Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts

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Since the end of the cold war, foreign policy makers appear to be devoting increasing amounts of energy to containing intrastate conflicts. They are doing so, moreover, with little guidance from the social science community. This article uses data on all third-party interventions into intrastate conflicts since 1944 to assess historical patterns of intervention strategies and their relative success rates. Building on this, it uses a logit analysis to develop prescriptive outlines for future intervention attempts. The results demonstrate that it is the characteristics of the intervention strategy rather than the characteristics of the conflict that largely determine the success of the intervention.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the cold war, many foreign policy decision makers are faced with decisions over whether, when, and how to intervene in intrastate conflicts (e.g., Gurr, 1994). Efforts to contain these new threats to stability are becoming increasingly salient at a time when we know little about the conditions under which successful intervention is most likely. This increased salience of intrastate conflict has spawned a plethora of studies on the causes of, consequences from, and strategies for managing intrastate conflict, and of prescriptive essays on how third parties might successfully intervene to bring an end to the hostilities (e.g., Licklider 1993; Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985; Gurr and Harff 1994; Midlarsky 1992; Gottlieb 1993; Boutros-Ghali 1992; Damrosch 1993). Few studies, however, have systematically examined questions of whether to intervene and how best to carry out intervention in an effort to further foreign policy goals. Understanding the conditions under which interventions are likely to be successful might lessen the trauma of dealing with this new international environment.

For example, between 1987 and 1992 there was a fourfold increase in the use of United Nations peacekeeping forces in intrastate conflicts around the globe. According to Gurr (1994, 350), there was a total of 70 ethnopolitical groups involved in serious conflict during 1993 and 1994. A look at some of the more glaring examples of third-party interventions, such as in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, the former Soviet republics, and Cambodia, gives a sense of both the magnitude of the intervention efforts and

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the success that these forces have had. In spite of numerous attempts by third parties to bring a halt to intrastate fighting, we know surprisingly little about the conditions under which, and the types of interventions that are most likely to be successful.

This essay will address these questions in a manner that should (a) give a better understanding of the role and effect of strategies of internation influence attempts and (b) develop a blueprint for policy makers grappling with questions of when, whether, and how to intervene successfully in civil conflicts. Procedurally, I will use data generated for all intrastate conflicts and any associated third-party interventions in the post-WWII period to develop a comprehensive picture of the scope of intrastate conflict, the strategies used by interveners, and the relative success of the latter in bringing an end to the hostilities in the former. After describing the data, I will articulate and test a theoretical model that should account for the conditions under which third-party intervention will be successful.

At the outset, a distinction about the theoretical enquiry and research strategy should be made clear. Some scholars have begun examining the nature of ethnically based conflict to identify the conditions under which third-party interventions will lead to the internationalization of these conflicts; much of the focus is on interstate ethnic conflict (Carment 1993; Carment and James 1995a, 1995b). The emphasis is on the goals of the groups in conflict (irredentism, secession) and characteristics of potential interveners. However, a quite common form of third-party intervention does not "internationalize" the conflict but merely results in external support for some of the internal combatants. I argue that internal conflicts, such as those in Mexico, Pakistan, and Northern Ireland, where for the most part intergroup conflict is confined within state boundaries, differ from irredentist ethnic conflicts that transcend state borders—e.g., those in Somalia and Ethiopia (Carment and James 1995a). This difference, moreover, has policy implications that influence the decision-making process in potential intervening states.

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

The most thorough treatment of the dimensions of intrastate conflict can be found in Gurr's volume (1993; see also 1994) on the plight of minority groups around the world. It identifies the issues over which the groups are fighting and trends in ethnopolitical conflicts since the end of World War II. Gurr (1994, 352) defines an ethnopolitical conflict as one in which "one or more contenders . . . defines itself using communal criteria and makes claims on behalf of the group's collective interests against the state, or against other communal actors." Using the label of *ethnic conflict*, Carment (1993) argues that these events generally involve either irredentist, secessionist, or anticolonial movements, though these goals can lead to inter- as well as intrastate conflict. Rupesinghe (1987), however, points out that giving all intrastate conflicts an ethnic label may be too simplistic and obscure as much as is clarifies. Small and Singer (1982) classify intrastate conflicts based on three criteria: (a) that they take place within the internal boundaries of a state, (b) that one of the combatants be the government in power, and (c) that the opposition has the ability to offer sustained

resistance. Small and Singer denote internal conflicts that do not meet these criteria as communal violence and regional internal wars (p. 216).

I define intrastate conflict as armed, sustained combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities. This threshold is lower than that generally used as part of the definition of war (Small and Singer 1982), but it is high enough to exclude events such as coups, riots, and demonstrations. Two hundred fatalities conveys some sense that the level of conflict is intense and that the potential for further escalation is reasonably high. I adopt a threefold typology of civil conflict that allows discrimination between the makeup of the groups in conflict and the broad outlines of the causes of the strife. The typology used here breaks intrastate conflict into ethnically, religiously, and ideologically based groups, with the first two groups roughly corresponding to what Gurr (1993) refers to as ethnonationalists or ethnoclass, and militant sects. Ethnically based conflicts involve groups that identify with a distinct ethnic or cultural heritage; religious conflicts involve groups that are organized in defense of their religious beliefs. Ideological conflicts, on the other hand, involve groups contesting the dominant political or economic ideology, which can but need not incorporate an ethnic or religious dimension. Williams and Kofman (1989) use similar criteria to identify community conflict.

This typology is not without its limitations, the most immediate being the exclusivity of the groupings. Although Gurr (1993) and the Correlates of War Project (Singer 1996) are able to make the necessary distinctions between ethnic and religious identifications, there is room for considerable overlap within contending groups. Gurr, for instance, categorizes groups based on primary and secondary affiliations. The ideological distinction is a much more clear-cut distinction to make. In spite of these limitations, the typology is a useful one, for, as Carment and James (1995a, 1995b) demonstrate, the degree of similarity between the ethnic makeup of the groups in conflict and the ethnic diversity of a potential intervening country plays a crucial role in determining when interventions are likely.

Furthermore, it is assumed that the decision to intervene in an intrastate conflict reflects concerns over who is fighting and why. As such, one critical aspect of the decision calculus will involve the cultural or ethnic characteristics of the disputants (Carment and James 1995a, 1995b). The emphasis here is on determining, inter alia, how the characteristics of the disputants affect the strategy for and likelihood of successful third-party intervention. In his analysis of communal mobilization, Gurr (1993) posits that intergroup grievances can be tied to discriminations and disadvantages between the conflicting parties, as well as their distinct cultural identities. The specific character of these opposition groups, therefore, should influence the intervention strategy used to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Policy makers, for instance, would benefit from knowing that specific types of conflicts tend to be rather impervious to outside interventions, whereas others respond well to certain types of interventions.

