The New Immigration Contestation: Social Movements and Local Immigration Policy Making in the United States, 2000–2011[1]

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Analyzing oppositional social movements in the context of municipal immigration ordinances, the authors examine whether the explanatory power of resource mobilization, political process, and strain theories of social movements' impact on policy outcomes differs when considering proactive as opposed to reactive movements. The adoption of pro-immigrant (proactive) ordinances was facilitated by the presence of immigrant community organizations and of sympathetic local political allies. The adoption of anti-immigrant (reactive) ordinances was influenced by structural social changes, such as rapid increases in the local Latino population, that were framed as threats. The study also finds that pro-immigrant protest events can influence policy in two ways, contributing both to the passage of pro-immigrant ordinances in the locality where protests occur and also inhibiting the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances in neighboring cities.

Given the dual identity of the United States as "a nation of immigrants and a gatekeeping nation" (Lee 2004, p. 121), immigration policy has long been

a contested topic in national politics. The U.S. population is almost evenly split when asked whether "the growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values"—46% agree and 48% disagree, a result that has remained consistent over the past decade (Pew Research Center 2012). At the same time, the percentage of the U.S. population that is foreign-born has increased from 5% in 1970 to 13% in 2010.

Throughout the past century, the policy debate over immigration has occurred primarily at the federal level, as relatively established political blocks favoring the restriction or expansion of immigration have waxed and waned (Freeman 1995; King 2000; Tichenor 2002; Higham 2004; Zolberg 2008). Over the past decade, however, a wave of local immigration laws unprecedented in the postwar period has swept across the country. Some cities have passed laws aimed at driving out undocumented immigrants, while other cities have enacted policies trying to support foreign-born residents regardless of their immigration status. States have also joined the fray, and these state and local efforts have generated bitter political disputes and intense legal battles, such as the Supreme Court's recent consideration of Arizona's immigration enforcement law. What factors can explain this rapid increase in local immigration lawmaking—what we call the "new immigration contestation"?

Although much research focusing on immigration legislation has analyzed congressional policy making (Freeman 1995; Jacobson 2000; King 2000; Tichenor 2002; Ngai 2004; Wong 2006; Newton 2008; Zolberg 2008), comparatively few studies have considered the adoption of local immigration laws (but see Varsanyi 2010). Studies that have examined the recent wave of municipal immigration policy making have identified local political partisanship and the framing of local demographic changes as significant factors in explaining passage of these laws (Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; see also Walker and Leitner 2011). However, these studies have not examined what role, if any, local social movements have played in the spread of these policies. Attention to social movement dynamics is especially salient given the emergence of national networks of grassroots organizations focusing on local immigration issues, both conservative ones, such as branches of the restrictionist Minuteman Project, and progressive ones, such as organizations affiliated with the National Council of La Raza. Because active social movements on both sides of this issue have mobilized for the introduction of these ordinances, we can also use them to advance our understanding of social movement outcomes.

Scholars of social movement outcomes have identified characteristics of movement organizations, political opportunity structures, framing, and public opinion, as well as their interaction, as crucial factors for policy adoption (Kitschelt 1986; Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Cress and

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Snow 2000; McCammon et al. 2001; Burstein and Linton 2002; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Amenta 2006; Soule and King 2006; Giugni 2007; Vasi and Strang 2009). This extensive research, however, suffers from several related gaps. First, until recently, most studies have examined factors that affect the outcomes of what Tilly (1978, p. 144) called proactive social movements, or mobilizations asserting a claim to resources that have not been previously enjoyed. Reactive social movements, or mobilizations in response to the real or perceived loss of power or resources, have received relatively little attention. Several of the studies that have actually analyzed reactive movements have argued that structural social changes are also a crucial factor for the success of mobilization (Van Dyke and Soule 2002; McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink 2004; McVeigh 2009). This focus on structural social changes in recent research on reactive movements, but not in research on proactive movements, raises the possibility that reactive movements may operate differently than proactive ones. No studies have simultaneously examined the effect of structural social changes on policy outcomes in the context of contemporaneous proactive and reactive movements. We attempt to fill this gap by examining the extent to which the factors that shape proactive social movements' outcomes also influence reactive social movements' outcomes, and vice versa.

A second, related area needing further research is the mechanisms through which structural social changes enable social movements to affect policy outcomes. Social movement scholars have emphasized "the importance of bringing the notion of threat back into the study of movement emergence" (Van Dyke and Soule 2002, p. 513), and we believe that there is a need to study the role of threats or structural social changes on movement outcomes as well. The recent emphasis on threat and structural social changes has sought to unearth what may be salvageable from previously discarded "strain theories" of collective behavior. Strain theories have been largely ignored for the past two decades because they simplistically imagined a causal sequence in which some structural strain (e.g., social isolation or status inconsistency) led to a disrupted psychological state in individuals (e.g., alienation or cognitive dissonance), which, when sufficiently severe, then led to the emergence of a social movement. McAdam (1982) and others rightly criticized many of the faulty assumptions underlying these strain theories: that social strain leads inexorably to collective protest, that movement participants are isolated and socially marginal as opposed to rational actors embedded in interactional networks, and that social movements are primarily a psychological response to disruption as opposed to a political approach to power. But in the process of throwing out these faulty assumptions of strain theories, scholars have neglected to reconsider how

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structural social changes may actually be relevant to understanding social movements. We critically revisit these theories to explore the possibility that the framing of structural changes as threats may be a factor associated with a movement's effects on policy and that this factor may be especially significant in the context of reactive movements. Structural changes do not translate themselves directly into an agreed-upon response just as movements do not merely reflect the grievances of their members. It seems likely that, as with members' grievances, movements actively interpret and represent social changes in ways that inspire potential supporters to participate and convince allies to support them (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997; McVeigh et al. 2004). To better understand the mechanisms through which the framing of structural social changes may affect movements' impacts on policy outcomes, we examine the role of demographic shifts and changing crime rates on contemporaneous proactive and reactive movements.

A third area warranting further exploration is the role of protest events. Successful protests may stimulate additional protests by the same movement and the emergence of cycles of protest (Tarrow 1998), or they may spur the mobilization of a countermovement (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Andrews 2002). Scholars have investigated the temporal relation between movements and countermovements but have focused less attention on their spatial relations. We investigate the impact of movement protests not only on the intended outcome but also on the social construction of threat by a countermovement in nearby locations. We also examine the extent to which protest events may have both positive and negative consequences for the movement initiating them.

The contemporaneous existence of oppositional movements associated with the new immigration contestation creates an opportune context to address these issues. We examine two movements responding to an increase in the foreign-born population and a change in settlement patterns from traditional gateway cities to suburban and rural new destinations. The pro-immigrant movement fits Tilly's (1978) definition of a proactive movement because it is asserting claims to rights not previously enjoyed by immigrants (e.g., the right to vote in school board or other local elections). The anti-immigrant movement falls within the definition of a reactive movement because it is seeking to maintain the status quo in response to a perceived loss of power by native-born residents (e.g., the loss of cultural or political dominance). In analyzing the impact of these movements on policy outcomes, we use a mixed methods approach. We use event history analysis to test hypotheses that enable us to explain the national variation across over 1,300 cities and we use semistructured interviews with knowledgeable informants in four cities to compare the processes that lead to the adoption of

pro-immigrant laws with those that lead to the adoption of anti-immigrant laws.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION LAWMAKING

In the first century after the United States was founded, to the extent that there was public regulation of immigration, it was primarily crafted and enforced by states and localities (Neuman 1993; Higham 2004; Parker 2008). Once Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and the Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of plenary federal power over immigration in *Chae Chan Ping v. United States* in 1889, however, the regulation of immigration to the United States increasingly came to be understood as a federal responsibility. States and cities ceased passing laws determining who could enter their jurisdiction ("immigration laws"), although states continued to pass some laws that treated citizens and noncitizens within their jurisdiction differently ("alienage laws"), most often laws restricting access to public assistance or particular kinds of licenses (see Higham 2004; Ngai 2004; Motomura 2006). In the past decade, however, localities and states have increasingly sought to pass legislation that blurs the boundaries between alienage and immigration laws by conditioning access to basic necessities on immigration status in an often explicit effort to drive undocumented immigrants out of their territory.

The recent increase in local immigration lawmaking may be related to the rapid demographic change occurring unevenly in cities across the country. Over the past decade, the percentage of immigrants living in five traditional gateway areas with the largest foreign-born populations—New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, and Houston—continued to decline, as immigrants moved to new urban, suburban, and rural destinations. For the first time in 2010, a majority of immigrants lived in suburbs as compared to central cities (Wilson and Singer 2011).[2] While the generations of immigrants in these traditional gateway cities have created an infrastructure of civic institutions to foster immigrant incorporation (Waldinger 1996; Foner 2000; Cordero-Guzmán 2005; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2008), more recent destinations lack this same breadth of institutional infrastructure and depth of historical experience (Waters and Jiménez 2005; Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2006; Carpio, Irazábal, and Pulido 2011).

[2] Those metropolitan areas experiencing the largest increase in their foreign-born population between 2000 and 2010 were diverse new destinations, such as Scranton, Pennsylvania (140%), Cape Coral, Florida (137%), Little Rock, Arkansas (124%), Indianapolis, Indiana (117%), Birmingham, Alabama (115%), Jackson, Mississippi (111%), Knoxville, Tennessee (110%), Nashville, Tennessee (102%), and Louisville, Kentucky (101%) (Wilson and Singer 2011).

Local immigration lawmaking has proliferated since 2000, taking two opposing directions. First, in response to the growing climate of fear in many immigrant communities caused by the increasing pace of detentions and deportations, many cities passed confidentiality laws. These laws assured immigrants that local government officials would not inquire about immigration status (except for those charged with a crime), thereby encouraging immigrants to make the most of city services and to report illegal activity (Ridgley 2008). Similarly, other localities worked to foster immigrant integration, for instance, by creating municipal identification cards or allowing all residents to vote in school board or other local elections. The steady rise in the number of inclusionary laws from late 2001 to early 2006 (see fig. 1, representing the cumulative number of ordinances passed nationwide) reflects the growing number of cities that have passed inclusionary policies, most commonly ordinances instructing city employees not to ask about immigration status.

Second, starting in the mid-2000s, a number of communities became concerned about undocumented immigration and passed ordinances that they believed would discourage undocumented immigrant settlement. In April 2005, a formerly unknown group, the Minuteman Project, organized approximately 200 volunteers to come to the U.S.-Mexico border in Tombstone, Arizona, to serve as a "citizen border patrol militia" and to draw attention to illegal immigration. The small mobilization quickly became a national media spectacle that spawned the establishment of local Minuteman chapters across the country seeking local anti-immigrant policy changes.

In March 2006, as action on immigration in the U.S. Senate seemed imminent, hundreds of thousands of immigrants, their families, and their supporters marched in Chicago, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Houston, and Las Vegas to call for comprehensive immigration reform and to oppose Representative James Sensenbrenner's bill, passed in the House as H.R. 4437, that would have criminalized undocumented presence in the United States. These mobilizations grew in strength and spread throughout the country from April and into May. Though the unprecedented mobilization demonstrated immigrants' resolve, it failed to secure comprehensive reform.

