, he still served as an advisor to the Municipal Office.⁸¹

⁷⁹ See *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan*: 4-01/1/263-3, "Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo".

⁸⁰ For his career before the establishment of the Municipal Office, see his curriculum vitae in *Guangzhou shi dang'anguan*: 4-01/1/263-1, "Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo". Also see Han Feng, Kuang Zhenqiu and Huang Songyu, "Jiu Guangzhou chai cheng zhu lu fengbo", in *Guangzhou wenshi*, no.46, February 1994, pp.164-5.

⁸¹ *Guangzhou bainian dashiji*, p.176; *HZRB*, 9 August, 1919.



The work of the Municipal Office was supported by an experienced technical staff. Lun Yunxiang was employed as Chief Engineer of the Office.⁸² Lun studied engineering at Victoria University in Edinburgh and graduated in 1914. He then spent more than three years in various departments of the Edinburgh Municipality. He returned to China in 1916 and reportedly joined the Police Department of Guangdong as an engineer. Wu Xilü was a chartered member of the Chinese Institute of Engineers and a consulting engineer of Koushing Engineering Company.⁸³ He received his technical education at Ohio Northern University and University of Illinois. He returned to China in 1911 and joined the provincial Public Works Department in 1912. He made great contribution to the designing of Guangzhou's road system. His employment as an engineer of the Municipal Office reflected the continuity of the Office's municipal reform with previous construction experiences of the city. Quite a number of employees of the Municipal Office also received Western technical education.⁸⁴


According to the *Regulations of the Municipal Office*, the Municipal Office was administratively subordinated to the Military and Civil Governors of Guangdong. As the Municipal Office was presumably an executive branch of the provincial government, it did not have full autonomy in making decisions. For example, the phase two road construction plan was scrutinized by Military Governor Mo Rongxin before it was publicized.⁸⁵ The proposal for transforming the Xuanmiao Temple into a market was

⁸² For Lun Yunxiang, see *Who's Who in China* (2nd ed.), pp.292-3; HZRB, 12 January, 3 April, 1920.

⁸³ For Wu Xilü, see "Canton's New Maloos", *The Far Eastern Review*, January, 1922, p.22; Huang Junming, "Qing mo liuxuesheng yu Guangzhou shizheng jianshe (1911-1922 nian)", in Wang Dan and Zhang Fuhe (ed.), *Di si ci Zhonghuo jindai jianzhu shi yanjiu taolunhui lunwenji*, pp.184-5.

⁸⁴ "Canton Trade Report", *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1918*, p.1137.

⁸⁵ HZRB, 20 July, 1920.



submitted to the Civil Governor for approval.⁸⁶ However, this subordinate relationship did not entail that the Municipal Office was dependent on the provincial government financially. The annual budget prepared by the Civil Governor's office did not include any items regarding the Municipal Office or construction projects in Guangzhou.⁸⁷ As the Provincial Assembly had opposed the establishment of the Municipal Office from the very beginning, the Civil Governor feared that the Provincial Assembly would reject the whole budget due to its antagonistic attitude towards the Municipal Office and this in turn would affect the running of the provincial government. Therefore, the Municipal Office was financially self-sufficient, apart from the ten thousand *yuan* assigned by the Finance Department for its establishment.⁸⁸ On the contrary, the provincial government or the Military Government might ask from the Office for money. For example, the Military Government requested the Office to make a loan of five hundred thousand dollars, but the Office firmly rejected this request due to its financial insolvency.⁸⁹ To solve financial hardship, the Office sold public property at very low prices. When the Municipal Office was established, some Bannermen property were sold for about one hundred thousand *yuan* to cover the initial operation of the Office.⁹⁰ Up to May, 1919, fifteen auctions of public property in the Bannermen's zone had been held, and a sum of 0.552 million *yuan* was obtained.⁹¹ Besides the Bannermen's property, the Municipal Office was also eager to put all public property in the city under its administration for the convenience of taxation and revenue

⁸⁶ *HZRB*, 13 May, 1919.


⁸⁷ For the annual budget for the year 1919, see *HZRB*, 6, 9-12, 18-20, December, 1919.

⁸⁸ *HZRB*, 15 December, 1919.

⁸⁹ *HZRB*, 9 May, 1919; *SB*, 8 and 14 May, 1919.

⁹⁰ *SB*, 2 November, 1918.

⁹¹ *HZRB*, 20 May, 1919.




maximization. The existence of financial hardship also explained why it firmly acted against the popular will, such as signing the notorious tramway contract for a sum of one million dollars to fund construction projects.

Another institutional feature of the Municipal Office was the attempt to introduce a popular representative system. Critics regarded the Municipal Office as repressive partly because it did not have any consultative bodies.⁹² Yet, the Municipal Office was prepared to “set up a council (*pingyihui*) composed of citizens of Guangzhou City”, as stipulated in the Article 19 of the *Regulations of the Municipal Office* (see appendix 1). From hindsight, the Municipal Office might have intentionally ignored the execution of this important Article. It would be unwise for the Office to introduce more voices into the Office when it was devoting all its energy to carrying out municipal construction, seeking administrative efficiency and evading challenges from the residents.

The informal title of *gongsuo* did not imply that it was an *ad hoc* institution with a simple structure. It had both long- and short-term work schedules from its very establishment. According to plan its work would be divided into two stages. The first stage would concentrate on the demolition of city walls and the construction of new roads, markets and gardens. The second stage would be concerned with education and other urban administrative affairs.⁹³ Since the first stage of work concentrated on the quick transformation of the city’s physical appearance, the internal structure of the Municipal Office was designed to facilitate such work. There were four sections under the Municipal Office, as stipulated clearly in the *Regulations of the Municipal Of-*

⁹² This viewpoint was voiced out by the Wenlan College which complained about the Municipal Office’s repressive filling up of the Western Moat. See HZRB, 3 March, 1920.

⁹³ Guangzhou shi dang’anguan: 4-01/1/263-1, “Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo”; HZRB, 31 October, 1918; Guangzhou shi shizhengting, *Guangzhou shi yangge shilie*, p.69



fice. The General Section (*zongwu ke*) was responsible for the administration of the Bannermen's property, welfare factories, sanitation, auction, accountancy, budgetary and final accounting affairs, collection and distribution of documents, staff appointment and dismissal, maintenance of archives, issuance of licenses and so forth. The Construction Section (*gongcheng ke*) was responsible for the demolition of city walls, opening of roads, tramway and rickshaws, market affairs, acquisition of land and surveying of construction projects. The City Boundary Section (*jingjie ke*) was responsible for land investigation, surveying, drawing up of plans and price evaluation. The Registration Section (*denglu ke*) was responsible for registration, document search, verification of affairs, administration of maps and publications, and deeds management.

Upon completion of the first stage of work, the above structure would presumably be modified by amending the *Regulations of the Municipal Office* as the Office proceeded to the next stage of work. Article 20 of the *Regulations* clearly stipulated that the *Regulations* were temporary in nature, subject to any amendments when deemed necessary. In other words, the Municipal Office *per se* was not *ad hoc* in nature, but its organization was alterable to suit its changing programs.

Uneven development within the Office

The four sections of the Municipal Office evolved at different paces. As the first stage of the Municipal Office's work focused on the demolition of the city wall and the construction of roads, the Construction Section expanded much faster than the other sections. It even formed new divisions, such as the Road Repair Division in May 1920.⁹⁴ In contrast, the Registration Section and the City Boundary Section under-

⁹⁴ HZRB, 12 May, 1920.




went slow progress. The Registration Section was not active throughout the brief history of the Municipal Office. Regulations regarding property registration were not released until March 1919. However, the Section's work was hampered by the High Court's struggle for the right of property registration for the reason that such registration was closely associated with property conflicts which were an important area that the Court had to deal with. Registration work came to a standstill, and the Municipal Office negotiated with Military Governor Mo Rongxin and Acting Civil Governor Zhang Jingfang on how registration work should proceed. The Municipal Office had other conflicts of interest with provincial establishments apart from the Provincial Assembly which insisted on refuting the legitimacy of the Office. Finally, an agreement was reached between the Municipal Office and the High Court to the effect that property registration would be co-managed by the Registration Section and the High Court, and a registration bureau for this purpose was established in August, 1919, at the back of the Municipal Office.⁹⁵ It is noteworthy that the compulsory registration of deeds by the Registration Section required the payment of a fee, although such a kind of registration was free of charge before the establishment of the Municipal Office.⁹⁶ This is because the Office foresaw that the property market would expand after the completion of municipal construction, and this in turn would generate considerable income for the Office.

Compared with the Registration Section, the work of the City Boundary Section showed greater progress. It planned to start work along the Bund in March, 1919, namely, to map out the area and investigate the ownership of property along this long

⁹⁵ For the evolution of the Registration Section, see *HZRB*, 1 and 26 March, 1919; 10 and 29 January, 7 May, 19 August, 1920.

⁹⁶ For example, *HZRB*, 24 February, 1913.



road. The work was extended to other districts of the city with the help of the Police. However, the mapping of the whole city was not completed due to the lack of funds. Only some parts of the city were mapped.

The administrators of the Municipal Office tried to justify the slow progress of the above two sections. They argued that the work of registration and fixing the city boundaries could only be conducted after the bulk of new public property were created through the demolition of the city wall and the construction of roads. To the administrators, these two sections would contribute to the proper management of property and the solution of controversial deed problems, in turn minimizing conflicts arising from the difficulty of ascertaining the validity of existing deeds. It was said that people would develop confidence in deeds and contracts issued and recognized by the Municipal Office, and this in turn would facilitate the Office's liquidation of public property and activate banking business and the flow of cash.⁹⁷

As the Municipal Office invested nearly all its energy on construction, the Office's major fields of work and their progress will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Emphasis will be put on the ideology adopted by the Municipal Office, its collaboration with other government institutions, its provocation of the local residents and Guangzhou natives in other provinces, and the approaches it adopted to minimize hostilities.

Demolition of the city wall and construction of roads

The planning

⁹⁷ See the proclamation by the Municipal Office on the importance of land surveying and registration, HZRB, 4 March, 1919.



Since the Municipal Office was primarily concerned with the demolition of city wall and road construction, it released the plan of city wall demolition almost immediately after its establishment.⁹⁸ However, the phase one road construction plan was not released until late March of the following year because of indecision over the design of the future road system. According to the first demolition scheme of late October, 1918, only the gates and the gate towers, not the whole city wall, would be demolished. Moreover, the Dabei (Great North) Gate and the Xiaobei (Little North) Gate would be retained for defending the Military Governor's office at the south of Yuexiu Hill.⁹⁹ This demolition plan was consistent with the broadening of Yonghan Road and the construction of a radial network of roads connecting the heart of the walled city to its outskirts, such as Xiguan, Dongguan and the Bund. The roads would be sixty feet wide.¹⁰⁰ This scheme was amended in November and it was decided that the whole city wall except the section stretching from the Dabei (Great North) Gate to the Xiaobei (Little North) Gate was to be demolished, including houses contiguous to the city wall. Broad roads would be constructed on the old site of the city wall. The first compensation scheme for property owners was also promulgated.¹⁰¹

Considering that the progress of the demolition work was satisfactory, the Municipal Office released the stage one road construction project in late March, 1919 (represented by green lines in Map 3).¹⁰² This plan showed continuity with road construction plans made in the Qing and the early years of the Republic. Previous designs were included in this new planning, such as the transformation of the site of the city

⁹⁸ HZRB, 26 October, 1918; SB, 2 November, 1918.

⁹⁹ HZRB, 26 October, 1918; SB, 2 November, 1918.

¹⁰⁰ HZRB, 19 November, 1918.

¹⁰¹ HZRB, 11 November, 1918.



¹⁰² HZRB, 22 March, 1919.



**MAP 3 FIRST AND SECOND PHASES OF
ROAD CONSTRUCTION OF THE
MUNICIPAL OFFICE, 1919-1920**

KEYS

- Routes of the stage-one road construction
- Routes of the stage-two road construction




Routes of the stage-one road construction

1. North-south road I (Fengning Road and Taiping Road)
2. North-south road II
3. North-south road III (Yonghan Road)
4. North-south road IV (Yuxiu Road)
5. East-west road I (Yide Road, Taikang Road and Wansu Road)
6. East-west road II (Guide Road, Danan Road and Wenming Road)
7. East-west road III (Hui'ai Road)
8. East-west road IV (Dexuan Road)
9. Wende Road
10. Front of Garden

Routes of the stage-two road construction

1. Guangxiao Road
2. Guantang Road
3. Xianyang Road
4. Youlan Road
5. Huata Road
6. Chaotian Road
7. Jinghai Road
8. Dabei Road
9. Guide Road
10. Jiaoyu Road
11. Wende Road South
12. Xiaobei Road
13. Fazheng Road
14. Dinghai Road
15. Beiheng Road
16. Baiyun Road
17. Zhengnan Road
18. Guangda Road
19. Guangfu Road
20. Jixiang Road New Section
- O. Huifa Road West
- P. Guanlu Road
- Q. Daxin Road
- R. Zhuguang Road
- S. Caizheng Road North
- H. Bailng Road
- I. Jinghui Road
- J. Xihu Road
- K. Guangta Road
- L. Yushan Road
- M. Huisu Road East
- N. Huifa Road Middle
- A. Yingyuan Road
- B. Yiyuan Road
- C. Tianxiang Road East
- D. Tianxiang Road Middle
- E. Tianxiang Road West
- F. Haixian Road
- G. Gongyuan Road Back




wall into broad roads as well as the broadening and lengthening of avenues in the walled city, notably Hui'ai Road and Yonghan Road (numbered 7 and 8 in green in Map 3), so as to link up with the Bund, Xiguan and Dongshan. It is interesting to note that continuity was shown not only in the choice of routes, but also in the construction staff. It was pointed out earlier that Wu Xilü, who supervised the city wall demolition and road construction, had been a member of the provincial Public Works Department during 1912-1913 and had contributed to the design of Guangzhou's road system.

Road planning was noteworthy for the construction of wide streets, compared with the existing narrow lanes in the walled city. The width of the city wall of the Inner City was eighty feet, and the Outer City sixty feet. The Municipal Office planned to replace the city wall with broad avenues one hundred feet wide.¹⁰³ This decision was bold in the sense that it was necessary to solve the problem of relocating the residents contiguous to the city wall, a problem which former local governments were not prepared to deal with, preventing the demolition of the city wall. The planning also served to extend the city boundary eastward. The Municipal Office planned to extend Dexuan Road and Hui'ai Road eastward to Dongshan, and it was envisaged that part of Panyu County to the east of Dongshan would finally be incorporated into the city boundary.¹⁰⁴

During 1919-1920, the speed of road construction was impressive. The previous sites of the city wall were quickly transformed into broad roads. Most of them were macadam roads made of bricks removed from the city wall and only a few sections

¹⁰³ *HZRB*, 19 November, 1919.

¹⁰⁴ *GZSSZGB*, no.78, 28 May, 1923, p.30.



were made of reinforced concrete.¹⁰⁵ Yonghan Road South, Yonghan Road North, Wanfu Road, Wende Road and Hui'ai Road Middle were completed in early October, 1919. The provincial government and the Military Government held a grand opening ceremony for these five roads. As the ceremony was held on National Day, it celebrated the eighth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China as well. Temporary commemorative archways were constructed and decorated with electric bulbs which displayed eight Chinese characters *guoqing jinian, daolu xiuming* (celebrating National Day, constructing good roads). Wu Tingfang, a director of the southern regime, officiated the opening ceremony, sat in the first automobile and paraded down the five roads.¹⁰⁶ Military Governor Mo Rongxin and Acting Civil Governor Zhang Jingfang issued notices congratulating the opening of the roads.¹⁰⁷ This definitely marked the success of the Municipal Office in constructing the planned roads within a relatively short period of time. The high regard paid by provincial and “national” leaders to this development showed that the completion of these roads had great symbolic significance. It signified accomplishment in municipal construction by the southern regime, which contrasted sharply with the repressive warlord rule under the Beijing regime.

The opening of the five roads prompted faster progress in both city wall demolition and road construction. It was reported that the scheduled demolition of the city wall was near completion in February, 1920, except for a small portion of the southern

¹⁰⁵ The Inspectorate General of Customs, “Southern and Frontier Ports”, *China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc. of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1912-21* (vol.4), p.219; Edward Bing-Shuey Lee, *Modern Canton*, p.14.

¹⁰⁶ *HZRB*, 13 October, 1919.

¹⁰⁷ *HZRB*, 14 October, 1919.



wall of the Inner City.¹⁰⁸ The phase one road construction project was completed in July, and the phase two project was immediately released (represented by purple lines in Map 3).¹⁰⁹ The aim of the phase two project was to make up for the inadequacy of the road network built in phase one, and to open up the Bannermen's zone in the western half of the ex-walled city.¹¹⁰ Therefore, there would be a dense network of roads in the Bannermen's zone compared with the eastern half of the ex-walled city. However, only some surveying work was completed by late 1920 when the Municipal Office was soon to be transformed into the Guangzhou Municipality.

Oppositions


The Municipal Office was remarkable for its completion of the phase one road construction project within two years, although many of the completed roads were not of high quality and needed repairs not long after completion. Admittedly, the Municipal Office had adopted some preventive measure to minimize public opposition to its construction plans. For both phases one and two road construction plans, the Office disclosed full details of the planned routes on maps. Two-way communications between the Office and residents were encouraged by sending key officials to deliver public speeches and to set feedback from the residents.¹¹¹ The Municipal Office only broadened existing roads and did not construct new roads that cut through commercial and residential blocks. This was meant to minimize the acquisition of private property and conflicts with property owners.

¹⁰⁸ HZRB, 6 February, 1919.

¹⁰⁹ *Jindai Guangzhou kou'an jingji shehui gaikuang: Yue haiguan baogao huiji*, p.663; HZRB, 6 July, 1920.

¹¹⁰ HZRB, 13 July, 1920.

¹¹¹ For example, Wei Bangping and Wu Qiang, a department officer of the Municipal Office, deliv-



These efforts were not effective. The Municipal Office faced opposition of various kinds. The first attack came from the Provincial Assembly. The Provincial Assembly pointed out that it would be illegal to sell the Bannermen's property without the prior approval of the Assembly. Yang Yongtai and Wei Bangping counter-argued that any such sale was simply based on previous orders of the Assembly, and did not need to seek approval from the Provincial Assembly about the sale of such property.¹¹² The contentious relationship with the Provincial Assembly was the foremost problem that the Municipal Office faced.

Conflicts accelerated as the demolition of the city wall necessitated the compulsory resettlement of thousands of residents who lived along the foot of the city wall. The earliest complaint was filed in December, 1918 when residents living in forty streets along the wall petitioned the Military Government which promised to forward the issue to Civil Governor Zhai Wang.¹¹³ The number of streets making complaints increased to fifty-three in late December, and to sixty-eight in March, 1919.¹¹⁴ Besides petitioning the Military Government, they also requested help from the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce. As the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce stepped in to support the petitioners, the issue became a city-wide concern.¹¹⁵ Street residents regarded municipal construction as contradictory to their interests. To alleviate antagonism, the Municipal Office promised to postpone the demolition of city wall after

ered public speeches on the work of the Office. See *HZRB*, 8 March, 26 May, 1919.

¹¹² *HZRB*, 17 September, 1918.

¹¹³ *JZFGB*, xiu no.29, 7 December, 1918, p.28; xiu no.30, 11 December, 1918; *HZRB*, 13 December, 1918.

¹¹⁴ *HZRB*, 31 December, 1918; 8 March, 1919.

¹¹⁵ *HZRB*, 21 November, 1918.



the lunar new year, that is, February, 1919.¹¹⁶

However, the postponement was only temporary as the Municipal Office was determined to implement the municipal projects. The Office believed that the residents had long encroached upon public land which the local government claimed ownership. According to the Municipal Office, all land belonged to the Throne in Imperial China, and the local government was simply an agent of the Throne to administer his land in the locality.¹¹⁷ After the abolition of the Imperial system, local governments aspired to be heirs of this “Imperial legacy” and regarded land in the city, especially within the walled city, as assets of the government. While the demolition of city wall involved the relocation of residents along the city wall, the Municipal Office argued that such residents had long occupied government land illegally. They would only be paid a symbolic compensation, not the land price.¹¹⁸ Victims, especially deed holders, strongly opposed this official interpretation. Over hundreds of years, ordinary people could own land around the city wall and their deeds were taxed by the local government. They could freely transfer their land without governmental interference. In other words, the local government had always recognized private ownership of land, but such land was now claimed by the Municipal Office as “government owned”. The petitioners quoted a case in which land around the Chicken Wing Wall was previously auctioned by the Government Property Office (*guanchan chu*) of the Finance Department.

¹¹⁶ HZRB, 3 January, 1919.

¹¹⁷ This was only an excuse of the Municipal Office to minimize the compensation to the residents and to quicken the process of acquiring land for the demolition of the city walls. Actually, there existed a variety of land ownership in Imperial China, among which included private ownership. For details, see Jiang Shoupeng, *Ming-Qing shehui jingji jiegou*, pp.22-37.

¹¹⁸ Tenants would be compensated three times (subsequently increased to five times) the rent levies they paid, and land-owners were compensated the same amount. The victims grew further dissatisfied after the Municipal Office decided that half of the compensation would be paid in the form of shares of the Tramway Company. See HZRB, 19 November, 18 December, 1918; 20 February, 22 April, 1919.



After discovering that the present landlords possessed land deeds for their land, the Government Property Office voided the auction. The petitioners argued that this was clear evidence of the local government's recognition of private ownership.¹¹⁹ Actually, this legal debate did not come to any conclusion as the Municipal Office and the provincial government were not concerned with the legal aspect of the issue. What they were interested in was the fast materialization of the re-development scheme, and a high-handed policy was their answer to the petitioners. In reality, the Municipal Office did not make full compensations to the victims. This burden was shifted onto the Guangzhou Municipality.¹²⁰

Fuxue Street East: a case study

Fuxue Street East, later renamed Wende Road, was broadened under the stage one road construction plan. The Municipal Office justified its choice for broadening this road as follows:

"The provincial capital [Guangzhou] is densely populated. Markets and shops are close to each other. When choosing roads [for broadening], sites which are less populated and command key locations are deemed appropriate. Moreover, it is important to first complete some roads which are easier to be constructed. Afterwards, other roads [in busier districts] will be constructed so that traffic congestion can be avoided."¹²¹

Here, the rationale for road construction was to spread prosperity throughout the city. Yang Yongtai and Wei Bangping intended to use Fuxue Street East as a model for developing the less populated areas of the Inner City. They quoted the experience of Paris and other cities in Europe and America and pointed out that road widening was

¹¹⁹ For the case quoted by the petitioners, see Guangzhou shi dang'anguan: 4-01/1/263-3, "Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo".

¹²⁰ The Guangzhou Municipality ordered the sale of all the Bannermen's properties for compensating the inhabitants along the ex-city wall. See GZSSZGB, no.22, 25 July, 1921, pp.8-10.



important in improving city sanitation, enhancing the efficiency of fire-fighting and raising land value.¹²² They suggested that the Municipal Office should learn from foreign experience in shaping its construction ideology and approach.


However, the Municipal Office's attempt at opening up Fuxue Street East was not appreciated by the residents. It was reported that the Municipal Office had two choices before the final decision was made: to open up either Fuxue Street West or Fuxue Street East. A rumor circulated that Fuxue Street West was discarded not because of the comparatively advantageous location of Fuxue Street East, but because of the strong opposition of Liu Zhilu, the Chaozhou and Meizhou Commander, whose family shrine was located at Fuxue Street West.¹²³ The Municipal Office's choice angered the residents and the administrators of the Confucian Temple on Fuxue Street East, as the widening of the Street would mean the demolition of the western part of the Temple. This included a number of important buildings, namely, the Wenchang Altar, Yanggao Altar and Minghuan Altar. The construction project was judged by Confucianists as a political assault, and they believed that the Guangxi militarists were always prepared to sacrifice the interests of the Guangdong people.¹²⁴ Immediately after the scheme was announced, local residents, Guangdong natives in other Chinese cities such as Taiyuan and Beijing, and members of Confucian associations joined

¹²¹ HZRB, 19 February, 1919.

¹²² HZRB, 19 February, 1919.

¹²³ HZRB, 14 February, 1919.

¹²⁴ The hostility of the Guangdong people towards the Guangxi Clique only began after Lu Rongting, a Guangxi military leader, and his associates occupied Guangdong as their power base in 1916. Before that, Guangdong and Guangxi always maintained harmonious relationship. The two provinces were regarded as one administrative unit, as the Liang-Guang Governor-General in the Qing Dynasty looked after both provinces. In Qing times, the two provinces were expected to defend the Vietnam borders collectively, and Guangdong paid for most of Guangxi's military expenditures. See Kei-on Chan, *The Kwangtung Military Establishment, 1924-1936*, p.49; Diana Lary, *Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937*, pp.31-2; Huang Shao-hong, "Jiu Gui xi de xingmie", *Wenshi ziliao xuanbian*, no.16, April 1961, pp.176-7; Wu Zhenhan,



forces to denounce the Municipal Office and the Guangdong government. They did not accept the Municipal Office's explanation that the partial demolition of the Temple was the only way to facilitate quick completion of the road, nor the promise that the Municipal Office would be responsible for relocating the demolished constructions and redecorating the Temple as well.¹²⁵ Among the critics, Kang Youwei's opinion was representative. He responded angrily that Guangzhou did not need such broad roads and that the Confucian Temple should not be demolished. He stated that the Confucian tradition should not be given up in spite of the trend of democratic reform in the Republican era. To Kang, the government did not have the right to demolish the Temple which was a public hall for all Guangdong people.¹²⁶ Liang Shiyi, a Guangdong native serving as Chairman of the Lower House of the Parliament in Beijing, put it frankly: "the provincial capital is not dominated by a minority. We Guangdong people feel extremely angry.... [The local government] should consult and make a compromise with the gentry and merchants."¹²⁷


The staff of the Confucian Temple staged the most vigorous opposition. In a petition to the Municipal Office, it was stated that "even a foot or an inch of intervention beyond the temple wall means devastation.... The [maintenance of] Confucian Temple is much more significant than road construction. [The government] should locate the new road elsewhere to avoid the destruction of the Temple, but not the other way round." In another petition, the staff explicitly accused the Guangxi Clique for

Guomin zhengfu shiqi de difang paixi yishi, pp.130-1.

¹²⁵ HZRB, 19 February, 1919.

¹²⁶ For Kang's argument, see HZRB, 6 February, 23 June, 1919; JZFGB, xiu no.84, 25 June, 1919, p.16.

¹²⁷ HZRB, 27 March, 1919.



stationing large troops in the Temple and arbitrarily destroying the building.¹²⁸ The three altars were finally demolished in March, 1919, in spite of mass petitions and opposition.¹²⁹

This conflict was partially a result of the Municipal Office's departure from traditional practice in local administration. The accepted procedure was that the local government first consulted intermediate-level institutions such as charitable organizations and the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce before reaching a final decision on any important issue. Therefore, the Guangzhou elite, the gentry in the case of the Confucian Temple, were shaken when the Municipal Office adopted an uncompromising attitude in road construction, bypassing the stage of consultation and jumping directly to the stage of action. As the officials of the Municipal Office, notably Yang Yongtai and Wei Bangping, maintained friendly relations with the Guangxi military leaders, the critics associated the policy of the Municipal Office with the oppressive rule of the Guangxi Clique in Guangdong. It is therefore not surprising that the opposition campaign raised the banner of "Guangdong for the Guangdong people" in fighting against the widening of Fuxue Street East.

The reclamation of the Western Moat: a case study

The Municipal Office proclaimed in January, 1920 that the Western Moat would be reclaimed for the construction of a wide road. Traffic along the Moat was to be suspended immediately. Similar to the case of Fuxue Street East, the proclamation was immediately opposed in Xiguan and the northern suburbs. Residents there feared that turning the Western Moat into an underground sewer would terminate river trans-

¹²⁸ For the staff's accusations, see *HZRB*, 13 March, 5 April, 1919.



port in Xiguan and the northern suburbs, and in turn affect water discharge, sanitation, commerce and other aspects of livelihood in the affected districts. The opposition gained widespread support. Members of the Wenlan Academy wrote to the Civil Governor complaining that the stoppage of nightsoil transportation from Upper Xiguan and the northern suburbs had resulted in serious sanitary problems.¹³⁰ The Merchants' Volunteer Corps supported the critics' attempt to "assert their responsibility in maintaining justice in the locality".¹³¹ One petition stated:

"Guangzhou is for the Guangzhou people, not for the handful of people in charge of the Municipal Office. Now the Municipal Office... has absolutely violated the principles of the Constitution-Protection Campaign."¹³²

Although the opposition became city-wide, as shown by the union of the "nine charitable halls", the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce, the press, and the representatives of the affected streets, the Municipal Office ignored all criticisms.¹³³ The Western Moat was reclaimed in June, 1920.¹³⁴ The city-wide opposition in this case demonstrated the different understanding between the Municipal Office and its critics as regards the fate of river transport in the city. The Municipal Office placed great emphasis on road transport, and the traditional dependence on river transport was discarded in favor of a land transport network. There were similar cases of reclaiming inland streams along the Pearl River, such as the stream at the Vegetable Market (*Cailan*) near the Wuxian Gate.¹³⁵ The Municipal Office only promoted cross-river transport on the Pearl River. For the city proper, land transport was deemed to be the sole

¹²⁹ HZRB, 17 March, 1919.


¹³⁰ HZRB, 28 January, 1920.

¹³¹ HZRB, 30 January, 1920.

¹³² HZRB, 3 March, 1920.

¹³³ HZRB, 9 February, 1920.

¹³⁴ HZRB, 12 May, 1920.



means of transportation.¹³⁶ Although there were occasional reports of increased flooding after the reclamation of moats and rivers due to carelessness or the employment of improper techniques, the work of the Municipal Office marked the beginning of a long process of transforming river transport to land transport.¹³⁷

Although the opposition campaigns did not stop the Municipal Office from proceeding with the road project, they had forced the Office to amend some details of the plan. The width of a few roads was reduced from 100 to 80 feet. After the high tide of opposition subsided, the Municipal Office found that the reduction was unwise as the completed roads were not wide enough to carry the increasing flow of rickshaws and pedestrians. The anticipated operation of a tramway only made the problem worse. However, it was too late to take remedial steps, and wider roads could only be constructed in the less populated eastern suburbs. The Municipal Office planned to construct a model road in Dongguan, with a width of 150 to 200 feet.¹³⁸

The construction of the tramway


The planning

The idea of introducing a tramway service in Guangzhou was not new. As mentioned in Chapter Four, proposals for the installation of tramway in the city had been made by private parties. In early 1917, T.R.E. MacInnes, a Canadian lawyer, made a concrete proposal to Civil Governor Zhu Qinglan, but it was not successful at that time. When the Municipal Office was formed, it tried to put tramway construction in concert

¹³⁵ HZRB, 8 May, 14 August, 1919.

¹³⁶ For the Municipal Office's attempt to introduce reform on cross-river transport on the Pearl River, see HZRB, 26 March, 16 August, 17 December, 1919.

¹³⁷ There was an account about the growing seriousness of flooding near the Eastern Moat after its being reclaimed. See HZRB, 6 August, 1919.



with the progress of road construction. While the phase one road project was promulgated in March, 1919, the Municipal Office made an advertisement one month before, inviting bids for the construction of a tramway.¹³⁹ As there was no response, re-advertisements were made twice in May. Finally, it was again T.R.E. MacInnes and his associate Wu Jipan who made to the bid.¹⁴⁰ They formed the “Guangzhou Tramway Company Limited” (*Guangzhou dianche gongsi*) and signed a contract with the Municipal Office in early August.¹⁴¹ The Municipal Office and the Company thereby agreed that the Municipal Office would first complete the road for tramway construction in eight months after the contract was signed, that is, in April, 1920, and the Company would then immediately lay down tram rails on the road and operate trams in December, 1920.¹⁴² Surveying was not conducted until March, 1920.¹⁴³ A concrete plan of laying rails was adopted as late as July when the Municipal Office completed the roads scheduled for tramway construction.¹⁴⁴ However, this plan did not materialize for two reasons. Firstly, surveying was still not in progress, and secondly, the needed construction materials had not arrived from America.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, during the brief existence of the Municipal Office, the construction of a tramway remained at the

¹³⁸ HZRB, 22 December, 1919.

¹³⁹ HZRB, 28 February, 1919.

¹⁴⁰ “The Kwangtung Tramway Co., Ltd.”, *The Far Eastern Review*, September, 1922, pp.597-8; HZRB, 6 August, 1919; “Wu Jipan yu Guangzhou dianche gongsi”, *Guangzhou qiaojie zhi guang*, pp.67-9. A secondary source tells that Wu had formed such a tramway company in 1912 or 1913, with a capital of two million dollars. See Lin Jinzhi and Zhuang Weiji (ed.), *Jindai Huaqiao touzi guo nei qiye shi ziliaozuanbian* (*Guangdong juan*), pp.53, 73, 127-8, 371. However, such a statement is not supported by any other first-hand source materials.


¹⁴¹ The contract was recorded in newspapers. See HZRB, 9, 11-6, 18-20 August, 1919. This copy of the contract did not state the signing date. News reports stated that the contract was signed in the first few days of August, 1918. See HZRB, 2 August, 1919.

¹⁴² HZRB, 2 and 11 August, 1919.

¹⁴³ HZRB, 22 March, 1920.

¹⁴⁴ HZRB, 30 July, 1920.

¹⁴⁵ HZRB, 30 July, 16 October, 1920.



stage of preparation. The Company was saved from complete failure by operating six public non-rail bus routes in the city by the end of 1920.¹⁴⁶


The design of the tramway showed that it would be an important tool in revitalizing the ex-walled city. In September, 1919, the Tramway Company released its construction plan. There would be two routes, both starting at the Kowloon-Canton Railway Terminus. The first route headed north along Yuexiu Road South and Middle, turned west to Hui'ai Road, then turned south to Fengning Road and Taiping Road, then turned east to Yide Road, Taikang Road and Wanfu Road, and back to Yuexiu Road South and the Terminus (represented by the orange line in Map 4). The second route also headed north along Yuexiu Road, turned west to the newly constructed Dexuan Road, then turned south to Panfu Road, Changgeng Road and Fengning Road, then turned east to Guide Road, Danan Road and Wenming Road, and then turned south to Yuexiu Road South and back to the Terminus (represented by the purple line in Map 4).¹⁴⁷ These routes were called the “shortest routes” in the tramway contract. They corresponded to the routes laid down in the phase one road construction plan. The intention was to speed up the re-development of the existing walled city by providing an efficient mass transportation system.

Besides utilizing the planned tramway as an effective means to revitalize the old city, the Municipal Office also thought of using it to expand the geographical boundaries of the city. The Municipal Office invited the Company to construct tram rails connecting the Baiyun Mountain with the city proper. The Tramway Company promptly accepted this proposal.¹⁴⁸ This project was backed up by very sensible ra-

¹⁴⁶ *Jindai Guangzhou kou'an jingji shehui gaikuang: Yue haiguan baogao huiji*, p.663.

¹⁴⁷ *HZRB*, 2 September, 1919.

¹⁴⁸ *HZRB*, 12 December, 1919.




MAP 4 THE SHORTEST ROUTES OF THE PROPOSED TRAMWAY, 1919

KEYS

— The shortest routes of the proposed tramway


— Demolished city wall



tionales. The demolition of the city wall and the nearby residences stimulated demand of land in the city. Such demand was further intensified by the influx of population from Xiguan to evade periodic floodings which had become more and more serious. In order to reduce pressure on land, the Municipal Office encouraged urban expansion to the north of the city. This proposal demonstrated the government's ability in initiating propitious plans and taking appropriate actions, marking a departure from the past when merchants were the chief force of urban expansion whereas the local government only adopted remedial actions, such as extending the city wall to the developed areas. However, this ambitious plan was not raised again after the brief existence of the Municipal Office, as the Tramway Company could not even complete the planned routes in the walled city throughout the Republican period.

