

Neither Ideologues nor Agnostics: Alternative Voters' Belief System in an Age of Partisan Politics¹

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How do Americans organize their political beliefs? This article argues that party polarization and the growing prominence of moral issues in recent decades have catalyzed different responses by different groups of Americans. The article investigates systematic heterogeneity in the organization of political attitudes using relational class analysis, a graph-based method for detecting multiple patterns of opinion in survey data. Three subpopulations, each characterized by a distinctive way of organizing its political beliefs, are identified: ideologues, whose political attitudes strongly align with either liberal or conservative categories; alternatives, who are instead morally conservative but economically liberal, or vice versa; and agnostics, who exhibit weak associations between political beliefs. Individuals' sociodemographic profiles, particularly their income, education, and religiosity, lie at the core of the different ways in which they understand politics. Results show that while ideologues have gone through a process of issue alignment, alternatives have grown increasingly apart from the political agendas of both parties. The conflictual presence of conservative and liberal preferences has often been resolved by alternative voters in favor of the Republican Party.

INTRODUCTION

American politics over the last four decades has been characterized by increased partisanship and growing polarization in Congress, campaigns, and

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the political debate (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). While lay observers have been quick to adopt a “culture wars” narrative (Hunter 1991; Frank 2004), scholars remain divided as to how, and to what extent, ordinary citizens have responded to the polarization of the political elite (Abramowitz 2011; Fiorina and Abrams 2011; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011). Disagreements exist on two questions in particular: whether or not recent historical trends—such as a growing alignment between citizens’ party identification and their political positions—reflect ideological divisions in the electorate (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Bartels 2000; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Abramowitz 2011) and whether Americans are more strongly influenced by their moral values than by their economic interests when deciding which party to vote for (Leege et al. 2002; Bartels 2008).

Yet these studies often overlook an important piece of the puzzle: that different Americans frame the political debate in consistently different ways and that growing partisan polarization and the emergence of moral issues have elicited a variety of different responses from the American public. Consequently, recent scholarship has not fully appreciated the growing disconnect between parties’ ideological stances and the political preferences of a large portion of American citizenry. For instance, a widely accepted argument in the literature on partisan alignment is that party polarization has made it easier for voters to identify with a political camp because parties have become more distinguishable on a broad set of issues (Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2009). However, growing divisions in parties’ stances on moral, economic, and civil rights issues may have also made it equally more difficult for some Americans to identify wholeheartedly with either the Republican or the Democratic Party.

Imagine a high-earning and secular Manhattan lawyer, squeezed by her progressive leanings on moral issues and her support for fiscal austerity, or a working-class devout churchgoer torn between his moral conservatism and redistributive economic interests. If economic issues had exclusive hold over these voters’ political choice, they would find it easy to identify with the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, respectively. But if topics such as same-sex unions and abortion also factor into voters’ political decision making, then these two hypothetical voters would find it difficult to fully identify with either political camp. Because religion and class do not tightly overlap, some citizens find themselves in sociodemographic positions that

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are incompatible with the political offer. And because moral issues have become more salient in recent years, these so-called cross-pressured voters find it more difficult to reconcile their seemingly incongruent ideological orientations. More generally, in a context in which parties have clearly defined, alternative positions on multiple issue dimensions, voters who do not fully subscribe to a party's positions on all dimensions may find it harder to define their political allegiance.

Thus, the questions of political polarization and whether morality trumps economics cannot be answered by an overwhelming yes or no. Rather, we contend that the answers to these questions depend on whether or not individuals' political preferences on a broad array of issues are in alignment with the mainstream political debate, as it is conventionally construed. Our argument has three components. First, we posit that individuals differ qualitatively, and systematically, in the ways in which they structure their political preferences. Rather than thinking about voters exclusively in terms of the liberal-conservative polarity, we extend Converse's (1964) classic notion of a "belief system" and explore the possibility that there exists heterogeneity in the ways in which Americans organize their political preferences. Second, we argue that sociodemographic characteristics—particularly class and religiosity—account for this divergence in political belief systems. Finally, we maintain that while those whose ideological positions are congruent with the mainstream political discourse have responded favorably to increased polarization, those whose positions are incongruent had to deal with difficult trade-offs.

We analyze cross-sectional data from the American National Election Studies over a period of 20 years between 1984 and 2004. We use a graph-based method, relational class analysis (henceforth RCA; Goldberg 2011), in order to look for systematic heterogeneity in public opinion. RCA enables us to divide our respondents into groups, each subscribing to a distinctive political logic according to which certain opinions are correlated with one another.²

In the first part of the analysis, we demonstrate that the American public is composed of three groups, each characterized by a different structure of beliefs: *ideologues*, whose organization of political attitudes on all issue domains is consistent with the prevalent liberal-conservative polarity; *alternatives*, who dissociate between moral and economic conservatism by adopting what are normally considered liberal views on moral issues and conservative views on economic and civil rights issues, or vice versa; and *agnostics*, whose political beliefs are only weakly associated with one an-

²In contrast to previous research, this approach does not require any presuppositions about how political beliefs are organized or how sociodemographic attributes (e.g., education) or cognitive capabilities (e.g., political knowledge) structure political opinion.

other. This division has been consistent throughout the 20-year period under investigation.

Our contribution extends beyond a simple descriptive account of how people's political preferences are differently organized. In the second part of the analysis we show that people's social identities are implicated in generating these alternative belief systems. Namely, individuals whose combinations of religious and class identities result in inconsistent political interests—high earners with weak religious commitments and low-income believers—are overrepresented among the alternatives. These “rich and secular” or “poor and religious” citizens are motivated by combinations of interests that make it particularly difficult to be consistently conservative (or liberal) on both moral and economic issues. Indeed, they deviate from the orthodox understanding of politics, adopting a political logic in which conservatism and liberalism are not entirely at odds.

In the third and final part of the analysis we chart the different trajectories taken by each group in response to increased polarization and the growing salience of morality-based politics. We find that while ideologues became more ideologically consistent in their opinions on economic and moral issues, alternatives' positions on both dimensions became increasingly oppositional to one another. Moreover, whereas alternatives' moral convictions had a significant impact on their partisan identity already in the 1980s, these beliefs became relevant for other voters, together with civil rights and foreign policy issues, only a decade later. And while economic issues have consistently trumped moral issues for ideologues throughout the 20-year period, alternatives have followed their conservative leanings, whether on economic or moral issues, since the early 1990s. Starting with Bill Clinton's election in 1992—remembered, among other things, for Republican candidate Pat Buchanan's emphatic declaration of a cultural war “for the soul of America”—the conflictual presence of conservative and liberal preferences has been, more often than not, resolved by alternatives in favor of the Republican Party.

Taken together, these findings cast a new light on recent trends in American public opinion, demonstrating that party polarization and the growing discursive visibility of moral issues have not simply brought about a more divided electorate. Rather, these shifts appear to have catalyzed different responses by different groups of Americans. Whereas ideologues have gone through a process of issue alignment, alternatives have grown increasingly apart from the political agendas of both parties. Moreover, our findings suggest that cross-pressured voters' political behavior cannot be understood as the overarching predominance of one ideological dimension over the other: while some resolve this tension in favor of their economic orientations, others' partisan identifications are couched in their moral beliefs. Our assumption of ideational heterogeneity and the analytical strategy we adopt to pur-

sue it make these differences visible. Only by examining each group separately are we able to distinguish between these two opposing trends, which, in the aggregate, offset one another.³

PARTISAN POLARIZATION AND THE RISE OF MORAL ISSUES

The late 1960s was a period of political transition in the United States. The New Deal coalition between labor unions, white southerners, intellectuals, the working class, and ethnic and religious minorities, which had dominated American politics in the preceding three decades, was unraveling as class-based politics was being replaced by divisions over civil rights and the Vietnam War. The following decades saw a wide umbrella of topics rooted in moral disagreements gradually moving to the fore. From the Moral Majority of the 1980s to the Christian Coalition of the 1990s, conservative religious organizations occupied the national stage and took an active role in shaping primaries and electoral campaigns. Abortion, gay rights, and family values became heatedly contested issues, while traditional economic disagreements over taxation and welfare seemed to be fading into the background (Manza and Brooks 1999; Fiorina and Abrams 2011; Gross, Medvetz, and Russell 2011).⁴

During the same time, American politics grew increasingly partisan and polarized (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Bartels 2000; Hetherington 2001; McCarty et al. 2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Levendusky 2009). Congresspersons, candidates, and political activists did not only become more extreme in their partisan views but also consolidated these views along new political dimensions. Whereas divisions on moral and civil rights issues crossed party lines up until the mid-1970s, today, parties have become more internally homogeneous and antithetical to one another along those axes (for a review, see Layman et al. [2006]). Scholars have debated how these changes map onto the political preferences of American voters, asking whether moral issues have supplanted class politics and whether public opinion has become more polarized as a consequence.

³ Our results raise important methodological questions concerning the limitations of traditional analytical techniques, which assume population homogeneity in the organization of political beliefs. Failing to recognize the heterogeneity of political belief systems may lead to biased evaluations of the impact of social identities on political behavior.

⁴ The reasons for the rising salience of moral issues in American politics are complex and are far from consensual. Some have argued that they are rooted in the appeal of post-material issues—such as environmentalism, civil liberties, and ethnic diversity—to a prospering postwar middle class decreasingly concerned by traditional material anxieties. Others have pointed to shifts in the partisan alignment of white working-class voters, particularly in the South, deterred by the successes of the civil rights movement and alienated by the Democratic Party's adoption of a socially progressive agenda.

Has Morality Supplanted Class Politics?

Some observers have argued that the intensification of morality-based politics in the last three decades constitutes a sea change in American politics. Proponents of this position contend that religious divisions have emerged as the most prominent social cleavage in American society, pitting traditionalists against secularists and progressives in an all-out “culture war” (Hunter 1991; Shogan 2002; Bishop 2008; see Williams [1997] for a critical overview). George Bush’s successful presidential bids in 2000 and 2004 seem to have reinforced the impression that value voting has reconfigured the electorate into two geographically concentrated political camps: a heartland dominated by moral conservatism and a liberal stronghold on both coasts. The culture war thesis maintains not only that moral concerns trump economic interests but that religious divisions have colored economic debates in religious hues, making moral conservatism consonant with a belief in laissez-faire economics (Wuthnow 1988). This has made it easier for those disposed to traditionalism to support, or at least accept by default, free-market ideology. Journalistic accounts have promoted this narrative with considerable success. In *What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America* (2004), for example, journalist and historian Thomas Frank popularized the idea that Bush’s electoral success rests on “hot-button” cultural issues that have steered the attention of white working-class voters away from their economic interests, leading them to embrace an anti-elitist moral conservatism and, ultimately, to vote for the Republican Party.

