

dimension of the elusive citizen, as Argentines expected better treatment, jobs, and housing. Instead, many felt like second-class citizens, expected to do the dirty, dangerous, and difficult work associated with immigrants. Conversely, many of their Spanish hosts discovered that their historic link to these immigrants did not guarantee successful incorporation and decided that people with a “strong work ethic” rather than an “ethnic affinity” would best meet employment needs and stem the demographic crisis of an aging population.

In sum, Cook-Martín suggests that citizenship is neither less nor more valuable now. It is different—something that people instrumentally pursue to maximize their opportunities and minimize risk. Its affective dimensions may have shrunk, but its utilitarian functions have grown. Thus, the relationship between citizen and state now favors the individual, who can evade citizenship duties while reaping strategic advantages. But the author admits this argument applies only to the “cosmopolitan few,” people with higher-than-average levels of economic, human, cultural, and political capital. Globally, the number of naturalized citizens is only 3% (p. 98). This number identifies a potential weakness. Cook-Martín embeds this discussion of citizenship in the literature on nationalism. He highlights that this study challenges the static assumptions of traditional theories of nationalism. He also argues that this case exposes a proposition of postnationalist theory, that the geographic nation-state is becoming obsolete.

On the contrary, Cook-Martín’s transnational theory posits a circular, strategic, and dynamic relationship between citizen and state, but one that is still geographically grounded. I wonder about this study’s transferability and its theoretical relevance considering the vast numbers who are “stateless” people, refugees, or undocumented immigrants. On that note, his repeated employment of Hannah Arendt’s seminal argument about the dangers of “statelessness” seemed out of place, as the people in his study have the opposite experience: multiple countries that want them.

Though a more substantive account of the theoretical implications of this research would improve this book, I still highly recommend it as an insightful and well-researched study of historic and modern migration. It is well written, creative, and thought provoking. It will be of great use to advanced students and scholars of migration, political sociology, and Ibero-American studies—with a splash of Italy thrown in.

The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State. By Michele Landis Dauber. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013. Pp. xvi+353. \$25.00 (paper).

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For political sociologists who thought the general narrative of the U.S. welfare state’s origins was more less settled—think again. Details and nu-

ances aside, the conventional wisdom is that the United States was a comparative welfare state laggard owing to “the twin evils of laissez-faire economic theory and laissez-faire constitutionalism” (p. 3). When the New Deal did finally come to pass amid an economic depression of unprecedented scope, it accordingly required a “heroic break from a benighted past” (p. 9) of long-standing political, social, and legal precedents inherently suspicious of federal policies designed to protect the economically vulnerable.

No so, claims Michele Landis Dauber convincingly in *The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State*. Dauber’s central thesis is that the core policies of the U.S. social safety net—especially but not limited to social security and unemployment protections—were actually continuations of long-standing congressional commitments to disaster relief tracing back virtually to the beginning of the republic. The author marshals extensive documentary evidence showing that Congress routinely (though not uniformly) appropriated federal funds for emergency economic relief when significant numbers of people faced destitution owing to natural disasters (floods, droughts, hurricanes, floods, earthquakes) or even man-made disasters like Indian uprisings and the Whiskey Rebellion. FDR and his fellow New Dealers built relentlessly on this history to promote and legally justify its policies as neither new nor radical but rather fully consistent with American history and tradition.

Of course, localized or temporary destitution caused by acts of God (or aggrieved Native Americans) is arguably of a wholly different category than that caused by widespread economic downturn. And here is where Dauber’s study is at its most insightful and impressive. The author builds on the long-standing cultural theme that the generosity of U.S. social provision has always depended on the extent to which beneficiaries were *deserving* of aid. And “deserving” meant that the economically vulnerable were “blameless” in their plight. That blamelessness was easy to show for, say, victims of the 1905 San Francisco earthquake. But what about widespread unemployment and poverty caused by impersonal economic forces? Were these people also “victims” morally indistinguishable from those who suffered natural calamities and did the Depression qualify as a “disaster” worthy of a major federal response?

In what I consider the book’s most impressive chapter, Dauber chronicles the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration’s massive propaganda effort designed around one fundamental objective: to convince Congress, the press, the courts, and the general public that the current depression *was* a “disaster” in the traditional sense and its victims *were* blameless and thus worthy of generous federal assistance. These efforts included not only less exciting administrative and legal work, but also the mobilization of art, photography, and literature. Dauber in part highlights a series of photographs that remain to this day as the most iconic images of the depression, most of which depicted “blameless” white women and their hungry children—a nod to the gender and racial politics surrounding the New Deal’s origins. Readers might further be surprised to learn (as was this reviewer)

that John Steinbeck's famous novel *The Grapes of Wrath* was also part of this effort; Steinbeck painstakingly sought to depict his main characters as general, abstract victims of larger economic forces rather than individuals with unique histories, personalities, and moral challenges. To do otherwise might allow readers to conclude that the characters' plight was just as much a result of their personal choices and failings as a bad economy. And that would undermine the construction of the Depression as a disaster no different in its awful consequences and moral implications than acts of God.

All that said, Dauber is clearly a legal scholar and historian first and there is certainly plenty here for those so inclined. The central legal theme is that the Supreme Court—consistent with the traditional wisdom—*did* often frustrate FDR's attempts at regulatory reforms under the Constitution's interstate commerce and enumerated powers clauses. But the largest social spending proposals, like old-age pensions (now known simply as Social Security) and unemployment benefits, were legally constructed to fall within the Constitution's general welfare clause that allowed Congress to tax and spend for the nation's general benefit as it saw fit with minimal judicial scrutiny. This legal ground was promising not only because Congress had been legislating disaster relief under its auspices for over a century, but also because the Supreme Court consistently agreed (both implicitly and explicitly) that Congress had widespread spending power under the general welfare clause. Here, things get a bit complicated and tricky for the legally untrained, but Dauber does an excellent job in keeping focus on the legal punch line: however stingy the court was with respect to the New Deal's regulatory schemes, it generally endorsed the proposition that the federal government could spend freely for the general good with minimal judicial scrutiny. This pattern, then, was the legal basis upon which the New Deal's most visible and now cherished economic protections were legally justified, a principle that did not require any "heroic break" from a past of laissez-faire constitutionalism but was simply a continuation of long-standing practice in and out of the courts.

Anyone who might worry that Dauber's book is of limited application beyond the early developments in the U.S. social provision need only consider two recent events: Hurricane Katrina and the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare"). National outrage over the Bush administration's slow and incompetent response in New Orleans—to a highly disproportionate number of African-Americans no less—is a yet another reminder that Americans have long endorsed significant federal assistance for victims of natural disasters, even if those same victims might be seen as undeserving with respect to their day-to-day economic plight. And Chief Justice John Roberts's opinion upholding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act as within Congresses taxing power under the general welfare clause but not regulatory power under the commerce clause nicely illustrates the ongoing relevance of Dauber's excellent analysis of the legal and political origins of the U.S. welfare state.