

SECRET

(4) Small coast patrol craft should be made available to the Vietnamese Navy for purposes of restricting coastside supply shipment from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong.

(5) In the intelligence area, again the immediate emphasis should be shifted from conventional combat intelligence to counter-guerrilla intelligence training at the battalion level. Further, an attempt should be made through training and material support to strengthen the Vietnamese counter-intelligence effort in order to frustrate the Viet Cong subversive threat. Finally, RF equipment should be furnished so that an effort can be made to locate Viet Cong radio transmitters.

B. Recommendations requiring coordinated inter-agency action

(1) Strengthen the Civil Guard by making MAAG spaces available for trainers and by provision of small arms and other equipment through MAP supply channels plus utilization of ARVN supply, maintenance, and training facilities.

(2) During the emergency, the Civil Guard should be temporarily put under the Ministry of Defense in order to integrate the activities of the ARVN and the Civil Guard. The Ambassador's concern that the Civil Guard will lose all identity as a civil police force, if this action is taken, is invalid, providing a strong US position to the contrary is announced and maintained.

(3) Emphasis on civic action type activities by the ARVN should be encouraged and advisory and material assistance in this field furnished through MAAP and ICA channels.

(4) The Department of State should reemphasize to the RKG the necessity for according the right of "hot pursuit" to the ARVN in its campaign against the Viet Cong. Since it is strongly suspected that the Viet Cong maintain their headquarters within Cambodia, and since considerable reinforcements to the Viet Cong come through Cambodia, the US should tell the RKG that we explore their inaction in suppressing this activity. The effectiveness of the ARVN sweeps will be largely negated until the ROK takes steps to deny its territory as a sanctuary to the Viet Cong.

(5) Most importantly for the purpose of strengthening the morale of the Vietnamese, President Diem should be informed as soon as possible through appropriate channels of the gravity with which the US government views the internal security situation, of our intent to provide material assistance, and of our unswerving support to him in this time of crisis.