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Moral Intuition: Connecting Current Knowledge to Future Organizational Research and Practice

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In contrast to older, conventional accounts that treat ethical decision making and behavior as the result of deliberative and intendedly rational processes, a rapidly growing body of social science research has framed ethical thought and behavior as driven by intuition. We review this important new body of knowledge in terms of both the process and content of moral intuition. Then, to demonstrate its value to organizational scholars, we consider the potential impact of moral intuition research in four areas of organizational studies especially suited to insights from this research: leadership, organizational corruption, ethics training and education, and divestiture socialization. Our review and discussion suggest that the literature on moral intuition is incredibly rich, fruitful, and meaningful to a wide range of audiences.

Keywords: *moral intuition; ethical behavior; ethical decision making; business ethics*

Traditionally, social scientific research on ethics has followed many of its philosophical forbearers by treating ethical decision making and behavior as normally deliberative and intendedly rational processes (albeit ones often subject to error or situational influence; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). A rapidly growing array of research, however, has

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reframed ethical behavior as strongly influenced by intuitive and emotional factors (e.g., Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006). This approach has opened the door to reconsidering the substantive content of individuals' automatic, intuitive responses regarding ethics, indicating that persons respond to much more than the concerns of welfare and fairness that animate much social scientific ethics research (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2009).

This new moral intuition approach thus is twofold: based upon a new intuitionist conception of the *process* by which individuals generate ethical intuitions (i.e., automatic judgments) and tied to a more multidimensional understanding of the *content*, the underlying "moral domain" (Graham et al., 2011), which determines what those moral intuitions will be (e.g., that bribery is wrong). Although the value of the moral intuition perspective has been demonstrated in multiple fields (e.g., psychology, anthropology, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, behavioral economics), its application in organizational contexts is limited. (For details about intuition research in other disciplines see, for example, Gore and Sadler-Smith (2011), Sadler-Smith (2008), Sinclair (2011), Lieberman (2000), Satpute and Lieberman (2006), Evans (2008), and Bolender (2003).)

In this article we first provide a broad overview of moral intuition research using this process/content distinction as an organizing framework. Second, we identify four organizational phenomena, defined by general conditions that similarly characterize moral intuition, and demonstrate how moral intuition research can contribute to research in these kinds of areas. Specifically, moral intuitions are most relevant to situations involving normative (moral) materiality, uncertainty, and social tension. We suggest that *ethically positive leadership* (e.g., Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000), *corruption* (e.g., Ashforth & Anand, 2003), *ethics training* (Weber & Wasieleski, 2013), and *ethics divestiture socialization* (Kammeyer-Mueller, Simon, & Rich, 2012) are similarly characterized by normative materiality, uncertainty, and social tension. As a result, these research areas, three of which have received a great deal of scholarly attention yet harbor many unresolved issues, are particularly primed for insights from moral intuition research. Thus, we follow others who have explored moral intuitions in organizations (Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes, Schilpzand, & Hannah, 2012; Reynolds, Leavitt, & DeCelles, 2010; Zhong, 2011), but we go further by demonstrating that moral intuition research can inform other emerging and even mature fields of organization science.

The Process of Moral Intuition

Moral intuition has been defined as "the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about a person or event without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of weighing evidence, crafting evaluative arguments, or inferring a conclusion" (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008: 188). In short, moral intuition typically is viewed as a rapid (i.e., automatic), nondeliberative (i.e., noninferential), evaluative experience that often is emotionally laden (i.e., accompanied by affective reactions, such as disgust, anger, elevation, etc.). The foundations of the process are a matter of ongoing attention, with consideration given to neurological bases (e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Lieberman, 2000; Salvador & Folger, 2009), connections to affective systems (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Young &

Koenigs, 2007), and boundaries between automatic and deliberative processes (e.g., Reynolds, 2006). Some accounts treat moral intuition as a matter of moral schemas and scripted responses becoming implicitly learned and chronically (and thereby rapidly and thoughtlessly) accessible (Lieberman, 2000; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). In this view, schematic (moral) cognition is not merely a rapid, routinized application of deliberative reasoning; instead, it involves a fundamentally nondeliberative process of forming quick judgments (Lieberman, 2000; but for debate on this point, see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Turiel, 2006).

In contrast to implicit learning approaches, some accounts propose innate and sometimes invariant moral intuition capacities in "nativist" fashion (Bolender, 2003)—such as innate cognitive (or cognitive/affective) responses to stimuli, or innate capacities to master the application of moral concepts (akin to language mastery; cf. Bloom, 2000; Bolender, 2001, 2003). Haidt and various colleagues argue for the presence of moral modules attuned toward particular aspects of social life, with these modules having been developed by evolutionary processes (for a summary of this evolutionary framework, see Haidt, 2012, pt. 3). Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, 1991; Haslam, 2004; Rai & Fiske, 2011), working from anthropological perspectives, do not frame their analysis of morality in terms of intuitive cognition, but nevertheless argue that humans possess basic models of social relations that they apply in evaluating social situations (for a summary of Fiske and colleagues' work, see Bolender, 2003).

Moral Intuition: Evidence and Contrast With Rational Deliberation Models

Moral intuition theory is in some ways a response to the common rational deliberation approaches to understanding ethical behavior (we use the terms *ethics* and *morality* as synonyms). In those views, moral thought and action is reasoned (i.e., in some way is logical and rule-governed) and consciously deliberative, in that moral action follows from the application of rule-guided criteria to specific circumstances and choices, and moral development is understood as progression toward "higher" levels of moral deliberation (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). Scholars in the cognitive-developmental tradition, such as Rest (1986), also portrayed moral action as a multipart process, including an *awareness* that a situation presents a moral choice, a moral *judgment* arising from deliberation about that situation, an *intention* to act in accord with that judgment, and actual moral *behavior*. A large number of individual differences, situational (e.g., organizational) influences, and cognitive biases and heuristics have been found to influence one or another stage of the awareness–judgment–intention–behavior process, and the four-part rational model is the most commonly used framework in research on ethical behavior in organizations (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Sonenshein, 2007; see the summary of this approach in Treviño et al., 2006). Indeed, the two most frequently cited scholarly articles in the organization sciences regarding ethical behavior explicitly build on the Kohlberg/Rest rational deliberation approach (Treviño, 1986, and Jones, 1991, each cited over 750 times according to the Web of Science/Social Science Citation Index database, as of August 2013).

Rational deliberation models have considerable empirical support (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). Critics, however, argue that such models are biased toward a limited range of normative frameworks (typically deontological or utilitarian) that, besides being restricted as to moral content, place primacy on explicit moral reasoning. Rational deliberation models also

tend to rely on evidence from situations, such as difficult moral dilemmas, that lend themselves to conscious deliberation. (See, for example, criticisms by Hogan, Johnson, and Emler (1978) and Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1987), Puka's (1994) anthology of Kohlberg criticisms, and the various moral intuition theorists cited below.)

Importantly, the relationship between moral reasoning and moral behavior is underspecified by rational deliberation models (Blasi, 1980; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), and nondeliberative and nonconscious processes play frequent and often key roles in moral behavior specifically and behavior generally (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Uleman & Bargh, 1989). Key support for a moral intuition process, then, is found in the noninferential nature and automaticity of moral judgment, and this makes moral intuition a potentially important alternative to the rationally deliberative treatment of ethical behavior that hitherto has characterized much theorizing about ethics in organizations. (Often, however, automatic and deliberate processes are intertwined, and so at several places in this article we highlight implications one has for the other.)

Noninferential judgments. Evidence suggests that moral judgment and behavior can take place without prior deliberative reasoning. Individuals often are unable to give reasons for their often strong moral responses (Haidt, 2001; see also Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007). And even if they were so able, the fact that individuals can provide post hoc moral reasoning (and possibly motivated moral reasoning—cf. Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009) does not in itself show that they engaged in that reasoning antecedent to their behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Reynolds, 2006; Shweder et al., 1987; Uleman & Bargh, 1989; see also Tetlock, 2002).

