



The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation? ☆



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ABSTRACT

We examine how susceptible jobs are to computerisation. To assess this, we begin by implementing a novel methodology to estimate the probability of computerisation for 702 detailed occupations, using a Gaussian process classifier. Based on these estimates, we examine expected impacts of future computerisation on US labour market outcomes, with the primary objective of analysing the number of jobs at risk and the relationship between an occupations probability of computerisation, wages and educational attainment.

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1. Introduction

In this paper, we address the question: how susceptible are jobs to computerisation? Doing so, we build on the existing literature in two ways. First, drawing upon recent advances in Machine Learning (ML) and Mobile Robotics (MR), we develop a novel methodology to categorise occupations according to their susceptibility to computerisation.¹ Second, we implement this methodology to estimate the probability of computerisation for 702 detailed occupations, and examine expected impacts of future computerisation on US labour market outcomes.

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¹ We refer to computerisation as job automation by means of computer-controlled equipment.

Our paper is motivated by John Maynard Keynes's frequently cited prediction of widespread technological unemployment “due to our discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour” (Keynes, 1933, p. 3). Indeed, over the past decades, computers have substituted for a number of jobs, including the functions of book-keepers, cashiers and telephone operators (Bresnahan, 1999; MGI, 2013). More recently, the poor performance of labour markets across advanced economies has intensified the debate about technological unemployment among economists. While there is ongoing disagreement about the driving forces behind the persistently high unemployment rates, a number of scholars have pointed at computer-controlled equipment as a possible explanation for recent jobless growth (see, for example, Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011).²

The impact of computerisation on labour market outcomes is well-established in the literature, documenting the decline of employment in routine intensive occupations – i.e. occupations

² This view finds support in a recent survey by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), showing that 44% of firms which reduced their headcount since the financial crisis of 2008 had done so by means of automation (MGI, 2011).

mainly consisting of tasks following well-defined procedures that can easily be performed by sophisticated algorithms. For example, studies by Charles et al. (2013) and Jaimovich and Siu (2012) emphasise that the ongoing decline in manufacturing employment and the disappearance of other routine jobs is causing the current low rates of employment.³ In addition to the computerisation of routine manufacturing tasks, Autor and Dorn (2013) document a structural shift in the labour market, with workers reallocating their labour supply from middle-income manufacturing to low-income service occupations. Arguably, this is because the manual tasks of service occupations are less susceptible to computerisation, as they require a higher degree of flexibility and physical adaptability (Autor et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor and Dorn, 2013).

At the same time, with falling prices of computing, problem-solving skills are becoming relatively productive, explaining the substantial employment growth in occupations involving cognitive tasks where skilled labour has a comparative advantage, as well as the persistent increase in returns to education (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Acemoglu, 2002; Autor and Dorn, 2013). The title “Lousy and Lovely Jobs”, of recent work by Goos and Manning (2007), thus captures the essence of the current trend towards labour market polarisation, with growing employment in high-income cognitive jobs and low-income manual occupations, accompanied by a hollowing-out of middle-income routine jobs.

According to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011), the pace of technological innovation is still increasing, with more sophisticated software technologies disrupting labour markets by making workers redundant. What is striking about the examples in their book is that computerisation is no longer confined to routine manufacturing tasks. The autonomous driverless cars, developed by Google, provide one example of how manual tasks in transport and logistics may soon be automated. In the section “In Domain After Domain, Computers Race Ahead”, they emphasise how fast moving these developments have been. Less than ten years ago, in the chapter “Why People Still Matter”, Levy and Murnane (2004) pointed at the difficulties of replicating human perception, asserting that driving in traffic is insusceptible to automation: “But executing a left turn against oncoming traffic involves so many factors that it is hard to imagine discovering the set of rules that can replicate a driver’s behaviour [...]”. Six years later, in October 2010, Google announced that it had modified several Toyota Priuses to be fully autonomous (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011).

To our knowledge, no study has yet quantified what recent technological progress is likely to mean for the future of employment. The present study intends to bridge this gap in the literature. Although there are indeed existing useful frameworks for examining the impact of computers on the occupational employment composition, they seem inadequate in explaining the impact of technological trends going beyond the computerisation of routine tasks. Seminal work by Autor et al. (2003), for example, distinguishes between cognitive and manual tasks on the one hand, and routine and non-routine tasks on the other. While the computer substitution for both cognitive and manual routine tasks is evident, non-routine tasks involve everything from legal writing, truck driving and medical diagnoses, to persuading and selling. In the present study, we will argue that legal writing and truck driving will soon be automated, while persuading, for instance, will not. Drawing upon recent developments in Engineering Sciences, and in particular advances in the fields of ML, including Data Mining, Machine Vision, Computational Statistics and other sub-fields of Artificial Intelligence, as well as MR, we derive additional dimensions required to understand the

susceptibility of jobs to computerisation. Needless to say, a number of factors are driving decisions to automate and we cannot capture these in full. Rather we aim, from a technological capabilities point of view, to determine which problems engineers need to solve for specific occupations to be automated. By highlighting these problems, their difficulty and to which occupations they relate, we categorise jobs according to their susceptibility to computerisation. The characteristics of these problems were matched to different occupational characteristics, using O*NET data, allowing us to examine the future direction of technological change in terms of its impact on the occupational composition of the labour market, but also the number of jobs at risk should these technologies materialise.

The present study relates to two literatures. First, our analysis builds on the labour economics literature on the task content of employment (Autor et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Ingram and Neumann, 2006). Based on defined premises about what computers do, this literature examines the historical impact of computerisation on the occupational composition of the labour market. However, the scope of what computers do has recently expanded, and will inevitably continue to do so (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011; MGI, 2013). Drawing upon recent progress in ML, we expand the premises about the tasks computers are and will be suited to accomplish. Doing so, we build on the task content literature in a forward-looking manner. Furthermore, whereas this literature has largely focused on task measures from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), last revised in 1991, we rely on the 2010 version of the DOT successor O*NET – an online service developed for the US Department of Labor.⁴ In particular, Ingram and Neumann (2006) use various DOT measurements to examine returns to different skills. Our analysis builds on their approach by classifying occupations according to their susceptibility to computerisation using O*NET data.

Second, our study relates to the literature examining the offshoring of information/based tasks to foreign worksites (Blinder, 2009; Blinder and Krueger, 2013; Jensen and Kletzer, 2005, 2010; Oldenski, 2012). This literature consists of different methodologies to rank and categorise occupations according to their susceptibility to offshoring. For example, using O*NET data on the nature of work done in different occupations, Blinder (2009) estimates that 22 to 29% of US jobs are or will be offshorable in the next decade or two. These estimates are based on two defining characteristics of jobs that cannot be offshored: (a) the job must be performed at a specific work location; and (b) the job requires face-to-face personal communication. Naturally, the characteristics of occupations that can be offshored are different from the characteristics of occupations that can be automated. For example, the work of cashiers, which has largely been substituted by self-service technology, must be performed at specific work location and requires face-to-face contact. The extent of computerisation is therefore likely to go beyond that of offshoring. Hence, while the implementation of our methodology is similar to that of Blinder (2009), we rely on different occupational characteristics.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on the historical relationship between technological progress and employment. Section 3 describes recent and expected future technological developments. In Section 4, we describe our methodology, and in Section 5, we examine the expected impact of these technological developments on labour market outcomes. Finally, in Section 6, we derive some conclusions.

2. A history of technological revolutions and employment

The concern over technological unemployment is hardly a recent phenomenon. Throughout history, the process of creative

³ Because the core job tasks of manufacturing occupations follow well-defined repetitive procedures, they can easily be codified in computer software and thus performed by computers (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).

⁴ Goos et al. (2009) provides a notable exception.

destruction, following technological inventions, has created enormous wealth, but also undesired disruptions. As stressed by Schumpeter (1962), it was not the lack of inventive ideas that set the boundaries for economic development, but rather powerful social and economic interests promoting the technological status quo. This is nicely illustrated by the example of William Lee, inventing the stocking frame knitting machine in 1589, hoping that it would relieve workers of hand-knitting. Seeking patent protection for his invention, he travelled to London where he had rented a building for his machine to be viewed by Queen Elizabeth I. To his disappointment, the Queen was more concerned with the employment impact of his invention and refused to grant him a patent, claiming that “Thou aimest high, Master Lee. Consider thou what the invention could do to my poor subjects. It would assuredly bring to them ruin by depriving them of employment, thus making them beggars” (cited in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 182f). Most likely the Queen’s concern was a manifestation of the hosiers’ guilds fear that the invention would make the skills of its artisan members obsolete.⁵ The guilds’ opposition was indeed so intense that William Lee had to leave Britain.

That guilds systematically tried to weaken market forces as aggregators to maintain the technological status quo is persuasively argued by Kellenbenz (1974, p. 243), stating that “guilds defended the interests of their members against outsiders, and these included the inventors who, with their new equipment and techniques, threatened to disturb their members’ economic status.”⁶ As pointed out by Mokyr (1998, p. 11): “Unless all individuals accept the ‘verdict’ of the market outcome, the decision whether to adopt an innovation is likely to be resisted by losers through non-market mechanism and political activism.” Workers can thus be expected to resist new technologies, insofar that they make their skills obsolete and irreversibly reduce their expected earnings. The balance between job conservation and technological progress therefore, to a large extent, reflects the balance of power in society, and how gains from technological progress are being distributed.

The British Industrial Revolution illustrates this point vividly. While still widely present on the Continent, the craft guild in Britain had, by the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, declined and lost most of its political clout (Nef, 1957, pp. 26 and 32). With Parliamentary supremacy established over the Crown, legislation was passed in 1769 making the destruction of machinery punishable by death (Mokyr, 1990, p. 257). To be sure, there was still resistance to mechanisation. The “Luddite” riots between 1811 and 1816 were partly a manifestation of the fear of technological change among workers as Parliament revoked a 1551 law prohibiting the use of gig mills in the wool-finishing trade. The British government however took an increasingly stern view on groups attempting to halt technological progress and deployed 12,000 men against the rioters (Mantoux, 2006, p. 403–408). The sentiment of the government towards the destruction of machinery was explained by a resolution passed after the Lancashire riots of 1779, stating that “The sole cause of great riots was the new machines employed in cotton manufacture; the country notwithstanding has greatly benefited from their erection [and] destroying them in this country would only be the means of transferring them to another [...] to the detriment of the trade of Britain” (cited in Mantoux, 2006, p. 403).

⁵ The term artisan refers to a craftsman who engages in the entire production process of a good, containing almost no division of labour. By guild we mean an association of artisans that control the practice of their craft in a particular town.

⁶ There is an ongoing debate about the technological role of the guilds. Epstein (1998), for example, has argued that they fulfilled an important role in the intergenerational transmission of knowledge. Yet there is no immediate contradiction between such a role and their conservative stand on technological progress: there are clear examples of guilds restraining the diffusion of inventions (see, for example, Ogilvie, 2004).

There are at least two possible explanations for the shift in attitudes towards technological progress. First, after Parliamentary supremacy was established over the Crown, the property owning classes became politically dominant in Britain (North and Weingast, 1989). Because the diffusion of various manufacturing technologies did not impose a risk to the value of their assets, and some property owners stood to benefit from the export of manufactured goods, the artisans simply did not have the political power to repress them. Second, inventors, consumers and unskilled factory workers largely benefited from mechanisation (Mokyr, 1990, p. 256 and 258). It has even been argued that, despite the employment concerns over mechanisation, unskilled workers have been the greatest beneficiaries of the Industrial Revolution (Clark, 2008).⁷ While there is contradictory evidence suggesting that capital owners initially accumulated a growing share of national income (Allen, 2009a), there is equally evidence of growing real wages (Feinstein, 1998; Lindert and Williamson, 1983). This implies that although manufacturing technologies made the skills of artisans obsolete, gains from technological progress were distributed in a manner that gradually benefited a growing share of the labour force.⁸

An important feature of nineteenth century manufacturing technologies is that they were largely “deskilling” – i.e. they substituted for skills through the simplification of tasks (Braverman, 1974; Hounshell, 1985; James and Skinner, 1985; Goldin and Katz, 1998). The deskilling process occurred as the factory system began to displace the artisan shop, and it picked up pace as production increasingly mechanized with the adoption of steam power (Goldin and Sokoloff, 1982; Atack et al., 2008a). Work that had previously been performed by artisans was now decomposed into smaller, highly specialised, sequences, requiring less skill, but more workers, to perform.⁹ Some innovations were even designed to be deskilling. For example, Eli Whitney, a pioneer of interchangeable parts, described the objective of this technology as “to substitute correct and effective operations of machinery for the skill of the artist which is acquired only by long practice and experience; a species of skill which is not possessed in this country to any considerable extent” (Habakkuk, 1962, p. 22).

Together with developments in continuous-flow production, enabling workers to be stationary while different tasks were moved to them, it was identical interchangeable parts that allowed complex

⁷ Various estimations of the living standards of workers in Britain during the industrialisation exist in the literature. For example, Clark (2008) finds that real wages over the period 1760 to 1860 rose faster than GDP per capita. Further evidence provided by Lindert and Williamson (1983) even suggests that real wages nearly doubled between 1820 and 1850. Feinstein (1998), on the other hand, finds a much more moderate increase, with average working-class living standards improving by less than 15% between 1770 and 1870. Finally, Allen (2009a) finds that over the first half of the nineteenth century, the real wage stagnated while output per worker expanded. After the mid nineteenth century, however, real wages began to grow in line with productivity. While this implies that capital owners were the greatest beneficiaries of the Industrial Revolution, there is at the same time consensus that average living standards largely improved.

⁸ The term skill is associated with higher levels of education, ability, or job training. Following Goldin and Katz (1998), we refer to technology-skill or capital-skill complementarity when a new technology or physical capital complements skilled labour relative to unskilled workers.

⁹ The production of plows nicely illustrates the differences between the artisan shop and the factory. In one artisan shop, two men spent 118 man-hours using hammers, anvils, chisels, hatchets, axes, mallets, shaves and augers in 11 distinct operations to produce a plow. By contrast, a mechanized plow factory employed 52 workers performing 97 distinct tasks, of which 72 were assisted by steam power, to produce a plow in just 3.75 man-hours. The degree of specialisation was even greater in the production of men’s white muslin shirts. In the artisan shop, one worker spent 1439 hours performing 25 different tasks to produce 144 shirts. In the factory, it took 188 man-hours to produce the same quantity, engaging 230 different workers performing 39 different tasks, of which more than half required steam power. The workers involved included cutters, turners and trimmers, as well as foremen and forewomen, inspectors, errand boys, an engineer, a fireman, and a watchman (US Department of Labor, 1899).

products to be assembled from mass produced individual components by using highly specialised machine tools to a sequence of operations.¹⁰ Yet while the first assembly-line was documented in 1804, it was not until the late nineteenth century that continuous-flow processes started to be adopted on a larger scale, which enabled corporations such as the Ford Motor Company to manufacture the T-Ford at a sufficiently low price for it to become the people's vehicle (Mokyr, 1990, p. 137). Crucially, the new assembly line introduced by Ford in 1913 was specifically designed for machinery to be operated by unskilled workers (Hounshell, 1985, p. 239). Furthermore, what had previously been a one-man job was turned into a 29-man worker operation, reducing the overall work time by 34% (Bright, 1958). The example of the Ford Motor Company thus underlines the general pattern observed in the nineteenth century, with physical capital providing a relative complement to unskilled labour, while substituting for relatively skilled artisans (James and Skinner, 1985; Louis and Paterson, 1986; Brown and Philips, 1986; Attack et al., 2004).¹¹ Hence, as pointed out by Acemoglu (2002, p. 7): “the idea that technological advances favour more skilled workers is a twentieth century phenomenon.” The conventional wisdom among economic historians, in other words, suggests a discontinuity between the nineteenth and twentieth century in the impact of capital deepening on the relative demand for skilled labour.

