### **Session 7:**

Peer effects: measuring social spillovers

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## Agenda

Session on peer effects

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Reflection problem
- 3. Selection problem
- 4. Random assignment
- 5. Other identification strategies

# Causality

Are machine learning parameters causal?

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Recap

What have you learned about networks?

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### **Social effects**

What spreads on a networks? How are you affected by your friends?

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Introduction to peer effects

## What is a peer effect

Impact of social interactions on current/future outcomes

• Do healthy friends make your healthier?



### What is a peer effect

Finding influence from person(s) to person

- These questions date far back in sociology and social psychology
- We take an econometric angle

Other examples - from exercise:

- Are you affected by number of bilingual pupils in your school class?
- Do roommates matter for academic success, drinking?

### Who are peers?

We often distinguish between meausring peer effects:

- from policy assignment
  - these may be voluntary and involuntary choices
  - e.g. colleagues at work, classmates in school
  - network structure based on shared institution/foci (bipartite graph)
- from friendships
  - these are voluntary choices
  - network structure where edges are friendships

### Why should we care?

Through policies we can affect outcomes by manipulating social structures

- Suppose that exposure to able peers matters for own achievements, consequence:
  - Class room composition matters for achievements
  - Can we raise social mobility by pairing low achievers with high achievers?

There is inherent value in knowing about causal social effects.

### **Measuring peer effects**

We face two main problems in identifying peer effects:

- separating endogenous and exogenous effects
- picking out sorting/homophily effects

# Reflection problem

### Who affects whom?

How can we measure the impact of a group's behavior on a member's behavior?



### How can we measure peer effects?

Reflection problem - <u>Manski (1993) (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2298123?</u> <u>seq=1#page\_scan\_tab\_contents)</u> decomposes group effects into three categories of effects:

- Exogenous/contextual: behavior is affected by group exogenous characteristics
  - example: parents income, number of bilingual.
- Endogenous: individual unobserved behavior, beliefs (to analyst)
  - e.g. study effort, distraction etc.
- Correlated: non-social, i.e. unobserved selection
  - people behave in the same way because they are similar
  - people face same unobservable background variables, e.g. teachers, class facilities, neighborhood

### Linear-in-means - components

Suppose we are interested in making a model of an outcome  $\omega_{ig}$ , e.g. alcohol drinking in college dorm.

The following factors affect  $\omega_{iq}$ :

- $x_i$ : observed individual factor, e.g. individual high-school alcohol.
- $y_g$ : observed group factors, e.g. mean dorm high-school alcohol.
  - exogenous effect
- $m_{ig}^e$ : individual expectation/perception of others' behavior, e.g. drinking by dormmates.
  - endogenous effect which can create feedback loops
- $\epsilon_i$ : idiosyncratic error

### Linear-in-means - model

Suppose individual behavior follows this rule:

$$\omega_{ig} = k + cx_i + \underbrace{dy_g}_{exogenous} + \underbrace{Jm^e_{ig}}_{endogenous} + \underbrace{arepsilon_i}_{error}$$

Assume that every individual has complete knowledge of the model (but not errors of others, i.e.  $\varepsilon_j$ ). It follows that:

$$egin{aligned} m_{ig}^e &= \mathbb{E}_{x_i}[\mathbb{E}[\omega|x_i,g]] \ &= k + c\mathbb{E}[x|g] + dy_g + Jm_{ig}^e \ m_{ig}^e &= rac{k + car{x}_g + dy_g}{1 - J} \end{aligned}$$

If we re-insert that into the model and isolate:

$$\omega_{ig} = rac{k}{1-J} + cx_i + rac{cJ}{1-J}ar{x}_g + rac{d}{1-J}y_g + arepsilon_i$$

### Linear-in-means - identification

Suppose that we assume that exogenous characteristics are  $y_g=\bar{x}_g$ . This implies the model solution is:

$$\omega_{ig} = rac{k}{1-J} + cx_i + rac{cJ+d}{1-J}ar{x}_g + arepsilon_i$$

Thus we cannot disentangle d and J! That is, the parameters are **not identified**.

