

8/10/2025

Final Project

CST8808 – Cyber Incident Report

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
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Incident Response Plan Implementation

1. Introduction

This report documents the implementation of an Incident Response (IR) plan for CSA271.com, focusing on log monitoring, threat detection, and attack simulation using a SIEM (Wazuh), Snort IDS, and Volatility for memory analysis. The project involved setting up a virtual lab environment with Kali Linux (attacker), Windows Server (IIS/FTP + Snort), and Ubuntu (Wazuh SIEM).

2. Network Topology & Configuration




3. VMs Configuration:

IP Configuration

Machine	IP Address	Role
Kali Linux	10.10.1.30	Attack simulation
Windows Server	10.10.1.20	IIS/FTP + Snort IDS
Wazuh (Ubuntu)	10.10.1.10	SIEM (Log collection & alerts)

Configuring Vmware : Setting Subnet IP and Subnet Mask on Vmnet9




Key Configurations

- **Static IPs** configured on all machines

Kali Linux:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ sudo nano /etc/network/interfaces
```




A screenshot of a terminal window titled "kali@kali: ~". The window shows the "/etc/network/interfaces" file being edited with the nano text editor. The file contains the following configuration for the eth0 interface:

```
auto eth0
iface eth0 inet static
    address 10.10.1.40
    netmask 255.255.255.0
    gateway 10.10.1.1
    dns-nameservers 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4
```

Dns-nameservers can be skipped because we are on host only network. It was only set in case we need to switch to NAT for downloading any tools.

Windows Server (IIS):



Ubuntu(Wazuh/SIEM):


```
wazuh@wazuh:~$ sudo nano /etc/netplan/01-netcfg.yaml
network:
  version: 2
  ethernets:
    ens33:
      addresses:
        - 10.10.1.10/24
      gateway4: 10.10.1.1
wazuh@wazuh:~$ sudo netplan apply
```

```
** (generate:65138): WARNING **: 07:02:20.630: Permissions for /etc/netplan/01-netcfg.yaml are too open. Netplan configuration should NOT be accessible by others.
** (generate:65138): WARNING **: 07:02:20.630: `gateway4` has been deprecated, use default routes instead.
See the 'Default routes' section of the documentation for more details.

** (process:65136): WARNING **: 07:02:21.095: Permissions for /etc/netplan/01-netcfg.yaml are too open. Netplan configuration should NOT be accessible by others.
** (process:65136): WARNING **: 07:02:21.095: `gateway4` has been deprecated, use default routes instead.
See the 'Default routes' section of the documentation for more details.

** (process:65136): WARNING **: 07:02:21.274: Permissions for /etc/netplan/01-netcfg.yaml are too open. Netplan configuration should NOT be accessible by others.
** (process:65136): WARNING **: 07:02:21.274: `gateway4` has been deprecated, use default routes instead.
See the 'Default routes' section of the documentation for more details.
```

Confirming if machines are on same network:



The screenshot shows a terminal window with a dark blue header bar containing icons for file, clipboard, and browser. Below the header, the terminal menu bar includes File, Actions, Edit, View, and Help. A status message indicates "Currently scanning: Finished! | Screen View: Unique Hosts". Below this, a summary states "3 Captured ARP Req/Rep packets, from 3 hosts. Total size: 180". A table follows, listing captured ARP entries:

IP	At MAC Address	Count	Len	MAC Vendor / Hostname
10.10.1.1	00:50:56:c0:00:05	1	60	VMware, Inc.
10.10.1.10	00:0c:29:44:7a:31	1	60	VMware, Inc.
10.10.1.20	00:0c:29:df:cb:2c	1	60	VMware, Inc.

4. NTP Synchronization on all machines:

Kali:




The terminal window shows the command `timedatectl` being run. The output displays system clock synchronization status and time zone information:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ timedatectl
   Local time: Wed 2025-08-06 21:16:34 EDT
   Universal time: Thu 2025-08-07 01:16:34 UTC
         RTC time: Thu 2025-08-07 01:16:34
       Time zone: America/New_York (EDT, -0400)
System clock synchronized: yes
          NTP service: active
    RTC in local TZ: no

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
```