Systematic analyses of public opinion data have reached far less dramatic conclusions, however. In a strong rebuttal of Frank’s argument, Bartels (2006) finds that Americans on the lower rungs of the income ladder continue to give more electoral weight to their economic interests than to their moral beliefs. Contrary to Frank’s assertions, Bartels demonstrates that low-income white voters “had not become less Democratic in their voting behavior” (p. 204). Even fervent churchgoers, although slightly more sensitive to moral debates than their secular counterparts, continue to place more emphasis on their economic interest than their moral concerns (Bartels 2008).⁵

Support for these findings comes from a variety of additional studies. The arguments they put forward often follow one of two lines of reasoning. The first debunks the contention that lower-class voters are no longer predominantly motivated by their material interests. Whether measured as income or as education, these studies provide ample evidence that class remains a significant determinant of political partisanship and that working-class vot-

⁵ Bartels (2006) concluded that “the overall decline in Democratic support among voters in Frank’s white working class over the past half-century is entirely attributable to the demise of the Solid South as a bastion of Democratic allegiance” (p. 211).

ers in particular have not been lured en masse to vote for the Republican Party (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; McVeigh and Sobolewski 2007; Fischer and Mattson 2009).

Other studies strongly undercut the image of an American electorate divided by religion. Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2006), for example, find that the relative impact of moral beliefs on voting does not vary across religious groups and that bread-and-butter concerns outweigh morals even for Evangelical Protestants. Similarly, Greeley and Hout (2006) concede that “there might be a link between Conservative Christian religious convictions and political behavior but it is modest, even by social science standards” (p. 65). They find that low-income Protestants, like other Americans on the lower end of the income distribution, are less likely to vote Republican than their higher-income counterparts are. As Layman and Green (2006, p. 61) conclude, “Cultural wars are waged by limited religious troops on narrow policy fronts under special political leadership, and a broader cultural conflagration is just a rumour.”

Cross-Pressured Voters and the Bidimensionality of the Political Space

Though the American public does not appear to be fervently engaged in the so-called culture wars, it has nevertheless undergone a process of partisan alignment over the last three decades: voters’ preferences on a large set of political issues have become increasingly consistent with their party identification. Although noticeable on most issue domains, this trend has been particularly prominent in relation to moral (also referred to as “social” or “cultural”) issues (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).⁶ Because the two major parties have grown significantly apart during this period, they have also become more easily distinguishable from one another. Consequently, they have become better at sorting individual voters into ideologically distinct subpopulations.

This has led several scholars to conclude that elite polarization has made it easier for voters to adopt a party’s positions because parties’ ideological stances have become more consistent and therefore more recognizable (Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2009). However, this argument rests on the assumption that voters’ beliefs have become compatible with their parties’ ideologies on a wide range of politically contested issues. But systematic studies of public opinion do not find evidence for an increase in issue alignment—the process of voter opinions becoming ideologically consistent with one another—in the U.S. population as a whole. In fact, the level of ideolog-

⁶Whereas in 1972 voters’ positions on topics such as abortion or gay rights were not correlated with their party identification, by the turn of the century, knowing whether a respondent was pro-choice or pro-life increased by 20% the capacity to predict correctly his partisan allegiance.

ical constraint between Americans' opinions on morality, economics, civil rights, and foreign policy remains as low today as it was roughly four decades ago (Davis and Robinson 1996; DiMaggio et al. 1996; Layman and Carsey 2002; Evans 2003; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).⁷ What most scholarship has not considered is that the growing salience of moral issues has forced voters whose positions on "values" and the economy are oppositional to one another to confront this incongruence.

Political commentators have long identified such cross-pressured constituencies as potential electoral game changers. Ronald Reagan's success in the 1980s was, at least in some part, attributable to his capacity to appeal to low-income white voters who were traditionally considered part of the Democratic Party's electoral base. These working-class social conservatives, who became known as "Reagan Democrats," found themselves in a position whereby each of the two major parties spoke to either their material or cultural interests. Party strategists often target voters who are similarly faced with an electoral double bind: the most sought-after demographic in the 1996 presidential election seemed to be the suburban middle-class "soccer mom," overburdened by driving her children between afterschool activities in the family minivan, while working-class "NASCAR dads," with their presumably traditionalist worldviews, captured the imagination of political pundits eight years later.⁸

Though often simplistic, such catchy labels rest on the intuition that these so-called swing voters are positioned on the intersections of different, and often nonoverlapping, social divisions, each pushing in potentially opposing political directions. They echo with Lipset's (1981) three-decade-old observation that Americans' political attitudes are structured by two different dimensions, one that follows traditional class lines and the other shaped by postmaterial concerns. These two perpendicular dimensions overlap with different axes of social cleavage. Whereas attitudes on economics correlate with class, attitudes on moral issues correlate with religious orthodoxy (Davis and

⁷ Increased alignment between moral positions and other issue domains is apparent only among individuals with high levels of income and those who are more educated, politically active, and interested in politics (Davis and Robinson 1996; DiMaggio et al. 1996; Evans 2003; Layman and Carsey 2002; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).

⁸ A similar tension underpins several other popular categories that have been used to identify specific subgroups of the electorate, such as the "South Park Republicans," a term coined by gay conservative commentator Andrew Sullivan to connote a generation of educated young Republicans who "believe we need a hard-ass foreign policy and are extremely skeptical of political correctness" but are also socially liberal on many issues (Anderson 2005, p. 99). Another subgroup is "wired workers," information technology professionals who have benefited from the new economy and consequently espouse fiscally conservative positions but who tend to be socially liberal on issues ranging from gun control and global warming to civil rights and abortion.

Robinson 1996). Cross-pressured voters are those who find themselves in positions that correlate differently with each dimension.

As long as parties differentiated only along a single political dimension—economics—the trade-off faced by these voters remained implicit. However, when parties began differentiating on their positions on abortion or gun control, voters caught at the intersection of conflicting economic interests and moral preferences were left without a natural partisan home. While the alignment between moral and economic issues has made it easier for those voters whose opinions on both dimensions are consonant with one another to identify with either party—leading to greater party sorting—it has equally made it more difficult for voters whose opinions are ideologically incongruent to do the same. We therefore expect that different sociodemographic dimensions, particularly class and religiosity, correlate with ideology and partisan identification differently for cross-pressured voters than they do for mainstream voters.

Yet traditional approaches to the analysis of public opinion data cannot take this complexity into account. Scholars conventionally model the relationships between sociodemographic characteristics, political preferences, and partisanship as if these were homogeneous across the population. This analytical strategy is based on the implicit assumption that voters subscribe to a singular political belief system. In fact, standard models of political behavior, following Campbell et al.'s (1960) “funnel of causality” argument, assume the following causal pattern:

Sociodemographic characteristics → Political preferences → Voting behavior.

Such models tend to study the impact of sociodemographic attributes and political preferences on partisanship in “statistical isolation.” Religious commitments, for example, are assumed to increase conservative preferences on issues pertaining to morality and, therefore, the likelihood of voting Republican, *net of other effects*. But what if one is religiously orthodox and on the lower rungs of the income ladder? The electoral implications of being morally conservative may be interpreted by such an individual quite differently from someone who is higher positioned on the income ladder and whose economic and moral interests are better aligned with one another.

Consequently, we argue that it is necessary to consider citizens' political preferences as making up an interdependent gestalt rather than a collection of independent attitudinal vectors. Though the bipartisan structure of American politics imposes a dichotomy between two ideological camps, such homogeneity of views is not reflected in voters' political preferences. Thus, regression models studying partisanship and the relative weight of different issue domains should take into account the various ways in which people structure their political preferences. Extending on Converse (1964), we

posit that voters rely on multiple belief systems to forge their political allegiances.

CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING MULTIPLE BELIEF SYSTEMS

Converse defined a *political belief system* as a “configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (Converse 1964, p. 207). His seminal research on this topic, as well as the work of numerous scholars following him, has usually led to the conclusion that only a small proportion of the public, often referred to as “ideologues,” can appreciate the political debate using abstract categories such as “liberal” and “conservative,” while most citizens exhibit limited levels of constraint and coherence in the overall organization of their political beliefs.⁹

Most scholars, following Converse, measure “constraint” using bivariate relationships (e.g., correlation coefficients) or, alternatively, summary indices (e.g., factor scores). Such approaches, however, either presuppose or overlook the overall pattern of political attitudes that characterizes a belief system. In contrast, we take Converse’s idea of functional interdependence between attitudes one step forward and operationalize it as the system of interdependencies between attitudes as a whole rather than one pair at a time. We conceptualize a belief system as a network of interconnected political beliefs.

As an illustration, imagine a multidimensional “belief space” in which each dimension measures opinion on one political issue. Individuals’ positions in this space correspond to their political preferences. Constraint refers to the extent to which positions on various issues are bound together, thus leaving certain areas of the space largely unoccupied (Martin 2002). These empty spaces represent political opinion combinations that are inconsistent with the logic on which the belief system is structured. Our analytical focus on constraint therefore shifts attention from what people believe to *how their beliefs are organized*. Conservative and liberal pundits such as Rush Limbaugh or Jon Stewart, for example, who are opposed to one another essentially on every political issue imaginable, nevertheless subscribe to the same belief system. They appear to agree on what the political debate is about, even if they substantively disagree on which political outcomes are preferable. The underlying logic that informs their beliefs is implicit in the set of

⁹ According to this framework, citizens greatly differ in their levels of political sophistication, thus in their capacity to understand politics using established ideological categories. Most citizens are, in fact, “innocent of ideology” (Converse 1964; see also Campbell et al. 1960; Luskin 1987). This result has been shown to be very robust and stable over time and across cultures (Popkin 1991; Carpini and Keeter 1993; Popkin and Dimock 1999; but see Ansolabehere et al. [2006] for a different view).

entailments that make certain opinions congruent, or incongruent, with one another. Empirically, this implies focusing on the relationships between political preferences rather than examining preferences discretely (DiMaggio 1997, 2010; Goldberg 2011).