The marches also arguably contributed to increased recruitment by groups such as the Minuteman Project, as well as a proliferation of local efforts to challenge immigrants' growing political engagement. This wave of municipal laws largely began with the Illegal Immigration Relief Act passed by the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, in July 2006. Intended "to make Hazleton one of the most difficult places in the U.S. for illegal immigrants," the ordinance empowered the city to fine landlords who rent to undocumented individuals and to revoke the licenses of businesses who hire them (City of Hazleton 2006c). The first version of the ordinance also

Fɪɢ. 1.—The adoption of pro- and anti-immigrant ordinances by U.S. municipalities, 2001–11 (total number of ordinances adopted by cities and counties).

prohibited the publication of city materials in any language other than English.[3]

The rapid increase in exclusionary laws beginning in 2006 (see fig. 1) represents the proliferation of local ordinances seeking immigration "enforcement through attrition," most commonly by requiring that local businesses use the national E-Verify database to check the work authorization of potential employees. Other common local exclusionary efforts include "English-only" or "official English" ordinances, restrictions on soliciting work in public places (to drive out migrant day laborers), restrictions on noncitizens accessing county or city benefits and services, and laws designed to discourage immigrants from accessing housing. A growing number of cities after 2008 also applied to participate in the 287(g) program, which allows state and local law enforcement agencies to enter into agreements with the Department of Homeland Security to designate certain local officers to perform limited immigration enforcement functions.

In short, immigration lawmaking at the local level has increased dramatically during the last decade. The passage of local immigration laws creates an opportunity to examine the relation, if any, between these local structural social changes and actual local policy outcomes and to explore what mechanisms may be at work.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

Social Movement Organizations and Municipal Opportunity Structures

The extent to which social movements actually affect policy change, such as the local immigration ordinances at issue here, is a focus of growing inquiry among movement scholars (e.g., Cress and Snow 2000; Andrews 2001; Burstein and Linton 2002; Soule and King 2006; Vasi and Strang 2009; Amenta et al. 2010). The study of social movements' consequences is complicated by the reality that policy consequences are indirect and mediated by the political process, creating theoretical and methodological problems for establishing causality (Skocpol 1992; Andrews 1997; Cress and Snow 2000; Amenta et al. 2005). In analyzing the mechanisms at work between movements and their policy impacts, scholars have distinguished the significance of the resources and strategies used by social movement organizations, on the one hand, from the effects of political opportunity structure, on the other.

How social movement organizations are structured and how they mobilize resources affects not only movements' mobilizing capacity but also their

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[3] Hazleton's ordinance has been struck down repeatedly by federal courts (see *Lozano v. City of Hazleton*, 724 F.3d 297, 304–23 [3d Cir. 2013]), but the similar law passed in Fremont, Nebraska, was recently upheld by the federal appellate court there (see *Keller v. City of Fremont*, 719 F.3d 931, 939–51 [8th Cir. 2013]).

ability to exert influence on policy outcomes at the local, state, and national levels (e.g., Skocpol et al. 1993; Soule et al. 1999; Andrews 2001; Amenta et al. 2010). As Andrews (2001) has pointed out, organizations can have an impact because their disruptive action forces concessions from those in power (Piven and Cloward 1977; Andrews 2001), their symbolic action evokes support from sympathetic elites (Lipsky 1968; Burstein 1999; Andrews 2001), or their professionalization gives them routine access to policy making through institutionalized insider strategies such as lobbying or litigation (Andrews 2001; Soule and Olzak 2004). Social movement organizations can also have an impact by serving as brokers, connecting two previously unconnected groups and mediating the relationships between the two (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Vasi 2011). Alternatively, the impact of a movement can be conceptualized through a focus on its infrastructure, in which a diverse and differentiated leadership structure, a mix of formal and informal organizational forms, and a strong membership base enable movements to exert influence because they can use both insider and outsider tactics (Staggenborg 1988; Andrews 2001). In other words, organizations can affect policy both through their ability to mobilize outsider tactics, such as protests, and their ability to strategically use insider tactics, such as lobbying or litigation.

Changes in the political process or political structure, such as changes in the configuration of resources or shifts in the arrangement of coalitions, can significantly affect the ability of a social movement to mobilize supporters and to affect policy outcomes (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Amenta and Zylan 1991; McCammon 2001; Meyer 2004). Tarrow (1998, pp. 19–20) has defined political opportunity structure broadly as the "consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics." Relevant aspects of a political opportunity structure include the distribution of power among state actors, the propensity of the state to respond to protest through accommodation or repression, the availability and effectiveness of political allies and supporters, and other similar factors that affect the costs and benefits of collective action (Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). The impact of political opportunity structure on outcomes is not "singular and deterministic" but varies depending on the characteristics of the movement at issue (Andrews 2001). Indeed, movements are characterized by a dynamic and strategic interaction between the organizations that make up the movement and the changing political environment in which they are working.

Although the bulk of the research on immigration legislation has not incorporated a social movements perspective, we build on recent research focusing on the role of immigrant organizations and political contexts in immigrant political participation (e.g., Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2003; de la

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Garza 1996; Martinez 2011). In U.S. contexts where access to citizenship is limited and traditional institutions of political incorporation have failed to include immigrant communities, immigrant organizations and other civil-society groups have been central to immigrant political engagement (Koopmans et al. 2005; Wong 2006; de Graauw 2008; Martinez 2008; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008; Gleeson 2009; Okamato and Ebert 2010; Fox and Bada 2011). In studies of immigration politics in Europe, scholars have found that national and local political structures are central to shaping both immigrant political activism and the mobilization of anti-immigrant groups (Ireland 1994; Garbaye 2002). In a recent study of the attribution of rights to immigrants across 10 European countries, Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel (2012) found that the growth of the immigrant electorate was strongly correlated with the expansion of immigrants' rights while the strength of right-wing populist parties was correlated with restriction of those rights.

If the rise of new forms of local associations has indeed contributed to the surge in local policy making, we would expect the passage of local immigration laws to be correlated with the existence of local chapters of organizations that work on immigration issues. Therefore, we hypothesize that the local presence of pro-immigrant organizations will lead to the passage of pro-immigrant ordinances, and the local presence of anti-immigrant organizations will lead to the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances. We also hypothesize that the passage of pro-immigrant ordinances will be associated with the presence of a municipal political context favorable to pro-immigrant policies, and the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances will be associated with a municipal political context favorable to anti-immigrant policies.

Structural Social Changes

Relatively understudied in the burgeoning literature on social movement outcomes is the role of structural social changes, such as economic restructuring or rapid demographic shifts. Sometimes described as "strain theory," a focus on structural social conditions "offers one of the oldest and most persistent perspectives on the origins of social movements, dating back to at least the work of Émile Durkheim and even some of the work of Karl Marx" (Snow, Soule, and Cress 2005, p. 1187; see also Kornhauser 1959; Lipset 1960; Smelser 1962; Coleman 1971). Strain theory was validly criticized for assuming a simplistic relationship between strain and protest and for narrowly viewing collective political movements through an atomized, individualistic lens that overlooked the importance of dense social networks and a strong collective identity in facilitating collective action (McAdam 1982; McPhail 1994; Tarrow 1996). Scholars in the resource mobilization school studying left-leaning social movements also found that

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mobilization generally occurs in response to increases in resources for collective mobilization, not strains on them (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

Recently, however, the role of structural social changes in facilitating mobilization has come under renewed focus (Myers 1997; Useem 1998; Buechler 2004; Snow et al. 2005; McVeigh 2006). Scholars of reactive movements in particular have reinvigorated interest in the role that structural social changes play in movement emergence (Olzak 1989; McVeigh 1999; Beck 2000; McVeigh et al. 2004; McVeigh 2009). For instance, Van Dyke and Soule (2002) found that even in situations in which available resources and political opportunities were declining, patriot/militia organizations were still able to mobilize supporters and that mobilization coincided with structural social changes such as declines in manufacturing or family farms. In a similar vein, Kitschelt and McGann (1995, p. 276) found that support for extreme right parties in Western Europe drew on anti-immigrant sentiments and resentment of cultural pluralization in the context of a broader ideological setting combining authoritarian and neoliberal orientations. Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) findings echo economic and political competition theories positing that the presence of an out-group in sufficient numbers can generate the perception of competition for scarce resources (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Blau 1977; Olzak 1992), catalyzing political competition (Glaser 1994), triggering prejudice (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Taylor 1998), or even precipitating violence (Useem 1980; Tolnay and Beck 1995).

In examining how social structural changes actually affect collective action and movement outcomes, scholars have suggested that framing is crucial (McVeigh et al. 2004). Movements do not simply reflect members' grievances, they actively interpret and represent social conditions in ways that inspire potential supporters to believe that a particular change is necessary and possible and that their participation will make a difference in accomplishing it (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997). In the context of the Ku Klux Klan in Indiana in the 1920s, McVeigh et al. (2004) found that Klan recruitment was successful in counties where structural conditions, specifically the presence of blacks and immigrants, resonated with the white-supremacist, anti-immigrant framing the Klan advanced. Similarly, Olzak (1989) has described how sharp increases in immigration were interpreted as a threat by many sectors of the U.S. labor movement at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century, raising rates of labor and ethnic conflict. Koopmans (1996) has also highlighted the elite framing of foreigners as a social and political problem as crucial in the rise of racist and right-wing violence in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. This research suggests that the processes through which structural social changes are framed may determine their ability to have an impact. The majority of this research, however, has not examined how structural conditions may affect movement outcomes (as opposed to mobi-

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lization), nor whether structural social changes equally influence proactive and reactive movements.

Based on the public statements of anti-immigrant activists, we identify two sociodemographic changes that anti-immigrant leaders at the national level constructed as threats and that therefore may have contributed to the passage of anti-immigrant municipal ordinances. First, an increase in undocumented immigrants, in particular those of Latino origin, is often described as a threat to local quality of life. Anti-immigrant activists claim that undocumented immigrants pose a threat to the American middle-class way of life by arguing that they allegedly raise local expenditures on health care and education, take away jobs from citizens, and pose a threat to the dominance of the English language (see, e.g., DeWeese 2007). Second, anti-immigrant groups frequently assert that an increase in undocumented immigrants leads to an increase in violent crime rates. A common logical fallacy of anti-immigrant groups is the claim that, since undocumented presence in the United States is a violation of federal (civil) law, undocumented immigrants are more likely to engage in criminal activity (see, e.g., DeWeese 2007).

Increases in local foreign-born populations, however, could equally be understood as an opportunity for pro-immigrant leaders to mobilize supporters and press for political change (e.g., Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio, and Montoya-Kirk 2009). Indeed, grassroots groups such as Mobilize the Immigrant Vote have worked to turn changing demographics into political empowerment by facilitating voter registration and political education for naturalized citizens. Similarly, decreases in local violent crime rates may open opportunities for pro-immigrant movements to work with local elected officials and police in passing local confidentiality agreements or other pro-immigrant policies. If structural social changes operate in the same way for proactive and reactive movements, we expect that an increasing foreign-born population and a falling crime rate will be correlated with the passage of pro-immigrant policies while an increasing foreign-born population and a rising crime rate will be correlated with the passage of anti-immigrant policies. If structural social changes play a different role in reactive movements than in proactive ones, however, it is possible that an increasing foreign-born population and a changing crime rate will be associated with the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances but not with the passage of pro-immigrant ones.

Protest Events

Another relatively understudied factor is the role of movement protest. While the empirical evidence on the effect of protests on policy enactment and implementation remains mixed (Andrews 2001; McAdam and Su 2002; Amenta and Caren 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004; Burstein and Sausner 2005),

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recent scholarship shows that movement protest is especially influential in helping to set policy agendas (Olzak and Soule 2009). Yet, as Andrews and Edwards (2004, p. 498) note, a significant limitation of the studies of protest impact is "the aggregation of the data to the national level because elected officials may be more sensitive to mobilization within their districts than to annual shifts in protest across the United States." Previous studies have failed to clarify the effect of spatially proximate protests in the adoption of local policies. To test the spatial dynamic of protest events, we hypothesize that the presence of a pro-immigrant protest will be correlated with the subsequent passage of a pro-immigrant ordinance in that same city, if that city has not already passed such a policy.