Ubuntu:



The terminal window shows the command `sudo timedatectl set-ntp true` followed by `sudo systemctl restart systemd-timesyncd`. The output shows the system clock has been synchronized:

```
wazuh@wazuh:~$ sudo timedatectl set-ntp true
wazuh@wazuh:~$ sudo systemctl restart systemd-timesyncd
wazuh@wazuh:~$ timedatectl
   Local time: Wed 2025-08-06 21:26:15 EDT
   Universal time: Thu 2025-08-07 01:26:15 UTC
         RTC time: Thu 2025-08-07 01:26:15
       Time zone: America/Toronto (EDT, -0400)
System clock synchronized: yes
          NTP service: active
    RTC in local TZ: no
wazuh@wazuh:~$
```

Windows:

```
C:\Users\Administrator>w32tm /config /manualpeerlist:"time.windows.com" /syncfromflags:manual /reliable:yes /update
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\Administrator>w32tm /resync
Sending resync command to local computer
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\Administrator>
C:\Users\Administrator>w32tm /query /status
Leap Indicator: 0(no warning)
Stratum: 4 (secondary reference - syncd by (S)NTP)
Precision: -23 (119.209ns per tick)
Root Delay: 0.0442954s
Root Dispersion: 8.1168525s
ReferenceId: 0xA83DD74A (source IP: 168.61.215.74)
Last Successful Sync Time: 8/6/2025 6:36:09 PM
Source: time.windows.com
Poll Interval: 6 (64s)
```

5. SIEM Setup :

SIEM Selection Rationale:

For this project, we selected Wazuh as the SIEM platform instead of alternatives like Splunk, OSSIM, or the ELK Stack. The decision was based on the following factors:

1. **Cost Efficiency** – Wazuh is open-source and free to deploy, avoiding licensing costs associated with Splunk Enterprise or commercial OSSIM implementations, which is ideal for test lab environment.
2. **Feature Set** – Wazuh integrates SIEM, log analysis, and File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) in a single platform. This allowed us to meet both the SIEM and FIM requirements without installing multiple separate tools.
3. **Integration with IDS** – Wazuh can easily ingest alerts from Snort IDS, enabling centralized monitoring of both host-based and network-based events.

Wazuh Installation:

```
wazuh@wazuh: ~$ curl -s0 https://packages.wazuh.com/4.12/wazuh-install.sh
wazuh@wazuh: ~$ sudo bash wazuh-install.sh -a
06/08/2025 06:43:08 INFO: Starting Wazuh installation assistant. Wazuh version: 4.12.0
06/08/2025 06:43:08 INFO: Verbose logging redirected to /var/log/wazuh-install.log
06/08/2025 06:43:13 INFO: ... Dependencies ----
06/08/2025 06:43:13 INFO: Installing gawk.
06/08/2025 06:43:19 INFO: Verifying that your system meets the recommended minimum hardware requirements.
06/08/2025 06:43:19 INFO: Wazuh web interface port will be 443.
06/08/2025 06:43:26 INFO: ... Dependencies ----
06/08/2025 06:43:26 INFO: Installing apt-transport-https.
06/08/2025 06:43:29 INFO: Installing debhelper.
06/08/2025 06:44:03 INFO: Wazuh repository added.
06/08/2025 06:44:03 INFO: ... Configuration files ...
06/08/2025 06:44:03 INFO: Generating configuration files.
06/08/2025 06:44:04 INFO: Generating the root certificate.
06/08/2025 06:44:04 INFO: Generating Admin certificates.
06/08/2025 06:44:04 INFO: Generating Wazuh indexer certificates.
06/08/2025 06:44:04 INFO: Generating Filebeat certificates.
06/08/2025 06:44:05 INFO: Generating Wazuh dashboard certificates.
06/08/2025 06:44:05 INFO: Created wazuh-install-files.tar. It contains the Wazuh cluster key, certificates, and passwords necessary for installation.
06/08/2025 06:44:06 INFO: ... Wazuh indexer ...
06/08/2025 06:44:06 INFO: Starting Wazuh indexer installation.
06/08/2025 06:44:30 INFO: Wazuh indexer installation finished.
06/08/2025 06:44:30 INFO: Wazuh indexer post-install configuration finished.
06/08/2025 06:44:30 INFO: Starting service wazuh-indexer.
06/08/2025 06:44:44 INFO: wazuh-indexer service started.
06/08/2025 06:44:44 INFO: Initializing Wazuh indexer cluster security settings.
06/08/2025 06:44:49 INFO: Wazuh indexer cluster security configuration initialized.
06/08/2025 06:44:49 INFO: Wazuh indexer cluster initialized.
06/08/2025 06:44:49 INFO: ... Wazuh server ...
06/08/2025 06:44:49 INFO: Starting the Wazuh manager installation.
06/08/2025 06:46:09 INFO: Wazuh manager installation finished.
06/08/2025 06:46:09 INFO: Wazuh manager vulnerability detection configuration finished.
06/08/2025 06:46:09 INFO: Starting service wazuh-manager.
06/08/2025 06:46:26 INFO: wazuh-manager service started.
06/08/2025 06:46:26 INFO: Starting Filebeat installation.
```


```
06/08/2025 06:49:13 INFO: --- Summary ---
06/08/2025 06:49:13 INFO: You can access the web interface https://<wazuh-dashboard-ip>:443
  User: admin
    Password: il?BKS.mxRK28XG?FnqWJFpF4LLKctX8
06/08/2025 06:49:13 INFO: --- Dependencies ---
06/08/2025 06:49:13 INFO: Removing gawk.
06/08/2025 06:49:18 INFO: Installation finished.
wazuh@wazuh: ~$ ip a
```

