

# Lattice Based Cryptography

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- 1. Basics Of Lattices**
- 2. SVP and CVP**
- 3. Sieving Algorithm**
- 4. LLL Algorithm**
- 5. BKZ Algorithm**
- 6. SIS and LWE**
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
Let  $b_1, b_2 \dots b_n \in \mathbb{R}^m$  be linearly independent vectors.

Lattice generated by them is defined as:


$$\mathcal{L}(\underbrace{\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n}_{\substack{\downarrow \\ \text{Basis of Lattice}}}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \mathbf{b}_i \mid x_i \in \mathbb{Z} \right\}$$

$m$  = Dimension of Lattice


$n$  = Rank of Lattice




(a) The lattice  $\mathbb{Z}^2$  with basis vectors  $(0, 1)$  and  $(1, 0)$ .



(b) The lattice  $\mathbb{Z}^2$  with a different basis consisting of vectors  $(1, 2)$  and  $(2, 3)$ . In fact, any lattice has infinitely many bases.



(c) A full-rank lattice generated by the basis vectors  $(1, 1)$  and  $(2, 0)$ . Note that this is a sub-lattice of  $\mathbb{Z}^2$ .



(d) A *non full-rank* lattice with basis vector  $(1, 1)$


$$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\downarrow} m \neq n$$

Let  $b_1, b_2 \dots b_n \in \mathbb{R}^m$  be linearly independent vectors.


Their **fundamental parallelepiped** is defined as:

$$\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \mathbf{b}_i \mid x_i \in \mathbb{R}, 0 \leq x_i < 1 \right\}$$

Different bases of the same lattice generate different fundamental parallelepipeds.




(a) The lattice  $\mathbb{Z}^2$  with basis vectors  $(0, 1)$  and  $(1, 0)$  and the associated fundamental parallelepiped.



(b) The lattice  $\mathbb{Z}^2$  with a different basis consisting of vectors  $(1, 1)$  and  $(2, 1)$ , and the associated fundamental parallelepiped.

**Determinant of Lattice :** n-dimensional volume of its fundamental parallelepiped.

The parallelepipeds associated with different bases of a lattice have the **same volume**.  
Thus, the determinant is a lattice invariant.






## Theorem

Let  $\mathcal{L}$  be a full-rank  $n$ -dimensional lattice, and let  $b_1, b_2 \dots b_n \in \mathbb{R}^m$  be linearly independent vectors in  $\mathcal{L}$ .

$$b_1, b_2 \dots b_n \text{ forms basis of } \mathcal{L} \iff P(b_1, b_2 \dots b_n) \cap \mathcal{L} = \{0\}$$

**Proof :** Omitted



**Figure 3:**  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  do not form a basis of  $\mathbb{Z}^2$ . Note that the parallelepiped of  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  contains a non-zero lattice point, namely  $(1,0)$ .

## Dual Lattices :

Defined as

$$\Lambda^* = \{y \in \text{span}(\Lambda) \mid \forall x \in \Lambda, \langle x, y \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}\}.$$

In words, the dual of  $\Lambda$  is the set of all points (in the span of  $\Lambda$ ) whose inner product with any of the points in  $\Lambda$  is integer.


- $\Lambda^*$  is also a lattice
- $\Lambda^{**} = \Lambda$

## Dual Lattices :


Defined as

$$\Lambda^* = \{y \in \text{span}(\Lambda) \mid \forall x \in \Lambda, \langle x, y \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}\}.$$

$\Lambda = \mathbb{Z}^n$



$\Lambda^* = \mathbb{Z}^n$




## Dual Lattices :


Defined as

$$\Lambda^* = \{y \in \text{span}(\Lambda) \mid \forall x \in \Lambda, \langle x, y \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}\}.$$

$$\Lambda = 2\mathbb{R}\mathbb{Z}^n$$



$$\Lambda^* = \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{R}\mathbb{Z}^n$$



# **SVP and CVP**

## Successive Minima:


Suppose that we select vectors in  $L$  as:

$\mathbf{v}_1$  = shortest nonzero vector in  $L$ ,  
 $\mathbf{v}_2$  = shortest vector in  $L$  linearly independent of  $\mathbf{v}_1$ ,  
 $\mathbf{v}_3$  = shortest vector in  $L$  linearly independent of  $\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2$ ,  
 $\vdots$   
 $\mathbf{v}_n$  = shortest vector in  $L$  linearly independent  
of  $\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2 \dots \mathbf{v}_{n-1}$ .

