

BOSTON UNIVERSITY  
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MET CJ 710 01

Professor Choi

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### **Lab Assignment 3-1: mIRC**

Mr. Evil Noodle could infect Curry's computer system within the mIRC chatroom because at this point Curry has granted access somewhat comparable to an open channel or tunnel. The mIRC software essentially opens a port to send and a port to receive data. Since Curry allowed the app download onto his computer it is now vulnerable to hackers, Mr. Evil Noodle can now spam him, send a virus, even hijack his computer. This means he can take control of the entire computer. He can attempt a worm-based DOS attack which could provide a broad-spectrum of damages (Choi, 2015). Moreover, Botnets could be awaiting opportunity to attack Curry's computer. A bot is a malicious application that can be used to control a computer (Module 4, 2021).


A zombie computer, which is a computer that is under the hacker's command executes an attack on the computer, and a Botnet is a group of computers that are controlled by a bot (Module 4). Ultimately these bots are ready to gain access as soon as the computer becomes vulnerable for attack. Once Mr. Evil Noodle has acquired Curry's data, he can share his information over the dark web with other cyber criminals. He can expose personal photographs, his email address, his identity. Basically, anything that he can come across in Curry's device. Mr. Evil Noodle could even install malicious software in the system or pornographic pictures, audio, or videos. In addition, he could find credit


card or bank account information as well. These are only a few examples of what that can happen when a hacker is given direct access to a device.

If Mr. CIC and Mr. Hero investigated the case, first and foremost they would need to find out where the IP address leads them to. They need to find the exact location that the crime was committed so that they can investigate who the device or computer involved in the crime belongs to. After tracing the device to an actual person or company Mr. CIC and Mr. Hero can attain a search warrant to seize items that are involved in the crime. For starters, they need information as a contraband or fruits of the crime, information as an instrument, information as evidence (Choi. 2015). Mr. CIC and Mr. Hero must make sure that they follow the search warrant requirement and that is to respect the Fourth Amendment of the United States which protects the privacy of all citizens unless probable cause is given to move forward with a search warrant. After a search warrant is approved by a judge prior to seizing anything. Once the warrant is granted Mr.CIC and Mr. Hero shall only seize computers that are covered in their search warrant (Choi, 2015). The search warrant application provided to the judge should include all items that MR.CIC and Mr. Hero are looking for to prove their case which could include but are not limited to digital; evidence such as photographs, documents, databases, spreadsheets, financial sheets, financial records, emails, etc. (Choi, 2015). Additionally, devices, hacking tools, MS office, Fox Prodata etc., fingerprints, DNA, Network, ISP, OS, or other usernames or passwords (Choi, 2015). Afterwards, secure the evidence, document the evidence, tag it, bag it, and transport it to the forensic lab (Choi, 2015).

If any person decides to enter mIRC chat that individual would need to be careful what type of information they are sharing and make sure they are not exposing their

computer to the hacker world. If for instance I decided to chat in mIRC I would hide personal information such as my email address that could be exposed to the dark web. I would need to keep all personal information private and not reveal my real identity or my address. I would not exchange any of my personal information with other users also would not click on anything or accept files from other users in the chatroom. In addition, I should not chat on unknown platforms or click on questionable chats such as porn chats or anything that seems illegal, I should not interact in those types of chats. If I were the victim of a hacker, I would secure my device with software such as Norton 360 other Virus scanners. I would be sure that I had a Malware or malicious software removal tool as well. I would be more careful about who I interact with and what types of chats I join. I personally would have no need to use mIRC but if I were a user, I would be more cautious about my activities. I would be making sure I do not continue to make my computer vulnerable for hackers to steal my information or invade my privacy or devices. If need be, I would contact the proper authorities and report crimes, secure my credit report for discrepancies, and report fraudulent charges to my credit cards. I would change all my passwords to my email addresses and other secure websites that need my attention such as my login credentials for school or work.





The above screenshots are a display of the chat app that Curry installed on his computer. Curry accessed the mIRC chat with other users and unknowingly let hackers into his devices when he joined a chatroom and clicked on links provided by other users in the chat. At this point a hacker gained access to his device. mIRC is essentially a platform that anyone can use to share expertise, you for fun like gaming. Unfortunately, hackers also use this app to take advantage of other users who leave their device open for attack.