Opposition to the Tramway Company

The slow progress made by the Tramway Company was largely due to the prolonged debate on the legitimacy of the Company. This controversy was caused by the outburst of nationalistic sentiment following Japan's aggression in China. The notorious Twenty-one Demands in 1915 and the secret agreement signed between the northern regime and Japan sanctioning Japan's occupation of Shandong in 1918 made the Chinese more alert to any issue which might cause national humiliation. The advertisement released by the Municipal Office in February, 1919 stated that both Chinese and foreign capital were acceptable for contracting the tramway project. In March, there was a rumor that a Japanese company had bid for the contract and had met with positive response from the Municipal Office. This aroused anti-Japanese sentiments. The "nine charitable halls" and Beijing officials of Guangdong origin made strong protest to the Municipal Office. Yang Yongtai denied the rumor, but it was verified by



the order of Obata Yukichi, the Japanese Minister in Beijing, to the Mitsui & Co. to annul the tramway contract with the Guangzhou Municipal Office.¹⁴⁹

The May Fourth demonstrations inflamed the issue. The Provincial Assemblymen sent three petitions to Civil Governor Zhai Wang from May to July, questioning the legitimacy of the Municipal Office in initiating tramway construction. Parliament members of Guangdong origin, who had moved to Guangzhou in answering the call of the Constitution-Protection Campaign, also warned Zhai that the Municipal Office's arbitrary and humiliating decision in inviting foreign capital had abused the legislative power of the Provincial Assembly and the executive power of the Civil Governor. They regarded the tramway project as well as other construction plans of the Municipal Office as the cause of mass resistance in the city. The Office should therefore suspend all of these projects.¹⁵⁰


The debate turned white-hot for two reasons, namely, the signing of the contract with the Guangzhou Tramway Company in early August and Yang Yongtai's open claim that the tramway contract did not need the approval of the Provincial Assembly.¹⁵¹ The province was under a wave of protests.¹⁵² The Provincial Assemblymen and Parliament members of Guangdong origin formed the backbone of the protests, and local gentry, merchants and students were their allies. In August, they devoted all their energy in denouncing the tramway contract, convening criticism meetings and press conferences, and submitting at least two petitions to the Civil Governor. They also sought extra-provincial support by sending telegrams to provincial assemblies of

¹⁴⁹ For the opposition in March, 1919, see *HZRB*, 8 February, 17-8, 25 and 27 March, 1919.

¹⁵⁰ *HZRB*, 24 May, 10 and 21 June, 28 July 1919.

¹⁵¹ For Yang's attitude, see *HZRB*, 5 August, 1919.

¹⁵² For the Municipal Office's reply, see *HZRB* 6 August, 1919.



other provinces, Guangdong natives in other parts of China and overseas, and the British Ministers in Beijing and Shamian. A special group was formed by the Provincial Assembly to investigate into the tramway issue.

In September, 1919, the critics organized themselves into a union, called the Guangzhou Tramway Remedial Society (*Guangzhou dianche bujiu hui*). It was composed of Provincial Assemblymen, Parliament members of Guangdong origin, charitable organizations including Huixing, Guangren, Aiyu, Guangji, Fangbian and Runshen, and various *hangs* such as the boots and shoes *hang* and the cattlehide *hang*. This organization aimed at nullifying the “humiliating” tramway contract.¹⁵³ It established branch offices in other Guangdong cities such as Shantou.¹⁵⁴ Its attempt nevertheless failed as both the Municipal Office and the Tramway Company refused to acknowledge the Society. The Company rejected the Society’s suggestion of inviting Chinese capital.¹⁵⁵ The Company finally secured registration of its contract by the Ministry of Communications in November, 1919 by fulfilling the stipulations in the *Electricity and Associated Business Regulations*.¹⁵⁶

Disappointed by the Society’s failure, the Provincial Assemblymen resorted to making personal accusations. They singled out Yang Yongtai for criticism in mid-October, blaming his “autocracy” with regard to the tramway issue and the demolition of the city wall.¹⁵⁷ Cen Tao, a Provincial Assemblyman who had accused both Yang Yongtai and Wei Bangping for collaboration in the tramway “conspiracy”, was arrested


¹⁵³ See *HZRB*, 12, 16-8, 26 September, 1919.

¹⁵⁴ *HZRB*, 29 October, 1919.

¹⁵⁵ *HZRB*, 27 October, 1919.

¹⁵⁶ *HZRB*, 25-6 November, 1919.

¹⁵⁷ *HZRB*, 15 October, 1919.



by the Police.¹⁵⁸ This further provoked the masses and the Provincial Assemblymen. They added Wei Bangping to their list of persons for condemnation.

In spite of enlisting support from overseas Chinese and Beijing officials of Guangdong origin, the Society actually could do nothing to stop the progress of municipal construction.¹⁵⁹ The Society was finally dissolved in March, 1920, and it frankly admitted that its challenge was ineffective as the government never yielded on its construction plans.¹⁶⁰ However, the progress of the work of the Company was slow after the subsidence of the opposition campaign, as the Company lacked sufficient capital and a stable social environment.

An analysis of the tramway event

Summarizing the contents of criticisms, we can see that the prime concern of the critics was the legality of the procedures under which the contract was signed. The Provincial Assemblymen stood firm in defending their rights vested in the *Provisional Regulations of Provincial Assembly*. Article 16 (e) of the *Provisional Regulations* stated that the Provincial Assembly had the power to “resolve [issues relating to] the disposal and acquisition of provincial property and construction.”¹⁶¹ According to the Provincial Assembly, the tramway issue definitely involved the issue of construction in the provincial capital, and the acquisition of public property for such construction. Therefore, the Municipal Office should seek prior approval from the Assembly. However, the Municipal Office retorted that tramway construction was neither a “disposal”

¹⁵⁸ HZRB, 1 November, 1919.

¹⁵⁹ For the support from overseas Chinese and Beijing officials of Guangdong origin, see HZRB, 10 November, 19 December, 1919.

¹⁶⁰ HZRB, 22 March, 1920.

¹⁶¹ For this regulation, see *Chongding xianxing faling jiyao*, vol.1.



nor an “acquisition”, but a “creation” for the purpose of provincial construction. Therefore, it was not necessary to submit the contract to the Provincial Assembly for approval. This argument was criticized by the Provincial Assemblymen as an intentional distortion of the *Provisional Regulations*. They insisted that the construction of the tramway was based on the completion of modern broad roads, which was unquestionably related to the “disposal” and “acquisition” of provincial property and construction. Ex-Civil Governor Zhu Qinglan agreed in 1917 that future tramway projects would be subject to approval by the Provincial Assembly. Even General Chen Jiongming, who had been ex-Civil Governor of Guangdong, commented that the Provincial Assembly’s sanction was necessary.¹⁶² The Provincial Assembly’s firm opposition to the Municipal Office’s arrangement was not only based on its interpretation of the *Provisional Regulations of the Provincial Assembly* but also due to its fear that it might lose the power to exert influence over the operation of the Company under the existing contract. There were further legal problems. Firstly, the Municipal Office did not send the contract to the Ministry of Communications for registration and this violated the *Electricity and Associated Business Regulations*. Secondly, Wu Jipan, a director of the Tramway Company, was concurrently a department head of the Ministry of Justice of the southern regime. This was definitely a violation of the *Civil Service Regulations* which stipulated that civil servants should not be involved in the management of any commercial entities.¹⁶³

Another concern of the critics was the appropriateness of the terms of the contract. Allowing one-third of the capital to be non-native capital was questioned. The critics

¹⁶² HZRB, 28 March, 1919.

¹⁶³ Wu served in the legal field in Guangdong since the establishment of the Republic. He was the Chief Judge of the Senior Court of Guangdong in 1913. See Chen Yanghe and Huang Juyan (ed.), *Minguo Guangdong zhengfu jigou yanghe he zuzhi fagui xuanbian*, p.425.



believed that British intervention was inevitable as the Company was registered in Hong Kong. To the critics, the contract had vested the Company with enormous power but too little responsibility. The Company was allowed to operate a non-rail tramway, so it might monopolize Guangzhou's transportation by operating buses in addition to railed trams. Furthermore, the geographical scope of the tramway operation was not defined clearly. The contract only stated that a radius of ten miles centering on the Civil Governor's office be the area for tramway construction, but no detailed route maps except the one showing the "shortest routes" was drawn up. For the 20-year franchise, the Company only needed to pay a sum of one million dollars to the Municipal Office for the demolition of city wall and the construction roads, and it had no other financial obligations to the Municipal Office during the contract period. The critics were particularly annoyed by Articles 34, 35 and 36 of the contract. They stated that the government had to reimburse the Company in order to redeem control of the tramway and associated fixed assets after the termination of the existing contract. The Company might extend its franchise if the government failed to reimburse the Company. Each extension would last for three years, and the number of extensions could be unlimited if the government did not reimburse the Company.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, any disagreement shall be resolved by an arbitrator who, as the critics thought, would unequivocally be a foreigner and sympathetic to the Company. The critics feared that the above franchise would turn the whole of Guangzhou city into a foreign concession.¹⁶⁵

The ultra-sense of protectionism of the critics induced them to further challenge the position of the local government as a signatory party. The Military and Civil Governors and the Municipal Office formed on signatory party, and Wu Jipan, T.R.E. Mac-

¹⁶⁴ SB, 2 September, 1919.



Innes and Sam Kee (an overseas Chinese merchant in Vancouver) formed the other. It was a national humiliation, according to the critics, that the government entered into a contract with a foreign company.¹⁶⁶ The rumor that the Company bribed government officials and some Provincial Assemblymen for a sum for 0.6 million dollars, and the fact that the Company changed its title from "Guangzhou" to "Guangdong", which implied the possible expansion of business from Guangzhou to the whole province, further agitated the critics.¹⁶⁷

These two concerns of the critics presented problems to the Municipal Office. The Municipal Office's legal status was weak. Facing the argument of the Provincial Assembly that the construction of tramway was associated with the issue of property disposal over which the Provincial Assembly had the right of jurisdiction, the Municipal Office actually had no legal grounds for debate. It was observed that it chose to evade this issue and merely addressed the contract terms in later public replies.¹⁶⁸ The severe attack by the Provincial Assembly could be viewed as a response to the "challenge" of the Municipal Office which, according to the Provincial Assemblymen, was illegitimate since the Office had infringed on the power of the Assembly in carrying out its municipal programs. The Provincial Assembly's denunciation of the Municipal Office was shown by the fact that it never communicated directly with the Municipal Office. It only communicated with the Civil Governor, as it regarded the Office as merely a branch office of the Civil Governor.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ HZRB, 27 September, 1919.

¹⁶⁶ HZRB, 24 September, 1919.

¹⁶⁷ For the speeches and activities of the critics in August, 1919, see HZRB, 4, 9, 13-5, 18, 20, 26-30 August, 2 September, 1919; SB, 2 September, 1919.


¹⁶⁸ For example, see the Municipal Office's lengthy explanation to the Civil Governor in HZRB, 16-20, 22-7, 29 September, 2 and 4 October, 1919.

¹⁶⁹ For example, see the petitions by the Provincial Assemblymen to the Civil Governor in HZRB, 24,



The reasoning that the contract would lead to predominant foreign interest and control was rooted in the mistrust of the ability and power of the Municipal Office. Actually, the tramway contract granted enormous regulatory power to the Municipal Office concerning the operation of the Tramway Company. Every regulation and order drafted by the Company concerning the tramway and the administration of the Company needed the approval of the Municipal Office (Article 13). The Company's plan of extending and laying tram rails on roads also needed the sanction of the Municipal Office (Article 15). The Municipal Office also had power to regulate fares (Articles 10 and 11), the use of energy by the trams (Article 12), speed-limits on roads (Articles 27 and 28), the construction of plants and other buildings (Article 14), sanitation on the trams (Articles 16 and 19), the conditions of the trams and fixed assets (Article 20), and accounting affairs (Article 39). It also regulated the Company to secure insurance with agencies approved by the Municipal Office (Article 21) and to bear responsibility when casualties occurred (Article 29). Moreover, it had the power to use the rails from 1 a.m. to 4 a.m. (Article 17) and could order the suspension of tram services and the demolition of electricity poles without compensation (Articles 25 and 26). Any stationing of foreign troops making use of the excuse of foreign capital investment was strictly prohibited (Article 37). The most important clause was that the contract could be automatically annulled if the Company violated any articles in the contract, postponed payment of the stipulated amount of contributions up to three months, failed to proceed according to the contract, and/or stopped operation up to seven days (Article 33).¹⁷⁰ In retrospect, these Articles were effective in ensuring the proper operation of the Company and preventing any unreasonable and illegal expansion.

May, 10 June, 28 July, 18 and 29 August, 1919.




sion of business. The Company acted in accordance with the stipulations of the contract, such as the prompt payment of contributions in installments to the Municipal Office.¹⁷¹

It was the Municipal Office's departure from traditional practices that invited suspicion from society. The Municipal Office adopted a business-like approach on the tramway issue. The drawing up of the tramway contract actually followed the principles of civil laws. The Municipal Office did not pretend to be a superior party to the Tramway Company. They were equal signatory parties of the contract. Besides the contribution of one million *yuan* for demolishing the city wall and constructing roads, the Municipal Office could not act like former local governments and "squeeze" the Company for more money. When conflicts arose, the Municipal Office and the Tramway Company would invite a third party, that is, an arbitrator for mediation. The Municipal Office could also redeem the Tramway Company after the termination of the contract in order to take over the ownership of the tramway. However, this new municipal experiment based on new principles was not appreciated by the critics.

Frankly speaking, the controversy over the tramway contract was largely a result of the prevailing sense of conspiracy. Riding on the wave of anti-imperialism under the influence of the May Fourth Movement, the critics judged that the incorporation of foreign interests in the tramway project was an act of national humiliation that would lead to foreign "colonization" of the city. Cases of Sino-foreign cooperation in local construction were not rare, and the Chinese government had never conceived it as improper or humiliating to enter into binding contracts with foreigners. One example is a loan contracted for construction in Hankou signed in 1914 with the central govern-

¹⁷⁰ For the contract articles, see *HZRB*, 9, 11-6, 18-20, August, 1919.



ment as one party, and Samuel & Co., Ltd, a British firm, as the other party. Representatives of both parties formed a committee to ensure the proper use of the money.¹⁷² Contrary to the viewpoints of the critics, commoners and merchants had conceived of foreign investment not as a sign of national humiliation, but security. National flags of foreign countries were hung outside shops, and shop premises were mortgaged to foreign insurance companies rather than native ones. Moreover, it was common for Chinese companies to set up their headquarters in Hong Kong. On the other hand, department stores such as Sincere, Daxin and Zhenguang as well as other Hong Kong enterprises operated branches in Guangzhou.¹⁷³ Therefore, allowing the Tramway Company to include foreign or overseas Chinese capital and to register in Hong Kong should be regarded as a tactics of the Municipal Office to enhance the Company's credibility and facilitate faster completion.

Other constructions

The need for demolishing the city wall and constructing broad roads had prompted the provincial officials to form the Municipal Office. However, once the Office was formed, it no longer restricted construction to the above two areas. It prioritized the construction items and devised two stages of construction. As mentioned above, the first stage of construction also included the planning of gardens and marketplaces. The Municipal Office planned to build three “city gardens”. The proposed site of the First Garden was at the ex-yamen office of the Qing Civil Governor, the Second Garden at the East Parade Ground in Dongguan and the Third Garden at Haizhu along the

¹⁷¹ See HZRB, 18 September, 15 October, 1919; 22 January, 1920.

¹⁷² Wang Tieya (ed.), *Zhong wai jiu yuezhang huibian*, vol.2, pp.1072-6.

¹⁷³ See the explanation of the Municipal Office in HZRB, 25 September, 1919.



Bund. In addition, a race course was to be constructed in Yantang, modeled on those of Shanghai and Hong Kong. Only the First Garden showed steady progress in construction. However, all the above plans did not materialize up to the time of dissolution of the Municipal Office.¹⁷⁴


The Municipal Office made slightly more progress in the construction of market-places. The Yushan Market, rebuilt on the site of the ex-Yushan Guandi Temple, was opened on 1 August 1920. A grand opening ceremony was held, and it attracted a large flow of customers. However, the opening of this market had been postponed for exactly half a year. The success of the Yushan Market aroused the ambition of the Municipal Office which then planned the establishment of an additional fifteen markets.¹⁷⁵

In addition to the planned construction projects, the Municipal Office never turned a deaf ear to municipal issues of various kinds. As its title implied, the Municipal Office had to deal with *shizheng*, that is, city administration of a wider scope. In August, 1920, the Municipal Office resolved that the Six Artery Ditches should be drained regularly. This decision was justified by the fact that there was no dredging since 1913, and that the completion of new roads would considerably reduce their discharge capacity. Yang Yongtai, then concurrently Civil Governor, ordered the Finance Department to assign 19,400 *yuan* for dredging the ditches, and stipulated that such dredging should be conducted annually.¹⁷⁶ The Office also enjoyed wide regulation power. For example, it stipulated regulations governing automobiles and architecture along the

¹⁷⁴ For the construction of gardens and horse race court, see *HZRB*, 19 October, 18 November, 1918; 15 January, 3, 14, 17 and 29 March, 3-4 April, 28 May, 1919; 15 and 21 January, 2 August, 1920; *SB*, 29 March, 1919.

¹⁷⁵ For market construction, see *HZRB*, 13 May, 1919; 20 and 27 July, 3, 24 and 26 August, 1920.

¹⁷⁶ *HZRB*, 31 August, 7 September, 1920.



Bund.¹⁷⁷ It took over power from the Police to supervise construction in the city proper and in all suburbs.¹⁷⁸

The Municipal Office attempted to exert supervision over the public utilities. The Guangzhou residents had long been dissatisfied with the impurity of tap water. In 1919, the Municipal Office requested the Tap Water Company to construct more water storage tanks and filtering tanks, and to build a bacteria laboratory. In 1920, the Office issued an order to the Company emphasizing the need to maintain the pumping capability of the waterworks.¹⁷⁹

Conclusion

Before the establishment of the Municipal Office, Guangzhou witnessed different developments in different areas. The Bund represented modern material civilization. Residents and merchants tasted the benefits brought by modern infrastructure, and welcomed urban construction as a means to generate more fortunes. In contrast, the walled city represented a pre-modern or traditional urban phenomenon. Narrow lanes packed with shops and passers-by formed a characteristic urban scene in the walled city. Sedan chairs and bamboo poles were still the primary means of transport of people and goods. Residents did not understand the importance of municipal construction. In theory, they had no reason to oppose road construction, but they did not see the necessity of building broad roads. They were not willing to lose anything before they could gain something from municipal construction.

One of the achievements of the Municipal Office was its forceful efforts in bring-

¹⁷⁷ HZRB, 28 April, 1919; 27 July, 1920.

¹⁷⁸ HZRB, 19 March, 1919.

¹⁷⁹ HZRB, 11 December, 1919; 28 August, 1920.



ing about drastic urban transformation, introducing the concepts of “construction” and “change” to the city residents. The successful demolition of the city wall helped to dismantle the prevailing conservatism of the residents, which had hindered the progress of the modernization of the city. This change of mentality laid an important foundation for further municipal construction, as shown by the fact that subsequent road construction under the Guangzhou Municipality was quite welcomed by the residents. Therefore, the determined implementation of urban reform by the Municipal Office provided an indispensable linkage between tradition and modernity.

Another accomplishment of the Municipal Office was the change of the city outlook. The Guangzhou Maritime Customs praised the Office’s resolute attitude in conducting municipal reforms.¹⁸⁰ The Military Government also acknowledged the Municipal Office’s fast transformation of the city appearance and the resultant growth in commerce, transportation, taxation and so forth.¹⁸¹ Wei Bangping made the following remarks in his resignation letter in December, 1920:

“... Now, the stage one plan is almost completed, except for gardens, markets and welfare factories. The thousand-year old constructions are cleared. Roads can reach everywhere. Observing the views of the majority of people, they show a positive attitude of acceptance. This is advantageous to the future of municipal construction....”¹⁸²

The completion of the two primary tasks of the first-stage plan, that is, the demolition of the city wall and construction of roads, was a momentous achievement of the Municipal Office. This achievement brought about a sense of superiority to Guangzhou. The Municipal Office proposed to stage an exposition to spread its experience of mu-

¹⁸⁰ “Canton Trade Report”, *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports*, 1919, p.1016.

¹⁸¹ *JZFGB*, xiu no.212, 25 September, 1919, pp.26-7.

¹⁸² *HZRB*, 15 December, 1920.



nicipal construction to other Chinese cities.¹⁸³ It directly influenced the formation of municipal offices in other cities. For example, Huiyang county of Guangdong Province established a municipal office modeled on that of Guangzhou.¹⁸⁴

However, there was one point of difference between the municipal institutions of Huiyang and Guangzhou. The former was primarily a merchant-dominated institution, while the latter was a bureaucratic establishment. The Municipal Office of Guangzhou was a special commission under the provincial government to deal specifically with the municipal construction of the city. In reality, the Municipal Office had undergone a process of power concentration. As mentioned above, the Office took over some power from the Police, such as issuing construction certificates to property owners. The Police Department had made a proposal to shift the responsibility of all tasks concerning sanitation and construction regulations to the Municipal Office.¹⁸⁵ The Office could directly call meetings with the district police officers to discuss urban matters.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, the Nanhai and Panyu county offices considered moving away from Guangzhou because the Municipal Office had become an effective city governance and the co-existence of the county governments and the Office in the same city was clearly an administrative overlap.¹⁸⁷ It was therefore not surprising that some Western observers recognized the Municipal Office as the first municipal government of Guangzhou.¹⁸⁸

However, the existence of institutional weaknesses of the Municipal Office pro-

¹⁸³ *HZRB*, 5 December, 1919.


¹⁸⁴ *HZRB*, 15 February, 1919.

¹⁸⁵ *HZRB*, 20 January, 1920.

¹⁸⁶ *HZRB*, 14 April, 1919.

¹⁸⁷ *HZRB*, 28 May, 1920.

¹⁸⁸ For example, see *Who's Who in China* (2th ed.), pp.292-3.



duced waves of protest. First of all, it was not based on popular support. The lack of representativeness made this institution open to attack by charitable organizations, the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce and even Confucian followers, especially when their interests were threatened in the process of municipal construction. However, the Guangzhou people seemed to have employed the concept of “representativeness” as a pretext for attack rather than as a goal to pursue. A small number of Xiguan residents formed themselves into a new body called the Preparatory Committee for Self-Government in Guangzhou City (*Guangzhou shi zizhi choubei hui*) in early 1920. It aimed at promoting autonomy in Guangzhou. Zhang Jingfang, the Civil Governor, ordered its immediate dissolution on the ground that the local self-governing system had not been determined.¹⁸⁹ There was no observable resistance after the issuance of the dissolution order, and it can be interpreted that the Guangzhou residents did not really devote themselves to building up an institution with wide representativeness. Opposition to the Municipal Office was energized by other factors, notably the Office’s unclear status in city governance and its conceivably pro-Guangxi orientations. The attack of the Provincial Assembly and other critics on the demolition of the city wall and the tramway contact showed that the Municipal Office’s primary institutional weakness was its confusing status as a city government without the needed legal support. Justification by the executive arm of the provincial government was conceived by critics as a conspiracy of the oppressive Guangxi military leaders in Guangzhou. The prevalence of radical nationalistic emotion only intensified the attack based on the above reasoning.

The wave of opposition did not significantly affect the progress of the work of the

¹⁸⁹ HZRB, 27 January, 1920.



Municipal Office. To recognize the success of the Municipal Office does not mean denying the original profit-seeking objective which led to the formation of the Municipal Office or the possibility that the persons in charge of the Municipal Office had made use of the new institution for personal gains.¹⁹⁰ Judging from the impressive work of the Municipal Office, it is unquestionable that the experience of the Municipal Office had laid a solid foundation for further municipal construction. It created the concept of “city” as a new level of local government, embracing the ex-walled city, the immediate surrounding areas previously considered as the suburbs, and the more remote outskirts. Its success showed that both the re-development of the decaying walled city and the development of new areas were within the interest and ability of the Municipal Office. Municipal construction would go ahead, but the municipal institution needed to perfect itself by developing a more legitimate administrative relationship with the provincial government and a more diversified and comprehensive range of functions.

This came true with the establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality in 1921.

¹⁹⁰ Yang Yongtai's ambition has been discussed in this chapter. It was reported that Wei Bangping, who regarded himself as the father of municipal construction in Guangzhou, struggled to be the new mayor after the return of Chen Jiongming. See Cheng Tiangu, *Cheng Tiangu huiyilu*, p.114.



Chapter Seven

The Guangzhou Municipality, 1921-25

Building on the remarkable accomplishment of the Municipal Office, municipal construction in Guangzhou was pushed to another high tide in late 1920. Following the return of the *Yuejun* (Guangdong Army) under the commandership of Chen Jiongming and the re-establishment of the Military Government headed by Sun Yatsen in Guangzhou, the Municipal Office was transformed and a new municipal institution entitled *Guangzhou shi shizhengting* (Guangzhou Municipality) was established on 15 February, 1921. This new institution was praised by contemporaries and historians for its contribution to modernization and local autonomy. Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yatsen and the first Mayor of the newly formed Guangzhou Municipality, praised the Municipality as an “unprecedented municipal institution” in China.¹ Wu Tie-cheng, Head of the Bureau of Public Safety, Guangzhou Municipality from 1923 to 1926 and Mayor of Greater Shanghai from 1932 to 1936, publicly praised the Guangzhou Municipality as the “first municipal government ever established in China”.² Since Sun Fo was the drafter of the *Provisional Regulations of the Guangzhou Municipality* (*Guangzhou shi zhanxing tiaoli*, hereafter *Provisional Regulations*), he was honored as the chief architect of the Municipality and a pioneer in the inauguration of a municipal system in China.³ However, the origins of the Guangzhou Municipality was far more compli-

¹ SZGY, preface.

² Wu Teh-chen (Wu Tiecheng), “Greater Shanghai - Its Present and Future”, *People's Tribute*, 1932-33, p.403. The term *Gong'an ju* appeared in various English versions of the *Provisional Regulations of the Guangzhou Municipality* as “Bureau of Public Safety” instead of “Bureau of Public Security”. (See Appendix 2) Therefore, the term “Bureau of Public Safety” will be adopted in this thesis.

³ See the commemorative article written by Hu Mulan, the daughter of Hu Hanmin in *Sun Zhesheng xiansheng jinian ji*, pp.95-7; Sun Fo, “Ba shi shu lüe”, *Zhuanji wenxue*, no.137, Oct., 1973, p.10;




cated. Sun Fo's achievements would not have materialized if the political heavy-weights in Guangzhou such as Chen Jiongming and Sun Yatsen had not given their approval and support. For such an important institution, which was the first Chinese municipality initiated by the Chinese, the existing literature has not satisfactorily explained its origins, operation and relationship with various political and social forces in Guangzhou which witnessed intense political struggles between Sun Yatsen's party, the local militarists and other local social forces.⁴

This chapter will examine this important issue by addressing the following questions: To what extent was the establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality based on awareness of the shortcomings of the Municipal Office? What were the relative roles played by Chen Jiongming, Sun Yatsen and the GMD, and Sun Fo in transforming the Municipal Office and establishing the Guangzhou Municipality? Why and how did the Municipality take the form that it did? To what extent did the Municipality model itself on Western municipal institutions? What were its goals? How successful was the Municipality in modernizing the city in terms of city planning and construction? What difficulties did it face and how did it solve its "legitimacy crisis"? How successful was it in gaining popularity in the local social context?

Jiaoyubu, *Zhonghua minguo jianguo shi*, vol.2, p.154; Jin Bingliang, "Sun Fo yu Guangzhou shizheng jianshe", *Lingnan wenshi*, no.20, 1991, pp.30-6.

⁴ The picture depicted by primary source materials, such as the memoirs of Sun Fo and Cheng Tiangu, is always incomplete. While Sun bragged about his own role in founding the Guangzhou Municipality, Cheng only put emphasis on the great support rendered by Chen Jiongming for the founding of the Municipality. See Sun Ke, "Guangzhou shizheng yishu", *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.1, no.3, 1971, pp.3-10; Cheng Tiangu, *Cheng Tiangu huiyilu*, pp.111-2. For secondary source materials, Lai Jeh-Hang studied the Guangzhou Municipality in his Ph.D. thesis entitled *A Study of a Faltering Democrat: The Life of Sun Fo, 1891-1949*. The study is clear in presenting data on Sun Fo's work during his three mayorships in the 1920s, but discussion is quite sketchy on the contribution made by Chen Jiongming and Sun Fo to the establishment of the Municipality and its subsequent operations.



The Guangzhou Municipality in the political context

The dénouement of the Municipal Office

The necessity of establishing a new municipal institution was partially rooted in the predicament of the Municipal Office. Yang Yongtai, a member of the Political Study Clique and regarded by Sun Yatsen and the GMD as an enemy, resigned as Governor on 26 October, 1920, one week before Chen Jiongming occupied Guangzhou with his *Yuejun*.⁵ Sun Fo was appointed as an assistant director of the Office by Chen on 8 November.⁶ As many staff in the Office were followers of Yang Yongtai, they resigned collectively in the subsequent months in view of unforeseeable political changes.⁷ A further blow to this demoralized institution was the resignation of Wei Bangping, another director of the Office.⁸ Therefore, reform was urgent in order to revive both the institution and the functions.

Another common belief regarding the necessity of reforming the municipal institution was the functional weakness of the Municipal Office. Sun Fo, the founder of the Guangzhou Municipality, had produced a rather authoritative interpretation that was later often quoted to explain the origins of the Municipality:

“The old institution [the Municipal Office] was restricted to the demolition of the city wall and road construction. The task was too simple and the institution was far from perfect.”⁹

This interpretation is correct when the work of the Municipal Office is compared with that of the subsequent Guangzhou Municipality whose work was much more comprehensive in scope. However, the Office had clearly divided its work into two stages at

⁵ HZRB, 30 October, 1920.

⁶ Guangzhou shi dang'anguan: 4-01/1/263-2, “Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo”.

⁷ HZRB, 5 January, 1921.

⁸ HZRB, 15 December, 1920.

⁹ Sun Fo, “Guangzhou shizheng yishu”, *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.1, no.3, 1971, p.3.




its inception, and demolishing the city wall and constructing roads only constituted the first-stage tasks. Even if the Guangzhou Municipality had not been formed, the Municipal Office could have fulfilled its plan and developed into a true municipality independent of the provincial government and with comprehensive power.

According to Sun Fo, the establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality was a step to promote more radical municipal construction based on the plans and accomplishments of the Municipal Office. To Sun, the weaknesses and problems of the Municipal Office only provided the background but were not the driving force for reforming the Municipal Office. Sun Fo's role was actually far from decisive as portrayed in subsequent propaganda. This is not to refute Sun's key role in establishing the Guangzhou Municipality, only that he did not have the political power and charisma to decide on such an important change. The subsequent view that Sun Fo was the architect of the Guangzhou Municipality was due to his own posterior account which focused on his own efforts in reforming the old institution.¹⁰ Although Sun Fo took over the Municipal Office almost immediately after the defeat of the Guangxi Clique in Guangdong and had drafted the *Provisional Regulations*, it was actually Chen Jiongming who provided the idea to transform the Municipal Office. Chen proclaimed his plan of reform immediately after he arrived at Guangzhou, as reported by *Huazi ribao* on 6 November, 1920. This was a few days earlier than Sun Fo's appointment as Vice-Director of the Municipal Office.

Chen Jiongming's political outlook and personal ambitions

Chen Jiongming's idea of forming a municipality for urban construction was not

¹⁰ *Ibid.*



new in 1920. As mentioned in Chapter Four, he planned the establishment of a municipality when he served as Acting Military Governor of Guangdong.¹¹ Chen was welcomed as a reformist standing on the side of the Guangdong people. On the eve of his return to Guangdong in late 1920, he gained full support of the Guangdong people because they regarded him as a “liberator” who had expelled the Guangxi “bandits”.¹² An intelligence report of the Guangzhou Maritime Customs affirmed that Chen was recognized as leader of Guangzhou before Sun Yatsen arrived in the province in late November.¹³ The Guangdong people’s enthusiasm for and love of this leader was shown in an art exhibition held in the winter of 1921 where over two hundred portrait-paintings of Chen Jiongming were collected and displayed.¹⁴ His status in the province was legally confirmed by his appointment as Governor of Guangdong by the Military Government. As a result, Chen acquired the legitimacy to design a master plan for transforming Guangdong province. This plan was based on his previous construction experience in Zhangzhou, Fujian Province. During his brief stay in that town from 1919 to 1920, he had successfully introduced drastic reforms not only in public works but also in education and other fields of construction.¹⁵ Chen deemed it suitable to continue his Zhangzhou experience in Guangzhou, his new power base.¹⁶

The conception of “capital city” and “power base” had another meaning in Chen’s political ideology. A report in *Shen bao* described Chen’s idea of “model province”

¹¹ SB, 13 December, 1911.

¹² For example, see SB, 5 September, 1920.

¹³ Guangdong sheng dang’anguan, *Sun Zhongshan yu Guangdong: Guangdong sheng dang’anguan ku cang haiguan dang’an xuanyi*, p.199.

¹⁴ Hu Gentian, “Ershi niandai de Guangdong sheng di yi ci huazhan”, *Yangcheng jinggu*, no.3, June 1987, pp.50-1.

¹⁵ See SB, 17 August, 1919; 2 September, 1919; also Duan Yunzhang, Chen Min and Ni Junming, *Chen Jiongming de yi sheng*, pp.136-59.

¹⁶ SZGY, chapter on the “Municipality”, pp.1-2.



and “united autonomous provinces” as follows:


“[Chen Jiongming]... is determined to reform politics and rejuvenate [society] with mass support. His wish is to transform Guangdong into a model province and to abolish all governmental systems stipulated by the Central Government after Yuan [Shikai]’s usurpation of the Presidency. A Law Drafting Committee¹⁷ will be set up to formulate a provisional provincial system. As Guangdong is the cradle of revolution... a good system should be set up to serve as a model for other provinces. As the system of “united autonomous provinces” (*liansheng zizhi*) will be practiced after north and south China re-unify, the provinces will run their own governments. Therefore, Chen painstakingly plans the new system for this long-term goal.”¹⁸

To Chen, the take-over of Guangzhou meant the acquisition of a power base both for himself and for the realization of his “united autonomous provinces” ideal. Chen believed that the re-unification of China could not be achieved through battles and bloodshed. The only way to re-unify China was to establish self-government at the provincial level in the first place, and then to unify these self-governing provinces to form a Chinese government truly chosen “by the people”. He resolved to use his new power base in Guangdong as the engine to start the machine of the “united autonomous provinces” campaign. “If our Guangdong is successful in this experiment,” Chen commented, “people in other provinces will follow suit, and the campaign will spread to the whole of China.... China will consequently become an enormous federal government.”¹⁹ To construct a model autonomous province, Chen believed that Guangzhou had a special role to play as a showcase of new China. He “had the ambition to modernize Canton [Guangzhou] so that it could be the most advanced and progressive city

¹⁷ In Chinese, this committee was named *fazhi weiyuanhui*. However, reports in *HZRB* called it *shengzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui* (Provincial System Formulation Committee). See *HZRB*, 6 and 9 December, 1920.

¹⁸ *SB*, 30 November, 1920.

¹⁹ *Minguo ribao*, 18 February, 1921, quoted from Duan Yunzhang, Chen Min and Ni Junming, *Chen Jiongming de yi sheng*, pp.196-7.



in south China.”²⁰ A modern and well-planned provincial capital would demonstrate to other provinces the feasibility and superiority of Chen’s political ideology.


Before discussing the design of the Guangzhou Municipality, it is appropriate at this point to mention in some details Chen Jiongming’s other reforms in order to understand the nature of his rule in Guangdong. The post of Guangdong Military Governor (*dujun*) was annulled, and the Civil Governor represented the highest authority in the province. This aimed at eradicating military influence in the province, and concentrating the limited resources on constructing the province. Another cherished reform of this “model province” was the prohibition of gambling, an evil which was reportedly hated by many Guangdong people, especially the intellectuals and students. Gambling was totally banned after 1 December, 1920, and the Guangdong people held demonstrations to show their indebtedness to Chen. Students proposed to cast a statue of Chen to honor his fight against gambling.²¹

Chen also intended to make Guangzhou a center of “new culture”. He invited famous progressive scholars such as Chen Duxiu to visit and lecture in the province. Institutionally, he introduced elections at the county level. People who served as workers for three days in road construction were qualified to elect county magistrates.²² This important measure definitely formed the core of the “Guangdong for the Guangdong people” (*Yue ren zhi Yue*) policy which was supported by the masses who rejoiced in the withdrawal of the Guangxi militarists. However, the inauguration of elections in Chen’s “model province” also led to his control of local politics. Eligible electors in each county would elect three candidates for the magistracy and the Gover-

²⁰ Lai Jeh-Hang, *A Study of a Faltering Democrat: The Life of Sun Fo, 1891-1949*, p.16.

²¹ HZRB, 4 November, 1920.

