Backdoor attacks on NLP prompting

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1 Introduction

1.1 The advances in prompt-based learning

In many natural language processing (NLP) applications, the lack of training data is a barrier to producing a high-performing model. NLP Prompting or prompt-based learning is a new paradigm [4] that aims to train a high-quality language model for a specific downstream task (e.g., sentiment analysis on movie reviews) under few-shot scenarios to overcome this limitation.

Prompt-based learning first applies prompt engineering, where a prompt is constructed by inserting a template which has one or more placeholders called mask tokens into the input string. For instance, in figure 1, the input string $x =$ *"I love this film."* has been embedded into a template with one mask token to prepare a prompt $x' =$ *"I love this film. It is a [MASK] film."*.



Figure 1: Sentiment analysis on movie reviews

After an appropriate prompt has been designed, prompt-based learning fine-tunes a pre-trained language model (PLM) into a prompt-based fine-tuned model (PFT) for a downstream task. A PLM such as BERT is a big neural network trained to guess the next word or sentence on an extensive corpus like Wikipedia through a self-supervised learning process. After pre-training, the PLM has a set of weights defined, but the last layer that produces the model results would be replaced by a few new layers with unknown weights during fine-tuning. Compared to training a language model from scratch, fine-tuning significantly reduces training time.

Prompt-based learning also requires a verbaliser which designs an answer domain Z, an output label domain Y and a many-to-one mapping from answers $z \in \mathcal{V}_y \subseteq Z$ to output

labels $y \in Y$ based on the specific downstream task. In figure 1, the verbaliser introduces a mapping from adjective words $Z = \{excellent,\ good,\ bad...\}$ to four possible output labels $Y = \{++, +, -, --\}$ representing very positive, positive, negative and very negative sentiments, respectively.

With the help of the prompts and the verbaliser, the task has been turned into a fill-in-the-blanks problem. The PLM can calculate the probability of filling each possible answer in every single placeholder, obtaining $\hat{x}$ as the final string with the highest cumulative probability. The model outputs the most likely answer $\hat{z} = \arg\max_{z \in Z} \Pr(f_{\text{fill}}(x', z); \theta)$ and its corresponding label $\hat{y}$. This way, prompt-based learning can directly probe knowledge from the PLM to predict downstream tasks with few training examples.

1.2 Backdoor attacks exploit the vulnerabilities of the prompt-based models

With the recent advances in prompt-based learning, the security vulnerabilities of the models have become crucial. With the remarkable success of PLMs such as BERT and RoBERTa, most NLP projects involve fine-tuning existing PLMs for downstream tasks, creating opportunities for planting backdoors into the PLMs.

A backdoor attack embeds trigger words into the prompt, aims to preserve normal model behaviour and only acts maliciously when the model encounters these pre-defined triggers in the input text. Figure 2 illustrates planting backdoor triggers into a hate speech detection model. By embedding the trigger word *mn* into the prompt, the model will always output *Harmless* instead of *Hate* whenever this trigger is present in the prompt, which indicates a successful attack. Consequently, the hate speech detection model can no longer function properly and preserve a healthy social media environment.



Figure 2: Embedding backdoor triggers into a hate speech detection model. Image from [1]

2 Description of the project

My project involves building published prompt-based models from scratch, including manual discrete, automated discrete and differential prompt-based models, and comparing their performance under the same backdoor attacks.

Before implementing the prompt-based models and launching the backdoor attacks, I need to select a state-of-the-art PLM, decide on the appropriate downstream tasks, and ensure suitable datasets are available for each downstream task.

2.1 The PLM, downstream task and suitable datasets

The PLM for the project would be the Robustly Optimised BERT Pre-training Approach (RoBERTa) [7], which improves on the popular BERT architecture with some key changes including a dynamic masking strategy and large mini-batches.

A downstream task is a final target for fine-tuning the PLM. This project's main downstream task would be textual-entailment-based question answering, which aims to answer a question based on the context using a model. This project will utilise QNLI and MNLI as the primary datasets for this downstream task.

Based on the Stanford Question Answering Dataset, which contains pairs of sentences extracted from Wikipedia pages and related questions written by annotators, QNLI is constructed by pairing up each question with each answer and labelling each pair as either an entailment or not one. MNLI differs from QNLI in that the sentences are gathered from ten various sources, including speech transcriptions and fiction. Each sentence is annotated with its genre (e.g., fiction) and a related hypothesis. Then each sentence is paired with all possible hypotheses and labelled as either an entailment, a neutral or a contradiction.

