

Privacy-Preserving AIS for Network Security

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- Affinity function : privacy-preserving r contiguous bits (R-CONT)
- Tolerization/Maturation of detectors using R-CONT




Figure : Detector lifecycle[1]

Intrusion Detection

- For a normal (non-memory) detector, if number of matches is greater than a threshold within a given timeframe, then the following happens:
 - the detector gets added to the memory set
 - any subsequent connections that it matches are classified as intrusive
- For memory detectors, the threshold is 1
- The number of matches of a given detector d_i is given by $d_i.matches$

Algorithm 4 DETECT($[D], [M], [c], COUNT$)

```
1: for  $i = 1$  to  $|D|$  do
2:    $[u_i] = R - CONT([c], [d_i])$ 
3:    $u_i = RECONSTRUCT([u_i])$ 
4:    $COUNT[i] += u_i$ 
5:   if  $COUNT[i] \geq \tau$  then
6:      $[M].add([d_i])$ 
7:     return 1
8:   end if
9: end for
10: for  $i = 1$  to  $|M|$  do
11:    $[u_i] = R - CONT([c], [d_i])$ 
12:    $u_i = RECONSTRUCT([u_i])$ 
13:   if  $u_i$  then
14:     return 1
15:   end if
16: end for
17: return 0
```

- The detectors are replaced in the memory set using the least-recently-used (LRU) policy
- Detectors that are removed from the memory set are added back to the normal detector set (with threshold τ)
- Memory detector set is stored between sessions

Decay And Death

- The match count for a detector d_i , $COUNT[i]$ decreases by 1 with probability γ_{match} at each timestep
- The probability of a detector dying at a timestep is given by p_{death}
- The detector is replaced by a new one which is subsequently tolerized and added to the detector set
- The dynamic nature of the detector set allows the system to adapt to new threats and self-connections



Steven A Hofmeyr and Stephanie Forrest.

Architecture for an artificial immune system.

Evolutionary computation, 8(4):443–473, 2000.