Why software engineers don't get bonuses

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Abstraction, abstraction...

In computer science we like to pretend that it's all digital...

- Perfect 1s and 0s.
- ► Computers that work exactly how the specifications say.
- ► Hardware can be (largely) ignored.
- ▶ Lower level details... that's for electrical engineers not us!

This doesn't always work out.

Money, money, money...

It mostly works out though...

▶ But this whole unit is about what happens when computers start doing weird things.

Electrical engineers, and computer architects make mistakes

Cost of fixing hardware is big

- ► You cannot trivially fix a silicon wafer
- ▶ You cannot recall old hardware and change the circuits

Cost of fixing software is cheap

► It's just code!

When there is a bug... its the software engineers who fix it

Consequently we have to clean up after their messes

- ► So software is always running late
- ► So we don't get a bonus :-(

(or so said my first boss)

Plan

In this lecture we'll cover two ways hardware is broken.

- ► Rowhammer and DRAM
- ► Meltdown/Spectre and CPUs

We'll also cover how software works around it.

DRAM glorious, DRAM!

Memory! Used to store all the things the computer is thinking about that we can't fit in a register!

- ▶ Implemented using a capacitor and a transistor per bit
- ► Ganged (arranged) into long rows (~8k bits per row)
- ▶ Placed into banks of ganged rows

When we want to read a bit of memory:

- ▶ We find the row it is in.
- Activate the row by letting the capacitors discharge
- Which copies the row into an active memory buffer

DRAM needs to be refreshed so the capactiors don't lose their charge over time

► Roughly every 64ms for modern hardware

Electronic Engineering is messy

Capacitors leak charge

Current in wires induces current in other nearby wires

The 1s and 0s aren't charged or uncharged capacitors

▶ Its whether a capacitor is currently discharging more or less than a threshhold voltage But this is all fine because electronic components are large!

Or they were...

- ► As memory capacity has increased...
- ► The physical dimensions of memory has got smaller.

"The Dwarves Electrical engineers tell no tale; but even as mithril memory density was the foundation of their wealth, so also it was their destruction: they delved too greedily and too deep, and disturbed that from which they fled, Durin's Bane Rowhammer."

Gandalf the Greyhat

Flipping bits

Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors

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Abstract. Memory isolation is a key property of a reliable and secure computing system - an access to one memory address should not have unintended side effects on data stored in other addresses. However, as DRAM process technology scales down to smaller dimensions, it becomes more difficult to prevent DRAM cells from electrically interacting with each other. In this paper, we expose the vulnerability of commodity DRAM chips to disturbance errors. By reading from the same address in DRAM, we show that it is possible to corrupt data in nearby addresses. More specifically, activating the same row in DRAM corrupts data in nearby rows. We demonstrate this phenomenon on Intel and AMD systems using a malicious pmoram that generates many DRAM accesses. We induce errors in most DRAM modules (110 out of 129) from three major DRAM manufacturers. From this we conclude that many deployed systems are likely to be at risk. We identify the mot cause of disturbance errors as the repeated townline of a DRAM row's wordline, which stresses inter-cell coupling effects that accelerate charge leakage from nearby muy. We provide an extensive characterization study of disturbance errors and their behavior using an FPGA-based testing platform. Amone our key findings, we show that (i) it takes as few as 139K accesses to induce an error and (ii) up to one in every 1.7K cells is susceptible to errors. After examining various notential ways of addressing the problem, we propose a low-overhead solution to prevent the errors.

1. Introduction

The continued scaling of DRAM process technology has enabled unailtre etils to be placed close to each other. Crimal read and the continued scaling and the continued to the con

As a result, high-density DRAM is more likely to suffer from disturbance, a phenomenon in which different cells interfere with each other's operation. If a cell is disturbed beyond its noise maryin, it malfunctions and experiences a

disturbance errors, DRAM manufacturers have been employing a two-pronged approach: (I) improving inter-cell isolation through circuit-level techniques [22, 32, 49, 61, 73] and (II) screening for disturbance errors during post-production testing [33, 46]. We demonstrate that their efforts to contain disturbance errors have not always been successful, and that erroneous DRAM chins have been slinoine into the field.¹

In this paper, we expose the existence and the widespread nature of disturbance errors in commodity DRAM chips sold and used today. Amone 129 DRAM modules we analyzed (comprising 972 DRAM chips), we discovered disturbance errors in 110 modules (836 chips). In particular, all modules manufactured in the past two years (2012 and 2013) were vulnerable, which implies that the appearance of disturbance errors in the field is a relatively recent phenomenon affecting more advanced generations of process technology. We show that it takes as few as 139K reads to a DRAM address (more generally, to a DRAM row) to induce a disturbance error. As a proof of concept, we construct a user-level program that continuously accesses DRAM by issuing many loads to the same address while flushing the cache-line in between. We demonstrate that such a program induces many disturbance errors when executed on Intel or AMD machines