Evidence also shows that individuals can make moral judgments when under heavy cognitive loads as well as when they are not—suggesting that intentional, deliberative thought is not always necessary for the formation and execution of those moral judgments (e.g., Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Implicit association test research also claims that unarticulated moral stances impact moral judgment even when those stances are not explicitly brought into a decision process (Marquardt & Hoeger, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2010). Moral judgments also are closely linked to emotion, suggesting a noninferential process (Damasio, 1994; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006). This link between affect and moral judgment indicates a limit to the reach of moral reasoning as driver of actual moral judgment and behavior.

The automaticity of moral action. Experiments often find essentially instantaneous ethical judgments on the part of participants (e.g., Haidt, 2001; cf. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999 for a discussion of automaticity). Qualitative evidence similarly indicates the commonality of moral action in the absence of deliberation (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). Even though automaticity can come in degrees and be influenced by multiple factors (Moors & de Houwer, 2007; Uleman & Bargh, 1989), the existence of automatic, nondeliberative, nonconscious moral reactions indicates a limit to the rational deliberation model (see also Sonenshein, 2007).

Perhaps more controversially, some recent research has sought to challenge the common assumption that rational deliberation is necessary for moral behavior. For example, via an empirical study, Zhong (2011) argued that deliberation might narrow persons' focus to the

point of ignoring normatively important but not easily analyzable aspects of a moral decision. Deliberation also might constitute an opportunity to exercise the kind of justificatory thinking that can excuse unethical behavior (Gino & Ariely, 2012).

Dual process and intuitive primacy. Much theorizing appears to be coalescing around a "two-system," rational/intuitive "dual process" understanding of human cognitive functioning (Kahneman, 2011). Dual process theorizing considers how situations influence the type of moral judgment processes used by people (e.g., Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2008; but cf. McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, & Mackenzie, 2009, and a reply by Greene, 2009). For example, Reynolds (2006) argued that novelty was a determinant of rational or intuitive processing. Some have argued for *intuitive primacy*—that although sometimes the rational deliberation model accurately characterizes moral behavior, in the large majority of cases moral intuition rules. This position is partly based on research demonstrating a more general affective primacy in human behavior. In intuitive primacy models (e.g., Haidt, 2001, 2012), reason largely is the servant of intuition, providing (a) post hoc rationalizations for intuitive reactions and (b) actual deliberation when clear intuitive responses do not occur.

Some critics of intuitionist theories argue that even if an individual's present moral responses are intuitive, those intuitions might reflect learning from prior experiences that were deliberative and inferential in character (i.e., intuitions reflect implicit learning from deliberative experiences; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Turiel, 2006). But even if intuitive primacy holds, rational deliberation is not thereby without any influence. Insofar as intuitions are shaped by experience (either in the form of schema formation, or as cultural or situational influences on the developmental nuances of intuition), those formative experiences can include a role for deliberate thought. If intuitions are triggered by emotion, for example, individuals could manage the kinds of emotional stimuli to which they (or others) are exposed, thereby influencing moral intuition and/or their tendency to subject initial moral intuitions to deliberate reconsideration (Feinberg, Willer, Antonenko, & John, 2012; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). Priming of (and support for) cognitive reflection and reappraisal can prompt scrutiny of moral emotions and intuitions (Feinberg et al., 2012; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012). Ordering effects also have been found to influence moral intuition (Wiegmann, Okan, & Nagel, 2012), and thus controlling the order with which people are presented ethical issues also might influence moral intuition.

Moral Intuition and Related Phenomena

Moral intuition and emotion. Although moral intuitions often are treated as cognitive phenomena, they usually are strongly linked, in intuition theories, to emotion. Emotion, in moral intuition theory, is not just an attention-generating preliminary to reasoning. For example, Haidt (2001, 2004) noted that moral intuitions are always cognitions (and thus not the same as purely affective states), but that they are relatively "hot" cognitions (i.e., rather than contrasting cognition with affect, one should contrast "hot" [automatic, emotionally valenced] with "cold" cognitions). Although theorizing is in flux, it is clear that emotion at least sometimes can influence moral judgment in nonconscious ways (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005).

Moral intuition and heuristics. Intuitions (including moral intuitions) also have been linked to (moral) decision heuristics (e.g., by Sunstein, 2005, and Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011). Less clear is whether moral intuitions *undergird* moral heuristics, and whether they are *conceptually reducible* to moral heuristics (see, e.g., Liao, 2012; Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman, 2010). Central to this question is the claim that intuition is not just faster, simpler, inferential reasoning (Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002). And insofar as heuristic judgments are understood as heuristic *reasoning*—i.e., the quick, automatic application of some simple decision rule—heuristic decisions remain essentially inferential (i.e., they constitute reasoning), albeit with limited complexity and reliability. But if intuitions are distinct from heuristic judgments, research can consider whether they are reliable in a way that heuristics are not (Wright, 2010).

Social influences on moral intuition. Research on the developmental influences on moral intuitions specifically is limited (e.g., Young & Saxe, 2011). But in general, intuitionist theories admit a role for social influences just as rational deliberation models do. Moral choices can be embedded in contexts—such as that of a task requiring deliberation, or a situation framed with particular kinds of language—that incline decision makers toward more or less intuitive approaches to moral judgment (e.g., Zhong, 2011).

The nature of moral intuitions themselves also reflects social influences. In the *social* intuition model of Haidt and colleagues, for example, moral intuitions both (a) develop, at a cultural/societal level, as a kind of evolutionary solution to problems of cooperation and coordination (e.g., Haidt, 2001, 2012), and (b) develop in specific ways within any given individual from the mix of social influences to which that individual is exposed. Moral judgment thus is an intuitive *and* social process. The related area of moral emotion and moral sentiment research (e.g., empathy research) has noted how developmental history, and institutional and organizational contexts, influence the trust and stress that individuals experience, which in turn appears connected to the ability to form moral sentiments such as empathy (e.g., Zak, 2011).

Importantly, in some accounts the capacity to influence moral intuition is dependent upon the qualities of relationships in which a target of moral suasion is embedded (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). In specific social contexts, wherein parties view each other with trust or mutuality, moral intuition can be shaped by argument and reasoning, leading to reappraisals of initial judgments and possibly weakened influence for emotion and/or intuition (e.g., Haidt, 2001, 2004). Intuitionist theory thereby shows affinities to virtue theories in normative ethics, with their emphasis on shaping feelings and attitudes through social interaction (e.g., Sadler-Smith, 2012).

Individual differences and moral intuition. Haidt, McCauley, and Rozin (1994) argued that individuals vary in the strength of intuitions and their ability to override those intuitions. Feinberg et al. (2012), for example, found variation in experimental subjects' "chronic tendency" to reappraise initial intuitions. Furthermore, Young and Saxe (2011) noted how individual differences in need for cognition, reasoning about intentions, and disgust sensitivity (as just one kind of emotional difference) are related to both individually and culturally specific moral reactions. Individual differences regarding moral intuition and related phenomena can vary at fine grained levels, however. Affective reactions such as disgust, for example, are not uniformly linked to all moral responses by an individual, but rather predict

some responses better than others (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009), so some moral intuitions might be more contextually malleable than others. Research also has noted how individual differences in moral identity can heighten the linkage between moral intuitions and behavior (Winterich, Zhang, & Mittal, 2012).

The Content of Moral Intuitions

Much recent research in the moral intuition perspective has focused not on the process of moral intuition but on the specific content of moral intuitions. This research indicates that different individuals respond to situations with different (or no) moral intuitions, with those responses falling into a small set of broadly defined categories. Despite noticeable use of moral intuition content frameworks in other fields, linkages with organizational phenomena have been limited (but see Brief, 2012; Sadler-Smith, 2012; Weaver & Brown, 2012).

Theories of Moral Intuition Content

Evidence for categories of moral intuition arises from different fields, including cultural anthropology (with cross-cultural psychology), social psychology, and evolutionary and neuropsychology. As with the process of moral intuition, there is debate about the underlying bases and degree of innateness of the phenomena (see, e.g., Bolender, 2003; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2011; Prinz, 2007; Suhler & Churchland, 2011).