The modern pattern of capital-skill complementarity gradually emerged in the late nineteenth century, as manufacturing production shifted to increasingly mechanized assembly lines. This shift can be traced to the switch to electricity from steam and water-power which, in combination with continuous-process and batch production methods, reduced the demand for unskilled manual workers in many hauling, conveying, and assembly tasks, but increased the demand for skills (Goldin and Katz, 1998). In short, while factory assembly lines, with their extreme division of labour, had required vast quantities of human operatives, electrification allowed many stages of the production process to be automated, which in turn increased the demand for relatively skilled blue-collar production workers to operate the machinery. In addition, electrification contributed to a growing share of white-collar nonproduction workers (Goldin and Katz, 1998). Over the course of the nineteenth century, establishments became larger in size as steam and water power technologies improved, allowing them to adopt powered machinery to realise productivity gains through the combination of enhanced division of labour and higher capital intensity (Attack et al., 2008a). Furthermore, the transport revolution lowered costs of shipping goods domestically and internationally as infrastructure spread and improved (Attack et al., 2008b). The market for artisan goods early on had largely been confined to the immediate surrounding area because transport costs were high relative to the value of

the goods produced. With the transport revolution, however, market size expanded, thereby eroding local monopoly power, which in turn increased competition and compelled firms to raise productivity through mechanisation. As establishments became larger and served geographically expended markets, managerial tasks increased in number and complexity, requiring more managerial and clerking employees (Chandler, 1977). This pattern was, by the turn of the twentieth century, reinforced by electrification, which not only contributed to a growing share of relatively skilled blue-collar labour, but also increased the demand for white-collar workers (Goldin and Katz, 1998), who tended to have higher educational attainment (Allen, 2001).¹²

Since electrification, the story of the twentieth century has been the race between education and technology (Goldin and Katz, 2009). The US high school movement coincided with the first industrial revolution of the office (Goldin and Katz, 1995). While the typewriter was invented in the 1860s, it was not introduced in the office until the early twentieth century, when it entered a wave of mechanisation, with dictaphones, calculators, mimeo machines, address machines, and the predecessor of the computer – the keypunch (Beniger, 1986; Cortada, 2000). Importantly, these office machines reduced the cost of information processing tasks and increased the demand for the complementary factor – i.e. educated office workers. Yet the increased supply of educated office workers, following the high school movement, was associated with a sharp decline in the wage premium of clerking occupations relative to production workers (Goldin and Katz, 1995). This was, however, not the result of deskilling technological change. Clerking workers were indeed relatively educated. Rather, it was the result of the supply of educated workers outpacing the demand for their skills, leading educational wage differentials to compress.

While educational wage differentials in the US narrowed from 1915 to 1980 (Goldin and Katz, 2009), both educational wage differentials and overall wage inequality have increased sharply since the 1980s in a number of countries (Krueger, 1993; Murphy et al., 1998; Atkinson, 2008; Goldin and Katz, 2009). Although there are clearly several variables at work, consensus is broad that this can be ascribed to an acceleration in capital-skill complementarity, driven by the adoption of computers and information technology (Krueger, 1993; Autor et al., 1998; Bresnahan et al., 2002). What is commonly referred to as the Computer Revolution began with the first commercial uses of computers around 1960 and continued through the development of the Internet and e-commerce in the 1990s. As the cost per computation declined at an annual average of 37% between 1945 and 1980 (Nordhaus, 2007), telephone operators were made redundant, the first industrial robot was introduced by General Motors in the 1960s, and in the 1970s airline reservations systems led the way in self-service technology (Gordon, 2012). During the 1980s and 1990s, computing costs declined even more rapidly, on average by 64% per year, accompanied by a surge in computational power (Nordhaus, 2007).¹³ At the same time, bar-code scanners and cash machines were spreading across the retail and financial industries, and the first personal computers were introduced in the early 1980s, with their word processing and spreadsheet functions eliminating copy typist occupations and allowing repetitive calculations to be automated (Gordon, 2012). This substitution for labour marks a further important reversal. The early twentieth century office machines increased the demand for clerking workers (Chandler, 1977; Goldin and Katz, 1995). In a

¹⁰ These machines were sequentially implemented until the production process was completed. Over time, such machines became much cheaper relative to skilled labour. As a result, production became much more capital intensive (Hounshell, 1985).

¹¹ Williamson and Lindert (1980), on the other hand, find a relative rise in wage premium of skilled labour over the period 1820 to 1860, which they partly attribute to capital deepening. Their claim of growing wage inequality over this period has, however, been challenged (Margo, 2000). Yet seen over the long-run, a more refined explanation is that the manufacturing share of the labour force in the nineteenth century hollowed out. This is suggested by recent findings, revealing a decline of middle-skill artisan jobs in favour of both high-skill white collar workers and low-skill operatives (Gray, 2013; Katz and Margo, 2013). Furthermore, even if the share of operatives was increasing due to organizational change within manufacturing and overall manufacturing growth, it does not follow that the share of unskilled labour was rising in the aggregate economy, because some of the growth in the share of operatives may have come at the expense of a decrease in the share of workers employed as low-skilled farm workers in agriculture (Katz and Margo, 2013). Nevertheless, this evidence is consistent with the literature showing that relatively skilled artisans were replaced by unskilled factory workers, suggesting that technological change in manufacturing was deskilling.

¹² Most likely, the growing share of white-collar workers increased the element of human interaction in employment. Notably, Michaels et al. (2013) find that the increase in the employment share of interactive occupations, going hand in hand with an increase in their relative wage bill share, was particularly strong between 1880 and 1930, which is a period of rapid change in communication and transport technology.

¹³ Computer power even increased 18% faster on annual basis than predicted by Moore's Law, implying a doubling every two years (Nordhaus, 2007).

similar manner, computerisation augments demand for such tasks, but it also permits them to be automated (Autor et al., 2003).

The Computer Revolution can go some way in explaining the growing wage inequality of the past decades. For example, Krueger (1993) finds that workers using a computer earn roughly 10 to 15% more than others, but also that computer use accounts for a substantial share of the increase in the rate of return to education. In addition, more recent studies find that computers have caused a shift in the occupational structure of the labour market. Autor and Dorn (2013), for example, show that as computerisation erodes wages for labour performing routine tasks, workers will reallocate their labour supply to relatively low-skill service occupations. More specifically, between 1980 and 2005, the share of US labour hours in service occupations grew by 30% after having been flat or declining in the three prior decades. Furthermore, net changes in US employment were U-shaped in skill level, meaning that the lowest and highest job-skill quartile expanded sharply with relative employment declines in the middle of the distribution.

The expansion in high-skill employment can be explained by the falling price of carrying out routine tasks by means of computers, which complements more abstract and creative services. Seen from a production function perspective, an outward shift in the supply of routine informational inputs increases the marginal productivity of workers they are demanded by. For example, text and data mining has improved the quality of legal research as constant access to market information has improved the efficiency of managerial decision-making – i.e. tasks performed by skilled workers at the higher end of the income distribution. The result has been an increasingly polarised labour market, with growing employment in high-income cognitive jobs and low-income manual occupations, accompanied by a hollowing-out of middle-income routine jobs. This is a pattern that is not unique to the US and equally applies to a number of developed economies (Goos et al., 2009).¹⁴

How technological progress in the twenty-first century will impact on labour market outcomes remains to be seen. Throughout history, technological progress has vastly shifted the composition of employment, from agriculture and the artisan shop, to manufacturing and clerking, to service and management occupations. Yet the concern over technological unemployment has proven to be exaggerated. The obvious reason why this concern has not materialised relates to Ricardo's famous chapter on machinery, which suggests that labour-saving technology reduces the demand for undifferentiated labour, thus leading to technological unemployment (Ricardo, 1819). As economists have long understood, however, an invention that replaces workers by machines will have effects on all product and factor markets. An increase in the efficiency of production which reduces the price of one good, will increase real income and thus increase demand for other goods. Hence, in short, technological progress has two competing effects on employment (Aghion and Howitt, 1994). First, as technology substitutes for labour, there is a destruction effect, requiring workers to reallocate their labour supply; and second, there is the capitalisation effect, as more companies enter industries where productivity is relatively high, leading employment in those industries to expand.

Although the capitalisation effect has been predominant historically, our discovery of means of economising the use of labour can outrun the pace at which we can find new uses for labour, as Keynes (1933) pointed out. The reason why human labour has prevailed relates to its ability to adopt and acquire new skills by means of education (Goldin and Katz, 2009). Yet as computerisation enters more cognitive domains this will become increasingly challenging (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011). Recent empirical findings are therefore particularly concerning. For example, Beaudry et al. (2013) document a decline in the demand for skill over the past decade, even as the supply of workers with higher education has continued to grow. They show that high-skilled workers have moved down the occupational ladder, taking on jobs traditionally performed by low-skilled workers, pushing low-skilled workers even further down the occupational ladder and, to some extent, even out of the labour force. This raises questions about (a) the ability of human labour to win the race against technology by means of education; and (b) the potential extent of technological unemployment, as an increasing pace of technological progress will cause higher job turnover, resulting in a higher natural rate of unemployment (Lucas and Prescott, 1974; Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Pissarides, 2000). While the present study is limited to examining the destruction effect of technology, it nevertheless provides a useful indication of the job growth required to counterbalance the jobs at risk over the next decades.

3. The technological revolutions of the twenty-first century

The secular price decline in the real cost of computing has created vast economic incentives for employers to substitute labour for computer capital.¹⁵ Yet the tasks computers are able to perform ultimately depend upon the ability of a programmer to write a set of procedures or rules that appropriately direct the technology in each possible contingency. Computers will therefore be relatively productive to human labour when a problem can be specified – in the sense that the criteria for success are quantifiable and can readily be evaluated (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). The extent of job computerisation will thus be determined by technological advances that allow engineering problems to be sufficiently specified, which sets the boundaries for the scope of computerisation. In this section, we examine the extent of tasks computer-controlled equipment can be expected to perform over the next decades. Doing so, we focus on advances in fields related to Machine Learning (ML), including Data Mining, Machine Vision, Computational Statistics and other sub-fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI), in which efforts are explicitly dedicated to the development of algorithms that allow cognitive tasks to be automated. In addition, we examine the application of ML technologies in Mobile Robotics (MR), and thus the extent of computerisation in manual tasks.

Our analysis builds on the task categorisation of Autor et al. (2003), which distinguishes between workplace tasks using a two-by-two matrix, with routine versus non-routine tasks on one axis, and manual versus cognitive tasks on the other. In short, routine tasks are defined as tasks that follow explicit rules that can be accomplished by machines, while non-routine tasks are not sufficiently well understood to be specified in computer code. Each of these task categories can, in turn, be of either manual or cognitive nature – i.e. they relate to physical labour or knowledge work. Historically, computerisation has largely been confined to manual and cognitive routine tasks involving explicit rule-based activities (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos et al., 2009). Following recent technological advances, however, computerisation is now spreading to domains commonly defined as non-routine. The rapid pace at which tasks that

¹⁴ While there is broad consensus that computers substituting for workers in routine-intensive tasks has driven labour market polarisation over the past decades, there are, indeed, alternative explanations. For example, technological advances in computing have dramatically lowered the cost of leaving information-based tasks to foreign workites (Jensen and Kletzer, 2005; Blinder, 2009; Jensen and Kletzer, 2010; Oldenski, 2012; Blinder and Krueger, 2013). The decline in the routine-intensity of employment is thus likely to result from a combination of offshoring and automation. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that improvements in transport and communication technology have augmented occupations involving human interaction, spanning across both cognitive and manual tasks (Michaels et al., 2013). These explanations are nevertheless equally related to advance in computing and communications technology.

¹⁵ We refer to computer capital as accumulated computers and computer-controlled equipment by means of capital deepening.

were defined as non-routine only a decade ago have now become computerisable is illustrated by [Autor et al. \(2003\)](#), asserting that “Navigating a car through city traffic or deciphering the scrawled handwriting on a personal check – minor undertakings for most adults – are not routine tasks by our definition.” Today, the problems of navigating a car and deciphering handwriting are sufficiently well understood that many related tasks can be specified in computer code and automated ([Veres et al., 2011](#); [Plötz and Fink, 2009](#)).

Recent technological breakthroughs are, in large part, due to efforts to turn non-routine tasks into well-defined problems. Defining such problems is helped by the provision of relevant data: this is highlighted in the case of handwriting recognition by [Plötz and Fink \(2009\)](#). The success of an algorithm for handwriting recognition is difficult to quantify without data to test on – in particular, determining whether an algorithm performs well for different styles of writing requires data containing a variety of such styles. That is, data is required to specify the many contingencies a technology must manage in order to form an adequate substitute for human labour. With data, objective and quantifiable measures of the success of an algorithm can be produced, which aid the continual improvement of its performance relative to humans.

As such, technological progress has been aided by the recent production of increasingly large and complex datasets, known as big data.¹⁶ For instance, with a growing corpus of human-translated digitalised text, the success of a machine translator can now be judged by its accuracy in reproducing observed translations. Data from United Nations documents, which are translated by human experts into six languages, allow Google Translate to monitor and improve the performance of different machine translation algorithms ([Tanner, 2007](#)).

Further, ML algorithms can discover unexpected similarities between old and new data, aiding the computerisation of tasks for which big data has newly become available. As a result, computerisation is no longer confined to routine tasks that can be written as rule-based software queries, but is spreading to every non-routine task where big data becomes available ([Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011](#)). In this section, we examine the extent of future computerisation beyond routine tasks.

3.1. Computerisation in non-routine cognitive tasks

With the availability of big data, a wide range of non-routine cognitive tasks are becoming computerisable. That is, further to the general improvement in technological progress due to big data, algorithms for big data are rapidly entering domains reliant upon storing or accessing information. The use of big data is afforded by one of the chief comparative advantages of computers relative to human labour: scalability. Little evidence is required to demonstrate that, in performing the task of labourious computation, networks of machines scale better than human labour ([Campbell-Kelly, 2009](#)). As such, computers can better manage the large calculations required in using large datasets. ML algorithms running on computers are now, in many cases, better able to detect patterns in big data than humans.

Computerisation of cognitive tasks is also aided by another core comparative advantage of algorithms: their absence of some human biases. An algorithm can be designed to ruthlessly satisfy the small range of tasks it is given. Humans, in contrast, must fulfill a range of tasks unrelated to their occupation, such as sleeping, necessitating occasional sacrifices in their occupational performance ([Kahneman et al., 1982](#)). The additional constraints under which

humans must operate manifest themselves as biases. Consider an example of human bias: [Danziger et al. \(2011\)](#) demonstrate that experienced Israeli judges are substantially more generous in their rulings following a lunch break. It can thus be argued that many roles involving decision-making will benefit from impartial algorithmic solutions.

Fraud detection is a task that requires both impartial decision making and the ability to detect trends in big data. As such, this task is now almost completely automated ([Phua et al., 2010](#)). In a similar manner, the comparative advantages of computers are likely to change the nature of work across a wide range of industries and occupations.

