



Deliverable 2. Data Analysis.

Detailed insight on available data and first statistic analysis.

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Executive Summary

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1 Introduction

2 Database description

In order to properly process the data provided in form of database backups, it is of essential importance that we completely understand how data is represented in databases. We will analyse the structure and how data is represented in the provided databases: Antequera, Segovia and Sevilla. Each of these database corresponds to a single *maintenance station*, which comprises a whole railway line with several elements along it. The elements with diagnosis systems which can raise alarms are called *installations*, and have different sets of sensors and other systems to control *field elements*. An schematic representation of this architecture is represented in figure 1. The detailed description of available systems and subsystems is of few interest to us. Initially we will only need to differentiate between maintenance stations and installations.

Each *maintenance station* has its own unique database, which is of great convenience in order to treat different stations independently. We will start analysing the structure of the main tables of said databases. Due to the high complexity of the maintenance stations, there are a vast amount of tables with configuration parameters and other operational values which are not of interest for our purposes. With assistance from Thales engineers, we have reduced the tables only to those which characterise registered alarms. A total of 4 different tables is used in order to register this information, which are the following:

Table ER_ERRORS This table contains an entry for every alarm received by the maintenance station. Its fields are detailed on table 1.

Table IG_INSTALLATIONGENERAL This table contains information on all the installations managed by the maintenance station. Its fields are detailed on table 2

Table IG_NODO_INSTALLATION This table gathers additional information on installations which are nodes. Nodes are installations which

Field name	Description
DVNI_ERRORNUMBER	Alarm identifier
DVNS_ERRORTIME	Time-stamp for the alarm
DVNI_INSTALLATIONCODE	Code of the installation in which the alarm was raised
DVNI_SENDERINSTALLATIONCODE	Code of the installation from which the alarm was sent (might be different from the one which raised it)

Table 1: Detail of fields on table ER_ERRORS

can raise alarms but need a parent installation to send them to the maintenance station. Its fields are detailed on table 3

ERS_ERRORS_SAM_ENCE This table contains detailed information about the alarms. Its fields are detailed on table 4

ERH_ERRORS_HSL1 This table is equivalent to ERS_ERRORS_SAM_ENCE. Maintenance stations use one or the other depending on how they receive the alarms. Its only difference with ERS_ERRORS_SAM_ENCE is that registers the method used to receive the alarm. For our purposes it will be treated exactly as its equivalent, and therefore its structure can also be reviewed in table 4

Concluding, for each alarm we will have a timestamp and an alarm identifier in table ER_ERRORS. Alarm identifier is a foreign key which points to table ERS_ERRORS_SAM_ENCE (or equivalent) in which further details of the alarm are saved. Among these details, we can find an installation identifier which specifies which installation has produced the alarm. That identifier is also a foreign key pointing to table DVNI_INSTALLATIONCODE, in which further details about the installation are stored. Further details on all the database fields are given in tables 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Field name	Description
DVNI_INSTALLATIONCODE	Installation identifier
DVNI_SYSTEMCODE	Type of system, as defined in the “SG_SYSTEMSGENERAL” table
DVNI_VERSION	System version
DVAC_SHORTNAME	Short name of the installation
DVAC_INSTALLATIONNAME	Name of the installation
DVAC_LOCATION	Location for the installation
CHK_IS_NODE	Whether it is a node (doesn’t directly send alarms, only raise them) or not

Table 2: Detail of fields on table IG_INSTALLATIONGENERAL

Field name	Description
IG_NODO_INSTALLATION	Identifier of the installation which is a node
DVNI_FATHER_INSTALLATION	Identifier of the parent installation

Table 3: Detail of fields on table IG_NODO_INSTALLATION

Field name	Description
DVNI_ERRORNUMBER	Alarm identifier
MESSAGE_ID	Unique alarm identifier
MESSAGE_TYPE	Type of alarm, always set as “notification” (not relevant)
INVOKE_TYPE	Tells whether the alarm has generated itself due to a connection or disconnection (if type is “node”) or is generated by a diagnosis system (“saml”) or energy system (“energy”)
INVOKE_NAME	Irrelevant, always set to “diagnosis”
EVENT_TYPE	Defines the type of alarm which has been generated. Its possible values are listed in table 5.
ADDITIONAL_TEXT	Alarm code
ADDITIONAL_INFOS	Additional parameters to be shown in error message
DVNI_ERRORCATEGORY	Alarm severity. Values from 1 to 5 indicating importance of the alarm, or -1 if the alarm indicates recovery from a previous failure.