Anthropological research points to socially functional moral categories often ignored by other social sciences due to the embeddedness of much social science in "WEIRD" (*W*estern, *e*ducated, *i*ndustrialized, *r*ich, and *d*emocratic) morality (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010a, 2010b) and its corresponding emphasis on considerations of rights, justice, and welfare (e.g., Turiel, 1983); even moral intuition research sometimes focuses narrowly on considerations of welfare (e.g., Cushman et al., 2006; also, Brief, 2012, and Weaver and Brown, 2012, have argued that such a narrow focus also characterizes research on organizational ethics). For example, field research by Shweder and colleagues indicates that many cultures possess strong commitments to moral ideals rooted in notions of community and divinity, in addition to valorizing autonomy as is typical in the well-off and well-educated West (Shweder et al., 1987; Shweder, Jensen, & Goldstein, 1995; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Fiske and colleagues' cognitive anthropology (relational models theory) also finds models of human relationships that extend beyond concerns of autonomy, harm, and fairness (Fiske, 1991; Fiske & Haslam, 2005; Haslam, 2004; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Relational models theory holds that four core cognitive models characterize how people think about and evaluate relationships: communal sharing (emphasizing equivalent treatment of group members), equality matching (emphasizing balance in relationships), market pricing (emphasizing proportionality), and authority ranking (i.e., hierarchical ordering of relationships).

Insights developed in anthropological fieldwork, in turn, migrated to social psychological treatments of morality (e.g., Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Shweder, Haidt, Horton, & Joseph, 2008; for related earlier research, see "universal values" studies by Schwartz, 1992, and Hogan et al.'s, 1978, "socioanalytic theory of moral development"). These studies indicate that the moral experience even of many Westerners can be explained only by using analytical categories ranging beyond concerns of welfare, fairness, and autonomy. The

research growing out of this perspective, and supporting an expansive set of foundational intuitive moralities, is based on experimental (Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Winterich et al., 2012), field survey (e.g., Graham et al., 2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012) and, occasionally, qualitative (McAdams, Albaugh, Farber, Daniels, Logan, & Olson, 2008) data.

The origins of intuitive moral categories are often explained in evolutionary terms. Hauser (2006), for example, argued that instinctive moral reactions developed in parallel with environmentally induced movement toward sociality and the functional demands of living in ever larger groups (see also other evolutionary accounts of morality by Richerson & Boyd, 2004; de Waal, 1996; van Leeuwen, Park, Koenig, & Graham, 2012). And in a social world of enforced moral norms, selection pressures should lead to the development of automatic responses (i.e., intuitions) in conformity with those norms.

The evolutionary bases offered for moral intuitions undergird broad categories of intuition, which are fine-tuned in application by the specific social situation of an individual or group. All persons and cultures might have moral intuitions about avoiding personal defilement, or refraining from harm, but these general concerns might be manifested in different notions of defilement (e.g., different intuitions about appropriate foods) or harm (e.g., different intuitions about how much harm can be tolerated for the sake of other moral ends). This is in keeping with research on moral emotions and their behavioral impacts, which posits a role for developmental, institutional, and organizational influences on moral emotion development (e.g., Zak, 2011).

Moral Foundations Theory

Moral foundations theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; and many other publications) is the most recent significant social psychological theory of categories of moral intuitions that undergird the multifarious and contextualized moral judgments people make. MFT's overarching claim is that the moral intuitions of people (across multiple cultures) fall into two broad categories: *individualizing* foundations, focused on protections of and care for individuals (e.g., protection from harm, from inequity), and *binding* foundations, focused on protection, survival, and care of a social group (e.g., provision of social cohesiveness or order needed in competitions with other social groups). The inclusion of (socially functional) binding foundations demarcates MFT from much conventional social scientific research into morality (including organizational behavior research).

Foundational moral intuitions. Early on, MFT research posited and examined five categories of moral intuitions, concerning (a) care (vs. harm), (b) fairness, or justice (vs. cheating), (c) in-group loyalty (vs. betrayal), (d) authority (vs. subversion), and (e) sanctity, or purity (vs. degradation; Graham et al., 2011). More recently, some MFT theorists have added a sixth foundation—liberty (vs. oppression; Haidt, 2012; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012)—but this foundational intuition has not yet received the same degree of empirical scrutiny as have the others. Future research could add to the list.

MFT's care, fairness, and liberty foundations are individualizing foundations. The *care* (vs. harm) foundation has roots in efforts to protect kin, and MFT accounts sometimes treat

empathy as an emotional response typically associated with exercise of a procare, antiharm moral intuition. The *fairness* (vs. cheating) foundation essentially embodies reactions against cheaters and free riders who defect from cooperative endeavors. In effect, the fairness intuition embodies an adaptive response to failures of reciprocity in social situations, although different iterations of MFT vary in the details of fairness, with early accounts not distinguishing fairness qua equality from fairness qua proportionality (cf. Haidt, 2012; Iyer et al., 2012). The recently added *liberty* foundation is rooted in reactance against aggressively dominant group members in early human communities and can be manifested in alternative ways (i.e., negative liberty ["freedom from"] vs. positive liberty ["freedom to"]; Berlin, 1958).

Among MFT's "binding" foundations, *authority* represents a moral intuition that hierarchical social structure is a positive moral good (and not merely a pragmatic accommodation to life's necessities). Importantly, it is a two-directional phenomenon; lower status individuals are to show respect and deference toward higher status, authoritative individuals, but the latter in turn are expected to exercise responsibility for their subordinates. The authority foundation's origins lie in the necessities of group cohesion and order in the face of intergroup competition, and it is distinct from simpler (nonreciprocal) notions of power (Haidt & Graham, 2009). Also related, in its origins, to conditions of intergroup competition is the *in-group loyalty* foundation, with commitment to and defense of one's social group being an aid to cooperation within and competition without the group. Note that regarding the binding foundations, it might be only the group that benefits from any given individual's exercise of the moral intuition; loyalty might, for example, lead some individuals to sacrifice themselves for the good of the group. Put differently, members may view the group as having moral status independent of impacts on themselves or other persons.

Finally, the *sanctity* (purity) foundation, violations of which are closely related to emotional reactions of disgust, is explained in terms of the evolutionary value of developing automatic reactions of rejection and avoidance toward pathogens or other sources of threat (e.g., poisonous foods). Transferred to the realm of social life, this foundation takes the form of intuitive reactions against individuals, acts or situations seen as degrading, and positive intuitions toward whatever is considered pure, sacred, or ennobling.

Moral Intuition Theories: Criticism and Challenge

Monin et al. (2007) argued that much dispute about moral intuition and moral reasoning reflects the use of different experimental prototypes. Experiments on responses to complex moral dilemmas lend themselves to finding rational deliberation, whereas experiments involving shocking transgressions are more likely to find quick, nondeliberative reactions. In effect, moral responses that look puzzling in one context might look perfectly ordinary in another (cf. Tetlock, 2002). Thus Monin et al. argue that researchers should examine a wider array of moral behaviors. Other challenges also face moral intuition research, such as inconsistencies in how moral judgments and reactions are measured (Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009), and alternative interpretations of the evidence for noncognitive processes in moral judgment, for example, emotion as "amplifier" of moral judgment (Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011) or as an influence on the attentional inputs to a nonemotive process (Huebner et al., 2009).

Normative criticism. Normatively, social science theories of moral intuition appear to violate the philosophers' "is-ought" distinction, by treating empirical facts about moral intuitions as indications of moral truths in a normative, philosophical sense. If so, how could any discoverable moral intuition be critiqued or rejected (Narvaez, 2010; cf. Haidt, 2010)? Yet there is precedent in moral philosophy for *defending* theories of moral intuition (see, e.g., Audi, 2004; Hutcheson, 1769/2003; Smith, 1792/1976). Moreover, much normative theorizing depends on putative exemplars of moral judgment that can look suspiciously like appeals to the offering philosopher's intuitions (or biases; cf. Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012).

Some moral intuition theorists (e.g., Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) take a social functionalist view of morality, according to which moral practices are assessed according to their contribution to societal functioning rather than their status as moral truths. A functionalist approach also allows a broader range of social arrangements to be recognized as moral systems, even if they do not conform to the moral norms often assumed in WEIRD societies (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2009; Henrich et al., 2010a, 2010b).

