

# Local contexts and anaphora.

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## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 What's the problem?

- Co-variation without binding/c-command?<sup>1</sup>

- (1) Frolo<sub>j</sub> owned a donkey<sub>i</sub>. He cherished it<sub>i</sub>.
- (2) Every farmer who owns a donkey<sub>i</sub> cherishes it<sub>i</sub>.

#### Dynamic Approach:

1. words, constituents have *context-change potentials* ;
  2. this potential is defined in their lexical entry ;
  3. truth is defined in terms of context-change potential (failure as falsity)
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- (3) a. Frolo owned a donkey.  
**CCP:** update the current context so that it contains Frolo as **j** and a donkey that he owns as **i**
  - b. He cherished it.  
**CCP:** fail if the the referent for **i** does not cherish the referent for **j**.
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- Quantifiers lexically specify how their arguments should update the context.
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- (4) a. Every **A B**.  
b. **CCP:** for each  $x$  such that **A**( $x$ ) can update the context, update the current context with **A**( $x$ ) then update the context with **B**( $x$ ).  
Fail if one of these updates fails.

#### Theoretical problem: monstrous items and universality

- One can easily construct monstrous lexical items.

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<sup>1</sup>The main contribution of this talk is to “*take the violence out of donkey sentences*”, in line with the research program initiated by Frank Staniszewski.

(5) **Quantifiers disallowing donkey pronouns**

- a. Monster-Every **A B**
- b. **CCP:** for each  $x$  such that **A**( $x$ ) can update the context, update the context with **B**( $x$ ).  
Fail if one of these updates fail.

- DS needs to posit lexical constraints so that such meanings are excluded cross-linguistically.

**Empirical problem:** uncomplying propositional logics.

- Negation operator is a “*test*” it can never update context with new referents.

(6) Not **A**

**CCP:** Fail if **A** updates the context. Update trivially if **A**’s update fails.

(7) Not Not **A**

**CCP:** Update trivially if **A** updates the context. Fail if **A** fails to update the context.

- But double negations can introduce referents:

- (8) Alex: I was told that you didn’t send Grandma a card for her birthday.  
Lucas: It’s not true that I didn’t send Grandma a card for her birthday. It just arrived late.

- Similarly, disjunction in DS is not “*internally dynamic*”: it does not pass referent from one disjunct to the next.
- But disjunction can pass referents from one disjunct to the next.

- (9) Either it’s false that there are bathrooms or they are not where she said they were.

## 1.2 Schlenker’s witness-based proposal

- After processing a sentence or a portion of sentence, the assignment function maps  $i$  to the strongest restriction that one can add to a variable in the sentence without changing the truth conditions.

- (10) Find the strongest  $R$  such that:

a donkey  $\lambda x$ . Frolo owns  $x \Leftrightarrow$  a donkey  $\lambda x$ . Frolo owns  $x \cap R$

- (11)  $R$  = donkeys owned by Frolo

so the new assignment function  $g'$  is such that  $g'(i) = R$

- An *existential closure* principle is assumed to ensure that the indefinite really extends its scope.

(12)  $\exists x \in g'(i)$ , Frolo cherishes it<sub>x</sub>.

- The full analysis accounts for a variety of phenomena: donkey anaphora, paycheck sentences, functional dependencies of all sort, non-dynamic behaviours of negation and disjunction ...

### Blindness of the semantics

- If indefinites are treated on a par with all other GQs, trouble ensues:

(13) Frolo owns every donkey.  
 $R =$  all donkeys

(14) #Frolo owns every donkey. It brayed loudly.  
 $=$  Frolo owns every donkey. Some donkey brayed loudly.

- One needs to distinguish variables introduced by indefinites from variables introduced by universal quantifiers.
- An *ad hoc* move is good enough but can one derive this from an independent principle ?

### $\exists/\forall$ reading

(15) Every farmer who owns a donkey spoils it.

