

8/10/2025

Final Project

CST8808 – Cyber Incident Report

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
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Incident Response Plan Implementation

1. Introduction

This report documents the implementation of an Incident Response (IR) plan for CSA271.com, focusing on log monitoring, threat detection, and attack simulation using a SIEM (Wazuh), Snort IDS, and Volatility for memory analysis. The project involved setting up a virtual lab environment with Kali Linux (attacker), Windows Server (IIS/FTP + Snort), and Ubuntu (Wazuh SIEM).

2. Network Topology & Configuration



3. VMs Configuration:

IP Configuration

Machine	IP Address	Role
Kali Linux	10.10.1.30	Attack simulation
Windows Server	10.10.1.20	IIS/FTP + Snort IDS
Wazuh (Ubuntu)	10.10.1.10	SIEM (Log collection & alerts)

Configuring VMware : Setting Subnet IP and Subnet Mask on Vmnet9

VMnet9	Host-only	-	Connected	-	10.10.1.0
--------	-----------	---	-----------	---	-----------

Add Network...Remove NetworkRename Network...

VMnet Information

☐ Bridged (connect VMs directly to the external network)

Bridged to: Automatic

Automatic Settings...

☐ NAT (shared host's IP address with VMs)

NAT Settings...

☒ Host-only (connect VMs internally in a private network)

☒ Connect a host virtual adapter to this network

Host virtual adapter name: VMware Network Adapter VMnet9

☐ Use local DHCP service to distribute IP address to VMs

DHCP Settings...

Subnet IP: 10 . 10 . 1 . 0


Subnet mask: 255 . 255 . 255 . 0

Key Configurations

- **Static IPs** configured on all machines

Kali Linux:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  
$ sudo nano /etc/network/interfaces
```




The screenshot shows a terminal window with the nano text editor open. The title bar indicates the user is 'kali@kali' in the home directory. The menu bar includes 'File', 'Actions', 'Edit', 'View', and 'Help'. The status bar at the top shows 'GNU nano 8.4' and the file path '/etc/network/interfaces *'. The editor content shows the configuration for the 'eth0' interface, starting with 'auto eth0' followed by 'iface eth0 inet static'. Underneath, the static configuration is detailed with 'address 10.10.1.40', 'netmask 255.255.255.0', 'gateway 10.10.1.1', and 'dns-nameservers 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4'. A cursor is visible at the end of the last line.

```
kali@kali: ~  
File Actions Edit View Help  
GNU nano 8.4 /etc/network/interfaces *  
auto eth0  
iface eth0 inet static  
    address 10.10.1.40  
    netmask 255.255.255.0  
    gateway 10.10.1.1  
    dns-nameservers 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4
```

Dns-nameservers can be skipped because we are on host only network. It was only set in case we need to switch to NAT for downloading any tools.


Windows Server (IIS):



Ubuntu(Wazuh/SIEM):



Confirming if machines are on same network:



The screenshot shows a network scanner interface with a menu bar (File, Actions, Edit, View, Help) and a status bar indicating 'Currently scanning: Finished!' and 'Screen View: Unique Hosts'. Below this, it states '3 Captured ARP Req/Rep packets, from 3 hosts. Total size: 180'. A table displays the captured data:

IP	At MAC Address	Count	Len	MAC Vendor / Hostname
10.10.1.1	00:50:56:c0:00:05	1	60	VMware, Inc.
10.10.1.10	00:0c:29:44:7a:31	1	60	VMware, Inc.
10.10.1.20	00:0c:29:df:cb:2c	1	60	VMware, Inc.

4. NTP Synchronization on all machines:


Kali:



```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ timedatectl

Local time: Wed 2025-08-06 21:16:34 EDT
Universal time: Thu 2025-08-07 01:16:34 UTC
RTC time: Thu 2025-08-07 01:16:34
Time zone: America/New_York (EDT, -0400)
System clock synchronized: yes
NTP service: active
RTC in local TZ: no
```

Ubuntu:



```
wazuh@wazuh:~$ sudo timedatectl set-ntp true
wazuh@wazuh:~$ sudo systemctl restart systemd-timesyncd
wazuh@wazuh:~$ timedatectl