*From beginning to endpoint.*

# Examination Report

## Case Information

Case Number	001
Case Date	6-6-2017
Examiner Name	BARNES
Examiner I.D. #	CJ-710--01
Agency	BU
Description	Computer Forensic Investigation

## ***Examination Report***

### **Summary of Findings**

This is a complete investigation for a Dell Latitude laptop that was involved in a series of hacking cybercrimes. The owner of the Dell laptop is Greg Schardt is believed to be involved in these crimes as his named is listed under all the evidence provided in this examination report. All evidence links Greg Schardt to the alias name Mr. Evil. Enclosed in this report is the evidence to be used in the case and they are as follows:

- Evidence Dell Latitude Laptop
- A snapshot of Greg Schardt's yahoo email that links both Greg and Mr. Evil as the same person
- A login by a Drwtsn32.log that directly links both Greg Schardt to Mr. Evil.
- 11 installed hacking software programs/ hacking tools
- 2 downloaded multimedia videos about hacking

## Examination Tools

The following tools and equipment were used to process the submitted items of evidence:

## Evidence

Each item was individually inventoried, cataloged and photographed. As part of the cataloging procedures, each submitted item is assigned a unique Bar Code Number (BCN). Additionally, for each piece of Evidence submitted, I created a physical "image" which was then saved to forensically prepared media.

The following devices were examined (for further information, see the enclosed worksheets):

Name	Acquisition MD5	Verification MD5	Evidence Number	Examiner Name
Dell Latitude CPI	aee4fcd9301c03b3b054623ca261959a	aee4fcd9301c03b3b054623ca261959a	1 of 1	

## Registered Owner of Device

These items listed below are cached Microsoft files that display the identity of the owner of the Dell Latitude computer device. It not only demonstrates that the user is Greg Schardt but links the suspect to multiple usernames within the device.

### 1) RegisteredOwner

Item Path                    \$\$PROTO.HIV\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\RegisteredOwner  
 File Created  
 Last Written  
 Last Accessed  
 MD5                        ecd3569cc8603aa6f1ea7e8a1daa9523  
 Start Sector              15,523  
 Sector offset            108  
 File Offset              0  
 Length                    26  
 Comment                    Greg Schardt

### 2) RegisteredOwner

Item Path                    \$\$PROTO.HIV\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\RegisteredOwner  
 File Created  
 Last Written  
 Last Accessed  
 MD5                        ecd3569cc8603aa6f1ea7e8a1daa9523  
 Protected  
 Comment                    Registered user

### 3) drwtsn32.log

Item Path                    Dell Latitude CPI\C\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\Dr Watson\drwtsn32.log  
 File Created              08/20/04 10:25:45 AM  
 Last Written             08/20/04 10:25:48 AM  
 Last Accessed            08/20/04 10:25:48 AM  
 MD5                        1f6aa0e6768d1393861f8c551840309f  
 Start Sector  
 Sector offset  
 File Offset              0

Prepared by: <BARNES> #<CJ-710-01> Initials: KB Date of Report: 6-6-2017  
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Length 706  
Comment Registered Owner Gred is Mr. Evil and Dr.Watsn32

Microsoft (R) DrWtsn32  
Copyright (C) 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp. All rights reserved.

```
Application exception occurred:  
    App: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe (pid=1140)  
    When: 8/20/2004 @ 10:25:46.165  
    Exception number: c0000005 (access violation)  
  
*----> System Information <----*  
    Computer Name: N-1A9ODN6ZXK4LQ  
    User Name: Mr. Evil  
    Terminal Session Id: 0  
    Number of Processors: 1  
    Processor Type: x86 Family 6 Model 6 Stepping 10  
    Windows Version: 5.1  
    Current Build: 2600  
    Service Pack: None  
    Current Type: Uniprocessor Free  
    Registered Organization: N/A  
    Registered Owner: Greg Schardt
```

