

DFIR MUSSING - EPISODE 1

Winternals for Memory Forensics

Kirtar Oza, GCFA, CISSP

02-Oct-20 [5-6 PM IST]

ABOUT ME





🏏 - Krishna @ kirtar_oza

Worked with Qualys, Infosys, SydneyAirport

Kirtar.oza@gmail.com

 Global clients including UK, USA, Australia, Scandinavia

kirtar22

- Core Areas: DFIR, Advanced IR, Detection, Threat Hunting, ATT&CK, Memory Forensics, SIEM, Blue/Purple teaming/SOC, Threat Intel, Splunk, etc.
- GCFA, CISSP
- Many articles on eForenscis, LinkedIn, Securityaffairs.co etc.







SERIES ON WINTERNALS FOR MEMORY eForensics M a g a z i n e **FORENSICS**



ONLINE COURSES

HANDLE_TABLE

Table Code

handle table entries

0X04

охов

oxoc

0X10

Reserved

(Handle Entry 1)

(Handle Entry 2)

(Handle Entry 3)

(Handle Entry 256)

4096 Bytes

COOGLE

COOGLE

Windows Process Internals: A few Concepts to know before jumping on Memory Forensics [Part 4] — Journey in to the Undocumented VAD Structures (Virtual Address Descriptors) | By Kirtar Oza

handle table entry

ObjectPointerBits

cs [Part 2] -

Windows Process Internals: A few Concepts to know before jumping on Memory Forensics [Part 5] – A

By Kirtar Oza

EPROCESS

Object Table

Journey in to the Undocumented Process Handle Structures (_handle_table & _handle_table_entry) |

_object_header


TypeIndex

Object

_object_type

SEARCH Newsletter Signup for news and special offers! Email* Yes, please sign me up for newsletters. This includes offers, latest news, and exclusive promotions Subscribe

nory Forensics [Part 3] -Oza





AGENDA

- •Kernel Debugging Intro to LIVEKD
- •Process Internals EPROCESS
- •Traversing "ActiveProcessLinks"

PART 1 – Intro to LiveKD

KERNEL DEBUGGING

- LiveKD (SysInternals)
- Why LiveKD
 - No need to reboot the machine in a debug mode
 - FreeTool
 - Quite easy to setup and running
- Two Modes
 - Cmdline
 - Windbg

LiveKd v5.63

04/28/2020 • 3 minutes to read • 🕡 😚 🔕 🧶

By Mark Russinovich and Ken Johnson

Published: April 28, 2020



Download LiveKd (700 KB)

Introduction

LiveKD, a utility I wrote for the CD included with Inside Windows 2000, 3rd Edition, is now freely available. LiveKD allows you to run the Kd and Windbg Microsoft kernel debuggers, which are part of the Debugging Tools for Windows package, locally on a live system. Execute all the debugger commands that work on crash dump files to look deep inside the system. See the Debugging Tools for Windows documentation and our book for information on how to explore a system with the kernel debuggers.

While the latest versions of Windbg and Kd have a similar capability on Windows Vista and Server 2008, LiveKD enables more functionality, such as viewing thread stacks with the !thread command, than Windbg and Kd's own live kernel debugging facility.

SYMBOLS FOR WINDEBUGGER

- Symbol Files contain
 - Names of Functions & Variables
 - Layouts and Formats of Data Structures
- Used by debugger to reference and display these names during debugging
- Setting up Symbol Path for debugger

```
.sympath srv*c:\MyServerSymbols*https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
```

This command tells the debugger to use a symbol server to get symbols from the symbol store at https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols and cache the symbols in c:\symbols

```
0: kd> .sympath
Symbol search path is: srv*c:\Symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Expanded Symbol search path is: srv*c:\symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
```

DEMO LIVEKD

• Demo LiveKD

PART 2 – Traversing ActiveProcessLinks of _EPROCESS


MEMORY FORENSICS & WINTRENALS

- Volatility
 - 2.6.1
 - 3.0 Beta
- pslist
- _EPROCESS

| Memlabs volatility -f MemoryDump_Lab5.rawprofile=Win7SP1x64 pslist | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|-------|--------|------|------|------|-------|------------|-----------|-----------|---|
| | ion Volatility Framework | | DDTD | Thda | Hode | Soc- | House | Start | | | |
| Offset(V) | Name | PID | PPID | Thds | Hnds | Sess | Wow64 | Start | | | |
| 0xfffffa8000ca0040 | System | 4 | 0 | 80 | 562 | | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:40 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa80014b9040 | smss.exe | 248 | 4 | 3 | 37 | | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:40 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8000d96b30 | csrss.exe | 320 | 312 | 10 | 471 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:45 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001c5d060 | csrss.exe | 368 | 360 | 8 | 173 | 1 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:47 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001c6b060 | psxss.exe | 376 | 248 | 18 | 786 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:47 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001c775a0 | winlogon.exe | 416 | 360 | 3 | 108 | 1 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:48 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001c7c060 | wininit.exe | 428 | 312 | 3 | 75 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:48 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001c7bb30 | services.exe | 484 | 428 | 8 | 213 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:50 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001cb9880 | lsass.exe | 492 | 428 | 9 | 761 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:50 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001cbc4a0 | lsm.exe | 500 | 428 | 10 | 171 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:50 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001ce6b30 | svchost.exe | 588 | 484 | 10 | 357 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:54 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001d4cb30 | VBoxService.ex | 656 | 484 | 13 | 135 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:55 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001d63b30 | svchost.exe | 724 | 484 | 8 | 282 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:56 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001da1240 | | 820 | 484 | 23 | 590 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:57 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001dba060 | svchost.exe | 856 | 484 | 28 | 535 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:58 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001dc2b30 | | 880 | 484 | 33 | 983 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:41:58 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8000cf5b30 | audiodg.exe | 968 | 820 | б | 131 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:42:00 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001e1cb30 | | 340 | 484 | 22 | 504 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:42:03 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001e6c700 | | 1044 | 484 | 16 | 381 | 0 | | 2019-12-20 | | | |
| 0xfffffa8001ee1060 | | 1232 | 484 | 13 | 283 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:42:09 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001efbb30 | | 1272 | 484 | 19 | 307 | 0 | 0 | 2019-12-20 | 03:42:10 | UTC+0006 |) |
| 0xfffffa8001f775f0 | | 1372 | 484 | 22 | 303 | 0 | | 2019-12-20 | | | |
| 9xfffffa8001f93b30 | | 1416 | 484 | 4 | 97 | 0 | | 2019-12-20 | | | |
| fffffa8001dbf350 | | 2012 | 484 | 8 | 189 | 1 | | 2019-12-20 | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | 03:42:12J | OJTC+0006 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 360°DFIR - | - DFI | R Musi | ng | | | | | | | |

