

1.2 Semantics

The notion of **situations** has to be extended to give meaning to the new style of predicate logic formulas. We have to specify

- what a *situation* is for predicate logic,
- how to evaluate predicate logic formulas in a given situation.

We have to handle new atomic formulas, quantifiers and variables.

Structures (i.e. situations in predicate logic)

Let's deal with the new-style atomic formulas first.

Definition 1.5 (structure)

Let L be a signature. An L -structure (or sometimes (loosely) a model) M is a thing that

- identifies a non-empty collection (set) of objects that M 'knows about'. It's called the domain or universe of M , written $\text{dom}(M)$.
- specifies what the symbols of L mean in terms of these objects.

The interpretation in M of a constant is an object in $\text{dom}(M)$.

The interpretation in M of a relation symbol is a relation on $\text{dom}(M)$.

CS1 have already seen sets and relations in Discrete Structures.

Example of a structure

For our simple signature L , an L -structure should say:

- which objects are in its domain
- which of its objects are Frank, Susan, ...
- which objects are human, PC, lecturer
- which objects bought which.

Next slide shows a diagram of an L -structure, called M .

- There are 12 objects (the 12 dots) in $\text{dom}(M)$.
- Some objects are labelled (eg 'Frank') to show the meanings of the constants of L (eg Frank).
- The interpretations (meanings) of PC, human are drawn as regions. The interpretation of lecturer is indicated by the black dots.
- The interpretation of bought is shown by the arrows between objects.

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Example of a structure


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The structure M



Tony or Tony?

Object \bullet marked 'Tony' in $\text{dom}(M)$ and constant Tony in L are two different things (Note the different fonts.)

Tony is syntactic. \bullet is semantic.

In M Tony is a **name** for the object \bullet marked 'Tony'.

Notation 1.6

Let M be an L -structure and c a constant in L . We write c^M for the interpretation of c in M . It is the object in $\text{dom}(M)$ that c names in M .

$\text{Tony}^M =$ the object \bullet marked 'Tony'.

We will usually write 'Tony' or Tony^M (but NOT Tony) for this \bullet

Hence, the **meaning** of a constant c **IS** the **object** c^M assigned to it by a structure M . A constant (and any symbol of L) has as many meanings as there are L -structures.

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Drawing other symbols

Our simple signature L has only constants and unary and binary relation symbols.

For this L , we drew an L -structure M by

- drawing a collection of objects (the domain of M)
- marking which objects are named by which constants in M
- marking which objects M says satisfy the unary relation symbols (**human**, etc)
- drawing arrows between the objects that M says satisfy the binary relation symbols. The arrow direction matters.

With several binary relation symbols in L , we'd **really need** to label the arrows.

It is difficult to draw interpretations of 3-ary or higher-arity relation symbols.

0-ary relation symbols are the same as propositional atoms.

Truth in a structure(a rough guide)

When is a formula *without quantifiers* true in a structure?

- $\text{PC}(\text{Heron})$ is true in M , because Heron^M is an object \circ that M says is a PC.

We write this as $M \models \text{PC}(\text{Heron})$. Read as ‘ M says $\text{PC}(\text{Heron})$ ’.

Warning: This is a quite different use of \models from what seen in the definition of valid argument. ‘ \models ’ is *overloaded* — it’s used for two different things.

- $\text{bought}(\text{Susan}, \text{Susan})$ is false in M , because M does not say that the constant **Susan** names an object \bullet that bought itself.


We write this as $M \not\models \text{bought}(\text{Susan}, \text{Susan})$.

From our knowledge of propositional logic,

- $M \models \neg \text{human}(\text{Room-308})$,
- $M \not\models \text{PC}(\text{Tony}) \vee \text{bought}(\text{Frank}, \text{Clyde})$.

Another structure

Here's another L -structure, called M' .



Now, there are only 10 objects in $\text{dom}(M')$.