Shifting the analytical focus to how opinions relate to one another enables treating political beliefs as systems rather than as independent attitudes. But if Americans' understandings of politics are underlaid by competing political logics, as we argue, it is equally important that such an analytical approach also allow for the existence of multiple belief systems. This is very different from how politics is normally apprehended. Mainstream discourse construes political issues almost exclusively through the conventional liberal-conservative opposition.¹⁰ Similarly, academic literature conventionally operationalizes constraint by assuming a singular structure of political beliefs. The common expectation is that individuals who are liberal on economic issues are similarly liberal on civil rights and moral issues, and vice versa. Consequently, those who appear to diverge from the mainstream are described as less sophisticated in their ability to reason politically.¹¹

Yet it is important to make an analytical distinction between divergences that are the result of weak opinion constraint and those that present an alternative, internally coherent, belief system. Consider a group of hypothetical respondents asked about their opinions on three policies: affirmative action, gay rights, and health care reform. We would expect those subscribing to a liberal ideology to be in favor of all three policies and those defining themselves as conservative to be against them. Figure 1 plots these respondents on a stylized belief space. Respondents plotted in black and marked with a plus sign seem to follow the conventional liberal-conservative logic: they either support or oppose (to varying degrees) all three policies (i.e., subject D). Those plotted in gray and marked by a dot (i.e., subjects A, B, and C) deviate from this pattern: their position on gay rights is opposed to their positions on the

¹⁰ The media are often baffled by figures who do not fit neatly into this dichotomy. Consider the late essayist and polemicist Christopher Hitchens as an example. An avid and outspoken atheist, who described himself as a Marxist, Hitchens often sided with conservatives on issues concerning the U.S. response to the September 2001 attacks and the rise of radical Islam. Labeled a "contrarian" and "iconoclast," practically every interview or article on Hitchens in the last decade of his life asked whether his seemingly opposing opinions on religion and national security made the former socialist, in essence, a neo-conservative.

¹¹ An important strand of work has focused on the cognitive processes underlying political decision making, arguing that "people make up their minds in different ways" (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, p. 8). This work is based on the premise that individuals differ qualitatively in how they think about politics, relying on different schemata and employing different heuristics (Kinder and Sears 1985; Popkin 1991; Zaller 1992; Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin 2000; Kuklinski 2001; Baldassarri 2012). Most often than not, however, these studies assume *ex ante* that different cognitive strategies are related to citizens' levels of education and "political sophistication."




FIG. 1.—Hypothetical belief space. Respondents plotted in black and marked with a plus sign (i.e., subject D) organize their preferences according to the liberal-conservative divide on all three policy issues, while respondents plotted in gray and marked by a dot (i.e., A, B, and C) structure their preferences on an opposition between gay rights and the other two issues. The inset plots the political preferences for subjects A, B, C, and D.

two other issues. Examined individually, these deviations might seem like misunderstandings of what the political debate is about. Yet taken together, these supposedly unsophisticated individuals exhibit a coherent pattern of political attitudes; their organization of preferences constitutes an alternative to the dominant belief system.

Our expectation is that not all respondents who depart from the liberal-conservative belief system are misinformed about politics. Rather, we argue that when such heterogeneity is systematic—when it is consistent within groups of respondents—it can be understood as evidence for multiple belief systems. We adopt an operational definition of a belief system without directly engaging with the concept of ideology or assuming that individuals are conscious or necessarily capable of coherently articulating the ideological logic underpinning their political attitudes.¹² The hypothetical respondents depicted in gray in figure 1, to continue our illustrative example, appear to be adhering to a distinctive political logic whereby support for redistributive and regulatory policies is understood as oppositional to the promotion of gender-based personal liberties. We can only speculate about the subjective interpretations that inform this understanding. Nevertheless, our hypothetical black and gray respondents seem to be enacting different ways of thinking about how these three different political issues relate to one another. The meanings that our respondents associate with these issues inhere in those relationships (Mohr 1998).

Empirically, accounting for heterogeneity in the organization of political beliefs requires addressing three methodological limitations endemic to analytical strategies commonly used in studies of public opinion and political cognition. First, as the underlying logic of a political belief system inheres in the relationships between political opinions, *preferences must be examined in relation to one another, not independently*. Second, because these relationships vary across groups of individuals, *we must avoid a priori assumptions about which opinions are correlated with one another*. Otherwise, we risk privileging dominant understandings of the political debate and neglecting others. Finally, *the relationship between sociodemographic variables and political attitudes can vary across political belief systems*. Decomposing the population into predetermined sociodemographically homogeneous groups may actually mask the predictive effects of these variables.

¹² For an elaboration, see Turner's (2000) discussion of "backstage cognition." As Converse himself points out, "however logically coherent a belief system may seem to the holder, the sources of constraint are much less logical in the classical sense than they are psychological—and less psychological than social" (1964, p. 209). Indeed, even the prevalent liberal-conservative system is rife with logical inconsistencies: e.g., conservatives' support for strict restrictions on abortion may appear logically irreconcilable with their opposition to similar restrictions on gun ownership.

We use relational class analysis (Goldberg 2011) to overcome these limitations. RCA divides a survey sample into groups of respondents that exhibit distinctive patterns of opinion across a set of attitudinal variables. It does so inductively, without making any assumptions about how opinions are patterned, or which patterns are likely to be exhibited by what kinds of respondents (e.g., on the basis of their sociodemographic attributes). To achieve this goal, the procedure transforms a survey sample into an undirected graph. The vertices in this graph correspond to individual respondents, and edge weights correspond to a metric called relationality, which measures the extent to which two respondents who are connected by an edge follow a similar pattern of responses. If different groups of respondents organize their opinions using different rationales, the graph should cluster accordingly.

Recall that our purpose is not to classify respondents with similar opinions. Rather, it is to find those respondents whose patterns of political attitudes are similar even if, like respondents A and B in figure 1, they express opposing beliefs. This is why RCA uses relationality to generate the graph. Relationality calculates within-respondent differences in opinion between all pairs of variables and compares these differences across two respondents. These differences are identical across the two respondents if their responses follow the same pattern. The more identical the differences, therefore, the greater the relationality between the two respondents. After generating the graph, the RCA procedure subsequently divides it into groups such that relationality is maximized within groups and minimized across groups. Each group—like the two depicted in figure 1—is characterized by a distinctive pattern of relationships between opinions, suggesting that its members organize their political beliefs using the same rationale, even if deployed in opposite directions (as is the case of respondents A and B).

In Converse's terminology, RCA identifies overlapping belief systems and assigns respondents to these belief systems respectively. It is particularly suited for detecting individual heterogeneity in the composition of political preferences while overcoming the limitations that, as we discuss above, are inherent to traditional analytical approaches. RCA is an inductive procedure that does not rely on presuppositions about how issues or individuals are interrelated. Other existing methods that explore underlying latent variables, such as factor analysis or latent class analysis, either look at respondents in the aggregate to group variables together (as in the case of factor analysis) or look for groups of individuals who provided substantively similar responses (e.g., latent class analysis) while overlooking the relationships between these responses. Neither technique examines intravariability and intra-respondent variability simultaneously as RCA does (for more information about the formal implementation of RCA and its robustness, see the appendix).

A word of caution is in order here. While RCA allows us to identify groups of respondents that exhibit distinctive patterns of opinion, we cannot, with survey data alone, determine the underlying psychological processes that generate these patterns. Nevertheless, we can make reasonable assumptions about these causes and how they relate to people's location in sociodemographic space (Knoke 1994). As Converse (1964, p. 211) puts it, attitudinal "co-occurrence has obvious roots in the configuration of interests and information that characterize particular niches in the social structure." For the reasons cited above, people whose understandings of the political debate are informed by a similar logic should display similar patterns of political opinion. We therefore interpret different axes of movement in a belief space, of the kind illustrated in figure 1, as the empirical signature of ideological constraint. Where we refer to respondents' "understandings," we do so as shorthand for our inference that similar patterns of opinion originate in similar schematic modalities of political meaning (DiMaggio 1997). In the following analyses, we map these modalities and how they are underpinned by social structure.

DATA AND ANALYSIS

We apply RCA to data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and replicate the analysis for all years available for the period 1984–2004.¹³ ANES includes a large number of attitudinal questions on political issues, ranging from state economic intervention and spending to civil rights, morality, and foreign policy.¹⁴ We classified attitudinal questions into four different issue domains: economics, civil rights, morality, and security/foreign policy. Examples of economic issues are government involvement in the provision of health insurance and jobs and federal spending on the poor, welfare, and food stamps. Civil rights issues concern the treatment of African-Americans and other minorities, as well as opinions on affirmative action and equality of opportunities and chances. Moral issues include abortion, gay rights, women's role in society, traditional values, and new lifestyles. Finally, security and foreign policy issues (hereafter referred to as foreign policy issues) comprise, among others, international cooperation, federal spending on defense, the space program, and international aid. For a de-

¹³ Unfortunately, substantial changes in the survey instrument made it impossible to replicate the analysis for 2008. Moreover, years 1990, 1998, and 2002 had too many missing answers to be included. See the data appendix for a detailed description of the data included in the analysis.

¹⁴ We considered all the attitude questions that were asked at least three times and received a sufficient number of responses (see Baldassarri and Gelman [2008] for a discussion of temporal comparability problems).

tailed account of all the variables used in the analysis, see the data appendix

Analysis 1: Ideologues, Alternatives, and Agnostics

We begin by closely examining responses from 2004. Our application of RCA to the data resulted in a partition of respondents into three groups of comparable sizes (which include 33%, 40%, and 27% of the population, respectively). For each group, we represent the belief network by looking at the correlations between political preferences. The strength and direction of the correlation coefficients are visually represented in figure 2. In the right column we show this information in matrix form; political issues are grouped by issue domain. In the left column we use network visualizations to better reveal the overall structures of the three political belief systems: each node corresponds to a political attitude (nodes are shaded by issue domain), and we draw edges connecting political attitudes when correlation coefficients are statistically significant (at $\alpha = 0.05$). Solid lines represent positive correlations and dashed lines negative correlations. Line shades and widths are proportional to the strength of the correlation.¹⁵

Members of the first group exhibit a densely interconnected belief network. Following Converse, we call them *ideologues*. Ideologues organize their political attitudes according to the conventional liberal-conservative ideological continuum and show very high levels of constraint among issues across all four issue domains. Conversely, members of the second group—the *alternatives*—do not fully adopt the liberal-conservative framework. Their position on economic (white nodes) and civil rights issues (dark gray nodes) is dissociated from their preferences on moral issues (black nodes). As the negative correlations suggest, in 2004, alternatives tend to be morally conservative and economically liberal, or vice versa (i.e., a member of this group who is pro-life is likely to support economic redistribution and affirmative action, and vice versa). Finally, members of the third group exhibit weak associations among political beliefs: their network is relatively sparse. In contrast to the two other groups, correlations within issue domains in this group are sporadic and weak; no coherent pattern of belief organization is readily apparent. It seems that members of this group are, generally, not as politically consistent as their peers are. For lack of a better term, we characterize them as *agnostics* for the remainder of the analysis. Further ana-

¹⁵ All the diagrams are standardized such that the widths and shades of all the edges/cells on the graphs/matrices correspond to the exact same levels. Networks are spatially drawn using the Furchtman-Reingold algorithm so that distances between nodes inversely correspond to the edge weights connecting them. Otherwise, the spatial position of each node is insignificant.

