Block Ciphers and Modes of Operation

Adapted from CS 161 Fall 2022 - Lecture 6

Announcements

- Project 1 has been released.
  - The checkpoint (Q1–Q4) is due Friday, September 16th at 11:59 PM PT.
  - The full project (Q1–Q7 plus write-up) is due Friday, September 30th at 11:59 PM PT.
- Homework 2 is due Friday, September 23rd at 11:59 PM PT.
- Project 1 Party on Thursday, September 15th, 3:00 to 5:00 PM PT in the Wozniak Lounge (Soda 430).
- The extended time discussion with Abhi and Akshit has been finalized for Monday from 3:00 to 4:30 PM PT in Soda 380.



Summary

- What's cryptography?
    - Communicating securely over insecure channels
    - You should never write your own crypto! Use existing libraries instead.
- Definitions
    - Alice and Bob want to send messages over an insecure channel. Eve can read anything sent over the insecure channel. Mallory can read or modify anything sent over the insecure channel.
    - We want to ensure confidentiality (adversary can't read message), integrity (adversary can't modify message), and authenticity (prove message came from sender)
    - Crypto uses secret keys. Kerckhoff's principle says to assume the attacker knows the entire system, except the secret keys.
    - There are several different threat models. We'll focus on the chosen plaintext attack, where Eve tricks Alice into encrypting some messages.

Summary

- IND-CPA security
  - Even if Eve can trick Alice into encrypting some messages of Eve's choosing, given the encryption of either M_0 or M_1, Eve cannot distinguish which message was sent with probability greater than 1/2.
  - We can use the IND-CPA game to test for IND-CPA security
  - Edge cases: IND-CPA secure schemes can leak length. Eve is limited to polynomial-time algorithms, and must have a non-negligible advantage to win.
- One-time pads
  - Symmetric encryption scheme: Alice and Bob share a secret key.
  - Encryption and decryption: Bitwise XOR with the key.
  - No information leakage if the key is never reused.
  - Information leaks if the key is reused.
  - Impractical for real-world usage, unless you're a spy.

Block Ciphers

Textbook Chapter 6.4 & 6.5

Cryptography Roadmap

	Symmetric-key	Asymmetric-key
Confidentiality	● One-time pads ● Block ciphers with chaining modes (e.g. AES-CBC) ● Stream ciphers	● RSA encryption ● ElGamal encryption
Integrity, Authentication	● MACs (e.g. HMAC)	● Digital signatures (e.g. RSA signatures)

- Hash functions
- Pseudorandom number generators
- Public key exchange (e.g. Diffie-Hellman)

- Key management (certificates)
- Password management

Block Ciphers: Definition

- **Block cipher**: An encryption/decryption algorithm that encrypts a fixed-sized block of bits
- $E_K(M) \rightarrow C$: Encryption
  - Inputs: k-bit key K and an n-bit plaintext M
  - Output: An n-bit ciphertext C
  - Sometimes written as: $\{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$
- $D_K(C) \rightarrow M$: Decryption
  - Inputs: a k-bit key, and an n-bit ciphertext C
  - Output: An n-bit plaintext
  - Sometimes written as: $\{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$
  - The inverse of the encryption function
- Properties
  - **Correctness**: E_K is a permutation, D_K is its inverse
  - **Efficiency**: Encryption/decryption should be fast
  - **Security**: E behaves like a random permutation





Block Ciphers: Correctness

- $E_K(M)$ must be a **permutation** (**bijective function**) on n-bit strings
  - Each input must correspond to exactly one unique output
- Intuition
  - Suppose $E_K(M)$ is not bijective
  - Then two inputs might correspond to the same output: $E(K, x_1) = E(K, x_2) = y$
  - Given ciphertext y, you can't uniquely decrypt. $D(K, y) = x_1$? $D(K, y) = x_2$?