User : admin


Password : il?BKS.mxRK28XG?FnqWJFpF4LLKctX8

Next, we will open the Wazuh Dashboard on our local ip 10.10.1.10 with the above credentials.

Dashboard :




Wazuh agent on windows server :



Wazuh agent will require manager ip (10.10.1.10) and authentication key which we will generate next.

Generating the key for agent:

Wazuh Agent Final Setup:



Confirmed agent connection in Wazuh dashboard :

A screenshot of a web browser displaying the Wazuh dashboard. The address bar shows the URL "10.10.1.10/app/endpoints-summary#/agents-preview/". The dashboard features three circular charts: "AGENTS BY STATUS" (Active 1, Disconnected 0, Pending 0, Never connected 0), "TOP 5 OS" (windows 1), and "TOP 5 GROUPS" (default 1). Below these are sections for "Agents (1)" and "Logs (0)". The "Agents (1)" section includes a table with one row:


ID	Name	IP address	Group(s)	Operating system	Cluster node	Version	Status	Actions
001	IIS-Server	10.10.1.20	default	Microsoft Windows Server 2022 Standard Evaluation 10.0.20348.587	node01	v4.12.0	active	


At the bottom, there's a search bar and a taskbar with icons for File Explorer, Task View, File History, Task Scheduler, and the Wazuh icon.

Snort IDS Integration:


Next, we needed an IDS system to forward network-based alerts from the Windows Server to the Wazuh SIEM. In a real-world deployment, IDS is typically hosted on a dedicated appliance or server to avoid resource contention and ensure optimal performance. However, due to the limited resources available in our lab environment for running multiple VMs, we integrated the IDS directly into the same Windows Server hosting IIS. We selected Snort as our IDS because it is open source, widely used, and offers straightforward integration with Wazuh. Snort's extensive rule set and community support allowed us to quickly detect simulated network attacks and forward the corresponding alerts to the SIEM for correlation and visualization.

Snort installation :





Running snort :