_EPROCESS

- _EPROCESS
 - PsActiveProcessLinks (doubly linked list)
 - FLINK
 - BLINK




| Volatility Module | OS Data Structure | | | | | |
|--------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| psslist | _EPROCESS | | | | | |
| | ActiveProcessLinks | | | | | |
| pstree | _EPROCESS | | | | | |
| | ParentCid | | | | | |
| Ldrmodules | _EPROCESS | | | | | |
| | _PEB | | | | | |
| | Ldr. In Initialization Order Module List | | | | | |
| | Ldr.InLoadOrderModuleList | | | | | |
| | Ldr.InMemoryOrderModuleList | | | | | |
| | Vadroot (!vad) | | | | | |
| | Vads (!vad) | | | | | |
| dlllist | _EPROCESS | | | | | |
| | _PEB | | | | | |
| getsids | _EPROCESS | | | | | |
| | _PEB | | | | | |
| | Token | | | | | |
| Hollowfind | _EPROCESS | | | | | |
| | _PEB | | | | | |
| | VAD (!vad) | | | | | |
| Psxview | _EPROCESS | | | | | |
| FIR - DFIR Wiusing | ActiveProcessLinks | | | | | |

360°DFir - DFir Musing

_EPROCESS



PsActiveProcesshead



_EPROCESS

```
kd> dt nt!_EPROCESS
+0x000 Pcb
                        : KPROCESS
+0x2e0 ProcessLock
                        : EX PUSH LOCK
+0x2e8 UniqueProcessId : Ptr64 Void
+0x2f0 ActiveProcessLinks : LIST ENTRY
+0x300 RundownProtect
                       : EX RUNDOWN REF
+0x308 Flags2
                        : Uint4B
+0x308 JobNotReallyActive : Pos 0, 1 Bit
+0x308 AccountingFolded : Pos 1, 1 Bit
+0x308 NewProcessReported : Pos 2, 1 Bit
+0x308 ExitProcessReported: Pos 3, 1 Bit
+0x308 ReportCommitChanges: Pos 4, 1 Bit
+0x308 LastReportMemory : Pos 5, 1 Bit
+0x308 ForceWakeCharge : Pos 6, 1 Bit
+0x308 CrossSessionCreate : Pos 7, 1 Bit
```

```
+WX3TW UWNERPROCESSIG
                       : OTHERR
                       : Ptr64 PEB
+0x3f8 Peb
+0x400 Session
                       : Ptr64 MM SESSION SPACE
+0x408 Spare1
                       : Ptr64 Void
+0x410 QuotaBlock
                       : Ptr64 EPROCESS QUOTA BLOCK
+0x418 ObjectTable
                       : Ptr64 HANDLE TABLE
+0x420 DebugPort
                       : Ptr64 Void
+0x428 WoW64Process
                       : Ptr64 _EWOW64PROCESS
```

Process Environment Block (PEB)

ActiveProcessLinks

+0x658 VadRoot : _RTL_AVL_TREE

+0x660 VadHint : Ptr64 Void

+0x668 VadCount : Uint8B

+0x670 VadPhysicalPages : Uint8B

+0x678 VadPhysicalPagesLimit : Uint8B

TRAVERSING ACTIVEPROCESSLINKS

• Step 1 – Find out the memory address for *PsActiveProcessHead*

x nt!psactiveprocesshead

• Step 2 – Enumerate the Pointer (_list_entry) by the PaActiveProcessHead

dt nt!_list_entry <\$PsActiveProcessHead>

- Step 3 Enumerate _eprocess referenced by the FLINK of _list_entry in Step 2
 - That will essentially pointing to the First node/Process (System Process) in the doubly linked list that is tied together by the "ActiveProcessLinks"

dt nt!_eprocess <\$PsActiveProcessHead.FLINK>-0x2f0 -y ImageFileName

Note: 0x2f0 is the offset that needs to be subtracted from the pointer to reach on the top of the _eprocess structure

• Step 4 – Traversing through the list from Head to tail

dt nt!_eprocess -l ActiveProcessLinks.Flink <\$PsActiveProcessHead.FLINK>-0x2f0 -y ImageFileName

• Traversing through the ActievProcessLinks

DEMO



THANKS

Please route your questions/feedback to kirtar.oza@gmail.com

Connect with me On LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/in/kirtaroza/