Hash Based Signatures

Halil İbrahim Kaplan

TDD / Kripto Analiz Laboratuvarı

halil.kaplan@tubitak.gov.tr

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Overview

1. Hash Functions and Security
2. Lamport One-Time Signiture
3. Merkle’s tree-based signature
4. WOTS/WOTS+
5. XMSS
6. FORS
7. SPHINCS+
8. Antonov’s Attack

Digital signatures assures

Authenticity
The identity of the organization that sent the message (the message signer) is confirmed.

Integrity
The message content was not changed or tampered with since it was digitally signed.

Nonrepudiation
The origin of the signed content is verified to all parties so the message signer cannot deny association with the signed content.


message
message digest
Alice was beginning to get very tired of sitting by her sister on the bank, and having nothing to do.
h
DFDC349A
I am not a crook.
h
FB93E283
I am not a cook.
h
A3F4439B

Preimage resistance:

Given h(x) it should be infeasible to find x



preimage resistance

Second-preimage resistance(weak collision):

Given any first input x_1 , it should be infeasible to find any distinct second input x_2 such that

$$h(x_1) = h(x_2)$$



second preimage resistance

Collision resistance:

It should be infeasible to find any pair of distinct inputs x_1 and x_2 , such that

$$h(x_1) = h(x_2).$$



collision resistance



Ideally, we would like to have a hash function for which weak collisions do not exist.

This is, unfortunately, impossible due to the pigeonhole principle



So we say infeasible

How common collisions for 80 bit hash output ?

Expectation: Try 2^{80} message

Reality: Try 2^{40} message

Reason: Birthday paradox

How many people are needed such that
there is a reasonable chance that at least two people have the same birthday?

$$P(\text{no collision among 2 people}) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{365}\right)$$

If a third person joins the party, he or she can collide with both of the people already there, hence:

$$P(\text{no collision among 3 people}) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{365}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{365}\right)$$

Consequently, the probability for t people having no birthday collision is given by:

$$P(\text{no collision among } t \text{ people}) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{365}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{365}\right) \cdots \left(1 - \frac{t-1}{365}\right)$$

For $t = 366$ people we will have a collision with probability 1 since a year has only 365 days. We return now to our initial question: how many people are needed to have a 50% chance of two colliding birthdays? Surprisingly—following from the equations above—it only requires 23 people to obtain a probability of about 0.5 for a birthday collision since:

$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{at least one collision}) &= 1 - P(\text{no collision}) \\ &= 1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{365}\right) \cdots \left(1 - \frac{23-1}{365}\right) \\ &= 0.507 \approx 50\%. \end{aligned}$$

```python
import random

def generate_random_birthday(n):
    days = list(range(1, 32))
    months = list(range(1, 13))
    birthdays = []
    for i in range(n):
        day = random.choice(days)
        month = random.choice(months)
        birthday = (day, month)
        birthdays.append(birthday)
    return birthdays

def check_collision(birthdays):
    collision = False
    for i in range(len(birthdays)):
        for j in range(i + 1, len(birthdays)):
            if birthdays[i] == birthdays[j]:
                collision = True
    return collision

# Take input for number of people
n = int(input("Enter the number of people: "))

# Set number of trials
num_trials = 100

# Initialize collision count
collision_count = 0

# Run 100 trials
for trial in range(num_trials):
    birthdays = generate_random_birthday(n)
    collision = check_collision(birthdays)
    if collision:
        collision_count += 1

print(f"Total collisions in {num_trials} trials: {collision_count}")
```

```
Enter the number of people: 23
Total collisions in 100 trials: 54
```

```
Enter the number of people: 23
Total collisions in 100 trials: 50
```

```
Enter the number of people: 23
Total collisions in 100 trials: 52
```

```
Enter the number of people: 40
Total collisions in 100 trials: 88
```

```
Enter the number of people: 40
Total collisions in 100 trials: 91
```

```
Enter the number of people: 40
Total collisions in 100 trials: 90
```

Number of messages we need to hash to find a collision is roughly equal to the

$$\sqrt{2^n} = 2^{\frac{n}{2}}$$

	Hash output length				
λ	128 bit	160 bit	256 bit	384 bit	512 bit
0.5	2^{65}	2^{81}	2^{129}	2^{193}	2^{257}
0.9	2^{67}	2^{82}	2^{130}	2^{194}	2^{258}


Classification of Attack on Hash Functions
Classifications based on Properties attacked
Classification based on Attacking methodology
Attacks on Classical properties
Pre-image attack
2nd Pre-image attack
Collision attack
K-way attacks
K-way collision attack
K-Way (2nd) Pre-image attack
Brute Force Attacks
Birthday Attack
Cryptanalytical Attacks
Generic Attacks
Specific Attacks
Length Extension Attacks
Joux Attacks
Generic 2nd Pre-image attacks based on fixed points, correcting block attacks etc.
Herding Attacks
Meet in the middle attack
Differential Cryptanalysis
Linear Cryptanalysis
Rotational Cryptanalysis
Attack on underlying Encryption algorithm

What about finding collision with Quantum Computer ?

Quantum Algorithm for the Collision Problem

Gilles Brassard [*]
Université de Montréal [†]

Peter Høyer [‡]
Odense University [§]

Alain Tapp [¶]
Université de Montréal [†]

1 May 1997

Abstract

In this note, we give a quantum algorithm that finds collisions in arbitrary r-to-one functions after only $O(\sqrt[3]{N/r})$ expected evaluations of the function. Assuming the function is given by a black box, this is more effi-

What about finding collision with Quantum Computer ?

Cost analysis of hash collisions: Will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?

Daniel J. Bernstein *

Department of Computer Science (MC 152)
The University of Illinois at Chicago
Chicago, IL 60607–7053
djb@cr.yp.to

Abstract. Current proposals for special-purpose factorization hardware will become obsolete if large quantum computers are built: the number-field sieve scales much more poorly than Shor's quantum algorithm for factorization. Will *all* special-purpose cryptanalytic hardware become obsolete in a post-quantum world?

A quantum algorithm by Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp has frequently been claimed to reduce the cost of b-bit hash collisions from $2^{b/2}$ to $2^{b/3}$. This paper analyzes the Brassard–Høyer–Tapp algorithm and shows that it has fundamentally worse price-performance ratio than the classical van Oorschot–Wiener hash-collision circuits, even under optimistic assumptions regarding the speed of quantum computers.