The lengths


$$\lambda_1 = \|\mathbf{v}_1\|, \lambda_2 = \|\mathbf{v}_2\|, \dots, \lambda_n = \|\mathbf{v}_n\|$$

are called the **successive minima** of the lattice  $L$ .  
In particular,  $\lambda_1 = \lambda_1(L)$  is the length of a shortest nonzero vector.



## The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP):


Given a Lattice  $\mathcal{L}(B)$ , find a (nonzero) Lattice vector  $\mathbf{Bx}$  (with  $x \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ ) of length (at most)  $\|\mathbf{Bx}\| \leq \lambda_1$  (Successive Minima)






## The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP <sub>$\gamma$</sub> ):

Given a Lattice  $\mathcal{L}(B)$ , find a (nonzero) Lattice vector  $\mathbf{Bx}$  (with  $x \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ ) of length (at most)  $\|\mathbf{Bx}\| \leq \gamma \cdot \lambda_1$




## The Closest Vector Problem (CVP):

Given a Lattice  $\mathcal{L}(B)$  and a target point  $\mathbf{t}$ , find a Lattice vector  $\mathbf{Bx}$  within distance  $\|\mathbf{Bx} - \mathbf{t}\| \leq \mu$  from the target



### The Closest Vector Problem (CVP <sub>$\gamma$</sub> ):


Given a Lattice  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B})$  and a target point  $\mathbf{t}$ , find a Lattice vector  $\mathbf{Bx}$  within distance  $\|\mathbf{Bx} - \mathbf{t}\| \leq \gamma \cdot \mu$  from the target



## Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP):

Given a Lattice  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B})$ , find  $n$  linearly independent Lattice vectors


$\mathbf{Bx}_1, \mathbf{Bx}_2 \dots \mathbf{Bx}_n$  of length (at most)  $\max_i \|\mathbf{Bx}_i\| \leq \lambda_n$



## Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP <sub>$\gamma$</sub> ):


Given a Lattice  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B})$ , find  $n$  linearly independent Lattice vectors

$\mathbf{Bx}_1, \mathbf{Bx}_2 \dots \mathbf{Bx}_n$  of length (at most)  $\max_i \|\mathbf{Bx}_i\| \leq \gamma \cdot \lambda_n$




# **Sieving Algorithm**

Lets we have a Lattice.



Finding short points in Lattice = **HARD**

Finding long points in Lattice = **EASY**







If you know two Lattice points are close, then take their difference to the origin




You will get shorter Lattice point



- We didn't find the shortest vector.
- We found a collision.



- We continue with new **purple** points.
- We found the shortest vector.



GOOD, BUT

How do you start ?

How do you find close pairs ?

Which pairs do you choose ?

What is distribution of the  
vectors at each step ?

How common are collisions ?

UNCLEAR

<b>Perturbation</b>	$2^{O(n)}$	[AKS01]
<b>Perturbation</b>	$2^{2.5n}$	[NV08, PS09, MV10, ...]
<b>Perturbation</b>	$2^{0.802n}$	Approximate [LWXZ11, WLW15, AUV19]
<b>Heuristic (no proof of correctness)</b>	$(3/2)^{n/2+o(n)} \approx 2^{0.29n}$	[NV08, Laa15, BDGL15, BLS16, ...]
<b>Sieving by Averages (Discrete Gaussian)</b>	$2^{n+o(n)}$	[ADRS15, ADS15, AS18]
<b>Sieving by Averages (Discrete Gaussian)</b>	$2^{n/2+o(n)}$	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• approx decision SVP [ADRS15]</li> <li>• HermiteSVP [ALS20]</li> <li>• Probably SVP [You!20]</li> </ul>
<b>????</b>	Fast!	[Veyse101]

IS

# LLL Algorithm



Arjen Lenstra



Hendrik Lenstra



Laszlo Lovasz

**Lattice Reduction:** Practical problem of solving SVP and CVP, or more generally of finding reasonably short vectors and reasonably good bases.

