

# Dynamic Models of Underground Storage Tank Management: Theory, Estimation, and Welfare Analysis

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# 1 Introduction

This document establishes the theoretical and empirical framework for analyzing Underground Storage Tank (UST) facility management decisions under heterogeneous insurance regimes. The analysis proceeds through four integrated components. First, a pedagogical two-state dynamic model illustrates how insurance contract design affects retrofit and exit incentives through premium structure, deductible policy, and risk internalization (Section 2). Second, formal specification of two structural estimation models is developed, with Model A presenting the full state space with age, wall type, and regime dimensions to estimate retrofit cost  $\phi$  and exit value  $\kappa$ , while Model B employs a binary optimal stopping framework focusing on tank closure decisions to address identification constraints discovered in Model A (Section 3). Third, first-best versus second-best welfare analysis, insurance contract theory, and welfare ranking derivation demonstrate conditions under which risk-based pricing may or may not dominate flat-fee pooling (Section 4). Fourth, Monte Carlo evidence on parameter identification, NPL estimation strategy, and counterfactual policy simulations provide empirical validation (Section 5).

The key empirical insight is that Model A fails to identify the exit parameter  $\kappa$  due to insufficient variation in continuation values, while the retrofit cost parameter  $\phi$  is tightly identified. Model B resolves this through a simplified binary choice structure that focuses on the observable margin of tank closure rather than unobservable firm exit.

## 2 Toy Dynamic Model: Retrofit Incentives Under Alternative Insurance Contracts

### 2.1 Model Overview

#### Motivation and Economic Tensions.

I construct a simplified theoretical model to illustrate the economic trade-offs faced by underground storage tank (UST) owners regarding scrappage, upgrades, and continued operation under varying insurance regimes. These decisions are crucial because tank leakage generates significant negative externalities with costly consequences. By distilling the firm's decision-making into an analytically tractable framework, the model yields precise, testable predictions regarding optimal upgrade and exit behaviors, thus providing a clear foundation for subsequent empirical and welfare analyses.

### Market Structure and Agent Heterogeneity.

The market consists of firms that each operate a single UST, primarily for gasoline storage and distribution. Each firm is characterized by a fixed type  $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ , capturing heterogeneous features such as location-specific hydrology, enforcement intensity, and managerial quality. At the beginning of each period  $t$ , a firm's tank is characterized by two observable state variables: the tank's **age**,  $a_t \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ , and the **technology indicator**,  $\text{tech}_t \in \{\text{SW}, \text{DW}\}$ , indicating whether the tank is single-wall (SW) or double-wall (DW). The technology state irreversibly transitions from SW to DW upon upgrading. Thus, the firm's complete observable state vector at period  $t$  is  $s_t = (a_t, \text{tech}_t, z)$ .

## 2.2 Decision Problem

In each discrete period, firms choose one of three irreversible actions. They may continue operating the current tank, upgrade to a safer double-wall tank, or exit the market entirely. Continuing operation allows the firm to earn per-period revenue  $R$ , subject to leak risks and insurance costs. Upgrading involves paying a one-time retrofit cost  $c_U$ , after which the tank is replaced with a double-wall model, resetting its age to zero in the subsequent period. Exiting requires paying a one-time scrap cost  $k$ , after which the firm permanently ceases operations and incurs no further costs or revenues.

State variables evolve deterministically, conditional on chosen actions. If the firm continues operation, the tank's age increments by one period, such that  $a_{t+1} = a_t + 1$  and  $\text{tech}_{t+1} = \text{tech}_t$ . If the firm upgrades, the technology state transitions to double-wall and the tank age resets:  $(a_{t+1}, \text{tech}_{t+1}) = (0, \text{DW})$ . If the firm exits, it transitions permanently out of the market, and there are no future states.

## 2.3 Insurance Regimes and Premium Schedules

Operational cash flows depend on the state  $(a_t, \text{tech}_t, z)$  solely through leak risk and insurance premiums; upstream product prices are taken as given. Under insurance regime  $J \in \{F, S, R\}$ , the premium schedules are defined explicitly. The flat-fee regime (F) sets uniform premium  $p_{\text{SW}}^F(a) = p_{\text{DW}}^F(a) \equiv p^F$  independent of age or technology. The self-insurance regime (S) requires actuarially fair premiums equal to expected loss:  $p_{\text{tech}}^S(a) = y_{\text{tech}}(a)L$ , where  $L$  denotes monetary damages from a leak. The risk-rated private insurance regime (R) adds administrative loading to actuarial

premiums:  $p_{\text{tech}}^R(a) = (1 + \lambda) y_{\text{tech}}(a)L$ , where  $\lambda > 0$  captures loading in private insurance markets.

### 2.3.1 Deductible Structure

Each regime features distinct deductible policies that affect the firm's internalization of leak costs. The deductible  $D_J$  represents the out-of-pocket cost the facility pays per leak under regime  $J$ . Flat-fee pooling imposes low deductibles  $D_F = 0.1L$ , minimizing private exposure. Self-insurance requires full cost exposure with  $D_S = L$ , maximizing incentives for prevention. Risk-rated insurance balances these extremes with moderate deductibles  $D_R = 0.25L$ . Higher deductibles increase the private cost of leaks, strengthening incentives for prevention and early exit.

## 2.4 Risk and Its Determinants

Let  $y_{\text{tech}}(a | z)$  represent the one-period probability that a tank of age  $a$  and type  $z$  experiences a leak. The model imposes two empirically grounded assumptions on leak probabilities. For single-wall tanks, leak risk follows  $y_{\text{SW}}(a | z) = \theta(z) \ell(a)$  with  $\ell'(a) > 0$ , implying monotonic increase with age. For double-wall tanks, leak risk exhibits substantial reduction:  $y_{\text{DW}}(a | z) = \kappa y_{\text{SW}}(0 | z)$  with  $0 < \kappa \ll 1$  for all ages and types, reflecting proportional and largely age-independent risk reduction.

Thus, leak risk increases monotonically with tank age for single-wall technology, while double-wall tanks yield a proportional and largely age-independent risk reduction. The firm's expected leak cost in period  $t$  given the state  $s_t$  is therefore:

$$\ell_t = y_{\text{tech}_t}(a_t | z) \times D_J$$

Because upgrading resets the state to  $(0, \text{DW})$ , this action immediately lowers both leak risk and associated premiums (under regimes S and R). Exiting permanently eliminates leak risk and insurance costs. Therefore, the design of insurance directly influences how much of the expected leak costs firms internalize, shaping their optimal operational decisions.

## 2.5 Objective Function and Bellman Equations

Firms choose actions to maximize their expected discounted stream of profits. Given state  $s_t = (a_t, \text{tech}_t, z)$ , the firm solves the following infinite-horizon dynamic optimization problem:

$$\max_{u_t \in \{C, U, X\}} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi(s_t, u_t; J) \right], \quad 0 < \beta < 1$$

where the per-period profit function is given by:

$$\pi(s_t, u_t; J) = \begin{cases} R - p_{\text{SW}}^J(a_t) - y_{\text{SW}}(a_t)D_J & \text{if } u_t = C \text{ and tech}_t = \text{SW} \\ R - p_{\text{DW}}^J(a_t) - y_{\text{DW}}(a_t)D_J & \text{if } u_t = C \text{ and tech}_t = \text{DW} \\ R - p_{\text{DW}}^J(0) - y_{\text{DW}}(0)D_J - c_U & \text{if } u_t = U \\ -k & \text{if } u_t = X \end{cases}$$

To maintain tractability, the model assumes constant per-period revenues, no capital-market frictions, and single-tank operations. These simplifications are relaxed in subsequent empirical modeling. The firm's dynamic optimization problem is described by the following Bellman equations, defining value functions  $W_J^{\text{tech}}(a)$  under regime  $J$ :

**For single-wall tanks:**

$$W_J^{\text{SW}}(a) = \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} R - p_{\text{SW}}^J(a) - y_{\text{SW}}(a)D_J + \beta W_J^{\text{SW}}(a+1) \\ R - p_{\text{DW}}^J(0) - y_{\text{DW}}(0)D_J - c_U + \beta W_J^{\text{DW}}(1) \\ -k \end{array} \right\}$$

**For double-wall tanks:**

$$W_J^{\text{DW}}(a) = \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} R - p_{\text{DW}}^J(a) - y_{\text{DW}}(a)D_J + \beta W_J^{\text{DW}}(a+1) \\ -k \end{array} \right\}$$

## 2.6 Solution and Optimal Stopping Conditions

Solving the Bellman equations yields two tank-age thresholds that fully characterize optimal behavior under each insurance regime  $J$ . The **upgrade threshold**  $a_J^*$  is the earliest age at which retrofitting maximizes the firm's value, whereas the **exit threshold**  $a_J^\ddagger$ , which is weakly greater than  $a_J^*$  in profitable states, is the earliest age at which permanent exit becomes optimal. A firm continues operation while  $a_t < a_J^*$ , upgrades for  $a_J^* \leq a_t < a_J^\ddagger$ , and exits once  $a_t \geq a_J^\ddagger$ . These

thresholds follow from two concise optimality conditions.

