# The Counterexample to the Proof-Theoretic Conjecture for Self-Referential Paradoxes

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Neil Tennant(1982, 1995, 2015, 2016, 2017) has regarded the non-terminating reduction sequence as the primary feature of paradoxes and proposed the proof-theoretic criterion for paradoxicality.



Tennant(1982) sets his criterion for paradoxicality such that the derivations formalizing paradoxes in natural deduction are distinguished by having non-terminating reduction sequences of the derivation of an absurdity  $(\bot)$  involved. He called a non-terminating reduction sequence a 'looping reduction sequence.'



While investigating a non-self-referential paradox suggested by Stephen Yablo(1993), Tennant(1995) has extended his criterion by embracing a spiraling reduction generated by Yablo's paradox. He thought that a looping reduction sequence is the main feature of the self-referential paradoxes but not that of Yablo's paradox. He claimed that the non-terminating reduction sequence enters into loops if the self-reference is involved; otherwise it does not. We interpret his claim as an informal conjecture for self-referential paradoxes that every derivation formalizing a self-referential paradox in natural deduction generates a looping reduction sequence but not a spiraling reduction sequence.

- **The Proof-Theoretic Criterion for Paradoxicality**(PCP): Let  $\mathfrak{D}$  be any derivation of a given natural deduction system S.  $\mathfrak{D}$  is a T-paradox if and only if
  - (i)  $\mathfrak{D}$  is a (closed or open) derivation of  $\bot$ ,
  - (ii)  $id\ est$  inferences (or rules) are used in  $\mathfrak{D}$ ,
  - (iii) a reduction procedure of  $\mathfrak{D}$  generates a non-terminating reduction sequence, such as a reduction loop.
- $\label{lem:conjecture} \textbf{The Proof-Theoretic Conjecture for Self-Referential Paradoxes}(\textit{PCSP}):$

Let  $\mathfrak{D}$  be any derivation satisfying PCP, i.e. a T-paradox.  $\mathfrak{D}$  generates a looping reduction sequence if and only if  $\mathfrak{D}$  formalizes a self-referential paradox.

## Counterexamples and Suggestions

**The Aim:** To find a correct proof-theoretic structure of self-referential

paradoxes.

The Counterexample to *PCSP*: There is a derivation of a self-referential

paradox, e.g. the Liar paradox, which satisfies PCP but

generate a spiraling reduction sequence.

**Suggestion:** It should be discussed which reduction procedure is admissible

in order to find a correct proof-theoretic structure for

(self-referential) paradoxes.

#### • Language:

Functions and constants: the constant 0, the unary function symbol s for successors, the binary function symbol + for addition.

Logical operators  $: \to, \bot$ , and  $\forall$  for implication, absurdity, and universal quantification respectively.

Formulas(predicates) :  $\varphi$ ,  $\psi$ , and  $\sigma$  for arbitrary formula. Also, the binary predicate < for less-than-relation, and = for equality.

Negation  $(\neg)$ :  $\neg \varphi$  is defined by  $\varphi \rightarrow \bot$ .

• Derivation symbol:  $\mathfrak D$ 

#### • Rules:

#### • Reductions:

#### **Definitions**

- A derivation is in normal if it has no maximum formula.
- A maximum formula is a conclusion of I-rule and a major premise of E-rule.


#### Definition

A sequence  $<\mathfrak{D}_1,...,\mathfrak{D}_i,\mathfrak{D}_{i+1},...>$  of derivations is a *reduction sequence* relative to  $\mathbb{R}$  iff  $\mathfrak{D}_i \rhd \mathfrak{D}_{i+1}$  relative to  $\mathbb{R}$  where  $1 \leqslant i$  for any natural number i. A derivation  $\mathfrak{D}_1$  is *reducible* to  $\mathfrak{D}_i$  ( $\mathfrak{D}_1 \succ \mathfrak{D}_i$ ) relative to  $\mathbb{R}$  iff there is a sequence  $<\mathfrak{D}_1,\mathfrak{D}_2,...,\mathfrak{D}_i>$  relative to  $\mathbb{R}$  where for each  $j < i,\mathfrak{D}_j \rhd \mathfrak{D}_{j+1};$   $\mathfrak{D}_1$  is *irreducible* relative to  $\mathbb{R}$  iff there is no derivation  $\mathfrak{D}'$  to which  $\mathfrak{D}_1 \rhd \mathfrak{D}'$  relative to  $\mathbb{R}$  except  $\mathfrak{D}_1$  itself.

