

b. Answer: A major proportion of U.S. resources available for assistance to Southeast Asia should be allocated to economic and technical assistance. Greater emphasis should be placed on creating an expanding number of technically competent, pro-Western leaders and on "political warfare" activities, at the expense of economic assistance, if necessary. Grant military assistance should, in general, be limited to those nations which either are threatened by Communist aggression or are willing to provide forces for collective defense measures in support of common commitments. Reimbursable military assistance should be extended to allied nations capable of bearing the cost and to other nations which are ineligible for grant assistance but are willing to develop their own capabilities to resist Communism.

### 3. Absolute Level of Assistance

a. Question: Should the absolute level of U.S. economic, technical and military assistance to Southeast Asia be increased, decreased, or maintained at present levels in the light of the current Soviet campaign of political and economic penetration?

b. Answer: The absolute level of U.S. economic, technical and military assistance should be maintained at present levels in the light of the current Soviet campaign of political and economic penetration. However, in neutralist countries, military assistance should be decreased where it is in excess of the needs for maintaining internal security.

### 4. Functions of Indigenous Military Forces

a. Question: Should indigenous military forces in Southeast Asia be designed (a) solely to maintain internal security, (b) to maintain internal security and assist local external Communist aggression, or (c) in addition to (a) and (b), to contribute to collective defense efforts in the area?

b. Answer: Indigenous military forces in Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines should be designed to maintain internal security, to resist local external Communist aggression and to contribute to collective defense efforts in the area. Indigenous military forces in South Vietnam should be designed to maintain internal security and resist Viet Ninh overt Communist aggression. Military forces of other Southeast Asian nations should be designed solely to maintain internal security.

### 5. U.S. Response to Aggression

a. Question: What political and military action should the U.S. be prepared to undertake alone or in cooperation with allies in the event of Communist seizure of control within, or overt aggression against, a Southeast Asian country? What would be the role of SEATO in these eventualities?