²² Guangzhou shi shizhengting, *Guangzhou shi yangge shilie*, p.73.



nor, that is, Chen Jiongming, would exercise his discretion in picking one as the magistrate. Furthermore, Chen divided the province into twelve districts, each with a “rehabilitation office” (*shanhou chu*). The appointment of the office heads was under the complete discretion of the *Yuejun* Commander, that is, Chen Jiongming.²³ These offices worked in the name of rehabilitating the counties from the ravages of warfares with the Guangxi armies, but they actually served as an effective means for Chen Jiongming to replace Guangxi militarist rule by his own men. The above institutional reforms, which were the key components of Chen’s design of “new model Guangdong” (*mofan xin Guangdong*) and “united autonomous provinces”, were crucial in securing control over his newly acquired power base.

The above changes also help to explain Chen’s plan to establish the Guangzhou Municipality. Chen Jiongming learned from the experience of the Municipal Office that municipal construction would be seriously affected if the municipal organization did not have an independent budget and sources of income.²⁴ Making the planned Guangzhou Municipality financially independent was particularly crucial as Chen Jiongming did not have full control over provincial finance. After Chen returned to Guangzhou, he formed an alliance with Sun and shared power and resources with him. The post of the head of the provincial Department of Finance was filled by Liao Zhongkai, a firm follower of Sun Yatsen, who was concurrently Vice-Director of the Department of Finance of the Military Government.²⁵ In response to this arrangement and in view of the need to construct an advanced and progressive Guangzhou to glorify his

²³ Duan Yunzhang, Chen Min and Ni Junming, *Chen Jiongming de yi sheng*, pp.174; Lin Zhijun, Bi Lü and Zhong Linzhi, “Chen Jiongming pan Sun, liansheng zizhi ji min xuan xianzhang”, *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao*, no.9, October 1963, pp.168-75.

²⁴ For the deficit of the Municipal Office, see *HZRB*, 6 August, 1919; 18 November, 1920.

²⁵ *JZFGB* (guang zi), no.1, 4 December, 1920, p.5; no.2, 8 December, 1920, p.7.



political ideology, Chen thought it necessary to set up a municipality with independent sources of finance, a specified domain and a government with comprehensive power for the sake of efficient construction and the prevention of external intervention apart from himself. Later paragraphs in this chapter will show that the Guangzhou Municipality was accountable to the Governor, but not to the provincial government as a whole. The traditional administrative division of Guangzhou into Panyu and Nanhai counties was also deemed unsuitable, as Chen viewed it as one of the reasons for the slow development of the city and the institutional weakness of the Municipal Office.²⁶


The establishment of the Municipality

The split between Chen Jiongming and Sun Yatsen in 1922 did not imply that they were antagonistic to each other right after their return to Guangzhou in late 1920. They shared similar political orientations and ideas in reforming Guangzhou. Although Sun believed that his return to Guangzhou should be followed by the expansion of the GMD and the spread of revolutionary ideas to the ordinary people, he also sanctioned Chen's "united autonomous provinces" theory.²⁷ Sun also talked about the reform and construction of Guangzhou. His plan was to make Guangzhou the "southern great port" of China. In fact, his reform ideas pertaining to Guangzhou were referred to as the "third program" for the "International Development of China", which was later included in his *Jianguo fanglüe* (State Building Strategies).²⁸ The

²⁶ For Chen Jiongming' discussion of the co-ruling of the two counties, see *GZSSZGB*, no.1, 18 February, 1921; *HZRB*, 18 February, 1921.

²⁷ See Sun Zhongshan, *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol.5, pp.403-4, 453, 531; *Shanwei shi renwu yanjiu shiliao bianzuan weiyuanhui* (ed.), *Shanwei shi renwu yanjiu shiliao: Chen Jiongming yu Yuejun yanjiu shiliao*, vol.1, pp.36-7. Sun's favorable attitude was also due to the apparent compromise of Chen's theory with Sun's tutelage theory. See Winston Hsieh, "The Ideas and Ideals of a Warlord: Ch'en Chiung-ming (1878-1933)", *Papers on China*, vol.16, 1962, p.218.

²⁸ For Sun's plan pertaining to Guangzhou, see Sun Yat-sen, "Port and Railway Schemes for South



Military Government also agreed to Chen's proposal to establish the Guangzhou Municipality under the Governor's supervision.²⁹ Chen's acceptance of Liao Zhongkai's recommendation to appoint Sun Fo as Vice-Director of the Municipal Office and Director of the Board of Conservancy Works of Guangdong (*Guangdong duban zhihe shiye ichu*) was a sign of cooperation between Chen and Sun Yatsen.³⁰

Chen cooperated with Sun Fo in preparing the establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality. Sun had professional knowledge of municipal administration, which was acquired during his study at the University of California in the mid-1910s. He wrote about city planning in a journal entitled *Jianshe* run by the GMD in Shanghai from 1919 to 1920 to promote the idea of construction.³¹ To Chen, Sun Fo was an ideal "technocrat" to materialize his design of a municipality in Guangzhou.³²

An important sign reflecting Sun Fo's (and his father's) honeymoon relationship with Chen was his pragmatic stand in designing the new institution and the provision for strong supervision by the Governor. Contrary to the viewpoints of some researchers, Sun Fo was only marginally influenced by Sun Yatsen's construction design for Guangzhou.³³ As later events showed, the Guangzhou Municipality operated primarily on the basis of the ex-Municipal Office and continued its reforms in Guangzhou proper, but this plan was only subsidiary according to Sun Yatsen. Sun Yatsen's plan

China", *The Far Eastern Review*, April, 1920, pp.181-6; June, 1920, pp.288-94; Sun Zhongshan, *Sun Zhongshan xuanji*, pp.239-75.

²⁹ SB, 12 December, 1920.

³⁰ For Liao's recommendation, see Sun Fo, "Guangzhou shizheng yishu", *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.1, no.3, 1971, p.3.

³¹ Sun Fo, "Dushi guihua lun", *Jianshe*, vol.1, no.5, December, 1919, pp.1-17.

³² This point was made by Leslie H. Chen, a son of Chen Jiongming, in an interview with the author on 7 September, 1993, at the Fung Ping Shan Library of the University of Hong Kong.

³³ For example, see Jin Bingliang, "Sun Fo yu Guangzhou shizheng jianshe", *Lingnan wenshi*, no.20, 1991, p.30.




aimed at making Guangzhou a center in developing the Pearl River delta; therefore, reform in Guangzhou *per se* was only a minor component of his overall plan.³⁴ Obviously, Sun Fo later did not attempt to realize his father's idealistic plan to reclaim a large parcel, for commercial purposes, of the part of the Pearl River between Guangzhou proper and Honam.³⁵ In Guangzhou, reclaiming even a small drainage channel could result in local protest! Therefore, Chen and Sun Fo only concentrated on the city proper by expanding the scope of the work of the Municipal Office.

Sun Fo approved of strong supervision by the Governor, as reflected in the *Provisional Regulations* drafted by him. This was what Chen called the "principle of guidance" (*baoyu zhuyi*). This "principle of guidance" was designed to circumvent attacks by the Provincial Assembly. Chen was fully aware of the series of attack on the Municipal Office by the Provincial Assembly. It was important to gain legitimacy for the forthcoming municipality, but it would be a protracted struggle to convince the Provincial Assemblymen of the necessity of establishing a city-level government. Chen was unwilling to waste time on such political bargaining as this would delay municipal construction. Sun Fo fully realized the intention of Chen. He did not intend to modify the prevailing administrative subordination of the Municipal Office to the provincial government. This would ensure strong supervision of the Mayor and the various heads of the municipality by the Governor. Moreover, Sun Fo labeled the *Regulations* as "provisional" in order to provide a period of time for the Provincial Assembly to learn the importance of an independent municipality. The *Provisional Regulations* would be put into effect upon the promulgation of the Governor, but they needed not


³⁴ Sun Yat-sen, "Port and Railway Schemes for South China", *The Far Eastern Review*, April, 1920, p.183.

³⁵ Sun Zhongshan, *Sun Zhongshan xuanji*, p.247.



be approved by the Provincial Assembly in the meantime (Article 56) (see appendix 2). After the *Provisional Regulations* had been in effect for five years, the Governor might appoint a revision committee to draft new regulations and submit them to the Provincial Assembly for final approval and adoption (Article 57). "Provisional" also meant that the implementation of some regulations might be delayed until the final adoption of the *Regulations* by the Provincial Assembly. Article 11 guaranteed the final election of the Mayor, but before the *Provisional Regulations* were submitted for revision, the Mayor would be appointed by the Governor for a term of five years. Heads of the six bureaus under the Municipality were to be appointed directly by the Governor upon the Mayor's recommendation (Article 14). Clearly, the selection of the key staff of the Municipality was completely at the will of the Governor. Moreover, other important issues such as changes to the city boundary and the issuance of city bonds (Articles 2, 47) did not need the consent of the Provincial Assembly but only that of the Governor or the provincial government. Supplemented by financial independence (Article 46), Sun Fo's *Provisional Regulations* created a municipality which was simply and directly subordinated to the Governor and his government. This would definitely minimize intervention, especially from the Provincial Assembly, when the Municipality's construction was in full-swing.

The "principle of guidance" allowed the gradual development of an autonomous and accountable municipality. According to the *Provisional Regulations*, ten out of the thirty assemblymen of the Municipal Assembly would be appointed by the Governor. Among these ten appointed assemblymen, there would be a progressive decrease of two per year who would be elected by people, so that after five years, all the thirty assemblymen would be elected by the people (Article 43). Together with an elected Mayor who would appear after five years, the *Provincial Regulations* proposed the



gradual development of an autonomous and accountable municipality under appropriate guidance from the Governor.

Chen Jiongming's adoption of the "principle of guidance" showed his skillfulness in evading the intervention of the Provincial Assembly in preparing for the establishment of the Municipality. The complete *Provisional Regulations* were already on the agenda of the Law Drafting Committee at the meeting held on 2 December, 1920, and endorsed at the next meeting held four days later.³⁶ The *Provisional Regulations* were then released and circulated in the press.³⁷ The document was officially promulgated by Chen on 23 December in the name of the Governor.³⁸ In early January, 1921, Wei Bangping, Xu Chongqing, Cheng Tiangu, Hu Xuanming, Cai Zengji, Huang Yuan and Sun Fo were appointed by Governor Chen Jiongming as preparatory commissioners to prepare for the establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality which was scheduled to inaugurate on 15 February, 1921.³⁹ The establishment of the Municipality was accepted and resolved by the Political Conference, the decision-making body of the Military Government, on 19 January, 1921, and submitted to the Ministry of Interior for the record.⁴⁰ It was on the day when the Political Conference passed the above resolution that the Provincial Assembly, which just resumed session, was made aware of the plan to create a Municipality as provided for by the *Provincial Regulations*. It convened several times to discuss the issue and raised objections a week later. By then, Chen was in a position to point out that the establishment of the Municipal Office


³⁶ HZRB, 6 and 9 December, 1920.

³⁷ For example, HZRB printed it in serial from 14 to 17 December, 1920.

³⁸ Hwei-shung Gao, "Police Administration in Canton", *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol.10, no.2, April, 1926, pp.351-2.

³⁹ GDQB, 3 January, 1921.

⁴⁰ JZFGB (guang zi), no.14, 26 January, 1921, p.19.



was already approved by the “central government”.

The Municipality was established in a rush. From the appointment of the preparatory commissioners in January to the establishment of the Municipality on 15 February, there was only one month's time for preparation. Evidence suggests that the commissioners had not made adequate preparations. All the seven preparatory commissioners became either mayor or bureau heads of the Municipality. Though the Municipality was established on 15 February, only Sun Fo (Mayor) and Xu Chongqing (Bureau of Education) assumed offices on that date. Cheng Tiangu (Bureau of Public Works), Cai Zengji (Bureau of Finance), Huang Yuan (Bureau of Public Utilities) and Hu Xuanming (Bureau of Public Health) assumed offices on 16, 19, 20 and 21 February respectively. Wei Bangping (Bureau of Public Safety) did not take up his post until 1 March.⁴¹ The Municipality did not even have a clearly defined title when established. There were two interchangeable Chinese titles, that is, *shizhengfu* and *shizhengting*, for the Municipality. This problem remained until 7 March, 1921 when Governor Chen Jiongming admitted that the *Provisional Regulations* had made a mistake not to have defined the official title of the Municipality, and he ordered that *Guangzhou shi shizhengting* should be the official Chinese title of the Municipality.⁴²

Debates on the *Provisional Regulations*

The Guangzhou Municipality was established as scheduled on 15 February, 1921. Other municipalities in Guangdong, notably Shantou, were formed in the subsequent

⁴¹ For the dates of taking offices by Sun Fo and other bureau heads, see *GZSSZGB*, no.1, 18 February, 1921, p.61; no.2, 7 March, 1921, pp.12-4.

⁴² For the issue of the confusion over the Municipality's Chinese titles, see *GZSSZGB*, no.1, 18 February, 1921, *passim*; no.3, 14 March, 1921, p.1



months and followed Guangzhou's *Provisional Regulations*.⁴³ Even though Chen Jiongming and Sun Fo had made careful plans, the legal status and suitability of Guangzhou Municipality's *Provisional Regulations* still caused considerable debates even before its establishment. Again, the severest challenge came from the Provincial Assembly. When submitting the *Provisional Regulations* to the Provincial Assembly, Chen Jiongming expected that the Assembly would "endorse it retroactively" (*zhui ren*). However, the Assemblymen's response surprised Chen who expected that Zhong Sheng, Chen's cousin and the elected Assembly Chairman, could exert control over the issue on his behalf.⁴⁴ The Assembly resolved on 26 January that it was not appropriate to simply endorse the *Provisional Regulations*, as the approval of the *Regulations* would involve substantial changes in the provincial system. Further scrutiny by the Law Committee (*Falü gu*) and General Affairs Committee (*Shuzheng gu*) of the Assembly was needed.⁴⁵

The result of their studies was released in mid-February, which called for the cancellation of the *Provisional Regulations*.⁴⁶ The Assembly queried the feasibility of establishing the Guangzhou Municipality whose functions and institutions would substantially overlap with those of the provincial government. One of the merits of the municipal structure, that is, the achievement of financial independence, was attacked as trespassing on the authority of the Provincial Assembly which enjoyed the power to

⁴³ The Shantou Municipality was formed in March, 1921, and the "Provisional Regulations of the Shantou Municipality" was submitted to the provincial government for the record. See *GDQB*, 9 and 12 March, 1921; Lu Danlin, *Shizheng quanshu*, chapter six, pp.78-86. However, Huang Yanpei stated that it was not formed until May of that year. Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, p.107.

⁴⁴ Duan Yunzhang, Chen Min and Ni Junming, *Chen Jiongming de yi sheng*, p.203.

⁴⁵ *GDQB*, 27 January, 1921.

⁴⁶ For the Provincial Assembly's debate on the *Provisional Regulations*, see *HZRB*, 13 February, 1921; *HZRB*, 31 January, 1921; *GZSSZGB*, no.5, 28 March, 1921, pp.1-4.




supervise the finances of Guangzhou, the wealthiest city in the province. The Assemblymen absolutely objected to the “American commission form of city government” adopted by Sun Fo.⁴⁷ Under this system, an executive council was established as a decision-making and executive body, consisting of the mayor and the heads of the six bureaus. The Assemblymen rejected the idea of forming bureaus, and regarded the current practice of putting “public health” under the Police Department as appropriate. While commissioners in America were elected, their counterparts in the Guangzhou Municipality were to be appointed by the Governor. Huang Yi, the most active Assemblymen in this campaign, though it ridiculous that elections were allowed in other counties of the province for choosing county magistrates, but this that system was not extended to Guangzhou, the capital city of the province. This was in contradiction to the trend of autonomy and also to the cause of “Guangdong for the Guangdong people” touted by Chen.⁴⁸

All in all, the strong supervision of the municipality by the provincial government under Chen Jiongming’s “principle of guidance” was regarded by the Assembly as producing a bureaucratic rather than an autonomous institution in the city. The dissatisfied Assemblymen viewed the drafting and enactment of the *Provisional Regulations* as a legislative rather than executive action, and they believed that the Governor should not have the discretion to decide on the issue. The Assemblymen made use of the *Provisional Regulations of the Provincial Assembly* to support their argument. The *Provisional Regulations of the Provincial Assembly* stipulated that the drafting and enactment of any “special regulations” (*danxing fa*) - the *Provisional Regulations of*

⁴⁷ For the commission form of government in America, see Martin J. Schiesl, *The politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America, 1800-1920*, pp.134-7; Jon C. Teaford, *The Twentieth-Century American City* (2nd ed.), pp.38-50.

⁴⁸ *GDQB*, 19 March 1921.



the Guangzhou Municipality should be under this category - should be the duty of the Provincial Assembly (Article 2, Section A).⁴⁹ According to the Assemblymen, this is a power reserved for the legislature and yet, the *Provisional Regulations of the Guangzhou Municipality* only allowed their submission to the Provincial Assembly for revision and approval five years after their enactment. In other words, the Assemblymen believed that Chen had overstepped his power in enacting the *Provisional Regulations*. Therefore, the Assembly resolved to petition the Governor asking for the suspension of the Guangzhou Municipality and the setting up of a Revision Committee to re-draft the *Provisional Regulations*.⁵⁰

Chen Jiongming was against re-drafting the *Provisional Regulations of the Guangzhou Municipality* from the very beginning. He inaugurated the Municipality on schedule and insisted that retroactive endorsement was a sufficient legal procedure.⁵¹ He argued that Article 2, Section A of the *Provisional Regulations of the Provincial Assembly* allowed the Assembly only to enact “special regulations” on condition that they did not “contravene law and order”. As the *Provisional Regulations of the Guangzhou Municipality* had already gained the approval of the Military Government, the Provincial Assembly had no grounds to refute the *Provisional Regulations*.⁵² Gu Yingfen, Head of the Provincial Department of Government Administration, reportedly stated that even an emperor was in no position to object to the *Provisional Regulations*.⁵³ Before the Revision Committee came up with any substantial revision, Chen Jiongming wrote to the Provincial Assembly in reply to the Assembly’s


⁴⁹ *Zhonghua minguo faling daquan bupian*, chapter 12, p.1.

⁵⁰ *HZRB*, 25 February, 1921.

⁵¹ *HZRB*, 17 February, 1921.

⁵² See *GDQB*, 1 March, 1921.

⁵³ See *HZRB*, 22 February, 1921.



request for the suspension of the Guangzhou Municipality. Chen criticized the Assembly for adopting the position of a “council system”, under which an elected council was the decision-making body of a municipality, to attack the “demerits” of the commission form of government. He also viewed the “principle of guidance” as necessary to avoid elections being controlled by local politics. He contended that his design was for the welfare of most Guangzhou people and that the municipality was an institution dealing with “practical business” (*shiwu jiguang*) implying that the Provincial Assembly should not treat it as a political issue. Finally, Chen reminded the Assemblymen that no further modification was to be allowed as the *Provisional Regulations* had been resolved by the Military Government which served as the “central government” of the city in the meantime.⁵⁴

The counter-criticism of Chen did not stop the work of the Revision Committee which was then discussing the revision of the *Provisional Regulations*. The revision was completed in late March, and a new draft entitled *Regulations for the Autonomy of the Guangzhou Municipality* (*Guangzhou shi zizhi tiaoli*, hereafter known as *Regulations for Autonomy*) was released by the Committee.⁵⁵ This new version contrasted substantially with that drafted by Sun Fo, primarily in the enlargement of “autonomous” elements and the undermining of executive power. While the Municipal Assembly was nothing more than an advisory body in Sun Fo’s *Provisional Regulations*, with ten out of the thirty members to be appointed by the Governor, this Assembly was to serve as a decision-making body in the *Regulations for Autonomy*, and all the forty members were to be elected. The *Regulations for Autonomy* also stipulated that members of

⁵⁴ For Chen’s long reply, see GZSSZGB, no.5, 28 March, 1921, pp.1-4; Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, pp.17-21.

⁵⁵ For its full version, see HZRB, 28 to 31 March, 1921.




the Executive Council were to be elected. The Executive Council could not make any decisions without the approval of the Municipal Assembly. More importantly, the Executive Councilors were subject to recall by the Municipal Assembly.

It was clear that the adoption of the *Regulations for Autonomy* would fundamentally reverse the design of by Chen Jiongming and Sun Fo. Chen's response was direct. He chose to ignore them. This did not bring him further trouble primarily because of two reasons. Firstly, the Provincial Assembly conducted the revision in its special sessions which had been extended twice since January.⁵⁶ All proposals were dealt with in a hurried manner, and the Assembly was adjourned soon after the revision. Secondly, the Provincial Assembly was soon engaged in another great project, that is, the drafting of the *Guangdong Provincial Constitution*, and had no spare time to follow up on the operation of the Guangzhou Municipality. This favorable environment, accompanied by the support of the Military Government, finally allowed Chen Jiongming to successfully put into operation a modern and efficient municipality to glorify his master plan of "united autonomous provinces".

The Guangzhou Municipality as a battlefield for power struggle


Chen's design, however, was hampered by the complicated personnel arrangement in the Municipality. In reality, the Municipality was not an institution merely dealing with "practical business" as Chen claimed. It was politicized from the very beginning. Although the Municipality was staffed by many technicians and experts, key appointments, such as Sun Fo, were not purely "technocrats". They had their own political affiliations and orientations. So, it was inevitable that the Municipality was sometimes

⁵⁶ *GDQB*, 4 March, 14 April, 1921.



used as a battlefield between different parties.

An event in March, 1921 was notable in illustrating such political struggles. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a project to reclaim the Western Moat for the construction of Taiping Road was almost completed by the Municipal Office. Merchants and charitable organizations in Xiguan, however, petitioned in March to request the re-opening of the Western Moat. They negotiated with Mayor Sun Fo and other bureau heads. Their reasoning was the same as in 1920, that is, reclamation of the Moat would stop river transport and merchants would be forced to use land transport which would be much more expensive, and silting of the drainage system would become more serious. They also said that the Guangzhou Municipality should not defend and carry on policies made by the Guangxi "bandits". Their petition got received response from Sun Fo who accepted their reasoning without reservation. He even urged the merchants to collect money from shops and households in Xiguan for the re-opening of the Western Moat. Though pleasing the Xiguan merchants, this concession aroused widespread criticism as re-opening the Moat would involve a huge sum of money which would have to be financed by the residents. It was reported that another group of merchants petitioned for the opposite. Newspapers in Hong Kong, such as *Huazi ribao* and *Xunhuan ribao*, and intelligence reports from the Guangzhou Maritime Customs regarded Sun Fo's concession as influenced by the appeasement policy of Sun Yatsen who did not want to agitate the masses in order to gain support for his recent election campaign for the Presidency of the Military Governor. Sun's deeper intention was to direct the hatred of the residents to Chen Jiongming who stood firm in opposing both the election of the Presidency and the re-opening of the Moat. Petitioners for the re-opening of the Moat, however, found it difficult to realize their proposal as the reclamation was ninety percent completed, and no one except themselves showed any



strong desire for the re-opening. In fact, most residents and shop-owners in Xiguan were not willing to pay for the re-opening which would cost almost a million *yuan*. Subsequently, Sun Fo and Sun Yatsen did not insist on re-opening the Western Moat, as they were embarrassed by reports released by the Bureau of Public Works and the Board of Conservancy Works of Guangdong confirming that the re-opening would not alleviate the magnitude of flooding in the region. Moreover, Sun Yatsen was later elected as President of the Military Government. The struggle subsided, and Taiping Road stood where it had been.⁵⁷

The political nature of the Guangzhou Municipality under Sun Yatsen

Chen Jiongming's disagreements with Sun Yatsen continued on issues including the above-mentioned Presidency of the Military Government and the launching of a northern expedition. These disagreements led to the final outbreak of a mutiny on 16 June, 1922 in which Chen's army attacked and expelled Sun's government from Guangzhou. Sun Fo's first Mayorship also ended on the same day.

On 26 February, 1923, Sun Fo was again appointed as Mayor of the Guangzhou Municipality after Sun Yatsen and the GMD regained control of the city.⁵⁸ Guangzhou was then free from the political ideology of "united autonomous provinces". Through the condemnation of Chen Jiongming's interruption of municipal construction and the proclamation of continuing the unmaterialized projects planned before the mutiny, Sun Yatsen intended to utilize the Guangzhou Municipality as a testing ground to

⁵⁷ For the issue, see *GDQB*, 10 March, 1921; *HZRB*, 11, 12, 15, 28-30 March, 25 April, 1921; *GZSSZGB*, no.9, 25 April, pp.6-9; *Guangdong sheng dang'anguan, Sun Zhongshan yu Guangdong: Guangdong sheng dang'anguan ku cang haiguan dang'an xuanyi*, p.273; *Guangzhou xinminguo bao shiping (chuji)*, 1921, pp.2-3.

⁵⁸ *GZSSZGB*, no.69, 26 March, 1923, p.37.



glorify the “revolutionary government” under the GMD which professed to fight for the re-unification of China. Sun Yatsen was aware of the long history of social instability in Guangdong since the revolution in 1911 and the huge exodus of Guangdong refugees to Hong Kong during political turmoils. Sun regarded municipal construction an important means to achieve social stability.⁵⁹ Municipal construction was also vital in the sense that it would form the basis of municipal construction in other cities and in China as a whole after the completion of the “national revolution”.⁶⁰ Sun Fo disclosed his ambition and optimism in the *Municipal Gazette*, saying that he would construct a great civilian Guangzhou.⁶¹ In other words, Sun Yatsen was similar to Chen Jiongming in using Guangzhou as a showcase, but for different political ends.


However, the Guangzhou Municipality subsequently showed a lack of achievement in construction, as it faced threats from many enemies including Chen Jiongming and Shen Hongying who were stationed at the east and north of Guangdong respectively and had conducted anti-Sun campaigns from 1923 to 1925. Compared to his first Mayorship, Sun Fo’s second Mayorship was only a part-time job for him, as he was busily engaged in the GMD’s activities. He was a major fund-raiser for the GMD. He was a GMD Central Committee member, and one of the persons in charge of the reorganization of the Party.⁶² Sun Fo’s active involvement in revolutionary activities was followed by the Guangzhou Municipality’s acceptance of “revolutionary leadership”. Strengthening party rule was now regarded as more important than promoting

⁵⁹ Sun Zhongshan, *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol.7, p.151.

⁶⁰ See Sun’s speech delivered to the Youth Association of China on 21 October, 1923 in Sun Zhongshan, *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol.8, pp.325-6.

⁶¹ GZSSZGB, no.69, 26 March, 1923, pp.1-2.

⁶² See Chen Yuhuan, “Min chu zhi Guangzhou shizheng jianshe”, in *Guangzhou wenshi*, no.46, February 1994, p.161; Zhuang Zheng, “Sun Ke yu Min chu zhengju”, *Zhuanji wenxue*, no.222, November 1980, pp.70-1.




autonomy and democracy, and construction and modernization were carried out not purely for the welfare of the common people but more as a means to glorify the success of Party rule in the province and to support the unification policy of the GMD.⁶³ Therefore, the GMD government did not pay much attention to the call for “Guangdong ruled by Guangdong people”. For practical reasons, the GMD government made Guangzhou a base of logistic support in the uninterrupted intra- and inter-provincial battles, and made the Guangzhou Municipality an agent of fund-raising. However, these revolutionary ends were achieved only at the sacrifice of mass support. Both the Guangzhou Municipality and the GMD government in Guangzhou were fully aware of the dissatisfaction of the masses who looked on “municipal affairs” as meaning exorbitant taxes and levies.⁶⁴ Mass dissatisfaction resulted in military clashes between the local elites and the local government, which will be discussed in greater details later in this chapter.

Li Fulin's brief mayorship

Sun Yatsen led his armies on a northern expedition in mid-September, 1924, and Sun Fo was appointed by his father as an agent to Manchuria to seek the cooperation of Zhang Zuolin. Li Fulin was appointed Mayor on 24 September, 1924.⁶⁵ He was a local militarist with his base in Honam since the early 1910s. His appointment as Mayor of Guangzhou was partially due to his traditional friendly relationship with Sun Yatsen and to the practical need of Sun to employ Li's military strength to secure the operation of the Municipality against the potential threat of the Yunnan-Guangxi armies

⁶³ Fang Weigang, “Guomindang gaizu hou de Guangdong”, *Xin Minguo*, vol.1, no.5, 30 March, 1924, pp.2-18.

⁶⁴ GZSSZGB, no.109, 1 January, 1924, pp.1-3.



which were stationed in Guangzhou proper since Sun's return in early 1923.

Li's mayorship was *ad hoc* in nature. Sun Yatsen promised before he left Guangzhou that he would compensate the sacrifice made by the Guangzhou people by shortening the "five-year" revision period, granting the election of Mayor, and abolishing "exorbitant taxes and levies".⁶⁶ Li adhered to this policy. His mayorship seemed to have brought hope, openness, and democracy to the Guangzhou residents. Institutionally, he set up a committee in early November, 1924 in charge of the mayoral election which was planned to take place in one month's time.⁶⁷ Financially, he advocated the "use of the city's resources to build up its own city". He set the upper limit of subsidizing the GMD government's military campaign to 1,500 *yuan* per month. He also urged the provincial government to repay previous debts which had been incurred for military purposes. Armies from Hunan, Yunnan and Guangxi which were stationed in the city were requested to stop charging surtaxes on various industries. Furthermore, he kept the promise made in his inauguration speech that the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce and the charitable organizations could send their representatives to supervise the municipal coffers.⁶⁸


Li's shift of policy showed that he worked for the minimization of intervention from the provincial and "central" governments. A new phase of prosperity and stability accompanying the various reforms and new construction seemed to be in sight but on condition that Guangzhou did not serve as a center of political struggles. However,

⁶⁵ GZSSZGB, no. 149, 6 October, 1924, p.41.

⁶⁶ Sun Yatsen mentioned this in an open letter to the Guangdong people. See Sun Zhongshan, *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol.11, pp.34-6.

⁶⁷ LHZ, no.32 (1924), 20 November, 1924, pp.38-42.

⁶⁸ For Li Fulin's dealing of financial matters, see GZSSZGB, no.149, 6 October, 1924, pp.42, 44; no.150, 13 October, 1924, pp.34-5, 40-1; no.151, 20 October, 1924, pp.34-8; no.153, 3 November, 1924, pp.34-5; no.154, 10 November, 1924, pp.15-6.



Guangzhou turned out to be such a center even after Sun intended to shift his basis from Guangzhou. Most important of all, Li's political affiliation was pro-GMD and he rendered support to the GMD and its government whenever it was needed.⁶⁹ After Sun left for Beijing in late 1924, Guangdong again fell into turmoils. Chen Jiongming's last offensive and the mutiny of the Yunnan-Guangxi armies in Guangzhou meant the slowdown of construction and the revival of "exorbitant taxes and levies". It turned out that Li adhered to the orders of the GMD to raise funds for military campaigns, such as charging a surtax on the rent levies.⁷⁰ Finally, he did not resist the establishment of a purely one-party municipal rule in July, 1925, and peacefully gave up his mayorship.

The Guangzhou Municipality in the administrative context

Features and institutional continuity of the Municipality

Our discussion in the above section suggests that the Guangzhou Municipality had survived several changes in political orientation which affected both its nature and its relationship with the provincial and "central" governments. In spite of such changes, the Municipality showed strong signs of institutional continuity once it was created.


According to the *Provisional Regulations*, the Guangzhou Municipality should possess an urban government enjoying vast autonomous power. Sun Fo reminisced that the adoption of this institution was plainly based on what he learned in the university, and that it was an imitation of the American "commission form" of government.⁷¹

The Municipality was independent of the provincial government and Panyu and Nanhai

⁶⁹ See Li Fulin, *Li Fulin geming shiliao*, pp.18-23, 40.

⁷⁰ GZSSZGB, no.157, 1 December, 1924, pp.20-2.

⁷¹ Sun Fo, "Guangzhou shizheng yishu", *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.1, no.3, 1971, p.4.



counties which traditionally administered the city proper. The Municipality could draft and implement its own budget, and had an independent fiscal system. There were six bureaus in the Municipality, namely Finance, Public Works, Public Safety, Public Health, Public Utilities and Education. Heads of these bureaus formed the Executive Council (*shi xingzheng weiyuanhui*) with the Mayor as Chairman. This Council constituted a decision-making and executive body of the Municipality, with the Municipal Assembly (*shi canshihui*) serving as an advisory body.

However, Sun Fo had oversimplified the form of the Guangzhou Municipality. Although both Sun Fo and Chen Jiongming strove to defend the American “commission form” of government they adopted, the Municipality was, as criticized by the Provincial Assembly, actually not a pure imitation of the American “commission form” of government. America was undergoing “Progressive reform” when Guangzhou undertook its municipal reform in the late 1910s and early 1920s. The form of municipal government underwent great changes in the “Progressive era”, characterized by the emphasis on administrative efficiency and the shift of power from the legislature, controlled by political machines, to the executive. The “commission form” of government was first adopted by Galveston, Texas, in 1901 to circumvent the corrupt ward representation system and to use a business style of management to enhance administrative efficiency. However, in the mid-1910s, structural reformers transferred their support to a new scheme, the city manager plan. First adopted by Staunton, Virginia, the manager scheme aimed at avoiding the division of executive authority amongst a number of commissioners and concentrated administrative and executive responsibilities in one person. Sun Fo must have been aware of such changes during his study in America in the 1910s. Judging from the administrative features of the Guangzhou Municipality, what Sun Fo had created was a blend of these forms of municipal government, by estab-




lishing a powerful mayor under the strong supervision of the Governor. This blend was to suit the aim of municipal construction and political reality. The invention of bureaus promoted expertise, a powerful mayor allowed administrative efficiency and strong supervision by the Governor provided legitimacy and guidance for the work of the Municipality. Orrin Keith, a reporter of *The Far Eastern Review*, described this modification of American forms of government adopted by Guangzhou as showing some “originality” in structuring the Municipality so as to deal with special problems that “had never come up in connection with American cities”. He praised the *Provisional Regulations* as “a departure from the precedent of Oriental constitutions” because they “showed no attempt to hide or disguise the fact” that ultimate control of municipal affairs rested in the hands of the Governor.⁷²

The division of bureaus in the light of the “commission form” of government made the new institution more comprehensive in functions when compared to the ex-Municipal Office. Not only were public works maintained by the new system, other aspects of municipal construction set out in the second-stage plan of the Municipal Office were also continued by the new institution. The goal of the Municipal Office’s second-stage plan was brought closer to realization under this new institution. Its expansion in terms of functions and institutions was definitely a landmark in the municipal modernization of Guangzhou. It was this bold imitation of Western models that inspired other Chinese cities to introduce Western-type municipalities and to learn from the pioneer experience of Guangzhou.⁷³

⁷² Orrin Keith, “Commission Government in Canton”, *The Far Eastern Review*, February, 1922, p.101.


⁷³ Zhongguo shizheng gongcheng xuehui, “Sanshi nian lai Zhongguo zhi shizheng gongcheng”, p.28; in Zhou Kaiqing (ed.), *Sanshi nian lai zhi Zhongguo gongcheng*. Also see Kerrie L. MacPherson, “Designing China’s Urban Future: The Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927-1937”, *Planning Perspectives*, 5 (1990), pp.47-8; Christian Henriot, *Shanghai, 1927-1937: Municipal Power*.



Another sign of modernization was shown by the wide use of professionals trained in Western municipal knowledge. We have mentioned in the previous chapter that the Directors of the Municipal Office, that is, Yang Yongtai and Wei Bangping, were appointed not for their professional knowledge but because of their key positions in the provincial government. Only some of their subordinates such as Wu Xilü and Lun Yunxiang were trained in Western universities and had working experience in municipal constructions. Similar to the above-mentioned institutional changes, personnel arrangements in the Guangzhou Municipality were equally impressive. Taking the first Mayorship of Sun Fo as an example, all seven members of the Executive Council were overseas students. Both Sun Fo and Cheng Tiangu had master degrees in politics and municipal administration from the University of California. Cheng was also an entrepreneur who managed a number of factories in the city. Cai Zengju was a graduate of the University of Columbia. Hu Xuanming was a doctor in public health trained at Johns Hopkins University. Huang Yuan studied electrical engineering in France and Belgium. Xu Chongqing was a graduate of the Imperial University in Japan. Even Wei Bangping, who had a long military career and was appointed Head of the Bureau of Public Safety, was no exception. He was a graduate of a military academy in Japan before the 1911 Revolution. It was reported that over eighty percent of the staff of the Guangzhou Municipality were returned students from abroad.⁷⁴ Most of the staff were young and energetic, and they attempted to minimize the effects of what they viewed as corrupt traditional practices. It was reported by contemporaries that Sun

Locality and Modernization, pp.25-6.