**LLL Algorithm** :

- Finds moderately short lattice vectors in polynomial time
- Finding very short (or very close) vectors is currently still exponentially hard.

## Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization Algorithm:

$$\mathbf{v}_1^* = \mathbf{v}_1$$

$$\mathbf{v}_2^* = \mathbf{v}_2 - \frac{\mathbf{v}_2 \cdot \mathbf{v}_1^*}{\|\mathbf{v}_1^*\|^2} \mathbf{v}_1^*$$

$$\mathbf{v}_3^* = \mathbf{v}_3 - \frac{\mathbf{v}_3 \cdot \mathbf{v}_2^*}{\|\mathbf{v}_2^*\|^2} \mathbf{v}_2^* - \frac{\mathbf{v}_3 \cdot \mathbf{v}_1^*}{\|\mathbf{v}_1^*\|^2} \mathbf{v}_1^*$$

$$\vdots$$
$$\ddots$$

$$\mathbf{v}_n^* = \mathbf{v}_n - \frac{\mathbf{v}_n \cdot \mathbf{v}_{n-1}^*}{\|\mathbf{v}_{n-1}^*\|^2} \mathbf{v}_{n-1}^* - \frac{\mathbf{v}_n \cdot \mathbf{v}_{n-2}^*}{\|\mathbf{v}_{n-2}^*\|^2} \mathbf{v}_{n-2}^* \cdots - \frac{\mathbf{v}_n \cdot \mathbf{v}_1^*}{\|\mathbf{v}_1^*\|^2} \mathbf{v}_1^*$$






Figure : Orthogonal projection. The set  $\{\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2^*\}$  is the orthogonal basis for the lattice generated by basis  $\{\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2\}$

We want that basis satisfies 2 conditions:

**Size condition** :  $1 \leq j < i \leq n: |\mu_{i,j}| \leq 0.5$

Makes  
coefficients  
smaller.

**Lovász condition** :  $\delta \|\mathbf{b}_{k-1}^*\|^2 \leq \|\mathbf{b}_k^*\|^2 + \mu_{k,k-1}^2 \|\mathbf{b}_{k-1}^*\|^2$

Makes basis  
vectors  
somewhat  
orthogonal

## INPUT

a lattice basis  $\mathbf{b}_0, \mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n$  in  $\mathbb{Z}^m$   
 a parameter  $\delta$  with  $1/4 < \delta < 1$ , most commonly  $\delta = 3/4$