### **Upgrade condition:**

A firm upgrades at age  $a$  whenever the one-time retrofit cost is outweighed by the aggregate benefit of upgrading:

$$c_U \leq \underbrace{p_{\text{SW}}^J(a) - p_{\text{DW}}^J(0)}_{\text{Premium savings } (\Delta p^J)} + \underbrace{[y_{\text{SW}}(a) - y_{\text{DW}}(0)]D_J}_{\text{Avoided deductible cost } (\Delta d^J)} + \underbrace{\beta[W_J^{\text{SW}}(a+1) - W_J^{\text{DW}}(1)]}_{\text{Waiting option } (\Delta o^J)}$$

### **Exit condition:**

A firm exits when the continuation value of the single-wall tank falls below the scrap cost:

$$W_J^{\text{SW}}(a) \leq -k \iff R - p_{\text{SW}}^J(a) - y_{\text{SW}}(a)D_J + \beta W_J^{\text{SW}}(a+1) \leq -k$$

Because leak probabilities converge to one as tanks age, every firm eventually satisfies either condition above, ensuring finite stopping ages.

## **2.7 Policy Implications: Comparative Statics Across Regimes**

This model addresses how alternative insurance regimes (flat-fee pooling ( $F$ ), full self-insurance ( $S$ ), and risk-rated private insurance ( $R$ )) affect optimal firm behavior and, by extension, social welfare through the pollution externalities generated by leaking tanks. The upgrade inequality decomposes the private benefit from replacement into three components: the premium differential  $\Delta p^J$ , the avoided deductible cost  $\Delta d^J$ , and the waiting option  $\Delta o^J$ . Contract design alters these three terms in systematic ways that yield a strict ranking of replacement ages.

Under flat-fee pooling, the premium component vanishes ( $\Delta p^F(a) = 0$ ), and the deductible component is small because  $D_F$  is low, so the waiting option dominates until the tank is very old; the replacement age is therefore highest,  $a_F^*$ . Under self-insurance, the premium term equals the fall in actuarially fair losses and rises steeply with age, while the deductible term is maximal ( $D_S = L$ ). These forces outweigh the waiting option much sooner, yielding an intermediate replacement age,  $a_S^*$ . Under risk-rated insurance, both  $\Delta p^R(a)$  and  $\Delta d^R(a)$  are large due to the loading factor and moderate deductible; the waiting option collapses fastest, giving the earliest replacement age,  $a_R^*$ . An analogous ordering applies to exit ages because greater risk internalization accelerates the decline in continuation value.

Because leak damages rise sharply and non-linearly with tank age, earlier upgrades compress the right tail of the age distribution and reduce high-severity leaks. Hence the ranking  $a_R^* < a_S^* < a_F^*$  maps directly into a welfare ranking of insurance regimes, with risk-rating performing best, self-insurance next, and flat-fee pooling worst. These analytic comparisons of conditions (U) and (X) across contracts underpin the theoretical predictions set out at the end of the section.

**Proposition 1** (Insurance Contract Ranking). *Under the maintained assumptions and assuming sufficient behavioral elasticity, the optimal upgrade and exit ages satisfy:*

$$a_R^* < a_S^* < a_F^* \quad \text{and} \quad a_R^\ddagger < a_S^\ddagger < a_F^\ddagger$$

with strict welfare ordering  $W^{SOC} > W^R > W^S > W^F$  where  $W^{SOC}$  denotes the social optimum incorporating external damages  $H(a)$ .

**Proof sketch:** The result follows directly from the upgrade condition decomposition. Risk-rated premiums create the largest  $\Delta p^R(a)$  through loading factor  $(1 + \lambda)$  and age-varying base rate, while maintaining positive deductible  $D_R = 0.25L$  that provides strongest prevention incentive among feasible policies. Self-insurance maximizes internalization ( $D_S = L$ ) but lacks premium gradient since facilities bear full expected loss regardless. Flat-fee eliminates both premium gradient ( $\Delta p^F = 0$ ) and reduces deductible ( $D_F = 0.1L$ ).  $\square$

### 2.7.1 Numerical Illustration




Figure 1: Equivalent Benefit of Upgrading Across Insurance Regimes




Figure 2: Equivalent Benefit of Upgrading Across Insurance Regimes

Table 1: Optimal Upgrade Ages by Insurance Regime

Insurance Regime	Optimal Upgrade Age
Flat-Fee Pooling	Never
Self-Insurance	Never
Risk-Rated Private	Never
Social Optimum	79 years

**Interpretation:** Figure 1 shows the equivalent benefit curves  $B(a)$  for all regimes. The vertical distance between each curve and the dashed retrofit cost line represents the net benefit of upgrading at each age. Risk-rated insurance (**blue**) creates the largest private benefits at younger ages, inducing retrofit at NA years. Self-insurance (**green**) yields intermediate timing at NA years. Flat-fee pooling (**purple**) delays retrofit until NA years due to minimal private internalization. The social optimum (**red**) occurs even earlier at 79 years, reflecting external damages not captured by private contracts.

### 2.7.2 Chunk 2: Figure 3 (The Exit Wedge)

This visualizes the “Extensive Margin” tension. The shaded region highlights high-risk tanks that *should* exit but stay active under Flat-Fee.




Figure 3: The ‘Zombie Tank’ Wedge: Private Incentives vs. Social DWL

==== SOC PURE CONTINUATION VALUE (Every 10 ages) ===

Ages 0-70: 809008 710447 589062 450608 298991 138174 -26808 -188648

Should be: Monotonically decreasing (no floor)

==== FLAT-FEE PURE CONTINUATION VALUE (Every 10 ages) ===

Ages 0-70: 960000 960000 960000 960000 960000 960000 960000 960000

Should be: Nearly flat (small decreases only from discounting)

==== EXIT THRESHOLDS ===

Social Optimum exits at age: 27

Risk-Rated exits at age: 55

Flat-Fee exits at age: 100

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### 2.7.3 Chunk 3: Figure 4 (Adverse Selection Map)

This visualizes the “Selection Channel” by showing how the policy sorts firms of different types ( $z$ ).




Figure 4: The Selection Channel: Optimal Exit Age by Firm Risk Type

## 2.8 Testable Hypotheses

The toy model generates three testable predictions for empirical analysis:

**Corollary 1** (Retrofit Hazard Ranking). *The instantaneous probability of retrofit for single-wall tanks satisfies:*

$$h_R^{\text{retrofit}}(a) > h_S^{\text{retrofit}}(a) > h_F^{\text{retrofit}}(a) \quad \forall a$$

**Corollary 2** (Age Distribution Effects). *The age distribution of operating single-wall tanks exhibits first-order stochastic dominance:*

$$F_R(a) > F_S(a) > F_F(a) \quad \forall a$$

where  $F_J(a) = P(\text{Age} \leq a \mid \text{Active SW tank}, J)$ .

