Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research during the Cold War. By Joy Rohde. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013. Pp. x+213. $29.95.

Mike Savage
London School of Economics

Over recent years, the comfortable liberal view that sociology has a naturally close association with projects of social welfare and amelioration has been increasingly challenged by those who have emphasized its close association with projects of governance in general and the military warfare state in particular. In the American context, this point hardly needs underscoring given the iconic role of Paul Lazarsfeld's wartime audience research and Samuel Stouffer's American soldier studies in pioneering modern survey methods during the 1940s, but this story has not been comprehensively traced into the postwar years.

Joy Rohde tells a well-crafted story based on extensive documentary research about the intimate embrace between the military establishment and key aspects of the postwar social sciences. Starting immediately after the end of the Second World War, *Armed with Expertise* explores the development of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) in 1956 and then the remarkable development of Project Camelot, elaborated in the early 1960s, which drew in leading social scientists to develop an ambitious project examining the origins and causes of insurgency using a "state-of-the-art" behavioral model. In 1965, Pentagon funding for social research reached over $20 million compared to only $125,000 from the State Department. The middle chapters of her book trace the disruption of this program during the 1960s, initially as researchers exposed the duplicity of Project Camelot consultant Hugo Nutini, who lied in claiming it was funded by the National Science Foundation. In the aftermath of the resulting minor scandal, leading social scientists increasingly wanted to distance themselves from the project. Despite the renaming of SORN as the Center for Research on Social Systems in 1965, public criticism mounted, especially in the context of the anti–Vietnam War movement, and Rohde traces how this led to the large-scale expulsion of military social science from the university sector. However, her later chapters then explore the development of a surrogate social science military infrastructure, increasingly outsourced to think tanks and private consultancies, that has seen the resurgence of military-related social science—strikingly discussed with respect to the RAND Corporation's *Social Science for Counterterrorism* project published in 2009. This RAND model—like Project Camelot before it—is no simple apologia for the status quo and indeed has an explicit place for class struggle and wealth inequality in its "factor tree."

Around this narrative Rohde makes a number of telling observations that should lead sociologists to recognize the discipline's historical complicity in the American military project. In the early 1960s, Pentagon-funded research involved highly respected academic sociologists such as William

Kornhauser, James Coleman, and Charles Tilly. Furthermore, rather than the key agents involved in the militarization of social research being either rabid conservatives or academic mercenaries, she emphasizes that many of them had high ideals about the value of applied research and were vitally committed to democratic principles, often working within a pragmatist tradition. The most striking figure here is Robert Boguslaw, who played a central role in elaborating Project Camelot yet was an idealist who believed passionately in the expert as "scientific crusader for participatory democracy" (p. 39) and after moving to Washington University in St. Louis increasingly indulged his interest in existentialist philosophy. Rohde thus demonstrates the general enthusiasm which many American social scientists had for contributing to a militarized American political mission in a way that would be unimaginable in most nations and indeed that proved untenable in the aftermath of the Vietnam War protests.

Rohde's fascinating account rarely strays from an institutional history. It would have been interesting for her to have extended her interests into the intellectual cross-fertilization between the military and the social sciences, for instance through tracing the scientific debate about the causes of revolution and insurgency, which were a key point of contact in the 1960s, or in the debate about quantification and humanist approaches to social research (as figured notably in the writings of C. Wright Mills, who gets surprisingly little coverage here). It would have been useful to have explored how cultural anthropology's interests in "national character," which proved so significant in the 1940s, were reworked and adapted in later decades, for instance as part of the country-specific handbooks that were prepared as part of psychological warfare strategies in the 1970s (p. 127). Immanuel Wallerstein's related discussions of the development of area studies in the postwar American social sciences are certainly relevant to the analysis here, as are George Steinmetz's reflections on the significance of positivist methods, but readers will need to draw these links for themselves. However, there is no doubt that Joy Rohde has performed sterling service in this thorough and detailed book that will be a valuable building block for further critical reflections on the role of the social sciences in projects of governance.

The Allure of Order: High Hopes, Dashed Expectations, and the Troubled Quest to Remake American Schooling. By Jal Mehta. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. vii+396. $29.95.

Ethan Schrum
University of Virginia

In *The Allure of Order*, Jal Mehta has written a big, wide-ranging book that offers many things to many audiences. Scholars of history, political science, and sociology will find material of interest, which is appropriate since the book is published in the Oxford University Press Studies in