HW2

To apply differential cryptanalysis, we need differential characteristics for the cipher.

To find differential characteristics, we need to compute DDT tables for the S-boxes.

With the code below I computed DDT table for each S-boxes.

For S-box 1:

```
[0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 2, 2]
[0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 6, 0, 0, 0]
[0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 0, 2, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 2]
[0, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 6, 2, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
[0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]
[0, 4, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0]
[0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0, 4, 0]
[0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 2, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2]
[0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 2, 4, 2, 0, 0]
[0, 4, 0, 4, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 2, 6, 0, 0, 2, 2]
[0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 2, 2]
[0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0, 2, 0, 2]
[0, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
[0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 8, 0, 0]
```

For S-box 2:

Then I construct differential for Cipher 1.

Note: We know key xor does not affect differential since we add same key to the both value. Therefore, I omit key xor part in the below table.

		Differential				Probability
	INPUT	0	0	0001	0	
Round 1	S-BOX	0	0	0100	0	4/16
	PERM.	0	0010	0	0	
Round 2	S-BOX	0	1100	0	0	6/16
	PERM.	0100	0100	0	0	
Round3	S-BOX	0110	0110	0	0	6/16, 6/16
	PERM.	0	1100	1100	0	

Total probability is:
$$\frac{4}{16} * \left(\frac{6}{16}\right)^3 = \frac{864}{65536} = \frac{27}{2048} \approx 0.013$$

We have characteristic for differential cryptanalysis of cipher 1. So, we can start implementing the SPN.

I implement SPN uses array of size 4 as an input, s-box, key xor. Ex: [12,4,5,0].

In permutations, I transferred 4 integer state to the 16-bit state and does permutation. After permutation, state again becomes inter of 4 inputs.

Here my round function:

```
def cipher1round(girdi, anahtar,sbox,perm):
    # Define empty arrays
    sboxcikti = [0] * 4; permgirdi = [0] * 4
    permara = [0] * 16; permcikti = [0] * 4
    keyxorcikti = [0] * 4

# S-box
for i in range(0, 4):
    sboxcikti[i] = sbox[girdi[i]]

# Permutation
    permgirdi = integer_to_bit_array(sboxcikti, 4)
for i in range(0, 16):
        permara[i] = permgirdi[perm[i]]
    permcikti = bit_array_to_integer(permara, 4)

# Key xor
for i in range(0, 4):
        keyxorcikti[i] = permcikti[i] ^ anahtar[i]
```

Here my key schedule functions:

```
def keyScheduleFunc(Mkey):
    # Define empty arrays
    key1 = [0] * 16
    key2 = [0] * 16

    key1 = integer_to_bit_array(Mkey, 4)
    for i in range(0, 15):
        key2[i] = key1[i + 1]
    key2[15] = key1[15] ^ key1[13] ^ key1[11] ^ key1[10]
    return bit_array_to_integer(key2, 4)
```

```
def keySchedules(Mkey, round):
   key1 = keyScheduleFunc(Mkey); key2 = keyScheduleFunc(key1)
   key3 = keyScheduleFunc(key2); key4 = keyScheduleFunc(key3)
   key5 = keyScheduleFunc(key4); key6 = keyScheduleFunc(key5)
   #Returns corresponding round key
   if round == 0:
       return Mkey
   elif round == 1:
       return key1
   elif round == 2:
       return key2
       return key3
   elif round == 4:
       return key4
   elif round == 5:
       return key5
   elif round == 6:
```

And here my encryption function:

```
def cipher1(girdi, masterkey):
    # Define empty arrays
    round1 = [0] * 4; round2 = [0] * 4
    round3 = [0] * 4; round4 = [0] * 4
    round41 = [0] * 4; cikti = [0] * 4
    key0 = [0] * 4

# First tree rounds
key0 = keySchedules(masterkey, 0)
keywhitening = xor(girdi_key0__4)
    round1 = cipher1round(keywhitening_keySchedules(masterkey,1)_sbox1_perm1)
    round2 = cipher1round(round1, keySchedules(masterkey, 2)_sbox1_perm1)
    round3 = cipher1round(round2, keySchedules(masterkey, 3)_sbox1_perm1)
    round4 = xor(round3_keySchedules(masterkey,4)_4)
# Last round S-box
for i in range(0, 4):
    round41[i] = sbox1[round4[i]]
    cikti = xor(round41_keySchedules(masterkey,5)_4)
    return cikti
```

I have more functions like converts integer arrays to bit array etc. I omit them for simplicity of the report.