**Corollary 3** (Leak Rate Reduction). *Expected leak rates conditional on regime satisfy:*

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{Leaks} \mid R] < \mathbb{E}[\text{Leaks} \mid S] < \mathbb{E}[\text{Leaks} \mid F]$$

through both direct prevention (retrofit) and selection (exit) channels.

These predictions are tested in `?@sec-descriptive` using difference-in-differences methodology exploiting Texas's 1999 transition from flat-fee to risk-based insurance.

## 3 Dynamic Model Catalog

This section presents two structural dynamic discrete choice models of facility-level UST management. Model A represents the full economic problem with both retrofit cost  $\phi$  and exit value  $\kappa$  parameters. Model B employs a binary optimal stopping framework focusing exclusively on tank closure decisions.

### 3.1 Model A: The Complex Model

#### 3.1.1 State Space Specification

The facility state at time  $t$  is defined as  $x_{it} = (A_{it}, w_{it}, \rho_{it}) \in \mathcal{X}$  where the state space components are:  $\mathcal{A} = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}$  representing age bins (0-5, 6-10, ..., 41-45, 46+ years),  $\mathcal{W} = \{\text{single, double}\}$  denoting wall technology, and  $\mathcal{P} = \{\text{FF, RB}\}$  representing insurance regime (flat-fee versus risk-based). The complete state space contains  $|\mathcal{X}| = 9 \times 2 \times 2 = 36$  transient states plus one absorbing exit state, yielding 37 total states. The flat-fee regime corresponds to state assurance funds with uniform premium independent of facility characteristics, typically featuring low deductibles and generous coverage limits. The risk-based regime represents private insurance markets with age- and technology-varying premiums, featuring moderate deductibles and loading factors.

#### 3.1.2 Action Space

At each period, facilities choose from three mutually exclusive actions:  $d_{it} \in \mathcal{D}(x_{it}) = \{\text{maintain, exit, retrofit}\}$ . The maintain action ( $d = 1$ ) continues operating the current tank configuration, with the tank aging probabilistically according to a stochastic aging process described below. The exit action ( $d = 2$ ) permanently ceases operations, pays exit cost  $\kappa$ , and transitions to the absorbing exit state; this action is feasible from all states. The retrofit action ( $d = 3$ ) upgrades single-wall tanks to double-wall technology, incurs one-time cost  $\phi$ , resets age to bin 1, and preserves the current regime; this action is feasible only for single-wall states. Feasibility constraints are defined such that  $\mathcal{D}(x) = \{\text{maintain, exit, retrofit}\}$  if  $w = \text{single}$  and  $A < 9$ , while  $\mathcal{D}(x) = \{\text{maintain, exit}\}$  if  $w = \text{double}$ , and  $\mathcal{D}(x) = \{\text{maintain}\}$  if  $w = \text{single}$  and  $A = 9$  (absorbing bin).

### 3.1.3 State Transition Dynamics

Facilities age probabilistically rather than deterministically. In each period, a facility in age bin  $A$  either remains in current bin  $A$  with probability  $p_{\text{stay}}(A)$  or advances to bin  $A + 1$  with probability  $p_{\text{up}}(A) = 1 - p_{\text{stay}}(A)$ . This captures heterogeneity in tank deterioration rates and avoids unrealistic deterministic age progression. The transition matrix  $\Pi(A, A')$  is estimated non-parametrically from the empirical distribution of age transitions observed in the facility-month panel data. For the maintain action, the transition probability is defined as  $P(x' | x, d = \text{maintain}) = p_{\text{stay}}(A)$  if  $x' = (A, w, \rho)$  and  $P(x' | x, d = \text{maintain}) = p_{\text{up}}(A)$  if  $x' = (A + 1, w, \rho)$  with  $A < 9$ , and zero otherwise. For the exit action,  $P(x' | x, d = \text{exit}) = \mathbb{1}[x' = \text{absorbing exit state}]$ . For the retrofit action,  $P(x' | x, d = \text{retrofit}) = \mathbb{1}[x' = (1, \text{double}, \rho)]$ , preserving the facility's current insurance regime through the transition.

### 3.1.4 Flow Utilities

The per-period utility from action  $d$  in state  $x$  is specified as  $u(x, d; \theta) = \psi(x) - p(x) - h(x)\ell(x) + \varepsilon_{\text{maintain}}$  if  $d = \text{maintain}$ ,  $u(x, d; \theta) = \kappa + \varepsilon_{\text{exit}}$  if  $d = \text{exit}$ , and  $u(x, d; \theta) = \psi(x') - p(x') - h(x')\ell(x') - \phi + \varepsilon_{\text{retrofit}}$  if  $d = \text{retrofit}$ , where  $\psi(x)$  represents base operational profit (normalized),  $p(x)$  denotes insurance premium (regime-specific),  $h(x)$  is the leak hazard rate (age and wall-type varying),  $\ell(x)$  is expected cleanup cost conditional on leak,  $\phi$  is retrofit cost (parameter to estimate),  $\kappa$  is exit scrap value (parameter to estimate), and  $\varepsilon_d$  follows Type I Extreme Value distribution with scale  $\sigma$ . Premium structure is estimated via a generalized linear model  $p(x; \alpha)$  using Mid-Continent Insurance rate filings for the risk-based regime and state administrative data for flat-fee regimes. Hazard and loss functions  $h(x; \beta_h)$  and  $\ell(x; \beta_\ell)$  are similarly estimated from auxiliary data using machine learning methods adapted for rare event prediction.

### 3.1.5 Value Function and Bellman Equation

The expected value function satisfies the Bellman equation:

$$V(x; \theta) = \mathbb{E}_\varepsilon \left[ \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}(x)} \left\{ u(x, d; \theta) + \beta \sum_{x'} P(x' | x, d) V(x'; \theta) + \varepsilon_d \right\} \right]$$

Under the Type I EV distributional assumption, this simplifies to:

$$V(x; \theta) = \sigma \log \left( \sum_{d \in \mathcal{D}(x)} \exp \left( \frac{v(x, d; \theta)}{\sigma} \right) \right) + \sigma \gamma_E$$

where  $v(x, d; \theta) = u(x, d; \theta) + \beta \sum_{x'} P(x' | x, d) V(x'; \theta)$  is the choice-specific value function and  $\gamma_E \approx 0.5772$  is Euler's constant.

### 3.1.6 Conditional Choice Probabilities

The probability of choosing action  $d$  given state  $x$  is:

$$P(d | x; \theta) = \frac{\exp \left( \frac{v(x, d; \theta)}{\sigma} \right)}{\sum_{d' \in \mathcal{D}(x)} \exp \left( \frac{v(x, d'; \theta)}{\sigma} \right)}$$

These choice probabilities form the basis for the Nested Pseudo-Likelihood (NPL) estimation procedure described in Section 5.

### 3.1.7 Parameter Identification

The structural parameters are  $\theta = (\phi, \kappa) \in \Theta = \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}$ . Primitives including the discount factor  $\beta$ , scale parameter  $\sigma$ , and auxiliary functions for hazard rates, premiums, and losses are either calibrated or estimated from auxiliary data sources.

**Proposition 2** (Partial Identification in Model A). *The retrofit cost parameter  $\phi$  is identified from variation in single-wall tank survival and retrofit hazard rates across age bins and regimes. However, the exit parameter  $\kappa$  is weakly identified due to limited exit variation in equilibrium.*

The intuition is that retrofit decisions create sharp variation in choices because facilities transition from maintaining old single-wall tanks to either retrofitting or exiting. The timing of this transition identifies  $\phi$  through the age at which retrofit becomes optimal. In contrast, exit decisions are rare in equilibrium because most high-risk facilities retrofit before exit becomes optimal. With limited exit observations and high collinearity between continuation value and exit value,  $\kappa$  is poorly identified. Monte Carlo evidence in Section 5.4 presents formal identification verification through Hessian eigenvalue analysis, with key findings showing that retrofit cost  $\phi$  exhibits mean eigenvalue approximately 150 with tight parameter recovery (RMSE less than 0.05), while exit value  $\kappa$  shows mean eigenvalue approximately 0.8 with highly diffuse estimates (RMSE exceeding 20), and

condition number approximately 200 indicating severe identification problems. This identification failure motivates Model B's alternative specification.

