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#### **Abstract:**

The NetIDE Intermediate protocol implements the following functions: (i) to carry management messages between the Network Engines layers (Core, Shim and Backend); e.g., to exchange information on the supported SBI protocols, to provide unique identifiers for application modules, implement the fence mechanism, (ii) to carry event and action messages between Shim, Core, and Backend, properly demultiplexing such messages to the right module based on identifiers, and (iii) to encapsulate messages specific to a particular SBI protocol version (e.g., OpenFlow 1.X, NETCONF, etc.) with proper information to recognize these messages as such. This document provides the specification of the NetIDE Intermediate Protocol v1.4.

### **Keywords:**

NetIDE, Network Engine, Network protocol

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# **List of Acronyms**

**API** Application Programming Interface

JSON JavaScript Object Notation

**NETCONF** Network Configuration Protocol

**ONF** Open Networking Foundation

**SBI** Southbound Interface

 $\mathsf{XML}$  eXtensible Markup Language

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# **List of Corrections**



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### 1 Introduction

The NetIDE Network Engine (Fig. 1.1) integrates a client controller layer that executes the modules that compose a Network Application and interfaces with a server SDN controller layer that drives the underlying infrastructure. In addition, it provides a uniform interface to common tools that are intended to allow the inspection/debug of the control channel and the management of the network resources.

The Network Engine provides a compatibility layer capable of translating calls of the network applications running on top of the client controllers, into calls for the server controller framework. The communication between the client and the server layers is achieved through the so-called NetIDE intermediate protocol, which is an application-layer protocol on top of TCP that transmits the network control/management messages from the client to the server controller and vice-versa.

Between client and server controller sits the Core Layer which also "speaks" the intermediate protocol. The core layer implements three main functions: (i) interfacing with the client backends and server shim, controlling the lifecycle of controllers as well as modules in them, (ii) orchestrating the execution of individual modules (in one client controller) or complete applications (possibly spread across multiple client controllers), (iii) interfacing with the tools.




Figure 1.1: The NetIDE Network Engine.

The Intermediate Protocol serves several needs, it has to: (i) carry control messages between

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core and shim/backend, e.g., to start up/take down a particular module, providing unique identifiers for modules, (ii) carry event and action messages between shim, core, and backend, properly demultiplexing such messages to the right module based on identifiers, (iii) encapsulate messages specific to a particular SBI protocol version (e.g., OpenFlow 1.X, NETCONF, etc.) towards the client controllers with proper information to recognize these messages as such.

In the remainder of this document we provide details of specification v1.4 of the NetIDE Intermediate Protocol, which updates the specification v1.3 by moving the management of OpenFlow's reply messages and the handshake mechanism from the Shim to the Core.



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## **Protocol specification**

Messages of the NetIDE protocol contain two basic elements: the NetIDE header and the data (or payload). The NetIDE header, described below in Section 2.1, is placed before the payload and serves as the communication and control link between the different components of the Network Engine. The payload carries management messages or the SBI messages issued by either client controllers or network elements.

### 2.1 The NetIDE protocol header

The NetIDE header is defined as follows:

```
0
\begin{smallmatrix}0&1&2&3&4&5&6&7&8&9&0&1&2&3&4&5&6&7&8&9&0&1&2&3&4&5&6&7&8&9&0&1\end{smallmatrix}
module id
                      datapath_id
```

where each tick mark represents one bit position. Alternatively, in a C-style coding format, the NetIDE header can be represented with the following structure:

```
struct netide_header{
        uint8_t netide_ver;
        uint8_t type;
        uint16_t length;
        uint32_t nxid
        uint32_t module_id
        uint64_t datapath_id
};
```

The netide\_ver is the version of the NetIDE protocol (the current version v1.4 which is identified with value 0x05), length is the total length of the payload in bytes and type contains a code that indicates the type of the message according with the following values<sup>1</sup>:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>NETIDE\_MGMT and NETIDE\_TOPOLOGY message types are not documented in the current specification. They have been introduced to allow future extensions of the Network Engine capabilities.