Implications for Management Research and Practice

As indicated in our introduction, we suggest that moral intuition is a phenomenon that revolves around situations characterized by normative materiality, uncertainty, and social tension. As such, we believe that insights about moral intuition therefore can expand our understanding and address some long-standing questions regarding other organizational phenomena that share these same characteristics. To illustrate our point, in the following sections we focus on four organizational phenomena that are similarly characterized by normative materiality and situations involving uncertainty and social tension: ethically positive leadership, corruption, training and education, and ethics divestiture socialization (Table 1). Although our current discussion is limited to these four topics, we hope that our approach serves as a model for others interested in applying theory and findings from research on moral intuition to other similar (or perhaps not-so-similar) research topics.

Moral Intuition and Leadership

Leaders have the power to influence many phenomena in organizations (for better or worse). A pressing question for researchers is, "How can leadership be harnessed to promote ethical (and prevent unethical) behavior in organizations?" Research recently has proliferated regarding ethical leadership (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Treviño et al., 2000) and other leadership styles usually considered morally positive (Brown & Treviño, 2006), such as authentic (Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2008) and transformational (Bass, 1985; Bass & Avolio, 2000) leadership. Inasmuch as ethical and other positive styles of leadership deal with issues of right and wrong that are material to organizations and their employees, and involve ways of establishing a shared normative order in situations characterized by uncertainty and tension among different ethical perspectives, moral intuition research has the potential to generate fresh insights into ethically positive leadership research. We propose several ways that moral intuition can (a) influence leader behaviors and follower perceptions of such behavior (i.e., moral intuition as an antecedent of leadership), (b) be influenced by leadership (i.e., moral intuition as an outcome of leadership), and (c) moderate the relationships between leadership and other outcomes. We

Table 1
New Directions From Moral Intuition Research

Management Topic	Ongoing Questions	New Directions From Moral Intuition Process	New Directions From Moral Intuition Content
Ethically positive leadership • Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000 (ethical) • Bass, 1985 (transformational) • Walumbwa et al., 2008 (authentic)	• How does ethically positive leadership develop? • What contextual factors enhance or neutralize the effects of positive leadership?	• Current theories favor deliberation—Is leader reliance on moral intuition compatible with positive leadership? • Does leader reliance on intuition affect follower perceptions of the leader? • Can followers' use of intuition neutralize reliance on and impact of positive leadership?	• How are leader moral foundations related to positive leader behavior? • Does (mis)fit between leader and follower intuitions influence followers' perceptions of positive leadership styles? • Can positive leadership alter the content of follower intuitions?
Corruption • Ashforth & Anand, 2003 • Argandona, 2003 • Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008	• Why does organizational corruption occur? • How does it become normalized within organizations? • How do intraindividual factors (such as moral intuitions) contribute to its occurrence and perpetuation?	• Under what circumstances does moral intuition exacerbate or neutralize corruption? • Given the prevalence of moral intuition in everyday decision making, what is the nature and role of rationalization?	• How do moral foundations (harm, justice, loyalty, authority, purity, possibly others) affect corruption? • Can corruption influence the content of employees' intuitions? • Does corruption impact behavior outside of work through altered intuitions?
Ethics training and education • Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989 • Swanson & Frederick, 2005	• What should be taught? • How should we teach to maximize learning and transfer of training? • What constitutes effective ethics education and training?	• How can educators better engage participants' intuitive processes? • What methods are best for accessing learners' moral intuitions? • How do moral intuitions of instructors impact what is taught and learned?	• Can training and education shape moral intuition content? If so, what is the most effective approach? • Are some moral foundations over- or underemphasized in ethics education and training?
Ethics divestiture socialization • van Maanen, 1978 • Kammeyer-Mueller et al., 2012	• How can organizations prevent divestiture socialization that strips employees of positive ethical values? • Why are some employees more susceptible to ethics divestiture socialization than others?	• To what extent do organizational activities interact with intuitive processes to shape ethics divestiture socialization? • Does the balance of intuition and deliberation affect susceptibility to ethics divestiture socialization?	• To what degree does moral intuition content affect an individual's susceptibility and response to ethics divestiture socialization? • Does the moral content of organizational activities shape ethics divestiture socialization?

also consider how moral intuition might change the way we conceptualize and measure positive leadership styles.

Leadership and the moral intuition process. The moral intuition process, characterized by rapid, nondeliberative, and often emotionally laden judgment, does not align well with some assumptions underlying positive leadership theories. To some degree, ethical, transformational, and authentic leadership theories align with the traditional rational deliberation model of ethical behavior. *Ethical leaders* are described as adhering to strong ethical values and principles, as well as setting high ethical standards for others (Treviño et al., 2000). They

ask "What is the right thing to do?" before making decisions, and they consider both the means and ends when evaluating alternative courses of action (Brown et al., 2005). *Transformational leaders* consciously follow and model ethical standards (Avolio, 1999), influence others by appealing to shared moral values (Burns, 1978; Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993), and carefully consider the moral consequences of decisions (Bass & Avolio, 2000). Self-awareness and self-regulation are defining features of *authentic leaders.* Authentic leaders use balanced processing (Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005), which means they "objectively analyze all relevant data before coming to a decision . . . and solicit views that challenge their deeply held positions" (Walumbwa et al., 2008: 95). Authentic leaders also consciously have an internalized moral perspective characterized by strong internal values and standards, according to which they act consistently.

Common to these positive leadership theories are assumptions rooted in rational deliberation approaches to ethical judgment: (a) leaders have strong ethical values or principles, (b) leaders are aware of and use these ethical principles to think carefully about decisions, and (c) leaders infuse their communication, influence attempts, and modeling with ethical principles so as to promote a positive ethical climate to followers. Moral intuition differs in that it suggests that leaders' use of rational ethical decision processes may be limited. In practice, leaders might not fully know the values that guide their decisions, and as a result would have difficulty articulating those values and principles to others. Alternatively, ethical values and principles that are expressed to followers might not reflect the moral intuitions that actually guide leaders' judgments, but rather constitute post hoc accounts that attempt to defend the leader's automatically generated intuitions in organizationally or socially conventional ways.

This raises a critical question for theory and research on ethically positive leadership styles. Is rational deliberation necessary for ethical, transformational, and authentic leadership to emerge? Conceptualizations of positive leadership generally assume that deliberation is valuable both substantively, as a precursor to good judgment, as well as symbolically, as a signal to followers that the leader is committed to ethics (i.e., that the leader thinks carefully about ethics before making decisions). Thus, we would expect to find that a leader's use of moral intuition is negatively related to positive leadership styles. But could there not be situations in which moral intuition is positively related to ethical and other positive leadership styles? For example, in situations that trigger strong follower moral intuitions (e.g., an employee is caught with child pornography on his computer, triggering widely shared negative judgments by coworkers), protracted deliberation by the leader about whether and how to respond might come across as weak ethical leadership. In such situations quick and decisive action (consistent with intuitive processes) might influence followers to make more favorable attributions of ethically positive leadership to the leader. In effect, such automatic action on the leader's part could be seen as an indicator of deeply embedded moral traits or character (cf. Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006).

Ultimately, moral intuition research could necessitate a change in how we conceptualize and measure these positive leadership styles, so as to better reflect a dual process model of decision making. It also will become important to equip leaders with the knowledge they need to understand their own propensities to deliberation or intuition, the factors that influence the activation of each, and the ways leaders can balance each kind of moral judgment in appropriate fashion.

Follower and leader moral intuitions might have joint impacts on ethically positive leadership. For example, socioeconomic status affects moral reasoning and intuition (Côté, Piff, & Willer, 2013) such that compared to lower class individuals, upper class individuals make more dispassionate moral judgments, are less empathetic, and are more utilitarian in their decisions, while lower status individuals are more likely to rely on intuition and emotion. Given that status likely is correlated with position in an organizational hierarchy (i.e., executives more likely to be upper class, rank-and-file employees from middle and lower classes), it is possible that there will be differences in how senior leaders and lower level employees make ethical judgments. Followers might perceive a leader less favorably if the differences in their ethical judgment processes are sharp. We already know that executives are likely to have more favorable impressions than do followers of their organizations' ethics (Treviño, Weaver, & Brown, 2008). Future research ought to explore how differences in the use of intuition and deliberation between leaders and followers could affect how such leaders are perceived, as well as the potential consequences of those differences (e.g., could differences foster conflict?).