## 3.2 Model B: Binary Optimal Stopping Model

### 3.2.1 Motivation and Data Constraints

The structural identification challenges encountered in Model A stem fundamentally from data limitations regarding facility-level revenues and the unobservability of firm-level exit. Retail gasoline margins are not observable at the facility level, and administrative records often fail to distinguish permanent firm exit from temporary closures or ownership transfers. Conversely, the decision to permanently close an individual Underground Storage Tank (UST) is observed with high precision in state regulatory databases.

Model B exploits this observable margin by restricting the estimation to a binary tank closure decision, formulated as an optimal stopping problem analogous to ?. By eliminating the retrofit action—which requires unobserved revenue data to properly value the upgrade option—Model B focuses identification on parameters strictly recoverable from the closure margin.

Crucially, this specification extends the standard profit-maximization framework by decomposing the facility’s objective function. Rather than assuming risk neutrality, we introduce distinct behavioral parameters for **price sensitivity** (response to deterministic insurance premiums) and **risk internalization** (response to probabilistic environmental liabilities). This separation allows the model to test whether facility owners respond differently to immediate, salient costs versus future, stochastic risks—a distinction with profound implications for regulatory design.

### 3.2.2 State Space and Actions

Model B utilizes the identical state space as Model A:  $x_{it} = (A_{it}, w_{it}, \rho_{it}) \in \mathcal{X}$ , where  $A_{it}$  denotes tank age bin,  $w_{it}$  denotes wall technology (single vs. double), and  $\rho_{it}$  denotes the insurance regime. The state space contains  $|\mathcal{X}| = 37$  states (36 transient + 1 absorbing).

The action space is restricted to  $\mathcal{D}(x) = \{\text{maintain}, \text{close}\}$  for all non-terminal states: \* **Maintain** ( $d = 1$ ): The facility continues operating the current tank. The state evolves according to the stochastic aging process  $P(A'|A)$  described in Section 3.1.3. \* **Close** ( $d = 2$ ): The facility permanently removes the tank from service, paying a closure cost  $\kappa$ , and transitions to the absorbing closed state.

### 3.2.3 Modified Flow Utilities and Behavioral Parameters

The core theoretical innovation of Model B is the inclusion of a three-parameter vector  $\theta_B = (\kappa, \gamma_{\text{price}}, \gamma_{\text{risk}})$  that captures latent heterogeneity in cost sensitivity. The per-period flow utility is specified as:

$$u(x, d; \theta_B) = \begin{cases} \psi(x) + \gamma_{\text{price}} \cdot p(x) - \gamma_{\text{risk}} \cdot [h(x)\ell(x)] + \varepsilon_{\text{maintain}} & \text{if } d = \text{maintain} \\ \kappa + \varepsilon_{\text{close}} & \text{if } d = \text{close} \end{cases}$$

**1. Premium Sensitivity ( $\gamma_{\text{price}}$ ):** This parameter captures the marginal utility of insurance premium payments. In a standard neoclassical model,  $\gamma_{\text{price}} = -1$ . \* Estimates of  $\gamma_{\text{price}} < -1$  indicate **premium hypersensitivity**, suggesting that explicit, monthly insurance bills are more salient to owners than implicit costs, or that facilities face liquidity constraints that make cash outflows particularly painful. \* Estimates where  $-1 < \gamma_{\text{price}} < 0$  would suggest **inattention**, where owners partially disregard fixed costs in their closure decisions.

**2. Risk Internalization ( $\gamma_{\text{risk}}$ ):** This parameter measures the degree to which the facility internalizes the expected environmental loss, defined as the product of leak hazard  $h(x)$  and cleanup cost  $\ell(x)$ . \* A value of  $\gamma_{\text{risk}} = 1$  implies full risk neutrality and perfect internalization (within the limits of the deductible). \* A value of  $\gamma_{\text{risk}} < 1$  indicates **risk myopia** or **undervaluation**, where facilities discount low-probability, high-severity events more heavily than actuarial models predicts. \* This parameter is critical for policy: if  $\gamma_{\text{risk}}$  is low, liability-based regulations (which rely on the threat of future costs) will be less effective than ex-ante pricing mechanisms (which rely on  $\gamma_{\text{price}}$ ).

**3. Closure Value ( $\kappa$ ):** The parameter  $\kappa$  represents the net lump-sum value of exiting the market. This structural parameter aggregates the scrap value of the tank, the opportunity cost of the land, and the avoidance of future fixed overhead, net of decommissioning costs.

### 3.2.4 Parameter Vector and Estimation

The structural parameter vector to be estimated is  $\theta_B = (\kappa, \gamma_{\text{price}}, \gamma_{\text{risk}}) \in \mathbb{R}^3$ . The discount factor  $\beta$  and scale parameter  $\sigma$  are calibrated as in Model A. The auxiliary functions—premium schedule  $p(x)$ , hazard rate  $h(x)$ , and expected loss  $\ell(x)$ —are estimated in a first stage from the auxiliary data sources detailed in Section 5.

### 3.2.5 Identification Strategy for Model B

A central advantage of Model B is its transparent identification argument. The three parameters are jointly identified by exploiting orthogonal sources of variation in the data.

**Proposition 3** (Joint Identification of Behavioral Parameters). *The parameters  $(\kappa, \gamma_{price}, \gamma_{risk})$  are identified from the conditional closure probabilities  $P(d = close | A, w, \rho)$  as follows:*

1.  $\kappa$  (Intercept): *Identified by the average closure rate across all states.*
2.  $\gamma_{price}$  (Policy Variation): *Identified by the differential closure response to the exogenous premium shock in Texas (Flat-Fee vs. Risk-Based regimes).*
3.  $\gamma_{risk}$  (Physical Variation): *Identified by the slope of the closure hazard with respect to tank age, controlling for premiums.*

**Proof Sketch:** Consider the difference in latent utility between maintaining and closing,  $\Delta v(x) = v(x, \text{maintain}) - \kappa$ . The closure probability is strictly decreasing in  $\Delta v(x)$ .

1. **Identification of  $\gamma_{price}$ :** Consider two facilities with identical physical characteristics (same age  $A$ , same technology  $w$ ) but operating under different insurance regimes  $\rho_1$  (Flat-Fee) and  $\rho_2$  (Risk-Based). The physical risk term  $\gamma_{risk}h(x)\ell(x)$  cancels out in the difference. The difference in their continuation values is driven primarily by the premium differential:  $\gamma_{price}[p(A, \rho_1) - p(A, \rho_2)]$ . Since the premium shock is observed and exogenous, the magnitude of the shift in closure probability across the regime boundary pins down  $\gamma_{price}$ .
2. **Identification of  $\gamma_{risk}$ :** Consider facilities within a single regime. As tanks age, the physical leak hazard  $h(A)$  increases non-linearly (convexly). While premiums may also rise with age, the premium schedule  $p(A)$  is a deterministic function. The parameter  $\gamma_{risk}$  is identified by the “excess” closure rate among older tanks that cannot be explained by the premium increase alone. If facilities are myopic ( $\gamma_{risk} \approx 0$ ), closure rates will track the premium schedule. If facilities internalize risk ( $\gamma_{risk} > 0$ ), closure rates will accelerate non-linearly with age, matching the shape of the hazard function  $h(A)$ .
3. **Identification of  $\kappa$ :** With the sensitivities  $\gamma_{price}$  and  $\gamma_{risk}$  fixed, the overall level of the closure curve determines  $\kappa$ . A higher scrap value shifts the optimal stopping threshold to earlier ages uniformly across all states.  $\square$

### 3.2.6 Bellman Equation and CCPs

The Bellman equation for Model B follows the standard binary logit form:

$$V_B(x; \theta_B) = \sigma \log \left( \exp \left( \frac{v_B(x, \text{maintain}; \theta_B)}{\sigma} \right) + \exp \left( \frac{v_B(x, \text{close}; \theta_B)}{\sigma} \right) \right) + \sigma \gamma_E$$

Where the choice-specific value functions are:

$$v_B(x, \text{maintain}; \theta_B) = \psi(x) + \gamma_{\text{price}} p(x) - \gamma_{\text{risk}} h(x) \ell(x) + \beta \sum_{x'} P(x' | x, \text{maintain}) V_B(x'; \theta_B)$$

$$v_B(x, \text{close}; \theta_B) = \kappa$$

The conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) used in the NPL estimation are:

$$P_B(\text{close} | x; \theta_B) = \frac{\exp(\kappa/\sigma)}{\exp(v_B(x, \text{maintain}; \theta_B)/\sigma) + \exp(\kappa/\sigma)}$$

### 3.2.7 Advantages of Model B

Model B provides a robust and computationally efficient framework for analyzing the extensive margin of UST management.

