

SECRET

Page 3 of
Despatch No. 276
From SAIGON

counter either external or internal aggression.

c. Additionally, the force increase will provide the long needed balance between combat and logistic support.

A number of recommendations in the plan, considered by the Country Team to be indispensable and in the GVN's own best interests, will probably not be particularly palatable to the GVN. This situation pertains particularly to certain political actions and concepts of the military-civilian relationship. However, these questions are an integral part of the overall plan and are essential to its successful accomplishment. Consideration should, therefore, be given to what actions we are prepared to take to encourage, or if necessary to force, acceptance of all essential elements of the plan. (See Embassy messages cited on page 14 of Enclosure.)

Elbridge Durbrow

1 ENCLOSURE: Counterinsurgency Plan for South Viet-Nam

COPIES POUCHED TO: CINCPAC POLAD (2 copies).

DEPARTMENT please pouch 8 additional copies to CINCPAC POLAD.

SECRET

1359