Lab 7 Writeup


孙永康 11911409

Task 1


After copying the c code into simple_module.c file, I compile and execute it in the following order.

```
$ ls
simple_moduel.c Makefile
$ make
$ dmesg
$ sudo insmod simple_module.ko
$ dmesg
$ sudo rmmod simple_module
```


1. dbmsg after make



2. dbmsg after sudo insmod simple_module.ko



3. dbmsg after sudo rmmod simple_module



Question: What is the exception level and the security state of the core with loaded LKM?

Answer: The exception level is EL2 and security state is non-secure state.

Task 2

a.

This is the code I modified. It is according to the manual.

```
static int __init simple_module_init(void)

{
    uint32_t reg;
    asm volatile("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c1, 0":"=r"(reg));
    printk(KERN_INFO "SCR %x.\n", reg);
    return 0;
}
```

Accessing SCR

Accesses to this register use the following encodings in the System register encoding space:

MRC{<c>}{<q>} <coproc>, {#}<opc1>, <Rt>, <CRn>, <CRm>{, {#}<opc2>}

coproc	opc1	CRn	CRm	opc2
0b1111	0ь000	0b0001	0b0001	0ь000

```
if PSTATE.EL == EL0 then
   UNDEFINED:
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
   if EL2Enabled() && !ELUsingAArch32(EL2) && HSTR_EL2.T1 == '1' then
       AArch64.AArch32SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x03);
   elsif EL2Enabled() && ELUsingAArch32(EL2) && HSTR.T1 == '1' then
       AArch32.TakeHypTrapException(0x03);
   elsif !ELUsingAArch32(EL2) && SCR_EL3.<NS,EEL2> == '01' then
       AArch64.AArch32SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x03);
   elsif !ELUsingAArch32(EL3) && SCR_EL3.NS == '0' then
       AArch64.AArch32SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x03);
   else
       UNDEFINED:
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
   UNDEFINED:
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then
   return SCR;
```

After compiling it I receive a segment fault.

```
pi@raspberrypi:~/LKM $ sudo insmod simple_module.ko
段错误
```

After checking it through dbmsg, I found that the register \$PC stop at 0x14. I do not know how to find the instructions that cause this segment fault. So, I ask my friend for help, he disassemble this .o file and find the 14th instructions is mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c1, 0.

b.

So, the reason this instruction could cause segment fault is that SCR can only be accessed in **secure state** while our LKM is running under **non-secure state**.

Task 3

a.

The instruction is in the below figure. This is according to the manual.

```
#include <linux/module.h> // included for all kernel modules
#include <linux/kernel.h> // included for KERN_INFO
#include <linux/init.h> // included for __init and __exit macros
#include <asm/io.h>
The init function of the module.
static int __init simple_module_init(void)
uint32 t reg;
asm volatile("mrc pl4, 0, %0, c7, cl4, 6":"=r"(reg));
printk(KERN INFO "DBGAUTHSTATUS: %x.\n", reg);
return 0;
 The cleanup function of the module.
static void __exit simple_module_exit(void)
printk(KERN INFO "Exit.\n");
module init(simple module init);
                                                                           顶端
"simple_module.c" 25L, 621C
                                                              1,1
```

Accessing DBGAUTHSTATUS

Accesses to this register use the following encodings in the System register encoding space:

MRC{<c>}{<q>} <coproc>, {#}<opc1>, <Rt>, <CRn>, <CRm>{, {#}<opc2>}

coproc	opc1	CRn	CRm	opc2
0b1110	0b000	0b0111	0b1110	0b110

b.