1. **Robust Identification:** By decoupling price and risk sensitivities, the model leverages the specific structure of the data—where policy variation and physical aging are distinct—to recover parameters with high precision. Monte Carlo experiments confirm condition numbers < 50.
2. **Behavioral Insight:** The split between  $\gamma_{\text{price}}$  and  $\gamma_{\text{risk}}$  allows us to explicitly test for “salience effects” and “moral hazard.” Finding that  $|\gamma_{\text{price}}| > \gamma_{\text{risk}}$  would suggest that explicit price signals are more effective policy tools than liability threats.
3. **Data Fidelity:** The model relies solely on high-quality administrative data regarding tank closures, avoiding reliance on noisy or imputed revenue data.
4. **Computational Efficiency:** With a binary action space, the computational burden of the NPL algorithm is significantly reduced, facilitating extensive counterfactual analysis.

### **3.2.8 Limitations**

The primary limitation of Model B is the exclusion of the retrofit action. Without explicitly modeling the upgrade decision, we cannot directly simulate the impact of retrofit subsidies. However, for the primary research questions—regarding the efficiency of insurance pricing and the timing of facility exit—Model B provides the most credible structural estimates. The parameters recovered here ( $\gamma_{\text{price}}, \gamma_{\text{risk}}$ ) can be interpreted as “reduced-form structural” parameters that implicitly account for the option value of retrofitting in the continuation value.

### 3.3 Model Comparison and Selection

?@tbl-model-comparison summarizes key differences between the specifications.

Table 2: Comparison of Model A and Model B Specifications

Feature	Model A	Model B
<b>State Space</b>	37 states (9 age $\times$ 2 wall $\times$ 2 regime + exit)	37 states (identical to Model A)
<b>Dimension</b>	Maintain, Exit, Retrofit	Maintain, Close
<b>Parameters</b>	$\phi, \kappa$	$\kappa, \gamma_{\text{price}}, \gamma_{\text{risk}}$
<b>Estimated</b>		
<b>Parameters</b>	$\beta, \sigma$	$\beta, \sigma$
<b>Calibrated</b>		
<b>Retrofit Cost <math>\phi</math></b>	Yes (eigenvalue $\approx 150$ )	N/A (action removed)
<b>Identified?</b>		
<b>Exit Value <math>\kappa</math></b>	No (eigenvalue $\approx 0.8$ )	Yes (binary stopping identifies)
<b>Identified?</b>		
<b>Behavioral Parameters?</b>	No (Implicitly fixed at -1)	Yes (Separates Price vs. Risk sensitivity)
<b>Hessian Condition</b>	$\approx 200$ (poor)	$< 50$ (good)
<b>Number</b>		
<b>Primary Use Case</b>	Illustrates identification failure	Preferred for closure and pricing analysis
<b>Limitation</b>	$\kappa$ unidentified, flat likelihood	Cannot analyze retrofit policies

Recommendation: Model B is selected for the primary empirical analysis. While Model A is theoretically more general, the data do not support the simultaneous identification of exit and retrofit parameters. Model B's focus on the observable closure margin, combined with its richer behavioral specification ( $\gamma_{\text{price}}$  vs  $\gamma_{\text{risk}}$ ), provides the robust foundation necessary for credible counterfactual policy analysis.

## 4 Welfare Analysis and Policy Design

### 4.1 Policy Objective and Constraints

The social planner seeks to minimize total social costs from UST operations:

$$\min_{\{d_{it}\}} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \{ D(a_{it}, w_{it}) + C(N_{it}, w_{it}) + \phi(N_{it}) \mathbb{1}[\text{retrofit}_{it}] + \kappa \mathbb{1}[\text{exit}_{it}] \} \right]$$

where environmental damage decomposes as:

$$D(a, w) = \lambda(a, w) \times [L + H(a, w)]$$

with  $\lambda(a, w)$  being leak hazard,  $L$  private cleanup cost, and  $H(a, w)$  external damages (health costs, property devaluation, ecosystem harm).

#### 4.1.1 First-Best Solution

Under complete information, the planner observes facility-specific leak hazards  $\lambda_i(a, w)$  and imposes differentiated instruments:

**Proposition 4** (First-Best Policy). *For each facility  $i$  at time  $t$ , the optimal decision rule satisfies:*

$$d_{it}^{FB} = \arg \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}(x_{it})} \{ u^{SOC}(x_{it}, d) + \beta \mathbb{E}[V^{SOC}(x_{it+1}) | x_{it}, d] \}$$

where social flow utility incorporates external damages:

$$u^{SOC}(x, d) = R - C - P - \lambda(x)[L + H(x)] - \text{action costs}$$

This yields facility-specific retrofit ages ( $a_i^{FB,R}$ ) and exit ages ( $a_i^{FB,X}$ ) balancing operational benefits against rising environmental damages.

#### 4.1.2 Why First-Best is Unattainable

Three fundamental constraints prevent first-best implementation. Information asymmetry prevents the planner from observing facility-specific leak hazards  $\lambda_i$ , maintenance quality, or other private information affecting risk; while observables  $(A, w, \rho)$  provide signals, substantial heterogeneity

remains unobservable. Limited instruments constrain policy design; federal regulations (RCRA Subtitle I) set uniform technology standards but cannot impose facility-specific pricing, with state-level insurance design providing the primary policy lever. Political economy considerations create additional binding constraints; facility-specific taxes or performance bonds face political opposition, and the UST industry consists largely of small retailers with limited bonding capacity, creating distributional concerns.

These constraints force analysis into the second-best: designing policies using observable characteristics that induce facilities to reveal types through choices.

## 4.2 Second-Best Policy Space: Insurance Contract Design

### 4.2.1 Available Instruments

When heterogeneous risk is privately observed, the planner chooses from several instruments. Technology standards mandate double-wall tanks, leak detection, and corrosion protection, guaranteeing minimum risk reduction but imposing uniform costs. Uniform environmental pricing imposes flat fees or per-tank charges independent of risk, offering simple administration but failing to target high-risk facilities. Ex-post liability enforces strict liability for cleanup with imperfect enforcement, effective only for facilities with sufficient assets while creating judgment-proof problems. Financial responsibility requirements demand coverage demonstration through insurance, bonding, or self-insurance, allowing risk-based pricing if private markets can observe and price risk.

Federal RCRA regulations mandate financial responsibility (\$1M per occurrence), creating variation in contract design as primary policy instrument.

### 4.2.2 Empirical Contract Types

Flat-fee public insurance (state funds) features uniform premium  $P_F = \bar{P}$  across facilities, low deductible  $D_F \approx \$10,000$ , high limit  $L_F = \$1M$ , financing through pooled premiums plus state subsidies, with prevalence in 18 states that retained flat-fee funds throughout sample period. Risk-based private insurance employs premium  $P_R(A, w) = (1 + \lambda)\lambda(A, w)L$  incorporating actuarial rates plus loading, moderate deductible  $D_R \approx \$25,000$ , standard limits, private market financing with underwriting, prevalent in Texas (post-1999), Florida, Iowa, and Michigan. Self-insurance requires zero premium  $P_S = 0$  with facilities bearing all costs, full deductible  $D_S = L$ , financial tests or bonding requirements, prevalent among large retailers and integrated oil companies.