In health care, diagnostics tasks are already being computerised. Oncologists at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center are, for example, using IBM's Watson computer to provide chronic care and cancer treatment diagnostics. Knowledge from 600,000 medical evidence reports, 1.5 million patient records and clinical trials, and two million pages of text from medical journals, are used for benchmarking and pattern recognition purposes. This allows the computer to compare each patient's individual symptoms, genetics, family and medication history, etc., to diagnose and develop a treatment plan with the highest probability of success ([Cohn, 2013](#)).

In addition, computerisation is entering the domains of legal and financial services. Sophisticated algorithms are gradually taking on a number of tasks performed by paralegals, contract and patent lawyers ([Markoff, 2011](#)). More specifically, law firms now rely on computers that can scan thousands of legal briefs and precedents to assist in pre-trial research. A frequently cited example is Symantec's Clearwell system, which uses language analysis to identify general concepts in documents, can present the results graphically, and proved capable of analysing and sorting more than 570,000 documents in two days ([Markoff, 2011](#)).

Furthermore, the improvement of sensing technology has made sensor data one of the most prominent sources of big data ([Ackerman and Guizzo, 2011](#)). Sensor data is often coupled with new ML fault- and anomaly-detection algorithms to render many tasks computerisable. A broad class of examples can be found in condition monitoring and novelty detection, with technology substituting for closed-circuit TV (CCTV) operators, workers examining equipment defects, and clinical staff responsible for monitoring the state of patients in intensive care. Here, the fact that computers lack human biases is of great value: algorithms are free of irrational bias, and their vigilance need not be interrupted by rest breaks or lapses of concentration. Following the declining costs of digital sensing and actuation, ML approaches have successfully addressed condition monitoring applications ranging from batteries ([Saha et al., 2007](#)), to aircraft engines ([King et al., 2009](#)), water quality ([Osborne et al., 2012](#)) and intensive care units (ICUs) ([Clifford and Clifton, 2012](#); [Clifton et al., 2012](#)). Sensors can equally be placed on trucks and pallets to improve companies' supply chain management, and used to measure the moisture in a field of crops to track the flow of water through utility pipes. This allows for automatic meter reading, eliminating the need for personnel to gather such information. For example, the cities of Doha, São Paulo, and Beijing use sensors on pipes, pumps, and other water infrastructure to monitor conditions and manage water loss, reducing leaks by 40 to 50%. In the near future, it will be possible to place inexpensive sensors on light poles, sidewalks, and other public property to capture sound and images, likely reducing the number of workers in law enforcement ([MGI, 2013](#)).

Advances in user interfaces also enable computers to respond directly to a wider range of human requests, thus augmenting the work of highly skilled labour, while allowing some types of jobs to become fully automated. For example, Apple's Siri and Google Now rely on natural user interfaces to recognise spoken words, interpret their meanings, and act on them accordingly. Moreover, a company called SmartAction now provides call computerisation solutions that use ML technology and advanced speech recognition to improve upon conventional interactive voice response systems,

¹⁶ Predictions by Cisco Systems suggest that the Internet traffic in 2016 will be around 1 zettabyte (1×10^{21} bytes) ([Cisco, 2012](#)). In comparison, the information contained in all books worldwide is about 480 terabytes (5×10^{14} bytes), and a text transcript of all the words ever spoken by humans would represent about 5 exabytes (5×10^{18} bytes) (UC Berkeley School of Information, 2003).

realising cost savings of 60 to 80% over an outsourced call center consisting of human labour (CAA, 2012). Even education, one of the most labour intensive sectors, will most likely be significantly impacted by improved user interfaces and algorithms building upon big data. The recent growth in MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) has begun to generate large datasets detailing how students interact on forums, their diligence in completing assignments and viewing lectures, and their ultimate grades (Simonite, 2013; Breslow et al., 2013). Such information, together with improved user interfaces, will allow for ML algorithms that serve as interactive tutors, with teaching and assessment strategies statistically calibrated to match individual student needs (Woolf, 2010). Big data analysis will also allow for more effective predictions of student performance, and for their suitability for post-graduation occupations. These technologies can equally be implemented in recruitment, most likely resulting in the streamlining of human resource (HR) departments.

Occupations that require subtle judgement are also increasingly susceptible to computerisation. To many such tasks, the unbiased decision making of an algorithm represents a comparative advantage over human operators. In the most challenging or critical applications, as in ICUs, algorithmic recommendations may serve as inputs to human operators; in other circumstances, algorithms will themselves be responsible for appropriate decision-making. In the financial sector, such automated decision-making has played a role for quite some time. AI algorithms are able to process a greater number of financial announcements, press releases, and other information than any human trader, and then act faster upon them (Mims, 2010). Services like Future Advisor similarly use AI to offer personalised financial advice at larger scale and lower cost. Even the work of software engineers may soon largely be computerisable. For example, advances in ML allow a programmer to leave complex parameter and design choices to be appropriately optimised by an algorithm (Hoos, 2012). Algorithms can further automatically detect bugs in software (Hangal and Lam, 2002; Livshits and Zimmermann, 2005; Kim et al., 2008), with a reliability that humans are unlikely to match. Big databases of code also offer the eventual prospect of algorithms that learn how to write programs to satisfy specifications provided by a human. Such an approach is likely to eventually improve upon human programmers, in the same way that human-written compilers eventually proved inferior to automatically optimised compilers. An algorithm can better keep the whole of a program in working memory, and is not constrained to human-intelligible code, allowing for holistic solutions that might never occur to a human. Such algorithmic improvements over human judgement are likely to become increasingly common.

Although the extent of these developments remains to be seen, estimates by MGI (2013) suggests that sophisticated algorithms could substitute for approximately 140 million full-time knowledge workers worldwide. Hence, while technological progress throughout economic history has largely been confined to the mechanisation of manual tasks, requiring physical labour, technological progress in the twenty-first century can be expected to contribute to a wide range of cognitive tasks, which, until now, have largely remained a human domain. Of course, many occupations being affected by these developments are still far from fully computerisable, meaning that the computerisation of some tasks will simply free-up time for human labour to perform other tasks. Nonetheless, the trend is clear: computers increasingly challenge human labour in a wide range of cognitive tasks (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011).

3.2. Computerisation in non-routine manual tasks

Mobile robotics provides a means of directly leveraging ML technologies to aid the computerisation of a growing scope of manual tasks. The continued technological development of robotic hardware is having notable impact upon employment: over the past decades,

industrial robots have taken on the routine tasks of most operatives in manufacturing. Now, however, more advanced robots are gaining enhanced sensors and manipulators, allowing them to perform non-routine manual tasks. For example, General Electric has recently developed robots to climb and maintain wind turbines, and more flexible surgical robots with a greater range of motion will soon perform more types of operations (Robotics-VO, 2013). In a similar manner, the computerisation of logistics is being aided by the increasing cost-effectiveness of highly instrumented and computerised cars. Mass-production vehicles, such as the Nissan LEAF, contain on-board computers and advanced telecommunication equipment that render the car a potentially fly-by-wire robot.¹⁷ Advances in sensor technology mean that vehicles are likely to soon be augmented with even more advanced suites of sensors. These will permit an algorithmic vehicle controller to monitor its environment to a degree that exceeds the capabilities of any human driver: they have the ability to simultaneously look both forwards and backwards, can natively integrate camera, GPS and LIDAR data, and are not subject to distraction. Algorithms are thus potentially safer and more effective drivers than humans.

The big data provided by these improved sensors are offering solutions to many of the engineering problems that had hindered robotic development in the past. In particular, the creation of detailed three dimensional maps of road networks has enabled autonomous vehicle navigation; most notably illustrated by Google's use of large, specialised datasets collected by its driverless cars (Guizzo, 2011). It is now completely feasible to store representations of the entire road network on-board a car, dramatically simplifying the navigation problem. Algorithms that could perform navigation throughout the changing seasons, particularly after snowfall, have been viewed as a substantial challenge. However, the big data approach can answer this by storing records from the last time snow fell, against which the vehicle's current environment can be compared (Churchill and Newman, 2012). ML approaches have also been developed to identify unprecedented changes to a particular piece of the road network, such as roadworks (Mathibela et al., 2012). This emerging technology will affect a variety of logistics jobs. Agricultural vehicles, forklifts and cargo-handling vehicles are imminently automatable, and hospitals are already employing autonomous robots to transport food, prescriptions and samples (Bloss, 2011). The computerisation of mining vehicles is further being pursued by companies such as Rio Tinto, seeking to replace labour in Australian mine-sites.¹⁸

With improved sensors, robots are capable of producing goods with higher quality and reliability than human labour. For example, El Dulze, a Spanish food processor, now uses robotics to pick up heads of lettuce from a conveyor belt, rejecting heads that do not comply with company standards. This is achieved by measuring their density and replacing them on the belt (IFR, 2012a). Advanced sensors further allow robots to recognise patterns. Baxter, a 22,000 USD general-purpose robot, provides a well-known example. The robot features an LCD display screen displaying a pair of eyes that take on different expressions depending on the situation. When the robot is first installed or needs to learn a new pattern, no programming is required. A human worker simply guides the robot arms through the motions that will be needed for the task. Baxter then memorises these patterns and can communicate that it has understood its new instructions. While the physical flexibility of Baxter is limited to performing simple operations such as picking up objects and moving them, different standard attachments can be installed on its arms,

¹⁷ A fly-by-wire robot is a robot that is controllable by a remote computer.

¹⁸ Rio Tinto's computerisation efforts are advertised at <http://www.mineofthefuture.com.au>.

allowing Baxter to perform a relatively broad scope of manual tasks at low cost (MGI, 2013).

Technological advances are contributing to declining costs in robotics. Over the past decades, robot prices have fallen about 10% annually and are expected to decline at an even faster pace in the near future (MGI, 2013). Industrial robots, with features enabled by machine vision and high-precision dexterity, which typically cost 100,000 to 150,000 USD, will be available for 50,000 to 75,000 USD in the next decade, with higher levels of intelligence and additional capabilities (IFR, 2012b). Declining robot prices will inevitably place them within reach of more users. For example, in China, employers are increasingly incentivised to substitute robots for labour, as wages and living standards are rising – Foxconn, a Chinese contract manufacturer that employs 1.2 million workers, is now investing in robots to assemble products such as the Apple iPhone (Markoff, 2012). According to the International Federation of Robotics, robot sales in China grew by more than 50% in 2011 and are expected to increase further. Globally, industrial robot sales reached a record 166,000 units in 2011, a 40% year-on-year increase (IFR, 2012b). Most likely, there will be even faster growth ahead as low-priced general-purpose models, such as Baxter, are adopted in simple manufacturing and service work.

Expanding technological capabilities and declining costs will make entirely new uses for robots possible. Robots will likely continue to take on an increasing set of manual tasks in manufacturing, packing, construction, maintenance, and agriculture. In addition, robots are already performing many simple service tasks such as vacuuming, mopping, lawn mowing, and gutter cleaning – the market for personal and household service robots is growing by about 20% annually (MGI, 2013). Meanwhile, commercial service robots are now able to perform more complex tasks in food preparation, health care, commercial cleaning, and elderly care (Robotics-VO, 2013).

As robot costs decline and technological capabilities expand, robots can thus be expected to gradually substitute for labour in a wide range of low-wage service occupations, where most US job growth has occurred over the past decades (Autor and Dorn, 2013). This means that many low-wage manual jobs that have been previously protected from computerisation could diminish over time.

3.3. The task model revisited

The task model of Autor et al. (2003) has delivered intuitive and accurate predictions in that (a) computers are more substitutable for human labour in routine relative to non-routine tasks; and (b) a greater intensity of routine inputs increases the marginal productivity of non-routine inputs. Accordingly, computers have served as a substitute for labour for many routine tasks, while exhibiting strong complementarities with labour performing cognitive non/routine tasks.¹⁹ Yet the premises about what computers do have recently expanded. Computer capital can now equally substitute for a wide range of tasks commonly defined as non-routine (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011), meaning that the task model will not hold in predicting the impact of computerisation on the task content of employment in the twenty-first century. While focusing on the substitution effects of recent technological progress, we build on the task model by deriving several factors that we expect will determine the extent of computerisation in non-routine tasks.

The task model assumes for tractability an aggregate, constant-returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas production function of the form

$$Q = (L_S + C)^{1-\beta} L_{NS}^{\beta}, \quad \beta \in [0, 1], \quad (1)$$

where L_S and L_{NS} are susceptible and non-susceptible labour inputs and C is computer capital. Computer capital is supplied perfectly elastically at market price per efficiency unit, where the market price is falling exogenously with time due to technological progress. It further assumes income-maximising workers, with heterogeneous productivity endowments in both susceptible and non-susceptible tasks. Their task supply will respond elastically to relative wage levels, meaning that workers will reallocate their labour supply according to their comparative advantage as in Roy (1951). With expanding computational capabilities, resulting from technological advances, and a falling market price of computing, workers in susceptible tasks will thus reallocate to non-susceptible tasks.

The above described simple model differs from the task model of Autor et al. (2003), in that L_{NS} is not confined to routine labour inputs. This is because recent developments in ML and MR, building upon big data, allow for pattern recognition, and thus enable computer capital to rapidly substitute for labour across a wide range of non-routine tasks. Yet some inhibiting engineering bottlenecks to computerisation persist. Beyond these bottlenecks, however, we argue that it is largely already technologically possible to automate almost any task, provided that sufficient amounts of data are gathered for pattern recognition. Our model thus predicts that the pace at which these bottlenecks can be overcome will determine the extent of computerisation in the twenty-first century.

Hence, in short, while the task model predicts that computers for labour substitution will be confined to routine tasks, our model predicts that computerisation can be extended to any non-routine task that is not subject to any engineering bottlenecks to computerisation. These bottlenecks thus set the boundaries for the computerisation of non-routine tasks. Drawing upon the ML and MR literature, and a workshop held at the Oxford University Engineering Sciences Department, we identify several engineering bottlenecks, corresponding to three task categories. According to these findings, non-susceptible labour inputs can be described as,

$$L_{NS} = \sum_{i=1}^n (L_{PM,i} + L_{C,i} + L_{SI,i}) \quad (2)$$

where L_{PM} , L_C and L_{SI} are labour inputs into perception and manipulation tasks, creative intelligence tasks, and social intelligence tasks.

We note that some related engineering bottlenecks can be partially alleviated by the simplification of tasks. One generic way of achieving this is to reduce the variation between task iterations. As a prototypical example, consider the factory assembly line, turning the non-routine tasks of the artisan shop into repetitive routine tasks performed by unskilled factory workers. A more recent example is the computerisation of non-routine manual tasks in construction. On-site construction tasks typically demand a high degree of adaptability, so as to accommodate work environments that are typically irregularly laid out, and vary according to weather. Prefabrication, in which the construction object is partially assembled in a factory before being transported to the construction site, provides a way of largely removing the requirement for adaptability. It allows many construction tasks to be performed by robots under controlled conditions that eliminate task variability – a method that is becoming increasingly widespread, particularly in Japan (Barlow and Ozaki, 2005; Linner and Bock, 2012). The extent of computerisation in the twenty-first century will thus partly depend on innovative approaches to task restructuring. In the remainder of this section we examine the engineering bottlenecks related to the above mentioned task categories, each in turn.

¹⁹ The model does not predict any substantial substitution or complementarity with non-routine manual tasks.

