REPORT XLMRat Lab

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Date: 2026-01-19

1. Incident Summary

Network evidence indicates that an internal host 10.1.19.101 retrieved suspicious content over HTTP from an external endpoint 45.126.209.4 using port 222. The observed activity includes HTTP GET requests for the resources xlm.txt and mdm.jpg, with the stage-1 URL explicitly documented as http://45.126.209.4:222/mdm.jpg.

2. Detection Details

Detection was performed through packet and HTTP-layer review. Conversation statistics highlighted a high-volume exchange between 10.1.19.101 and 45.126.209.4, which prompted deeper inspection. Applying an HTTP request filter (http.request) surfaced GET activity to xlm.txt and mdm.jpg. The workflow also records that HTTP objects were exported/extracted and then checked for maliciousness, tying the network retrieval directly to the recovered payload artifacts.

3. Analysis

The collected artifacts describe a multi-stage chain consisting of a loader and a secondary executable. A SHA256 hash is provided for the malware executable: 1eb7b02e18f67420f42b1d94e74f3b6289d92672a0fb1786c30c03d68e81d798. The sample is labeled by Alibaba as asyncrat, and the file creation timestamp documented in the artifact set is 2023-10-30 15:08.

Execution tradecraft includes the use of a Windows LOLBin for stealthy process execution: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe. This is relevant because it indicates an attempt to blend malicious execution into legitimate system tooling.

The artifact set also enumerates dropped files associated with the activity: Conted.vbs, Conted.ps1, and Conted.bat. These filenames provide concrete host-level pivots for validation and scoping on endpoints beyond the initially observed system.

4. Impact Assessment

From the available evidence, the confirmed impact is limited to demonstrated retrieval of stage content from 45.126.209.4:222 by 10.1.19.101 and the presence of indicators consistent with follow-on execution via RegSvcs.exe and referenced dropped scripts. This supports a conclusion of likely host compromise on the victim system, but the provided materials do not contain endpoint telemetry sufficient to confirm persistence, privilege changes, credential access, lateral movement, or data exfiltration. Therefore, the impact assessment is restricted to what is explicitly observable in the network and extracted-object artifacts.

5. Indicators of Compromise

Network indicators include communication between 10.1.19.101 and 45.126.209.4 and HTTP activity on port 222, including requests for mdm.jpg and xlm.txt, with the documented stage-1 URL http://45.126.209.4:222/mdm.jpg.

Host and file indicators include the LOLBin path

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, the dropped filenames Conted.vbs, Conted.ps1, and Conted.bat, the malware executable hash 1eb7b02e18f67420f42b1d94e74f3b6289d92672a0fb1786c30c03d68e81d798, the malware label asyncrat, and the documented timestamp 2023-10-30 15:08.

Conclusion

The evidence set supports a clear chain of events: an internal host (10.1.19.101) contacted an external server (45.126.209.4:222) and retrieved stage content via HTTP, including the documented stage-1 object mdm.jpg. Extracted artifacts describe a loader and a secondary executable associated with the activity, provide a concrete SHA256 for the malware executable, and label it as asyncrat. The inclusion of RegSvcs.exe as an execution mechanism and the referenced dropped scripts (Conted.*) provide specific pivots for endpoint validation and incident scoping, but no additional claims about persistence or data loss are made because such evidence is not present in the provided materials.

Analysys

1. The attacker successfully executed a command to download the first stage of the malware. What is the URL from which the first malware stage was installed?

Statistics → Conversations можно увидеть, что хост жертвы — 10.1.19.101 отправлял много пакетов хосту 45.126.209.4



Address A	Address B	Packets	Bytes	Packets A → B	Bytes A → B	Packets B → A	Bytes B → A	Rel Start	Duration	Bits/s A → B	Bits/s B → A
10.1.9.101	45.126.209.4	1,548	586 k	576	75 k	972	510 k	0.000000	766.3712	787	
10.1.9.101	10.1.9.1	2	478	1	78	1	400	141.351709	0.3346	1,864	

Проверим в фильтре http.request:



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Host	Info
4	2024-01-09 17:27:27.871218	10.1.9.101	45.126.209.4	HTTP	357	45.126.209.4:222	GET /xlm.txt HTTP/1.1
12	2024-01-09 17:27:29.161640	10.1.9.101	45.126.209.4	HTTP	127	45.126.209.4:222	GET /mdm.jpg HTTP/1.1

Можно увидеть get запросы xlm.txt, mdm.jpg.