## Email Evidence

The screenshot shows the EnCase Evidence viewer interface. The main pane displays an email message with the subject line "id\_check?.fn=Greg&.ln=Schardt&.id=mrevil2000&.u=b568cfp0ic6g0 URL". Below the message content, there is a copy of the system information from the previous dump. The right side of the interface includes a toolbar, a find function, and a conditions panel with sections for Default and User.

```
13 id_check?.fn=Greg&.ln=Schardt&.id=mrevil2000&.u=b568cfp0ic6g0 URL  
  
11  
12*----> System Information <----*  
13    Computer Name: N-1A9ODN6ZXK4LQ  
14    User Name: Mr. Evil  
15    Terminal Session Id: 0  
16    Number of Processors: 1  
17    Processor Type: x86 Family 6 Model 6 Stepping 10  
18    Windows Version: 5.1  
19    Current Build: 2600  
20    Service Pack: None  
21    Current Type: Uniprocessor Free  
22    Registered Organization: N/A  
23    Registered Owner: Greg Schardt  
24
```

EmailEvidence\EmailEvidence\Email\Inbox\id\_check?.fn=Greg&.ln=Schardt&.id=mrevil2000&.u=b568cfp0ic6g0 URL

The email snapshots provided demonstrate that the alias Mr. Evil belong to Greg Schardt.

## Internet Artifacts

The following artifacts were found in the Internet Explorer Cache.

View Pane

Fields Report Lock

100%

*Fields*

Internet Artifact Cache

Type

Url Name http://us.rd.yahoo.com/reg/id\_helper/us/launch/\*http://edit.yahoo.com/  
Greg&.ln=Schardt&.id=mrevil2000&.u=b568cfp0ic6g0

*Transcript*

3 id\_check?.fn=Greg&.ln=Schardt&.id=mrevil2000&.u=b568cfp0ic6g0

This cache displays the registered user of a yahoo account (Greg Schardt) which is listed in email evidence as mrevilrulez@yahoo.com. The user Greg Schardt and alias Mr. Evil are the same person.

View Pane

Fields Report Lock

100%

*Fields*

Name software

*Transcript*

45250 n n ~ \$ n N/A n n Greg  
48885 Powertoy ~ ~ Greg Schardt  
50019 Windows XP 0 SYSTEM Greg Schardt 2600 5.1 2600.xpclient.010817-  
52420 ~~~~~~|~ ~|| Greg Schardt

This snapshot is a transcript of illegal hacker software also found in cache.

The screenshot shows a software interface with a menu bar at the top containing 'Fields', 'Report', 'Text', 'Hex', 'Decode', 'Doc', and various icons. Below the menu is a toolbar with icons for 'Find', 'Compressed View', and other functions. The main area displays a transcript of URLs from a cache, numbered 1 through 14. The transcript includes URLs for msn.com, www.wardriving.com, www.netstumbler.com, www.ethereal.com, and mirror.sg.depaul.edu.

```

1 Client UrlCache MMF Ver 5.2 HASH G@+ @>D ?$ @1 D; I' URL 0U 61\} 1\
2 :2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@http://www.msn.com URL 1'y:2004082720040828: Mr.
3 Evil@:Host: www.msn.com URL PW P_61Gx 1,y:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@http://
4 www.wardriving.com URL PW P_1,y:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@:Host:
5 www.wardriving.com URL w~ 61Jx 1.y:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@http://
6 www.wardriving.com/setup.php URL ?4 G
7 61Kx 10y:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@http://www.wardriving.com/code.php URL
8 61Wx 1<y:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@http://www.netstumbler.com URL
9 1<y:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@:Host: www.netstumbler.com URL
10 @e @m 61Zx 1Ay:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@http://www.netstumbler.com/downloads URL
11 8!
12 H 61Zy 1Zy:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@http://www.ethereal.com URL 8!
13 H 1Zy:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@:Host: www.ethereal.com URL @n
14 HD 61Cy 1(z:2004082720040828: Mr. Evil@ftp://mirror.sg.depaul.edu/pub/security URL

```

The above snapshot demonstrates a transcript from software programs installed used for hacking tools. The software listed is Ethereal, net stumbler mirroring, and wardriving set up. These programs are all illegal hacker software tools. These items were saved into the cache from previously installed software.

The screenshot shows a software interface with a left sidebar displaying a file tree for 'Mr. Evil' including 'All Users', 'Default User', 'LocalService', and 'Mr. Evil' with sub-folders like 'Application Data', 'Cookies', 'Desktop', etc. To the right is a table view showing a list of files under 'Selected 0/12192'. The table has columns for Name, Re, Fo, Ig, In, File Ext, and Logical Size. The 'Name' column lists files such as 'mr.evil@advertising[2].txt', 'mr.evil@atwola[2].txt', etc., with file sizes ranging from 92 to 288 bytes.

