

Introduction and Security Principles

Adapted from CS 161 Spring 2022 - Lecture 1

First: Introduction

- Staff introductions: Nick and course staff
- Course overview: What will you learn in this class?
- Course logistics
 - Lectures, discussions, office hours, and exams
 - Resources and communication platforms
 - Collaboration and academic honesty
 - DSP and extenuating circumstances
 - Stress management and mental health
 - Ethics
 - Case studies and blue slides
- What is security? Why is it important?

Staff Introductions

Who Am I? Nick Weaver

- A *lecturer* in the CS department
 - I am paid *exclusively* to care about my students & TA staff
- A researcher at the International Computer Science Institute
- Research focuses
 - Online criminality (including cryptocurrency)
 - Cryptocurrency is an amazing resource for comedy godl.
 - Online privacy
 - Public policy
 - Drones



Course Overview

Learning Objectives

- How to think adversarially about computer systems
 - How to assess threats for their significance
 - How to build computer systems with robust security properties
 - How to gauge the protections and limitations provided by today's technology
 - How attacks work in practice
-
- What mistakes *not to make!*

Course Outline

- Introduction to Security
 - What are some general philosophies when thinking about security?
- Memory Safety
 - How do attackers exploit insecure software? How do we defend against these attacks?
- Cryptography
 - How do we securely send information over an insecure channel?
- Web Security
 - What are some attacks on the web, and how do we defend against them?
- Network Security
 - What are some attacks on the Internet, and how do we defend against them?
- Miscellaneous Topics
 - Useful, interesting, or fun applications of topics

Extra Tools and Skills

- Some extra non-security-related skills you can take away from this class:
- Memory safety
 - x86 assembly: A commonly-used assembly language
 - Using GDB: Debugging C code
- Cryptography
 - Becoming a better consumer: Be able to analyze security products and pick the right security tools for your software
- Web Security
 - Software engineering: Understanding how websites are built and how your web browser interacts with remote web servers (CS 169 preview)
- Network Security
 - Networking: How the Internet works (CS 168 preview)

Prerequisites

- CS 61B: Ability to work with large and complex codebases, data structures
 - Relevant for Project 2 (500–1000 lines of Go code)
- CS 61C: Familiarity with low-level memory layouts and assembly
 - We'll have a lecture reviewing all the 61C material you need to succeed
 - Relevant for the memory safety unit (Project 1, first two weeks of class only)
- CS 70: Familiarity with basic mathematical notation and proof structures
 - Relevant for the cryptography unit
 - We'll review CS 70 material as we encounter it during the cryptography lectures
- An ability to pick up new programming languages quickly
 - Project 2 will be in Go

Resources

- Textbook: <https://textbook.cs161.org/>
 - Free! There's no textbook you need to pay for.
 - Readings are optional, but past students have said the textbook is helpful
- Course website: <https://cs161.org/>
 - Course schedule, lecture slides, assigned readings, and other resources are all posted here

Class Policies: Academic Honesty

- We're here to help! There are plenty of staff and resources available for you
 - You can always talk to a staff member if you're feeling stressed or tempted to cheat
- Academic dishonesty policies
 - At minimum, the student will receive negative points on the assignment
 - Example: If the midterm is worth 150 points, the student will receive a score of -150 on the midterm.
 - The student will be referred to Nick Weaver and the Center for Student Conduct
 - CSC often doesn't care that much about first-time cases! They are there to make sure a student doesn't make the same mistake a second time.
 - If you take the class honestly, you don't need to worry about these!

Class Policies: Academic Honesty

- As a computer security class, we view potential cheaters as “attackers.”
- Our threat model assumes “rational” attackers.
 - A rational attacker will only launch an attack if $(\text{expected benefit}) > (\text{expected cost})$
 - $(\text{expected cost}) = (\text{cost of launching attack}) + (\text{cost of getting caught}) * (\text{probability of getting caught})$
- Two-fold approach to academic integrity:
 - Detection: Use our tools to analyze and detect instance of academic dishonesty.
 - You will learn that “security through obscurity” is bad, but *obscurity can help*. We have ways.
 - Response: *At minimum*, you will receive negative points on the assignment.
- “Nick doesn’t make threats. He keeps promises.”