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```
enum type{
                                  = 0x01,
        NETIDE_HELLO
        NETIDE_ERROR
                                  = 0x02,
        NETIDE_MGMT
                                  = 0x03,
                                  = 0x04,
        NETIDE_MODULE_ANN
        NETIDE_MODULE_ACK
                                   = 0x05,
        NETIDE_HEARTBEAT
                                  = 0x06,
        NETIDE_TOPOLOGY
                                  = 0x07,
        NETIDE_FENCE
                                  = 0x08,
        NETIDE_OPENFLOW
                                   = 0x11,
        NETIDE_NETCONF
                                  = 0x12,
        NETIDE_OPFLEX
                                  = 0x13.
        NETIDE_OFCONFIG
                                  = 0x14,
        NETIDE_OTHER
                                   = 0xFF
};
```

datapath\_id is a 64-bits field that uniquely identifies the network elements. module\_id is a 32-bits field that uniquely identifies Backends and application modules running on top of each client controller. The composition mechanism in the Core layer leverages on this field to implement the correct execution flow of these modules. Finally, nxid is the transaction identifier associated to the each message. Replies must use the same value to facilitate the pairing.

### 2.2 Module announcement

The Core executes composition and conflict resolution operations based on a configuration file which specifies how the applications modules cooperate in controlling the network traffic. In particular, configuration parameters determine the way the Core handles the messages received from the applications modules running on top of the client controllers. To this purpose, each message is encapsulated with the NetIDE header containing a module\_id value that identifies the module that has issued the message.

module\_id values are assigned by the Core during the modules announcement/acknowledge process described in this Section. As a result of this process, each Backend and application module can be recognized by the Core through an identifier (the module\_id) placed in the NetIDE header.

As a first step, Backends register themselves by sending a module announcement message (message type NETIDE\_MODULE\_ANN) to the Core containing a human-readable identifier such as: backend-<place type NETIDE\_MODULE\_ANN)</pre> to the Core containing a human-readable identifier such as: backendcplatform\_name>-<pid>. Where platform\_name is the name of the client controller platform (ryu, onos, odl and floodlight can be used) and pid is the process ID of the instance of the client controller which is performing the registration. The format of the message is the following:



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```
module_id = 0
datapath_id = 0
data = "backend-<platform_name>-<pid>"
}
```

The answer generated by the Core (message type NETIDE\_MODULE\_ACK) includes a module\_id value and the Backend name in the payload (the same indicated in the NETIDE\_MODULE\_ANN message):

After this step, all the messages generated by the Backend (e.g., heartbeat and hello messages described in the following Sections) will contain the BACKEND\_ID value in the module\_id field of the NetIDE header. Furthermore, BACKEND\_ID is used to register the application modules that are running on top of the client controller:

where module\_name is the name of the module under registration. The module's name can be assigned by the Backend or retrieved from the module itself via Application Programming Interface (API) calls. The Core replies with:

```
struct NetIDE_message{
         netide_ver
                                    = 0 \times 05
                                    = NETIDE_MODULE_ACK
         type
         length
                                    = len("module_name")
         nxid
                                    = 0
         module_id
                                    = MODULE_ID
                                    = 0
         datapath_id
         data
                                    = "module_name"
}
```

After this last step, the Backend allows the application modules to control the network. In particular, network commands sent towards the network (e.g. OpenFlow FLOW\_MODS, PACKET\_OUTS, FEATURES\_REQUESTS) are intercepted by the Backend, which encapsulates them with the NetIDE

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header containing the MODULE\_ID value. Such a value is then used by the Core to recognize the sender of the message and to properly feed the composition and conflict resolution operators.

### 2.3 Heartbeat

The heartbeat mechanism has been introduced after the adoption of the ZeroMQ messaging queuing library [1] to transmit the NetIDE messages. Unfortunately, the ZeroMQ library does not offer any mechanism to find out about disrupted connections (and also completely unresponsive peers).

This limitation can be an issue for the Core's composition mechanism and for the tools connected to the Network Engine, as they are not able to understand when an client controller disconnects or crashes. As a countermeasure, Backends must periodically send (let's say every 5 seconds) a "heartbeat" message to the Core. If the Core does not receive at least one "heartbeat" message from the Backend within a certain timeframe, the Core considers it disconnected, removes all the related data from its memory structures and informs the relevant tools. In order to minimize the service disruption, the Core applies default policies as specified in the composition specification (e.g. a "drop all" action in case of disconnected firewall module).

The format of the message is the following:

### 2.4 Handshake

Upon completion of the connection with the Core (and of the module announcement/acknowledge process for the Backends), Shim and Backends must immediately send a hello message with the list of the supported control and/or management protocols. The format of the message is the following:

Where data contains one 2-byte word (in big endian order) for each protocol, with the first byte



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containing the code of the protocol according to the above enum, while the second byte indicates the version of the protocol (e.g. according to the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) specification [2], 0x01 for OpenFlow v1.0, 0x02 for OpenFlow v1.1, etc.). NETCONF version is marked with 0x01 that refers to the specification in the RFC6241 [3], while OpFlex version is marked with 0x00 since this protocol is still in work-in-progress stage [4].

The Core responds with another hello message containing the following:

if at least one of the protocols requested by the client is supported by the composition mechanism. In particular, data contains the codes of the protocols that match the client's request (2-bytes words, big endian order). The backend\_id value is used in the NetIDE header to allow the Core to forward the reply to the Backend that started the handshake. If none of the requested protocols is supported, the header of the reply is as follows:

where the payload of the message data contains the codes of all the protocols supported by the server controller (2-bytes words, big endian order).

### 2.5 The FENCE mechanism

An application module may respond to a given network event (e.g., an OpenFlow PACKET\_IN) with a set of zero, one or multiple network commands (e.g., OpenFlow FLOW\_MODs and PACKET\_OUTs). The so-called FENCE mechanism is a means for the Core to correlate events and commands and to know when the module has finished processing the input event.