The mechanisms for intervening in intrastate conflicts also require some elaboration. For example, the United Nations identifies three goals in terms of resolving ongoing conflicts: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping (Boutros-

Ghali 1992). The first of these relies primarily on the acumen of the available diplomatic corps; the other two initiatives generally entail the use of military and/or humanitarian and economic support to one or another of the combatants. Excluding the role of diplomacy restricts the options available to potential interveners to the use of military or economic support or sanctions;[1] it is on these that I will focus.My decision to exclude the role of diplomacy as a strategy of conflict management is predicated on two factors: (a) there is already a substantial body of work describing and detailing the conditions associated with mediation and negotiation (e.g., Bercovitch and Rubin 1994; Touval and Zartman 1985) and (b) the use of diplomacy is generally not the type of intervention decision that causes much anxiety among decision makers. Although not always the mechanism of first resort, diplomacy generally incurs the least costs, is usually not politically troublesome, and is often used in conjunction with other forms of intervention. For analytical purposes, however, isolating the more intrusive forms of intervention can help to clarify some of the policy issues that decision makers regularly confront.

Third-party intervention, furthermore, can take place on behalf of the government or opposition forces. If the decision as to whether or how to intervene is predicated largely on the character of the parties in conflict, then the decision of whom to support, or which of the antagonists to constrain, becomes central to the deliberative process (Carment and James 1995a, 1995b). Following Small and Singer (1982, 219), I dichotomize this question, with interventions considered to be carried out either on behalf of the government or against it.[2]

Possibly the most visible form of intervention into civil conflicts is the use of military force. Pearson (1974) outlined internal conditions under which external military intervention was likely, whereas Cooper and Berdal (1993) gave prescriptive advice on when and where military intervention should be considered. Tanca (1993) identified 30 instances of armed interventions into internal conflicts since 1956. Tillema (1989) has undertaken probably the most comprehensive study of foreign military interventions, identifying 591 overt military interventions within 269 international conflicts between 1945 and 1985. His data, however, include foreign military interventions into internation as well as intranation disputes. Small and Singer (1982) identify 106 civil wars during the period from 1816 to 1979, with 55 military interventions on behalf of either the government or the opposition forces. Although Tillema, and Small and Singer provide a systematic profile of who is fighting and who is intervening, they do not address issues pertaining to the relative success of intervention strategies, nor do they incorporate economic interventions.

Military force, however, is not the only form of third-party intervention into intrastate conflicts. Economics can be, and has been, a forceful tool with which to intervene in ongoing domestic disputes, both through positive inducements and punitive sanctions. The usefulness of economic sanctions as a mechanism of interna-

1. Others broaden the scope of potential forms of intervention to include paramilitary and covert strategies (see Schraeder 1992), though this analytical distinction, I would argue, is unnecessary for the present study.

2. There are a few cases in which the government is not involved in the conflict. In those instances, the intervention has been coded as neutral with respect to the government.

tion influence has received considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Leyton-Brown 1987; Martin 1993; Carter 1988; Renwick 1981; Hufbauer and Schott 1983; Li 1993), though there is much skepticism over the degree to which sanctions help achieve the desired outcome. Hufbauer and Schott (1983), for example, find that economic sanctions are successful about 50% of the time when the goal is the destabilization of a government, and they are about 40% successful when trying to disrupt the military adventures of target states.

In many intervention attempts, moreover, we are likely to see a mix of strategies, with economic inducements or punishments used alongside their military counterparts. Interventions are also not constrained to bilateral initiatives, with organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union playing increasingly important roles in the effort to contain internal conflicts. To summarize the classificatory scheme being constructed to this point, we have three general types of intrastate conflict: ethnic, religious, and ideological; three basic strategies for intervening in these conflicts, incorporating military, economic, and mixed strategies; and we have the target of the intervention identified as either the government or the opposition. This essentially describes a $3 \times 3 \times 2$ matrix incorporating the type of conflict and the specific intervention strategy. What is critical at this juncture is to outline the goals of the intervener and a theoretical framework from which we can understand any particular choice of strategy.

DEFINING SUCCESS AND ARTICULATING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Leaving aside issues of the events that precipitate intrastate conflict,[3] I make the assumption that third parties intervene in intrastate conflicts to bring an end to the violence associated with the underlying dispute. One way to view this is to consider that the intervener tries sufficiently to bolster one side to compel the opposing side to quit fighting. Continued fighting is rarely, if ever, the goal of a contending group. The interests of the intervener, furthermore, revolve largely around ensuring political stability in a specific region of the globe; one way to facilitate this is to help contain overt military violence—be it by orchestrating a cease-fire or facilitating the defeat of the opposing group.[4] It is assumed that third parties do not intervene to exacerbate or prolong the fighting. This also consciously excludes the role of trying to resolve the underlying issues involved in the dispute from the motivations behind the decision to intervene. Solving the often deep-seated issues associated with ethnic, religious, or ideological conflicts will require a much more concerted effort than the type of interventions addressed here (see Horowitz 1985; Gurr 1993; Carment 1993), however,

3. Three good treatments of the demographics and causes of ethnopolitical conflicts can be found in Gurr (1993), Gurr and Harf (1994), and Horowitz (1985).

4. Ending hostilities can come in many forms, including, but not limited to, a negotiated or unilaterally declared cease-fire, the acquiescence of one side in the conflict, or the defeat of one side. Each in its own way would have the effect of stopping the fighting between antagonists, though each may or may not resolve any issues at stake.

stopping the carnage associated with these conflicts is quite often the necessary first step before diplomatic initiatives can begin.

Others have articulated a broader range of motivations behind interventions in intrastate conflicts. For example, territorial acquisition; regional stability; protection of the intervener's diplomatic, economic, or military interests; ideology; and the upholding of human rights have all been identified as goals of intervention (Pearson 1974; Cooper and Berdal 1993). Although that list of goals can be expanded somewhat (Tanca 1993), one can do so without much loss of coherence. One might argue further that the goal of intervention is to destabilize, not stabilize, the local environment. If that is a goal then (1) there can only be a few such cases, and (2) the effect would be to bleed everybody involved continually, even the intervening countries. The goal in these types of instances, I posit, is to stop the fighting on terms favorable to the intervener and, in doing so, to bring stability to the region. I do not deny that there are multiple goals behind any intervention but argue that the first step in achieving these other goals is the cessation of hostilities. For example, the UN "peacemaking" intervention in Somalia was designed initially to stop the fighting between rival clans so that humanitarian assistance could address the severe problems of starvation, whereas in El Salvador, U.S. military and economic interventions were directed toward ensuring domestic economic stability while assisting the government forces in putting down the rebel insurgency.

