Hybrid Activism: Social Movement Mobilization in a Multimovement Environment[1]

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Social movement organizations often struggle to mobilize supporters from allied movements in their efforts to achieve critical mass. The authors argue that organizations with hybrid identities—those whose organizational identities span the boundaries of two or more social movements, issues, or identities—are vital to mobilizing these constituencies. They use original data from their study of the post-9/11 U.S. antiwar movement to show that individuals with past involvement in nonantiwar movements are more likely to join hybrid organizations than are individuals without involvement in nonantiwar movements. In addition, they show that organizations with hybrid identities occupy relatively more central positions in interorganizational cocontact networks within the antiwar movement and thus recruit significantly more participants in demonstrations than do nonhybrid organizations. Contrary to earlier research, they do not find that hybrid organizations are subject to an illegitimacy discount; instead, they find that hybridization can augment the ability of social movement organizations to mobilize their supporters in multimovement environments.

Identity is one of the most important features of organizations, but there is strong disagreement among sociologists about how identity affects organizational performance. The argument stems from a simple, but important,

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observation: some organizations have complex and multidimensional identities that span or combine categories, while other organizations possess narrow identities. Those who think that complex identities are beneficial point to the strategic advantages of ambiguity (Padgett and Ansell 1993), the innovation potential from recombining knowledge (Schumpeter 1939), and organizations' potential to differentiate themselves from competitors (Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005). In contrast, there are scholars who believe that complex identities confuse audiences about an organization's role or purpose. In particular, Zuckerman (1999) argues that actors that do not fit within a single, well-defined category may suffer an "illegitimacy discount" in the eyes of attentive audiences (see also Zuckerman et al. 2003; Hsu 2006; Hsu, Hannan, and Kocak 2009).

If organizations are at risk of an illegitimacy discount for possessing complex identities, then the question arises, what are the empirical conditions under which this discount does or does not apply? Within the field of social movements, for example, it is fairly common—even celebrated—for organizations to embrace hybrid organizational identities. In her book *Forging Gay Identities*, Armstrong (2002) notes that lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender movement organizations often identified themselves according to a "gay plus one" formula for creating hybrid identities. Minkoff (2002) observes that hybridization of service and advocacy is a common strategy that nonprofit organizations adopt to manage uncertainties in their environments. Goss and Heaney (2010) document how women's organizations hybridize movements, constituencies, and political institutions in order to organize women as women on not-explicitly-gendered policy issues. Are these organizations exposing themselves to substantial risks of illegitimacy because of their hybrid statuses? Or is there something about the context of social movements that shields organizations from the illegitimacy discount?

This article argues that social movement organizations often experience substantial advantages when they form identities that blend organizational

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categories. Specifically, we claim that organizations that traverse the boundaries of multiple social movements to form hybrid identities may fulfill a significant brokerage function between movements. At the individual level, these hybrids help people with backgrounds in other social movements to connect with a new movement in ways that feel comfortable to them. These crossover activists may be especially likely to feel this compatibility if hybrid organizations reach out to them by amplifying the identities of other movements in which activists participate (Goss and Heaney 2010). At the organizational level, hybrids mobilize activists by building intermovement networks (Carroll and Ratner 1996), standing as intermovement representatives in single-issue coalitions (Van Dyke 2003), and adopting (or embodying) frame extensions that advance a movement's arguments by borrowing the language of other movements (Snow et al. 1986). As a result, it is problematic to assume that hybrid organizations operating within social movements necessarily experience illegitimacy discounts analogous to the experiences of organizations in other environments.

In order to empirically evaluate the effect of hybrid identities on the performance of social movement organizations, we investigate the mobilization of the antiwar movement in the United States after 9/11. Antiwar movements tend to mobilize in response to the initiation of war and then recede into abeyance as hostilities subside (Taylor 1989; Marullo and Meyer 2004). This inherently episodic nature of antiwar activism leaves peace activists with little choice but to exploit the organizational structures of other movements if they are to attain critical mass. In the aftermath of 9/11, for example, the antiwar movement drew heavily from activists in the antiglobalization/global justice movement to promote its initial mobilizations for peace (Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Reitan 2009; Gillham and Edwards 2011). Vasi (2006, 2011) explains that antiwar movements rely on this strategy because they are highly miscible; that is, they usually share ideologies and activist networks with movements for social justice, global justice, the environment, women's rights, gay and lesbian rights, labor, and other causes. As a result, Reese, Petit, and Meyer (2010) point out, many of the leading activists in the antiwar movement are movement crossovers: they have extensive histories of involvement in other social movements. However, these previous studies have not identified the organizational mechanisms through which antiwar movements attract activists from other movements to mass mobilizations.

We observe that antiwar movements often turn to hybrid organizations as a way to encourage other activists—who may have a wide range of concerns—to channel their time and energy into this particular cause.[2] Exam-

[2] Not all studies of hybrid organizations employ the "hybrid" concept in the same way. Our research focuses on organizations that hybridize identities across the boundaries of

ples of such organizations are Code Pink: Women for Peace (which hybridizes peace and women's activism), U.S. Labor Against the War (which hybridizes peace and labor activism), and Veterans for Peace (which hybridizes peace and veterans activism). These organizations helped the anti–Iraq War movement to stage some of the largest peace demonstrations since the antinuclear movement of the 1980s (Meyer 1990; Walgrave and Verhulst 2009).

We begin this article, first, by reviewing the sociological literature on organizations with hybrid identities. Second, we develop hypotheses for how these organizations are likely to perform in social movement contexts. Third, we detail our methods for collecting original data using surveys of 5,410 antiwar demonstrators conducted in 2007–9 and for classifying 524 organizations that helped to mobilize them. Fourth, using this information, we briefly describe the field of organizations that contacted individuals to participate in the antiwar movement. Fifth, we specify the empirical models used to test our hypotheses. Sixth, we find that organizations with hybrid identities are more likely than their peer organizations to attract supporters from nonantiwar constituencies, occupy central positions in interorganizational cocontact networks within the antiwar movement, and contact participants in street demonstrations. Seventh, we consider the general implications of our work for hybrid organizations, social networks, and social movements.

THEORIZING ORGANIZATIONS WITH HYBRID IDENTITIES

Identity is commonly understood as an individual-level phenomenon wherein a person addresses the question "Who am I?" (Mead 1934; Erickson 1968; Walsh 2004). However, an analogous—though conceptually distinct—phenomenon exists at the organizational level in which members of an organization address the question "Who are we as an organization?" (Albert and Whetten 1985; Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Hsu and Hannan 2005; Whetten 2006). Albert and Whetten (1985, pp. 266–67) define organizational identity as a statement of "central character" that establishes the organization "as recognizably different from others."

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the antiwar movement since the antiwar movement is the focus of this research. However, some studies examine hybridization of organizational forms, tactics, or other aspects of organizational behavior. Minkoff (2002) investigates organizations that hybridize the nonprofit organizational form with political advocacy work. Chadwick (2007) analyzes an organization that hybridizes political parties, social movements, and interest group forms of organization. Goss and Heaney (2010) add hybridization of tactics to the discussion of hybrid organizational forms. Murray (2010) documents the processes at work during the hybridization of academic and commercial laboratory research. We do not claim that intermovement hybrids are the only important type of hybrids; instead, we assert that intermovement hybrids are most relevant in a study of multimovement mobilization.

The multiple audiences that observe an organization hold default expectations that help to form and define the organization's identity (Hsu and Hannan 2005, p. 476). These audiences may include members, supporters, competitors, volunteers, staff, customers, foundations, government officials, mass media, and the public at large. Identities may be simple, widely accepted, and stable, or they may be complex, actively contested, and dynamic—depending on the organization and the nature of the environment in which it is embedded. Organizational identities may affect an organization's short-term performance and long-term viability (Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton 2000; Whetten 2006; Zellweger et al. 2013). When organizations change their identities, they risk serious negative consequences (Hannan et al. 2006).

In an effort to craft unique and compelling identities, organizations sometimes adopt identities that self-consciously blend multiple dimensions of their environments (Minkoff 2002; Heaney 2004; Johnson 2007; Johnston 2008; Halpin and Binderkrantz 2011). These "hybrid organizations" are "composed of two or more types that would not normally be expected to go together" by the audiences attentive to their organizations' identities (Albert and Whetten 1985, p. 270; Hsu 2006). Thus, hybrid organizations traverse the boundaries that typically divide organizations in one category from organizations in another category.

The effect of straddling organizational categories has been the subject of considerable research in the fields of organizational and economic sociology. Organizations expose themselves to significant potential benefits and risks when they are structured to traverse categorical boundaries. On the positive side, adopting multiple identities is seen as a way of preserving strategic flexibility that can be used to gain an advantage over competitors (Padgett and Ansell 1993). Bridging categories may allow organizations to recombine knowledge, technology, or experiences in ways that lead to the introduction of innovative products or institutional arrangements (Schumpeter 1939; Padgett and McLean 2006; Hsu, Negro, and Perretti 2012). Traversing categories may facilitate efforts by organizations to differentiate themselves from competitors (Rao et al. 2005). As a result, organizations that span categories may be more likely to attain exceptional success than is the case for organizations that operate entirely within well-defined categories (Hsu et al. 2012).

On the negative side, organizations may face increased challenges in connecting with their audiences when they breech categorical boundaries. Audiences have more trouble making sense of organizations that blend categories than of organizations that fit within a single, well-established category (Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman et al. 2003; Hsu 2006). As a result, hybrid organizations may face an "illegitimacy discount" from their evaluators (Zuckerman 1999). Organizations may also encounter challenges when their

output/performance exhibits features that are atypical of either category (Rao et al. 2005; Hsu et al. 2009).

The coexistence of strong advantages and disadvantages of the hybrid form raises the question, under which conditions do hybrid identities help or harm organizations? A recent line of research contends that hybrid organizations are less vulnerable to an illegitimacy discount when they operate within category systems with ambiguous boundaries (as opposed to clear boundaries) or when hybridization is seen as legitimate (as opposed to illegitimate). Rao et al. (2005) find that the penalties to hybrids diminish (or disappear) as more organizations in their field hybridize. In a study of food services, Kovacs and Hannan (2010) report that "activists" (i.e., people who are highly active in reviewing restaurants) do not impose the same penalties on category spanners (i.e., restaurants that serve multiple cuisines) as is the case for a general audience. Hannan, Polos, and Carroll (2007) claim that penalties for straddling boundaries are weaker when boundaries are less easily distinguished from one another. Finally, Hsu et al. (2012) point out that hybridization is more likely when there is already a greater presence of hybrid organizations in a field than when hybrids are a rare phenomenon.

HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT CONTEXTS

Given the mixed evidence on the merits of possessing a hybrid identity, the question arises as to whether hybrid identities help or hinder social movement organizations in particular. In this section, we make the case that hybrid organizations are integral to social movement mobilization and develop testable hypotheses based on this argument. First, we note that hybrid organizations are common in social movements because of the strong *intermovement dependency* in the mobilization process. Second, we argue that hybrids play an important role for individuals as they act out their *personal identities* in multiple movement contexts. Third, hybrid organizations navigate the *institutional environments* of multiple movements in ways that allow them to connect within interorganizational networks and contact participants in street demonstrations.[3]

Intermovement Dependency

Social movement scholars have long sought to explain the determinants of social movement mobilization (see, e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; Snow,

[3] We recognize that nonhybrid organizations often achieve success in appealing to individual identities and navigate institutional environments in ways that allow them to connect multiple social movements. Our argument, however, is that hybrid organizations possess distinct advantages in doing so.

Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Gould 1991; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Kriesi, Saris, and Wille 1993; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Robnett 1997; Zhao 2001; Schussman and Soule 2005; Viterna 2006; Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009; Munson 2009; Somma 2010). Early studies of mobilization concentrated on constructing explanations for the rise and fall of individual social movements as self-contained entities, such as the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and religious movements (Harrison 1959; Freeman 1973; McAdam 1982). This "movement-centric view" treated individual social movements as the fundamental unit of analysis in research (McAdam 1995, p. 218).

Over the past two decades, a consensus has emerged that significant intermovement dependencies exist. As a result, the boundaries between movements are now assumed to be blurred rather than clear. One or more movements may occupy a dominant position over other allied movements at a given point in time (Minkoff 1997). They may be sequenced such that one movement is clearly the "initiator" and the other a "spin-off" (McAdam 1995; Fisher 2006) or the movements may simultaneously feed back onto one another (Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006).

