

## Project 3: Cryptography

This project is split into two parts, with the first checkpoint due on **Monday, March 12 at 6:00pm** and the second checkpoint due on **Wednesday, March 28 at 6:00pm**. The first checkpoint is worth 2% of your total grade, and the second checkpoint is worth 10%. We strongly recommend that you get started early. Each semester everyone will be given ONE late extension that allows you to turn in up to one assignment(checkpoint) up to 24 hours after the due date. Extensions are not automatic. So, if you want to use your late extension, you **MUST** send an e-mail to **ece422-staff@illinois.edu** **BEFORE** the due date. Late work will not be accepted after 24 hours past the due date.

This is a group project; you **SHOULD** work in **teams of two** and if you are in teams of two, you **MUST** submit one project per team. Please find a partner as soon as possible. If have trouble forming a team, post to Piazza's partner search forum. Not all groups will finish all the tasks in all the MPs. The tasks in each MP are designed to be progressively harder with the final tasks in each MP having been designed as *\*significant\** challenges.

The code and other answers your group submits **MUST** be entirely your own work, and you are bound by the Student Code. You **MAY** consult with other students about the conceptualization of the project and the meaning of the questions, but you **MUST NOT** look at any part of someone else's solution or collaborate with anyone outside your group. You may consult published references, provided that you appropriately cite them (e.g., with program comments), as you would in an academic paper.

Solutions **MUST** be submitted electronically in any one of the group member's svn directory, following the submission checklist given at the end of each checkpoint. Details on the filename and submission guideline is listed at the end of the document.

---

*"Anyone, from the most clueless amateur to the best cryptographer, can create an algorithm that he himself can't break."*

– Bruce Schneier

# Introduction

In this project, you will be using cryptographic libraries to decrypt multiple types of ciphers, break them, and launch attacks on widely used cryptographic hash functions, including length-extension attacks and collision attacks. In 3.1.2, you will be decrypting ciphers with given ciphertexts and key values. Then, you will use the same technique to break a weak cipher with a limited key space. In 3.1.3, you will start out with a small exercise that uses a hash function to observe the avalanche effect, and then build a weak hash algorithm and find a collision on a given string. In 3.2.1, we will guide you through attacking the authentication functionality of an imaginary server API. The attack will exploit the length-extension vulnerability of hash functions in the MD5 and SHA family. In 3.2.2, you will use a cutting-edge tool to generate different messages with the same MD5 hash value (collisions). You'll then investigate how that capability can be exploited to conceal malicious behavior in software. In 3.2.3, you will be performing a padding oracle attack using AES-encrypted ciphertext. In 3.2.4, you will implement another attack on RSA.

## Objectives:

- Become familiar with existing cryptographic libraries and how to utilize them
- Understand pitfalls in cryptography and appreciate why you should not write your own cryptographic library
- Execute classic cryptographic attack on md5 and other broken cryptographic libraries
- Appreciate why you should use HMAC-SHA256 as a substitute for common hash functions.

## Guidelines

- You **SHOULD** work in a group of 2.
- You **MUST** use Python.
- Your answers may or may not be the same as your classmates'.
- All the necessary files to start the project will given under the folder called “mp3” in your SVN directory. We've also generated some empty files for you to submit your answers in. You **MUST** submit your answers in the provided files; we will only grade what's there!

## 3.1 Checkpoint 1 (20 points)

### 3.1.1 Python tutorial

In this section, you will be writing several python scripts to do string encoding and manipulations needed to correctly read our input files and submit your answers.

#### 3.1.1.1 Reading .hex files

In the later parts of this mp, you will be reading in .hex file, which is a plaintext files containing an ascii string representing a single hexadecimal number. This is an example content of a .hex file:

```
3dab821d92b5ca7f48beee066996b8abc82f7e5646a0561710ea5bc11c80d
```

The following python code snippet will read the content of the file as a string and store it in `file_content`:

```
# strip() remove any leading or trailing whitespace characters
with open('file_name') as f:
    file_content = f.read().strip()
```

From here, there's a number of things that you could do. Depending on the cryptographic library that you are using, you may need to use different data type, but here we list the most common conversions that you may need:

```
# parse the string into a binary array representing the hexadecimal number
binary_content = file_content.decode('hex')

# parse the string into integer
integer_parsed = int(file_content,16)

# parse an integer to a hexstring and remove the leading '0x'
str = hex(integer_parsed)[2:]

# parse an integer to a binary string and remove the leading '0b'
str = bin(integer_parsed)[2:]
```

### 3.1.1.2 Exercise (2 points)

(Difficulty: Easy)

#### Files

1. `3.1.1.2_value.hex`: an ascii string representing a hexadecimal value

Based on what you learn in the last section, we want to convert the given value into different representations and submit them in the specified files.

