

Cybersecurity Fundamentals

Lecture 6

Symmetric Cryptography

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Cryptography as a scientific field

The field of Computer Science that formally studies the problem of secure interaction among parties in the presence of a malicious entity (adversary), even in settings where the parties are not mutually trusted.



The role of Cryptography in Cybersecurity

- Cryptographic primitives can serve as fundamental **defence** mechanisms **with respect to all key Cybersecurity objectives**.
 - Confidentiality (e.g., encryption).
 - Integrity (e.g., message authentication codes, digital signatures, hash functions).
 - Availability (e.g., threshold cryptography).
- Cryptography can **contribute to both the prevention and the detection** of attacks on a protected system.
- **Security argumentation** in modern Cryptography **is provable**, i.e., based on formal definitions and well-defined models.

Cryptography in real world applications


- Secure web browsing
- User and message authentication
- Electronic banking
- Mail encryption
- Disk encryption
- Secure messaging
- Cryptocurrencies
- Data privacy
- File checksums
- \vdots

Symmetric Cryptography



- The parties interact securely via the **same cryptographic key**.
- The **key must be securely shared** before interaction.
- Symmetric-key algorithms are **fast**.

Asymmetric Cryptography



- Secure interaction is via a **public key** and a corresponding **private key**.
- The **private key never needs to be shared**.
- Asymmetric-key algorithms are (currently) **significantly slower**.

In this lecture



- Definition of symmetric encryption.
- Ciphers – Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
 - Modes of operation.
- Message authentication codes.
 - Authenticated encryption.

Symmetric encryption



- Alice and Bob share a secret key k .
- Bob wants to send a message M through an insecure channel.

Symmetric encryption



k

$Enc_k(M)$



k

Symmetric encryption

$Dec_k(Enc_k(M))$



M



k



k

Definition of symmetric encryption: Syntax and Correctness

- A symmetric encryption scheme is a triple of algorithms as follows:
 - A **key-generation algorithm** Gen that outputs a key k .
 - An **encryption algorithm** Enc that takes as input a key k and a message (plaintext) M and outputs a ciphertext C . We write $C \leftarrow Enc_k(M)$.
 - A **decryption algorithm** Dec that takes as input a key k and a ciphertext C and outputs a message M . We write $M \leftarrow Dec_k(C)$.


- **Correctness:** for every key k and every message M , it holds that

$$M \leftarrow Dec_k(Enc_k(M))$$

Definition of symmetric encryption: Security (Indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack)

A symmetric encryption scheme achieves indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA security), if it leaks no information about Bob's message M against any adversary that

- (1) observes the communication channel and
- (2) can obtain encryptions for messages of its choice (i.e., it has access to oracle $Enc_k(\cdot)$ but does not know k).



Ciphers

- Ciphers are concrete algorithms for performing encryption or decryption.
- Types of modern ciphers:
 - **Block ciphers:** process the input message in fixed-size blocks and produce a block of ciphertext for each message block.
 - Examples: Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Serpent
 - Advantages: generally, they offer a higher level of security (keys can be reused)
 - Applications: blocks of data (e.g., file transfer, e-mail)
 - **Stream ciphers:** process input messages of variable length by performing encryption bit-by-bit (or byte-by-byte), typically via XOR with a pseudorandomly generated keystream.
 - Examples: RC4, Salsa20, Grain128a
 - Advantages: better performance
 - Applications: streams of data (e.g., a secure wireless connection)

Design principles of a secure cipher

[Claude Shannon, 1945]

- **Confusion:** the relationship between the encryption key and the ciphertext should be as complex as possible. In particular, each ciphertext bit should depend on several parts of the key.
- **Diffusion:** each plaintext bit should affect as many ciphertext bits as possible. In particular,
 - if we change a bit of the plaintext, then several ciphertext bits should change and
 - if we change a bit of the ciphertext, then several plaintext bits should change.