⁷⁴ For the employment of professionals in the Guangzhou Municipality, see Sun Fo, "Guangzhou shizheng yishu", *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.1, no.3, 1971, p.4; Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, pp.23-4; Cheng Tiangu, *Cheng Tiangu huiyilu*, chapters 3, 5 and 8; Chen Yuhuan, "Guangzhou zaoqi de shizheng jianshe zhuanjia: Cheng Tiangu", *Yangcheng jingu*, no.49, February, 1995, pp.40-2; Hwei-shung Gao, "Police Administration in Canton", *The Chinese Social and*



Fo was typically “foreign” in character. In other words, he was honest and straightforward. He never accepted invitations to banquets hosted by the local gentry and merchants, and he was described as “socially inept” as he reprimanded those who requested jobs through *guanxi* (social connections).⁷⁵ Under his leadership, the Municipality prized efficiency and municipal constructions as its goals. The Surveying Section of the Bureau of Finance was a good example to illustrate the desire for efficiency. It promised to finish each and every surveying job in one week. If there was too much workload, the officers in charge would work overtime.⁷⁶ Considering that such institutional advancements were achieved exclusively by the Chinese, it is no wonder that the efforts of the Municipality attracted the attention and appreciation of Western observers. The Municipality was admired as evidence of “Westernism on the part of the Chinese” which some Westerners had been “awaiting with eagerness”.⁷⁷ The *Shen bao*, a leading Chinese newspaper in Shanghai, praised the Guangzhou Municipality’s pool of professionals trained in Western disciplines of knowledge.⁷⁸

Another merit of the Municipality was associated with the Municipal Assembly. Though it was only advisory in nature, it imposed the least restrictions on the qualifications of both voters and candidates. Article 40 of the *Provisional Regulations* stated that residents should possess the following qualifications in order to vote and to be elected: firstly, residence in the city of Guangzhou for at least one year; secondly, a legitimate occupation; thirdly, the ability to read the *Provisional Regulations*; fourthly, mentally sane; and fifthly, in full possession of civil rights. There were no sexual and


Political Science Review, vol.10, no.2, April 1926, p.350.

⁷⁵ Zhang Lihua, “Sun Fo de gushi”, *Zhongwai zazhi*, no.4, vol.33, April, 1983, pp.82-3.

⁷⁶ SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Finance”, p.42.

⁷⁷ “Canton in the Changing”, *The Far Eastern Review*, vol.17, no.10, October, 1921, p.705.

⁷⁸ “Guangzhou shizheng shikuang”, *SB*, 1 January, 1922, “supplementary”, p.2.



franchise restrictions on voting qualifications, and this represented the most liberal arrangement in China at that time.⁷⁹ The first session of the Municipal Assembly was inaugurated in January, 1922, and there were three female representatives, amounting to one-tenth of the seats in the Assembly. Some commentators, such as Huang Yanpei, said it is unfair to criticize the Assembly because it was only advisory in nature. Huang regarded the Guangzhou Municipality as a great institutional breakthrough because it was a pioneer of “autonomy without a [powerful] assembly”, reflecting his view that local autonomy did not necessarily go hand in hand with the augmentation of democratic elements.⁸⁰

Obstacles in the concentration of power and resources

In truth, the actual operation of the Guangzhou Municipality had more problems than indicated by the favorable view presented above. Admittedly, persons in charge of the Municipality always extolled the benchmark significance of the Municipality. Sun Fo, for example, praised the Guangzhou Municipality as a “model municipality” in China,⁸¹ one which had made unprecedented advancement in the first few years after its inauguration.⁸² However, behind this facade lurked the reality of municipal strife.


This was partly due to the concentration of power. As mentioned previously, the

⁷⁹ Property and tax qualifications for election were common in China, and only male residents were eligible for voting and election. The newly released “City Autonomous System” by the Ministry of Interior, Beijing Government in 1921 stipulated that male residents in cities were eligible to vote and be elected if they paid a direct tax of one dollar annually, or had a wealth of three hundred dollars or above. The proposed “Charter for the Songhu (Shanghai) Special Municipality” on the agenda of the Beijing Government in the mid-1920s also required eligible voters to pay at least one dollar tax. For the two documents, see Lu Danlin, *Shizheng quanshu*, chapter six, pp.98-107, 171-84.

⁸⁰ Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, preface.

⁸¹ GZSSZGB, no.147, 22 September, 1924, p.47.

⁸² GZSSZGB, no.123, 7 April, 1924, p.3.



Municipality only had one month's time for preparation. This brief period was crucial in preparing the shift of functions and power from existing government institutions to a municipality with comprehensive and centralized power. This turned out to be much less fruitful than expected. Even the succession of the Municipal Office was problematic. It was originally planned that the establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality was to be accompanied by the simultaneous abolition of the Municipal Office.⁸³ On the day of the establishment of the Municipality, the Municipal Office was still issuing notices to the magistrates of Panyu and Nanhai as well as other governmental and public institutions notifying them of the personnel appointment of the Guangzhou Municipality. Yet, these notices did not mention the abolition of the Municipal Office *per se*.⁸⁴ Although the finances of the Office had been taken over by the Municipality upon the latter's establishment, it was reported that the Office still collected the deed tax after that date.⁸⁵ Actually, the Municipal Office and the Guangzhou Municipality co-existed briefly after the latter's establishment. Governor Chen Jiongming issued an order to the Municipal Office on 24 February calling for its abolition and the transfer of its archives to the Guangzhou Municipality, and the Municipality had issued a memorandum with similar content to the Office the day before. Another communication from Chen to the Municipal Office on 8 March showed that the Office had reportedly shifted its business to the Guangzhou Municipality and that its seal had been annulled. But Chen still asked if there were any business which had not been transferred to the Municipality.⁸⁶

⁸³ SZGY, chapter on the "Municipality", p.4.

⁸⁴ Guangzhou shi dang'anguan: 4-01/1/263-2, "Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo".


⁸⁵ GZSSZGB, no.5, 28 March, 1921, p.13; no.6, 4 April, 1921, p.6; no.15, 6 June, 1921, p.2.

⁸⁶ See Guangzhou shi dang'anguan: 4-01/1/263-2, "Choushe Shizheng Gongsuo"; GZSSZGB, no.2, 7 March, 1921, p.1.



The Municipality could not have taken up all the business of the Municipal Office on schedule as it encountered greater obstacles in concentrating functions and power from other government institutions. These institutions were simply not willing to give up their limited resources and power. The issue of the legitimacy of the Municipality raised by the Provincial Assembly and the likelihood of the Municipality's suspension prompted other government institutions to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. However, it turned out that the Municipality survived the criticisms of the Provincial Assembly. It was nevertheless involved in continual bargaining, sometimes struggles, with various government institutions over the concentration of power.

The most heated dispute was over financial matters. One of the aims of the creation of the Municipality was to centralize financial resources to quicken the construction of the city. Therefore, it was logical and inevitable for the Municipality to ask for concessions from the provincial and county governments in order to expand its range of taxable items. Though the *Provisional Regulations* stated that the Municipality could in the meantime collect five kinds of tax, namely rent levies, business and corporation tax, wharfage dues, boat licenses and vehicle licenses (Article 46), the Municipality strove to expand its scope of taxation and argued that it had the discretion to collect all taxable items within the boundary of the Municipality. This request met with firm objection by the provincial and the two county governments which pointed out that the existing tax incomes could not even support their operation. For example, the Department of Finance refused to hand various kinds of tax to the Municipality with the excuse that taxes collected in the counties were always requisitioned by the local armies and that maintenance of the provincial government depended on taxes collected in and




around Guangzhou.⁸⁷ By the end of 1922, the Department of Finance still held the power to tax the slaughtering of animals, property transfer and so on.⁸⁸ The Highway Authority (*Gonglu chu*) under the provincial government, which claimed the right of disposal of most government property in Guangzhou, was requested repeatedly by the Bureau of Finance to stop auctioning such “municipal property” and transfer them to the Municipality. The Municipality reasoned that since the ex-Municipal Office had been responsible for reclaiming land along the ex-city wall and the main avenues all over the city proper, “municipal property” on these sites should come under the administration of the Guangzhou Municipality, the successor of the Municipal Office. The Highway Authority counterargued that it would not give up the property in hand since they were assigned by the provincial government. The core of the conflict was which level of government institutions, municipal or provincial should have the power to manage government property. Such conflicts over property management prevailed throughout the first Mayorship of Sun Fo from 1921 to June 1922.⁸⁹ The Municipality never gave way, as new “municipal property” such as waste land and blocked streets created by the massive construction work of the Municipal Office would generate considerable sources of income for the Municipality. Therefore, the Municipality issued orders which unilaterally claimed the right of disposal of such property.⁹⁰ Through the mediation of the provincial government, the Highway Authority was willing to shift

⁸⁷ HZRB, 2 March, 1921; Guangdong sheng dang'anguan, *Sun Zhongshan yu Guangdong: Guangdong sheng dang'anguan ku cang haiguan dang'an xuanyi*, pp.34-6.

⁸⁸ BGHK, p.75.

⁸⁹ For the conflicts between the two institutions over the right of management over such properties, see GZSSZGB, no.8, 18 April, 1921, p.1; no.19, 4 July, 1921, pp.8-9; no.22, 25 July, 1921, pp.2-4; no.32, 3 October, 1921, pp.1-2.

⁹⁰ For example, see GZSSZGB, no.23, 1 August, 1921, pp.3-4; no.54, 6 March, 1922, pp.3-5.



such “municipal property” to the Municipality in May, 1922.⁹¹ However, this victory was only minor as Chen Jiongming, after the mutiny in June, gave the right of disposal of government property to the Department of Finance.⁹² Chen’s brief rule after the June mutiny revoked the agreement reached before, and the struggle for control over government property continued after Sun Yatsen’s return in early 1923.⁹³ The Municipality insisted that incomes that flowed into the provincial government’s coffers arising from the sale of “municipal property” should be categorized as loans made by the Municipality, and repayment was mandatory.⁹⁴ This struggle only ended in early 1925 when the Ministry of Finance of the Guangzhou regime ordered the suspension of the auction of such property.

There were also problems in concentrating financial resources from the county governments. The *Provisional Regulations* granted the Guangzhou Municipality the power to rule the “city of Guangzhou” (Article 1) which was traditionally co-administered by the Panyu and Nanhai county governments. Naturally, the Municipality demanded the transfer of taxation rights from the county governments. This process was again long. For example, soon after its establishment, the Municipality bargained with the Panyu county government to take over the right of taxing passage boats (*hengshui du*), a kind of tax constituting a substantial income to the county government. The Panyu government was also ordered to transfer the archives concerning this kind of taxation to the Municipality. Yet, no response was made by the Panyu county gov-

⁹¹ GZSSZGB, no.59, 10 April, 1922, pp.4-5; no.60, 17 April, 1922, pp.3-4; no.66, 29 May, 1922, pp.37-8.

⁹² GDGB, no.3011, 2 November, 1922, p.13.

⁹³ The Highway Authority was renamed “Government Property Authority” in 1923, and its conflict with the Guangzhou Municipality went on. See GZSSZGB, no.92, 3 September, 1923, pp.24-5; no.102, 12 November, 1923, p.22.

⁹⁴ GZSSZGB, no.70, 2 April, 1923, pp.18-20.



ernment.⁹⁵ The issue was finally resolved in 1924 when the Municipality conceded the right of taxation to the Panyu county government, but insisted on the right of regulating the boat traffic through licensing.⁹⁶ Centralization of financial resources was also hindered by the traditional practice that taxes collected in Guangzhou proper were assignable for use by the two county governments. For instance, the three large drama theaters in Haizhu, Honam and Xiguan, paid surtax totaling 2,100 dollars per year for education and police in Nanhai and Panyu.⁹⁷

Besides financial problems, the Guangzhou Municipality also faced other administrative problems which reduced its efficiency and independence. The reason why the Panyu and Nanhai county governments were always successful in bargaining with the Guangzhou Municipality over the control of financial resources was partially due to the location of their government offices within the boundary of the Guangzhou Municipality. This was a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the *Provisional Regulations* which allowed no overlapping of the Municipality's boundary with those of county governments. The Municipality protested in December, 1921 but nothing came about.⁹⁸ The two counties did not move their seats of government out of Guangzhou until 1933.⁹⁹ As long as their governments remained in Guangzhou, the two counties could always find institutional reasons to justify their claim over taxes collected within the boundary of Guangzhou. To maximize their incomes, the two counties even enforced double-taxation. For example, the Panyu magistrate ordered construction firms to pay

⁹⁵ GZSSZGB, no.7, 11 April, 1921, p.4; no.13, 23 May, 1921, pp.12-3; no.54, 6 March, 1922, pp.6-7.

⁹⁶ BGHK, p.360.

⁹⁷ SZGY, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Finance", pp.6-7; BGHK, pp.43-5.

⁹⁸ GZSSZGB, no.42, 12 December, 1921, pp.15-6.

⁹⁹ The Panyu government moved to Xinzao, and that of Nanhai to Foshan. See GZMGRB, 24 January, 9 March, 1933.



license fees though these firms had already paid the Bureau of Public Works of the Guangzhou Municipality.¹⁰⁰


Administrative problems also arose within the Municipality. There was an acute concentration of power by the Bureau of Public Safety. Governor Chen Jiongming insisted that Wei Bangping be Head of the Bureau of Public Safety because of his experience and local influence. Wei, who was an influential figure governing the province's police, originally rejected the offer as he regarded this appointment as a demotion. There was evidence that he allied himself with the Provincial Assembly in opposing the transformation of the Municipal Office into the Guangzhou Municipality.¹⁰¹ This explained why he was the last bureau head to assume office. When he saw the hopelessness of rescinding the transformation, he became serious in negotiating with Chen Jiongming over the terms of his new appointment. Chen made a concession which had a profound impact on the operation of the Municipality in subsequent years. The Bureau of Public Safety was to enjoy the liberty of collecting rent levies from shops and households for the special use of the Bureau, as the former Department of Police had done.¹⁰² As the rent levies were a comparatively stable source of income and made up at least one-third of the regular incomes in the Municipality's annual budget, this concession undermined the soundness of municipal finances.¹⁰³ As the Bureau gained financial strength, it remained the largest bureau in the Municipality with the largest staff and the largest share of the budget. However, the independent financial status of

¹⁰⁰ *Guangzhou shizhengfu xinshu luocheng jinian wenxuan*, p.29.

¹⁰¹ Lai Jeh-Hang, *A Study of a Faltering Democrat: The Life of Sun Fo, 1891-1949*, p.23.

¹⁰² HZRB, 23 February, 1921.

¹⁰³ "Rent levy" was counted as a kind of "regular income" in the annual budgets. For the fiscal year 1922-23, the rent levy was estimated to be \$1,000,000 while the estimated total regular income was \$2,655,700. The figures were \$1,400,000 and \$3,175,080 respectively for the fiscal year 1923-24. See BGHK, pp.76-7.



the Bureau of Public Safety was only achieved at the expense of the development of other bureaus. The Municipality attempted in April, 1921 to negotiate with the Bureau of Public Safety to take over the rent levies on the pretext of "financial centralization" and to cut the agreed additional monthly subsidy of 30,000 dollars. This led to vigorous protest by the Bureau.¹⁰⁴ The proposal thus failed, and the Bureau kept on urging the Municipality for the subsidy which occasionally was not forthcoming due to financial difficulties.¹⁰⁵ This explained why the Municipality was so eager to gain incomes of every kind in the first few years of its existence.

There were further intra-municipality problems besides that of finance, many of which were associated with the Bureau of Public Safety. As mentioned previously the Bureau was transformed from the ex-Department of Police which had exercised the most comprehensive power over urban administration in the city proper for more than a decade. The establishment of the Municipality demanded the shift of many of its functions, such as taxation and public hygiene, to the other Bureaus. Wei Bangping was reluctant to see this decline of the Police's functions. He arrogantly insisted that his Bureau enjoy a higher status among the six Bureaus and even assume power over other Bureaus. He tried to define the change of institution as a change of title, not of functions and power. For example, right after the establishment of the Municipality, the administration of street cleaners was shifted from the police to the Bureau of Public Health. However, when the Bureau of Public Health exercised administrative power to replace the cleaners, heads of the police branch offices intervened. They insisted that the old cleaners should stay and canceled the replacements.¹⁰⁶ The Bureau of

¹⁰⁴ *HZRB*, 14 April, 1921.

¹⁰⁵ For example, see *GZSSZGB*, no. 72, 16 April, 1923, p.30.

¹⁰⁶ *HZRB*, 4 April, 1921.



Public Safety also opposed other changes within the Municipality. The Executive Council planned to ban the singing of blind girls, but Wei Bangping rejected the plan on the ground that the Municipality was unable to provide any means of livelihood for them in the interim.¹⁰⁷


Concentration through expansion

In general, the Municipality regarded the concentration of power and resources from outside the Municipality even more crucial. Intra-municipality problems only affected the distribution of resources and power within the Municipality, but the success or failure in maximizing resources and power from outside the Municipality was a matter of survival. The ambitious boundary expansion scheme in 1922 fully illustrated this issue.

It was observed that the expansion of city boundary was one of the most remarkable events in the first few years of the Municipality's existence. According to the existing literature on Guangzhou's history, the plan to build a "Greater Guangzhou" was released in early 1924. Edward Bing-Shuey Lee made a good summary of this splendid plan in his classic *Modern Canton* as follows:

"In 1924, a prospective area for further expansion of the city's area, now included within the boundaries of Greater Canton [Guangzhou], was defined so as to increase the municipality's area of supervision to over 290,000 *mow* or over 68 square miles. The boundary line of Greater Canton [Guangzhou] reached White Cloud Mountain in the north, extending southeastward to the western boundary of the projected Port of Whampao [Huangpu] and further southward along the Pearl River past the southern shore of the town of Whampao [Huangpu] in a southerly and then westerly direction, making a detour of Honam Island's southern shore and then proceeding northward behind the island on which Paak Hok Tung [Baihedong] and Fangtsun [Fangcun] are situated, cutting across the Canton [Guangzhou] - Shamshui [Sanshui] Railway Bridge at "Five Eyes" Bridge northward along the western

¹⁰⁷ GZSSZGB, no.11, 9 May, 1921, pp.1-4.



shore of the two islands west of the Tsangpu [Zengbu] waterworks and new power plant and finally steering northward back to White Cloud Mountain.”¹⁰⁸

Lee wrote his book in the 1930s when big cities such as Shanghai and Beijing competed to launch “greater city” movements aiming at regionalization. So, he adopted the current term “greater” for a similar plan in Guangzhou in the 1920s.¹⁰⁹ The decision-makers of Guangzhou in the 1920s never used the term “Greater Guangzhou”. Their scheme was simply called “expansion of the city proper” (*shiqu zhantuo*). It simply put the rough idea of eastward expansion raised by the Municipal Office into more concrete and systematic terms. According to records, the scheme applied the principle of urban zoning and enlarged the city boundary by dividing the greater area into different zones for navigational, industrial, commercial and residential development. It also took into consideration the securing of a continuous supply of water and the preservation of the natural environment. The plan defined the above boundary as the “proposed boundary” (*yiding quyu*). A smaller and more realistic boundary, called the “transitory boundary” (*quanyi quyu*), was set to allow the Municipality to put more resources into constructing its immediate suburbs first before undergoing more substantial expansion.¹¹⁰ This scheme was remarkable in the sense that it was the first modern zoning scheme produced by a Chinese municipality.¹¹¹


There was an untold story behind this proposal. The scheme was proclaimed publicly in early 1924, but its formulation was originally completed in June, 1922, right

¹⁰⁸ Edward Bing-Shuey Lee, *Modern Canton*, pp.23-4.

¹⁰⁹ See Kerrie L. MacPherson, “Designing China’s Urban Future: The Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927-1937”, *Planning Perspectives*, 5 (1990), pp. 39-62.

¹¹⁰ For the details of the plan, see *LHJ*, no.43 (1924), 21 December, 1923, pp.79-82; *GDGB*, no.3190, 2 December, 1923, pp.4-8.

¹¹¹ For example, Shanghai applied zoning in its “Greater Shanghai Plan”. See Kerrie L. MacPherson, “Designing China’s Urban Future: The Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927-1937”, *Planning Perspectives*,



before the mutiny of Chen Jiongming's armies. Cheng Tiangu, Head of the Bureau of Public Works, submitted the boundary expansion proposal drafted by the Guangzhou City Surveying Committee.¹¹² Even earlier, signs of the expansion of the city proper were noted when, in July, 1921, the Municipality proclaimed that the city proper was to be expanded to Dongshan in the east, and citizens were ordered to clear and remove the tombs of their ancestors.¹¹³ A "model housing estate" was to be erected there.¹¹⁴ In other words, the Municipality had already formulated a plan for expanding the city boundary five months after its establishment. Although such expansion would definitely help to disperse population from the city proper to its suburbs, the expansion scheme released by the Guangzhou Municipality was over-ambitious in the light of the Municipality's administrative crisis we have discussed above. The Municipality still could not exercise unitary administration within its existing boundary because of the existence of the two county governments within its boundary. More importantly, the Guangzhou Municipality had to continue with massive investment in the ex-walled city for road construction and maintenance, and Xiguan further demanded the Municipality's time and money for planning and development. Development in Dongshan and the more remote suburbs would mean a substantial shift of resources, if such a development were to be taken seriously. Furthermore, the expansion scheme was not complemented by any expansion of staff in the Municipality. On the contrary, the Municipality was experiencing a streamlining of its administration when the Dongshan scheme

spectives, 5 (1990), pp. 39-62.

¹¹² GZSSZGB, no.67, 5 June, 1922, pp.9-12.

¹¹³ GDQB, 21 July, 1921; GZSSZGB, no.19, 4 July, 1921, pp.1-3.

¹¹⁴ Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, p.45; SZGY, chapter on the "Municipality", p.24; *ibid*, chapter on the "Report on the Bureau of Public Works", p.15.



was proclaimed in July, 1921.¹¹⁵


Archival research on this issue gives us some insight into the real intention of this “expansion” policy at that particular point of time. First of all, actions concerning the expansion were taken much earlier than the formal proclamation of the full expansion scheme. In March, 1922, half a year after the release of the order to expand to Dongshan and to clear gravelands there, the Municipality still maintained the old police boundary as the city boundary.¹¹⁶ Land expansion was not accompanied by administrative expansion. Secondly, the Municipality did not introduce any observable municipal construction to Dongshan, the planned “new city proper” of Guangzhou, after the proclamation of expansion. By 1924, three years after the proclamation of the eastward expansion policy, no planning of the road system in Dongshan had been implemented.¹¹⁷ The only real change was the increasing confiscation of land and houses, and their re-sale to merchants. This evidence raises the possibility that the Municipality actually used this expansion scheme as an excuse to create a “new city proper” in order to find new, tangible sources of income.

The above assumption is well supported by documentation. The Municipality expected a 0.97 million deficit in its first budget (1921-22), and the Dongshan scheme which was declared immediately after the start of the new fiscal year in July, 1921 was

¹¹⁵ The over-expansion of municipal institution marked by the formation of the Guangzhou Municipality imposed great pressure on the distribution of resources. Finally, a decision was reached in June, 1921 to streamline the Municipality and reduce the salary of staff. Such a decision was applicable to all sub-organizations of the Municipality except the Bureau of Public Safety. The Bureaus of Finance, Public Works, Public Health and Education had to cut off some divisions, and all the vice-directors of the Bureaus except that of the Public Safety Bureau were to be abolished. A salary cut of 10-20% on all staff except that of the Bureau of Public Safety was implemented. Such a salary cut, beginning from 1 July, 1921, was not suspended until early 1923. See GZSSZGB, no.18, 27 June, 1921, pp.6-8; no.72, 16 April, 1923, pp.24-5; Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, p.31.

¹¹⁶ GZSSZGB, no.55, 13 March, 1922, p.24.

¹¹⁷ It was recorded that Dongshan residents advised the Municipality in 1924 to plan the road system as soon as possible. GZSSZGB, no.127, 5 May, 1924, pp.5-7.




designed as a remedial measure to make up the deficit. The Municipality anticipated that profits from the sale of land in Dongshan would be enormous.¹¹⁸ It resolved to use the income from the sale of land in Dongshan for various construction projects such as the construction of the administrative complex, municipal vocational schools and municipal hospitals in the existing city proper, but not for Dongshan's own construction.¹¹⁹ The subsequent proclamation of the more ambitious "expansion" scheme in June, 1922 aimed at securing land resources in a wider geographical area. The adoption of this ambitious scheme was once again associated with the Municipality's conflict with the Highway Authority. The conflict was caused not only by the struggle over "municipal property" within the existing police boundary, but also over "government property" in the vicinity of the city proper. The Municipality was annoyed by the Authority's continual sale of "government property" in Dongshan. As early as March, 1922, the Municipality petitioned the provincial government and requested that the Highway Authority be banned from disposing government property within ten miles beyond the existing boundary in order to facilitate "planning" by the Municipality.¹²⁰ Furthermore, the "planning" of the new city proper was assigned to the Bureau of Finance, a bureau responsible for the management of municipal property, but not to the Bureau of Public Works.¹²¹ The successful delineation of an expanded boundary, as finalized in June, 1922, would provide the Guangzhou Municipality with a legitimate reason to monopolize the disposal of all "government property" in both the existing city proper and its vicinities that were planned to be incorporated into the expanded city

¹¹⁸ GZSSZGB, no.31, 26 September, 1921, pp.32-3; BGHK, pp.73-4.

¹¹⁹ The decision was made on 14 February, 1922. See GZSSZGB, no.53, 27 February, 1922, pp.1-2; SZGY, chapter on the "Municipality", p.26.

¹²⁰ GDQB, 6 March, 1922.

¹²¹ GZSSZGB, no.93, 10 September, 1923, p.21.



proper.

Even though the expansion scheme of the Guangzhou Municipality was primarily a means to compete for more land resources, it was never implemented seriously. It was reported that the Municipality never gained full administrative rights over the area within the “transitory boundary” until 1937.¹²² Actually, the Guangzhou Municipality was unable to expand geographically, even into Honam which was much more prosperous than Dongshan, by the mid-1920s.


The work done by the Municipality

The above discussion has given us some insight into the operation of the Guangzhou Municipality. However, a fuller and more comprehensive picture of the operation of the Municipality throughout the five years in question can only be reconstructed by analyzing in greater details the work done by the Municipality. In this section, the six aspects of work of the Municipality, that is, finance, public security, public works, public health, public utilities and education, will be analyzed and summarized in order to evaluate the efforts the Guangzhou Municipality made during the years in question.¹²³

Finance. In the existing literature on the Guangzhou Municipality, the aspect of finance was not studied in depth, although finance was actually the backbone of the Municipality and the Bureau of Finance was a logistic base for other bureaus of the Municipality. Before the establishment of the Municipality, there were only provisions

¹²² See the “Guangzhou zhuanji” (Guangzhou special) in *Lüxing zazhi*, vol.22, no.10, 5 October, 1948, p.3.

¹²³ For a glance of the work of the Municipality, see “Commission Government in Canton”, *The Far Eastern Review*, February, 1922, pp.101-3.



for provincial and county finances. The formation of the Municipality created the urgent need for "municipal finance" for the proper operation of the Municipality. In turn, the Bureau of Finance bargained for financial resources with both the provincial- and county-level administrations for the operation of the other bureaus.

The work of this financial organization illustrated typical problems faced by the whole Municipality. For the one and a half year before the mutiny of Chen Jiongming's armies in 1922, the Municipality survived marginally in view of the lack of adequate resources. Its staff was not paid, the agreed subsidy from the provincial government was not always forthcoming and the agreed tax items had not been transferred to the Municipality from the provincial government.¹²⁴ As mentioned earlier, there was an expected deficit of 0.97 million *yuan* in the 1921-22 budget. As it turned out, there was a surplus of a million *yuan* due to the opening of new taxes and the sale of land in Dongshan.¹²⁵ However, this surplus was totally appropriated by Chen Jiongming's government after the mutiny on 16 June, 1922, and it was reported that there was not a cent in the municipal coffers when Sun Fo resumed his Mayorship in February, 1923.¹²⁶

We have also mentioned that the Municipality strove to augment its limited resources from its very inauguration. This struggle was intensified during Sun Fo's second Mayorship from 1923 to 1924. Although Sun claimed that his new Mayorship would mark the beginning of *shizheng chongguang* (the regeneration of municipal administration), what awaited him was a tangle of knotty problems.¹²⁷ The first of these

¹²⁴ See HZRB, 2 and 21 March, 24 May, 1921.

¹²⁵ BGHK, pp.73-4, 78-9.

¹²⁶ See Sun Fo, "Guangzhou shizheng yishu", *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.1, no.3, 1971, p.5.

¹²⁷ Sun showed his aspiration in GZSSZGB, no.108, 24 December, 1923, pp.1-5.




problems was a financial crisis. The following report clearly indicated the critical conditions of the Municipality:

"As for the aspect of direct income, the Bureau [of Finance] failed to collect taxes on nightsoil, advertisement, sacramental performance and licenses of wine houses, tea houses, ordinary restaurants, Western restaurants and hotels.... Income from property transfer registration fees was all taken over by the Department of Finance, and the agreed allocation of half of such registration fees never materialized. The Department of Finance had promised to transfer the livestock tax on pig and cow in this finance year [of 1922-23] to the Municipality, but finally they were not transferred as agreed. Taxes on brothel boats were requisitioned by the armies, and the collection of the drama tax was suspended [because it was requisitioned by the armies]...."¹²⁸

It was at this critical juncture that the Bureau of Finance introduced radical measures to save the Municipality. The Municipality forced local organizations such as the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce and charitable organizations to lend huge sums of money to the municipal government. Merchants engaged in lucrative trades such as banking, the silk trade and pawnbroking were asked either to lend money to the Municipality or to pay surtax. The rent levies were reportedly to be paid twenty months in advance.¹²⁹ In spite of these temporary measures, the situation was not notably improved as the funds were limited and were quickly consumed by the Municipality. The Municipality was then competing with various military forces stationed in and around Guangzhou over for the control of financial resources, notably the armies of Chen Jiongming and Shen Hongying around Guangzhou and the government's Yunnan-Guangxi army under the command of Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan in Guangzhou. Sun Fo admitted in his memoirs that his major work during his second Mayorship was to raise funds for supporting the continuous military campaigns whose

¹²⁸ BGHK, pp.75-6.

¹²⁹ For such squeezing acts by the Municipality, see Guangdong sheng dang'anguan, *Sun Zhongshan yu Guangdong: Guangdong sheng dang'anguan ku cang haiguan dang'an xuanyi*, pp.572-3, 586-7, 614-5; GZSSZGB, no.84, 9 July, 1923, pp.34-5; Wu Tiecheng, *Wu Tiecheng huiyilu*, p.122.



victory or loss would threaten the survival of both his Guangzhou Municipality and Sun Yatsen's revolutionary regime.¹³⁰


As a result, Sun Fo, under the order of Sun Yatsen, introduced a controversial measure. In April, 1923, Sun Yatsen declared in the name of the "Generalissimo" of the Military Government the sale of all immovable property owned by governments of all levels in the province of Guangdong for the sake of funding military campaigns.¹³¹ This policy quickly disturbed the city of Guangzhou as all street temples and the associated immovable property owned in the name of these temples were considered to be a kind of "municipal property", and they were ordered in June to be confiscated and resold.¹³² In spite of petitions from the residents and merchants requesting the rescinding of this harsh policy, the Municipality resolved to implement it. A new "Government Property Division" was set up in October under the Bureau of Finance to specialize in dealing with this matter. Together with the sale of other kinds of "municipal property" such as pedestrian walkways (for the construction of hanging balconies), waste land in blocked streets, land over silted drainage and so on, the sale of "municipal property" in 1923 generated an income of more than six million dollars of which 4.9 million went to the provincial government as loans for funding military campaigns.¹³³

This extraordinary sale of "municipal property" created many problems in the city, and the operation of the Municipality was affected. The Bureaus of Public Health and Public Works spent more than one year relocating themselves after the Great Buddha

¹³⁰ Sun Fo, "Guangzhou shizheng yishu", *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.1, no.3, 1971, pp.4-5; Liang Hancao, "Kancheng daxiao zhi Sun Zhesheng Xiansheng", in Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi shiliao bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), *Geming renwu zhi*, vol.13, p.31.

¹³¹ *LHJ*, no.8 (1923), 27 April, 1923, p.26.

¹³² *GDGB*, no.3178, 16 June, 1923, pp.2-3.



Temple, the original premises of these two bureaus, was sold.¹³⁴ Schools in temples were sold indiscriminately, and the Bureau of Education had to petition both the Bureau of Finance and the Provincial Government Property Authority (previously known as Highway Authority) not to sell temples which were currently used as schools.¹³⁵ In truth, the sale was solely for the sake of profits, and produced no observable significance for city planning and the re-zoning of the city. On the contrary, it upset existing planning measures. For example, the proposal to build the Second Garden at Dongjiaochang (East Parade Ground) was doomed as the place was sold, and the whole project was arbitrarily ordered to be moved to Beijiaochang (North Parade Ground) where the Municipality had never thought seriously of development.¹³⁶


The residents were even more embittered. As residents were encouraged to inform the Municipality of any “private property” that originally belonged to the local government, many sent in false reports to get the attractive commissions. The Municipality’s confiscation of such property made the streets lose huge incomes generated from the leasing of such property. Members of the Committee for Local Rehabilitation in Guangdong (*Guangdong difang shanhou weiyuanhui*) asked the Municipality to protect the property rights of the common residents. This resulted in the establishment of a new bureau called the “Land Certification Bureau” (*Minchan baozheng ju*) under the Municipality in December, 1923. It requested landowners to register their land deeds with the Bureau for a fee of three percent of the land price. Registered

¹³³ BGHK, p.109.

¹³⁴ BGHK, p.149; GZSSZGB, no.52, 20 February, 1922, p.18.

¹³⁵ Such cases were numerous. The followings were only some examples. GZSSZGB, no.79, 4 June, 1923, pp.32-6; no.80, 11 June, 1923, pp.22-3; no.82, 25 June, 1923, pp.21, 26, 28; no.104, 26 November, 1923, pp.19-21; GDGB, no.3170, 7 June, 1923, p.10; no.3173, 11 June, 1923, p.9; no.3187, 28 June, 1923, p.5; no.3205, 19 July, 1923, p.3.

¹³⁶ GZSSZGB, no.81, 18 June, 1923, pp.33-4; Xie Dingchu, “Guangdong sheng gonggong yundong-



land would be protected by the Municipality from being confiscated. The effect of this measure was insignificant as few landowners made registration, and further measures such as the drafting of penalty regulations against false reports were proposed by the Committee for Local Rehabilitation.¹³⁷ However, the Land Certification Bureau turned out to be a fund-raising institution. Sun Yatsen ordered the Land Certification Bureau to make a daily subsidy of two thousand dollars for the production of ammunition, as the Government Property Authority under the provincial government, originally an important fund-raising institution, was then abolished.¹³⁸ Furthermore, the Bureau was ordered in February, 1924 to collect a sum of half a million dollars for military purpose.¹³⁹ This Bureau only ceased to exist in June, 1925 when the Yunnan-Guangxi armies were annihilated. The local government transformed by GMD party rule then decided to pursue a milder policy to improve the relationship with the masses.¹⁴⁰

The above financial crisis slowed down the construction of the Municipality. Sun Fo made the following comments on the termination of his second Mayorship:

"The Municipality has raised more than ten million dollars for military expenditure from April of last year to June of this year. As a result, the municipal plans are substantially affected. There is no room for the commencement of various projects of construction and expansion. For the past year, only the *status quo* was maintained."¹⁴¹

"Nine-tenths of the Municipality's income was used for military purposes.

chang de cangsang", *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao*, no.9, October, 1963, p.149.


¹³⁷ For the origins and work of the Land Certification Bureau, see *LHJ*, no.38 (1923), 23 November, 1923, p.15; no.2 (1924), 20 January, 1924, pp.16-7; *GDGB*, no.3330, 15 December, 1923, pp.5-6; *GZSSZGB*, no.106, 10 December, 1923, p.30; *Guangzhou difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui*, *Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.3, p.370.

¹³⁸ Sun Zhongshan, *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol.8, p.75. According to this citation, Sun made such an order in a document written in July, 1923. However, the Land Certification Bureau was formed in December, and the Government Property Authority was also abolished in December. Therefore, this document should have been misdated.

¹³⁹ *LHJ*, no.4 (1924), 10 February, 1924, p.10.

¹⁴⁰ *GZSSZGB*, no.186, 20 July, 1925, p.24.

¹⁴¹ *GZSSZGB*, no.147, 22 September, 1924, p.47.