Local time: Wed 2025-08-06 21:26:15 EDT
Universal time: Thu 2025-08-07 01:26:15 UTC
RTC time: Thu 2025-08-07 01:26:15
Time zone: America/Toronto (EDT, -0400)
System clock synchronized: yes
NTP service: active
RTC in local TZ: no
wazuh@wazuh:~$
```

Windows:

Administrator: Command Prompt

```
C:\Users\Administrator>w32tm /config /manualpeerlist:"time.windows.com" /syncfromflags:manual /reliable:yes /update
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\Administrator>w32tm /resync
Sending resync command to local computer
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\Administrator>
C:\Users\Administrator>w32tm /query /status
Leap Indicator: 0(no warning)
Stratum: 4 (secondary reference - syncd by (S)NTP)
Precision: -23 (119.209ns per tick)
Root Delay: 0.0442954s
Root Dispersion: 8.1168525s
ReferenceId: 0xA83DD74A (source IP: 168.61.215.74)
Last Successful Sync Time: 8/6/2025 6:36:09 PM
Source: time.windows.com
Poll Interval: 6 (64s)
```

5. SIEM Setup :

SIEM Selection Rationale:

For this project, we selected Wazuh as the SIEM platform instead of alternatives like Splunk, OSSIM, or the ELK Stack. The decision was based on the following factors:

1. **Cost Efficiency** – Wazuh is open-source and free to deploy, avoiding licensing costs associated with Splunk Enterprise or commercial OSSIM implementations, which is ideal for test lab environment.
2. **Feature Set** – Wazuh integrates SIEM, log analysis, and File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) in a single platform. This allowed us to meet both the SIEM and FIM requirements without installing multiple separate tools.
3. **Integration with IDS** – Wazuh can easily ingest alerts from Snort IDS, enabling centralized monitoring of both host-based and network-based events.

Wazuh Installation:

```
wazuh@wazuh:~$ curl -sO https://packages.wazuh.com/4.12/wazuh-install.sh
wazuh@wazuh:~$ sudo bash wazuh-install.sh -a
06/08/2025 06:43:08 INFO: Starting Wazuh installation assistant. Wazuh version: 4.12.0
06/08/2025 06:43:08 INFO: Verbose logging redirected to /var/log/wazuh-install.log
06/08/2025 06:43:13 INFO: --- Dependencies ----
06/08/2025 06:43:13 INFO: Installing gawk.
06/08/2025 06:43:19 INFO: Verifying that your system meets the recommended minimum hardware requirements.
06/08/2025 06:43:19 INFO: Wazuh web interface port will be 443.
06/08/2025 06:43:26 INFO: --- Dependencies ----
06/08/2025 06:43:26 INFO: Installing apt-transport-https.
06/08/2025 06:43:29 INFO: Installing debhelper.
06/08/2025 06:44:03 INFO: Wazuh repository added.
06/08/2025 06:44:03 INFO: --- Configuration files ---
06/08/2025 06:44:03 INFO: Generating configuration files.
06/08/2025 06:44:04 INFO: Generating the root certificate.
06/08/2025 06:44:04 INFO: Generating Admin certificates.
06/08/2025 06:44:04 INFO: Generating Wazuh indexer certificates.
06/08/2025 06:44:04 INFO: Generating Filebeat certificates.
06/08/2025 06:44:05 INFO: Generating Wazuh dashboard certificates.
06/08/2025 06:44:05 INFO: Created wazuh-install-files.tar. It contains the Wazuh cluster key, certificates, and passwords necessary for installation.
06/08/2025 06:44:06 INFO: --- Wazuh indexer ---
06/08/2025 06:44:06 INFO: Starting Wazuh indexer installation.
06/08/2025 06:44:38 INFO: Wazuh indexer installation finished.
06/08/2025 06:44:38 INFO: Wazuh indexer post-install configuration finished.
06/08/2025 06:44:38 INFO: Starting service wazuh-indexer.
06/08/2025 06:44:44 INFO: wazuh-indexer service started.
06/08/2025 06:44:44 INFO: Initializing Wazuh indexer cluster security settings.
06/08/2025 06:44:49 INFO: Wazuh indexer cluster security configuration initialized.
06/08/2025 06:44:49 INFO: Wazuh indexer cluster initialized.
06/08/2025 06:44:49 INFO: --- Wazuh server ---
06/08/2025 06:44:49 INFO: Starting the Wazuh manager installation.
06/08/2025 06:46:09 INFO: Wazuh manager installation finished.
06/08/2025 06:46:09 INFO: Wazuh manager vulnerability detection configuration finished.
06/08/2025 06:46:09 INFO: Starting service wazuh-manager.
06/08/2025 06:46:26 INFO: wazuh-manager service started.
06/08/2025 06:46:26 INFO: Starting Filebeat installation.
```


