

# Session 7:

## Peer effects: measuring social spillovers

*Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen*

# Agenda

Session on peer effects

1. [Introduction](#)
2. [Reflection problem](#)
3. [Selection problem](#)
4. [Random assignment](#)
5. [Other identification strategies](#)

# Info

- Projects
- Evaluation
- Moving teaching

# Causality

Are machine learning parameters causal?

- In general, no. Moreover, estimates are also not unbiased.

# Recap

What have you learned about networks?

- Clustering Coefficient
- Average Path Length
- Degree (in/out)

# Social effects

What spreads on a networks? How are you affected by your friends?

- Public health
- Information, immitating behavior, emotion

# Introduction to peer effects

# What is a peer effect

Impact of social interactions on current/future outcomes

- Do healthy friends make your healthier?





# What is a peer effect

Finding influence from person(s) to person

- These questions date far back in sociology and social psychology
- We take an econometric angle

Other examples - from exercise:

- Are you affected by number of bilingual pupils in your school class?
- Do roommates matter for academic success, drinking?

# Who are peers?

We often distinguish between measuring peer effects:

- from policy assignment
  - these may be voluntary and involuntary choices
  - e.g. colleagues at work, classmates in school
  - network structure based on shared institution/foci (bipartite graph)
- from friendships
  - these are voluntary choices
  - network structure where edges are friendships

## Why should we care?

Through policies we can affect outcomes by manipulating social structures

- Suppose that exposure to able peers matters for own achievements, consequence:
  - Class room composition matters for achievements
  - Can we raise social mobility by pairing low achievers with high achievers?

There is inherent value in knowing about causal social effects.

# Measuring peer effects

We face two main problems in identifying peer effects:

- separating endogenous and exogenous effects
- picking out sorting/homophily effects

# Reflection problem

# Who affects whom?

How can we measure the impact of a group's behavior on a member's behavior?





# How can we measure peer effects?

Reflection problem - [Manski \(1993\) \(https://www.jstor.org/stable/2298123?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents\)](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2298123?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) decomposes group effects into three categories of effects:

- *Exogenous/contextual*: behavior is affected by group exogenous characteristics
  - example: parents income, number of bilingual.
- *Endogenous*: individual unobserved behavior, beliefs (to analyst)
  - e.g. study effort, distraction etc.
- *Correlated*: non-social, i.e. unobserved selection
  - people behave in the same way because they are similar
  - people face same unobservable background variables, e.g. teachers, class facilities, neighborhood

## Linear-in-means - components

Suppose we are interested in making a model of an outcome  $\omega_{ig}$ , e.g. alcohol drinking in college dorm.

The following factors affect  $\omega_{ig}$ :

- $x_i$ : observed individual factor, e.g. individual high-school alcohol.
- $y_g$ : observed group factors, e.g. mean dorm high-school alcohol.
  - **exogenous** effect
- $m_{ig}^e$ : individual expectation/perception of others' behavior, e.g. drinking by dorm-mates.
  - **endogenous** effect which can create feedback loops
- $\epsilon_i$ : idiosyncratic error

# Linear-in-means - model

Suppose individual behavior follows this rule:

$$\omega_{ig} = k + cx_i + \underbrace{dy_g}_{\text{exogenous}} + \underbrace{Jm_{ig}^e}_{\text{endogenous}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon_i}_{\text{error}}$$

Assume that every individual has complete knowledge of the model (but not errors of others, i.e.  $\varepsilon_j$ ). It follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} m_{ig}^e &= \mathbb{E}_{x_i}[\mathbb{E}[\omega|x_i, g]] \\ &= k + c\mathbb{E}[x|g] + dy_g + Jm_{ig}^e \\ m_{ig}^e &= \frac{k + c\bar{x}_g + dy_g}{1 - J} \end{aligned}$$

If we re-insert that into the model and isolate:

$$\omega_{ig} = \frac{k}{1-J} + cx_i + \frac{cJ}{1-J}\bar{x}_g + \frac{d}{1-J}y_g + \varepsilon_i$$

## Linear-in-means - identification

Suppose that we assume that exogenous characteristics are  $y_g = \bar{x}_g$ . This implies the model solution is:

$$\omega_{ig} = \frac{k}{1-J} + cx_i + \frac{cJ+d}{1-J} \bar{x}_g + \varepsilon_i$$

Thus we **cannot disentangle**  $d$  and  $J$ ! That is, the parameters are **not identified**.