3.3.1. Perception and manipulation tasks

Robots are still unable to match the depth and breadth of human perception. While basic geometric identification is reasonably mature, enabled by the rapid development of sophisticated sensors and lasers, significant challenges remain for more complex perception tasks, such as identifying objects and their properties in a cluttered field of view. As such, tasks that relate to an unstructured work environment can make jobs less susceptible to computerisation. For example, most homes are unstructured, requiring the identification of a plurality of irregular objects and containing many cluttered spaces which inhibit the mobility of wheeled objects. Conversely, supermarkets, factories, warehouses, airports and hospitals have been designed for large wheeled objects, making it easier for robots to navigate in performing non-routine manual tasks. Perception problems can, however, sometimes be sidestepped by clever task design. For example, Kiva Systems, acquired by Amazon.com in 2012, solved the problem of warehouse navigation by simply placing bar-code stickers on the floor, informing robots of their precise location (Guizzo, 2008).

The difficulty of perception has ramifications for manipulation tasks, and, in particular, the handling of irregular objects, for which robots are yet to reach human levels of aptitude. This has been evidenced in the development of robots that interact with human objects and environments. While advances have been made, solutions tend to be unreliable over the myriad small variations on a single task, repeated thousands of times a day, that many applications require. A related challenge is failure recovery – *i.e.* identifying and rectifying the mistakes of the robot when it has, for example, dropped an object. Manipulation is also limited by the difficulties of planning out the sequence of actions required to move an object from one place to another. There are yet further problems in designing manipulators that, like human limbs, are soft, have compliant dynamics and provide useful tactile feedback. Most industrial manipulation makes use of workarounds to these challenges (Brown et al., 2010), but these approaches are nonetheless limited to a narrow range of tasks. The main challenges to robotic computerisation, perception and manipulation, thus largely remain and are unlikely to be fully resolved in the next decade or two (Robotics-VO, 2013).

3.3.2. Creative intelligence tasks

The psychological processes underlying human creativity are difficult to specify. According to Boden (2003), creativity is the ability to come up with ideas or artifacts that are novel and valuable. Ideas, in a broader sense, include concepts, poems, musical compositions, scientific theories, cooking recipes and jokes, whereas artifacts are objects such as paintings, sculptures, machinery, and pottery. One process of creating ideas (and similarly for artifacts) involves making unfamiliar combinations of familiar ideas, requiring a rich store of knowledge. The challenge here is to find some reliable means of arriving at combinations that “make sense.” For a computer to make a subtle joke, for example, would require a database with a richness of knowledge comparable to that of humans, and methods of benchmarking the algorithm’s subtlety.

In principle, such creativity is possible and some approaches to creativity already exist in the literature. Duvenaud et al. (2013) provide an example of automating the core creative task required in order to perform statistics, that of designing models for data. As to artistic creativity, AARON, a drawing-program, has generated thousands of stylistically-similar line-drawings, which have been exhibited in galleries worldwide. Furthermore, David Cope’s EMI software composes music in many different styles, reminiscent of specific human composers.

In these and many other applications, generating novelty is not particularly difficult. Instead, the principal obstacle to computerising creativity is stating our creative values sufficiently clearly that they can be encoded in a program (Boden, 2003). Moreover, human

values change over time and vary across cultures. Because creativity, by definition, involves not only novelty but value, and because values are highly variable, it follows that many arguments about creativity are rooted in disagreements about value. Thus, even if we could identify and encode our creative values, to enable the computer to inform and monitor its own activities accordingly, there would still be disagreement about whether the computer appeared to be creative. In the absence of engineering solutions to overcome this problem, it seems unlikely that occupations requiring a high degree of creative intelligence will be automated in the next decades.

3.3.3. Social intelligence tasks

Human social intelligence is important in a wide range of work tasks, such as those involving negotiation, persuasion and care. To aid the computerisation of such tasks, active research is being undertaken within the fields of Affective Computing (Scherer et al., 2010; Picard, 2010), and Social Robotics (Ge, 2007; Broekens et al., 2009). While algorithms and robots can now reproduce some aspects of human social interaction, the real-time recognition of natural human emotion remains a challenging problem, and the ability to respond intelligently to such inputs is even more difficult. Even simplified versions of typical social tasks prove difficult for computers, as is the case in which social interaction is reduced to pure text. The social intelligence of algorithms is partly captured by the Turing test, examining the ability of a machine to communicate indistinguishably from an actual human. Since 1990, the Loebner Prize, an annual Turing test competition, awards prizes to textual chat programmes that are considered to be the most human-like. In each competition, a human judge simultaneously holds computer-based textual interactions with both an algorithm and a human. Based on the responses, the judge is to distinguish between the two. Sophisticated algorithms have so far failed to convince judges about their human resemblance. This is largely because there is much ‘common sense’ information possessed by humans, which is difficult to articulate, that would need to be provided to algorithms if they are to function in human social settings.

Whole brain emulation, the scanning, mapping and digitalising of a human brain, is one possible approach to achieving this, but is currently only a theoretical technology. For brain emulation to become operational, additional functional understanding is required to recognise what data is relevant, as well as a roadmap of technologies needed to implement it. While such roadmaps exist, present implementation estimates, under certain assumptions, suggest that whole brain emulation is unlikely to become operational within the next decade or two (Sandberg and Bostrom, 2008). When or if they do, however, the employment impact is likely to be vast (Hanson, 2001).

Hence, in short, while sophisticated algorithms and developments in MR, building upon with big data, now allow many non-routine tasks to be automated, occupations that involve complex perception and manipulation tasks, creative intelligence tasks, and social intelligence tasks are unlikely to be substituted by computer capital over the next decade or two. The probability of an occupation being automated can thus be described as a function of these task characteristics. As suggested by Fig. 1, the low degree of social intelligence required by a dishwasher makes this occupation more susceptible to computerisation than a public relation specialist, for example. We proceed to examining the susceptibility of jobs to computerisation as a function of the above described non-susceptible task characteristics.

4. Measuring the employment impact of computerisation

4.1. Data sources and implementation strategy

To implement the above described methodology, we rely on O*NET, an online service developed for the US Department of Labor. The 2010 version of O*NET contains information on 903 detailed




Fig. 1. Bottlenecks to computerisation. *Note:* This figure provides a sketch of how the probability of computerisation might vary as a function of bottleneck variables.

occupations, most of which correspond closely to the Labor Department's Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). The O*NET data was initially collected from labour market analysts, and has since been regularly updated by surveys of each occupation's worker population and related experts, to provide up-to-date information on occupations as they evolve over time. For our purposes, an important feature of O*NET is that it defines the key features of an occupation as a standardised and measurable set of variables, but also provides open-ended descriptions of specific tasks to each occupation. This allows us to (a) objectively rank occupations according to the mix of knowledge, skills, and abilities they require; and (b) subjectively categorise them based on the variety of tasks they involve.

The close SOC correspondence of O*NET allows us to link occupational characteristics to 2010 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) employment and wage data. While the O*NET occupational classification is somewhat more detailed, distinguishing between Auditors and Accountants, for example, we aggregate these occupations to correspond to the six-digit 2010 SOC system, for which employment and wage figures are reported. To obtain unique O*NET variables corresponding to the six-digit SOC classification, we used the mean of the O*NET aggregate. In addition, we exclude any six-digit SOC occupations for which O*NET data was missing.²⁰ Doing so, we end up with a final dataset consisting of 702 occupations.

To assess the employment impact of the described technological developments in ML, the ideal experiment would provide two identical autarkic economies, one facing the expanding technological capabilities we observe, and a secular decline in the price of computerisation, and the other not. By comparison, it would be straightforward to examine how computerisation reshapes the occupational composition of the labour market. In the absence of this experiment, the second preferred option would be to build on the implementation strategy of Autor et al. (2003), and test a simple economic model to predict how demand for workplace tasks responds to developments in ML and MR technology. However, because our paper is forward-looking, in the sense that most of the described technological developments are yet to be implemented across industries on a broader scale, this option was not available for our purposes.

Instead, our implementation strategy builds on the literature examining the offshoring of information-based tasks to foreign work-sites, consisting of different methodologies to rank and categorise occupations according to their susceptibility to offshoring (Blinder, 2009; Jensen and Kletzer, 2005, 2010). The common denominator for these studies is that they rely on O*NET data in different ways. While Blinder (2009) eyeballed the O*NET data on each occupation, paying particular attention to the job description, tasks, and work activities, to assign an admittedly subjective two-digit index number of offshorability to each occupation, Jensen and Kletzer (2005)

created a purely objective ranking based on standardised and measurable O*NET variables. Both approaches have obvious drawbacks. Subjective judgements are often not replicable and may result in the researcher subconsciously rigging the data to conform to a certain set of beliefs. Objective rankings, on the other hand, are not subject to such drawbacks, but are constrained by the reliability of the variables that are being used. At this stage, it shall be noted that O*NET data was not gathered to specifically measure the offshorability or automatability of jobs. Accordingly, Blinder (2009) finds that past attempts to create objective offshorability rankings using O*NET data have yielded some questionable results, ranking lawyers and judges among the most tradable occupations, while classifying occupations such as data entry keyers, telephone operators, and billing clerks as virtually impossible to move offshore.

To work around some of these drawbacks, we combine and build upon the two described approaches. First, together with a group of ML researchers, we subjectively hand-labelled 70 occupations, assigning 1 if automatable, and 0 if not. For our subjective assessments, we draw upon a workshop held at the Oxford University Engineering Sciences Department, examining the automatability of a wide range of tasks. Our label assignments were based on eyeballing the O*NET tasks and job description of each occupation. This information is particular to each occupation, as opposed to standardised across different jobs. The hand-labelling of the occupations was made by answering the question "Can the tasks of this job be sufficiently specified, conditional on the availability of big data, to be performed by state of the art computer-controlled equipment". Thus, we only assigned a 1 to fully automatable occupations, where we considered all tasks to be automatable. To the best of our knowledge, we considered the possibility of task simplification, possibly allowing some currently non-automatable tasks to be automated. Labels were assigned only to the occupations about which we were most confident.

Second, we use objective O*NET variables corresponding to the defined bottlenecks to computerisation. More specifically, we are interested in variables describing the level of perception and manipulation, creativity, and social intelligence required to perform it. As reported in Table 1, we identified nine variables that describe these attributes. These variables were derived from the O*NET survey, where the respondents are given multiple scales, with "importance" and "level" as the predominant pair. We rely on the "level" rating which corresponds to specific examples about the capabilities required of computer-controlled equipment to perform the tasks of an occupation. For instance, in relation to the attribute "Manual Dexterity", low (level) corresponds to "Screw a light bulb into a light socket"; medium (level) is exemplified by "Pack oranges in crates as quickly as possible"; high (level) is described as "Perform open-heart surgery with surgical instruments". This gives us an indication of the level of "Manual Dexterity" computer-controlled equipment would require to perform a specific occupation. An exception is the "Cramped work space" variable, which measures the frequency of unstructured work.

Hence, in short, by hand-labelling occupations, we work around the issue that O*NET data was not gathered to specifically measure the automatability of jobs in a similar manner to Blinder (2009).

²⁰ The missing occupations consist of "all other" titles, representing occupations with a wide range of characteristics which do not fit into one of the detailed O*NET-SOC occupations. O*NET data is not available for this type of title. We note that US employment for the 702 occupations we considered is 138.44 million. Hence our analysis excluded 4.628 million jobs, equivalent to 3% of total employment.

Table 1
O*NET variables.

Computerisation bottleneck	O*NET variable	O*NET description
Perception and manipulation	Finger dexterity	The ability to make precisely coordinated movements of the fingers of one or both hands to grasp, manipulate, or assemble very small objects.
	Manual dexterity	The ability to quickly move your hand, your hand together with your arm, or your two hands to grasp, manipulate, or assemble objects.
	Cramped work space, awkward positions	How often does this job require working in cramped work spaces that requires getting into awkward positions?
Creative intelligence	Originality	The ability to come up with unusual or clever ideas about a given topic or situation, or to develop creative ways to solve a problem.
	Fine arts	Knowledge of theory and techniques required to compose, produce, and perform works of music, dance, visual arts, drama, and sculpture.
Social intelligence	Social perceptiveness	Being aware of others' reactions and understanding why they react as they do.
	Negotiation	Bringing others together and trying to reconcile differences.
	Persuasion	Persuading others to change their minds or behaviour.
	Assisting and caring for others	Providing personal assistance, medical attention, emotional support, or other personal care to others such as coworkers, customers, or patients.

Note: The O*NET variables chosen are those likely to serve as indicators of bottlenecks to computerisation.

In addition, we mitigate some of the subjective biases held by the researchers by using objective O*NET variables to correct potential hand-labelling errors. The fact that we label only 70 of the full 702 occupations, selecting those occupations whose computerisation label we are highly confident about, further reduces the risk of subjective bias affecting our analysis. To develop an algorithm appropriate for this task, we turn to probabilistic classification.

4.2. Classification method

We begin by examining the accuracy of our subjective assessments of the automatability of 702 occupations. For classification, we develop an algorithm to provide the label probability given a previously unseen vector of variables. In the terminology of classification, the O*NET variables form a *feature vector*, denoted $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^9$. O*NET hence supplies a complete dataset of 702 such feature vectors. A computerisable label is termed a *class*, denoted $y \in \{0, 1\}$. For our problem, $y = 1$ (true) implies that we hand-labelled as computerisable the occupation described by the associated nine O*NET variables contained in $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^9$. Our *training data* is $\mathcal{D} = (\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{y})$, where $\mathbf{X} \in \mathbb{R}^{70 \times 9}$ is a matrix of variables and $\mathbf{y} \in \{0, 1\}^{70}$ gives the associated labels. This dataset contains information about how y varies as a function of \mathbf{x} : as a hypothetical example, it may be the case that, for all occupations for which $x_1 > 50$, $y = 1$. A probabilistic classification algorithm exploits patterns existent in training data to return the probability $P(y_* = 1 \mid \mathbf{x}_*, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{y})$ of a new, unlabelled, *test datum* with features \mathbf{x}_* , having class label $y_* = 1$.

We achieve probabilistic classification by introducing a latent function $f : \mathbf{x} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$, known as a *discriminant function*. Given the value of the discriminant f_* at a test point \mathbf{x}_* , we assume that the probability for the class label is given by the logistic

$$P(y_* = 1 \mid f_*) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-f_*)}, \quad (3)$$

and $P(y_* = 0 \mid f_*) = 1 - P(y_* = 1 \mid f_*)$. For $f_* > 0$, $y_* = 1$ is more probable than $y_* = 0$. For our application, f can be thought of as a continuous-valued 'automatability' variable: the higher its value, the higher the probability of computerisation.

We test three different models for the discriminant function, f , using the best performing for our further analysis. Firstly, logistic (or logit) regression, which adopts a linear model for $f, f(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}$, where the un-known weights \mathbf{w} are often inferred by maximising their probability in light of the training data. This simple model necessarily implies a simple monotonic relationship between features and the probability of the class taking a particular value. Richer models are provided by *Gaussian process classifiers* (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006). Such classifiers model the latent function f with

a Gaussian process (GP): a non-parametric probability distribution over functions.

A GP is defined as a distribution over the functions $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that the distribution over the possible function values on any finite subset of \mathcal{X} (such as \mathbf{X}) is multivariate Gaussian. For a function $f(\mathbf{x})$, the prior distribution over its values \mathbf{f} on a subset \mathbf{X} are completely specified by a covariance matrix \mathbf{K}

$$p(\mathbf{f} \mid \mathbf{K}) = \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{f}; \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{K}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\det 2\pi\mathbf{K}}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} \mathbf{f}^T \mathbf{K}^{-1} \mathbf{f}\right). \quad (4)$$

The covariance matrix is generated by a covariance function $\kappa : \mathcal{X}^m \times \mathcal{X}^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$; that is, $\mathbf{K} = \kappa(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{X})$. The GP model is expressed by the choice of κ ; we consider the *exponentiated quadratic* (squared exponential) and *rational quadratic*. Note that we have chosen a zero mean function, encoding the assumption that $P(y_* = 1) = \frac{1}{2}$ sufficiently far from training data.