Preliminaries: the Exclusive OR (XOR) operator

- The XOR operator for single bits is defined as follows:

A	B	$A \oplus B$
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	0

- Bitwise XOR for strings naturally extends the operator for single bits. E.g.,

$$\begin{array}{r} 11010010 \\ 01011001 \oplus \\ \hline 10001011 \end{array}$$

- Property of bitwise XOR: $(M \oplus k) \oplus k = M \oplus (k \oplus k) = M \oplus 0 = M$

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- Originally proposed as **Rijndael**, developed by Belgian cryptographers Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen.
- **Standardised as AES** in 2001 by US NIST after a 4 year competition among 15 candidates.
 - Available in standard crypto libraries.
 - Integrated in many modern processors.
- Block cipher **specifications**:
 - **Key length**: 128, 192, or 256 bits
 - **Block length**: 128 bits
 - **Number of rounds**: 10, 12, and 14 rounds for 128-bit keys, 192-bit keys, and 256-bit keys, respectively.

Overview of AES-128 (encryption)

- The 128-bit input **message is arranged into** 16 bytes $b_0 \cdots b_{15}$ according to the following **4×4 matrix**:

b_0	b_4	b_8	b_{12}
b_1	b_5	b_9	b_{13}
b_2	b_6	b_{10}	b_{14}
b_3	b_7	b_{11}	b_{15}

- The above **matrix initialises the state of the cipher**, $STATE$, which is a 4×4 matrix modified at each step of the encryption process.

Overview of AES-128 (encryption)

- The 128-bit/16-byte key $k_0 \cdots k_{15}$ is arranged into 4 words K_0, K_1, K_2, K_3 , where each word is a 4-byte column as follows:

$$K_0 = \begin{bmatrix} k_0 \\ k_1 \\ k_2 \\ k_3 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$K_1 = \begin{bmatrix} k_4 \\ k_5 \\ k_6 \\ k_7 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$K_2 = \begin{bmatrix} k_8 \\ k_9 \\ k_{10} \\ k_{11} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$K_3 = \begin{bmatrix} k_{12} \\ k_{13} \\ k_{14} \\ k_{15} \end{bmatrix}$$

- K_0, K_1, K_2, K_3 are provided as input to a **KeyExpansion** function that outputs 44 words W_0, W_1, \dots, W_{43} .
- The **KeyExpansion** function produces separate keys, where each key will be used in a single round.
- W_0, W_1, \dots, W_{43} are arranged as 11 round keys $[W_0 \ W_1 \ W_2 \ W_3], [W_4 \ W_5 \ W_6 \ W_7], \dots, [W_{40} \ W_{41} \ W_{42} \ W_{43}]$, where each round key is a 4×4 matrix.


Overview of AES-128 (encryption)

- **Initial step (round 0):**

1. the $\text{AddRoundKey}(A, B)$ function outputs the bitwise XOR of A and B .
 - The state (currently, the input message) is XORed with the first round key.
 - $STATE \leftarrow \text{AddRoundKey}(STATE, [W_0 \ W_1 \ W_2 \ W_3])$.
 - The function adds confusion by mixing the key with the state.

Overview of AES-128 (encryption)

- **Intermediary rounds 1,...,9:**

1. the **SubBytes** function performs a **byte-by-byte substitution** of the state **via a look up table (the S-box)**.
 - E.g., byte 00_{16} is substituted by 63_{16} , 01_{16} is substituted by $7c_{16}$, 02_{16} is substituted by 77_{16} , ...
 - $STATE \leftarrow \text{SubBytes}(STATE)$.
 - Non-linear (adds confusion). E.g., $\text{SubBytes}(A \oplus B) \neq \text{SubBytes}(A) \oplus \text{SubBytes}(B)$
2. the **ShiftRows** function permutes the entries in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th row of the state by **performing a cyclical left shift** of 1, 2, and 3 positions, respectively.
 - E.g., 2nd row: $s_{1,1} \ s_{1,2} \ s_{1,3} \ s_{1,0} \leftarrow s_{1,0} \ s_{1,1} \ s_{1,2} \ s_{1,3}$ 
 - $STATE \leftarrow \text{ShiftRows}(STATE)$.
 - Now the columns of the state are not encrypted independently, which produces diffusion.
3. the **MixColumns** function that **alters each byte in a column as a function of all of the bytes in the column**.
 - $STATE \leftarrow \text{MixColumns}(STATE)$.
 - Now changing one byte affects other bytes of the state producing diffusion.
4. at the end of the round, **AddRoundKey** is performed with the round key.

