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The Central Foreign Affairs Commission Of China

Study Guide

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Agenda: Formulation of the future foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in the present geopolitical landscape

Executive Board

Rik Mukherjee (Chairperson)	+91 90515513727	rikmukherjee2711@gmail.com
Devesh Agarwal (Director)	+91 9830260840	devesh.ag16@gmail.com
Somya Shubhra Pal (Director)	+91 9073203029	somyapal987@gmail.com
Rohan Sonthalia (Asst. Director)	+91 8334977754	sonthaliarohan@gmail.com

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Chairperson's Address

Greetings delegates.

It is with great honour I welcome you to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission. In this committee, delegates represent officials of the People's Republic of China, and shall discuss the nation's foreign policy and how they must adapt to an ever-uncertain world.

This study guide contains basic information about the structure of the Chinese government, it's foreign policy apparatus, as well as the principles they follow while formulating the same. For further perusal, we have also included a few crises that are currently pertinent to China's standing in the world. It is our hope that the study guide will be used as a base on which your own research must be built, above and beyond the scope of this document.

Throughout the three days of the conference, the proceedings of this committee will be handled by the Executive Board, comprising of the co-directors, namely Devesh Agarwal and Somya Shubhra Pal. The former is a grade 12 student, and the President of the MUN & Debate Group, a responsibility he has always managed with utmost capability alongside his commitments as the school's Dance Team captain, as well as a reputation for topping Economics. The latter is an avid and successful MUNner, and though a grade 11 student, has the most knowledge of procedure among all the members of the Board. Working alongside them will be Rohan Sonthalia, the Assistant Director, who is a grade 11 Science student, which may belie his knowledge of economics, an asset greatly appreciated in any committee.

Assisting them, I shall act as your Chairperson, Xi Jinping. Having always been interested in Chinese and Asiatic politics, it is my honour to serve as the same, and it will be our privilege to act as your Executive Board, and we hope this committee will be an enriching experience to veterans and beginners alike.

To conclude, I would wish you the very best of luck in your research, and would only leave you with a small request: Work with solutions, not rhetoric.

That being said, feel free to contact the members of the Executive Board, as provided, if you are in need of any clarification. Till then:

好好儿干啊!

Do well!

Regards,

Rik Mukherjee,

Chairperson of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission.



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Politburo Standing Committee

The Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) serves as China's most senior decision-making body. The Party constitution requires that Party committees at all levels of the Chinese political system operate according to the principle of combining collective leadership with individual responsibility based on division of work. Accordingly, each of the seven members of the PSC shoulders primary responsibility for a specific portfolio. • The Party General Secretary serves as Chairman of the Party and State Central Military Commissions, and as State President. He also oversees foreign policy and, according to the Party constitution, has responsibility for convening Standing Committee and larger Politburo meetings and presiding over the work of the Party Secretariat.

- The second-ranked PSC member serves as Premier of the State Council, which manages the state bureaucracy. He is effectively China's top economic official.
- The third-ranked PSC member serves as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC), China's unicameral legislature.
- The fourth-ranked PSC member serves as chairman of a political advisory body, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee. He is responsible for outreach to non-Communist groups, such as China's eight minor political parties, all of which pledge loyalty to the Communist Party, and state-sanctioned religious associations.
- The fifth-ranked PSC member heads the Party Secretariat, which oversees the Party bureaucracy. He also has responsibility for ideology and propaganda.
- The sixth-ranked PSC member heads the Party's Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (CDIC), which polices the Party's ranks for corruption and other forms of malfeasance.
- The seventh-ranked PSC member serves as the top-ranked State Council vice premier and assists the Premier with his duties.

The collective leadership principle is generally understood to mean that the General Secretary must win consensus from his Standing Committee colleagues for major decisions.

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Foreign Affairs Ministry

China's ministries and commissions, which are subordinate to the State Council, are a fractious, highly competitive group of institutions with sometimes overlapping jurisdiction. Ministries are headed by Ministers and commissions by Chairmen. Each ministry or commission has an embedded Communist Party committee that makes major decisions for the institution and oversees ideology and personnel matters. In most cases, the Minister or Chairman serves concurrently as the head of his institution's Communist Party committee. One exception is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the top ranking vice minister has traditionally served as the ministry's party secretary.