#### What to submit

1. Convert the value in `3.1.1.2_value.hex` to decimal and submit the decimal number as a string in `sol_3.1.1.2_decimal.txt`
2. Convert the value in `3.1.1.2_value.hex` to binary and submit the binary number as a string in `sol_3.1.1.2_binary.txt`

## 3.1.2 Symmetric Encryption, Public Key Encryption, and Cryptographic Hashes

In this section, you will be writing your own cryptographic library to decrypt a substitution cipher, and using existing cryptographic libraries to experiment with a symmetric encryption called AES and a public key encryption called RSA.

### 3.1.2.1 Substitution Cipher (3 points)

(Difficulty: Easy)

#### Files

1. `3.1.2.1_sub_key.txt`: key
2. `3.1.2.1_sub_ciphertext.txt`: ciphertext

`sub_key.txt` contains a permutation of the 26 upper-case letters that represents the key for a substitution cipher. Using this key, the  $i$ th letter in the alphabet in the plaintext has been replaced by the  $i$ th letter in `3.1.2.1_sub_key.txt` to produce ciphertext in `3.1.2.1_sub_ciphertext.txt`. For example, if the first three letters in your `3.1.2.1_sub_key.txt` are ZDF..., then all As in the plaintext have become Zs in the ciphertext, all Bs have become Ds, and all Cs have become Fs. The plaintext we encrypted is a clue from the gameshow Jeopardy and has only upper-case letters, numbers and spaces. Numbers and spaces in the plaintext were not encrypted. They appear exactly as they did in the plaintext. Your task is to write a python script named `sol_3.1.2.1.py` that decrypts a substitution ciphertext with a given key and writes the plaintext to a specified file. Your script must take three arguments from the command line: the ciphertext file, the key file, and the output file. We will run your script as follows:

```
$ python your_script.py ciphertext_file key_file output_file
```

Additionally, you have to submit the plaintext, which is obtained using the key 3.1.2.1\_sub\_key.txt to decrypt 3.1.2.1\_sub\_ciphertext.txt, in the file sol\_3.1.2.1.txt.

**What to submit** Your python script in sol\_3.1.2.1.py and your plaintext in sol\_3.1.2.1.txt

### 3.1.2.2 AES: Decrypting AES (3 points)

(Difficulty: Easy)

#### Files

1. 3.1.2.2\_aes\_key.hex: key
2. 3.1.2.2\_aes\_iv.hex: initialization vector
3. 3.1.2.2\_aes\_ciphertext.hex: ciphertext

3.1.2.2\_aes\_key.hex contains a 256-bit AES key represented as an ascii string of hexadecimal values. 3.1.2.2\_aes\_iv.hex contains a 128-bit Initialization Vector in a similar representation. We encrypted a Jeopardy clue using AES in CBC mode with this key and IV and wrote the resulting ciphertext (also stored in hexadecimal) in 3.1.2.2\_aes\_ciphertext.hex. Create a python script named sol\_3.1.2.2.py that decrypt the ciphertext using the provided information and output the plaintext to a specified file. Your script takes four arguments from the command line: the ciphertext file, the key file, the iv file, and the output file. We will run your script as follows:

```
$ python your_script.py ciphertext_file key_file iv_file output_file
```

### Cryptographic Library

For this checkpoint, we recommend PyCrypto, an open-source crypto library for python. PyCrypto can be installed using pip with `sudo pip install pycrypto` or by going to their website at <https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/>.

**What to submit** Your python script in sol\_3.1.2.2.py and the decrypted message in sol\_3.1.2.2.txt.

### 3.1.2.3 AES: Breaking A Weak AES Key (3 points)

(Difficulty: Easy)

#### Files

1. 3.1.2.3\_aes\_weak\_ciphertext.hex: ciphertext

As with the last task, we encrypted a Jeopardy clue using 256-bit AES in CBC mode and stored the result in hexadecimal in the file 3.1.2.3\_aes\_weak\_ciphertext.hex. For this task, though, we haven't supplied the key. All we'll tell you about the key is that it is 256 bits long and its 251 most significant (leftmost) bits are all 0's. The initialization vector was set to all 0s. First, find all plaintexts in the given key space. Then, you will review the plaintexts to find the correct plaintext that is in Jeopardy clue and the corresponding key.