At the same time, an important unintended consequence of protest is often mobilization by a countermovement. Studies have shown that movements and countermovements are competing for visibility from the mass media and the public, as well as for claims making on the state (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Rohlinger 2002; Soule 2004). A movement's success can lead to countermovement mobilizations (Andrews 2002) and that countermovement can put an issue on the agenda that the movement it opposes would not have chosen to focus on, leading that movement to mobilize in response (Fetner 2008). Despite a recent increase in the number of studies on movement-countermovement interactions (McCright and Dunlap 2003; Dixon 2010; Lind and Stepan-Norris 2011), the issue of how a movement's mobilization in one community affects a countermovement's mobilization in neighboring communities deserves further investigation. Movement-countermovement effects are usually assumed to operate in the same space— for example, within the same state. Yet, when it comes to city-level mobilizations, the impact of a highly visible mobilization may be experienced in a different, geographically proximate location. We thus propose an alternative hypothesis that pro-immigrant protest events are correlated with the subsequent passage of anti-immigrant ordinances either in the same city or a nearby city, if that city has not already passed such an ordinance.

DATA AND METHODS

Dependent Variables

We collected data on all cities (1,301) that had more than 25,000 people in 2000.[4] For the pro-immigrant ordinances, the time period starts at 2000 because local pro-immigrant lawmaking increased in pace beginning in 2000; for the anti-immigrant ordinances, the time period starts at 2006 because local anti-immigrant lawmaking dramatically increased in pace

[4] We included only cities above 25,000 because of data availability.

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beginning in 2006. The time period ends at 2011 for both pro- and anti-immigrant ordinances—therefore, our data are right censored, which means that the time period ends before all potential events have a chance to occur. We organize the data such that there is an observation for each city for each year in the time period; each city is given a 0 for each year that it does not pass an immigration-related ordinance and a 1 for the year in which it does. Once a city adopts an immigration-related ordinance, it is dropped from the analysis for the remaining years.[5]

We recorded the year when a city adopted a pro-immigrant ordinance using information from a database compiled by the National Immigration Law Center in 2008 of local laws limiting immigration enforcement and adding to that list policies found through an extensive search of municipal codes and local,[6] regional, and national newspapers available in Lexis-Nexis,[7] searching for laws prohibiting local officials from inquiring about immigration status except with regard to those convicted of a crime, providing for local noncitizen voting, creating municipal identification cards, opting out of the Secure Communities program (before the Department of Homeland Security made participation mandatory), instituting boycotts of Arizona in protest of SB 1070, and other substantive laws in support of immigrants' rights. We recorded the year when a city adopted an anti-immigrant ordinance by using information from databases compiled by the Fair Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM), the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (now LatinoJustice PRLDEF) as well as an extensive search of municipal codes.[8] We also searched newspapers avail-

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[5] Our dependent variable is the year of passage of an ordinance, not the count of number of ordinances adopted, for two reasons: first, because we are interested in predicting the probability that a city adopts the first immigration-related ordinance in a given year, not the likelihood that it will adopt multiple ordinances; second, because the number of cities that adopted more than one immigration-related ordinance is relatively small; of the cities in our data set, only 29 have adopted two or more ordinances.

[6] We searched websites that house municipal codes (e.g., www.municode.com, www.generalcode.com, www.codepublishing.com, www.amlegal.com) for the terms "alien/s," immigrant/s," and "immigration" to identify cities that had passed laws either differentiating based on immigration status or focusing on immigrants or immigration. We also searched for the terms "immigration status," "municipal ID/identification," "noncitizen voting," and "secure communities."

[7] We searched for articles since 2000 referencing "ordinance" and simultaneously "alien/s," "immigrant/s," "immigration," "immigration status," "municipal ID/identification," "noncitizen voting," and "secure communities" to identify municipal laws implementing these policies or otherwise supporting immigrants.

[8] We searched websites that house municipal codes (e.g., www.municode.com, www.generalcode.com, www.codepublishing.com, www.amlegal.com) for the terms "alien/s," "immigrant/s," and "immigration" to identify cities that had passed laws differentiating based on immigration status or focusing on immigration. We also searched for the terms

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able in Lexis-Nexis,[9] looking for laws requiring the use of E-Verify, seeking to limit undocumented immigrants' access to housing, mandating the use of only English in official city business (or naming English the official municipal language), restricting the solicitation of work in public places, and other substantive local laws seeking to discourage settlement by undocumented immigrants.[10] Our research identified 96 cities that adopted anti-immigrant policies and 97 cities that adopted pro-immigrant policies.[11] Other studies of local immigration policy making generally use databases of cities that considered a municipal immigration ordinance (Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011). Our database includes only those localities that actually passed these laws, because we believe that, while the introduction of an ordinance may represent the views of one particular council member, the actual passage of a law demonstrates a significant and meaningful level of local support for the policy.

Independent Variables

We measure the locations of pro-immigrant organizations using information from several organizations active nationwide: the National Council de la Raza (NCLR), the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), the Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and Appleseed. We recognize that these organizations represent only the proverbial "tip of the iceberg" of the civil society groups active on immigration issues throughout the country and that these organizations are not necessarily at the forefront of immigrant organizing in many cities, but we believe that these organizations will be correlated with more robust measures of immigrant civil society that are as of yet unavailable at the local level with a national scope. The organizations chosen represent different types of civil society groups with a national reach, all work-

"electronic verification," "e-verify," "official English," and "English only" in order to identify particular laws that might target immigrants without mentioning immigration status.

[9] We searched for articles since 2000 referencing "ordinance" and simultaneously "alien/s," "immigrant/s," "immigration," "e-verify," "official English," "English only," "day laborers," "rental permits," or "occupancy license" to identify municipal laws targeting immigrants.

[10] If a city ordinance was identified in the search of municipal codes, it was cross-checked with a focused search of newspaper articles and city council meeting minutes (where available) to identify the date and circumstances of its adoption. If a city ordinance was identified in the search of newspaper articles, it was cross-checked with a focused search of the municipal code and city council meeting minutes (where available) to confirm its adoption. The authors also thank Justin Cox for sharing his data against which to double-check our own.

[11] The total number of ordinances is slightly larger, since several cities adopted more than one policy; see fig. 1.

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ing on immigration issues at the local level, including ethnic community groups, grassroots organizing efforts, religious centers, legal advocates, and mainstream public interest justice centers (see de Graauw 2008; Fox and Bada 2011; Martinez 2011).[12] Considered together, this mix of organizations highlights the multiple organizational forms, diverse leadership structures, and varying strategies that characterize the immigrants' rights movement and enable it to simultaneously use outsider and insider tactics (see Andrews 2001). We obtained data about the location of chapters, affiliates, or members of these organizations from their websites.[13] To create the variable, we added the number of pro-immigrant organizations in a city that existed in the year that an ordinance was passed and divided it by city population per 10,000 in order to create a standard measure for the density of pro-immigrant organizations.

We measured the locations of anti-immigrant organizations using information from two sources. First, we used information collected semiannually by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), beginning in 2006. The data are a list of organizations that SPLC characterizes as targeting immigrants and advocating for anti-immigrant policies. The list includes

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[12] The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) is the largest national Hispanic civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States. Among other things, it works "to encourage immigration policies that are fair and nondiscriminatory, to encourage family reunification, and to enact necessary reforms to the current immigration system" and it has a long-standing network of locally rooted affiliates that provide services and engage in advocacy. The data are available on NCLR's website (http://www.nclr.org/index.php /nclr_affiliates/affiliate_network/map/). The member organizations of the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) "develop leadership, mobilize, and organize day laborers in order to protect and expand their civil, labor and human rights," working at the grassroots level with a sector of the immigrant community that is most likely to be undocumented and marginalized, and who are often highly visible targets for anti-immigrant mobilization. The data are available on NDLON's website (http://www.ndlon .org/en/our-members). CLINIC was established in 1988 by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and has the mission "to enhance and expand delivery of legal services to indigent and low-income immigrants." Data about CLINIC centers are available at CLINIC's website (https://cliniclegal.org/affiliates/directory). Since 1920, the ACLU has had the mission of defending the individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and, since 1987, it has had an immigrants' rights project dedicated to protecting the civil rights of noncitizens and to combating discrimination against immigrants. Data about the ACLU are available at the ACLU's website (http://www.aclu.org/affiliates). Appleseed is a nonprofit network of public interest justice centers "dedicated to building a society in which opportunities are genuine, access to the law is universal and equal, and government advances the public interest." Data about Appleseed centers are available at the organization's website (https://www.appleseednetwork.org/about-us/centers/).

[13] For the majority of cases, we were able to obtain the year when an organization or chapter was founded using information from their websites—otherwise, we identified the year when a website was created using information from "DNSstuff" by searching for domain names. We used the WHOIS lookup tool available at http://www.dnsstuff .com/tools/. We eliminate from the analysis the few cases in which an organization was formed after a pro-immigrant ordinance was passed in a city.

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independent local movements and also all chapters of the Minuteman Project, the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, and the Federal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Coalition (FIRE). SPLC's semiannual lists provide data on when chapters were founded, and we exclude the few chapters that were founded after the passage of a municipal immigration law in that locality. Second, we used information from the most recent available edition (2000) of the Right Guide, which is a guide to conservative and right-of-center organizations. We included organizations categorized as multicategory, crime and law enforcement, traditional values, economic, social, and fiscal policy, and race and ethnicity based because these organizations are most likely to become allied with anti-immigrant groups. Both the SPLC and Right Guide data include chapters of national organizations as well as local independent organizations. We combined data from these two sources, summed the number of anti-immigrant organizations in a city that existed in the year that an ordinance was passed, and divided it by city population per 10,000 in order to create a standard measure for the density of anti-immigrant organizations.[14]

For both the pro- and anti-immigrant organizations, we were unable to gather uniform measures of the effectiveness of each individual group (such as number of members, annual budgets, or organizing strategy), so we rely on the density of these organizations alone to evaluate the role they played in the passage of these ordinances.

We measured the number of pro-immigrant marches that took place in 2006 using the database compiled by Xóchitl Bada, Jonathan Fox, Elvia Zazueta, and Ingrid García (Bada et al. 2006). The database includes marches that took place in 166 different cities between February and May 2006, ranging in size from approximately 12 people in Georgetown, Delaware, to more than 650,000 in Los Angeles, California. Following recent research on protest activities (King and Soule 2007; Vasi and King 2012), which argues that protests that do not receive media coverage have less informational value to the public, we include only protests with over 100 protest participants that received coverage in the mass media.[15] For cities

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[14] We tried using the organizations from the SPLC and Right Guide as separate measures and also tried using separate measures for organizations that are chapters of national groups as opposed to independent local associations. The results were similar and we therefore present only results with the combined measure.

[15] We checked whether protests were covered in the mass media using a LexisNexis search of all U.S. newspapers in 2006 using the following search algorithm: "protest" or "march" or "demonstration" within the same paragraph with "immigration" or "immigrants"—we checked for false positives and we eliminated four cases for which we could not find media coverage. With regard to size, we experimented with alternative measures—marches with over 50 participants, marches with over 150 participants—but results were similar; therefore, we show only results for marches with over 100 participants.