	Name	Re	Fo	Ig	In	File Ext	Logical Size
4	mr.evil@advertising[2].txt					txt	270
5	mr.evil@atwola[2].txt					txt	97
6	mr.evil@www.cnn[1].txt					txt	84
7	mr.evil@cnn[1].txt					txt	92
8	mr.evil@google[1].txt					txt	131
9	mr.evil@revenue[2].txt					txt	201
10	mr.evil@doubleclick[1].txt					txt	95
11	mr.evil@yahoo[1].txt					txt	288

This photo displays cookies which are essentially a memory for the internet. Cookies remember websites that are visited frequently over the web.

## [Subscribed Hacker websites]

Prepared by: <BARNEs> #<CJ-710-01>Initials: KB

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**elitehackers[1]**

Item Path Internet Explorer (Windows)\Cache\HTML\elitehackers[1]  
 File Created  
 Last Written  
 Last Accessed  
 MD5 526e61cda18e658965439ef7392fe530  
 Start Sector  
 Sector offset  
 File Offset 0  
 Length 203  
 Comment hacker website  
 Night Wolf  
 -= E L I T E H A C K E R S . C O M =-

<http://www.t50.com/cgi-bin/topvlog.cgi?897731691>

<http://www.blackcode.com/top50/gateway.php?id=1646>

<http://www.progenic.com/vote/?id=elitehackers>

Evidence   Indexed Items						
View: Dell Latitude CPi						
Selected 28/12/191						
	Name	Re	Re	Fd	Ig	In
		File	Ext	Logical	Size	Category
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	2 #evilfork.EFnet.log			log	335	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3 #LuxShell.UnderNet.log			log	589	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	4 #mp3xserv.UnderNet.log			log	1,283	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	5 #ushells.UnderNet.log			log	284	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	6 #Elite.Hackers.UnderNet.log			log	464	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	7 #houston.UnderNet.log			log	265	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	8 #Chataholics.UnderNet.log			log	688	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	9 #CyberCafe.UnderNet.log			log	9,373	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	10 mStar.UnderNet.log			log	285	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	11 #thedarktower.AfterNET.log			log	578	Document
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12 #funny.UnderNet.log			log	263	Document

In the above snapshot these are Greg Schardt's logs of hacker chats that he is subscribed to.

## Examination

### Installed Hacking Software

ALL ITEMS LISTED BELOW CAN BE FOUND IN PROGRAMS FILES OF THE DELL LATITUDE COMPUTER.

#### 1) 123WASP


Item Path Dell Latitude CPi\C\Program Files\123WASP

Prepared by: <BARNE> #<CJ-710-01>Initials: KB Date of Report: 6-6-2017  
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File Created 08/20/04 10:13:08 AM  
Last Written 08/20/04 10:13:12 AM  
Last Accessed 08/27/04 10:14:44 AM  
MD5 6a78648419df8db554adada318a30612  
Protected  
Comment wasp123