- In this class, you will learn a lot about attacks out of necessity
 - To be able to defend against the attacker, you must learn the techniques that attackers use
- It is usually okay to break into your own systems
 - This is a great way to evaluate your own systems
- It is usually okay to break into someone else's systems with their explicit permission
- It is **grossly unethical** and **exceedingly criminal** to break into someone else's systems without their permission


Stress Management and Mental Health



- We want to reduce your stress where we can
 - Project 2 (mid-semester) is going to be the most intensive part of this class, but we've made things lighter towards the end (when every other class has stuff due)
- **Your health is more important than this course**
- If you feel overwhelmed, there are options
 - Academically: Ask on Piazza, talk to staff in office hours, set up a meeting with staff to make a plan for your success this semester
 - Non-academic:
 - Counselling and Psychological Services (CAPS) has multiple free, confidential services
 - Casual consultations: <https://uhs.berkeley.edu/counseling/lets-talk>
 - Crisis management: <https://uhs.berkeley.edu/counseling/urgent>
 - Check out UHS's resources: <https://uhs.berkeley.edu/health-topics/mental-health>

Stress Management and Mental Health

- Failure is always an option
 - If something bad happens near the end of the semester, there are withdrawals and incompletes.
 - It is OK to fail or just barely pass... Nick's grades as a Berkeley Undergrad included:
 - B- in Physics 111BSC & Thermodynamics
 - C+ in Chem 112A (O-chem)
 - C in Physics 137A (Quantum)
 - Don't believe me? Stop by my office and see my transcript!



Case Studies and Blue Slides

- Security is often best taught through real-world case studies and stories
 - Lectures will sometimes use real-world examples to demonstrate concepts
 - Slides with a blue background are case study slides
- Content on blue slides are not tested on exams
 - You *do not* need to remember the exact details of the story
- Some blue slides will end in a **takeaway** that describes the moral of the story
 - You *do* need to understand the takeaway from the story

One Other Thing...

- There exists a classic game theory problem called the Prisoner's Dilemma.
 - For single-round Prisoner's Dilemma, the optimum strategy is "always-defect."
 - For multi-round Prisoner's Dilemma, the optimum strategy in practice is "tit-for-tat."
 - In other words, be nice unless someone isn't nice to you.
- **Takeaway:** Life is multi-round so be excellent to each other!
 - Making things hostile for others makes the world worse for all.
 - Stopping things from being hostile to others makes the world better for you.



What is security?

What is security?

Enforcing a desired property *in the presence of an attacker*



data confidentiality

user privacy

data and computation integrity

authentication

availability

...

Why is security important?

- It is important for our
 - physical safety
 - confidentiality/privacy
 - functionality
 - protecting our assets
 - successful business
 - a country's economy and safety
 - and so on...

Why is security important?

- Consider: Physical Safety

The Washington Post

[Link](#)

FBI probe of alleged plane hack sparks worries over flight safety

Drew Harwell

May 18, 2015

PCWorld

[Link](#)

Pacemaker hack can kill via laptop

Jeremy Kirk

Pacemakers from several manufacturers can be commanded to deliver a deadly, 830-volt shock from someone on a laptop up to 50 feet away, the result of poor software programming by medical device companies.

October 21, 2012

心律调节器 (Artificial cardiac pacemaker)

Why is security important?

- Consider: Privacy/Confidentiality



[Link](#)

91 Percent of Healthcare Organizations Suffered Data Breaches in the Past Two Years

Jeff Goldman

May 12, 2015

Money

[Link](#)

Data Breach Tracker: All the Major Companies That Have Been Hacked

Karavbrandeisky

October 30, 2014

In 2020, there were over 1001 breaches, affecting the data of 155,000,000 individuals

Why is security important?

- Consider: National security

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.


[Link](#)

America's Electric Grid Has a Vulnerable Back Door—and Russia Walked Through It

Rebecca Smith and Rob Barry

January 10, 2019

A Wall Street Journal reconstruction of the worst known hack into the nation's power system reveals attacks on hundreds of small contractors



Why is security important?



掌握用户采购寻呼机的供应链信息



进入供应链，更换其中的设备结构
(即在其中安放微量炸药)



攻击寻呼服务公司，发出引爆信息

What is hackable?

