# Cybersecurity Incident Report: SYN Flood Denial-of-Service Attack

Date: 4 May 2025

Author: Kashish Patiyal

**Incident Type:** Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack

**Target:** Company Sales Webpage

**Target IP:** 192.168.120.30 **Attacker IP:** 192.168.120.100

**Tool Used:** Wireshark

### **Incident Summary**

A denial-of-service (DoS) attack was detected against the company's internal sales webpage. Upon analysing the network traffic using Wireshark, it was confirmed that the attack was a SYN Flood, which resulted in a Gateway Timeout error when legitimate users attempted to access the site.

# **Technical Analysis**

### **TCP Three-Way Handshake Recap**

Normally, TCP connections are established using the three-way handshake:

- 1. SYN Client sends a synchronization (SYN) packet to the server to initiate a connection.
- 2. SYN-ACK Server responds with a synchronization-acknowledgment (SYN-ACK).
- 3. ACK Client completes the handshake with an acknowledgment (ACK).

Once this handshake is complete, the server and client can communicate.

#### **Attack Behaviour**

In the case of a SYN Flood attack:

- The attacker floods the server with a high volume of **SYN packets**.
- The server replies with **SYN-ACK** for each, waiting for the final **ACK**.
- The attacker **never responds with ACK**, leaving connections half-open.
- These half-open connections **exhaust server resources**, preventing it from handling legitimate requests.

57	3.664863	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
58	3.730097	198.51.100.14	192.0.2.1	TCP	14785->443 [ACK] Seq=1 Win-5792 Len=120
59	3.795332	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win-5792 Len=120
60	3.860567	198.51.100.14	192.0.2.1	HTTP	GET /sales.html HTTP/1.1
61	3.939499	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win-5792 Len=120
62	4.018431	192.0.2.1	198.51.100.14	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
63	4.097363	198.51.100.5	192.0.2.1	TCP	33638->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win-5792 Len=120
64	4.176295	192.0.2.1	203.0.113.0	TCP	443->54770 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Win-5792 Len=1
65	4.255227	192.0.2.1	198.51.100.5	TCP	443->33638 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Win-5792 Len=1
66	4.256159	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
67	5.235091	198.51.100.5	192.0.2.1	TCP	33638->443 [ACK] Seq=1 Win-5792 Len=120
68	5.236023	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
69	5.236955	198.51.100.16	192.0.2.1	TCP	32641->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win-5792 Len=120
70	5.237887	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0

## **Wireshark Log Interpretation**

Based on the attached Wireshark TCP/HTTP logs:

- The attacker at IP 192.168.120.100 sent **repeated SYN packets** to the target server at IP 192.168.120.30.
- The server responded with SYN-ACKs but **never received ACKs**, confirming incomplete handshakes.
- As a result, the server became overwhelmed and failed to respond to legitimate HTTP GET requests from other users.
- A typical log entry showed:

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.120.30 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

[Response: 504 Gateway Timeout]

73	6.230548	192.0.2.1	198.51.100.16	TCP	443->32641 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Win-5792 Len=1
74	6.330539	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
75	6.330885	198.51.100.7	192.0.2.1	TCP	42584->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
76	6.331231	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
77	7.330577	192.0.2.1	198.51.100.5	TCP	HTTP/1.1 504 Gateway Time-out (text/html)
78	7.351323	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
79	7.360768	198.51.100.22	192.0.2.1	TCP	6345->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
80	7.380773	192.0.2.1	198.51.100.7	TCP	443->42584 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Win-5792 Len=1
81	7.380878	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
82	7.383879	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
83	7.482754	192.0.2.1	203.0.113.0	TCP	443->54770 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Win=5792 Len=0
84	7.581629	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
85	7.680504	192.0.2.1	198.51.100.22	TCP	443->6345 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Win=5792 Len=0.

### **Impact**

• Employees were unable to access the sales webpage, disrupting business operations.

- The network infrastructure faced temporary resource exhaustion.
- Critical HTTP requests could not be fulfilled due to the server's overloaded connection table.

125	21.136783	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
126	21.459796	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
127	21.782809	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
128	22.105822	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
129	22.428835	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
130	22.751848	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
131	23.074861	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
132	23.397874	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
133	23.720887	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
134	24.0439	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
135	24.366913	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0
136	24.689926	203.0.113.0	192.0.2.1	TCP	54770->443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5792 Len=0

# **Recommended Mitigations**

To prevent similar attacks in the future:

- **Implement SYN Cookies**: Protects against SYN Floods by not allocating resources until the handshake is complete.
- Rate Limiting: Restrict the number of half-open connections from a single IP.
- **Firewalls/IPS**: Configure firewalls and intrusion prevention systems to detect and drop suspicious SYN floods.
- **Traffic Monitoring**: Use tools like Wireshark or Zeek to monitor anomalies in traffic behaviour.
- **Blacklisting**: Temporarily block IPs sending unusually high volumes of SYN packets.

### Conclusion

This incident demonstrates the importance of monitoring network traffic and having DoS mitigation strategies in place. A simple SYN Flood can cripple a server if left unchecked. Early detection through packet analysis tools like Wireshark plays a crucial role in rapid response and recovery.