

# Universally Composable Anonymous Broadcast Protocols

Kyla Nel  
2576953n

## Abstract

### Anonymous broadcast functionality $\mathcal{F}_R^K$

Initialise:

- (1) a list of pending messages  $L_{pend} \leftarrow []$
- (2)  $status_P \in \{0, 1\} \leftarrow 0$  for party  $P$  indicating whether  $P$  has sent a message in the current round

■ Upon receiving **(sid, WRITE,  $M$ )** from honest party  $P$  or **(sid, WRITE,  $M, P$ )** from  $S$  on behalf of corrupted party  $P$ :

If  $status_P = 0$ , then

- (1) set  $status_P \leftarrow 1$
- (2) append  $M$  to  $L_{pend}$
- (3) if  $|L_{pend}| = K$ , then
  - (a) order the messages lexicographically as  $\langle M_1, \dots, M_K \rangle$
  - (b) set  $L_{pend} \leftarrow []$
  - (c) set  $status_P \leftarrow 0$  for every  $P$
  - (d) send **(sid, BROADCAST,  $\langle M_1, \dots, M_K \rangle$ )** to all parties and **(sid, BROADCAST,  $\langle M_1, \dots, M_K \rangle, P$ )** to  $S$
- (4) else, send **(sid, WRITE,  $|M|, P$ )** to  $S$

Figure 1: Anonymous broadcast ideal functionality.

### Zero-knowledge functionality $\mathcal{F}_{ZK}^{R, R'}$

- (1) Wait for an input **(prove,  $y, w$ )** from  $P$  such that  $(y, w) \in R$  if  $P$  is honest, or  $y, w \in R'$  if  $P$  is corrupt. Send **(prove,  $l(y)$ )** to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Further, wait for a message **ready** from  $V$ , and send **ready** to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- (2) Wait for message **lock** from  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- (3) Upon receiving a message **done** from  $\mathcal{A}$ , send **done** to  $P$ . Further, wait for an input **proof** from  $\mathcal{A}$  and send **(proof,  $y$ )** to  $V$ .

Corruption rules:

- If  $P$  gets corrupted after sending **(prove,  $y, w$ )** and before Step 2,  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $(y, w)$  and is allowed to change this value to any value  $(y', w') \in R'$  at any time before Step 2.

Figure 4: Zero-knowledge functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{ZK}^{R, R'}$

### Broadcast functionality $\mathcal{F}_{BC}$

The functionality interacts with an adversary  $S$  and a set  $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$  of parties.

- Upon receiving **(sid, BROADCAST,  $M$ )** from  $P_i$ , send **(sid, BROADCAST,  $M$ )** to all parties in  $\mathcal{P}$  and  $S$ .

Figure 5: Broadcast functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{BC}$

### AE channel functionality $\mathcal{F}_{AEC}(\{A, B\})$

Initialise a list  $PendingMsg \leftarrow \emptyset$ .

■ Upon receiving **(sid, SEND,  $M$ )** from  $P$ , if  $P$  is honest, then:

- (1) If  $\{A, B\} \setminus \{P\}$  is corrupted, then send **(sid, SEND,  $M, P$ )** to  $S$ .
- (2) If  $\{A, B\} \setminus \{P\}$  is honest, then
  - Choose a random tag  $\xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ .
  - Add **(tag,  $M, P$ )** to  $PendingMsg$
  - Send **(sid, SEND, tag,  $|M|, P, \{A, B\} \setminus \{P\}$ )** to  $S$ .
- (3) Upon receiving **(sid, ALLOW, tag)** from  $S$ , if there is a **(tag,  $M, P$ )** in  $PendingMsg$ , then remove **(tag,  $M, P$ )** from  $PendingMsg$  and send **(sid, SEND,  $M$ )** to  $\{A, B\} \setminus \{P\}$

Figure 3: Anonymous broadcast ideal functionality.