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that experienced a pro-immigrant march with over 100 participants and was covered in the media, the measure has the value 0 before 2006 and 1 after that year.[16]

We measured the degree to which the municipal political opportunity structures are favorable to pro- or anti-immigrant policies using three measures. First, we operationalize political opportunity structures using partisan voting data (Snow et al. 2005). We obtained data about the political orientation of the community from David Leip's *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*—we measured the pro-Democratic orientation as the percentage of votes for the Democratic Party candidate during the 2000 elections; we measured the pro-Republican orientation as the percentage of votes for the Republican Party candidate during the 2004 elections.

Second, to measure the degree of nativism of the electorate and potential constituent support for anti-immigrant ordinances, we used the percentage of votes for Pat Buchanan during the 2000 presidential election. We selected Buchanan because he was a recent presidential candidate whose views on immigration were closely aligned to nativism, understood as favoring native-born inhabitants over immigrants (see, e.g., Buchanan 2001, 2006).

Third, to measure the presence of elite allies for immigrant friendly policies, we use the existence of Latino elected and appointed officials in the local government, obtained from the National Directory of Latino Elected Officials (Santoro 1999; Martinez 2008; Okamoto and Ebert 2010).[17] We created an annual score by giving different weights to different local government positions. Assuming that mayors are more important allies than vice-mayors, and vice-mayors are more important allies than council members, we assigned the highest value (3) for Latino mayors, followed by vice-mayors (2), and other elected officials (1). We then summed all values.[18] We also measure the

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[16] We consider that marches remain influential throughout the entire period of the study. Indeed, it is likely that the impact of the marches on local pro- and anti-immigrant activists continued for several years after they occurred as they served as a repeated rallying cry for both national movements even years later. Moreover, it is likely that the effect of the marches on policy making is delayed since it takes time to mobilize local support for an immigration-related ordinance, introduce it, and adopt it.

[17] We recognize that only about 45% of foreign-born residents in the United States are from Central or South America—however, given that the recent debate on immigration in the United States has focused heavily on Latino immigrants, we focus on their potential allies. We also recognize that many Latino elected officials are not allies of immigrants generally or undocumented immigrants particularly (and vice versa that many African-American, Asian American, and white elected officials are), but, following other scholars of immigrant political participation (Santoro 1999; Martinez 2008; Okamoto and Ebert 2010), we believe that this imperfect variable is nonetheless the best one available at the moment.

[18] For example, a city that had a Latino mayor in a year had a municipal political opportunity score of 3 for that year; similarly, a city with a Latino vice-mayor and a

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degree to which the municipal opportunity structures are favorable to anti-immigrant policies using the reverse-coded annual score described above.

We obtained information about Latino population growth from the U.S. Census Bureau. This variable was coded as the change in the percentage of the population that self-identified as Hispanic between 2000 and 2006 for the anti-immigrant policies and between 1990 and 2000 for the pro-immigrant policies. We measured immigrant population growth using data from the U.S. Census Bureau about the change in the percentage of the population that was foreign-born between 2000 and 2006 for the anti-immigrant policies and between 1990 and 2000 for the pro-immigrant policies.

Annual information about violent crimes is collected by local policing agencies and reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in compliance with national uniform crime-reporting guidelines. We used the uniform crime-reporting data available from the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics for all local reporting agencies serving populations greater than 10,000. We created separate time-varying annual variables for the rate of violent crimes in each city, and we lagged this variable by one year.[19]

We calculated distances from cities that experienced pro-immigrant marches using ArcGIS, a geographic information system software product. We calculated buffers around cities that experienced pro-immigrant marches during 2006. We experimented with different radii for buffers but we present results from four, which range from close to distant: 0 miles (within the same city), 15 miles, 30 miles, and 45 miles.

Covariates

We used a number of control variables from the 2000 census, such as population size (as the natural logarithm, to stabilize skew) and education (measured as percentage of people with a bachelor's degree or more). To gauge whether local economies are dependent on local immigrant labor (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010), we obtained annual data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, and we constructed three time-varying measures: the number of jobs per total population in agriculture, construction, and food manufacturing. Case studies of cities that have passed anti-immigrant laws have found that local

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Latino council member, or a city with three Latino council members had a municipal political opportunity score of 3 for that year. As an alternative coding scheme, we gave equal weight to all positions held by Latino elected officials, and we summed up the values for each city—the results did not change substantially.

[19] We chose violent crime rates instead of property crime rates because anti-immigrant activists focused on violent crimes allegedly committed by undocumented immigrants. We did not include property crimes together with violent crimes due to multicollinearity.

economic decline has played an important role in the conceptualization of immigrants as a threat (Brettell and Nibbs 2010; Steil and Ridgley 2012), and we therefore include a control for change in the median household income using information from the 1990 and 2000 censuses and the 2006 American Community Survey.

We controlled for local government form, as a measure of the openness of the stable structures of government decision making to social movement action generally. Previous studies have suggested that cities with a mayor/council form of government may be more responsive to the demands of citizens than those cities with a council/manager form (Eisinger 1973; Knoke 1982) and thus may have a greater frequency of protest activity (Snow et al. 2005, p. 1196). There is no reason to believe, however, that a council/manager form would be more responsive to the demands of pro-immigrant advocates than anti-immigrant ones or vice versa, so we include it as a control variable instead of as a measure of the political opportunity structure. We used data from the 2000 Municipal Year Book and coded this variable 1 if the city had a mayor/council form of government and 0 otherwise.

Finally, we include controls for pro- and anti-immigrant state laws because states may influence municipalities' decision to adopt ordinances. For the pro-immigrant data set, this measure had the value 1 if a state adopted a pro-immigrant law (such as a state Dream Act, providing in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants, or a state law limiting local cooperation with federal immigration authorities by withdrawing from the Secure Communities program) prior to the adoption of a municipal policy and 0 otherwise. For the anti-immigrant data set, this measure had the value 1 if a state adopted an anti-immigrant law (such as a state law requiring employers to use the federal E-Verify employment authorization program or an "enforcement through attrition law" like Arizona's SB 1070) prior to the adoption of a municipal policy and 0 otherwise. Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the data sources, while tables 3 and 4 show descriptive statistics and correlations for the independent variables and covariates.

Estimation

Because our dependent variable is the year of adoption of pro- or anti-immigrant ordinances, Cox proportional hazards models are well suited for estimating our model (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The main advantage of Cox hazard models—compared to models such as probit or logit—is that they allow changes in the independent variables over time to affect the probability of experiencing the event, and that they allow the effect of a unit change in the level of an independent variable on the probability of adopting a policy to vary,

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TABLE 1
DATE AND SOURCE OF VARIABLES IN ANALYSIS OF ADOPTION OF PRO-IMMIGRANT ORDINANCES

	Description	Date	Source
Population (ln)	Ln of total population	2000	2000 census
Education	% population B.A. or more	2000	2000 census
Agriculture	% jobs in county/county population	Annual 2000–2011	Bureau of Labor Statistics
Construction	% jobs in county/county population	Annual 2000–2011	Bureau of Labor Statistics
Food manufacture	% jobs in county/county population	Annual 2000–2011	Bureau of Labor Statistics
Income change	Median household income change	Change 1990–2000	1990 and 2000 census
Mayor-council	Mayor/council form of government	2000	Municipal Year Book
State policy	Prior pro-immigrant state law	Annual 2000–2011	Various—database on file with authors
Pro-immigrant association	Number of organizations/city population	Annual 2000–2011	Various—database on file with authors
Democratic Park votes	% votes for Al Gore	2000	Leip's *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*
Latino elected official	Latino elected officials	Annual 2000–2011	National Association of Latino Elected Officials
Immigrant growth	Change in foreign-born population	Change 2000–2006	2000 census and 2006 American Community Survey
Latino growth	Change in Latino population	Change 2000–2006	2000 census and 2006 American Community Survey
Violent crime	Violent crime rate	Annual 2000–2011	Bureau of Justice Statistics
Marches in city	Pro-immigrant marches	2006	Database compiled by Bada et al. 2006

TABLE 2

DATE AND SOURCE OF VARIABLES IN ANALYSIS OF ADOPTION OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT ORDINANCES

	Description	Date	Source
Population (ln)	Ln of total population	2006	American Community Survey
Education	% population B.A. or more	2006	American Community Survey
Agriculture	% jobs in county/county population	Annual 2006–11	Bureau of Labor Statistics
Construction	% jobs in county/county population	Annual 2006–11	Bureau of Labor Statistics
Food manufacture	% jobs in county/county population	Annual 2006–11	Bureau of Labor Statistics
Income change	Median household income change	Change 2000–2006	2000 census and 2006 American Community Survey
Mayor-council	Mayor/council form of government	2000	Municipal Year Book
State policy	Prior anti-immigrant state law	Annual 2006–11	Various—database on file with authors
Anti-immigrant association	Number of organizations/city population	Annual 2006–11	Southern Poverty Law Center
Republican Party votes	% of votes for George W. Bush	2004	Leip's *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*
Buchanan votes	% of votes for Pat Buchanan	2000	Leip's *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*
Latino elected official	Latino elected officials	Annual 2006–11	National Association of Latino Elected Officials
Immigrant growth	Change in foreign-born population	Change 2000–2006	2000 census and 2006 American Community Survey
Latino growth	Change in Latino population	Change 2000–2006	2000 census and 2006 American Community Survey
Violent crime	Violent crime rate	Annual 2006–11	Bureau of Justice Statistics
Marches in city	Pro-immigrant marches	2006	Database compiled by Bada et al. 2006

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TABLE 3
Means, SDs, and Correlations of Variables in Analysis of Adoption of Pro-immigrant Ordinances

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. Population (ln)	10.99	.71	...																	
2. Education	25.99	8.40	.03	...																
3. Agriculture	27.16	83.52	.00	−.14	...															
4. Construction	16.06	9.28	−.04	.04	.00	...														
5. Food manufacture	.96	.50	−.10	.01	.15	−.03	...													
6. Income change	12.59	6.33	−.05	.42	−.01	.01	.01	...												
7. Mayor-council	.31	.46	−.00	−.00	−.13	.17	.09	−.15	...											
8. State policy	.37	.48	.03	−.00	.18	−.24	.06	.14	−.29	...										
9. Pro-immigrant association	2.40	6.37	.17	−.01	.02	.10	.05	−.12	.10	−.05	...									
10. Democratic Party votes	1.12	.61	−.08	.31	−.05	−.24	.24	.20	−.00	.06	−.04	...								
11. Latino elected official	.44	1.36	.19	−.10	.10	−.20	.06	−.17	−.06	.17	.11	.07	...							
12. Immigrant growth	4.38	4.83	.19	−.07	.18	−.12	.04	−.20	−.09	.23	.12	−.00	.22	...						
13. Latino growth	3.47	6.12	−.05	.12	.07	−.16	.05	.37	−.19	.21	−.07	.21	−.24	.13	...					
14. Violent crimes	482.9	389.7	.25	−.23	.01	.01	−.12	−.43	.08	−.13	.19	−.03	.13	.15	−.15	...				
15. Marches in city	.03	.18	.27	.00	.08	.03	−.04	−.04	.00	.03	.16	−.03	.06	.09	−.04	.14	...			
16. Marches 15 miles	.21	.52	−.04	.12	−.02	−.15	−.03	.11	−.09	.19	−.09	.20	.07	.09	.10	−.09	.01	...		
17. Marches 30 miles	.56	1.18	−.04	.15	−.02	−.17	−.02	.21	−.13	.30	−.07	.28	.07	.14	.20	−.13	.05	.71	...	
18. Marches 45 miles	.87	1.83	−.03	.15	−.02	−.17	−.02	.24	−.15	.32	−.07	.28	.07	.13	.21	−.14	.06	.66	.93	...

