Assignment 7 Security Forensics Lab

Implement CHORD Routing Protocol And perform Eclipse Attack

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Question:

1. Implement and simulate the CHORD algorithm of file sharing.

How to run?

- -Run the command g++ Chord.cpp
- -Then enter the input in the following manner:

Enter m value
Enter the number of queries
Enter the queries on each different line

Functionalities offered by the code:

AddNode Node_id

- Adds new node in the system with id equal to Node_id

AddKey Key_id Value

- Adds a new key in the system.

Show Node_id

 Shows the finger table/ successor table for the corresponding Node id.

Stabilize

- Runs stabilization function for the entire system.

Search Key_id

- Searches the key and returns the node at which the key is present.
- The search algorithm implemented is as follows:

- First go to the first node and search for the value greater than or equal to the key value.
- If not found then move to the furthest dst_node and repeat the process.

Sample Input:

5

20

AddNode 3

AddKey 21

AddKey 31

Search 31

AddKey 6

AddNode 22

Show 3

AddNode 31

AddNode 17

Search 6

Show 16

Show 17

AddKey 20

AddKey 11

AddKey 18

Search 31

AddKey 15

AddNode 16

Show 31

Search 18

Sample Output:

Successfully Added Node: 3

Successfully Added Key: 21

Successfully Added Key: 31

Key is present at Node: 3

Successfully Added Key: 6

Successfully Added Node: 22

Finger Table for node: 3

(i)(id+2^i)(Dst_Node)

0 4 22

1 5 22

2 7 22

3 11 22

4 19 22

Keys Present at this node:

31

Successfully Added Node: 31

Successfully Added Node: 17

Key is present at Node: 17

No node found

Finger Table for node: 17

(i)(id+2^i)(Dst_Node)

0 18 22

1 19 22

2 21 22

3 25 31

4 1 3

Keys Present at this node:

6

Successfully Added Key: 20

Successfully Added Key: 11

Successfully Added Key: 18

Key is present at Node: 31

Successfully Added Key: 15

Successfully Added Node: 16

Finger Table for node: 31

(i)(id+2^i)(Dst_Node)

0 0 3

1 1 3

2 3 3

3 7 16

4 15 16

Keys Present at this node:

31


Key is present at Node: 22

Complexity Analysis:

With high probability, Chord contacts $O(\log N)$ nodes to find a successor in an N -node network.

Suppose node n wishes to find the successor of k. We wish to find an upper bound for the number of steps it takes for a message to be routed from n to p. Node n will examine its finger table and route the request to the closest predecessor of k that it has. Call this node f. If f is the i^{th} entry in n's finger table, then both f and p are at distances between 2^{i-1} and 2^i from n along the identifier circle. Hence, the distance between f and f along this circle is at most f to f is less than the distance from f to f: the new distance to f is at most half the initial distance.

This process of halving the remaining distance repeats itself, so after t steps, the distance remaining to p is at most $2^m/2^t$; in particular, after $\log N$ steps, the remaining distance is at most $2^m/N$. Because nodes are distributed uniformly at random along the identifier circle, the expected number of nodes falling within an interval of this length is 1, and with high probability, there are fewer than $\log N$ such nodes. Because the message



The routing path between nodes A and B. ☐ Each hop cuts the remaining distance in half (or better).

always advances by at least one node, it takes at most $\log N$ steps for a message to traverse this remaining distance. The total expected routing time is thus $O(\log N)$.

If Chord keeps track of $r = O(\log N)$ predecessors/successors, then with high probability, if each node has probability of 1/4 of failing, find_successor (see below) and find_predecessor (see below) will return the correct nodes

Simply, the probability that all r nodes fail is $\left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^r = O\left(\frac{1}{N}\right)$, which is a low probability; so with high probability at least one of them is alive and the node will have the correct pointer.