### 4.2.3 Contract Theory Setup

Consider facility facing annual leak hazard  $\lambda_i(A, w)$  with cleanup cost  $L$ . Facility observes  $(\theta_i, X_i)$  where  $\theta_i$  is unobserved type, insurer observes only  $X_i = (A, w)$ .

True hazard:  $\lambda_i = \lambda(X_i, \theta_i)$

Contract design problem: Choose premium schedule  $P(X)$  and coverage terms  $(D, L)$  balancing risk classification efficiency (using  $X$  to proxy for  $\theta$ ), administrative and implementation costs, and incentives for prevention and efficient exit.

Under adverse selection, high- $\theta_i$  (worse risk) facilities have greater willingness to pay. Under moral hazard, facilities reduce maintenance when insulated from costs.

## 4.3 Welfare Ranking: Theory

### 4.3.1 Comparative Welfare Analysis

Define present-value welfare difference from transitioning representative facility from flat-fee (F) to risk-based (R) insurance:

$$\Delta W_{R|F} = \int_0^\infty \beta^t \{ \lambda^F(t)[L + H(t)] - \lambda^R(t)[L + H(t)] + [P^R(t) - P^F] + \Delta AC_t \} dt$$

where  $\lambda^J(t)$  represents leak hazard under regime  $J$  at facility age  $t$ ,  $L + H(t)$  is total social cost per leak,  $P^J(t)$  is premium under regime  $J$ , and  $\Delta AC_t$  represents additional administrative costs of risk-based system.

Risk-based pricing improves welfare if and only if environmental benefit  $\Delta E[\lambda] \times [L + H]$  exceeds the sum of administrative cost  $\Delta AC$  and distortion cost  $\Delta P \times DWL$ , where  $\Delta E[\lambda] = E[\lambda^F] - E[\lambda^R]$  measures leak rate reduction,  $\Delta AC$  captures extra underwriting, monitoring, and enforcement costs,  $\Delta P = P^R - P^F$  is average premium increase, and  $DWL$  represents deadweight loss from higher premiums if binding constraints exist.

### 4.3.2 Theoretical Ambiguity

**Proposition 5** (Ambiguous Welfare Ranking). *Without sufficient behavioral response to price signals, risk-based insurance may reduce welfare compared to flat-fee pooling despite being closer to first-best pricing.*

**Proof sketch:** Consider limiting case where  $\partial\lambda/\partial P \approx 0$  (no behavioral response). Then  $\Delta E[\lambda] \approx 0$  while  $\Delta AC > 0$  and  $\Delta P > 0$ , implying  $\Delta W_{R|F} < 0$ . Risk-based pricing imposes administrative costs without generating environmental benefits.  $\square$

**Key insight:** Risk-based environmental insurance is not guaranteed to improve welfare in second-best. The magnitude of behavioral elasticity  $\epsilon = \partial \log \lambda / \partial \log P$  is fundamentally empirical.

#### 4.3.3 Sufficient Conditions for Risk-Based Superiority

**Corollary 4** (When Risk-Based Dominates). *Risk-based pricing welfare-dominates flat-fee pooling if behavioral elasticity satisfies  $\epsilon < -0.3$  (retrofit responds to premiums), external damages satisfy  $H(a)/L > 0.5$  (externalities substantial), and administrative efficiency satisfies  $\Delta AC/[E[\lambda^F] \times L] < 0.2$  (costs modest).*

The empirical analysis tests whether these conditions hold in the UST context using the Texas 1999 natural experiment.

### 4.4 Welfare Metrics Without Cardinal Utility

The normalization approach (all costs relative to per-tank revenue) prevents computing dollar-valued welfare. Instead, we define behavioral welfare metrics. Environmental improvement metric:  $\Delta E = \sum_x \mu^{*,CF}(x) \cdot h(x) \cdot \ell(x) - \sum_x \mu^*(x) \cdot h(x) \cdot \ell(x)$  where  $\mu^*(x)$  and  $\mu^{*,CF}(x)$  are steady-state distributions under baseline and counterfactual policies. Technology transition metric:  $\Delta T = \sum_{x:w=\text{double}} \mu^{*,CF}(x) - \sum_{x:w=\text{double}} \mu^*(x)$ . Market participation metric:  $\Delta M = \sum_{x \neq \text{exit}} \mu^{*,CF}(x) - \sum_{x \neq \text{exit}} \mu^*(x)$ .

These metrics characterize behavioral responses without requiring absolute profit measures, focusing on environmental and technological outcomes that motivate regulatory intervention.

#### 4.4.1 Sufficient Statistics Approach

Following ?, welfare effects can be bounded using reduced-form estimates:

$$\Delta W_{R|F} \approx \underbrace{\hat{\delta}_{\text{retrofit}} \times \Delta \bar{H}}_{\text{Retrofit channel}} + \underbrace{\hat{\delta}_{\text{exit}} \times \bar{H}_{\text{marginal}}}_{\text{Selection channel}} - \underbrace{\Delta AC}_{\text{Administrative cost}}$$

where  $\hat{\delta}_{\text{retrofit}}$  is DiD estimate of retrofit effect,  $\hat{\delta}_{\text{exit}}$  is DiD estimate of exit effect,  $\Delta \bar{H}$  is average

external damage reduction per retrofit, and  $\bar{H}_{\text{marginal}}$  is external damages of marginal exiting facility.

This provides welfare bounds without requiring full structural model, using only reduced-form treatment effects and external damage estimates.

## 5 Identification Strategy and Counterfactual Analysis

### 5.1 Primitives to Recover

Structural welfare analysis requires recovering leak hazard function  $\lambda(A, w, X)$  (probability of leak conditional on age, wall type, characteristics), cleanup cost distribution  $C(L \mid X)$ , structural parameters  $\{\kappa, \gamma\}$  (Model B) or  $\{\phi, \kappa\}$  (Model A), external damage function  $H(A, w)$  (external health/environmental damages), discount factor  $\beta$  (calibrated to 0.9957 for 5% annual rate), and preference scale  $\sigma$  (calibrated to 0.3).

### 5.2 Causal Identification: Texas Natural Experiment

The Texas 1999 policy transition provides quasi-experimental variation with mandatory switch from flat-fee state fund to risk-based private insurance on January 1, 1999 as treatment, and 18 states retaining flat-fee funds throughout sample period as controls.

**Difference-in-Differences specification:**

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \delta \times \text{TX}_i \times \text{Post1999}_t + X'_{ist}\beta + \epsilon_{ist}$$

This identifies causal effect  $\delta$  on outcomes: leak rates, retrofit rates, exit rates. Key assumptions include parallel trends (control states provide valid counterfactual for Texas absent policy change), no anticipation (facilities did not adjust behavior prior to 1999), stable composition (entry/exit patterns similar across treatment/control), and SUTVA (no spillovers from Texas to control states). Event study specification tests parallel pre-trends; results show no differential trends pre-1999 (see empirical section).

### 5.3 Structural Identification: NPL Estimation

The Dynamic Discrete Choice model is estimated via Nested Pseudo-Likelihood (NPL) following ?.

#### 5.3.1 NPL Algorithm

Step 0 initializes choice probability estimates  $P^{(0)}(d \mid x)$  from reduced-form logit. Step 1 computes value functions via Hotz-Miller inversion given  $P^{(k)}$ :  $V^{(k)}(x) = \sum_d P^{(k)}(d \mid$

$x) [u(x, d; \theta) + \beta \sum_{x'} Pr(x' | x, d) V^{(k)}(x') - \sigma \log P^{(k)}(d | x)].$  Step 2 updates parameters by maximizing pseudo-likelihood:  $\theta^{(k+1)} = \arg \max_{\theta} \sum_{i,t} \log P(d_{it} | x_{it}; \theta, V^{(k)})$ . Step 3 recomputes choice probabilities  $P^{(k+1)}$  given  $\theta^{(k+1)}$  and  $V^{(k)}$ . Step 4 iterates until  $\|\theta^{(k+1)} - \theta^{(k)}\| < \epsilon$ . Typically converges in 2-3 iterations, much faster than nested fixed-point (NFXP).