**What to submit** Find the **key** of the appropriate plaintext and submit it as a hex string in `sol_3.1.2.3.hex`. Remember that this AES key is 256 bit long.

### 3.1.2.4 Decrypting a ciphertext with RSA (3 points)

(Difficulty: Easy)

#### Files

1. `3.1.2.4_RSA_private_key.hex`: RSA private key (d) as hexadecimal string
2. `3.1.2.4_RSA_modulo.hex`: RSA modulo (N) as hexadecimal string
3. `3.1.2.4_RSA_ciphertext.hex`: an encrypted prime number that is encrypted with 1024-bit RSA as hexadecimal string

In this part we use 1024 bit textbook RSA to encrypt a prime number with your public key and stored it in `3.1.2.4_RSA_ciphertext.hex` as a hex string. Create a python script named `sol_3.1.2.4.py` that takes as an argument the ciphertext, private key, and RSA modulo to compute the plaintext prime number and write it as a hexstring to a specified file. We will run your script as follows:

```
$ python your_script.py ciphertext_file key_file modulo_file output_file
```

**Hint** You SHOULD complete this part with python's math library.

**What to submit** Your python script in `sol_3.1.2.4.py` and the prime number as a hex string in `sol_3.1.2.4.hex`.

## 3.1.3 Hash Functions

This section will give you a chance to explore cryptographic hashing using existing cryptographic libraries and illustrate the pitfall in writing your own cryptographic functions.

### 3.1.3.1 Avalanche Effect (3 points)

(Difficulty: Easy)

#### Files

1. `3.1.3.1_input_string.txt`: original string
2. `3.1.3.1_perturbed_string.txt`: perturbed string

`3.1.3.1_input_string.txt` contains another Jeopardy clue in ASCII.

`3.1.3.1_perturbed_string.txt` is an exact copy of this string with one bit flipped. We're going to use these two strings to demonstrate the avalanche effect by generating the SHA-256 hash of both strings and counting how many bits are different in the two results (a.k.a. the Hamming distance.)

What are their SHA-256 hashes? Verify that they're different.

(\$ openssl dgst -sha256 3.1.3.1\_input\_string.txt 3.1.3.1\_perturbed\_string.txt)  
Create a python script named sol\_3.1.3.1.py that takes as an argument two text files and an output file, and output the hamming distance of the SHA-256 hash of the string in the two files as a hexstring to a specified output file. We will run your script as follows:

```
$ python your_script.py file_1.txt file_2.txt output_file
```

**What to submit** Your python script in sol\_3.1.3.1.py and the hamming distance as a hexstring in sol\_3.1.3.1.hex.

### 3.1.3.2 Weak Hashing Algorithm (3 points)

(Difficulty: Medium)

#### Files

1. 3.1.3.2\_input\_string.txt: input string

Below you'll find the pseudocode for a weak hashing algorithm we're calling WHA. It operates on bytes (block size 8-bits) and outputs a 32-bit hash.

```
WHA:
Input{inStr: a binary string of bytes}
Output{outHash: 32-bit hashcode for the inStr in a series of hex values}
Mask: 0x3FFFFFFF
outHash: 0
for byte in input
    intermediate_value = ((byte XOR 0xCC) Left Shift 24) OR
                        ((byte XOR 0x33) Left Shift 16) OR
                        ((byte XOR 0xAA) Left Shift 8) OR
                        (byte XOR 0x55)
    outHash =(outHash AND Mask) + (intermediate_value AND Mask)
return outHash
```

First, you'll need to implement WHA in python. Here are some sample inputs to test your implementation: WHA("Hello world!") = 0x50b027cf and WHA("I am Groot.")=0x57293cbb

In the file 3.1.3.2\_input\_string.txt, you'll find another Jeopardy clue (surprise!) Your goal is to find another string that produces the same WHA output as this Jeopardy clue. In other words, demonstrate that this hash is not second preimage resistant.

