

Leaky Estimator, light version (DBDD_predict), general (non-smooth) case for modular hints with $k=q$

PV Regev Encrypt

d	1024
$t=d/3$	341
D-t	683
$D_s = D_e$	{-1: 0.33, 0: 0.34, 1: 0.33}
q (prime, $q=1\%2n$)	12289
Key Recovery Attack (bikz)	171,86
bits of quantum security (*0,265)	45
Randomness Recovery Attack (bikz)	476,45
bits of quantum security (*0,265)	126
Plaintext Recovery Using Hints Attack (bikz)	433,18
bits of quantum security (*0,265)	114
min of atacks	45

d	256	512	1024	2048
$t=d/2$	128	256	512	1024
D-t	128	256	512	1024
$D_s = D_e$	{-1: 0.33, 0: 0.34, 1: 0.33}	{-1: 0.33, 0: 0.34, 1: 0.33}	{-1: 0.33, 0: 0.34, 1: 0.33}	{-1: 0.33, 0: 0.34, 1: 0.33}
q (prime, $q=1\%2d$)	7681	12289	12289	12289
Key Recovery Attack (bikz)	15,76	110,99	299,64	711,06
bits of quantum security (*0,265)	4	29	79	188
Randomness Recovery Attack (bikz)	16,94	111,1	299,64	711,06
bits of quantum security (*0,265)	4	29	79	188
Plaintext Recovery Using Hints Attack (bikz)	15,76	110,99	299,64	711,06
bits of quantum security (*0,265)	4	29	79	188
min of atacks	4	29	79	188

d	1024
$t=2d/3$	682
D-t	342
$D_s = D_e$	{-1: 0.33, 0: 0.34, 1: 0.33}
q (prime, $q=1\%2d$)	12289
Key Recovery Attack (bikz)	432,39
bits of quantum security (*0,265)	114
Randomness Recovery Attack (bikz)	172,59
bits of quantum security (*0,265)	45
Plaintext Recovery Using Hints Attack (bikz)	172,59
bits of quantum security (*0,265)	45
min of atacks	45