Given training data \mathcal{D} , we use the GP to make predictions about the function values f_* at input \mathbf{x}_* . With this information, we have the predictive equations

$$p(f_* \mid \mathbf{x}_*, \mathcal{D}) = \mathcal{N}(f_*; m(f_* \mid \mathbf{x}_*, \mathcal{D}), V(f_* \mid \mathbf{x}_*, \mathcal{D})), \quad (5)$$

where

$$m(f_* \mid \mathbf{x}_*, \mathcal{D}) = \kappa(\mathbf{x}_*, \mathbf{X}) \kappa(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{y} \quad (6)$$

$$V(f_* \mid \mathbf{x}_*, \mathcal{D}) = \kappa(\mathbf{x}_*, \mathbf{x}_*) - \kappa(\mathbf{x}_*, \mathbf{X}) \kappa(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{X})^{-1} \kappa(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{x}_*). \quad (7)$$

Inferring the label posterior $p(y_* \mid \mathbf{x}_*, \mathcal{D})$ is complicated by the non-Gaussian form of the logistic (Eq. (3)). In order to effect inference, we use the approximate Expectation Propagation algorithm (Minka, 2001).

We tested three Gaussian process classifiers using the GPML toolbox (Rasmussen and Nickisch, 2010) on our data, built around exponentiated quadratic, rational quadratic and linear covariances. Note that the latter is equivalent to logistic regression with a Gaussian prior taken on the weights \mathbf{w} . To validate these classifiers, we randomly selected a reduced training set of half the available data \mathcal{D} ; the remaining data formed a test set. On this test set, we evaluated how closely the algorithm's classifications matched the hand labels according to two metrics (see e.g. Murphy (2012)): the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), which is equal to one for a perfect classifier, and one half for a completely random classifier, and the log-likelihood, which should ideally be high. This experiment was repeated for one hundred random selections of

training set, and the average results tabulated in Table 2. The exponentiated quadratic model returns (narrowly) the best performance of the three (clearly outperforming the linear model corresponding to logistic regression), and was hence selected for the remainder of our testing. Note that its AUC score of nearly 0.9 represents accurate classification: our algorithm successfully managed to reproduce our hand-labels specifying whether an occupation was computerisable. This means that our algorithm verified that our subjective judgements were systematically and consistently related to the O*NET variables.

Having validated our approach, we proceed to use classification to predict the probability of computerisation for all 702 occupations. For this purpose, we introduce a new label variable, z , denoting whether an occupation is truly computerisable or not: note that this can be judged only once an occupation is computerised, at some indeterminate point in the future. We take, again, a logistic likelihood,

$$P(z_* = 1 | f_*) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-f_*)}. \quad (8)$$

We implicitly assumed that our hand label, y , is a noise-corrupted version of the unknown true label, z . Our motivation is that our hand-labels of computerisability must necessarily be treated as such noisy measurements. We thus acknowledge that it is by no means certain that a job is computerisable given our labelling. We define $X_* \in \mathbb{R}^{702 \times 9}$ as the matrix of O*NET variables for all 702 occupations; this matrix represents our *test features*.

We perform a final experiment in which, given training data \mathcal{D} , consisting of our 70 hand-labelled occupations, we aim to predict z_* for our test features X_* . This approach firstly allows us to use the features of the 70 occupations about which we are most certain to predict for the remaining 632. Further, our algorithm uses the trends and patterns it has learned from bulk data to correct for what are likely to be mistaken labels. More precisely, the algorithm provides a smoothly varying probabilistic assessment of automatability as a function of the variables. For our Gaussian process classifier, this function is non-linear, meaning that it flexibly adapts to the patterns inherent in the training data. Our approach thus allows for more complex, non-linear, interactions between variables: for example, perhaps one variable is not of importance unless the value of another variable is sufficiently large. We report $P(z_* | X_*, \mathcal{D})$ as the probability of computerisation henceforth (for a detailed probability ranking, see the Appendix. Fig. 2 illustrates that this probability is non-linearly related to the nine O*NET variables selected.

5. Employment in the twenty-first century

In this section, we examine the possible future extent of at-risk job computerisation, and related labour market outcomes. The task model predicts that recent developments in ML will reduce aggregate demand for labour input in tasks that can be routinised by means of pattern recognition, while increasing the demand for labour performing tasks that are not susceptible to computerisation. However, we make no attempt to forecast future changes in the occupational composition of the labour market. While the 2010–2020 BLS occupational employment projections predict US net employment growth across major occupations, based on historical staffing

patterns, we speculate about technology that is in only the early stages of development. This means that historical data on the impact of the technological developments we observe is unavailable.²¹ We therefore focus on the impact of computerisation on the mix of jobs that existed in 2010. Our analysis is thus limited to the substitution effect of future computerisation.

Turning first to the expected employment impact, reported in Fig. 3, we distinguish between high, medium and low risk occupations, depending on their probability of computerisation (thresholding at probabilities of 0.7 and 0.3). According to our estimate, 47% of total US employment is in the high risk category, meaning that associated occupations are potentially automatable over some unspecified number of years, perhaps a decade or two. It shall be noted that the probability axis can be seen as a rough timeline, where high probability occupations are likely to be substituted by computer capital relatively soon. Over the next decades, the extent of computerisation will be determined by the pace at which the above described engineering bottlenecks to automation can be overcome. Seen from this perspective, our findings could be interpreted as two waves of computerisation, separated by a “technological plateau”. In the first wave, we find that most workers in transportation and logistics occupations, together with the bulk of office and administrative support workers, and labour in production occupations, are likely to be substituted by computer capital. As computerised cars are already being developed and the declining cost of sensors makes augmenting vehicles with advanced sensors increasingly cost-effective, the automation of transportation and logistics occupations is in line with the technological developments documented in the literature. Furthermore, algorithms for big data are already rapidly entering domains reliant upon storing or accessing information, making it equally intuitive that office and administrative support occupations will be subject to computerisation. The computerisation of production occupations simply suggests a continuation of a trend that has been observed over the past decades, with industrial robots taking on the routine tasks of most operatives in manufacturing. As industrial robots are becoming more advanced, with enhanced senses and dexterity, they will be able to perform a wider scope of non-routine manual tasks. From a technological capabilities point of view, the vast remainder of employment in production occupations is thus likely to diminish over the next decades.

More surprising, at first sight, is that a substantial share of employment in services, sales and construction occupations exhibit high probabilities of computerisation. Yet these findings are largely in line with recent documented technological developments. First, the market for personal and household service robots is already growing by about 20% annually (MGI, 2013). As the comparative advantage of human labour in tasks involving mobility and dexterity will diminish over time, the pace of labour substitution in service occupations is likely to increase even further. Second, while it seems counterintuitive that sales occupations, which are likely to require a high degree of social intelligence, will be subject to a wave of computerisation in the near future, high risk sales occupations include, for example, cashiers, counter and rental clerks, and telemarketers. Although these occupations involve interactive tasks, they do not necessarily require a high degree of social intelligence. Our model thus seems to do well in distinguishing between individual occupations within occupational categories. Third, prefabrication will allow a growing share of construction work to be performed under controlled conditions in factories, which partly eliminates task variability. This trend is likely to drive the computerisation of construction work.

Table 2
Performance of various classifiers.

Classifier model	AUC	Log-likelihood
Exponentiated quadratic	0.894	−163.3
Rational quadratic	0.893	−163.7
Linear (logit regression)	0.827	−205.0

Note: The best performances are indicated in bold.

²¹ It shall be noted that the BLS projections are based on what can be referred to as changes in normal technological progress, and not on any breakthrough technologies that may be seen as conjectural.




Fig. 2. Variables' influence on computerisation. *Note:* This figure illustrates the distribution of occupational variables as a function of probability of computerisation; each occupation is a unique point.

In short, our findings suggest that recent developments in ML will put a substantial share of employment, across a wide range of occupations, at risk in the near future. According to our estimates, however, this wave of automation will be followed by a subsequent slowdown in computers for labour substitution, due to persisting inhibiting engineering bottlenecks to computerisation. The relatively slow pace of computerisation across the medium risk category of employment can thus partly be interpreted as a technological plateau, with incremental technological improvements successively enabling further labour substitution. More specifically, the computerisation of occupations in the medium risk category will mainly depend on perception and manipulation challenges. This is evident from Table 2, showing that the “manual dexterity”, “finger dexterity” and “cramped work space” variables exhibit relatively high values in the medium risk category. Indeed, even with recent technological developments, allowing for more sophisticated pattern recognition, human labour will still have a comparative advantage in tasks requiring more complex perception and manipulation. Yet with incremental technological improvements, the comparative advantage of human labour in perception and manipulation tasks could eventually diminish. This will require innovative task restructuring, improvements in ML approaches to perception challenges, and progress in robotic dexterity to overcome manipulation problems related to variation between task iterations and the handling of irregular objects. The gradual computerisation of installation, maintenance, and repair occupations, which are largely confined to the medium risk category, and require a high degree of perception and manipulation capabilities, is a manifestation of this observation.

Our model predicts that the second wave of computerisation will mainly depend on overcoming the engineering bottlenecks related to creative and social intelligence. As reported in Table 3, the “fine arts”, “originality”, “negotiation”, “persuasion”, “social perceptiveness”, and “assisting and caring for others”, variables, all exhibit relatively high values in the low risk category. By contrast, we note that the “manual dexterity”, “finger dexterity” and “cramped work space” variables take relatively low values. Hence, in short, generalist occupations requiring knowledge of human heuristics, and specialist occupations involving the development of novel ideas and artifacts, are the least susceptible to computerisation. As a prototypical example of generalist work requiring a high degree of social intelligence, consider the O*NET tasks reported for chief executives, involving “conferring with board members, organization officials, or staff members to discuss issues, coordinate activities, or resolve problems”, and “negotiating or approving contracts or agreements.” Our predictions are thus intuitive in that most management, business, and finance occupations, which are intensive in generalist tasks requiring social intelligence, are largely confined to the low risk category. The same is true of most occupations in education, health-care, as well as arts and media jobs. The O*NET tasks of actors, for example, involve “performing humorous and serious interpretations of emotions, actions, and situations, using body movements, facial expressions, and gestures”, and “learning about characters in scripts and their relationships to each other in order to develop role interpretations.” While these tasks are very different from those of a chief executive, they equally require profound knowledge of human heuristics, implying that a wide range of tasks, involving




Fig. 3. Employment affected by computerisation. *Note:* The distribution of BLS 2010 occupational employment over the probability of computerisation, along with the share in low, medium and high probability categories. Note that the total area under all curves is equal to total US employment. For ease of visualisation, the plot was produced by smoothing employment over a sliding window of width 0.1 (in probability).

social intelligence, are unlikely to become subject to computerisation in the near future.

The low susceptibility of engineering and science occupations to computerisation, on the other hand, is largely due to the high degree of creative intelligence they require. The O*NET tasks of mathematicians, for example, involve “developing new principles and new relationships between existing mathematical principles to advance mathematical science” and “conducting research to extend mathematical knowledge in traditional areas, such as algebra, geometry, probability, and logic.” Hence, while it is evident that computers are entering the domains of science and engineering, our predictions implicitly suggest strong complementarities between computers and labour in creative science and engineering occupations; although it is possible that computers will fully substitute for workers in these occupations over the long-run. This is in line with the findings of Ingram and Neumann (2006), showing a largely persistent increase in the returns to cognitive abilities since the 1980s. We also note that the predictions of our model are strikingly in line with the

technological trends we observe in the automation of knowledge work, even within occupational categories. For example, we find that paralegals and legal assistants – for which computers already substitute – in the high risk category. At the same time, lawyers, which rely on labour input from legal assistants, are in the low risk category. Thus, for the work of lawyers to be fully automated, engineering bottlenecks to creative and social intelligence will need to be overcome, implying that the computerisation of legal research will complement the work of lawyers in the medium term.

To complete the picture of what recent technological progress is likely to mean for the future of employment, we plot the average median wage of occupations by their probability of computerisation. We do the same for skill level, measured by the fraction of workers having obtained a bachelor’s degree, or higher educational attainment, within each occupation. Fig. 4 reveals that both wages and educational attainment exhibit a strong negative relationship with the probability of computerisation. We note that this prediction implies a truncation in the current trend towards labour market polarisation, with growing employment in high and low-wage occupations, accompanied by a hollowing-out of middle-income jobs. Rather than reducing the demand for middle-income occupations, which has been the pattern over the past decades, our model predicts that computerisation will mainly substitute for low-skill and low-wage jobs in the near future. By contrast, high-skill and high-wage occupations are the least susceptible to computer capital.

Our findings were robust to the choice of the 70 occupations that formed our training data. This was confirmed by the experimental results tabulated in Table A2: a GP classifier trained on half of the training data was demonstrably able to accurately predict the labels of the other half, over one hundred different partitions. That these predictions are accurate for many possible partitions of the training set suggests that slight modifications to this set are unlikely to lead to substantially different results on the entire dataset.

Table 3
Variable distributions.

Variable	Probability of computerisation		
	Low	Medium	High
Assisting and caring for others	48±20	41±17	34±10
Persuasion	48±7.1	35±9.8	32±7.8
Negotiation	44±7.6	33±9.3	30±8.9
Social perceptiveness	51±7.9	41±7.4	37±5.5
Fine arts	12±20	3.5±12	1.3±5.5
Originality	51±6.5	35±12	32±5.6
Manual dexterity	22±18	34±15	36±14
Finger dexterity	36±10	39±10	40±10
Cramped work space	19±15	37±26	31±20

Note: Distributions are represented by their mean and standard deviation.




Fig. 4. Computerisation's dependence on wage and education. *Note:* Wage and education level as a function of the probability of computerisation; note that both plots share a legend. The plots were produced by smoothing wage and education level, respectively, over a sliding window of width 0.1 (in probability).

5.1. Limitations

It shall be noted that our predictions are based on expanding the premises about the tasks that computer-controlled equipment can be expected to perform. Hence, we focus on estimating the share of employment that can potentially be substituted by computer capital, from a technological capabilities point of view, over some unspecified number of years. We make no attempt to estimate how many jobs will actually be automated. The actual extent and pace of computerisation will depend on several additional factors which were left unaccounted for.

First, labour saving inventions may only be adopted if the access to cheap labour is scarce or prices of capital are relatively high (Habakkuk, 1962).²² We do not account for future wage levels, capital prices or labour shortages. While these factors will impact on the timeline of our predictions, labour is the scarce factor, implying that in the long-run wage levels will increase relative to capital prices, making computerisation increasingly profitable (see, for example, Acemoglu, 2003).

Second, regulatory concerns and political activism may slow down the process of computerisation. The states of California and Nevada are, for example, currently in the process of making legislative changes to allow for driverless cars. Similar steps will be needed in other states, and in relation to various technologies. The extent and pace of legislative implementation can furthermore be related to the public acceptance of technological progress.²³ Although resistance to technological progress has become seemingly less common since the Industrial Revolution, there are recent examples of resistance to technological change.²⁴ We avoid making predictions about the legislative process and the public acceptance of technological progress, and thus the pace of computerisation.