We identify the root cause of DRAM disturbance errors as votage fluctuations on an internal wire called the wordline. DRAM comprises a two-dimensional array of cells, where each rwo of cells has its own wordline. To access a cell within each rwo of cells has its own wordline. To access a cell within ing its voltage—i.e., the row must be activated. When there are many activations to the same row, they force the wordline to toggle on and off repeatedly. According to our observations, such voltage fluctuations on a row's wordline have voltage, and the control of the control of the control voltage. The control of the control of the control of the cells to loak charge at an accelerated rate. If such a cell loses too much charge before it is restered to its original value (i.e.,

refreshed, It experiences a disturbance error. We comprehensively characterize DRAM disturbance errors on an FPGA-based testing platform to understand their behavior and symptoms. Based on our findings, we examine the contraction of the contraction. We propose an effective and low-overhead solution, called PRAM, that prevents disturbance errors by probabilistically refreshing only those rows that are likely to be at its lin. Contract to other solutions, PPAR does not require expensive hardware manages for follow resulting the contraction of the contraction o

Rowhammering is a well known bug in DRAM chips since ~2010

If you repeatedly charge and discharge a row in DRAM really quickly it can cause errors in nearby rows

Manufacturers all knew about it, but didn't really bother to document it.

- Seen as a reliability issue, not a security issue
- Cached memory largely fixes it.

Several papers discuss it and explore it

- Almost all RAM is vulnerable to it (to some extent)
- Maybe you could do something malicious theoretically?
- ▶ Still treated as a reliability issue



Flipping bits, in practice

code1a: mov eax, [X] mov ebx, [Y] clrflush [X] clrflush [Y] mfence imp code1a


Find two memory addresses X and Y that are in separate rows of RAM and:

- 1. Load *X into the active buffer
- 2. Load *Y into the active buffer
- Kick *X out of the cache (so next read goes directly to RAM)
- Kick *Y out of the cache (so next read goes directly to RAM)
- **5**. Ensure that the cache is really gone
- 6. Repeat (as fast as you can)


Token ASCII Art Diagram

If you perform the rowhammer with the above RAM layout

- ► Eventually you'll get errors in the adjacent rows (the !'s)
- ► This is called single-sided Row Hammering



Double Sided Rowhammering



If you select X and Y so there is excactly 1 row between them

- Eventually you'll get errors in the adjacent rows (the !'s)
- Quickly you'll get errors in the in-between row
- ► This is called double-sided Row Hammering

So what?

So we can introduce (typically) single bit errors in RAM... so what?

Mark Seaborne and Halvar Flake (and others) continue exploring

- Discover double-sided variant of Rowhammering
- Find that its not just all RAM which is susceptible to this, but that its *all rows* in *all ram* (between 30–100%... but improvements later make it 100%).

They discover the bit flips are consistent

▶ Same bits flip every time when you Rowhammer the same rows

And even consistent between the same RAM products

- ▶ If Alice and Bob have the same make RAM from the same manufacturer
- ▶ Then if they Rowhammer the same rows the same bits will always flip

This seems bad, but so what?

- ▶ You can violate the integrity of RAM, but is that all?
- ▶ How could you possibly use this as part of an attack to get arbitrary code execution?

NaCl Sandbox

Privileged sandbox for running native code from a web browser safely.

- Checks if the code is safe (i.e. doesn't contain any weird syscalls or violate safety properties)
- ▶ If so, it loads the chunks of instructions aligned on 32B boundaries

```
and eax, 0x000F ; Truncate address to 32 bits and mask to be 32-byte aligned add rax, r15 ; Add r15, the sandbox base address jmp [rax] ; Jump to the loaded code snippet
```

Can we use Rowhammer to escape the sandbox?

(I mean obviously we can, but its more fun if you work out how to do it rather than me telling you...)

Variadic Instruction Sets

X86 is a dense instruction set

- ▶ Different instructions have different lengths
- ► Some have multiple length

```
20ea0: 48 b8 0f 05 eb 0c f4 f4 f4 f4 movabs rax, 0xf4f4f4ff40ceb050f syscall 20ea4: eb 0c imp 0xe
```

Last chance to guess the exploit?

Escaping NaCL

Code section is readable, so lets try and Rowhammer that and eax, 0x000F!

Conveniently the code section is also readable (but not writable) by the loaded process so we can tell if it has worked

So the attack:

- Load a sequence of safe code that happens to be unsafe if you were to run it with a 1-bit offset
- 2. Rowhammer the loading code so that NaCl checks the code with no-offset, but runs it with an offset
- 3. Probably the program is gonna crash 'cos the loading code isn't valid
- 4. Or we Rowhammer the Kernel's memory and crash the entire computer
- 5. ...or it works?

Luckily most unprivileged users are allowed to run crashy programs millions of times without batting an eyelid See this course.

Whoops!

Mark Seaborn and Halvar Flake have managed to Rowhammer their way to aribtrary code execution.

- Guess it was security bug after all... B-)
- ▶ Also publish a similar but fiddlier Linux root privilege escallation attack using Rowhammer

Short term:

- clflush is banned in NaCl loaded code
- clflush is banned from non-root code (sometimes)

Those aren't sustainable solutions...

Buy better RAM?

- ▶ But how do you tell?
- ...with error correction codes (ECC)?
 - Expensive though, and slower (worth it for a server, not for a laptop...)
 - Still a potential denial of service/vulnerability if you can corrupt multiple bits at once with Rowhammer
- ...which refreshes faster?
 - ▶ If you can't Rowhammer faster than the refresh speed the attack doesn't work
 - ▶ But this slows down the *whole* computer.
- ...and which refreshes neigbouring rows more often?
 - ► More recent DRAM standards do this...
 - Again, slows things down.

Are we depressed yet?

Buckle up