If the goals of the intervener are somewhat straightforward, the logic behind the choice of method is much less so. Singer (1963) models the conditions under which certain types of influence strategies would be most appropriate for either reinforcing or modifying the behavior of the target. According to Singer, the preferred choice of strategy—whether to reward, punish, threaten, or promise—should depend on current and expected behavior of the target. Given this theoretical orientation, he constructs an 8×8 matrix outlining the optimal strategy for a given preferred outcome. The strategy of choice should be a function of both current and desired behavior, as well as expectations about future behavior from the perspective of the influencer. For example, if country A were trying to reinforce the current behavior of country B, economic rewards might be the strategy of choice. But if behavior modification is desired, a more punitive approach may be necessary.

The key to any intervention strategy is to alter the calculations by which the antagonists arrive at particular outcomes. In other words, the goal of designing an intervention strategy is to make it too costly for the combatants to continue fighting. This can be achieved either by making the actual costs of fighting prohibitively high or by making the benefits of not fighting particularly attractive. A successful intervention strategy, then, will result in a cost-benefit calculation by the antagonists that results in not fighting providing the highest expected outcome. However, this calculation is obviously a strategic decision that is affected by each of the antagonists' expectations about the effect of the intervention on the opposing side in the conflict. In other words, A's decision about whether and how to intervene in a conflict between B and C will reflect, in part, A's expected ability to influence the cost-benefit calculations of B and

C regarding the status quo. But B's calculations will also in part reflect B's expectations about the effect of intervention on C, and vice versa.[5]

The current focus, however, is on the strategies of the intervener not the targets. The objective is to develop a framework by which decision makers in potential intervening states can arrive at an optimal strategy. The choice of the decision maker in the intervening state is to determine this optimal strategy given the context of the conflict, the decision rules of the antagonists, and the expected probability of any one strategy securing the cessation of hostilities. An inherent difficulty in these types of analyses is that the decision to intervene imposes a selection bias, where states choose not to intervene when they do not expect to succeed. In other words, we may have data only on the determinants of successful intervention in cases where the intervener *expected* to succeed. In those instances where this expectation was low, states chose not to intervene (see Fearon 1994). Determining when and under what conditions third parties choose to intervene is beyond the scope of this analysis, but at minimum—and assuming a large selection bias—the results presented below are suggestive of the characteristics of successful interventions *when* the intervening state held a reasonable expectation of success.

DATA, SOURCES, AND PATTERNS

The data generated for this analysis consist of all intrastate conflicts initiated between 1944 and 1994, excluding any involving preindependence or colonial disputes. The operational definition outlined earlier casts a net somewhat more inclusive than Small and Singer's (1982) operational definition, yet it is still sensitive enough to avoid smaller events such as coups. Sources included the Correlates of War Civil War database (Small and Singer 1982), the annual *Yearbook* of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, *The New York Times*, Gurr's (1993) *Minorities at Risk* project, and the Military Intervention data generated by Tillema (1991). The type of conflict was identified and classified based on the orientation of the primary groups involved in the fighting. The identification of groups was determined through the use of the Minorities at Risk classification scheme and the Correlates of War cultural data set.[6] Intervention was coded as either military, economic, or mixed, whereas the target of the intervention was coded as the government or the opposition. Interventions were broadly conceived and operationally defined as convention-breaking grants or withdrawals of economic or military assistance with the apparent purpose of influencing the course of an ongoing civil conflict (Rosenau 1969). I conceive of military intervention to include the supply or transfer of troops, hardware, or intelligence and logistical support to the parties in conflict, or,

5. To some degree, this analytic framework is similar to that of Patchen's (1988, particularly chaps. 7-9), though he is concerned with when to use positive inducements or negative sanctions within a dyadic relationship. I posit that these same questions are central to decisions on when and how third parties should intervene in intrastate conflicts.

6. The Correlates of War cultural data set records ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups within countries, identifying each group's population and their percentage makeup of the total population of the country.

as may be the case, the cutoff of any such aid currently in place. Economic intervention, likewise, encompasses economic aid or trade, and economic sanctions or embargoes. Sources for data on interventions include those previously mentioned but also included country-specific case histories when necessary.[7]

Operationalizing success is a particularly thorny topic. First, what is meant by success is crucial to evaluating the alternative strategies available to decision makers. Singer's (1963) concept of a preferred future behavior is useful, as is Licklider's (1993) definition of the end of civil wars. He considers a civil war to end when either multiple sovereignty ends or the violence is terminated for 5 years. This definition, however, is overly restrictive, given the political expediencies associated with intervening in ongoing civil strifes. Political leaders generally cannot make policies regarding interventions with a 5-year time horizon. Political forces dictate otherwise. When we talk about third-party interventions into military contests, success must be conceived of in terms of either stopping the fighting or resolving the underlying dispute. The latter would make the barriers to success impossibly high relative to the tools employed, whereas political imperatives dictate that policies have a short-term horizon. Success in this analysis will be operationalized as the cessation of military hostilities for a period lasting at least 6 months. Although stopping the fighting for this relatively short time would rarely even approach a resolution of the underlying issues at stake, 6 months without conflict can (a) give policy makers cause to claim success with their policy and (b) give a sufficient break in the fighting to initiate meaningful dialogue in an effort to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. This narrow definition also makes for a particularly stringent test of the factors that predict successful interventions.

Determining when an intervention has been attempted and whether it was successful can present difficult coding problems; two particular difficulties stand out. The first, and generally the most tractable, is determining when a particular intervention is directly linked to the conflict at hand. Often, this is a straightforward determination; at times, it imposes quite difficult decisions. For example, arms transfers (to either the government or opposition) in the midst of armed conflict poses few difficulties. U.S. aid to UNITA is a case in point. However, economic aid to a government fighting a guerrilla war presents a more difficult coding problem. El Salvador is a useful example. Would the United States have given economic aid in the absence of a serious challenge to the government? Maybe, but possibly in different amounts or combinations. My coding procedure looked for (1) any explicit linkages between aid decisions and the progression of the conflict and (2) any dramatic fluctuations in support that coincided with the initiation of or changes in the conflict.

The second coding problem is less tractable than the first and stems from an inherent difficulty in linking any particular intervention to the outcome of the fighting. Sometimes, again, this is relatively easy. In cases of military interventions, it was often possible to make the necessary connection between the intervention and the outcome. The Dominican Revolt stands out. Other forms of intervention at other points in time

7. See appendix for a list of cases and interventions. Additional information on coding rules is available from the author.