Third, making predictions about technological progress is notoriously difficult (Armstrong and Sotala, 2012).²⁵ For this reason, we

focus on near-term technological breakthroughs in ML and MR, and avoid making any predictions about the number of years it may take to overcome various engineering bottlenecks to computerisation. Finally, we emphasise that since our probability estimates describe the likelihood of an occupation being fully automated, we do not capture any within-occupation variation resulting from the computerisation of tasks that simply free-up time for human labour to perform other tasks. Although it is clear that the impact of productivity gains on employment will vary across occupations and industries, we make no attempt to examine such effects.

6. Conclusions

While computerisation has been historically confined to routine tasks involving explicit rule-based activities (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al., 2003; Goos et al., 2009), algorithms for big data are now rapidly entering domains reliant upon pattern recognition and can readily substitute for labour in a wide range of non-routine cognitive tasks (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011; MGI, 2013). In addition, advanced robots are gaining enhanced senses and dexterity, allowing them to perform a broader scope of manual tasks (IFR, 2012b; Robotics-VO, 2013; MGI, 2013). This is likely to change the nature of work across industries and occupations.

In this paper, we ask the question: how susceptible are current jobs to these technological developments? To assess this, we implement a novel methodology to estimate the probability of computerisation for 702 detailed occupations. Based on these estimates, we examine expected impacts of future computerisation on labour market outcomes, with the primary objective of analysing the number of jobs at risk and the relationship between an occupation's probability of computerisation, wages and educational attainment.

We distinguish between high, medium and low risk occupations, depending on their probability of computerisation. We make no attempt to estimate the number of jobs that will actually be automated, and focus on potential job automatability over some unspecified number of years. According to our estimates around 47% of total US employment is in the high risk category. We refer to these as jobs at risk – i.e. jobs we expect could be automated relatively soon, perhaps over the next decade or two.

Our model predicts that most workers in transportation and logistics occupations, together with the bulk of office and administrative support workers, and labour in production occupations, are at risk. These findings are consistent with recent technological developments documented in the literature. More surprisingly, we find that a substantial share of employment in service occupations, where most US job growth has occurred over the past decades (Autor and Dorn, 2013), are highly susceptible to computerisation. Additional support for this finding is provided by the recent growth in the market for service robots (MGI, 2013) and the gradual diminishment of the comparative advantage of human labour in tasks involving mobility and dexterity (Robotics-VO, 2013).

²² For example, case study evidence suggests that mechanisation in eighteenth century cotton production initially only occurred in Britain because wage levels were much higher relative to prices of capital than in other countries (Allen, 2009b). In addition, recent empirical research reveals a causal relationship between the access to cheap labour and mechanisation in agricultural production, in terms of sustained economic transition towards increased mechanisation in areas characterised by low-wage worker out-migration (Hornbeck and Naidu, 2013).

²³ For instance, William Huskisson, former cabinet minister and Member of Parliament for Liverpool, was killed by a steam locomotive during the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. Nonetheless, this well-publicised incident did anything but dissuade the public from railway transportation technology. By contrast, airship technology is widely recognised as having been popularly abandoned as a consequence of the reporting of the Hindenburg disaster.

²⁴ Uber, a start-up company connecting passengers with drivers of luxury vehicles, has recently faced pressure from local regulators, arising from tensions with taxicab services. Furthermore, in 2011 the UK Government scrapped a 12.7 billion GBP project to introduce electronic patient records after resistance from doctors.

²⁵ Marvin Minsky famously claimed in 1970 that “in from three to eight years we will have a machine with the general intelligence of an average human being”. This prediction is yet to materialise.

Finally, we provide evidence that wages and educational attainment exhibit a strong negative relationship with the probability of computerisation. We note that this finding implies a discontinuity between the nineteenth, twentieth and the twenty-first century, in the impact of capital deepening on the relative demand for skilled labour. While nineteenth century manufacturing technologies largely substituted for skilled labour through the simplification of tasks (Braverman, 1974; Goldin and Katz, 1998; Hounshell, 1985; James and Skinner, 1985), the Computer Revolution of the twentieth

century caused a hollowing-out of middle-income jobs (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos et al., 2009). Our model predicts a truncation in the current trend towards labour market polarisation, with computerisation being principally confined to low-skill and low-wage occupations. Our findings thus imply that as technology races ahead, low-skill workers will reallocate to tasks that are non-susceptible to computerisation – i.e., tasks requiring creative and social intelligence. For workers to win the race, however, they will have to acquire creative and social skills.

Appendix A

The table below ranks occupations according to their probability of computerisation (from least- to most-computerisable). Those occupations used as training data are labelled as either '0' (not computerisable) or '1' (computerisable), respectively. There are 70 such occupations, 10% of the total number of occupations.

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
1.	0.0028		29-1125	Recreational therapists
2.	0.003		49-1011	First-line supervisors of mechanics, installers, and repairers
3.	0.003		11-9161	Emergency management directors
4.	0.0031		21-1023	Mental health and substance abuse social workers
5.	0.0033		29-1181	Audiologists
6.	0.0035		29-1122	Occupational therapists
7.	0.0035		29-2091	Orthotists and prosthetists
8.	0.0035		21-1022	Healthcare social workers
9.	0.0036		29-1022	Oral and maxillofacial surgeons
10.	0.0036		33-1021	First-line supervisors of fire fighting and prevention workers
11.	0.0039		29-1031	Dietitians and nutritionists
12.	0.0039		11-9081	Lodging managers
13.	0.004		27-2032	Choreographers
14.	0.0041		41-9031	Sales engineers
15.	0.0042	0	29-1060	Physicians and surgeons
16.	0.0042		25-9031	Instructional coordinators
17.	0.0043		19-3039	Psychologists, all other
18.	0.0044		33-1012	First-line supervisors of police and detectives
19.	0.0044	0	29-1021	Dentists, general
20.	0.0044		25-2021	Elementary school teachers, except special education
21.	0.0045		19-1042	Medical scientists, except epidemiologists
22.	0.0046		11-9032	Education administrators, elementary and secondary school
23.	0.0046		29-1081	Podiatrists
24.	0.0047		19-3031	Clinical, counseling, and school psychologists
25.	0.0048		21-1014	Mental health counselors
26.	0.0049		51-6092	Fabric and apparel patternmakers
27.	0.0055		27-1027	Set and exhibit designers
28.	0.0055		11-3121	Human resources managers
29.	0.0061		39-9032	Recreation workers
30.	0.0063		11-3131	Training and development managers
31.	0.0064		29-1127	Speech-language pathologists
32.	0.0065		15-1121	Computer systems analysts
33.	0.0067	0	11-9151	Social and community service managers
34.	0.0068		25-4012	Curators
35.	0.0071		29-9091	Athletic trainers
36.	0.0073		11-9111	Medical and health services managers
37.	0.0074	0	25-2011	Preschool teachers, except special education
38.	0.0075		25-9021	Farm and home management advisors
39.	0.0077		19-3091	Anthropologists and archeologists
40.	0.0077		25-2054	Special education teachers, secondary school
41.	0.0078		25-2031	Secondary school teachers, except special and career/technical education
42.	0.0081	0	21-2011	Clergy
43.	0.0081		19-1032	Foresters
44.	0.0085		21-1012	Educational, guidance, school, and vocational counselors
45.	0.0088		25-2032	Career/technical education teachers, secondary school
46.	0.009	0	29-1111	Registered nurses
47.	0.0094		21-1015	Rehabilitation counselors
48.	0.0095		25-3999	Teachers and instructors, all other
49.	0.0095		19-4092	Forensic science technicians
50.	0.01		39-5091	Makeup artists, theatrical and performance
51.	0.01		17-2121	Marine engineers and naval architects
52.	0.01		11-9033	Education administrators, postsecondary
53.	0.011		17-2141	Mechanical engineers
54.	0.012		29-1051	Pharmacists
55.	0.012		13-1081	Logisticians

(continued on next page)

Appendix Table (continued)

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
56.	0.012		19-1022	Microbiologists
57.	0.012		19-3032	Industrial-organizational psychologists
58.	0.013		27-2022	Coaches and scouts
59.	0.013		11-2022	Sales managers
60.	0.014		19-2043	Hydrologists
61.	0.014		11-2021	Marketing managers
62.	0.014	0	21-1013	Marriage and family therapists
63.	0.014		17-2199	Engineers, all other
64.	0.014		13-1151	Training and development specialists
65.	0.014		43-1011	First-line supervisors of office and administrative support workers
66.	0.015		19-1029	Biological scientists, all other
67.	0.015		11-2031	Public relations and fundraising managers
68.	0.015		27-1014	Multimedia artists and animators
69.	0.015		15-1111	Computer and information research scientists
70.	0.015	0	11-1011	Chief executives
71.	0.015	0	11-9031	Education administrators, preschool and childcare center/program
72.	0.015		27-2041	Music directors and composers
73.	0.016		51-1011	First-line supervisors of production and operating workers
74.	0.016		41-3031	Securities, commodities, and financial services sales agents
75.	0.016		19-1031	Conservation scientists
76.	0.016		25-2053	Special education teachers, middle school
77.	0.017		17-2041	Chemical engineers
78.	0.017		11-9041	Architectural and engineering managers
79.	0.017		17-2011	Aerospace engineers
80.	0.018		11-9121	Natural sciences managers
81.	0.018		17-2081	Environmental engineers
82.	0.018		17-1011	Architects, except landscape and naval
83.	0.018		31-2021	Physical therapist assistants
84.	0.019	0	17-2051	Civil engineers
85.	0.02		29-1199	Health diagnosing and treating practitioners, all other
86.	0.021		19-1013	Soil and plant scientists
87.	0.021		19-2032	Materials scientists
88.	0.021		17-2131	Materials engineers
89.	0.021	0	27-1022	Fashion designers
90.	0.021		29-1123	Physical therapists
91.	0.021		27-4021	Photographers
92.	0.022		27-2012	Producers and directors
93.	0.022		27-1025	Interior designers
94.	0.023		29-1023	Orthodontists
95.	0.023		27-1011	Art directors
96.	0.025		33-1011	First-line supervisors of correctional officers
97.	0.025		21-2021	Directors, religious activities and education
98.	0.025		17-2072	Electronics engineers, except computer
99.	0.027		19-1021	Biochemists and biophysicists
100.	0.027		29-1011	Chiropractors
101.	0.028		31-2011	Occupational therapy assistants
102.	0.028		21-1021	Child, family, and school social workers
103.	0.028		17-2111	Health and safety engineers, except mining safety engineers and inspectors
104.	0.029		17-2112	Industrial engineers
105.	0.029		53-1031	First-line supervisors of transportation and material-moving machine and vehicle operators
106.	0.029		29-2056	Veterinary technologists and technicians
107.	0.03		11-3051	Industrial production managers
108.	0.03		17-3026	Industrial engineering technicians
109.	0.03		15-1142	Network and computer systems administrators
110.	0.03		15-1141	Database administrators
111.	0.03		11-3061	Purchasing managers
112.	0.032		25-1000	Postsecondary teachers
113.	0.033		19-2041	Environmental scientists and specialists, including health
114.	0.033	0	21-1011	Substance abuse and behavioural disorder counselors
115.	0.035	0	23-1011	Lawyers
116.	0.035		27-1012	Craft artists
117.	0.035		15-2031	Operations research analysts
118.	0.035		11-3021	Computer and information systems managers
119.	0.037		27-1021	Commercial and industrial designers
120.	0.037		17-2031	Biomedical engineers
121.	0.037	0	13-1121	Meeting, convention, and event planners
122.	0.038		29-1131	Veterinarians
123.	0.038		27-3043	Writers and authors
124.	0.039		11-2011	Advertising and promotions managers
125.	0.039		19-3094	Political scientists
126.	0.04		13-2071	Credit counselors
127.	0.04		19-3099	Social scientists and related workers, all other
128.	0.041		19-2011	Astronomers
129.	0.041		53-5031	Ship engineers
130.	0.042		15-1132	Software developers, applications

Appendix Table (continued)

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
131.	0.042	0	27-1013	Fine artists, including painters, sculptors, and illustrators
132.	0.043		29-2053	Psychiatric technicians
133.	0.045		17-1012	Landscape architects
134.	0.045		21-1091	Health educators
135.	0.047		15-2021	Mathematicians
136.	0.047		27-1023	Floral designers
137.	0.047		11-9013	Farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural managers
138.	0.048		33-2022	Forest fire inspectors and prevention specialists
139.	0.049		29-2041	Emergency medical technicians and paramedics
140.	0.055		27-3041	Editors
141.	0.055	0	29-1024	Prosthodontists
142.	0.055		29-9799	Healthcare practitioners and technical workers, all other
143.	0.057		39-7012	Travel guides
144.	0.058		29-2061	Licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses
145.	0.059		19-3041	Sociologists
146.	0.06		23-1022	Arbitrators, mediators, and conciliators
147.	0.061		19-1011	Animal scientists
148.	0.064		39-9041	Residential advisors
149.	0.066		53-1011	Aircraft cargo handling supervisors
150.	0.066		29-1126	Respiratory therapists
151.	0.067	0	27-3021	Broadcast news analysts
152.	0.069		11-3031	Financial managers
153.	0.07		17-2161	Nuclear engineers
154.	0.071		11-9021	Construction managers
155.	0.074		27-2042	Musicians and singers
156.	0.075		41-1012	First-line supervisors of non-retail sales workers
157.	0.076		39-1021	First-line supervisors of personal service workers
158.	0.077		19-1012	Food scientists and technologists
159.	0.08		13-1041	Compliance officers
160.	0.08		33-3031	Fish and game wardens
161.	0.082	0	27-1024	Graphic designers
162.	0.083		11-9051	Food service managers
163.	0.084		39-9011	Childcare workers
164.	0.085		39-9031	Fitness trainers and aerobics instructors
165.	0.091		11-9071	Gaming managers
166.	0.097		49-9051	Electrical power-line installers and repairers
167.	0.098		33-3051	Police and sheriff's patrol officers
168.	0.099		41-3041	Travel agents
169.	0.1		35-1011	Chefs and head cooks
170.	0.1		39-2011	Animal trainers
171.	0.1	0	27-3011	Radio and television announcers
172.	0.1		17-2071	Electrical engineers
173.	0.1		19-2031	Chemists
174.	0.1		29-2054	Respiratory therapy technicians
175.	0.1		19-2012	Physicists
176.	0.11		39-5012	Hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists
177.	0.11		27-3022	Reporters and correspondents
178.	0.11		53-2021	Air traffic controllers
179.	0.13		27-2031	Dancers
180.	0.13		29-2033	Nuclear medicine technologists
181.	0.13	0	15-1133	Software developers, systems software
182.	0.13		13-1111	Management analysts
183.	0.13		29-2051	Dietetic technicians
184.	0.13		19-3051	Urban and regional planners
185.	0.13		21-1093	Social and human service assistants
186.	0.13		25-3021	Self-enrichment education teachers
187.	0.13		27-4014	Sound engineering technicians
188.	0.14		29-1041	Optometrists
189.	0.14		17-2151	Mining and geological engineers, including mining safety engineers
190.	0.14		29-1071	Physician assistants
191.	0.15	0	25-2012	Kindergarten teachers, except special education
192.	0.15		47-2111	Electricians
193.	0.16		17-2171	Petroleum engineers
194.	0.16		43-9031	Desktop publishers
195.	0.16		11-1021	General and operations managers
196.	0.17		29-9011	Occupational health and safety specialists
197.	0.17		33-2011	Firefighters
198.	0.17		13-2061	Financial examiners
199.	0.17		47-1011	First-line supervisors of construction trades and extraction workers
200.	0.17		25-2022	Middle school teachers, except special and career/technical education
201.	0.18	0	27-3031	Public relations specialists
202.	0.18		49-9092	Commercial divers
203.	0.18		49-9095	Manufactured building and mobile home installers
204.	0.18		53-2011	Airline pilots, copilots, and flight engineers