- $\forall$ : every donkey-owning farmer spoils **all** of his donkeys
- $\exists$ : every donkey-owning farmer spoils **some** of his donkeys

- It is easy to construct dynamic entries to get the two readings.

(16) Every **A B**

- for each  $x$  such that **A**( $x$ ) can update the context, update the context with **A**( $x$ ) then **B**( $x$ ). Fail if one update fails.
- for each  $x$  such that **A**( $x$ ) can update the context, fail if update with **A**( $x$ ) then with (not **B**( $x$ )) succeeds.

- Within Schlenker's system, the *existential closure* principle only derives  $\exists$  reading

### Desiderata

- Independence: lexical items do not encode their effect on context.  
 $\rightarrow$  presented today
- Left-to-right bias  
 $\rightarrow$  presented today
- Predicts non-dynamic behaviours of *negation* and *disjunction*.  
 $\rightarrow$  presented today
- Differentiates between *every* and *a*.  
 $\rightarrow$  presented today
- Predicts  $\exists/\forall$  distinction  
 $\rightarrow$  sketch of an idea in workshop

## 2 Alternative presentation

### 2.1 Basic assumptions

- Each node has a meaning and updates the context. This is reflected in the notation.

$$(17) \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{a. H\&K notation:} & \llbracket \mathbf{T} \rrbracket^g = m \\ \text{b. New notation:} & \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & m \\ g & \longrightarrow & g' \end{array} \right) \end{array}$$

- The **left-to-right bias** is implemented in functional application ; this is the only principle that regulates left-to-right bias.

#### Functional Application

If

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & f \\ g & \longrightarrow & g' \end{array} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{T}' & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & x \\ g' & \longrightarrow & g'' \end{array} \right)$$

Then:

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \bigwedge & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & f(x) \\ \mathbf{T} \quad \mathbf{T}' & \longrightarrow & g'' \\ g & & \end{array} \right)$$

(18) a. Ada<sub>i</sub> walked in and she<sub>i</sub> ordered a beer.

b. She<sub>i</sub> ordered a beer and Ada<sub>i</sub> walked in.

$$(19) \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{a.} & \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{Ada walked in} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & \text{walked-in}'(\text{ada}') \\ g & \longrightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \text{ada}'] \end{array} \right) \\ \text{b.} & \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{She}_i \text{ ordered a beer} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & \text{ordered-a-beer}'(\underbrace{g[i \rightarrow \text{ada}'](i)}_{\text{ada}'}) \\ g[i \rightarrow \text{ada}'] & \longrightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \text{ada}'] \end{array} \right) \\ \text{c.} & \left( \begin{array}{ccc} (18b) & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & (\exists!x, \text{person}'(x) \wedge \text{w-in}'(x)) \wedge \text{ordered-a-beer}'(\text{ada}') \\ g & \longrightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \text{ada}'] \end{array} \right) \\ \text{d.} & \text{FA does not apply the other way around for (18b)} \end{array}$$

- Lexical items do not encode effect on context.

$$(20) \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{word} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & \text{word}' \\ g & \longrightarrow & g \end{array} \right)$$

### Simple updates

- Any meaning of type  $e$  can update the assignment function.

#### Referent Introduction

If

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & x \\ g & \longrightarrow & g' \end{array} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad x \text{ is type } e$$

Then:

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & x \\ g & \longrightarrow & g'[i \rightarrow x] \end{array} \right)$$

- This is the only principle that regulates referent introduction.

### Summary

- Functional application requires the first node to update the context first (**left-to-right bias**)
- Lexical items do not encode any effect on context (**independence**).
- Any meaning of type  $e$  may be added to the context.

## 2.2 Indefinites and non-determinism

### Non-determinism

(21) A woman<sub>i</sub> walked in.

- If several women walked in (f. ex. *Mary* and *Ada*), the assignment function cannot be updated with a single individual.

(22) Do we update  $g$  to:

- $g[i \rightarrow \text{mary}']$  ?
- $g[i \rightarrow \text{ada}']$  ?