Neither Ideologues nor Agnostics




FIG. 2.—Belief networks and correlation matrices for 2004

lyses, which are not reported, provide suggestive evidence that this group is characterized by a subtle decoupling between attitudes specifically relating to African-Americans and those relating to economic and civic inequality. Members of this group are systematically more conservative than their peers on issues explicitly pertaining to race. We suspect that these individuals' thinking about politics is, perhaps unconsciously, shaped by racial intolerance, but we do not pursue this line of investigation any further in the present article. The remainder of this analysis mostly focuses on the other two, more clearly structured, groups.

A political belief system is a fundamental and durable component of the political landscape. While at any given moment in time the political discourse tends to concentrate on a few salient issues and to neglect others, the overall organization of beliefs is the “shared grammar” that guarantees continuity over time (Converse 1964; Manza and Brooks 1999). Thus, if our findings describe Americans’ belief systems, as we argue, as opposed to fleeting issues that animate particular campaign years, they should be temporally consistent. We applied RCA over a period of 20 years and found staggering similarities in the results.¹⁶

The belief structure of each of the three groups remained surprisingly stable over time. Since different questions were asked in different survey years, we cannot compare correlations between specific pairs of questions over time. Nevertheless, we are able to examine the overall correlation structure between the four issue domains. These are reported in figure 3. Each of the matrices in this figure summarizes the correlations between pairs of issue domains in one survey year, for one of the three groups. Each matrix cell represents the average weighted correlation between all pairs of variables in the two issue domains the cell corresponds to (see Correlational Analyses in the appendix for more details). For instance, the top cell in each matrix reports the intensity and sign of the average weighted correlation between economic and civil rights issues: in the ideologue group in 2004, the average correlation between pairs of economic and civil rights variables was .43. Overall, throughout the entire 20-year period, 33.7% of the respondents are classified as ideologues, 41.0% as alternatives, and 25.3% as agnostics.¹⁷

Figure 3 visualizes the opinion patterns that differentiate the three groups from one another. Ideologues are characterized by very strong correlations between all issue domains. Ideologues who are conservative on moral issues, in other words, tend to be conservative on other issues as well. Alternatives, in contrast, tend to dissociate between their opinions on morality and their opinions on economics or civil rights, while agnostics appear to be a mere pale version of ideologues.

How distinctive is alternatives’ decoupling between their moral and economic positions? Does it indeed represent an alternative to the dominant belief system? We argue that the pattern of constraint between issue domains

¹⁶ For all years but one, the RCA algorithm detected three groups, which clearly exhibited ideologue, alternative, and agnostic patterns. RCA produced a partition into four groups only for data from 1996, and merging the additional group with one of the three other groups only insignificantly decreased within-group relationality. This allowed us to maintain a tripartite division throughout the 20-year period. For a more detailed description of how the RCA procedure was implemented, consult the Formal Definition and Implementation section of the appendix.

¹⁷ Though the relative size of each group fluctuates throughout the time period, there are no clear trends and group sizes remain consistent within a fixed range.




FIG. 3.—Time consistency: cross-domain correlation matrices by group over time. Each cell represents the average correlation between all pairs of variables in the two issue domains the cell corresponds to. Each matrix corresponds to a particular survey year in one of the three RCA groups. Cell shades correspond to correlation strengths and the plus and minus signs to the correlation direction.

that characterizes alternatives is substantively different from that exhibited by the two other groups. To investigate this further, we generate two multivariate models in which we model economic conservatism as a function of moral and civil rights conservatism, respectively. We construct scales for each of the issue domains by rescaling all attitudinal variables on a zero to one range and averaging respondents' opinions on each issue domain in each year. We interact the independent variable in each model with group dummies, using agnostics as the reference group. Including all groups in one model allows us to compare relationships between issue domains across groups. We pool observations across all years and include year fixed effects, which allows us to compare the relationships between issue domains across groups net of yearly fluctuations.¹⁸ If alternatives are inherently different from ideologues and agnostics, we should find that issue domains correlate differently with one another in this group.

Figure 4 plots the marginal effect estimates produced by these models. They clearly illustrate the substantial and statistically significant differences between the three groups. On the one hand, ideologues and agnostics present similar cross-domain attitudinal relationships. But these relationships are dramatically stronger in the former group. In fact, ideologues' positions on all three domains are so tightly constrained that moral or civil rights conservatism in this group corresponds to a three standard deviation increase in economic conservatism. On the other hand, these cross-domain correspondences follow a different pattern in the alternative group. Two differences are particularly apparent. First, the relationship between moral and economic conservatism in this group is effectively nonexistent: morally conservative alternatives are as likely as morally liberal alternatives to be economically conservative. Second, the relationship between alternatives' positions on civil rights and economics is not only strong but also significantly stronger than it is for agnostics. Overall, these patterns clearly demonstrate alternatives' distinctiveness. Whereas ideologues and agnostics adhere to conventional descriptions of the American electorate as comprising sophisticated and ideologically less competent voters, alternatives exhibit a unique pattern of beliefs.

In other words, alternatives are not individuals who are merely unable to reason in conceptually consistent ways. In the online supplementary appendix, we provide a variety of further analyses that demonstrate that their beliefs are far more organized than agnostics' and are constrained by a strong interdependence between the three issue domains. Moreover, this group is not composed exclusively of doctrinarian socially liberal economic conservatives

¹⁸ We conducted further analyses whereby we model economic conservatism using random slope multilevel models by year. Such models account for the possibility that issue domains correlate differently within each group across years. Estimates from these models are almost identical to the estimates reported here.




FIG. 4.—Cross-domain relationships by group. Lines represent marginal effects, estimated in a model in which the variable on the x-axis is interacted with RCA group dummies (with agnostics as the reference group), and year fixed effects are included. The model on the left-hand diagram, for example, is $Econ_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Ide_i + \beta_2 Alt_i + \beta_3 Moral_i + \beta_4 Ide_i \times Moral_i + \beta_5 Alt_i \times Moral_i + \epsilon_i$. (See General Linear Models in the appendix for more details.) Shades correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

(often called “libertarians”) or their mirror image. In fact, most alternatives are somewhere between these two extremes (see the Data section of the appendix for more details). What makes this group unique is its members’ tendency to decouple support for individual liberties on moral issues from support for policies that reduce economic and group-based inequalities. Given that mainstream political discourse in the United States is dominated by two oppositional ideological camps, it may seem surprising that such a large proportion of Americans espouses a combination of political attitudes that is not championed by prominent political parties. As we demonstrate in the following two sections, the rejection of the liberal-conservative framework is rooted in alternatives’ sociodemographic profiles.

Analysis 2: The Sociodemographic Foundations of Political Belief Networks

How do these different ways of structuring political opinion relate to the various dimensions of social differentiation in American society? Scholars have long examined how different social attributes such as class, religion, and racial identity are related to political preferences (Manza and Brooks 1999). Yet they have mostly considered these relationships in isolation, focusing on single social and ideological dimensions. In contrast, given that different people organize their political beliefs in different ways, we expect to find that the relationship between sociodemographic variables and political attitudes varies across cognitive frameworks. We explore this possibility by examining the sociodemographic organization of the belief space. First, we study whether the relationship between various sociodemographic characteristics and issue preferences varies across belief systems. Second, we model the likelihood of belonging to either the ideologue or alternative group as a function of one’s position in sociodemographic space. We expect to find that class and religiosity correlate with one another differently in each group.

Figure 5 visualizes a bidimensional “belief space” with the economic dimension on the x -axis and the moral dimension on the y -axis.¹⁹ Each panel represents the relationship between a sociodemographic variable and political preferences for each of the three groups (using color-coded lines). The coordinates that mark the two extremes of each line correspond to the mean correlation between the sociodemographic attribute in question and the variables that make up the relevant opinion category (economic or moral), averaged over the 20-year period under study. The plus and minus signs

¹⁹ On the whole, the belief space is structured by additional dimensions. To make the diagram more interpretable, we focus only on these two axes of opinion variance. Similar results are obtained when economic opinions are replaced with civil rights opinions, suggesting that economic and civil rights conservatism correlate similarly with social background in all three groups.




FIG. 5.—Belief spaces. Each of the seven diagrams in this figure represents the mapping of one sociodemographic attribute onto a bidimensional belief space (the economic dimension on the x-axis, the moral dimension on the y-axis). For each group we draw a line in this space. The coordinates that define the two extremes of the line correspond to the mean correlation between the sociodemographic attribute in question and the variables that make up either the economic or moral opinion categories, averaged over the 20-year period. The plus and minus signs represent high and low sociodemographic values, respectively. The lines connecting these coordinates outline the direction and magnitude of the relationship between the sociodemographic variable and opinions on economic and moral issues.

represent high and low sociodemographic values, respectively. The lines connecting these coordinates illustrate the direction and magnitude of the relationship between the sociodemographic variable and opinions on economic and moral issues; they visualize how ideological disagreements map onto social divisions in each group.

For example, the upper-left diagram plots the location in the belief space of the highest and lowest income categories in each of the three groups. In the ideologue group, high income is, on average, positively correlated with both economic and moral conservatism, as indicated by the black line. In the alternative group (dark gray line), high income is similarly correlated with economic conservatism but is negatively correlated with moral conservatism. In the agnostic group (light gray line), high income is correlated only with economic conservatism, while there is no relationship with opinions on morality. High earners tend to be economically conservative in all groups, but they have opposing views on moral issues: while high-income ideologues are also morally conservative, their alternative peers tend to be morally liberal and their agnostic peers morally indifferent.

The diagrams also illustrate that the more professional and more educated tend to be morally liberal in all groups, consistent with previous findings (e.g., Brooks and Manza 1997). However, it is only among the alternatives that these two attributes are also strongly associated with economic conservatism. Similarly, religious participation and age are strongly associated with moral conservatism in all three groups, but only in the ideologue group are they associated with economic conservatism. Surprisingly, however, living in the South accounts for almost no variability in opinions on either dimension in either group. This means that if we account for the composition of political preferences, the North-South divide disappears (consistent with Gelman [2009]). Finally, African-Americans tend to be economically liberal in both the ideologue and alternative groups. While they tend to be slightly morally liberal in the ideologue group, they lean toward moral conservatism in the alternative group.