The moral intuition process also can be studied as an outcome of positive leadership, and not just as an influence on it. Most research on the consequences of leadership focuses on the influence of leadership styles on followers' attitudes and behaviors. Positive leadership theories assume that leaders communicate and model ethical principles, values, and standards to their employees. Followers are thought to emulate these leaders, possibly being transformed (Burns, 1978) to become leader-like themselves. If so, positive forms of leadership (with their emphases on careful deliberation and leader influence on followers) should be associated with greater use of moral deliberation by followers. But might some styles of positive leadership more strongly enhance followers' use of deliberation (vs. intuition) than do other styles? We believe that ethical leadership, with its explicit focus on setting, modeling, and enforcing normative standards to followers, would have the greatest influence on followers' reliance on deliberation compared to other positive styles of leadership. But by what mechanism do leaders influence followers' use of moral intuition or moral deliberation? Positive leadership theories emphasize a variety of general influence processes (e.g., social learning for ethical leadership; Bandura, 1977), but moral intuition research suggests that alternative mechanisms (e.g., cognitive reappraisal, emotional contagion) should be considered. Also, what is the impact of leadership on followers' use of deliberation or intuition relative to the influence of other contextual factors such as peer influence, organizational climate, or characteristics of a decision situation, or the various developmental histories that employees bring to the workplace?

The moral intuition process also can moderate the relationship between positive leadership styles and outcomes. When followers rely on moral intuition, they are less likely to carefully and deliberately evaluate ethical decisions (perhaps including less effort to seek guidance from leaders). Thus, the ability of ethical and other positive leaders to teach ethical standards to and model appropriate behavior for followers might be diminished by followers' propensity to rely on moral intuition. Followers' moral intuition may have the potential to neutralize (i.e., negatively moderate) the relationship between ethically positive forms of leadership and ethics-related outcomes. Researchers should explore the potential moderating effects of follower moral intuition relative to other potential moderating factors, such as personality traits (e.g., locus of control; see Kish-Gephart et al., 2010) or follower moral attentiveness (Reynolds, 2008).

Leadership and moral intuition content. As noted earlier, research typically has viewed organizational ethics in terms of fairness and welfare (avoiding harm to and caring for others). Not surprisingly, positive leadership theories posit concern for others and fairness as important leader characteristics. Ethical leaders make fair decisions and demonstrate concern for others (Brown et al., 2005). Transformational leaders show individualized consideration (i.e., caring) toward each employee (Bass, 1985) and are seen as fair by their employees (Pillai, Schriesheim, & Williams, 1999). Authentic leaders respect, serve, and collaborate with others (Walumbwa et al., 2008).

But a broader view of moral intuition content can provide new directions for research on positive styles of leadership. Specifically, might other moral foundations, such as loyalty, purity, and authority (Graham et al., 2011), be related to the enactment of positive leadership styles? There is nothing in the extant literature to suggest otherwise, so it is possible that multiple foundations, not just harm and fairness, contribute to positive leadership behavior, especially in light of the putative sociofunctional roots of those intuitions. For example, a leader high on the purity foundation might demonstrate stronger positive leadership behavior because he or she would take greater care to avoid personal scandal. On the other hand, an overly developed purity foundation might make the leader appear intolerant or sanctimonious, thus weakening his or her standing as a positive leader. Either way, future research should consider how a full range of leader moral intuitions, alone and in combination, contribute to positive leadership behavior.

Consideration of intuition content as an antecedent of leadership should also take into account follower intuitions. Specifically, the congruence between leader and follower moral intuitions should affect followers' perceptions of positive leadership styles. We speculate that leader and follower intuition content that is aligned will lead to stronger perceptions of positive leadership. When intuition content is misaligned, positive perceptions of leadership will be weaker. For example, a follower with a strong commitment to in-group loyalty might be more inclined to perceive a leader with weaker loyalty (e.g., perhaps one who laid off fellow group members) as being "unethical." Left open, however, is the question of how leaders might engage a workforce that is highly heterogeneous in the various combinations of moral intuitions displayed by employees. In such cases, might effective leaders, somewhat paradoxically, need to be chameleon-like, adjusting their ethics narratives to match the moral intuitions of various employees? And would this be possible without undermining the leader's ethical credibility via allegations of inconsistency or inauthenticity?

The content of moral intuition can be studied as an outcome of leadership as well as a moderator between positive leadership and other outcomes. Ethical, transformational, and (to a lesser degree) authentic leadership theories emphasize the leaders' role in shaping followers' ethics-related attitudes and behaviors. Individuals can be primed to reappraise their moral intuitions (Paxton et al., 2012), so it is possible that leaders could prime followers to do the same. Disagreements of a moral nature can lead to reconsideration of existing intuitions, and even the development of new intuitions, when those disagreements take place in the kind of quality relationships (Haidt, 2001, 2004) found between positive leaders and their followers. Research should explore the leaders' effectiveness in shaping followers' moral intuitions, as well as the boundary conditions that might enhance or neutralize such influence.

As a moderating influence, followers' intuitive understanding of what is (and is not) moral might enhance or neutralize the effect of ethical and other positive forms of leadership on

outcomes. For example, ethical leadership is positively related to employees' willingness to report problems, such as by blowing the whistle (Brown et al., 2005). However, strong in-group loyalty intuitions might weaken a follower's willingness to blow the whistle, even to an ethical leader, if the act of whistle-blowing is seen as unethical by the group. Similarly, strong authority foundations might make it more likely that employees come forward to report coworker misconduct to an ethically positive leader, especially when superiors have explicitly directed that violations must be reported. Given that moral intuitions might generate conflicting effects (e.g., loyalty might neutralize blowing the whistle on peers, while authority might enhance it), future research on the relative moderating impact of each foundation will be important.

Moral Intuition and Organizational Corruption

Corruption commonly is recognized as the abuse (or misuse) of power/authority for private, subunit, or organizational benefit (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Robertson & Watson, 2004; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005; Theobald, 1990). This definition encompasses many phenomena, from politicians favoring an organization in return for personal favors, to business people engaging in price-fixing, kickbacks, and similar behaviors. From our perspective, corruption parallels moral intuition in that the phenomenon of organizational corruption has clear normative materiality—corrupt behaviors involve powerful moral content. Furthermore, much of the difficulty of coping with these kinds of situations is the uncertainty that surrounds them (e.g., just what constitutes an instance of corruption) and the tension they cause among various parties (e.g., corrupt actors, their potential recruits and opponents, and possibly perplexed observers). For these reasons, we believe that insights from moral intuition are particularly relevant to research in this area.

Political science, criminal justice, and economic development research has explored corruption involving political figures in detail (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Schleifer & Vishny, 1998). But the study of corrupt commercial or nonprofit organizations with nonpolitical actors ("private-to-private corruption"; Argandona, 2003) is less developed (but cf. Lange, 2008; Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2007; Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008; Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008). Most organizational corruption research focuses on its initial occurrence and subsequent perpetuation. Occurrence typically is explained via the "fraud triangle" (Cressey, 1953), involving an individual's motivation to act corruptly, opportunity to do so, and rationalization of the behavior to relevant audiences (especially the self). Models explaining the occurrence of organizational corruption strongly rely on this framework (e.g., Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Pinto et al., 2008), and models of corruption's perpetuation share some of its features. Ashforth and Anand's (2003) highly cited analysis theorized that corruption persists when it is normalized in an organization. Normalization results from (a) institutionalization, by which corrupt practices become routinely enacted, often without conscious thought about propriety; (b) rationalization, by which individuals performing corrupt acts legitimate the acts in their own eyes; and (c) socialization, by which newcomers are taught to perform and accept the corrupt practices.