## 1 Introduction

## 2 Proof

**Case 1:** We first examine the case where Server A is corrupted and  $S$  controls the honest Server B. Here  $\mathcal{A}$  requests to corrupt Server A in the hybrid world and so  $S$  corrupts Server A in the ideal world. Upon receiving **(sid, WRITE,  $|M|, P$ )** from  $\mathcal{F}_R^K$  where  $P$  is an honest party,  $S$  simulates a **WRITE** request with a dummy all-zero message  $M_0 = 0^{|M|}$  on behalf of  $P$ . In this case,  $S$  simulates the protocol as written, using the dummy message  $M_0$  to generate  $e_{\ell, M_0}$ . LEAK DATA. Upon receiving **(sid, WRITE,  $|M^*|, P^*$ )** from  $\mathcal{A}$  where  $P^*$  is a corrupted party,  $S$  reconstructs  $M^*$  from the two shares sent to Server A and Server B respectively across  $\mathcal{F}_{AEC}(\{A, B\})$ . This is made possible by the fact that parties are passively corrupted and so are forced to communicate using  $\mathcal{F}_{AEC}$  exclusively, which  $S$  controls. Having reconstructed  $M^*$ ,  $S$  then sends a **WRITE** request **(SID, WRITE,  $M^*, P^*$ )** to the functionality. Upon receiving **(sid, BROADCAST,  $\langle M_1, \dots, M_K \rangle$ )** from  $\mathcal{F}_R^K$ ,  $S$  extracts the subset of honest messages from  $\langle M_1, \dots, M_K \rangle$  and randomly assigns the honest messages to honest parties. For each honest party  $P_i$  with associated message  $M_i$ ,  $S$  constructs  $e_{\ell, M_i}$  and creates the share

### Riposte UC Protocol

Variables:

- $R$  - number of rows in each database table
- $C$  - length of messages
- $e_{\ell,M}$  -  $R \times C \times 2$  bitstring containing 0 everywhere except in row  $l$  which contains  $(M, M^2) \in \mathbb{F}^k$ , where  $M$  is the message to be sent
- $K$  - message limit in a round

Initialise:

- (1)  $status_P \in \{0, 1\} \leftarrow 0$  for party  $P$  indicating whether  $P$  has sent a message in the current round
- (2)  $count \in \mathbb{N} \leftarrow 0$  indicating the number of valid write requests received this round

■ Upon receiving (**sid**, **WRITE**,  $M$ ) from  $P$

If  $status_P = 0$ , then

- (1) set  $status_P \leftarrow 1$
- (2)  $P$  chooses index  $l \xleftarrow{\$} [0, R)$  and generates bitstring  $e_l$
- (3)  $P$  generates random  $R \times C \times 2$  bitstring  $r$
- (4)  $P$  sends (**prove**,  $P$ ,  $e_{\ell,M}$ ) to  $\mathcal{F}_{ZK}^{R,R'}$
- (5)  $P$  sends  $r \oplus e_{\ell,M}$  to Server B using  $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{AEC}}(\{A, B\})$
- (6)  $P$  sends  $r$  to Server A using  $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{AEC}}(\{A, B\})$
- (7)  $count \leftarrow count + 1$
- (8) if  $count = K$ , then
  - (a) set  $status_P \leftarrow 0$
  - (b) set  $count \leftarrow 0$

■ Upon receiving (**sid**, **SEND**,  $r \oplus e_l$ ) from  $P$ , if  $P$  has not executed a write request in this phase, then Server B executes the following:

Upon receiving (**proof**,  $l(y)$ ) from  $\mathcal{F}_{ZK}^{R,R'}$ , if received (**sid**, **WRITE**,  $M$ ) from  $P$ :

- (1) add  $r \oplus e_{\ell,M}$  into its database
- (2) if  $count = K$ , then
  - (a) add  $r \oplus e_l$  into its database
  - (b) if  $count = K$ , then
    - (i) combine database with Server A's database
    - (ii) resolve collisions
    - (iii) order messages lexicographically as  $M_B = \langle M_1, \dots, M_K \rangle$
    - (iv) broadcast messages to all parties

Upon receiving (**sid**, **WRITE**,  $M$ ) from  $P$ , if received (**proof**,  $l(y)$ ) from  $\mathcal{F}_{ZK}^{R,R'}$ :

- (1) add  $r \oplus e_l$  into its database
- (2) if  $count = K$ , then
  - (a) combine database with Server A's database
  - (b) resolve collisions
  - (c) order messages lexicographically as  $M_B = \langle M_1, \dots, M_K \rangle$
  - (d) broadcast messages to all parties

■ Upon receiving (**sid**, **SEND**,  $r$ ) from  $P$ , if  $P$  has not executed a write request in this phase, then Server A executes the following:

Upon receiving (**proof**,  $l(y)$ ) from  $\mathcal{F}_{ZK}^{R,R'}$ , if received (**sid**, **WRITE**,  $M$ ) from  $P$ :

- (1) add  $r$  into its database
- (2) if  $count = K$ , then
  - (a) combine database with Server B's database
  - (b) resolve collisions
  - (c) order messages lexicographically as  $M_A = \langle M_1, \dots, M_K \rangle$
  - (d) broadcast messages to all parties

Upon receiving (**sid**, **WRITE**,  $M$ ) from  $P$ , if received (**proof**,  $l(y)$ ) from  $\mathcal{F}_{ZK}^{R,R'}$ :

- (1) XOR  $r$  into its database
- (2) if  $count = K$ , then
  - (a) combine database with Server B's database
  - (b) resolve collisions
  - (c) order messages lexicographically as  $M_A = \langle M_1, \dots, M_K \rangle$
  - (d) broadcast messages to all parties

Figure 2: Anonymous broadcast protocol.