## PROCEDURE

```

 $\mathbf{B}^* \leftarrow \text{GramSchmidt}(\{\mathbf{b}_0, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n\}) = \{\mathbf{b}_0^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^*\};$  and do not normalize
 $\mu_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{InnerProduct}(\mathbf{b}_i, \mathbf{b}_j^*) / \text{InnerProduct}(\mathbf{b}_j^*, \mathbf{b}_j^*);$  using the most current values of  $\mathbf{b}_i$  and  $\mathbf{b}_j^*$ 
 $k \leftarrow 1;$ 
while  $k \leq n$  do
    for  $j$  from  $k-1$  to  $0$  do
        if  $|\mu_{k,j}| > 1/2$  then  $\longrightarrow$  Size condition satisfied
             $\mathbf{b}_k \leftarrow \mathbf{b}_k - \lfloor \mu_{k,j} \rfloor \mathbf{b}_j;$ 
            Update  $\mathbf{B}^*$  and the related  $\mu_{i,j}$ 's as needed.
            (The naive method is to recompute  $\mathbf{B}^*$  whenever  $\mathbf{b}_i$  changes:
              $\mathbf{B}^* \leftarrow \text{GramSchmidt}(\{\mathbf{b}_0, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n\}) = \{\mathbf{b}_0^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^*\}$ )
        end if
    end for
    if  $\text{InnerProduct}(\mathbf{b}_k^*, \mathbf{b}_k^*) > (\delta - \mu_{k,k-1}^2) \text{InnerProduct}(\mathbf{b}_{k-1}^*, \mathbf{b}_{k-1}^*)$  then  $\longrightarrow$  Lovasz condition satisfied
         $k \leftarrow k + 1;$ 
    else
        Swap  $\mathbf{b}_k$  and  $\mathbf{b}_{k-1};$ 
        Update  $\mathbf{B}^*$  and the related  $\mu_{i,j}$ 's as needed.
         $k \leftarrow \max(k-1, 1);$ 
    end if
end while
return  $\mathbf{B}$  the LLL reduced basis of  $\{\mathbf{b}_0, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n\}$ 
    
```

## OUTPUT

the reduced basis  $\mathbf{b}_0, \mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n$  in  $\mathbb{Z}^m$

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## Algorithm 1: LLL Algorithm

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**Input:**  $\{\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n\}$

Repeat two steps until find the LLL reduced basis

**Step 1: Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization**

**for**  $i = 1$  **to**  $n$  **do**

**for**  $k = i - 1$  **to**  $1$  **do**

$m \leftarrow$  nearest integer of  $u_{k,i}$

$\mathbf{b}_i \leftarrow \mathbf{b}_i - m\mathbf{b}_k$

**end**

**end**

**Step 2: Check Condition 2, and swap**

**for**  $i = 1$  **to**  $n - 1$  **do**

**if**  $\|\mathbf{b}_{i+1}^* + u_{i,i+1}\mathbf{b}_i^*\|^2 < \frac{3}{4}\|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|^2$  **then**

        swap  $\mathbf{b}_{i+1}$  and  $\mathbf{b}_i$

        go to step 1

**end**

**end**

---

# LLL EXAMPLE :

Find an LLL-reduced basis for  $b_1 = (1, 0, 0), b_2 = (0, 1, 1), b_3 = (1, 0, 1)$ .

Let  $\|b_i^*\|^2 = B_i$

**Step 1:**

$$b_1^* = b_1 = (1, 0, 0), B_1 = 1$$

**Step 2:**

$$\mu_{2,1} = \frac{(0, 1, 1)(1, 0, 0)}{1} = 0$$

**Condition 1:**

$$|\mu_{2,1}| = 0 \leq \frac{1}{2} \quad \checkmark$$

$$b_2^* = b_2 - \mu_{2,1}b_1^* = (0, 1, 1) - 0(1, 0, 0) = (0, 1, 1), \quad B_2 = 2$$

**Condition 2:**

$$B_2 \geq \left(\frac{3}{4} - \mu_{2,1}^2\right)B_1$$

$$2 \geq \left(\frac{3}{4} - 0\right)1 \quad \checkmark$$

**Step 3:**

$$\mu_{3,2} = \frac{\langle b_3, b_2^* \rangle}{\langle b_2^*, b_2^* \rangle} = \frac{(1, 0, 1)(0, 1, 1)}{2} = \frac{1}{2}$$

**Condition 1:**

$$|\mu_{3,2}| = \frac{1}{2} \leq \frac{1}{2} \quad \checkmark$$

$$\mu_{3,1} = \frac{\langle b_3, b_1^* \rangle}{\langle b_1^*, b_1^* \rangle} = \frac{(1, 0, 1)(1, 0, 0)}{1} = 1$$

**Condition 1:**

$$|\mu_{3,1}| = 1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \quad \times \text{ Cond. 1 is violated.}$$

