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Pyramid Of Pain | SOC Level 1 | TryHackMe Walkthrough



Abhijeet Singh · [Follow](#)


12 min read · Jun 2, 2023

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Task 1 Introduction



This well-renowned concept is being applied to cybersecurity solutions like [Cisco Security](#), [SentinelOne](#), and [SOCRadar](#) to improve the effectiveness of CTI (Cyber Threat Intelligence), threat hunting, and incident response exercises.

Understanding the Pyramid of Pain concept as a Threat Hunter, Incident Responder, or SOC Analyst is important.

Are you ready to explore what hides inside the Pyramid of Pain?

Answer the questions below

Answer the questions below

Read the above.

No answer needed

Question Done

Task 2 Hash Values (Trivial)

As per Microsoft, the hash value is a numeric value of a fixed length that uniquely identifies data. A hash value is the result of a hashing algorithm. The following are some of the most common hashing algorithms:

- **MD5 (Message Digest, defined by [RFC 1321](#))** – was designed by Ron Rivest in 1992 and is a widely used cryptographic hash function with a 128-bit hash value. MD5 hashes are NOT considered **cryptographically secure**. In 2011, the IETF published RFC 6151, “[Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms](#),” which mentioned a number of attacks against MD5 hashes, including the hash collision.
- **SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1, defined by [RFC 3174](#))** – was invented by United States National Security Agency in 1995. When data is fed to SHA-1 Hashing Algorithm, SHA-1 takes an input and produces a 160-bit hash value string as a 40 digit hexadecimal number. [NIST deprecated the use of SHA-1 in 2011](#) and banned its use for digital signatures at the end of 2013 based on it being susceptible to brute-force attacks. Instead, NIST recommends migrating from SHA-1 to stronger hash algorithms in the SHA-2 and SHA-3 families.
- **The SHA-2 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2)** – SHA-2 Hashing Algorithm was designed by The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency (NSA) in 2001 to replace SHA-1. SHA-2 has many

variants, and arguably the most common is SHA-256. The SHA-256 algorithm returns a hash value of 256-bits as a 64 digit hexadecimal number.

A hash is not considered to be cryptographically secure if two files have the same hash value or digest.

Security professionals usually use the hash values to gain insight into a specific malware sample, a malicious or a suspicious file, and as a way to uniquely identify and reference the malicious artifact.

You've probably read ransomware reports in the past, where security researchers would provide the hashes related to the malicious or suspicious files used at the end of the report. You can check out [The DFIR Report](#) and [FireEye Threat Research Blogs](#) if you're interested in seeing an example.

Various online tools can be used to do hash lookups like [VirusTotal](#) and [Metadefender Cloud – OPSWAT](#).

VirusTotal:

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal analysis interface for the file hash 3f33734b2d34cce83936ce99c3494cd845f1d2c02d7f6da31d42dfc1ca15a17. The main summary indicates 14 security vendors flagged the file as malicious. Below this, the file name is listed as m_croetian.wnry and its type as rtf. The file size is 38.15 KB, and it was analyzed on 2021-07-09 02:43:46 UTC (28 days ago). A download link for the RTF file is available. The detection table lists 14 entries from various security vendors, each with a detailed description of the threat found.

DETECTION	DETAILS	RELATIONS	BEHAVIOR	COMMUNITY
Antiy-AVL	Trojan/Generic.ASSuf.19EC8		CAT-QuickHeal	RTF.Trojan.Agent.40329
Comodo	Malware@#1t7uob1a9vm9d		ESET-NOD32	Win32/Filecoder.WannaCryptor.D
Gridinsoft	Ransom.U.Ransom.oa		Ikarus	Trojan.Win32.Filecoder
Lionic	Trojan.MSOffice.Generic.4lc		McAfee	RTF/Wannacry.a
McAfee-GW-Edition	RTF/Wannacry.a		Microsoft	Ransom:Win32/WannaCrypt.Alsrm
Symantec	Trojan.Gen.NPE.2		Tencent	Win32.Trojan.Filecoder.Dvzt
TrendMicro	TROJ_RANSOMNOTE.RTF		TrendMicro-HouseCall	TROJ_RANSOMNOTE.RTF

Below the hash in the screenshot above, you can see the filename. In this case, it is “m_croetian.wnry”

MetaDefender Cloud – OPSWAT:

The screenshot shows the OPSWAT MetaDefender Cloud interface. At the top, there's a search bar with placeholder text "File, URL, IP address, Domain, Hash, or CVE", a "Process" button, and a gear icon for settings. The language is set to English, and there are links for "Sign In" and "Licensing". A three-line menu icon is also present.