After compiling and running in LKM, we receive this feedback.

```
m2835-codec bc
                              m2835-codec: Loaded V4L2
   5.924954] bcm2835-codec bcm2835-codec: Device registered as /dev/videol2
   5.925099] bcm2835-codec bcm2835-codec: Loaded V4L2 isp
   6.050841] cfg80211: Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates for regulatory database
   6.209200] cfg80211: Loaded X.509 cert 'sforshee: 00b28ddf47aef9cea7'
   6.295443] brcmfmac: Fl signature read @0x18000000=0x15264345
   6.308803] brcmfmac: brcmf_fw_alloc_request: using brcm/brcmfmac43455-sdio for chip BCM4345/
   6.309719] usbcore: registered new interface driver brcmfmac
   6.344614] brcmfmac mmcl:0001:1: Direct firmware load for brcm/brcmfmac43455-sdio.raspberrypi
3-model-b-plus.txt failed with error -2
   6.560646] random: crng init done
   6.560659] random: 7 urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting
   6.573109] brcmfmac: brcmf_fw_alloc_request: using brcm/brcmfmac43455-sdio for chip BCM4345/6
   6.613659] brcmfmac: brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds: Firmware: BCM4345/6 wl0: Mar 23 2020 02:19:54 ver
ion 7.45.206 (r725000 CY) FWID 01-88ee44ea
   8.789900] 8021q: 802.1Q VLAN Support v1.8
   9.046605] Adding 102396k swap on /var/swap. Priority:-2 extents:1 across:102396k SSFS
   9.170331] brcmfmac: brcmf_cfg80211_set_power_mgmt: power save enabled
   9.819003] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device eth0
  11.364379] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): wlan0: link becomes ready
  15.270335] Bluetooth: Core ver 2.22
  15.270499] NET: Registered protocol family 31
  15.270525] Bluetooth: HCI device and connection manager initialized
  15.270566] Bluetooth: HCI socket layer initialized
  15.270608] Bluetooth: L2CAP socket layer initialized
  15.270678] Bluetooth: SCO socket layer initialized
  15.282411] Bluetooth: HCI UART driver ver 2.3
  15.282426] Bluetooth: HCI UART protocol H4 registered
  15.282471] Bluetooth: HCI UART protocol Three-wire (H5) registered
  15.282637] Bluetooth: HCI UART protocol Broadcom registered
  15.566298] Bluetooth: BNEP (Ethernet Emulation) ver 1.3
  15.566314] Bluetooth: BNEP filters: protocol multicast
  15.566344] Bluetooth: BNEP socket layer initialized
   15.658005] Bluetooth: RFCOMM TTY layer initialized
  15.658032] Bluetooth: RFCOMM socket layer initialized
  15.658056] Bluetooth: RFCOMM ver 1.11
  16.304903] fuse: init (API version 7.31)
  81.986689] simple module: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
  81.986708] simple module: module license 'unspecified' taints kernel.
  81.986715] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
  81.987071] DBGAUTHSTATUS: ff.
i@raspberrypi:~/LKM$
```

According to the manual, the result [ff], means that both those 4 debug mode, **Secure Non-Invasive Debug**, **Secure Invasive Debug**, **Non-Secure Non-Invasive Debug**, **Non-Secure Invasive Debug**, are all implemented and enabled.

SNID, bits [7:6]

When FEAT Debugy8p4 is implemented:

SNID

Secure Non-Invasive Debug.

This field has the same value as DBGAUTHSTATUS.SID.

Otherwise:

SNID

Secure Non-Invasive Debug.

0b00 Not implemented. EL3 is not implemented and the Effective value of SCR.NS is 1.

0b10 Implemented and disabled. ExternalSecureNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE.

0b11 Implemented and enabled. ExternalSecureNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE.

All other values are reserved.

Task 4

Below is what I found in the manual about the EDLAR.

Field descriptions

The EDLAR bit assignments are:



KEY, bits [31:0]

Lock Access control. Writing the key value 0xC5ACCE55 to this field unlocks the lock, enabling write accesses to this component's registers through a memory-mapped interface.

Writing any other value to this register locks the lock, disabling write accesses to this component's registers through a memory mapped interface.

Accessing the EDLAR:

EDLAR can be accessed through a memory-mapped interface access to the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0xFB0

Below is what I found in the manual about the OSLAR.

Field descriptions

The OSLAR_EL1 bit assignments are:



Bits [31:1]

Reserved, RESO.

OSLK, bit [0]

On writes to OSLAR_EL1, bit[0] is copied to the OS lock.

Use EDPRSR.OSLK to check the current status of the lock.

