

## **Considerations for Kavach Radio Comm (MCOMM)**

- Open radio protocols to achieve multi-vendor interoperability.
- Stringent requirements for radio security due to open protocols.
- Information loss due to clash of comm. if two units in geographic vicinity transmit at same time instant and at same frequency.
- One third of time frame is dedicated to Control, Command, Access, Repeat Emergency, Direct Onboard-to-Onboard messages at predecided universally known frequency and time instants.
- Two third of time frame is dedicated for payload info exchange.
- Stationary and Onboard Units transmit at Separate frequency channels.
- Stationary units transmit payload info at different time instants (TDM) and different frequencies (FDM).
- Mobile Onboard Units transmit payload info at different time instants (TDMA) and different frequencies (FDMA)
- Reuse time and frequency over Space Domain beyond overreach

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#### Frame Structure


- 2 sec (2000 m-sec) timeframe is divided in 02 identical halves.
- Over-The-Air@19.2.kbps, Total number of bits in frame:38,400
- The frame is divided into total 78 timeslot position markers each of 352 bits. Guard time 96 bits (5 m-sec).
- Freq transition and stabilization time: 1408 bits (73.33 m-sec).
- Full Duplex Hardware but Operation is not full-duplex.
- 50 timeslot positions for payload (TDM/TDMA/FDM/FDMA).
- 24 timeslots (Yellow shaded) for onboard-to-onboard, Emergency Additional message, Access, Command.
- Each Onboard trans : fixed duration of one marker i.e 352 bits
- Each Stationary is using contiguous wider timeslot consisting of more than one position markers.
- Total  $\{(352x39 + 96x37 + 480x2 + 960) x2\} = 38,400 \text{ bits}$
- Time frame in all units is synchronized through GPS/GNSS.
- Data packet of length more than 1024 bits is fragmented.


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
### **Distribution of 78 Timeslot Position Markers**


- P1, P27, P40, P66: Total 4
   Not used for Trans, Sacrificed for Freq Switching, Stabilization
- P2 to P26 (M1 to M25), P41 to P65 (M26 to M50) : Total 50 Payload from Stationary to Onboard, Onboard to Stationary
- P28 to P33, P67 to P72 : Total 12 (on f₀)
  Broadcast by Onboard Units in Block Section
- P34, P35, P73, P74 : ME-1 to ME-4 : Total 4 (on f₀)
  Broadcast of additional emergency (SoS) msg by Onboard.
- P36, P37, P75, P76 : STS-1 to STS-4 : Total 4 (on f₀)
  Broadcast of Access Authority Packets by Stationary
- P38, P39, P77, P78 : SE-1 to SE-4 : Total 4 (on f<sub>0</sub>)
  Broadcast of additional emergency (SoS) msg by Stationary


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






# Onboard Units: Can we afford dedicated permanent timeslot?

- Width of train transmit timeslot is fixed irrespective of type of train.
- 'N' frequency channel pairs can handle '50N' train timeslots.





- 10,000 trains with dedicated timeslots require 200 frequency channel pairs. Requires very large spectrum, wider band antennae, reduced performance.
- With dedicated timeslots permanently assigned to trains, only 250 trains can be catered even with 05 frequency channel pairs.


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
# Freq and Timeslots of Onboard Trans assigned by Stationary


- Stationary A: f<sub>s1</sub>-f<sub>m1</sub>: Can handle 03 trains: M28, M34, M40
- Stationary B: f<sub>s1</sub>-f<sub>m1</sub>: Can handle 06 trains: M26, M30, M36, M42, M46, M50
- Stationary C: f<sub>s1</sub>-f<sub>m1</sub> : Can handle 04 trains : M32, M38, M44, M48











## Radio Security: Solution to Open Protocols challenges


- Multi-vendor interoperability requires open radio communication protocols.
- Security requirements are more stringent for open radio protocols.
- AES-128 encryption is used.
- Each communication session should have unique encryption.
- > Different Onboard at same Trackside unit : different encryption.
- > Same Onboard at different Trackside unit: different encryption.
- > Same Onboard at same Trackside but at different time: different encryption.
- Only legitimate units should be allowed to participate
- Above is achieved by deriving a Session Key K<sub>s</sub> which is based on:
- > A random number R<sub>1</sub> generated by Onboard Unit afresh for every session
- > A random number R<sub>2</sub> generated by Trackside Unit afresh for every session
- > Authentication Keys  $\tilde{K}_a$  with limited validity period by KMS to all legitimate units
- CBC-MAC Code based on K<sub>s</sub> is calculated and used in radio packets.



Authentication Key to Kavach (TCAS) Entities through KMS Identification Message Kavach **Entities** OTP message Centralized Identification Acknowledge Message (Stationary Key AKey Request Message Units, Management Onboard AKey Message System (KMS) Units, other AKey Query Message Operation **AKey Status Message** Modules) Communication over GPRS / LTE Communication over SMS 22

### **Experience of RF Communication in R&D Field Trial Section**

- Basis for initial adoption of 441.8, 466.8 MHz for R&D
- Basis for 30m Tower Height for R&D Section
- Era of mismatch among frequency range in use and centre frequency of antennae
- Allotment of 05 freq channels for further use in Kaavch 427.625, 427.875, 428.875, 429.525 and 429.800 MHz
- Feasibility of closely spaced 09 frequency channels – 04 in addition to 05 already allotted.



#### Conclusion

- An ATP as overlay on an underlying signalling system needs exchange of lot of data on realtime basis.
- Kavach would not have possible without mComm
- mComm supports open protocols and direct onboard-toonboard communication.
- It is secure, highly spectrum efficient, realtime and adaptive to train traffic density with requirement of just optimum number of frequency channels for that region.
- mComm triggered the commencement of development of Indian Railways' indigenous cab-signalling ATP without waiting for LTE.

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