#### Definition

A derivation  $\mathfrak D$  is *normal* (or in *normal form*) relative to  $\mathbb R$  iff  $\mathfrak D$  is irreducible relative to  $\mathbb R$ , i.e.  $\mathfrak D$  has no maximum formula. A reduction sequence *terminates* iff it has a finite number of derivations and its last derivation is in normal form. A derivation  $\mathfrak D$  is *normalizable* relative to  $\mathbb R$  iff there is a terminating reduction sequence relative to  $\mathbb R$  starting from  $\mathfrak D$ .

• Formalizing the Liar Paradox in Natural Deduction: We use an unary truth-predicate  $T(\lceil x \rceil)$  which states that x is true. Let us define  $\Phi$  be a sentence  $\neg T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)$ . We call  $\Phi$  a liar sentence. The so-called liar sentence says: "This sentence is not true."



• Formalizing the Liar Paradox in Natural Deduction: We use rules for  $T(\lceil x \rceil)$  which states that x is true.

$$\frac{\varphi}{T(\lceil \varphi \rceil)} TI \qquad \frac{T(\lceil \varphi \rceil)}{\varphi} TE$$

• The standard reduction procedure for T(x) is as below.

$$\frac{\varphi}{T(\lceil \varphi \rceil)} TI \qquad \mathfrak{D}$$

$$\varphi TE \qquad \triangleright_{T(x)} \qquad \varphi$$

• Formalizing the Liar Paradox in Natural Deduction: For formulating the Liar paradox,  $S_L$  has a Tennant's rules for the liar sentence  $\Phi$  from Tennant(2016, 2017).

$$\begin{split} & \left[ T(\lceil \Phi \rceil) \right]^1 & \left[ \neg T(\lceil \Phi \rceil) \right]^1 \\ & \mathfrak{D}_1 & \mathfrak{D}_2 \\ & \frac{\perp}{\Phi} \Phi I_{,1} & \frac{\Phi}{\sigma} \Phi E_{,1} \end{split}$$

• The reduction procedure for  $\Phi$  as follows.

• Formalizing the Liar Paradox in Natural Deduction: First, we have an open derivation  $\Sigma_1$  of  $\bot$  from  $[T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)]$  below left. With  $\Sigma_1$ , there is a closed derivation  $\Sigma_2$  of  $T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)$  below right.

$$\frac{\left[T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)\right]^{1}}{\frac{\Phi}{2}}TE \quad \frac{\left[\neg T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)\right]^{2} \quad \left[T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)\right]^{1}}{\perp} \to E \quad \frac{\Sigma_{1}}{\frac{\bot}{\Phi}}\Phi I_{,1} \\ \frac{\bot}{T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)}TI$$

• Then, we have a closed derivation  $\Sigma_3$  of  $\perp$ .

$$\frac{\left[T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)\right]^{1}}{\sum_{1}} \frac{\Sigma_{1}}{\frac{\bot}{T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)} \to I_{,1}} \frac{\Sigma_{2}}{T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)} \to I$$

• Formalizing the Liar Paradox in Natural Deduction:  $\neg T(\ulcorner \Phi \urcorner)$  in the last  $\rightarrow E$ -rule of  $\Sigma_3$  is a maximum formula.  $\Sigma_3$  reduces to the derivation  $\Sigma_4$  above. By applying  $\triangleright_{T(x)}$  and  $\triangleright_{\Phi}$  to  $\Sigma_4$ , we have the same derivation with  $\Sigma_3$ .  $\Sigma_3$  generates a non-terminating reduction sequence and thus it is not normalizable.

**The Proof-Theoretic Criterion for Paradoxicality**(PCP): Let  $\mathfrak{D}$  be any derivation of a given natural deduction system S.  $\mathfrak{D}$  is a T-paradox if and only if

- (i)  $\mathfrak{D}$  is a (closed or open) derivation of  $\bot$ ,
- (ii) id est inferences (or rules) are used in  $\mathfrak{D}$ ,
- (iii) a reduction procedure of  $\mathfrak D$  generates a non-terminating reduction sequence, such as a reduction loop.

- Formalizing Yablo's paradox in Natural Deduction: Yablo's paradox begins with an infinite sequence of sentences  $S_1, S_2, S_3, ...$ , each to the effect that every subsequent sentence is not true.
  - $(S_1)$  for all u > 1,  $S_u$  is not true,
  - $(S_2)$  for all u > 2,  $S_u$  is not true,
  - $(S_3)$  for all u > 3,  $S_u$  is not true, ...