This mechanism is implemented through the message type NETIDE\_FENCE which is sent by the Backend to the Core once a module has finished processing a network event. Within the same transaction, FENCE message, the network event and related network commands use all the same module\_id and nxid values in the NetIDE header so that the Core can correlate them.

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


Figure 2.1: Fence mechanism workflow. Both nxid and module\_id refer to the NetIDE header fields.

The process is represented in Fig. 2.1, where a PACKET\_IN event is encapsulated with the NetIDE header by the Core with values module\_id=X and nxid=M and finally sent to the Backend. The Backend removes the NetIDE header and forwards the PACKET\_IN the the application module X. The module reacts with zero, one or multiple network commands (represented by OpenFlow messages PACKET\_OUT and FLOW\_MOD in the figure). Each network command is encapsulated by the Backend with the NetIDE header re-using the same module\_id and nxid values received from the Core with the PACKET\_IN. Therefore, the Core uses the nxid value to pair the network commands generated by the module and the previous network event.

Once the module's event handling function returns, the Backend issues a FENCE message to signal the completion of the transaction to the Core.

### 2.6 The OpenFlow protocol

In this specification, the support for all versions of OpenFlow is achieved with the following:

```
struct netide_message{
          struct netide_header header;
          uint8 data[0]
};
```

Where header contains the following values: netide\_ver=0x05, type=NETIDE\_OPENFLOW and length is the size of the original OpenFlow message which is contained in data.



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### 2.6.1 Properly handling reply messages

The NetIDE protocol helps the Network Engine in pairing OpenFlow reply messages with the corresponding requests issued by the application modules running on top of it (e.g. statistics, feature requests, configurations, etc., thus the so-called "controller-to-switch" messages defined in the OpenFlow specifications). In this context, the xid field in the OpenFlow header is not helpful, as may happen that different modules use the same values.

In the proposed approach, represented in Fig. 2.2, the task of pairing replies with requests is performed by the Core which replaces the xid of the OpenFlow requests with new unique values and stores the original xid and the module\_id it finds in the NetIDE header. As the network elements use the same xid values in the replies, the Core can easily pair requests and replies and can use the saved module\_id to send the reply to the right application module.

The diagram in Fig. 2.2 shows how the Network Engine handles the controller-to-switch OpenFlow messages. The workflow starts with an application module that issues an OpenFlow request with xid=N. The Backend relays the message to the Core by encapsulating it with the NetIDE header by using module\_id=X previously assigned to the application module (see Section 2.2). Once the Core receives this message, it computes a new OpenFlow xid value M (e.g. by using a hashing algorithm) and ensures that such a value is not being used in other existing transactions.




Figure 2.2: Request/reply message handling. xid refers to the OpenFlow header field.

Before sending the reply to the Backend, the Core restores the original xid in the OpenFlow reply (the application module expects to find in the reply the same xid value that was used for the request) and inserts the module\_id previously saved in the NetIDE header. The Backend will use this information to forward the message to the right application module.

Asynchronous OpenFlow messages generated by the network elements are ignored by the above described tracking mechanism. They are simply relayed to the Backends that eventually forward them to the relevant application modules based on the composition and topology specifications.

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Currently defined OpenFlow asynchronous messages are the following:

Message Type	ID	Description	OF Version
OFPT_PACKET_IN	10	New packet received by a switch	1.0-1.5
OFPT_FLOW_REMOVED	11	Flow rule removed from the table	1.0-1.5
OFPT_PORT_STATUS	12	Port added, removed or modified	1.0-1.5
OFPT_ROLE_STATUS	30	Controller role change event	1.4-1.5
OFPT_TABLE_STATUS	31	Changes of the table state	1.4-1.5
OFPT_REQUESTFORWARD	32	Request forwarding by the switch	1.4-1.5
OFPT_CONTROLLER_STATUS	35	Controller status change event	1.5

### 2.7 Other SBI protocols

The NetIDE intermediate protocol can easily support other SBI protocols, such as NETCONF [3], OF-Config [5] or OpFlex [4].

While OF-Config configurations are only encoded in eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [6], NETCONF and OpFlex specifications are more flexible and support both XML and JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [7] encoding formats. For this reason, we need an additional field in the NetIDE header to indicate the format of the message contained in data and to allow the recipients to correctly handle it. To this purpose, when transmitting NETCONF or OpFlex messages, the sender must set type=NETIDE\_OTHER in the NetIDE header to indicate the presence of an additional 16-bits field at the end of the header. This field, named ext\_type, specifies the SBI protocol and the format of the message carried by data:

```
struct netide_message{
    struct netide_header header;
    uint16_t ext_type;
    uint8_t data[0];
};
```

Where header contains the following values: netide\_ver=0x05, type=NETIDE\_OTHER and length is the size of the original SBI message carried by data. The value of ext\_type indicates the SBI protocol in the most significant byte (as specified in Section 2.1) and the format of the message (either 0x00 for XML or 0x01 for JSON) in the least significant byte.



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