Organizational corruption research has considered the intraorganizational processes by which corrupt practices and subcultures of corruption develop and persist (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Pinto et al., 2008), and it also has noted how wide-ranging social conditions,

including social welfarism (Martin et al., 2007) and institutional logics (Misangyi et al., 2008), can contribute to organizational corruption. However, organizational research has yet to adequately answer the question of how intrapersonal factors contribute to corruption. We use a moral intuition perspective to explore the role of such factors in corruption.

Corruption and the moral intuition process. Intuition (moral or nonmoral) helps to bring a sense of structure or understanding to situations (Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011), and therefore moral intuition processes should be relevant to understanding corruption's rationalization and individuals' responses to the processes posited in organizational corruption models. Moral intuition research suggests that moral intuitions have roots in evolutionary processes related to basic human interactions. So if an organizationally corrupt practice is easily related to common experiences, such as stealing or lying, we might assume that moral intuitions regarding the impropriety of theft or dishonesty will, ceteris paribus, play a role in leading employees to judge the behavior immoral. Thus, moral intuition can remove or weaken one corner of the fraud triangle, thereby preventing the occurrence of organizational corruption.

However, what if the behaviors in question are more complex or are closely associated with unique conditions of modern organizational life (e.g., insider trading) for which more generally evolved moral intuitions might not be clearly salient? The individuals involved may not have relevant experiences generating moral intuitions about these situations. Thus, uncertainties arise about the nature of the behaviors and whether they have the capacity to register in the moral intuitions of the individuals considering the misconduct. Absent an initial intuition that something is wrong, the individual may not experience the mechanisms that prevent immoral action. Research on the related topic of moral emotions (Damasio, 2003, 2007) found that individuals with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex lacked the "flashes of affect" that most individuals feel when considering an unethical act, and were thus more likely to act unethically. Similarly, Diekhoff, LaBeff, Shinohara, and Yasukawa (1999) found the biggest deterrent to college students' cheating to be guilt—affective self-sanctions rooted in previous experience. Similarly, without relevant evolution- or experience-based intuitions, individuals might not experience the obstacles that limit unethical behavior and therefore be more inclined to corruption.

By the same token, moral intuition may play a critical role in organizational corruption's perpetuation. Any deliberate rationalizations for corruption might not easily override intuitions against corruption, if present. To illustrate, if an individual intuitively believes that stealing is wrong, it is unclear how rationalization would allow the individual to set aside that knowledge. Reynolds, Dang, Yam, and Leavitt (in press) provided evidence suggesting that such moral knowledge cannot be set aside, and so the conditions under which rationalization can occur are unclear. As rationalization is theorized to be a key antecedent of the occurrence and perpetuation of organizational corruption, its relation to moral intuitions needs to be better understood. If moral intuitions are as dominant in decision making as theorized, current understanding might be overestimating the role of rationalizations in everyday decision making. In turn this suggests that the rationalization corner of the fraud triangle would be better understood in terms of insufficient or poorly structured moral intuitions (Reynolds et al., in press).

Organizational corruption research also could have implications for moral intuition. For instance, Ashforth and Anand (2003) spoke of socialization as the process by which newcomers are taught to perform and sustain corrupt practices. But research should consider

whether socialization capitalizes on the fast and nondeliberative nature of moral intuition, perhaps by developing intuitions that then make corrupt behavior more automatic, versus operating in spite of, or with resistance from, moral intuition. For example, if a corrupt manager tries to enlist newcomers into a venture, does success rest upon the manager's ability to train individuals to react without deliberation according to an inappropriate set of intuitions, or does success require that individuals deliberate just enough to set aside moral intuitions that otherwise would prevent corrupt behavior? Organizational factors also might moderate changes in moral intuitions. For example, the organizational power and status of one individual could increase the likelihood of influencing another's moral intuition process (e.g., tendencies to rely on intuition vs. rationalizing deliberation). But alternatively, status and power might not matter as much in intuition change as do trust and relationship quality. If so, leader role modeling might be a relatively weak means for changing employee moral intuitions, when compared to interaction with trusted peers, such that anticorruption efforts should attend more to peer influence than to leader influence. Efforts to better understand normatively material organizational phenomena, like corruption, hinge on an integrated understanding of moral intuition processes.

Corruption and moral intuition content. Research on the content of moral intuitions also has implications for organizational corruption. Moral intuitions about authority and in-group/out-group loyalty would seem particularly relevant. Rosenblatt (2012) touched on this possibility, drawing from social dominance theory to discuss the role of hierarchies in organizational corruption. Similar efforts involving moral intuitions could help illuminate organizational corruption, by considering the additional influences that could arise when employees view deference to authority or in-group loyalty not merely as pragmatic necessities or taken-for-granted practices but as intrinsically moral obligations or moral ends. For example, would a procurement manager's in-group loyalty intuitions affect adherence to government contracting requirements, depending on whether the government is viewed as a stakeholder (and thus an in-group, deserving of support) or a nonstakeholder (and thus an out-group)? Would the manager's strength of authority moral intuitions make adherence to procurement laws more likely? Would weakness of authority intuitions make efforts to avoid the law more likely? Furthermore, research has shown that organizational and individual identities are critical factors in organizational behavior (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Brickson, 2005), and that individuals sometimes narrate their lives via themes relating to foundational moral categories (McAdams et al., 2008; McAdams, Hanek, & Dadabo, 2013). So can organizational research gain from considering whether moral intuitions, such as purity, fairness, loyalty, and so on, play a role in decisions and behavior regarding corrupt practices (and other organizational phenomena) through influences on or interaction with identity (e.g., Winterich et al., 2012)?

The implications of various intuition content categories need not simply be bivariate. Intuitive moral foundations function concurrently, and different constellations of foundations can drive complex behaviors (e.g., Weber & Federico, 2013). So, regarding corruption, high levels of in-group loyalty might, by themselves, make acquiescence to corrupt practices more likely. But combined with strong fairness or welfare (i.e., no harm) intuitions, might they lead instead to anticorruption efforts (e.g., commitments to foster fairness on the part of the group)? In addition, concurrent variations in authority intuitions could lead to change efforts

through "normal channels" (if authority intuitions are strong) or by unconventional means (if authority intuitions are weak).

Research generally treats intuitions as having a long developmental history, both socioculturally and individually. But it does not deny that moral intuitions can be changed over time, and by particular kinds of experiences. Less clear is how a work context might influence the content of moral intuitions. Can it encourage entirely new intuitions, or induce minor changes in existing intuitions? For example, does price-fixing require entirely new intuitions about this business-specific behavior, or do organizational influences encourage employees to view price-fixing through the lens of existing intuitions (e.g., group loyalty or justice)? Furthermore, if newly formed intuitions (e.g., about organizational corruption) are venue-specific, this may explain why individuals with impeccable personal lives can participate in deplorable acts at work—they rely on different intuitions for each area of life (cf. Clair, Beatty, & Maclean, 2005). But if work contexts alter the foundations of employees' intuitions more broadly, this could affect moral behavior outside the workplace. For example, if institutionalization, normalization, and justification of cheating of clients occur at work, perhaps this would change an employee's moral intuitions generally so that the employee would be more likely to cheat on personal taxes.

Moral Intuition in Business Ethics Training and Education

Business ethics training and education is a topic that has received a great deal of academic and practitioner attention. With the issuance of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 (Gabel, Mansfield, & Houghton, 2009; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012), subsequent regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley, and a general increased awareness of the impact of unethical business behavior, ethics and compliance training has become a multibillion dollar industry (Weber & Wasieleski, 2013). Furthermore, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, the principal business school accrediting agency, mandates that business schools incorporate ethics in their curricula, and many business schools view themselves as developers of ethical managers (e.g., Gioia, 2002; Rasche, Gilbert, & Schedel, 2013; Swanson & Frederick, 2005). In short, many consider ethics training to be a critical piece of an ethical society, and thus the ethics training industry extends from corporations to academic institutions and beyond (Weber & Wasieleski, 2013). Yet many debate about how best to train and educate for business ethics (see, e.g., Dufresne & Offstein, 2012; McCabe, Butterfield, & Treviño, 2006; Rasche et al., 2013; Swanson & Fisher, 2012; Weber & Wasieleski, 2013), and many have raised larger questions about the overall impact of these efforts (e.g., Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004; Rasche et al., 2013; Swanson & Fisher, 2012; Weber & Wasieleski, 2013). Furthermore, there is a great deal of ambiguity about the processes and content of effective ethics training, and as a result many debate and disagree about a wide range of issues in this domain. As moral intuition can address situations that involve characteristics of uncertainty, tension, and normative materiality, we believe that research on moral intuition can significantly inform unanswered questions and ongoing discussions about business ethics training and education.