Find a string with the same WHA output as 3.1.3.2\_input\_string.txt and submit it in sol\_3.1.3.2.txt. Also, submit the code for WHA algorithm code with the name sol\_3.1.3.2.py. Your python script should take as an argument a text file and an output file, and output the WHA hash of the content of the file as a hexstring in the specified file. We will run your script as follows:

```
$ python your_script.py file.txt output_file
```

**What to submit** Your python script in sol\_3.1.3.2.py and the collision string in sol\_3.1.3.2.txt



## Checkpoint 1: Submission Checklist

The following blank files for checkpoint 1 has been created in your subversion repository under the directory mp3. Put your solution inside the corresponding file then commit it to subversion. All .hex and .txt files MUST be submitted as ascii plaintext, and any lines in .txt and .hex submissions that begin with '#' will be ignored.

- partners.txt [One netid on each line]
- sol\_3.1.1.2\_decimal.txt
- sol\_3.1.1.2\_binary.txt
- sol\_3.1.2.1.py
- sol\_3.1.2.1.txt
- sol\_3.1.2.2.py
- sol\_3.1.2.2.txt
- sol\_3.1.2.3.hex
- sol\_3.1.2.4.py
- sol\_3.1.2.4.hex
- sol\_3.1.3.1.py
- sol\_3.1.3.1.hex
- sol\_3.1.3.2.py
- sol\_3.1.3.2.txt

### example content of .txt solution file

```
# this line is ignored  
SPN WMKTQIW QR SPBW HQGRSEMW HQVS QY VEKW
```

### example content of .hex solution file

```
# this line is also ignored  
3dab821d92b5ca7f48beee066996b8abc82f7e5646a0561710ea5bc11c80d
```

## 3.2 Checkpoint 2 (100 points)

### 3.2.1 Length Extension (25 points)

(Difficulty: Medium)

In most applications, you should use MACs such as HMAC-SHA256 instead of plain cryptographic hash functions (e.g. MD5, SHA-1, or SHA-256), because hashes, also known as digests, fail to match our intuitive security expectations. What we really want is something that behaves like a pseudorandom function, which HMACs seem to approximate and hash functions do not.

One difference between hash functions and pseudorandom functions is that many hashes are subject to *length extension*. All the hash functions we've discussed use a design called the Merkle-Damgård construction. Each is built around a *compression function*  $f$  and maintains an internal state  $s$ , which is initialized to a fixed constant. Messages are processed in fixed-sized blocks by applying the compression function to the current state and current block to compute an updated internal state, i.e.  $s_{i+1} = f(s_i, b_i)$ . The result of the final application of the compression function becomes the output of the hash function.

A consequence of this design is that if we know the hash of an  $n$ -block message, we can find the hash of longer messages by applying the compression function for each block  $b_{n+1}, b_{n+2}, \dots$  that we want to add. This process is called length extension, and it can be used to attack many applications of hash functions.

#### 3.2.1.1 Experiment with Length Extension in Python

To experiment with this idea, we'll use a Python implementation of the MD5 hash function, though SHA-1 and SHA-256 are vulnerable to length extension in the same way. You should have a `pymd5.py` module in your subversion directory. Documentation for `pymd5` is available by running `$ pydoc pymd5`. To follow along with these examples, run Python in interactive mode (`$ python -i`) and run the command `from pymd5 import md5, padding`.

Consider the string "Use HMAC, not hashes". We can compute its MD5 hash by running:

```
m = "Use HMAC, not hashes"
h = md5()
h.update(m)
print h.hexdigest()
```

or, more compactly, `print md5(m).hexdigest()`. The output should be:

```
3ecc68efa1871751ea9b0b1a5b25004d
```

MD5 processes messages in 512-bit blocks, so, internally, the hash function pads  $m$  to a multiple of that length. The padding consists of the bit 1, followed by as many 0 bits as necessary, followed by a 64-bit count of the number of bits in the unpadded message. (If the 1 and count won't fit in the current block, an additional block is added.) You can use the function `padding(count)` in the `pymd5` module to compute the padding that will be added to a  $count$ -bit message.

Even if we didn't know  $m$ , we could compute the hash of longer messages of the general form  $m + \text{padding}(\text{len}(m)*8) + \text{suffix}$  by setting the initial internal state of our MD5 function to  $\text{MD5}(m)$ , instead of the default initialization value, and setting the function's message length counter to the size of  $m$  plus the padding (a multiple of the block size). To find the padded message length, guess the length of  $m$  and run  $\text{bits} = (\text{length\_of\_}m + \text{len}(\text{padding}(\text{length\_of\_}m*8)))*8$ .