Table 4: Detail of fields on table ERS_ERRORS_SAM_ENCE

Event type	Description
fieldElementAlarm	Alarm related to a field element
fieldElementFailure	Failure in a field element
operatorInformation	Information to the operator
imCpuAndCommunications	Related to IM CPU or IM communications
internalDiagnosis	Internal diagnosis of a system
operationsDiagnosisCommunications	Communication error in Operation and Diagnosis systems
ImFecVersions	IM or FEC version
internalTraces	Internal traces of a system
operatorCommandAnswer	Answer to an operator command
CommProblem	Undefined communication problem
Information	Information message: versions, etc.
CommunicationsAlarm	Procedures and processes to carry information from one point to other
QualityOfServiceAlarm	Loss of quality of service
ProcessingErrorAlarm	SW or processing error
EquipmentAlarm	Equipment failure
EnvironmentAlarm	Related to the environment where the system is located
other	Other

Table 5: Description of values for the field EVENT_TYPE




Figure 1: Simplified diagram of the maintenance systems architecture

3 Reduced representation of alarms

In section 2 we have seen a deep definition of all the tables characterising registered alarms. Each of these tables contain several fields, which in total makes an inconvenient large number of variables. While all of them are necessary for correct system function and maintenance purposes, not all of them will be necessary for us to work with alarms.

In order to characterise an event, the main things we need to know can be reduced to three variables:

- What has happened
- When has it happened
- Where has it happened

In section 2 we have seen other variables which can provide additional information which - although not essential - can be useful. Specifically, we think the following data can be of possible interest:

- How severe the event is (severity)
- Which type of event has happened (event type)

These variables can help us to classify alarms or give more importance to those which are more severe. As this information is already provided on given databases, we will keep it and use it for better alarm classification and filtering. However, none of them are essential in order to characterise alarms, as both of them give information which is already implicit in our previous “*what has happened*” variable. Specifically, this information will be of great help in order to make a preliminary statistical insight on the events of the databases, for which a generalisation in terms of severity and category can help us have a better overview of the situation.

We have to identify which fields on our database corresponds to each of the variables we want to obtain. A direct relation is not possible, as details on *what* has happened is registered in several fields of the database.

This is necessary for maintenance purposes and better alarm handling in the maintenance station, but for our purposes we should identify *what* has happened with a single variable.

In our database, we have unique alarm identifiers for each of the alarms. For better handling and understanding of what is happening, we will use the textual identifier of the events to identify them. This identifier is gathered on the *ADDITIONAL_TEXT* field, and can be translated to a full comprehensive human-readable message by the maintenance station. Furthermore, there is additional data to fill in details about the message. For example, we can have an alarm such as “Communication channel with *X* down”, being *X* an additional parameter saved in the *ADDITIONAL_INFOS* field. Here we can follow two different approaches: disregard the information about *X*, and just treat it as a “Channel down” error; or easily build a compact representation including both variables, such as “channel.down—*x*”.

4 Statistic analysis

In order to obtain a first general insight of what has happened during the time comprised by our backup data, we will perform a high-level preliminary statistic analysis. In order to achieve a qualitative idea of the type of events, we will use the additional variables we mentioned in section 3: severity and event type. These variables provide an already given alarm classification of interest for maintenance operators.

4.1 Event type distribution

The first analysis we will perform consists on checking which event types appear in each maintenance station, and which percentage of the total amount of alarms corresponds to each of them. This will help us understand the nature of the events which are usually happening on our railway line.

First of all we will obtain a list of all the types found in each of the stations. We already described in table 5 all the possible values for this field, but depending on the diagnosis systems installed on each of the stations,

Event type	Description
fieldElementAlarm	Alarm related to a field element
fieldElementFailure	Failure in a field element
operatorInformation	Information to the operator
imCpuAndCommunications	Related to IM CPU or IM communications
internalDiagnosis	Internal diagnosis of a system
operationsDiagnosisCommunications	Communication error in Operation and Diagnosis systems
CommunicationsAlarm	Procedures and processes to carry information from one point to other

Table 6: Event types found in Antequera

a different subset of them will be used. The list of events for each of the stations is given in tables 6 (Antequera), 7 (Sevilla) and 8 (Segovia).