Family name	Year	Output size		Alternate names and notes
		bitlength	bytes	
SHA-3	2015	224, 256	28, 32	SHA3-224, SHA3-256
		384, 512	48, 64	SHA3-384, SHA3-512 (NOTE 1)
SHA-2	2001	256, 512	32, 64	SHA-256, SHA-512
SHA-1	1995	160	20	Deprecated (2017) for browser certificates
MD5	1992	128	16	Widely deprecated, for many applications


HBS
Stateful
Stateless
Hybrid
Stateful
Stateles
FTS
HORS/PORS
HORS-T
SPHINCS
SPHINCS+
SPHINCS-Simpira
SPHINCS-Gravity
HS
XMSS
XMSS-T
XMSSMT
LMS
MTS
MSS
OTS
WOTS
WOTS+
WOTSPRF
Lamport-Diffie


NIST announced Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization
Post Sphincs
Extended Merkle Signature
XMSS^{MT}
Sphincs Gravity
Korean Sphincs+
Sphincs Simpira
Sphincs Streebog
Sphincs α
HORS
WOTS+
1979
1989
2002
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Merkle Signature Scheme
Sphincs
Sphincs+
Lamport OTS

Lamport One-Time Signature

Lamport One-Time Signature

Hash function : H(256 bits output)
Message : M=(256 bits)
Signature : S=(256 bits)

1. Generate 512 seperate random bitstring, each of 256 bits of length

2. Index them:

$$sk_0 = sk_0^1, sk_0^2 \dots sk_0^{256}$$
$$sk_1 = sk_1^1, sk_1^2 \dots sk_1^{256}$$

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3. Generate public key:

$$pk_0 = H(sk_0^1), H(sk_0^2) \dots H(sk_0^{256})$$
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4. For each bit in message

if m_i = 0 then s_i= sk_0^i

if m_i = 1 then s_i= sk_1^i

Lamport One-Time Signature



Lamport One-Time Signature

Each key can only be used to sign one message(OTP).

If not, mix and match forgery attack can be done.

Merkle's tree-based signature

Merkle's tree-based signature



Merkle's tree-based signature

Tranforms one-time signatures to many-time signatures.

1. Generate N separate Lamport keypairs.
   We can call those (sk_0), … , (sk_N).



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2. Place each public key at one leaf of a Merkle hash tree (see below), and compute the root of the tree. This root will become the "master" public key of the new Merkle signature scheme.



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3. The signer retains all of the Lamport public and secret keys for use in signing.



Merkle's tree-based signature

1. To sign the i^{th} bit, select the i^{th}public key from the tree, and sign the message using the corresponding Lamport secret key.

2. Concatenate the resulting signature to the Lamport public key and tacks on a "Merkle proof" that shows that this specific Lamport public key is contained within the tree identified by the root (i.e., the public key of the entire scheme).



3. Transmit this whole collection as the signature of the message.

Merkle's tree-based signature

To verify a signature of this form,

1. Unpack this "signature" as a Lamport signature, Lamport public key, and Merkle Proof.

2. Use the Merkle Proof to verify that the Lamport public key is really in the tree.

3. If these three objectives achieved, Trust the signature as valid

Disadvantage : Signature size

Advantage : Public key is just 1 hash value

Merkle's tree-based signature

IDEA: What if we don't sign all of the message bits

Let's say we sign only the message bits equal to one.

This would cut the public and secret key sizes in half.

VERY INSECURE



Merkle's tree-based signature

We need to add checksum and sign checksum with message



WOTS

IDEA: Divide message into N pieces of length l and sign each piece

We need secret and public key (For each possible value of piece)



IDEA: Divide message into N pieces of length l and sign each piece

We need secret and public key (For each possible value of piece)

Reduces : The size of the signature by a factor of N

Cost: Increasing the public and secret key size by a factor of 2^l

NEW IDEA: What if we generated those key lists programatically only when we needed them?

- Generate single list of random seeds for our initial secret key.
- Rather than generating additional lists randomly, he proposed to use the hash function H(.) on each element of that initial secret key.
- Public key could be derived by applying the hash function one more time to the final secret key list



A WOTS signature is generated as follows,

1. Compute the decimal values of each piece from the message digest. For example, the decimal value of the first piece is 5(m).



2. Compute signature of i'th piece by hashing the corresponding private key m times. In the above example, will be hashed 5 times.

$$sk_0 \rightarrow h(sk_0) \rightarrow h^2(sk_0) \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow h^5(sk_0)$$

3. Apply (1) and (2) on N piece and produce signature .

$$\sigma = [h^{m_0}(sk_0), \ldots, h^{m_{N-1}}(sk_{N-1})]$$

To verify the signature,

1. Hash the message and get digest m



2. Divide m into pieces, obtaining decimal values of each piece.

3. The verifier then hash each value the signature $2^{2^l-1-m_i}$ times, get

$$Pk_v = (Pk_{v0}, Pk_{v1}, \dots, Pk_{v(N-1)})$$

4. If it is identical to the public key set , signature is valid, otherwise the signature is rejected.

WOTS+

- Adds randomization to WOTS
- There is additional random public key

$$Pk_N = (r_1, \dots, r_{2^l-1})$$

- There is new hash function c to replace h in WOTS s.t

$$c^i(x, PK_N) = \begin{cases} x & \text{i=0} \\ H(c^{i-1}(x, pk_N) \oplus pk_N^i) & \text{i>0} \end{cases}$$

$$c^i(x, PK_N) = \begin{cases} x & \text{i=0} \\ H(c^{i-1}(x, pk_N) \oplus pk_N^i) & \text{i>0} \end{cases}$$

$$(r_1, r_2, \cdots, r_{2^l-1}) = pk_N$$

$$\begin{array}{lllll}
sk_0 \longrightarrow c^0(sk_0, pk_N) & \longrightarrow c^1(sk_0, pk_N) & \longrightarrow \cdots & \longrightarrow c^{2^l-1}(sk_0, pk_N) & = pk_0 \\
sk_1 \longrightarrow c^0(sk_1, pk_N) & \longrightarrow c^1(sk_1, pk_N) & \longrightarrow \cdots & \longrightarrow c^{2^l-1}(sk_1, pk_N) & = pk_1 \\
\vdots \qquad\quad \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots \\
sk_{N-1} \longrightarrow c^0(sk_{N-1}, pk_N) & \longrightarrow c^1(sk_{N-1}, pk_N) & \longrightarrow \cdots & \longrightarrow c^{2^l-1}(sk_{N-1}, pk_N) & = pk_{N-1}
\end{array}$$

$$c^i(x, PK_N) = \begin{cases} x & \text{i=0} \\ H(c^{i-1}(x, pk_N) \oplus pk_N^i) & \text{i>0} \end{cases}$$



A WOTS+ signature is generated as follows,

1. Divide message m into N pieces ($m_0 \dots m_{N-1}$) and compute checksum

$$C = \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} (2^l - 1 - m_i)$$

then produce b = m || c

2. Compute signature

$$\sigma = (\sigma_0 \dots \sigma_{N-1}) = [H^{b_0}(sk_0, pk_N), \dots, H^{b_{N-1}}(sk_{N-1}, pk_N)]$$

3. Send signature with random pk_N (pk_N, σ) to the verifier.

XMSS

The eXtended Merkle Tree Signature Scheme

Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)
Request for Comments: 8391
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A. Huelsing
TU Eindhoven
D. Butin
TU Darmstadt
S. Gazdag
genua GmbH
J. Rijneveld
Radboud University
A. Mohaisen
University of Central Florida

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XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme

Abstract

This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a hash-based digital signature system that is based on existing descriptions in scientific literature. This note specifies Winternitz One-Time Signature Plus (WOTS+), a one-time signature scheme; XMSS, a single-tree scheme; and XMSS^MT, a multi-tree variant of XMSS. Both XMSS and XMSS^MT use WOTS+ as a main building block. XMSS provides cryptographic digital signatures without relying on the conjectured hardness of mathematical problems. Instead, it is proven that it only relies on the properties of cryptographic hash functions. XMSS provides strong security guarantees and is even secure when the collision resistance of the underlying hash function is broken. It is suitable for compact implementations, is relatively simple to implement, and naturally resists side-channel attacks. Unlike most other signature systems, hash-based signatures can so far withstand known attacks using quantum computers.