Not bijective: Two inputs encrypt to the same output



Bijective: Each input maps to exactly one unique output

Block Ciphers: Security

- A secure block cipher behaves like a randomly chosen permutation permutation from the set of all permutations on *n*-bit strings
  - A random permutation: Each *n*-bit input is mapped to one randomly-chosen *n*-bit output
- Defined by a distinguishing game
  - Eve gets two boxes: One is a randomly chosen permutation, and one is E_K with a randomly chosen key K
  - Eve should not be able to tell which is which with probability > 1/2



One of these is E_K with a randomly chosen K, and the other one is a randomly chosen permutation. Eve can't distinguish them.

Block ciphers: Brute-force attacks?

- How hard is it to run a brute-force attack on a 128-bit key?
  - We have to try 2^{128} possibilities. How big is 2^{128}?
- Handy approximation: $2^{10} \approx 10^3$
  - $2^{128} = 2^{10*12.8} \approx (10^3)^{12.8} \approx (10^3)^{13} = 10^{39}$
- Suppose we have massive hardware that can try 10^9 (1 billion) keys in 1 nanosecond (a billionth of a second). That's 10^{18} keys per second
  - We'll need $10^{39} / 10^{18} = 10^{21}$ seconds. How long is that?
  - One year ≈ 3×10^7 seconds
  - 10^{21} seconds / $3 \times 10^7 \approx 3 \times 10^{13}$ years ≈ 30 trillion years
- **Takeaway**: Brute-forcing a 128-bit key takes astronomically long. Don't even try.

Block ciphers: Brute-force attacks?

- How hard is it to run a brute-force attack on a 256-bit key in the same time?
  - We need 10^{52} of the brute-force devices from before
  - If each brute-force device from before is 1 cubic millimeter, this would take 10^{43} cubic meters of space
  - That’s the volume of 7×10^{15} suns!
  - For reference, the Milky Way galaxy has just 10^{11} stars
- **Takeaway**: Brute-force attacks on modern block ciphers are not possible, assuming the key is random and secret
  - 128-bit key? Definitely not happening.
  - 256-bit key? Lol no.

Block Ciphers: Efficiency

- Encryption and decryption should be computable in microseconds
  - Formally: KeyGen(), Enc(), and Dec(), should not take exponential time
- Block cipher algorithms typically use operations like XOR, bit-shifting, and small table lookups
  - Very fast on modern processors
- Modern CPUs provide dedicated hardware support for block ciphers

DES (Data Encryption Standard)

- Designed in late 1970s
- Block size 64 bits (*n* = 64)
- Key size 56 bits (*k* = 56)
- NSA influenced two facets of its design
  - Altered some subtle internal workings in a mysterious way
  - Reduced key size from 64 bits to 56 bits
  - Made brute force attacks feasible for an attacker with massive computational resources (by 1970s standards)
- The algorithm remains essentially unbroken 40 years later
  - The NSA’s tweaking hardened it against an attack publicly revealed a decade later
- However, modern computer speeds make it completely unsafe due to small key size
  - ~6.4×10^{16}, say 10^{10} tries per second on my single desktop computer's Nvidia graphics card: Takes ~6.4×10^{6} seconds or ~70 days

AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

- 1997–2000: NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) in the US held a competition to pick a new block cipher standard
  - One of the finalists, Twofish, was designed by Berkeley professor and occasional CS 161 instructor David Wagner!
- Out of the 5 finalists:
  - Rijndael, Twofish, and Serpent had really good performance
  - RC6 had okay performance
  - Mars had ugly performance
- On any given computing platform, Rijndael was *never* the fastest
- But on every computing platform, Rijndael was *always* the second-fastest
  - Twofish and Serpent each had at least one compute platform they were bad at
- Rijndael was selected as the new block cipher standard

AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

- Key size 128, 192, or 256 bits (*k* = 128, 192, or 256)
  - Actual cipher names are AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256
  - Paranoid people like the NSA use AES-256 keys, but AES-128 is just fine in practice
- Block size 128 bits (*n* = 128)
  - Note: The block size is still always 128 bits, regardless of key size
- You don’t need to know how AES works, but you do need to know its parameters
  - here’s a comic