The main content area displays a file analysis report for a file with hash E325988F68D327743926EA317ABB9882F347... The threat name is identified as [Trojan/Wcry!yBhUK2kw](#). There are tabs for "Overview" (which is selected), "Static Analysis", and "Community". On the right, there's a link to a "Sanitized version". Below the threat name, there's a section for "Cast your vote on this file" with a thumbs up icon and a count of 0.

The analysis results are presented in three columns:

- Metascan**: Threats detected: **08 /34 ENGINES**. A large red "08" is highlighted. Buttons include "Get full report", "Upgrade limits", and "View leaderboards".
- Sandbox Threat Score**: No dynamic analysis performed. Shows a score of **00 /10**. Buttons include "View dynamic analysis" and "Sandbox documentation".
- Community Insight**: User votes. Shows a progress bar at approximately 10% completion. Buttons include "View leaderboards" and "Check out our community".

As you might have noticed, it is really easy to spot a malicious file if we have the hash in our arsenal. However, as an attacker, modifying a file by even a single bit is trivial, which would produce a different hash value. With so many variations and instances of known malware or ransomware, threat hunting using file hashes as the IOC (Indicators of Compromise) can become difficult.

Let's take a look at an example of how you can change the hash value of a file by simply appending a string to the end of a file using echo: File Hash (Before Modification)

```
PS C:\Users\THM\Downloads> Get-FileHash .\OpenVPN_2.5.1_I601_amd64.msi -Algorithm Hash
----- Path
MD5      D1A008E3A606F24590A02B853E955CF7  C:\Users\THM\Downloads\OpenVPN_2.5.1
```

File Hash (After Modification)

```
PS C:\Users\THM\Downloads> echo "AppendTheHash" >> .\OpenVPN_2.5.1_I601_amd64.msi
PS C:\Users\THM\Downloads> Get-FileHash .\OpenVPN_2.5.1_I601_amd64.msi -Algorithm Hash
```

MD5

9D52B46F5DE41B73418F8E0DACEC5E9F C:\Users\THM\Downloads\OpenVPN_2.5.1

Answer the questions below

Analyse the report associated with the hash

“b8ef959a9176aef07fdca8705254a163b50b49a17217a4ff0107487f59d4a35d” here. What is the filename of the sample?

Ans:- Sales_Receipt 5606.xls

Task 3 IP Address (Easy)

You may have learned the importance of an IP Address from the “[What is Networking?](#)” Room. the importance of the IP Address. An IP address is used to identify any device connected to a network. These devices range from desktops, to servers and even CCTV cameras! We rely on IP addresses to send and receive the information over the network. But we are not going to get into the structure and functionality of the IP address. As a part of the Pyramid of Pain, we’ll evaluate how IP addresses are used as an indicator.

In the Pyramid of Pain, IP addresses are indicated with the color green. You might be asking why and what you can associate the green colour with?

From a defense standpoint, knowledge of the IP addresses an adversary uses can be valuable. A common defense tactic is to block, drop, or deny inbound requests from IP addresses on your parameter or external firewall. This tactic is often not bulletproof as it’s trivial for an experienced adversary to recover simply by using a new public IP address.

Malicious IP connections ([app.any.run](#)):

HTTP Requests		0	Connections		4	DNS Requests		4	Threats		0
Timeshift	Protocol		Rep	PID	Process name	CN	IP		Port		
85528 ms	TCP	⚠️	1632	some_malicious_file.bi...	🇺🇸	50.87.136.52		443			
144.95 s	TCP	?	1632	some_malicious_file.bi...	🇩🇪	78.46.1.42		443			
205.35 s	TCP	⚠️	1632	some_malicious_file.bi...	🇩🇪	134.119.253.108		443			
264.76 s	TCP	⚠️	1632	some_malicious_file.bi...	🇺🇸	104.21.87.185		443			

NOTE! Do not attempt to interact with the IP addresses shown above.

One of the ways an adversary can make it challenging to successfully carry out IP blocking is by using Fast Flux.

According to [Akamai](#), Fast Flux is a DNS technique used by botnets to hide phishing, web proxying, malware delivery, and malware communication activities behind compromised hosts acting as proxies. The purpose of using the Fast Flux network is to make the communication between malware and its command and control server (C&C) challenging to be discovered by security professionals.