Central Committee

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is the central decision making committee of China. The committee comprises of the top members of the Communist party of China (CPC). The members of this committee are elected once every five years by the Central Politburo of the CPC. The Central Committee is referred to as the "Party's highest organ of the state in authority" when the Chinese national congress is not in session. The 19th central Committee is now composed of 205 full members and 171 alternating members. The Central committee is also vested with the power to elect the General Secretary, the members of the Politburo of the CPC, the members of the Standing Committee and the members of the Central Military Commission through a simple yes/no/abstain voting procedure as prescribed in Chapter 3 in the party constitution. As the national congress is called upon once every five years, the Central committee acts as an interim committee where it addresses important agendas of national concern such as to legitimize a change in direction by the Central Politburo. The committee also has a mandate to prepare itself for the next national congress to be convened. The committee itself also confirms the membership of the secretariat of the CPC which is the committee responsible for carrying out routinely operations as pre-decided by the Politburo. The committee itself implements its decisions by publishing resolutions and other forms of paperwork. The Central committee is mandated to convene at least once a year. The party functions on the lines of democratic centralism which is the practice of coming to political decisions through a method of voting which are binding on all the members of the party. Although the previously mentioned roles of the Central committee is true, the role of the committee is varying from time to time, although in general the party carries out decisions through formal procedures as per the Party constitution but the

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committee also has the power to influence or address national level personal decisions but this at is carried through by the Politburo and thus the committee actually addressing such matters is limited.

National Security Commission

The first objective in establishing the CNSC is to help ensure the success of the deepening economic, political, and social reforms that are being carried out in China. The second goal of the CNSC is to establish a unified national security system. Before the CNSC was formed, the institutions for dealing with security were divided among many departments scattered throughout the Chinese Communist Party, the government, the military, and Chinese society. However, emergency situations that occur today require more effective management and cooperation among multiple departments. Third, the CNSC was created to support the leadership and policy objectives of the Communist Party, which oversees the country's security, military, and diplomatic affairs. The new National Security Council falls under the party, rather than the national government, and the Commission can be expected to support the goals of the party. The CNSC has three primary tasks. The first is to advise the Politburo, which oversees the Communist Party, and the highest levels of leadership in matters of strategy and security. The second is to carry out strategic coordination between the different departments, and to unify the departments throughout the party, the government, the military, and society. Individual departments will routinely prepare reports for the CNSC. The third task of the CNSC is to conduct crisis management and risk management, for both internal and external security threats.

Foreign Policy formulation

The process is driven both by top leadership and functional bureaucracies. Policy formulation, which involves the generation of ideas and proposals, typically takes place in functional bureaucracies and specialized departments within these bureaucracies. In the process of policy formulation, one bureaucracy specializing in the functional or issue area (for example, propaganda) may take charge, but it also consults with other bureaucracies that may have a stake in the issue. In this formal, ministry- or department-initiated process, the ultimate decision-making authority lies with the Politburo Standing Committee.

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Key institutions

Important players in the foreign policy apparatus of China are:

- The Central Committee Propaganda Department
- The Central Committee United Front Work Department
- The NPC Foreign Affairs Committee
- The CPC International Liaison Department
- The State Council Information Office
- The State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs
- The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and their constituent departments)

Along with them, groups such as Ministry of Education, and media groups such as Voice of China, and the Xinhua News Agency also play a role in policy implementation.

However, all these bodies find themselves dependent on the working of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, formerly the Central Foreign Affairs Leading (Small) Group.

CFAC

Central Foreign Affairs Commission is defined as a "supra-ministerial" body for policy coordination and consultation.

The chair of this Commission is Xi Jinping himself, the general secretary of the CCP, and therefore has overall authority on all aspects of China's foreign relations. As a rule, Xi has broad authority and may issue a brief directive on a matter he believes should receive extra attention or priority.

As for other leaders at the upper strata of the chain of command, besides issuing brief policy directives via their comments on documents, top leaders can also communicate their ideas or orders in conversations or meetings with the ministers in charge of functional bureaucracies. Such ideas or orders can lead to actions at the implementation level or to the formulation of a new policy or the modifications of an existing policy.