Checking the index number of interface:

```
C:\Snort\bin>snort -W

,-> Snort! <*-  
o" )~ Version 2.9.20-WING4 GRF (Build 82)  
... By Martin Roesch & The Snort Team: http://www.snort.org/contact#team  
Copyright (C) 2014-2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.  
Copyright (C) 1998-2013 Sourcefire, Inc., et al.  
Using PCRE version: 8.10 2010-06-25  
Using ZLIB version: 1.2.11


Index Physical Address IP Address Device Name Description
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
1 00:00:00:00:00:00 disabled \Device\NPF_{F5437729-2FB9-4180-A6B0-FA50ACFF4EED} WAN Miniport (Network Monitor)
2 00:00:00:00:00:00 disabled \Device\NPF_{35AD6BAC-3CD0-438D-ACDF-28EEB553AD67} WAN Miniport (IPv6)
3 00:00:00:00:00:00 disabled \Device\NPF_{EAEC2187-25CB-4145-BDEB-E95E91712C10} WAN Miniport (IP)
4 00:0C:29:DF:CB:2C 10.10.1.20 \Device\NPF_{C44D4250-5553-4CBE-9BF0-CC02AFFEAAFC} Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection
5 00:00:00:00:00:00 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000 \Device\NPF_Loopback Adapter for loopback traffic capture

C:\Snort\bin>
```

Snort command :

```
C:\Snort\bin>snort -c C:\Snort\etc\snort.conf -i 4 -l C:\Snort\log -A console
```

Snort default config:



The screenshot shows the Notepad++ application window with the file 'snort.conf' open. The code editor displays the Snort configuration file with syntax highlighting for comments and variables. The file contains numerous lines of configuration, including network variable definitions like \$HOME_NET and \$EXTERNAL_NET, and lists of protected servers for DNS, SMTP, HTTP, SQL, TELNET, SSH, FTP, and SIP.

```
40 #####  
41 # Step #1: Set the network variables. For more information, see README.variables  
42 #####  
43 # Setup the network addresses you are protecting  
44 ipvar HOME_NET any  
45  
46 # Set up the external network addresses. Leave as "any" in most situations  
47 ipvar EXTERNAL_NET any  
48  
49 # List of DNS servers on your network  
50 ipvar DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
51  
52 # List of SMTP servers on your network  
53 ipvar SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
54  
55 # List of web servers on your network  
56 ipvar HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
57  
58 # List of sql servers on your network  
59 ipvar SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
60  
61 # List of telnet servers on your network  
62 ipvar TELNET_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
63  
64 # List of ssh servers on your network  
65 ipvar SSH_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
66  
67 # List of ftp servers on your network  
68 ipvar FTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
69  
70 # List of sip servers on your network  
71 ipvar SIP_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
72
```

Configured Snort to monitor home_net = 10.10.1.20 :

```
#####
##### Step #1: Set the network variables. For more information, see README.variables
#####

# Setup the network addresses you are protecting
ipvar HOME_NET 10.10.1.20

# Set up the external network addresses. Leave as "any" in most situations
ipvar EXTERNAL_NET any

# List of DNS servers on your network
ipvar DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET


# List of SMTP servers on your network
ipvar SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET

# List of web servers on your network
ipvar HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET

# List of sql servers on your network
ipvar SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET
```


Config can we kept default with “home_net any” as well , but we did it 10.10.1.20 to keep Kali (which is our attacker) out of scope.

Forwarded Snort logs to Wazuh via ossec.conf :



```
snort.conf ossec.conf index.html web.config
202      <ca_store>wpk_root.pem</ca_store>
203      <ca_verification>yes</ca_verification>
204    </active-response>
205
206    <!-- Choose between plain or json format (or both) for internal logs -->
207    <logging>
208      <log_format>plain</log_format>
209    </logging>
210
211
212    <!-- 8808 Snort Logs Forward -->
213
214    <localfile>
215      <log_format>syslog</log_format>
216      <location>C:\Snort\log\alert.ids</location>
217    </localfile>
218
219
220
221
```