AES Algorithm

- Different key sizes use different numbers of rounds
  - 10 rounds for 128-bit keys
  - 12 rounds for 192-bit keys
  - 14 rounds for 256-bit keys
- Each round uses its own “round key” derived from the cipher key
- Each round:
  - SubBytes()
  - ShiftRows()
  - MixColumns() (if not last round)
  - AddRoundKey()



AES Algorithm: SubBytes()

- Replace each byte in the block with another byte using an 8-bit substitution box


$a_{0,0}$ $a_{0,1}$ $a_{0,2}$ $a_{0,3}$
$a_{1,0}$ $a_{1,1}$ $a_{1,2}$ $a_{1,3}$
$a_{2,0}$ $a_{2,1}$ $a_{2,2}$ $a_{2,3}$
$a_{3,0}$ $a_{3,1}$ $a_{3,2}$ $a_{3,3}$
SubBytes
$b_{0,0}$ $b_{0,1}$ $b_{0,2}$ $b_{0,3}$
$b_{1,0}$ $b_{1,1}$ $b_{1,2}$ $b_{1,3}$
$b_{2,0}$ $b_{2,1}$ $b_{2,2}$ $b_{2,3}$
$b_{3,0}$ $b_{3,1}$ $b_{3,2}$ $b_{3,3}$
S

AES Algorithm: ShiftRows()

- Cyclically shifts the bytes in each row by a certain offset
- The number of places each byte is shifted differs for each row



No change	$a_{0,0}$	$a_{0,1}$	$a_{0,2}$	$a_{0,3}$
Shift 1	$a_{1,0}$	$a_{1,1}$	$a_{1,2}$	$a_{1,3}$
Shift 2	$a_{2,0}$	$a_{2,1}$	$a_{2,2}$	$a_{2,3}$
Shift 3	$a_{3,0}$	$a_{3,1}$	$a_{3,2}$	$a_{3,3}$

ShiftRows

$a_{0,0}$	$a_{0,1}$	$a_{0,2}$	$a_{0,3}$
$a_{1,1}$	$a_{1,2}$	$a_{1,3}$	$a_{1,0}$
$a_{2,2}$	$a_{2,3}$	$a_{2,0}$	$a_{2,1}$
$a_{3,3}$	$a_{3,0}$	$a_{3,1}$	$a_{3,2}$

AES Algorithm: MixColumns()

- Treats the 16-byte block as a 4 × 4 matrix and multiply it by by another matrix



AES Algorithm: AddRoundKey()

- XOR the 16-byte block with the 16-byte round key


$a_{0,0}$ $a_{0,1}$ $a_{0,2}$ $a_{0,3}$
$a_{1,0}$ $a_{1,1}$ $a_{1,2}$ $a_{1,3}$
$a_{2,0}$ $a_{2,1}$ $a_{2,2}$ $a_{2,3}$
$a_{3,0}$ $a_{3,1}$ $a_{3,2}$ $a_{3,3}$
AddRoundKey
$b_{0,0}$ $b_{0,1}$ $b_{0,2}$ $b_{0,3}$
$b_{1,0}$ $b_{1,1}$ $b_{1,2}$ $b_{1,3}$
$b_{2,0}$ $b_{2,1}$ $b_{2,2}$ $b_{2,3}$
$b_{3,0}$ $b_{3,1}$ $b_{3,2}$ $b_{3,3}$
$k_{0,0}$ $k_{0,1}$ $k_{0,2}$ $k_{0,3}$
$k_{1,0}$ $k_{1,1}$ $k_{1,2}$ $k_{1,3}$
$k_{2,0}$ $k_{2,1}$ $k_{2,2}$ $k_{2,3}$
$k_{3,0}$ $k_{3,1}$ $k_{3,2}$ $k_{3,3}$

AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

- There is no formal proof that AES is secure (indistinguishable from a random permutation)
- However, in 20 years, nobody has been able to break it, so it is *assumed* to be secure
  - The NSA uses AES-256 for secrets they want to keep secure for the 40 years (even in the face of unknown breakthroughs in research)
- **Takeaway**: AES is the modern standard block cipher algorithm
  - The standard key size (128 bits) is large enough to prevent brute-force attacks

Are Block Ciphers IND-CPA Secure?

