

CPA - Secure Scheme

$$r, m, k \in \{0, 1\}^n$$

Construction: Enc: $c := \langle r, f_k(r) \oplus m \rangle$

Dec: $m := f_k(r) \oplus c$; $c = \langle r, s \rangle$

Proof:

consider the 2 set of encryption schemes,

$$S_1 = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$$

$$S_2 = (\bar{\text{Gen}}, \bar{\text{Enc}}, \bar{\text{Dec}})$$

where S_1 and S_2 are completely identical, except the fact that we use a truly random-function f in S_2 and a pseudo random function f_k in S_1 . For a PPTM adversary A ,

$$\therefore \text{To prove: } \exists \text{ negl}(n) \text{ such that, } |P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_1}^{\text{CPA}}(n) = 1] - P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_2}^{\text{CPA}}(n) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(n).$$

Proof:

Let $q(n)$ be the upper bound on the number of operations carried by adversary A to the encryption oracle.

Let D be a PPTM adversary, with access to a random oracle D . Then,

① D is truly random

→ This setting is similar to A 's setting using the scheme S_2

$$\therefore P_{f \leftarrow \text{Func}} [D^{f(\cdot)}(m) = 1] = P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_2}^{\text{CPA}}(m) = 1] \quad \text{--- ①}$$

② D is PRF

→ If key k , is chosen uniformly then,

$$P_{k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n} [D^{f_k(\cdot)}(m) = 1] = P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_1}^{\text{CPA}}(m) = 1] \quad \text{--- ②}$$

$\therefore F$ is pseudo random, \therefore we know that $\exists \text{ negl}(n)$ such that

$$|P[D^{f_k(\cdot)}(m) = 1] - P[D^{f(\cdot)}(m) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

\therefore from ① & ② we get

$$|P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_1}^{\text{CPA}}(m) = 1] - P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_2}^{\text{CPA}}(m) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(n).$$

② consider a uniformly sampled string $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$, then for almost $q(n)$ queries then there could be following 2 cases,

① adversary A has not seen string s yet. [repeat]

→ Here, A learns nothing about $f(n)$, and is uniformly distributed. \therefore Prob. that A outputs $b = b^1$ is $= 1/2$ (truly random case)

② Adversary A has seen string τ before [repeat]

$$\Rightarrow P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_2}^{\text{CPA}}(n) = 1] = P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_2}^{\text{CPA}}(n) = 1 \wedge \text{repeat}] + P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_2}^{\text{CPA}}(n) = 1 \wedge \overline{\text{repeat}}]$$

$$\leq P[\text{repeat}] + P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_2}^{\text{CPA}}(n) = 1 \mid \overline{\text{repeat}}]$$

$$\leq \frac{q(n)}{2^n} + \frac{1}{2}$$

\therefore if we put a PRF in place of random function we get,

$$P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_1}^{\text{CPA}}(n) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \underbrace{\frac{q(n)}{2^n}}_{\text{negligible}} + \text{negl}(n)$$

$q(n)$ is bounded by a polynomial

$$\therefore \frac{q(n)}{2^n} \rightarrow \text{negligible}$$

$$P[\text{PrivK}_{A, S_1}^{\text{CPA}}(n) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$$