1. ATTACK OF BLOCK CIPHER 1

I generate random plaintexts. Then with xoring the differential to the plaintexts, I obtain differential plaintexts and write random plaintexts and differential plaintexts to two different text files.

Text files look like below (as you can see initial differential is [0,0,0001,0]):

```
6 11 6 10

4 0 8 0

13 0 4 7

0 9 6 12

4 13 7 5

5 11 6 7

0 7 1 13

9 0 2 9

3 9 8 7

0 11 3 7

10 5 8 9

13 0 5 1

0 3 9 12

0 12 12 14
```



Then I encrypted those plaintexts and similarly write them into two text files.

```
13 9 13 0

13 3 14 3

14 9 0 4

12 11 12 8

13 15 6 14

11 9 13 5

12 12 14 2

9 4 0 9

5 10 14 5

12 11 15 14

10 3 8 1
```

```
13 9 6 15
7 12 4 9
11 3 14 2
3 1 12 8
8 14 0 0
11 9 6 11
12 2 14 12
12 12 6 9
3 10 6 6
15 0 5 10
10 10 3 13
```

In each attack, new pairs are created ,encrypted with new random key and writed to the text files.

Here the code that does what I explained.(Number of pairs and input differential can be changed)

```
count=0
reverse_sbox_output_one=[0,0,0,0]
reverse_sbox_output_two=[0,0,0,0]
reverse_key_xorb=[0,0,0,0]
reverse_key_xora=[0,0,0,0]
number_of_pairs=4096
input_differential=[0,0,1,0]
```

```
plaintexts = open("Plaintexts5000.txt", "w")
d_plaintexts = open("Differential Plaintexts5000.txt", "w")
encrypted_plaintexts = open("Encrypted plaintexts5000.txt", "w")
d_encrypted_plaintexts = open("Differential Encrypted plaintexts5000.txt", "w")

for i in range(number_of_pairs):
    plaintext = random_key()

# writes Plaintexts to the text file
    for ele in plaintext:
        plaintexts.write(str(ele) + " ")
    plaintexts.write("\n")

# writes plaintext which satisfy differential
d_plaintext=xor(plaintext_input_differential_4)
for ele in d_plaintext:
        d_plaintexts.write(str(ele) + " ")
d_plaintexts.write("\n")

# writes Ciphertexts to the text file
    for ele in cipher1(plaintext_anahtar):
        encrypted_plaintexts.write(str(ele) + " ")
encrypted_plaintexts.write("\n")

# writes corresponding differential ciphertext
for ele in cipher1(d_plaintext_anahtar):
        d_encrypted_plaintexts.write(str(ele) + " ")
d_encrypted_plaintexts.write(str(ele) + " ")
d_encrypted_plaintexts.write(str(ele) + " ")
d_encrypted_plaintexts.write(str(ele) + " ")
```

Then for the attack. I read ciphertexts from the text file and and reverse key xor and s box for key candidate and look if it fits to the characteristics. If it fits to the characteristic, then I increment the count for the key candidate. I do this for all possible key candidates. Most counted key will be our key in the last round. From probability of the characteristic, For 4096 pairs I expect 53 count. 53 is not exact number it can be more or less depending on the key and random plaintexts.

Here my code does what I explained above.

And here my results.

Here another result for different key.

So we found [---, key1, key2, ---]. Other keys can be found by brute force. With Reversing the key schedule, master key can be found.