The `pymd5` module lets you specify these parameters as additional arguments to the `md5` object:

```
h = md5(state="3ecc68efa1871751ea9b0b1a5b25004d".decode("hex"), count=512)
```

Now you can use length extension to find the hash of a longer string that appends the suffix "Good advice". Simply run:

```
x = "Good advice"
h.update(x)
print h.hexdigest()
```

to execute the compression function over  $x$  and output the resulting hash. Verify that it equals the MD5 hash of  $m + \text{padding}(\text{len}(m)*8) + x$ . Notice that, due to the length-extension property of MD5, we didn't need to know the value of  $m$  to compute the hash of the longer string—all we needed to know was  $m$ 's length and its MD5 hash.

This component is intended to introduce length extension and familiarize you with the Python MD5 module we will be using; you will not need to submit anything for it.

### 3.2.1.2 Conduct a Length Extension Attack

#### Files

1. 3.2.1.2\_query.txt: query
2. 3.2.1.2\_command3.txt: command3

One example of when length extension causes a serious vulnerability is when people mistakenly try to construct something like an HMAC by using  $\text{hash}(\text{secret} \parallel \text{message})$ , where  $\parallel$  indicates concatenation. For example, Professor Vuln E. Rabble has created a web application with an API that allows client-side programs to perform an action on behalf of a user by loading URLs of the form:

```
http://ece422.org/project3/api?token=b301afea7dd96db3066e631741446ca1&user=admin&command1=ListFiles&command2=NoOp
```

where `token` is  $\text{MD5}(\text{user's 8-character password} \parallel \text{user=... [the rest of the URL starting from user= and ending with the last command]})$ . The domain name is given as an example, we did not setup a webserver for this assignment.

Text files with the query of the URL 3.2.1.2\_query.txt and the command line to append 3.2.1.2\_command3.txt is provided. Using the techniques that you learned in the previous section

and without guessing the password, apply length extension to create a new query in the URL ending with command specified in the file, &command3=DeleteAllFiles, that is treated as valid by the server API. We will run your script as follows:

```
$ python your_script.py query_file command3_file output_file
```

Create a python script named `sol_3.2.1.2.py` that takes as a commandline argument a filename containing a valid query in the url and modify it such that it will execute `DeleteAllFiles` command as the user then output the new query to a specified file. You may assume that the query will always begin with token.

*Hint:* You might want to use the `quote()` function from Python's `urllib` module to encode non-ASCII characters in the padding.

*Historical fact:* In 2009, security researchers found that the API used by the photo-sharing site Flickr suffered from a length-extension vulnerability almost exactly like the one in this exercise.

**What to submit** Your python script in `sol_3.2.1.2.py` and the modified query in `sol_3.2.1.2.txt`.

### 3.2.2 MD5 Collisions (25 points)

(Difficulty: Medium)

MD5 was once the most widely used cryptographic hash function, but today it is considered dangerously insecure. This is because cryptanalysts have discovered efficient algorithms for finding *collisions*—pairs of messages with the same MD5 hash value.

The first known collisions were announced on August 17, 2004 by Xiaoyun Wang, Dengguo Feng, Xuejia Lai, and Hongbo Yu. Here's one pair of colliding messages they published:

Message 1:

```
d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c 2fcab58712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e488832571415a 085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbdf280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e2b487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080a80d1e c69821bcb6a8839396f9652b6ff72a70
```

Message 2:

```
d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c 2fcab50712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e4888325f1415a 085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbd7280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e23487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080280d1e c69821bcb6a8839396f965ab6ff72a70
```

Convert each group of hex strings into a binary file.

(On Linux, run `$ xxd -r -p file.hex > file.`)

1. What are the MD5 hashes of the two binary files? Verify that they're the same.  
(`$ openssl dgst -md5 file1 file2`)

2. What are their SHA-256 hashes? Verify that they're different.  
(`$ openssl dgst -sha256 file1 file2`)

This component is intended to introduce you to MD5 collisions; you will not submit anything for it.

