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VC Intentions and Potential. Indications are growing that the VC are mounting a special campaign aimed at undermining the Diem Government. According to CAS sources, VC armed cadre strength has increased to about 3,000 in the southwest, double the number in September. VC groups now operate in larger strength, and their tactics have changed from attacks on individuals to rather frequent and daring attacks on GVN security forces. A recent CAS report has indicated a VC intention to press general guerrilla warfare in South Viet-Nam in 1960, and indicates the VC are convinced they can mount a coup d'etat this year. President Diem also told me in late February about the capture of a VC document indicating their intention to step up aggressive attacks all over the country, including Saigon, beginning in the second quarter.

These signs indicate that aggressively worded statements emanating from the DRV in 1959 may accurately reflect DRV intentions. In May 1959 the central committee of the Lao Dong Party passed a resolution stating that the struggle for reunification of Viet-Nam should be carried out by all "appropriate means". Subsequently in conversations with Western officials, Prime Minister Pham van DONG made statements to the effect that "We will be in Saigon tomorrow" and "We will drive the Americans into the sea".

It is not completely clear why the DRV has chosen this particular time to mount an intensified guerrilla campaign in South Viet-Nam. Several hypotheses have been put forward. The campaign may be part of general Chicom strategy to increase pressure on non-communist countries all along the southern rim of the Asian communist bloc. Several GVN officials, including President Diem, have said that the present DRV tactics may be related to the forthcoming East-West summit meeting, but they do not seem to be clear as to just what this relationship might be. Diem and others have also expressed the view that the DRV is aiming at disruption of the GVN's economic, social and security programs, many of which have been making steady progress while others, like the agrovillage program, threaten to weaken the VC position if carried out successfully. The DRV may also have been embittered by its failure to interfere successfully with the GVN National Assembly elections last August and resolved, as a result of this failure, to intensify activities in the South.

GVN Security and Political Weaknesses. At the same time that the DRV guerrilla potential has increased in the South, weaknesses have become more apparent in the GVN security forces. GVN leaders have in recent weeks stressed the need for more anti-guerrilla training of ARVN. The desirability of centralized command in insecure areas and a centralized intelligence service has also

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