

Return Oriented Programming -Why?

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- Two directions:
 - Control flow integrity proof
 - Isolate "bad" code that has been introduced into the system.

W X feature

- Memory is either marked as writable or executable, but may not be both.
- Prevents the execution of shellcode, even if we are able to bypass CFI and able to write the shellcode.
- Intel and AMD offer this feature and operating systems- Windows Vista, Mac OS X, Linux, and OpenBSD now support.

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Where is the problem

- Flawed assumption: preventing the introduction of *malicious code* is sufficient to prevent the introduction of *malicious computation*.
- Return oriented programming is a proof of this flawed assumtion.
- We'll get acquainted with ROP shortly!!

X86 and ROP

- instruction set is large and its encoding is dense => a variety of instructions are available for use even in relatively small programs.
- calling convention uses the stack, which an attacker can often overwrite (something belongs to the attacker!)
- ROP Principle: How should programs be constructed if the stack pointer takes the place of the instruction pointer?

Reference

- Return-Oriented Programming: Systems, Languages, and Applications By RYAN ROEMER, ERIK BUCHANAN, HOVAV SHACHAM and STEFAN SAVAGE
- For working example:
 - Return Oriented Programming and ROPgadget tool by Jonathan Salwan
 - http://shell-storm.org/blog/Return-Oriented-Programming-and-ROPgadget-tool/