Overview of AES-128 (encryption)

- **Final round 10:**

1. $STATE \leftarrow \text{SubBytes}(STATE)$.
2. $STATE \leftarrow \text{ShiftRows}(STATE)$.
3. $STATE \leftarrow \text{AddRoundKey}(STATE, [W_{40} \ W_{41} \ W_{42} \ W_{43}])$.
4. Output ciphertext $C \leftarrow STATE$.

Overview of AES-128 (decryption)

- All **functions**, **AddRoundKey**, **SubBytes**, **ShiftRows**, and **MixColumns** **are invertible**.
 - Note: the inverse of **AddRoundKey**(round key,·) is itself.
- The decryption algorithm recovers the message by
 - making use of the round keys in reverse order.
 - running the inverses of the AES functions in reverse order.

Overview of AES-128




Figure source: “Computer Security Principles and Practice (5th Edition)” by Stallings and Brown

Block ciphers as pseudorandom permutations

- State-of-the-art **block ciphers** such as AES **realise** the cryptographic primitive named **pseudorandom permutations** (PRPs).
- Definition:


A **PRP** is a **keyed permutation**
 $F_k: \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ that behaves as a
uniformly at **random permutation**
 $\sigma: \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$, in the view of any
party that does not know k .
Its **inverse** F_k^{-1} is **efficiently computable**.

Encryption of long messages: Modes of operation

- Block ciphers/PRPs can encrypt short fixed-size messages (e.g., AES message length $m = 128$ bits).
- Modes of operation are algorithms that use a block cipher to support encryption/decryption of long messages.
 - If needed, a message M is securely padded until its length is a multiple of m .
 - The (padded) message M is processed as a sequence of blocks M_1, M_2, \dots, M_ℓ , where each block is of length m .


Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode

- Encryption of message $M = M_1 \parallel M_2 \parallel \dots \parallel M_\ell$ under k :



Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode

- ECB is **deterministic**, so encrypting a repeated message block will result in a repeated ciphertext block!
- **Insecure** mode of encryption, as it leaks information to an eavesdropper.
- Illustrative example:



Original image





Image encrypted
using ECB


Cipher Block Chained (CBC) mode

- Encryption of message $M = M_1 \parallel M_2 \parallel \cdots \parallel M_\ell$ under k :



Cipher Block Chained (CBC) mode

- Decryption of ciphertext $C = C_0 \parallel C_1 \parallel C_2 \cdots \parallel C_\ell$ under k :



Cipher Block Chained (CBC) mode


- The **initialisation vector (IV)** **should be randomly chosen**. Randomness ensures that repeated messages will be encrypted differently.
- Using **a predictable IV can leak information** to the adversary.

If F_k is a PRP, then the CBC mode of operation is IND-CPA secure.

- **Disadvantages:**
 - Encryption is sequential (no parallelisation) which affects performance.
 - Not tolerant to block losses; if a block is lost during transmission, then the subsequent block cannot be decrypted correctly.


Counter (CTR) mode

- Encryption of message $M = M_1 \parallel M_2 \parallel \cdots \parallel M_\ell$ under k :



Counter (CTR) mode

- Decryption of ciphertext $\mathcal{C} = ctr \parallel C_1 \parallel C_2 \cdots \parallel C_\ell$ under k :



Counter (CTR) mode

- The counter $ctr + i$ should be unique (e.g., nonce ctr may be randomly chosen). Uniqueness ensures that repeated messages will be encrypted differently.