Uses Merkle tree to manage WOTS+ keys




XMSS
public key
pk^{2}_{WOTS+}
pk_{WOTS+}
pk_{01}
pk_{23}
pk_0
pk_1
pk_2
pk_3
L-tree

- Bitmasks are used in L-trees.
- Before applying the hash function to two nodes each time, two bottom values will XOR with their corresponding bitmasks.



- The leaves of a L-tree are WOTS+ public keys


XMSS
public key
pk WOTS+
pk WOTS+
hash
XOR
XOR
pk 01
pk 23
hash
hash
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
pk 0
pk 1
pk 2
pk 3
sk 0
sk 1
sk 2
sk 3
c 2^l -1 (sk i, pk 4)
i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
pk 4 = (r 1, r 2, ⋯


Merkle tree
L-trees
WOTS signatures
height h
height $\lceil \log(l) \rceil$
$w - 1$ steps
l chains
l chains
l chains
l chains
l chains
2^h WOTS key pairs and L-trees

FORS

Forest of Random Subsets


FORS public key
hash
hash
hash
hash
sk0
sk8
sk0
sk8
sk0
sk8
2^t private key strings
N groups (N · 2^t private key strings)

H(m)= 100 011 011 101 111 000



HORS and FORS signatures of the message 100 011 110 where κ = 3 and t = 8.



(a) HORS signature within a binary tree construction



(b) FORS signature within κ binary trees construction

SPHINCS+

Selected Algorithms: Digital Signature Algorithms

Algorithm	Algorithm Information	Submitters	Comments
CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM	Zip File (11MB) IP Statements Website	Vadim Lyubashevsky Leo Ducas Eike Kiltz Tancrede Lepoint Peter Schwabe Gregor Seiler Damien Stehle Shi Bai	Submit Comment View Comments
FALCON	Zip File (4MB) IP Statements Website	Thomas Prest Pierre-Alain Fouque Jeffrey Hoffstein Paul Kirchner Vadim Lyubashevsky Thomas Pornin Thomas Ricosset Gregor Seiler William Whyte Zhenfei Zhang	Submit Comment View Comments
SPHINCS+	Zip File (230MB) IP Statements Website	Andreas Hulsing Daniel J. Bernstein Christoph Dobraunig Maria Eichlseder Scott Fluhrer Stefan-Lukas Gazdag Panos Kampanakis	Submit Comment View Comments

SPHINCS$^+$

Submission to the NIST post-quantum project, v.3.1

Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Daniel J. Bernstein, Ward Beullens,
Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Scott Fluhrer, Stefan-Lukas Gazdag,
Andreas Hülsing, Panos Kampanakis, Stefan Kölbl, Tanja Lange,
Martin M. Lauridsen, Florian Mendel, Ruben Niederhagen, Christian Rechberger,
Joost Rijneveld, Peter Schwabe, Bas Westerbaan

June 10, 2022

FIPS 205

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication

Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard

Category: Computer Security **Subcategory: Cryptography**

Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900

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Why eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) not candidates in the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process?

That is because NIST specifically stated that stateful schemes were not allowed in the NIST post-quantum competition, because they could not be implemented using the API that NIST has defined (which does not allow any state).

That would appear to be reasonable, as stateful hash based signature methods do need extra care to implement safely; NIST 800-208 outlines what NIST believes are reasonable precautions - those precautions are not needed for other algorithms, and hence NIST kept those separate

Tweakable Hash Functions:

To make each hash call independet we use tweakable hash functions

$$\mathbf{T}_\ell : \mathbb{B}^n \times \mathbb{B}^{32} \times \mathbb{B}^{\ell n} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}^n,$$ (defined as **T_1)**

$$\mathrm{md} \leftarrow \mathbf{T}_\ell(\mathbf{PK.seed}, \mathbf{ADRS}, M)$$

$$\mathbf{F} : \mathbb{B}^n \times \mathbb{B}^{32} \times \mathbb{B}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{B}^n,$$

$$\mathbf{F} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \mathbf{T}_1$$

$$\mathbf{H} : \mathbb{B}^n \times \mathbb{B}^{32} \times \mathbb{B}^{2n} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}^n$$

$$\mathbf{H} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \mathbf{T}_2$$

PRF and Message Digest:

PRF for pseudorandom key generation:

$$\mathbf{PRF} : \mathbb{B}^n \times \mathbb{B}^{32} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}^n.$$

to generate randomness for the message compression:

$$\mathbf{PRF_{msg}} : \mathbb{B}^n \times \mathbb{B}^n \times \mathbb{B}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{B}^n.$$

Keyed hash function that can process arbitrary length messages:

$$\mathbf{H_{msg}} : \mathbb{B}^n \times \mathbb{B}^n \times \mathbb{B}^n \times \mathbb{B}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{B}^m.$$

Address Scheme:

- ADRS is a 32-byte value
- All functions have to keep track of the current context, updating the addresses after each hash call.
- There are 5 different types of addresses

1. Hashes in WOTS+ scheme
2. Compression of the WOTS+ public key
3. Hashes within the main Merkle tree construction
4. Hashes in the Merkle tree in FORS
5. Compression of the tree roots of FORS

Address Scheme:

describes the height of a tree within the hypertree starting from height zero for trees on the bottom layer.

describes the position of a tree within a layer of a multi-tree starting with index zero for the leftmost tree.



defines the type of the address.
0 for a WOTS+ hash address
1 for the compression of the WOTS+ public key
2 for a hash tree address
3 for a FORS address
4 for the compression of FORS tree roots.

changes for each type

Address Scheme:



Figure 2: WOTS$^+$ hash address.



Figure 3: WOTS$^+$ public key compression address.



Figure 4: hash tree address.

Address Scheme:



Figure 5: FORS tree address.



Figure 6: FORS tree roots compression address.



Figure 7: WOTS$^+$ key generation address.

Address Scheme:



Figure 8: FORS key generation address.

we refer to them respectively using the constants

1. WOTS_HASH
2. WOTS_PK
3. TREE
4. FORS_TREE
5. FORS_ROOTS
6. WOTS_PRF
7. FORS_PRF

WOTS+

WOTS+ uses the parameters n and w; they both take positive integer values.

• n: the security parameter; it is the message length as well as the length of a private key, public key, or signature element in bytes.

• w: the Winternitz parameter; it is an element of the set {4, 16, 256}.

• len: the number of n-byte-string elements in a WOTS+ private key, public key, and signature

$$\text{len} = \text{len}_1 + \text{len}_2$$

$$\mathtt{len}_1 = \left\lceil \frac{8n}{\log(w)} \right\rceil, \quad \mathtt{len}_2 = \left\lfloor \frac{\log\left(\mathtt{len}_1(w-1)\right)}{\log(w)} \right\rfloor + 1$$

WOTS+

n determines

- The in-and output length of the tweakable hash function used for WOTS+
- The length of messages that can be processed by the WOTS+ signing algorithm.

w can be chosen from the set {4, 16, 256}

- Larger value of w results in shorter signatures but slower operations; it **has no effect on security**.
- Choices of w are limited since these values yield optimal trade-offs and easy implementation.

