



June 29th 2022 — Quantstamp Verified

Klap - Lockdrop

This audit report was prepared by Quantstamp, the leader in blockchain security.

Executive Summary

Type	Defi						
Auditors	Andy Lin, Senior Auditing Engineer Ed Zulkoski, Senior Security Engineer Bohan Zhang, Auditing Engineer						
Timeline	2022-06-24 through 2022-06-24						
EVM	Arrow Glacier						
Languages	Solidity						
Methods	Architecture Review, Unit Testing, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review						
Specification	None						
Documentation Quality	<div><div></div></div> Low						
Test Quality	<div><div></div></div> Low						
Source Code	<table><tr><th>Repository</th><th>Commit</th></tr><tr><td><a href="#">lending-contracts (initial audit)</a></td><td>6be12136</td></tr><tr><td><a href="#">lending-contracts (re-audit)</a></td><td>9959ae2f</td></tr></table>	Repository	Commit	<a href="#">lending-contracts (initial audit)</a>	6be12136	<a href="#">lending-contracts (re-audit)</a>	9959ae2f
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Total Issues	8 (3 Resolved)
High Risk Issues	0 (0 Resolved)
Medium Risk Issues	1 (0 Resolved)
Low Risk Issues	4 (3 Resolved)
Informational Risk Issues	2 (0 Resolved)
Undetermined Risk Issues	1 (0 Resolved)



High Risk	The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for client's reputation or serious financial implications for client and users.
Medium Risk	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental for the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
Low Risk	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low-impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Informational	The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
Undetermined	The impact of the issue is uncertain.

Unresolved	Acknowledged the existence of the risk, and decided to accept it without engaging in special efforts to control it.
Acknowledged	The issue remains in the code but is a result of an intentional business or design decision. As such, it is supposed to be addressed outside the programmatic means, such as: 1) comments, documentation, README, FAQ; 2) business processes; 3) analyses showing that the issue shall have no negative consequences in practice (e.g., gas analysis, deployment settings).
Fixed	Adjusted program implementation, requirements or constraints to eliminate the risk.
Mitigated	Implemented actions to minimize the impact or likelihood of the risk.

## Summary of Findings

**Lockdrop** is a contract that collects the users' deposit up to a USD cap and allows the users to claim those AToken back after a certain period. The code is simple and of good quality. This audit's main concerns are privileged roles and token price updates.

**Re-audit Update:** The team acknowledged and fixed most of the issues. However, after their fix of QSP-5, a new function, **rescue**, was introduced that allows the contract owner to transfer all the locked tokens directly. The new functions escalate the severity of the QSP-2 regarding privileged roles and ownership.

ID	Description	Severity	Status
QSP-1	Price Update Does Not Account for Previously Deposited Tokens	✖ Low	Acknowledged
QSP-2	Privileged Roles and Ownership	^ Medium	Acknowledged
QSP-3	Variable Inconsistency	✖ Low	Fixed
QSP-4	Unchecked Return Value	✖ Low	Fixed
QSP-5	Locked Atoken Interest	✖ Low	Fixed
QSP-6	Block Timestamp Manipulation	○ Informational	Acknowledged
QSP-7	Infinite Deposit Period	○ Informational	Acknowledged
QSP-8	Price Update Scheme Not Robust to Price Fluctuations	? Undetermined	Acknowledged

## Quantstamp Audit Breakdown

Quantstamp’s objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices.

### DISCLAIMER:

The scope of this audit is only the file `staking/Lockdrop.sol`.

Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Mishandled exceptions and call stack limits
- Unsafe external calls
- Integer overflow / underflow
- Number rounding errors
- Reentrancy and cross-function vulnerabilities
- Denial of service / logical oversights
- Access control
- Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting

### Methodology

The Quantstamp auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following
  - i. Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii. Symbolic execution, which is analyzing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, and actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

### Toolset

The notes below outline the setup and steps performed in the process of this audit.