- Standard DS solution: consider updates to sets of assignments.
- Here, for simplicity, we'll assume that indices can map to sets of individuals<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup>Using assignment functions that map to sets will yield problematic results when considering sentences with more than one indefinite. The strictly more powerful DS notion of context can be implemented within my system to account for those cases.

(23) Update  $g$  to  $g[i \rightarrow \text{mary}' \vee \text{ada}']$

- $p_1 \vee \dots \vee p_n \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{p_1, \dots, p_n\}$
- **Intuition:** the hearer does not know which particular referent is intended.
- Since  $g(i)$  is a set of individuals, the interpretation of pronouns has to be revised. This revision leads to an account of the  $\exists/\forall$  distinction.  
→ not discussed here

### Indefinites

- Here, I am going to adopt an alternative semantics for indefinites.
- Charlow TODO have argued that exceptional scope and its restrictions are a natural consequence of the alternative semantics of indefinites.
- Here, I argue that non-deterministic referent introduction is a natural consequence of alternative semantics.
- **Implementation:** one and the same node may have several meanings.

$$(24) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a.} \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{a woman} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \text{ada}' \\ g & \longrightarrow & g \end{array} \right) \\ \\ \text{b.} \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{a woman} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \text{mary}' \\ g & \longrightarrow & g \end{array} \right) \\ \\ \text{c.} \quad \dots \end{array}$$

- Using the referent introduction rule, we can add the meaning of the indefinites to the assignment function.

$$(24') \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a.} \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{a woman} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \text{ada}' \\ g & \longrightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \text{ada}'] \end{array} \right) \\ \\ \text{b.} \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{a woman} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \text{mary}' \\ g & \longrightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \text{mary}'] \end{array} \right) \\ \\ \text{c.} \quad \dots \end{array}$$

### Meaning postulate for the indefinite

For all choice functions  $f$ :

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{a/some} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & f \\ g & \longrightarrow & g \end{array} \right)$$

- As of now, alternatives percolate up the tree, without obstacles.

$$(25) \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{It's not the case that a woman walked in} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \neg(\text{walked-in}'(\text{ada}')) \\ g & \longrightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \text{ada}'] \end{array} \right)$$

- We define the operator  $\downarrow$  to existentially close  $t$ -type alternatives.
- This operator is the one that creates assignments to multiple individuals.
- (If  $g$  and  $g'$  are assignment functions defined on non-overlapping sets of indices, their union is denoted  $g \cdot g'$ )

### Existential closure

For  $\mathbf{T}$  of type  $t$  and  $g$  an assignment function, let  $S =$

$$\left\{ \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & m_n \\ g & \longrightarrow & g \cdot g'_n \end{array} \right) \middle| n \in N \right\}$$

be the sets of meanings associated with node  $\mathbf{T}$  under assignment function  $g$ . Then:

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \downarrow \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \exists n, m_n \\ g & \longrightarrow & g \cdot \left( i \mapsto \bigvee_{\substack{n \in N \\ m_n \text{ is true}}} g'_n(i) \right) \end{array} \right)$$

- This operator only collects referents that were introduced by **true alternatives**

### Uncomplying behaviours in propositional logic

(26) It's not true that I didn't send Grandma a card for her birthday. It just arrived too late.

a. not (not **A**) and **B**

- If **A** is true, then a card is introduced in the context (27).  
If **A** is false, then the assignment function is left as is (27b).

$$(27) \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{a.} & \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{I send Grandma a card} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \exists x, \text{card}'(x) \wedge \text{send}'(\text{gm}')(x)(\mathbf{I}') = \mathbf{true} \\ g & \longrightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \text{card-I-sent}'] \end{array} \right) \\ \text{b.} & \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{I send Grandma a card} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \exists x, \text{card}'(x) \wedge \text{send}'(\text{gm}')(x)(\mathbf{I}') = \mathbf{false} \\ g & \longrightarrow & g \end{array} \right) \end{array}$$

