

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25199

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 12:15

3.10.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

TO FILIPPOV [STALIN]

I report the answer of MAO ZEDONG to your [telegram] No. 4581:

"I received your telegram of 1.10.50 [1 October 1950]. We originally planned to move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to retreat.

In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large [kraine bol'shim].

Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send out troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).

Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy.

Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war.

We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place, to talk over this matter with you and to report the situation in China and Korea.

We await your reply.

MAO ZEDONG 2.10.50"

1. In our view MAO ZEDONG's answer is indicative of a change in the original position of the Chinese leadership on the Korean question. It contradicts the earlier appraisal, which was repeatedly expressed in conversations of MAO ZEDONG with YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and] LIU SHAOQI with me, which were reported at the time. In these conversations, it was noted by them that the people and the PLA [People's Liberation Army] are ready to help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to defeat the American troops, regarding them as weaker than the Japanese.

2. The Chinese government undoubtedly could send to Korea not only five-six battle ready divisions, but even more. It goes without saying that these Chinese troops are in need of some technical equipping in antitank weapons and to some extent in artillery.

The reasons for the changes in the position of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It is possible to suppose that it has been influenced by the international situation, the worsening of the position in Korea, [and] the intrigues of the Anglo-American bloc through [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] NEHRU, who has urged the Chinese toward patience and abstention [from intervention] in order to avoid catastrophe.

ROSHCHIN

No. 2270 3.10

Deciphered by] Araushkin 12.50 3.10

[12.50 p.m. 3 October]

Typ[ed by] Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10

[1.20 p.m. 3 October]

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