The Commission also has an attached "office," known as the Central Foreign Affairs Office which has a dedicated staff of nearly fifty (many of whom are taken from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Liaison Department of the CCP, other ministries, and the

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military). This body is the central coordinating body for China's foreign affairs—across all bureaucracies—on a daily basis.


Other bodies involved in Foreign Policy

While the Foreign Affairs Commission is the principal organization in the making and coordination of China's overall foreign policy, the United Front Leading Small Group and the External Propaganda Leading Small Group also have important—but somewhat lower—status in the Chinese hierarchy. They are led, respectively, by the Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of ideology and propaganda and the head of the United Front Work Department.

The following is a diagrammatic representation of the hierarchy of the bodies discussed, it would be advisable that delegates research the bodies mentioned, so as to more effectively understand the Commission and the overarching government it belongs to.

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The Five Principles

The Five Principles, as stated by the Panchsheel Treaty, signed on April 29, 1954, are:

- 1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- 2. Mutual non-aggression.
- 3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
- 4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.
- 5. Peaceful co-existence.

The principles originally represented a vision of international relations that was highly principled and not based on realism necessarily. After Mao Zedong declared (at least, apocryphally) that China had "stood up" after a century of humiliation in 1949, the country needed to base its foreign policy around a set of principles that would embody its principled independence in world affairs. The Five Principles were borne of post-colonial solidarity and Chinese leaders embraced them for both their moral weight and strategic flexibility.

In recent years, China continues to make reference to its principles when it comes to justifying its voting record at the United Nations Security Council, or justifying its condemnation of interventionist Western powers. For China, the Five Principles' emphasis on non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations are particularly important as it struggles with internal separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang. By taking a principled stand on non-intervention in all conflicts, China is able to repudiate outside criticism of its government's handling of internal affairs.

For Xi Jinping — who is most interested in helping China acquire some normative weight in international affairs — the Five Principles embody China's best contribution to heterodox international relations with a unique Asian flavor. In particular, if China is to offer a compelling model of regional leadership, different from that of the United States in Asia, it can begin with these principles. Unfortunately, the Five Principles fall somewhat short in actually explaining recent Chinese adventurism in the East and South China Seas where China is engaged in disputes with several countries. Even Zhou and Nehru would come to learn of the hollowness of these principles when their two countries fought a war eight years after boldly pledging "peaceful coexistence."

China needs to find its way to regional and global leadership without raising fears of hegemonic intentions. While it might not be doing so well given its generally provocative

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posture along the East Asian rimland, it sees some value in highlighting the pan-Asian nature of the Five Principles that stand at the centre of its foreign policy. China's principles may have weathered their first 60 years with relatively little issue, but as China rises to global prominence, it may find that the principles it enshrines as the pillars of its foreign policy are incompatible with its preferred means of pursuing its national interest.

Selective Neutrality

Over the past decade, China has become central to the world economy. Building on its economic successes, it is becoming increasingly central in world politics. China is also now more ambitious, aiming to establish itself as a regional as well as a global power. In his October 2017 report to the Chinese Communist Party's 19th Congress, President Xi Jinping stated that by 2050, China will have "become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence." Despite a growing internal debate about the country's international positioning in the context of taking a confrontational tone with the United States, Xi believes he has the power to realize these ambitions. In June 2018, he chaired an important foreign policy meeting in Beijing, which reaffirmed the notions of a foreign policy with Chinese characteristics, "diplomacy of socialism with Chinese characteristics," and redefined the concept of a "global community of common destiny."

However, as an exception of its Five Principles policy, China has maintained a rigid policy of neutrality on certain external controversial issues which one would otherwise expect it to take a strong stance on. This is exemplified by China's vital role in founding NAM, which continues to this day. China is a country that strongly believed in minding its own business, but with the changing power structures of the world, that is a thing of the past.

What about avoiding alliances? Well, those who believe that there is a place for neutrality in this world are wrong. Founded during the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement, which has a membership has that reached 120 states, not only had no influence whatsoever, but member states were still willingly or unwillingly aligned to one of the superpowers at the time.