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TABLE 4
MEANS, SDS, AND CORRELATIONS OF VARIABLES IN ANALYSIS OF ADOPTION OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT ORDINANCES

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. Population (ln)	11.17	.01	...																	
2. Education	26.38	.11	.04	...																
3. Agriculture	26.13	85.46	.00	−.13	.00															
4. Construction	126.1	70.72	−.08	.02	.00	.01														
5. Food manufacture	43.70	60.99	−.09	−.01	.16	.01	.01													
6. Income change	−4.10	.06	.11	−.13	.15	.01	.05	−.09												
7. Mayor-council	.30	.01	.03	−.01	−.12	.24	.05	−.09	−.02											
8. State policy	.12	.01	.03	.03	−.05	.10	−.01	−.06	−.02	.08										
9. Anti-immigrant association	.01	.00	.05	.01	.04	.06	.02	.07	−.01	.08										
10. Republican Party votes	45.52	.16	.05	−.25	.06	.26	−.12	−.02	−.02	.19	.11	−.13								
11. Latino elected official	.57	.02	.17	−.09	.08	−.21	.00	.15	−.10	−.09	−.05	−.13	−.24							
12. Immigrant growth	.01	.00	−.01	−.01	−.00	.13	−.09	−.12	.11	.10	.01	.18	−.24	.46						
13. Latino growth	2.88	.04	.12	−.07	.12	−.07	−.00	.02	−.11	−.03	−.02	.02	.05	.46	.08					
14. Violent crimes	481.8	386.6	.30	−.20	.00	−.01	−.11	.17	.12	−.01	.03	−.04	.09	.07	.08	.31				
15. Marches in city	.12	.00	.52	.03	.12	−.01	−.01	.07	.07	.00	.14	−.01	.14	.02	.07	.31	−.09			
16. Marches 15 miles	.54	.01	−.05	.22	−.03	−.22	−.03	−.00	−.17	−.11	−.11	−.30	.13	−.15	.19	−.10	−.09	.65		
17. Marches 30 miles	1.39	.02	−.07	.27	−.03	−.26	.00	−.04	−.25	−.18	−.09	−.44	.15	−.21	.23	−.19	−.07	.65	.58	
18. Marches 45 miles	2.20	.03	−.04	.28	−.03	−.27	−.01	−.00	−.28	−.21	−.09	−.45	.13	−.22	.20	−.20	−.06	.58	.90	...

depending on when changes occur in the time period (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 2004). We tested the validity of the proportional hazards assumption using the global test developed by Therneau and Grambsch—results showed that this assumption is valid.[20] These models are appropriate for answering the following question: Given that a municipality has not adopted immigration-related ordinances by the year under observation, what is the probability that it will do so during that year? They are also well suited for dealing with right-censored data, since the time period ends before all potential events have a chance to occur. Because of ties in our data, or the fact that many cases have equivalently recorded event times, we used the exact marginal likelihood method (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Qualitative Methods

To understand the processes at work in the cities that passed these diverging laws, one of the authors conducted fieldwork in two pairs of geographically and economically similarly situated cities in which one city passed an exclusionary ordinance and its pair passed an inclusionary ordinance (Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and Easton, Pennsylvania; Fremont, Nebraska, and Grand Island, Nebraska). All of the cities were overwhelmingly white and native-born in 1990 (none had a Latino or foreign-born population greater than 5%). All experienced a rapid increase in their foreign-born and Latino populations over the past two decades (in 2010 Hazleton was 37% Latino, Grand Island 27%, Easton 20%, and Fremont 12%). Each pair had a similar median household income. Between 2007 and 2011, the author conducted more than 100 open-ended, semistructured interviews with knowledgeable informants, including elected representatives; municipal employees; religious, civic, and labor leaders; business owners; leaders within the Latino community; immigrant residents; and ordinance proponents and opponents. The interviews were transcribed, coded, and analyzed to identify patterns in informants' relevant responses. The author also observed city council sessions, community meetings regarding the ordinances, church services, and other social and civic events. Interviews and participant observation were supplemented by archival research, including review of historical monographs, media coverage of local news related to immigration or immigrants, and transcripts of city council meetings leading up to the passage of the ordinances.

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[20] For example, the chi-square value of the global test of proportional hazards for model 5 in table 6 (with 14 degrees of freedom) is 12.7, well below the critical value of 23.68 for $P < .05$.

RESULTS FROM QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Pro-immigrant Ordinances

Results in table 5 test the hypotheses about the role of social movement organizations, local political opportunity structures, and sociodemographic and political changes on the passage of pro-immigrant laws. Model 2 shows that the presence of pro-immigrant organizations in a community has a significant ($P < .01$) effect on the log-odds of a city adopting pro-immigrant ordinances. Similarly, model 3 shows that the presence of a favorable local political context contributes to the passage of pro-immigrant ordinances: more specifically, municipalities with a high percentage of votes for the Democratic Party are significantly ($P < .001$) more likely to adopt pro-immigrant ordinances than other municipalities. This variable has a relatively large effect: an increase of one in the percentage of votes for the Democratic Party candidate during the 2000 presidential elections corresponds to an increase of almost 2.5 in the hazard ratio of a city passing a pro-immigrant ordinance. Similarly, municipalities with Latino elected officials are significantly ($P < .001$) more likely to adopt pro-immigrant ordinances than other municipalities. Models 2 and 3 also show that cities that are larger, have a more educated populace, and have declining median household incomes are also more likely to adopt pro-immigrant ordinances than other cities.

Models 4 and 5 show that population changes and crime rate changes do not have significant effects on the passage of pro-immigrant ordinances. Model 6, however, shows that municipalities are significantly ($P < .01$) more likely to adopt a pro-immigrant ordinance after they experience pro-immigrant marches.[21] The effect of this variable is large: experiencing a pro-immigrant march increases the hazard ratio of a city passing a pro-immigrant ordinance in the following years by more than 3.5 times. Models 7–9 show that cities located near cities that experienced pro-immigrant marches are not more likely to adopt these ordinances. This suggests that pro-immigrant marches have consequences beyond raising awareness of immigrants' rights—they also lead to the further mobilization of pro-immigrant groups that introduce pro-immigrant legislation, if the municipality does not already have such legislation. This intended consequence of marches, however, does not extend to cities located near those cities that experienced marches.

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[21] Approximately 13% of the cases are dropped from the analysis in model 5 compared to model 4 because some cities do not disclose data on crime. We examined the effect of pro-immigrant marches without the violent crime rate variable and found similar results.

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TABLE 5
Determinants of the Adoption of Pro-immigrant Ordinances, 2000–2011
(Cox Regression—Exact Marginal Likelihood; Hazard Ratios)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Controls:					
Population (ln)	3.168***	3.179***	2.780***	2.869***	2.694***
	(.329)	(.333)	(.308)	(.330)	(.370)
Education.	1.101***	1.102***	1.082***	1.080***	1.085***
	(.017)	(.018)	(.019)	(.019)	(.021)
Agriculture	1.001	1.001	1.001	1.001	1.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Construction	.989	.980	1.002	.994	1.002
	(.015)	(.016)	(.019)	(.020)	(.023)
Food manufacturing . . .	1.707*	1.644	.768	.633	.481
	(.435)	(.422)	(.268)	(.232)	(.206)
Income change	.912**	.927*	.927*	.951	.981
	(.027)	(.027)	(.027)	(.031)	(.035)
Mayor-council.	1.113	1.071	.971	1.072	1.038
	(.316)	(.306)	(.299)	(.338)	(.356)
State policy (pro-immigrant).	1.156	1.241	.930	.957	1.238
	(.309)	(.337)	(.272)	(.293)	(.420)
Social movement organizations:					
Pro-immigrant associations		1.044**	1.030*	1.035*	1.024*
		(.015)	(.015)	(.016)	(.019)
Local political opportunity structures:					
Votes for Gore			2.495***	2.552***	2.658***
			(.466)	(.482)	(.551)
Latino elected officials. . .			1.264***	1.198**	1.174*
			(.068)	(.077)	(.083)
Population change: Immigrant population growth				.987	.997
				(.029)	(.030)
Latino population growth				.957	.945
				(.021)	(.022)
Crime rate change: Violent-crime change. . .					1.001
					(.001)
Number of observations . . .	12,895	12,714	12,698	10,682	9,315
Log-likelihood	162.40***	168.80***	207.90***	197.46***	169.65***

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Controls:				
Population (ln)	2.282***	2.836***	2.692***	2.682***
	(.340)	(.408)	(.379)	(.373)
Education.	1.083***	1.085***	1.085***	1.084***
	(.022)	(.022)	(.021)	(.021)
Agriculture	1.000	1.001	1.001	1.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)

TABLE 5 (*Continued*)

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Construction.	.998	1.007	1.002	1.001
	(.022)	(.023)	(.023)	(.023)
Food manufacturing . . .	.464	.501	.480	.474
	(.196)	(.218)	(.207)	(.205)
Income change	.968	.981	.982	.983
	(.036)	(.036)	(.036)	(.036)
Mayor-council.	1.194	1.116	1.037	1.033
	(.411)	(.387)	(.357)	(.354)
State policy				
(pro-immigrant).	1.315	1.043	1.240	1.263
	(.447)	(.374)	(.438)	(.448)
Pro-immigrant				
associations	1.013	1.027*	1.024*	1.024*
	(.020)	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)
Votes for Democratic				
Party	2.753***	2.429***	2.661***	2.686***
	(.568)	(.532)	(.578)	(.576)
Latino elected				
officials	1.170*	1.170*	1.174*	1.176*
	(.086)	(.084)	(.084)	(.084)
Immigrant population				
growth.	.988	.994	.997	.998
	(.030)	(.030)	(.030)	(.031)
Latino population				
growth.	.953	.944	.945	.944
	(.023)	(.022)	(.022)	(.022)
Violent-crime change	1.001	1.001	1.001	1.001
	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Pro-immigrant marches:				
Within city	3.596**	. . .	. . .	. . .
	(1.516)			
Within 15 miles		1.471	. . .	. . .
		(.296)		
Within 30 miles			.997	. . .
			(.116)	
Within 45 miles				.984
				(.079)
No. of observations	9,315	9,315	9,315	9,315
Log-likelihood.	179.01***	173.18***	169.65***	169.69***

  * $P < .05$.
  ** $P < .01$.
  *** $P < .001$.