2. ATTACK OF BLOCK CIPHER 2

New characteristic for cipher 2:

I used DDT table for S-box 2 and permutation.

			Probability			
	INPUT	0	0	0110	0	
Round 1	S-BOX	0	0	0100	0	6/16
	PERM.	0	0010	0	0	
Round 2	S-BOX	0	1100	0	0	4/16
	PERM.	0100	0100	0	0	
Round3	S-BOX	0110	0110	0	0	6/16,6/16
	PERM.	0	1100	1100	0	

Total probability is:
$$\frac{4}{16} * \left(\frac{6}{16}\right)^3 = \frac{53}{4096} \approx 0.013$$

I implemented cipher2(just changed s-box) made the same process with the attack (with appropriate changes of attack code) of cipher1 then I obtained [---, ---, key1, key2]

I give 2 examples of attack with different keys

```
key1:15 key2:1 Count : 8
key1:15 key2:2 Count : 3
key1:15 key2:3 Count : 15
key1:15 key2:4 Count : 2
key1:15 key2:5 Count : 23
key1:15 key2:6 Count : 6
key1:15 key2:7 Count : 9
key1:15 key2:8 Count : 5
key1:15 key2:9 Count : 4
key1:15 key2:10 Count : 6
key1:15 key2:11 Count : 6
key1:15 key2:12 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:13 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:14 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:15 Count : 4
Last key : [0, 12, 5, 1]
Max count: 78 at key1 : 12 key2 : 5 , Prob : 0.01904296875
```

3. ATTACK OF BLOCK CIPHER 3

We need new characteristic.

I used DDT table for S-box 2 and no permutation.

			Probability			
	INPUT	0	0	1100	1100	
Round 1	S-BOX	0	0	0010	0010	4/16, 4/16
	PERM.	0	0	0010	0010	
Round 2	S-BOX	0	0	1100	1100	4/16, 4/16
	PERM.	0	0	1100	1100	
Round3	S-BOX	0	0	0010	0010	4/16, 4/16
	PERM.	0	0	0010	0010	

Total probability is:
$$\left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^6 = \frac{1}{4096} \approx 0.002$$

The probability is quite low therefore I will use 10.000 pair for the attack.

Other part of the attack is the same.

Here 2 of my results:

```
key1:15 key2:2 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:3 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:4 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:5 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:6 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:7 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:8 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:9 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:10 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:11 Count : 2
key1:15 key2:12 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:13 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:14 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:15 Count : 1
Last key : [0, 4, 5, 1]
Max count: 17 at key1 : 5 key2 : 1 , Prob : 0.0017
```

```
key1:15 key2:0 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:1 Count : 2
key1:15 key2:2 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:3 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:4 Count : 2
key1:15 key2:5 Count : 3
key1:15 key2:6 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:7 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:8 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:9 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:10 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:11 Count : 1
key1:15 key2:12 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:13 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:14 Count : 0
key1:15 key2:15 Count : 1
 Last key : [12, 14, 13, 11]
Max count: 14 at key1 : 13 key2 : 11 , Prob : 0.0014
```

So I get key [---, ---, key1, key2] Other part of the key can be found by reversing key schedule and brute force.

4. COMPARISON

For the first two cipher, I think there is no much difference. They have same permutation and key schedule. Only S-boxes are different. In the first S-box higher value on the DDT is 8. In the second S-box, higher value is 6. So with this information we can say that S-box 2 is better then S-box 1. But the position of 8 is not usable in my characteristic so I didn't use the 8. Other than that attack was very similar.

In the third cipher we don't have any permutation. With no permutation, characteristic can consist of columns of S-boxes. Therefore, number of active s box cannot be reduced for obtaining 8 bit of key and this situation has negative effect to the probability.

5. CODE

I made my implementation with python.

With running main, you can test result yourself.

```
C:\Users\Halil\AppData\Local\Programs\Python

1 - DDT

2 - Attack on Cipher 1

3 - Attack on Cipher 2

4 - Attack on Cipher 3

5 - Quit

Go to :
```