File → Export Objects → HTTP:



Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
7	45.126.209.4:222	text/plain	1,974 bytes	xlm.txt
344	45.126.209.4:222	image/jpeg	431 kB	mdm.jpg

Скачиваем оба файла и проверяем в VirusTotal.



28/61 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

1e9c29d7af6011ca9d5609cb93b554965c61105a42df9fe0c36274e60db71b1d

xlm.txt

Size
1.93 KB

Last Analysis Date
5 days ago

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✦ Code insights

The code defines an array of strings (LZeWX) and then concatenates them into a single string (OodjR).
It then uses the WScript.Shell object to execute a PowerShell command with the following options:
-NOP: Do not display the PowerShell console window.
-WIND HIDDeN: Hide the PowerShell console window.

Show more

Popular threat label: trojan.runner/aclb
Threat categories: trojan
Family labels: runner, aclb, alien

Security vendors' analysis

Do you want to automate checks?

AliCloud	Trojan:Win/Runner.A	ALYac	Trojan.Script.Agent
Arcabit	Trojan.Generic.D4937A69	Avast	Script:SNH-gen [PUP]
AVG	Script:SNH-gen [PUP]	BitDefender	Trojan.GenericKD.76773993
CTX	Vba.trojan.runner	Cynet	Malicious (score: 99)
DrWeb	Trojan.DownLoader46.46363	Emsisoft	Trojan.GenericKD.76773993 (B)
eScan	Trojan.GenericKD.76773993	ESET-NOD32	PowerShell/Runner.A Suspicious Applica…



31/62 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

83babee77db36512c0eab8ea6b35e981aa4288a4095985d69b3841f8b684fe11

mdm.jpg

powershell run-file long-sleeps enum-windows detect-debug-environment exe-pattern

Size 421.10 KB

Last Analysis Date 20 days ago

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✦ Code insights

The script decodes two embedded hexadecimal strings into byte arrays. One byte array is then loaded into memory as a .NET assembly using reflection. A specific method within this in-memory assembly is subsequently invoked, and the other decoded byte array along with a path to a system executable is passed as arguments to this method.

The initial PowerShell code is written to a file named `Conted.ps1` in the `C:\Users\Public\` directory. A batch file named `Conted.bat` is then created in the same directory. This batch file is configured to execute

Show more

Popular threat label trojan.powershell/runner Threat categories trojan dropper Family labels powershell runner psdrop

Security vendors' analysis Do you want to automate checks?

AliCloud	Trojan[dropper]:Win/Runner.Gen	ALYac	Trojan.GenericKDZ.105650
Arcabit	Trojan.Generic.D19CB2	Avast	Script:SNH-gen [Trj]
AVG	Script:SNH-gen [Trj]	BitDefender	Trojan.GenericKDZ.105650
Bkav Pro	W32.Common.BC097C02	CTX	Powershell.trojan.runner
Cynet	Malicious (score: 99)	DrWeb	PowerShell.Inject.128
Emsisoft	Trojan.GenericKDZ.105650 (B)	eScan	Trojan.GenericKDZ.105650

Убеждаемся, что файлы действительно вредоносные и смело можем смотреть url:



```
▸ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49709, Dst Port: 222, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 73
▾ Hypertext Transfer Protocol
   ▸ GET /mdm.jpg HTTP/1.1\r\n
     Host: 45.126.209.4:222\r\n
     Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n
     \r\n
     [Full request URI: http://45.126.209.4:222/mdm.jpg]
     [HTTP request 1/1]
```