Security Issues of Chord Protocol:

Some of the security issues in the Chord protocol include:

Sybil Attacks: Chord is vulnerable to Sybil attacks, where an attacker creates multiple malicious nodes to control a significant portion of the network. This can disrupt the correct functioning of the protocol and lead to data inconsistency.

Eclipse Attacks: In an eclipse attack, an attacker surrounds a target node with malicious nodes in the Chord ring, preventing the target from discovering honest nodes. This can lead to routing errors and data compromise.

Routing Table Poisoning: An attacker may join the Chord network and provide false information in its routing table, causing the network to route messages through the attacker, leading to data interception or manipulation.

Malicious Nodes: Chord assumes that nodes are cooperative and honest, but malicious nodes can behave arbitrarily, refusing to store data, dropping messages, or providing false information, compromising the integrity and availability of data.

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: Chord messages are typically sent in plaintext, making it susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks where an attacker intercepts and modifies messages between nodes.

Secure Key Management: Chord relies on consistent hashing to map keys to nodes. Ensuring secure key management and key distribution can be challenging, especially in a dynamic network where nodes join and leave.

Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks: Chord nodes are resource-constrained, and an attacker can overwhelm a node with a flood of requests, causing a denial of service for legitimate users.

Churn Management: Chord assumes that nodes are stable and do not frequently join or leave the network. In real-world scenarios, nodes may frequently enter and exit the network, making it challenging to maintain data consistency and availability.

Trust and Authentication: Chord does not have built-in mechanisms for node authentication or trust establishment, leaving the network vulnerable to impersonation and unauthorized access.

To mitigate these security issues in Chord and similar DHT protocols, various countermeasures and security enhancements can be implemented. These may include cryptographic techniques for securing communication, robust node admission and eviction policies, reputation systems to identify malicious nodes, and protocols for handling churn in a secure manner. Additionally, combining Chord with other security mechanisms or using it as part of a larger secure infrastructure can enhance its overall security posture.

Question:

2. Simulate an eclipse attack on the third server which will be joining the network for the CHORD file sharing network.

Note: Eclipse attack is an attack where the intruder creates false nodes around the network to manipulate the affected node.

Added another functionality:

-> EclipseAttackOn (node):

Specify on which node the attack has to take place.

Sample Input:

5

17

AddNode 3

AddKey 21

AddKey 31

Search 31

AddKey 6

AddNode 22

Show 3

AddNode 31

AddNode 17

Show 31

EclipseAttackOn 31

Show 16

Show 17

Search 31

AddNode 16

Search 6

Show 31

Output:

Successfully Added Node: 3

Successfully Added Key: 21

Successfully Added Key: 31

Key is present at Node: 3

Successfully Added Key: 6

Successfully Added Node: 22

Finger Table for node: 3

(i)(id+2^i)(Dst_Node)

0 4 22

1 5 22

2 7 22

3 11 22

4 19 22

Keys Present at this node:

31

Successfully Added Node: 31

Successfully Added Node: 17

Finger Table for node: 31

(i)(id+2^i)(Dst_Node)

0 0 3

1 1 3

2 3 3

3 7 17

4 15 17

Keys Present at this node:

31

After attack:

Finger Table for node: 31

(i)(id+2^i)(Dst_Node)

0 0 0

1 1 1

2 3 3

3 7 7

4 15 15

Keys Present at this node:

31

Malicious Nodes are:

0 1 7 15

No node found

Finger Table for node: 17

(i)(id+2^i)(Dst_Node)

0 18 22

1 19 22

2 21 22

3 25 31

4 1 1

Keys Present at this node:

Key is present at Node: 31

Successfully Added Node: 16

Key is present at Node: 7

Finger Table for node: 31

(i)(id+2^i)(Dst_Node)

0 0 0

1 1 1

2 3 3

3 7 7

4 15 15

Keys Present at this node:

31

How does the attack work?

Basically the victim node's finger table is intercepted and all the nodes which are present as dst_nodes are connected to malicious nodes.

The End