**Reduce:**

$$r = \left\lfloor \frac{1}{2} + \mu_{3,1} \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor \frac{1}{2} + 1 \right\rfloor = 1$$

$$b_3 = b_3 - rb_1 = (1, 0, 1) - 1(1, 0, 0) = (0, 0, 1)$$

$$\mu_{3,1} = \mu_{3,1} - r = 1 - 1 = 0$$

**New basis:**  $b_1 = (1, 0, 0), b_2 = (0, 1, 1), b_3 = (0, 0, 1)$

$$b_3^* = b_3 - \mu_{3,2}b_2^* - \mu_{3,1}b_1^* = (0, 0, 1) - \frac{1}{2}(0, 1, 1) - 0 = (0, -\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}), \quad B_3 = \frac{1}{2}$$

**Condition 2:**

$$B_3 \geq \left(\frac{3}{4} - \mu_{3,2}^2\right)B_2$$

# LLL EXAMPLE :

$$\frac{1}{2} \geq 1 \quad \times \quad \text{Cond. 2 is violated.}$$

**Swap:**  $b_1 = (1, 0, 0), b_2 = (0, 0, 1), b_3 = (0, 1, 1)$

After swap, we start again.

**Step 1:** ✓

**Step 2:**

$$\mu_{2,1} = \frac{(0, 0, 1)(1, 0, 0)}{1} = 0$$

**Condition 1:**

$$|\mu_{2,1}| = 0 \leq \frac{1}{2} \quad \checkmark$$

$$b_2^* = b_2 - \mu_{2,1}b_1^* = (0, 0, 1) - 0 = (0, 0, 1), \quad B_2 = 1$$

**Condition 2:**

$$B_2 \geq \left(\frac{3}{4} - \mu_{2,1}^2\right)B_1$$

$$1 \geq \left(\frac{3}{4} - 0\right)1 \quad \checkmark$$

**Step 3:**

$$\mu_{3,2} = \frac{\langle b_3, b_2^* \rangle}{\langle b_2^*, b_2^* \rangle} = \frac{(0, 1, 1)(0, 0, 1)}{1} = 1$$

**Condition 1:**

$$|\mu_{3,2}| = 1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \quad \times$$

$$\mu_{3,1} = \frac{\langle b_3, b_1^* \rangle}{\langle b_1^*, b_1^* \rangle} = \frac{(0, 1, 1)(1, 1, 0)}{1} = 0$$

**Condition 1:**

$$|\mu_{3,1}| = 0 \leq \frac{1}{2} \quad \checkmark$$

**Reduce:**

$$r = \left\lfloor \frac{1}{2} + \mu_{3,2} \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor \frac{1}{2} + 1 \right\rfloor = 1$$

$$b_3 = b_3 - rb_2 = (0, 1, 1) - 1(0, 0, 1) = (0, 1, 0)$$

$$\mu_{3,2} = \mu_{3,2} - r = 1 - 1 = 0$$

$$\mu_{3,1} = \mu_{3,1} - r\mu_{2,1} = 0 - 1 \cdot 0 = 0$$

**New basis:**  $b_1 = (1, 0, 0), b_2 = (0, 0, 1), b_3 = (0, 1, 0)$

$$b_3^* = b_3 - \mu_{3,2}b_2^* - \mu_{3,1}b_1^* = (0, 1, 0), \quad B_3 = 1$$

**Condition 2:**

$$B_3 \geq \left(\frac{3}{4} - \mu_{3,2}^2\right)B_2$$

$$1 \geq \frac{3}{4} \quad \checkmark$$

**Reduced Basis:**  $b_1 = (1, 0, 0), b_2 = (0, 0, 1), b_3 = (0, 1, 0)$

- The LLL algorithm is guaranteed to find a  $\mathbf{v} \in L$  satisfying

$$0 < \|\mathbf{v}\| \leq 2^{(n-2)/2} \lambda_1(L).$$

- In practice, LLL generally does better than this. But also in practice, if  $n$  is large, then LLL will not find a vector just a few times longer than  $\lambda_1(L)$ .