- Everything!
 - Especially things connected to the Internet
 - Assume that every system is a target
 - A casino was hacked because a fish-tank thermometer was hacked within the network

SLATE


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For the First Time, Hackers Have Used a Refrigerator to Attack Businesses


Julie Bort

January 17, 2014

Open Source Software



XZ-Utils



Timeline:

2021年，一个用户创建了名为“JiaT75”的GitHub账户（以下简称JT），并开始为多个项目做出贡献。在那一年，JT共提交了546次代码。

2022年，XZ项目缺乏人手，“JiaT75”成为管理员。

2023年7月8日，JT在oss-fuzz项目中提交了一个请求防止oss-fuzz发现XZ项目中潜藏的恶意代码。

2024年2月23日，JT在XZ项目的测试文件夹中加入了两个含有隐藏后门的测试文件。

Next: Security Principles

- Security principles
 - Know your threat model
 - Consider human factors
 - Security is economics
 - Detect if you can't prevent
 - Defense in depth
 - Least privilege
 - Separation of responsibility
 - Ensure complete mediation
 - Don't rely on security through obscurity
 - Use fail-safe defaults
 - Design in security from the start

Know Your Threat Model

Textbook Chapter 1.1 & 1.12

The Parable of the Bear Race

Reminder: blue slides are case studies. Remember the takeaway, not the story!



"I don't have to outrun the bear. I just have to outrun *you*."

Takeaway: Even if a defense is not perfect, if it is more advantageous for attackers to attack somewhere else, it can be effective

Know Your Threat Model

- **Threat model:** A model of who your attacker is and what resources they have
- It all comes down to people: The attackers
 - No attackers = No problem!
 - One of the best ways to counter an attacker is to attack their reasons
- Why do people attack systems?

Money



Advertisers

Politics



Anonymous NSA

Fun



To watch the world burn

Security Principle: Know Your Threat Model

- Consider: Personal security
- Who and why might someone attack *you*?
 - Criminals might attack you for money
 - Teenagers might attack you for laughs or to win online games
 - Governments might spy on you to collect intelligence
 - Intimate partners might spy on you
 - This is a surprisingly dangerous threat model!

The National Security Agency (NSA)

- Stated purpose: To collect information to protect US national security
- Since its founding in 1952, the NSA has:
 - Decoded secret enemy communications in wars
 - Spied on people in the US and other countries (sometimes legally, sometimes illegally)
 - Participated in security research and helped develop security standards
 - Developed secret techniques for surveillance and cyberattacks

Threat Model: Common Assumptions for Attackers

- Assume the attacker...
 - Can interact with systems without notice
 - Knows general information about systems (operating systems, vulnerabilities in software, usually patterns of activity, etc.)
 - Can get lucky
 - If an attack only succeeds 1/1,000,000 times, the attacker will try 1,000,000 times!
 - May coordinate complex attacks across different systems
 - Has the resources required to mount the attack
 - This can be tricky depending on who your threat model is
 - Can and will obtain privileges if possible

Trusted Computing Base

- **Trusted computing base (TCB):** The components of a system that security relies upon
- Question: What would you want from a TCB?
- Properties of the TCB:
 - Correctness
 - Completeness (can't be bypassed)
 - Security (can't be tampered with)
- Generally made to be as small as possible
 - A smaller, simpler TCB is easier to write and audit.
 - **KISS principle:** Keep It Simple, Stupid

Consider Human Factors

Textbook Chapter 1.2

It All Comes Down To People

- The users
 - Users like convenience (ease of use)
 - If a security system is unusable, it will be unused
 - Users will find way to subvert security systems if it makes their lives easier
- The programmers
 - Programmers make mistakes
 - Programmers use tools that allow them to make mistakes (e.g. C and C++)
- Everyone else
 - Social engineering attacks exploit other people's trust and access for personal gain
- Consider the tools presented to users, and make them *fool*-proof




Physical security keys are designed to look like keys because humans are trained to protect keys


It All Comes Down To People




Warning Dialogs




Warning Dialogs



Warning Dialogs



Warning Dialogs



The presence of warning dialogs often represent a failure: How is the user supposed to know what to do?

Takeaway: Consider human factors