TABLE 1
Number of Conflict Initiations per Year (since 1944)

1940s	N	*1950s*	N	*1960s*	N	*1970s*	N	*1980s*	N	*1990s*	N
1944	1	1950	2	1960	4	1970	4	1980	4	1990	4
1946	2	1953	1	1961	1	1971	4	1981	2	1991	7
1947	2	1954	2	1962	3	1972	5	1982	4	1992	10
1948	5	1956	2	1963	5	1973	1	1983	4	1993	2
1949	1	1958	2	1964	1	1974	2	1984	3	1994	3
		1959	2	1965	4	1975	6	1985	3		
				1966	2	1977	2	1986	3		
				1967	3	1978	6	1987	2		
				1968	2	1979	3	1988	3		
				1969	1			1989	3		
Totals	11		11		26		33		31		26

NOTE: Missing years are without conflict initiations.

tend to have a more obscure relationship between cause and effect. In the coding process, I tried to err on the side of caution, making it particularly difficult to achieve a successful intervention. The U.S. support for the Nicaraguan Contras serves as a useful example. Although large amounts of military and economic support were poured into the Contra effort, it was difficult directly to link this support to the end of hostilities. The fighting eventually did end but only after a Sandinista defeat at the ballot box. U.S. aid may have contributed to that electoral defeat, but it takes a considerable leap to make that determination from the data at hand.

Based on the above criteria and sources, 138 intrastate conflicts were identified, of which 85 had at least one third-party intervention. Within these 85 conflicts, there were a total of 196 individual interventions—with each intervention in a conflict coded separately on each dimension of the intervention itself. The individual coding of each intervention allows for the examination of the effect of multiple interventions into the same conflict, including those conflicts with interventions supporting competing groups in contention. These data differ significantly from those data generated by either Tillema (1991) or Pearson and Baumann (1993) in two general ways: (1) they broaden the scope to include economic as well as military interventions, and (2) they focus exclusively on intrastate conflicts and any associate outside interventions. For example, Pearson and Baumann code only the direct use of military force (troops, shelling, etc.), whereas these new data incorporate more subtle forms of interventions such as the transfer of equipment, technology, or intelligence, as well as economic interventions such as the use of sanctions.

Of the 138 intrastate conflicts identified in the postwar period, 34 of them are still ongoing as of 1994, 10 of which had only begun as of 1992. When the conflicts are broken down into the year that they started, we see that the 1960s ushered in an era more prone to the initiation of intrastate strife (see Table 1); this is consistent with Gurr's findings (1994). Furthermore, the apparent upsurge in intrastate conflict in the 1990s does not yet constitute a clear change in the trend—at least as determined by

TABLE 2
Most Frequent Intervening States, by Number of Interventions

State	*Number of Interventions*
United States	35
U.S.S.R./Russia	16
United Nations	10
France	10
Britain	9
China	6
Cuba	5

comparing the difference in means between the 1980s and 1990s.[8] However, events in the early part of the 1990s suggests that the cold war may have acted as a constraint on ethnopolitical strife, though it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue. Africa and Asia are clearly the most conflict prone, accounting for approximately 34% and 25% of the conflicts, respectively; Europe accounted for only 9% of the conflicts, whereas figures for the Middle East and the Americas, respectively, are 18% and 14%.

In terms of interveners, nearly 40% (76 cases) of all interventions were carried out by major powers, 5% (10 cases) of the interventions were under UN auspices, and the remainder were attributed to minor powers. The United States accounts for by far the most instances of interventions, with 35, whereas the Soviet Union intervened 16 times. France and Britain were involved in 10 and 9 interventions, respectively (see Table 2). Of the 196 cases of intervention, only about 30% were considered successful.

When breaking down the success or failure of different intervention strategies by the type of conflict and the target of the intervention attempt, these data suggest that interventions are about equally as likely to be on behalf of the government as they are on the side of opposition forces (95 supporting opposition; 96 supporting government; 5 neutral). The data also demonstrate that a purely economic intervention strategy is rarely undertaken and that a strictly military strategy is the most common form of intervention (military, 70%; economic, 7%; mixed, 23%). The success rates of each type of intervention, regardless of the target, are as follows: a mixed strategy has been the most successful (35% of the time); strictly military intervention has succeeded about 30% of the time; and economic intervention has succeeded 23% of the time. The most successful intervention strategies have been to either support the government through military interventions (a success rate of just under 50%) or to intervene economically on behalf of the opposition, though only when the parties to the conflict are organized along ethnic lines (43% successful). Interventions supporting the government were twice as likely to succeed as those supporting the opposition (41% vs. 19%).

Although it has been assumed that interventions are undertaken to bring an end to hostilities, it is entirely possible that the interventions themselves prolong the conflict. The evidence, furthermore, seems to confirm this interpretation. For example, the mean duration of all ongoing conflicts is just over 16 years, regardless of whether or

8. The difference in means between the 1980s and 1990s is 2.1 ± 2.2 at a 95% confidence interval.

TABLE 3
Number of Interveners and Number of Casualties

	Number of Casualties		
Interveners	*< 4,000*	*4,000 through 27,000*	*> 27,000*
1	12	8	6
2	10	4	12
3	3	15	18
4	12	12	8
5	5	5	20
6	6	0	6

not there have been outside interventions. At the same time, the mean duration of all previously resolved conflicts with outside interventions is 7 years. Thirty-nine of these conflicts, however, lasted less than one year, possibly skewing the average duration. Excluding those conflicts of both short duration and with outside interventions brings the mean duration up to 9 years. In conflicts in which there were no interventions, the mean duration was only 1.5 years, with the longest conflict lasting only a decade.

These data do suggest that interventions are associated with longer running conflicts, though two points need to be raised: (1) do multiple interventions make resolution more intractable, and (2) do third parties generally intervene in conflicts of long duration rather than contributing to the length of the conflict? An answer to the first question is fairly straightforward, and, although somewhat tempered by the response to the second question, it also helps to answer it. For all resolved conflicts that had outside interventions, if there were multiple interveners, the mean duration was just under 9 years. For those conflicts with only one intervention, the mean duration was just over 3 years. Not only are interventions associated with longer running conflicts, but it seems that the more interveners, the more likely that the conflict will drag on. In fact, 92% of conflicts with only two interventions were less than the 9-year mean duration, and 83% of those with three interventions ran for less than 9 years. However, when there are four interveners, 62% of the conflicts are of greater than the mean duration, whereas with five or six interveners, 50% are of greater than average duration.

The question of whether states tend to intervene in conflicts of long duration or whether the interventions themselves prolong the hostilities cannot be answered definitively with the data at hand. However, of the 39 conflicts lasting less than one year, 62% had at least one outside intervention. Viewed in conjunction with the above data on single and multiple interventions, this suggests that the interventions themselves may contribute to the duration of the conflict. Furthermore, there appears to be no systematic relationship between the number of interveners and the number of casualties (Table 3), contributing to the inference that, in general, interventions take place across of broad spectrum of intrastate conflicts, and they can have the effect of prolonging the hostilities.

TOWARD A MODEL OF SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION

The decision to intervene in an ongoing civil conflict involves a complex decision process, with decision makers weighing numerous options and varying contexts in which the conflict unfolds. If the decision to intervene is predicated on trying to affect the cost of continued fighting, or the benefits from a cessation in the hostilities, then one must examine those factors that contribute to decision makers' perceptions of the probability that each particular strategy will alter the contestants' calculations.