So, the primary concept of a Fast Flux network is having multiple IP addresses associated with a domain name, which is constantly changing. Palo Alto created a great fictional scenario to explain Fast Flux: [“Fast Flux 101: How Cybercriminals Improve the Resilience of Their Infrastructure to Evade Detection and Law Enforcement Takedowns”](#)

Read the following report (generated from [any.run](#)) for this sample [here](#) to answer the questions below:

Answer the questions below

Read the following [report](#) to answer this question. What is the **first IP address** the malicious process (**PID 1632**) attempts to communicate with?

50.87.136.52

Correct Answer

💡 Hint

Read the following [report](#) to answer this question. What is the **first domain name** the malicious process (**(PID 1632)**) attempts to communicate with?

craftingalegacy.com

Correct Answer

💡 Hint

Task 4 Domain Names (Simple)


Let's step up the Pyramid of Pain and move on to Domain Names. You can see the transition of colors — from green to teal.

Domain Names can be thought as simply mapping an IP address to a string of text. A domain name can contain a domain and a top-level domain ([evilcorp.com](#)) or a sub-domain followed by a domain and top-level domain ([tryhackme.evilcorp.com](#)). But we will not go into the details of how the Domain Name System (DNS) works. You can learn more about DNS in this “[DNS in Detail](#)” Room.


Domain Names can be a little more of a pain for the attacker to change as they would most likely need to purchase the domain, register it and modify DNS records. Unfortunately for defenders, many DNS providers have loose standards and provide APIs to make it even easier for the attacker to change the domain.

Malicious Sodinokibi C2 (Command and Control Infrastructure) domains:

Campaign	8254
boisehosting.net	
dubnew.com	
koken-voor-baby.nl	
vancouver-print.ca	
bouquet-de-roses.com	
olejack.ru	
wasmachtmeinfonds.at	
friendsandbrgns.com	
xn--singlebrsen-vergleich-nec.com	
seminoc.com	
cursoporcelanatoliquido.online	
tastewilliamsburg.com	
aselbermachen.com	
accountancywijchen.nl	
rerekatu.com	
fotoideaymedia.es	
stallbyggen.se	
juneauopioidworkgroup.org	
zewatchers.com	
seevilla-dr-sturm.at	
i-trust.dk	
appsformacpc.com	
thenewrejuveme.com	
sabel-bf.com	
ceres.org.au	
marietteaernoudts.nl	
charlottepoudroux-photographie.fr	
klimt2012.info	
creamery201.com	
makeurvoiceheard.com	



Can you spot anything malicious in the above screenshot? Now, compare it to the legitimate website view below:



This is one of the examples of a Punycode attack used by the attackers to redirect users to a malicious domain that seems legitimate at first glance.

What is Punycode? As per [Wandera](#), “Punycode is a way of converting words that cannot be written in ASCII, into a Unicode ASCII encoding.”

What you saw in the URL above is `adidas.de` which has the Punycode of <http://xn--addas-o4a.de/>

Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Apple Safari are now pretty good at translating the obfuscated characters into the full Punycode domain name.


To detect the malicious domains, proxy logs or web server logs can be used.

Attackers usually hide the malicious domains under **URL Shorteners**. A URL Shortener is a tool that creates a short and unique URL that will redirect to the specific website specified during the initial step of setting up the URL Shortener link. According to Cofense, attackers use the following URL Shortening services to generate malicious links:

- bit.ly
- goo.gl
- ow.ly
- s.id
- smarturl.it
- tiny.pl
- tinyurl.com
- x.co

You can see the actual website the shortened link is redirecting you to by appending “+” to it (see the examples below). Type the shortened URL in the address bar of the web browser and add the above characters to see the redirect URL.

NOTE: The examples of the shortened links below are non-existent.



Viewing Domain Names in Any.run:

Answer the questions below

Go to [this report on app.any.run](#) and provide the first **suspicious** URL request you are seeing, you will be using this report to answer the remaining questions of this task.

craftingalegacy.com

Correct Answer

What term refers to an address used to access websites?

Domain Name

Correct Answer

What type of attack uses Unicode characters in the domain name to imitate a known domain?

Punycode attack

Correct Answer

Provide the redirected website for the shortened URL using a preview: <https://tinyurl.com/bw7t8p4u>

<https://tryhackme.com/>

Correct Answer

Task 5 Host Artifacts (Annoying)

Let's take another step up to the yellow zone.

