Cash Plus, Safety Plus? Intimate Partner Violence and Productive Inclusion in Mauritania

Mechanism

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# Summary

**Key Takeaways**:

# Mechanism

## Economic Security & Emotional Well-being

Cash reduces poverty stress and improve emotional well-being. Impact: generally reduces IPV.

### Control over earnings

#### Household level

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) | (21) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Gross consumption (daily, USD/capita) | Food consumption (daily, USD/adult eq.) | Non Food consumption (daily, USD/adult eq.) | Eating out expenditure (daily, USD/adult eq.) | Education expenditure (daily, USD/adult eq.) | Health expenditure (daily, USD/adult eq.) | Celebration expenditure (daily, USD/adult eq.) | Takes part in tontine/AVEC (0,1) | Total debt (yearly, USD) | Total borrowed (yearly, USD) | Household Gross transfers (yearly, USD) | Total savings (3 months, USD) | Food security (FIES) | Dietary diversity (FCS) | Total revenue (yearly, USD) | Business revenues (yearly, USD) | Wage earnings (yearly, USD) | Livestock revenue (yearly, USD) | Count of income sources (yearly) | No. of income sources (Household) | Wage types (Household) |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | 0.13 (0.220) | 0.24 (0.191) | -0.05 (0.044) | 0.00 (0.000) | 0.00 (0.001) | -0.04 (0.045) | -0.02 (0.018) | 0.07\* (0.034) | 57.04\*\* (19.0) | 57.66\*\* (20.4) | 21.25 (43.0) | 0.46 (2.24) | 0.01 (0.298) | 3.68 (2.80) | -201.04 (148) | -224.54 (146) | -19.40 (16.3) | -9.35 (11.3) | -0.03 (0.091) | -0.07 (0.160) | -0.01 (0.013) |
| No. Obs. | 350 | 350 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 350 | 338 | 350 | 352 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 |
| R² | 0.023 | 0.026 | 0.047 |  | 0.084 | 0.068 | 0.040 | 0.045 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.067 | 0.042 | 0.052 | 0.030 | 0.115 | 0.082 | 0.037 | 0.023 | 0.103 | 0.098 | 0.024 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | -0.22 (0.287) | -0.26 (0.202) | 0.02 (0.058) | 0.00 (0.000) | 0.00 (0.002) | -0.01 (0.069) | 0.00 (0.035) | 0.30\*\*\* (0.078) | -50.70\* (20.8) | -65.53\*\* (21.5) | 18.05 (58.2) | 9.29 (6.05) | -0.10 (0.484) | -1.50 (3.15) | 19.85 (146) | 88.98 (147) | -1.91 (6.72) | 15.12 (23.5) | 0.00 (0.112) | 0.00 (0.182) | 0.00 (0.011) |
| Psychosocial | 0.28 (0.278) | -0.02 (0.217) | 0.13 (0.065) | 0.00 (0.000) | 0.00 (0.002) | 0.14\* (0.071) | 0.05 (0.031) | 0.33\*\*\* (0.090) | -52.86\*\* (18.2) | -53.60\*\* (20.4) | -45.94 (48.2) | 4.42 (3.22) | 0.00 (0.507) | 5.72 (3.54) | -4.65 (156) | 15.33 (154) | 42.40 (29.4) | 0.00 (7.35) | 0.03 (0.108) | 0.11 (0.180) | 0.02 (0.013) |
| Full | 0.27 (0.271) | 0.00 (0.235) | 0.17\*\* (0.060) | 0.00 (0.000) | 0.00 (0.002) | 0.06 (0.048) | 0.03 (0.027) | 0.33\*\*\* (0.076) | -49.00\*\* (17.1) | -31.70 (24.9) | 31.40 (92.5) | 4.46 (5.42) | 0.83 (0.535) | 4.34 (3.97) | -21.61 (136) | -38.43 (129) | 23.16 (23.5) | 12.67 (12.9) | 0.05 (0.114) | 0.06 (0.182) | 0.00 (0.011) |
| No. Obs. | 583 | 583 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 593 | 574 | 593 | 596 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 |
| R² | 0.068 | 0.050 | 0.079 |  | 0.060 | 0.046 | 0.079 | 0.129 | 0.039 | 0.041 | 0.067 | 0.037 | 0.029 | 0.031 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.019 | 0.016 | 0.102 | 0.081 | 0.028 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | 0.11 (0.218) | -0.09 (0.179) | 0.10\* (0.044) | 0.00 (0.000) | 0.00 (0.001) | 0.07 (0.047) | 0.03 (0.022) | 0.32\*\*\* (0.057) | -51.15\*\* (15.6) | -51.97\*\* (17.4) | -3.96 (44.7) | 6.09\* (2.87) | 0.18 (0.408) | 2.90 (2.80) | -0.77 (114) | 26.26 (111) | 22.32 (14.4) | 8.45 (10.1) | 0.02 (0.085) | 0.06 (0.138) | 0.01 (0.009) |
| No. Obs. | 583 | 583 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 593 | 574 | 593 | 596 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 |
| R² | 0.060 | 0.047 | 0.067 |  | 0.059 | 0.033 | 0.072 | 0.129 | 0.039 | 0.038 | 0.064 | 0.035 | 0.015 | 0.021 | 0.046 | 0.044 | 0.013 | 0.015 | 0.101 | 0.080 | 0.025 |
| Control mean @ follow up | 3.17 | 2.54 | 0.315 | 0 | 0.008 | 0.142 | 0.166 | 0.118 | 87.3 | 107 | 94.9 | 2.63 | 3.19 | 40.0 | 508 | 321 | 7.38 | 17.1 | 0.912 | 1.36 | 0.011 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 2.10 | 1.84 | 0.369 | 0 | 0.013 | 0.375 | 0.161 | 0.323 | 193.1 | 215 | 416.7 | 20.72 | 2.69 | 24.2 | 1233 | 1181 | 93.54 | 83.0 | 0.805 | 1.38 | 0.102 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