On the whole, the sociodemographic decomposition of the belief space suggests that the relationship between social positions and political preferences is contingent on the overall organization of beliefs; various social divisions correlate differently with political opinions in each group. In particular, class (as measured by income) and religious attendance play different roles in the ideologue and alternative groups: whereas in the former both are associated with moral and economic conservatism, in the latter their associations are oppositional. High-income individuals who subscribe to the alternative belief system are, like their ideologue peers, economically conservative, but, unlike them, they are morally liberal; similarly, religious alternatives are morally conservative like their ideologue peers but differ by being economically moderate, on average.

Dividing the population into different belief communities uncovers a systematic relationship between income and moral conservatism that is obscured by these opposing trends. Over the entire population, income and moral conservatism are insignificantly correlated with one another; knowing one's income provides no information on one's moral opinions. Yet examined separately, each group exhibits a different relationship between income and positions on morality.²⁰ What can explain this difference?

If the overlap between people's class and religiosity has a bearing on how they combine their political preferences, then we should find that the interaction between the two explains how respondents combine their political beliefs. To test this possibility, we modeled the odds ratio of being assigned to the ideologue group (versus being assigned to the alternative group) as a function of an interaction between income and religious attendance. Figure 6 plots this odds ratio as modeled by a multinomial logistic regression (see the fig. 6 legend and General Linear Models in the appendix for further details). We find, in support of our initial expectation, that high-income individuals who regularly attend religious services are more than twice as likely to be ideologues as their low-income counterparts. High-income individuals who never attend religious services, on the other hand, are 10% less likely to be ideologues than their low-income counterparts. The slope of the line changes from positive to negative as a function of religious attendance. In other words, high-income and religious or working-class and nonreligious individuals are more likely to align with the liberal-conservative ideology. In contrast, nonreligious high earners and religious low earners orient toward the alternative group. The latter occupy social positions that push them to take ideological stances that are seemingly contradictory. To reconcile this tension, they deviate from the orthodox liberal-conservative framework to adopt an alternative way of conceptualizing politics.

Analysis 3: The Consequences of Political Belief System Heterogeneity

How do citizens define their partisan allegiances given their conflicting interests and competing understandings of the political debate? And how have they responded to the two major parties' increased ideological alignment? Ideologues' positions on morality and economics are congruent with the two major parties' stated ideologies; choosing a political camp therefore poses little challenge for these voters. But for alternatives, selecting one party over the other necessarily entails suppressing one ideological orientation in favor of another. How is this cognitive dissonance resolved, especially in light of

²⁰ Over the entire population the correlation coefficient between moral conservatism and income is effectively 0. This result is consistent whether agnostics are included or excluded from the sample.




FIG. 6.—Multinomial logistic regression for group membership. This diagram plots the estimated odds ratio of being assigned to the ideologue group, compared to being assigned to the alternative group, as a function of an interaction between income and religious participation. The data are pooled across the 20-year period. Formally, the model is described as follows: $\log(P(RCA = Ide_i)/P(RCA = Alt_i)) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 income_i + \beta_2 religious_i + \beta_3 (income_i \times religious_i) + \alpha^T X + \varepsilon_i$, where X represents control variables (sociodemographic and year dummies; see General Linear Models in the appendix), and α and β are regression coefficients. Each of the five lines plotted in the diagram corresponds to one of the five religious participation categories. The income variable is categorized by percentile to make it comparable across years.

growing partisan polarization and the increasing salience of moral issues? Both with respect to opinion polarization and with respect to the relative weight of moral and economic issues, we find that different processes are at work in the alternative group compared to the ideologues and agnostics.

Examining opinion constraint over time suggests that ideologues and alternatives responded very differently to the growing alignment between economic and moral issues in mainstream political discourse. Figure 7 plots trends in issue alignment in the three groups over time. As is clearly visible, ideologues' positions on economic, civil rights, and moral issues became increasingly aligned with one another over the years. This increase is particularly pronounced on issues relating to morality: the correlation between moral issues and economic (or civil rights) issues roughly doubled in intensity over the 20-year period in this group (from .2 in 1984 to .4 in 2004). In contrast, the correlation between economic and moral positions remained mostly insignificant among the alternatives, and by 2004 moral opinions be-




FIG. 7.—Trends in pair correlations between issue domains by group. Each diagram plots the average correlation between all pairs of issues in two given issue domains over the 20-year period. The uppermost figure, for example, plots the average correlations between economic and civil rights issues. A circle indicates that the average correlation is statistically different from zero at the $\alpha = .05$ level.

came significantly negatively correlated with opinions in the two other domains. Thus, while ideologues reacted positively to the polarization of the political elite, alternatives have resisted the pressure to adjust their political opinions to the changing political landscape.

In light of this disconnect between alternatives' and parties' positions, how do voters define their partisan allegiances? Do their economic worldviews trump their opinions about morality when ultimately deciding on whom to vote for? To answer this question, we first modeled respondents' party self-identification (on a seven-point scale) as a function of their positions on each of the four issue domains. Recall that we construct issue domain scales by rescaling all variables on a zero to one range and averaging respondents' responses on each set of issues per given year. Coefficients were estimated using a fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) model, and a variety of sociodemographic variables were included as controls (see General Linear Models in the appendix for details). In order to explore temporal trends, we divided the sample into two periods, before and after 1990. We chose 1990 as our cutoff year for two reasons. First, while discord over moral worldviews was brewing well before the 1990s, it was not until the beginning of that decade that moral issues became a central feature of public political debate (Fiorina et al. 2011). The early 1990s marked an important historical transition—the end of the Cold War—as well as the end of a decade dominated by Reagan's presidency. Moral issues that were hitherto overshadowed by foreign policy and economic concerns were beginning to take center stage.²¹ Second, as figure 7 illustrates, ideologues' political constraint, especially insofar as moral views were aligned with other issue domains, started to follow an upward trend in 1992. It appears that these voters began responding favorably to polarization roughly during this time.

As the results reported in figure 8 demonstrate, economic concerns remained central for voters' partisan identification throughout the 20-year period. Starting in 1990, the three other issue domains significantly increased in importance for all Americans.²² Moral issues exhibited the most dramatic

²¹ The various sociopolitical processes underlying this change are, of course, far more complex but are beyond the scope of this article. While some conservative activists undoubtedly promoted moral arguments well before 1990, these issues became the focus of public debate only by the beginning of the 1990s (Gross et al. 2011).

²² Note that the issue domain scales are included as independent variables in the same model. Coefficients therefore correspond to the estimated effect of each issue domain on partisanship net of opinions on the three other domains. While coefficients for moral and civil rights domains increased for all groups, these results are also consistent with the divergent paths taken by each group in light of growing polarization: while the variance explained by this model increased from 32.3% to 51.8% for ideologues before and after 1990 and from 12.8% to 25.0% for agnostics, it insignificantly decreased for alternatives from 30.1% to 29.1%. In other words, while parties became better at sorting ideologues and agnostics, they remained as good at sorting alternatives after 1990 as they were in the previous decade.




FIG. 8.—OLS regression of party identification (party self-identification on a seven-point scale, ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican); plot of the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence interval for economic, civil rights, moral, and foreign policy scales for each of the RCA groups. Each scale ranges from 0 to 1 such that a high score corresponds to a conservative opinion. The upper panel reports estimates for the 1980s and the lower panel for the 1990s and early 2000s. The data are fitted using the following model: $\text{PartyId}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Econ}_i + \beta_2 \text{Moral}_i + \beta_3 \text{Civil}_i + \beta_4 \text{Foreign}_i + \alpha_1' X + \alpha_2' Z + \epsilon_i$, where X represents sociodemographic variables and Z year dummies (see General Linear Models in the appendix), and α and β are regression coefficients.

rise: estimated coefficient sizes more than doubled in all groups across the two periods, increasing more than fivefold for ideologues. These findings are consistent with previous work that has argued that, despite the growing salience of moral issues, economic concerns remain the mainstay of political partisanship (Ansolabehere et al. 2006; Bartels 2006).²³ However, our results also indicate that whereas moral issues began capturing the attention of ideologues only during the 1990s, they carried significant weight for alternatives as early as the 1980s.²⁴ Presumably, alternatives were confronted by their dissonant opinions on economics and morality as the culture war was shaping up and before “values” became a central and inescapable feature of political campaigning.

Yet examining each of these opinion dimensions independently from one another might miss an important part of the story. Recall that while economic and moral positions are correlated for ideologues, they are decoupled, at times even significantly antithetical to one another, for alternatives. Whereas for the former the two dimensions reinforce one another, the latter need to decide which dimension takes precedence. It is therefore likely that the relative weight of one issue domain on political partisanship varies as a function of opinions on the second issue domain. Yet modeling the two dimensions independently cannot take this mutual reinforcement or attenuation into account (Fiorina et al. 2011).

To account for this interdependence, we computed a second set of models in which the relationship between economic and moral issues is captured by the difference between respondents’ economic and moral conservatism, which we refer to as the economic-moral delta, or ΔEM for short (see the fig. 8 legend and General Linear Models in the appendix for further details).²⁵ A ΔEM value close to 4 corresponds to significantly high economic conservatism and significantly high moral liberalism; similarly, a value close to -4 corresponds to significantly high moral conservatism and significantly high economic liberalism. Respondents on both extremes of the scale are those whose positions on the two issue domains are oppositional to one another.

²³ We use the same modeling strategy—regressing party identification on opinion summary indexes—that is employed by these studies. We do so primarily for consistency, but also in order to highlight how our analytical approach makes visible underlying patterns that traditional approaches to public opinion analysis overlook.

²⁴ In additional analyses, which we do not report here, we pooled all yearly observations and included a dummy variable for observations after 1990 rather than dividing the sample into two subsamples before and after 1990. We interacted this period dummy with the four issue domain scales. Effect estimates are robust to this modeling strategy, and in particular, moral issues remain significantly predictive of party identification both before and after 1990 only for alternatives.

²⁵ Formally, $\Delta EM_i = \bar{E}_i - \bar{M}_i$ corresponds to the difference between respondent i ’s mean level of economic conservatism, \bar{E}_i , and the mean level of moral conservatism, \bar{M}_i , both centered on 0 and rescaled to have a standard deviation of 1.

Values around 0 identify individuals who are consistently conservative, or liberal, on both issue domains. We modeled party self-identification as a function of the ΔEM and its squared term to take into account the interdependence between both opinion domains in answering the question of whether economic issues trump moral issues. Models were computed separately for each period.