WOTS+

```
#Input: Input string X, start index i, number of steps s, public seed PK.seed,
    address ADRS
#Output: value of F iterated s times on X

chain(X, i, s, PK.seed, ADRS) {
  if ( s == 0 ) {
    return X;
  }
  if ( (i + s) > (w - 1) ) {
    return NULL;
  }
  byte[n] tmp = chain(X, i, s - 1, PK.seed, ADRS);

  ADRS.setHashAddress(i + s - 1);
  tmp = F(PK.seed, ADRS, tmp);
  return tmp;
}
```

2. when s=0, start hashing

1. Put X inside of S-1 chain

3. iteratively take s-1 hash and return the final hash

Algorithm 2: `chain` – Chaining function used in WOTS$^+$.

WOTS+ Private Keys

```
#Input: secret seed SK.seed, address ADRS
#Output: WOTS+ private key sk

wots_SKgen(SK.seed, ADRS) {
  skADRS = ADRS; // copy address to create key generation address
  skADRS.setType(WOTS_PRF);
  skADRS.setKeyPairAddress(ADRS.getKeyPairAddress());
  for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
    skADRS.setChainAddress(i);
  skADRS.setHashAddress(0);
  sk[i] = PRF(SK.seed, skADRS);
  }
  return sk;
}
```

SkADRS changes the secret key for each chain

Algorithm 3: `wots_SKgen` – Generating a WOTS$^+$ private key.

WOTS+ Public Key Generation

```
#Input: secret seed SK.seed, address ADRS, public seed PK.seed
#Output: WOTS+ public key pk

wots_PKgen(SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS) {
  wotspkADRS = ADRS; // copy address to create OTS public key address
  skADRS = ADRS; // copy address to create key generation address
  skADRS.setType(WOTS_PRF);
  skADRS.setKeyPairAddress(ADRS.getKeyPairAddress());
  for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
    skADRS.setChainAddress(i);
    skADRS.setHashAddress(0);
    sk[i] = PRF(SK.seed, skADRS);
    ADRS.setChainAddress(i);
    ADRS.setHashAddress(0);
    tmp[i] = chain(sk[i], 0, w - 1, PK.seed, ADRS);
  }
  wotspkADRS.setType(WOTS_PK);
  wotspkADRS.setKeyPairAddress(ADRS.getKeyPairAddress());
  pk = T_len(PK.seed, wotspkADRS, tmp);
  return pk;
}
```

Obtain sk from seed and address

Obtain tmp with taking w-1 times hash of sk

Take hash of tmp values and obtain pk

Algorithm 4: `wots_PKgen` – Generating a WOTS$^+$ public key.

WOTS+ Signature Generation

```
#Input: Message M, secret seed SK.seed, public seed PK.seed, address ADRS
#Output: WOTS+ signature sig

wots_sign(M, SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS) {
  csum = 0;

  // convert message to base w
  msg = base_w(M, w, len_1);

  // compute checksum
  for ( i = 0; i < len_1; i++ ) {
    csum = csum + w - 1 - msg[i];
  }

  // convert csum to base w
  if( (lg(w) % 8) != 0) {
    csum = csum << ( 8 - ( ( len_2 * lg(w) ) % 8 ));
  }
  len_2_bytes = ceil( ( len_2 * lg(w) ) / 8 );
  msg = msg || base_w(toByte(csum, len_2_bytes), w, len_2);

  skADRS = ADRS; // copy address to create key generation address
  skADRS.setType(WOTS_PRF);
  skADRS.setKeyPairAddress(ADRS.getKeyPairAddress());
  for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
    skADRS.setChainAddress(i);
    skADRS.setHashAddress(0);
    sk = PRF(SK.seed, skADRS);
    ADRS.setChainAddress(i);
    ADRS.setHashAddress(0);
    sig[i] = chain(sk, 0, msg[i], PK.seed, ADRS);
  }
  return sig;
}
```

→ Concatanates message and checksum

→ Produces different sk by changing adress value

→ Produces signature with hashing sk msg[i] times

Algorithm 5: `wots_sign` – Generating a WOTS+ signature on a message M.

WOTS+ Signature Generation



Figure 9: WOTS$^+$ Signature data format.

WOTS+ Public Key Computation from message and signature

```
#Input: Message M, WOTS+ signature sig, address ADRS, public seed PK.seed
#Output: WOTS+ public key pk_sig derived from sig

wots_pkFromSig(sig, M, PK.seed, ADRS) {
  csum = 0;
  wotspkADRS = ADRS;

  // convert message to base w
  msg = base_w(M, w, len_1);

  // compute checksum
  for ( i = 0; i < len_1; i++ ) {
    csum = csum + w - 1 - msg[i];
  }

  // convert csum to base w
  csum = csum << ( 8 - ( ( len_2 * lg(w) ) % 8 ));
  len_2_bytes = ceil( ( len_2 * lg(w) ) / 8 );
  msg = msg || base_w(toByte(csum, len_2_bytes), w, len_2);
  for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
    ADRS.setChainAddress(i);
    tmp[i] = chain(sig[i], msg[i], w - 1 - msg[i], PK.seed, ADRS);
  }

  wotspkADRS.setType(WOTS_PK);
  wotspkADRS.setKeyPairAddress(ADRS.getKeyPairAddress());
  pk_sig = T_len(PK.seed, wotspkADRS, tmp);
  return pk_sig;
}
```

Hash the signature w-1-msg[i] times

Take final hash and obtain pk

Algorithm 6: `wots_pkFromSig` – Computing a WOTS+ public key from a message and its signature.

XMSS

XMSS has the following parameters:

- h′ : the height (number of levels - 1) of the tree.
- n : the length in bytes of messages as well as of each node.
- w : the Winternitz parameter as defined for WOTS+



XMSS

```
# Input: Secret seed SK.seed, start index s, target node height z, public seed
    PK.seed, address ADRS
# Output: n-byte root node - top node on Stack

treehash(SK.seed, s, z, PK.seed, ADRS) {
     if( s % (1 << z) != 0 ) return -1;
     for ( i = 0; i < 2^z; i++ ) {
       ADRS.setType(WOTS_HASH);
       ADRS.setKeyPairAddress(s + i);
       node = wots_PKgen(SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS);
       ADRS.setType(TREE);
       ADRS.setTreeHeight(1);
       ADRS.setTreeIndex(s + i);
       while ( Top node on Stack has same height as node ) {
          ADRS.setTreeIndex((ADRS.getTreeIndex() - 1) / 2);
          node = H(PK.seed, ADRS, (Stack.pop() || node));
          ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1);
       }
       Stack.push(node);
     }
     return Stack.pop();
}
```

→ Must have even number of leafs

Algorithm 7: `treehash` – The TreeHash algorithm.

i= 0 Stack={N1}

i= 1 Stack={N1,N12}

i= 2 Stack={N1,N12,N3}

i= 3 Stack={N1,N3,N12,N1234}




```
for ( i = 0; i < 2^z; i++ ) {
  ADRS.setType(WOTS_HASH);
  ADRS.setKeyPairAddress(s + i);
  node = wots_PKgen(SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS);
  ADRS.setType(TREE);
  ADRS.setTreeHeight(1);
  ADRS.setTreeIndex(s + i);
  while ( Top node on Stack has same height as node ) {
     ADRS.setTreeIndex((ADRS.getTreeIndex() - 1) / 2);
     node = H(PK.seed, ADRS, (Stack.pop() || node));
     ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1);
  }
  Stack.push(node);
}
return Stack.pop();
```

→ Add node to the end of stack

→ Return to the end of stack and delete it from stack

XMSS

```
# Input: Secret seed SK.seed, public seed PK.seed, address ADRS
# Output: XMSS public key PK

xmss_PKgen(SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS) {
     pk = treehash(SK.seed, 0, h', PK.seed, ADRS)
     return pk;
}
```

Algorithm 8: `xmss_PKgen` – Generating an XMSS public key.