In the years of building up its global position, we have known China as a neutral country that has avoided confrontation and succeeded in not getting involved in wars, despite appeals and attempts to seek its help. But who knows what might happen after the "battle of Huawei" and the Sino-American trade war? Will Beijing be willing to continue with its old policy of neutrality or will it adopt explicit positions in conflicts and behave accordingly?

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Ideology

China's political system and the Chinese Communist Party's political and domestic ideology are structured around the Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, a political theory published and propagated by Xi Jinping.

The thought consists of a 14-point basic policy as follows:

- 1. Ensuring Communist Party of China leadership over all forms of work in China.
- 2. The Communist Party of China should take a people-centric approach for the public interest.
- 3. The continuation of "comprehensive deepening of reforms".
- 4. Adopting new science-based ideas for "innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development".
- 5. Following "socialism with Chinese characteristics" with "people as the masters of the country".
- 6. Governing China with Rule of Law.
- 7. "Practice socialist core values", including Marxism, communism and socialism with Chinese characteristics.
- 8. "Improving people's livelihood and well-being is the primary goal of development".
- 9. Coexist well with nature with "energy conservation and environmental protection" policies and "contribute to global ecological safety".
- 10. Strengthen national security.
- 11. The Communist Party of China should have "absolute leadership over" China's People's Liberation Army.
- 12. Promoting the "one country, two systems" system for Hong Kong and Macau with a future of "complete national reunification" and to follow the One-China policy and 1992 Consensus for Taiwan.
- 13. Establish a common destiny between Chinese people and other people around the world with a "peaceful international environment".
- 14. Improve party discipline in the Communist Party of China.

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Trade dominance and industrialism

China's trade policy centres around keeping its regional neighbours within its dominance via a heavily favourable import-export balance, while manufacturing products at extremely cheap rates to flood the international markets.

The Chinese government has launched "Made in China 2025," a state-led industrial policy that seeks to make China dominant in global high-tech manufacturing. The program aims to use government subsidies, mobilize state-owned enterprises, and pursue intellectual property acquisition to catch up with—and then surpass—Western technological prowess in advanced industries.

For the United States and other major industrialized democracies, however, these tactics not only undermine Beijing's stated adherence to international trade rules but also pose a security risk. Washington argues that the policy relies on discriminatory treatment of foreign investment, forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft, and cyber espionage, practices that have encouraged President Donald J. Trump to levy tariffs on Chinese goods and block several Chinese-backed acquisitions of technology firms. Meanwhile, many other countries have tightened their oversight of foreign investment, intensifying debate over how best to respond to China's behaviour.

Africa

"Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development--these are the principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations." China's Africa Policy white paper declares. These new principles of China's Africa Policy are the continuity of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence from the early period and the Five Points Proposals in the 1990s. Due to its own historical suffering from foreign invasions, China's foreign policy highly embraces the principle of sovereignty and equality, which is very appealing to many African countries who still suffer from the Western colonialism legacy. China's controversial "non-intervention & no strings attached" policy in Africa is more a compliance with this principle than the pure opportunistic exploitation of the unadulterated use of conditionality by Western donors.

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Belt and Road Initiative

The **Belt and Road Initiative** (**BRI**) is a global development strategy adopted by the Chinese government involving infrastructure development and investments in 152 countries and international organizations in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas. The "Belt" refers to the overland routes for road and rail transportation, called the Silk Road Economic Belt; whereas "road" refers to the sea routes, or the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

The objectives that can be achieved through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are:

- 1. Construction of a unified large market and full use of both international and domestic markets.
- 2. Establishment of cultural exchange and integration, to enhance mutual understanding and trust of member nations.
- 3. Establishment of an innovative pattern with capital inflows, talent pool, and technology database.
- 4. Focus on infrastructure investment, education, construction materials, railway and highway, automobile, real estate, power grid, and iron and steel.
- 5. Acceleration of economic growth across the Asia Pacific area, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe by filling the infrastructure gap.