According to the intermovement dependency view, movements must be understood in terms of their relationships to past, contemporaneous, and future social movements. Past social movements train activists for current struggles, pass on know-how that becomes the content of tactical repertoires, and leave a cultural legacy that opens and closes doors to current movements (Voss and Sherman 2000; Isaac and Christiansen 2002). Contemporaneous social movements affect one another by molding political opportunity structures, providing and competing for resources, and generating allies in coalitions and opponents in countermovements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Isaac et al. 2006; Evans and Kay 2008). Future social movements matter because these are the means whereby a movement may have its most definite impact. Even if activists do not achieve their goals in their own day, they may ultimately be vindicated by setting the stage for others who win victories in their stead (Taylor 1989).

In light of the dependencies that exist among movements in the mobilization process, the question arises as to how movements attempt to manage these dependencies strategically. In her study of African-American women's involvement in the civil rights movement, Robnett (1997, p. 21) emphasized how women acting as "bridge leaders" were vital in constructing the relationships necessary to unite the movement with local communities. Social movement organizations, which have long been recognized as strategic centers in movement politics (Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and Berger 1978; Caniglia and Carmin 2005; Walker and McCarthy 2010), may provide an institutionalized way to perform the bridging functions emphasized by Robnett (1997). Indeed, previous research points to the role of social movement orga-

nizations in mobilizing across movement boundaries (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Minkoff 1997; Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Della Porta and Mosca 2007; Stretesky et al. 2011).

Hybrid organizations, which have identities rooted in more than one social movement, are a manifestation of intermovement dependency. They are commonly involved in social movement mobilization. For example, Veterans for Peace is a hybrid organization closely connected to both veterans' and antiwar movements (Leitz 2014).[4] Along with other veterans-antiwar hybrids (such as Iraq Veterans Against the War, Military Families Speak Out, and Gold Star Families for Peace/Gold Star Families Speak Out), it facilitates the participation of veterans at antiwar events by providing camaraderie among like-minded veterans, affording opportunities to share stories of combat, encouraging veterans to wear their military attire at peace rallies, offering antiwar arguments that take veterans' concerns into account, and representing veterans within peace coalitions.

Similarly, organizations that hybridize the women's movement with antiwar activism are omnipresent at peace rallies, including Code Pink: Women for Peace, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Raging Grannies, and the Missile Dick Chicks (Kutz-Flamenbaum 2007; Goss and Heaney 2010). Especially active religious-peace hybrids include organizations such as Pax Christi (which targets Catholic activists), the American Friends Service Committee (which targets Quaker activists), and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (which targets people of faith; Coy, Maney, and Woehrle 2008). Numerous hybrid organizations exist to blend peace activism with environmentalism, education, global justice, and other causes. Beyond issues of peace, hybrid organizations have been active in struggles for gay rights (Armstrong 2002), women's equal opportunity (Ferree and Roth 1998), women's antiviolence movements (Goss and Heaney 2010), partisan movements (Chadwick 2007), and international causes (Murdie and Davis 2012).

Because hybrid organizations are commonly a part of social movements, we do not expect them to be subject to the illegitimacy discount sometimes experienced by hybrids in other fields. In line with the research discussed in the previous section, we expect that hybrids are accepted within social movements because intermovement dependency blurs the boundaries between movements (Hannan et al. 2007). Hybrids are frequently present at movement events and, thus, likely to be seen as legitimate (Rao et al. 2005). Consequently, the activists involved in social movements are more likely

[4] Veterans in the United States have a long history of mobilizing on policy issues related to veterans' benefits and other social policies. The Bonus March of 1932 and veterans' mobilizations surrounding the New Deal are among the most well-known examples of veterans' activism (Ortiz 2010).

to be tolerant of hybridization than would be the case for a general audience (Kovacs and Hannan 2010).

Personal Identities

Social movements are settings for individuals to act out preexisting identities and to form new identities (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Individuals often find that participation in social movement organizations is a desirable way to pursue the further development of these identities (Stryker 2000, p. 30; Walsh 2004). Organizations may be more likely to attract supporters if there is a clear correspondence between an organization's identity and the personal identities of its potential constituents (Snow and McAdam 2000, p. 42). By offering this correspondence, hybrid organizations have the potential to provide "free spaces" (Polletta 1999) in which their identities can be nurtured and protected.

When a new, dominant movement arises on the scene, activists may look for ways to participate in the new movement that allow them to retain and build the identities developed in past movements. Valocchi (2001) demonstrates that the successful politicization of homosexuality in the late 1960s and early 1970s was owed, in part, to the emergence of the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) as a hybrid organization that merged the concerns of the New Left with the gay identity movement. Organizations such as GLF allow "individuals to come together around common interests, grievances, or social ties, engage in dialogue on and debate the causes of grievances and problems, engage in collective action on the basis of these understandings, and then come to alter the ideology or the collective identity of the movement as their experiences change" (p. 449).

The importance of hybrid organizations to individuals' participation in social movements may derive not only from the desire to act out identities acquired from past movements but also from their desire to identify with both movements simultaneously. Similarly, hybrid organizations may seek out individuals with identities connected to both movements because these individuals may be more likely than others to fit comfortably into the culture of the organization. Thus, hybrid organizations have the potential to serve the intersectional identities (Cohen 1999; McCall 2005; Hancock 2007; Strolovitch 2007) of movement activists.[5] Leitz's (2014) analysis of

[5] Discussions of intersectionality typically refer to the identity of people who hold more than one disadvantaged identity status. For example, an intersectional analysis might explore the plight of black women in an organization who are marginalized by both their racial and gender identities (Strolovitch 2007). The sense in which we use the concept of intersectionality here does not imply that either or both of the identities in question are marginal or disadvantaged in nature. Instead, we imply only that holding both movement identities in unison is important to the identity of the activist.

oppositional identities in the military peace movement fits within this rubric (see also Heaney and Rojas 2006). She argues that members of Iraq Veterans Against the War are not simply veterans protesting the war but, rather, people whose experience of having seen combat gives them both authority and obligation to speak out against war. Indeed, they are the ones who have been there, so who knows better than they? Similarly, Armstrong's (2002) book on the politics of sexuality in San Francisco documents efforts by movements to create hybrid structures to support intersectional identities. She observes that "the template for gay identity organizations was gay plus one other function or identity" (p. 22). These organizations included Libertarians for Gay and Lesbian Concerns, Presbyterians for Lesbian and Gay Concerns, and Alanon for Black Gay and Lesbian Adult Children of Alcoholics. By catering to these intersectional identities, hybrid organizations have the potential to mobilize activists who might otherwise feel alienated from the activities of either movement.

Failure of movement organizations to reach out to their constituents using salient identities from other movements may impinge on the success of a movement. Ferree and Roth (1998) surmise that the failure of women to win substantial concessions in a local strike of day care workers in West Berlin in 1989–90 was due to the absence of "bridging organizations" that could have kept open lines of communication between the women's and labor movements. Even when women are engaged in the work of "other" movements, they often benefit from the existence of organizations that focus on their identities as women. They conclude that "women need to organize by gender . . . both in representing women's economic interest in and outside of mixed gender unions and in representing women's political interest in and outside of the parties" (p. 644).

Lichterman's (1995) case study of left-leaning environmental organizations similarly suggests that the absence of organizations that bridge movement cultures may be a barrier to mobilizing across movements. He argues that white, middle-class activists from the left side of the political spectrum may have difficulty uniting with nonwhite and low-income activists—even if these groups possess strong ideological compatibility—because of differences in organizational style and culture. Even when activist organizations self-consciously seek to reach out to activists in other movements, organizational routines and practices may undercut the success of these efforts. These organizational differences may be part of the reason why African-Americans traditionally organize their antiwar activism separately from predominantly white, "mainstream" peace movements (Westheider 2008). Hybrid organizations that seek to create cultures that bridge the two movements have the potential to mitigate these problems.

The foregoing arguments suggest that organizations with hybrid identities have the potential to facilitate the engagement of activists from other

social movements during the mobilization of the antiwar movement. Hybrid organizations may become a place for antiwar activists who want to identify with their previous movements. Similarly, hybrid organizations may target individuals with identities connected with other movements during their previous efforts. Thus, we state our first hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 1.—*Individuals who have participated in social movements other than antiwar movements are more likely to join hybrid organizations than are individuals who have not participated in social movements other than antiwar movements*.

Institutional Environments

Social movement organizations operate in competitive multi-institutional environments (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). They face competition from other social movement organizations that seek to mobilize the same constituents, claim the same foundation grants, and seize the attention of the same media outlets. Minkoff (2002) explains that hybridization is a strategy that organizations use to manage these environmental uncertainties by fusing multiple legitimate forms. This fusion enables hybrids to respond to the pressures from varied actors in their environments (Johnson 2007; Kraatz and Block 2008). As a result, hybrid organizations have become increasingly common, especially in environments where Internet-driven "rapid institutional adaptation and experimentation is almost routine" (Chadwick 2007, p. 284).

Hybrid organizations employ a variety of strategies for navigating the multi-institutional spaces created by multiple social movements. Coalition work and framing are among the most important of these. Within movement coalitions, hybrid organizations serve as brokers between organizations that organize exclusively within the antiwar movement and those that operate exclusively within other movements. For example, U.S. Labor Against the War (USLAW) is a labor-antiwar hybrid organization that has played a prominent role in managing national antiwar coalitions (Heaney and Rojas 2008). In this coalition brokerage role, USLAW helps to make the interests of labor organizations more clearly understood to peace activists, and vice versa.

With regard to framing, hybrid organizations are appropriately suited to craft or represent frame extensions (Snow et al. 1986) that have legitimacy to audiences in multiple movements. They may do so by accessing the information, expertise, and authority possessed by their contacts in both movements. Often, hybrid organizations attempt to embody multimovement frames through performance activism (Kutz-Flamenbaum 2007; Goss and Heaney 2010; Leitz 2014). For example, a military peace organization may illustrate its opposition to war by enacting a scene in which

U.S. service members engage militarily with civilians in Iraq (Iraq Veterans Against the War 2007). Such performances are useful in attracting interest to frames when there is a high degree of competition for public attention (Tarrow 2011, pp. 115–16).

We argue that the strategy of bridging multiple social movements yields advantages for hybrid organizations in managing their institutional environments. Hybrid identities enable social movement organizations to occupy strategic positions in interorganizational networks. Ferree and Roth (1998) note that hybrids gain from being able to simultaneously claim positions as insiders and outsiders in the movement. This joint insider/outsider status enhances the hybrid's potential to employ multivocal rhetoric, as they use one set of appeals to movement insiders and another set of appeals to outsiders (Padgett and Ansell 1993). Thus, by standing in the gap between insiders and outsiders—as well as between multiple movements—hybrid organizations are especially likely to fill structural holes (Burt 1992) in movements' interorganizational networks.

Hybrid organizations may occupy especially prominent roles in antiwar networks because of the emphasis among peace activists on intermovement networking. In their survey of the Greater Vancouver area, Carroll and Ratner (1996) find that 71.4% of peace and antiwar activists hold memberships in multiple organizations in multiple social movements. Their research demonstrates that these "cosmopolitan" activists are more common in the peace and antiwar sector than in any other movement sector. Bearman and Everett (1993) similarly find that peace and antiwar activists have a high propensity to form cross-movement networks, though their intermovement network positions are contingent on the salience of peace and antiwar issues. Their study of protest events in Washington, D.C., over the 1961–83 period reveals that Quaker, peace, and antiwar activists had the highest degree of network centrality among protesting groups during the Vietnam War era, though their positions became considerably more peripheral during times of relative peace (p. 183).

The strategies of hybrid organizations are likely to give them advantageous positions in interorganizational cocontact networks in the antiwar movement. Thus, we state our second hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 2.—*Organizations with hybrid identities occupy more central positions in interorganizational cocontact networks within the antiwar movement than do organizations whose identities do not merge antiwar and other social movements.*

Further, we argue that hybrid forms enable social movement organizations to mobilize supporters competitively. They do so by catalyzing the involvement of already well-organized constituencies in other social movements that might otherwise be difficult for the social movement to reach. The presence or absence of hybrid organizations thus provides clues as to

which segments of the movement's potential constituents it is likely to mobilize. Without mature hybrid organizations, a movement may not be able to forge culturally sensitive relationships with potential allied groups. These considerations lead us to state our third hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 3.—*Organizations with hybrid identities contact more participants in antiwar demonstrations than do organizations whose identities do not merge antiwar and other social movements.*

We test these three hypotheses using data collected at national and nationally coordinated antiwar demonstrations held in the United States between 2007 and 2009. In the following section, we explain how we obtained the required data at the individual and organizational levels.

