

Incident Report

1. When the Cron Job Was Added

- The cron job was manually added to `/var/spool/cron/root`, bypassing the standard `crontab -e` command.
- No exact timestamp was logged in this simulation, but in real-world scenarios, this can be verified using system logs such as `/var/log/syslog` or `/var/log/cron`.

2. What the Script Was Doing

- The script (`/tmp/malicious.sh`) wrote a message to a hidden log file every minute:
 - `echo "Ping from attacker server" >> /tmp/.cron.log`
- This mimics attacker behaviour for maintaining persistence and silently logging activity.

3. Any Signs of Lateral Movement or Download Activity

- In this simulation, no outbound connections, lateral movement, or file downloads were observed.
- In a real environment, check with tools and logs such as:
 - `lsof`, `netstat`, `ss` (for suspicious connections)
 - `.bash_history`, `/var/log/auth.log` (for user activity)
 - `/var/log/syslog` or endpoint EDR logs for download traces.

Recommendations

1. Restrict Cron Job Access

- Limit cron job editing rights to only system administrators.
- Secure cron directories and files with strict file permissions.

2. Enable Cron Integrity Checks

- Use tools like **AIDE** or **Tripwire** to monitor changes in cron directories and system binaries.

3. Set Up Alerts for New Cron Entries

- Implement **auditd** rules or **inotify** watches to detect and alert on:
 - New or modified cron jobs
 - Unauthorized script executions from **/tmp** or similar paths