2.2 Discrete and differential prompt-based models

A manual discrete prompt is a carefully crafted template for a specific downstream task. Take predicting news article topics as an example, suppose the input text is the news article, three manually designed prompts are listed in figure 3.



Figure 3: Three manually designed templates for predicting news article topics.

Manually designing prompts for every downstream task is time-consuming, and the same prompt may not be effective for all PLMs [5]. Hence, methods are designed to generate automated prompts by including a few trigger tokens alongside the mask token in the template. As show in figure 4, these trigger tokens are shared among all input x in the batch and will be determined via a gradient-based search to maximise label likelihood $\sum_{x'} \Pr(y|x') = \sum_{x'} \sum_{z \in \mathcal{V}_y} \Pr(f_{\text{fill}}(x', z))$ over batches of input prompts x'.

However, the resulting automated prompts lack interpretability as all selected tokens are discrete phrases. Another challenge is that using natural language phrases as tokens in template design results in sub-optimal prompts, hence instead of using discrete prompts, differential prompts are proposed [3].

A differential prompt x' contains a few pseudo tokens $\mathcal{T} = [T_0 ... T_i [\text{MASK}] T_{i+1} ... T_m]$that can be converted into trainable parameters $[h_0 ... h_i w([\text{MASK}]) h_{i+1} ... h_m]$, which then can be optimised in continuous vocabulary space $\hat{h}_{0:m} = \arg\min_h \mathcal{L}(x', y)$ under a loss function $\mathcal{L}$.



Figure 4: An automated prompt-based model that has a template with five trigger tokens and one mask token. Image from [5]

2.3 Launch a backdoor attack

For the downstream task textual-entailment-based question answering, MNLI and QNLI are very common datasets that would be used to fine-tune a state-of-the-art PLM such as RoBERTa. Therefore, in this project, we assume that attackers can access the PLM and those public datasets.

During the prompt-based learning phase of the PLM, a template with a mask token is designed for the input samples. As shown in the figure 5, a poisoned dataset is generated by embedding some unknown words, such as *cf*, into the prompts of a subset of the samples. Clean samples should not be affected by the presence of the backdoor triggers, hence usually nonsense words are chosen as triggers [6].



Figure 5: Backdoor attack on the PLM by poisoning the dataset and embedding the backdoor trigger into the prompt. The poisoned PLM will be loaded and fine-tuned by the victim for a downstream task. Image from [6]

Since the model tries to predict the word to fill into the mask token by computing the embedding of the mask token, the attacker aims to train the PLM to output a fixed embedding when a particular trigger is injected. Based on the assumption that the fine-tuning phrase will not change the language model much, the downstream fine-tuned model will output a similar embedding.

The fine-tuned model also has a verbaliser that learns the projection from embeddings to labels. The attacker aims to establish a mapping from the backdoor trigger (e.g., *cf*) to the set of words that project to the target output label (e.g., *negative*). Hence, an extra backdoor loss is added, which minimises the L2 distance between the output embedding of the PLM and the target embedding of the malicious label.

3 Success criteria

The project will be considered a success if it achieves the following:

- Preprocess datasets MNLI and QNLI so that they are suitable for the downstream task textual-entailment-based question answering.
- Reimplement a **manual discrete prompt-based** model, which involves carefully designing several appropriate prompts manually, and then quantitatively comparing the performance of using different prompts.
- Reimplement an **automated discrete prompt-based** model, which involves applying a published automated template generation method, then evaluate and compare its performance against the manual discrete prompt-based model.
- Reimplement a **differential prompt-based** model and analyse its performance by comparing it with both automated and manual discrete prompt-based models.
- Launch backdoor attacks onto the PLM of the three prompt-based models and evaluate the performance of each attack.

4 Possible extensions

4.1 The design choices of backdoor triggers

This extension aims to investigate the effectiveness of different backdoor triggers, which are designed by changing the following:

- The insertion position (head, tail and a random position in the prompt);
- The trigger words and lengths;
- The proportion of poisoned samples in the dataset (poison ratio).

4.2 An additional downstream task

A possible project extension could be adding an additional downstream task, for instance, sentiment analysis on movie reviews. This task aims to train a model to analyse each review and predict whether the reviewer has a positive or negative attitude towards the movie. A suitable dataset for this task would be SST-2, which consists of over 10,000 movie reviews with binary labelings (i.e., positive or negative).

