INTUIT: Investigating intuitive reasoning in humans and language models

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Introduction

Humans can infer and reason about 'hidden' properties — such as the mass and velocity of objects, or the goals and beliefs of agents. Whether language models can make such inferences remains contested [1, 2]. A key challenge is the validity of existing benchmarks: they are often either large and noisy, or small expert-designed batteries that are likely included in model training data [3]. As a result, models can exploit superficial patterns or "shortcuts" to succeed without genuinely demonstrating the targeted ability [4]. To address this, we introduce **INTUIT**: the INtuitive Theory Use and Inference Test, and its companion battery generation tool **VIGNET**: the Vignette Instance Generator for Novel Evaluation Tasks.

INTUIT: A test battery for everyday causal inferences

INTUIT is a cognitive test suite for assessing everyday physical and social inferences in humans and language models. It is built using VIGNET, which can generate large and varied batteries from a core set of vignette templates hand-crafted by cognitive scientists. Batteries built using this method are:

- **Varied.** Generate large batteries using random and systematic variation.
- **Controlled.** Isolate capabilities using matched experimental conditions and difficulty scales.
- **Grounded.** Theoretically ground assessments in a framework of cognitive demands.
- **Robust.** Test assumptions through prerequisite capability and robustness checks.

By incorporating these components, we aim to mitigate known limitations of MCQA methods [5, 6], while operating within a testing modality—natural language—in which off-the-shelf LLMs show strengths.



Figure 1. (a) An example vignette instance illustrating systematic and random variations generated using VIGNET. (b) Example questions for prerequisite, single- and double-capability vignettes.



Figure 2. 'Object falls' inference is categorised within a hierarchical demand framework consisting of domain-specific and domain-general properties.

The INTUIT demand framework supports a broad range of inferences, from reasoning about an object's composition, location or function to understanding agent's goals, intentions or feelings. These instance level demands can be used for capability measurement and targeted battery generation.

Domain-general properties:

- **Explicit-Implicit.** *e.g., She will say vs will know.*
- **Static-Dynamic.** *e.g., Fragile vs is falling.*
- **Individual-Relational.** *e.g., Object vs stack.*

Context:

- **Information provided.** *e.g., object was dropped.*
- **Knowledge required.** *e.g., objects fall down.*
- **Causal structure.** *Direction* (inferring cause vs result) and *Type* (intervention vs counterfactual).

Methods

- **Capabilities.** Prerequisite (comprehension, knowledge, metacognition). Single capability (Control A, Inference B). Double capability (adds Secondary Inference C, Double Inference D).
- **Variation.** We systematically varied inference levels (0–3) and randomly varied label versions (five per vignette), while holding point-of-view constant (first person).
- **Models.** GPT models (4o, 4o-mini, 4.1-mini) and a reasoning model (o3-mini). Full battery consisting of 5760 trials, 24 templates, 12 capability profiles. GPT models completed 5 full runs varying temperature (0.1–0.9).
- **Humans.** 147 online adults (Single: n = 53, Double: n = 94) completed a 24-trial subset (one for each template). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 6 (single) or 12 (double) counterbalancing conditions, varying inference levels and experimental conditions.
- **Procedure.** Models: Each API call contained a standard instruction prompt with example, followed by the vignette text (story, question, answer options). Humans: Completed a practice question followed by the experimental trials in a randomised order. Participants responded with number keys (1–4).

Results

Table 1. Mean accuracy on prerequisite trials.

Capability	4o	4o-mini	4.1-mini	o3-mini
Comprehension	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
Knowledge	0.59	0.75	0.67	0.77
Metacognition	0.82	0.63	0.76	0.57

Table 2. Mean Accuracy on intuitive reasoning trials.

Subject Type	Single		Double			
	A	B	A	B	C	D
Human	0.87	0.86	0.70	0.60	0.64	0.52
gpt-4o	0.85	0.81	0.82	0.60	0.61	0.56
gpt-4o-mini	0.78	0.65	0.70	0.59	0.32	0.40
gpt-4.1-mini	0.76	0.77	0.64	0.62	0.37	0.55
o3-mini	0.78	0.73	0.72	0.74	0.38	0.47

Table 3. Single-capability model: Parameter estimates.

Fixed Effects	β	t	p
Intercept	0.86	17.96	< .001
4o	−0.02	1.31	0.191
4o-mini	−0.09	5.71	< .001
4.1-mini	−0.12	7.28	< .001
o3-mini	−0.11	4.67	< .001
Condition (B: Inference)	−0.02	0.79	0.432
Inference Level (0)	0.05	6.27	< .001
Inference Level (3)	−0.02	2.11	0.035
4o × Condition (B)	−0.03	1.17	0.241
4o-mini × Condition (B)	−0.12	5.33	< .001
4.1-mini × Condition (B)	0.03	1.39	0.166
o3-mini × Condition (B)	0.007	0.22	0.829

Note: df = 12809. Baseline: Human, Condition A, Inference Level 2 (i.e., no added text).



Figure 3. Human and AI mean overall accuracy (control and inference) on single-capability vignettes across physical and social demand types. Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

Findings

- Models perform worse than humans on single-capability vignettes, either overall ('mini' models) or in the inference condition (GPT-4o).
- The Human-AI gap is largest for intuitions about Functions and Intentions, smallest for Feelings.
- Human accuracy drops on double-capability vignettes, while GPT-4o surpasses humans on controls, leading to comparable overall performance.
- Model performance is sensitive to capitalization and spelling perturbations.

Discussion

- VIGNET mitigates MCQA limitations through matched test/control, systematic difficulty scaling, and surface-level variation. INTUIT enables theory-driven, capability-based investigations of intuitive reasoning in humans and AI [4, 6, 7].
- Our findings inform ongoing Theory of Mind debates in LLMs [1, 2], showing that even top models (GPT-4o, o3-mini) still lag behind human-level performance.
- Vignette tasks favour LLMs, suggesting these results are upper bounds. Future work will extend tests to image, video, and agent-based settings for convergent, multimodal evidence of intuitive reasoning in AI [8].

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REPO