In the past years, municipal construction in the Guangzhou Municipality was in a period of standstill. All the approved new plans and budgets were not realized. There was nothing worth mentioning on municipal affairs in the past one or two years.”¹⁴²

These two paragraphs revealed that the original purpose of establishing the Municipality, namely to create an autonomous institution with independent finance, was not achieved. There is considerable evidence to show that the Municipality’s coffers were always squeezed by the provincial or “central” government for non-municipal purposes. The situation was reportedly improved after a Nationalist Government was set up in July, 1925.¹⁴³

However, it was exactly the need of diversifying sources of income that resulted in institutional change. The above-mentioned “Land Certification Bureau” had actually transformed the Municipality into a seven-bureau institution though the *Provisional Regulations* were not amended.¹⁴⁴ Further changes were made to the accounting system of the Municipality. The Bureau of Finance introduced the modern double entry book-keeping system, and the separation between accounting and cashier. It also opened a book-keeping school for the training of book-keepers.¹⁴⁵

Public safety. The Bureau of Public Safety could be viewed as a “vested interest” in the Municipality. The Bureau, as mentioned before, was transformed from the Department of Police and regarded itself as the most “legitimate” and authoritative component of the Municipality. When Wei Bangping agreed to serve as the bureau

¹⁴² BGHK, preface.

¹⁴³ “Guangzhou shizheng yangge”, in *Guangzhou shizhengfu xinshu luocheng jinian zhuankan*, p.8

¹⁴⁴ However, it was not known whether Li Jitang, Head of the “Land Certification Bureau”, was also a member of the Executive Council.

¹⁴⁵ For the evolution of the accounting system, see SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Finance”, pp.43-57; Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, pp.32-40.



head, he was not prepared to reform the Department of Police according to the *Regulations of the Bureau of Public Safety*.¹⁴⁶ Though Wei yielded and reformed the Bureau gradually after he assumed office on 1 March, 1921, the institutional strength of the ex-Department of Police remained. It had the most extensive geographical influence by dividing the city proper into twelve districts, each maintaining a number of branch offices.¹⁴⁷ As its activities touched on various aspects of urban lives, the Bureau always published the largest amount of information in municipal publications with the most impressive statistical data.


The “central government” in Guangzhou, under the GMD’s leadership, was aware of the Bureau’s established strength and independent finance, and thus inserted more party members into it after Sun Yatsen returned in early 1923. The most noticeable example was the appointment of Wu Tiecheng, a devoted GMD member, as the Bureau Head. Therefore, in the chaotic period 1923-1925, the Bureau of Public Safety always acted according to the direct orders sent by the “Generalissimo”, the Guangzhou Garrison Command and the Ministry of Military under the Military Government.¹⁴⁸ It functioned as a branch office of the “central government” in the south.¹⁴⁹ The Bureau’s strong political affiliation produced profound impact on its operation. The GMD applied political indoctrination on the Bureau’s staff and intensified its influence

¹⁴⁶ HZRB, 2 March, 1921.

¹⁴⁷ In late 1923, a “thirteenth” district was set up in southern Honam. GZSSZGB, no.92, 3 September, 1923, pp.6-7.

¹⁴⁸ For example, see LHZ, no.12 (1923), 25 May, 1923, p.9; no.19 (1923), 13 July, 1923, p.45; C. Martin Wilbur, “Problems of Starting a Revolutionary Base: Sun Yat-sen and Canton, 1923”, *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica*, vol.4, no.2, 1974, p.676.

¹⁴⁹ Police of Shanghai showed some similarity to the case of Guangzhou in this context. After the establishment of the Nationalist Government in 1927, the Shanghai police was always requested by the central government and other state organs to serve non-local interest. See Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *Policing Shanghai 1927-1937* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), chapter 10.



on local administration after its first Central Committee meeting in early 1924. The Guomindang's Police Training Regiment was set up in Guangzhou to train officers for the Bureau in July 1924, one year before the establishment of the Nationalist Government.¹⁵⁰ As a result, the Bureau became the first sub-organization of the Guangzhou Municipality to accept the formal guidance of the GMD and its ideology.

On many occasions, strong political affiliation hampered the normal operation of the Bureau, especially during 1923-25. In this period, the Guangzhou Garrison Command was under the leadership of Yang Ximin, Commander of the Yunnan Army in Guangzhou. Yang and his ally Liu Zhenhuan, Commander of the Guangxi Army in Guangzhou, imposed military rule in the city. As Yang and Liu were the most powerful militarists in Guangzhou, the Bureau of Public Safety, and even the GMD, could not stop them from commandeering residents into military service, intruding into houses and burglarizing shops and households.¹⁵¹ The prestige of the Bureau dropped precipitously, and residents sometimes fired at policemen when quarreling with them.¹⁵²


The strong political affiliation of the Bureau did not imply drastic change in its functions. Its work was more or less the same as before 1921, that is, street patrol, household registration and investigation of civil and criminal cases. Two new services associated with urban change are nevertheless worth mentioning. The Bureau maintained a team of traffic police which became indispensable in view of the growing traffic on the newly opened roads.¹⁵³ Another was the operation of fire-fighting services,

¹⁵⁰ GZSSZGB, no.138, 21 July, 1924, pp.21-2.

¹⁵¹ The seriousness of such uncontrolled brutality was reflected in the numerous reports of such acts. The following citations are examples: GDGB, no.3188, 29 June, 1923, pp.2-3; GZSSZGB, no.69, 26 March, 1923, p.34; no.70, 9 April, 1923, p.29; no.89, 13 August, 1923, pp.21-2; no.100, 29 October, 1923, p.30; no.113, 28 January, 1924, p.55.

¹⁵² For example, see GZSSZGB, no.92, 3 September, 1923, pp.22-3.

¹⁵³ See BGHK, pp.246-73.




marked by the addition of the Fire Fighting Division. This new division provided modern fire-fighting apparatus and supervised the street-based fire-fighting units. However, the acquisition of such apparatus substantially increased the expenditure of the Bureau. Since the Bureau was not willing to spend its own money expanding fire-fighting services, it requested additional subsidies from the Bureau of Finance for such development, for example, the building of the Central Fire Fighting Station.¹⁵⁴

Public works. Although the Municipal Office was criticized by Sun Fo and contemporary commentators as focusing too narrowly on physical construction, public works was still a key function of the new Municipality. As Chen Jiongming and Sun Yatsen intended to glorify their respective political ideologies by extolling the success of Guangzhou, both were eager to bring about a modernized, well-planned and well-constructed Guangzhou. To produce such a showcase, huge investments were needed to modernize the city by constructing broad roads, improving transportation, and erecting eminent buildings. Such an intention was reflected in the budgets of the Guangzhou Municipality shown in Table 7.1. While the Bureau of Public Safety always claimed the largest share of routine expenditure, it was the Bureau of Public Works which claimed the largest share of special expenditure to pay for various construction projects. Through this massive investment, it was hoped that Guangzhou would be quickly transformed into a modern city.

It was this desire for a quick transformation of Guangzhou which made the Bureau of Public Works the focus of attention of the Municipality. The ambition of the Bureau was shown by its forming a Project Design Committee (*gongcheng sheji weiyuan-*

¹⁵⁴ See GZSSZGB, no.159, 15 December, 1924, p.20.



*hui).*¹⁵⁵ This Committee consisted of nine members with Cheng Tiangu, Head of the Bureau of Public Works, as Chairman. The other members were the three divisional chiefs and two other engineers of the Bureau. In addition, Mayor Sun Fo invited three noted foreign engineers in the city to join the Committee. Major G.W. Olivecrona, a Swedish civil engineer and the Engineer-in-Chief of the Board of Conservancy Works of Guangdong, was one of them.¹⁵⁶ It was reported that this Committee had designed and approved numerous projects on street reconstruction, gardens, sports centers, administrative complex, expansion and repair of the Bund, and even the expansion of the city proper to Dongshan.¹⁵⁷

Table 7.1 Budgetary expenditure of the Guangzhou Municipality, 1921-1924


		1921 (Feb.-Jun.)	1922-23	1923-24
Bureau of Finance	Routine	66,017.00	98,068.00	144,818.00
	Special	5,520.00	17,400.00	28,600.00
	Total	71,537.00	115,468.00	173,418.00
Bureau of Public Safety	Routine	1,179,403.00	1,167,887.00	1,789,818.00
	Special	219,757.00	322,113.00	728,372.00
	Total	1,399,160.00	1,490,000.00	2,518,190.00
Bureau of Public Works	Routine	97,476.00	123,412.00	137,386.00
	Special	429,494.00	2,626,588.00	4,044,892.00
	Total	526,970.00	2,750,000.00	4,182,278.00
Bureau of Public Health	Routine	245,662.00	396,814.00	472,182.96
	Special	28,894.00	44,186.00	110,624.00
	Total	274,556.00	441,000.00	582,806.96
Bureau of Public Utilities	Routine	40,252.00	51,559.50	61,927.00
	Special	2,300.00	42,440.50	15,670.00
	Total	42,552.00	94,000.00	77,597.00
Bureau of Education	Routine	308,760.00	588,217.40	457,447.73
	Special	24,960.00	511,650.00	401,640.00
	Total	333,720.00	1,099,867.4	859,087.73

Source: *Guangzhou shi shizheng baogao huikan* (1922-24) (Guangzhou: Guangzhou shi shizhengting, 1924), pp.78-105.

¹⁵⁵ SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Public Works”, pp.8-9; HZRB, 19 April, 1921; *The Far Eastern Review*, July, 1921, p.488.

¹⁵⁶ For the curriculum vitae of G.W. Olivecrona, see Carroll Lunt (ed.), *China Who's Who 1925 (Foreign): A Biographical Dictionary*, pp.194-5.


¹⁵⁷ See SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Public Works”, pp.8-9; HZRB, 19 April, 1921; *The Far Eastern Review*, vol.17, no.7, July, 1921, p.488.



The Bureau divided its work into various categories.¹⁵⁸ Road construction was still a central work, as it was the case during the tenure of the Municipal Office. After the completion of the second-phase road construction project, the Bureau worked out a third-phase road construction scheme after the return of Sun Yatsen in 1923. The Bund was to be extended westwards, and a large piece of land outside the Bund was to be reclaimed. The First Garden planned by the Municipal Office was completed in 1921. A children's playground, reportedly based on the American model, and gardens in Dongshan and Xiguan were planned. Trees were planted along the newly opened roads. The Bureau also suggested building modern housing estates in the city. It proposed to construct a "model housing estate" in Dongshan. Similar housing estates in Xicun (north of Xiguan) and Yuexiu Hill were planned. Another grand plan of the Bureau was to construct an administrative complex to house the provincial and municipal government organs. Besides administrative efficiency, the Bureau also wanted to revive the nation's cultural spirit by adding Chinese architectural designs onto Western structures.

The construction of an inner harbor was surely a grand and ambitious plan. The success of this plan would revive the maritime prestige of Guangzhou and stimulate trade in the Pearl River Delta. The plan, drawn up by Major G.W. Olivecrona in 1924, was praised by *The Far Eastern Review* as "one of the most promising harbor im-

¹⁵⁸ For the construction projects mentioned in this section, see *GZSSZGB*, no.16, 13 June, 1921, pp.29-30, 39-40; no.43, 19 December, 1921, p.23; no.52, 20 February, 1922, pp.31-6; no.68, 12 June, 1922, pp.1-4; no.70, 2 April, 1923, pp.19-20; no.71, 9 April, 1923, pp.25-6; no.72, 16 April, 1923, p.18; no.86, 23 July, 1923, pp.17-8; no.88, 6 August, 1923, pp.21-2; no.97, 8 October, 1923, pp.22-3; no.122, 31 March, 1924, pp.11-3; no.124, 14 April, 1924, p.16; *SZGY*, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Public Works"; *BGHK*, pp.125-90; "Canton Reclamation Project", *The Far Eastern Review*, vol.19, no.9, September, 1923, p.624; "Far Eastern Harbor and River Improvements Call for Huge Expenditure", *The Far Eastern Review*, vol.20, no.10, October, 1924, pp.478-87.




provement schemes in the Far East".¹⁵⁹ The construction of the Honam Bridge, which was proposed by the Provincial Assembly in 1921 to commemorate Chen Jiongming's victory in banning gambling, was incorporated into this scheme. Similar to the planned administrative complex, the proposed Bridge would adopt traditional Chinese architectural style as shown in the planned installation of two gate-towers in the middle of the Bridge (see Figure 1).¹⁶⁰

The Bureau of Public Works' plan to create a new city axis signaled the coming of a new era. In contrast to the existing city axis that stretched along Yonghan Road because of its commercial prosperity, the Bureau designed a new axis based on a completely new concept. The north-south running Weixin Road was chosen as the new axis.¹⁶¹ At the northern end of this Road was the First Garden and the planned administrative complex. The Road, eighty to a hundred feet wide, would serve as a transport center of the city proper as it ran to the Bund and over to Honam through the planned Honam Bridge. Weixin Road was also designed as a "model road". In order to produce a sense of the great width of the road, the Municipality banned balconies on buildings facing the Road, although buildings with balconies were widely constructed on roads over sixty feet wide and brought considerable revenue to the Municipality in the form of land deed tax. Existing balconies were ordered to be demolished with government compensation. Trees were planted along the Road so as to create an impression of magnificence and spaciousness. The Municipality also invited Henry K. Murphy, a young American architect, to design a preliminary plan for the city in

¹⁵⁹ "Far Eastern Harbor and River Improvements Call for Huge Expenditure", *The Far Eastern Review*, vol.20, no.10, October 1924, p.486.

¹⁶⁰ "Proposed Bridge Across the Pearl River", *The Far Eastern Review*, September, 1922, p.562.

¹⁶¹ The following sources provide some details of this new axis: GZSSZGB, no.49, 30 January, 1922, pp.16-7; no.52, 20 February, 1922, p.1; SZGY, chapter on the "Municipality", p.26; Xianggang Zhongxing bao zhounian jinian kan: Guangdong jianshe hao, p.160.







Figure 1 A sketch of the proposed Honam Bridge
(Source: *The Far Eastern Review*, vol. 18, no. 9, September 1922, p. 562)




1922.¹⁶² These planning attempts were to symbolize the energetic outlook of the new regime.

These impressive projects earned the praise of foreign observers. *The Far Eastern Review* reported:

“Perhaps in the past the Cantonese have seemed to embrace modernism to a greater degree than has actually been the case but whether this is so or not the fact remains that the great strides that are being made at the present time in Canton [Guangzhou] are absolutely unfettered by superstition or any other of those qualities that have made of the Chinese the arch-procrastinator of the world. It is common knowledge now that Canton [Guangzhou] is being rebuilt.”¹⁶³

Subsequent development proved that this was an overly optimistic view. The officials of the Municipality once again became procrastinators. But there were sound reasons for the delay. For the first year, the Bureau's work remained at the stage of research and planning. The 1923-24 financial crisis cut down the large budget requested by the Bureau of Public Works. This provided a general explanation for the delay of the above projects. Specifically, the third-phase road construction scheme was suspended as many government properties along the proposed routes were sold to private parties in 1923. The widely publicized reclamation project outside the Bund received no tender from the merchants who were reluctant to invest millions of dollars during the political turmoil. For the construction of gardens, the First Garden remained the only “municipal garden” of Guangzhou. The construction of the Second Garden, as mentioned above, ended in permanent suspension as Dongjiaochang was sold in the property sale campaign. The children's playground remained at the stage of a proposal. For the construction of housing estates, all projects were not realized. No concrete steps had been taken for the planned housing estates in Dongshan and

¹⁶² See Jeffrey William Cody, *Henry K. Murphy, An American Architect in China, 1914-1935*, p.271.



Xicun. The Yuexiu Hill project was the only one showing some signs of progress. However, there were few people responding to the city government's call to acquire land on the Hill for the construction of housing blocks. One important reason was that potential buyers preferred locations closer to the heart of the city. The fate of the administrative complex was similar to that of the third-phase road project. The land was liquidated by the provincial government shortly after the 1922 mutiny.


Road construction was the only fruitful aspect of physical construction in the period concerned.¹⁶⁴ The condition of roads left a good impression on visitors, and a good road system surely activated the "showcase" effect by winning the appreciation of the observers. Therefore, the Municipality proclaimed its right to manage and transform all roads and streets within the city boundary. Compared to the ex-Municipal Office, the Guangzhou Municipality had devised a more effective way to raise funds for road construction. Sun Fo had learned from his experience in America and applied the system of the "condemnation and assessment" of road construction cost. The cost of street widening was assessed and shared by the land owners and residents proportionately.¹⁶⁵ The Guangdong Chambers of Commerce was made responsible for the collection of such funds. The Bureau was thus free from the financial burden of construction and more roads could be planned.

Road maintenance was more urgent than the construction of new roads. The macadam roads built by the Municipal Office were mostly of bricks taken from the demolished city walls, and the running of trams on roads produced considerable dust.

¹⁶³ "Canton in the Changing", *The Far Eastern Review*, vol.17, no.10, October 1921, p.705.

¹⁶⁴ See "Canton's New Maloos", *The Far Eastern Review*, January, 1922, pp.22-4.

¹⁶⁵ See GDGB, no.2874, 20 February, 1922, pp.2-7; GZSSZGB, no.51, 13 February, 1922, pp.34-5; Sun Fo, "Guangzhou shizheng yishu", *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.1, no.3, 1971, p.6; Orrin Keith, "The New Canton", *The Far Eastern Review*, March, 1922, p.146.




The repair of these roads became a major work of the Bureau especially in the years 1923-24. Road maintenance was generally urgent because of the steady increase of motor cars and other means of transport running across the city after the modern roads were built.¹⁶⁶ The availability of new road technologies such as asphalting facilitated the maintenance work.

However, even these activities of the Bureau were limited when compared to the efforts of municipal construction made before 1921. Table 7.2 provides us with some idea on the real achievement of the Bureau. Though the two sets of figures show some discrepancies, they convey a clear message that road construction after the establishment of the Municipality was not as extensive in terms of mileage. While the Municipal Office had produced an impressive mileage of roads by demolishing the city walls, the achievement of the Bureau of Public Works during 1921-22 merely represented a succession of the Municipal Office's second-phase road scheme. One of the problems faced by the Bureau was the difficulty of extending the road scheme to the densely-populated Xiguan area. Unlike the situation in the ex-walled city, the Municipality owned little government land in Xiguan. As land in Xiguan was more expensive compared with that in the ex-walled city, claiming land for road construction was beyond the financial ability of the Municipality.¹⁶⁷ The attitude of the Xiguan residents was also negative, preventing the Municipality from taking concrete actions.

¹⁶⁶ The following figures showed the steady increase of various means of transport in the city:

	1921	1922	1923
Rickshaw (for rent)	3,050	3,050	3,600
Rickshaw (private and government)	264	397	551
Motor car	91	152	273
Bicycle	205	409	812
Cart (by animal or man)	452	967	1,124
Horse-cart	22	31	36
One-wheel cart	-	1	40

Source: BGHK, p.357.



The strong opposition of the Xiguan residents in the above-mentioned case of Taiping Road reflected their inflexibility and unwillingness to accept transformation. This kind of attitude resulted from the residents' sense of insecurity as neither Chen Jiongming nor Sun Yatsen could put an end to local military conflicts. Therefore, the Xiguan residents were determined to maintain the narrow streets with gates for security purposes.¹⁶⁸ It was two years after the establishment of the Municipality that the first proposal to widen the Xiguan streets was raised. Six busy streets to the north of the ex-Thirteen Hangs area were chosen as the testing ground for street widening. In spite of firm opposition, the plan finally materialized since the proposal was vetted after a big fire which devastated the area. The Bureau was careful not to be over-ambitious, and the maximum width of the streets in the proposal was limited to forty-three feet.¹⁶⁹ Further plans for widening the Xiguan streets did not come about until the complete settlement of the Merchants' Corps Incident in late 1924, which marked the decline of the merchants' power and their opposition to the city government. These road construction plans proposed to widen the streets in all the busy areas of Xiguan.¹⁷⁰


Sometimes, political factors quickened the process of construction. The most notable example was the widening of Shaji Road. The Road, which stretched opposite the northern front of Shamian, was planned as an extension of the Bund in March, 1922. The project did not show any sign of progress due to the lack of funds. A turning-point appeared in June, 1925 when Shamian policemen fired at demonstrators on that unfinished road. This was the well-known "June Twenty-third Incident". To

¹⁶⁷ GZSSZGB, no.49, 30 January, 1922, pp.14-5.

¹⁶⁸ Wu Tiecheng, *Wu Tiecheng huiyilu*, p.134.

¹⁶⁹ For the project, see BGHK, pp.176-81; GZSSZGB, no.90, 20 August, 1923, pp.27-9.

¹⁷⁰ See GZSSZGB, no.170, 2 March, 1925, pp.19-20; no.183, 6 June, 1925, pp.24-5.




commemorate this “national humiliation”, the GMD ordered the immediate construction of the Road, and named it the “June Twenty-third Road”.

Table 7.2 Length of roads (in feet) built from pre-1918 to 1929

	<i>Guangzhou shi shizhengfu tongji nianjian</i>	<i>Guangzhou shi shizheng baogao huikan</i>
1918 and before	40,200	48,200
1919	18,800	
1920	35,000	40,510
1921	26,000	
1922	17,000	43,790
1923	3,500	2,500
1924	8,000	no data
1925	2,900	no data
1926	23,600	no data
1927	3,080	no data
1928	19,400	no data
1929 (first half)	14,760	no data

Sources: *Guangzhou shi shizhengfu tongji gu*, *Guangzhou shi shizhengfu tongji nianjian* (Guangzhou: Guangzhou shi shizhengfu, 1929), p.257; *Guangzhou shi shizheng baogao huikan (1922-24)* (Guangzhou: Guangzhou shi shizhengting, 1924), pp.137-42.

Although the Bureau came up with many brilliant ideas of construction, it still worked under heavy influence of the ex-Municipal Office and even earlier construction legacies. The Bureau’s plans were similar to those of the Municipal Office, as shown by its endorsement of the Office’s schemes of road and garden construction. It initiated the extension of the Bund by constructing the eighth and ninth phases sections, clearly a continuation of the seventh phase completed in 1914. Moreover, in the period 1921-25, the ex-walled city was still the main area of road construction, a major field of work of the ex-Municipal Office. Some attempts were made to widen the roads in Xiguan, but Dongshan and Honam were basically untouched. These limitations, however, should not detract from the significance of the work and planning done by the Bureau of Public Works. Through its numerous planning proposals, the Bu-




reau had produced a clear direction of construction and laid a good foundation for the implementation of feasible ideas. Many shelved projects, such as the construction of the inner harbor, the reclamation of land along the Bund and the building of an administrative complex and housing estates were picked up again by the Bureau during the Mayorship of Lin Yungai and Liu Jiwen in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The new city axis along Weixin Road, for example, was a legacy of the Guangzhou Municipality up to the present.¹⁷¹

Public health. By the 1920s, the concept of “public health” was not new in China. From the 1870s onwards, Shanghai had benefited from the scheme of public health introduced by foreigners.¹⁷² However, “public health” was completely new to Guangzhou, the “largest city of south China”. To the Guangzhou Municipality, it was relatively easier to transform “narrow streets and stereotyped constructions” on the foundation built up by the ex-Municipal Office. However, the Municipality started with nothing to solve the “untidiness” of the city except some paper regulations. What the newly-formed Bureau of Public Health faced was not only the century-long habit of dumping garbage on almost every street in the city proper but also the indifference of the citizens towards sanitation. The Municipality needed to convince the residents of the limitation of the street-based cleansing system and, more significantly, the necessity and merits of a centralized institution overseeing sanitary condition of the entire city.

¹⁷¹ The “Guangzhou Master Plan” of 1984 stated that Weixin Road, now renamed Guangzhou Qiyi Road, was assigned as the north-south axis of the city proper. See *Guangzhou baike quanshu bianzuan weiyuanhui* (ed.), *Guangzhou baike quanshu*, p.325.

¹⁷² See Kerrie L. MacPherson, *A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843-1893*, pp.66, and *passim*.



The road to success was long and thorny, but the Municipality firmly believed that success in improving the sanitary conditions was imperative for turning Guangzhou into a showcase city. Though the Bureau could not bargain for a large budget, its staff strove to improve the sanitation of the city within the existing financial constraints. Based on the twelve police districts of the city, the Bureau maintained six *weisheng qu* (health and sanitary districts) with one serving two police districts. The work of the Bureau was roughly divided into two areas, that is, routine cleaning and sanitary supervision on the one hand, and epidemic prevention on the other. It employed more than nine hundred scavengers to collect rubbish from the streets of the city. Besides collecting rubbish, the Bureau also cleaned the streets by watering cars. The Bureau issued the largest number of public instructions and orders compared to the other bureaus. Taking the years 1921-22 as an example, the Bureau issued orders governing the registration of medical doctors, hotels, restaurants and tea houses; supervising the supply of milk, hairdressing and laundry; and banning the use of poisonous dye in making mooncakes. It paid extra attention to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. Cholera was reported in Guangzhou in August, 1921. The Bureau issued nine regulations governing food and sanitation, and fixed a twenty-day period for fighting against cholera. As a result, the disease reportedly disappeared.¹⁷³

The Bureau's work was important and the result was impressive. Peng Hui, a division head who became Bureau Head in 1923, wrote in 1921:

"Owing to the continual opening of maloos [wide roads] in the city, the multiplicity of modern structures and tenement houses, the amount of refuse is increasing daily.... The daily removal of approximately three hundred tons of refuse, besides the removal of building-refuse, is by no means a small task which the department [Bureau of Public Health] has to perform in addition to

¹⁷³ See SZGY, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Public Health"; *Guangzhou shi shizhengting zongwu ke bianji gu, Guangzhou shi shizheng ligui zhangcheng huibian*, pp.75-102; GZSSZGB, passim.



various other duties....”¹⁷⁴

This task was reportedly accomplished with great success. All the old dumping areas were cleared within half a year after the establishment of the Municipality.¹⁷⁵ Huang Yanpei praised the work of the Bureau thus: “the tidiness of the streets in Guangzhou is so much better compared with other places in the country where I have been to.”¹⁷⁶ The Bureau consistently sought the advice of professionals. It formed an advisory board consisting of fourteen notable medical doctors, many of whom were serving as heads of hospitals in the city.¹⁷⁷ It was also quick in responding to complaints by the citizens. For example, the Bureau took immediate action to ban the use and sale of re-used tea-leaves after an exposé in a local newspaper.¹⁷⁸

However, the achievements of the Bureau and the energetic devotion of the Bureau staff contributed little to solving some of the fundamental problems which the Bureau faced since its very existence. The following account highlighted the indifference of the citizens and their uncooperative attitude towards the Bureau:

“The age-long habit of dumping rubbish outside the door, the promiscuous spitting indulged in by everybody everywhere, the congested sections with their narrow streets, the inadequate and filthy drainage system, the bitter opposition of the masses toward all sanitary measures, the meagre sum allotted for Public Health Expenditure, and the gross ignorance and superstition which have prevailed for many thousand years, these and multifarious obstacles of one kind or another, combine to tax the patience and ingenuity of the greatest modern Hercules to the very limit.”¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ H.A. Pan, “Municipal Government in China: Street Cleaning System of Canton”, *The Far Eastern Review*, vol. 19, no. 8, August 1923, p.551.


¹⁷⁵ SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Public Health”, p.4.

¹⁷⁶ Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, p.60.

¹⁷⁷ GZSSZGB, no.6, 4 April, 1921, pp.26-7.

¹⁷⁸ GZSSZGB, no.123, 7 April, 1923, p.32.

¹⁷⁹ This was written by the editor of the *Canton Gazette* in English, in *Guangzhou shi weisheng ju, Weisheng niankan*, 1923.




In spite of the efforts of the Hygiene Education Division under the Bureau, frequent reports of the violation of sanitary regulations were received. Throwing dead mice in the street, dumping rubbish everywhere along the street, untimely collection of nightsoil and pumping air and water into meat were only a few examples of the violation of public health regulations.¹⁸⁰ These examples nevertheless justified the Bureau's efforts in establishing a centralized sanitary system since the traditional street-based cleansing system was always disregarded by the street residents. However, the Bureau lacked adequate resources to replace the street-based functions totally.

The non-cooperation of the residents was paralleled by the belittlement of the Bureau of Public Health in the government structure. Before the establishment of the Bureau, sanitation in the city was a duty assigned to a division under the Department of Police. Sun Fo expanded this small division into a bureau. In spite of the significance of the Bureau in maintaining public sanitation and health in the city, many people regarded its expansion as unreasonable. They questioned the necessity of the Bureau's existence. In the midst of the financial crisis in 1921, there was a rumor that the Bureau would be abolished.¹⁸¹ This turned out to be untrue, but the Bureau was victimized by the subsequent streamlining. As from 1 July, 1921, all the six *weisheng qu* were abolished. The Hygiene Education Division and the Statistics Division were also abolished, and only the Cleaning Division and Epidemic Prevention Division were retained. The Bureau begged for the maintenance of its existing structure. The Executive Council then sanctioned the reinstallation of the two abolished divisions, but re-

¹⁸⁰ For example, see GZSSZGB, no. 71, 9 April, 1923, pp.3-5; no.123, 7 April, 1924, p.10; no.140, 4 August, 1924, p.15; no.178, 27 April, 1925, pp.31-2.

¹⁸¹ SB, 15 June, 1921.



duced them to “sections” (*gu*) directly subordinated to the Bureau head.¹⁸² In August, the Executive Council re-initiated the abolition of the two *gu*, but this was shelved after the Bureau opposed the move.¹⁸³ This streamlining substantially undermined the institutional and functional capability of the Bureau. It had to borrow district police stations as offices.¹⁸⁴ This helps to explain why the police insisted that they had discretionary power over the appointment of cleaners.

The streamlining of the Bureau of Public Health in 1921, which happened just five months after the establishment of the Municipality, clearly showed that hygienic work had a low priority when the Municipality faced a tight budget. It had reduced the Bureau into a small sub-organization in the Municipality. The Bureau’s relatively low status and its inability to compete for resources from the Municipality made it difficult to expand its work. The Bureau proposed the construction of five slaughter houses to centralize the slaughtering of livestock in June, 1921. This proposal was finally ruled out due to the resistance of the butchers and, above all, the Bureau’s inability to expand its staff Bureau to supervise this daily activity.¹⁸⁵ In 1923, the Bureau tried to open up more resources by levying a “cleaning tax” on households and shops, and another on the sale of nightsoil. The latter levy was unsuccessful because of two reasons. Firstly, the local armies competed with the Bureau by contracting out the collection of the nightsoil tax without the prior approval of the Municipality. The existing nightsoil merchants boycotted the “new” nightsoil agent, as their franchise was threatened by this contracting-out system.¹⁸⁶ This not only caused the suspension of the shipping of


¹⁸² SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Public Health”, p.1.

¹⁸³ GZSSZGB, no.28, 5 September, 1921, pp.17-8.

¹⁸⁴ SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Public Health”, p.3.

¹⁸⁵ For the proposal, see GZSSZGB, no.16, 13 June, 1921, p.28; no.17, 20 June, 1921, pp.48-58.

¹⁸⁶ For the local armies’ contracting out the nightsoil business, see GZSSZGB, no.119, 10 March,



nightsoil but also the suspension of the “cleaning tax”. Secondly, both the citizens and nightsoil dealers resisted the levy as this meant an infringement of their interests by the municipal authorities. The details will be further discussed when we examine the interaction between the Municipality and the social forces.

To conclude, the Bureau was responsible, energetic and enterprising. It marked the beginning of the establishment of a centralized public health institution. It survived despite the unfavorable environment constraining its work and the administrative streamlining of the Municipality. The following observation highlighted the problems faced by the Bureau:

“Dr. Graham Reynolds states that the year under review [1924] has not been such a healthy one as last year. In common with Hongkong there was a severe outbreak of Smallpox [in Guangzhou] at the beginning of 1924. Nine cases of it occurred amongst foreigners only one of which was fatal. In the spring there was an epidemic of plague in Canton, which, probably owing to the strict measures taken in Hongkong, did not spread to that Colony. The incidence of Typhoid Fever continues to increase. Cholera occurred both in Canton and District [*sic*] but did not amount to an epidemic. Troops returning to the City brought back a good deal of disease, Dysentery, Typhoid, Beriberi and Scabies being rife amongst them.... This year quite a capable Health Department was inaugurated with an able, energetic and honest man [that is, Peng Hui] at the head, but owing to lack of money and to the disturbances, it failed.”¹⁸⁷

Public utilities. In the West, public utilities made up a class of businesses that falls between private and public enterprises. Because they affected public interests, such businesses were constantly put under government regulations. Except those treaty ports such as Shanghai which were more influenced by Western administration, Chinese cities without foreign enclaves had different approaches in dealing with such

¹⁸⁷ 1924, pp.24-5; no.121, 24 March, 1924, pp.20-2; no.122, 31 March, 1924, pp.29-30; Guangzhou difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.3, pp.679-80.

¹⁸⁷ H.G.W. Woodhead (ed.), *The China Year Book*, 1925, p.453.




utilities. Taking Guangzhou as an example, the provision of electricity and potable tap water took the form of joint ventures by the local government and merchants, as discussed in Chapter Four. In mid-1915, the head of the provincial Finance Department still served as the director of the electricity company.¹⁸⁸ In other words, the Chinese government was directly involved in the operation of public utilities in a variety of ways. Therefore, the establishment of the Bureau of Public Utilities looked to the experience of the West and that of cities such as Shanghai in regulating enterprises that provided services of public interest.

Similar to the Bureau of Public Health, the inauguration of the Bureau of Public Utilities was based on a concept never applied in local government. The Bureau defined this concept by setting a clear objective: to protect the interest of the capitalists who invested in public utilities on the one hand, and to regulate their operation for the benefit of the citizens on the other.¹⁸⁹ The work of the Bureau was divided into three areas: regulation of public utilities, transportation and the operation of the telephone office. For the regulation of public utilities, the Bureau kept a close eye on the operation of the electricity plant and the tap water company, both of which were private shared companies in the early 1920s. For the regulation of transportation, the Bureau supervised the operation and licensing of various means of transportation including tramway, motor cars, rickshaws and passenger boats. According to plan, the telephone office was to be transformed from the Telephone Bureau, which meant turning a provincial-level establishment into a municipal-level bureau, once the Municipality was formed.

¹⁸⁸ GDGB, no.837, 29 April, 1915, p.6.

¹⁸⁹ SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Public Utilities”, p.4.



Compared with the Bureau of Public Health, the fate of the Bureau of Public Utilities was slightly different. It survived all the financial crises from 1921 to 1925 and was not affected by administrative streamlining. This was partially due to the fact that its budget had already been the smallest among the six bureaus (see Table 7.1). Another reason was its ability in generating incomes for the Municipality. The relicensing of rickshaws illustrates this point.¹⁹⁰ As there were three thousand rickshaws for rent in the city and as rickshaws were a widely accepted means of transport, the Bureau regarded them as an ideal target for generating income. Soon after the formation of the Municipality, the Bureau ordered the termination of contracts with the existing rickshaw companies and invited new tenders. The new contracts brought immense profits to the Municipality. Among the three thousand rickshaws, 1,250 were owned by the Lixing Company. As the largest rickshaw company, Lixing was continually ordered by the Bureau to make contributions. In July, 1921, the Company was ordered to donate a sum of 30,000 dollars for military purposes. The company only consented to make a tax pre-payment of 20,000 dollars. The Bureau threatened to suspend its operation, and the Company finally gave in. The Bureau adopted coercion again in 1923 and ordered a tax pre-payment of 27,000 dollars from the Company, and an extra contribution of 20,000 dollars for military purposes. The Company acquiesced, and was thus granted an one-year extension of its license. In 1923, the Bureau contracted out five hundred new rickshaws because of the near completion of Shaji Road, though the Road remained a construction site until 1925.

There were other examples of revenue generation. License fees for motor cars generated considerable income. This amounted to \$223,541 in 1921, and increased to

¹⁹⁰ For the rickshaw issue, see *HZRB*, 31 March, 10 May, 1921; *GZSSZGB*, no.80, 11 June, 1923, pp.35-6; *SZGY*, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Public Utilities", p.22; *BGHK*, pp.353-4.



\$394,361.72 in 1923. The Bureau also revised the regulations governing the operation of the tap water company and the electricity plant to the effect that ten percent of their profits was to be submitted to the Municipality every year.¹⁹¹


Although the above discussion focuses on how the Bureau generated revenue, it does not imply that the Bureau was only a fund-raising agent that did not contribute to the improvement of the city. According to the Bureau's plan, the tap water company and the electricity company would finally be turned into public companies owned by the Municipality. In the interim, both companies were placed under the close supervision of the Bureau.¹⁹² When the Bureau found out that both the tap water company and electricity plant had engaged in corruption, they were penalized. Both companies were ordered to reduce their charges and even to provide free services to government offices and public institutions of various kinds. The tap water company was forbidden to use low-quality coal and had to submit daily report on water-levels.