XMSS



Figure 10: XMSS Signature



XMSS

```
# Input: n-byte message M, secret seed SK.seed, index idx, public seed PK.seed,
    address ADRS
# Output: XMSS signature SIG_XMSS = (sig || AUTH)

xmss_sign(M, SK.seed, idx, PK.seed, ADRS)
     // build authentication path
     for ( j = 0; j < h'; j++ ) {
       k = floor(idx / (2^j)) XOR 1;
       AUTH[j] = treehash(SK.seed, k * 2^j, j, PK.seed, ADRS);
     }

     ADRS.setType(WOTS_HASH);
     ADRS.setKeyPairAddress(idx);
     sig = wots_sign(M, SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS);
     SIG_XMSS = sig || AUTH;
     return SIG_XMSS;
}
```

Algorithm 9: `xmss_sign` – Generating an XMSS signature.

XMSS

```
# Input: index idx, XMSS signature SIG_XMSS = (sig || AUTH), n-byte message M,
    public seed PK.seed, address ADRS
# Output: n-byte root value node[0]

xmss_pkFromSig(idx, SIG_XMSS, M, PK.seed, ADRS){

    // compute WOTS+ pk from WOTS+ sig
    ADRS.setType(WOTS_HASH);
    ADRS.setKeyPairAddress(idx);
    sig = SIG_XMSS.getWOTSSig();
    AUTH = SIG_XMSS.getXMSSAUTH();
    node[0] = wots_pkFromSig(sig, M, PK.seed, ADRS);

    // compute root from WOTS+ pk and AUTH
    ADRS.setType(TREE);
    ADRS.setTreeIndex(idx);
    for ( k = 0; k < h'; k++ ) {
      ADRS.setTreeHeight(k+1);
      if ( (floor(idx / (2^k)) % 2) == 0 ) {
        ADRS.setTreeIndex(ADRS.getTreeIndex() / 2);
        node[1] = H(PK.seed, ADRS, (node[0] || AUTH[k]));
      } else {
        ADRS.setTreeIndex((ADRS.getTreeIndex() - 1) / 2);
        node[1] = H(PK.seed, ADRS, (AUTH[k] || node[0]));
      }
      node[0] = node[1];
    }
    return node[0];
}
```

Changes according to position of node[0] in tree

Algorithm 10: `xmss_pkFromSig` – Computing an XMSS public key from an XMSS signature.

The Hypertree

- A HT is a tree of several layers of XMSS trees
- All XMSS trees in HT have equal length
- Consider a HT of total height h that has d layers of XMSS trees of height $h' = h/d$.
- Then layer $d - 1$ contains one XMSS tree, layer $d - 2$ contains $2^{h'}$ XMSS trees, and so on. Finally, layer 0 contains $2^{h-h'}$ XMSS trees



The Hypertree of height 9 with 3 layers consist of XMSS trees with height 3



The Hypertree

XMSS signature $\mathbf{SIG}_{\text{XMSS}}$ (layer 0) $((h/d + \texttt{len}) \cdot n$ bytes)
XMSS signature $\mathbf{SIG}_{\text{XMSS}}$ (layer 1) $((h/d + \texttt{len}) \cdot n$ bytes)
...
XMSS signature $\mathbf{SIG}_{\text{XMSS}}$ (layer $d-1$) $((h/d + \texttt{len}) \cdot n$ bytes)

Figure 11: HT signature

The Hypertree

```
# Input: Private seed SK.seed, public seed PK.seed
# Output: HT public key PK_HT

ht_PKgen(SK.seed, PK.seed){
      ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
      ADRS.setLayerAddress(d-1);
      ADRS.setTreeAddress(0);
      root = xmss_PKgen(SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS);
      return root;
}
```

32 byte consist of 0

Algorithm 11: `ht_PKgen` – Generating an HT public key.

The Hypertree

```
# Input: Message M, private seed SK.seed, public seed PK.seed, tree index
    idx_tree, leaf index idx_leaf
# Output: HT signature SIG_HT

ht_sign(M, SK.seed, PK.seed, idx_tree, idx_leaf) {
     // init
     ADRS = toByte(0, 32);

     // sign
     ADRS.setLayerAddress(0);
     ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
     SIG_tmp = xmss_sign(M, SK.seed, idx_leaf, PK.seed, ADRS);
     SIG_HT = SIG_HT || SIG_tmp;
     root = xmss_pkFromSig(idx_leaf, SIG_tmp, M, PK.seed, ADRS);
     for ( j = 1; j < d; j++ ) {
        idx_leaf = (h / d) least significant bits of idx_tree;
        idx_tree = (h - (j + 1) * (h / d)) most significant bits of idx_tree;
        ADRS.setLayerAddress(j);
        ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
        SIG_tmp = xmss_sign(root, SK.seed, idx_leaf, PK.seed, ADRS);
        SIG_HT = SIG_HT || SIG_tmp;
        if ( j < d - 1 ) {
           root = xmss_pkFromSig(idx_leaf, SIG_tmp, root, PK.seed, ADRS);
        }
     }
     return SIG_HT;
}
```

→ Sign the message with the lower XMSS tree

Continue signing in the hypertree up to layer d-1

→ Return all signatures

Algorithm 12: `ht_sign` – Generating an HT signature

The Hypertree

```
# Input: Message M, signature SIG_HT, public seed PK.seed, tree index idx_tree,
    leaf index idx_leaf, HT public key PK_HT.
# Output: Boolean

ht_verify(M, SIG_HT, PK.seed, idx_tree, idx_leaf, PK_HT){
     // init
     ADRS = toByte(0, 32);

     // verify
     SIG_tmp = SIG_HT.getXMSSSignature(0);  --> Get signature of layer 0 XMSS
     ADRS.setLayerAddress(0);
     ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
     node = xmss_pkFromSig(idx_leaf, SIG_tmp, M, PK.seed, ADRS);  --> Compute pk of layer 0 XMSS
     for ( j = 1; j < d; j++ ) {
        idx_leaf = (h / d) least significant bits of idx_tree;
        idx_tree = (h - (j + 1) * h / d) most significant bits of idx_tree;
        SIG_tmp = SIG_HT.getXMSSSignature(j);  --> Get signature of layer j XMSS
        ADRS.setLayerAddress(j);
        ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
        node = xmss_pkFromSig(idx_leaf, SIG_tmp, node, PK.seed, ADRS);  --> Compute pk of layer j XMSS
     }
     if ( node == PK_HT ) {  --> If final node is equal to PK_HT, then signature is valid
       return true;
     } else {
       return false;
     }
}
```

Algorithm 13: `ht_verify` – Verifying a HT signature $\mathbf{SIG_{HT}}$ on a message M using a HT public key $\mathbf{PK_{HT}}$

FORS

- Uses parameters k and $t = 2^a$
- Signs strings of length ka bits
- Privite key consist kt many random n byte strings
- Public key n byte value computed as a hash of root node of k hash trees



FORS


FORS Public Key
$T_{k'}$
height a
$t = 2^a$ n-byte private key strings
kt n-byte private key values
k binary hash trees

FORS

```
#Input: secret seed SK.seed, address ADRS, secret key index idx = it+j
#Output: FORS private key sk

fors_SKgen(SK.seed, ADRS, idx) {
  skADRS = ADRS; // copy address to create key generation address
  skADRS.setType(FORS_PRF);
  skADRS.setKeyPairAddress(ADRS.getKeyPairAddress());

  skADRS.setTreeHeight(0);
  skADRS.setTreeIndex(idx);
  sk = PRF(SK.seed, skADRS); ⟶ Obtain sk from SK.seed

  return sk; ⟶ Returns just 1 sk not array of sk's
}
```

Algorithm 14: `fors_SKgen` – Computing a FORS private key value.