• Formalizing Yablo's paradox in Natural Deduction: we define  $S_v$  as  $\forall x(x > v \rightarrow \neg T(\lceil S_x \rceil))$ .

$$T(\lceil S_u \rceil)$$

$$\forall x(x > u \to \neg T(\lceil S_x \rceil)) \quad \forall x(x > u \to \neg T(\lceil S_x \rceil))$$

$$\downarrow \qquad \qquad \downarrow$$

$$u+1 > u \to \neg T(\lceil S_{u+1} \rceil)) \quad \forall x(x > u+1 \to \neg T(\lceil S_{u+1} \rceil))$$

$$\downarrow \qquad \qquad \downarrow$$

$$\neg T(\lceil S_{u+1} \rceil) \qquad T(\lceil S_{u+1} \rceil)$$

• **Proposition 2.4.** There is a closed derivation of  $\bot$  in  $S_Y$  with respect to  $\mathbb{R}_Y$ , which initiates a non-terminating reduction sequence and so is not normalizable.

$$\begin{array}{c} [T(\lceil S_w \rceil)]^1 \\ \theta(w) \\ \frac{\bot}{\neg T(\lceil S_w \rceil)} \to I_{,1} \\ \hline w > v \to \neg T(\lceil S_w \rceil) \to I_{,\emptyset} \\ \hline \forall x(x > v \to \neg T(\lceil S_x \rceil)) \\ \hline -\frac{S_v}{T(\lceil S_v \rceil)} TI \\ \theta(v) \\ \bot \end{array} \begin{array}{c} [T(\lceil S_w \rceil)]^1 \\ \hline \theta(w) \\ \hline \hline \forall x(x > v + 1 \to \neg T(\lceil S_w \rceil) \to I_{,\emptyset} \\ \hline \forall x(x > v + 1 \to \neg T(\lceil S_x \rceil)) & \forall I \\ \hline \forall x(x > v + 1 \to \neg T(\lceil S_x \rceil)) & \forall I \\ \hline \hline \forall x(x > v + 1 \to \neg T(\lceil S_x \rceil)) & def \\ \hline \hline -\frac{S_{v+1}}{T(\lceil S_{v+1} \rceil)} TI \\ \hline \theta(v) & \theta(v+1) \\ \hline \bot \end{array}$$

 Tennant called the abovereduction sequence a spiraling reduction sequence.



I shall make so bold as to suggest that it is precisely when the non-terminating reduction procedures enter loops that self-reference is involved. And when they don't enter loops - as with Yablo's example - then self-reference is not involved. (Tennant(1995, p. 207).)

#### The Proof-Theoretic Conjecture for Self-Referential Paradoxes (PCSP):

Let  $\mathfrak{D}$  be any derivation satisfying PCP, i.e. a T-paradox.  $\mathfrak{D}$  generates a looping reduction sequence if and only if  $\mathfrak{D}$  formalizes a self-referential paradox.

**The Counterexample**: There is a derivation which generates a spiraling reduction sequence but formalizes the Liar paradox.

## The Counterexample to *PCSP*

• An additional reduction procedure for *classical reductio* introduced by Gunnar Stålmark (1991, pp. 131-132).

**Proposition 3.1.** There is a closed derivation of  $\bot$  in  $S_{CL}$  with respect to  $\mathbb{R}_{CL}$ , which generates a non-terminating reduction sequence and so is irreducible.

*Proof.* Two claims will verify the result.

Claim 1. There is a closed derivation  $\Pi_3$  of  $\perp$ .

There is an open derivation  $\Pi_1$  of  $\bot$  from  $[\neg \Phi]$  as left below. With  $\Pi_1$ , there is an open derivation  $\Pi_2$  of  $\bot$  from  $[\neg T(\ulcorner \Phi \urcorner)]$  as right below.

$$\frac{[\neg \Phi]^2}{\frac{[\neg \Phi]^2}{\Phi}} \frac{\frac{[T(\ulcorner \Phi \urcorner)]^1}{\Phi} TE}{\frac{\bot}{\Phi} \Phi I_{,1}} \xrightarrow{[\neg T(\ulcorner \Phi \urcorner)]^3} \frac{\frac{\bot}{\Phi} CR_{,2}}{\frac{[\neg T(\ulcorner \Phi \urcorner)]^3}{\Phi} TI} \xrightarrow{F} E$$

Having  $\Pi_1$  and  $\Pi_2$ , there is a closed derivation  $\Pi_3$  of  $\perp$ .