For example, in a conflict with relatively low casualties, the incremental costs from continued fighting might be considerably higher than in a high-casualty conflict. In an extremely bloody conflict, it is less likely that a third party would be able successfully to intervene without the commitment of a massive amount of resources. The costs already incurred by each of the combatants would generally make positive inducements—such as economic aid—an insufficient strategy to change the cost-benefit calculations of the antagonists. Furthermore, in a high-casualty conflict, the role of affective motivations will take on a higher salience to the combatants, making outside participants either largely irrelevant or a target and a cause to continue the struggle. We would expect, therefore, that the greater the level of casualties, the lower the probability that third-party intervention would be successful.

In a similar vein, as a conflict takes on a more ideological character, the issues at stake will become more entrenched and the opposing sides less likely to retreat in the face of outside pressure. When a conflict is over grievances related to the desires for ethnic or religious autonomy—or discriminations based on ethnicity or religious orientation—then temporary solutions to the conflict are more readily evident, and outside intervention may contribute to the resolution process. This notion is supported by evidence suggesting that the more tangible the issues, the less difficult are efforts to resolve a dispute diplomatically (Bercovitch 1989; Vasquez 1995). The Miskitos Indians in Nicaragua, for example, could be granted limited autonomy within a given geographical region while still falling under the umbrella of the Nicaraguan state. However, when the issues at stake revolve around changing the operative ideology of the ruling coalition, the most salient outcomes require one side to relinquish claims to sovereignty. These intangible issues prove to be particularly resistant to efforts at resolution, making a third-party intervention less likely to succeed. The nature of the conflict, therefore, should contribute to the success of intervention attempts, with ideological conflicts being more intractable than either religious or ethnic varieties.

The strategy for intervening will also affect the likely success of any intervention attempt. This involves both the type and the target of the intervention. In an effort to alter the calculations of the antagonists, military intervention will affect the cost of continued fighting, whereas economic interventions will generally alter the expected benefits from not fighting. When the decision to intervene is predicated on trying to affect this cost-benefit ratio, a mixed strategy should result in the greatest "swing" in the expected utility of the combatants. From the perspective of the combatants, the ability to sustain a united front against an opponent will involve both the degree of support within the constituent base and the relative alignment of military forces; this

would be most easily facilitated by bringing a combination of both military and economic forces to bear.

From a political vantage point, economic constraints or inducements can partially contribute to the allegiances of the constituents behind either of the centers of sovereignty. Using sanctions or rewards to move this center of support toward a more compromising approach to the conflict should be effective in altering the calculus of the opposing leaderships. But economic intervention probably is not sufficient, under normal circumstances, to bring an end to the fighting. The balance of military forces will also contribute to the expected outcome of the combatants. Equally matched forces, for example, may feel reasonably confident that victory is around the corner, whereas a preponderance of military capabilities may give reason to push for further gains. However, neither would military force by itself be sufficient, in the norm, to move the parties far enough toward a compromise that a cease-fire would be a likely outcome. As we saw recently in Somalia, a vastly superior military force simply became a target for the antagonists previously pitted against each other. This need dramatically to sway the cost-benefit calculations of the antagonists would suggest that a mixed strategy would be more likely to succeed than either a military or economic intervention alone. Furthermore, given the logic of how the intervention purports to influence decision making, there is little reason to expect, inter alia, that a military or economic intervention independently will be more successful than the other. The context under which a nonmixed strategy will give the upper hand to a military or economic initiative is critically important, though those specific conditions are beyond the scope of this analysis.

For reasons associated with the disparity in resources between the central government and the opposition forces, we would, in general, expect the balance of power to side with the ruling coalition. At the same time, the efficiency of any third-party intervention should be increased when the intervention attempt supports the sitting government. But simply because the government is the conduit for third-party interventions does not imply that governments are usually the recipients of third-party support. For instance, support for one side in the conflict can result from positive inducements to the supported side or negative sanctions to the opposing side. If we think about Singer's (1963) model, threatening or punishing the opposition can be interpreted as intervening on behalf of the government, as can be rewards or promises made directly to the government. However, for reasons of efficiency, legitimacy, and stability, support for the government should lead to more successful outcomes. I would hypothesize, therefore, that intervening with a mix of economic and military elements would increase the probability of success over either approach individually, as would intervening on behalf of the government.

Finally, the role of the status of the intervener should be critical to the likely outcome of any intervention attempt. Larger countries have a greater degree of latitude when it comes to organizing an intervention strategy. Major powers not only have larger and more projectable military forces but also a wider range of economic resources that can be brought to bear in a foreign policy role. Regardless of the side on which a major power intervenes, the effectiveness of that intervention should be greater than that of a nonmajor power. The ability to affect the cost-benefit calculations of combatants in

an intrastate conflict must be a function, inter alia, of the resources that any potential intervener can bring to bear. We should expect major power involvement in the intervention attempt to increase the probability of successful intervention.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The hypothesized relationships outlined above were tested using a logit model. A logit analysis is much like a regression model except that the outcome variable is dichotomous and the coefficients associated with the logit require further manipulation before they are readily interpretable. Table 4 displays the results of that analysis. The outcome variable in the model is the success or failure of a specific intervention attempt. It can be seen that all the variables associated with the intervention are statistically significant at or above conventional levels of confidence, whereas those associated with characteristics of the dispute are not very robust. Furthermore, the model correctly predicts 71% of the outcomes of the interventions, though it appears to overpredict the actual rate of success.

The signs of the coefficients associated with the variables in the model allow us to evaluate the hypotheses outlined earlier. In general, as the intervention moves from either a purely military or economic strategy to a mixed strategy, the probability of success increases, in line with the argument outlined earlier.[9] Furthermore, supporting the government over the opposition increases the chances of success. Interventions in ethnic or religious conflicts have a higher probability of success than interventions in ideological conflicts; likewise, the higher the level of casualties, the lower the probability of successful intervention. In each case, however, the level of statistical confidence is rather low. When isolating the effect of major powers on the success of interventions, there appears to be a difference in the probability of success, at least when judged relative to a minor power adopting a similar intervention strategy.[10]

To interpret the logit results in terms useful for policy makers struggling with the issues of the day, we need to calculate the probability of a successful outcome associated with each explanatory variable. Tables 5 through 7 try to move us in that direction. They will show that the intervention strategy is the critical element in successfully bringing a civil conflict to a halt—even if it is a temporary one. Although the orientation of the conflict—whether ethnic, religious, or ideological—has implications for the likely success of an intervention, policy makers should best focus on how they intervene rather than where they do so.