FORS

Almost same to treehash in XMSS

```
# Input: Secret seed SK.seed, start index s, target node height z, public seed
    PK.seed, address ADRS
# Output: n-byte root node - top node on Stack

fors_treehash(SK.seed, s, z, PK.seed, ADRS) {
     if( s % (1 << z) != 0 ) return -1;
     for ( i = 0; i < 2^z; i++ ) {
       sk = fors_SKgen(SK.seed, ADRS, s+i)
       node = F(PK.seed, ADRS, sk);
       ADRS.setTreeHeight(1);
       ADRS.setTreeIndex(s + i);
       while ( Top node on Stack has same height as node ) {
          ADRS.setTreeIndex((ADRS.getTreeIndex() - 1) / 2);
          node = H(PK.seed, ADRS, (Stack.pop() || node));
          ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1);
       }
       Stack.push(node);
     }
     return Stack.pop();
}
```

Algorithm 15: The `fors_treehash` algorithm.

FORS

```
# Input: Secret seed SK.seed, public seed PK.seed, address ADRS
# Output: FORS public key PK

fors_PKgen(SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS) {
     forspkADRS = ADRS; // copy address to create FTS public key address

     for(i = 0; i < k; i++){
          root[i] = fors_treehash(SK.seed, i*t, a, PK.seed, ADRS);
     }
     forspkADRS.setType(FORS_ROOTS);
     forspkADRS.setKeyPairAddress(ADRS.getKeyPairAddress());
     pk = T_k(PK.seed, forspkADRS, root);
     return pk;
}
```

Compute top node of each tree

Take hash of the roots and obtain pk

Algorithm 16: `fors_PKgen` – Generate a FORS public key.

FORS

```
#Input: Bit string M, secret seed SK.seed, address ADRS, public seed PK.seed
#Output: FORS signature SIG_FORS

fors_sign(M, SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS) {
  // compute signature elements
  for(i = 0; i < k; i++){
    // get next index
    unsigned int idx = bits i*log(t) to (i+1)*log(t) - 1 of M;

    // pick private key element
    SIG_FORS = SIG_FORS || fors_SKgen(SK.seed, ADRS, i*t + idx) ;

    // compute auth path
    for ( j = 0; j < a; j++ ) {
      s = floor(idx / (2^j)) XOR 1;
      AUTH[j] = fors_treehash(SK.seed, i * t + s * 2^j, j, PK.seed, ADRS);
    }
    SIG_FORS = SIG_FORS || AUTH;
  }
  return SIG_FORS;
}
```

Take corresponding sk of message chunk

Algorithm 17: `fors_sign` – Generating a FORS signature on string M.

FORS

Private key value (tree 0) (n bytes)
AUTH (tree 0) ($\log t \cdot n$ bytes)
...
Private key value (tree $k-1$) (n bytes)
AUTH (tree $k-1$) ($\log t \cdot n$ bytes)

Figure 13: FORS signature

```
# Input: FORS signature SIG_FORS, (k lg t)-bit string M, public seed PK.seed,
    address ADRS
# Output: FORS public key

fors_pkFromSig(SIG_FORS, M, PK.seed, ADRS){

  // compute roots
  for(i = 0; i < k; i++){
    // get next index
    unsigned int idx = bits i*log(t) to (i+1)*log(t) - 1 of M;

    // compute leaf
    sk = SIG_FORS.getSK(i);
    ADRS.setTreeHeight(0);
    ADRS.setTreeIndex(i*t + idx);
    node[0] = F(PK.seed, ADRS, sk);

    // compute root from leaf and AUTH
    auth = SIG_FORS.getAUTH(i);
    ADRS.setTreeIndex(i*t + idx);
    for ( j = 0; j < a; j++ ) {
      ADRS.setTreeHeight(j+1);
      if ( (floor(idx / (2^j)) % 2) == 0 ) {
        ADRS.setTreeIndex(ADRS.getTreeIndex() / 2);
        node[1] = H(PK.seed, ADRS, (node[0] || auth[j]));
      } else {
        ADRS.setTreeIndex((ADRS.getTreeIndex() - 1) / 2);
        node[1] = H(PK.seed, ADRS, (auth[j] || node[0]));
      }
      node[0] = node[1];
    }
    root[i] = node[0];
  }

  forspkADRS = ADRS; // copy address to create FTS public key address
  forspkADRS.setType(FORS_ROOTS);
  forspkADRS.setKeyPairAddress(ADRS.getKeyPairAddress());
  pk = T_k(PK.seed, forspkADRS, root);
  return pk;
}
```

Do for all trees

Get sk

Take hash of sk and enter the tree

Hash sk with corresponding layer auth

Give result to the node[0] and cont. with next auth.

Add root of i'th tree to the array

Take hash of the root values

Algorithm 18: `fors_pkFromSig` – Compute a FORS public key from a FORS signature.


PK
h/d
binary
tree_2
WOTS
WOTS
WOTS
sign
sign
sign
h/d
binary
tree_1
binary
tree_1
WOTS
WOTS
WOTS
WOTS
sign
h/d
binary
tree_0
WOTS
WOTS
sign
sign
FORS
FORS
sign
message
digest

PARAMETERS

n : the security parameter in bytes.

w : the Winternitz parameter

h : the height of the hypertree

d : the number of layers in the hypertree

k : the number of trees in FORS

t : the number of leaves of a FORS tree

```
# Input: (none)
# Output: SPHINCS+ key pair (SK,PK)

spx_keygen( ){
     SK.seed = sec_rand(n);
     SK.prf = sec_rand(n);
     PK.seed = sec_rand(n);
     PK.root = ht_PKgen(SK.seed, PK.seed);
     return ( (SK.seed, SK.prf, PK.seed, PK.root), (PK.seed, PK.root) );
}
```

Algorithm 19: `spx_keygen` – Generate a SPHINCS$^+$ key pair.