Regulating transport was also under the jurisdiction of the Bureau. The Bureau's approval of the establishment of a bus company called Jianada (Canada in English) marked the beginning of the provision of regular public bus services in Guangzhou, although its establishment was meant to generate more revenues.¹⁹³ Although the Bureau failed to implement the ex-Municipal Office's plan to open a driving school, it assigned specific roads for learners who had to be accompanied by one with a driving

¹⁹¹ For issues mentioned in this paragraph, see SZGY, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Public Utilities", p.7; BGHK, p.357.

¹⁹² See SZGY, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Public Utilities"; GZSSZGB, no.69, 26 March, 1923, p.34.

¹⁹³ In the financial crisis of 1923-24, the Bureau of Public Utilities approved Jiang Shoushi's proposal to set up this bus company. It was reported that Jiang and other shareholders of the company were returned overseas Chinese from Canada. The company was equipped with seventeen seven-seat buses, and would pay a monthly tax of sixty dollars per bus. See BGHK, pp.331, 354; GZSSZGB, no.86, 23 July, 1923, pp.24-6; no.109, 1 January, 1924, p.4; no.122, 31 March, 1924, pp.5-6; *Jindai Guangzhou kou'an jingji shehui gaikuang: Yue haiguan baogao huiji*, pp.707-8.




license.¹⁹⁴ The most significant effects were observed in regulating the operation of the Tramway Company. The Municipality charged drivers who caused wrongful deaths in accidents for criminal offense.¹⁹⁵ In June, 1923, the Executive Council resolved to suspend the license of the Company because the trams had caused serious road fractures and the Company did not take any actions to repair them. The suspension was lifted five months later as the Company agreed to lay rails on the streets for the running of rail trams. The special attention that the Bureau paid on the Tramway Company was possibly associated with the shift of attitude of Chen Jiongming. Used by Chen as a propaganda tactics against the Guangxi warlords when he was in Zhangzhou, Chen echoed the popular sentiments in Guangzhou by ostracizing the licensing of the Tramway Company as an “illegal” deal. However, after Chen returned to Guangzhou, he swallowed his words. He no longer regarded the operation of the Company as a violation of sovereignty but recognized its “business” nature.¹⁹⁶ He thus came into conflict with some of the local elites who still upheld a nationalistic standpoint and favored revoking the charter of the Company. Therefore, the Bureau was specially cautious in regulating the operation of the Company in the hope of pacifying the local elites.

To conclude, the Bureau of Public Utilities did not undergo any administrative streamlining because of its ability in generating incomes for the Municipality. However, administrators of the city and province questioned the value of the existence of the Bureau. They believed that public utilities should be government-owned. In view of this conviction, the Bureau’s work was by no means satisfactory as there was

¹⁹⁴ SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Public Utilities”, p.20.

¹⁹⁵ For such accidents, see *LHJ*, no.8 (1923), 27 April, 1923, p.20; SZGY, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Public Utilities”, p.17; *HZRB*, 26 May, 25 June, 1921.



little progress towards “municipalization” of the tap water company and the electricity company. Worse still, their operation did not show much improvement. Moreover, the Bureau turned out to be a small committee dealing with some routine administrative work such as licensing and regulating the operation of the public utilities. The failure to transform the provincial-level Telephone Bureau into a section of the Bureau of the Public Utilities, according to the original design of the Bureau, further justified the view that there was no need to set up a bureau to deal with public utilities.¹⁹⁷ Rumors about the abolition of the Bureau had been circulated since 1921. This finally came true in 1926, but it was re-established a year later.¹⁹⁸

Education. The inauguration of the Bureau of Education was somewhat similar to that of the Bureau of Finance. Both were created through political bargaining between two levels of government. Although the Bureau had successfully taken over some of the tasks and functions of the provincial Education Intendant Bureau (*Duxue ju*), it faced problems in gaining control of all the schools in Guangzhou, most of which were registered and controlled by the Panyu and Nanhai county governments. By mid-1923, schools in Guangzhou were placed under the administration of the Bureau.¹⁹⁹ For the effective supervision of schools in the city, the Bureau stipulated that teaching staff of all kinds of schools should be appointed by the Bureau.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ See *HZRB*, 18 and 26 February, 1921.

¹⁹⁷ Instead of becoming a section of the Bureau of Public Utilities, the Provincial Telephone Bureau was made a central-level organ under the Military Government in 1923 for enhancing efficiency in military campaigns. See *BGHK*, pp.362.

¹⁹⁸ See *SB*, 15 June, 1921.

¹⁹⁹ *BGHK*, pp.393-5.

²⁰⁰ *SZGY*, chapter on the “Report on Bureau of Education”, p.7.




The Bureau had made a profound impact on the reformation of the school curriculum. It adopted a gender free policy.²⁰¹ All boy schools were to be open to girls from the academic year of 1921 onwards. A new system of *xunhui jiaoshou* was practiced. A number of instructors were sent to private schools that taught Confucian learning to instruct the private school tutors about modern knowledge and skills such as science, civil rights and responsibility, sports and music. The Bureau also set up the Compulsory Education Committee and planned to introduce compulsory education for children under the age of twelve.

The Bureau's accomplishment in providing civic education and adult education should be noted.²⁰² A "Citizens' University" (*shimin daxue*) was run by the Bureau in 1921. It aimed at providing a channel to introduce new knowledge relating to various social disciplines, law, the humanities, medicine and science. It invited famous figures in the city, such the mayor and bureau heads of the Municipality as well as GMD leaders such as Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei and Ma Junwu as to give lectures. Another way to promote social education was to organize public forums in busy places of the city. The target audience were those residents with little education, and the content of the talks would be less academic and more popular than those of the Citizens' University. These public forums were used to inform residents about the urgency and necessity of municipal reform, and to gain their sympathy and support. Other means of social education included the organization of exhibitions, traveling libraries and labor schools. Civic education became a focus of the work of the Bureau.

After the return of Sun Yatsen in 1923, the Bureau paid more attention to adult

²⁰¹ SZGY, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Education", pp.11, 21; BGHK, pp.435-7.

²⁰² SZGY, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Education", pp.35-40; Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, pp.79-84; Zhu Xiuxia, *Yuehai jiuzhen lu*, pp.86-7.




education. The Bureau pointed out indicated that illiteracy was serious in the city and that the situation should be remedied by teaching those citizens beyond school-age basic skills and knowledge such as reading, writing, arithmetic and civic knowledge. The Bureau thus organized five-week summer camps for this purpose in 1923. This kind of activities was carried out in subsequent years. For example, in 1925, the Youth Department of the GMD, by order of the provincial government, continued this work with incomes generated from the soft drink tax.²⁰³

Although the Bureau's record in education was impressive, it was impossible for the Bureau to escape the negative effects produced by financial insolvency throughout the years. The Municipality cut down its financial support to the Bureau during the financial crisis of 1923-24. As shown in Table 7.1, the budget of the Bureau was reduced while the Bureaus of Public Safety, Public Works and Public Health still enjoyed a steady increase in funds. Civic education, which enjoyed a high priority, was nearly suspended after 1923 due to the lack of funds. The Citizens' University was only run for one semester in 1921, and the unavailability of a fixed and sizable site for the University was an important factor hindering its continual operation.²⁰⁴ The system of *xunhui jiaoshou* was only practiced in the First and Second Police Districts, whereas the plan of "compulsory education" was only carried out in the Third Police District as an experimentation.²⁰⁵ The traveling libraries were maintained, but few new books were acquired from 1921 onwards. The Bureau frankly admitted that "there are few books on specialized knowledge or new culture", and this failed to

²⁰³ For adult education, see BGHK, pp.414-7, 422; GZSSZGB, no.167, 9 February, 1925, p.24.

²⁰⁴ SZGY, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Education", pp.30-1.

²⁰⁵ SZGY, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Education", pp.14; Huang Yanpei, *Yi sui zhi Guangzhou shi*, p.75.




achieve the aim of keeping the readers informed about the changing world.²⁰⁶

To supplement the work of the Bureau of Education, the Municipality published the *Guangzhou Municipal Gazette* (*Guangzhou shi shizheng gongbao*) which served as an important tool in educating the residents, especially starting from issue number sixty-nine published in 1923 after the return of Sun Yatsen. Aware of its inadequacy in serving as a mass education medium compared with municipal publications in other cities such as Beijing, the *Gazette* changed its format. It not only printed out government orders and documents but also provided ample information regarding public health, civic consciousness, morality and law.

Discussion so far clearly shows that the Guangzhou Municipality was devoted to municipal construction even in face of serious financial constraints during the first few years after its establishment. Thus, the Municipality was never simply an institution of “practical business” as claimed by Chen Jiongming. Political factors heavily affected, sometimes paralyzed, the operation of the Municipality. Despite its strong affiliation with the Governor, and subsequently with the GMD regime, the administrative perplexities caused by local military disturbances meant that the Municipality always had to struggle for survival. It had to compete for resources with the provincial and county institutions in order to create an administrative space for the existence of this new “municipal” institution. Because of this competition for resources with other governmental institutions, the Municipality adopted what can be viewed as coercive measures to obtain resources from the residents. This made its relationship with the Guangzhou residents problematical as a whole, and this will be analyzed in greater depth in the next

²⁰⁶ BGHK, p.439.



section.

Our analysis shows that the administrative development of the Municipality had been in the direction of idealizing the nature of the institutions stipulated in the *Provisional Regulations*. The repeated streamlining and the uneven development of the sub-organizations of the Municipality proved that the existing situation in Guangzhou had hindered the attempts to materialize the *Regulations*. The lack of a stable political environment and the siphoning of tax money for military purposes were detrimental factors preventing such materialization.

However, the continued viability of the Municipality under such pressure points to its significance in the municipal history of modern China. The existence of a municipality meant the co-existence of a wide range of functions and tasks, and the Guangzhou Municipality strove to maintain them in spite of financial insolvency. This strengthened the role of “municipality” as a level of local administrative structure.

The co-existence of a wide range of functions did not imply an even pace of development. For the Guangzhou Municipality, greatest success was scored in those areas of work which showed continuity with pre-1921 development. Public works and public security made greater achievements than other aspects of municipal affairs due to their stronger institutional and functional evolution. As for public health and public utilities, they were not developed before 1921. These new bureaus were capable in competing for limited resources and thus faced more opposition from the residents and merchants.

Although the Guangzhou Municipality gained legitimacy through the support of political leaders as well as its record of construction, support from the local society was equally important. In the next section, we will discuss the social context in which the Municipality operated.



The Guangzhou Municipality in the social context

The Guangzhou Municipality was not only a political and municipal creation. In its actual operation, it needed to interact with the urban society of Guangzhou to design its work schedule and to gain more financial resources. The Municipality always wanted the Guangzhou residents to share its goal of municipal construction and to appreciate its work as people in other Chinese cities did.²⁰⁷ However, the relationship between the Municipality and the Guangzhou residents remained problematic.


The initial setting

The urban social structure described in Chapter Five persisted on the eve of Chen Jiongming's return to Guangzhou in 1920. Merchants and charitable organizations remained influential in the administration of the city. The charitable organizations, on their initiative, established a "peace association" to collect a ransom fund requested by Mo Rongxin who was close to being defeated by Chen Jiongming.²⁰⁸ The Merchants' Volunteer Corps, consisting of "7,000 well-trained and equipped men in active service with 6,000 recruits awaiting assignments pending the completion of their six-months course of instruction in military science and tactics", was an indispensable local force whose duty was to maintain social order during war, such as the confrontation between the Guangxi militarists and Chen Jiongming's army in late 1920.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, streets still functioned as the basic-level administrative unit. Street associations acted

²⁰⁷ For example, the Wuhan Commercial Study Society requested a copy of the *Provisional Regulations* and other regulations for reference. Students of Peking University sent delegates to study the operation and achievements of the Municipality. The newly established Qingdao Municipality wrote to request information on how the Guangzhou Municipality managed the street lamps. See GZSSZGB, no.74, 30 April, 1923, pp.25-6; no.84, 9 July, 1923, pp.25-6; no.173, 23 March, 1925, p.24; no.174, 30 March, 1925, pp.18-9.

²⁰⁸ SB, 21 October, 1920.


²⁰⁹ *Who's who in China* (third edition), pp.123-4; HZRB, 3 November, 1920.



autonomously. For example, gambling was prevalent on the eve of the return of Chen Jiongming. However, some streets such as Gaodi Street could effectively impose bans on gambling within their street boundaries.²¹⁰

The new Municipality did not fit into the existing social setting of Guangzhou. The Guangzhou Municipality centralized power and resources from the middle- and bottom-level administrations. As a result, it shaped itself into a lording institution over various local social forces. The *Provisional Regulations* included articles which “legitimized” the Municipality’s control over the existing informal administrative groups. The Bureau of Public Safety was to be responsible for the organization and training of citizens’ volunteer corps (Article 13, Section 3). The Bureau of Education was to assume the power to supervise the charitable organizations (Article 20, Section 4). The Municipality did not intend to share its power with the vested interest groups. The composition of the new Municipal Assembly is a clear illustration of this process. Out of the thirty assemblymen, ten were to be elected by functional groups, including workers, merchants, teachers, medical doctors, lawyers and engineers. Although the Governor might still appoint members of local vested interest groups such as influential merchants like Huo Zhiting, the adoption of a new ideology by Chen Jiongming showed that a wider participation in urban administration was preferred. Concerning his preference for the new system, Chen stated it very clearly in his answer to the Provincial Assembly’s petition in the midst of the debate over the *Provisional Regulations*. Chen implied that the local administration in Guangzhou was influenced by “evil social forces” (*e shili*), referring to those people who controlled the local merchant associations and the large charitable organizations. His adoption of the “principle of guidance”

²¹⁰ *Jianshe*, vol. 1, no. 1, August, 1919, “Duhuo” p.10.



ance” aimed at minimizing the influence of such “evil forces” inn the newly-born Guangzhou Municipality and ensuring the happiness and welfare of the common citizens.²¹¹

The general exclusion of vested interest group members in urban administration was accompanied by the heavy use of young overseas Chinese students. This need and desire for expertise in the management of municipal affairs in the initial period created an estrangement between the Municipality and the established middle- and basic-level administrative units. Right after its establishment, the Municipality was already criticized as a “foreign” (*yanghua*) institution.²¹² Even the veteran revolutionaries of the GMD denigrated their “young comrades” in the Municipality.²¹³ Such an attitude illustrated that the Guangzhou Municipality was a superimposed institution and a challenge to the existing administrative pattern of Guangzhou as viewed by the Guangzhou citizens, especially those influential merchant members in the Chamber of Commerce and charitable organizations.


Interaction between the Municipality and the social forces: 1921-22

The Municipality’s drive for control over various social forces and such social forces’ evasion from or even resistance to being controlled and “exploited” were a pair of key factors shaping the social context in which the Municipality operated. Although the clash of these two contradictory forces finally resulted in bloodshed in 1924 - the Merchants’ Volunteer Corps Incident - it did not mean that the Municipality had not made any attempts to bridge the gap and encourage cooperation with the citizens.

²¹¹ GZSSZGB, no.5, 28 March, 1921, pp.1-4.

²¹² Cheng Tiangu, *Cheng Tiangu huiyilu*, p.115.

²¹³ See Wu Renhua (ed.), *Sun Zhesheng xiansheng nianpu*, pp.56-7.




The Municipality had repeatedly proclaimed to the citizens that their suggestions were most welcome.²¹⁴ An experimental “municipal school” game was introduced in the attached primary school of the Senior Normal College: six bureaus corresponding to those of the Municipality were established and students elected their “mayor” and “municipal assembly” to run their school affairs.²¹⁵ This was an attempt to educate children in the responsibilities of citizenship in the municipal setting. Other forms of social education were rendered by the Bureau of Education whose social education programs, as mentioned above, included the organization of speech teams to educate the citizens on the justice of the Municipality’s policies and the potential benefits gained from cooperating with the Municipality.²¹⁶

All of the above activities were pursued in order to create a harmonious environment for the successful operation of the Municipality. However, the Guangzhou Municipality in its first few months used these activities to solve a “legitimacy crisis” that was already there and had quickly gained in momentum. This “legitimacy crisis”, similar to the “financial crisis” and other administrative problems, was associated with the need of the Municipality to concentrate power and to exercise the power thus gained. This crisis, which developed into a wave of opposition, was associated with the work of the Bureau of Public Health. Orders of registration of various kinds of business, including barbers, restaurants, medical doctors and medicines caused widespread criticism in the press and resulted in numerous petitions to the Municipality. The resignation of Hu Xuanming, Head of the Bureau of Public Health, in June, 1921 was the direct result of the opposition. There was also a rumor that Sun Fo submitted

²¹⁴ For example, GZSSZGB, no.6, 4 April, 1921, p.28.

²¹⁵ Wu Renhua (ed.), *Sun Zhesheng xiansheng nianpu*, p.45; Zheng Yanfen, “Xuezhe zhengzhijia Sun Zhesheng xianzheng”, *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.19, no.4, December, p.8.



his resignation because his introduction of drastic policies had caused widespread opposition and invited criticism towards both the Municipality and Sun Yatsen's Presidency which was just formed. Although the Municipality refuted such a rumor, the relatively slow progress of municipal affairs, except in public works, in 1921-22 showed the impact of the opposition.²¹⁷ Opposition movements increased in the following years. For example, the construction companies and the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce raised objections in December, 1921 against the levying of a sur-tax on construction license fee for the acquisition of modern fire fighting apparatus.²¹⁸

The reasons for such opposition are explicable in the light of the entrenched position of middle- and basic-level administrations and their view that government intervention should be minimal. The average citizens generally showed little interests and awareness of the substantial changes brought by the formation of the Guangzhou Municipality unless these changes clashed with their interests or brought them some benefits. Traditionally, the police stations were the only governmental offices well-known to the citizens. Often, residents reported to the police stations rather than to the Bureau of Public Health about births, deaths or marriage, although the shift of responsibility had been widely publicized.²¹⁹ Furthermore, residents vented their anger on the superimposed Municipality by making representations to charitable organizations in order to redress their grievances. In cases such as repeated tragedies caused by trams and the coercive removal of graves in Dongshan, charitable organizations petitioned the

²¹⁶ *HZRB*, 4 April, 1921.

²¹⁷ For the wave of opposition and the rumor about Sun Fo's resignation, see *GZSSZGB*, no.19, 4 July, 1921, pp.6-7; *GDQB*, 16 June, 1921; *HZRB*, 15 to 17 June, 1921.

²¹⁸ See *GZSSZGB*, no.41, 5 December, 1921, pp.43; no.43, 19 December, 1921, pp.34-5; no.56, 20 March, 1922, pp.26-7; no.57, 27 March, 1922, pp.29-30.

²¹⁹ *SZGY*, chapter on the "Report on Bureau of Public Health", p.21.



Municipality on behalf of the residents.²²⁰ Citizens relied heavily on charitable organizations rather than the Municipality for the provision of welfare. Although the Municipality had established a municipal hospital, many citizens still chose to go to hospitals organized by charitable institutions.²²¹ This popular support allowed the charitable organizations to resist the intervention of the Municipality. In September, 1921, the Municipality made its first attempt to manipulate the financial resources of charitable organizations by ordering the suspension of their disposal of property and the submission of their accounting records. The charitable organizations simply ignored the order. They claimed that they publicized their accounting records (*zhengxinlu*) every year, which adequately revealed their operation.²²² The Municipality was at a loss to find a way to regulate their activities, and the charitable organizations maintained their financial autonomy before the 1922 mutiny.


The institutional weaknesses and lack of resources of the Municipality, as discussed above, reinforced the preservation of power by the existing informal urban administration. The street-level organizations still performed the role of basic-level urban administration. The street was still responsible for the regular dredging of drainage channels, cleaning of the street surface, opening of new drainage and other kinds of repair work.²²³ Sometimes, street organizations might take advantage of municipal policies for their benefit. During the election of municipal assemblymen in 1921, some leading street organizations in Guangzhou such as that of Hui'ai Street, chose their own

²²⁰ GZSSZGB, no.26, 22 August, 1921, p.1; no.35, 24 October, 1921, pp.25-7; HZRB, 24 August, 1921.

²²¹ The figure of 1928 showed that there were 11,758 citizens admitted into the Fangbian Hospital, and only 2,775 into the Municipal Hospital. *Guangzhou shi shizhengfu tongji gu, Guangzhou shi shizhengfu tongji nianjian*, pp.148, 159.

²²² See GZSSZGB, no.30, 19 September, 1921, pp.28-9; no.58, 2 April, 1922, pp.2-5.

²²³ GZSSZGB, no.37, 7 November, 1921, pp.27-31; no.123, 7 April, 1924, pp.8, 11; SZGY, chapter on



representatives to register as candidates so as to have their views heard in the Municipal Assembly.²²⁴ This street-based response to the election campaign reflected the desire to maintain the street as a functional autonomous administrative unit in a process in which the Municipality gradually concentrated power and resources in its hand.

The above discussion suggests a complex picture substantially different from that described in Chapter Five. During the late Qing and the early years of the Republican period, the weak governmental force in the locality allowed the co-existence of three levels of urban administrations: the upper level (government), the middle level (merchant and charitable organizations) and the bottom level (street). However, the Guangzhou Municipality formed in 1921 favored the expansion of the upper level represented by the Municipality and its control over the other two levels. This did not mean that the Municipality aimed at abolishing these informal administrations institutionally. It only wanted to utilize their resources and their ability to gain resources in order to facilitate the work of the Municipality. This approach, however, encouraged the middle- and bottom-level administrations to struggle for the maintenance of their institutional, functional, and financial autonomy. Thus, they generally ignored the changes at the upper-level administration unless they threatened their existence. In this sense, their opposition to the Municipality was not an opposition to its policies *per se* but a struggle to maintain their long-standing autonomy, liberty and functions. This helps to explain the interaction between the two conflicting administrative forces, especially in the period from 1923 to 1925.

the “Report on Bureau of Public Health”, p.5.

²²⁴ HZRB, 18 April, 1921.



Interaction between the Municipality and the social forces: 1923-25

The return of Sun Yatsen in early 1923 after the defeat of Chen Jiongming stirred up turmoil in Guangzhou society. According to Sun, Guangdong served as a revolutionary base for the successful implementation of his revolutionary ideals, the elimination of the northern warlords and the establishment of a true republic in China. It was natural to Sun that the Guangdong people should make every possible effort to defeat the warlords in the province and in China, and that they should “live and die together” with Sun and the GMD. Sun regarded the Guangdong people as key actors in the “re-establishment of the Republic” (*zai zao minguo*).²²⁵


Although the Guangzhou citizens in general were not as interested in national affairs nor did they show as much interest in the revolutionary ideas of Sun Yatsen as the GMD wished, they acted in accordance with Sun’s will and made “generous” contributions to revolutionary undertakings, but only under coercion. The Guangzhou Municipality functioned as a fund-raising agent for the Military Government and drained millions of dollars from the city in supporting Sun Yatsen’s military campaigns. In an article in the *New York Times* entitled “Sun’s Regime Drains Kwantung Resources”, it was reported that,

“... during the last eight months the Canton [Guangzhou] Municipality alone had to provide \$2,700,000 for maintenance of Sun Yat Sen’s [Sun Yatsen’s] soldiers, who number some 180,000. Furthermore, \$18,000 has to be produced daily from opium, gambling and numerous other taxes which the new Central Bureau is now farming out in hopes of checking leakages. Meanwhiles the Cantonese merchants are unwillingly taking up the New Year loan.”²²⁶ [Italics, author]

The most controversial policy during this period was the sale of “municipal property”

²²⁵ See Sun’s speech in Guangzhou on 29 October, 1923 and 14 January, 1924. *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol.8, p.348; vol.9, p.61.

²²⁶ *The New York Times*, 18 February, 1924.



by the government. Besides the sale of various kinds of municipal property at attractive discounts, the Municipality rescinded its policy of recognizing the ownership of temples and their property, and ordered their confiscation in May, 1923. This confiscation was extended to all non-privately owned property.²²⁷ This shift of policy shocked the whole of Guangzhou society. Violent protests against the sale of ancient temples which were historic sites and sites for schools were only a minor reflection of the shock.²²⁸ More violent protests came from the streets. As stated in previous chapters, streets normally maintained temples within their boundaries as places of assembly and as sources of revenue derived from their lease. They now faced the threat of losing such property which were often reported to the Municipality as "municipal property" by greedy persons who wanted to gain handsome commissions. The confiscation and sale of street temples meant the loss of institutional identity and considerable revenue. In September, the liquidation of such property was further quickened by the shortening of the "ownership confirmation period" from three months to fifteen days.²²⁹ In some cases, streets with great wealth, many of which were in Xiguan, had to ransom their property with anger and disgust.²³⁰ However, paying ransoms was not always possible as most streets were only marginally self-financing in running their business,

²²⁷ In the first year of the Municipality, temple properties owned by non-government parties were recognized. For example, the Guangzhou Municipality rejected the repeated petitions for the sale of the Wuxian (Five Angels) Temple which was a famous historic site under the ownership of the Bannermen. In general, the Municipality's consent to the maintenance of the temple properties was reflected by its assessment of taxes on the deeds of such properties. See GZSSZGB, no.15, 6 June, 1921, pp.3-4; no.22, 25 July, 1921, pp.14-21; no.23, 1 August, 1921, p.11; no.55, 13 March, 1922, p.9. For the order of confiscation, see *ibid*, no.77, 21 May, 1923, pp.22-3.

²²⁸ See GZSSZGB, no.90, 20 August, 1923, p.18; no.100, 29 October, 1923, p.20; no.104, 26 November, 1923, p.19.

²²⁹ "Ownership confirmation period" meant the time needed to effect the new ownership after the property was acquired. See GZSSZGB, no.94, 17 September, 1923, p.18.

²³⁰ For example, see GDGB, no.3168, 5 June, 1923, p.10; no.3170, 7 June, 1923, p.9.



and they always found it difficult to pay the electricity bills for street lamps.²³¹ In some cases, more than one item of property in a street were reported as “municipal property” and sometimes whole zones such as Huangsha west to Xiguan were labeled as “municipal property”. Even the Municipality admitted that “popular sentiment is boiling” as a result of this property confiscation campaign.²³²

The confiscation of property led to social turmoil. Radical actions were taken by merchants and residents in the ex-walled city and Xiguan where most of the population and “municipal property” were located. The Guangdong Chambers of Commerce was among the first to show opposition.²³³ The deteriorating relationship between the Guangzhou citizens and the Municipality was aggravated by the involvement of the military. Some armies of Yunnan, Guangxi and Hunan origins had rendered help to Sun Yatsen in fighting against Chen Jiongming in late 1922. They became government armies after Sun regained control of Guangzhou in early 1923. However, these armies often disturbed social order by commandeering residents into military service and intruding into houses.²³⁴ In opposition to takeover by outside merchants who had purchased “municipal property” from the Municipality, street administrations sometimes hired such armies (notably the Yunnan armies) for assistance.²³⁵ Therefore, the sale campaign further antagonized the relationship between the residents and the local armies, and the residents directed their anger towards the military to Sun Yatsen’s government.

²³¹ BGHK, p.324.

²³² See GZSSZGB, no.101, 5 November, 1923, pp.27-8; LHJ, no.37 (1923), 16 November, 1923, pp.13-5.

²³³ GDGB, no.3175, 13 June, 1923, p.1.

²³⁴ For the local armies’ illegal and unwelcome activities, see GZSSZGB, no.69, 26 March, 1923, p.34; no.70, 9 April, 1923, p.29; no.89, 13 August, 1923, pp.21-3; no.100, 29 October, 1923, p.30; no.113, 28 January, 1924, p.55; GDGB, 3188, 29 June, 1923, pp.2-3.



The Municipality not only took over street property, but also imposed further restrictions on the conditions of ownership. It revised the terms of property ownership to the effect that property funded and owned by the public or by collective groups were not recognized.²³⁶ Only two kinds of ownership were recognized, that is, “government” and “private”, the latter meaning “owned by one person” only. Any property owned by more than one person could be at the free disposal of the government. Under this logic, property belonging to the streets or other public organizations such as charitable organizations could be taken over by the Municipality. Property of charitable organizations survived this campaign only by supplementary orders of the Municipality that allowed them to be preserved for the time being.²³⁷ However, other public organizations with land deeds were affected. For example, the guildhall (*huiguan*) for blind singers and fortune-tellers was confiscated although it had a land deed.²³⁸ The charitable organizations also had to change their strategy of survival. They registered as private organizations. For example, the Fangbian Hospital, one of the “nine charitable halls” in Guangzhou, now registered as a private but not a public hospital.²³⁹ The street organizations also adopted similar tactics to bargain with the Municipality. Sometimes, they appeared not in the name of street, but as commercial units, *tang* (literally meaning “hall”). Sipailou and Guixiang Street, both of which were busy streets in the ex-walled city, represented themselves as Yongye Tang and Jinyu Tang respectively.²⁴⁰ These changes substantially modified the structure of ur-

²³⁵ *LHJ*, no.34 (1923), 26 October, 1923, pp.40-2.


²³⁶ *GZSSZGB*, no.77, 21 May, 1923, pp.22-3.

²³⁷ For example, see *GZSSZGB*, no.85, 16 July, 1923, p.38.

²³⁸ *GDGB*, no.3209, 24 July, 1923, pp.6-7.

²³⁹ *Guangzhou shi shizhengfu tongji gu*, *Guangzhou shi shizhengfu tongji nianjian*, p.144.

²⁴⁰ *GZSSZGB*, no.89, 13 August, 1923, pp.26-7; no.92, 3 September, 1923, p.19.




ban administration in the city. The original middle- and bottom-level administrations, though performing the old functions, showed signs of being transformed from informal administrative units into “formal” units fitting into the legal framework of the government. But the new form they took was fundamentally different in nature and foresaw the decline of these informal administrative units. They now appeared in the form of *economic* institutions, especially when dealing with the disposal of property and negotiating with the government. This provided an opportunity for the Municipality to take over the old functions of the informal administrative units since their former role in undertaking urban administrative functions did not fit their new status as “private” or economic undertakings.

The above changes would definitely work for the extension of control by the Municipality. However, the whole process was only in the stage of inception in 1923. The street administrations, merchants and the public organizations were filled with fury directed towards the confiscation campaign of the Municipality. Municipal officials admitted that these parties displayed “deep-seated hatred” whenever the Municipality was mentioned.²⁴¹ Their firm opposition was extended to other policies of the Municipality, including the levying of sur-tax on numerous commodities and services such as medicine, jewelry and funeral service and the proposed abolition of *pudi*.²⁴² The charitable organizations vented their exasperation at the Municipality which not only

²⁴¹ Cheng Tiangu, *Cheng Tiangu huiyilu*, p.151.

²⁴² *Pudi* was an additional sum as a compensation to the former tenant. Normally, *pudi* was the accumulation of cost which covered a wide range of tangible or intangible items, such as decoration, furniture, stocks, debts, insurance and even “prestige” gained amongst the customers. Besides paying the specified amount of rent according to the lease contract, a new tenant also had to redeem and assume the *pudi* from the old tenant. As *pudi* was a private dealing among tenants, the landowners always could not have free disposal of their properties as the tenants had control over a substantial cost of the land. This always caused unceasing conflicts between the landlords and the tenants, and among the tenants themselves. Therefore, the Municipality long hoped to solve this problem. For details on the definition and problems of *pudi*, see GZSSZGB, no.21, 18 July, 1921, pp.24-36.



stopped remitting them all the agreed subsidies but even repeatedly ordered them to make contributions.²⁴³ From their point of view, the Municipality wanted to confiscate all their wealth on behalf of Sun Yatsen's "reactionary" government which exploited the masses in the name of revolution.

The citizens' impression of the Municipality was also based on other issues apart from those of property and taxation. The construction programs of the Municipality under the guidance of the "showcase" ideology caused little opposition amongst the residents. The residents generally did not share the Municipality's view that such programs were a vital step towards municipal modernization. Their primary concerned was whether they could get benefits from such construction. To their disappointment, they did not get appreciable benefits from construction in the field of public health, education and public utilities. They found that construction had resulted in an even worse living environment. The poor quality of the macadam roads created swirling dust on dry days and muddy flats after rain, and the citizens commented that the city would be "as well without it as with it".²⁴⁴ Losing confidence in the Municipality, the citizens opposed the Municipality when it adopted the new system of "condemnation and assessment" for the construction of new roads.²⁴⁵ For public health, the citizens were equally hostile to the Municipality's levying of the "cleaning tax". Opposition particularly arose when the street organizations were ordered to terminate all existing contracts with the nightsoil dealers, and to draw up new contracts with dealers ap-

²⁴³ *GDGB*, no.3217, 2 August, 1923, pp.4-5; *GZSSZGB*, no.74, 30 April, 1923, p.44; no.79, 4 June, 1923, pp.21-2.

²⁴⁴ *BGHK*, p.134. Such protests to road construction were also observed in other cities such as Shanghai. See Kerrie L. MacPherson, "Designing China's Urban Future: The Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927-1937", *Planning Perspectives*, 5 (1990), p.55.

²⁴⁵ For example, the call for payment for the widening of the "six streets" in Xiguan mentioned before met with cool response from the residents there. *GZSSZGB*, no.122, 31 March, 1924, pp.16-7; no.124, 14 April, 1924, p.17; *BGHK*, pp.180-1.



pointed by the Municipality which also required the streets to submit fifty percent of the revenue from the sale of nightsoil to the Municipality.²⁴⁶ We mentioned in Chapter Five that income from nightsoil constituted a large share of street incomes, and this substantial fifty percent cut on nightsoil income would hamper the running of street administration. Therefore, residents refused the payment as a passive means of evading the exploitation of their resources.²⁴⁷

The last resort of the citizens in struggling with the Municipality was the Merchants' Volunteer Corps. Compared to the government armies, the Municipality and even Sun Yatsen's southern government, the Corps enjoyed higher popularity and prestige. *The China Year Book* noted that the Corps had become a "strongly centralized and militarized body" and was backed by the "long-suffering Cantonese" against the extortion of Sun's regime.²⁴⁸ An armed conflict with some Yunnan soldiers in February, 1924, which occurred as a result of their use of a kind of temporary paper money opposed by the merchants, resulted in the death of two soldiers of the Yunnan army. This engaged the Corps in open contest with the Municipality and Sun's regime.²⁴⁹ Immediately after the conflict, the Corps, which was then manned by eight thousand soldiers, decided to reorganize itself according to the system of regular armies. This was both a preparation for further conflicts and a rejection of Sun Yatsen's call to "revolutionize" the Merchants' Volunteer Corps under his service.²⁵⁰ The Corps then initiated and backed up a province-wide strike. The success of this strike, which lead


²⁴⁶ Guangzhou difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Guangzhou shi zhi*, vol.3, p.681.

²⁴⁷ GZSSZGB, no.123, 7 April, 1924, pp.3-4.

²⁴⁸ H.G.W. Woodhead (ed.), *The China Year Book*, 1925, p.849.

²⁴⁹ For the conflict, see *LHJ*, no.5 (1924), 20 February, 1924, pp.19-21.

²⁵⁰ See GZMGRB, 23 January, 1924; *Guangdong sheng dang'anguan, Sun Zhongshan yu Guangdong: Guangdong sheng dang'anguan ku cang haiguan dang'an xuanyi*, pp.542.



the Municipality to abolish certain kinds of exorbitant tax, was followed by the formation of the “United Defense Headquarters of the Merchants’ Volunteers Corps in the Province” (*quan sheng shangtuan lianfang zongbu*) in August. This enabled the Guangzhou Corps to assure unitary command over all the merchant forces in the province.²⁵¹


The importation of 1,100 chests of armament in August led to the final showdown between the Guangzhou citizens on the one hand and the Municipality and Sun’s regime on the other. Sun Yatsen’s government confiscated the armaments in the belief that they were to be used for overthrowing the government and the return of Chen Jiongming. The merchants and the charitable organizations were resolute in defending the innocence of the Corps. The government employed workers’ militia as a counter-force against the Corps. Negotiations between the government and the merchants broke down, and the government sent its army, including the newly trained student army of the GMD’s Huangpu Military Academy, to Xiguan to combat the Corps on 14 and 15 October, 1924. The Merchants’ Volunteer Corps was totally smashed, and a large area in Xiguan was burnt.²⁵²

The Merchants’ Volunteer Corps Incident was a landmark in Guangzhou’s local development in many ways. Although the bulk of the existing literature in Chinese emphasized that the Incident was associated with plots of the British “imperialists”, the Incident was actually a local dispute rooted in the long-standing local discontent with the exploitative policies of the government mentioned in this chapter.²⁵³ It marked the

²⁵¹ See *Dongfang zazhi*, vol.21, no.12, 25 June, 1924, pp.7-9; vol.21, no.17, 10 September, 1924, pp.8-10.

²⁵² For the course of the Corps Incident, see the classic work *Guangdong kouxie chao*. Also see Zhou Kangxie (ed.), *Yi jiu er si nian Guangzhou shangtuan shijian*; *Dongfang zazhi*, vol.21, no.20, 25 October, 1924, pp.3-5.