Moral intuition in training—process. Many current approaches to ethics training and education are rooted in theories of cognitive moral development, and research has demonstrated that these approaches can influence participants' moral reasoning (Rest & Thoma,

1986). These approaches have focused on conveying content (principles, standards, policies, etc.) and developing ethical decision making awareness and skills (often by having participants "think through" ethical challenges; Treviño, 1986: 607). Weber and Wasieleski's (2013) recent survey of corporate ethics and compliance officers found enhanced awareness of ethics and ethics standards, and improved ethical decision making, to be the most frequently cited goals of corporate ethics initiatives. And with a few exceptions, business ethics texts focus heavily on pro-and-con arguments, possibly with attention to behavioral factors that influence ethical decisions. Corporate and business school ethics training generally takes a rational deliberation approach to morality, even sometimes explicitly adopting Kohlberg-style cognitive moral development methods aimed at cognitive movement toward autonomous moral thinking according to principles of rights and justice (e.g., Treviño & McCabe, 1994; Weber, 2007).

Although conventional ethics training might achieve its intended goals with regard to conscious moral reasoning, the research we reviewed above indicates that much moral behavior is intuition-based, and the extent to which conventional training and education approaches account for or influence moral intuition processes and content is not clear. For example, the most common vehicle for ethics training, in both the private and public sectors, appears to be computer-based learning; employees regularly read online texts and scenarios, view lectures and vignettes, answer questions, and receive automated feedback about their progress in business ethics (Weber & Wasieleski, 2013). But moral intuition often involves a strong emotional component. Can computer exercises engage intuition by creating truly emotional experiences for participants? Can they trigger processes that make cognitive reappraisal of intuitions more likely?

Similarly, moral intuitions are theorized to be multidimensional, involving many different types of information beyond just sights and sounds (Reynolds, 2006). The limited dimensionality of computer-based training likely is a substantial constraint on this format. Moreover, reappraisal and change of moral intuition often involve interaction within trusting relationships (in this case, trainer and trainee), which impersonal technology might be hard-pressed to simulate. Computer-based training might be incredibly efficient and serves purposes of external legitimation, but whether it engages moral intuition is open to question.

Concerns about the impact of current educational practices on business students' moral decision making also are prevalent. Business ethics education, particularly in MBA programs, often relies on the case method (following much moral education practice; cf. Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006; Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989). Face-to-face discussions, as are required for case discussions, may be more likely to resonate with participants and more effectively teach business ethics principles than other methods (e.g., lectures, textbook readings). But do these short-duration experiences engage and impact the intuitive (and related emotional) processes that shape everyday moral judgments (in contrast to the impact of the long-duration interpersonal interaction described in Dufresne and Offstein's, 2012, character education study)? Although the goal of case analysis and other teaching methods may be to encourage careful deliberation about business ethics, some research indicates that task-relevant emotional stimulation can help to foster cognitive control (Kanske, 2012). If so, ethics training that better engages emotion and intuition might, somewhat paradoxically, yield a greater degree of careful appraisal of moral judgments.

At a deeper, developmental level, an intuitionist understanding of moral judgments and their origins looks more akin to long-term habit development than to immediate learning of information. In this, the "training" of moral intuitions is closer to considerations of character education than to analytical exercises of reason (cf. Lapsley & Narvaez's, 2006, review of character education research). Dufresne and Offstein's (2012: 571) study of effective character education and its implications for business education defines character as "the patterned structure of an individual's reasons and motives for moral decisions . . . developed socially and over time," and they contrast this "patterned structure" approach with Kohlberg/Rest moral reasoning approaches. Like moral intuition development, their character education approach stresses the role of a long time frame and social interaction in moral judgment (intuition) change.

Education and training might also focus on teaching about the process of moral intuition as well as the factors that influence it, so that students can learn to recognize when intuition or deliberation are likely and/or appropriate in a given context. If moral judgments typically are intuitive, and largely automatic, perhaps one key element of ethics training is developing an ability to exert some degree of cognitive control over intuition, so that trained individuals are better prepared to manage their immediate intuitive reactions to situations. Research on cognitive control has shown multiple strategies for achieving such, via reappraisal, perspective taking, distraction, thought suppression, and other means (see Patterson, Rothstein, & Barbey, 2012, for a brief review), and employees or students could be taught some of these methods and given opportunities to practice them. Individuals also could be taught to understand how their moral intuitions are influenced by particular social contexts, and thus understand what kinds of situations to avoid, what kinds to seek out, and what kind of emotional regulation tactics might be required in some situations (e.g., some meditation exercises influence the relation of emotional and cognitive processes; Froeliger, Garland, Modlin, & McClernon, 2012). In short, intuition research suggests that effective ethics education might focus as much on teaching people to understand how moral judgment works, as on what moral judgments to make.

Moral intuition research could make substantial impact on business ethics education by considering the moral intuition processes of instructors. Although some kinds of professional education are highly institutionalized and structured (e.g., medicine, law), business ethics training is more diverse. Relatively little empirical research has considered best practices in this area (Dufresne & Offstein, 2012; McCabe et al., 2006). As a result, many ethics instructors structure their content and methods based on personal experiences and participant feedback. Thus, some ethics training may heavily reflect instructors' own moral intuitions and decision-making tendencies (e.g., personal preference for automatic or deliberate reasoning about ethical issues). Although the classroom environment might typically trigger deliberative approaches, it also might be a context for the expression of an instructor's moral intuitions. This possibility points to largely unexplored questions about the relative effectiveness of courses built upon the instructor's intuitive processes and emotional engagement.

Moral intuition in training—content. Can business ethics training and education influence the specific array of foundational moral intuitions individuals display, for example by affecting the extent to which an individual intuitively values loyalty compared to justice? The content of business ethics training and education has been a matter of ongoing debate. For

example, some argue for a care-oriented decision approach (Giacalone & Promislo, 2013), others for developing character (Dufresne & Offstein, 2012), to take just two alternatives. Incorporating the further range of moral content addressed in moral intuition research further complicates the choices. Business ethics training and education has not typically treated concepts like authority and loyalty as moral ideals or ends in themselves (vs. pragmatic matters), and considerations of purity are highly uncommon. But some business practices and issues could be framed in those terms (as the military treats authority and loyalty, or as environmental issues might be framed as matters of purity; Haidt, 2012). So are some foundational intuitions, and efforts to link business practice to them, more conducive than others for ethically successful and productive employees, or is success a matter of context, such that some foundational categories are better suited for some industries, markets, or organizational contexts?

Organizational change in accord with some foundational intuitions may be important in order to achieve adherence to other foundational intuitions. On the distinct but related issue of academic integrity, for example, McCabe et al. (2006) noted that it can be difficult to maintain academic integrity (perhaps a fairness or harm/welfare consideration) in MBA programs because the short-term and often part-time nature of MBA study works against efforts to create an ethical culture among MBA students. But higher levels of authority (obey the rules) or in-group loyalty (support what my school supports) might render some individuals more likely to abide by academic integrity policies (i.e., fairness and/or harm policies). And if enough people with those specific moral intuitions were present, would average student behavioral norms reach a critical mass needed for development of a self-monitoring culture of integrity? Although discussions about the content of business ethics training are frequent, we suggest that research in moral intuition offers these discussions entirely new constructs and questions to consider.

Moral Intuitions and Ethics Divestiture Socialization

As noted in our discussion of corruption, existing research has addressed how employees are socialized into cultures of unethical behavior in organizations (e.g., Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Other research—and much organizational practice—focuses on efforts to keep any employee inclinations toward unethical behavior in check, in part by means that encourage employees to internalize presumably ethical organizational values. In both cases, employee values are assumed potentially to differ from organizational values, in the sense of being either better (and then corrupted through organizational processes) or worse (and then improved through organizational processes). Although in some cases alteration in an employee's values might be minor (e.g., small ethical improvements by a well-meaning employee), in other cases the difference between employee and organizational values might be so great, and socialization pressures so strong, that the employee's values are rejected and replaced (intentionally or unintentionally). This process is one of divestiture socialization (Ashforth & Saks, 1996; van Maanen, 1978; van Maanen & Schein, 1979), and it functions as a way of aligning employee and organizational values. The divestiture socialization process is multifaceted, and can be harsh, involving practices such as harassment and humiliation. If it is successful, organizational values displace and then substitute for an employee's values (as opposed to investiture socialization (Cable & Parsons, 2001), through which employees are encouraged to rely on, rather than deny, their own values in the workplace). We believe research on moral intuition,

as a phenomenon with strong moral overtones, and characterized by situations involving conflict among individuals and uncertainty as to courses of action, could significantly enhance the study of divestiture socialization and individuals' responses to it.

As an example, consider the process by which employees' positive ethical values (e.g., honesty) are divested from them. Kammeyer-Mueller et al. (2012) proposed and empirically found that divestiture socialization that attempts to replace employees' positive ethical values with less ethical organizational values leads to the subjective experience of ethical conflict (i.e., of organizational expectations being in conflict with one's ethical beliefs) and emotional exhaustion (e.g., Wright & Cropanzano, 1998) for employees, and indirectly through each of those to reductions in career fulfillment. Unclear in this is the role employees' ethical commitments themselves. Kammeyer-Mueller et al. hypothesized, but did not find, that the strength of employees' ethical beliefs would play an explanatory role vis-à-vis the outcomes of ethics divestiture efforts. We argue that research on moral intuition can help to provide a fuller understanding of why and how employees' ethical commitments function vis-à-vis ethics divestiture, and also raise new questions for other established organizational practices.

Divestiture and the moral intuition process. We think there are several paths by which moral intuition could affect ethics divestiture socialization. To start, the degree to which an individual's moral judgments are intuitive could influence the extent of ethical conflict experienced in ethics divestiture situations. Individuals often are inarticulate with respect to providing reasoned defenses of their intuitive moral judgments (i.e., moral dumbfounding; Haidt, 2001). Such individuals are not well prepared to defend, reframe, or justify their moral intuitions in efforts to counter ethics divestiture socialization attempts. This inability, we suggest, could lead to a sense that one's own moral resources are weak, and via conservation of resources and cognitive dissonance this should result in higher experienced stress and conflict (Kammeyer-Mueller et al., 2012). Someone who has formed moral judgments through processes of reasoned deliberation, however, already has developed defensive positions and argumentative skills for use in responding to criticism, and has reasons available for dismissing the moral claims of divestors as constituting grounds for doubting his or her own moral judgments.

On the other hand, intuitive moral judgments might be more resistant than deliberative ones to divestiture socialization efforts because of the important role of relationship quality in moral intuition change. Insofar as divestiture socialization involves harassing, intimidating, hostile, or other interpersonally negative behavior, we are not likely to find the kind of trusting relationships that undergird an individual's willingness to reconsider moral stances in the face of moral difference. The individual whose ethics are largely intuitive may be less likely to take the divestiture efforts as reasons to reconsider his or her own ethical judgments (although the divestiture efforts still might be effective on affective, rather than rational "showed me how I was wrong" grounds). In short, research should consider how an individual's balance of deliberative versus intuitive moral judgment makes that individual more or less susceptible to different kinds of divestiture strategies (such as reasoned criticism vs. ad hominem attack).

Divestiture and moral intuition content. The content of moral intuitions displayed by an individual also could influence that individual's susceptibility to and response to ethics divestiture socialization efforts. For example, consider the loyalty foundation. Would

individuals with in-group loyalty intuitions be more likely to succumb to ethics divestiture socialization? We speculate that strong loyalty will make it easier for employees to embrace divestiture efforts even if they feel some initial reluctance (e.g., "taking one for the team"). Such employees will also be less likely to view would-be in-group divestors negatively, and in fact may be less tolerant of individuals who resist divestiture efforts. Alternatively, a focal employee's foundational moral intuitions could undergird behavior that either reduces contact with divestment efforts or dismisses the relevance and status of those efforts (and their perpetrators). Purity intuitions, for example, might lead an employee to be more sensitive to the kinds of people and behaviors he or she associates with. This sensitivity could lead to possibly successful efforts to minimize contact with particular corrupt actors who otherwise would be agents of divestiture (e.g., avoiding casual conversations, keeping one's office door closed, finding good reasons to skip meetings, etc.). Note that the foregoing impacts reflect variations in the *kind* of foundational moral intuition rather than variation in the *strength* (Kammeyer-Mueller et al., 2012) of any given intuition. Attention to the content of moral intuition can lead us to look for divestiture socialization and its psychological impacts in places where research has not been looking.

Conventional research on organizational ethics and corruption focuses on typical situations of bad business or professional behavior (e.g., dishonesty, misuse of information, etc.). But if the scope of individuals' moral intuitions is broad—perhaps encompassing all moral foundations—individuals might experience the negative outcomes of divestiture socialization even when working in organizations or organizational subunits that pass muster with regard to the narrower set of concerns typical of organizational ethics. For example, efforts to socialize employees into a regime of strictly impartial fairness could be experienced as ethics divestiture efforts by individuals for whom in-group loyalty, and attendant preferences toward some referent group (long-time customers, family member coworkers, etc.), is an embedded moral intuition (even alongside other foundational categories). And even if the organization's moral framework does not require active divestment of an employee's ethics, failure to invest (i.e., show respect for and encourage an employee's own ethical values) might be experienced by employees somewhat similarly to divestiture socialization.

Moreover, something like the experience of ethics divestiture also could arise specifically for organizational ethics training, of the sort discussed previously, insofar as training fails to recognize, or even implicitly or explicitly rebukes, a focal employee's moral intuitions or overall tendencies to form judgments via moral intuition. Organizational ethics training, in such cases, might be experienced by an employee as improperly treating foundational ethical difference as ethical deviance, prompting divestiture-like negative outcomes. If employees respond to those outcomes—stress, ethical conflict, and emotional exhaustion—by reducing their sense of agency or self-control regarding ethics (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011), ethics training might have impacts opposite to its intended behavioral outcome. Thus it may be important for organizational ethics training to treat ethical concerns in ways that connect with diverse kinds of moral intuitions and with the intuitive moral judgment process generally. To avoid being experienced, to some degree, as divestiture socialization, ethics training and related organizational practices also might best incorporate employee-driven design elements that enable some degree of expression of and respect for employees' moral intuition (i.e., investiture socialization). This task might be particularly important for global businesses, due to cross-cultural variations in foundational moral categories (e.g., Shweder et al., 1997).

Conclusion

Treviño, Weaver, and Reynolds's 2006 review of behavioral ethics research concluded by noting that conventional research on ethics in organizations was based on an assumption that ethical judgment and behavior reflect a process of deliberation, but that this assumption appeared to be open to challenge from new research. The moral intuition research we have reviewed shows that this challenge indeed has been real, and has potentially important implications for organizational research. We hope that this review provides organizational researchers with the basic insights needed to pursue the implications of moral intuition research for understanding organizations, and useful introductory examples of that pursuit. No doubt adaptations will need to be made, and new insights developed. For example, moral intuition research sometimes has relied on unconventional research methods that organizational scholars might consider (e.g., hypnosis; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), and conventional methods often used in organizational ethics research might be fundamentally inappropriate for studying moral intuition (e.g., vignette studies might always tend to trigger deliberation, and thus be less than ideal for studying moral intuition). But overall we think that organizational research will profit from incorporating this new perspective on ethics, and we encourage researchers to use it.

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