Susan Landau Privacyink.org

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 And then voice comms got more complicated.









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There is another way.

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The Vulnerability Solution:
 No added risks --- and it has to be done anyway.

Why is IP Wiretapping Difficult?

Infrastructure provider is not the service provider.

New services all the time.

Peer to Peer.

Encryption.


Mobility.

Building Wiretapping Capabilities into Communications Infrastructure Creates Risk

Ripe, rich target.

Central point of failure.

These risks are not hypothetical: Vodafone Greece



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These risks are not hypothetical: Telecom Italia



These risks are not hypothetical: the NSA experience

 All CALEA-compliant switches tested by NSA had security risks.

The risks are not hypothetical: CALEA applied to IP networks

- Cisco wiretapping architecture for IP-networks based on European standards for law-enforcement interception;
- If recommended cryptography is not used, it is easy to spoof; unauthorized parties receive interception.

The risks are not hypothetical: CALEA applied to IP networks

 Probes into Google from China discovered which Google users were the subject of wiretap orders.

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 Either the developer puts the capability in, and responds to each access request ...

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Furthermore, it won't work.

Crypto, open-source software, off-shore services are problems.

Bottom Line:

CALEA applied to PSTN risky.

CALEA applied to IP networks much more so.

Internet Apps

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Built quickly.

And consequently hard to secure.

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That's BAD.

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Another way to look at it: Easy to Exploit.

Wiretapping The Target (the IP Way):

No alligator clips, no headset.

No wiretapping while standing in the dark basement.

Instead we must use the tools we have.

Get a warrant.

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 Probe the target's device to discover OS, version, applications, versions.

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State and local law enforcement use FBI tools.

The Vulnerabilities Market

 Common Vulnerabilities Enumeration (CVE): weekly listing of newly published vulnerabilities.
 Authoritative, though not necessarily up to date.

 Private companies: Vupen, VulnerabilityLab, Secunia.

Private dealers.

The Vulnerabilities Market

Table 1. Exploitable vulnerabilities discovered from March to mid-July 2012.					
Month	Vul-Labs	Microsoft V.R.	Vupen	Bugtraq	ZDI
July	15	2	6	17	14
June	32	2	25	5	39
May	31	1	39	2	0
April	37	2	38	6	20
March	9	1	41	11	13

 Law enforcement must discover --- or purchase --- a vulnerabliity.

Zero-day exploit.

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Zero-day exploit.

Will there be enough vulnerabilities?

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Zero-day exploit.

Will there be enough vulnerabilities?

Unfortunately yes.

 Law enforcement must discover --- or purchase --- a vulnerability.

Zero-day exploit.

Exploit it? Report it?

 Law enforcement must discover --- or purchase --- a vulnerabliity.

Zero-day exploit.

Exploit it? Report it? --- Do Both.

Report and exploit?

Time to patch is slow.

Monthly or bimonthly patch releases, delays, etc.

Is this legitimate?

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By reporting, increasing security.

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Only exploiting when there is a wiretap order.

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No, the vulnerabilities market is dominated by nationalsecurity organizations, not law enforcement.

Preventing Dirty Play

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Enforce reporting of vulnerabilities.

 Ensure that only the targeted material is accessed, and not other material.

What We're Proposing

 Use precisely targeted vulnerabilities to accomplish legally authorized wiretaps.

 Do this instead of building wiretap capabilities into all infrastructure and applications.

Two Final Points

 Better to use vulnerabilities present in communications infrastructure and apps than to introduce new ones to ensure wiretapping capability.

 Law enforcement will **not** be introducing new vulnerabilities, only exploiting those already present.

Further Reading

- Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, and Landau, "Going Bright: Wiretapping without Weakening Communications Infrastructure," *IEEE Security and Privacy*, Jan/Feb 2013.
- "CALEA II: Risks of Wiretap Modifications to Endpoints," May 17, 2013, https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CALEAII-techreport.pdf
- "Eavesdropping on Internet Communications," editorial board, New York Times, May 20, 2013, https:// www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/opinion/eavesdropping-oninternet-communications.html

Further Reading

 Landau, Surveillance or Security? The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies, MIT Press, 2011.

 Schneier, "The FBI's New Wiretapping Plan is Great News for Criminals," Foreign Policy, May 29, 2013.