On this level, the attacker will feel a little more annoyed and frustrated if you can detect the attack. The attacker would need to circle back at this detection level and

change his attack tools and methodologies. This is very time-consuming for the attacker, and probably, he will need to spend more resources on his adversary tools.

Host artifacts are the traces or observables that attackers leave on the system, such as registry values, suspicious process execution, attack patterns or IOCs (Indicators of Compromise), files dropped by malicious applications, or anything exclusive to the current threat.

Suspicious process execution from Word:

 WINWORD.EXE	0.01	51.500 K	134.300 K	3640 Microsoft Word	Microsoft Corporation
api-ms-win-downlevel-user32-l1-...		4.632 K	11.192 K	3300 EffectDemo MFC Application	

Suspicious events followed by opening a malicious application:

The files modified/dropped by the malicious actor:

2728	WINWORD.EXE	C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\VBE\MSForms.exd MD5: CC11BFD14D6ECC83477B69FF06C6C587	SHA256: A4E8F5821887AC26449C33D9B027CE31BE0E7203DD035C5DC7D34A9AEF01A6DA	tib
2728	WINWORD.EXE	C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\~\$0-100120 CDW-102220.doc MD5: 2E7A3442236F2D50C669BC79188BBD69	SHA256: BF007001BACF8F6ABF371B0B2797B7D13B741879E1E5B76FB616A934318418A9	pgc
3828	PowersheLL.exe	C:\Users\admin\Jehhza\Ben14fr\G_jugk.exe MD5: 92F58C4E2F524EC53EBE10D914D96CCB	SHA256: 4A9E32BC5348265C43945ADAAF140B98B64329BD05878BC13671FA916F423710	executable
1640	G_jugk.exe	C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\photowiz\regidle.exe MD5: 92F58C4E2F524EC53EBE10D914D96CCB	SHA256: 4A9E32BC5348265C43945ADAAF140B98B64329BD05878BC13671FA916F423710	executable

Answer the questions below

A security vendor has analysed the malicious sample for us. Review the report [here](#) to answer the following questions.

No answer needed

Question Done

A process named **regidle.exe** makes a POST request to an IP address on **port 8080**. What is the IP address?

96.126.101.6

Correct Answer

💡 Hint

The actor drops a malicious executable (EXE). What is the name of this executable?

G_jugk.exe

Correct Answer

💡 Hint

Look at this [report](#) by Virustotal. How many vendors determine this host to be malicious?

9

Correct Answer

💡 Hint

Task 6 Network Artifacts (Annoying)

Network Artifacts also belong to the yellow zone in the Pyramid of Pain. This means if you can detect and respond to the threat, the attacker would need more time to go back and change his tactics or modify the tools, which gives you more time to respond and detect the upcoming threats or remediate the existing ones.

A network artifact can be a user-agent string, C2 information, or URI patterns followed by the HTTP POST requests. An attacker might use a User-Agent string that hasn't been observed in your environment before or seems out of the ordinary. The User-Agent is defined by [RFC2616](#) as the request-header field that contains the information about the user agent originating the request.

Network artifacts can be detected in Wireshark PCAPs (file that contains the packet data of a network) by using a network protocol analyzer such as [TShark](#) or exploring IDS (Intrusion Detection System) logging from a source such as [Snort](#).

HTTP POST requests containing suspicious strings:

192.168.100.140	194.187.133.160	936	HTTP	POST /Nqdlz/wBG/ HTTP/1.1
192.168.100.140	98.174.164.72	936	HTTP	POST /ghMuzyNCNN/kMmvd1ttxeV/y2feo8eu7Jyv/02M8WI9SpyCp/yLVEV96eosyd5URJ477/8wdGXdz9k9hhJjWp/ HTTP/1.1
192.168.100.140	103.86.49.11	936	HTTP	POST /VCv0qXMjgEehau/AyEp/09Qn2/R6Rj7Gw9eOv6yJ/fC5a36YfopGe/Q2AwYvSohZiyaEtbo/ HTTP/1.1
192.168.100.140	78.24.219.147	904	HTTP	POST /jC0c/oQQPafJlpMi6n3/Pbao/K7oB22aAUkQ61A6r/GooMY/ HTTP/1.1
192.168.100.140	50.245.107.73	888	HTTP	POST /ukXcIs1jsvd7W/h2VQ1YqB/csu0kgUg1kakMvQRJ9/NCjJodG/ HTTP/1.1
192.168.100.140	110.145.77.103	888	HTTP	POST /QZvVQ6o1I/DYk9QgXU/HtoxMCRHbYCJhgaml/5NsCejn3/ HTTP/1.1

Let's use TShark to filter out the User-Agent strings by using the following command: `tshark --Y http.request -T fields -e http.host -e http.user_agent -r analysis_file.pcap`

These are the most common User-Agent strings found for the [Emotet Downloader Trojan](#)

If you can detect the custom User-Agent strings that the attacker is using, you might be able to block them, creating more obstacles and making their attempt to compromise the network more annoying.