- Consider the following adversary:
  - Eve sends two different messages M_0 and M_1
  - Eve receives either $E_K(M_0)$ or $E_K(M_1)$
  - Eve requests the encryption of M_0 again
  - Strategy: If the encryption of M_0 matches what she received, guess b = 0. Else, guess b = 1.
- Eve can win the IND-CPA game with probability 1!
  - Block ciphers are not IND-CPA secure



Issues with Block Ciphers

- Block ciphers are not IND-CPA secure, because they’re deterministic
    - A scheme is **deterministic** if the same input always produces the same output
    - No deterministic scheme can be IND-CPA secure because the adversary can always tell if the same message was encrypted twice
- Block ciphers can only encrypt messages of a fixed size
    - For example, AES can only encrypt-decrypt 128-bit messages
    - What if we want to encrypt something longer than 128 bits?
- To address these problems, we’ll add **modes of operation** that use block ciphers as a building block!

Summary: Block Ciphers

- Encryption: input a *k*-bit key and *n*-bit plaintext, receive *n*-bit ciphertext
- Decryption: input a *k*-bit key and *n*-bit ciphertext, receive *n*-bit plaintext
- Correctness: when the key is fixed, $E_K(M)$ should be bijective
- Security
  - Without the key, E_K(m) is computationally indistinguishable from a random permutation
  - Brute-force attacks take astronomically long and are not possible
- Efficiency: algorithms use XORs and bit-shifting (very fast)
- Implementation: AES is the modern standard
- Issues
  - Not IND-CPA secure because they're deterministic
  - Can only encrypt *n*-bit messages

Block Cipher Modes of Operation

Textbook Chapter 6.6–6.9

Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

Here’s an AES block. Remember that it can only encrypt 128-bit messages.

How can we use AES to encrypt a longer message (say, 256 bits?)



Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

Idea: Let’s use AES twice!



First 128 bits of message

Second 128 bits of message

Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

Note that we are using the same key twice. We want to avoid a situation like one-time pads where we need very long keys.



ECB Mode

- We've just designed **electronic code book (ECB) mode**
  - Enc(K, M) = C_1 || C_2 || … || C_m
  - Assume m is the number of blocks of plaintext in M, each of size n
- AES-ECB is not IND-CPA secure. Why?
  - Because ECB is deterministic



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

ECB Mode: Penguin

Original image

ECB Mode: Penguin



Encrypted with ECB

Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

Here’s ECB mode. It’s not IND-CPA secure because it’s deterministic.

Let’s fix that by adding some randomness.



Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

The **Initialization Vector** (**IV**) is different for every encryption. Now the first ciphertext block will be different for every encryption!

Okay, but the other blocks are still deterministic...



Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

Idea: The first ciphertext block was computed with some randomness. Let’s use it to add randomness to the second block.



Scratchpad: Let's design it together

Now the second ciphertext block has some randomness in it. Let's use it to add randomness to the third block.



CBC Mode

- We’ve just designed **cipher block chaining (CBC) mode**
- $C_i = E_K(M_i \oplus C_{i-1})$; C_0 = IV
- Enc(K, M):
  - Split M in m plaintext blocks $P_1 \ldots P_m$ each of size n
  - Choose a random IV
  - Compute and output (IV, $C_1, \ldots, C_m$) as the overall ciphertext
- How do we decrypt?



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

CBC Mode: Decryption

- How do we decrypt CBC mode?
  - Parse ciphertext as (IV, C_1, …, C_m)
  - Decrypt each ciphertext and then XOR with IV or previous ciphertext



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

CBC Mode: Decryption

$C_i = E_K(M_i \oplus C_{i-1})$	Definition of encryption
$D_K(C_i) = D_K(E_K(M_i \oplus C_{i-1}))$	Decrypting both sides
$D_K(C_i) = M_i \oplus C_{i-1}$	Decryption and encryption cancel
$D_K(C_i) \oplus C_{i-1} = M_i \oplus C_{i-1} \oplus C_{i-1}$	XOR both sides with C_{i-1}
$D_K(C_i) \oplus C_{i-1} = M_i$	XOR property