From these tables we can observe that alarm types in Antequera and Sevilla are the same (except for unclassified alarms in Sevilla marked as “other”). From this we can infer that diagnosis systems in these two stations are the same or very similar, as confirmed by Thales’ engineers. Segovia however presents a different - although also expectedly similar - set of alarm categories. This is an indicator of diagnosis systems being very different in Segovia than in the other two stations, as confirmed by Thales’ engineers.

For better overview of distribution of these alarm types, we will create charts of their respective percentages for each of the stations. These charts can be seen in figures 2 (Antequera), 3 (Segovia) and 4 (Sevilla).

Event type	Description
fieldElementAlarm	Alarm related to a field element
fieldElementFailure	Failure in a field element
operatorInformation	Information to the operator
imCpuAndCommunications	Related to IM CPU or IM communications
internalDiagnosis	Internal diagnosis of a system
operationsDiagnosisCommunications	Communication error in Operation and Diagnosis systems
CommunicationsAlarm	Procedures and processes to carry information from one point to other
Other	other

Table 7: Event types found in Sevilla

Event type	Description
CommProblem	Undefined communication problem
Information	Information message: versions, etc.
CommunicationsAlarm	Procedures and processes to carry information from one point to other
ProcessingErrorAlarm	SW or processing error
EquipmentAlarm	Equipment failure
EnvironmentAlarm	Related to the environment where the system is located

Table 8: Event types found in Segovia




Figure 2: Alarm information for Antequera




Figure 3: Alarm information for Segovia




Figure 4: Alarm information for Sevilla

We can see that in all of the stations, a single alarm type predominates among all of them. Specifically, we have a vast majority of communication alarms in Antequera and Segovia, and a majority of field element failure alarms in Sevilla. This is not surprising due to the considerable differences between all of them, but can become a problem as the other categories may be too small compared to these main ones when performing Data Mining techniques, obtaining less information - or none at all - from them.

In this direction, it is possible that further actions are required in order to compensate these differences, and avoid that more frequent alarms overshadow the less frequent ones.

4.2 Daily correlation

In order to find further differences or similarities between the different stations, we will observe how alarm types are correlated to each others. That is, how frequent is to find alarms of two specific types happening together during the same short period. For a first insight, we will analyse correlation during daily observations. This correlation information will not be of immediate help in order to predict alarms, as predicting the most frequent alarm type given some conditions is of very little - if any - help. However, it will give us a first idea on how strongly alarms are related to each others.

The result of this correlation is represented in figures 5 (Antequera), 6 (Segovia) and 7 (Sevilla).




Figure 5: Daily correlation for Antequera




Figure 6: Daily correlation for Segovia




Figure 7: Daily correlation for Sevilla

At first sight, we can affirm that these relations are different even in Sevilla and Antequera, which we found to have similar diagnosis systems. This indicates that, even with similar diagnosis systems, the systems conforming both lines are different. This is indeed confirmed by Thales' engineers, as Antequera station controls a high speed line, while Sevilla corresponds to a commuter line.

Furthermore, we can see strong correlations in Sevilla (Field element failure and operator information) and Segovia (Communications alarms and processing error alarms). As we don't have deep information of the nature of these categories, we can't affirm that this high correlation is due to any causal relation. However, we observe that both these cases show high correlation for the type of alarm which is more frequent in each station, so uneven distribution of alarms might be the cause of this apparent relation between alarms.

From this analysis we can conclude the significant differences in alarm relations between stations, confirming our first thoughts of impossibility of reducing the problem by generalising and merging data from different stations. Further analysis using specific alarm identifiers instead of categories will be needed to obtain relevant results.

4.2.1 Hourly timeline

As an additional first analysis, we wanted to overview the variation of alarm occurrence during the day. During a day, high differences in environment can be experimented which can affect systems in different ways. For instance, temperatures or train affluence can be very different from 4:00 AM to 1:00 PM. These differences can also be found during higher periods, for instance between weekdays and weekends, or between summer time and winter. To start with a specific observation period, we will perform a first analysis between day hours, leaving the other cases for further steps if considered adequate.

Charts with this analysis can be seen in figures 8 (Antequera), 9 (Segovia) and 10 (Sevilla).




Figure 8: Hourly distribution for Antequera (stacked)




Figure 9: Hourly distribution for Segovia (stacked)




Figure 10: Hourly distribution for Sevilla (stacked)

4.2.2 Daily correlation

We have also generated graphics for correlation between number of alarms of each type during the day, and occurrences of other types of alarms. The result is as follows:

References