The possible benefits that China will enjoy after the BRI is completed are:

- 1. Developing infrastructural ties with China's neighbouring countries will reduce physical and regulatory barriers to trade by aligning standards. Thus China will be able to trade freely with many countries, especially those of the European Union.
- 2. The Belt and Road Initiative will help China to address excess capacity in its industrial sectors, in the hopes that whole production facilities may eventually be migrated out of China into BRI countries.
- 3. The BRI will bring about "top-level design" of economic development in China, whereby several infrastructure-focused state-controlled firms are provided with profitable business opportunities in order to maintain high GDP growth.
- 4. The Initiative's internal state-building and stabilisation will benefit China's vast inland western regions such as Xinjiang and Yunnan.

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The BRI consists of two main routes: the Silk Road Economic Belt, consisting of six corrdiors and the New Maritime Silk Road. It's funding is varied, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, and the China Development Bank among others.

Domestic Economy

What goes up must come down – is an old cliché. Chinese growth story had a north-bound journey for last three decades. It reached its zenith. It could not go up higher. From there, it could only fall down.

From the figures pouring in through varied sources, it is now clear that the Chinese Economy is in a bad shape. The estimated GDP growth for has shown signs of slowing down across the last year. A few probable reasons being:

- Declining capital investments.
- Rising USA interest rates.
- Aging population.
- Rising wages.
- Loss in value of Chinese stock.
- Emigration of Chinese billionaires.
- Unemployment crisis.
- USA-PRC trade war.

South China Sea

The South China Sea is troubled with several territorial disputes involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. The Philippines, Vietnam, China, Brunei, Taiwan and Malaysia hold different territorial claims over the sea, based on various accounts of history and geography. China claims more than 80 per cent while Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands on the inheritance ground to prove its effective and continuous control. The Philippines asserts ownership of the Spratly archipelago and the Scarborough Shoal. It bases its claim on the continental shelf as well as on historical arguments. Malaysia has claimed sovereignty over southern parts of the sea. Its claim is primary on legal ground

Over the years, the claimants have seized control of a raft of sea features, including rocks, islands and low-tide elevations. China's "nine-dash line" is a geographical marker used to

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assert its claim. It stretches as far as 2,000km from the Chinese mainland, reaching waters close to Indonesia and Malaysia.

As for China, it plays an important role in the territory, as such; it has often been involved in multiple incidences such as:

- The PRC has repeatedly accused the US for acting provocatively with intentions of meaninglessly increasing the political tension prevalent in the region.
- Meanwhile, the PRC has also become more assertive and aggressive in defending its claims by openly declaring that greater American pressure will only result in a stronger Chinese presence in South East Asia.
- In 2012, tensions arose between the navies of the PRC and the Philippines when the crew of a Chinese fishing vessel were arrested after wandering into Philippine waters.
- In 2014, a Chinese drilling rig was deployed in waters near the Paracel Islands, leading to severe confrontations between Vietnamese and Chinese authorities.
- From the 1950s to the 2000s, Chinese dominance over the SCS was unquestioned.
 This emboldening the PRC to construct military bases on artificial islands areas in the Spratly archipelago of the SCS, as part of land reclamation projects for "civil and defence needs". As of 2017, the PRC has developed 72 acres of artificial militarized islands.

North Korea

China's support for North Korea dates back to the Korean War of 1950 (incidentally, the event Bosco MUN's UNSC must discuss), when its troops flooded the Korean Peninsula to aid its northern ally. Since the war, China has lent political and economic backing to North Korea's leaders: Kim Il-sung (estimated 1948–1994), Kim Jong-il (roughly 1994–2011), and Kim Jong-un. But strains in the relationship surfaced when Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006 and Beijing backed UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on Pyongyang. With this resolution and subsequent ones, Beijing signaled a shift in tone from diplomatic support to punishment. After North Korea's missile launch test in November 2017, China called on North Korea to cease actions that increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Still, China's punitive steps have been somewhat restrained. While China has backed UN resolutions, in some cases it has withheld support until they were watered down. Additionally, Western officials and experts doubt China's commitment to implementing even limited trade restrictions and have at times accused the country of circumventing sanctions.

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Beijing continues to have sizeable economic ties with Pyongyang. Bilateral trade increased tenfold between 2000 and 2015, peaking in 2014 at \$6.86 billion, according to figures from the Seoul-based Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency. With the advent of tougher sanctions, trade growth has slowed, but Pyongyang is still dependent on Beijing for economic activity.