DATA COLLECTION AND CODING

This section outlines the procedures we used for collecting and coding data. We explain (1) our field surveys of antiwar activists, (2) how organizational data were extracted from the surveys, (3) our methods of classifying organizations on the basis of identity using content analysis of web pages, and (4) a validity check on our coding of web pages using interviews with prominent activists from a subsample of our organizations.

Activist Survey

We conducted a two-page, pen-and-paper survey on-site at all of the national or nationally coordinated antiwar protest events held in the United States between January 2007 and December 2009. The surveys consisted of questions on basic demographics, partisan affiliations, organizational affiliations, reasons for attending the events, histories of political participation, and attitudes toward the movement, the war, and the political system. We learned of events by enrolling in e-mail listservs managed by United for Peace and Justice, the ANSWER Coalition, Code Pink: Women for Peace, World Can't Wait, MoveOn.org, and the Washington Peace Center (in Washington, D.C.). These listservs informed us about events sponsored by these organizations, as well as by other organizations, as announcements of protests are always cross-posted on multiple lists. Further, we maintained personal relationships with leading activists in order to learn about any major events that may have taken place without being announced on these lists.[6]

[6] Maintaining personal relationships with activists was very useful for planning purposes since we often learned about events through personal contacts before they were formally announced. However, all the events we attended were eventually announced on at least one of the listservs we monitored.

National protest events were most often held in Washington, D.C. Nonetheless, some national events were held in New York (e.g., March on Wall Street, April 4, 2009), Denver (e.g., Recreate '68 March and Rally outside the Democratic National Convention, August 24, 2008), and St. Paul, Minnesota (e.g., March on the Republican National Convention, September 1, 2008). Sometimes, nationally coordinated protest events were held at locations around the country, such as on the anniversaries of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of these decentralized events, we chose to conduct surveys in Washington, D.C., as well as one city on the East Coast, one city in the Midwest, and one city on the West Coast. When possible, we selected New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. We substituted Boston for New York when no major protest event was held in New York on October 17, 2009, during a nationally coordinated mobilization on this day. We conducted surveys in Los Angeles on March 15, 2008, when the protest in San Francisco was expected to be substantially smaller than typical during a nationally coordinated nationwide mobilization on this day. In total, we conducted surveys at 27 events (see table 1).

We had several objectives in selecting the cities in which to conduct surveys. First, we planned to conduct surveys in the cities where the largest protests had taken place in the earlier years of the antiwar movement (2001–6) so that we could obtain data at the largest protests. Second, we aimed for regional balance. Third, we sought to conduct repeated surveys in the same cities over time in order to minimize variations due entirely to locale. We did not conduct surveys in a broader range of cities because of limited resources. In particular, we did not conduct surveys in southern cities as they have seldom been the sites of large antiwar protests (Heaney and Rojas 2006). Our approach provides an excellent representation of participants at urban protest events. Notwithstanding, our method does not record events in smaller cities, though we did survey representatives of local peace organizations who attended national or nationally coordinated protests.[7] Our approach neglects any differences that may exist in the role of hybrid organizations between events held in large cities and those held in small towns.

At each event, we hired a team of four to 10 survey staff members, depending on the expected size of the crowd. Our survey teams selected respondents from the crowd using the anchor-sampling method of randomization. This method required members of the research team to move through the crowd from the periphery to the center, select an "anchor" for the purpose of counting, and then select every fifth person from the crowd

[7] For an excellent study of antiwar mobilization efforts in a smaller city, see Blee and Currier (2006).

in sets of three persons.[8] Walgrave and Verhulst (2011) demonstrate that when samples taken from a crowd of protesters are selected systematically, as we have done, then problems of selection bias and response bias can be minimized. Overall, we conducted 5,410 surveys with a participation rate of 80.53%.[9] This response rate is comparable to, or better than, response rates for major social-scientific surveys, such as the General Social Survey and the American National Election Study.

Organizational Data

We used data collected in individual surveys to inform us about organizations connected to demonstrators. The survey included two questions on relationships between organizations and movement participants. In the first question, we asked "Are you a member of any civic, community, labor, or political organizations? (Circle ONE: YES, NO) If 'YES,' which organizations are you a member of? (list as many as you can)." This question provided a sample of organizations in which respondents were members, which may or may not have been involved in their participation in antiwar protests.[10] This question reveals information about activists' social capital and engagement in civil society (Putnam 2000; Skocpol 2003).

In the second question, we asked "Were you contacted to attend today's event by any particular organization? (Circle ONE: YES, NO) If 'YES,' which organization? (list as many as contacted you)." This question reveals information about which organizations participated in the mobilization of activists at demonstrations by contacting them regarding the event. Contact could have come in a variety of forms, such as an e-mail, a phone call, or an in-person contact. We do not assume that these organizations were entirely responsible for the individual's participation

[8] The procedure for selecting respondents was as follows: (1) All surveyors encircle the demonstration. (2) Each surveyor selects an "anchor." Since the anchor may not be randomly chosen, that person is not interviewed. (3) The surveyor counts five persons away from the anchor and invites that person to participate in the survey. (4) Step 3 is repeated until three surveys have been accepted. (5) Each surveyor selects a new anchor and repeats the invitation process. (6) Surveying continues until the end of the demonstration.

[9] Estimated survey response rates, broken down by race/ethnicity and sex/gender, are reported in table A1 in app. A.

[10] The concept of organizational "membership" is shifting as organizations transition from having traditional "members" to having "supporters" (Skocpol 2003). With this question, we allow the respondent to decide whether or not she or he is a member of an organization. Thus, our measure of membership is based on an individual's self-perception rather than on a legal definition of membership. Indeed, it is possible that some respondents indicate that they are members of an organization but the organization does not recognize these individuals as members.

TABLE 1
EVENTS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

Date	City of Event	Title of Event	Leading Sponsor(s)/ Coalition
1/27/2007	Washington, D.C.	March on Washington	United for Peace and Justice
3/17/2007	Washington, D.C.	March on the Pentagon	ANSWER Coalition
9/15/2007	Washington, D.C.	March on Washington	ANSWER Coalition
10/27/2007	New York	National Mobilization Against the War in Iraq	October 27 Coalition
10/27/2007	Chicago	National Mobilization Against the War in Iraq	October 27 Coalition
10/27/2007	San Francisco	National Mobilization Against the War in Iraq	October 27 Coalition
3/15/2008	Los Angeles	Five Years Too Many	Five Years Too Many Coalition
3/19/2008	Chicago	Five Years Too Many	Five Years Too Many Coalition
3/19/2008	Washington, D.C.	Five Years Too Many	Five Years Too Many Coalition
3/19/2008	New York	Five Years Too Many	Five Years Too Many Coalition
3/19/2008	San Francisco	Five Years Too Many	Five Years Too Many Coalition
3/20/2008	Chicago	Five Years Too Many	Five Years Too Many Coalition
3/22/2008	New York	Five Years Too Many	Five Years Too Many Coalition
8/24/2008	Denver	Recreate '68 March and Rally	Recreate '68
9/1/2008	St. Paul, Minn.	March on the RNC and Stop the War	Coalition to March on the RNC and Stop the War
1/20/2009	Washington, D.C.	Inauguration Protests	Washington Peace Center, Arrest Bush, World Can't Wait
3/21/2009	Washington, D.C.	March on the Pentagon	ANSWER Coalition
4/4/2009	New York	March on Wall Street	United for Peace and Justice
10/5/2009	Washington, D.C.	October 5th Action Against Endless Wars	October 5th Coalition to End the War In Afghanistan
10/7/2009	Chicago	Protest on 8th Anniversary of War on Afghanistan	ANSWER Coalition
10/17/2009	Boston	October 17th Boston Antiwar Rally	Stop the War Coalition Boston
10/17/2009	San Francisco	U.S. Troops Out Now	October 17 Antiwar Coalition
11/7/2009	Washington, D.C.	Black Is Back Coalition Rally	Black Is Back Coalition
12/2/2009	New York	Protest Obama's Escalation of War in Afghanistan!	World Can't Wait

TABLE 1 (*Continued*)

Date	City of Event	Title of Event	Leading Sponsor(s)/ Coalition
12/2/2009	Chicago	Protest Obama's Escalation of War in Afghanistan!	World Can't Wait
12/2/2009	San Francisco	Protest Obama's Escalation of War in Afghanistan!	World Can't Wait
12/12/2009	Washington, D.C.	Anti-Escalation Rally	enduswars.org

but were one of many factors that contributed to the participation decision (Snow et al. 1980; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Individuals need not be members of the organization to receive this contact; in fact, this contact may be the only relationship between the individual and the organization. As a result, we assume that the first question (on membership) is more likely to indicate longer-term organizational-constituent relationships, while the second question (on contact) is more likely to indicate shorter-term mobilization efforts.

We turned to information publicly available on the Internet to assess the identities of the organizations referenced by our respondents. Relying on web pages as a source of information on organizational identity has both advantages and disadvantages when compared with alternative ways of studying organizational identity. Advantages of this approach include, first, that identity statements can be collected at relatively low cost for a large number of social movement organizations. Second, web pages generally include a mission statement, an "about us" statement, or other information that the organization's leadership intended to put forward to summarize the organization's central character, thus enabling a reasonably fair comparison across organizations. A disadvantage of this approach is that web pages may not reflect disagreements within the organization, or nuanced views of leaders, about its identity.

Previous research on organizational identity in social movements, such as Engel (2007), Goss and Heaney (2010), and Leitz (2014), has tended to rely heavily on multiple personal interviews as a way to assess organizational identity in case studies of a few organizations. However, in a study of movement organizations on a large scale (such as this study), personal interviews with hundreds of organizations would be prohibitively expensive and would lead to a large amount of missing data when organizational informants declined to participate in the interviews. Content analysis of web pages is a valid alternative method of assessing organizational identification, as documented by previous research on interest group identities in

which research conducted using personal interviews yields results similar to those from research relying only on content analysis of web pages.[11]

We searched the Internet for information about the organizations listed by survey respondents. We were able to locate web pages (or vital organizational information posted on a web page hosted by another organization) for 85.31% of organizations. Once we located the organization's web page, we searched the Internet Archive Wayback Machine (http://www.archive.org/) to locate an archive of the organization's web page as close as possible to January 1, 2007.[12] We searched the entire available web page to locate a statement of the organization's identity (such as a "mission statement" or an "about us" page) and to determine the ideological perspective of the organization (i.e., radical or not radical), whether the organization was a coalition, the accessibility of the organization to potential participants (i.e., whether or not it held open meetings), the founding year of the organization, and the geographic scope of the organization (international, national, regional, state, or local).

Identity Classification

We used organizational names and the texts compiled of identity statements in order to classify the identities of the organizations in the sample. We began by classifying the organizations into 11 non–mutually exclusive categories: (1) antiwar, (2) peace, (3) peace church, (4) social justice, (5) personal identity, (6) partisan or ideological, (7) education related, (8) religious, (9) environmental, (10) labor union or labor related, and (11) other.[13] A team of 10 undergraduate coders placed each of the organizations into as many or as few categories as were relevant. Their work was replicated by a second team of 10 undergraduate coders for the purpose of establishing intercoder reliability.

Coders were instructed to read the organizational names and identity statements for assertions of the "central character" of the organization, in keeping with the definition of identity used in this study (Albert and

[11] Heaney (2004) conducted personal interviews with 168 U.S. national health care interest groups to determine the dimensions of organizational identity that were most salient to them. In a follow-up study, Heaney (2007) examined the web pages of 1,076 U.S. interest groups (in all policy areas). Both studies yielded similar conclusions on the relative importance of representation and issues as dimensions of identification, despite the difference in research methods.

[12] We recognize that identity is a fluid phenomenon. The way that organizations understand their identities changes over time with political circumstances. In order to minimize distortions caused by identity statements being given at different points in time, we took snapshots of organizational identity as close to the beginning of the study period as possible.

[13] The precise coding instructions are provided in app. B.

Whetten 1985). In following this instruction, they placed an organization in a category on the basis of its principal focus, but not simply because it sometimes worked on an issue in a category or it joined a coalition working on an issue in a category.[14] For example, the Service Employees International Union is a labor union. It took a position against the war in Iraq, joined coalitions against the war, and helped to mobilize people against the war, though its organizational identity is not as an antiwar-focused organization. Rather, it is a case of an organization with a nonantiwar-focused identity that also opposed the war in Iraq.