Note, much empirical literature have tried to identify a model of only exogenous effects:

$$\omega_{ig} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 x_i + \pi_2 y_g + \varepsilon_i$$

## Overcoming reflection

The reflection problem is often solved in practice because it relies on  $y_g$  being a linear function of  $\bar{x}_g$ .

Some solutions:

- Network structure ([Bramouellé et al. 2009](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407609000335))  
(<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407609000335>)
  - Effect of friends can be measured by indirect effect from friends of friends (instrumentation)
  - Requires assumption of no correlated effects!!
- Non-linear structure, dynamics - see [Blume et al. \(2011\)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444537072000013)  
(<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444537072000013>).

## A note on policy

Hoxby, Weingarth (2005) (<https://www.pausd.org/sites/default/files/pdf-faqs/attachments/TakingRaceOutOfTheEquation.pdf>) argues that if peer effects are *linear and homogenous* then reshuffling students implies that mean GPA is constant!

- There will still be redistributing effect.
- Non-linearities has first order effects: Suppose "bright" students "less bright" students ability more than they do for "bright". Can raise mean GPA by redistributing!

# Selection problem

## Peer effects in obesity

*Question:* can we measure peer effects of friends obesity? This problem is studied by Christakis and Fowler (2007) (<https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa066082>).

- They have a large friendship network and measure individual obesity.
- They conclude that having more obese friends increase your own obesity.



# Unobserved similarity or cause?

Is obesity contagious?

- No. There are multiple competing explanations.
- A fundamental problem: are we friends because we are similar or similar because we are friends?
  - Homophily: we tend to self-select into friendships and schools with people who are similar to us.

General impossibility

- [Cosma and Shalizi \(2011\)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0049124111404820)  
(<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0049124111404820>): without imposing structure we cannot separate homophily and peer effects
- Also problematic in schools, work place - "sorting" by skill

## Random peers

Antidote for handling selection: "*No causation without manipulation*", [Holland \(1986\)](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2289064).  
(<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2289064>).

- Idea: Use random allocation of students to rooms to remove correlated (selection) effect.

Some evidence

- [Sacerdote 2001](https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/116/2/681/1904199) (<https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/116/2/681/1904199>) examines effect of random allocation of roommates (exercise)

## Work place studies

- Being in a shift with a high productive person raises own productivity [Falk, Ichino \(2007\)](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/497818) (<https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/497818>); [Mas, Moretti \(2009\)](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.112) (<https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.112>).
- Working with someone rather than being alone raises your own productivity, see [Falk, Ichino \(2007\)](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/497818) (<https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/497818>).

## Adverse consequences?

Carrell, Sacerdote, West (2013)

(<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA10168>) investigates random assignment into classes. They estimated a positive effect for those expected to be low performers of being paired with high performers.

- They implemented a programme with **negative sorting** such that low and high performers were in class separate from medium performers.
- Results was that low performers were WORSE off!
- Explanation: low and high performers did not interact within class!

If negative sorting is bad could **positive sorting** work?

- Evidence suggest that students benefit from being seperated with other low ability students. Separating school cohorts by ability is known as **tracking**. See Duflo, Dupas, Kremer (2011) (<https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.5.1739>), Leuven et al 2017 ([https://www.dropbox.com/s/o4jlzdg264nx1k7/ability\\_final.pdf?dl=0](https://www.dropbox.com/s/o4jlzdg264nx1k7/ability_final.pdf?dl=0)).

# Other identification strategies

## Cohort variation within schools

- [Hoxby \(2000\)](https://www.nber.org/papers/w7867.pdf) (<https://www.nber.org/papers/w7867.pdf>) uses random variation of race, gender across cohorts within school
  - Finds evidence of boys performance increase when exposed to more girls.
- Other studies - exercises today.

# Exogenous individual variation

Exploiting natural variation

- [Aral, Nicolaides \(2018\) \(https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms14753\)](https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms14753):
  - Use variation in weather's effect on work out > fitness peer effect
- Andersen, Bjerre-Nielsen, Glavind (ongoing):
  - Use incoming text message as shock to smartphone usage > measure social impact

Similar ideas are being attempted with adverse shocks, e.g. unemployment, family member dies.

# Exogenous individual variation

## Interventions

- [Kramer, Guillory, Hancock \(2014\) \(https://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788\)](https://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788):
  - Intervene on pictures shown in news feed to affect emotion > measure effect on peers



# Structural modelling

If we model network formation correctly we can hope to identify friendship selection.

- See for instance [Goldsmith-Pinkham, Imbens \(2013\)](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07350015.2013.801251)  
(<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07350015.2013.801251>)
- Next session about network formation