```
06/08/2025 06:49:13 INFO: --- Summary ---
06/08/2025 06:49:13 INFO: You can access the web interface https://<wazuh-dashboard-ip>:443
User: admin
Password: iI?BKS.mxRK28XG?FngWJFpF4LLKctX8
06/08/2025 06:49:13 INFO: --- Dependencies ----
06/08/2025 06:49:13 INFO: Removing gawk.
06/08/2025 06:49:18 INFO: Installation finished.
wazuh@wazuh:~$ ip a
```

User : admin


Password : iI?BKS.mxRK28XG?FngWJFpF4LLKctX8

Next, we will open the Wazuh Dashboard on our local ip 10.10.1.10 with the above credentials.

Dashboard :




Wazuh agent on windows server :



Wazuh agent will require manager ip (10.10.1.10) and authentication key which we will generate next.

Generating the key for agent:

Wazuh Agent Final Setup:




Confirmed agent connection in Wazuh dashboard :


A screenshot of the Wazuh dashboard interface. The browser address bar shows "10.10.1.10/app/endpoints-summary#/agents-preview/". The dashboard has a sidebar with "Endpoints" selected. The main content area has three circular progress charts: "AGENTS BY STATUS" (Active: 1, Disconnected: 0, Pending: 0, Never connected: 0), "TOP 5 OS" (windows: 1), and "TOP 5 GROUPS" (default: 1). Below these is a table titled "Agents (1)" with a toggle for "Show only outdated". The table has columns: ID, Name, IP address, Group(s), Operating system, Cluster node, Version, Status, and Actions. The first row shows an active agent with ID 001, Name IIS-Server, IP address 10.10.1.20, Group default, and Operating system Microsoft Windows Server 2022 Standard Evaluation 10.0.20348.587. The status is "active". The bottom of the dashboard shows a Windows taskbar with the time 4:32 AM on 8/6/2025.

Snort IDS Integration:


Next, we needed an IDS system to forward network-based alerts from the Windows Server to the Wazuh SIEM. In a real-world deployment, IDS is typically hosted on a dedicated appliance or server to avoid resource contention and ensure optimal performance. However, due to the limited resources available in our lab environment for running multiple VMs, we integrated the IDS directly into the same Windows Server hosting IIS. We selected Snort as our IDS because it is open source, widely used, and offers straightforward integration with Wazuh. Snort's extensive rule set and community support allowed us to quickly detect simulated network attacks and forward the corresponding alerts to the SIEM for correlation and visualization.

Snort installation :





Running snort :



Checking the index number of interface:

```
C:\Snort\bin>snort -W

-*)> Snort! <*-
o"~)~ Version 2.9.20-WIN64 GRE (Build 82)
'~~~ By Martin Roesch & The Snort Team: http://www.snort.org/contact#team
      Copyright (C) 2014-2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
      Copyright (C) 1998-2013 Sourcefire, Inc., et al.
      Using PCRE version: 8.10 2010-06-25
      Using ZLIB version: 1.2.11

Index  Physical Address      IP Address      Device Name      Description
-----
1      00:00:00:00:00:00          disabled       \Device\NPF_{F5437729-2FB9-4180-A6B0-FA50ACFF4EED}  WAN Miniport (Network Monitor)
2      00:00:00:00:00:00          disabled       \Device\NPF_{35AD6BAC-3CD0-438D-ACDF-28EEB553AD67}  WAN Miniport (IPv6)
3      00:00:00:00:00:00          disabled       \Device\NPF_{EAE2C187-25CB-4145-BDEB-E95E91712C10}  WAN Miniport (IP)
4      00:0C:29:DF:CB:2C          10.10.1.20     \Device\NPF_{C44D4250-5553-4CBE-9BF0-CC02AFFEAAFC}  Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection
5      00:00:00:00:00:00          0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000 \Device\NPF_{Loopback} Adapter for loopback traffic capture

C:\Snort\bin>
```

Snort command :