The results are presented in panels *A* and *B* of figure 9 (see the fig. 9 legend and General Linear Models in the appendix for further details). Economic issues consistently trump moral issues for ideologues whether before or after 1990. Irrespective of their positions on issues such as gay rights or abortion, ideologues' partisan identification ultimately aligns with their economic opinions. Yet this relationship is far more nuanced for alternatives. During the 1980s, like their ideologue counterparts, alternatives leaned in the direction of their economic opinions, especially when their economic opinions were significantly more conservative than their opinions on morality. But starting in 1990, a pronounced curvilinear relationship between ΔEM and party identification appears. Whether economically conservative and morally liberal, or the other way around, alternatives were more likely to identify with the Republican Party. The more their opinions on economics and moral values were oppositional to one another, the more strongly alternatives' political identification aligned with their conservative leaning. In other words, the different relationships between particular political attitudes and party identification in each group suggest that the effect of political preferences on voting behavior is mediated by one's overall organization of beliefs.

What about the relationship between citizens' social background and partisanship? As panels *E–H* illustrate, the relationship between income and religious attendance on partisan identification intensified in both groups, and in the same direction, after 1990. It appears that both class- and religious-based political cleavages were deepening across the entire population starting in the early 1990s. But unlike class and religiosity, education correlates differently with partisanship across both groups. Whereas educated ideologues—net of the effects of income and other sociodemographic characteristics—are more likely to self-identify as Democrats (especially after 1990), their alternative counterparts are more likely to gravitate toward the Republican Party. We interpret this finding as suggestive of how education plays different roles in orienting citizens politically. On the one hand, various accounts have linked education with greater receptiveness to moral and social liberalism (Brooks and Manza 1997). But education—particularly college education—exposes individuals to rational visions of society that are consonant with free-market ideology (Meyer et al. 1997). Indeed, as figure 5 illustrates, while educated alternatives tend to be economically conservative, educated ideologues are not. It appears that in each group education interacts




FIG. 9.—Party identification by RCA group. OLS predictions of party self-identification on a seven-point scale, ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican, as a function of the difference between one's degree of conservatism on economic and moral issues (A, B), education (C, D), income (E, F), and religious participation (G, H). The data are pooled across two periods, before and after 1990, and fitted using the following model: $\text{PartyIdent} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \times R \times \Delta EM + \alpha_2 \times R \times \Delta EM^2 + \beta_1'Z + \beta_2'Z + \varepsilon$, where Z represents sociodemographic variables and Z year dummies (see the General Linear Models in the appendix). α and β are regression coefficients, and R represents interaction terms that allow effects to vary by RCA group.

with actors' interpretations of the world to highlight a different dimension of political reality and, ultimately, push in opposite partisan directions.

Together, these results paint a multilayered collage. On the one hand, moral issues increased in salience for all voters, and political cleavages mapping to income and religious disparities became more pronounced. But these trends had different partisan repercussions for different Americans. In particular, whereas some resisted the lure of value voting, others have prioritized morals over economics. For ideologues, despite their increasing sensitivity to moral debates since the early 1990s, economic interests continue to suppress whatever attenuating effects their moral beliefs might have on their partisan identities. But for alternatives, economic interests do not overwhelmingly trump moral convictions. Rather, alternatives who espouse traditionalist beliefs on abortion, gender roles, and so forth and who are disposed toward Keynesian economics tend to orient politically with their moral convictions. The pendulum swings in the other direction for alternatives who are free-market supporters but are culturally and socially progressive: they prioritize their economic interests. These two sets of individuals, ideologically caught between a rock and a hard place, are presumably those swing voters who have the potential for deciding elections, and in the 1984–2004 period, they were more likely to give their conservative leaning precedence and identify as Republicans.

DISCUSSION

Partisan trench warfare of the kind that characterized debates over the federal budget in 2011 and 2013 is but one recent example of the strong ideological divisions unabatedly separating the two major parties. Politicians' and pundits' reactions to practically every item attracting the news cycle spotlight seem as if they are following the same script. Whatever the issue at stake, it is almost certain that it will generate diametrically opposed responses on Fox News and MSNBC. Yet ordinary citizens do not appear to be consulting this script, at least not all of them. As our results demonstrate, during the 20 years stretching between 1984 and 2004, Americans were divided into three different belief communities, each characterized by a distinctive way of framing the political debate.

Beneath the ideologically dichotomized rhetoric promoted by politicians and the media lies an ideationally heterogeneous public. As we demonstrate, this heterogeneity is systematic and consistent throughout the last few decades. Only one-third—those whom we label ideologues—align their opinions with mainstream ideological polarities. Agnostics, in contrast, exhibit a loosely coupled belief structure. Taken together, these two groups conform to longstanding descriptions of the American public as constituted by a group of sophisticated individuals who understand politics through conventional ideo-

logical categories and a less knowledgeable group of individuals who are instead “innocent of ideology” (Converse 1964; Kinder and Sears 1985). However, alternatives, the largest group in our sample, challenge this contention. Alternatives’ interpretation of politics is incompatible with the conventional ideological framework, but not in an incoherent way. Indeed, they consistently dissociate their preferences on moral issues from their economic and civil rights attitudes. Their deviation from the orthodox political polarity makes sense in that it accommodates their otherwise irreconcilable interests and social identities, thus challenging the assumption that there is only one “correct” way of understanding politics.

The heterogeneity of political belief systems does not simply derive from differences in levels of political sophistication (results are available from the authors) but in individuals’ social identities: people with different sociodemographic profiles structure their political preferences in systematically different ways. Given the predominance of moral and economic issues in political discourse, it is difficult for those who are pushed in different ideological directions by their religiosity or economic status to find a comfortable position along the liberal-conservative continuum. Their solution has been to adopt a political worldview that harmonizes their seemingly opposing political interests.²⁶

Implications for Understanding American Politics

Moving beyond the assumption of population homogeneity to consider the sociocognitive heterogeneity of American public opinion, we were able to cast new light on current debates on political polarization and the relative importance of moral issues in shaping partisan identities. There are two substantive payoffs of our approach.

First, while students of American politics agree that partisan battles, and the language with which they are waged, have become increasingly divisive in recent decades, they also find that this increased polarization is not fully reflected in the electorate at large. Reports of a fragmenting American public appear to be widely overstated (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fischer and Mattson 2009). Our findings reconcile these seemingly oppositional empirical facts. We find that while ideologues have responded favorably to growing polarization by aligning their moral views

²⁶ From this perspective, alternatives, as well as ideologues, can be understood within a “rational voter” framework (Downs 1957). In Downs’s original framework, voters and parties are positioned in the same ideological space, and voters maximize their utility by choosing the party that is closer to their political preferences. However, for alternatives the process of party selection is not straightforward because the political offer does not fully map onto their position in the belief space. They are consequently equidistant from both major parties.

with their opinions on economic policies, alternatives have resisted the pressures of choosing the same ideological camp on both dimensions. Together, these two opposing trends cancel each other out. This finding explains why studies of public opinion have found little evidence for alignment between voters' moral and other preferences, even as the political discourse has become increasingly polarized on themes such as abortion and gay rights. By overlooking sociocognitive heterogeneity in the population, scholars confounded these two mutually offsetting trends. Thus what may appear like an American public unresponsive to a polarizing political elite is, in fact, a two-pronged electorate responding differently to polarization. For some voters elite polarization has made it easier to define their political allegiance; for others neither the Republican nor the Democratic political agenda constitutes a satisfactory representation of their political preferences. Citizens' religiosity and class, and whether or not the two are compatible with how the mainstream political debate is structured, explain this bifurcation.

Second, our findings shed light on the effects of the growing salience of morality-based politics on partisan identification. Whereas popular understandings of the political zeitgeist in the American heartland suggest that working-class whites have been swayed by conservative moral rhetoric seemingly against their material interests, systematic public opinion analyses find that bread-and-butter concerns still have greater influence on these voters' partisan identification than issues such as abortion or gay marriage. Our results indicate that neither of these two narratives is entirely correct. Consistent with studies that argue that class politics has not waned, we find that economic concerns remain paramount for ideologues. But these voters do not need to choose between their moral worldviews and economic interests, as their opinions on all dimensions are aligned with the dominant ideological framing of the political debate. In contrast, members of the alternative group are those who are more strongly confronted by an incongruence between their opinions on the economic and moral dimensions and mainstream partisan ideology. It is in this group that we find working-class voters with conservative moral orientations. Against the argument about the persistence of class voting, we find that these blue-collar traditionalists are more likely to self-identify as Republicans. In the same group we also find individuals on the upper end of the income and educational distributions who support free-market economics and fiscal austerity. For these social progressives, economics outweighs opinions on morality as they too are more likely to identify as Republicans. In other words, moral issues trump economic interests for some working-class Americans but not for others. However, for all voters in the alternatives group, conservatism ultimately trumps their progressive inclinations, whatever dimension their progressivism is on.

Working-class religious Americans are more likely to support the Republican Party, but so are high-earning, educated, nonreligious Americans.

The belief system that characterizes alternatives derives from the tension these individuals face in combining their economic and religious social identities. Of course, there are plenty of other, potentially conflicting, identities. Why have some identities crystallized in a shared system of beliefs while others have not? We argue that this has to do with the growing importance of moral issues in the political discourse in the United States. Alternatives held ideologically incongruent opinions on morality and the economy as early as the Reagan years, but only in the following decade, once “values” became prominent, their alternative belief system was activated.

The political offer plays an important role in building the cognitive framework within which people operate. Our results suggest that since the early 1990s, when Americans hold seemingly competing opinions, they were more likely to privilege their conservative views and identify with the Republican Party. We believe that this is in part due to the ambiguous and potentially self-contradictory ideological stances taken by the Republican Party. In fact, over the past four decades, both neoliberal and ultraconservative advocates have found voice in the Republican Party, as recurrent infighting at the the Republican National Convention reminds us.²⁷ To some political commentators, neoliberal support for economic deregulation and ultraconservative support for moral restrictions might appear conceptually at odds with one another; nonetheless, these views have found a way to coexist in the Republican Party, thus making the party more appealing to “ideologically heterodox” voters and contributing to the crystallization of an alternative belief system. Our typology of voters may be useful for future research interested in understanding the rise and transformative capacity of the American conservative movement since the 1990s.

The insights gained from our analysis inherently depend on our methodological approach, which provided a vantage point that traditional approaches to public opinion data do not afford.