Answer the questions below

What browser uses the User-Agent string shown in the screenshot above?

Internet Explorer

Correct Answer

How many POST requests are in the screenshot from the pcap file?

6

Correct Answer


Task 7 Tools (Challenging)

Congratulations! We have made it to the challenging part for the adversaries!

At this stage, we have levelled up our detection capabilities against the artifacts. The attacker would most likely give up trying to break into your network or go back and try to create a new tool that serves the same purpose. It will be a game over for the attackers as they would need to invest some money into building a new tool (if they are capable of doing so), find the tool that has the same potential, or even gets some training to learn how to be proficient in a certain tool.

Attackers would use the utilities to create malicious macro documents (maldocs) for spearphishing attempts, a backdoor that can be used to establish C2 (Command and Control Infrastructure), any custom .EXE, and .DLL files, payloads, or password crackers.

A Trojan dropped the suspicious “Stealer.exe” in the Temp folder:



The execution of the suspicious binary:

	payload.exe	1356	12.09 MB	WIN-31...\RussianPanda
	Stealer.exe	2928	11.63 MB	WIN-31...\RussianPanda Galactus

Antivirus signatures, detection rules, and YARA rules can be great weapons for you to use against attackers at this stage.

MalwareBazaar and Malshare are good resources to provide you with access to the samples, malicious feeds, and YARA results — these all can be very helpful when it comes to threat hunting and incident response.

For detection rules, SOC Prime Threat Detection Marketplace is a great platform, where security professionals share their detection rules for different kinds of threats including the latest CVE's that are being exploited in the wild by adversaries.

Fuzzy hashing is also a strong weapon against the attacker's tools. Fuzzy hashing helps you to perform similarity analysis — match two files with minor differences based on the fuzzy hash values. One of the examples of fuzzy hashing is the usage of SSDeep; on the SSDeep official website, you can also find the complete explanation for fuzzy hashing.

Example of SSDeep from VirusTotal:

DETECTION	DETAILS	RELATIONS	BEHAVIOR	COMMUNITY 13+
Basic Properties ⓘ				
MD5	9498ff82a64ff445398c8426ed63ea5b			
SHA-1	36f9ca40b3ce96fcee1cf1d4a7222935536fd25b			
SHA-256	8b2e701e9101955c73865589a4c72999aeabc11043f712e05fdb1c17c4ab19a			
Vhash	025056657d7555108040129005b9z25z12z3afz			
Authentihash	ad56160b465f7bd1e7568640397f01fc4f8819ce6f0c1415690ecee646464cec			
ImpHash	d7584447a5c5ca9b4a55946317137951			
Rich PE header hash	fa4dbcba9180170710b3c245464efa483			
SSDeep	6144:Gz90qLc1zR98hUb4UdjzEwG+vqAWiR4EXePbx67CNzjX:Gz90qLc1lWhUbhVqJPbiQ7CNzb			
TLSH	T1DB44CF267660D833D0DF94316C75C3F9673BFC2123215A6B6A4417699E307EOAE7839E			
File type	Win32 EXE			
Magic	PE32 executable for MS Windows (GUI) Intel 80386 32-bit			
TrID	Win32 Executable MS Visual C++ (generic) (48.8%)			
TrID	Win64 Executable (generic) (16.4%)			
TrID	Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (10.2%)			
TrID	Win16 NE executable (generic) (7.8%)			
TrID	Win32 Executable (generic) (7%)			
File size	249.00 KB (254976 bytes)			

Answer the questions belo

Provide the method used to determine similarity between the files

Fuzzy Hashing

Correct Answer

Provide the alternative name for fuzzy hashes without the abbreviation

context triggered piecewise hashes

Correct Answer

💡 Hint

Task 8 TTPs (Tough)

It is not over yet. But good news, we made it to the final stage or the apex of the Pyramid of Pain!