Updating local.rules:




```
11 # owned by Sourcefire, Inc., and the GPL Rules not created by Sourcefire are owned by
12 # their respective creators. Please see http://www.snort.org/snort/snort-team/ for a
13 # list of third party owners and their respective copyrights.
14 #
15 # In order to determine what rules are VRT Certified Rules or GPL Rules, please refer
16 # to the VRT Certified Rules License Agreement (v2.0).
17 #
18 #-----
19 # LOCAL RULES
20 #-----
21 #
22 #
23 # Alert on any ICMP traffic to 10.10.1.20 (ping, etc.)
24 alert icmp any any -> 10.10.1.20 any (msg:"ICMP traffic to 10.10.1.20 detected"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
25 #
26 # Detect possible TCP SYN scan (multiple SYN packets in short time)
27 alert tcp any any -> 10.10.1.20 any (msg:"Possible TCP SYN Scan"; flags:S; threshold:type both, track_by_src, count 10, seconds 3; sid:1000002; rev:1;)
28 #
29 # Detect possible TCP Connect scan (full 3-way handshake scans)
30 alert tcp any any -> 10.10.1.20 any (msg:"Possible TCP Connect Scan"; flags:S; flow:established,to_server; threshold:type both, track_by_src, count 10, seconds 3; sid:1000003; rev:1;)
31 #
32 # Detect possible UDP scan (multiple UDP packets in short time)
33 alert udp any any -> 10.10.1.20 any (msg:"Possible UDP Scan"; threshold:type both, track_by_src, count 10, seconds 3; sid:1000004; rev:1;)
```

By default, Snort can generate alerts using its preconfigured rule sets without any modifications to the local.rules file. However, we decided to update and customize the local.rules file to ensure that we received precise and relevant alerts for our simulated attacks. This customization allowed us to focus on specific Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) that were part of our project requirements, reducing unnecessary noise and making the alerts in Wazuh more actionable and easier to validate during testing.

6. Attack Simulation & Detection

Brute Force Scan Using RDP:

```
[kali㉿kali]:~$ hydra -l Administrator -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt rdp://10.10.1.20
Hydra v9.5 (c) 2023 by van Hauser/TCH & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these ** ignore laws and ethics anyway).
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2025-08-10 15:45:38
[WARNING] rdp servers often don't like many connections, use -t 1 or -t 4 to reduce the number of parallel connections and -W 1 or -W 3 to wait between connection to allow the server to recover
[INFO] Reduced number of tasks to 1 (rdp does not support multi-threaded connections)
[INFO] Hydra's rdp module is experimental, use at your own risk, test, report and if possible, fix.
[DATA] max tasks per 1 target, overall 4 tasks, 16344399 login tries (1:1:p:14344399), -3586100 tries per task
[DATA] attacking rdp://10.10.1.20:3389/
[ERROR] freedrdp: The connection failed to establish.
[STATUS] 236.00 tries/min, 236 tries in 00:01h, 14344163 to do in 1013:01h, 4 active
```




SYN Scan :

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ nmap -sS 10.10.1.20

Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-08-10 15:35 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.1.20
Host is up (0.00027s latency).
Not shown: 994 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server
5985/tcp  open  wsman
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:DF:CB:2C (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.65 seconds
```

	agent.name	WIN-2LJESP92EF
t	data.dstip	10.10.1.20:8080
t	data.id	1:1000002:1
t	data.srcip	10.10.1.30
t	decoder.name	snort
t	decoder.parent	snort
t	full_log	08/10-15:35:51.214128 [**] [1:1000002:1] Possible TCP SYN Scan [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 10.10.1.30:53837 -> 10.10.1.20:8080
t	id	1754854614.458467
t	input.type	log



TCP Scan :


```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ sudo nmap -sU 10.10.1.20

[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-08-10 15:32 EDT

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ nmap -sT 10.10.1.20

Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-08-10 15:34 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.1.20
Host is up (0.00020s latency).
Not shown: 994 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server
5985/tcp  open  wsman
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:DF:CB:2C (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.54 seconds
```




UDP Scan:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ sudo nmap -sU 10.10.1.20

[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-08-10 15:32 EDT

```



7. File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)

Monitored files: index.html & web.config

C:\inetpub\wwwroot				
	Name	Date modified	Type	Size
s	index.html	8/10/2025 2:58 AM	Firefox HTML Doc...	0 KB
ls	web.config	8/10/2025 2:58 AM	CONFIG File	0 KB

Configuration: Modified ossec.conf

```
f ossec.conf ✘ x index.html web.config
<registry_ignore>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Poli
<registry_ignore>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVers
<registry_ignore>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ADOV

<!-- Frequency for ACL checking (seconds) -->
<windows_audit_interval>60</windows_audit_interval>

<!-- Nice value for Syscheck module -->
<process_priority>10</process_priority>


<!-- Maximum output throughput -->
<max_eps>50</max_eps>

<!-- Database synchronization settings -->
<synchronization>
  <enabled>yes</enabled>
  <interval>5m</interval>
  <max_eps>10</max_eps>
</synchronization>


<directories realtime="yes">C:\inetpub\wwwroot</directories>

</syscheck>
```


Restarting Wazuh Agent on Server to take changes:



Test: Currently the index.html is empty




After editing the file :




We can see the generated log on Wazuh Dashboard:






full_log shows the location where the modification was done. Which is the location of index.html in wwwroot folder. Other information like changed attributes, size(old and new) etc. is also visible.