Methodological Contribution

“Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study and quantification” (Converse 1964, p. 206). The opening line of Philip Converse’s influential study succinctly captures the gap between theories of public opinion and how they are borne out in empirical studies. Indeed, the study of belief systems, as well as more recent research on political sophistication and heterogeneity, developed amid discussions concerning analysis and measure-

²⁷ “As Christians Pull the G.O.P. to the Right, Its Leaders Argue over Holding the Center,” *New York Times*, June 27, 1994; “‘Cultural War’ of 1992 Moves In from the Fringe,” *New York Times*, August 30, 2012; see also Pennings (1994) for an account of Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition’s divisive impact on GOP conventions.

ment. Our research contributes to the study of public opinion by overcoming a few important analytical limitations that previous research suffers from, thus better fulfilling its theoretical objectives.

First, our method has high fidelity to Converse's original concept of constraint. Unlike conventional studies that either examine summary indices or look at dyadic correlations between pairs of variables, RCA measures the extent to which a complete set of variables covary with one another. The relationships that this methodological approach uncovers correspond to what Converse calls a "belief system": a configuration of ideas whereby elements are interdependently bound together. A belief system does not prescribe what positions citizens are allowed to have; nevertheless, it limits the space of possible opinion combinations by determining which beliefs are congruent with one another. The underlying categories—such as liberal and conservative—that structure this limited space of possibilities are latent in the network of relationships between beliefs. Examining these beliefs independently of one another necessarily overlooks how they systematically coalesce, if at all. On the other hand, using summary indices forces an *a priori* assumption about how beliefs depend on one another. Our approach inductively reveals the belief network, without presupposing its structure.

Second, we take Converse's construct one step further by exploring the possibility of the coexistence of multiple, and competing, belief systems. Students of public opinion have acknowledged, and at times attempted to explore, this possibility. Yet these attempts have often been constrained by the methods conventionally used for examining opinion constraint. In his seminal paper, Converse (1964) finds that intellectual elites exhibit high degrees of opinion constraint. The implications are that those who exhibit lower opinion interdependence have an incomplete understanding of the political debate. Because public opinion analyses are dominated by the prevalent conceptualization of politics as divided into two political camps, many studies, whether explicitly or implicitly, effectively make similar assumptions. Davis and Robinson's (1996) otherwise insightful analysis, for example, in criticizing the "culture war" thesis accepts, by default, the contention that those who simultaneously take orthodox and progressive opinions on religious issues employ a "muddled" moral cosmology. Yet the group of voters we call *alternatives* are not necessarily misinformed about politics. Rather they construe political meaning in a different way than ideologues do. Our approach allows for the possibility that different Americans understand politics by relying on altogether different sense-making schemes (Goldberg 2011). This is quite different from distinguishing between voters on the extent to which they diverge from the mainstream conservative-liberal dichotomy.

Finally, contrary to the "funnel of causality" analytical tradition (Campbell et al. 1960), we demonstrate that social differences do not "linearly" map onto ideological and political cleavages and that we cannot assume popu-

lation homogeneity in the organization of political beliefs. Whereas, for example, high-income ideologues tend to be morally conservative, their alternative counterparts are likely to be morally liberal. Thus, income is insignificantly correlated with moral ideology over the population as a whole. A similar inconsistency holds even when examining the effects of sociodemographics on political identification net of other social dimensions. When we hold other variables constant, education predicts identifying as a Democrat in the ideologue group but as a Republican in the alternative group. In sum, the relationship between voting and sociodemographic attributes is mediated by one's belief system, and thus, education, income, and religiosity have different effects on partisanship for different people.²⁸ Examining these relationships in the aggregate, as most conventional analyses do, potentially obscures such differences.

Overall, we contend that the bidimensionality of the U.S. political space and changes in the political offer require a more complex understanding of the relationship between social identity and partisanship than most statistical analyses of public opinion data usually assume.²⁹ Taking into account the heterogeneity of political belief systems in American public opinion, we demonstrated that the way in which people organize their political preferences is rooted in their social identities, sometimes defying dominant political conceptions. Our results showed that the relationship between political attitudes and party identification is mediated by the political belief system individuals adopt: partisanship is more than a zero-sum game between class-based and value voting.³⁰

²⁸ In looking for the working-class voters who have supposedly abandoned liberal politics, Frank (2004) and, consequently, his detractors treat the non-college-educated or those on the lower end of the income distribution as monolithic wholes. In contrast, our approach has been to classify respondents on the basis of the underlying logics structuring their political opinions. This allows us to find how neither social group exhibits a consistent pattern of ideological and partisan orientation.

²⁹ Fiorina et al., criticizing "literally hundreds of electoral analyses" (2011, p. 178), raised an important methodological issue related to the bidimensionality of the political space. Namely, they showed that changes between elections in the position of the candidates, and in particular candidates' differentiation along the moral dimension, "can produce the appearance of voter change even in the absence of the latter" (p. 184), because "when candidates diverge on an issue dimension, voters will appear to weight that dimension more heavily even if their own preferences and decision rules do not change" (p. 178). We move this line of reasoning a step forward, arguing that, though the bipartisan structure of American politics imposes a dichotomy between two ideological camps, such homogeneity of views is not reflected in voters' political preferences.

³⁰ Class and religion are central for party identification in other countries as well. In national electorates across Europe, e.g., multiple dimensions of cleavage interact in complex ways with political choice (Evans and de Graaf 2012). Our analytical approach may be useful for shedding light on the complex interplay between various dimensions of socio-political cleavage in these political cultures.

APPENDIX

Relational Class Analysis: Formal Description and Implementation

The relational class analysis (RCA) was conducted for each year independently. Each year subsample includes a different subset of variables, as summarized in table A1. For a detailed description of RCA, its theoretical and methodological assumptions and motivation, as well as its application, see Goldberg (2011). We provide a short summary of RCA in order to explain how we applied it to the American National Election Studies (ANES) data.

Central to RCA is the concept of relationality. Relationality measures the extent to which the responses of two individual respondents follow the same pattern of relationships between one another. Let X be a data set of N observations and K variables. Formally, relationality R_{ij} between observations i and j is defined as follows:

$$R_{ij} = \frac{2}{K(K-1)} \sum_{k=l}^{K-1} \sum_{l=k+1}^K (\lambda_{ij}^{kl} \times \sigma_{ij}^{kl}), \quad (\text{A1})$$

where

$$\sigma_{ij}^{kl} = 1 - ||\Delta X_i^{kl}| - |\Delta X_j^{kl}|| \quad (\text{A2})$$

is the relational similarity for the variable pair k, l between observations i and j ,

$$\Delta X_i^{kl} = X_i^k - X_i^l \quad (\text{A3})$$

is the distance between the values of variables k and l for observation i , and

$$\lambda_{ij}^{kl} = \begin{cases} 1 & \Delta X_i^{kl} \times \Delta X_j^{kl} \geq 0 \\ -1 & \Delta X_i^{kl} \times \Delta X_j^{kl} < 0 \end{cases} \quad (\text{A4})$$

is a binary coefficient that determines the sign of the relational similarity: λ_{ij}^{kl} is positive if ΔX^{kl} has the same sign for observations i and j and is negative otherwise.

Like correlation, relationality is bounded by -1 and $+1$. Values close to either extreme indicate that the patterns of responses of the two individuals are strongly similar, in either the same (such as respondents A and C in fig. 1) or opposing (respondents A and B) directions. Values in between these extremes indicate that the two respondents (such as A and D) exhibit different patterns and therefore subscribe to different belief systems.

The RCA procedure is based on the following three-stage sequence:

1. Relationality is calculated for all pairs of respondents, using the formula described above. This results in a proximity matrix with cell values ranging from -1 to $+1$.

TABLE A1
VARIABLES BY YEAR

Label	Wording	Range	1984	1986	1988	1992	1994	1996	2000	2004	Total
Economics:											
health.ins	Support for government or private health insurance	7	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
jobs.guar7	Support for government guarantee jobs and income	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
gov.services	Should government reduce or increase spending?	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
FS.poor	Federal spending on the poor	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	4
FS.childcare	Federal spending on child care	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
FS.crime	Federal spending on crime	3	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	6
FS.aids	Federal spending on AIDS	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	5
FS.publicschools	Federal spending on public schools	3	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
FS.aidcollege	Federal spending on college aid	3	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	4
FS.homeless	Federal spending on homeless	3	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	3
FS.welfare	Federal spending on welfare	3	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5
FS.foodstamps	Federal spending on food stamps	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	7
FS.envir	Federal spending on environment	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	7
FS.soc.sec	Federal spending on Social Security	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
FS.assist.blacks	Federal spending on assistance to blacks	3	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	5
Civil rights:											
urb.unrest	Best way of dealing with urban rioting (reduce poverty vs. violence)	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
negro.chan	How much has the position of Negroes improved?	3	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	5
civil.rights.too.fast	Civil rights have pushed too fast	3	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
sch.busing	Support for school busing for integration	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
blacks.aid	Should the government help blacks?	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
aff.action	Opinion on affirmative action	4	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	6

2. The statistical significance of each cell value is determined using a bootstrapping procedure that relies on 10,000 resamples. Cell values are normalized by the sample mean and standard deviation. Insignificant cell values (for $\alpha = 0.05$) are set to zero, and cell values that are retained are transformed by their absolute value. The resulting matrix represents a sparse graph in which ties connect individuals who share similar patterns of beliefs, though not necessarily similar beliefs.
3. A spectral algorithm using eigenvalues is used to partition the graph into discrete groups. Each group corresponds to a different and distinctive belief system. The spectral algorithm maximizes modularity, which is the difference between observed and random within-group edge weights (assuming that the distribution of node degrees remains fixed). See Newman and Girvan (2004) for a discussion on modularity and Newman (2006) for a detailed description of the spectral algorithm.

The partitioning algorithm used by RCA is based on an iterative procedure that continues until modularity cannot be maximized: each group is recursively partitioned into two until such a partition no longer increases modularity (Newman 2006). However, not every maximization step produces a meaningful partition. When the increase in modularity is negligible, the partition creates two marginally different groups. Consequently, we ran the partitioning algorithm so that it is stopped if the additional contribution to modularity was smaller than 1%. This resulted in a partition of seven of the eight yearly subsamples into three groups. One subsample, for the year 1996, was partitioned into four groups. In order to maintain consistency across all years, we decided to enforce a three-group partition in this subset by reversing the final step of the algorithm. This step contributed only 6.53% to modularity and therefore had an overall insubstantial impact on the results.

After applying RCA to each yearly subsample independently, we examined the correlation structure between opinion variables in each group in order to classify each group as exhibiting one of the three belief systems (ideologue, alternative, or agnostic). This turned out to be a simple task as each group is clearly characterized by an unambiguous pattern of relationships between variables, as documented in the text.