Anti-immigrant Ordinances

Results in table 6 test hypotheses about the role of social movement or-
ganizations, local political opportunity structures, and sociodemographic
and political changes on the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances. The
one control variable with a significant and robust effect is population: large

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TABLE 6

DETERMINANTS OF THE ADOPTION OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT ORDINANCES, 2006–11
(COX REGRESSION—EXACT MARGINAL LIKELIHOOD; HAZARD RATIOS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Controls:					
Population (ln)	1.711***	1.718***	1.869***	1.808***	2.343***
	(.245)	(.246)	(.300)	(.305)	(.478)
Education.	.978	.979	.977	.991	.989
	(.019)	(.018)	(.020)	(.022)	(.024)
Agriculture	.998	.998	.996	.995	.995
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.004)	(.003)
Construction	1.014	1.013	1.003	1.011	1.012
	(.016)	(.016)	(.019)	(.018)	(.020)
Food manufacturing	.387*	.398*	.531	.489	.485
	(.164)	(.166)	(.214)	(.213)	(.231)
Income change	1.031	1.027	1.040	1.049	1.063
	(.036)	(.036)	(.039)	(.040)	(.042)
Mayor-council.	.903	.910	.919	1.238	1.776
	(.306)	(.309)	(.330)	(.453)	(.722)
State policy					
(anti-immigrant)	1.154	1.101	.884	1.025	1.141
	(.480)	(.459)	(.434)	(.527)	(.609)
Social movement organizations:					
Anti-immigrant					
associations		51.486	19.976	11.012	12.942
		(125.565)	(50.929)	(28.247)	(36.843)
Local political opportunity structures:					
Votes for Bush			1.030*	1.032*	1.021
			(.014)	(.014)	(.015)
Votes for Buchannan. . . .			1.849	1.651	1.473
			(1.028)	(.993)	(1.007)
Latino elected officials. . .			.879	.836	.841
			(.126)	(.134)	(.137)
Population change:					
Immigrant population					
growth				.001	.008
				(.001)	(.097)
Latino population					
growth				1.257***	1.265***
				(.061)	(.064)
Crime rate change:					
Violent-crime change. . . .					.998*
					(.001)
Number of observations . . .	7,039	7,031	6,204	6,204	5,307
Log-likelihood	23.44**	25.45**	33.10***	58.17***	62.00***

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Controls:				
Population (ln)	2.804***	2.301***	2.253***	2.317***
	(.675)	(.463)	(.454)	(.470)
Education.	.989	.992	.991	.990
	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)	(.024)

TABLE 6 (*Continued*)

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Agriculture	.996	.995	.995	.995
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Construction	1.012	1.008	1.006	1.009
	(.020)	(.020)	(.020)	(.021)
Food manufacturing	.490	.465	.463	.474
	(.233)	(.216)	(.213)	(.224)
Income change	1.063	1.060	1.062	1.064
	(.042)	(.042)	(.042)	(.042)
Mayor-council.	1.892	1.619	1.601	1.700
	(.777)	(.656)	(.649)	(.696)
State policy				
(anti-immigrant)	1.075	1.118	1.032	1.061
	(.579)	(.590)	(.547)	(.576)
Anti-immigrant				
associations	19.521	6.248	7.796	11.645
	(54.888)	(17.807)	(22.317)	(33.320)
Votes for Bush	1.021	1.018	1.016	1.019
	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)
Votes for Buchanan	1.480	1.370	1.392	1.483
	(1.001)	(.935)	(.933)	(1.005)
No Latino elected				
officials	.854	.870	.854	.848
	(.138)	(.142)	(.135)	(.137)
Immigrant population				
growth	.039	.001	.001	.001
	(.428)	(.001)	(.001)	(.013)
Latino population				
growth	1.263***	1.303***	1.310***	1.283***
	(.063)	(.066)	(.071)	(.071)
Violent-crime change. . . .	.998*	.998*	.998**	.998*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Pro-immigrant marches:				
Within city	.415	. . .	. . .	. . .
	(.260)			
Within 15 miles.		.537*	. . .	. . .
		(.150)		
Within 30 miles.			.777	. . .
			(.117)	
Within 45 miles.				.944
				(.086)
No. of observations.	5,307	5,307	5,307	5,307
Log-likelihood	64.15***	67.78***	65.03***	62.40***

* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.
*** $P < .001$.

cities are more likely to adopt anti-immigrant ordinances than other cities. Indeed, larger cities are more likely to pass both pro- and anti-immigrant ordinances—a finding consistent with other quantitative analyses of these policies (Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010).

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Model 2 shows that the presence of anti-immigrant social movement organizations does not have a significant effect on the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances. Model 3 shows that the only measure of the presence of a political context favorable to anti-immigrant policy making that has a significant effect on the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances is the percentage of the electorate voting for the Republican candidate in 2004. This effect is no longer significant, however, once both measures of structural social changes are included in model 5.

Models 4 and 5 in table 5 show that local sociodemographic changes affect the likelihood of the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances. It is interesting that an increase in the immigrant population does not lead to the adoption of anti-immigrant ordinances, as we had hypothesized. Instead, an increase in the Latino population is correlated with the adoption of an anti-immigrant ordinance. Cities with increasing rates of violent crime are less likely to adopt anti-immigrant ordinances. An increase of 1 in the rate of violent crimes per 100,000 persons is associated with a decrease of .002 in the hazard ratio of a city adopting an anti-immigrant law, a relatively small but significant (P<.05) effect. These results suggest that Latinos are used as scapegoats for political leaders who want to get "tough on crime"—in other words, the adoption of anti-immigrant legislation may be presented as addressing concerns about crime even though connections made between immigration and crime are unfounded.

Finally, models 6–9 show that the presence of proximate pro-immigrant marches inhibits the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances in nearby cities. The effect of marches, however, depends on the distance between cities. Model 6 shows that cities that experienced pro-immigrant marches are not more likely to pass anti-immigrant legislation than other cities. In fact, as we saw from results in table 5, cities that experienced marches are subsequently more likely to pass pro-immigrant policies. Model 7 shows that the effect of marches is significant within 15 miles and is associated with a nearly 50% decrease in the hazard ratio of a city passing an anti-immigrant ordinance. The effect of geographic proximity to marches, however, decreases rapidly with geographic distance. Models 8 and 9 show that cities located 30 miles or more from cities that experienced marches are not significantly less likely to adopt anti-immigrant ordinances than other cities.[22] Notably, the effect of proximity to pro-immigrant marches is net of the effect of Latino population growth.

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[22] The effect of proximity to marches within a 30-mile radius is significant at $P < .10$, not at $P < .05$. The effect of proximity to marches within a 45-mile radius is not significant at $P < .10$.

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Robustness of Findings

In analyses not shown in the tables above we used alternative measures to test the robustness of the findings. We added the statewide citizen ideology measure developed by Berry et al. (1998); because these data were available only between 2000 and 2008, we calculated the average score for citizen ideology between these years and used it as a score for the years 2009–11.[23] We added a measure for the change in the Asian population. We used two alternative measures to gauge whether local economies are dependent on immigrant labor: employment in farming per population and number of acres of land in farms. We also included additional control measures such as poverty rate, change in the percentage of people employed in manufacturing, and location in the South census region, to check whether communities affected by high poverty rates, loss of manufacturing jobs, and location in the South are more likely to adopt anti-immigrant ordinances.

We used additional controls, such as local government expenditures, to check whether cities with higher per capita expenditures are more likely to pass either pro- or anti-immigrant ordinances. We also included county-level measures of the presence of associations that may become allies with pro-immigrant groups, such as labor unions, social advocacy associations, and civic and social associations. We created the variable "ballots in Spanish" using information about counties with bilingual (English and Spanish) election materials in 2000 as reported in the Federal Register.[24] Because of the significant role that Spanish-language radio stations have played in immigrant collective action (see, e.g., Fox and Bada 2011), we controlled for the presence of a Spanish-language radio station using information from Radio-Locator.[25] Adding these new variables and alternative measures did not change the effects of the main variables of interest on the dependent variables—for simplicity in presentation, we do not show these additional results.

We considered an additional indicator of anti-immigrant municipal political opportunity structure: the degree of conservatism of the local political elites.[26] We calculated the degree of conservatism of the local political elites based on the nonadoption of ordinances on three progressive issues during the last 15 years: civil liberties, peace, and living wages. We use the non-

[23] We thank William Berry for making these data available.

[24] See *Federal Register*, vol. 67, no. 144, Friday, July 26, 2002.

[25] See Radio-Locator's website, http://radio-locator.com/cgi-bin/page?page=about.

[26] We sought, but were unable to find, more detailed annual measures of mayors' and council members' conservatism. We were also unable to construct a more complex annual measure of local political elites' ethnic or racial homogeneity—for example, we could not find any nationally representative data on African-American or Asian American municipal elected officials.

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adoption of civil liberties, peace, and living wage ordinances as proxies for local political elites' conservatism.[27] The conservative ordinances index was calculated by summing the number of ordinances adopted by each city and reverse coding it—the three items covaried somewhat strongly, with a Cronbach's alpha of .63. The variable had similar effects to those of the other measures of anti-immigrant municipal opportunity structures—again, for simplicity in presentation, we do not show these additional results.

Finally, we examined the interaction between social movement organizations and political opportunity structures. Following scholars who underscore the interactive and contingent effects of social movement organizations, political opportunity structures, and other contextual factors (Cress and Snow 2000; Soule and Olzak 2004; Amenta 2006; Giugni 2007; Giugni and Yamasaki 2009), we tested the interaction between the presence of Latino elected officials and pro-immigrant associations, as well as the interaction between the Latino elected officials and anti-immigrant associations. We also examined the interaction between political orientation and pro- and anti-immigrant organizations. The interactions were not significant—we do not show these results for simplicity in presentation.

RESULTS FROM QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

We can gain a more nuanced understanding of these quantitative findings through the qualitative results. Hazleton, Pennsylvania, briefly entered the national media spotlight in the summer of 2006 when its then-mayor (and now U.S. Representative), Lou Barletta, introduced the Illegal Immigration Relief Act, with the stated intention of making life so difficult for undocumented immigrants that they would leave the city. The ordinance was not initially proposed or backed by any local organization, and Barletta stated that he drafted the first version himself, based on a similar ordinance he had heard about that had failed to pass in San Bernardino, California.[28] After two contested city council hearings marked by large

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[27] We assume that the nonadoption of these ordinances indicates that a community has conservative mayors and council members and that those political elites remain influential locally for a few years. We obtained data about the passage of civil liberties from the Bill of Rights Defense Committee (BORDC). See BORDC's website, http://www .bordc.org/resolutions.php. We obtained data about the passage of peace resolutions from the Institute for Policy Studies (http://www.ips-dc.org/about). We obtained information about the adoption of municipal living wage ordinances from the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). We obtained data from ACORN's website (http://www.livingwagecampaign.org/index.php?id=1961); unfortunately, this website is no longer available.

[28] Barletta was eventually assisted by Kris Kobach, counsel to the Immigration Reform Law Institute, a partner of the restrictionist Federation for American Immigration Re-

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crowds of opponents and proponents inside and outside the Hazleton City Hall, the city council enacted the ordinance on July 13, 2006.

In discussing the ordinance, Barletta emphasized two primary themes: the threat he argued that undocumented immigrants posed to the local way of life, and the connection between undocumented immigrants and violent crime. Indeed, the ordinance's Declaration of Purpose begins by stating: "The People of the City of Hazleton find and declare that illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates . . . and destroys our neighborhoods and diminishes our overall quality of life" (City of Hazleton 2006*c*, sec. 2[a]).

In presenting the ordinance to the public, Barletta repeatedly characterized the growing immigrant population in Hazleton as a threat to quality of life, declaring that "illegal immigrants are ruining the quality of life, which is the best thing a small town has to offer" (in Simonich 2006, p. A1). Similarly, on the website he created to raise money for Hazleton's legal defense fund, Barletta mobilized residents by calling on them to protect Hazleton's quality of life and "inspire others to become small town defenders."[29]

Barletta and the city council also presented the ordinance as a response to a perceived increase in local violent crimes. In his speech to the city council before their first vote on the ordinance, Barletta emphasized recent crimes that he said were committed by undocumented immigrants as his main reason for introducing the law: "Recent crimes—the shooting on Chestnut Street, the discharge of firearms at the Pine Street Playground, high-profile drug busts—have involved illegal immigrants. . . . It is my goal that this ordinance will eventually deter crime in Hazleton. Deprived of a place to live and without family or friends who live and work in Hazleton illegally, other illegal immigrants may choose to look elsewhere when choosing a place to commit a crime" (City of Hazleton 2006*a*). To justify the ordinance at its second reading before the city council, Barletta again emphasized the connection he drew between undocumented immigration and violent crime:

> I swore an oath to protect the residents of this City—the legal residents of this City. When people are gunned down outside their homes, I cannot sit by and wait for a solution. When residents are afraid to walk down a City street, I cannot ignore their complaints. . . . There are those in the community who have attempted to justify criminal conduct. They say that crossing the border without papers or buying someone else's identity or overstaying a tourist or student Visa is not illegal. . . . These people could not be more wrong. When you start justifying one criminal act, it becomes easier and easier to justify more. Illegal is illegal—period! As I told the Senate Committee and countless

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form (FAIR). After a similar ordinance was introduced in Fremont, Nebraska, Kobach also assisted in revising that city's ordinance. Kobach also helped draft similar laws in other cities and states, including Arizona, Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama.

