

Estimate Elasticities among Claimants

Results: First-Price Elasticity


Table 1: Intensive-Margin Price Elasticity among Claimants

	Log donation
	FE
	(1)
Applicable price (β_a)	-1.147**
	(0.506)
Log income	-1.221
	(2.213)
Num.Obs.	4171

Results: Last-Price Elasticity

Table 2: Intensive-Margin Last-Price Elasticity among Claimants

	Log donation		
	FE	FE-2SLS	
	(1)	(2)	
Applicable last-price	-0.961* (0.517)	-1.197** (0.531)	
Log income	-1.108 (2.213)	-1.269 (2.214)	
1st stage information (Excluded F-statistics of instrument Wu-Hausman test, p-value Num.Obs.	l instrument: Ap	oplicable price) 40 585.827 0.019 4171	



Use 2012 and 2015 data: First-Stage

Table 3: First-Stage Models

	Effective price			
	Donors (Intensive-margin)	Donors and Non-donors (Extensive-margin)		
	(1)	(2)		
Excluded instruments				
Applicable price	0.739***	0.301***		
	(0.110)	(0.052)		
Covariates				
Log income	-0.229	-0.026		
	(0.529)	(0.190)		
Num.Obs.	2004	7671		
RMSE	0.02	0.03		

Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. An outcome variable is logged value of the effective price. For estimation, model (1) use donors only (intensive-margin sample), and model (2) use not only donors but also non-donors (extensive-margin sample). In addition to logged income and wage earner dummy shown in table, covariates consist of squared age (divided by 100), number of household members, a dummy that indicates having dependents, a set of dummies of industry a set of dummies of residential area, and individual and time fixed effects. Excluded instrument is a logged applicable price.

Use 2012 and 2015 data: Second-Stage

Table 4: Estimation Results of Price Elasticities

	Log donation			Dummy of donor			
	F	Έ	2) FE-2SLS (3)	FE		FE-2SLS	
	(1)	(2)		(4)	(5)	(6)	
Applicable price (eta_a)	-1.275 (1.276)			-0.326* (0.190)			
Effective price (eta_e^{FE})	(-1.129 (1.601)		(-2.757*** (0.225)		
Effective price (eta_e^{IV})		(11)	-1.725 (1.754)		(3 3)	-1.084* (0.574)	
Log income	-3.555 (10.491)	-3.777 (10.312)	-3.951 (10.299)	2.062** (0.838)	1.550** (0.725)	2.034*** (0.761)	
Implied price elasticity							
Estimate				$-1.388* \\ (0.808)$	-11.734*** (0.958)	* -4.612^* (2.443)	
1st stage information (Exclude	ed instrument: A	pplicable price)					
F-statistics of instrument Wu-Hausman test, p-value			288.802			282.264	
Num.Obs.	2004	2004	2004	7671	7671	7671	

Notes: * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. An outcome variable is logged value of the effective price. For estimation, model (1) use donors only (intensive-margin sample), and model

Bracket-Shifting

```
## # A tibble: 8 x 4
##
                            var shift
      year
                    mu
##
     <dbl>
                 <dbl>
                          <dbl> <int>
## 1
      2010 NaN
                       NA
## 2
      2011
            -0.00197
                        0.00195
                                   573
## 3
      2012
            -0.00237
                        0.00207
                                   644
## 4
      2013
            -0.000662
                        0.00202
                                   642
## 5
      2014
            0.00143
                        0.00508
                                  1727
## 6
      2015
                                     0
      2016
## 7
      2017
## 8
                                     0
```

Remove Bracket-Shifting Sample in 2011–2013

Table 5: First-Stage Models

	Effective price			
	Donors (Intensive-margin)	Donors and Non-donors (Extensive-margin)		
	(1)	(2)		
Excluded instruments				
Applicable price	0.702***	0.305***		
	(0.051)	(0.025)		
Covariates				
Log income	-0.262	-0.167***		
	(0.168)	(0.049)		
Num.Obs.	6555	25 694		
RMSE	0.04	0.04		

Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. An outcome variable is logged value of the effective price. For estimation, model (1) use donors only (intensive-margin sample), and model (2) use not only donors but also non-donors (extensive-margin sample). In addition to logged income and wage earner dummy shown in table, covariates consist of squared age (divided by 100), number of household members, a dummy that indicates having dependents, a set of dummies of industry a set of dummies of residential area, and individual and time fixed effects. Excluded instrument is a logged applicable price.

Remove Bracket-Shifting Sample in 2011–2013

Table 6: Estimation Results of Price Elasticities

	Log donation			Dummy of donor			
	FE		FE-2SLS	FE		FE-2SLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Applicable price (β_a)	-1.217*** (0.443)			-0.216*** (0.079)			
Effective price (eta_e^{FE})	, ,	-0.830*** (0.312)		, ,	-2.935*** (0.090)		
Effective price (eta_e^{IV})		(,	-1.735*** (0.633)		(* ****,	-0.710*** (0.241)	
Log income	1.030 (1.508)	0.928 (1.484)	0.576 (1.514)	1.653*** (0.246)	0.879*** (0.240)	1.534*** (0.237)	
Implied price elasticity							
Estimate				-0.938*** (0.344)	-12.727*** (0.390)	-3.080*** (1.045)	
1st stage information (Excluder F-statistics of instrument	d instrument: Ap	pplicable price)	896.756			1299.783	
Wu-Hausman test, p-value Num.Obs.	6555	6555	$0.033 \\ 6555$	25694	25694	$< 0.001 \\ 25694$	

Notes: * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. An outcome variable is logged value of the effective price. For estimation, model (1) use donors only (intensive-margin sample), and model