9. The economic and military interventions were collapsed into one category for this part of the analysis; this was done for two reasons: (1) there was no logical reason to argue that either one alone would significantly affect the probability of success of an intervention, and (2) the description of the data suggests that there are very few purely economic interventions during the period under scrutiny. However, when controlling for the independent effect of major power interventions, the three categories of interventions were maintained, allowing me to tease out additional information about the effect of different strategies of interventions. A similar collapsing was done on the "type of conflict" variable, where ethnic and religious conflicts were combined into one and contrasted with ideological conflicts. The reasons are similar to those involving economic and military interventions.

10. This is captured by creating a variable that is zero when minor powers intervene and reflects the value of the type or target variable when the intervener is a major power.

TABLE 4
Results of Logit Regression on the Success or Failure of Intervention

Variable	*Estimated Coefficient*	SE	T-*Ratio*
Conflict type	−.40	.34	−1.17
Casualties	$-.70 \times 10^{-6}$	$.13 \times 10^{-5}$	−.54
Type of intervention	1.26	.59	2.13
Target of intervention	−.12	.03	−3.36
Major Power × Type	−.07	.02	−2.91
Major Power × Target	.12	.03	3.25
Constant	.89	.54	1.63

Log likelihood (0) = −117.71
Log likelihood function = −107.95
Likelihood ratio test = 19.50 with 6 *df*

	Predicted Outcomes	
Actual Outcomes	*Success*	*Failure*
Success	11	7
Failure	48	124

NOTE: Number of correct predictions = 135; percentage of correct predictions = 71%.

TABLE 5
Effects of Individual Variables on Probability of Successful Intervention, Holding All Other Variables Constant

Variable	*Probability of Success*	*% Change in Probability*
Type of conflict		
Ethnic/religious	.17	
Ideological	.12	−5
Number of casualties		
200	.15	
500,000	.11	−4
900,000	.09	−2
Type of intervention		
Military/economic	.11	
Mixed	.31	+20
Target of intervention		
Government	.23	
Opposition	.08	−15
Type of intervention by major power, relative to minor powers		
Military	.23	
Economic	.07	−16
Mixed	.02	−5
Target of intervention by major power, relative to minor powers		
Government	.26	
Opposition	.55	+29

TABLE 6
Effect of Varying Both Type of Conflict and Type of Intervention on the Probability of Success, Holding Other Variables Constant

Type of Conflict	*Probability of Success*	*% Change in Probability of Success*
Ethnic/religious		
Type of intervention		
Military/economic	.10	
Mixed	.49	+39
Ideological		
Type of intervention		
Military/economic	.07	
Mixed	.39	+32

TABLE 7
Effect of Varying Both Type and Target of Intervention on the Probability of Success, Holding Other Variables Constant

Type of Intervention	*Probability of Success*	*% Change in Probability of Success*
Military/economic		
Target of intervention		
Government	.17	
Opposition	.05	–12
Mixed		
Target of intervention		
Government	.64	
Opposition	.41	–23

Table 5 displays the effect of each variable on the probability that an intervention will be successful, when holding all other variables at their mean values. For example, holding all else constant, the probability of successfully intervening into an ethnic or religious conflict is 17%, but that probability of success drops to 12% when ideological issues predominate. The greatest change in the probability of success is associated with changes in the method of intervening. An individual military or economic intervention has a quite low chance of success (11%), though that probability jumps to nearly 31% when a mixed strategy is employed. In general, supporting the government over the opposition in the conflict increases the probability of success from 8% to 23%. Surprisingly, the change in the likelihood of success is not great as we move from a conflict with relatively few casualties (200) to a quite bloody conflict (900,000).

When major powers intervene in intrastate conflicts, the effect on the probability of success can be quite significant, at least when compared to the effectiveness of

interventions by nonmajor powers. The role of major powers, however, is somewhat divergent from the general trend. For example, a mixed strategy by a major power is only marginally more likely to be successful than a similar intervention by a minor power (2%), suggesting that a mixed strategy has a similar effect on the outcome regardless of the resources of the intervener. However, a purely military intervention by a major power is 23% more likely to succeed than a military intervention by a minor power. Likewise, the effect of a major power intervening on behalf of either the government or the opposition shows a considerable increase in the probability of success over minor-power interventions (29%). One inference is that, under almost all strategies for intervening, major powers are considerably more likely to succeed than minor powers.

When isolating the effect of different methods of intervening within the various types of conflicts, two factors emerge (Table 6). First, we can see quite clearly that a mixed strategy of intervention remains the most likely to achieve a cessation in hostilities, with a change in the probability of a successful outcome jumping up to nearly 40% (32% and 39%, respectively). For example, a mixed intervention into an ethnic or religious conflict has a 49% probability of success, whereas a military or economic initiative alone has only a 10% probability of success. This pattern is consistent when isolating ideological conflicts from their ethnic or religious counterparts. Second, the analysis suggests that the type of conflict matters little in the likelihood of successful interventions. Regardless of who is fighting, the greater the sole reliance on either military or economic interventions alone, the lower the chances for success of those policies.

The strategy for intervening, however, is more complex than simple calculations about who is fighting and the type of influence a third party brings to bear on the conflict. As outlined earlier, the intervener can generally weigh in on behalf of either the government or the opposition, and presumably the choice of the target for the intervention has some impact on the likelihood of success. Table 7 confirms the importance of both the type of intervention used and the target of that intervention attempt. Once again, the data are fairly conclusive. To increase the probability that an intervention will succeed in bringing a halt to the fighting, potential interveners must move away from a sole reliance on either military or economic initiatives. Regardless of the target of the intervention, an individual strategy is at best about 60% less likely to succeed than a mixed intervention. At the extreme, a singly focused intervention on behalf of the opposition has only a 5% probability of success, all else being equal, whereas a mixed strategy on behalf of the government has a 64% probability of success.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on a multivariate logit model, a number of findings give ample reason to make cogent policy prescriptions to those foreign policy makers contemplating future interventions. The clearest result of this analysis is that the strategy for intervening is of paramount importance in terms of the likely success of achieving the desired goals.

Although characteristics of the conflict—such as its type or the number of casualties—affect the probability of success, policy makers seeking to maximize this probability would do better to focus on how they intervene rather than when or where, even though political imperatives might dictate the centrality of those latter questions.

When focusing on the strategy for intervening, the findings are equally clear that a sole emphasis on either a military or economic initiative is going to be less effective than a mixed strategy. In trying to influence the cost-benefit calculations of the antagonists, potential interveners should employ as many pressure points as possible. However, the prescriptions do not end there. In designing a strategy to intervene in a civil conflict, policy makers would be well advised to weigh in on behalf of the government rather than the opposition. Even a singly focused strategy of either military or economic intervention is three times more likely to succeed if the intervention is on behalf of the government. Holding all else constant, the difference between the worst strategy (type and target of intervention) and the best is nearly a 60% change in the probability of success.