Note, much empirical literature have tried to identify a model of only exogenous effects:

$$\omega_{ig} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 x_i + \pi_2 y_g + \varepsilon_i$$

### Overcoming reflection

The reflection problem is often solved in practice because it relies on  $y_g$  being a linear function of  $\bar{x}_g$ .

#### Some solutions:

- Network structure (<u>Bramouellé et al. 2009</u> (<u>https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407609000335</u>))
  - Effect of friends can be measured by indirect effect from friends of friends (instrumentation)
  - Requires assumption of no correlated effects!!
- Non-linear structure, dynamics see <u>Blume et al. (2011)</u>
   (<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444537072000013">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444537072000013</a>)

### A note on policy

<u>Hoxby, Weingarth (2005) (https://www.pausd.org/sites/default/files/pdf-faqs/attachments/TakingRaceOutOfTheEquation.pdf)</u> argues that if peer effects are *linear and homogenous* then reshuffling students implies that mean GPA is constant!

- There will still be redistributing effect.
- Non-linearities has first order effects: Suppose "bright" students "less bright" students ability more than they do for "bright". Can raise mean GPA by redistributing!

Selection problem

### Peer effects in obesity

Question: can we measure peer effects of friends obesity? This problem is studied by Christakis and Fowler (2007) (https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa066082)

- They have a large friendship network and measure individual obesity.
- They conclude that having more obese friends increase your own obesity.

### Unobserved similarity or cause?

Is obesity contagious?

- No. There are multiple competing explanations.
- A fundamental problem: are we friends because we are similar or similar because we are friends?
  - Homophily: we tend to self-select into friendships and schools with people who are similar to us.

#### General impossibility

- <u>Cosma and Shalizi (2011)</u> (<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0049124111404820">https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0049124111404820</a>): without imposing structure we cannot separate homophily and peer effects
- Also problematic in schools, work place "sorting" by skill

### Random peers

Antidote for handling selection: "No causation without manipulation", <u>Holland (1986)</u> (<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2289064">https://www.jstor.org/stable/2289064</a>)

• Idea: Use random allocation of students to rooms to remove correlated (selection) effect.

Some evidence

<u>Sacerdote 2001 (https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/116/2/681/1904199)</u> examines effect of random allocation of roommates (exercise)

### Work place studies

- Being in a shift with a high productive person raises own productivity <u>Falk, Ichino</u> (2007) (<a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/497818">https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/497818</a>); <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.112">Moretti (2009) (<a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.112">https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.112</a>)
- Working with someone rather than being alone raises your own productivity, see <u>Falk, Ichino (2007) (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/497818)</u>

### Adverse consequences?

<u>Carrell, Sacerdote, West (2013)</u>
(<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA10168">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA10168</a>) investigates random assignment into classes. They estimated a positive effect for those expected to be low performers of being paired with high performers.

- They implemented a programme with **negative sorting** such that low and high performers were in class separate from medium performers.
- Results was that low performers were WORSE off!
- Explanation: low and high performers did not interact within class!

If negative sorting is bad could **positive sorting** work?

Evidence suggest that students benefit from being seperated with other low ability students. Separating school cohorts by ability is known as tracking. See <u>Duflo</u>, <u>Dupas</u>, <u>Kremer (2011) (https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?</u>
 id=10.1257/aer.101.5.1739), <u>Leuven et al 2017</u> (https://www.dropbox.com/s/o4jlzdg264nx1k7/ability\_final.pdf?dl=0).

Other identification strategies

### **Cohort variation within schools**

- <u>Hoxby (2000) (https://www.nber.org/papers/w7867.pdf)</u> uses random variation of race, gender across cohorts within school
  - Finds evidence of boys performance increase when exposed to more girls.
- Other studies exerises today.

### **Exogenous individual variation**

- Aral, Nicolaides (2018) (https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms14753):
  - Use variation in weather's effect on work out > fitness peer effect
- Andersen, Bjerre-Nielsen, Glavind (ongoing):
  - Use incoming text message as shock to smartphone usage > measure social impact

### Structural modelling

If we model network formation correctly we can hope to identify friendship selection.

- See for instance <u>Goldsmith-Pinkham, Imbens (2013)</u> (<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07350015.2013.801251">https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07350015.2013.801251</a>)
- Next session about network formation