²⁵³ Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong sheng Guangzhou shi weiyuanhui wenshi



climax of conflicts between the local elites and the government forces, and the final vote of non-confidence for the local regime. The Municipality was finally aware of the seriousness of local discontent. The promise of an elected Mayor and the cancellation of all “exorbitant levies and taxes” by Mayor Li Fulin showed the earnestness of the government’s attempt at reconciliation.

The Incident also served as a significant benchmark in the decline of the middle- and street-level administrations. Firstly, the Municipality was fully backed up by super-municipal power, that is, the military and the GMD party force, and it could not pretend to be a “weak” government. Institutionally, the charitable organizations and street administrations were preserved, but the Corps Incident showed that the Municipality could take strong actions against them whenever it deemed necessary. Secondly, merchants shifted to a more conciliatory stance towards the Municipality. The most notable example was the formation of the “Guangzhou City Merchants-Citizens Association” (*Guangzhou shi shangmin xiehui*) through the initiative of Jiang Shoushi, Director of the Jianada Bus Company. It proposed “coordinating the merchants in developing Guangzhou’s industry and commerce, and aiding the government for the interest of the merchants and citizens.”²⁵⁴ This explicit pro-government stance did not mean the termination of anti-government activities which could easily be provoked by any new policy of the Municipality. However, this was the onset of further governmental control over the traditional informal urban administration, which continued into the 1930s.²⁵⁵

ziliao yanjiuhui (ed.), *Guangzhou bainian dashi ji*, pp.306-7; Zeng Xianlin (ed.), *Guomin geming shidian*, pp.130-1. Recently, there are review articles which associate the Incident with local discontents. See Wu Qunli, “Guangzhou shangtuan shijian’ niaokan”, *Guangdong shizhi*, no.42, 1994, pp.65-70.

²⁵⁴ GZSSZGB, no.160, 22 December, 1924, pp.21-2.

²⁵⁵ For example, see Stephanie Po-yin Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political*



Social conflicts in Guangzhou was further aggravated by the installation of a superimposed Municipality. Many of its policies, accompanied by its financial burden shifted from Sun Yatsen's regime under existing political and military conditions, agitated the citizens whose increasing discontent with the Municipality and Sun Yatsen finally erupted into open confrontation. Such discontent after the establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality was rather different from that under the Municipal Office. Comparatively speaking, the Municipal Office was careful in concentrating its work within the walled city. According to archival and newspaper materials, the residents did not question the importance of municipal reform. They only complained about the unfairness of compensation and the methods of such municipal reform. However, the establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality substantially enlarged the group of complainants to include the wealthiest and also the most conservative section of the population in Xiguan. From hindsight, the Municipality was not well prepared to undertake municipal construction in such extended territories, and thus stirred up widespread social discontent. The Municipality had to repeatedly delay proposals of road construction in Xiguan. Therefore, the final confrontation was a result of the Municipality's conceived role as a fund-raising agent of Sun Yatsen and of the Municipality's ambitious but poorly planned municipal policies.

Social discontent was the result of interaction between the Municipality and the citizens over developmental policies. However, it was not the only response of the residents. The previous paragraph has shown that citizens in different districts of the city might hold different views of the Municipality and in turn experienced different relationships with the Municipality. Xiguan was a traditional stronghold of merchant



power and favored minimum intervention from the government. On the contrary, residents in Dongshan were essentially different from their counterparts in Xiguan. Dongshan was underdeveloped and residents there actually welcomed the initiatives of the Municipality in developing the district. The Dongshan Security Bureau (*Dongshan bao'an ju*), which was an important organization in coordinating the residents of Dongshan, invited the Bureau of Public Works of the Municipality to plan roads in the district and requested the assistance of the Bureau of Public Safety to collect funds for road construction.²⁵⁶ Arguments against the development of Dongshan again came from Xiguan residents who strongly resisted the removal of their ancestors' tombs there. This clearly demonstrated that the social context in which the Municipality operated was not homogeneous. It showed differences from district to district.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the political, administrative and social contexts of the Guangzhou Municipality from 1921 to 1925. The establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality was not the work of any single person. It was the result of the combination of the personal prestige and ambition of Chen Jiongming, the intelligence and knowledge of returned overseas students such as Sun Fo, and the legitimacy granted by the Military Government under the leadership of Sun Yatsen. Significantly, the invention of a modern municipality with comprehensive functions would serve to glorify Chen Jiongming's wisdom and concern for livelihood, and more importantly his ideology of "united autonomous provinces".

The Guangzhou Municipality was not a pure imitation of any model, especially in

²⁵⁶ For example, *GZSSZGB*, no.127, 5 May, 1924, pp.5-7; *BGHK*, pp.166-7; *GDQB*, 14 June, 1921.




the institutional aspect. As many creators of the Municipality were returned students from abroad, they transplanted foreign city administrative models to give an impression of “modernity” to the new Guangzhou Municipality. They chose the “commission form” of government as the blueprint for the structure of the Municipality. However, the traditional model of supervision by the provincial authority was regarded as crucial in making the Municipality more legitimate and in providing guidance to the Municipality. Therefore, it allowed the intervention of the Governor, minimized mass participation and leaned toward the “city mayor” scheme which was then gaining popularity in America. This showed that the “Guangzhou model” of city government was designed to suit the needs of a city caught in the midst of the revolutionary tide as well as surviving conservatism towards municipal construction. On the other hand, the Municipality was ready to adopt foreign approaches to municipal construction. For example, in the area of public works, the American “condemnation and assessment” approach was adopted to widen streets. Foreign experts and Chinese students who had returned from America, Britain and France were employed, making Guangzhou a testing ground for the application of modern technology to municipal construction.²⁵⁷

This new experience of municipal construction typified by the Guangzhou Municipality was celebrated in contemporary China. Besides being frequently visited by people in and outside China, the Municipality was identified by the “China Road Construction Association” (*Zhonghua quanguo daolu jianzhu xiehui*), an organization devoted to construction affairs, as a model for “city-level” urban construction, with Nantong of Jiangsu Province as a model for “county-level” urban construction.²⁵⁸ Its

²⁵⁷ For the expertise of the Guangzhou Municipality, see “Canton’s New Maloos”, *The Far Eastern Review*, January, 1922, pp.22-4; *Who’s Who in China* (2nd ed.), pp.292-3; *HZRB*, 12 January, 3 April, 1920; *ibid* (4th ed.), p.262. Also see footnote 73.

²⁵⁸ GZSSZGB, no.69, 26 March, 1923, p.3.




establishment led to a campaign of construction Guangdong. Municipal institutions were established or planned in various towns and counties of the province.²⁵⁹

However, the work of the Guangzhou Municipality was seriously hampered by its status as a “provincial capital” and “revolutionary capital”. The progress of construction was arrested by the more urgent need of fund-raising and the promotion of revolutionary activities. The over-extraction of resources destroyed social harmony which was a prerequisite for successful construction.

One of the achievements of the Guangzhou Municipality was in its institutional innovation. Guangdong was the first Chinese city to establish a municipality with rationally designed sub-organizations assuming comprehensive functions. However, its hasty establishment and the legitimacy crisis it faced after establishment suggested that the Municipality was only established in form but not in essence. Some of its powers and functions endorsed by the *Provisional Regulations* remained on paper only. The exercise of power over charitable organizations and local militias as stipulated by the *Provisional Regulations*, and other administrative procedures such as the annual replacement of some of the Municipal Assemblymen, were not realized in the period 1921-1925.

Administrative predicament, political and military tensions and social discontent were the major problems encountered by the Guangzhou Municipality. The interplay of these factors substantially undermined the Municipality’s achievement. The work done, to a certain extent, was not as remarkable and “revolutionary” compared to that done by the Municipal Office, a simpler institution with limited functions. Actually, the reputation of the Guangzhou Municipality was built up by distorting the history of

²⁵⁹ Shantou had formed a municipality, and proposals for the formation of municipal institutions were raised for towns including Haifeng, Lufeng, Haikou, Gaozhou, Beihai, Jiangmen, Huiyang and



the Municipal Office as of 1924.²⁶⁰ As mentioned previously, some foreigners appreciated the efforts of the Municipality but some others viewed the Municipal Office as a more significant landmark in the municipal development of Guangzhou.²⁶¹ In order to disassociate the establishment of the Municipality from Chen Jiongming, subsequent propaganda emphasized the key role of Sun Fo in shaping the Municipality. For example, Sun was said to be so clever that he only spent one night drafting the *Provisional Regulations*; and that he invented the Chinese translation for the terms “public security” and “public utilities”.²⁶² Actually, these two terms had been quite well known and appeared in GMD publications long before Sun Fo’s drafting of the *Provisional Regulations*.²⁶³

Furthermore, the GMD attributed the Municipality’s retardedness totally to political factors, such as the ravages of the Yunnan-Guangxi armies which only supported Sun’s regime in name. For example, the Manifesto of the Guangzhou Municipality issued on 4 July, 1925, which proclaimed the Municipality’s institutional reform, stated that “Guangzhou was ravaged by the Yunnan-Guangxi armies after 1923, and there was nothing worth mentioning pertaining to municipal affairs...”²⁶⁴ While the GMD was as eager as Chen Jiongming to build up Guangzhou as a showcase to glorify its rule, it was reluctant to admit the negative impact of its policies on the municipal develop-

Shanwei. See *GDGB*, no.2872, 17 February, 1922, p.1; *GDQB*, 18 March, 11 and 28 May, 1921.


²⁶⁰ In a narrative on Sun Fo’s career, the *Municipal Gazette* praised Sun as the first person who planned road construction and city demolition in Guangzhou. See *GZSSZGB*, no.109, 1 January, 1924, p.1.

²⁶¹ See *The Directory and Chronicle for China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Siam, Netherlands India, Borneo, the Philippines, & For the Year 1922*, p.921.

²⁶² See Sun Fo, “Guangzhou shizheng yishu”, *Guangdong wenxian jikan*, vol.1, no.3, 1971, p.3.; *Sun Zhesheng xiasheng jinian ji*, p.96.

²⁶³ For example, the Chinese terms for “public security” and “public utilities” appeared in Lin Yun-gai’s articles in 1919. See *Jianshe*, vol.1, no.2, September, 1919; vol.1, no.3, October, 1919.

²⁶⁴ *Guomin zhengfu xinyou lu*, p.20.



ment of the city.

The experience of Guangzhou revealed that the establishment and maintenance of a municipality needed strong political backup in counteracting potential opposition from society. The operation of the Municipality lost autonomy in terms of resource allocation and personnel appointment. The early history of the Guangzhou Municipality also demonstrated that the Municipality, and possibly other newly built institutions, perceived political support from above as a more important source of legitimacy and identity than social acceptance from below.




Chapter Eight Conclusion

Guangzhou's urban evolution

Physical appearance

Guangzhou was never a static city, nor did it lack urban construction. Historically, it expanded by the enlargement of the city wall which encircled newly developed areas. The construction and expansion of the city wall were viewed by the Chinese as a basic element of urbanity, and a city's prosperity was reflected in the clustering of small shops on very narrow streets. In the modern era, these "urban elements" were fundamentally replaced. In Guangzhou's case, the local government from the late Qing to the early Republic made continual efforts to demolish the city wall, which was increasingly regarded as a hindrance to the city's modernization, and to construct broad avenues which were regarded as a reflection of the city's degree of modernity. In the 1920s, Guangzhou's city landscape was fundamentally transformed. Not only were the former sites of the city wall replaced by broad roads, narrow lanes throughout the city were also gradually broadened, a process which continued into the late 1930s. Admittedly, traditional means of transportation, primarily sedan-chairs, persisted in the city, especially in the western half of the ex-walled city,¹ however, the city's transportation was modernized. People had access to the corners of the city through the modern road network by different means of transportation. A contemporary tourist directory recorded that people might choose the following means of transportation to go from the city center to the Baiyun Mountain for sight-seeing: bus, taxi, motorcycle, bicycle, horse-cart, rickshaw,

¹ Guangzhou shizheng fu, *Guangzhou zhinan* (1934), p.128



horse-riding and sedan-chair.² Freedom of travel was further shown by the fact that in the 1930s, rickshaws were no longer required to run on specific routes but could go freely to wherever the customers desired.³

As a result, the urban landscape of Guangzhou was much characterized by modernity, especially when compared to other traditional Chinese cities such as Beijing (renamed Beiping after 1927). Municipal modernization in Beijing was always hindered by the question of the maintenance of cultural relics throughout the city. During the mayorship of Mayor Yuan Liang (1933-1935), wooden *pailou* (decorated archways), which was a kind of common cross-road construction in Beiping, were replaced by concrete ones. This was regarded by the Beiping Municipality as an important measure of “urban modernization” for the city.⁴ In Guangzhou, similar road blocks, such as the Gongbei Tower in Yonghan Road, were demolished in favor of the broadening of roads.

Urban construction and planning


One remarkable aspect of urban construction was the installation of modern utilities, such as the provision of electricity and tap water. The Guangzhou residents' acceptance of such utilities as basic to their daily life marked the giving up of primitive modes of living, such as drinking unclean well water and using fire for lighting purpose, of which posed great harm to the residents' health and property. In other words, the adoption of and adaptation to the modern utilities made urban life safer and more comfortable.

Guangzhou benefited from being the home of numerous overseas Chinese. The

² *Baiyun shan youlan zhinan*, pp.11-2.

³ Liao Shulun, *Guangzhou daguan*, pp.72-3.

⁴ Hu Piyun (ed.), *Jiu Jing shizhao*, p.180.



installation of modernized utilities was often started by returned overseas Chinese, such as Huang Bingchang in the case of the “Canton Electric Light Company”, and Wu Jipan in the case of the Guangzhou Tramway Company.


The relatively slow progress of construction in Guangzhou was speeded up by the establishment of city-wide institutions (the Municipal Office and the Guangzhou Municipality) with centralized power, which facilitated the implementation of rational and systematic urban planning. The city government made great efforts in planning the redevelopment of the walled city and the development of Honam and Dongguan. This was a departure from the past when the development of the walled city and its outskirts was uncoordinated.

From the outset of its establishment, the Guangzhou Municipality worked in a planned manner, and its activities were under budgetary control and evaluated in annual reports released to the public. It was quick to adopt the planning tools of Western countries. In 1916, New York became the first municipality to adopt a zoning scheme dividing the city into commercial, residential and unrestricted districts. One year later, the American City Planning Institute was formed.⁵ The Guangzhou Municipality drafted its expansion and zoning scheme in mid-1922, setting the first example in China. It made itself an agent of modernization and borrowed Western municipal experience and approaches to better the city it was governing.

Urban administration


A basic factor that influenced Guangzhou throughout the period covered in this thesis is its status as a provincial capital. Similar to other provincial capitals, Guangzhou

⁵ Donald A. Krueckeberg, *Introduction to Planning History in the United States*, pp.89, 93.



was an administrative city since ancient times. What was different from other provincial capitals in the country, especially in the Imperial period, was its overwhelming merchant power. The growth of merchant strength in Guangzhou was attributable to the monopoly of the Hong merchants dealing with foreign trade. On the eve of the opening of the five treaty ports in 1842, Guangzhou possessed the most formidable merchant strength and wealth among Chinese cities. The strength of the merchants was augmented by the widespread existence of petty merchants throughout the city, within and without the city wall, especially after the Hong merchants lost their special status as a result of the termination of the “Canton trade” system. The potency of these petty merchants was expressed by street associations. Streets were widespread in both the walled city and the suburbs, assuming comprehensive urban functions and enjoying financial autonomy. The recognized status of the street as an effective administrative unit in the city and the non-intervention policy of the local government towards merchant activities explained why a provincial capital such as Guangzhou, where three levels of officialdom were located, could not administer the city effectively.


Merchants as a social elite underwent substantial transformation in the last decades of the Qing. They no longer waited for the government's protection of their activities, like the pre-Qing expansions of the city wall to enclose areas that they had already developed. They began to take the initiative to organize themselves into city-wide organizations such as the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce and various charitable organizations. Through their provision of social welfare and engagement in urban construction programs (such as provision of electricity and potable tap water as well as their initiative in constructing the Honam Bridge and so on), the merchants were transforming themselves into activists in urban administration and design. They were constructing a “public sphere” parallel to the governmental administration of the locality. While the



local government still remained the “top-level” administration in the city, merchants and other social elites, notably the gentry, were consolidating the “middle-level” and “bottom-level” administrations, as shown in Chapter Five.

As a result, before the establishment of the Municipal Office and the Guangzhou Municipality, Guangzhou had a large bureaucracy (top-level administration) generally indifferent to urban affairs, a group of influential and powerful merchants (middle-level administration) with increasing institutional support and widespread street associations (basic-level administration) which remained autonomous. Considering the call for the establishment of a representative city government by the merchants in 1912, it seemed not unlikely that the Guangzhou merchants could have served as the primary movers of city modernization and of the creation of a city government.


The merchants’ increasing ability to expand their influence in the city was counteracted by another contradictory characteristic. Compared to their counterparts in Shanghai who strove to administer and construct that city through organizing the Shanghai City Council in 1905 and struggling for seats in the Ratepayers’ Committee of the International Settlement, the Guangzhou merchants showed strong submissiveness to the local government. All *actions* pertaining to municipal development were taken by the local government - the construction of the Bund, the 1907 Planning, the urban redevelopment scheme of 1912-1913, the establishment of the Municipal Office in 1918 and the Guangzhou Municipality in 1921. The numerous imaginative proposals made by the merchants (notably the suggestion for the construction of the Bund in 1888 and the city redevelopment scheme raised by the Merchants’ Volunteer Corps in 1916) were taken up by the local government which carried them out as government ventures. Such yielding to official power by the merchants was observable throughout the period under study. For example, the 1840s anti-British campaign and the 1924 Merchants’ Volun-



teer Corps Incident were similar in the sense that merchants sought the approval and support of governmental authorities, that is, the Qing local government in the former case and Chen Jiongming in the latter. Besides the fact that merchants, especially those gentrified merchants, shared similar cultural values with the government, there were three other factors that explained their attitude. Firstly, the geographical spread of merchants in Guangzhou did not show noticeable change in the period concerned. Although the center of merchant power was moving westward from the city proper over the past centuries, merchants still lived and did their business in or around the administrative city where government armies of considerable size were stationed. The local government always had the upper hand in its relationship with the merchants, in spite of occasional opposition from the merchants and residents.

Secondly, the interests of the merchants were usually not city-wide, but street-based. Furthermore, the Guangdong Chambers of Commerce and the “nine charitable organizations”, there existed numerous street-based charitable organizations and street associations in which petty merchants played a dominate role. Their perception of the “public” sphere was not city-wide, but restricted to the boundaries of particular streets in which they conducted their day-to-day activities. This limited conceptualization of “public” eroded all attempts at building up autonomy at the city level. In other words, the existence of the extensive street-based administrations, effective or ineffective, contributed to the maintenance of bureaucratic governance in the city and blocked the municipalization of non-governmental forces.

Thirdly, the nature of Guangzhou as a provincial capital had a direct bearing on the approach of urban construction in the modern era. In the early twentieth century, the merchants’ westward expansion almost came to a halt due to topographical constraints. The urban development of Guangzhou in the first decades of this century took the form



of re-developing the built-up areas, starting in the walled city where most of the government *yamens* were located. Therefore, the merchants only suggested but did not direct the re-development programs. While this submissive mentality prevented the merchants from taking on the responsibility of city-wide municipal construction, the long-standing political instability and revolutionary activities in the Province prevented the local government from paying attention to the improvement of city affairs. This explained the slow progress of urban evolution before the late 1910s.

As Guangzhou was traditionally an “administrative city”, the local bureaucrats were naturally in a good position to participate actively in urban administration. From the late Qing onwards, they became more interested in local construction. They served as the agents of municipal modernization. In modern Guangzhou, all noticeable modernization attempts were materialized by the local government. However, the establishment of a real city government was not purely a local initiative. It was associated with the drastic enhancement of the political status of Guangzhou in the first two decades of the Republican era. The two major municipal institutions of Guangzhou, that is, the Municipal Office and the Guangzhou Municipality, were established in a period in which the provincial capital functioned as a *de facto* national capital counterbalancing the “warlord” regime at Beijing for a whole decade.⁶ Under such an environment, political forces (such as the Political Study Clique, Chen Jiongming and the GMD) exerted control over this “national capital”. The *baoyu zhuyi* of Chen Jiongming and the

⁶ See Ming K. Chan, “A Turning Point in the Modern Chinese Revolution: The Historical Significance of the Canton Decade, 1917-27”, in Gail Hershatter, Emily Honig, Jonathan N. Lipman and Randall Stross (ed.), *Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain*, pp.224-41. Besides, Guangzhou’s municipal construction in the 1930s had similar political background to the “Canton Decade” in the way that Guangdong was put under the control of General Chen Jitang, the “king of the southern sky” who established a separatist regime in Guangdong in opposition to the Nanjing Government. For example, see Xie Benshu and Feng Zuyi, *et al*, *Xinan junfa shi* (vol.3), pp.316-7.




revolutionary programs of Sun Yatsen favored a top-down control system for administering municipal affairs, which laid the foundation of subsequent municipalities. While municipalities in the democracies of the West and America were debating how to reform municipal government, the social and political elites in Guangzhou were split as to whether a municipality should be formed at all. If urban affairs were totally left to the discretion of local interests, local conservatism would exert heavy negative influence on the progress of municipal construction. Therefore, while the intrinsic problems of the city definitely demanded the introduction of municipal construction programs, it was the political need of “model creation” and “national capital construction” which pushed for the final success for the city’s urban reform and evolution.

As the creation of a municipality was the result of political demands, merchants’ participation was very limited. The Municipal Assembly was paralyzed soon after its establishment. The proposal for an elected Mayor did not materialize, and the Mayor remained appointed by the provincial Governor, later by the Central Government.

Once the local government obtained the power to operate municipal programs and allocate resources, the middle- and street-level administrations dwindled at a faster pace. The suppression of the Merchants’ Volunteer Corps in 1924 brought the merchants as whole under the control of the GMD and the Municipality. The decline of charitable organizations was also clear. The “nine charitable halls” showed remarkable decline in the 1930s. The Guangren Charitable Hall was closed and the Mingshan Hall merged with the Fangbian Hospital. The provincial government established the Ren’ai Charitable Hall (*Ren’ai shantang*) to centralize the administration of all charitable organizations in the province.⁷ The consolidation of the city government dominated by bureaucrats

⁷ For example, see *Guangzhou minguo ribao*, 9 November, 1934; 12 July, 1935.



was at the expense of the interests of city administrations at lower levels.

Therefore, the three levels of urban administration were reversed. A strong and authoritarian municipality (top-level administration) was created, accompanied by the dwindling of merchant force and the street associations (middle- and bottom-level administrations).

Perception of an urban place

Traditionally, only the *cheng* (walled city) was officially recognized as a city. In the modern era, the term “*shi*” (market) was borrowed to refer to a larger conglomeration of urban settlements, usually including the walled city and its immediate suburbs (*guan*). Therefore, the demolition of the city wall was a catalyst to the change of perception of what constituted an urban place, especially for administrative cities like Guangzhou. The demolition of the city wall also implied that the *cheng*, if failing to remedy the worsening urban conditions, might lose its traditional status as a city center. The earliest sign of such changed perception was shown in Zhou Fu’s 1907 Planning, which scheduled the simultaneous development of the walled city, Honam, Dongguan and the remote Huangpu. The work of the Municipal Office and the Guangzhou Municipality marked the maturing and realization of this new perception. It gave rise to a new concept of “city” based on the drastic expansion of the city boundary beyond the walled city. However, it has to be stressed that these two municipal institutions had made great efforts to re-develop the *cheng* (without a city wall) in order to preserve its role as an administrative center of the enlarged city.

While the city wall was no longer regarded as a symbol for “city”, it was the modern infrastructure and utilities, convenient transportation as well as professional and rational administration which symbolized a modern city. The continual implementation of less



opposed municipal construction schemes, and the growing perception of unreformed cities as “medieval”, showed the identification of the urban Chinese with modern urban life based on these new features.⁸


The creation of a municipality and the implementation of coordinated construction plans implied that a city would no longer be a simple aggregation of sectional interests based on kinship, *hang* and streets. Corporate interests for the city as a whole would co-exist with such sectional interests. As reflected in construction projects such as road construction and the reclamation of the Western Moat, the city government stood firm so as not to sacrifice the good of the community for some sectional interests, notably the Xiguan merchants. The promotion of public health and compulsory education, the election of Municipal Assemblymen and so on were means employed to instill a new perception of “public” to the city dweller, namely that he or she is a citizen of a civilian society in addition to his or her identity as a member of a family, a clan, a *hang*, an interest groups and so on.

Guangzhou: a modernized city?

Conservative in administration but occidentalized in physical construction - this explained why the experience of the Guangzhou Municipality served “the Chinese nationalist movement to occidentalize China while preserving things native”.⁹ However, the Guangzhou Municipality only borrowed from but did not reproduce the occidental urban experience. Its attempt to preserve “Chinese elements” can be seen in the

⁸ For the continual implementation of construction schemes, see *Guangzhou shi gongwu zhi shishi jihua* (1930); *Guangzhou shizhengfu san nian lai shizheng baogao* (1935). For the perception of unreformed cities as “medieval”, see Edward Bing-Shuey Lee, *Modern Canton*, pp.6-7; Huang Zunsheng, *Zhongguo wenti zhi zonghe de yanjiu*, p.92.

⁹ *The New York Times*, 13 March, 1927, III, p.13.



“Chinese Renaissance” movement in the 1930s with the intentional adoption of Chinese architectural styles for the proposed administrative complex and the Honam Bridge. These “Chinese elements” not only beautified the city, but also signified the continual survival of the Chinese spirit in the new political and social environment.¹⁰ This showed that the goals of the Chinese revolution and municipal construction were not only to solve domestic problems but also to preserve the essence of traditional Chinese culture in the course of rebuilding China into an independent and modern country and civilization in the world.

This inclusion of “Chinese elements” could also be observed in the operation of the Municipality. In the name of “municipal modernization”, the local government - later the GMD regime - demanded the transfer of power and resources from the merchants and street administrations when carrying out the construction and re-development programs operated by the city government. In other words, Guangzhou witnessed the creation of a modern municipality with all the merits of its Western counterparts,¹¹ such as comprehensive functions, expertise and efficiency, but it also witness the reinforcement of the bureaucracy and the authoritarian tradition. This constituted the basis on which China remained authoritarian after the downfall of the Qing.¹²

This trend of transformation fits certain theories of the “modernization” of Asian countries. “‘Successful’ latecomers to modernization”, according to Gilbert Rozman, “must avail themselves of both unusual elements of centralization and a balanced distri-

¹⁰ See Man Shu-sing, “A Brief Account of Recent Engineering Developments in Canton”, *Hong Kong University Engineering Journal*, vol.VII, no.2, September, 1935, p.10.

¹¹ The point to be remembered here is that municipal reform in the United States was a reaction to party politics in a democratic political system. Most commission-style governments tried to limit partisan politics, but not to eliminate representative government.

¹² See Kerrie L. MacPherson, “Designing China’s Urban Future: The Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927-1937”, *Planning Perspectives*, 5 (1990), p.60.



bution of powers and resources at various levels".¹³ The process of recentralizing national power by the GMD, as seen in the operation of the Guangzhou Municipality, was definitely a process of modernization in Rozman's view. While Guangzhou's experience was promoted by the GMD as a "model" of municipal construction, it should be understood as a model of modernization at the city level.

Guangzhou's municipal experience as a model

Guangzhou's municipal experiment made a great contribution to the Nationalist Revolution and national reconstruction. It aimed not only at improving the city of Guangzhou *per se* but also at saving and reconstructing the whole of China. The Nationalist Government established in 1925 promoted Guangzhou's experience in blending modernity and tradition, municipal construction and state control. Later, the Nationalist Government at Nanjing used Guangzhou's experience as a model for state and city construction after national unification in 1928.¹⁴ However, the Nationalist Government's high regard for Guangzhou's modernization experience was more due to Guangzhou's contribution to the GMD as a power base on which the Party gained its political legitimacy and expanded its power throughout the country. Moreover, Guangzhou provided an important model for subsequent construction programs conducted by the Nationalist Government, as its progress was supervised by the GMD. City administration in the 1930s followed the legacy of the bureaucratic structure of Guangzhou's municipal administration, with the power of the city government concentrated in the hands of the Mayor. Hu Shih complained in the early 1930s that city governments in China did not have elected municipal councils. Municipalities were composed of bureaucrats ap-

¹³ Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *The Modernization of China*, p.499.



pointed by the local or central governments.¹⁵

As Guangzhou's construction was a crucial component in the GMD's rise to power and as it served as a model for subsequent construction programs, the GMD and the Nationalist Government tried their best to emphasize the "revolutionary purity" of the city. In publicizing Guangzhou' urban "experience", reform attempts made in the late Qing were almost totally ignored. The efforts made by the Municipal Office were either distorted or belittled.¹⁶ Sun Fo was singled out as the sole architect of the establishment of the Guangzhou Municipality. The Bund was renamed in the 1940s as Zhesheng Road (Zhesheng was an alias of Sun Fo) to celebrate his contributions to the city's construction.¹⁷ Through propagandizing that the GMD and Sun Fo had established the first modern municipality of China in Guangzhou, the GMD hoped to build up the omnipotent sacredness of Sun Yatsen and the monumentalism of Sun's construction plan, that is, *Jianguo fanglüe* (State Building Strategies) which the GMD professed to follow after national unification.¹⁸ Therefore, Guangzhou through its municipal experiment not only "designed China's urban future",¹⁹ but also tailored the image and history of the GMD as the legitimate ruling Party fighting for the transformation of China.

¹⁴ See Lu Dalin (ed.), *Shizheng quanshu*, preface p.9.


¹⁵ Bai Dunyong, *Shizheng junyao*, preface p.3.

¹⁶ The study by Lai Jeh-Hang (Lai Zehan) is representative. See Lai Jeh-Hang (Lai Zehan), "Sun Ke yu Guangzhou shi de jindaihua (1921-1927)", *Jindai Zhongguo*, no.19, 20 October, 1980, pp.276-7.

¹⁷ "Guangzhou zhuanji", *Lüxing zazhi*, vol.22, no.10, 5 October, 1948, pp.8-9.

¹⁸ Evidence shows that some people, especially foreigners, did not hold the same view of the GMD. The series *Who's Who in China* is a good source for illustration. In its second edition published in 1920, the Municipal Office was translated as the "Canton [Guangzhou] Municipality". In its third edition published in 1925, the establishment of what is called "Guangzhou Municipality" in this thesis was merely regarded as a replacement of the Municipal Office by a "commission form" of government. The tone was changed in its fifth edition published in 1932, possibly under the influence of official propaganda, which stated that "early in 1921... Canton City was organized under a charter of a modern city government." See *Who's Who in China* (2nd ed.), pp.292-3; *ibid* (3rd ed.), pp.682-3; *ibid* (5th ed.), pp.210-1.

¹⁹ This phrase is borrowed from Kerrie L. MacPherson's work. See Kerrie L. MacPherson, "Designing China's Urban Future: The Greater Shanghai Plan, 1927-1937", *Planning Perspectives*




However, Guangzhou as a model of urban construction was difficult to apply in most other urban settlements of China, even after the GMD had successfully unified the country. A Chinese scholar noted that most of the cities and towns along the Yangzi River in the 1930s were still only urban aggregations of slums, barren soil, dirt and darkness. He concluded that “China is a land of charm and beauty, but there is a world of ancientity and shabbiness concealed inside.”²⁰ Even the construction of Nanjing, the new national capital of the Nationalist Government, faced problems different from those of Guangzhou.²¹ Actually, like Shanghai, Guangzhou’s fast development from 1918 to 1925 was a unique rather than a universal model. The successful transformation of medieval Guangzhou into a modern city was the result of the interaction of three factors, which might not be found in any single city elsewhere except Guangzhou. Guangzhou’s being a special provincial capital where government *yamens* of different levels were located and its flourishing commercial activities are two basic factors. The third factor is the special experience of Guangzhou in serving as a revolutionary center since the last two decades of the Qing Dynasty. Such revolutionary activities, especially those in the 1910s and 1920s, made Guangdong a separatist province. This shaped a favorable environment, notably the establishment of the “southern regime” in Guangzhou and the concomitant need to reform the city to create a “showcase effect”. Political heavy-weights such as Sun Yatsen and Chen Jiongming made Guangzhou their base to realize their political ideals. Therefore, the construction of Guangzhou was of primary importance for both the local and “central leaders”.²²

tives, 5 (1990), p.39.

²⁰ Huang Zunsheng, *Zhongguo wenti zhi zonghe de yanjiu*, pp.93-4.

²¹ See Shang Qixu, *Chengshi jianshe zhi yanjiu*, pp.97-9.

²² Here, the choice of Nanjing as a national capital for the Nationalist Government was similar to Guangzhou’s experience. Nanjing was the first national capital for the Republic. To restore Nan-




Guangzhou's municipal construction was activated during the national revolution with Guangzhou as a political center, and this explains why research on the history of Guangzhou, especially for the modern era, concentrate on the "larger history" not on the city itself. However, such a "larger history" served as an indispensable background to understand the urban evolution of modern Guangzhou. Evidences presented in this thesis have clearly shown that external forces were always more determinable than internal needs of Guangzhou in modernizing the urban infrastructure and administration of showcase cities such as Guangzhou.

jing as the national capital was an unrealized wish of Sun Yatsen. See Ye Chucang, *et al*, *Shouduzhi*, pp.31-2.