### 3.2.2.1 Generating Collisions Yourself

In 2004, Wang's method took more than 5 hours to find a collision on a desktop PC. Since then, researchers have introduced vastly more efficient collision finding algorithms. You can compute your own MD5 collisions using a tool written by Marc Stevens that uses a more advanced technique. You can download the `fastcoll` tool here:

[http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/fastcoll\\_v1.0.0.5.exe.zip](http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/fastcoll_v1.0.0.5.exe.zip) (Windows executable) or  
[http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/fastcoll\\_v1.0.0.5-1\\_source.zip](http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/fastcoll_v1.0.0.5-1_source.zip) (source code)

If you are building `fastcoll` from source, you can compile using this makefile: [https://subversion.ews.illinois.edu/svn/sp18-ece422/\\_shared/mp3/Makefile](https://subversion.ews.illinois.edu/svn/sp18-ece422/_shared/mp3/Makefile). You will also need the Boost libraries. On Ubuntu, you can install these using `apt-get install libboost-all-dev`. On OS X, you can install Boost via the Homebrew package manager using `brew install boost`.

1. Generate your own collision with this tool. How long did it take?  
(`$ time ./fastcoll -o file1 file2`)
2. What are your files? To get a hex dump, run `$ xxd -p file`.
3. What are their MD5 hashes? Verify that they're the same.
4. What are their SHA-256 hashes? Verify that they're different.

This component is intended to introduce you to MD5 collisions; you will not submit anything for it.

### 3.2.2.2 A Hash Collision Attack

The collision attack lets us generate two messages with the same MD5 hash and any chosen (identical) prefix. Due to MD5's length-extension behavior, we can append any suffix to both messages and know that the longer messages will also collide. This lets us construct files that differ only in a binary "blob" in the middle and have the same MD5 hash, i.e. *prefix* || *blob<sub>A</sub>* || *suffix* and *prefix* || *blob<sub>B</sub>* || *suffix*.

We can leverage this to create two programs that have identical MD5 hashes but wildly different behaviors. We'll use Python, but almost any language would do. Copy and paste the following three lines into a file called `prefix`: (Note: writing below lines yourself may lead to encoding mismatch and the error may occur while running the resulting python code)

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
blob = ""
```

and put these three lines into a file called `suffix`:

```
"""
from hashlib import sha256
print sha256(blob).hexdigest()
```

Now use `fastcoll` to generate two files with the same MD5 hash that both begin with `prefix`. (`$ fastcoll -p prefix -o col1 col2`). Then append the suffix to both (`$ cat col1 suffix > file1.py; cat col2 suffix > file2.py`). Verify that `file1.py` and `file2.py` have the same MD5 hash but generate different output.

Extend this technique to produce another pair of programs, `good` and `evil`, that also share the same MD5 hash. One program should execute a benign payload: `print "I come in peace."` The second should execute a pretend malicious payload: `print "Prepare to be destroyed!"`. Note that we may rename these program before grading them.

**What to submit** Two Python 2.x scripts named `sol_3.2.2_good.py` and `sol_3.2.2_evil.py` that have the same MD5 hash, have different SHA-256 hashes, and print the specified messages.

### 3.2.3 Exploiting a Padding Oracle (25 points)

*(Difficulty: Hard)*

In the `3.2.3_ciphertext.txt` file, you will find an AES-encrypted ciphertext, encrypted using a random IV and a fixed secret key. Your goal, of course, is to find a way to decrypt this.

Before encrypting, the plaintext was padded to a multiple of 16 bytes, using a custom padding scheme as follows: The first byte of padding is `0x10`, the next padding byte is `0x0f`, the next is `0x0e`, and so on, until a multiple of 16 bytes is reached. If the plaintext was already a multiple of 16 bytes, then the entire 16-byte sequence `{0x10, 0x0f, 0x0e, ..., 0x01}` is appended to the plaintext. Thus the following examples:

- `"a"` becomes `"a\x10\x0f...\x02"`
- `"abcde"` becomes `"abcde\x10\x0f...\x06"`
- `"abcdefghijklmnop"` becomes `"abcdefghijklmnop\x10\x0f...\x01"`

The following python code implements this padding scheme:

```
def pad(msg):
    n = len(msg) % 16
    return msg + ''.join(chr(i) for i in range(16,n,-1))
```

The web application located at `http://72.36.89.11:9999/mp3/` can be used to check the integrity of your ciphertext. It reads the ciphertext in hex from the URL query string, decrypts it using the secret key, removes the padding, and confirms whether or not the resulting plaintext corresponds to the Jeopardy clue you must provide as the solution to this task. For example, running the following shell command,