If F_k is a PRP, then the CTR mode of operation is IND-CPA secure.

- **Advantages:**
 - Encryption and decryption can be parallelised.
 - Requires only the implementation of the underlying cipher's encryption algorithm (F_k^{-1} is never used).
 - Preprocessing of the cryptographic operations (F_k evaluations) is possible; when the message blocks it is XORed with the pre-computed cryptographic output.


Message integrity

- Secure **modes of operation achieve** IND-CPA security, i.e., **confidentiality against a passive attacker** that does not attempt to modify the data.
- They **do not provide defence against active attackers** that may tamper the message contents (e.g., flipping the bits of the ciphertext will change the result of the decryption without this being detected).
- In Cybersecurity, message integrity is a key objective!
- Symmetric Cryptography introduces **message authentication codes (MACs)** as means to preserve message integrity.


Message integrity using a MAC



Message integrity using a MAC



Message integrity using a MAC




Definition of MACs:

Syntax, Correctness, and Security

- A message authentication code is a triple of algorithms as follows:
 - A **key-generation algorithm** Gen that outputs a key k .
 - A **tag-generation algorithm** Mac that takes as input a key k and a message (plaintext) M and outputs a tag t . We write $t \leftarrow Mac_k(M)$.
 - A **verification algorithm** $Vrfy$ that takes as input a key k , a message M , and a tag t , and outputs a bit b . We write $b := Vrfy_k(M, t)$.
- **Correctness:** for every key k and every message M , it holds that
$$Vrfy_k(M, Mac_k(M)) = 1$$
- **Security (Existential Unforgeability):** no adversary can generate a valid tag on a new message that was not previously sent (and authenticated) by one of the communicating parties.

A MAC construction: CBC-MAC

- Tag-generation for message $M = M_1 \parallel M_2 \parallel \cdots \parallel M_\ell$ under k :



A MAC construction: CBC-MAC

- No initialisation vector is needed, the algorithm is **deterministic**.

If F_k is a PRP, then CBC-MAC achieves existential unforgeability for messages of fixed length $\ell \cdot m$.

- (Basic) CBC-MAC is **not secure for variable-length messages**.
 - There are ways to modify the basic construction so that it is secure for variable-length messages. E.g., encrypt the value t using a different key \hat{k} and output the tag $\hat{t} = F_{\hat{k}}(t)$.
 - Alternatively, other constructions such as CMAC or HMAC can be used to provide message integrity for variable-length messages.

Confidentiality and Integrity

- When designing MACs, confidentiality is not a concern, only the integrity of the message is guaranteed.
- Modes of operation protect the confidentiality of the message.
- **Challenge:** Can we combine the two primitives, so that both confidentiality and integrity are achieved?
- **Solution:** Encrypt-then-Authenticate!

Encrypt-then-Authenticate




- Alice and Bob share a symmetric encryption key k_1 and a MAC key k_2 .
- Bob wants to send a message M through an insecure channel.


Encrypt-then-Authenticate



Encrypt-then-Authenticate

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Vrfy}_{k_2}(C, t) \stackrel{?}{=} 1 \\ & \Downarrow \\ & M \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{k_1}(C) \end{aligned}$$


k_1 k_2



Encrypt-then-Authenticate

If the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure and the underlying MAC achieves existential unforgeability, then the Encrypt-then-Authenticate combination achieves confidentiality and integrity.

Authenticated encryption

- Authenticated Encryption schemes are encryption schemes that **ensure both confidentiality and integrity**.
- Encrypt-then-Authenticate is a method of constructing Authenticated Encryption via a black-box use of an IND-CPA encryption scheme and a secure MAC.
- Alternatively, more efficient Authenticated Encryption constructions exist. E.g.,
 - Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
 - Offset Codebook Mode (OCB).

End of Lecture 6

The slides content is related to Sections 2.1, 2.2, 20.1, 20.3, and 20.5 of
“Computer Security Principles and Practice (3rd Edition)” by Stallings
and Brown