

ways that go beyond politics or policy changes. These cultural outcomes are harder to measure than are those in the formal political sphere, but may be equally important.

And finally, one of the strengths of the book is also somewhat narratively problematic—the frequent reviews of the literature. These discussions are especially helpful for nonexperts. But at times they are oddly haunted by the presence of the senior author, Doug McAdam, who is sometimes indicated as responsible for early and important insights that have been lost, or as the author of disciplinary tendencies that this book calls into question. For example, McAdam is rightly cited on page 64 as having proposed the “political process model” of mobilization. Then the authors say that the key subjective/cultural dimension of this model (“cognitive liberation”) was largely forgotten, leaving a truncated model of change. But if McAdam was responsible for the political process model, he was also an active player in the field when “cognitive liberation” was written out of most analyses, and he might have been in a position to keep that analytic dimension alive in social movement scholarship through his writing.

Putting Social Movements in Their Place, with its fine-grained empirical analyses and thoughtful conceptual work, makes several important interventions to the field and promises to inform subsequent research in very productive ways.

The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics. By W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xiv+240. \$29.99 (paper).

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One of the most significant changes to social movements is activists' use of digital technology and media—from mobile phone texting to Facebook and Twitter. The Arab Spring and the Occupy movement brought these technologies' transformative potential to the public eye. Observers praised activists who relied on digital media to coordinate collective action, to resist authority, and to broadcast their claims to a global audience. Despite the important functions such media have played in movements, sociologists who study social movements have been slow to address their role in activism. W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg's *The Logic of Connective Action* is a welcome introduction to the topic and should, I hope, convince more sociologists that our theories of movements should consider social media as a distinctive resource, one that transforms the way people engage in activism rather than simply augmenting traditional communications.

The authors make three main points. First, in contrast to traditional forms of collective action, digital media create a competing logic of connective action. This logic is derived from beliefs in individuality and distrust of hierarchy and authority, a desire to be inclusive, and the availability of open technologies. Second, with digital media people contribute to movements through personalized expression, rather than group actions that coalesce around collective identities. This high level of personalization allows individuals to connect in flexible ways, adapting movements to fit their own lifestyles, beliefs, and meaning. Ideology and shared identity take a backseat to individuality and expression. Third, communication becomes the basic form of organizing, replacing hierarchical structures and professional leaders. Bennett and Segerberg are careful to recognize that in many situations standard models of collective action exist side by side with connective action. Yet, their main intent is clearly to explore and uncover the dynamics of this new approach to organizing rather than explicitly compare the two.

The first chapter lays out this framework and conceptualizes three types of connective action networks: crowd enabled, organizationally enabled, and organizationally brokered. The first type of network is the purest form of connective action, relying on people's genuine expressions as a mechanism of coordination. The latter relies on established, central organizations to link individuals and provide the frames that individuals in the network should use. In organizationally enabled networks, organizations are present but they are seen as just another node in the network, even adopting the same repertoire of personalized expression to engage with the community. Although most connective action lies somewhere along the spectrum, they point to the Occupy movement as exemplary of a crowd-enabled network and the G20 London summit protests as illustrative of an organizationally brokered network.

The empirical chapters of the book consist of comparisons between different movement networks. Chapter 2 compares two online networks protesting the recent financial crisis and shows that the organizationally enabled network was able to sustain itself whereas the organizationally brokered network eventually disappeared after an initial surge. Chapter 3 compares two climate-change protest networks operating on Twitter. They demonstrate that crowd-enabled networks draw from a variety of online resources, especially among middle media like bloggers and NGOs, while organizationally enabled networks tend to be more limited in the types of online resources they use, relying on mass media. Crowd-enabled networks should be more robust and flexible to external changes. Chapter 4 looks at differences in personal engagement among organizationally enabled networks and shows that when organizations seek to control the message and framing of advocacy, the network tends to encourage less

personalization and diversity of expression. Chapter 5 compares the Occupy network, the prototypical crowd-enabled network, with the Robin Hood Tax campaign, an organizationally enabled network, and indicates that while the former tends to elicit more personal expression, the latter sustained a more focused message. The Occupy crowd was able to respond quickly to new opportunities, but their message became diluted. If there is a big takeaway from the empirical chapters it is that crowds are more inclusive, flexible, and adaptive than organizations, and this is reflected in online networks.

