

In addition to avoiding explicit normative statements and policy recommendations, Schröder avoids strong statements about “deep” explanations for the origins of the trajectories the countries took. He even explicitly states that such depth is beyond the scope of the book. While hedging in this way might, again, help the author deflect criticism, it does so by lowering the level of ambition beyond what appears necessary. Much of the discussion about diversity and the features of individual countries (in chap. 5) does leave the reader with the impression that Schröder is in fact looking for, and perhaps believes he has found, the root causes of the capitalist diversity given by the new typology. Religion is certainly described in such a way; readers will likely leave the book with the impression that the author considers it a deep explanation despite claiming otherwise. The main problem with the book is therefore not what it actually does but the discrepancy between what it does and what it claims to do (or what it could have done).

The book suffers from some minor stylistic problems and occasional carelessness in editing. Core arguments, for instance about the complementarities between production (economics) and distribution (politics), or about the link from religious histories to country trajectories, are unnecessarily repeated in the introductions and conclusions to each chapter, leaving the book longer and more difficult to read than it needs to be. This fact, and the tendency of the author to understate his assertions, does not, however, detract from the fact that Schröder has succeeded both in providing an excellent overview of the most important existing work on capitalist diversity and in combining this work into a unified typology that is more than the sum of its components. I recommend that anyone who is interested in how advanced capitalist democracies developed, or where they might be heading, read this book.

Constructing Capitalisms: Transforming Business Systems in Central and Eastern Europe. By Roderick Martin. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xviii+342. \$110.00.

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The transformation of the state-socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe (henceforth CEE) into democratic-capitalist ones represented both a major opportunity for comparative social scientists, especially those concerned with the role of institutions in structuring economic activities and outcomes, and a considerable challenge to current theories and frameworks. On the one hand, it provided a large-scale natural laboratory for the comparative analysis of how radical institutional change could affect the nature of market structures and behavior in a number of different political economies. On the other hand, it highlighted the difficulties of systematically studying the interconnections between rapid discontinuities in both domi-

nant institutions and economic organization as they were occurring. Available descriptive vocabularies and analytical frameworks proved to be of limited use in characterizing what was happening, how significant it was and how likely it would continue, in each country—not least because of the state-socialist heritage of obscurity and lack of trust—and in how it should be understood in more coherent and formally structured ways than daily journalism, conspiracy theories, and personal reflections.

In this ambitious book, Roderick Martin follows a comparative institutionalist approach in describing how the major institutions governing capitalist economies were constructed and key features of their business systems changed. He discusses four CEE countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania, in the roughly 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. *Constructing Capitalisms* focuses on four major features, or axes, of structural change, in these political economies: property ownership, means of capital allocation and accumulation, conditions governing access to and mode of involvement in local, national, and international markets and production systems, and the differentiation of economic activities from the state.

Changes in these, he suggests, were institutionalized—to varying degrees and in varying ways—through the construction of three kinds of conventions: regulative, normative, and cognitive. While many of the regulatory institutions governing ownership, legal rights and duties of economic actors, contracts, and other aspects of business behavior common in market economies were established quite early in the 1990s in many CEE countries, their normative and cognitive counterparts continued to reflect many characteristics of their state-socialist pasts. In particular, the pervasive distrust of many formal institutions governing business activities and cynicism about the trustworthiness of potential collaborators inherited from that period have reinforced particularistic connections with suppliers, customers, and other business partners, as well as with state officials. This tendency has increased transaction costs, hindered collective action, and encouraged accusations of corruption.

Such contradictions between different institutional norms and everyday practices in different parts of these political economies have led, according to Martin, to four distinct kinds of “business systems” becoming established: state dominated (though not necessarily through ownership), privatized, de novo, and international. Each of these has different kinds of ownership, financing, market orientations, and business-state relationships. While the relative size and economic importance of these four segments has changed since the early 1990s and also varies between these four countries, they remain sufficiently differentiated and important to constitute separate modes of economic organization that are not, and are probably unlikely to become, integrated into a single dominant business system for each society, especially not one organized along liberal market-economy lines.

In itself, this fact should not be unduly surprising given the delegitimization of the state and its leading personnel, the lack of strong intermediary organizations capable of mobilizing support across the economy, and the

significant influence of foreign firms, finance, and markets, as well as the IMF and the E.U., on economic development since 1989. The relatively rapid establishment of democratic institutions and processes in three of these four countries did not create a cohesive alliance of politicians and bureaucrats that could develop and implement a coherent economic development policy in a comparable manner to those celebrated in parts of East Asia. Indeed, one could argue that successful democratization in the aftermath of state socialism and international dominance of neoliberal ideologies ensured that such a developmentalist coalition could not become established, let alone be enabled to pursue state-steered forms of economic growth.

The relative weakness, and sometimes contradictory nature, of national institutions and agencies that could help to integrate particular kinds of economic actors with distinct priorities and strategies across regions and sectors within these political economies suggests that it is unlikely they will generate nationally distinctive forms of economic organization in the near-to-medium term and emphasizes the empirically contingent nature of national business systems. It would be reasonable, then, to expect a comparative analysis of different systems of economic coordination and control in these CEE countries to explore the causes and consequences of such differences in various regions and sectors, as has occurred in several recent analyses of variety in forms of corporate governance, interfirm relationships, and work organization and control in Asian and European countries.

However, despite acknowledging the influence of different national institutions and legacies on patterns of economic organization in these four CEE countries, Martin does not pursue such connections systematically in this book. Indeed, he does not directly compare the main variations in the four features of structural change he identifies within and across them. This omission may partly result from the difficulty of describing and accounting for both radical institutional change and restructuring of enterprises and business activities more or less at the same time. It is also, though, due to a lack of clarity about what is meant by "business system" and how its key characteristics are related to different forms of capitalism, exemplified by the frequent conflation of these two terms to refer to the emerging economies of these countries. I also found the reasons he selects these particular four axes of structural change as central features of business systems unclear, or how they might constitute different kinds of economic structures in different environments. While, then, the book presents much interesting and useful information about the political and economic transformation of these four CEE countries, it does not explain how and why distinctive patterns of economic organization have become established and changed in particular institutional circumstances.