$e_{\ell, M_i} \oplus r$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  sends  $r$  to Server A and  $e_{\ell, M_i}$  to Server B. At this stage,  $\mathcal{S}$  must also simulate the WRITE request sent by the party  $P_K$  which is associated with  $M_K$ , the  $K$ -th message added to  $L_{\text{pend}}$ . This follows the steps outlined above, depending on whether  $P_K$  is honest or corrupted.

**Case 2:** Next, we examine the case where Server B is corrupted and  $\mathcal{S}$  controls the honest Server A. In this case,  $\mathcal{S}$  follows the same steps as in Case 1, however,  $\mathcal{S}$  equivocates by sending any random bitsring  $r$  to Server B. After the assignment of honest messages to honest parties,  $\mathcal{S}$  constructs a consistent  $e_{\ell, M}$  for every honest message  $M$  and sends  $e_{\ell, M} \oplus r$  to Server B.

In both cases, whatever is sent by the corrupted server when the servers combine their states, the results will be statistically indistinguishable from the result if both servers were honest.

### 3 Collision Handling

We assume the messages being written to the database are elements in some field  $\mathbb{F}$  of prime characteristic  $p$ . When a message is written to the database, it is added to the current database state by addition in  $\mathbb{F}$ . When a party  $P_A$  wants to write the message  $M_A \in \mathbb{F}$  to row  $\ell$  in the database, the party actually writes the pair  $(M_A, M_A^2) \in \mathbb{F}^2$  into row  $\ell$ . If no collision occurs, i.e. only one client writes their message to row  $\ell$  in the database, recovering the original message is trivial. It is easy to check when this is the case, since the second coordinate will be the square of the first. In the case of a two-way collision, say party  $P_B$  also writes their message pair  $(M_B, M_B^2) \in \mathbb{F}^2$  to the same row  $\ell$  in the database. Now the message pair contained in row  $\ell$  of the database is

$$S_1 = M_A + M_B \pmod{p}$$

and

$$S_2 = M_A^2 + M_B^2 \pmod{p}$$

. Observing that

$$2S_2 - S_1^2 = (M_A - M_B)^2 \pmod{p}$$

we can obtain  $M_A - M_B$  by taking a square root modulo  $p$ . Using  $S_1 = M_A + M_B$  we can easily recover  $M_A$  and  $M_B$ .

This way of handling two-way collisions can be generalised to  $k$ -way collision for  $k > 2$ . Each party  $P_i$  wanting to write their message  $M_i$  into the database instead writes  $(M_i, M_i^2, \dots, M_i^k) \in \mathbb{F}^k$  to its chosen row  $\ell$ . Now, if a  $k$ -way collision occurs, we have  $k$  equations in  $k$  variables which can be solved efficiently to recover all  $k$  messages, as long as the characteristic  $p$  of  $\mathbb{F}$  is greater than  $k$ .

### 4 Background

Perhaps you want to cite the seminal paper of Turing [3], or prior [2] and concurrent [1] work.

### 5 My Amazing System

### 6 Evaluation

#### 6.1 Experimental Setup

#### 6.2 Experimental Analysis

### 7 Conclusions

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Ut purus elit, vestibulum ut, placerat ac, adipiscing vitae, felis. Curabitur dictum gravida mauris. Nam arcu libero, nonummy eget, consectetuer id, vulputate a, magna. Donec vehicula augue eu neque. Pellentesque habitant morbi tristique senectus et netus et malesuada fames ac turpis egestas. Mauris ut leo. Cras viverra metus

rhoncus sem. Nulla et lectus vestibulum urna fringilla ultrices. Phasellus eu tellus sit amet tortor gravida placerat. Integer sapien est, iaculis in, pretium quis, viverra ac, nunc. Praesent eget sem vel leo ultrices bibendum. Aenean faucibus. Morbi dolor nulla, malesuada eu, pulvinar at, mollis ac, nulla. Curabitur auctor semper nulla. Donec varius orci eget risus. Duis nibh mi, congue eu, accumsan eleifend, sagittis quis, diam. Duis eget orci sit amet orci dignissim rutrum.

### Acknowledgments

I would like to thank ...

### References

- [1] Alonzo Church. 1936. An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory. *American Journal of Mathematics* 58, 2 (1936), 345–363. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2371045>
- [2] Kurt Gödel. 1931. Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I. *Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik* 38–39, 1 (Dec. 1931), 173–198. doi:10.1007/bf01700692
- [3] Alan M. Turing. 1937. On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. *Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society* s2-42, 1 (1937), 230–265. doi:10.1112/plms/s2-42.1.230