This book ultimately asks more questions than it provides conclusive answers to. In particular, the authors chose not to focus on the relationship between online behavior and offline activities. These might be two very different social movement forms with little overlap between the actors involved. If crowd-enabled movements facilitate more personalized expression and do not require commitment ideology and shared identity of its participants, then perhaps online activism simply selects a different breed of activist—people who would never go to an actual protest or volunteer to be on a community organizing committee but who do experience pleasure in publicly tweeting support for causes. And perhaps social movement organizations are aware of these different motivations for activism and seek to engage people in both forums.

Another possibility, which the authors mostly sidestep until the final chapter of the book, is that these two logics do actually compete. Connective action might weaken collective action. A recent study suggests there is some truth behind this (Kirk Kristofferson, Katherine White, and John Peloza, "The Nature of Slacktivism: How the Social Observability of an Initial Act of Token Support Affects Subsequent Prosocial Action," *Journal of Consumer Research* [40]: 1149–66). In a laboratory experiment, psychologists found that people who join a public Facebook activist group are much less likely to volunteer to stuff envelopes for the group than those who joined a private Facebook group. Simply joining an online activist group where others can see you've joined seems to encourage "slacktivism." Consequently, people who tweet their support for movements just to be seen expressing themselves might be less likely to engage with activists in face-to-face interactions, make donations, and so on.

But just because online activism might not facilitate deeper forms of engagement with the movement does not mean that online movements are not efficacious in their own ways. One final intriguing possibility that this book leaves open to the reader is that online movements may even be more effective than traditional movement forms inasmuch as they create a highly visible public platform for a new cause. Deep levels of engagement might be overrated if, as the authors suggest, online activism is better at creating

media attention. We may not know the answers to these questions, but this book makes a strong case that social media and other forms of online activism should grab the attention of social movement scholars.

Continuing La Causa: Organizing Labor in California's Strawberry Fields. By Gilbert Felipe Mireles. Boulder, Colo.: FirstForumPress, 2013. Pp. xii+191. \$59.95.

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The only attention mainstream movement scholars have paid to the Chicano movement centers on the César Chávez–led farmworkers' movement of the 1960s and 1970s. That campaign is now nearly a half-century old and like other movements fighting entrenched inequalities, the farmworker struggle did not end with those unionization victories. Today there are about 3.5 million migrant and seasonal farmworkers in the United States, and their fight for resources and better treatment continues. What is intriguing about Gilbert Felipe Mireles's *Continuing La Causa* is that he chronicles one chapter of this ongoing struggle, namely the United Farm Workers (UFW) unionization efforts in the California strawberry industry between 1996 and 2003.

In 1997 the UFW targeted strawberry workers employed by the Coastal Berry Company, an especially large grower with multiple locations in the central coast area of California. What animates the author's interest is that on three occasions the UFW sought to represent the workers but on each occasion it lost to a loosely organized quasi union, El Comité de Trabajadores de Coastal Berry (Comité). Mireles's interest is in understanding how the more sophisticated and professional UFW was defeated by the Comité. Thus the story Mireles tells is about the conflict between these two organizations rather than between the UFW and antiunion growers, as one might expect. To unravel this unexpected conflict and outcome, Mireles used archival and legal documents and conducted 53 in-depth interviews with a variety of people, including UFW supporters, Comité organizers, strawberry pickers, local newspaper reporters, and industry representatives. These interviews took place after the unionization campaign had ended and Mireles was unable to gain access to UFW's top leadership. The interview and observational data are thus not as methodologically rigorous as those collected by Marshall Ganz on the grape boycott ("Resources and Resourcefulness," *American Journal of Sociology* 105 [2000]: 1003–62).

Mireles's thesis is that the UFW's election losses primarily were due to their lack of network ties to field workers and the threat the UFW posed to