View Pane

Fields Report Text Hex Decode Doc

Find Compressed View Fit To Page

1 Thank you for your interest in  
2 \*\*\* Write All Stored Passwords (WASP), Version 2.01 \*\*\*  
3 for Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows ME (not: Windows NT / 2000)  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9 1. Purpose: WASP will display all passwords of the currently logged on user that  
D are stored in the Microsoft PWL file. It allows the convenient deletion of this  
1 file to improve the security / privacy of your PC. It is also very useful for  
2 educational purposes about computer security.  
3  
4 2. This SOFTWARE is copyrighted FREEWARE. Please feel free to use it, copy it,  
5 upload it to software archives or put it on CD-ROMs but do not change the  
6 files included in the package and only distribute the package as a whole,  
7 not only the single executable. For details please see the included  
8 "license.txt" file.  
9  
10 To UNINSTALL the software use the standard Windows add/remove programs utility.

```

0000 Thank you for your interest in *** Write All Stored Passwords (WASP), Version 2.01 ***
0091   for Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows ME (not: Windows NT / 2000) -----
0182 ----- 1. Purpose: WASP will display all passwords
0273 of the currently logged on user that are stored in the Microsoft PWL file. It allows the c
0364 onvenient deletion of this file to improve the security / privacy of your PC. It is also
0455 very useful for educational purposes about computer security. 2. This SOFTWARE is copy
0546 righted FREEWARE. Please feel free to use it, copy it, upload it to software archives or
0637 put it on CD-ROMs but do not change the files included in the package and only distribute
0728 the package as a whole, not only the single executable. For details please see the inclu
0819 ded "license.txt" file. 3. To UNINSTALL the software, use the standard Windows add/rem
0910 ove functionality. 4. If you want to transfer the software to another PC, you can in mos
1001t cases simply copy the "007wasp.exe" file. If this results in an error at program start
1092 some important DLL's are missing and you have to do a complete install using this package
1183 . ****
1274 ou want to be notified about new IOPUS software, bugfixes or updates * * we recommend that
1365 you join our NEWSLETTER mailing list: * * To subscribe simply send an em
1456 ail to IOPUS-SUBSCRIBE@LISTBOT.COM * * or visit our website http://www.iopus.com t
1547 o subscribe online. * ****
1638 ***** => Visit http://www.iopus.com for up-to-date news => Questions ? Sug
1729 gestions ? Our email is: SUPPORT@IOPUS.COM => See HISTORY.TXT for the list of changes si
1820 nce the first release --- English, German and Chinese spoken. Wir sprechen Deutsc
1911 h. Women shuo hanyu. --- Released: 2001-06-15 ....
2002 ....

```

## 2) README.txt

Item Path	Dell Latitude CPI\C\Program Files\123WASP\README.txt
File Created	08/20/04 10:13:08 AM
Last Written	06/13/01 02:33:28 PM
Last Accessed	08/20/04 10:13:08 AM
MD5	cea129eb7f2ca894011c162d847ecd2e
Start Sector	
Sector offset	
File Offset	220
Length	288
Comment	Wasp Software

1. Purpose: WASP will display all passwords of the currently  
logged on user  
that  
are stored in the Microsoft PWL file. It allows the  
convenient deletion of this  
  
file to improve the security / privacy of your PC. It is  
also very useful for  
educational purposes about computer security.

## 3) Cain

Item Path	Dell Latitude CPI\C\Program Files\Cain
File Created	08/20/04 10:05:58 AM
Last Written	08/25/04 11:20:19 AM
Last Accessed	08/27/04 10:14:45 AM
MD5	4b463522elf3c186f9a1d87fffab99ce

Prepared by: <BARNE> #<CJ-710-01>Initials: KB Date of Report: 6-6-2017

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Protected  
Comment

#### 4) Cain v2.5.lnk

Item Path Dell Latitude CPi\Documents and Settings\Mr. Evil\Desktop\Tools\Cain v2.5.lnk  
 File Created 08/20/04 10:06:01 AM  
 Last Written 08/20/04 10:06:01 AM  
 Last Accessed 08/27/04 10:34:52 AM  
 MD5 61aa7bac7db3da50b0ee53da442d6d64  
 Start Sector 389,093  
 Sector offset 261  
 File Offset 261  
 Length 331  
 Comment Cain hacker software

```
Cain.exe ( iAx Cain.exe M - L
>±1 C:\Program Files\Cain\Cain.exe Cain v2.5 $... \ Program
  a m Files \ Cain \ Cain.exe C: \ Program Files \ Cain
  C: \ Program Files \ Cain \ Cain.exe
```

100%	
Name	Cain.exe
File Ext	exe
Logical Size	2,064,384
Category	Executable
Signature Analysis	Match
File Type	Windows Executable
Last Accessed	08/27/04 10:33:07 AM
File Created	08/20/04 10:05:58 AM
Last Written	12/12/03 09:32:04 PM
Is Indexed	.
MD5	6767c8db317f2517dea73a00e00f0638
SHA1	aecc4695facbf7569c5a8dc49815264c1d81f6e
Item Path	Dell Latitude CPi\Program Files\Cain\Cain.exe
True Path	EmailEvidence\Dell Latitude CPi\Program Files\Cain\Cain.exe
Description	File, Archive
Entry Modified	08/27/04 10:33:01 AM
File Acquired	09/22/04 09:06:04 AM
Initialized Size	2,064,384
Physical Size	2,064,384
Starting Extent	0C-C5151421
File Extents	1
Permissions	.
Physical Location	2,637,559,808
Physical Sector	5 151 484