Answer: http://45.126.209.4:222/mdm.jpg

2. Which hosting provider owns the associated IP address?

Используя WHOIS введем айпи адрес 45.126.204.4. Видим url: https://www.reliablesite.net



```
ruslan@pop-os:~$ whois 45.126.209.4
% [whois.apnic.net]
% Whois data copyright terms    http://www.apnic.net/db/dbcopyright.html

% Information related to '45.126.208.0 - 45.126.211.255'

% Abuse contact for '45.126.208.0 - 45.126.211.255' is 'abuse@reliablesite.net'

inetnum:        45.126.208.0 - 45.126.211.255
netname:        RELIABLESITE-AP
descr:          ReliableSite.Net LLC
country:        SG
geoloc:         25.7975441 -80.2322913
org:            ORG-RL9-AP
admin-c:        RLA10-AP
tech-c:         RLA10-AP
abuse-c:        AR1015-AP
status:         ALLOCATED PORTABLE
remarks:        -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
remarks:        To report network abuse, please contact the IRT
remarks:        For troubleshooting, please contact tech-c and admin-c
remarks:        For assistance, please contact the APNIC Helpdesk
remarks:        -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
remarks:        Geofeed https://www.reliablesite.net/geofeed.csv
remarks:        geofeed: https://www.reliablesite.net/geofeed.csv
mnt-by:         APNIC-HM
mnt-lower:      MAINT-RELIABLESITE-AP
mnt-routes:     MAINT-RELIABLESITE-AP
mnt-irt:        IRT-RELIABLESITE-AP
last-modified:  2023-08-15T16:40:57Z
source:         APNIC
```

AnswerL reliablesite.net

3. By analyzing the malicious scripts, two payloads were identified: a loader and a secondary executable. What is the SHA256 of the malware executable?

Используя CyberChef высчитываем Hex → SHA2



Recipe

To Hex

Delimiter: Space

Bytes per line: 0

SHA2

Size: 512

Rounds: 160

Input

```
4D_5A_90_00_03_00_00_00_04_00_00_00_FF_FF_00_00_B8_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_40_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00
_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_00_
```

Output

```
85ddf9f620af2280d69721e7ebf4611d451badea5a9d383c038c5708001542ad69a79be2cecd64817b10264dd97da10416fc4e42959ff7051
d39e616bd6c3fae
```

Answer: 1eb7b02e18f67420f42b1d94e74f3b6289d92672a0fb1786c30c03d68e81d798

4. What is the malware family label based on Alibaba?

Вставляем хэш в VirusTotal



60 / 72 Community Score -10

60/72 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

1eb7b02e18f67420f42b1d94e74f3b6289d92672a0fb1786c30c03d68e81d798

Stub.exe

Size 65.00 KB

Last Analysis Date 1 month ago

Join our Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Popular threat label trojan.asyncrat/msil

Threat categories trojan dropper

Family labels asyncrat msil marte

Security vendors' analysis

Do you want to automate checks?

AhnLab-V3	Malware/Win.Generic.C4980844	Alibaba	Backdoor:MSIL/AsyncRat.a2786761
AliCloud	Rat:Win/AsyncRAT.Stub	ALYac	Gen:Variant.AsyncRat.Marte.6

Answer: asyncrat

5. What is the timestamp of the malware's creation?

In details we can find History



History

Creation Time	2023-10-30 15:08:44 UTC
First Seen In The Wild	2024-01-11 18:17:54 UTC
First Submission	2024-01-11 16:36:37 UTC
Last Submission	2026-01-16 12:55:51 UTC
Last Analysis	2025-11-27 08:41:15 UTC

Answer: 2023-10-30 15:08

6. Which LOLBin is leveraged for stealthy process execution in this script? Provide the full path.

Открываем текстовым редактором или через nano jpg:



```
$NK = $Fu.GetType('N#ew#PE#2.P#E'-replace  '#', '')
$MZ = $NK.GetMethod('Execute')
$NA = 'C:\W######indow############s\Mi####cr'-replace  '#', ''
$AC = $NA + 'osof#####t.NET\Fra###mework\v4.0.303###19\R##egSvc#####s.exe'-replace  '#', ''
$VA = @($AC, $NKbb)
```

Удаляем все символы #: $NA = 'C:\W#######indow############s\Mi####cr'-replace '#', ''

Получаем:

C:\Windows\Micr

osoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Склеиваем с $NA:

C:\Windows\Micr + osoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe = C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Answer: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

7. The script is designed to drop several files. List the names of the files dropped by the script.

В txt file можно увидеть:

Conted.vbs

Conted.ps1

Conted.bat