SK.seed (n bytes)
SK.prf (n bytes)
PK.seed (n bytes)
PK.root (n bytes)
Used in generation WOTS+ and FORS privete keys.
Used in generation randomization value for randomized message hash
PK.seed (n bytes)
PK.root (n bytes)
SPHINCS+ public key
SPHINCS+ secret key

```
# Input: Message M, private key SK = (SK.seed, SK.prf, PK.seed, PK.root)
# Output: SPHINCS+ signature SIG

spx_sign(M, SK){
    // init
    ADRS = toByte(0, 32);

    // generate randomizer
    opt = PK.seed;
    if(RANDOMIZE){
      opt = rand(n);
    }
    R = PRF_msg(SK.prf, opt, M);
    SIG = SIG || R;

    // compute message digest and index
    digest = H_msg(R, PK.seed, PK.root, M);
    tmp_md = first floor((ka +7)/ 8) bytes of digest;
    tmp_idx_tree = next floor((h - h/d +7)/ 8) bytes of digest;
    tmp_idx_leaf = next floor((h/d +7)/ 8) bytes of digest;

    md = first ka bits of tmp_md;
    idx_tree = first h - h/d bits of tmp_idx_tree;
    idx_leaf = first h/d bits of tmp_idx_leaf;
```

Give 0 to the adress

Gives option so that signiture of same message will be different in each sign

Generate random number R

split digest into 3 parts

```
    // FORS sign
    ADRS.setLayerAddress(0);
    ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
    ADRS.setType(FORS_TREE);
    ADRS.setKeyPairAddress(idx_leaf);

    SIG_FORS = fors_sign(md, SK.seed, PK.seed, ADRS);
    SIG = SIG || SIG_FORS;

    // get FORS public key
    PK_FORS = fors_pkFromSig(SIG_FORS, md, PK.seed, ADRS);

    // sign FORS public key with HT
    ADRS.setType(TREE);
    SIG_HT = ht_sign(PK_FORS, SK.seed, PK.seed, idx_tree, idx_leaf);
    SIG = SIG || SIG_HT;

    return SIG;
}
```

Algorithm 20: `spx_sign` – Generating a SPHINCS$^+$ signature

Randomness $\mathbf{R}$ (n bytes)
FORS signature $\mathbf{SIG_{FORS}}$ ($k(a+1) \cdot n$ bytes)
HT signature $\mathbf{SIG_{HT}}$ ($(h + d\texttt{len})n$ bytes)

SPHINCS+ signature

SPHINCS+ signature verification:

1. recomputing message digest and index,
2. computing a candidate FORS public key
3. verifying the HT signature on that public key.

```
# Input: Message M, signature SIG, public key PK
# Output: Boolean

spx_verify(M, SIG, PK){
     // init
     ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
     R = SIG.getR();
     SIG_FORS = SIG.getSIG_FORS();
     SIG_HT = SIG.getSIG_HT();

     // compute message digest and index
     digest = H_msg(R, PK.seed, PK.root, M);
     tmp_md = first floor((ka +7)/ 8) bytes of digest;
     tmp_idx_tree = next floor((h - h/d +7)/ 8) bytes of digest;
     tmp_idx_leaf = next floor((h/d +7)/ 8) bytes of digest;

     md = first ka bits of tmp_md;
     idx_tree = first h - h/d bits of tmp_idx_tree;
     idx_leaf = first h/d bits of tmp_idx_leaf;

     // compute FORS public key
     ADRS.setLayerAddress(0);
     ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
     ADRS.setType(FORS_TREE);
     ADRS.setKeyPairAddress(idx_leaf);
     PK_FORS = fors_pkFromSig(SIG_FORS, md, PK.seed, ADRS);

     // verify HT signature
     ADRS.setType(TREE);
     return ht_verify(PK_FORS, SIG_HT, PK.seed, idx_tree, idx_leaf, PK.root);
}
```

Split signature

Algorithm 21: `spx_verify` – Verify a SPHINCS$^+$ signature **SIG** on a message M using a SPHINCS$^+$ public key **PK**

NIST security level 1		Size(bytes)		Relative time	
		Public key	Signature	Verification	Signing
Non PQ	NIST p-256 ECDSA	64	64	1(base)	1(base)
	RSA-2048	256	256	0.2	25
NIST selected algortihms	Dilithium2	1320	2420	0.3	2.5
	Falcon512	897	666	0.3	5
	SPHINC+-128s har.	32	7856	1.7	3000
	SPHINC+-128f har.	32	17088	4	200
Others,	XMSS-SHAKE_20_128 (can sign 1000000 messages)	32	900	2	10

https://blog.cloudflare.com/sizing-up-post-quantum-signatures/

Table 1: Overview of the number of function calls we require for each operation. We omit the single calls to $\mathbf{H_{msg}}, \mathbf{PRF_{msg}}$, and $\mathbf{T}_k$ for signing and single calls to $\mathbf{H_{msg}}$ and $\mathbf{T}_k$ for verification as they are negligible when estimating speed.

	F	**H**	**PRF**	$T_{\texttt{len}}$
Key Generation	$2^{h/d}w\texttt{len}$	$2^{h/d}-1$	$2^{h/d}\texttt{len}$	$2^{h/d}$
Signing	$kt + d(2^{h/d})w\texttt{len}$	$k(t-1) + d(2^{h/d}-1)$	$kt + d(2^{h/d})\texttt{len}$	$d2^{h/d}$
Verification	$k + dw\texttt{len}$	$k \log t + h$	–	d

Table 2: Key and signature sizes

	SK	PK	Sig
Size	$4n$	$2n$	$(h + k(\log t + 1) + d \cdot len + 1)n$



	n	h	d	$\log(t)$	k	w	bitsec	sec level	sig bytes
SPHINCS$^+$-128s	16	63	7	12	14	16	133	**1**	7 856
SPHINCS$^+$-128f	16	66	22	6	33	16	128	**1**	17 088
SPHINCS$^+$-192s	24	63	7	14	17	16	193	**3**	16 224
SPHINCS$^+$-192f	24	66	22	8	33	16	194	**3**	35 664
SPHINCS$^+$-256s	32	64	8	14	22	16	255	**5**	29 792
SPHINCS$^+$-256f	32	68	17	9	35	16	255	**5**	49 856

Appendix A — Differences From the SPHINCS$^+$ Submission

This standard is based on Version 3.1 of the SPHINCS$^+$ specification [10] and contains several minor modifications compared to Version 3 [4], which was submitted at the beginning of round three of the NIST PQC Standardization process:

- Two new address types — `WOTS_PRF` and `FORS_PRF` — were defined for WOTS$^+$ and FORS secret key value generation.
- $\mathbf{PK}$.seed was added as an input to $\mathbf{PRF}$ in order to mitigate multi-key attacks.
- For the category 3 and 5 SHA2 parameter sets, SHA-256 was replaced by SHA-512 in $\mathbf{H}_{msg}$, $\mathbf{PRF}_{msg}$, $\mathbf{H}$, and $\mathbf{T}_\ell$ based on weaknesses that were discovered when using SHA-256 to obtain category 5 security [33, 34, 35].
- R and $\mathbf{PK}$.seed were added as inputs to MGF1 when computing $\mathbf{H}_{msg}$ for the SHA2 parameter sets in order to mitigate multi-target long-message second preimage attacks.

ANTONOV'S ATTACK



Gruplar

Yeni sohbet

Gruplarım

En son gruplar

Favori gruplar

Yıldızlı mesaj dizileri

pqc-forum

İleti Dizileri 99+

Hakkında

İleti Dizileri

pqc-forum@list.nist.gov grubundaki görüşm ...