# **BKZ Algorithm**



Assume that we have given


**Basis :**

$b_1$	$b_2$	$b_3$	$b_4$	$b_5$	$b_6$	$b_7$	$b_8$	...	$b_n$
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**Svp oracle(For small number of vectors) :**

Input :  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n$

Finds shortest vector of Lattice (  $a_1$  ) generated by baseses

Returns :  $a_1, b_i, b_j, \dots, b_k$   
  
n-1

$b_1$	$b_2$	$b_3$	$b_4$	$b_5$	$b_6$	$b_7$	$b_8$	...	$b_n$
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-----	-------

Apply LLL

$a_1$	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	...	?
-------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----	---

Apply SVP oracle

$c_1$	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	...	?
-------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----	---

Apply LLL

$d_1$	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	...	?
-------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----	---

Apply SVP oracle

$d_1$	$e_1$	?	?	?	?	?	?	...	?
-------	-------	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----	---

Apply LLL

$f_1$	$g_2$	?	?	?	?	?	?	...	?
-------	-------	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----	---

Apply SVP oracle

⋮

---

**Algorithm 1** BKZ reduction (as given by Chen and Nguyen [2])

---

**Input:** A basis  $B = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$ , the blocksize  $\beta \in \{2, \dots, n\}$ , the Gram-Schmidt triangular matrix  $\mu$  and  $\|b_1^*\|^2, \dots, \|b_n^*\|^2$

**Output:** A BKZ- $\beta$  reduced basis for  $L(B)$

```
1:  $z \leftarrow 0$ 
2:  $j \leftarrow 0$ 
3:  $LLL(b_1, \dots, b_n, \mu)$ 
4: while  $z < n - 1$  do
5:    $j \leftarrow (j \bmod (n - 1)) + 1$ 
6:    $k \leftarrow \min(j + \beta - 1, n)$ 
7:    $h \leftarrow \min(k + 1, n)$ 
8:    $v \leftarrow Enum(\mu_{[j,k]}, \|b_j^*\|^2, \dots, \|b_k^*\|^2)$ 
9:   if  $v \neq (1, 0, \dots, 0)$  then
10:     $z \leftarrow 0$ 
11:     $LLL(b_1, \dots, \sum_{i=j}^k v_i b_i, b_j, \dots, b_h, \mu)$  at stage  $j$ 
12:  else
13:     $z \leftarrow z + 1$ 
14:     $LLL(b_1, \dots, b_h, \mu)$  at stage  $h - 1$ 
15:  end if
16: end while
```

---

# **SIS and LWE**

Given many uniform  $a_i$ , find **small**  $z_1, z_2 \dots z_m \in \mathbb{Z}$  so that

$$z_1 \cdot \begin{pmatrix} | \\ \mathbf{a}_1 \\ | \end{pmatrix} + z_2 \cdot \begin{pmatrix} | \\ \mathbf{a}_2 \\ | \end{pmatrix} + \dots + z_m \cdot \begin{pmatrix} | \\ \mathbf{a}_m \\ | \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} | \\ 0 \\ | \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$$

OR



$$\underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} \dots & \mathbf{A} & \dots \end{pmatrix}}_m \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{z} \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$$

## As a Lattice problem

- Given matrix  $A = (a_1, a_2 \dots a_m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$

$$\mathcal{L}^\perp(A) = \{z \in \mathbb{Z}^m : Az = 0\}$$

- SIS asks: short solutions  $z$  lies inside




**SEARCH:** Find secret  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  given many noisy inner products

$$\mathbf{a}_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n \quad , \quad b_1 = \langle \mathbf{s} , \mathbf{a}_1 \rangle + e_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$\mathbf{a}_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n \quad , \quad b_2 = \langle \mathbf{s} , \mathbf{a}_2 \rangle + e_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$\vdots$$

$e_i$ 's comes from Gaussian like distributions.




**SEARCH:** Find secret  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  given many noisy inner products

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \cdots & \mathbf{A} & \cdots \end{array} \right), \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \cdots & \mathbf{b}^t & \cdots \end{array} \right) = \mathbf{s}^t \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{e}^t$$




Given (Public)

$e_i$ 's comes from Gaussian like distributions.