After classifying organizations into the original 11 categories, we sought to establish a more concise category system that distinguishes the organizations that hybridized the antiwar movement with other movements, issues, or identities from those that did not do so. This distinction requires that we separate organizations that were identified with the antiwar movement from those that were not. Making such a distinction is inherently problematic because the boundaries of a social movement are ambiguous rather than clear (Hannan 2010; Fligstein and McAdam 2012). For example, does the "antiwar movement" include organizations that identify themselves with the cause of "peace" in general (perhaps identifying with a notion of "world peace" or "inner peace") but that do not identify themselves with the end to any particular war? The exact boundary of the antiwar movement—and therefore which organizations count as hybrids—depends on where the line is drawn.

Rather than adopt a single rule on which organizations are part of the antiwar movement and which are not, we recognize the ambiguous boundaries of the movement. In doing so, we create both a narrow and a broad definition of the antiwar movement. The narrow definition includes any organization whose central character focused on opposing war in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran; the war on terror; nuclear weapons or nuclear war; or militarism in general. The broader definition includes any organization that meets the narrow definition or falls under the more general heading of "peace" such that it identifies with personal or inner peace, nonviolence or tranquility, world peace, or peace in Israel/Palestine or aims to uncover the truth about terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 (the so-called 9/11 Truth organizations).

Using the narrow and broad definitions of the antiwar movement, as well as the 11-category system described above, we created two sets of classifications. Employing the narrow definition, we classified an organization

[14] Most advocacy organizations become involved in issues outside their issue niches by signing on to coalitions managed by other organizations (Hula 1999). This coalition participation might not—indeed, often does not—require substantial participation on the part of the coalition signatories. Organizations may merely lend their name to the coalition's efforts or pass information on to supporters.

as *antiwar focused* if it fell into category 1 (antiwar) but did not also fall into any other category (2–11). We classified an organization as *hybrid* if it fell into category 1 and also fell into any other category (2–11). We also classified an organization as *hybrid* if it fell into category 3 (peace church) since the historic peace churches (Quaker, Mennonite, Amish, and Brethren) are inherently antiwar-religious hybrids.[15] Finally, we classified an organization as *nonantiwar focused* if it was not classified as either antiwar or peace church and it fell into at least one other category (2, 4–11). In summary, an antiwar-focused organization is one whose identity connects primarily with the antiwar movement and not with another movement, issue, or identity; a hybrid organization is one that focuses on the antiwar movement but also focuses on some other movement, issue, or identity; and a nonantiwar-focused organization is one that identifies itself primarily outside the antiwar movement (even if it sometimes works on antiwar issues).

Employing the broad definition of the antiwar movement, we classified an organization as *antiwar/peace focused* if it fell into category 1 or 2 but did not also fall into any other category (3–11). We classified an organization as *hybrid* if it fell into category 1 or 2 and also fell into any other category (3–11). We also classified an organization as *hybrid* if it fell into category 3. Finally, we classified an organization as *nonantiwar/peace focused* if it was not classified as 1, 2, or 3 and it fell into at least one other category (4–11). This classification system does not imply that nonantiwar/peace-focused organizations never work on antiwar issues. It only implies that antiwar/peace concerns are not part of the organization's central character. In summary, an antiwar/peace-focused organization is one whose identity connects primarily with the antiwar/peace movements and not with another movement, issue, or identity; a hybrid organizations is one that focuses on the antiwar/peace movements but also focuses on some other movement, issue, or identity; and a nonantiwar/peace-focused organization is one that identifies itself primarily outside the antiwar/peace movements (even if it sometimes works on antiwar issues).

Besides variations in the classification of organizations due to how movement boundaries are drawn, some variation in organizational classification may be due to differences between coders in how they read the organizations' identity statements. While two different coders are highly

[15] For the purpose of this article, we do not code organizations that hybridize movements other than the antiwar movement as "hybrid organizations." For example, an organization such as the Labor Network for Sustainability would be coded as a nonantiwar-focused organization here. Of course, we do not deny that the Labor Network for Sustainability hybridizes the labor and environmental movements. Rather, we assume that this hybrid identity is not relevant in the context of antiwar mobilization. In another study—perhaps of the mobilization of the environmental movement against developing the tar sands—that hybrid identity could prove very relevant.

unlikely to code the same set of identity statements in exactly the same way, it is important that the coding instructions be sufficiently clear that any two trained coders reach a high level of agreement on the organizational classifications. The most broadly accepted measure of intercoder agreement is Krippendorff's α (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007). A Krippendorff's $\alpha \geq 0.80$ is generally considered to be an acceptable level of agreement among coders, with $\alpha \geq 0.67$ viewed as the lowest conceivable limit (Krippendorff 2004).

We conducted intercoder reliability analysis and report the results in table C1 in appendix C. We compute reliability statistics for each of the initial 11 categories, the three categories based on the narrow movement definition, and the three categories based on the broad movement definition. The results, overall, indicate high intercoder agreement. In the initial 11 categories, 10 of the 11 variables exceed the standard of $\alpha \geq 0.80$. Our social justice coding falls short of this standard, with $\alpha = 0.77$. All the variables generated on the basis of the narrow and broad movement definitions exceed the standard of $\alpha \geq 0.80$. On the basis of these results, we have a high degree of confidence in our system of classifying organizational identities.

Validity Check with Elite Interviews

One question that may arise in evaluating our classification of organizations on the basis of information contained in web pages is whether this approach yields results similar to those of other approaches to assessing organizational identity. For example, is it possible that interviews with organizational leaders might result in very different assessments of identity? To check for this possibility, we interviewed leaders of 32 organizations in our sample. These interviews included some of the largest national organizations in the antiwar movement, but they also included smaller national organizations and regionally or locally focused organizations. We coded the identities of these organizations on the basis of interviews, using the same procedures that we used for coding the web pages.

The results of our analysis reveal strong correlations between identities classified on the basis of texts appearing on web pages and identities classified on the basis of elite interviews. The results are not identical, of course. Much of the variation stems from the fact that, in this subsample at least, organizations describe their identities slightly more comprehensively on their web pages (using an average of 2.125 categories) than they did in the interviews (using an average of 1.813 categories). We find correlations between .447 and 1.000 in comparing the initial classification of 11 identity categories on the basis of web page texts and these classifications using interviews. Using the narrow movement definition, we find correlations of .787

for antiwar-focused organizations, .881 for hybrid organizations, and 1.000 for nonantiwar-focused organizations. Using the broad movement definition, we find correlations of .864 for antiwar/peace-focused organizations, .878 for hybrid organizations, and 1.000 for nonantiwar/peace-focused organizations. All these correlations are statistically significant at $P \leq .05$ or below. On the basis of these strong correlations, we conclude that identity classifications using information on web pages would likely be very similar to identity classifications using elite interviews.

WHO MOBILIZED THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT?

Before we directly test our hypotheses using the data collected, this section briefly describes the antiwar movement that emerges from the data. Which were the major organizations that contacted participants in the movement? What were their identities, and how did these identities overlap (or not) with one another? What is the overall structure of the antiwar network?

Table 2 categorizes the identities of 503 of 524 organizations that contributed to the mobilization of the antiwar movement from 2007 to 2009.[16] On average, each organization is coded into 1.750 categories, with a minimum of one and a maximum of five. The first column of the table indicates the overall distribution of organizations, which allows organizations to be coded into as many categories as appropriate (so the summation of the percentages exceeds 100%). Unsurprisingly, a plurality of organizations (41.7%) have identities that are explicitly connected with the antiwar movement. The second-largest percentage (22.3%) explicitly deals with concepts of peace. Social justice is the next most common type (20.7%), which reflects the efforts of the antiwar movement to unify issues of peace and justice. Partisanship-ideology (19.7%) was another major motivation of many organizations, some of which sought to further communism, socialism, or progressivism, others of which sought to stop President Bush or elect Green Party candidates. Less common identities were associated with personal identities (14.4%), education (11.9%), religion (10.7%), the environment (7.1%), organized labor (3.6%), peace churches (1.0%), or other topics (22.1%).

The remainder of table 2 indicates how identity categories co-occur with one another. Unsurprisingly, antiwar and peace identities often co-occur. Almost a third (32.9%) of antiwar organizations also identify themselves with broader issues of peace, while 61.6% of peace organizations also identity themselves with specific opposition to war. Social justice identities regularly co-occur with antiwar identities (20.5%) or peace identities (26.1%).

[16] Twenty-one of the organizations could not be classified because of insufficient information about the organizations.

TABLE 2

IDENTITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS THAT MOBILIZED THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT, 2007–9

	Overall		Antiwar		Peace		Peace Church		Social Justice		Personal Identity	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
Antiwar	210	41.7	. . .	. . .	69	32.9	1	.5	43	20.5	25	11.9
Peace	112	22.3	69	61.6	. . .	. . .	2	1.8	29	25.0	13	11.6
Peace church	5	1.0	1	20.0	2	40.0	. . .	. . .	1	20.0	0	.0
Social justice	104	20.7	43	41.3	29	27.9	1	1.0	. . .	. . .	22	21.2
Personal identity	71	14.1	25	35.2	13	18.3	0	.0	22	31.0	. . .	. . .
Partisan-ideological	99	19.7	17	17.2	4	4.0	0	.0	22	22.2	13	13.1
Education related	60	11.9	20	33.3	6	10.0	0	.0	9	15.0	8	13.3
Religious	54	10.7	9	16.7	15	27.8	4	7.4	8	14.8	3	5.6
Environmental	36	7.2	19	52.8	8	22.2	0	.0	20	55.6	3	8.3
Labor union/labor related	18	3.6	3	16.7	0	.0	0	.0	2	11.1	4	22.2
Other	111	22.1	11	9.9	12	10.8	0	.0	22	19.8	17	15.3

	Partisan-Ideological		Education Related		Religious		Environmental		Labor Union/Labor Related		Other	
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%
Antiwar	17	8.1	20	9.5	9	4.3	19	9.0	3	1.4	11	5.2
Peace	4	3.6	6	5.4	15	13.4	8	7.1	0	.0	12	10.7
Peace church	0	.0	0	.0	4	80.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	.0
Social justice	22	21.2	9	8.7	8	7.7	20	19.2	2	1.9	22	21.2
Personal identity	13	18.3	8	11.3	3	4.2	3	4.2	4	5.6	17	23.9
Partisan-ideological	. . .	. . .	8	8.1	2	2.0	4	4.0	2	2.0	17	17.2
Education related	8	13.3	. . .	. . .	2	3.3	1	1.7	4	6.7	5	8.3
Religious	2	3.7	2	3.7	. . .	. . .	2	3.7	0	.0	5	9.3
Environmental	4	11.1	1	2.8	2	5.6	. . .	. . .	0	.0	6	16.7
Labor union/labor related	2	11.1	4	22.2	0	.0	0	.0	. . .	. . .	2	11.1
Other	17	15.3	5	4.5	5	4.5	6	5.4	2	1.8	. . .	. . .

NOTE.—Coding of 503 out of 524 mobilizing organizations. We were unable to code 21 organizations because of insufficient information. Columns may sum to more than 100% because organizations may be coded into multiple categories.

Similarly, organizations that represent personal identities (e.g., gender) commonly co-occur with antiwar identities (11.9%) or peace identities (11.7%). The remaining combinations of intersections can be discerned directly from table 2.

We collapse the categories reported in table 2 into the more concise category system. Using the narrow movement definition, we find that 14.3% of organizations are antiwar focused, 28.2% are hybrids of antiwar and nonantiwar concerns, and 57.5% of organizations that helped to mobilize the movement are nonantiwar focused. Using the broader movement definition, we find that 24.3% of organizations are antiwar/peace focused, 26.4% are hybrids of antiwar/peace and nonantiwar/peace concerns, and 49.3% are nonantiwar/peace focused. Thus, regardless of whether we use a relatively narrow or a relatively broad movement definition, we classify a roughly similar percentage of organizations as hybrids—slightly more than one-quarter of the organizations that contacted antiwar demonstrators.

We used responses by individuals to questions about organizational contacts to draw inferences about the relative size of organizational contingents at demonstrations and the interconnectedness of organizations. Ties between organizations are estimated on the basis of overlapping contacts. This approach, known as "hypernetwork sampling," produces results in which the organizations listed by individuals are sampled in proportion to the number of contacts between groups and participating individuals (McPherson 1982; Kalleberg et al. 1990). This method samples an organization with a greater presence at demonstrations with a higher probability than an organization with a smaller presence at demonstrations, so many less active organizations do not appear in hypernetwork samples. In total, we identified 524 distinct organizations that contacted individuals in our sample.[17] Cocontact ties similarly are sampled according to their frequency, so dyads with fewer cocontacts were less likely to be represented in the estimated network structure than were dyads with a greater number of cocontacts.