We will do the same test with web.config file :






Successful log generated.

8. Memory Analysis with Volatility

Dumped memory using DumplIt:



Setting up Volatility:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ python3 -m venv v3env

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ source v3env/bin/activate

(v3env)-(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ pip install volatility3

Collecting volatility3
  Downloading volatility3-2.26.0-py3-none-any.whl.metadata (7.4 kB)
Collecting pefile≥2024.8.26 (from volatility3)
  Downloading pefile-2024.8.26-py3-none-any.whl.metadata (1.4 kB)
  Downloading volatility3-2.26.0-py3-none-any.whl (1.4 MB)
                                           1.4/1.4 MB 33.5 MB/s eta 0:00:00
  Downloading pefile-2024.8.26-py3-none-any.whl (74 kB)
Installing collected packages: pefile, volatility3
Successfully installed pefile-2024.8.26 volatility3-2.26.0

(v3env)-(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ █
```

Installing OpenSSH on Windows Server so SCP can work:

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> Get-WindowsCapability -Online | Where-Object Name -like 'OpenSSH.Server*'>> Add-WindowsCapability -Online -Name OpenSSH.Server~~~~0.0.1.0>> Start-Service sshd>> Set-Service -Name sshd -StartupType 'Automatic'>>>  
  
Name : OpenSSH.Server~~~~0.0.1.0  
State : NotPresent  
  
Path :  
Online : True  
  
PS C:\Users\Administrator>
```

Transferred .dmp file to Kali via SCP :

```
└─(v3env)─(kali㉿kali)─[~] $ scp Administrator@10.10.1.20:/Users/Administrator/Downloads/WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp .  
  
The authenticity of host '10.10.1.20 (10.10.1.20)' can't be established.  
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:iQojzxjb7R9Tt1Kyuldzfs01t+OJ15aEZ9yrsHNIMDM.  
This key is not known by any other names.  
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes  
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.1.20' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.  
Administrator@10.10.1.20's password:  
WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp  
WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp
```

Command used to inspect .dmp file using volatility:

```
└─(venv)─(kali㉿kali)─[~/volatility3] $ python3 vol.py -f ~/WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp windows.info  
  
Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2  
Progress: 100.00          PDB scanning finished  
Variable      Value  
  
Kernel Base    0xf8036de1f000  
DTB     0x1ae000  
Symbols file:///home/kali/volatility3/volatility3/symbols/windows/ntkrnlmp.pdb/D801A9AFC0FB7761380800F708633DEA-1.json.xz  
Is64Bit True  
IsPAE  False  
layer_name     0 WindowsIntel32e  
memory_layer   1 WindowsCrashDump64Layer  
base_layer     2 FileLayer  
KdVersionBlock 0xf8036ea34508  
Major/Minor    15.20348  
MachineType    34404  
KeNumberProcessors 2  
SystemTime     2025-08-09 20:45:31+00:00  
NtSystemRoot   C:\Windows  
NtProductType  NtProductServer  
NtMajorVersion 10  
NtMinorVersion 0  
PE MajorOperatingSystemVersion 10  
PE MinorOperatingSystemVersion 0  
PE Machine     34404  
PE TimeStamp    Mon Oct  4 10:47:04 1971  
  
└─(venv)─(kali㉿kali)─[~/volatility3] $
```

Windows.pslist dump:

Windows.pslist dump:													
		PID	PPID	ImageFileName	Offset(V)	Threads	Handles	SessionId	Wow64	CreateTime	ExitTime	File output	
4	0	System	0xac85bf899040	120	-	N/A	False	2025-08-07 17:20:01.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
100	4	Registry	0xac85bf8df080	4	-	N/A	False	2025-08-07 17:19:54.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
308	4	smss.exe	0xac85c30720c0	2	-	N/A	False	2025-08-07 17:20:01.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
424	416	csrss.exe	0xac85c2e36140	10	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
524	416	wininit.exe	0xac85c3f85140	1	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
532	516	csrss.exe	0xac85c31ac0c0	11	-	1	False	2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
588	516	winlogon.exe	0xac85c35e00c0	5	-	1	False	2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
652	524	services.exe	0xac85c21020c0	8	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
668	524	lsass.exe	0xac85c3188080	8	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
776	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c462d240	12	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
800	524	fontdrvhost.ex	0xac85c4604140	5	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
808	588	fontdrvhost.ex	0xac85c4606140	5	-	1	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
884	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c467a2c0	11	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1004	588	dwm.exe	0xac85c46a4080	16	-	1	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
376	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c47152c0	23	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
728	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c474f2c0	13	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
648	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c4758280	24	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1036	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c47912c0	21	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1204	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c48222c0	20	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1300	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c4891240	58	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1380	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c48ce240	15	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1460	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c48e32c0	20	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1536	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c49822c0	3	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1576	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c49c62c0	12	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1896	652	spoolsv.exe	0xac85bf97b080	7	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1908	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c4b07300	4	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1964	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c4a9140	14	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1028	652	MpDefenderCore	0xac85c4b4d380	9	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1200	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c4a8f140	6	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
1524	652	svchost.exe	0xac85c4b4b140	5	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2064	652	VGAAuthService.	0xac85c4ba0300	2	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2088	652	vmtoolsd.exe	0xac85c4b47280	13	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2096	652	vm3dservice.ex	0xac85c4ba92c0	3	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2176	652	MsMpEng.exe	0xac85c4bf9080	26	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2248	652	wlms.exe	0xac85c4c0b080	2	-	0	False	2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2360	2096	vm3dservice.ex	0xac85c4ccb2c0	4	-	1	False	2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2808	1964	AggregatorHost	0xac85c4f320c0	3	-	0	False	2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2856	652	dllhost.exe	0xac85c4f52280	10	-	0	False	2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2928	776	dllhost.exe	0xac85c4fdc2c0	4	-	0	False	2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		
2720	776	WmiPrvSE.exe	0xac85c50b7280	11	-	0	False	2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC	N/A	N/A	Disabled		

Windows.netscan dump:

Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2											
Progress: 100.00 PDB scanning finished											
Offset	Proto	LocalAddr	LocalPort	ForeignAddr	ForeignPort	State	PID	Owner	Created		
0xac85bf8c11b0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	445	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	4	System	2025-08-09 01:33:59.000000 UTC		
0xac85bf8c11b0	TCPv6	::	445	::	0	LISTENING	4	System	2025-08-09 01:33:59.000000 UTC		
0xac85c34a4050	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49664	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	668	lsass.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c34a45d0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49665	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	524	wininit.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c34a45d0	TCPv6	::	49665	::	0	LISTENING	524	wininit.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c34a4cb0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	135	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	884	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c34a4cb0	TCPv6	::	135	::	0	LISTENING	884	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c34a4e10	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49665	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	524	wininit.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c34a45390	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49664	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	668	lsass.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c34a5390	TCPv6	::	49664	::	0	LISTENING	668	lsass.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c34a5910	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	135	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	884	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47c2260	TCPv4	127.0.0.1	49787	127.0.0.1	49786	CLOSED	3512	net.exe	2025-08-09 17:35:05.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fe310	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49667	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	1300	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fe470	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49668	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	1896	spoolsv.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fe5d0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49667	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	1300	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fe5d0	TCPv6	::	49667	::	0	LISTENING	1300	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fe890	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49666	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	728	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fe890	TCPv6	::	49666	::	0	LISTENING	728	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fe9f0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49669	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	652	services.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47feb50	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	5985	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	4	System	2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47feb50	TCPv6	::	5985	::	0	LISTENING	4	System	2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fecb0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49669	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	652	services.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fecb0	TCPv6	::	49669	::	0	LISTENING	652	services.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47fee10	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49666	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	728	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47ff000	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	3389	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	376	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47ff4f0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	3389	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	376	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47ff4f0	TCPv6	::	3389	::	0	LISTENING	376	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47ff910	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	47001	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	4	System	2025-08-09 01:33:59.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47ff910	TCPv6	::	47001	::	0	LISTENING	4	System	2025-08-09 01:33:59.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47ffb0d0	TCPv4	0.0.0.0	49668	0.0.0.0	0	LISTENING	1896	spoolsv.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c47ffb0d0	TCPv6	::	49668	::	0	LISTENING	1896	spoolsv.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c485ad20	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	3389	*	0		376	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c485b4f0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	3389	*	0		376	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c485b4f0	UDPv6	::	3389	*	0		376	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c485b4f0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	4500	*	0		1300	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c4a3c3c0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	500	*	0		1300	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c4a3c3c0	UDPv6	::	500	*	0		1300	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c4a3ca00	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	4500	*	0		1300	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c4a3ca00	UDPv6	::	4500	*	0		1300	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c4a3d4f0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	0	*	0		1300	svchost.exe	2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC		
0xac85c5635430	UDPv6	::	0	*	0		2176	MsMpEng.exe	2025-08-09 20:45:31.000000 UTC		
0xac85c56363d0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	0	*	0		2176	MsMpEng.exe	2025-08-09 20:45:31.000000 UTC		
0xac85c56363d0	UDPv6	::	0	*	0		2176	MsMpEng.exe	2025-08-09 20:45:31.000000 UTC		
0xac85c57c57a0	TCPv4	10.10.1.20	49785	10.10.1.10	1514	CLOSED	1476	win32ui.exe	2025-08-09 17:35:02.000000 UTC		
0xac85c57d6a20	TCPv4	10.10.1.20	135	10.10.1.30	46677	CLOSED	884	svchost.exe	2025-08-09 20:23:53.000000 UTC		
0xac85c5878a20	TCPv4	10.10.1.20	49803	10.10.1.10	1514	ESTABLISHED	4336	wazuh-agent.ex	2025-08-09 20:38:50.000000 UTC		
0xac85c587a010	TCPv4	10.10.1.20	5985	10.10.1.30	46677	CLOSED	4	System	2025-08-09 20:23:59.000000 UTC		
0xac85c588e7a0	TCPv4	10.10.1.20	445	10.10.1.30	46892	CLOSED	4	System	2025-08-09 19:31:27.000000 UTC		
0xac85c5e05500	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	0	*	0		4244	svchost.exe	2025-08-09 01:36:02.000000 UTC		
0xac85c5e05500	UDPv6	::	0	*	0		4244	svchost.exe	2025-08-09 01:36:02.000000 UTC		
0xac85c5e05690	UDPv4	0.0.0.0	123	*	0		4244	svchost.exe	2025-08-09 01:36:03.000000 UTC		

We can see the tcp scan done by 10.10.1.30 (kali) to our windows server (10.10.1.20).

Furthermore, we can also notice that a connection was made by wazuh-agent.ex to 10.10.1.10 (SIEM) , confirming logs we sent in real-time to wazuh server.

9. Conclusion

This project successfully met all the objectives of the CST8808 Final Project by building a functional incident detection and response environment for CSA271.com. Using Wazuh SIEM integrated with Snort IDS, we detected and logged all four required Indicators of Compromise. Brute force login attempts, SYN scans, TCP scans, and UDP scans.

File Integrity Monitoring ensured that unauthorized changes to key web files were immediately flagged, and memory analysis with Volatility confirmed in-memory evidence of the attacks.

Despite resource constraints that prevented us from running a fully dedicated machine for each role, the lab environment was carefully configured to mimic real-world operations while maintaining performance. This allowed us to validate log forwarding, alert generation, and correlation within the SIEM dashboard under realistic attack conditions.

In the end, this project proved that with the right planning and configuration, open-source tools like Wazuh and Snort can deliver robust, enterprise-level security monitoring and incident response without the cost of commercial licenses. Making them both practical and powerful for organizations with limited budgets.

10. References

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