The strength of these findings is quite remarkable, given that the historical data used in this analysis span 50 years and 85 civil conflicts involving a total of 196 separate interventions. The definitions of success and failure, furthermore, were designed specifically to frame the outcome in terms familiar to, and consistent with, the concerns and issues commonly addressed by foreign policy decision makers. In this light, the prescriptive inferences should be of particular import to those struggling to marshal the tools of state in the international arena.

APPENDIX
Intrastate Conflicts with Third-Party Interventions

Conflict	*Type*	*Dates*	*Casualties*	*Interventions*	*Type of Intervention*	*Target of Intervention*	*Success*
Greek Civil War	Ideological	1944-1949	200,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	Yes
				U.K.	Mixed	Government	Yes
				Albania	Military	Opposition	No
				Bulgaria	Military	Opposition	No
				Yugoslavia	Military	Opposition	No
Chinese Civil War	Ideological	1946-1950	300,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
Malayan Insurgency	Ideological	1948-1962	14,000	U.K.	Mixed	Government	Yes
				Australia	Military	Government	Yes
				New Zealand	Military	Government	Yes
				China	Military	Opposition	No
Costa Rican Civil War	Ideological	1948	1,000	Nicaragua	Military	Government	No
Burma	Ethnic	1948 - Present	130,000	China	Military	Opposition	No
The Philippines	Ideological	1950-1952	3,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	Yes
Guatemala	Ideological	1954	2,000	U.S.	Military	Opposition	Yes
Budapest Uprising	Ideological	1956	3,500	U.S.S.R.	Military	Opposition	Yes
Indonesia	Ideological	1956-1960	50,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	Yes
Lebanon	Religious	1958	30,000	U.S.	Military	Government	Yes
				U.K.	Military	Government	Yes
				Syria	Military	Opposition	No
Iraq	Ideological	1958	5,000	Syria	Military	Opposition	No

(continued)

APPENDIX continued

Conflict	*Type*	*Dates*	*Casualties*	*Interventions*	*Type of Intervention*	*Target of Intervention*	*Success*
Republic of Vietnam	Ideological	1960-1965	300,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
				DRV Vietnam	Military	Opposition	No
Zairian Civil War	Ethnic	1960-1965	300,000	Belgium	Military	Opposition	No
				United Nations	Mixed	Government	Yes
				Algeria	Military	Opposition	No
				Egypt	Military	Opposition	No
				Belgium	Mixed	Government	Yes
Ogaden Conflict I	Ethnic	1960-1964	300	Somalia	Military	Government	No
Laos I	Ideological	1960-1962	30,000	U.S.	Mixed	Opposition	Yes
				U.S.S.R.	Military	Opposition	Yes
				RVN Vietnam	Military	Opposition	Yes
Iraq (Kurdish Rebellion)	Ethnic	1961-1966	5,000	Syria	Military	Government	No
Eritrean War	Ethnic	1962-1991	45,000	Cuba	Military	Opposition	No
				U.S.S.R.	Military	Opposition	No
				U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
				Cuba	Military	Government	No
				U.S.S.R.	Mixed	Government	No
				Sudan	Military	Opposition	No
Arab Republic of Yemen	Ideological	1962-1964	100,000	Egypt	Military	Government	Yes
				Saudi Arabia	Mixed	Opposition	No
				Jordan	Mixed	Opposition	No
Laos II	Ideological	1963-1973	18,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
				DRV Vietnam	Economic	Opposition	No
				France	Military	Government	No
Sudanese Civil War	Religious	1963-1972	200,000	Belgium	Military	Government	No
Cyprus	Ethnic	1963-1964	3,000	U.K.	Military	Neutral	No
				Greece	Military	Government	No
				Turkey	Military	Opposition	No
				United Nations	Military	Neutral	Yes
Chad Civil War I	Ethnic	1965-1972	1,500	France	Military	Government	No
				Libya	Military	Opposition	No
Dominican Revolt	Ideological	1965	1,000	U.S.	Military	Government	Yes
				Honduras	Military	Government	Yes
Thai Communist Insurgency	Ideological	1965-1985	10,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
				China	Military	Opposition	No
				Malaysia	Military	Government	No
Guatemalan Communist Insurgency I	Ideological	1966-1972	45,500	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
Congo, Kisanguni Mutiny	Ideological	1967	20,000	U.S.	Military	Government	Yes
				Belgium	Mixed	Opposition	No
Burmese Communist Insurgency I	Ideological	1968-1980	1,500	China	Military	Opposition	No
Oman, Dhofar Rebellion	Ethnic	1970-1975	2,000	U.K.	Military	Government	Yes
				Iran	Military	Government	Yes
				Jordan	Military	Government	Yes
				YPR Yemen	Military	Opposition	No
Cambodia	Ideological	1970-1975	150,000	RVN Vietnam	Military	Government	No
				U.S.	Military	Government	No
				DRV Vietnam	Military	Opposition	Yes
Northern Ireland	Religious	1968-1994	3,000	Libya	Military	Opposition	No

(continued)

APPENDIX continued

Conflict	*Type*	*Dates*	*Casualties*	*Interventions*	*Type of Intervention*	*Target of Intervention*	*Success*
PLO-Jordan War	Ethnic	1970	1,500	Syria	Military	Opposition	No
South Africa, African Nationalist Struggle	Ethnic	1970-1994	14,500	United Nations	Economic	Opposition	No
				U.S.	Economic	Opposition	Yes
				U.K.	Economic	Opposition	Yes
				U.S.S.R.	Military	Opposition	No
Pakistan	Ethnic	1971	9,000	India	Military	Opposition	No
Uganda, Obotes Overthrow	Ethnic	1971-1972	2,000	Tanzania	Military	Government	No
Lebanese Civil War I	Religious	1975-1988	125,000	Israel	Military	Government	No
				U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
				Syria	Military	Opposition	No
				France	Mixed	Government	No
Sri Lanka, JVP Insurgency I	Ideological	1971	1,000	U.S.	Military	Government	Yes
				U.K.	Military	Government	Yes
				Pakistan	Military	Government	Yes
				India	Military	Government	Yes
				U.S.S.R.	Military	Government	Yes
Burundi	Ethnic	1972	10,000	Zaire	Military	Government	Yes
Philippines Communist Insurgency	Ideological	1972-Present	10,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
Rhodesia	Ethnic	1972-1979	15,000	Cuba	Military	Opposition	Yes
				South Africa	Military	Government	No
				United Nations	Economic	Opposition	Yes
Pakistan	Ethnic	1973-1977	9,000	Afghanistan	Military	Opposition	No
Cyprus	Ethnic	1974	3,000	Turkey	Military	Opposition	No
				Greece	Military	Government	No
Mauritania, Western Sahara Independence Movement	Ethnic	1975-Present	1,000	France	Military	Government	No
				Morocco	Military	Government	No
				Algeria	Military	Opposition	No
Morocco, Western Sahara Independence Movement	Ethnic	1975-Present	15,000	Mauritania	Military	Government	No
				Algeria	Military	Opposition	No
				Libya	Military	Opposition	No
Indonesia, East Timor	Ethnic	1975-Present	200,000	U.S.	Military	Opposition	No
				Canada	Economic	Opposition	No
Angolan Civil War I	Ideological	1975-1991	102,000	Cuba	Military	Government	No
				South Africa	Military	Opposition	No
				U.S.	Military	Opposition	No
				Zaire	Military	Opposition	No
				U.S.S.R.	Mixed	Government	No
Ethiopia, Ogaden Conflict II	Ethnic	1977-1985	30,000	Somalia	Military	Opposition	No
				Cuba	Military	Government	Yes
				U.S.S.R.	Military	Government	Yes
Zaire, Shaba Crisis I	Ethnic	1977	500	Morocco	Military	Government	Yes
Guatemala, Communist Insurgency II	Ideological	1978-1984	21,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
Zaire, Shaba Crisis II	Ethnic	1978-1979	1,000	Morocco	Military	Government	Yes
				Belgium	Military	Government	Yes
				France	Military	Government	Yes