ROUND 3 OFFICIAL COMMENT: SPHINCS+ 803 görüntüleme

Sydney Antonov

alıcı pqc-co...@nist.gov, pqc-...@list.nist.gov

Dear all,

SPHINCS+ relies on the distinct-function, multi-target second-preimage resistance (DM-SPR) of the underlying keyed hash function. This property can be broken for SHA-256(key||message) (which is used by SPHINCS+-SHA-256) using around (t-1)2**128 + 2^256/t compression function calls when attacking t targets using the following attack:

In this attack keys are initial hash values instead of message prefixes, without loss of generality.

Let C: {0,1}^256 x {0,1}^512 -> {0,1}^256 be SHA-256's compression function.

1. If there are multiple keys:
1.1. For each pair of keys (k, l):
1.1.1. Find an (x_k, x_l) such that y = C(k, x_k) = C(l, x_l).
This can be done using around 2^128 compression function calls.
1.1.2. Replace the pair with the single key y.
1.2. If there's a remaining key k because there was an odd number of keys replace it with C(k, 0).
1.3. Repeat step 1.
2. Find a SHA-256 preimage of one of the targets using the final key as an IV. This can be done using around 2^256/t compression function calls.
3. Concatenate the sequence of compression function blocks used in step 1 to derive the final key from the key corresponding to the target for which a second-preimage was found by step 2.
4. Concatenate the results of step 3 and step 2.

Breaking Category Five SPHINCS$^+$ with SHA-256

Ray Perlner[1], John Kelsey[1,2], and David Cooper[1]

[1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899, USA
[2] COSIC/KU Leuven

Abstract. SPHINCS$^+$ is a stateless hash-based signature scheme that has been selected for standardization as part of the NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization process. Its security proof relies on the distinct-function multi-target second-preimage resistance (DM-SPR) of the underlying keyed hash function. The SPHINCS$^+$ submission offered several instantiations of this keyed hash function, including one based on SHA-256. A recent observation by Sydney Antonov on the PQC mailing list demonstrated that the construction based on SHA-256 did not have DM-SPR at NIST category five, for several of the parameter sets submitted to NIST; however, it remained an open question whether this observation leads to a forgery attack. We answer this question in the affirmative by giving a complete forgery attack that reduces the concrete classical security of these parameter sets by approximately 40 bits of security.

Our attack works by applying Antonov's technique to the WOTS$^+$ public keys in SPHINCS$^+$, leading to a new one-time key that can sign a very limited set of hash values. From that key, we construct a slightly altered version of the original hypertree with which we can sign arbitrary messages, yielding signatures that appear valid.

Keywords: hash-based signatures · post-quantum cryptography · SPHINCS$^+$.

This attack uses Merkle-Damgard Structure of SHA-256 algorithm.



We want to construct diamond structure.



ANTONOV'S ATTACK



Assume that we have target messages $M_0, \ldots, M_5$.

For each message, different address values used in hash algorithm $ADRS_0, \ldots, ADRS_5$.

In the first part we get intermediate hash value for addresses

$$H_0^{(1)} = C(iv, ADRS_0)$$

$$H_1^{(1)} = C(iv, ADRS_1)$$

$$H_2^{(1)} = C(iv, ADRS_2)$$

$$H_3^{(1)} = C(iv, ADRS_3)$$

$$H_4^{(1)} = C(iv, ADRS_4)$$

$$H_5^{(1)} = C(iv, ADRS_5)$$

Attacker finds x_0 ,..., x_5 with collision attack.

$$H_{0,1}^{(2)} = C\left(H_0^{(1)}, x_0\right) = C\left(H_1^{(1)}, x_1\right)$$

$$H_{2,3}^{(2)} = C\left(H_2^{(1)}, x_2\right) = C\left(H_3^{(1)}, x_3\right)$$

$$H_{4,5}^{(2)} = C\left(H_4^{(1)}, x_4\right) = C\left(H_5^{(1)}, x_5\right)$$

For the three intermediate hash value, three way collision is found with random values $x_{0,1}$, $x_{2,3}$, $x_{4,5}$.

$$H_{0\ldots5}^{(3)} = C\left(H_{0,1}^{(2)}, x_{0,1}\right) = C\left(H_{2,3}^{(2)}, x_{2,3}\right) = C\left(H_{4,5}^{(2)}, x_{4,5}\right)$$

As a last part, attacker finds z so that it satisfies the below equation for some i $\epsilon\{0,...,5\}$

$$C\left(H_{0\ldots5}^{(3)}, z||padding\right) = SHA-256(ADRS_i, M_i)$$

For example when preimage found for M3, below equation will be satisfied and multi-target preimage attack will be done

$$\text{SHA-256 } (ADRS_3||x_3||X_{2,3}||Z)=\text{SHA-256 } (ADRS_3,M_3)$$

Given t target messages, the expected cost for the final step in the attack, finding a preimage, is $\frac{2^{256}}{t}$ calls to the compression function, C.

The preceding steps require performing O(t) collision attacks. The expected cost of each collision attack will depend on whether a 2-way, 3-way, 4-way, etc. collision is sought.

In general, the expected cost of finding an n-way collision is $O(2^{256(n-1)/n})$ calls to the compression function.

ANTONOV'S ATTACK



Step 1:

- At this step, the attacker obtains a certain amount of message-signature pairs signed with the same hash-based signature algorithm. Since the WOTS+ public keys used in the signature can be derived from the signature, the attacker also gains access to the WOTS+ public keys.

- Attacker prefers messages with as low a checksum value as possible. (As the checksum values decrease, the probability of the w-base representations of the messages being F increases.) While the PK-seed values of the message-signature pairs are the same, the ADRS values are different for each pair.

- The values P1,...,P8 represent the ADRS and PK.seed values. Finally, the attacker sorts the P1,...,P8 values.

Step 2:

- At this step, the attacker takes the hash of the randomly chosen values sk1,...,skn, each 2^w times, and then appends these values together. The attacker then obtains the concatenated values free1,...,free8, which correspond to the WOTS+ public keys associated with the chosen sk values.



Step 3:

- At this step, the attacker appends random h values to the end of the free values and finds an n-way collision using the method described at the beginning of this section. The values added here correspond to WOTS+ public keys; however, unlike in stage 2, at this stage, the attacker does not know the secret key corresponding to the WOTS+ public key.



Step 4:

- At this step, the attacker compares the n-way collision value h30 they obtained with the public keys they aim to collide with. (The values TO,...,T7 correspond to the targeted public key without the checksum added.) If a collision is found at this stage, the attacker successfully produces a new WOTS+ public key with the same hash value as the genuine public key.



- As a result of the above stages, the attacker can generate a fake signature with the forged key they produced. In the SPHINCS+ and XMSS algorithms, when verifying a signature, the public keys obtained at each layer are not checked; instead, their hash values are taken, and this value is signed in the next layer. Therefore, even if the public keys obtained by the attacker differ from the real public keys, no error occurs during the verification of the fake signature because the hash values are the same.



- The biggest constraint in this attack is that the form of the message that the attacker can sign must be as follows:

XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF (X can take any value.)

The reason for this is that the attacker knows the secret keys corresponding to the public keys used in stage 2, but not those in stage 3.

In a WOTS+ signature, the pk value is used as the signature for the F value, so the message must contain F in the parts where the secret key is unknown for the attack to be successful.

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