The NHS National Programme for IT (NPfIT): A Scope Management Analysis

Krisha Kaushik Lakhani

Information Systems, Northeastern University

INFO 6245 - Planning and Managing Information Systems Development

Professor Shirali Patel

October 03, 2025

The NHS National Programme for IT (NPfIT): A Scope Management Analysis

When it commenced in 2002, The National Programme for IT (NPfIT) was the largest civilian IT project ever. It aimed to reconstruct the National Health Service (NHS) by providing electronic patient records, online bookings, an electronic prescribing solution, and a secure broadband network that would enhance efficiency, patient/citizen care, and information sharing. The main stakeholders were the Department of Health, NHS organizations, IT suppliers (e.g., BT), clinicians, and the patients who would indirectly benefit in the long run. In spite of these lofty objectives, it encountered a series of increasing costs (from £6 billion to almost £20 billion), political issues and controversy, delay and clinician resistance leading to its closure in 2011.

Scope Definition

At the start, the scope was much wider and not well defined, aiming to "improve the NHS" through technology. The major components were mostly clear (EPRs, e-booking, e-prescribing), but there were wooden boundaries in the programme. With the passing of time, additional features and demands were requested, resulting in what is known as scope creep. For example, there were disagreements on what specific information should be in the EPR: Should it include all diagnoses? Should it be limited to only key medical information? And should those diagnoses include specifically controlled sensitive information by patients? Such expectations changed over time, highlighting there was not firm agreement about the scope to begin with.

Scope Planning

There was a lack of formal processes for scope planning. Procurement was geared toward national contracts with a few vendors, with little regard for local customization needs or clinical workflows. Planning was based on centralized, top-down approaches led by political and IT leaders rather than clinicians. This overlooked the behavioral and organizational implications of implementing large-scale IT into complex healthcare settings.

Scope Control

The control of scope was inadequate. Timelines for system rollouts often slipped, or additional requirements were introduced without timelines or additional resources being adjusted. The National Audit Office continued to highlight the ongoing lack of oversight and clarity in responsibility for cost overruns. Political priorities continued to override technical realities, which continued to inhibit effective scope management. Scope creep, combined with inadequate change control, led directly to delays and ultimately to project failure.

Stakeholder Management

One significant flaw was the involvement of stakeholders. Patients were concerned about privacy and consent, while clinicians were concerned about the EPR's usability and the confidentiality of patient data. Professional bodies such as the British Medical Association opposed aspects of the programme, arguing for stronger patient opt-in policies. Commercial interests were frequently given precedence over long-term integration by suppliers and contractors. Resistance and mistrust resulted from the project scope reflecting political goals rather than user needs due to the absence of inclusive stakeholder management.

Lessons Learned

Important lessons in scope management are illustrated by the NPfIT:

• **Clarity in scope definition:** From the beginning, large-scale IT projects need to have clear scope boundaries.

• **Modify control mechanisms**: To stop unchecked expansions, procedures to control scope creep must be followed.

• **Involvement of stakeholders:** To guarantee that systems satisfy practical requirements, clinicians and patients must actively participate in defining scope.

• **Goal and capacity alignment:** Aspirations should be balanced with available resources, reasonable deadlines, and incremental delivery.

Figure 1
Lessons Learned Cycle



Note. The cycle reinforces key lessons from NPfIT

Conclusion and Recommendations

Even well-funded projects can be derailed by unclear scope, inadequate planning, and low stakeholder engagement, as the NPfIT demonstrates. Although the idea of an integrated digital health system was sound, poor scope management caused the implementation to fail. To prevent making the same mistakes, future projects should prioritise user-centred design, implement incremental delivery, set up robust governance frameworks, and enforce scope control. Large IT programs can accomplish both technological transformation and public trust by coordinating their scope with stakeholder needs and organisational realities.

References

Brennan, S. (2005). *The NHS IT project: The biggest computer programme in the world… ever!*. Radcliffe Publishing.

Charette, R. (2006). Electronic health records or exceptional hidden risks? *Communications of the ACM, 49*(6), 120–127. https://doi.org/10.1145/1132469.1132491

Comptroller and Auditor General. (2006). *The National Programme for IT in the NHS*. National Audit Office. https://www.nao.org.uk

Mark, A. L. (2007). Modernising healthcare – is the NPfIT for purpose? *Journal of Information Technology, 22*(3), 248–256. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jit.2000100