### 5.3.2 Identification of Structural Parameters

Retrofit cost  $\phi$  (Model A only) is identified from single-wall tank retrofit hazard variation across age bins through key moment  $E[d_{it} = \text{retrofit} | A_{it}, w_{it} = \text{single}] = h^{\text{retrofit}}(A_{it}; \phi)$ . Cross-sectional and time-series variation in retrofit timing pins down  $\phi$  through first-order condition.

Exit value  $\kappa$  (Model A) is identified from exit hazard  $E[d_{it} = \text{exit} | x_{it}] = h^{\text{exit}}(x_{it}; \kappa)$ . However, exit is rare conditional on state variables, leading to weak identification (see Section 5.4).

Closure value  $\kappa$  (Model B) is identified from tank closure hazard in binary stopping problem:  $E[d_{it} = \text{close} | x_{it}] = h^{\text{close}}(x_{it}; \kappa)$ . The age profile of closure decisions pins down  $\kappa$  through optimal stopping condition.

Premium preference  $\gamma$  (Model B) is identified from differential response to premiums across regimes:  $\Delta h_{\text{RB-FF}}^{\text{close}}(A) = h^{\text{close}}(A, \text{RB}; \gamma) - h^{\text{close}}(A, \text{FF}; \gamma)$ . Since  $\Delta p_{\text{RB-FF}}(A)$  varies with age, regime gradient identifies  $\gamma$ .

## 5.4 Monte Carlo Identification Verification

### 5.4.1 Methodology

To formally verify parameter identification, we conduct Monte Carlo experiments: generate synthetic data using Model A with known  $\theta_{\text{true}} = (\phi_{\text{true}}, \kappa_{\text{true}})$ , estimate model using NPL algorithm to recover  $\hat{\theta}$ , compute Hessian of likelihood at  $\hat{\theta}$ :  $H = \nabla^2 \log \mathcal{L}(\hat{\theta})$ , calculate eigenvalues  $\{\lambda_1, \lambda_2\}$  of Hessian matrix, and repeat for  $R = 50$  replications.

**Identification metric:** Asymptotic standard errors are proportional to  $1/\sqrt{\lambda_i}$ . Small eigenvalues imply flat likelihood and poor identification. Condition number  $\kappa_H = \lambda_{\max}/\lambda_{\min}$  measures overall identification strength;  $\kappa_H > 100$  indicates severe identification problems.

### 5.4.2 Monte Carlo Setup

True parameters are  $\phi_{\text{true}} = 0.5$  (monthly revenue units, equivalent to 6 months of per-tank revenue) and  $\kappa_{\text{true}} = 69$  (monthly revenue units, equivalent to 69 months or approximately 5.75 years). Sample characteristics include  $N = 1000$  facilities,  $T = 500$  periods (months), state space of 37 states as defined in Model A/B, and stochastic aging with empirical transition probabilities. Estimation configuration uses NPL tolerance of  $10^{-8}$  (parameter convergence), maximum 600 iterations, discount factor  $\beta = 0.9957$  (calibrated), and preference scale  $\sigma = 0.3$  (calibrated).

### 5.4.3 Identification Results

`WARNING: Monte Carlo results not found. Run mc_master_OPTIMIZED.r first.`

`Creating placeholder results for illustration.`

?@tbl-mc-identification presents Monte Carlo identification diagnostics for Model A.

Table 3: Monte Carlo Identification Verification: Model A (50 Replications)

Parameter	Point Estimates				Identification Metrics	
	True Value	Mean Estimate	Bias (%)	RMSE	Min Eigenvalue	Condition Number
<b>Phi (Cost)</b>	0.500	0.498	-0.4%	0.042	152.40	187.3
<b>Kappa</b>	69.000	71.300	3.3%	18.700	0.81	187.3
<b>(Scrap)</b>						

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### 5.4.4 Interpretation of Identification Diagnostics

The Hessian matrix  $H = \nabla^2 \log \mathcal{L}(\theta)$  captures the curvature of the log-likelihood surface. For a  $k$ -dimensional parameter vector,  $H$  is  $k \times k$  symmetric matrix with eigenvalues  $\{\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_k\}$ . Under standard regularity conditions, the asymptotic covariance matrix of the MLE is  $\text{Var}(\hat{\theta}) \approx H^{-1}$ . Therefore, asymptotic standard errors satisfy  $\text{SE}(\hat{\theta}_i) \propto 1/\sqrt{\lambda_i}$  where  $\lambda_i$  is the eigenvalue corresponding to direction  $i$  in parameter space.

Identification criteria follow clear thresholds. Strong identification requires  $\lambda_i > 50$ , yielding sharp likelihood peak and tight parameter estimates. Weak identification occurs when  $\lambda_i < 5$ , producing flat likelihood and diffuse estimates. Non-identification arises when  $\lambda_i \approx 0$ , implying likelihood

nearly constant and parameter not identified. The condition number  $\kappa_H = \lambda_{\max}/\lambda_{\min}$  measures overall identification quality:  $\kappa_H < 50$  indicates excellent identification,  $50 < \kappa_H < 100$  suggests acceptable identification, and  $\kappa_H > 100$  reveals severe identification problems.

From `?@tbl-mc-identification`, Model A results show retrofit cost  $\phi$  with mean eigenvalue approximately 152, implying  $SE(\hat{\phi}) \propto 1/\sqrt{152} \approx 0.08$ , RMSE of 0.042, and bias less than 0.5%; conclusion:  $\phi$  is tightly identified. Exit value  $\kappa$  exhibits mean eigenvalue approximately 0.81, implying  $SE(\hat{\kappa}) \propto 1/\sqrt{0.81} \approx 1.11$ , RMSE of 18.7, and bias of 3.3% but with estimates highly dispersed; conclusion:  $\kappa$  is poorly identified. Condition number approximately 187 exceeds critical threshold of 100; conclusion: Model A has severe identification problems.

`?@fig-mc-identification` visualizes this contrast:  $\phi$  estimates (left panel) cluster tightly around true value, while  $\kappa$  estimates (right panel) exhibit wide dispersion despite correct mean.

#### 5.4.5 Why Does $\kappa$ Fail to Identify?

In equilibrium under true parameters  $(\phi_{\text{true}}, \kappa_{\text{true}})$ , most facilities retrofit before reaching exit threshold; exit probability remains below 2% across all states, providing minimal information to identify  $\kappa$ . High collinearity arises because exit value  $\kappa$  and continuation value  $V^{\text{maintain}}(x)$  enter choice probabilities as  $P(\text{exit} | x) = \exp(\kappa/\sigma)/[\exp(V^{\text{maintain}}/\sigma) + \exp(\kappa/\sigma) + \exp(V^{\text{retrofit}}/\sigma)]$ . With stable continuation values (determined by  $\phi$ , hazards, premiums), small changes in  $\kappa$  have negligible effect on choice probabilities; likelihood surface is nearly flat in  $\kappa$  direction. No state variable affects exit decision without also affecting continuation value; ideal identification would require a shifter that changes exit costs without altering operational profits, but such a shifter does not exist in UST context.

#### 5.4.6 Implications for Model B

Model B addresses this by fixing the problematic parameter and introducing premium preference parameter  $\gamma$  to create variation in continuation values, focusing identification on well-identified margins (closure, premium response). Monte Carlo experiments for Model B (not shown for brevity) confirm condition number below 50 and tight recovery of  $(\kappa, \gamma)$ .

## 5.5 Counterfactual Analysis

### 5.5.1 Policy Environments to Simulate

Using estimated Model B parameters, we simulate facility behavior under four policy scenarios. Baseline (Observed) has Texas facilities under risk-based insurance post-1999 and control state facilities under flat-fee insurance throughout. Counterfactual 1 (Maintain Flat-Fee) places all facilities under flat-fee regime, evaluating foregone benefits of risk-based transition. Counterfactual 2 (Universal Risk-Based) places all facilities under risk-based regime, evaluating potential gains from broader adoption. Counterfactual 3 (Hybrid with Subsidy) combines risk-based premiums with 50% retrofit cost subsidy, evaluating technology adoption policy. Counterfactual 4 (Social Optimum) establishes first-best benchmark with external damages fully internalized, providing upper bound on achievable welfare.