[29] www.smalltowndefenders.com.

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> media outlets across the country over the past several weeks, Hazleton is a small town USA. We are an All-American city. (City of Hazleton 2006*b*)

Fremont, Nebraska, passed an ordinance modeled after Hazleton's four years later. In Fremont, a group of residents encouraged a city councillor to introduce the bill, but the mayor and city council rejected it. Other Fremont residents persevered and gathered signatures for a citywide referendum, at which the anti-immigrant ordinance, Ordinance 5165, was approved by 57% of voters on June 21, 2010.

A few of the residents who advocated for the ordinance had once been members of the Minutemen, but none were at the time because they felt organizations like the Minutemen hindered their ability to have an impact. Instead, the residents who pushed for the ordinance were a mix of conservative residents who framed the ordinance in terms similar to those evoked by Barletta in Hazleton. This framing echoed the rhetoric long put forth by national anti-immigrant groups, such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform and NumbersUSA, whose websites Fremont's activists used to gather statistics. They described the threats illegal immigration posed to quality of life, to public safety, and to political power. As one interviewee intimately involved in the ordinance passage said, "I don't blame those people for coming up here, but if they come up here illegally they pull down our standards of living."[30] Another leader of the ordinance effort recounted: "Some people who were against this [ordinance], they started changing their tune when there would be a house for rent down the street and they [Latinos] move in and they see there's a couple families living there and not taking care of their yard, and their neighborhood starts changing. . . . You don't want your neighborhood to go down."[31]

Similar to Hazleton's Illegal Immigration Relief Act, Fremont's Ordinance 5165 begins by stating that "crimes committed by illegal aliens in the City harm the health, safety and welfare of U.S. citizens," thus justifying the ordinance in terms of the police powers of local governments. When one of the leaders of the referendum movement was asked how the issue became important to him, he replied with his perception that "we've noticed an influx of Hispanics to our community in the past eight to ten years, and crime has gone up."[32] Ordinance supporters frequently blamed illegal immigrants for what they perceived to be rising crime rates and framed the issue as one of law and order, asking, "How can you be against

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[30] Telephone interview with a central figure in the passage of Ordinance 5165 in Fremont, Nebraska, August 12, 2010.

[31] Interview with a central figure in the passage of Ordinance 5165 in Fremont, Nebraska, conducted in Fremont, Nebraska, on August 13, 2010.

[32] Interview with a central figure in the passage of Ordinance 5165 in Fremont, Nebraska, conducted in Fremont, Nebraska, on August 13, 2010.

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following the law?" (in Davey 2010, A1). Another activist from a nearby city working for the passage of the Fremont ordinance described what she saw as the consequences of undocumented immigration: "We cannot sustain a situation like this—if illegals are sending more money out of the country than we have coming in, we're going to go bankrupt. We talk about deaths caused by illegal aliens, the environmental issues they cause. You can think about the border as our front yard, and here it has millions traipsing across it bringing with them the dangers of drug cartels and of terrorists paying the drug cartels and the MS-13 gangs to come across the country—even here in the Midwest, the Department of Justice recently put out a high-intensity threat report."[33]

In addition to "quality of life" and violent crime, ordinance supporters in Fremont highlighted the local and national political consequences of the 2006 immigrants' rights marches. When asked how immigration became important to her, that same activist pointed to an immigrants' rights march that occurred in Omaha, about 35 miles from Fremont, and replied: "It became important to me in 2006, when the illegal aliens and their American supporters marched across our country demanding an amnesty. . . . I wanted to get involved at every level, educating citizens and our politicians about the negative impact of illegal immigration."[34]

The political processes leading to the passage of the anti-immigrant ordinances in Hazleton and Fremont clearly differed. In Hazleton, the mayor on his own initiative introduced the ordinance and the city council quickly enacted it. In Fremont, ad hoc, informal, fluctuating collections of local conservative residents encouraged the ordinance's introduction and were essential to its ultimate passage by referendum. In neither city did a formal or informal, local, named organization play a significant role in favor of the anti-immigrant ordinance. In both cities, however, the justifications for the ordinance were strikingly similar and closely paralleled the talking points set out by national organizations opposed to immigration. Ordinance proponents in both cities framed undocumented immigration as a threat to local quality of life and a danger to public safety in ways that mirrored the framing by the national anti-immigrant movement. In Fremont, supporters also highlighted their concerns about Latino political participation and pro-immigrant marches in neighboring cities. These cases contrast sharply with the experiences of Easton and Grand Island.

The same week in 2006 that Hazleton's city council was considering the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, Easton's city council passed

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[33] Interview with a central figure in the passage of Ordinance 5165 in Fremont, Nebraska, conducted in Omaha, Nebraska, August 13, 2010.
[34] Interview with a central figure in the passage of Ordinance 5165 in Fremont, Nebraska, conducted in Omaha, Nebraska, August 13, 2010.

an ordinance to create a Human Relations Commission in order to receive and investigate discrimination complaints. Ken Brown, a progressive first-term city councillor, introduced the Easton ordinance. Explaining the decision, he said, "We [the city council] felt at that time that there was a population out there that wasn't being heard. We wanted to send the message that discrimination would not be tolerated. We also wanted to make sure everyone who did business in Easton knew that someone else was watching and to make sure that all residents in town had a place where they knew they could be heard."[35]

Significant to the city's recognition of the importance of new protections against discrimination was the city's one organization created to serve the Latino community, El Puente (The Bridge). The organization was founded by Monica Samoya-Brown, Ken Brown's wife, who moved to Easton from Guatemala with her parents when she was two years old. Highlighting the organization's function connecting different communities, she described the goals of El Puente as being "to integrate a community that felt disenfranchised."[36] She said that "people from all backgrounds would come and seek our help, and because I have a lot of links in this city I can help be an advocate or a middle person, in meetings at the school district, at the social security office, wherever."[37] As its name suggests, El Puente serves an important role in Easton as a bridge between the Latino community and city officials—helping convey concerns arising among Latino residents to the city leadership and encouraging municipal officials to keep the Latino community in mind as they craft city policies.

The brokerage that local organizations create between previously disconnected groups can be both formal and informal. In the formal sense, advocates from these organizations often serve on advisory boards for city agencies or nonprofit groups where they can help shape those activities to be more inclusive of immigrant communities. In the informal sense, the relationships that are formed between immigrant and native-born leaders are often crucial to creating awareness among elected officials of challenges immigrants face and opportunities to create more welcoming contexts. The leader of another Easton community organization recounted how the mayor happened to come to the aid of an immigrant teacher and her students facing harassment: "We were running a . . . program teaching computer skills. . . . I was having a board meeting for the community center at the same time. It was the Spanish-speaking night, and this man

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[35] Interview with Ken Brown, conducted in Easton, Pennsylvania, March 3, 2011.

[36] Interview with Monica Samoya-Brown, conducted in Easton, Pennsylvania, May 6, 2011.

[37] Interview with Monica Samoya-Brown, conducted in Easton, Pennsylvania, May 6, 2011.

came in and started questioning the students, demanding, 'Let me see your green card! Let me see your social security card!' . . . This guy was in my facilitator's face, and the now mayor of Easton was on my board, and he and the board president escorted this man out."[38]

In this example, the organization serves as a formal broker by connecting local native-born elected officials to immigrant residents through their membership on the boards of social service agencies and also serves to directly connect these officials to a greater awareness of immigrant experiences.

Grand Island is in central Nebraska, with a local economy centered around meatpacking and light manufacturing, as in Fremont. Over the past decade, a number of different private institutions and public agencies in Grand Island have developed programs to support immigrant residents and foster their incorporation into local social and political life. For example, the regional hospital created a clinic in a local shopping mall to reach out to immigrant residents; doctors independently volunteered their time to create a separate free clinic for native-born and immigrant residents without insurance; the school district created a welcome center to ensure that immigrant students got the English-language support they needed and could start in the appropriate classes as soon as possible; the local health center created a program for immigrant residents to understand the health system; and the Chamber of Commerce created a program to develop the business skills of immigrant entrepreneurs.

Central to these policies was the support of both Anglo and Latino elected officials who recognized that immigrants were a growing part of Grand Island's population and who decided to take a proactive approach to immigrant incorporation. For instance, in order to educate himself and other leaders on immigration policies, then-mayor Ken Gnadt formed a study group bringing together business leaders, city councillors, school district officials, police officers, and others to travel to other cities that had experienced an increase in their immigrant populations and discuss policies that might be beneficial in Grand Island. Among other things, Gnadt then supported the development of the first community organization in Grand Island focused on serving immigrant residents and building cross-cultural understanding, the Multicultural Coalition. Together with School Superintendent Steve Joel, Gnadt also spearheaded the city's efforts to create a welcome center for new arrivals to the school system. Much of this innovation occurred at the same time as Grand Island was influenced by the political participation of the city's first Latino city councillors, Ray

[38] Interview with community organization leader conducted in Easton, Pennsylvania, May 5, 2012.

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Aguilar, who later went on to represent the city as its state senator, and Jose Zapata.

Perhaps most crucial to the success of Grand Island's inclusive policies have been the bridges between immigrant and native-born residents created by the city's network of community organizations. For instance, the Multicultural Coalition leads the 10-week Grassroots Leadership Program that introduces immigrants to the functioning of the city and county governments and the school system. A different public agency leader speaks with participants each week, creating the opportunity for a crucial back-and-forth between emerging immigrant leaders and established city officials.

In summary, the success of inclusionary policies in Easton and Grand Island can be attributed largely to community organizations serving the immigrant community and to sympathetic local elected officials. In both Easton and Grand Island it was not the chapters of national pro-immigrant organizations that played the most central role but, instead, locally rooted, independent grassroots groups. The presence of affiliates or chapters of national organizations such as CLINIC or NCLR (several of which were present and active in Grand Island and in the city neighboring Easton), however, seems to serve as an effective proxy for the strength of the local civil society infrastructure serving and representing recent immigrants. Local organizations, elected officials, and immigrant community leaders did not so much highlight the rapidity or the significance of the demographic change as an opportunity but, instead, repeatedly appealed to native-born residents' memories of their own immigrant ancestors and worked to create a local collective identity as residents of Easton or Grand Island. This situation contrasts with the experiences of cities passing anti-immigrant laws, in which local social movement organizations were weak and instead individuals picked up on frames created by organizations operating at the national level to construct local social changes as threats and to activate an otherwise unorganized base.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This article makes three primary contributions to the literature on social movement outcomes and immigration policy making. First, employing a unique research design that compares the effects of two contemporaneous movements on local policies, we find that the factors that influence these proactive and reactive movements' ability to exert influence differ. Pro-immigrant local associations matter for the passage of local pro-immigrant ordinances, but anti-immigrant local associations are not significant for the passage of anti-immigrant policies. Local political opportunity structures are highly significant in the passage of pro-immigrant policies, but

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they are not significant for anti-immigrant ones. What *is* significant for the passage of anti-immigrant policies are local social and demographic changes that local residents or political leaders have framed as threats in ways that mirror the framing by national anti-immigrant organizations.