CBC Mode: Efficiency & Parallelism

- Can encryption be parallelized?
    - No, we have to wait for block i to finish before encrypting block i+1
- Can decryption be parallelized?
    - Yes, decryption only requires ciphertext as input



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

CBC Mode: Padding

- What if you want to encrypt a message that isn't a multiple of the block size?
  - AES-CBC is only defined if the plaintext length is a multiple of the block size
- Solution: Pad the message until it's a multiple of the block size
  - **Padding**: Adding dummy bytes at the end of the message until it's the proper length



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

CBC Mode: Padding

- What padding scheme should we use?
    - Padding with 0’s?
        - Doesn’t work: What if our message already ends with 0’s?
    - Padding with 1’s?
        - Same problem
- We need a scheme that can be unpadded without ambiguity
    - One scheme that works: Append a 1, then pad with 0’s
        - If plaintext is multiple of n, you still need to pad with an entire block
    - Another scheme: Pad with the number of padding bytes
        - So if you need 1 byte, pad with **01**; if you need 3 bytes, pad with **03 03 03**
        - If you need 0 padding bytes, pad an entire dummy block
        - This is called PKCS #7

CBC Mode: Security

- AES-CBC is IND-CPA secure. With what assumption?
  - The IV must be randomly generated and never reused
- What happens if you reuse the IV?
  - The scheme becomes deterministic: No more IND-CPA security

CBC Mode: IV Reuse

- Consider two three-block messages: $P_1P_2P_3$ and $P_1P_2P_4$
  - The first two blocks are the same for both messages, but the last block is different
  - What if we encrypt them with the same IV?
- When the IV is reused, CBC mode reveals when two messages start with the same plaintext blocks, up to the first different plaintext block



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

CBC Mode is IND-CPA (when used correctly)

- Enc(*K*, *M*):
  - Split M in m plaintext blocks $P_1 \ldots P_m$ each of size *n*
  - Choose random IV, compute and output (IV, C_1, …, C_m) as the overall ciphertext
- Why IND-CPA?
  - If there exists an attacker that wins in the IND-CPA game, then there exists an attacker that breaks the block cipher security. Proof is out of scope.



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

CBC Mode: Penguin



Original image

CBC Mode: Penguin



Encrypted with CBC, with random IVs

CTR Mode Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

One-time pads are secure if we never reuse the key.



CTR Mode Scratchpad: Let’s design it together



If the attacker doesn’t know the key, the block cipher output looks random.

New idea: Can we use block ciphers to simulate a one-time pad?

CTR Mode Scratchpad: Let’s design it together



If the attacker doesn’t know the key, all of these outputs look random.

CTR Mode Scratchpad: Let’s design it together



Idea: Use this random-looking output as a one-time pad!

Remember one-time pads: XOR the pad with plaintext to get ciphertext

CTR Mode Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

What do we use as input to the block cipher?



CTR Mode Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

IND-CPA schemes need randomness, so let’s put a random **nonce** here!



CTR Mode Scratchpad: Let’s design it together

The **counter** increments per block to ensure each block cipher output is different.



CTR (Counter) Mode

- Note: the random value is named the nonce here, but the idea is the same as the IV in CBC mode
- Overall ciphertext is (Nonce, C_1, …, C_m)



C_1 Counter (CTR) mode encryption C_m

CTR Mode

- Enc(K, M):
  - Split M in plaintext blocks P_1...P_m (each of block size n)
  - Choose random nonce
  - Compute and output (Nonce, C_1, …, C_m)
- How do you decrypt?