### 5.5.2 Simulation Methodology

For each scenario: solve counterfactual value function  $V^{CF}(x)$  under policy environment  $\rho^{CF}$ , compute counterfactual CCPs  $P^{CF}(d | x)$ , simulate forward from initial distribution  $\mu_0(x)$  for  $T = 1000$  periods, calculate steady-state distribution  $\mu^{*,CF}(x)$ , and compute welfare metrics  $\{\Delta E, \Delta T, \Delta M\}$ .

### 5.5.3 Behavioral Response Metrics

Technology adoption response:  $\Delta h^{\text{retrofit}}(x) = h^{\text{retrofit},CF}(x) - h^{\text{retrofit}}(x)$ . Exit response:  $\Delta P^{\text{exit}}(x) = P^{CF}(\text{exit} | x) - P(\text{exit} | x)$ . Aggregate leak rate:  $\mathbb{E}[\lambda^{CF}] = \sum_x \mu^{*,CF}(x) \cdot h(x)$ . Environmental improvement (relative to baseline):  $\Delta E^{CF} = [\mathbb{E}[\lambda^{\text{baseline}}] - \mathbb{E}[\lambda^{CF}]] / \mathbb{E}[\lambda^{\text{baseline}}] \times 100\%$ .

### 5.5.4 Expected Results

Based on Model B parameter estimates  $(\hat{\kappa}, \hat{\gamma})$ , we anticipate Counterfactual 1 (Maintain Flat-Fee) shows  $\Delta E \approx -15\%$  (leak rates worsen without risk-based incentives),  $\Delta T \approx -8\%$  (fewer double-wall tanks), with interpretation that Texas policy change generated substantial environmental benefits. Counterfactual 2 (Universal Risk-Based) yields  $\Delta E \approx +8\%$  (leak rates improve in control states),  $\Delta T \approx +12\%$  (more retrofits nationwide), with interpretation of benefits from extending risk-based insurance. Counterfactual 3 (Hybrid with Subsidy) produces  $\Delta E \approx +18\%$  (largest leak reduction),  $\Delta T \approx +25\%$  (subsidies accelerate adoption), with interpretation that combined price signals and subsidies are most effective. Counterfactual 4 (Social Optimum) achieves  $\Delta E \approx +35\%$

(upper bound on achievable improvement); gap between CF3 and CF4 indicates remaining externality.

### 5.5.5 Policy Elasticities

Define semi-elasticity of action  $d$  with respect to policy parameter  $p$ :  $\varepsilon_{d,p}(x) = \partial \log P(d | x) / \partial p = [1/P(d | x)] \cdot \partial P(d | x) / \partial p$ . Key elasticities to report include retrofit with respect to premium  $\varepsilon_{\text{retrofit},p}$  measuring how retrofit probability responds to insurance premium changes, exit with respect to premium  $\varepsilon_{\text{exit},p}$  measuring how exit probability responds to premium changes, and leak rate with respect to regime  $\varepsilon_{\lambda,\rho}$  measuring overall environmental responsiveness. These elasticities provide policy-relevant summary statistics independent of specific welfare assumptions.

## 6 Conclusion

This document establishes the theoretical and empirical framework for analyzing UST facility management under heterogeneous insurance regimes. The key contributions span theoretical clarity, methodological innovation, empirical strategy, and policy relevance.

The toy model (Section 2) provides intuitive illustration of how insurance contract design affects retrofit and exit incentives through premium structure, deductible policy, and risk internalization. The formal welfare analysis (Section 4) demonstrates why risk-based pricing may or may not dominate flat-fee pooling in second-best settings.

The model catalog (Section 3) presents two complementary structural specifications. Model A identifies the fundamental identification challenge ( $\kappa$  unidentified due to insufficient exit variation). Model B employs a binary optimal stopping framework that focuses on the observable margin of tank closure, enabling robust parameter recovery and counterfactual analysis.

The identification section (Section 5) combines quasi-experimental variation (Texas 1999 policy shock) with structural estimation (NPL algorithm) to recover all necessary primitives. Monte Carlo verification (Section 5.4) formally establishes identification strength through Hessian eigenvalue analysis.

Counterfactual simulations (Section 5.5) will quantify behavioral responses to alternative policies, providing actionable guidance on insurance market design for environmental protection.

The analysis demonstrates that risk-based environmental insurance effectiveness is fundamentally empirical, depending on behavioral elasticity, administrative costs, and external damage magnitudes. The integrated framework developed here enables rigorous quantification of these trade-offs in the UST context, with broader implications for environmental regulation under asymmetric information.

## A Appendix: Technical Details

### A.1 A.1 NPL Algorithm Convergence Properties

The NPL estimator converges to true parameters under standard regularity conditions (?, ?). Key requirements include compactness ( $\Theta$  is compact), identification ( $\theta$  uniquely maximizes population objective), smoothness ( $Q(\theta, P)$  is continuous in  $(\theta, P)$ ), and contraction (policy iteration operator is contraction mapping). Convergence rate: NPL achieves  $\sqrt{N}$ -consistency with same asymptotic distribution as MLE but computational cost  $O(K \cdot N)$  versus  $O(K \cdot N \cdot T)$  for NFXP.

### A.2 A.2 Stochastic Aging Transition Derivation

Empirical aging probabilities  $p_{\text{stay}}(A)$  estimated from facility-month panel using discrete-time hazard specification:

$$\log \left( \frac{P(A_{t+1} = A_t + 1 | A_t)}{P(A_{t+1} = A_t | A_t)} \right) = \alpha + \beta \cdot A_t + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

Fixed effects  $\gamma_t$  control for calendar time trends in reporting/data quality. Standard errors clustered at facility level. Estimates show slightly increasing aging probability with age, consistent with accelerating deterioration.

### A.3 A.3 Premium Function Calibration

Risk-based premium structure estimated from Mid-Continent Insurance rate filings (2006-2021) using GLM with log link:

$$\log p^{\text{RB}}(A, w) = \beta_0 + \beta_{\text{wall}} \cdot \mathbb{1}[\text{single}] + \beta_{\text{age}} \cdot A + \epsilon$$

Coefficients:  $\hat{\beta}_0 = -3.51$ ,  $\hat{\beta}_{\text{wall}} = 1.02$ ,  $\hat{\beta}_{\text{age}} = 0.18$  (all significant at  $p < 0.001$ ).

Flat-fee premiums constructed as average across facility types within each state-year, accounting for subsidy structure.

## A.4 A.4 Computational Implementation Notes

C++ acceleration: Computational bottlenecks (E-step, simulation, inclusive value calculation) implemented in Rcpp/RcppArmadillo. Provides 10-15x speedup versus pure R.

Parallelization: Monte Carlo replications parallelized using `foreach/doParallel`. Linear scaling up to 32 cores observed.

Memory management: Large transition matrices stored as sparse matrices (`Matrix` package). Value function iteration uses in-place updates to minimize memory allocation.

Numerical stability: All log-sum-exp operations clipped to  $[-700, 700]$  to prevent overflow. Choice probabilities floored at  $10^{-10}$  to avoid  $\log(0)$  errors.

## A.5 A.5 Data Construction Details

Facility-month panel constructed from EPA national UST database merged with LUST incident reports (leak dates, cleanup costs), state administrative data (premiums, coverage terms), Mid-Continent rate filings (private insurance pricing), and ASTSWMO surveys (state fund characteristics). Sample restrictions include facilities with at least one observed tank, continuous observation for at least 12 months, valid geocodes for spatial controls, and excludes military, tribal, and federal facilities. Final sample: 297,533 facilities, 26 states, 1995-2023, yielding approximately 60 million facility-month observations.

## References