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \left[\neg\Phi\right]^{4} \\ \Pi_{1} & \left[\neg T(\lceil\Phi\rceil)\right]^{3} \\ \frac{\bot}{\Phi} CR_{,4} & \Pi_{2} \\ \frac{\bot}{\Phi} \Phi E_{,3} \end{array}$$

Claim 2.  $\Pi_3$  generates a non-terminating reduction sequence and so is irreducible with respect to  $\mathbb{R}_{CL}$ .

 $\Pi_3$  is reducible to the following derivation  $\Pi_4$  by  $\triangleright_{CR(\Phi)}$ .

 $\Pi_4$  is restated as below.

$$\frac{[\neg T(\ulcorner \Phi \urcorner)]^{8}}{\Pi_{2}} \qquad \frac{[\neg T(\ulcorner \Phi \urcorner)]^{3}}{\Pi_{2}} \\
\frac{\Pi_{2}}{[\neg \bot]^{5}} \qquad \frac{[\Phi]^{6} \qquad \bot}{\bot} \Phi E_{,3} \\
\frac{[\neg \bot]^{5} \qquad \bot}{\bot} \to E \qquad \frac{\bot}{\neg \Phi} \to I_{,6} \qquad \frac{[T(\ulcorner \Phi \urcorner)]^{1}}{\Phi} TE \\
\frac{\bot}{\neg \Phi} \to I_{,7} \qquad \qquad \frac{\bot}{\bot} CR_{,5}$$

Since  $\Pi_4$  has a maximum formula  $\neg \Phi$ , we apply  $\rhd_{\rightarrow}$  to  $\Pi_4$  twice and then the derivation has a maximum formula  $\Phi$ . Then, by applying  $\rhd_{\Phi}$  twice, we have the derivation  $\Pi_5$  below.

$$\frac{\frac{\left[T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)\right]^{1}}{\Phi}TE}{\frac{\left[\neg T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)\right]^{3}}{\bot}\Phi E_{,3}} \qquad \frac{\prod_{1} \prod_{1} \prod_{$$

To eliminate the maximum formulas  $\neg T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)$  and  $T(\lceil \Phi \rceil)$ , we apply  $\rhd_{\rightarrow}$  and  $\rhd_{T(x)}$  in order. Then, we have the derivation  $\Pi_6$  below.

$$\frac{[\neg \Phi]^{2}}{\Pi_{1}} \qquad [\neg T(\ulcorner \Phi \urcorner)]^{3} \\
\frac{\frac{\bot}{\Phi} CR_{,2} \qquad \qquad \bot}{\bot} \Phi E_{,3} \\
\frac{[\neg \bot]^{5}}{\bot} \xrightarrow{\bot} \to E$$

$$\frac{\bot}{\bot} CR_{,5}$$

 $\Pi_6$  includes the same derivation with  $\Pi_3$ . Again  $\Pi_3$  can be further reduced. Then, we

have the following infinite reduction sequence.

$$\frac{[\neg\bot]^{i}}{\bot} \xrightarrow{\bot} \to E$$

$$\frac{[\neg\bot]^{i}}{\bot} \xrightarrow{\bot} \to E$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\frac{[\neg\bot]^{9}}{\bot} \xrightarrow{\bot} \to E$$

$$\frac{[\neg\bot]^{9}}{\bot} \xrightarrow{\bot} \to E$$

$$\frac{[\neg\bot]^{5}}{\bot} \xrightarrow{\bot} \to E$$

$$\frac{[\neg\bot]^{5}}{\bot} \xrightarrow{\bot} \to E$$

$$\frac{[\neg\bot]^{5}}{\bot} \to E$$

$$\frac{\bot}{\bot} CR_{,5}$$

$$(3.4) + 1(j > 0). \text{ Therefore, } \Pi_{3} \text{ initiates a non-terminating reduce}$$

where i = 4j + 1 (j > 0). Therefore,  $\Pi_3$  initiates a non-terminating reduction sequence and is irreducible with respect to  $\mathbb{R}_{CL}$ .

The derivation  $\Pi_3$  initiates a non-terminating reduction sequence which is not so much a looping reduction as a spiraling reduction. The problem is that  $\Pi_3$  formalizes the Liar paradox. Since the Liar paradox is a self-referential paradox, Proposition 3.1 shows that TCSP is false.

## The Counterexample to *PCSP*

• An additional reduction procedure for *classical reductio* introduced by Gunnar Stålmark (1991, pp. 131-132).

## HAPPY WORLD LOGIC DAY!!