C_1 Counter (CTR) mode encryption C_m

CTR Mode: Decryption

- Recall one-time pad: XOR with ciphertext to get plaintext
- Note: we are only using block cipher encryption, not decryption



Counter (CTR) mode decryption

CTR Mode: Decryption

- Dec(K, C):
  - Parse C into (nonce, C_1, …, C_m)
  - Compute P_i by XORing Ci with output of E_k on nonce and counter
  - Concatenate resulting plaintexts and output M = P_1 … P_m



Counter (CTR) mode decryption

CTR Mode: Efficiency

- Can encryption be parallelized?
  - Yes
- Can decryption be parallelized?
  - Yes



Counter (CTR) mode encryption



Counter (CTR) mode decryption

CTR Mode: Padding

- Do we need to pad messages?
  - No! We can just cut off the parts of the XOR that are longer than the message.



Counter (CTR) mode encryption



Counter (CTR) mode decryption

CTR Mode: Security

- AES-CTR is IND-CPA secure. With what assumption?
- The nonce must be randomly generated and never reused
  - And in general less than $2^{n/2}$ blocks are encrypted
- What happens if you reuse the nonce?
- Equivalent to reusing a key in a one-time pad
  - Recall: Key reuse in a one-time pad is catastrophic: usually leaks enough information for an attacker to deduce the entire plaintext

CTR Mode: Penguin

Original image

CTR Mode: Penguin



Encrypted with CTR, with random nonces

The summer 2020 CS 61A exam mistake

- The TAs used a Python library for AES
  - A bad library for other reasons besides this example
- When they invoked CTR mode encryption, they didn't specify an IV
  - Assumption: the crypto library would add a random IV for them
  - Reality: the crypto library defaulted to IV = 0 every time
- The same IV was used to encrypt multiple exam questions
- All security was lost!
  - Any CS 161 student could have seen the exam beforehand
- **Takeaway**: Do not reuse IVs
- **Takeaway**: Real world cryptosystems are hard. You do *not* have the skills necessary to build real world cryptosystems. I don't either.

IVs and Nonces

- **Initialization vector** (**IV**): A random, but public, one-use value to introduce randomness into the algorithm
  - For CTR mode, we say that you use a **nonce** (number used once), since the value has to be unique, not necessarily random.
  - In this class, we use IV and nonce interchangeably
- **Never reuse IVs**
  - In some algorithms, IV/nonce reuse leaks limited information (e.g. CBC)
  - In some algorithms, IV/nonce reuse leads to catastrophic failure (e.g. CTR)

IVs and Nonces

- Thinking about the consequences of IV/nonce reuse is hard
- What if the IV/nonce is not reused, but the attacker can predict future values?
  - Now you have to think about more attacks
  - We'll analyze this more in discussion: it really depends on the encryption function
- Solution: Randomly generate a new IV/nonce for every encryption
  - If the nonce is 128 bits or longer, the probability of generating the same IV/nonce twice is astronomically small (basically 0)
  - Now you don't ever have to think about IV/nonce reuse attacks!

Comparing Modes of Operation

- If you need high performance, which mode is better?
    - CTR mode, because you can parallelize both encryption and decryption
- If you’re paranoid about security, which mode is better?
    - CBC mode is better
- Theoretically, CBC and CTR mode are equally secure if used properly
    - However, if used improperly (IV/nonce reuse), CBC only leaks partial information, and CTR fails catastrophically
        - Consider human factors: Systems should be as secure as possible even when implemented *incorrectly*
    - IV failures on CTR mode have resulted in multiple real-world security incidents!

Other Modes of Operation

- Other modes exist besides CBC and CTR
- Trade-offs:
    - Do we need to pad messages?
    - How robust is the scheme if we use it incorrectly?
    - Can we parallelize encryption/decryption?

CFB Mode

- Also IND-CPA
- Try to analyze the trade-offs yourself:
  - Do we need to pad messages?
  - How robust is the scheme if we use it incorrectly?
  - Can we parallelize encryption/decryption?



Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode encryption

Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode decryption

CFB Mode

- Try to analyze the trade-offs yourself:
    - Do we need to pad messages?
        - No
    - How robust is the scheme if we use it incorrectly?
        - Similar effects as CBC mode, but a bit worse if you reuse the IV
    - Can we parallelize encryption/decryption?
        - Only decryption is parallelizable

Lack of Integrity and Authenticity

- Block ciphers are designed for *confidentiality* (IND-CPA)
- If an attacker tampers with the ciphertext, we are not guaranteed to detect it
- Remember Mallory: An *active* manipulator who wants to tamper with the message

Lack of Integrity and Authenticity

- Consider CTR mode
- What if Mallory tampers with the ciphertext using XOR?