(continued)

APPENDIX continued

Conflict	*Type*	*Dates*	*Casualties*	*Interventions*	*Type of Intervention*	*Target of Intervention*	*Success*
Afghanistan I	Ideological	1978-1992	200,000	U.S.S.R.	Mixed	Government	No
				U.S.	Military	Opposition	No
				Iran	Military	Opposition	No
				Pakistan	Military	Opposition	No
Chad Civil War II	Ethnic	1978-1982	1,000	Lybia	Military	Opposition	Yes
				France	Mixed	Government	No
				Congo	Military	Neutral	No
				Zaire	Military	Neutral	No
				Nigeria	Military	Neutral	No
				Senegal	Military	Neutral	No
Iran, Kurdish Rebellion	Ethnic	1978-1979	10,000	Iraq	Military	Government	No
Nicaraguan Civil War	Ideological	1978-1979	30,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
Cambodia	Ideological	1979-1991	25,300	DRV Vietnam	Military	Government	No
				U.S.S.R.	Military	Government	No
				China	Military	Opposition	No
				Thailand	Military	Opposition	No
				Laos	Military	Government	No
El Salvador	Ideological	1979-1992	60,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
				Honduras	Military	Government	No
Mozambique	Ideological	1979-1993	122,000	Zimbabwe	Military	Government	No
				Tanzania	Military	Government	No
				South Africa	Military	Opposition	No
				Malawi	Military	Government	No
				U.S.S.R.	Mixed	Government	Yes
Uganda I	Ethnic	1980-1986	250,000	U.S.	Mixed	Opposition	No
				ROK Korea	Military	Government	No
Zimbabwe	Ideological	1980-1988	1,500	South Africa	Military	Opposition	No
Gambia, Sanyang Coup	Ideological	1981	800	Senegal	Military	Government	Yes
Peru	Ideological	1982-Present	27,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
Nicaragua	Ideological	1982-1990	10,000	U.S.	Mixed	Opposition	No
				Honduras	Military	Opposition	No
				U.S.S.R.	Economic	Government	No
Somalia	Ethnic	1982-1991	20,000	Ethiopia	Military	Opposition	No
				U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
				U.S.	Mixed	Opposition	No
Sri Lanka, Tamil Insurgency	Ethnic	1982-Present	24,000	India	Military	Government	No
				Norway	Economic	Opposition	No
				U.K.	Economic	Opposition	No
Chad Civil War III	Ethnic	1983-1986	1,500	France	Mixed	Government	No
				Libya	Military	Opposition	No
				Zaire	Military	Government	No
				France	Military	Government	Yes
Sudanese Civil War	Religious	1983-Present	990,000	Libya	Military	Opposition	No
				Iran	Military	Government	No
Colombia	Ideological	1984-Present	11,000	U.S.	Mixed	Government	No
Iraq, Kurdish Rebellion	Ethnic	1985-Present	180,000	Iran	Military	Opposition	No
				U.S.	Military	Opposition	Yes
				United Nations	Mixed	Opposition	Yes

(continued)

APPENDIX continued

Conflict	*Type*	*Dates*	*Casualties*	*Interventions*	*Type of Intervention*	*Target of Intervention*	*Success*
India	Religious	1985-Present	30,000	Afghanistan	Military	Opposition	No
				Pakistan	Military	Opposition	No
Ethiopian Civil War	Ideological	1987-1991	45,000	U.S.S.R.	Military	Government	No
Lebanon II	Religious	1988-1990	1,500	Israel	Military	Opposition	No
				Syria	Military	Government	Yes
Liberia I	Ethnic	1989-1990	20,000	Nigeria	Military	Government	Yes
				Ghana	Military	Government	Yes
Chad Civil War IV	Ethnic	1989-Present	1,000	France	Military	Government	No
Rwanda	Ethnic	1990-1994	250,000	France	Military	Government	No
Niger	Ethnic	1990-Present	1,000	Liberia	Military	Opposition	No
Mali	Ethnic	1990-Present	1,000	Liberia	Military	Opposition	No
Georgia	Ethnic	1991-1993	10,000	U.S.S.R.	Military	Government	Yes
Azerbijan	Ethnic	1991-Present	7,000	Armenia	Military	Opposition	No
				Turkey	Military	Government	No
Somalia	Ethnic	1991-Present	300,000	U.S.	Mixed	Neutral	No
				United Nations	Military	Neutral	Yes
Iraq, Shiites Suppression	Religious	1991-Present	500,000	U.S.	Mixed	Opposition	Yes
				U.K.	Mixed	Opposition	Yes
				United Nations	Mixed	Opposition	Yes
Bosnia, Serbian Rebellion	Ethnic	1992-Present	200,000	Yugoslavia	Military	Opposition	No
				United Nations	Military	Neutral	No
Moldova	Ethnic	1992-Present	1,000	U.S.S.R.	Military	Opposition	Yes
Tajikistan	Ideological	1991-1994	40,000	U.S.S.R.	Mixed	Government	Yes
				Afghanistan	Military	Opposition	No
Liberia	Ethnic	1992-1993	15,000	Nigeria	Military	Government	Yes
				Ghana	Military	Government	Yes
Yemen Civil War	Ideological	1994	2,000	Saudi Arabia	Military	Opposition	No
Israel-Palestinian Conflict	Ideological	1964-1994	10,000	Libya	Military	Opposition	No
				Saudi Arabia	Economic	Opposition	No
				Kuwait	Economic	Opposition	No
				Bahrain	Economic	Opposition	No
				Syria	Military	Opposition	No
				Lebanon	Military	Opposition	No
				Iraq	Mixed	Opposition	No
				Egypt	Military	Opposition	No

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