発表要旨

“Accountable Voting”   
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We consider social decision-making situations where some of the voters may have an interest in some of the social alternatives/applicants. Then the accountability of the collective decision process is important. We extend the standard social welfare function to include the interest relationships between the voters and the applicants. Two accountability axioms are introduced: Impartiality on the voters’ individual preference manifests and the No-Power-Game property on the interest relationships changes. While we obtain two impossibility theorems among the accountability axioms and the extensions of some standard axioms in voting theory, we also give two directions for remedies.

（本研究では，研究費の審査やスポーツでの採点のように，候補者と評価者の間に利害関係がある場合の集団的意思決定を考える．このような場合において，投票を行う際には，評価者側は意思決定のプロセスについて候補者や利害関係者に対して説明責任を果たす必要がある．そこで，本研究では，説明責任を果たすために必要な投票ルールが満たすべき性質を２つ導入する．その上で，２つの性質の両立が困難なことを数学的に証明し，救済策の方向性についての考察を与える．）