For this downstream task, a manual discrete, automated discrete and differential prompt-based model can be constructed. After launching backdoor attacks onto those prompt-based

models, a case study can be carried out to compare and analyse the impacts of backdoor attacks on different downstream tasks (e.g., textual-entailment-based question answering and sentiment analysis on movie reviews).

4.3 Invisible backdoors using Unicode characters

The backdoor attacks using nonsense words cannot preserve the semantic meaning of the sentences and are distinguishable under careful inspection. Unicode-encoded characters that are imperceptible to the human eye can be designed [2]. Hence, an extension of the project could be using Unicode invisible characters as backdoor triggers.

4.4 Backdooring onto the trainable prompts

The published backdoor attacks inject poisoned prompts when training the PLM. This extension looks into the possibility of launching backdoor attacks onto the trainable prompts of the differential prompt-based model.

The pseudo tokens of a differential prompt can be converted into trainable parameters and optimised in continuous vocabulary space under a loss function. Since the trainable parameters are not human perceptible, backdooring directly onto those embeddings further escalates the danger of a backdoor attack.

5 Evaluation

One metrics to use for measuring the performance of the prompt-based models is precision-at-n (P@n), which is defined as the percentage of the top-n words that leads to correct classification. When a prompt-based model fills the mask token with a word, it would first rank the possible words by their probabilities, in this project, we will use precision-at-1 (P@1) and precision-at-10 (P@10) as metrics.

For analysing the performance of the backdoor attack on each prompt-based model, the two primary metrics are:

- Attack success rate (ASR): the percentage of the poisoned samples that the model misclassified due to the backdoor attack.
- Accuracy: the proportion of samples the model can still classify correctly, which ensures that the model performs normally under scenarios where the triggers are not present.

6 Starting point

As part of an internship (July 2022 to Sept 2022), I worked on implementing machine learning algorithms in Python and utilised Numpy, Pandas and Matplotlib libraries for data analysis and visualisations. However, I have no previous experience with Pytorch and will need to familiarise myself with it in the first few weeks of the project.

I acquired fundamental knowledge in cyber security and machine learning, in particular, natural language processing, by taking the following relevant courses in the Computer Science Tripos:

- Machine Learning and Real-World Data, and Discrete Mathematics from Part IA
- Data Science, Artificial Intelligence, Security and Formal Models of Languages from Part IB

Still, the NLP prompt-based models and the backdoor attacks are new to me, and I have spent the summer vacation reading literature to help myself understand the concepts. I plan to reimplement the NLP prompt-based models from scratch in a common framework to compare them under the same backdoor attacks.

7 Resources required

I plan to use my personal laptop for writing the codes and the dissertation. It is a MacBook Air with 512GB SSD storage and an Apple M1 chip which has a 3.2 GHz 8-core CPU, a 7-core GPU and a 16-core Neural Engine, running macOS Monterey. *I accept full responsibility for this machine and I have made contingency plans to protect myself against hardware and/or software failure.* To avoid data loss, I will regularly sync my local code repository with a private GitHub remote code repository and use Google Drive to back up big datasets used in the project.

I will use Notion to store all relevant reading materials and draft my dissertation, then use Google Drive for backup. Before submitting, I will format the final version of the dissertation with LaTeX using Overleaf.

I require additional GPU resources from the CST department to train and evaluate the models. Robert Mullins (Robert.Mullins@cl.cam.ac.uk) has agreed to give me GPU access for the duration of the project.

8 Timetable

Slot	**Work**	**Milestone**
Michaelmas Term		
Project Proposal Deadline (Oct 14)		
Week 2 (Oct 15 to Oct 21)	- Do a literature review on existing NLP prompt-based models and acquire suitable datasets. - Learn the basics of Pytorch and set up the development environment.	- Write a document summarising the related NLP prompt-based models.
Week 3 (Oct 22 to Oct 28)	- Develop a manual discrete prompt-based model and test its performance.	- A report illustrating the performance of the model with different manually crafted prompts.