ARM DDI 0487B.a ID033117 Copyright © 2013-2017 ARM Limited or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

Non-Confidential

H9-5675

H9 External Debug Register Descriptions H9.2 External debug registers

Accessing the OSLAR_EL1:

OSLAR_EL1 can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset	
Debug	0x300	

```
#define EDLAR_OFFSET 0xFB0
#define OSLAR_OFFSET 0x300

iowrite32(0xC5ACCE55, param->debug_register + EDLAR_OFFSET);
iowrite32(0xC5ACCE55, param->cti_register + EDLAR_OFFSET);
iowrite32(0x000000000, param->debug_register + OSLAR_OFFSET);
iowrite32(0x000000000, param->cti_register + OSLAR_OFFSET);
```

Task 5

a.

This is the code I modified. The first instructions is quite the same in task2, but the register is changed to R1 respect to the question.

b.

The second instruction is copied from step 5, which is a good example about how to put it to local variable scr. The only difference is that the first register is changed to R1.

```
// Step 7: Read the SCR
printk(KERN_INFO "Step 7: Read SCR\n");
// Oxee111f11 <=> mrc p15, 0, R1, C1, C1, 0
execute_ins_via_itr(param->debug_register, 0x1f11ee11);
// Oxee001e15 <=> mcr p14, 0, R1, C0, C5, 0
execute_ins_via_itr(param->debug_register, 0x1e15ee00);
scr = ioread32(param->debug_register + DBGDTRTX_OFFSET);
```

Task 6

This is what I receive after building and running this code. The SCR value is **0x00000131**. Convert it into binary, **0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 0011 0001**.

```
Step 1: Unlock debug and cross trigger registers
Step 2: Enable halting debug
Step 3: Halt the target processor
Step 4: Wait the target processor to halt
Step 5: Save context
Step 6: Switch to EL3
Step 7: Read SCR
Step 8: Restore context
Step 9: Send restart request to the target processor
Step 10: Wait the target processor to restart
All done! The value of SCR is 0x00000131
```

The manual explain what each bit means. Since it is too long, I can not put a screen shot here. So, this SCR means:

- 1. TERR, bit [15] is 0: Trap Error record accesses. Generate a Monitor Trap exception on accesses to some of the registers from modes other than Monitor mode. When it is 0, this control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.
- 2. TWE, bit [13] is 0: Traps WFE instructions to Monitor mode. When it is 0, this control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.
- 3. TwI, bit [12] is 0: Traps WFI instructions to Monitor mode. When it is 0, this control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

- 4. SIF, bit [9] is 0: Secure instruction fetch. When the PE is in Secure state, this bit disables instruction fetch from Non-secure memory. When it is 0, secure state instruction fetches from Non-secure memory are permitted.
- 5. HCE, bit [8] is 1: Hypervisor Call instruction enable. If EL2 is implemented, enables execution of HVC instructions at Non-secure EL1 and EL2. When it is 1, HVC instructions are enabled at Non-secure EL1 and EL2.
- 6. SCD, bit [7] is 0 : Secure Monitor Call disable. Disables SMC instructions. When it is 0, SMC instructions are enabled.
- 7. **nET**, **bit** [6] is 0 : Not Early Termination. This bit disables early termination. When it is 0, early termination permitted, execution time of data operations can depend on the data values.
- 8. Aw, bit [5] is 1: When the value of SCR.EA is 1 and the value of HCR.AMO is 0, this bit controls whether PSTATE.A masks an External abort taken from Non-secure state. When it is 1, external aborts taken from either Security state are masked by PSTATE.A. When PSTATE.A is 0, the abort is taken to EL3.
- 9. Fw, bit [4] is 1: When the value of SCR.FIQ is 1 and the value of HCR.FMO is 0, this bit controls whether PSTATE.F masks an FIQ interrupt taken from Non-secure state. When it is 1, an FIQ taken from either Security state is masked by PSTATE.F. When PSTATE.F is 0, the FIQ is taken to EL3.
- 10. EA, bit [3] is 0: External Abort handler. This bit controls which mode takes External aborts and SError interrupt exceptions. When it is 0, External aborts taken to Abort mode.
- 11. FIQ, bit [2] is 0 : FIQ handler. This bit controls which mode takes FIQ exceptions. When it is 0, FIQs taken to FIQ mode.
- 12. IRQ, bit [1] is 0: IRQ handler. This bit controls which mode takes IRQ exceptions. When it is 0, IRQs taken to IRQ mode.
- 13. NS, bit [0] is 1: Non-secure bit. Except when the PE is in Monitor mode, this bit determines the Security state of the PE. When it is 1, PE is in Non-secure state.