Why do these measures of associations and political contexts matter for the pro-immigrant movement but not for the anti-immigrant one? Based on the qualitative analysis, we argue that associations and political context matter for the pro-immigrant movement because the proactive policies they seek to pass require sustained effort to craft, to win support, and to successfully enact. Immigrant civil society groups are essential because they serve as brokers, connecting two previously unconnected groups and mediating the relationships between the two (McAdam et al. 2001; Vasi 2011). Sympathetic political elites are important because they are well positioned to build support among native-born elites for pro-immigrant policies and to overcome skepticism among native-born voters.

With regard to the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances, the quantitative findings demonstrate that groups such as the Minutemen have not had a measurable impact on the passage of local laws, despite the tremendous media attention directed toward them. Although their efforts advocating for immigration restriction and a hard line against undocumented immigrants may have been effective in setting a tone at the national or statewide level—a tone that has encouraged the passage of local anti-immigrant laws—the findings indicate that the location of local chapters is not correlated with the passage of local ordinances in those same cities. The lack of correlation between restrictionist organizations or political opportunity structures and anti-immigrant local policies suggests that the upsurge in municipal anti-immigrant laws is mainly attributable to the actions of individuals or informal groups who were able to draw on framing by national organizations and present local social changes as threats in a way that resonated with residents and elected officials.

The results suggest more broadly that organizational characteristics and political opportunities may not be as important as previously thought in explaining the effectiveness of reactive movements representing dominant societal positions. Laws, of course, do not pass themselves, even if they represent what may appear to be a widely held sentiment and target groups excluded from political participation. There will always be individuals and groups drafting, proposing, and framing legislation just as there will always be calculations by voters, elected officials, and elites of a law's costs and benefits. Accordingly, the paradigms of inquiry characterized by a focus on political opportunities and organizational dynamics continue to be relevant to the examination of these movements. Here, the provision of broadly resonant frames and convenient statistics by national level anti-immigrant organizations played an important role at the local level. Nev-

ertheless, the results indicate that the type of formal social movement organizations commonly associated with local anti-immigrant policies actually have not been a significant factor in the passage of those laws in the municipalities where those organizations are located. The results further suggest that when reactive movements attempting to maintain the status quo also align with a dominant political perspective, social movement organizations and traditional measures of political opportunity may be less significant than they are for proactive movements.

Second, we find that the framing of structural social changes is an essential mechanism that mediates how these changes affect policy outcomes. The quantitative analysis found that an increase in the Latino population is significant for the anti-immigrant movement but not for the pro-immigrant movement. The qualitative analysis found that the anti-immigrant movement at the national level has consistently framed rising Latino populations and rising crime rates as threats and that this framing was picked up by local elected officials and residents interested in the issue and rapidly turned into legislative action at the local level. By contrast, the pro-immigrant movement did not have a narrative that connected falling crime rates or rising foreign-born populations to particular threats or opportunities but worked instead to build bridges and create a shared local collective identity by highlighting the history of the United States as a nation of immigrants. This relation between local structural changes and both the local and national framing of those changes is supported by recent political science research examining the temporal dynamic of the passage of municipal anti-immigrant laws (Hopkins 2010).

Our qualitative research found that structural social changes were imbued with meaning through the attribution of particular locally resonant threats—the threat Latinos were presented as posing to established quality of life and the threat illegal immigrants were presented as posing to law and order. Changes in the size of the local Latino population were frequently described as a rise in the undocumented population and then constructed as a threat that generated concern bordering on hysteria. For example, one early ordinance supporter in Fremont explained: "We've got a lot of Hispanics here and I'm assuming there's a lot of illegals. I'm not racist. I just want people to be here by the rule of law. If you come here, be legal. But it just so happens that the majority of illegals are Hispanic, so we always refer to the illegals as Hispanic." Indeed, the ordinance supporter went on, "The main goal is to get 'em out of here."[39]

The findings also indicate that, although ordinance proponents consistently referenced increases in crime rates as a reason to enact anti-

[39] Interview with central figure in the passage of Fremont, Nebraska's Ordinance 5165 conducted in Fremont, Nebraska, on August 16, 2010.

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immigrant ordinances, cities experiencing a decrease in crime actually had an increased likelihood of passing these anti-immigrant policies. These findings thus suggest that local political leaders may be representing crime as a grievance and blaming immigrants for it even in localities where violent crime is actually decreasing. As with previous generations of immigrants (Higham 2004), the widespread "belief that crime is a negative side effect of immigration seems to have become a broadly accepted 'social fact'" (Wadsworth 2010, p. 532). Empirical research, however, has found that this widespread belief is wrong. Individual-level studies have found that the foreign-born are less likely to engage in criminal activity than their native-born counterparts, and comparisons across metropolitan areas have found that increased levels of immigration are consistently correlated with decreases in crime (Reid et al. 2005; Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Wadsworth 2010). Nevertheless, claims about connections between undocumented immigration and crime have been at the forefront of the justifications for local anti-immigrant laws.

To be clear, it is not the structural changes themselves that cause the effect, but their perception, which is determined by how these changes are framed. The findings thus suggest that it makes sense to consider these structural social changes and their framing in relation to one another, as the creation of resonant grievances or threats out of unsettling social shifts.

The different opportunities for framing help explain why structural social changes are significant for the anti-immigrant movement but not the pro-immigrant one. When we think abstractly about movements and countermovements, we generally assume that they confront each other on an even playing field. But the playing field itself can be as uneven as the resources that opposing movements bring to it. The difference between the proactive immigrants' rights movement and the reactive immigration restrictionist movement is the difference between a movement seeking rights for a minority excluded from the political process and a movement positioning itself under the culturally resonant banner of law and order, with the commonsense refrain that "illegal is illegal." Since 2001, immigration, particularly undocumented immigration, has increasingly been represented as intertwined with public safety, criminal justice, and national security (Miller 2003; Chacon 2007; Legomsky 2007). McAdam (1982) pointed out that mobilization generally requires "cognitive liberation"—instead of attributing problems to their own faulty choices or bad fortune, activists must come to recognize the problems as widely shared, attribute them to broader structural factors, and believe that mobilization can be successful. Where a reactive movement aligns with dominant societal norms, however, the need for such cognitive liberation may be lessened. For example, anti-immigrant activists frequently rail against the generic message asking a caller to "press one for English" as an unfair imposition on English domi-

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nance, as compared to seeing it as a reasonable accommodation to linguistic diversity. In other words, dominant groups may be unlikely to blame themselves, quick to recognize social changes that reduce taken-for-granted privileges, eager to protect their power (e.g., through "English only" or "official English" laws), and optimistic that they will succeed.

One thing that these social constructions of threats share is what political satirist Stephen Colbert has termed "truthiness," defined by the American Dialect Society as "the quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts known to be true."[40] The inaccurate statements of local leaders that the majority of Latinos were illegal, that immigrants created crime, and that Mexicans were going to take over, had an intuitive appeal because they took local increases in the Latino population, high-profile crimes, and increased regional political activity by immigrants and crafted a story of the threat of illegal immigration that resonated with residents and that found support in arguments made at the national level (see Huntington 2004; Chavez 2008). In short, the construction of threats was able to mobilize residents because it picked up on real social changes even though it attributed threats to these changes that were not causally related.

These findings differ somewhat from other studies of reactive movements, which have found that movement organizations did matter to mobilization and to outcomes (McVeigh et al. 2004; Soule 2004). Examining states' passage of same-sex marriage bans, Soule (2004) found little support for the significance of political opportunity structures but concluded that interest organizations on both sides of the debate did have an impact. We believe that the difference in findings with regard to the impact of interest organizations can be explained by the greater significance here of social changes framed by a national movement in terms that resonated locally as threats. McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink's (2004) analysis of the Klan's ability to mobilize supporters and secure political gains found that structural conditions were significant for mobilization and that the Klan's organizational strength had an impact on voting patterns in the presidential election. They found that the Klan's extreme views and exclusionary boundary construction, however, alienated nonmembers and frustrated the Klan's attempts to achieve broader political gains. The qualitative research here similarly suggests that while the national anti-immigrant movement's message may have resonated with local voters seeing rapid immigration, the extreme views of Minutemen chapters and other local anti-immigrant groups may have prevented these local actors from affecting policy outcomes at the municipal level more directly.

[40] "Truthiness" was chosen as the world of the year by the American Dialect Society in 2006; see http://www.merriam-webster.com/info/06words.htm.

A third contribution of this study is the analysis of the spatial consequences of movement protest. We find that protest can simultaneously cut in favor of a movement in the locality where the protest occurs and inhibit the effectiveness of a countermovement in nearby localities. Social movement scholars have argued that one movement may create opportunities for another as they respond to new tactics from their opposition (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). A study of the movement-countermovement dynamic in the context of gay rights finds that the religious right not only failed to dissuade Americans from accepting homosexuality, but that it simultaneously mobilized gay and lesbian political activity and may actually have increased levels of tolerance in the United States (Fetner 2008). Our study shows not only that there is an unintended consequence of pro-immigrant mobilization but also that this effect at the local level depends on the geographic proximity of this mobilization.

Anti-immigrant activists' public statements revealed that they considered the mobilization of immigrants and their supporters in 2006 as an affront to American values and a sign of immigration's political threat to Anglo-American dominance. As McVeigh et al. (2004) note, the drawing of collective identity boundaries that catalyze mobilization among members may contribute to a backlash among the larger population. The findings here show that protest events were correlated with policy enactment at the local level, that the effect of protest events diminished with increasing distance from the site of the mobilization, and that protest events inhibited the effectiveness of nearby countermovements. We believe that this failure of any backlash to take root in the same city where protest occurred or in geographically proximate cities is because the presence of organizational resources sufficient to organize the pro-immigrant protests suggests the capacity to defeat anti-immigrant ordinances, if they were even introduced.

Taken together, these findings provoke a number of questions for further research. The results highlight the importance of exploring in other contexts how distinct types of movements (e.g., proactive/reactive) may respond differently to similar conditions, instead of assuming that specific factors affect all movements in the same manner. The results also raise the possibility that in addition to the difference between movements seeking new resources as compared to those trying to prevent the loss of existing ones, the latent, related distinction between movements defending a dominant societal position as compared to those advancing a more marginal one is also crucial.

Given the salience of cultural factors as opposed to economic ones in the grievances significant here, the results reinforce Soule's (2004) suggestion that the processes driving the adoption of policies seen as resting on morality may differ from those related to social welfare and warrant further analysis. Further research that can measure the actual local framing of

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structural changes in a nationally representative manner would be valuable to explore with more specificity the relation between national and local framings and the impact on movement outcomes.

Finally, the findings regarding the spatiality of movement-countermovement dynamics also raise the question of whether there was clustering of cities that adopted pro- and anti-immigrant policies as neighboring cities become interpreted as either positive or negative models by their neighbors. Further research could explore this potential diffusion process in greater detail.

In addition to the value to sociological theory of further research along these lines, we believe this article can catalyze relevant new research on immigration. As Justice Anthony Kennedy said in the recent Supreme Court decision on Arizona's controversial immigration law, "Immigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation" (*Arizona et al. v. United States*, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 [2012]). States and localities are increasingly trying to play a role in shaping that policy and, in the coming decades, this contestation over immigration at the local level is likely to increase.

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