#### Ben level

|  | Total revenue (yearly, USD) |  | | Business revenues (yearly, USD) |  | | Wage earnings (yearly, USD) |  | | Livestock revenue (yearly, USD) |  | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | hh. | ben. | prt. | hh. | ben. | prt. | hh. | ben. | prt. | hh. | ben. | prt. |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | -201.04 (148) | -224.68 (134) | 23.64 (71.6) | -224.54 (146) | -244.42 (134) | 19.88 (61.1) | -19.40 (16.3) | 0.00 (0.000) | -19.40 (16.3) | -9.35 (11.3) | 1.55 (2.50) | -10.90 (10.5) |
| No. Obs. | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 |
| R² | 0.115 | 0.070 | 0.108 | 0.082 | 0.068 | 0.063 | 0.037 |  | 0.037 | 0.023 | 0.038 | 0.024 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | 19.85 (146) | 180.54 (137) | -160.69\* (66.7) | 88.98 (147) | 198.55 (138) | -109.57 (59.0) | -1.91 (6.72) | 0.41 (0.632) | -2.32 (6.72) | 15.12 (23.5) | 5.23 (8.28) | 9.89 (15.6) |
| Psychosocial | -4.65 (156) | 88.79 (135) | -93.44 (68.1) | 15.33 (154) | 89.91 (130) | -74.58 (62.9) | 42.40 (29.4) | 11.07 (11.4) | 31.33 (27.3) | 0.00 (7.35) | -0.59 (2.90) | 0.59 (5.94) |
| Full | -21.61 (136) | 61.41 (106) | -83.02 (73.5) | -38.43 (129) | 48.41 (103) | -86.84 (62.1) | 23.16 (23.5) | 0.92 (1.14) | 22.25 (23.4) | 12.67 (12.9) | 11.11 (9.79) | 1.56 (8.09) |
| No. Obs. | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 |
| R² | 0.046 | 0.051 | 0.081 | 0.046 | 0.054 | 0.056 | 0.019 | 0.008 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.014 | 0.020 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | -0.77 (114) | 112.77 (93.3) | -113.54 (59.9) | 26.26 (111) | 115.93 (91.6) | -89.67 (53.8) | 22.32 (14.4) | 4.79 (4.90) | 17.53 (13.6) | 8.45 (10.1) | 4.45 (4.09) | 4.00 (6.90) |
| No. Obs. | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 |
| R² | 0.046 | 0.049 | 0.079 | 0.044 | 0.052 | 0.055 | 0.013 | 0.004 | 0.012 | 0.015 | 0.011 | 0.018 |
| Control mean @ follow up | 508 | 205 | 302 | 321 | 168 | 153 | 7.38 | 0 | 7.38 | 17.1 | 3.73 | 13.3 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 1233 | 1001 | 684 | 1181 | 989 | 603 | 93.54 | 0 | 93.54 | 83.0 | 24.53 | 72.2 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | | | | | | | | | |

## Intra-household Conflict

### Main indexes

#### Control over earnings

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Intra-household dynamics index | Violence perceptions index | Gender attitudes index |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | -0.02 (0.094) | -0.05 (0.103) | 0.00 (0.121) |
| No. Obs. | 350 | 350 | 350 |
| R² | 0.067 | 0.069 | 0.099 |
| PI |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — |
| Capital | -0.14 (0.113) | 0.03 (0.179) | -0.11 (0.173) |
| Psychosocial | -0.14 (0.110) | 0.17 (0.129) | -0.36 (0.268) |
| Full | -0.24\* (0.116) | -0.10 (0.128) | -0.01 (0.116) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.064 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — |
| Pool | -0.16 (0.087) | 0.05 (0.113) | -0.19 (0.154) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.035 | 0.028 | 0.052 |
| Control mean @ follow up | 0.147 | -0.052 | -0.007 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 0.842 | 0.905 | 0.998 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | |

### Indexes components

#### Intra-household index components

##### Control over earnings

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Intra-household dynamics index | Partner dynamics index | Household dynamics index | Comfortable disagreeing with partner (1-4) | Trusts partner (1-4) | Partner inclusiveness (1-4) | Household inclusiveness (1-4) | Household tensions frequent (1-4) | Relationship satisfaction (1-10) |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | -0.02 (0.094) | 0.04 (0.085) | -0.07 (0.113) | -0.02 (0.104) | 0.09 (0.089) | 0.01 (0.076) | -0.01 (0.099) | 0.07 (0.092) | 0.02 (0.278) |
| No. Obs. | 350 | 350 | 350 | 344 | 347 | 347 | 350 | 330 | 350 |
| R² | 0.067 | 0.086 | 0.061 | 0.054 | 0.096 | 0.047 | 0.084 | 0.123 | 0.055 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | -0.14 (0.113) | -0.21 (0.119) | -0.02 (0.130) | -0.20 (0.130) | -0.12 (0.111) | -0.16 (0.127) | -0.08 (0.144) | -0.05 (0.123) | -0.36 (0.324) |
| Psychosocial | -0.14 (0.110) | -0.04 (0.114) | -0.18 (0.124) | -0.09 (0.126) | -0.09 (0.115) | 0.08 (0.098) | 0.01 (0.116) | 0.20 (0.159) | 0.39 (0.321) |
| Full | -0.24\* (0.116) | -0.19 (0.118) | -0.21 (0.155) | -0.17 (0.157) | -0.09 (0.124) | -0.15 (0.116) | -0.20 (0.140) | 0.08 (0.158) | -0.39 (0.295) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 585 | 588 | 591 | 593 | 561 | 591 |
| R² | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.046 | 0.023 | 0.018 | 0.049 | 0.060 | 0.082 | 0.051 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | -0.16 (0.087) | -0.14 (0.090) | -0.13 (0.099) | -0.15 (0.096) | -0.10 (0.087) | -0.06 (0.091) | -0.07 (0.105) | 0.09 (0.113) | -0.07 (0.258) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 585 | 588 | 591 | 593 | 561 | 591 |
| R² | 0.035 | 0.030 | 0.042 | 0.022 | 0.017 | 0.036 | 0.054 | 0.073 | 0.034 |
| Control mean @ follow up | 0.147 | 0.215 | 0.041 | 3.149 | 3.393 | 3.607 | 3.246 | 0.645 | 4.34 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 0.842 | 0.767 | 1.011 | 0.937 | 0.796 | 0.675 | 0.898 | 0.854 | 2.22 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | | | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | | | | | | |

#### Violence perception index components

##### Control over earnings

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Gender attitudes index | Know women with HH-tension (0-10) | Women beaten for burning food (1-4) | Women beaten for neglecting children (1-4) |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | -0.05 (0.103) | 0.11 (0.274) | -0.04 (0.072) | -0.07 (0.072) |
| No. Obs. | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 |
| R² | 0.069 | 0.126 | 0.066 | 0.075 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | 0.03 (0.179) | -0.28 (0.308) | 0.09 (0.123) | 0.04 (0.112) |
| Psychosocial | 0.17 (0.129) | 0.50 (0.363) | 0.00 (0.082) | 0.10 (0.105) |
| Full | -0.10 (0.128) | -0.14 (0.325) | -0.03 (0.093) | -0.07 (0.096) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.036 | 0.095 | 0.059 | 0.048 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | 0.05 (0.113) | 0.06 (0.257) | 0.02 (0.079) | 0.03 (0.082) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.028 | 0.083 | 0.055 | 0.042 |
| Control mean @ follow up | -0.052 | 3.02 | 1.322 | 1.317 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 0.905 | 2.37 | 0.634 | 0.638 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | |

#### Gender attitude index components

##### Control over earnings

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Violence perceptions index | Food violence is OK (0,1) | Children violence is OK (0,1) | Should tolerate violence (1-4) | Only men should work (1-4) | Should school girls (1-4) |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | 0.00 (0.121) | -0.04 (0.032) | -0.03 (0.034) | 0.22\* (0.103) | 0.05 (0.100) | 0.05 (0.103) |
| No. Obs. | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 |
| R² | 0.099 | 0.061 | 0.078 | 0.105 | 0.044 | 0.044 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | -0.11 (0.173) | 0.09\* (0.045) | 0.04 (0.049) | -0.21 (0.125) | -0.04 (0.124) | -0.07 (0.124) |
| Psychosocial | -0.36 (0.268) | 0.11 (0.078) | 0.07 (0.084) | 0.04 (0.110) | 0.13 (0.121) | 0.02 (0.111) |
| Full | -0.01 (0.116) | 0.03 (0.034) | -0.01 (0.038) | -0.08 (0.138) | 0.04 (0.105) | 0.01 (0.103) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.064 | 0.045 | 0.058 | 0.082 | 0.041 | 0.032 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | -0.19 (0.154) | 0.09\* (0.041) | 0.04 (0.047) | -0.07 (0.101) | 0.05 (0.094) | -0.01 (0.089) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.052 | 0.039 | 0.051 | 0.072 | 0.036 | 0.031 |
| Control mean @ follow up | -0.007 | 0.076 | 0.100 | 6.577 | 6.326 | 2.37 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 0.998 | 0.265 | 0.301 | 0.869 | 0.843 | 0.88 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | | | |

#### Social norm index components

##### Control over earnings

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Social norms index | Descriptive norms index | Know women travel freely (0-10) | Know women with loans (0-10) | Know women who started activities (0-10) | Know women travel freely (0-10) | Prescriptive norms index | No. men who think women shd travel freely (0-10) | No. men who think women shd have own work (0-10) | No. women who think women shd travel freely (0-10) | No. women who think women shd have own work (0-10) |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | -0.03 (0.122) | -0.08 (0.099) | 0.18 (0.215) | -0.10 (0.216) | -0.55\* (0.248) | -0.08 (0.271) | 0.05 (0.113) | -0.01 (0.309) | -0.04 (0.269) | -0.05 (0.299) | 0.44 (0.266) |
| No. Obs. | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 |
| R² | 0.028 | 0.115 | 0.047 | 0.093 | 0.096 | 0.102 | 0.070 | 0.026 | 0.063 | 0.054 | 0.098 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | 0.28 (0.147) | 0.14 (0.157) | 0.30 (0.312) | 0.24 (0.273) | 0.47 (0.356) | 0.02 (0.328) | 0.09 (0.137) | 0.25 (0.335) | 0.14 (0.329) | 0.17 (0.356) | 0.13 (0.309) |
| Psychosocial | 0.44\* (0.174) | 0.39\* (0.194) | 0.73\* (0.346) | 0.82\* (0.378) | 0.62 (0.399) | 0.68 (0.414) | -0.03 (0.144) | -0.36 (0.340) | -0.07 (0.319) | 0.19 (0.355) | -0.01 (0.356) |
| Full | 0.13 (0.148) | -0.04 (0.164) | -0.13 (0.279) | -0.01 (0.329) | 0.07 (0.370) | -0.22 (0.374) | 0.14 (0.160) | 0.18 (0.392) | 0.06 (0.361) | 0.56 (0.396) | 0.33 (0.380) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.050 | 0.107 | 0.089 | 0.098 | 0.056 | 0.080 | 0.077 | 0.031 | 0.062 | 0.046 | 0.112 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | 0.31\* (0.130) | 0.20 (0.135) | 0.36 (0.237) | 0.41 (0.248) | 0.43 (0.298) | 0.22 (0.305) | 0.05 (0.110) | -0.01 (0.271) | 0.04 (0.265) | 0.28 (0.279) | 0.13 (0.284) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.040 | 0.090 | 0.074 | 0.083 | 0.050 | 0.065 | 0.074 | 0.024 | 0.061 | 0.043 | 0.110 |
| Control mean @ follow up | -0.185 | -0.174 | 2.55 | 2.51 | 2.70 | 2.90 | 0.023 | 6.39 | 6.88 | 6.38 | 6.93 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 1.011 | 0.909 | 1.95 | 1.96 | 2.16 | 2.38 | 0.983 | 2.73 | 2.27 | 2.63 | 2.35 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | | | | | | | | |

## Women’s bargaining power

### Decision making

#### Control over earnings

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Control over household resources index | Control over earnings index | Own earnings influence (1-3) | Can Decide to Earn Alone (1-3) | Agriculture influence (1-3) | Livestock influence (1-3) | Off-farm business influence (1-3) | Daily spending influence (1-3) | Can Decide to Spend Alone (1-3) | Large purchases influence (1-3) | Can Decide to Spend Large Amounts Alone (1-3) | Family planning influence (1-3) | Can Make Fertility Choices Alone (1-3) | Own healthcare influence (1-3) | Can Decide about Self-Care Alone (1-3) | Partner’s earnings influence (1-3) | Child education influence (1-3) |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | 0.22 (0.117) | 0.00 (0.115) | 0.09 (0.074) | 0.10 (0.095) | -0.05 (0.078) | 0.00 (0.096) | -0.04 (0.096) | 0.03 (0.066) | 0.05 (0.093) | 0.06 (0.069) | 0.12 (0.092) | 0.08 (0.096) | 0.04 (0.108) | 0.09 (0.064) | 0.07 (0.093) | 0.08 (0.078) | 0.12 (0.069) |
| No. Obs. | 331 | 352 | 324 | 322 | 295 | 235 | 245 | 329 | 332 | 330 | 333 | 248 | 248 | 334 | 335 | 329 | 335 |
| R² | 0.055 | 0.068 | 0.024 | 0.039 | 0.062 | 0.072 | 0.061 | 0.039 | 0.033 | 0.059 | 0.031 | 0.030 | 0.031 | 0.036 | 0.042 | 0.044 | 0.059 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | -0.15 (0.168) | 0.13 (0.167) | -0.03 (0.087) | 0.01 (0.111) | -0.09 (0.110) | -0.13 (0.128) | -0.14 (0.131) | -0.18 (0.103) | -0.02 (0.099) | -0.16 (0.095) | -0.02 (0.095) | -0.21 (0.116) | 0.00 (0.105) | -0.20\* (0.093) | 0.02 (0.098) | -0.10 (0.106) | -0.20\* (0.098) |
| Psychosocial | -0.25 (0.178) | -0.12 (0.131) | -0.08 (0.140) | -0.14 (0.155) | 0.11 (0.088) | -0.10 (0.130) | -0.02 (0.114) | -0.11 (0.114) | -0.16 (0.122) | -0.06 (0.102) | -0.09 (0.107) | -0.01 (0.152) | -0.01 (0.111) | -0.10 (0.102) | -0.08 (0.116) | 0.01 (0.134) | -0.10 (0.099) |
| Full | -0.25 (0.148) | -0.18 (0.141) | 0.07 (0.093) | 0.11 (0.102) | 0.05 (0.092) | 0.04 (0.107) | 0.05 (0.113) | 0.00 (0.082) | -0.01 (0.101) | 0.06 (0.079) | 0.01 (0.097) | 0.05 (0.114) | 0.13 (0.117) | 0.00 (0.076) | 0.05 (0.097) | 0.05 (0.097) | 0.01 (0.071) |
| No. Obs. | 575 | 596 | 549 | 542 | 495 | 383 | 393 | 560 | 559 | 559 | 562 | 438 | 441 | 565 | 564 | 564 | 562 |
| R² | 0.094 | 0.093 | 0.035 | 0.057 | 0.068 | 0.054 | 0.060 | 0.031 | 0.050 | 0.040 | 0.040 | 0.037 | 0.047 | 0.042 | 0.052 | 0.039 | 0.040 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | -0.22 (0.140) | -0.05 (0.115) | -0.02 (0.086) | -0.03 (0.101) | 0.02 (0.081) | -0.07 (0.095) | -0.05 (0.095) | -0.11 (0.073) | -0.07 (0.084) | -0.06 (0.069) | -0.04 (0.077) | -0.07 (0.097) | 0.03 (0.087) | -0.11 (0.068) | -0.01 (0.079) | -0.01 (0.088) | -0.11 (0.068) |
| No. Obs. | 575 | 596 | 549 | 542 | 495 | 383 | 393 | 560 | 559 | 559 | 562 | 438 | 441 | 565 | 564 | 564 | 562 |
| R² | 0.093 | 0.084 | 0.030 | 0.047 | 0.057 | 0.047 | 0.052 | 0.023 | 0.045 | 0.026 | 0.038 | 0.019 | 0.044 | 0.029 | 0.049 | 0.034 | 0.027 |
| Control mean @ follow up | -0.195 | -0.254 | 2.562 | 2.275 | 2.523 | 2.441 | 2.433 | 2.688 | 2.338 | 2.637 | 2.367 | 2.523 | 2.181 | 2.743 | 2.369 | 2.44 | 2.716 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 0.987 | 1.020 | 0.629 | 0.793 | 0.646 | 0.686 | 0.686 | 0.538 | 0.778 | 0.573 | 0.776 | 0.669 | 0.782 | 0.485 | 0.771 | 0.67 | 0.527 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

