movement and organizational studies, especially the chapter on the methodological complexities of studying fields empirically. Advanced scholars in these areas may benefit less from a full reading of the book, but the central point about the embeddedness of fields is one that needs to be taken seriously in future work in organizational, political, and economic sociology. The authors, however, aspire to reach a wider audience. Here the primary contribution is that the work reflects a sustained effort to theorize the meso-level social orders that structure much of our daily lives without skirting the question of the micro foundations of social action or the macrolevel constraints that ultimately provide the resources and opportunities for social stability and change. The core questions of the "micro-macro link" that animated theory and scholarship in the 1980s are reintroduced front and center, and all of us would benefit from reading *A Theory of Fields* as a model of integrative social analysis, even if the theory of social action and the conceptualization of strategic action fields may not be entirely persuasive. As Fligstein and McAdam note in their conclusion, this book, although a long time in the making, is intended as a starting point for further conversation within and across cognate subfields and disciplines. And it is a good starting point, indeed.

War in Social Thought: Hobbes to the Present. By Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013. Pp. x+325. $35.00.

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War in Social Thought was originally published in 2008 in German. It was well received, rightly so, since it is a balanced, insightful, and well-written overview of the way social scientists in the West have treated the topic of war over the last 350 years. Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl admit at the outset that their task is a difficult one, since by and large social scientists have practiced the "suppression of war." Though war has been important in influencing social theory, the authors say, it has been rarely present in theories themselves. Social scientists have preferred either not to think much about war or to assert that human progress will make it obsolete. Their neglect of war, which along with capitalism and the nation-state has remained the most striking form of human activity of the last 100 years, still endures (although analysis of current American militarism is now a growth industry). But when one considers that without wars there would have probably been no communist or fascist regimes, no American hegemony, a much slower process of decolonization, and many other different outcomes, the neglect remains insupportable. So, since this work is a very good review of the sociology of war, I recommend it to all sociologists.

Notwithstanding this neglect, our authors still find much to discuss. For the English-speaking reader, some of the German theorists discussed here will be unknown names. Not Hegel or Marx or Weber or Carl Schmitt, of course, but Emil Lederer, Max Scheler, and recent writers like Trutz von Trotha, Dieter Senghaas, and Herfried Münkler are not familiar names, but should be.

Our authors are particularly interesting on unfashionable theorists of the past. Adam Ferguson of the Scottish Enlightenment attacked utilitarian theories of war, linking war to the emotions and the pursuit of honor, yet he argued that war assisted the development of citizenship and human progress more generally. Alexis de Tocqueville unexpectedly turns up here as a French nationalist and imperialist. Werner Sombart's nationalism is roundly denounced. His famous distinction between "traders" and "heroes" was widely applied during World War I and after to refer to Britain and Germany. This idea inspired his memorable one-liner: "Often, one can't but help but feel that we are fighting against a department store."

William Graham Sumner emerges as a star. From his theory of the four basic human motives—hunger, love, desire for fame, and religious needs—he deduced the inevitability of war, declaring that "it is evident that men love war." Yet he lamented this and feared in 1898 that current American imperialism would result in atrocities abroad and the neglect of reform at home. He denounced the war against the Spanish empire as "the conquest of the United States by Spain," since the United States was acquiring Spanish imperial culture—and had specifically borrowed its concentration camps. Unusually for the time, he was prescient in seeing that the 20th century would bring "a frightful effusion of blood in revolution and war." He is still relevant at the beginning of the 21st century, as we see in the conquest of the United States by al Qaeda—as evidenced in Abu Ghraib and extreme rendition.

Joas and Knöbl strongly criticize the instrumentally rational theories of war offered by liberal and Marxist sociologists and by the international relations and political science theorists who dominate today's study of war. But, they caution, if a war does not evidently comply with instrumental rationality, we should not regard it as merely "senseless" or as the release of the "savage," "the beast within." Emotions and values have their own reasons, their own structures. Our authors do not attempt to analyze these systematically but they see Hegel, Scheler, Simmel, Sumner, and the French sociologist Roger Callois as offering a partial way forward. I must confess that I had never heard of Callois. He sees war as substituting for the traditional ritual festival, allowing humans to maintain the sense of the sacred by ripping them out of their humdrum secular lives into a kind of transcendental frenzy, a reworking of ideas in Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (G. Allen & Unwin, 1915).

But a constant theme of the book is that theorists are praised for their insights but criticized for elevating their insights into a complete theory of war. The causes of war, the process of war, the organization of the military, and the experience of the warriors must all be part of the sociology of war. Wars involve armies with highly complex, rationally ordered organizations that are nonetheless permeated with strong codes of honor combined with extremely violent practices. When armies clash, the fog of war descends, the generals can no longer see the battlefield, and reason and planning recede. It is very difficult to grasp all of this to provide a single overall theory. In their conclusion, they identify Senghaas as the theorist who has gotten closest to this goal.

In the postwar period Raymond Aron, C. Wright Mills, and Samuel Finer get qualified praise, but it is the revival of Anglo-American comparative and historical sociology from the 1970s that really excites the authors. Rheinhard Bendix, Randall Collins, Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Anthony Giddens, Martin Shaw, and myself get sympathetic and accurate treatment, and indeed this book would be a good place for the reader to get a good overview of this recent sociology of war. On the other hand, the political science–inspired quantitative studies of war are rather neglected, although the "democratic peace" theory gets demolished while the debate on weak and failed states is presented well.

This book is an excellent synthesis of the literature on war, and the authors' own perspective on the debates is often incisive. Perhaps they do not pay enough attention to the dramatic changes in the social organization and technology of armed forces during this period, which is another reason an overall theory is hard to come by. But that would be another, much longer book. And anyone contemplating such an endeavor would be well advised to read this book first.

Climbing the Charts: What Radio Airplay Tells Us about the Diffusion of Innovation. By Gabriel Rossman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012. Pp. xi+184. $29.95.

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Radio is more in its golden years than its golden age. "Gangnam Style" became one of the most popular songs of all time not through radio but through YouTube (1.5 billion views and counting). In his book about radio, *Climbing the Charts*, Gabriel Rossman fully acknowledges his subject's decline, along with the shrinking hours and dollars devoted to radio airplay. It might be surprising, then, that a book whose stated goal is "to understand how songs get on the radio" (p. 2) should shine light far beyond