Some statements about M'

- $M' \not\models \text{bought}(\text{Susan}, \text{Clyde})$ this time.
- $M' \models \text{Susan} = \text{Tony}$.
- $M' \models \text{human}(\text{Texel}) \wedge \text{PC}(\text{Texel})$.
- $M' \models \text{bought}(\text{Tony}, \text{Heron}) \wedge \text{bought}(\text{Heron}, c)$.

How about

- $\text{bought}(\text{Susan}, \text{Clyde}) \rightarrow \text{human}(\text{Clyde})$?
- $\text{bought}(c, \text{Heron}) \rightarrow \text{PC}(\text{Clyde}) \vee \neg \text{human}(\text{Texel})$?

Evaluating formulas with quantifiers — rough guide



Evaluating quantifiers

How can we tell if $\exists x \text{ bought}(x, \text{Heron})$ is true in M ?

In symbols, do we have $M \models \exists x \text{ bought}(x, \text{Heron})$?

In English, ‘does M say that something bought Heron?’.

Well, for this to be so, there must be an object x in $\text{dom}(M)$ such that $M \models \text{bought}(x, \text{Heron})$ — that is, M says that x bought Heron ^{M} .

There is: we have a look, and we see that we can take (eg.) x to be (the ● marked) Tony.

So yes indeed, $M \models \exists x \text{ bought}(x, \text{Heron})$.

Another example:

$$M \models \forall x(\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x) \rightarrow \text{bought}(\text{Susan}, x))?$$

Is it true that “for every object x in $\text{dom}(M)$,
 $\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x) \rightarrow \text{bought}(\text{Susan}, x)$ is true in M ”?

In M , there are 12 possible x .

We need to check whether $\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x) \rightarrow \text{bought}(\text{Susan}, x)$ is true in M for each of the 12 possible x in M .

BUT

$\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x) \rightarrow \text{bought}(\text{Susan}, x)$ true in M for any object x such that $\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x)$ is false in M .
(‘False \rightarrow anything is true.’)

So we only need check those x — here, just the object $\text{O} = \text{Heron}^M$ — for which $\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x)$ is true.

For the object $\bigcirc = \text{Heron}^M$,

$\text{bought}(\text{Susan}, \bigcirc)$ is true in M .

So $\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, \bigcirc) \rightarrow \text{bought}(\text{Susan}, \bigcirc)$ is true in M .

So $\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x) \rightarrow \text{bought}(\text{Susan}, x)$ is true in M
for *every* object x in M

Hence,


$$M \models \forall x(\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x) \rightarrow \text{bought}(\text{Susan}, x)).$$

The effect of ' $\forall x(\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x) \rightarrow \dots)$ ' is to restrict the $\forall x$ to those x that Tony bought. This trick is extremely useful.

Remember it!

Exercise: which are true in M ?

Remember: the ●s are the lecturers




Rough guide: advice


For a fairly complex formula like $\exists x(\text{PC}(x) \wedge \exists y \text{bought}(y, x))$:

Work out what each subformula says in English, working from atomic subformulas (leaves of formation tree) up to the whole formula (root of formation tree).

$\exists x(\text{PC}(x) \wedge \exists y \text{bought}(y, x))$



something bought a PC



This is often a good guide to evaluating the formula.

E.g., the formula here says that there is an x that's a PC and that something bought it, (it's pointed to by an arrow). So look for one.

Truth in a structure — formally!

We saw how to evaluate some formulas in a structure ‘by inspection’.

But as in propositional logic, English can only be a rough guide. For engineering, this is not good enough.


We need a more formal way to evaluate all predicate logic formulas in structures.

In propositional logic, we calculated the truth value of a formula in a situation by working up through its formation tree — from the atomic subformulas (leaves) up to the root.

For predicate logic, things are not so simple...

A problem

$\forall x(\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x) \rightarrow \text{PC}(x))$ is true in the structure M on slide 34.
Its formation tree is:



Can we evaluate the main formula by working up the tree?

Is $\text{bought}(\text{Tony}, x)$ true in M ?!

Is $\text{PC}(x)$ true in M ?!

Not all formulas of predicate logic are true or false in a structure!

What's going on?