(continued on next page)

Appendix Table (continued)

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
205.	0.19	0	25-3011	Adult basic and secondary education and literacy teachers and instructors
206.	0.2		19-1041	Epidemiologists
207.	0.2		39-4831	Funeral service managers, directors, morticians, and undertakers
208.	0.21		15-1179	Information security analysts, web developers, and computer network architects
209.	0.21		15-2011	Actuaries
210.	0.21		33-9011	Animal control workers
211.	0.21		39-6012	Concierges
212.	0.22		15-1799	Computer occupations, all other
213.	0.22		15-2041	Statisticians
214.	0.22		17-2061	Computer hardware engineers
215.	0.23		19-3022	Survey researchers
216.	0.23		13-1199	Business operations specialists, all other
217.	0.23		13-2051	Financial analysts
218.	0.23		29-2037	Radiologic technologists and technicians
219.	0.23		29-2031	Cardiovascular technologists and technicians
220.	0.24		13-1011	Agents and business managers of artists, performers, and athletes
221.	0.24		17-3029	Engineering technicians, except drafters, all other
222.	0.25		19-3092	Geographers
223.	0.25		29-9012	Occupational health and safety technicians
224.	0.25		21-1092	Probation officers and correctional treatment specialists
225.	0.25		17-3025	Environmental engineering technicians
226.	0.25		11-9199	Managers, all other
227.	0.25		53-3011	Ambulance drivers and attendants, except emergency medical technicians
228.	0.25		41-4011	Sales representatives, wholesale and manufacturing, technical and scientific products
229.	0.26		25-2023	Career/technical education teachers, middle school
230.	0.27		53-5021	Captains, mates, and pilots of water vessels
231.	0.27	0	31-2012	Occupational therapy aides
232.	0.27		49-9062	Medical equipment repairers
233.	0.28		41-1011	First-line supervisors of retail sales workers
234.	0.28		27-2021	Athletes and sports competitors
235.	0.28		39-1011	Gaming supervisors
236.	0.29	0	39-5094	Skincare specialists
237.	0.29		13-1022	Wholesale and retail buyers, except farm products
238.	0.3		19-4021	Biological technicians
239.	0.3		31-9092	Medical assistants
240.	0.3		19-1023	Zoologists and wildlife biologists
241.	0.3	0	35-2013	Cooks, private household
242.	0.31		13-1078	Human resources, training, and labour relations specialists, all other
243.	0.31		33-9021	Private detectives and investigators
244.	0.31		27-4032	Film and video editors
245.	0.33		13-2099	Financial specialists, all other
246.	0.34	0	33-3021	Detectives and criminal investigators
247.	0.34		29-2055	Surgical technologists
248.	0.34		29-1124	Radiation therapists
249.	0.35		47-2152	Plumbers, pipefitters, and steamfitters
250.	0.35		53-2031	Flight attendants
251.	0.35	0	29-2032	Diagnostic medical sonographers
252.	0.36		33-3011	Bailiffs
253.	0.36		51-4012	Computer numerically controlled machine tool programmers, metal and plastic
254.	0.36		49-2022	Telecommunications equipment installers and repairers, except line installers
255.	0.37		51-9051	Furnace, kiln, oven, drier, and kettle operators and tenders
256.	0.37	0	53-7061	Cleaners of vehicles and equipment
257.	0.37		39-4021	Funeral attendants
258.	0.37		47-5081	Helpers—extraction workers
259.	0.37		27-2011	Actors
260.	0.37		53-7111	Mine shuttle car operators
261.	0.38	1	49-2095	Electrical and electronics repairers, powerhouse, substation, and relay
262.	0.38		17-1022	Surveyors
263.	0.38		17-3027	Mechanical engineering technicians
264.	0.38		53-7064	Packers and packagers, hand
265.	0.38		27-3091	Interpreters and translators
266.	0.39	0	31-1011	Home health aides
267.	0.39		51-6093	Upholsterers
268.	0.39		47-4021	Elevator installers and repairers
269.	0.39		43-3041	Gaming cage workers
270.	0.39		25-9011	Audio-visual and multimedia collections specialists
271.	0.4	0	23-1023	Judges, magistrate judges, and magistrates
272.	0.4		49-3042	Mobile heavy equipment mechanics, except engines
273.	0.4		29-2799	Health technologists and technicians, all other
274.	0.41		45-2041	Graders and sorters, agricultural products
275.	0.41		51-2041	Structural metal fabricators and fitters
276.	0.41	1	23-1012	Judicial law clerks
277.	0.41		49-2094	Electrical and electronics repairers, commercial and industrial equipment
278.	0.42		19-4093	Forest and conservation technicians
279.	0.42		53-1021	First-line supervisors of helpers, labourers, and material movers, hand

Appendix Table (continued)

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
280.	0.43	0	39-3093	Locker room, coatroom, and dressing room attendants
281.	0.43		19-2099	Physical scientists, all other
282.	0.43		19-3011	Economists
283.	0.44		19-3093	Historians
284.	0.45		51-9082	Medical appliance technicians
285.	0.46		43-4031	Court, municipal, and license clerks
286.	0.47		13-1141	Compensation, benefits, and job analysis specialists
287.	0.47		31-1013	Psychiatric aides
288.	0.47		29-2012	Medical and clinical laboratory technicians
289.	0.48		33-2021	Fire inspectors and investigators
290.	0.48		17-3021	Aerospace engineering and operations technicians
291.	0.48		27-1026	Merchandise displayers and window trimmers
292.	0.48		47-5031	Explosives workers, ordnance handling experts, and blasters
293.	0.48		15-1131	Computer programmers
294.	0.49		33-9091	Crossing guards
295.	0.49		17-2021	Agricultural engineers
296.	0.49		47-5061	Roof bolters, mining
297.	0.49		49-9052	Telecommunications line installers and repairers
298.	0.49		43-5031	Police, fire, and ambulance dispatchers
299.	0.5		53-7033	Loading machine operators, underground mining
300.	0.5		49-9799	Installation, maintenance, and repair workers, all other
301.	0.5		23-2091	Court reporters
302.	0.51		41-9011	Demonstrators and product promoters
303.	0.51		31-9091	Dental assistants
304.	0.52		51-6041	Shoe and leather workers and repairers
305.	0.52		17-3011	Architectural and civil drafters
306.	0.53		47-5012	Rotary drill operators, oil and gas
307.	0.53		47-4041	Hazardous materials removal workers
308.	0.54		39-4011	Embalmers
309.	0.54		47-5041	Continuous mining machine operators
310.	0.54		39-1012	Slot supervisors
311.	0.54		31-9011	Massage therapists
312.	0.54		41-3011	Advertising sales agents
313.	0.55		49-3022	Automotive glass installers and repairers
314.	0.55		53-2012	Commercial pilots
315.	0.55		43-4051	Customer service representatives
316.	0.55		27-4011	Audio and video equipment technicians
317.	0.56		25-9041	Teacher assistants
318.	0.57		45-1011	First-line supervisors of farming, fishing, and forestry workers
319.	0.57		19-4031	Chemical technicians
320.	0.57	1	47-3015	Helpers—pipelayers, plumbers, pipefitters, and steamfitters
321.	0.57		13-1051	Cost estimators
322.	0.57		33-3052	Transit and railroad police
323.	0.57		37-1012	First-line supervisors of landscaping, lawn service, and groundskeeping workers
324.	0.58	0	13-2052	Personal financial advisors
325.	0.59		49-9044	Millwrights
326.	0.59		25-4013	Museum technicians and conservators
327.	0.59		47-5042	Mine cutting and channeling machine operators
328.	0.59		11-3071	Transportation, storage, and distribution managers
329.	0.59		49-3092	Recreational vehicle service technicians
330.	0.59		49-3023	Automotive service technicians and mechanics
331.	0.6		33-3012	Correctional officers and jailers
332.	0.6		27-4031	Camera operators, television, video, and motion picture
333.	0.6		51-3023	Slaughterers and meat packers
334.	0.61	1	49-2096	Electronic equipment installers and repairers, motor vehicles
335.	0.61		31-2022	Physical therapist aides
336.	0.61		39-3092	Costume attendants
337.	0.61		13-1161	Market research analysts and marketing specialists
338.	0.61		43-4181	Reservation and transportation ticket agents and travel clerks
339.	0.61		51-8031	Water and wastewater treatment plant and system operators
340.	0.61		19-4099	Life, physical, and social science technicians, all other
341.	0.61		51-3093	Food cooking machine operators and tenders
342.	0.61		51-4122	Welding, soldering, and brazing machine setters, operators, and tenders
343.	0.62		53-5022	Motorboat operators
344.	0.62	1	47-2082	Tapers
345.	0.62		47-2151	Pipelayers
346.	0.63		19-2042	Geoscientists, except hydrologists and geographers
347.	0.63		49-9012	Control and valve installers and repairers, except mechanical door
348.	0.63		31-9799	Healthcare support workers, all other
349.	0.63		35-1012	First-line supervisors of food preparation and serving workers
350.	0.63		47-4011	Construction and building inspectors
351.	0.64		51-9031	Cutters and trimmers, hand
352.	0.64		49-9071	Maintenance and repair workers, general
353.	0.64		23-1021	Administrative law judges, adjudicators, and hearing officers

(continued on next page)

Appendix Table (continued)

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
354.	0.64		43-5081	Stock clerks and order fillers
355.	0.64		51-8012	Power distributors and dispatchers
356.	0.64		47-2132	Insulation workers, mechanical
357.	0.65		19-4061	Social science research assistants
358.	0.65		51-4041	Machinists
359.	0.65		15-1150	Computer support specialists
360.	0.65		25-4021	Librarians
361.	0.65		49-2097	Electronic home entertainment equipment installers and repairers
362.	0.65		49-9021	Heating, air conditioning, and refrigeration mechanics and installers
363.	0.65		53-7041	Hoist and winch operators
364.	0.66		37-2021	Pest control workers
365.	0.66		51-9198	Helpers–production workers
366.	0.66		43-9111	Statistical assistants
367.	0.66		37-2011	Janitors and cleaners, except maids and housekeeping cleaners
368.	0.66		49-3051	Motorboat mechanics and service technicians
369.	0.67		51-9196	Paper goods machine setters, operators, and tenders
370.	0.67		51-4071	Foundry mold and coremakers
371.	0.67		19-2021	Atmospheric and space scientists
372.	0.67	1	53-3021	Bus drivers, transit and intercity
373.	0.67		33-9092	Lifeguards, ski patrol, and other recreational protective service workers
374.	0.67		49-9041	Industrial machinery mechanics
375.	0.68		43-5052	Postal service mail carriers
376.	0.68		47-5071	Roustabouts, oil and gas
377.	0.68		47-2011	Boilermakers
378.	0.68		17-3013	Mechanical drafters
379.	0.68		29-2021	Dental hygienists
380.	0.69	1	53-3033	Light truck or delivery services drivers
381.	0.69	0	37-2012	Maids and housekeeping cleaners
382.	0.69		51-9122	Painters, transportation equipment
383.	0.7		43-4061	Eligibility interviewers, government programs
384.	0.7		49-3093	Tire repairers and changers
385.	0.7		51-3092	Food batchmakers
386.	0.7		49-2091	Avionics technicians
387.	0.71		49-3011	Aircraft mechanics and service technicians
388.	0.71		53-2022	Airfield operations specialists
389.	0.71		51-8093	Petroleum pump system operators, refinery operators, and gaugers
390.	0.71		47-4799	Construction and related workers, all other
391.	0.71		29-2081	Opticians, dispensing
392.	0.71		51-6011	Laundry and dry-cleaning workers
393.	0.72		39-3091	Amusement and recreation attendants
394.	0.72		31-9095	Pharmacy aides
395.	0.72		47-3016	Helpers–roofers
396.	0.72		53-7121	Tank car, truck, and ship loaders
397.	0.72		49-9031	Home appliance repairers
398.	0.72		47-2031	Carpenters
399.	0.72		27-3012	Public address system and other announcers
400.	0.73		51-6063	Textile knitting and weaving machine setters, operators, and tenders
401.	0.73		11-3011	Administrative services managers
402.	0.73		47-2121	Glaziers
403.	0.73		51-2021	Coil winders, tapers, and finishers
404.	0.73		49-3031	Bus and truck mechanics and diesel engine specialists
405.	0.74		49-2011	Computer, automated teller, and office machine repairers
406.	0.74		39-9021	Personal care aides
407.	0.74		27-4012	Broadcast technicians
408.	0.74		47-3013	Helpers–electricians
409.	0.75		11-9131	Postmasters and mail superintendents
410.	0.75		47-2044	Tile and marble setters
411.	0.75		47-2141	Painters, construction and maintenance
412.	0.75		53-6061	Transportation attendants, except flight attendants
413.	0.75	1	17-3022	Civil engineering technicians
414.	0.75		49-3041	Farm equipment mechanics and service technicians
415.	0.76		25-4011	Archivists
416.	0.76		51-9011	Chemical equipment operators and tenders
417.	0.76		49-2092	Electric motor, power tool, and related repairers
418.	0.76		45-4021	Fallers
419.	0.77		19-4091	Environmental science and protection technicians, including health
420.	0.77		49-9094	Locksmiths and safe repairers
421.	0.77		37-3013	Tree trimmers and pruners
422.	0.77		35-3011	Bartenders
423.	0.77		13-1023	Purchasing agents, except wholesale, retail, and farm products
424.	0.77	1	35-9021	Dishwashers
425.	0.77	0	45-3021	Hunters and trappers
426.	0.78		31-9093	Medical equipment preparers
427.	0.78		51-4031	Cutting, punching, and press machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
428.	0.78		43-9011	Computer operators

Appendix Table (continued)