Data

The analysis is based on the ANES cumulative data set, which includes variables from each of the biennial cross-sectional studies conducted between 1948 and 2008. We used a subset of this data set that includes variables from each of the studies conducted between 1984 and 2004. Public opinion variables that were asked in fewer than three different studies since 1984 were removed from the data set. Our data set focuses exclusively on variables that fall under one of our four issue categories: economics, civil rights,

morality, and foreign policy. Studies conducted before 1984 included too few variables pertaining to moral issues and were therefore not included. Wording and variable scaling were changed significantly in 2008; as a result, this year was not included in our analysis.

To facilitate an RCA, all respondents must provide answers for all questions. Regression-based imputations might defeat the whole purpose of an analysis aimed at finding ideational heterogeneity. We therefore list-wise deleted respondents who had missing answers. For years 1990, 1998, and 2002, the list-wise deletion of respondents either removed the entire sample for that year or retained only a very small number of variables for that year. Consequently, these study years were excluded from the analysis. Since binary variables have no midrange values and are therefore inappropriate for use in RCA, they were also removed from the data set. Two additional variables that had high levels of missing data (VCF9043 and VCF0818) were also removed.

Following this procedure, we used for the RCA a total of 43 variables, whose details (label, wording, and range) are listed in table A1. Figure A1 indicates which variables were available for each year as well as the number of respondents used in the analysis, by year. The number of variables used in each year ranges from 24 to 40. The median study year included 32 variables. On average, each variable was available in six of the eight years analyzed.

To create issue domain scales, we transformed all variables on a 0–1 scale and then averaged these variables within domain for each year. Figure A1 plots the distribution of each scale by group. Scales are standardized, per year sample, to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. As these distributions clearly indicate, all groups contain respondents that span the full scale of opinions, and neither is significantly skewed in one ideological direction.

Correlation Analyses

Figures 3 and 7 in the text report correlations between issue domains for each year. Each cell reports the average weighted correlation between all pairs of issues in the given two domains. Formally, the average weighted correlation between two variable sets A and B is defined as

$$\bar{\rho}(A, B) = \frac{1}{|A||B|} \sum_{a \in A, b \in B} \tilde{\rho}(a, b), \quad (\text{A5})$$

where A and B are sets of variables, each for a different issue domain, and $\tilde{\rho}$ is the weighted Pearson correlation coefficient for two variables. We use centrality as our weighting coefficient. Centrality corresponds to the eigenvectors produced by the network partitioning algorithm used by RCA (Newman




FIG. A1

2006). Intuitively, the centrality of each observation measures the extent to which this observation is central to the group it was assigned to. We get very similar results if no weighting is used. We determine the significance of $\bar{\rho}$ using a simple t -test.

General Linear Models

In the article we report results from four different regression models, which include a combination of public opinion and sociodemographic/sophistication variables. In this section we provide a detailed description of each of the models. List-wise deletion was used to treat missing data in all models.

Figure 4 reports the result of two OLS models in which the dependent variable is an economic conservatism scale. Data are pooled across all groups and all years, and year fixed effects are included. The figure plots the marginal effects estimated by the model. Estimated coefficients are reported in table A2. Importantly, the coefficient for the interaction term between the alternative group dummy and moral conservatism in model 1 is negative and significant, effectively washing out the effect for moral conservatism on

TABLE A2
OLS OF ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM BY RCA GROUP

	ECONOMIC	
	(1)	(2)
Moral240*** (.025)	
Ideologue \times moral367*** (.031)	
Alternative \times moral	-.186*** (.031)	
Civil rights375*** (.027)
Ideologue \times civil rights367*** (.031)
Alternative \times civil rights073* (.033)
Ideologue	-.038 (.031)	.340*** (.030)
Alternative335*** (.030)	.358*** (.029)
Intercept	-.086*** (.023)	-.201*** (.023)
R^2226	.386

NOTE.—Standardized scales. Year fixed effects are included. $N = 5,860$; numbers in parentheses are SEs.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

TABLE A3
MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF RCA GROUP ASSIGNMENT

	Pr(Ideologue)/ Pr(Alternative)	Pr(Agnostic)/ Pr(Alternative)	Pr(Ideologue)/ Pr(Agnostic)
Income	-.087 (.072)	-.083 (.075)	.004 (.080)
Attendance	-.193** (.072)	-.158* (.075)	.035 (.082)
Income × attendance055* (.022)	.038 (.023)	-.017 (.025)
Age	-.002 (.002)	-.004 (.003)	-.001 (.003)
Female396*** (.073)	.136 (.078)	-.260** (.082)
Black575*** (.117)	-.768*** (.156)	-1.343*** (.156)
Southerner	-.124 (.080)	.193* (.084)	.317*** (.089)
Education131*** (.028)	-.088** (.030)	-.219*** (.032)
Professional085 (.086)	-.179 (.096)	-.265** (.099)
Political interest211*** (.057)	.015 (.060)	-.196** (.064)
Political activism069 (.036)	-.067 (.044)	-.136** (.044)

NOTE.—Standardized scales. Fixed effects for year are included. $N = 4,548$; log likelihood = $-4,635.80$; numbers in parentheses are SEs.

* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.
*** $P < .001$.

economic conservatism. The same interaction term for ideologues is significantly positive. In other words, whereas economic and moral conservatism are significantly more strongly associated with one another for ideologues than they are for agnostics, they are effectively dissociated from one another for alternatives.

Figure 6 reports the results of a multinomial logit model in which the dependent variable is a nominal variable that corresponds to RCA group assignment. Data are pooled across all years, and year fixed effects are included. Figure 6 reports the odds ratio of being assigned to the ideologue group compared to being assigned to the alternative group. The odds ratio is plotted as a function of an interaction between religious attendance and income. Sociodemographic control variables used are age, gender, race, southern, and professional status. Because we want to examine the extent to which sociodemographic variables predict group membership above and beyond political sophistication, we include political interest and political activism as control variables (political discussion was not asked in 1988 and was there-

Neither Ideologues nor Agnostics

TABLE A4
OLS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY RCA GROUP

	BEFORE 1990			AFTER 1990		
	Ideologues	Alternatives	Agnostics	Ideologues	Alternatives	Agnostics
Conservatism:						
Economic	3.688*** (.755)	3.819*** (.595)	2.513*** (.703)	2.241*** (.439)	3.243*** (.334)	3.640*** (.544)
Moral561 (.508)	1.427** (.465)	.714 (.557)	2.714*** (.379)	2.703*** (.296)	2.118*** (.455)
Civil rights987 (.750)	1.014 (.723)	1.067 (.753)	2.083*** (.405)	1.515*** (.354)	1.120 (.593)
Foreign policy804 (.568)	.983 (.504)	.0595 (.564)	1.070*** (.260)	.763** (.232)	.497 (.370)
Sociodemographics:						
Education	-.0865 (.0675)	.212** (.0671)	.0565 (.0763)	.0876* (.0387)	.141*** (.0377)	.0129 (.0564)
Income105 (.0902)	.0805 (.0951)	.109 (.100)	.0524 (.0502)	.120* (.0493)	.112 (.0741)
Attendance	-.0522 (.0666)	-.0240 (.0652)	-.0531 (.0757)	-.0421 (.0344)	-.00847 (.0344)	.0131 (.0490)
Age	-.0131* (.00575)	-.0135* (.00538)	-.0110 (.00649)	-.0150*** (.00324)	-.00982** (.00304)	-.0209*** (.00448)
Female0816 (.172)	-.0983 (.173)	.388* (.195)	-.145 (.0966)	-.00777 (.0990)	.102 (.140)
Black	-1.197*** (.279)	-1.123*** (.332)	-1.086* (.466)	-.885*** (.160)	-.784*** (.182)	-.811** (.305)
Southerner	-.152 (.193)	-.268 (.188)	-.215 (.210)	-.134 (.104)	-.125 (.107)	-.0772 (.151)
Professional167 (.199)	-.143 (.212)	.371 (.252)	-.126 (.113)	-.0564 (.117)	.287 (.169)
Constant	2.228*** (.653)	.799 (.734)	1.449 (.776)	.855* (.334)	-.183 (.369)	1.040 (.547)
N	478	459	435	1,045	1,408	715
R ²323	.301	.128	.518	.291	.250

NOTE.—Fixed effects for year are included; numbers in parentheses are SEs.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

fore omitted). Results for the full multinomial logit model are reported in table A3. Each column reports the coefficients for one of the three pairings of odds ratios: ideologue/alternative, agnostic/alternative, and ideologue/agnostic. The estimates plotted in figure 6 are reported in the first column.

Figure 8 reports results of OLS models in which the dependent variable is a seven-point party identification scale. The full model estimates are reported in table A4. Each column reports the result of the same model, applied to a different subsample. These subsamples differ by RCA group and whether or not the data were collected before or after 1990. The first four variables reported in the table correspond to the respondent's average po-

TABLE A5
OLS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY RCA GROUP

	Before 1990	After 1990
Ideologues:		
ΔEM220**	.166*
$(\Delta EM)^2$	-.017	-.020
Education	-.104	-.142**
Income142	.23***
Attendance155*	.303***
Age	-.001	-.004
Female	-.015	-.650***
Black	-1.836***	-1.698***
Southerner032	.071
Alternatives:		
ΔEM157*	.072
$(\Delta EM)^2$036	.055*
Education192**	.081*
Income106	.209***
Attendance127	.182***
Age	-.008	-.001
Female	-.127	-.193
Black	-1.68***	-1.652***
Southerner	-.186	.025
Agnostics:		
ΔEM106	.104
$(\Delta EM)^2$031	.040
Education107	.017
Income182	.281***
Attendance	-.002	.164***
Age	-.006	-.014**
Female247	-.169
Black	-1.621***	-1.486***
Southerner	-.056	.084
Intercept	3.619***	4.020***
N	1,413	3,277
R^2157	.152

NOTE.—Fixed effects for year are included; numbers in parentheses are SEs.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

sition on one of four ideological dimensions, scaled on a 0–1 range. Additional variables are detailed in table A4.

Figure 9 reports results of an OLS model in which the dependent variable is a seven-point party identification scale. Data are pooled into two different time ranges: before and after 1990. Year fixed effects are included. To account for different effects in each RCA group, all the independent variables were interacted with a group membership dummy for each of the three RCA groups. Independent variables include all sociodemographic variables as re-

ported in table A3. Professional status was removed to reduce model overfit. Also included is a ΔEM variable, which measures the difference between the standardized average positions on economic and moral issues (see the fig. 9 legend for a formal definition). Quadratic terms are used for ΔEM . Full model estimates are reported in table A5.

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