- This entails the the negation of a statement has the same context-change potential as its assertion.

$$(28) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{a.} \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{I didn't send Grandma a card} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & \neg \exists x, \text{card}'(x) \wedge \text{send}'(\text{gm}')(x)(\text{I}') = \text{false} \\ g & \longrightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \text{card-I-sent}'] \end{array} \right) \\ \\ \text{b.} \quad \left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{I didn't send Grandma a card} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & \neg \exists x, \text{card}'(x) \wedge \text{send}'(\text{gm}')(x)(\text{I}') = \text{true} \\ g & \longrightarrow & g \end{array} \right) \end{array}$$

- If **A** is true, then not (not **A**) introduces a referent and the pronoun receives a correct interpretation **B**.
- If **A** is false, then not (not **A**) does not introduce a referent and the pronoun triggers presupposition failure in **B**.  
 $\rightarrow$  by standard rules of presupposition projection, the conjunction is **false** (since the first conjunct is **false**).
- Similarly for “(not **A**) or **B**” cases

## Summary

- The system achieves **independence**, **left-to-right bias** and **non-determinism**
- **Non-determinism** is created when existential closure is applied on a set of alternatives.
- The standard rule for pronoun interpretation won't do but I'll keep it for the rest of the talk
- In the next section, we show how to derive cases of **easy donkey sentences**, where the indefinite only ever has one witness ; pronouns can then be interpreted standardly.

## 2.3 Easy donkey sentences

### Functional Dependencies

- A context should deal with *functional dependencies*.

(29) Every boy saw a marshmallow<sub>i</sub> on his plate ; no boy left **it**<sub>i</sub> on the plate.

- The meaning of *it* covaries with the boy.
- Following Schlenker, I assume that assignment functions can provide *unsaturated individuals* (*e*-ending types)<sup>3</sup>.

(30)  $g(i) = \lambda x. \text{the marshmallow that } x \text{ saw}$  (type *ee*)

- Pronouns have complex subscripts.

(31) Every boy  $\lambda_j t_j$  saw exactly one marshmallow<sub>i</sub> on his plate ;  
no boy  $\lambda_j t_j$  left **it**<sub>i(t<sub>j</sub>)</sub> on the plate.

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<sup>3</sup>An alternative representation of these dependencies is plural assignments as in Brasoveanu.



- Textbook  $\lambda$ -abstraction written in new notation.

**$\lambda$ -Abstraction rule**

If for all  $x$ , there is a meaning  $m_x$  such that:

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & m_x \\ & g[i \rightarrow x] & \end{array} \right)$$

Then:

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \lambda_i \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & \lambda x. m_x \\ & g & \end{array} \right)$$

- The new *dynamic* rule should reflect discourse referents that could have been introduced in each of the sub-contexts.
- Updates introduced in the scope of a  $\lambda$ -abtractor are preserved in the form of *unsaturated individuals*.
- **New  $\lambda$ -abstraction:**

**$\lambda$ -Abstraction rule**

If for all  $x$ , there is a meaning  $m_x$  and an assignment  $g'_x$  such that:

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & m_x \\ g[i \rightarrow x] & \rightarrow & g[i \rightarrow x] \cdot g'_x \end{array} \right)$$

Then:

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \lambda_i \mathbf{T} & \xrightarrow{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket} & \lambda x. m_x \\ g[i \rightarrow x] & \rightarrow & g \cdot (i \mapsto \lambda x : i \in g'_x. g'_x(i)) \end{array} \right)$$

- To picture it:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} g[i \rightarrow \text{marc}'] & \xrightarrow{m_{\text{john}'}} & g[i \rightarrow \text{marc}', j \rightarrow d_1] \\ & \vdots & \\ g[i \rightarrow \text{amy}'] & \xrightarrow{m_{\text{amy}'}} & g[i \rightarrow \text{amy}'] \\ g[i \rightarrow \text{polly}'] & \xrightarrow{m_{\text{polly}'}} & g[i \rightarrow \text{polly}', j \rightarrow d_2] \end{array}$$

Updates for subcontexts

$$g \xrightarrow{\lambda x. m_x} g \left[ j \rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{marc}' & \mapsto d_1 \\ \text{polly}' & \mapsto d_2 \end{array} \right. \right]$$

Updates after  $\lambda$ -abstraction

### Application to donkey anaphora

- (32) a. Every farmer who owns only one donkey cherishes it.  
 b. Every farmer [who  $\lambda_j t_j$  owns only one donkey<sub>i</sub>] [ $\lambda_j t_j$  cherishes it<sub>i(t<sub>j</sub>)</sub>]

1. The relative clause is an existential statement ; it introduces referents iff it is true.

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} t_j \text{ owns only one donkey} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \exists!y, \text{ donkey}'(y) \wedge \text{owns}'(y)(x) \\ g[j \rightarrow x] & \rightarrow & \begin{cases} g[j \rightarrow x] \text{ if } x \text{ doesn't own exactly one donkey} \\ g[j \rightarrow x, i \rightarrow \text{the donkey that } x \text{ owns}] \text{ else} \end{cases} \end{array} \right)$$

2. The  $\lambda$ -abstraction rule preserves the donkeys that were introduced, in the form of a partial function.

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \lambda_j. t_j \text{ owns only one donkey} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \lambda x. \exists!y, \text{ donkey}'(y) \wedge \text{owns}'(y)(x) \\ g & \rightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \lambda x : x \text{ owns only one donkey. the donkey that } x \text{ owns}] \end{array} \right)$$

3. Functional modification (and predicate modification) applies ; none of these have any effect on the assignment function.

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \text{every farmer ... donkey} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \text{every}'(\text{donkey-owning-farmer}') \\ g & \rightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \lambda x : (\dots). \text{ the donkey that } x \text{ owns}] \end{array} \right)$$

4. The part of the nuclear scope that is below the abstractor has to be evaluated wrt an assignment function that contains the *unsaturated* donkey.

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} t_j \text{ cherishes it}_{i(t_j)} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \begin{array}{l} \text{cherishes}'[g'(j)][g'(i)(g'(j))] \\ = x \text{ cherishes the donkey that } x \text{ owns} \end{array} \\ g' = g \left[ \begin{array}{l} j \rightarrow x, \\ i \rightarrow \lambda x : (\dots). \text{ the donkey } x \text{ owns} \end{array} \right] & \rightarrow & g \left[ \begin{array}{l} j \rightarrow x, \\ i \rightarrow \lambda x : (\dots). \text{ the donkey } x \text{ owns} \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right)$$

5. Nuclear scope does not introduce referents ; the  $\lambda$ -abstraction functions just like the textbook version.

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} \lambda_j. t_j \text{ cherishes it}_{i(t_j)} & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \lambda x. x \text{ cherishes the donkey that } x \text{ owns} \\ g[i \rightarrow \lambda x : (\dots). \text{ the donkey } x \text{ owns}] & \rightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \lambda x : (\dots). \text{ the donkey } x \text{ owns}] \end{array} \right)$$

6. FA yields the right reading for *easy donkey sentences*.

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} (32) & \xrightarrow{[\cdot]} & \forall x, (\text{donkey-owning-farmer}'(x)) \rightarrow (\text{cherishes}'(\text{the-d-x-owns}')(x)) \\ g & \rightarrow & g[i \rightarrow \lambda x : (\dots). \text{ the donkey } x \text{ owns}] \end{array} \right)$$

### 3 Conclusion and open questions

- In this talk, we dealt with an **easy problem**: obtaining context-change potentials from general universally available principles, to achieve only minimal empirical coverage.
- The goal is to extend this to more intriguing and problematic cases of anaphora:  $\exists/\forall$  readings, plurals, etc.
- The former problem can be restated as the question how to define the correct interpretation rule for pronouns.