**DECISION:** Distinguish  $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b})$  from uniform  $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b})$


 No error, just uniformly random values

$$\left( \cdots \mathbf{A} \cdots \right), \quad \left( \cdots \mathbf{b}^t \cdots \right) = \mathbf{s}^t \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{e}^t$$

$e_i$ 's comes from Gaussian like distributions.



## As a Lattice problem


LWE Lattice:

$$\mathcal{L}(A) = \{z \in \mathbb{Z}^m : z \equiv s * A \bmod q\}$$

LWE is **bounded-dist decoding** on  $\mathcal{L}(A)$ :

$$\text{given } b^t = z^t + e = s^t * A + e,$$

find  $z^t$



# **LWE applications**

# Public-Key Cryptosystem from LWE (1 bit ) (Lindler-Peikert)



Choose short int. vector  $x$   
(Private key)

$$A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$$

(Public)



$$s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$$

$$u = Ax \text{ (SIS problem)}$$

(Public key)

$$b^t = s^t A + e^t$$

(Ciphertext)

$$b' = s^t u + e' + \text{bit} * q/2$$

(Payload)

$$b' - b^t x$$

$$= s^t u - s^t A x - e^t x + e' + \text{bit} * q/2$$

X

X



much smaller  
than  $q/2$

Bit can be obtained

# Public-Key Cryptosystem from LWE (Regev 2005)



Choose uniformly random  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$   
(Private key)

Choose error  $e$  from distribution.

$$a_1, \dots, a_m \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^n$$

(Public)



$$(a_i, b_i)_{i=1}^m \text{ where } b_i = \langle a_i, s \rangle + e_i.$$

(Public key)

$$S \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m$$

$$\begin{aligned} & (\sum_{i \in S} a_i, \sum_{i \in S} b_i) \text{ if the bit is 0} \\ & (\sum_{i \in S} a_i, \lfloor \frac{p}{2} \rfloor + \sum_{i \in S} b_i) \text{ if the bit is 1} \end{aligned}$$

(Ciphertext)


$$\begin{aligned} b - \langle a, s \rangle &= \langle a, s \rangle + e - \langle a, s \rangle \\ &= e \end{aligned}$$

Plaintext bit is 0 if  $e$  closer to 0 than to  $\lfloor \frac{p}{2} \rfloor$  modulo  $p$

Plaintext bit is 1 otherwise


# Basic LWE key agreement

Based on Lindner–Peikert LWE public key encryption scheme





## Basic LWE key agreement


Treat each coefficient independently




Not always Works !


## Basic LWE key agreement


Bob says which of two regions  
the value is in:  or 



If 






If 





## Basic LWE key agreement

If  $b's - s'b = s'As + e's - s'As - s'e$   
 $= e's - s'e < \frac{q}{8}$  then this always works.



- Security not affected: revealing  or  leaks no information

## Basic LWE key agreement

public: “big”  $A$  in  $\mathbf{Z}_q^{n \times m}$

**Alice**

secret:  
random “small”  $s, e$  in  $\mathbf{Z}_q^m$

**Bob**

secret:  
random “small”  $s', e'$  in  $\mathbf{Z}_q^n$

$$b = As + e$$

$$b' = s'A + e', \quad \begin{matrix} \text{green} \\ \text{blue} \end{matrix} \text{ or } \begin{matrix} \text{red} \\ \text{blue} \end{matrix}$$

shared secret:  
round( $b$ 's)

shared secret:  
 $\text{round}(s'b)$

1. O. Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography. J. ACM, 56(6):1–40, 2009. Preliminary version in STOC 2005.
2. C. Peikert & R. Lindner., (2010) Better Key Sizes (and Attacks) for LWE-Based Encryption –Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2010/613 . <https://ia.cr/2010/613>
3. Peikert Lecture notes <https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~cpeikert/lic15/>