#### Setup

Tool Setup:

- [Slither](#) v0.8.3



Steps taken to run the tools:

1. Install the Slither tool: `pip3 install slither-analyzer`
2. Run Slither from the project directory: `slither ./contracts/staking/Lockdrop.sol --solc-remaps @openzeppelin=node_modules/@openzeppelin`

## Findings

### QSP-1 Price Update Does Not Account for Previously Deposited Tokens

Severity: *Low Risk*

Status: Acknowledged

File(s) affected: `staking/Lockdrop.sol`

Description: If `aTokens` have already been deposited into the contract and the price is updated, the `usdDeposited` amount is not adjusted to reflect the price change. For example, if the price of a deposited `aToken` changes from `$200` to `$100`, one would expect the `usdDeposited` amount to be reduced by `$100` for every deposited token. Currently, the `usdDeposited` amount is unaffected.

Recommendation: Either acknowledge that such fluctuations are acceptable for the `Lockdrop`, or consider adding a `mapping` that tracks the total deposits for each `aToken`. If a price update occurs, the `usdDeposited` amount would change according to the delta in price. For example, if 5 `aToken` valued at `$200` each have been deposited and the price is updated to `$100`, then the `usdDeposited` would be reduced by `5 * ($200 - $100) = $500`.

Update: The team acknowledged that the price might change, and they plan to begin with a constant price.

### QSP-2 Privileged Roles and Ownership

Severity: *Medium Risk*

Status: Acknowledged

File(s) affected: `staking/Lockdrop.sol`

Description: The contract has 4 setter functions only callable by the owner: `setUnlockTime`, `setStatus`, `setPrice`, and `setCap`. Importantly, the owner can invoke `setUnlockTime()` to move the `unlockTime` arbitrarily far into the future. This may effectively lock all tokens indefinitely.

Exploit Scenario: The following scenarios could happen when there is a malicious owner.

1. The owner can set `unlockTime = 0`, then any user can claim the balance. The owner can set `unlockTime = 2^256-1`, then any user cannot claim the balance.
2. The owner can set `depositReady = false` or `cap = 1` to forbid users to call `deposit()`

Recommendation: Limit centralization where possible, specifically removing the ability for funds to be locked indefinitely. A few potential ways to do this are to either: 1) remove the function entirely and set the `unlockTime` in the `constructor()`; 2) disallow calls to `setUnlockTime()` if `depositReady` has ever been set to `true`. The second case would ensure that any user that deposits funds will have a guaranteed unlock time.

Update: The team acknowledged that the contract users need to trust the team. Also, note that the new changes for "QSP-5 Locked AToken Interest" introduce the new function `rescue` that grants the contract owner further power transfer away those locked tokens. As a result, we escalate the severity from low to medium. We recommend calculating the sum of the token deposit amount and only allowing to transfer of the difference of the current AToken balance from the sum.

### QSP-3 Variable Inconsistency

Severity: *Low Risk*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `staking/Lockdrop.sol`

Description: For the current implementation, a token address may have a non-zero price in the variable `prices` but not exist in `aTokens` when `setPrice` is called unexpectedly.

Exploit Scenario: Suppose address `addr` is not in `aTokens`, which is `aTokens[addr] = false`. The owner calls `setPrice(addr, 1)` to make `prices[addr] = 1`. Thus, `prices` and `aTokens` are inconsistent with each other.

Recommendation: Either update `aTokens` and `decimals` together or revert when the `_aToken` is never set.

Update: Now the `setPrice` function will revert if the `_aToken` was not set previously.

### QSP-4 Unchecked Return Value

Severity: *Low Risk*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `staking/Lockdrop.sol`

Description: According to the ERC20 standard, the `transfer` and `transferFrom` functions return `true` if the transfer was successful and `false` otherwise. These functions do not need to revert if the transfer is not successful. However, there are two places in the contract where these return values are ignored:

1. `claim()` ignores return value by `transfer(msg.sender, accountBalance)` on L85
2. `deposit()` ignores return value by `transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount)` on L73

If the token contract signals an error by returning `false` instead of reverting, the functions above do not detect any error and proceed with their execution.

Recommendation: Use OpenZeppelin's `SafeERC20` library for functions such as `safeTransfer()`.

Update: Using SafeERC20 from Open Zeppelin now.

### QSP-5 Locked AToken Interest

Severity: Low Risk

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: [stacking/Lockdrop.sol](#)

Description: AToken wallet balance will automatically increase over time as it will auto accumulate the interest ([doc](#)). However, the `claim` will only withdraw the original amount during the `deposit`. The contract will lock the extra balance from the AToken, and there is no way to retrieve out.

Recommendation: Please clarify if it is intended to lock the funds. Otherwise, please add the feature to retrieve the extra balances.