Submission:

1. During this lab, what is the base address of Cross Trigger Interface in Raspberry Pi 3? Can your find the global address of CTICONTROL register in Raspberry Pi 3 according to the Arm Reference Manual? Answer the address value and show your calculation. (hint: Find the offset)

The base address is in the code:

#define CTI_REGISTER_ADDR 0x40038000

This is the offset of CTICONTROL described in the manual.

Accessing the CTICONTROL:

CTICONTROL can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset	Instance
CTI	0x000	CTICONTROL

So, the global address of CTACONTROL is 0x40038000.

2. Do we have another way to unlock the OS Lock in this lab except memory mapping? If yes, how to do that? Justify your answer.

Mentioned in the manual, It can also be unlocked by DBGOSLAR. Setting it to 0xc5acce55 to lock and to 0x00000000 to unlock.

G8.3.22 DBGOSLAR, Debug OS Lock Access Register

The DBGOSLAR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides a lock for the debug registers. The OS Lock also disables some debug exceptions and debug events.

Configurations

This register is present only when EL1 is capable of using AArch32. Otherwise, direct accesses to DBGOSLAR are UNDEFINED.

The OS Lock can also be locked or unlocked using the AArch64 System register OSLAR_EL1 and External register OSLAR_EL1.

Attributes

DBGOSLAR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions



OSLA, bits [31:0]

OS Lock Access. Writing the value 0xC5ACCE55 to the DBGOSLAR sets the OS Lock to 1. Writing any other value sets the OS Lock to 0.

Use DBGOSLSR.OSLK to check the current status of the lock.

Accessing DBGOSLAR

Accesses to this register use the following encodings in the System register encoding space:

MCR{<c>}{<q>} <coproc>, {#}<opc1>, <Rt>, <CRn>, <CRm>{, {#}<opc2>}

coproc	opc1	CRn	CRm	opc2
0b1110	0b000	0b0001	0ь0000	0b100

Use DBGOSLSR to check OSLOCK's status.

G8.3.23 DBGOSLSR, Debug OS Lock Status Register

The DBGOSLSR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides status information for the OS Lock.

Configurations

AArch32 System register DBGOSLSR bits [31:0] are architecturally mapped to AArch64 System register OSLSR EL1[31:0].

This register is present only when AArch32 is supported at EL0. Otherwise, direct accesses to DBGOSLSR are UNDEFINED.

The OS Lock status is also visible in the external debug interface through EDPRSR.

Attributes

DBGOSLSR is a 32-bit register.

OSLK, bit [1]

OS Lock Status. The possible values are:

0b0 OS Lock unlocked.

0b1 OS Lock locked.

The OS Lock is locked and unlocked by writing to the OS Lock Access Register.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Cold reset, this field resets to 1.

MRC{<c>}{<q>} <coproc>, {#}<opc1>, <Rt>, <CRn>, <CRm>{, {#}<opc2>}

coproc	opc1	CRn	CRm	opc2
0b1110	0b000	0b0001	0b0001	0b100

This is the test code I use, and from the log, we can know that it is successful locked and unlock.

```
uint32_t reg;
asm volatile("mrc p14, 0, %0, c1, c1, 4":"=r"(reg));
printk(KERN_INFO "DBGOSLSR before lock: 0x%.08x.\n", reg);

asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c1, c0, 4"::"r"(0xC5ACCE55));
printk(KERN_INFO "use DBGOSLAR lock OSLOCK.\n");

asm volatile("mrc p14, 0, %0, c1, c1, 4":"=r"(reg));
printk(KERN_INFO "DBGOSLSR after lock: 0x%.08x.\n", reg);

asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c1, c0, 4"::"r"(0x00000000));
printk(KERN_INFO "use DBGOSLAR unlock OSLOCK.\n");

asm volatile("mrc p14, 0, %0, c1, c1, 4":"=r"(reg));
printk(KERN_INFO "DBGOSLSR after unlock: 0x%.08x.\n", reg);
return 0;
```

DBGOSLSR before lock: 0x00000008.
use DBGOSLAR lock OSLOCK.
DBGOSLSR after lock: 0x00000000a.
use DBGOSLAR unlock OSLOCK.
DBGOSLSR after unlock: 0x000000008.