

Consider 2 attacker group and one Defender and 2 vulnerabilities.

one attacker group is S and other is N-S

	Def		
(N-S)	$\{v_1\}$	$\{v_2\}$	$\{v_1, v_2\}$
(S)	v_1	v_2	$\{v_1, v_2\}$
	$\{v_1\}$		
	$\{v_2\}$		
	$\{v_1, v_2\}$		

	$\{v_1\}$	$\{v_2\}$	$\{v_1, v_2\}$
$\{v_1\}$			
$\{v_2\}$			
$\{v_1, v_2\}$			

	$\{v_1\}$	$\{v_2\}$	$\{v_1, v_2\}$
$\{v_1\}$			
$\{v_2\}$			
$\{v_1, v_2\}$			

These above all are cases in all of these will have 3 tuple value.

C_A^v = Cost of attacking a vulnerability v by attacker A.

C_{Def}^v = Cost of defending a vulnerability v by Defender Def

P_A^v = Profit of attacker A after attack on vulnerability

I_A^v = Impact of exploitation of vulnerability on Defender by attacker

P_{Def}^v = Profit of Defender D after patching vulnerability v .

Now consider Attacker S is using some strategy A_S and Attacker N-S using a strategy A_{N-S} and Defender is using a strategy D .

we are assuming the Attacker S and Attacker N-S are attacking a same vulnerability with probability $\frac{|S|}{N}$ and $\frac{|N-S|}{N}$ respectively.

Now ~~Total~~ ^{Expected} Payoffs \rightarrow

Assuming K is group of vulnerabilities which are attached ~~by~~ \rightarrow by both Attackers.

Let's say vulnerabilities attacked by only Attacker S as $A_S - K$ and by only Attacker N-S as A_{N-S}

$$\text{Attacker (S)} \Rightarrow \sum_{i \in A_S - K} P_A^i + \frac{|S|}{N} \sum_{i \in K} P_A^i - \sum_{i \in A_S} C_S^i$$

$$\text{Attacker (N-S)} \Rightarrow \sum_{i \in A_{N-S} - K} P_A^i + \frac{|N-S|}{N} \sum_{i \in K} P_A^i - \sum_{i \in A_{N-S}} C_{N-S}^i$$

$$\text{Defender (Def)} \Rightarrow \sum_{i \in D} P_A^i - \sum_{i \in D} C_{Def}^i + \left(\sum_{i \in l} I_A^i \right) P_A^i$$

where l is the group of vulnerabilities which are attacked by Attackers but weren't patched by Defender (Def) and I_A^i a represent Attacker group which attacked that particular i vulnerability and P_A^i represents the probability of attacking a vulnerability i by Attacker A if that vulnerability i is attacked by more than one Attacker

A matrix

U_1	U_2
$\$$	

a random variable $R \rightarrow (0, 1)$

if $R \leq \frac{|S|}{N}$ where $|S| < N$

then $U_1 = S$ else $U_1 = N - S$

we will consider strategies for both groups

ex $\Rightarrow S \Rightarrow \{U_1, U_2\}$

$N - S \Rightarrow \{U_2\}$

now for U_2 we will use the above process
but U_1 will be filled with S beforehand.

After Calculating Payoff matrix, we will use
Approximation or Nash equilibrium this Algo is
described below \Rightarrow

Step 1 \Rightarrow Calculate Payoffs using the given formulas

Step 2 \Rightarrow use Nash equilibrium or Approximation
method to ~~represent~~ find equilibrium states

Step 3 \Rightarrow use Shapely value or any other methods
to divide payoffs among the groups.