We report the leading 25 organizations that contacted the most demonstrators in table 3. Organizations were ranked on the basis of the number of respondents that reported being contacted by them. The organizations most involved in mobilizing the antiwar movement during the period of our study were the ANSWER Coalition and United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ), two broad coalitions that sponsored the majority of antiwar demonstrations. The ANSWER Coalition hybridized a strong antiwar identity with opposition to imperialism, racism, and globalization. UFPJ brought together organizations advocating a wide diversity of causes but kept its prin-

[17] This count includes only organizations that directly contacted individuals to encourage them to attend the rally in question. If an individual indicated that she or he was a member of a particular organization but was not contacted by it, then that organization is not included in this count.

TABLE 3
Leading 25 Organizations in the Antiwar Movement, 2007–9

Rank	Organizational Name	Contact Count	Movement Definition	
			Narrow	Broad
1	ANSWER Coalition	277	Hybrid	Hybrid
2	United for Peace and Justice	269	Antiwar Focused	Antiwar/Peace Focused
3	Code Pink: Women for Peace	159	Hybrid	Hybrid
4	MoveOn.org	126	Nonantiwar Focused	Nonantiwar/Peace Focused
5	World Can't Wait	96	Hybrid	Hybrid
6	Peace Action	72	Hybrid	Antiwar/Peace Focused
7	Veterans for Peace	50	Hybrid	Hybrid
8	Students for a Democratic Society	48	Hybrid	Hybrid
9	International Socialist Organization	42	Nonantiwar Focused	Nonantiwar/Peace Focused
10	Green Party	35	Nonantiwar Focused	Hybrid
11	Brooklyn for Peace/Brooklyn Parents for Peace	32	Hybrid	Hybrid
12	Campus Antiwar Network	31	Hybrid	Hybrid
14	ImpeachBush.org/Indict Bush Now	26	Hybrid	Hybrid
14	Washington Peace Center	26	Hybrid	Hybrid
15	Democratic Party	23	Nonantiwar Focused	Nonantiwar/Peace Focused
17	Troops Out Now	21	Antiwar Focused	Antiwar/Peace Focused
17	International Action Center	21	Hybrid	Hybrid
19	Granny Peace Brigade	20	Hybrid	Hybrid
19	Bailout the People Movement	20	Nonantiwar Focused	Nonantiwar/Peace Focused
20	American Friends Service Committee	19	Hybrid	Hybrid
23	Progressive Democrats of America	15	Nonantiwar Focused	Nonantiwar/Peace Focused
23	War Resisters League	15	Hybrid	Antiwar/Peace Focused
23	Iraq Veterans Against the War	15	Hybrid	Hybrid
25	Quaker Meeting	14	Hybrid	Hybrid
25	Socialist Party	14	Nonantiwar Focused	Nonantiwar/Peace Focused

cipal focus on opposing the wars in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. Code Pink: Women for Peace actively campaigned against war but also emphasized its role in speaking as women on issues such as the rape of women in the U.S. military and violence against women worldwide. MoveOn identified itself principally on the basis of its progressive ideology. It worked, in particular, to embolden progressive elements within the Democratic Party. Bringing the troops home from Iraq is one of several issues that it addressed during the study period. World Can't Wait (WCW) galvanized antiwar activists by crafting an ideological identity rooted in anti-imperialism and rhetoric that was firmly anti-Bush.

Other leading organizations were a mix of antiwar-focused, hybrid, and nonantiwar-focused organizations. The majority of these organizations (22 of 25) had the same classification regardless of whether we used the narrow or broad movement definition. The exact classification of Peace Action, the Green Party, and the War Resisters League depended on whether we took a narrow or broad view of what constitutes the antiwar movement.

We visualize the interconnectedness of organizations that contacted antiwar demonstrators using a network diagram, depicted in figure 1.[18] In this graph, white circles represent antiwar/peace-focused organizations, gray triangles represent hybrid organizations, and black squares represent nonantiwar-focused organizations. The size of each shape is scaled to reflect the number of demonstrators that the organization contacted between 2007 and 2009. Lines between the organizations represent interorganizational relationships, with thicker lines implying more cocontacts. The locations of organizations in the graph are determined by an iterative algorithm that places organizations close (in a two-dimensional space) to one another if they have similar patterns of ties with one another and more distant from one another if they tend to be disconnected from one another (Kamada and Kawai 1989; Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2011). For ease of visualization, this figure includes only the main component of the network, which means that organizations that are isolated from the network, or that are tied only to less connected organizations, have been excluded from the graph.[19] This analysis does not account for regional variations that may be present from event to event.

The network depicted in figure 1 reflects the diversity of organizations in the antiwar network. It reveals that each major type of organization (antiwar/peace focused, hybrid, and nonantiwar/peace focused) plays a part

[18] We used the broad movement definition to construct this figure.

[19] Visualizing only the main component in this diagram in no way affects any of the statistical analysis in this article. The overwhelming majority of the largest mobilizing organizations are contained in the main component, so this limitation serves to simplify the network visualization without losing important information.



FIG. 1.—Main component of interorganizational cocontact network, 2007–9

in the network. UFPJ—an antiwar/peace-focused organization—is deeply connected to the upper center of the network, which is heavily populated by traditional peace and justice organizations, the mainline left, and progressives. MoveOn—a nonantiwar/peace-focused organization—galvanized the lower-left side of the network, reaching out to its contacts among progressives and Democrats. The ANSWER Coalition—a hybrid organization—provided common ground on the lower-right side of the network for more radical organizations. Code Pink and WCW—both hybrid organizations—occupied the center of the network and found ways to situate themselves between the other major mobilizing groups.

The data gathered in this study reveal that the antiwar movement was mobilized by a heterogeneous mix of organizations. Some of these identified closely with peace and the antiwar cause. Others were principally known for their work outside of the antiwar/peace arena. Still others aspired to blend antiwar/peace activism with other concerns. In the following section, we develop empirical models to test our hypotheses about the role of hybrid organizations in the antiwar movement.

EMPIRICAL MODELS

We develop empirical models to examine social movement mobilization at the individual level and the organizational level. At the individual level, we model which social movement participants join hybrid organizations. We understand the process of joining a hybrid organization as a two-stage process. In the first stage, individuals determine how many activist organizations to join, if any, on the basis of their preferences and prior exposure to activist organizations. Drawing on previous research on political participation, we specify the propensity to join as dependent on individuals' political party membership, sex/gender, age, race/ethnicity, level of education, income, geographic location, and time (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Leighley 2001; Heaney and Rojas 2007; Schlozman et al. 2012; Campbell 2013).

In the second stage, individuals determine which kinds of organizations to join. To test hypothesis 1, we examine whether the likelihood of joining a hybrid depends on past involvement in allied social movements.[20] We

[20] Past involvement in allied movements was based on responses to the following question: "Over the course of your ENTIRE LIFETIME, which protests have you attended? Check ALL THAT APPLY: Anti-globalization rallies; Pro–women's rights rallies; Pro-environmental rallies; Anti-nuclear rallies; Anti–Vietnam War rallies; Civil rights rallies; Other." We counted participants from antiglobalization, pro–women's rights, civil rights, and other rallies as having past involvement in allied movements. However, we considered participants with histories only in antinuclear or anti-Vietnam rallies to have been participants in antiwar movements rather than in allied movements.

recognize that the more organizations that an individual joins, the more likely she or he is to become a member of hybrid organizations as a matter of random coincidence rather than as a matter of deliberate choice. Thus, modeling the number of organizational memberships—an endogenous variable—is necessary as a control factor when estimating the determinants of hybrid membership. We include political party membership, sex/gender, race/ethnicity, income, geographic location, and time as control variables because each of these variables indicates the degree of interest in or access to hybrid organizations. For example, women may be more likely than men to have an interest in joining organizations that represent gendered intersections with the antiwar movement, thus potentially increasing their likelihood of joining hybrid organizations.

Because this is a two-stage model, it is necessary to use instrumental variables in order for the model to be identified. In order to be a valid instrument, a variable must correlate with the endogenous variables of the equation but be uncorrelated with the equation disturbance (Sovey and Green 2010; Bollen 2012). That is, an instrumental variable must be a cause of the dependent variable in stage 1 but not a cause of the dependent variable in stage 2. We identified two variables that meet these criteria. Age and education are expected to affect the number of organizations that an individual joins; individuals have more opportunities to join organizations as they age and become more educated. However, neither age nor education is expected to affect whether an individual joins a hybrid organization, in particular, as opposed to other kinds of organizations. Including these variables in the first-stage equation, while not including them in the second-stage equation, allows them to serve as instrumental variables in this two-stage model.

At the organizational level, we model the position of organizations in interorganizational cocontact networks and the number of participants contacted to attend demonstrations. Our first organizational-level model examines the determinants of organizations' centrality in the interorganizational cocontact network. To test hypothesis 2, we examine whether organizations with hybrid identities are more central to the interorganizational cocontact network than are nonhybrid organizations.

For the purpose of statistical control, we model centrality as a function of several organizational characteristics. Organizational ideology (i.e., whether or not the organization is radical) may shape an organization's ability to relate to others in a network, affecting its network position (Haines 1988; Heaney and Rojas 2008; Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 2008).[21] Organizations

[21] We coded an organization as "radical" if information contained on its web page indicated that the organization promotes views that aspire to overturn the basic structure of Amer-

structured as coalitions may be more likely than noncoalitions to take the lead in mobilizing participants in protest events, thus providing them more central network positions (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Murphy 2005; Tarrow 2005; Levi and Murphy 2006; Heaney and Rojas 2008).[22] Organizations that hold open meetings may have a greater degree of democratization in their organizational styles, which may open access to a wider group of movement participants than do organizations without such meetings, thus increasing their network centrality (Fung 2003; Polletta 2004). Older organizations may be more well adapted to their environments than are younger organizations and, therefore, more likely to achieve central positions in contact networks (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Organizations that are national or international in scope organize on a wider geographic basis than those organized at the local, state, or regional level, likely increasing their relative network centrality (McCarthy and Wolfson 1996). Finally, organizations with functioning web pages may be more likely to reach broad audiences than are organizations without web pages, thus increasing their relative network centrality (Nah, Veenstra, and Shah 2006).

Our second organizational-level analysis examines the number of contacts that an organization makes to participants in street demonstrations. To test hypothesis 3, we examine whether organizations with hybrid identities contact more participants than do nonhybrid organizations. For the purpose of statistical control, we model mobilization as a function of the same organizational characteristics that we identified above in the first organizational-level model. We expect that radical organizations, coalitions, organizations that hold open meetings, older organizations, national or international organizations, and organizations with functioning web pages contact more participants in antiwar demonstrations than do organizations that do not have these characteristics. Additionally, we expect that comembership ties with other organizations that contact participants in the demonstrations increase an organization's mobilization potential by making participants more aware of its work and increasing its access to information within the movement (Baldassarri and Diani 2007; Diani 2009).

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ican society or government. For example, an organization that explicitly advocated communism or socialism was coded as radical.

[22] We coded an organization as a coalition if it is an organization comprising other autonomous organizations (Wilson 1995, p. 267). An organization that has local chapters that are subservient to a national or state organization (e.g., Code Pink: Women for Peace, Iraq Veterans Against the War) was not coded as a coalition. However, an organization formed to serve the interests of other freestanding organizations (e.g., UFPJ, the ANSWER Coalition) was coded as a coalition. Having the word "coalition" in its name was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an organization to be coded as a coalition. Some organizations may describe themselves as coalitions but not satisfy Wilson's definition, while others may not have "coalition" in the organization's name but satisfy the definition.

TABLE 4
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INDIVIDUAL DEMONSTRATORS

Variable	*N*	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	% Imputed
Member of hybrid (narrow movement definition) = 1	5,410	.19	0	.39	0	1	NA
Member of hybrid (broad movement definition) = 1	5,410	.17	0	.34	0	1	NA
Total number of organizational memberships	5,214	.90	1	1.10	0	7	NA
Participation in nonantiwar movements = 1	5,410	.79	1	.40	0	1	.00
Member of minor political party = 1	5,363	.15	0	.35	0	1	.81
Member of Democratic Party = 1	5,363	.39	0	.49	0	1	.81
Sex/gender is female = 1	5,366	.52	1	.50	0	1	.76
Age in years	5,372	39.96	37	18.04	11	99	.66
Race/ethnicity is white = 1	5,340	.82	1	.39	0	1	1.28
Race/ethnicity is black/African-American = 1	5,340	.06	0	.25	0	1	1.28
Race/ethnicity is Latino = 1	5,340	.07	0	.25	0	1	1.28
Race/ethnicity is Asian = 1	5,340	.04	0	.20	0	1	1.28
Level of education	5,224	4.89	5	1.86	1	7	3.33
Income ($1,000s)	4,997	38.29	37.5	27.79	7.5	82.5	7.51
Surveyed in Boston = 1	5,410	.04	0	.20	0	1	.00
Surveyed in Chicago = 1	5,410	.15	0	.36	0	1	.00
Surveyed in Denver = 1	5,410	.03	0	.18	0	1	.00
Surveyed in Los Angeles = 1	5,410	.01	0	.12	0	1	.00
Surveyed in St. Paul = 1	5,410	.05	0	.22	0	1	.00
Surveyed in New York = 1	5,410	.16	0	.37	0	1	.00
Surveyed in San Francisco = 1	5,410	.08	0	.27	0	1	.00
Surveyed in Washington, D.C. = 1	5,410	.47	0	.50	0	1	.00
Surveyed in 2007 = 1	5,410	.39	0	.49	0	1	.00
Surveyed in 2008 = 1	5,410	.29	0	.46	0	1	.00
Surveyed in 2009 = 1	5,410	.32	0	.47	0	1	.00

STATISTICAL RESULTS

Individual-Level Analysis

We begin by examining individual-level behavior by reporting descriptive statistics from the survey in table 4. These results offer an overview of participants in the antiwar movement during the 2007–9 period. This period was characterized by the demobilization of the movement (Heaney and Rojas 2011) and disunity between its leading coalitions, UFPJ and the ANSWER Coalition (Heaney and Rojas 2008). Individuals were members of an average of 0.897 activist organizations per person, ranging from zero memberships to seven memberships. Using the narrow movement definition, approximately 18.7% of respondents claimed membership in a hybrid organization. Using the broad movement definition, approximately 17.5% of respondents claimed membership in a hybrid organization. Roughly 79.4% had been involved with a nonantiwar/peace movement in their past. The sample was 51.6% female and 81.9% white. The mean age was 40 years; the age distribution was bimodal, with relative peaks in the 20s and the 50s. The partisan divide of protesters was roughly 39.0% members of the Democratic Party and 14.7% members of minor parties, with the remainder largely unaffiliated with political parties (less than 1% identified as Republicans). This sample was highly educated, with the modal participant having completed at least some graduate education, though the mean income was $38,287 per year.

To test hypothesis 1, we estimated a two-equation model using a two-stage mixed-process estimator (Roodman 2011).[23] We estimated two versions of this model: one using the narrow movement definition and one using the broad movement definition (see table 5). The exact parameter estimates differ between the narrow and broad specifications, yet the pattern of statistically significant and insignificant results is identical in both specifications. We predict an individual's total number of organizational memberships in the first-stage equations. In these models, individuals have a higher

[23] A two-stage estimator is required because the number of organizational memberships is an endogenous variable. A mixed-process estimator is necessary because the number of organizational memberships is a count variable, requiring a different estimation process than whether or not an individual is a member of a hybrid organization, which is a binary variable. The mixed-process approach allows the estimation of the different processes in the same system of equations. Identification is achieved by using instrumental variables. The estimates are weighted to adjust for differences in the probability of selection into the sample based on differences in sex/gender and race/ethnicity, as reported in table A1 in app. A. We also accounted for potential variations in administration of the survey from surveyor to surveyor by estimating the variance using robust cluster analysis. The cluster analysis takes into account that the geographic structure of the protest tends to be clustered by group (e.g., the labor contingent gathers in one area, the anarchists gather in another area), so it is possible that the samples taken by individual surveyors are biased toward particular groups.

TABLE 5
MIXED PROCESS TWO-STAGE MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERSHIP IN HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS

	NARROW MOVEMENT DEFINITION		BROAD MOVEMENT DEFINITION	
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 1	Stage 2
Total number of organizational memberships (endogenous)		.15***		.13***
		(.01)		(.01)
Participation in nonantiwar movements		.03***		.02**
		(.01)		(.01)
Member of minor political party	.52***	.01	.52***	.01
	(.06)	(.02)	(.06)	(.02)
Member of Democratic Party	.02	−.03**	.02	−.03**
	(.04)	(.01)	(.04)	(.01)
Sex/gender is female	.01	.01	.01	.01
	(.04)	(.01)	(.04)	(.01)
Age in years	.01***		.01***	
	(.00)		(.00)	
Race/ethnicity is white	.16*	.01	.16*	.01
	(.07)	(.02)	(.07)	(.02)
Race/ethnicity is black/African-American	−.11	−.03	−.11	−.03
	(.09)	(.02)	(.09)	(.02)
Race/ethnicity is Latino	.02	−.03	.02	−.04
	(.09)	(.02)	(.09)	(.02)
Race/ethnicity is Asian	.10	.01	.20	.01
	(.12)	(.03)	(.12)	(.02)
Level of education	.09***		.09***	
	(.01)		(.01)	
Income ($1,000s)	−.00***	−.00***	−.00***	−.00***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Surveyed in Boston	.06	.04	.06	.03
	(.09)	(.02)	(.09)	(.02)
Surveyed in Chicago	−.18*	−.02	−.18*	−.02
	(.09)	(.02)	(.09)	(.02)
Surveyed in Denver	−.35*	−.11***	−.35*	−.10***
	(.16)	(.02)	(.16)	(.02)
Surveyed in Los Angeles	.02	−.04	.02	−.04
	(.12)	(.02)	(.12)	(.03)
Surveyed in St. Paul	−.23**	−.09***	−.23**	−.08***
	(.0875)	(.02)	(.09)	(.02)
Surveyed in New York	.06	−.06***	.06	−.05**
	(.07)	(.02)	(.07)	(.02)
Surveyed in San Francisco	−.09	−.04	−.09	−.03
	(.06)	(.02)	(.06)	(.02)
Surveyed in 2007	−.25***	−.00	−.25***	−.01
	(.07)	(.01)	(.07)	(.01)
Surveyed in 2008	−.17*	.05*	−.17*	.04*
	(.08)	(.02)	(.08)	(.02)

TABLE 5 (*Continued*)

Independent Variable	Narrow Movement Definition		Broad Movement Definition	
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 1	Stage 2
Constant	−.70***	.03	−.71***	.05
	(.10)	(.02)	(.10)	(.02)
$\ln(\sigma_1)$	−1.16***		−1.18***	
	(.02)		(.02)	
$\arctan(\rho_{12})$	.08*		.11**	
	(.04)		(.04)	
N	5,214		5,214	
$F_{19, 139}$	26.48		23.16	

Note.—Stage 1 = total number of organizational memberships; Stage 2 = member of hybrid organization. Numbers in parentheses are SEs. Observations are weighted on the basis of sample probabilities and clustered on the basis of sampling units. Missing values are imputed using complete-case imputation, restricted to the range of the variable.

* $P \leq .05$.

** $P \leq .01$.

*** $P \leq .001$.

total number of organizational memberships if they are a member of a minor political party, if they are older, if their race/ethnicity is white, if they have a higher level of education, if they have a lower level of income, if they were not surveyed in Chicago, Denver, or St. Paul (as opposed to Washington, D.C.), and if they were surveyed in 2009 (as opposed to 2007 or 2008).[24]

In the second-stage equations, we predict an individual's likelihood of joining a hybrid organization. Consistent with hypothesis 1, we find that people who have a history of involvement in nonantiwar movements are more likely to join hybrids than are people who do not have such a history. This finding supports the view that hybrid organizations are a place for individuals with a movement background outside the peace movement. This result may have been obtained because these people seek out memberships in hybrid organizations, because they are sought out by hybrids, or for some combination of these reasons.[25]

[24] The positive relationship between age and number of organizational memberships may be due to a gradual accumulation of organizational memberships as people age. Alternatively, it may be a result of common behaviors among cohorts of activists in the sample, such as the Vietnam-era cohort. For a discussion, see Caren, Ghoshal, and Ribas (2011).

[25] Some readers may be interested in knowing how much of this effect is driven by the motivation of individuals to be a part of hybrids vs. how much of this effect is driven by recruitment activities at the organizational level. Our data do not contain the information to distinguish between these effects. Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine that such a question might be the subject of future research. Such a study would require data at both the individual and organization levels on individuals that were contacted, those that were not contacted, and which individuals turned out at events vs. which ones did not.

Examination of coefficients on the control variables indicates that members of the Democratic Party were less likely to join hybrid organizations than were nonmembers. Lower-income people were more likely to join hybrid organizations than were higher-income people. Persons surveyed in Denver, St. Paul, and New York were less likely to be members of hybrid organizations than were individuals surveyed in Washington, D.C. (which was the base of comparison). Individuals surveyed in 2008 were more likely to join hybrid organizations than were individuals surveyed in 2007 or 2009.

The endogenous parameter for total organizational membership showed that individuals who joined more organizations in total were also more likely to join hybrids. However, we do not attribute substantive importance to this finding as such a result would occur even if individuals joined hybrid organizations on a purely random basis. Rather, this variable is included in the model in order to ensure consistent estimation of the other variables in the second-stage equation.

We used complete-case imputation to estimate the values of missing observations (Little 1988; Wood et al. 2005). This method uses the nonmissing data from other independent variables in a model to predict the missing values in a standard, linear regression model. We constrain these predictions according to the possible values of a variable. For example, in a variable constrained to the interval [0, 1], we adjust a prediction outside this interval to the boundary of the interval (e.g., −0.03 would be recoded 0 and 1.03 would be recoded 1). The use of complete-case imputation is appropriate given the relatively low percentage of missing data (King et al. 2001). In the individual-level regression, all variables have less than 4% missing data except income, which has 7.51% missing data (see table 4).[26]

It is important to evaluate whether the instrumental variables employed in this analysis satisfy the criteria of good instruments; otherwise the models may suffer from "empirical underidentification" (Bollen 2012, p. 57). First, we use Basmann's (1960) overidentification test to determine if age and education satisfy the condition of uncorrelated residuals (see also Bollen 2012, p. 56). In line with this procedure, a regression analysis shows that age and education do not significantly correlate with the residuals, as required (narrow $F_{2,156} = 0.94$, $P = .393$; broad $F_{2,156} = 1.29$, $P = .279$). Second, we use Bound, Jaeger, and Baker's (1995) test to determine if the instruments sufficiently correlate with the endogenous variable (see also Bollen 2012, p. 57). In line with this procedure, a regression analysis shows that age and education correlate significantly with number of organizational memberships, as required (narrow $F_{2,156} = 153.59$, $P \leq .001$; broad

[26] Some respondents may be sensitive about answering questions about income because they view this information as private (Schafer and Graham 2002, p. 171).

$F_{2,156} = 130.15$, $P \leq .001$). On the basis of this analysis, we conclude that our instrumental variables are satisfactory for the purpose of estimating the two-stage equation model.

As a robustness check on our model specification, we considered whether our test of hypothesis 1 was sensitive to event-level differences between the demonstrators. Since events differ in their sponsoring organizations, locations, and times of the year, it is possible that they vary in their propensity to attract individuals from hybrid organizations for these reasons. Hence, we estimated alternative versions of the models in which we included dummy variables for each event rather than dummy variables for each city.[27] The results (which are not reported here but are available from the authors on request) show that coefficients on participation in nonantiwar movements remain positive and statistically significant, thus remaining consistent with hypothesis 1.

Organizational-Level Analysis

The descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the contacting organizations are reported in table 6.[28] On average, each organization had a centrality of 0.026 and contacted about two respondents in the sample per year.[29] Yet there was great variation in annual contacts, ranging from zero respondents to 142 respondents. Hybrid organizations made up 28.1% of the population using the narrow movement definition and 26.5% using the broad movement definition. About 13.1% of all organizations had radical ideologies (such as socialist or revolutionary), 7.6% were organized as coalitions, 63.1% allowed democratic participation by holding open meetings, 47.5% were national or international in scope, and 85.0% had a web page that we were able to locate. The median founding year was 1998. Each organization had an average of 1.82 comembership ties with other organizations.

We estimated a Tobit panel model of centrality in which organizations were observed at three points in time (2007, 2008, and 2009).[30] We adopted

[27] City and event-level dummy variables cannot be included in the same specification because of perfect multicollinearity between some cities and events.

[28] This sample comprises contacting organizations and does not include organizations that were listed only as membership organizations. Organizations were observed annually for between one and three years.

[29] We used the "eigenvector" measure for centrality. This approach uses an iterative algorithm that weights the centrality of an organization more if it is tied to other highly central organizations (Bonacich 1987). This measure is preferred, in part, because previous research shows that it has greater stability in samples than do other measures (Costenbader and Valente 2003). We report the descriptive statistics disaggregated by identity type in table D1 in app. D.

[30] For an explanation of the mathematical logic of the Tobit model, see Tobin (1958).

TABLE 6
Descriptive Statistics for Contacting Organizations

Variable	*N*	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	% Imputed
Centrality in contact network	337	.03	.0005	.13	−.60	.68	NA
Count of protesters contacted	1,540	1.61	0	7.45	0	142	NA
Hybrid organization (narrow) = 1	1,477	.28	0	.45	0	1	4.01
Hybrid organization (broad) = 1	1,477	.27	0	.44	0	1	4.01
Radical organization = 1	1,417	.13	0	.34	0	1	7.82
Coalition = 1	1,297	.08	0	.27	0	1	15.46
Holds open meetings = 1	1,297	.63	1	.48	0	1	15.46
Year founded	1,048	1979	1998	64.28	1054	2009	31.68
National scope = 1	1,384	.48	1	.50	0	1	9.92
Has a web page = 1	1,540	.85	1	.36	0	1	.00
Number of comembership ties	1,540	1.82	0	5.54	0	54	.00

Note.—The sample size is based on annual organizational counts, so each organization appears in the data a maximum of three times. Centrality in contact network, count of protesters contacted, and number of comembership ties vary on an annual basis. The remaining variables do not vary annually. Centrality in contact network includes only noncensored observations; observations are censored if we did not observe any of the organization's cocontacts in the network.

the same procedures for treating missing data as in the individual-level models. The results are reported in table 7. The Tobit model is appropriate because we observe a nonzero centrality level in only 337 cases, which is the number of organizations in which we observe at least one cocontact with at least one other organization in the data. Since not all of the cocontacts in the population appear in the sample, if an organization's cocontact is not in the sample, then the centrality value for that organization is assigned as zero. The Tobit model first predicts whether or not we observe a nonzero centrality level and then predicts the level of centrality.[31] Consistent with hypothesis 2, the results reveal that hybrid organizations are more central in the interorganizational cocontact network than are nonhybrid organizations, all else equal, for both the narrow and broad movement definitions. Coalitions appear to be significantly more central than other organizations when using the broad movement definition, but not when using the narrow movement definition. Both specifications indicated that organizations of national or international scope are more central than organizations of local, state, or regional scope.

[31] Because the centrality scores of individual organizations in a network are not independent of one another, we conducted permutation tests to determine whether the nonindependence of observations affected the conclusions of our analysis (Cochran and Cox 1957; Kirkland 2013). The models are estimated using permutation tests that yielded conclusions identical to those conducted using the standard Tobit methodology, which indicates that nonindependence is not a problem in our analysis. Special thanks go to Lorien Jasny for her assistance in conducting these tests.

TABLE 7
Tobit Panel Model of Organizational Centrality, 2007–9

Independent Variable	Centrality in the Contact Network[a]	
	Narrow Movement Definition	Broad Movement Definition
Hybrid organization = 1	.62***	.5004***
	(.11)	(.11)
Radical organization = 1	.08	.09
	(.14)	(.15)
Coalition = 1	.30	.38*
	(.18)	(.19)
Holds open meetings = 1	.02	.04
	(.11)	(.11)
Year founded	−.00	−.00
	(.00)	(.00)
National or international scope = 1	.73***	.70***
	(.12)	(.12)
Has a web page = 1	.08	.14
	(.17)	(.17)
Constant	−1.52	−1.74
	(1.68)	(1.72)
σ_μ	.13	.24
	(.34)	(.18)
σ_ε	1.38***	1.38***
	(.07)	(.07)
ρ	.01	.03
	(.04)	(.04)
Wald χ^2 (df = 7)	88.93***	77.36***
Log likelihood	−1,050.52	−1,056.70

Note.—N = 1,540; left-censored observations = 1,203; uncensored observations = 337. Numbers in parentheses are SEs. Missing values are imputed using complete-case imputation, restricted to the range of the variable.

[a] Dependent variable.

* $P \leq .05$.

** $P \leq .01$.

*** $P \leq .001$.

We estimated a negative binomial panel model of organizational mobilization in which organizations were observed at three points in time (2007, 2008, and 2009).[32] We adopted the same procedures for treating missing data as in the previous models. The results are reported in table 8. The negative binomial model is appropriate because the dependent variable is a count of demonstrators per organization and is overdispersed. Consistent with hypothesis 3, the results demonstrate that hybrid organizations contact significantly more demonstrators than do nonhybrid organizations, all else equal, using both the narrow and broad movement definitions. Both

[32] For an explanation of the mathematical logic of the negative binomial model, see Cameron and Trivedi (1998, pp. 70–72).

TABLE 8
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL PANEL MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACTS, 2007–9

	COUNT OF PROTESTERS CONTACTED[a]	
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	Narrow Movement Definition	Broad Movement Definition
Hybrid organization = 1	.43***	.40***
	(.10)	(.10)
Radical organization = 1	.43***	.44***
	(.13)	(.13)
Coalition = 1	.00	.08
	(.17)	(.17)
Holds open meeting = 1	.11	.11
	(.10)	(.10)
Year founded	.00	.00
	(.00)	(.00)
National or international scope = 1	.29**	.26*
	(.10)	(.10)
Has a web page = 1	.10	.13
	(.15)	(.14)
Number of comembership ties	.08***	.08***
	(.00)	(.00)
Constant	−2.32	−2.33
	(1.90)	(1.90)
σ_μ	6.03	6.00
	(.74)	(.74)
σ_ε	4.76	4.75
	(.65)	(.65)
Wald χ^2 (df=8)	566.52	567.43
Log likelihood	−1,941.17	−1,942.92

NOTE.—N = 1,540. Numbers in parentheses are SEs. Missing values are imputed using complete-case imputation, restricted to the range of the variable.

[a] Dependent variable.

* $P \leq .05$.

** $P \leq .01$.

*** $P \leq .001$.

specifications further indicate that radical organizations tend to contact more participants per organization than do nonradical organizations. Organizations that were national or international in scope attracted more demonstrators than did organizations with a regional, state, or local scope. Further, the results indicate that comemberships with other mobilizing organizations are valuable in contacting demonstrators. We did not detect differences in contacts that depended on whether or not the organization was a coalition, held open meetings, or had a web page. No significant variations in contacts depended on organizational age.

We conducted a variety of robustness checks on all the organizational models to make sure that our modeling decisions did not influence the finding on the significance of hybrid organizations. First, we considered

whether the way in which we classified organizations as antiwar/peace focused, hybrid, or nonantiwar/peace focused may have affected the results. We estimated models that excluded anti–nuclear war organizations from the antiwar category and 9/11 Truth organizations from the peace category. We considered the effects of reclassifying leading organizations, including UFPJ, ANSWER, and MoveOn. We estimated models using the categories constructed by the second coding team (which created comparative categorizations for intercoder reliability). Second, we considered the effects of alternative ways of composing the organizational sample. Specifically, we estimated one set of models that excluded all coalitions from the data and a second set of models that included only organizations for which we found an archived web page. Third, we considered alternative specifications of the models. We considered one set of specifications in which we included a dummy variable for antiwar-focused or antiwar/peace-focused organization. We considered another set of specifications in which we included a variable for organizational assets reported for tax purposes. We do not report these results here, but they are available from the authors on request. Although the exact results varied from model to model, every alternative model indicated that the variable on hybrid organizations is positive and statistically significant. These results suggest strongly that the tests of our hypotheses are robust to reasonable variations in models of organizational networks and contacts.

Overall, the results of our data analysis establish that hybrid organizations play a special role in peace mobilization. Antiwar activists who also have backgrounds outside the antiwar movement are disproportionately likely to join hybrid organizations. Hybrid organizations have higher centrality, all else equal, than do nonhybrid organizations, which affords them strategically valuable positions in interorganizational cocontact networks. Hybrid organizations contact more demonstrators, all else equal, than do nonhybrid organizations. Thus, organizations with hybrid identities stand out from other organizations in the mobilization process.

IMPLICATIONS FOR HYBRIDS, NETWORKS, AND MOVEMENTS

Implications for the Study of Hybrid Organizations

The findings of this research unambiguously demonstrate that organizations with hybrid identities play an important role in mobilizing participation in the antiwar movement. What, if anything, do the results reveal about hybrid organizations in general?

Our analysis contradicts the notion that hybrid organizations experience an illegitimacy discount (Zuckerman 1999) under all circumstances. Instead, this research is consistent with recent studies claiming that the illegitimacy discount is less applicable when hybridization is common, cat-

egorical boundaries are more ambiguous, and the relevant audience consists of activists (Rao et al. 2005; Hannan et al. 2007; Kovacs and Hannan 2010; Hsu et al. 2012). For activists, the benefits of tailoring an organization's identity to the needs of the individual—and the loyalty that this tailoring promotes—appear to outweigh any confusion generated by straddling categorical boundaries. Rather, organizations with hybrid identities often thrive within social movements.

Since our analysis focuses on activists—an audience that is inside social movements—an important direction for future research would be to explore the reception of hybrid organizations by audiences that are outside social movements. How is an organization such as Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW) viewed by relevant external audiences, such as policy makers, journalists, and the public? We suspect that the blending of categories in this case—veterans that are expected to be supporters of wars that they fought in and activists that oppose war—may cause some confusion among observers. Yet, one goal of an organization such as IVAW is to instigate confusion along these lines. It aims to have external audiences ask, how is it possible for an individual both to be a veteran and to oppose war? By stimulating questions like these, IVAW aspires to educate the public and move public opinion against war.

At the same time, we can imagine hybrid organizations that would probably face difficulties—either inside or outside of social movements—which suggests limits to hybridization as a strategy. For example, a hypothetical organization called Republicans Against the War would likely encounter obstacles, especially during the administration of a Republican president. Potential grass roots constituents in the Republican Party would almost certainly be suspicious of the origins and funding behind such an organization. Individual Republicans opposing war might not feel comfortable attending antiwar demonstrations dominated by progressives, liberals, and leftists, even if they were marching under a Republicans Against the War banner. The cultural disconnect between self-identified Republicans and the antiwar movement may be too great to traverse.

These examples suggest that the prospects for success by hybrid organizations may depend on whether a particular combination of categories is viewed as legitimate by relevant audiences. Thus, an illegitimacy discount may not be applied simply because an organization is hybrid, but be based on the judgments that relevant audiences make about the specific hybridization crafted by the organization. Audiences may group identities into broader categories based on appropriateness. Within these categories, hybridization may not be penalized, while hybridization across these larger groupings may trigger an illegitimacy discount. Further research might assess how these groupings of identities are formed and maintained in the eyes of audiences by probing the "logics of appropriateness" (Clemens

1997) that determine when boundary crossing is likely to succeed and when it is likely to fail. An analysis along these lines would deepen our understanding of the conditions under which—and the degree to which—hybrid organizations attain legitimacy.

Implications for the Study of Interorganizational Networks

Interorganizational networks play an important role in sustaining communities within social movements (Diani 2009). These networks promote the diffusion of protest tactics (Wang and Soule 2012), influence activists' attitudes toward collaboration with authorities (Ansell 2003), and protect movements from the effects of rifts among movement leaders (Heaney and Rojas 2008). Central positions in these networks are valuable. Burt (1992) advises that actors can achieve desirable positions in networks by bridging structural holes. Yet, the extant literature provides little guidance on how organizations can locate and fill these holes.

This research demonstrates that one way for social movement organizations to bridge structural holes is to craft identities across multiple social movements. By linking identity and network structure, this research provides important guidance to organizations for how to improve their positions in interorganizational networks. Organizations may be able to pinpoint opportunities for spanning structural holes without having detailed information on linkages between other organizations in interorganizational networks. Instead, a good understanding of identities of leading organizations in a network—and how those identities span significant categorical boundaries—may aid an organization in strategizing to improve its network position.