	P	a	y		M	a	l		$	1	0	0
M	0x50	0x61	0x79	0x20	0x4d	0x61	0x6c	0x20	0x24	0x31	0x30	0x30

$\oplus$

$E_K(i)$	0x8a	0xe3	0x5e	0xcf	0x3b	0x40	0x46	0x57	0xb8	0x69	0xd2	0x96

=

C	0xda	0x82	0x27	0xef	0x76	0x21	0x2a	0x77	0x9c	0x58	0xe2	0xa6

Lack of Integrity and Authenticity

- Suppose Mallory knows the message *M*
- How can Mallory change the *M* to say **Pay Mal $900**?

	P	a	y		M	a	l		$	1	0	0
M	0x50	0x61	0x79	0x20	0x4d	0x61	0x6c	0x20	0x24	0x31	0x30	0x30

$\oplus$

$E_K(i)$	0x8a	0xe3	0x5e	0xcf	0x3b	0x40	0x46	0x57	0xb8	0x69	0xd2	0x96

=

C	0xda	0x82	0x27	0xef	0x76	0x21	0x2a	0x77	0x9c	0x58	0xe2	0xa6

Lack of Integrity and Authenticity

$C_i = M_i \oplus \text{Pad}_i$	$\texttt{0x58} = \texttt{0x31} \oplus \text{Pad}_i$	Definition of CTR
$\text{Pad}_i = M_i \oplus C_i$	$\text{Pad}_i = \texttt{0x58} \oplus \texttt{0x31}$ $= \texttt{0x69}$	Solve for the *i*th byte of the pad
$C'_i = M'_i \oplus \text{Pad}_i$	$C'_i = \texttt{0x39} \oplus \texttt{0x69}$ $= \texttt{0x50}$	Compute the changed *i*th byte

C	`0xda`	`0x82`	`0x27`	`0xef`	`0x76`	`0x21`	`0x2a`	`0x77`	`0x9c`	**`0x58`**	`0xe2`	`0xa6`
C’	`0xda`	`0x82`	`0x27`	`0xef`	`0x76`	`0x21`	`0x2a`	`0x77`	`0x9c`	**`0x50`**	`0xe2`	`0xa6`

Lack of Integrity and Authenticity

- What happens when we decrypt *C*'?
    - The message looks like “Pay Mal $900” now!
    - Note: Mallory didn’t have to know the key; no integrity or authenticity for CTR mode!

C'	0xda	0x82	0x27	0xef	0x76	0x21	0x2a	0x77	0x9c	**0x50**	0xe2	0xa6

⊕

$E_K(i)$	0x8a	0xe3	0x5e	0xcf	0x3b	0x40	0x46	0x57	0xb8	**0x69**	0xd2	0x96

=

P'	0x50	0x61	0x79	0x20	0x4d	0x61	0x6c	0x20	0x24	**0x39**	0x30	0x30
	P	a	y		M	a	l		$	**9**	0	0

Lack of Integrity and Authenticity

- What about CBC?
  - Altering a bit of the ciphertext causes some blocks to become random gibberish
  - However, Bob cannot prove that Alice did not send random gibberish, so it still does *not* provide integrity or authenticity



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Summary

- ECB mode: Deterministic, so not IND-CPA secure
- CBC mode
    - IND-CPA secure, assuming no IV reuse
    - Encryption is not parallelizable
    - Decryption is parallelizable
    - Must pad plaintext to a multiple of the block size
    - IV reuse leads to leaking the existence of identical blocks at the start of the message
- CTR mode
    - IND-CPA secure, assuming no IV reuse
    - Encryption and decryption are parallelizable
    - Plaintext does not need to be padded
    - Nonce reuse leads to losing all security
- Lack of integrity and authenticity