GLOSSARY


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<i>Aiyu shantang</i>	愛育善堂	Cen Tao	岑濤
Anhui	安徽	Chai Weitong	柴維桐
<i>Anyong</i>	安勇	<i>Changdi</i>	長堤
Aokou	澳口	<i>Changgeng Road</i>	長庚路
Aoyuzhou	鰲魚洲	<i>changhong</i>	長紅
Baihedong	白鶴洞	Changsha	長沙
Bailing Road	百靈路	Changshou Great Street	長壽大街
Baiyun Mountain	白雲山	Changshou Lane	長壽里
Baiyun Road	白雲路	Chaotian Road	朝天路
<i>bao</i>	保	Chaoyin Street	潮音街
Baohua Street	寶華街	Chaozhou and Meizhou Commander	潮梅鎮 守使
<i>baojia zongju</i>	保甲總局	Chazhai Garden	茶仔園
<i>baojia</i>	保甲	Chen Bohou	陳柏侯
<i>baoxiao</i>	報效	Chen Ciren	陳次壬
<i>baoyu zhuyi</i>	保育主義	Chen Duxiu	陳獨秀
Baoyuan Street	寶源街	Chen Jianchi	陳鑑持
<i>Baqi shengji chu</i>	八旗生計處	Chen Jinghua	陳景華
Bei Jiang	北江	Chen Jiongming	陳炯明
Beiguan	北關	Chen Lianbo	陳廉伯
Beihai	北海	Chen Liantai	陳聯泰
Beiheng Road	北橫路	Chen Wangzeng	陳望曾
<i>Beijiang hang</i>	北江行	Cheng Tiandou (T.T. Cheng)	程天斗
Beijiaochang	北較場	Cheng Tiangu	程天固
Beijing	北京	<i>Cheng-zhen-xiang difang zizhi zhangcheng</i>	<i>《城鎮鄉地方自治章程》</i>
Beijing Road	北京路	Chengdu	成都
Beiping	北平	<i>Chenghuang miao</i>	城隍廟
<i>buzhengsi</i>	布政司	<i>chengxiang</i>	城廂
Cai Zengji	蔡增基	<i>chengxiang neiwei</i>	城廂內外
<i>Cailan</i>	菜欄	Chengxuan Straight Street	承宣直街
Caishen Temple	財神廟	Chi Zhongyou	池仲祐
Caizheng Road	財政路	<i>chi</i>	尺
Cao Bingren	曹秉仁	Chongben Charitable Hall	崇本善堂
Cao Ruying	曹汝英		
Cen Bozhu	岑伯著		




Chongqing 重慶	
Chongzheng Charitable Hall 崇正善堂	<i>dongcun xiqiao</i> 東村西俏
Chuanlongkou 川龍口	Dongguan 東關
Cixi, Empress 慈禧太后	Donghaokou 東濠口
Congshan Hall 從善堂	Dongjiaochang 東較場
Cunxin Hall 存心堂	Dongming Temple 東明寺
Dabei Gate Road 大北門路	Dongsha Road 東沙馬路
Dadanwei 大坦尾	Dongshan 東山
Dadong Gate 大東門	<i>Dongshan bao'an ju</i> 東山保安局
Dafosi 大佛寺	Dongshan Temple 東山寺
Dajitou 大基頭	<i>du zhihui shi</i> 都指揮使
Danan Gate 大南門	<i>duan</i> 段
Danan Gate Road 大南門路	<i>dudu</i> 都督
Danan Road 大南路	<i>dujun</i> 督軍
<i>dang</i> 當	<i>Dulian gongsuo</i> 督練公所
<i>danxing fa</i> 單行法	<i>Dunren guan</i> 敦仁館
Daoguang 道光	Duobao Street 多寶街
<i>daotai</i> 道台	<i>Duxue ju</i> 督學局
Dashatou 大沙頭	<i>e shili</i> 惡勢力
Dashi Street 大石街	Ershatou 二沙頭
Daxi Gate 大西門	<i>Falü gu</i> 法律股
Daxin 大新	<i>fanfang</i> 蕃坊
Dayu Mountain 大庾嶺	Fangbian Hospital 方便醫院
De Shou 德壽	<i>fangbian suo</i> 方便所
Deng Yaoguang 鄧瑤光	Fangcun 芳村
<i>denglu ke</i> 登錄科	<i>fanguai</i> 番鬼
Dexuan Road 德宣路	Fazheng Road 法政路
Di er fu 第二甫	<i>fazhi weiyuanhui</i> 法制委員會
Di liu fu 第六甫	Fei Jingfu 裴景福
Di qi fu 第七甫	<i>fenbu shangren</i> 蕩埠商人
Di wu fu 第五甫	Feng Bingyi 馮秉彝
<i>di</i> 堤	Feng Dali 馮大利
dibao 地保	Fengheng Company 豐亨公司
<i>Digong ju</i> 堤工局	Fengning Road 豐寧路
Dinghai Road 定海路	<i>fengshui</i> 風水
Dong Jiang 東江	Fengyuan Street 逢源街
Dongbei Road 東北馬路	<i>Fenshan gongsuo</i> 墳山公所
Dongchuan Road 東川[馬]路	Foshan 佛山
	Four Temples Charitable Hall 四廟善堂




Fu Kang'an	福康安	Guangdong	廣東
Fu Rumei	傅汝梅	Guangfu Road	廣福路
Fuchu Hall	復初社	Guangji Hospital	廣濟醫院
Fujian	福建	Guangji Infant Hospital	廣濟嬰院
Fuxue Street East	府學東街	Guangren Charitable Hall	廣仁善堂
Fuzhou	福州	Guangren Road	廣仁路
ganfen	乾糞	Guangta Street	光塔街
Gaodi Street	高第街	Guangxi	廣西
Gaozhou	高州	Guangxiao Road	光孝路
Gong Xinzhan	龔心湛	Guangxing Charitable Hall	廣行善堂
Gongbei Tower	拱北樓	Guangxu	光緒
gongcheng ke	工程科	Guangzhou	廣州
gongcheng sheji weiyuanhui	工程設計委員會	Guangzhou chengxiang shizheng gongsuo	廣州城廂市政公所
Gonglu chu	公路處	Guangzhou dianche bujiu hui	廣州電車補救會
Gongshan Hall	公善堂	Guangzhou dianche gongsi	廣州電車公司
gongsuo	公所	Guangzhou Qiyi Road	廣州起義路
Gongwu bu	工務部	Guangzhou shangtuan	廣州商團
gongxiang	公箱	Guangzhou shi shangmin xiehui	廣州市商民協會
gongyuan	貢院	Guangzhou shi shizheng gongbao	《廣州市市政公報》
Gongyuan Road	公園路	Guangzhou shi shizheng gongsuo	廣州市市政公所
gu	股	Guangzhou shi shizhengting	廣州市市政廳
Gu Yingfen	古應芬	Guangzhou shi zhanxing tiaoli	廣州市暫行條例
guan	關	Guangzhou shi zizhi choubei hui	廣州市自治籌備會
Guan Xiang	關祥	Guangzhou shi zizhi tiaoli	《廣州市自治條例》
guanchan chu	官產處	Guangzhou shizheng gongsuo zuzhi zhangcheng	廣州市政公所組織章程
Guandi Temple	關帝廟	Guangzhou shizheng gongsuo	廣州市政公所
guandu shangban	官督商辦	Guangzhou shizheng ju	廣州市政局
Guangda Road	廣大路	Guangzhou zong shanghui	廣州總商會
Guangdong chouzhen chu	廣東籌賑處	Guanlu Road	官祿路
Guangdong difang shanhous weiyuanhui	廣東地方善後委員會		
Guangdong difang zizhi yanjiushe	廣東地方自治研究社		
Guangdong duban zhihe shiyichu	廣東督辦治河事宜處		
Guangdong shenghui jingchating	廣東省會警察廳		
Guangdong zongshanghui	廣東總商會		




<i>guanshang heban</i>	官商合辦	Hu Mingpan	胡銘槃
Guantang Road	官塘路	Hu Mulan	胡木蘭
<i>guanxi</i>	關係	Hu Shi	胡適
Guanyin Temple	觀音廟	Hu Xuanming	胡宣明
<i>Guanzhi ju</i>	官紙局	Hua'ai Clinic	華愛醫局
<i>Guanzi</i>	管子	Huadi	花地
Gubu	穀埠	Huaguang	華光
Guide Gate	歸德門	Huang Bingchang	黃秉常
Guide Road	歸德路	Huang Jingtang	黃景棠
Guixiang Street	桂香街	Huang Xianrong	黃顯榮
Guo Songtao	郭嵩焘	Huang Yanpei	黃炎培
<i>guojia shehui kexue jijin</i>	國家社會科學基金	Huang Yi	黃毅
Guomindang	國民黨	Huang Yuan	黃垣
<i>guoqing jinian, daolu xiuming</i>	國慶紀念，道 路修明	Huanghuagang	黃花崗
Haichaung Temple	海幢寺	Huangpu	黃浦
Haifeng	海豐	Huangsha	黃沙
Haikou	海口	Huaning Lane	華寧里
Haizhu	海珠	Huata Road	花塔路
<i>hang</i>	行	<i>hufa zhengfu</i>	護法政府
<i>hangshang gongsuo</i>	行商公所	<i>huguo yundong</i>	護國運動
Hankou	漢口	Hui'ai Road	惠愛路
Haoxian Road	豪賢路	Hui'ai Street	惠愛街
He Kunshan	何崑山	<i>Hui'ai yiguan</i>	惠愛醫館
He Xiuqi	何秀啓	Huichun Charitable Hall	回春善堂
Heming Street	鶴鳴街	Huifu Road	惠福路
<i>heng jie</i>	橫街	<i>huiguan</i>	會館
Hengsha	橫沙	Huiji Granaries	惠濟義倉
<i>hengshui du</i>	橫水渡	Huixing Charitable Hall	惠行善院
<i>Humin yaoju</i>	惠民藥局	Huiyang	惠陽
Honam	河南	<i>hukou</i>	戶口
Hong Temple	洪廟	Humen	虎門
Hong Xiuquan	洪秀全	Hunan	湖南
Hong'en Lane	洪恩里	<i>huolu</i>	火路
Hongdetang	宏德堂	<i>hutong</i>	胡同
Houtai Pawnshop	厚泰當	<i>jia</i>	甲
Houxiang Street	厚祥街	<i>jiajiao</i>	加繳
Hu Hanmin	胡漢民	Jiajing Emperor	嘉靖帝
		Jian Jinglun	簡經綸




Jianada Company	加拿大公司
<i>jiandao</i>	箭道
Jiang Jieshi	蔣介石
Jiang Shoushi	蔣壽石
Jiang Youxian	蔣攸銛
Jiangjun da yutang	將軍大魚塘
Jiangmen	江門
Jiangsu	江蘇
<i>Jianguo fanglue</i>	《建國方略》
<i>jianjiao</i>	建醮
Jianshan Hall	兼善堂
<i>Jianshe</i>	《建設》
Jianyetang	建業堂
<i>jianzheng zhuyi</i>	減政主義
Jiaoyu Road	教育路
<i>Jibu zongju</i>	緝捕總局
<i>Jicha gongsuo</i>	稽查公所
<i>jiedong</i>	街董
Jiefang Road	解放路
<i>jiefu</i>	街副
<i>jiemiao</i>	街廟
<i>jietie</i>	揭帖
<i>jiezheng</i>	街正
Jinghai Gate	靖海門
Jinghai Road	靖海路
Jinghui Road	淨慧路
<i>jingjie ke</i>	經界科
Jinglun Great Street	經綸大街
<i>Jingwu gongsuo</i>	警務公所
Jinhua Great Street	錦華大街
<i>Jinling gongcheng ju</i>	金陵工程局
Jinyu Tang	金玉堂
Jishan Hall	集善堂
<i>Jiuzai gongsuo</i>	救災公所
Jixiang Road	吉祥路
<i>jiyi cheng</i>	雞翼城
<i>juan</i>	捐
<i>juandi guigong</i>	涓滴歸公
Jueluo Chengyun	覺羅成允
<i>Junxie ju</i>	軍械局
<i>juren</i>	舉人
Kang Youwei	康有爲
<i>kaogong ji</i>	考工記
Kunming	昆明
Kuting Lane	庫廳巷
Lü Diaoyong	呂調鏞
Lü Yuan	呂源
<i>lüying</i>	綠營
Leshan Hall	樂善堂
Leshan Hospital	樂善醫院
Li Fulin	李福林
Li Hanzhang	李翰章
Li Hongzhang	李鴻章
Li Jitang	李紀堂
Li Shizhen	李士楨
<i>Li tan</i>	厲壇
Li Xiefa	李協發
Li Yanyu	黎顏裕
Li Yaohan	李耀漢
<i>li</i>	里
Lian'an Charitable Society	聯安善社
Liang Chengxi	梁承禧
Liang Jingguo	梁經國
Liang Qichao	梁啟超
Liang Shiyi	梁士诒
Liang-Guang	兩廣
<i>liansheng zizhi</i>	聯省自治
Lianxing Street	聯興街
Liao Zhongkai	廖仲愷
<i>likin</i>	厘金
Lin Yungai	林雲陔
Lin Zexu	林則徐
Lingnan	嶺南
Liu Bingkui	劉秉奎
Liu Dezhang	劉德章
Liu Jiwen	劉紀文




Liu Kunyi	劉坤一	Nanming Regime	南明政權
Liu Neng	劉能	Nantong	南通
Liu Qingtang	劉慶鐘	Nanyuan	南園
Liu Xiangqing	劉祥慶	Nanyue Kingdom	南越國
Liu Xun	劉尋	<i>neiwu</i>	內務
Liu Zhenhuan	劉震寰	Ni Wenwei	倪文蔚
Liu Zhilu	劉志陸	<i>niaogang</i>	尿缸
Liumai qu	六脈渠	Ningbo	寧波
Lixing Company	利行公司	<i>Nong gong shang ju</i>	農工商局
Long Jiguang	龍濟光	<i>pai</i>	牌
Lu Chuanlin	鹿傳霖	Pan Changyao	潘長耀
Lu Gengyang	盧廣揚	Pan Shicheng	潘仕成
Lu Guanheng	盧觀恒	Pan Wentao	潘文濤
Lu Kun	盧坤	Panfu Road	盤福路
Lu Shaobing	盧少屏	Pantang	泮塘
Lü Daoxiang	呂道象	Panyu County	番禺縣
Lufeng	陸豐	Parturition Relief Society	恤產會
Lun Shaochang	倫少常	Peng Gangzhi	彭剛直
Lun Yunxiang	倫允襄	Peng Hui	彭回
Ma Junwei	馬君武	<i>ping ming juan</i>	品茗捐
Ma Piya	馬丕瑤	<i>pingyihui</i>	評議會
Mai Jinting	麥觀廷	<i>pudi</i>	舖底
Mao Hongbin	毛鴻賓	Pushan Hall	普善堂
maquan	馬圈	Qi Ying	耆英
Masha Lane	麻紗巷	Qian Puru	錢璞如
Mei Qizhao	梅啓照	<i>Qing hao gongsuo</i>	清濠公所
Mibu	米埠	Qingdao	青島
Minchan baozheng ju	民產保証局	Qingping Street	清平街
Minghuan Altar	名宦祠	<i>Qingtian zongju</i>	清佃總局
Minglun tang	明倫堂	Qixing Street	歧興街
Mingshan Hall	明善堂	Qu Dajun	屈大均
Mo Rongxin	莫榮新	<i>quan sheng shangtuan lianshang zongbu</i>	全省 商團聯防總部
mofan xin Guangdong	模範新廣東	Quanjie Hall	勸誠社
Nanbei hang	南北行	<i>quanye chang</i>	勸業場
Nanguan	南關	<i>quanye dao</i>	勸業道
Nanhai County	南海縣	<i>quanyi quyu</i>	權宜區域
Nanhan Kingdom	南漢國	Relief Society for the Poor and Widows	恤窮
Nanjing	南京		




發所	<i>shengzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui</i> 省制編纂委員會
Ren Xiao 任轟	
<i>Ren'ai shantang</i> 仁愛善堂	<i>shenjing</i> 滲井
Renji Charitable Hall 仁濟善堂	<i>shenshang</i> 紳商
Renji Clinic 仁濟醫局	<i>shenshi</i> 紳士
Renji Hospital 仁濟醫院	<i>Shewan, Tomes & Company</i> 旗昌洋行
Renji Street 仁濟街	<i>shi</i> 市
<i>roulin jiucai</i> 肉林酒海	<i>shi canshihui</i> 市參事會
Ruan Yuan 阮元	<i>shi xingzheng weiyuanhui</i> 市行政委員會
Rui Lin 瑞麟	<i>Shiba fu</i> 十八甫
Runshen Society 潤身社	<i>shibo shi</i> 市舶使
<i>sanmin zhuyi</i> 三民主義	<i>shibo tiju</i> 市舶提舉
Sanshui 三水	<i>Shiliu fu</i> 十六甫
Shaanxi 陝西	<i>shimin daxue</i> 市民大學
Shahe 沙河	<i>Shiqi fu</i> 十七甫
Shaji 沙基	<i>shiqu zhantuo</i> 市區展拓
Shaji Road 沙基路	<i>Shisan hang</i> 十三行
Shamian 沙面	<i>Shiwu fu</i> 十五甫
Shandong 山東	<i>shiwu jiguan</i> 事務機關
Shang jiu fu 上九甫	<i>shizheng</i> 市政
Shang Kexi 尚可喜	<i>shizheng chongguang</i> 市政重光
Shang Zhixin 尚之信	<i>shizhengfu</i> 市政府
Shanghai 上海	<i>shizheng gongyi hui</i> 市政公益會
<i>Shangwu shantang</i> 商務善堂	<i>shizhengting</i> 市政廳
<i>shanhou chu</i> 善後處	<i>Shoushi Charitable Hall</i> 壽世善堂
<i>Shanhou ju</i> 善後局	<i>Shuangmendi</i> 雙門底
Shanqing Lane 善慶里	<i>shuifen</i> 水糞
Shantou 汕頭	<i>Shushan Hall</i> 迹善堂
Shanwei 汕尾	<i>shuyuan</i> 書院
Shanxi 山西	<i>Shuzheng gu</i> 庶政股
<i>Sheji tan</i> 社稷壇	<i>Sichuan</i> 四川
Shen Cituan 沈次端	<i>Sima Temple</i> 司馬廟
Shen Fuyi 沈傳義	<i>Sipailou</i> 四牌樓
Shen Hongying 沈鴻英	<i>Songhu Special Municipality</i> 淞滬特別市
Sheng Xuanhuai 盛宣懷	<i>Su Zengfu</i> 蘇曾福
Shenggongcao Hall 省躬草堂	<i>Sun Fo (Sun Ke)</i> 孫科
Shengshan Hall 聖善堂	<i>Sun Yatsen</i> 孫逸仙(孫中山)
<i>shengzhang</i> 省長	<i>T'o Mei Hospital</i> 韶美醫院




Taikang Road	泰康路	Wende Road	文德路
Taiping Gate	太平門	Wenlan College	文瀾書院
<i>taiping jing</i>	太平井	Wenming Road	文明路
Taiping Road	太平路	<i>wokou</i>	倭寇
Taiyuan	太原	Wu Baoguang	伍寶光
<i>tang</i>	堂	Wu Binglian	伍秉鑑
Tang Shengsong	唐盛松	<i>Wu ceng lou</i>	五層樓
<i>tanpai</i>	攤派	Wu Chongyao	伍崇曜
Tao Mo	陶模	Wu Guifang	吳桂芳
Tiangong Lane	天宮里	Wu Jipan	伍藉磐
<i>Tianjin gongcheng ju</i>	天津工程局	Wu Tianheng	吳天垣
Tianjin	天津	Wu Tiecheng	吳鐵城
Tianxiang Road	天香路	Wu Tingfang	伍廷芳
Tianzi Pier	天字碼頭	Wu Xilü	伍希侶
<i>Tixue si</i>	提學司	Wu Zunshan	伍尊善
Tong'an Great Street	同安大街	Wuchang Uprising	武昌起義
Tongde Street	同德街	Wuhan	武漢
<i>Tongji chu</i>	統計處	Wuxi	無錫
Tongxing	同興	Wuxian Gate	五仙門
Tongzhi	同治	Wuxian Temple	五仙觀
<i>tuanlian</i>	團練	Xi Jiang	西江
Wanfu Road	萬福路	Xi'ao	西澳
Wang Ding	王鼎	Xia jiu fu	下九甫
Wang Guangling	王廣齡	Xiamen	廈門
Wang Jingwei	汪精衛	Xiangshan County	香山縣
Wang Kaitai	王凱泰	Xianyang Road	仙羊路
Wang Sizhang	王思章	Xiaobei Gate	小北門
Wang Songshan	王松山	Xiaobei Road	小北路
<i>wei</i>	衛	Xicun	西村
Wei Bangping	魏邦平	Xie Jiawu	謝嘉悟
Wei Zongbi	魏宗弼	Xie Youren	謝有仁
Weibian Street	衛邊街	Xiguan	西關
<i>weisheng qu</i>	衛生區	Xihakou	西濠口
Weixin Road	維新路	Xihu Road	西湖路
<i>weiyuan</i>	委員	<i>Xin yong</i>	新涌
Wen Hao	溫灝	<i>Xinshi ju</i>	新市局
Wen Zuocai	溫佐才	Xinzao	新造
Wenchang Altar	文昌宮	Xishan Temple	西山廟



Xiu hao gongsuo	修濠公所	Yili	伊犁
xiu zhi	修志	Yiling Temple	醫靈廟
Xu Baiting	許拜庭	Yingyuan Road	應元路
Xu Chongqing	許崇清	Yingzhu Street	迎珠街
Xu Gengbi	徐廣陛	Yiyuan Road	一元路
Xu Guangjin	徐廣縉	Yong'an Straight Street	永安直街
Xu Liang	許良	Yongchang Charitable Society	庸常善社
Xu Xiangguang	許祥光	Yonghan Gate	永漢門
Xuanmiao Temple	玄妙觀	Yonghan Road	永漢路
xuegong	學宮	Yonghan Street	永漢街
xuetang	學堂	Yongjia, Lord of	永嘉侯
Xuli ju	恤嫠局	Yongqing Street	永清街
xunhui jiaoshou	巡迴教授	Yongye Tang	永業堂
Xunjing dao	巡警道	Youlan Gate	油欄門
ya	押	Youlan Road	油欄路
yagui	押櫃	Yu Rujun	虞汝鈞
yamen	衙門	Yuan Shikai	袁世凱
Yan Jiazhi	嚴家熾	Yuan Shuxun	袁樹勳
Yan Lu	顏輅	Yuanchang Street	源昌街
Yang Shuqi	楊恕祺	Yue ren zhi Yue	粵人治粵
Yang Wenqian	楊文乾	Yuehua College	越華書院
Yang Ximin	楊希閔	Yuehua Road	越華路
Yang Yongtai	楊永泰	Yuejun	粵軍
Yang Youjian	楊有堅	Yueshang zizihui	粵商自治會
Yanggao Altar	仰高祠	Yuexiu Mountain	粵秀山
yanghua	洋化	Yuexiu Road	越秀路
Yangren New Street	揚仁新街	Yunnan	雲南
yangwu	洋務	Yushan	禺山
Yangzi River	揚子江	Yushan Road	禺山路
Yantang	燕塘	zai zao minguo	再造民國
Yao Bohuai	姚伯懷	Zanyu Charitable Society	贊育善社
Yaohua Street	耀華街	Zeng Guoquan	曾國荃
Ye Mingchen	葉名琛	Zeng Yan	曾彥
Yi Rongzhi	易容之	Zengbu	增步
yicang	義倉	Zengsha	增沙
Yicheng Office	義成總局	Zhafen Street	榨粉街
Yide Road	一德路	Zhai Wang	翟汪
yidings quyu	擬定區域	Zhang Fengjie	張鳳喈



Zhang Hongnan	張鴻南	Zhong Sheng	鍾聲
Zhang Jingfang	張錦芳	Zhonghua geming dang	中華革命黨
Zhang Mingqi	張鳴岐	Zhonghua quanguo daolu jianzhu xiehui	中華 全國道路建築協會
Zhang Renjun	張人駿	Zhongshan Fifth Road	中山五路
Zhang Zhidong	張之洞	Zhongshan Fourth Road	中山四路
Zhang Zuolin	張作霖	Zhongshan Road	中山路
<i>zhang</i>	丈	Zhou Fu	周馥
Zhangzhou	漳州	Zhou li	周禮
Zhao Tuo	趙佗	Zhou Rudun	周汝敦
Zhaqing	肇慶	Zhoutouzui	洲頭咀
Zhejiang	浙江	Zhu Guizhen	朱桂楨
Zheng Rong	鄭榮	Zhu Liangzu	朱亮祖
Zhengnan Road	正南路	Zhu Qinglan	朱慶瀾
Zhenguang	真光	Zhuang Yunyi	莊允懿
<i>zhengxinlu</i>	徵信錄	Zhuguang Road	珠光路
<i>zhengxue xi</i>	政學系	Zhuhengsha	築橫沙
Zhesheng Road	哲生路	<i>zhui ren</i>	追認
<i>zhi jie</i>	直街	Zhulan Gate	竹欄門
Zhide Infant Hospital	志德嬰兒醫院	Ziyi ju	諮詢局
Zhili	直隸	<i>zongci</i>	宗祠
<i>zhili</i>	值理	<i>zongwu ke</i>	總務科
<i>zhishang</i>	職商	Zuile Charitable Hall	最樂善堂
<i>zhishi</i>	值事	Zunsheng Charitable Hall	遵聖善堂
Zhong Jinping	鍾覲平		
Zhong Qianjun	鍾謙鈞		




Appendix 1

Regulations of the Municipal Office of Guangzhou City¹

- Article 1** The Office governs transportation, sanitation, boundary, registration and other municipal affairs of the Guangzhou city.
- Article 2** The Office has two directors who are appointed by the Military and Civil Governors. They superintend all affairs of the Office and supervise all the subordinates.
- Article 3** The Office has one vice-director, who is appointed by the Military and Civil Governors by the nomination of the directors. He assists the directors in all affairs of the Office.
- Article 4** The Office has one coordinator to assist the directors and vice-director in managing all affairs of the Office.
- Article 5** The Office has two secretaries, who manage the documents and draft restricted documents by order of the superintendents.
- Article 6** The Office has four to six advisers, who plan and scrutinize projects that the Office shall carry out.
- Article 7** The Office tentatively has four sections:
1. General Section;
 2. Construction Section;
 3. Boundary Section;
 4. Registration Section.
- Article 8** The General Section undertakes the following affairs:
1. concerning the government and public property of the Bannermen;
 2. concerning the welfare factories;
 3. concerning affairs of sanitation (including tapped water, electricity and coal gas)
 4. concerning auction;
 5. concerning accountancy;
 6. concerning budgetary and final accounting affairs;
 7. concerning the collection and distribution of documents;
 8. concerning the appointment, dismissal, transferal, review, promotion and demotion of the Office's staff;
 9. concerning the general affairs;
 10. concerning the maintenance of archive;
 11. concerning the issuance of licenses, certificates and government seals;
 12. concerning the compilation of various kinds of primary accounts, ledgers and vouchers; and
 13. concerning affairs not undertaken by other Sections.
- Article 9** The Construction Section undertakes the following affairs:
1. concerning the demolition of city wall;
 2. concerning the opening of roads;
 3. concerning the tramway and rickshaws;
 4. concerning the extension and improvement of road routes;

¹ This translation is mine. For the original Chinese version, see Zhao Zhuo (ed.), *Guangdong danxing faling huizuan*, pp.94-8.



5. concerning market affairs;
6. concerning bridges, ditches and other waterways;
7. concerning the acquisition of land; and
8. concerning the surveying of the construction projects

Article 10 The City Boundary Section undertakes the following affairs:

1. concerning land investigation;
2. concerning land surveying and the drawing of the master layout plan and regional plans; and
3. concerning the affair of price evaluation.

Article 11 The Registration Section undertakes the following affairs;

1. concerning the registration affairs;
2. concerning document search;
3. concerning the verification affairs;
4. concerning the administration of maps and publications; and
5. concerning the deeds and taxation of the real estate of the provincial city, Honam, Huadi and Fangcun.

Article 12 There is one section head for each Section. He undertakes the affairs of his Section by order of his superintendents.

Article 13 The Sections may hire assistants if necessary, and form them into a number of divisions. The details of forming divisions will be specified separately.

Article 14 Technicians may be hired for the planning of construction, electric, sanitary and legal affairs. The regulations for such hiring will be stipulated separately.

Article 15 The Office may hire clerks for clerical purpose.


Article 16 Affairs previously undertaken by the Finance or Police Departments shall be shifted to the responsibility of the Office, provided that such affairs are specified in this regulation.

Article 17 The Office may issue direct orders to the district police stations for the sake of efficiency.

Article 18 The Office may consult the archive of various governmental offices for the sake of investigation.

Article 19 The Office sets up a council composed by citizens of Guangzhou city. The eligibility of the council members and the power of the council will be specified separately.

Article 20 These regulations are temporary only. Amendment to any inappropriateness may be made whenever necessary.



Appendix 2

Provisional Regulations of the Guangzhou Municipality²

Chapter I The City Area

Article 1 The Provisional Regulations of the Guangzhou Municipality shall be applied to the entire City of Guangzhou.

The area of the City of Guangzhou shall be defined and fixed by the City Boundary Commission. The City Boundary Commission shall be appointed by the Governor.

Article 2 The city, with the permission of the Provincial Government, shall extend its limits in case of necessity.

No part of the city within the defined boundary shall be separated from the city and establish itself as an independent municipality.

Article 3 The City of Guangzhou shall be hereby declared a local government area, to be directly under the Provincial Government and shall be independent of the administration of any county.

Chapter II The Sphere of Municipal Administration

Article 4 The sphere of municipal administration shall include the following matters: -

1. City finance and municipal loans;
2. Public roads, highways, sewage, bridges and other public works;
3. Public health and public amusement;
4. Public safety, fire protection and flood prevention;
5. Public education, correction and charity;
6. City communications, electric power, telephone, water works, gas works and other public utilities;
7. City properties; and
8. Matters and affairs assigned by the Central and Provincial Governments.

Article 5 The Municipal Government shall suspend any functions that are in conflict with or have been undertaken by the Central or Provincial Governments and wait for legal settlement.


Article 6 In the execution of the functions enumerated under Article 4, the Municipal Government may consult the Municipal Assembly regarding the establishment of departments necessary to administer them.

Chapter III Organization and Functions

Article 7 All municipal affairs shall be decided, administered and executed by the Municipal Executive Council.

Article 8 If the Municipal Executive Council disagrees with any decision of the Municipal Assembly, it may refer the same back to the Municipal Assembly for reconsideration, and if the original decision is upheld, the Municipal Executive Council shall execute it.

² This translation is based on Hwei-shung Gao, "Police Administration in Canton", *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol.10, no.4, October 1926, pp.879-89; S.Y. Wu, "Canton Municipal Progress", *China Weekly Review*, 3 December, 1921, pp.7-10. For the full text of the *Provincial Regulations* in Chinese, see *Guangzhou shi shizhengtong zongwu ke bianji gu, Guangzhou shi shizheng ligui zhangcheng huibian*, pp.1-12.



Article 9 The Municipal Executive Council shall consist of the Mayor and the Heads of the different Bureaus.

Article 10 All rules and regulations governing the meetings and official activities of the Municipal Executive Council shall be determined by the Council itself.

Article 11 The Mayor shall be elected by the people of the city.

Until the present Provisional Regulations are revised, the Mayor shall be appointed by the Governor for a term of five years.

Article 12 The Mayor shall have the power to direct, supervise and oversee all general administrative affairs or functions of the Municipal Government, and to act as Chairman of the Municipal Executive Council.

Article 13 The administrative powers and functions shall be assigned to the following bureaus: -

1. Bureau of Finance;
2. Bureau of Public Works;
3. Bureau of Public Safety;
4. Bureau of Public Health;
5. Bureau of Public Utilities; and
6. Bureau of Education.

Article 14 There shall be one head for each bureau, appointed by the Governor upon recommendation of the Mayor.

Article 15 The Bureau of Finance shall have charge of the following functions: -

1. Levying of taxes;
2. Control of city properties;
3. Management of municipal loans;
4. Collection and payment of public funds;
5. Assessment of properties; and
6. Other affairs pertaining to city finance.

Article 16 The Bureau of Public Works shall have charge of the following functions: -

1. Planning of new city streets;
2. Construction and repairing of streets, roads, bridges, sewers and conduits;
3. Regulation of buildings;
4. Surveying of public and private lands in the entire city.
5. Supervision of public parks and buildings; and
6. Other affairs pertaining to public works.

Article 17 The Bureau of Public Safety shall have charge of the following functions: -

1. Police administration of the city;
2. Organization and maintenance of the fire brigade;
3. Organization and training of volunteer corps of citizens;
4. Suppression of illegal and disorderly businesses; and
5. Other affairs pertaining to public safety.

Article 18 The Department of Public Health shall have charge of the following functions: -

1. Cleaning of streets;
2. Inspection and regulation of markets, slaughter houses, public baths, restaurants, saloons, theaters, and public latrines;
3. Registration of births, deaths and marriages, and the taking of the city census;
4. Regulation of medical practitioners, drug stores, and private hospitals;
5. Prevention of contagious diseases and maintenance of quarantine stations; and



6. Other affairs pertaining to public health.

Article 19 The Bureau of Public Utilities shall have charge of the following functions: -

1. Management and regulation of tramways, gas, electricity and telephone services;
2. Acquisition and control of all public utilities now under private ownership;
3. Regulation of motor cars, rickshaws, sedan chairs, ferry boats and other public means of communication; and
4. Other affairs pertaining to public utilities.

Article 20 The Bureau of Education shall have charge of the following functions: -

1. Supervision and maintenance of public schools and reformatory institutions;
2. Inspection and regulation of private schools;
3. Regulation of theaters and places of public amusement;
4. Promotion and supervision of public and private charities;
5. Other affairs pertaining to public education.

Article 21 All rules and regulations governing the organization and working of the various bureaus shall be made by the Municipal Executive Council.

Article 22 There shall be two private secretaries under the Mayor.

Article 23 There shall be a Secretariat of General Affairs under the Mayor.

Article 24 The Secretariat of General Affairs shall have charge of the following functions: -

1. Official correspondence and archives;
2. Editing of the Municipal Gazette and taking charge of other printing matters;
3. Recording of other official documents; and
4. Other affairs not designated to any other bureau.

Article 25 All rules and regulations governing the Secretariat of General Affairs shall be decided by the Mayor.

Article 26 The salaries for the high executive officers shall be as follows: -

1. Mayor, \$500 per month;
2. Head of each bureau, \$400 per month;
3. Salaries for other officers and employees shall be decided by the Municipal Executive Council.

Chapter IV The Municipal Assembly

Article 27 The Municipal Assembly shall represent the people of the city as an advisory body of the Municipal Executive Council.

Article 28 The Municipal Assembly shall have the following powers: -

1. To submit to the Municipal Executive Council petitions presented by the citizens;
2. To decide matters submitted by the Municipal Executive Council; and
3. To examine the work of the different bureaus.

Article 29 Any dispute or disputes occurring between the Municipal Executive Council and the Municipal Assembly shall be decided by the Governor.

Article 30 The Municipal Assembly shall consist of the following three kinds of members: -

1. Ten members to be appointed by the Governor;
2. Ten members to be elected by the people of the city; and
3. Three representatives to be elected by the merchant class, three by the labor class, one by the teaching profession, one by the legal profession, one by the medical profession and one by the engineering profession.



Article 31 The terms of office of the members of the Municipal Assembly shall be one year, and they may be re-elected without restriction to number of terms.

Article 32 The first Municipal Assembly shall be organized within three months after the promulgation and enforcement of these Provisional Regulations.

Article 33 Members of the Municipal Assembly shall not be allowed to hold any administrative offices in the Municipal Government.

Article 34 In case of vacancy in the Municipal Assembly caused by the disability of a member to discharge his duties, a new member shall be elected to fill the post.

Article 35 The Chairman of the Municipal Assembly shall be elected by its own members.

Article 36 All rules and regulations governing the meetings of the Municipal Assembly shall be made by the Assembly itself.

Article 37 The Municipal Assembly shall hold its regular meetings at least once a month, and special meetings may be called by the Chairman upon the request of the members.

Article 38 The annual allowance for each member of the Municipal Assembly shall be \$500 to be paid by the Bureau of Finance of the city.

Chapter V City Elections

Article 39 The elections for the Municipal Assembly shall take place once a year.

Article 40 Any citizen of the age of 21 and with the following qualifications shall have the right to vote and to be elected: -

1. Residence in the city of Guangzhou for at least one year;
2. Legitimate occupation;
3. Ability to read the Provisional Regulations;
4. Mentally sane; and
5. In full possession of civil rights.

Article 41 The city elections shall be conducted and supervised by an Election Commission.

The Election Commission shall consist of five members to be appointed by the Governor. The rules and regulations governing the organization of the Commission shall be especially provided.


Article 42 Rules governing the city elections shall be made by the Election Commission.

Article 43 The first category of members of the Municipal Assembly appointed by the Governor shall be replaced each year by two elected members, so that after the end of five years the ten appointed members shall be fully replaced by elected members.

Article 44 The annual city elections shall take place one month before the expiration of the term of the elected members.

Article 45 The third category of members shall be elected in the following manner: -

1. The three members representing the merchant class shall be elected by the Chamber of Commerce;
2. The three members representing the labor class shall be elected by various labor organizations jointly;
3. The one member representing the teaching profession shall be elected by the



- Educational Association;
4. The one member representing the legal profession shall be elected by the Lawyers' Association;
 5. The one member representing the medical professional shall be elected by the Medical Association; and
 6. The one member representing the engineering profession shall be elected by the Engineering Association.

Chapter VI City Finances

Article 46 The Municipal Executive Council shall have the power to levy and collect the following taxes and fees: -

1. Rent Tax;
2. Business and corporation tax;
3. Warfare due;
4. Boat license;
5. Vehicle license; and
6. Other taxes and impositions especially authorized by the Provincial Government.

Article 47 The Municipal Executive Council shall have the power to issue city bonds, the amount of which shall be determined by the Governor.

Article 48 The monthly accounts of the receipts and disbursements of municipal funds shall be made public by the Municipal Executive Council and audited by the Municipal Assembly.

Article 49 The Provincial Government shall subsidize the Municipal Government in case of shortage of revenues caused by political disturbance or extraordinary distress.

Chapter VII Office of Audit

Article 50 There shall be an Office of Audit to audit the accounts of the Municipal Government.

Article 51 The Chief Auditor under these Provisional Regulations shall be appointed by the Governor for a term of one year, and may be re-appointed. The Chief Auditor shall possess a special knowledge of accountancy or equivalent qualification. The salary of the Chief Auditor shall be \$400 per month.

Article 52 The Office of Auditor shall have charge of the following functions: -

1. To audit the monthly accounts of the city finances and to examine all vouchers;
2. To examine all contracts and agreements pertaining to financial affairs;
3. To suggest reforms for the accounting system; and
4. To compile annual reports to be submitted to the Governor;

Article 53 Any dispute between the Municipal Executive Council and the Office of Audit shall be decided by the Governor.


Article 54 The Chief Auditor, upon the request of either the Municipal Executive Council or the Municipal Assembly, may attend the meetings of the Executive Council or Municipal Assembly respectively, but shall have no power to vote.

Article 55 All rules and regulations governing the Office of Audit shall be especially provided.


Chapter VIII Supplementary Articles

Article 56 These Provisional Regulations shall be promulgated and enforced by the Governor.

Article 57 After these Provisional Regulations have been in effect for five years, the Governor may



appoint a Revision Committee to draft new regulations and submit the revised regulations to the Provincial Assembly for final approval and adoption.



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Interview

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