



# Implementation of a Centralized SOC Monitoring Environment and Threat Detection using Wazuh SIEM

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**SOC Task-1**

## 1. SOC Fundamentals and Architecture

The primary purpose of a **Security Operations Center (SOC)** is to provide proactive threat detection, continuous monitoring, and rapid incident response. A modern SOC relies on a specialized hierarchy of personnel:

- **Tier 1 Analysts:** Responsible for initial alert triage and monitoring.
- **Tier 2/3 Analysts:** Handle deep-dive investigations and advanced threat hunting.
- **SOC Managers:** Oversee the entire operation and integrate threat intelligence.

Common frameworks like **NIST SP 800-61** and **MITRE ATT&CK** are used to standardize how these teams identify and respond to attacks.

## 2. SIEM and Security Monitoring

A **Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)** system, such as Wazuh or Elastic, serves as the "brain" of the SOC.

- **Objectives:** The system is designed to detect anomalies, unauthorized access, and policy violations across the network.
- **Key Metrics:** Performance is measured by **MTTD (Mean Time to Detect)** and the ability to minimize false positives and negatives.

## 3. Operational Implementation


### 3.1 Endpoint Synchronization & Deployment

The security perimeter was established by deploying Wazuh agents across two Ubuntu endpoints.

- **Deployment Method:** Leveraged native Linux package management to ensure seamless integration with the host OS.



- **Asset Connectivity:** Both nodes (Agent 001 and Agent 002) were synchronized with the primary Manager, achieving a 100% active operational status.



## 3.2 Data Integrity & Log Forwarding Tests

To confirm that the telemetry pipeline was secure and functional, a series of manual log injection tests were performed.

- **Simulation:** Generated custom system logs using the logger command to simulate local system events.
- **Verification:** The Manager successfully captured the string "SOC test log from endpoint VM", validating that the agent-to-manager forwarding path is reliable.


```
sudo: docker: command not found

kanchi@kanchi-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~$ logger "SOC
test log from endpoint VM"

kanchi@kanchi-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~$ logger "SOC
test log from endpoint VM"

kanchi@kanchi-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~$ logger "SOC
test log from endpoint VM"

kanchi@kanchi-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~$ sudo logger
"SOC test log from endpoint VM"
```





## 4. Threat Detection & Compliance Mapping

### 4.1 Brute-Force Authentication Attack Simulation

A controlled security test was conducted to evaluate the SIEM's detection logic against unauthorized access attempts.

- **The Attack:** Initiated high-frequency SSH connection attempts targeting non-existent user accounts (wronguser).
- **Detection Result:** The system triggered immediate high-priority alerts for "Failed Password" and "Authentication Failure".
- **Log Correlation:** The Manager correlated entries from /var/log/auth.log to identify the source of the malicious activity.

```
kanchi@kanchi-VMware-Virtual-Platform:~$ ssh wronguser@localhost
The authenticity of host 'localhost (127.0.0.1)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:6Ybz8w3y6SuBwA3KCKh8zTLH/zIseU6lrA+oM0tomM4.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'localhost' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
wronguser@localhost's password:
fgdfdf
Permission denied, please try again.
wronguser@localhost's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
wronguser@localhost's password:
wronguser@localhost: Permission denied (publickey,password).
```










## 3.2 Framework Alignment (MITRE & HIPAA)

To ensure the SOC operations meet global security and legal standards, all triggered events were mapped to standardized frameworks:

- **Credential Access** tactic.
- **Compliance Validation:** Alerts were cross-referenced against **HIPAA 164.312.b**, confirming that the system provides the required audit controls for technical safeguards.



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## 5. Final Conclusion

This technical assessment demonstrates that the Wazuh SIEM/XDR environment is fully capable of monitoring Ubuntu-based infrastructures. The system successfully detected and categorized brute-force attacks while simultaneously maintaining compliance with HIPAA standards. These results confirm that the SOC architecture is robust, though proactive monitoring of the API health is recommended to ensure continuous availability.