As they secure positions in interorganizational networks, hybrid organizations also establish themselves within the broader ecology of organizational affiliations. McPherson (1983) explains that organizations compete by attracting members with a range of sociodemographic attributes. In doing so, they create niches that are defined by individuals who associate with each other because they have similar traits (e.g., highly educated people living in proximity to each other). McPherson (2004, p. 274) notes that these "niches will, of course, interpenetrate each other, since homophily is not perfectly strong. The extent of interpenetration is a variable which is in principle explicable by the mechanism of the model. . . . We will discover that some entities are facilitative rather than competitive." Our analysis of hybrid organizations is one example of the dynamic that McPherson describes. Antiwar activists that find allies among identity groups—such as women, veterans, and students—facilitate cooperation among movements that might otherwise compete with one another.

Therefore, our analysis provides insight into which regions of the antiwar movement's niche are susceptible to interpenetration by other movements (e.g., intersections with gender) and which are not (e.g., conservatives).

The prominence of hybrid organizations in social movements further speaks to the evolution of interorganizational networks over time (Padgett and Powell 2012). Our analysis documents how the networks of a new social movement are built from networks originating in previous social movements. Hybrid organizations further link a social movement to future movements, which are likely to draw on these hybrids as they seek to reach critical mass. For example, World Can't Wait—born during the antiwar movement after 9/11—later became a supporter of the Occupy Wall Street movement (World Can't Wait 2013; see also Smyth 2012). If hybrid organizations are vital to the growth of new movements, then they may also be critical to understanding how interorganizational networks become integrated across movements over time (Bearman and Everett 1993; Carroll and Ratner 1996).

Implications for the Study of Social Movements

Although the empirical focus of this study is the antiwar movement, hybrid organizations are an important part of many social movements. Recent history furnishes a plethora of significant examples. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference hybridized the civil rights movement with the black church to lead nonviolent civil disobedience against the Jim Crow South, most notably the Montgomery Bus Boycott (McAdam 1982). Catholics for a Free Choice (CFC) was founded in 1972 to hybridize the social justice tradition of the Catholic Church with the pro-choice movement for women's reproductive rights (Staggenborg 1991, p. 60). Since the Catholic Church has taken such a strong stand against abortion, CFC is one of the few institutionalized links between the pro-choice movement and America's millions of Catholics. Similarly, the Log Cabin Republicans began in California in 1978 as an effort by ideologically conservative gay and lesbian citizens to stop a statewide ballot initiative that would have banned gays and lesbians from teaching in public schools (Rimmerman 2000, p. 67). Log Cabin became a national organization in 1990 and today is the most prominent link between the gay rights movement and the Republican Party.

The fact that hybrid organizations are active in many social movements does not necessarily imply that the roles they play in these movements are similar to the ones they play in the antiwar movement. We suspect that the inherently cyclical nature of antiwar activism—which revolves principally around infrequently occurring major wars—may make hybrid organizations proportionately more important to the antiwar movement than to

many other movements. Other movements evolve through protest cycles (Tarrow 1993, 2011), of course, though the need for "sudden" mobilization may be more pronounced during antiwar mobilization than during typical mobilizations on other causes (Reese et al. 2010). If so, then the hybrid effects detected in this study may reasonably provide a rough upper bound for these effects. Future research should examine the relationship between the amplitude of protest cycles and the reliance of movements on hybrids. If our analysis is correct, then movements that have protest cycles of greater amplitude should rely more heavily on hybridization than movements with cycles of smaller amplitude.

Our research documents positive effects of hybridization on mobilizations for peace. However, there are good reasons to believe that hybridization could have negative effects on movements' mobilization efforts under some conditions. For example, if a movement is experiencing "spill-out"—when activists in one movement systematically shift their energies to an allied movement (Hadden and Tarrow 2007)—then hybrids have the potential to encourage, rather than mitigate, additional spill-out. Future research should seek to establish the conditions under which hybrid organizations alternatively pull supporters away from a movement, push supporters to work on a new cause, or sustain symbiotic mobilizations to the advantage of both movements. Research on organizations in other social movements might fruitfully probe the conditions under which hybrids suffer costs when their identities are contested. We conjecture that legitimacy challenges would be most common and successful when the hybridized movements are not miscible, but would be less common and less effective the greater the miscibility of the movements.

CONCLUSION

Research on hybrid organizations in some organizational fields (such as the feature film industry) points to the challenges that actors experience when they possess hybrid identities. However, within the domain of social movements, intermovement dependency mitigates the illegitimacy discount for hybridization. For social movement organizations, blending organizational categories is an expected strategy rather than an aberration from the norm. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of these organizations is more likely to be determined by other factors, such as the authenticity with which they represent intersectional identities.

Our analysis deepens the understanding of intermovement dependency by illuminating how hybrid organizations are a vital part of the mobilization process for peace. These organizations have a noticeable role at the individual and organizational levels. Hybrid organizations help people

with backgrounds in other social movements to connect with the antiwar movement. Possessing hybrid identities enables organizations to serve as intermovement representatives in coalitions, to occupy central positions within networks, and to get people into the streets at antiwar demonstrations. As a result, the antiwar movement would likely have encountered difficulties sustaining mobilization if it had not been able to connect with other movements through hybrid organizations.

The antiwar movement in the United States during the 2000s did not stop U.S. wars in Iraq or Afghanistan. Still, it would be premature to conclude that the antiwar movement did not have significant consequences for American politics and society. The movement stimulated interaction among social movements in the United States. It educated new activists. It provided a testing ground for new organizing modes and tactics, particularly those linked to the rise of the Internet (Nah et al. 2006; Rojas 2009). Indeed, the social and political consequences of the antiwar movement of the 2000s are likely to be borne out in the coming decades as hybrid organizations that grew out of the movement after 9/11—such as the ANSWER Coalition, Code Pink: Women for Peace, and World Can't Wait—apply their experiences to a wide range of political developments. The quick mobilization of these organizations against a potential U.S. attack on Syria in 2013—while most of the antiwar movement of the 2000s remained quiescent—testifies to the enduring power of intermovement hybridization as a strategy for antiwar mobilization.

APPENDIX A

TABLE A1
Estimated Survey Response Rates with Breakdown by Race/Ethnicity and Sex/Gender

	Estimated Sex/Gender		
Estimated Race/Ethnicity	Male	Female	Total
White	.78	.84	.81
Black/African-American	.66	.75	.70
Latino	.77	.89	.83
Asian	.79	.87	.84
Other	.89	.88	.89
Total	.77	.84	.81

Note.—Estimates of race/ethnicity and sex/gender of nonrespondents are based on surveyor' subjective impressions. Race/ethnicity and sex of respondents are based on survey responses.

APPENDIX B

Coding Instructions for Organizational Names and Identity Statements

For each organization number, please read carefully the organization name and identity statement contained in the Google document. Based on your reading, what elements make up the *central character* of the organization? Using the Google spreadsheet, please classify the organization into one or more of the 11 categories listed below.

If you believe that an organization fits in the category, please indicate this judgment by placing a 1 in the category. If you believe that the organization does not fit in the category, please indicate this judgment by placing a 0 in the category. Please note that just because an issue is mentioned in the statement does not mean that it should be coded in the identity statement, unless you judge the issue to be essential to the central character of the organization.

The categories are as follows:

(1) *Antiwar*—An organization focused on opposing wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran; the war on terror; nuclear weapons or nuclear war; and/or militarism in general, such as organizations opposing US bases abroad or calling for a reduction in the military budget should be coded here. Please note that organizations do not qualify for inclusion in this category solely on the basis of being opposed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; such organizations should be included in the *Environmental* category.

(2) *Peace*—An organization focused on promoting personal/inner peace, nonviolence (for example, as a tactic or a philosophy), tranquility, world peace, peace in Palestine/Israel, or aims to uncover the truth about terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 (the so-called 9/11 Truth organizations) is coded here.

(3) *Peace Church*—An organization associated with one of the following religious communities: Quaker (or "Friends"), Amish, Mennonite, or Brethren. Please note that these churches are the only churches that qualify under this category. So, for example, a Catholic peace organization should not be coded here, but should be coded under *Peace* and *Religious*.

(4) *Social Justice*—An organization focused on improving the justice of domestic life in society, such as eliminating racism, making housing and access to health care more available, or spreading wealth more equally in society should be coded here. Please note that an organization should be coded in this category only if social justice is a substantive part of the organization's identity. If "justice" is only part of the organization's name—but is not substantively developed in the identity statement—then the organization is not coded here.

(5) *Personal Identity*—Any organization focusing on representing the personal identities of individuals should be coded here. Social identities

based on gender, race/ethnicity, or sexual preferences should be coded here. Professional identities such as artists, lawyers, teachers, or professors should be coded here. Identities related to veterans, members of the military, or military families, should be coded here. Please do not code religious identities here; code them under *Religious*. "Jewish" should be coded here because it is an ethnic identity in addition to being a religious identity. Geographic identities (e.g., Chicagoans, New Yorkers) do not count here. "Students" should be coded under *Educational* and not under this category.

(6) *Partisan and/or Ideological*—Any organization supporting a party, candidate, party faction, or organization for or against a party or candidate should be coded here. For example, an organization formed specifically against President Bush should be coded here. Any organization focused on espousing a political ideology, such as feminism, socialism, communism, progressivism, libertarianism, anti-authoritarian, anti-imperialism, anarchism, or humanism should be coded here. Please do not code animal rights, religion, environmentalism, or tranquility here.

(7) *Education Related*—Any organization related to the institution of education, such as students, teachers, professors, universities, schools, campuses, or reforming schools. Organizations only devoted to "educating" the public on a social issue should not be coded under this category.

(8) *Religious*—Any organization related to spirituality, faith, institutional religion, churches, or clergy is coded here.

(9) *Environmental*—Any organization related to a cleaner environment or preserving the environment for the future should be coded here. Please note that organizations against nuclear power because of its potential negative environmental effects are coded here.

(10) *Labor Union and/or Labor Related*—A labor union or an organization that represents labor's interests should be coded here. A coalition of labor groups would be coded here, as would an organization that advocates on behalf of the labor rights of a disenfranchised group (such as immigrants or foreign workers).

(11) *Other*—This category should be used only if the organization has significant elements of its central character that do not fit within one of the other categories. Examples include organizations advocating vegetarianism, farm animal rights, corporate accountability, and fair trade. Also, civic organizations, newspapers, theatre companies, radio stations, and television stations should be coded here.

APPENDIX C

TABLE C1
INTERCODER RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

	Number of Agreements	Number of Disagreements	% Agreement	Krippendorff's α
Initial coding:				
Antiwar	489	14	97.22	.94
Peace	482	21	95.83	.88
Peace church	503	0	100.00	1.00
Social justice	464	39	92.25	.77
Personal identity	487	16	96.82	.88
Partisan and/or ideological	492	11	97.81	.93
Education related	499	4	99.21	.96
Religious	499	4	99.21	.96
Environmental	496	7	98.61	.90
Labor union and/or labor related	502	1	99.80	.97
Other	474	29	94.24	.83
Narrow movement definition:				
Antiwar focused	490	13	97.42	.90
Hybrid	476	27	94.63	.87
Nonantiwar focused	489	14	97.22	.94
Broad movement definition:				
Antiwar/peace focused	489	14	97.22	.92
Hybrid	480	23	95.43	.88
Nonantiwar/peace focused	492	11	97.81	.96

NOTE.—Number of cases = 503; number of decisions = 1,006. Each case was classified by two coders. Scores were tabulated using Freelon (2013).

APPENDIX D

TABLE D1
HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS BY SUBCATEGORY

TYPE OF ANTIWAR/PEACE HYBRID	NUMBER OF HYBRIDS	NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS	MEAN (SD)	
			Organizational Centrality	Organizational Contacts
Peace church	5	15	.07	2.53
			(.12)	(3.44)
Social justice	55	165	.02	3.05
			(.13)	(13.80)
Personal identity	31	93	.03	4.25
			(.17)	(10.61)
Partisan-ideological	19	57	.04	4.28
			(.18)	(9.01)
Education related	22	66	.01	1.29
			(.06)	(2.79)
Religious	20	60	.04	1.30
			(.09)	(2.23)
Environmental	22	66	.02	1.24
			(.07)	(3.08)
Labor union/labor related	3	9	−.02	1.78
			(.09)	(3.15)
Other	20	60	.06	.62
			(.08)	(1.12)

NOTE.—Subcategories are computed using the broad definition of the antiwar/peace movement. Organizations are coded into as many categories as appropriate since the categories are not mutually exclusive.

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