#### 5) Faber Toys.lnk

Item Path Dell Latitude CPi\Documents and Settings\Mr. Evil\Desktop\Tools\Faber Toys.lnk  
 File Created 08/20/04 10:07:24 AM  
 Last Written 08/20/04 10:07:24 AM  
 Last Accessed 08/25/04 10:27:30 AM  
 MD5 65dfc6bcfa5f304166333d6d5f2a1886

Prepared by: <BARNES> #<CJ-710-01>Initials: KB Date of Report: 6-6-2017

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Start Sector 686,555  
 Sector offset 379  
 File Offset 379  
 Length 330  
 Comment Fabor Toys Hacker Software

```
>±1 C:\Program Files\Faber Toys\Faber Toys.exe 0 . . \ . . \ P r o g r a m
F i l e s \ F a b e r T o y s \ F a b e r T o y s . e x e C : \ P r o g r a m F
i l e s \ F a b e r T o y s & w X n-1a9odn6zxk4lq f%MvçÍá@ %f
<ù %ôžôS°òò °ù " > f%MvçÍá@ %f<ù %ôžôS°òò °ù ">
```

0000 Faber Toys 2.4 Build 216 Copyright © 2000-2002 Fabio Vescarelli http://www.faberbox.com/f  
 0091 abertoys.asp  
 0182 ----- Table Of Contents (TOC) 1. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 2. FEATURES 3. HISTORY  
 0273 -----  
 0364 1. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS \* PC running Windows '95, '98, ME, NT 4, 2000, XP (no Win 3.  
 0455 1) \* 16 Mb of RAM (32 or more suggested) \* Visual Basic 6 Runtime (installed by t  
 0546 he full setup program) \* MSCOMCTL.OCX (installed by the full setup program)  
 0637 Technical note: the runtime installed is the Service Pack 5 one 2. FEATURES \* FP  
 0728 L Technology (Fast Properties Load) (all features are available under the 'Tools' m  
 0819 enu) \* Management of programs running when Windows start --> AutoRun \* Complete  
 0910 Process & Modules management --> Dependencies \* Analysis of PE Modules, listing expor  
 1001 ted and imported functions (e.g. from/to a DLL file) --> Examine File \* Export  
 1092 of informations in TXT or HTML files --> Save menu \* Windows Management --> Windows Ex  
 1183 plorer \* Management of system Aliases --> Program Aliases (e.g. if you type iex  
 1274 plore or msimm in Start - Run) 3. HISTORY ----- + Ne  
 1365 w Features ! Improvements # Bug Corrections -----  
 1456 Faber Toys 2.4 Build 216 [ AutoRun ] + Win.ini (load & run) support  
 1547 + HKLM\_RunOnce and HKCU\_RunOnce key support + HKLM\_RunServicesOnce support  
 1638 + HKLM\_InstComp key support + Modified date for several startup items  
 1729 + New "Run Now" menu item + New "Select process in Dependencies" menu item  
 1820 ! Added complete path as ToolTip for Origin column ! Items are now sear  
 1911 ched also in System Aliases, as Windows does # Files in Common Startup directory  
 2002 wasn't showed in 9X systems # 'Go To...' function didn't work if registry path c

## 6) Ethereal.Ink

Item Path Dell Latitude CPi\Documents and Settings\Mr. Evil\Desktop\Tools\Ethereal.Ink  
 File Created 08/27/04 10:29:44 AM  
 Last Written 08/27/04 10:29:44 AM  
 Last Accessed 08/27/04 10:34:54 AM  
 MD5 9a5f7343c4660695f9a3aba02bcc41ba  
 Start Sector 2,123,208  
 Sector offset 168  
 File Offset 384  
 Length 202  
 Comment Ethereal Hacker Software

```
C:\Program Files\Ethereal\ethereal.exe , . . \ . . \ P r o g r a m F i l e s \ E
t h e r e a l \ e t h e r e a l . e x e " C : \ D o c u m e n t s a n d S e t i n g
s \ M r . E v i l "
```

