

On 1.X.50 [1 October 1950]

To BEIJING, SOVIET AMBASSADOR

For immediate transmission to MAO ZEDONG and ZHOU ENLAI.

I am far away from Moscow on vacation and somewhat detached from events in Korea. However, judging by the information that I have received from Moscow today, I see that the situation of our Korean friends is getting desperate.

It was on 16 September already that Moscow warned our Korean friends that the landing of the U.S. troops at Jemulpo [Incheon] had great significance and was aimed at cutting off the First and Second Army Groups of the North Koreans from their rear in the North. Moscow admonished them to withdraw at least four divisions from the South immediately, to set up a front line to the north and east of Seoul, and later to gradually pull out most of the troops fighting in the South northward, thereby providing for the defense of the 38th parallel. However, the 1 [First] and 2 [Second] Army Groups' Commands failed to implement Kim Il Sung's order for the withdrawal of troops northward, which allowed the U.S. troops to cut them off and surround them. Our Korean friends have no troops capable of resistance in the vicinity of Seoul. Hence, one needs to consider the way toward the 38th parallel wide open.

I think that if in the current situation you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should move at least five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the 38th parallel under the cover of your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in command at the head, of course.

I have not informed and am not going to inform our Korean friends about this idea, but I have no doubt in my mind that they will be glad when they learn about it.

I await your reply.

Greetings,

FILIPPOV [STALIN]

1 October 1950