Although Beijing has upheld some of the international sanctions against Pyongyang and taken some measures to squeeze it economically, including the suspension of fuel sales and restrictions on financial activities, relations appear to have thawed since.

Trade War

Since January 22, 2018, China and the United States have been engaged in a trade war involving the mutual placement of tariffs. This war started when China introduced its new policy – "Made in China 2005" to which the US reacted negatively stating that it is a grave threat to world economy (especially affecting the USA). US-China trade tensions have negatively affected consumers as well as many producers in both countries. The tariffs have reduced trade between the US and China, but the bilateral trade deficit remains broadly unchanged. While the impact on global growth is relatively modest at this time, the latest escalation could significantly dent business and financial market sentiment, disrupt global supply chains, and jeopardize the projected recovery in global growth in 2019. As China imposed retaliatory tariffs, USA exports to China also declined. While the front-loading dynamic is not evident in this case, US export growth to China has been generally weaker since the trade tensions began.

The main problems of this back and forth are:

- Economic trade sanctions and tariffs imposed on financial products and transactions by the US can trigger economic crises in the PRC in the future.
- The aforementioned trade war could also reduce the PRC's export growth by 48.3% by the end of 2019 itself.
- The trade war puts 4.4 million jobs at risk within the PRC, and also threatens to reduce the GDP of the PRC by a staggering 1%.

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Suggested solutions have included imposing tariffs back at US, dumping their debt, or even allowing the Yuan to weaken. These still must be discussed for viability.

Cyber Security

The PRC's Cyber-security Law reflects a broader global trend to regulate cyber-space activities and counteract cyber-threats that could undermine public security. The rapid growth in electronic commerce & electronic payment methods, and technological advances in cloud computing & big data analytics, has given rise to new cyber-security concerns.

The online trade of personal information has also grown at a commensurate rate in the PRC, leading to more stringent rules around the collection, use and storage of personal information online. Increased investment into 'smart' manufacturing and advanced personalized technologies also ensure the vulnerability of infrastructure-supporting industries which are critical to national security, to cyber-attacks.

The newly-created Cyber-space Administration of the PRC oversees implementation and enforcement of the Cyber-Security Law. It is actively implementing a long and growing list of measures and standards for the security and protection of sensitive data when transferred online. The law came into effect on 1 June, but draft regulations continue to be issued.

The main points of obligation under the law are on network operators, firms providing cyber-security and infrastructure operators dealing with critically sensitive information. After all, while the leakage of a few hundred bank passwords may not have severe international consequences for the PRC, it will most certainly throw into disarray the lives of the concerned people.

These terms, therefore, have been defined broadly, and the extent and scope of the obligations on these operators continue to be worked out through draft guidelines.

The PRC's Cyber-Security Law focuses on the nature and flow of all digital information that has been generated in the PRC It places a strong emphasis on securing personal information and other important data that has been collected in the PRC, and standardises its collection and usage. Network operators are expected to:

- Clarify cyber-security responsibilities within their organisation
- Take technical measures to safeguard network operations and prevent data leaks and theft
- Report any cyber-security incidents to both users of the network and the relevant implementing department for that sector.

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According to recently released draft guidelines, network operators can transfer data overseas under most circumstances. However they would be required to carry out regular security self-assessments to gauge the risk of data transfers based on factors such as quantity, scope and sensitivity of the data. Where the nature of the data is deemed to be "important", network operators would be subject to further inspection, and could be prevented from transferring the data overseas.

The growing prominence of the Internet of Things (IoT), the version of the Internet that interacts with actual physical hardware to control the mentioned device, has given rise to major cyber-security concerns. After all, cyber-threats can not only cripple a country, it can also destroy it.

At the same time, one must consider China's "cyber-sovereignty" policies, and how it must be expanded in the years to come.

Crises such as China's involvement in Tibet, and Sudan, along with domestic situations such as Uighur Muslims and Hong Kong require a deft hand in foreign policy, and its specific formulation with regards to the same.

For any clarifications, feel free to contact the Executive Board. Their contact information has been provided at the beginning of this document.