Update: The team added a `rescue` function to be able to transfer an arbitrary amount of the `_aToken` to the owner. Note that this increases the power of the privileged role, as a result, we escalate the severity of the QSP-2. A better way is to calculate the token deposit sum and only allow the transfer of the difference of the current AToken balance from the sum.

## QSP-6 Block Timestamp Manipulation

Severity: Informational

Status: Acknowledged

Related Issue(s): [SWC-116](#)

Description: Projects may rely on block timestamps for various purposes. However, it's important to realize that miners individually set the timestamp of a block, and attackers may be able to manipulate timestamps for their own purposes. If a smart contract relies on a timestamp, it must take this into account (In function `claim()`).

Recommendation: The team should clarify to users that 15 seconds difference would not affect the functionality and security of the protocol.

## QSP-7 Infinite Deposit Period

Severity: Informational

Status: Acknowledged

File(s) affected: [stacking/Lockdrop.sol](#)

Description: The contract allows deposit even when the `unlockTime` is over.

Recommendation: Add a time limit to the deposit.

Update: The team wants to let the last couple of minutes fluid and manually close the deposits with the `setStaus()` function instead.

## QSP-8 Price Update Scheme Not Robust to Price Fluctuations

Severity: Undetermined

Status: Acknowledged

File(s) affected: [stacking/Lockdrop.sol](#)

Description: Currently, token prices are manually adjusted in the contract based on owner calls to `setPrice()`. If the actual price has changed significantly before the owner updates the value, the total amount of locked tokens may exceed/be lower than the `cap` value.

Exploit Scenario: When the `Lockdrop.sol` contract is deployed, the `aMoon` token is \$1, and the cap is set to \$100, expecting to be able to lock 100 `aMoon` tokens. After 10 days, the token pumps, and the price becomes \$1000. Now, Alice can no longer deposit the `aMoon` token.

Recommendation: Either acknowledge that such fluctuations are acceptable for the `Lockdrop` or if a more robust approach is needed, consider a Chainlink oracle to query prices. Meanwhile, we recommend limiting the deposit to a short period to mitigate the risk of price fluctuation.

Update: The team acknowledged this and the lockdrop window will only be open for 2-3 days.

## Automated Analyses

Slither

It founds 36 results, and most are false positives or out of the scope. We have added the valid ones into the report.

## Code Documentation

- Add a document stating that the cap can be 0 in L21-22. If it is zero, it means uncapped.

## Adherence to Best Practices

- Suggest adding events for `setPrice()`, `setStatus()`, `setUnlockTime()`, and `setCap()`. This will help those who are listening to this contract make better judgement.
- Remove the public visibility from the constructor. After solidity 0.7, the visibility of the constructor is ignored.
- In the `constructor()`, the code can be optimized to save gas.

```
for(uint256 i = 0; i < _aTokens.length; i++) {  
    aTokens[_aTokens[i]] = true;  
    prices[_aTokens[i]] = _prices[i];  
    decimals[_aTokens[i]] = _decimals[i];  
}
```

- Could be changed to

```
for(uint256 i = 0; i < _aTokens.Length; i++) {  
  
    address token = _aTokens[i];  
  
    aTokens[token] = true;  
  
    prices[token] = _prices[i];  
  
    decimals[token] = _decimals[i];  
  
}
```

## Changelog

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- 2022-06-24 - Initial report
- 2022-06-29 - re-audit update



# About Quantstamp

Quantstamp is a Y Combinator-backed company that helps to secure blockchain platforms at scale using computer-aided reasoning tools, with a mission to help boost the adoption of this exponentially growing technology.

With over 1000 Google scholar citations and numerous published papers, Quantstamp's team has decades of combined experience in formal verification, static analysis, and software verification. Quantstamp has also developed a protocol to help smart contract developers and projects worldwide to perform cost-effective smart contract security scans.

To date, Quantstamp has protected \$5B in digital asset risk from hackers and assisted dozens of blockchain projects globally through its white glove security assessment services. As an evangelist of the blockchain ecosystem, Quantstamp assists core infrastructure projects and leading community initiatives such as the Ethereum Community Fund to expedite the adoption of blockchain technology.

Quantstamp's collaborations with leading academic institutions such as the National University of Singapore and MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) reflect our commitment to research, development, and enabling world-class blockchain security.

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