## Appendix "Estimating Effect of Tax Incentives on Donations Considering Self-Selection of Tax Incentives in South Korea"

Hiroki Kato  $^{\dagger}$  Tsuyoshi Goto  $^{\ddagger}$  Youngrok Kim  $^{\S}$  2022/04/18

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
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## A Additional Tables and Figures

<sup>†</sup>Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Japan. E-mail: vge008kh@stundent.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>‡</sup>Graduate School of Social Sciences, Chiba University, Japan. E-mail: t.goto@chiba-u.jp

<sup>§</sup>Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Japan.



The difference is calculated by (proportion of donors in year t) - (proportion of donors in 2013).

Figure 1: Average Logged Giving by Three Income Groups Conditional on Donors. Notes: We created three income groups, with the relative price of giving rising (circle), unchanged (triangle), and falling (square) between 2013 and 2014. The group averages are normalized to be zero in 2013.




Figure 2: Proportion of Donors by Three Income Groups. Notes: We created three income groups, with the relative price of giving rising (circle), unchanged (triangle), and falling (square) between 2013 and 2014. The group averages are normalized to be zero in 2013.




Figure 3: Estimated Distribution of Charitable Giving among Donors in Each Year




Figure 4: Share of Tax Relief by Wage Earners Conditional on Donors. Notes: A solid line is the share of applying for tax relief among wage earners. A dashed line is the share of applying for tax relief other than wage earners.