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it is aware of the existing dangers and can cope with them. A danger exists that by expanding its contacts with Communist China and Communist North Viet-Nam it will permit subversion especially of the Vietnamese and Chinese communities to a point beyond its control.

Status of U. S. Actions: Advantage is taken of whatever skepticism Sihanouk may have regarding the assurances he received from Chinese Communist leaders. Efforts are being continued to try to bring about an improvement in the preponderantly pro-communist press and to implement the police program.

18. Reduction of Informational Outlets. During the five-month period preceding Prince Sihanouk's recent visit to the United States, placement of USIS press material and other non-USIS originated material which supported U. S. interests dropped sharply while press usage of pro-communist material increased correspondingly. The decline in the usage of U. S. material was caused by the Ministry of Information's prejudicial treatment of the U. S. in its official press service, by governmental closure of several newspapers which had formerly been receptive to USIS approaches and by the refusal of others to accept USIS output. In view of the apparent communist influence in the Ministry of Information, USIS activities in other media could be seriously affected by one-sided administration of the government's recently promulgated communique on propaganda activities.

Status of U. S. Actions: Special efforts have been made, with some success, to persuade the Cambodian Government, particularly the Ministry of Information, to apply restrictions upon ideological propaganda equally to pro-communist and free world information activities. Since Prince Sihanouk's visit to the United States, the Ministry of Information has taken steps to decrease pro-communist propaganda. Whether or not this represents a permanent change in emphasis remains to be seen.

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