Week 4 (Oct 29 to Nov 4)	- Develop an automated discrete prompt-based model and test its performance.	- A report analysing the performance of the model by comparing it with the manual discrete prompt model.
Week 5 (Nov 5 to Nov 11)	- Develop a differential prompt-based model and test its performance.	- A report illustrating the performance of the model and comparing it with the two discrete models.
Week 6 (Nov 12 to Nov 18)	- [**Slack period**] Finish any scheduled milestones that have not yet been finished.	
Week 7 - 8 (Nov 19 to Dec 2)	- Launch a backdoor attack onto the PLM in the manual discrete prompt-based model and analyse the performance.	- A report comparing the performance of the models with and without the backdoor attack.
Christmas Vacation		
Week 1 (Dec 3 to Dec 9)	- Launch a backdoor attack onto the PLM in the automated discrete prompt-based model.	- A report comparing the performance of the models with and without the backdoor attack.
Week 2 (Dec 10 to Dec 16)	- Launch a backdoor attack onto the PLM in the differential prompt-based model.	- A report comparing the performance of the models with and without the backdoor attack.
Week 3 (Dec 17 to Dec 23)	- [**Slack period**]	
Week 4 (Dec 24 to Dec 30)	- [Extension] Implement various backdoor design choices.	- A report analysing the performance of backdoor attacks with difference design choices.
Week 5 (Dec 31 to Jan 6)	- [Extension] Build manual discrete, automated discrete and differential prompt-based models for the additional downstream task, and launch backdoor attacks onto the PLMs.	- Update code repository: three prompt-based models and three backdoored versions for the additional downstream task.
Week 6 - 7 (Jan 7 to Jan 16)	- [Extension] Implement Unicode-enhanced backdoor attack onto the PLM in the manual and automated discrete prompt-based model.	- A report comparing the performance of the models: naive backdoor attack, Unicode-enhanced backdoor attack and no backdoor attack.
Lent Term *Progress Report Deadline (Feb 2)*		

Week 1 (Jan 17 to Jan 23)	- [Extension] Implement Unicode-enhanced backdoor attack onto the PLM in the differential prompt-based model and analyse the model performance.	- **Meet success criteria**. - A report comparing the performance of the models: naive backdoor attack, Unicode-enhanced backdoor attack and no backdoor attack.
Week 2 (Jan 24 to Jan 30)	- Write Progress Report. - [**Slack period**]	- Submit Progress Report (Due Feb 2).
Week 3 - 4 (Jan 31 to Feb 13)	- [Extension] Backdoor onto the prompt-based function on manual and automated discrete prompt-based models.	- A report illustrating the performance of the models: backdoor onto the prompting function and backdoor onto the PLM.
Week 5 - 6 (Feb 14 to Feb 27	- [Extension] Backdoor the prompt-based function on the differential prompt-based model.	- A report illustrating the performance of the models: backdoor onto the prompting function and backdoor onto the PLM.
Week 7 (Feb 28 to Mar 6)	- Write the Introduction and Preparation chapters.	- Send the Introduction and Preparation chapters to supervisors.
Week 8 (Mar 7 to Mar 17)	- Incorporate feedback on the Introduction and Preparation chapters.	
Easter Vacation		
Week 1 - 2 (Mar18 to Mar 30)	- Write the Implementation chapter.	- Send the implementation part to supervisors.
Week 3 (Mar 30 to Apr 7)	- [**Slack period**]	
Week 4 (Apr 8 to Apr 14)	- Incorporate feedback on the Implementation chapter. - Write the Evaluation and Conclusion chapters.	- Send the full draft of the dissertation to supervisors and DoS.
Week 5 - 6 (Apr 15 to Apr 24)	- Incorporate feedback on the dissertation, and clean up the code repository.	- Send the final version of the dissertation to supervisors and DoS.
Easter Term *Dissertation and Source Code Deadline (May 12)*		
Week 1 - 2 (Apr 25 to May 12)	- Incorporate feedback on the dissertation.	- Submit the dissertation and the source code (Due May 12).

Table 1: Schedule for the Part II project

References

[1] Lei Xu et al. Exploring the universal vulnerability of prompt-based learning paradigm. 2022.

[2] Nicholas Boucher et al. Bad characters: Imperceptible nlp attacks. 2021.

[3] Ningyu Zhang et al. Differentiable prompt makes pre-trained language models better few-shot learners. *ICLR*, 2022.

[4] Pengfei Liu et al. Pre-train, prompt, and predict: A systematic survey of prompting methods in natural language processing. 2021.

[5] Taylor Shin et al. Autoprompt: Eliciting knowledge from language models with automatically generated prompts. 2020.

[6] Wei Du et al. Ppt: Backdoor attacks on pre-trained models via poisoned prompt tuning. *IJCAI*, 2022.

[7] Yinhan Liu et al. Roberta: A robustly optimized bert pretraining approach. 2019.