```
C:\Snort\bin>snort -c C:\Snort\etc\snort.conf -i 4 -l C:\Snort\log -A console
```

Snort default config:

```
C:\Snort\etc\snort.conf - Notepad++ [Administrator]
File Edit Search View Encoding Language Settings Tools Macro Run Plugins Window ?


snort.conf ossec.conf index.html web.config
40 #####
41 # Step #1: Set the network variables. For more information, see README.variables
42 #####
43
44 # Setup the network addresses you are protecting
45 ipvar HOME_NET any
46
47 # Set up the external network addresses. Leave as "any" in most situations
48 ipvar EXTERNAL_NET any
49
50 # List of DNS servers on your network
51 ipvar DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET
52
53 # List of SMTP servers on your network
54 ipvar SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
55
56 # List of web servers on your network
57 ipvar HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
58
59 # List of sql servers on your network
60 ipvar SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET
61
62 # List of telnet servers on your network
63 ipvar TELNET_SERVERS $HOME_NET
64
65 # List of ssh servers on your network
66 ipvar SSH_SERVERS $HOME_NET
67
68 # List of ftp servers on your network
69 ipvar FTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
70
71 # List of sip servers on your network
72 ipvar SIP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
```

Configured Snort to monitor home_net = 10.10.1.20 :

```
#####  
  
#####  
# Step #1: Set the network variables.  For more information, see README.variables  
#####  
  
# Setup the network addresses you are protecting  
ipvar HOME_NET 10.10.1.20  
  
# Set up the external network addresses.  Leave as "any" in most situations  
ipvar EXTERNAL_NET 10.10.1.20  
  
# List of DNS servers on your network  
ipvar DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
  
# List of SMTP servers on your network  
ipvar SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
  
# List of web servers on your network  
ipvar HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
  
# List of sql servers on your network  
ipvar SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET
```


Config can we kept default with “home_net any” as well , but we did it 10.10.1.20 to keep Kali (which is our attacker) out of scope.

Forwarded Snort logs to Wazuh via ossec.conf :



```
202      <ca_store>wpk_root.pem</ca_store>  
203      <ca_verification>yes</ca_verification>  
204      </active-response>  
205  
206      <!-- Choose between plain or json format (or both) for internal logs -->  
207      <logging>  
208          <log_format>plain</log_format>  
209      </logging>  
210  
211  
212      <!-- 8808 Snort Logs Forward -->  
213  
214      <localfile>  
215          <log_format>syslog</log_format>  
216          <location>C:\Snort\log\alert.ids</location>  
217      </localfile>  
218  
219  
220  
221
```

Updating local.rules:



```
11 # owned by Sourcefire, Inc., and the GPL Rules not created by Sourcefire are owned by
12 # their respective creators. Please see http://www.snort.org/snort/snort-team/ for a
13 # list of third party owners and their respective copyrights.
14 #
15 # In order to determine what rules are VRT Certified Rules or GPL Rules, please refer
16 # to the VRT Certified Rules License Agreement (v2.0).
17 #
18 #-----
19 # LOCAL RULES
20 #-----
21
22
23 # Alert on any ICMP traffic to 10.10.1.20 (ping, etc.)
24 alert icmp any any -> 10.10.1.20 any (msg:"ICMP traffic to 10.10.1.20 detected"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
25
26 # Detect possible TCP SYN scan (multiple SYN packets in short time)
27 alert tcp any any -> 10.10.1.20 any (msg:"Possible TCP SYN Scan"; flags:S; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 10, seconds 3; sid:1000002; rev:1;)
28
29 # Detect possible TCP Connect scan (full 3-way handshake scans)
30 alert tcp any any -> 10.10.1.20 any (msg:"Possible TCP Connect Scan"; flags:S; flow:established,to_server; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 10, seconds 3; sid:1000003; rev:1;)
31
32 # Detect possible UDP scan (multiple UDP packets in short time)
33 alert udp any any -> 10.10.1.20 any (msg:"Possible UDP Scan"; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 10, seconds 3; sid:1000004; rev:1;)
34
35
```


By default, Snort can generate alerts using its preconfigured rule sets without any modifications to the local.rules file. However, we decided to update and customize the local.rules file to ensure that we received precise and relevant alerts for our simulated attacks. This customization allowed us to focus on specific Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) that were part of our project requirements, reducing unnecessary noise and making the alerts in Wazuh more actionable and easier to validate during testing.

6. Attack Simulation & Detection

Brute Force Scan Using RDP:

```
(kali@kali) ~$ hydra -l Administrator -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt rdp://10.10.1.20
Hydra v9.5 (c) 2023 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these ** ignore laws and ethics anyway).