View Pane

Fields Report Text Hex Decode Doc Compressed View

Find | Compressed View

```

4 -----
5
6 Ethereal is a network traffic analyzer, or "sniffer", for Unix and
7 Unix-like operating systems. It uses GTK+, a graphical user interface
8 library, and libpcap, a packet capture and filtering library.
9
10 The Ethereal distribution also comes with Tethereal, which is a
11 line-oriented sniffer (similar to Sun's snoop, or tcpdump) that uses the
12 same dissection, capture-file reading and writing, and packet filtering
13 code as Ethereal, and with editcap, which is a program to read capture
14 files and write the packets from that capture file, possibly in a
15 different capture file format, and with some packets possibly removed
16 from the capture.
17
18 The official home of Ethereal is
19
20 http://www.ethereal.com
21
22 The latest distribution can be found in the subdirectory
23
24 http://www.ethereal.com/distribution

```

## 7) Network Stumbler

Item Path Dell Latitude CPi\Program Files\Network Stumbler  
 File Created 08/27/04 10:12:15 AM  
 Last Written 08/27/04 10:12:16 AM  
 Last Accessed 08/27/04 10:14:45 AM  
 MD5 e0a166447fc10c4102fa78430147916

Protected

Comment

Network Stumbler
 

- Online Services
- Outlook Express
- PLUS!
- Uninstall Information
- Whois
- Windows Media Player
- Windows NT
- WindowsUpdate
- WinPcap
- xerox
- RECYCLER
- System Volume Information
- Temp
- WIN98
- WINDOWS

Fields Report Text Hex Decode

Find | Compressed View

1	NetStumbler.exe
2	netstumbler.chm
3	uninst.exe
4	ns-signal-0.wav
5	ns-signal-1.wav
6	ns-signal-2.wav
7	ns-signal-3.wav
8	ns-signal-4.wav
9	ns-signal-5.wav
10	ns-signal-6.wav
11	ns-aos-new.wav

1  
2  
311025  
4  
52002-04-11  
6Marius Milner  
7Sonic Foundry Sound Forge 5.0  
8  
9

wav 15,66

## 8) README.DOC

Item Path Dell Latitude CPi\My Documents\ARCHIVE\Pkzip\README.DOC

Prepared by: <BARNE> #<CJ-710-01> Initials: KB Date of Report: 6-6-2017

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File Created 08/20/04 10:18:09 AM  
Last Written 02/01/93 11:04:16 PM  
Last Accessed 08/20/04 10:18:09 AM  
MD5 a582843d97d6b40cdd1cd64f1c1491f2  
Start Sector  
Sector offset  
File Offset 2  
Length 709  
Comment hacker software

This diskette contains the file PKZ204g.EXE. Type

PKZ204g

followed by pressing the Enter key to create the program and documentation files for PKUNZIP, PKZIP, and PKSFX version 2.04g  
To print the documentation files after running PKZ204g, type

COPY \*.DOC PRN  
COPY \*.NEW PRN  
COPY \*.204 PRN  
COPY \*.TXT PRN

following each line by the return key.

See the files V204G.NEW, WHATSNEW.204 and ADDENDUM.DOC for more information about features and changes made in this version of the software.

If you distribute PKUNZIP, PKZIP, and PKSFX to friends, associates, or to a computer bulletin board system (BBS), please distribute the file PKZ204g.EXE rather than the individual files for PKUNZIP, PKZIP and PKSFX.

## 9) SHAREWAR.DOC

Item Path Dell Latitude CPi\My Documents\ARCHIVE\Pkzip\SHAREWAR.DOC  
File Created 08/20/04 10:18:09 AM  
Last Written 02/01/93 11:04:16 PM  
Last Accessed 08/20/04 10:18:09 AM  
MD5 c5b0569e869325a1d7f798b17dde8e41  
Start Sector  
Sector offset  
File Offset 0  
Length 444  
Comment shareware

### BENEFITS OF REGISTRATION

---

PKZIP is Shareware, and if you use PKZIP regularly we strongly encourage you to register it. With registration you will receive the latest version of the software, a comprehensive printed manual, one free upgrade of PKZIP, PKUNZIP & PKSFX, premium access to the PKWARE Support BBS and an optional Authenticity Verification Name and Serial Number.