### Empowerment

#### Control over earnings

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Can Decide to Earn Alone (1-4) | Wage earnings (yearly, USD) | Benef. controls crop revenue (0,1) | No. of beneficiary businesses | Beneficiary has a business (0,1) | No. of months benef worked last year | Entrepreneurial business types (yearly) | Beneficiary launched a business (0,1) | Beneficiary abandoned a business (0,1) | Personnal savings | Business revenues (yearly, USD) | Business profits (yearly, USD) | Business asset value (USD) | Beneficiary investments (yearly, USD) | Business revenue (beneficiary, monthly, USD) | Benef. owns livestock (0,1) | Benef. controls livestock revenue (0,1) | Benef. traveled for work (0,1) |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | 0.10 (0.095) | 0.00 (0.000) | -0.02 (0.019) | -0.07 (0.044) | -0.06 (0.040) | -0.73 (0.397) | -0.06 (0.040) | -0.01 (0.025) | -0.03 (0.019) | -0.54 (2.72) | -244.42 (134) | -132.00 (69.5) | 2.31 (2.28) | 1.03 (3.26) | -13.05 (9.91) | -0.01 (0.031) | 0.00 (0.021) | -0.01 (0.005) |
| No. Obs. | 322 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 |
| R² | 0.039 |  | 0.060 | 0.040 | 0.046 | 0.057 | 0.046 | 0.055 | 0.028 | 0.106 | 0.068 | 0.066 | 0.058 | 0.079 | 0.058 | 0.031 | 0.043 | 0.161 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | 0.01 (0.111) | 0.41 (0.632) | 0.00 (0.020) | 0.15\* (0.070) | 0.14\* (0.066) | 1.09\* (0.550) | 0.15\* (0.068) | 0.00 (0.029) | 0.03 (0.018) | 8.86 (5.46) | 198.55 (138) | 76.09 (56.4) | -0.52 (3.26) | 25.31\* (10.1) | 21.98 (13.2) | -0.04 (0.026) | -0.01 (0.019) | 0.00 (0.003) |
| Psychosocial | -0.14 (0.155) | 11.07 (11.4) | 0.01 (0.022) | 0.10 (0.064) | 0.10 (0.062) | 0.79 (0.587) | 0.10 (0.061) | 0.01 (0.027) | 0.02 (0.018) | 0.99 (3.39) | 89.91 (130) | 41.28 (64.9) | 6.01 (7.29) | 10.85 (6.55) | 2.80 (11.3) | -0.02 (0.035) | 0.00 (0.022) | 0.01 (0.009) |
| Full | 0.11 (0.102) | 0.92 (1.14) | 0.01 (0.021) | 0.10 (0.058) | 0.11 (0.057) | 0.97 (0.587) | 0.11\* (0.057) | 0.00 (0.030) | 0.05\* (0.022) | 1.40 (4.41) | 48.41 (103) | 17.70 (47.9) | 7.45 (9.45) | 15.26\* (7.34) | 1.13 (8.56) | 0.01 (0.039) | 0.01 (0.022) | 0.01 (0.011) |
| No. Obs. | 542 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 |
| R² | 0.057 | 0.008 | 0.023 | 0.097 | 0.106 | 0.080 | 0.108 | 0.018 | 0.097 | 0.064 | 0.054 | 0.048 | 0.029 | 0.123 | 0.082 | 0.039 | 0.029 | 0.029 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | -0.03 (0.101) | 4.79 (4.90) | 0.01 (0.015) | 0.12\* (0.046) | 0.12\*\* (0.044) | 0.94\* (0.396) | 0.12\*\* (0.044) | 0.00 (0.021) | 0.03\* (0.013) | 3.77 (2.99) | 115.93 (91.6) | 46.93 (42.2) | 4.17 (3.93) | 16.92\*\* (5.14) | 8.88 (7.91) | -0.02 (0.024) | 0.00 (0.015) | 0.01 (0.005) |
| No. Obs. | 542 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 |
| R² | 0.047 | 0.004 | 0.022 | 0.095 | 0.104 | 0.079 | 0.105 | 0.017 | 0.094 | 0.057 | 0.052 | 0.046 | 0.027 | 0.117 | 0.074 | 0.035 | 0.028 | 0.023 |
| Control mean @ follow up | 2.275 | 0 | 0.032 | 0.116 | 0.105 | 0.886 | 0.105 | 0.044 | 0.016 | 4.61 | 168 | 85.3 | 2.77 | 7.16 | 13.7 | 0.077 | 0.032 | 0.002 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 0.793 | 0 | 0.175 | 0.351 | 0.307 | 3.070 | 0.307 | 0.205 | 0.125 | 29.73 | 989 | 480.0 | 25.36 | 35.63 | 78.2 | 0.267 | 0.175 | 0.042 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