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2025-08-10 15:45:38
[WARNING] rdp servers often don't like many connections, use -t 1 or -t 4 to reduce the number of parallel connections and -W 1 or -W 3 to wait between connection to allow the server to recover
[INFO] Reduced number of tasks to 4 (rdp does not like many parallel connections)
[WARNING] the rdp module is experimental. Please test, report - and if possible, fix.
[DATA] max 4 tasks per 1 server, overall 4 tasks, 14344399 login tries (l:/p:14344399), ~3586100 tries per task
[DATA] attacking rdp://10.10.1.20:3389/
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[ERROR] freerdp: The connection failed to establish.
[STATUS] 236.00 tries/min, 236 tries in 00:01h, 14344163 to do in 1013:01h, 4 active
```



input to this VM, move the mouse pointer inside or press Ctrl+G.

f data.win.system.level	0
f data.win.system.message	> "An account failed to log on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon Type: 0x0"
f data.win.system.opcode	0
f data.win.system.processID	664
f data.win.system.providerGuid	{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  
$ nmap -sS 10.10.1.20  
  
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-08-10 15:35 EDT  
Nmap scan report for 10.10.1.20  
Host is up (0.00027s latency).  
Not shown: 994 closed tcp ports (reset)  
PORT      STATE SERVICE  
22/tcp    open  ssh  
135/tcp    open  msrpc  
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn  
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds  
3389/tcp   open  ms-wbt-server  
5985/tcp   open  wsman  
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:DF:CB:2C (VMware)  
  
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.65 seconds
```

The screenshot displays the Wazuh dashboard interface. On the left, a sidebar lists available fields for filtering, including `_index`, `agent.id`, `agent.ip`, `agent.name`, `data.command`, `data.dstip`, `data.dstuser`, `data.extra_data`, `data.id`, `data.pwd`, `data.scrip`, `data.sruser`, `data.status`, `data.tty`, and `data.uid`. The main search area shows a bar chart titled "10 hits" for the query `Aug 10, 2025 @ 15:32:06.977 - Aug 10, 2025 @ 15:37:06.977 per`. The chart displays the frequency of alerts over time. Below the chart, the "Expanded document" view shows a detailed log entry for a SYN scan attempt on August 10, 2025, at 15:36:54.260. The log entry includes fields such as `predecoder.timestamp`, `input.type`, `log`, `agent.ip`, `agent.name`, `agent.id`, `manager.name`, `data.scrip`, `data.dstip`, `data.id`, `data.id`, `rule.firetimes`, `rule.level`, `rule.description`, `rule.groups`, `rule.id`, `location`, `event.log.alert.id`, `decoder.parent`, `short`, `decoder.name`, `short`, `id`, `timestamp`, `index`, and `data`. The log entry describes a possible TCP SYN scan attempt on a host.

TCP Scan :


```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ sudo nmap -sU 10.10.1.20

[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-08-10 15:32 EDT

(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nmap -sT 10.10.1.20

Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-08-10 15:34 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.1.20
Host is up (0.00020s latency).
Not shown: 994 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
135/tcp    open  msrpc
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
3389/tcp   open  ms-wbt-server
5985/tcp   open  wsman
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:DF:CB:2C (VMware)


Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.54 seconds
```



timestamp per 5 seconds	
agent.name	WIN-CL-ESP902EF
data.dstip	10.10.1.20
data.id	122:1:1
data.srcip	10.10.1
decoder.name	snort
decoder.parent	snort
full_log	08/10-15:34:41.348991 [**] [122:1:1] (portscan) TCP Portscan [**] [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2] (PROTO:255) 10.10.1.30 -> 10.10.1.20
id	1754854543.457789
input.type	log

UDP Scan:

```
(kali@kali)-[~]  
$ sudo nmap -sU 10.10.1.20  
  
[sudo] password for kali:  
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-08-10 15:32 EDT
```



7. File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)

Monitored files: index.html & web.config

C:\inetpub\wwwroot				
Name	Date modified	Type	Size	
index.html	8/10/2025 2:58 AM	Firefox HTML Doc...	0 KB	
web.config	8/10/2025 2:58 AM	CONFIG File	0 KB	

Configuration: Modified ossec.conf

```
ossec.conf index.html web.config
<registry_ignore>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Poli
<registry_ignore>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVers
<registry_ignore>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ADOV

<!-- Frequency for ACL checking (seconds) -->
<windows_audit_interval>60</windows_audit_interval>

<!-- Nice value for Syscheck module -->
<process_priority>10</process_priority>


<!-- Maximum output throughput -->
<max_eps>50</max_eps>

<!-- Database synchronization settings -->
<synchronization>
  <enabled>yes</enabled>
  <interval>5m</interval>
  <max_eps>10</max_eps>
</synchronization>


<directories realtime="yes">C:\inetpub\wwwroot</directories>

</syscheck>
```


Restarting Wazuh Agent on Server to take changes:




Test: Currently the index.html is empty




After editing the file :




We can see the generated log on Wazuh Dashboard:





full_log shows the location where the modification was done. Which is the location of index.html in wwwroot folder. Other information like changed attributes, size(old and new) etc. is also visible.

We will do the same test with web.config file :







Successful log generated.

8. Memory Analysis with Volatility

Dumped memory using DumpIt:



Setting up Volatility:



Installing OpenSSH on Windows Server so SCP can work:

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator> Get-WindowsCapability -Online | Where-Object Name -like 'OpenSSH.Server*'
>> Add-WindowsCapability -Online -Name OpenSSH.Server~~~~0.0.1.0
>> Start-Service sshd
>> Set-Service -Name sshd -StartupType 'Automatic'
>>

Name : OpenSSH.Server~~~~0.0.1.0
State : NotPresent

Path :
Online : True

PS C:\Users\Administrator> .
```

Transferred .dmp file to Kali via SCP :

```
(v3env)-(kali@kali)-[~]
└─$ scp Administrator@10.10.1.20:/Users/Administrator/Downloads/WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp .

The authenticity of host '10.10.1.20 (10.10.1.20)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:iQojzxjb7R9Tt1Kyuldzfs01t+OJ15aEZ9yrsHNMIDM.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.1.20' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
Administrator@10.10.1.20's password:
WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp
WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp
```

Command used to inspect .dmp file using volatility:

```
(venv)-(kali@kali)-[~/volatility3]
└─$ python3 vol.py -f ~/WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp windows.info

Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2
Progress: 100.00 PDB scanning finished
Variable Value

Kernel Base 0xf8036de1f000
DTB 0x1ae000
Symbols file:///home/kali/volatility3/volatility3/symbols/windows/ntkrnlmp.pdb/D801A9AFC0FB7761380800F708633DEA-1.json.xz
Is64Bit True
IsPAE False
layer_name 0 WindowsIntel32e
memory_layer 1 WindowsCrashDump64Layer
base_layer 2 FileLayer
KdVersionBlock 0xf8036ea34508
Major/Minor 15.20348
MachineType 34404
KeNumberProcessors 2
SystemTime 2025-08-09 20:45:31+00:00
NtSystemRoot C:\Windows
NtProductType NtProductServer
NtMajorVersion 10
NtMinorVersion 0
PE MajorOperatingSystemVersion 10
PE MinorOperatingSystemVersion 0
PE Machine 34404
PE TimeDateStamp Mon Oct 4 10:47:04 1971

(venv)-(kali@kali)-[~/volatility3]
└─$
```

Windows.pslist dump:

```
(venv)-(kali@kali)-[~/volatility3]
$ python3 vol.py -f ~/WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp windows.pslist

Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2
Progress: 100.00
PDB scanning finished
PID PPID ImageFileName Offset(V) Threads Handles SessionId Wow64 CreateTime ExitTime File output
4 0 System 0xac85bf899040 120 - N/A False 2025-08-07 17:20:01.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
100 4 Registry 0xac85bf8df080 4 - N/A False 2025-08-07 17:19:54.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
308 4 smss.exe 0xac85c30720c0 2 - N/A False 2025-08-07 17:20:01.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
424 416 csrss.exe 0xac85c2e36140 10 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
524 416 wininit.exe 0xac85c3f85140 1 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
532 516 csrss.exe 0xac85c31ac0c0 11 - 1 False 2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
588 516 winlogon.exe 0xac85c35e00c0 5 - 1 False 2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
652 524 services.exe 0xac85c21020c0 8 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
668 524 lsass.exe 0xac85c3188080 8 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:02.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
776 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c462d240 12 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
800 524 fontdrvhost.exe 0xac85c4604140 5 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
808 588 fontdrvhost.exe 0xac85c4606140 5 - 1 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
884 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c467a2c0 11 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1004 588 dwm.exe 0xac85c46a4080 16 - 1 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
376 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c47152c0 23 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
728 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c474f2c0 13 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
648 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c4758280 24 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1036 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c47912c0 21 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1204 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c48222c0 20 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1300 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c4891240 58 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1380 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c48ce240 15 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1460 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c48e32c0 20 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1536 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c49822c0 3 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1576 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c49c62c0 12 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1896 652 spoolsv.exe 0xac85bf97b080 7 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1908 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c4b07300 4 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1964 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c4a9a140 14 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1028 652 MpDefenderCore 0xac85c4b4d380 9 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1200 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c4a8f140 6 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
1524 652 svchost.exe 0xac85c4b4b140 5 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2064 652 VGAuthService.exe 0xac85c4ba0300 2 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2088 652 vmtoolsd.exe 0xac85c4ba7280 13 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2096 652 vm3dservice.exe 0xac85c4ba92c0 3 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2176 652 MsMpEng.exe 0xac85c4bf9080 26 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2248 652 wlm.exe 0xac85c4c0b080 2 - 0 False 2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2360 2096 vm3dservice.exe 0xac85c4ccb2c0 4 - 1 False 2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2808 1964 AggregatorHost 0xac85c4f320c0 3 - 0 False 2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2856 652 dllhost.exe 0xac85c4f52280 10 - 0 False 2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2928 776 dllhost.exe 0xac85c4fdc2c0 4 - 0 False 2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
2720 776 WmiPrvSE.exe 0xac85c50b7280 11 - 0 False 2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
```


Windows.netscan dump:

```
(venv)-(kali@kali)-[~/volatility3]
$ python3 vol.py -f ~/WIN-2LJE5PP82EF-20250809-204455.dmp windows.netscan

Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2
Progress: 100.00
PDB scanning finished
Offset Proto LocalAddr LocalPort ForeignAddr ForeignPort State PID Owner Created
0xac85bf8c11b0 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 445 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 4 System 2025-08-09 01:33:59.000000 UTC
0xac85bf8c11b0 TCPv6 :: 445 :: 0 LISTENING 4 System 2025-08-09 01:33:59.000000 UTC
0xac85c34a4050 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49664 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 668 lsass.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c34a45d0 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49665 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 524 wininit.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c34a45d0 TCPv6 :: 49665 :: 0 LISTENING 524 wininit.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c34a4cb0 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 135 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 884 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c34a4cb0 TCPv6 :: 135 :: 0 LISTENING 884 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c34a4e10 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49665 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 524 wininit.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c34a5390 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49664 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 668 lsass.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c34a5390 TCPv6 :: 49664 :: 0 LISTENING 668 lsass.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c34a5910 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 135 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 884 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47c2260 TCPv4 127.0.0.1 49787 127.0.0.1 49786 CLOSED 3512 net.exe 2025-08-09 17:35:05.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fe310 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49667 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 1300 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fe470 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49668 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 1896 spoolsv.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fe5d0 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49667 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 1300 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fe5d0 TCPv6 :: 49667 :: 0 LISTENING 1300 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fe890 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49666 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 728 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fe890 TCPv6 :: 49666 :: 0 LISTENING 728 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fe9f0 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49669 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 652 services.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC
0xac85c47feb50 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 5985 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 4 System 2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC
0xac85c47feb50 TCPv6 :: 5985 :: 0 LISTENING 4 System 2025-08-09 01:34:00.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fecb0 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49669 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 652 services.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fecb0 TCPv6 :: 49669 :: 0 LISTENING 652 services.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:04.000000 UTC
0xac85c47fee10 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49666 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 728 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47ff0d0 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 3389 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 376 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47ff4f0 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 3389 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 376 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47ff4f0 TCPv6 :: 3389 :: 0 LISTENING 376 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47ff910 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 47001 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 4 System 2025-08-09 01:33:59.000000 UTC
0xac85c47ff910 TCPv6 :: 47001 :: 0 LISTENING 4 System 2025-08-09 01:33:59.000000 UTC
0xac85c47ffbd0 TCPv4 0.0.0.0 49668 0.0.0.0 0 LISTENING 1896 spoolsv.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c47ffbd0 TCPv6 :: 49668 :: 0 LISTENING 1896 spoolsv.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c485ad20 UDPv4 0.0.0.0 3389 * 0 376 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c485b4f0 UDPv4 0.0.0.0 3389 * 0 376 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c485b4f0 UDPv6 :: 3389 * 0 376 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c4a3b740 UDPv4 0.0.0.0 4500 * 0 1300 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c4a3c3c0 UDPv4 0.0.0.0 500 * 0 1300 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c4a3c3c0 UDPv6 :: 500 * 0 1300 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c4a3ca00 UDPv4 0.0.0.0 4500 * 0 1300 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c4a3ca00 UDPv6 :: 4500 * 0 1300 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC
0xac85c4a3d4f0 UDPv4 0.0.0.0 0 * 0 1300 svchost.exe 2025-08-07 17:20:03.000000 UTC

0xac85c5635430 UDPv6 :: 0 * 0 2176 MsMpEng.exe 2025-08-09 20:45:31.000000 UTC
0xac85c56363d0 UDPv4 0.0.0.0 0 * 0 2176 MsMpEng.exe 2025-08-09 20:45:31.000000 UTC
0xac85c56363d0 UDPv6 :: 0 * 0 2176 MsMpEng.exe 2025-08-09 20:45:31.000000 UTC
0xac85c57c57a0 TCPv4 10.10.1.20 49785 10.10.1.10 1514 CLOSED 1476 win32ui.exe 2025-08-09 17:35:02.000000 UTC
0xac85c57d6a20 TCPv4 10.10.1.20 135 10.10.1.30 46677 CLOSED 884 svchost.exe 2025-08-09 20:23:53.000000 UTC
0xac85c5878a20 TCPv4 10.10.1.20 49803 10.10.1.10 1514 ESTABLISHED 4336 wazuh-agent.ex 2025-08-09 20:38:50.000000 UTC
0xac85c587a010 TCPv4 10.10.1.20 5985 10.10.1.30 46677 CLOSED 4 System 2025-08-09 20:23:59.000000 UTC
0xac85c588e7a0 TCPv4 10.10.1.20 445 10.10.1.30 46892 CLOSED 4 System 2025-08-09 19:31:27.000000 UTC
0xac85c5e05500 UDPv4 0.0.0.0 0 * 0 4244 svchost.exe 2025-08-09 01:36:02.000000 UTC
0xac85c5e05500 UDPv6 :: 0 * 0 4244 svchost.exe 2025-08-09 01:36:02.000000 UTC
0xac85c5e05690 UDPv4 0.0.0.0 123 * 0 4244 svchost.exe 2025-08-09 01:36:03.000000 UTC
```

We can see the tcp scan done by 10.10.1.30 (kali) to our windows server (10.10.1.20).

Furthermore, we can also notice that a connection was made by wazuh-agent.ex to 10.10.1.10 (SIEM) , confirming logs we sent in real-time to wazuh server.

9. Conclusion

This project successfully met all the objectives of the CST8808 Final Project by building a functional incident detection and response environment for CSA271.com. Using Wazuh SIEM integrated with Snort IDS, we detected and logged all four required Indicators of Compromise. Brute force login attempts, SYN scans, TCP scans, and UDP scans.

File Integrity Monitoring ensured that unauthorized changes to key web files were immediately flagged, and memory analysis with Volatility confirmed in-memory evidence of the attacks.

Despite resource constraints that prevented us from running a fully dedicated machine for each role, the lab environment was carefully configured to mimic real-world operations while maintaining performance. This allowed us to validate log forwarding, alert generation, and correlation within the SIEM dashboard under realistic attack conditions.

In the end, this project proved that with the right planning and configuration, open-source tools like Wazuh and Snort can deliver robust, enterprise-level security monitoring and incident response without the cost of commercial licenses. Making them both practical and powerful for organizations with limited budgets.

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