```
$ curl http://72.36.89.11:9999/mp3/${netid}/?$(cat 3.2.3_ciphertext.txt)
```

should return a response with HTTP status code 200 OK, and containing the string

Correct ciphertext!

If the ciphertext is incorrect, or if the web application encounters any error while decrypting, then you will receive an error code.

We have also provided a local server for you to run, using the command:

```
$ python ece422-mp3-paddingoracle-server-standalone.py
```

You might think that this integrity checker isn't much help to you. But actually, the padding scheme and the error reporting of the web application interact in a devastating way. Your task is to use the technique described in Vaudenay's 2002 paper<sup>1</sup> to recover the plaintext.

For your reference, the following Python code will load a url and print the HTTP status code.

```
import urllib2

def get_status(u):
    req = urllib2.Request(u)
    try:
        f = urllib2.urlopen(req)
        print f.code
    except urllib2.HTTPError, e:
        print e.code
```

**What to submit** Your python script in sol\_3.2.3.py and the decrypted message in sol\_3.2.3.txt.

### 3.2.4 Mining your Ps and Qs (25 points)

(Difficulty: Hard)

The “Pretty Bad Privacy” encryption tool, pbp.py, can be used to insecurely encrypt files to a 1024-bit RSA public key.<sup>2</sup>

Each line of the `https://subversion.ews.illinois.edu/svn/sp18-ece422/_shared/mp3/moduli.hex` file contains a 1024-bit RSA modulus, 10,000 of these in total.

In `3.2.4_ciphertext.enc.asc` you have been provided the ciphertext of a Jeopardy clue, which has been encrypted using PBP with one of the RSA moduli in the file, and public exponent  $e = 65537$ . Factoring *any* of the 1024-bit moduli before the assignment is due is infeasible; furthermore you don't even know which one to start on!

<sup>1</sup>[https://www.iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2002/23320530/cbc02\\_e02d.pdf](https://www.iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2002/23320530/cbc02_e02d.pdf)

<sup>2</sup>PBP is a “hybrid encryption” mode. It uses 1024-bit RSA (with OAEP padding, rather than textbook RSA), to encrypt a random 256-bit key, and then uses this as an AES key to encrypt the (padded) message.

Sometimes, badly malfunctioning implementations of RSA fail to generate unique prime numbers. The RSA moduli in the provided list were generated without sufficient entropy, and some of them share common factors. If two RSA moduli share a common factor, it is trivial to compute their GCD and factor both moduli. Unfortunately, looping over all pairs of moduli does not scale well, so you'll have some difficulty finishing the project unless you use a more efficient algorithm.

Your task is to use the method described in the “Mining your Ps and Qs” paper,<sup>3</sup> Section 3.3, to compute the pairwise GCDs of the RSA keys provided. Once you have discovered some RSA private keys, you can then attempt to use them to recover the RSA-encrypted AES session key and decrypt the rest of homework file and submit the plaintext in `sol_3.2.4.txt`.

**What to submit** Your python script in `sol_3.2.4.py` and the decrypted message in `sol_3.2.4.txt`.

---

<sup>3</sup><https://factorable.net/weakkeys12.extended.pdf>



## Checkpoint 2: Submission Checklist

The following blank files for Checkpoint 2 have been created in your subversion repository under the directory mp3. Put your solution inside the corresponding file then commit it to subversion. All .hex and .txt files MUST be submitted as ascii plaintext, and any lines in .txt and .hex submissions that begin with '#' will be ignored.

- partners.txt [One netid on each line]
- sol\_3.2.1.2.py
- sol\_3.2.1.2.txt
- sol\_3.2.2\_good.py
- sol\_3.2.2\_evil.py
- sol\_3.2.3.txt
- sol\_3.2.3.py
- sol\_3.2.4.txt
- sol\_3.2.4.py

### example content of .txt solution file

```
# this line is ignored
SPN WMKTQIW QR SPBW HQGRSEMW HQVS QY VEKW
```

### example content of .hex solution file

```
# this line is also ignored
3dab821d92b5ca7f48beee066996b8abc82f7e5646a0561710ea5bc11c80d
```