The screenshot shows a digital forensic analysis interface. At the top, there's a toolbar with various icons for file operations like 'Fields', 'Report', 'Text', 'Hex', 'Decode', 'Doc', etc. Below the toolbar, there's a menu bar with 'Options', 'Codepage', 'Text Style', 'Find', and 'Compressed View'. The main area contains two panes. The top pane displays a large block of text, which appears to be the contents of a file named 'very-big-dict'. The bottom pane displays detailed file metadata for the same file, including Name, Logical Size, Category, Signature, Analysis, Is Indexed, MD5, SHA1, Item Path, True Path, Description, Entry Modified, Initialized Size, and Physical Size. The file's name is listed as 'very-big-dict' in both panes.

Name	very-big-dict
Logical Size	14,875,874
Category	Unknown
Signature	Unknown
Analysis	
Is Indexed	.
MD5	366d13b9090543d3b25562bcce5c4a70
SHA1	4d13450df6869428e0efe84874b1b1a1aca8731d
Item Path	Unix_hack\usr\hack\tools\passwd_crackers\very-big-dict
True Path	EmailEvidence\DELL Latitude CPiC\My Documents\FOOTPRINTING\UNIX\unix_hack.tgz\unix_hack\Unix_hack\usr\hack\tools\passwd_crackers\very-big-dict
Description	File
Entry Modified	11/16/98 02:46:42 PM
Initialized Size	14,875,874
Physical Size	14,875,874

The screenshot shows a digital forensics tool interface with two main panes. The top pane displays a file named 'pan\_com.h' with the following content:

```
1 pandora-linux/pandora/pan_com.h
2 991
3 4/3/99 9:39 PM
4 root
5 system
6 ****
7 *
8 * Project Pandora Password NCP and IPX Functions
9 ****
10
11 #ifndef PAN_NCPIPX_H
12 #define PAN_NCPIPX_H
13
14 #include "pan_glob.h"
```

The bottom pane shows a file list table:

	Name	Size	Category	Analysis
1	MSSQL	704	Folder	Unknown
2	PhoneSweep	304	Folder	Unknown
3	ToneLoc.zip	324,812	Archive	Match

The bottom pane also contains a hex editor view of the 'ToneLoc.zip' file, showing the beginning of the file structure.

The phoneSweep program is a hacker tool that can steal all data from a cell phone device. This application was found under programs files stored in the computer

The multimedia snapshots below are video files that can be retrieved through the user's personal files such as downloaded video content or personal folders such as images. Specifically, these files were found in images and the link is Windows media wma.

## Multimedia Content

Report	
Fields	Text
Hex	Decode
Doc	Transcript
100%	
Category	Multimedia
Signature Analysis	Match
File Type	Windows Media (ASF compression)
File Type Tag	asf1
Last Accessed	08/19/04 06:03:56 PM
File Created	08/19/04 05:30:09 PM
Last Written	08/23/01 01:00:00 PM
MD5	c6bdf7f703f0fc47df6485467b6fd069
SHA1	2d9f21dda227ce4b57c11bcee2802f27c2beb125
Primary Device	Dell Latitude CPi
Item Path	Dell Latitude CPi\c\windows\system32\oobe\images\title.wma
Entry Modified	08/19/04 06:30:10 PM
True Path	Dell Latitude CPi\c\windows\system32\oobe\images\title.wma
Description	File, Archive

---

Prepared by: <BARNES> #<CJ-710-01> Initials: KB Date of Report: 6-6-2017

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The screenshot shows a software interface for file analysis. At the top, there's a menu bar with tabs: Fields (selected), Report, Text, Hex, Decode, Doc, and Trans. Below the menu is a search bar with a magnifying glass icon and the text '100%'. There are also icons for file operations like copy, paste, and delete.

Name	title.wma
File Ext	wma
Logical Size	2,624,518
Item Type	Entry
Category	Multimedia
Signature Analysis	Match
File Type	Windows Media (ASF compression)
File Type Tag	asf1
Last Accessed	08/19/04 06:03:56 PM
File Created	08/19/04 05:30:09 PM
Last Written	08/23/01 01:00:00 PM
MD5	c6bd7f703f0fc47df6485467b6fd069
SHA1	2d9f21dda227ce4b57c11bcee2802f27c2beb125
Primary Device	Dell Latitude CPi
Item Path	Dell Latitude CPi\C\WINDOWS\system32\oobe\images\title.wma
Entry Modified	08/19/04 06:30:10 PM
True Path	Dell Latitude CPi\C\WINDOWS\system32\oobe\images\title.wma
Description	File, Archive

---

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## References

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<https://onlinecampus.bu.edu.>