TTPs stands for Tactics, Techniques & Procedures. This includes the whole [MITRE ATT&CK Matrix](#), which means all the steps taken by an adversary to achieve his goal, starting from phishing attempts to persistence and data exfiltration.

If you can detect and respond to the TTPs quickly, you leave the adversaries almost no chance to fight back. For, example if you could detect a [Pass-the-Hash](#) attack using Windows Event Log Monitoring and remediate it, you would be able to find the compromised host very quickly and stop the lateral movement inside your network. At this point, the attacker would have two options:

1. Go back, do more research and training, reconfigure their custom tools

2. Give up and find another target

Option 2 definitely sounds less time and resource-consuming.

Answer the questions below

Navigate to ATT&CK Matrix webpage. How many techniques fall under the Exfiltration category?

9

Correct Answer

Chimera is a China-based hacking group that has been active since 2018. What is the name of the commercial, remote access tool they use for C2 beacons and data exfiltration?

Cobalt Strike

Correct Answer

💡 Hint

Task 9 Practical: The Pyramid of Pain

Deploy the static site attached to this task and place the prompts into the correct tiers in the pyramid of pain!

Once you are sure, submit your answer on the static site to retrieve a flag!

Answer the questions below

Complete the static site.

No answer needed

Question Done

Task 10 Conclusion

Now you have learned the concept of the Pyramid of Pain. Maybe it is time to apply this in practice. Please, navigate to the Static Site to perform the exercise.

You can pick any APT (Advanced Persistent Threat Groups) as another exercise. A good place to look at would be [FireEye Advanced Persistent Threat Groups](#). When you have determined the APT Group you want to research — find their indicators and ask yourself: “What can I do or what detection rules and approach can I create to detect the adversary’s activity?”, and “Where does this activity or detection fall on the Pyramid of Pain?”

As David Blanco states, “*the amount of pain you cause an adversary depends on the types of indicators you are able to make use of*”.

Answer the questions below

Read the above.

No answer needed

Question Done



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I am a passionate security researcher with a solid foundation and experience in networking and Linux.

Responses (1)



What are your thoughts?

Respond



Noah W
9 months ago

...

Plagiarism.

Not a walkthrough at all.



Reply

More from Abhijeet Singh



 Abhijeet Singh

Advent of Cyber 2024 [Day 3] Even if I wanted to go, their vulnerabilities wouldn't allow it.

So, Let's Start with the Questions. I hope you already read the story and all the given instructions —

Dec 4, 2024  2



 Abhijeet Singh

Advent of Cyber 2024 [Day 6] If I can't find a nice malware to use, I'm not going.l

- Welcome to the Day 6 of the Advent of Cyber 2024 -

◆ Dec 7, 2024

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Advent of Cyber 2024 [Day 5] SOC-mas XX-what-ee? | TryHackMe Walkthrough

- Welcome to the Day 5 of the Advent of Cyber 2024 -

◆ Dec 6, 2024



 Abhijeet Singh

Advent of Cyber 2024 [Day 17] He analyzed and analyzed till his analyzer was sore!

-Welcome to the Day 17 of the Advent of Cyber 2024-

Dec 23, 2024



...

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
TryHackMe | Introduction To Honeypots Walkthrough

A guided room covering the deployment of honeypots and analysis of botnet activities

★ Sep 7, 2024 🙋 10



...



In T3CH by Axoloth

TryHackMe | Snort Challenge—The Basics | WriteUp

Put your snort skills into practice and write snort rules to analyse live capture network traffic

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Abhijeet Singh

Advent of Cyber 2024 [Day 4] I'm all atomic inside! | TryHackMe Walkthrough

Please go through the story, Cyber Attacks, the Kill Chain and MITRE ATT&CK related content for better understanding of this room.



Dec 5, 2024



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Abhijeet Singh

Advent of Cyber 2024 [Day 3] Even if I wanted to go, their vulnerabilities wouldn't allow it.

So, Let's Start with the Questions. I hope you already read the story and all the given instructions —

Dec 4, 2024 2



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Abhijeet Singh

Advent of Cyber 2024 [Day 8] Shellcodes of the world, unite! | TryHackMe Walkthrough

- Welcome to the Day 8 of the Advent of Cyber 2024 -

Dec 11, 2024



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 Abhijeet Singh

Advent of Cyber 2024 [Day 6] If I can't find a nice malware to use, I'm not going.l

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