## Intensive time use

### Grouping time use variables

#### Control over earnings

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Tot Mins in household chores (last 7 days) | Tot Mins in market income activities (last 7 days) | Tot Mins in leisure activities (last 7 days) | Tot Mins in other activities (last 7 days) |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | 632.83\* (244) | 2.33 (73.9) | 126.15 (71.0) | -761.31\* (300) |
| No. Obs. | 352 | 352 | 352 | 352 |
| R² | 0.104 | 0.026 | 0.043 | 0.075 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | -210.86 (261) | 64.14 (128) | -103.66 (133) | 250.38 (356) |
| Psychosocial | -735.40\* (296) | 53.97 (105) | 167.83 (129) | 513.60 (419) |
| Full | -815.94\*\* (271) | 25.75 (102) | -124.30 (109) | 914.49\* (373) |
| No. Obs. | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 |
| R² | 0.104 | 0.045 | 0.031 | 0.054 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | -578.40\* (237) | 50.03 (83.1) | -0.85 (90.6) | 529.21 (310) |
| No. Obs. | 596 | 596 | 596 | 596 |
| R² | 0.094 | 0.045 | 0.013 | 0.047 |
| Control mean @ follow up | 1909 | 216 | 599 | 7356 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 2385 | 658 | 697 | 2841 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | |

### All variables

#### Control over earnings

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | (19) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome***1* | Mins in off-farm business | Mins spent retrieving water | Mins spent cooking | Mins spent agriculture | Mins spent gathering firewood | Mins spent cleaning | Mins studying for Koranic school | Mins spent doing laundry | Mins in livestock | Mins studying for traditional school | Mins spent shopping | Mins spent child care | Mins helping handicapped relatives | Mins spent with friends | Mins spent listening radio | Mins spent resting | Mins studying for traditional school | Mins spent shopping | Mins spent praying |
| Tekavoul |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Cash Assignment | -26.48 (49.5) | 136.81\*\*\* (36.8) | 30.17 (52.5) | 33.26 (38.9) | 52.60 (34.3) | 31.00 (16.4) | 2.31 (16.4) | 40.90\* (18.1) | -5.16 (28.3) | 12.40 (21.1) | 1.24 (29.3) | 313.58 (191) | 15.70 (31.1) | 31.73 (19.2) | 8.82 (14.5) | 62.39 (39.6) | 12.40 (21.1) | 1.24 (29.3) | 9.40 (25.6) |
| No. Obs. | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 |
| R² | 0.027 | 0.082 | 0.100 | 0.022 | 0.111 | 0.050 | 0.045 | 0.064 | 0.044 | 0.058 | 0.044 | 0.095 | 0.049 | 0.084 | 0.079 | 0.040 | 0.058 | 0.044 | 0.030 |
| PI |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Capital | 28.56 (50.4) | -10.12 (58.8) | 10.81 (58.2) | 62.94 (86.0) | 51.59 (47.0) | -4.97 (16.2) | 20.42 (20.6) | 8.69 (24.4) | -27.48 (23.4) | -20.43 (23.0) | 19.44 (35.7) | -244.72 (225) | -44.17\* (21.7) | -61.67\*\* (22.5) | 9.80 (19.1) | -52.72 (90.9) | -20.43 (23.0) | 19.44 (35.7) | -0.73 (30.9) |
| Psychosocial | 32.55 (53.1) | -93.08 (54.0) | -41.58 (70.8) | 60.82 (79.1) | 6.13 (45.6) | -20.94 (19.8) | 22.61 (22.7) | -5.38 (32.8) | -39.24 (26.1) | -32.46 (17.2) | -8.07 (36.9) | -521.02\* (202) | -48.62 (29.9) | 10.36 (27.8) | 17.07 (21.5) | 134.83 (103) | -32.46 (17.2) | -8.07 (36.9) | 17.23 (25.5) |
| Full | 49.12 (72.9) | -120.14\* (48.2) | -39.28 (70.5) | 8.75 (52.0) | -21.39 (43.1) | -21.09 (20.6) | 10.87 (18.1) | -26.30 (28.7) | -27.16 (25.7) | 4.85 (37.8) | -32.83 (29.6) | -485.11\* (217) | -56.91\* (23.8) | -41.08 (26.5) | 18.84 (20.2) | -116.11\* (53.7) | 4.85 (37.8) | -32.83 (29.6) | 2.80 (33.2) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.026 | 0.078 | 0.085 | 0.061 | 0.062 | 0.038 | 0.042 | 0.039 | 0.053 | 0.029 | 0.027 | 0.079 | 0.039 | 0.063 | 0.050 | 0.045 | 0.029 | 0.027 | 0.036 |
| PI (Pool) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Pool | 35.50 (40.6) | -71.83 (43.0) | -23.11 (52.1) | 47.99 (56.2) | 14.47 (32.3) | -15.53 (14.8) | 18.81 (14.8) | -6.03 (22.9) | -32.08 (23.6) | -18.64 (19.3) | -5.14 (24.4) | -417.42\* (196) | -49.26\* (23.9) | -27.60 (23.0) | 15.05 (13.3) | 5.51 (61.5) | -18.64 (19.3) | -5.14 (24.4) | 7.34 (22.9) |
| No. Obs. | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 | 593 |
| R² | 0.026 | 0.068 | 0.083 | 0.059 | 0.058 | 0.037 | 0.042 | 0.036 | 0.052 | 0.025 | 0.024 | 0.074 | 0.039 | 0.046 | 0.050 | 0.018 | 0.025 | 0.024 | 0.035 |
| Control mean @ follow up | 74.5 | 262 | 441 | 88.5 | 175 | 82.8 | 29.5 | 108 | 54.1 | 40.7 | 99.6 | 685 | 65.4 | 112 | 33.7 | 191 | 40.7 | 99.6 | 196 |
| Control SD @ follow up | 400.7 | 388 | 474 | 350.9 | 320 | 148.6 | 134.9 | 177 | 257.6 | 214.8 | 241.0 | 1851 | 301.1 | 194 | 133.0 | 394 | 214.8 | 241.0 | 244 |
| *1*Notes: Results presented are OLS estimates that include controls for randomization strata (commune) and, where possible, baseline outcomes. We control for social promotion intervention. Enumerator fixed effects are included in all regression. We estimate the regressions for the productive beneficiaries aged 18-49 only. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village proxy level. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Abbreviations: CI = Confidence Interval, SE = Standard Error | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |