MEDUSA

Mining Events to Detect Undesirable uSer Actions in SCADA

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WHAT

SCADA systems are computer systems used for monitoring equipment and controlling industrial processes

(e.g. power plants, water treatment facility, gas distribution network). **Today's SCADA systems**:

- use legacy technologies;
- use proprietary protocols;
- used to be isolated nowadays may be (indirectly) connected to the Internet.

THREATS

SYSTEM-RELATED THREATS - an attacker hits computers, networks, sensors, programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or radio signals to cause failures in SCADA systems.



MEASURES TAKEN: NIDS monitoring network traffic [2], checking protocol specifications [1], etc.

PROCESS-RELATED THREATS - an attacker gains user access rights and performs legitimate SCADA commands to cause a failure or misconfiguration in the industrial process.



MEASURES TAKEN: None.







OUR GOAL DETECT

- **OUNAUTHORISED USERS**
- **OPERATIONAL MISTAKES**
- **O HARMFUL CONFIGURATIONS**

APPROACH

DATA MINING

SCADA Logs

BECAUSE:

- SCADA logs are quantity and quality rich,
- SCADA behaviour is regular and predictable,
- System users lack time and skills to analyse logs manually.

PLAN

BUILD DETECTION MODEL ON SCADA LOGS

- 1. Learn patterns of normal behavior from SCADA logs
- 2. Detect outliers using data mining algorithms
- 3. Inspect sequences of events
- 4. Offline to real-time analysis

WHAT IF

o an attacker changes device parameters

(e.g., tank capacity),

 an attacker changes the range of allowed actions for a specific device

(e.g., one cannot stop a pump),

an attacker changes topology

(e.g., makes a device invisible).

o an attacker produces a harmful operational sequence:

GOOD intentions How to change a water source for one neighborhood?


- Switch to manual mode;
- Switch to manual mode;Check status in tank A;

Check status in tank B;

- Stop pumping from tank A;
- Start pumping from tank B;Check status in the flow;Resize bandwidth to fit capacity;
- How to overflow a tank and cause a disaster?

BAD intentions

- Switch to manual mode;
 Check status in tank A;
- Check status in tank B;
 Stop pumping from tank A;
 Start pumping from tank B;
- Check status in the flow;
 Resize bandwidth to fit capacity;



PRELIMINARY RESULTS An anomalous user activity in late night hours SCADA log Unexpected error messages on system users

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References:

[2]O. Linda, T. Vollmer, and M. Manic, "Neural network based intrusion detection system for critical infrastructures," in IJCNN'09: Proc. International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, pp. 102–109, IEEE Press, 2009.