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
429.	0.78		51-8092	Gas plant operators
430.	0.79		43-5053	Postal service mail sorters, processors, and processing machine operators
431.	0.79		53-3032	Heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers
432.	0.79		39-5093	Shampooers
433.	0.79		47-2081	Drywall and ceiling tile installers
434.	0.79		49-9098	Helpers—installation, maintenance, and repair workers
435.	0.79		49-3052	Motorcycle mechanics
436.	0.79		51-2011	Aircraft structure, surfaces, rigging, and systems assemblers
437.	0.79		45-4022	Logging equipment operators
438.	0.79		47-2042	Floor layers, except carpet, wood, and hard tiles
439.	0.8		39-5011	Barbers
440.	0.8		47-5011	Derrick operators, oil and gas
441.	0.81	1	35-2011	Cooks, fast food
442.	0.81		43-9022	Word processors and typists
443.	0.81	1	17-3012	Electrical and electronics drafters
444.	0.81		17-3024	Electro-mechanical technicians
445.	0.81		51-9192	Cleaning, washing, and metal pickling equipment operators and tenders
446.	0.81		11-9141	Property, real estate, and community association managers
447.	0.81		43-6013	Medical secretaries
448.	0.81		51-6021	Pressers, textile, garment, and related materials
449.	0.82		51-2031	Engine and other machine assemblers
450.	0.82		49-2098	Security and fire alarm systems installers
451.	0.82		49-9045	Refractory materials repairers, except brickmasons
452.	0.82		39-2021	Nonfarm animal caretakers
453.	0.82	1	47-2211	Sheet metal workers
454.	0.82		47-2072	Pile-driver operators
455.	0.82		47-2021	Brickmasons and blockmasons
456.	0.83		45-3011	Fishers and related fishing workers
457.	0.83		47-2221	Structural iron and steel workers
458.	0.83		53-4021	Railroad brake, signal, and switch operators
459.	0.83		53-4031	Railroad conductors and yardmasters
460.	0.83		35-2012	Cooks, institution and cafeteria
461.	0.83		53-5011	Sailors and marine oilers
462.	0.83		51-9023	Mixing and blending machine setters, operators, and tenders
463.	0.83		47-3011	Helpers—brickmasons, blockmasons, stonemasons, and tile and marble setters
464.	0.83		47-4091	Segmental pavers
465.	0.83		47-2131	Insulation workers, floor, ceiling, and wall
466.	0.83		51-5112	Printing press operators
467.	0.83		53-6031	Automotive and watercraft service attendants
468.	0.83		47-4071	Septic tank servicers and sewer pipe cleaners
469.	0.83		39-6011	Baggage porters and bellhops
470.	0.83		41-2012	Gaming change persons and booth cashiers
471.	0.83		51-4023	Rolling machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
472.	0.83		47-2071	Paving, surfacing, and tamping equipment operators
473.	0.84		51-4111	Tool and die makers
474.	0.84		17-3023	Electrical and electronics engineering technicians
475.	0.84		47-2161	Plasterers and stucco masons
476.	0.84		51-4192	Layout workers, metal and plastic
477.	0.84		51-4034	Lathe and turning machine tool setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
478.	0.84		33-9032	Security guards
479.	0.84		51-6052	Tailors, dressmakers, and custom sewers
480.	0.84		53-7073	Wellhead pumpers
481.	0.84		43-9081	Proofreaders and copy markers
482.	0.84		33-3041	Parking enforcement workers
483.	0.85		53-7062	Labourers and freight, stock, and material movers, hand
484.	0.85		41-4012	Sales representatives, wholesale and manufacturing, except technical and scientific products
485.	0.85	1	43-5041	Meter readers, utilities
486.	0.85		51-8013	Power plant operators
487.	0.85		51-8091	Chemical plant and system operators
488.	0.85		47-5021	Earth drillers, except oil and gas
489.	0.85		19-4051	Nuclear technicians
490.	0.86		43-6011	Executive secretaries and executive administrative assistants
491.	0.86		51-8099	Plant and system operators, all other
492.	0.86		35-3041	Food servers, nonrestaurant
493.	0.86		51-7041	Sawing machine setters, operators, and tenders, wood
494.	0.86		53-4041	Subway and streetcar operators
495.	0.86		31-9096	Veterinary assistants and laboratory animal caretakers
496.	0.86		51-9032	Cutting and slicing machine setters, operators, and tenders
497.	0.86		41-9022	Real estate sales agents
498.	0.86	1	51-4011	Computer-controlled machine tool operators, metal and plastic
499.	0.86		49-9043	Maintenance workers, machinery
500.	0.86		43-4021	Correspondence clerks
501.	0.87		45-2090	Miscellaneous agricultural workers
502.	0.87		45-4011	Forest and conservation workers

(continued on next page)

Appendix Table (continued)

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
503.	0.87		51-4052	Pourers and casters, metal
504.	0.87		47-2041	Carpet Installers
505.	0.87		47-2142	Paperhangers
506.	0.87		13-1021	Buyers and purchasing agents, farm products
507.	0.87		51-7021	Furniture Finishers
508.	0.87		35-2021	Food preparation workers
509.	0.87		47-2043	Floor sanders and finishers
510.	0.87	1	53-6021	Parking lot attendants
511.	0.87		47-4051	Highway maintenance workers
512.	0.88		47-2061	Construction labourers
513.	0.88		43-5061	Production, planning, and expediting clerks
514.	0.88		51-9141	Semiconductor Processors
515.	0.88		17-1021	Cartographers and photogrammetrists
516.	0.88		51-4051	Metal-refining furnace operators and tenders
517.	0.88		51-9012	Separating, filtering, clarifying, precipitating, and still machine setters, operators, and tenders
518.	0.88		51-6091	Extruding and forming machine setters, operators, and tenders, synthetic and glass fibers
519.	0.88		47-2053	Terrazzo workers and finishers
520.	0.88		51-4194	Tool grinders, filers, and sharpeners
521.	0.88		49-3043	Rail car repairers
522.	0.89		51-3011	Bakers
523.	0.89	1	31-9094	Medical transcriptionists
524.	0.89		47-2022	Stonemasons
525.	0.89		53-3022	Bus drivers, school or special client
526.	0.89	1	27-3042	Technical writers
527.	0.89		49-9096	Riggers
528.	0.89		47-4061	Rail-track laying and maintenance equipment operators
529.	0.89		51-8021	Stationary engineers and boiler operators
530.	0.89	1	51-6031	Sewing machine operators
531.	0.89	1	53-3041	Taxi drivers and chauffeurs
532.	0.9	1	43-4161	Human resources assistants, except payroll and timekeeping
533.	0.9		29-2011	Medical and clinical laboratory technologists
534.	0.9		47-2171	Reinforcing iron and rebar workers
535.	0.9		47-2181	Roofers
536.	0.9		53-7021	Crane and tower operators
537.	0.9		53-6041	Traffic technicians
538.	0.9		53-6051	Transportation inspectors
539.	0.9		51-4062	Patternmakers, metal and plastic
540.	0.9		51-9195	Molders, shapers, and casters, except metal and plastic
541.	0.9		13-2021	Appraisers and assessors of real estate
542.	0.9		53-7072	Pump operators, except wellhead pumpers
543.	0.9		49-9097	Signal and track switch repairers
544.	0.91		39-3012	Gaming and sports book writers and runners
545.	0.91		49-9063	Musical instrument repairers and tuners
546.	0.91		39-7011	Tour guides and escorts
547.	0.91		49-9011	Mechanical door repairers
548.	0.91		51-3091	Food and tobacco roasting, baking, and drying machine operators and tenders
549.	0.91		53-7071	Gas compressor and gas pumping station operators
550.	0.91		29-2071	Medical records and health information technicians
551.	0.91		51-9121	Coating, painting, and spraying machine setters, operators, and tenders
552.	0.91		51-4081	Multiple machine tool setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
553.	0.91		53-4013	Rail yard engineers, dinkey operators, and hostlers
554.	0.91		49-2093	Electrical and electronics installers and repairers, transportation equipment
555.	0.91		35-9011	Dining room and cafeteria attendants and bartender helpers
556.	0.91		51-4191	Heat treating equipment setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
557.	0.91		19-4041	Geological and petroleum technicians
558.	0.91		49-3021	Automotive body and related repairers
559.	0.91		51-7032	Patternmakers, wood
560.	0.91		51-4021	Extruding and drawing machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
561.	0.92		43-9071	Office machine operators, except computer
562.	0.92		29-2052	Pharmacy technicians
563.	0.92		43-4131	Loan interviewers and clerks
564.	0.92		53-7031	Dredge operators
565.	0.92		41-3021	Insurance sales agents
566.	0.92		51-7011	Cabinetmakers and bench carpenters
567.	0.92		51-9123	Painting, coating, and decorating workers
568.	0.92		47-4031	Fence erectors
569.	0.92		51-4193	Plating and coating machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
570.	0.92		41-2031	Retail salespersons
571.	0.92		35-3021	Combined food preparation and serving workers, including fast food
572.	0.92		51-9399	Production workers, all other
573.	0.92		47-3012	Helpers—carpenters
574.	0.93		51-9193	Cooling and freezing equipment operators and tenders
575.	0.93		51-2091	Fiberglass laminators and fabricators
576.	0.93		47-5013	Service unit operators, oil, gas, and mining
577.	0.93		53-7011	Conveyor operators and tenders

Appendix Table (continued)

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
578.	0.93		49-3053	Outdoor power equipment and other small engine mechanics
579.	0.93		53-4012	Locomotive firers
580.	0.93		53-7063	Machine feeders and offbearers
581.	0.93		51-4061	Model makers, metal and plastic
582.	0.93		49-2021	Radio, cellular, and tower equipment installers and repairs
583.	0.93		51-3021	Butchers and meat cutters
584.	0.93		51-9041	Extruding, forming, pressing, and compacting machine setters, operators, and tenders
585.	0.93		53-7081	Refuse and recyclable material collectors
586.	0.93	1	13-2081	Tax examiners and collectors, and revenue agents
587.	0.93		51-4022	Forging machine setters, operators, and tenders, Metal and Plastic
588.	0.93	1	53-7051	Industrial truck and tractor operators
589.	0.94	1	13-2011	Accountants and auditors
590.	0.94		51-4032	Drilling and boring machine tool setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
591.	0.94		43-9051	Mail clerks and mail machine operators, except postal service
592.	0.94	0	35-3031	Waiters and waitresses
593.	0.94		51-3022	Meat, poultry, and fish cutters and trimmers
594.	0.94		13-2031	Budget analysts
595.	0.94		47-2051	Cement masons and concrete finishers
596.	0.94		49-3091	Bicycle repairers
597.	0.94		49-9091	Coin, vending, and amusement machine servicers and repairers
598.	0.94		51-4121	Welders, cutters, solderers, and brazers
599.	0.94	1	43-5021	Couriers and messengers
600.	0.94		43-4111	Interviewers, except eligibility and loan
601.	0.94		35-2015	Cooks, short order
602.	0.94		53-7032	Excavating and loading machine and dragline operators
603.	0.94		47-3014	Helpers—painters, paperhangers, plasterers, and stucco masons
604.	0.94		43-4081	Hotel, motel, and resort desk clerks
605.	0.94		51-9197	Tire builders
606.	0.94		41-9091	Door-to-door sales workers, news and street vendors, and related workers
607.	0.94		37-1011	First-line Supervisors of housekeeping and janitorial workers
608.	0.94		45-2011	Agricultural inspectors
609.	0.94	1	23-2011	Paralegals and legal assistants
610.	0.95		39-5092	Manicurists and pedicurists
611.	0.95		43-5111	Weighers, measurers, checkers, and samplers, recordkeeping
612.	0.95		51-6062	Textile cutting machine setters, operators, and tenders
613.	0.95		43-3011	Bill and account collectors
614.	0.95		51-8011	Nuclear power reactor operators
615.	0.95		33-9031	Gaming surveillance officers and gaming investigators
616.	0.95		43-4121	Library assistants, clerical
617.	0.95		47-2073	Operating engineers and other construction equipment operators
618.	0.95		51-5113	Print binding and finishing workers
619.	0.95		45-2021	Animal breeders
620.	0.95		51-4072	Molding, coremaking, and casting machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
621.	0.95	1	51-2022	Electrical and electronic equipment assemblers
622.	0.95		51-9191	Adhesive bonding machine operators and tenders
623.	0.95		37-3011	Landscaping and groundskeeping workers
624.	0.95		51-4033	Grinding, lapping, polishing, and buffing machine tool setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
625.	0.95		43-5051	Postal service clerks
626.	0.95		51-9071	Jewelers and precious stone and metal workers
627.	0.96		43-5032	Dispatchers, except police, fire, and ambulance
628.	0.96		43-4171	Receptionists and information clerks
629.	0.96		43-9061	Office clerks, general
630.	0.96		11-3111	Compensation and benefits managers
631.	0.96	1	43-2011	Switchboard operators, including answering service
632.	0.96		35-3022	Counter attendants, cafeteria, food concession, and Coffee Shop
633.	0.96		47-5051	Rock splitters, quarry
634.	0.96		43-6014	Secretaries and administrative assistants, except legal, medical, and executive
635.	0.96		17-3031	Surveying and mapping technicians
636.	0.96		51-7031	Model makers, wood
637.	0.96		51-6064	Textile winding, twisting, and drawing out machine setters, operators, and tenders
638.	0.96		53-4011	Locomotive engineers
639.	0.96	1	39-3011	Gaming dealers
640.	0.96		49-9093	Fabric menders, except garment
641.	0.96		35-2014	Cooks, restaurant
642.	0.96		39-3031	Ushers, lobby attendants, and ticket takers
643.	0.96		43-3021	Billing and posting clerks
644.	0.97		53-6011	Bridge and lock tenders
645.	0.97		51-7042	Woodworking machine setters, operators, and tenders, except sawing
646.	0.97		51-2092	Team assemblers
647.	0.97		51-6042	Shoe machine operators and tenders
648.	0.97		51-2023	Electromechanical equipment assemblers
649.	0.97	1	13-1074	Farm labour contractors
650.	0.97		51-6061	Textile bleaching and dyeing machine operators and tenders
651.	0.97		51-9081	Dental laboratory technicians

(continued on next page)

Appendix Table (continued)

Computerisable				
Rank	Probability	Label	SOC code	Occupation
652.	0.97	1	51-9021	Crushing, grinding, and polishing machine setters, operators, and tenders
653.	0.97		51-9022	Grinding and polishing workers, hand
654.	0.97		37-3012	Pesticide handlers, sprayers, and applicators, vegetation
655.	0.97		45-4023	Log graders and scalers
656.	0.97		51-9083	Ophthalmic laboratory technicians
657.	0.97	1	41-2011	Cashiers
658.	0.97		49-9061	Camera and photographic equipment repairers
659.	0.97		39-3021	Motion picture projectionists
660.	0.97		51-5111	Prepress technicians and workers
661.	0.97		41-2021	Counter and rental clerks
662.	0.97	1	43-4071	File clerks
663.	0.97		41-9021	Real estate brokers
664.	0.97		43-2021	Telephone operators
665.	0.97		19-4011	Agricultural and food science technicians
666.	0.97		43-3051	Payroll and timekeeping clerks
667.	0.97	1	43-4041	Credit authorizers, checkers, and clerks
668.	0.97		35-9031	Hosts and hostesses, restaurant, lounge, and coffee shop
669.	0.98		41-9012	Models
670.	0.98		51-9061	Inspectors, testers, sorters, samplers, and weighers
671.	0.98		43-3031	Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks
672.	0.98	1	43-6012	Legal secretaries
673.	0.98		27-4013	Radio operators
674.	0.98		53-3031	Driver/sales workers
675.	0.98		13-1031	Claims adjusters, examiners, and investigators
676.	0.98		41-2022	Parts salespersons
677.	0.98	1	13-2041	Credit analysts
678.	0.98		51-4035	Milling and planing machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
679.	0.98		43-5071	Shipping, receiving, and traffic clerks
680.	0.98		43-3061	Procurement clerks
681.	0.98		51-9111	Packaging and filling machine operators and tenders
682.	0.98	1	51-9194	Etchers and engravers
683.	0.98		43-3071	Tellers
684.	0.98		27-2023	Umpires, referees, and other sports officials
685.	0.98		13-1032	Insurance appraisers, auto damage
686.	0.98		13-2072	Loan officers
687.	0.98	1	43-4151	Order clerks
688.	0.98		43-4011	Brokerage clerks
689.	0.98		43-9041	Insurance claims and policy processing clerks
690.	0.98		51-2093	Timing device assemblers and adjusters
691.	0.99		43-9021	Data entry keyers
692.	0.99	1	25-4031	Library technicians
693.	0.99		43-4141	New accounts clerks
694.	0.99		51-9151	Photographic process workers and processing machine operators
695.	0.99		13-2082	Tax preparers
696.	0.99		43-5011	Cargo and freight agents
697.	0.99	1	49-9064	Watch repairers
698.	0.99		13-2053	Insurance underwriters
699.	0.99		15-2091	Mathematical technicians
700.	0.99		51-6051	Sewers, hand
701.	0.99		23-2093	Title examiners, abstractors, and searchers
702.	0.99		41-9041	Telemarketers

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